Title: Owens v. Publix Supermarkets
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-667
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 29, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
______________________________
Nos.  SC95667 & SC96235
______________________________
EVELYN OWENS and JOHN OWENS
Petitioners,
vs.
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC.,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
ELVIA SORIANO and ANGEL SORIANO,
Petitioners,
vs.
B & B CASH GROCERY STORES, INC., etc.,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
[November 15, 2001]
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449
(Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (en banc), and Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), based on express and direct conflict with 
Teate v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), on the
issue of whether, in a slip and fall case, the condition of a transitory foreign
1  By "transitory foreign substance," we refer generally to any liquid or solid
substance, item or object located where it does not belong.  See Black's Law
Dictionary 660 (7th ed. 1999) (A foreign substance is "[a] substance found . . .
where it is not supposed to be found").  
2  For purposes of oral argument, on our own motion, we consolidated these
two cases.  On our own motion, we now consolidate these cases for disposition in
this opinion.
-2-
substance1 is itself sufficient to establish constructive knowledge.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.2  For the reasons that follow, we
hold that where a plaintiff slips and falls on a transitory foreign substance in a
defendant's business premises, once the plaintiff establishes that he or she fell as a
result of that transitory foreign substance, the burden shifts to the defendant to
produce evidence that it exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
FACTS
1.  Owens
Evelyn Owens ("Owens"), along with her husband John Owens, brought this
personal injury action against Publix Supermarkets, Inc. ("Publix").  Owens was a
part-time employee in the Publix bakery.  On March 4, 1995, after she completed
her work for the day, Owens "clocked out" but stayed at Publix to do some
grocery shopping.  While walking down an aisle, Owens slipped and fell on a
discolored piece of banana lying on the floor. 
3  In addition, Owens presented evidence that nine slip-and-fall accidents had
occurred at that Publix within the last nine months, but none of these occurred on
the aisle in which she fell and no other details were provided as to the nature of
these accidents, including whether the individual fell on a transitory foreign
-3-
At trial, Owens did not present any direct evidence of the length of time the
piece of banana was on the floor.  In fact, Owens testified that she did not see the
substance that had caused her to fall.  Owens did, however, present the testimony
of Alma Jean Ross, another shopper in the store, who testified that she was walking
down the chip and bread aisle at the same time as Owens and that Owens had
slipped on "a piece of banana" without the peel, which was about an inch or longer
and "kind of mushed . . . where she hit it . . . kind of squashed down."  When
asked if the banana was discolored, Ross responded, "Very much, uh-huh.  It
wasn't black, but it was dark."  Ross further testified that she had been at Publix
"[a]bout three or four minutes" before encountering Owens, but admitted she had
no knowledge of how long the banana had been on the floor. 
As to the maintenance and inspection of the floors, there was evidence that it
was the responsibility of Publix employees to look out for items on the floor and
that managers would walk the store, "inspecting everything."  However, Publix did
not keep inspection records and there was no evidence presented as to when the
particular aisle was last inspected.3
substance. 
-4-
After Owens presented her case-in-chief, Publix moved for a directed verdict
on liability, arguing that Owens failed to present any evidence that Publix had actual
or constructive knowledge that the banana piece was on the floor.  Finding that the
evidence of the condition of the banana was insufficient to establish a basis for
Publix's liability, the trial court directed a verdict and entered final judgment for
Publix.
On appeal, a panel of the Fifth District reversed the granting of the directed
verdict, see Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2655 (Fla.
5th DCA Dec. 4, 1998), reh'g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn, 729 So. 2d
at 449, but upon rehearing en banc, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court's
directed verdict in favor of Publix.  In affirming the trial court, the Fifth District
framed the issue in the case as follows: "Does the fact that a piece of discolored
banana is found on the floor give rise to an inference that the banana fragment had
been there long enough to give this critical constructive knowledge?"  Owens, 729
So. 2d at 449.  The Fifth District answered the question by explaining, "it depends
on the other circumstances of the case."  Id.  Based upon the other circumstances
in this particular case, the Fifth District concluded that because at least two theories
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existed as to how the banana peel got on the floor, it was the plaintiff's obligation to
prove that the aging occurred on the floor.  See id. at 450. The Fifth District held
that to justify the inference that Publix had constructive knowledge of the condition,
we would have to assume that the aging of the banana fragment
occurred on the floor of the market and not in the store's fruit bin from
which it was taken by a customer and a portion given to an infant
being pushed in a shopping cart who dropped it on the floor shortly
before plaintiff came along.  Although either possibility exists, since it
is plaintiff's obligation, in order to show constructive knowledge, to
prove that the aging occurred on the floor, the directed verdict was
proper.
Id. at 450. 
In reaching this result, the Fifth District distinguished our opinion in
Montgomery v. Florida Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973),
reasoning that the plaintiff in Montgomery, who slipped and fell on a collard leaf
was able
to present additional circumstances to establish the span of time the
leaf had been on the floor.  These additional circumstances were:  (1)
Plaintiff and her husband had been in the area of the fall for fifteen
minutes prior to the accident; (2) No other shoppers were around the
area where she fell;  (3) No one swept the floor during that period;  (4)
During this period, two store employees were in the area;  (5) Not only
was the leaf wilted but it was also "dirty looking." 
Owens, 729 So. 2d at 449-50. 
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Sharp disagreed with the majority that our
decision in Montgomery necessarily stood for the proposition that additional
circumstances other than the aged condition of the foreign substance were required
in order to survive a directed verdict or summary judgment motion.  See id. at 452
(Sharp, J., dissenting).  Judge Sharp concluded that in Owens, the aged food item
or its deteriorated condition was sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on
constructive notice from which a jury could find that the "offending piece of
banana" had been on the floor of the supermarket a sufficiently long period of time
so that Publix, in its capacity as owner-operator, should have discovered it and
cleaned it up.  See id. at 452 (Sharp, J., dissenting). 
2.  Soriano
Like Evelyn Owens, Elvia Soriano also injured herself when she slipped and
fell on a discolored piece of banana in a grocery store.  See Soriano, 757 So. 2d at
515-16.  As stated in the Fourth District's opinion:
The store employee who helped Mrs. Soriano to her feet took a piece
of banana peel off her shoe.  Mrs. Soriano described the piece of peel
as being brown with very little yellow in color.
The store manager testified that the store tried not to sell brown
bananas, as customers generally do not like to buy bananas after they
turn brown.  Mrs. Soriano acknowledged, however, that the store did
sell brown bananas with skin like the piece on which she slipped.
Id. at 515.
-7-
At trial, Jose Alvarez, the former store manager of B & B Cash Grocery
Store ("B & B") testified that the store kept daily inspection reports "to remind us
to check the store on an hourly basis."  Nevertheless, when asked if the store in
general was swept hourly, Alvarez replied, "To be honest, no.  We try to do it but,
no.  We tried to sweep as many times as we could."  Alvarez conceded that no one
was assigned the duty to sweep the floors at a certain time every day, and that all of
the daily inspection reports were completed at one time.  He admitted that the
reports, which indicated that someone went around inspecting at a specific time,
were false.  Alvarez further stated that he was aware that these inspection reports
were being falsified, that everyone at the management level of the store knew about
it, and that an assistant manager who came from another store told him that it was
done that way in every store in which he had worked.  Moreover, Alvarez
conceded that there were no sweeping records for the day of Soriano's accident.
In addition, Alvarez testified that customers "all the time" would "partake of
the food in the store before they get to the cash registers."  He also admitted that
on occasion customers would eat the fruit that was for sale in the store and on
occasion customers would drop the food they were eating.
After the close of Soriano's case, the trial court directed a verdict for B & B,
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show actual or constructive notice. 
-8-
In affirming the granting of a directed verdict, the Fourth District adopted the
reasoning of Owens that "in order to show constructive knowledge, the plaintiff
had the obligation to prove that the aging occurred on the floor."  Soriano, 757 So.
2d at 516.  The Fourth District rejected Soriano's contention that the circumstantial
evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer constructive notice:
We conclude that the circumstantial evidence in this case
required the impermissible stacking of inferences to establish
constructive notice.  As such, we cannot infer, as Appellant contends,
that the supermarket only sells yellow bananas, that it must have been
yellow when it reached the floor, and that it sat on the floor until it
turned brown.  The inference is just as likely in such a case that
someone had purchased the brown banana and dropped it on the floor
in that condition, or that someone brought the brown banana into the
grocery store, as there was competent evidence that customers of the
store would often eat food while in the store and drop debris on the
floor.
Id.  The Fourth District determined that there was "no additional evidence to
establish that the banana peel was on the floor for any length of time, such as cart
tracks, foot prints, dirt, or even grit."  Id.  Without this additional evidence, the
Fourth District concluded, "we cannot infer that the foreign substance had been on
the floor for a sufficient length of time to charge B & B with constructive
knowledge."  Id.
As to Soriano's additional contention that there was evidence that B & B
employees had failed to fill out inspection reports and sweep on a regular basis, the
4  "[A]ctual or constructive knowledge is irrelevant in cases not involving
transitory, foreign substances (i.e., the typical banana peel case), if ample evidence
of negligent maintenance can be shown."  Mabrey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,
438 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). 
-9-
Fourth District, relying on Rowe v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.
1st DCA 1998), held that it would not apply a theory of negligent mode of
operation as "an alternative to requiring actual or constructive notice where injuries
result from slipping on a foreign substance in a market setting."  Id. at 516-17.    
ANALYSIS
A.  Florida's Slip and Fall Law
1.  Actual or Constructive Notice Requirement Related
to Transitory Foreign Substances
All premises owners owe a duty to their invitees to exercise reasonable care
to maintain their premises in a safe condition.  See, e.g., Everett v. Restaurant &
Catering Corp., 738 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  Despite this general
proposition, when a person slips and falls on a transitory foreign substance, the rule
has developed that the injured person must prove that the premises owner had
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition "in that the
condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary care, the
premises owner should have known of it and taken action to remedy it."  Colon v.
Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc., 721 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).4 
-10-
Constructive knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence showing
that:  (1) "the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that in the
exercise of ordinary care, the premises owner should have known of the
condition;" or (2) "the condition occurred with regularity and was therefore
foreseeable."  Brooks v. Phillip Watts Enter., Inc., 560 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990).  In the latter category, evidence of recurring or ongoing problems that
could have resulted from operational negligence or negligent maintenance becomes
relevant to the issue of foreseeability of a dangerous condition.  See generally Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reggie, 714 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Nance v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). 
In both Owens and Soriano, the appellate courts determined that the aging
condition of the banana alone was insufficient to survive a directed verdict because
the aging appearance, without more, was insufficient to show the storeowners'
constructive knowledge.  The last time this Court addressed the issue of the
quantum of circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on constructive
notice was nearly thirty years ago in Montgomery.    
In Montgomery, this Court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the
plaintiff presented evidence that she had been in the area of the fall for fifteen
minutes before falling; no other shoppers were in the area when she fell; no
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employee swept the floor while she was there; two employees were nearby when
the accident occurred; the collard leaf upon which she slipped was old, wilted and
dirty looking; and water was on the floor where she fell.  281 So. 2d at 303.
As Judge Sharp correctly pointed out in her dissent in Owens, we did not
determine in Montgomery whether the condition of the collard leaf alone would
have been sufficient to establish constructive notice of a dangerous condition. 
Owens, 729 So. 2d at 451 (Sharp, J. dissenting).  Instead, we noted that
constructive notice "may be proved, like any fact, by circumstantial evidence." 
Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 304.  We stated that "[s]ince there was a conflict in the
evidence, the trial court properly submitted the matter to the jury."  Id. at 303.    
Since Montgomery, Florida's appellate courts have struggled to determine
whether in a given case sufficient evidence exists to create a jury question on the
issue of constructive notice.  Depending on the description of the transitory foreign
substance, some appellate courts have concluded that the appearance of the
transitory foreign substance may in itself be sufficient to create a jury question on
constructive notice.  See Ramey v. Winn Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 710 So. 2d 191,
192-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (partially melted butter with lumps in it); Woods v.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (unidentified
substance described as "very dirty," "trampled," "containing skid marks, scuff
-12-
marks," and "chewed up"); Ress v. X-tra Super Food Ctrs., Inc., 616 So. 2d 110,
110-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (substance that appeared to be sauerkraut was "gunky,
dirty and wet and black"); Hodges v. Walsh, 553 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989) (sticky substance in bowling alley had dried); Washington v. Pic-N-Pay
Supermarket, Inc., 453 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (collard green leaves
were "old, nasty" and "looked like they had been there for quite a while"); Camina
v. Parliament Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (ice cream was
thawed, dirty, and splattered).
The Third District's decision in Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610
So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), illustrates a case where the court concluded that
the condition of a transitory foreign substance created a jury question on
constructive notice.  In Newalk, the court held that testimony that oil spots were on
the floor and that the spots appeared old was in itself sufficient for the question of
liability to go to the jury.  Id. at 529-30.  In determining that the trial court correctly
denied the supermarket's motion for directed verdict, the court stated:
Newalk's friend's testimony that oil spots were on the floor and that
the spots appeared old was as least some evidence indicating the
unidentified spots were present for a sufficient length of time for the
owners in their exercise of reasonable care to have acted to remedy the
condition.
Thus, because the testimony of Newalk's friend was at least
some evidence of negligence, we conclude the question of the
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market's liability properly went to the trier of fact.  Here, it was up to
the jury to conclude whether the substance had been on the floor for a
sufficient length of time that the owner should have known of the
condition and corrected the condition regardless of who created it.  
Id. at 529-30 (citations omitted).
In contrast, where there was nothing about the description of the substance
that would indicate the length of time it was on the floor, courts have precluded the
jury from deciding the issue of negligence.  See Publix Super Market, Inc. v.
Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (a piece of cake was on the
floor, but there was no evidence as to how long it had been on floor); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. King, 592 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (slippery, oily, clear
substance, but no evidence of "signs of age, such as skid marks, smudges, or the
like"); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 215 (Fla. 5th DCA
1989) (slippery substance, but no evidence as to how or when it got on the floor,
or the length of time it was there before the fall); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gaines,
542 So. 2d 432, 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (loose dried rice and beans, but no
evidence that they appeared old or were ground into the floor or crushed, and no
evidence of broken packages). 
In addition, even where there may be something about the transitory foreign
substance to indicate its aging or deteriorated condition, some appellate decisions
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have precluded the jury from resolving the issue of constructive notice.  For
example, in Bates v. Winn Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1966), the case relied upon by both the Owens and Soriano majorities, the
plaintiff slipped on a banana peel and the only evidence of constructive knowledge
was that the peel was "dark, over ripe, black, old, and nasty looking."  182 So. 2d
309.  In affirming summary judgment for the grocery store, the Second District
explained:
To infer from the color and condition of the peeling alone that it had
been there a sufficient length of time to permit discovery, we would
first have to infer that the banana peel was not already black and
deteriorated when it reached the defendants' floor.  This is the type of
"mental gymnastics" prohibited by the [Food Fair Stores v.] Trusell
[131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961)] decision . . . since the latter inference,
under the circumstances, is not to the exclusion of all other reasonable
inferences. 
Id. at 311. 
Contrary to the Second, Fourth and Fifth Districts, the Third District has
held that a jury question was created based on the condition of the transitory
foreign substance, even though the plaintiff could not establish to the exclusion of
all other reasonable inferences that the condition of the substance resulted from the
length of time it was on the floor.  See Teate v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d
1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).  In Teate, the Third District held that evidence of the
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description of the substance was sufficient for the jury to infer constructive
knowledge:
Teate presented evidence that there was some water on the floor
around the peas.  Teate contends that the water was there because the
peas had been on the floor for some time and had thawed.  The jury
could believe this and find that the peas had been on the floor for a
sufficient time to put Winn-Dixie on notice of the dangerous condition. 
Winn-Dixie counters that the water was a result of "permafrost" or ice
crystals on the bag of peas that instantly melted when it hit the floor. 
The jury could choose to believe this argument, find the peas had
fallen perhaps only seconds before the fall, and decide that there was
insufficient notice.
Id. at 1061 (emphasis supplied).  Thus, the Third District determined that the jury
could decide whether the existence of the water around the peas was evidence of
the length of time the peas were on the floor, and accordingly, evidence of
constructive knowledge.  As to the grocery store's argument that the jury was being
required to speculate by building one inference on another, the Third District
explained:  
Since it was established that there was some water on the floor, it was
completely within the jury's province to decide why the water was
there.  The jury needed to draw only one inference from direct
evidence to reach a decision as to the defendant's constructive notice
of the condition.  It was entitled to believe Teate and to select the
inference that it did.
Id. (citations omitted).  See also Thoma v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.,
649 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (the fact that there might be a "plethora"
-16-
of reasonable inferences other than the inferences raised by appellants creates a jury
issue).  
Even by broadening the permissible inferences a jury may consider as a
result of the condition of the substance, the threshold question of whether a jury
issue is created in any given case may still depend on the transitory foreign
substance showing some signs of deterioration or aging.  Thus, with case law
making constructive notice of the dangerous condition the linchpin of liability, an
injured person's ability to establish constructive notice is often dependent on the
fortuitous circumstance of the observed condition of the substance.
2.  Mode of Operation Theory 
In contrast to cases that address whether the defendant had constructive
notice of the specific transitory foreign substance, we have on a limited basis
recognized that, by virtue of the nature of the business or its mode of operation, the
requirement of establishing constructive knowledge is altered or eliminated.  See
Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 35 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1948).  In Wells, the
plaintiff allegedly injured herself when she fell on an empty bottle in the aisle of the
grandstand of a dog track.  Id. at 720.  The dog track moved for a directed verdict,
claiming that the plaintiff was unable to establish either constructive or actual notice. 
In rejecting the position of the defendant, the Court explained:
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It is true that such a rule [requiring actual or constructive notice]
has been imposed on stores, banks, shops and other business places
of that character, but we think a different rule applies to a place of
amusement like a race track where patrons go by the thousand on
invitation of the proprietors, and are permitted to purchase and drink
bottled beverage of different kinds and set the empty bottles anywhere
they may find space to place them. . . .
Places of amusement where large crowds congregate are
required to keep their premises in reasonably safe condition
commensurate with the business conducted.  If the owner fails in this,
and such failure is the proximate result of injury to one lawfully on the
premises, compensatory damages may be recovered if the one injured
is not at fault.  One operating a place of amusement like a race course
where others are invited is charged with a continuous duty to look
after the safety of his patrons.  Both sanitary and physical safety of its
patrons require that receptacles be provided for bottles and that they
be so placed.
We do not mean to imply that they are insurers of the safety of
their patrons, but we do say that reasonable care as applied to a race
track requires a higher degree of diligence than it does when applied to
a store, bank or such like place of business.  
Id.  (citations omitted). 
Although this Court has never extended the mode of operation theory to a
supermarket or grocery store setting, neither has this Court specifically rejected the
mode of operation theory as a permissible theory of liability in these settings.  In
Carl's Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. 1953), for example, this
Court indicated that the mode of operation principle would extend to a supermarket
setting if the issue were properly pled.  In that case, we explained that the Wells
dog track or public amusement rule might be applicable to a supermarket or
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grocery store where the creator of a dangerous condition would necessarily know
about the condition and therefore be held responsible for his or her own creation. 
See Carl's Market, 69 So. 2d at 791.  We explained that in Wells the peculiar facts
made it unnecessary for the plaintiff to meet the burden of establishing actual or
constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  In that case it was manifest that the
defendant was selling bottled drinks, without providing a place for the deposit of
empty bottles which could be expected therefore to roll around underfoot and
become hazards to the unwary.  In other words, the dangerous obstacles were the
creations of the defendant who in effect was on notice as soon as the bottled
refreshments were sold.
Carl's Market, 69 So. 2d at 791.  We thus acknowledged that "if the plaintiffs could
convince the jury that the dangerous condition was created by persons connected
with the store the matter of notice was inconsequential."  Id. 
Despite this pronouncement, the First District has squarely rejected an
extension of the mode of operation theory to supermarkets.  See Rowe v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).  In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Lawrence disagreed, explaining:
The instant case is distinguishable from the usual slip-and-fall
case:  The defendant, in the usual case, is not charged with creating a
hazardous condition, but only with having actual or constructive
knowledge that such a condition exists.  The Rowes, by contrast,
allege that Winn-Dixie created the hazardous condition by negligently
operating the seafood salad display.  The Rowes urge that, despite
that it is undisputed that the seafood salad was spilled by a customer,
nevertheless Winn-Dixie created the risk that such spills would occur
by offering food samples without stationing an attendant at the display,
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and without providing eating utensils, napkins, or any waste receptacle.
Id. at 1182 (Lawrence, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).  Although no other
reported appellate case in Florida has squarely rejected the application of the
negligent mode of operation theory to a supermarket, at least two other appellate
cases have appeared to severely limit its application.  See Publix Super Market, Inc.
v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (store's operation of
demonstration table at which pieces of cake were made available for customers to
sample was not inherently dangerous and was not being operated in a negligent
manner even though at time plaintiff fell the demonstration table was not manned by
a Publix employee as was required by Publix store policy); Schaap v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 579 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (store's cookie
program was not "inherently dangerous" or conducted in a negligent manner). 
B.  Other Jurisdictions
In contrast to the focus on the constructive notice issue in Florida's premises
liability law, courts in other jurisdictions have embraced a variety of different
approaches that alter the traditional rules of premises liability.  Indeed, "the modern
status of the traditional principle includes 'a broad trend toward liberalizing the rules
restricting recovery by one injured on the premises of another.'"  Jackson v. K-Mart
Corp, 840 P.2d 463, 467 (Kan. 1992).  Although the approaches embraced by the
5  See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983); Gonzales v.
Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 326 So. 2d 486, 488 (La. 1976); 
6  See, e.g., Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc., 733 P.2d 283, 286
(Ariz. 1987).  
7  See, e.g., Gump v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 418 (Haw. Ct. App.
1999); affirmed in part, reversed in part, 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000); Pimentel v.
Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 891 (Wash. 1983).
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jurisdictions that have modernized the traditional principles of premises liability
have varied, certain historical observations and policy considerations have been
identified.  
As the Supreme Court of Washington has explained:  "The predominant
theme running through these cases appears to be that modern techniques of
merchandising necessitate some modification of the traditional rules of liability." 
Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 892 (Wash. 1983).  First, the evolution of
modern merchandise marketing techniques, including self-service, have increased
the  likelihood of spills and breaks occurring.5  Second, a store adopting the self-
service technique should reasonably anticipate certain types of accidents and
therefore is already on notice as to those accidents.6  Third, because the self-
service technique allows for lower overhead and greater profits, the businesses that
adopt the self-service technique are in a better position to prevent and attend to the
risks involved.7  Fourth, it is unfair to place the burden on the customer to establish
8  See, e.g., Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 221 A.2d 513, 514-15
(N.J. 1966).
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actual or constructive notice of the condition on the part of the premises owner or
operator when the defendant is in control of its own premises and the evidence on
which notice is based.8
Based on a variety of these policy considerations, the approaches courts
have adopted include a burden-shifting analysis, an application of the mode of
operation theory of negligence, and the elimination or modification of the
requirement of proving constructive notice of the specific transitory foreign
substance.  One of the earliest approaches has been to reallocate the burdens of
proof by adopting a burden-shifting analysis.  In Wollerman v. Grand Union
Stores, 221 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1966), the New Jersey Supreme Court based its
decisions to reallocate the burdens of proof on the superior knowledge that the
premises owner has when compared to the knowledge of the plaintiff and the
unequal positions of the plaintiff and the premises owner with respect to their
access to information about the cause of the accident.  That court stated:  
The customer is hardly in a position to know precisely which
was the neglect.  Overall the fair probability is that defendant did less
than its duty demanded, in one respect or another. At least the
probability is sufficient to permit such an inference in the absence of
evidence that defendant did all that a reasonably prudent man would
9  However, the Louisiana legislature subsequently overruled the court's
decisions by codifying the requirement of actual or constructive knowledge into
statute.  See 1990 La. Acts 1025, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.6 (West 1990).
-22-
do in the light of the risk of injury his operation entailed. It is just,
therefore, to place "the onus of producing evidence upon the party
who is possessed of superior knowledge or opportunity for
explanation of the causative circumstances."
Id. at 514-15 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Kahalili v. Rosecliff Reality, Inc., 141
A.2d 301, 307 (N.J. 1958)).  In summarizing the various justifications for shifting
the burden to storekeepers, the court concluded:
[W]here a substantial risk of injury is implicit in the manner in which a
business is conducted, and on the total scene it is fairly probable that
the operator is responsible either in creating the hazard or permitting it
to arise or to continue, it would be unjust to saddle the plaintiff with
the burden of isolating the precise failure. The situation being
peculiarly in the defendant's hands, it is fair to call upon the defendant
to explain, if he wishes to avoid an inference by the trier of the facts
that the fault probably was his.
 
Id. at 515 (emphasis supplied).  See also Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 200 A.2d 777,
781 (N.J. 1964) ("[I]t is appropriate to require defendants to come forward with
proof of the measures they took to deal with the probability that litter would fall and
accumulate.").
Louisiana also developed its own burden-shifting approach.9  In so doing,
the Louisiana Supreme Court focused on the nature of the operation of self-service
stores and how "[n]umerous items displayed upon shelving along the aisles or
-23-
walkways in self-service stores entice the customers to focus their eyes upon the
display rather than on the surface upon which they walk."  Kavlich v. Kramer, 315
So. 2d 282, 284 (La. 1975).  The court also explained that the self-service system
"increases the risk of harm from objects dropped on the floor by customers and,
correspondingly, the duty to minimize the risk by frequent inspections and
cleanups."  Gonzales v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 326 So. 2d 486, 488 (La.
1976).
Because of these modern-day realities, the Louisiana Supreme Court created
a rebuttable presumption of negligence that shifted the burden to the storeowner to
prove it was not negligent.  In Kavlich, the plaintiff slipped on a "piece of banana
about the size of a finger."  315 So. 2d at 284.  However, as the Court explained:  
[The plaintiff] was in no position to know under what circumstances
the piece of banana came to rest upon the floor.  She was in no
position to prove that the piece of banana rested on the floor because
the employees of the store were negligent.  She has established clearly
that the piece of banana was there when she entered the store; that she
stepped upon the piece of banana; and that it caused her to slip, fall,
and be injured.  The burden then shifts to the defendant to go forward
with the evidence to exculpate itself from the presumption that it was
negligent.
Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
-24-
That court enunciated the burden-shifting approach even more explicitly in
Gonzales, a case in which the plaintiff slipped on a spill of olive oil about two feet
in diameter:
[P]laintiffs established that there was a spill of olive oil about two feet
in diameter in the aisle where [the plaintiff] was shopping; that the oil
came from a broken bottle near the olive oil shelf; that she did not see
the oil spill; that she stepped into the olive oil; and that it caused her to
slip, fall, and be injured.
Upon proof of such facts . . . the duty of going forward with
the evidence to exculpate the store employees from negligence shifts
to the store owner.  When it appears that a third person dropped the
foreign substance, the store owner must establish that periodic
inspections made and other protective measures taken were
reasonable.  Implicit in the decision is a recognition that, in the self-
service system, customers are prone to drop objects on the floor and
that a customer who slips and falls on such an object is usually in no
position to establish how long it has been on the floor.
. . . .
. . . . If the evidence brought forward establishes that the store owner
is free from fault, there can be no liability.
326 So. 2d at 488-89 (emphasis added).  Thus, rather than requiring the plaintiff to
prove how long the olive oil was on the floor, the court placed the burden on the
store owner to prove that it took reasonable measures in the form of periodic
inspections and other protective measures consistent with the knowledge that this
type of risk is foreseeable in a self-service operation.  After the decisions in
Gonzales and Kavlich, the Louisiana Supreme Court expanded the evidentiary
burden placed on the store operator to present evidence "that his employees did
-25-
not cause the hazard and that he exercised such a degree of care that he would have
known under most circumstances of a hazard caused by customers."  Brown v.
Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 452 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. 1984), see also McCardie v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 511 So. 2d 1134, 1135-36 (La. 1987).
Like the courts in New Jersey and Louisiana, the Colorado Supreme Court
also has embraced burden-shifting by recognizing an exception to the notice
requirement where "the storekeeper's operating methods 'are such that dangerous
conditions are continuous or easily foreseeable.'"  Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith,
658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983) (quoting Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 494 So.
P.2d 839, 840 (Colo. 1972)).  The Colorado Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence when he
presents evidence that the nature of the defendant's business gives rise
to a substantial risk of injury to customers from slip-and-fall accident,
and that the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by such an
accident within the zone of risk.  It is then incumbent upon the
defendant to produce evidence that it exercised reasonable care under
the circumstances.  The ultimate decision whether the defendant
exercised such care is to be made by the finder of fact.
Smith, 658 P.2d at 258 (emphasis supplied).  
In Smith, the grocery store customer fell after "he stepped on a substance
that witnesses described as looking like hand lotion."  Id. at 256.  The substance
was not in an area where the store displayed the item.  See id. at 257 n.3.  However,
-26-
the Colorado Supreme Court cited both the New Jersey Supreme Court cases of
Wollerman and Bozza with approval and adopted the New Jersey burden-shifting
approach to a self-service supermarket.  See Smith 658 P.2d at 257-58.  In quoting
with approval from the Colorado Court of Appeals opinion, it found that the
absence of proof of actual or constructive notice was not critical:
[I]n a self-service grocery operation, the easy access to the
merchandise often results in its spillage and breakage. This, along with
the fact that a customer's attention understandably is focused on the
items displayed rather than on the floor, creates a dangerous
condition.  
Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).  The Colorado Supreme Court noted: 
The testimony of the store manager, who had 18 ½ years of
experience in Safeway stores, supports the court of appeals' statement
that spillage occurs frequently in self-service grocery stores.  He
acknowledged that it is common for food items to be dropped on the
floor by customers and not unusual that substances appear on the
floor in different aisles than where they are displayed.  The evidence
here was that the slippery substance was not among the items shelved
along the aisle in which the spillage occurred.
Id. at 257 n.3.
Echoing the sentiments of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the court
explained that: 
Our holding does not make the operator of a self-service
grocery store an insurer against all accidents on the premises.  The
proprietor is guilty of negligence only if he fails to use reasonable care
under the circumstances to discover the foreseeable dangerous
-27-
condition and to correct it or to warn customers of its existence.  We
believe, however, that it is unrealistic to require the victim of a fall
resulting from a dangerous condition in a self-service grocery store to
present evidence of the absence of reasonable care by the storekeeper.
The steps the storekeeper took to discover the condition and to
correct or warn of it are peculiarly within his own knowledge.
Id. at 258 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
  
Instead of the burden-shifting analysis, other jurisdictions have adopted a
negligent mode of operation theory of liability, which also eliminates the
requirement that the plaintiff prove actual or constructive notice of the specific
transitory condition.  As described by the Arizona Supreme Court: 
The "mode-of-operation" rule looks to a business's choice of a
particular mode of operation and not events surrounding the plaintiff's
accident.  Under this rule, the plaintiff is not required to prove notice if
the proprietor could reasonably anticipate that hazardous conditions
would regularly arise.
Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc., 733 P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. 1987); see
also Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1995)
("Pursuant to the 'mode of operation' rule, the conduct of customers is imputed to
the store owner by reason of the store owner's choice of customer self-service as a
mode of operation."); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 893 (Wash. 1983)
("[Actual or constructive notice] need not be shown . . . when the nature of the
proprietor's business and his methods of operation are such that the existence of
-28-
unsafe conditions on the premises is reasonably foreseeable."); Gump, 5 P.3d at
434 (adopting the mode of operation theory as "a logical extension of the traditional
rule of liability"); Jackson, 840 P.2d at 470 (explaining that the mode of operation
theory applies to those accidents caused by a dangerous condition that was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mode of operation).
Still other jurisdictions have declined to eliminate entirely the constructive
notice requirement, but have reduced the difficulty for the plaintiff to satisfy that
requirement.  Some jurisdictions, for example, have eliminated the requirement of
proof that the condition had existed for an extended period of time before the fall
occurred.  See generally, Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Store or Business
Premises Slip-and-Fall:  Modern Status of Rules Requiring Showing of Notice of
Proprietor of Transitory Interior Condition Allegedly Causing Plaintiff's Fall, 85
A.L.R.3d 1000, 1006 (1978); Strack v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 150
N.W.2d 361, 364 (Wis. 1967); see also Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264
A.2d 796, 799-800 (Vt. 1970) (explicitly refusing to eliminate the notice requirement
or to adopt the burden-shifting analysis, but nonetheless holding that the failure of
the defendant to produce evidence that it took reasonable precautions created a jury
issue as to whether the defendant exercised reasonable care under the
circumstances).  
-29-
These cases clearly establish the modern jurisprudential trend of departing
from the traditional rule of premises liability when a plaintiff slips and falls on a
transitory foreign substance.  Indeed, courts have explicitly recognized the
unfairness of a plaintiff having to establish that the premises owner or operator had
constructive notice of the specific transitory foreign substance.  This is especially
true when the very nature of that business is, like supermarkets, one in which
transitory foreign substances regularly fall to the floors and where the risk of
customers slipping as a result of these hazards is a foreseeable one.  With this
overview, we now turn to the appropriate resolution of Owens and Soriano and
whether the traditional rules of premises liability should be altered.
C.  The Cases on Review
In both Owens and Soriano, a piece of banana was located where it should
not have been--on the floor of a supermarket.  In each case, the customer slipped
and fell and received injuries because of the presence of the banana.  Neither
Owens nor Soriano was in any position to know the circumstances that placed the
piece of banana on the floor prior to her fall; nor was either one of them in any
position to prove that the piece of banana was on the floor because of the
negligence of store employees.  In both cases, the piece of banana appeared to be
aging, but the appellate courts concluded that, without more, the plaintiff could not
-30-
establish that the aging occurred on the floor to the exclusion of all other reasonable
inferences.
We reach several conclusions in these cases.  First, we conclude that the
granting of the directed verdicts was erroneous.  In both Owens and Soriano,
evidence of the deteriorated condition of the foreign substance provided a
sufficient basis for the plaintiffs in these cases to survive a directed verdict.  An
appellate court reviewing the grant of a directed verdict must view the evidence and
all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and can
affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a
verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.  See Frenz Enters., Inc. v. Port
Everglades, 746 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  
The aging condition of the banana in each case gave rise to a reasonable
inference that the aging occurred on the floor.  If the aging occurred on the floor,
this would provide circumstantial evidence of constructive notice; that is, that it was
on the floor a sufficient period of time so that the defendant knew or should have
known of its existence.  As the Third District recognized in Teate, the mere fact that
there may be alternative explanations inconsistent with the deterioration occurring
on the floor does not render the circumstantial evidence of constructive knowledge
fatally deficient.  524 So. 2d at 1061.  Rather, the condition of the substance gives
-31-
rise to an inference that the aging occurred on the floor and allows the jury to make
the ultimate factual determination as to whether the dangerous condition resulted
from the store's failure to properly maintain and inspect the floors.  This analysis is
consistent with our opinion in Montgomery.  We find that the Second District's
reliance in Bates upon Trusell to be misplaced.  See Bates, 182 So. 2d at 311. 
Thus, we disapprove of the reasoning of Bates, which was followed in Owens and
Soriano, and we approve Judge Sharp's dissent in Owens.    
Although we
determine that the granting of the directed verdict in these cases was erroneous, our
review of the myriad number of cases dealing with transitory foreign substances
demonstrates to us that instead of focusing on the duty of the premises owner to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, courts have instead focused
on the ability of the plaintiff to prove actual or constructive knowledge of an unsafe
condition.  The shortcomings of the traditional premises liability rule as it has been
applied are apparent; particularly that the burden is placed on the plaintiff to prove
that the owner had constructive knowledge of the specific transitory foreign
substance.  More specifically, all too often, the outcome of whether the case will be
decided by the jury depends on the exact description of the transitory foreign
substance.  As both of the cases on review demonstrate, because a plaintiff is often
unable to establish when the area was last maintained, the defendant benefits from
-32-
its own lack of record-keeping.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in
Wollerman, it is unfair to place the burden on a customer to establish actual or
constructive notice on the part of the premises owner who is in control of its own
premises and the evidence on which notice is based.  See Wollerman, 221 A.2d at
514.  
For example, Soriano presented evidence not only of the condition of the
banana, but also that there was a total lack of record-keeping and that the store had
no way of knowing when it last swept the area.  Thus, the question raised is
whether the store should benefit from its own lack of record-keeping and whether
the lack of evidence as to reasonable precautions taken should raise an inference
that the store did not exercise that degree of care commensurate with the
foreseeable risk of injury.  In addition, with regard to foreseeability, the former
manager in Soriano testified that it was common for customers to eat food before
they got to the cash registers; on occasion customers would eat the fruit that was
for sale; and on occasion customers would drop the food they were eating.  
"Florida, like other jurisdictions, recognizes that a legal duty will arise
whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of harming
others."  McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992).  It is
undisputed that under Florida law, all premises owners owe a duty to their invitees
-33-
to exercise reasonable care to maintain their premises in a safe condition.  The
existence of a transitory foreign substance on the floor is not a safe condition.   
Having surveyed cases in this State as well as in other jurisdictions, we
conclude that modern-day supermarkets, self-service marts, cafeterias, fast-food
restaurants and other business premises should be aware of the potentially
hazardous conditions that arise from the way in which they conduct their business. 
Indeed, the very operation of many of these types of establishments requires that
the customers select merchandise directly from the store's displays, which are
arranged to invite customers to focus on the displays and not on the floors.  In
addition, the premises owners are in a superior position to establish that they did or
did not regularly maintain the premises in a safe condition and they are generally in a
superior position to ascertain what occurred by making an immediate investigation,
interviewing witnesses and taking photographs.  In each of these cases, the nature
of the defendant's business gives rise to a substantial risk of injury to customers
from slip-and-fall accidents and that the plaintiff's injury was caused by such an
accident within the zone of risk.
All of these factors lead us to conclude that premises liability cases involving
transitory foreign substances are appropriate cases for shifting the burden to the
premises owner or operator to establish that it exercised reasonable care under the
-34-
circumstances, eliminating the specific requirement that the customer establish that
the store had constructive knowledge of its existence in order for the case to be
presented to the jury.  Presumptions, which are created either judicially or
legislatively and arise from considerations of fairness, public policy, and
probability, are used to allocate the burden of proof.  See generally Charles W.
Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 301.1 (2000 ed.) 
Accordingly, we adopt the following holding to be applied to slip-and-fall
cases in business premises involving transitory foreign substances.  We hold that
the existence of a foreign substance on the floor of a business premises that causes
a customer to fall and be injured is not a safe condition and the existence of that
unsafe condition creates a rebuttable presumption that the premises owner did not
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.  
Thus, once the plaintiff establishes that he or she fell as a result of a
transitory foreign substance, a rebuttable presumption of negligence arises.  At that
point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show by the greater weight of evidence
that it exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises under the
10  The presumption is one affecting the burden of proof pursuant to section
90.304, Florida Statutes (2000).  As we explained in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand &
Associates, 780 So. 2d 45, 59 n.20 (Fla. 2001):   
Section 90.304 provides that "in civil actions, all rebuttable
presumptions which are not defined in s. 90.303 are presumptions
affecting the burden of proof."  Pursuant to section 90.302(2), a
presumption affecting the burden of proof "imposes upon the party
against whom it operates the burden of proof concerning the
nonexistence of the presumed fact."  Thus, when evidence rebutting
such a presumption is introduced, the presumption does not
automatically disappear.  It is not overcome until the trier of fact
believes that the presumed fact has been overcome by whatever
degree of persuasion is required by the substantive law of the case. 
See generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, §§ 302.1, 302.2,
303.1, 304.1 (2000 ed.).
-35-
circumstances.10  The circumstances could include the nature of the specific hazard
and the nature of the defendant's business.  
This shift away from the artificial requirement that the injured person
establish how long a transitory foreign substance was on the floor of the
defendant's premises makes sense from a policy viewpoint because it will prevent
premises owners or operators from benefitting from their absence of record-
keeping and it will increase the incentive for them to take protective measures to
prevent foreseeable risks.  This opinion shall be applicable to all cases commenced
-36-
after the decision becomes final and those cases already commenced, but in which
trial has not yet begun.
We emphasize that this burden-shifting does not eliminate the plaintiff's
burden of proving that the slip and fall accident was the cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.  We also emphasize that this holding does not render the premises owners
or operators strictly liable for the injury.  The ultimate question for the jury is
whether the premises owner or operator exercised reasonable care in maintaining its
premises in a safe condition. 
As to the theory of mode of operation rejected by the Fourth District and
raised by the Sorianos as an issue on appeal in this Court, in accordance with our
precedent, we recognize the continued viability of the mode of operation theory.  If
the evidence establishes a specific negligent mode of operation such that the
premises owner could reasonably anticipate that dangerous conditions would arise
as a result of its mode of operation, then whether the owner had actual or
constructive knowledge of the specific transitory foreign substance is not an issue. 
The dispositive issue is whether the specific method of operation was negligent and
whether the accident occurred as a result of that negligence.  To the extent that
Rowe, Schapp, and Sanchez reject or limit the application of the mode of operation
theory, we disapprove those decisions.
 
11  In light of our disposition in this case, the remaining issues are moot.
-37-
Nonetheless, we conclude that in Soriano, although the plaintiffs alleged a
negligent mode of operation, the evidence the plaintiffs produced to support such a
theory was that B & B employees had failed to timely fill out inspection reports and
sweep on a regular basis.  This evidence amounts to no more than a general claim
of negligence in the maintenance of the premises and does not support a more
specific claim of negligent mode of operation in this case.
In conclusion, we hold that in this case, the directed verdicts were
erroneously entered because the condition of the banana raised a basis for
establishing the store's constructive knowledge.  Whether the aging occurred before
the banana fell or whether the aging occurred on the floor is an issue for the jury, as
are the reasonable inferences from the failure to sweep the floors regularly.
Upon remand in each case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it
exercised reasonable care by properly maintaining and inspecting the premises.  For
the reasons we expressed above, we quash the decisions of the Fifth District in
Owens and the Fourth District in Soriano, and we remand these cases for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.11 
It is so ordered.
-38-
SHAW, ANSTEAD, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
HARDING, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J.,
concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in result only.
I concur with the result reached by the majority and with the burden shifting
discussion, which I conclude is the crux of the majority’s opinion.  I cannot join in
the majority opinion.  Specifically, I do not join in the majority’s discussion of the
viability of the mode of operation theory.  
This case presents the Court with the opportunity to reexamine this Court’s
doctrine, which has consumed inordinate judicial labor in our trial courts during
almost the entirety of the second half of the past century.  Almost every Florida tort
lawyer who has practiced tort law for any length of time since the 1950s has
struggled with the application of the rules of this Court’s decisions in Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961); Food Fair Stores of Florida,
Inc. v. Patty, 109 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1959); and Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So.
2d 789 (Fla. 1953).  In Patty, this Court stated the rule to be:
-39-
The established rule in this state is that if the dangerous condition of
the floor is created by a servant or agent of the owner, or even if
created by an outsider, and the condition is one which has existed for
sufficient length of time that the owner should have known of it, then
under these circumstances the owner may be held liable for ensuing
injuries.
Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Patty, 109 So. 2d at 6 (emphasis added).
In Trusell, this Court clarified that there would always be actual knowledge if
the dangerous condition was created by the owner’s employee or agent.  However,
the debate constantly repeats as to what evidence is sufficient to demonstrate
sufficient constructive knowledge on the part of a store’s owner to have the
owner’s liability decided by a jury.
I conclude that the rule of these cases needs to be reexamined and changed
because:  (1) the rule has proven to be too difficult to administer, resulting in
differing results as to the same facts and has had to be the subject of such
substantial and continuing appellate labor; (2) the rule fails to take into
consideration that the Court has moved from contributory negligence as a defense,
barring all recoveries, to comparative negligence, which is a doctrine of
apportionment of fault; (3) the Legislature and this Court have adopted the doctrine
of apportionment of fault by juries; and (4) the public, as consumers, have an
expectancy that store owners will provide safe places to shop, bear the burden of
-40-
protecting consumers against injuries while they shop, and price into their
commodities the costs of that protection and paying for injuries that result to the
customers from unsafe conditions on their premises.
The fundamental duty in these cases is a duty on the part of the store owner
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.  It is this duty which should
be the central to the legal doctrine in theses cases–not the store owner’s
constructive knowledge of an unsafe condition.  A foreign object on the floor in a
store which causes a customer to fall and be injured is simply not a safe condition. 
Proof of an unsafe condition should be a sufficient prima facie showing of the store
owner’s breach of duty.  Thus, it is logical that when such a condition is shown to
have existed, resulting in a fall and injury, the burden of overcoming this prima facie
case should be on the store owner.  I agree that the store owner can reduce its
percentage of liability or even in some instances overcome this prima facie case by
evidence of the store owner’s lack of knowledge of the condition, reasonable care
in attempting to guard against the unsafe condition, and warning of such a
condition.  Issues of care in respect to whether the store owner or the plaintiff
should have known about the condition are really issues subsumed within
apportionment of fault rather than duty.  This occurs through the store owner’s
liability being reduced by proving the customer’s comparative negligence.  But all
-41-
of these issues are rightly for the jury to decide as a matter of fact, not for the judge
to decide as a matter of law.
In sum, I believe this decision can and should be accomplished by a
succinct, straight-forward receding from the constructive knowledge portion of the
rule of the store owner’s liability.
HARDING, J., concurring in result only.
Based on Teate v. Winn Dixie Stores, 524 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988),
I agree with the majority that evidence of the deteriorated condition of a banana
provides a sufficient basis for the jury to make the ultimate factual determination as
to whether the dangerous condition resulted from the store’s failure to properly
maintain or inspect the floors.  Accordingly, I agree that the granting of the directed
verdicts in these cases was erroneous and, thus, agree with the majority’s decision
to quash the decisions below.  However, I would go no further.  The majority’s
discussion regarding “the shortcomings of traditional premises liability” is
supervenient and not necessary to the resolution of these cases.  By doing as such,
the majority goes too far in deciding the cases at hand and essentially rewrites
Florida’s law regarding slip-and-fall cases. 
LEWIS, J., concurs.
-42-
Two Cases Consolidated - 
Applications for Review of the Decisions of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D98-683
and Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-1668 
(Orange and Palm Beach Counties)
B.C. Muszynski, Kissimmee, Florida; and Bambi G. Blum, Miami, Florida, and Simon
& Dondero, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioners
Michael V. Hammond and Richard S. Womble of Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett, Hurt,
Donahue & McLain, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
for Respondents
Joseph H. Williams of Troutman, Williams, Irvin, Green & Helms, P.A., Winter Park,
Florida, 
for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae, in support of
Elvira Soriano, et al., Petitioners