Title: Com. v. Milton
Citation: 421 A.2d 1054, 491 Pa. 614
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 1980

491 Pa. 614 (1980) 421 A.2d 1054 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ronald Frank MILTON, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted September 24, 1980. Decided October 31, 1980. John A. Halley, Pittsburgh (Court-appointed), for appellant. *615 Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy Dist. Atty., Kathryn L. Simpson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ. FLAHERTY, Justice. Appellant, Ronald Frank Milton, was convicted of robbery and murder of the first degree in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. After denial of post-verdict motions, a direct appeal was taken to this Court whereupon the judgments of sentence were affirmed. 483 Pa. 9, 394 A.2d 512. Subsequently, a claim for post-conviction relief, based on an assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel, was denied and the present appeal ensued. The ineffectiveness of counsel claim is grounded upon a failure to preserve in post-trial motions an objection made at trial to the jury charge. The asserted defects in the charge are an incomplete definition of voluntary manslaughter and an improper expression of opinion by the judge with respect to the inappropriateness of a voluntary manslaughter verdict. The challenged portion of the charge is the following: *617 Appellant's brief relies on an excerpt from the charge, wherein the judge stated, "I don't want to go into what is `sufficient provocation,'" to infer that a full explanation was not given for the elements of voluntary manslaughter. Examination of the charge in its entirety, however, reveals that the elements of such crime were fully explained. Objection to expression of opinion as to the inappropriateness of a voluntary manslaughter conviction was likewise without merit[1] since 1) the jury was fully informed of its power to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, and 2) the jury was instructed that it was not bound by the court's opinion of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 470 Pa. 131, 367 A.2d 719 (1976); Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 362 A.2d 217 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 471 Pa. 419, 370 A.2d 373 (1977). Counsel's failure to pursue the patently meritless objection to the jury charge cannot constitute ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Hence, relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act was properly denied. Judgment of sentence affirmed. ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which O'BRIEN C.J., joins. ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. Trial counsel's exception to the jury charge was meritorious. Thus, counsel's failure to preserve this objection by post-verdict motion did not have a reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant's interest and constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Appellant's conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted. This Court has held that a jury charge may include a judge's statement of opinion that there is insufficient evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter charge only if *618 the evidence is, in fact, insufficient and two conditions are met: Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino, 485 Pa. 513, 518, 403 A.2d 82, 84 (1979) quoting Commonwealth v. Bennett, 471 Pa. 419, 427, 370 A.2d 373, 377 (1977). The first of these conditions was clearly not fulfilled. Indeed, the Commonwealth concedes in its brief, "the charge in the instant case . . . mirrors the instruction found to be in error in Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino, 485 Pa. 513, 403 A.2d 82 (1979)." In Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino we held that the jury charge "did not inform the jury that voluntary manslaughter could be returned whether or not the evidence would support that verdict." (Emphasis in original) (Footnote omitted). Id., 485 Pa. at 513, 403 A.2d at 84. This Court stated: Id., 485 Pa. at 513 n.5, 403 A.2d at 84 n.5. Here, the trial court charged in relevant part: Clearly the charge did not advise the jury of its right to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter no matter what facts the jury might find. Rather, the jury charge specifically stated that to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter the jury must find either (1) an unreasonable belief in the justification of the killing, or (2) passion and "sufficient provocation." Further, the court effectively removed consideration of these factors from the jury by commenting that it did not believe them to be present in the case, and by not clearly stating that the jury is the sole finder of fact. Although Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino, supra, and Commonwealth v. Bennett, supra, had not been decided at the time of appellant's trial, existing law clearly required that, upon request, a defendant charged with murder had the right to a proper charge of voluntary manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. *620 denied, 419 U.S. 1000, 95 S. Ct. 316, 42 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1974). Obviously, counsel may not defend a claim of ineffectiveness simply on the basis that a case presenting similar facts has not yet been decided. To permit such a defense would be to ignore counsel's role as an advocate in the judicial process. If a legal principle has been enunciated whose application has a reasonable possibility of advancing the client's interest, it is counsel's duty to raise a claim based upon that principle, unless there is reason to do otherwise. Manifestly, appellant's trial counsel is charged with knowledge of Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, which was decided fourteen months before the start of appellant's trial. Indeed, counsel's objection at trial to the jury charge indicates his recognition that there was merit in the challenge. Having raised a meritorious objection at trial, counsel clearly did not have any reasonable basis for abandoning the claim by failing to raise it in a post-trial motion and thereby preserve the issue for appeal. Judgment of sentence should be reversed and a new trial granted. O'BRIEN, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion. [1] Appellant does not argue that there was, in fact, evidence which would have supported a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.