Title: Desmond v. News & Observer Publishing Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 132PA18-2
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 132PA18-2 
Filed 14 August 2020 
BETH DESMOND 
 
 
v. 
THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., and MANDY LOCKE 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, 263 N.C. App. 26, 823 S.E.2d 412 (2018), affirming the order 
and judgment entered 18 November 2016 and the order entered 30 January 2017 by 
Judge A. Graham Shirley in Superior Court, Wake County.  Heard in the Supreme 
Court on 4 November 2019. 
Dement  Askew & Johnson,  by James T. Johnson and Chynna T. Smith, for 
plaintiff-appellee Beth Desmond.   
The Bussian Law Firm, PLLC, by John A. Bussian, McGuire Woods, by Bradley 
R. Kutrow, and Brooks, Pierce, Mclendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by 
Mark J. Prak, Julia C. Ambrose, and Timothy G. Nelson, for defendant-
appellant The News and Observer Publishing Company, Tharrington Smith 
L.L.P., by Wade M. Smith,  for Mandy Locke. 
 
Essex Richards, P.A., by Jonathan E. Buchan, for The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, et al., amici curiae. 
 
Wyche, PA, by William M. Wilson, III, for Professor William Van Alstyne, 
amicus curiae. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
Plaintiff, Beth Desmond, filed a complaint alleging defamation on the part of 
defendants, the News and Observer Publishing Company (the N&O) and reporter 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Mandy Locke, arising out of a series of articles published by defendants in 2010.  
Following a trial, in which the jury found defendants liable for defamation and 
awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages, defendants appealed.  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order and judgment, concluding 
that plaintiff presented clear and convincing evidence of actual malice and that there 
was no error in the jury instructions.  Desmond v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 263 
N.C. App. 26, 67, 823 S.E.2d 412, 438–39 (2018) (Desmond II).  We affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
Background 
 
Plaintiff’s defamation claim arises out of a series of articles published by 
defendants in 2010 entitled “Agents’ Secrets,” which reported on alleged problems 
within the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (the SBI) that purportedly 
led to wrongful convictions.  Plaintiff was at that time a Special Agent with the SBI 
serving as a forensic firearms examiner, which is a “discipline in forensic science” 
mainly concerned with “comparing cartridge cases and bullets and other ammunition 
components.”  In the final article of the four-part “Agents’ Secrets” series, defendants 
reported on and were critical of plaintiff’s work in two related criminal cases in Pitt 
County.  See generally State v. Green, 187 N.C. App. 510, 653 S.E.2d 256, 2007 WL 
4234300 (2007) (unpublished); State v. Adams, 212 N.C. App. 235, 713 S.E.2d 251, 
2011 WL 1938270 (2011) (unpublished). 
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Charges in both cases originated from a confrontation that occurred on 19 April 
2005 in Pitt County.  Two groups of women engaged in a series of verbal altercations 
over the course of an afternoon that ultimately culminated with multiple gun shots 
and one bullet striking a ten-year-old child, Christopher Foggs, in the chest.  Foggs 
died from the gunshot wound at the hospital later that evening.  Desmond II, 263 
N.C. App. at 31–33, 823 S.E.2d at 418–19.  
 
Jemaul Green, who drove his girlfriend, Vonzeil Adams, to the scene of the 
incident, was indicted for multiple offenses, including first-degree murder.  His trial 
took place in 2006.  In support of its case, the State presented testimony from twelve 
eyewitnesses to the shooting.  Green testified on his own behalf and asserted that 
when he drove to the Haddock house he had in his possession a 9mm handgun that 
he had illegally purchased and that he took it with him that day out of concern for 
his own safety.1  Green testified that during the incident he saw an unknown black 
male in between the Haddock house and a neighboring house standing closely behind 
a car—a “black Neon”—and that this man fired a handgun in Green’s direction, 
prompting Green to return fire in self-defense.  According to Green, Adams then 
snatched the gun from him and fired additional shots at the Haddock house before 
they both got back in the car and left the scene.  None of the State’s twelve 
eyewitnesses observed anyone at the scene with a gun other than Green.  Green’s 
                                            
1 Green testified that one of the women riding in the car with him and Adams to the 
Haddock house had a Taser and that another of the women had a sword.   
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own witness Victoria Gardner testified that she was standing in between the houses, 
that she did not see anyone near the black Neon, that she did not hear any shots other 
than those coming from Green, and that she did not see anyone with a gun other than 
Green.   
 
The State also presented evidence concerning eight fired cartridge casings and 
six bullet fragments recovered from the scene.  The casings were found “in a fairly 
small circle” next to a tree where Green had been standing when he fired his 9mm 
handgun, and the bullet fragments were found “in a very tight pattern” leading from 
Green’s location.  The State also presented testimony from plaintiff, who had been 
assigned by the SBI to the case and who performed microscopic comparison analysis 
of the cartridge casings and bullet fragments.  The prosecutors in the case originally 
sent only the cartridge casings to the SBI’s crime lab for analysis, mistakenly 
assuming that the bullet fragments had no forensic value.  When plaintiff arrived in 
Pitt County to testify and learned that bullet fragments had also been recovered from 
the scene, she discussed with the prosecutors whether they wanted the bullets 
examined as well.  The prosecutors decided that they did want the bullets examined, 
and the trial judge rescheduled plaintiff’s testimony for the following day so that 
plaintiff could perform an examination of the bullets.  Accordingly, plaintiff returned 
to the crime lab that day, performed an examination of the six bullet fragments, and 
compiled a report of her examination.  Plaintiff’s work was reviewed by her senior 
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supervisor, Neal Morin, who examined the bullets under a comparison microscope 
and arrived at the same conclusions as plaintiff.   
 
On the following day, plaintiff returned to Pitt County to give her testimony.  
Plaintiff opined that the eight cartridge casings had been fired from the same gun 
and that the gun was a Hi-Point 9 millimeter semiautomatic pistol.  Regarding the 
bullet fragments, plaintiff opined that while four of the bullets were too damaged to 
have any forensic value, two of the bullets were fired from the same type of gun, a Hi-
Point 9 millimeter semiautomatic pistol, but she could not conclusively determine 
whether the bullets were fired from the same gun.  Plaintiff’s analysis involved 
examining the “class characteristics,” or “rifling impressions,” which are the “lands 
and grooves” (i.e. ridges and impressions) that are left on a bullet as it travels through 
the barrel of a gun.2  Plaintiff determined that the class characteristics of the two 
bullets were the same—“nine lands and grooves with a left hand direction of twist 
down the barrel.”  Because only one manufacturer makes their guns “9-left,” plaintiff 
was able to determine that the type of gun was a Hi-Point Model C.   
                                            
2 Firearms examiners also analyze “individual characteristics,” which “come[ ] from 
the markings that are inside the gun” and “that are actually imparted to the firearm during 
the manufacture.”  Plaintiff explained that “when the manufacturer makes the gun the tools 
that are used to make the gun are harder than the metals of the gun itself and so those tools 
would leave unique markings, irregularities, random markings on the internal part of the 
gun, so every place that that cartridge, the soft metals of that ammunition comes in contact 
would be a potential for us to look at it as a firearms examiner for this unique individual 
detail.”  Plaintiff’s determination regarding the individual characteristics was “inconclusive.”   
 
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After plaintiff had testified regarding her forensic examination of the cartridge 
casings and the bullet fragments, the prosecutor sought to have plaintiff hold a 
semiautomatic handgun (unloaded) and explain to the jury where the “ejection port” 
is and how it operates to eject the cartridge casing each time the gun is fired.  During 
a brief voir dire examination by defense counsel while the jury was in recess, plaintiff 
stated with “absolute certainty” that the two bullets came from a 9mm Hi-Point 
firearm.  Following a court recess, the prosecutor had plaintiff hold a 9mm Hi-Point 
model C handgun to explain how the ejection port in a semiautomatic handgun works.  
 
Green was ultimately convicted of second-degree murder, as well as multiple 
counts of discharging a weapon into occupied property and assault with a deadly 
weapon.  Green appealed on grounds unrelated to the ballistics evidence, and on 
appeal the Court of Appeals upheld his convictions.  Green, 2007 WL 4234300, at *2, 
*6–*7.   
 
Vonzeil Adams was also indicted for first-degree murder and other offenses in 
connection with the shooting; her trial took place in 2010.3  Before trial, Adams’s 
defense attorney, David Sutton, filed a motion seeking to preclude the State 
presenting plaintiff’s expert testimony at trial.  The motion was affixed with an 
extensive affidavit from Adina Schwartz, a professor at the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, in which Schwartz challenged the scientific reliability of firearms 
                                            
3 A mistrial was declared in Adams’ initial trial in 2009, and the second trial took 
place in April of 2010.   
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examination, as well as the SBI’s firearms examination protocols and plaintiff’s 
documentation.  The trial court denied this motion and plaintiff again testified 
regarding her opinions concerning the cartridge casings and bullet fragments.   
Near the end of the Adams trial, Sutton, with permission of the trial court, 
asked another local attorney, Fred Whitehurst, to take photographs of the two bullet 
fragments about which plaintiff had testified.  Whitehurst, a former FBI chemist, had 
no training in firearms examination, but he owned a microscope with the capacity to 
take photographs.  Whitehurst and Sutton emailed the resultant photographs (the 
Whitehurst Photographs) to other attorneys, including one attorney representing an 
as of-yet untried co-defendant of Vonzeil Adams, and other individuals interested in 
firearms examination, including Schwartz.  The Whitehurst Photographs, including 
one photograph in particular (the Comparison Photograph) in which the bullets are 
posed back-to-back, or “base-to-base,” raised questions among those circulating the 
photographs because they could not perceive any matching class characteristics in 
the two bullets.  Based largely on these photographs, Sutton filed a motion for 
mistrial.   
 
In the motion, Sutton alleged that the photographs “clearly show that the 
‘lands and grooves’ in Q-9 and Q-10[, the two bullet fragments,] are distinctly 
dissimilar.”  Additionally, Sutton asserted that “[t]he photographs have been sent to 
William Tobin, formerly of the FBI laboratory for analysis,” and that Tobin had stated 
that “ ‘preliminary’ [sic] based upon a photograph sent by Dr. Whitehurst there is 
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ample reason to question whether the class characteristics in Q-9 and Q-10 are the 
same.”4  The trial court denied the motion for mistrial.  Adams was convicted—under 
an aiding-and-abetting theory—of one count of voluntary manslaughter, three counts 
of discharging a firearm into occupied property, and one count of assault with a 
deadly weapon.  Adams, 2011 WL 1938270, at *3.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
concluded there was no error in her convictions.  Id. at *7.   
 
 Around this time, Locke, who was a staff writer for the N&O, became 
interested in the Green and Adams cases and obtained copies of the photographs from 
Whitehurst.  After speaking with Sutton, Locke began working on a story about 
plaintiff’s work in the Green and Adams cases.  As part of her research, Locke 
reviewed the court filings and evidence from the Green and Adams cases, interviewed 
Jemaul Green in prison, and researched the discipline of firearms examination.  In 
an early draft for her story, Locke included a direct quote from Sutton:  “[Plaintiff] 
just made it up.  She made it up because she could, and prosecutors needed her to.  
It’s that simple.”  Locke began looking for experts in firearms examination or related 
fields willing to comment on the Whitehurst Photographs.  To that end, Locke 
communicated by email and phone with Bill Tobin and Adina Schwartz, both 
mentioned above, as well as Liam Hendrikse, a firearms forensic scientist from 
Canada, and Dr. Stephen Bunch, a firearms forensic scientist and former FBI 
                                            
4 Tobin later testified that this statement attributed to him in the motion was accurate 
except for the use of the word “ample,” which he did not recall using.   
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scientist from Virginia.  Locke and the N&O ultimately published statements which 
were attributed to these four individuals as purported firearms experts and which in 
effect confirmed Sutton’s allegation—that is, defendants published statements 
asserting that firearms experts had examined the Whitehurst Photographs, 
determined that plaintiff’s analysis was false, and questioned whether plaintiff was 
extremely incompetent or had falsified her report in order to help the prosecution 
convict a potentially innocent man.  As will be discussed more in-depth below, these 
four individuals strongly disputed making the statements attributed to them by 
defendants.   
 
Defendants planned to publish Locke’s story as part of its “Agents’ Secrets” 
series in August of 2010.  John Drescher, the executive editor and senior vice 
president of the N&O, described the series in an email to the N&O’s vice president in 
charge of marketing, stating:  “In August, we’ll publish a four-part series, ‘Agents’ 
Secrets,’ showing how practices by the [SBI] have led to wrongful convictions.  The 
series, by reporters Joseph Neff and Mandy Locke, reveals that the agency teaches 
its laboratory analysts and agents to line up with prosecutors’ theories, sometimes 
with devastating results.”  Locke testified that she and Neff, as well as Steve Riley, 
the senior editor directly responsible for editing the “Agents’ Secrets” series, “were 
constantly in communication” when preparing the series for publication.  According 
to Locke, “we do double-check each other’s work,” and “there wasn’t a day that passed 
that we weren’t comparing notes and collaborating in some form or fashion.”   
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In one of these email communications in May of 2010, Locke stated that they 
were “rocking and rolling on the SBI project” and included plaintiff in a list of “a few 
agents/analyst[s] who we are bearing down on.”  Locke requested “reports (absolutely 
everything we know)” on these agents.  Upon learning that plaintiff had a degree from 
Julliard, Locke wrote that she was “curious to know of her discipline” and asked for 
a “search or anything else . . . that would register someone who was an artistic 
genius.”  When she received in response an article discussing plaintiff’s previous 
career as a ballerina; Locke wrote:  “Yes.  Bingo!  How in the world this woman went 
from ballet to firearms identification work is beyond me.  But, what a lovely tidbit.”  
Locke passed this information along to Neff, who responded, “lovely.  [T]hat’s even 
better than a bassoonist.”  In an email Riley sent to Drescher, Locke, and Neff, he 
discussed the progress of the “Agents’ Secrets” series, stating that “this all adds up to 
some pretty serious allegations against individual agents, and we’ve got to be 
properly loaded if this is to be written with an edge, as it should be.”  An internal 
story folder circulated to N&O staff summarized the upcoming article, stating that 
“Beth Desmond, the SBI analyst charged with studying the cartridges and bullet 
fragments . . . said she’s dead certain there was a single gun used that day” and that 
“Desmond had no idea how to evaluate firearm evidence or, worse, she ignored all 
rules of the trade and fabricated the results to help police secure their victory.”   
 
Near the end of July 2010, defendants decided to move up their planned 
publication date of the “Agents’ Secrets” series.  John Drescher explained in an email:  
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“News breaking here.  In advance of our SBI series, Roy Cooper [the Attorney 
General] is replacing the SBI director.  We likely will move series to start Sunday, 
Aug. 7.”  In an email later that day, Steve Riley confirmed the decision to move up 
the publication date, stating:  “I know this makes things harder for everyone, but this 
will make us much more timely,” and “[e]verything won’t be perfect, but it’ll be good.”  
Locke later emailed Shawn Rocco, one of defendants’ photojournalists involved in the 
series, apologizing for the “strain” of the new publication date and stating “[b]elieve 
me, I’m feeling it too.  Especially with Joe [Neff] gone and out till Friday.”  Rocco 
responded: 
[H]mmm, how to say this nicely . . . shut up. [Smiley Icon] 
we’re all in this together. 
 
[C]oncentrate on writing the best damn piece you’ve ever 
done.  [I] want you to compel our readers to gather 
pitchforks and torches.  [B]ecause shit like this has got to 
change. 
 
[I]’m infuriated that robin [Pendergraff] still keeps a job. 
t’aint nothing new in state gov, I know, but I’m pissed 
nonetheless. 
 
 
When the SBI and plaintiff first became aware of the Whitehurst Photographs 
in July 2010, they immediately had concerns that the photographs were misleading 
due to a variety of issues.  Jerry Richardson, then the assistant director of the SBI 
Crime Laboratory, emailed Whitehurst to discuss the misleading nature of the 
photographs, stating: 
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[W]e have noted a number of issues associated with the 
photos.  These issues include:  photographs are not 
properly oriented, improper side lighting, unknown 
microscope magnification; focus; and, the use of what 
appears to be tweezers or other metal objects to handle 
evidence during photography which could alter the 
evidence. 
 
When plaintiff learned that the N&O and Locke were planning a story about firearms 
examination involving the Whitehurst photographs, plaintiff contacted Locke to 
arrange a meeting.   
During the resulting interview at the SBI’s crime lab on 3 August 2010, 
plaintiff explained to Locke that for numerous reasons the Whitehurst Photographs 
did not depict the matching class characteristics that plaintiff had observed in her 
laboratory analysis.  Plaintiff explained that firearms examination is “three-
dimensional” and that “it’s very difficult to show in just one picture what we do.  It’s 
not truly representative of what we do in firearms.”5  Further, plaintiff noted that 
while she “ha[s] great respect for [Whitehurst],” “he’s not a firearms expert, and he 
knows that.”  One of the problems with the Whitehurst Photographs, plaintiff 
explained, was the lighting.  Plaintiff stated that “[i]t takes hours under the 
microscope to get the right lighting, to get them lined up the right way to be able to 
measure those.  It’s very careful and patient examination.”  Plaintiff stated that 
                                            
5 The transcript of Locke’s interview with plaintiff contains formatting issues that are 
omitted here for clarity.   
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another issue on a more fundamental level was that the bullets in the Comparison 
Photograph were improperly positioned.  Plaintiff explained: 
MS. DESMOND: 
And so that’s the end of the base 
right here and that’s it.  This bullet here, this is the base 
but the— 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
Uh-huh. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
–the nose is up here. 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
So it’s base to base. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
Correct. 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
Okay. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
In firearms, we don’t do that.  
We never do that.  Every bullet we look at would be similar 
in casings.  The nose is to the left the nose is to the left, or 
if the nose is to the right and the nose to the right.  [sic]  
Okay.  So we would never compare anything base to base.  
That’s wrong.  That’s just not right.  Everyone who is a 
firearms examiner 101 knows not to do that. 
 
 
But this is basically what this picture is showing.  If 
you do that base to base – this is the base and there’s the 
base here.  Put these together and you try to line them up.  
They’re going to be off.  Right?  They’re going to look like 
they’re not in alignment. 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
Uh-huh. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
They’re not going to look right.  
They’re – it’s a mis-perception. You can’t – it doesn’t look 
like the other base, not even close. 
 
Plaintiff repeatedly stressed that the Comparison Photograph “is not depicting what 
I saw in the microscope and what I measured.”  Plaintiff explained, “[t]hat’s why you 
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need to put it on the microscope.  You cannot do it from a picture.”  Plaintiff and Locke 
discussed the fact that plaintiff’s work had been checked by Neal Morin, who 
examined the bullets under a microscope and reached the same conclusions as 
plaintiff.  Moreover, plaintiff stated:  “I guarantee that if you ask another qualified 
examiner, a qualified firearms examiner, what they – to go ahead and examine it 
under the microscope, that they will come to the same conclusion I have.”  In that 
regard, Locke asked plaintiff about the fact that the bullets were going to be sent for 
an independent examination.  Plaintiff responded, “[t]his is what we’ve been asking 
them to do. . . . Of course, we would like for it to be sent to any other qualified firearms 
examiner.  We have been asking for it.”   
 
At no point in the interview did Locke mention anything about firearms 
experts asserting based on the Whitehurst Photographs that plaintiff’s analysis had 
been false and questioning whether plaintiff was incompetent or corrupt.  According 
to plaintiff, Locke simply told her that “it’s a firearms piece in a much larger article.”  
Towards the end of the interview, plaintiff attempted to make sure Locke understood 
what she was saying, asking “[d]id I make things clear for you?” and “[d]o you 
understand what I’m saying.”  Locke said that she did.  Plaintiff would later testify 
that: 
I thought she understood.  I thought that – I thought I set 
the record straight.  You know, I thought I had – I went in 
there and told her how I had testified in the Pitt County 
case, I told her the facts of the case, and then I explained 
to her why this picture – she shouldn’t rely on the picture 
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and how we in turn don’t rely on pictures to – you don’t 
form an opinion on a picture.   
 
Plaintiff testified that she “felt relieved that [she] had done the interview with” Locke.  
Before Locke left, she asked if she could take plaintiff’s picture, stating “I would love 
to take a picture of you because we’ve asked for your photo to be provided.”  Plaintiff 
stated:  
MS. DESMOND: 
It’s – it’s fine.  You can.  I would 
prefer, though, if – if you don’t mind, if you – how can I say 
this?  I absolutely don’t mind you taking my picture.  If you 
were going to print the picture, please take great care 
because I work a lot of cases. 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
Uh-huh. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
And I do work on sometimes 
cases that are very sensitive and I don’t want my name and 
picture out there for safety reasons.  And that’s the only 
thing. 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
Okay. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
So just be aware of that, if you 
don’t mind. 
 
 
Eleven days later, in accordance with their advanced publication schedule, 
defendants published on the front page of the N&O the following story (the 14 August 
Article) featuring plaintiff’s picture, as well as an even more prominent picture of the 
Comparison Photograph coupled with a caption inquiring of the audience, “WHAT 
CAN YOU SEE?”: 
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Defendant’s 14 August Article is highly critical of plaintiff and her work in the 
Green case and includes numerous assertions and opinions concerning plaintiff that 
Locke later attributed to the four purported firearms experts mentioned above, 
including, inter alia, the following five statements:  
1. 
“Independent firearms experts who have studied the 
photographs question whether Desmond knows anything 
about the discipline.  Worse, some suspect she falsified the 
evidence to offer prosecutors the answers they wanted.” 
 
2. 
“ ‘This is a big red flag for the whole unit,’ said 
William Tobin, former chief metallurgist for the FBI who 
has testified about potential problems in firearms analysis.  
‘This is as bad as it can be.  It raises the question of whether 
she did an analysis at all.’ ” 
 
3. 
“The independent analysts say the widths of the 
lands and the grooves on the two bullets are starkly 
different, which would make it impossible to have the same 
number.” 
 
4. 
“ ‘You don’t even need to measure to see this doesn't 
add up,’ said Hendrikse, the firearms analyst from Toronto.  
‘It’s so basic to our work.  The only benefit I can extend is 
that she accidentally measured the same bullet twice.’ ” 
 
5. 
“Other firearms analysts say that even with the poor 
photo lighting and deformed bullets, it’s obvious that the 
width of the lands and grooves are different.” 
 
In a section alleging that “[a]t the SBI lab, training is often minimal,” the article 
claims that plaintiff “was a novice examiner” who “came to the field through a 
peculiar route” and discusses plaintiff’s prior career as a ballerina.  According to the 
article, the prosecutors in the Green case “needed [plaintiff’s] help to fix a potentially 
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crippling weakness in their case” and that her analysis of the two bullet fragments 
pictured in the Comparison Photograph6 “would make or break the case against 
Jemaul Green.”  The article does not mention that thirteen eyewitnesses to the 
shooting testified that they saw no one other than Green with a firearm.  The article 
also asserts that when plaintiff examined the two bullets in the Comparison 
Photograph she “scribbled down the measurements of the lands and grooves” and that 
“[h]er report eliminated doubt about another shooter.”  The article does not mention 
that four additional bullets were recovered from the scene and that plaintiff, as 
reflected both in her typed report and her trial testimony, concluded that no 
determinations could be made as to these four bullets.    
 
Additionally, the article mentions plaintiff’s use of the “absolute certainty” 
language and states that plaintiff “said this month that she meant to say she was 
absolutely certain that the bullets were consistent with a Hi-Point 9mm.”  According 
to the article, “[t]o make either determination, [plaintiff] had to conclude that the 
bullets had the same number of lands and grooves,” and that, in any event, “[i]t is 
[plaintiff’s] measurements that befuddle independent analysts asked to evaluate the 
photographs of the two bullets.”   
                                            
6 The 14 August Article notes that the Comparison Photograph was taken by 
Whitehurst, whom the article describes as a “former FBI crime lab analyst” and an attorney 
“who formerly worked at the SBI’s crime lab.”  The article includes a quote from Whitehurst, 
stating that “[i]t didn’t take a lot of analysis to see there was something really off here.”  The 
article does not explain, as Locke discussed in her trial testimony, that firearms “was not 
[Whitehurst’s] discipline; he was a chemist” and that Whitehurst “just so happen[ed] to own 
a microscope that had the capacity to take a photograph.”   
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Shortly after the 14 August article was published, Bill Tobin called Jerry 
Richardson to apologize for the way his statement had been portrayed, to explain that 
the statement explicitly attributed to him in the article was a version of a statement 
he made only in response to hypothetical “what-if” questions from Locke, and to make 
clear that he was not one of the “independent” experts referenced in the other 
statements in the article.  Liam Hendrikse, who was also unaware that he was 
supposed to be one of the “independent” experts referenced in the article, contacted 
the N&O to request a retraction for statements that were explicitly attributed to him.   
 
Plaintiff was in Pennsylvania visiting her father in the hospital when she 
heard about the 14 August Article.  Plaintiff testified that when she was able to get 
to a computer and pull up the article, she was stunned: 
I was surprised at how the size of this, the picture was just 
right there, and this picture just popped up on the screen, 
and all I could see was like what can you see in asking the 
reader what they can see looking at this photograph after 
I had just finished telling her all the reasons, everything I 
thought was wrong with why you shouldn’t use this 
photograph. 
 
 
And so I immediately felt like the blood just ran out 
of my body.  I didn’t know if I was angry or if I was upset.  
I didn’t know how to feel when I looked at this and so I 
started trying to read it and I couldn’t get through the first 
paragraph.  I had to walk away.  I had to keep coming back 
and reading the article in little bits and pieces and there 
were things that just kind of stuck out with me like they 
needed her to fix, you know, fix the case, and falsify the 
evidence and ballerina.  It was almost implying that 
someone like me, a ballerina, had no business doing 
firearms examinations and that I was incompetent.  I 
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mean, this is – it was insane.  It’s reporting that these 
experts in my field are saying – are saying that I falsified 
evidence and saying that I didn’t even do the analysis and 
that these can’t possibly be what I said they were, that 
they’re starkly different, and so I was stunned.   
 
 
I was stunned at how large the article was.  I 
thought it was just going to be a little blurb.  I thought it 
was just going to be a little piece in a larger article, and the 
fact that it was me and my picture and these bullets are 
there on the front page as soon as you look, I was stunned. 
 
An August newsletter for John Jay College of Criminal Justice reported that “a 
forensic analyst from the [SBI] in North Carolina and John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice alumna, Beth Desmond, has been accused of making a mistake in matching 
two bullets that sent an innocent man to prison for murder, according to the News 
and Observer, Raleigh, NC.”  
 
After the 14 August Article was published, Stephen Bunch performed an 
independent examination of the ballistics evidence from the Green case.  The results 
of Bunch’s report corroborated plaintiff’s examination.  Bunch testified that plaintiff 
“basically got the same answers [he] did.”  Regarding the class characteristics in the 
two bullets depicted in the Whitehurst Photographs, Bunch stated that “[t]hey’re spot 
on.”   
On 31 December 2010, the N&O published a follow-up article (the 31 December 
Article), also written by Locke and Neff and entitled “[r]eport backs SBI ballistics.”7  
                                            
7 The article, published on the front page of the N&O, again features plaintiff’s picture.   
 
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Compared to the 14 August Article, the 31 December Article devotes considerably 
more attention to plaintiff’s use of the “absolute certainty” language and includes a 
subheading stating, “[h]owever, agent’s courtroom certainty that bullets came from 
one gun in question.”8  The article, which repeats much of the factual recitation from 
the 14 August Article, briefly discusses the results of Bunch’s independent 
examination of the ballistics evidence that had been the focus of the previous article, 
but alleges that Bunch’s “findings undermined the certainty of [plaintiff’s] 
testimony.”  In the same vein as the five statements from the 14 August Article quoted 
above, the 31 December Article includes an additional allegation that is attributed 
explicitly, in part, to Bunch: 
6. 
“Ballistics experts who viewed the photographs, 
including a second FBI scientist who wrote the report 
released Thursday, said the bullets could not have been 
fired from the same firearm.” 
 
 
In one of her first cases following the publication of the 14 August Article 
plaintiff was told “to be prepared, they’re coming after you,” and thereafter she began 
facing aggressive cross-examination from defense attorneys on the basis of the 
article’s allegations.  Plaintiff testified that in an Alamance County case a respected 
defense attorney “came after [her] really hard,” holding up the 14 August Article in 
front of the jury and vigorously interrogating plaintiff about the various things of 
which she’d been accused.  The same attorney was quoted at that time in an article 
                                            
8 Plaintiff never testified that the bullets came from one gun.   
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in the Charlotte Observer, also written by Locke and Neff, as stating that plaintiff “is 
putting false information in the courts” and “lacks the credentials and training to do 
her job.”9  Plaintiff testified that when she realized this attorney was representing a 
defendant in one of her subsequent cases, “she became very pale knowing that it was 
him” and “was so afraid of what [he] might have done when [she] went to testify in 
front of him again.”10  Plaintiff stated that her “credibility and [her] character had 
been attacked and that [she] was always constantly having to defend [her]self from 
that point on.”   
Plaintiff’s difficulties continued following the publication of the 31 December 
Article.  Plaintiff stated that she “felt like [the 31 December Article] didn’t really do 
anything to clear [her] name” and that “[i]t seemed like it was just following me 
around and there was nothing I could do to get rid of what was in that first article.”  
At an Association of Firearms and Tool Mark conference that plaintiff attended in 
Buffalo, New York, after putting on her nametag, plaintiff was asked, “[y]ou know 
you’re a little famous, don’t you?”  Plaintiff stated she became embarrassed to wear 
                                            
9 This Charlotte Observer article, which repeats statement 2 from the 14 August 
Article, was admitted into evidence only on the issue of damages.     
 
10 Plaintiff testified that this attorney apologized to her at a subsequent trial, stating: 
 
I remember when I got off the stand, I went down and as I 
crossed by his table, I remember him reaching up, grabbing my 
hand and pulling me down and saying, “Hey, listen.  I’m so sorry 
for what I did to you.”  He said, “I hope you can forgive me,” and 
I shouldn’t have listened to them or something to that effect.   
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her name tag because everyone seemed to be discussing the 14 August article, with 
one prominent firearms expert asking, “aren’t you the girl that’s caused all the 
trouble down in North Carolina?”   
Plaintiff testified that she realized that her “life as a firearms examiner or in 
the forensic science field had changed and . . . [she] had continued to struggle ever 
since then.”  Plaintiff found “it was difficult to work cases,” and she began “having 
trouble concentrating on anything.”  When the SBI’s crime lab was evacuated due to 
a bomb threat, she felt responsible.  Following an incident in which plaintiff returned 
home from work and saw “a car in front of [her] house and there were two men, and 
one guy was outside of his car with the door open and taking pictures of [her] house 
and [her] son was playing in the driveway,” plaintiff became “obsessed with safety” 
and “would GPS [her] son everywhere that he went.”  Eventually, plaintiff requested 
a transfer and ultimately was transferred out of the crime lab in September 2013.   
Procedural History 
Plaintiff filed this defamation action against defendants on 29 November 
2012.11  Plaintiff originally alleged that sixteen statements contained in the 14 
August and 31 December articles were defamatory.  Defendants moved for summary 
judgment, which was denied on 14 March 2014.  Defendants appealed.   
                                            
11 Plaintiff’s original complaint included additional defendants, including McClatchy 
Newspapers, Inc., the “corporate parent” of N&O, that were subsequently dismissed from the 
case.   
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that defendants’ interlocutory 
appeal was appropriate because the case involved application of the “actual malice” 
standard, the misapplication of which could “have a chilling effect on a defendant’s 
right to free speech.”  Desmond v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 241 N.C. App. 10, 16, 
772 S.E.2d 128, 134 (2015) (Desmond I) (quoting Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 211 
N.C. App. 469, 474, 710 S.E.2d 309, 314 (2011)).  The court explained that “[i]n order 
to recover for defamation, a plaintiff generally must show that the defendant caused 
injury to the plaintiff by making false, defamatory statements of or concerning the 
plaintiff, which were published to a third person.”  Id. at 16, 772 S.E.2d at 135 (citing 
Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 29, 568 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2002)).  
Significantly however, First Amendment principles mandate that “[w]here the 
plaintiff is a public official and the allegedly defamatory statement concerns his 
official conduct, he must prove that the statement was made with actual malice—
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.”12  Id. at 17, 772 S.E.2d at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis v. 
Rapp, 220 N.C. App. 299, 302–03, 725 S.E.2d 597, 601 (2012)).  Having concluded 
that defendants’ interlocutory appeal was properly before the court, the Court of 
Appeals proceeded to address whether genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
                                            
12 Plaintiff stipulated that she was a public official.   
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sixteen allegedly defamatory statements contained in defendants’ 14 August and 31 
December articles.   
In evaluating each of these statements, the court noted that while in order to 
be actionable as defamation a statement must be one of fact, not merely opinion, the 
United States Supreme Court has cautioned against “an artificial dichotomy between 
‘opinion’ and fact” and has stated that “expressions of ‘opinion’ may often imply an 
assertion of objective fact.”  Id. at 20, 772 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990)); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18–19 (“Simply 
couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and 
the statement, ‘In my opinion Jones is a liar,’ can cause as much damage to reputation 
as the statement, ‘Jones is a liar.’  As Judge Friendly aptly stated:  ‘It would be 
destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of 
defamatory conduct simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words “I think.” ’ ”).  
The Court of Appeals noted that fact and opinion can be particularly difficult to 
separate in a case like this one, “which involves mostly Locke’s reports of opinions of 
experts regarding Desmond’s work.”  Id. at 21, 772 S.E.2d at 137.  As the court stated: 
Some of the allegedly defamatory statements, though 
stated as expressions of opinion from experts, may be 
factually false because Locke reported that the experts 
expressed opinions regarding Desmond’s work that they 
actually did not express.  In some instances, the evidence 
indicates that Locke asked the experts a hypothetical 
question, and they answered on the assumption that the 
facts of the hypothetical question were true, while the facts 
were actually false and Locke either knew the facts were 
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false or she asked the question with reckless disregard for 
the actual facts.  The experts’ opinions were then stated in 
the article as opinions which the experts gave about 
Desmond’s actual work, instead of in response to a 
hypothetical question.  Thus, the statements, even as 
opinions, “imply a false assertion of fact” and may be 
actionable under Milkovich. 
 
Id. at 21, 772 S.E.2d at 137; see Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (stating that “where a 
statement of ‘opinion’ on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and 
defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show 
that such statements were made with knowledge of their false implications or with 
reckless disregard of their truth”).  Ultimately, the court held that ten of the 
statements were not actionable as defamation, but that the six statements—five 
published in the 14 August Article and one published in the 31 December Article—
were actionable and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether those 
six statements were false and defamatory and whether defendants published these 
six statements with actual malice.  Id. at 30–31, 772 S.E.2d at 143.  Accordingly, the 
court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s denial of defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. 
 
Defendants filed a petition for discretionary review of the interlocutory appeal, 
which this Court denied. 
 
At trial, plaintiff called approximately twenty-three witnesses and presented 
over one hundred exhibits.  Plaintiff’s evidence in support of her defamation claim 
included extensive evidence relating to the Green and Adams cases, Locke’s research 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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and preparation of the articles, Locke’s interviews and communications with various 
individuals, and communications between employees of the N&O.  Plaintiff also 
presented evidence concerning the issue of damages focusing heavily on the mental 
and emotional impact plaintiff suffered as a result of defendants’ articles, including 
testimony from her psychiatrist and counselor stating that plaintiff suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder.  Defendants called two witnesses, including Locke, 
and presented fewer than twenty exhibits.  At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, and 
again at the close of all evidence, defendants moved for directed verdict under Rule 
50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The trial court denied these motions.  The jury 
found both the defendants liable for defamation for the first five statements and 
awarded plaintiff $1,500,000 in damages; as to statement six, the jury found the N&O 
liable for defamation and awarded plaintiff $11,500 in actual damages.   
 
The punitive damages phase of the trial began on 19 October 2016.  The jury 
awarded plaintiff $7.5 million in punitive damages against the N&O and $75,000 
against Locke.  The trial court reduced the punitive damages award against the N&O 
to $4,534,500.00 pursuant to N.C.G.S. 1D-25(b).13  Defendants moved for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  The trial 
court denied this motion on 30 January 2017.  Defendants appealed. 
                                            
13 This statute limits punitive damages to the greater of three times the amount of 
compensatory damages or $25,000.   
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On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion 
for directed verdict and motion for JNOV because plaintiff failed to present sufficient 
evidence of actual malice and that there were several errors in the jury instructions.  
The Court of Appeals disagreed, first determining after a careful review of the record 
that plaintiff presented clear and convincing evidence that defendants published the 
six statements with actual malice.  Desmond II, 263 N.C. App. at 55, 823 S.E.2d at 
431.  The court then addressed defendants’ arguments concerning the jury 
instructions, concluding that:  the trial court did not err in denying defendants’ 
proposed instruction concerning the element of falsity; the trial court did not err in 
instructing the jury to evaluate falsity using the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, as opposed to the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to the 
issue of actual malice; and the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on 
the statutory aggravating factors required to support an award of punitive damages.  
Id. at 60–67, 823 S.E.2d at 435–38.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s order and judgment.  Id. at 67, 823 S.E.2d at 439. 
 
Defendants filed a petition for discretionary review, which this Court allowed 
on 27 March 2019.14  
                                            
14 After the Court heard arguments in this case, the N&O filed a “NOTICE OF 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING” advising the Court that The McClatchy Company had filed 
a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York and that the N&O was included as an affiliated entity and debtor in the 
filing.  The N&O stated that as a result of the bankruptcy filing, its position was that “further 
proceedings in this matter are subject to the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 
pending further order of the Bankruptcy Court.”  In an order filed 2 April 2020, this Court 
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Analysis 
I. 
Actual Malice 
 
Defendants argue that the defamation verdict here cannot be squared with the 
First Amendment because plaintiff failed to present clear and convincing evidence of 
actual malice.  According to defendants, plaintiff’s evidence reveals only a post-
publication dispute between an investigative reporter and her quoted experts 
centered on subjective intent and unspoken context.  These “misunderstandings,” 
defendants contend, do not establish constitutional actual malice under the First 
Amendment.  Accordingly, defendants argue that they were entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law on plaintiff’s defamation claim because the evidence was insufficient 
to create a triable issue of actual malice.  After careful review, we conclude that 
plaintiff presented clear and convincing evidence of actual malice and that the trial 
court did not err in denying defendant’s motions for directed verdict and JNOV.   
 
The standard of review for the denial of a directed verdict or JNOV is the same 
and inquires “whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury.”  Green v. 
                                            
directed the parties “to inform this Court if and when the bankruptcy court grants relief from 
the automatic stay provisions or when the automatic stay lapses.”  On 30 June 2020, the 
parties jointly filed a “NOTICE OF BANKRUPTCY COURT’S ORDER MODIFYING THE 
AUTOMATIC STAY,” informing the Court that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York entered an order modifying the automatic stay “Solely to the 
Extent Necessary to Permit the North Carolina Supreme Court to Issue an Appeal Opinion” 
in this case.   
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Freeman, 367 N.C. 136, 140, 749 S.E.2d 262, 267 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Dennis Lilly 
Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322, 411 SE.2d 133, 138 (1991)).  “If ‘there is evidence to support 
each element of the nonmoving party’s cause of action, then the motion for directed 
verdict and any subsequent motion for [JNOV] should be denied.’ ” Id. at 140–41, 749 
S.E.2d at 267 (quoting Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 215, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 
(1993)).  Whether a party is entitled to a directed verdict or JNOV is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Id. at 141, 749 S.E.2d at 267 (first citing Scarborough v. 
Dillard’s, Inc., 363 N.C. 715, 720, 693 S.E.2d 640, 643 (2009); then citing N.C. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., 366 N.C. 505, 512, 742 S.E.2d 
781, 786 (2013)).  Further, “[w]e review decisions of the Court of Appeals for errors of 
law.”  Pine v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 371 N.C. 707, 715, 821 S.E.2d 155, 160 (2018) 
(quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611, 781 S.E.2d 
282, 284 (2016)).   
As the Court of Appeals noted, “[i]n order to recover for defamation, a plaintiff 
generally must show that the defendant caused injury to the plaintiff by making false, 
defamatory statements of or concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a third 
person.”  Desmond I, 241 N.C. App. at 16, 772 S.E.2d at 135 (citing Boyce & Isley, 
PLLC v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 29, 568 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2002)).  Moreover, as the 
United States Supreme Court first explained in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the 
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First Amendment15 places an additional burden on a plaintiff who is a public official 
seeking damages for defamation relating to his or her official conduct by requiring 
the plaintiff to “prove[ ] that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”  376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 
U.S. 496, 499 (1991) (“The First Amendment protects authors and journalists who 
write about public figures by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defamatory 
statements were made with what we have called ‘actual malice,’ a term of art 
denoting deliberate or reckless falsification.”).   
Notably, “[m]ere negligence does not suffice.  Rather, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the author ‘in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication,’ or acted with a ‘high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity.’ ”  Id. 
at 510 (alteration in original) (first quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 
(1968); then quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)); see also Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989) (“Although failure 
to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful 
avoidance of the truth is in a different category.”  (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733)).  
Further, “[a]ctual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused 
with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.”  
                                            
15 The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277 (citations omitted). 
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Masson, 501 U.S. at 510–11 (citing Greenbelt Cooperative Publ’g Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 
398 U.S. 6 (1970)).  
 
Following New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court has further 
elaborated on the actual malice standard and the role of the courts in enforcing this 
constitutional safeguard: 
[t]he question whether the evidence in the record in a 
defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual 
malice is a question of law.  This rule is not simply 
premised on common-law tradition, but on the unique 
character of the interest protected by the actual malice 
standard.  Our profound national commitment to the free 
exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, 
demands that the law of libel carve out an area of breathing 
space so that protected speech is not discouraged.  The 
meaning of terms such as “actual malice”—and, more 
particularly, “reckless disregard”—however, is not readily 
captured in one infallible definition.  Rather, only through 
the course of case-by-case adjudication can we give content 
to these otherwise elusive constitutional standards.  
Moreover, such elucidation is particularly important in the 
area of free speech for precisely the same reason that the 
actual malice standard is itself necessary.  Uncertainty as 
to the scope of the constitutional protection can only 
dissuade protected speech—the more elusive the standard, 
the less protection it affords.  Most fundamentally, the rule 
is premised on the recognition that judges, as expositors of 
the Constitution, have a duty to independently decide 
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the 
constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any 
judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing 
proof of ‘actual malice.’ 
 
. . . . 
 
We have not gone so far, however, as to accord the 
press absolute immunity in its coverage of public figures or 
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elections.  If a false and defamatory statement is published 
with knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the 
truth, the public figure may prevail.  A “reckless disregard” 
for the truth, however, requires more than a departure 
from reasonably prudent conduct.  There must be sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication.  The standard is a subjective one—there must 
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of 
probable falsity.  As a result, failure to investigate before 
publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would 
have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless 
disregard. . . . 
 
In determining whether the constitutional standard 
has been satisfied, the reviewing court must consider the 
factual record in full.  Although credibility determinations 
are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard because 
the trier of fact has had the opportunity to observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses, the reviewing court must 
examine for itself the statements in issue and the 
circumstances under which they were made to see whether 
they are of a character which the principles of the First 
Amendment protect. 
 
Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 685–89 (cleaned up); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[I]n cases raising First Amendment 
issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an 
independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the 
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’ ” 
(quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284–86)).16   
                                            
16 Amici, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, citing Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., contend that the Court of Appeals below erred 
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by viewing the evidence of actual malice in the light most favorable to plaintiff and, in doing 
so, failed to conduct an “independent examination of the whole record” required by United 
States Supreme Court precedent.  466 U.S. at 499.  In Bose Corp., the Supreme Court held 
that a federal trial judge’s ultimate “finding” of actual malice was not insulated from an 
appellate court’s independent examination of the record by virtue of the “clearly erroneous” 
standard applicable to findings of fact in a federal bench trial.  Id. at 514 (“[T]he clearly-
erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe 
the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case 
governed by New York Times.”).  Notably, however, the Court did not suggest that an 
appellate court, in reviewing whether the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support 
a finding of actual malice, should make its own findings of fact and credibility determinations, 
or overrule those of the trier of fact.  For example, the petitioner there alleged that the 
respondent, in a critical magazine review of the petitioner’s loudspeaker system, falsely 
asserted with actual malice that musical instruments heard through the speakers tended to 
wander “about the room,” as opposed to the truthful description of wandering “along the 
wall.”  Id. at 488–91.  The district court found as fact a lack of credibility in the respondent’s 
employee’s assertion in his trial testimony that he interpreted these descriptions as 
synonymous and, based only on that finding and its finding that “about the room” was not an 
accurate description, determined that the petitioner had proven actual malice.  Id. at 511–
12.  The Supreme Court did not disturb the district court’s credibility finding, or any of the 
district court’s “purely factual findings,” but simply held that the lack of credibility stemming 
from the respondent’s employee’s unconvincing and “vain attempt to defend his statement as 
a precise description of the nature of the sound movement” did not, by itself constitute clear 
and convincing evidence that respondent possessed actual malice at the time of the 
publication.  Id. at 512–13.  This is factually distinguishable from the situation here, in 
which, as discussed below, plaintiff presented ample evidence tending to show defendants’ 
awareness of falsity and doubts regarding the truth of the six statements at the time of the 
publication.  More to the point, the principle of viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party on a motion for JNOV, while it must be applied in 
conjunction with the heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard and with the 
appellate court’s “independent examination of the whole record,” is necessary—where 
findings of fact and credibility determinations must ultimately be made by the jury—in order 
to ascertain whether the record can permissibly and constitutionally support a finding of 
actual malice.  Were we to, as amici seemingly urge, make our own factual determinations 
on the evidence and on the ultimate question of actual malice itself, we would impermissibly 
invade the province of the jury and conflict with Supreme Court precedent to the contrary.  
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 n.11 (1967) (stating that where a result of either 
negligence or actual malice “finds reasonable support in the record it is for the jury, not for 
this Court, to determine whether there was knowing or reckless falsehood” (citing New York 
Times, 376 U.S. at 284–285)).  As such, we do not view an appellate court’s “duty to 
independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the 
constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear 
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Here, because plaintiff stipulated that she was a public official and because the 
allegedly defamatory statements concerned her official conduct, she was required to 
present sufficient evidence for the jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that 
defendants published the statements at issue with actual malice.  The trial court, in 
denying defendants’ motions for directed verdict and JNOV, determined that plaintiff 
had met this evidentiary burden, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.  
Consistent with our “duty to independently decide whether the evidence in the record 
is sufficient to cross th[is] constitutional threshold,” we “must consider the factual 
record in full” and “examine . . . the statements in issue and the circumstances under 
which they were made to see whether they are of a character which the principles of 
the First Amendment protect.”  Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 686, 688.  In addition to the 
evidence as summarized in the factual background provided above, we will 
summarize additional portions of the evidence relevant to plaintiff’s claim.17   
 
The crux of plaintiff’s defamation claim is that in the six statements 
defendants falsely claimed that independent firearms experts were asserting based 
                                            
and convincing proof of ‘actual malice,’ ” Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 685–89, as inherently 
inconsistent with the principle that a court, on a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, must 
determine “whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury,” Green, 367 N.C. at 140, 749 S.E.2d 
at 267 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
17 We emphasize that our discussion of the evidence in this case is a reflection of the 
record as viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and summarizes what the jury could 
permissibly have found as fact under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard.  It was for 
the jury, not this Court, to determine whether defendants in fact acted with actual malice, 
and we note that we give due regard here to the principle that credibility determinations are 
within the province of the jury.   
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on the Whitehurst Photographs that plaintiff, either through extreme incompetence 
or deliberate fraud, had botched her laboratory analysis in the Green case with the 
added consequence of securing the conviction of a potentially innocent man.  Plaintiff 
contended that this false narrative began when Locke first learned of the Whitehurst 
Photographs and the motion for mistrial filed in the Adams case, in which Adams’ 
attorney, David Sutton, stated that “William Tobin says preliminary [sic], based upon 
a photograph sent by Dr. Whitehurst, there is ample reason to question whether the 
class characteristics in Q-9 and Q-10 are the same.”  When Locke discussed the Green 
and Adams cases with Sutton in April 2010 and decided to write the story, she 
included a quote from Sutton in an early draft that was later removed, stating that 
“[plaintiff] just made it up.  She made it up because she could, and prosecutors needed 
her to.  It’s that simple.”  According to plaintiff’s theory of the case, defendants 
decided early on that this was the story and that it would constitute the last of their 
four-part “Agents’ Secrets” series, which reported on alleged errors or wrongdoing by 
SBI agents and “how practices by the [SBI] have led to wrongful convictions.”  An 
internal story folder circulated to N&O staff summarized the planned article, stating 
that “Desmond had no idea how to evaluate firearm evidence or, worse, she ignored 
all rules of the trade and fabricated the results to help police secure their victory.”   
However, all that existed to support such a story, apart from a rather 
sensational allegation by a zealous defense attorney, was Tobin’s statement that the 
Whitehurst Photographs raised a preliminary “question” over the class 
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characteristics.  As plaintiff’s counsel stated in closing arguments, Locke “needed [the 
story] to be what David Sutton had said. . . . That was what she needed the story to 
be, but she didn’t have it.  This is what she had, a question.”  Accordingly, Locke set 
out to procure independent experts who would substantiate the story suggested by 
Sutton.  Defendants’ articles reported that Locke did indeed obtain such “independent 
firearms experts” who, having “studied the photographs,” not only stated, inter alia, 
that “the widths of the lands and grooves on the two bullets are starkly different, 
which would make it impossible to have the same number,” and that “the bullets 
could not have been fired from the same firearm,” but also “question[ed] whether 
Desmond knows anything about the discipline” and “suspect[ed] she falsified 
evidence to offer the prosecutors the answer they wanted.”  Yet, plaintiff’s evidence 
tends to show no one, not least of which the four individuals to whom the statements 
were attributed, was willing to make such statements—that is, experts were not 
asserting based on the Whitehurst Photographs that plaintiff’s analysis was false and 
questioning whether plaintiff was incompetent or corrupt.  As plaintiff’s counsel 
stated at the end of her closing argument: 
This was the story on April 6th.  “William Tobin says 
preliminary [sic], based upon a photograph sent by Dr. 
Whitehurst, there is ample reason to question whether the 
class characteristics in Q-9 and Q-10 are the same.” 
 
Well, guess what?  This is exactly what [Locke] had 
on August 14, 2010, the story was the same.  After all of 
the attempts to scramble, to try to talk to everybody, . . . 
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everybody is saying the same thing.  That was still all she 
had.  
 
Moreover, plaintiff’s evidence tends to show defendants’ publication of the false 
statements was not a result of mere negligence or failure to investigate, but stemmed 
rather from a “purposeful avoidance of the truth.”  Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692.   
 
One of Locke’s purported sources for the six statements was Bill Tobin, a 
“former chief metallurgist for the FBI.”  Plaintiff presented evidence tending to show 
that Tobin did not make some of the statements attributed to him and that he only 
made other statements when asked as a hypothetical to assume that a serious 
mistake had been made in the analysis.  For example, in his deposition testimony, 
Tobin was asked about several of the statements attributed to him: 
Q 
If I understand your answer correctly, your 
comment, This is as bad as it can be, or It doesn’t get any 
worse than this, was assuming that it was determined that 
a mistake or an error had been made; is that fair to say? 
 
A 
Yes, I would also remind, should remind 
somebody, that that was out of context. In context I was 
also implying that what I just said is true with regard to 
the practice of firearms identification, but one needs to put 
that also in a systemic context because what I believe we 
had already discussed, if in fact an error had been made, 
how it crept through the system through what should have 
been some systemic peer reviews, supervisory reviews of 
the crime lab, itself, as well. 
 
So in other words, even if an error existed, it should 
have been detected somewhere along the normal system of 
reviews before it’s admitted or before it’s released from the 
agency. So that was in the context in which I said it doesn’t 
get any worse than that, if in fact an error was made. 
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Again, that’s the subjunctive, the caveat or disclaimer, 
then, comma, then this is it doesn’t get any worse than the 
easiest of the three types of an error creeping all the way 
through the system.  That what I was meaning by it doesn’t 
get any worse than this. 
 
Again, I was not referring to a specific examiner or 
a specific case. I was just discussing general errors as Type 
1, Type 2, and Type 3 errors and the presumed system of 
checks and balances and error quality control process that 
should exist in the system.  Does that make any sense? 
 
Q 
It does.  So is it fair to say that your comment 
of either, This is as bad as it could be or It doesn’t get any 
worse than this, that you may have made to Mandy Locke 
was not referring to Beth Desmond’s work in this case? 
 
A 
Correct. 
 
Q 
In any of your conversations with Ms. Locke, 
did you state to Ms. Locke that you questioned whether 
Beth Desmond knew anything at all about the discipline of 
firearms examination? 
 
A 
First of all, I continue to advise Fred and 
Mandy that I have no basis to make any claims of this 
particular examiner’s work. I have none. I have no, I didn’t 
know who she or he was. I had no experience with her work 
product, so I have no basis to make any statements 
regarding a specific examiner’s proficiency. 
 
It’s not even a field in which I normally will deal 
anyway. So on numerous levels I had no basis to make any 
claim about someone’s proficiency.  So I don’t recall making 
any statement that she doesn’t know anything about 
firearms or whatever you, firearms identification. I don’t 
recall making that statement. 
 
If I did, it would have been included in the universe 
or the entire same pool, it’s known as, entire possible 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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events leading up to an error if one occurred, if one had 
occurred, but I don’t recall making that statement. 
 
Q 
So is it fair to summarize your answer by 
saying you don’t recall making any statement like that, but 
if you had made a statement like that, the only way you 
could have possibly made a statement like that is if in 
response to the assumption that a mistake had, in fact, 
been made and you were laying that out as one possibility 
along with a lot of other possibilities as the cause of the 
mistake. 
 
A 
Yes, but that is such a foreign statement. I 
would not be in a basis to claim that somebody doesn’t know 
anything about an area in which I don’t even deal, in which 
I don’t even perform, that I don’t even operate. 
 
So again, I continually admonish—well, not, I 
continually reminded Fred and Mandy that I can only 
present generic assessments of errors, what types of errors 
and systematic issues from my experiences, both as a 
scientists and also as a[ ] forensic examiner inside, behind 
the blue wall.  I can only address these areas generically. 
 
So I would not have any basis at all to make any 
statement about someone’s proficiency in an area outside 
of metallurgy material science and possibly legally, in the 
legal community. But I would not make such a statement. 
That’s not, I have no basis to make that statement. 
 
Q 
In any of your conversations with Ms. Locke, 
did you ever tell Ms. Locke that you suspected that Beth 
Desmond falsified evidence to offer prosecutors the answer 
they wanted? 
 
A 
No.  Again, I have no basis.  There is not, that 
is so inconsistent on numerous levels for me to make that 
statement, so I did not make that statement. 
 
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Q 
In any of your conversations with Ms. Locke 
did you ever tell Ms. Locke that you questioned whether 
Beth Desmond had done an analysis at all? 
 
A 
I'll say if you take out the two words Beth and 
Desmond, yes. I do recall including that in the—that’s 
called drylabbing—take the name out and I concluded that, 
included that in the possible universe of explanations as to 
what could have occurred if an error had, in fact, been 
made. 
 
But I did not specifically indicate that Beth Desmond 
committed an error.  Again, over and over I told anyone 
with whom I was interacting, I have no basis to judge her 
work product or her proficiency. 
 
(Emphases added.)  While there were no recordings of Locke’s interviews or 
conversations with the expert sources, Locke wrote in her notes from a conversation 
with Tobin that Tobin stated that “[p]hotographs are not data upon which I rely to 
make my decision.”  Following this passage, Locke’s notes include a variation of the 
Tobin quote later reported in the article as statement 2 (“This is a big red flag for the 
whole unit,” said William Tobin, former chief metallurgist for the FBI, who has 
testified about potential problems in firearms analysis. “This is as bad as it can be.  
It raises the question of whether she did an analysis at all.”).  Yet, immediately 
preceding this quote, Locke noted Tobin as stating:  “Preface this by saying 
photographs present accurate picture.”  Locke admitted in her testimony that Tobin 
was qualifying his statement on the assumption that it was later determined that the 
Whitehurst Photographs were in fact accurate depictions of the class characteristics 
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of the bullets.  Yet, Locke did not include Tobin’s prefatory qualifying statement in 
the article.   
 
Tobin’s testimony is bolstered by email communications between Locke and 
Tobin prior to the publication of the articles.  In a 3 August 2010 email from Tobin to 
Locke, he stated: 
I don’t do F/TM [firearms/toolmark] examinations, and 
most particularly don’t render opinions from photographs 
in an area in which I don’t function.  I only testify as a 
scientist objecting to the lack of a scientific foundation for 
testimonies 
of 
individualization 
(specific 
source 
attribution), and report on the opinion of my [rather 
distinguished] colleagues who also strenuously disagree 
with the conclusions rendered by F/TM examiners.  The 
science doesn’t support such conclusions. 
 
I never testify as to the possible fact of a match, only as to 
the lack of scientific (and statistical) foundation for 
inferences of individualization. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, despite Tobin’s explicit statement that he did not “render 
opinions from photographs in an area in which I don’t function,” defendants 
attributed statements to Tobin representing that Tobin had specifically analyzed 
plaintiff work in the Green and Adams cases.  Statement 2 was explicitly reported as 
a quote from Tobin, and Locke asserted that Tobin was one of the “independent” 
expert sources for the other statements.   
 
Shortly after the 14 August article was published, Tobin called Jerry 
Richardson, then the assistant director of the SBI Crime Laboratory, to apologize for 
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the way Tobin’s statements had been portrayed and make clear that he was not one 
of the “independent” experts referenced in the article.  According to Richardson: 
[T]he first morning after I was back in the office after the 
articles were published I did receive a phone call from a 
Mr. Tobin.  Mr. Tobin immediately apologized to me . . . .  
He wanted me to share his apologies also with the crime 
laboratory, with Ms. Desmond, and with our director at the 
time because of the things that were printed in the article.  
He made it clear he was not one of the I guess external 
experts that had made comments.  He made it clear to me 
that his comments were in very general terms.  He did say 
he was answering those questions in a form of “what-ifs,” 
what if this happened and those were how his responses 
were based, and again he apologized, and he stated at that 
point he would not have any further contact with the 
reporter. 
 
This conversation is reflected in an email that Richardson sent later that day to other 
individuals in the SBI, in which Richardson stated: 
FYI 
 
Bill Tobin, FBI Chief Metallurgist, who is quoted from 
Saturday’s article contact[ed] me earlier today.  He wanted 
to apologize to Beth Desmond, the SBI Firearms Section 
and me for the manner in which his comments were 
portrayed in Firearms article.  He advises that he only 
answered questions from the reporter in general terms and 
actually was not aware of the circumstances of any of the 
cases and has no knowledge of Desmond’s work.  Tobin 
advises that his quotes are from three different questions 
and appears to have been combined from a series of “What 
ifs.”  He further wanted us to know that he is not one of the 
independent experts that is mentioned in the article. 
 
In his deposition testimony, Tobin confirmed that this email accurately described his 
conversation with Richardson.   
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Another of Locke’s purported expert sources was Liam Hendrikse, a consulting 
forensic scientist in the field of firearms and ballistics living in Canada.  Hendrikse 
was among those included in the emails circulating the Whitehurst Photographs 
following the Adams trial.  When Locke contacted Hendrikse asking if he would be 
willing to discuss the case, Hendrikse was hesitant to speak with her in part because 
of the possibility that he could be retained to perform an independent examination of 
the ballistics evidence from the Green case.  In an email to Whitehurst and Schwartz, 
Hendrikse asked if he should speak with Locke and noted that he had not “examined 
and compared the samples Q9 and Q10 ‘first hand’ ” and that “anything that [he] 
would say would of course be a qualified opinion.”  Hendrikse wrote that he 
“suppose[d] he should discuss [Locke’s] intentions with her, and then go from there.”  
Schwartz advised Hendrikse to “do whatever’s comfortable” and that if he spoke with 
Locke, “make sure you qualify your opinions as much as you think they should be 
qualified.”  Hendrikse also discussed his concerns in an email with another local 
attorney, stating that he intended to speak with Locke “just to get an idea of her 
intentions with respect to this article” and that “[i]f the article seems to be more 
general, than specific, then [he] would see no reason why [he] couldn’t comment.”  
After Hendrikse spoke with Locke, he wrote that his concerns were alleviated “given 
the nature of the article” and that he had “had a very general conversation with the 
reporter, in my mind perfectly harmless.”   
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At trial, Hendrikse testified that when he spoke with Locke they largely 
discussed firearms examination generally, and he told her that the class 
characteristics of the bullets looked different in the Whitehurst Photographs but 
repeatedly stressed the limitations of photographs and the fact that a physical 
examination would be necessary to make any determinations about the bullets.  With 
respect to statement 1 (“Independent firearms experts who have studied the 
photographs question whether Desmond knows anything about the discipline.  
Worse, some suspect she falsified the evidence to offer prosecutors the answers they 
wanted.”), Hendrikse denied making any such comments and assumed when the 
article was published that Locke must have been referring to other sources.  
Similarly, Hendrikse denied making statements 3 and 4 as written, testifying that 
he never stated that “the widths of the lands and the grooves on the two bullets are 
starkly different, which would make it impossible to have the same number” or that 
“You don’t even need to measure to see this doesn’t add up.”  With respect to the last 
portion of statement 4 (“It’s so basic to our work.  The only benefit I can extend is that 
she accidentally measured the same bullet twice.”), which was specifically attributed 
to Hendrikse in the article, Hendrikse testified that he did state something similar, 
but only by way of explanation in response to a question in which he was asked to 
assume that a serious mistake had in fact been made.  According to Hendrikse, this 
comment 
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was an explanation that I gave to Ms. Locke in our 
conversation.  Based on assuming somebody went in there 
looked at these two samples and determined that they 
actually were different, then how would that mistake have 
been made, and that was the explanation that I gave her, 
but that wasn’t the only benefit that I came up with 
because that was prefaced as “I can’t tell you whether she’s 
right or wrong because I haven’t looked at the exhibits.” 
 
After the 14 August article was published, Hendrikse wrote to the N&O with 
his concerns about the inaccuracies in the article and to request a retraction for the 
statements that were explicitly attributed to him, stating:   
I’ve been having trouble with the context of the quotes that 
are attributed to me, and I was wondering if a retraction 
was possible. 
 
The two quotes that I have real issues with are the 
following: 
 
1. “The chances of a gun not matching a bullet recovered 
from the crime scene when it involves an American gun is 
highly likely.  Our days of speaking with such certainty 
should be over.” 
 
The first part of that was misinterpreted. We were 
speaking on the phone, about Class Characteristics, not 
Individual Characteristics.  When we spoke about how 
Agent Desmond arrived at determining that the bullet was 
fired from a Hi-Point, I mentioned that it is usually very 
difficult to narrow down the possible makes of gun, to just 
one when analyzing the Class Characteristics of a bullet.  
The quote makes it seem like I’m saying it’s unlikely that 
you can link a bullet to the individual gun that fired it. This 
is wrong, and in a nutshell makes me appear to be a 
lunatic. The existence of such a quote could have longer-
term ramifications with respect to my career and 
credentials. 
 
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The latter part of that quote doesn’t really say anything 
without that first part. 
 
2. The only benefit I can extend is that she accidentally 
measured the same bullet twice. 
 
I feel that this is unfair to both agent Desmond, and to 
myself. Both verbally, and in writing, I stated that I 
couldn’t tell you if she was right or wrong unless I 
examined the items. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  As previously stated, Hendrikse was unaware at the time that he 
was purportedly a source for the other statements attributed to the “independent” 
experts.   
Another of Locke’s expert sources for the six statements was Dr. Stephen 
Bunch, a firearms examiner and a supervisor of the firearms and tool mark section 
at the Virginia Department of Forensic Science laboratory.  In his testimony, Bunch 
stated that in his one phone conversation and follow-up emails with Locke he 
answered general questions about firearms examination and denied that he made 
any of the statements as reported in defendants’ articles.  In his first email following 
their phone conversation, Bunch asked that any of his comments be kept off the 
record, stating:  “Thank you for being understanding of my refusal to comment about 
this case.  Frankly, I know nothing factual about it at all.”  In subsequent emails, 
after Bunch had seen the Whitehurst Photographs, Bunch wrote to Locke that “it 
appears” in the photographs that the class characteristics are different, but that he 
“would have to look at the actual specimens to really offer a firm opinion.”  In a 
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separate email, Bunch wrote to Locke:  “I wish I could see the actual specimens and 
then I could render a real opinion”; and “[s]trange things can happen though when 
one observes photos, so I hate to state anything with firmness.”  Bunch testified that 
he never told Locke that the class characteristics of the bullets were actually different 
(or that it was obvious they were different), that he questioned whether plaintiff knew 
anything about the discipline of firearms examination, or that he questioned whether 
plaintiff had done an analysis at all:   
Q. 
. . . [D]id you ever tell Ms. Locke that it was 
obvious that the widths of the lands and grooves on the two 
bullets at issue were different? 
 
A. 
I may have suggested that they appeared 
different in the photographs but I wouldn’t have said 
definitively they were different, no. 
 
Q. 
And similar question:  Did you ever tell Ms. 
Locke that the widths of the lands and grooves on the two 
bullets were starkly different? 
 
A. 
Only I may have used that word in referring 
to their appearance in the key photograph possibly.  I don’t 
recall.  But I wouldn’t have said as a fact that they were 
starkly different, no, not without examining them. 
 
Q. 
Okay.  And in any of your conversations with 
Ms. Locke did you ever tell Ms. Locke that you questioned 
whether Beth Desmond knew anything at all about the 
discipline of firearms examination? 
 
A. 
I really don’t think so.  I don’t think that came 
up at all in our one telephone conversation so at least not 
to my recollection.  I can’t conceive of – I’ve had dealings 
with that and when the FBI questions one examination 
over another.  That can be a dicey topic.  I’ve thought about 
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that a lot over the years, so no, I can’t conceive of saying 
something like that just based on a potential single 
mistake. 
 
Q. 
And I believe I’ve already asked you this but 
I’m going to ask you again:  In any of your conversations 
with Ms. Locke, did you ever tell Ms. Locke that you 
suspected that Ms. Desmond falsified the evidence to offer 
the prosecutors the answer they wanted? 
 
A. 
No, I wouldn’t have done that.  I didn’t even 
think of that myself, as mentioned. 
 
Q. 
Did you ever tell Ms. Locke that you 
questioned whether or not Beth Desmond had done an 
analysis at all? 
 
A. 
No, I don’t think so.  I don’t even know for sure 
whether her name came up in an initial conversation, I 
don’t know.  It may have, it may not have.  I’m not sure, 
but it was a general conversation I think about where she 
could find other examiners to do this or comment on it, and 
it was the general – maybe a little bit of a general 
discussion on the science and, you know, the good and the 
bad or whatever. 
 
 
Locke originally asserted in a sworn deposition that Tobin, Hendrikse, and 
Bunch were her expert sources for the six statements.  The following day, however, 
Locke asserted that she had inadvertently omitted Schwartz as an additional expert 
source for the statements.  Locke had one conversation with Schwartz, who is not a 
firearms expert.  In Locke’s notes from this conversation, Locke quotes Schwartz as 
stating “Hi-Point Model C.  I don’t know enough to dispute that.”  In her deposition, 
Schwartz testified that she did not recall Locke asking for her opinion as to whether 
the bullets in the Whitehurst photograph had been fired from the same gun.  Had she 
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been asked, Schwartz stated that she would have explained she was not “qualified to 
judge” and “would have referred her to Liam [Hendrikse].”  Schwartz further testified 
in this respect: 
  
Q. 
Did you or would you have ever told Mandy 
Locke that the widths of the land and groove impressions 
on the bullets that Beth Desmond examined are starkly 
different, and therefore it’s impossible for the bullets to 
have the same number of land and groove impressions? 
 
A. 
I could only have said I might have said that 
Liam had that opinion or that Fred had that opinion, or 
possibly if Bill Tobin had that opinion, or possibly if Bill 
Tobin got involved that they had that opinion.  I’m not 
competent to have such an opinion.  I was not then and I 
am not now.  I have never been competent to have such an 
opinion. 
 
Q. 
And would you have ever told Mandy Locke 
that the bullets in question could not have been fired from 
the same firearm? 
 
A. 
Again, I am not competent to have such an 
opinion. 
 
Regarding statement 1 (“Independent firearms experts who have studied the 
photographs question whether Desmond knows anything about the discipline. Worse, 
some suspect she falsified the evidence to offer prosecutors the answers they 
wanted”), Schwartz testified: 
Q. 
Would you have ever told Mandy Locke that 
you questioned whether or not Beth Desmond knew 
anything about the discipline of firearms examination? 
 
A. 
I don’t recall saying such a thing, I don’t.  I’d 
say that this isn’t the kind of thing I would have said. 
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. . . . 
 
Q. 
Would you have ever told Mandy Locke that 
you suspected that Beth Desmond had falsified her report? 
 
A. 
No, that is not something I would have said, 
chiefly because I don’t have access to Ms. Desmond’s mind.  
To say falsified would have been that she did something 
deliberately lied.  How could I know without having access 
to her mind.   
 
Schwartz’s testimony that she would not have made such statements is consistent 
with her affidavit and testimony in the Adams case, as well as an email she sent to 
individuals interested in the Whitehurst Photographs on 10 April 2010, in which she 
stated:  “[A] definitive statement that the bullets came from two different guns can’t 
be made on the basis of Fred’s photographs or, indeed, any photos.  To reach a definite 
conclusion as to the class characteristics on the two bullets, the bullets themselves 
will need to be examined.”   
 
Locke’s communications with her purported expert sources tend to show not 
only that Locke frequently sought to obtain their statements on the hypothetical 
assumption that plaintiff’s analysis had already been determined to be false, which 
is not the manner in which any of the resulting statements that were actually made 
were reported in the articles, but also that Locke tended to misrepresent to her 
sources the SBI’s response to any questions that had been raised by the Whitehurst 
Photographs.  For example, when the SBI first received the Whitehurst Photographs 
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on 24 July 2010, Richardson emailed Whitehurst to discuss the misleading nature of 
the photographs.  Richardson wrote: 
[W]e have noted a number of issues associated with the 
photos.  These issues include:  photographs are not 
properly oriented, improper side lighting, unknown 
microscope magnification; focus; and, the use of what 
appears to be tweezers or other metal objects to handle 
evidence during photography which could alter the 
evidence. 
 
This email was forwarded to Locke, who then emailed Bunch and Hendrikse stating:  
Not surprisingly instead of addressing a grave mistake the 
SBI leadership is trying to discredit the photos you and the 
others saw of those bullet fragments in the case in North 
Carolina that we discussed.  The photographer had the 
fragments propped up on metal tweezers, but he said he 
didn’t handle the bullets with them.  The SBI leadership is 
saying that the metal-to-metal contact likely corrupted the 
evidence.  Liam, could tweezers, particularly if they are not 
used to pick up the bullets affect the number of lands and 
grooves visible?  Could it make a new land or groove?   
 
Locke’s email, which again opened with the false premise that it was already 
established that plaintiff’s analysis was unsound (i.e. “a grave mistake”), omitted the 
SBI’s legitimate concerns with the photographs and falsely suggested the SBI was 
asserting that the use of tweezers had “likely corrupted the evidence” or even had 
created new lands and grooves on the bullets.  Bunch responded that the fictitious 
latter proposition was “laughable,” and Hendrikse stated that “you’d have to be some 
sort of ham-handed strong man to accidentally create what looks like equidistant 
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rifling impressions on either of the fragments, or obliterate rifling that was originally 
there.”   
 
Notably, in Hendrikse’s response, he again stressed the necessity of an 
independent examination in order to resolve any questions concerning the bullets, 
stating “[t]he fact remains that unless I physically examine them I won’t know if 
ultimately SBI NC are correct or not.  Did they ever employ an independent examiner 
to give a second opinion?”  In her responding email,18 Locke acknowledged that an 
independent examination was planned, but again misrepresented the position of the 
SBI: 
Liam, thanks for that; it’s what I suspected.  They’ve hired 
the guy and run through a million hoops to physically get 
the bullets sent.  The DA has dragged his feet per pressure 
from the SBI.  They’re avoiding scrutiny. 
 
As Locke admitted in her trial testimony, the latter statements were false, as both 
the Pitt County DA and the SBI wanted to have an independent examination 
performed on the bullets.19 
 
Locke similarly mispresented what plaintiff had said about the photographs 
when Locke spoke to her purported sources.  In their interview, plaintiff repeatedly 
                                            
18 This email evidently was not provided to plaintiff by defendants along with the other 
emails produced during discovery and was instead provided to plaintiff by Hendrikse. 
 
19 Locke asserted that the false accusations in her email originated with Sutton, 
stating that “Sutton has a very strong personality, and he had some very strong thoughts, 
and I think that he had made the issues sound bigger than it was to me, and I erroneously 
repeated it,” and that “Sutton was very frustrated.  He felt that Mr. Everett’s office was 
standing in the way of these bullets being tested.  I now know and think he was wrong[.]” 
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stressed to Locke that firearms examination requires physical examination under a 
microscope by a qualified examiner and cautioned against attempting to draw any 
conclusions from a photograph, particularly one taken by someone who, like 
Whitehurst, is not a firearms expert.  On the subject of the use of tweezers, plaintiff 
pointed to this as one example of Whitehurst’s noticeable inexperience in firearms 
examination, stating that this could have “potentially, potentially” impaired the 
bullets for future examination.  Plaintiff explained, “I’m just saying that a firearms 
person would never use tweezers on any type[,] I don’t even care if you[‘re] only 
holding them up for a picture.  You don’t do that.  If I had done that, I would have 
been chased out of here.”  Plaintiff further stressed that she and the SBI were eager 
for the bullets to be reexamined, stating, “[t]his is what we’ve been asking them to 
do” and that “[o]f course, we would like for it to be sent to any other qualified firearms 
examiner.  We have been asking for it. . . . I am – I have – I’m wanting someone to 
look at them.  That’s fine with me.”  Yet, in an email to Hendrikse later that day, 
Locke stated that plaintiff was “sure that the tweezers as we discussed last week had 
ruined the evidence and that no one would be able to make any good conclusions now.”  
 
While misrepresenting these portions of the interview to her sources, plaintiff’s 
evidence also shows that Locke ignored other critical aspects of her interview with 
plaintiff.  In the interview, plaintiff not only reiterated what Locke’s experts had 
stated—that no conclusions can, or should, be drawn from mere photographs—but 
also repeatedly stressed that due to conspicuous issues with the photographs, 
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including the poor lighting and improper positioning of the bullets, the class 
characteristics she and Morin had observed are not visible in the Whitehurst 
Photographs, particularly in the Comparison Photograph.  As previously noted, 
plaintiff explained at length how firearms examiners “never compare anything base 
to base,” that “[e]veryone who is a Firearms examiner 101 knows not to do that,” and 
that if “you try to line them up[,] [t]hey’re going to be off.  Right?  They’re going to 
look like they’re not in alignment.”  In this respect, plaintiff also presented evidence 
that, prior to publication, a photographer for defendants’ “Agents’ Secrets” series 
tried to raise this same concern in a team meeting by drawing lines diagonally across 
a piece of paper, tearing the paper in two down the middle of the lines, and then 
turning one of the pieces around to show that the lines no longer lined up with each 
other.  Additionally, Locke testified that as part of her research she “read every 
operating procedure manual for every section of the state crime laboratory as far back 
as they had retained those materials” and was aware that the bullets were improperly 
positioned in the comparison photograph.  Thus, plaintiff’s evidence tends to show 
that in spite of Locke’s awareness of the myriad problems with the Whitehurst 
Photographs, particularly the “base-to-base” Comparison Photograph, and the fact 
that no one, most especially plaintiff, was asserting that the relevant class 
characteristics were visible in the Comparison Photograph, defendants featured the 
Comparison Photograph prominently on the front page of their newspaper along with 
the caption “WHAT CAN YOU SEE?” inviting the average reader to look for 
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something that could not be seen and to do what independent firearms experts would 
not—form an opinion based merely on a photograph.    
 
Plaintiff’s evidence also demonstrated that, despite Locke’s sources’ repeated 
statements that any substantive analysis of the bullets in question would require 
physical examination under a microscope, Locke never sought to interview or 
otherwise contact Neal Morin.  Morin, plaintiff’s supervisor at that time, was the only 
other qualified firearms examiner who had examined the bullets under a microscope, 
and he had agreed with plaintiff’s conclusions regarding the matching class 
characteristics and had signed off on her work.  Plaintiff presented evidence that 
Locke was aware of Morin and his role in reviewing plaintiff’s analysis.  In Locke’s 
interview with plaintiff, plaintiff explained: 
MS. DESMOND: 
. . . All of my work is checked by a senior 
examiner, someone that is more senior to me.  And so that 
person takes it back through all the evidence, looks at it 
and has to come to the same conclusion I did before they 
sign up – off on it.” 
 
MS. LOCKE: 
And that would be Neal Morin. 
 
MS. DESMOND: 
Yes, it was. 
 
Locke even wrote in her research notes “Check on Neal Morin, approved peer review 
of Desmond,” yet never attempted to contact Morin.   
 
When asked why she had interviewed plaintiff but not Morin, Locke first 
testified that she did not interview Morin because “the chain of custody log indicated 
that Mr. Morin had access to specimen for ten minutes,” and because “one of the 
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primary concerns was how [plaintiff’s] testimony differed from her laboratory report,” 
and Morin did not testify.  Locke acknowledged that plaintiff’s “determinations on 
the class characteristics w[ere] the central question” but asserted that she did not 
understand how interviewing Morin would “have changed or made this story any 
different for Ms. Desmond.”  In her testimony on the following day, when asked why 
she had not sought to interview Morin when she was already at the SBI crime lab 
interviewing plaintiff, Locke suggested an additional reason why she had not 
interviewed Morin: 
“[t]he protocol for talking to anybody employed with the 
SBI is to reach out to the public information officer. . . . A 
public information officer was not present in that 
interview, and so I would not have stormed over to the 
firearms unit at that moment to try to interview anybody 
else without looping in the public information officer.” 
 
Yet, plaintiff had testified that when she contacted Locke to discuss her concerns with 
the Whitehurst Photographs, a public information officer’s presence was a 
prerequisite to the interview: 
A. 
. . . I went to the director and I told him that I 
wanted to talk to her and at least give the facts of the case 
that I testified on, only to give the facts of a case that I 
testified on and to explain, you know, these pictures, if this 
is what she was looking at, and he had agreed and he had 
said that the only way he would let me do that is if he would 
have – he would have the public information officer come 
in with me to make sure, you know, sit in the room – the 
interview room, and I said that would be fine. 
 
 
And so then I called Mandy Locke, and I set up an 
interview to talk about the Pitt County case. 
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Q. 
And did you in fact have an interview with 
Mandy Locke? 
 
 
A. 
I did. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Q. 
And it was you and Mandy Locke and who 
else was there? 
 
 
A. 
Her name was Jennifer Canada, and she was 
the public information officer with the Department of 
Justice. 
 
Morin testified that he was at the lab during Locke’s interview with plaintiff, he 
anticipated being asked questions by Locke, and he was surprised that he was not.   
 
Also relevant to the question of defendants’ regard for the truth or falsity of 
their publications is plaintiff’s evidence concerning various mischaracterizations and 
omissions in the articles.  Consistent with the theme of the “Agents’ Secrets” series—
to show “how practices by the [SBI] have led to wrongful convictions”—the 14 August 
article asserted that Pitt County prosecutors needed plaintiff’s bullet analysis to “fix 
a potentially crippling weakness in their case” and that plaintiff’s “analysis would 
make or break the case against Jemaul Green.”  Yet, despite Locke’s insistence in her 
trial testimony that “we try to tell our readers as much as we know and provide to 
them as much information as we can,” the article omits key information about the 
case against Green, perhaps most pertinently the fact that thirteen eyewitnesses 
testified at the trial and none of them observed anyone other than Green with a 
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firearm.  Further, Locke acknowledged she was aware of credibility issues with Green 
and his claim of self-defense which were omitted from the 14 August and 31 December 
articles.  According to Locke, “I think any intelligent reader understanding that a 
man opened fire in a populated street who had been convicted of murder and sent to 
prison might have some credibility issues.  I didn’t need to say that.”   
The 14 August Article mischaracterizes not only the strength of the State’s 
case, but also the impact of plaintiff’s testimony upon the case.  For example, the 
article asserts that when plaintiff examined the two bullets in the Comparison 
Photograph she “scribbled down the measurements of the lands and grooves”20 and 
that “her report eliminated doubt about another shooter.”  The article mentions 
neither the four additional bullets recovered from the scene nor the fact that plaintiff, 
as reflected both in her typed report and her trial testimony, concluded that no 
determinations could be made as to these four bullets.  The 14 August Article also 
discusses the fact that Green wanted to introduce evidence tending to show that, not 
long after the shooting, the victim’s brother was seen at Vonzeil Adams’ house 
threatening Adams with a gun.  According to the article, this “evidence that [the 
                                            
20 In her trial testimony, Locke denied that the word “scribbled” conveyed any negative 
connotation, stating, “[n]o, I do not agree with that.  My doctor scribbles.”  Locke also asserted 
that the 14 August Article’s discussion of plaintiff’s prior career in ballet was intended to be 
complimentary and denied that it was in any way derogatory, explaining that “it was really 
interesting that she had this background.”  The discussion is included in the article as part 
of a section alleging that “[a]t the SBI lab, training is often minimal” and claiming that 
plaintiff “was a novice examiner” who “came to the field through a peculiar route.”  By 
contrast, in discussing with Hendrikse his prior work as a model, Locke told him she would 
not have reported it because it would not have been relevant.   
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victim’s brother] could have been a second shooter” was excluded because “Desmond 
had convinced the judge:  Nothing but bullets and casings from a Hi-Point 9mm Model 
C had been recovered there.”  This is false, as the judge’s primary ruling was that the 
proffered evidence was inadmissible hearsay and, as previously stated, plaintiff made 
no determinations as to four additional bullets recovered from the scene.   
The 14 August Article also discusses plaintiff’s use of the “absolute certainty” 
language in her trial testimony, noting that plaintiff at one point “concluded with 
‘absolute certainty’ that they were fired from the same kind of gun.”  The article states 
that plaintiff “said this month that she meant to say she was absolutely certain that 
the bullets were consistent with a Hi-Point 9 mm.”  What the article does not state 
and what Locke, having read the trial transcripts and specifically discussed this issue 
with plaintiff, was aware of is that plaintiff’s “absolute certainty” comment was made 
during voir dire outside of the presence of the jury, that it occurred after plaintiff had 
already testified regarding her analysis of the cartridge casings and bullet fragments, 
and that the voir dire examination concerned the prosecution’s proposed 
demonstration of how a semiautomatic handgun’s ejection port works.21  Thus, it is 
unlikely that any purported issue with plaintiff’s “absolute certainty” language (as 
opposed to “scientific certainty” or “consistent with”) had any effect on the trial or the 
                                            
21 Thus, the voir dire examination was not conducted in order for the trial court to rule 
on the admissibility of plaintiff’s expert testimony.  
 
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jury’s verdict, contrary to the suggestion of the 14 August Article.  This information 
is similarly omitted in the 31 December Article, despite the fact that this article 
focuses far more heavily on the purported “absolute certainty” issue rather than on 
plaintiff’s substantive analysis of the bullets.22  Additionally, the subheading of the 
31 December Article erroneously refers to plaintiff’s “certainty that bullets came from 
one gun,” rather than one type of gun.   
Finally, plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates that defendants were aware not only 
of the necessity of an independent examination of the bullets in order for any 
determinations to be made concerning plaintiff’s analysis, but also of the fact that the 
bullets were indeed going to be independently examined—but not before the planned 
publication date of defendants’ “Agents’ Secrets” series, in which the 14 August 
Article was set to be the final article in the four-part series.  Defendants did not wait 
for the results of the independent examination, which ultimately confirmed plaintiff’s 
analysis.  Instead, shortly before publication, defendants decided to move the “Agents’ 
Secrets” series up a week in order to be “more timely”—that is, to piggyback on the 
breaking news that the Attorney General had replaced the SBI director.   
Overall, following “an independent examination of the whole record,” Bose 
Corp., 466 U.S. at 499, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding 
                                            
22 The evidence, including the 31 December Article and the trial testimony, tends to 
show an effort by defendants to deflect from what was reported in the 14 August Article about 
plaintiff’s substantive analysis and to portray their story all along as one largely concerned 
with plaintiff’s “testimonial overstatement” in using the “absolute certainty” language.  
 
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by clear and convincing evidence that Locke and the N&O published the six 
statements with serious doubts as to the truth of the statements or a high degree of 
awareness of probable falsity, Masson, 501 U.S. at 510.  If the evidence reflected, as 
defendants urge, a simple “misunderstanding” or a “he-said/she-said dispute” 
between a reporter and her sources, then it may very well have been insufficient to 
meet the New York Times standard.  Here, however, the evidence concerning Locke’s 
purported expert sources, including, inter alia, the numerous confirmations that no 
conclusions should be drawn from photographs, not only tends to support those four 
individuals’ testimony that they did not make the six statements attributed to them, 
but also tends to show, particularly in light of the expert subject matter at issue, that 
those individuals would never have made such statements—that, indeed, it would 
have made little to no sense for them to have made such statements.  Meanwhile, the 
evidence of numerous statements made by Locke in her communications with her 
purported expert sources and in her deposition and trial testimony would support a 
finding by the jury of a lack of credibility on her part with respect to the statements 
attributed to those purported sources and, more generally, to decisions made at each 
step of the publication process leading up to the 14 August Article.  This evidence 
concerning Locke, including the myriad ways in which she was aware, and repeatedly 
made aware, of the false aspects of the six statements and various other portions of 
the 14 August and 31 December Articles, yet evidently disregarded this information, 
is highly pertinent to the question of Locke’s state of mind with respect to the truth 
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or falsity of the six statements at the time of publication.  Moreover, the contrasting 
evidence between Locke and the purported expert sources must be also considered in 
the context of the additional evidence concerning the internal communications of 
defendants’ employees, the significant mischaracterizations and omissions in the 14 
August and 31 December Articles tending to portray a narrative of events divorced 
from reality, the attempts by defendants in their 31 December Article and in their 
testimony and representations in the trial court to shift the focus away from the 
Whitehurst Photographs and plaintiff’s substantive analysis in the Green case to the 
purported issue of plaintiff’s “testimonial overstatement,” and the fact that 
defendants did not wait for the independent examination of the ballistics evidence 
but rather advanced their publication date in order to capitalize on the latest 
headlines—all of which tends to show, as the Court of Appeals below described it, 
“that the primary objective of defendants was sensationalism rather than truth.”  
Desmond II, 263 N.C. App. at 54, 823 S.E.2d at 431.  When viewed as a whole, the 
evidence is sufficient for the jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that 
defendants published the statements with actual malice—that is, “knowledge of 
falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth.”  Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688. 
Certainly, the jury could have found that false and defamatory statements 
published in the 14 August and 31 December Articles were the result of a significant 
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pattern of negligence on the part of defendants that fell short of actual malice.23  
Where, however, the record would support either finding, the question must be 
submitted to the jury.  See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 n.11 (1967) (stating 
that where a result of either negligence or actual malice “finds reasonable support in 
the record it is for the jury, not for this Court, to determine whether there was 
knowing or reckless falsehood” (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284–285)).    
We recognize the significant societal interests implicated by the issue here and 
discussed at length in amici curiae briefs filed by several organizations on behalf of 
defendants.  The First Amendment “demands that the law of libel carve out an area 
of breathing space so that protected speech is not discouraged,” Harte-Hanks, 491 
U.S. at 686 (cleaned up), and this breathing space is particularly vital in the context 
of the discussion of issues affecting our criminal justice system and our system of 
government.  The Supreme Court, however, “ha[s] not gone so far . . . as to accord the 
press absolute immunity in its coverage of public figures” and public officials.  Id. at 
688; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The need to avoid 
                                            
23 Defendant argues that the law protects a reporter’s “rational interpretation” of an 
ambiguous source, even if the interpretation is wrong.  Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 289–
90 (1971).  While the jury, which was instructed on rational interpretation, could have found 
that defendants’ statements were within the realm of rational interpretation, plaintiff 
presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the reported statements 
transcended any rational interpretation and resulted instead from a deliberate falsification 
or a reckless disregard for the truth.  Additionally, defendants note that a plaintiff must 
establish that a challenged statement is not “substantially true.”  The issue of the sufficiency 
of the evidence regarding the issue of falsity is not properly before the Court; in any event, 
plaintiff presented ample evidence that the six statements were not substantially true.    
 
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self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue.  If 
it were, this Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and 
broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for 
defamation.”).  An individual still maintains a “right to the protection of his own good 
name.”  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.  Moreover, while the clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard is more stringent than the preponderance of the evidence standard, it is not 
an insurmountable burden.  See, e.g., California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa 
Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (per curiam) (footnote omitted) (“Three standards 
of proof are generally recognized, ranging from the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ 
standard employed in most civil cases, to the ‘clear and convincing’ standard reserved 
to protect particularly important interests in a limited number of civil cases, to the 
requirement that guilt be proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in a criminal 
prosecution.” (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–44 (1979))); Scarborough 
v. Dillard’s, Inc., 363 N.C. 715, 721, 693 S.E.2d 640, 643 (2009) (stating that the clear 
and convincing standard “is more exacting than the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ 
standard generally applied in civil cases, but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
standard applied in criminal matters” (citing Williams v. Blue Ridge Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n, 207 N.C. 362, 363–64, 177 S.E. 176, 177 (1934))).  Where plaintiff presented 
sufficient evidence to meet this evidentiary burden, the issue was properly submitted 
for a jury determination. 
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As such, the trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motions for directed 
verdict and JNOV.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with 
respect to this issue. 
II. 
Jury Instructions 
Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in its jury instructions 
regarding the issue of material falsity by instructing the jury as follows:   
The attribution of statements, opinions or beliefs to a 
person or persons may constitute libel if the attribution is 
materially false, or put another way, if it is not 
substantially 
true. 
The 
question 
is 
whether 
the 
statements, opinions or beliefs of the individuals that were 
reported as being held or expressed by the individuals were 
actually expressed by those individuals. 
 
According to defendants, when a publication attributes a statement to a speaker, the 
defamatory “sting” is not in the attribution to the source but instead is in “the 
underlying statement of fact attributed to the speaker.”  Defendants contend that the 
trial court instructed the jury to consider only the material falsity of the attribution, 
standing alone, and never instructed the jury to consider the material falsity of the 
underlying statement of fact attributed to the speaker.  Defendants argue that the 
trial court should have adopted their proposed instruction, stating: 
If you find that the underlying facts reported by a 
challenged Statement are substantially true, separate and 
apart from the attribution to a cited or quoted source or 
sources, you should find that Plaintiff has not carried her 
burden of proving material falsity. 
 
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We disagree. 
“It is a well-established principle in this jurisdiction that in reviewing jury 
instructions for error, they must be considered and reviewed in their 
entirety.”   Murrow v. Daniels, 321 N.C. 494, 497, 364 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1988) (citing 
Gregory v. Lynch, 271 N.C. 198, 203, 155 S.E.2d 488, 492 (1967)).  Further, “[w]here 
the trial court adequately instructs the jury as to the law on every material aspect of 
the case arising from the evidence and applies the law fairly to variant factual 
situations presented by the evidence, the charge is sufficient. Id. at 497, 364 S.E.2d 
at 395 (citing King v. Powell, 252 N.C. 506, 114 S.E.2d 265 (1960)).   
With respect to the issue of falsity, “[t]he common law of libel” “overlooks minor 
inaccuracies and focuses on substantial truth.”  Masson, 501 U.S. at 516 (emphasis 
added).  As such, “[m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as ‘the 
substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.’ ”  Id. at 517 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  Thus, a plaintiff must establish that “the sting,” the aspect 
causing injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, is materially false.  Stated differently, “the 
issue of falsity relates to the defamatory facts implied by a statement.”  Milkovich, 
497 U.S. at 20 n.7.  Here, however, what constitutes the actionable defamatory facts 
has been difficult at times to parse due to the unique factual posture, which involves 
statements that attribute other statements to third parties as experts opining about 
plaintiff’s work as an expert in the same specialized field.  As the Court of Appeals 
stated in Desmond I, “[i]n this case, which involves mostly Locke’s reports of opinions 
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of experts regarding Desmond’s work, fact and opinion are difficult to separate.”  
Desmond I, 241 N.C. App. at 21, 772 S.E.2d at 137.   
In that appeal, the court rejected defendants’ argument that “ ‘[m]any of the 
statements identified in [plaintiff’s] Complaint are simply expressions of opinion’ by 
various experts whom Locke interviewed, not assertions of fact, and thus not 
actionable.”  Desmond I, 241 N.C. App. at 20, 772 S.E.2d at 136–37.  The court 
explained, as noted above, that “[s]ome of the allegedly defamatory statements, 
though stated as expressions of opinion from experts, may be factually false because 
Locke reported that the experts expressed opinions regarding Desmond’s work that 
they actually did not express.”  Id. at 21, 772 S.E.2d at 137.  Thus, in these instances, 
an expert’s opinion that by itself would not have been actionable is actionable here 
because defendants published an assertion of fact that the expert made a statement 
of opinion that they did not state.  For example, if Bill Tobin had published an article 
on his personal blog in which he opined that the Comparison Photograph is “a big red 
flag” and “raises the question of whether [plaintiff] did an analysis at all,” plaintiff 
would have been hard pressed to establish that his indeterminate statement, though 
critical, was sufficiently an assertion of fact to be actionable as defamation against 
Tobin himself.  Where, however, defendants publish a statement claiming that Tobin 
expressed that same statement of opinion, this statement attributing an opinion 
critical of plaintiff to an expert in her field is an actionable assertion of fact.  In such 
an instance, “the sting” is in the attribution alone—the false assertion of fact that an 
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expert in plaintiff’s field holds an opinion critical of plaintiff.  Thus, the trial court 
correctly instructed the jury that an “attribution . . . may constitute libel if the 
attribution is materially false.”  (Emphases added.)  
On the other hand, other statements published by defendants attribute to 
experts statements that contain an assertion of fact in their own right.  For example, 
statement six provides that “[b]allistics experts who viewed the photographs . . . said 
the bullets could not have been fired from the same firearm.”  This statement asserts 
as fact not only that experts made statements concerning plaintiff, but also, in turn, 
that those experts’ statements are assertions of fact that plaintiff’s analysis was 
conclusively wrong.  The sting in such a statement is not only in the attribution,24 but 
also in the underlying assertion of fact.25  As such, in order to establish the falsity of 
                                            
24 We do not agree with defendants’ assertion that “when a publication attributes a 
statement to a speaker, it is not the truthfulness of the attribution that matters.”  Part of the 
sting in the allegedly defamatory statements here necessarily lies in the fact that they are 
attributed to an expert in plaintiff’s specialized field.  As the Court of Appeals stated, 
“[w]ithout attribution to experts in the relevant field, the statements have ‘a different effect 
on the mind of the reader.’ ”  Desmond II, 263 N.C. App. at 63, 823 S.E.2d at 436 (citation 
omitted); see also id. at 63, 823 S.E.2d at 436 (“The statements are close to nonsense if they 
are attributed to people with no expertise:  ‘[Several people at Starbucks] who have studied 
the photographs question whether Desmond knows anything about the discipline.  Worse, 
some suspect she falsified the evidence to offer prosecutors the answers they wanted.’ ”). 
 
25 As a hypothetical, had Bunch’s report, rather than confirming plaintiff’s analysis, 
revealed that the bullets could not have been fired from the same gun, we do not believe that 
plaintiff would have been able to establish material falsity of this statement in such a 
scenario.  We recognize that in such a scenario a statement attributing only an opinion, 
rather than an assertion of fact, would necessarily be affected as well; however, we believe 
that the effect on such a statement would properly be considered not with the issue of falsity, 
but rather with the issue of damages, i.e. the extent to which plaintiff suffered, for example, 
any harm to her reputation or loss of standing in the community.  
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such a statement plaintiff was required to show that both the attribution and the 
underlying assertion were materially false.   
In this respect, we think the trial court’s instruction on material falsity 
provided a correct statement of the law: 
Plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence 
that the statement was materially false.  If a statement is 
substantially true it is not materially false.  It is not 
required that the statement was literally true in every 
respect.  Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial 
provided that the statement was substantially true.  This 
means that the gist or sting of the statement must be true 
even if minor details are not.  The gist of a statement is the 
main point or heart of the matter in question.  The sting of 
a statement is the hurtful effect or the element of the 
statement that wounds, pains or irritates.  The gist or sting 
of a statement is true if it produces the same effect on the 
mind of the recipient which the precise truth would have 
produced. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  On the issue of material falsity the trial court instructed the jury 
to evaluate whether “the sting” of each statement was substantially true.  We do not 
view the fact that the trial court elsewhere instructed the jury that an attribution 
may constitute libel, which as discussed above is a correct statement of the law, as an 
invitation to the jury to disregard its earlier directive to evaluate “the heart of the 
matter in question” and determine whether “the sting” of each statement was 
substantially true.  Absent such an attribution instruction, the jury may have 
questioned whether it could properly find an attribution of a mere opinion to be a 
defamatory statement.  By contrast, defendants’ proposed instruction could 
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potentially have misled the jury by inviting the jury to attempt to evaluate 
“underlying facts”—which the instruction does not define or explain in relation to an 
assertion of fact actionable as defamation—when there was only an underlying 
opinion.   
  
Viewing the jury instructions in their entirety, we conclude that the trial court 
properly instructed the jury regarding the issue of falsity and that there was no error 
in the instructions.   
III. 
Punitive Damages Jury Instructions 
 
Finally, defendants argue the trial court erred in instructing the jury on 
punitive damages because the instructions did not require the jury to find the 
existence of one of the statutorily required aggravating factors.  We agree. 
N.C.G.S. § 1D-15 provides: 
(a) Punitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant 
proves that the defendant is liable for compensatory 
damages and that one of the following aggravating factors 
was present and was related to the injury for which 
compensatory damages were awarded: 
 
(1) Fraud. 
(2) Malice. 
(3) Willful or wanton conduct. 
 
(b) The claimant must prove the existence of an 
aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a)-(b) (2019).  “Malice” and “willful or wanton conduct” are defined 
under this chapter as follows: 
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(5) “Malice” means a sense of personal ill will toward 
the claimant that activated or incited the defendant to 
perform the act or undertake the conduct that resulted in 
harm to the claimant. 
 
. . . . 
 
(7) “Willful or wanton conduct” means the conscious 
and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights 
and safety of others, which the defendant knows or should 
know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or 
other harm.  “Willful or wanton conduct” means more than 
gross negligence. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 1D-5.   
 
Here, over defendants’ objection, the trial court did not instruct the jury that 
it was required to find one of the statutory aggravating factors under N.C.G.S. § 1D-
15 before awarding punitive damages.  The trial court, in reliance on the pattern jury 
instructions, reasoned that a finding of actual malice in the liability stage 
automatically allowed for an award of punitive damages and obviated any need for 
the jury to find one of the statutory aggravating factors.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, stating that “the trial court instructed in accord with the pattern jury 
instructions,” which are “the preferred method of jury instruction[.]”  Desmond II, 263 
N.C. App. at 66, 823 S.E.2d at 438 (citing In re Will of Leonard, 71 N.C. App. 714, 
717, 323 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1984)).   
We conclude that the pattern jury instructions utilized in this case do not 
accurately reflect the law regarding punitive damages and that the trial court erred 
in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find one of the statutory 
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aggravating factors before awarding punitive damages.  The preface to the relevant 
pattern jury instructions provide: 
Under current U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
however, in the case of a public figure or public official, the 
element of publication with actual malice must be proven, 
not only to establish liability, but also to recover presumed 
and punitive damages.  Thus, in a defamation case 
actionable per se, once a public figure plaintiff proves 
liability under the actual malice standard, that plaintiff 
will be able to seek presumed and punitive damages without 
proving an additional damages fault standard[.]  
 
N.C.P.I.—Civil 806.40 (2017) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  While the first 
quoted sentence is correct, the following sentence reflects a misapprehension of the 
law in this context.   
As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that a public official plaintiff 
seeking damages for defamation relating to his or her official conduct must prove 
actual malice.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80.  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
has held that states may not permit an award of punitive damages in a defamation 
case absent a showing of actual malice, even where the plaintiff is a private figure.   
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.  The Supreme Court, however, has not held that a showing of 
actual malice automatically obviates any state law prerequisites to an award of 
punitive damages.  Thus, plaintiff’s successful showing of actual malice in the liability 
stage permits an award of punitive damages under Supreme Court precedent, but it 
does not eliminate the necessity of a jury finding one of the statutory aggravating 
factors under N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a), which does not include actual malice. 
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In that regard, based on the plain language of the statutory definitions of 
“malice” and “willful or wanton conduct,” we do not view either of these aggravating 
factors as synonymous with actual malice.  As previously noted, unlike “malice” as 
defined by N.C.G.S. § 1D-5(5), “[a]ctual malice under the New York Times standard 
should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising 
from spite or ill will.”  Masson, 501 U.S. at 510–11 (citing Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g 
Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).  Moreover, while actual malice refers solely 
to a defendant’s subjective concern for the truth or falsity of a publication (i.e., 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), “willful or wanton conduct” 
focuses on a defendant’s “conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to 
the rights and safety of others.”  N.C.G.S. § 1D-5(7) (emphasis added).  On top of that, 
“willful or wanton conduct” requires an additional finding unnecessary for a showing 
of actual malice—specifically, that “the defendant knows or should know” that the 
conduct “is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or other harm.”  Id.    
 
Certainly, much of the evidence presented in support of plaintiff’s showing of 
actual malice would also be relevant to the jury’s determination regarding the 
existence of the statutory aggravating factors.  However, the jury must in fact make 
such a determination upon proper instructions from the trial court before an award 
of punitive damages can be awarded.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that it was required to find one of the statutory aggravating factors 
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before awarding punitive damages.  As such, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this 
issue. 
Conclusion 
In summary, we conclude that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial 
court did not err in denying defendants’ motions for directed verdict and JNOV.  
Further, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the issue of falsity.  We 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to these issues.  However, the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find one of the 
statutory aggravating factors before awarding punitive damages pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a).  As such, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on this 
issue and remand to that court for further remand to the trial court for a new trial on 
punitive damages only.   
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.