Title: State v. Edward Robinson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-48-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). VERNIERO, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court was required to use fact-specific jury instructions regarding the witnesses' identification of Robinson as the perpetrator. On February 19, 1996, Morningstar Santana, along with her friends, Crystal Matos and Ruth Acosta, and Santana's boyfriend, George Power, were in Santana's Paterson apartment in the Alabama housing complex. Sometime around 11:30 p.m., someone knocked on the door and a man entered, brandishing a gun and announcing a holdup. The man was wearing a ski hat that covered the top of his head to his eyebrows, but revealed his face. Santana claimed that she recognized the perpetrator as someone she knew from the housing complex whose first name was Eddie. Acosta, who also lived at the complex, did not recognize the perpetrator and did not believe he lived in the area. The perpetrator forced the adults to kneel with their hands behind their heads and went through everyone's pockets. Dissatisfied with the money he obtained, the perpetrator began to yell, This isn't it, this isn't it. He kept telling the group he knew there was more money present. Santana became fearful and told the perpetrator there was money in the back bedroom. The perpetrator entered the bedroom holding Power and pointing the firearm at his head. Once in the bedroom, Power told the perpetrator there was money in the dresser drawer. The perpetrator took several hundred dollars, saying, This is what I'm talking about. The perpetrator then hit Santana in the back because she kept staring at him. Similarly, at one point the perpetrator became impatient with Matos, striking her in the head with his weapon. After taking more valuables, the perpetrator yanked the receiver from the bedroom telephone and fled. When police arrived, Santana informed them that they were robbed by an Eddie West. She later stated that a woman in the complex who had seen a man running from the building had told her that the man's last name was West. The day after the robbery, another neighbor and acquaintance of Robinson's told Santana that the perpetrator's name was Gregory Marshall, who was also known as Durrell. That same day, Santana went to the police station and looked through photo books to no avail. The record does not reveal whether Robinson's photo was in any of the books shown to Santana. She was also shown a picture of Gregory Marshall, but Santana said that was not the man who robbed her. About two months later, police considered Robinson a suspect in the robbery when he was arrested for a homicide occurring during the course of a similar robbery. On April 20, 1996, Santana was shown a photographic lineup of five men. She identified Robinson as the perpetrator who had robbed her and her guests. Shortly thereafter, Power and Acosta also were brought to police headquarters. They were shown photo arrays separately and each identified Robinson as the perpetrator. Acosta later acknowledged that Santana and Power told her they had identified someone and that Acosta should go to police headquarters to sign the picture. Robinson was charged with multiple counts of first degree robbery and weapons offenses. He was tried on May 13-15, 1998. Santana, Acosta, and Power all testified, relaying their accounts of the robbery and their identification of Robinson's photograph at the police station. They also identified Robinson at trial as the man who had robbed them. Matos was not located by investigating detectives and did not testify at trial. Robinson testified on his own behalf. He stated that he had lived at the Alabama housing complex in 1989, but not at the time of the robbery. He further testified that in February 1996, he had spent two days in Paterson while traveling from North Carolina to purchase drugs in New York. However, he claimed that he did not go to the Alabama housing complex at that time. He denied knowing or having met any of the victims except for Santana, who he said he possibly met when he was selling drugs. Defense counsel and the prosecutor devoted a significant portion of their closing arguments to the identification question. Defense counsel stressed that Santana had provided different names for the perpetrator, and claimed there was a reasonable doubt because the victims' identifications were subject to error. The prosecutor rebutted those suggestions by arguing that providing different names was not the same as making inconsistent identifications, that the victims had ample opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of the crime, and that the multiple identifications of Robinson amounted to proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's charge on identification stated that it was the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the person who committed the crime. Further, the trial court noted the identification testimony of the State witnesses and instructed that it was for the jury to determine what weight, if any, to give this testimony. The trial court also told the jury that in performing this task, it was to consider the opportunity the witnesses had to see the perpetrator at the time of the crime and whether the witnesses' in-court identification resulted from their observations of the perpetrator during the crime rather than from a separate, out-of-court identification. Robinson's attorney did not object to any portion of