Title: Skindzelewski v. Smith
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP000623
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2020

2020 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP623 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
David Skindzelewski, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Joseph Smith, Jr., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 930 N.W.2d 281,388 Wis. 2d 144 
 (2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 10, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mary E. Triggiano   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and KELLY, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Craig S. Powell and Hart Powell, S.C., Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by Craig S. Powell. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by Brian 
P. Keenan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Brian P. Kennan. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP623 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV8101) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
  : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David Skindzelewski, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph Smith, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and KELLY, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   David 
Skindzelewski 
committed a crime, pled guilty, and spent time in jail as a 
consequence for committing that crime until a circuit court vacated 
his conviction because the statute of limitations rendered the 
conviction erroneous.  In this action, Skindzelewski sued his 
criminal defense attorney for legal malpractice because his 
attorney failed to raise the statute of limitations as an 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
2 
 
affirmative defense in his criminal case.  Neither the circuit 
court nor the court of appeals permitted his suit to proceed to 
trial because Skindzelewski could not prove he was actually 
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted.  Skindzelewski 
asks this court to reverse the unpublished court of appeals 
opinion1 affirming the circuit court's2 grant of summary judgment. 
¶2 
The actual innocence rule requires a criminal defendant 
who sues his defense attorney for legal malpractice to establish 
the defendant did not commit the crime of which he was convicted.  
Skindzelewski concedes his guilt but advocates the formulation of 
an exception to the actual innocence rule.  We decline to create 
one under the facts presented by Skindzelewski's lawsuit.  Nothing 
about Skindzelewski's case warrants developing an exception to the 
actual innocence rule; recognizing one under these circumstances 
would reward criminality.  As a matter of law, Skindzelewski cannot 
succeed on his legal malpractice claim.  We affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In March 2014, the State charged Skindzelewski with 
theft by contractor in violation of Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5) (2009-
10) after Skindzelewski failed to perform work for which he was 
                     
1 Skindzelewski v. Smith, No. 2018AP623, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2019) (per curiam). 
2 The Honorable Mary E. Triggiano of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
3 
 
paid in 2010.3  Because the amount taken was less than $2,500, the 
offense was a Class A misdemeanor under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3)(a).  
The criminal complaint alleged Skindzelewski received $1,264 from 
a family to install roof vents on its home, but he failed to 
perform the work.  The complaint also alleged that Skindzelewski 
admitted he did not do the work, spent the money on personal 
expenses, and owed the family for taking its money without 
performing the contracted-for work.  The statute of limitations 
for a misdemeanor is three years.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1). 
¶4 
The State Public Defender's Office appointed attorney 
Joseph Smith to represent Skindzelewski.  Smith never raised the 
three-year statute of limitations as a defense to the theft charge.  
Neither the prosecutor nor the presiding judge recognized that the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
barred 
conviction. 
 
Skindzelewski 
ultimately pled guilty in 2015 and was sentenced to eight months 
in jail.  The circuit court imposed this sentence consecutive to 
time being served on a prior conviction.  Skindzelewski began 
serving his theft-by-contractor sentence in mid-December 2015.  
While Skindzelewski was in jail, his new attorney filed a 
postconviction motion, contending his conviction should be vacated 
because the State charged him after the three-year statute of 
limitations expired.  In April 2016, the circuit court granted the 
motion and vacated the conviction, and Skindzelewski was 
                     
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
4 
 
immediately released from jail.  Before his release, Skindzelewski 
spent approximately four months incarcerated for his crime. 
¶5 
After being released, Skindzelewski sued Smith for legal 
malpractice, alleging Smith negligently failed to raise the 
statute of limitations as a defense in his criminal case, resulting 
in Skindzelewski's incarceration.  The State, on behalf of Smith,4 
admitted Smith's negligence but pled several affirmative defenses, 
including the actual innocence rule set forth in Hicks v. Nunnery, 
2002 WI App 87, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 N.W.2d 809.  Both parties 
moved for summary judgment. 
¶6 
Skindzelewski asked the circuit court to adopt an 
exception to the actual innocence rule, as applied by certain 
foreign jurisdictions in cases involving sentencing errors.  
Concluding that "[t]he law in Wisconsin is clear[,]" the circuit 
court declined to adopt a novel exception to prevailing law, 
applied the governing actual innocence rule, and granted the 
State's motion for summary judgment.  Skindzelewski appealed.  In 
an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals determined it had no 
power to modify Hicks and rejected Skindzelewski's argument for 
establishing an exception to the actual innocence rule.  See 
Skindzelewski v. Smith, No. 2018AP623, unpublished slip op., ¶11 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2019) (per curiam).  Skindzelewski filed a 
petition for review, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                     
4 Because public defenders are state employees, the State 
represents Smith in this civil suit. 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
5 
 
