Title: Middleton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-2469
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2469 
____________ 
 
DALE GLENN MIDDLETON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 9, 2017] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Middleton’s motion for rehearing is hereby granted.  We substitute the 
following revised opinion for our previous opinion issued October 22, 2015. 
On August 6, 2012, a jury found Dale Middleton guilty of first-degree 
premeditated murder for the killing of Roberta Christensen, first-degree felony 
murder with a weapon, burglary of an occupied dwelling while armed, and dealing 
in stolen property.1  The jury voted 12-0 to impose the death penalty.  The trial 
court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Middleton to death.  
                                          
 
1.  The State nolle prossed the third-degree grand theft charge of the 
indictment.  
 
 
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Middleton now appeals his convictions and sentence of death.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth in this 
opinion, we affirm Middleton’s conviction of first-degree murder and uphold his 
death sentence.  
I.  Statement of the Case and Facts 
 
Roberta Christensen, as well as her husband of thirty-one years, lived in a 
trailer across the street from Middleton.  On July 1, 2009, Mr. Christensen went to 
New Jersey to visit the couple’s son.  Before her husband left, they bought mobile 
phones that allowed them to use a walkie-talkie mechanism to communicate while 
they were apart.   
Middleton lived in a trailer with Garrett Wade Fowler, Kenneth Wade 
Sullivan and Sullivan’s girlfriend, Haleigh Zinker.  On occasion, Middleton would 
visit the victim at her home and would sometimes borrow money and cigarettes 
from her.  On the morning of July 27, 2009, Middleton went over to the victim’s 
trailer while she was preparing to go to the bank.  After he left, she realized that 
she had left approximately $400 in tip money out, and suspected that Middleton 
had seen it.  She deposited the money into the bank that afternoon.  When the 
victim returned from the bank she noticed that someone had attempted to remove 
the screen from the window by her front door.   
 
 
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On the morning of July 28, 2009, Middleton rode around with his 
girlfriend’s roommate, Steve Britnell, for a period of time looking for drugs.  The 
two eventually found methamphetamine around twelve or one o’clock that 
afternoon.  They returned to Middleton’s trailer and shared the methamphetamine.  
At this time, Garrett Wade Fowler and his girlfriend were also at the trailer.  At 
approximately 4:30 p.m., Fowler and Britnell decided to go to Walmart to “boost.”  
Middleton declined to go, stating that he had business to take care of, that someone 
owed him some money, and that he needed to take a shower.   
While Britnell and Fowler were gone, Middleton took a knife from the sink 
of his trailer and went over to the victim’s home.  While in the victim’s kitchen, he 
asked her for money.  When she refused and attempted to push him out of the 
trailer, he attacked her with the knife.  Christensen was alive and moving 
erratically as she was dragged from the kitchen area to the bedroom.  Once in the 
bedroom, Middleton cut Christensen’s throat.  Before leaving her home, Middleton 
stole her flat-screen television and power cord and carried the television across the 
street to his trailer.  There, he washed his hands in the kitchen sink, changed his 
clothes, but kept his boots on.  He placed the bloody clothes in a bag with the 
murder weapon.    
When Fowler and Britnell returned to Middleton’s trailer, Middleton was 
there with Chris Jenkins, Kenneth Wade Sullivan and Sullivan’s girlfriend.  There 
 
 
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was a flat screen television in the kitchen with a blanket covering it.  At this time, 
Middleton had already showered and his hair was still wet.  He stated that the 
person that owed him money had given him the television as payment.     
After Jenkins and Sullivan left, Fowler was sitting on the porch as Middleton 
stood at the door.  Fowler noticed that Middleton had a red substance on his boots, 
which Middleton claimed happened because he got something out of the dumpster.  
Later, Britnell and Middleton drove around in Britnell’s black Pontiac to two 
different pawn shops trying to sell the victim’s television; both pawn shops were 
closed.  They both then got on the phone and began to call around to see if they 
could find someone who wanted to purchase the television.   
At approximately 5:30 p.m., Middleton called Christopher Jenkins to his 
home.  Middleton asked Jenkins to bring drugs with him.  When Jenkins arrived at 
Middleton’s trailer, Middleton asked Jenkins for assistance in selling the 
television.  After Jenkins took a photo of the television, he and Middleton went 
into the bedroom where Middleton crushed and consumed two Roxicodone pills, 
saving one pill for later.   
Mrs. Christensen’s husband had last spoken to her on July 28, 2009, around 
2:50 p.m.  He watched a movie and fell asleep from approximately 4 p.m. to 6:40 
p.m.  When he woke up he was surprised that his wife had not called him; he 
repeatedly attempted to contact his wife on the walkie-talkie phone, to no avail.  
 
 
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He also left a message on the home’s voicemail.  Mr. Christensen called the 
couple’s other son who lived near the victim’s home and asked him to check on his 
mother. 
When the Christensen’s son and his wife arrived at his parents’ home, he 
noticed Mrs. Christensen’s car parked in its usual spot.  The trailer door was 
unlocked and the son went inside.  When the son walked into the kitchen, he saw a 
big puddle of blood on the kitchen floor.  Next to the puddle of blood he saw a 
yellow broom with a sharp edge.  He followed the path of blood to a closed 
bedroom door.  He opened the door and saw his mother’s dead body on the floor.  
He heard his father on the walkie-talkie calling out for him and his mother.  He 
went outside to call the police.  He stopped his wife from entering the trailer.  
While on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, he went back into the trailer to 
confirm that his mother was not breathing.   
Randy Ammons helped Middleton sell the television to his brother, Rolland 
Ammons.  When Middleton went to Randy Ammons’ house, he said that he had 
just taken a shower and did not want the dog to jump on him.  A little after 7 p.m., 
Middleton, in a vehicle driven by Wade Fowler, followed Randy Ammons to 
Ronnie Ammons’ house to sell the television.  Fowler stayed outside by his car 
while Middleton took the television, covered with a comforter, inside and sold it to 
Rolland for $200.  At some point earlier, while riding around trying to sell the 
 
 
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television, Middleton placed the bag with the bloody clothes and the murder 
weapon inside of a dumpster. 
After selling the television, Britnell drove Middleton to a gas station, where 
Middleton purchased cocaine from someone in a truck.  They consumed some of 
the drugs while in the car.  Soon thereafter, the serpentine belt on the car broke and 
Britnell drove to a relative’s house to have it fixed.  While the car was being fixed, 
Middleton walked a few hundred yards to a local bar, Brewskis, and called Britnell 
to pick him up once the car was fixed.  When Middleton got back to the car, he 
was really upset and was crying while he was on the phone with his girlfriend and 
said, “I’m sorry.”  The two drove back to the trailer park where Middleton lived.  
When they arrived, there were police cars in the area.  Not wanting to get too close 
to the police officers, the two turned off at someone else’s house, where they got 
out of the car and stood in the yard.     
Later that evening, officers found Middleton at the residence of Darrell 
Dubel.  When the officers arrived, Britnell’s car was there.  At this time, Middleton 
was barefoot and had placed his boots and socks in Britnell’s trunk.  Officer John 
Rhoden asked Brandon Jenkins, Britnell and Middleton to come to the Sheriff’s 
Office for questioning.  Middleton’s boots were later recovered from the trunk and 
were found to have the victim’s blood on them.  While in custody, Middleton 
confessed.  The bloody clothes and the murder weapon were never discovered.     
 
 
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A.  Middleton’s Confession 
During the trial, the State played Middleton’s interview videos for the jury, 
including the fifth and final video where Middleton ultimately confessed to the 
murder.  Detective Faulkner and Assistant State Attorney Ashley Albright were 
present during Detective Maerki’s questioning of Middleton.  The recording of the 
first interview, which was conducted in Detective Maerki’s office, could not 
subsequently be retrieved.  As a precautionary measure, the second and third 
interviews were conducted using the computer equipment located in Detective 
Faulkner’s office.  Maerki read Middleton his rights, as detailed on a Miranda2 
card.  Maerki detected an odor of alcohol on Middleton, and also noticed that his 
eyes were bloodshot and watery.  He was surprised that Middleton did not have 
slurred speech and that his coordination was fine.  He stated that Middleton 
seemed to be fully aware of everything that was happening during the 
interrogation. 
 
Middleton told Maerki that everything happened so fast that he never 
checked to see if the victim had any money.  He stated that he thought that the 
victim ended up in the hallway, and that he did not remember cutting her throat.  
He stated that after the murder, he did not bathe, and only washed his hands.  He 
admitted that he acted alone.  He told the police the location of the dumpster where 
                                          
 
2.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
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he threw the bag with his clothes and the murder weapon.  He stated that he kept 
his boots on and put them in the trunk of Steve Britnell’s small black car.  He 
admitted to selling the television later that night to Rolland Ammons for $200.  He 
additionally admitted that he used the same $200 to purchase more drugs.  
B.  Forensic Testimony 
Crime scene technician Jackie Moore assisted Detective Bradley at the crime 
scene.  She testified that there was no evidence of a struggle in the living room 
area.  She recalled that there was a void in the dust on a television stand in the 
living room indicating that there was previously a television and remote there.  She 
testified that there were bloodstains on the dining room table and chairs that led 
toward the master bedroom.  The bloodstains on the wall of the bedroom indicated 
that at some point the victim had been standing and had stepped in blood.   On the 
floor near the wall next to the refrigerator and the dining room table, there was 
blood with drag marks and some pooling of blood.  The drag marks indicated that 
the victim was alive and moving erratically as she was dragged from the kitchen 
area to the bedroom.  There was blood with drag marks in the doorway of the 
master bedroom.  There were bloody shoe impressions from the master bedroom to 
the kitchen.   
The victim had a gaping wound in her throat.  The medical examiner 
testified that there were several passes like a sawing motion with a sharp 
 
 
- 9 - 
instrument to create the margin of the wound.  The blood stains indicated that the 
victim’s carotid artery was not cut until she got into the bedroom.  Her hands and 
shirt were saturated with blood.  She also had blood running down her abdomen 
that soaked into the waistband of her pants.  The amount and pattern of blood on 
the victim’s waistband indicated that she may have been sitting up slightly or 
halfway when she received the neck injury.  The victim’s shirt was pulled upwards 
toward her neck, which is consistent with being dragged.   
The laceration to the victim’s throat produced significantly more blood than 
was seen in the blood trail through the kitchen.  The victim had a bruise on her 
cheek that was consistent with the tread and design of Middleton’s boots.  The 
victim had bruises and a cut to her face, a puncture and stab wounds on her chest, 
neck, ear, and arms.  The bloody shoeprints were well defined closer to the 
bedroom and became faint as they continued down the hall.  The victim’s son’s 
shoes were tested and eliminated as the shoes that caused the bloody shoe 
impressions.  Moore testified that this indicated that the blood was likely dried by 
the time the victim’s son found her.  There were various items located close to the 
victim’s body, which indicated that she was grabbing for things during the 
struggle.  The victim had bloody injuries to her arms and wrists.  She had defensive 
wounds that indicated that she was trying to get away from someone who had a 
knife.  None of the injuries to the victim’s extremities would have killed or 
 
 
- 10 - 
incapacitated her.  The autopsy revealed that the neck injury occurred toward the 
end of the attack.  Following the neck injury, the victim could have been conscious 
for ten to twenty seconds, and alive for minutes after losing consciousness. 
On the kitchen floor of Middleton’s residence, there was a washed-out shoe 
impression that was similar to those found inside the victim’s residence.  This print 
tested positive for blood, but no DNA profile could be obtained.  The medical 
examiner found blood on the sink of the only bathroom in Middleton’s trailer, but 
no DNA profile could be obtained.  There was blood beside the dresser in 
Middleton’s bedroom, but the DNA profile was determined to be inconclusive.  A 
different bloodstain in Middleton’s room matched the victim’s DNA on four of 
thirteen points.  The probability that a randomly selected Caucasian person could 
match the same DNA profile at these four locations is one in 41,680.  
Donna Lee and Rolland Ammons’ fingerprints were the only prints found on 
the victim’s television.  Middleton’s fingerprints were not found inside the victim’s 
residence.  There was no evidence that the trailer had been ransacked or that the 
victim’s things had been rifled through.  Moore explained that the vanity in the 
victim’s bedroom had blood spatter on the outside, but not the inside, indicating 
that the door to the cabinet of the vanity was closed during the attack.  Inside the 
cabinet, there was a purse that appeared to have been thrown in there.  There was 
 
 
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evidence of blood spatter on the purse and also blood inside of the purse.  The 
purse was empty, and there were no fingerprints found on the purse.3  
C.  Penalty Phase 
During the penalty phase, the defense presented testimony from Dr. James 
D. Barnard, and the State presented testimony from Dr. Deborah Leporowski.4  
The defense’s court-appointed mitigation investigator, Joe Parish, also testified, as 
did Middleton’s sisters.   
1.  Psychological Witnesses Testimony 
Dr. Barnard assisted the defense in formulating mitigating evidence and 
conducted a mental health evaluation of Middleton.  His findings indicated that 
Middleton underreported the type of drugs he abused and the frequency of their 
use.  Dr. Barnard determined that Middleton began abusing painkillers after being 
prescribed the medications following an accidental fall.  He also determined that 
Middleton began smoking marijuana between the ages of ten and thirteen.  He 
described the onset of cocaine use at age twenty-five, ceasing at age thirty.  
Additionally, Middleton told Dr. Barnard that he had used methamphetamine once 
a year since he was twenty-eight years old.  This statement conflicted with his 
                                          
 
3.  During the guilt phase, the defense rested without presenting a case-in-
chief. 
 
4.  They testified consistently with their respective testimony provided at the 
hearing on Middleton’s pretrial motion to suppress his confession. 
 
 
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assertion during his police interview that the day of the murder was the first time 
he had ever used methamphetamine.  Dr. Barnard testified that Middleton reported 
briefly being medically treated for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  
Dr. Barnard characterized ADHD as symptomatic of difficulty with impulse 
control, difficulty regulating behavior to standards or norms, high-rate motor 
activity, and difficulty focusing attention.  
Dr. Barnard also found that Middleton was possibly exaggerating his 
symptoms, which may sometimes be viewed as a cry for help.  Dr. Barnard found 
it quite significant that Middleton’s personality type is known to have problems 
with repressed anger and hostility and that persons with this condition are 
sometimes able to control their anger but sometimes have anger outbursts that are 
difficult or impossible for them to control.  Equally significant, opined Dr. 
Barnard, is that individuals with this personality type have real problems 
responding to authority and taking direction and often accept little or no 
responsibility for their behavior.  Dr. Barnard concluded that Middleton could not 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law on the day in question and that 
his substance abuse on the date of the murder would have likely impaired anyone’s 
psychological controls, even someone who had no difficulty with impulse control.   
On cross-examination, Dr. Barnard admitted that he did not review all of the 
records in this case, i.e., the depositions of people close to Middleton, his arrest 
 
 
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and jail records, and his confession to the murder.  Dr. Barnard conceded that 
Middleton is not mentally retarded.  The State questioned Dr. Barnard about the 
report that was conducted by Dr. Landrum in August 2009 which found 
Middleton’s IQ to be 72.  Dr. Barnard testified that Middleton informed him that 
he did not give his best effort on the IQ test conducted by Dr. Landrum.  When Dr. 
Barnard administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV) test in 
September 2011, he determined that Middleton’s full scale IQ was 83.  Dr. Barnard 
determined that Middleton was not malingering during the exam he administered.  
He stated that he was aware that Middleton was administered the WAIS-IV test for 
a third time in this case by Dr. Riordan in March 2012.   
Dr. Riordan’s March 2012, evaluation indicated that Middleton’s IQ score 
was 75.  Dr. Barnard would have expected Middleton’s IQ score to be higher if all 
other factors were stable.  This lower score could be an indication of various 
factors including Middleton being under the weather or malingering.  There were 
no indications that Middleton was ever separated from the general population in 
prison due to any mental health issues.  Dr. Barnard admitted that Middleton slit 
his wrists in a holding cell and did so in an attempt not to be extradited back to a 
facility in Georgia.   
Dr. Deborah Leporowski testified for the State.  She stated that in order to 
prepare for her testimony, she reviewed the reports, previous testimony, and 
 
 
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depositions of Doctors Barnard and Riordan and the report of Dr. Landrum.  She 
also reviewed the police reports in this case, transcripts, witness interviews, letters 
that Middleton wrote while he was in jail, and Department of Corrections records. 
She also interviewed Middleton.  Dr. Leporowski maintained that Middleton’s IQ 
scores are illogical with an initial score of 72, a score of 83 two years later and 
then months later receiving a score of 75.  Dr. Leporowski opined that a score of 
83 is likely Middleton’s actual IQ score.  Dr. Leporowski diagnosed Middleton 
with antisocial personality disorder, as did Dr. Barnard.  
Dr. Leporowski determined that Middleton was malingering “or at least 
exaggerating” when taking his personality tests.  Dr. Leporowski found no history 
of mental illness in Middleton’s records or in her interview with him.  She rejected 
any assertion that Middleton’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially 
impaired.  She opined that Middleton’s upbringing did not in any way lead him to 
believe that those actions involving this crime were okay or were warranted in any 
way based on the victim’s behavior.  She testified that everything he told her about 
the day of the crimes was logical, made sense, and indicated that he was able to 
make decisions and choices.  Dr. Leporowski further noted that Middleton 
appeared to remember what he did throughout the day, where he did drugs and 
with whom.  On cross-examination, she stated that Middleton’s jail records 
 
 
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indicated that his detox from drugs while in jail was typical and did not evidence 
drug dependence, but that he used them intermittently when he had access to them.   
2.  Family History Testimony 
The trial court appointed Joe Parrish, a licensed private investigator, to assist 
the defense in developing mitigation for the penalty phase.  Mr. Parrish determined 
that Middleton’s mother abused drugs and his older siblings acted as parents to 
him.  Middleton expressed to Parrish some depression concerning the death of his 
father figure, a former employer, who had died.  Mr. Parrish found that Middleton 
was employed at a welding company for a period of time and was described by the 
owner as being a hard worker and very dependable.  Parrish also found that 
marijuana use at an early age led Middleton to abuse heavier drugs.  Mr. Parrish 
spoke with Middleton’s eldest daughter, who lived in the same mobile park with 
her mother and younger sister.  She explained that in the days leading up to the 
murder, she noticed that her father’s physical appearance had changed and that he 
was abusing drugs.  Parrish also described a history of domestic violence between 
Middleton and his girlfriend, Sabrina Jones.   
Devenna Pearson, Middleton’s older sister, testified on his behalf.  She 
described their childhood as physically and emotionally painful.  She explained 
that their mother provided for the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter 
and basic hygiene through social security benefits that she received following the 
 
 
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death of her husband.  She explained that she and Middleton were never required 
to go to school.  Pearson additionally explained that she was sexually molested by 
her stepfather for approximately three and a half years, and that her mother was 
aware of the abuse but did not stop it.  Her older sister found out and stopped the 
abuse by cutting their abusive stepfather.  She recalled that she was sent away for a 
few months and Middleton remained in the house with their mother.  She described 
her brother, as she knew him growing up, as outgoing, fun and someone who 
always tried to make everyone laugh.  
Dewanna Sprowse, Middleton’s eldest sister, also testified on his behalf.  
She explained that their mother would sell her food stamps for beer and drugs.  
Sprowse recalled that Middleton did not have clean clothes and fitted shoes, and 
that if she was not home to get her siblings up and ready for school then their 
mother would just tell them to go outside and play.  She explained that one of her 
stepfathers was physically abusive to her younger siblings, including Middleton.  
She testified that their mother had always placed men before her children, and that 
she did not spend any money on holidays, birthdays, or books.  She recalled 
Middleton being about age twelve or thirteen when he finally quit going to school.  
 
 
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She described Middleton, as she remembered him growing up, as a sweetheart, 
talented, with a good heart.5 
D.  Middleton’s Pretrial Motion to Suppress His Confession 
 
The defense filed a motion to suppress the defendant’s confession, claiming 
that Middleton was too intoxicated to waive his Miranda rights.  The motion 
additionally alleged that Middleton did not possess the intellectual ability to 
comprehend his Miranda rights and that Middleton’s final interview was conducted 
after Middleton’s attorney provided the Sheriff’s Office with a form invoking 
Middleton’s constitutional right to remain silent.  The hearing on the motion took 
place on April 10, 2012, and June 29, 2012.    
1.  Lay Witnesses 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Christopher Jenkins testified for 
the defense.  He testified that he was disabled and was prescribed Roxicodone and 
Xanax.  He testified that since 2007 he would either sell or give Middleton his 
prescription medications.  On the day of the murder, he went to Middleton’s trailer 
to give him some drugs and to look at the television that Middleton wanted to sell.  
He gave Middleton three Roxicodone pills.  Middleton snorted two of the pills 
while Jenkins was there.   
                                          
 
5.  The trial court held a Spencer hearing on August 24, 2012.  See Spencer 
v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  Neither the State nor the defense presented 
any additional evidence. 
 
