Title: Solar Research Corporation v. Parker
Citation: 221 So. 2d 138
Docket Number: 37546
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 1969

221 So. 2d 138 (1969)
SOLAR RESEARCH CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation and Jack N. Holcomb, Individually, and Dorothy Jean Holcomb, Individually, Petitioners,
v.
Julius F. PARKER, Jr., As Executor of the Estate of Julius F. Parker, Leo L. Foster and John A. Madigan, Jr., a Partnership and Rivers Buford, Jr., Individually, Respondents.
No. 37546.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 2, 1969.
*139 Jack N. Holcomb and Dorothy Jean Holcomb in pro. per.
Julius F. Parker, Jr., of Parker, Foster &amp; Madigan, Gene D. Brown of Horne, Rhodes &amp; Lamb, Tallahassee, for respondents.
DREW, Justice.
Pertinent facts and background in this litigation are set forth in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Third District.[1] We granted certiorari because of the holding in the decision that the trial court should have granted the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff attorneys because "the preponderance of the evidence was to the effect there were agreed fees"[2] and the holding of the District Court with reference to the power and authority of the trial court in "evaluating and assessing" attorneys fees.[3] These conclusions of the District Court conflict with many decisions of this Court.[4]
On the merits of the controversy, the ultimate judgment of the District Court must be approved. We separate this opinion into a discussion, first of the Buford Claim and second of the Foster Claim. Preliminarily, however, we deem it essential to briefly discuss a matter that seems to have led the trial court into error. It concerns the difference in the legal principles involved in attorneys fees awarded as costs and assessed against the party or parties in litigation, and attorneys fees earned by a lawyer and due him by his client for legal services rendered. It is the latter type of fees that are involved in this case. In consideration of the factors entering into the determination of the amount of the fee, however, the trial court seems to have applied the rule applicable to the allowance of fees of the former type. In his order denying *140 a judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court said:
The cases governing the award of attorneys fees in condemnation proceedings,[5] divorce and related proceedings,[6] actions on insurance policies,[7] workmen's compensation,[8] probate proceedings[9] and similar cases involve altogether different principles from those involved in these proceedings. An extended discussion of this question in this case is neither justified nor required.[10]
Count II of the Buford Complaint filed June 26, 1965, alleges:
In support of this count Buford offered in evidence a letter from Holcomb dated November 20th, 1964, acknowledging receipt of Buford's bill for $2,500.00 for services and concluding with the following paragraph:
*141 The defendant Holcomb testified he wrote the letter. He offered no testimony to contradict the amount of the fee due Buford. In such circumstances Buford was clearly entitled to a directed verdict.
A summary judgment was granted plaintiff attorneys on the issue of liability for attorneys fees. The only issue to be submitted to the jury is succinctly stated in the pretrial order as follows:
The evidence on this question by both parties establishes a contract to pay a fee of $5,000.00 "win, lose, or draw." The quoted language was used by Foster in his discussion of fees and the defendant Holcomb repeatedly confirmed the use of such a phrase. Holcomb's contention as to his understanding of the contract is summarized in the following answer given to the last question propounded to him:
The fact that the case was disposed of in a manner that was a complete victory for Holcomb without Foster and Buford having to perform all the services they contemplated having to render was not only favorable to the client but a break for the attorneys. What effect the standing reputation and ability of counsel had in the ultimate victory is, of course, impossible to measure. Such is universally recognized, however, as a factor in determining the reasonableness of professional fees. Moreover, had the case involved all the services contemplated and more, the attorneys, under the contract, would have been limited to the amount agreed on.
There is another  and more basic  reason why the attorneys were entitled to recover here as a matter of law. Under the pleadings and the pre-trial order the burden was on Holcomb to prove not only that he had no contract for a fixed fee but that the reasonable value of the services performed by Foster for Holcomb was less than that charged. There is no evidence in the record to support that claim. This seems to have been recognized by the trial judge at the conclusion of the evidence when he said  in a colloquy with counsel out of the jury's presence:
Most of the cases referred to in the trial court's order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict, supra, fall within the category of cases heretofor alluded to concerning fees as costs in legal proceedings.[11] Baruch v. Giblin[12] was a suit like this and the statement in that opinion as to opinion evidence must be considered in the light of the facts in that case. The record there shows that many witnesses testified as to the value of the services rendered by Giblin to Baruch. The opinion evidence varied from $1,000 to $15,000. The fee awarded was $6,250.00, well within the range of the evidence. In Folmar v. Davis,[13] referred to by the trial judge, there was opinion evidence above and below the amount awarded. In Lyle v. Lyle[14] the late Judge Sturgis speaking for the court reversed an award for attorney fees in a divorce case but made the following comments concerning attorneys fees generally.[15]
Most of the other cases, as recognized by the trial judge, fall within the category of costs and the rule there is not applicable here.
It is pertinent to re-emphasize the fact that the law governing the recovery of attorneys fees in suits of this nature is exactly the same as any other professional fee. Judge Sturgis in the Lyle case, supra, summed up the situation here when he said:[16]
The decision of the District Court, as modified, is approved.
ERVIN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
[1]  Parker v. Solar Research Corporation. 210 So. 2d 271 (1st Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1968).
[2]  The language used in the opinion is:

"We also further find that the trial court further erred in not granting the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The preponderance of the evidence was to the effect that there were agreed fees. There was sufficient admissions, by the appellee Holcomb of the discussion and agreement of the amounts of the fees to offset any very weak contention that said fees were to be paid only if certain things had to be done." Id. at 274.
[3]  The exact language used to which we refer is:

"The work-knowledge of an attorney is a very technical matter and its value to a client can, in most instances, be more properly evaluated and assessed by a court, who has had personal experiences in these matters, than by a lay man jury. Therefore, the trial court is in a better position to act upon the reasonableness of the evidence and accredit the proper preponderance thereof and in the case sub judice, we think he should have and in so doing, have granted the motions for directed verdict, or certainly the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By adopting this opinion, we do not feel that we are substituting our judgment for that of a jury, but we are substituting our judgment for that of the trial court." Id.
[4]  The holding that a trial court should grant a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict where "the preponderance of the evidence" supported the wrong party, is clearly erroneous. "A case should not be taken from the jury, unless the conclusion follows from the evidence, as matter of law, that no recovery can be lawfully had upon any view taken of facts that the evidence tends to establish." (e.s.) Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Smith, 67 Fla. 10, 64 So. 354 (1914); Wager v. East Coast Hospital Assn., 105 Fla. 547, 141 So. 743 (1932). Also see 32 Fla.Jur. Trial, § 85 et seq. (1960) and the myriad of cases there cited upholding this elemental proposition.

As to the language quoted in footnote 3, the views expressed by the District Court are wholly unnecessary to its ultimate judgment and may be considered obiter. See Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960). In the interest of uniformity in the law and the avoidance of confusion in the decisions on the general subject treated, such language is disapproved.
[5]  Fla. Stat. §§ 73.091, 73.131 (1967), F.S.A.
[6]  Fla. Stat. §§ 61.071, 61.16 (1967), F.S.A.
[7]  Fla. Stat. § 627.0127 (1967), F.S.A.
[8]  Fla. Stat. § 440.34 (1967), F.S.A.
[9]  Fla. Stat. §§ 734.01, 737.22, 733.20 (1967), F.S.A.
[10]  Compare, however, Dade County v. Renedo, 147 So. 2d 313, 1 A.L.R.3d 1391 (Fla. 1962), where this Court held that when there is conflicting opinion evidence as to value in eminent domain proceedings the jury's award must be not less than the lowest nor more than the highest figure.
[11]  See footnotes 6 to 9, supra.
[12]  122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935).
[13]  108 So. 2d 772 (3d Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1959).
[14]  167 So. 2d 256 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1964).
[15]  Id. at 257.
[16]  Id.