Title: Stephens v. Cty. of Tulare
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S129794
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

1
Filed 5/25/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JOHN STEPHENS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S129794 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F044123 
COUNTY OF TULARE et al., 
) 
 
) 
Tulare County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. 205376 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We must decide whether a county employee was dismissed for disability 
within the meaning of Government Code section 31725.  If he was so dismissed, 
because the county board of retirement ruled he was not entitled to a disability 
retirement the county would be required to reinstate him to his old job, together 
with back wages and benefits.  Because we conclude the trial court ruled correctly 
that the employee was not dismissed from his job, we reverse the decision of the 
Court of Appeal. 
FACTS 
John Stephens began working for the Tulare County Sheriff-Coroner as a 
detention specialist III in December 1994.  He was assigned to the Bob Wiley 
Detention Facility, where his job entailed working on the floors with jail inmates, 
transporting inmates, and writing reports.  His job also required him to carry a 
firearm.  In the course of his duties, in 1995 he suffered an injury to his right 
thumb.  In 1996 he injured his thumb again and spent some time away from work.  
 
 
2
When he returned to work, his employer modified his job to “light duty” pursuant 
to the recommendation of his physician, Dr. John Edwards.  In this new position, 
Stephens was assigned to a housing unit control room, requiring him to open and 
close the security doors in the jail for the other detention officers by pushing 
buttons using both hands.  It was anticipated that when the jail became fully 
staffed, Stephens would rotate into the central control room, where his work would 
also involve pushing a button to open a security door.  Captain Janet Perryman 
testified that the button-pushing duties in the control room of a housing unit and in 
the central control room were not significantly different. 
When Stephens complained his modified light duty was inconsistent with 
the limitations recommended by Dr. Edwards, he was examined by a hand 
specialist.  The specialist’s June 17, 1997, report acknowledged Dr. Edwards’s 
recommendation “that the client perform no longer than 15-20 minutes of upper 
extremity activity at one period of time and then have a break,” but concluded:  
“Currently the control room officer job is adhering to this prescription.  The client 
is able to do 5-15 minutes of hand tasks and then patrol the control room for one to 
five minutes without using his hands.  The client does use his hands frequently but 
not at a constant rate and is able to take a break after 15-20 minutes of hand 
activity.”  (Italics added.)  Following this report, Stephens apparently continued in 
his modified light-duty position and was in fact rotated into the central control 
room. 
Stephens testified that in September 1997, while performing this modified 
light duty, Sergeant Montoya, one of his supervising sergeants, approached him 
and asked how he was doing.  Stephens told him his thumb was bothering him, but 
he denied he asked Sergeant Montoya to be relieved.  
Sergeant Sheri Lehner, another of Stephens’s supervising sergeants, also 
testified to events occurring in September 1997.  She reported that Stephens had 
 
 
3
approached her and complained that “there was a misunderstanding as to what his 
light duty was supposed to be,” and that “he was suffering from pain in his thumb, 
due to his job assignment.”  Sergeant Lehner confirmed that, following a shift, 
Stephens’s thumb was in fact red and swollen.  He told her he was not supposed to 
use his thumb for more than 15 minutes at a time.  Because persons performing 
Stephens’s job worked 12-hour shifts, Sergeant Lehner thought it would be 
infeasible for Stephens to take a break every 15 minutes. 
Sergeant Lehner also testified that Stephens told her not to be “surprised 
when things start happening” when he was rotated from the housing unit control 
room into the central control room, that he would call his lawyer, and he would 
“own the County” because in his last lawsuit, which was successful, the trial court 
had informed everyone that reassigning him would be considered a discriminatory 
act.1  Stephens boasted of his attorney’s legal prowess and said that “this time 
we’ll sue for money.”  Sergeant Lehner reported this conversation to her superiors.  
In light of Stephens’s complaints, Captain Perryman sent him a letter that 
forms the basis of his claim he was dismissed from his job.  The letter, dated 
September 12, 1997, stated in pertinent part: 
“You have been working in a modified work assignment (light duty) at the 
Bob Wiley Detention Facility due to an injury to your right hand.  Your doctor, 
John Edwards, has described your restrictions as ‘no inmate contact, some right 
hand activities―no more than (2) hours per day, writing limitations of 15-20 
minute intervals, no power gripping or pulling of the right hand.’  The Department 
has made efforts to accommodate your return to work and reviewed job 
                                              
1  
The lawsuit to which Stephens refers is not explained, although he had filed 
eight different workers’ compensation claims between 1994 and 1997. 
 
 
4
assignments and duties performed in the Division.  The tasks required in operating 
a control room at the facility appeared to accommodate the doctor’s listed 
restrictions for use of your right hand.  You have in fact worked in a housing 
control room for sometime [sic]. 
“On 9-8-97 you notified Sergeant C. Lehner that you believed there was a 
misunderstanding about your light duty and the restrictions.  It was your opinion 
that working in Central Control would result in compromising those restrictions. 
“You were assigned to Central Control and given the task of training 
Detention Service Officer Rosario.  You worked Central Control and when going 
off duty on 9-10-97 you spoke to Sergeants Lehner and Montoya.  You were asked 
how your hand was and responded that it was swollen. 
“Because of your statements we believe that we will not be able to provide 
a modified work assignment at this time.  This letter is to confirm to you that you 
are not to return to work until further notice.  At such time as your condition 
improves and you are able to return to work with no restrictions, or improves to 
the point that you are able to perform the ‘light duty’ tasks required in Central 
Control without further complaint or injury, you will be expected to submit time 
sheets reflecting OFF DUTY/SICK/PERSONAL.  I understand you have an open 
job injury claim for this problem ([Lab. Code, §] 4850) that has yet to be resolved.  
Until notified by Worker’s Compensation we will expect your time sheets to 
reflect use of your personal sick leave.” 
 
 
5
Captain Perryman testified:2  “The letter was generated . . . to make sure 
that [Stephens] understood that our concern for him was that we not further injure 
his thumb.  And that he needed to do what had to be done in terms of return[ing] 
to work, with no restrictions, as a . . . Detention Specialist [III], which is 
commonly referred to as a gun-toter.  Or to be well to the point where he could 
serve in the capacity of a Detention Service Officer, which is the light-duty 
position that we had temporarily provided him with.”  Captain Perryman further 
testified she did not intend the letter to be a “dismissal from employment”; it was 
her understanding the letter left open the possibility of Stephens’s return to work 
in either a light-duty capacity or performing the full range of duties as a detention 
specialist III.  She testified the sheriff’s department had taken no affirmative steps 
to terminate Stephens and, when asked whether Tulare County had “actually 
terminated him from [the] county payroll, paid him off for any accrued leave,” she 
answered:  “No, not at all.”  
After receiving Captain Perryman’s letter, Stephens did not return to work.  
Asked at trial whether he was terminated from his employment “shortly after 
1997,” that is, after he received Captain Perryman’s letter, he replied:  “Not to my 
knowledge.”  Asked whether he had ever received a termination notice, he replied:  
“No.  No termination.”  
For the rest of 1997, and until December 19, 1998, Stephens received full 
pay from Tulare County in the form of his sick and personal leave and then 
                                              
2  
By the time of trial, Captain Perryman had been promoted to assistant 
sheriff in charge of adult jail facilities and her last name had changed to Hinesly.  
We will continue to refer to her as Captain Perryman in this opinion, as that was 
her name at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. 
 
 
6
benefits pursuant to Labor Code section 4850.3  Following cessation of his section 
4850 benefits in late 1998, he participated in vocational rehabilitation and was 
trained to become a computer technician.  After completion of that training, 
Stephens twice sought positions with the county but was unsuccessful in obtaining 
a job.  He worked various part-time jobs with other, private employers in 1998; 
during this time he also received a compromise and release for $7,000, settling one 
of his workers’ compensation cases (see fn. 1, ante). 
Stephens applied for a disability retirement with the Tulare County 
Employees’ Retirement Association (TCERA) on November 18, 1998.  While his 
application was pending, Tulare County informed him of an opening for a job he 
could perform consistent with his medical limitations, but withdrew the offer of 
employment when the county decided not to fund the position.  TCERA’s Board 
of Retirement subsequently denied his application for a disability retirement, and 
the superior court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus.  He then sent a letter 
to the Tulare County Sheriff-Coroner demanding reinstatement pursuant to 
Government Code section 31725.  He also filed a government tort claim, seeking 
payment of retroactive wages pursuant to the same statute, which the county 
denied. 
                                              
3  
Labor Code section 4850 provides:  “(a) Whenever [a qualified law 
enforcement officer] . . . is disabled, whether temporarily or permanently, by 
injury or illness arising out of and in the course of his or her duties, he or she shall 
become entitled, regardless of his or her period of service with the city, county, or 
district, to a leave of absence while so disabled without loss of salary in lieu of 
temporary disability payments or maintenance allowance payments under Section 
139.5, if any, which would be payable under this chapter, for the period of the 
disability, but not exceeding one year, or until that earlier date as he or she is 
retired on permanent disability pension, and is actually receiving disability 
pension payments, or advanced disability pension payments pursuant to Section 
4850.3.” 
 
 
7
Stephens’s employer then sent him a letter dated December 5, 2002, 
explaining that “As it is the decision of the Board of Retirement that you are not 
substantially incapacitated, and thus able to work, the County is ready to reinstate 
you to employment.”  The letter asked him to contact a designated person “to 
initiate an interactive review of restrictions per ADA/[FEHA], to discuss 
arrangements for your return to work and to discuss your new assignment.”  The 
letter also gave Stephens the option of not returning to work and stated that if he 
did not contact the designated person by December 20, the sheriff-coroner would 
assume he was not returning.  Stephens’s attorney contacted the designated person 
to begin the process of reinstatement. 
When Stephens had not been reinstated by May 23, 2003, he filed a petition 
for writ of mandate in superior court, seeking reinstatement and repayment of back 
wages and benefits pursuant to Government Code section 31725.  On June 11, 
2003, he received a response letter from the sheriff-coroner, informing him he had 
been reinstated to the sheriff’s department.  Stephens returned to work for the 
sheriff’s department on July 1, 2003, and performed the same modified light duty 
the sheriff-coroner had made available in 1997.  Asked whether “prior to returning 
in July of ’03 . . . did your condition change such that you could work the light-
duty functions that you had been working in ’97,” he replied:  “There was no 
change.  It has been the same.”  
The trial court issued an alternative writ but ultimately denied relief.  The 
court concluded Captain Perryman’s September 12, 1997, letter “contemplates that 
Mr. Stephens is still an active County employee utilizing leave time.  At no time 
was Mr. Stephens advised in this letter that he was dismissed from employment.  
Although the letter does state ‘do not return to work until further notice,’ it goes 
on to tell Mr. Stephens that he will be placed on sick leave until he can report back 
to work under certain conditions.  These were conditions that only Mr. Stephens 
 
 
8
could determine. . . .  Mr. Stephens always had a doctor’s release and could have 
gone back to work if he had informed the County that he was willing and able.  At 
no time did Mr. Stephens advise the County that he considered this a dismissal.”  
The trial court found that because Stephens did not seek a new medical evaluation 
of his thumb after receiving Captain Perryman’s letter or seek reinstatement with 
the county during this time period, “the only reasonable determination the court 
can make is that Mr. Stephens could have been performing these duties all along 
but never complied with the letter of September 12, 1997, by informing the 
County that he could perform.” 
The Court of Appeal reversed, and we granted review. 
DISCUSSION 
Resolution of the present dispute requires us to interpret the meaning of 
Government Code section 31725 (section 31725).  That statute provides in full:  
“Permanent incapacity for the performance of duty shall in all cases be determined 
by the board.[4]  [¶] If the medical examination and other available information do 
not show to the satisfaction of the board that the member[5] is incapacitated 
physically or mentally for the performance of his duties in the service and the 
member’s application [for a disability retirement] is denied on this ground the 
board shall give notice of such denial to the employer.  The employer may obtain 
judicial review of such action of the board by filing a petition for a writ of 
mandate in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure or by joining or 
                                              
4  
Reference to the “board” refers to the county board of retirement.  (Gov. 
Code, § 31459, subd. (c).) 
5  
Reference to a “member” refers to members of a retirement association 
(Gov. Code, § 31470), including “[a]ll sheriffs, undersheriffs, chief deputies 
sheriff, jailers, turnkeys, deputies sheriff . . .” (id., § 31470.2). 
 
 
9
intervening in such action filed by the member within 30 days of the mailing of 
such notice.  If such petition is not filed or the court enters judgment denying the 
writ, whether on the petition of the employer or the member, and the employer has 
dismissed the member for disability[,] the employer shall reinstate the member to 
his employment effective as of the day following the effective date of the 
dismissal.”  (Italics added.)   
In other words, if (1) the county board of retirement rules an 
applicant/employee is not permanently disabled so as to be entitled to a disability 
retirement, (2) the board denies the employee’s disability retirement application on 
that ground, and (3) no appeal is filed or all appeals are final, then the 
applicant/employee is entitled to reinstatement to his or her prior position if (4) the 
employing county has previously “dismissed” the employee “for disability.”  
(§ 31725.)  Section 31725, where applicable, has been interpreted to require not 
only reinstatement but also payment of wages and benefits that would have 
accrued during the period of dismissal.  (Leili v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 148 
Cal.App.3d 985 (Leili); see generally Tapia v. County of San Bernardino (1994) 
29 Cal.App.4th 375, 387 (Tapia) [applicant must comply with statutory claim 
presentation requirements].) 
That Stephens applied for a disability retirement, the county board of 
retirement denied his application on the ground he was not disabled, and all 
appeals are final are not disputed by the parties, thus satisfying the first three 
prerequisites to reinstatement under section 31725.  The only question remaining 
is whether the county dismissed Stephens for disability within the meaning of 
section 31725. 
“When interpreting statutes, ‘we follow the Legislature’s intent, as 
exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law . . . .  “This court has 
no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention 
 
 
10
which is not expressed.” ’ ”  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 53, 59.)  “Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable 
indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their 
usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context.  [Citation.]  If the 
plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we 
need not embark on judicial construction.  [Citations.]  If the statutory language 
contains no ambiguity, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and 
the plain meaning of the statute governs.”  (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
240, 244.)   
Applying these principles here requires us to discern the plain meaning of 
the word “dismissed” as used in section 31725.  To “dismiss” means to “send or 
remove from employment.”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 652.)  As 
used in connection with section 31725, “dismissed,” “terminated,” and “released” 
all share a common meaning.  Those terms describe a circumstance in which the 
employment relationship, at the employer’s election, has ended.  Because the 
relationship has ended, (1) the employer no longer has an obligation to pay salary 
or other forms of compensation, and (2) the employee has no basis for expectation 
that a position exists, will be kept open, or will be made available upon the 
employee’s offer to return to work.  Because section 31725 is concerned only with 
the consequences of “[p]ermanent incapacity for the performance of duty,” we can 
reasonably assume the statute addresses permanent, not merely temporary, 
absence from employment.  An employee who is temporarily absent from the 
workplace due to illness or vacation, where both employer and employee 
understand the employee will return to work when the reason for the leave ceases, 
would have no need to pursue a disability retirement before the board of 
retirement.   
 
 
11
In addition, a dismissal as contemplated by section 31725 requires an 
employer action that results in severance of the employment relationship.  An 
employee who is neither sent away nor removed, but voluntarily absents himself 
or herself from the job, without more, cannot validly claim he or she was 
“dismissed” by the employer.  An employee who is uncertain of his or her status 
or the existence of an employment relationship is entitled to seek clarification. 
Was Stephens dismissed from his job?  Plainly not.  The trial court found 
he injured himself on the job, took medical leave, and then returned to work 
subject to medical restrictions concerning the use of his right thumb.  His 
employer provided him with a modified light-duty position consistent with those 
restrictions.  Sergeant Lehner testified Stephens nevertheless complained that he 
was reinjuring his thumb even in this modified light duty, that she observed his 
thumb was in fact red and swollen, and that he told her his modified light duty was 
inconsistent with his medical restrictions.  Stephens admitted he told Sergeant 
Montoya that his thumb bothered him.  These express and implied factual 
determinations are supported by substantial evidence and are thus entitled to 
deference on appeal.  (Alvarez-Gasparin v. County of San Bernardino (2003) 106 
Cal.App.4th 183, 188.) 
Stephens’s complaints led Captain Perryman to send him the September 12, 
1997, letter that forms the crux of this case.  The critical portion of the letter 
provides:  “Because of your statements we believe that we will not be able to 
provide a modified work assignment at this time.  This letter is to confirm to you 
that you are not to return to work until further notice.  At such time as your 
condition improves and you are able to return to work with no restrictions, or 
improves to the point that you are able to perform the ‘light duty’ tasks required in 
Central Control without further complaint or injury, you will be expected to 
submit time sheets reflecting OFF DUTY/SICK/PERSONAL.  I understand you 
 
 
12
have an open job injury claim for this problem ([Lab. Code, §] 4850) that has yet 
to be resolved.  Until notified by Worker’s Compensation we will expect your time 
sheets to reflect use of your personal sick leave.”  (Italics added.)   
The letter thus directed Stephens to leave work temporarily until his 
medical condition improved and required him to report his absence from the 
workplace on his timesheets to reflect that he was either off duty or taking sick or 
personal leave.  As the trial court concluded:  “At no time was Mr. Stephens 
advised in this letter that he was dismissed from employment.”  This factual 
conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.  Captain Perryman testified that 
she did not intend the letter to be a termination of Stephens’s employment, that she 
anticipated he would return to the job when he had been rehabilitated to the point 
that he could perform the modified light duty tasks required in the central control 
room, and that he was never taken off the county’s payroll or had his accrued 
leave time paid off.  That the letter expressly instructed Stephens to use his sick 
leave while away from work is a clear indication it did not constitute a dismissal.  
Stephens himself testified he did not consider the letter a “termination” nor did he 
ever receive a formal notice of termination.  The county’s subsequent offer to 
bring him back in a different modified position is consistent with the view he had 
not been dismissed from employment.   
In concluding Stephens was dismissed, the Court of Appeal below reasoned 
that, although he was provided with modified light duty working in the housing 
unit control room, his employer insisted that he rotate into the central control 
room, where his duties would allegedly be physically inconsistent with his 
documented medical restrictions, thus placing Stephens in the untenable position 
of either accepting assignment to duties that would injure him or declining to do so 
and absenting himself from the job. 
 
 
13
We respectfully disagree.  The county assigned Stephens to perform 
modified light duty, and the trial court concluded that he “always had a doctor’s 
release to perform the modified duties” and his doctor “never changed his 
recommendation as to Mr. Stephens’ ability to perform this modified position.”  
Although Stephens testified the duties in the central control room were more 
strenuous because there was “more activity” and “[m]ore use of the hand,” and 
that he could perform the modified light duty in the housing unit control room but 
not in the central control room, the trial court was not obligated to accept these 
assertions in the face of other, contrary testimony.  For example, Captain 
Perryman testified:  “The primary difference between a person working in a 
control room of a housing unit and central control, would be who they dealt with 
and the request to open or close the door or to communicate over the intercom.  
[¶] In a housing unit, a large percentage of those transactions would have to do 
with inmates; and in central control you would deal exclusively with staff . . . .”  
Significantly, when asked whether the actual physical requirements of using your 
thumb to push buttons was “significantly different” from one assignment to the 
other, Captain Perryman answered: “No.”  As the parties presented conflicting 
evidence on this point, we defer to the trial court’s implicit factual determination 
as supported by substantial evidence.  
The Court of Appeal also criticized the trial court’s determination that 
Stephens could have returned to work anytime between 1997 and 2003 if he had 
chosen to do so, finding this an “illusory” option, as the September 12, 1997, letter 
premised Stephens’s return on his being able to work in the central control room 
“without further complaint or injury.”  But as we explained, ante, substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s factual determination that the physical demands 
of working in the central control room were no different than in the housing unit 
control room.  
 
 
14
In sum, we conclude that applying the plain meaning of section 31725 to 
the facts of this case supports the county’s position that it never dismissed 
Stephens from his job.  Our conclusion is consistent with the legislative intent 
underlying the statute, as demonstrated by its legislative history.  “According to 
the Report of the Assembly Committee on Public Employment and Retirement 
. . . , the purpose of amending the Retirement Act was to eliminate severe financial 
consequences to an employee resulting from inconsistent decisions between an 
employer and the Retirement Board as to whether a particular employee is 
incapacitated and unable to perform the duties of his position.  Prior to the 1970 
amendment of section 31725 [which added the statutory language at issue in this 
case], a local government employer could release an employee [under a local 
county rule] and the Retirement Board could deny the employee a disability 
pension on the ground he was not disabled.  The Assembly committee found that, 
‘As a result of such disputes, approximately one percent of the applicants for a 
disability retirement pension have found themselves in the position of having 
neither a job, nor a retirement income.’ 
“The committee concluded[:]  ‘Thus, to remedy this problem, which . . . is 
virtually a matter of life and death for the very few individuals involved each year, 
the Public Employees’ Retirement System should be given authority . . . to 
mandate reinstatement of an individual—upon a finding of a lack of disability—
but that the employing agency have the right of appeal to the courts.’ 
“The committee continued:  ‘Such a method provides a system which 
involves only two administrative or judicial proceedings instead of three,’ since 
the employee does not have to sue in court on a writ to secure an order to 
reemploy or an order to pay the disability allowance.”  (McGriff v. County of Los 
Angeles (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 394, 399-400 (McGriff).) 
 
 
15
In enacting section 31725, the Legislature was thus concerned that disputes 
between local governments and county retirement boards over whether an 
employee was disabled left such employees in limbo, having neither employment 
nor disability income.  The Legislature solved this problem by giving the 
retirement board the final word on whether an employee was disabled and 
providing that dismissed employees must be reinstated if the board found they 
were not disabled, while also giving local governments the right to take a judicial 
appeal of the board’s decision.  In this way, the Legislature ensured that county 
employees dismissed for disability would have either employment or disability 
income and not be left destitute.  (Alvarez-Gasparin v. County of San Bernardino, 
supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 187 [“The County cannot deny an employee both 
disability retirement and employment”].)  Nothing in this history suggests the 
Legislature intended the statutory reinstatement remedy to apply to employees 
who do not face this involuntary financial dilemma, that is, those who are not 
actually dismissed from their jobs.  Nor does this legislative history indicate the 
Legislature was concerned about employees who choose voluntarily to leave the 
county’s employ.  Neither type of employee faces the dilemma of losing a job due 
to a disability whose existence the board of retirement declines to acknowledge. 
Stephens falls outside the class of employees the Legislature intended to 
protect by enacting section 31725.  Captain Perryman, informed by Sergeant 
Lehner that Stephens was reinjuring his thumb even in the modified light duty to 
which he was assigned, instructed Stephens to leave work and take sick leave until 
his medical condition improved to the point where he could return without concern 
for reinjury.  Not only did Captain Perryman’s letter presuppose Stephens had the 
ability to return in the future but, by reporting his time off as sick leave, Stephens 
 
 
16
was not faced with the loss of income.  Stephens simply did not face the financial 
dilemma the Legislature intended to address in section 31725.6  
Although Stephens admits he “was not fired in the sense that his 
employment status was not terminated,” he contends case law has enlarged the 
meaning of “dismissed” to extend to situations lacking a formal termination or 
dismissal.  The Court of Appeal agreed, summarizing this legal authority thusly:  
“We begin by reiterating some principles gleaned from the earlier section 31725 
‘dismissal’ cases.  First, ‘dismissed’ does not mean the same thing as ‘terminated’ 
or ‘fired.’  An employee may be effectively dismissed if the county simply takes 
him or her off active duty (Leili[, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 985]), or the employee 
voluntarily places himself or herself on a disability leave (Hanna [v. Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Dept. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 887;] Tapia[, supra, 29 
Cal.App.4th 375;] Phillips [v. County of Fresno (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1240]).  
This is so even if the employee eventually returns to work because the disability is 
temporary (Raygoza [v. County of Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1240;] 
Phillips), because the employee has been retrained or rehabilitated, or because the 
employer is able to make the appropriate accommodations.  Moreover, an out-of-
work employee is no less ‘dismissed’ because the county has no position available 
compatible with the employee’s work restrictions (Hanna, Tapia, Raygoza, 
Phillips), or even because the employee is, or appears to be, disabled 
                                              
6  
Because Stephens claims the September 12, 1997, letter from Captain 
Perryman effectively dismissed him from his employment, this case, contrary to 
the Court of Appeal’s apparent view, does not pose a situation in which an 
employee chooses to absent himself from work, believing himself too disabled to 
work in the only position provided by the employer.  Although other remedies 
may apply in such a case, the remedy provided in section 31725 applies only when 
an employer dismisses an employee for disability. 
 
 
17
notwithstanding the retirement board’s contrary conclusion (Raygoza, Phillips).  
In short, the fact Stephens was never formally terminated is immaterial to our 
analysis.”  (Italics added.) 
Relying on this expansive interpretation of section 31725, Stephens 
maintains Captain Perryman’s September 12, 1997, letter effectively dismissed 
him.  As we explain, although we agree a qualifying dismissal within the meaning 
of section 31725 need not be accompanied by any particular formality, some form 
of a termination is nevertheless required.  To the extent Stephens and the Court of 
Appeal assert otherwise, they overstate the reach of prior judicial interpretations of 
section 31725. 
Stephens relies initially on two early cases, McGriff, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d 
394, and Leili, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 985.  In McGriff, the employee was 
“released” from her job “due to her medical incapacity” (McGriff, at p. 395) 
pursuant to a local county civil service rule.  The retirement board denied her 
application for a disability retirement because she was not permanently disabled, 
and the county denied her request for reinstatement.  The trial court ruled she was 
entitled to reinstatement as of the date she was released from her job and the 
appellate court affirmed, but without discussing whether a release due to medical 
incapacity constituted a dismissal within the meaning of section 31725.   
Leili is similar.  In that case, a county firefighter “was taken off active 
duty” (Leili, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 987) after he sustained back injuries, but 
denied a disability retirement when the county board of retirement found he was 
not disabled.  The Leili court ordered the firefighter reinstated pursuant to section 
31725.  Although the court did not discuss whether being “taken off active duty” 
was equivalent to being “dismissed,” it spoke in terms of the employee being 
“released” and “terminated.”  (Leili, at p. 988, describing McGriff, supra, 33 
Cal.App.3d 394.) 
 
 
18
As a later court explained, “Neither McGriff nor Leili directly addresses the 
meaning of the word ‘dismissed’ in the context of section 31725—both cases 
assume the employee had been dismissed.”  (Phillips v. County of Fresno, supra, 
225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1255 (Phillips).)  Indeed, from all that may be discerned 
from either court’s opinion, the employer’s action releasing or removing the 
employee from active duty in fact constituted a dismissal.  Both cases impliedly 
assume no formal dismissal from the job is necessary in order to activate section 
31725’s protections; an employer’s action that has the same effect will do.  
Neither case is inconsistent with our conclusion in the instant case that a dismissal 
(in some form) is required before section 31725 can apply. 
Raygoza v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1240, on which 
Stephens also relies, is inapposite.  Raygoza, a deputy marshal, suffered a 
documented injury to his psyche that precluded him from using a weapon.  His 
employer, the Marshal of the Municipal Courts of Los Angeles County, notified 
him that he was “relieved of duty (fired)” from his job.  (Id. at p. 1242, italics 
added.)  The dispute centered not on whether Raygoza was in fact dismissed, but 
on whether the marshal was required to reinstate him when no position compatible 
with his work restrictions was available.  
Stephens also relies on Phillips, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 1240, in which the 
employee, a deputy sheriff, voluntarily requested and received a medical leave of 
absence without pay.  (Id. at p. 1245.)  The county board of retirement denied his 
application for a disability retirement, as well as his petition for rehearing.  Two 
days later Phillips sought reinstatement.  The county refused, but the trial court 
directed it to reinstate him as of the day he sought to end his voluntary leave of 
absence.  (Id. at p. 1248.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, explaining that although 
“[i]t is undisputed the County never formally terminated Phillips nor did the 
sheriff formally remove him from active duty” (id. at p. 1254), section 31725 
 
 
19
applies to more than the narrow situation in which employment has been 
“expressly terminated by the employer” (Phillips, at p. 1255).   
Both Stephens and the Court of Appeal below mischaracterize the holding 
in Phillips and thus overstate its importance.  The appellate court below opined 
that Phillips held an employee may be “effectively dismissed” within the meaning 
of section 31725 if the employee voluntarily places himself or herself on disability 
leave.  Stephens similarly asserts that “Phillips expanded the application of 
§31725 to situations where the employee had initially voluntarily left work rather 
than to only situations where the employer had initiated the action to take the 
employee off work.”  But the holding in Phillips is not so broad. 
In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Phillips court signified it agreed the 
employee was entitled to reinstatement as of the date he sought reinstatement, as 
the trial court held, not as of the date he voluntarily took a medical leave without 
pay.  In other words, when Phillips requested and was granted a leave of absence, 
he neither quit nor was he dismissed; the county merely allowed him to absent 
himself from work.  Although, at his request, his absence was without pay, the 
agreement between himself and the county, characterized as a “leave,” reflected a 
mutual understanding that he intended, and would be allowed, to return.  It was 
when the county denied Phillips’s request to return to his job that it acted in a way 
that severed the employment relationship.  Phillips does not hold that an 
employee’s voluntary decision to take leave time is the equivalent under section 
31725 of being dismissed for disability.  It holds only that a failure to reinstate an 
employee, following a period of permissive, voluntary leave, can constitute a 
“dismissal” despite the absence of a formal termination or firing.   
Thus understood, Phillips has no application to the instant case.  Whereas 
in Phillips the employee sought to return to his job after a period of voluntary 
medical leave and claimed he was “dismissed” as of the day his employer refused 
 
 
20
to reinstate him, Stephens never sought to return to his job between 1997 and 
2003, but claims he was “dismissed” as of the day following his receipt of Captain 
Perryman’s September 12, 1997, letter.  Because the county never refused to 
reinstate Stephens, but simply told him to take sick leave until his medical 
condition allowed him to perform the modified light duty recommended by his 
physician, Phillips is not inconsistent with our conclusion that the county never 
dismissed Stephens within the meaning of section 31725. 
To the extent Stephens claims two forms sent to him by AIGCS, Inc., the 
workers’ compensation claims administrator for the County of Tulare, effected his 
dismissal, we reject that claim as well.  At the threshold, that Stephens preserved 
this claim for appeal by raising it in the trial court is not clear.  Although he 
mentions the two insurance forms in his trial court pleadings, the thrust of his 
argument was focused on the September 12, 1997, letter from Captain Perryman.  
Nevertheless, assuming for argument the claim is properly before us, we reject it.  
Stephens maintains he was dismissed by two AIGCS forms he received; each had 
a box checked next to a statement indicating the county “Does not have a job 
available within your work restrictions.”  That an insurance company can serve as 
proxy for the employer, such that a simple checked box can “dismiss” an 
employee within the meaning of section 31725, seems doubtful.  In any event, the 
trial court ruled a position had always been available for Stephens were he willing 
to return to work in the central control room and implicitly found Stephens 
understood that, notwithstanding the AIGCS forms.  Substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s conclusion:  Stephens’s assignment to the central control room 
involved the same physical requirements as his modified light duty in the housing 
unit control room, those duties did not change and, when he returned to the job in 
2003, he operated under the exact same medical restrictions.  Stephens presented 
no evidence that, despite these facts, he nevertheless believed he had been 
 
 
21
dismissed by the two AIGCS forms.  The record thus supports the trial court’s 
ruling that the county in fact had a position available that accommodated 
Stephens’s then documented medical restrictions. 
In sum, although the phrase “dismissed . . . for disability,” as used in 
section 31725, has been interpreted to encompass employer actions that are 
functionally equivalent to terminating an employee, Stephens cites no authority, 
and we have found none, holding that an employer functionally or effectively 
terminates an employee by telling the employee to go out on sick leave until his or 
her medical condition abates sufficiently to enable return to the job.  As the court 
said in Alvarez-Gasparin v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at 
page 188:  “There is simply no showing that plaintiff was dismissed, expressly or 
impliedly.”  Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Captain Perryman’s 
September 12, 1997, letter did not dismiss Stephens from his employment and that 
the protections of section 31725 were never triggered. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded 
to that court with directions to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petition 
for writ of mandate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Stephens v. County of Tulare 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 123 Cal.App.4th 964 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S129794 
Date Filed: May 25, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tulare 
Judge: Patrick J. O’Hara 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Thomas J. Tusan for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, Ron Rezac, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Crystal E. 
Sullivan, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel (Tulare) and James G. Line, Deputy County Counsel, for Tulare 
County Employees’ Retirement Association as Amicus Curie on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel (Los Angeles) and  Stephen R. Morris, Principal Deputy County 
Counsel, for California State Association of Counties and the California League of Cities as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas J. Tusan 
1233 West Shaw Ave., Suite 100 
Fresno, CA  93711 
(559) 225-2510 
 
Crystal E. Sullivan 
Deputy County Counsel 
2900 West Burrel 
County Civic Center 
Visalia, CA  93291 
(559) 795-0972 
 
Stephen R. Morris 
Principal Deputy County Counsel 
648 K.H. Hall of Administration 
500 West Temple Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90012-2713 
(213) 974-1957