 
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The State called Steve Britnell to testify at the suppression hearing.  He 
testified consistently with his guilt phase testimony.  Britnell recalled he and 
Middleton each taking one Xanax pill on the morning of the murder.  He further 
recalled that in the early afternoon, the two shared $20 worth of methamphetamine, 
which Britnell described as “a little bit.”  He indicated that immediately following 
the sale of the television, he drove Middleton to a Circle K to purchase cocaine.  
They each consumed “a line or two” of cocaine in the Circle K parking lot.  Later, 
Captain John Rhoden and Lieutenant Brad Stark approached them and asked them 
to come to the police station to give a statement.  They drove to the station 
voluntarily.   
Captain Rhoden testified that Middleton had no trouble standing or keeping 
his posture, did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, spoke 
clearly, and did not appear to have any problems understanding what was being 
said to him.  Lieutenant Stark testified that none of the men appeared to be off-
balance.  Nothing indicated that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.  
On cross-examination, he stated that it would surprise him to hear that Middleton 
had done crystal meth, cocaine and Xanax during that day. 
Detective Marty Faulkner testified regarding his interviews of Middleton.  
The first interview occurred on July 28, 2009, at 11:56 p.m., in his office, with 
another detective and Assistant State Attorney Ashley Albright present.  He read 
 
 
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the Miranda card verbatim to Middleton, who signed, dated and time stamped it.  
Middleton agreed to speak with detectives, but seemed nervous.  He stated that 
Middleton appeared to be coherent and not under the influence of any drugs; 
Middleton was responsive to questions and his memory appeared to be fine.  The 
interview lasted approximately one hour.  Middleton made no admissions during 
this interview.  
Faulkner interviewed Middleton a second time, again in his office, in the 
early morning hours of July 29, 2009.  Middleton made no admissions.  The third 
interview lasted three minutes, and at that time Middleton claimed that Garrett 
Wade Fowler had committed the murder.  Middleton was placed under arrest at the 
end of the third interview.  When Faulkner returned to work, at approximately 11 
a.m., Sergeant Coleman informed him that Middleton wanted to speak with him.  
Coleman testified and corroborated that Middleton made this request and that he 
relayed the request to Faulkner.  This interview lasted for approximately twenty-
three minutes before Middleton asked to go back to his cell.  The officers then 
immediately concluded the interview and returned Middleton to his cell.   
Faulkner further testified that on July 30, he felt obligated to check on 
Middleton, based on Middleton’s state of mind during the interview conducted the 
previous day.  When Faulkner arrived, Middleton was in segregation and standing 
at the gate of his cell.  Middleton asked to speak to him, and Faulkner had 
 
 
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Middleton escorted to his office, where the final interview took place.  During this 
final interview, after repeatedly being advised of his Miranda rights, Middleton 
confessed to murdering Roberta Christensen.  On cross-examination, Faulkner 
acknowledged that he informed Middleton that he would have to waive his right to 
counsel to speak with him, and it was on the final (approximately seventh) time 
that Faulkner told Middleton what he would have to say in order to waive his 
rights, which Middleton had in fact done.   
Assistant Public Defender Stanley Glenn testified that he was initially 
appointed to represent Middleton.  He stated that on the morning of July 30, 2009, 
he filed an invocation of rights form with the clerk’s office and that afternoon he 
personally delivered it to the Sheriff’s Office front desk, instructing them that it be 
given to the lead detective investigating Christensen’s death.  Glenn first met with 
Middleton the next day and reviewed the form with him.  Middleton was very 
depressed at this time.  Glenn was concerned that Middleton needed someone to 
talk to and might make incriminating statements.  He repeatedly informed 
Middleton not to make any statements without him being present.  On cross-
examination, Glenn acknowledged that unbeknown to him, when he filed the 
invocation of rights form at 11:28 a.m. and delivered it to the Sheriff’s Office that 
afternoon on July 30, 2009, the defendant had already confessed at approximately 
9:24 a.m. that morning.    
 
 
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2.  Psychological Testimony 
Forensic psychologist Dr. Gregory Landrum testified for the defense at the 
suppression hearing.  He testified that he met with Middleton on two occasions in 
August 2009.  He indicated that Middleton was competent to proceed and assist in 
his own defense.  He determined that Middleton’s IQ was 72, which is in the 
borderline mental retardation range.  He additionally determined that Middleton 
reads on a fifth-grade level.  Dr. Landrum was not asked to do an evaluation 
regarding Miranda competency. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Landrum stated emphatically that Middleton is 
not mentally retarded.  Dr. Landrum stated that it is possible that Middleton was 
faking when he was examined by Dr. Riordan, who determined that his IQ was 75, 
months after being examined by Dr. Barnard, who determined that it was 83.  
According to Dr. Landrum, administering the same tests within a year may result 
in a false positive.   
Dr. James Barnard also testified for the defense.  He prepared two reports, 
one of which was a psychological evaluation and the other an examination of 
Middleton’s competency to waive his Miranda rights.  He determined that 
Middleton’s full scale IQ was 83.  He additionally found that Middleton was not 
malingering.  Dr. Barnard indicated that Middleton’s chronic use of drugs resulted 
in an increased tolerance for the substances and the need for more of the 
 
 
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substances to get high.  This factor and other factors indicate dependence on a 
substance as distinguished from abuse.   He reported Middleton’s statement that 
drugs make him “go, go, go” and less able to control his impulses and that 
Middleton told him that before he went to jail he had not slept for two nights.  Dr. 
Barnard opined that Middleton should have been placed in a private detox facility 
when he was arrested.  Dr. Barnard determined that at the time of Middleton’s 
confession, he was likely withdrawing from substances and may have been under 
the effects of substances, at least during the time of his initial interrogation.  
Dr. Barnard administered an instrument entitled “Dr. Thomas Grisso’s 
Understanding and Appreciating Miranda Rights.”  Dr. Barnard testified that 
Middleton’s total score was 13 out of 30, more than two standard deviations below 
the mean.  He testified that although Middleton could paraphrase portions of 
Miranda, he “showed a very significant weakness in terms of his ability to 
intelligently apply knowledge of Miranda, to novel situations.”  Dr. Barnard stated 
that it was difficult to reconcile his findings during the testing with what he saw on 
the confession video.  He explained that there is no correlation between having had 
Miranda warnings administered in the past and actually understanding them.  He 
also stated that there are no validity scales for Grisso’s Miranda test.  
On cross-examination, Dr. Barnard stated that Middleton made general 
remarks indicating that he may have been malingering during the testing with Dr. 
 
 
- 23 - 
Landrum, but he did not specifically mention whether he was referring to the IQ 
test.  Dr. Barnard’s testing also indicated that Middleton may have exaggerated 
some of his answers to appear more maladjusted than he actually was on the date 
of the testing.  Dr. Barnard diagnosed Middleton with antisocial personality 
disorder; he explained that one major feature of this disorder is that the person has 
a tendency to be untruthful.  
Dr. Barnard further testified that before the Grisso test was administered, 
Middleton stated he had been advised of his rights at least five times.  However, 
after the Grisso test, Middleton claimed that he had never been read Miranda 
rights, despite his extensive criminal history.  After the Grisso test, Middleton told 
Dr. Barnard that the confession tapes had been altered.  Middleton also told the 
doctor that methamphetamines make him think better.  Middleton made comments 
to Dr. Barnard indicating that the police in Okeechobee violated his rights, which 
Dr. Barnard opined indicates that he knew what his rights were.   
On redirect, Dr. Barnard stated that the conditions that Middleton was under 
at the time of the interrogation, plus the interrogation procedures themselves, made 
it more likely that he would acquiesce to the police.  He also opined that Middleton 
did not fully comprehend his Miranda rights when he waived them. 
Dr. Michael Riordan testified for the defense.  Dr. Riordan was ordered to 
conduct a neuropsychological evaluation on Middleton.  Dr. Riordan prepared a 
 
 
- 24 - 
written report, which he subsequently modified or redacted.  He modified his 
original finding that Middleton had brain damage, and in the subsequent report he 
indicated that Middleton suffers from a cognitive disorder.  He explained that “the 
cognitive disorder was the more appropriate term as a neuropsychologist to 
report.”  Dr. Riordan reviewed the reports prepared by Dr. Barnard.  He agreed 
with Dr. Barnard’s finding that Middleton was incompetent to waive his Miranda 
rights at the time of his interrogation, based on his borderline intellectual 
functioning, his cognitive disorder, and his drug use, which would have caused 
withdrawal at the time of the interrogation.  Dr. Riordan also found that Middleton 
had polysubstance dependence disorder.  He indicated that Middleton was not 
malingering.  Dr. Riordan did not have Middleton perform the Grisso test, but did 
not disagree with Dr. Barnard’s findings. 
Dr. Riordan did not diagnose an antisocial personality disorder.  His report 
indicated that Middleton had a tendency to exaggerate his problems.  Dr. Riordan 
had previously indicated in a February 11, 2012, letter to the defense that 
Middleton was not initially incompetent to waive his Miranda rights, but as the 
interrogation progressed, he became incompetent to proceed.  Dr. Riordan wrote a 
letter to the defense in April 2012 indicating that Middleton’s drug withdrawal 
would have furthered his incompetence, but Dr. Riordan did not review jail records 
to determine whether Middleton was suffering from withdrawal symptoms.  And 
 
 
- 25 - 
Middleton did not state that he was suffering from withdrawal symptoms during 
the interrogation.  Instead, he told Dr. Riordan that the police harassed him and 
tampered with the confession tapes.  Dr. Riordan was not aware that Middleton 
signed a Miranda waiver.  
Dr. Deborah Leporowski testified for the State.  She testified that she 
reviewed Dr. Landrum’s report, along with the deposition reports and in-court 
testimony of Dr. Riordan.  She also reviewed Dr. Barnard’s raw data and his 
deposition and was present for his testimony.  Additionally, she reviewed 
Middleton’s videotaped confessions, witness statements, drug treatment records, 
and Department of Corrections and jail records; she also interviewed Middleton at 
the county jail on May 10, 2012.  She did not administer the WAIS test because it 
had already been administered three times.  She testified that the discrepancy in the 
scores may be due to poor motivation or deliberately underperforming on the test 
with Dr. Riordan.  Dr. Leporowski reviewed Dr. Riordan’s testing, his raw data, 
and his report and determined that Middleton performed in the average or above-
average range on most instruments.  She opined that “[t]he only areas where he 
demonstrated anything really in an impaired range were instruments that I felt 
could be accounted for by his lack of education.”  She observed that his scores 
varied on the memory tests, with delayed recall being in the impaired range and 
 
 
- 26 - 
stated, “Those are essentially the only two areas where there’s anything that’s not 
perfectly intact in the overall neuropsychological functioning area.” 
Dr. Leporowski stated that she would not diagnose the defendant with brain 
damage or a cognitive disorder.  She stated there was nothing in the testing that 
would indicate that Middleton had trouble comprehending the Miranda warnings.  
Additionally, she said Middleton was candid with her about his drug use on the day 
of the murder and even told her that there was another drug that he used that day 
that Britnell did not report.  He did not have difficulty reporting the information in 
a logical order.   
In addition to not administering another WAIS-IV, Dr. Leporowski did not 
administer another Grisso test.  She explained that one shortcoming of the exam is 
that it was developed for a certain jurisdiction, in 1980, and the language that the 
exam tests for has not been updated, despite the change in the administration of the 
warnings across jurisdictions.  Middleton told Dr. Leporowski that he was 
threatened and that the confession tapes had been altered.  She concluded that 
Middleton had the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda 
rights.  
Dr. Leporowski disagreed with Dr. Riordan’s testimony indicating that 
Middleton was suffering from withdrawal.  She opined that withdrawal typically 
occurs seventy-two hours after consuming drugs and alcohol.  She explained that 
 
