Title: STATE v BAUGH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13547
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1977

N o . 13547 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 THE STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- RANDALL CRAIG BAUGH, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t c o u r t o f t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Donald L. S h a f f e r a r g u e d , Libby, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana A l l e n B. C h r o n i s t e r a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General, I-lelena, Montana William A. Douglas argued, County A t t o r n e y , Libby, Montana Submitted: September 29, 1977 Decided: YO\I i 5 ]gn F i l e d : l U \ ( , S : ~ f l M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. I n August 1975, the body of ~ a v i d s c c a was discovered i n an isolated area of Lincoln County, Montana. Sometime a f t e r that, warrants of a r r e s t were issued for Randall Craig Baugh, defendant herein, and William Beechman. William Beechman has never been found. I n November 1975, Randall Craig Baugh turned himself i n t o the authorities. Defendant was arraigned and plead not guilty t o the charge of deliberate homicide i n the District Court, Lincoln County. P r e t r i a l motions were made by the s t a t e and the defense. Among these was a motion by the s t a t e t o amend the Information as t o the alleged date of the crime and motions for discovery made by defendant. Two prospective witnesses were arrested by the s t a t e for the deliberate homicide of Davidmcca. One, Randy Jacobsen, was arrested before the defense could t a l k t o him and held over night. It was a week a f t e r t h i s incident that Jacobsen consented t o an interview by the defense. The other witness, William Phillip Stuart, was arrested i n N e w Mexico and then released. The defense requested the court t o help locate Stuart. The court ordered the Lincoln County s h e r i f f ' s office t o cooperate with the Lincoln County public defender's office i n locating Stuart because the Lincoln County public defender has no budget o r personnel t o pursue such matters. The Lincoln County s h e r i f f ' s office located Stuart i n N e w Mexico, did not inform the public defender, but instead informed the Lincoln County attorney, who then flew t o N e w Mexico, interviewed Stuart, arrested him, gave him a polygraph examination, released him, flew back t o Montana, and then informed the defense and the court of the whereabouts of Stuart. T r i a l was had in Lincoln County, Montana, starting on M a y 17, 1976. The jury was interviewed prior t o voir d i r e by Hon. Robert C. Sykes, because of a controversy that existed a t t h a t existed a t that time between the Lincoln County sheriff and the county attorney, William Douglas. Evidence began on May 18, 1976. O n May 21, 1976, the defense made two motions for a mistrial. The f i r s t motion was made because defendant had been brought t o court on the morning of M a y 21 i n handcuffs, and thoehandcuffs were unlocked in front of the jury before the t r i a l commenced. The reason for the handcuffs, according t o the deputy sheriff, was the defendant's bickering. The other motion was because a juror, Sandy Kolar, had evidence of the matter acquired outside of the t r i a l . I n fact, Kolar was present with Douglas when videotape of the exhumation of the body of D a v i d p c c a had been shown. Douglas was fully aware Kolar was present a t t h i s videotape showing. Both motions for mistrial were denied; Kolar was excused and an alternate juror was seated. A further motion for m i s - t r i a l was made and a motion for a directed verdict. Defendant was found guilty and sentenced t o 75 years i n the Montana s t a t e prison. Defendant appeals from the judgment, and presents four issues on appeal: 1. Whether a defendant charged with deliberate homicide has a right t o a jury instruction on mitigated deliberate homi- cide? 2. Whether the a r r e s t of potential defense witnesses deprives a defendant of due process and a f a i r t r i a l ? 3. Whether it i s reversible error for an accused to appear i n handcuffs before a jury? 4. Whether the replacing of a juror who is a personal friend of the prosecutor and has personal knowledge of evidence of the. case is error, i f replaced by an alternate juror prior to the time the jury goes into deliberations? Issue 1. Is a defendant charged with deliberate homicide entitled t o a jury instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide even though no evidence i s presented on that issue. Under sectlon 94-5-103, R.C.M. 1947, deliberate homicide is mitigated i f committed "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional s t r e s s for which there i s reasonable explanation or excuse." A s ascertained from the record, defendant's theory is that he did not k i l l the deceased and had no knowledge of who did. A t t r i a l , defendant's attorney, in h i s opening statement stated: "* * * 'Now,-,Randy w i l l take the stand and I w i l l t e l l you essentially what he w i l l say. H e has no knowledge o r information as t o how ~ a v i d G c c a met h i s death, he could speculate and that is a l l it would be i s pure speculation, he doesn' t know, * * *" This Court reaffirmed the Montana rule on the requirement fbr an instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide i n State v. Buckley , Mont , , 557 P.2d 283, 33 St.Rep. 1204, 1207 (1976) and s e t out t h i s t e s t : "* * * the d i s t r i c t court's instructions must cover every issue or theory having support in the evidence, and the inquiry of the d i s t r i c t court must only be whether o r not any evidence exists i n the record to warrant an instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide .'' 557 P.2d 285. The United States Supreme Court i n Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L ed 2d 844 (1973), stated that the defendant i s 'entitled t o instruction on a lesser included offense, i f evidence would permit the jury rationally t o find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. I n the instant case there was no evidence i n the record t o show mitigation a s required by section 94-5-103. In f a c t , defendant's theory throughout the t r i a l was that he did not murder the victim. In State v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 16, 149 P. 279 (1915), it was said: "* * * I n many instances, however, the evidence i s such as t o show that the defendant is either guilty of the offense charged o r is entitled t o an acquittal. In such cases the court may not be put i n error for refusing o r f a i l i n g t o instruct a s to the lower degree o r the included offense ." This rationale applies to the instant case, and the t r i a l court acted properly in not giving the alternate instruction on m i t i - gated homicide. Issue 2, concerns the county attorney's arresting and holding *itnesses Jacobsen and Stuart and a f t e r questioning releasing them. Defendant alleges t h i s prejudicially impaired the effectiveness of defense counselfs e f f o r t s t o interview these same witnesses. This Court i n State v. Gangner, 73 Mont. 187, 194, 235 P. 703 (1925) stated: "Whatever the popular notion may be, it i s neither the duty nor the right of the s t a t e , acting through its public officers, t o secure the convic- tion of one of i t s citizens by any available means, f a i r or foul. The Constitution guarantees t o everyone accused of crime a f a i r and impartial t r i a l * * * and the s t a t e had no more right t o deny defendant's counsel access t o a witness material t o the defense then it would have had t o secrete the witness t o prevent the defendant using him * * *.I' In the instant case while defense counsel was able t o t a l k t o these witnesses, defendant contends the prosecution so intimidated them that the effectiveness of the interviews was substantially diminished. Yet, there i s no showing how the prosecution intimidated these witnesses or that it in- structed them not t o cooperate with the defense attorney, or that it otherwise attempted t o directly impede the effectiveness of defense counsel. The record shows that a t the time these witnesses were interviewed and arrested, they were potential defendants i n t h i s case. There is extensive discussion in1 the record concerning these witnesses. It i s clear from that discussion the court took every action possible t o provide the defense access t o them. While defense counsel may have had d i f f i c u l t y in locating and interviewing witnesses Jacobsen and Stuart, there is nothing i n the record to show lack of due process, which could be a t t r i - buted to the s t a t e ' s investigatory procedure. Issue 3. O n the morning of May 21, 1975, defendant was escorted into the courtroom i n handcuffs by a deputy sheriff. Apparently the handcuffs were removed once defendant was i n the courtroom. Counsel for defendant contends defendant having been seen by the jury i n handcuffs i s reversible error. When the handcuff incident occurred, defense counsel moved i n chambers for a mistrial and was denied. Ruling, however, on the mistrial was reserved in order t o give the court opportunity t o question the jurors a f t e r the verdict was in t o determine whether the jurors were influenced by the handcuff incident. This was done a f t e r the jury reached its verdict, but before it was announced. This exchange took place between the court and jurors: "THE COURT: N o w before presenting t h i s verdict t o .me, I would l i k e t o ask the jurors some questions. Did any of the jury observe the defendant during the course of the t r i a l being brought into the courtroom in handcuffs? "THE JURY: Yes sir. "THE COURT: Now, did that i n any way affect any of you i n your deliberations a s t o h i s g u i l t or innocence? ''THE JURY: No. "THE COURT: It did not, any of you? The basic principles of the criminal justice system is that an accused, whatever h i s past record, is presumed innocent u n t i l proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L ed 481 (1895). It follows that the accused is also entitled to the indicia of innocence. I n the presence of the jury, he is ordinarily entitled t o be relieved of handcuffs, o r other restraints, so he w i l l not be m d e d as an obviously bad person o r to suggest that the fact of h i s g u i l t i s a foregone conclusion. United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614 (4th C i r . 1970). The Montana case closest in point i s State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970). There t h i s Court held the defendant was not prejudiced by having t o wear j a i l clothing during the t r i a l . However, the Ninth Circuit Court i n Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854 (1972), reversed the Montana holding and held that compelling the accused t o wear prison clothing mag deny him the presumption of innocence. I n State v. Sawyer, 60 Wash.2d 83, 371 P.2d 932 (1962), - the defendant was handcuffed i n the courtroom upon adjournment, much like the instant case wherein the defendant was brought into court handcuffed and then unlocked. The court found no prejudicial error. Sawyer relied upon W a y v. United States, 285 F.2d 253, 254, (10th C i r . 1960) where, a s here, the defendant was brought into t r i a l handcuffed, without order of the court, and the handcuffs were then removed. I n Way the court held that "in the absence of an indication of pre- judicial consequences, such an occurrence does Inot warrant the granting of a new t r i a l . " It i s incumbent upon defendant t o demonstrate actual prejudice, which he has not done here. The Ninth Circuit i n United States v. Kress, 451 F.2d 576 (1971), held that an appearance before the jury during t r i a l by a defendant i n shackles is not inherently prejudicial. The majority rule i s that, absent unusual circumstances, a prisoner brought into court for t r i a l is entitled t o appear free from a l l bonds o r shackles, t h i s right being an important component of a f a i r and impartial t r i a l . However, i n State v. Jones, 130 N.J.Super. 596, 328 A.2d 41 (1974), the court held defendant's right t o be free of shackles during t r i a l need not be extended t o the right to be free of shackles while being taken back and -forth between the courthouse and the j a i l . Most courts now agree with Sawyer that a defendant i s not denied a f a i r t r i a l and i s not entitled t o a mistrial solely because he was momentarily and inadvertently seen.:in handcuffs by jury members. I n the instant case counsel f o r defendant admits the jury was well aware of the fact defendant was i n custody and not free on bail. There is no indication t h i s occurrence was pre- judicial. In the absence of an indication of prejudicial conse- quences, such an occurrence does not warrant the granting of a new t r i a l . - 8 - Issue 4 . O n M a y 21, 1976, five days a f t e r the t r i a l commenced it came t o the court's attention that juror Kolar, along with the county attorney and h i s wife had, several months prior t o t r i a l , viewed a videotape of the exhumation of the deceased. This fact was unknown t o the court and counsel for the defendant prior to that time. Z t was immediately apparent t o the court that: "* * * under these circumstances, M i s s Kolar was not qualified nor should have been made part of t h i s jury unless t h i s was known t o defendant's attorney prior t o t h i s time. 11 Prior t o determining a course of action, the court called juror Kolar into chambers and i n the presence of counsel and defendant, the following transpired : "THE COURT: So would you have the b a i l i f f,:aBki her t o come in here. The l a s t time I asked, I think I asked Mrs. Hunt t o come in here and I scared the t a r out of her. Well,- I don' t want t o scare the t a r out of you. It has just come t o m y attention and con- firmed by M r . Douglas that prior to the time of t h i s t r i a l , i n h i s .presence, you did observe and see the videotaping that had been conducted of the exhumation of the body. "MISS KOLAR: Yes. "THE COURT: Well, now it is m y opinion that that should have in i t s e l f disqualified you from partici- pating i n t h i s t r i a l , because you have observed part of the process of the interrogation and investigation of t h i s case and that could affect your deliberations fiossibly and t h i s information, not being known t o M r . Shaffer prevented him from possibly exercising the right of a peremptory challenge that he might have exercised or might not have. Now, what I a m concerned with i s whether or not during the course of t h i s t r i a l have you a t any time discussed t h i s fact with any other member of the jury? "MISS KOLAR: No, I have not. "THE COURT: And there hasn't been any juror that knows f r o m you that you saw any of t h i s videotaping o r anything? "MISS KOLAR: N o ." It was further developed upon questioning by defense counsel that juror Kolar was a friend of the county attorney, and "more so" of h i s wife and the videotape was viewed prior t o going t o see a movie. The court then further questioned juror Kolar: "THE COURT: Well, just one thing. A s it pertained t o your participating on the jury and i n the voir dire, you f e l t that viewing that had not in any way affected your opinion as t o the g u i l t or innocence of M r . Baugh? "MISS KOLAR: No. sir. "THE COURT: And you f e l t that since t h i s was just a viewing of the exhumation that that in no way would affect your deliberations? "MISS KOLAR: No, it would not. "THE COURT: Now, did you f e e l that your friendship with Mrs. Douglas and your knowledge of M r . Douglas would , .. . !. in- any way affect your deliberations? MISS KOLAR: No, sir." The court then excused juror Kolar from further service and even though thisvinformation "should have been disclosed by M r . Douglas during the voir dire" the court f e l t the t r i a l could proceed by seating one of the alternate jurors. The court's finding that no prejudice had resulted i s clear from the denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial. I In open court, the jury, with the alternate s i t t i n g for Kolar, was admonished: ':'THE COURT: JC * * M r . Smith, a t t h i s time, you should take the jury box and i n so doing, although the Court knows o r makes t h i s assumption, the reasons for Miss Kolar's not participating in any further proceedings should not and w i l l hot affect the r e s t of you jurors participating i n t h i s case and that we are proceeding with the t r i a l . That was one of the reasons we have alternate jurors i f certain circumstances do arise. Now, a t t h i s time, having reconvened, M r . Douglas, c a l l your next witness ." A t the conclusion of the t r i a l , a f t e r the jury had reached i t s verdict, but before that,verdict was announced, the court questioned the jury: "THE COURT: During the time that Miss Kolar was a member of the jury, did she discuss with any of you any of the evidence on the t r i a l ? "THE JURY :' No. "THE COURT: Let the record show that a l l of the jury answer no t o that question. That the previous question, they stated that the bringing of the defendant i n handcuffs into the courtroom in t h e i r presence did not affect their deliberations and the presumption of the defendant's innocence u n t i l proven guilty. Now, the fact that Miss Kolar was removed from the jury and M r . Smith replaced her, did that i n any way affect your deliberations on t h i s case? "THE JURY: N o .I1 Defendant was not prejudiced by the occurrence involving juror Kolar. While serious prejudice may have arisen i f juror Kolar had participated i n the verdict, those problems were thus arrested by replacing her with an alternate juror and the further safeguards taken by the t r i a l judge. The verdict and judgment of the t r i a l court i s affirmed. .---We Concur : 1