Title: Roberio v. Massachusetts Parole Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12482
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 24, 2019

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SJC-12482 
 
JEFFREY S. ROBERIO  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2019. - October 24, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole.  Constitutional Law, Parole, Ex 
post facto law.  Due Process of Law, Parole, Retroactive 
application of statute.  Statute, Retroactive application.  
Practice, Criminal, Parole. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 24, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Christine M. Roach, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the plaintiff. 
 
Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Elizabeth Zito, of New York, Janie Y. Miller, of 
California, David J. Apfel, & Marielle Sanchez, for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case concerns whether retroactive 
application of a 1996 amendment to G. L. c. 127, § 133A 
(§ 133A), which prescribes parole eligibility conditions for 
prisoners serving life sentences, is an ex post facto violation, 
either on its face or as applied to the plaintiff, Jeffery S. 
Roberio. 
 
In 1986, seventeen year old Roberio was convicted of armed 
robbery and murder in the first degree premised on theories of 
felony-murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  As a result of our decision in 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (Diatchenko I), which 
applied Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), and 
invalidated mandatory life sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders, Roberio became immediately eligible for parole. 
 
In 2015, the defendant Parole Board (board) denied 
Roberio's application for parole and applied the 1996 amendment 
to § 133A that increased the maximum permissible period between 
subsequent applications for parole from three years to five 
years.  See St. 1996, c. 43.  Roberio challenged the board's 
decision in the Superior Court, and a judge concluded that the 
board did not abuse its discretion. 
3 
 
 
 
We allowed Roberio's application for direct appellate 
review and conclude that because the primary aim of the 1996 
amendment was to afford relief to families of murder victims, 
the Legislature intended the amendment to apply retroactively.  
We also conclude that the amendment is not unconstitutional on 
its face.  However, further discovery concerning the board's 
practical implementation of the 1996 amendment is necessary to 
determine whether application of the amendment to Roberio is 
nonetheless unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
Superior Court judge's order allowing the board's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.1 
 
Background and facts.  The details of Roberio's crimes are 
set forth in Commonwealth v. Roberio, 440 Mass. 245, 246-247 (2003) 
(affirming convictions), and need not be repeated here.  It 
suffices to say that as a juvenile, Roberio devised and executed 
a vicious robbery, during which he and another individual 
brutally beat and strangled an elderly man to death. 
 
In 2015, the board unanimously denied Roberio's first 
parole application on the ground that he was not "fully 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the 
Juvenile Law Center; Prisoners' Legal Services; Northeastern 
University School of Law, Prisoners' Rights Project; Harvard Law 
School, Prison Legal Assistance Project; and the Coalition for 
Effective Public Safety. 
4 
 
 
rehabilitated."  The board cited Roberio's lack of corrective 
programming aimed at addressing his substance abuse, anger, and 
violence issues, issues which Roberio claimed had led to the 
very murder for which he was incarcerated, leaving the board 
with serious concerns regarding "whether he still presents a 
risk of harm to the community, and whether his release is 
compatible with the best interest of society."  In conjunction 
with this denial, the board ordered a review in five years and 
advised that during those five years "Roberio should engage in 
rehabilitative programming that addresses substance abuse, 
anger, violence, and any potential mental health issues that may 
impair his ability to function as a law abiding citizen in 
society."2 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 127, § 133A, provides in pertinent part: 
 
"After [a parole hearing] the parole board [(board)] may, 
by a vote of two-thirds of its members, grant to such 
prisoner a parole permit to be at liberty upon such terms 
and conditions as it may prescribe for the unexpired term 
of his sentence.  If such permit is not granted, the . . . 
board shall, at least once in each ensuing five year 
period, consider carefully and thoroughly the merits of 
each such case on the question of releasing such prisoner 
on parole, and may, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, 
grant such parole permit." 
 