the charge or request any additional charge on identification. After brief deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Robinson was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment plus ten years, with thirty years of parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed Robinson's conviction and sentence in an unreported decision. The Supreme Court granted Robinson's petition for certification and also granted the Attorney General's motion to appear as amicus curiae. HELD: A trial court may but is not required to refer to the facts of the case when providing instructions on identification. Considering the instructions in their entirety, the context of the evidence, and the arguments of trial counsel, the jury charge here was fair. 1. This Court held in State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981), that a trial court should instruct on identification when a defendant's identification is a fundamental or an essential issue in the case. To that end, the Court approved the use of the model charge on identification then in existence. The model charge approved in Green, as revised in 1990, was essentially the charge given by the trial court in this case. Robinson argues here that the trial court's failure to set forth the defense's factual contentions made the charge deficient. Green does not require a trial court to refer to the facts of the case when providing instructions on identification, and the Court declines to impose that requirement. (Pp. 11-14) 2. The model charge on identification was revised in 1999, after Robinson's trial. Like the model charge in place at the time of Robinson's trial, the current charge does not require that a trial court comment on the evidence adduced at trial. The decision whether to add specific factual references is reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court. The Supreme Court has required that jury instructions be molded or tailored to the facts adduced at trial, but in contexts where the statement of relevant law is potentially confusing or misleading to the jury when divorced from the facts. The Court is satisfied that the instructions here left no doubt that the jury properly understood and performed its function. (Pp. 14-20) 3. Robinson also argues that the trial court committed plain error because its identification instruction was unbalanced in favor of the State. The Court disagrees with this characterization of the charge. And, even if the Court were to assume some error in the portion of the charge to which Robinson objects, the charge as a whole thoroughly explained the law and was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. (Pp. 20-23) The judgement of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE STEIN, concurring, agrees that trial courts are not required to formulate jury instructions that include a balanced summary of the evidence on identification, but would encourage trial courts to include a balanced summary of the evidence in a jury trial whenever such an instruction would aid a jury in reaching a just result. JUSTICE O'HERN, dissenting, in which JUSTICE LONG joins, is of the view that a generic charge setting forth the law of identification without reference to the contrasting evidence presented by the parties is deficient. He also concludes that the instruction here was biased in favor of the State because it mentioned only the State's identification evidence. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate, concurring opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN, joined by JUSTICE LONG, has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EDWARD ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued May 2, 2000 -- Decided July 24, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Michelle Katich, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Ronald S. Fava, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney). H. John Witman, III, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. In this criminal appeal, we consider whether the jury instructions on identification should have been tailored or molded to the unique facts of the case. Defendant was convicted of armed robbery largely on the basis of eyewitness testimony. In essence, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error because it did not comment on the perceived weaknesses in the State's evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its charge to the jury. Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction. A. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 48 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EDWARD ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant. STEIN, J., concurring In this appeal the Court considers whether criminal jury trial instructions on identification should be tailored to fit the facts of a case. The Court concludes that trial courts may, but are not required to, formulate jury instructions that include a balanced summary of the evidence on identification adduced at trial. Although I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to encourage trial courts to include a balanced summary of the evidence in a criminal jury trial instruction whenever such an instruction would aid a jury in reaching a just result. Trial courts in this state historically have been entrusted with the power to tailor jury instructions and to summarize the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 18 (1990)( An abstract statement about causation or the