¶7 
On appeal, "[w]e independently review a grant of summary 
judgment[.]"  West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ixthus Med. Supply, Inc., 
2019 WI 19, ¶9, 385 Wis. 2d 580, 923 N.W.2d 550 (quoting Water 
Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, 
¶11, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285).  We employ the same 
methodology as the circuit court and court of appeals.  Id.  
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law."  Id.; see also Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)(2017-18). 
III.  ANALYSIS  
A.  General Principles of Negligence 
¶8 
A plaintiff must prove four elements to establish 
negligence:  duty, breach, causation, and damages.  Coffey v. City 
of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 531, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  In this 
legal malpractice case, Skindzelewski's claim involves only the 
third element——causation.  In order to establish causation, the 
plaintiff must show that the negligent act was "a substantial 
factor in producing" the plaintiff's injury.  Morden v. Continental 
AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶60, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 (quoting 
Nieuwendorp v. American Family Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 2d 462, 475, 529 
N.W.2d 594 (1995)); see also Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 
Wis. 2d 607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980) ("The test of cause in 
Wisconsin is whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial 
factor in producing the injury.").  Even if a plaintiff proves the 
general elements of negligence, courts may preclude liability 
based on public policy considerations.  See, e.g., Howard v. Mt. 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
6 
 
Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 517-20, 217 N.W.2d 383 
(1974), aff'd on rehearing 219 N.W.2d 576. 
¶9 
The 
elements 
of 
a 
legal 
malpractice 
claim 
are 
substantially the same as the elements comprising a general 
negligence claim.  The plaintiff must prove:  (1) an attorney-
client relationship existed; (2) the attorney's actions were 
negligent; (3) the attorney's negligent actions caused the 
client's injury; and (4) the client suffered an actual injury.  
See Lewandowski v. Continental Cas. Co., 88 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 276 
N.W.2d 284 (1979) (quoted source omitted).  In order to prove 
causation and injury, a plaintiff must show that "but for the 
negligence of the attorney, the client would have been successful 
in the prosecution or defense of an action."  Glamann v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 144 Wis. 2d 865, 870, 424 N.W.2d 924 (1988) 
(quoting Lewandowski, 88 Wis. 2d at 277).  This burden has been 
characterized as requiring the plaintiff to prove a case within a 
case:  the plaintiff must show that, but for his lawyer's 
negligence, the civil case would have succeeded.  Id.  When the 
legal malpractice arises from professional services rendered in a 
criminal case, the client must additionally prove that he was 
actually innocent of the criminal charge as a component of the 
causation element.  See Hicks, 253 Wis. 2d 721, ¶34.  This actual 
innocence rule arises out of public policy considerations.  Id. 
B.  The Actual Innocence Rule 
¶10 In Hicks v. Nunnery, the court of appeals adopted the 
actual innocence rule, citing cases from foreign jurisdictions.  
Hicks, 253 Wis. 2d 721, ¶¶34-49; see generally Wiley v. County of 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
7 
 
San Diego, 966 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1998); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783 
(Mass. 1991).  In applying the rule, our court of appeals held 
that, in a legal malpractice case arising from a criminal defense 
attorney's representation, the plaintiff must show something more 
than "but for" the attorney's negligence, the plaintiff would have 
been found not guilty.  Hicks, 253 Wis. 2d 721, ¶46.  In order to 
pursue a civil claim for damages against a negligent criminal 
defense attorney, the plaintiff must also show he was actually 
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted.  Id. 
¶11 The actual innocence rule has been part of Wisconsin's 
jurisprudence for nearly two decades.  See id., 253 Wis. 2d 721, 
¶34; Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2) (2017-18).5  Neither party asks us to 
overrule Hicks or challenges its rationale.  Skindzelewski, 
however, asks us to adopt an exception to the actual innocence 
rule.  He bears the burden of establishing an exception is 
warranted and should apply in his case.  See State v. McFarren, 62 
Wis. 2d 492, 499-500, 215 N.W.2d 459 (1974) (the burden of proof 
rests on the party "desiring change" and seeking "to change the 
present state of affairs" (quoted source omitted)).  Skindzelewski 
has not satisfied his burden. 
C.  Application 
¶12 Skindzelewski asks us to recognize what he characterizes 
as a "narrow" exception to the actual innocence rule, which would 
relieve a plaintiff of establishing his innocence whenever defense 
                     
