Title: Saichek v. Lupa
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93615, 93774
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2003

Docket Nos. 93615, 93774 cons.-Agenda 15-November 2002.
BARBARA SAICHEK, Appellee, v. MALGORZATA LUPA et 
 								al. (Malgorzata Lupa, Appellant).
Opinion filed March 20, 2003.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	The sole issue in this appeal is whether a plaintiff who has
brought an action against two defendants to recover damages for
a single, indivisible set of injuries arising from concurrent but
independent acts of negligence may continue with her claim
against the first of the defendants after being awarded and paid the
full amount of damages she proved following entry of a default
judgment in her favor against the second defendant. The circuit
court held that she could not and dismissed her claim against the
first defendant pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)). The appellate court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 329 Ill. App. 3d
1059. We granted the first defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the
judgment of the appellate court.
	The pertinent facts are not in dispute. In October of 1998,
plaintiff, Barbara Saichek, was the passenger in a taxicab operated
by Valentin N. Zdunkevich. While the cab was stopped and
waiting to make a turn at an intersection in the Village of
Northbrook, it was rear-ended by an automobile driven by
Margaret Lupa. As a result of the collision, plaintiff suffered
severe and permanent personal injuries. In addition, some of her
personal property was lost or damaged.
	Plaintiff subsequently filed a two-count complaint in the
circuit court of Cook County to recover damages from Lupa (count
I) and, "in the alternative," from Zdunkevich (count II) based on
their alleged negligence. Lupa answered the complaint and
participated in the litigation. Zdunkevich did not. After being
served with process, Zdunkevich failed to enter an appearance, file
pleadings or make any other response to plaintiff's complaint.(1)
Plaintiff therefore moved for entry of a default judgment against
him pursuant to section 2-1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2000)). That motion was granted. An
order of default was entered in favor of plaintiff and against
Zdunkevich, and Zdunkevich was duly notified of the default as
required by statute. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1302 (West 2000).
	Following entry of the default order, a "prove up" hearing was
held at which plaintiff presented testimony and documentary
evidence to substantiate the loss she had suffered. Based on that
evidence, the circuit court assessed plaintiff's damages at $40,792.
The court thereupon entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against Zdunkevich in that amount. It also awarded plaintiff her
costs.
	Once she obtained the default judgment against Zdunkevich,
plaintiff initiated nonwage garnishment proceedings against his
insurer, American Country Insurance Company (American
Country), in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/12-701 et seq. (West 2000).
American Country appeared and answered, indicating that it
provided insurance coverage for Zdunkevich and had no objection
to the garnishment. Based on American Country's stipulation, the
circuit court entered judgment against the company for
$43,681.73, representing the amount of plaintiff's judgment
against Zdunkevich in the underlying action plus costs and accrued
interest.
	American Country paid plaintiff the full amount due. At the
company's request, plaintiff, through her attorney, executed a
document entitled "Satisfaction Release of Judgment." The
document recited that "having received full satisfaction and
payment," plaintiff, by her attorney, was releasing the judgment
against "only *** Zdunkevich and American Country Insurance."
The document further recited that in accordance with section
12-183(h) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-183(h)
(West 2000)), the judgment in favor of plaintiff was vacated and
her cause of action dismissed, but "only as to *** Zdunkevich and
*** American Country Insurance Co." A parenthetical added that
the "cause remains pending as to defendant Malgorzata Lupa."(2)
	After that document was executed and filed, Lupa moved to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint against her pursuant to section 2-619
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)).
As grounds for her motion, Lupa argued that plaintiff had
sustained a single, indivisible set of injuries for which there was
a single, indivisible set of damages and that plaintiff was therefore
entitled to but one opportunity to prove what her damages were.
In Lupa's view, plaintiff could have deferred that opportunity until
after she had presented her case against Lupa. Instead, she elected
to substantiate her damages at the "prove up" hearing following
Zdunkevich's default. Based on the evidence plaintiff presented at
that hearing, the trial court determined that plaintiff's damages
amounted to $40,792 and entered judgment for her in that amount.
