Title: P. v. Briceno
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S117641
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2004

Filed 11/4/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S117641 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Ct.App. 4/3  
 
 
 ) 
G029525, G029607 
ALBERTO FRANCISCO BRICENO et al.,  ) 
 
 ) 
Orange County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 ) 
Super. Ct. No. 00NF3394 
___________________________________  ) 
 
At the March 7, 2000 Primary Election, the California electorate passed 
Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998.  
Proposition 21 made significant changes in the law concerning gang-related crime.  
In this case, we decide whether Penal Code1 section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(28) 
(section 1192.7(c)(28)), which adds to the list of serious felonies “any felony 
offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22,” applies 
only to the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal street gang 
defined in section 186.22, subdivision (a) (section 186.22(a)), or whether it also 
applies to any felony offense committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
2
as defined in the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (section 186.22(b)(1)) gang 
sentence enhancement. 
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the definition of “serious 
felony” in section 1192.7(c)(28) also includes “any felony offense” that was 
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of  section 
186.22(b)(1).  We reverse the judgment only insofar as the Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial court’s finding that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for 
a serious felony and remanded the matter for resentencing.  In all other respects, 
we affirm the judgment. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On Christmas Day, 2000, defendants Alberto Briceno and Evaristo Landin 
went on a crime spree in Orange County, robbing four people at gunpoint in four 
separate incidents.  Defendant Briceno2 was convicted of four counts of robbery 
(§ 211), and the jury found true the allegation that the robberies were committed 
for the benefit of a criminal street gang under  section 186.22(b)(1).3 
                                             
 
2  
The issue before the court involves only the prior conviction allegations 
against defendant Briceno.  There are no issues pending before our court regarding 
defendant Landin.  Hereafter, “defendant” refers to defendant Briceno. 
3  
Section 186.22(b)(1) provides in pertinent part that, “any person who is 
convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of . . . any criminal street gang, 
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and consecutive 
to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she 
has been convicted, be punished as follows:  [¶]  (A) Except as provided in 
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the person shall be punished by an additional term of 
two, three, or four years at the court’s discretion.  [¶]  (B) If the felony is a serious 
felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the person shall be 
punished by an additional term of five years.  [¶]  (C) If the felony is a violent 
felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished 
by an additional term of 10 years.” 
 
 
3
 
In a bifurcated trial held after the jury had reached its verdicts, the trial 
court found true allegations that defendant had suffered two prior convictions of 
serious felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes law4 and section 667, 
subdivision (a)(1).5  One prior conviction—for shooting at an occupied vehicle in 
violation of section 246—was not challenged on appeal and is not at issue here.  
The other prior “conviction” was, in actuality, two convictions that occurred on 
the same day but were jointly alleged as one prior serious felony—a conviction for 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon for the benefit of a criminal street gang 
(§§ 12021, subd. (a), 186.22(b)(1)), and a conviction for carrying a concealed 
firearm while an active participant in, and for the benefit of, a criminal street gang 
(§§ 12025, subd. (b)(3), 186.22(b)(1)).  Defendant received an indeterminate 
sentence of 27 years to life, consecutive to a determinate term of 23 years and four 
months. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s finding that defendant’s prior  
convictions of section 12021, subdivision (a), and section 12025, subdivision 
(b)(3), constituted a prior conviction of a serious felony within the meaning of the 
Three Strikes law and section 667, subdivision (a)(1).  Noting that section 12021, 
                                             
 
4  
The Three Strikes law defines a prior conviction as “Any offense defined in 
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense defined in 
subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state.”  (§§ 667, subd. 
(d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) 
5  
Section 667, subdivision (a)(1) provides in pertinent part that “any person 
convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious 
felony in this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which 
includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the 
sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for 
each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.”  Section 667, 
subdivision (a)(4) provides: “As used in this subdivision, ‘serious felony’ means a 
serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.” 
 
 
4
subdivision (a) and section 12025, subdivision (b)(3) are not listed as serious 
felonies in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), the Court of Appeal rejected the 
Attorney General’s argument that the conviction was a serious felony because the 
sentence had been enhanced under section 186.22(b)(1), which applies to crimes 
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. 
 
The Attorney General had relied upon section 1192.7(c)(28), which adds to 
the list of serious felonies “any felony offense, which would also constitute a 
felony violation of Section 186.22.”  The Court of Appeal ruled that a conviction 
for a crime that is not listed as a serious felony that includes a gang enhancement 
under section 186.22(b)(1) is not a strike “[b]ecause a criminal street gang 
enhancement . . . cannot be used to transform an . . . offense [not on the section 
1192.7, subdivision (c) serious felony list] into a ‘serious’ felony.”  Equating the 
term “felony violation” with “felony offense,” the Court of Appeal reasoned that 
the section 1192.7(c)(28) phrase, “any felony offense, which would also constitute 
a felony violation of Section 186.22” (italics added), is limited to the one 
substantive felony offense contained in section 186.22, active participation in a 
criminal street gang in violation of section 186.22(a).6  Section 186.22(b)(1), 
because it adds an additional term of imprisonment to the base term of the 
underlying felony, is a sentence enhancement and thus is not a “felony violation” 
                                             
 
6  
Section 186.22(a) provides:  “Any person who actively participates in any 
criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or 
by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years.”  Section 
186.22(a) is a substantive offense that is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a 
felony.  (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1112.) 
 
 
5
within the meaning of section 1192.7(c)(28).  We granted the Attorney’s General 
petition for review.   
DISCUSSION 
 
Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) enumerates those felony violations that 
constitute serious felonies under California law.  Where a defendant has been 
convicted of a serious felony, reoffending may result in severe consequences: 
certain prior serious felony convictions are strikes under the Three Strikes law 
(§§ 667, subds. (d)(1), (h), 667.1, 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), 1170.125; Prop. 184, § 2), 
and all prior serious felony convictions subject a defendant to an additional five-
year sentence enhancement if the current offense is a serious felony.  (§ 667, subd. 
(a)(1) & (4).) 
 
The electorate, in passing Proposition 21, added several new felony 
violations to the list of serious felonies in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), 
including section 1192.7(c)(28), which makes “any felony offense, which would 
also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22,” a serious felony.  As noted, 
the Court of Appeal held that this language limited the reach of section 
1192.7(c)(28) to the substantive felony offense of active participation in a criminal 
street gang, in violation of section 186.22(a).  The Attorney General maintains that 
section 1192.7(c)(28) includes any felony offense not enumerated in section 
1192.7, subdivision (c) where the offense is committed for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang, within the meaning of the section 186.22(b)(1) gang sentence 
enhancement.  
 
This is the court’s third opportunity to interpret gang-related provisions 
enacted by Proposition 21.  In Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894 
(Robert L.), we held that section 186.22, subdivision (d)—an alternate penalty 
provision that applies to a person convicted of a gang-related “public offense 
punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor”—applies to all misdemeanors and is not 
 
 
6
limited to so-called wobblers, which are offenses that are punishable as either a 
misdemeanor or a felony.  In Montes v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 350 
(Montes), we held that section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), an alternate penalty 
provision that applies to any gang-related “felony punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison for life,” applies only to those offenses in which the underlying 
felony itself, excluding enhancements, carries a life sentence.  Here, we interpret 
the phrase in section 1192.7(c)(28), “any felony offense, which would also 
constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.”  For the reasons stated below, we 
conclude that section 1192.7(c)(28) includes within its ambit any felony offense 
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang under the section 186.22(b)(1) 
gang sentence enhancement.   
 
“In interpreting a voter initiative . . . we apply the same principles that 
govern statutory construction.  [Citation.]  Thus, ‘we turn first to the language of 
the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.’  [Citation.]  The statutory 
language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the 
overall statutory scheme [in light of the electorate’s intent].  [Citation.]  When the 
language is ambiguous, ‘we refer to other indicia of the voters’ intent, particularly 
the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.’  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.)  In other words, “our primary purpose 
is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the voters who passed the initiative 
measure.”  (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 130.)   
 
Turning to the language of section 1192.7(c)(28) itself, our first task is to 
determine whether the phrase, “any felony offense, which would also constitute a 
felony violation of Section 186.22,” has an ordinary meaning to the electorate.  At 
first blush, this language appears susceptible of two interpretations, one narrow 
and one broader.  The term “felony violation” as used in section 1192.7(c)(28) 
could refer only to substantive felony offenses, as held by the Court of Appeal, in 
 
 
7
which case section 1192.7(c)(28) would be necessarily limited to the one 
substantive offense contained in section 186.22—the section 186.22(a) substantive 
felony offense of active participation in a criminal street gang.7 
 
However, the term “felony violation” could also be read to include sentence 
enhancements, as the Attorney General argues, in which case section 
1192.7(c)(28) would apply to “any felony offense, which would also constitute a 
felony violation of section 186.22,” namely, a felony violation of any felony 
offense that includes the section 186.22(b)(1) gang sentence enhancement.  
Because it is arguable that the ordinary language of section 1192.7(c)(28) is not 
clear on its face, the next step is to determine the meaning of the phrase, “any 
felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22,” 
in light of Proposition 21 as a whole. 
                                             
 
7  
There are no other substantive offenses contained in section 186.22.  
Section 186.22(b)(1), because it adds an additional term of imprisonment to the 
base term of the underlying felony offense, is a sentence enhancement.  (People v. 
Jefferson (2001) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(c).)  Section 
186.22, subdivision (d) is an alternate penalty provision that applies to a person 
convicted of a gang-related misdemeanor offense.  (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th 
894.)  Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) is an alternate penalty provision that 
applies to any gang-related underlying felony “punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison for life.”  (See, Montes, supra, 31 Cal.4th 350.)  Section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(4) is an alternate penalty provision that provides for an 
indeterminate life sentence for certain underlying felony offenses that are gang 
related.  (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 900, fn. 5.)  Neither is section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(2) a substantive offense for it provides that if the underlying felony 
described in section 186.22(b)(1) is committed on school grounds, “that fact shall 
be a circumstance in aggravation of the crime in imposing a term under [the 
section 186.22(b)(1)]” enhancement.  The remaining subdivisions of section 
186.22 do not describe sentence enhancements, substantive offenses, or alternate 
penalty provisions; they simply define various terms used in section 186.22 (e.g., 
§ 186.22, subds. (e), (f), (i)), or provide directions to the trial court upon 
sentencing (e.g., § 186.22, subds. (b)(3), (c), (g)). 
 
 
8
 
In People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 16, we stated: “Statutory language 
should not be interpreted in isolation, but must be construed in the context of the 
entire statute of which it is a part, in order to achieve harmony among the parts.”  
Viewing Proposition 21 as a whole, we conclude that the term “violation” in 
section 1192.7(c)(28) includes sentence enhancements. 
 
The most compelling evidence that the term “felony violation” as used in 
section 1192.7(c)(28) includes a sentence enhancement under section 186.22(b)(1) 
is that the list of serious felonies in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) itself contains a 
provision in which the term “violation” specifically references a sentence 
enhancement.  Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(40), enacted by Proposition 21, 
adds to the list of serious felonies “any violation of Section 12022.53.”  Section 
12022.53 is a sentence enhancement scheme that applies to persons who use 
firearms.8  Section 12022.53 uses the term “enhancement” throughout.  For 
example, section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) provides that the “[t]he 
enhancements provided in this section shall apply to any person who is a principal 
in the commission of an offense,” where certain facts are pled and proved.  Section 
12022.53, subdivision (l) provides that “[t]he enhancements provided in this 
section shall not apply to the lawful use or discharge of a firearm by a public 
officer . . . or by any person in lawful self-defense . . . .”  This court has defined 
                                             
 
8  
Section 12022.53 provides that a person who, in the commission of a 
specified felony, “personally uses a firearm, shall be punished by an additional and 
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years” (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (b)), “personally and intentionally discharges a firearm, shall be punished by 
an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 20 
years” (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), or “personally and intentionally discharges a 
firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury . . . or death, to any person 
other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term 
of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life” (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). 
 