5 Published court of appeals decisions have "statewide 
precedential effect" until overruled by this court.  Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
8 
 
counsel's negligence results in a conviction or sentence 
unauthorized by law.  To support this proposed modification to the 
general rule, Skindzelewski first cites court of appeals decisions 
from foreign jurisdictions recognizing narrow exceptions for cases 
involving sentences beyond statutory maximums.  Relying primarily 
on Johnson v. Babcock, 136 P.3d 77 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) and Powell 
v. Associated Counsel for Accused, 106 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005), Skindzelewski suggests the actual innocence rule should not 
apply when a circuit court imposes a sentence it had no authority 
to order. 
¶13 In Johnson v. Babcock, the plaintiff's criminal defense 
attorney did not object to the imposition of a sentence more than 
20 years longer than authorized by statute.  Johnson, 136 P.3d at 
78.  The Oregon Court of Appeals held that actual innocence was 
not a necessary element of the criminal defendant's legal 
malpractice claim because he received a "legally impermissible 
sentence."  Id. at 81.  Similarly, in Powell, the Washington Court 
of Appeals did not require proof of actual innocence because the 
criminal defendant's sentence was 300 percent longer than the 
statutory maximum for his crime.  Powell, 106 P.3d at 272.  The 
Powell court deemed the situation "unfair."  Id. at 274.  
Distinguishing that case from Skindzelewski's, the criminal 
defendant in Powell had "no quarrel with having been incarcerated 
for the period of time justified by the" crime to which he pled 
guilty.  Id. 
¶14 Skindzelewski's reliance on these cases to support his 
proposed exception is misplaced.  As a preliminary matter, neither 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
9 
 
of these cases applied an exception to the actual innocence rule 
based on a failure to raise an affirmative defense and we have not 
discovered a single case that has done so.  The statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense in both the civil and 
criminal context.  See Robinson v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 137 
Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987); State v. Slaughter, 200 
Wis. 2d 190, 198, 546 N.W.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Statutes of 
limitation generally, as in the present case, act as an affirmative 
defense.").  Rather, Johnson and Powell each recognized an 
exception to the actual innocence rule in the extraordinarily 
narrow context of a guilty defendant whose sentence exceeded the 
statutory limit applicable to the crime of which he was convicted.  
See Johnson, 136 P.3d at 78; Powell, 106 P.3d at 273-74.  Unlike 
the plaintiff in Powell, Skindzelewski does "quarrel with having 
been incarcerated" even though the approximately four months of 
his sentence he spent in jail falls within the nine-month statutory 
maximum for the Class A misdemeanor he admits having committed.  
See Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3)(a).  Skindzelewski argues that his 
criminal defense attorney's failure to raise the statute of 
limitations resulted in a legally impermissible conviction, 
thereby challenging the conviction itself, not the period of 
incarceration.  In contrast, neither of the plaintiffs in the cases 
cited by Skindzelewski argued that their underlying convictions 
were erroneous. 
¶15 Skindzelewski also relies on Hilario v. Reardon, 960 
A.2d 337 (N.H. 2008), but the plaintiff in that case, just like 
the plaintiffs in Johnson and Powell, did not challenge the 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
10 
 
conviction.  In Hilario, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted 
an exception to the actual innocence rule for a criminal defendant 
who pled guilty under an agreement with the State to recommend 
suspending part of his sentence upon certain conditions being met.  
Hilario, 960 A.2d at 339.  The defendant's attorney, without the 
defendant's knowledge, moved to withdraw the plea.  Id.  When the 
defendant later moved for suspension of his sentence, the State 
objected, citing the attorney's plea withdrawal attempt as a breach 
of the plea agreement.  Id.  The trial court agreed with the State 
and denied the defendant's motion.  Id.  In response, the defendant 
filed a legal malpractice suit against his defense counsel.  Id.  
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reaffirmed the application of the 
actual innocence rule in legal malpractice actions "challeng[ing] 
the underlying conviction, [or] tend[ing] to undermine or 
indirectly challenge it."  Id. at 343 (citations omitted).  That 
court recognized an exception to the rule only "where the alleged 
legal malpractice occurred after the plea and sentencing, where 
the claim is unrelated to any strategic or tactical decision 
relating to the plaintiff's convictions, and where the plaintiff 
does not argue that but for his attorney's negligence he would 
have obtained a different result in the criminal case."  Id. at 
345 (emphasis added). 
¶16 Neither prerequisite to New Hampshire's application of 
this 
exception 
to 
the 
actual 
innocence 
rule 
exists 
in 
Skindzelewski's case.  The legal malpractice by Skindzelewski's 
criminal defense attorney——a failure to assert the statute of 
limitations as a defense to the criminal charge——arose prior to 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
11 
 
the plea and sentencing.  Unlike the defendant in Hilario, 
Skindzelewski does argue, as reflected in his civil complaint, 
that but for his attorney's negligence, he would have obtained a 
different result——namely, Skindzelewski "could not have been 
convicted 
and 
wrongfully 
incarcerated." 
 
In 
this 
case, 
Skindzelewski challenges his conviction, a circumstance under 
which the New Hampshire Supreme Court would leave the actual 
innocence rule intact and fully applicable. 
¶17 Unlike the cases on which Skindzelewski relies, all of 
which involved errors committed by counsel after conviction, 
Skindzelewski's claim rests on a legal error that would have 
precluded his conviction notwithstanding his guilt.  In this 
regard, a criminal defense attorney's failure to raise the statute 
of limitations as an affirmative defense is analogous to a failure 
to make a meritorious motion to suppress evidence.  The court of 
appeals in Hicks held that even when a conviction results from an 
attorney's failure "to bring a clearly meritorious motion to 
suppress evidence that establishes guilt, which the state could 
not prove without it[,]" the actual innocence rule applies.  Hicks, 
253 Wis. 2d 721, ¶43.  During oral argument, Skindzelewski's 
counsel acknowledged that a criminal defendant could not sue his 
counsel for failing to make a motion to suppress that would have 
been granted if brought, even if an acquittal would have 
necessarily followed.  The law bars such legal malpractice claims 
because even if an attorney's negligence harms a defendant by 
adversely affecting the outcome of the case, attorney error does 
not negate a guilty defendant's culpability.  Neither failing to 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
12 
 
make a motion to suppress nor failing to raise the statute of 
limitations severs the causal link between a criminal defendant's 
culpable behavior and the time spent incarcerated, when the 
criminal defendant is actually guilty.  Regardless of the 
attorney's error, the defendant nonetheless bears ultimate 
responsibility 
for 
his 
criminal 
conduct 
and 
consequent 
imprisonment. 
¶18 In contrast, if a defendant——like the defendants in 
Johnson and Powell——serves the maximum time authorized by statute 
for his criminal conduct but then serves additional time as a 
result 
of 
his 
attorney's 
error, 
the 
additional 
time 
of 
incarceration 
is 
causally 
unconnected 
to 
the 
antecedent 
criminality.  In other words, any period of incarceration in excess 
of the statutory maximum sentence is solely attributable to the 
attorney's error and completely detached from the defendant's 
criminal conduct.  Similarly, losing the benefit of a plea deal 
that includes a sentence suspension, as occurred in Hilario, is 
solely attached to the attorney's error and entirely unrelated to 
the defendant's criminal behavior. 
¶19 Skindzelewski attempts to distinguish an attorney's 
failure to raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense from an attorney's failure to make a suppression motion.  
First, he argues that the expiration of the statute of limitations 
divests a court of jurisdiction over the defendant.  Second, he 
asserts that the statute of limitations confers a right on the 
defendant to be free from prosecution.  The former has no merit 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
13 
 
and we reject the latter as a basis for recognizing an exception 
to the actual innocence rule. 
¶20 While the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations in a criminal case eliminates a court's personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, see State v. Muentner, 138 Wis. 2d 
374, 382, 406 N.W.2d 415 (1987), a criminal defendant forfeits his 
objection to personal jurisdiction by failing to object before 
sentencing and conviction.  Kelley v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 475, 479, 
195 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Godard v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 189, 190-91, 
197 N.W.2d 811 (1972) (violation of a statutory requirement caused 
a court to lose personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but the 
defendant's subsequent guilty plea waived the objection to 
personal jurisdiction); State v. Asmus, 2010 WI App 48, ¶4, 324 
Wis. 2d 427, 782 N.W.2d 435 ("[A] defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction is waived by pleading to the information."  (citation 
omitted)).  Because the law forecloses a remedy for a criminal 
defendant who forfeits an objection based upon a lack of personal 
jurisdiction, it would be incongruous to revive the forfeited 
objection in a civil case as a basis for a civil remedy. 
¶21  Skindzelewski 
next 
argues 
that 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations confers a right to be free from prosecution.  Even if 
this proposition were true, the right would be merely a statutory 
one.  Skindzelewski concedes that Hicks did not establish any 
exception to the actual innocence rule for a claim of legal 
malpractice based on the violation of a constitutional right.  It 
would be nonsensical to create a right of recovery for the 
violation of a statutory right while withholding recovery for the 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
14 
 
violation of a constitutional right.  In criminal proceedings, 
"constitutional protections are to safeguard against conviction of 
the wrongly accused . . . .  They are not intended to confer any 
direct benefit outside the context of the criminal justice system."  
Hicks, 253 Wis. 2d 721, ¶43 (quoted source omitted).  The same 
principle applies to statutory safeguards, such as statutes of 
limitation. 
¶22 Skindzelewski took money from his victim in advance 
payment for work he never performed.  Instead of returning the 
money, Skindzelewski converted it to his own use.  Skindzelewski 
pled 
guilty 
to 
the 
crime 
of 
theft-by-contractor. 
 
Once 
postconviction counsel discovered the statute of limitations had 
lapsed prior to the State charging Skindzelewski, he was released 
from jail after serving only a portion of his sentence.  Despite 
his guilt, the law afforded Skindzelewski a remedy for the 
erroneous conviction——namely, his liberty.  The law does not, 
however, give him an additional monetary remedy against his 
negligent lawyer.  Doing so would be tantamount to rewarding this 
guilty defendant for his crime, which "would . . . shock the 
public conscience, engender disrespect for courts and generally 
discredit the administration of justice."  Hicks, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 
¶40 (quoting Wiley, 966 P.2d at 986). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶23 Skindzelewski 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
his 
burden 
of 
establishing a compelling reason to change existing law.  The 
actual innocence rule is premised on the fundamental principle 
that society imposes consequences for criminal acts, to be borne 
No. 
2018AP623 
 
15 
 
solely by the guilty.  Nothing about Skindzelewski's case warrants 
carving out an exception to the actual innocence rule under these 
facts.  The law does not recognize a cause of action for a criminal 
defendant against his attorney merely because a more competent 
attorney could have achieved a better result.  We affirm the court 
of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in Skindzelewski's legal malpractice suit because he 
conceded his guilt to the crime of which he was convicted.  Because 
Skindzelewski conceded guilt, his claim of legal malpractice 
against his criminal defense attorney is legally barred. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶24 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
No.  2018AP623.bh 
 
1 
 
¶25 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  In almost every case 
that reaches this court, we are called upon to interpret and apply 
the positive law enacted by the people——the Constitution, 
statutes, and the like.  This case, in contrast, comes as an 
entreaty for the judiciary to make a public policy declaration in 
the exercise of our common law powers. 
¶26 David Skindzelewski pled guilty to a crime, and served 
time because his criminal defense attorney failed to raise a 
statute of limitations defense that would have precluded his 
conviction.  Following his release, Skindzelewski brought this 
legal malpractice action against that attorney.  The majority says 
he cannot succeed, relying principally on Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 
WI App 87, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 N.W.2d 809.  There, the court of 
appeals made a sweeping public policy declaration——namely, in a 
legal malpractice action against a criminal defense attorney, a 
plaintiff must prove he was actually innocent of the convicted 
crime.  Id., ¶46.  The wrinkle in this case is that Skindzelewski 
does not ask us to modify Hicks or otherwise challenge its 
reasoning.  He asks instead for this court to create an exception 
to the actual innocence rule Hicks pronounced. 
¶27 The difficulty I see in this case, however, is that I'm 
not so sure Hicks was rightly decided in the first instance.  The 
usual approach in our line of work is to leave public policy 
decisions to the legislature.  Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 539, 
576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("This court has long held that it is the 
province of the legislature, not the courts, to determine public 
policy.").  Although I do not question our authority to act as a 
No.  2018AP623.bh 
 
2 
 
common law court in narrow areas, a broad public policy 
pronouncement like the one in Hicks is probably best left to those 
elected to be policymakers——the legislature.  Borgnis v. Falk Co., 
147 Wis. 327, 351, 133 N.W. 209 (1911) ("When acting within 
constitutional limitations, the legislature settles and declares 
the public policy of a state, and not the court."). 
¶28 We might consider eliminating the Hicks rule and 
allowing criminal legal malpractice claims to undergo the standard 
rigors of any other legal malpractice claim.  Success requires the 
plaintiff to prove:  "(1) a lawyer-client relationship existed; 
(2) the defendant committed acts or omissions constituting 
negligence; (3) the attorney's negligence caused the plaintiff 
injury; and (4) the nature and extent of injury."  Hicks, 253 
Wis. 2d 271, ¶33.  The factfinder determines if these elements are 
met.  See Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 732-33, 275 
N.W.2d 660 (1979).  This includes a determination under the 
causation element that the allegedly negligent attorney's actions 
were a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injury.  
Id. at 735.  It may be that the jury in this case would find that 
the negligence of Skindzelewski's attorney was not a substantial 
factor, or that Skindzelewski is not entitled to any damages 
because of his admission that he committed the crime.  See Mashaney 
v. Bd. of Indigents' Def. Servs., 355 P.3d 667, 687-88 (Kan. 2015) 
(Stegall, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Kansas Supreme 
Court's rejection of the actual innocence rule and suggesting "the 
jury may decide that even had the defense attorney not been 
No.  2018AP623.bh 
 
3 
 
professionally negligent the criminal defendant would still have 
been convicted due to his actual guilt"). 
¶29 Similarly, eliminating the actual innocence rule would 
leave space for the circuit court to make an independent public 
policy determination.  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 264, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  While Hicks pronounced 
a policy-based rule with statewide application, judicial public 
policy determinations are normally conducted "on a case-by-case-
basis."1  Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 
WI 62, ¶16, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 (quoted source 
omitted).  The individualized approach, one that empowers juries 
and individual circuit courts to look at the unique facts of each 
case, may be preferable to a blanket rule in this area. 
¶30 On the other hand, I'm not so sure Hicks is wrong either.  
Underlying Hicks is a sense that criminal law is different from 
civil law.  The principle here is that when someone commits a 
crime, it is an act against society, and those who commit crimes 
                     
1 This court has traditionally articulated six public policy 
reasons for not imposing liability despite a finding of negligence:   
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) 
the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the 
negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) 
because 
allowance 
of 
recovery 
would 
place 
too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to 
open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of 
recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or 
just stopping point. 
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 
(1976) (citations omitted). 
No.  2018AP623.bh 
 
4 
 
should not receive the recompense for their attorneys' errors in 
the same way a civil litigant can seek recovery.  Hicks, 253 
Wis. 2d 721, ¶41 ("Allowing civil recoveries to guilty plaintiffs 
'impermissibly shifts responsibility for the crime away from the 
convict.'" (quoted source omitted)).  The guiding moral principle 
is that those who commit crimes are always the primary cause of 
any resulting criminal punishment notwithstanding errors by their 
attorney.  Id. ("Regardless of the attorney's negligence, a guilty 
defendant's conviction and sentence are the direct consequence of 
his own perfidy . . . ." (quoted source omitted)). 
¶31 If the animating rationale of Hicks is correct, and its 
result is therefore correct too, I do not see why we would 
entertain any exceptions to it.  This is where I part ways with 
the majority.  If the moral foundation of the actual innocence 
rule pronounced in Hicks is sound, then the distinctions the 
majority makes do not seem relevant.  The majority suggests the 
fact that a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense is 
relevant to whether an exception should be granted.  But what does 
that have to do with the moral culpability of a criminal?  I am 
also unpersuaded by the majority's efforts to distinguish cases 
where someone serves a sentence longer than is allowed by law from 
a case like this where a person never should have served a single 
day in prison had his attorney not been negligent.  Time in prison 
that should not have been served had the state's laws been followed 
all looks the same to me, as Skindzelewski persuasively argues 
here.  I fail to see how the normative claims underlying the actual 
innocence rule leave room for that type of hair-splitting. 
No.  2018AP623.bh 
 
5 
 
¶32 In sum, while I would entertain a rethinking of Hicks, 
Skindzelewski does not ask us to do that here.  Without briefing 
and argument on these matters, I must accept the status quo; that 
means accepting Hicks as our starting point.  I see no principled 
reason to distinguish this case from the rationale of Hicks, and 
I therefore cannot with consistency craft an exception to the 
actual innocence rule.  Thus, although I do not join the majority's 
rationale, I concur in the mandate. 
 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶33 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
David 
Skindzelewski spent 122 days in prison as the result of his defense 
counsel's negligence in failing to identify that the prosecution 
against him was barred by the statute of limitations.1  The 
conviction was vacated once defense counsel's negligence was 
discovered, 
and 
Skindzelewski 
subsequently 
filed 
a 
legal 
malpractice claim.  Although defense counsel conceded his 
negligence, the circuit court granted his motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Skindzelewski could not prove his 
"actual innocence," a requirement articulated by the court of 
appeals in Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 
N.W.2d 809.2  Bound by Hicks, the court of appeals in this case 
affirmed. 
¶34 Skindzelewski petitions this court to create an 
exception to the actual innocence rule, which the majority declines 
to do.  The public policy rationale upon which the Hicks actual 
innocence requirement was founded does not apply in cases where 
                     
1 Skindzelewski was charged in March 2014 with theft by 
contractor, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5) (2009-10), for 
conduct that occurred in 2010.  Because the amount taken was less 
than $2,500, it was a Class A misdemeanor, which has a three-year 
statute of limitations pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Generally, "[t]o prevail in a legal malpractice action, a 
plaintiff must prove four elements:  (1) a lawyer-client 
relationship existed; (2) the [attorney] committed acts or 
omissions constituting negligence; (3) the attorney's negligence 
caused the plaintiff injury; and (4) the nature and extent of 
injury."  Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, ¶33, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 
643 N.W.2d 809. 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
2 
 
defense counsel's failure to raise a valid statute of limitations 
defense results in an unlawful conviction.  A narrow exception to 
the actual innocence rule should be established for such cases.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶35 The Hicks court cited to five "policy considerations [it 
found] to be persuasive and which informed" its decision to require 
a criminal defendant to prove his or her actual innocence in a 
legal malpractice action in order to recover.3  Hicks, 253 
Wis. 2d 721, ¶39.  Those policy considerations were: 
 "permitting a convicted criminal to pursue a legal 
malpractice claim without requiring proof of 
innocence would . . . shock the public conscience, 
engender disrespect for courts and generally 
discredit the administration of justice"; 
 responsibility for the crime would impermissibly be 
shifted away from the plaintiff; 
 a guilty criminal has no right to a skillful 
attorney who may succeed in obtaining an acquittal; 
 "civil recovery by a guilty plaintiff is not 
warranted because of 'the nature and function of 
the constitutional substructure of our criminal 
justice system'"; and 
 unlike other victims of legal malpractice, a 
wrongfully convicted plaintiff has the opportunity 
to assert their Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Id., ¶¶40-44 (quoted sources omitted). 
¶36 The five public policy reasons relied upon by the Hicks 
court do not apply in a case such as this one, where defense 
counsel's negligent failure to identify a valid statute of 
                     
3 These considerations emanated from one case in particular, 
Wiley v. Cty. of San Diego, 966 P.2d 963, 985 (Cal. 1998). 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
3 
 
limitations defense was the sole cause of Skindzelewski's unlawful 
conviction.  First, Skindzelewski's prosecution and subsequent 
incarceration was unlawful and thus recovery for the harm caused 
would not "shock the public conscience" or "engender disrespect 
for the courts."  In fact, to deny that Skindzelewski was harmed 
is disrespectful of the administration of justice and the 
legislature's public policy choice to prohibit criminal charges 
arising from remote misconduct.  See John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 
194, 291 N.W.2d 502 (1980). 
¶37 Second, allowing Skindzelewski to recover is not 
"rewarding this guilty defendant for his crime" as the majority 
suggests, majority op., ¶22, because Skindzelewski was legally 
innocent and, but for defense counsel's error, he could not have 
been convicted.  Even the majority appears to recognize that 
conduct "solely attributable to the attorney's error and 
completely detached from the defendant's criminal conduct" can 
form the basis of an exception to the actual innocence rule.  
Majority op., ¶18.  Because Skindzelewski could not be convicted, 
his situation is more akin to an innocent person wrongfully 
convicted than to a guilty person taking advantage of his 
wrongdoing. 
¶38 Third, the success of Skindzelewski's claim that he was 
unlawfully convicted had no relationship to the skillfulness of 
his attorney.  Unlike a motion to suppress evidence, which may 
require a skilled attorney in order to prevail, raising a statute 
of limitations defense requires only the basic legal competency of 
reading the statute and bringing it to the attention of the circuit 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
4 
 
court judge.4  Moreover, proving a legal malpractice claim arising 
from failure to raise the statute of limitations would not be 
complicated, as no witnesses need to be called or persuasive 
argument made.  See Kevin Bennardo, A Defense Bar:  The "Proof of 
Innocence" Requirement in Criminal Malpractice Claims, 5 Ohio St. 
J. Crim. L. 341, 360-61 (2007). 
¶39 Fourth, Skindzelewski's malpractice claim does not arise 
from defense counsel's failure to assert an alleged constitutional 
violation, and thus the substructure of the criminal justice system 
is not protective.  The remedy of suppression and the bar on 
prosecution beyond the statute of limitations serve different 
purposes and the majority's attempt to analogize them fails.  The 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the sole 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations."  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-
37 (2011).  On the other hand, criminal statutes of limitations 
serve to "protect the accused from having to defend himself against 
charges of remote misconduct" and to "ensure that criminal 
prosecutions will be based on evidence that is of recent origin."  
John, 96 Wis. 2d at 194.  While the exclusionary rule accomplishes 
deterrence of future violations of constitutional rights, release 
from prison alone does not accomplish the interest in ensuring 
individuals are not penalized for remote misconduct. 
¶40 Finally, the fact that Skindzelewski could raise a Sixth 
Amendment claim resulting in his release from prison does not 
                     
4 In this case, Skindzelewski was facing a basic misdemeanor 
charge which has a statute of limitations of three years, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1). 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
5 
 
compensate him for the 122 days that he spent in prison solely due 
to his defense counsel's negligence.  The civil tort system's 
purpose is to compensate an injured party and make them whole.  
See Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶60, 293 
Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  The majority fails to adequately 
explain why shifting the burden of defense counsel's malpractice 
onto Skindzelewski is appropriate under these circumstances.  See 
Bennardo, supra ¶38, at 362 ("Disallowing a guilty defendant from 
recovering from her negligent lawyer allows the lawyer to escape 
responsibility for her wrongful conduct and shifts the burden of 
the malpractice onto her client."). 
¶41 A number of courts do not impose an actual innocence 
public policy requirement in criminal legal malpractice cases and, 
in those that do, there are several recognized exceptions.5  In a 
case relied upon by the Hicks court, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court foreshadowed that an exception to the actual innocence 
requirement could be appropriate in a case such as Skindzelewski's, 
where defense counsel's negligence caused a defendant to be 
convicted.  See Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 1991).  The 
Glenn court distinguished between guilt in fact and legal guilt 
and stated that it would "be difficult to defend logically a rule 
                     
5 Several courts have recognized an exception to the actual 
innocence exception where a defendant's unlawful sentence is 
divorced from his or her conduct.  See Johnson v. Babcock, 136 
P.3d 77 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); Powell v. Associated Counsel for 
Accused, 106 P.3d 271, 272 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); see also Hilario 
v. Reardon, 960 A.2d 337, 345 (N.H. 2008) ("Nor do we agree that 
using the actual innocence standard to create de facto immunity 
from malpractice for criminal defense attorneys, no matter the 
nature of their malpractice, nor when it occurs, so long as the 
criminal defendant bears some degree of guilt, is sound public 
policy."). 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
6 
 
that requires proof of innocence" where "a clear act of negligence 
of defense counsel was obviously the cause of the defendant's 
conviction of a crime."  Id. at 787 (footnote omitted).  In 
addition, the Seventh Circuit has strongly suggested that proof of 
actual innocence may not be required in a malpractice claim arising 
from failure to identify a complete legal defense like the statute 
of limitations.  See Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 
1997); see also Susan M. Treyz, Criminal Malpractice:  Privilege 
of the Innocent Plaintiff?, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 719, 728 & n.65, 
729 (1991) ("Imposing a requirement of innocence when an attorney 
has failed to raise a statute of limitations defense shows 
persuasively how the innocence requirement will hinder valid 
criminal malpractice claims."). 
¶42 Because 
the 
rationale 
for 
the 
actual 
innocence 
requirement does not apply in Skindzelewski's case, I would create 
a narrow exception in legal malpractice cases where defense 
counsel's failure to raise a valid statute of limitations defense 
results in an unlawful conviction.  Accordingly, I would reverse 
the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court with 
an order to grant Skindzelewski summary judgment on liability and 
to conduct further proceedings on damages. 
¶43 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP623.rfd 
 
 
1