Title: State v. Cook
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S49851
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2006

FILED: May 11, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DAVID ALLEN COOK,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 961037561; CA A106503; SC S49851)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 4, 2004.
Rankin Johnson, IV, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs were
Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, and David E. Groom, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** and Balmer, Justices.****
CARSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for resentencing consistently with the Court
of Appeals opinion.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, William C. Snouffer, Judge. 183 Or App 237, 51 P3d 673 (2002).
**Chief Justice at the time of argument.
***Chief Justice at the time the decision was issued.
****Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
CARSON, J.
At issue in this criminal case is whether the admission
of hearsay statements by two codefendants who did not testify at
defendant's criminal trial violated defendant's right "to meet
the witnesses face to face" under Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution, or his right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  During defendant's trial, the trial court
allowed the state to introduce hearsay statements by defendant's
two codefendants.  Defendant was convicted and appealed,
primarily claiming that the admission of those statements
violated his confrontation rights under both the state and
federal constitutions.  In a per curiam opinion, the Court of
Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction despite the admission of
those statements.  State v. Cook, 183 Or App 237, 51 P3d 673
(2002).  We allowed defendant's petition for review and now
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the trial court.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 2, 1996, police discovered the bodies of two
murdered men near a Larch Mountain rock quarry that commonly was
used as a place for target shooting.  One had a gunshot wound to
his head and five or six additional gunshot wounds to his body;
the second had 13 gunshot wounds to various parts of his body.
The police officers investigating the murders
identified defendant and his two codefendants, Gregory and Lewis,
as suspects.  Witnesses described seeing a vehicle that matched
Gregory's at the scene of the murders, and Gregory had made a
telephone call to the police on the night of the murders,
informing them that he had information about the crime.  
Later, after Gregory made inculpatory statements about
the murders when the officers questioned him, the police gave him
Miranda warnings and arrested him.  While in custody, Gregory
made two recorded statements to the police.  In those statements,
Gregory stated that he, defendant, and Lewis had gone to Larch
Mountain for target shooting.  A short time later, the two
victims arrived and also began target shooting.  Gregory reported
that, after speaking with the victims briefly, he and Lewis were
walking with their backs to defendant when Gregory heard gunfire
and turned to see one of the victims lying on the ground. 
According to Gregory, the other victim was looking in Gregory's
direction and holding a gun.  Gregory attempted to shoot at that
victim, but the victim hid behind a pile of gravel before Gregory
could fire.  Gregory stated that he and Lewis then fled into the
woods.  When he came out of the woods, Gregory encountered one of
the victims lying on the ground, wounded but still moving, and he
shot that victim in the head to "put him out of his misery[.]" 
Gregory also stated that, after the killings, defendant had
claimed that he had shot the victims because one of the victims
had pointed his gun at Gregory.  However, Gregory admitted that
defendant might have shot the victims just for the thrill of
shooting someone and that he, defendant, and Lewis had discussed
shooting someone earlier that day and had discussed specifically
shooting those victims.
The police also went to Lewis's residence and asked to
speak with him about the murders.  After the police gave him
Miranda warnings, Lewis made a recorded statement to the police
in which he reported that he, Gregory, and defendant had talked
about shooting someone earlier on the day of the shootings and
had discussed shooting the victims a short time before they were
shot.  Lewis claimed that defendant had said that he felt
energized ("pumped") about shooting the victims.  Lewis also
admitted that he had shot one of the victims twice in the back. 
Later, the police arrested defendant.  Defendant
admitted that he had shot the victims, but he claimed that he had
done so in Gregory's defense.
For the deaths of the victims, the state charged
defendant, Gregory, and Lewis with multiple counts of aggravated
murder and informed the trial court that it would be seeking the
death penalty for each defendant.  Prior to defendant's trial,
Gregory and Lewis pleaded guilty to several counts of aggravated
murder.  Their plea agreements did not require them to testify
against defendant at his trial.   
Before his trial, defendant moved to exclude the
statements that Gregory and Lewis had made to the police,
claiming that the statements, if offered against him for the
truth of their content, would be inadmissible hearsay and, if
admitted, would violate his confrontation rights under the state
and federal constitutions.  The trial court denied that motion,
concluding that the statements of Gregory and Lewis were
admissible under the "against penal interest" exception to the
hearsay rule. 
