Title: Eaglin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-1760, SC13-1785
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2015

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-1760 
____________ 
 
DWIGHT T. EAGLIN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1785 
____________ 
 
DWIGHT T. EAGLIN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 25, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Dwight T. Eaglin, who was twenty-seven years old at the time of the crimes, 
was convicted and sentenced to death for the June 2003 murders of correctional 
officer Darla K. Lathrem and inmate Charles Fuston.  Eaglin committed the 
 
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murders while attempting to escape from Charlotte Correctional Institution, where 
he was serving a life sentence for a prior murder.  This Court affirmed his 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  See Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 950 
(Fla. 2009).   
Eaglin now appeals the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief, 
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and simultaneously 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief and deny Eaglin’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of the crimes as follows: 
The evidence at trial established that in 2003, the Charlotte 
Correctional Institution was undergoing a renovation of the inmate 
dormitories.  That same year, Eaglin, [Stephen] Smith, and [Michael] 
Jones, who were part of a group of inmates permitted to participate in 
the renovation process, began planning an escape attempt.  With 
regard to the escape plans, the inmates constructed an escape ladder 
and a metal tool that would hook to the outer lights of the prison, but 
the tool was destroyed a month before the attempted escape.  Eaglin 
blamed [the inmate victim, Charles] Fuston and John Beaston, another 
inmate, for destroying the tool. 
Two inmates, Kenneth Christopher Lykins and Jesse Baker, 
testified to what they heard about the escape plans.  Lykins testified 
that he overheard Eaglin, Smith, and Jones talking about their 
upcoming escape.  Specifically, Eaglin stated that he would kill 
Fuston before he left because “he didn’t like the way he disrespected 
him.”  Lykins also overheard Eaglin state that he would kill anyone 
 
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who tried to stop him from doing what he was going to do.  On cross-
examination, Lykins, a twelve-time convicted felon, was impeached 
with an affidavit in which he denied knowing anything about the 
escape or the killing of Lathrem and Fuston.  He explained this prior 
inconsistency by stating he had been concerned with his own safety. 
Jesse Baker, another inmate and nine-time convicted felon, also 
testified to overhearing the escape plans.  He specifically heard 
Eaglin, Smith, and Jones stating that “they would kill any bitch that 
got in their way.”  Further, Baker testified that Eaglin wanted to 
“straighten” Fuston, which indicated an intent to kill.  Baker was 
impeached with the fact that he suffered from severe depression and 
was previously housed in the psychiatric dorm and the crisis unit of 
the prison. 
Additional testimony from correctional officers working at the 
time of the escape attempt established that on June 11, 2003, Eaglin 
was observed attempting to jump on the outer-perimeter fence of the 
prison.  When officers responded to the scene, Eaglin was sprayed 
with chemical agents and subdued.  Thereafter, Officer Lathrem was 
found in a mop closet, huddled in a fetal position with injuries to her 
head area.  A medium-sized sledgehammer was located near her body.  
Fuston was located in another cell lying on the floor with blood 
coming from underneath his head.  He was unconscious but still 
breathing at that time.  Beaston was found conscious in a secured cell 
with a large wound in the middle of his forehead.  Beaston was the 
only surviving victim of the attacks. 
The morning after the attempted escape, Eaglin was questioned 
regarding the murders.  Eaglin stated he wanted the “chair,” and that 
he “tried to kill those three people.”  Eaglin also admitted that he tried 
to “jump the fence.” 
With regard to the injuries suffered by the victims, the medical 
examiner, Dr. R. H. Imami, testified that Lathrem’s injuries included a 
hemorrhage in her right eye, two injuries on the right side of her head, 
and injuries on her face.  Dr. Imami found no evidence of defensive 
wounds or injuries and concluded that skull and brain injuries were 
the cause of Lathrem’s death.  The cause of these injuries was heavy, 
blunt force trauma.  Dr. Imami opined that Lathrem was struck at least 
three times and that any of the blows would have caused her death.  
Finally, Dr. Imami stated that she believed the sledgehammer entered 
into evidence caused the injuries. 
 
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Dr. Imami also conducted the autopsy of Fuston.  Fuston had 
injuries to the right and left sides of his face and head, the back of his 
head, and his mouth, in addition to skull fractures caused by blunt 
trauma.  In total, Fuston suffered three to four fatal blows.  Dr. Imami 
did not see typical defensive wounds but she observed a small skin 
scrape on the back of Fuston’s left hand.  She opined that the scrape 
could have been caused when he fell or during subsequent medical 
intervention.  Ultimately, Dr. Imami concluded that skull and brain 
injuries by blunt-force trauma to the head were also the cause of 
Fuston’s death and that the trauma was caused by a hammer. 
Upon the testing of evidence obtained during the investigation 
of the murders, Lathrem’s DNA was discovered on the sledgehammer 
that was near her body.  Both Lathrem’s and Fuston’s DNA were 
located on the pants Eaglin wore on the day of the murder.  Lathrem’s 
DNA was also located on Eaglin’s left boot.  On cross-examination, 
defense counsel referred to earlier testimony of a corrections officer 
who testified that he assisted in removing Lathrem’s body from the 
mop closet and then escorted Eaglin to the visiting park.  The crime 
laboratory analyst conceded that this scenario presented the possibility 
of cross-contamination between Lathrem’s blood and Eaglin’s clothes.  
She also stated that she did not analyze every item sent to her but she 
matched the DNA profile of Lathrem to DNA found on codefendant 
Smith’s right shoe. 
The defense presented no witnesses but moved for a judgment 
of acquittal, which was denied by the court.  The jury convicted 
Eaglin of the first-degree murders of Lathrem and Fuston. 
Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 939-40.   
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Eaglin’s prior 
violent felony—first-degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  Id. at 940.  He was serving this sentence at the time of the 
murders in this case.  Id.  
 
Prior to testifying during the penalty phase, Eaglin stated on the record that 
he did not want to present background mitigation evidence regarding his childhood 
 
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and that his counsel had decided not to present mental health mitigation—a 
decision with which Eaglin informed the trial court that he agreed.  Id. at 945.  
Although Eaglin had informed counsel at the outset of the case that he did not want 
counsel to contact members of his family, counsel nonetheless undertook an 
investigation into Eaglin’s background.  Id.   
Upon review of this potential mitigation, counsel ultimately agreed with 
Eaglin’s decision not to present this information, explaining on the trial record that 
the presentation of mental health mitigation to the jury could be “dangerous,” and 
stating during postconviction proceedings that Eaglin’s background represented a 
“double-edged sword” that could adversely affect his case.  Id. at 946.  Instead, the 
theme of the defense’s mitigation presentation was that the conditions at the 
correctional facility contributed to the occurrence of the crime, including 
inadequate supervision over construction, a failure in security staffing systems, and 
permitting inmate mobility.  Id. at 940, 944 n.4.   
Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended that Eaglin be sentenced 
to death by a vote of eight to four for each murder.  After conducting a Spencer1 
hearing, the trial court entered its order sentencing Eaglin to death.  Id. at 941.  The 
trial court found that the following statutory aggravators applied to Eaglin’s 
murder of Officer Lathrem: (1) the murder was committed by a person under 
                                          
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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sentence of imprisonment; (2) Eaglin had a prior violent felony conviction; (3) the 
murder was committed for the purpose of effecting an escape from custody; (4) the 
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); and (5) the victim was a law 
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of legal duties (merged with 
escape from custody).  Id.  With respect to Eaglin’s murder of Fuston, the trial 
court found that the following statutory aggravators applied: (1) the murder was 
committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Eaglin had a prior 
violent felony conviction; and (3) the murder was CCP.  Id. 
 
After reviewing a presentence investigation report (PSI), the trial court 
found in mitigation that “Eaglin suffered from a severely abusive childhood with a 
severely dysfunctional family.”  Id.  The trial court assigned this mitigator some 
weight.  Id.  However, the trial court rejected the proposed mitigators stemming 
from the allegations of prison negligence.  Id.  Finding that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigators, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and 
sentenced Eaglin to death for both murders.  Id.  On direct appeal, this Court 
affirmed Eaglin’s convictions and death sentences.  Id. at 950.2   
                                          
 
2.  Eaglin raised six issues on direct appeal, all of which this Court rejected: 
(1) the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from impeaching a State 
witness; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to admit into penalty-phase evidence 
the videotape of an interview of a former guard trainee; (3) the jury and the trial 
court were not presented with available mitigation evidence, and the trial court 
failed to consider all mitigating evidence available in the record; (4) the trial court 
erred in using Eaglin’s supposed lack of remorse against him in sentencing him to 
 
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Eaglin subsequently filed a timely initial motion for postconviction relief 
and an amended motion for postconviction relief, ultimately raising eleven claims.3  
Following a Huff4 hearing, the postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing 
on several of Eaglin’s claims: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
adequately advise Eaglin regarding his limited waiver of penalty-phase mitigation 
                                          
 
death; (5) the trial court erred in giving an instruction on and finding the CCP 
aggravator; and (6) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional.  Id. at 941.   
3.  Eaglin’s postconviction claims were as follows: (1) his constitutional 
rights were violated because he was denied access to public records; (2) requiring 
him to file his postconviction motion within one year after his conviction and 
sentence became final, as required by rule 3.851, violates due process and equal 
protection guarantees; (3) counsel were ineffective before trial and during the guilt 
phase of trial for (A) failing to argue, in the motion to suppress Eaglin’s 
statements, that he was not capable of adequately understanding his Miranda rights 
and therefore did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights; 
(B) failing to move for a change of venue and failing to undertake voir dire of the 
jurors regarding publicity of the case during jury selection; and (C) failing to 
challenge the admissibility of scientific evidence and testimony; (4) counsel were 
ineffective for failing to adequately advise Eaglin regarding the nature, 
circumstances, and consequences of his limited waiver of penalty-phase mitigation 
and failing to advise the trial court of Eaglin’s history of mental illness and non-
compliance with necessary medication prior to the in-court colloquy; (5) counsel 
were ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare mitigation 
evidence; (6) newly discovered evidence established that the forensic evidence 
presented by the State lacks scientific rigor; (7) Florida’s lethal injection procedure 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (8) the State’s use of inconsistent and 
irreconcilable theories in order to obtain the death sentence was unconstitutional; 
(9) the combination of these errors constituted cumulative error; (10) Eaglin’s 
convictions are unreliable because the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and 
(11) the appointment of Dr. Harry Krop as a confidential competency expert 
created a conflict of interest.  
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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and failing to advise the trial court of his history of mental illness and non-
compliance with necessary medication prior to an in-court colloquy; (2) trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare 
mitigation evidence; and (3) trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of 
trial for failing to argue that Eaglin was not capable of adequately understanding 
his Miranda5 rights. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Eaglin’s 
amended motion for postconviction relief.  This appeal follows, and Eaglin also 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  
ANALYSIS 
I.  Rule 3.851 Claims 
 
On appeal to this Court, Eaglin raises three claims challenging the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief.  First, Eaglin asserts that his trial counsel 
were ineffective during the penalty phase.  Second, Eaglin contends that he also 
received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, pertaining to 
motions to suppress his inculpatory statements.  Finally, Eaglin asserts that the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying two of his postconviction claims.   
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Penalty-Phase Counsel 
                                          
 
 
5.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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In his first claim on appeal, Eaglin argues that trial counsel were ineffective 
during the penalty-phase proceedings based on two alleged errors.  First, Eaglin 
contends that trial counsel were ineffective with respect to his statement that he did 
not wish to present background mitigation and that he agreed with counsel’s 
strategic decision to not present mental health mitigation during the penalty phase.  
As part of this claim alleging that his waiver of mitigation was not knowing and 
voluntary, Eaglin contends both that the colloquy undertaken by the trial court did 
not satisfy the requirements articulated by this Court in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 
2d 246 (Fla. 1993), and that counsel were ineffective in failing to inform the trial 
court that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was not medicated prior 
to the colloquy.  Second, Eaglin argues that trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to undertake an adequate investigation into his background and mental 
health history, and thereby could not adequately advise him regarding the 
presentation of this mitigation during the penalty phase.  We address each aspect of 
this ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel claim in turn. 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has explained that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
 
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demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. 
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted)).   
As to the second requirement of prejudice, this Court has explained: 
With respect to those claims alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel specifically during the penalty phase, penalty-phase prejudice 
under the Strickland standard is measured by “whether the error of 
trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence in the sentence of 
death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and 
the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.”  Hurst [v. 
State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 (Fla. 2009)].  Under this standard, a 
defendant is not required “to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, 
but rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in [that] outcome.’ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 
(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).  “To assess that 
probability, [the Court] consider[s] ‘the totality of the available 
mitigation evidence . . .’ and ‘reweigh[s] it against the evidence in 
aggravation.’ ”  Id. at 41 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
397-98 (2000)). 
Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 873 (Fla. 2013). 
“[T]his Court’s standard of review is two pronged: (1) this Court must defer 
to the [trial] court’s findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial 
evidence supports them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the 
deficiency and prejudice prongs.”  Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010) 
(quoting Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 2004)).  “Thus, under 
 
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Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law 
and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court’s factual findings.”  
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).   
1.  Knowing & Voluntary Waiver of Mitigation 
Eaglin’s first argument involves the colloquy undertaken prior to penalty-
phase testimony, during which Eaglin and his counsel informed the trial court that 
Eaglin did not wish to present mitigation evidence regarding his background and 
that counsel had made the strategic decision not to present mental health 
mitigation—a strategic decision with which Eaglin informed the trial court he 
agreed.  Eaglin now asserts that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because 
the trial court’s colloquy did not comply with the requirements established by this 
Court in Koon, 619 So. 2d 246, and because counsel failed to advise the trial court 
of his mental illness and lack of medication.   
As an initial matter, we reject Eaglin’s argument pertaining to the adequacy 
of the Koon inquiry itself because this claim should have been raised on direct 
appeal.  See Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 853-54 (Fla. 2003).  Moreover, even if 
this claim was not procedurally barred, it would still be without merit because 
Koon is not applicable where the defendant does not waive all penalty-phase 
mitigation.  See Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 188 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he 
requirements of Koon are not applicable in this case because [the defendant] 
 
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presented mitigating evidence.”).  As we recognized on direct appeal in rejecting 
Eaglin’s claim that the trial court failed to consider all available mitigation in the 
record, this is not a case in which the defendant waived his right to present 
mitigation evidence.  See Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 945.   
We also reject Eaglin’s argument pertaining to counsel’s performance during 
the colloquy, which the postconviction court denied after holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  Specifically, Eaglin contends that counsel were aware that Dr. Harry 
Krop, a psychologist retained by the defense, had diagnosed Eaglin with bipolar 
disorder and that, as a result of this diagnosis, he was at a greater risk of suffering 
manic episodes, which he asserts directly affected his ability to have a rational 
understanding of the proceedings against him.   
As noted by the postconviction court in denying this claim, however, trial 
counsel had no reason to question Eaglin’s competency due to his bipolar 
diagnosis.  Therefore, trial counsel’s decision not to inform the trial court about his 
bipolar diagnosis and its effect on his competency prior to the colloquy cannot be 
deemed deficient.  In fact, Eaglin recognizes that trial counsel were well aware of 
Eaglin’s bipolar diagnosis prior to the penalty phase.  Indeed, prior to the guilt 
phase of the trial, counsel had retained Dr. Krop to undertake an evaluation of 
Eaglin’s mental health status.   
 
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Although Dr. Krop diagnosed Eaglin with bipolar disorder and antisocial 
personality disorder, he also informed counsel that he “did not feel that there was 
neuropsychological impairment” and that Eaglin was a “very intelligent 
individual.”  Intelligence testing undertaken by Dr. Krop prior to trial indicated 
that Eaglin had a full scale IQ score of 117.  Additionally, Dr. Krop specifically 
testified during the postconviction evidentiary hearing that, based on his evaluation 
of Eaglin, he had no concerns regarding his competency, and counsel testified that 
they were aware of Dr. Krop’s diagnoses.   
 
Moreover, co-counsel Doug Withee testified that during the trial 
proceedings, Eaglin was “bright” and “alert” and that Withee “did not have any 
problem communicating with . . . Eaglin [and Eaglin] did not appear to have any 
problem communicating with [him].  [Eaglin] seemed to understand the whole 
picture.”  Co-counsel Neil McLoughlin supported Withee’s impressions of Eaglin, 
stating that in his view Eaglin was competent and that there was “no good-faith 
basis” to undertake a competency evaluation.  
 
Accordingly, Eaglin has not demonstrated that counsel’s decision not to 
inform the trial court of his bipolar disorder and medication regime constituted 
deficient performance.  We therefore conclude that this argument is without merit 
and reject Eaglin’s claim. 
2.  Failure to Adequately Advise Eaglin Regarding Presentation of Background & 
Mental Health Mitigation Evidence 
 
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Eaglin’s next argument is that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
properly advise him regarding the decision not to present background and mental 
health mitigation during the penalty phase.  Specifically, Eaglin asserts that trial 
counsel did not undertake a meaningful investigation into these two categories of 
potentially mitigating evidence and therefore could not adequately advise him on 
the potential merit of presenting such evidence.  Additionally, Eaglin argues that, 
although trial counsel may have undertaken some limited investigation into 
potential mitigation, counsel decided to present only the prison negligence 
mitigation before reviewing the results of this investigation.  Moreover, Eaglin 
contends that counsel’s strategy to pursue prison negligence mitigation evidence in 
lieu of “conventional” mitigation evidence was patently unreasonable. 
Eaglin claims that, through several lay witnesses, he could have presented 
compelling mitigation evidence regarding his traumatic childhood and extensive 
head trauma that he suffered while boxing and playing football.  In support, Eaglin 
called multiple lay witnesses at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Although 
none of these witnesses testified during the penalty phase, each of them asserted 
that they were available and would have testified if they had been asked.  
Additionally, Eaglin argues that he could have presented compelling mental health 
mitigation.  In support, Eaglin presented the testimony of numerous mental health 
 
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experts during the postconviction evidentiary hearing to explain the extent of his 
mental health problems, including alleged brain damage and bipolar disorder.   
After reviewing the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the 
postconviction court determined that trial counsel’s investigation into Eaglin’s 
potential background and mental health mitigation was adequate and that counsel’s 
decision not to present this mitigation represented reasonable trial strategy.  With 
respect to trial counsel’s investigation, the postconviction court noted that “[t]he 
record reflects that the defense team visited [Eaglin’s] mother, grandfather, and 
other family members, retained a defense mental health expert, and retained a 
mitigation specialist.”  The postconviction court concluded that trial counsel’s 
decision not to present background or mental health mitigation was clear trial 
strategy, made after having adequately investigated Eaglin’s background and 
mental health and with his complete agreement with that strategy at that time.   
As to deficiency, the postconviction court concluded as follows: 
  
Merely because postconviction counsel has secured experts 
years after trial who have more favorable opinions does not establish 
that trial counsel was deficient for relying on the defense experts at 
the time of trial.  Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000); Jones 
v. State, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999).  The information from Dr. Krop 
at the time of trial reveal[ed] no evidence of post concussive 
syndrome, seizures, or that Defendant’s brain was not functioning 
normally.  Rather, Dr. Krop found no neurological impairment.  Trial 
counsel were not ineffective for relying on this information in 
formulating their trial strategy and deciding to focus on what they 
believed was the more effective mitigation evidence of negligence on 
the part of the Department of Corrections.   
 
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Regarding Eaglin’s potential background mitigation, the postconviction 
court explained that Eaglin’s mother left him when he was three years old and thus, 
“even had she been called to testify at trial, it is unlikely she would have been able 
to provide any information about [Eaglin] except his first year or so, and nothing 
about the rest of [his] life.”  The postconviction court also explained that, while 
Eaglin’s brother would have been able to testify about the childhood abuse both he 
and Eaglin suffered, Eaglin “presented no testimony [at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing] that [he] was negatively affected mentally by that abuse.”  In 
fact, Eaglin’s brother affirmatively testified that “their abusive childhood did not 
result in [Eaglin] behaving erratically or unpredictably.”  The postconviction court 
concluded that “any potential mitigation evidence regarding [Eaglin’s] abusive 
childhood . . . would have been countered in cross-examination by all the positive 
aspects of his life and his accomplishments in spite of enduring an abusive 
childhood.” 
Regarding Eaglin’s potential mental health mitigation, the postconviction 
court explained that his “family and friends did not testify as to any obvious signs 
of mental illness or drastic mood changes, and that [Eaglin] did not report any such 
symptoms until he was arrested.”  The postconviction court observed that “the 
defense experts merely diagnosed [Eaglin] with bipolar disorder based on one prior 
diagnosis given without any supporting testing, and based solely on [Eaglin’s] own 
 
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self-reporting.”  In addition, the postconviction court found significance in 
Eaglin’s “inconsistencies in self reporting his symptoms to defense experts during 
postconviction evaluations.”   
Ultimately, the postconviction court determined that even if there was 
deficiency, there was no prejudice established.  We agree.  We do not address 
deficiency because it is clear that the prejudice component cannot be established 
even if counsel were deemed deficient.  See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546 (“A 
court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific 
ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice 
component is not satisfied.” (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932)). 
Even if counsel had presented testimony during the penalty phase that shed 
light on Eaglin’s abusive childhood, his dysfunctional family, and that he suffered 
from mental health disorders, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase 
would not be undermined when viewed in the context of the penalty phase 
evidence and the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.  See Hurst, 18 
So. 3d at 1013.  Both of Eaglin’s death sentences were supported by multiple 
aggravators, two of which—CCP and prior violent felony conviction—this Court 
has recognized as among the most serious aggravators under Florida’s death 
penalty scheme.  See Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 974 (Fla. 2011).  Further, the 
prior violent felony aggravator is especially significant in this case, given that 
 
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Eaglin was serving a life sentence for a prior murder when he committed the 
murders in this case.   
In addition, although the jury did not hear information regarding Eaglin’s 
childhood, the trial court considered his abusive childhood based on the PSI.  In 
fact, the trial court found as a nonstatutory mitigator that “Eaglin suffered from a 
severely abusive childhood with a severely dysfunctional family.”  The trial court 
assigned this factor some weight, but still concluded that the numerous aggravators 
outweighed the mitigators.  See Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 941.   
Accordingly, we conclude that any alleged failures of counsel during the 
penalty phase do not undermine confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase.  
We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief on this claim. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Guilt-Phase Counsel 
In his next claim, Eaglin asserts that trial counsel were ineffective during the 
guilt-phase proceedings for failing to effectively argue several motions to suppress 
statements Eaglin made to Florida Department of Law Enforcement Agent 
Uebelacker after his arrest.  The statements at issue occurred on the morning of 
June 12, 2003, at Charlotte Correctional Institution, where Agent Uebelacker met 
Eaglin in an administrative office at the prison.  When Eaglin entered the office, he 
made several unsolicited spontaneous statements to Agent Uebelacker, which 
 
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included references to wanting the electric chair and that Eaglin had “tried to kill 
those three people.”   
After Eaglin made these statements, Agent Uebelacker read Eaglin his 
Miranda rights.  Then, after Eaglin stated that he understood his rights, Agent 
Uebelacker asked him if he would allow the interview to be recorded.  In the 
recorded interview, Eaglin himself actually recited his Miranda rights for Agent 
Uebelacker without solicitation.  To ensure that Eaglin understood his rights, 
Agent Uebelacker proceeded to read Eaglin his Miranda rights again.  During the 
recorded interview, Eaglin stated that he “decided to jump the fence” and reiterated 
that he wanted “the chair.”   
 
Eaglin’s trial counsel filed multiple motions to suppress the statements, 
arguing several theories of suppression, including a Miranda violation and lack of 
voluntariness.  With respect to Eaglin’s claim that his statements were not 
voluntary, counsel argued that Eaglin was unable to exercise free will because he 
suffered from lacerations on his arms, back, and legs; was sprayed with a chemical 
agent during the escape attempt; was kicked in the head; received minimal medical 
treatment; and had not slept for more than thirty hours.  The trial court denied the 
motions to suppress.   
In his postconviction claim, Eaglin argued that trial counsel were deficient in 
litigating the motions to suppress because counsel should have argued that a 
 
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bipolar “manic episode” rendered him incapable of knowingly and voluntarily 
waiving his Miranda rights.  The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing 
on this claim but ultimately denied it.   
We conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim.  
Eaglin has not established either that trial counsel were deficient in litigating the 
motions to suppress or that raising the bipolar “manic episode” as a basis to 
suppress his statements would have resulted in the motions being granted.    
In support of this claim, Eaglin relies on testimony elicited during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing that demonstrated he may have been suffering 
from a bipolar “manic episode” at the time he met with Agent Uebelacker.  
Specifically, Eaglin points to the testimony of Dr. Philip Harvey, a clinical 
psychologist, who testified that it was his opinion that Eaglin was suffering from a 
bipolar “manic episode” at the time of the crimes and that bipolar “manic 
episodes” can last for several days.  Dr. Harvey explained that suffering from a 
bipolar “manic episode” can affect an individual’s judgment.  This testimony was 
supported by Dr. David Pickar, a psychiatrist, who also testified at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing that Eaglin was likely experiencing bipolar 
manic symptoms on the day of the murders.   
However, as noted by the postconviction court, this testimony presented at 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing is contradicted by the evidence that was 
 
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presented during the trial proceedings regarding the motions to suppress.  For 
example, a nurse at the correctional facility testified before the trial court that she 
observed Eaglin in a holding cell following his apprehension, and he was “alert 
and oriented, responding to her questions verbally.”  Eaglin also testified during a 
hearing on the motions to suppress, where he admitted that he had made the 
statements, that he had recited his rights during the recorded interview, and that he 
understood those rights.   
Trial counsel litigated the motions to suppress at length, asserting multiple 
bases for suppression.  Although Eaglin now contends that trial counsel were 
deficient in not raising his mental illness, his postconviction counsel did not 
question trial counsel during the evidentiary hearing regarding their strategy in 
litigating the motions to suppress or why the bipolar “manic episode” was not 
raised.  While we disagree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that this 
failure to specifically question trial counsel constituted a waiver of the claim, we 
agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that the evidence Eaglin did 
present fails to establish that he was incapable of understanding his Miranda rights.  
Eaglin has also failed to demonstrate how, even if the bipolar “manic episode” had 
been raised in litigating the motions to suppress, this would have resulted in the 
motions being granted.  Accordingly, because Eaglin cannot demonstrate either 
deficiency or prejudice, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.   
 
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C.  Summarily Denied Claims 
Eaglin also asserts on appeal that the postconviction court erred in 
summarily denying two claims without holding an evidentiary hearing: (1) the 
State utilized inconsistent, irreconcilable, and misleading theories of prosecution in 
his trial and the trial of one of his codefendants, Stephen Smith; and (2) the State 
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  Because both of these claims are refuted by the record, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s summary denial of these claims. 
 
 1.  The State’s Use of Inconsistent Theories of Prosecution in Eaglin’s Trial 
& in the Trial of Eaglin’s Codefendant 
 
 
Eaglin first asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 
his claim that the State utilized inconsistent theories in prosecuting Eaglin and 
codefendant Stephen Smith and thereby violated his due process rights.  
Specifically, Eaglin argues that in Smith’s trial, the State argued that Smith had 
been planning the escape for months and only brought Eaglin in as the “muscle” 
shortly before the escape attempt.  He also argues that Smith, who did not testify at 
Eaglin’s trial, said in a recorded statement that was introduced at Smith’s trial that 
there was no plan to kill inmate Fuston or whichever prison guard they 
encountered.  Eaglin asserts that in his trial, the State conversely portrayed him as 
the primary actor, which directly conflicts with the State’s theory in Smith’s trial.    
 
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 Even if the use of inconsistent theories of prosecution could rise to the level 
of a due process violation, the postconviction court correctly concluded that the 
State presented consistent theories of prosecution in Eaglin’s and Smith’s trials.  
As noted by the postconviction court, “the State argued in Smith’s case that Eaglin 
committed the murders, followed Smith’s plan, and Smith was a principal.  At 
[Eaglin’s] trial, the State again argued [Eaglin] committed the murders.”  A review 
of the record supports the postconviction court’s factual findings.   
  The fact that the State used consistent prosecution theories is further 
bolstered by the fact that the trial court in Smith’s case stated that the State could 
not argue that Smith may have wielded the sledgehammer.  Therefore, Eaglin’s 
claim is refuted by the record, and the postconviction court did not err in 
summarily denying this claim.  
2.  The State Withheld Exculpatory Evidence from Eaglin in Violation of Brady 
Eaglin next asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 
his claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense in 
violation of Brady.  Specifically, Eaglin asserts that the State failed to disclose to 
the defense that one of his other codefendants, Michael Jones, had been offered a 
plea agreement in exchange for his cooperation.  Additionally, Eaglin contends 
that, as part of a plea agreement, the State Attorney’s Office agreed that it would 
use its best efforts to have codefendant Jones incarcerated in a prison outside the 
 
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State of Florida and that letters between an assistant state attorney and the Florida 
Department of Corrections (DOC) regarding these efforts were not revealed.  
Eaglin claims he only learned of this information on May 20, 2011, upon 
postconviction counsel’s review of Jones’s 2008 court file at the Charlotte County 
Clerk’s Office. 
The record conclusively refutes this claim because the record demonstrates 
that on November 10, 2005, an assistant state attorney took proffered testimony 
from Jones while in the presence of Jones’s counsel, and on December 22, 2005, 
the assistant state attorney provided a copy of Jones’s proffered testimony to 
Eaglin’s co-counsel Withee.  At the outset of the proffer, the State made clear that 
the parties had not entered into a plea agreement.  In the proffer, Jones discussed 
the escape attempt that occurred on the night of the murders, consistently 
implicating Eaglin in the escape attempt.  Jones did not testify at Eaglin’s trial, and 
Eaglin was subsequently convicted of the murders on March 31, 2006.   
After Eaglin was convicted and sentenced to death, Jones subsequently 
entered into a plea agreement with the State in January 2007.  In return, Jones 
would be sentenced to life in prison, and the State Attorney’s Office would use its 
best efforts to encourage the DOC to allow Jones to serve his sentence outside the 
State of Florida.  In Jones’s plea colloquy, the State confirmed on the record that 
these were terms agreed to in the plea agreement.   
 
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In order to show a Brady violation, Eaglin must demonstrate that “(1) 
favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, 
[he] was prejudiced.”  Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 1002, 1027-28 (Fla. 2014).   
With respect to Jones’s proffer, the record refutes Eaglin’s claim that this 
information was suppressed by the State.  As noted by the postconviction court, a 
transcript of this proffer was provided to Eaglin’s co-counsel Withee on December 
22, 2005, months before Eaglin’s trial.  Similarly, Eaglin’s claim that the State 
suppressed the terms of Jones’s plea agreement, including that the State Attorney’s 
Office would use its best efforts to ensure Jones served his sentence out of state, is 
refuted by the record in that the State agreed to the terms of the plea agreement in 
open court, during Jones’s plea colloquy, which took place in January 2007. 
Moreover, the record refutes Eaglin’s assertion that the allegedly suppressed 
information constituted favorable evidence.  The record shows that Jones’s proffer, 
as well as the terms of the subsequent plea agreement, were not exculpatory.  In his 
proffer, Jones consistently inculpated Eaglin in the escape attempt.  Further, 
neither the proffer itself nor the terms of the plea agreement had any impeachment 
value, as Jones did not testify at Eaglin’s trial and did not enter into the plea 
agreement until after Eaglin had already been convicted.   
 
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For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial 
of this claim.  We turn next to Eaglin’s habeas corpus petition. 
II.  Habeas Corpus Petition 
 
In his habeas petition, Eaglin raises one issue—appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to identify and raise on direct appeal that an actual conflict of 
interest was created when the trial court appointed Dr. Krop to serve as a 
confidential competency expert for Eaglin’s codefendant, Michael Jones.  Eaglin 
asserts that Dr. Krop’s appointment as a competency expert in Jones’s case 
prejudiced his own case and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise this claim on direct appeal.  Eaglin also asserts that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to supplement the record with portions of the Jones trial 
transcript.  We disagree.  
 
In preparation for trial, Eaglin’s counsel retained Dr. Krop on March 22, 
2004, to undertake a mental health evaluation.  Dr. Krop interviewed Eaglin, 
administered testing, and ultimately diagnosed him with bipolar disorder and 
antisocial personality disorder.  Although trial counsel originally indicated that 
they intended to call Dr. Krop during the penalty-phase proceedings, counsel 
decided against presenting mental health mitigation, and Dr. Krop did not testify.  
Eaglin was ultimately sentenced to death on March 31, 2006, and he filed his 
notice of appeal in this Court on April 21, 2006. 
 
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Several months after the trial court had sentenced Eaglin to death and Eaglin 
had filed his notice of appeal, Jones attempted to enter into a plea agreement 
regarding the first-degree murder of the correctional officer killed during the 
escape attempt.  However, the trial court did not initially accept Jones’s plea and 
orally appointed Dr. Krop, along with two other doctors, to evaluate Jones’s 
competency.  Subsequently, in October 2006, the trial court issued a written order 
appointing Dr. Krop to undertake a competency evaluation in Jones’s case.  In 
accordance with this appointment, Dr. Krop undertook a competency evaluation of 
Jones, and the trial court ultimately accepted Jones’s plea in January 2007.   
 
Eaglin alleges that Dr. Krop’s subsequent appointment as a competency 
expert in Jones’s case created a conflict of interest due to the fact that he had 
previously served as a confidential mental health expert in Eaglin’s case.  Eaglin 
alleges that the conflict of interest is established by “the simple fact that he was 
working as a confidential psychologist for two codefendants with opposing 
interests.”  Based on this alleged conflict of interest, Eaglin asserts that the counsel 
he received was adversely affected.  In seeking habeas corpus relief, Eaglin argues 
that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this conflict of interest on direct appeal 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  
In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Eaglin 
relies on this Court’s opinion in Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (Fla. 
 
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2003), in which this Court stated that it was error for a postconviction court to 
allow a mental health expert to testify for the State at an evidentiary hearing where 
that expert had previously been appointed as a confidential mental health expert for 
a codefendant.  This Court stated that, because the codefendants’ interests were 
antagonistic, a conflict of interest existed, and it was unlikely that the expert could 
render a truly objective opinion.  Id.   
While Eaglin appears to analogize Walton to this case, Walton is completely 
inapposite.  Unlike in Walton, Eaglin cannot establish any alleged conflict of 
interest that prejudiced his case, as Dr. Krop did not offer any testimony at 
Eaglin’s trial and was only appointed to Jones’s case after he had completed all 
work on Eaglin’s case and after Eaglin was convicted and sentenced to death.  
Moreover, Dr. Krop, along with two other mental health experts, evaluated Jones 
only for competence and did not undertake any further investigation into Jones’s 
mental health.  Thus, Eaglin’s reliance on Walton is misplaced, and his assertion 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this argument on direct 
appeal is unavailing.    
Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to 
raise this meritless issue on direct appeal, or for failing to supplement the record in 
order to facilitate presentation of this meritless claim.  See Jennings v. State, 123 
So. 3d 1101, 1124 (Fla. 2013) (holding that appellate counsel was not deficient for 
 
- 29 - 
failing to raise a meritless issue on appeal).  Therefore, we deny Eaglin’s petition 
for habeas corpus relief.  
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief, 
and we also deny Eaglin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County,  
Christine Hissam Greider, Judge - Case No. 082003CF0015250001X 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, William 
McKinley Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-
South, and Elizabeth Tandiwe Stewart, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent