Title: Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Division of the District Court Department
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12121
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2017

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SJC-12121 
 
DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL FOR THE PUBLIC DEFENDER DIVISION OF THE 
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES & another1  vs.  ACTING 
FIRST JUSTICE OF THE LOWELL DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
DEPARTMENT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 9, 2016. - May 24, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Committee for Public Counsel Services.  District Court, Drug 
court session. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 23, 2016. 
 
 
The case was reported by Duffly, J. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Ryan 
M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) 
for the plaintiffs. 
 
Bethany L. Stevens for the defendant. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  This matter is before us on a reservation and 
report, by a single justice of this court, of a petition for 
                     
 
1 Deputy Chief Counsel for the Private Counsel Division of 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
2 
 
 
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The petition, brought by the 
Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Deputy Chief 
Counsel for the Private Counsel Division of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services (collectively CPCS), sought an order 
affirming CPCS's independent authority under G. L. c. 211D to 
select and supervise attorneys for indigent defendants in the 
pilot program it had launched in the drug court session of the 
Lowell Division of the District Court Department (drug court).  
The issue arose after the Acting First Justice of the Lowell 
District Court (Justice), citing the need for a "team" approach 
to cases in the drug Court, removed CPCS attorneys from drug 
court cases to which they had been assigned and excluded CPCS 
attorneys from assignment to any new case in the drug court. 
 
The single justice, in her reservation and report, observed 
that "the matter raises some important legal questions that 
ought to be decided by the full court, concerning specialty 
courts in general and adult drug courts in particular, and the 
respective roles and responsibilities of judges, [CPCS], and 
individual defense attorneys."  The issue highlights the tension 
that may arise between an attorney's duty to zealously advocate 
for the rights of the drug court defendant and a drug court 
model that favors a collaborative and nonadversarial approach to 
supervision of the drug court defendant.  We recognize that the 
3 
 
 
success of drug court outcomes depends in large part on an 
unconditional commitment to the goal of treatment from all 
members of the drug court team, including the drug court 
defendant.  Nonetheless, we conclude that CPCS has the sole 
authority under G. L. c. 211D for the assignment of counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants and that a judge may not override 
that authority to accommodate a preference for attorneys willing 
to assume a collaborative and nonadversarial role in drug court 
proceedings. 
 
Background.  1.  The drug court model.  Drug courts have 
been developed to provide the option of treatment as an 
alternative to incarceration in cases where the underlying 
criminal behavior is thought to be motivated by a defendant's 
substance abuse.  Executive Office of the Trial Court, Adult 
Drug Court Manual, A Guide to Starting and Operating Adult Drug 
Courts in Massachusetts at 2-3 (2015) (drug court manual).  Drug 
courts are defined as "problem-solving courts that operate under 
a specialized model in which the judiciary, prosecution, defense 
bar, probation, law enforcement, substance use, mental health, 
and social service communities work together to provide 
treatment to people with substance use challenges" with the 
ultimate goal of public safety and reduction of recidivism.  Id. 
at 3. 
4 
 
 
 
To accomplish these purposes, drug courts necessarily are 
different from regular criminal sessions during which a judge 
may impose probation to accommodate a need for treatment rather 
than a sentence of incarceration.  A defendant's success with 
substance abuse treatment in such circumstances more often than 
not depends on his or her self-motivation and the availability 
of resources to support the treatment alternatives.  Drug 
courts, by contrast, are premised on the truism that successful 
treatment, though achievable, is difficult for a defendant with 
little more than sincere motivation and good intentions at his 
disposal.  Thus, drug courts are distinguished from regular 
criminal sessions by the "integration of treatment and services 
with judicial case oversight and intensive court supervision."  
Id. at 39.  In accordance with this formula for success, the 
drug court model incorporates features, described infra, not 
common in regular criminal sessions. 
 
The structure of the drug court is informed by "evidence-
based best practices" emphasizing the necessity of a team 
approach to the development and oversight of the defendant's 
prescribed course of substance abuse treatment.  Id. at 3.  A 
judge is the leader of the drug court team and, in that 
capacity, assembles the team which typically includes the 
"program coordinator, assistant district attorney, defense 
attorney, probation officer(s), clerk, case manager, specialty 
5 
 
 
court clinician, treatment providers, local law enforcement, and 
representatives from local organizations that provide services 
to drug court participants."  Id. at 8.  In keeping with the 
treatment purpose, team members must have expertise in substance 
use disorders and therapeutic options, and be sensitive to 
issues of gender, age, race, language, and cultural issues that 
may bear on the drug court defender's likelihood of success.  
Id.  Collectively, the team members have the knowledge and 
experience to develop an appropriate treatment plan for each 
drug court defendant.  Just as important, they are adept at 
identifying the personal and societal causes of failure and the 
ways to undercut their impact on the treatment goals. 
 
The probation officer, clerk, and treatment providers are 
essential to the mission of the team.  They are present at each 
drug court session, providing a consistency in the oversight of 
drug court defendants at each drug court session.  Participation 
by the assistant district attorney and defense counsel is 
encouraged but not always possible.  Defense counsel has no 
formal role in the drug court sessions because in the post-
adjudicative setting, the drug court defendant has no right to 
counsel.  However, if a drug court defendant is issued a 
probation violation notice, defense counsel is appointed and is 
expected to "zealously advocate for the rights of his or her 
client."  Id. at 8. 
6 
 
 
 
The work of the drug court is accomplished during the 
weekly session over which the judge presides with the assistance 
of the other team members.  In preparation for each drug court 
session, the team is assembled for a "staffing," the purpose of 
which is to review the progress of each drug court defendant who 
will appear before the court that day.  Id. at 27.  During the 
staffing, the team determines whether sanctions are necessary.  
However, if sanctions are to be considered, the discussion is 
deferred until defense counsel has been notified and given the 
opportunity to appear.  After the staffing, the formal drug 
court session is held with the defendant in attendance.  Only 
drug court cases are on the session docket.  During the session, 
the judge interacts personally with each drug court defendant 
and offers words of encouragement or praise.  The session is 
open to all drug court defendants scheduled to appear that day 
with the expectation that the opportunity to "see the 
consequences of others' actions [will] build[] a sense of mutual 
support among the participants."  Id. at 28. 
 
In accordance with the drug court manual, drug courts are 
encouraged to have "clear, objective, and specific eligibility 
criteria" for admission.  Id. at 15.  Typically, a defendant 
must meet three eligibility criteria for admission to the drug 
court:  (1) the defendant must have a substance use disorder; 
(2) the defendant must have been found guilty, pleaded guilty, 
7 
 
 
or admitted to sufficient facts for a continuance without a 
finding; and (3) the defendant must have been placed on 
supervised probation.  Id.  An eligible defendant is entitled to 
the advice of counsel on the risks and benefits of drug courts. 
 
Drug court defendants must agree to a one-year commitment 
during which they may be required to submit to "random and 
comprehensive drug and alcohol testing multiple times weekly, 
weekly meetings with the probation officer and attendance at a 
weekly or bi-weekly status hearing before the judge."  Id. at 
21.  These conditions purposely are more demanding based on the 
underlying philosophy that drug court defendants must exhibit an 
unconditional commitment to engage in and comply with a rigorous 
substance abuse treatment program.  Id. at 19.  And, as with any 
probationer, the drug court defendant risks a violation of 
probation if he or she fails to comply with the conditions of 
probation. 
 
2.  The pilot program in the Lowell drug court.  The drug 
court commenced operations in June, 2014, and from its 
inception, the Justice has been the judge with primary 
responsibility to oversee the court.  In July, 2015, CPCS 
initiated a drug court pilot program (pilot), which, in a 
departure from CPCS's long-standing policy, permitted the 
assignment of counsel to indigent drug court defendants for 
every stage of the drug court proceedings.  CPCS's policy was 
8 
 
 
driven by the legal principle that in the drug court 
postdisposition proceedings, drug court defendants had no right 
to counsel; the right to counsel attached only if the defendant 
was subject to a probation violation hearing.  CPCS was 
constrained as well by budgetary considerations.  No funding had 
been appropriated to defray the costs associated with the 
assignment of counsel to this class of defendants beyond the 
reach of the right to counsel provided by G. L. c. 211D. 
 
The impetus for the pilot was a series of discussions that 
began in December, 2013, among CPCS, judges, and other 
representatives of the Administrative Office of the Trial Court.  
The advocacy for this expanded access to defense counsel was 
informed by the experiences of judges in other drug court 
sessions who touted the efficacy and desirability of assigned 
counsel at all stages of the drug court sessions.  These judges 
and others involved in the management of the drug court sessions 
believed that a drug court defendant's likelihood of success in 
substance abuse treatment would be enhanced if defense counsel 
gained expertise in addiction issues and was familiar with the 
team's view of the defendant's participation.  This pilot 
innovation permitted assigned counsel to participate in drug 
court "staffings" which ordinarily would not involve the 
presence of appointed counsel. 
9 
 
 
 
The pilot began after the Justice was notified by a letter 
dated July 15, 2015, of CPCS's proposal to locate the pilot 
program in the drug court.  This letter advised that "the task 
of assuring counsel for participants already determined indigent 
in the trial session will be handled by our staff office and by 
Middlesex Defense Attorneys  . . . just as is done in all court 
sessions."  The record contains no evidence that the Justice 
rejected these conditions for the implementation of the pilot in 
the drug court. 
 
