Title: In Re Gershater
Citation: 256 Kan. 512
Docket Number: 72,196
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1994

256 Kan. 512 (1994)
In the Matter of DOROTHY GERSHATER, Respondent.
No. 72,196

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 9, 1994.
Marty M. Snyder, deputy disciplinary administrator, argued the cause, and Bruce E. Miller, disciplinary administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner.
Donald G. Strole, of Lawrence, argued the cause for the respondent, and respondent appeared pro se.
Per Curiam:
This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against Dorothy Gershater, of Lawrence, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas.
This action arises out of the conduct of Dorothy Gershater in a civil action based on a landlord-tenant dispute in the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas. On October 19, 1991, attorney Andrew Ramirez filed a civil action on behalf of his client, R. Mike McBride d/b/a Mackenzie Place Apartments, against two former tenants, Marc Lee and Bryon Frick. Dorothy Gershater, the respondent, represented the defendants Marc Lee and Bryon Frick in the above action. The subject matter of this disciplinary proceeding arises out of her representation in the Douglas County action.
The matter was heard before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. At that hearing, the Disciplinary Administrator presented evidence for the complainant and advised that the parties had stipulated to the complaint through the filing of an answer by the respondent and stipulations by the respondent. Exhibits were offered and admitted without objection.
The hearing panel unanimously found as follows:
Based on the above findings, the panel entered the following conclusions of law:
In mitigation, the panel found no evidence to indicate a pattern of misconduct or multiple offenses on the part of the respondent. Additionally, the panel concluded that there was no evidence that the respondent obstructed the disciplinary proceedings and that the respondent was forthright in her relation to the disciplinary proceedings and cooperated at all times. Further mitigating circumstances considered by the panel included a letter from attorney William B. Pendleton, who stated that in his opinion the respondent was a thoroughly competent attorney.
*515 In aggravation, the panel found that one prior disciplinary offense against the respondent existed, which offense resulted in an informal admonition. Additionally, the panel found that the respondent demonstrated an almost complete lack of remorse to the extent that she failed to understand that lying to a court is a very serious offense.
The panel adopted the recommendation of the Disciplinary Administrator that the respondent, Dorothy Gershater, be censured by publication. In adopting this recommendation, the panel referred to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991). The panel referred to Standard 5.13, calling for a reprimand when a lawyer knowingly engages in other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. The panel also cited Standard 6.23, which calls for a reprimand when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule and causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. Finally, the panel cites Standard 7.3, calling for a reprimand when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or to the legal system.
We have considered the facts and conclusions of the panel and note that the respondent has filed no exceptions to the report, findings, and recommendations of the panel. Upon our consideration of the findings and conclusions, we believe that the recommended discipline by the panel is inappropriate. We find it is inappropriate because it fails to reflect the serious nature of the violations in this case. Instead, we believe that a one-year suspension from the practice of law more appropriately reflects the nature of the violations in this case. A minority of the court believes the harsher penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law would be more appropriate.
The Standards relied upon by the panel in recommending discipline more or less involved negligent conduct by an attorney. While Standard 5.13 does suggest intentional conduct adversely reflecting upon a lawyer's fitness to practice, the comments of *516 this section generally include conduct related to, but not directly involved in, the practice of law. In this case, the respondent failed to appear for a trial setting that she knew about, lied to the court and counsel about her reasons for not appearing, and in the following letter to her clients attempted to blame the trial judge and opposing attorney for the default judgment entered against her clients:
"Dear Marc and Bryon,
Before the panel and in her statement to this court, the respondent admitted that her hospital tests were completed before her calls to the court and counsel so that "there was really no reason for me not to show up at trial."
The respondent's actions, in our opinion, may not be characterized as negligent. Her actions were intentional and involved misrepresentation to the district court judge and opposing counsel in the trial of a lawsuit. Her actions could not be more closely connected with the practice of her profession.
*517 In order to explain her actions for not appearing for trial, she again lied to her clients and blamed the district court judge and opposing counsel for what she termed "unethical" conduct. Moreover, the respondent suggested to her clients that any motion to remedy the default judgment would "be in front of the same judge, so you may not get a fair hearing."
Before the panel, and upon addressing this court, the respondent expressed her disbelief and amazement at not being granted a continuance by the court. In the respondent's mind, "hospital tests" should have been enough, without more, to obtain the continuance. The respondent overlooks the fact that the communication to the court and counsel was a lie. Moreover, the trial court, in a well-reasoned ruling from the bench, proceeded to grant a default judgment without the presence of the respondent or her clients.
The respondent's clients were required to obtain the services of another attorney in Manhattan to address their needs with reference to the default judgment entered against them. While there is little evidence of record to suggest the extent of the harm to the respondent's clients based on her conduct, it is clear to us that her clients were in fact prejudiced by reason of her failure to appear at trial.
The respondent's actions were intentional. The respondent lied to the court, misrepresented her failure to appear, and lied to her clients concerning the reasons for not appearing. The respondent blamed the court and opposing counsel for "outrageous conduct" and accused the court and counsel of unethical conduct. We believe that the actions of the respondent go to the very heart of her professional responsibility in dealing with clients, the court and opposing counsel, and the public. The panel concluded that the actions of the respondent throughout her representation in this case violated MRPC 1.1 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 258), MRPC 1.3 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 263), MRPC 1.4 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 267), MRPC 3.3 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 314), MRPC 3.4 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 318), MRPC 3.5(d) (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 320), MRPC 4.1 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 327), MRPC 8.2 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 345), and MRPC *518 8.4(c), (d) (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 347). These violations involve competence; diligence; communication; candor; disobedience to a court; conduct degrading to a tribunal; truthfulness; false statements regarding a judge's integrity; and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Under the circumstances, the court concludes that the appropriate sanction for the above violations is suspension from the practice of law in Kansas for a period of one year.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent, Dorothy Gershater, be suspended from the practice of law in the State of Kansas for a period of one year.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 218 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 187).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order be published in the official Kansas Reports and the costs of this action be assessed to the respondent.