Title: Baugher v. Beaver Constr. Co.
Citation: 791 So. 2d 932
Docket Number: 1981020
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 22, 2000

791 So. 2d 932 (2000)
Dann BAUGHER and Myra Dasinger
v.
BEAVER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
1981020.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 22, 2000.
Rehearing Denied February 23, 2001.
Stan Brobston of Brobston &amp; Brobston, P.C., Bessemer, for appellants
*933 John D. Gleissner of Rogers &amp; Associates, Birmingham, for appellee.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
Beaver Construction Company substantially completed construction of Wildwood Apartments in 1979. Nearly 15 years later, on March 17, 1994, a fire destroyed Wildwood Apartments. At that time, Dann Baugher and Myra Dasinger, tenants of Wildwood Apartments, suffered a loss of property as a result of the fire. On February 14, 1996, Baugher and Dasinger brought a suit to recover damages against Beaver Construction in the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson County Circuit Court. On March 9, 1998, the case was transferred to the Birmingham Division of the Jefferson County Circuit Court. On November 10, 1998, Beaver Construction moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on February 12, 1999.
Appealing the summary judgment, Baugher and Dasinger argue that the trial court erroneously grounded the summary judgment on the expiration of the period of limitations imposed by the construction statute of repose, §§ 6-5-220 to -228, Ala. Code 1975. Baugher and Dasinger argue that the statute's limitation for the commencement of a civil action against architects, engineers, and builders, which bars all causes of action that accrue more than 13 years after substantial completion of the improvements entailing their services, is unconstitutional.
We, however, hold § 6-5-220 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, to be constitutional. Moreover, we agree with the trial court in its holding that § 6-5-221(a) barred Baugher and Dasinger from suing Beaver Construction, which completed construction on Wildwood Apartments nearly 15 years before the cause of action accrued in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Beaver Construction.
Section 6-5-221(a), Ala.Code 1975, reads as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Article I of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 is entitled "Declaration of Rights." Article I, Section 13, states:
Article I, Section 36, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 further provides:
In reviewing a party's challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on a claim that the statute violates the party's right to a remedy guaranteed by § 13 of the Constitution, this Court has applied both the "vested rights approach" and the "common-law rights approach." See, e.g., Kruszewski v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 935 (Ala.1995); Murdock v. Steel Processing Servs., Inc., 581 So. 2d 846 (Ala. 1991); Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala.1988). We follow this same review process in this case.
Because Baugher and Dasinger's property damages occurred after the effective date of the construction statute of repose, their causes of action had not yet accrued when the statute was enacted. Under the vested rights approach, § 6-5-221(a), Ala.Code 1975, does not violate § 13 because it does not deprive Baugher and Dasinger of a vested right in a cause of action. See Kruszewski and Reed, supra.
In Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102, 115 (Ala.1988), the Court reasoned:
(Quoting Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 352-54 (Ala. 1981).) (Emphasis added and emphasis omitted.) See also Lankford v. Sullivan, Long &amp; Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Ala. 1982).
The construction statute of repose found in § 6-5-220 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, does operate to abrogate certain common-law rights after the expiration of the 13-year period. This Court has previously identified common-law rights of action against architects, engineers, and builders. See, e.g., Watson, Watson, Rutland/Architects, Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 559 So. 2d 168, 174 (Ala.1990) (holding that an architect could be held liable for failing to inspect reasonably); McFadden v. Ten-T Corp., 529 So. 2d 192, 201 (Ala.1988) (holding that a contractor, a builder, could be held liable for negligently widening and resurfacing a highway and that the contractor was not insulated from liability by the owner's acceptance of the contractor's work); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala.1983) (allowing the plaintiff to pursue his claims, grounded in both negligence and the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, against the engineers responsible for the installation of an electric arc furnace); Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971) (holding that caveat emptor does not apply to a builder-vendor's sale of a newly constructed house). While the legislation in question does operate to abolish certain common-law causes of action, nonetheless the legislation passes constitutional muster even judged by the common-law rights approach because the legislation "eradicates or ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the police power." Reed, supra.
Reed explains:
527 So. 2d  at 116. However, "[i]n this regard, it is not enough for the legislature to merely characterize the problem as a `social evil' and then recite in the enacting clause that the legislation is directed to that evil. There must be a substantial relationship between the act and the eradication of the evil." Lankford, 416 So. 2d  at 1001.
In § 6-5-225, Ala.Code 1975, the Alabama Legislature expressed its findings and intent in enacting the statute:
(Emphasis added.)
Buildings are unique in that typically they are intended to endure indefinitely if not permanently. Without this statute, architects, builders, and engineers would remain subject to liability until they die or, indeed, for some months after they have died. See 43-2-350(b), Ala.Code 1975. The construction statute of repose bears a substantial relationship to the eradication or amelioration of this potentially perpetual liability as well as the evils specifically found by the Legislature. Therefore, as a valid exercise of police power, as judged by the common-law rights approach, the statute comports with Article I, Section 13 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
Furthermore, in the present statute, the Legislature has remedied the defect that caused its precursor to be declared unconstitutional. See Jackson, 435 So. 2d  at 729. In Jackson, the Court found that the statute did not provide for those plaintiffs whose causes of action accrued close to the expiration of the limitations period. In the present statute, the Legislature has added a "savings clause" to provide parties who are injured near the expiration of the thirteen-year period sufficient time to file their actions.
For the above-stated reasons, we find § 6-5-220 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, to be constitutional under both the vested rights approach and the common-law rights approach. We therefore affirm the summary judgment in favor of Beaver Construction Company.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
BROWN, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  While we have already held that the Legislature has the inherent power to enact a statute of limitations establishing the period within which a claim must be brought, see Sellers v. Edwards, 289 Ala. 2, 265 So. 2d 438 (1972); Plant v. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975), the statute in this case is a statute of repose. Black's Law Dictionary defines "statute of repose":

"A statute that bars a suit a fixed number of years after the defendant acts in some way (as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered any injury. Cf. Statute of Limitations.
"`A statute of repose ... limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.' 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4, at 20-21 (1987)."
Black's Law Dictionary 1423 (7th ed.1999).
Therefore, because the 13-year period begins to run upon the substantial completion of the improvements, rather than upon the injury to the plaintiff's person or property or upon the accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action otherwise, the statute is a statute of repose, rather than a simple statute of limitations.