Title: Young v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060473
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2007

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PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
GREGORY LEON YOUNG 
 
v.  Record No. 060473   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  April 20, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in remanding a robbery conviction for a new sentencing 
proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, rather than ordering a new 
trial on all issues, based on the erroneous admission of 
evidence of other crimes during the guilt phase of a defendant’s 
trial. 
 
Gregory Leon Young was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Danville for robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-58.  Young was convicted of the offense and sentenced, in 
accordance with the jury verdict, to a term of life 
imprisonment.1 
Young chose to represent himself at his trial.  The 
evidence at trial showed that in January 2004, a robbery 
occurred at “Check ‘n Go,” a check-cashing establishment in the 
City of Danville (the Danville robbery). 
                     
1 In the same trial, Young also was convicted for use of a 
firearm in the commission of a robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  However, Young’s conviction for use of a firearm 
is not before us in this appeal. 
 
2
Shanna D. Jones was the sole cashier in the store when a man 
entered and handed her a note that read, “I Have a Gun Give me 
$2,100 you have 10 seconds.”  The man produced a gun from inside 
his coat and stated, “Just do what I say and you don’t get 
hurt.”  Jones gave the man $1,776, the entire contents of her 
“money drawer.”   
The Commonwealth offered into evidence several segments of 
a video recording made of Young in the Henry County Sheriff’s 
Office about one week after the Danville robbery.  Young had 
been taken into custody in Henry County for a separate bank 
robbery that had occurred in the City of Martinsville (the 
Martinsville robbery).  While Young was in custody at the Henry 
County Sheriff’s Office, City of Martinsville police officers 
interviewed him for about three hours regarding the Martinsville 
robbery.  When the Martinsville police officers concluded their 
interview, City of Danville police officers questioned Young for 
an additional hour regarding the Danville robbery.  Both 
interviews were preserved on a video recording (the Henry County 
interview).  During the Henry County interview, Young confessed 
that he committed the Danville robbery.   
The Commonwealth informed the circuit court that the 
Commonwealth did not intend to present to the jury any 
statements in the Henry County interview that would be 
inadmissible in evidence.  The circuit court stated that it 
 
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would allow the Commonwealth to play the portions of the Henry 
County interview relating to the Danville robbery, but ruled 
that other portions of the video recording that were unrelated 
to the Danville offenses would be inadmissible. 
The Commonwealth showed the jury the portion of the Henry 
County interview in which Young confessed to the Danville 
robbery.  The jury also was shown, however, some inadmissible 
portions of the Henry County interview, including Young’s 
statements concerning his purchase and use of illegal drugs, his 
previous robbery charges, and his admission that he had 
committed other robberies in the past.2 
Young repeatedly objected to the introduction of any 
statements he made in the Henry County interview concerning his 
prior crimes and drug use.  On three occasions, the circuit 
court instructed the jury to disregard any evidence of Young’s 
prior crimes or other acts that were not related to the Danville 
robbery. 
                     
2 The jury was shown portions of the Henry County interview 
in which Young mentioned a robbery that occurred in Henry 
County, and in which he referred to the Danville robbery as 
“this particular job.”  At other points in the Henry County 
interview, Young admitted that he had been involved in “some 
more armed robberies,” stated that he had a “bad history” and 
had made “several” mistakes, and began discussing a prior 
robbery charge.  The jury also was shown a portion of the Henry 
County interview in which Young asked his interviewer, “[D]id 
those guys really get me in Martinsville?”  The jury also 
observed Young stating that he used the proceeds of the Danville 
 
4
After the jury found Young guilty on the robbery charge, 
the circuit court conducted a sentencing proceeding.  At the 
sentencing proceeding, the jury heard evidence presented by the 
Commonwealth that Young previously had been convicted of armed 
robbery, common law robbery, statutory burglary, “first degree” 
burglary, breaking and entering, grand larceny, three other 
felony convictions of larceny, and misdemeanor larceny. 
Young appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, 
which concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the 
jury to see the portions of the Henry County interview relating 
to Young’s other crimes and drug use.  However, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the circuit court’s error was harmless 
with respect to the issue of Young’s guilt because the evidence 
of guilt was overwhelming.  Young v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 
616, 633-35, 625 S.E.2d 691, 701-02 (2006). 
The Court of Appeals further determined that the 
presentation of Young’s statements in the Henry County interview 
relating to the “Henry County offense,” for which Young had not 
yet been convicted, and of the statements relating to Young’s 
involvement with illegal drugs, introduced into evidence during 
the guilt phase, did not constitute harmless error with regard 
to the sentencing proceeding.  The Court of Appeals held that 
                                                                  
robbery to buy illegal drugs, and that his purpose in coming to 
Henry County was “[f]or drugs.” 
 
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because this evidence would have been inadmissible in the 
sentencing proceeding, its erroneous admission during the guilt 
phase prejudiced Young in the jury’s determination of his 
sentence.  Id. at 637-38, 625 S.E.2d at 701-02. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Young’s conviction, but 
remanded the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing 
proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, which provides for such a 
proceeding when a sentence is “set aside or found invalid solely 
due to an error in the [original] sentencing proceeding.”  Id.  
The Court of Appeals concluded that because the error in the 
guilt phase of the trial affected the sentencing proceeding but 
was harmless with respect to the issue of Young’s guilt, the 
sentence was invalid “solely due to an error in the sentencing 
proceeding” within the meaning of Code § 19.2-295.1.  Young 
appeals from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 
 
Young contends that the Court of Appeals set his sentence 
aside only because of evidentiary error during the guilt phase 
of his trial, not because of an error “in the sentencing 
proceeding.”  Therefore, Young argues, the Court of Appeals 
erred in ordering a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-
295.1, which only affords a remedy for errors that occur in the 
sentencing phase of a trial.  Young asserts that because the 
evidentiary error occurred during the guilt phase of his trial, 
his case should be remanded for a new trial on all issues.  
 
6
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of 
Appeals properly concluded that because the evidentiary error 
was harmless with regard to the issue of Young’s guilt, the 
error affected only the sentence imposed by the jury.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth contends that the erroneous admission of evidence 
occurred “in the sentencing proceeding,” within the meaning of 
Code § 19.2-295.1, and the Court of Appeals properly remanded 
the case for a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-
295.1, rather than for a new trial on all issues.  We disagree 
with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
 
An issue of statutory interpretation presents a pure 
question of law, which we review de novo on appeal.  Conyers v. 
Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 
S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007); Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 
455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006); Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 
352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003).  We determine the meaning of 
certain statutory language from the express words contained in 
the statute.  Washington, 272 Va. at 255, 634 S.E.2d at 313; 
Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 
(2004); Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 604 S.E.2d 66, 
68 (2004). 
We consider the disputed language in the context of the 
entire statute, rather than by isolating particular words or 
phrases.  Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 335, 345, 641 
 
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S.E.2d 486, 492 (2007); Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 
S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 
514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999).  When statutory language is 
unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language 
and may not give the words a construction that amounts to 
holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually 
stated.  Gunn v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587, 637 S.E.2d 324, 
327 (2006); Tucker, 268 Va. at 493, 604 S.E.2d at 68; Alger, 267 
Va. at 259, 590 S.E.2d at 565. 
The statute we examine in the present case, Code § 19.2-
295.1, provides in relevant part: 
In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the 
defendant is guilty of a felony . . . a separate proceeding 
limited to the ascertainment of punishment shall be held as 
soon as practicable before the same jury.  At such 
proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present the defendant’s 
prior criminal convictions. . . . After the Commonwealth 
has introduced such evidence of prior convictions, or if no 
such evidence is introduced, the defendant may introduce 
relevant, admissible evidence related to punishment. . . . 
If the sentence imposed pursuant to this section is 
subsequently set aside or found invalid solely due to an 
error in the sentencing proceeding, the court shall impanel 
a different jury to ascertain punishment. . . . 
 
Id.  
 
We conclude that this statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous.  The statute refers to the sentencing proceeding as 
a “separate proceeding limited to the ascertainment of 
punishment,” and specifies the evidence that the parties may 
present “[a]t such proceeding.”  Id.  Thus, as set forth in the 
 
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statute, “the sentencing proceeding” is a distinct phase of a 
criminal trial that follows a jury’s determination of a 
defendant’s guilt.  Accordingly, an error “in the sentencing 
proceeding” can occur only after the jury determines the issue 
of the defendant’s guilt and in the stage of the trial when the 
jury considers the separate issue of the defendant’s punishment. 
 
