Title: Chappell v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 941106
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting, Lacy, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
E. TYREE CHAPPELL 
 
v.  Record No. 941106                     OPINION BY 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND                    JUNE 9, 1995 
POWER COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 
 
Richard H.C. Taylor, Judge 
 
 
 
The principal question presented in this landowner's appeal 
from a judgment confirming the commissioners' report in a 
proceeding to condemn an easement is whether the testimony 
adduced and proffered by the landowner was sufficient to prove 
that the award of compensation for damage to the residue was 
unjust. 
 
In October 1992, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Vepco) 
filed a petition to condemn an easement for the construction of 
Vepco's 230 kV Elmont-Chickahominy transmission line.  The route 
crosses one corner of a farm owned by E. Tyree Chappell.  
Approximately half of the farm lies in a flood plain.  The corner 
crossed by the easement is cleared land and, with access to State 
Route 637, is suitable for residential development.  Chappell's 
farm contains 91.72 acres; the easement will cover 0.85 of an 
acre. 
 
In preparation for trial, Chappell served a subpoena on 
Donald E. Koonce, Vepco's Director of Transmission Operations.  
In response to interrogatories, Chappell advised that he also 
planned to call another witness, Gillis G. Pratt, Jr., a real 
estate appraiser, who would opine that "the greatest loss to the 
property is the damages to the remainder . . . [which] is 
significantly devalued, because of its proximity to the right of 
way of a high voltage transmission line, including the public 
awareness and fear of living in the vicinity of electromagnetic 
fields caused by such transmission lines." 
 
Vepco filed a motion to quash the Koonce subpoena and a 
motion in limine to exclude "evidence of or reference to 
electromagnetic fields ('EMF'), any alleged link between EMF and 
adverse human health effects, any alleged public perception of 
any such link, and the effects, if any, of any such perception on 
property values in Hanover County."  The trial court granted both 
motions. 
 
Following a view of the property by the court and the 
commissioners, Vepco introduced the testimony of a single 
witness, Michael C. McCall, a real estate appraiser.  McCall 
fixed the value of the easement at $11,900; the damage to an "80-
foot strip running along the easement" at $22,155; no damage to 
the residue outside this "buffer strip"; and total just 
compensation at $34,100. 
 
Chappell, testifying as his only witness, valued the 
easement at $12,750; damage to the residue at $81,750; and total 
just compensation at $94,500.  For the record, Chappell proffered 
the testimony of Gillis Pratt, a real estate appraiser.  Pratt 
evaluated the easement at $14,445; damage to the residue at 
$65,555; and total just compensation at $80,000. 
 
The trial court entered judgment confirming the 
commissioners' report which assessed the value of the easement at 
$12,325; damage to the residue at $25,655; and total just 
compensation at $37,980. 
 
In his challenge on appeal to the quantum of the award of 
damage to the residue, Chappell contends that the trial court 
erred in excluding his evidence of public fear emanating from the 
presence of high voltage power lines and the effect of that fear 
on the market value of his property.  He relies upon language 
contained in Appalachian Pr. Co. v. Johnson, 137 Va. 12, 30-31, 
119 S.E. 253, 258 (1923), where we said that "the commissioners 
could have properly taken into consideration the effect of the 
fear of the [transmission] line breaking down and injuring 
persons and property . . . if the liability [for] such injury in 
fact depreciated the market value of the property."  Chappell 
insists that the trial court's order excluding his evidence from 
consideration by the commissioners "was in contravention of 
precedent and resulted in unfair prejudice . . . as reflected by 
the Commissioners' award." 
 
We do not agree that Johnson is controlling precedent.  The 
landowner was awarded nothing for damage to the residue; damage 
to the residue was not an issue before this Court; and the 
language Chappell invokes is obiter dicta. 
 
