Title: CLAUDIA MICHALSKI V REUVEN BAR LEVAV MD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114107
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 1, 2001  
CLAUDIA MICHALSKI and MICHAEL MICHALSKI,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 114107  
REUVEN BAR-LEVAV, M.D. and DR. 
REUVEN BAR-LEVAV & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
Following a motion for summary disposition brought  
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), plaintiff's Handicappers’ Civil  
Rights Act claim was dismissed by the circuit court.1  The  
Court of Appeals reversed.  The issue before this Court is  
1 In 1998, after plaintiff filed her claim, the name of 
the act was changed to the Persons with Disabilities Civil 
Rights Act.  1998 PA 20, MCL 37.1101; MSA 3.550(101).  This  
opinion will refer to the act as the Handicappers’ Civil 
Rights Act.  
 
whether 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals properly concluded that plaintiff  
presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact  
with respect to whether defendant regarded her as having a  
determinable 
physical 
or 
mental 
characteristic 
that  
substantially limited one or more of her major life  
activities.  We hold that plaintiff did not present sufficient  
evidence to create such a question, and we reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.  
I  
On September 1, 1995, plaintiff signed an employment  
contract with defendant to begin work as an executive  
secretary on September 11, 1995.2
 On September 4, 1995,  
plaintiff experienced numbness and tingling on her left side,  
which persisted for four days.  She was seen by her family  
doctor, who referred her to Dr. Green, a neurologist.  
Plaintiff was able to begin work as scheduled. On September  
23, 1995, plaintiff saw Dr. Green, who told her he suspected  
multiple sclerosis, but was unable to make a positive  
diagnosis at that time.  Plaintiff testified at her deposition  
that she told defendant and others at the office about this  
tentative diagnosis.  Plaintiff maintains that, after she  
2 For convenience, we will refer to Claudia Michalski as 
the “plaintiff” and Reuven Bar-Levav as the “defendant.” 
Additionally, we note that we have been informed that  
defendant Bar-Levav is deceased. However, there has been no 
request to substitute his estate as a party.  
2  
 
 
 
revealed her condition, defendant undertook a course of  
harassment, which she attributed to his perception of her  
medical condition.3  
Dr. Green saw plaintiff again on October 28, 1995.  At  
this time, plaintiff had no symptoms of multiple sclerosis,  
and Dr. Green indicated on her medical record that she was  
"doing fine, feels great.”  Plaintiff continued to work  
without incident until December 28, 1995, when she left work,  
experiencing a loss of vision in one eye.  She was seen by Dr.  
Green, 
who 
diagnosed 
multiple sclerosis.  She was hospitalized  
for three days, and her vision improved after treatment.  
However, she did not return to work.  
Plaintiff 
brought this action alleging a violation of the  
Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA) and a claim for  
intentional infliction of emotional distress.4
 After  
discovery, defendant moved again for summary disposition  
pursuant to MCR 2.116 (C)(10).5  The circuit court granted the  
3 Defendant maintained that he was unaware of her medical  
condition until after she left work on December 28, 1995.  
4 The circuit court granted summary disposition for 
defendant on the intentional infliction of emotional distress  
count.  The Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling, and no 
issue regarding this claim is involved in this appeal.  
5 
 Defendant first moved for summary disposition on 
December 9, 1996. 
The trial court initially denied  
defendant’s 
motion 
regarding 
the 
HCRA 
claim 
without 
prejudice. 
(continued...)  
3  
 
motion, concluding:  
[T]here is no evidence that the condition that 
Plaintiff was perceived to have was a condition 
which substantially limits one or more for [sic] 
major life activities. And no evidence to suggest 
that the Defendant had any knowledge that one or 
more of the major life activities was limited.  
On January 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a two­
to-one decision affirming the dismissal of the intentional  
infliction of emotional distress count, but reversing the  
dismissal 
of 
plaintiff's 
handicap 
discrimination 
claim 
because  
it believed that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence  
to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination.6  
Relying on Sanchez v Lagoudakis,7 plaintiff argued that one  
could find that her condition was a handicap as defined by the  
statute because the HCRA prohibits discrimination, even when  
an individual does not exhibit symptoms of a handicap.  A  
majority of the Court of Appeals agreed.  
Noting that under Sanchez, the focus is on the employer’s  
conduct and belief or intent, and not merely on the employee’s  
condition, the majority reasoned that the mere fact that  
5(...continued) 
Following the completion of discovery, defendant filed a 
renewed motion for summary disposition on April 11, 1997.  
6 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 26, 1999 
(Docket No. 204033).  
7 440 Mich 496; 486 NW2d 657 (1992); Sanchez v Lagoudakis  
(On Remand), 217 Mich App 535; 552 NW2d 472 (1996), rev’d on 
other grounds After Remand 458 Mich 704; 581 NW2d 257 (1998).  
4  
 
plaintiff was symptom free should not preclude her cause of  
action.  The Court of Appeals explained that an “individual  
with multiple sclerosis can lead a normal life until the next  
exacerbation, 
which 
occurs 
with 
varying 
frequency 
and 
degree.”  
Similarly, individuals with handicaps such as epilepsy and  
asthma may have periods of time where they are symptom free.  
Although plaintiff was not definitively diagnosed with  
multiple sclerosis, the Court of Appeals reasoned that  
applying Sanchez, in which the defendant based his employment  
decision on rumors that the plaintiff had AIDS, there was  
sufficient evidence to establish that in the present case,  
defendant may have regarded plaintiff as handicapped.  The  
Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff's deposition testimony  
established that she informed defendant from the beginning of  
her employment that her doctors suspected she had multiple  
sclerosis.  
Further, 
plaintiff periodically took some time off  
during September and October 1995 to undergo testing for  
multiple sclerosis and to receive treatment to lessen the side  
effects of some of the testing procedures.  Therefore, the  
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in  
granting summary disposition in defendant's favor.  
Judge Whitbeck dissented.  His dissent focused on the  
fact that the definition of "handicap" was altered by a 1990  
5  
 
 
amendment to the HCRA8 to require that the physical or mental  
characteristic in question substantially limit one or more  
major life activities of the individual. The version of the  
statute in effect at the time of the events in Sanchez did not  
include this requirement; thus, it was improper for the  
majority to rely on that case as support for its conclusion.  
The dissent reasoned that, under the applicable version of the  
HCRA, the plain language of the statute required defendant to  
perceive 
plaintiff 
as 
having 
a 
characteristic 
that  
substantially limited a major life activity. 
Because  
plaintiff 
did 
not 
present any evidence that defendant regarded  
her as having a condition that substantially impaired a major  
life activity, the dissent concluded that summary disposition  
was properly granted.  
This Court granted leave to appeal.  461 Mich 1020  
(2000).  
II  
A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR  
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff's claim  
and is subject to de novo review.  Smith v Globe Life Ins Co,  
460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).  In reviewing a motion  
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court  
considers the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary  
8 See 1990 PA 121.  
6  
evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in  
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The motion  
is properly granted if the documentary evidence presented  
shows that there is no genuine issue with respect to any  
material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to  
judgment as a matter of law.  
The HCRA provides that "[a]n employer shall not . . .  
[d]ischarge or otherwise discriminate against an individual  
with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or  
privileges of employment, because of a handicap[9] that is  
unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of  
a particular job or position." 
MCL 37.1202(1)(b); MSA  
3.550(202)(1)(b).  To establish a prima facie case of handicap  
discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is  
handicapped as defined by the HCRA, (2) the handicap is  
unrelated to his ability to perform the duties of his job, and  
(3) he was discriminated against in one of the ways described  
in the statute.  Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 602;  
580 NW2d 817 (1998).  
The act, as amended in 1990, defines handicap for  
employment related purposes as follows:  
(i)
 A determinable physical or mental  
9 The 1998 amendments of the act substituted the word  
“disability” for the word “handicap” throughout the act.  1998  
PA 20.  
7  
characteristic of an individual, which may result 
from disease, injury, congenital condition of  
birth, 
or 
functional 
disorder, 
if 
the  
characteristic:  
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially 
limits 1 or more of the major life activities of 
that 
individual 
and 
is 
unrelated 
to 
the  
individual's ability to perform the duties of a 
particular job or position or substantially limits 
1 or more of the major life activities of that 
individual and is unrelated to the individual's  
qualifications for employment or promotion.  
* * *  
(ii) A history of a determinable physical or 
mental characteristic described in subparagraph 
(i).  
(iii) Being regarded as having a determinable 
physical or mental characteristic described in  
subparagraph (i). 
[ M C L  
3 7 . 1 1 0 3 ( e ) ;  M S A   
3.550(103)(e).][10]  
Relying on subsection (iii), plaintiff argued that defendant  
undertook a course of harassment because he perceived her as  
handicapped. Thus, resolution of this matter requires us to  
construe this subsection of the statute.  
Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, its  
plain meaning reflects legislative intent, and judicial  
construction is not permitted.  McKenzie v Auto Club Ins  
Ass'n, 458 Mich 214, 217; 580 NW2d 424 (1998).  In this case,  
10 Following the 
1998 amendments to the act, the substance 
of MCL 37.1103(e); MSA 3.550(103)(e) is now found in MCL 
37.1103(d); MSA 3.550(103)(d).  Apart from substituting the 
word 
“disability” 
for the word “handicap,” the subsections are 
identical.  
8  
 