We find no support in the language of Code § 19.2-295.1 for 
the Court of Appeals’ contrary interpretation, that any error 
occurring during the guilt phase of a trial but affecting the 
sentence a defendant receives, is an error “in the sentencing 
proceeding.”  That rationale would render any part of a criminal 
trial, even the voir dire of potential jurors, a part of “the 
sentencing proceeding” if jurors were exposed to inadmissible 
evidence that may ultimately have affected the jury’s sentencing 
decision. 
 
We also must reject the Court of Appeals’ construction of 
Code § 19.2-295.1 because that construction effectively would 
require us to add language to the statute.  The Court of 
Appeals’ construction would require us to discount the 
unambiguous phrase, “due to an error in the sentencing 
proceeding” and effectively replace that language with the 
phrase “due to an error affecting the sentencing proceeding.”  
Such an interpretation of the statute would violate the basic 
principle that courts cannot, by judicial interpretation, add 
 
9
language to a statute that the General Assembly did not include 
in its enactment.  Washington, 272 Va. at 459, 634 S.E.2d at 
316; Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 
561, 564-65 (2003); Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 
544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001). 
 
In addition, we observe that we have ordered a new 
sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1 only when we have 
reversed a judgment solely due to an error committed in the 
sentencing phase of a trial.  See, e.g., Gillespie v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 753, 761, 636 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2006) 
(remand of statutory burglary conviction for new sentencing 
proceeding because sentence imposed for prior offense and fact 
of acquittal on other charge were erroneously admitted into 
evidence in sentencing proceeding); Jaccard v. Commonwealth, 268 
Va. 56, 59, 597 S.E.2d 30, 31 (2004) (remand of malicious 
wounding conviction for new sentencing proceeding because jury 
erroneously was informed in sentencing phase that defendant’s 
prior probation status had been revoked); Hills v. Commonwealth, 
262 Va. 807, 812, 553 S.E.2d 722, 725 (2001) (remand of rape 
conviction for new sentencing proceeding because circuit court 
failed to instruct jury in sentencing phase that parole had been 
abolished in Virginia); Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 
117, 532 S.E.2d 629, 635 (2000) (remand of eight felony 
convictions for new sentencing proceeding because circuit court 
 
10
failed to instruct jury in sentencing phase that parole had been 
abolished in Virginia). 
 
Here, because the improper evidence of other crimes was 
presented during the guilt phase of Young’s criminal trial, not 
in his sentencing proceeding, the remedy of a new sentencing 
proceeding afforded by Code § 19.2-295.1 is inapplicable.3  
Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering 
that Young’s case be remanded solely for a new sentencing 
proceeding. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further 
remand to the circuit court for a new trial on the robbery 
indictment, if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE AGEE join, 
dissenting. 
 
The majority decides today that Gregory Leon Young, a 
convicted armed robber, is entitled to a new opportunity to 
adjudicate his guilt notwithstanding the finality of the Court 
of Appeals’ conclusions that “the evidence of [Young’s] guilt 
                     
3 The Court of Appeals’ holding determining which items of 
“other crimes” evidence resulted in prejudicial error is not 
before us in this appeal.  Therefore, we express no opinion 
regarding which statements in the Henry County interview 
resulted in prejudice to Young. 
 
11
was overwhelming,” Young v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 616, 636, 
625 S.E.2d 691, 701 (2006), and that the error in his trial 
prejudiced only the jury’s sentencing determination, not its 
finding of guilt.  Id. at 638, 625 S.E.2d at 702.  In my view, 
to disturb the conclusive effect of a jury’s valid determination 
of guilt runs counter to the General Assembly’s manifest purpose 
for creating a bifurcated jury-trial procedure for non-capital 
felonies and Class 1 misdemeanors.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
The issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred 
by ordering only a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-
295.1 instead of a new trial on the issues of both guilt and 
sentencing.  The relevant portion of Code § 19.2-295.1 states: 
 
If the sentence imposed pursuant to this section 
is subsequently set aside or found invalid solely due 
to an error in the sentencing proceeding, the court 
shall impanel a different jury to ascertain 
punishment, unless the defendant, the attorney for the 
Commonwealth and the court agree, in the manner 
provided in [Code] § 19.2-257, that the court shall 
fix punishment. 
 
The majority “conclude[s] that this statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous.”  With respect to the phrase “solely due to an 
error in the sentencing proceeding,” I disagree. 
“Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in 
more than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, 
is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks 
 
12
clearness and definiteness.”  Gillespie v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 
753, 758, 636 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2006) (citing Brown v. Lukhard, 
229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985)).  Where the language 
of an enactment is ambiguous, resort to the rules of statutory 
construction is appropriate.  Buonocore v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Tel. Co., 254 Va. 469, 472, 492 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1997) (citing 
USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 248 Va. 185, 194, 445 S.E.2d 
145, 150 (1994); City of Virginia Beach v. Board of Supervisors, 
246 Va. 233, 236, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993); Wertz v. Grubbs, 
245 Va. 67, 70, 425 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1993)); Virginia Dep’t of 
Labor & Indus. v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va. 97, 101−02, 353 
S.E.2d 758, 762 (1987) (Where statutory language is ambiguous, 
“we . . . must resort to extrinsic evidence and the rules of 
construction to determine legislative intent, ‘the paramount 
object of statutory construction.’ ”) (quoting Vollin v. 
Arlington County Electoral Bd., 216 Va. 674, 678−79, 222 S.E.2d 
793, 797 (1976)). 
On its face, the text of Code § 19.2-295.1 is not clear 
whether “an error in the sentencing proceeding” means, as the 
majority concludes, a discrete act or occurrence that happens 
between the temporal beginning and ending of a sentencing 
proceeding, or the prejudicial impact such an event has on the 
validity of the sentence imposed, irrespective of when it 
temporally occurs.  The majority dismisses the latter 
 
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interpretation, claiming that if we adopted it, we would be 
impermissibly rewriting the pertinent provision of Code § 19.2-
295.1 to read, “due to an error affecting the sentencing 
proceeding.”  Yet, the majority engages in the very sort of 
statutory revision that it claims to eschew when it effectively 
replaces the enacted language with the phrase “due to an error 
during the sentencing proceeding.”  Thus, despite its claim that 
the relevant text is unambiguous and its recitation of the plain 
meaning rule, the majority engages in its own statutory 
construction to reach the conclusion that Young is entitled to a 
new trial on the robbery indictment. 
Since the General Assembly’s use of the word “in” allows 
the provision at issue to be “understood in more than one way,” 
Gillespie, 272 Va. at 758, 636 S.E.2d at 432, resort to the 
principles of statutory construction is appropriate in order to 
decide the issue before us.  See Buonocore, 254 Va. at 472, 492 
S.E.2d at 441.  “A statute must be construed with reference to 
its subject matter, the object sought to be attained, and the 
legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should 
receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that 
purpose rather than one which will defeat it.”  Esteban v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 605, 609, 587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003) 
(citing Stanley v. Tomlin, 143 Va. 187, 195, 129 S.E. 379, 382 
(1925)); see also Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 227, 389 S.E.2d 
 
14
670, 674 (1990) (“ ‘Every statute is to be read so as to promote 
the ability of the enactment to remedy the mischief at which it 
is directed.’ ”) (quoting Board of Supervisors v. King Land 
Corp., 238 Va. 97, 103, 380 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1989)). 
Before the General Assembly’s enactment of Code § 19.2-
295.1 in 1994, see 1994 Acts chs. 828, 860, 862, 881, a jury 
made its guilt and sentencing decisions for non-capital offenses 
in an unitary proceeding, based solely on evidence relevant to 
the charged offense and the statutory range of permissible 
punishment.  See Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 42, 510 
S.E.2d 232, 235 (1999); Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 637, 
648, 621 S.E.2d 140, 145 (2005).  With the enactment of that 
statute and the resulting change to a bifurcated system for jury 
trials of non-capital felonies and Class 1 misdemeanors, the 
General Assembly advanced the laudable goal of “truth in 
sentencing,” Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 113, 532 
S.E.2d 629, 632 (2000), by expanding the scope of information 
that a jury can receive in making its sentencing decision.  With 
the advent of two separate proceedings, one for the 
determination of guilt and the other for the determination of an 
appropriate sentence, the General Assembly recognized that an 
error committed during an accused’s trial could conceivably 
prejudice only a jury’s sentencing decision.  Thus, one year 
 
