Title: State v. Michael D. Jackson
Citation: 2004 WI 29
Docket Number: 2002AP000947-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2004

2004 WI 29 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0947-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael D. Jackson,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 264 Wis. 2d 893, 664 N.W.2d 126 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 11, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. Konkol 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Joseph E. Schubert and Brennan & Collins, Milwaukee, and oral 
arguments by Joseph E. Schubert. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Lara 
M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2004 WI 29 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0947-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 1401) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael D. Jackson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Michael 
Jackson, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a circuit court judgment of conviction and 
order denying postconviction relief.1  As a repeat offender, 
Jackson was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without 
owner's consent, a Class E felony, and fleeing an officer, an 
unclassified felony.   
                                                 
1 State v. Jackson, No. 02-0947, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. April 24, 2003) (affirming a judgment and an order of 
the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Daniel L. Konkol, 
Judge).  
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This case addresses how penalty enhancers are to be 
applied to unclassified felonies in calculating the maximum term 
of confinement under Truth-in-Sentencing I.2 Jackson contends 
that the court of appeals erred in calculating the maximum term 
of his available confinement by failing to add the six-year 
penalty enhancer to the full term of imprisonment pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1997-98).3  He also advances that the court 
should have bifurcated the penalty enhancer between confinement 
and extended supervision, allocating 75% of it to the maximum 
term available for confinement. 
¶3 
We agree with the court of appeals that the penalty 
enhancer is neither subject to bifurcation nor is it to be added 
to the underlying term of imprisonment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62.  However, we also determine that the court of appeals' 
reliance on Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d), the statute specifying 
that the extended supervision term imposed by the court be at 
least 25% of the term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.  
Ultimately, although our method of calculations differs from 
that used by the court of appeals, we affirm because the 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin adopted Truth-in-Sentencing legislation in two 
phases.  The first phase, TIS-I, was enacted in June 1998 and 
applied to offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999.  
See 1997 Wis. Act 283.  The second phase, TIS-II, was enacted in 
July 2002 and became effective February 1, 2003.  See 2001 Wis. 
Act 109.  Because Jackson was sentenced under the provisions of 
TIS-I, this case does not address the recent changes of TIS-II. 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
3 
 
difference here in the calculations has no practical effect on 
Jackson's sentence. 
I 
¶4 
Jackson was convicted of both operating a motor 
vehicle 
without 
owner's 
consent 
and 
fleeing 
an 
officer.  
Operating a vehicle without owner's consent is a Class E felony 
with a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment.  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.50(3)(e).  Fleeing an officer is an unclassified 
felony with a maximum sentence of three years of imprisonment.  
Wis. Stat. § 346.17(3)(a).  As a repeat offender, Jackson was 
subject to a penalty enhancer of six years of imprisonment on 
each count.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(b).   
¶5 
Because Jackson was charged and convicted under Truth-
in-Sentencing I (TIS-I), his sentence of imprisonment was 
bifurcated into a term of confinement followed by a term of 
extended supervision.4  Without a penalty enhancer, the maximum 
term of confinement for the Class E felony was two years, while 
the maximum term of confinement for the unclassified felony was 
two years, three months.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2).  With the 
repeater penalty enhancer, the circuit court increased the 
maximum term of confinement for each offense by six years.   
¶6 
At sentencing, due to a misunderstanding, the circuit 
court indicated that without the penalty enhancer, the maximum 
                                                 
4 
Under 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
legislation, 
the 
term 
"imprisonment" 
does 
not 
mean 
time 
in 
prison. 
 
Rather, 
"imprisonment" consists of both the time of confinement (in 
prison) and the time following the confinement spent on extended 
supervision.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1).   
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
4 
 
term of confinement for the unclassified felony was "something 
like 18 months" when in fact it was 27 months.  Based on that 
error, the circuit court sentenced Jackson with the belief that 
the maximum amount of confinement he faced with the repeater 
enhancer was seven years, six months (18 months + 72 months = 90 
months) for the unclassified fleeing charge.  The court 
correctly determined that with the penalty enhancer, the maximum 
amount of confinement for operating a motor vehicle without 
owner's consent, the Class E felony, was eight years (24 months 
+ 72 months = 96 months).  Jackson was sentenced to eight years 
(96 months) of imprisonment on each count, consisting of six 
years (72 months) of confinement and two years (24 months) of 
extended supervision, to run concurrently.    
¶7 
Jackson subsequently filed a motion for postconviction 
relief, arguing that the circuit court incorrectly calculated 
the maximum terms of confinement for both the classified and 
unclassified felony convictions.  He claimed that because the 
general repeater penalty enhancer statute states that the 
"maximum term of imprisonment" may be increased, the circuit 
court was required to add the penalty enhancer to the term of 
imprisonment and then to bifurcate the six-year penalty enhancer 
into a term of confinement and extended supervision before 
adding it to the confinement and extended supervision on his 
underlying offenses.  Accordingly, Jackson argued that under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6, the court could add only 75% of the 
six-year penalty enhancer (54 months) to his underlying terms of 
confinement.  The circuit court denied the motion, concluding 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
5 
 
that it had properly added the penalty enhancer.  Jackson 
appealed. 
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  
State v. Jackson, No. 02-0947, unpublished slip op. at ¶2 (Wis. 
Ct. App. April 24, 2003).  In doing so, it noted that Jackson's 
argument for bifurcating the penalty enhancer conflicted with 
State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, ¶¶35-36, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 
N.W.2d 24, which held that penalty enhancers are to be added to 
the term of confinement and not to extended supervision.  Id., 
¶8.  The court explained that while a penalty enhancer is added 
to the underlying maximum term of confinement, the 25% rule of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d) regarding extended supervision may 
serve to limit the time actually available to be served in 
confinement.  Id., ¶9.     
¶9 
After a series of mathematical calculations, the court 
of appeals concluded that the circuit court sentenced Jackson on 
the Class E felony with a correct understanding of the maximum 
term of confinement, eight years (96 months), but sentenced him 
on the unclassified felony under the mistaken belief that the 
maximum term of confinement was seven years, six months (90 
months).  Id., ¶17.  The court determined that the true maximum 
term of confinement for the unclassified felony was actually 
seven years, two and four-tenths months (86.4 months).  Id.   
¶10 Nevertheless, it affirmed the judgment of conviction 
and order denying postconviction relief, reasoning that because 
the circuit court had sentenced Jackson to concurrent terms on 
each count, the conviction for the Class E offense would remain 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
6 
 
unchanged, and the reduction of the unclassified felony would 
have no practical effect upon his sentence.  See id., ¶19.  The 
court invited Jackson to file a motion for reconsideration if he 
still sought resentencing, but Jackson instead filed a petition 
for review with this court. 
II 
¶11 This case addresses how penalty enhancers are applied 
at sentencing in determining the maximum term of confinement for 
unclassified felonies under TIS-I.  Our resolution of this case 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
several 
statutes. 
 
The 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law subject 
to independent appellate review.  State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, 
¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 625 N.W.2d 359 (citing State v. Setagord, 
211 Wis. 2d 397, 405-06, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997)). 
¶12 Our goal in interpreting a statute is to discern the 
intent of the legislature.  See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶13, 
262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  When there is doubt as to the 
meaning of a criminal statute, courts should apply the rule of 
lenity and interpret the statute in favor of the accused.  Id.  
(citing State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 322 N.W.2d 264 
(1982); State v. Wilson, 77 Wis. 2d 15, 28, 252 N.W.2d 64 
(1977)).  
III 
¶13 We begin our discussion by examining the relevant 
statutes.  Since this case involves the application of a penalty 
enhancer, we look first to Wis. Stat. § 939.62, which provides 
for penalty enhancers for repeat offenders.  It states in part: 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
7 
 
939.62 Increased penalty for habitual criminality. 
(1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is 
defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for 
any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed 
. . . the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by 
law for that crime may be increased as follows: 
. . . .  
(b) A maximum term of more than one year but not more 
than 10 years may be increased by not more than 2 
years if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors 
and by not more than 6 years if the prior conviction 
was for a felony.  
(Emphasis added). 
 
¶14 In this case, Jackson concedes that he is a repeater 
on the basis of a prior felony conviction.  Accordingly, the 
"maximum term of imprisonment" for each of his offenses is 
increased by six years.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(b). 
¶15 Our inquiry encompasses the application at sentencing 
of penalty enhancers to unclassified felonies under TIS-I 
legislation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01 represents Truth-in-
Sentencing as it existed under TIS-I.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1) 
requires a circuit court to impose a bifurcated sentence 
consisting of a term of confinement followed by a term of 
extended 
supervision 
whenever 
it 
sentences 
a 
person 
to 
"imprisonment."  It states: 
973.01 
Bifurcated 
sentence 
of 
imprisonment 
and 
extended supervision. 
(1) BIFURCATED SENTENCE REQUIRED.  Except as provided 
in sub. (3), whenever a court sentences a person to 
imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons for a 
felony committed on or after December 31, 1999, the 
court shall impose a bifurcated sentence that consists 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
8 
 
of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term 
of extended supervision under s. 302.113. 
¶16 The structure for each bifurcated sentence is set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2).  Subdivisions 1 to 5 of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) specify the maximum term of confinement for 
classified felonies.  Subdivision 6 addresses the maximum term 
of confinement for unclassified felonies, which is the focus of 
our inquiry.  The provisions relating to unclassified felonies 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 provide in part: 
(2) STRUCTURE OF BIFURCATED SENTENCES.  The court 
shall ensure that a bifurcated sentence imposed under 
sub. (1) complies with all of the following: 
. . . . 
(b) Imprisonment portion of bifurcated sentence.  The 
portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term 
of confinement in prison may not be less than one 
year, subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for 
the felony, and, except as provided in par. (c), may 
not exceed whichever of the following is applicable. 
[Subds. (b) 1 to 5 
list the 
maximum 
term of 
confinement for classified felonies B through E] 
6. For any felony other than a felony specified in 
subds. 1. to 5., the term of confinement in prison may 
not exceed 75% of the total length of the bifurcated 
sentence. 
¶17 The key to understanding the applicability of penalty 
enhancers under TIS-I lies in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), which 
is entitled "[p]enalty enhancement."  The first sentence of the 
provision directs the sentencing court to add the penalty 
enhancer to the maximum term of confinement.  The second 
explains 
the 
relationship 
between 
the 
increased 
term 
of 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
9 
 
confinement and the overall term of imprisonment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(c) states: 
(c) 
Penalty 
enhancement. 
 
The 
maximum 
term 
of 
confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be 
increased by any applicable penalty enhancement.  If 
the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in 
par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the total 
length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed 
is increased by the same amount.    
(emphasis added). 
¶18 Despite the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), 
Jackson contends that the court of appeals erred in adding the 
entire six years of enhancement to the underlying term of 
confinement.  He argues that the enhancer should have instead 
been added to the term of imprisonment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62.  Additionally, he asserts that the penalty enhancer 
should 
be 
bifurcated 
between 
confinement 
and 
extended 
supervision with 75% of the six-year enhancer (54 months) added 
to 
his 
underlying 
term 
of 
confinement 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6.5 
¶19 The State counters that Wis. Stat. §§ 939.62(1)(b) and 
973.01(2)(c) unambiguously provide that the six-year repeater 
penalty enhancer should be added to the underlying maximum term 
of confinement that could be imposed for each of Jackson's 
offenses.  It further observes that Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 
                                                 
5 Although it is not entirely clear, Jackson appears to 
maintain the position he took in the circuit court that because 
the six-year penalty enhancer is added to and increases the term 
of imprisonment, the penalty enhancer must be bifurcated into a 
term of confinement and extended supervision.  (Jackson's Brief 
at 10-12). 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
10 
 
does not provide for the bifurcation of penalty enhancers; 
rather, 
it 
explains 
that 
for 
unclassified 
felonies, 
the 
underlying term of confinement may not exceed 75% of the total 
length of imprisonment.   
 
¶20 We agree with the State that Jackson's penalty 
enhancer was not subject to bifurcation and was correctly added 
to the underlying maximum term of confinement.  Ultimately, the 
difficulty we have with Jackson's positions is twofold.  First, 
Jackson ignores the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), which 
anticipates the question before us and specifically directs 
courts to add the penalty enhancer to the term of confinement, 
thereby increasing the overall term of imprisonment by the same 
amount.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c).  Second, as the court of 
appeals recognized, Jackson's contention conflicts with the 
precedent of Volk, 258 Wis. 2d 584.   
 ¶21 In Volk, the court of appeals confronted a similar 
issue involving the effect of penalty enhancers on classified 
offenses under Truth-in-Sentencing.  There, the defendant argued 
that the circuit court erroneously applied the penalty enhancer 
of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 to the extended supervision term of his 
bifurcated sentence.  Id., ¶2.  The court of appeals agreed, 
holding that Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) does not allow a 
sentencing court to impose any portion of a penalty enhancer as 
extended supervision.  Id.  The court based its interpretation, 
in part, on the language of the statute, which authorized courts 
to apply the enhancer to the term of confinement but conferred 
no such authorization for the term of extended supervision.  
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
11 
 
Id., ¶36.  It also relied upon legislative history to support 
its conclusion.  Id., ¶¶41-42 
¶22 The legislative history cited by the court of appeals 
in Volk was the final report of the Criminal Penalties Study 
Committee.6 
 
Id. 
 
The 
Committee 
was 
charged 
with 
the 
responsibility of making recommendations regarding the Truth-in-
Sentencing 
legislation 
and 
drafting 
proposed 
legislation 
necessary 
to 
implement 
those 
recommendations. 
 
State 
of 
Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee, Final Report 
("Report"), August 31, 1999, at 6. 
¶23 In its report, the Committee made two recommendations 
regarding penalty enhancers under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c).  
First, it noted: 
If pleaded and proved, these enhancers increase the 
maximum term of confinement for the underlying crime 
and increase the overall maximum term of imprisonment 
as well.  They do not lengthen the maximum term of 
extended supervision for the underlying crime. . . .   
Report at 60 (footnotes omitted).7   
                                                 
6 The Criminal Penalties Study Committee's report can be 
accessed at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=42. 
7 In providing an example, the Report continued: 
  
[S]uppose that one has been convicted of the crime of 
assault by a prisoner while armed with a dangerous 
weapon. . . . The dangerous weapon penalty enhancer 
adds 5 years to the maximum term of confinement for 
the 
underlying 
assault 
charges 
while 
likewise 
increasing the overall maximum term of imprisonment by 
the same amount.  It does not increase the maximum 
term of extended supervision. 
State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee, Final 
Report, August 31, 1999, at 60 (footnotes omitted). 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
12 
 
¶24 Second, the Committee advanced: 
The 
extended 
supervision 
caps . . . would 
apply 
regardless of whether the penalties for the crime of 
conviction have been increased because the actor is a 
habitual criminal and/or because one of the penalty 
enhancers . . . has been pleaded and proved.  In these 
instances the maximum term of confinement increases 
according to schedules in the Statutes and the overall 
maximum term of imprisonment increases by a like 
amount.  The maximum term of extended supervision, 
however, does not increase. . . . Given the purposes 
of extended supervision, the Committee believes this 
amount is sufficient.  It does not recommend adjusting 
extended 
supervision 
caps 
when 
penalty 
enhancers 
(including habitual criminality) are present in the 
case. 
Report at 20 (footnotes omitted). 
¶25 While the focus of Volk involved the effect of penalty 
enhancers on extended supervision, we nevertheless find it 
instructive in the present case.  As the State explains in its 
brief, "the real question in both [this case and Volk] is how 
penalty enhancers are to be applied under Truth-in-Sentencing's 
bifurcated sentencing structure."   
¶26 In making his arguments, Jackson ignores the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) which specifically states that the 
penalty enhancer is added to the maximum term of confinement, 
which in turn increases the total length of imprisonment by the 
same 
amount. 
 
He 
is 
correct 
to 
note 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.62(1)(b) 
provides that 
the general repeater penalty 
enhancer increases the "maximum term of imprisonment" by six 
years.  Yet, it is the truth-in-sentencing provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01 that explain how that increase in the maximum 
term of imprisonment may be accomplished. 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
13 
 
¶27 Finally, in an effort to reduce the maximum term of 
confinement for his Class E felony, operating a motor vehicle 
without owner's consent, Jackson argues that by adding a penalty 
enhancer to this classified felony, it transforms into an 
unclassified 
felony 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6.  That statute provides: 
6. For any felony other than a felony specified in 
subds. 1. to 5., the term of confinement in prison may 
not exceed 75% of the total length of the bifurcated 
sentence. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6. 
 
¶28 Jackson reasons that his operating a motor vehicle 
without owner's consent conviction, which is listed as a Class E 
felony under subdivision 5 of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) becomes 
an unclassified felony because no classified felonies listed in 
subdivisions 1-5 contain a penalty enhancer.  He contends that 
it therefore falls within the definition of an unclassified 
felony, i.e., a felony "other than a felony specified in subds. 
1. to 5," and the maximum term of confinement may not exceed 75% 
of imprisonment. 
¶29 Although 
novel, 
Jackson's 
argument 
is 
without 
authority.  Essentially his position is that the addition of a 
penalty enhancer renders all felonies unclassified.  The 
language of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 belies such a contention.  
Indeed, the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 contemplates 
a distinction between classified and unclassified felonies when 
it exempts classified felonies from its scope.  Because Jackson 
provides no basis to challenge his Class E felony sentence other 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
14 
 
than this rejected transformation argument, we need only address 
the application of penalty enhancers to unclassified felonies. 
¶30 In sum, based upon Volk and Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), 
together with its legislative history, we determine that the 
legislature did not intend sentencing courts to bifurcate 
penalty enhancers between confinement and extended supervision 
or add them to the term of imprisonment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62, as Jackson advances.  Rather, it intended courts to 
add them to the maximum term of confinement for each underlying 
offense, thereby increasing the overall term of imprisonment by 
the same amount. 
IV 
 
¶31 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant's 
proffered 
methodology is in error, we turn next to the question of how to 
calculate the maximum confinement time for unclassified felonies 
with penalty enhancers under TIS-I.  The circuit court arrived 
at a conclusion different from that set forth by the court of 
appeals, which in turn differed from that advanced by the State. 
 
¶32 All agree that for unclassified felonies the penalty 
enhancer is added initially to the term of confinement pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) and that the penalty enhancer 
cannot be bifurcated.  For the unclassified felony, fleeing an 
officer, the maximum confinement without a penalty enhancer is 
two years, three months (27 months).  The conclusions of the 
maximum confinement for the unclassified felony with the six-
year penalty enhancer are as follows: 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
15 
 
Circuit court:  seven years, six months (90 
months) 
Court of appeals:  seven years, two and four-
tenths months (86.4 months) 
State of Wisconsin:  eight years, three months 
(99 months). 
 
¶33 In its decision, the court of appeals determined that 
the circuit court sentenced Jackson on his unclassified felony 
under the mistaken belief that the maximum term of confinement 
was seven years, six months (90 months).  Jackson, unpublished 
slip op. at ¶17.  The court concluded that the true maximum term 
of confinement was seven years, two and four-tenths months (86.4 
months).  Id.   
 
¶34 It arrived at this figure by first noting that 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), in adding a six-year 
penalty enhancer to the underlying maximum term of confinement, 
the 
underlying 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment 
is 
likewise 
increased by six years.  In calculating, the court added the 
penalty enhancer of six years (72 months) to the underlying 
maximum term of confinement (27 months) for a total of 99 months 
maximum term of confinement.  Id., ¶14. 
   
  Six year penalty enhancer 
 
 
 
(72 months)              
+ Underlying maximum term of confinement 
(27 months) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
99 months 
 
  Six year penalty enhancer 
 
 
 
(72 months) 
+ Underlying maximum term of imprisonment 
(36 months) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 months               
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
16 
 
 
¶35 It then applied the 25% extended supervision rule 
found in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d) to limit the term of 
confinement.  Id., ¶15.  The 
25% 
extended 
supervision 
rule 
states that, "[t]he term of extended supervision that follows 
the term of confinement in prison may not be less than 25% of 
the length of the term of confinement in prison imposed under 
par. (b)."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d).  The court of appeals 
interpreted this to require that Jackson's term of available 
imprisonment, nine years (108 months), be greater than or equal 
to his term of available confinement, eight years, three months 
(99 months), plus 25% of that confinement term (24.75 months).  
See id., ¶16.  Because it was not, the court reduced the maximum 
amount of confinement to a term of 86.4 months, consistent with 
the 25% extended supervision rule.  Id.  The court explained its 
calculations as follows: 
If extended supervision must be 25% of confinement and 
extended supervision plus confinement must be less 
than or equal to maximum imprisonment, the problem can 
be conceptualized as dividing Jackson's 108-month 
maximum imprisonment into 5 parts: 4 parts confinement 
and 1 part extended supervision.  Therefore: 
minimum extended supervision = 108/5 = 21.6 
maximum confinement = 4 [x] 21.6 = 86.4 
It follows that Jackson was subject to a maximum 
confinement of 86.4 months because this amount, when 
compared with Jackson's 108-month maximum sentence, 
leaves 
25% 
of 
86.4 
(21.6 
months) 
for 
extended 
supervision. 
Id., ¶16. 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
17 
 
 
¶36 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
reliance 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(d) here is misplaced.  That statute requires that 
the amount of extended supervision be at least 25% of the term 
of confinement that the sentencing court imposes.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(d).  In placing its focus on the 25% rule of 
extended supervision, the court of appeals failed to account for 
the 75% rule of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6, which specifically 
addresses the calculations of maximum term of confinement for 
unclassified felonies.   
 
¶37 As earlier noted, this 75% rule provides that, "[f]or 
any felony other than a felony specified in subds. 1. to 5., 
[the classified felonies], the term of confinement in prison may 
not exceed 75% of the total length of the bifurcated sentence."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6.8  Had the court of appeals properly 
focused on the 75% rule of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6, there 
would have been no need to resort to the minimum extended 
supervision 
requirements 
to 
reduce 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
confinement.  Had it taken Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 into 
account, it would have determined, as we do, that the maximum 
term of confinement here does not run afoul of the minimum 
extended supervision requirement.  
                                                 
8 Under TIS-II, only a few unclassified felonies remain.  
These include operating an automobile while intoxicated with a 
minor 
passenger 
(third 
or 
fourth 
offense), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(f) 
(2001-02), 
and 
the 
felony 
enhancement 
of 
committing domestic abuse during the 72-hour period following a 
domestic abuse incident.  Wis. Stat. § 939.621 (2001-02).  
Therefore, the 75% rule has limited application for future 
cases. 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
18 
 
 
¶38 Unlike the court of appeals, the State addresses Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6.  It asserts, however, that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6 does not speak to the issue of how penalty 
enhancers are applied.  Rather, the State explains that the 
statute discusses how unclassified felonies are bifurcated prior 
to or without a penalty enhancer being applied.  Accordingly, it 
contends that the circuit court could have added the entire six-
year (72 month) penalty enhancer to the underlying maximum term 
of confinement, two years, three months (27 months), for a total 
of available term of eight years, three months (99 months). 
 
  Six year penalty enhancer 
 
 
 
(72 months)              
+ Underlying maximum term of confinement 
(27 months) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
99 months 
 
¶39 It is unclear from the language of the statutes if the 
legislature intended, as the State asserts, to disjoin the 75% 
requirement of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 from Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(c) altogether.  We acknowledge that the State's 
position regarding the statutory scheme is a reasonable one.  
Yet there is another reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
scheme: the two statutes should be read together.  
 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 instructs how to 
calculate the maximum term of confinement for unclassified 
felonies.  The first step is to identify the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence.  This is accomplished by relying on the 
second sentence of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), which explains 
that the total length of the bifurcated sentence is increased by 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
19 
 
the same amount that was added to the underlying maximum term of 
confinement with enhancement.  After arriving at this figure, 
the 75% rule of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 applies to determine 
the maximum term of confinement available.  
 
¶41 When there is doubt concerning the severity of the 
penalty described by statute, Wisconsin law provides that a 
court must favor a milder penalty over a harsher penalty.  Cole, 
262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶67 (citing Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 289).  This 
rule of lenity generally establishes that ambiguous penal 
statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.  Id.  
As a result, we interpret the statute in favor of Jackson. 
 
¶42 Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 should be read together with Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(c) in calculation of the maximum term of confinement 
for unclassified felonies with penalty enhancers under TIS-I.  
We apply the 75% rule of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 after the 
penalty enhancer is added to the underlying maximum term of 
confinement.  This addition, in turn, pursuant to the second 
sentence of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), increases the total term 
of imprisonment by the same amount.  We then apply the 75% rule 
to the total term of imprisonment to calculate the maximum 
amount of confinement for the unclassified felony with the 
penalty enhancer.9 
                                                 
9We recognize that our conclusion of six years, nine months 
(81 months) is the same maximum term of confinement that Jackson 
is seeking.  However, for the reasons explained above, his 
methodology in arriving at that figure is inconsistent with Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01(2)(c), its legislative history, and State v. 
Volk, 2002 WI App 274, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24. 
No. 
02-0947-CR   
 
20 
 
 
  Six year penalty enhancer 
 
 
 
(72 months)              
+ Underlying maximum term of imprisonment 
(36 months) 
  (Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c)) 
___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 months 
 
108 months x 75% = 81 months maximum amount of confinement 
 
¶43 Although our determination of the maximum term of 
confinement for Jackson's unclassified felony is less than both 
the circuit court and court of appeals, our decision has no 
practical effect upon the sentence imposed.  As the court of 
appeals explained, any reduction in Jackson's unclassified 
offense leaves his Class E concurrent sentence both unchanged 
and controlling.  Jackson, unpublished slip op. at ¶19.   
V 
¶44 In sum, we conclude that the general penalty enhancer 
for an unclassified felony under TIS-I is neither subject to 
bifurcation nor is to be added to the underlying term of 
imprisonment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  We also 
determine, however, that the court of appeals' reliance on Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01(2)(d), the statute specifying that the extended 
supervision term imposed by the court be at least 25% of the 
term of confinement imposed, was misplaced.  In the end, while 
our method of calculations differs from that used by the court 
of appeals, we affirm because the difference here in the 
calculations has no practical effect on Jackson's sentence. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority opinion that under Truth-in-Sentencing I (TIS I),10 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c)11 and State v. Volk, 2002 
WI App 274, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24, the circuit court 
was not required to bifurcate Jackson's six-year penalty 
enhancer and add it to the underlying term of imprisonment for 
his unclassified felony.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 20.  However, I 
disagree with the majority's method of calculating Jackson's 
sentence, and therefore cannot join Part IV of the opinion.  As 
will be demonstrated below, the majority's method of calculating 
Jackson's sentence for his unclassified felony ignores the plain 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(b)&(c). 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
calculation in Part IV of the opinion is the mathematical 
equivalent of what the majority linguistically claims is 
prohibited in Part III.   
¶46 As this case involves the interpretation of several 
portions of Wis. Stat. § 973.01, the relevant provisions are set 
forth in full bellow.  Section 973.01 provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Bifurcated Sentence Required.  Except as 
provided in sub. (3), whenever a court sentences a 
person to imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons 
for a felony committed on or after December 31, 1999, 
the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence that 
consists of a term of confinement in prison followed 
by a term of extended supervision under s. 302.113. 
                                                 
10 See 1997 Wis. Act 283.  
11 All reference to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
(2) Structure of Bifurcated Sentences.  The court 
shall ensure that a bifurcated sentence imposed under 
sub. (1) complies with all of the following: 
(a) Total length of bifurcated sentence.  Except 
as provided in par. (c), the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum term of 
imprisonment for the felony. 
(b) Imprisonment portion of bifurcated sentences.  
The portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a 
term of confinement in prison may not be less than one 
year, subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for 
the felony, and, except as provided in par. (c), may 
not exceed whichever of the following is applicable: 
 . . . . 
6. For any felony other than a felony specified 
in subds. 1. to 5., the term of confinement in prison 
may not exceed 75% of the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence.  
(c) Penalty enhancement.  The maximum term of 
confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be 
increased by any applicable penalty enhancement.  If 
the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in 
par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the total 
length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed 
is increased by the same amount.  
(d) Minimum term of extended supervision.  The 
term of extended supervision that follows the term of 
confinement in prison may not be less than 25% of the 
length of the term of confinement in prison imposed 
under par. (b).   
Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (emphasis added).  
¶47 The majority opinion, relying on the "rule of lenity," 
majority 
op., 
¶41, 
comes 
to 
a 
conclusion 
that 
directly 
contravenes the express language of this statute.  The majority 
calculates the maximum amount of confinement for a penalty 
enhanced, 
unclassified 
felony 
by 
erroneously 
reading 
§ 973.01(2)(c) to require that any increase in the term of 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
confinement also increases the term of imprisonment, which is 
then subject to the 75 percent bifurcation rule contained in 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6.  Majority op., ¶¶40, 42.  However, the majority 
provides no authority for the proposition that § 973.01(2)(b)6. 
incorporates § 973.01(2)(c).  The majority cites to no statutory 
provision that subjects the enhanced term of confinement in 
§ 973.01(2)(c) to the confinement limitations contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b).  Quite the contrary, § 973.01(2)(b) 
specifically states that any increase in confinement time under 
the penalty enhancement provision of § 973.01(2)(c) is not 
subject to the limitations contained in § 973.01(2)(b)1.-6.  
Rather than incorporating § 973.01(2)(c) into § 973.01(2)(b)6., 
§ 973.01(2)(b) explicitly excludes penalty enhancers from the 
limitations on confinement time contained therein.  Sections 
973.01(2)(b) and 973.01(2)(b)6., when read together, provide:  
"[t]he portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term of 
confinement in prison . . . except as provided in par. (c) [the 
penalty enhancement provision], may not exceed . . . . 75% of 
the total length of the bifurcated sentence."  By applying the 
75 percent rule contained in § 973.01(2)(b)6. after adding the 
penalty enhancer to the total term of initial imprisonment, the 
majority effectively eradicates the phrase "except as provided 
in par. (c)" from § 973.01(2)(b).  Because this language appears 
in paragraph (b), it applies to all of the limits contained in 
the subdivisions of paragraph (b).  The majority fails to 
explain why this language is inapplicable to the limit in 
subdivision 6.   
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
¶48 The error of the majority's interpretation is obvious 
if one looks to the other limitations on the time of confinement 
contained in the subdivisions of § 973.01(2)(b).  If, as the 
majority argues, the allowable increase in confinement time 
contained in § 973.01(2)(c) is subject to the confinement 
limitations contained in § 973.01(2)(b)1.-6., then the penalty 
enhancer 
provision 
is 
rendered 
a 
nullity 
for 
classified 
felonies.  For example, the sentencing limitation contained in 
subdivision 4 provides that "[f]or a Class D felony, the term of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
may 
not 
exceed 
5 
years."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)4.  Similarly, subdivision 5 provides 
that "[f]or a Class E felony, the term of confinement in prison 
may not exceed 2 years."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)5.  If any 
increase in confinement time under § 973.01(2)(c) is subject to 
the limitations contained in § 973.01(2)(b)1.-6., then the term 
of confinement for a Class D felony could never exceed five 
years, even if a penalty enhancer applied.  Likewise, for a 
Class E felony, the term of confinement could never exceed two 
years, even if the initial sentence were subject to a penalty 
enhancer.  Therefore, if a person were convicted of a Class E 
felony and subject to, say, a six-year penalty enhancer, the 
additional six years could never attach to his sentence.  Under 
Volk, 258 Wis. 2d 584, the penalty enhancer cannot be added to 
the term of extended supervision, and under the majority's 
logic, the increased term of confinement is still subject to the 
two-year limit in § 973.01(2)(b)5.   
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
5 
 
¶49 This result is purely absurd, as it reads the penalty 
enhancement provision out of the statute.  The statute attempts 
to avoid this absurd result by providing that the limits on the 
term of confinement contained in § 973.01(2)(b)1.-6. apply 
"except as provided in par. (c)."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) 
(emphasis added).  Contrary to the majority's suggestion, 
majority 
op., 
¶39, 
this 
language 
is 
crystal 
clear 
and 
unambiguously indicates that the limits contained in the 
subdivisions of paragraph (b) do not apply to increases in 
confinement time under the penalty enhancement provision of 
paragraph (c).  The majority's reading of the statute ignores 
this language and therefore places the vitality of penalty 
enhancers under TIS I in serious jeopardy.  The majority fails 
to 
explain 
why 
the 
penalty 
enhancement 
provision 
of 
§ 973.01(2)(c) 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
limit 
contained 
in 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6., 
but 
not 
the 
limits 
proscribed 
in 
§ 973.01(2)(b)1.-5.  In other words, the majority does not 
explain why the phrase "except as provided in par. (c)" applies 
to subdivisions 1.-5. but not to subdivision 6.  The only 
difference between § 973.01(2)(b)1.-5. and § 973.01(2)(b)6. is 
that the former provisions cap confinement time for classified 
felonies at a definitive number, whereas, the latter provision 
caps confinement time for unclassified felonies by providing 
that the term of confinement cannot exceed a certain percentage 
of the total sentence.  None of the limits contained in the 
subdivisions 
of 
§ 973.01(2)(b) 
contain 
any 
reference 
to 
§ 973.01(2)(c).  If any increase in confinement time under 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
6 
 
§ 973.01(2)(c) is subject to the limit in § 973.01(2)(b)6., then 
any 
increase 
must 
also 
be 
subject 
to 
the 
limits 
in 
§ 973.01(2)(b)1.-5.  There is simply no textual basis for 
distinguishing the limit on confinement time for unclassified 
felonies from the limits proscribed for classified felonies; 
both are subject to the phrase "except as provided in par. (c)." 
¶50 The majority attempts to justify a distinction by 
misreading the second sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) in conjunction 
with § 973.01(2)(b)6. to provide that the enhanced sentence is 
bifurcated only after the enhancer is added to the initial 
sentence.  Majority op., ¶¶40, 42.  The second sentence of 
§ 973.01(2)(c) provides:  "If the maximum term of confinement in 
prison specified in par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, 
the total length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed 
is increased by the same amount."  (Emphasis added.)  Notably, 
this sentence does not provide that the total length of an 
increased sentence is thereafter subject to the limitations in 
§ 973.01(2)(b).  To read this sentence as such is entirely 
illogical 
because, 
as 
demonstrated 
above, 
§ 973.01(2)(b) 
expressly excludes increases in the term of confinement under 
§ 973.01(2)(c) from the requirements listed in § 973.01(2)(b)1.-
6.  Also, the first sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) provides:  "The 
maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may 
be increased by any applicable penalty enhancement."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The plain language of the statute contemplates that the 
enhancer is added after the maximum term of confinement 
specified in paragraph (b) is calculated.  The second sentence 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
7 
 
of § 973.01(2)(c) simply provides that the total term of 
imprisonment calculated under § 973.01(2)(b) is subsequently 
increased as a mathematical consequence of the penalty enhancer 
being added to the term of confinement pursuant to the first 
sentence in § 973.01(2)(c).   
¶51 The majority writes, "[w]e apply the 75% rule of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 after the penalty enhancer is added 
to the underlying maximum term of confinement."  Majority op., 
¶42.  The error of the majority is obvious.  The penalty 
enhancer cannot be added to the underlying term of confinement 
until 
the 
underlying 
term 
of 
confinement 
is 
calculated.  
However, 
in 
order 
to 
calculate 
the 
underlying 
term 
of 
confinement in the first place, the 75 percent rule of 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6. must be applied.   
¶52 I do not understand how the majority can add the 
penalty enhancer in § 973.01(2)(c) to the underlying term of 
confinement without first calculating the underlying term of 
confinement 
under 
the 
75 
percent 
rule 
contained 
in 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6.  The statute itself requires that the penalty 
enhancer is added after the initial term of confinement is 
calculated:  "The maximum term of confinement in prison 
specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable 
enhancement.  If the maximum term of confinement in prison 
specified in par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the 
total length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed is 
increased 
by 
the 
same amount."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) 
(emphasis added).  The majority never calculates the underlying 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
8 
 
term of confinement and instead seems to add the enhancer 
directly to the total term of the sentence.  See majority op., 
¶40-42. 
¶53 Either the majority is applying the 75 percent rule 
twice——once to calculate the underlying term of confinement and 
then again after the penalty enhancer is added——or the majority 
is simply adding the penalty enhancer to the total term of 
imprisonment without ever calculating the underlying term of 
confinement.  This second possibility is the mathematical 
equivalent of Jackson's argument that the majority supposedly 
rejects.  Jackson argues that his penalty enhancer, six years or 
72 months, is subject to the 75 percent bifurcation rule and 
added to the total length of imprisonment.  Pet'r br., at 8-10.  
Therefore, Jackson reasons that only 75 percent of 72 months, or 
54 months should be added to his initial 27-month term of 
confinement to produce a total 81 months of confinement.  Id. at 
10.  The majority states that it rejects this argument.  
Majority op., ¶3.  
¶54 Yet, the majority reaches the exact same figure as 
Jackson regarding his total term of increased confinement, 81 
months.  Compare majority op., ¶42 with pet'r br., at 10, 12.  
The majority reasons that the 72-month enhancer increases the 
total term of imprisonment to 108 months, which is then 
bifurcated according to the 75 percent rule, to reach 81 months 
of confinement.  Majority op., ¶42.  The only difference between 
the majority's approach and Jackson's is that instead of 
bifurcating the 72 months up front and then adding the resulting 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
9 
 
54 months to the original 27 months of confinement to reach 81 
months, the majority adds the 72 months to the total term of 
initial imprisonment, 36 months, and then bifurcates under the 
75 percent rule to reach 81 months.    
¶55 The majority's reading of § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) directly 
contradicts its earlier position that the total amount of 
confinement subject to a penalty enhancer is not calculated by 
adding 
the 
enhancer 
to 
the 
original 
underlying 
term 
of 
imprisonment.  Majority op., ¶3.  While the majority states that 
it rejects Jackson's argument that the 72-month enhancer should 
be added to the underlying maximum term of imprisonment, id., 
its mathematical formula does precisely just that: 
Six year penalty enhancer 
 
 
 
(72 months) 
   + Underlying maximum term of confinement  
(36 months) 
 
(pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c)  
____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 months. 
 
108 months x 75% = 81 months maximum amount of confinement 
Majority op., ¶42. 
¶56 Following the approach of the State, and in accordance 
with the plain language of the statute, I conclude that Jackson 
should be subject to a total of 108 months imprisonment, 
composed of 99 months confinement and 9 months extended 
supervision.  When read properly, § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) set forth a 
two-step procedure for calculating sentences affected by a 
penalty enhancer.  First, the original term of imprisonment is 
calculated pursuant to the limits contained in § 973.01(2)(b).  
Second, under § 973.01(2)(c), "[t]he maximum term of confinement 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
10 
 
in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any 
applicable penalty enhancement."  Therefore, any applicable 
penalty enhancer increases the total amount of confinement that 
was calculated under paragraph (b).    
¶57 Prior to the application of the penalty enhancer, the 
total 
amount 
of 
imprisonment 
available 
for 
Jackson's 
unclassified felony is three years or 36 months.  This 
underlying sentence is bifurcated into a term of confinement and 
a 
term 
of 
extended 
supervision. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1).  
Symbolically, this relationship between confinement, extended 
supervision, 
and 
the 
total 
term 
of 
imprisonment 
can 
be 
represented as follows: "a" = confinement; "b" = extended 
supervision; and "c" = total term of imprisonment.  Pursuant to 
§ 973.01(1), "a" + "b" = "c."  Therefore, "c," the total term of 
imprisonment, equals 36 months.  
¶58 Under 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6., 
the 
maximum 
amount 
of 
confinement for an unclassified felony may not exceed 75 percent 
of the total length of the sentence.  As such, Jackson's maximum 
term 
of 
confinement 
for 
his 
unclassified 
felony, 
pre-
enhancement, is 75 percent of 36 months, or 27 months.  The 
remainder, nine months, is the term of extended supervision.  
Therefore, Jackson's pre-enhanced sentence is represented as 
follows:  "a"= 27; "b"= 9; and "c"= 36.  27 + 9 = 36.   
¶59 Next, pursuant to § 973.01(2)(c), the amount of the 
penalty enhancer is added to the maximum term of confinement 
specified in paragraph (b), which was just determined to be 27 
months.  Jackson's penalty enhancer is six years or 72 months.  
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
11 
 
Adding 72 months to 27 months yields a total period of 
confinement 
of 
99 
months. 
 
Therefore, 
post-enhancement, 
Jackson's term of confinement "a1" has a value of 99.  While the 
amount of confinement is now greater than 75 percent of 
Jackson's total sentence, as discussed supra, § 973.01(2)(b) 
provides that the 75 percent rule for unclassified felonies in 
§ 973.01(2)(b)6. is not applicable to an increase in the term of 
confinement under § 973.01(2)(c).   
¶60 The second sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) provides that if 
"a" is increased by 72 months, "c," as a function of "a" + "b" 
is increased by that same amount:  "a" + 72 + "b" = "c" + 72.  
Jackson's sentence structure now appears as follows:  "a1" + "b" 
= "c1" or 99 + 9 = 108.  Thus, pursuant to the second sentence of 
§ 973.01(2)(c), "c1" is now 108 months, which is 72 months 
greater than "c," the precise amount of the increase in 
confinement between "a" and "a1."  Therefore, Jackson's total 
enhanced sentence should be 108 months, composed of 99 months 
confinement and nine months extended supervision.   
¶61 I do agree with the majority, although for different 
reasons, that the court of appeals erred in applying the 25 
percent rule contained in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d).  Majority 
op., ¶36.  Section 973.01(2)(d) provides:  "The term of extended 
supervision that follows the term of confinement in prison may 
not be less than 25% of the length of the term of confinement in 
prison imposed under par. (b)."  (Emphasis added.)  This section 
has no reference to paragraph (c); it simply provides that when 
a bifurcated sentence is calculated under paragraph (b), the 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
12 
 
term of extended supervision cannot be less than 25 percent of 
the term of confinement calculated under that paragraph.  As 
noted above, § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) provide a two-step procedure for 
calculating sentences with penalty enhancers.  Under the initial 
calculation pursuant to § 973.01(2)(b)6., Jackson's term of 
confinement was 27 months and his term of extended supervision 
was nine months.  Twenty-five percent of 27 months equals 6.75 
months. 
 
Therefore, 
Jackson's 
initial 
term 
of 
extended 
supervision was greater than 25 percent of the initial term of 
confinement and the proscription contained in § 973.01(2)(d) was 
not violated.  As § 973.01(2)(c) provides that a penalty 
enhancer is added to the term of confinement after the original 
sentence is bifurcated under § 973.01(2)(b), the 25 percent rule 
in § 973.01(2)(d) does not apply to the enhanced sentence.   
¶62 The majority states that this approach is reasonable, 
majority op., ¶29, yet, in the interest of "lenity," it elects 
to adopt an approach that ignores the plain language of 
§ 973.01(2)(b)&(c) and contradicts its earlier position that the 
total amount of confinement subject to a penalty enhancer is not 
calculated by adding the enhancer to the original underlying 
term of imprisonment.   
¶63 For these reasons, while I concur in the mandate of 
the majority opinion, I do not join Part IV of the opinion. 
 
No.  02-0947-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
1