Title: In re D.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 339A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 339A19 
Filed 11 December 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) and on writ of certiorari 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review orders entered on 15 April 2019 and 18 
June 2019 by Judge Shamieka L. Rhinehart in District Court, Durham County.  This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020, 
but was determined upon the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to 
Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department 
of Social Services; and William A. Blancato for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Sean P. Vitrano for respondent-appellant father. 
 
Christopher M. Watford for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
Respondent-father Marcus B. and respondent-mother Danita M. appeal from 
orders entered by the trial court terminating their parental rights in their minor 
children D.M., M.M., and D.M.1  After careful consideration of the arguments that 
                                            
1 D.M., M.M., and D.M. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion 
as, respectively, “David,” “Michael,” and “Danielle,” which are pseudonyms used to protect 
the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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have been advanced in the parents’ briefs in light of the record and the applicable 
law, we affirm the trial court’s termination orders. 
I.  Factual Background 
On 25 August 2015, the Durham County Department of Social Services filed a 
petition alleging that David and Michael were neglected juveniles.  In its petition, 
DSS alleged that, from 22 May 2014 to 24 June 2015, the family had received in-home 
services that were intended to address the parents’ problems with domestic violence 
and substance abuse.  However, respondent-father failed to engage in services that 
were intended to address issues relating to domestic violence, mental health, or 
substance abuse during this time.  Although the last documented incident of domestic 
violence involving the parents had occurred on 18 January 2015, a social worker 
observed “aggressive, controlling speech” that respondent-father had directed toward 
respondent-mother on three separate occasions between 6 July 2015 and 14 August 
2015. 
DSS further alleged that, on 5 July 2015, it had received a new report that the 
parents had left David and Michael, who were three and one years old, respectively, 
at the time, in the family home by themselves.  According to DSS, the family home 
was “regularly filthy, cluttered, and unsanitary with open garbage and roaches on 
the floor.”  Respondent-mother told representatives of DSS that she absented herself 
from the home every evening until it became time for the children to go to bed because 
respondent-father would drink alcohol, become confrontational, and act in a verbally 
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aggressive manner.  Although respondent-mother was five months pregnant with her 
eleventh child, she admitted to DSS representatives that she had smoked marijuana 
until relatively recently.  On 14 August 2015, respondent-mother left the family home 
with David and Michael and entered a domestic violence shelter. 
On 22 October 2015, Judge William A. Marsh, III, entered an order 
determining that David and Michael were neglected juveniles in that they “are not 
receiving proper care or supervision or live in an environment injurious to their 
welfare.”  Judge Marsh ordered that David and Michael remain in respondent-
mother’s custody on the condition that she provide them with a safe and stable living 
environment and abstain from being with respondent-father in the presence of the 
children.  In addition, Judge Marsh prohibited the parents from residing together 
with the children.  As a precondition for allowing the parents to reunify with the 
children, Judge Marsh ordered respondent-mother to ensure that the children were 
properly supervised at all times; to participate in and complete domestic violence 
services and follow all recommendations; refrain from engaging in physical 
altercations with respondent-father; actively participate in mental health and 
substance abuse services and comply with all resulting recommendations; submit to 
random drug screens; complete a parenting program; and obtain and maintain safe 
and stable housing.  Similarly, Judge Marsh ordered respondent-father to ascertain 
the amount of child support that he should be required to pay through the IV-D 
program; ensure that the children were properly supervised at all times; participate 
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and complete anger management services through the Duke Addictions program; 
refrain from engaging in physical altercations with respondent-mother; comply with 
all substance abuse and mental health recommendations that he received from Duke 
Addictions; submit to random alcohol screens; complete a parenting program; and 
obtain and maintain gainful employment or some other lawful source of income. 
On 8 December 2015, respondent-mother gave birth to Danielle.  On 6 July 
2016, respondent-mother was arrested and charged with driving while impaired.  As 
a result, David and Michael were placed in the temporary legal custody of respondent-
father by consent on 13 July 2016. 
On 20 September 2016, DSS filed a petition alleging that Danielle was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained the entry of an order placing David, 
Michael, and Danielle in nonsecure custody.  In its petition, DSS alleged that, on the 
evening of 19 September 2016, the parents had been drinking and began arguing.  At 
6:00 a.m., respondent-father awoke and could not locate David and Michael.  After 
law enforcement officers had been notified, David and Michael were found at the 
home of an individual who had been authorized to supervise respondent-mother’s 
visits with the children and who reported that she had “heard something at the door”; 
that “it was the children trying to get in”; that, upon opening the door, she saw “a 
small red car drive away;” and that, while she could not identify the vehicle’s driver, 
“[respondent-mother] is known to drive a small red car.”  At the time that the parents 
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arrived at the police station, they were observed to be under the influence of an 
impairing substance and placed under arrest. 
The issues raised in the 20 September 2016 petition came on for hearing before 
Judge Marsh on 10 November 2016.  On 10 November 2016, Judge Marsh entered an 
order determining that Danielle was a neglected and dependent juvenile.  In addition, 
Judge Marsh found that the parents had completed a parenting program, that 
respondent-mother was not currently engaged in substance abuse and mental health 
treatment, and that respondent-father needed to engage in substance abuse 
treatment.  As a precondition for allowing the parents to reunify with Danielle, the 
trial court ordered respondent-mother to resume her participation in mental health 
therapy; ensure that Danielle was properly supervised at all times; refrain from 
engaging in physical altercations with respondent-father; actively engage in mental 
health and substance abuse services and follow any resulting recommendations; 
submit to random drug screens; maintain safe and stable housing; and participate in 
supervised visitation with Danielle.  Similarly respondent-father was ordered to 
ensure that Danielle was properly supervised at all times; refrain from engaging in 
physical altercations with respondent-mother; maintain gainful employment or some 
other source of lawful income; maintain stable housing; refrain from the use of 
impairing substances; and complete services with Duke Addictions. 
After a permanency planning hearing held on 2 February 2018 and 27 March 
2018, the trial court entered an order on 5 June 2018.  In its order, the trial court 
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found that respondent-mother had completed active parenting and anger 
management classes in September 2017 and that respondent-mother had been 
referred to a family violence case manager with DSS on 6 September 2017, had been 
referred for domestic violence counseling, and was awaiting the assignment of a 
counselor.  The trial court further found that respondent-mother had begun 
participating in Vision’s Substance Abuse Comprehensive Outpatient Treatment on 
31 October 2016 and that, after several negative urine screens, it had been 
determined that respondent-mother no longer needed these services.  In addition, the 
trial court found that respondent-mother had been referred to Carolina Outreach on 
9 November 2017 with a recommendation that she begin weekly occupational therapy 
and medication management.  However, respondent-mother had only attended three 
therapy sessions since January 2018 and was not consistently engaged in the 
medication management process.  In view of the fact that respondent-mother was 
participating in substance abuse services at Visions, DSS had not received random 
drug screening information and had referred respondent-mother to Duke Family 
Care for that purpose.  On 26 March 2018, respondent-mother had begun full-time 
employment as a housekeeper at a hotel.  Finally, the trial court found that it was 
not possible for the children to be returned to respondent-mother in the near future 
because she was still engaged in mental health treatment and attempting to secure 
stable housing and employment. 
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In the same order, the trial court found that respondent-father had been 
working three days a week at a Bojangles restaurant and was earning a weekly 
amount of $200 in addition to the $1,060 in Supplemental Security Income that he 
received each month.  Although respondent-father had been participating in the 
Substance Abuse Comprehensive Outpatient Treatment program, Visions had 
determined that he was no longer eligible to receive their services for insurance-
related reasons in November 2017.  In addition, even though respondent-father had 
been referred to B & D Integrated Solutions, he had not been receiving services from 
that entity.  Respondent-father had completed a domestic violence assessment and 
active parenting and anger management classes in September 2017.  On the other 
hand, respondent-father had not been attending Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics 
Anonymous meetings.  The trial court further found that it was not possible for the 
children to be returned to respondent-father because he had not been consistently 
participating in mental health treatment and lacked stable housing.  In addition, the 
trial court expressed “uncertain[ty]” concerning the level of sobriety that respondent-
father had achieved and maintained given that respondent-father had not 
participated in random drug screening.  As a result, based upon all of these 
considerations, the trial court established a primary permanent plan for all three 
children of reunification, with a secondary permanent plan of adoption.  After a 
permanency planning hearing held on 25 June 2018, the trial court entered an order 
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instructing respondent-mother to present negative drug and alcohol screens and 
requiring respondent-father to re-engage in substance abuse treatment. 
On 20 June 2018, DSS filed a motion seeking to have the parents’ parental 
rights in the children terminated based upon neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); 
willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had 
led to the children’s removal from the family home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and 
dependency, N.C.G.S. §. 7B-1111(a)(6).  The termination petition came on for hearing 
before the trial court in early 2019, with the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding 
having been conducted on 20 and 21 February 2019 and 20 and 21 March 2019 and 
with the dispositional phase of the proceeding having been conducted on 16 and 17 
April 2019.  On 15 April 2019, the trial court entered an adjudication order 
determining that the parents’ parental rights were subject to termination on the basis 
of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
conditions that had led to the children’s removal from the family home.  On 18 June 
2019, the trial court entered a dispositional order concluding that termination of the 
parents’ parental rights would be in the children’s best interests and terminating the 
parents’ parental rights in the children.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). 
The parents noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s termination 
orders.  On 22 November 2019, the trial court entered an order dismissing 
respondent-mother’s appeal on the grounds that she had failed to attach a certificate 
of service to her notice of appeal.  On 11 December 2019, respondent-mother filed a 
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petition seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of the trial 
court’s termination orders on the merits.  On 27 December 2019, this Court allowed 
respondent-mother’s certiorari petition. 
II. Substantive Legal Analysis 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination orders before this Court, the 
parents contend that the trial court erred by determining that their rights in the 
children were subject to termination for neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and willful 
failure to make reasonable progress, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  “[A]n adjudication of 
any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of 
parental rights.”  In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019).  For that 
reason, we begin our analysis by considering whether the trial court erred by 
determining that the parents’ parental rights in the children were subject to 
termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 
Termination of parental rights proceedings involve the use of a two-stage 
process.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, 1110 (2019).  “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 
bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence 
of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General 
Statutes.”  In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1109(f) (2019)).  “If [the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed 
in [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111 are present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at 
which the court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile[s] to 
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terminate parental rights.”  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 
(2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110). 
“This Court reviews a trial court’s adjudication decision pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1109 ‘in order to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent 
and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law,’ with the 
trial court’s conclusions of law being subject to de novo review on appeal.”  In re 
N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 74, 833 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2019) (citations omitted).  “Findings of 
fact not challenged by respondent[s] are deemed supported by competent evidence 
and are binding on appeal.”  In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) 
(citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)).  “A trial 
court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is 
deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary 
finding.”  In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305, 310 (2019) (citing In re 
Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 403−04, 293 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1982)). 
“[A] trial judge may terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child in the event 
that it finds that the parent has neglected his or her child in such a way that the child 
has become a neglected juvenile as that term is defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101.”  In re 
M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 869, 844 S.E.2d 916, 920 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 
(2019)).  A neglected juvenile is “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age . . . whose 
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parent . . . does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “who lives in an 
environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). 
“[I]n deciding whether a child is neglected for purposes of 
terminating parental rights, the dispositive question is the 
fitness of the parent to care for the child ‘at the time of the 
termination proceeding.’ ”  In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 
435, 621 S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005) (quoting In re Ballard, 311 
N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (emphasis 
omitted)).  In the event that “a child has not been in the 
custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior 
to the termination hearing, ‘requiring the petitioner in 
such circumstances to show that the child is currently 
neglected by the parent would make termination of 
parental rights impossible.’ ”  Id. (citation omitted).  In 
such circumstances, the trial court may find that a parent’s 
parental rights in a child are subject to termination on the 
grounds of neglect in the event that the petitioner makes 
“a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect 
by the parent.”  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d 
at 167 (citation omitted). 
 
In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80, 833 S.E.2d at 775.2  “When determining whether future 
neglect is likely, the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances 
occurring between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.”  
In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 95, 839 S.E.2d 792, 797 (2020) (citing In re Ballard, 311 
N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)).  “A parent’s failure to make progress in 
                                            
2 As we have noted today in our opinion in In re R.L.D., No. 122A20, slip op. at 5 & 
n.3 (N.C. Dec. 11, 2020), a showing of past neglect and a probability of future neglect is not 
necessary to support a determination that a parent’s parental rights in a juvenile are subject 
to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in light of the fact 
that such a determination is also permissible in the event that there is a showing of current 
neglect. 
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completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of future neglect.”  In re M.A., 374 
N.C. at 870, 844 S.E.2d at 921 (quoting In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 637, 810 
S.E.2d 370, 373 (2018)). 
In Finding of Fact No. 8,3 the trial court found that the family had received in-
home services from 22 May 2014 to 24 June 2015 in order to address the parents’ 
substance abuse and domestic violence problems.  Subsequently, all three children 
were found to be neglected juveniles.  In Finding of Fact Nos. 10 and 11, the trial 
court found that David and Michael had been removed from respondent-mother’s care 
and placed in the temporary custody of respondent-father on 13 July 2016 as a result 
of the fact that respondent-mother had been charged with driving while subject to an 
impairing substance.  In the aftermath of this determination, the parents were 
allowed to be in each other’s presence as long as they were able to refrain from 
engaging in domestic violence and utilizing impairing substances.  In Finding of Fact 
No. 12, the trial court found that, on 19 September 2016, the children came into DSS 
custody based upon improper supervision, the parents’ substance abuse problems, 
and the level of conflict between the parents. 
In Finding of Fact Nos. 14 through 25 and Finding of Fact No. 31, the trial 
court described respondent-mother’s progress, or lack thereof, in addressing the 
                                            
3 The references to specific findings of fact contained in the remainder of this opinion 
are all to the adjudication order that the trial court entered on 15 April 2019 given that all 
of the parents’ challenges to the trial court’s decision to terminate their parental rights in the 
children are directed to that order. 
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barriers to reunification that had been found to exist, which included substance abuse 
problems, mental health concerns, unstable housing, domestic violence issues, and 
the lack of appropriate parenting skills.  In Finding of Fact Nos. 23 through 32, the 
trial court described respondent-father’s progress, or lack thereof, in addressing the 
barriers to reunification that had been found to be exist, which included substance 
abuse problems, mental health concerns, domestic violence issues, the lack of stable 
housing and gainful employment, and the absence of appropriate parenting skills.  
The trial court found that, “[b]ased on the fact of the lack of insight as it relates to 
[d]omestic [v]iolence issues, inconsistency in mental health services, lack of stable 
housing and lack of consistency in random drug screens, . . . the risk of harm to these 
children still exists” and “the children would live in an environment injurious to their 
welfare if returned to their parents.”  As a result, the trial court determined that 
“[t]here is a reasonable probability of repetition of neglect” if the children were 
returned to their parents’ care. 
A.  Respondent-Father’s Appeal 
Although respondent-father has not questioned the propriety of the trial 
court’s determination that the children had been the subject of a prior adjudication 
of neglect, he does challenge the lawfulness of the trial court’s decision that there was 
a reasonable probability that the neglect that the children had experienced would be 
repeated in the event that they were returned to his care in light of his alcohol abuse,  
the existence of domestic violence concerns, the inconsistent level of mental health 
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services that he had received, and the fact that he lacked stable housing.  More 
specifically, respondent-father asserts that some of the trial court’s findings of fact 
lack sufficient evidentiary support and that the remaining findings do not suffice to 
establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that the neglect that the children 
had experienced would be repeated if they were returned to his care. 
As the trial court’s order reflects, respondent-father has an extensive history 
of substance abuse and involvement in domestic violence dating back to May 2014.  
It is undisputed that, in September 2016, all three children were taken into DSS 
custody as a result of the parents’ failure to provide them with proper supervision, 
the parents’ abuse of impairing substances, and the existence of conflict between the 
parents.  After carefully considering the record developed before the trial court, we 
are satisfied that the trial court’s findings suffice to support its determination that 
there was a likelihood that the children would be neglected in the event that they 
were returned to the parents’ care. 
As an initial matter, respondent-father argues that the portion of Finding of 
Fact No. 36(a) stating that his “last random [drug] screen was back in May 2018 and 
he is currently not receiving treatment for substance abuse” lacks sufficient record 
support.  Respondent-father argues, in reliance upon his own testimony at the 
termination hearing, that he had returned to Visions about three weeks earlier and 
that he had been participating in a substance abuse aftercare program and drug 
screens as part of that process.  According to respondent-father, the record contains 
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evidence tending to show that his last assessment and alcohol screening, which was 
negative, had occurred on 10 January 2019. 
After carefully reviewing the record evidence, we are unable to conclude that 
the challenged portion of Finding of Fact 36(a) is supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence.  As we have already noted, the adjudicatory phase of the 
termination hearing commenced on 20 February and concluded on 21 March 2019. 
For that reason, a month elapsed between the date upon which the termination 
hearing began and the date upon which it concluded.  At the 21 February 2019 
hearing date, Sheena Wagner, a substance abuse counselor with the Duke Family 
Care Program, testified that she had last obtained a drug screen from respondent-
father in May 2018 and that she had closed respondent-father’s case in September 
2018 in light of his failure to submit to three random drug screens.  A closure report 
generated by Duke Family Care on 18 September 2018 and admitted into evidence 
confirmed this portion of Ms. Wagner’s testimony.  In addition, Ms. Wagner testified 
that she had conducted a reassessment for respondent-father in January 2019 and 
that he had reported his participation in the aftercare program at Visions on that 
occasion.  After recommending that respondent-father continue to participate in that 
aftercare program, Ms. Wagner contacted Visions and learned that respondent-father 
“had not been engaged for some months.” 
On the other hand, respondent-father testified at the 20 March 2019 hearing 
that he had returned to Visions aftercare just a few weeks earlier.  The trial court 
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appears to have found this testimony to be credible in Finding of Fact No. 27, in which 
it stated that respondent-father had “returned [ ] to Visions approximately three 
weeks ago.”  In addition, a Duke Family Care progress summary that was accepted 
into evidence at the termination hearing indicates that respondent-father had 
submitted to a drug screen in January 2019 and had tested negative for the presence 
of all substances.  The contents of this progress summary were reflected in Finding 
of Fact Nos. 24 and 29.  As a result, in light of the fact that the trial court’s findings 
generally appear to accept the validity of respondent-father’s contention that he had 
recently returned to participation in substance abuse treatment and had tested 
negatively shortly before the end of the termination hearing, we disregard the 
challenged portion of Finding of Fact 36(a) in evaluating the validity of the trial 
court’s determination that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were 
subject to termination on the basis of neglect in light of his alleged failure to 
adequately address his substance abuse problems.  See In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 358, 
838 S.E.2d 173, 177 (2020) (disregarding a finding of fact that lacked sufficient 
evidentiary support in determining whether the trial court had properly found the 
existence of grounds for terminating a parent’s parental rights). 
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the record support for certain of 
the trial court’s findings of fact, respondent-father argues that the trial court’s 
remaining findings of fact do not support the trial court’s determination that there is 
a reasonable probability of repetition of neglect if the children were returned to his 
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care based upon his failure to adequately address his alcohol abuse problems.  As the 
trial court’s unchallenged findings and the record evidence reflect, however, 
respondent-father had an extensive history of substance abuse; the parents had 
received in-home services from 22 May 2014 to 24 June 2015 for the purpose of 
addressing problems relating to substance abuse and domestic violence; and the 
children had been removed from the home on 19 September 2016 after an evening 
during which the parents had been arguing and drinking alcohol.  In addition, the 
trial court’s findings and the record evidence reflect that respondent-father’s 
treatment at Duke Family Care was terminated in September 2018 after Ms. Wagner 
had been unable to make contact with him for three consecutive months.  Although 
respondent-father does appear to have completed a reassessment and drug screen in 
January 2019, his most recent drug screen prior to that date had been approximately 
eight months earlier.  In addition, even though the record contains evidence tending 
to show that respondent-father had begun participating in a substance abuse 
aftercare program at Visions before the conclusion of the termination proceeding, his 
involvement in that program had only commenced after the motion to terminate his 
parental rights in the children had been filed and the termination hearings had 
actually begun.  A careful review of the trial court’s findings and the record evidence 
demonstrates that the record contains ample support for the trial court’s 
determination that, in light of respondent-father’s “extensive substance abuse 
histor[y]” and his inconsistent involvement in the drug screening process, 
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respondent-father had failed to establish “the status or durability” of his sobriety and 
to mitigate the risks that continued alcohol abuse might pose for the children.  See In 
re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68  (stating that the trial judge has the 
responsibility for evaluating the credibility and weight to be afforded to the evidence 
and to determine the reasonable inferences that should be drawn from the credible 
evidence). 
In addition, respondent-father argues that the trial court had erred by 
determining that it was likely that the neglect that the children had previously 
experienced would recur in the event that they were returned to his care on the basis 
of the trial court’s determination that he had failed to adequately address the issue 
of domestic violence.  In respondent-father’s view, the trial court lacked any basis in 
the evidentiary record for making Finding of Fact No 36(b), in which the trial court 
determined that, even though “there may be no reported domestic violence incidents 
between these parties since 2016, this does not mean to this Court that the mother 
or father have expressed meaningful insight about how domestic violence impacts 
them or could cause harm to their children.”  More specifically, respondent-father 
contends that he had not been called upon to testify about his understanding of the 
impact that domestic violence would have upon the parents or the children, that no 
expert witness had testified that he was oblivious to the adverse effects that domestic 
violence could cause, and that the manner in which the trial court had addressed this 
issue in its order had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof with respect to the 
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domestic violence issue away from DSS and onto him.  Once again, we are not 
persuaded by respondent-father’s argument. 
In its termination order, the trial court made unchallenged findings that the 
parents had an extensive history of domestic violence dating back to May 2014, with 
DSS having taken the children into its custody on 19 September 2016 as the result, 
in part, of the “arguing of the parents.”  In addition, the trial court judicially noticed 
the finding contained in the initial adjudication order “that these children are 
neglected due to the domestic violence between both the parents.”  The trial court 
further found that respondent-father had been referred to Penny Dixon, a contractor 
for DSS associated with the Durham Crisis Response Center, for a domestic violence 
assessment and that, even though respondent-father had completed the assessment 
process on September 2017, he had failed to comply with Ms. Dixon’s recommendation 
that he participate in long-term individual counseling, with respondent-father having 
claimed in his testimony at the termination hearing that he had been waiting on a 
return call from Ms. Dixon.  As a result of the fact that respondent-father “did not 
exercise any initiative to follow through with [Ms. Dixon,]” the trial court found that 
there had been “no expressed insight from the father about how domestic violence 
impacts him[.]” 
Respondent-father’s assertion that the trial court had no basis for finding that 
he had not attained an understanding of the potential ill effects of  domestic violence 
in the absence of an admission on his own part or testimony to that effect from an 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
expert witness lacks merit.  In view of the fact that the record contains evidence 
tending to show an extensive history of domestic violence between the parties dating 
back to May 2014, the trial court could have reasonably found that respondent-
father’s failure to comply with the recommendation that he participate in long-term, 
individual counseling for the purpose of addressing the issue of domestic violence was 
tantamount to a failure on his part to adequately recognize and address the role that 
domestic violence had played in his own life and that of his children.  In addition, 
rather than improperly shifting the burden of proof with respect to domestic violence 
from DSS to respondent-father, the challenged portion of the trial court’s termination 
order merely noted that respondent-father had failed to successfully rebut the 
evidence that DSS had presented in support of its contention that he had failed to 
adequately address his domestic violence issues.  See, e.g., In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 
118, 125, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984) (holding that, instead of impermissibly shifting 
the burden of proof from the petitioner to the parent, the challenged finding of fact 
was “nothing more than an accurate statement of the procedural stance of the case” 
and simply stated that “the respondents did not produce evidence that contradicted 
the allegations set forth in the petition”). 
Similarly, respondent-father contests the validity of the trial court’s 
determination that there was a probability that the neglect that the children had 
previously experienced would be repeated in the event that they were returned to his 
care given his failure to adequately address concerns relating to his mental health 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-21- 
and housing stability.  The trial court’s findings concerning respondent-father’s 
failure to address the issues of substance abuse and domestic violence, which were 
the two central problems that led DSS to intervene in the life of the family beginning 
in May 2014 and that resulted in the children’s removal from the family home in 
September 2016, are sufficient, standing alone, to support the trial court’s 
determination that there was a likelihood that the children would be neglected in the 
future in the event that they were returned to respondent-father’s care.  See In re 
M.A., 374 N.C. at 870, 844 S.E.2d at 921 (holding that, even though the respondent 
claimed to have made reasonable progress in addressing the issues of substance use, 
domestic violence, and income and housing stability, the trial court’s findings 
concerning the respondent’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic 
violence, which was the primary reason that the children had been removed from the 
home, were, standing alone, sufficient to support a determination that a repetition of 
neglect was likely to occur).  For that reason, we will refrain from addressing 
respondent-father’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s determination that his 
parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), including those relating to mental health and 
housing concerns.  As result, given that the trial court did not err by determining that 
respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the 
basis of neglect; that the existence of a single ground for termination suffices to 
support the termination of a parent’s parental rights in a child, see In re A.R.A., 373 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
N.C. 190, 194, 835 S.E.2d 417, 421 (2019); and that respondent-father has not 
challenged the validity of the trial court’s best interests determination, we affirm the 
trial court’s termination order with respect to respondent-father. 
B.  Respondent-Mother’s Appeal 
Like respondent-father, respondent-mother acknowledges that the children 
had previously been adjudicated to be neglected juveniles while arguing that the trial 
court erred by finding that there was a likelihood that the earlier neglect would be 
repeated in the event that the children were returned to her care.  In support of this 
contention, respondent-mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidentiary support 
for certain of the trial court’s findings of fact and asserts that there had been a 
“marked change in [her] circumstances” from the time of the children’s removal from 
her home to the time of the termination hearing.  After a thorough review of the 
record, we are convinced that the trial court’s findings regarding respondent-mother’s 
failure to adequately address the issues of substance abuse and domestic violence 
have sufficient evidentiary support and support its determination that there was a 
likelihood of future neglect in the event that the children were returned to her care. 
As an initial matter, respondent-mother challenges a portion of Finding of Fact 
No. 36(c), in which the trial court found that it is “uncertain as to the status and 
durability of [respondent-mother’s] sobriety and . . . that the risk of harm to the 
children has not been removed by these parents,” as lacking in sufficient evidentiary 
support.  According to respondent-mother, the quoted portion of the trial court’s 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-23- 
adjudication order is “not an actual finding” given that the trial court failed to carry 
out its duty to “ascertain the truth from the various circumstances” and has done 
nothing more than state that “the court is not certain as to what to find.” 
After examining Finding of Fact No. 36(a) in its entirety, we have no hesitation 
in concluding that the language upon which respondent-mother’s argument rests 
states a logical inference that the trial court chose to make from other evidentiary 
facts.  See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (stating 
that “[a]ny determination reached through ‘logical reasoning from evidentiary facts’ 
is more properly classified a finding of fact”).  At the beginning of Finding of Fact 
36(a), the trial court provided a detailed discussion of respondent-mother’s lack of 
progress in addressing her substance abuse problems.  Among other things, the trial 
court found that respondent-mother’s case at Duke Family Care had been closed in 
September 2018 after Ms. Wagner had been unable to contact respondent-mother for 
three consecutive months.  In addition, the trial court found that, while respondent-
mother tested negatively when screened for alcohol use in January 2019, her most 
recent test result before that date had been provided in May 2018.  Finally, the trial 
court found as a fact that: 
both of these parents have extensive substance abuse 
histories and because of a lack of being consistent in 
participating in random drug screens for alcohol, this 
Court is uncertain as to the status and durability of their 
sobriety and finds that the risk of harm to the children has 
not been removed by these parents; when the parents are 
under the influence they create an injurious environment 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-24- 
where they become incapable of providing proper 
supervision and care. 
 
Thus, when considered in its entirety, Finding of Fact No. 36(a) consists of (1) a 
description of respondent-mother’s extensive history of substance abuse and her 
inconsistent record of participating in required drug screens and (2) a reasonable 
inference that the extent and duration of respondent-mother’s sobriety had not been 
demonstrated.  See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68 (holding that 
the trial court “had the responsibility to ‘pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight to be given to their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom’ ” (quoting Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 359, 160 S.E.2d 29, 33 
(1968))).  As a result, we hold that Finding of Fact No. 36(a) constitutes a proper 
finding on the part of the trial court. 
In addition, respondent-mother argues that Finding of Fact No. 36(a) lacks 
sufficient record support.  In support of this assertion, respondent-mother relies upon 
findings of fact made in the 5 June 2018 permanency planning order that she had 
several negative urine screens from 31 August 2017 to 20 October 2017, that she had 
a negative drug screen on 27 March 2018, and that she submitted to drug screens 
during her period of relapse in April and June 2018 and upon an unchallenged finding 
of fact contained in the trial court’s termination order that she provided a negative 
drug screen in January 2019.  In further support of her challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidentiary support for Finding of Fact No. 36(a), respondent-mother points to 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-25- 
the results of drug screens administered by her probation officer in “mid-late 2018” 
that did not test for alcohol.  Finally, respondent-mother directs our attention to 
testimony from her probation officer that she had regularly met with respondent-
mother since September 2018 without detecting any odor of alcohol or seeing any 
evidence of alcohol use and that the records maintained by DSS concerning her visits 
with the children from September 2018 to February 2019 did not contain a single 
indication that respondent-mother smelled of alcohol or appeared to be intoxicated. 
The fundamental problem with respondent-mother’s challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidentiary support for Finding of Fact No. 36(a) is that the trial 
court never found that respondent-mother had ever failed or refused to submit to drug 
screens or had ever had negative results during the drug screening process.  
Similarly, the trial court never found that respondent-mother had or had not been 
observed to be under the influence of alcohol at any time since September 2018.  
Instead, Finding of Fact No. 36(a) simply states that respondent-mother had been 
inconsistent in her participation in the drug screening process.  In unchallenged 
Finding of Fact No. 23, the trial court found that, while respondent-mother 
participated in two drug screens in April and May of 2018, she “did not get randomly 
screened from June to December 2018.”  In addition, respondent-mother missed a 
drug screening appointment scheduled for 30 July 2018, with her Duke Family Care 
case having been closed in September 2018 after Ms. Wagner could not contact 
respondent-mother for three consecutive months.  As a result, we conclude that 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-26- 
Finding of Fact No. 36(a) has ample evidentiary support.  See In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 
at 379, 831 S.E.2d at 310 (stating that a “finding that is supported by clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence 
that would support a contrary finding) (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 403–04, 293 
S.E.2d at 132). 
Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that there 
was a likelihood that the neglect that the children had previously experienced would 
be repeated in light of the fact that she had demonstrated the existence of a marked 
change in circumstances relating to her substance abuse problems at the time of the 
termination hearing.  The argument that respondent-mother makes in support of this 
contention relies upon an attempt to shift the focus from her inconsistency in 
submitting to random drug screens and a claim that DSS had failed to prove that she 
had consumed alcohol after the summer of 2018.  The record does, of course, reflect 
that respondent-mother last tested positive for the presence of alcohol in April of 2018 
and that she had tested negative for the presence of all controlled substances, 
including alcohol, in January 2019.  On the other hand, the trial court’s unchallenged 
findings of fact establish that respondent-mother did not submit to random drug 
screens from June to December 2018 and that her case with Duke Family Care had 
been closed in September 2018 after she failed to respond to Ms. Wagner’s attempts 
to make contact with her.  In light of respondent-mother’s extensive substance abuse 
history and her failure to consistently participate in the drug screening process, we 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-27- 
hold that the trial court had an ample evidentiary basis for determining that 
respondent-mother had failed to achieve a stable or durable state of sobriety 
sufficient to eliminate the risk of harm to her children. 
In addition to her challenge to the trial court’s treatment of her struggles with 
substance abuse, respondent-mother objects to the manner in which the trial court 
addressed the issue of her involvement with domestic violence.  As an initial matter, 
we note that the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact establish that respondent-
mother had completed a domestic violence assessment in September of 2017, at which 
it had been recommended that respondent-mother complete domestic violence 
counseling, and that respondent-mother had never presented a certificate of 
completion indicating that she had obtained the recommended counseling.  In 
addition, the trial court’s findings reflect that respondent-mother had received 
counseling at the Durham Crisis Response Center from May 2018 to December 2018. 
According to respondent-mother, Finding of Fact No. 20, in which the trial 
court stated that the counseling sessions in which respondent-mother participated at 
the Durham Crisis Response Center “do not contain[ ] counseling particularly on 
domestic violence,” lacks sufficient evidentiary support.  Respondent-mother makes 
a similar challenge to Finding of Fact No. 36(b), in which the trial court found, in 
pertinent part, that: 
[respondent-mother] has an extensive history of being in 
domestic violence relationships with her partners which 
stems from at least 1997 when a former partner fractured 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-28- 
her bone. . . .  The court takes judicial notice of the findings 
of fact in the adjudication order that these children are 
neglected due to the domestic violence between both the 
parents.  The Court finds that there may be no reported 
domestic violence incidents between these parties since 
2016, this does not mean to this Court that [respondent-
mother] or [respondent-father] have expressed meaningful 
insight about how domestic violence impacts them or could 
cause harm to their children.  The court reviewed 
[respondent-mother’s exhibit #4 — Assessment from the 
Durham Crisis Response Center]; [respondent-mother] 
discussed in one session about maintaining sobriety, the 
care of her children in foster care, how to handle grief and 
to get her children back. 
 
In respondent-mother’s view, the trial court erred by finding that her counseling 
sessions at the Durham Crisis Response Center did not address domestic violence 
issues. 
In support of her contention that she had received domestic violence counseling 
at the Durham Crisis Response Center, respondent-mother points to an intake form 
in which she indicated that she wanted to address “domestic violence, coping skills” 
and to counseling notes that mention issues relating to the safety of the children, the 
management of grief, an analysis of past deficiencies in the decisions that she had 
made, and the need to control her substance abuse.  According to respondent-mother, 
her counselor at the Durham Crisis Response Center “would have used these topics 
to relate to domestic violence or would have redirected [respondent-mother.]” 
In its adjudication order, the trial court stated that it had reviewed respondent-
mother’s assessment from the Durham Crisis Response Center and the records 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-29- 
relating to respondent-mother that had been generated by that entity relating to 
respondent-mother through December 2018.  The counseling case notes indicate that 
various topics had been discussed during the counseling that respondent-mother had 
received at the Durham Crisis Response Center, such as “concerns about safety of 
[the] children in foster care,” respondent-mother’s desire for reunification with the 
children, and the changes that respondent-mother was “making to maintain 
sobriety.”  The Durham Crisis Response Center records only contain a single 
reference to the issue of domestic violence, which appears in a set of case notes that 
are dated 18 June 2018.  For that reason, we hold that the trial court’s determination 
that the counseling that respondent-mother received at the Durham Crisis Response 
Center did not involve any particular focus upon issues relating to domestic violence 
had ample evidentiary support and that, even though the record might support a 
contrary decision, “this Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that was 
before the trial court.”  In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 12, 832 S.E.2d at 704; see also In re 
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110–11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252–53 (1984) (stating that “our 
appellate courts are bound by the trial courts’ findings of fact where there is some 
evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings 
to the contrary.”) 
Similarly, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that 
there was a likelihood that the neglect that the children had experienced would be 
repeated in the event that they were returned to her care given that she had 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-30- 
demonstrated that there had been a marked change in her circumstances relating to 
the issue of domestic violence issues by the time of the termination hearing.  In 
support of this contention, respondent-mother maintains that she had been able to 
show improvement in her situation as it relates to domestic violence by “refrain[ing]” 
from respondent-father, having been involved in no reported incident of domestic 
violence involving respondent-father for three years, obtaining a domestic violence 
assessment, and engaging in counseling at the Durham Crisis Response Center. 
As we have previously indicated, the trial court did not err by finding that the 
counseling that respondent-mother had received at the Durham Crisis Response 
Center did not place any particular emphasis upon issues relating to domestic 
violence.  In addition, the trial court acknowledged that there had been no reported 
incidents of domestic violence involving the parents since 2016 and that respondent-
mother had obtained a domestic violence assessment in 2017.  Even so, given 
respondent-mother’s extensive history of participation in interpersonal relationships 
involving domestic violence and her failure to complete the recommended domestic 
violence counseling, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that respondent-
mother had failed to express “meaningful insight about how domestic violence 
impacts them or could cause harm to their children.”  For that reason, we hold that 
the trial court did not err by determining that respondent-mother had failed to 
adequately address the issue of domestic violence by the time of the termination 
hearing and that its findings of fact with respect to this issue suffice to support its 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-31- 
determination that there was a likelihood of future neglect in the event that the 
children were returned to her care. 
In light of our determination that the trial court’s findings with respect to the 
issues of substance abuse and domestic violence suffice to show the existence of the 
required likelihood of future neglect in the event that the children were returned to 
respondent-mother’s case, we need not address respondent-mother’s challenge to the 
trial court’s determination that she had failed to adequately address her mental 
health and housing problems.  See In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 870, 844 S.E.2d at 921 
(holding that a parent’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic violence 
can be sufficient to support a determination that there is a likelihood of future 
neglect).  In view of the fact that the trial court did not err by finding that respondent-
mother’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of 
neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), that the existence of a single ground 
for termination will suffice to support the termination of a parent’s parental rights in 
a child, see In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 194, 835 S.E.2d at 421, and that respondent-
mother has not challenged the trial court’s determination that the termination of her 
parental rights would be in the children’s best interests, we affirm the trial court’s 
termination order with respect to respondent-mother as well. 
AFFIRMED.