Title: Bromstad-Deturk v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 431, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
LORI BROMSTAD-DETURK, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 431, 2008 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
 
)  C.A. No. 08C-02-118 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE  
 
) 
COMPANY, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 8, 2009 
Decided:  June 2, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the court en banc. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 2nd day of June 2009, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Lori Bromstad-Deturk filed a complaint in the Superior Court against 
State Farm seeking to recover underinsured motorist benefits under three separate 
insurance policies.  The trial judge granted State Farm’s 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss.  On appeal, Bromstad-Deturk asserts that the trial judge incorrectly 
determined that 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) prohibits stacking multiple insurance policies.  
Because § 3902(c)’s unambiguous language precludes Bromstad-Deturk from 
stacking her three insurance policies, we find no merit to her arguments and affirm.  
 
2 
 
(2) 
Bromstad-Deturk and her husband purchased three separate insurance 
policies from State Farm to cover the couple’s three vehicles.  Each policy 
contained an underinsured motorist coverage provision with a $100,000 limit.  On 
May 25, 2007, Bromstad-Deturk sustained injuries in a car accident when another 
driver crossed the centerline and struck her car.  The driver of that other car 
tendered his $15,000 insurance policy limit on December 26, 2007.  In her 
complaint, filed on February 13, 2008, Bromstad-Deturk demanded that State Farm 
“stack all three separate insurance policies . . . into one recovery” for a total 
recovery of $300,000.  State Farm has paid Bromstad-Deturk $100,000 under one 
of those policies, and the parties entered a stipulation acknowledging that the 
payment satisfies all claims arising under that policy.  That stipulation, entered on 
April 17, 2008, also acknowledges that Bromstad-Deturk filed a declaratory 
judgment action in the Superior Court. 
 
(3) 
In lieu of filing an answer to Bromstad-Deturk’s complaint, State 
Farm filed a motion to dismiss.  In its motion to dismiss, State Farm argued that 
Bromstad-Deturk’s insurance policies contained an “anti-stacking” provision, 
authorized by § 3902(c).  That policy language states: 
If two or more vehicles owned or leased by you, your spouse or any 
relative are insured for this coverage under one or more policies 
issued by us or an affiliated company, the total limit of liability under 
all such coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability. 
 
 
3 
The trial judge agreed with State Farm and granted its motion to dismiss.1  The trial 
judge determined that “the anti-stacking provisions in the insurance policies are 
permitted by the plain language of 18 Del. C. § 3902(c), and that therefore the 
terms of the insurance agreements preclude the Plaintiff from stacking her 
insurance policies.”2  This appeal followed. 
 
(4) 
Bromstad-Deturk raises one issue on appeal.  She asserts a right to 
stack her three insurance policies and, as a result, recover $300,000 from State 
Farm.  We review de novo a trial judge’s interpretation of an insurance agreement 
and grant of a motion to dismiss.3  We also review de novo a trial judge’s statutory 
construction.4  
 
(5) 
Bromstad-Deturk asserts that we should permit her to stack her 
insurance policies because the purpose of § 3902(c) is to “protect insured persons 
from the negligence of impecunious tortfeasors.”  Bromstad-Deturk urges us not to 
read § 3902(c) narrowly, but requests that we construe that statute broadly to allow 
stacking in her situation.  Bromstad-Deturk alleges “fundamental unfairness” 
                                                 
1 
Bromstad-Deturk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4147587 (Del. Super. Ct.). 
2 
Id. at *1. 
3 
AT&T Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 931 A.2d 409, 415 (Del. 2007) (citing 
AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt., LLC. v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 444 (Del. 2005); Phillips 
Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997)). 
4 
Colonial Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Ayers, 772 A.2d 177, 179 (Del. 2001) (citing State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 604 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1992)). 
 
4 
because § 3902(c) allows policyholders to stack three policies from three different 
insurers but precludes an insured from stacking three policies from the same 
insurer.   
 
(6) 
We agree with the trial judge and affirm on the basis of his well 
reasoned opinion.  Section 3902(c) clearly and unambiguously allows the type of 
anti-stacking provision found in Bromstad-Deturk’s policies.  We will not 
encroach upon the General Assembly’s apparent intent to allow those with multiple 
policies from different, unaffiliated insurers to stack their uninsured motorist 
coverage, while allowing anti-stacking provisions that preclude stacking multiple 
policies issued by the same insurer.   
 
(7) 
We suggest, however, that because consumers like Bromstad-Deturk 
may not fully comprehend the significance of an anti-stacking provision, the 
General Assembly might consider amending § 3902 to require insurers to notify 
consumers that they would be able to stack multiple policies from different, 
unaffiliated insurers.  Adding a notice requirement to § 3902, would serve to 
encourage consumers to evaluate the pros and cons of choosing to ensure multiple 
vehicles through one insurer. 
 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice