Title: Gay v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961214
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, 
Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
GORDON GAY 
 
v.   Record No. 961214 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                   February 28, 1997 
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NOTTOWAY COUNTY 
 
Thomas V. Warren, Judge 
 
 
In this case, we consider whether a deposition was 
properly used as a basis for entering summary judgment and the 
proper standard for determining the accrual date of a cause of 
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 
U.S.C. §§ 51 through 60. 
 
On February 1, 1994, Gordon Gay filed a motion for 
judgment against his former employer, Norfolk and Western 
Railway Company (N&W), pursuant to FELA.  Gay claimed that he 
was injured by exposure to diesel fumes and exhaust emitted by 
N&W's locomotives during his employment from September 8, 1956 
to December 9, 1993.  N&W filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction based on Gay's deposition and 
pleadings.  N&W claimed that Gay's motion for judgment was not 
filed within FELA's three-year statute of limitation period, 45 
U.S.C. § 56, because his cause of action arose in 1989 when he 
was diagnosed with myelodysplasia, a form of leukemia, or 
chronic anemia. 
 
At the hearing on N&W's motion, Gay argued that the motion 
was "essentially a motion for summary judgment" and objected to 
the use of his deposition in considering the motion.  The trial 
court held that Gay had waived his objection to the use of the 
deposition, that the cause of action accrued when Gay was 
diagnosed in 1989, and, therefore, the three-year limitations 
period barred his action.  We awarded Gay an appeal. 
 
Gay assigns error to the trial court's ruling that he 
waived his objection to the use of his deposition.  Gay also 
claims that reasonable people could differ as to when the cause 
of action accrued and, therefore, the trial court erred in 
holding that, as a matter of law, the cause of action accrued 
in 1989.  We consider these issues in order. 
 
I. 
 
During the hearing on N&W's motion, Gay objected to the 
use of his deposition as a basis for summary judgment, relying 
on Rule 3:18 and Code § 8.01-420.  The trial court held that 
Gay waived his objection because he did not raise it until 
after the motion was made, briefed, and argued.  That ruling 
was error. 
 
Rule 3:18 and § 8.01-420 impose a very specific condition; 
namely, the parties must agree to the use of depositions before 
they may serve as a basis in whole, or in part, for the entry 
of summary judgment.  This condition requires some showing of 
acquiescence in the use of a deposition.  The record in this 
case cannot support a finding that Gay agreed to the use of his 
deposition.  Cf. Parker v. Elco Elevator Co., 250 Va. 278, 281 
n.2, 462 S.E.2d 98, 100 n.2 (1995) (no objection made at any 
time to use of deposition).  Gay unequivocally objected to the 
use of his deposition before the trial court entered judgment. 
 We agree that the better practice would have been for Gay to 
have made his objection known earlier in the proceedings.  
Nevertheless, in the absence of any basis to conclude that Gay 
agreed to the use of his deposition, the trial court could not 
enter summary judgment based in whole, or in part, on that 
deposition. 
 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that Gay 
waived his objection to the trial court's use of his deposition 
and in entering summary judgment based on the deposition 
without agreement by the parties as required by Rule 3:18 and 
§ 8.01-420.
*  This conclusion requires that we reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings; however, because Gay's claim relating to the 
method of determining the accrual date of his cause of action 
will arise on remand, we also address this issue. 
 
II. 
 
The federal courts apply a discovery rule for ascertaining 
when an employee's cause of action accrues under the FELA.  
This rule, simply stated, is that the cause of action accrues 
when the employee "knows or should know" that he was injured 
and that the injury was work-related.  United States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 n.7 (1979) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 
337 U.S. 163, 169-170 (1949)); Townley v. Norfolk & Western 
                     
     
*N&W also argues that the trial court's use of the 
deposition testimony was not error because its motion was not a 
motion for summary judgment but a "Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" and, therefore, Rule 3:18 and § 
8.01-420 do not apply.  This argument is disingenuous. 
Regardless of the label N&W placed on it, this motion was 
functionally a motion for summary judgment and subject to Rule 
3:18 and § 8.01-420. 
Ry., 887 F.2d 498, 501 (4th Cir. 1989); Young v. Clinchfield 
R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 1961).  Formal 
confirmation by a physician or other expert that an illness or 
injury is work-related is not necessary for a cause of action 
to accrue.  Townley, 887 F.2d at 501; Albert v. Maine Central 
R.R. Co., 905 F.2d 541, 544 (1st Cir. 1990).   
 
N&W argues that the trial court correctly held that Gay's 
cause of action accrued in 1989 when he was diagnosed with 
leukemia because Gay testified that, at that point, he 
suspected his leukemia was caused by inhalation of diesel 
fumes.  N&W relies primarily on Townley v. Norfolk & Western 
Railway for the proposition that an employee "knows or should 
know" that his injury is work-related when he "suspects" such a 
causal relationship.  Our review of Townley, however, does not 
support N&W's reading of that case.   
 
In Townley, the court considered the time at which a 
railroad employee "knew or should have known" that he had black 
lung disease.  The employee had worked around coal dust from 
1948 to 1979.  He suffered respiratory and heart problems for 
10 years before he retired on disability in 1979.  The employee 
testified that he knew that other railroad workers exposed to 
coal dust had contracted black lung disease and that railroad 
workers were encouraged to apply for black lung benefits.  In 
1980, the employee requested that his employer send him the 
information he needed to apply for black lung benefits.  The 
employee argued that because he did not know that he had black 
lung disease, his cause of action did not accrue until he 
received a formal diagnosis of the disease from the doctor in 
1984.  
 
In discussing when the employee's cause of action arose, 
the court in Townley stated that the employee's action "accrued 
no later than 1980 when . . . he suspected that he suffered 
from black lung and that his condition was caused by his work 
on the railroad."  Id. at 501.  This statement, however, does 
not mean that if a plaintiff "suspected" his condition was 
work-related he "knew or should have known" the injury was 
work-related.  The full holding of the case is that, based on 
all the evidence, it was "obvious from [the employee's] actions 
that he possessed sufficient information that he knew, or 
should have known, that he had been injured by his work with 
the railroad [in 1980]."  Id.
 
An employee's mere suspicion of an injury or its probable 
cause, standing alone, is not the operative standard for 
determining when a cause of action accrues under FELA.  Rather, 
all the relevant evidence must be considered.  In making this 
determination, several factors have been identified, including 
the degree of inquiry made by the employee, the number of 
possible causes of the injury, whether medical advice indicated 
no causal connection between the injury and the workplace, 
DuBose v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 1026, 1031 
(5th Cir. 1984); the complexity of the employee's symptoms, the 
expert knowledge or diagnostic skill of the medical doctors or 
experts consulted, Young, 288 F.2d at 503-04; and the existence 
of a medically recognized and documented causal link between 
the employee's symptoms and his working conditions, Stoleson v. 
United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1980) (action 
brought under FTCA which applies same discovery rule applied to 
action brought under FELA).  On remand, considering all the 
relevant evidence, if reasonable persons could disagree about 
when Gay "knew or should have known" that his injury was work-
related, the issue should be submitted to the jury.  It is 
improper, however, to resolve the issue solely on the basis 
that an employee suspected that his illness was work-related. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
Reversed and remanded.