defendant's state of mind is not nearly so useful as one stating the same idea in the context of the various factual alternatives projected by the parties. ); State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 294 (1981) (suggesting that trial courts giving identification instruction briefly review conflicting contentions of parties regarding identification of defendant); State v. Parker, 33 N.J. 79, 94 (1960)( We approve, especially in a protracted trial, . . . with its voluminous and conflicting testimony, of a trial court's undertaking to point out to the jury the significant evidence in the case. ); State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, 507 (E. &amp; A. 1922) ( It is not said [the facts] were untruly stated, but that their recital refreshed the minds of the jury. Every comment on evidence by the court has that effect, and it is not error when, as here, the jury is instructed to rely on their own recollection. ); State v. Overton, 85 N.J.L. 287, 294 (E. &amp; A. 1913) ( [I]t is always the right, and in many cases the duty, of the trial judge to express freely the impressions made on his mind by the evidence, thus giving the jury the benefit of his judicial experience . . . provided always the ultimate decision of disputed matters of fact is fairly left to them. ). Federal district court judges, as governor[s] of the trial, also possess the common law power to analyze, dissect, explain, summarize, and comment on the evidence. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997). The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Trial by Jury Standards encourages judges, when necessary, to explain the relationship of evidence to the legal issues. ABA Criminal Justice Trial By Jury Standards 15-4.2 at 223 (3d ed. 1996). Standard 15-4.2, Right of judge to give assistance to the jury during trial, states as follows: (a) The court should not express or otherwise indicate to the jury his or her personal opinion whether the defendant is guilty or express an opinion that certain testimony is worthy or unworthy of belief. (b) When necessary to the jurors' proper understanding of the proceedings, the court may intervene during the taking of the evidence to instruct on a principle of law or the applicability of the evidence to the issues. This should be done only when the jurors cannot be effectively advised by postponing the explanation to the time of giving final instructions. (c) The development of innovative mechanisms to improve juror comprehension of the issues of the case and the evidence presented should be encouraged consistent with the rules of evidence and the rights of the parties. [Ibid. (emphasis added).] As the majority notes, the most recent model jury charge on identification permits trial courts to comment on any evidence relevant to any of the . . . factors that a jury may consider, including, for instance, the opportunity of the witness to view the offender and factors relating to cross-racial identification. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 14-15). Like the majority, I acknowledge that the decision whether to comment on the evidence properly is remitted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 15). I further agree with the majority that trial counsel, not the trial court, ultimately is responsible for persuading the jury to adopt counsel's interpretation of the evidence. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 19). However, the trial court has the non-delegable responsibility for ensuring the fairness of the trial. As commentators have discussed, jury instructions frequently are misunderstood by juries and thus must be carefully crafted by trial courts to ensure that they fairly and clearly convey the law to the jury. See generally Joel D. Lieberman &amp; Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y &amp; L. 589 (1997) (reviewing empirical research on effectiveness of jury instructions); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 37, 41-44 (1993) (stating that [m]uch research by linguists, psychologists and others has confirmed that jurors tend to have great difficulty understanding the instructions that are supposed to guide their decisionmaking ); William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 731, 743 (1981)(concluding that the jury's capacity to serve as a repository of the people's sense of justice, reason, and fair play is being questioned and suggesting ways to improve juror comprehension). One change among many that commentators have recommended to improve juror comprehension is that trial courts incorporate a summary of the evidence in juror instructions. Jack B. Weinstein, a distinguished judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, has argued persuasively that judicial summaries of the evidence aid in the pursuit of fairness. Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 166 (1988). See also Christopher N. May, "What Do We Do Now?": Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 869, 870 (1995) (encouraging trial judges to weave the evidence into the instructions, or use the threat of doing so to induce counsel to link the evidence to the law in their closing arguments ). According to Judge Weinstein, a judicial summary of the evidence can clarify what may have been distorted by the bias of counsel's arguments and can increase the jury's ability to understand the proceedings it has attended, and thus increase the accuracy of verdicts. Weinstein, supra, 118 F.R.D. at 166. Another commentator has argued that trial courts should summarize the evidence in tailored jury instructions because when the facts illuminate the abstract legal concepts set forth in the instructions, jurors' understanding of the law greatly improves. May, supra, 28 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. at 892. Additionally, by utilizing the facts to illustrate the law, the jury's ability to use the instructions in a systematic manner is enhanced, reducing the possibility that it may overlook key elements or evidence critical to the outcome of the case. Id. at 893. Although trial courts understandably may be hesitant to summarize the evidence for fear of saying too much, too little, or being unbalanced, thereby providing a potential basis for reversal, trial judges should not reflexively permit those concerns to prevail over the potential benefits of tailored jury charges. We have observed that our judges are made of sterner stuff than to act out of fear of reversal. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 541 (1995). Submissions to counsel at the charge conference of a proposed instruction that incorporates a balanced summary of the evidence should diminish the likelihood that that summary will afford a basis for reversal. See Weinstein, supra, 118 F.R.D. at 170 (stating that proposed summary of evidence should be discussed at charge conference and that actual process of summarizing . . . the evidence can be similar to the process of instructing the jury on the law in a jury charge ); R. 1:8-7 (requiring trial courts to hold a charge conference on the record in all criminal cases and stating that [a]t the conference the court shall advise counsel of the offenses, defenses and other legal issues to be charged and shall rule on requests made by counsel ). Although I am satisfied that the trial court's charge in this case was not prejudicially unbalanced in favor of the State, the issue would not have arisen if the trial court had included in its instruction a balanced summary of all the material evidence on the question of identification. This record indicates that defense counsel adequately focused the jury's attention on the evidence that favored defendant. The arguments of counsel, however, will not always be an adequate substitute for a methodical and impartial summary of the material evidence by the trial court. Even though not necessary in every criminal trial, inclusion of a balanced summary of the evidence in a court's jury charge generally will enhance the jury's ability to weigh the evidence and return a just verdict. In my view, the value of a fair summary of the evidence to the deliberations of an informed jury substantially outweighs the burden of formulating the charge and the slight risk of an adverse reaction by counsel. I am fully in agreement with Judge Weinstein's conclusion on the issue: Despite the occasional mishaps [that] can result from use of the summary . . . power, most difficulties can be avoided by a trial judge who employs cautious procedures and a measure of common sense. Taking advantage of the power to summarize . . . is one means of keeping jury trials fair, jury verdicts reasonable, and jurors a little less confused. [Weinstein, supra, 118 F.R.D. at 188.] STATE OF NEW JERSEY Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD ROBINSON Defendant-Respondent. O'HERN, J. dissenting, In a long series of cases, we have held that an essential ingredient to a fair trial is that adequate and understandable instructions be given to the jury. State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 475 (1997). Gartland cited State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) for the well-settled proposition that an instruction that is appropriate in one case may not be sufficient for another case. Ordinarily, the better practice is to mold the instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case. This case is inconsistent with that principle. In order to meet its burden with respect to the identification of the individual who committed the offenses the State has presented the testimony of several witnesses. You'll recall they included Miss Santana, Mr. Power, and Miss Acosta. And you will recall that those three individuals testified in this courtroom and identified the defendant in this court as the person who committed the offense or offenses. According to the witnesses, their identification of the defendant in court is based upon the observations and perceptions which they made of the defendant on the scene at the time the offense or offenses were being committed. No mention was made to the jury of the following facts: (1) that Miss Santana told police at first that the perpetrator was named Eddie West, not Eddie Robinson; (2) that Santana then told police a short time later that Gregory Marshall, not defendant, was the robber; (3) that Santana may have failed to pick defendant's photograph from a police book (it is disputed whether defendant's picture was in this book); (4) that Miss Acosta claimed that she was urged by Santana and Mr. Power to sign the picture after they told her they had identified the perpetrator from a photo array. Nor was there ever any mention made, more generally, that the defense had elicited evidence of uncertainty and suggestiveness that would undermine the identifications. NO. A-48 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EDWARD ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 24, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz