Title: Petro-LubricantTesting Laboratories, Inc. v. Adelman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2018

Petro-LubricantTesting Laboratories, Inc. v. Adelman Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Asher Adelman established eBossWatch.com, which published an article, “'Bizarre’ and hostile work environment leads to lawsuit.” The article detailed a gender-discrimination, workplace-harassment, and retaliation lawsuit brought against Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc., and its chief executive officer and co-owner, John Wintermute (collectively Wintermute), by a former employee, Kristen Laforgia. More than a year after the article’s publication, Wintermute’s attorney sent a letter to Adelman, contending that the article was false and defamatory, Laforgia’s complaint was baseless, and that Laforgia and Wintermute had settled the lawsuit. In an email response, Adelman defended the article, stating that it was a reporting of Laforgia’s complaint, with a few modifications that, by Adelman’s opinion, made clear the article reported on what was filed in Laforgia’s complaint. Wintermute still filed a defamation action. The trial court found the modified article fell within the ambit of the fair report privilege and dismissed the defamation lawsuit. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court, holding that under the single publication rule, a new statute of limitations began to run only “if a modification to an Internet post materially and substantially alters the content and substance of the article.” The panel reasoned that “if a minor modification diminishes the defamatory sting of an article, it should not trigger a new statute of limitations.” The panel therefore dismissed as untimely Wintermute’s defamation lawsuit filed more than one year following publication of the original article. The panel did not decide whether the fair report privilege barred the action. The Court granted Wintermute’s petition for certification. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined genuine issues of disputed fact remained concerning whether Adelman made a material and substantive change to the original article, and the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the defamation action based on the single publication rule. However, the Court found the modified article was entitled to the protection of the fair report privilege. The article was a full, fair, and accurate recitation of a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed the defamation action, and on that basis the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. Asher Adelman (A-39-16) (078597)Argued November 6, 2017 -- Decided May 7, 2018ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. At issue in this case are two common law doctrines that protect speech from overreaching lawsuits: the single publication rule and the fair report privilege. Defendant Asher Adelman established eBossWatch.com. On August 3, 2010, the website published an article entitled “'Bizarre’ and hostile work environment leads to lawsuit.” The article details a gender- discrimination, workplace-harassment, and retaliation lawsuit brought against Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc., and its chief executive officer and co-owner, John Wintermute (collectively Wintermute), by a former employee, Kristen Laforgia. The article summarized and quoted portions of Laforgia’s complaint and described Wintermute as, among other things, “a violent bully, a racist, and a womanizer” who regularly used profanity and referred to women in the most vulgar and degrading language. Of particular significance to the present appeal, the article indicated that Wintermute “allegedly forced workers to listen to and read white supremacist materials.” More than one year later—on December 22, 2011—Wintermute’s attorney sent a letter to Adelman, contending that the article was false and defamatory, that Laforgia’s complaint was baseless, and that Laforgia and Wintermute had settled the lawsuit. In an email response, Adelman defended the article, stating that it was “clearly a reporting of [Laforgia’s] complaint.” Nevertheless, Adelman indicated that he “made some minor changes to the wording” of the article “to make it even more clear that [the] article is a factual reporting of [Laforgia’s] complaint.” Adelman provided a link to the modified article, which was posted in December 2011 but retained the original date of publication. A number of changes were made to the article, some seemingly minor. The most significant change for purposes of this appeal is the replacement of, “[Wintermute] also allegedly forced workers to listen to and read white supremacist materials,” with “John Wintermute also allegedly regularly subjected his employees to 'anti- religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic, anti-gay rants,’” quoting from Laforgia’s complaint. Wintermute filed the present defamation action. The trial court found that because of alterations to the original article, the single publication rule did not apply, and therefore the limitations period had not expired. Nevertheless, the court held that the modified article fell within the ambit of the fair report privilege and dismissed the defamation lawsuit. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the modified article constituted a second publication. 447 N.J. Super. 391, 400-01 (App. Div. 2016). The panel held that under the single publication rule, a new statute of limitations begins to run only “if a modification to an Internet post materially and substantially alters the content and substance of the article.” Id. at 400. The panel reasoned that “if a minor modification diminishes the defamatory sting of an article, it should not trigger a new statute of limitations.” Ibid. The panel therefore dismissed as untimely Wintermute’s defamation lawsuit filed more than one year following publication of the original article. Id. at 400-01. The panel did not decide whether the fair report privilege barred the action. The Court granted Wintermute’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 136 (2017).HELD: The single publication rule applies to an internet article. However, if a material and substantive change is made to the article’s defamatory content, then the modified article will constitute a republication, restarting the statute of limitations. In this case, there are genuine issues of disputed fact concerning whether Adelman made a material and substantive change to the original article, and the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the defamation action based on the single publication rule. However, the modified article is entitled to the protection of the fair report privilege. The article is a full, fair, and accurate recitation of a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed the defamation action, and on that basis the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment. 1 1. A defamation action must be filed within one year of the publication of an actionable writing or utterance.N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. Generally, every repetition of a defamatory writing gives rise to a separate cause of action under the multiple publication rule. To mitigate the harshness and unfairness of the inflexible application of the multiple publication rule, courts developed the “single publication rule.” Churchill v. State, 378 N.J. Super. 