Title: Smith v. Walton
Citation: 271 So. 2d 409
Docket Number: 46829
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: January 2, 1973

271 So. 2d 409 (1973) Ruby Lee SMITH v. Jerry WALTON. No. 46829. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 2, 1973. *411 Brunini, Everett, Grantham &amp; Quin, Robert A. Weems, Vicksburg, for appellants. Ramsey, Bodron &amp; Thames, P. Kelly Loyacono, Vicksburg, for appellee. *410 ROBERTSON, Justice: Ruby Lee Smith and her children brought suit against Jerry Walton in the Circuit Court of Warren County, Mississippi, for the wrongful death of George Smith, her husband and the father of her children. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, Jerry Walton. Hence this appeal. About 7:00 P.M. on the night of February 2, 1970, after it had been raining and snowing during the day, George Smith was walking north on the right shoulder of U.S. Highway 61 about 2 1/2 miles north of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Jerry Walton, after noting Smith walking rather close to the pavement with his back to him, continued to drive north on U.S. Highway 61 at about 30 to 35 miles per hour. Walton testified that there was no other traffic on the highway and he continued to drive close to the east edge of the pavement. Walton also testified that he first saw Smith when he was about a block and a half away but did not sound his horn and really didn't pay too much attention to him. When Walton was about half a carlength back of him, Smith suddenly stepped or jumped over on the highway. Walton tried to swerve to the left but the right corner of his car hit Smith. Smith was thrown up on the hood of the car; his head and arm hit the windshield and broke it, and his body fell off of the right side of the car. Walton estimated that Smith was about a foot or a foot and a half on the highway when his car struck Smith. Appellants assign as error: *413 The trial court was correct in refusing to direct a verdict for the appellants because "All questions of negligence and contributory negligence" are for the jury to decide under proper instructions of the court as to the applicable principles of law involved. Section 1455, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). Instruction (A) is clearly erroneous and the granting of this instruction constituted fatal error. It was formerly the law of Mississippi that a pedestrian walk on the lefthand side of a highway facing oncoming traffic, Section 5574, Mississippi Code of 1930 Annotated, but that section was repealed in 1938, Section 159, Chapter 200, General Laws of Mississippi of 1938. In Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964) this Court said: It is true that Section 8202(a), Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956), provides: but Section 8202(d) also states the law to be: Section 8250, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956), also provides: Instruction (B) does not embody either the "when necessary" or "when reasonably necessary" test to whether the horn should have been sounded and Smith warned of the approach of Walton's car. In this respect this instruction was in conflict with Instruction No. 1 for plaintiffs which correctly stated this test. Instruction (B) was faulty and should not have been approved. It was a question for the jury to decide upon proper instructions whether or not it was reasonably necessary for Walton, acting as a reasonable and prudent man, to sound his horn when it was raining and snowing and Smith was walking along the shoulder of the road with his back to approaching traffic and apparently unaware of the approach of Walton's automobile. Instruction (C) is subject to the same criticism as Instruction (B). It does not submit for the jury's consideration whether it was necessary for Walton to sound his horn under the peculiar circumstances of this case. This incomplete instruction should not have been given. Instruction (D) uses the terms "curb, shoulder or other place of safety" when no "curb" or "other place of safety" was involved in this case. It also does not mention that the action of the deceased must have been the "sole" proximate cause *414 of his injuries. It doesn't mention the other tests that apply in this case: that the defendant must have been traveling at a reasonable and proper rate of speed under the weather conditions then prevailing, must have been keeping a reasonable lookout, and must have given warning of his approach if found to be reasonably necessary. This instruction is rather confusing because it uses the term "Plaintiff" rather than "Smith" or "the deceased". Instruction (E) is an abstract instruction, is not made applicable to the peculiar facts of this case, does not submit the test of warning where reasonably necessary and is otherwise incomplete. It is also subject to the criticism of being repetitious and thereby overemphasizing only one of the many tests to be applied. For the reasons herein stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. GILLESPIE, C.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH, SUGG and BROOM, JJ., concur. RODGERS, P.J., and JONES, J., dissent in part and concur in part. RODGERS, Presiding Justice (dissenting in part). I agree with the opinion of Judge Jones. The appellant was entitled to a directed verdict of liability, because the testimony of the defendant shows that he was negligent, and that his negligence contributed to the injury of the decedent, George Earl Smith. Section 1455, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) does not apply as to the negligence of appellee, because his testimony admits his negligence. He was "paying no attention." He drove his automobile as close to the decedent as possible on a cold, rainy, snowy night and made no effort to slow the speed of his car or to warn him. I agree with the majority opinion that the instructions granted the appellee were erroneous. They failed to take into consideration our Mississippi Comparative Negligence Statute: Section 1454, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). Moreover, they are based upon the assumption of risk doctrine. This rule does not apply to the facts in this case. The decedent was not warned and obviously did not know that the automobile was about to run over him. The rule of assumption of risk requires knowledge coupled with deliberate exposure. One text writer describes the doctrine of assumption of risk as follows: See also Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 2, Chapter XXI (1956); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 68, pp. 439-457 (1971). JONES, Justice (dissenting in part): In addition to those facts stated in the original opinion reversing this case, we cite these matters proven by the testimony of appellee himself. He was traveling north as stated and overtook the decedent whom he saw and followed for a block and a half before striking him. Decedent was walking on the right-hand side of the pavement and parallel to it. Decedent gave no sign of being aware of the approach of appellee's car. This was a two-lane interstate highway. There was no other car in sight either north or south of the parties. It *415 was in February, cold, raining and snowing. Appellee was traveling 30 or 35 miles per hour. While appellee saw decedent and for a block and a half knew that he was beside the pavement, appellee did absolutely nothing to advise decedent that the car was there and took no steps for the protection of decedent. He did not appreciably, if any, slow his speed, did not sound his horn, or turn his car to the left. He testified that when he, appellee, got about half a car length from decedent, he, the decedent, stepped over in the highway and the right corner part of the car struck him when he had come only about a foot or foot and a half into the road. Suppose appellee had moved his car one foot to the left of its course! There was plenty of room for the car to travel to the left of the pedestrian. Even before repeal of Section 5574, Code of 1930, this Court, through Justice Griffith, made some findings that are pertinent here: I call attention again to those quotes from Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 696-697, 160 So. 2d 685, 687 (1964): Layton v. Cook, supra, was cited with approval in Stewart v. White, 220 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1969) where the Court said: Remembering that appellee testified that the accident happened about one and one-half feet over on the pavement, we believe this statement by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Kelly v. Ludlum, 9 La. App. 57, 118 So. 781 (1928), writ of certiorari and review denied by Supreme Court (October 2, 1928), is in point: Also, as said in 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic section 406, page 954 (1963): I again cite 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile and Highway Traffic section 401, page 950 (1963) where it is said: Chapter 200, Laws of 1938 repealing Section 5574, Code of 1930 (Section 8202, Code of 1942 Annotated) fixes rules regarding pedestrians, none of which would be applicable here, except section (d) thereof, reading: Section 8250, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) is applicable as we see it: It should be noted that this sentence is different from the provisions of Section 8202 in that it requires the blowing of a horn when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation. To insure means, according to Black's Law Dictionary 946 (4th ed. 1951), "To make sure or secure, to guarantee, as, to insure safety to anyone." To insure safe operation would certainly require, when appellee was following decedent for a block and a half, overtaking him, and seeing he was unaware of the approach of the car, that he do something sound the horn, turn to the left, or stop. The life of this human was far more important than the infinitesimal energy required to do either of these things. It is my opinion that appellee was at least guilty of negligence that contributed to the death, and the jury should have been so instructed. I am also of the opinion that the facts in this case would have warranted an instruction directing the jury to find the defendant guilty of negligence. RODGERS, P.J., concurring. [1] The deviation involved in this case was two feet rather than one and one-half feet.