Title: Chadwick v. Duxbury Public Schools
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12054
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2016

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SJC-12054 
 
NANCY CHADWICK  vs.  DUXBURY PUBLIC SCHOOLS & others.1 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     May 3, 2016. - October 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.2 
 
 
Privileged Communication.  Evidence, Privileged communication.  
Practice, Civil, Discovery.  Public Employment, Collective 
bargaining.  Labor, Collective bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 8, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to compel discovery was heard by Raffi Yessayan, 
J. 
 
 
A question of law presented in a petition for leave to 
prosecute an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court was 
reported by Andrew R. Grainger, J.  The Supreme Judicial Court 
on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals 
Court. 
 
 
 
Jonathan J. Margolis (Beth R. Myers with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
                     
 
1 Karen Baynes, Andrew Stephens, and Marc Talbot. 
 
 
2 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
John J. Cloherty, III, for the defendants. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Ava R. Barbour, of Michigan, Matthew D. Jones, Ira C. 
Fader, James A.W. Shaw, Jasper Groner, Haidee Morris, Matthew E. 
Dwyer, Eric P. Klein, & Katherine D. Shea for Massachusetts 
Teachers Association & others. 
 
Paul T. Hynes & Michael R. Keefe for Professional Fire 
Fighters of Massachusetts. 
 
Stephen J. Finnegan & Christopher J. Petrini for 
Massachusetts Association of School Committees, Inc., & another. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this appeal, we consider an issue of first 
impression:  whether an employer, in defense of a lawsuit 
alleging discrimination in employment filed by a union member, 
may demand communications between the union member and her union 
representatives or between union representatives acting in their 
official capacity.  The issue arises on interlocutory review of 
a discovery dispute in a Superior Court action brought by the 
plaintiff, Nancy Chadwick, alleging claims of discrimination and 
retaliation against the defendants.3  The plaintiff objected to 
certain of the defendants' discovery requests, asserting a 
"union member-union" privilege.  A Superior Court judge rejected 
the plaintiff's claim and entered an order compelling production 
of the requested discovery.  The plaintiff filed an application 
for relief under G. L. c. 231, § 118, and a single justice of 
the Appeals Court reported the issue to a panel of the Appeals 
                     
 
3 The plaintiff claimed unlawful handicap discrimination, 
failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and retaliation. 
3 
 
Court.4   We transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
In her challenge to the defendant's discovery requests, the 
plaintiff concedes that a union member-union privilege has never 
been recognized in Massachusetts.  She argues, however, that 
G. L. c. 150E, the statute establishing the collective 
bargaining rights of public employees, should be interpreted to 
recognize a union member-union privilege and that such a 
privilege bars the employer's access to the requested discovery. 
We affirm the judge's ruling declining to recognize such a 
privilege, as we discern no legislative intent to incorporate 
within G. L. c. 150E a union member-union privilege extending 
beyond the labor dispute setting, and we decline to recognize 
the privilege under common law. 
 
Background.  The following summary of the facts is drawn 
from the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, the motion 
                     
 
4 The plaintiff filed two applications for relief under 
G. L. c. 231, § 118, from the Superior Court judge's order 
compelling production of the communications.  In the first, she 
requested that a single justice of the Appeals Court recognize a 
privilege and remand for entry of a protective order.  The 
single justice affirmed the judge's order compelling production 
but allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to seek further review.  
In her second petition, the plaintiff requested that the single 
justice report the case to the full court.  In response, the 
single justice reported the issue to a panel of the Appeals 
Court. 
4 
 
judge's memorandum of decision and order on the defendants' 
motion to compel, and other relevant documents in the record. 
 
1.  The alleged discrimination and retaliation.  Beginning 
in 2006, and continuing to her retirement in 2015, the plaintiff 
was employed as an English teacher at Duxbury High School.   
During her employment by the Duxbury public schools, the 
plaintiff was represented by the Duxbury Teachers Association, 
the local affiliate of the Massachusetts Teachers Association.  
She served as president of the Duxbury Teachers Association for 
six years, from 2010 to 2015. 
 
In 1998, the plaintiff was diagnosed with posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), but she successfully managed the 
symptoms until 2009.  After 2009, she experienced panic attacks, 
anxiety, hypervigilance, and disturbed sleep patterns, which she 
asserts were caused by work conditions, including bullying and 
harassment from her direct supervisor.  In 2012, the plaintiff's 
attorney notified the school superintendent of her PTSD 
diagnosis and requested accommodation in the form of a 
replacement supervisor.  In response, the school superintendent  
assigned the assistant principal to conduct the plaintiff's 
performance evaluation but declined to alter the subject-matter 
supervisor for the English courses that the plaintiff taught. 
 
In December, 2013, and between March and May, 2014, the 
plaintiff and the defendants engaged in a series of interactions 
5 
 
that, according to the plaintiff, involved discrimination and 
retaliation against her.5  On June 9, 2014, the plaintiff was 
placed on a "directed growth plan,"6 a disciplinary action that 
permitted Duxbury public schools to dismiss her at the end of 
the 2014-2015 school year.  The plaintiff commenced this lawsuit 
seeking monetary damages in December, 2014.7 
 
2.  The discovery requests.  On January 5, 2015, the 
defendants served document requests and interrogatories pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 26, as amended, 423 Mass. 1401 (1996), and 
                     
 
5 In December, 2013, the assistant principal completed an 
evaluation that the plaintiff asserts contained false and 
unwarranted criticisms.  In March, 2014, the plaintiff's 
immediate supervisor sent her an electronic mail (e-mail) 
message referencing errors the plaintiff allegedly made entering 
data in the school's electronic grading system.  In May, 2014, 
the principal summoned the plaintiff to a meeting with the 
superintendent, the principal, the assistant principal, and the 
plaintiff's immediate supervisor regarding certain performance 
issues.  The day of the meeting, the plaintiff's counsel 
delivered a letter to the superintendent, reminding him of her 
posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis and requesting that the 
plaintiff's immediate supervisor limit contact with the 
plaintiff to group settings.  The record does not indicate 
whether this request was allowed. 
 
 
6 Neither this document nor other letters and e-mail 
messages referenced in the background are contained in the 
record. 
 
 
7 In her complaint, the plaintiff asserted that she filed a 
complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination on June 24, 2014.  The defendants denied the 
allegation and defended on the ground that the plaintiff has not 
exhausted administrative remedies.  The details of this 
complaint are not in the record, and neither party has raised 
this as an issue in this appeal. 
6 
 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 33, as amended, 385 Mass. 1212 (1982), 
respectively.  On June 19, 2015, the plaintiff objected to 
certain of the discovery requests,8,9 claiming a union member-
                     
 
8 The plaintiff objected to the following interrogatories on 
the basis of an asserted union member-union privilege: 
 
 
"Identify, by name, business address and telephone 
number, each person whom Plaintiff believes to have 
knowledge of any of the events alleged in this Complaint, 
and set forth the specific knowledge that each such person 
is believed to have." 
 
 
"Set forth in full detail the sum and substance of any 
unrecorded oral statements you believe you may have made to 
the Defendant (or employees, or former employee, of the 
Defendant) concerning the Incidents alleged in the 
Complaint and, of the injuries (or damages) alleged in the 
Complaint, or which you intend to use for any purpose in 
the litigation." 
 
 
"Identify (a) each person (other than Plaintiff's 
attorneys) with whom Plaintiff has discussed any of the 
Incidents alleged in his [sic] Complaint; (b) the date, 
place and means (e.g., telephone, face-to-face 
conversation, e-mail) of each such discussion; (c) the 
substance of each such discussion; and (d) any other 
persons who were present during each such discussion." 
 
 
9 The plaintiff objected to the following requests for 
document production claiming a union member-union privilege: 
 
 
"Request:  All documents that Plaintiff provided to or 
received from her Union or Union representatives, including 
but not limited to the Massachusetts Teachers Association, 
at any time concerning Plaintiff's performance evaluations 
or performance reviews." 
 
 
"Request:  All photographs, diagrams, depictions, 
videos, reenactments, sketches, drawings, tape recordings 
or other materials recorded and/or kept by Plaintiff that 
refer to the Incidents alleged in the Complaint." 
 
 
7 
 
union privilege.  At the request of the defendants, the 
plaintiff supplied a privilege log for ninety-two electronic 
mail (e-mail) messages withheld from disclosure.  The defendants 
filed a motion to compel production of the requested discovery, 
and the plaintiff responded with an opposition and cross-motion 
for protective order.10  The Superior Court judge declined the 
plaintiff's request to recognize a union member-union privilege 
and ordered the plaintiff to disclose all requested discovery 
withheld on the basis of an asserted union member-union 
privilege.  The judge acknowledged that some jurisdictions have 
recognized a union member-union privilege, but he concluded that 
the Legislature is the more appropriate body to weigh the policy 
implications of doing so and declined the plaintiff's request to 
create such a privilege. 
 
Discussion.  The plaintiff seeks recognition of a union 
member-union privilege "that would protect from disclosure to 
                                                                  
 
"Request:  Please provide copies of all electronic 
messages (i.e., emails, phone text messages or chat 
messages) sent or received by You that relates [sic] to the 
Incidents alleged in the Complaint in any way." 
 
 
10 The plaintiff asked that the judge rule on her motion for 
protective order as follows: 
 
 
"The Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for a Protective Order 
with Respect to Communications with her Union is ALLOWED.  
Communications between the plaintiff and her union, union 
representatives or other members on matters of union 
business are privileged to the extent that they were not 
intended to be distributed to third parties." 
8 
 
employers communications between public sector employees and 
their unions when made (1) in confidence; (2) in connection with 
bargaining or representative services relating to anticipated or 
ongoing disciplinary or grievance proceedings; (3) between an 
employee (or the employee's attorney) and union representatives; 
or (4) by union representatives acting in official 
representative capacities."  Conceding that no such privilege 
exists under G. L. c. 150E, the plaintiff argues instead that we 
should interpret the statute as implying a union member-union 
privilege to secure the collective bargaining rights inherent in 
the statute.  More specifically, she contends that the 
prohibited practices in G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1) and (2), are 
vital to furthering the statute's purpose and that such 
prohibitions must extend beyond the context of collective 
bargaining disputes to protect employee and union interests. 
 
1.  Standard of review.  The issue before us comes by way 
of a report for appellate review entered by a single justice of 
the Appeals Court.  Under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., a 
single justice of the Appeals Court has the authority to allow 
appellate review of an interlocutory order or a question of law 
contained therein.  CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Attorney Gen., 380 
Mass. 539, 540 (1980).  See Barnes v. Metropolitan Hous. 
Assistance Program, 425 Mass. 79, 84 (1997).  On review of a 
report by the single justice, we consider the merits of the 
9 
 
underlying order.  CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, supra at 540, 544.  The 
issue whether the court should recognize a union member-union 
privilege as implicit in G. L. c. 150E is a pure question of 
law.  Thus, we accord "no deference to the judge's decision" 
declining to recognize the privilege.   See Barr Inc. v. 
Holliston, 462 Mass. 112, 114 (2012), quoting Sylvester v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 445 Mass. 304, 308 (2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1147 (2006) (reviewing interlocutory order 
reported for appellate review by judge of Superior Court). 
 
2.  Statutory scheme.  We begin the analysis of the 
plaintiff's claim by reviewing the statutory language to 
determine if it reveals an unspoken legislative intent to create 
a union member-union privilege.  General Laws c. 150E grants 
public employees of the Commonwealth, as defined therein, the 
right to bargain collectively over "wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, and to engage in lawful, 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection, free from interference, 
restraint, or coercion."11  G. L. c. 150E, § 2.  As relevant 
here, it is a "prohibited practice for a public employer" to, 
among other things, (1) "[i]nterfere, restrain, or coerce any 
                     
 
11 General Laws c. 150E, § 6, also includes "wages, hours, 
standards [of] productivity and performance, and any other terms 
and conditions of employment" in the topics subject to 
collective bargaining negotiations. 
10 
 
employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under this 
chapter"; or (2) "[d]ominate, interfere, or assist in the 
formation, existence, or administration of any employee 
organization."  G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), (2).  Considering 
the statutory scheme as a whole, its essential purpose is to 
protect the right of public employees to organize and to protect 
unions and their members from intrusion or control by the 
employer in the collective bargaining context. 
 
To determine whether the Legislature intended that 
communications between a union member and a union representative 
be protected from disclosure to an employer in its defense 
against a civil action filed by an employee, "we look first to 
the language of the relevant statute, which is generally the 
clearest window into the collective mind of the Legislature."  
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 659 (2014), citing Commonwealth 
v. Nanny, 462 Mass. 798, 801-802 (2012).  "If the language of 
the statute is unambiguous, our function is to enforce the 
statute according to its terms."  Reading Co-Op. Bank v. Suffolk 
Constr. Co., 464 Mass. 543, 547-548 (2013), citing Massachusetts 
Community College Council MTA/NEA v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 402 
Mass. 352, 354 (1988). 
 
We conclude that the privilege sought by the plaintiff is 
not implicit in G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1) and (2), because 
those provisions clearly are not intended to apply to a civil 
11 
 
action.  First, the dispute underlying the plaintiff's civil 
action is not related to "the formation, existence, or 
administration of any employee organization," as protected in 
G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (2).  Although the plaintiff was 
president of her local union for six years, her lawsuit relates 
to allegedly discriminatory actions taken against her personally 
as an employee, not to matters encompassing union activity.  
Neither is a privilege implicit in § 10 (a) (1), which provides 
that a public employer may not "[i]nterfere, restrain, or coerce 
any employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under this 
chapter" (emphasis added).  The rights provided under c. 150E 
protect collective bargaining and "lawful, concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection."  G. L. c. 150E, § 2.  Where the plain and 
unambiguous language of § 10 (a) (1) restricts its application 
to the collective bargaining context, we cannot say that, in 
securing that right, the Legislature contemplated a necessity to 
protect the confidentiality of union member-union communications 
in a private lawsuit brought by the union member against the 
employer. 
 
Consistent with the statutory emphasis on protecting the 
right to collective bargaining, § 10 (a) (1) has been 
interpreted by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission to 
protect the confidentiality of communications between a union 
12 
 
and its members in labor disputes.12  See Bristol County 
Sheriff's Dep't, 31 M.L.C. 6, 17 (2004) (employer prohibited 
from asking union members, during internal affairs 
investigations, "overly-broad questions about the means and 
methods by which the Union was organizing the upcoming picket" 
because such organization "clearly falls within the realm of 
concerted activities protected under [G. L. c. 150E, § 2]).  See 
also City of Lawrence & Lawrence Patrolmen's Ass'n, 15 M.L.C. 
1162, 1165-1166 (1988) (employer prohibited from demanding 
content of letter containing communications between union 
members and union administrator because subject matter protected 
whether written or oral). 
 
A parallel provision in the National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2012), has been interpreted similarly 
by the National Labor Relations Board (board).13  In Cook Paint & 
                     
 
12 This is the first case in the courts of the Commonwealth 
where the existence of a union-member privilege has been 
litigated, even though G. L. c. 150E was enacted in 1973, see 
St. 1973, c. 1078, §§ 1-8, and the concept behind protected 
collective bargaining has been recognized in a Massachusetts 
statute since 1937, see St. 1937, c. 436, §§ 1-15, and St. 1938, 
c. 345, § 2, inserting G. L. c. 150A.  The likely explanation 
for the dearth of cases raising the issue is the practice of the 
Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, where many labor 
disputes are resolved, of protecting confidential communications 
between a union and its members from disclosure during labor 
disputes. 
 
 
13 Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (board) 
are helpful for our analysis because the National Labor 
 
13 
 
Varnish Co. & Paintmakers & Allied Trades Local 754, 258 
N.L.R.B. 1230 (1981) (Cook Paint), the board ruled that 
compelled disclosure of communications between an employee and 
his union steward during the grievance process violated the 
prohibition against interfering, restraining, or coercing 
employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining 
rights.14  Id. at 1232, citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  The 
communications sought in Cook Paint related to an incident where 
an employee allegedly fell in a paint spill after notifying his 
union representative of the spill and being advised to return to 
regular duties while the representative sought out the floor 
supervisor.  Id. at 1230.  As a result of the incident, the 
employer decided to discharge the employee.  Id.  The board 
relied on the facts that the union representative's involvement 
                                                                  
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2012), contains 
parallel provisions to G. L. c. 150E.  Specifically, the 
prohibited employment practices in G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), 
(2), as cited by the plaintiff, are addressed in parallel 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1) (prohibited practice "to interfere with, restrain, 
or coerce employees in the exercise of [collective bargaining] 
rights"), and § 158(a)(2) (prohibited practice to "to dominate 
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it"). 
 
 
14 The board has also recognized that, for "collective 
bargaining . . . to work, the parties must be able to formulate 
their positions and devise their strategies without fear of 
exposure.  This necessity is so self-evident as apparently never 
to have been questioned."  Berbiglia, Inc., & Retail Store 
Employees' Union, Local 782, 233 N.L.R.B. 1476, 1495 (1977). 
14 
 
"arose solely as a result of his status as union steward" and, 
after the union filed a grievance on behalf of the employee, the 
employer specifically sought contemporaneous notes taken by the 
representative in his capacity of carrying out union functions.  
Id. at 1231-1232. 
 
In ruling that the employer impermissibly interfered with 
the employee's collective bargaining rights by demanding the 
substance of the conversations during the grievance process, the 
board reasoned that "consultation between an employee 
potentially subject to discipline and his union steward 
constitutes protected activity in one of its purest forms."  Id. 
at 1232.  The board specifically limited its ruling, 
emphasizing, "[T]his case does not mean that all discussions 
between employees and stewards are confidential and protected by 
the [National Labor Relations Act].  Nor does our decision hold 
that stewards are, in all instances, insulated from employer 
interrogation."  Id. 
 
Unlike proceedings that are directly connected to the 
collective bargaining context, the plaintiff here seeks a 
protective order in a civil lawsuit against her employer.  Civil 
lawsuits are beyond the zone of protection for union rights 
contemplated in G. L. c. 150E.  Therefore, the plain and 
unambiguous language of § 10 (a) (1) does not require that 
communications between union members and union representatives 
15 
 
be protected from interference by an employer defending itself 
from an employee's civil action. 
 
3.  Common-law privilege.  Having concluded that there is 
no statutorily based privilege implicit in G. L. c. 150E, we now 
decline the plaintiff's request to judicially create such a 
privilege.  Under Massachusetts law, a litigant or witness may 
not rely on a privilege to withhold evidence in a legal 
proceeding except as recognized by the "constitution, statute, 
rules promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court, or the common 
law."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 501 (2016).  In the absence of a 
recognized privilege as set forth in § 501, this court has the 
power to create privileges, but "it is a power that we have 
exercised sparingly."15  Babets v. Secretary of the Executive 
Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 234 (1988), citing Three 
Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 360 (1983), cert. 
denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).  
Privileges are exceptions to the general duty imposed on a 
person to be a witness, disclose information, and produce 
writings.  Matter of the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 463 Mass. 
162, 166 (2012). 
                     
 
15 Until we recognized a judicial deliberative privilege in 
Matter of the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162, 163 
(2012), we had not recognized a common-law privilege since 1889.  
See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 597 n.12 
(2000). 
16 
 
 
a.  The plaintiff's reliance on other jurisdictions.  The 
plaintiff relies principally on a recent case, Peterson v. 
State, 280 P.3d 559 (Alaska 2012) (Peterson), in which the 
Supreme Court of Alaska recognized a broad union-member 
privilege based on language in the State's Public Employment 
Relations Act.16  Id. at 564-565.   Peterson goes substantially 
beyond other jurisdictions that have considered the matter, and 
is the only case we have located where a court has judicially 
recognized such a privilege for civil lawsuits without relying 
on a State statute specifically protecting the same.17  The 
Supreme Court of Alaska held that "[a]ny attempt by the State to 
force disclosure of confidential communications between an 
employee and a union representative during a grievance 
proceeding would constitute an unfair labor practice" (emphasis 
                     
 
16 Alaska's Public Employment Relations Act contains 
provisions similar to § 8 of the Federal act and to § 10 (a) of 
G. L. c. 150E.  See Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559, 565 (Alaska 
2012), citing Alaska Stat. § 23.40.110. 
 
 
17 In Bell v. Village of Streamwood, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1052 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), a judge of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois adopted a portion of an 
Illinois statute granting a broad union-member privilege.  Id. 
at 1056, citing 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803.5.  The privilege 
recognized in that case protected communications made "(1) in 
confidence; (2) in connection with 'representative' services 
relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary proceedings; (3) 
between an employee and his union representative; (4) where the 
union representative is acting in his or her official capacity."  
Id.  Conversely, the statute is not limited to communications 
relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary proceedings.  
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803.5(a). 
17 
 
in original).  Id. at 565.  The communications at issue in 
Peterson developed during a grievance proceeding, but when the 
union and the State were unable to resolve the issue, the 
employee filed a civil suit claiming wrongful termination.  Id. 
at 561.  The court created a broad union-member privilege after 
reasoning that the "protection against forced disclosure of 
confidential union-related communications should not be lost if 
the grievance dispute is not resolved and the employee files a 
civil suit" because "the strong interest in confidential union-
related communications" would otherwise be undermined.  Id. at 
565. 
 
Other jurisdictions that have analyzed this issue have 
declined to judicially create privileges that would apply to 
matters outside of grievance proceedings or disciplinary 
investigations.  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, although 
recognizing that "an employer engages in an unfair labor 
practice when it compels a union representative to disclose 
confidential communications with a union employee" during a 
disciplinary investigation, declined to create a privilege that 
would apply in the context of a grand jury proceeding.  In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 155 N.H. 557, 560-561, 563 (2007).  The 
court reasoned that the petitioner "failed to show that the 
union relationship is so highly valued by an ordered society 
that its confidences warrant protection even at the cost of 
18 
 
losing evidence important to the administration of justice."  
Id. at 563, quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated January 20, 
1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).  Likewise, a 
California court declined to recognize a union-member privilege.  
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 
881, 891 (2003), the court concluded that determination of the 
"countervailing policy reasons why a union representative should 
not be compelled during civil litigation to disclose factual 
information obtained from other union members he or she 
represents . . . is the province of the Legislature, not this 
court" (emphasis in original). 
 
b.  The Legislature's role.  In any event, the question 
whether to create such a privilege is better left to the 
Legislature.  The decision to create a privilege requires a 
"balancing of the public's interest in obtaining every person's 
[evidence] against public policy considerations in favor of 
erecting a . . . privilege."  Three Juveniles, 390 Mass. at 364.  
As to this issue, the Legislature may be in a better position to 
decide whether to create a privilege and, if so, to weigh the 
considerations involved in defining its contours.  See Matter of 
a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 598-599 (2000), S.C., 443 
Mass. 20 (2004).  See also Babets, 403 Mass. at 235, quoting 
McCormick, Evidence § 75, at 180 (3d ed. 1984) ("It may be 
argued that legitimate claims to confidentiality are more 
19 
 
equitably received by a branch of government not preeminently 
concerned with the factual results obtained in litigation, and 
that the legislatures provide an appropriate forum for the 
balancing of the competing social values necessary to sound 
decisions concerning privilege"). 
 
Not only is the Legislature the more appropriate body to 
weigh policy considerations and the contours of any such 
privilege, this is not an appropriate case on which to 
judicially create such a privilege.  We have been "especially 
reluctant to create new privileges on the basis of speculation 
or conjecture as to the harms which may result from our failure 
to do so."  Babets, 403 Mass. at 238.  The record before us 
contains a privilege log listing a series of communications 
between the plaintiff and representatives and members of her 
union.  We do not know the content of those communications or 
the context in which they were made.  We do not know if they 
were made in a confidential setting or whether they were made to 
the union representative while acting in that role.  Without 
clarity in the record on these points, any harm to the plaintiff 
in declining her request to create a privilege is only 
speculative. 
20 
 
 
Conclusion.  We decline to create a union member-union 
privilege in this case, and we affirm the order below.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
18 The only issue before us is whether a Massachusetts court 
should recognize a union member-union privilege.  Although we 
decline to recognize the privilege in the circumstances of this 
case, we do not address whether a protective order may be 
entered under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (c), as amended, 466 Mass. 
1401 (2013).  A court has inherent powers to issue protective 
orders "to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices," 
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 213-214 
(2011), quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 
(1984), and may exercise that power in appropriate circumstances 
involving communications between a union member and her union.