Although the record does not establish the precise date on 
which the pilot commenced, disagreement between the Justice and 
CPCS attorneys surfaced on September 15, 2015, in an incident 
involving one of the CPCS attorneys chosen to participate in the 
pilot.  It is not necessary to recite the details of that 
incident; the upshot was that the Justice removed the attorney 
from the assigned case and informed the attorney in charge of 
the CPCS office in the Lowell Division of the District Court 
Department that this attorney would not be permitted to 
represent probationers in the drug court.  The Justice removed 
the attorney without specifying the reason or providing an 
opportunity for the attorney to be heard.  On November 16, 2015, 
CPCS attorneys filed a motion for recognition of counsel and for 
the recusal of the Justice on behalf of the probationer who had 
been represented by the attorney removed by the Justice.  On 
10 
 
 
December 10, 2015, the Justice issued a memorandum of decision, 
denying the motion as moot.2 
 
On several occasions in December, 2015, the Justice 
declined to recognize previously assigned CPCS attorneys and 
appointed bar advocates as substitute counsel.  Eventually the 
Justice announced a categorical ban on CPCS attorneys in the 
drug court, effectively terminating the drug court pilot.  
Although the Justice did not explain his reasoning for the 
categorical ban on CPCS attorneys, he later expressed the belief 
that CPCS attorneys in the Lowell office were "extremely 
hostile" to the drug court mission and that they refused to 
"participate fully" as team members. 
 
Discussion.  The petitioners argue that under G. L. c. 211D 
and S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as amended, 416 Mass. 1306 (1993), CPCS 
has independent authority to assign counsel to indigent criminal 
defendants and that a judge may not remove assigned counsel 
without notice and the opportunity to be heard, or categorically 
exclude CPCS attorneys from assignments in the drug court.  The 
Justice concedes these limitations on a court's role in the 
assignment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants.  He 
argues, however, that in the exercise of his authority to choose 
                     
 
2 The issue became moot after the Justice readmitted the 
defendant to probation, thereby making the appointment of 
counsel unnecessary. 
11 
 
 
drug court "team" members and to insure fidelity to the drug 
court model, he may bypass the statutorily mandated system for 
assignment of counsel to give preference to volunteer "team" 
attorneys in probation violation cases.  We do not doubt the 
desirability and efficacy of a collaborative and nonadversarial 
approach in the drug court, and we recognize its value in making 
the drug court an effective intervention for defendants who 
would otherwise recidivate because of their substance abuse 
issues.  We conclude, however, that this purpose, laudable as it 
may be, cannot trump the statutory mandate that CPCS, not the 
court, is to assign counsel for indigent defendants. 
 
When G. L. c. 211D was enacted in 1983, the Legislature had 
the benefit of decades of public advocacy for a "comprehensive, 
coordinated, and independent" system to insure an indigent 
criminal defendant's right to counsel.  See Rosenfeld, The Right 
to Counsel and Provision of Counsel to Indigents in 
Massachusetts:  The Hennessey Era, 74 Mass. L. Rev. 148, 148 
(1989) (Hennessey Era).  See also St. 1983, c. 673.  That 
advocacy followed this court's decisions in Pugliese v. 
Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471, 475-476 (1957) (recognizing right 
to counsel where defendant lacked sufficient intelligence to 
represent himself), and Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476, 
482-483 (1957) (violation of art. 12 of Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights where defendant was not represented by 
12 
 
 
counsel), both of which were decided well before the United 
States Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 339, 343-344 (1968).  In the aftermath of these 
decisions, the Supreme Judicial Court promulgated S.J.C. Rule 
10, 337 Mass. 813 (1958), which required the appointment of 
counsel for indigent defendants in noncapital felony cases in 
the Superior Court.3 
 
In 1960, the Legislature created the Massachusetts 
Defenders Committee, the first State-wide publicly funded 
defender agency.  St. 1960, c. 565.  Plagued by a shortage of 
resources, however, the defender's committee was unable to 
deliver on its mission to provide counsel to all indigent 
defendants eligible to receive the service.  Goodwin, Comment, 
Massachusetts' Struggle to Adhere to the Gideon Mandate:  Will 
the Lavallee Decision, Coupled With Legislative Reform, Finally 
Establish a State Indigent Criminal Defense System that is 
Constitutionally Sound?  32 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. 
                     
