Title: Cummings v. Prater
Citation: 386 P.2d 27, 95 Ariz. 20
Docket Number: 7115
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: October 24, 1963

95 Ariz. 20 (1963) 386 P.2d 27 Marie L. CUMMINGS, Appellant, v. Eva PRATER, Appellee. No. 7115. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. October 24, 1963. Rehearing Denied November 19, 1963. *22 Charles Christakis, Phoenix, for appellant. Gust, Rosenfeld &amp; Divelbess, by Frank E. Flynn, Phoenix, for appellee. BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice. Appellant was plaintiff in a suit for personal injuries. Summary judgment was entered for defendant and it is from that judgment that plaintiff appeals. In considering the motion for summary judgment, this Court must take that view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff and give the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If, when viewed in this manner, the evidence is such that reasonable men might reach different conclusions as to whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact the judgment must be reversed. Harbour v. Reliable Insurance Company, 94 Ariz. 344, 385 P.2d 220. Plaintiff had rented an apartment from defendant on an oral lease and moved in the first week in September, 1957. She had been in the apartment three or four days before the accident. The apartment had a side door opening on to a path which led to an alley where the garbage cans were located. Plaintiff had not previously used the side door. On the path were a series of concrete slabs. The first of these slabs was close to the step from which one would step down to the path from the side door. It was irregular in shape and its edges were worn and jagged. It was several inches higher than the level of the path. A little after 11:00 p.m. on the night of the accident, plaintiff went out the side door for the first time. She was on her way to put garbage in a can in the alley. The only light there was came from a street lamp in the alley. While it was not pitch dark, the lighting was extremely dim. Plaintiff was injured when she stepped down to the path and fell over the concrete slab. She had not examined the premises carefully and had no previous knowledge of the existence of the slab. In his order granting the summary judgment the trial judge ruled: In its inception, the general rule was that in the absence of an express contract a tenant took the demised premises as he found them and the maxim caveat emptor (or more precisely caveat lessee) applied. Middleton v. Green, 35 Ariz. 205, 276 P. 322; 2 Underhill on Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 477. As it was put by an English judge in Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B.N.S. 221, 240, 143 Eng.Rep. 768, 776 (1863): This stringent rule was and is an exception to general negligence law but has been relaxed in many jurisdictions, including Arizona. In Middleton v. Green, 35 Ariz. 205, 209-210, 276 P. 322, 324, recently cited with approval by us in Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172, 379 P.2d 149, where we adopted the "public use" doctrine and imposed liability on a landlord for negligent condition of the premises, we said: The theory of liability in the Middleton case was "nuisance" rather than negligence.[1] In city of Yuma v. Evans, 85 Ariz. 229, 234, 336 P.2d 135, 139, we said: But in Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 504-507, 105 N.W.2d 244, 246-247, 88 A.L.R.2d 577, the Court said: The Court then overruled previous Minnesota cases as follows: See also Freitag v. Evenson, Or., 375 P.2d 69, 70. 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Sec. 27.16 expresses the following rule as most consistent with general negligence theory: And see Prosser Law of Torts, Sec. 80; Restatement of Torts, Sec. 358, Comment a, Illustration. We think this to be the modern rule[2] most consistent with withdrawing special protection from tort liability where the social and economic reasons for that protection no longer exist.[3] We hold, therefore, that the landlord is under a duty of ordinary care to inspect the premises when he has reason to suspect defects existing at the time of the taking of the tenancy and to either repair them or warn the tenant of their existence.[5] In other words he is under the duty to take those precautions for the safety of the tenant as would be taken by a reasonably prudent man under similar circumstances. Our attention has been directed to Pena v. Stewart, 78 Ariz. 272, 278 P.2d 892, in support of the doctrine of caveat emptor. Although the Pena case discusses that question, the holding in the case is that the evidence of causation was so conjectural that it was not sufficient to support the cause of action. The landlord testified on deposition she knew of the presence of the concrete slab at the time plaintiff moved into the apartment. She testified she had used the side door after the slab was put down. She also testified that the slab had not been changed since it had been put down. The record does not disclose any warning by the defendant of the existence of the slab. The only issue in the case is whether the condition of the slab was of such a nature that in the exercise of ordinary care the defendant was under a duty to warn plaintiff of its existence or to repair the condition. People can get hurt on almost anything. But the mere fact of injury does not compel the conclusion that the condition was unreasonably dangerous. And the extent of the landlord's duty is to be measured against the unreasonableness of the danger of the condition.