See 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 301.01(5) (2017) ("In cases involving 
inmates serving life sentences with parole eligibility, a parole 
review hearing occurs five years after the initial parole 
release hearing, except where the [board] members act to cause a 
review at an earlier time"). 
5 
 
 
 
At the time Roberio committed his crimes, § 133A provided 
that when the board denied a prisoner who was serving a life 
sentence parole, it was required to "carefully and thoroughly" 
reconsider the merits of that prisoner's case "at least once in 
each ensuing three year period."  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as 
amended through St. 1982, c. 108, § 2.  We refer to the period 
between the board's denial of parole and a prisoner's subsequent 
review as a "setback" or "set-back period." 
 
Roberio brought his challenge to the board's decision in 
Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, arguing that the 
board abused its discretion in failing to consider adequately 
his juvenile status in making its parole determination.  He also 
sought a declaration, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, that the 
board's application of the 1996 amendment to him posed a 
significant risk of prolonging his incarceration and, as a 
result, violated his constitutional right to be protected from 
the operation of ex post facto laws, as provided in art. I, 
§ 10, of the United States Constitution and art. 24 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The judge denied Roberio's 
subsequent motions for judgement on the pleadings and summary 
judgment, and allowed the board's cross motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.  The judge found that the board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Roberio's parole, and she concluded that 
6 
 
 
Roberio's claim of increased punishment was speculative and 
conjectural. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Retroactive application of the 1996 
amendment.  As an initial matter, the parties agree that the 
board applied the 1996 amendment retroactively to Roberio.  
Roberio argues that the Legislature did not intend for the 1996 
amendment to operate retroactively, and therefore, we should 
apply the ordinary presumption of prospective application in 
this case.  See G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second.  The board maintains 
that the 1996 amendment may operate retroactively because it is 
procedural in nature and, in any event, prospective application 
of the amendment would be inconsistent with the aims of its 
enactment.  We need not reach the board's argument that the 1996 
amendment is procedural because we conclude that the Legislature 
in fact intended the amendment to apply retroactively.3 
                     
 
3 We also note that this analysis overlaps significantly 
with our analysis under the ex post facto clauses.  A law is not 
procedural if it "affects substantive rights," Stewart v. 
Chairman of Mass. Parole Bd., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 843, 845-846 
(1994), and a law violates the ex post facto clauses only if it 
affects "substantive rights," see Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 
Mass. 589, 591 (1988).  Moreover, the United States Supreme 
Court has stated that even seemingly procedural changes may run 
afoul of the ex post facto clauses if the practical effect is to 
affect a substantive right.  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 
n.12 (1981) (statute could violate ex post facto clause even if 
statute "takes a seemingly procedural form").  See Clay v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 475 Mass. 133, 141 n.10 (2016) 
(procedural changes could constitute ex post facto laws).  
Therefore, we conclude that it is prudent to engage in the ex 
7 
 
 
 
In accordance with our rule of statutory construction, 
amendments to penal statutes are "presumptively prospective" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 553 
(2013).  See G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second.  The objective of this 
presumption "is to 'preserve, even after legislative change of a 
statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an 
earlier act or omission made criminal by the statute repealed in 
whole or in part.'"  Bradley, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 100 (2012). 
 
The presumption of prospective application is not absolute.  
Watts v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49, 55 (2014), citing Bradley, 
466 Mass. at 553.  "In accordance with G. L. c. 4, § 6," it will 
not apply where "the prospective application of the legislation 
in question would be 'inconsistent with the manifest intent of 
the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same 
statute.'"   Watts, supra, quoting Bradley, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Didas, 471 Mass. 1, 5 (2015) (same).  We 
generally treat these as "distinct exceptions."  Watts, citing 
Bradley, supra.  See Bradley, supra ("Legislature intended that 
                     
post facto analysis regardless of whether the amendment appears 
procedural.  See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990) 
("Subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible than 
overt ones. . . .  [T]he constitutional prohibition is addressed 
to laws, whatever their form, which make innocent acts criminal, 
alter the nature of the offense, or increase the punishment" 
[quotations and citation omitted]). 
8 
 
 
there be two exceptions, perhaps often related in fact, but 
separate and distinct in meaning").  But see Didas, supra at 10 
n.11 (single line of inquiry may be sufficient to address both 
exceptions where party advances essentially same argument under 
both exceptions).  We consider both in turn. 
 
The presumption of prospective application is inconsistent 
with the manifest intent of the Legislature where an intention 
that the statute apply retroactively is clearly expressed.  
Watts, 468 Mass. at 55, quoting Bradley, 466 Mass. at 554.  "The 
Legislature may clearly express its intent through the words 
used in a statute or the inclusion of other retroactive 
provisions in the statute that would make prospective 
application of the provision at issue anomalous, if not absurd" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Bradley, supra.  Under this 
exception, "inferring that the Legislature probably intended 
retroactive application is not enough; that intent must be 
'clearly expressed'" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
The act providing for the 1996 amendment, entitled "An Act 
relative to eligibility for parole," provided only,  "Section 
133A of chapter 127 of the General Laws . . . is hereby amended 
by striking out, in line 24, the word 'three' and inserting in 
place thereof the following word:  five."  The Legislature did 
not express an intention that the 1996 amendment apply 
retroactively.  Indeed, "the section is silent as to its 
9 
 
 
temporal application."  Bradley, 466 Mass. at 555.  See Watts, 
468 Mass. at 56.  Nor are there other provisions included in the 
act that would make prospective application of the amended 
§ 133A "anomalous, if not absurd" (citation omitted).  Bradley, 
supra at 554. 
 
Turning to the second exception, the presumption of 
prospective application is "repugnant to the context of the same 
statute where it would be contrary to the purpose of the statute 
to delay the accomplishment of that purpose" (quotations 
omitted).  Bradley, 466 Mass. at 555–556.  Although "the phrase 
does not refer to the intent of the Legislature, and certainly 
does not require that the intent of the Legislature be made 
'manifest,' it does compel us to discern the legislative purpose 
of the statute at issue and determine whether prospective 
application would be inconsistent with that purpose."  Id. at 
556. 
 
The legislative history of the 1996 amendment demonstrates 
that the intent of the Legislature was to reduce the workload of 
the board and, "more importantly," benefit the families of 
murder victims, in requiring them to "undergo the trauma of a 
parole hearing only once every five years instead of once every 
three years."  Memorandum regarding House Bill No. 1894, "An Act 
relative to eligibility for parole" (Mar. 14, 1996).  See House 
of Representatives, Committee on Local Affairs, Fact Sheet for 
10 
 
 
House Bill No. 1894 (Feb. 9, 1995) (same).  Thus, the 
Legislature's goal in enacting the 1996 amendment is clear.  
Prospective application would have the anomalous result of 
affording relief to some families but not others, which would be 
inconsistent with the Legislature's plain intention and 
repugnant to the context of the statute.  See Bradley, 466 Mass. 
at 559 (where Legislature amended school zone statute to, in 
part, "diminish the unfair disparate impact" of prior statute 
"on urban and minority residents," repugnant to context of 
statute to apply amendment prospectively and prolong resulting 
unfair disparate impact of prior statute).  Cf. Watts, 468 Mass. 
at 61-62 (although act extending jurisdiction of Juvenile Court 
was silent as to temporal application, it was passed with 
informed understanding that actual implementation would likely 
require additional staff and services; prospective application 
takes these considerations, as well as legal complexities and 
impact of opposite construction, into account and is not 
repugnant to act's purpose). 
 
2.  Application of ex post facto clause.  Both art. I, 
§ 10, of the United States Constitution and art. 24 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provide protection from the 
operation of ex post facto laws.  Clay v. Massachusetts Parole 
Bd., 475 Mass. 133, 135 (2016).  Roberio has invited us to 
determine that our State Constitution affords greater protection 
11 
 
 
than that of the Federal Constitution.  We decline to do so 
where we have considered this issue before and have consistently 
considered the two as coextensive.  See Police Dep't of Salem v. 
Sullivan, 460 Mass. 637, 644, n.11 (2011); Commonwealth v. Cory, 
454 Mass. 559, 564 n.9 (2009); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 
489, 492 n.4 (2000). 
 
The prohibition against ex post facto laws serves the 
important, twin aims of assuring that legislative acts give fair 
warning of their effect and "restraining arbitrary and 
potentially vindictive legislation."  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 
24, 29 (1981).  See Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 456-457 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010 (1985), quoting Weaver, supra 
at 30 ("Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is 
. . . the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when 
the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed 
when the crime was consummated").  Retroactive changes that 
affect parole eligibility are "a proper subject for application 
of the ex post facto clause."  Clay, 475 Mass. at 136 (parole 
eligibility is part of law annexed to crime at time of person's 
offense).  See, e.g., Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000); 
California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 
(1995) (Morales).  In this context, an ex post facto law is one 
that "changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, 
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed."  
12 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589, 590 (1988), quoting 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).  See Collins 
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1990) (emphasizing that 
Calder decision controls). 
 
We have stated that "the controlling inquiry as to whether 
the retroactive application of a law affecting parole 
constitutes an ex post facto violation is whether such 
application 'creates a significant risk of prolonging [an 
individual's] incarceration.'"  Clay, 475 Mass. at 136–137, 
quoting Garner, 529 U.S. at 251.  See Morales, 514 U.S. at 509.  
In this case, Roberio may establish the requisite risk either by 
demonstrating that the 1996 amendment is facially 
unconstitutional, meaning it "by its own terms show[s] a 
significant risk" of prolonging his incarceration, see Garner, 
supra at 255, or by demonstrating with evidence derived from the 
amendment's "practical implementation by the agency charged with 
exercising its discretion, that its retroactive application will 
result in a longer period of incarceration than under the 
earlier rule."  Id. at 255.  See id. at 251 ("requisite risk" 
can either be "inherent in the framework of amended [statute or] 
demonstrated on the record"); Clay, supra at 137 (same). 
 
We recently addressed whether a 2012 amendment to § 133A 
increasing the number of board member votes necessary to grant 
parole from a simple majority to a majority vote of two-thirds 
13 
 
 
violated the ex post facto clause as applied to a juvenile 
homicide offender similarly situated to Roberio.  Clay, 475 
Mass. at 134.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended through St. 
2012, c. 192, § 39.  The offender had received four votes in 
favor of parole from a panel of seven members.  Id.  Under the 
version of § 133A in effect at the time the offender committed 
his crime, he would have been granted parole with this majority 
vote, see G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended through St. 1973, 
c. 278.  However, in accordance with the 2012 amendment 
requiring a vote of two-thirds of the panel members, the board 
denied parole.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended through 
St. 2012, c. 192, § 39. 
We reiterated that, "[u]nder Massachusetts law, the . . . 
board has discretionary authority to grant parole," see G. L. 
c. 27, § 5, and that "no one is guaranteed a grant of parole."  
Clay, 475 Mass. at 138-139, citing Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 
674.  Thus, "disposition of the facial challenge" would "rest on 
whether . . . the supermajority amendment 'increases, to a 
significant degree, the likelihood or probability of prolonging 
[an individual's] incarceration.'"  Clay, supra, quoting Garner, 
529 U.S. at 256. 
We concluded that the inherent effect of the supermajority 
amendment did not create a significant risk of increased 
punishment for the individuals covered by the amendment.  Clay, 
14 
 
 
475 Mass. at 139.  Id., quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 514 
("Absent the . . . board's decision as to [the offender's] 
parole application and the apparent effect on it of the 
supermajority amendment, we are presented with nothing beyond 
speculation and conjecture that the supermajority amendment to § 
133A would 'increase the measure of punishment attached to the 
covered crimes'").  However, as applied to the offender, 
application of the supermajority amendment did in fact 
constitute an ex post facto violation because he was able to 
demonstrate that, but for the amendment, the board would have 
granted him parole.  Clay, supra at 140.  "This [was] not a case 
in which the risk of increased punishment [was] merely a 
'speculative and attenuated possibility.'"  Id., quoting 
Morales, supra at 509. 
 
In Clay, we relied heavily on two Supreme Court cases that 
have direct bearing on the issue raised in this case.  See 
Morales, 514 U.S. at 499; Garner, 529 U.S. at 244.  In Morales, 
supra at 501-502, the Court addressed whether an amendment to 
California's parole procedure allowing the parole board to 
decrease the frequency of parole hearings violated the ex post 
facto clause.  The prisoner in that case was a twice-convicted 
murderer.  Id. at 502.  At the time of the second murder, he 
would have been entitled to annual parole suitability hearings 
once he was parole eligible; however, the California Legislature 
15 
 
 
amended the relevant statute to allow the parole board to defer 
subsequent parole hearings for up to three years if the prisoner 
had been convicted of more than one offense that involved taking 
a life.  Id. at 503.  After the prisoner's first application for 
parole was denied, the parole board deferred his next hearing 
for three years.  The prisoner claimed that the amendment 
violated the ex post facto clause.  Id. at 503-504. 
 
The Court concluded that the amendment did not affect the 
sentence for the offense but, rather, the "'method to be 
followed' in fixing a parole release date."  Id. at 508.  The 
prisoner urged the Court to find that any legislative change 
that creates a "conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's 
punishment" violates the ex post facto clause.  Id.  The Court  
rejected this approach, noting that it would require an 
"invalid[ation] of any number of minor . . . changes that might 
produce [a] remote risk of impact on a prisoner's sentence," 
leading to a "micromanagement of an endless array of legislative 
adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures" that "might 
create some speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a 
prisoner's actual term of confinement by making it more 
difficult for him to make a persuasive case for early release, 
but that fact alone cannot end the matter for ex post facto 
purposes."  Id. at 508-509.  Declining to create a single 
"formula" for identifying legislative changes that violate the 
16 
 
 
ex post facto clause, the Court determined that in evaluating 
the constitutionality of an amendment, "we must determine 
whether it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure 
of punishment attached to the covered crimes."  Id.  at 509. 
 
The Court held that the amendment created "only the most 
speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the 
prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for 
covered crimes."  Id.  In making this determination, the Court 
relied on a several factors, including that the likelihood of 
parole for the class of prisoners affected by the amendment was 
remote; that the amendment was carefully tailored; that the 
parole board was required to make particularized findings to 
support its decision; and that the parole board retained 
discretion under the amendment to assign either an annual review 
or a two-year set-back period.  Id. at 510-512.  The Court also 
stated that "there is no reason to conclude that the amendment 
will have any effect on any prisoner's actual term of 
confinement, for the current record provides no basis for 
concluding that a prisoner who experiences a drastic change of 
circumstances would be precluded from seeking an expedited 
hearing from the [b]oard."  Id. at 512. 
 
In Garner, the Court reviewed an amendment to a Georgia 
parole law that reduced the frequency of parole review from 
every third year to every eighth year for inmates serving life 
17 
 
 
sentences.  Garner, 529 U.S. at 247.  The Court stated that 
certain differences between Georgia's amended parole law and the 
California law reviewed in Morales, including five more years 
between hearings, fewer procedural safeguards, and covering more 
prisoners than just multiple murderers, were "not dispositive," 
and reiterated that there is no single formula "for identifying 
which legislative adjustments, in matters bearing on parole, 
would survive an ex post facto challenge."  Id. at 251-252.  The 
Court added that "States must have due flexibility in 
formulating parole procedures and addressing problems associated 
with confinement and release."  Id. at 252. 
 
