Title: Wright v. Town of Huxley
Citation: 249 N.W.2d 672
Docket Number: 2-57214
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 1977

249 N.W.2d 672 (1977) James W. WRIGHT and Big Jim's, Inc., Appellants, v. The TOWN OF HUXLEY, Iowa, et al., Appellees. No. 2-57214. Supreme Court of Iowa. January 19, 1977. *673 Raymond Rosenberg and Robert A. Wynn, Des Moines, for appellants. Donald L. Smith, of Reynolds, Gilchrist, Nutty, Smith &amp; Sharp, Ames, for appellees. Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. This is a declaratory judgment action asking that an ordinance enacted by the town council of Huxley, Iowa, be declared unconstitutional. The trial court held part of the ordinance was valid and part void. Plaintiffs appeal from that portion of the judgment adverse to them; defendants cross-appeal. We affirm on both appeals. *674 The case was submitted on stipulated facts. Big Jim's, Inc. is a corporation which holds a combination class C beer and liquor license. The corporation operates a restaurant and tavern in Huxley. Plaintiff James W. Wright was formerly the sole owner of this business. He is now president of the corporation. For convenience, we refer to both plaintiffs as Big Jim's. The defendants are the town of Huxley and a number of its officers. Although now Huxley should be called a city rather than a town, (§ 362.2(1), The Code, 1975), it was designated throughout these proceedings by the latter name. We therefore refer to Huxley and its officers jointly as the town. The ordinance in question contains these provisions: The ordinance makes a violation of its provisions punishable by fine or jail term. Instead of waiting to be charged with a violation of the ordinance, Big Jim's challenged its validity by this declaratory judgment action. I. We deal first with a preliminary matter which seems to disturb the parties but which we feel is without significance under the facts before us. Big Jim's argues the right of the town to pass the ordinances depends upon power granted local authorities under the Home Rule Amendment to the Iowa Constitution and subsequent statutory enactments. Big Jim's further insists liquor control is among the powers the city had not elected to exercise under the optional provisions of the statute. See Chapter 1088, § 9, Acts of the 64th G.A. as amended by Chapter 1212, § 1, Acts of the 65th G.A. (1974). Cf. City of Burlington v. Citizens to Protect Our Freedoms, 214 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Iowa 1974). We give this matter no further consideration because we conclude the town's power to legislate as it did does not depend on home rule authority. The power of the State to regulate the liquor business is broad and comprehensive, much more so than in the conduct of other private endeavors. The general rule is stated this way in 45 Am.Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 24 at 503 (1969): This concept was formidably strengthened by the 21st Amendment to the federal constitution, which included this language: In commenting on this matter in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114, 93 S. Ct. 390, 395, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, 349-350 (1972) the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say: Generally on the broad power to regulate beer or liquor operations see State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 602, 57 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1953); State v. Arluno, 222 Iowa 1, 14, 268 N.W. 179, 185 (1936); DuPont v. Planning &amp; Zoning Com'n, 156 Conn. 213, 240 A.2d 899, 902 (1968); State ex rel. Hart v. Parham, 412 P.2d 142, 147 (Okl.1966); Miller v. Zoning Com'n, 135 Conn. 405, 65 A.2d 577, 578 (1949); State ex rel. Galle v. City of New Orleans, 113 La. 371, 36 So. 999, 1003 (1904); cf. Craig et al. v. Boren et al., ___ U.S. ___, 97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1976). Even conceding the authority of the State, Big Jim's contends this power is not delegable to municipalities. We do not agree. We hold § 123.39 includes a proper and valid delegation of authority to cities and towns. It provides in part: In an early case this court said in State ex rel. Witter v. Forkner, 94 Iowa 1, 13, 62 N.W. 772, 775-776 (1895): Cf. Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 509 P.2d 497, 504 (1973), cert. denied, Owen v. Musick, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S. Ct. 1443, 39 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1974). We hold there is no merit to Big Jim's contention passage of the ordinance was beyond the town's municipal authority. Nor do we agree with the argument that the authority granted in § 123.39 is limited to the issuance or suspension of licenses. The italicized portion of the quoted statute refutes any such conclusion. II. We next take up the claim the ordinance is unconstitutional. Much of Big Jim's argument proceeds on the premise the power to regulate liquor business is like the power to regulate other private activities; but, as already pointed out, the law has always recognized a greater need to control traffic in liquor because of its greater effect on "public health, welfare and morals." The Iowa Liquor Control Act (Chapter 123), announces this public policy in § 123.1: See also Soursos v. City of Mason City, 230 Iowa 157, 158, 296 N.W. 807, 808 (1941) where this court said: This brings us to a consideration of the specific constitutional attacks made on the ordinance in question. This presents two separate problems. The first involves the two sections of the ordinance prohibiting exhibition dancing (§ 16.5 and § 16.6). The second involved two sections regulating nudity (§ 16.7 and § 16.8). As to the first two sections, the trial court found the ordinance was unconstitutional for both vagueness and overbreadth. The town appeals from this finding. The two sections involving nudity were found to be constitutional and valid. Big Jim's appeals from this determination. III. We consider, first, the question of the town's cross-appeal challenging the trial court's finding that a general prohibition against exhibition dancing on the licensed premises is unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth. Vagueness and overbreadth, while closely related, are separate concepts. State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 1973). We agree with the trial court that the portion of the ordinance relating to exhibition dancing is both vague and overbroad, although we base our conclusion