Title: Ex Parte Windsor
Citation: 683 So. 2d 1042
Docket Number: 1931643
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 23, 1996

683 So. 2d 1042 (1996)
Ex parte Harvey Lee WINDSOR.
(Re Harvey Lee Windsor v. State).
1931643.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 23, 1996.
Rehearing Denied October 18, 1996.
*1044 Kathryn V. Stanley, Montgomery, Hugh Holladay, Pell City, and Ray Lowery, Pell City, for Petitioner.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Gilda Branch Williams, Deputy Atty. Gen., for Respondent.
COOK, Justice.
Harvey Lee Windsor was convicted on June 12, 1992, of the capital murder of Rayford Howard. The murder occurred during the course of a robbery of a convenience store. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously recommended that Windsor be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the recommendation. Initially, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial Windsor v. State, 683 So. 2d 1013 (Ala.Cr. App.1993); however, this Court granted the State's petition for the writ of certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Windsor v. State, 683 So. 2d 1021 (Ala.1994). Thereafter, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Windsor's conviction. See Ex parte Windsor, 683 So. 2d 1027 (Ala.Cr.App.1994). We have now granted Windsor's petition for certiorari review. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
At trial, the State offered evidence that Harvey Lee Windsor and an accomplice, Colon Lavon Guthrie, robbed two convenience stores. The owner of each store was fatally shot. This appeal addresses Windsor's conviction for the capital murder of Rayford Howard, who was killed in the first of those two robberies. The statement of facts set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals in its June 17, 1994, opinion included the following:
683 So. 2d  at 1030.
Windsor argues that the indictment charging him with capital murder was fatally defective. We hereby adopt the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals in its June 17, 1994, opinion, in holding that the indictment was not constitutionally vague or fatally defective. That court stated:
683 So. 2d  at 1032. See also Acres v. State, 548 So. 2d 459, 462-64 (Ala.Cr.App.1987).
Windsor contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a change of venue and that its failure to do so constituted reversible error. We disagree.
Buskey v. State, 650 So. 2d 605, 609-10 (Ala. Cr.App.1994). The trial judge questioned the veniremembers regarding their knowledge of the facts of this case. The lack of response he received when he asked which members of the venire were familiar with the case supports his denial of the motion for a change of venue. There was no abuse of discretion.
Windsor contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a continuance on the date of trial. The record indicates that the defendant was represented by two attorneys, Mr. Lowery and Mr. Holladay. On the day of trial, the defense sought *1047 to obtain a continuance when Mr. Doyle, of the Capital Representation Resource Center, agreed to assist in defending Windsor if a continuance could be obtained. The continuance was sought to allow Mr. Doyle time to prepare for the trial. Upon questioning by the judge, Mr. Doyle indicated that he had not filed a notice of appearance earlier because he had thought a plea agreement had been reached. The following occurred:
R.T. at 37-38. Whether to grant or to deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Arnold v. State, 601 So. 2d 145, 156 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). Windsor was represented by two attorneys. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing on the day of trial to grant a continuance in order for an additional attorney to join in Windsor's defense.
Windsor contends that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse a potential juror for cause, on the basis that she had expressed a concern regarding crime and because she knew the assistant district attorney, Lamar Williamson. We have written:
Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1989). See also Jenkins v. State, 627 So. 2d 1034, 1043 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). The potential juror of whom Windsor complains was questioned as follows:
On voir dire, Juror B. stated that she felt that she could listen to the evidence and return an impartial verdict. The trial court was in the best position to determine whether she should be stricken for cause. "A trial judge's ruling on a challenge for cause is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous and represents an abuse of discretion." Ex parte Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73, 82 (Ala.1995), citing Morrison v. State, 601 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Cr.App.1992), and Hunter v. State, 585 So. 2d 220 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). Considering the evidence pertinent to the question, we conclude that the failure to grant Windsor's challenge for cause was not clearly erroneous.
Windsor next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to hold that the State had improperly used 9 of its 17 strikes to remove women from the jury venire. After the trial in this case, the United States Supreme Court, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994), extended the principle of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), to apply to gender-based strikes. Since J.E.B., several cases have been remanded for Batson-type hearings pursuant to allegations that the State used its strikes in a discriminatory way against females on the jury venire. See Hemphill v. State, 669 So. 2d 1020 (Ala.Cr.App.1995); Roy v. State, 680 So. 2d 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1995); Allen v. State, 659 So. 2d 135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Morris v. City of Dothan, 659 So. 2d 979 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); Talley v. State, 669 So. 2d 1006 (Ala.Cr.App.1994).
The trial court anticipated that gender-based strikes would one day be subject to scrutiny. In determining that the defendant had not made a prima facie case of discrimination based on gender, the court stated:
R.T. at 290-92. "A circuit court's ruling on a Batson objection is entitled to great deference, and we will reverse a circuit court's Batson findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Branch, 526 So. 2d  at 625-26." Ex parte Thomas, 659 So. 2d 3, 8 (Ala.1994). In Thomas, this Court disapproved of determining whether a prima facie case was made by comparing statistics on the number of blacks on a jury to the number of blacks on the venire. We also stated:
Ex parte Thomas, 659 So. 2d  at 8. In determining that no prima facie case was made of gender-based discrimination in this case, the trial court considered, in addition to statistics, whether the defendant had proven a pattern of strikes that suggested discrimination. We hold, under the circumstances of this case, that an inference of discrimination was not established where 9 of 17 peremptory strikes were used to remove females from the jury venire. The trial court's finding that the defendant made no prima facie case of gender-based discrimination was not clearly erroneous.
Windsor also contends that the State discriminatorily struck 2 of 4 African-Americans from the jury venire. The remaining two African-Americans served on the jury. The following occurred:
R.T. at 287-90. Based on a review of the record, we conclude that the reasons given by the prosecutor were race-neutral and that the striking of the two African-Americans from the jury did not violate Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986); Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala.1987); or Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991).
Windsor contends that the in-court identifications of him by Tommy Pepper and Sammie Sue Osborne should not have been allowed because, he argues, those witnesses had previously been exposed to impermissibly suggestive photographs. (He makes a similar argument regarding Bobbie Sue Osborne. However, Bobbie Sue Osborne made no in-court identification; therefore, any allegation of error in this regard is misplaced.) In considering whether the in-court identifications in this case should have been excluded, we note:
Tommy Pepper identified the defendant Windsor in a photographic lineup and then identified him in the courtroom as the man he had seen running from his father's Lawrence County store on the night of his father's murder. Windsor contends that because Pepper had told an officer he had seen Windsor's picture in the newspaper before seeing the photographic lineup, his identification of Windsor in that lineup, as well as his in-court identification of Windsor, was, therefore, tainted. The trial court disagreed, stating:
R.T. at 728. The trial court found that Pepper's in-court identification was independent of his identification of the defendant from the photographic lineup and that the photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive. This finding is supported by Pepper's testimony that, although he did not recall telling anyone that he had seen the defendant's picture in the paper before identifying the defendant in the photographic lineup, he got a good look at the defendant on the evening of the crime and his identification of him was independent of the photographs. The trial court did not err in allowing Pepper to identify the defendant or in admitting evidence of the out-of-court identification.
Sammie Sue Osborne testified that she had seen Colon Lavon Guthrie and a friend of Guthrie's, whom Guthrie called "Harvey,"[1] at her home on February 25, 1988. She testified that on that occasion Windsor sat across from her at the kitchen table. Like Pepper, she also testified that her in-court identification was based on an independent recollection; specifically that her independent recollection was based on the defendant's visit to her home. Under the facts, we conclude that the identification was reliable, and we note that the record contains no evidence suggesting misidentification.
Windsor argues that the "be on the lookout" bulletin ("BOLO") issued by law enforcement officials to officers in North Alabama and Tennessee was not based on an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" and that, therefore, his arrest, which occurred pursuant to that bulletin, was illegal. Thus, he argues, Randall Pepper's pistol, the sawed-off shotgun, and other evidence recovered from the car should not have been admitted into evidence because, he argues, they were fruits of an illegal search. The BOLO, asking officers to be on the lookout for men resembling the bulletin description, contained a photograph of Windsor and *1052 Guthrie and described the vehicle in which they were thought to be traveling. The BOLO alerted the Tennessee police officer who spotted the two men asleep in a car matching the description given in the bulletin, at a rest area on or about March 6, 1988. The car was backed into the parking space, with the front tires sharply turned toward the exit ramp of the rest area. One of the occupants of the car was wearing a dark-colored ball cap, as described in the bulletin. The officer called for reinforcements. Windsor and Guthrie were thereafter arrested and charged with the murder of Rayford Howard.
Windsor contends that the admission of the items recovered from the car into evidence was improper because, he argues, the Tennessee officer did not have probable cause to arrest him. The State, on the other hand, argues that the bulletin issued by Alabama officials was based on a warrant and that the Tennessee officer had a right to rely on that bulletin.
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S. Ct. 675, 682, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). The evidence offered at trial indicated that a black Ford Mustang automobile with the word "Boss" on the side was reported as being driven erratically in St. Clair County on the day Rayford Howard was murdered. The tag number of that vehicle was reported to the police. That same car was seen later that day in Marshall County and at Tommy's Store in Lawrence County. Sammie Sue Osborne identified Windsor as having visited her house on the date of the murder. He was with Guthrie, and the two men were in the Mustang automobile with the word "Boss" written on it. Windsor's uncle testified that the tag bearing the number reported to the police had been on one of his cars immediately before he had a visit from Windsor. Shortly after Windsor's visit, the uncle noted that the same tag was no longer on his car.
We have reviewed the record in this case and we conclude that the events leading up to the arrest of Windsor, as evidenced by the testimony of the witnesses at trial, provided probable cause for the officer to connect Windsor and Guthrie with the robbery/murder of Rayford Howard. The BOLO identified the men by photograph and described the car in which they were traveling. The officer making the arrest did rely on the information in the BOLO in arresting Windsor and Guthrie. The items recovered from the car were not discovered as the result of an illegal arrest; therefore, they were properly admitted into evidence.
Windsor argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to offer evidence that Windsor participated in the robbery and murder of Randall Earl Pepper, which occurred on the same day as the robbery and murder of Rayford Howard. The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this issue as follows in its June 17, 1994, opinion:
"Rowell v. State, 570 So. 2d 848, 852 (Ala. Cr.App.1990).
683 So. 2d  at 1035. We agree with the analysis of the evidence by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The robbery and murder of Rayford Howard and the robbery and murder of Randall Earl Pepper occurred only hours apart, on the same day. Both victims were convenience store owners, and the crimes were factually similar. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence regarding Windsor's participation in the robbery and murder of Randall Earl Pepper.
Windsor contends that the trial court erred in allowing Bobbie Sue Osborne and Sammie Sue Osborne to testify that they heard Colon Lavon Guthrie refer to his companion as "Harvey" when the two men visited Bobbie Sue's house and when they visited Sammie Sue's house. The record indicates that any error was not objected to during the defendant's trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals, reviewing this issue in accordance with the plain error rule, see Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P., found no error. That court, in its June 17, 1994, opinion, quoted C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence:
683 So. 2d  at 1034. We note the following statements from the Court of Criminal Appeals:
Ferguson v. State, 401 So. 2d 204, 207-08 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), quoting Abercrombie v. State, 382 So. 2d 614 (Ala.Cr.App.1980). The testimony of Bobbie Sue Osborne and Sammie Sue Osborne was offered to identify Windsor and to place the two men together. Because the testimony was offered to establish identitythat the man with Guthrie on the two occasions was this defendant, Harvey Lee Windsorit was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule.
Windsor argues that the security measures taken at his trial, and, in particular, in front of one panel of the jury venire, were prejudicial to him. Defense counsel made the following objection:
R.T. at 259-64.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has written:
Goodwin v. State, 495 So. 2d 731, 733 (Ala.Cr. App.1986). The trial judge did not witness the incident the defendant says was prejudicial. Furthermore, defense counsel did not immediately bring the alleged incident to the court's attention. Considering the fact that Windsor was charged with a capital offense, we conclude that the number of guards in the courtroom was not excessive. There having been no abuse of the trial court's discretion in this regard, no reversible error occurred.
Windsor contends that the State violated a pre-trial discovery order when it failed to produce photographic enlargements of certain palm prints and fingerprints of the defendant. The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury and made the following determination:
The Court of Criminal Appeals found "no evidence that the State failed to make that evidence available as soon as practicable in this case." 683 So. 2d  at 1034. The trial judge gave the defense additional time to examine the materials before allowing the State to present testimony in relation thereto. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that there was no violation of the discovery order.
Windsor contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the *1056 crime of capital murder because, he argues, the evidence offered against him at trial was almost entirely circumstantial. The Court of Criminal Appeals has written:
Jenkins v. State, 627 So. 2d 1034, 1040 (Ala. Cr.App.1992). The evidence offered at the trial placed Harvey Lee Windsor in the company of Colon Lavon Guthrie on the date of the crime. The two men were identified as being in a Ford Mustang automobile bearing the word "Boss" and matching the description of the vehicle used by the suspects, and bearing a license plate that had been on an automobile in the yard of Windsor's uncle. The Mustang automobile, when the police recovered it, contained articles tying the automobile and Windsor to the murder of Rayford Howard. A review of the record convinces this Court that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Harvey Lee Windsor guilty of the capital murder of Rayford Howard.
Windsor contends that the trial court committed error when charging the jury on the theory of complicity because, he argues, the jury was not instructed that the intent to rob was a necessary element of the crime. The jury was charged as follows:
R.T. at 1056-57 (emphasis added). Previously, the trial court had defined robbery in the first degree as follows:
Windsor contends that the trial judge should have charged the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter and that the trial court's failure to do so requires a reversal of his conviction. In support of his argument, Windsor contends that several witnesses testified that he had been consuming alcoholic beverages on the day Rayford Howard was murdered. He cites Anderson v. State, 507 So. 2d 580 (Ala.Cr.App.1987):
507 So. 2d  at 584. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that this issue was not presented to the trial court and, therefore, it reviewed the alleged error in light of the plain error doctrine, Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated, in its June 17, 1994, opinion:
683 So. 2d  at 1037. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find no plain error in the court's not charging the jury with regard to manslaughter and voluntary intoxication.
Windsor contends that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury that Windsor could not be convicted of capital murder if it found that the intent to commit robbery was formed after Howard's death. Because Windsor did not raise this issue at trial, we review it pursuant to the plain error doctrine.
Hallford v. State, 548 So. 2d 526, 534-35 (Ala. Cr.App.1988). The trial court charged the jury as follows:
R.T. at 1053-56. The jury was instructed that the intentional murder had to occur during the course of a robbery in the first degree. By giving these instructions, the trial judge adequately apprised the jurors of the facts under which they could find the defendant guilty of capital murder.
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the State relied on only one aggravating circumstance, specifically, that the capital offense occurred during the commission of a first degree robbery. Windsor contends that this "double-counting" is unconstitutional.
Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 965-66 (Ala.Cr. App.1992). See also Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 641 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). The trial court correctly considered the robbery as an aggravating circumstance.
Windsor argues that he was precluded from introducing certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial. In particular, he argues that his mother was not allowed to testify regarding statements doctors made to her following a motorcycle wreck involving Windsor. We hereby adopt the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which addressed this issue as follows:
683 So. 2d  at 1038. Mrs. Windsor testified at the hearing that "[if Windsor] done anything, he did not know he was doing it. That is all I can say. Before he had that accident, he was a healthy, happy man. He could do anything he set his mind to do. All I can say is he is not the same." R.T. at 1094. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, although the trial court did err, because Mrs. Windsor testified extensively with regard to the effects the accident had on the defendant no plain error occurred.
Windsor also argues that the State made several prejudicial remarks during the sentencing hearing and that those remarks require a reversal. Specifically, Windsor contends that the State improperly urged the jury to disregard any mitigating evidence; that the State misled the jury into believing that the death penalty was mandatory; that the State referred to Windsor in inflammatory and prejudicial terms; and that the State urged the jury to abjure mercy. None of these alleged errors was objected to by the defense.
Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474, 489 (Ala.Cr. App.1990). These alleged errors were not objected to at trial. Considering them in the full context of the prosecution's remarks, we note that the court cautioned the jury near the end of the State's remarks to the jury:
R.T. at 1111. This cautionary instruction to the jury following the State's remarks cured any error.
We have considered all of the issues raised by Windsor, and we have searched the entire record for plain error. We have also considered the appropriateness of the sentence *1062 of death. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Harvey Lee Windsor's capital murder conviction and sentence of death is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, INGRAM, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
[1]  Windsor also alleges error in allowing Sammie Sue Osborne's testimony regarding Guthrie's identification of his friend as "Harvey." This alleged error is discussed in Section X. of this opinion.