Title: PETRONELLA BATSHON V MAR QUE GENERAL CONTRACTORS I
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116895
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2001

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 18, 2001  
PETRONELLA BATSHON and BENSON  
RUBIN,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
No. 116895  
MAR-QUE GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC., 
DEWEY STEWART and EXPERT PLUMBING, 
INC.,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, who successfully  
interposed a release executed by the plaintiffs and an  
insurance company. Summary disposition was granted in favor  
of the defendants, and the circuit court and the Court of  
Appeals affirmed. We reverse on the ground that the release  
did not limit the potential liability of the defendants.  
I  
Plaintiffs Petronella Batshon and Benson Rubin owned a  
 
house in Southfield.1  An October 1993 fire did substantial  
damage to the structure. 
Working from several trucks,  
firefighters evidently pumped a significant amount of water  
into the building. Perhaps in connection with the fire, the  
basement flooded knee-deep several weeks later.  
Substantial reconstruction work was done in early 1994.  
The cost was apparently borne by AAA of Michigan, the insurer  
of the house.  
As 
the 
reconstruction work was being done, the plaintiffs  
decided to connect with the city water line.  They contracted  
with Mar-Que General Contractors. 
Mar-Que, in turn,  
subcontracted with Dewey Stewart to dig a trench for the pipe,  
and with Expert Plumbing, Inc., to install the water line.  
In March 1994, the basement walls of the house buckled,  
causing additional damage.  This suit is premised on the  
plaintiffs’ allegation that this damage was caused by the  
negligence of Mar-Que and its subcontractors (Stewart and  
Expert Plumbing) in the course of installing the water line.  
Evidently, the plaintiffs’ initial conclusion had been  
that the collapse of the walls was the result of the fire and  
the efforts of the fire department.  With the assistance of  
counsel, they sent AAA an April 1994 letter demanding that AAA  
pay a significant portion of the $27,900 bill for repairing  
the walls.  
1 
 We present the facts from the materials at hand, 
cautioning that this case has not been tried.  
2  
The negotiations with AAA led to a $3,000 settlement, in  
exchange for a May 1994 release. The meaning of that release  
is the central question in this case.  
In October 1995, the plaintiffs filed in district court  
a complaint against Mar-Que, Stewart, and Expert Plumbing.2  
The defendants responded with motions for summary disposition  
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), saying that the language of the release  
barred the plaintiffs’ claim.  
The 
district 
court granted the motions, agreeing that the  
release barred the claims against the present defendants. The  
court later denied reconsideration.  The plaintiffs appealed,  
but the circuit court affirmed.  
The Court of Appeals also affirmed,3 and the plaintiffs  
now seek leave to appeal in this Court.  
II  
The release was executed on a generic printed form that  
bore the title, “RELEASE COVERING ALL CLAIMS.” 
AAA’s name was  
typed into a blank space, so that the plaintiffs were  
releasing 
“AAA 
of 
Michigan, 
his/her/their 
executors,  
administrators, and all persons or organizations responsible  
2 
 The materials at hand indicate that Expert Plumbing 
filed a cross-claim against Mar-Que and Stewart.  
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 25, 2000 
(Docket No. 212062).  Initially, the Court of Appeals had 
denied leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered June 30, 
1997 (Docket No. 201729).  However, this Court remanded the 
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave 
granted. 457 Mich 875 (1998).  
3  
 
for his/her/their acts from all claims and causes of action  
for all injuries, losses, and damages sustained by [the  
plaintiffs], arising from an incident, all or part of which  
occurred on or about the 23rd day of March, 1994, at or near  
[the plaintiffs’ Southfield address].” The printed form also  
contained the language, “I intend this document to operate as  
a release for all consequences of the injuries, losses and  
damages sustained by me,” after which were typed the words “in  
regards to the basement walls whether or not I am presently  
aware of such consequences.”  
The defendants argue that the release covers “all  
persons.”  Agreeing, the Court of Appeals said that “[t]he  
word ‘all’ encompasses the broadest possible classification.”  
The plain language of the release does not, however, cover all  
persons and organizations.4  The key sentence in the release  
agreement provides for a “release of AAA of Michigan,  
4 We agree with these statements made by the Court of 
Appeals in the present case:  
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion  
for summary disposition de novo.  Harrison v Olde  
Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679  
(1997).  
The validity of a release turns on the intent 
of the parties.  A release must be fairly and 
knowingly made to be valid.  Skotak v Vic Tanny  
Int’l, Inc, 203 Mich App 616, 618; 513 NW2d 428 
(1994). If the language of a release is clear and 
unambiguous, 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
parties 
is  
ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the language.  Wyrembelski v St Clair Shores, 218 
Mich App 125, 127; 553 NW2d 651 (1996).  
4  
 
 
 
his/her/their executors, administrators, and all persons or  
organizations responsible for his/her/their acts.”  The first  
use of the term “his/her/their”5 unmistakably is as a  
substitute for repeating AAA of Michigan.  It is likewise  
plain that when the term “his/her/their” is used again in the  
same sentence that it is also a substitute for AAA of  
Michigan.  See Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460  
Mich 348, 356; 596 NW2d 190 (1999) (explaining that a court  
should “give contextual meaning to [a contractual] phrase to  
determine what the phrase conveys to those familiar with our  
language and its contemporary usage”). It follows that this  
printed release form is not a complete release of liability  
with respect to all parties in connection with the incident  
underlying the release, but rather pertains to “all persons or  
organizations” only insofar as they might be “responsible for  
[AAA’s] acts.”6  
The nature of the potential claim being released was  
stated in terms that were expansive (“I intend this document  
to operate as a release for all consequences of the injuries,  
losses and damages sustained by me in regards to the basement  
5 
 The drafters of this form alternatively linked male, 
female, and plural pronouns, but if the drafters had thought 
to include “its” (“his/her/its/their”), the antecedent would 
have been more clear.  
6 By contrast, consider the broad wording of the releases  
in Romska v Opper, 234 Mich App 512, 514; 594 NW2d 853 (1999), 
and Meridian Mut Ins Co v Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc (On Remand), 
242 Mich App 645, 649-650; 620 NW2d 310 (2000).  
5  
 
 
 
 
 
walls whether or not I am presently aware of such  
consequences”).
 
Because 
this 
document 
more 
narrowly  
identifies the persons and entities being released, however,  
only they can invoke this broad language.  Again, the release  
plainly states that AAA of Michigan and certain parties  
connected to AAA were released. The present defendants were  
not among those covered by the expansively worded release of  
potential liability unless they can be fitted within the  
phrase “all persons or organizations responsible for [AAA’s]  
acts.”  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the  
district court, circuit court, and Court of Appeals, and  
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings  
that are consistent with this opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
6