Title: State v. Lionel N. Anderson
Citation: 2006 WI 77
Docket Number: 2004AP002010-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2006

2006 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2010-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lionel N. Anderson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 238 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 707 N.W.2d 159 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Harry R. Hertel and Hertel & Gibbs, S.C., Eau Claire, and 
oral argument by Harry R. Hertel. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
2006 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2010-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2001CF5442) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lionel N. Anderson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals1 affirming the judgment 
of conviction of defendant Lionel N. Anderson for first-degree 
sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) 
(2003-04)2 by the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Richard J. 
Sankovitz, Judge.   
                                                 
1 State v. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238, 288 Wis. 2d 83, 707 
N.W.2d 159. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Two issues are presented:  
I. 
Did the circuit court err—— 
(A) by allowing the jury to see and hear the victim's 
videotaped interview in the jury room during deliberations 
rather than on the record in open court;  
(B) 
by 
communicating 
with 
the 
jury 
during 
its 
deliberations outside the presence of the defendant and 
without notice to or consultation with the defendant;  
(C) by communicating with the jury outside the 
presence of defense counsel and without notice to or 
consultation with defense counsel;  
(D) by failing to make or preserve a record of its 
statements or comments to the jury relating to the case; 
and  
(E) by refusing the jury's requests to have the  
defendant's and the victim's in-court testimony read to it 
while allowing the jury during deliberation to see and hear 
the victim's videotaped interview? 
II. If so, were any of the errors prejudicial? 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court committed error in 
each respect and the defendant was prejudiced.  Accordingly, the 
decision of the court of appeals is reversed, the judgment of 
conviction vacated, and the matter remanded to the circuit court 
for a new trial. 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts are not disputed.  This case arises 
out of alleged sexual assaults the defendant committed against 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
3 
 
then-eight-year-old M.L.  The defendant's wife is the legal 
guardian of M.L.  Some time after the assault, the victim 
apparently told two cousins of the incidents.  Some time later, 
the sister of the defendant's wife informed the defendant's wife 
of the incidents.  When the defendant's wife confronted the 
victim, the victim initially denied the incidents but later said 
they had occurred.  The assaults allegedly occurred in February 
or March 2001, and the defendant's wife informed the police of 
the assaults some time later.  The specific allegations of 
sexual assault and the chain of events leading up to the 
defendant's arrest are not relevant to the matter before the 
court, so we do not discuss them in detail. 
¶5 
After the allegations were made, the victim was 
interviewed by a social worker and the entire interview was 
recorded on videotape.  In the interview, the victim described 
the alleged sexual assault in detail. 
¶6 
At the jury trial, the State called six witnesses: the 
victim, the two cousins to whom she had described the assault, 
the defendant's wife, the social worker who had interviewed the 
victim, and an expert on delayed disclosure of sexual abuse who 
had not spoken to the victim.   
¶7 
Prior to the victim's taking the witness stand at 
trial, the State showed the jury in open court the victim's 
videotaped interview, without defense objection.  The victim's 
direct testimony was presented at trial primarily through the 
victim's videotaped interview with a social worker.   
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
When the victim testified on direct examination, she 
did not recite the allegations stated in the videotaped 
interview.  Rather, her testimony on direct examination was 
brief; she reaffirmed the truth of the allegations made in the 
video.  The victim was subject to cross-examination, minimal 
redirect examination, and re-cross-examination at which time she 
repeated the allegations in the videotape. 
¶9 
The defense called three witnesses: the defendant (who 
denied having engaged in sexual contact), his cousin who 
testified that the victim told him that the sexual assault never 
occurred, and the police officer who interviewed the defendant's 
wife when she and the victim reported the sexual assault. 
¶10 The jury retired for deliberations on the afternoon of 
the second day of trial.  Deliberations continued the next day.  
During deliberations, the jury requested in writing that all 
trial exhibits, including the victim's videotaped interview, be 
sent to the jury room and that a television and VCR be provided 
so 
that 
the 
jurors 
could 
watch 
the 
victim's 
videotaped 
interview.  The jury's note is in the record.  The jury was 
brought into the courtroom, and the circuit court's response to 
the jury's request was made on the record.  Defense counsel 
objected to sending any of the exhibits into the jury room.   
¶11 The circuit court granted the jury's request over the 
objections of defense counsel.  In the presence of counsel and 
the defendant, however, the court stated that it was "going to 
instruct" the bailiff to instruct the jury to view the videotape 
only once; that it may stop the videotape at any time; and that 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
5 
 
it may not rewind or re-watch any part of the videotape.  The 
actual instructions the circuit court gave the bailiff and the 
bailiff gave the jury are not in the record.3  Thus the jury's 
viewing 
of 
the 
victim's 
videotaped 
interview 
during 
deliberations occurred in the jury room, outside the presence of 
the defendant, defense counsel and the State's counsel, the 
circuit court judge, and the bailiff.  No independent record was 
made of the replay proceedings.  
¶12 During deliberations, the jury requested Exhibit 8, a 
police report that had not been received in evidence.  The 
circuit court apparently discussed this request with counsel and 
the jury was advised that the exhibit had not been received into 
evidence.  The record is silent whether the defendant was 
present during this discussion.  The jury's note and the circuit 
court's response are in the record. 
¶13 Once again during deliberations, the jury sent a note 
to the circuit court requesting evidence.  This time the jury 
asked the circuit court to read the defendant's and the victim's 
in-court testimony to the jury.  The circuit court, without 
consulting the State's counsel, the defendant, or defense 
counsel, apparently sent a note back to the jury stating that it 
would be "cumbersome" to read the entire testimony to the jury, 
                                                 
3 It is unclear from the record whether the circuit court 
separately instructed the bailiff of the limits on the jury's 
watching the videotape or whether the circuit court intended to 
have the bailiff rely on its statement to counsel and the 
defendant. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
6 
 
and that the jury should be more specific about what it wanted 
to hear.   
¶14 In response to the circuit court's note, the jury 
apparently sent yet another note to the circuit court, stating 
that it did not understand the defendant's testimony.  In 
response to this note from the jury, the circuit court 
apparently sent another note to the jury, asking the jury to 
explain which parts of the defendant's testimony it did not 
understand so that those parts could be read to the jury.  The 
jury apparently never responded to the circuit court's note.  
None of these last four notes (two from the jury and two from 
the circuit court) is in the record. 
¶15 After the jury reached its verdict, but before the 
verdict was read, the circuit court advised the State's counsel, 
the defendant, and defense counsel in open court and on the 
record of the jury's communications with it and its "unilateral" 
response 
and 
reconstructed 
from 
memory 
its 
ex 
parte 
communications with the jury.   
¶16 In its summary of what had transpired, the circuit 
court explained that it denied the jury's first request to read 
back all of the testimony, giving the jury the circuit court's 
"standard answer which I don't believe would be objectionable 
and, in fact, which I think is the only reasonable answer."   
¶17 The circuit court explained that in its view, "it was 
cumbersome" to read back that amount of testimony, that "it may 
be unnecessary" to read back the testimony, and that the jury 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
7 
 
should advise the circuit court what parts of the testimony it 
could not remember.   
¶18 As the circuit court explained, the jury followed up 
its question with another note stating that "the jury didn't 
understand all of [the defendant's] testimony."  According to 
the circuit court, it responded to this note from the jury, 
stating that if there were any parts of the testimony that the 
jury didn't understand, the jury should list those parts and the 
circuit court would read back those parts to the jury.  
¶19 The only record of the communications is the circuit 
court's oral rendition of the notes.  The circuit court's 
responses to the jury took place without any input from or 
opportunity for the defendant or both counsel to be heard.  The 
circuit court's description of its unilateral communications is 
as follows: 
Since the last time we were on the record, I 
received 
two 
other 
requests 
from 
the 
jury 
for 
information which I answered unilaterally. 
I gave a standard answer which I don't believe 
would be objectionable and, in fact, which I think is 
the only reasonable answer. 
The jury asked for the entire testimony of [the 
defendant] and [the victim] to be read back.  My 
standard answer and the one that I gave the jury was 
because it's cumbersome to read back that amount of 
testimony and because it may be unnecessary, please 
tell us what parts, if any, you can't remember and we 
would be happy to provide you with that information 
and I urged them to rely on their collective memory.  
Then I received a follow-up question saying that the 
jury 
didn't understand 
all of 
[the defendant's] 
testimony and to that response——and to that question I 
said if there's any parts that you can't understand, 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
8 
 
list them for us and we would be able to provide you 
with the testimony read back on those points. 
Those questions were provided to the jury.  I 
assume that when [the] bailiffs bring the jury down 
that they'll bring those written questions and answers 
to be included in the file. 
¶20 The circuit court asked both counsel whether anything 
needed to be placed in the record.  Both counsel responded, 
"No."  After the circuit court made the statement set forth 
above, neither the State's counsel nor the defendant nor defense 
counsel objected to the circuit court's ex parte communications 
with the jury or to the circuit court's failure to read to the 
jury the victim's or defendant's testimony, even though the jury 
had the opportunity during deliberations to view the victim's 
videotaped interview. 
¶21 After the circuit court made the statement set forth 
above and no objections were made, the jury was brought into the 
courtroom, and the circuit court requested that the jury provide 
the circuit court with the four notes.  The jury foreperson 
informed the circuit court that the notes had been thrown away 
in the jury room.  The circuit court went on to read the 
verdict.  Apparently no effort was made by anyone to retrieve 
the notes; the notes are not in the record.  This court 
therefore does not know the precise language of these written 
communications between the circuit court and the jury.  
¶22 The jury found the defendant guilty of the charge, and 
the circuit court sentenced him to an 18-year bifurcated 
sentence, 12 years of initial confinement and 6 years of 
extended supervision.  The defendant moved for postconviction 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
9 
 
relief on several grounds including ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The circuit court rejected the defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims without a hearing. 
II 
¶23 We now consider the alleged errors of the circuit 
court in turn.  First, we examine the circuit court's decision 
to allow the jury to hear and see the victim's videotaped 
interview during deliberations in the jury room rather than on 
the record in open court.  Second, we examine the circuit 
court's 
ex 
parte 
communications 
with 
the 
jury 
during 
deliberations outside the presence of the defendant and without 
notice to or consultation with the defendant.  Third, we examine 
the circuit court's ex parte communications with the jury during 
deliberations outside the presence of defense counsel and 
without notice to or consultation with defense counsel.  Fourth, 
we examine the circuit court's failure to make or preserve a 
record of its statements or comments to the jury relating to the 
case.  Fifth and finally, we examine the circuit court's 
refusing the jury's requests during deliberations to have the 
victim's and the defendant's testimony read to it while allowing 
the jury during deliberations to see and hear the victim's 
videotaped interview. 
A 
¶24 We first examine the circuit court's decision to allow 
the victim's videotaped interview to be shown in the jury room 
during deliberations rather than on the record in open court. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 The defendant objected to the jury's seeing and 
hearing the victim's videotaped interview during deliberations.  
The defendant also asserts in this court that the circuit court 
erred in allowing the jury to view the videotape in the jury 
room rather than in open court.  The State argues that the 
defendant did not preserve the challenge to the videotape's 
being presented in the jury room rather than in open court.  We 
reach both issues, namely whether the jury should have been 
permitted to see and hear the videotape and where such a viewing 
should take place.   
¶26 If an error was not properly preserved in the circuit 
court, this court may consider the alleged error on review when 
the error raises a question of sufficient public interest to 
merit a decision on appeal and the error raises a question of 
law that has been briefed by both sides and does not involve any 
questions of fact.4    
¶27 Whether an exhibit should be sent to the jury room 
during deliberations is a discretionary decision for the circuit 
court.5  Factors that a circuit court considers in determining 
whether an exhibit should be sent into the jury room include 
"whether the exhibit will aid the jury in proper consideration 
of the case, whether a party will be unduly prejudiced by 
                                                 