 
- 27 - 
on his jail medical records, he is described as cool, cooperative, coherent, and not 
agitated.  Dr. Leporowski spoke with the jail nurse, who indicated that they never 
had to use detox protocols for Middleton and that he did not need any medical 
attention at all.  She opined that this is indicative of his intermittent, rather than his 
continuous, use of the substances.  Dr. Leporowski found that Middleton was 
malingering during her evaluations of him.   
On cross-examination, Dr. Leporowski acknowledged that Middleton 
reported doing methamphetamine before lunch, followed by eighty milligrams of 
OxyContin, then Roxicodone that afternoon at his trailer, and Xanax and cocaine 
later that evening.  He also indicated that he walked down to Brewskis and 
consumed a couple of beers and three lines of cocaine.   
The trial court denied the defense’s motion to suppress Middleton’s 
confession. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Avoid Arrest Aggravator 
Middleton first argues that the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest 
aggravator.  We agree that the record does not support this aggravator as 
Middleton’s sole or dominant motivation for the murder.  This Court has 
consistently held that where the victim is not a law enforcement officer, “the State 
must show that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of 
 
 
- 28 - 
the witness” in order to prove this aggravator.  Davis v. State, 604 So. 2d 794, 798 
(Fla. 1992); see also Green v. State, 583 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1991); Perry v. State, 522 
So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1988).  The trial court’s order on this issue lists eight facts that 
support this aggravator:  
(1) the defendant personally knew the victim, and went to her home 
without any type of disguise; (2) the defendant told Garret Wade 
Fowler that he was going to rob Roberta Christensen, after seeing a 
large amount of money inside her home the day before; (3) the 
defendant walked 130 feet to the victim’s home in broad daylight;   
(4) the defendant knew that the victim was home because he could see 
her red car from his own home, and the car was parked directly in 
front of the entrance to her home; (5) the defendant knew that the 
victim’s husband was out of town and she was home alone; (6) the 
victim did not pose any physical threat to the defendant; (7) the 
defendant armed himself with a knife from his residence, before going 
over to the victim’s home; and (8) the victim was the defendant’s 
neighbor, who lived almost directly across the street.   
 
In addition, the trial court indicated that the main object of the criminal endeavor 
was the tip money, not the television.  Finally, the trial judge said that if the victim 
was left alive the defendant would have been quickly arrested. 
 
Notably, only a few of these factors have a direct bearing on or support the 
avoid arrest aggravator (i.e., the defendant knew the victim and did not wear a 
disguise and the defendant would have been promptly arrested had the victim lived 
and identified him).  Many of the other factors listed by the trial court for this 
aggravator either supported Middleton’s statement that he went to the victim’s 
home to borrow money, or that he went there only intending to rob her, before 
 
 
- 29 - 
things became “crazy.”  This Court has determined that the eighth factor listed is 
not enough to prove this aggravator.  See Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 
2000); Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1996).  Additionally, the trial 
court’s determination that Middleton’s primary objective was to obtain the “easily 
concealable tip money,” implies that pecuniary gain was a dominant motive for the 
killing. 
 
In Davis, Green, and Perry, the defendants raised similar issues involving 
the avoid arrest aggravator.  In each of these cases, this Court struck the avoid 
arrest aggravator even though the defendants were acquainted with the victims.  In 
Davis, the defendant stabbed an elderly female acquaintance inside her home and 
stole some of the victim’s belongings before exiting the residence.  Davis, 604 So. 
2d at 795.  In Green, the defendant and his girlfriend went to the home of their 
landlords, a married couple, and paid them $250, under the threat of an impending 
eviction.   Green, 583 So. 2d at 648.  Green went home, changed his shirt, grabbed 
the largest butcher knife from his kitchen and went back to his landlord’s house.  
When he arrived at the house, his landlord let him into the house, but was adamant 
about keeping Green’s check.  Green stabbed the husband and wife.  Green 
returned the knife to his home and, later that night, hitched a ride from 
Hillsborough County to St. Petersburg and then to Ft. Lauderdale.  In Perry, the 
defendant killed his neighbor during a robbery attempt.  522 So. 2d at 819.  The 
 
 
- 30 - 
fact that the victims could have identified the defendants was not enough to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the 
murders was witness elimination.  
Although the trial judge correctly stated that the avoid arrest aggravator can 
be supported by circumstantial evidence through inferences from the facts in the 
record, his reliance on cases such as Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1998), 
and Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978), is not well-founded.  In Jennings 
we upheld the finding of this aggravator based on the fact that the defendant knew 
the victim, used gloves, and stated that if he ever committed a robbery he would 
not leave any witnesses.  And in Riley, we affirmed the finding of this aggravator 
based on the defendant knowing the victim coupled with the fact that the victim 
was “executed after one of the perpetrators expressed a concern for subsequent 
identification.” 
   Although the trial court infers that Middleton killed the victim because he 
would have been arrested quickly if he had left her alive, there are no other facts 
that indicate that this was his sole or dominant reason for killing her, especially in 
the absence of other evidence indicating that Middleton was specifically concerned 
about eliminating the victim as a witness.  Therefore, we strike this aggravating 
circumstance. 
B.  CCP Aggravator 
 
 
- 31 - 
Middleton next challenges the trial court’s finding of the cold, calculated 
and premeditated aggravator (CCP).  On appeal, it is this Court’s task to review the 
record to ensure that the trial court applied the correct rule of law for each 
aggravating circumstance, and if so, determine whether there is competent 
substantial evidence in the record to support the finding.  Willacy v. State, 696 So. 
2d 695 (Fla. 1997).  We agree with Middleton that there was not competent, 
substantial evidence in the record to support this aggravator.   
In order to establish the CCP aggravator, it is the State’s burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “the killing was the product of cool and calm 
reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage 
(cold)”; (2) “the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit 
murder before the fatal incident (calculated)”; (3) “the defendant exhibited 
heightened premeditation (premeditated)”; and (4) “the defendant had no pretense 
of moral or legal justification.”  Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007).    
“ ‘CCP involves a much higher degree of premeditation’ than is required to prove 
first-degree murder.”  Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381-82 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 921 (Fla. 2000)).  “Premeditation can be 
established by examining the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the 
accused.”  Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98.  Further, “the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant planned or prearranged to commit murder 
 
 
- 32 - 
before the crime began.”  Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311, 1318 (Fla. 1990).  
“The CCP aggravator can ‘be indicated by circumstances showing such facts as 
advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the 
appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course.’ ”  Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 
98 (quoting Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988)). 
 
In this case, the evidence is inconsistent with the murder being a product of 
cool and calm reflection.  Although Middleton procured a knife prior to entering 
the victim’s residence, there is no evidence that he possessed the weapon for the 
purpose of attacking the victim.  Rather, Middleton planned to commit a robbery.  
In walking over to the victim’s residence, Middleton did not conceal his identity.  
The evidence suggests that while inside the victim’s residence, the victim refused 
Middleton’s request for money.  After a struggle ensued, Middleton fatally stabbed 
the victim.  It was during the course of this struggle when Middleton formulated 
his intent to kill her.  Middleton’s behavior at the time of the murder can be aptly 
described as murder committed in a frenzied rage or during a heated struggle 
following the victim’s refusal to give him money.  Following this spontaneous 
murder—which was not carried out as a matter of course—the victim’s body 
remained in her residence; Middleton left her home with the victim’s property, to 
wit, her television.  
 
 
- 33 - 
 
Based on this evidence, we conclude that the State did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Middleton had a careful prearranged plan or design to 
murder the victim before he entered the victim’s residence.  Thus, we disagree with 
the trial court’s finding that the murder was a planned event, not a sudden, 
impulsive act.  Although following the murder Middleton washed his hands in his 
kitchen sink, changed his clothes, and placed his bloody clothes in a bag with the 
murder weapon—as noted by the trial court—these actions do not prove that he 
planned the murder beforehand.   
 
 We conclude that the evidence is not indicative of a heightened 
premeditated intent to murder.  The facts in this case are similar to Castro v. State, 
644 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1994), which did not involve a careful design and 
heightened premeditation necessary for CCP when “the record reflect[ed] that 
Castro planned to rob Scott.”  In addition, we did not find the murder in 
Hansbrough v. State, 509 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Fla. 1987), to show the cold and 
calculated premeditation necessary for CCP where there “appear[ed] to be a 
robbery that got out of hand,” resulting in a “frenzied stabbing.”  Accordingly, we 
conclude that there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the finding of 
the CCP aggravator.  Therefore, we strike the finding of this aggravator.   
 
“When this Court strikes an aggravating factor on appeal, ‘the harmless error 
test is applied to determine whether there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
 
 
- 34 - 
affected the sentence.’ ”  Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 765 (Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Jennings v. State, 782 So. 2d 853, 863 n.9 (Fla. 2001)); see also Diaz v. 
State, 860 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2003) (“We find this error harmless, however, 
after consideration of the two remaining aggravating circumstances and the five 
mitigating circumstances in this case.”).  Despite striking the avoid arrest and CCP 
aggravators, two valid aggravators remain in this unanimous death-
recommendation case.  The two aggravators which remain are that the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and that it was committed during the 
commission of a burglary and for pecuniary gain, which were each given “great 
weight” by the trial court.  The trial court did not find any statutory mitigation 
applicable in this case. 
 
In its sentencing order, the trial court expressly stated that any of the 
considered aggravating circumstances found in this case, standing alone, would be 
sufficient to outweigh the mitigation in total presented regarding the Christensen 
murder.  In Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 868 (Fla. 2009), this Court held that the 
trial court’s erroneous finding of the CCP aggravator was harmless because the 
sentencing order provided that “any one of the aggravators found (except the 
felony probation aggravator) was sufficient to outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances found in this case and due to the other applicable aggravating 
factors.”  Therefore, it is clear that the trial court would have imposed a death 
 
 
- 35 - 
sentence for Middleton absent the avoid arrest and CCP aggravators.  Because we 
conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous findings of the 
avoid arrest and CCP aggravators contributed to Middleton’s death sentence, the 
errors were harmless. 
C.  Proportionality 
Middleton argues that without the avoid arrest and CCP aggravators, his 
death sentence is disproportionate as compared to cases such as Perry and Davis.  
After striking the two aggravators in this case, we find that the sentence of death is 
still proportional to similar cases. 
In order to ensure uniformity in death penalty proceedings, this Court 
undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to determine whether the case falls within the category of the most 
aggravated and least mitigated.  See Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 578 (Fla. 
2005) (quoting Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003)). This 
analysis involves a thoughtful and deliberate proportionality review considering 
the totality of circumstances of the case and then comparing it with other capital 
cases with similar aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  It is not a 
comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 
2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).   
 
 
- 36 - 
In this case, the jury voted twelve to zero in favor of the death penalty.  The 
trial court weighed four aggravators against eleven nonstatutory mitigators.6  The 
aggravators found are: (1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant 
was engaged in the commission of a burglary or an attempt to commit a burglary 
and the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (2) the capital felony was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting 
escape from custody; (3) the capital felony was HAC; and (4) the capital felony 
was CCP.  The court gave all of these aggravators great weight.  The eleven 
nonstatutory mitigators found are: (a) the defendant has below-average or 
borderline intelligence (little weight); (b) the defendant suffers from attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (little weight); (c) the defendant has a long 
history of chronic substance abuse (some weight); (d) the defendant had no adult 
role models to guide him as a child (little weight); (e) the defendant’s mother was 
not involved in child-rearing or supervision and was unavailable emotionally for 
her children (little weight); (f) the defendant had a steady history of employment 
until his chronic substance abuse and incarcerations made it difficult to maintain 
such employment (little weight); (g) the defendant had little, if any, formal 
education (little weight); (h) the defendant has two children (little weight); (i) the 
                                          
 
6.  The trial court determined that the proposed mitigator that Middleton’s 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired was not proven. 
 
