Title: Bennett v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 310, 2019
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARCUS BENNETT, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§    No. 310, 2019 
§ 
§    Court Below–Superior Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§    Cr. ID. No. 1705009232 (S) 
§   
§   
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 29, 2019 
Decided:   October 11, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Marcus Bennett, appeals from the Superior Court’s 
judgment denying his first motion for postconviction relief filed under Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State has filed a motion to affirm the 
judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Bennett’s opening 
brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Bennett was indicted on one count of 
manslaughter, one count of first degree vehicular homicide, three counts of first 
degree reckless endangering, one count of driving a motor vehicle while under the 
 
2 
influence of alcohol, one count of driving a motor vehicle while his license was 
suspended or revoked, one count of criminal mischief causing damage in an amount 
less than $1,000, and four additional traffic offenses.  On September 5, 2017, Bennett 
entered a Robinson plea1 to the charge of manslaughter and the State nolle 
prosequied the remaining charges.  On October 27, 2017, the Superior Court 
sentenced Bennett to twenty-five years, suspended after ten years and the successful 
completion of the Key Program, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.  
Bennett did not appeal and his conviction became final on November 26, 2017.2 
(3) 
On April 1, 2019, Bennett filed his first motion for postconviction relief 
along with a request that the Superior Court appoint counsel to represent him in the 
postconviction proceedings.  Bennett asserted his trial attorney was ineffective for 
(i) failing to notify him of his right to appeal; and (ii) giving Bennett the “bad advice” 
to accept the State’s plea offer.  The Superior Court concluded Bennett’s motion was 
procedurally barred because it was untimely filed and Bennett had failed to satisfy 
the pleading requirements necessary to overcome the procedural bar.   Accordingly, 
the Superior Court denied the motion and Bennett’s request for appointment of 
counsel.  This appeal followed. 
                                                 
1 Robinson v. State, 291 A.2d 279 (Del. 1972) (permitting the acceptance of a guilty plea in the 
absence of an admission of guilt). 
2 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m) (providing that a judgment of conviction becomes final thirty 
days after the Superior Court imposes a sentence if the defendant does not file a direct appeal). 
 
3 
(4) 
In reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction 
relief, this Court must first consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before 
it may consider the merits of any postconviction claims.3  Rule 61(i)(1), in relevant 
part, requires a motion for postconviction relief to be filed within one year after a 
conviction becomes final.4  Under Rule 61(i)(5), the one year limitations period does 
not apply to a claim that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that 
satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2), which requires a defendant to 
plead with particularity that: (i) new evidence exists that creates a strong inference 
that the defendant is actually innocent; or (ii) a new retroactive constitutional rule of 
law applies to invalidate the defendant’s convictions.5 
(5) 
Bennett’s motion is procedurally barred as untimely filed because it 
was filed more than one year after his conviction became final.  For the first time on 
appeal, Bennett argues that a decision handed down by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Mack v. Superintendent Mahoney SCI6 created a 
“new rule of retroactive right” sufficient to excuse his procedural default under Rule 
61.  We generally will not entertain an argument raised for the first time on appeal.7  
                                                 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
5 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 
6 714 F. App’x 151 (3rd Cir. 2017). 
7 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”). 
 
4 
In any event, Bennett’s argument is unavailing.  The Mack decision did not create a 
new rule of constitutional law; the Third Circuit merely applied the United States 
Supreme Court precedent of Martinez v. Ryan8 to the facts before it.9  We have 
previously held that Martinez did not create a newly-recognized retroactive right to 
counsel entitling a movant to overcome Rule 61’s procedural bars.10 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
8 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
9 Mack, 714 F. App’x, at 152 (“We too agree that Martinez applies . . . .”). 
10 Roten v. State, 2013 WL 5808236, at *1 (Del. Oct. 28, 2013) (“Martinez does not hold that there 
is a federal constitutional right to counsel in first postconviction proceedings.”).