Title: Commonwealth v. Tejada
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11951
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2020

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SJC-11951 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE TEJADA. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 7, 2019. - January 23, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Voir dire, 
Empanelment of jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 28, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary K. 
Ames, J., and the cases were tried before Howard J. Whitehead, 
J. 
 
 
 
David H. Mirsky (Joanne T. Petito also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted of three counts of 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  On appeal, he 
2 
 
argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
convictions; (2) his statements to police on the night of his 
arrest should have been suppressed; and (3) the trial judge 
erred by declining to ask a requested question about anti-
Hispanic juror bias during voir dire.  Separately, the defendant 
asks us to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the convictions and 
decline to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
grant the requested relief. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for subsequent discussion.  
In the early morning hours of September 5, 2011, Lawrence police 
arrested the defendant after he said that he had killed his wife 
and her two teenage children.  At approximately 2 A.M. that 
morning, a neighbor was returning home with his family when the 
defendant approached him in a parking lot and asked to be taken 
to the police station because "he had just killed three people."  
The neighbor (who did not know the defendant) agreed to 
telephone the police, and waited with the defendant until they 
arrived.  When the neighbor asked the defendant what had 
happened, the defendant responded that he had killed his family 
because they were "talking down to him."  The neighbor was 
unsure whether to believe the defendant, who was shaking and 
whose eyes were "bugging out." 
3 
 
 
When the police arrived, the neighbor remained to translate 
for the defendant, whose native language is Spanish and who did 
not speak English.  Police asked the defendant what had 
happened; through the neighbor's efforts at translation, the 
defendant repeated the substance of what he had told the 
neighbor, and provided an address to a nearby apartment building 
where he said the shootings had taken place.  He also told the 
officers that he had tried to shoot himself, but had run out of 
bullets.  When officers asked the defendant what he had done 
with the weapon, the defendant told them that he had discarded 
it after leaving the house to go for a walk.  Although the 
defendant seemed anxious, he was cooperative and calm, and he 
maintained an even tone throughout the conversation. 
 
Officers eventually decided to investigate the accuracy of 
the defendant's statements; they pat frisked and handcuffed him, 
placed him in the back seat of a police cruiser, and drove the 
few blocks to the address the defendant had provided.  After 
knocking on the apartment door and receiving no response, police 
broke down the door.  Inside the apartment, they found the three 
victims, all deceased, in an upstairs bedroom. 
 
Police recovered a variety of forensic evidence from the 
scene and the defendant's person.  First, officers observed 
bloody footprints on the stairs, going through the kitchen, and 
heading toward the back door; forensic analysis later determined 
4 
 
that the footprints were consistent with the type of shoes the 
defendant had been wearing.1  In addition, the defendant's hands 
tested positive for gunshot residue, and there were traces of 
the victims' blood on the defendant's clothing.  In the grass 
behind the apartment building, police found a revolver 
containing six spent shell casings that matched bullets 
recovered from the scene.  The revolver had traces of blood on 
it from at least two people.  The defendant's wife's blood 
matched the major female profile. 
 
Prior proceedings.  Before trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress his statements to police.  The motion was denied with 
respect to the defendant's statements while he was seated on the 
curb speaking with police; the motion was allowed with respect 
to statements made once the defendant was handcuffed and seated 
in the police cruiser. 
 
Following the partial denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress, a Superior Court jury convicted him of three counts of 
                     
 
1 At trial, a forensic analyst described the defendant's 
shoes as a "class match" for the footprints found at the scene.  
The analyst explained that a "class match" means that the 
defendant's shoes shared features such as size, design features, 
and wear with the footprints recovered at the scene.  Although a 
"class match" is not a conclusive determination that only a 
particular shoe could have left the footprints, the analyst 
stated that a class match still has "great significance." 
5 
 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions of murder in 
the first degree.  The defendant contends also that his motion 
to suppress should have been allowed, because his statements to 
police were inadmissible as the product of a custodial 
interrogation where no Miranda warnings were given, and because 
his statements to police were involuntary.  He argues further 
that the judge's decision not to ask the venire a requested 
question concerning juror bias constituted reversible error.  In 
addition, the defendant asks that we exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or to 
order a new trial pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
there was insufficient evidence to convict him of murder in the 
first degree under either a theory of deliberate premeditation 
or a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Where, as here, a 
trial judge denies a defendant's motion for a required finding, 
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth and determine whether "any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 
6 
 
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  As long as there is sufficient 
evidence of one theory, the convictions remain undisturbed on 
appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220 (2007). 
 
We turn to consider whether there was sufficient evidence 
to establish murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation.2  To sustain the convictions under this 
theory, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the 
defendant (1) caused the death of the victims; (2) intended to 
kill the victims; and (3) acted with deliberate premeditation.  
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 44 (2018); Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 37 (2013).  As there is no claim that 
the defendant did not cause the death of the victims, what 
remains is to consider whether the defendant intended to kill 
them, and whether he acted with deliberate premeditation. 
 
The defendant's neighbor testified that the defendant told 
him that he had shot the victims because he had grown tired of 
them "talking down to him."  Another witness testified that the 
defendant and his wife had argued in the hours prior to her 
                     
 
2 Because we conclude, see infra, that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish deliberate premeditation, we need not 
address whether there was sufficient evidence to establish 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 
Mass. 538, 548 (2011); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 
123 (1999); Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 270 n.5 
(1994). 
7 
 
death, when she insisted on taking the defendant's keys to 
prevent him from drinking and driving.  The jury also heard 
evidence that the victims were shot at close range, and that the 
victims were found lying in close proximity to one another, in a 
single bedroom.3 
 
To establish the intent to kill, the Commonwealth must 
prove that the defendant "consciously and purposefully intended" 
to kill the victims.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, 
supra at 44; Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 37.  
Here, the jury could infer from the neighbor's testimony that 
the defendant shot his family because he had grown tired of them 
criticizing him or "talking down to him."  Moreover, as we 
previously have held, the use of a firearm at close range 
provides strong evidence of an intent to kill.  See Commonwealth 
v. Andrews, 427 Mass. 434, 440 (1998) (shooting victim at close 
range warranted finding of intent to kill).  Thus, the evidence 
was sufficient to establish that the defendant intended to kill 
his victims. 
                     
 
3 The Commonwealth acknowledges that a subsequent review of 
the forensic analysis indicated that the expert opinion 
estimating that the shots were fired from between three and nine 
inches away was inaccurate, and that a proper estimate would 
have been between three and twenty-four inches.  Even absent 
this specific testimony, however, independent evidence that the 
gunshot wounds contained markings consistent with close- or 
intermediate-range gunfire was sufficient for the jury to 
conclude that the victims had been shot at close range. 
8 
 
 
The defendant contends, however, relying upon Commonwealth 
v. Mills, 400 Mass. 626, 627 (1987), that the evidence was 
insufficient because his intoxication and his mental state 
indicate that he lacked the mental capacity to form the intent 
to kill.  The defendant's reliance on Mills is misplaced.  
Unlike Mills, supra, where the defendant sought, and was denied, 
an instruction on criminal responsibility, the defendant in this 
case did not pursue a defense of criminal responsibility or 
diminished capacity, nor did he seek an instruction on criminal 
responsibility.4  Compare id. at 627, 630. 
 
Moreover, the jury in fact were instructed to consider 
whether the defendant's intoxication and his mental state would 
have prevented him from forming the intent to kill.  See 
Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 470-471 (1987) (evidence of 
intoxication and mental impairment relevant to question whether 
defendant formed intent to kill); Commonwealth v. Henson, 394 
                     
 
4 Although we have not required a judge to instruct on 
criminal responsibility absent a request, see Commonwealth v. 
Genius, 387 Mass. 695, 697-699 (1982), we have concluded that, 
in limited circumstances, evidence of intoxication or mental 
impairment may be so severe as to warrant a reduction in the 
verdict pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, where no instruction on 
the effect of intoxication was requested or given.  See 
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 507-508 (1978).  As 
discussed, see note 5, infra, in this case the conflicting 
evidence of the defendant's intoxication is insufficient to 
warrant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
9 
 
Mass. 584, 592 (1985) (if there is evidence that defendant was 
under influence of alcohol or drugs at time of crime, judge 
should instruct jury to consider that evidence on question 
whether Commonwealth has proved specific intent beyond 
reasonable doubt).  While there was conflicting evidence as to 
the defendant's condition, the jury were free to weigh that 
evidence as they saw fit.5  See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 419 
Mass. 350, 352-353 (1995) (specific intent to kill, as 
demonstrated by defendant's repeated infliction of serious 
injuries, was not negated by evidence of voluntary 
intoxication).  Notwithstanding the evidence of the defendant's 
intoxication, the jury could have concluded that the defendant's 
statements and his use of a firearm at close range established 
an intent to kill. 
 