The Court concluded that the amendment to the Georgia law 
did not create a significant risk of prolonging the respondent's 
incarceration on its face because it was "qualified in two 
important respects.  First, the law vest[ed] the Parole Board 
with discretion as to how often to set an inmate's date for 
reconsideration, with eight years for the maximum. . . . Second, 
the Board's policies permit[ed] expedited parole reviews in the 
event of a change in their circumstance or where the Board 
receives new information that would warrant a sooner review" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 254. 
 
The Court stated that "[w]hen the rule does not by its own 
terms show a significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, 
by evidence drawn from the rule's practical implementation by 
18 
 
 
the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its 
retroactive application will result in a longer period of 
incarceration than under the earlier rule," id. at 255, and 
concluded that on the record before it, the Court could not 
determine whether the change in the Georgia law "lengthened the 
respondent's time of actual imprisonment."  Id. at 256.  The 
record before them "contained little information bearing on the 
level of risk created by the change in law," and "[w]ithout 
knowledge of whether retroactive application of the [amendment] 
increases, to a significant degree, the likelihood or 
probability of prolonging respondent's incarceration," the Court 
was unable to reach a conclusion concerning the respondent's as-
applied challenge.  Id. at 256.  The Court remanded for further 
proceedings and emphasized that the respondent must show that, 
"as applied to his own sentence," the amendment created a 
"significant risk of increasing his punishment.  This remains 
the issue in the case, though the general operation of the 
Georgia parole system may produce relevant evidence and inform 
further analysis on the point."  Id. at 255. 
 
a.  Facial challenge.  For much the same reasons discussed 
by the Supreme Court in Garner and Morales, we are not persuaded 
that there is a significant risk of prolonged incarceration 
"inherent in the framework" of the 1996 amendment.  Garner, 529 
U.S. at 251.  As discussed, the decisions regarding whether, 
19 
 
 
when, and under what conditions to grant parole rest entirely 
with the board.  See G. L. c. 27, § 5.  Parole is not required; 
indeed, it is not even presumed.  G. L. c. 27, § 5.  The effect 
of the 1996 amendment was to allow the board to exercise one 
facet of its discretion.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended 
through St. 1996, c. 43.  The 1996 amendment does not affect a 
covered prisoner's initial eligibility date, the standards for 
parole suitability, or the board's statutory obligation to 
"consider carefully and thoroughly" the merits of each 
prisoner's parole application.  G. L. c. 127, § 133A.  It merely 
affects the "method to be followed" for fixing a parole release 
date.  Morales, 514 U.S. at 508.  Critically, the 1996 amendment 
does not require the board to assign five-year set-back periods.  
Indeed, the amendment maintains the integrity of the board's 
ability to assign whatever set-back period it deems appropriate 
and necessary, as well as the discretion to revisit that 
decision either at the request of a prisoner or on its own 
initiative.  G. L. c. 127, § 133A.4  See Garner, 529 U.S. at 254 
                     
 
4 Roberio attempts to distinguish his case from Garner v. 
Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 254 (2000), and California Dep't of 
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508 (1995), by arguing 
that, although the board has the discretion to grant expedited 
hearings, it does not exercise that discretion in practice.  See 
120 Code Mass. Regs. § 304.03 (2017) (providing for 
reconsideration of board decision).  This argument affects the 
as-applied analysis only.  See Clay, 475 Mass. at 140, quoting 
Garner, supra at 255 (petitioner may demonstrate requisite risk 
20 
 
 
(parole board's policies permitted expedited parole reviews in 
event of change in circumstance or where parole board received 
new information that would warrant earlier review); Morales, 
supra at 512-513 (record provided no basis for concluding that 
prisoner who experienced drastic change of circumstances would 
be precluded from seeking expedited hearing from parole board). 
 
Roberio urges us to draw a distinction between his position 
and those of the petitioners in Garner and Morales based on his 
status as a juvenile homicide offender, because as a juvenile 
offender he has greater prospects for reform.  We conclude that 
such a distinction is unnecessary.  As an initial matter, we 
note that in the context of a facial challenge, we consider the 
impact that the amendment will have on the entire class of 
persons covered by the amendment.  In this case, the class of 
prisoners covered by the 1996 amendment consists of prisoners 
serving life sentences with the possibility of parole.5  For 
                     
with evidence derived from amendment's "practical 
implementation"). 
 
 
5 "Every prisoner who is serving a sentence for life in a 
correctional institution of the commonwealth, except prisoners 
confined to the hospital at the Massachusetts Correctional 
Institution, Bridgewater, except prisoners serving a life 
sentence for murder in the first degree who had attained the age 
of [eighteen] years at the time of the murder and except 
prisoners serving more than [one] life sentence arising out of 
separate and distinct incidents that occurred at different 
times, where the second offense occurred subsequent to the first 
conviction, shall be eligible for parole at the expiration of 
21 
 
 
purposes of the maximum permissible set-back period, the statute 
does not make a distinction between juvenile and adult 
offenders. 
 
Nonetheless, we conclude that any risk that the 1996 
amendment might have a more significant impact on juveniles than 
it does on adults is sufficiently mitigated by the fact that 
juveniles are already afforded certain protections in the parole 
process for the express purpose of guaranteeing that those 
offenders will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be 
considered for parole.  We recognized in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 
at 670, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, that "children are 
constitutionally different from adults, for purposes of 
sentencing," because they have "diminished culpability and 
greater prospects for reform."  Flowing from that recognition 
was our directive to the board that it consider a prisoner's 
juvenile status at the time of his parole, see Diatchenko I, 
supra at 674 ("board to evaluate the circumstances surrounding 
the commission of the crime, including the age of the offender, 
together with all relevant information pertaining to the 
offender's character and actions during the intervening years 
since conviction.  By this process, a juvenile homicide offender 
will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be considered for 
                     
the minimum term fixed by the court under [G. L. c. 279, § 24]."  
G. L. c. 127, § 133A. 
22 
 
 
parole suitability"), and our directive that such offenders be 
afforded the procedural protections of representation by 
counsel, as well as the opportunity to obtain expert assistance 
in connection with that initial parole hearing.6  Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 32 (2015) 
(Diatchenko II).  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A ("If a prisoner is 
indigent and is serving a life sentence for an offense that was 
committed before the prisoner reached [eighteen] years of age, 
the prisoner shall have the right to have appointed counsel at 
the parole hearing and shall have the right to funds for experts 
pursuant to [G. L. c.] 261").  Notwithstanding these special 
considerations, we emphasized that, even in cases of juvenile 
homicide offenders, under art. 26, the offender is entitled only 
to a meaningful opportunity for release; parole is not 
guaranteed.  Diatchenko II, supra at 29–30. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the 1996 amendment is not 
unconstitutional on its face.  See Garner, 529 U.S. at 255; 
Morales, 514 U.S. at 514; Clay, 475 Mass. at 139-140. 
                     
 
6 The board was cognizant of its obligation to consider 
Roberio's juvenile status and noted in its decision, "While 
Roberio's age and development at the time of the crime are 
important factors to consider in assessing his parole 
suitability, the most important criteria in the analysis of 
parole suitability remains whether Roberio meets the legal 
standard for parole." 
23 
 
 
 
b.  As-applied challenge.  We next consider whether the 
amendment is unconstitutional as applied to Roberio.  An 
offender must demonstrate, "by evidence drawn from the rule's 
practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising 
discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a 
longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule."  
See Garner, 529 U.S. at 255.  The record evidence concerning the 
board's practical implementation of the 1996 amendment, though 
uncontested, is extremely limited.  Upon close examination, it 
does not afford us the necessary context to draw sound 
conclusions with regard to the board's overarching practices. 
 
In pressing his claim, Roberio relies on affidavits from 
two attorneys, Patricia Garin and Barbara Kaban, who draw from 
their experiences with the board in practice and their analysis 
of parole data collected over certain periods.  Attorney Garin 
focuses her practice on criminal defense and prisoners' rights, 
with a concentration on issues relating to parole.  She also 
teaches a course on prisoner rights and supervises the 
prisoners' rights clinic at Northeastern University School of 
Law.  Attorney Kaban is the principal investigator for a study 
of Massachusetts juvenile homicide offenders funded by the Shaw 
Foundation.  She also has served as the director of juvenile 
appeals for the Committee for Public Counsel Services, where her 
24 
 
 
responsibilities included monitoring the outcomes of parole 
hearings for juvenile homicide offenders. 
 
Their affidavits suggest that the board is exercising its 
statutory responsibility to "consider carefully and thoroughly 
the merits of each such case" in determining whether to release 
a prisoner on parole and, where parole is denied, in determining 
the length of the set-back period.  G. L. c. 127, § 133A.  
Attorney Garin's review of parole statistics for 2012 reflects 
that the board issued records of decision for 134 prisoners that 
year and that 108 were denied parole.  Of the 108 prisoners 
denied parole, seventy-seven received five-year set-back 
periods.  Attorney Kaban's affidavit states that since 2013, the 
board has held parole hearings for thirty-four juvenile homicide 
offenders, thirteen of whom the board granted parole. 
 
What gives cause for concern is Attorney Garin's assertion, 
unrebutted by the board, that, in over thirty years of 
experience, she has "no knowledge of the board ever allowing a 
motion for reconsideration to reduce a lifer's setback period" 
or ever acting on its own "to hold a review hearing sooner than 
the setback period identified in the decision denying parole."  
If a prisoner's opportunity to seek and be afforded an expedited 
review is for all practical purposes illusory, as the record may 
suggest, then application of the 1996 amendment might create a 
significant risk of prolonging the length of incarceration for 
25 
 
 
those prisoners who, after the imposition of a four- or five-
year set-back period, can demonstrate a material change in 
circumstances that would warrant an earlier review of the merits 
of their parole applications.  Whether the board in practice 
exercises its discretion to expedite review hearings for those 
prisoners that have demonstrated a material change in 
circumstances would significantly affect our as-applied 
analysis.  See Garner, 529 U.S. at 254. 
 
Without a comprehensive demonstration of the board's 
practical application of the 1996 amendment since the date of 
its enactment, we are unable to reach a conclusion concerning 
Roberio's as-applied challenge.  Here, it is apparent that 
further discovery is necessary, and we remand the case for that 
purpose.  See Garner, 529 U.S. at 256, 257.  On remand, Roberio 
is entitled to obtain discovery from the board identifying the 
cases, if any, where it has allowed a motion for reconsideration 
to reduce the set-back period of a prisoner with a life sentence 
or acted on its own to hold an earlier review.  If the board can 
identify no such cases, the board should be allowed the chance 
to furnish evidence demonstrating that the opportunity for a 
26 
 
 
prisoner with a life sentence to obtain a reduction in the set-
back period is not, in fact, illusory.7 
 
Conclusion.  The 1996 amendment does not create a 
significant risk of prolonging incarceration on its face.  
Nonetheless, further discovery concerning the board's 
implementation of the 1996 amendment is necessary to determine 
whether the amendment, as applied to Roberio, is 
unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we vacate the Superior Court 
judge's order allowing the board's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
 
7 The factual determination is not whether Roberio's 
petition for an early hearing, which was summarily denied 
without explanation on April 10, 2018, would have been granted 
if the opportunity to seek an early hearing based on a change in 
circumstances were not illusory.  Unless we allow the deposition 
of each member of the board, which we do not propose, a prisoner 
cannot prove that he would have been granted an earlier hearing 
if the board gave him a meaningful opportunity to obtain one.  
Rather, the factual determination is whether the board provides 
prisoners with a meaningful opportunity to obtain an earlier 
hearing.  This must be measured by statistics or other evidence 
reflecting what the board actually does, and not by what the 
board says it might be willing to do.