Title: Matter of Estate of Stuckle
Citation: 427 N.W.2d 96
Docket Number: 
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 1988

Matter of Estate of Stuckle Annotate this Case 427 N.W.2d 96 (1988) In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Daniel STUCKLE, Deceased. Marion STUCKLE, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Douglas J. STUCKLE, individually and as Personal Representative of the Daniel Stuckle Estate, Bonnie McPherson and LuEtta Bleibaum, Respondents and Appellees. Civ. No. 870375. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 28, 1988. Joseph F. Larson II (argued), Jamestown, for petitioner and appellant. Gilje, Greenwood & Dalsted, Jamestown, for respondents and appellees; argued by Charles J. Gilje. GIERKE, Justice. Marion Stuckle appeals from county court judgments denying several of her claims in probate against the estate of her husband, Daniel Stuckle. We dismiss the appeal. The requirements of Rule 54(b), N.D.R. Civ.P., are fully applicable in probate proceedings. Matter of Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525 , 528 (N.D.1985). In Matter of Estate of Sorensen, 406 N.W.2d 365 (N.D.1987), we said: "Under North Dakota Century Code § 30.1-02-06.1 [U.P.C. 1-308], the right to appellate review of probate orders is governed by the rules applicable to appeals to the Supreme Court in equity cases from the district court. Section 28-27-02, NDCC, specifies which orders *97 are appealable to this Court. Once jurisdiction is established under § 28-27-02, NDCC, Rule 54(b)'s separate requirements must also be met, if applicable. Gillan v. Saffell, 395 N.W.2d 148 , 149 (N.D.1986). Parties in probate cases bear the duty of requesting a Rule 54(b) order or certification if they seek an appeal. First Trust Co. of North Dakota v. Conway, 345 N.W.2d 838 , 842 (N.D. 1984)." The parties have acknowledged that Daniel's estate has not been closed and that Marion has additional claims against the estate which remain pending before the county court. There is nothing in the record certified to this court which can be construed as a Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., certification. Compare First Trust Co. of North Dakota v. Conway, supra, 345 N.W.2d at 841-842. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE and LEVINE, JJ., concur. MESCHKE, Justice, concurring. I concur. I write separately to evaluate for myself the functions of Rule 54(b) and final decisions in appeals, particularly of probate proceedings. Perhaps my review will aid others. Daniel Stuckle died on July 4, 1984, devising his estate to his widow, Marion, and three children by a prior marriage. His son, Douglas, was named personal representative of his estate. Daniel had sold the east half of section 3 to Douglas in 1979 and willed a "life estate in the balance due in that certain contract for deed" to Marion. In July 1986, Marion sued Douglas in district court for principal and interest overdue on that contract. In October 1986, Marion petitioned for a family allowance from the estate and to compel settlement of the estate. In March 1987, Douglas petitioned the county court to construe the will, to approve his accounting, and to settle and distribute the estate. Marion then petitioned to remove Douglas as personal representative for cause and to disallow certain of his expenses. In his return to Marion's last petitions, Douglas filed another accounting. After an April 1987 hearing, the county court made a series of rulings: (1) Payments of both principal and interest on the contract for deed on the east half of section 3, which were delinquent at the time of Daniel's death, belonged to the estate; (2) Installments of principal due on that contract after Daniel's death "shall be placed in trust" for Marion, while interest installments, as well as "interest and profits" from the trust, belonged to Marion; (3) Marion's testamentary life estate in the north half of section 9 was subject to Daniel's right under the will "to purchase from my estate all or any part of the farm land which I may own at the time of my death for an amount equal to 80% of the appreciated value thereof on reasonable terms," so that, if Daniel purchased, the proceeds would also be placed in trust for income to Marion; (4) Marion "did not show a need for family allowance," and was awarded only $10 per month for 12 months; (5) Marion's motion for a stay of "determination of the amount owed under the contract for deed," pending her prior district court action, was denied, but the county court did not determine the amount due, nor did it order settlement or distribution of the estate; and (6) Daniel was removed as personal representative. Marion has appealed from each of these rulings except the removal of Daniel as personal representative. Marion also complains about the failures of the county court to set aside her exempt property entitlement under NDCC 30.1-07-01 and to decide whether she or the estate was entitled to crop share rental from the north half of section 9 during administration of the estate. NDRCivP 54(b) says: "Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. If more than one claim for relief is presented in *98 an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or if multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of that determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." When our civil rules were adapted from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1957, Rule 54(b) was imported to our practice, largely in its present form, applicable to both multiple claims and multiple parties.[1] So designed, Rule 54(b) gives a trial court considerable power to decide what is a final order in each case and what is an order that the trial court may later revise in the course of that case. Rule 54(b) reflected the long-standing federal jurisprudence generally requiring a final judgment or order for an appeal.[2] Thus, unheralded, *99 and unnoticed for nearly a decade,[3] Rule 54(b) annexed most of the federal doctrine of "final decisions"[4] to our haphazard scheme of "reviewable orders."[5] The federal doctrine, generally allowing appeal of only a "final decision," has been statutorily fixed for many years. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 9 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 110.06 (1987). North Dakota has not usually had a comparable statutory imprint. Our appeals statute, NDCC 28-27-02, derived from the "Field Code of Procedure," has long spoken only in terms of appealable orders, without expressly referring to final judgments.[6] Today, only subsection *100 2 of seven categories of appealable orders expressly calls for a "final order."[7] Subsection 1 implies something final, when it authorizes review of an order which "in effect determines the action...." But, at best, North Dakota's statutory tradition about limiting appeals to final decisions has been weak. Nevertheless, North Dakota has had some tradition against piecemeal appeals. Thus, for example, our first supreme court recognized "... a mere interlocutory order [] is not appealable, ..." Persons v. Simons, 1 N.D. 243, 245, 46 N.W. 969, 970 (1890). This loose custom was capricious and vacillating. Appeals were allowed from some kinds of intermediate orders, such as one denying leave to amend an answer, Hermes v. Markham, 78 N.D. 268, 49 N.W.2d 238 (1951), or striking an affirmative defense, La Duke v. E.W. Wylie Co., 77 N.D. 592, 44 N.W.2d 204 (1950); but not from others, such as one allowing an amended complaint, Holobuck v. Schaffner, 30 N.D. 344, 152 N.W. 660 (1915), or denying a motion to strike a complaint (but reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, anyway), Torgerson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 51 N.D. 745, 200 N.W. 1013 (1924). Appeals were allowed from some kinds of intermediate procedural orders, such as one granting or denying a change of venue, Robertson Lumber Co. v. Jones, 13 N.D. 112, 99 N.W. 1082 (1904); but not from others, such as one denying consolidation of two actions, Swiggum v. Valley Inv. Co., 73 N.D. 422, 15 N.W.2d 862 (1944). These examples illustrate that the concept of finality for a civil appeal was not confirmed in North Dakota before the advent of Rule 54(b). Nevertheless, there were occasional flashes of insight before that about the importance of finality to bring about appellate review.[8] *101 The final decision doctrine seems to have really been vitalized in North Dakota by Rule 54(b) and its correlation with the strong federal tradition.[9] This was rational. The same reasons of effectiveness and efficiency of judicial determination support the policy in this state as elsewhere.[10] Unfortunately, our application of the finality doctrine has been disordered and erratic, even after the complementary function of Rule 54(b) was recognized. See, as illustrations of varying results, Arneson v. City of Fargo, 303 N.W.2d 515 (N.D.1981) (Justice Pederson, concurring); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall and Fiedler, 311 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1981); and Union State Bank v. Woell, 357 N.W.2d 234 (N.D.1984). In recent years, we have struggled to shape a coherent and sensible approach to the subject. Compare Keller v. Gama, 378 N.W.2d 867 (N.D.1985) and Geo-Mobile, Inc. v. Dean Bender Chevrolet, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.1986), where we decided appeals from intermediate orders, with Gillan v. Saffell, 395 N.W.2d 148 (N.D.1986) and Gast Construction Company, Inc. v. Brighton Partnership, 422 N.W.2d 389 (N.D.1988), where we declined appeals, without Rule 54(b) action, when there were unadjudicated claims remaining to be resolved in the trial court. By now, it should be apparent that the latest decisions are the prevailing doctrine, based, as they are, on better rationale and stronger tradition. Subject to appropriate exceptions, perhaps akin to the federal model,[11] a final decision will generally be required for a civil appeal. Absent the support of a Rule 54(b) finality determination and direction, an intermediate order or judgment leaving claims unadjudicated in the trial court will not normally be considered on appeal. This look back on the reasons for and traditions of finality as the springboard for appellate review in civil matters brings us to the relationship of Rule 54(b) and final decisions to probate matters. In 1983, direct appeals from county court to the supreme court were authorized,[12] following the earlier adoption of the constitutional amendment creating a unified judicial system. It then became necessary to interpolate the general principle of finality for an appeal, together with the complementary procedure for "finality" under Rule 54(b), for proceedings under the relatively new Uniform Probate Code, NDCC *102 Title 30.1, which had become effective July 1, 1975. That process of applying principles about final decisions to probate proceedings, for which there was no precise federal parallel,[13] has hardly been developed and exposed by our prior opinions. The need for a final judgment or order, without a Rule 54(b) determination and direction, to appeal a probate court matter was initially identified in First Trust Co. of North Dakota v. Conway, 345 N.W.2d 838 , 842 (N.D.1984), and has been reiterated in several more recent opinions, Matter of Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525 , 528 (N.D.1985), and Matter of Estate of Sorensen, 406 N.W.2d 365 (N.D.1987). But, this case differs from those in ways which may be meaningful in view of the uncertain effects on finality of some sections of the Uniform Probate Code. Conway[14] and Sorensen each involved "supervised administration." "Supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and settlement of a decedent's estate under the continuing authority of the court which extends until entry of an order approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative, or other order terminating the proceeding." NDCC 30.1-16-01. "Interim orders ... may be issued by the court at any time during the pendency of a supervised administration, ..." usually without notice. NDCC 30.1-16-05. See also NDCC 30.1-13-04 (a demand for notice can entitle any interested person to notice of any interim order). Without a Rule 54(b) determination and direction, it is plain that an order in a supervised administration cannot be final and appealed until entry of an order approving distribution of the estate. That is what Conway and Sorensen held. Erickson, supra, held that an order commencing a probate proceeding was not final or appealable without supporting Rule 54(b) action, but went on to hold that a formal testacy order could be appealed. Our Uniform Probate Code declares a "formal testacy order" to be "final as to all persons with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that the court considered or might have considered incident to its rendition relevant to the question of whether the decedent left a valid will, and to the determination of heirs," subject to certain exceptions; a formal testacy order is also expressly "[s]ubject to appeal." NDCC 30.1-15-12. In contrast, this Stuckle estate is not a "supervised administration" and no "formal testacy order" is involved in this appeal. The character of an order or judgment in an unsupervised probate proceeding is designated in NDCC 30.1-12-07: "Scope of proceedingsProceedings independentException. Unless supervised administration as described in chapter 30.1-16 is involved, each proceeding before the court is independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate; petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which are particularly described by other sections of chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23, no petition is defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the subject of a final order; proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may be combined with proceedings for appointment of personal representatives; and a proceeding for appointment of personal representative is concluded by an order making or declining the appointment." (emphasis supplied).[15] *103 This designates finality in an unsupervised probate proceeding as simply a matter of a concluding order on each separate petition. But, when there are multiple petitions about interrelated claims in an unsupervised probate proceeding, some reconciliation of this uncomplicated plan with the current convention of a need for finality remains necessary. Rule 54(b) and its corollary finality doctrine must be reckoned with because the Uniform Probate Code clearly incorporates existing procedural rules governing civil appeals.[16] Considerations of effective and efficient judicial administration of appeals are similarly important in probates as in other civil matters. On this appeal in the Stuckle estate, we need not delineate every kind of decision in unsupervised probates which might be appealable without a supporting 54(b) determination and direction.[17] We only need to sketch the outlines of this case enough to show that these rulings are incomplete. They do not decide all disputes between Marion and the estate. In the phrasing of Rule 54(b), it is obvious that these rulings adjudicate "fewer than all of the claims" and do "not terminate the action." Therefore, the rulings are "subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims" in settlement and distribution of the estate. While the potential of error is readily detectable in these rulings, I concur that, since the county court did not make an express determination that "there is no just reason for delay" and did not expressly direct entry of a separate judgment under NDRCivP 54(b), the rulings to date are not final and this appeal is premature. We could remand the record, while retaining jurisdiction of the appeal, for the county court to consider making a Rule 54(b) determination and direction. We have done this occasionally. See Courchene v. Delaney Distributors, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 781 (N.D.1988) and 421 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1988). But that is not appropriate for every appeal of a non-final decision unembellished with an adequate expression that it should be treated as final. Where unsettled issues are evident and are linked to those brought for review, piecemeal appeals should not be encouraged without appropriate reason. More than conservation of judicial energy and elimination of delays is involved. See 9 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 110.07 (1987). Comprehension on appeal is usually improved by thorough development and elaboration at trial of related facts and legal problems. To me, completion of that process seems particularly important for pondering the interactive controversies in this case.[18]