Title: Dr. M. Hassen Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Center
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1472
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-1472
____________
DR. M. HASSEN MOOSSUN,
Petitioner,
vs.
ORLANDO REGIONAL HEALTH CARE, et al.,
Respondents.
[June 20, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care, 760 So. 2d
193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), based on conflict with the decisions in Charyulu v. Mercy
Hospital, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), Brown v. Meyers, 702 So. 2d
646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Limited by
Simpson, Inc., 618 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), on the issue of whether a trial
court’s order setting a case management conference constitutes sufficient “record
activity” to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute under Florida Rule of Civil
-2-
Procedure 1.420(e) even though there has been no other record activity by the
litigants in the case.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For
the reasons set out below, we hold that the order setting a case management
conference in this case does not constitute sufficient record activity to preclude
dismissal under rule 1.420(e).
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
The relevant proceedings to date are set out in the opinion below:
The suit below arose out of the death of twenty-year-old
Ameena Moossun [“Ameena”], who died from pneumonia at Sand
Lake Hospital in 1994.  Ameena had fallen ill while on vacation with
her mother in Orlando and the record suggests that her condition was
misdiagnosed.  Suit was filed by Ameena’s father, Dr. M. Hassen
Moossun [“Dr. Moossun”], acting as personal representative of
Ameena’s estate.  
The case languished following the filing of the amended
complaint on November 3, 1997, perhaps because shortly after the
filing, plaintiff’s out-of-town counsel filed a motion to withdraw.  The
last filing by a party appears to be a request to produce filed by
Orlando Regional Healthcare System [“ORHC”] on January 27, 1998.
In the year following the filing of ORHC’s request to produce,
only two documents appear to have been filed in this action.  On
February 18, 1998, the court issued an order substituting new counsel
to represent Dr. Moossun.  Then, on January 26, 1999, the trial court
issued an “Order Setting Case Management Conference.”
Moossun, 760 So. 2d at 193-94 (footnote omitted).  The order directed the parties to
submit a written status report and set a case management hearing to be attended by
1.  The order provides:
ORDER SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
After a review of the file, the Court finds the DATE OF LAST
RECORD ACTIVITY was: FEBRUARY 18, 1998
IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED as follows:
1. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER, Counsel and Pro Se
parties, shall review the case and determine the status thereof.  Plaintiff
or it’s [sic] Counsel shall deliver by hand or mail DIRECTLY TO THE
UNDERSIGNED JUDGE, no later than FIVE (5) DAYS prior to
March 19, 1999, a written report of the status of this case, including
but not limited to, motions pending, discovery taken and expected,
estimated time to bring action to trial, and the necessary action
recommended to be taken to move the case along or close it out.  Such
report may be in letter form and a copy shall be furnished to the
opposing party.
2. THERE WILL BE A CASE MANAGEMENT HEARING
ON March 19, 1999 at 8:30 A.M., in Courtroom 19-A, (19th floor)
Orange County Courthouse, 425 N. Orange Avenue, Orlando,
Florida, at which time the Court will review the written status report
and determine what matters may aid in the disposition of the action. 
(No phone hearings)
3. PURSUANT TO RULE 1.200(c), FLORIDA RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, ON FAILURE OF A PARTY TO ATTEND
THIS CONFERENCE ON March 19, 1999, THE COURT MAY
DISMISS THE ACTION, STRIKE THE PLEADINGS, LIMIT PROF
[SIC] OR WITNESSES, OR TAKE ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE
ACTION, WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE.
DONE AND ORDERED at, Orlando, Orange County, Florida
this January 26, 1999.
________________________________________
Walter Komanski, Circuit Judge
-3-
all parties on March 19, 1999.  See id. at 194.1  Two days later, on January 28,
Id. (footnote omitted).
2.  The report asserted the following non-record activity:
A.  Obtained Case file from Previous Counsel of Record containing
over two thousand pages of loose material shipped to our office by an
outside copying facility as arranged by the previous counsel which, as
received, were in a state of disarray and disorder.
B.  Devoted substantial time and effort to organize, review, and to
make an in-depth study of materials provided by previous counsel to
my office.
C.  Obtained transcripts of Depositions of Plaintiff;  Plaintiff’s wife and
daughter, who were deposed by the Defendants on September 23-24,
1997, which was not performed by the previous Counsel of Record.
D.  Reviewed and had the deponents review their depositions
containing about four hundred pages of testimony.
E.  Prepared and furnished errata sheets and subscriptions for each
deponent dated April 23, 1998, to the Reporting Company for use and
benefit of the defendants.  (Copies attached herewith a Appendix “A”).
F.  Ongoing necessary research and consultations with professionals of
appropriate expertise related to the case.
G.  On June 22, 1998, furnished releases from several medical
providers as requested by Francis E. Pierce, III, Esquire, for use and
-4-
1999, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of prosecution, asserting
that “[t]he last recorded activity in this case was the Request to Produce served in
this action by Defendant, Orlando Regional Health Care System d/b/a Sand Lake
Hospital, which was served on January 27, 1998.”  Id.  On March 15, 1999, counsel
for Dr. Moossun filed his status report on behalf of Ameena’s estate, listing
nonrecord activity that occurred in the case between February 18, 1998, and January
28, 1999.  See id. at 195.2  
benefit of the Defendant Richard P. Nathanson, M.D.  (Copies
attached herewith as Appendix “B”).
Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care, 760 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA
2000).
-5-
The trial court subsequently held a hearing, and thereafter entered an order
dismissing the case for lack of prosecution on March 24, 1999.  See id.  According
to the district court,
The order reviewed the activity set forth in counsel’s letter of March
15, 1999, and concluded that none of the activity constituted “record
activity” sufficient to preclude dismissal of the action.  The court
further concluded that the case management order entered by the court
was insufficient to establish record activity.  The court explained that
“[t]he Case Management Order entered was only designed to
determine the status of the case and to clear the court’s docket of cases
that have been concluded or abandoned.”
Id.  On appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Dr. Moossun argued that the
trial court’s order setting a case management conference constituted sufficient
“record activity” to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute.  See id.  In rejecting
that argument and affirming the circuit court’s decision, the district court relied on
this Court’s ruling in Toney v. Freeman, 600 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1992), wherein we
held that a trial court’s status order and a response to that order did not constitute
sufficient “record activity” to preclude dismissal under rule 1.420(e).  See Moossun,
760 So. 2d at 196.  In its opinion the district court acknowledged several district
-6-
court decisions apparently to the contrary, Charyulu v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 703
So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Brown v. Meyers, 702 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997); and Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Limited by Simpson, Inc., 618 So.
2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).  See Moossun, 760 So. 2d at 196-97.
ANALYSIS
Dr. Moossun asserts that an order setting a case management conference
requiring a written report and attendance of the parties at a case management
conference is designed to hasten the suit to judgment, and therefore constitutes
“record activity” sufficient to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute.  For this
reason, he argues, the district court’s decision should not have relied on the
principles announced in Toney in affirming the trial court’s order of dismissal. 
Rule 1.420(e), of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled “Failure to
Prosecute” and provides:
(e) Failure to Prosecute.  All actions in which it appears on the
face of the record that no activity by filing of pleadings, order of court,
or otherwise has occurred for a period of 1 year shall be dismissed by
the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person,
whether a party to the action or not, after reasonable notice to the
parties, unless a stipulation staying the action is approved by the court
or a stay order has been filed or a party shows good cause in writing at
least 5 days before the hearing on the motion why the action should
remain pending.  Mere inaction for a period of less than 1 year shall not
be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute.
3.  See, e.g., Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Sinclair, 632 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla.
2d DCA 1994); Kohly v. Wallach, 580 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
-7-
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).  This rule is intended to ensure that actions filed in
Florida’s courts are diligently prosecuted by the parties.  The rule provides for
dismissal without prejudice of actions wherein no record activity has taken place for
a year.3  
This Court construed rule 1.420(e) in Toney as it pertained to a court-ordered
status request which required written responses detailing the status of an action. 
After responses were submitted and a hearing, the trial court dismissed the action
due to lack of prosecution.  On appeal, the district court reversed the dismissal,
holding the status order and responses constituted record activity for purposes of
rule 1.420(e).  See Toney, 600 So. 2d at 1100.  Upon review, this Court held that
the status request and responses did not constitute record activity under rule
1.420(e).  
In our opinion in Toney, we explained that “not every action taken in a case
is sufficient to prevent dismissal under the rule.”  Id.  Under the rule “[r]ecord
activity must be more than a mere passive effort to keep the case on the docket; the
activity must constitute an affirmative act calculated to hasten the suit to judgment.” 
Id.  Relying on two district court decisions which had held that a trial court’s status
4.  See Caldwell v. Mantei, 544 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Norflor
Construction Corp. v. City of Gainesville, 512 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
-8-
request did not preclude dismissal, 4 we concluded that such court activity is not the
type of activity contemplated by the rule to preclude dismissal in the face of an
otherwise dormant record:
We find the opinions in Norflor Construction and Caldwell to be
consistent with the principle that record activity must advance a case
toward resolution.  As Judge Downey noted in his dissenting opinion
below, "[i]n a stretch of the imagination . . . most any activity
demonstrates there is life in the case and nudges it along.  However,
the ideal is to do something affirmative, something of substance."  591
So. 2d at 202 (Downey, J., dissenting).  Not every paper placed in the
court file may be considered as record activity.
We also find this reasoning to be consistent with the spirit and
purpose of the rule.  Trial judges should be encouraged to take an
active role in keeping themselves informed of the cases assigned to
them.  We refuse to construe appropriate case management activities in
such a way as to give the parties leave to ignore the case for another
year before dismissal is possible.  Such a construction would thwart the
purpose of case management and the purpose of the rule itself--to
encourage prompt and efficient prosecution of cases and to clear court
dockets of cases that have essentially been abandoned.
We reject Freeman's argument that the specific status order and
response in this case constituted record activity because the order
asked counsel to respond to questions designed to advance the case
toward resolution and because Orkin's response, indicating the plaintiff
had died, further advanced the case.  The status order was designed to
obtain information about the progress of the case; it did not move the
case forward in the sense of a progression toward resolution.  Although
Orkin's response did mention that the plaintiff died, this response did
not in and of itself advance the case in any way, but merely attempted
to explain the delay in prosecution.
-9-
Toney, 600 So. 2d at 1100-01 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  Hence, in
Toney, we rejected an argument almost identical to that asserted here.
The petitioner attempts to distinguish Toney and asserts that the primary issue
in Toney was whether a status request was “record activity,” whereas, here, the
issue is whether a status conference constitutes record activity.  He further asserts
that although this Court in Toney mentioned “case management activities,” we did
not specifically address whether a case management conference constitutes record
activity, and some district courts have used this fact to distinguish Toney. 
Dr. Moossun cites Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Limited by Simpson,
Inc., 618 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Heart
of the City, Inc., 565 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).  In Samuels the trial court
ordered a status conference and when only the plaintiff’s counsel appeared, the trial
court entered a default judgment against the defendants.  See Samuels, 618 So. 2d at
310.  After a later hearing contesting the entry of the default judgment, the trial court
set aside the default and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution under rule 1.420(e).  See id.  On appeal, the Fourth District reversed,
holding that the order setting a status conference, coupled with the attendance of
one of the parties at the conference, was sufficient record activity to preclude
dismissal under rule 1.420(e).  See id. at 311.  In its opinion, the district court
5.  In addition to its decision in Miami Beach Awning, the Third District in
Charyulu v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), held
that a plaintiff’s notice to convene a case management conference constituted
sufficient record activity to preclude dismissal for failure to prosecute.  Charyulu
differs from Samuels and Miami Awning in that the case management conference in
Charyulu was actually initiated by the plaintiff rather than by the court on its own
motion.  See id.  
-10-
distinguished Toney:
Toney is distinguishable from the instant case.  Toney did not
address the issue of whether an order setting a status conference,
coupled by the attendance of one or both parties at such a conference
constitutes record activity sufficient to preclude dismissal under rule
1.420(e).  The third district addressed this very issue in Miami Beach
Awning Co. v. Heart of the City, Inc., 565 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA
1990), holding that a trial court's order setting a cause for status
conference, almost by definition, is reasonably calculated to advance
the cause toward resolution, thus is sufficient to preclude dismissal for
lack of prosecution.  Id. at 739.  In so holding, the court distinguished
Norflor Construction Corp., supra.  Id.
We agree with the distinction drawn in Miami Beach Awning
Co. between a status order and a status conference.  While responses
to a status order such as the one entered in Toney are sought simply for
the court's own information, the parties' attendance at a status
conference can significantly advance a cause toward resolution, for
example, by narrowing the issues to be tried or through exploration of
settlement possibilities.
Samuels, 618 So. 2d at 311.  The Fourth District later relied on and followed its
decision in Samuels in Brown v. Meyers, 702 So. 2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997).5  
We cannot agree with Dr. Moossun’s attempts to distinguish Toney, nor with
-11-
the distinctions relied upon in Samuels or Miami Beach Awning.  This Court in
Toney enunciated a clear policy that “[t]rial judges should be encouraged to take an
active role in keeping themselves informed of the cases assigned to them.”  600 So.
2d at 1100.  For this reason, we “refuse[d] to construe appropriate case management
activities in such a way as to give the parties leave to ignore the case for another
year before dismissal is possible.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Our reference to “case
management activities” clearly contemplated more than just a status report and
would reasonably be construed to include status conferences.  Both have the same
purpose of requiring the parties to explain what is going on in the case.  
The trial court’s initiative in docket management, however, is no substitute
for the parties’ affirmative responsibility to prosecute the action in a timely manner. 
In short, and akin to our reasoning in Toney, allowing parties to avoid dismissal for
another year because a court elects to hold a status conference would “thwart the
purpose of case management and the purpose of the rule itself–to encourage prompt
and efficient prosecution of cases and to clear court dockets of cases that have
essentially been abandoned.”  Id.  Accordingly, we find that this case is controlled
by the reasoning of Toney.
We acknowledge that on the one hand, this case differs from Toney in that
the court scheduled a hearing for the purpose of reviewing the status report.  The
-12-
trial court directed that the status report include information concerning any pending
motions, discovery taken and expected, estimated time to bring action to trial, and
whatever necessary action the parties recommended to be taken to move the case to
completion.  See Moossun, 760 So. 2d at 194.  However, based on our reasoning
and logic in Toney, we find no reason to differentiate between a court-initiated
status request and a status conference.  Both essentially serve the same purpose and
neither should be used as a vehicle to breathe life into a case not otherwise
prosecuted by the parties for another year.  Indeed, if taken to its extreme, such
reasoning would allow cases to remain pending indefinitely based solely on a
diligent trial court’s annual call for a status report or conference.  
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, and consistent with our holding in Toney, we
hold that the entry of a court order setting a case management conference does not
constitute “record activity” sufficient to preclude dismissal for lack of prosecution
under rule 1.420(e).  Accordingly, we approve the decision below and disapprove
the decisions in Miami Beach Awning and Samuels to the extent that they are
inconsistent with this decision.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
-13-
WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring.
I concur in the well-stated majority opinion affirming the district court’s
adherence to this Court’s precedent in Toney v. Freeman, 600 So. 2d 1099 (Fla.
1992).  I write to respond to the dissenting opinion’s attempt to distinguish Toney.  I
conclude that Toney cannot be distinguished on the difference between an order
directing a written status report and an order directing an oral status hearing when
this Court’s stated rationale in Toney is considered:
We also find this reasoning to be consistent with the spirit and
purpose of the rule.  Trial judges should be encouraged to take an
active role in keeping themselves informed of the cases assigned to
them.  We refuse to construe appropriate case management activities in
such a way as to give the parties leave to ignore the case for another
year before dismissal is possible.  Such a construction would thwart the
purpose of case management and the purpose of the rule itself–to
encourage prompt and efficient prosecution of cases to clear court
dockets of cases that have essentially been abandoned.
Id. at 1100.
Moreover, I specifically disagree with the dissent’s assertion that this holding
“furthers the cause of arbitrary efficiency at the expense of justice, and makes it
possible for trial courts to ignore possibly meritorious cases.”  Dissenting op. at 20. 
-14-
This assertion ignores that there are citizens who, by the receipt of service of
process, are made defendants to lawsuits in our courts, and these defendants have
interests and matters at risk in being parties to these lawsuits.  The defendants’
interests must be protected and should be of equal concern to our courts as are the
interests of those who, by paying a filing fee, become plaintiffs and have the power
to have these defendants brought into court.  It is a reality that being sued is costly
to the party sued in money, emotion, time, and many other tangible and intangible
ways.  This is true even when the suit is totally meritless.
The long-in-place court rule which is here at issue, i.e., rule 1.420(e), simply
recognizes that if a suit is not pursued by the party who has brought it, the court will
not allow the suit to linger.  This is so not only because unwarranted delay not only
consumes scarce judicial resources, but because it unfairly burdens the defendant
with the various kinds of costs of the process merely by a lawsuit’s lingering
presence.  Justice is served to no one by allowing lawsuits to remain dormant.
Of course, it must be remembered that the dismissal under rule 1.420(e) is
without prejudice.  See Southeast Mrtg. Co. v. Sinclair, 632 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla.
2d DCA 1994).  Thus, the lawsuit may be refiled unless the suit has previously been
dismissed or the statute of limitations has run.
-15-
LEWIS, J., dissenting.
Because I conclude that the ordering of a status conference by a trial court
constitutes record activity which advances a case toward resolution under Toney v.
Freeman, 600 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1992), I must respectfully dissent.  I cannot join the
majority opinion, because, in my view, the petitioner’s cause of action should be
allowed to proceed.  The trial court did not simply request a status report, but it
ordered the parties to attend a status conference, and it is, therefore, clear that the
situation addressed by the Court today is fundamentally different than the scenario
before this Court in Toney.
Certainly, this Court used clear language when it enunciated the principle
underlying the Toney decision: “Record activity must be more than a mere passive
effort to keep the case on the docket; the activity must constitute an affirmative act
calculated to hasten the suit to judgment.”  Id. at 1100.  In Toney, we held that a
trial court’s mere status request did not constitute adequate record activity to
prevent dismissal for lack of prosecution.  There are meaningful distinctions,
however, between an order requesting an update on the status of a case and an order
setting a case management conference.  Simple logic dictates that a trial court-
ordered status conference must qualify as record activity that results in “hasten[ing]
-16-
the suit to judgment.”  As Judge Orfinger correctly noted in his dissenting opinion
below, in this proceeding, “more is required than a mere status report.”  Moossun v.
Orlando Regional Health Care, 760 So. 2d 193, 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Orfinger,
Senior Judge, dissenting).  The trial court’s order required the respective parties to
deliver to the court not only a written status report, but to also attend and fully
participate in a case management hearing.  See id. at 194.  This mandatory hearing
certainly would have caused progression of Moosun’s cause of action toward
judgment.  Therefore, while the facts of Toney and the instant action are dissimilar,
the reasoning of Toney counsels against the dismissal of the petitioner’s cause of
action.
The majority’s holding today is not, in my view, in accord with Florida law
regarding the type of activity that is sufficient to preclude dismissal for failure to
prosecute.  A striking example of the inconsistency is this Court’s  decision in
Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2000).  In Fuster-Escalona, this
Court held that the filing of a motion to disqualify the presiding trial judge was
sufficient record activity to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. 
See id. at 1066.  The plaintiff did not request a hearing on his motion, and unlike the
instant case, the trial court did not schedule any proceedings.  See id.  In Fuster-
Escalona, however, this Court allowed the plaintiff’s cause of action to proceed,
-17-
notwithstanding the mere filing of a motion without scheduling a hearing.  It is clear
to me that a trial judge’s scheduling and requiring a case management conference is
certainly more significant than the simple filing of a motion to disqualify.  Thus,
dismissal of the instant cause of action is error.
Additionally, there are multiple decisions from Florida district courts of
appeal which allow actions to proceed when considerably less record activity has
occurred than that which was involved in the instant case.  In DeVane v. P.J.
Constructors, Inc., 710 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), the district court held that
while the plaintiff had not taken any cognizable action since filing its complaint, the
defendant’s amended answer constituted record activity sufficient to defeat a motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.  See id. at 1377.  Additionally, Florida courts
consistently hold that the mere filing of a notice of hearing or deposition defeats a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.  See, e.g., Miranda v. Volvo North
America Corp., 763 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Garland v. City of Delray
Beach, 685 So. 2d 1392, 1394 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Escalona v. Kersten, 682 So.
2d 223, 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).  Finally, district courts also commonly hold that
the act of simply sending a letter to the trial judge is “sufficient record activity to
avoid dismissal if . . . placed in the court file.”  Smith v. Broward County, 654 So.
2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also Cole v. Dep’t of Corrections, 726 So.
-18-
2d 854, 855-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  I find these cases significant to the resolution
of the issues before the Court in the instant cause, and I am persuaded that ordering
a status conference is a more significant action than merely noticing a deposition or
sending a letter.  Therefore, Moossun’s action should not be dismissed.  
It is important in my mind to note that the framework of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure make a case management conference, by its very nature, a
significant event in the life of a legal action.  At such a conference, the trial court
may, among many other actions, limit, schedule, order, or expedite discovery;
schedule or hear motions in limine; pursue the possibilities of settlement; and
require the filing of preliminary stipulations if issues can be narrowed.  See Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.200(a).  Pursuant to rule 1.200(d), the pretrial order generated as a result
of a case management conference “shall control the subsequent course of the
action.”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(d).  As noted in Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars
Ltd. By Simpson, Inc., 618 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), “the parties’
attendance at a status conference can significantly advance a cause toward
resolution, for example, by narrowing issues to be tried or through exploration of
settlement possibilities.”  Id. at 311; see also Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Heart of
the City, Inc., 565 So. 2d 739, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“[T]he court’s order setting
the cause for a status conference was, almost by definition, reasonably calculated to
6.  Because there is absolutely no evidence in the record before this Court
that the trial court below ordered the status conference as part of a “diligent . . .
annual call for a status report,” majority op. at 12, the hypothetical “indefinitely
pending case” does not exist in the instant action.  Certainly, if the only record
activity in the instant case was a yearly status conference and nothing else, dismissal
for failure to prosecute could be proper.  However, because that situation does not
exist here, I see no need to hypothetically contemplate either of the parties’
reasoning “taken to its extreme.”  Id.
-19-
advance the cause toward resolution.”) (emphasis supplied); Charyulu v. Mercy
Hosp., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Brown v. Meyers, 702 So.
2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
I fear the larger, and most important, issue here is the unacceptable continuing
transition of the judiciary from a system of justice dedicated to the resolution of
citizens’ disputes and problems based on the merits to a system and process that is
inexplicably focused upon docket management and the conclusion of litigation for
the sake of conclusion.  The chief concern of the courts should not be resolution for
the sake of finality only, but it should be to render justice based upon the merits of
the action in a timely, thoughtful manner.  While trial courts certainly do have the
inherent power to manage their dockets so as to move cases toward final judgment,6
dismissal of cases just to reduce the overall number of pending actions before a
court is not, I submit, a proper method of fulfilling the obligations that the judiciary
owes every Floridian.  The judicial system is charged by the Florida Constitution
-20-
with properly adjudicating causes of action brought before it on the merits, and
finding artificial ways to avoid this responsibility is simply wrong in my view.  I fear
that the Court’s holding today simply furthers the cause of arbitrary efficiency at the
expense of justice, and makes it possible for trial courts to ignore possibly
meritorious cases.  While we cannot speculate whether the present action is or is not
meritorious in substance, that is not the issue.  We must be concerned, however,
with whether we are to become a system of docket control over substance. 
Therefore, I must dissent.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D99-1114 
(Orange County)
Zahid H. Chaudhry, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Richard L. Allen, and Brian L. Wagner of Mateer & Harbert, P.A., Orlando, Florida;
Francis E. Pierce, III and David B. Falstad of Gurney & Handley, P.A., Orlando,
Florida; and Thomas E. Dukes and Ruth Osborne of McEwan, Martinez, Luff, Dukes
& Ruffier, Orlando, Florida,
-21-
for Respondents