 
- 37 - 
defendant was subjected to chronic neglect, as well as made aware of sexual abuse 
that was inflicted by his stepfather upon his sister (little weight); (j) the defendant 
expressed remorse for his crime (little weight); and (k) the defendant exhibited 
appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight). 
Having stricken two of the aggravators, this Court must analyze the two 
appropriately found aggravators of HAC and during the commission of a 
burglary/pecuniary gain with the nonstatutory mitigators outlined above.  We begin 
this analysis with the trial court’s weighing of both the aggravators and mitigators.  
Each of the aggravators was given great weight.  We have in a long line of cases 
found the HAC aggravator to be one of the most serious in our limited statutory 
aggravating circumstances.  See, e.g., Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1999).      
Significantly, the trial court only gave one of the nonstatutory mitigators “some 
weight” and the other eleven were given “little weight.”  Additionally, because 
some of the mitigators were similar, the trial court analyzed them together.  
Namely, the trial court combined the analysis for the defendant’s proposed 
mitigator of low IQ with his diagnoses of ADHD.  The trial court also combined 
the analysis for the defendant’s proposed mitigators of no adult role models, his 
mother being emotionally unavailable, the defendant being chronically neglected, 
and his sister being molested by his stepfather.   
 
 
- 38 - 
The defense argues that this case is similar to Davis v. State, 604 So. 2d 794 
(Fla. 1992), and Perry v. State, 522 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1988).  However, both are 
distinguishable from this case.  In Davis this Court, after striking two aggravators, 
did not impose a life sentence.  Rather we remanded the matter to the trial judge 
for reconsideration of the sentence because we could not determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the trial judge would have imposed a death sentence in the 
absence of the two aggravators that were stricken.  The trial judge ultimately 
determined that the remaining aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and reimposed a sentence of death.  We affirmed.  The 
fact that Davis ultimately received a life sentence was not based on the elimination 
of aggravating circumstances but was the result of postconviction relief for 
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding racial comments.     
This Court in Perry had to address a situation involving a judge’s override of 
a jury recommendation of life.  In order to uphold the imposition of a death 
sentence under those circumstances, we must find that no reasonable person could 
differ with the sentence of death.  See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).  
While Perry also involved the striking of two aggravating circumstances, that 
factor was not the basis for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.  This 
Court made it clear that there were mitigating circumstances presented to the jury 
that the jury could have considered in reaching its determination of a life sentence.  
 
 
- 39 - 
Thus, we said the Tedder standard had not been met, and the case was remanded 
for imposition of a life sentence without parole for twenty five years.     
This case is, however, more similar to Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 
1996), where this Court found the defendant’s death sentence to be proportionate 
under circumstances much like the ones presented here.  In Geralds the jury 
unanimously voted for a death sentence, the same aggravators were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and the trial court gave minimal weight to the defendant’s 
mitigation.  Geralds was a carpenter who worked remodeling the victim’s trailer.  
Knowing that the victim’s husband was out of town, he attacked her, beating her, 
stabbing her in the neck and stealing various items from the home.  At his original 
sentencing, the trial court found the same four aggravators that were found in this 
case.  We struck the CCP and witness elimination aggravators, and remanded for a 
new penalty phase.  On appeal from the subsequent sentencing, we again struck the 
CCP aggravator, but found there was no reasonable likelihood of a life sentence 
under the circumstance of that case.  674 So. 2d at 104-05. 
In both this case and Geralds, the juries unanimously recommended 
sentences of death.  Both cases ultimately have the aggravators of heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel murder during the course of a felony/pecuniary gain, and the 
aggravators were given great weight.  The mitigators in each case were 
nonstatutory, with exception of the age mitigator found in Geralds, and in each 
 
 
- 40 - 
instance they were given little or very little weight.  We conclude here, as we did 
in Geralds, that even without the aggravators that were stricken, the trial court 
would have found the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating 
evidence.  We, therefore, find that Middleton’s death sentence is proportional.      
D.  Order of Penalty Phase Witnesses/Continuance 
Middleton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to continue the penalty phase to allow the family to travel to the trial and 
present mitigation testimony prior to the expert testimony.  The defense argues that 
this ruling prohibited the defense from setting the predicate for the expert 
testimony through the lay witness testimony.  The decision of whether to grant a 
motion for continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial court.  In re Gregory, 
313 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1975).  This Court has made clear that it will cautiously 
review the trial court’s decision to deny such a motion and will not reverse the 
decision unless there has been a palpable abuse of this judicial discretion which 
clearly and affirmatively appears in the record.  Magill v. State, 386 So. 2d 1188, 
1188 (Fla. 1980); Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1138 (Fla. 1976). 
To prevail on his motion for continuance, the defendant was required to 
show: (1) prior due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence; (2) that substantially 
favorable testimony would have been forthcoming; (3) that the witness was 
available and willing to testify; and (4) that the denial of the continuance caused 
 
 
- 41 - 
material prejudice.  Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d at 99 (citing United States v. 
O’Neill, 767 F.2d 780, 784 (11th Cir. 1985)).   
On the requirement of prior due diligence, the defense admitted that it did 
not use the proper subpoena to ensure that the witnesses traveled from Georgia to 
provide testimony on the date scheduled for their testimony.  The trial court gave a 
full day in between the guilt and the penalty phase to allow both sides to resolve 
any issues with witness availability.  Despite this, the defense witnesses were not 
available to testify.  In rejecting the defense’s motion for a continuance, the trial 
court offered the defense an opportunity to allow its investigator to travel to 
Georgia to pick up the witnesses and bring them to court or, alternatively, to live 
stream their testimony from a facility in Georgia.  Had the defense done its due 
diligence, the trial court could have been made aware of the possibility that 
Middleton’s relatives could not travel, and these same arrangements could have 
been made a day prior, without the need for a continuance. 
As to the second, third, and fourth requirements, the denial of the motion did 
not prevent the jury from hearing the testimony of the relatives, and there is no 
indication that the defense was materially prejudiced.  It only required the jury to 
hear this evidence after the expert witness testimony.  Additionally, the expert 
witness essentially provided general details about the defendant’s childhood, which 
were corroborated by the relatives’ testimony.  Although the defense may have 
 
 
- 42 - 
been inconvenienced by the denial of the motion because it preferred for the 
relatives to testify before the experts, the denial of the continuance did not prevent 
the jury from hearing the testimony.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Middleton’s motion for a continuance. 
E.  Denial of Defense’s Request for a Mitigation Specialist 
Middleton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
defense funds to appoint a mitigation specialist.  The appointment of experts is 
within the trial court’s discretion.  San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1347 (Fla. 
1997).  A trial court’s denial of funds to an indigent defendant for appointment of 
an expert will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
Florida appellate courts use a two-part test to evaluate an alleged abuse of 
discretion: (1) whether the defendant made a particularized showing of need; and 
(2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s denial of the motion 
requesting the expert assistance.  Id.  If such a request is denied, and not later 
renewed by the party asserting the need, it is waived.  Id.   
On October 28, 2010, the parties attended a hearing where the trial court 
granted the defense’s motions to appoint co-counsel and a fact investigator.  In 
appointing the investigator, the trial court stated that “in a death penalty case with 
issues of mitigation, it’s almost self-evident” why the defense would need an 
investigator.  The very next motion that the trial judge heard in that proceeding was 
 
 
- 43 - 
the defendant’s motion to appoint a mitigation specialist.  The State objected to the 
motion, stating that an expert was not needed to do the type of investigations that a 
mitigation specialist is expected to do.  
 
The trial court denied the motion pursuant to Leon Shaffer Golnick Adver., 
Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), stating that the defense was 
asking him to disregard an administrative order from the chief judge of the circuit, 
which set a maximum hourly rate for specialists on the case, “based on nothing 
other than representations of counsel” that the mitigation specialist’s work would 
not be “duplicative of [the investigator just appointed].”  The trial court refused to 
appoint a mitigation specialist because the defense did not demonstrate a 
particularized need or showing for one.  Therefore, the trial court denied the 
motion without prejudice and invited the defense to set a hearing on the motion in 
the future when it could demonstrate a particularized need.   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense’s motion to 
appoint a mitigation specialist.  The defense did not demonstrate a particularized 
need for the mitigation specialist, in light of its having been granted the 
appointment of an experienced investigator.  The defense claims that only the 
mitigation specialist can explain how his or her responsibilities are different from 
those of a fact investigator.  This argument is not persuasive.  Although a 
mitigation specialist can best explain his or her capabilities and strategy, the 
 
 
- 44 - 
attorney requesting the services should at the very least be able to provide the court 
with an explanation of what the mitigation specialist is expected to provide that the 
fact investigator may not.  Without this explanation, the defense is requesting for 
the court to provide state funds for the defense to conduct what may very well be 
the gathering of information cumulative to that gathered by the court-appointed 
fact investigator.   
Middleton’s reliance on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), is misplaced.  
In Ake, the Supreme Court reversed because the state court did not provide the 
defendant expenses for a psychiatric evaluation to assess his sanity at the time of 
the crime.  Id.  Importantly, in that case, the defendant was initially declared 
incompetent to stand trial.  Id.  Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the 
defendant was entitled to a psychiatrist once he made a preliminary showing that 
his sanity at the time of the offense was likely to be a significant factor at trial.  Id.  
 