  
we find that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.  
Considering the statute in its entirety, to qualify for  
protection under subsection (iii), an employee must be  
“regarded as having a determinable physical or mental  
characteristic,” as that characteristic is described in  
subsection (i) (emphasis added).  Subsection (i)(A) describes  
the 
determinable 
physical or mental characteristic as one that  
“substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities  
of that individual . . . .” 
(emphasis added).
 The  
characteristic must also be unrelated either to “the  
individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job  
or position” or to “the individual’s qualifications for  
employment or promotion.”  
Thus, while a plaintiff need not actually have a  
determinable physical or mental characteristic, to qualify as  
handicapped under subsection (iii), the plain statutory  
language does require that the plaintiff prove the following  
elements: 
(1) the plaintiff was regarded as having a  
determinable physical or mental characteristic; (2) the  
perceived characteristic was regarded as substantially  
limiting one or more of the plaintiff’s major life activities;  
and (3) the perceived characteristic was regarded as being  
unrelated either to the plaintiff’s ability to perform the  
duties of a particular job or position or to the plaintiff’s  
9  
 
qualifications for employment or promotion.11  Only the first  
two elements are at issue in this case.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that reliance  
on Sanchez as support for the conclusion reached by the Court  
of Appeals majority is misplaced.  The version of the HCRA in  
effect at the time of the events in Sanchez contained no  
requirement 
that 
the 
determinable 
physical 
or 
mental  
characteristic substantially limit a major life activity.  
Thus, under the pre-1990 version of the statute, a plaintiff  
only needed to be regarded as having a determinable physical  
or mental characteristic.12  
Finally, we note that the phrase “regarded as having,”  
found in subsection (iii), and the phrases “substantially  
limits” and “is unrelated” found in subsection (i)(A), all  
appear in the present tense.  Depending on whether a plaintiff  
is proceeding under the “actual” or “regarded as” portions of  
the statute, because of the Legislature’s choice of present  
tense language in defining the term handicap, we must evaluate  
the physical or mental characteristic at issue either (1) as  
11 
Contrary 
to 
the dissent’s assertion, this test does not 
require plaintiff to demonstrate that she actually exhibited 
symptoms typical of multiple sclerosis.  
12 Although the dissent purports to be giving effect to 
every phrase, clause, and word of the statute, its analysis 
essentially reads the “substantially limits” requirement out 
of the statute.  
10  
 
  
it actually existed at the time of the plaintiff’s  
employment,13 or (2) as it was perceived at the time of the  
plaintiff’s employment.  
Thus, to qualify for coverage under subsection (iii),  
plaintiff 
must 
be 
regarded 
as 
presently 
having 
a  
characteristic 
that 
currently 
creates 
a 
substantial 
limitation  
of a major life activity.14  In this case, plaintiff did not  
13 See Chmielewski, supra. 
The issue presented in 
Chmielewski was whether, in determining if a person was 
handicapped under the act, “the trier of fact should assess 
the individual without the benefit of medication or other  
mitigating measures, or if it should assess the individual’s 
condition as it presently exists with the benefit of such 
measures.” Id. at 595. Focusing on the statute’s requirement 
that the individual’s condition substantially limits a major 
life activity, the Court held that it must examine the 
plaintiff’s condition as it exists, with the benefit of his 
medication. Id. at 606-607.  
Assessing an actual handicap at the time of employment is 
consistent with the federal approach under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).  In Sutton v United Air Lines, Inc, 
527 US 471, 482-483; 119 S Ct 2139; 144 L Ed 2d 450 (1999), 
the Court stated that “[a] ‘disability’ exists only where an 
impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not 
where 
it 
‘might,’ 
‘could’ or ‘would’ be substantially limiting 
. . . .” Because of the similarities between the HCRA and the  
ADA, analogous federal precedent may be persuasive, although 
not necessarily binding. Chmielewski, supra at 601-602.  
14 The dissent criticizes our focus on the present-tense 
language of the statute.  We remind the dissent that while it  
may seem incongruous that the HCRA does not provide protection 
against discrimination on the basis of a possibility that one 
might become handicapped in the future, our duty is to apply 
the law.  As the author of the dissent observed in her  
discussion concerning
Protection Act: 
the scope of the Whistleblowers’ 
(continued...) 
11 
 