Plaintiff collected the judgment in full, plus interest and costs.
Lupa contended that the total amount of damages is not subject to
relitigation before a different trier of fact and that plaintiff has
therefore already received all that she would ever be entitled to
receive. Further litigation would accomplish nothing.
	The circuit court agreed. It distinguished this case from
situations involving the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740
ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)) where a plaintiff who has
settled with one defendant is allowed to proceed to trial against
one or more remaining defendants, subject to the nonsettling
defendants' right to a setoff for the amount of the settlement. Here,
there was no settlement. The amounts recovered by plaintiff were
the product of a judicial determination. The court held that once
plaintiff elected to obtain such a judicial determination, she could
not seek additional amounts in a subsequent proceeding. The
damage award assessed by the court at the "prove up" hearing
served as a cap on the total amount of damages plaintiff could
recover. Because plaintiff had accepted payment for the full
amount of the judgment, the court held, there was nothing left for
her to recover. No uncompensated injuries remained. Accordingly,
the court granted Lupa's motion and dismissed plaintiff's claim
against her.(3)
	 The appellate court reversed, relying on Holman v. Simborg,
152 Ill. App. 3d 453 (1987). In Holman, the plaintiff had filed a
two-count complaint to recover damages for injuries he sustained
while working on the roof of a building owned and managed by
defendants. Count I sounded in negligence. Count II asserted a
claim under the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48,
par. 60 et seq.) At trial, the court directed a verdict for defendants
on the Structural Work Act claim. The negligence count, however,
proceeded to trial before a jury. The jury found in favor of plaintiff
and against defendants on that count. It assessed plaintiff's
damages at $116,371, but found that he was 65% at fault and
reduced his damages by a corresponding amount to $40,730.
	The appellate court subsequently reversed the directed verdict
and remanded for a new trial on the Structural Work Act claim. In
so doing, it specified that damages were fixed at the $116,371
amount awarded by the jury. Prior to the new trial, plaintiff
accepted payment of $40,730 plus interest in satisfaction of the
judgment on the negligence claim, a sum which corresponded to
the amount he would have received after application of the
reduction based on his comparative fault. The trial court issued an
order releasing the original judgment against defendants. The
matter then proceeded to trial on the Structural Work Act claim.
At that trial, plaintiff prevailed on the Structural Work Act cause
of action and was awarded $75,641, the difference between the
original jury verdict of $116,371 and the $40,730 which
defendants had previously paid to plaintiff.
	The judgment for plaintiff triggered a second appeal, this time
by defendants. Defendants argued that the payment they made on
the negligence claim satisfied all claims plaintiff could assert
against them based on the injury at issue in the case, including her
Structural Work Act claim. Accordingly, they argued that plaintiff
should not have been permitted to obtain a second judgment after
retrial on the Structural Work Act count.
	In rejecting defendants' argument, the appellate court focused
on what the parties had intended when defendants offered and
plaintiff accepted the $40,730 payment prior to the retrial.
Viewing the language used in the circuit court's order of
satisfaction and release in light of the circumstances existing at the
time of the transaction, the court concluded that plaintiff's
acceptance of the initial $40,730 payment was not intended to
serve as full satisfaction of plaintiff's injury claim. Accordingly,
it affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
	The appellate court in the case before us found this precedent
to be decisive. Following the approach taken in Holman, it looked
to the intention of the parties. The court observed that the
"Satisfaction Release of Judgment" executed by plaintiff following
entry of judgment in her favor in the garnishment proceedings
stated that it pertained only to the judgment against Zdunkevich
and his insurer and that "the cause remains pending as to
defendant *** Lupa." Comparing the situation to Holman, the
court held that the qualifying language contained in the
"Satisfaction Release of Judgment" when considered
		"in light of the parties' knowledge that plaintiff's claim
alleged one count of negligence against Lupa and one
count of negligence against Zdunkevich, demonstrates
that plaintiff did not intend for the $40,792 payment to
constitute full satisfaction of her injury claim." 329 Ill.
App. 3d at 1062.
