Title: Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Larry Sokolowski
Citation: 2006 WI 103
Docket Number: 2004AP000468
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2006

2006 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP468 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Burbank Grease Services, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Larry Sokolowski and United Grease LLC and 
United Liquid Waste Recycling, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 28 
Reported at: 278 Wis. 2d 698, 693 N.W.2d 89 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Diane M. Nicks   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Michael L. Hermes and Metzler and Hager, S.C., Green Bay, and 
oral argument by David J. Sisson. 
 
For the defendant-respondent Larry Sokolowski there was a 
brief by Stephen J. Eisenberg, Pam M. Baumgartner, and Eisenberg 
Law Offices, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Stephen J. 
Eisenberg. 
 
For the defendants-respondents United Grease LLC and United 
Liquid Waste Recycling, Inc., there was a brief by David E. 
McFarlane, Mark H.T. Fuhrman, Sheila M. Sullivan, and Bell, 
Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Mark H.T. 
Fuhrman. 
 
 
2006 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP468  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV2397) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Burbank Grease Services, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Larry Sokolowski and United Grease LLC and 
United Liquid Waste Recycling, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part; reversed in part and remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case requires us 
to determine whether the trade secret statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90 (2003-04),1 precludes all civil law remedies based on 
the misappropriation of confidential information that falls 
outside of the statutory definition of a trade secret.  We also 
determine 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 943.70(2) criminalizes the 
subsequent misappropriation of confidential information when the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
2 
 
information 
was 
lawfully 
obtained. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
§ 134.90(6)(a) does not preclude all other civil remedies based 
on the misappropriation of confidential information, if the 
information does not meet the statutory definition of a trade 
secret under § 134.90(1)(c).  Accordingly, in the case before 
us, § 134.90(6)(b)2 permits civil tort remedies based on the 
misappropriation 
of 
confidential 
information. 
 
Therefore, 
because the plaintiff's complaint stated other common law claims 
and because material facts relevant to those claims are 
disputed, it was error to dismiss the complaint.  However, we 
also conclude that § 943.70(2) does not apply when an individual 
lawfully obtains computer-stored confidential information, but 
later 
misappropriates 
it. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
plaintiff's 
§ 943.70(2) claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment.  
Accordingly, we affirm in part; reverse in part and remand to 
the circuit court for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND2 
¶2 
Burbank Grease Services, LLC (Burbank) is engaged in 
the business of collecting and processing used restaurant fry 
grease, trap grease, and industrial grease.  In 2001, Burbank 
had approximately 11,250 customers in Wisconsin and 3,200 in 
surrounding states.  About 65% of Burbank's customers were 
restaurants; the rest were grease trap and industrial customers.   
                                                 
2 In order to resolve the legal issues presented by this 
review, we take the following facts derived from the pleadings 
and affidavits as true, but only for the purpose of our review.  
See Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 229, 321 N.W.2d 182 
(1982). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Larry Sokolowski (Sokolowski) was employed by Burbank 
in various management positions from November 1997 to April 
2001.  When he resigned from Burbank, Sokolowski was territory 
manager.  His duties in that position included the oversight of 
sales 
people, 
the 
management 
of 
customer 
relations 
with 
industrial clients and the preparation of spreadsheets and 
billings for Burbank's accountant.   
¶4 
Burbank distributed a code of conduct in regard to 
confidential information that it required all managers to 
acknowledge and to follow.  The code provided that "[n]o . . . 
employee 
shall 
disclose 
any 
confidential 
or 
privileged 
information to any person within the Company who does not have a 
need to know or to any outside individual or organization except 
as required in the normal course of business."  Sokolowski was 
aware of this provision. 
¶5 
All Burbank employees received an employee handbook 
that contained a provision requiring non-disclosure of trade 
secret and confidential business information.  The handbook 
provided that disclosure could result in disciplinary action, 
including termination.  The handbook provision also stated that 
employees might be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement 
as a condition of employment.  Sokolowski acknowledged in 
writing that he received and understood this provision.3  
                                                 
3 The non-disclosure section of the employee handbook reads 
as follows: 
The 
protection 
of 
confidential 
business 
information 
and 
trade 
secrets 
is 
vital 
to 
the 
interests 
and 
the 
success 
of 
[Burbank]. 
 
Such 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On April 15, 2001, Sokolowski signed an employment 
agreement with United Liquid Waste Recycling, Inc. (United 
Liquid), and on April 20, 2001, he resigned from Burbank.  Prior 
to 
resigning, 
he 
obtained 
confidential 
information 
from 
Burbank's computer system.  He took the following information 
with him when he left:  (1) a hardcopy of a list of Burbank's 
grease trap customers, containing about 2,400 names, phone 
numbers and addresses, contact persons, total gallons for each 
grease trap, and pricing Burbank had applied to each customer; 
(2) a spreadsheet of Burbank's industrial clients that showed 
the amount of grease collected from each customer times the 
market rate less a processing fee, which determined what Burbank 
                                                                                                                                                             
confidential information includes, but is not limited 
to, the following examples: 
• computer processes 
• computer programs and codes 
• customer lists 
• financial information 
• marketing strategies 
• new materials research 
• pending projects and proposals 
• proprietary production processes 
• research and development strategies 
• technological data 
• technological prototypes 
Employees 
who 
are 
exposed 
to 
confidential 
information may be required to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement as a condition of employment.  Employees who 
improperly 
use 
or 
disclose 
trade 
secrets 
or 
confidential business information will be subject to 
disciplinary action, up to and including termination 
of employment and legal action, even if they do not 
actually benefit from the disclosed information. 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
5 
 
would pay the customer for the material collected;4 and (3) a 
computerized spreadsheet showing the amount of collections and 
revenues per customer for certain drivers, organized by the 
driver's route.  Sokolowski took the information with him when 
he left Burbank's employ, without Burbank's permission and with 
the knowledge that Burbank considered all of this information 
confidential. 
¶7 
On April 25, 2001, Sokolowski began working for United 
Liquid as a sales and customer service representative.  United 
Liquid provided waste and cake sludge hauling and glass, metal, 
and plastic recycling services to industrial, municipal, and 
commercial clients throughout Wisconsin.  Sokolowski and United 
Liquid later formed United Grease, LLC (United Grease), which 
began collecting fry grease, trap grease and industrial grease 
in direct competition with Burbank.   
¶8 
Sokolowski 
had 
Burbank's 
confidential 
information 
entered into United Liquid's computer system.  Sokolowski used 
this confidential information to solicit customers for United 
Grease.   
¶9 
Subsequently, United Grease acquired about 80 fry 
grease customers, which were mostly former Burbank customers, 
and 157 grease trap customers, the majority of which were former 
                                                 
4 Burbank points out in its briefs that this was a 
specialized pricing/payment formula based on the customer's 
grease yield percentage after Burbank's processing costs, and 
that no other competitor possessed this information, nor was it 
available through proper means. 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
6 
 
Burbank customers.  United Grease also managed to acquire one or 
two of Burbank's former industrial customers. 
¶10 When 
Burbank 
became 
aware 
that 
Sokolowski 
was 
soliciting its customers, it filed this action alleging that 
Sokolowski misappropriated Burbank's trade secrets in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 134.90; breached his duty of loyalty to Burbank, 
which he owed as Burbank's agent; intentionally interfered with 
Burbank's business relationships; and committed computer crimes 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.70(2).  The complaint also 
alleged that United Grease and United Liquid had aided and 
abetted Sokolowski in the breach of his duty of loyalty; had 
conspired 
to 
deprive 
Burbank 
of 
its 
customers; 
and 
had 
intentionally interfered with Burbank's business relationships.   
¶11 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the 
complaint. 
 
The 
circuit 
court5 
concluded 
that 
Burbank's 
confidential information was not protected by Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90(6), the trade secret statute, because the information 
did not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret.  The 
circuit court also concluded that by enacting § 134.90(6), all 
common law tort claims based on the misappropriation of 
confidential information were precluded, except those that 
involved information that met the statutory definition of a 
trade secret.  And further, the court concluded that there had 
                                                 
5 The Honorable Diane M. Nicks, circuit court judge for Dane 
County, presided.  
No. 
2004AP468   
 
7 
 
been no computer crime under Wis. Stat. § 943.70(2) because 
Sokolowski 
was 
authorized 
to 
obtain 
the 
computer-stored 
information when he obtained it.   
¶12 Burbank appealed the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.  We review that 
decision. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶13 This case requires us to review summary judgment 
dismissing Burbank's complaint.  When we do so, we independently 
apply the same methodology as the circuit court.  Green Spring 
Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  The summary judgment awarded here is driven by the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(6) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.70.  Statutory construction or a statute's application to 
a 
set 
of 
facts 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
decide 
independently, owing no deference to the decisions of other 
courts.  Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 853, 434 
N.W.2d 773 (1989). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
8 
 
B. 
Statutory Construction 
 
1. 
General principles 
¶14 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  We look first at the plain language of the 
statute, taking into consideration the context in which the 
provision 
under 
consideration 
is 
used. 
 
Id., 
¶¶45-46.  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning."  Id., ¶45.  The scope, history and purpose of the 
statute are also "relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of 
an unambiguous statute as long as [they] are ascertainable from 
the text and structure of the statute itself."  Id., ¶48.  When 
a word of common usage is not defined in a statute, we may turn 
to a dictionary to ascertain its meaning.  See Garcia v. Mazda 
Motor of Am., Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶14, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 
365.  If the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may consider 
extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to aid in our 
analysis.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶50.  However, we may consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
"to 
confirm 
or 
verify 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation."  Id., ¶51.   
2. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90(1)(c) defines the term "trade 
secret" 
and 
§ 134.90(2) 
prohibits 
any 
person 
from 
misappropriating a trade secret through a variety of specific 
acts set forth in the statute.  The statute also permits courts 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
9 
 
to grant injunctions, § 134.90(3), and to award damages in 
addition to, or in lieu of, injunctive relief, § 134.90(4).   
¶16 Previous judicial decisions that Burbank has not 
appealed have concluded, for purposes of this case, that 
Burbank's confidential information Sokolowski, United Grease and 
United 
Liquid 
used 
did 
not 
qualify 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c) as trade secrets.  Accordingly, we do not decide 
whether the confidential information that Sokolowski took from 
Burbank would qualify as trade secrets under § 134.90(1)(c).  
Instead, we are asked to construe subsec. (6) of § 134.90 to 
determine if it precludes Burbank's other claims for relief, 
even though what was taken did not qualify as trade secrets.   
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90(6) states: 
Effect on other laws.  (a) Except as provided in 
par. (b), this section displaces conflicting tort law, 
restitutionary law and any other law of this state 
providing a civil remedy for misappropriation of a 
trade secret.   
(b) This section does not affect any of the 
following: 
1. 
Any contractual remedy, whether or not based 
upon misappropriation of a trade secret.   
2. 
Any 
civil 
remedy 
not 
based 
upon 
misappropriation of a trade secret. 
3. 
Any criminal remedy, whether or not based 
upon misappropriation of a trade secret. 
¶18 Burbank argues that the statutory language explicitly 
preserved its common law claims, because those claims were not 
based on the misappropriation of a trade secret and therefore, 
fit squarely within Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(b)2.  The defendants, 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
10 
 
on the other hand, urge us to adopt the court of appeals ruling, 
that all of Burbank's claims are pre-empted by § 134.90(6)(a).  
They argue that the legislative intent underlying the statute 
was to encompass all claims based upon confidential business 
information, even when a claim does not allege or depend on 
determining that the confidential information met the statutory 
definition of a trade secret.   
¶19 We begin our statutory construction by examining the 
plain language of the statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46.  
When we examine the language of para. (6)(a) and subd. (6)(b)2 
in the context of Wis. Stat. § 134.90, we first focus on the 
term "trade secret."  This is because the "effect on other laws" 
provision, para. (6)(a), specifically states that the statute 
displaces "any other law of this state providing a civil remedy 
for misappropriation of a trade secret."  (Emphasis added.)  
"Trade secret" is defined in para. (1)(c) of § 134.90, and as we 
explained above, Burbank has not appealed the conclusion that 
its confidential information that Sokolowski took was not a 
trade secret, as defined in § 134.90(1)(c). 
¶20 Accordingly, 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(6)(a) appears to have the effect of making § 134.90 the 
exclusive remedy for civil claims based on the misappropriation 
of a statutorily-defined trade secret.   However, what is at 
issue here is whether para. (6)(a) precludes Burbank's other 
tort claims, which were not based on the theory that the 
confidential information Sokolowski took constituted a trade 
secret, as defined in § 134.90(1)(c).   
No. 
2004AP468   
 
11 
 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90(6)(a) prefaces its preclusive 
language with "[e]xcept as provided in par. (b)," indicating 
that despite the expressed intent of one paragraph of the trade 
secret statute to displace other remedies for trade secret 
misappropriation, another paragraph of the statute expressly 
states that there remain claims based on the misappropriation of 
confidential information that will not be affected by § 134.90.  
For example, subd. (6)(b)2 provides that subsec. (6) does not 
affect "[a]ny civil remedy not based upon misappropriation of a 
trade secret."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶22 Focusing on the common word "any" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90(6)(b)2, we use a dictionary definition for assistance.  
See Garcia, 273 Wis. 2d 612, ¶14.  "Any" is defined as:  "one or 
some indiscriminately of whatever kind"; and "unmeasured or 
unlimited in amount, number, or extent."  Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary 51 (5th ed. 1977).  "Any" is a very broad 
term.  Accordingly, we conclude that its use evinces a broad 
range of civil remedies that are not precluded by para. (6)(a).  
Subdivision (6)(b)2 excepts from the class of unaffected 
remedies only those remedies based on the misappropriation of a 
statutorily-defined trade secret.  It leaves available all other 
remaining civil remedies for the protection of confidential 
information.  
¶23 The statutory term "civil remedy" is a technical term 
that is given its technical, legal meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶45.  Black's Law Dictionary aids us in this regard.  It 
defines "remedy" as: 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
12 
 
The means of enforcing a right or preventing or 
redressing a wrong; legal or equitable relief. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1320 (8th ed. 1990).  We conclude the sum 
effect of the statutory terms is that civil claims for relief 
are not abrogated by Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(b)2, with the 
exception of those civil tort claims that require the use of a 
statutorily-defined trade secret.  It follows that all other 
types of civil tort claims that Burbank may assert in regard to 
the misuse of its confidential information remain available to 
it under the directive of § 134.90(6)(b)2. 
¶24 Furthermore, to adopt the court of appeals' view, that 
para. (6)(a) in combination with subd. (6)(b)2 precludes all 
Burbank's common law claims, would require us to read into the 
statute the following underlined language: 
(b) This section does not affect any of the 
following: 
. . .  
2. 
Any 
civil 
remedy 
not 
based 
upon 
misappropriation of a trade secret and not based on 
confidential business information.6 
                                                 
6 The relevant language of the court of appeals decision 
supports our conclusion that it has the effect of adding 
language to the statute:   
We construe § 134.90(6) to preempt common law claims 
for unauthorized use of confidential information that 
does not meet the statutory definition of a trade 
secret, 
as 
well 
as 
common 
law 
claims, 
however 
denominated, that are based solely on allegations or 
evidence either of misappropriation of a trade secret 
in violation of § 134.90(1) and (2) or unauthorized 
use of confidential information. 
Burbank Grease Svcs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2005 WI App 28, ¶37, 
278 Wis. 2d 698, 693 N.W.2d 89 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
13 
 
However, the legislature did not choose the language employed by 
the court of appeals, and we are not free to add it.  
¶25 We discussed our obligation to use restraint in adding 
words to those chosen by the legislature in State v. Hall, 207 
Wis. 2d 54, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997), where we quoted with 
approval, the United States Supreme Court's refusal to add 
language to an unambiguous statute:  
Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional 
questions, 
but 
this 
interpretative 
canon 
is not 
license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted 
by the legislature.  Any other conclusion, while 
purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint, 
would trench upon the legislative powers vested in 
Congress . . . .  Proper respect for those powers 
implies that "[s]tatutory construction must begin with 
the language employed by Congress and the assumption 
that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose."   
Id. at 83-84 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 
680 (1985)).  To adopt the court of appeals' interpretation, as 
the 
defendants 
advocate, 
would 
require 
us 
to 
expressly 
contradict the principle that it is the legislature that chooses 
the words of a statute. 
¶26 The defendants also urge us to conclude that subsec. 
(7) of Wis. Stat. § 134.90, the uniformity clause, supports the 
court of appeals' interpretation.  Subsection (7) states:  
Uniformity of application and construction.  This 
section shall be applied and construed to make uniform 
the law relating to misappropriation of trade secrets 
among states enacting substantially identical laws. 
The plain 
language 
of subsec. (7) 
relates 
only to the 
"misappropriation of trade secrets," which, according to our 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
14 
 
analysis of subd. (6)(b)2 and the plain meaning of subsec. (7), 
requires a statutorily-defined trade secret as a prerequisite.  
Our construction in this regard is in accord with the promotion 
of uniformity by subsec. (7), because the statutory definition 
of a trade secret is made uniform throughout the states enacting 
a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and our 
application of that definition has been in accord with other 
UTSA jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 851; 
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 
899 (Minn. 1983); Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 
00CV5141 (GBD), 2006 WL 839022, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 
2006).  
¶27 We discussed the purpose and effect of Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90 four years after its enactment, in Minuteman.  We held 
that the 1986 passage of the Wisconsin version of the UTSA 
displaced the previously controlling common law definition of a 
trade secret in Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc.  v. 
Hosch, 109 Wis. 2d 290, 325 N.W.2d 883 (1982).7  Minuteman, 147 
Wis. 2d at 851-52.  However, we also reasoned that the 
                                                 
7 In Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109 
Wis. 2d 290, 325 N.W.2d 883 (1982), we held that an insurance 
agency's customer list and expiration list were not trade 
secrets.  We followed previous common law on trade secret 
determinations, applying the six factors of Restatement of the 
Law of Torts, Vol. 4, § 757 cmt. b (1939), as the test for 
determining whether the information met the criteria for 
classification as a trade secret.  Corroon, 109 Wis. 2d at 295.  
This definition was changed by the passage of Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90.  Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 851, 
434 N.W.2d 773 (1989). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
15 
 
definition used in Corroon of a trade secret remained "helpful."  
Id. at 853.  We did not address § 134.90(6)(b)2 in Minuteman 
because it was not relevant to the questions presented.   
¶28 Our analysis of the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90(6)(b)2 results in only one reasonable interpretation; 
therefore, the statute is not ambiguous.  Our interpretive 
inquiry would normally stop here.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  
However, we also note that we can use legislative history to 
confirm a plain-meaning interpretation.  Id., ¶50.  The 
legislative history does so here.   
¶29 The Special Committee on the UTSA, established and 
directed 
by 
the 
Legislative 
Council 
to 
investigate 
the 
desirability of incorporating uniform trade secret protections 
into state law, issued a 1984 Staff Brief that explained the 
various implications of the potential adoption of the UTSA.  
That report cited comments of the UTSA Commissioners to explain 
the purpose of its effect on other law: 
Section 7(a) of the [Uniform Trade Secrets] Act 
states 
that 
it 
"displaces 
conflicting 
tort, 
restitutionary, and other law of [the enacting state] 
pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of 
a trade secret."  Section 7(b) provides that the law 
does not affect contractual or other civil liability 
or relief that is not based on misappropriation of a 
trade 
secret 
or 
criminal 
liability 
for 
misappropriation of a trade secret.   
The 
Commissioners' 
Comments 
state 
that 
the 
[Uniform Trade Secrets] Act is not intended to be a 
comprehensive remedy.  According to the Comment, it 
applies to duties imposed by law in order to protect 
competitively significant secret information.  The Act 
does not apply to duties voluntarily assumed through 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
16 
 
an express or an implied-in-fact contract.  For 
example, 
the 
enforceability of 
covenants 
not to 
disclose trade secrets, and covenants not to compete 
that are intended to protect trade secrets, are 
governed by other law.  Also, the Act does not apply 
to duties imposed by law which are not dependent upon 
the existence of competitively significant secret 
information, like an agent's duty of loyalty to his or 
her principal.   
Wis. Legis. Council, Staff Brief 84-9, Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, at 8 (Aug. 14, 1984) (emphasis added).  The commissioners' 
comment that the UTSA was not enacted to be the exclusive remedy 
for 
misappropriation 
of 
confidential 
information 
is 
a 
confirmation 
that 
our 
plain 
meaning 
analysis 
accurately 
interprets Wis. Stat. § 134.90. 
¶30 The court of appeals relied on opinions from other 
jurisdictions for its conclusion that all claims for the 
misappropriation of confidential information are abrogated by 
Wisconsin's enacting a version of the UTSA.  See Burbank Grease, 
278 Wis. 2d 698, ¶¶29-37.  Most of the decisions were from 
federal courts.  They did not rely on interpretations of state 
statutes, as we do, but rather, they relied only on the nature 
of the UTSA as creating generally uniform laws, as does the 
dissent.  
¶31  We recognize that Wis. Stat. § 134.90 is derived from 
the UTSA; that 44 states have adopted some version of the UTSA; 
and that those states' interpretations of similar statutes may 
serve as useful extrinsic sources to assist in statutory 
construction, if required.  However, as explained above, we 
conclude that the legislative history of Wisconsin's enactment 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
17 
 
of the UTSA is more persuasive because it affirms the plain 
meaning of § 134.90(6)(b)2. 
¶32 Furthermore, even if we were to employ cases from 
other jurisdictions as extrinsic sources for the interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 134.90, we conclude that they do not support the 
conclusion that all of Burbank's tort claims based on the 
misappropriation 
of 
confidential 
information 
have 
been 
abrogated.8  Our review of the cited cases shows that only a few 
of them support the conclusion of the court of appeals.9  But 
rather, after a review of all of those cited decisions, we 
determine that three categories of cases emerge:  (1) when the 
claims are based only on the misuse of confidential information 
that fits the statutory definition of a trade secret, a claim 
                                                 
8 Some cases use the term "preempted" and other cases use 
the term "displaced" when referring to those claims that cannot 
be brought due to the UTSA.  We use the term "abrogated" because 
preemption is a legal term of art and displaced is imprecise.   
9 See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, L.P. v. Playwood Toys, 
Inc., No. 94C6884, 1999 WL 529572 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1999); 
Bliss Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest Brake Bond Co., 270 
F. Supp. 2d 943, 948-49 (W.D. Mich. 2003).   
No. 
2004AP468   
 
18 
 
under the UTSA is the only tort claim available;10 (2) when the 
claims are based on the misuse of confidential information that 
does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret, the 
UTSA does not abrogate those claims;11 and (3) when the claims 
are based on misuse of confidential information, some of which 
meet the statutory definition of a trade secret and some of 
                                                 
10 See R.K. Enter., LLC v. Pro-Comp Mgmt., Inc., 356 Ark. 
565, at 571 (2004) (concluding that tort claims of conversion 
and conspiracy stem from the same acts that were found to be 
misappropriations of trade secrets and therefore, are abrogated 
by the potential award of damages for the trade secret claim); 
Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini, No. 01C6405, 2003 WL 1989605, 
at *22 (N.D. Ill. April 28, 2002) (concluding that claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and promissory estoppel are 
based on misuse of trade secrets and therefore, are precluded as 
separate claims under the Illinois Trade Secret Act); On-Line 
Techs. v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 141 F. Supp. 2d 246, 260-61 (D. 
Conn. 2001) (precluding claims including unjust enrichment where 
the plaintiff sought to recover only for the misuse of trade 
secrets); Glasstech, Inc. v. TGL Tempering Sys., Inc., 50 
F. Supp. 2d 722, 730-31 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (precluding common law 
claims where claims were based only on the misappropriation of 
trade secrets); Hutchison v. KFC Corp., 809 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 
(D. Nev. 1992) (precluding that plaintiff's unjust enrichment 
and unfair competition claims because they are based solely on 
trade secrets). 
11 See Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. P'ship v. Airtek, 
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (concluding that to 
the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, 
plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., 
Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652, 
658-59 (E.D. Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not 
based on information determined to be a trade secret, could 
proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 
(E.D. Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are 
premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. 
Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 465 n.3 (2000) (concluding that claims 
based solely upon the misappropriation of trade secrets are 
abrogated by the UTSA). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
19 
 
which do not, the UTSA abrogates claims only to the extent that 
they are based on a trade secret; separate claims based on other 
factual allegations survive.12  These classes of cases are 
                                                 
12 See Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 898 (Del. 
2002) (ruling that plaintiff's common law claims were properly 
precluded where all claims seeking civil remedies were based 
solely on the alleged misappropriation of a trade secret); 
Automed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921-22 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001) (allowing a former employer to pursue two breach of 
fiduciary duty claims against former employee because former 
employees 
may 
have 
started 
inappropriately 
plotting 
their 
departure and competitive use of confidential information while 
still employed by former employer, even where other claims were 
abrogated by the trade secret statute); Corporate Express Office 
Prods. v. Brown, Nos. 00C608C & 00C666C, 2001 WL 34381111, at 
*13 (W.D. Wis. July 18, 2001) (concluding that claim was not 
abrogated insofar as it was not based on the misappropriation of 
a trade secret); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 
F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-73 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (concluding that breach 
of fiduciary duty claim was based solely on misappropriation of 
trade secret and therefore, abrogated by the UTSA); Paint Brush 
Corp. v. Neu, 599 N.W.2d 384, 391-93 (S.D. 1999) (holding that 
where a breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on evidence that 
employee was taking steps to compete with employer while still 
employed was not abrogated by trade secrets statute); Thermodyne 
Food Serv. Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 940 F. Supp. 1300, 
1309 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty 
claim premised on conduct other than the misappropriation of 
trade secret technology would survive, but declined to allow the 
claim before it because it was based on a trade secret); Powell 
Prods., Inc. v. Marks, 948 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo. 1996) 
(concluding that "preemption is only appropriate where 'other 
claims are no more than a restatement of the same operative 
facts which would plainly and exclusively spell out only trade 
secret misappropriation'"); Web Communic'ns Group, Inc. v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 316, 321-22 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(concluding that unjust enrichment claim was abrogated to the 
extent it is based upon a trade secret); Smithfield Ham & Prods. 
Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346, 348-49 (E.D. Va. 
1995); (concluding that tortious interference with contract 
claims were not abrogated by Virginia's UTSA where those claims 
did not rely on the misappropriation of trade secrets); Omnitech 
Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on trade 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
20 
 
helpful and Burbank could easily fit within those cases 
comprising the second class.  However, as we explained, cases 
from other jurisdictions cannot substitute for our construction 
of the relevant Wisconsin Statute.  
¶33 In sum, we interpret the comment in the legislative 
history, our Minuteman holding and the three classes of cases 
from other jurisdictions as support of our interpretation that 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(a) and (b)2, taken 
together, are meant to do the following:  (1) replace all pre-
existing definitions of "trade secret" and remedies for tort 
claims dependent solely on the existence of a specific class of 
information statutorily defined as "trade secrets"; and (2) 
leave available all other types of civil actions that do not 
depend on information that meets the statutory definition of a 
"trade secret."  Therefore, any civil tort claim not grounded in 
a trade secret, as defined in the statute, remains available to 
Burbank.  Accordingly, we overrule the contrary conclusion of 
the court of appeals, and we withdraw language from any case 
that 
relied 
on 
the 
holding 
of 
Burbank 
in 
regard 
to 
§ 134.90(6)(a) and (b)2.  See, e.g., Aon Risk Servs., Inc. v. 
Liebenstein, 2006 WI App 4, ¶10, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 710 N.W.2d 
175. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
secret information was abrogated by the Louisiana statute's 
preclusion provision, but allowed other breach of fiduciary duty 
claims, although ultimately rejecting them because there was no 
contractual agreement that would create a fiduciary duty). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
21 
 
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.70(2) 
¶34 We also interpret Wis. Stat. § 943.70, the computer 
crimes statute, to ascertain if Burbank has stated a claim under 
the statute sufficient to survive summary judgment review.  The 
language of § 943.70(2), under which Burbank makes its claim, is 
as follows: 
Offenses against computer data and programs.  (a)  
Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization 
does any of the following may be penalized as provided 
in pars. (b) and (c):  
 
1. 
Modifies 
data, 
computer 
programs 
or 
supporting documentation.   
 
2. 
Destroys 
data, 
computer 
programs 
or 
supporting documentation. 
 
3. 
Accesses computer programs or supporting 
documentation.  
 
4. 
Takes possession of data, computer programs 
or supporting documentation. 
 
5. 
Copies data, computer programs or supporting 
documentation. 
 
6. 
Discloses restricted access codes or other 
restricted access information to unauthorized persons.   
¶35 Burbank argues that the phrase "other restricted 
access information" means any information to which access is 
somehow 
restricted, 
including 
the 
substantive 
information 
contained within a computer's database.  We disagree.  First, 
Burbank 
contends 
that 
Sokolowski 
improperly 
disclosed 
confidential information to the other defendants that had been 
stored on its computer.  It does not allege that he obtained the 
information 
from 
Burbank's 
computer 
without 
authorization.  
No. 
2004AP468   
 
22 
 
However, in order to potentially come within the ambit of para. 
(2)(a), Sokolowski must have taken the information "willfully, 
knowingly and without authorization."     
¶36 Second, we note that subd. (2)(a)6 does not use the 
term "data" as do subds. 1, 2, 4 and 5.  Yet it appears that 
Burbank's complaint is centered on an alleged taking possession 
of 
Burbank's 
data. 
 
"Data" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.70(1)(f) as follows: 
[A] representation of information, knowledge, facts, 
concepts or instructions that has been prepared or is 
being prepared in a formalized manner and has been 
processed, is being processed or is intended to be 
processed in a computer system or computer network.  
Data may be in any form including computer printouts, 
magnetic storage media, punched cards and as stored in 
the memory of the computer.  Data are property. 
Subdivision (2)(a)4 addresses the taking of data.  However, as 
noted above, Sokolowski would have had to take possession of the 
data without authorization in order to contravene subd. 4 and 
Burbank makes no such allegation.   
¶37 We interpret the phrase "other restricted access 
information" in subd. (2)(a)6 as referring to another type of 
information that is not "data," yet is critical to the 
protection of computers.  We do so because "restricted access 
codes" is joined with "other restricted access information" in 
the statute by "or," such that their function within the statute 
is to act as alternatives.  They apply to the same general 
proscription of impermissible computer access.  The former 
phrase is more specific about the vehicle for access and the 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
23 
 
latter more general.   A plain reading of terms stated in the 
alternative leads us to conclude that subd. 6 was meant to 
prohibit disclosing information that would permit unauthorized 
persons to access restricted or confidential information.  There 
has been no allegation that Sokolowski provided information to 
others that would permit them to access Burbank's computer 
system. 
¶38 We note that the legislative history supports the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 943.70, as it did with Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90.  Subdivision (2)(a)6 of § 943.70 was not a part of the 
original version of § 943.70.  The legislature added that 
provision in 1983 Wisconsin Act 438.  The drafting records 
reveal that then Deputy Attorney General, Ed Garvey, in a memo 
dated January 30, 1984 to Representative Gary Johnson and 
Senator Mordecai Lee, suggested the addition of the subd. 6 to 
§ 943.70 "to correct an oversight in the original law."  His 
memo 
indicates 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice's 
concern 
with 
attempted and actual penetration of computer systems through 
restricted access codes and other information that facilitated 
access.13 
                                                 
13 The Garvey memo states:  
A simple phrase such as "discloses restricted access 
codes or other access information to unauthorized 
persons" 
would 
suffice 
to 
cover 
intentional 
unauthorized disclosure of such information. 
We question whether there is a need for different 
penalties for disclosure, one if it results in 
attempted penetration of a system and another in case 
of actual penetration. 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
24 
 
The provision was originally drafted as follows: 
Discloses information which he or she knows may enable 
another person to access data, computer programs or 
supporting documentation without authorization.  This 
subdivision applies only if another person actually 
gains that access. 
1983 A.B. 695 Draft at 2.  However, in the course of drafting 
amendments, it was changed to the current version: 
Discloses restricted access codes or other restricted 
access information to unauthorized persons.   
1983 Wis. Act 438, § 5.  And finally, the Legislative Reference 
Bureau's statement of purpose supports our plain reading of 
subd. (2)(a)6:  "The bill prohibits a person from wilfully and 
without authorization disclosing to another person how to access 
data, computer programs or supporting documentation."  1983 A.B. 
695 Draft, LRB analysis. 
¶39 In 
sum, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
construction of Wis. Stat. § 943.70(2)(a)6, that it prohibits 
the unauthorized disclosure of codes, passwords or other 
information that grants access to restricted-access systems.  
Burbank Grease, 278 Wis. 2d 698, ¶45.  We also agree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that the statute was not meant to 
criminalize the disclosure of all types of information that 
could be stored on a computer, when that information was 
obtained with authorization in the first instance.  Id.  
Burbank's interpretation of the statute would create the overly 
broad result of criminalizing any unauthorized disclosure of 
information that had once been stored on a computer that had 
restricted access, even though the individual had authorization 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
25 
 
to access the information when he obtained it.  Nothing in the 
statute suggests that is what the legislature meant to do.   
D. 
Summary Judgment Review 
 
1. 
General principles 
¶40 Appellate 
review 
of 
summary 
judgment 
decisions 
involves several steps.  We first review the complaint to 
determine if it states a claim for relief.  Westphal v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 569, 669 N.W.2d 
166.  We then examine the answer to see if it joins issues of 
fact or law.  Id.  Once we have concluded that the complaint and 
answer join issue, we examine the moving party's affidavits to 
determine if they make a prima facie showing that it is 
appropriate to grant summary judgment to the movant.  Id.  
Summary judgment is proper if "there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and [one] party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law."  Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 
148, ¶11, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  In evaluating the evidence, we draw all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 339, 294 
N.W.2d 473 (1980). 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
26 
 