 
3 Rule 10 of the Supreme Judicial Court Rules, 337 Mass. 813 
(1958), was amended three times thereafter.  In 1962, the rule 
was amended to allow the appointment of counsel in any case 
warranted by the circumstances. 345 Mass. 792 (1962).  In 1964, 
the rule was amended a second time to require the appointment of 
counsel in all cases where a sentence of imprisonment was a 
possible consequence of conviction.  347 Mass. 809 (1964)  In 
1969, the court amended what was by then S.J.C. Rule 3:10 to 
require the assignment of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee 
unless exceptional circumstances dictated otherwise.  355 Mass. 
803 (1969).  See 351 Mass. 791 (1967) (renumbering rules of 
Supreme Judicial Court). 
13 
 
 
Confinement 77, 84 (2006).  Twenty years after the creation of 
the defender's committee, it was still responsible for "less 
than one-half" of the cases of indigent criminal defendants.  
Id. at 86-87.  The patchwork of county defender programs that 
operated as a complement to the defender's committee was itself 
inadequate to have any salutary effect on the system for the 
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants.  Id. at 
87.  Also, until the decision in Abodeely v. County of 
Worcester, 352 Mass. 719 (1967), private attorneys appointed 
under the authority of S.J.C. Rule 3:10 had no constitutional or 
statutory right to payment for their services.  Abodeely, supra 
at 723-724. 
 
Concern about these and other serious shortcomings in the 
indigent defender system prompted then Chief Justice Edward 
Hennessey to establish a committee,4 chaired by Associate Justice 
Herbert Wilkins (Wilkins Committee), to "set out guidelines and 
standards for defender programs, including such requirements as 
caseload controls, training, vertical representation and 
provision of support services."  Rosenfeld, Defense of Indigents 
                     
 
4 The committee, officially named the "Committee on 
Appointment of Competent Counsel for Indigent Criminal 
Defendants in District and Municipal Courts" (Wilkins 
Committee), was established in 1976.  The Wilkins Committee 
released its interim report on December 16, 1976, and its final 
report on March 21, 1979. 
14 
 
 
in Massachusetts:  A New Approach, 28 Boston Bar J. Vol. 22, 22 
(Nov./Dec. 1984).  See Hennessey Era, supra at 149. 
Chief Justice Hennessey envisioned an indigent defender system 
that was "centrally administered and financed . . . , within the 
judicial branch but independent of the [c]ourt."  Id. at 151.  
The Wilkins Committee issued reports in 1976 and 1979, 
identifying the primary impediments to the system envisioned by 
Chief Justice Hennessey as the lack of (1) a central 
administrative and funding mechanism; (2) standards for quality 
control; and (3) requirements for training and education.  Id. 
at 149-150.  Armed with the work of the Wilkins Committee and 
other advocacy groups supporting his vision, Chief Justice 
Hennessey personally supported legislative initiatives intended 
to accomplish this purpose.  Id. at 151. 
 
Leading up to the enactment of G. L. c. 211D in 1983, the 
Legislature also had the benefit of appellate cases documenting 
abuses of the then-existing system for the appointment of 
counsel to indigent defendants.5  Under that system, judges, 
                     
 
5 See, e.g., Matter of McKenney, 384 Mass. 76, 77, 89, 101 
(Appendix) (1981) (public censure and retirement of former judge 
for misconduct including favoritism in appointment of counsel 
for indigent defendants); Matter of Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 369-
370, 376-377 (Appendix) (1979) (censure for failing to ensure 
that counsel was appointed for indigent party); Matter of Troy, 
364 Mass. 15, 36, 73 (1973) (discipline for conditioning the 
right to court-appointed counsel on defendant's surrender of 
right to post bail). 
15 
 
 
despite the obvious constitutional conflict in exercising that 
role, had exclusive authority for the appointment of counsel.6 
 
Against this historical backdrop, the Legislature enacted 
G. L. c. 211D in 1983, establishing CPCS as the sole statutory 
entity with the authority to "plan, oversee, and coordinate the 
delivery of criminal . . . legal services" to indigent 
defendants.  G. L. c. 211D, § 1.  General Laws c. 211D created a 
centralized agency with the responsibility for every aspect of 
the system for providing counsel for indigent defendants.  Id.  
That responsibility begins with the duty to establish, subject 
only to the approval of the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
indigency standards to be applied in determining a defendant's 
right to appointed counsel.  G. L. c. 211D, § 2.  For the 
benefit of those defendants qualifying for the appointment of 
counsel, CPCS is charged with the duty to oversee the "training, 
qualification and removal of counsel" who accept appointments as 
counsel for indigent defendants.  G. L. c. 211D, § 4.  Vested 
with this authority, CPCS has the ability to insure that 
indigent defendants have access to effective assistance of 
                     
 
6 "The appointment of counsel by judges creates -- at the 
least -- the appearance that lawyers are being assigned cases to 
move dockets and that lawyers may be more loyal to the judge 
than to the client."  See Statement of Stephen B. Bright, 
Innocence Protection Act of 2001, Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., on S.486, at 
40 (June 27, 2001). 
16 
 
 
counsel.  The statute also has an egalitarian approach to the 
appointment of counsel, allowing that CPCS create a rotating 
appointment system to "encourage open access among attorneys 
participating within the private counsel division."  Id.  As 
explained, infra, the over-all statutory scheme addressed a 
range of issues that, prior to 1983, undermined the goal of a 
comprehensive and unified system for the assignment of counsel 
to indigent defendants. 
 
The plain language of G. L. c. 211D, § 5, viewed in the 
context of the entire statutory scheme, supports for our 
conclusion that CPCS has sole authority to assign counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants.  The procedure in G. L. c. 211D, 
§ 5, contemplates a two-step process for the assignment of 
counsel.  The first step is the determination of indigency, a 
duty within the exclusive authority of the judge.  Id.  The 
statute is clear that, in the second step, "A justice or 
associate justice shall assign a case to [CPCS]" (emphasis 
supplied).  Id.  This statutory division of authority between 
the judge and CPCS is reinforced in S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 5, which 
provides that "the judge shall assign [CPCS] to provide 
representation for the party, unless exceptional circumstances, 
supported by written findings, necessitate the use of a 
different procedure that is consistent with G. L. c. 211D and 
the rules of this court" (emphasis supplied).  Therefore, we 
17 
 
 
discern no ambiguity in the respective roles of the judge and 
CPCS.  The judge's role is to determine indigency and to assign 
the case to CPCS; the role of CPCS is to assign the case to an 
attorney with responsibility to represent the defendant.7 
 
The Justice does not dispute this interpretation of G. L. 
c. 211D, § 5.  Rather, he argues that we should recognize an 
exception for the drug court based on the need for the team 
approach deemed essential to the success of the drug court 
model.  To the extent that the social science research validates 
the efficacy of a nonadversarial "team" approach in the adult 
drug court model, we take no issue with that proposition.  
Nonetheless, the statute provides no authority for a judge to 
craft an exception for a drug court, and the Justice cites none.  
As framed by the Justice, the judge, as the leader of the drug 
court team, may use his authority to select the team members to 
give preference to volunteer attorney "team" members in the 
appointment of counsel for probation violation matters.  
Although important, the authority to select team members is an 
administrative duty that must give way to the clear statutory 
duty of CPCS to assign counsel.  Further, this exception to the 
                     
 
7 According to CPCS, except for CPCS staff attorneys, CPCS 
does not assign individual attorneys to CPCS cases.  Instead, 
CPCS contracts with the various county bar advocate programs 
which in turn make the assignments in accordance with the 
statutory mandate to fairly apportion the cases among available 
attorneys. 
18 
 
 
statutorily mandated procedure would effectively remove CPCS 
attorneys from the pool of attorneys in the drug court.  "The 
carving out of any exceptions to [a] clear [statutory] mandate 
is for the Legislature, not the judiciary."  D'Avella v. 
McGonigle, 429 Mass. 820, 822 (1999). 
 
Conclusion.  Although we acknowledge and appreciate the 
important and special role of the drug court in achieving 
important public policy interests, we are constrained to follow 
the clear dictates of G. L. c. 211D and S.J.C. Rule 3:10, which 
vest CPCS with sole and independent authority to assign counsel 
for indigent defendants.  Where a drug court defendant who is 
indigent is alleged to have violated the terms of probation, the 
judge must appoint CPCS as counsel.  Counsel assigned by CPCS 
may be removed only for cause after a hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.