4 Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140 
(1980) (superceded on other grounds by Wis. Stat. § 895.52). 
5 Shoemaker v. Marc's Big Boy, 51 Wis. 2d 611, 619, 187 
N.W.2d 815 (1971) (citing Bash v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. 
Co., 38 Wis. 2d 440, 157 N.W.2d 634 (1968)). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
11 
 
submission of the exhibit, and whether the exhibit could be 
subjected to improper use by the jury."6  A circuit court's error 
in sending an exhibit to the jury room during deliberations is 
subject to a harmless error test.7  The State, the beneficiary of 
any such error in the present case, has the burden to persuade 
this court that the circuit court's error is harmless.8   
¶28 This court reviews a circuit court's discretionary 
decision to determine whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  A circuit court erroneously exercises 
its discretion when it fails to exercise its discretion, when 
the facts do not support the circuit court's decision, when the 
circuit court applies the wrong legal standard, or when the 
circuit court fails to use a demonstrated rational process to 
reach a reasonable conclusion.9    
¶29 We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion in allowing the jury to hear and see the victim's 
videotaped interview but failed to apply the correct legal 
                                                 
6 State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 260, 432 N.W.2d 913 
(1988). 
7 Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 262.   
8 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998) ("The 
burden of 
proving no 
prejudice 
is on the 
beneficiary of the error."). 
9 Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶45, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698; Morden 
v. Cont'l 
AG, 
2000 WI 
51, 
¶81, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659; Oostburg State Bank v. United Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11-12, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
12 
 
standard in the instant case when it allowed the jury to view 
the videotape in the jury room.    
¶30 This court has set forth the procedure a circuit court 
should use when it exercises its discretion to allow a jury to 
replay a recording during deliberations: The jury should return 
to the courtroom and the recording should be played for the jury 
in open court.  This procedure minimizes the risk of breakage or 
erasure of the recording and, more importantly, allows a circuit 
court to guide the jury, with the assistance of all counsel, so 
that no part of the recording is overemphasized relative to the 
testimony given from the witness stand.   
¶31 By playing the recording in open court during jury 
deliberations, the circuit court can guarantee that the jury 
does not play the recording multiple times and may instruct the 
jury as necessary to minimize the risk of overemphasis.  For 
example, the circuit court might remind the jury, in open court, 
that it should not unduly emphasize the recording over in-court 
testimony of witnesses or over other evidence.  
¶32 In Franklin v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 717, 724-25, 247 
N.W.2d 721 (1976), the court explained the reasons for playing 
an audiotape 
for 
the 
jury 
in the 
courtroom 
during its 
deliberations as follows: 
We cannot approve of this practice which entails the 
risk of breakage or accidental erasure of the tape 
while it is beyond the trial court's supervision and 
which presents the danger of overemphasis of the 
confession 
relative 
to 
testimony 
given 
from the 
witness stand.  We are of the opinion that the proper 
practice and procedure is that the trial court retain 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
13 
 
control of the jury's exposure to confessions.  If 
during the course of its deliberations the jury 
requests to hear a recorded confession replayed or a 
written confession reread, it is within the trial 
court's discretion to grant such request.  The jury 
should 
then 
return 
to 
the 
courtroom, 
and 
the 
confession should be read to or played for the jury 
there.10 
¶33 Although the Franklin case involved an audiotaped 
interview with the accused, the procedure set forth in that case 
applies just as forcefully to a victim's videotaped interview.  
The same considerations are present in both instances.  The 
State acknowledges that there may be benefits to playing the 
videotape in open court during jury deliberations.11    
¶34 We conclude that the circuit court failed to adhere to 
the procedure set forth in the Franklin decision and therefore 
                                                 
10 (Citations 
omitted). 
 
In 
Franklin 
v. 
State, 
74 
Wis. 2d 717, 247 N.W.2d 721 (1976), the court relied on State v. 
Payne, 199 Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929).  In Payne, this court 
created a per se rule that stenographic notes of a confession, 
or a written confession, could not be taken into the jury room 
based 
on 
concern 
that 
the 
jury 
might 
overemphasize 
the 
confession.  In Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 259-60, which was decided 
after the Franklin case, we overruled the per se rule, 
concluding that allowing a written confession in the jury room, 
just like allowing any other exhibit in the jury room, was 
within the discretion of the circuit court   
Jensen did not affect our holding in Franklin relating to 
the procedure to be used to give an audiotape to a jury during 
deliberations, and Jensen retained the concerns expressed in 
Payne and Franklin of the danger of overemphasizing any 
evidence.  Had the court intended Jensen to overrule Franklin, 
it would have said so. 
11 The 
State's 
brief 
asserts 
that 
courts 
in 
other 
jurisdictions are evenly divided on whether the replay of a 
videotape must be done in open court or may be done in the jury 
room. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
14 
 
erred in allowing the jury to see and hear the videotape in the 
jury room during deliberations rather than in open court on the 
record.  
B 
¶35 The circuit court's alleged second error is its 
communications with the jury during deliberations outside the 
presence of the defendant and without notice to or consultation 
with the defendant.   
¶36 The parties agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court's communications with the jury outside the 
presence of the defendant is error, violating the defendant's 
constitutional and statutory right to be present.  We agree with 
the parties. 
¶37 An accused has both a constitutional and statutory 
right to be present at the criminal trial.  The interpretation 
and application of a constitutional provision and a statute are 
questions of law that we determine independently of the circuit 
court or court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses.12   
¶38 An accused's constitutional 
right 
to 
be present 
derives from the right to be heard and confront witnesses and 
                                                 
12 State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 389, 549 N.W.2d 210 
(1996); State ex rel. Sielen v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, 176 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
15 
 
from the accused's right to due process.13  The constitutional 
right to be heard and confront witnesses appears in the Sixth14 
and Fourteenth15 Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.16   
                                                 
13 United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per 
curiam) ("The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a 
large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 
but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due 
Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not 
actually 
confronting 
witnesses 
or 
evidence 
against 
him." 
(citation omitted)). 
14 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
15 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution is relevant here because the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment rights are applied to the States through incorporation 
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). 
16 Article I, Section 7, which provides for the "Rights of 
the Accused," states: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
16 
 
¶39 The United States Supreme Court stated in Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970), that "[o]ne of the most basic 
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the 
accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of 
his trial." 
¶40 An accused's Wisconsin constitutional right to be 
present at the criminal trial was interpreted in State v. 
Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 334 N.W.2d 263 (1983), to mean that a 
"criminal defendant is entitled to be present at his trial and 
to have counsel at every stage where he needs aid in dealing 
with legal problems."17 
 
¶41 An accused's statutory right to be present at the 
criminal trial derives from Wis. Stat. § 971.04.  In relevant 
parts, 
§ 971.04 
states 
that 
"the 
defendant 
shall 
be 
present: . . . [a]t trial . . . ."   
¶42 A trial runs from the commencement of jury selection 
through the final discharge of the jury and at any time an 
action is taken affecting the accused.18  Williams v. State, 40 
Wis. 2d 154, 160, 161 N.W.2d 218 (1968). In other words, 
                                                                                                                                                             
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
17 State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 334 N.W.2d 263 
(1983). 
18 In Williams v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 154, 160, 161 N.W.2d 218 
(1968), the court cites a discussion in American Jurisprudence 
2d, Criminal Law, regarding an accused's constitutional right to 
be present.  The Williams opinion is not specific about whether 
it is addressing a constitutional right or a statutory right. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
17 
 
according to Williams, an accused has a right to be present 
whenever any substantive step is taken in the case: 
The trial . . . is generally conceived as running from 
the commencement of the selection of the jury through 
the rendering of the verdict and the final discharge 
of the jury, though some statements of the right to be 
present speak of it as running from the finding of the 
indictment, or from arraignment, to final judgment.  
During this period, defendant has a right to be 
personally present when anything is done affecting 
him, or, as it is sometimes put, whenever any 
substantive step is taken by the court in his case.19 
¶43 A substantive step in a trial for which an accused has 
a 
right 
to 
be 
present 
includes 
the 
circuit 
court's 
communications with the jury during deliberations.20   
¶44 State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 334 N.W.2d 263 
(1983), is the modern foundation for an accused's constitutional 
right to be present for a circuit court's communications with 
the jury during deliberations.  The Burton court explained that 
any such communication to the jury requires the presence of the 
                                                 
19 Williams, 40 Wis. 2d at 160 (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d 
Criminal Law § 288, at 318) (quotation marks omitted; emphasis 
added). 
20 See 
Burton, 
112 
Wis. 2d at 
565 
(error 
to 
exclude 
defendant from communications with jury); see also State v. 
Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶62, 248 Wis. 2d 259, 635 N.W.2d 838 
(same); 
State 
v. 
Peterson, 
220 
Wis. 2d 474, 
487-88, 
584 
N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1998) (same); State v. David J.K., 190 
Wis. 2d 726, 739, 528 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1994) (same); State 
v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 87-88, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 
1994) (same); State v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d 949, 957, 472 
N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991) (same).  Cf. May v. State, 97 
Wis. 2d 175, 187, 293 N.W.2d 478 (1980) (defendant's absence for 
communication between judge and jury regarding questions of law 
does not violate § 971.04). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
18 
 
accused and defense counsel so that they may observe the judge's 
demeanor, facial expressions, and tone of voice and object to 
any statements or request curative statements as necessary.  The 
Burton court stated: 
[W]e do not condone the practice of a judge entering 
the jury room or communicating with a jury outside of 
the presence of the defendant and of counsel for the 
defendant both and the state, even when the judge 
scrupulously takes a court reporter with him or her to 
the jury room to record the comments.  The judge is a 
figure of authority and respect during the trial; his 
or 
her 
intrusions 
into 
the 
sanctity 
of 
jury 
deliberations may affect those deliberations.  Even a 
transcript of the judge's communication cannot reveal 
a judge's facial expressions or tone of voice.  
Defense counsel and defendant must be present to have 
the opportunity to observe the judge's demeanor first-
hand, to object to statements or request curative 
statements in the event that the communication may be 
improper in any way.21 
¶45 In Burton the court made clear that it will not 
reverse a conviction when a circuit court communicates with the 
jury outside the presence of an accused when the error was 
harmless. The burden of persuasion is on the State, the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove that the error was harmless.22 
[S]ituations will 
inevitably arise 
in 
which the 
communication is so innocuous that it cannot be said 
that the error in any way influenced the jury's 
verdict.  When these situations arose the court [in 
earlier cases] properly was unwilling to require that 
the defendant be granted a new trial. . . . The court 
                                                 
21 Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 569. 
22 Id. at 570. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
19 
 
must consider whether the constitutional error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.23  
¶46 In the present case neither the defendant nor defense 
counsel objected at trial to the defendant's absence or 
affirmatively waived the defendant's right to be present when 
the circuit court communicated with the jury outside the 
defendant's presence.  The State asserts that by not objecting 
at trial to the defendant's absence, defense counsel did not 
preserve the challenge to the circuit court's communications 
with the jury outside the defendant's presence.24  Preservation 
                                                 
23 Id. (applying harmless error regarding circuit court 
communications with the jury in the absence of defendant and 
defense counsel). 
In some pre-Burton cases addressing circuit court ex parte 
communications with the jury, the court applied a per se rule 
requiring reversal of a conviction.  See, e.g., Havenor v. 
State, 125 Wis. 444, 445-48, 104 N.W. 116 (1905).  The Burton 
court explicitly rejected this per se rule.  Burton, 112 
Wis. 2d at 570.  
In other pre-Burton cases, the court did not require per se 
reversal when the court had communications with the jury outside 
the presence of the accused and the accused's counsel and 
applied a harmless error analysis.  For a discussion of these 
cases, see Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 566-69. 
24 For 
some 
proceedings, 
the 
defendant's 
presence 
is 
mandatory.  See, e.g., State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 675, 
563 N.W.2d 528 (1997) (defendant cannot waive right to be 
present for sentencing). 
See State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 86-87, 519 N.W.2d 621 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 565) (defense 
counsel could affirmatively waive an accused's right to be 
present at a conference relating to a jury request for the 
rereading of the information). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
20 
 
of an objection takes on importance in the present case because 
the parties dispute whether a challenge to the alleged error 
should be reviewed as a direct claim of circuit court error or 
as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶47 The court of appeals concluded that because defense 
counsel did not object to the circuit court's communications 
outside the defendant's and defense counsel's presence, the 
claim should be analyzed in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
framework.25          
¶48 The significant difference between review of a direct 
claim of circuit court error and a review of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is that in the former review, 
the State (the beneficiary of the alleged error) has the burden 
of persuasion that no error occurred or that any error is 
harmless.  In a review of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
                                                                                                                                                             
The State argues that a jury can be ordered to deliberate 
further any time until the verdict is accepted by the court.  
See State v. Knight, 143 Wis. 2d 408, 416-17, 421 N.W.2d 847 
(1988).  Thus, the State contends that had the defendant 
objected to the communications after the circuit court announced 
its ex parte communications, the circuit court might have 
sustained the objection and allowed argument as to whether to 
read back the testimony.  The argument might have convinced the 
circuit court to read the testimony to the jury and order the 
jury to continue deliberations.  Thus, argues the State, the 
defendant did not preserve his objection to the ex parte 
communications.   
25 State v. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238, ¶13, 288 Wis. 2d 83, 
707 N.W.2d 159. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
21 
 
counsel, the accused has the burden of persuasion that defense 
counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial.26    
¶49 We have not previously addressed the question whether 
an 
accused's 
failure 
to 
object 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
communicating with the jury outside the accused's presence 
constitutes a waiver of the accused's objection.  This court and 
the court of appeals have, however, typically considered an 
accused's challenge on appellate review to a circuit court's 
communications with a jury during jury deliberations outside the 
presence of the accused (even when the accused and accused's 
counsel have failed to object to the accused's absence) as 
review of a direct claim of circuit court error rather than as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.    
¶50 This court and the court of appeals have on several 
occasions addressed an accused's challenge to a circuit court's 
ex parte communication with a jury outside the presence of the 
accused when no objection was made at trial.  In four cases, the 
accused's challenge to the communications made in his absence 
was treated by the court as a direct challenge, rather than as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel even though no 
objection was made at trial to the defendant's absence. 
¶51 In State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 334 N.W.2d 263 
(1983), the court considered a constitutional challenge to the 
circuit 
court's 
communications 
with 
the 
jury 
during 
                                                 
26 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984); State 
v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
22 
 
deliberations outside the presence of the accused.  During jury 
deliberations, the circuit court judge twice entered the jury 
room and spoke with the jury regarding the status of the 
deliberations and other matters not directly related to the 
substantive aspects of the case.  Unlike the instant case, the 
circuit court judge in Burton had a court reporter record the 
communications with the jury.27   
¶52 Defense counsel in Burton never objected to the 
circuit court's ex parte communications with the jury during the 
trial. 
The 
accused's 
only 
objection 
to 
the 
ex 
parte 
communication was by a motion for post-conviction relief.28  The 
accused's brief in Burton indicates, however, that defense 
counsel was not made aware of the communications until after the 
trial was completed.29  We analyzed the accused's challenge to 
the communications being conducted outside his presence as a 
direct challenge to the alleged error, not as a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶53 In State v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d 949, 472 N.W.2d 615 
(Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals addressed a constitutional 
challenge to the circuit court's communications with the jury 
during deliberations.  During deliberations, the jury sent the 
circuit court a note asking if entrapment was an issue to be 
considered in the case.  The circuit court responded with a one-
                                                 
27 Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 563. 
28 Id. at 564.   
29 Id.   
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
23 
 
word 
note: 
"No."30 
 
This 
communication 
occurred 
without 
consultation with the accused, accused's counsel, or the State's 
counsel.  Nothing in the court of appeals decision or the briefs 
evidences an objection by the accused or accused's counsel at 
trial.  Nonetheless, the court of appeals did not address the 
case as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
burden was on the State to prove the error harmless.   
¶54 In State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 519 N.W.2d 621 
(Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals addressed a circuit 
court's communications 
with 
the jury 
during 
deliberations 
outside the presence of the accused.  The circuit court 
conducted 
six 
conferences 
with 
the 
jury 
during 
jury 
deliberations outside the presence of the accused, but with the 
State's counsel and defense counsel present.  In the first five 
conferences with the jury, neither the accused nor defense 
counsel objected on the record to the conference being held in 
the accused's absence or affirmatively waived on the record the 
accused's right to be present.  On the sixth occasion, the 
accused, through counsel, orally waived his right to be present 
at the conference.31   
¶55 As to the one communication in which defense counsel 
affirmatively waived on the record on the accused's behalf the 
                                                 
30 State v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d 949, 957, 472 N.W.2d 615 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
31 State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 85-86 519 N.W.2d 621 
(Ct. App. 1994).  Defense counsel was not present for one of the 
jury conferences. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
24 
 
accused's right to be present, the court of appeals treated the 
accused's right to be present as waived.  When the court of 
appeals reviewed the accused's failure to be present at the 
other conferences, it did so as a direct challenge to the 
alleged error.32  
¶56 In State v. Peterson, 220 Wis. 2d 474, 584 N.W.2d 144 
(Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals considered a challenge to 
a 
circuit 
court's 
communications 
with 
the 
jury 
during 
deliberations based on the accused's right to be present in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04.  In Peterson, the jury asked two questions 
regarding the meaning of certain terms in the jury instructions.  
Prior to responding to the questions, the circuit court held an 
in-chambers conference at which the accused's counsel and the 
prosecutor were present but the accused was not.33  There is no 
indication that defense counsel objected on the grounds that the 
accused was absent from the conference.  Noting that the accused 
did not affirmatively waive his right to be present, the court 
of appeals treated the claim as a direct challenge, engaging in 
a harmless error analysis, rather than as a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.34 
¶57 In State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, 248 Wis. 2d 259, 
635 N.W.2d 838, the court of appeals addressed a constitutional 
                                                 
32 McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d at 86-88. 
33 State 
v. 
Peterson, 
220 
Wis. 2d 474, 
479-80, 
584 
N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1998). 
34 Peterson, 220 Wis. 2d at 487-89. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
25 
 
challenge to a circuit court's communications with the jury 
during deliberations.  In Koller, the jury asked the circuit 
court during deliberations if the jury could see evidence and a 
transcript of certain trial testimony.  Without consulting the 
accused, accused's counsel, or the State's counsel, the circuit 
court responded to the jury through the bailiff that the items 
were "not available."35  The accused's counsel did not object at 
trial to the ex parte communication upon learning of the 
communication after the fact.   
¶58 Citing Bjerkaas, the court of appeals stated that 
"unless a defendant has waived his or her rights . . . the error 
is subject to harmless error analysis."36  The court of appeals 
addressed the alleged error directly, not under a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
¶59 Thus, the court of appeals has on four occasions 
considered a circuit court's communications with the jury during 
jury deliberations outside the presence of the accused and 
without an objection at trial by the accused or accused's 
counsel as a direct challenge rather than as a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
¶60 In 
State 
v. 
David 
J.K., 
190 
Wis. 2d 726, 
528 
N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals addressed a 
constitutional challenge to the accused's absence during a voir 
                                                 
35 State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶61, 248 Wis. 2d 259, 
635 N.W.2d 838. 
36 Koller, 248 Wis. 2d 259, ¶62 (citing Bjerkaas, 163 
Wis. 2d at 957-58). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
26 
 
dire proceeding as both a direct challenge and a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.37  As in McMahon, defense 
counsel was present and did not object on the ground that the 
accused was absent.  The court of appeals first determined that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and then 
concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective.38 
¶61 This decision to address the alleged error as both a 
direct challenge and a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel may be explained by the fact that, in his brief, the 
accused argued both of these positions but did not state that 
they were being argued in the alternative.  
¶62 No subsequent decision has cited David J.K. for the 
proposition that an accused's absence from a substantive step in 
the trial when no objection was made at trial should be analyzed 
as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  David J.K. is 
cited in the Peterson decision, 220 Wis. 2d 474, 488, for the 
proposition that it is error to exclude an accused when the 
circuit court communicates with the jury, and, as we have 
discussed, the court of appeals in Peterson treated the 
                                                 
37 The circuit court conducted part of the voir dire in 
chambers because some of the potential jurors stated that they 
had had experiences with sexual abuse.  David J.K., 190 
Wis. 2d at 735.  It appears that David J.K. was present for the 
voir dire that was conducted in open court but when the voir 
dire was conducted in the judge's chambers, David J.K. was not 
included. 
38 David J.K., 190 Wis. 2d at 735-38. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
27 
 
accused's challenge as a direct challenge even though no 
objection to the accused's absence was made at trial. 
¶63 Taken together, these cases support the conclusion 
that whatever the requirement for an accused's waiver of the 
right to be present when a circuit court communicates with the 
jury, something more than the failure to object is needed to 
convert the challenge from a direct challenge to the alleged 
error to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.    
¶64 We conclude that although neither the defendant nor 
defense counsel objected to the circuit court's communicating 
with the jury in the defendant's absence, the alleged error is 
treated as a direct challenge in the appellate court, not as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
C 
¶65 We turn now to the question whether the circuit 
court's communications with the jury outside the presence of 
defense counsel and without notice to or consultation with 
defense counsel violated the defendant's constitutional right to 
be represented by counsel.   
¶66 The interpretation and application of a constitutional 
provision is a question of law that this court determines 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.39   
                                                 
39State ex. rel. Sielen v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, 176 Wis. 2d 101, 106 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
28 
 
¶67 An accused has the right to be represented by counsel 
at all critical stages of the trial.40  Like the defendant's own 
right to be present, the right to have counsel present is 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.41 
¶68 A critical stage is any point in the criminal 
proceedings when a person may need counsel's assistance to 
assure a meaningful defense.42  The assistance of counsel when a 
court communicates with the jury during deliberations may be 
necessary to a meaningful defense.   
¶69 Indeed, our cases make clear that the right to counsel 
attaches for communications between the circuit court and the 
                                                 
40 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004) (citing Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) and United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 224 (1967)) ("The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an 
accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all 
critical stages of the criminal process."); United States v. 
Gomez, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (jury selection); Burton, 112 
Wis. 2d at 
564-65 
(court 
communication 
with 
jury 
during 
deliberations); Spencer v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 565, 568-571, 271 
N.W.2d 25 (1978) (jury instruction); State v. Mills, 107 
Wis. 2d 368, 369-70, 320 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1982) (jury 
instruction).  
41 Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 565 (citing Rogers v. United 
States, 
422 
U.S. 
35, 
38 
(1975), 
Spencer 
v. 
State, 
85 
Wis. 2d 565, 570, 271 N.W.2d 25 (1978); State v. Mills, 107 
Wis. 2d 368, 369-370, 320 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
42 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967) ("The 
plain wording of this [Sixth Amendment] guarantee [of counsel] 
thus encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to 
assure a meaningful 'defence.'"). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
29 
 
jury during deliberations.43  As one federal court has colorfully 
observed, the purpose of defense counsel's presence in the 
context of a trial court's communication with the jury is to 
allow counsel to "prime the pump of persuasion" and, thus, 
potentially convince the court to address the jury communication 
in a manner that would support the defendant's interests.44 
¶70 The circuit court thus erred by failing to have 
defense counsel present when it communicated with the jury in 
the present case.     
¶71 No objection was made at trial to the circuit court's 
communicating with the jury outside the presence of defense 
counsel.  An accused's failure to object to the absence of 
                                                 
43 See Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 565.  Cf. United States v. 
Rogers, 422 U.S. 35, 38-39 (1975) (addressing defendant's right 
under 
Fed. 
R. 
Crim. 
Pro. 
43 
to 
be 
present 
for 
jury 
communications). 
In addition, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice 
Standards, Trial by Jury, Standard 15-5.2(a) (1996), provides 
for the presence of defense counsel for a determination of 
whether testimony should be read to the jury: 
If the jury, after retiring for deliberation, requests 
a review of certain testimony the court should notify 
the prosecutor and counsel for the defense, and allow 
all parties to be heard on the jury's request. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury 
Standard 
15-5.2(a) 
(3d 
ed. 
1996), 
available 
at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/jurytrial_toc.html 
(last visited June 22, 2006). 
44 United States v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1992).  
The presence of the accused would not have been sufficient to 
remove 
the 
specter 
of 
error 
from 
the 
circuit 
court's 
communication 
with 
the 
jury 
because 
the 
accused 
had 
a 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at that time.   
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
30 
 
counsel is not a waiver of the right to counsel.  An accused's 
waiver of counsel must be a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver. "[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and we do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."45      
¶72 In State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997), the court stated that to satisfy the requirement of a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel, a circuit 
court must conduct a colloquy to establish that the accused is 
aware of the charges against him, the seriousness of those 
charges, the potential penalties, and most important for the 
instant case, that he made a deliberate choice to proceed 
without counsel.  The Klessig court stated: 
To prove . . . a valid waiver of counsel, the circuit 
court must conduct a colloquy designed to ensure that 
the defendant:  (1) made a deliberate choice to 
proceed 
without 
counsel, 
(2) 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, 
(3) was aware of the seriousness of the charge or 
charges against him, and (4) was aware of the general 
range of penalties that could have been imposed on 
him.  If the circuit court fails to conduct such a 
colloquy, a reviewing court may not find, based on the 
record, that there was a valid waiver of counsel.46 
¶73 In the instant case, the record does not reflect that 
any such colloquy was held with the defendant.  We thus 
                                                 
45 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). 
46 State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997) (citation omitted). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
31 
 
conclude, as mandated by Klessig, that the defendant did not 
waive his right to counsel in the present case and that the 
circuit court committed error in communicating with the jury 
outside the presence of defense counsel. 
¶74 Ordinarily, the absence of counsel at a critical stage 
of the trial is not subject to harmless error analysis.  The 
United States Supreme Court has observed: "[W]hen a defendant is 
deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either 
throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at 
least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is 
automatic."47  Generally the denial of counsel is deemed a 
"structural error" and the harmless error analysis does not 
apply.48 
¶75 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court observed 
in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), that a 
violation of the right to counsel at certain critical stages of 
the proceeding may not warrant reversal of the judgment of 
conviction and, in some circumstances, a harmless error analysis 
may apply.  In Morrison, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Cases 
involving 
Sixth 
Amendment 
deprivations 
are 
subject to the general rule that remedies should be 
tailored 
to 
the 
injury 
suffered 
from 
the 
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily 
infringe on competing interests. . . . Our approach 
has thus been to identify and then neutralize the 
taint 
by 
tailoring 
relief 
appropriate 
in 
the 
                                                 
47 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978). 
48 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) 
(citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
32 
 
circumstances to assure the defendant the effective 
assistance of counsel and a fair trial.  The premise 
of 
our 
prior 
cases 
is 
that 
the 
constitutional 
infringement identified has had or threatens some 
adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's 
representation or has produced some other prejudice to 
the defense. Absent such impact on the criminal 
proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a 
remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with 
full recognition of the defendant's right to counsel 
and to a fair trial.49 
¶76 Thus, although a circuit court's communications with 
the jury during deliberations are critical stages when the right 
to counsel may be necessary to protect the substantive rights of 
the accused, a harmless error analysis may apply to certain 
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.50  This court 
                                                 
49 Typically, when a defendant is denied the right to legal 
representation during a critical stage of the trial, a new trial 
is warranted without resort to harmless error analysis.  For 
further discussion of the denial of the right to counsel, see 
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1981), and the 
cases cited therein. 
50 In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the United 
States Supreme Court held that some violations of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel may be subject to harmless error 
analysis.  In Satterwhite, the trial court required the capital 
defendant 
to 
undergo 
a 
psychological 
evaluation 
at 
the 
prosecution's request prior to the appointment of defense 
counsel and without advising counsel before the examination in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Estelle 
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).   
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
33 
 
and the court of appeals have applied harmless error analysis to 
the denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the 
circuit court has had ex parte communications with the jury.51  
The State has the burden of persuasion that the error was 
harmless in the present case, that is, that counsel was not 
necessary to protect the accused's substantive rights. 
D 
 
¶77 We now consider whether the circuit court committed 
error by failing to make a record of or preserve a record of its 
statements or comments to the jury relating to the case. 
 
¶78 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 805.13(1) 
requires 
that 
all 
statements or comments by the circuit court judge to the jury 
relating to the case shall be on the record: 
Statements by judge.  After the trial jury is sworn, 
all statements or comments by the judge to the jury or 
                                                                                                                                                             
The United States Supreme Court observed that while not all 
constitutional violations amount to reversible error, "[s]ome 
constitutional violations . . . by their very nature cast so 
much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that, as a 
matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.  Sixth 
Amendment violations that pervade the entire proceeding fall 
within this category."  Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256.  The Court 
noted that, in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, reversal was automatic only in cases in which "the 
deprivation of the right to counsel affected——and contaminated——
the entire criminal proceeding."  Id. at 257.  In light of the 
fact that evidence of the psychological evaluation of the 
defendant did not pervade the entire proceeding, the Court held 
that a harmless error analysis applied.  Id. at 258.  
51 Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 565; Koller, 248 Wis. 2d 259, ¶62; 
Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d at 957. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
34 
 
in their presence relating to the case shall be on the 
record.52 
 
¶79 The circuit court's statements or comments to the jury 
in the instant case were not on the record.  Thus, the circuit 
court erred by failing to comply with Wis. Stat. § 805.13(1).  
¶80 The circuit court also erred by failing to preserve as 
part of the record the written questions and written responses. 
Unfortunately 
no 
one 
attempted 
to 
retrieve 
the 
written 
communications, and this court does not have a record upon which 
to gauge the questions and the responses. 
¶81 A circuit court's failure to make a record of 
communications with the jury as required by statute is error 
subject to a harmless error analysis.  In light of the absence 
of a sufficient record, an appellate court will have great 
                                                 
52 See also Douglas-Hanson Co., Inc. v. BF Goodrich Co., 229 
Wis. 2d 132, 153, 598 N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1999), aff'd by an 
equally divided court, 2000 WI 22, 233 Wis. 2d 276, 607 
N.W.2d 621, overruled in part on other grounds by Tietsworth v. 
Harley-Davidson, 
Inc., 
2004 
WI 
32, 
270 
Wis. 2d 146, 
677 
N.W.2d 233 (Based on § 805.13(1), "the court's receipt of the 
jury's request for additional exhibits should have been conveyed 
to the parties and counsel."). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
35 
 
difficulty 
concluding 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
erroneous 
procedure in communicating with the jury was harmless error.53   
E 
¶82 Finally, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
by refusing the jury's requests to have the defendant's and the 
victim's in-court testimony read to it while allowing the jury 
during deliberations to see and hear the victim's videotaped 
interview.     
¶83 When a jury has questions regarding testimony, "the 
jury has a right to have that testimony read back to it, subject 
to the discretion of the trial judge to limit the reading."54  
This court will reverse a circuit court's decision refusing to 
read 
testimony to 
the 
jury 
when 
the 
circuit 
court has 
                                                 
53 John P. Ludington, Annotation, Postretirement Out-of-
Court Communications Between Jurors and Trial Judge As Grounds 
for New Trial or Reversal in Criminal Case, 43 A.L.R. 4th 410, 
§ 2[a] (1986) (absence of a record of communications between 
judge and jury lends itself to reversal); see also 43 A.L.R. 4th 
410, § 24 (same); Brown v. State, 682 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Minn. 
2004) (highlighting the importance of an accurate and complete 
record, "particularly [at] a stage as delicate as communications 
with the jury and with counsel during deliberations," and 
explaining that the failure to make such record contributed to 
reversal); People v. O'Rama, 579 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 1991) 
("[T]he precise language and tone of the juror note may be 
critical to counsel's analysis").  Cf. Kohlhoff v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d 148, 160, 270 N.W.2d 63 (conferences pertaining to 
judge-jury communications in response to juror questions "should 
be transcribed"). 
54 Kohlhoff v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 159, 270 N.W.2d 63 
(1978) (citing Jones v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 41, 57, 233 N.W.2d 430 
(1975), 
and 
State 
v. 
Cooper, 
4 
Wis. 2d 251, 
255-56, 
89 
N.W.2d 816 (1958)). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
36 
 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.55 
 
A 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercises its discretion when it fails to exercise 
its discretion, when the facts do not support the circuit 
court's decision, when the circuit court applies the wrong legal 
standard, or when the circuit court fails to use a demonstrated 
rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion.56   
¶84 A circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion in 
refusing to read testimony to the jury on the jury's request is 
subject to a harmless error analysis.57   
¶85 Before discussing whether the circuit court's decision 
to refuse the jury's request to hear the testimony was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion, we first must determine 
whether the circuit court in the instant case refused the jury's 
request.   
¶86 At the hearing on postconviction motions, the circuit 
court denied that it had refused to provide the jury with the 
information it requested.  It asserted that it had simply asked 
the jurors to refine their request so as not to waste their time 
                                                 
55 Kohlhoff, 85 Wis. 2d at 159 (citing State v. Tarrell, 74 
Wis. 2d 647, 659, 660, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976), and Patterson v. 
Phillips, 216 Wis. 165, 172, 256 N.W. 624 (1934)). 
56 Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶45, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698; Morden 
v. Cont'l 
AG, 
2000 WI 
51, 
¶81, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659; Oostburg State Bank v. United Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11-12, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986). 
57 See Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 262 (harmless error applies to 
circuit court decision whether to allow jury access to evidence 
during deliberations). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
37 
 
or the limited time of the court reporters who would have to 
provide the information. 
¶87 From the State's perspective, the circuit court never 
refused the jury's request to hear the in-court testimony.  The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
victim's 
and 
defendant's 
in-court 
testimony was not read back to the jury because the jury failed 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
questions 
seeking 
clarification of the jury's request to have the testimony read 
to it. 
¶88 In contrast, the defendant contends that the circuit 
court's failure to follow up on the jury's response to the 
circuit court's note effectively denied the jury's request.  The 
defendant asserts that the circuit court's question to the jury 
was impossible for the jury to answer because the jury's problem 
was that it could not recall the defendant's testimony.  How was 
the jury to answer the circuit court's question, the defendant 
asks, about what part of the defendant's testimony it could not 
remember or understand, when the jury was asserting it could not 
remember or understand the defendant's testimony?  
¶89 The 
State 
responds 
that 
the 
jurors 
could 
have 
specified portions of the testimony they wished read back, such 
as stating that they wished to hear the defendant's testimony 
about his conversations with his wife or the defendant's 
testimony about his travels outside the state.    
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
38 
 
¶90 How the circuit court responds to a jury's inquiry is 
committed to that court's discretion,58 but we conclude that the 
circuit court frustrated the jury's request to have the in-court 
testimony read by failing to follow up on the circuit court's 
request to the jury for clarification.  We do not know why the 
circuit court chose not to follow up on its second communication 
to the jury.  We might posit that the circuit court assumed that 
because the jury did not answer the circuit court's inquiry, it 
no longer wished to have the testimony read back.  The jury may 
affirmatively abandon its efforts to have the testimony read 
back, but no such affirmative abandonment occurred here.   
¶91 When the circuit court in the present case failed to 
follow up on the jury's request for further information, we 
conclude that it in effect denied the jury's request to have the 
testimony read back.  
¶92 Having established that the circuit court's actions 
constitute a refusal of the jury's request to have the testimony 
read back, we now proceed to determine whether that refusal was 
an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion.  
¶93 When the circuit court exercises its discretion in 
deciding whether to read testimony to the jury during its 
deliberations, the circuit court should consider such factors as 
whether 
the 
evidence 
will 
aid 
the 
jury 
in 
the 
proper 
consideration of the case, whether the evidence could be 
                                                 
58 Kohloff, 85 Wis. 2d at 159; State v. Lombard, 2004 WI App 
52, ¶11, 271 Wis. 2d 529, 678 N.W.2d 338. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
39 
 
subjected to improper use by the jury, whether a party will be 
unduly prejudiced if the jury is allowed to view the evidence 
again, and whether the deliberations will be unduly extended by 
the circuit court's reading lengthy testimony.59   
¶94 In determining whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in refusing to read in-court testimony 
to the jury during jury deliberations, we examine the reasoning 
of the circuit court and the factors the circuit court 
considered.   
¶95 Initially, we observe that in the circuit court's 
recounting of its communications with the jury, the circuit 
court acknowledged that it had given the jury its "standard 
answer" to a request to hear the testimony, rather than 
carefully considering the request under the circumstances of the 
instant case. 
¶96 The circuit court first explained that reading the 
testimony would be "cumbersome."  Yet nothing in the record 
establishes "cumbersomeness."  The victim's in-court testimony 
and the defendant's testimony are rather brief.  The victim's 
testimony covers 18 pages of transcript.  The defendant's 
testimony covers 25 pages.  To read all 43 pages of transcript 
requested by the jury would probably have taken no longer than 
                                                 
59 See Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 260 (holding that a written 
confession could be sent to the jury, subject to the circuit 
court's proper exercise of discretion). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
40 
 
45 minutes.60  The victim's videotaped interview, which the 
circuit court gave the jury, runs approximately 36 minutes.  The 
circuit court failed to consider whether in this particular case 
the reading of the testimony would be cumbersome enough to 
justify its refusal to read the testimony. 
¶97 We do not mean to foreclose the possibility that the 
circuit court could have read the jury only part of the 
transcript.  Had the circuit court read part of the transcript, 
we would be presented with a different case.  We agree with the 
characterization in Judge Kessler's concurring and dissenting 
opinion in the court of appeals: the jury "wanted to hear it 
all, so they heard nothing."61 
¶98 The 
circuit 
court's 
reconstruction 
of 
the 
communications also demonstrates that the circuit court failed 
to consider that the instant case turned on the credibility of 
the defendant and the victim, and the jury was apparently having 
difficulty with the issue.  The jury requested this testimony, 
after two other requests for evidence, on the second day of 
deliberations after several hours of deliberations.  The jury 
began deliberations at 3:20 p.m. on the second day of trial and 
                                                 
60 The circuit court, of course, did not have transcripts at 
the point in the trial when the jury requested that the 
testimony be read back.  However, because the testimony had been 
taken within two days of when the jury made the request, the 
circuit court and court reporter might have had a fairly good 
estimate of the time required to read the testimony. 
61 State v. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238, ¶35, 288 Wis. 2d 83, 
707 N.W.2d 159 (Kessler, J., concurring in part & dissenting in 
part). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
41 
 
retired at 5:45 p.m. that day.  The jury returned a verdict at 
about l:30 p.m. the following day.  The jury was likely rather 
far along in the deliberation process when it requested the 
testimony.   
¶99 It appears from the jury's request for the testimony 
that the jury was attempting to evaluate the defendant's and 
victim's credibility and their respective versions of events.  
The jury had first asked for all the evidence and then asked for 
a police report.  The jury had listened to and watched the 
victim's videotaped interview in the jury room.  Now the jury 
wanted to hear the victim's direct and cross-examination 
testimony and the defendant's testimony explaining the events.  
Thus it appears that the requested testimony would have been of 
aid to the jury in the proper consideration of the case.  The 
circuit court failed to consider these circumstances.  Defense 
counsel might have been able to persuade the circuit court to 
grant the jury's request or to phrase its response to the jury 
in different, more understandable terms had counsel been 
included in the circuit court's decision.  
¶100 In exercising its discretion in deciding whether to 
read the testimony to the jury, the circuit court also failed to 
consider that it had allowed the jury to hear the victim's 
entire 
videotaped 
interview 
in 
the 
jury 
room, 
during 
deliberations.  In sending the videotape into the jury room the 
circuit court did not ask the jury what part of the videotape it 
did not remember or understand.  Instead the circuit court 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
42 
 
stated that it would defer to the jury's perceived need to see 
and hear the evidence. 
¶101 The circuit court used a different standard in 
determining whether to send the victim's videotaped interview 
into the jury room and whether to read the in-court testimony to 
the jury.  The circuit court, without explanation, applied 
different rules to the jury's request to hear the defendant's 
and victim's in-court testimony, testimony that was subject to 
cross-examination.  Here, the circuit court asked the jury what 
it did not understand or remember before it would read any 
testimony.  Here, the circuit court failed to defer to the 
jury's perceived need for a reading of the testimony.       
¶102 The circuit court viewed the reading of testimony as 
cumbersome and perhaps unnecessary.  It did not apply that test 
to the videotape.   
¶103 In sending the videotape into the jury room, the 
circuit court erroneously stated that the videotape was not a 
direct examination of the victim but was offered to corroborate 
her testimony.  But it had the effect of a direct examination.  
The victim's in-court testimony was essentially the same as the 
videotape.  Perhaps in determining the credibility of the 
victim, the jury was trying to compare the videotape and in-
court testimony in order to resolve questions about the victim's 
and the defendant's testimony.  The circuit court erroneously 
concluded that in rehearing the videotape the jury would not 
encounter the dangers inherent in reading back the testimony of 
a single witness.  But the videotape was the testimony of a 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
43 
 
single witness.  The circuit court's permitting the jury to see 
and hear the victim's entire videotaped interview in the jury 
room overemphasized the State's evidence and the victim's out-
of-court statements. 
¶104 Reading the testimony to the jury would have given the 
defendant an opportunity to be heard again by the jury and would 
have 
enabled 
the 
circuit 
court to 
avoid 
the 
danger of 
overemphasis of an out-of-court statement relative to the in-
court testimony.62  In Franklin, we explained that allowing a 
jury to hear an audiotaped confession in the jury room was of 
concern because tape "presents a danger of overemphasis of the 
confession relative to testimony given from the witness stand."63   
¶105 Similarly, in State v. Payne, 199 Wis. 615, 629-30, 
227 N.W. 258 (1929), the court warned of the risk of undue 
emphasis on one side's case that might result if testimony of 
one side but not the other were brought into the jury room: 
[I]t is obvious that to permit a jury to take the 
written portion of the testimony to the jury room,  
compelling them to rely upon their memories for the 
testimony on the other side, gives one side of the 
controversy an undue advantage, and it would seem 
                                                 
62 State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 61, 79-80, 341 N.W.2d 639 
(1984). 
63 Franklin v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 717, 724, 247 N.W.2d 721 
(1976) (emphasis added). 
 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
44 
 
plain that such exhibits should not be permitted to be 
taken to the jury room.64 
¶106 In State v. Jaworski, 135 Wis. 2d 235, 400 N.W.2d 29 
(Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeals considered the issue of 
undue influence when the circuit court granted the jury's 
request for written statements that were damaging to the 
accused.   The accused's counsel objected.  The court of appeals 
observed that "[t]his is not a case where the jury has been 
prejudiced by having undue weight placed upon certain evidence 
by the court; the jury itself considered certain evidence 
important enough to request it during its deliberations."65    
¶107 The result of the circuit court's decision in the 
present case is obvious: The direct testimony of the State's 
most significant witness could be replayed in its entirety while 
the jury was not permitted to hear again the in-court testimony 
and cross-examination of the victim or the defendant, even 
though the jury believed it needed the in-court testimony to 
decide the case.   
¶108 The State's argument in closing at trial and in 
arguing harmless error in this court is that the victim's 
videotaped interview was extremely compelling evidence.  The 
                                                 
64 State v. Payne, 199 Wis. 615, 629-30, 227 N.W. 258 
(1929), created a per se rule that written confessions could not 
go to the jury.  In Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 260, the court 
overturned this per se rule but maintained the principle that a 
circuit court must be diligent in avoiding overemphasis on 
evidence brought into the jury room. 
65 State v. Jaworski, 135 Wis. 2d 235, 244, 400 N.W.2d 29 
(Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
45 
 
argument magnifies the circuit court's erroneous exercise of 
discretion in failing to consider the videotape when refusing to 
read the defendant's and victim's testimony as requested by the 
jury.  With the circuit court's sanction, or more precisely 
because of the circuit court's sanction, the jury was permitted 
to view the videotape again, but never heard any testimony 
again. 
 
Without 
careful 
consideration 
of 
the 
particular 
circumstances of the present case, the circuit court created a 
situation in which the jury could overemphasize the victim's 
version of events.    
¶109 In gauging the circuit court's exercise of discretion 
in responding to the jury's request, we also apply the legal 
standard that a circuit court is obligated to respond to a jury 
inquiry with sufficient specificity to clarify the jury's 
problem.  In State v. Booth, 147 Wis. 2d 208, 212-13, 432 
N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals explained that 
the circuit court had a duty "upon receiving a question or 
request from the jury . . . to respond [to the inquiry] with 
sufficient specificity to clarify the jury's problem."66   
¶110 In responding to the jury's inquiry in the instant 
case, the circuit court failed to satisfy the legal standard of 
specificity.  The jury wanted testimony read to it because the 
jury could not remember or did not understand all of the 
defendant's testimony.   In response, the circuit court asked 
                                                 
66 Quoting Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 145 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
46 
 
the jury to state what it did not understand.  In the present 
case, the circuit court's request that the jury itemize matters 
it did not remember or understand placed an unnecessary burden 
on the jury, discouraging the resolution of doubt or conflict 
among the jurors as to the import of evidence presented at 
trial.  
¶111 Under the facts before us, we conclude that the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
determining whether to read the victim's and defendant's 
testimony by resorting to its "standard answer" rather than 
considering the facts of the particular case before it.  The 
circuit court's exercise of its discretion was not based on 
demonstrated reasoning and resulted in allowing the jury to 
overemphasize the victim's videotaped interview without hearing 
again the in-court testimony of the victim or the defendant.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in refusing to read the testimony the 
jury requested.  
III 
¶112 The preceding discussion establishes that the circuit 
court erred by allowing the jury to view the victim's videotaped 
interview in the jury room rather than in open court; by 
communicating with the jury outside the presence of the 
defendant 
and 
defense 
counsel 
and 
without 
notice 
to 
or 
consultation with either the defendant or defense counsel; by 
communicating with the jury off the record and failing to 
preserve the written communications with the jury on the record; 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
47 
 
and by denying the jury's request to have the defendant's and 
victim's in-court testimony read to it while granting the jury's 
request during deliberations to view the victim's videotaped 
interview in the jury room.  
¶113 We now determine whether any of the errors were 
prejudicial.  The defendant contends that the circuit court's 
errors contributed to the verdict obtained.   
¶114 The court has formulated the test for harmless or 
prejudicial error in a variety of ways.67  The United States 
Supreme Court set forth a test for harmless error in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 
(1967).  Under Chapman, the error is harmless if the beneficiary 
of the error proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."68       
¶115 "In recent years, the United States Supreme Court and 
this court, while adhering to the Chapman test, have also 
articulated alternative wording.  See, e.g., Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1999); State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
                                                 
67 This court has articulated several factors to aid in the 
analysis of harmless error.  See, e.g., State v. Norman, 2003 WI 
72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97; State v. Billings, 110 
Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 N.W.2d 192(1983). 
68 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh'g denied, 
386 U.S. 987 (1967); State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60, 277 
Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
48 
 
¶48, n.14, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189."69  The Neder/Harvey 
test for harmless error asks whether it is "clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error."70 
¶116 We conclude that whatever test we use in applying a 
harmless error analysis in the instant case, the error here was 
not harmless.  
¶117 In the present case, the lack of a record of 
communications between the circuit court and the jury and the 
circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion in deciding not 
                                                 
69 State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶59 n.9, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 
N.W.2d 637; 
id., 
¶¶79-84 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
(discussing Chapman and Neder formulas for harmless error); id., 
¶¶87-88 (Wilcox, J., concurring) (same). 
See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) ("Is 
it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have found the defendant guilty absent the error?"); Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (State must "prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained . . . [and] the court must be able to 
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."); Koller, 248 Wis. 2d 259, ¶62 ("An error is harmless if 
there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial."). 
For further discussion of harmless error in Wisconsin, see 
State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶59 n.10, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 315, 643 
N.W.2d 480 ("We recognize that there has been a gradual merger 
of this court's collective thinking in respect to harmless 
versus prejudicial error.  Regardless of whether the test is 
prejudicial error or harmless error, or whether any difference 
between the two remains, our conclusion in this case is the 
same." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
70 State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
49 
 
to read to the jury all or part of the defendant's and victim's 
testimony as requested by the jury when the jury had access to 
the victim's videotaped interview in the jury room were 
prejudicial errors, combining "to contribute to the verdict 
obtained."71  
¶118 "A factor weighing heavily in favor of the prejudicial 
nature of an ex parte judge-jury communication is the absence of 
a complete record of the communication, because a reviewing 
court is thus deprived of an opportunity to make an assessment 
of the prejudicial effect of the communication."72  The circuit 
court could have improperly influenced the jury deliberations, 
even if such influence was accidental.73  We cannot fully gauge 
the jury's questions and the responses from the record before 
the court.    
                                                 
71 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶60. 
72 John P. Ludington, Annotation, Postretirement Out-of-
Court Communications Between Jurors and Trial Judge As Grounds 
for New Trial or Reversal in Criminal Case, 43 A.L.R. 4th 410, 
§ 2[a] (1986); see also 43 A.L.R. 4th 410, § 24 ("In some cases 
involving improper ex parte judge-jury communications during the 
deliberative phase of a criminal prosecution, the absence of a 
complete record as to the alleged communications has been held a 
factor weighing heavily in favor of reversal, since the 
appellate court is thereby deprived of an opportunity to make an 
assessment of the prejudicial effect of the communication.").  
Cf. Kohlhoff, 85 Wis. 2d at 160 (conferences pertaining to 
judge-jury communications in response to juror questions "should 
be transcribed"). 
73 Cf. 
Burton, 
112 
Wis. 2d at 
571-72 
(ex 
parte 
jury 
communications held harmless where there was a record and the 
communications were not substantive in nature). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
50 
 
¶119 The circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion 
in giving the jury the victim's videotaped interview to be 
viewed in the jury room while refusing the jury's request to 
hear in-court testimony of the victim and the defendant was 
prejudicial error.  When credibility is a crucial issue, a 
videotape of an out-of-court statement of the victim takes on 
great significance, especially when the in-court testimony was 
limited.  Allowing a jury to see and hear the victim's 
videotaped statements a second time in the jury room during 
deliberations 
unduly 
emphasizes 
the 
victim's 
statements.  
"Permitting the replay of the video . . . in the jury room 
during deliberation was equivalent to allowing a live witness to 
testify a second time in the jury room."74  Further, by allowing 
the jury to watch the video in the jury room rather than in open 
court, the circuit court deprived itself and the defendant of 
the 
opportunity 
to 
instruct 
the 
jury 
regarding 
possible 
overemphasis on any one piece of evidence.    
¶120 The circuit court's allowing the jury to place undue 
emphasis on the videotape was aggravated in the present case 
when the circuit court refused to grant the jury's request to 
hear the victim's and defendant's in-court testimony again.  
¶121 In a case turning on the credibility of witnesses, the 
jury was obviously having difficulty sorting it all out and 
wanted to be able to re-examine the evidence.  As the Alaska 
                                                 
74 United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1073 (1988). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
51 
 
Supreme Court has observed, "A jury's request to review evidence 
during its deliberations obviously raises questions of great 
importance to a criminal defendant's rights, as it generally 
reflects doubt or disagreement on the part of at least some of 
the jurors . . . ."75   
¶122 One reasonable explanation of the jury's request for 
the testimony——after several hours of deliberation——is that it 
had serious doubts about the outcome of the case and wanted to 
hear the testimony again to determine whether a guilty verdict 
was appropriate.  In other words, the jury may have doubted the 
verdict that it eventually reached, but was not permitted to 
have testimony read, upon request, that might have been contrary 
to that verdict.   
¶123 The point is this: The jury clearly valued the 
testimony that it sought to hear.  The circuit court denied the 
jury's request without examining the circumstances of the 
instant case.  In light of the value the jury clearly placed on 
the in-court testimony, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the circuit court's failure to read the victim's and 
defendant's testimony to the jury did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.    
¶124 The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court's failure to read back the defendant's testimony did not 
                                                 
75 Dixon v. State, 605 P.2d 882, 887 (Alaska 1980).  See 
also Murray v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 621, 628, 266 N.W.2d 288 (1978) 
("The fact that the jury specifically requested that Knuckles' 
testimony be re-read after several hours of deliberation 
indicates the crucial nature of the testimony."). 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
52 
 
prejudice the defendant, given the State's strong case and the 
defendant's weak defense.  Indeed the court of appeals observed 
that had the testimony been read back, it is likely that the 
rereading would have hurt the defendant more than it would have 
helped him.76   
¶125 We agree with the court of appeals that the evidence 
was sufficient to convict the defendant.  But we have repeatedly 
stated that harmless error is not a sufficiency of the evidence 
test.77  We agree with the defendant that the circuit court 
created a situation of undue emphasis on the State's portion of 
the case, which contributed to the verdict obtained.  In the 
instant case these errors were not harmless.  
*  *  *  * 
¶126 We conclude that the circuit court erred: 
(A) by allowing the jury to see and hear the victim's 
videotaped interview in the jury room during deliberations 
rather than on the record in open court;  
(B) by communicating with the jury during its deliberations 
outside the presence of the defendant and without notice to or 
consultation with the defendant;  
                                                 
76 State v. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238, ¶19, 288 Wis. 2d 83, 
707 N.W.2d 159. 
77 See, e.g., Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94, ¶58, 282 
Wis. 2d 664, 698 N.W.2d 714; State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶28, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485. 
No. 
2004AP2010-CR   
 
53 
 
(C) by communicating with the jury outside of the presence 
of defense counsel and without notice to or consultation with 
the defense counsel;  
(D) by failing to make or preserve a record of its 
statements or comments to the jury relating to the case; and  
(E) by refusing the jury's requests to have the defendant's 
and the victim's in-court testimony read to it while allowing 
the jury during deliberation to see and hear the victim's 
videotaped interview.   
¶127 We conclude that the circuit court committed error in 
each 
respect 
and 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
prejudiced.  
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, 
the judgment of conviction vacated, and the matter remanded to 
the circuit court for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶128 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority identifies several circuit court decisions that it 
concludes are error.  Majority op., ¶2.  For the purposes of 
this dissent, I will assume, without deciding, that the circuit 
court did err.1  When I examine those assumed errors under the 
standards for determining whether they were harmless, I do so 
based on the actual testimony from Lionel Anderson's trial for 
first-degree sexual assault of a child.  The majority employs 
similar harmless error standards; however, it applies them to 
abstract principles, not to the concrete facts of this case.  
This is where we differ.  I conclude that all errors, in light 
of the actual testimony, were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, irrespective of which harmless error test is employed.  
Accordingly, because I would affirm the court of appeals 
decision 
upholding 
Anderson's 
conviction, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
I.  DISCUSSION  
¶129 The errors described in the majority opinion range 
from discretionary decisions of the circuit court, to ignoring 
statutory directives, to constitutional concerns.  However, as 
                                                 
1 The claimed errors that the majority opinion relies on 
are:  permitting the videotape of the victim's testimony to be 
played in the jury room, rather than in open court, not acceding 
to the jury's request to have the child's courtroom testimony 
and Anderson's courtroom testimony read in the jury room, 
answering two questions from the jury without Anderson and 
counsel being present, failing to direct the bailiff to retrieve 
the two jury questions and the court's written answers from the 
wastebasket where the jury deposited them so there would be 
exact statements of what was said.  Majority op., ¶2.  
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
the majority opinion states, all of Anderson's claims of error 
are subject to harmless error analyses.  Majority op., ¶¶112-25.  
A. 
Harmless Error 
¶130 We have explained that for an error to affect the 
substantial rights of a party and warrant reversal, it must be 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the 
proceeding would not have been the same absent the error.  State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  We 
have concluded that this test is based on Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18 (1967).  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶44-46.  It is 
also asserted that the test was established in Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶51 
(Crooks, J., concurring).  We have earlier articulated the test 
for harmless error as "whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed" to the outcome.  State v. Dyess, 124 
Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  We explained that a 
"reasonable possibility" under Wisconsin law is the equivalent 
of "reasonable probability" in United States Supreme Court 
parlance.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶41.  The specific wording 
of the test has been a matter of dispute on this court for some 
time.  Id., ¶52 n.1, (Crooks, J., concurring); see also State v. 
DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶59 n.10, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480 
(recognizing a coalescence of varying standards for harmless 
error, but determining that under the specific facts of the 
case, it did not matter which standard was applied to the 
specific error in the case); see also Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 
WI 94, ¶57, 282 Wis. 2d 664, 698 N.W.2d 714 ("In other words, if 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have [rendered the same verdict] absent the error, then the 
error did not contribute to the verdict" and is harmless 
(internal quotes omitted)).   
¶131 The result of the harmless error analysis in this case 
does not turn on how one phrases the test; either phrasing will 
yield the same result.  The majority opinion agrees that the 
same result will be reached regardless of which phrasing of 
harmless error is employed.  Majority op., ¶116.  I reach a 
different conclusion about harmless error than the majority 
opinion does because a harmless error analysis is a fact-driven 
analysis, and the majority opinion eschews the facts.   
¶132 The majority opinion reaches its conclusions about 
harmless error without reviewing the actual testimony that the 
jury heard, but instead, discusses the effect of the errors in 
terms of abstract principles.  However, a jury's verdict is 
driven by the facts it hears.  Therefore, I discuss the claimed 
errors in light of the actual testimony that was presented to 
the jury in the courtroom and in the jury room, as well as the 
testimony 
the 
jury 
requested 
but 
did 
not 
hear 
during 
deliberations.   
B. 
Claims of Error  
1. 
Testimony requested by the jury during deliberations 
¶133 The majority opinion does not conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in permitting 
the jury to see the child's videotape testimony after it began 
deliberations.  Majority op., ¶29.  Instead, it concludes it was 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
error to permit the jury to see the child's videotaped interview 
in the jury room, rather than in open court.  Id.   
¶134 As a starting point, I note that when a jury has 
questions about testimony presented in the courtroom, "the jury 
has a right to have that testimony read to it, subject to the 
discretion of the trial judge to limit the reading."  Kohlhoff 
v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 159, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978).  Permitting 
the jury to review evidence in the jury room, without some other 
aggravating circumstances, is not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion, even when the evidence favors one of the parties, 
which most evidence does.  State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 
260-61, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988).   
¶135 In Jensen, the 
circuit 
court 
permitted Jensen's 
confession to go to the jury during its deliberations, which was 
claimed to be an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id. at 258.  
In examining the claimed error, we overruled State v. Payne, 199 
Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929), which had established a per se 
rule against sending a defendant's confession to the jury room.2  
Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 259.  We replaced the per se rule with a 
list of factors under which this type of claimed error should be 
evaluated:  (1) whether the testimony would aid the jury in its 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion relies heavily on Franklin v. State, 
74 Wis. 2d 717, 247 N.W.2d 721 (1976), for its conclusion that 
the jury should not have been permitted to view the videotape in 
the jury room.  However, Franklin is based on State v. Payne, 
199 Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929), which we overruled in State 
v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 259, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988).  
Accordingly, Franklin's conclusion that it is error to permit a 
showing of a videotape in the jury room, without some other 
aggravating circumstances not present here, is no longer good 
law. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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consideration of the case; (2) whether the defendant would be 
"unduly prejudiced" by jury access to this evidence during 
deliberations; and (3) whether the evidence would be subject to 
improper use by the jury.  Id. at 260.  Later in Jensen, we 
explained that even if we had not chosen to overrule Payne, we 
would conclude that providing the defendant's confession to the 
jury during deliberations was harmless error, by examining the 
same three factors set out above.  Id. at 262.    
¶136 Because I have assumed all alleged errors are actually 
errors for the purposes of this appeal, I examine the three 
Jensen factors for harmless error in regard to playing the 
videotape in the jury room.  First, the videotape would aid the 
jury in its deliberations.  It would permit a review of the 
facts told by the child that relate to sexual assault, as the 
child told them soon after the assault had occurred.  Second, 
Anderson was not "unduly prejudiced" by the jury's review of 
this testimony, simply because it favored the State.  Most 
evidence 
favors 
one 
party 
or 
another. 
 
That 
Anderson's 
conviction had a "credibility element" to it is no different 
than was present in Jensen where we permitted the confession to 
go to the jury room and said, "The issue was credibility——the 
credibility of the defendant, of the police officers and of the 
complainant."  Id. at 261.  Third, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the location where the jury saw the 
videotape affected its verdict.  The circuit court carefully 
instructed the bailiff that he was to be present when the 
videotape was shown and that he was to permit the jury to see 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
the videotape only one time.  Anderson does not contend that the 
bailiff did not follow these instructions.  Therefore, the jury 
did not improperly use the videotape. 
¶137 Furthermore, the videotape was carefully introduced by 
the social worker who conducted the videotaped interview of the 
victim.  The social worker testified about the interviewing 
technique she used and her conversations with the child.  She 
concluded that the child was not "suggestible"; that the child 
understood the difference between a truth and a lie; and that 
the child had promised to tell the truth.  The social worker 
explained: 
Q: 
[D]id you use the Step-Wise protocol when you 
interviewed M? 
A: 
Yes, I did. 
Q: 
In the report phase, did you test whether or not 
she would correct you when you made a mistake? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
What did you find? 
A: 
That she did. 
Q: 
And what about her willingness to say, I don't 
know, when she didn't know the answers to the 
questions? 
A: 
She specifically, when I asked her how old her 
mom was, said, I don't know. 
Q: 
What did you conclude from that? 
A: 
That she wasn't going to go along with everything 
I said.  She was not suggestible. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
Q: 
Did you ask her open-ended questions when you got 
to the disclosure phase from—— about the abuse? 
A: 
Yes.   
Q: 
And she was able to answer open-ended questions? 
A: 
Yes.  Not extensively.  She was only eight.  She 
gave information at that level, yes. 
Q: 
Did you videotape your interview of M[]? 
A: 
Yes. 
. . .  
Q: 
[D]id 
M[] 
demonstrate 
that 
she 
knew 
the 
difference between a truth and a lie? 
A: 
Yes, she did. 
Q: 
Was she able to accurately give answers to the 
hypothetical questions you posed to her? 
A: 
Yes.   
Q: 
Did she understand that there were consequences 
to lying? 
A: 
She named three different negative consequences 
for lying. 
Q: 
Did she indicate she knew it was important to 
tell the truth? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
And did she promise you to tell the truth? 
A: 
Yes, she did. 
¶138 After the social worker had testified about the 
process she employed when interviewing the child, the videotaped 
interview was played in open court.  It contained the following 
questioning of the eight-year-old child by the social worker: 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
Q: 
So it sounds like you had a problem with your 
dad.  Were you in your mom's room with your 
sisters? 
A: 
No.  In the kitchen. 
Q: 
What happened in the kitchen? 
A: 
He called my name and, uh, I said 'what' and he 
said 'are you gonna do my thing' and then he made 
me do it. 
Q: 
He made you do it?  Where were you when he made 
you do it? 
A: 
In the kitchen. 
Q: 
Oh, okay, so you were in the kitchen when he made 
you do it? 
A: 
Mm-hmm. 
Q: 
Okay.  So, when he called you it sounds like you 
were with your sisters? 
A: 
Mm-hmm. 
Q: 
In what room? 
A: 
My mom's room. 
Q: 
Okay.  So it sounds like your dad called you, he 
said do you wanna do it, you said no, he made you 
do it in the kitchen, and then you went back to 
your sisters in your mom's room, your mom came 
home from Kmart, you looked at what she bought, 
and then you went to bed. 
A: 
Mm-hmm. 
Q: 
Tell me what else you remember about that. 
A: 
Well, um, I forgot. 
. . .  
Q: 
When you said he asked you if you wanted to do 
it, what did he say?  Tell me exactly his words 
if you can remember. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
A: 
'Do you want to play with my tail' and I said 
'no' and that's all. 
Q: 
Okay.  So he would say 'do you want to——'  He 
said 'do you want to play with my tail'?   
A: 
Mm-hmm. 
Q: 
And you said 'no.'  And then what happened right 
after that? 
A: 
He pulled down his pants and made me do it. 
Q: 
He pulled down his pants and made you do it?  
Okay.  Tell me what he made you do. 
A: 
He made me get down on my knees and suck it. 
Q: 
He made you get down on your knees and suck it? 
A: 
Mm-hmm. 
Q: 
Okay.  And then what happened? 
A: 
And that's all. 
Q: 
Okay.  And tell me about the sucking part. 
A: 
It was black and it was pink inside and it was 
hairy on the bottom. 
Q: 
What was? 
A: 
His tail. 
Q: 
His tail was black, and pink on the inside, and 
hairy on the bottom?  Okay.  What does a tail do? 
A: 
Pee. 
. . .  
Q: 
Do you call that part on a boy——or a man——
something besides a tail? 
A: 
In the front? 
Q: 
Mm-hmm. 
A: 
Um—— a dick. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
Q: 
A dick?  Okay. 
. . .  
Q: 
So, it sounds like your dad had you kneel down 
and suck on his tail?   
A: 
Uh-hmm. 
Q: 
Okay.  Tell me what that was like. 
A: 
Mm—— nothing.  It was nasty and yellow stuff came 
out of it. 
Q: 
It was nasty and yellow stuff came out of it?  
Okay.  And where did the yellow stuff go? 
A: 
In my mouth. 
Q: 
And what happened then? 
A: 
I went to the bathroom and spit it out. 
Q: 
Where? 
A: 
In the bathroom. 
Q: 
Where in the bathroom? 
A: 
In the toilet. 
¶139 The majority opinion next claims that it was error to 
permit playing the videotape while not providing a reading of 
the 
child's 
in-court 
testimony 
and 
Anderson's 
in-court 
testimony, both of which were requested by the jury.  Majority 
op., ¶2.  One of the reasons that the majority opinion concludes 
this was not harmless error is because the child, in her trial 
testimony, "on direct examination, she did not recite the 
allegations stated in the videotaped interview."  Majority op., 
¶8.   
¶140 The majority opinion's representation at ¶8, misstates 
the contents of the child's testimony.  The child's testimony 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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recited the same facts in the courtroom as she did in videotaped 
testimony.  I briefly quote from the child's courtroom testimony 
to demonstrate the overwhelmingly convincing nature of that 
testimony, which was consistent with her videotaped allegations 
of sexual assault: 
Q: 
. . . What caused you to leave the room? 
A: 
He was calling my name.   
Q: 
And he's Lionel? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
And when—— Do you know how far away that room 
is from where he was?  
A: 
Yes.   
Q: 
How far away is it? 
A: 
Two feet. 
Q: 
Two feet.  And what room were you called to? 
A: 
The kitchen. 
Q: 
And what's in the kitchen? 
A: 
Table. 
Q: 
What kind of table? 
A: 
Glass. 
Q: 
Is that table still there today?   
A: 
Uh-huh.   
Q: 
Yes.  When you say, Uh-huh, you mean yes, 
right? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
And what were you asked to do? 
A: 
Suck the thing. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
Q: 
Suck his thing, okay.  And how—— Were you 
standing up? 
A: 
On my knees.   
Q: 
Was he standing up?  
A: 
No.   
Q: 
What was he doing? 
A: 
Sitting down. 
. . .  
Q: 
Can you describe the thing for me?  
A: 
Black and pink. 
Q: 
Black and pink.  Where is it pink? 
A: 
Inside.  
Q: 
Inside.  How—— I mean, do you have to pull 
anything back? 
A: 
Uh-huh. 
Q: 
Yes?  
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Can you be more specific as to where it is 
pink? 
A: 
On the inside. 
Q: 
Okay.  Do you remember how long the thing was? 
A: 
No.  
Q: 
No.  Okay.  Can you tell us anything else about 
the thing?  
A: 
It was black on the outside. 
Q: 
Okay.  And anything else? 
A: 
No. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
Q: 
Okay.  And when you had to suck on his thing, 
did he do anything else to you? 
A: 
Some stuff came out.   
Q: 
Some stuff came out.  What stuff?  
A: 
Yellow.   
Q: 
Yellow.  Like yellow—— like this yellow or a 
different yellow?  
A: 
Light.   
Q: 
Lighter?   
COURT: Like this?  So the record is clear, Mr. Smith 
is holding up a legal pad. 
Q: 
I didn't hear your answer? 
A: 
It was lighter. 
Q: 
Lighter.  And does it taste like anything?  
A: 
No. 
Q: 
No.  What did you do after that?  
A: 
Went to the bathroom and spit it out. 
Q: 
This happened three times? 
A: 
Twice. 
As can be readily determined by reviewing what the jury heard in 
the courtroom, the child's testimony in court repeated in detail 
the same allegations she made previously.   
¶141 The majority argues that showing the videotape in the 
jury room was error, when combined with other factors, one of 
which was failing to read the victim's trial testimony: 
In the present case, the lack of a record of 
communications between the circuit court and the jury 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion in deciding not to read to the jury all or 
part of the defendant's and victim's testimony as 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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requested by the jury when the jury had access to the 
victim's videotaped interview in the jury room were 
prejudicial errors, combining "to contribute to the 
verdict obtained." 
Majority op., ¶117 (emphasis added).  However, as the undisputed 
facts show, reading the child's courtroom testimony to the jury 
would have been of no benefit to Anderson.  If anything, 
Anderson benefited when the circuit court did not fulfill the 
jury's request to have the child's courtroom testimony read to 
it. 
¶142 Notwithstanding the testimony in the record, the 
majority opinion repeats and repeats that failing to read the 
child's in-court testimony contributed to its view that it was 
prejudicial error not to read the child's courtroom testimony.  
Majority op., ¶¶112, 117, 119-21.  The majority opinion ties 
this claim of error to the principle of "credibility."  Majority 
op., ¶¶118-21.  It implies that if the child's in-court 
testimony had been read to the jury during deliberations, the 
jury may not have believed the child.  Majority op., ¶¶121, 123.  
However, there is absolutely no factual support in the record 
for this conclusion.   
¶143 Just like Sergeant Joe Friday in a long forgotten 
television sitcom, I say look at the facts.  If the child's in-
court testimony had been read, it would have made the videotaped 
testimony even more powerful.  Therefore, I conclude that if the 
circuit court erred, it surely was harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
¶144 The other trial testimony that the jury requested at 
the same time it asked to have the child's in-court testimony 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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read was Anderson's.  Again, in order to determine whether this 
unfulfilled request is or is not harmless error, it is necessary 
to examine Anderson's testimony.  There is no other way to 
determine the potential effect it could have had if it had been 
read to the jury.   
¶145 Anderson's 
testimony 
was 
practically 
void 
of 
information that would have weighed in the jury's deliberations.  
We quote the portions of Anderson's testimony that relate to the 
charge of first-degree sexual assault of a child: 
Q: 
Okay. 
 
You've 
heard, 
Mr. 
Anderson, 
the 
accusations that 
M[] 
has 
made against 
you?  
You've been here yesterday and today? 
A: 
Yes.  
Q: 
And I'm going to ask you, Mr. Anderson, did you 
ever touch M[] in a sexual manner? 
A: 
No.   
Q: 
Did you ever call her out of the room—— out of a 
room where she was watching something with her 
sisters—— 
A: 
No. 
Q: 
——to have her perform oral sex on you? 
A: 
No. 
Q: 
Has your penis ever been in her mouth? 
A: 
No.  
Q: 
What color is your penis, Mr. Anderson? 
A: 
Huh? 
Q: 
What color is your penis? 
A: 
Brown. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
Q: 
Brown? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Any pink on it? 
A: 
No. 
As the State points out, Anderson's testimony presented only a 
flat denial, without elaboration, to the State's strong case.  
It was of such an unpersuasive nature that it would have had no 
effect on the jury's verdict if it had been read in the jury 
room.3  There was nothing in it except Anderson's brief denial, 
which the jury surely knew was in his testimony because without 
Anderson's denial of the charges, there would have been no need 
for a jury trial.   
¶146 The majority's explanation for the harm of this error 
relates to the jury's weighing the child's credibility and 
Anderson's 
credibility, 
and 
what 
the 
majority 
opinion 
characterizes as the undue influence of the victim's videotaped 
testimony where credibility was at issue.  Majority op., ¶119.  
The majority opinion also asserts that the jury wanted to have 
the child's and Anderson's in-court testimony read to it because 
                                                 
3 We list the remaining information offered in Anderson's 
testimony, 
which 
along 
with 
the 
quoted 
transcript 
text, 
constitutes the sum total of possible information the jury could 
have gained from having his testimony read to it:  he and his 
wife were in the process of a divorce, he had a fourth grade 
education, he did farming work in Louisiana after leaving 
school, he then lived and worked in Milwaukee, he and his wife 
had been foster parents to three kids, his wife had confronted 
him about the alleged sexual assault, his wife subsequently 
asked him to leave the house, he then went to a cousin's house 
in Milwaukee, he left the cousin's house and went to Kentucky, 
he did not read or write well, he was arrested for these charges 
in Kentucky, he had not talked with the victim or her sisters 
about any inappropriate conduct. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
"the jury was obviously having difficulty sorting it all out."  
Majority op., ¶121.  This is pure speculation.  It is equally 
plausible that two jury members were arguing whether Anderson 
fled to Kentucky or to some other state to avoid prosecution.  
No one knows why the jury asked to have the child's and 
Anderson's courtroom testimony read.  However, what is clear 
beyond refute is that reading Anderson's and the child's in-
court testimony to the jury would not have changed this verdict.  
¶147 In my evaluation of Anderson's concerns about what 
testimony was, and was not, provided to the jury during its 
deliberations, I am persuaded that if all the testimony the jury 
requested had been read to it, the following factors prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that, nevertheless, Anderson would 
have been convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child:  
(1) the child's in-court testimony contained a detailed account 
of the sexual assault, told in words a young child would choose; 
(2) the child's in-court description of Anderson's ejaculation, 
the color of the ejaculate and what she did with it, would not 
be knowledge an eight-year-old child would have, absent sexual 
assault; (3) the child's description of the particulars of the 
sexual assault in the videotaped testimony was consistent with 
her in-court testimony; and (4) Anderson's complete lack of a 
substantive defense, except to say he did not do it, offered no 
reason why the child should not be believed.  Accordingly, I 
conclude that if there were error in these discretionary 
decisions of the circuit court, any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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2. 
Judge's ex parte jury communications  
¶148 The majority concludes that the circuit court judge's 
communications with the jury outside the presence of Anderson 
and counsel is prejudicial error.  Majority op., ¶126.  Although 
the majority contends that a record-less ex parte communication 
between the judge and jury can deprive the reviewing court of 
the ability to assess its effect, it acknowledges that such is 
not always the case.  Majority op., ¶81 n.53.  
¶149 I agree that a judge's communication with a jury 
during deliberations outside the presence of the defendant and 
counsel is error; however, it is not structural error that 
requires reversal.  State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 570, 334 
N.W.2d 263 (1983).  The majority opinion does not describe facts 
that it concludes show that the judge-jury communication 
prejudiced Anderson.  Instead, it relies on the principle that 
what the court said in response to the jury's questions cannot 
be ascertained with certainty and therefore, this lack of 
verbatim record determines that the error was not harmless.  
Majority op., ¶118.  However, this stated rationale causes the 
majority 
opinion 
to 
overrule 
Burton, 
which 
specifically 
concluded that ex parte communications between the circuit court 
and the jury are not structural errors requiring reversal:   
We continue to believe, as we said in Havenor, 
that communication between judge and jury outside the 
open courtroom and outside the presence of the 
defendant and defense counsel constitutes error, but 
we do not readopt the Havenor rule that such error 
constitutes automatic grounds for reversal for the 
same reasons that this court earlier abandoned the 
rule.  . . .  We hold that communication between a 
judge and a jury, while the jury is deliberating, 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
outside the courtroom and outside the presence of the 
defendant 
and 
defense 
counsel 
constitutes 
constitutional error, if the defendant has not waived 
the constitutional right to be present.  The court 
must consider whether the constitutional error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 569-70 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967)).   
¶150 In addition, the evidence on which the jury made its 
determination was so overwhelmingly in support of the State's 
case that it is almost impossible to ascertain what the judge 
could have said that would have meaningfully augmented the 
convincing evidence in favor of the State's case.  Furthermore, 
the judge's on-the-record description of the communications 
between him and the jury demonstrate that the exchanges did not 
implicate the quality of the child's or Anderson's in-court 
testimonies.  See majority op., ¶19.  And, while it is beyond 
dispute that the circuit court should have required the bailiff 
to retrieve the notes between the jury and the court from the 
wastebasket where the jury said it had discarded them, the lack 
of those notes does not make the circuit court's communications 
with the jury prejudicial.  To conclude that it does, would 
require us to treat this error as structural error requiring 
reversal, and as I have explained above, that would require 
overruling at least 23 years of precedent.  Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 
at 570.  Therefore, given the circuit court's explanation of 
those communications, I conclude that the failure to make or 
preserve a verbatim record of statements from and to the jury 
was also harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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II.  CONCLUSION 
¶151 When 
I 
examine 
those 
assumed 
errors 
under 
the 
standards for determining whether they were harmless, I do so 
based on the actual testimony from Lionel Anderson's trial for 
first-degree sexual assault of a child.  The majority employs 
similar harmless error standards; however, it applies them to 
abstract principles, not to the concrete facts of this case.  
This is where we differ.  I conclude that all errors, in light 
of the actual testimony, were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, irrespective of which harmless error test is employed.  
Accordingly, because I would affirm the court of appeals 
decision 
upholding 
Anderson's 
conviction, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
¶152 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins in this dissent.   
 
 
No.  2004AP2010-CR.pdr 
 
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