Title: SMALL v MCRAE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-369
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 1982

No. 81-369 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 AARON P. SMALL, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. ROBERT J. McRAE, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana Charles F. Moses, Billings, Montana For Respondent: John Bobinski argued, Helena, Montana J. Michael Young, Helena, Montana Filed: Submitted: May 12, 1982 Decided: October 4, 1982 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . The a p p e l l a n t , P r o f e s s o r Aaron P . Small, f i l e d a one count l i b e l a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Dean Robert J. McRae, and McRae moved f o r summary judgment. Small t h e n moved to amend h i s c o m p l a i n t . The T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District, i n and f o r Yellowstone County, g r a n t e d Dean McRae s motion f o r summary judgment and denied S m a l l ' s motion to amend t h e c o m p l a i n t . The t h i r d count of S m a l l ' s proposed amended c o m p l a i n t was denied w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to h i s r i g h t to r e p l e a d . Small a p p e a l s . The a p p e l l a n t was t h e appointed and a c t i n g chairman of t h e E n g l i s h Department a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e . On O c t o b e r 1 0 , 1980, t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Robert J. McRae, as Dean of t h e s c h o o l of 1 i b e r a l a r t s , t e r m i n a t e d a p p e l l a n t 1 s chairmanship and i n connec- t i o n t h e r e w i t h addressed and d e l i v e r e d a memorandum t o him as a way of n o t i f y i n g him and t h e o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s of such change i n chairmanship, as provided by s e c t i o n 9 . l o 0 ( F ) (1) ( c ) ( T r a n s f e r of T i t l e s ) o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement i n f o r c e a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e a t t h a t t i m e . The r e a s o n s c i t e d f o r t h e change i n c l u d e d i n a d e q u a t e l e a d e r s h i p t h a t f a i l e d to b r i n g a p o l a r i z e d department i n t o a smoother-functioning u n i t , i n c r e a s e d acrimony w i t h i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t , f a i l u r e t o handle t h e a d m i n i s t r a - t i v e f u n c t i o n s of t h e o f f i c e e f f e c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y and, f i n a l l y , concern o v e r t h e p a s t and ongoing c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e n e w l y - i n s t i t u t e d mass placement p r o c e s s f o r freshman c o m p o s i t i o n . The memorandum ends by s t a t i n g : "Thank you, A l , f o r t h e e f f o r t s you have expended i n t h i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i n t h e p a s t seven months. I a m s o r r y t h a t t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e appointment h a s n o t worked o u t . I wish you my s i n c e r e goodwill as you r e t u r n t o f u l l - t i m e t e a c h i n g , which I know is your f i r s t l o v e . M y esteem f o r you as a t e a c h e r of y o u r d i s c i p l i n e is u n t a r n i s h e d . " T e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s chairmanship c a r r i e d w i t h it l o s s of a s t i p e n d of $900 p e r academic y e a r and $150 p e r summer s e s s i o n , b u t d i d n o t a f f e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s academic rank, t e n u r e , base s a l a r y or membership i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t . Although t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement provided a g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e which a p p e l l a n t could have pursued, he e l e c t e d i n s t e a d t o f i l e t h i s l i b e l a c t i o n a g a i n s t Dean McRae. W e a g r e e w i t h t h e trial j u d g e ' s f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s and a d o p t h i s memorandum. O r i g i n a l l y , t h i s was an a c t i o n i n l i b e l and was submitted t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t on t w o motions. One by which t h e a p p e l l a n t s o u g h t t o f i l e an amended complaint adding f o u r new c o u n t s . The o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t s o u g h t damages caused by t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l . The amended c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d Count I , t h e same as t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t ; Count 11, a p p e l l a n t was d e p r i v e d of due p r o c e s s c o n t r a r y to h i s r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s and t h e S t a t e of Montana; Count 111, a p p e l l a n t was d e n i e d freedom of e x p r e s s i o n and speech i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s under t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e S t a t e of Montana; Count I V , t h a t t h e l i b e l a l l e g e d i n Count I v i o l a t e s t h e p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e and t h e e q u a l pro- t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n ; Count V , t h a t any s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e g i v e n by l e g i s l a t u r e is c o n t r a to Montana and United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s . B e f o r e g e t t i n g i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s of a p p e l l a n t s proposed amended complaint , r e s p o n d e n t asserts as a g e n e r a l matter t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s motion to amend should be denied on t h e ground t h a t j u s t i c e would n o t be served through t h e g r a n t i n g o f it. I n s u p p o r t of t h i s argument t h e r e s p o n d e n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t , as a member of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t , t h e a p p e l l a n t agreed t o e x e r c i s e t h e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e t o s e t t l e a l l d i s p u t e s a l l e g i n g b r e a c h , m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r improper a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e terms found i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. The o f f i c i a l s t a t e p o l i c y , r e l a t i n g to c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s , is found i n s e c t i o n 39-31-101, MCA: " i t is t h e p o l i c y of t h e S t a t e of Montana t o encourage t h e p r a c t i c e and pro- c e d u r e of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g to a r r i v e a t f r i e n d l y a d j u s t m e n t o f a l l d i s p u t e s between p u b l i c employers and t h e i r employees. " A s c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t by t h e r e s p o n d e n t , t h i s Court h a s looked t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n placed on t h e N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s A c t by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s as an a i d t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Montana P u b l i c Employees C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A c t . S e e , f o r example, S t a t e ex rel. Department of Highways v. P u b l i c Employees C r a f t Council ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785. S e c t i o n 39-31-306(2), MCA, of t h e Montana P u b l i c Employees C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A c t , states t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement may c o n t a i n : " a g r i e v a n c e procedure c u l m i n a t i n g i n f i n a l and b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n of unresolved g r i e v a n c e s and d i s p u t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of agreements." The c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement of E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e c o n t a i n e d such a p r o v i s i o n i n t h i s case. S e e , s e c t i o n 12.100, e t s e q . F i n a l l y , s e c t i o n 39-31-306 ( 3 ) 1 MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t : " [ a ] n agreement be tween t h e p u b l i c employer and a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a l l be v a l i d and e n f o r c e d under its terms when e n t e r e d i n t o i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s c h a p t e r and s i g n e d b y t h e c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r of t h e state or p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o r Commissioner of h i g h e r educa- t i o n or h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ." A s c o r r e c t l y noted by t h e r e s p o n d e n t , t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , c o n s t r u i n g t h e F e d e r a l N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s A c t , have enun- c i a t e d a s t r o n g p o l i c y f a v o r i n g a r b i t r a t i o n of l a b o r d i s p u t e s and r e q u i r i n g c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s t o be exhausted p r i o r to t h e commencement of a l a w s u i t . S e e , f o r example, Republic S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n v. Maddox ( 1 9 6 5 ) r 379 U.S. 650, 652-653, 8 5 S.Ct. 614, 616-17, 1 3 L.Ed.2d 580, wherein J u s t i c e Harlan s t a t e d : "As a g e n e r a l r u l e i n c a s e s t o which f e d e r a l l a w a p p l i e s , f e d e r a l l a b o r p o l i c y r e q u i r e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l employees wishing to a s s e r t c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e s must a t t e m p t use of t h e c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e procedure c r e e d upon by employer and union as t h e mode of r e d r e s s . I f t h e union r e f u s e s to p r e s s or o n l y perfunc- t o r i l y p r e s s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l I s claim, d i f - f e r e n c e s may arise as to t h e forms of r e d r e s s t h e n a v a i l a b l e . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d .) But u n l e s s t h e c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e s o t h e r w i s e , t h e r e c a n be no doubt t h a t t h e employee must af f o r d t h e union t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to act on h i s b e h a l f . Congress h a s e x p r e s s l y approved c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s as a p r e f e r r e d method f o r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s and s t a b i l i z i n g t h e 'common lawt of t h e p l a n t . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) "Union i n t e r e s t i n p r o s e c u t i n g employee g r i e v a n c e s is clear. Such a c t i v i t y compli- ments t h e u n i o n ' s s t a t u s as e x c l u s i v e b a r g a i n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by p e r m i t t i n g it to p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g admi- n i s t r a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t . I n a d d i t i o n , c o n s c i e n t i o u s h a n d l i n g of g r i e v a n c e claims w i l l enhance t h e u n i o n ' s p r e s t i g e w i t h employees. Employer i n t e r e s t s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , a r e s e r v e d by l i m i t i n g t h e c h o i c e of remedies a v a i l a b l e to a g g r i e v e d employees. And it c a n n o t be s a i d , i n t h e normal s i t u a t i o n , . - t h a t c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s are i n a d e q u a t e -- to p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f a n - - - a g g r i e v e d employee - - u n t i l the- employee h a s - - - a t t e m p t e d t o implement t h e p r o c e d u r e s - - and found them s o . s u p p l i e d . ) --- - " A c o n t r a r y r u l e which would p e r m i t an i n d i v i - d u a l employee t o c o m p l e t e l y s i d e s t e p a v a i l a b l e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s i n f a v o r of a l a w s u i t h a s l i t t l e t o commend it. I n a d d i t i o n to c u t t i n g across t h e i n t e r e s t s a l r e a d y mentioned, it would d e p r i v e employer and union of t h e a b i - l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h a uniform and e x c l u s i v e method f o r o r d e r l y s e t t l e m e n t of employee g r i e v a n c e s . I f a g r i e v a n c e procedure cannot be made e x c l u s i v e , it l o s e s much of its d e s i r a b i l i t y as a method of s e t t l e m e n t . A r u l e c r e a t i n g such a s i t u a t i o n 'would i n e v i - t a b l y e x e r t a d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon both t h e n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c o l l e c - t i v e agreements. t ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) " Only i n t h o s e cases where it is c e r t a i n t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e c o n t a i n e d i n a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement is n o t s u s c e p t i b l e t o an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t c o v e r s t h e d i s p u t e is an employee e n t i t l e d t o s i d e s t e p t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. S e e , T o r r i n g t o n Company v. Metal P r o d u c t s Workers Union Local 1645 (2nd C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) r 362 F.2d 677. The r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and p o l i c i e s which mandate t h e use of t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s under t h e f e d e r a l act a p p l y e q u a l l y t o d i s p u t e s which arise under t h e State P u b l i c Employees C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A c t . A l l t h e a l l e g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed amended complaint r e v o l v e around h i s removal as chairman of t h e E n g l i s h Department a t E a s t e r n . The argument b o i l s down to whether p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s were used. Such a c o n t e n t i o n m o s t d e f i n i t e l y f a l l s w i t h i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t ' s d e f i n i t i o n of " g r i e v a n c e ," as : "an a l l e g a t i o n by a f a c u l t y member . . . t h a t t h e r e h a s been a b r e a c h , m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or improper a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e terms of t h i s agreement by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " To allow a member of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t t o c o m p l e t e l y s i d e s t e p a v a i l a b l e p r o c e d u r e s would, j u s t as under f e d e r a l l a w , e x e r t a d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon both t h e n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreements and e f f e c t i v e l y d e p r i v e employers and unions of t h e a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h a uniform and e x c l u s i v e method f o r t h e o r d e r l y s e t t l e m e n t of employee g r i e v a n c e s . The respondent c o n t e n d s t h a t because t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s had t h e b e n e f i t of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement, and y e t chooses t o i g n o r e t h e c o n t r a c t u a l g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e , j u s t i c e would n o t be s e r v e d by condoning h i s v i o l a t i o n of t h e agreement and a l l o w i n g him l e a v e of c o u r t t o amend h i s complaint and state a d d i t i o n a l g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t , McRae , and t h e proposed new d e f e n d a n t s . I n answer t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t t h e a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement need o n l y be followed i n c o n t r a c t u a l d i s p u t e s . The a p p e l l a n t u r g e s t h a t t h e i s s u e i n t h i s case does not c e n t e r on a c o n t r a c t u a l d i s p u t e b u t , r a t h e r , on a v i o l a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t . A p p e l l a n t proceeds to develop t h i s argument by f i r s t p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i - s i o n s cannot be modified by s t a t u t e . S e e , No11 v. C i t y of Bozeman ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 504, 534 P.2d 880, and Madison v. Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126. A p p e l l a n t c o n c l u d e s by s t a t i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s cannot be modified by p r i - v a t e c o n t r a c t . Such a c o n t r a c t would be u n e n f o r c e a b l e . T h i s r e s u l t f i n d s s u p p o r t i n s e c t i o n 1-3-204, MCA: "Waiver of b e n e f i t of a l a w . Anyone may waive t h e advantage of a l a w i n t e n d e d s o l e l y f o r h i s b e n e f i t . But a l a w e s t a b l i s h e d f o r a p u b l i c r e a s o n cannot be contravened by a p r i v a t e agreement." The r u l e t h a t a l a w e s t a b l i s h e d f o r a p u b l i c purpose cannot be contravened by a p r i v a t e agreement is also supported i n t h e case law. S e e , f o r example, New S i l v e r B e l l Mining Company v. County of L e w i s and C l a r k ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 129 Mont. 269, 284 P.2d 1012; and S t a t e ex. rel. Neiss v. District Court ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 324, 511 P.2d 979. The a p p e l l a n t ' s p o i n t is t h a t h i s r i g h t t o l i t i g a t e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e p r o c e d u r e s used i n removal of h i s t i t l e c a n n o t be l i m i t e d by c o n t r a c t u a l agreement. Although t h e l a w c i t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t is c o r r e c t , t h e premises upon which it is based is h e r e c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . The i s s u e t o be determined is whether t h i s is, i n f a c t , a v i o l a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t , o r m e r e l y a c o n t r a c t u a l d i s p u t e . The answer t o t h a t q u e s t i o n f o l l o w s i n con- n e c t i o n w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s of t h e pro- posed amended c o m p l a i n t . With t h e s e i n t r o d u c t o r y m a t t e r s completed, a t t e n t i o n is d i r e c t e d to t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s which a p p e l l a n t s o u g h t t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o t h e act i o n v i a amendment of h i s c o m p l a i n t . The proposed Count I1 a l l e g e s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s d e p r i v e d o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l due p r o c e s s i n t h a t t h e memorandum which led to h i s d i s m i s s a l as chairman placed i n i s s u e h i s good name, r e p u t a t i o n , honor and i n t e g r i t y w i t h o u t g i v i n g him n o t i c e or o p p o r t u n i t y to be h e a r d . I n s u p p o r t of t h i s a l l e g a t i o n , a p p e l l a n t relies on Board of Regents v. Roth, ( 1 9 7 2 ) r 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, and P e r r y v. Sindermann ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 593, 92 S e c t . 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570. These a u t h o r i t i e s , and t h e numerous o t h e r s c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t i n t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e b r i e f i n g he h a s s u b m i t t e d , are s u b j e c t t o t h e f a c t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t they involved summary d i s m i s s a l s from p u b l i c employment, or t h e e q u i v a l e n t t h e r e o f , which is n o t t h e case h e r e . Although such d i s t i n c t i o n may be one of d e g r e e o n l y , it is n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r t i n e n t i n determining whether any r e q u i r e m e n t of due p r o c e s s h a s been f u l f i l l e d . " 'Due p r o c e s s , u n l i k e some l e g a l r u l e s , is n o t a t e c h n i c a l c o n c e p t i o n w i t h a f i x e d c o n t e n t u n r e l a t e d to t i m e , p l a c e and c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " C a f e t e r i a and R e s t a u r a n t Workers v. McElroy " [Dlue p r o c e s s is f l e x i b l e and c a l l s f o r such p r o c e d u r a l p r o t e c - t i o n s as t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n demands." Morrissey v. B r e w e r "The fundamental r e q u i r e m e n t of due p r o c e s s is the o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard ' a t a meaningful t i m e and i n a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. E l d r i d g e ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, A d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e p r o c e d u r e s followed i n any g i v e n case is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s u f f i c i e n t r e q u i r e s an a n a l y s i s of t h e governmental and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s t h a t are a f f e c t e d by t h e a c t i o n t a k e n . A s s t a t e d i n A r n e t t v. Kennedy ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 416 U.S. 134, 167, 168, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1651, 40 L.Ed.2d 15; by t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court: "Having determined t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e of p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s a p p l i e s to a p p e l l e e ' s d i s c h a r g e from p u b l i c employment, t h e q u e s t i o n arises whether a n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t to p r e s e n t f a v o r a b l e w i t n e s s e s and t o c o n f r o n t and exa- mine a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s , must be accorded b e f o r e removal. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e depends on a b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s i n which t h e Government1 s i n t e r e s t i n e x p e d i t i o u s removal o f a n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y employee is weighed a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e a f f e c t e d employee i n c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c employment. ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) A s t h e Court s t a t e d i n C a f e t e r i a and R e s t a u r a n t Workers v. McElroy, [ s u p r a ] ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what p r o c e d u r e s due p r o c e s s may r e q u i r e under any g i v e n set of circum- s t a n c e s must begin w i t h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e government f u n c t i o n involved as w e l l as of t h e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t t h a t h a s been a f f e c t e d by governmental a c t i o n . " I I n s h o r t , due p r o c e s s is n o t a f i x e d c o n c e p t b u t , r a t h e r , is one which must be t a i l o r e d t o each s i t u a t i o n i n such a way t h a t it meets t h e needs and p r o t e c t s t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e v a r i o u s par- ties involved. The due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s a p p l i c a b l e to someone d e s t i n e d t o s u f f e r t h e g r i e v o u s loss a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t e r m i n a t i o n of employment a r e d i f f e r e n t from t h e due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of a c o l l e g e pro- f e s s o r who s u f f e r s t h e l o s s of h i s t i t l e as department chairman and t h e nominal s t i p e n d which accompanies it. It is concluded t h a t t h e governmental i n t e r e s t i n o r d e r l y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t d i s r u p t i o n of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l p r o c e s s is s u f f i c i e n t to allow summary d i s m i s s a l of d e p a r t m e n t chairmen when t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of due p r o c e s s a r e accommodated t h r o u g h t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n procedure o u t l i n e d i n sec- t i o n 12.000, e t seq. , of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. These p r o c e d u r e s g i v e a g g r i e v e d f a c u l t y members t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c h a l l e n g e any a l l e g e d b r e a c h , m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r improper a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e terms of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. Although t h e y were n o t e x e r c i s e d , t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s were a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t to s e e k r e i n s t a t e m e n t as department chairman. Such a g r i e v a n c e procedure af f o r d s t h e a p p e l l a n t an o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard a t a meaningful t i m e and i n a meaningful manner. The r e q u i r e m e n t s of due p r o c e s s are t h e r e b y m e t . I t f o l l o w s t h a t Count I1 d o e s not set f o r t h a c o g n i z a b l e claim and p e r m i t t i n g its i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n by t h e r e q u e s t e d amendment would be a f u t i l e act. Count I11 o f t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t is grounded upon t h e a l l e g a t i o n , s t a t e d i n g e n e r a l terms, t h a t a p p e l l a n t was t e r m i n a t e d and d i s c h a r g e d as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e e x e r c i s e of h i s cons ti t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d freedom of speech and e x p r e s s i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e conduct of t h e department and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t a l s o a l l e g e s i n a r e v e r s e form t h a t t h e ter- m i n a t i o n and d i s c h a r g e concerned p r o x i m a t e l y r e s u l t s i n a d e n i a l o f h i s r i g h t t o freedom of speech and e x p r e s s i o n . I t is s e t t l e d t h a t a v a l u a b l e governmental b e n e f i t , such as a j o b , may n o t be denied on a b a s i s which i n f r i n g e s ones c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l l y - p r o t e c t e d i n t e r e s t s , e s p e c i a l l y ones i n t e r e s t i n freedom of speech. P e r r y v. Sindermann, s u p r a , and 4 2 U.S.C. s e c t i o n 1983 ( C i v i l R i g h t s S t a t u t e ) . The problem w i t h Count I11 is, f i r s t , whether removal of a p p e l l a n t from h i s t i t l e and s t i p e n d as chairman of t h e E n g l i s h Department, b u t n o t from h i s job, c o n s t i t u t e s a v a l u a b l e govern- mental b e n e f i t which f a l l s under t h e p r o t e c t i o n accorded i n P e r r y m i t t i n g its i n c o r p o r t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n by t h e r e q u e s t e d amend- ment would be a f u t i l e act. However, t h i s does not mean t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t is n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e p l e a d h i s proposed Count I11 i n o r d e r t o meet t h e requirement of s p e c i f i c i t y i n its a l l e g a t i o n s through t h e medium of a p r o p e r motion and n o t i c e and h e a r i n g t h e r e o n . I n view of t h i s , t h e q u e s t i o n of whether a chairmanship t i t l e d o e s c o n s t i t u t e a v a l u a b l e governmental b e n e f i t is n o t reached o r determined a t t h i s t i m e . Likewise, t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e e f f e c t , i f any, of t h e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e provided i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement a s t h e same a p p l i e s to Count I11 c a n n o t be determined u n l e s s r e p l e a d i n g is accomplished. Counts I V and V of t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t are d i f - f e r e n t hues of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e founded upon t h e p r i v i - l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e s and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of t h e Montana and F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n s u b s t a n c e , t h e y comprise a c h a l l e n g e to t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e accorded to a p u b l i c a t i o n made i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of a p u b l i c d u t y . The e f f i c a c y of t h i s p r i v i l e g e is t h e b a s i s of t h e d e f e n s e a s s e r t e d by r e s p o n d e n t McRae and, also, t h e b a s i s f o r h i s motion f o r sum- mary judgment lodged a g a i n s t both t h e a c t i o n s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i - n a l c o m p l a i n t and Count I o f t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t . Consequently, t h e y w i l l a l l be t r e a t e d t o g e t h e r i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s : L i b e l is d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 27-1-802, MCA, as: " a f a l s e and u n p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n . . . which exposes any p e r s o n to h a t r e d , contempt, r i d i c u l e , or obloguy o r which c a u s e s him to be shunned or avoided o r which h a s a tendency to i n j u r e him i n h i s o c c u p a t i o n . " S e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, i n t u r n , d e f i n e s what p u b l i - c a t i o n s are p r i v i l e g e d : "A p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n is one made : ( I ) I n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y . . ." I n t h e c a s e of S t o r c h v. Board of Directors of E a s t e r n Montana Region Five Mental H e a l t h C e n t e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 176, 181-182, 545 P.2d 644, 647-648, t h i s Court had t h e o c c a s i o n to v . Sindermann, s u p r a ; and, second, whether t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of Count 111, a s p r e s e n t l y framed, s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of spe- c i f i c i t y a p p l i c a b l e t o a c l a i m of a d e n i a l of f i r s t amendment p r i v i l e g e s . The memorandum i s s u e d by Dean McRae, t h e a l l e g e d o f f e n s i v e p o r t i o n of which is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o Count I11 b y r e f e r e n c e from Count I o f t h e amended c o m p l a i n t , gave as r e a s o n s f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s loss of t i t l e h i s i n a d e q u a t e l e a d e r s h i p , h i s f a i l u r e to b r i n g a p o l a r i z e d department i n t o a smoother f u n c t i o n i n g u n i t , t h e f a c t t h a t acrimony had i n c r e a s e d w i t h i n t h e E n g l i s h Department, h i s f a i l u r e t o e f f e c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y handle t h e a d m i n i s t r a - t i v e d e t a i l a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e o f f i c e , and h i s f a i l u r e t o pro- p e r l y c o o r d i n a t e t h e newly i n s t i t u t e d mass placement p r o c e s s f o r freshman composition. Although t h e s e r e a s o n s are a l l e g e d t o be f a l s e , nowhere are t h e y o f f s e t by a l l e g a t i o n s i n Count 111, s p e c i f y i n g what speech o r e x p r e s s i o n was e x e r c i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t which is e n t i t l e d t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n as having a proximate r e l e v a n c e t o t h e l o s s of h i s t i t l e of chairinan of t h e E n g l i s h Department. A s s t a t e d i n R o t o l o v. Borough of C h a r l e r o i ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) "The a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e complaint s t r i k e u s as vague and c o n c l u s o r y . They f a i l to i n d i c a t e , when, where, and how Rotolo had ' e x e r c i s e d h i s f i r s t amendment p r i v i l e g e s , ' r e n d e r i n g it i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e i f indeed h i s a c t i v i t y was t h e s o r t a f f o r d e d p r o t e c t i o n under t h e f i r s t amendment and whether it had any rele- vance t o t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s employment. The a l l e g a t i o n s s t a t e no f a c t s upon which to weigh t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of t h e claim; t h e y do n o t a v e r t h e c o n t e n t of t h e a l l e g e d f i r s t amendment e x e r c i s e . " S e e , also, Kennedy v. H & M Landing, I n c . ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) r 529 F.2d 987; Kauffman v. Moss ( 3 r d C i r . 197O), 420 F.2d 1270, cert. d e n i e d ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 400 U.S. 846; Negrich v. Hohn ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 6 7 ) , 379 F.2d 213; and V a l l e y v. Maule ( ~ . C o n n . I t is concluded t h a t Count I11 o f t h e amended c o m p l a i n t , as p r e s e n t l y framed, d o e s n o t set f o r t h a c o g n i z a b l e claim and per- c o n s i d e r t h i s code s e c t i o n and it s t a t e d : "A p r i v i l e g e d communication is one which, ex- c e p t f o r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which it is made, may be defamatory and a c t i o n a b l e . ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) "While some of t h e quoted s u b s e c t i o n s do men- t i o n m a l i c e t h e p e r t i n e n t s u b s e c t i o n 1, s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t q u a l i f i e d p r i v i l e g e . R a t h e r it c o n s t i t u t e s an a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e w i t h t h e o n l y requirement being t h a t t h e i n t r a d e p a r t - ment communication be one rendered w h i l e engaged i n an ' o f f i c i a l d u t y . ' There can be no doubt t h a t t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g of employees is p a r t of t h e ' o f f i c i a l d u t y 1 of t h e Montana Regional H e a l t h C e n t e r s . "Whether s t a t e m e n t s made by such p u b l i c o f f i- cers i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g of employees may be s u b j e c t to a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e h a s been answered i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e many t i m e s . Under f a c t s similar t o t h e i n s t a n t case, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n B a r r v . Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434, 1441, s t a t e d t h a t i n s o f a r as a p u b l i c o f f i c e r was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e scope of h i s a u t h o r i t y h i s communication was a b s o l u t e l y p r i v i l e g e d . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) The Court went on to s a y why an a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e as e s s e n t i a l i n such a c i r c u m s t a n c e , q u o t i n g a p p r o v i n g l y from Judge Learned Hand 's d e c i s i o n i n G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , 2 C i r . , 177 F.2d 579, 581: " I . . . it is impossible t o know whether t h e claim is w e l l founded u n t i l t h e case h a s been t r i e d , and t h a t t o submit a l l o f f i c i a l s , t h e i n n o c e n t a s w e l l a s t h e g u i l t y , to t h e burden o f a t r i a l and t o t h e i n e v i t a b l e danger of its outcome, would dampen t h e a r d o r of a l l b u t t h e most r e s o l u t e , or t h e most i r r e s p o n s i b l e , i n t h e u n f l i n c h i n g d i s c h a r g e of t h e i r d u t i e s 1 . . . " S i n c e t h e i n t e r n a l communication was w i t h i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y , it enjoyed an a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e and could t h e r e - f o r e n o t be t h e s u b j e c t of l i b e l a c t i o n . " To p u t t h e meaning of --- S t o r c h i n p e r s p e c t i v e f o r a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s case, c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement and a Montana code s e c t i o n should be noted. The p r o v i s i o n i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement which a l l o w s t h e dean to remove department chairmen, and implements p r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n of a new chairman, is a u t h o r i z e d under s e c t i o n 20-25-301, MCA. S u b s e c t i o n 11 o f t h i s s t a t u t e a l l o w s t h e r e g e n t s to: " a p p o i n t a p r e s i d e n t and f a c u l t y f o r each of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e system, a p p o i n t any o t h e r n e c e s s a r y o f f i c e r s , a g e n t s , and employees, and f i x t h e i r compensation ." S u b s e c t i o n 15, i n t u r n , a l l o w s the r e g e n t s to: " c o n f e r , a t t h e r e g e n t s ' d i s c r e t i o n , upon t h e p r e s i d e n t and f a c u l t y of each of t h e u n i t s of t h e system f o r t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e u n i t such a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i n g to t h e immediate c o n t r o l and management, o t h e r t h a n f i n a n c i a l , and t h e s e l e c t i o n of t e a c h e r s and employees." The c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement p r o v i d e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t r a n s f e r of t i t l e , being s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) : "1. The a p p r o p r i a t e Dean w i l l implement pro- c e d u r e s f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n of a new academic a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t Chairperson when one of t h e following c o n d i t i o n s o c c u r s : " c . The Dean n o t i f i e s a l l members of the u n i t and t h e Chairperson t h a t i n h i s or h e r judgment a change should t a k e p l a c e ." The c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement a l s o p r o v i d e s a g r i e v a n c e procedure under s e c t i o n 12.100. T h i s s e c t i o n d e f i n e s " g r i e v a n c e , " a s : "An a l l e g a t i o n by a f a c u l t y member or t h e A.A.U.P. t h a t t h e r e h a s been a breach, m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r improper a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e terms of t h i s agreement by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " T h i s s e c t i o n a l s o p r o v i d e s t h a t : "A g r i e v a n c e must be f i l e d by a f a c u l t y member of t h e A.A.U.P. w i t h i n t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) days from t h e d a t e t h e g r i e v a b l e e v e n t was determined. Any g r i e v a n c e n o t processed i n accordance w i t h the time l i m i t spe- c i f i e d h e r e i n s h a l l f o r t h e purposes of t h i s agreement be deemed n u l l and w i t h o u t f u r t h e r r e c o u r s e . " The c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement t h e n d e t a i l s a procedure f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v - a n c e s . I n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e procedure is followed and t h e g r i e v a n c e remains u n s e t t l e d , binding a r b i t r a t i o n is provided f o r under s e c t i o n 12.200. J u s t a s t h i s Court i n S t o r c h found t h a t t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g -- of employees was an o f f i c i a l duty of t h e Montana Regional H e a l t h C e n t e r s , t h e r e seems to be l i t t l e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s case t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d upon t h e board of r e g e n t s under s e c t i o n 20-25-301(15) MCA, a s w e l l a s t h e enumerated d u t y found i n s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement g i v i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e dean power t o remove d e p a r t - mental c h a i r p e r s o n s , makes t h e memorandum i n q u e s t i o n an o f f i c i a l d u t y s u b j e c t t o a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e under t h e s t a t u t e . The - - S t o r c h d e c i s i o n a l s o p o i n t s o u t two important c o n c e p t s : F i r s t of a l l , once a communication is l a b e l e d a s p r i v i l e g e d , it is n o t defamatory and t h e r e f o r e not a c t i o n a b l e . Secondly, t h e a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e a r i s e s when t h e i n t r a d e p a r t m e n t communication is rendered d u r i n g t h e course of an o f f i c i a l d u t y , The a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s a number of i s s u e s q u e s t i o n i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e d e f e n s e of a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e : 1. F i r s t of a l l , he a s s e r t s " a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o employment." I n l i g h t of t h i s r i g h t t o employment, t h e a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard b e f o r e anyone can be deprived of such a p r o p e r t y r i g h t . A p p e l l a n t concludes by s t a t i n g t h a t any d i s m i s s a l w i t h o u t such n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard would not be a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y , and t h e r e f o r e no s t a t u t o r y p r i v i - l e g e would a r i s e . The merits of t h e due p r o c e s s a s s e r t i o n have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d i n connection w i t h Count I1 o f t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t and w i l l n o t be repeated h e r e . S u f f i c e it t o say t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s view d o e s n o t p r e v a i l . 2. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n o p p o s i t i o n to t h e motion f o r summary judgment is t h a t , i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e to be a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y which g i v e s rise to t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e , t h e r e must be compliance with t h e r e q u i r e - ments of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. A p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h r e e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s of t h e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement: F i r s t , t h a t t h e r e was no n o t i f i c a t i o n to a l l members of t h e u n i t under s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) . Secondly, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n of t h e col- l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t t h e dean g i v e n o t i c e t h a t a change should t a k e p l a c e . There is no requirement t h a t t h e dean g i v e any reason n e c e s s i t a t i n g a change. To g i v e such a reason is beyond t h e proper d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l duty. T h i r d l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement o n l y r e q u i r e s a n o t i c e from t h e dean t h a t a change should t a k e p l a c e --- n o t a judgment t h a t the removal of t h e department c h a i r p e r s o n has taken p l a c e . I n s u p p o r t of t h e f i r s t of t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s , a p p e l l a n t s t a t e s t h a t evidence to be set f o r t h i n a f f i d a v i t form w i l l c l e a r l y show t h a t t h e requirement of n o t i f i c a t i o n was not followed by t h e dean u n t i l some L a t e r p e r i o d of t i m e . A p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d February 1 3 and 2 4 , 1981, make no mention of compliance with t h i s requirement. The respondent n o t e s i n t h i s regard t h a t t h e af f i d a v i t s f i l e d by D r . L a r r y J o n e s and P r e s i d e n t Van de Wetering show t h a t t h e respondent was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e scope of h i s o f f i c i a l d u t i e s and d i d d i s c h a r g e those d u t i e s i n a proper manner when he removed t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s t i t l e of chairman of t h e E n g l i s h Department. The memorandum which is t h e b a s i s of t h i s l a w s u i t a l s o contained a n o t a t i o n a t t h e bottom t h a t photocopies were s e n t to members of t h e Departments of E n g l i s h , Philosophy , Humanities and R e l i g i o u s s t u d i e s . F i n a l l y , i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement o n l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e dean n o t i f y a l l members of t h e u n i t and t h e c h a i r p e r s o n t h a t a change should t a k e p l a c e . There is no requirement t h a t such n o t i c e to t h e u n i t and t h e c h a i r p e r - son be contemporaneous. It is e v i d e n t h e r e t h a t n o t i f i c a t i o n of a l l u n i t members d i d t a k e p l a c e and t h e o n l y evidence i n t h e r e c o r d seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n was proximate to t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n given to t h e a p p e l l a n t . Turning t o a p p e l l a n t ' s second argument w e find t h e c o n t e n t i o n r a i s e d t h a t because t h e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement does not s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e t h e dean to g i v e reasons f o r t h e removal of a department chairman, t o g i v e such reasons would v i o l a t e t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement and would n o t be a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y . Although t h e respondent does n o t a d d r e s s t h i s i s s u e beyond r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a f f i d a v i t s which n o t e t h a t t h e dean d i d p r o p e r l y d i s c h a r g e h i s d u t i e s under t h e c o l l e c - t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement, a p p e l l a n t l s argument would a p p e a r to be w i t h o u t merit. It would seem t o be n e c e s s a r i l y implied i n any r e q u i r e m e n t of n o t i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e removal t h a t the r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n be g i v e n to t h e outgoing chairman t o p u t him on n o t i c e of why t h e change is n e c e s s a r y . The t h i r d , and f i n a l , argument which a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n sup- p o r t of h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement were n o t met is t h a t t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o n l y r e q u i r e s a judgment t h a t t h e change s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e , r a t h e r t h a n a judgment t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n h a s taken p l a c e . Once a g a i n , t h e r e s p o n d e n t does n o t a d d r e s s t h i s argument beyond cita- t i o n t o t h e two s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t s which n o t e t h a t t h e respon- d e n t p r o p e r l y d i s c h a r g e d h i s d u t i e s under t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. The a p p e l l a n t ' s argument h e r e is based on a semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d e f i n i t i o n to be g i v e n t o t h e word, " s h o u l d , " as c o n t a i n e d i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. A p p e l l a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t " s h o u l d , " as used i n t h i s case, means " s h a l l , " and is t h e r e f o r e n o t a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . A s used i n t h i s c a s e , however, "should" does a p p e a r t o be a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Once t h e dean n o t i f i e s t h e u n i t members and t h e department c h a i r p e r s o n t h a t a change should t a k e place, t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i o n of a new d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r p e r s o n are implemented. These p r o c e d u r e s are found a t s e c t i o n 9 . l o 0 ( F ) (1) ( a ) through ( f ) . The p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i o n of a new department c h a i r p e r s o n do not c o n t e m p l a t e any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e dean1 s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t a change i n t h e chairmanship of t h e department should t a k e p l a c e . Such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e dean a p p e a r s to be f i n a l and t h e c o r r e c t avenue of a p p e a l from such a d e c i s i o n would be t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t a t sect i o n 12.000 o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. The p r o c e d u r e s followed by t h e dean do n o t appear to v i o l a t e t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. 3 . The t h i r d c o n t e n t i o n r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n opposi- t i o n t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment is t h a t l i b e l is a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Montana code, and t h e r e f o r e it would n o t be a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y to l i b e l someone --- t h e r e f o r e , no s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e would arise. The c i r c u l a r r e a s o n i n g involved i n t h i s argument is a p p a r e n t . Once it is determined t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was made i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y , it is c o n s i d e r e d p r i v i l e g e d and no l o n g e r f a l l s w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l . Not f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i - t i o n of l i b e l , such a s t a t e m e n t would not be an a c t i o n a b l e tort. 4 . The f o u r t h argument which t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n opposi- t i o n to r e s p o n d e n t ' s mot i o n f o r summary judgment is t h a t r e l i a n c e upon any s t a t u t e g r a n t i n g p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e and t h e r e b y making them immune from p r o s e c u t i o n f o r l i b e l a r i s i n g d u r i n g t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e governmental immunity s t a t u t e , and is t h e r e f o r e uncon- s i t u t i o n a l i n l i g h t of A r t . 11, Sec. 1 8 , 1972 Mont.Const. T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e r e s h a l l be no s o v e r e i g n immunity e x c e p t as s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by law and t w o - t h i r d s v o t e of each House. S e c t i o n 2 - 9 - 0 1 1 ( d ) , MCA, a d d r e s s e s governmental immunity, and states i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l s e c t i o n : " ' P e r s o n a l i n j u r y ' means any i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from l i b e l , s l a n d e r , m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , or f a l s e arrest, any b o d i l y i n j u r y , s i c k n e s s , d i s e a s e , o r d e a t h s u s t a i n e d by any person and caused by an o c c u r r a n c e f o r which t h e S t a t e may be h e l d l i a b l e . " S e c t i o n s 2-9-111 t h r o u g h 2-9-114, MCA, s p e l l o u t t h e immunity which t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s s e e n f i t to g r a n t to t h e l e g i s l a t i v e body, t h e members, o f f i c e r s and a g e n t s o f t h e j u d i c i a r y , t h e g o v e r n o r ' s o f f ice and l o c a l government o f f i c i a l s d i s c h a r g i n g o f f i c i a l d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h approving - 17 - o r v e t o i n g o r d i n a n c e , o r w h i l e involved i n l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y . S e c t i o n 2-9-305, MCA, s p e l l s o u t when t h e governmental e n t i t y is to be joined as a d e f e n d a n t and p r o v i d e s f o r t h e immunization and i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n of employees whose n e g l i g e n c e or wrongful act, e r r o r o r o m i s s i o n , or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e conduct gave rise to t h e claim --- u n l e s s t h e claim is based on an i n t e n t i o n a l tort or f e l o n i o u s act of t h e employee. The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e code s e c t i o n s modify and e x p l a i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e l i b e l s t a t u t e and show t h a t t h e immunity g r a n t e d i n l i b e l a c t i o n s is n o t a b s o l u t e because it does n o t c o v e r torts t h a t are i n t e n t i o n a l o r f e l o n i o u s . The respon- d e n t c o u n t e r s t h i s argument by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t s e c t i o n 2-9-101(a), MCA, p r o v i d e s : " ' C l a i m ' means any claim a g a i n s t a governmen- t a l e n t i t y , f o r money damages o n l y , which any p e r s o n is l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to r e c o v e r as damages because of p e r s o n a l i n j u r y or p r o p e r t y damage caused by a n e g l i g e n t o r wrongful act or omission committed by any employee of t h e governmental e n t i t y w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of h i s employment, under c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t h e governmental e n t i t y i f a p r i v a t e p e r s o n , would be l i a b l e to t h e c l a i m a n t f o r s u c h damages under t h e laws of t h e s t a t e . " I n t h e c a s e of S t a t e ex r e l . Byorth v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 175 Mont. 6 3 , 67, 572 P.2d 201, 203, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " t h e T o r t C l a i m s A c t a t t a c h e s l i a b i l i t y to t h e S t a t e i n t h e same manner and to t h e same e x t e n t t h a t l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s t o a p r i - v a t e person." There can be no l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t to r e c o v e r y f o r l i a b i l i t y when t h e a c t i o n complained of does n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a t o r t . Before a w r i t i n g is c o n s i d e r e d a n a c t i o n a b l e l i b e l , t h e Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t it be unpri- v i l e g e d . Once t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n is made t h a t t h e w r i t i n g is p r i - v i l e g e d , no a c t i o n a b l e t o r t e x i s t s and t h e r e is no l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t to r e c o v e r y . The t w o code s e c t i o n s are complemen- t a r y , and no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n e x i s t s . 5. The f i f t h argument which t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n opposi- t i o n t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment is t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , i n t h e case of Butz v. Econmou ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, i m p l i e d l y o v e r r u l e d its earlier d e c i s i o n i n Barr v. Matteo, s u p r a . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t because t h i s Court i n S t o r c h , s u p r a , r e l i e d - - on Barr i n s u p p o r t of its d e c i s i o n , S t o r c h is no l o n g e r good l a w . The Butz case arose under 42 U.S.C., s e c t i o n 1983, and c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e of whether a f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l is p e r s o n a l l y immune i f , i n t h e c o u r s e of e n f o r c i n g a s t a t u t e , he i n f r i n g e s someone's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . F e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s may n o t , w i t h impunity, d i s c h a r g e t h e i r d u t i e s i n a way t h a t is known to them to v i o l a t e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o r t r a n s g r e s s a c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d cons t i t u - t i o n a l r u l e . I n answer t o t h i s argument t h e r e s p o n d e n t f i r s t p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h i s l a w s u i t arises under state l a w and, as such, t h i s C o u r t h a s t h e f i n a l s a y as t o t h e s t a t e l a w governing t h e s u i t . T h i s r u l e is c l e a r l y implied i n t h e h o l d i n g of Erie R a i l r o a d v. Tompkins ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 8 2 L.Ed. 1188: "Except i n matters governed by t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n or by A c t s of Congress, t h e l a w t o be a p p l i e d i n any c a s e is t h e law of t h e S t a t e . And whether t h e l a w of t h e S t a t e s h a l l b e d e c l a r e d by its L e g i s l a t u r e i n a s t a t u t e or by its h i g h e s t Court i n a d e c i s i o n is not a matter of f e d e r a l c o n c e r n . There is no f e d e r a l g e n e r a l common l a w . Congress has no power to d e c l a r e s u b s t a n t i v e r u l e s of common l a w a p p l i c a b l e i n a S t a t e whether t h e y be local i n t h e i r n a t u r e o r ' g e n e r a l , be t h e y commercial l a w or a p a r t of t h e l a w of t o r t s . And no c l a u s e i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p u r p o r t s to c o n f e r such a power upon t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . " The S t o r c h d e c i s i o n being t h e latest pronouncement by t h i s Court on t h e i s s u e of s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e i n l i b e l a c t i o n s , t h e d e c i - s i o n is s t i l l good law. I n S t o r c h , t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t i n o r d e r t o t a k e advantage o f t h e a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e provided under s e c t i o n 27-1-804 ( I ) , MCA: " t h e o n l y r e q u i r e m e n t [is] t h a t t h e i n t r a d e - p a r t m e n t communication be one rendered w h i l e engaged i n an ' o f f i c i a l d u t y . ' " S t o r c h , 169 Mont. a t 181, 545 P.2d a t 647. I f t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s a c t i o n s f a l l w i t h i n t h i s e x c e p t i o n , t h e n t h e memorandum i n q u e s t i o n would be a b s o l u t e l y p r i v i l e g e d w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t e and an a b s o l u t e d e f e n s e to t h e l i b e l a c t i o n found i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t and Count I of t h e amended c o m p l a i n t . Secondly, t h e r e s p o n d e n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t the Butz case d i d n o t o v e r r u l e -- Barr . The cases involved d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s . I n Barr, t h e q u e s t i o n was whether a f e d e r a l o f f i c e r could be h e l d -- l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t of defamation based on a p u b l i c a t i o n i s s u e d w i t h i n t h e o f f i c i a l ' s a u t h o r i t y . Butz, on t h e o t h e r hand, was a s e c t i o n 1983 a c t i o n , which c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e of a f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l ' s p e r s o n a l immunity where, i n t h e c o u r s e of e n f o r c i n g a s t a t u t e , t h e f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l i n f r i n g e s someone's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Moreover, t h i s Court i n Butz recognized t h a t its d e c i s i o n was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h - - Barr. A t 438 U.S. 507, t h e Court s t a t e d : "We t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t , i n a s u i t f o r damages a r i s i n g from u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c t i o n , f e d e r a l e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s e x e r c i s i n g d i s c r e t i o n are e n t i t l e d o n l y t o t h e q u a l i f i e d immunity spe- c i f i e d i n Scheuer [Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 2321 s u b j e ~ ~ o t h o s e e x c e p t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s where it is demonstrated t h a t a b s o l u t e immu- n i t y is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e conduct of t h e p u b l i c b u s i n e s s . "The Scheuer p r i n c i p l e of o n l y q u a l i f i e d immu- n i t y f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s is con- s i s t e n t w i t h Barr v. Matteo, . . ." J u s t i c e Rehnquist, joined by t h e Chief J u s t i c e , J u s t i c e S t e w a r t and J u s t i c e S t e v e n s , i n a s e p a r a t e o p i n i o n , s t a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g a t 438 U.S. 522: "Here t h e Court a t least r e c o g n i z e s and r e a f - f i r m s t h e minimum p r o p o s i t i o n f o r which B a r r s t a n d s - - t h a t e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s are absolu- t e l y immune a t least from a c t i o n s p r e d i c a t e d on common-law claims as long as they are a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e o u t e r l i m i t s of t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) B a r r is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , however, on t h e ground t h a t it d i d n o t i n v o l v e a v i o l a t i o n of ' t h o s e fun- damental p r i n c i p l e s of f a i r n e s s embodied i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . ' " ( C i t a t i o n omitted .) From t h i s language w e can see t h a t B a r r , r e l i e d upon by t h i s C o u r t to s u p p o r t its d e c i s i o n i n S t o r c h , - was n o t o v e r r u l e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Butz. A d d i t i o n a l l y , S t o r c h is w i t h i n t h e modern t r e n d of t h e l a w which e x t e n d s to lower p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s an a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e i n r e g a r d to s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e h i r i n g and d i s c h a r g e of employees. S e e , 26 ALR 3rd 492. A s a f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n , a p p e l l a n t u r g e s t h a t r e l i a n c e upon S t o r c h would be misplaced i n t h i s case because, i n S t o r c h , t h e p l a i n t i f f asked t h e Court to read i n t o t h e s t a t u t e on p r i v i l e g e d communications t h a t t h e r e must be an absence of malice b e f o r e such a d e f e n s e w i l l arise. N o such claim is made i n t h i s case; t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e s p o n d e n t asserts t h a t r e l i a n c e on S t o r c h is i n a p p r o p r i a t e because t h e language c i t e d by t h e r e s p o n d e n t is d i c t u m n o t r e l a t i n g to i s s u e s s p e c i f i c a l l y p r e s e n t e d to t h e C o u r t . The d e f e n d a n t i n S t o r c h s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i e d on a b s o l u t e -- p r i v i l e g e under t h e s t a t u t e a s a complete d e f e n s e to t h e l i b e l c l a i m e d . When t h e p l a i n t i f f a t t a c k e d t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e d e f e n s e by a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s an absence of malice, t h e Court n e c e s s a r i l y had t o d e t e r m i n e what r e q u i r e m e n t s must be m e t b e f o r e t h e d e f e n s e of a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e arises. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h e i s s u e was n e c e s s a r y to t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n and t h e r e f o r e n o t dictum. 6. A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t it is improper i n a l i b e l case to g r a n t a motion f o r summary judgment and d i s m i s s a l i n l i g h t of A r t . 11, Sec. 7 , 1972 Mont.Const. T h i s p r o v i s i o n g i v e s to j u r i e s t h e r i g h t to d e t e r m i n e both t h e l a w and t h e f a c t s i n a l i b e l c a s e . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e j u r y h e r e must be g i v e n t h e r i g h t to d e t e r m i n e whether t h e d e f e n d a n t can p r o p e r l y r e l y upon t h e a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e under s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA. The i s s u e h a s been c l e a r l y s e t t l e d by t h i s Court i n G r i f f i n v . Opinion P u b l i s h i n g Company ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580, and Manley v. Harer ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 82 Mont. 30, 264 P. 937. I n Manley, t h e Court h e l d t h a t where t h e r e is a f a i l u r e to e s t a b l i s h a n e s s e n t i a l element of t h e cause of a c t i o n , t h e c a s e becomes one o f l a w f o r t h e Court. S e e , also Cooper v. Romney ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 49 Mont. 119, 1 4 1 P. 289. 7 . A p p e l l a n t raises one f i n a l argument i n o p p o s i t i o n to r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment . The a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t summary judgment would n o t be p r o p e r because a d i s p u t e d q u e s t i o n of f a c t is o u t s t a n d i n g . Based on a p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t , b r i e f s and p l e a d i n g s , it is argued t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of whether a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s were a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y is s t i l l d i s p u t e d . I n t h e case of S t a t e ex rel. C i t y Motor Company v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 4 ) r 166 Mont. 52, 55, 530 P.2d 486, 487, t h i s Court gave c i t a t i o n t o Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e D i g e s t and noted t h a t a p a r t y opposing a motion f o r summary judgment: "must p r e s e n t f a c t s i n p r o p e r form--conclusions of l a w w i l l n o t s u f f i c e ; and t h e opposing p a r t y ' s f a c t s must be material and of a s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e , n o t f a n c i f u l , f r i v o l o u s , gauzy, nor merely s u s p i c i o n s ." Rule 56 ( e ) of t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure p r o v i d e s t h a t s u p p o r t i n g and opposing a f f i d a v i t s , " s h a l l be made on p e r s o n a l knowledge, s h a l l set f o r t h such f a c t s as would be a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i d e n c e , and s h a l l show a f f i r m a t i v e l y t h a t t h e a f f i a n t is com- p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y to t h e matter s t a t e d t h e r e i n . . . [and s h a l l show] t h a t t h e r e is a genuine i s s u e f o r t r i a l . " Rule 5 6 ( e ) F4.R.Civ.P. Rule 5 6 ( c ) s t a t e s t h a t a motion f o r summary judgment, " s h a l l be rendered f o r t h w i t h i f t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show t h a t t h e r e is no genuine i s s u e as to any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d to a judgment as a m a t t e r of law." Rule 5 6 ( c ) M.R.Civ.P. I n t h e case of Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 450, 548 P.2d 613, 615, t h i s Court noted: " T h i s Court h a s on many o c c a s i o n s commented upon t h e n a t u r e of t h e burden of proof imposed on t h e moving p a r t y under Rule 56. The Court h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment h a s t h e burden of showing t h e complete absence of any genuine i s s u e a s to a l l f a c t s which are deemed i n a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of those s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n - c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment as a matter of l a w . W e have a l s o h e l d t h e r u l e o p e r a t e s t o hold t h e movant to a 'strict s t a n d a r d 1 and t h a t : " ' . . . To s a t i s f y h i s burden t h e movant must make a showing t h a t is q u i t e clear what t h e t r u t h is, and t h a t e x c l u d e s any real doubt as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . . . I 1 ' Kober & K y r i s s v. S t e w a r t & B i l l i n g s Deaconess H o s p i t a l , 148 Mont. 117, 122, 417 P.2d 476, 478. "The d i s t r i c t c o u r t does n o t f u n c t i o n to adju- d i c a t e genuine i s s u e s of f a c t on a motion f o r summary judgment c a u s e - - i t m e r e l y d e t e r m i n e s whether such i s s u e s e x i s t . Thus t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion w i l l be indulged to t h e e x t e n t of a l l i n f e r e n c e s which may be reason- a b l y drawn from t h e o f f e r e d p r o o f . Mally v. Asanovich, 149 Mont. 99, 105, 423 P.2d 294; Johnson v. S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l , 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469." I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether d i s p u t e d q u e s t i o n s of f a c t remain o u t s t a n d i n g i n t h i s case it should be k e p t i n mind t h a t t h e b a r e a s s e r t i o n s found i n a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f s a r e not s u f f i c i e n t to d e f e a t a motion f o r summary judgment. Likewise, t h e c o n c l u s o r y s t a t e m e n t s found i n a p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t s of February 1 3 and 2 4 , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h i s d i s m i s s a l : "was n o t done i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of d u t y i n t h a t it v i o l a t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , b o t h S t a t e and F e d e r a l , was n o t done i n accordance with t h e r e q u i r e - ments of t h e C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Agreement and w a s n o t done w i t h i n any s u p e r s e d i n g s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s . . ." a r e not s u f f i c i e n t to d e f e a t a motion f o r summary judgment. The a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w would c l e a r l y not be a d m i s s i b l e i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l , and are not p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court. S e e , Rule 5 6 ( e ) M.R.Civ.P. I t is concluded t h a t t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l o u s communication w a s a b s o l u t e l y p r i v i l e g e d under t h e s t a t u t e , which is cons t i t u - t i o n a l l y v a l i d , as a consequence of which t h e r e is no o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e of f a c t , and t h e r e s p o n d e n t is e n t i t l e d to have h i s motion for summary judgment g r a n t e d , e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e cause s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t and r e p e a t e d as Count I i n t h e proposed amended complaint. W e t u r n now t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e remaining c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e found i n Counts I V and V of t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t . Count I V c o n t e n d s t h a t r e l i a n c e on t h i s s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is a v i o l a t i o n of t h e p r i v i - l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e of t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , as w e l l as t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e , a s it p e r m i t s a l i b e l which would be a c t i o n a b l e a g a i n s t any o t h e r p e r s o n . Count V a l l e g e s t h a t r e l i a n c e on t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n i n Count I V o f t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t is a novel i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t one w i t h o u t merit. The p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n pro- h i b i t s a state from d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t t h e c i t i z e n s of o t h e r states where t h e r e is no s u b s t a n t i a l r e a s o n f o r t h e d i s c r i m i n a - t i o n beyond t h e f a c t t h a t they are c i t i z e n s of o t h e r states. See Toomer v. Witsell ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460. The i n q u i r y i n each case is whether r e a s o n s e x i s t f o r t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and whether t h e d e g r e e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e a r s a close r e l a t i o n t o t h e r e a s o n s . The s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e a t i s s u e i n t h i s case cannot p o s s i b l y v i o l a t e t h e p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e . A l l p e r s o n s , be t h e y c i t i z e n s of Montana o r c i t i z e n s of any o t h e r state b r i n g i n g a l i b e l a c t i o n i n t h i s s t a t e , are e q u a l l y s u b j e c t to t h e s t a t u - t o r y d e f e n s e . Turning to t h e i s s u e of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , t h a t i s s u e is a n a l y z e d by using a two-step p r o c e s s . I n i t i a l l y , t h e Court must c o n s i d e r t h e n a t u r e of t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d , to d e t e r m i n e what l e v e l of s c r u t i n y is a p p l i - c a b l e t o t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Memorial H o s p i t a l v. Maricopa County ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306. Unless t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n touches on a fundamental r i g h t ( s u c h as r e l i g i o u s freedom, freedom of speech or a s s o c i a t i o n , p r i v a c y or r i g h t to t r a v e l ) , or is drawn upon a n i n h e r e n t l y s u s p e c t d i s t i n c t i o n ( s u c h as race, r e l i g i o n or a l i e n a g e ) , t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t o r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is presumed; t h e o n l y r e q u i r e m e n t being t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n be r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to a l e g i t i m a t e state i n t e r e s t . N e w O r l e a n s v. Dukes ( 1 9 7 6 ) r 427 U . S . 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511. " R a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d " means t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i l l be upheld i f it h a s any - r a t i o n a l b a s i s . S e e , L i n d s l e y v. N a t u r a l Carbonic G a s C o . No fundamental r i g h t or s u s p e c t class is a t i s s u e h e r e , so t h e Court should a p p l y t h e r a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n test. The r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is obvious, and h a s a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . See G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , s u p r a , quoted i n S t o r c h . Equal p r o t e c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l p e r s o n s s h a l l be t r e a t e d a l i k e under l i k e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S e e , f o r example H a r t f o r d C o . v . H a r r i s o n ( 1 9 3 7 ) r 301 U.S. 459, 57 S.Ct. 838, 8 1 L.Ed. 1223. A s noted above i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e , t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to a l l who a r e " l i b e l e d " by p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e scope of t h e i r employment. Count I V of t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t h a s no b a s i s i n l a w . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n Count V are e s s e n t i a l l y v a r i a t i o n s on a theme which h a s a l r e a d y been c o n s i d e r e d . The a p p e l l a n t cites t h e case of N o 1 1 v. C i t y of Bozeman ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 504, 507, 534 P.2d 880, 881, wherein t h i s Court s a i d : "With r e f e r e n c e to t h e s u b j e c t s upon which t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e a k s , its d e c l a r a t i o n s are b i n d i n g upon t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; S t a t e ex rel. P i e r c e v. G~wdy, 62 Mont. 1 1 9 , 203 P. 1115. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s are c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e l e g i s l a t u r e and p r e v e n t t h e enactment of any law which e x t i n g u i s h e s o r l i m i t s t h e powers c o n f e r r e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S t a t e e x rel. Bonner v. Dixon, 59 Mont. 58, 195 P. 841; S t a t e ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, 50 P.2d 959." A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t , i n l i g h t of A r t . 11, Sec. 1 8 , 1972 Mont. Const. which a b o l i s h e s immunity f o r governmental e n t i t i e s , " e x c e p t a s may be s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by l a w by a t w o - t h i r d s v o t e of each House of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , " t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s a t t e m p t t o expand t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e i n l i b e l a c t i o n s under s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s sta1:utorily c r e a t e d p r i v i l e g e would not s t a n d up t o a p p e l l a n t ' s c l e a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o be p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t l i b e l under A r t . 11, Sec. 7 , 1972 Mont.Const. T h i s p r o v i s i o n g i v e s e v e r y person t h e r i g h t to speak f r e e l y and p u b l i s h whatever t h e y p l e a s e on any s u b j e c t , b u t makes them r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y . A p p e l l a n t ' s claims i n r e g a r d t o Count V are c l e a r l y w i t h o u t merit. The c o n s t i t u t i o n does not d e f i n e l i b e l , j u s t a s it does n o t d e f i n e t h e e l e m e n t s which make up any o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e t o r t . T h i s job is l e f t to t h e c o u r t s and t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . L i b e l h a s always been d e f i n e d as a f a l s e and u n p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s is t r u e under Montana s t a t u t e , as w e l l as under common l a w p r i n c i p l e s . I f a communication is p r i v i l e g e d , it is n o t a n a c t i o n a b l e l i b e l . Such p r i v i l e g e s were e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e common l a w f o r p u b l i c p o l i c y r e a s o n s . S e e , G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , s u p r a . Because such a communication is not a tort, no recognized wrong h a s been s u f f e r e d which would g i v e rise to a cause of a c t i o n . Count: V o f t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t is w i t h o u t l e g a l f o u n d a t i o n . The judgment of t h e District Court is a f f i r m e d . We concur: U Chief ~ u s t i c e \ Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: I confess at the outset that I do not understand the foregoing opinion. Its ratio decidendi escapes me. Rather than attempting to refute what is in the foregoing opinion, therefore, I will here assert only what I think the rule in this case ought to be. This case comes to us on essentially two grounds: (1) that Aaron P. Small was deprived of due process when he was removed as chairman of the English department of Eastern Montana College; and (2) that in his removal, he was libelled. It is clear that Aaron P. Small was removed as chairman of the English department without being afforded due process as to his removal, including an evidentiary hearing where he would have the right to present favorable witnesses, and to confront and examine adverse witnesses. The grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement for the unit of which Small was a member is not a sufficient substitute for Small's right to come to the courts for protection of his con- stitutional due process rights. Section 1-3-204, MCA. I find no case cited in the foregoing opinion stating otherwise, and there could be none. In like manner, summary judgment should not be granted against Small on his first amendment claims, and his libel claims, on the ground of lack of specificity in the pleadings. NcRae gave as his reasons for dismissing Small as chairman his "inadequate leadership", his "failure to bring a polarized department into a smoother functioning unit", "acrimony had increased within the English department", and an allegation that Small had failed to effectively and conscientiously handle the administrative detail associated with his office. Small has answered that these allegations are false. What more specificity could he at this stage allege, if his contention is true that such statements are false? The District Court and this Court are applying here the specificity requirements of civil right actions under federal law as exemplified by Rotolo v . Borough of Charleroi (3rd Cir. 19761, 532 F.2d 920, 923. In our state court, Small is not suing for a deprivation of his federal civil rights, but for his constitutionally protected rights under our state and federal constitution. In that situation, it should be recognized that our pleadings under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are notice pleadings only and that specificity occurs after discovery has been completed. Further, with regard to Small's libel action, there is a factual question existent as to whether he was discharged pursuant to "official action." The pleadings evince an underlying allegation that McRae was acting in concert with others to deprive Small of his chairmanship. Without further proceedings we cannot tell at this point whether "official action" was actually involved here or whether there was a drive to impugn his teaching and administrative integrity and ability in the guise of official action. That is an issue a jury should decide. For those reasons, I would set aside the summary judgment, and let the facts come to light as to which party should receive judgment in this case. Therefore, I dissent. Justice M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea c o n c u r r i n g . I a g r e e w i t h t h e r e s u l t reached by t h e m a j o r i t y , b u t n o t i n its r e a s o n i n g . C l e a r l y , t h e r e was n o l i b e l . And j u s t as c l e a r l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f should have exhausted t h e c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e pro- c e d u r e s b e f o r e r e s o r t i n g to t h e c o u r t s .