	Finding no evidence in the record that would support a
contrary view of plaintiff's intent, the appellate court concluded
that the "Satisfaction Release of Judgment" executed by plaintiff
does not bar her from pursuing her claim against Lupa. The
appellate court further held, based on principles applicable to
settlements involving joint tortfeasors, that any recovery obtained
by plaintiff from Lupa would be reduced by the amount plaintiff
was awarded on her claim against Zdunkevich, thereby eliminating
"the possibility that plaintiff will recover double damages for her
injury." 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. The appellate court therefore
reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the cause for
further proceedings.
	We granted Lupa's petition for leave to appeal, and the matter
is now before us for review. In undertaking that review, we begin
by reiterating that the matter arose in the context of an order by the
circuit court granting Lupa's motion to dismiss pursuant to section
2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2000)). The questions a court must consider where a section 2-619
dismissal is challenged on appeal are whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists and whether the defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (2001). Our review of a dismissal under section
2-619 is de novo. Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School
District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 479 (2002).
	In assailing the appellate court's disposition of this case, Lupa
first argues that the court should not have relied on Holman. We
agree. At issue in Holman was how an accord and satisfaction
entered with respect to one claim in a lawsuit affected a second
claim in the suit involving the same set of parties. An accord and
satisfaction is a contractual method of discharging a debt or claim.
To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must be: (1) a bona
fide dispute, (2) an unliquidated sum, (3) consideration, (4) a
shared and mutual intent to compromise the claim, and (5)
execution of the agreement. See Solomon v. American National
Bank &amp; Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d 132, 134 (1993) The "accord"
itself is the actual agreement between the parties while the
"satisfaction" is its execution or performance. See Fremarek v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067,
1071 (1995). It is grounded in contract law. See Emrick v. First
National Bank of Jonesboro, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 1116 (2001).
Because of this contractual nature, the intent of the parties is of
central importance. See Solomon v. American National Bank &amp;
Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d at 134-35. That is why the focus in
Holman was on the parties' intent.
	This case is similar to Holman in that the plaintiff in each case
advanced two different claims and received payment for the first
claim before litigation on the second was complete. In marked
distinction to Holman, however, the claims in the case before us
are not asserted against the same defendants. Each of the two
counts of plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery from a different
defendant. The defendants are independent of one another. Lupa,
the second defendant, played no role in the litigation between
plaintiff and Zdunkevich, the first defendant, and the liability of
the two defendants is premised on separate acts or omissions.
	Because of the differences between the parties involved in
counts I and II, resolution of this case cannot turn on the parties'
intentions as it did in Holman. Whatever plaintiff and Zdunkevich
may have intended when Zdunkevich paid and plaintiff accepted
full payment of the judgment entered against Zdunkevich on count
I, those intentions are not binding on Lupa. Lupa could not be said
to have agreed to the transaction between Zdunkevich and plaintiff
because she was not a party to it. The only way to reach a contrary
result would be by holding that plaintiff's intentions when she
concluded her litigation against Zdunkevich could somehow be
imputed to Lupa. Given that the parties are independent of one
another and that plaintiff's causes of action are distinct, such a
holding would have no basis in the law. As the Holman court
correctly noted, "accord and satisfaction" requires a shared and
mutual intent to compromise the claim. No such mutuality is
present with respect to Lupa.
	The doctrine of accord and satisfaction is inapplicable to this
case for another reason as well. Accord and satisfaction
presuppose that the parties disputed the amount due but agreed to
give and accept something other than that which they thought was
due in order to settle a claim. See Collection Professionals, Inc. v.
Logan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 959, 963 (1998). No such disagreement or
compromise were present here. The "Satisfaction Release of
Judgment" signed by Zdunkevich and plaintiff was executed in the
nonwage garnishment proceedings filed after Zdunkevich's default
in plaintiff's personal injury action. When that document was
signed, there was no dispute regarding the amount Zdunkevich
owed. The judgment amount was specific and certain, and plaintiff
did not have to accept less than that sum. The "Satisfaction
Release of Judgment" recited that plaintiff received full payment.
That she did, in fact, receive payment of the judgment in full is
conceded.
