Title: Parks v. John Petroleum, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 408, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES G. PARKS, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN PETROLEUM, INC.,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 408, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 06C-10-039 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: February 11, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: April 12, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 12th day of April 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Charles G. Parks, Jr. (“Parks”), filed 
an appeal from the Superior Court’s June 4, 2010 decision accepting in part 
the Superior Court Commissioner’s July 31, 2009 Report and 
Recommendation and recommitting the matter to the Commissioner for re-
calculation of the damages owed by Parks and entry of judgment.1  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(4)(iv), “[a] judge of the [Superior] Court shall 
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which an objection is 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in November 1996, the plaintiff-
appellee, John Petroleum, Inc. (“JPI”), leased a gas station and delicatessen 
on Philadelphia Pike, Wilmington, Delaware, to Eastern Petroleum, Inc.  
Attached to the lease was a Guaranty that permitted assignment of the lease 
to a guarantor who would be liable with the tenant for the payment and 
performance of the tenant’s obligations under the lease.  The lease was 
modified in 1997, 1999 and 2000 to provide for changes in the amount of 
rent.  In 2000, the lease was assigned to F. Warren Harris, Sr. & Son, LLC.  
In 2002, that entity assigned the lease to Parks, a Connecticut attorney.  In 
2004, Parks in turn assigned the lease to Urso Enterprises, Inc. (“Urso”).   
 
(3) 
The language of the 2004 assignment explicitly provided that, 
“. . . [f]or a period of Five (5) years, up to and including the 20th day of May 
2009, [Parks] shall remain obligated to Landlord pursuant to the Third 
Amendment, dated April 21, 2002, which shall remain in full force and 
effect as to [Parks] until that date.”  Under the April 21, 2002 Third 
Amendment, Parks agreed to “assume all of the obligations of the Tenant 
under the Lease.”  
                                                                                                                                                 
made.  A judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations of the Commissioner.  A judge may also . . . recommit the matter to the 
Commissioner with instructions.” 
 
3
 
(4) 
Soon after taking possession in 2004, Urso defaulted on the 
rent.  After giving Urso several opportunities to cure the default, all of which 
were unsuccessful, JPI started eviction proceedings.  In October 2004, JPI 
sent a certified letter to Parks informing him of Urso’s default.  JPI took 
possession of the property in August 2005.  The buildings and grounds had 
sustained substantial damage and a display case, grill and meat slicer were 
missing from the delicatessen.  After making a number of costly repairs, JPI 
leased the property to another party in December 2005.  In October 2006, 
JPI filed suit against Urso, Peter A. Urso and Parks.  Default judgment was 
entered against Urso and Peter A. Urso in February 2008.   
 
(5) 
JPI’s claims against Parks were tried before a Superior Court 
Commissioner in June 2009.  The Commissioner found Parks liable for rent 
from July to December 2005, past due taxes, as well as an insurance 
premium on the property and damages to the property in the total amount of 
$78,834.94.  Parks appealed to the Superior Court from the Commissioner’s 
report and recommendation.  The Superior Court adopted the bulk of the 
Commissioner’s findings, but remanded the matter to the Commissioner for 
re-calculation of damages, directing him to include in the amount of the 
damages an additional $28,538.75 in past due rent, bringing the total amount 
of damages to $107,373.69.  On June 8, 2010, the Commissioner modified 
 
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the amount of the damages in accordance with the Superior Court’s direction 
and requested the Prothonotary to enter judgment against Parks in that 
amount.        
 
(6) 
In its June 4, 2010 decision, the Superior Court concluded that 
Parks assumed the status of “guarantor” under the unambiguous language of 
the lease agreement, including the 2004 assignment, by virtue of his own 
admission at the hearing before the Commissioner and under Delaware law.2  
Contrary to Parks’ argument, the Superior Court also concluded that, in 
accordance with the agreement, as well as the applicable law, Parks was not 
entitled to written notice from JPI of Urso’s breach.3  The Superior Court 
also concluded, based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, that JPI 
made reasonable efforts to mitigate Parks’ damages by making repairs to the 
property and re-letting it within a reasonable time.  Finally, the Superior 
Court concluded that Parks’ affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver 
were unsupported by the evidence adduced at the hearing.    
 
(7) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s decision, Parks claims 
that the Superior Court’s decision was legally erroneous because a) he did 
                                                 
2 Schwartz v. Centennial Ins. Co., 1980 WL 77940 (Del. Ch. 1980) (citing, inter alia, 4 
Corbin, Contracts, §866; Restatement, Second, Contracts, §150; 6 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Assignments, §110). 
3 Orange Bowl Corp. v. Warren, 386 S.E. 2d 293, 295 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).  
Nevertheless, JPI did send a certified letter to Parks at his business address on October 7, 
2004 notififying him of Urso’s breach, a fact undisputed by Parks at the hearing. 
 
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not receive legally sufficient notice of Urso’s default or a legally sufficient 
demand for performance by JPI; b) JPI implicitly abandoned the guaranty 
and waived any recourse against him; c) the damages incurred by Urso were 
not foreseeable; and d) his affirmative defenses were not adequately 
considered by either the Commissioner or the Superior Court. 
 
(8) 
Under Delaware law, all rights and remedies under a 
commercial lease agreement are governed by general contract principles.4  
According to such principles, contracts must be construed as a whole, to 
give effect to the intentions of the parties.5  Where the language of the 
contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent is ascertained by 
giving the language its ordinary and usual meaning.6  A contract is 
ambiguous only when its provisions are reasonably or fairly susceptible of 
different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.7 
 
(9) 
An appeal to this Court from a decision of the Superior Court is 
based upon the law and the facts.8  This Court will accept the findings of the 
Superior Court if they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the 
product of an orderly and logical reasoning process, even if independently 
                                                 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, §5101(b). 
5 Northwestern Nat’l. Ins. Co. v. Esmark, Inc., 672 A.2d 41, 43 (Del. 1996). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972). 
 
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we would have reached a different conclusion.9  Only when the Superior 
Court’s findings are clearly wrong and justice requires their overturn will we 
decline to accept them.10  We review conclusions of law de novo.11    
 
(10) We have carefully reviewed the Commissioner’s July 31, 2009 
report, the Superior Court’s June 4, 2010 decision, as well as the record in 
this case.  We conclude that there was no legal error or abuse of discretion 
on the part of the Superior Court and that its factual findings, including the 
amount of damages owed by Parks, are supported by the record and are the 
product of an orderly and logical deductive process.  We affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment on the basis of its well-reasoned decision dated June 4, 
2010. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clarendon Nat’l. Ins. Co., 604 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1992).