Title: In the Matter of Ablitt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12929
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2021

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SJC-12929 
 
IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN A. ABLITT. 
 
 
February 3, 2021. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Disbarment, Conflict 
of interest, Misuse of client funds, Use of confidence or 
secret, Deceit.  Due Process of Law, Attorney disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
The respondent attorney, Steven A. Ablitt, appeals from the 
judgment of a single justice of this court disbarring him from 
the practice of law.1  He claims both that the findings of 
misconduct are not supported by substantial evidence and that 
his due process rights were violated in the disciplinary 
proceedings.  We affirm. 
 
 
1.  Background.  On September 6, 2016, bar counsel filed a 
two-count petition for discipline against the respondent and his 
former law partner, Lawrence F. Scofield, arising out of their 
default services law practice, Ablitt Scofield, P.C.2  At one 
time, the firm had offices in Massachusetts, Florida, and Puerto 
Rico; until it was restructured in 2013, Ablitt owned ninety-
nine shares of the firm, while Scofield owned the remaining 
                                                          
 
 
1 This appeal is subject to the court's standing order 
governing bar discipline appeals.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 
Mass. 1303 (2015).  Pursuant to the standing order, we dispense 
with oral argument. 
 
 
2 Lawrence F. Scofield defaulted on the petition for 
discipline and subsequently was disbarred.  The petition for 
discipline proceeded to hearing solely against the respondent. 
 
2 
 
 
 
share.3  Ablitt also owned, or held interests in, several 
ancillary businesses, some of which provided services to the 
firm. 
 
 
Because of the nature of its practice, the firm customarily 
advanced certain fees for the benefit of its lender clients for 
expenses such as filing fees, title searches, and auctions.  
Over time, and particularly after U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 
Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 655 (2011) (Ibanez) (foreclosure action 
may not be commenced where lender not in possession of 
promissory note), those cash advances, combined with poor 
billing and collection practices, created a financial burden for 
the firm, and client funds on deposit in an Interest on Lawyers' 
Trust Account (IOLTA or IOLTA account) were used to pay the 
firm's operating expenses. 
 
 
As amended, count one of the petition for discipline 
charged that the respondent was responsible for intentional 
misuse of client funds, failed as a partner in the firm to 
supervise the firm's financial and accounting personnel, and 
failed to maintain required IOLTA account records.  Count two 
charged that the respondent engaged in misrepresentation, 
disclosed confidential client information, and was involved in a 
conflict of interest in connection with a factoring agreement 
the firm used to finance its accounts receivable. 
 
 
A hearing committee of the Board of Bar Overseers (board) 
held a public hearing, at which the respondent was represented 
by counsel.  Over the course of thirteen days, fifteen 
witnesses, including the respondent and Scofield, testified, and 
283 exhibits were admitted in evidence.  After the hearing, on 
the respondent's motion, the evidence was reopened and there was 
an additional day of testimony.  Thereafter, the hearing 
committee issued a report, determined that bar counsel had 
proved the allegations of misconduct, and recommended that the 
respondent be disbarred. 
 
 
The board adopted the committee's findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations, and voted to recommend that the respondent 
be disbarred.  An information was filed in the county court 
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 Mass. 
1310 (2009).  A single justice of this court reviewed the record 
                                                          
 
 
3 In 2013, three partners were added to the firm, and it was 
restructured as "Connolly, Geaney, Ablitt & Willard, A 
Professional Corporation."  The firm, as restructured, closed in 
June 2014.  
3 
 
 
 
and, after a hearing, accepted the hearing committee's role as 
the "sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented at 
the hearing."  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a).  She concluded 
that the findings were supported by substantial evidence.  See 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6).  The single justice accepted the 
board's recommendation as to sanction, and a judgment of 
disbarment entered. 
 
 
2.  Disciplinary violations.  We summarize the hearing 
committee's subsidiary findings, as adopted by the board and, 
like the single justice, conclude that the findings are 
supported by substantial evidence.4  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 8 (6).  Its ultimate "findings . . . , as adopted by the 
board, are entitled to deference, although they are not binding 
on this court."  Matter of Ellis, 457 Mass. 413, 415 (2010).  
See Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 296 (2018). 
 
 
a.  Count one:  intentional misuse of client funds, failure 
to supervise, and failure to maintain records.  By 2010, the 
firm's operating account had been depleted.  Faced with mounting 
financial pressures, the respondent authorized the firm's 
accounting department to withhold payments to certain vendors.  
His partner, Scofield, learned that the firm's chief financial 
officer, Alfred Moss, was misusing IOLTA funds to pay operating 
expenses, and reprimanded him.  In December 2010, on the 
respondent's recommendation, Robert Feige was hired as a 
financial consultant.  By the beginning of 2011, however, the 
firm owed millions of dollars to its vendors. 
 
 
Between October 2010 and March 2011, the firm opened 
several new IOLTA accounts and an operating account.  The 
respondent and Scofield were the only signatories to those 
accounts.  Nonetheless, Moss continued to misuse IOLTA funds to 
pay firm expenses, and his employment was terminated in February 
2011.  Soon thereafter, Feige became the firm's chief financial 
officer.  Feige reported to both the respondent and Scofield 
that "a pretty big number" had been misappropriated from the 
                                                          
 
 
4 The respondent's argument that the single justice's 
memorandum of decision is not sufficiently detailed is without 
merit.  Like the single justice, we have considered the record 
in light of the respondent's arguments that the board's findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence, that it did not 
consider adequately his own testimony and documentary evidence, 
and that it relied on witnesses who he thought were not 
credible.  Like the single justice, we conclude that the board's 
findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
4 
 
 
 
firm's IOLTA accounts.  The respondent and Scofield adopted 
Feige's recommendation to replenish the IOLTA funds from new 
client trust funds received on behalf of other clients and, over 
time, from the firm's profits. 
 
 
Beginning in February 2011, Feige provided the respondent 
with weekly summaries of the firm's finances, showing that the 
firm's accounts payable exceeded its accounts receivable.  In 
addition, the respondent required that Feige and other 
accounting personnel report directly to him, and instructed that 
he be involved in meetings with creditors, lenders, and vendors.   
 
 
The firm's financial condition continued to deteriorate, 
particularly after the court's decision in Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 
655.  Various of the firm's lender clients froze foreclosure 
litigation, and for the next five or six months, the firm had no 
new foreclosure work.  Because it continued to incur operating 
expenses, however, it began operating at a loss.  The firm's 
debts to vendors, including the respondent's ancillary 
businesses, escalated, and the accounting department began using 
the firm's credit cards to "buy extra time" to cover payroll and 
other expenses. 
 
 
In August 2011, five checks drawn on the IOLTA accounts 
were returned for insufficient funds.  As a result, bar counsel 
opened an investigation.  By that time, the respondent, 
Scofield, Feige, and Mary Donovan, a member of the firm's 
accounting staff, had met to review the firm's financial 
records.  The respondent retained legal ethics counsel to assist 
in responding to bar counsel's inquiry.  Ethics counsel taught 
Donovan how to perform the three-way reconciliation required by 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015).5  
Given that there were insufficient funds in the IOLTA accounts 
to reconcile them, however, a false set of records was created 
and submitted to bar counsel.  Although, based on the false 
records, bar counsel closed its investigation in May 2012, she 
emphasized to the respondent that the lawyers must comply with 
their professional obligations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.  
Despite the warning, the respondent took no steps to comply with 
that obligation. 
 
                                                          
 
 
5 For convenience, in this opinion, we cite the current 
versions of the rules of professional conduct, which include 
substantially the same language as those in effect at the 
relevant times in this matter. 
5 
 
 
 
 
No later than the fall of 2011, the respondent was aware of 
both Moss's and Feige's misuse of IOLTA funds.  By November 
2011, funds transferred from the firm's IOLTA accounts were 
being used to pay credit card bills, as well as other 
operational expenses.  In August 2012, a check for $370,000 
drawn on one of the firm's IOLTA accounts was returned for 
insufficient funds.  Bar counsel opened a second investigation.  
That investigation subsequently was closed based on what the 
hearing committee determined were false statements by Feige to 
bar counsel. 
 
 
In November 2012, the firm began receiving funds on behalf 
of a client, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC (Ocwen), and by May 2013, 
it had received more than $2 million.  By May 24, 2013, however, 
the balance of the IOLTA account was less than $188,000, 
although no payments to Ocwen had been made, and notice had not 
been given to Ocwen that the funds were withdrawn to pay firm 
fees.  Between February 11, 2013, and May 22, 2013, the firm's 
records indicated that approximately $591,000 was transferred 
from this IOLTA account to the firm's operating account. 
 
 
In 2013, the firm added three new partners to its practice:  
John Connolly, Jr.; Kevin Geaney; and Rachelle Willard.  At the 
time, the firm was interested in regaining approval to handle 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) loans, which 
had been lost years earlier.  It considered restructuring to 
give Fannie Mae the impression that the respondent was no longer 
managing the firm.  In May 2013, Connolly told Fannie Mae that 
the firm was under new management, although the respondent 
retained management authority. 
 
 
In August 2013, Geaney learned that there were insufficient 
funds in the IOLTA account to cover a check Willard had 
requested, and that approximately $3 million was missing from 
the account.  At a meeting attended by the respondent, Scofield, 
Connolly, Geaney, and Willard, the lawyers were informed that, 
acting on the instruction of Feige, IOLTA funds had been used to 
cover firm operational expenses.  Options, including terminating 
Feige's employment, were discussed.  Although the respondent 
testified that he favored firing Feige, the hearing committee 
credited contrary testimony from other firm lawyers and 
employees. 
 
 
In October 2013, a firm restructuring agreement and a 
consulting agreement were signed, listing May 16, 2013, as the 
effective date.  Notwithstanding the respondent's position that, 
after May 16, 2013, he lacked management responsibility for the 
6 
 
 
 
firm -- in light of the restructuring agreement, his purported 
resignation, and the consulting agreement -- the substantial 
evidence supports the hearing committee's conclusion that he 
retained that responsibility.  Regardless of their purported 
effective date, the documents were signed in October 2013, 
months after Fiege's misconduct was discussed at the August 
meeting.  The substantial evidence also supports the hearing 
committee's finding that the changes were largely illusory, 
designed in part to fool Fannie Mae into approving the firm to 
handle its business. 
 
 
On September 3, 2014, the respondent filed a Chapter 7 
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the firm, listing 
himself and his ancillary businesses as creditors.  Ocwen also 
filed a proof of claim, alleging that more than $2 million of 
its funds, which should have been deposited in an IOLTA account, 
had been misappropriated. 
 
 
As the hearing committee found, and the board agreed, the 
respondent had a "hands-on approach" to the firm's financial 
affairs and was well aware of its declining financial viability.  
Not only did he have a substantial ownership interest in the 
firm itself, but he also had ownership interests in ancillary 
businesses that received payments from it.  He recommended 
hiring Feige to improve its financial condition.  The hearing 
committee concluded that by failing to terminate Feige's 
employment after the misconduct was discovered, the respondent 
ratified Feige's misappropriation of client funds.  In addition, 
the hearing committee found, and the board agreed, that by 
collecting salary payments from the firm and ancillary 
businesses during the period that the respondent was aware of 
the misuse of IOLTA funds to pay operating expenses, the 
respondent benefited from the misuse. 
 
 
The hearing committee found, and the board accepted, that 
not only was the respondent willfully blind to the misuse of 
client funds, but he also had actual knowledge of the misuse, 
and was personally responsible, pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 
5.3 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1447 (2015), because he 
ratified Feige's actions and failed to mitigate them.  See 
Matter of Zimmerman, 17 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 633 (2001), 
quoting C.W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 13.3.3, at 696 
(1986) ("[A] lawyer cannot avoid 'knowing' a fact by 
purposefully refusing to look.  While a lawyer 'is not under an 
obligation to seek out information,' his or her 'studied 
ignorance of a readily accessible fact by consciously avoiding 
it is the functional equivalent of knowledge of the fact'").  By 
7 
 
 
 
failing to adopt procedures sufficient to ensure that the 
conduct of nonlawyer staff was compatible with the respondent's 
professional obligations, by failing to ensure that the conduct 
of nonlawyer staff under his supervision adhered to those 
professional obligations, and by ratifying the misconduct of 
nonlawyers, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3 
(responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistance) and Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 8.4 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015) 
(dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
 
 
By failing to maintain individual client ledgers, failing 
to perform and retain a three-way reconciliation of IOLTA 
accounts, and failing to ensure that only client trust funds 
were deposited into IOLTA accounts, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (segregation of trust funds) and 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (trust account documentation).  
By failing to keep clients reasonably informed about their 
cases, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4, as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 (2015) (communication with clients). 
 
 
b.  Count two:  fee factoring agreement.  The petition's 
second count alleged that the respondent made knowing 
misrepresentations to a "factoring" company, Durham Commercial 
Capital Corp. (Durham), to the effect that the firm was 
financially solvent, for the purpose of inducing Durham to loan 
money to the firm.  The agreement granted Durham a security 
interest in the firm's accounts receivable, notwithstanding that 
the firm previously had granted another creditor a security 
interest in the same assets.  Although the respondent testified 
that he believed, at the time he signed the agreement, that the 
firm was solvent, there is substantial evidence to support the 
hearing committee's finding, adopted by the board, that the 
respondent was aware, as of October 2012, that the firm was 
unable to meet its payroll or other debts. 
 
 
The firm did not comply fully with the factoring agreement.  
In February 2013, the respondent assigned several clients 
(including Ocwen) to Durham, notwithstanding a provision in the 
firm's contract with Ocwen that prohibited nonconsensual 
assignments.  Certain client invoices, provided by the 
respondent to Durham, disclosed the subject of the firm's 
representation.  In addition, beginning in November 2013, the 
respondent asked another client to send payments directly to a 
bank account in Puerto Rico controlled by the respondent, rather 
than directly to Durham, as the factoring agreement required.  
The hearing committee did not credit the respondent's claim that 
the payments made to the Puerto Rico account were for the 
8 
 
 
 
benefit of the firm's "stand alone" Puerto Rico office, and 
therefore were not covered by the factoring agreement. 
 
 
By disclosing confidential client information to Durham, 
without the clients' consent, the respondent violated Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.6 (a), as amended, 474 Mass. 1301 (2016) 
(confidentiality of information).  In addition, by failing to 
obtain his clients' informed consent prior to entering into the 
factoring agreement, the respondent materially limited his 
ability to represent his clients, both because he was motivated 
by his own interests and because the factoring agreement created 
obligations to Durham, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7 (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 (2015) (conflict of 
interest).  By using clients' confidential information to their 
disadvantage and his own advantage, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8 (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1349 (2015) 
(conflict of interest).  Finally, by misrepresenting to Durham 
that the firm was solvent and that it was paying its debts in a 
timely manner, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) 
(misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation). 
 
 
3.  Due process claim.  In addition to challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence of misconduct, the respondent 
contends that the proceedings before the board did not comport 
with due process considerations, a claim we also reject.  
Stripped of hyperbole, the gravamen of the respondent's 
complaint is that bar counsel's investigation was "designed to 
prove [her] initial conclusion" that the respondent was solely 
responsible for the demise of the firm of which he owned ninety-
nine of its one hundred shares, and that the investigation was 
deficient because, among other things, bar counsel "had not 
reviewed or even sought a substantial portion of [the law 
firm's] files."  In the respondent's view, "the only way to 
mount a defense to the [petition for discipline]" was to obtain 
"access to all" such files.  On appeal, he also contends that 
the single justice's memorandum of decision failed adequately to 
address his claim.6 
 
 
The respondent principally complains that the board's chair 
improperly denied his request for prehearing discovery subpoenas 
                                                          
 
 
6 Although the single justice did not separately address the 
denial of what the respondent characterizes as "voluminous" 
discovery, there is no merit to it, as the single justice 
correctly summarized. 
 
9 
 
 
 
for a broad swath of e-mail messages and documents held by (1) 
the trustee in the firm's bankruptcy proceeding, (2) seven 
individuals who worked at or with the law firm, and (3) three 
corporate entities.  The respondent contends that, as a result 
of the ruling, he had access to only a "small" portion of 
documents and communications (including e-mail messages) 
relating to the now-defunct law firm, i.e., the documents 
obtained by bar counsel.  There is no dispute, however, that bar 
counsel opened her files to the respondent (with the exception 
of her work product), or that the respondent had access to the 
same documents as bar counsel.  Nor did the respondent 
demonstrate that the procedure established by the rules -- which 
permits hearing subpoenas for witnesses and documents -- 
prejudiced his defense.  See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers 
§ 4.9(a)(2) (2017).7  As the board's chair concluded, the 
respondent failed to demonstrate "substantial need" as required 
by the rule.  Taking into account that "the information sought 
or its substantial equivalent has been provided or was available 
by other means, [and] taking into consideration the formal or 
informal discovery that has already occurred," id., the board's 
chair denied the applications. 
 
 
The respondent was permitted to -- and did -- subpoena 
witnesses to the hearing, and he examined them there.  No 
witnesses were excluded.  One of the witnesses produced 3,400 
pages of e-mail printouts and delivered them to respondent's 
counsel on May 25, 2017, more than two months prior to the 
conclusion of the hearing.8  There was no claim that bar counsel 
withheld documents from the respondent.  See Matter of the 
                                                          
 
 
7 Section 4.9(a)(2) of the Rules of the Board of Bar 
Overseers provides that "[a] motion to take a discovery 
deposition shall be allowed only upon a showing of a substantial 
need for the deposition in the preparation of the applicant's 
case, taking in to consideration:  (A) The nature and complexity 
of the case and the need to assure an expeditious, economical 
and fair proceeding.  (B) Whether the information sought or its 
substantial equivalent has been provided or was available by 
other means, taking into consideration the formal or informal 
discovery that has already occurred.  (C) The prevention of 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden, including economic 
burden, that the deposition may cause the deponent." 
 
 
8 Among the documents produced were messages from the e-mail 
boxes of Feige, Geaney, and Connolly.  The respondent also 
obtained the e-mail box of an employee of Durham.  Bar counsel 
provided the respondent's e-mail box. 
10 
 
 
 
Discipline of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2007) (bar 
counsel did not withhold documents she did not possess; no 
denial of due process).  Rather, both bar counsel and the 
respondent had access to the "full email file [of] Robert Feige, 
the partial email files of [the respondent] and [a]ttorneys John 
Connolly and Kevin Geaney" and "a sampling of the operational, 
financial, and, significantly, IOLTA account establishment 
records and documents of the [f]irm during the relevant time 
period."  Although the respondent contends that he did not have 
all firm e-mail, he failed to demonstrate how the purportedly 
missing e-mail could have aided his defense.  The respondent did 
not, in short, establish that his ability to present an 
effective defense was impeded by the denial of the requested 
prehearing discovery. 
 
 
Bar counsel is not obliged to participate in what amounts 
to a prehearing fishing expedition for evidence that might prove 
exculpatory.  See Matter of Abbott, 437 Mass. 384, 392 (2002); 
Matter of London, 427 Mass. 477, 481-482 (1998) (failure to 
interview respondent's witness does not violate of due process).  
While we recognize that there might be circumstances in which 
the denial of prehearing discovery may be so prejudicial as to 
amount to a due process violation, see Matter of Tobin, 417 
Mass. 81, 87 (1994), those circumstances are not present here, 
see Matter of McDonald, 18 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 382 
(2002).  Among other things, the hearing committee granted the 
respondent's request to reopen the hearing, after he had had 
ample opportunity to review all documents, and the only witness 
he called was himself. 
 
 
4.  Sanction.  The board's findings amply support its 
conclusion that the respondent violated multiple rules of 
professional conduct.  In considering the single justice's 
determination as to sanction, we inquire whether the sanction 
imposed is "markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered by 
the various single justices in similar cases."  Matter of Alter, 
389 Mass. 153, 156 (1983).  Considering the "cumulative effect 
of the several violations committed by the respondent," Matter 
of Palmer, 413 Mass. 33, 38 (1992), and, like the single 
justice, giving "substantial deference to the board's 
recommendation," Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333 (2003), we 
agree that disbarment is warranted, see Matter of Gordon, 385 
Mass. 48, 58 (1982) (while board's recommendation as to sanction 
is entitled to substantial deference, "ultimate duty of decision 
rests with this court"). 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
a.  Sanction for established misconduct.  Although the 
board focused on the misconduct for which the most severe 
sanction is warranted, intentional misuse of client funds, bar 
counsel established a far broader swath of misconduct.  
Considering the cumulative effect of that misconduct reinforces 
the conclusion that disbarment is the correct sanction. 
 
 
Bar counsel established that IOLTA funds intentionally were 
used, with the respondent's knowledge, to pay the firm's 
operating expenses.  At least one client, Ocwen, was deprived of 
more than $2 million dollars and, by the time of the 
disciplinary hearing, had not been reimbursed for the loss.  See 
Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 292 (1991).  Disbarment is the 
presumptive sanction for intentional misuse of client funds, 
either with the intent to deprive or with actual deprivation 
resulting.  See Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 186 (1997). 
 
 
This is not a case where the misconduct consists more 
narrowly of failing adequately to supervise a nonlawyer's 
handling of client funds.  In such cases, a term suspension has 
been imposed.  See Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1014-1015 
(2005) (two-year suspension, with prohibition on civil practice 
on reinstatement where attorney failed to supervise nonlawyer, 
resulting in commingling and conversion of client funds, without 
restitution); Matter of Goldberg, 23 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
191 (2007) (suspension of one year and one day for failure to 
supervise nonlawyer); Matter of Gordon, 20 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 166 (2004) (two-year suspension where attorney, 
victimized by employee theft, failed to reconcile and audit 
client account after learning of it, and engaged in other 
misconduct). 
 
 
Even after becoming aware of Moss's and Feige's misuse of 
IOLTA funds for the firm's operational benefit, the respondent 
failed to supervise the accounting staff and failed to make 
reasonable efforts to put in place measures that would provide 
reasonable assurances that the respondent's professional 
obligations with respect to client funds were satisfied.  See 
Matter of Fuster, 24 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 287 (2008) 
(eighteen-month suspension for failure to adequately supervise 
nonlawyers and other misconduct, including commingling and 
negligent misuse of client funds; prior record of discipline).  
The respondent's failure to terminate Feige, and allowing him to 
remain in control of the firm's finances, ratified the 
misconduct within the meaning of Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3 (c) (1) 
and (2).  Likewise, the respondent violated the rules of 
professional conduct directly and through the acts of another, 
12 
 
 
 
in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a).  In addition, the 
respondent's failure to keep IOLTA records that complied with 
the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and the dishonored 
checks drawn on IOLTA accounts also warrant public discipline.  
See Matter of Beatrice, 23 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 31 
(2007). 
 
 
In connection with the factoring agreement, the respondent 
disclosed confidential client information for his own benefit, 
i.e., obtaining financing for the firm.  In so doing, he created 
a conflict of interest between his contractual obligation to 
Durham and his professional obligations to his clients.  See 
Matter of Wise, 433 Mass. 80, 90-92 (2000) (six-month suspension 
for conflict of interest and revealing confidential client 
information); Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 745-746 (1990) 
(six-month suspension for engaging in conflict of interest). 
 
 
The respondent made material misrepresentations to Durham 
concerning the firm's solvency and falsely represented that 
pledged assets had not been previously encumbered.  A term 
suspension has been imposed for similar misconduct.  See Matter 
of Hass, 477 Mass. 1015, 1017-1019 (2017) (two-month suspension 
for falsely representing that client settlement not already 
encumbered); Matter of Goodman, 22 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
352 (2006) (one-year suspension for multiple misrepresentations 
to insurance companies); Matter of Behenna, 10 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 15 (1994) (two-year suspension for executing 
closing documents that falsely represented terms of 
transaction). 
 
 
b.  Factors considered in mitigation and aggravation.  i.  
Mitigating factors.  In his answer to the petition for 
discipline, the respondent alleged no factors in mitigation of 
sanction.  See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.15(d), 
(f).  At the hearing, while he testified to certain medical 
conditions and stress, he offered no medical records, expert 
testimony, or other evidence that those circumstances caused or 
contributed to the misconduct.  See Matter of Dragon, 440 Mass. 
1023, 1024 (2003) (requiring causal connection between claimed 
mitigating factor and misconduct).  Further, those circumstances 
and stress appear to have occurred after the respondent became 
aware that Feige and others had misappropriated the IOLTA funds, 
in August 2013 at the latest.  We agree with the board that 
those factors do not weigh in mitigation of sanction. 
 
 
The same is true of the respondent's contention that he and 
his spouse lent money to the firm to pay the firm's expenses and 
13 
 
 
 
to restore the firm's retirement plan.  Those "loans" do not 
serve as restitution to a client, see Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 
at 290-292, or evidence of reform, see Matter of Corbett, 478 
Mass. 1004, 1005-1006 (2017).  Self-interested loans are not an 
outward sign of remorse.  See id.  Further, client funds are not 
fungible commodities, see Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. at 301, 
and IOLTA accounts cannot be treated as a line of credit for a 
lawyer or law firm experiencing financial difficulties. 
 
 
ii.  Aggravating factors.  The board properly weighed 
multiple factors in aggravation, including the respondent's use 
of IOLTA funds for personal gain, lack of candor before the 
hearing committee, harm to clients, and lack of acknowledgment 
of essential ethical rules. 
 
 
After learning that the firm's IOLTA accounts were being 
used to fund the firm's operational needs, and knowing the 
firm's strained financial condition, the respondent continued to 
collect his salary and use the firm's funds to pay his own 
personal expenses.  He did not take necessary steps to ensure 
that IOLTA funds were properly managed, notwithstanding that bar 
counsel had twice previously investigated the firm when IOLTA 
checks were returned for insufficient funds.  At least one 
client was not compensated for its loss.  He "engaged in more 
and wider misconduct."  Matter of Haese, 468 Mass. 1002, 1008 
(2014). 
 
 
Although the respondent contends that the board erred in 
weighing in aggravation the hearing committee's finding that he 
gave false testimony before the hearing committee, he is 
entitled to defend himself.  While a respondent is entitled to 
defend himself, he is not entitled to testify falsely.  Finally, 
although the respondent contends that the board erred in finding 
that he demonstrated a lack of appreciation for basic ethics 
obligations and a lack of remorse, and in weighing those factors 
in aggravation, on the evidence presented, the board properly 
could conclude that the respondent's "lack of remorse and 
insincerity with regard to acceptance of responsibility" are 
aggravating factors.9  Matter of Corbett, 478 Mass. at 1007. 
 
                                                          
 
 
9 Although both the board's and the single justice's 
memoranda reference events that occurred prior to the misconduct 
charged in the petition for discipline, those events do not form 
the basis for discipline.  The references do not establish a 
violation of due process, as the respondent contends.  See 
Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. at 300 n.9. 
14 
 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion.  A bar discipline proceeding is not a forum 
best used broadly to cast blame or aspersions on others.  It is 
a proceeding with a narrow focus:  to determine whether there is 
a preponderance of evidence that an attorney has violated one or 
more rules of professional conduct and, if so, what sanction is 
warranted.  The respondent's continued focus in these 
proceedings on matters other than the charged misconduct does 
him a disservice because evidence of misconduct is neither 
excused nor obscured by accusations of misconduct by others.  
With deference to the sanction recommended by the board, we 
affirm the judgment of the single justice that disbarment is 
warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Mark L. Josephs for the respondent.