Title: Commonwealth v. Obi
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11957
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 2016

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SJC-11957 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAISY OBI. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 8, 2016. - September 21, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Sentence.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, 
Probation, Challenge to jurors, Jury and jurors, Conduct of 
judge, Disqualification of judge.  Jury and Jurors.  Judge. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Somerville Division 
of the District Court Department on August 28, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Paul M. Yee, Jr., J., and a 
motion for resentencing was heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Kimberly M. Peterson for the defendant. 
 
Mary F.P. O'Neill, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant, a landlord, was convicted of 
assault and battery after pushing a tenant who is Muslim down a 
flight of stairs.  The defendant was sentenced to a term of 
incarceration of two years in a house of correction, six months 
to serve, with the balance suspended for a period of two years.  
The judge imposed two special conditions of probation during the 
period of suspension:  that the defendant provide a written 
disclosure to prospective tenants that she had been convicted of 
assaulting a tenant and had had several harassment prevention 
orders issued against her; and that the defendant attend an 
introductory class on Islam.  A single justice of the Appeals 
Court stayed execution of the defendant's sentence pending this 
appeal. 
 
The defendant contends that imposition of this length of a 
period of incarceration, and the special conditions of 
probation, would violate her constitutional rights under both 
the Federal and State Constitutions.  She also asserts error in 
a number of the judge's rulings at trial.  We conclude that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the sentence of 
incarceration or in requiring the defendant to provide written 
disclosure to prospective tenants as a condition of probation.  
We do not address the defendant's constitutional objections to 
being required to attend the class on Islam as a condition of 
probation, which were not raised in the trial court.  We further 
3 
 
conclude that the judge's other contested rulings were not 
error.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
1.  Trial proceedings.  We recite the facts the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for later discussion.  The 
defendant, a septuagenarian Christian minister, owns a three-
family apartment building in Somerville, where she lives on the 
second floor.  At the time of trial, the defendant had been a 
landlord for almost twenty years.  Gilhan Suliman, a Muslim 
woman, leased the third-floor apartment from the defendant on a 
short-term basis from April 1, 2012, through August 31, 2012; 
she lived there with her husband and five children. 
 
The relationship between the defendant and Suliman soured 
over the course of Suliman's short tenancy.  Suliman contacted 
the defendant multiple times to complain that there was no 
electricity or heat in her apartment.  The defendant, for her 
part, complained that Suliman and her family were too noisy, and 
that more people were living in Suliman's apartment than were 
permitted under the terms of her lease, an allegation that 
Suliman denied.  At one point, the defendant attempted to raise 
Suliman's rent to compensate for Suliman's purportedly excessive 
water usage.  In addition, the defendant served Suliman with a 
4 
 
notice to quit, asserting that the additional occupants violated 
the terms of Suliman's lease.2 
 
The animosity between the defendant and Suliman, however, 
went beyond typical landlord-tenant issues.  According to 
Suliman, the defendant also made disparaging remarks to Suliman 
about her religious beliefs.  One night in May, 2012, the 
defendant stood on the stairs outside of Suliman's apartment, 
screaming about "how Muslims are, they should be burned in hell, 
and how [the] prophet should be burned in hell."  On another 
occasion, in June, 2012, after accusing Suliman's children of 
throwing trash in the street, the defendant shouted that they 
were "wicked kids" and "evil."  She added, "[B]ecause they are 
Muslims . . . they will be delivered in hell."  Suliman reported 
the latter incident to police. 
 
The confrontation that resulted in the defendant's 
conviction in this case occurred on August 28, 2012, three days 
before Suliman's lease was to terminate.  That morning, as 
Suliman was walking up the stairs to the second floor of the 
apartment building on the way up to her third-floor apartment, 
the defendant accosted her.  The defendant was upset because she 
                     
 
2 The record indicates that Suliman had obtained a 
harassment prevention order against the defendant before August 
28, 2012.  The record is silent, however, about the basis for 
that order.  The order was not admitted in evidence, but was 
considered by the judge during sentencing. 
5 
 
believed that Suliman had been ringing her doorbell.  According 
to Suliman, however, construction workers, not she, had rung the 
bell, in connection with work that they were doing in the 
neighborhood.  The defendant shouted, "Get out of my house," and 
pushed Suliman, who fell down approximately fifteen to twenty 
stairs, hitting her face on a railing.  As a result of the fall, 
Suliman cut her lip and tore a ligament in her shoulder.  
Suliman immediately telephoned the police.  When a police 
officer arrived at the scene, Suliman's lip was bleeding and she 
appeared to be in pain.3  Both Suliman and her children were 
crying.  The officer placed the defendant under arrest in 
connection with the incident. 
 
2.  Procedural posture.  The defendant was charged with one 
count of violating an abuse prevention order, in violation of 
G. L. c. 209A, § 7, and one count of assault and battery, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a).  After a series of 
pretrial hearings and a period of pretrial probation, a one-day 
jury trial was conducted in the District Court on April 23, 
2014, on the charge of assault and battery.  The Commonwealth 
                     
 
3 Suliman did not testify that she received medical 
treatment for her injuries.  During the sentencing proceeding, 
however, Suliman stated that, since the August 28, 2012 
incident, she has taken prescription medication for shoulder 
pain and has participated in physical therapy. 
 
6 
 
filed a nolle prosequi with respect to the charged violation of 
an abuse prevention order.4 
 
The defendant's theory of the case was that Suliman was 
"the tenant from Hell."  During her testimony, the defendant 
denied that she had pushed Suliman down the stairs, and 
maintained that she was in her apartment praying when police 
knocked on her door and arrested her.  The defendant argued that 
Suliman had maneuvered to have her arrested in order to stave 
off being evicted for having too many people living in her 
apartment.  In support of this view, the defendant emphasized 
that Suliman repeatedly had called the police to complain about 
the defendant, and that Suliman had filed a complaint with the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination alleging that 
the defendant had sought to evict her because of her religion.  
The defendant denied ever shouting at Suliman or her children, 
and denied that there were any issues with the hot water or 
electricity in Suliman's apartment. 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty of assault and battery.  
The judge requested a mental health evaluation in aid of 
sentencing, and ultimately sentenced the defendant on 
                     
 
4 As filed, the complaint incorrectly charged that the 
defendant had violated an abuse prevention order, not a 
harassment prevention order.  See note 2, supra.  The judge 
denied the Commonwealth's motion to amend the complaint to 
correct the error, on the ground that the motion was first made 
on the day of trial. 
7 
 
June 2, 2014.  On June 3, 2014, the defendant sought 
postconviction relief, filing a notice of appeal and a motion to 
be resentenced by a different judge.  After a hearing on June 
10, 2014, the trial judge denied the motion for resentencing.  
On July 17, 2014, a single justice of the Appeals Court allowed 
the defendant's motion for a stay of execution of sentence, and 
directed the District Court to enter an order releasing her from 
custody and relieving her from compliance with the conditions of 
probation pending her appeal.  We transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
imposed an unconstitutional term of incarceration and 
unconstitutional conditions of probation.  She contends also 
that it was error for the judge to deny a peremptory challenge 
that defense counsel made during empanelment and that it was 
error for the judge not to recuse himself from her case. 
 
a.  Sentencing.  The judge heard additional information in 
aid of sentencing that was not presented to the jury.  A mental 
health evaluation indicated that the defendant did not have a 
history of mental illness or aggressiveness requiring treatment 
or medication.  The judge also learned, however, that several 
other tenants had obtained harassment prevention orders against 
the defendant, some of which were still in effect at the time of 
8 
 
sentencing.5  Furthermore, Suliman stated that "[t]he emotional 
and health impact of what [the defendant] had done to [her] 
family will be felt for years to come." 
 
As noted, the judge sentenced the defendant to a term of 
incarceration of two years in a house of correction, six months 
to serve, with the balance suspended.  The conditions of 
probation included the following.  The defendant was required to 
provide "a written disclosure to every tenant that [the 
defendant] rents property to," stating that the defendant "has 
been convicted of assaulting a tenant in the past, and has had 
several harassment prevention orders issued against her by the 
Court in the past."  In addition, the defendant was required to 
enroll in and attend an introductory class on Islam, and to 
provide her probation officer with written documentation that 
she had done so.  Moreover, the defendant was required to comply 
with all Federal and State laws, including antidiscrimination 
and housing laws.  During the sentencing hearing, the judge told 
the defendant, "You have to respect the rights of people of the 
Muslim faith.  You have to respect all people.  All right.  
That's the message I'm sending out to you.  That is the message 
that I'm sending out to the community.  All right.  Even you, 
                     
 
5 The basis for these harassment orders is not in the 
record. 
9 
 
wanting to be a person of God, have to [show] respect for all 
people." 
 
1.  Term of incarceration.  The defendant argues that the 
term of her incarceration is so disproportionate to her offense 
that it violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  In the defendant's view, the sentence of two years in a 
house of correction with six months to serve is 
disproportionately harsh, because she was a seventy-one year old 
woman with no criminal record at the time of her conviction, and 
because Suliman suffered relatively minor injuries as a result 
of the assault and battery.6  "A judge has considerable latitude 
within the framework of the applicable statute to determine the 
appropriate individualized sentence."  Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
414 Mass. 88, 92 (1993).  Although some sentences may "be so 
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel [or] 
unusual punishment," Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 379 
(1989), quoting Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 496 
& n.2 (1981), and cases cited, a sentenced defendant must meet 
the "heavy burden" of showing that the sentence "shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity" 
                     
 
6 The judge told the defendant during the sentencing hearing 
that some portion of her punishment "has to be incarceration.  
So that you can reflect on what you have done and what you will 
be doing in the future, that this shall never happen again." 
10 
 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 
910 (1976). 
 
The defendant has not met the burden of showing that her 
sentence was disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, 
and certainly not so disproportionate as to be cruel or unusual 
punishment.  During the sentencing hearing, Suliman explained 
that the defendant's assault and battery has had a "deep 
physical impact" on her, that she has been unable to sleep at 
night, and that she does not trust people in the same way she 
did before the incident.  She added that her children are now 
afraid of going outside, and that her six year old son had 
started wetting his bed.  Compare Commonwealth v. Sanchez, supra 
at 379-380 (imposition of two consecutive life sentences and two 
other concurrent life sentences for defendant was not 
disproportionate given extent of psychological harm, stigma, and 
lasting injuries suffered by victims).  The sentence was within 
the maximum permitted by statute.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13A 
(authorizing sentence of up to two and one-half years in house 
of correction for conviction of assault and battery).7  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Tart, 408 Mass. 249, 267 (1990) (short sentence 
of incarceration was not disproportionate to offense of fishing 
                     
 
7 The record indicates that the defendant could face adverse 
immigration consequences as a result of her conviction and 
sentence.  This issue was not, however, raised on appeal. 
11 
 
commercially without required permit).  Simply put, the 
defendant's sentence does not "shock[] the conscience and 
offend[] fundamental notions of human dignity" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 910. 
 
2.  Written disclosure as condition of probation.  The 
defendant argues that the condition of probation requiring her 
to disclose in writing to prospective tenants that she has been 
convicted of assaulting a tenant in the past, and has had 
harassment prevention orders issued against her, violates art. 1 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  A trial judge 
generally may impose a term of probation "for such time and upon 
such conditions as [the judge] deems proper."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 87.  "A probation condition is enforceable . . . so long as 
the condition is 'reasonably related' to the goals of sentencing 
and probation."  Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 459 
(2001), citing Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 403 (1998).  
"The principal goals of probation are rehabilitation of the 
defendant and protection of the public."  Commonwealth v. 
Lapointe, supra.  Other goals include "punishment, deterrence, 
and retribution" (citation omitted).  Id.  The goals "are best 
served if the conditions of probation are tailored to address 
the particular characteristics of the defendant and the crime" 
(citation omitted).  Id. 
12 
 
 
Although a judge "may place restrictions on probationers' 
freedoms that would be unconstitutional if applied to the 
general public," Commonwealth v. Pike, supra, such restrictions 
are not without limits, and merit "special scrutiny."  United 
States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975).  
The more tenuous the relationship between a given condition and 
the goals of probation, and the more extensively a 
constitutional right is burdened, the less likely the condition 
is to be permissible.  In Commonwealth v. Lapointe, supra at 
457, 460, for example, we upheld a condition that prohibited a 
probationer convicted of indecent assault and battery on his 
daughter from living with most of his minor children, on the 
basis that the condition substantially advanced the public 
safety, rehabilitation, and deterrence goals of probation.  
Although we recognized that the condition might restrict his 
constitutional rights, including freedom of association, we 
concluded that it struck "an appropriate balance between the 
facts of [his] case and the goals of sentencing and probation."  
Id. at 461.8  In Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 412-413, 
418 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996) (Power), we 
similarly upheld a condition that prohibited a probationer who 
                     
 
8 Contrast Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 405 (1998) 
(determining that condition of probation banishing probationer 
from Massachusetts did not bear reasonable relationship to 
permissible goals of probation). 
13 
 
had been convicted of armed robbery of a bank, after spending 
twenty-three years as a fugitive, from profiting from the story 
of her crime.  The condition was deemed permissible in the 
circumstances to deter the probationer and others similarly 
situated from seeking to profit from criminality.  Id. at 418.  
Although we recognized that the condition "implicate[d]" the 
probationer's constitutional right to freedom of speech, we 
concluded that it did not burden that right unduly, because the 
probationer remained free to speak about her crime if she did 
not benefit financially from doing so.  Id. at 415. 
 
Had the probationer in Power, supra, been prohibited from 
speaking about her crime outright, however, we might well have 
reached a different result.9  We previously have rejected a 
condition of probation that subjected probationers to a "blanket 
threat of warrantless searches," see Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 
402 Mass. 789, 795 (1988), notwithstanding the fact that such a 
condition might aid in the probationers' rehabilitation and help 
to ensure their compliance with other conditions of probation. 
Id. at 792-793.  The condition was determined to be simply too 
restrictive of the probationer's rights under art. 14 of 
                     
 
9 See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1124 (2014) 
(decision pursuant to Appeals Court rule 1:28 vacating condition 
of probation that prohibited probationer from making oral or 
written communications about victim to the probationer's 
family). 
14 
 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Id. at 795.  Accordingly, 
we consider the extent to which the contested condition of 
probation advances the goals of probation, and the extent to 
which it burdens a constitutional right. 
 
The defendant maintains that requiring the written 
disclosure as a condition of probation violates her right under 
art. 1 to "acquir[e], possess[] and protect[] property."  As we 
noted in Power, supra at 418, however, some limitation on a 
probationer's ability to make a profit is permissible where that 
limitation substantially advances an enumerated probationary 
goal.  The condition here substantially advances one such goal -
- public safety.  The record does not indicate what caused 
tenants to seek harassment prevention orders against the 
defendant, but the fact that several tenants have sought such 
orders suggests that her behavior towards tenants is a recurring 
problem.  Complying with the notice condition in this case 
likely will affect the defendant's ability to earn the same 
level of rental income from her property as she has been able to 
previously.  To the extent that the condition is 
constitutionally burdensome at all, however, it is not so 
burdensome as to be invalid.10 
                     
 
10 The defendant also argues, incorrectly, that the 
condition violates the criminal offender record information 
statute, G. L. c. 6, § 172 (d), which makes it "unlawful to 
 
15 
 
 
Although courts have split on whether conditions of 
probation seeking to shame the probationer by requiring him or 
her to provide public notice of a conviction are 
constitutionally permissible,11 that is not squarely at issue 
here.  The condition imposed on the defendant in this case is 
directed narrowly at ensuring that future tenants are aware of 
the risk they take by agreeing to rent one of the defendant's 
apartments.12 
 
3.  Class on Islam as condition of probation.  The 
defendant additionally argues that requiring her to attend a 
class on Islam as a condition of probation is unduly restrictive 
of her rights under the establishment and free exercise clauses 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
                                                                  
request or require a person to provide a copy of his criminal 
offender record information" in certain circumstances.  
"[C]riminal offender record information," however, is defined 
only to include "records and data . . . compiled by a 
Massachusetts criminal justice agency."  See G. L. c. 6, § 167.  
That information is distinct from the disclosure required here. 
 
 
11 See Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of First 
Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter 
Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 783, 787-803 (1999) 
(cataloging inconsistent treatment of "shame" conditions 
considered by courts). 
 
 
12 The judge explained, "There has to be a written 
disclosure to every tenant that you rent property to.  I cannot 
take away your rental property, but any tenants or prospective 
tenants that are renting need to know the type of person you 
are." 
16 
 
Rights.  While conditions of probation that touch on religion 
and risk incursion upon constitutionally protected interests 
should be imposed only with great circumspection, the defendant 
raised no such concerns before the trial court judge, and there 
is no information in the record that would allow us to evaluate 
her claims.  Because she raises these claims for the first time 
on appeal, they have been waived.  See Commonwealth v. Cowels, 
470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015). 
 
4.  "Respect" as condition of probation.  The defendant 
contends further that the judge should not have required as a 
condition of her probation that she "respect the rights of 
people of the Muslim faith," because that requirement was 
impermissibly vague.  While "[t]he constitutional rule against 
vague laws applies as equally to conditions of probation as it 
does to legislative enactments," Power, supra at 421, in context 
the judge's statement was clear.  "Respect" for Muslims was not 
an independent condition of probation; the judge merely was 
explaining his reasoning for requiring that the defendant comply 
with all Federal and State laws, including antidiscrimination 
and housing laws.  The requirement that the defendant obey 
local, State, and Federal laws and court orders is a standard, 
permissible condition of probation.  See Commonwealth v. Maggio, 
414 Mass. 193, 194 (1993) (condition of probation requiring 
17 
 
compliance with all existing laws is "essentially . . . imposed 
on all defendants who are placed on probation"). 
 
b.  Peremptory challenge.  During jury empanelment, defense 
counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove from the panel a 
prospective juror who was wearing a headscarf of the sort 
commonly worn by Muslim women.  Although the juror did not 
indicate her religious beliefs on her juror questionnaire, the 
Commonwealth requested that the judge confirm defense counsel 
had not exercised the peremptory challenge for a "religious 
purpose."  The judge then asked defense counsel why he had 
exercised the peremptory.  Defense counsel replied, "I don't 
have any particular reason, just a gut feeling that she wouldn't 
be sympathetic to my client, and I'm exercising my peremptory 
based on that, Your Honor, nothing to do with her religion, 
race, creed, or national origin."  The judge found that the 
response was not a "sufficient answer" to overcome the 
Commonwealth's objection, and sat the juror over the defendant's 
objection.  As a result of a randomized process,13 the juror 
later served as foreperson of the jury. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's denial of her trial 
counsel's peremptory challenge deprived her of her right to a 
                     
 
13 The judge's practice was to select as foreperson of the 
jury the juror sitting closest to him.  In this case, the juror 
at issue was sitting closest to the judge after the only juror 
sitting closer was chosen randomly as an alternate. 
18 
 
fair and impartial jury.  She also contends, for the first time 
on appeal, that there was insufficient evidence in the record 
that the juror was Muslim, and that the judge should have 
conducted an individual voir dire regarding the juror's 
religion.  In addition, the defendant maintains that her trial 
counsel incorrectly was required to articulate a credible reason 
for his peremptory challenge.  These arguments are without 
merit. 
 
Defendants have a right under the United States 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to be 
tried by an impartial jury.  Commonwealth v. Wood, 389 Mass. 
552, 559 (1983).  "The right to use peremptory challenges, 
however, is not absolute."  Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 
295, 305 (2012) (Prunty).  Although "[w]e presume that 
peremptory challenges are properly made," that presumption can 
be rebutted by a prima facie showing that there is "a pattern of 
challenges of members of the same discrete group" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 306.  The presumption can also be rebutted by 
a prima facie showing that a challenge was made to "a single 
prospective juror within a protected class, . . . where there is 
a likelihood that [the prospective juror is] being excluded from 
the jury solely on the basis of . . . group membership"  
(citation and quotation omitted).  Id.  Discrete groups that are 
protected include groups defined by potential jurors' sex, race, 
19 
 
color, creed, or national origin.  See id. at 305 n.13, citing 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488-489 & n.33, cert. 
denied 444 U.S. 881 (1979).  After a prima facie showing has 
been made, the burden shifts to the challenging party to provide 
"a neutral explanation establishing that the challenge is 
unrelated to the prospective juror's group affiliation."  
Prunty, supra at 306, quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 
461, 464 (1991).  We review the denial of a peremptory challenge 
for abuse of discretion.  See Prunty, supra at 304. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth objected to the defendant's exercise 
of a peremptory challenge on the basis that the prospective 
juror, like Suliman, was Muslim.  Although the defendant argues 
on appeal that there was insufficient evidence that the juror 
actually was Muslim, the judge observed that the juror's 
headscarf was of a type traditionally worn by Muslim women, and 
that no other prospective jurors appeared to be Muslim.  The 
Commonwealth further pointed out that Suliman, who identified 
herself as Muslim, wore a similar headscarf.  Accordingly, there 
was a prima facie showing that defense counsel exercised a 
peremptory challenge based on the prospective juror's religion.  
See Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 9 (2013) (considering 
percentage of group members excluded, and "whether the 
challenged jurors are members of the same constitutionally 
protected group as the defendant or the victim").  Given this, 
20 
 
the burden shifted to the defendant to provide a group-neutral 
explanation for the challenge. 
 
We defer to the judge's determination that the defendant's 
burden was not met here.  In Prunty, supra at 307, 309-310 & 
n.21, we deferred to a judge's conclusion that a proffered 
reason for exercising a peremptory challenge of the only 
African-American in the venire was a "mere sham," noting that 
the judge "made clear findings as to both [the] adequacy and 
[the] genuineness" of that reason.  Here, although defense 
counsel stated that the challenge was not motivated by religious 
considerations, his only other explanation for the challenge was 
a "gut feeling" that the juror would not be sympathetic to the 
defendant.  Like the judge in Prunty, supra at 309-310, the 
judge in this case found clearly that that explanation was 
inadequate.  We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
ruling. 
 
c.  Recusal.  During the posttrial hearing on the 
defendant's motion for resentencing by a different judge, the 
defendant argued that the trial judge relied on improper 
considerations in his sentencing decision, including a dislike 
of her that was based on the judge's interactions with her at 
prior proceedings.  According to the record, the judge 
previously had presided at a hearing with respect to a 
harassment prevention order that Suliman had sought against the 
21 
 
defendant.  In addition, the judge had presided over a civil 
complaint that Suliman had filed against the defendant to 
recover her security deposit. 
 
The judge rejected these arguments, noting that he was one 
of three judges who regularly sat in the District Court in 
Somerville, where the defendant's trial was held, and that "some 
familiarity" with defendants passing through that court house 
was to be expected.  He added, "In this particular case I didn't 
see anything, when I searched my own mind, that I could not be 
fair and impartial towards [the defendant] whether or not during 
the trial or whether or not during sentencing."  On appeal, the 
defendant argues for the first time that the trial judge should 
have recused himself for the entirety of the trial.  In the 
alternative, the defendant argues, as she did after sentencing, 
that her motion for resentencing by a different judge should 
have been allowed. 
 
Posttrial recusal motions, however, "are presumptively 
untimely at least absent a showing of good cause for tardiness."  
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 428 Mass. 543, 547 
(1998).  Although the defendant's trial counsel stated that he 
was unaware of the judge's involvement in prior proceedings 
against her, he was at least aware that those proceedings had 
occurred; the Commonwealth attempted unsuccessfully to introduce 
Suliman's harassment prevention order in evidence at the start 
22 
 
of trial.  In addition, defense counsel cross-examined Suliman 
regarding her civil complaint.  Accordingly, the defendant has 
not shown good cause for waiting to raise this claim until after 
her conviction.  See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 
411 Mass. 451, 464 (1991) ("The judicial process can hardly 
tolerate the practice of a litigant with knowledge of 
circumstances suggesting possible bias or prejudice holding 
back, while calling upon the court for hopefully favorable 
rulings, and then seeking recusal when they are not forthcoming" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.