Title: Kizer v. Finch
Citation: 672 So. 2d 511
Docket Number: 1940607
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 1995

672 So. 2d 511 (1995)
Clara S. KIZER
v.
Laura FINCH, et al.[1]
1940607.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 15, 1995.
*512 Marco A. Gonzalez of Kizer, Bennitt &amp; Gonzalez, Birmingham, for Appellant.
Frank C. Ellis, Jr. and J. Frank Head of Wallace, Ellis, Fowler &amp; Head, Columbiana, for City of Helena.
Jesse P. Evans III of Najjar Denaburg, P.C., Birmingham, for Laura Finch, Brian Wiggonton, Susan Wiggonton and Valerie Vining.
RICHARD L. JONES, Retired Justice.
Does occupancy by a subdivision lot owner of an unimproved but publicly dedicated strip of property, lying between the front line of the lot and the street curb, vest in the lot owner a property right superior to the right of the public to use the right-of-way, as contemplated by the public dedication? Under the facts of this case, we answer the question in the negative; thus, the summary judgment in favor of the lot owners is reversed and the cause is remanded.
The trial court entered the following "Order on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment":
(Emphasis added.)
The emphasized language in paragraph 4 of the trial court's order, under the heading "Final Judgment," is dispositive of this appeal.
Obviously, the trial court was of the opinion that the defendants were entitled to relief for what it perceived as culpable conduct by the plaintiff, Kizer. To grant relief, however, by allowing the lot owners to exercise exclusive possession of the right-of-way in question is not a mere extension of the "dedication of public ways" rule set out and applied in Cloverdale and Citronelle. Nor does the conditional language "until such time as said strip of land is further improved by the City of Helena" square the trial court's judgment with the cited authorities. Indeed, the trial court's holding here under review effectively overrules the existing legal concept that abutting lot owners are allowed permissive use of publicly dedicated rights-of-way subject to the superior right of the public pursuant to the terms of the dedication. The abutting lot owners' rights in the right-of-way are subservient to the rights of the general public to use the City's right-ofway. For a recent case holding that once a dedication is perfected, absent a statutory vacation the accepting municipality holds that title in fee simple, see Montabano v. City of Mountain Brook, 653 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1995).
Our holding that the defendant lot owners are permissive users (having an interest in the nature of a possibility of reverter), and are not being allowed to hold exclusive possession of the disputed right-of-way strip does not mean that the defendants are without a remedy by way of injunction, or by way of a claim for the maintenance of a nuisance based on culpable conduct that wrongfully interferes with the lot owners' peaceable enjoyment of their privately owned adjoining properties.
We express no opinion on the merits of such claims, nor should our suggestions with respect to legally cognizable remedies be construed as being an exclusive list of possible remedies. Our holding merely perpetuates the long-standing rule relating to property interests of affected parties resulting from public dedication of subdivision streets and roadways. Lybrand v. Town of Pell City, 260 Ala. 534, 71 So. 2d 797 (1954). See, also, Shelby Contracting Co. v. Pizitz, 285 Ala. 301, 231 So. 2d 743 (1970).
Because of our holding with respect to the lot owners' motion for summary judgment, and because the lot owners' "interest" in the disputed property does not rise to the level of an estate, we further hold that the lot owners' "contingent expectancy, dependent upon an event which may never occur" (Shelby Contracting Co. v. Pizitz, 285 Ala. at 309, 231 So.2d at 750), is not a sufficient interest to support a trespass claim.
This opinion was prepared by retired Justice RICHARD L. JONES, sitting as a Justice of this Court pursuant to § 12-18-10(e), Ala.Code 1975.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
*515 ALMON, HOUSTON, INGRAM, and COOK, JJ., concur.
HOOPER, C.J., concurs in the result.
SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., dissent.
KENNEDY, Justice (dissenting).
Although I do not agree with the trial court's reasoning, it is clear to me that any error would be harmless error and that its judgment is due to be affirmed. The facts are undisputed[2] and, clearly, the appellant has not demonstrated any right to maintain a nuisance that disrupts her neighbors' peaceable enjoyment of their property.
SHORES, J., concurs.
[1]  Although the City of Helena was named as a defendant originally, the City's motion to dismiss was granted; the appellant does not challenge that dismissal. Thus, the Court does not treat the City of Helena as a party to this appeal.
[2]  It is undisputed that this controversy was precipitated by the appellant's insistence on allowing her dogs to defecate on the right-of-way areas of her neighbors' yards.