Title: Marcus Lynn Whitson v. City of Hoover
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1071468
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2009

REL: 01/16/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1071468
____________________
Marcus Lynn Whitson
v.
City of Hoover
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-08-164)
PER CURIAM.
Marcus Lynn Whitson appeals from a judgment of the Shelby
Circuit Court denying his motion for a change of venue to
Jefferson County and dismissing his age-discrimination claim
against the City of Hoover ("the City"), made pursuant to the
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2
Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, § 25-1-20
et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  We reverse as to the dismissal of
the age-discrimination claim and affirm the circuit court's
refusal to order a change of venue.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On September 23, 2004, Whitson, who was then employed by
the City, suffered an on-the-job injury to his right arm and
shoulder.  On May 17, 2007, Whitson initiated an action in the
Shelby Circuit Court seeking benefits for his injury pursuant
to the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975.  Approximately two weeks later, the City
terminated Whitson's employment, stating that there were no
light-duty positions available that Whitson could fill.  
Whitson and the City thereafter negotiated a settlement
to resolve Whitson's worker's compensation claim and, on
July 10, 2007, the trial court entered an order approving the
settlement.  That order stated in pertinent part:
"2. [Whitson] shall have and recover from the [City]
the lump sum of $71,972.92 representing all claims
for past, present, and future compensation and
vocational rehabilitation benefits arising out of
[Whitson's] injury or injuries.
"3.  Medical benefits shall remain open subject to
the provisions of Alabama Code [1975,] § 22-5-77.
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"4.  The [City] and its insurance carrier are hereby
released and discharged from all claims for past,
present, or future compensation and vocational
rehabilitation 
benefits, 
whether 
based 
on
[Whitson's] 
vocational 
disability, 
physical
impairments, or otherwise.  Accordingly, [Whitson]
shall not be entitled to any additional benefits in
the future, with the exception of future medical
benefits as set out above, regarding [Whitson's]
on-the-job injuries.  This settlement shall preclude
[Whitson] from re-petitioning the court for a
determination of his loss of earning capacity based
upon vocational disability in accordance with the
Workers' Compensation Act as amended in May 1992."
This settlement effectively terminated Whitson's claim,
although it remained open insofar as Whitson required further
medical care for his injury.
On November 7, 2007, Whitson filed a new action against
the City in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that the City
had terminated his employment because of his age, in violation
of the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and
because he had filed a claim for worker's compensation
benefits, in violation of the retaliatory-discharge statute,
§ 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975.  On December 18, 2007, the City,
which is located in both Jefferson County and Shelby County,
moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to transfer the case to the
Shelby Circuit Court based on that court's previous handling
of Whitson's worker's compensation claim.  The Jefferson
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Circuit Court granted that motion and transferred the case to
the Shelby Circuit Court on December 19, 2007.  
On March 20, 2008, the City moved for the dismissal of
Whitson's complaint, arguing that Whitson had already been
compensated for his injury and termination pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation Act and that he could not, therefore,
assert additional claims under that Act or seek additional
remedies outside that Act.  Whitson filed a response opposing
the City's motion in regard to his age-discrimination claim;
however, he agreed to drop his retaliatory-discharge claim.
He then argued that, without the retaliatory-discharge claim,
venue 
for 
his 
case 
was 
proper 
in 
Jefferson 
County;
accordingly, he moved the Shelby Circuit Court to transfer the
case back to the Jefferson Circuit Court.  On June 12, 2008,
the Shelby Circuit Court denied Whitson's motion to transfer
the case and granted the City's motion to dismiss the age-
discrimination claim, the only remaining claim.  Whitson then
filed this appeal.
II.  Issues
Two issues are presented in this appeal: (1) whether
Whitson can maintain an action alleging his employment was
1071468
5
unlawfully terminated based on his age after he was already
compensated for his loss of future earnings when he settled
his worker's compensation claim, and (2) whether the Shelby
Circuit Court erred by denying his motion to transfer this
action back to the Jefferson Circuit Court after he agreed to
the dismissal of his retaliatory-discharge claim.
III.  Analysis
A.  Dismissal of Whitson's Age-Discrimination Claim
The Shelby Circuit Court dismissed Whitson's age-
discrimination claim on the basis that the remedies provided
by the Workers' Compensation Act are exclusive of other
remedies.  In support of its order, the court cited Baptist
Memorial Hospital v. Gosa, 686 So. 2d 1147 (Ala. 1996), and
Kelley v. Dupree, 376 So. 2d 1371 (Ala. 1979), and stated as
follows:
"Specifically in regard to on the job injuries,
Alabama caselaw is clear that when an employee
elects to be compensated under the Alabama Workers'
Compensation Act, then such employee shall be
precluded from all other rights and remedies.
Kelley v. Dupree, 376 So. 2d 1371 (Ala. 1979);
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Gosa, 686 So. 2d 1147
(Ala. 1996)."
(Emphasis added.)
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In Gosa, the more recent of the two cases cited by the
circuit court, however, the plaintiffs sought to recover from
their employer additional damages, under common-law causes of
action, for the same on-the-job, physical injuries for which
they had already recovered workers' compensation benefits.
686 So. 2d at 1148.  This Court properly rejected this effort,
citing § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in part:
"The rights and remedies granted in this chapter
to an employee shall exclude all other rights and
remedies of the employee, his or her personal
representative, parent, dependent, or next of kin,
at common law, by statute, or otherwise on account
of injury, loss of services, or death. Except as
provided in this chapter, no employer shall be held
civilly liable for personal injury to or death of
the employer's employee, for purposes of this
chapter, whose injury or death is due to an accident
or to an occupational disease while engaged in the
service or business of the employer, the cause of
which accident or occupational disease originates in
the employment."
(Emphasis added.)  The same was true in Kelley, the other case
cited in the circuit court's order.  376 So. 2d at 1372.  The
decision in Kelley likewise was based upon § 25-5-53.   
We also take note of § 25-5-52, Ala. Code 1975, which
provides:
"Except as provided in this chapter, no employee
of any employer subject to this chapter, nor the
personal representative, surviving spouse or next of
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kin of any such employee shall have any right to any
other method, form, or amount of compensation or
damages for an injury or death occasioned by an
accident 
or 
occupational 
disease 
proximately
resulting from and while engaged in the actual
performance of the duties of his or her employment
and from a cause originating in such employment or
determination thereof."
(Emphasis added.)
As indicated by the statutory passages emphasized above,
and indeed the passage from the circuit court's judgment
itself, which is also emphasized above, the exclusivity of the
remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Act does apply
"in regard to on-the-job injuries."  Here, however, Whitson
seeks to recover outside the Workers' Compensation Act, not
for his on-the-job physical injuries, but for injuries
suffered by virtue of a completely different cause of action
with 
a 
completely 
different 
gravamen, namely wrongful
termination of employment (in this case based on alleged age
discrimination).  The principle that the Workers' Compensation
Act provides the exclusive remedies for on-the-job physical
injuries, as provided in §§ 25-5-52 and -53 and cases applying
those statutes, is thus inapposite to the issue in this case.
The circuit court also stated:
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8
"Mr. Whitson elected to be compensated under the
Alabama Workers' Compensation Act and reached a
settlement with the City of Hoover for $ 71,972.92
based on a negotiated 62% vocational disability
rating, which was approved by this Court on July 10,
2007, well after the date of his termination.
Section 25-5-57(a)(3)(i), Ala. Code 1975, provides
that vocational disability can only be considered
when the employee has not returned to work at a wage
equal to or greater than the employee's pre-injury
wage.  The logical result of this code section is
that when a vocational disability rating is used as
the basis for a settlement, then the employee is
being compensated for either a reduction in wages
and/or termination."
We disagree with the circuit court's reasoning.  Section
25-5-57(a)(3)(i), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"If, on or after the date of maximum medical
improvement, 
except for scheduled injuries as
provided in Section 25-5-57(a)(3), an injured worker
returns to work at a wage equal to or greater than
the worker's pre-injury wage, the worker's permanent
partial disability rating shall be equal to his or
her physical impairment and the court shall not
consider any evidence of vocational disability."
The purpose of § 25-5-57(a)(3)(i) is simply to set parameters
on the amount of worker's compensation benefits an employee
may receive in the event the employee returns to work earning
a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee earned
before his or her accident.  It is true that a settlement that
provides the employee payments reflective of his or her degree
of vocational disability, rather than his or her physical-
1071468
9
disability rating, arguably suggests (but in and of itself
does not dispositively establish) that the employer and
employee based the settlement on a mutual understanding that
the employee had not returned to work, at least not at a wage
equal to or greater than his or her pre-injury wage.
Nonetheless, and regardless of whether an employee recovers
damages (either at trial or in a settlement) for his or her
on-the-job physical injuries based on not having returned to
work following the occurrence of those injuries, we see
nothing in § 25-5-57 that forecloses a separate claim of
wrongful termination, whether for an alleged retaliatory
discharge as expressly allowed under § 25-5-11.1 or for an
allegedly discrimination-based discharge under a federal
statute or, as here, an applicable state statute.
We would have a different case if the settlement
agreement itself, i.e., by its own terms, indicated an
agreement between the parties that served to foreclose any
subsequent further claims of the nature asserted here.  It
does not.  Paragraph 2 of the settlement agreement, as
incorporated in the order of the Shelby Circuit Court, begins
with a provision that clearly indicates that the moneys paid
1071468
10
to Whitson represented amounts the parties agreed were due
Whitson under the Workers' Compensation Act as benefits to
which Whitson was entitled as a result of his on-the-job
physical injury:  "[Whitson] shall have and recover from the
employer the lump sum of $71,972.92, representing all claims
for past, present, and future compensation and vocational
rehabilitation benefits arising out of [Whitson's] injury or
injuries."  (Emphasis added.)  The terms of art used in this
passage indicate that the payment of a "lump sum" is being
made solely for the purpose of compensating Whitson for loss
of "compensation ... benefits" and "vocational rehabilitation
benefits" to which Whitson would otherwise be entitled under
the Workers' Compensation Act.  Moreover, this passage
explicitly states that the lump-sum payment of  $71,972.92 is
being made for all claims that would "arise out of [Whitson's]
injury or injuries."  This last phrase clearly indicates that
the purpose of the payment was to compensate Whitson for the
physical injury he suffered in the course of his employment,
not at all the same gravamen that exists in his lawsuit
alleging age discrimination in the termination of his
employment. 
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Consistent with this understanding of the purpose of the
aforesaid lump-sum payment, the next paragraph in the
settlement agreement (paragraph 3 of the Shelby Circuit
Court's order) states that "[m]edical benefits shall remain
open subject to the provisions of Ala. Code [1975,]
§ 25-5-77."  Again, the use of a term such as "medical
benefits" and, indeed, the explicit citation to the applicable
section of the Workers' Compensation Act governing "medical
benefits" make it clear that the purpose of the agreement is
to address Whitson's claims under that Act.
Nothing in paragraph 4, the next paragraph in the
parties' agreement, is inconsistent with the foregoing.  In
fact, to the contrary, the first sentence of paragraph 4
states:
"The [City] and its insurance carrier are hereby
released and discharged from all claims for past,
present, or future compensation and vocational
rehabilitation 
benefits, 
whether 
based 
on
[Whitson's] 
vocational 
disability, 
physical
impairments, or otherwise."
(Emphasis added.)  Syntactically, the object of the "release[]
and discharge[]" in this sentence is simply "all claims ...
for compensation and vocational rehabilitation benefits."  The
follow-up clause beginning with "whether" is merely a
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12
"conditional clause"; it does not expand the set of claims to
which the release applies in the first place but merely
confirms that there is no subset of the previously defined set
of claims that is exempt from the release. 
The second sentence of paragraph 4 reads:  "Accordingly,
[Whitson] shall not be entitled to any additional benefits in
the future, with the exception of future medical benefits as
set out above, regarding [Whitson's] on-the-job-injuries."
The use of the term "accordingly" to begin the sentence
signifies that what is about to be said follows naturally or
logically from the immediately preceding sentence.  Therefore,
it is significant (1) that this second sentence goes on to
explain that the restriction is against Whitson's receiving
any additional "benefits," a term of art under the Workers'
Compensation Act, and (2) that the second sentence ends with
the qualifying phrase "regarding [Whitson's] on-the-job
injuries," thus limiting the types of claims being released.
Again, Whitson's on-the-job physical injuries are not at all
the same gravamen as that which underlies Whitson's subsequent
claim alleging age discrimination in the termination of his
employment.
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The 
final 
sentence 
in 
paragraph 
4 
states: 
"This
settlement shall preclude [Whitson] from re-petitioning the
court for a determination of his loss of earning capacity
based upon vocational disability in accordance with the
Workers' Compensation Act as amended in May 1992."  This
sentence is corroborative of the construction of the previous
provisions of the agreement described above. 
Based on the foregoing, it cannot reasonably be concluded
that the settlement agreement between the parties expresses
any intention by the parties to release any claims other than
those arising under the Workers' Compensation Act. In short,
the "compensation and vocational rehabilitation benefits" for
which the City is released and discharged under the agreement
do not exhaust the universe of "damages" that Whitson could
now be seeking to recover for his termination based on his
age.  Such "damages" include more than what can fairly be
classified as "benefits."  The Alabama Age Discrimination in
Employment Act incorporates the remedies available for age
discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.  Remedies under the
federal act, 29 U.S.C. § 626, are designed to make the
1071468
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plaintiff whole and include damages representing full backpay
(as opposed to a percentage of backpay designed to be a
compensatory "benefit"), fringe benefits, reinstatement, or
full front pay for a finite future period (as opposed to a
percentage of pay designed to be a compensatory "benefit"),
equitable relief, and attorney fees.  See Munoz v. Oceanside
Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2000).  The federal
act also provides for liquidated damages (over and above
compensatory damages) for "willful" violations.  See United
States E.E.O.C. v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
117 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 1997).
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's judgment is
due to be reversed insofar as it dismissed Whitson's age-
discrimination claim.
B. Denial of Whitson's Motion for Change of Venue
Whitson also contends on appeal that the Shelby Circuit
Court  erred in denying his motion to transfer the case back
to Jefferson County.  Preliminarily, we note that Whitson does
not argue that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred by initially
transferring the case to Shelby County.  Whitson argues,
however, that once he agreed to the dismissal of his
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retaliatory-discharge claim under the Workers' Compensation
Act, his case should have been transferred back to Jefferson
County.  He fails, however, to offer any analysis or cite any
caselaw that supports his argument; rather, he merely declares
that the case should have been transferred back to Jefferson
County.  The City points out that this Court has held that if
a municipality is physically located in two or more counties,
venue is appropriate in either county.
"'The burden of proving a duty to transfer [an action] is
on the party raising the issue.'  Ex parte Alabama Power Co.,
640 So. 2d 921, 922 (Ala. 1994), citing Ex parte Ralston, 519
So. 2d 488 (Ala. 1987), and Ex parte Finance America Corp.,
507 So. 2d 458 (Ala. 1987)."  Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 919,
921 (Ala. 2004).  Whitson has failed to show that the Shelby
Circuit Court had any duty to transfer the case back to the
Jefferson Circuit Court.  The only caselaw he cites in the
section of his brief making this argument in fact indicates
that Shelby County was an appropriate venue for this dispute.
See Ex parte City of Haleyville, 827 So. 2d 778 (Ala. 2002)
(stating that a municipality that is physically located in two
or more counties may be sued in either of those counties).  It
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is not this Court's duty to formulate legal arguments or
provide authorities in support of an appellant's position on
appeal.  Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251
(Ala. 1994).  We therefore decline to further address
Whitson's assertion that the Shelby Circuit Court exceeded its
discretion in not transferring the case back to Jefferson
County.
IV. Conclusion
To the extent the circuit court dismissed Whitson's age-
discrimination claim, its judgment is reversed and the cause
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  We
affirm the judgment insofar as it denied Whitson's motion to
transfer the case back to Jefferson County.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Bolin, J., concur in the result.
Stuart, J., dissents.