principally on the former. A statute is said to be vague in the constitutional sense when it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so uncertain that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1976) and citations; State v. Wedelstedt, supra, 213 N.W.2d at 656; State v. Williams, 171 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937, 90 S. Ct. 1837, 26 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1970). In the present case, the council attempted to ban all "exhibition dancing." However, it did not define exhibition dancing or in any way limit the application of that term. Obviously, it was not meant to prohibit all dancing, or the qualifying term "exhibition" would have been unnecessary. Neither did it mean to ban only nude dancing because that is done in other sections of the ordinance. "Exhibition" has a number of dictionary definitions. We set out a few of them here: We hold §§ 16.5 and 16.6 are so vague and uncertain that it is impossible for persons of common intelligence to ascertain with certainty when permissible dancing stops and prohibited dancing starts. We hold those two sections to be in violation of the 14th Amendment due process clause. They are therefore invalid. We need not, and do not, consider the other constitutional objections raised to these two sections. IV. We next consider Big Jim's appeal, which asserts the trial court erroneously *677 found the two provisions of the ordinance dealing with nudity were valid and enforceable. (§§ 16.7 and 16.8) Again, we affirm the trial court. In doing so we rely in large measure on the broad power to regulate the liquor business discussed in Division I of this opinion. Big Jim's assault upon this part of the ordinance takes several paths. First it claims a violation of First Amendment rights because the dance is an accepted method of expression and the ordinance is an interference with the right of free speech. One of the leading cases in this area is California v. LaRue, supra. That case concerned a state liquor department regulation prohibiting certain sexually explicit entertainment at licensed bars and nightclubs. There, as here, a claim was made that the regulations were an unconstitutional interference with the performers' freedom of expression under the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The court said (409 U.S. 117-118, 93 S. Ct. 396-397, 34 L.Ed.2d 351-352): "* * * Relying strongly on LaRue, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reached a similar result in two cases. See Boston Licensing Board v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 328 N.E.2d 848 (Mass.1975) and City of Revere v. Aucella, 338 N.E.2d 816 (Mass.1975). See also State v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Iowa 1970); Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So. 2d 891, 894 (Fla.1971); Major Liquors, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 188 Neb. 628, 198 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Neb.1972); City of Portland v. Derrington, 253 Or. 289, 451 P.2d 111, 114, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901, 90 *678 S. Ct. 212, 24 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1969); Crownover v. Musick, supra, 509 P.2d at 514. We agree with the reasoning of the foregoing authorities. The "expression" element of the nude dancing prohibited by this ordinance is surely incidental, as any patron of Big Jim's would probably concede. We hold the ordinance is not an unconstitutional encroachment on 1st Amendment rights. Now it is Big Jim's, rather than the town, which says the ordinance is both vague and overbroad. We discussed vagueness in Division III hereof and need not repeat what we said there. "Overbroad" refers to language which attempts to accomplish its purpose by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. It not only forbids conduct constitutionally subject to proscription but also includes those actions ordinarily deemed to be constitutionally protected. See State v. Wedelstedt, supra, 213 N.W.2d at 656, and citations. We consider first the issue of vagueness. There is no merit to this contention. The ordinance is explicit and specific in its prohibition. We find it difficult to believe Big Jim's seriously contends people of common intelligence would not understand the meaning of nudity or would not be able to determine when the ordinance was violated by exposing to public view the breasts, buttocks, or genitals. The question of overbreadth is less certain. Big Jim's complaint here is that the ordinance offends by including in its interdiction men as well as women. We might observe that a failure to do so undoubtedly would have triggered an equal protection challenge. Big Jim's argues it is not a reasonable exercise of police power to forbid men to appear in public with breasts exposed. He cites the male swimming truck example and asks if all who are thus attired are to be guilty of violating this ordinance. That hypothetical set of facts is not before us. The case is here, not to test a conviction under a specific factual background, but on a declaratory judgment action. Until a case involving the hypothesis posed by Big Jim's is before us, the overbreadth of the ordinance should not be decided. This same issue was met in the LaRue case by this language: The Massachusetts Supreme Court also reserved the resolution of that question with this language (328 N.E.2d at 852): See also City of Revere v. Aucella, supra, 338 N.E.2d at 817. We, too, reserve such questions "for another day" when a controversy based on a specific claimed violation is before us. All we hold now is that the ordinance on its face passes constitutional tests. *679 It is significant that both LaRue and Boston were declaratory judgment actions. Revere was a suit seeking an injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance. Like the present appeal, none of these cases involved a particular set of facts alleged to violate the ordinance or regulation involved. For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court on both appeals. We add this caveat. Our decision does not apply to statutes or ordinances banning nudity in all public places. It is limited to the broad power of the state or municipality to regulate liquor traffic and to prohibit specified conduct on premises holding a beer or liquor license under Chapter 123, The Code. Cf. Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 248 N.W.2d 708 (Minn.1976). AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.