 In this case, Middleton was evaluated by four different doctors and was also 
appointed a fact investigator.  Additionally, during the hearing on Middleton’s 
motion to appoint a mitigation specialist, the defense told the court that it would 
come back a few months before the trial to request the appointment of a mitigation 
expert, and the court invited the defense to do so.  The defense never renewed the 
motion.  If at any point the defense could specifically demonstrate how a 
mitigation specialist was imperative to its case, in addition to the other previously 
 
 
- 45 - 
provided experts, the defense could have set a hearing on the motion that had 
already been filed.   Because error has not been demonstrated, we deny relief on 
this claim.  Although we find no abuse of discretion in this case, we note that it 
may be appropriate in other cases for a trial court to grant the defense’s request to 
appoint a mitigation specialist. 
F.  Individualized Sentencing Requirement 
Middleton raises numerous claims to support his argument that the trial court 
did not perform the individualized sentencing required for death penalty cases.   He 
first claims the trial court improperly and arbitrarily rejected findings of medical 
experts, and cites Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1990), for support.  In 
Nowitzke, however, this Court reiterated that it is improper for the prosecution to 
discredit the insanity defense, as a legal defense, in front of the jury.  Id. at 1355.  
No defense of insanity was made in this case, and no argument based on Nowitzke 
was made.  Instead the defense argues for a new penalty phase claiming the trial 
judge denigrated the field of psychology and rejected the findings of the experts.  
This argument is based on the trial court’s agreement with and citation to the 
dissent in United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the 
dissenting judge commented on the imprecision of the science of psychiatry.  
Despite this agreement, the trial court evaluated the testimony of all of the experts 
 
 
- 46 - 
who testified about the defendant’s mental status and determined that Dr. 
Leporowski was more credible.  Relief on this issue is not warranted.  
Middleton additionally claims that the trial court used a strawman argument 
to denigrate the defense’s mitigation.  See Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 814-
15 (Fla. 1996) (explaining that a strawman argument is one where the prosecutor 
creates an issue not raised by the defense then proceeds to knock it down).  In this 
case, the trial court did not manufacture an argument for the purpose of using the 
testimony regarding Middleton’s psychological state.  The defense argued and the 
trial court considered the mitigating factor of substantial impairment.  The 
psychological data the trial court used to find that Middleton was not impaired was 
previously presented to assess Middleton’s mental state, and the two experts that 
testified during the penalty phase were repeatedly questioned about those reports 
and asked to compare their findings to the reports of the nontestifying doctors.  The 
trial court considered the entire record of proceedings where Middleton’s 
psychological capacity was concerned.  This strawman argument has no merit.  See 
Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 374 (Fla. 2005) (determining that the trial court was 
allowed to use in-court testimony and an expert’s report, which was admitted into 
evidence during the Spencer hearing, to conclude that the mitigator of inability to 
conform conduct to the requirements of the law was not established). 
 
 
- 47 - 
Middleton next claims that the trial court improperly rejected mitigating 
evidence of impaired capacity.  The trial court provided a thorough explanation of 
why it was rejecting the statutory mitigator that defendant’s ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.7  The trial court 
compared the testimony of Dr. Barnard, who determined that the defendant was 
not “substantially impaired,” to the testimony of Dr. Leporowski, who stated that 
she saw no evidence that the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder and 
noted that the defendant made rational decisions on the night of the murder.  After 
considering the record, the trial court determined that the statutory mitigator did 
not exist.  See Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 318 (Fla. 1997) (contradictory 
evidence on mitigating factor supports trial court’s conclusion that factor did not 
exist).  Relief on this claim is denied.  
Middleton further claims the trial court used the wrong standard in 
evaluating his abusive childhood and abused its discretion in assigning weight to 
this mitigation, citing Mines v. State, 390 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1980), and Campbell v. 
State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds by Trease v. 
                                          
 
 
7.  Middleton also argues the trial court should have evaluated the evidence 
as nonstatutory mitigation.  It is clear from the trial court’s discussion that 
consideration was given to substantial impairment, significant impairment, and 
impairment, and the court found none had been demonstrated.  It should also be 
noted that the trial court used the mental health and drug use evidence to support 
other nonstatutory mitigation. 
 
 
- 48 - 
State, 768 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2000), as support.  Both Mines and Campbell stand for 
the proposition that once a trial court determines that a defendant is not insane, it 
must still consider the statutory mental mitigating factors.  Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 
418-19; Mines, 390 So. 2d at 337.  The trial court below did not reject the statutory 
mental mitigators after finding Middleton to be sane; it rejected them after a 
reasoned analysis comparing the findings of the mental health experts who 
evaluated him.  To the extent that Middleton argues that the trial court erred in 
using the sanity standard to reject the nonstatutory mental mitigation and assigned 
it improper weight, this Court addressed this issue in Consalvo.  In that case, this 
Court found that where the trial court would have likely accorded a mitigating 
circumstance the same amount of weight had it used a different standard, the 
defendant’s claim should be denied.  697 So. 2d at 818-19.  The trial court 
incorporated its analysis from the order on Middleton’s motion to suppress his 
confession and additionally referred to Dr. Leporowski’s finding that the defendant 
was thinking rationally on the night of the murder.  Therefore, it is not likely that a 
different standard of review would have changed the trial court’s ruling on this 
issue.  
G.  Admission of Middleton’s Confession Video 
Middleton’s motion to suppress his confession contained three general 
allegations: (1) that the defendant’s statements were illegally obtained because the 
 
 
- 49 - 
consumption of drugs and alcohol caused him to become incompetent to proceed 
with the interview process, invalidating his waiver of his rights; (2) that the 
defendant does not have the intellectual ability to adequately comprehend his 
Miranda rights in order to knowingly and intelligently waive them; and (3) that the 
final interview was conducted after the defendant was represented by counsel and 
after his court-appointed counsel filed his Invocation of Constitutional Rights form 
with the clerk on July 30, 2009, at 11:28 a.m.  The trial court in the order on the 
motion specifically addressed each allegation, and denied the motion.  Middleton 
now claims that the admission of this evidence into his trial was error, based on the 
same claims raised in his pretrial motion.8  We conclude that the motion to 
suppress was properly denied. 
 
A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress comes to this Court 
cloaked with a presumption that its factual findings are correct, but we              
apply a de novo standard of review to legal issues and mixed questions of law and 
fact which ultimately determine constitutional issues.  Smithers v. State, 826 So. 
2d 916, 924-25 (Fla. 2002).  When considering the validity of a confession, this 
                                          
 
8.  Defense counsel raised a standing objection to anything that would 
involve the motion to suppress the confession, including but not limited to 
interviews of the defendant.  The jury was provided with an edited transcript that 
had been approved by both parties to refer to as they watched the interviews.  
Jurors were notified that the transcripts were not evidence and would be collected 
once the video was over.    
 
 
- 50 - 
Court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s 
confession.  Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000). 
In Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992), this Court stated that under 
the Florida Constitution,   
if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she does not want to 
be interrogated, interrogation must not begin or, if it has already 
begun, must immediately stop.  If the suspect indicates in any manner 
that he or she wants the help of a lawyer, interrogation must not begin 
until a lawyer has been appointed and is present or, if it has already 
begun, must immediately stop until a lawyer is present.  Once a 
suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate 
interrogation on any offense throughout the period of custody unless 
the lawyer is present, although the suspect is free to volunteer a 
statement to police on his or her own initiative at any time on any 
subject in the absence of counsel. 
 
A waiver of a suspect’s constitutional rights must be voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent, and, where reasonably practical, prudence 
suggests it should be in writing. . . .  [A]ny statement obtained in 
contravention of these guidelines violates the Florida Constitution and 
may not be used by the State.  
 
Id. at 966 (footnotes omitted). 
 
A defendant who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused has himself initiated further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.”  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484-85 (1981).  It does not appear that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Middleton’s motion to suppress his confession.  The trial court determined 
 
 
- 51 - 
that the office where the confession occurred was a standard office, and not an 
interrogation room or any other  
particularly threatening or intimidating venue.  The defendant did not 
appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  His speech was 
clear and coherent.  His answers are fairly responsive to the questions 
asked.  He was capable of articulating thoughts, giving directions and 
describing events.  More importantly, the video tape confirms and 
corroborates fully the testimony of Captain John Rhoden, Lieutenant 
Brad Stark, Detective Marty Faulkner and Dr. Deborah Lep[o]rowski.  
It is more difficult to reconcile the videotape with the testimony of 
Drs. James B[a]rnard and Michael Riordan.   
 
These findings are supported by the record.   
The trial court also determined that, based on the testimony of Middleton’s 
friend, Britnell, and the officers who encountered Middleton on the night of the 
murder, he did not appear to be so influenced by drugs and alcohol as to be 
incoherent or not understand that he was waiving his right to remain silent.  The 
trial court also observed that of the four psychologists who evaluated Middleton, 
Dr. Leporowski appeared to have been the most thorough; she reviewed all of the 
records and gave the most reasonable explanation for the discrepancies between 
the doctors on the issue of Middleton’s capacity to knowingly and voluntarily 
waive his right.   
As to the defendant’s claim regarding the invocation of rights form filed by 
the attorney, the trial court observed that it is clear from the record that 
Middleton’s invocation of rights form had not been executed or served on law 
 
 
- 52 - 
enforcement prior to the defendant’s last interview.   The written invocation of 
rights was filed in the court file at 11:28 a.m. on July 30, 2009, and served on the 
Sheriff’s Office that afternoon after the defendant’s last interview, which was 
conducted that morning at approximately 9:24 a.m.   
The trial court’s finding that Middleton initiated contact with Detective 
Faulkner is also supported by the record.  It is clear from the record that Middleton 
initiated the final interview with Detective Faulkner, understood that he had the 
right to remain silent, and voluntarily chose to waive it.  At the beginning of the 
fourth interview, the defendant was reminded of his Miranda rights.  He continued 
to blame Wade Fowler; he was arrested minutes later.  When Detective Faulkner 
arrived at the Sheriff’s Office on July 29, 2009, at approximately 11 a.m., he was 
notified that Middleton was requesting to speak to him again.  The recording began 
at 12:35 p.m.  On the recording, Detective Faulkner confirmed that Middleton had 
in fact requested to speak to him and that Middleton had not yet been to first 
appearance.  Detective Faulkner read Middleton his Miranda rights and Middleton 
waived his right to remain silent.  After initially asking why a different man was 
not in jail, Middleton began to ramble about clearing his conscience and getting his 
life together.  The detectives repeatedly asked him not to waste their time.  
Middleton began to explain the events of the day, including drug use.  He 
explained that he and Steve Britnell went to someone’s house and did OxyContin 
 
 
- 53 - 
and smoked methamphetamine.  He did not remember what time he went to the 
victim’s trailer, only that it was less than twenty minutes after Fowler and Britnell 
went to Walmart.  He stated that he knocked on the victim’s door and things just 
went “crazy.”  He described the events as “foggy.”  When Detective Faulkner 
followed up with a question about how long Middleton was at the victim’s trailer 
before the altercation occurred, Middleton stated that he did not want to talk 
anymore and requested to go back to his cell.  Detective Faulkner immediately 
states, “The time is now 12:58 P.M., concluding the interview with Dale.”    
Faulkner testified that he went over to the jail the next day, July 30, to check 
on Middleton because he was so distraught the night before.  He stated that upon 
seeing him at the jail, Middleton requested to speak to him again.  Detective 
Faulkner immediately had one of the corrections officers escort Middleton to his 
office.  The Sheriff’s Office and the jail are connected, with the distance from 
Faulkner’s office and the jail being approximately fifty yards.  The jury reviewed 
the January 30, 2009, recording of Middleton’s interview, along with a transcript.  
The video begins with Detective Faulkner confirming that it was Middleton who 
initiated the interview.  Middleton informs Faulkner during the interview that he 
had been to first appearance that morning and was told not to talk to anyone.  
Faulkner told him that they could not speak unless he specifically decided to speak 
without his attorney being present.  Faulkner repeatedly asked Middleton if he was 
 
 
- 54 - 
sure that he wanted to talk without his attorney present; Middleton responded that 
he did.  Faulkner read Middleton his Miranda rights again.  Middleton again 
waived his right to remain silent.  Middleton insisted on speaking with Faulkner to 
clear his head and get past what happened.  Thereafter, Middleton confessed to the 
murder of the victim and the theft of her television. 
When Detective Maerki entered the room, he inquired whether Middleton 
had been to first appearance, to which Middleton replied that he had.  He also 
inquired whether Middleton had requested to speak to him and Faulkner, to which 
Middleton also replied in the affirmative.  Throughout the entire interview, 
Middleton repeatedly offered information, stating that he wanted everything to be 
over with because the murder that he committed was out of character; he resisted 
the offer to have counsel present, and he agreed to assist in the investigation. 
It is clear from the record that Middleton initiated contact with Detective 
Faulkner, rendering his subsequent interview valid under Edwards v. Arizona. 
Additionally, the requirements of Traylor have been met in this case where the 
detectives immediately stopped the interview at Middleton’s request, and only 
resumed their conversation with him on his prompting.  The trial court properly 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the videotaped confession. 
H.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
 
- 55 - 
Middleton argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
judgment of acquittal, claiming that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
to support Middleton’s convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and first-
degree felony murder.  After the State rested in the guilt phase, the defense moved 
for a judgment of acquittal, claiming that the State had not proven that the murder 
was premeditated in nature, only that it was committed during a robbery.  The 
State responded by pointing out that Middleton stabbed the victim thirty-five 
times.  The trial court denied the motion finding the threshold for submission of the 
case to the jury had been surpassed because of the totality of the evidence, 
including DNA evidence, blood spatter evidence, the number of stab wounds, the 
nature of the wounds, and Middleton’s arming of himself prior to going to the 
victim’s trailer. 
The defense also moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the burglary count, 
claiming that Middleton was invited into the trailer and stating that the State did 
not prove that Middleton intended to commit the theft of the television before he 
entered the trailer.  The State responded that Middleton said the victim told him to 
leave and attempted to remove him from the trailer, thus withdrawing any consent 
to enter that was initially given.  The State also argued that it did not have to prove 
intent to commit theft because it could proceed on the theory that the defendant 
remained in the home with the intent to commit murder, which he ultimately 
 
 
- 56 - 
committed.   The trial court denied the motion for acquittal on these grounds.  The 
defense then notified the court that, based on the court’s decision on the motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge, the defense had no argument as to the 
motion for judgment of acquittal on felony murder, which was predicated on the 
burglary.  We affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  
The evidence in a capital case is judged to be sufficient when it is both 
competent and substantial.  See Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296, 308 (Fla.), cert. 
denied, 562 U.S. 1010 (2010).  This Court has an obligation to independently 
review the record to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support 
Middleton’s convictions.  Id.  This Court must “view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found 
the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Rodgers v. 
State, 948 So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006) (citing Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 
(Fla. 2001)).  Further, “[a] general guilty verdict rendered by a jury instructed on 
both first-degree murder alternatives may be upheld on appeal where the evidence 
is sufficient to establish either felony murder or premeditation.”  Crain v. State, 
894 So. 2d 59, 73 (Fla. 2004).   
 
 
- 57 - 
The jury was instructed on both premeditated and felony murder, and the 
jury found Middleton guilty on a special verdict form listing both felony murder 
and premeditated murder; the jury found him guilty of both. 
“Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a 
fully formed conscious purpose to kill. The purpose may be formed a 
moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of time 
to permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and 
the probable result of the act.”  Premeditation may be inferred from 
such facts as “the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence 
of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, 
the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature 
and manner of the wounds inflicted.” 
Hall v. State, 107 So. 3d 262, 281 (Fla. 2012) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Bradley, 787 So. 2d at 738; Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 92 
(Fla. 1997)), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 203 (2013).  
Here, sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction for premeditated 
first-degree murder and first-degree felony murder.  The defendant went to his 
neighbor’s trailer armed with a knife.  When she would not give him money and 
attempted to get him out of her trailer, the defendant attacked her with the knife.  
The medical examiner testified that the forensic evidence indicated a struggle 
between the victim and the defendant that began in the kitchen, and that drag 
marks indicated that the victim was alive and moving erratically as she was 
dragged from the kitchen area to the bedroom.  The medical examiner also said 
there were several passes of a sharp instrument to create the margin of the wound, 
 
 
- 58 - 
such as a sawing motion.  The blood stains indicated that her carotid artery was not 
cut until she got into the bedroom.  The amount and pattern of blood on the 
victim’s waistband indicates that she may have been sitting up slightly or halfway 
when she received the neck injury.  The victim’s shirt was pulled upwards toward 
her neck, which is consistent with being dragged.  The victim had a bruise on her 
cheek that was consistent with the tread and design of Middleton’s boots.  The 
victim had bruises and a cut to her face, a puncture and stab wounds on her chest, 
neck, ear, and arms.  The victim had defensive wounds that indicated that she was 
trying to get away from someone who had a knife.  The autopsy revealed that the 
neck injury occurred toward the end of the attack.  There was sufficient evidence 
that the defendant committed the homicide with a premeditated design to effect the 
death of Mrs. Christensen.  See Hall, 107 So. 3d at 281. 
 
There is also sufficient evidence of felony murder.  In Bradley v. State, 33 
So. 3d 664 (Fla. 2010), this Court determined that a conviction for felony murder 
will stand where the State can show that, even if the defendant was invited into the 
home by an occupant, the consent was expressly revoked prior to the defendant’s 
opportunity to begin the attack on the victim.  Id. at 683.  In this case, Middleton 
explained that he and Wade Fowler had been discussing the crime for a few days 
because they were experiencing “hard times.”  Middleton asked the victim to loan 
him money, but she said she did not have any money because she paid the bills.  
 
 
- 59 - 
He stated the victim got scared and tried to push him out of her trailer.  Middleton 
pulled out the knife he brought with him, and the attack ensued.  Thereafter, 
Middleton took the victim’s television, which he later sold for $200.  Under these 
facts, even if the victim invited Middleton into her kitchen, as he claimed, that 
consent was clearly revoked when the victim attempted to get Middleton out of her 
home, and when she struggled with him down the hallway before he ultimately cut 
her throat in the bedroom.   
I.  Section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (2009) 
Middleton claims that the CCP aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad, is incapable of a constitutionally narrow construction and has been and 
is being applied in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner.  He also claims that the 
standard jury instruction administered in this case did not require that the State 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to kill before the crime began, and is 
therefore unconstitutional.  We deny relief as this Court has on numerous 
occasions upheld the constitutionality of this aggravating factor and the standard 
jury instruction against similar claims.  See, e.g., McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 
613, 643 (Fla. 2010); Donaldson v. State, 722 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1998); Hunter v. 
State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995).  
J.  Jury Instructions 
 
 
- 60 - 
Middleton claims that the jury instruction stating that the jury must only 
consider mitigation after it is “reasonably convinced” of its existence is improper. 
More specifically, he claims that it violates separation of powers for the judiciary 
to place a limitation on the consideration of mitigation that the legislature has not 
specifically placed in the statute.  We deny relief because these specific challenges 
have been raised and rejected by this Court in a number of cases.  See Salazar v. 
State, 991 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2008); Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007); 
Bogle v. State, 655 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1995); Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 
1994). 
K. Section 921.141 (5)(d), Florida Statutes (2009) 
Middleton argues that the felony murder aggravator is facially 
unconstitutional because (1) it does not genuinely narrow the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty, and (2) it does not reasonably justify the imposition 
of a more severe sentence compared to others found guilty of murder.  As support 
for his argument, Middleton cites the decisions of three other state supreme courts 
that have declared this aggravator to be improper, and urges this Court to follow 
those courts, and do the same.  We again reject Middleton’s argument on this issue. 
In Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985), this Court rejected the 
argument that Middleton makes here, stating that “[t]he legislative determination 
that a first-degree murder that occurs in the course of another dangerous felony is 
 
 
- 61 - 
an aggravated capital felony is reasonable.”  Id. at 178 (citing State v. Dixon, 283 
So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)); see also Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997) 
(“Eligibility for this aggravating circumstance is not automatic: The list of 
enumerated felonies in the provision defining felony murder is larger than the list 
of enumerated felonies in the provision defining the aggravating circumstance of 
commission during the course of an enumerated felony. . . .  This scheme thus 
narrows the class of death-eligible defendants.  We find no error.” (citations 
omitted) (footnotes omitted)); see also Blanco v. McNeil, No. 07-61249-CIV, 2010 
WL 9098788 at *9 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2010) (rejecting Blanco’s claim that felony 
murder aggravator was unconstitutional (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 
299 (1990))). 
L.  Hurst v. Florida 
During the pendency of this case, the United States Supreme Court found 
Florida’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016).  We granted supplemental briefing in which Middleton argued that he is 
entitled to a new penalty phase.  On remand from the United States Supreme 
Court, we determined that “before a sentence of death may be considered by the 
trial court in Florida, the jury must find the existence of the aggravating factors 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to 
impose death, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
 
 
- 62 - 
circumstances.”  Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 53 (Fla. 2016).  We further held that 
a unanimous jury recommendation is necessary for the imposition of death and 
determined that Hurst error is capable of harmless error review.  Id. at 68.   
We reject Middleton’s argument that he is entitled to a life sentence under 
section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2012).  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 63-66.  Thus, 
the issue before us is whether any Hurst error during Middleton’s penalty phase 
proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  This Court has determined 
that Hurst error is evaluated by the following harmless error standard: 
Where the error concerns sentencing, the error is harmless only if 
there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
sentence.  See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000).  
Although the harmless error test applies to both constitutional errors 
and errors not based on constitutional grounds, “the harmless error 
test is to be rigorously applied,” [State v.] DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
[1129,] 1137 [Fla. 1986], and the State bears an extremely heavy 
burden in cases involving constitutional error.  Therefore, in the 
context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the burden is on the State, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury’s failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to Hurst’s death 
sentence in this case.  We reiterate:  
 
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct 
result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more 
probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an 
overwhelming evidence test.  Harmless error is not a 
device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the 
trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  
 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139.  “The question is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the [sentence].”  Id. 
 
 
- 63 - 
 
Id. at 68 (last alteration in original).  For the error to be harmless, this Court must 
determine that a rational jury would have unanimously found that there were 
sufficient aggravating factors that outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 
 
We emphasize the unanimous jury recommendation of death in this case.  
This unanimous recommendation allows us to determine that, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a rational jury would have unanimously found that sufficient aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigation.  See Davis v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S528, 
S539-40 (Fla. Nov. 10, 2016).  Jurors in Middleton’s case heard standard jury 
instructions informing them that they were to determine sufficient aggravators 
existed and that aggravation outweighed mitigation before recommending death.  
See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11.  Jurors were presented with mitigation and 
informed that they could consider mitigating circumstances of which they were 
reasonably convinced.   
 
Although the jurors were not informed that they were required to find 
unanimously that sufficient aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigation, 
the jury did recommend death unanimously in this case.  We conclude that the jury 
would have unanimously made the findings necessary to impose death.  See Davis, 
41 Fla. L. Weekly at S539-40.  The extreme aggravation in this case further 
bolsters our determination that any Hurst error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt: the trial court found both HAC and during the commission of a burglary 
 
 
- 64 - 
aggravators supported by competent, substantial evidence.  These are among the 
most serious aggravating factors. 
 
