Title: Ex parte Aurora Mercedes Soto. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Aurora Mercedes Soto v. State of Alabama) (Franklin Circuit Court: CC05-299; Criminal Appeals : CR-06-0460). Writ Denied. No Opinion.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070118
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2008

REL:04/11/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070118
_________________________
Ex parte Aurora Mercedes Soto
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Aurora Mercedes Soto
v.
State of Alabama)
(Franklin Circuit Court, CC-05-299;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-0460)
BOLIN, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
1070118
2
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur specially.
1070118
3
COBB, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the majority that Aurora Mercedes Soto's
petition for the writ of certiorari is due to be denied.
Soto's bare allegation that she "would ... argue that the
record in [her] case does not support a guilty finding on the
charge of making a terrorist threat" fails to state or support
any of the grounds for issuing the writ set forth in Rule
39(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.  Moreover, Soto did not address in
her petition the finding by the Court of Criminal Appeals, in
its unpublished memorandum, that she failed to preserve her
constitutional challenge to Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-10-15.  See
Rice v. English, 835 So. 2d 157, 166 (Ala. 2002) (noting that,
in the state courts in Alabama, "[t]he 'plain-error' rule,
which dispenses with the necessity for error preservation, is
confined to death-penalty cases"); D.W.L. v. State, 821 So. 2d
246, 248 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) ("'Even constitutional issues
must first be correctly raised in the trial court before they
will be considered on appeal.'" (quoting Hansen v. State, 598
So.2d 1, 2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991))).  Soto's generic,
nonspecific, and conclusory comment in the trial court was not
sufficient to preserve her constitutional arguments for
1070118
4
appeal.  Cole v. State, 721 So. 2d 255, 260 (Ala. Crim. App.
1998) (holding that a motion to dismiss containing "general
and nonspecific grounds" and "a general conclusory statement"
challenging the constitutionality of a criminal statute was
insufficient to support appellate review because "'[t]he trial
court should not be made to cast about for reasons why a
statute might be unconstitutional'" (quoting Perry v. State,
568 So. 2d 339, 340 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990))).
However, I write specially to note fundamental concerns
with the application and interpretation of Ala. Code 1975, §
13A-10-15(a)(1)b raised by Soto's petition.  Underlying Soto's
petition is a challenge to the Court of Criminal Appeals'
holding in its unpublished memorandum that the evidence
supports a verdict that Soto made a terrorist threat because
a rational fact-finder could find that Soto's actions
constituted threats and that those threats disrupted school
activities.  Although this holding expresses the currently
prevailing interpretation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-10-
15(a)(1)b in our courts, I fundamentally disagree with this
holding for two reasons.  First, the manner in which the Court
of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum interprets the
1070118
5
statute does not give effect to legislative intent as
expressed by the plain wording of the statute.  Second, the
analysis used to reach this holding fails to apply an
objective standard so as to limit the statute to punishing
only that speech that may be appropriately regulated under the
constitution.
I.
The prevailing interpretation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-
10-15(a)(1)b does not comport with the legislature's
intent as expressed by the plain wording of the statute.
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in
enacting the statute. If possible, the intent of the
legislature should be gathered from the language of the
statute itself."  Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579
So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. 1991).  "Where a statutory
pronouncement is distinct and unequivocal, there remains no
room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed
intent of the legislature must be given effect." Ex parte
Holladay, 466 So. 2d 956, 960 (Ala. 1985) (citing Dumas Bros.
Mfg. Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 534 (Ala.
1983)).  
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6
However, if the statute is ambiguous or uncertain, a need
for judicial construction arises.  "[L]egislative intent ...
may be gleaned from the language used, the reason and
necessity for the act, and the purpose sought to be obtained."
Holladay, 466 So. 2d at 960 (citing Shelton v. Wright, 439 So.
2d 55 (Ala. 1983)).  Further, in determining how to properly
construe a statute to effect its legislative intent, "the
Court may consider conditions that might arise under the
provisions of the statute and examine the results that will
flow from giving the language in question one particular
meaning rather than another."  Volkswagen, 579 So. 2d at 1305.
Additional rules of construction apply when the statute
being construed is a criminal statute.  Alabama Code 1975, §
13A-1-6, provides that "[a]ll provisions of [the Alabama
Criminal Code] shall be construed according to the fair import
of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of
the law, including the purposes stated in Section 13A-1-3,"
one of which  is "[t]o give fair warning of the nature of the
conduct proscribed." § 13A-1-3(2).
As the Court of Criminal Appeals has accurately stated:
"'"'[A]mbiguous criminal statutes must be narrowly
interpreted, in favor of the accused.' United States
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v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 937 (11th Cir. 1991)[,
vacated on rehearing, 977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir.
1992)]. '[I]t is well established that criminal
statutes should not be "extended by construction."'
Ex parte Evers, 434 So. 2d 813, 817 (Ala. 1983).
'"[C]riminal statutes must be strictly construed, to
avoid ensnaring behavior that is not clearly
proscribed."' United States v. Bridges, 493 F.2d
918, 922 (5th Cir. 1974)." Carroll [v. State],
supra, 599 So. 2d [1253] at 1264 [(Ala. Crim. App.
1992)].'"
Grace v. State, 899 So. 2d 302, 308 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)
(quoting State v. Brooks, 701 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996)).
I believe § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b must be construed in
accordance with the above authorities.  I have grave concerns
regarding 
whether 
the 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals'
interpretation of § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b reflects the legislative
intent in enacting the statute, in light of the above
authorities.  
The statute reads as follows:
"(a) A person commits the crime of making a
terrorist threat when he or she threatens by any
means to commit any crime of violence or to damage
any property by doing any of the following:
"(1) Intentionally or recklessly:
"....
1070118
Based on the facts set forth in the petition and in the
1
Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum, it does not
appear that any of the evidence adduced at trial supports a
finding that Soto made any threat with the requisite intent to
retaliate against one of the persons described in subsection
(a)(2) of the statute.  Subsection (a)(2) makes no grammatical
sense unless it is read in conjunction with subsection (a)(1).
However, Soto did not raise this point as grounds for either
her appeal or her petition, and there is no indication that
she raised it in the trial court, either.  Therefore, I do not
address the implications of subsection (a)(2) in this special
concurrence.
8
"b. Causing the disruption of
school activities.
"....
"(2) With the intent to retaliate against
any person who:[1]
"a. 
Attends 
a 
judicial 
or
administrative proceeding as a witness
or 
party 
or 
produces 
records,
documents, or other objects in a
judicial proceeding.
"b. Provides to a law enforcement
officer, adult or juvenile probation
officer, 
prosecuting 
attorney, 
or
judge any information relating to the
commission or possible commission of
an offense under the laws of this
state, of the United States, or a
violation 
of 
conditions 
of 
bail,
pretrial 
release, 
probation, 
or
parole."
The Court of Criminal Appeals, however,  has approached
the statute as though it reads:
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"A person commits the crime of making a terrorist
threat when he or she makes a threat by any means to
commit any crime of violence or to damage any
property, which intentionally or recklessly causes
the disruption of school activities."
See, e.g., P.J.B. v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1026, Feb. 1, 2008]  __
So. 2d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (holding, in a case
involving a student who, while riding a school bus, threatened
to damage private property that had "no connection to the
school," that a person commits the crime of making a terrorist
threat when the making of a threat intentionally or recklessly
significantly disrupts school activities).
Soto's 
indictment 
takes 
a 
similar 
approach; 
that
indictment reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Aurora M. Soto ... threatened to commit a crime of
violence, to-wit: threatened that if anything ever
happened to her daughter at school she would go
crazy and blow everybody up and/or that she was
going to Mexico to hire a Bruha (witch) to put a
spell on Mrs. Pounders (a teacher) and if that
didn't work she would take care of Mrs. Pounders
herself and or other threatening acts, which
intentionally or recklessly caused the disruption of
school activities in violation of Section 13A-10-15,
of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and
dignity of the State of Alabama."
(Emphasis added.)
Section 
13A-10-15(a)(1)b, 
as 
actually 
worded,
criminalizes only threats to commit a crime of violence by
1070118
10
intentionally or recklessly disrupting school activities or
threats to damage property by intentionally or recklessly
disrupting school activities.  Thus, under the statute, a
threat to blow up the school on the first day of fall semester
would be a "terrorist threat," even if the threat was made
during summer vacation and the danger of the student's
carrying out the threat was averted by authorities before
school activities were actually disrupted.
Thus construed, § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b puts persons on notice
that a threat to commit a crime of violence or to destroy
property by disrupting school activities is a terrorist threat
that is punishable by law.  A reasonable person would expect
that such a threat would be taken seriously by school
officials and that it would result in significant disruption
of the education process, the activation of law enforcement
and emergency-response teams, and the disruption of the lives,
peace, and security of students, parents, and educators.
Further, in the light of recent tragedies in our nation in
which students have made and then carried out such threats, a
reasonable person should expect that making such a threat
would be punishable by law.
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I voice my concerns about the prevailing interpretation
and application of § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b because incorrectly
applying the statute vastly broadens the scope of the statute
beyond what the legislature could have reasonably intended by
the clear language of the statute and also makes the statute
absurd and unpredictable in its application.  The prevailing
view, and the view reflected in decisions of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, is that § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b criminalizes any
threat to commit a crime of violence or to destroy property if
the threat intentionally or recklessly causes a disruption of
school activities.  Thus, for example, a student's statement
of his intent to ride around on Halloween night smashing
pumpkins is a "terrorist threat" under this interpretation if
the making of the threat recklessly causes a teacher to miss
an important class to address the threat, or if the same
student significantly disrupts a school assembly by taking
over the podium to voice the smashing-pumpkin threat, but it
is not a terrorist threat if school officials never find out
about or react to the threat.
The current interpretation by the courts, however, is not
what the plain language of the statute says.  Further, under
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this interpretation, the statute does not sufficiently put a
person on notice that what he or she is about to say
constitutes a crime, because the commission of the offense of
making a terrorist threat in a school environment depends on
the actual effect of the statement, such as whether and to
what extent school officials react (or overreact) to a
statement that has nothing to do with threatening to
intentionally or recklessly disrupt school activities.
II.
The prevailing interpretation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-
10-15(a)(1)b, fails to satisfy due-process requirements
and 
to 
apply 
the 
statute 
to 
prohibit 
only
constitutionally unprotected speech.
Statutes punishing spoken words are subject to even more
rigorous rules of construction than are other criminal
statutes.  Such statutes are valid if written or construed so
as not to unconstitutionally infringe on the right to free
speech.  Even if the clear wording of an otherwise valid
statute punishes constitutionally protected speech, we are
bound to interpret that statute narrowly and to apply it in a
manner that does not infringe on First Amendment rights. As
this Court stated in Frolik v. State, 392 So. 2d 846, 847
(Ala. 1981):
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13
"State statutes designed to punish spoken words can
be upheld if, as authoritatively construed by the
state courts, they are narrowly limited in their
application to speech that is not protected under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct.
766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942). See generally, Annot.,
39 L. Ed. 2d 925 (1975)."
Much of the speech the legislature intended § 13A-10-
15(a)(1)b to prohibit is not protected by the First Amendment
and is appropriately punishable. 
"[T]he First Amendment ... permits a State to ban a
'true threat.' Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, [505
U.S. 377] at 388[(1992)] ('[T]hreats of violence are
outside the First Amendment'); Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994);
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., 519
U.S. 357, 373 (1997).
"'True 
threats' 
encompass 
those 
statements 
where
the 
speaker 
means 
to 
communicate 
a 
serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals. See Watts v. United States, supra, at
708 ('political hyberbole' is not a true threat);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S., at 388. The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats
'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence'
and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in
addition to protecting people 'from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.' Ibid."
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (emphasis
added).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has defined a "threat" as follows:
"A communication is a threat when 'in its context
[it] would "have a reasonable tendency to create
apprehension that its originator will act according
to its tenor."'  In other words, the inquiry is
whether there was 'sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intentionally 
made 
the 
statement 
under 
such
circumstances 
that 
a 
reasonable 
person 
would
construe them as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm....' Thus, the
offending remarks must be measured by an objective
standard. ...  
"The fact-finder must look at the context in
which the communication was made to determine if the
communication would cause a reasonable person to
construe it as a serious intention to inflict bodily
harm."
United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir.
2003) (citations and footnote omitted); cf. Mitchell v. State,
887 So. 2d 1017, 1020 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (Cobb, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-11-8(a)(2),
"defines a threat as a communication, verbal or nonverbal,
'made with the intent to carry out the threat, that would
cause a reasonable person who is the target of the threat to
fear for his or her safety'").  Under an objective standard,
the reactions of others to a statement are relevant to the
jury's determination of whether a reasonable person would have
1070118
15
construed the statement as a serious intention to inflict
bodily harm.  Alaboud, 347 F.3d at 1298.
An objective standard ensures against punishing citizens
for protected utterances that, taken in context, cannot
reasonably be interpreted as a "true threat."  Cf. Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  Further, because an
objective standard does not make the crime dependent on
whether another person reacts unreasonably to a statement
that, in context, was not intended to be a threat, such a
standard comports with due process and with the principles of
construction set forth in Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-1-6 and -3(2),
supra, by ensuring that persons can reasonably predict whether
the speech they are about to utter constitutes a crime.
As currently interpreted and applied, § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b
criminalizes any threat to commit a crime of violence or to
destroy property if the threat causes a "disruption" of school
activities.  This interpretation makes the commission of the
crime entirely contingent on the subjective reaction (or
overreaction) of school administrators, not on whether a
reasonable person would construe a statement, taken in the
context in which it was spoken, as a serious expression of an
1070118
16
intention to inflict bodily harm or to destroy property.  When
subjectively construed, the statute includes within its
compass protected speech and does not comport with due process
because it criminalizes statements the speaker could not
reasonably have predicted 
would 
have 
disrupted 
school
activities.
I recognize that there are instances when speech that
does not constitute a "true threat" may properly be punished
under 
§ 
13A-10-15(a)(1)b. 
 
For 
example, 
under 
some
circumstances, speech proscribed by the plain language of the
statute amounts to words that, even if intended as a prank by
an objective standard, incite immediate panic in the same way
as does the act of falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded
theater.  See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52 ("[T]he
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done.  The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic." (citations omitted)).  I believe that
applying § 13A-10-15(a)(1)b to punish such speech does not
violate due process or the First Amendment.
1070118
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I am additionally concerned about the constitutionality
of the statute because of several ambiguities inherent in the
language chosen by those who drafted it.  Those concerns,
however, must wait for another day.
III.  Conclusion.
Although I agree that Soto's petition is due to be denied
on procedural grounds, were it otherwise I could not conclude
that the prevailing interpretation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-
10-15(a)(1)b, would constitute a ground for denying the writ
in this case.
1070118
18
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
Structurally, 
syntactically, 
and 
grammatically,
§ 13A-10-15(a), Ala. Code 1975, is nonsensical.  Because the
petition before us falls short of providing this Court with
grounds upon which to issue a writ of certiorari, however, I
concur in denying the writ.