Nevertheless, we need not decide whether a landowner in a 
proceeding to condemn an easement for an electric transmission 
line may be entitled to compensation for diminution in the market 
value of the remaining land attributable to the fears of 
prospective purchasers.  The rule is well settled that, "[i]n 
every eminent domain case involving a partial taking, the measure 
of damages to the residue of the property not taken is the 
difference in the fair market value immediately before and 
immediately after the taking."  East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. 
Riner, 239 Va. 94, 100, 387 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1990); accord Town 
of Rocky Mount v. Hudson, 244 Va. 271, 273, 421 S.E.2d 407, 408 
(1992).  And, as Chappell acknowledges on brief, "[s]peculative 
matters should not be considered by commissioners in determining 
just compensation."  Applying these principles, we examine the 
probative value of the damage evidence Chappell vouched for the 
record.   
 
Koonce, Vepco's employee, was never asked to evaluate damage 
to the residue, and Pratt produced no evidence of comparable 
sales consummated at prices allegedly diminished by public fear 
of electric transmission lines.  As Chappell agreed in oral 
argument, "[i]t is difficult to prove market value loss when 
there are no actual sales of comparable property." 
 
In support of his estimate of damage to the residue, Pratt 
referred to an article he had read in the "Journal of Real Estate 
Research".  Based upon "a survey of several experienced 
appraisers all over the country," the author of the article 
concluded that the effect of high voltage power lines on 
residential property values "ranged from zero to 50 percent 
difference . . . with the median being typically something 
greater than 10 percent".  While Pratt testified that he applied 
a 10 percent depreciation formula to one parcel containing 13.77 
acres "because of the visual" problem, it is unclear from the 
record what percentage factor or factors related to the fears of 
prospective customers he applied to other portions of the rest of 
Chappell's farm. 
 
We think that the proffered testimony failed to quantify any 
damage to the fair market value of the residue attributable to 
the alleged public fear of high voltage transmission lines.  
Consequently, the testimony Chappell proffered was inadmissible. 
 East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Riner, 239 Va. at 100, 387 
S.E.2d at 479-80. 
 
Finally, Chappell complains that the trial court erred in 
denying his "absolute right of cross-examination" and that "[d]ue 
to the Court's evidentiary rulings, the Commissioners' award was 
arrived at under erroneous principles and should have been 
overturned by the Trial Court". 
 
On cross-examination, Chappell's counsel asked McCall if, 
during the course of his testimony in earlier Vepco condemnation 
cases, "the question [had] come up about fear of power lines".  
The trial court, taking the view that Chappell's question was 
within the intendment of the exclusion order entered in limine, 
sustained Vepco's objection to the question, and Chappell's 
counsel resumed interrogation on a different subject. 
 
"We will not consider testimony which the trial court has 
excluded without a proper showing of what that testimony might 
have been."  O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 697, 364 S.E.2d 
491, 505 cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).  "[W]hen testimony is 
rejected before it is delivered, an appellate court has no basis 
for adjudication unless the record reflects a proper proffer."  
Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 968, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 
(1977); accord Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 570, 385 
S.E.2d 850, 854 (1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); 
MacKall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 256-57, 372 S.E.2d 759, 769 
(1988), cert. denied 492 U.S. 925 (1989); Barrett v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 108, 341 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1986); Wyche 
v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 839, 842, 241 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1978); 
Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 630-31, 136 S.E. 765, 767 
(1927); Jackson's Case, 98 Va. 845, 846-47, 36 S.E. 487, 488 
(1900).  Although the trial court invited Chappell to pursue his 
right of "vouching the record", we find nothing in that record 
that constitutes a proper proffer. 
 
The commissioners' award was lower than the highest damage 
estimates and higher than the lowest.   
 
It is a well settled rule of law in this State that it 
requires strong evidence to warrant the appellate court 
in setting aside an award of commissioners when the 
only exception is to the quantum of damages. 
 
Chairman Highway v. Fletcher, 153 Va. 43, 46, 149 S.E. 456, 457 
(1929); accord Highway Commissioner v. Carter, 216 Va. 639, 641, 
222 S.E.2d 776, 777 (1976). 
 
We hold that the record fails to show that the difference 
between the market value of the residue immediately before and 
immediately after the condemnation was greater than the award the 
commissioners made, and we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court confirming the award. 
 
Affirmed.