471, 479-80 (App. Div. 2005). Under the single publication rule, a speech or a single radio or television broadcast delivered to an audience of thousands of people or the issuance of the first edition of a newspaper or book gives rise to only one cause of action. The rule ensures that a defamation action is brought within one year of an initial defamatory publication. The single publication rule, however, has limits. The reprinting of an article in the next issue of a magazine or the delivery of the second edition of a book is deemed a republication—a second publication—giving rise to a new cause of action and the running of a new statute of limitations. Moreover, an article or book that is substantially modified from its initial release to its later issuance is also classified as a republication. (pp. 12-15)2. Whether in print or electronic media, republication triggers the start of a new statute of limitations. What constitutes republication in a website setting is the issue. In Churchill, the Appellate Division held that no principled reason justified “treating the Internet differently than other forms of mass media.” 378 N.J. Super. at 483. The Court agrees that the beneficent purpose of the single publication rule applies as strongly to the internet as it does to traditional media. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted legal constructs for determining when the defamatory content or substance of an internet article is sufficiently altered to constitute a republication. The Court distills the following principle from the relevant cases: a republication occurs to an online publication if an author makes a material and substantive change to the original defamatory article. A material change is one that relates to the defamatory content of the article at issue. A substantive change is one that alters the meaning of the original defamatory article or is essentially a new defamatory statement incorporated into the original article. (pp. 15-22)3. The Appellate Division erred in granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because a genuine issue of fact was in dispute concerning whether a republication occurred. It is one thing to write that Wintermute “forced workers to listen and read white supremacist materials” and another to write that he “regularly subjected his employees” to rants against people of the Jewish and Catholic faiths, minorities, and gay people. White supremacists do not necessarily have a monolithic and uniform belief structure. Reasonable people may disagree about the scope of a white supremacist’s belief system; reasonable people will not disagree about the meaning of anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and anti-gay rants. The change to the article was material—relating to the article’s defamatory content. At the very least, genuine issues of fact are in dispute about whether the modification to the original article was substantive—that is, whether it injected a wholly new defamatory statement into the article. The Court rejects the suggestion that Adelman’s purported intention to lessen the defamatory sting of the modified article somehow alters the assessment of whether the new defamatory material constitutes a republication and does not agree that the new defamatory material resulted in a “softening” of the original article. (pp. 22-26)4. The conclusion that Adelman is not entitled to summary judgment under the single publication rule does not mean he exposed himself to additional liability by modifying the article. The fair report privilege extends to a full, fair, and accurate report regarding a public document that marks the commencement of a judicial proceeding, including a civil complaint, regardless of the truth or falsity of the initial allegations and defenses because citizens have a right to know what has been filed in court and how the judicial system responds to it. Any reasonable person reading the modified article would understand that it was reporting on facts alleged in a civil complaint. The modified article is a full, fair, and accurate account of a court-filed complaint alleging gender discrimination, workplace harassment, and retaliation and is protected by the fair report privilege. (pp. 26-30) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED. JUSTICE SOLOMON, CONCURRING, expresses the view that the newest version of Adelman’s blog post did not constitute a republication as a matter of law and that plaintiffs’ claim is thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. According to Justice Solomon, the majority’s determination that “white supremacist materials” are distinct from materials that are “anti-religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic, anti-gay” is contrary to common parlance, and any changes to the article were not substantive. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a concurring opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE TIMPONE join. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 39 September Term 2016 078597PETRO-LUBRICANT TESTING LABORATORIES, INC., and JOHN WINTERMUTE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.ASHER ADELMAN, d/b/a/ eBossWatch.com, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 6, 2017 – Decided May 7, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 447 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2016). James T. Prusinowski argued the cause for appellants (Trimboli & Prusinowski, attorneys; James T. Prusinowski, and Mark G. Clark, of the Michigan bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the briefs, and Stephen E. Trimboli, on the briefs). Garen Meguerian argued the cause for respondent (Garen Meguerian, on the brief). Eugene Volokh (First Amendment Clinic) of the California bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for amicus curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (Hartman & Winnicki; and the First Amendment Clinic, attorneys; Daniel L. Schmutter and Eugene Volokh, on the brief). CJ Griffin argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, and the 1 American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; CJ Griffin, on the brief, and Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero, Alexander R. Shalom, of counsel and on the brief). Thomas J. Cafferty argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Press Association (Gibbons, attorneys; Thomas J. Cafferty, of counsel and on the brief, and Nomi I. Lowy and Lauren James-Weir, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Defamation law balances two competing interests -- anindividual’s right to protect his reputation from unjustifiedand false aspersions and our citizens’ right to free expressionand robust debate in our democratic society. Because aninformed public is a prerequisite to a functioning democracy,our common law provides special safeguards to protect speechfrom unwarranted attacks through the legal process. At issue inthis case are two common law doctrines that protect speech fromoverreaching lawsuits: the single publication rule and the fairreport privilege. Generally, the single publication rule bars the resettingof the one-year statute of limitations governing a defamationaction when multiple copies of a printed article are widelydistributed and read. In this appeal, we must determine how thesingle publication rule applies to an article posted on awebsite and what changes to an article’s content constitute a 2 republication that triggers the running of a new statute oflimitations. Plaintiffs Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc., andits chief executive officer and co-owner, John Wintermute(collectively Wintermute), filed an action against defendantAsher Adelman alleging defamation per se, defamation, falselight publicity, and intentional infliction of emotionaldistress. Adelman ran a website named “eBossWatch.com” thatpublished a list of “America’s Worst Bosses.” The websiteposted an article recounting allegations in a civil complaintthat Wintermute engaged in highly offensive workplace conductand ranked Wintermute thirty-ninth on the worst-bosses list.After Wintermute complained about the article, Adelman modifiedit but not to Wintermute’s satisfaction. Wintermute’s lawsuitwas filed within one year of the modified article’s publicationbut outside the limitations period for the original article. The trial court denied Adelman’s summary judgment motion onstatute-of-limitations grounds, finding that the singlepublication rule did not apply because the changes made to theoriginal article constituted a second publication. Thedefamation action therefore was not time-barred. Nevertheless,the court granted summary judgment in favor of Adelman based onthe fair report privilege because the modified article was afull, fair, and accurate report of a lawsuit filed against 3 Wintermute. On that basis, the defamation lawsuit wasdismissed. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’ssingle-publication-rule analysis, concluding that the minormodifications to the second article did not transform thearticle into a second publication. Accordingly, the AppellateDivision determined that the statute of limitations began to runwhen the original article was published and dismissedWintermute’s action as untimely. We now hold that the single publication rule applies to aninternet article. However, if a material and substantive changeis made to the article’s defamatory content, then the modifiedarticle will constitute a republication, restarting the statuteof limitations. In the record before us, there are genuineissues of disputed fact concerning whether Adelman made amaterial and substantive change to the original article. Wetherefore conclude that the Appellate Division erred indismissing the defamation action based on the single publicationrule at the summary judgment stage. We concur, however, with the trial court that the modifiedarticle is entitled to the protection of the fair reportprivilege. The article is a full, fair, and accurate recitationof a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed 4 the defamation action, and on that basis we affirm the AppellateDivision’s judgment. I. A. In addressing this appeal, we rely on the facts adduced inthe summary judgment record. Adelman established eBossWatch.com to provide job seekerswith information about the work environment in certain companiesand organizations. The website publishes an annual “America’sWorst Bosses” list -- a list compiled by “workplace experts”based on a methodology created by Adelman. On August 3, 2010, the website published an article,drafted by an eBossWatch.com volunteer and edited by Adelman,entitled “'Bizarre’ and hostile work environment leads tolawsuit.” The article details a gender-discrimination,workplace-harassment, and retaliation lawsuit brought againstWintermute by a former employee, Kristin Laforgia. The 2010edition of “America’s Worst Bosses” -- published on December 15,2010 -- ranked John Wintermute as number thirty-nine on the listof the one-hundred worst bosses. A hyperlink attached toWintermute’s name brought readers to the article. The article summarized and quoted portions of Laforgia’seleven-page complaint. We recite only parts of the articlehere. The article described Wintermute as, among other things, 5 “a violent bully, a racist, and a womanizer” who regularly usedprofanity and referred to women in the most vulgar and degradinglanguage. The article also described Wintermute as having “anexplosive temper when drunk,” and stated that he “had orattempted to have affairs with several of Petro[-Lubricant]’sfemale employees” and “threatened to kill [one female employee]when she ended their relationship.” Additionally, the articlerepeated Laforgia’s allegation that she was fired because sherefused to lie for the company when a retaliation lawsuit wasbrought by a former female employee. Of particular significanceto the present appeal, the article indicated that Wintermute“allegedly forced workers to listen to and read whitesupremacist materials.” More than one year later -- on December 22, 2011 --Wintermute’s attorney sent a letter to Adelman, contending thatthe article was false and defamatory, that Laforgia’s complaintwas baseless, and that Laforgia and Wintermute had settled thelawsuit. The letter demanded the removal of Wintermute’s namefrom the worst-bosses list and the article from the website andthreatened legal action if Adelman did not comply. In an email response, Adelman defended the article, statingthat it contained no factual misstatements and was “clearly areporting of [Laforgia’s] complaint.” Adelman, moreover,asserted that ranking Wintermute on the list of the one-hundred 6 worst bosses was clearly an expression of opinion protected bythe First Amendment. Nevertheless, Adelman indicated that he“made some minor changes to the wording” of the article and itstitle “to make it even more clear that [the] article is afactual reporting of [Laforgia’s] complaint.” Adelman provided a link to the modified article, entitled“Hostile Work Environment Lawsuit Filed Against Petro-LubricantTesting Laboratories,” which was posted in December 2011.1 Themodified article retained the original date of the article’spublication. A number of changes were made to the article, someseemingly minor. In addition to altering the article’s title,Adelman removed a photograph of Petro-Lubricant’s sign from thearticle and changed some wording in the body of the article.For example, while the original article stated that Laforgiaclaimed Wintermute is “a violent, raging drunk,” the modifiedarticle stated that Laforgia claimed he is “a 'dangerous andviolent alcoholic.’” The most significant change for purposes of this appeal isthe replacement of, “[Wintermute] also allegedly forced workersto listen to and read white supremacist materials,” with “JohnWintermute also allegedly regularly subjected his employees to1 The exact date of the publication of the modified article is unknown but likely occurred on or about December 22, 2011. 7 'anti-religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic,anti-gay rants,’” quoting from Laforgia’s complaint. Adelman continued to rank Wintermute as number thirty-nineon eBossWatch.com’s worst-bosses list, and a hyperlink to hisname connected readers to the modified article. B. Unsatisfied with Adelman’s response, plaintiffs filed thepresent defamation action. Adelman moved for summary judgment,contending that the statute of limitations and fair reportprivilege barred the lawsuit. Ultimately, the trial courtconcluded that the defamation claims relating to the publicationof the original article and the worst-bosses list were time-barred. The court came to a different conclusion concerning themodified article. The court found that because of alterationsto the original article, the single publication rule did notapply, and therefore the limitations period had not expired onthe modified article. Nevertheless, in the end, the court heldthat the modified article fell within the ambit of the fairreport privilege and dismissed the defamation lawsuit.2 C. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’sfinding that the modified article constituted a second2 We do not recite those portions of the procedural history not germane to the appeal before us. 8 publication. Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman,447 N.J. Super. 