We find that the State can sustain its burden of showing that any Hurst error 
in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although the jury in this 
case was informed that it was not required to recommend death unanimously, it did 
so.  The unanimous recommendation of death in this case is the sort of 
recommendation we have determined is constitutionally sufficient to impose a 
sentence of death.  Cf. Davis, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S539-40.  Based on the 
foregoing, Middleton is not entitled to a new penalty phase. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm Middleton’s conviction for 
first-degree murder and his death sentence. 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which LABARGA, C.J., concurs. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
 
I join the Court’s opinion, which affirms Middleton’s conviction and death 
sentence.  I write separately to emphasize the importance of a mitigation specialist 
 
 
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to the defense team’s investigation and presentation in a capital case and to 
encourage trial courts to provide defense counsel the assistance of both a 
mitigation specialist and a fact investigator upon a proper and timely request.   
In my view, a trial court should not deny a request for a mitigation specialist 
either based on the misconception that these specialists are similar to fact 
investigators or based on undue emphasis on an additional expert “costing too 
much.”  It is also important that prosecutors do not add to that misconception by 
arguing, as the prosecutor did here, that all “a mitigation expert does is synthesiz[e] 
spankings and timeouts and things of that nature,” and “you don’t have to be an 
expert” to “go out and find people who can offer mitigation about . . . bumps [the 
defendant] got on the head or spankings he got in school or whatever the case 
might be.”9 
As for the importance of a mitigation specialist, this Court has emphasized 
that “the obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of a capital 
case cannot be overstated—this is an integral part of a capital case.”  State v. 
Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002).  The investigation into mitigation can be 
                                          
 
 
9.  The prosecutor’s sarcastic comments reflect not only a misunderstanding 
of the effect of early childhood traumas on brain development but also highlight 
the tendency of some prosecutors to degrade mitigation.  Cf. Oyola v. State, 158 
So. 3d 504, 512-13 (Fla. 2015) (rebuking prosecutorial arguments that  
characterize a defendant’s mitigating evidence as “excuses,” “make-believe,” 
“flimsy,” or “phantom”).  
 
 
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a monumental undertaking, requiring a significant amount of time that would 
ideally begin as soon as possible.  See American Bar Association (ABA) 
Guidelines for the Appointment & Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases (ABA Guidelines), Commentary to Guideline 1.1, reprinted in 31 
Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 925 (2003).  The difference between a thorough assessment of 
mitigation and a cursory one could, quite literally, be a matter of life and death.  
When funding is properly requested, the defense team should receive the assistance 
of both a fact investigator and a mitigation specialist to ensure a complete and 
reliable mitigation investigation.   
There is an “apparent widespread use of mitigation specialists or 
coordinators” in Florida, as the First District Court of Appeal has explained when 
quashing a trial court order denying a defendant’s motion for additional mitigation 
coordinator fees.  Criminal Specialist Investigations, Inc. v. State, 58 So. 3d 883, 
886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).10  Cases in this Court demonstrate that the use of a 
mitigation specialist in capital cases is not unusual in Florida.  See, e.g., Turner v. 
State, 37 So. 3d 212, 219 (Fla. 2010) (noting that a mitigation specialist testified in 
a capital case); Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 203 (Fla. 2010) (noting that the 
                                          
 
 
10.  The issue was before the First District, rather than this Court, because a 
life sentence was imposed following the penalty phase, and the mitigation 
specialist was requesting additional compensation for her work in having 
successfully developed mitigation. 
 
 
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defense counsel had enlisted the assistance of a mitigation specialist in a capital 
case); Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 360 (Fla. 2008) (noting that a mitigation 
specialist testified in the penalty phase of a capital case).11    
The ABA has published guidelines to “set forth a national standard of 
practice for the defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal 
representation” for defendants facing a possible death penalty.  ABA Guidelines, 
31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 919.  At the hearing on the motion to appoint a mitigation 
specialist in this case, the defense counsel urged the trial court to consider the ABA 
Guidelines, by explaining that these Guidelines “include[] a suggestion, if not a 
mandatory requirement, that a mitigation specialist . . . should be appointed in 
death cases because of the nature of the crime and because of the serious nature of 
the potential penalty.”  The prosecutor’s misguided response was, “I could care 
less about what they [the ABA] think about the death penalty and how it operates 
in the State of Florida.”  
Contrary to the opinion of the prosecutor in this case, the ABA Guidelines 
do have relevance to capital cases, even if these guidelines are not binding in 
                                          
 
 
11.  Since at least 2011, mitigation specialists have been recognized as a part 
of capital cases, when the General Appropriations Act of 2011 set the maximum 
hourly rate for mitigation specialists at $75.  See ch. 2011-69, § 4, at 126, Laws of 
Fla; see also § 27.425, Fla. Stat. (indicating that the rate specified annually in the 
General Appropriations Act is the maximum compensation rate in cases in which 
the court has appointed private counsel or declared a person indigent for costs). 
 
 
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determining whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  The United States 
Supreme Court has referred to the various renditions of these guidelines as “guides 
to determining what is reasonable” for an attorney’s performance, or as reflecting 
“well-defined norms” for attorney conduct.  Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 
& n.7 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).  This Court has also 
relied upon these guidelines in determining whether trial counsel has adequately 
investigated mitigation evidence.  See, e.g., Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974, 984-85 
(Fla. 2009) (citing the ABA Guidelines in a postconviction appeal to determine 
that trial counsel’s performance as to investigating and presenting mitigation 
evidence was deficient); Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 974 (Fla. 2006) 
(citing the Supreme Court’s reliance on the ABA Guidelines in Wiggins in 
determining that trial counsel unreasonably failed to attempt to present mental 
health mitigation evidence, and concluding that there was competent, substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of deficient performance).  
A mitigation specialist is “an indispensable member of the defense team 
throughout all capital proceedings[,] . . . possess[ing] clinical and information-
gathering skills and training that most lawyers simply do not have.”  ABA 
Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 959.  Not only do 
mitigation specialists have honed skills in gathering and understanding the nature 
of potential mitigation evidence, such as the significance of early childhood 
 
 
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trauma, but mitigation specialists—unlike the defendant’s lawyer—can testify in 
the penalty phase to impart the results of their mitigation investigation to the jury 
that must weigh the mitigation and aggravation in determining whether to 
recommend the death sentence.  
As opposed to fact investigators, mitigation specialists “are generally trained 
in the social sciences, with college degrees in social work or psychology,” and “are 
adept at gathering institutional records, interviewing lay and professional people, 
and compiling case histories.”  Hon. Helen G. Berrigan, The Indispensable Role of 
the Mitigation Specialist in a Capital Case: A View From the Federal Bench, 36 
Hofstra L. Rev. 819, 827-28 (2008).  “Significantly, they are trained in uncovering 
family trauma and screening for often subtle mental and psychological disorders,” 
and are “experienced in interpersonal communication so they know how to develop 
trust and rapport with even the most difficult or distrustful of individuals.”  Id. at 
828 (footnote omitted).  Part of the mitigation specialist’s job is to “conduct a 
comprehensive life history investigation of the client and identify all relevant 
mitigation issues.”  Richard G. Dudley Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It 
Right: Life History Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health 
Assessment, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 963, 966 (2008) (footnote omitted).   
 
 
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A mitigation specialist has the potential to benefit a criminal defendant in a 
capital case in a wide variety of ways, as summarized by the commentary to 
Guideline 4.1 of the ABA Guidelines:   
They have the time and the ability to elicit sensitive, embarrassing and 
often humiliating evidence (e.g., family sexual abuse) that the 
defendant may have never disclosed.  They have the clinical skills to 
recognize such things as congenital, mental or neurological 
conditions, to understand how these conditions may have affected the 
defendant’s development and behavior, and to identify the most 
appropriate experts to examine the defendant or testify on his behalf.  
Moreover, they may be critical to assuring that the client obtains 
therapeutic services that render him cognitively and emotionally 
competent to make sound decisions concerning his case. 
. . .  The mitigation specialist compiles a comprehensive and well-
documented psycho-social history of the client based on an exhaustive 
investigation; analyzes the significance of the information in terms of 
impact on development, including effect on personality and behavior; 
finds mitigating themes in the client’s life history; identifies the need 
for expert assistance; assists in locating appropriate experts; provides 
social history information to experts to enable them to conduct 
competent and reliable evaluations; and works with the defense team 
and experts to develop a comprehensive and cohesive case in 
mitigation. 
The mitigation specialist often plays an important role as well 
in maintaining close contact with the client and his family while the 
case is pending.  The rapport developed in this process can be the key 
to persuading a client to accept a plea to a sentence less than death. 
 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 959-60 
(footnotes omitted); see also ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases (2008), reprinted in 36 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 677, 682 (2008) (explaining that mitigation specialists are skilled 
interviewers who can identify and locate relevant persons, recognize and elicit 
 
 
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information related to mental health, establish a rapport with witnesses, and 
“advise counsel on the appropriate mental health and other expert assistance”).   
The importance of appointing a mitigation specialist becomes all the more 
evident in a case involving an indigent defendant, where the trial court appoints 
private counsel, who generally does not have the same institutional resources as the 
Public Defender’s Office.  In such cases, the trial judge effectively decides “what 
financial assistance, investigators, or experts the defense will be allowed.”  
Berrigan, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 823.  “By controlling the purse strings, the trial 
judge effectively controls the quantity and quality of information that will flow to 
the jury if a penalty phase is necessary.”  Id.  As the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated, “[p]ermitting an indigent capital defendant to introduce 
mitigating evidence has little meaning if the funds necessary for compiling the 
evidence [are] unavailable.”  Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 
1983), overruled on other grounds by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (11th 
Cir. 1986).   
Accordingly, given the importance of a mitigation specialist to the defense’s 
presentation in a capital case, I strongly encourage trial courts to liberally grant 
proper requests for mitigation specialists.  Nevertheless, I would not find reversible 
error in this case because the defense lawyer expressly stated that he would renew 
his request for a mitigation specialist, but he did not do so.  Further, in this direct 
 
 
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appeal, Middleton is unable to show how he was prejudiced.  I therefore concur in 
the affirmance of the conviction and death sentence.  
LABARGA, C.J., concurs. 
 
QUINCE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s findings that the evidence here is sufficient to 
sustain Middleton’s convictions.  I disagree with the majority’s finding that the 
Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the same reasons set forth 
in Justice Perry’s partial concurrence in Davis v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S528, 
S540-41 (Fla. Nov. 10, 2016) (Perry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
The jury’s unanimous recommendation of death in this case does not enable this 
Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors would have made all 
the findings necessary for the imposition of death unanimously.  Just as this Court 
declined to speculate as to how the jurors would have voted in Hurst v. State, 202 
So. 3d 40, 69 (Fla. 2016), so too should we decline to speculate in this case.  I 
conclude that the error here was harmful. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okeechobee County,  
Robert Eugene Belanger, Judge - Case No. 472009CF000448CFAXMX 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
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for Appellee