At defendant's pretrial hearing, Gregory and Lewis
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination
and refused to testify.  Both further stated that they would
continue to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights if called as
witnesses at defendant's trial.  At defendant's trial, the state
offered -- and the trial court admitted -- the testimony of a
police officer describing Gregory's recorded statement, as well
as an audiotape recording of that statement.  The state also
offered -- and the trial court again admitted -- another
officer's testimony describing Lewis's statement and an audiotape
recording of Lewis's post-arrest statement.  
After the trial, a jury found defendant guilty of three
counts of aggravated murder and determined that defendant should
be sentenced to "true life" imprisonment pursuant to ORS 163.105. 
Defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed his
convictions, remanding only for entry of corrected sentences. 
Cook, 183 Or App at 238.  Defendant then petitioned this court
for review. (1)
This court allowed defendant's petition for review and
took the case under advisement on March 4, 2004.  Shortly
thereafter, on March 8, 2004, the United States Supreme Court
issued its decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36, 124 S
Ct 1354, 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).  In Crawford, the Court
reconsidered its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56, 100 S Ct 2531, 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980).  Roberts had held that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution permitted the admission of out-of-court hearsay
statements if two conditions were met:  (1) the declarant must
have been unavailable to testify at trial; and (2) the statements
must have carried "adequate indicia of reliability," either
because those statements fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or because they otherwise possessed "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id. at 66.  
In Crawford, after reexamining the historical
underpinnings of the federal constitutional right to
confrontation in criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court
determined that the Roberts "reliability" requirement for the
admission of hearsay evidence did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment
when "testimonial evidence" was at issue.  Crawford, 541 US at
42-56, 61.  Specifically, the Court held:
"Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the
States flexibility in their development of hearsay law
–- as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether.  Where testimonial evidence is at
issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required:  unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination."   



Id. at 68.
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford overruled its
contrary prior cases.  Additionally, this court's jurisprudence
relating to the state constitutional right to confrontation in
criminal prosecutions under Article I, section 11, derived from
and followed those Supreme Court precedents. (2)  We therefore
asked the parties in this case to submit supplemental briefing
respecting the impact of Crawford on our deliberations.  In doing
so, this court asked both the state and defendant to consider the
following questions:
"(1)  Whether and to what extent the Supreme
Court's decision in Crawford impacts this court's
analysis in [this case] under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution;
"(2)  Whether this court should re-examine its
case law concerning the 'reliability' requirement
respecting an accused person's right 'to meet witnesses
face to face' under Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution; and
"(3) If 'yes' to question (2), how the court should construe the wording of the right 'to meet
witnesses face to face' under Article I, section 11, of
the Oregon Constitution." 
In response to that request, both parties prepared and submitted
additional briefing addressing each of those questions. (3)  We
turn now to an analysis of the various issues presented. 
II. ANALYSIS
This court first considers a defendant's statutory
claims, if any; next, the court considers a defendant's state
constitutional claims; and, finally, the court considers a
defendant's federal constitutional claims.  See State v. Nielsen,
316 Or 611, 618, 853 P2d 256 (1993) (describing that paradigm). 
A. Oregon Evidence Code
As noted, defendant claims at the outset that the
statements of Gregory and Lewis were inadmissible hearsay under
the Oregon Evidence Code.  "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
OEC 801(3). The statements that Gregory and Lewis made to the
police were offered for their truth, i.e., they were offered to
prove that defendant did not act in defense of Gregory when he
shot the victims because defendant previously had discussed
shooting someone. (4)  Therefore, the statements were hearsay. 
Hearsay statements are not admissible as evidence in Oregon
courts in the face of a timely objection to their admission,
unless the statements fit within one of the exceptions provided
by the Oregon Evidence Code or provided by another source of law. 
OEC 802.
OEC 804(3)(c) sets forth the "against penal interest"
exception to the hearsay rule.  That exception provides that a
hearsay statement is admissible "if the declarant is unavailable
as a witness" (OEC 804(3)) and if the statement "at the time of
its making * * * so far tended to subject the declarant to * * *
criminal liability * * * that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the
person believed it to be true."  OEC 804(3)(c).  
This court applies a two-part standard of review to a
trial court evidentiary ruling that a statement fits within an
exception to the hearsay rule.  State v. Cunningham, 337 Or 528,
538-39, 99 P3d 271 (2004).  The court will uphold the trial
court's preliminary factual determinations if any evidence in the
record supports them.  Id. at 537.  However, the court reviews
the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion, as to whether the
hearsay statement is admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule, to determine if the trial court made an error of law.  Id.
at 538.
Returning to the present case, we first must determine
whether Gregory and Lewis were "unavailable" for the purposes of
OEC 804.  A declarant is unavailable as a witness if, inter alia,
the declarant "[i]s exempted by ruling of the court on the
grounds of privilege from testifying concerning the subject
matter of a statement[.]"  OEC 804(1)(a).  As noted, at
defendant's pretrial evidentiary hearing, both Gregory and Lewis
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.  They also stated that they
would assert their Fifth Amendment rights at defendant's trial if
they were called as witnesses.  Under those circumstances, the
trial court correctly held that Gregory and Lewis were
unavailable. (5)  See State v. Rawls, 252 Or 556, 558-63, 451 P2d 127 (1969) (holding that assertion of privilege to be free
from compelled self-incrimination makes declarant unavailable).
Next, we turn to the second criterion for admissibility
under OEC 804(3)(c), that is, whether the declarant's statement
tends to subject him to criminal liability.  Gregory admitted to
shooting one of the victims in the head and admitted that,
earlier in the day, he had spoken with the defendant and Lewis
about shooting someone.  Lewis admitted to shooting one of the
victims twice in the back and admitted that he had been part of
the earlier discussion about shooting someone.  Those statements
potentially subjected Gregory and Lewis to criminal liability. 
Defendant claims that some parts of the statements made
by Gregory and Lewis were not self-inculpatory in that they only
inculpated the defendant.  Defendant appears to ask us to parse a
declarant's statement into single sentences or phrases and to
examine each sentence or phrase wholly independent of its
context.  This court previously has rejected such an approach,
and defendant has offered nothing in his arguments that persuades
us to alter that view.  See State v. Wilson, 323 Or 498, 512 n 9,
918 P2d 826 (1996) (refusing to follow United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of FRE 804(3)(c) that noninculpatory parts
of broader narrative are not admissible under "against-penal-interest" hearsay exception).  In fact, this court has "held
that, under OEC 804(3)(c), a declarant's hearsay statements that
were against the declarant's penal interest and that also
inculpated a criminal defendant were admissible in the
defendant's criminal trial."  Wilson, 323 Or at 512 (citing
Nielsen, 316 Or at 620-21).  The statements of Gregory and Lewis
were both self-inculpatory and inculpated defendant.  Therefore,
the trial court correctly held that the second requirement for
admissibility under OEC 804(3)(c) was satisfied.  
Finally, we examine the third requirement for
admissibility under OEC 804(3)(c), that is, whether a reasonable
person in declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless he or she believed that it was true, by considering the
circumstances under which the statement was made.  See Nielsen,
316 Or at 620-21 (evaluating surrounding circumstances at time of
statement).  In carrying out our analysis, we consider whether
the declarant made the statement while in custody; whether the
police conducted a lengthy interrogation and gave the declarant
Miranda warnings; whether the statement was detailed and made
soon after the crime; whether the declarant described his role in
the crime or tried to shift blame to the defendant; and whether
the declarant exposed himself to the same level of criminal
liability as the defendant.  Nielsen, 316 Or at 620-21; Wilson,
323 Or at 513.  
Although Gregory and Lewis made their statements while
in police custody and under police interrogation, other
surrounding circumstances support the trial court's conclusion
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not
have made the statements unless he believed that they were true. 
See Nielsen, 316 Or at 620 (discussing concern for statements
made while in custody but still finding them admissible).  This
court previously has stated, "We decline to adopt a per se rule
invalidating all hearsay 'confessions' made in custody * * *." 
Nielsen, 316 Or at 624.  
Gregory and Lewis made their formal statements after
receiving Miranda warnings, and both knew that their statements
could be used against them.  Gregory and Lewis were not offered
leniency for their statements.  Both of their statements were
detailed and were made within hours after the crime.  Gregory and
Lewis exposed themselves to the same degree of criminal liability
as defendant by describing their roles in the crime; Gregory
admitted to shooting one of the victims in the head, and Lewis
admitted to shooting one of the victims twice in the back. 
Furthermore, Gregory was not evasive or defensive; he actually
initiated contact with the police by calling them on the
telephone the night of the murders.  Similarly, Lewis was not
evasive or defensive; he freely answered the police officers'
questions.  Finally, Lewis was aware of the consequences of his
statement, as he acknowledged that he likely would be charged
with murder.
Those circumstances support the trial court's
conclusion that a reasonable person in either declarant's
position would not have made the statements that each made unless
he believed that they were true.  We therefore conclude that,
under OEC 804(3)(c), the statements of Gregory and Lewis were
admissible as statements against penal interest.
B. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right * * * to meet the witnesses face to face
* * *."  To determine if the admission of out-of-court statements
made by a declarant who is not testifying violates a defendant's
Article I, section 11, rights under the Oregon Constitution, this
court has relied upon the test announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Roberts, 448 US 56.  State v. Campbell, 299 Or
633, 648, 705 P2d 694 (1985).  As mentioned above, the Roberts
test contains two requirements.  First, the declarant must be
unavailable, and, second, the declarant's statement must have
"adequate indicia of reliability."  Id. (quoting Roberts, 448 US
at 66).  A statement is considered reliable when it falls within
a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or when it is accompanied by
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."  Nielsen, 316 Or
at 623 (quoting Roberts, 448 US at 65-66).
Although the United States Supreme Court no longer
adheres to the Roberts test in the context of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, we continue to use it to analyze
Confrontation Clause claims under Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution:
"This court's holding in Nielsen -- applying the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio
v. Roberts to analyze indicia of reliability and
trustworthiness under Article I, section 11 -- is not
modified by subsequent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.  See State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 749,
653 P2d 942 (1982)('[w]hen this court gives Oregon law
an interpretation corresponding to a federal opinion,
our decision remains the Oregon law even when federal
doctrine later changes')."
Wilson, 323 Or at 514 n 10.  "This court has noted the United
States Supreme Court's [previous] departure[s] from Roberts, but
has continued to apply the [Roberts test] to its analysis of
confrontation issues under Article I, section 11."  State v.
Moore, 334 Or 328, 336, 49 P3d 785 (2002). 
As we previously have discussed, Gregory and Lewis
would not have testified at defendant's trial.  Therefore,
Gregory and Lewis were unavailable under Article I, section 11.
We now consider the second requirement of the Roberts
test, i.e., reliability.  This court has not determined
previously whether a statement against penal interest falls
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," but we need not reach
that issue here, because, as described below, the statements of
Gregory and Lewis contained particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, satisfying the second part of the test for
reliability.  See Nielsen, 316 Or at 623 (noting that no cited
authority supported conclusion that statement against penal
interest falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception").
In Nielsen, this court held that a declarant's
statement contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
if the statement clearly subjected the declarant to criminal
liability and the record contained no evidence that the declarant
had a motive to lie.  Id.  To determine whether the declarant had
a motive to lie, this court considered whether the declarant
tried to shift the blame to another; whether the police promised
the declarant leniency or tried to intimidate him; whether the
declarant was unaware of the consequences of his statement;
whether the declarant had been given Miranda warnings; and
whether the statement was the product of protracted interrogation
or a plea bargain.  Id. at 623-24.     
Like the declarant in Nielsen, the statements of
Gregory and Lewis subjected them to criminal liability.  Gregory
admitted to shooting one of the victims in the head, and Lewis
admitted to shooting one of the victims twice in the back. 
Furthermore, the record contains no suggestion that either had a
motive to lie.  Examination of the record reveals that neither
Gregory nor Lewis attempted to shift blame to the defendant but,
instead, exposed themselves to the same level of criminal
liability as the defendant.  In fact, Lewis was well aware of the
consequences of his statement, acknowledging that he likely would
be charged with murder.  Furthermore, the police made no promises
of leniency, and the statements were not made as part of a plea
bargain.  The police gave Gregory and Lewis Miranda warnings, and
both gave detailed statements within hours after the murders. 
Finally the police did not attempt to intimidate Gregory or
Lewis; Lewis even stated that "both of the officers were
extremely polite."    
The facts contained in the record lead us to conclude
that the statements of Gregory and Lewis contained adequate
indicia of reliability under Article I, section 11.  The trial
court therefore was entitled to conclude, as it did, that the
admission of those statements under OEC 804(3)(c) did not violate
defendant's rights under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution.
C. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him
* * *."  In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the Confrontation Clause test that it had announced in Roberts,
448 US 56, and construed the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
to apply primarily to "testimonial" hearsay statements admitted
in criminal trials against a defendant. (6)  Crawford, 541 US
at 53, 60-61.  Conversely, if a hearsay statement is not
"testimonial," then the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does
not apply.  See id. at 68 (suggesting such an approach). 
Although the Supreme Court did not comprehensively define the
word "testimonial," the Court concluded that a "recorded
statement, knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition."  Id. at
52, 53 n 4.  Crawford went on to hold that a testimonial hearsay
statement is admissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  Id. at 68.
In Crawford, the police questioned the declarant while
she was in their custody.  Id. at 65.  In response, she made a
statement implicating herself and the defendant in a crime and
undermining the defendant's self-defense claim.  Id. at 39-40,
65.  After the declarant asserted a privilege and refused to
testify, the trial court admitted the declarant's statement under
the "against penal interest" hearsay exception.  Id. at 40.  The
Supreme Court held that the statement was testimonial because the
declarant had made it while in police custody and in response to
police questioning.  Id. at 53 n 4, 61.  The Court further
concluded that the second requirement for admission of a
testimonial hearsay statement was missing because "the State
admitted [the] testimonial statement against [the defendant],
despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine [the
declarant]."  See id. at 68.  Therefore, the Court concluded that
admission of the statement violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment confrontation right.  Id. at 68. 
The present case is closely analogous to Crawford. 
Here, the declarants, Gregory and Lewis, made statements while in
police custody and in response to police questioning.  The
statements inculpated Gregory, Lewis, and defendant in a crime
and undermined defendant's defense-of-others claim.  By asserting
their rights against self-incrimination, Gregory and Lewis did
not testify at defendant's trial, and the trial court admitted
the statements of Gregory and Lewis under the hearsay exception
for statements against penal interest.  Under Crawford, those
statements were testimonial because Gregory and Lewis made them
while in police custody and in response to police questioning. 
Thus, although the first requirement for admitting testimonial
hearsay under Crawford was met, because Gregory and Lewis were
unavailable, the second requirement was not met, because
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Gregory and Lewis. 
Therefore, admission of their statements violated defendant's
Sixth Amendment confrontation right.
D. Harmless Error 
We have held that the trial court's admission of the
statements at issue here did not violated defendant's
confrontation right under the Oregon Constitution but did violate 
his confrontation right under the United States Constitution. 
Finding a federal constitutional error, however, does not end our
analysis, because some classes of federal constitutional errors
do not require automatic reversal of a conviction in all cases. 
See Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 23, 87 S Ct 824, 17 L Ed 2d
705 (1967) (so stating).  Rather, violations of federal
constitutional rights must be analyzed under the federal harmless
error test, and, if that test is satisfied, reversal may not be
required.  See id. at 21 (stating that "[w]hether a conviction
for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal
constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a
federal question as what particular federal constitutional
provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they
have been denied").  "Trial errors" are subject to harmless error
analysis.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US 279, 307-09, 111 S Ct
1246, 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991).  Violations of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause are trial errors subject to harmless error
analysis under the rule announced in Chapman.  See Harrington v.
California, 395 US 250, 253, 89 S Ct 1726, 23 L Ed 2d 284 (1969)
(so stating).  
A federal constitutional error is harmless, such that
the conviction will be upheld, "if the reviewing court may
confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 US 673, 681, 106 S Ct 1431, 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986)
(describing the test announced in Chapman).  In reviewing the
whole record to determine whether an error was harmless, the
court should consider "the importance of the [improperly
admitted] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, * * * and, of course, the overall strength of
the prosecution's case."  Id. at 684.
Stated at the outset, the sole issue that we must
consider under the above-described harmless error analysis is
whether the improperly admitted evidence, when viewed in the
context of all the other properly admitted evidence, uniquely
established defendant's state of mind when he shot the victims,
i.e., whether he acted under a reasonable belief that one of the
victim's was attempting to rob or kill Gregory. (7)  Before
trial, the police questioned defendant about the shootings, and
he stated that he had seen one of the victims point a gun at
Gregory and, in response, defendant fired all 30 shots from his
gun into the victims.  The state introduced those statements at
defendant's trial.  Also, defendant took the stand and admitted
intentionally shooting the victims, though he claimed that he had
done so in defense of Gregory.  The physical evidence of the
crime further established that the victims had been shot by the
gun that defendant had admitted shooting.  Thus, defendant's
conviction turned on the issue whether he shot the victims in
defense of others; consequently, that issue must be the focus of
our harmless error analysis.  
To counter defendant's defense-of-others claim, the
prosecution, in part, relied upon the hearsay statements of
Gregory and Lewis.  In those statements, Gregory and Lewis both
claimed that defendant previously had discussed shooting someone
on several occasions, thus undermining his defense-of-others
claim.
Specifically, Gregory stated that defendant "was always
sayin' that he wanted to shoot somebody."  Gregory further stated
that one week before the murders he and defendant had been at
Larch Mountain target shooting and had seen some "Mexicans"
firing an automatic weapon.  Upon seeing the "Mexicans," Gregory
stated that he and defendant "probably" engaged in a conversation
about shooting the "Mexicans."  Gregory also stated that he and
defendant "probably" had discussed shooting the victims before
defendant began firing at them.  Finally, Gregory stated that he,
defendant, and Lewis had discussed killing the victims just
before they were shot and that he thought defendant had shot the
victims "[j]ust to shoot somebody."
Lewis stated that Gregory and defendant had told him
that, while they had been at Larch Mountain a week before the
murders, some "Mexicans" arrived and began firing an automatic
weapon.  Lewis further stated that Gregory and defendant stated
"they would have liked to shoot [the Mexicans] if they had both
had [better weapons]."  Lewis also stated that Gregory and
defendant had told him, while they had been at Larch Mountain on
the day of the murders, that, "if somebody came up there that day
with the gun they wanted, that they'd probably shoot them * * *." 
Additionally, Lewis confirmed that Gregory and defendant had told
him that, "if they [had] an opportunity on [the day of the
murders] that they[] [were] going to shoot somebody." 
Eventually, Lewis admitted that he, Gregory, and defendant had
discussed "killing somebody on the way up to Larch Mountain." 
Finally, Lewis stated that, while the victims had been checking
their target, he, Gregory, and defendant "talk[ed] about shooting
the guys * * *."   
In addition to the foregoing statements of Gregory and
Lewis, the prosecution also introduced statements by several of
defendant's other acquaintances to the effect that defendant
previously had discussed shooting someone on numerous separate
occasions.  Several of defendant's acquaintances further stated
that defendant often spoke of a desire to shoot someone, and one
witness testified that, after the murders, Lewis told him that
Lewis, Gregory, and defendant intentionally had killed the
victims.   
Specifically, Crocker, defendant's friend, stated that
defendant, while riding in a car with Crocker two or three weeks
before the murders, took out a handgun, waved it around, and
stated that "he wanted to use it to try to kill someone someday." 
Crocker further testified that defendant had stated that "he
wanted to use the gun to try to kill someone and get away with it
* * * to reenact the movie 'Seven.'" (8)  Finally, Crocker
testified that defendant had stated that he had brought some
combat or jungle boots that would be useful for running through
the forest when "try[ing] to kill someone[.]"  Those were the
same boots that defendant later wore on the day of the murders.   

Drinkard, Gregory's former girlfriend, testified that,
two weeks before the murders, she had been riding in a car with
defendant when defendant had stated, "I'm going to kill
somebody[,] and I'm going to take down whoever goes with me."   
Another one of defendant's friends, Cassily, testified
that defendant had stated, a few months before the murders, that
"he wanted to * * * see what his gun would do to somebody * * *"
and that "he wanted to see what a bullet would do to human
flesh."  Cassily also testified that defendant commonly talked
about killing people and that defendant, two or three weeks
before the murders, had stated that he "want[ed] to rob people of
their guns on Larch Mountain[]" and "get away with it."
Defendant's former roommate, McGee, testified that
defendant, a week before the murders, had told McGee of a
conversation that defendant had had with Gregory while defendant
and Gregory had been at Larch Mountain.  Defendant stated that he
and Gregory had discussed shooting some "Hispanics" who were at
Larch Mountain and taking an automatic weapon that the
"Hispanics" were shooting.  During that conversation, defendant
and Gregory also discussed murdering any witnesses to the robbery
so that "nobody would find out about it[.]"  According to McGee,
defendant stated that he and Gregory did not go through with the
robbery because some additional people had showed up.    
Defendant's former coworker, Galbraith, testified that
defendant had stated that "he was thinking about taking out
[killing] one of his friend's girlfriends[]" and asked "how much
he should charge to do something like that."  A day later,
defendant had stated that "he was thinking about [killing the
girlfriend] for $400, maybe even free."  Another one of
defendant's former coworkers, Foht, testified that defendant had
stated that "a friend of his had offered him several thousand
dollars * * * to bump off somebody."
Defendant's high school friend, Karczag, testified
that, one week before the murders, defendant had stated that he
wanted to "becom[e] a hired assassin * * * and kill[] for money."
Defendant's friend Marcia Nicholas testified that
defendant had made statements expressing an interest in killing
people "[a]ll throughout high school."  Defendant had stated that
"he was curious as to what it would be like to kill somebody."  
Finally, David Nicholas, another one of defendant's
high school friends, testified that he and defendant were at
Larch Mountain target shooting about three weeks before the
murders when other people arrived to target shoot as well. 
Nicholas stated that the other people had made some "rude
comments toward us[]" and that, in response, defendant "said that
we could take them out [and] take their weapons[.]"  Nicholas
also testified that, while visiting Lewis in jail some time after
the murders, he had asked Lewis about what had happened on Larch
Mountain, and Lewis had told him that "we did it on
purpose." (9)       
The main distinction between the statements of Gregory
and Lewis and the statements by the witnesses who testified at
defendant's trial is that the former described the intent and
plan to kill the specific victims in this case.  The latter
primarily helped establish that defendant had a general interest
and desire to kill someone.  However, Cassily testified that
defendant had expressed a more specific plan to "rob people of
their guns on Larch Mountain[]" and "get away with it."  That
testimony is consistent with what Gregory and Lewis said about
defendant planning to shoot or rob someone earlier on the day of
the murders.  Additionally, McGee's testimony about the plan to
shoot the "Hispanics" during an earlier incident on Larch
Mountain and steal their automatic weapon duplicates similar
statements by Gregory and Lewis.  Furthermore, David Nicholas's
testimony about Lewis's post-murder statement that he, Gregory,
and defendant had killed the victims "on purpose[,]" corresponds
with what Gregory and Lewis told the police about the murders,
i.e., that Gregory, Lewis, and defendant had planned to kill the
victims and had not acted in self-defense.  Hence, the probative
value of the statements of Gregory and Lewis was diminished in
comparison to the rest of the prosecution's case.  The statements
constituted cumulative evidence, and they were substantially
corroborated by defendant's statements and several other
witnesses.
Finally, the prosecution's case, even after
disregarding the inadmissible statements, was strong.  In
comparison, defendant's defense-of-others claim was weak. 
Specifically, defendant did not initially assert that he had
acted in defense of others.  During police interrogation after
the crimes, defendant repeatedly claimed that he could not
remember what had happened that evening.  After further
questioning, defendant eventually "remembered" that one of the
victims had pointed a gun at Gregory and, in response, defendant
began firing.  Furthermore, defendant told conflicting versions
of the shooting.  At first, defendant told his cousin's husband,
Daniels, that he had shot one of the victims and that Gregory had
shot the other.  Later, defendant told the police that he had
shot both of the victims.   
Defendant's defense-of-others claim also was undermined
by his actions after the shooting.  Defendant did not report the
shooting to the police but, instead, attempted to hide his weapon
and otherwise cover up his involvement in the shooting.
Additionally, the physical evidence present at the
scene of the shooting contradicts essential parts of defendant's
defense-of-others theory.  According to defendant, Gregory,
Lewis, and the victims were standing between two and ten feet
apart, examining their target down in a gravel pit.  At some
point, defendant, who was about 60 feet away, saw one of the
victims point his gun at Gregory.  Defendant then began firing
and fired all 30 bullets from his gun.  Defendant stated that he
did not remember specifically aiming at the victims or repeatedly
pulling the gun's trigger.  Part of defendant's case at trial
suggested that either defendant had fired instinctively without
aiming or that his gun had malfunctioned and began firing
automatically.  Defendant also claimed that he had done all the
initial shooting and then ran into the woods when his gun was
empty.  
However, the firearms experts who testified at
defendant's trial, including both defense and prosecution
witnesses, agreed that, if defendant had rapidly fired his gun
while Gregory, Lewis, and the victims were between two and ten
feet apart, both Gregory and Lewis would have been shot.  Those
firearms experts also testified that, based upon the number of
times that defendant had shot the victims, defendant had been
consciously aiming at the victims and had not just instinctively
pulled the trigger.  Moreover, a disinterested witness who had
been present in the vicinity of the shootings testified that he
had heard several different weapons being fired simultaneously. 
The expert testimony, taken in conjunction with that of the
disinterested witness, not only contradicts defendant's claim
that he did all the initial firing and then ran into the woods
when his gun was empty, but it also more generally subverts
defendant's entire version of what happened.  The physical
evidence, which established that defendant's expenditure of 30
rounds of ammunition was not a sudden, unanticipated reaction to
events but was, instead, a focused and murderous undertaking, was
sufficient by itself to scuttle defendant's theory of the case.   
Therefore, considering the cumulative nature of the
inadmissible statements and the relative strength of the
prosecution's case, we conclude, on the whole record, that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for resentencing consistently with the Court
of Appeals opinion.
1. The state has not petitioned separately for review, so no
issues related to the Court of Appeals' rationale for remanding
the case for resentencing are before us.  
2. See, e.g., State v. Nielsen, 316 Or 611, 622-23, 853 P2d
256 (1993); State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648, 705 P2d 694
(1985). 
3. Although addressing all the questions, none of the
responses contained a principled, in-depth review of Oregon
precedents with the purpose of persuading this court to reexamine
its Article I, section 11, jurisprudence in this area.  We
therefore leave to another day the question whether, in fact,
Crawford is also a correct statement of Oregon law.  See State v.
Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282, 290-91, 121 P3d 613 (2005) (discussing
role of stare decisis and circumstances under which this court
will reconsider its prior decisions).    
4. The state argues that defendant failed to identify the
statements that he claims were improperly admitted and,
therefore, waived his objection.  Although defendant's objections
were not a model of clarity, we conclude that he identified the
statements that he found objectionable with sufficient
specificity to permit review of the issues.   
5. The state and defendant both agree that Gregory and Lewis
were unavailable; thus, we are not called upon here to decide
whether the assertion of privilege by Gregory and Lewis was
valid.  We note, however, that this court previously has held
that a witness who has been convicted of a crime and has
exhausted his direct appeals may not assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering questions
about that crime.  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 232, 986 P2d 5
(1999).        
6. The Court declined to delineate the exact boundaries of the
Sixth Amendment confrontation right, stating, "even if the Sixth
Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that
is its primary object[.]"  Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36, 53,
124 S Ct 1354, 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).
7. ORS 161.209 provides, in part:
"A person is justified in using physical force upon
another person * * * to defend a third person from what
the person reasonably believes to be the use or
imminent use of unlawful physical force, and the person
may use a degree of force which the person reasonably
believes to be necessary for the purpose."
However, the legislature has imposed limitations on the use of
physical force set out in ORS 161.219: 
"[A] person is not justified in using deadly
physical force upon another person unless the person
reasonably believes that the other person is:
"(1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony
involving the use or threatened imminent use of
physical force against a person; or
"* * * * *
"(3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly
physical force against a person."
ORS 161.219. 
8. Seven (New Line Cinema 1995) (film portraying crimes of a
serial killer who chooses victims based upon each victim's
commission of one of the seven deadly sins).
9. We note that defendant did not object to David Nicholas's
testimony about what Lewis had told him during the jail visit. 
In fact, defendant's lawyer specifically asked Nicholas to
further explain the context of the statement on cross-examination.