	As a general rule, obtaining judgment against one person
liable for a loss does not bar the plaintiff from prosecuting claims
against any other person who may also be liable for that loss. See,
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments §49 (1982); 74 Am. Jur.
2d Torts §74 (2001). The initial judgment, however, will normally
serve as a limit on the plaintiff's entitlement to redress. See, e.g.,
Bodam v. City of Chicago, 241 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941 (1993)
(where a plaintiff has been awarded damages in a lawsuit against
one tortfeasor and then seeks to hold a second tortfeasor liable for
the same injury in a subsequent action, the plaintiff is not
permitted to recover an amount of damages greater than that
awarded in the first suit). The reason is straightforward. Once the
amount of the loss has been judicially determined and a valid and
final judgment has been entered, a plaintiff may not relitigate the
question of her damages in a subsequent proceeding. See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §50, Comment d (1982).
	In the case before us, the amount of damages sustained by
plaintiff was determined by the court following a hearing. The
judgment was final, and its validity was unquestioned. Based on
the judgment, plaintiff brought nonwage garnishment proceedings,
which resulted in her obtaining the full amount of damages
awarded by the court, plus interest and costs. Because the
judgment has now been satisfied, and because plaintiff is
precluded from relitigating the question of her damages, she has
already received all that she is entitled to receive for the injuries
that gave rise to this litigation. That being so, plaintiff no longer
has an enforceable claim. Restatement (Second) of Torts §886,
Comment b (1979). She is barred from further action against
anyone else who is liable for the same damages. W. Keeton,
Prosser &amp; Keeton on Torts §48, at 330 (5th ed. 1984).
	The situation is analogous to the one present in Laver v.
Kingston, 11 Ill. App. 2d 323 (1956), where a motorist was struck
and injured by a truck owned by Archer-Daniel-Midland Company
(ADM). The motorist sued ADM in federal court based on the
negligence of the company's truck driver and was awarded a
judgment of $7,500, which ADM payed, along with the motorist's
costs of suit. After the judgment was satisfied, the motorist
attempted to obtain additional damages by suing the driver of the
truck in state circuit court. On the truck driver's motion, the circuit
court dismissed and the motorist appealed.
	In undertaking its review, the appellate court noted that while
a different defendant was named in the state-court proceeding, the
two lawsuits arose from a single accident and involved a single
injury. The basis for liability, the injuries sustained by the
motorist, and the compensation due the motorist were identical in
the two actions. When the federal court entered its judgment, it
settled all of those issues. Because "there can be only one
compensation for one wrong," and because the amount awarded
by the federal court had been paid in full and the judgment
satisfied, the appellate court ruled that the plaintiff was barred
from further suit. Laver, 11 Ill. App. 2d at 329. "To hold
otherwise," held the court, "would be to promote litigation ***
[and ] permit a plaintiff to recover twice for one injury." Laver, 11
Ill. App. 2d at 329. Accordingly, dismissal of the motorist's
complaint was affirmed.
	Plaintiff resists such a result in this case by arguing that the
judgment entered by the circuit court following the "prove-up"
hearing on her damages should not be deemed a complete and
dispositive adjudication of the full measure of her loss. According
to plaintiff, the judgment was based on informal proceedings
rather than "actual litigation" and was intended as only partial
compensation for her injuries. This argument is untenable. The
award of damages based on the matters presented at the prove-up
hearing was part of the default proceeding which plaintiff elected
to pursue. Judgments by default have the same validity and force
as those rendered upon a trial of the issues. See Menconi v.
Davison, 80 Ill. App. 2d 1, 6 (1967). Accordingly, plaintiff cannot
assert that the issue of her damages was not actually litigated.
	Although we have no record of what transpired during the
prove-up hearing, we fail to see how that proceeding could have
been anything other than beneficial for plaintiff. Just as there was
no adversarial challenge on the question of liability, plaintiff was
apparently relieved of any significant adversarial challenge to the
elements of damages for which she sought compensation. Without
an adversarial challenge by Zdunkevich or his insuror, plaintiff's
claims avoided the same level of scrutiny to which they would
otherwise have been subject. Spared such scrutiny, plaintiff was
free to present any element of damages she could claim in good
faith. She had no reason to make less than a full and complete
presentation of her damage claims, and she never explains what
additional damages she hopes to collect from Lupa that she was
unable to get from Zdunkevich or his insurance company.
	In that regard, we note again that this case does not present a
situation where some of the plaintiff's injuries can be attributed to
one tortfeasor while others can be traced to a different tortfeasor.
The accident that gave rise to this litigation inflicted a single set of
injuries on plaintiff for which she sustained a single, indivisible set
of damages. Under such circumstances, allowing plaintiff's action
against Lupa to go forward would require us to hold that plaintiff
is entitled to seek and recover different amounts of damages based
on the very same theory of recovery for the very same injuries in
the very same accident. That would be impermissible. Should
plaintiff prevail, the judgments would be inconsistent. Given the
facts of this case, there is no way, legally or logically, that a higher
damage award against Lupa could be squared with the damage
award already entered against Zdunkevich and paid by his insurer.
	Allowing plaintiff to proceed against Lupa cannot be justified
on the grounds that Lupa's culpability might be greater than
Zdunekvich's. Apportionment of liability for plaintiff's damages
will be resolved in the contribution action which remains pending
between those parties. Whatever the outcome of that proceeding,
it will not affect the question of plaintiff's entitlement to damages.
The relative culpability of the defendants for an injury and the
damages plaintiff sustained as a result of that injury are entirely
separate issues.
	Illinois adheres to the single recovery principle. That principle
holds that there may not be more than one recovery of damages for
a single, indivisible injury. Where a plaintiff has sustained such an
injury, as the plaintiff in this case did, the plaintiff may not divide
up her claim and bring successive proceedings to obtain additional
damages. Having once been awarded damages for the injuries by
the court, she cannot seek compensation for those injuries again.
That is so "regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has recovered
all that he or she might have recovered" in the initial proceeding.
Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 502 (2002).
	Because a plaintiff cannot sue for part of his claim in one
action and then seek recovery for the remainder of his claim in
another (See Rein v. David A. Noyes &amp; Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 340
(1996)), all of a plaintiff's damages must be presented and
considered at once, when the matter is first litigated at trial (see
Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 502). When the plaintiff in the case before us
presented her damage claims to the circuit court following
Zdunkevich's default, she was therefore required to put forward all
of the damages for which she sought compensation. That includes
prospective damages as well as damages that had already accrued.
Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d  at 502.
	Such a result is not inequitable. The court did not require
plaintiff to proceed as she did. As Lupa has argued, plaintiff could
have waited to present her damage claims until she went to trial
against Lupa. The decision to reject that course was plaintiff's
alone. She is the one who elected to go forward with the
immediate prosecution and collection of her claims for damages.
Having requested an adjudication of her damages claims and then
having received and accepted the full amount of damages she
sought, plaintiff will not be heard to complain that the damages
she received were in some way inadequate or complete. The law
precludes plaintiff from recovering more. Because plaintiff would
not be entitled to a further award of damages from Lupa even if
Lupa were found liable, an essential element of plaintiff's
negligence claim against Lupa is absent. Bodam v. City of
Chicago, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 941. The circuit court was therefore
correct in granting Lupa's motion to dismiss.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 



 



 



1.      1Although Zdunkevich failed to answer plaintiff's complaint, he
ultimately secured counsel and responded to a cross-claim for
contribution filed against him by Lupa later in the proceedings. 

2.      2The portion of the document containing this language was set out in
the form of an order by the court. The version of the document
contained in the record bears a file stamp by the circuit clerk dated
March 7, but the signature line for the judge is blank. A different copy
of the document is appended to plaintiff's brief. That version does not
have a file stamp from the clerk and also lacks a signature by a judge.
It does, however, bear a circuit judge's stamp, and its validity has not
been challenged. 

3.      3Although the contribution claims between Lupa and Zdunkevich
remained pending, the circuit court made an express written finding
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) that there
was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.