 
present any evidence to create a question of fact regarding  
whether 
defendant 
regarded her as having a characteristic that  
substantially limited a major life activity at the time she  
was his employee.  She presented no evidence that Dr. Bar- 
Levav regarded her as unable to perform basic tasks of  
ordinary life. 
Indeed, from all indications, she was  
physically capable of performing her job duties.  At most,  
plaintiff presented evidence that she informed defendant that  
she 
had 
been 
tentatively diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and  
that he believed that this might substantially limit her major  
life activities in the future.  Thus, the trial court properly  
granted summary disposition on plaintiff's claim that she was  
regarded as handicapped under the HCRA.  
Although plaintiff also argued in the Court of Appeals  
that she was actually handicapped pursuant to subsection (i)  
14(...continued) 
The Legislature could have defined protected 
activity to include confrontation, as in the False 
Claims Act.  It could have allowed employees to 
recover without a showing of reporting or being 
about to report.  It did neither. 
Instead, the 
Legislature defined protected activity as reporting 
a violation or being about to report one.  The  
Legislature can and may rewrite the statute, but we 
will not do so. [Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger,  
Inc, 456 Mich 395, 405-406; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).]  
Consequently, while the Legislature may, and perhaps should, 
amend the HCRA to include within its scope of protection 
discrimination based on the possibility of a future handicap, 
we decline to do so by construing the HCRA in a manner  
inconsistent with its plain language.  
12  
 
of the HCRA, the Court of Appeals did not address this  
argument.  Therefore, we remand this case to the Court of  
Appeals for consideration of plaintiff’s actual handicap  
theory.  
III  
In conclusion, we find that, in order to succeed on a  
claim brought under subsection (iii), the plain language of  
the statute requires an employee prove (1) that the employee  
was regarded as having a determinable physical or mental  
characteristic, (2) that the perceived characteristic was  
regarded as substantially limiting one or more of the  
plaintiff’s major life activities, and (3) that the perceived  
characteristic was regarded as being unrelated either to the  
plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job  
or position or to the plaintiff’s qualifications for  
employment or promotion.  
Moreover, 
depending on whether the claim is brought under  
subsection (i) (“actual” handicap) or subsection (iii)  
(“perceived” handicap), because of the present-tense language  
used in the statute, courts must evaluate the physical or  
mental characteristic at issue either (1) as it actually  
existed at the time of the plaintiff’s employment, or (2) as  
it was perceived at the time of the plaintiff’s employment.  
Because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence  
13  
 
to create a question of fact regarding whether the defendant  
regarded her as having a characteristic that substantially  
limited one or more of her major life activities, we reverse  
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s ruling  
granting 
summary 
disposition 
in 
defendant’s 
favor on  
plaintiff’s claim that she was regarded as handicapped  
pursuant to subsection (iii).  We remand to the Court of  
Appeals for consideration of plaintiff’s actual handicap  
theory.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
14  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CLAUDIA MICHALSKI and MICHAEL J.  
MICHALSKI,  
Plaintiff-Appellees,  
No. 114107  
REUVEN BAR-LEVAV, M.D., and 
DR. REVEN BAR-LEVAV &  
ASSOCIATES, P.C.,  
Defendant-Appellants.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial  
court correctly granted defendants' motion for summary  
disposition. 
 
Plaintiffs 
have 
submitted 
sufficient 
evidence 
to  
create a genuine issue of fact whether Dr. Bar-Levav  
discriminated 
against Ms. Michalski because he thought she was  
handicapped.  Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's  
opinion.  
Plaintiffs brought their claim pursuant to the Michigan  
Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (HCRA).1  The HCRA prohibits  
1MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq. The HCRA  
has been renamed the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights 
(continued...)  
 
employment discrimination on the basis of a handicap.  Its  
definition of a handicap includes "[b]eing regarded as having  
a determinable physical or mental characteristic" that  
"substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities  
of that individual . . . ." 
MCL 37.1103(e); MSA  
3.550(103)(e).  When an employer discriminates against an  
employee because the employer perceives the employee as  
handicapped, the employer is in violation of the HCRA.  See  
Sanchez v Lagoudakis, 440 Mich 496; 486 NW2d 657 (1992), (On  
Remand) 217 Mich App 535; 552 NW2d 472 (1996), rev'd on other  
grounds after remand 458 Mich 704; 581 NW2d 257 (1998).  
In interpreting the scope of subsection (iii) of the HRCA  
using a narrow "present tense" standard, the majority gives it  
a meaning that the Legislature could not have intended. This  
Court has declined to embrace a literal construction of  
statutory language where such literalism would produce  
unreasonable and unjust results inconsistent with the purpose  
of the statute. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hospital, 461 Mich  
394, 403-404; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). In disregard of this  
principle, the majority concludes that, to discriminate under  
the statute, an employer must perceive that its employee has  
a condition that, at the time, substantially limits a major  
1(...continued) 
Act. See 1998 PA 20.  
2  
life activity.  Under this interpretation, if the employer  
discriminated 
against the employee for having a condition that  
would develop into a handicap in the future, it would not  
violate subsection (iii).  No violation of the act would occur  
if 
the 
employer 
discriminated against the employee because the  
employer perceived that the employee had a condition that  
presently was becoming a handicap.  
The majority notes that the HRCA was amended in 1990.  
The amendments effected a slight change in the definition of  
a disability, but did not alter the well-settled purpose of  
the act. They did nothing to change the legislative intent or  
the breadth of the "regarded as" prong as stated in the act  
and described in Sanchez, supra. Under Sanchez, this Court  
determined that a plaintiff need not display symptoms of a  
handicap to be protected by the act. Rather, subsection (iii)  
is violated if an employer discriminates because it believes  
the employee is handicapped, even if the belief is erroneous.  
The majority's "present tense" rendering of subsection  
(iii) whittles the "regarded as" prong down to a nubbin. It  
leaves a subsection (iii) claim virtually indistinguishable  
from a claim under subsection (i).  
Subsection (i) extends protection to those who have an  
"actual handicap." In order to prevail under that subsection,  
an employee must show that he suffers from the symptoms of an  
3  
 
 
actual disease that impedes work. In addition, the employer  
must be shown to have based an adverse employment decision on  
that fact. Subsection (iii) addresses situations where an  
employer is erroneous in believing that the employee has a  
disability. But, under the majority's standard, what would a  
plaintiff have to prove to recover under subsection (iii)?  
For example, Ms. Michalski could not succeed merely by  
showing that Dr. Bar-Levav took an adverse action against her  
because (1) he perceived that she was in a dormant stage of MS  
and that (2) his perception was that she was becoming  
handicapped. Under the majority's "present tense" test, she  
would have to show that (1) she actually exhibited symptoms  
typical of MS, (2) her employer perceived them as limiting her  
life activities, and (3) acted on that perception by taking  
adverse action against her.  
Additionally, despite being required to prove the  
manifest existence of actual symptoms, to succeed under  
subsection (iii), plaintiff would have to show an absence of  
the perceived handicapping disorder. Indeed, if she actually  
suffered from the handicap, recovery would be available under  
subsection (i), obviating any need for subsection (iii).  
Hence, the majority's holding leaves such a narrow avenue for  
recovery under subsection (iii) that it renders the "regarded  
as" prong of the HCRA a virtual dead letter.  
4  
 
Courts must, as far as possible, give effect to every  
phrase, clause, and word of a statute. People v Borchard- 
Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). Moreover,  
courts should avoid unnecessarily reading any portion of a  
statute out of existence because of rigid adherence to the  
doctrines of literalism and plain meaning. See, e.g., Lane v  
Pena, 518 US 187, 199-200; 116 S Ct 1092; 135 L Ed 2d 486  
(1996) (rejecting petitioner's invitation to read certain  
language out of the federal Rehabilitation Act); Mason v Wayne  
Co Bd of Comm'rs, 447 Mich 130, 137; 523 NW2d 791  
(1994)(declining to "read out of existence" the word  
"crosswalks" from the highway exception to Michigan's  
governmental immunity statute); Nalepa v Plymouth-Canton  
Community School Dist, 207 Mich App 580, 588; 525 NW2d 897  
(1995)(rejecting 
an 
interpretation 
that 
"would 
read 
subsection  
5 of the governmental immunity act out of the statute  
entirely").  
The Legislature could not have intended the literal  
"present 
tense" 
interpretation embraced by the majority. It is  
in 
derogation 
of established 
principles 
of 
statutory  
construction.  
A better view would recognize that it is immaterial  
whether an employer who perceives an employee as having a  
substantial limitation, believes it to be "present" or  
5  
"future." If the employer discriminates because it perceives  
the employee is handicapped or is becoming handicapped, it  
violates subsection (iii) of the act. Thus, subsection (iii)  
should 
be 
interpreted 
to 
contemplate 
a 
finding 
of  
discrimination for adverse acts against an employee arising  
from (1) an employer's perception of a handicap and (2) the  
perception that the handicap threatens work, even in the  
future.  
The definition of "handicap" used in the HCRA is similar  
to that used in the federal Americans With Disabilities Act  
(ADA).  ADA case law and regulations can be guides for us in  
interpreting the HCRA.  See Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220  
Mich App 212, 216-217; 559 NW2d 61 (1996).  In Sutton v United  
Airlines,2 the United States Supreme Court stated:  
There 
are 
two 
apparent 
ways 
in 
which  
individuals 
may 
fall 
within 
this 
statutory 
definition:(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes 
that a person has a physical impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life  
activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly 
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment 
substantially limits one or more major life  
activities.  In both cases, it is necessary that a 
covered entity entertain misperceptions about the 
individual-
-
-it must believe either that one has a  
substantially limiting impairment that one does not 
have or that one has a substantially limiting 
impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so 
limiting.  
The Court then identified that an individual may fall  
2527 US 471, 489; 119 S Ct 2139; 144 L Ed 2d 450 (1999).  
6  
within the definition in another way. The ADA, it said, also  
protects individuals "who are regarded as impaired and who, as  
a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity."  
Id. at 489, quoting School Bd of Nassau Co v Arline, 480 US  
273, 284; 107 S Ct 1123; 94 L Ed 2d 307 (1987).  In other  
words "having such an impairment means . . . [having] a  
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major  
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others  
toward such impairment . . . ." 29 CFR 1630.2(l)(2).  
In the Michalskis' case, we are reviewing a trial court's  
decision to grant summary disposition.  We must consider all  
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the  
Michalskis' favor.  Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606,  
617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).  
The majority has acknowledged that "[Ms. Michalski]  
informed defendant that she had been tentatively diagnosed  
with multiple sclerosis and that he believed that this might  
substantially limit her major life activities in the future."  
Federal law considers MS a physical impairment,3 and there is  
no dispute here that it qualifies as a physical characteristic  
under the Michigan statute.  
Plaintiffs presented Dr. Bar-Levav's own testimony that  
he recognized MS as a degenerative neurological disease with  
3See 45 CFR pt 84, app A.  
7  
 
an outcome that can be "very bad."  They alleged that, after  
learning that Ms. Michalski was suspected of having MS, Dr.  
Bar-Levav routinely criticized and berated her work, speech  
and appearance.  When she complained of her symptoms, they  
asserted, he told her that God was punishing her.  
Considering the factual allegations and supporting  
documents in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, I would  
find that a jury could infer that defendant regarded Ms.  
Michalski as handicapped.  In addition, it could conclude that  
she was not handicapped and that defendant acted on his faulty  
perception in violation of the HCRA.  
Plaintiffs created a genuine issue of material fact  
concerning whether Dr. Bar-Levav erroneously regarded Ms.  
Michalski as substantially limited in a major life activity  
because he believed her afflicted with MS. Thus, I would  
affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court grant  
of summary disposition and would remand this case to the trial  
court for further proceedings.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
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