15
after the General Assembly first created the bifurcated system, 
it added the provision now at issue.  See 1995 Acts ch. 567.1 
The entirety of Code § 19.2-295.1 is directed at post-
conviction sentencing proceedings.  The contested language 
directs that, when a sentence is “set aside or found invalid 
solely due to an error in the sentencing proceeding,” the trial 
court shall impanel a different jury to determine only 
punishment.  Code § 19.2-295.1 (emphasis added).  The statute 
does not address those instances when the basis for reversal is 
an error in the determination of a defendant’s guilt.  Nor 
should it.  When an error at trial requires the reversal of a 
jury’s guilt determination and the award of a new trial, the 
sentence imposed by that jury is necessarily also set aside.  
But, as the General Assembly recognized, with separate 
proceedings for determining guilt and sentencing, there is no 
reason to set aside a jury’s guilt determination when an error 
prejudices only its imposition of sentence.  The majority’s 
construction of Code § 19.2-295.1, however, renders this 
distinction meaningless and is irreconcilable with that 
                     
1 In 1995, the relevant portion of Code § 19.2-295.1 
provided, “If the sentence on appeal is subsequently set aside 
or found invalid solely due to an error in the sentencing 
proceeding, the court shall impanel a different jury to 
ascertain punishment, unless the defendant, the attorney for the 
Commonwealth and the court agree, in the manner provided in 
§ 19.2-257, that the court shall fix punishment.”  The General 
 
16
statute’s express declaration that the penalty phase of a 
bifurcated criminal trial is “a separate proceeding limited to 
the ascertainment of punishment.” 
The basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision to invalidate 
Young’s life sentence was the prejudicial impact of the jurors’ 
knowledge of Young’s unadjudicated criminal conduct on their 
sentencing decision.  Young, 47 Va. App. at 638, 625 S.E.2d at 
702.  The Court of Appeals found no reversible error either in 
the guilt phase alone, or in the guilt and sentencing 
proceedings collectively.  Id.  “The only harm done was in 
sentencing.”  Id. at 638 n.10, 625 S.E.2d at 702 n.10.  Thus, 
the Court of Appeals set aside Young’s sentence “solely due to 
an error in the sentencing proceeding.”  The appropriate remedy 
under such circumstances is to remand the case to the trial 
court to “impanel a different jury to ascertain punishment.”  
Code § 19.2-295.1.  As the Court of Appeals appropriately noted, 
“[t]o remand for a new trial would be a futile act.” Young, 47 
Va. App. at 638 n.10, 625 S.E.2d at 702 n.10.  It also would be 
a waste of judicial resources. 
Nevertheless, the majority opines that the Court of 
Appeals’ “rationale would render any part of a criminal trial, 
even the voir dire of potential jurors, a part of ‘the 
                                                                  
Assembly amended the statute to its current version in 2001.  
2001 Acts ch. 389. 
 
17
sentencing proceeding’ if jurors were exposed to inadmissible 
evidence that may ultimately have affected the jury’s sentencing 
decision.”  This concern, however, is misplaced because the 
majority’s observation actually reflects how bifurcated trials 
proceed.  Jurors are not told to disregard all the evidence 
heard during the guilt phase of a trial upon commencement of the 
sentencing proceeding.  Instead, all the evidence presented 
during the guilt proceeding carries forward and is appropriately 
considered by the jury during the penalty phase.  Indeed, that 
is precisely why the inadmissible evidence regarding Young’s 
unadjudicated conduct, which was introduced during the guilt 
phase, rendered the jury’s imposition of sentence invalid.  
Otherwise, there would have been no error in the sentencing 
proceeding.2 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding Young’s case for a 
new sentencing proceeding only. 
                     
2 Citing Gillespie, 272 Va. at 761, 636 S.E.2d at 434, 
Jaccard v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 56, 59, 597 S.E.2d 30, 31 
(2004), Hills v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 807, 812, 553 S.E.2d 722, 
725 (2001), and Fishback, 260 Va. at 117, 532 S.E.2d at 635, the 
majority states “that we have ordered a new sentencing 
proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1 only when we have reversed a 
judgment solely due to an error committed in the sentencing 
phase of a trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  But, the issue before us 
today is one of first impression.