Title: Delaware v. Abel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 50, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 50, 2012 
 
 
Plaintiff Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DAVID ABEL, 
 
 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 1106003662 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  October 10, 2012 
Decided:  December 5, 2012   
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
Paul R. Wallace, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
Joseph A. Hurley, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice, for the Majority: 
2 
 
 
A State Trooper stopped a Hells Angels member for speeding.  When asked 
where he was going, the defendant cordially declined to answer.  The State 
Trooper informed the defendant he would pat him down, and the defendant 
revealed he possessed two handguns.  We AFFIRM the Superior Court judge’s 
grant of defendant’s motion to suppress because under the totality of the 
circumstances, no particularized, reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
defendant was presently armed and dangerous existed.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Delaware State Trooper John Andrew Lloyd, while patrolling Interstate 95 
on June 4, 2011, observed two motorcycles driving southbound at a higher rate of 
speed than normal traffic.  Lloyd also observed that one of the drivers, defendant 
David Abel, wore Hells Angels insignia or “colors” on his clothing.  After deciding 
to “pace” the two motorcyclists with another Trooper, Lloyd determined they were 
driving 80 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone.  When Lloyd activated the 
lights on his unmarked police car, David Abel pulled over on the left shoulder and 
his companion pulled over on the right.  Lloyd stopped the motorcycle driven by 
Abel, and the other Trooper stopped Abel’s companion on the other side of the 
interstate. 
3 
 
Lloyd is a veteran member of the Delaware State Police intelligence unit, a 
group that receives training about and investigates criminal activity by Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs).  Hells Angels Motorcycle Club and Pagans 
Motorcycle Club are both recognized as OMGs.  Police generally consider 
Delaware to be Pagan territory, and the Pagans and Hells Angels are rivals with a 
history of violent interactions.  While Lloyd does have significant experience with 
Pagans members, he testified at the suppression hearing that his “experience with 
[Hells] Angels is very limited.  Delaware doesn’t have one[—]I think we have one 
person in the State.  Pagans we have.  I couldn’t tell you how many we have.  I 
encounter Pagans all the time.”1 
During the stop, “Abel remained calm and his hands remained primarily in 
view on the handlebars of the motorcycle.”2  His “hands were in view before Lloyd 
approached . . ., except for when Abel reached to retrieve his license and 
registration.”  Not only were his hands in view, but also because of the 
motorcycle’s handlebars, “Able had to raise his arms to grip” them.3  Lloyd’s 
patrol car videotaped the interaction between Lloyd and Abel:    
[9:45:16] [a.m.] 
                                          
 
1 App. to Opening Br. A–56. 
2 State v. Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2011).   
3 Id. at *1 n.7. 
4 
 
Trooper Lloyd:  
What’s going on? 
 
David Abel:  
Nothing, how are you? 
 
[Lloyd]:  
What’s going on?  We got you going 80 and you were 
tailgating that car. 
 
[Abel]:  
[Unintelligible] 
 
[Lloyd]:  
Any reason you were going that fast? 
 
[Abel]:  
Just running a little late, that’s all. 
 
[Lloyd]:  
Where you headed? 
 
[Abel]:  
We’re going out on a run today.   
 
[Lloyd]:  
Where to? 
 
[Abel]: 
I think you got everything there [Abel is handing Lloyd 
his license and registration]. 
 
[Lloyd]:  
Where you guys going? 
 
[Abel]:  
[laughing] I’m not gonna go through all that – I’m not 
gonna go through all that man.  We’re just goin’ out for a 
ride that’s all. 
 
[Lloyd]:  
Yeah no big deal.  I mean I’m not . . .  
 
[Abel]:  
[Unintelligible] I mean yeah.  Like I said we’re just 
running late.  [Unintelligible] and that’s all . . . 
 
[Lloyd]:  
In Delaware or out of Delaware? 
 
[Abel]:  
We’re going out of Delaware.  If you guys let us go, 
we’ll get right out of Delaware! [laughs] 
 
[9:45:53] [a.m.] 
 
 
5 
 
[Lloyd]:  
Any weapons on ya? 
 
[Abel]:  
No. 
 
[Lloyd]:  
No guns? 
 
[Abel]:  
No I’m good. 
 
[Lloyd]: 
Alright, I’m gonna pat you down make sure you don’t 
have a gun on ya. 
 
[Abel]:  
Why ya, I mean, for what? 
 
[Lloyd]:  
I’m gonna pat ya down. 
 
[Abel]:  
I’ve got a gun [Unintelligible]. 
 
[Lloyd]: 
Huh? 
 
[Abel]:  
I’ve got a gun.  I’ve got two.  I’ve got one here [points to 
jacket] and one here [points to pants]. 
 
[Lloyd]: 
Alright. 
 
[Abel]:  
I’ve got a permit to carry, but I don’t have one in 
Delaware. 
 
[Lloyd]:  
Alright.  Let me just make sure you’re safe here.  Put 
your hands behind your back. 
 
[9:46:11 a.m.]4 
After this brief interaction, Lloyd conducted a pat down, recovered the two 
handguns, and arrested Abel.   
                                          
 
4 App. to Opening Br. A–68 to A–69 (some brackets in original) (Transcript of State’s 
Suppression Exhibit No. 1).  The transcript was not available for the trial judge to review during 
the suppression hearing, but she did review the video from which the transcript was taken at least 
five times.  Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *1 n.6. 
6 
 
The State charged Abel with speeding and two counts of Carrying a 
Concealed Deadly Weapon.5  Abel filed a motion to suppress, arguing that “he did 
not exhibit any conduct or behavior that would create a reasonable suspicion that 
he was armed or dangerous” and “that an affiliation with a motorcycle gang, in and 
of itself, is insufficient to provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an 
individual is armed and dangerous.”6  The State countered that “the combination of 
Abel’s [Hells Angels] vest and his refusal to reveal his destination were enough to 
warrant the pat down for weapons under the totality of the circumstances.”7  The 
trial judge heard argument and granted the motion to suppress in her October 31, 
2011 opinion.8 
On November 7, 2011, the State filed a motion for reargument, wishing to 
advance arguments under 21 Del C. § 701 and 11 Del C. § 1902.9  The trial judge 
denied the State’s motion on the grounds that the State failed to raise the 
arguments both in its papers and at the suppression hearing.10  On January 3, 2012, 
                                          
 
5 Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *1 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
6 Id. (citations omitted).  
7 Id. at *2 (citations omitted). 
8 Id. at *1. 
9 State’s Mot. Rearg. ¶¶ 4, 6. 
10 State v. Abel (Abel Order), 2011 WL 5925284, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 28, 2011) (ORDER) 
(citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Middleby Corp., 2011 WL 2462661, at *2 (Del. Super. 
June 15, 2011)).  The State admitted it had not initially raised issues under 21 Del. C. § 701 in its 
7 
 
the trial judge dismissed the charges.  The State now appeals the trial judge’s 
suppression decision.     
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In general, we review the trial judge’s grant of a motion to suppress for an 
abuse of discretion.11  To the extent that her decision is based on factual findings, 
we review those for abuse of discretion.12  We must adopt her factual findings and 
her reasonable inferences as long as there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support them and the findings are not clearly erroneous.13  Her factual findings 
“can be based upon physical evidence, documentary evidence, testimonial 
evidence, or inferences from those sources jointly or severally.”14  We review de 
novo her legal conclusions concerning the motion to suppress “to determine 
                                                                                                                                        
Motion for Reargument.  State’s Mot. Rearg. ¶ 4.  The State fails to mention 11 Del. C. § 1902 in 
its Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.  App. to Opening Br. A–7 to A–9. 
11 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del. 2008) (citations omitted). 
12 Id. at 1284–85 (citations omitted). 
13 Id. at 1285 (citations omitted); Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 153 (Del. 2002) (“[T]his Court 
on appeal will test individual findings of fact only to ensure that the factual findings and 
inferences are supported by ‘competent evidence.’” (citation omitted)); Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 491 (Del. 2000) (“In any appeal, the factual findings of a trial 
judge will not be set aside by a reviewing court unless those factual determinations are clearly 
erroneous.”). 
14 Cede & Co., 758 A.2d at 491. 
8 
 
whether the totality of the circumstances, in light of the trial judge’s factual 
findings, support a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”15 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A.  
The State is limited to arguing officer safety. 
Despite the State’s “moving target” approach to its briefing, the State is 
limited to arguing the motion to suppress on the theory of officer safety.  Under 
Supreme Court Rule 8, we decline to address questions that were not fairly 
presented to the trial judge.16  As the trial judge noted and the record supports, the 
State failed to present arguments under 21 Del C. § 701 and 11 Del C. § 1902 
during the suppression hearing.17  Furthermore, State’s counsel was asked at oral 
argument, “Are you relying on officer safety and is the State’s position on appeal 
[the officer] could have patted [Abel] down without asking” about weapons?18  
Counsel responded, “[Y]es.  The State’s primary theory is that this was a suitable 
measure for officer safety given the totality of circumstances here.”19  Therefore, 
the State is limited to its arguments about officer safety.   
                                          
 
15 Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1285 (emphasis added). 
16 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
17 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
18 Oral Argument at 8:36, State v. Abel, No. 50, 2012 (Del. Oct. 10, 2012), available at 
http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/audioargs.stm. 
19 Id. at 8:53. 
9 
 
 
B. 
 In light of the trial judge’s factual findings, Lloyd could not have 
possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Abel was armed and 
dangerous. 
 
In order to justify a pat down on the grounds of officer safety, an officer 
must have reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person subject to the frisk is 
presently armed and dangerous.20  We define “[r]easonable suspicion” as “the 
officer’s ability ‘to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[] the intrusion.’”21  
“A pat down . . . requires articulable facts specific to the person frisked.”22   
In order to determine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists, we 
conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis, in light of the trial judge’s factual 
findings.23  We evaluate “the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the 
eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, 
combining objective facts with such an officer’s subjective interpretation of those 
facts.”24  The question we review is whether, based on the trial judge’s findings, an 
                                          
 
20 Holden v. State, 23 A.3d 843, 847 (Del. 2011) (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 
(2009)). 
21 Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999)). 
22 Id. at 849 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1980)). 
23 Id. at 847. 
24 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999) (citations omitted). 
10 
 
officer in Lloyd’s position could have had a “reasonable[,] articulable suspicion 
that [Abel was] armed and presently dangerous.”25 
The trial judge found that Lloyd’s determination that Abel was speeding, 
based on Lloyd’s testimony that “he paced Abel ‘at 80 in a 55,’” justified the initial 
stop.26  She found that Abel “initially cooperated” with the stop “by providing his 
license and registration.”27  She found that:  “Abel’s hands remained visible almost 
the entire time, Lloyd never identified a bulge in Abel’s vest or pants” that might 
indicate a weapon, and “all of [Abel’s] movements could be easily observed.”28  
According to the trial judge, “Abel never exhibited any hostile or aggressive 
behavior towards Lloyd,” and “considering Abel had just been stopped for 
speeding, the video from Lloyd’s dashboard camera depicts Abel as being quite 
jovial.”29  The stop occurred mid-morning and the trial judge made no finding that 
Interstate 95 was a high crime area frequented by motorcycle gangs.  None of these 
factual findings are “clearly erroneous” based on the transcripts from the 
suppression hearing and the video taken during the stop; therefore, they bind us. 
                                          
 
25 Holden, 23 A.3d at 847 (citing State v. Henderson, 892 A.2d 1061, 1064 (Del. 2006)). 
26 State v. Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *1, *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2011). 
27 Id. at *4. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
11 
 
The trial judge, despite watching the video at least five times, did not 
address Abel’s statement about “going on a run today.”  Because she conducted a 
totality of the circumstances analysis and found that “Lloyd never articulated a 
particularized suspicion that Abel was armed and dangerous aside from Abel’s 
alleged gang membership and his refusal to answer a question about his 
destination,”30  we infer that she gave that comment little to no weight.  Because 
we review for abuse of discretion, we infer the same.  Both parties stipulated that 
“Hells Angels Motorcycle Club” is an “Outlaw Motorcycle Gang,” (OMG) and 
that “troopers are aware that OMG members are routinely directed to participate in 
club events, including mandatory motorcycle rides or ‘runs’ and these events have 
been the source of violent encounters involving the use of weapons against other 
motorcycle clubs.”31  However, the parties dispute whether Abel meant that he was 
in Delaware on gang business (as opposed to just being out riding his motorcycle) 
or even whether that gang business might have been innocuous.32      
                                          
 
30 Id. at *6 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2011).  We recognize that we must judge the facts “against an 
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (citations omitted).  We take the trial judge’s comment 
that Lloyd failed to articulate additional facts to mean that, with Lloyd as the only witness at the 
suppression hearing, she found no facts giving rise to a particularized suspicion other than the 
alleged Hells Angels membership and Abel’s refusal to tell Lloyd his destination. 
31 App. to Opening Br. A–9. 
32 Compare Opening Br. at 18, and Oral Argument at 7:52, 9:08, State v. Abel, No. 50, 2012 
(Del. Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/audioargs.stm (“‘I’m out 
on a run.’  Gang speak for ‘I’m engaged in business here, I’m engaged in gang business.’  
12 
 
Based on the trial judge’s factual findings, she correctly noted that the issue 
is “whether Abel’s clothing,” denoting alleged gang membership, “coupled with 
his unwillingness to share his destination,” created a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that Abel was presently armed and dangerous under the totality of the 
circumstances” as established by the facts she found.33  Under 11 Del. C. § 1902, 
Lloyd was permitted to ask Abel about his destination because Lloyd had 
reasonable grounds to suspect Lloyd was speeding.34  Lloyd was not obligated to 
respond,35 and as the trial judge found, he “politely declined to divulge that 
                                                                                                                                        
[Lloyd] knows [Abel is] in enemy territory. . . .  He knows that in fact Mr. Abel says to him, ‘I 
am on a run.’  That is one of those phrases that he uses.  And this officer knows on a run means, 
and if you look that’s stipulated to . . . that on a run means you’re doing gang business and that 
. . . can involve violence and that can involve weapons.”), with Answering Br. at 26–27, and Oral 
Argument at 20:35–22:10, 21:45 (“[T]here can be bad gang business; there can be good gang 
business, but saying ‘on a run’ doesn’t mean ‘Aha! that tells me this is bad.’  And wouldn’t 
[Abel] be kind of stupid to say to a policeman, given the experiences that Abel has had, ‘I don’t 
want to go through that again, been there done that,’ that he’s going to say, ‘And by the way I’m 
doing some gang business?’”).  Even the State’s counsel at one point uses the more innocuous 
term “ride” in place of “run” later in his argument.  Oral Argument at 11:12 (“When [Lloyd] 
says, ‘Where are you going?’ And then [Abel] says, you know, ‘Look, we’re just out on a ride, 
things like that,’ and [Lloyd] says, ‘Yeah, but . . . where?’ and [Abel] says ‘Well I’m not going 
to go into all that with you.’  I think that is further evidence that he may be involved in activity 
that he doesn’t want the police officer to know about.”). 
33 State v. Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2011). 
34 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1049 (Del. 2001). 
35 Id. at 1049 n.29 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439–40 (1984) (“[T]he officer 
may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to 
obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  But the detainee is not 
obliged to respond.  And, unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause 
to arrest him, he must then be released.”)). 
13 
 
information.”36  We agree with the trial judge that while Lloyd was entitled to ask 
Abel additional questions about his destination, “Abel’s refusal did not give Lloyd 
a reasonable[,] articulable suspicion that Abel was armed and dangerous.”37 
In Caldwell, we held that the following three facts did not “justify a 
reasonably prudent person in believing that Caldwell was armed and dangerous:”38  
“(1) Caldwell’s movement of his right arm as he pulled over, (2) Caldwell’s 
apparent nervousness and perspiration, and (3) Caldwell’s implausible assertion 
that he did not know the identity of his passenger.”39  As the trial court aptly noted, 
“If the police were not justified in Caldwell to conduct a pat down where the 
defendant told an ‘implausible story,’ a pat down is certainly not justified here.”40 
We next turn to the issue of Abel’s affiliation with the Hells Angels.  The 
trial judge noted that “[w]hile the State concedes that the situation that Lloyd 
encountered when he approached Abel ‘would not appear to be all that menacing 
to the untrained observer,’ it asserts that Abel’s [Hells] Angels Motorcycle Club 
vest ‘changes everything.’”41  The State heavily relies on Lloyd’s training and 
                                          
 
36 Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *6. 
37 Id. at *4. 
38 Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1051. 
39 Id. at 1050. 
40 Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *4. 
41 Id. at *5 (footnote omitted) (citing State’s Resp. at 2). 
14 
 
experience with OMGs, and the assertion that “[a] gang member traveling unarmed 
through a rival gang’s territory is subject to a serious risk to [his] safety; 
consequently, a police officer encountering a Hells Angels member flying colors in 
Pagans territory faces a heightened concern that the person has access to a 
weapon.”42  If we agree with the State’s position, then the law of Delaware would 
be that whenever an officer pulls over a Hells Angels member wearing his 
organization’s colors for a traffic violation in the State of Delaware, the officer 
may frisk the motorcyclist for weapons, because the State of Delaware is rival 
gang territory.43   
Our decision in Walker v. State44 is distinguishable.  In Walker, the 
following facts supported a finding of reasonable suspicion: (1) the location of the 
incident in a high crime area; (2) the defendant’s “initial flight upon seeing the 
police car;” (3) the officer’s suspicion that the defendant participated in a drug 
sale; and (4) the knowledge that “drug traffickers often carry deadly weapons.”45  
Here, the trial judge made no factual finding that Interstate 95 is a high crime area; 
                                          
 
42 App. to Opening Br. A–9. 
43 We suppose the Hells Angels member would also have to give an unsatisfactory answer in 
response to 11 Del C. § 1902 questions, but as he is not required to answer those questions by 
law, it is difficult to see how that meaningfully adds to the analysis.   
44 Walker v. State, 610 A.2d 728, 1992 WL 115945 (Del. Apr. 20, 1992) (TABLE). 
45 Id. at *2 (citation omitted). 
15 
 
moreover, she specifically found that Abel was polite, jovial, and cooperative with 
Lloyd.   
In this specific fact setting, we find the reasoning in State v. Dollard46 
persuasive.  In Dollard, “the State concede[d] that the only appreciable threat to 
‘officer safety’ was the [police officer’s] knowledge that drug dealers often carry 
weapons.”47  The interaction took place in a well-lit area, not known to be a “high 
crime” area.48  Other officers were on the scene, and the defendant “did not act 
nervously or otherwise inappropriately, nor did he make any threatening or evasive 
gestures.  There were no obvious signs of a potential weapon on his person.”49  The 
officer himself “testified that he conducted a pat-down search of [the defendant] 
because he believed [the defendant] was a drug dealer, he knew drug dealers often 
carried dangerous weapons, and it was his police department’s policy routinely to 
conduct pat-down searches of suspected drug dealers.”50   
The Superior Court judge in Dollard found that no Delaware case was 
directly on point, but that other jurisdictions were split: “Some courts have 
concluded that a police officer’s belief that a suspect is a drug dealer along with his 
                                          
 
46 788 A.2d 1283 (Del. Super. 2001). 
47 Id. at 1285–86. 
48 Id. at 1285. 
49 Id. at 1287.  
50 Id.  
16 
 
knowledge that drug dealers often carry weapons will justify a pat-down search of 
the suspect; other courts have determined that something more is required before a 
pat-down search is proper.”51  Ultimately, the judge was convinced “that the more 
prudent interpretation of Terry is to require that an officer base a determination that 
his safety or that of others is in danger upon more than his belief that the suspect is 
a drug dealer and his knowledge that drug dealers often carry weapons.”52  She 
commented that “allowing pat-down searches of suspected drug dealers to be 
conducted as a matter of routine practice, without other attendant circumstances, 
would eviscerate Terry[’s] requirement that the pat-down be based on a 
particularized suspicion developed by the officer with respect to each individual 
suspect.”53  
In contrast to Dollard, State v. Miglavs54 presents facts that properly give 
rise to a particularized, reasonable suspicion.  The Supreme Court of Oregon 
affirmed a decision denying defendant’s motion to suppress.55  While the defendant 
argued “that his cooperative attitude and lack of suspicious behavior was sufficient 
to dispel any concerns that the officers had for their safety,” the court noted that 
                                          
 
51 Id. at 1288 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 1289. 
53 Id. 
54 90 P.3d 607 (Or. 2004). 
55 Id. at 614. 
17 
 
“defendant’s attitude and demeanor are just two circumstances that the officers 
and, ultimately, [the] court must consider.”56  The court identified the combination 
of factors that “were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable and individualized 
suspicion that defendant might have posed a safety threat.”57  The court noted that 
the contact with the defendant “occurred at a late hour in a darkened area in the 
general vicinity where one of the officers recently had encountered armed 
members of the 18th Street gang.”58  The court considered the defendant 
“uncooperative during the initial investigation when he refused to reveal the 
location of his residence in the apartment complex.”59  Furthermore, “although 
defendant was free to move from the immediate area after his identification was 
returned to him, he chose to remain in the area near where the police were 
conducting an ongoing investigation,” which reasonably heightened the officers’ 
safety concerns.60   
The court also addressed the defendant’s gang-related clothing.  While 
“clothing that announces a gang affiliation does not, by itself, give rise to the kind 
of individualized suspicion of a safety threat required under Article I, section 9[ of 
                                          
 
56 Id. at 612 (citing State v. Ehly, 854 P.2d 421 (Or. 1993)). 
57 Id. at 614 (emphasis omitted).  
58 Id. at 613. 
59 Id. (citation omitted).  
60 Id. at 614.  
18 
 
the Oregon Constitution],” “officers reasonably may draw inferences about human 
behavior from their training and experience.”61  The court found the officers “knew 
from training and recent personal experience that the gang identified on 
defendant’s shirt operated in the immediate vicinity of the contact and that 
members of that gang carried weapons,” and “one of the officers recently had 
removed a gun from one of the members of that gang.”62  Relying on those two 
facts, the court found that the concern for officer safety was “not based solely on 
generalized or stereotypical information about gang behavior,” but rather was 
particularized because it was “based on specific training about and recent personal 
experience with a narrowly identified group, viz., members of the local gang to 
which defendant and his male companion proclaimed their allegiance and which 
operated in the area where the officers encountered defendant.”63  That kind of 
particularized, personal experience is absent in the instant case.   
A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel confronted a very similar situation to 
this case in United States v. Robinson, a 2–1 table decision.64  In Robinson, two 
men in Hells Angels jackets had pulled over on the side of the road because one of 
                                          
 
61 Id. at 613 (citation omitted). 
62 Id.  
63 Id.   
64 United States v. Robinson, 149 F.3d 1185, 1998 WL 322656 (6th Cir. May 22, 1998) 
(TABLE)   
19 
 
the motorcycles was sputtering.65  Three police officers approached the men, and 
one of the officers observed a knife sheath on Robinson’s companion.  When 
Robinson heard one officer inform the other to pat him down, Robinson then 
turned over two knives. At that point, the court found, besides the knife and gun 
found on Robinson’s companion, five additional factors: (1) the police officer 
recognized the Hells Angels as a criminal organization; (2) Robinson and his 
companion were physically larger than the officers; (3) Robinson and his 
companion were from out of state; (4) Robinson and his companion informed the 
officers they were traveling from Chicago to New York (raising concern because 
Brecksville, Ohio, was not the best route and they were stopped at 6:51 a.m.); and 
(5) After Robinson’s companion informed him that the officers were going to pat 
down his companion, Robinson took a few steps toward the officer and his 
companion, but then complied with the officer’s instructions to return to his 
motorcycle.66  The court found that these five “factors described by the 
Government, even when taken together, provide little basis for reasonable 
suspicion that [the defendant] was armed and dangerous.”67  The court affirmed the 
suppression order because had “the officers based their patdown of [Robinson] on 
                                          
 
65 Id. at *1 
66 Id. at *4–5. 
67 Id. at *5. 
20 
 
objectively reasonable suspicion, rather than, say, prejudice towards motorcycle 
riders, members of the [Hells] Angels, or people from out-of-state, they must have 
been relying almost entirely on the fact that a pistol and knife were recovered 
from” Robinson’s companion, which was not a proper justification for the Terry 
frisk.68 
While concern for “officer safety is both legitimate and weighty, it cannot in 
all circumstances justify a search or seizure.  Otherwise nearly any invasion of a 
person’s privacy could be justified by arguing that the police needed to protect 
themselves from harm.”69 “Officer safety” is not a talisman, and “the mere 
incantation of ‘officer safety’” does not “provide the necessary reasonable 
suspicion for a frisk.”70  “The relevant inquiry is ‘whether a reasonably prudent 
man in the circumstances could be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of 
others was in danger.’”71  We have commented that, “[g]enerally, a pat down is 
justified based on the nature of the suspected crime, a sudden reach by the 
individual, a bulge, or a history with the specific individual.”72  Because we must 
                                          
 
68 Id.  
69 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 872 n.78 (Del. 1999) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 170 
F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 Holden v. State, 23 A.3d 843, 850 (Del. 2011).  
71 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
72 Id.  
21 
 
make our analysis in light of the trial judge’s findings,73 the issue becomes whether 
Abel’s refusal to reveal his destination, combined with his Hells Angels affiliation, 
give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion under the totality of the 
circumstances.   
Abel’s affiliation with the Hells Angels does not support a finding of 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Abel was armed and dangerous.  Lloyd had 
no personal, particularized experience with Abel, and extremely limited experience 
with the Hells Angels.  At best, Lloyd extrapolated his general suspicions about the 
Pagans and applied them to Abel.  While Lloyd may have believed that the Hells 
Angels and the Pagans are rival gangs and Delaware is Pagan territory, Abel was 
traveling on a very busy interstate and Lloyd was aware of no facts that indicated 
gang activity was occurring nearby.  This was mid-morning and not in a high crime 
area.  Abel’s failure to reveal his destination, combined with his Hells Angels 
affiliation, does not catapult this case into one where reasonable, articulable 
suspicion exists.  That is particularly so, given the trial judge’s factual finding, 
gleaned from a real time video of the encounter, that Abel was cooperative, polite, 
and jovial.  As the trial judge noted, “Abel’s hands remained visible almost the 
entire time, Lloyd never identified a bulge in Abel’s vest or pants” that might 
                                          
 
73 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del. 2008). 
22 
 
indicate a weapon, and “all of [Abel’s] movements could be easily observed.”74  
We hold that the facts in this case fail to raise a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that Abel was armed and dangerous that would justify the pat down, and that 
accordingly, any evidence seized must be suppressed. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We AFFIRM the grant of the motion to suppress and, therefore, the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
                                          
 
74 State v. Abel, 2011 WL 5221276, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2011). 
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RIDGELY, Justice, dissenting, with HOLLAND, Justice, joining: 
It is undisputed in this case that there was probable cause to stop Abel for 
breaking the law.  Trooper Lloyd was justified in making a limited warrantless 
search for the protection of himself if he had a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that Abel was armed and dangerous.75  We are required to apply an objective test to 
resolve the issue of whether reasonable, articulable suspicion justified a protective 
search.76  The level of suspicion necessary to constitute reasonable suspicion “is 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” 
and “is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.”77  The “officer 
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety or that of others was in danger.”78 
“[D]ue weight must be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences 
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”79  Ultimate 
determinations of reasonable suspicion (or lack thereof) are subject to this Court’s 
                                          
 
75 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1969).  
76 Id. at 21-22. 
77 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  
78 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
79 Id.  
24 
 
independent review.80  Thus, we examine the totality of the circumstances, “as 
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or 
similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer’s subjective 
interpretation of those facts.”81  The totality of the circumstances in this case 
provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Abel was armed and dangerous.  
Trooper Lloyd has been a Delaware State Trooper for seven years.  He has 
participated in thousands of traffic stops and has specialized training on outlaw 
motorcycle gangs.  He received daily intelligence briefings which include updates 
on the activities of outlaw motorcycle gangs.  He knew from his training that 
members of organized, criminal gangs are more likely to assault police officers and 
that the most active motorcycle gang in Delaware is the Pagans, rivals of the Hells 
Angels.  The parties stipulated that “troopers are aware that OMG [outlaw 
motorcycle gang] members are routinely directed to participate in club events, 
including mandatory motorcycle rides or ‘runs’ and these events have been the 
                                          
 
80 Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 697-98 (1996).  See also Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 
1280, 1285 (Del. 2008) (“Where as here, we are reviewing the denial of motion to suppress 
evidence based on an allegedly illegal stop and seizure, we conduct a de novo review to 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances, in light of the trial judge's factual findings, 
support a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop.”) 
81 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18 (1981)). 
25 
 
source of violent encounters involving the use of weapons against other motorcycle 
clubs.”82   
Trooper Lloyd witnessed Abel and another Hells Angel travelling 80 m.p.h. 
in a 55 m.p.h. zone wearing Hells Angels colors in Pagan gang territory.  Abel’s 
excessive speed on a motorcycle put at risk not only his own life but also the lives 
of others on the road.  A conviction of driving 25 m.p.h. over the speed limit would 
require the suspension of his driving privileges in Delaware.83   
When Trooper Lloyd pulled Abel over, Lloyd was alone and did not have 
immediate back up.  Abel said he was on a “run” but he refused to say where he 
was going.  He explained no emergency circumstances to justify his dangerous 
speed that put both his life and his driving privileges at risk.  His conduct was 
consistent with being on gang business.  While the trial court and the Majority give 
“little to no weight” to Abel’s admission of being “on a run today,” that fact is 
present nevertheless and lends support to Trooper Lloyd’s suspicion that Abel was 
prepared for a violent encounter.  Trooper Lloyd knew he would be particularly 
vulnerable once he returned to his car to do computer inquiries on Abel.  He had a  
                                          
 
82 State v. Abel, No. 50, 2012, slip op. at 11 (Del. Dec. 5, 2012) (quoting App. to Op. Br. A-9).  
83 2 Del. Admin. C. § 2208-4.7.2 (“When convicted of driving 25 MPH over the posted limit, the 
driver's license will be suspended for a mandatory period of 1 month.”).  
26 
 
reasonable concern for his personal safety that justified a protective search.  Abel’s 
motion to suppress should have been denied.   
We respectfully dissent.