Title: State v. Madison
Citation: 114 Ariz. 221, 560 P.2d 405
Docket Number: 3624
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 1977

114 Ariz. 221 (1977) 560 P.2d 405 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. O'Dell MADISON, Appellant. No. 3624. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 7, 1977. Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Thomas G. Bakker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Westover, Choules, Shadle &amp; Bowen, P.C. by Allen J. Clark, Yuma, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. The defendant, O'Dell Madison, appeals from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to first degree burglary and grand theft, A.R.S. § 13-302 and § 13-663, with a prior *222 conviction, A.R.S. § 13-1649(A)(1). Sentence was imposed at not less than 12 years nor more than 15 years for the burglary; and not less than 10 years nor more than 12 years for the grand theft, said sentences to run concurrently. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 47(e)(5), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S. The issues are: The pertinent facts are as follows. By indictment the defendant was charged with committing: burglary and grand theft of the Western Auto Store on 18 April 1975; burglary and grand theft of Rascos Dry Goods Store on 12 May 1975; burglary and grand theft of Western Auto on 20 May 1975. The alleged crimes all occurred in Yuma, Arizona. There was, in addition, one count of receiving stolen property. Trial was set for 10 July 1975. Three days before trial the State filed an addendum to the indictment alleging a prior conviction for first degree burglary. The defendant admitted the prior conviction at trial outside the presence of the jury. The jury returned verdicts of guilty to the charge of burglary and of grand theft of Western Auto on 18 April 1975. The defendant received directed verdicts or acquittals on the remaining counts. On the day set for sentencing, 21 July 1975, the trial court realized that the defendant, who had been tried and convicted by an eight person jury, was, in fact, entitled to have been tried by a twelve person jury under Arizona Constitution and statute and the following transpired: And: The defendant was retried 19 September 1975 on the charge of burglary and of grand theft of Western Auto on 18 April 1975, the charges for which he was previously convicted, and was again found guilty as to both. The defendant was not retried on the five charges for which he was previously acquitted. DOUBLE JEOPARDY The issue here is whether a defendant may be retried consonant with the prohibition against double jeopardy on the Fifth Amendment and Arizona Constitution, Art. 2, § 10, where the trial court sua sponte declares a mistrial over the defendant's objection, after the jury verdict but before the judgment and sentence. The United States Supreme Court has consistently followed the approach first announced in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824) concerning the double jeopardy clause in the context of a declaration of mistrial over the defendant's objection. Perez, supra, states that the trial court is vested with authority to declare a mistrial, and the defendant may be retried consistently with the Fifth Amendment where, taking all circumstances in account, the court finds that "there is a manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." 9 Wheat. at 580, 6 L. Ed. at 165. The court must scrupulously exercise its sound discretion in determining that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S. Ct. 547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971). While the Supreme Court has emphasized that their double jeopardy decisions are considered "on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization," Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 at 464, 93 S. Ct. 1066 at 1070, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425 at 431 (1973), we think that the circumstances of the instant case can be analogized to previous decisions, summarized by Mr. Justice Rehnquist *224 in Illinois v. Somerville, supra, involving a declaration of mistrial due to some type of serious error in the proceedings. In United States v. Perez, supra, the court held that "manifest necessity" justified the discharge of jurors unable to reach a verdict and therefore the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial. Retrial was permitted in Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 15 S. Ct. 73, 39 L. Ed. 146 (1894), where a mistrial was declared after the trial judge learned that one of the jurors had been a member of the grand jury that indicted the defendant, and in Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199, 37 S. Ct. 107, 61 L. Ed. 244 (1916), where after the first jury had been empaneled and sworn they were discharged after the State discovered that the defendant had not pled to the indictment. In Illinois v. Somerville, supra, the respondent was indicted for theft. After the jury was sworn in, the prosecutor realized that the indictment was fatally deficient under Illinois law in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime charged. Such defect could not be waived by the respondent's failure to object and could have been asserted on appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding to overturn a final judgment of conviction. The trial court concluded that further proceedings under the indictment would be useless and ordered a mistrial over the defendant's objection. Justice Rehnquist concluded that in light of the Illinois criminal procedural rules the declaration of a mistrial was manifestly necessary and was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. He noted: Turning to the facts of the instant case, the defendant faced a potential sentence of not less than ten years to life because of the admitted prior felony conviction. A.R.S. § 13-1649(A)(1). Only eight jurors were empaneled at the first trial, although Arizona Constitution, Art. 2, § 23 reads: And our statute reads as follows: Had the trial judge not declared a mistrial and had proceeded to sentence the defendant "reversal on appeal [would have been] a certainty." Illinois v. Somerville, supra; Porter v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 36, 448 P.2d 92 (1968). By declaring a mistrial and ordering retrial with a twelve person jury even after the jury had returned a verdict, Houp v. State of Nebraska, 427 F.2d 254 (8th Cir.1970), the court prevented a possible reversal on appeal and corrected the error and afforded the defendant a second opportunity to defend against the charge. *225 We note also that even if the trial court was in error in granting a mistrial, we see no prejudice to the defendant. By the trial court's ruling, the defendant received a new trial which he might not have otherwise been entitled to. If the court was in error, there certainly was no prejudice to the defendant. REMARKS OF THE TRIAL COURT A different judge presided over the second trial. The State was proceeding only on the two counts of which the defendant had been convicted at the first trial. In his introductory remarks to the prospective jury panel the judge stated: Shortly thereafter the judge said: At this point the prosecutor and defense counsel approached the bench and a discussion was held off the record. The court then stated to the jury panel: During the recess which followed, the defense counsel motioned for a mistrial on the basis that the above remarks had implicated the defendant in other offenses to his prejudice. The court denied the motion. When the twelve jurors were empaneled and sworn, the court stated: We do not believe the defendant was prejudiced in any way by these remarks. The jury could have easily ascribed the reference to "Rascos" as a mere oversight on the court's part. Any error was cured by the court's immediate correction. Any potential prejudice resulting from the inadvertent reference to the defendant's being charged with "various criminal offenses" was dissipated, we think, when the court later clarified the phrase before the empaneled jury to mean that the defendant was charged with burglary and grand theft. State v. Foster, 83 N.M. 128, 489 P.2d 408 (1971); McCracken v. State, 431 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1967). DID THE STATE PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME? Defendant contends that the State did not prove the elements of the crime of grand theft because of the failure to show that the property belonged to another. Theft is the "felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property of another." A.R.S. § 13-661(A)(1). The evidence indicates that the property was taken from Western Auto and defendant stated in his brief: If this be a valid objection, the testimony indicates that Western Auto was, in fact, identified as a corporation: SPEEDY TRIAL The defendant contends that he was denied a speedy trial upon retrial under Rule 8.2(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (1973), because of the delay occasioned by the mistrial. Since we have *226 found that it was manifestly necessary for the trial court to declare a mistrial, Rule 8.2(d) applies. Rule 8.2(d) provides that a trial ordered after a mistrial shall commence within 60 days of the entry of the order of the court. The order for mistrial was entered 21 July 1975. The defendant was retried on 19 September 1975, the 60th day under the rule. We find no error. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.