Title: Avery Contracting, LLC v. Niehaus
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95064
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
AVERY CONTRACTING, LLC,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
) 
No.  SC95064 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
) 
RICHARD NIEHAUS, LISA J. NIEHAUS, 
) 
ALICIA NIEHAUS, CREEKSTONE 
 
) 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, AND 
) 
MISSOURI HIGHWAYS AND   
 
) 
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondents.   
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY 
Honorable Nathan B. Stewart, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 28, 2016 
 
Avery Contracting, LLC (Avery) appeals from a judgment dismissing its petition 
for a private way of necessity over properties owned by Richard, Lisa, and Alicia 
Niehaus, the Creekstone Homeowners Association (collectively, the Creekstone parties), 
and the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission (MHTC).   Avery’s claim 
against the Creekstone parties is barred by section 228.341,1 which, in part, provides that 
the statutes authorizing private ways of necessity do not apply to roads created by or 
included in a recorded plat referencing a declaration creating an owner’s association.  
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo. Supp. 2012.  
 
  
 
 
2 
 
Avery’s claim against MHTC is barred because the statutes authorizing private ways of 
necessity do not authorize the private condemnation of public property.  The judgment is 
affirmed.    
Facts 
Avery alleges that in 1995, the Raebel Living Trust (Raebel Trust) owned land 
(the Property) located adjacent to Route M, a public road.   In 1996, the circuit court of 
Jefferson County entered an order of condemnation awarding MHTC a portion of the 
Property.   The condemnation order stated that all abutter’s rights of direct access to the 
adjacent Route M were “herewith prohibited or limited.”    
 
Avery purchased the Property in 2013.  Avery then filed a petition against the 
Creekstone parties and MHTC to establish a private access road pursuant to section 
228.342, which provides for the establishment or widening of a private road upon a 
showing of strict necessity.   Avery alleged that the Property is adjacent to Route M and, 
as a result of the Raebel condemnation, “has no recorded means of ingress or egress to a 
public road.”  Avery further alleged that “there is an absence of a reasonably practical 
way to and from the [Property] to a public road” and that “[t]he establishment of the 
private road petitioned for is a way of strict necessity.” 
 
Avery’s petition requested that the circuit court establish a 40-foot wide private 
road generally following Creekstone Drive and exiting onto Moss Hollow Road, which 
Avery alleged is a public road.  Creekstone Drive runs from Moss Hollow Road, through 
the Creekstone subdivision, and ends in a cul de sac.  Avery requested that the road begin 
on property owned by the Creekstone parties, cross into “the cul de sac bowl of 
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Creekstone Drive,” follow the general location of Creekstone Drive, and end at the 
intersection of Moss Hollow Road and property owned by MHTC.2  Avery alleged that 
Creekstone Drive is described in a recorded subdivision plat referencing a declaration 
creating an owner’s association.   
Avery also requested a declaratory judgment requiring MHTC to provide limited 
access to Route M under the theory that MHTC has no authority to completely prohibit 
Avery’s access to the Property.   Specifically, Avery alleged that nothing in the Missouri 
Constitution gives MHTC the authority to “completely prohibit access to, from and 
across state highways so as to completely and permanently land lock” real estate.   Avery 
further alleged that the Raebel condemnation was vague, uncertain, and irregular because 
the language “prohibiting or limiting” direct access from the Property to Route M is 
ambiguous. 
The Creekstone parties and MHTC filed motions to dismiss Avery’s petition 
pursuant to Rule 55.27 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The 
Creekstone parties asserted that the petition should be dismissed because: (1) Avery’s 
petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Avery’s petition 
alleges that the Property is located adjacent to a public road; (2) Avery’s claim is barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata; (3) Avery’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations; 
and (4) Avery’s claim is not ripe for adjudication because the court could order MHTC to 
provide an access road to Route M.   MHTC asserted that Avery’s petition should be 
                                              
2 See the aerial photograph at the end of this opinion depicting the location of the 
properties owned by the parties and the location of Creekstone Drive. 
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dismissed because MHTC is not subject to the private way of necessity provisions in 
chapter 228 and because Avery acquired the Property subject to the access restrictions set 
forth in the Raebel condemnation. 
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions to dismiss and dismissed 
Avery’s petition without prejudice without specifying the grounds for dismissal.  Avery 
raises eight points on appeal.   As established below, the motions to dismiss raise valid 
grounds for dismissal, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to address each of Avery’s points 
on appeal.     
Standard of Review 
A judgment dismissing an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted is subject to de novo review.  Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 410, 
413 (Mo. banc 2014).   A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the adequacy 
of a plaintiff's petition.   Id. at 413-14.   An appellate court reviews the petition to 
determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that meet the elements of a recognized cause of 
action or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.   Id. at 414.   The facts alleged are 
assumed to be true and all inferences from those facts are construed broadly in favor of 
the plaintiff.   Id.  A judgment of dismissal will be affirmed if it is supported by any 
ground raised in the motion to dismiss.  Dujakovich v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 574, 577 
(Mo. banc 2012).  
 
When, as in this case, the circuit court does not specify reasons for dismissing a 
petition, an appellate court presumes that the circuit court’s judgment is based on one of 
the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss.  City of Chesterfield v. DeShetler Homes, Inc., 
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938 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. App. 1997).   Accordingly, this Court will affirm a judgment 
of dismissal if any ground supports the motion, regardless of whether the trial court relied 
on that ground.  Id. 
Analysis 
 
“Prior to reaching the merits of the issues in this case, this Court must determine, 
sua sponte, if there is a final judgment.”  Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798, 801 
(Mo. banc 2012) (citing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997)).  The 
circuit court dismissed Avery’s petition without prejudice.  This Court has referred to a 
“general rule” holding that a dismissal without prejudice does not yield a final, 
appealable judgment.  Naylor Senior Citizens Hous., LP v. Side Const. Co., Inc., 423 
S.W.3d 238, 243 (Mo. banc 2014).   Nonetheless, an appeal from a dismissal without 
prejudice “can be taken where the dismissal has the practical effect of terminating the 
litigation in the form cast or in the plaintiff's chosen forum.”  Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. 
Elyria Foundry Co., 955 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 1997).   
The judgment in this case has the practical effect of terminating Avery’s suit to 
establish a private way of necessity along Creekstone Drive and over property owned by 
MHTC.  As established below, section 228.341 precludes Avery’s proposed road over 
Creekstone Drive as a matter of law, and Avery may not condemn a private way of 
necessity over property owned by MHTC.   Therefore, this Court declines to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of an appealable judgment.  
 
 
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I. The trial court properly dismissed the petition against the Creekstone parties. 
 
Avery petitioned the trial court for the establishment of a private roadway of 
necessity pursuant to section 228.342, which provides: 
A private road may be established or widened in favor of any owner 
or owners of real property for which there is no access, or 
insufficiently wide access, from such property to a public road if the 
private road sought to be established or widened is a way of strict 
necessity.   As used in this section, the term “strict necessity” shall 
include the necessity to establish or widen a private road in order to 
utilize the property for the uses permitted by law. 
 
    
The availability of a private road pursuant to section 228.342 is specifically limited by 
section 228.341.  In pertinent part, section 228.341 provides: “[n]othing in sections 
228.341 to 228.374 shall be deemed to apply to any road created by or included in any 
recorded plat referencing or referenced in an indenture or declaration creating an owner’s 
association, regardless of whether such road is designated as a common element.”  
Although section 228.341 unequivocally provides that “nothing” in sections 228.341 to 
228.374 applies to roads such as Creekstone Drive, Avery’s petition, nonetheless, 
expressly requests the application of the statutes to establish a private access road along 
Creekstone Drive.  Consequently, the trial court did not err by sustaining the Creekstone 
parties’ motion to dismiss Avery’s petition to establish a private road along Creekstone 
Drive. 
II.  The trial court properly dismissed the petition against MHTC. 
Avery’s petition also asserts a claim for the establishment of a private way of 
necessity against MHTC pursuant to section 228.342.  Avery, however, cites no case 
from Missouri or elsewhere holding that statutes like section 228.342 authorize private 
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ways of necessity across public lands.3  There are two aspects of section 228.342 that 
establish that the statute does not authorize the private condemnation of public lands.   
First, section 228.342 implements the specific exception to the general 
constitutional ban on the taking of property for private use found in article, I section 28 of 
the Missouri Constitution, which provides in relevant part: 
That private property shall not be taken for private use with or without 
compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private 
ways of necessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands 
of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner 
prescribed by law.   
 
The plain language of article I, section 28 generally prohibits the taking of private 
property for private use with specific, limited exceptions for private ways of necessity 
and agricultural or sanitary drains and ditches.  The fact that section 228.342 implements 
the specific exception to the general constitutional ban on the taking of private property 
for private use implies that the scope of section 228.342 extends only to providing a 
limited right to take private property for private use.    
Second, “proceedings to acquire a private way over the lands of another are 
against the common law and the common rights and must, therefore, be strictly 
construed.”   Anderson v. Mantel, 49 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Mo.  App. 2001) (quoting Wolfe 
v. Swopes, 955 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Mo.App.1997)); see also, Jobe v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 
684 P.2d 719, 722 (Wash. App. 1984) ( legislation authorizing private ways of necessity 
must be strictly construed and limited to that which is expressly conferred or necessarily 
                                              
3 MHTC is a department of the executive branch of the state government.  Missouri Highway & 
Transp. Comm'n v. Kansas City Cold Storage, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Mo. App. 1997).  
Avery does not allege that MHTC owns private property. 
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implied because such legislation delegates the condemnation power of eminent domain to 
private individuals).   A strict construction of section 228.342 presumes nothing that is 
not expressed.  See, Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371,381 (Mo. banc 
2014).  Section 228.342 does not expressly authorize the establishment or widening of a 
private road over public lands.  Therefore, section 228.342 does not authorize private 
ways of necessity over public land.   
The trial court did not err by dismissing Avery’s petition to establish a private way 
of necessity across public lands owned by MHTC. 
Conclusion 
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge 
 
All concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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