391, 400-01 (App. Div. 2016). The panel heldthat under the single publication rule, a new statute oflimitations begins to run only “if a modification to an Internetpost materially and substantially alters the content andsubstance of the article.” Id. at 400. The panel determinedthat the modified article was “intended . . . to diminish thedefamatory sting” of the original article after Adelman receivedthe attorney’s letter threatening a lawsuit. Ibid. It reasonedthat “if a minor modification diminishes the defamatory sting ofan article, it should not trigger a new statute of limitations.”Ibid. According to the panel, the only “substantive difference”between the original article -- “Wintermute requir[ed] hisemployees to listen to and read white supremacist materials” --and the modified article -- “Wintermute subjected his employeesto 'anti-religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholicand anti-gay rants’” -- was “immaterial.” Id. at 399-400. Fromthe panel’s perspective, “[t]he allegedly defamatory informationis the same in both articles.” Id. at 400. Because, in itsview, the modified article did not represent a secondpublication, the single publication rule applied, and the one-year statute of limitations commenced when the original articlewas published in August 2010. Ibid. The panel therefore 9 dismissed as untimely Wintermute’s defamation lawsuit filed inJune 2012, more than one year following publication of theoriginal article. Id. at 400-01. The panel did not decide whether the fair report privilegebarred the defamation action, as the trial court had concluded. We granted Wintermute’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 136 (2017). We also granted the motions filed by theAmerican Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ), the NewJersey Press Association, and the Reporters Committee forFreedom of the Press to participate as amici curiae. II. A. Wintermute does not dispute that the single publicationrule applies to internet postings. He urges this Court,however, to reject the Appellate Division’s standard fordetermining when an internet article constitutes a republicationtriggering the running of a new statute of limitations.Wintermute argues that a republication occurs when modificationsare made or material is added to a defamatory posting or whenthe modified posting is circulated to attract a new audience.He also contends that a modified article does not lose itsstatus as a second publication merely because the author intendsto soften the defamatory impact or make the article “less”defamatory. Wintermute concludes that the changes made to the 10 article as a whole, whether judged by the Appellate Division’sor his proposed standard, constituted a republication.3 B. Adelman submits that the Appellate Division applied thecorrect standard in finding that, under the single publicationrule, the minor modifications to the article did not transformit into a second publication restarting the statute oflimitations. He therefore asserts that Wintermute’s defamationaction is time-barred. Amici curiae ACLU-NJ, the New Jersey Press Association, andthe Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press maintain that arepublication occurs only if the modifications to an internetarticle are material and substantial and the modified article isintended to reach a new audience. They note that if themodified article is qualitatively the same as the originalarticle, then the single publication rule applies. Amici alsoassert that changes to an article that soften its defamatorycontent should not be the basis for restarting a limitationsperiod because publishers should not be punished for takingremedial measures. The Press Association argues that thedefinition of material modifications to an article, for3 Although the Appellate Division’s opinion does not address the fair report privilege, Wintermute argued before the panel that the privilege could not be invoked because Adelman failed to inform the reader that the Laforgia lawsuit had settled. 11 republication purposes, are those “that result in a morenegative view of [a complainant] in the mind of the reader thanwas created by the original version of the publication.” Inthat vein, the ACLU-NJ contends that the term “whitesupremacist” is “widely understood to include animus based onrace, religion, and sexual orientation,” and therefore noqualitative difference exists between the original and modifiedarticles. Finally, amici state that because the source materialfor the modified article is a court-filed civil complaint, thearticle is protected by the fair report privilege. III. A. We must decide when modifications to an allegedlydefamatory internet article sufficiently alter the defamatorymeaning of the article to render it a republication, triggeringa new statute of limitations. The standard for determining whatconstitutes a republication is an issue of law that we review denovo. In setting that standard, we owe no deference to theinterpretative conclusions reached by the trial court andAppellate Division. See Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507,512-13 (2009). B. A defamation action must be filed within one year of thepublication of an actionable writing or utterance. N.J.S.A. 12 2A:14-3. Generally, every repetition of a defamatory writing orutterance gives rise to a separate cause of action under themultiple publication rule. Churchill v. State, 378 N.J. Super. 471, 479 (App. Div. 2005); Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 378-79 (Law Div. 1974), aff’d o.b.,141 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1976), aff’d o.b., 74 N.J. 461(1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A(1) cmt. a (Am. LawInst. 1977) [hereinafter Restatement]; see also Salzano v. N.Jersey Media Grp. Inc., 201 N.J. 500, 512 (2010) (noting thatliability generally is imposed on “one who repeats orrepublishes the defamatory statements of another”). However,the application of this rule to mass publications would lead toan endless replication of legal actions and threaten a publisherwith boundless financial liability. Churchill, 378 N.J. Super.at 480 (citing Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463 , 465-66 (N.Y.2002)). To mitigate the harshness and unfairness of theinflexible application of the multiple publication rule, courtsdeveloped the “single publication rule.” Id. at 478-79;Restatement § 577A(2) cmt. b. Under the single publication rule, a speech or a singleradio or television broadcast delivered to an audience ofthousands of people or the issuance of the first edition of anewspaper or book gives rise to only one cause of action.Restatement § 577A(2) cmt. b, § 577A(3) cmt. c. The single 13 publication rule “protect[s] defendants and the courts from thenumerous suits which might be brought for the same words”carried through modern means of mass communication. Barres, 131 N.J. Super. at 385 (quoting Restatement § 577A(3) cmt. c). Therule ensures that a defamation action is brought within one yearof an initial defamatory publication. See In re Phila.Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 2012). The ruletherefore advances not only an express legislative policyfavoring a shortened statute of limitations period in defamationcases, but also judicial economy by funneling a plaintiff’smultiple damage claims into a single cause of action.Churchill, 378 N.J. Super. at 479. In short, the singlepublication rule gives speech the protection it needs fromvexatious and financially ruinous lawsuits that might stifle andinhibit the expression of ideas that inform and enlighten thepublic. The single publication rule, however, has limits. Thereprinting of an article in the next issue of a magazine or thedelivery of the second edition of a book is deemed arepublication -- a second publication -- giving rise to a newcause of action and the running of a new statute of limitations.Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d at 174; Restatement § 577A(3)cmt. d. Moreover, an article or book that is substantiallymodified from its initial release to its later issuance is also 14 classified as a republication. See, e.g., Cox Enters., Inc. v.Gilreath, 235 S.E.2d 633 , 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that“libelous statement differed in material respects in the variouseditions” and therefore “a cause of action must be afforded foreach edition of a newspaper”); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc.,422 N.Y.S.2d 552, 556 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (finding republicationbecause later-released book “had been substantially modified”from earlier version), aff’d, 420 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1981). IV. Our defamation law generally does not distinguish betweenactionable conduct in print or electronic form or give lesserprotection to speech in one medium or the other. See Too MuchMedia, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 234 (2011) (“The fact that[publications] appear on the Internet does not matter to theoutcome [of determining whether they deserve protection underNew Jersey’s Shield Law].”). Indeed, most jurisdictions applythe single publication rule to internet publications. SeeChurchill, 378 N.J. Super. at 479-83. Therefore, whether inprint or electronic media, “[r]epublication triggers the startof a new statute of limitations.” Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052 (D.N.D. 2006); Restatement § 577A(3) cmt.d. What constitutes republication in a website setting is theissue. 15 For this Court, defining the parameters of the singlepublication rule, particularly in the context of a websitepublication, is a matter of first impression. We therefore lookto other courts for guidance. In Churchill, the Appellate Division applied the singlepublication rule to online publications. 378 N.J. Super. at 478. There, the State Commission of Investigation (SCI) postedon its public website a report that the plaintiffs allegedimproperly impugned their integrity. Id. at 475. Theplaintiffs filed a defamation action against the SCI and itsagents more than a year after the report’s first appearance onthe website. Ibid. The Appellate Division rejected theplaintiffs’ arguments that the SCI repeatedly republished thereport by maintaining it continuously on the SCI website and byaltering the website’s homepage various times to draw moreattention to the report. Id. at 483-84. In applying the singlepublication rule, the Appellate Division held that no principledreason justified “treating the Internet differently than otherforms of mass media.” Id. at 483. It also concluded that thetechnical changes to the website’s homepage merely “altered themeans by which website visitors could access the report,” but inno way altered the report itself, and therefore did not cause arepublication. Id. at 483-84. 16 We agree that the beneficent purpose of the singlepublication rule applies as strongly to the internet as it doesto traditional media. Books, magazines, and movies remain inlibraries and homes, where they are continuously available tonew viewers for unlimited periods. Articles attached to awebsite stand in a similar position. Here we must determine when an internet article issufficiently altered that it becomes a republication giving riseto a new cause of action. In addressing the types ofmodifications to online articles that will not justify theprotection of the single publication rule, we first look togeneral principles of defamation law. Every defamation case involves an assessment of “whetherthe statement at issue is reasonably susceptible of a defamatorymeaning.” Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 765 (1989) (citing Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc.,116 N.J. 418, 424 (1989)). “A defamatory statement, generally,is one that subjects an individual to contempt or ridicule, onethat harms a person’s reputation by lowering the community’sestimation of him or by deterring others from wanting toassociate or deal with him.” Durando v. Nutley Sun, 209 N.J. 235, 248-49 (2012) (quoting G.D. v. Kenny, 205 N.J. 275, 293(2011)). Deciding whether a statement is defamatory requires anevaluation of “the fair and natural meaning” of the challenged 17 words through the perspective of a reasonable person. Romainev. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 290 (1988) (quoting Herrmann v.Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 431 (App. Div.1958)). The allegedly defamatory statements must be viewed inthe context of the whole publication. Ibid. Whether a modifiedarticle is a republication will depend -- in large part -- onwhether the altered article contains defamatory statements notexpressed in the original article. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted legal constructsfor determining when the defamatory content or substance of aninternet article is sufficiently altered to constitute arepublication. For example, in Davis v. Mitan (In re Davis),the United States District Court for the Western District ofKentucky held that “where substantive material is added to awebsite, and that material is related to defamatory materialthat is already posted, a republication has occurred.” 347 B.R. 607, 612 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (emphasis added). In that case, thedefendants filed for bankruptcy and blamed the plaintiffs fortheir financial troubles. Id. at 609-10. The defendantscreated a website, described by the bankruptcy court as a“scandal sheet,” which suggested that the plaintiffs were “conartists.” Id. at 610. The claims in the plaintiffs’ initialdefamation action were filed beyond the one-year statute oflimitations and dismissed. Ibid. Afterwards, the defendants 18 updated their website, listing “additional nefarious activities”in which the plaintiffs allegedly engaged. Ibid. Theplaintiffs then filed a new defamation action. Ibid. TheDistrict Court declined to dismiss the second action on statuteof limitations grounds, finding that the new defamatoryinformation was substantive in nature and constituted arepublication. Id. at 612. Similarly, in Larue v. Brown, the Court of Appeals ofArizona held that republication occurs on a website when an“update or modification [of an internet publication] affects thesubstance of the allegedly defamatory material.” 333 P.3d 767,772 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). In Larue, the statute of limitationshad expired on the original defamatory internet articles. Ibid.However, the defendants’ responses to readers’ comments --posted directly below the original articles -- not only repeatedthe earlier defamatory allegations, but “also added to andaltered the substance of the original material.” Id. at 773.The Arizona appellate court concluded that the defendants’responses to its website’s readers constituted a republicationand therefore the defamation suit was brought within thelimitations period. Ibid.; see also Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that statement on website isrepublished when “the statement itself is substantively alteredor added to, or the website is directed to a new audience”). 19 In contrast, the addition of new material to a websiteunrelated to an earlier allegedly defamatory report posted onthe site will not reset the statute of limitations. SeeChurchill, 378 N.J. Super. at 478. The New York Court ofAppeals made this point in Firth. 775 N.E 2d at 466. In Firth,the State Inspector General issued a report that the claimantalleged was defamatory. Id. at 464. More than a year after thereport was posted on a government website, the claimant broughta defamation action against the state. Ibid. The Court ofAppeals held that the Inspector General’s posting of anunrelated report on the same government website did not count asa republication of the earlier report about the claimant. Id.at 466. The Court of Appeals noted that “it is not reasonablyinferable that the addition [of unrelated material on a website]was made either with the intent or the result of communicatingthe earlier and separate defamatory information to a newaudience.” Ibid.; see also Atkinson, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55(updating list of names and addresses of Board of Directors wasunrelated to defamatory content and not republication because it“did not materially or substantially alter the substance orcontent”). These cases illustrate that not every alteration to awebsite will restart the statute of limitations period on adefamation claim. Technical website changes and alterations 20 unrelated to the substance of the allegedly defamatory contentin the article do not constitute republication. We do notsuggest that changes to a website intended to pitch an articleto an entirely new audience may not constitute a republication.That issue is not before us. In this case, our focus must be on changes to the contentor substance of the article itself in determining whether arepublication has occurred. We distill the following principlefrom the cases that we have discussed: a republication occursto an online publication if an author makes a material andsubstantive change to the original defamatory article. A material change is one that relates to the defamatorycontent of the article at issue. See Black’s Law Dictionary 638(9th ed. 2009) (defining “material evidence” as “[e]videncehaving some logical connection with the facts of consequence orthe issues”). A material change is not a technical websitemodification or the posting on the website of another articlewith no connection to the original defamatory article. A substantive change is one that alters the meaning of theoriginal defamatory article or is essentially a new defamatorystatement incorporated into the original article. See Webster’sThird New International Dictionary 2280 (1981) (defining“substantive” as “having the character of an independent self-subsistent . . . thing: . . . not derivative or dependent”). A 21 substantive change is not the mere reconfiguring of sentences orsubstitution of words that are not susceptible of conveying anew defamatory meaning to the article. V. Given that standard, we must determine whether theAppellate Division properly entered summary judgment in favor ofAdelman on the basis of the single publication rule. Indeciding that issue, “we apply the same standard governing thetrial court -- we view the evidence in the light most favorableto the non-moving party.” Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad,210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012). Our function is not “to weigh theevidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determinewhether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Brill v. GuardianLife Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting Andersonv. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 249 (1986)). Only “whenthe evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as amatter of law’” should a court enter summary judgment. Ibid.(quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). We find that the Appellate Division erred in grantingsummary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because agenuine issue of fact was in dispute concerning whether arepublication occurred. The issue is whether the changes to the defamatory contentof the original article were material and substantive, thus 22 rendering the modified article a republication. Most of thechanges to the article were minor in nature, such as replacingthe article’s title and the photograph at the top of the page.For instance, we see no substantive distinction between thearticle’s description of Wintermute as “a violent, raging drunk”in the original article, and as “a 'dangerous and violentalcoholic’” in the modified article. Those changes did notconstitute a republication. We come to a different conclusion, however, concerning themodified article’s allegations that Wintermute expressed animustoward specific groups based on religion, ethnicity, and sexualorientation. The original article stated that “[Wintermute]also allegedly forced workers to listen to and read whitesupremacist materials.” The modified article deleted thatallegation and replaced it with the following: “John Wintermutealso allegedly regularly subjected his employees to 'anti-religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic, anti-gayrants.’” The differences here are not technical or semantic. Bothallegations -- imputing to him white supremacist views andimputing to him a specific animus toward people based on theirreligious denominations and sexual orientations -- clearly aredefamatory by impugning Wintermute’s character. But it is onething to write that Wintermute “forced workers to listen and 23 read white supremacist materials” and another to write that he“regularly subjected his employees” to rants against people ofthe Jewish and Catholic faiths, minorities, and gay people. White supremacists do not necessarily have a monolithic anduniform belief structure. See Alejandro Beutel, Nat’lConsortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses toTerrorism, Key Concepts to Understand Violent White Supremacy 1-3 (Apr. 2017) [hereinafter Beutel, Key Concepts to WhiteSupremacy]. Although white supremacist groups share “the samegeneral belief that Whites are superior to other races,” they“also have major ideological differences.” Id. at 1-2; see ChipBerlet & Stanislav Vysotsky, Overview of White SupremacistGroups, 34 J. Pol. & Mil. Soc. 11, 11 (2006) [hereinafter Berlet& Vysotsky]. Although some white supremacists may hold “anti-religious” views, many others root their beliefs in theirreligious faith. See Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 , 1015 (E.D. Wis. 2002); People v. Lindberg, 190 P.3d 664, 694 (Cal. 2008); see also Joe R. Feagin et al, WhiteRacism 106-07 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that one important whitesupremacist group is “the Christian Identity movement, areligious denomination whose members believe that God’s chosenpeople are white Anglo-Saxon Protestants”). While most whitesupremacists hold “anti-Jewish” beliefs, some do not. SeeBeutel, Key Concepts to White Supremacy at 2. And though most 24 white supremacists hold “anti-gay” beliefs, not all do. SeeBerlet & Vysotsky at 14 n.1; Walter M. Hudson, Racial Extremismin the Army, 159 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 11 n.45 (1999).4 A reasonable person might not believe that all whitesupremacists hold anti-religious or anti-gay views. However, aCatholic, a Jew, a minority, and a gay person will almostcertainly take offense when they are the specific target of ahateful rant. Reasonable people may disagree about the scope ofa white supremacist’s belief system; reasonable people will notdisagree about the meaning of anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, andanti-gay rants. Clearly, the change to the article was material -- relatingto the article’s defamatory content. At the very least, genuineissues of fact are in dispute about whether the modification tothe original article was substantive -- that is, whether itinjected a wholly new defamatory statement into the article.The analysis is no different merely because the original articlealready had defamatory statements. See Davis, 347 B.R. at 612;Larue, 333 P.3d at 773.4 The concurrence refers to white supremacists and members of the Ku Klux Klan interchangeably. See post at ___ (slip op. at 4). However, although all members of the Ku Klux Klan are white supremacists, not all white supremacists are members of the Ku Klux Klan. See Berlet & Vysotsky at 17. 25 We reject the Appellate Division’s suggestion thatAdelman’s purported intention to lessen the defamatory sting ofthe modified article somehow alters the assessment of whetherthe new defamatory material constitutes a republication. SeePetro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc., 447 N.J. Super. at 400.Good intentions, without more, do not diminish the impact thatdefamatory words have on undermining another’s reputation.5 Wealso do not agree with the Appellate Division’s suggestion thatthe new defamatory material resulted in a “softening” of theoriginal article. Our conclusion that Adelman is not entitled to summaryjudgment under the single publication rule does not mean thatAdelman exposed himself to additional liability by modifying thearticle. Adelman is not liable for taking the remedial measureof quoting directly from Laforgia’s complaint, a public documenton file with the New Jersey judiciary, because he is protectedby the fair report privilege. VI. A. The fair report privilege “protects the publication ofdefamatory matters that appear in a report of an official action5 Good intentions and remedial conduct may be factors in determining certain categories of damages. See N.J.S.A. 2A:43- 2; see also Bock v. Plainfield Courier-News, 45 N.J. Super. 302, 311 (App. Div. 1957). 26 or proceeding.” Salzano, 201 N.J. at 513. The privilege“extends to defamatory statements contained in filed pleadingsthat have not yet come before a judicial officer.” Id. at 519. The right of citizens to have transparency in governmentand court proceedings is one of the basic pillars undergirdingthe fair report privilege. See id. at 520 (“[T]he public has aright of access not only to our courts, but also to courtrecords.” (quoting Report of the New Jersey Supreme CourtSpecial Committee on Public Access to Court Records § 2.1.1(Nov. 29, 2007))). The privilege recognizes that “[m]embers ofthe public simply cannot attend every single court case andcannot oversee every single paper filing” and that protectionmust be given to those who “fairly and accurately” report “onevery aspect of the administration of justice, including thecomplaint and answer, without fear of having to defend adefamation case.” Ibid. Thus, the fair report privilege extends to “[a] full, fair,and accurate report regarding a public document that marks thecommencement of a judicial proceeding,” including a civilcomplaint alleging discrimination or retaliation. See id. at521-22 (applying fair report privilege to article written aboutbankruptcy complaint). The fair report privilege applies to areport of a court-filed complaint regardless of “the truth orfalsity of the initial allegations and defenses” because 27 citizens have a right to know what “has been filed in court andhow the judicial system responds to it.” Id. at 521. Even whena report is “not . . . exact in every immaterial detail,” theprivilege will apply provided that the account conveyed is“substantially correct.” Id. at 523 (quoting Costello v. OceanCty. Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 607 (1994)). Although the trial court squarely addressed the fair reportprivilege and dismissed the lawsuit on that ground, theAppellate Division did not reach that issue. The petition forcertification challenged only the Appellate Division’s dismissalof the lawsuit based on the single publication rule, not thetrial court’s dismissal based on the fair report privilege.Nevertheless, the fair report privilege was aired in theparties’ and amici’s Appellate Division and Supreme Court briefsand was thoroughly discussed during oral argument. We havereviewed the modified article and Laforgia’s complaint. Thereis no question that the article is substantially correct in itsrendition of the complaint. The statement alleging a specificanimus against certain groups is a direct quotation from thecomplaint. Allowing the lawsuit to proceed would be a needlesswaste of resources of the parties and the court system and wouldimpose an undue cost on speech that the fair report privilege isintended to protect. B. 28 The modified article is protected by the fair reportprivilege because the article is a full, fair, and accuratereport of Laforgia’s civil complaint filed in Superior Court,which alleged, at great length, gender discrimination, workplaceharassment, and retaliation. Adelman’s modified articleessentially recounted the allegations set forth in Laforgia’scomplaint. Laforgia’s complaint alleged, among other things, thatWintermute (1) “is a dangerous and violent alcoholic,” (2)“regularly uses profanity in the workplace and has referred tofemale employees” in offensive and derogatory terms, (3) “has anexplosive temper while drunk,” (4) “is an avowed atheist andwhite supremacist,” (5) “regularly subjects his employees toanti-religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic,anti-gay rants,” (6) “regularly listens to broadcasts from whitesupremacists and will turn up the broadcasts so loudly thatemployees are forced to hear it,” and (7) “hands out hate-filledwhite supremacist and atheist books and papers and requires hisemployees to read them.” Any reasonable person reading the modified article wouldunderstand that it was reporting on facts alleged in a civilcomplaint. Wintermute argues that Adelman should be stripped of theprivilege because the modified article failed to report that 29 Wintermute and Laforgia had settled the case. A settlement ofthe lawsuit, however, is not an adjudication of the truth orfalsity of a complaint’s allegations. The fair report privilegemay not protect a publication that only reprints the allegationsbut not the favorable verdict. Salzano, 201 N.J. at 524; seealso Hudak v. Times Publ’g Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 546, 576-77(W.D. Pa. 2008). A settlement, however, is different from afavorable verdict. A settlement generally “reflects ambiguouslyon the merits of the action” and is not a determination ofwhether the allegations are true or false. See McCubbrey v.Veninga, 39 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pender v.Radin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36 , 40 (Ct. App. 1994)). Here, the parties agreed that the terms of the settlementwould remain confidential, and therefore the settlement termswere not made available to the public. Nothing in the recordsuggests that the settlement, which resulted in a dismissal ofthe complaint, constituted a judgment on the merits or on thetruth or falsity of the allegations. In the mind of somereaders, reference to a settlement might even have suggested anadmission of fault. In short, we conclude that the modified article is a full,fair, and accurate account of a court-filed complaint alleginggender discrimination, workplace harassment, and retaliation andis protected by the fair report privilege. 30 VIII. In conclusion, the Appellate Division improperly enteredsummary judgment, dismissing Wintermute’s lawsuit based on thesingle publication rule. Genuine factual issues were in disputeconcerning whether the modified article constituted arepublication, restarting the statute of limitations. We also find that the trial court properly dismissedWintermute’s lawsuit based on the fair report privilege. Themodified article gave a full, fair, and accurate account of acourt-filed civil complaint. The judgment of the Appellate Division dismissingWintermute’s defamation action is affirmed as modified. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a concurring opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE TIMPONE join. 31 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 39 September Term 2016 078597PETRO-LUBRICANT TESTING LABORATORIES, INC., and JOHN WINTERMUTE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.ASHER ADELMAN, d/b/a eBossWatch.com, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE SOLOMON, concurring. I join with the majority’s affirmance, but disagree withits reasoning. I agree that Churchill v. State, 378 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div. 2005), applies to electronic forms of media. Ialso agree that the “article was entitled to the protection ofthe fair-report privilege.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 4). Iwrite separately to express my belief that the newest version ofAdelman’s blog post did not constitute a republication as amatter of law and that plaintiffs’ claim is thus barred by theone-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. I would,therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. SeePetro-Lubricant Testing Labs. v. Adelman, 447 N.J. Super. 391(App. Div. 2016). 1 I. As a starting point, I note that the majority has correctlydefined what constitutes a republication.1 Ante at ___ (slip op.at 21). Changes do not amount to republication unless there isa substantive or material alteration in the subsequentpublication. See Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1038,1055 (D.N.D. 2006). In the present case, the majoritydetermined that changes further delineating the term “whitesupremacist” were material. I disagree. In Atkinson, the court differentiated between immaterialmodifications and modifications amounting to a republication.Id. at 1054. Changes are immaterial if they are “unrelated tothe defamatory material,” ibid. (citing Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463 , 466 (N.Y. 2002)), or are “mere[] technical” changesthat modify the way in which information on the website isaccessed, ibid. (citing Churchill, 378 N.J. Super. at 482-83).The majority acknowledges that a republication occurs “wheresubstantive material is added to a website, and that material isrelated to defamatory material that is already posted.” Davisv. Mitan (In re Davis), 347 B.R. 607, 612 (W.D. Ky. 2006)1 I posit that whether the author sought a new audience is a consideration, but is not determinative as to whether a republication occurred. Nevertheless, as the majority acknowledged, that issue is not before this Court. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 21). 2 (emphasis added) (determining that “new material” added to thedefendant’s website “contained substantive information relatedto [the plaintiff] and, by reference, to [his] family” andtherefore constituted a republication); see also Larue v. Brown,333 P.3d 767, 773 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (finding republicationwhere defendant responded to readers’ comments directly beloworiginal article and the responses “added to and altered thesubstance of the original material by providing additionalinformation in response to a reader’s questions, and re-urgingthe truth of the original articles”). Nevertheless, themajority determined that the term “white supremacist materials”designates materials distinct from those that are “anti-religion, anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic, anti-gay.” II. The majority’s determination that “white supremacistmaterials” are distinct from materials that are “anti-religion,anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic, anti-gay” iscontrary to common parlance. The modifications specifying thekinds of rants that plaintiffs’ employees were subjected to dono more than further define “white supremacist” by setting forthits subsets. I do not agree with the majority that settingforth subsets of white supremacist views in Adelman’s later blog 3 post further defamed Wintermute. See ante at ___ (slip op. at24-25). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines a “white supremacist”as “a person who believes that the white race is inherentlysuperior to other races and that white people should havecontrol over people of other races.” White Supremacist,Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/white%20supremacist (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). While thistraditional definition has clear roots in our country’s history,the ideological underpinnings of the white supremacist movementhave “broadened.” See Nat’l Consortium for the Study ofTerrorism & Responses to Terrorism, Key Concepts to UnderstandViolent White Supremacy 1 (Apr. 2017). “[T]he [whitesupremacist] movement has broadened its focus to include otherethnic and religious groups, including Latinos, Asians, MiddleEasterners, Muslims, and Sikhs. They have also targetedindividuals of different sexual and gender identities, such asgay/lesbian and transgendered individuals.” Ibid.; see alsoCapitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 ,770 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In Klan ceremony, thecross is a symbol of white supremacy and a tool for theintimidation and harassment of racial minorities, Catholics,Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the Klan.”);United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1009, 1010 (7th Cir. 4 2012) (discussing postings by a white supremacist defendant ofthe personal information of a jury foreperson who convicted afellow white supremacist, including the following: “gay Jewish[Juror A], who has a gay black lover and ties to professionalantiracist groups”). Although an individual may not subscribeto the same exact views about each group targeted by whitesupremacists, the person’s identity and label as a whitesupremacist does not change. In short, the language inAdelman’s modification contains a widely held, well-supportedunderstanding of the term “white supremacy” -- “anti-religion,anti-minority, anti-Jewish, anti-[C]atholic, anti-gay.” III. The language relied upon by the majority to conclude thatAdelman’s modification is a republication is, in fact, anindistinguishable substitute. As such, I find no republicationbecause the modifications, with which the majority takes issue,did not add additional information to the original post, seeDavis, 347 B.R. at 612; Larue, 333 P.3d at 773, and did notsubstantively change its content as a matter of law, see Nesterv. O’Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997)(“Whether a term is clear or ambiguous is . . . a question oflaw.” (ellipsis in original) (quoting Kaufman v. Provident Life& Cas. Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 275 , 282 (D.N.J. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993))). 5 I therefore agree with the Appellate Division that anychanges to the article were not substantive. A finding that thesecond blogpost was not a republication matters because it endsthe case. Here, the majority is able to resort to the fair-report privilege. Without that, the majority’s fine parsing ofthe term “white supremacist” would result in a trial on themerits. That can have a chilling effect on the media indefamation suits where the privilege is not available. When, ashere, changes to a publication are not substantive and do notamount to a republication, a defamation claim should end withouta jury trial. Thus, I respectfully concur in the judgment ofthe majority. 6