[6] One of the tests used in determining whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous is *27 whether it is "open and obvious" or as it has been better put: Of course, the bare fact that a condition is "open and obvious" does not necessarily mean that it is not unreasonably dangerous. Harper and James, 27.13. The open and obvious condition is merely a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether the condition was unreasonably dangerous. In the instant case the photographs clearly portray the condition of the premises and the position of the slabs. Both the trial court and this court may consider these photographs. Cope v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Ariz. 197, 185 P.2d 772. But cf. Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh, 91 Ariz. 371, 372 P.2d 708. The photographs show proven physical facts: that the slabs are of the same type placed in the same manner, and are in the same condition as are thousands of other stepping stones in the community. These facts taken with the depositions, pleadings and affidavits show that no reasonable man could come to any conclusion other than that there was no issue of fact to be tried. Maloy v. Taylor, 86 Ariz. 356, 346 P.2d 1086. The slabs do not constitute a condition that is unreasonably dangerous and defendant may assume the tenant is likely to take perfectly good care of himself and the chances of harm are slight. Defendant states that plaintiff's cause of action is barred because she amended her complaint with permission of the court after the Statute of Limitations had run. As defendant has not filed a cross appeal this question is not properly before us and cannot be considered. Affirmed. UDALL, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur. [1] Courts have used a number of devices to avoid the harshness of the rule of caveat lessee, see e.g. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (liability imposed because of an implied warranty); Holzhauer v. Sheeny, 127 Ky. 28, 104 S.W. 1034 (liability imposed because of "deceit"); Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297, 41 L.R.A. 278 (caveat emptor applies only where cause of action is in contract not in tort). [2] As is so often the case, the modern rule had an early genesis. See, e.g., Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397, 1 L.R.A. 429 (1888) "The actual holdings in the cases lead to this result: The landlord, as a rule, need not, before leasing the premises, look for defects therein. But if he has knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable man to suspect that defects actually exist, he should disclose such facts to the prospective tenant * * * he cannot close his eyes to facts that would lead a reasonable man to act." [3] As was said by Justice Alfred C. Lockwood in Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 398, 31 P.2d 971, 978-979: "It is the glory of American civilization that it is animated by a spirit of progress. It is constantly striving to lead humanity toward a higher goal in things both material and moral, and we believe the courts of the land, instead of acting as a drag on the wheels of social justice, merely because there is no precedent for the action required, should apply the principle that wherever there is a right there is a remedy, and use their power to protect that right effectually, even if in so doing they are forced to broaden their definitions and extend their jurisdiction over a field which was not previously covered, either because it did not exist, or was not properly understood in the past." [4] Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 Mich.L.R. 260, 260-261, the author states: "In seeking an explanation for this rule some light is shed by considering the status of the parties in the days when this phase of the law was being moulded into form. The landlord was a man of great wealth and consequent power and influence. The tenant was commonly a menial servant with a very limited power of choice in selecting his humble home. The common law judges largely represented the landowning class. It is only natural to find that these intangible affiliations and prejudices were reflected in the law." And see James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 Yale L.J. 548. [5] Harper and James, supra, Sec. 27.13 "The gist of the matter is unreasonable probability of harm in fact. And when that is great enough in spite of full disclosure, it is carrying the quasi-sovereignty of the landowner pretty far to let him ignore it to the risk of life and limb." [6] Keeton, Personal injuries resulting from open and obvious conditions 100 U of Pa. L.Rev. 629.