 
9
section 12022.53 as a sentence enhancement on several occasions.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1052; People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
1166, 1170.)  “When a word or phrase is repeated in a statute, it is normally 
presumed to have the same meaning throughout.”  (People v. McCart (1982) 32 
Cal.3d 338, 344.)  The fact that section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(40) uses the term 
“violation” to refer to a sentence enhancement that constitutes a serious felony 
strongly supports the conclusion that the term “felony violation” as used in section 
1192.7(c)(28) also includes a sentence enhancement. 
 
Not only does the list of serious felonies in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) 
itself contain a provision that refers to a violation as including an enhancement, 
another felony reenacted by Proposition 21, Welfare and Institutions Code section 
707, subdivision (b)(21), specifically refers to the term “felony violation” as 
encompassing the section 186.22(b)(1) gang sentence enhancement.  Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)(21) establishes a presumption that a 
16- or 17-year-old minor is “not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under 
juvenile court law” where he or she is charged with “[a]ny violent felony, as 
defined in Subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code, which would also 
constitute a felony violation of subdivision (b) of Section 186.22 of the Penal 
Code.”  (Italics added.)  “Where a voter initiative contains a provision that is 
identical to a provision previously enacted by the Legislature, in the absence of an 
indication of a contrary intent, we infer that the voters intended the provision to 
have the same meaning as the provision drafted by the Legislature.”  (Montes, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 355-356.)  The phrase in Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 707, subdivision (b)(21), “which would also constitute a felony violation,” 
is identical to its counterpart in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(28), and its 
meaning is clear:  the Legislature, and now the voters, intended that the term 
 
 
10
“felony violation” in Proposition 21 include the section 186.22(b)(1) gang 
sentence enhancement. 
 
In Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th 894, we held that a misdemeanor offense 
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang could be punished as a felony 
under section 186.22, subdivision (d).  Thus, the section 1192.7(c)(28) phrase 
“felony violation of Section 186.22,” simply distinguishes crimes that are felonies 
regardless of section 186.22 from crimes that are initially misdemeanors, but 
become felonies by virtue of section 186.22.  As stated in People v. Arroyas 
(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448 (Arroyas), a “misdemeanor, converted to a 
felony by [section 186.22,] subdivision (d) [is not also] subject to the felony 
enhancement provided in [section 186.22,] subdivision (b)(1).” 
 
Our conclusion is consistent with the voters’ intent to dramatically increase 
the penalties for all gang-related felony offenses.  In the Findings and Declarations 
section of Proposition 21, “The people [found] and declare[d]” that:  “Criminal 
street gangs and gang-related violence pose a significant threat to public safety and 
the health of many of our communities.  Criminal street gangs have become more 
violent, bolder, and better organized in recent years.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary 
Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (b), p. 119 (hereafter, Ballot 
Pamphlet).)  “Gang-related crimes pose a unique threat to the public because of 
gang members’ organization and solidarity.  Gang-related felonies should result in 
severe penalties.”  (Id., § 2, subd. (h), p. 119, italics added.)  “Dramatic changes 
are needed in the way we treat . . . criminal street gangs . . . if we are to avoid the 
predicted, unprecedented surge in . . . gang violence.”  (Id., § 2, subd. (k), p. 119.)   
 
Nothing in the above quoted language suggests that the voters intended to 
limit section 1192.7(c)(28) to the 186.22, subdivision (a) substantive felony 
offense of active participation in a criminal street gang.  Instead, consistent with 
their intent to punish all gang-related felony offenses more severely, section 
 
 
11
1192.7(c)(28) broadly covers “any felony offense [that] violat[es] Section 186.22.”  
(Italics added.)  By referring to section 186.22 generally, section 1192.7(c)(28) 
demonstrates the voters’ intent also to encompass subdivision (b) of section 
186.22, which defines gang-enhanced felonies.  (See, e.g., People v. Murphy 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 143 [“the electorate and the Legislature have both shown 
that they know how to use language expressly requiring a violation of [a specific 
Penal Code section] when that is their intent”].) 
 
Defendant argues, however, that if section 1192.7(c)(28) defines a “serious 
felony” as any felony conviction that includes a gang enhancement under section 
186.22(b)(1), there would be no need for Proposition 21 to have enacted section 
667.5, subdivision (c)(19), which adds to the list of violent felonies “[e]xtortion, as 
defined in Section 518, which would constitute a felony violation of Section 
186.22 of the Penal Code,” and section 667.5, subdivision (c)(20), “[t]hreats to 
victims or witness, as defined in Section 136.1, which would constitute a felony 
violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code,” because the two subdivisions 
would be surplusage.  To the contrary, the enactment of these two subdivisions 
furthers the argument that any felony offense that includes a gang enhancement 
under section 186.22(b)(1) is a serious felony as defined by section 1192.7(c)(28). 
 
Specifically, extortion (§ 518) is a felony offense that becomes a violent 
felony when it is committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang under the 
section 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement.  (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(19).)  Making threats 
to victims or witnesses (§ 136.1), is a serious felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(37)) that 
becomes a violent felony when it is committed for the benefit of a criminal street 
gang under the section 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement.  (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(20).)  
Section 1192.7(c)(28), on the other hand, turns any felony offense that includes a 
gang enhancement under section 186.22(b)(1) into a serious felony.  Thus, 
contrary to defendant’s claim, each of the above subdivisions has a different 
 
 
12
effect; there is no overlap among these provisions, which were all enacted by 
Proposition 21, suggesting that the voters thoughtfully enacted a comprehensive 
penalty and punishment scheme. 
 
Finally, turning any felony offense into a serious felony by virtue of 
conduct that would invoke a sentence enhancement is not uncommon in section 
1192.7, subdivision (c).  Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8)9 makes any felony not 
otherwise enumerated in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) a serious felony if the 
defendant personally uses a firearm or personally inflicts great bodily injury,10 and 
section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23)11 makes any felony not otherwise enumerated 
in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) a serious felony if the defendant personally uses 
a dangerous or deadly weapon.12  (See, e.g., People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
456, 464 [under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23), “a defendant who ‘personally 
uses a dangerous or deadly weapon’ in the commission of a felony [is] classified 
as a ‘serious’ felon and [is] subject to a five-year enhancement [under section 667, 
subdivision (a)(1)] if he has previously been convicted of a serious felony”].)  We 
conclude, therefore, that the voters intended section 1192.7(c)(28) to define 
                                             
 
9  
Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) provides that “any felony in which the 
defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an 
accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm” is a 
serious felony. 
10  
The language in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) corresponds to the 
language in the section 12022.5 enhancement, personal use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony, and the language in the section 12022.7 enhancement, 
personal infliction of great bodily injury on a person other than an accomplice.  
11  
Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23) provides that “any felony in which the 
defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon” is a serious felony. 
12  
The language in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23) corresponds to the 
language in the section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement, personal use of a 
deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony. 
 
 
13
“serious felony” as including any felony offense that is committed for the benefit 
of a criminal street gang under the section 186.22(b)(1) gang sentence 
enhancement.13 
 
In so holding, we disagree with the Court of Appeal that this interpretation 
of subdivision (c)(28) is derailed by the language of section 186.22(b)(1)(B) and 
(C).  The Court of Appeal was apparently concerned that if section 1192.7(c)(28) 
made all gang-related felonies serious felonies, a defendant convicted of a gang-
related felony would never be punished under section 186.22(b)(1)(A), the 
sentence enhancement that applies where the defendant is convicted of a felony 
that is gang related, but would always be subject to the sentence enhancement for 
a serious felony that is gang related under section 186.22(b)(1)(B), rendering 
section 186.22(b)(1)(A) surplusage.  Not so. 
 
When Proposition 21 added section 1192.7(c)(28), it also amended section 
186.22(b)(1) by adding the substantive language contained in (b)(1)(A), (B), and 
(C).  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 4, p. 119.)14  Section 
                                             
 
13  
In light of our holding, we do not address the Attorney General’s alternate 
argument that defendant’s guilty plea to violations of section 12021, subdivision 
(a) and section 12025, subdivision (b)(3), plus the admission of the section 
186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement as to both offenses is equivalent to the section 
186.22(a) substantive offense. 
14  
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 21, section 186.22(b)(1) provided in 
pertinent part that “any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the 
benefit of . . . any criminal street gang . . . shall, in addition and consecutive to the 
punishment prescribed for the felony . . . be punished by an additional term of one, 
two, or three years at the court’s discretion.”  (Stats. 1997, ch. 500, § 2.)  
Proposition 21 amended section 186.22(b)(1) to read: “any person who is 
convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of . . . any criminal street gang . . . 
shall, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony . . . 
be punished [as follows: (A)  Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the 
person shall be punished] by an additional term two, three or four years at the 
court’s discretion[.  (B) . . . If] the felony is a serious felony, as defined in 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
14
186.22(b)(1)(A) provides that a person convicted of “a felony” that is gang related 
shall receive, at the court’s discretion, an additional two-, three-, or four-year term 
at sentencing.  Section 186.22(b)(1)(B) provides that a person convicted of “a 
serious felony” that is gang related shall receive an additional five-year term at 
sentencing.  Section 186.22(b)(1)(C) provides that a person convicted of a “violent 
felony” that is gang-related shall receive an additional 10-year term at sentencing.  
Thus, section 186.22(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C) speak to an event that occurs in the 
current proceeding.  Section 1192.7, subdivision (c), on the other hand, comes into 
play only if the defendant reoffends, at which time any prior felony that is gang 
related is deemed a serious felony.  Thus, any felony that is gang related is not 
treated as a serious felony in the current proceeding, giving effect to section 
186.22(b)(1)(A).  (See, e.g., People v. Rizo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 685, 687 [as 
with statutes, courts are to give meaning to every word of an initiative if possible, 
and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage].)   
 
Not only does this interpretation give meaning to section 186.22(b)(1)(A), 
(B), and (C), it also avoids the impermissible bootstrapping that would occur if 
any felony that is gang related is also deemed serious in the current proceeding.  
Specifically, while it is proper to define any felony committed for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang as a serious felony under section 1192.7(c)(28), it is improper 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the person shall be punished by an additional 
term of five years.  [(C)]  If the felony is a violent felony, as defined in subdivision 
(c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished by an additional term of 10 
years.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 4, p. 119.)  In 2001, the 
Legislature made clarifying changes to section 186.22(b)(1) by adding the 
bracketed language and creating  section 186.22(b)(1)(A), (B), & (C).  (Stats. 
2001, ch. 854, § 22.) 
 
 
15
to use the same gang-related conduct again to obtain an additional five-year 
sentence under section 186.22(b)(1)(B).  As stated by the Court of Appeal in 
Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, in reference to whether a gang-related 
misdemeanor punished as a felony under section 186.22, subdivision (d) could 
further be enhanced under the section 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement, “Although 
[section 186.22,] subdivision (d) allows the court to impose felony punishment for 
a misdemeanor committed with a gang-related purpose, nothing in the statute or in 
its stated purposes suggests an intention of the people of this state to bootstrap 
[section 186.22,] subdivision (d) misdemeanors into [section 186.22,] subdivision 
(b)(1) felonies as a means of applying a double dose of harsher punishment.”  
(Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445; see also Montes, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 907, fn. 18.) 
 
Similarly, although section 1192.7(c)(28) turns any prior gang-related 
felony offense into a strike if a defendant reoffends, nothing in Proposition 21 or 
in its stated purposes suggests an intention of the voters to bootstrap, in the same 
proceeding, any felony offense committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang 
into a section 186.22(b)(1)(B) offense “as a means of applying a double dose of 
harsher punishment.”  (Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.) 
 
 
16
 
DISPOSITION 
 
We conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeal be reversed only 
insofar as the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s prior serious felony 
finding, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.  In all other 
respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
17
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Briceno 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 109 Cal.App.4th 1330 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S117641 
Date Filed: November 4 , 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Gregg L. Prickett 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Leslie Conrad, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Alberto Francisco 
Briceno. 
 
Frederick L. McBride, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Evaristo 
Landin. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Gil P. Gonzalez and Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney (Orange) and Brian N. Gurwitz, Deputy District Attorney, as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
18
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Leslie Conrad 
15332 Antioch St., pmb 501 
Pacific Palisades, CA  90272 
(310) 459-8828 
 
Ronald A. Jakob 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2580 
 
Brian N. Gurwitz 
District Attorney 
401 Civic Center Drive West 
Santa Ana, CA  92701 
(714) 347-8790