Title: State v. Jones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51940
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 2005

FILED:  October 20, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Appellant,
v.
JAMES LOUIS JONES,
Respondent.
(03CR2144FE; SC S51940)
En Banc
Expedited appeal under ORS 138.060(2)(a).*
Submitted March 11, 2005.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Solicitor General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff-appellant.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant-respondent.  With her
on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartland, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services
RIGGS, J.
The order of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
*Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court, William L.
Lasswell, Judge. Order dated October 21, 2004.
RIGGS, J.
In this criminal matter, we decide whether ORS 41.910
requires suppression of (1) statements that defendant made during
two police interviews before the police notified defendant that
they had been videotaping each interview; and (2) police officer
testimony that described those same statements.  The trial court
granted defendant's pretrial motions to suppress both the
prenotification parts of the videotape and the officers'
testimony describing defendant's statements during those
prenotification periods.  The state appeals those rulings
directly to this court pursuant to ORS 138.060(2)(a). (1)
  For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's decision to
suppress the videotape, but reverse its decision as to the
officers' testimony.  
The following facts are not in dispute.  On November
30, 2003, police took defendant into custody after he allegedly
had shot and killed his wife's boyfriend.  Before surrendering
himself to the police, defendant said that he had shot the victim
in self-defense.  The police took defendant to the sheriff's
station and commenced questioning him there at approximately 3:30
a.m.  The station interview room was painted white and had a
white, orb-shaped camera, approximately two inches in diameter,
mounted in one corner.  A flat, triangular microphone, which
resembled a computer mouse, was on the table in the room.  The
parties agree that there was nothing about the white orb in the
corner or the object on the table that revealed to defendant what
those items were or that either was operating.  
Six and one-half minutes into the first interview, the
police told defendant that "a lot of our conversations are being
recorded and this is being recorded also * * * [b]oth video and
audio."  Throughout the remainder of that interview, the police
repeatedly reminded defendant that they were recording him.  
Police commenced their second interview of defendant at
approximately 4:30 p.m. that afternoon in the same room.  The
police did not tell defendant that they were recording the 
second interview until they had videotaped 35 minutes of that
interview.  
The state charged defendant with intentional murder,
ORS 163.115(1)(a).  Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress
both the videotape material and the interviewing officers'
testimony related to those parts of the two interviews that
preceded police notification about the videotaping. (2)
  The
state responded that the videotaped material and police officer
testimony were admissible.  
The trial court ruled that evidence of the
prenotification parts of both interviews was inadmissible.  It 
therefore suppressed (1) those parts of the videotapes; and (2)
the officers' testimony related to those interview periods.  The
state appeals and assigns error to each of those rulings.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the state did not
argue to the trial court that differing circumstances surrounding
each interview provided separate grounds for admitting the
evidence pertaining to each interview.  The state bore the burden
to preserve for appeal any alternative argument supporting the
admissibility of any part of the evidence.  See State v. Wyatt,
331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (party did not preserve claim
on appeal that trial court failed to consider alternatives to
precluding evidence or to imposing less onerous sanction for
discovery violation at issue).  The state failed to meet that
burden.  It follows that we must decide only whether the trial
court correctly suppressed the prenotification part of videotape
from either interview, or correctly suppressed the related police
officer testimony from either interview.
The parties' arguments focus on two statutes, ORS
165.540 and ORS 41.910.  ORS 165.540 provides, in part:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided * * * a person
may not:
"* * * * *
"(c) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any
part of a conversation by means of any device,
contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical,
mechanical, manual or otherwise, if not all
participants in the conversation are specifically
informed that their conversation is being obtained.
"* * * * *
"(2)(a) The prohibitions in subsection (1) * * *
(c) of this section do not apply to:
"* * * * * 
"(B) Public officials in charge of and at jails,
police premises, sheriffs' offices, Department of
Corrections institutions and other penal or
correctional institutions, except as to communications
or conversations between an attorney and the client of
the attorney."
ORS 165.535 provides, in part:
“As used in ORS 41.910 * * * [and ORS] 165.540 * * *:
"(1)  'Conversation' means the transmission
between two or more persons of an oral communication
which is not a telecommunication or a radio
communication."
ORS 41.910 provides:
"Evidence of the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted:  
"(1) In violation of ORS 165.540 shall not be
admissible in any court of this state, except as
evidence of unlawful interception.
"(2) Under ORS 165.540(2)(a) shall not be
admissible in any court of this state unless:  
"(a) The communication was intercepted by a public
official in charge of and at a jail, police premises,
sheriff's office, Department of Corrections institution
or other penal or correctional institution; and
"(b) The participant in the communication, against
whom the evidence is being offered, had actual notice
that the communication was being monitored or
recorded."
ORS 133.721 provides, in part:
"As used in ORS 41.910 and 133.721 to 133.739 and
this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
"* * * * *
"(7) 'Oral communication' means:
"(a) Any oral communication, other than a wire or
electronic communication, uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation[.]"
The state argues that the trial court erred in
suppressing both the videotape and the officers' testimony
because defendant's statements did not constitute "oral
communication" for purposes of suppression under ORS 41.910 or
within the meaning of ORS 165.540.  Defendant, on the other hand,
argues that suppression is warranted under both ORS 41.910(1) and
ORS 41.910(2).  To evaluate those arguments, we look to the
legislature's intent in enacting the pertinent statutes. 
ORS 41.910(1) provides the general suppression remedy
for all violations of ORS 165.540.  A person violates ORS
165.540(1)(c) when that person fails to “specifically inform[]”
all participants in a conversation that the person is obtaining
that conversation.  ORS 41.910(2) provides a suppression remedy
for only the exceptions set out in ORS 165.540(2)(a).  While
certain public officials who obtain conversation are exempt from
criminal liability under ORS 165.540(2)(a)(B), ORS 41.910(2)
nevertheless requires suppression of “evidence of the contents”
of the intercepted communication unless the person being
monitored or recorded receives “actual notice” of the monitoring
or recording.  Thus, ORS 41.910 requires suppression under either
subsection (1) or (2) if the communication participant fails to
receive notice that his or her statements are being obtained or
intercepted.  
As noted above, the state does not contend that the
police either specifically informed or provided actual notice to
defendant of their videotaping during the prenotification parts
of the interviews.  Therefore, under the parallel notification
requirements of ORS 165.540(1)(c) and ORS 41.910(2)(b), the
prenotification parts of both interviews are subject to
suppression unless the state is correct that neither ORS
165.540(1)(c) nor ORS 165.540(2)(a)(B) applies.  For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that the state is incorrect in asserting
that neither of those provisions apply, and we hold that evidence
pertaining to the prenotification parts of both interviews are
subject to suppression under ORS 41.910.
The state contends that ORS 165.540 applies to a 
"conversation" that is obtained, and that "conversation" is
limited to "oral communication."  The state then relies on the
definition of "oral communication" provided in ORS 133.721(7)(a)
and concludes that, because defendant's statements do not
constitute "oral communication," they are not "conversation"
within the meaning of ORS 165.540.  That analysis, however,
misconstrues the applicable provisions.  
ORS 165.535(1) defines “conversation” for purposes of
ORS 165.540 as "the transmission between two or more persons of
an oral communication which is not a telecommunication or a radio
communication."  That definition distinguishes person-to-person
oral communication, such as defendant’s statements to the police,
from both radio communication and telecommunication.  See ORS
165.535(3) and (4) (defining those latter terms).  However, the
term "oral communication," as used in ORS 165.535(1), is not
further defined by ORS 133.721(7)(a), as the state contends.  ORS
133.721 expressly provides that the definitions set out therein,
including the definition of "oral communication," apply to terms
"used in ORS 41.910 and [ORS] 133.721 to 133.739 and this
section[.]"  ORS 165.540 and ORS 165.535 are absent from that
list.  Thus, the definitions set out in ORS 133.721 are
inapplicable to an analysis of defendant's statements under the
terms of ORS 165.540 and do not place the police conduct in this
case beyond the reach of ORS 165.540.  We reject the state's
contentions to the contrary. (3)

Because defendant's statements constitute
"conversation" within the meaning of ORS 165.540, and because the
police failed to notify defendant that they were recording his
statements, evidence related to those statements fall within the
suppression provisions of ORS 41.910.  
We next consider whether ORS 41.910 requires
suppression of the prenotification parts of the videotape
evidence, the testimonial evidence relating to those interview
periods, or both.  As seen above, ORS 41.910(1) and (2) require
suppression of "evidence of the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted."  We first must determine whether
defendant's statements constitute "oral communication" within the
meaning of that statute. (4)
   If so, we then must determine
what constitutes "evidence of the contents" of "intercepted"
communication.
As the state correctly points out, the legislature has
given the term "oral communication" a very specific meaning for
purposes of ORS 41.910.  ORS 133.721(7)(a) limits the reach of
the suppression remedy by providing a two-pronged definition of
"oral communication," both prongs of which must be satisfied
before ORS 41.910 mandates suppression.  First, the speaker of
the intercepted communication must have exhibited "an expectation
that such communication [wa]s not subject to interception."  ORS
133.721(7)(a).  Second, the speaker must have done so "under
circumstances justifying [that] expectation."  Id.  The first
prong of the definition requires the court to examine whether a
speaker exhibited an expectation that the communication was not
subject to interception.  The second prong requires the court to
decide whether the circumstances surrounding the communication
justify that same expectation.
In this case, the state does not argue that defendant
failed to exhibit the requisite expectation.  Thus, we assume
that the first prong of the statutory test is satisfied.  We
therefore turn to the second prong of the "oral communication"
definition.  As to the first interview, the circumstances 
justified the required expectation.  As the parties acknowledge,
nothing about the appearance of the equipment in the room would
have alerted defendant that his statements could be or were being
intercepted. 
The state argues, however, that "a person under
suspicion for murder, who is interviewed at a sheriff's office * * * should understand that there is at least a good possibility
that anything he says will be recorded."  That argument
incorrectly assumes that the protections of Oregon law do not
apply once a person is suspected of a crime or is taken into
police custody.  But such an assumption would render the notice
provisions of ORS 41.910 meaningless.  Accordingly, we conclude
that defendant's statements during his first interview, made
before the police informed him that he was being recorded,
constituted "oral communication" within the meaning of ORS
41.910. 
Having determined that “oral communication” is at
issue, we now must determine whether ORS 41.910 requires
suppression of the videotape, the testimonial evidence, or both. 
By its terms, ORS 41.910 requires suppression of the “contents”
of oral communication that was “intercepted.”  ORS 133.721
defines those terms as follows:
"(2) 'Contents' when used with respect to any
wire, electronic or oral communication, includes any
information concerning the identity of the parties to
such communication or the existence, substance, purport
or meaning of that communication.
"* * * * * 
"(5) 'Intercept' means the acquisition, by
listening or recording, of the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical or other device."
Because those definitions apply to ORS 41.910, the
legislature's intent is clear.  Once all other conditions are
met, ORS 41.910 requires suppression of evidence of "any
information concerning the identity of the parties to" or the
"existence, substance, purport[,] or meaning of" communication
that was "acqui[red] by listening or recording * * * through the
use of any electronic, mechanical[,] or other device." 
In this case, both the prenotification part of the 
videotape of defendant’s first interview and the related
officers' testimony constitute evidence of "information
concerning the identity of the parties to" or the "existence,
substance, purport[,] or meaning of th[e] communication." 
However, only the videotape constitutes evidence of information
concerning party identity or communication substance that was
"acqui[red] by listening or recording * * * through the use of
any electronic, mechanical[,] or other device."  It follows that
the trial court correctly suppressed the prenotification part of
the videotape from defendant's first interview.  And, because the
state did not argue separate grounds for admitting evidence from
each interview, we will not disturb the trial court's order
suppressing the prenotification part of the videotape from
defendant's second interview.  
By contrast, the interviewing officers' testimony
concerned their own knowledge of defendant's identity and
statements.  The officers did not acquire their knowledge of
defendant's identity through videotaping him; neither did they
hear defendant's statements through the use of any device.  Put
differently, the officers' knowledge of defendant's identity or
statements did not arise by virtue of any interception activity,
but through their direct participation in the communication. 
That participation occurred simultaneous to, but independent of,
the videotaping; the relationship between the two was temporal
and nothing more.  Thus, the interviewing officers' testimony
regarding defendant's statements during the prenotification
period of the first interview is not subject to suppression under
ORS 41.910.  Because nothing about the second interview would
alter the foregoing analysis, the officer testimony pertaining to
that interview is, likewise, not subject to suppression under ORS
41.910.  The trial court erred in holding otherwise. 
In this appeal, defendant raises several alternative
arguments for suppressing the officers' testimony.  First,
defendant argues that ORS 133.735 requires suppression of the
officers' testimony.  That statute provides, in part:
"(1)  Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing
or proceeding in or before any court * * * may move to
suppress the contents of any wire, electronic or oral
communication intercepted under ORS 133.724, or
evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that: 
"(a) The communication was unlawfully intercepted[.]"
ORS 133.724 provides, in part:
"(1) An ex parte order for the interception of
wire, electronic or oral communications may be issued
by any circuit court judge upon written application
made upon oath or affirmation of the individual who is
the district attorney or a deputy district attorney
authorized by the district attorney for the county in
which the order is sought."
ORS 133.724 further outlines procedures for obtaining
ex parte orders when police intercept various forms of
communication.  However ORS 133.735(1)(a) provides for
suppression of only unlawfully "intercepted" communications or
"evidence derived therefrom."  Because the same definitions apply
to ORS 133.735 that apply to ORS 41.910, defendant's argument
under ORS 133.735 fails for the same reasons that it did under
ORS 41.910:  the officers' testimony was not "acqui[red] by
listening or recording * * * through the use of any electronic,
mechanical[,] or other device."  ORS 133.721(5).  Neither was
that testimony "evidence derived [from that recording.]"  ORS
133.735(1).  As discussed earlier, the officers directly
participated in the communication and heard defendant's
statements as he uttered them in their physical presence.  The
officers' knowledge of defendant's statements did not derive from
the simultaneous recording, but from their personal participation
in the interview.  Contrary to defendant's assertions, then, the
officers' testimony is not subject to suppression under ORS
133.735. 
Next, defendant makes several new arguments related to
whether the interviewing officers possessed an independent
recollection of defendant's statements, whether some of their
testimony instead derived from the suppressed parts of videotape,
and whether two of the officers' testimony had become tainted by
exposure to the videotapes at the suppression hearing.  We cannot
reach those issues here.  Defendant can raise those arguments as
objections at trial if or when those officers testify.  We cannot
speculate in this interlocutory appeal whether the state will
call those officers to testify, what the substance of that
testimony might be, and whether or not the suppressed parts of
videotape will be involved in that testimony.  Neither does the
present record reflect whether the officers relied on their
review of suppressed parts of the videotapes and, if so, to what
extent.   
In sum, we conclude that the trial court correctly
suppressed the prenotification parts of videotape from
defendant's first interview under ORS 41.910, and we uphold that
ruling as to both interviews.  However, the trial court erred
when it suppressed the interviewing officers' testimony from both
interviews because that testimony was not evidence of the
contents of intercepted communication within the meaning of ORS
41.910.   
The order of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
1. ORS 138.060(2)(a) provides, in part, that, "when the
state chooses to appeal from an order [suppressing evidence made
prior to trial], the state shall take the appeal from the circuit
court to the Supreme Court if the defendant is charged with
murder or aggravated murder."
2. Defendant did not (and does not) challenge the
admissibility of the videotape or testimonial evidence related to
the post-notification parts of the two interviews; those parts
are not at issue in this appeal. 
3. The statutory context lends further support.  In 1959,
the legislature amended ORS 165.540 (criminal statute) and ORS
41.910 (suppression remedy) to include the unlawful interception
of "conversation," and it added ORS 165.535 to define
"conversation" for both statutes.  Or Laws 1959, ch 681, §§ 1, 2,
5.  Following those amendments, both the criminal statute and the
suppression remedy operated under the same terms, with
"conversation" merely defined as person-to-person oral
communication, as distinguished from telecommunication or radio
communication.  In 1979, however, the legislature amended the
text of ORS 41.910; it replaced "conversation" with "oral
communication" and added the definition of "oral communication"
that is now set forth in ORS 133.721(7)(a).  Or Laws 1979, ch
716, §§ 2, 12.  The legislature chose not to maintain parallel
terms between the criminal statute and its suppression remedy. 
That choice limits only the suppression remedy by application of
the more specific definition for "oral communication" supplied by
ORS 133.721.  
4. Defendant's statements to the police in both interviews
did not involve wire communication. ORS 133.721(10) provides:
"'Wire communication' means any communication made
in whole or in part through the use of facilities for
the transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable or other like connection between the point of
origin and the point of reception, whether furnished or
operated by a public utility or privately owned or
leased."
Defendant's utterance was the point of origin of his statements,
and the interviewing officers were the point of reception.  No
transmission facilities through wire, cable, or otherwise were
involved in defendant's direct communication to the officers.