Title: NGC Theatre Corporation v. Mummert
Citation: 107 Ariz. 484, 489 P.2d 823
Docket Number: 10341
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 1971

107 Ariz. 484 (1971) 489 P.2d 823 NGC THEATRE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. John MUMMERT, Sheriff of Maricopa County; and Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Appellees. No. 10341. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 20, 1971. Rehearing Denied November 16, 1971. *485 Brown &amp; Finn, by Michael J. Brown, Tucson, Stanley Fleishman, Hollywood, Cal., for appellant. Moise Berger, Maricopa County Atty., by Robert L. Storrs, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for appellees. CAMERON, Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the trial court holding that the film "I Am Curious (Yellow)" is obscene under the Arizona statutes § 13-531.01 and § 13-535 A.R.S. and granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the appellant, National General Corporation, from exhibiting the film within the State of Arizona. *486 We are called upon to decide: The film was exhibited for a period of approximately five weeks at the Vista Theater in Phoenix, Arizona. Thereupon it was seized pursuant to a search warrant and without prior adversary hearing. In a collateral action such procedure was set aside. Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 88 S. Ct. 2103, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1313 (1968). After petition and hearing on the petition, a full adversary hearing was set for 28 November 1969. After the hearing and after two viewings of the film by the trial judge, the judge found the film to be obscene, ruled that continued exhibition thereof constituted a public nuisance, granted a permanent injunction against exhibition thereof, and ordered the film impounded. DEFINITION Appellant first contends that the definition of obscenity in the Arizona statute is not consistent with the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court decisions decided thereunder. The statute in effect at the time of the prior adversary hearing was an almost literal reproduction of the ALI, Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) (Tent.Draft No. 6, 1957), and read as follows: The United States Supreme Court has stated: We have examined the definition and find it sufficient that an "ordinary person can intelligently choose in advance what course is lawful for him to pursue." We agree with the statement of the Arizona Court of Appeals: MOTION PICTURES § 13-535 A.R.S., wherein relevant, reads as follows: Appellant would have us apply the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine and exclude motion pictures from such treatment. We decline to do so. Exhibit reference is had to § 13-531.01. That section defines an obscene "item" as follows: We hold that the statute, § 13-535 A.R.S., embraces obscene motion pictures. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION APPLY? The protection offered by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to citizens in obscenity cases, has been poorly delineated, if indeed it has been delineated at all. We agree with Mr. Justice Harlan (in dissent) that, "no stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by this Court." A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" (Fanny Hill) v. Attorney General of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 455, 86 S. Ct. 975, 996, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1, 26 (1966). However indistinct the guidepost set by the United States Supreme Court may be, we must, nevertheless, attempt to determine whether the trial court was correct when it denied the protection of the First Amendment to the facts (and the film) in the instant case. Motion pictures are forms of expression within the meaning of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952). The standard to be used in determining whether the film is obscene is a federal constitutional standard under the United States Constitution: It is the standard that the United States Supreme Court under the United States Constitution has determined to be the national "contemporary community *488 standard" that must be applied by the states in determining whether to extend the protection of the First Amendment to a particular case. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court is the only court that can practically (and authoritatively) say what the national standard is to be. We are not then concerned with standards of other states or an average of the standards of other communities. The application of this federal constitutional (national) standard is a matter of law for the court: The trial court, then, must, as a matter of law and using the national standards as set down by the United States Supreme Court, determine if the defendant or the material in a particular case is protected by the First Amendment. This is usually done in the "prior adversary hearing" as required by the United States Supreme Court. Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965). We believe that the procedure followed in this case, wherein a "prior adversary hearing" was held, was correct. Even though the Arizona statutes do not require this proceeding, the United States Supreme Court cases most certainly do. Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra; Freedman v. Maryland, supra; City of Phoenix v. Fine, 4 Ariz. App. 303, 420 P.2d 26 (1966). The next question concerns the guidelines to be followed by the court in making this determination. We believe that under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the trial judge, when determining as a matter of law whether to apply the First Amendment protection in an obscenity action, is faced with four categories of cases. The first two categories are concerned primarily with the manner in which the material is handled by the defendant. The last two categories are concerned primarily with the nature of the material. In all categories we assume that the material is potentially, if not actually, obscene in its patently offensive appeal to prurient interest in sex. First is the situation wherein, by the manner in which the material is used, the defendant is protected by the First Amendment. The materials may be so-called "hard core pornography," but because of the use to which the defendant is putting them the First Amendment applies. Possession of obscene material and pornography for viewing or reading within one's home is, for example, protected by the First Amendment, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969), as would be a showing and distribution for bona fide scientific or educational use. The second category includes material which, though it may not be patently offensive or obscene, because of the actions of the seller or the defendant it is without First Amendment protection and its sale, distribution, showing or publication may be prohibited. An example of this category is Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S. Ct. 942, 16 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1966), wherein the material itself was not on its face obscene, but because of the pandering and the appeal to the viewer's prurient interest the defendant was denied First Amendment protection. It may well be that the sale or showing to minors will fall in this category. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S. Ct. 524, 1 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1957). It is the actions and intent of the defendant and not the material per se that makes him liable for his misconduct: Thirdly we have the type of case that gives us the most trouble and the greatest number of cases. These are the "redeeming social value" cases. This category does not include the so-called "hard core pornography," but does include material which by its nature standing isolated and alone would be considered obscene but is redeemable by the fact that it is not so patently offensive that the work taken as a whole does not have some modicum of social value or literary merit. It must be borne in mind that the test is "utterly without redeeming social value," and not "utterly without social value." The social value must be such as to redeem the whole work, and in the case of very offensive hard core works, this is usually an insurmountable task. There is, then, a class that social values cannot redeem. This is the fourth category; this is the so-called "hard core pornography" which is obscene on its face and is not protected by the First Amendment. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S. Ct. 958, 16 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966). We find it objectionable and illogical to hold, as the appellant suggests, that hard core pornography can be made publishable by interspacing it with items of alleged redeeming social value. We do not believe that the "redeeming social value test" can draw this type of material out of the cesspool of obscenity, to the protection of the First Amendment. See People v. Abronovitz, 62 Misc.2d 1069, 310 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1970); Miller v. Reddin, 293 F. Supp. 216 (C.D.Cal. 1968); City of Youngstown v. DeLoreto, 19 Ohio App.2d 267, 251 N.E.2d 491 (1969). These are the cases in which the court can say that "there [can] be no doubt that the film is obscene." Dunn v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 240 Md. 249, 255, 213 A.2d 751, 754 (1965); John P. Frank, 41 Washington Law Review, supra. The best definition of hard core pornography that we have read is as follows: The trial court in its order stated that "the Brennan `social value' doctrine in Fanny Hill is not a rule of law binding upon this court to the extent that I must consider it as a third independent test of obscenity without weighing it against the doctrine set forth in Roth [,] being the prurient interest and patent offensiveness tests." We have no difficulty in placing the film "I Am Curious (Yellow)" in the fourth category and holding that the trial court did not commit error in failing to consider the social value doctrine as a separate independent test in determining that the film was not protected by the First Amendment. IS "I AM CURIOUS (YELLOW)" OBSCENE? Having cleared the hurdle of the federal constitutional standards, we now reach the issue of obscenity vel non under the Arizona statute. "I Am Curious (Yellow)" is admittedly tame by many current standards. We candidly make this assertion notwithstanding its literal and explicit depictions of rape, fellatio, cunnilingus, suggested sodomy and various other lewd and lascivious acts. Whether this speaks highly of current general standards of acceptability, however, is not of concern to this court. We need only test the film against the definition of obscenity in the Arizona statute, § 13-531.01, subsec. 2 A.R.S., and we find that the trial court did not commit error as a trier of fact in determining that the film was obscene. Once the court, as a matter of law, has determined that the First Amendment protection does not apply, the trier of fact then may decide whether the material in question is obscene according to local standards and state law. The dominant theme of this film taken as a whole, upon the application of contemporary standards, appeals to a prurient interest in sex. It goes beyond the customary limits of description and representation of sexual matters in Arizona and is utterly without redeeming social importance. § 13-531.01, subsec. 2 A.R.S. We hold that the trial judge was correct in finding that it violated the Arizona statute defining obscenity. PROCEDURE The procedure followed by the trial court in holding the prior adversary hearing for purposes of determining if the protection of the First Amendment was to be applied to the case and also in determining whether the film was obscene under our statutes at the same hearing is not the procedure to be followed where there may be a jury involved, as in a violation of our criminal obscenity statutes. In that situation, after the prior adversary hearing out of the presence of the jury, the jury as trier of fact must still determine whether the material violates the state's obscenity statute. Where, however, the matter is tried before the court without a jury, as here, the court may decide both issues in a single hearing. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HAYS, V.C.J., and UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.