Title: Commonwealth v. Boucher
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11605
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2016

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SJC-11605 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD M. BOUCHER, JR. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 11, 2015. - March 23, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Instructions to jury.  Intoxication.  Mental 
Impairment.  Intent. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 2, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Raymond P. Veary, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, Paul E. Nemser, & Joshua M. Daniels, for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, on a theory of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty in the May 27, 2010, shooting death of James Tigges 
 
 
2 
at a party in Plymouth.1  The defendant also was convicted of 
armed assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, in the shooting of Tigges's friend, 
Jackson Duncan, who was paralyzed from the chest down when a 
bullet severed his spinal cord.2 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge's 
instructions as to the manner in which the jury could consider 
evidence of mental impairment by intoxication precluded them 
from considering that evidence on the question whether the 
defendant acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Specifically, 
he contends that the instructions improperly limited the jury's 
consideration of that evidence to the elements of murder in the 
first and second degree requiring intent or knowledge, such as 
premeditation or malice, whereas conviction of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty does not 
require either that a defendant know his or her acts are 
extremely atrocious or cruel, or that he or she intend them to 
be.  In the alternative, the defendant suggests that this court 
should adopt a specific intent requirement for murder committed 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, as was proposed in concurring 
                     
1 The defendant was acquitted of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of premeditation. 
2 In addition, the defendant was convicted of unlawful 
possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n). 
 
 
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opinions in Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 828-829 (2014) 
(Duffly, J., concurring), and Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 
763, 777-778 (2014) (Gants, J., concurring).  We decline the 
invitation to adopt a new formulation of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty at this time.  The defendant asks also that we exercise 
our extraordinary power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
reduce his degree of guilt to murder in the second degree. 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that there was no 
error requiring reversal, and we see no reason to grant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following.  
Early on the evening of May 26, 2010, Adam Egan was in his 
apartment in Plymouth with a friend, when the two decided to 
telephone some other friends and invite them over.  Tigges, 
Duncan, the defendant, and another friend of his were among the 
guests.  Eventually, the party grew to approximately twenty 
people, in their late teens or early twenties, all of whom were 
drinking alcohol.  The defendant, like most of the guests, was 
drinking beer.  Some of the guests played a drinking game called 
"beer pong," but no one testified to having seen the defendant 
participate in the beer drinking game.  Two witnesses testified 
that, although the defendant had been drinking, he "seemed 
normal," and was acting no differently from his manner on 
previous occasions when they had been at parties with him.  The 
 
 
4 
defendant was not slurring his words, nor was he stumbling or 
falling over. 
At one point, while the defendant was in the kitchen with 
Duncan and another guest, the defendant dropped a gun; he said 
"oh shit" and picked it up.  When Duncan inquired why the 
defendant had the gun and what he would do if he got caught with 
it, the defendant said that he would have no problem shooting a 
police officer "if he had to."  Duncan thought the gun was a 
"Glock," and he could see that it was loaded.  The defendant 
told him, in a manner that appeared to be "kinda cocky" or 
"bragging," that the bullets were hollow tip.3  The presence of 
the gun in the apartment made Duncan "uncomfortable," and he 
decided to leave the party. 
As Duncan and Tigges were leaving through the back door, 
the defendant removed a bottle of beer from Duncan's back 
pocket; Duncan's cousin, Mikayla Plaisted, took the bottle from 
the defendant and handed it back.  Duncan and Tigges continued 
walking outside to the back yard, with Plaisted close behind.  
The defendant followed them, making comments; he called Tigges 
and Duncan names like "pussy" and "bitch," and asked if Duncan 
                     
3 A ballistics expert testified that a hollow point bullet 
is designed to expand when the projectile strikes an object, so 
that when a hollow point bullet "strikes human tissue" it 
results in a larger wound than that caused by other types of 
bullets. 
 
 
5 
thought he was a "tough guy." 
The defendant was somewhere between four and fifteen feet 
from Tigges and Duncan when he began to shoot at them.4  Duncan 
was shot first; Tigges jumped in front of him as the shots were 
being fired.  The defendant continued to fire until the gun made 
several clicking sounds.5  He then ran from the scene.  Plaisted 
chased him for some distance, shouting, "I know who you are, you 
shot my cousin, you're not going to get away with it, they're 
going to find you."  The defendant turned around, looked at her, 
raised his hand as though it were a gun, and smiled, before 
continuing to run. 
Tigges was shot four times, in the abdomen and left leg.  
He remained conscious after he was shot; he was moaning and 
grimacing and appeared to be in a great deal of pain.  He said 
"please don't touch me," "it hurts," and that it hurt 
"everywhere."  Tigges was transported to a local hospital, and 
then to a Boston hospital, where he died a few hours later as a 
result of his wounds.  Duncan was shot once in the chest; the 
bullet traveled through his body and transected his spinal cord.  
Duncan survived, but was paralyzed from the chest down.  He was 
                     
4 Witnesses variously described the distance between the 
defendant and the victims at that point as from four to five 
feet, eight feet, eight to ten feet, and ten to fifteen feet. 
5 The police later recovered nine spent shell casings at the 
scene. 
 
 
6 
one of the Commonwealth's key witnesses at trial. 
A trained police canine was dispatched to the scene shortly 
after the shootings, at approximately 1:20 A.M. on the morning 
of May 27, 2010, in an effort to locate the defendant.  The 
canine tracked to a house several blocks away, but the defendant 
was not found inside and no physical evidence was recovered.6  He 
was apprehended approximately two weeks later, at a fast food 
restaurant in another town. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Instruction on diminished capacity.  
The defendant argues that the judge's instruction on diminished 
capacity was erroneous.  He claims that the instruction 
improperly limited the jury's consideration of the evidence of 
his intoxication and, consequently, did not allow the jury to 
consider evidence of his diminished capacity from the 
consumption of alcohol with reference to whether the shooting 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.7  Specifically, 
the defendant maintains that because the instruction on 
intoxication limited the jury's consideration of the evidence of 
                     
6 The police later learned that the house where the canine 
had alerted was that of one of the defendant's friends. 
7 There was testimony at trial that the defendant had been 
drinking, but the evidence of whether and to what degree the 
defendant was intoxicated was disputed.  In support of the 
defendant's theory that he was highly intoxicated, one witness 
testified that everyone at the party "was drinking beer" and 
"getting drunk," including the defendant who by midnight was 
"very drunk." 
 
 
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intoxication to his knowledge and intent, they would not have 
been able to consider his level of intoxication with reference 
to whether the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty because, under current law, to convict a defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, the Commonwealth is not required to prove that the 
defendant either knew his or her acts were extremely atrocious 
or cruel, or intended that they be so. 
We do not agree with the defendant's view of these 
instructions.  The instructions correctly described the elements 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty.  The judge properly instructed the jury on the 
existing state of the law, and the factors set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983) (Cunneen), 
that they were to consider in determining whether the killing 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty:  "indifference 
to or taking pleasure in the victim's suffering, consciousness 
and degree of suffering of the victim, extent of physical 
injuries, number of blows, manner and force with which 
delivered, instrument employed, and disproportion between the 
means needed to cause death and those employed."  The judge also 
instructed properly that "proof of malice aforethought is the 
only requisite mental intent for a conviction of murder in the 
first degree based on murder committed with extreme atrocity or 
 
 
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cruelty," id., and that "murder committed with malice 
aforethought may be found to have been committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, even though the murderer did not know that 
his act was extremely atrocious or cruel," id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Monsen, 377 Mass. 245, 253 (1979).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 91 (2002).  The judge 
correctly explained that "[t]he inquiry focuses on the 
defendant's actions in terms of the manner and means of 
inflicting death and on the resulting effect on the victim." 
 
After giving the instruction on extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, the judge then instructed on diminished capacity by 
voluntary consumption of alcohol.  The challenged portion of 
that instruction is as follows: 
 
 
"I now want to turn to the issue of diminished 
capacity.  Whenever the defendant's knowledge or intent 
must be proved, the defendant's culpability rests upon the 
Commonwealth's proof of such knowledge or intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In other words, the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the 
required knowledge or intent in order to prove that he 
committed the crime.  Whenever the Commonwealth must prove 
the defendant's intention to do something, you should 
consider any credible evidence of the effect upon the 
defendant of his consumption of alcohol in determining 
whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of proof.  
Likewise, whenever the Commonwealth must prove the 
defendant's knowledge of any facts or circumstances, you 
should consider any credible evidence of the effect upon 
the defendant of his consumption of alcohol in determining 
whether the Commonwealth has met its burden. 
 
"More particularly, you should consider any credible 
evidence of the effect upon the defendant of his 
 
 
9 
consumption of alcohol in determining, one, whether [the 
defendant] deliberately premeditated the killing of James 
Tigges.  That is whether he thought before he acted and 
whether he reached the decision to kill after reflection, 
at least for a short period of time.  Two, whether [the 
defendant] intended to kill or to cause grievous bodily 
harm to James Tigges or was aware that his conduct created 
a plain and strong likelihood that Mr. Tigges's death would 
result from his conduct.  And three, whether [the 
defendant] acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing 
the death of James Tigges. 
 
"In considering such evidence, you should consider it 
along with all other credible evidence relevant to the 
defendant's intent and/or knowledge.  I reiterate, whenever 
the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant intended to do 
something or had knowledge of certain facts or 
circumstances, in order to prove a crime, such as first or 
second-degree murder, you should consider any credible 
evidence of the effect of his consumption of alcohol in 
determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of 
proving the defendant's intent or knowledge beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
 
The defendant contends that, in context, this instruction, 
with its frequent references to his knowledge or intent, would 
have suggested to the jury that they could consider evidence of 
intoxication only to establish the elements of the offense that 
require intent or knowledge, such as premeditation and malice.  
Under this view, the jury would have been precluded from 
considering evidence of the defendant's impairment from 
intoxication as it related to all of the Cunneen factors, 
because "intent and knowledge are not aspects of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty."  See Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 
794, 797-798 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 
124, 130 (2000). 
 
 
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When the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty is in play, 
an instruction on voluntary intoxication that links 
consideration of intoxication only to a defendant's intent or 
knowledge, without also explaining that the jury may consider 
intoxication in relation to whether the defendant committed the 
killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is in error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 750 (2014); Commonwealth 
v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 422 (2014).  An instruction on 
voluntary intoxication also is erroneous if it is unclear from 
the context in which it is given that the jury may consider 
whether a defendant's intoxication negates a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, supra at 
798 ("[T]he context in which the instruction was given, 
immediately after the instruction on murder in the second 
degree, suggested that mental impairment related only to the 
issue of malice. . . .  It should have been made clear to the 
jury that they could consider evidence of mental impairment on 
the specific question whether the murder was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty"). 
Here, however, the instruction correctly conveyed that the 
effect upon the defendant of his consumption of alcohol was 
relevant to the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the 
defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner.  Moreover, after 
the jury requested clarification as to the instructions on 
 
 
11 
murder in the first degree and voluntary intoxication, the judge 
provided them with a written document containing the language 
that he had used previously, formatted in such a way as to show 
that "credible evidence of the effect upon the defendant of his 
consumption of alcohol" should "[m]ore particularly" be 
considered in reaching a determination whether the defendant 
"acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing the death of 
James Tigges."  We previously have concluded that a similar 
instruction was not erroneous.  See Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 
463 Mass. 37, 49 (2012) (not error to instruct that jury "may 
consider evidence of impairment when considering whether [a 
defendant] acted in a cruel or an atrocious manner causing the 
death of [a victim]").  See also Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 
Mass. 837, 848-849 (2006). 
b.  Request that jury be instructed to consider knowledge 
or intent.  The defendant suggests in the alternative that we 
should consider adding an additional element of knowledge or 
intent in cases involving extreme atrocity or cruelty, above 
that required to prove malice.  In his proposed jury 
instructions, while acknowledging that it was inconsistent with 
the current state of the law, defense counsel requested that, as 
suggested by language in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 
686 & n.16 (1980) (Gould), the jury should be instructed that 
they "may consider what effect, if any, the defendant's impaired 
 
 
12 
capacity had on his ability to appreciate the consequences of 
his choices" in relation to having acted with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty.8  Before us, the defendant's argument expands upon 
his request for a Gould instruction.  The defendant contends 
that the jury should be instructed that when "a conviction is 
based on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, it must be 
proven that the defendant intended that the consequences of his 
actions be extremely atrocious or cruel." 
In our decisions following Gould, however, we have 
reiterated that there is no requirement of intent, beyond the 
requirement of malice needed for all convictions of murder, in 
order to convict a defendant on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  Thus, the instruction as given complies with the 
current state of the law and was not erroneous.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Szlachta, supra at 47 (although Gould appeared 
to suggest "that the court was introducing a new mens rea 
                     
8 The Commonwealth argues that defense counsel was not 
sufficiently specific in challenging the absence of the 
requested language in the judge's final charge, and therefore 
that any objection to the absence of the proposed instruction 
was not preserved.  After the charge, counsel directed the 
judge's attention to the omission of the requested language by 
reference to the numbered paragraphs of his written 
instructions, including the request for the Gould instruction.  
See Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 684-685 (1980).  
Although counsel's objection may not have been a model of 
clarity, the request for that instruction was preserved.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 422 Mass. 373, 376-377 (1996); 
Commonwealth v. Biancardi, 421 Mass. 251, 252 (1995). 
 
 
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element . . . our jurisprudence following Gould clearly has 
rejected this suggestion"); Cunneen, supra at 227 ("proof of 
malice aforethought is the only requisite mental intent for a 
conviction of murder in the first degree based on murder 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty"). 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant also 
asks us to review his murder conviction under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and reduce the degree of guilt to murder in the second 
degree.  We have conducted a review of the entire record 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we see no reason to set 
aside or reduce the defendant's conviction.  See Commonwealth v. 
LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 261-262 (2008). 
Judgments affirmed.