2. 
The pleading of civil law claims 
¶41 We begin by examining Burbank's civil law claims 
against Sokolowski, United Grease and United Liquid that are not 
based on a statutorily-defined trade secret, to determine if all 
facts pleaded were proved true whether Burbank would be entitled 
to relief.  Westphal, 266 Wis. 2d 569, ¶9.  The remaining claims 
are:  (1) Sokolowski breached the duty of loyalty he owed to 
Burbank as its agent; (2) United Grease and United Liquid 
knowingly aided and abetted Sokolowski's breach of his duty of 
loyalty; (3) all defendants unlawfully interfered with Burbank's 
business relationships; and (4) all defendants conspired to 
unlawfully interfere with Burbank's business relationships.   
¶42 A claim for the breach of an agent's duty of loyalty 
may sound both in tort and in contract.  See Aon, 2006 WI App 4, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶8; Harman v. La Crosse Tribune, 117 Wis. 2d 
448, 454-55, 344 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1984).  When such a claim 
is made against an employee, the first question is whether the 
agent has a fiduciary relationship with the employer.  Burg v. 
Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 330 
N.W.2d 192 (1983).  If the employee is a "key employee," then a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty will exist.  Aon, 2006 WI App 4, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶26 (citing Burg, 111 Wis. 2d at 4-7).  Whether an 
employee is a "key employee" depends on the precise nature of 
his or her employment duties, which determination requires a 
factual inquiry.  Aon, 2006 WI App 4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶28.   
¶43 If a duty of loyalty exists, and a third party 
encourages and profits from a breach of the duty of loyalty, a 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
27 
 
claim for aiding and abetting the breach will lie.  St. Francis 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hearthside Homes, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 74, 80, 
221 N.W.2d 840 (1974).  This, again, is a fact specific inquiry.  
Id.  
¶44 Interference with a present or prospective contractual 
relationship requires proof of the following five elements:  
"(1) the plaintiff had a contract or prospective contractual 
relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant interfered 
with the relationship; (3) the interference was intentional; (4) 
a causal connection exists between the interference and the 
damages; and (5) the defendant was not justified or privileged 
to interfere."  Hoey Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Ricci, 2002 WI App 
231, ¶27, 256 Wis. 2d 347, 653 N.W.2d 763.  All of these 
elements require full factual development. 
¶45 However, "a civil pleading need not define issues or 
state detailed facts; only 'fair notice' . . . of what the claim 
is and the grounds upon which it rests" are required.  State ex 
rel. Adell v. Smith, 2001 WI App 168, ¶¶5-6, 247 Wis. 2d 260, 
633 N.W.2d 231.  It is also true that when a court analyzes a 
complaint to determine whether it states a particular claim for 
relief, the label given the claim in the complaint is not 
dispositive.  Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 
169-70, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).  
¶46 We conclude that Burbank has sufficiently stated 
claims against the defendants.  For example, regarding Burbank's 
claim that Sokolowski breached the duty of loyalty he owed 
Burbank as its agent, Burbank alleged: 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
28 
 
9. 
. . . prior to his departure from Burbank, 
Sokolowski obtained a computer generated report from 
Burbank's computer system, containing valuable and 
confidential 
information 
about 
the 
business 
relationships Burbank had with its customers . . . . 
. . .  
18. As Procurement/Territory Manager at Burbank, 
Sokolowski owed Burbank certain duties of an agent to 
a principal, including, a duty of loyalty and a duty 
not to disclose information material to his agency.  
Sokolowski stood in a confidential relationship to 
Burbank 
regarding 
the 
trade 
secrets 
and 
other 
confidential 
data 
provided 
to 
him 
as 
Procurement/Territory Manager at Burbank. 
Complaint (Dane County Cir. Ct. July 30, 2002).  In regard to 
United Liquid and United Grease, as well as Sokolowski, Burbank 
alleged: 
 
10. Sokolowski took information he received from 
Burbank's customer database and entered or directed 
someone to enter that information into United Grease's 
computer database. 
 
11. Sokolowski and United Grease are using the 
valuable and confidential information obtained from 
Burbank to solicit customers of Burbank to do business 
with United Grease. 
 
12. As a result of the illegal and unauthorized 
use of confidential information belonging to Burbank, 
Sokolowski 
and 
United 
Grease 
have 
succeeded 
in 
diverting substantial customer relationships away from 
Burbank, resulting in loss of profits to Burbank. 
. . .  
 
25. United Grease and United Liquid Waste were 
aware 
of 
the 
agency 
and 
other 
duties 
owed 
by 
Sokolowski to Burbank.  
 
26. United 
Grease 
and 
United 
Liquid 
Waste 
intentionally 
and 
wrongfully 
lent 
substantial 
assistance to aid Sokolowski in breaching his agency 
and other duties to Burbank.   
No. 
2004AP468   
 
29 
 
. . .  
 
40. . . . 
Burbank 
had 
contractual 
or 
other 
ongoing business relationships with businesses in the 
food industry in the Upper Midwest.  Burbank had a 
reasonable 
expectation 
that 
absent 
improper 
interference 
by 
a 
third 
party, 
these 
business 
relationships 
would 
continue 
for 
the 
indefinite 
future. 
. . .  
 
42. . . . 
Sokolowski 
and 
United 
Grease 
intentionally and improperly interfered with Burbank's 
business relationships with its customers by inducing 
or otherwise causing its customers to discontinue 
their business relationships with Burbank. 
Id.  These allegations are sufficient pleadings to support the 
remaining civil claims.  
¶47 All defendants entered general denials to the material 
facts Burbank asserted, so we now move to the affidavits in 
support of dismissing Burbank's complaint to see if they make a 
prima facie case for dismissal.  Westphal, 266 Wis. 2d 569, ¶9. 
3. 
The affidavits 
¶48 The defendants' affidavits in support of summary 
judgment dismissing the complaint assert that the information 
Sokolowski used was not sufficiently confidential to warrant the 
protections that Burbank has claimed, that Sokolowski used only 
information that he had authority from Burbank to obtain, that 
Sokolowski had no agreement with Burbank to keep its information 
confidential after he terminated his employment, and that the 
information he used is available from sources other than 
Burbank's records. 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
30 
 
¶49 We conclude that these affidavits are insufficient to 
establish that there are no material issues of disputed fact 
relative to Burbank's remaining claims.  For example, disputed 
material 
facts 
include 
the 
details 
of 
Sokolowski's 
responsibilities while employed by Burbank; whether at the time 
that he obtained the confidential information he utilized after 
he left Burbank's employment, he was planning to work for United 
Liquid; the context in which he signed his acknowledgement of 
Burbank's code of conduct that precluded the disclosure of 
confidential information and whether Burbank would have employed 
him if he refused to sign; and the participation, or lack 
thereof, by United Grease and United Liquid in the obtaining and 
using of Burbank's confidential information.  All of these 
issues, and many more, await the development of a full factual 
record at trial.  Accordingly, the court of appeals erred when 
it affirmed the circuit court's summary judgment dismissing 
Burbank's complaint.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 To 
summarize, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(6)(a) does not preclude all other civil remedies based 
on the misappropriation of confidential information if the 
information 
is 
not 
defined 
as 
a 
trade 
secret 
under 
§ 134.90(1)(c). 
 
Accordingly, 
in 
the 
case 
before 
us, 
§ 134.90(6)(b)2 permits civil tort remedies based on the 
misappropriation 
of 
confidential 
information. 
 
Therefore, 
because the plaintiff's complaint stated other common law claims 
and because material facts relevant to those claims are 
No. 
2004AP468   
 
31 
 
disputed, it was error to dismiss the complaint.  However, we 
also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 943.70(2) does not apply when an 
individual 
lawfully 
obtains 
computer-stored 
confidential 
information, but later misappropriates it.  Therefore, the 
plaintiff's § 943.70(2) claim was properly dismissed on summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm in part; reverse in part and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded. 
 
 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
1 
 
¶51 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This court is 
not interpreting Wis. Stat. § 134.90 in a vacuum.1  Section 
134.90 is based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which 
44 states have adopted in some form.  See Unif. Trade Secrets 
Act (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (Master ed. 2005).  Many 
states have already weighed in on the interpretation of this 
uniform law. 
¶52 What is remarkable about the majority opinion is its 
disregard 
of 
the 
legislative 
directive 
that 
§ 134.90 
be 
interpreted 
to 
"make 
uniform 
the 
law 
relating 
to 
misappropriation of trade secrets among the states."  Section 
134.90(7).  Although the majority opinion sets forth a litany of 
cases in footnotes, it fails to recognize that a listing of UTSA 
cases is no substitute for the mandated uniformity analysis.  
Why does the majority ignore the legislative directive that 
§ 134.90 be construed to further a uniform interpretation of 
UTSA among the states? 
¶53 The majority unabashedly answers the question.  It 
does not think that the uniformity goal is all that important, 
so it casts it aside.  Rather, what is of prime importance to 
the majority is its own purported plain-language construction of 
the statute: "cases from other jurisdictions cannot substitute 
for our construction of the relevant Wisconsin Statute."  
Majority op., ¶32.  Lest the reader think that this disregard of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version.   
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
2 
 
the legislative directive is an isolated statement in its 
opinion, such disregard permeates the majority's analysis. 
¶54 Not only does the majority disregard the directive of 
the legislature on how this statute should be interpreted, but 
also 
it 
concludes 
that 
its 
own 
purported 
plain-language 
interpretation is the only "reasonable interpretation."  Id., 
¶28.  In the wake of its conclusion, the majority discards what 
the court of appeals and legal commentators describe as the 
correct or prevailing interpretation.  Because the majority's 
approach undermines the uniformity goal of UTSA, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶55 One essential goal of UTSA is to make uniform the law 
of the states adopting it.  Indeed, the legislature specifically 
adopted this goal as a directive in § 134.90(7):  "This section 
shall be applied and construed to make uniform the law relating 
to misappropriation of trade secrets among states enacting 
substantially identical laws."  Both the drafters of UTSA and 
the legislature have recognized the need for uniformity in a 
world of business where transactions occur between states as 
frequently as within one state's borders. 
¶56 At most, the majority pays lip service to UTSA's 
uniformity goal and the corresponding legislative directive.  It 
fails to engage in the necessary analysis to determine what is 
the uniform interpretation of the preemption provisions in UTSA 
or how cases decided by courts in other UTSA jurisdictions 
analyze the language in these provisions. 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
3 
 
¶57 Instead, the majority reasons that its interpretation 
promotes the required uniformity of interpretation because: (1) 
its interpretation is based on the plain meaning of the words 
"trade secret," (2) other states have the same language in the 
statute, and (3) some of those states' interpretations of UTSA 
are in accord with its interpretation.  It reasons "[our] 
construction in this regard is in accord with the promotion of 
uniformity by [§ 134.90(7)], because the statutory definition of 
a trade secret is made uniform throughout the states enacting a 
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and our 
application of that definition has been in accord with other 
UTSA jurisdictions."  Majority op., ¶26. 
¶58 Of course other states have the same language in the 
statute.  That is the nature of uniform laws.  The question is 
not whether other states have the same language, but rather how 
do other states interpret that language and why do they 
interpret it that way? 
¶59 The majority does not seem to care about the answer.  
Concluding that its analysis of the plain language of the 
statute "results in only one reasonable interpretation," it 
declares that the "statute is not ambiguous."  Id., ¶28.  What 
about states that interpret the statute differently than does 
the majority?  Why is the interpretation given by courts in 
those states unreasonable? 
¶60 The 
majority 
weakly 
attempts 
to 
address 
these 
questions.  It does not analyze the interpretations of other 
states observing only that "cases from other jurisdictions 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
4 
 
cannot substitute for our construction of the relevant Wisconsin 
Statute."  Id., ¶32. 
¶61 Furthermore, the majority asserts that a number of 
UTSA cases from other jurisdictions are distinguishable because 
"they relied only on the nature of the UTSA as creating 
generally uniform laws."  Id., ¶30.  This assertion is specious.  
The majority is distinguishing these cases for doing precisely 
what 
they 
were supposed 
to 
do 
(and 
precisely 
what the 
legislature has directed this court to do in § 134.90(7)):  
apply and construe § 134.90 in a manner to make the law uniform 
among states adopting UTSA. 
¶62 In 
discarding 
other 
states' 
interpretations, 
the 
majority stands the legislative directive of uniformity on its 
head.  What is needed is a thoughtful analysis of the 
interpretations of other states.  Instead, the majority strikes 
out on its own path that begins and ends with its own purported 
plain-language construction.  Ironically, the majority does not 
explain how its interpretation of § 134.90(6) comports with the 
plain language of § 134.90(7), the legislative directive for a 
uniform interpretation. 
¶63 I acknowledge that courts across jurisdictions may be 
less than absolutely uniform in their approaches to UTSA 
preemption.  This lack of absolute uniformity, however, does not 
mean that this court should discard everything they have said.  
Although legitimate debate may remain as to what rule of 
preemption 
UTSA 
dictates, 
the 
majority 
should 
at 
least 
meaningfully engage in that debate. 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
5 
 
¶64 Standing in contrast to the majority's approach is 
that of the court of appeals.  Unlike the majority, the court of 
appeals' decision undertakes an analysis of the interpretations 
that courts in other UTSA jurisdictions have given to the UTSA 
preemption provisions embodied in § 134.90(6).  See Burbank 
Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2005 WI App 28, ¶¶29-37, 278 
Wis. 2d 698, 693 N.W.2d 89. 
¶65 The court of appeals determined that if common law 
claims for unauthorized use of confidential information that did 
not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret were 
permitted, the result would undermine the uniformity and clarity 
that motivated the creation and passage of UTSA.  Id., ¶30.  It 
further determined that the prevailing rule in most UTSA 
jurisdictions is that UTSA is meant to replace tort claims for 
unauthorized use of confidential information with a single 
statutory cause of action.  Id., ¶35. 
¶66 The court of appeals found this rule persuasive.  It 
therefore concluded that § 134.90(6) preempts common law claims, 
however denominated, that are based solely on allegations or 
evidence 
of unauthorized 
use of 
confidential 
information, 
regardless of whether that information meets the statutory 
definition of a trade secret.  Id., ¶37.   
¶67 I laud the court of appeals for its analysis of UTSA 
case law in light of the purposes of UTSA in order to reach what 
it deemed the proper interpretation of § 134.90(6).  The court 
of appeals correctly sought to further UTSA's uniformity goal 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
6 
 
and obey the corresponding legislative directive in § 134.90(7).  
If only the majority would do the same. 
¶68 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation 
of 
UTSA's 
preemption 
provision 
is 
contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
interpretation but consistent with that of legal commentators.  
One such commentator, Robert Unikel, explains in detail.  He 
divides the case law in UTSA jurisdictions into three views.  
See Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap:  Protecting 
"Confidential Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade 
Secrets, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 841, 886-87 (Summer 1998).  Under 
the first view, which is the view adopted by the court of 
appeals 
and 
rejected 
by 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
there 
is 
preemption of all non-UTSA claims for the protection of both 
trade secrets and other confidential information.  Id. at 886.  
Unikel explains that, absent contrary legislative guidance by a 
state, this view "is the most reasonable."  Id. at 887.  
Contrast the majority opinion:  "Our analysis . . . results in 
only one reasonable interpretation."  Majority op., ¶28. 
¶69 Are Unikel and the court of appeals unreasonable, or 
is the majority?  Here is Unikel's explanation for why the 
interpretation of UTSA applied by the court of appeals is the 
more reasonable: 
Permitting litigants in UTSA states to assert common-
law claims for the misappropriation or misuse of 
confidential data would reduce the UTSA to just 
another basis for recovery and leave prior law 
effectively 
untouched. 
 
Further, 
by 
expressly 
exempting "contractual remedies, whether or not based 
upon misappropriation of a trade secret" and "other 
civil 
remedies 
that 
are 
not 
based 
upon 
misappropriation 
of 
a 
trade 
secret" 
from 
its 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
7 
 
preemptive penumbra, the UTSA makes clear that only 
those claims addressing or arising out of wrongs 
distinct from pure information piracy survive passage 
of the trade secret statute.  Indeed, contrary 
interpretations of the UTSA's "Effect on Other Law"  
provision [§ 134.90(6) in Wisconsin], such as those 
embodied in the second and third views of UTSA 
preemption, effectively negate the UTSA's goal of 
promoting 
uniformity 
in 
"trade 
secrets" 
law.  
Additionally, these contrary interpretations render 
the 
statutory 
preemption 
provision 
effectively 
meaningless. 
Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap, at 888 (emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted).  
¶70 Thus, the majority opinion has adopted one of the 
views that Unikel says "render[s] the statutory preemption 
provision effectively meaningless."  Id.  That does not sound 
very reasonable to me. 
¶71 Moreover, the court of appeals and Unikel do not stand 
alone.  Another commentator's interpretation of UTSA, like that 
of Unikel and the court of appeals, is that the intent of UTSA 
was to preempt common law claims based on "allegedly secret 
information" regardless of 
whether 
such information 
would 
previously have been denominated a "trade secret": 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, courts applying UTSA 
in states around the country have ruled that many 
alternative trade secret claims——alleged as unfair 
competition, 
common 
law 
misappropriation, 
unjust 
enrichment, and so forth——are pre-empted by the UTSA's 
statutory scheme. . . .  The common thread among these 
cases is that each state's legislature intended to 
occupy the field of claims involving allegedly secret 
information through the UTSA. 
Tait Graves, A Trade Secret by Any Other Name is Still a Trade 
Secret:  Why UTSA Pre-emption Matters, 10 Intell. Prop. Strat., 
No. 7, 3 (April 2004) (emphasis added). 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
8 
 
¶72 In the end, the majority discards all interpretations 
of UTSA but its own, concluding that its purported plain-
language interpretation is the only reasonable one.  In the wake 
of its conclusion, the majority rejects what the court of 
appeals and legal commentators describe as the correct or 
prevailing interpretation.  The majority thereby undermines the 
uniformity 
goal 
of 
UTSA 
and 
violates 
the 
corresponding 
legislative directive in § 134.90(7).   
II 
¶73 The problem with the majority opinion is amplified by 
its 
approach 
to 
the 
definition 
of 
"trade 
secret" 
in 
§ 134.90(1)(c).  Although this court was not asked to review 
whether Burbank's customer information was a "trade secret" 
under the statutory definition,2 the scope of that definition is 
pivotal in interpreting the preemption provisions in UTSA.  This 
much the majority seems to recognize.  See majority op., ¶19. 
¶74 The majority concludes, however, that § 134.90(6) does 
not 
preempt 
civil 
remedies 
based 
on 
misappropriation 
of 
"confidential information" that falls outside the statutory 
definition of a "trade secret."  Majority op., ¶1.  The majority 
thereby 
distinguishes 
between 
"statutorily-defined" 
trade 
secrets as actionable under UTSA and other "confidential 
information" as actionable under Wisconsin common law.  Id., 
¶24.  Such a distinction, however, may be just what the drafters 
                                                 
2 Burbank did not seek review of the court of appeals' 
determination that its customer information was not a "trade 
secret" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c). 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
9 
 
of UTSA (and the Wisconsin legislature in adopting UTSA) sought 
to avoid. 
¶75 The majority's conclusion again appears to be at odds 
with the interpretation given UTSA by legal commentators.  
According to one commentator, UTSA was intended to divide 
information into two categories:  (1) actionable "trade secrets" 
and (2) unprotected knowledge or skill.  For example, one 
commentator writes: 
The Restatement of Unfair Competition, following 
the lead of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and cases 
following the Act, eliminates the distinction between 
information 
that 
is 
a 
trade 
secret 
and 
other 
confidential information.  All secret information of 
economic value falls within the definition of trade 
secrets.  Trade secrets are protected against any 
misappropriation. 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and 
the Mobility of Management Employees:  A New Problem for the 
Law, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 659, 662 (Summer 1996) (emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted). 
 
¶76 Similarly, Unikel states that UTSA reflects a "'two-
tiered' approach to the protection of commercial knowledge——an 
approach in which information is classified only as either a 
protected 'trade secret' or unprotected 'general skill and 
knowledge.'"  Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap, at 868.3 
                                                 
3  Unikel characterizes both the First Restatement of Torts 
and the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition as reflecting 
the same approach.  Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" 
Gap:  Protecting "Confidential Information" Not Rising to the 
Level of Trade Secrets, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 841, 867-68 (Summer 
1998).  He is somewhat critical of this two-category approach, 
however, and he argues for a three-category approach.  Id.  
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
10 
 
¶77 To the extent these commentators are correct, the 
majority's 
construction 
of 
§ 134.90 
is 
not. 
 
If 
these 
commentators are correct, it would appear that common law causes 
of action for misappropriation of "confidential information" 
that is not a "trade secret" under UTSA are no longer available 
in UTSA states such as Wisconsin. 
¶78 The 
majority's 
construction 
of 
§ 134.90(6) 
would 
undermine uniformity if courts in other states gave their 
analogous provisions of UTSA such a construction.  If litigants 
in the various states could maintain common law claims for 
misappropriation of "confidential information" that does not 
rise to the level of a UTSA-defined "trade secret," then trade 
secret law across jurisdictions would continue to depend on the 
varying common law rules as to misappropriation of economically-
valuable secret information.  The majority does not endeavor to 
explain how this could have been the intent of either the 
drafters of UTSA or the legislature. 
III 
¶79 In sum, the majority disregards the uniformity goal of 
UTSA, disobeying the legislative directive that § 134.90 be 
construed to further a uniform interpretation of UTSA among the 
states.  Because I disagree with the majority's approach, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2004AP468.awb 
 
 
 
1