To establish that a defendant acted with deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth must show that "the plan to kill 
was formed after deliberation and reflection" (citation 
                     
 
5 The defendant's neighbor testified that the defendant was 
agitated, that his eyes were "bugging out," that he might have 
been intoxicated, and that he had admitted to attempting 
suicide.  One police officer noted that, when he was arrested, 
the defendant had been in possession of what the officers 
suspected was cocaine; there was no evidence that the defendant 
had cocaine in his system. The responding officers described the 
defendant as anxious but calm, and disputed that the defendant's 
eyes had been "widening."  Another witness testified that, 
although the defendant had been drinking a few hours earlier, he 
had not appeared drunk at that time. 
10 
 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 118-119 
(2001).  Such reflection can occur over "days, hours, or even 
seconds."  Id. at 119.  Here, the jury could have found that the 
defendant acted with deliberate premeditation when shooting his 
family in response to them "talking down to him" and in response 
to his earlier dispute with his wife.  The jury also could have 
found that the defendant shot the victims from close range in 
the same room.  From this, they could have concluded that the 
defendant shot the victims in succession, which was sufficient 
to establish deliberate premeditation.  See id. (obtaining and 
repeatedly firing gun at close range was sufficient to establish 
deliberate premeditation); Andrews, 427 Mass. at 440 (firing 
multiple shots at unarmed victim at close range was sufficient 
to establish deliberate premeditation).  There was no need for 
the jury to know the precise positions of the defendant and the 
victims in order to establish deliberate premeditation; the 
defendant's argument to the contrary is without merit. 
 
2.  Whether the defendant's statements prior to his arrest 
should have been suppressed.  The defendant argues that his 
statements to police near the scene were inadmissible because 
the officers failed to advise him of his Miranda rights.  See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The defendant also 
contends that his statements to police were involuntary, and 
11 
 
that the judge's decision not to conduct a voir dire on the 
issue requires a new trial. 
 
a.  Whether Miranda warnings were necessary.  When 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the 
motion judge's findings of fact absent clear error, but 
independently review the judge's ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law.  Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 
(2004).  If we determine that the statements should have been 
suppressed, we then must decide whether their introduction at 
trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth 
v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 472-473 (2015). 
 
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify specifically 
which of his statements the defendant seeks to suppress.  The 
statements the defendant made on the night of the shooting can 
be divided into three categories:  (1) statements to his 
neighbor prior to the arrival of the police; (2) statements to 
police (with the assistance of his neighbor and, subsequently, a 
Spanish-speaking police officer who translated the defendant's 
statements into English); and (3) statements after the defendant 
was placed in a police cruiser.  The defendant concedes that the 
first set of statements did not require Miranda warnings because 
they were not made to law enforcement; the third set of 
12 
 
statements was suppressed.  Thus, the defendant's challenge only 
extends to the second group of statements.6 
Miranda warnings are required when "a reasonable person in 
the defendant's position would have believed he was in custody" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211 
(2001).  We consider four factors when determining whether an 
interrogation was custodial in nature: 
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any 
belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the 
nature of the interrogation, including whether the 
interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and 
influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; 
and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement 
was made, the person was free to end the interview by 
leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the 
interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the 
interview terminated with an arrest." 
 
Id. at 211-212 (Groome factors).  No single factor is 
dispositive.  See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 
(1984). 
 
Custodial interrogations are "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any 
                     
 
6 We note that many of the statements the defendant made to 
the officers were duplicative of those he made to the neighbor 
prior to the arrival of the police.  The specific statements 
that the defendant challenges are those pertaining to his use -- 
and disposal -- of a gun, and his explanation that he had 
attempted to shoot himself but had run out of bullets. 
13 
 
significant way."  Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 
(1995), quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  Whether an 
interrogation is custodial "depends on [whether] the objective 
circumstances of the interrogation" engender unduly "compulsive" 
pressures.  Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 124 (1998), 
quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). 
 
In this case, the motion judge's findings of fact were well 
grounded in the evidence.  She found that four Lawrence police 
officers, responding to a radio dispatch alerting them to a man 
who claimed to have killed someone, located the defendant and 
his neighbor in a parking lot.  After the neighbor told the 
officers that the defendant had asked the neighbor to call the 
police because he had killed someone, one of the officers asked 
the defendant what had happened, whom he had killed, and where 
he lived.  The defendant, speaking in Spanish with the neighbor 
translating, told the officer that he had killed his family and 
provided an address where he said the shootings had taken place.  
In response to further questions, the defendant said that he had 
shot his family because they would not stop yelling at him, that 
he had tried to shoot himself but had run out of bullets, and 
that he had discarded the gun upon leaving the house to go for a 
walk. 
 
The motion judge found that, throughout this initial 
exchange, the defendant was seated on a curb with multiple 
14 
 
police officers standing around him.  Although the officers were 
not sure they believed the defendant, they had noticed a small 
amount of blood on his clothes and acknowledged that they would 
not have let him leave had he requested to do so.  The officers 
did not, however, order the defendant to remain seated or 
physically restrain him.  Absent any independent corroboration 
of the defendant's claims, they decided to relocate to the 
address he provided in order to investigate whether anyone there 
needed assistance.  At that point, the defendant was frisked, 
handcuffed, and placed in a police cruiser.  Once the officers 
entered the apartment and found the victims, they arrested the 
defendant and, for the first time, advised him of his Miranda 
rights. 
 
Weighing the Groome factors, we conclude, as did the motion 
judge, that, on balance, the initial interrogation in the 
parking lot was not custodial and thus did not require Miranda 
warnings.  The first three factors all weigh against a 
determination that the defendant had been subject to a custodial 
interrogation at that point.  The interrogation was in a public 
parking lot, not in a police station or other secluded area.  
There was no evidence that the defendant was "either mentally or 
physically intimidated."  See Bryant, 390 Mass. at 739.  Rather, 
the evidence indicated that the defendant was not "restrained" 
and did not "reasonably perceive[] himself to be restrained," 
15 
 
thus cutting against a finding that the questioning exemplified 
the "compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation."  See id. at 
739-740, and cases cited. 
 
Regardless of whether the officers would have allowed the 
defendant to leave, there is no indication that he was 
considered a suspect during the initial conversation in the 
parking lot.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the officers 
ever communicated to the defendant that he was a suspect or that 
he was not free to leave.  See Morse, 427 Mass. at 123-124 
(officer's subjective view that individual being questioned was 
suspect relevant only to extent that officer communicated this 
belief to individual).  In addition, there was no evidence that 
the officers were accusatory or aggressive; upon arriving on the 
scene and being unsure whether a crime had been committed, they 
simply asked the questions necessary to assess the situation. 
 
The fourth Groome factor -- whether the defendant was free 
to leave -- possibly weighs in the defendant's favor.  As the 
defendant argues, the officers did testify that they would not 
have let the defendant leave had he tried to do so.  In 
addition, a person in the defendant's position, i.e., having 
admitted to killing someone, reasonably might believe that he or 
she was in custody.  Assuming without deciding, however, that 
the defendant is correct, this single factor does not transform 
the interrogation into a custodial inquiry.  See Commonwealth v. 
16 
 
Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 624 (2018) (where environment was not 
coercive and other Groome factors weigh against finding of 
custody, fact that defendant was not free to leave was 
insufficient to establish custodial interrogation). 
 
Accordingly, those statements made by the defendant to 
police prior to being placed in the police cruiser did not 
require Miranda warnings. 
 
b.  Whether the statements were voluntary.  The defendant 
also argues that his statements to the police were involuntary, 
and that the trial judge's decision not to conduct a voir dire 
to ascertain whether the statements were voluntary requires a 
new trial. 
 
Where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a 
defendant's statement, a judge must conduct a voir dire hearing 
on the issue outside the presence of the jury, and must make a 
determination whether the statement was voluntary before it may 
be considered by a jury.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass. 
462, 468-469 (1976).  A defendant also may request that the jury 
be instructed to consider the issue.  When such an instruction 
is given, each juror must assess the voluntariness of a 
defendant's statements, and should not consider the statement as 
evidence unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was 
voluntary.  See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 836 
(1997).  Even where a defendant does not request a voir dire on 
17 
 
the voluntariness of his or her statement, if the evidence 
presented at trial raises "a substantial claim of 
involuntariness," a judge's failure "to conduct a voir dire, to 
make the necessary ruling and to instruct the jury 
properly . . . on his [or her] own motion constitutes reversible 
error" (emphasis added).  Harris, supra at 470-471. 
 
After the denial of his motion to suppress, at trial the 
defendant did not request a voir dire on the voluntariness of 
his statement.  Thus, we must consider whether the evidence 
introduced at trial raised a sufficiently "substantial" issue of 
voluntariness so as to have required the judge to address the 
issue sua sponte.  We conclude that it did not. 
 
In Harris, the "substantial claim" pertaining to 
voluntariness was evidence that the defendant "confessed to the 
police only after having been beaten."  Id. at 472.  Here, there 
was no evidence of overt coercion.  The defendant argues, 
however, that there was evidence he had been drinking and might 
have been intoxicated, that he was agitated while waiting for 
police, and that he professed suicidal thoughts.  Together, he 
maintains, this evidence raised a substantial question whether 
his statements were voluntarily made. 
 
While "intoxication may render a confession involuntary," 
"mere evidence of drinking alcohol or using drugs" does not 
trigger a trial judge's obligation to inquire into voluntariness 
18 
 
sua sponte.  Commonwealth v. Brady, 380 Mass. 44, 49 (1980).  
Moreover, suicidal thoughts "do not necessarily negate the 
voluntariness of a confession."  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 
Mass. 147, 168 (2009).  None of the witnesses testified that the 
defendant had had difficulty interacting with the witness or 
answering questions.  In addition, witnesses offered competing 
statements as to the defendant's demeanor.7  Unlike the clear 
evidence of overt coercion in Harris, 371 Mass. at 470-472, the 
inconsistent evidence regarding the defendant's intoxication and 
agitated demeanor did not amount to a "substantial claim" that 
his statements were involuntary.  The judge thus was not 
required, absent a request from the defendant, to conduct a voir 
dire on the issue of voluntariness. 
 
Moreover, the judge instructed the jury that they were not 
to accept the defendant's statements as evidence unless they 
were satisfied that the statements had been made voluntarily.  
The jury were free to weigh the competing evidence and to decide 
for themselves whether they were satisfied that the defendant's 
statements were voluntary.  We discern no error. 
                     
 
7 The defendant's neighbor testified that the defendant was 
not calm and acknowledged that he "might have been on 
something."  Another witness, however, testified that the 
defendant did not seem drunk when he left his sister-in-law's 
house (approximately one and one-half hours before the 
shootings), and a police officer testified that the defendant 
had appeared calm during his interaction with police. 
19 
 
 
3.  Requested question about juror bias.  The defendant 
maintains that the trial judge's denial of his request to pose a 
question about anti-Hispanic bias during juror empanelment 
requires a new trial.  "[A]s a practical matter, when a motion 
that prospective jurors be interrogated as to possible prejudice 
is presented, we believe the trial judge should grant that 
motion."  See Commonwealth v. Espinal, 482 Mass. 190, 201 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Lumley, 367 Mass. 213, 216 
(1975).  Nonetheless, in these circumstances, the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in declining to do so. 
 
During juror voir dire, the defendant requested that the 
judge ask each member of the venire whether the juror believed 
that "Hispanics, from cities such as Lawrence, are more likely 
to commit crimes of violence than any other ethnicity [or] 
people."  Stating that he had no evidence that such a bias 
existed, and concerned that the impact of the question might be 
to cause ethnic bias, the judge declined to pose the question.  
The judge did agree, however, to ask jurors whether the fact 
that the defendant would require an interpreter could affect 
their ability to remain impartial; he reasoned that this 
question might "overlap" with the issue of ethnic bias. 
 
We review a trial judge's decisions regarding the scope of 
jury voir dire for abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lopes, 440 Mass. 731, 736 (2004).  Where there is a "substantial 
20 
 
risk of extraneous issues that might influence the jury," 
however, we have said that, upon request, the judge must inquire 
into the subject of that bias through individual questioning.  
Id. at 736-737.  A substantial risk exists "whenever the victim 
and the defendant are of different races or ethnicities, and the 
crime charged is murder, rape, or sexual offenses against 
children."  Espinal, 482 Mass. at 196. 
 
"A judge need not," however, "probe into every conceivable 
bias imagined by counsel," id. at 198, and "is warranted in 
relying upon his [or her] final charge to the jury to purge any 
bias from the jurors prior to their deliberations," Commonwealth 
v. Estremera, 383 Mass. 382, 388 (1981).  "A defendant's 'bare 
allegation' that there exists a 'widespread belief' that could 
result in bias is not sufficient to cause us to conclude that 
the judge abused his [or her] discretion by declining to conduct 
voir dire on the issue" (citation omitted).  Espinal, 482 Mass. 
at 200. 
 
In the present case, both the defendant and the victims are 
Hispanic.  Thus, the case did not present the type of 
"substantial risk of extraneous issues" that we held in Espinal 
obligates a judge to probe ethnic or racial bias by voir dire as 
a matter of law (citation omitted).  See id. at 196.  We discern 
21 
 
no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination not to 
conduct the requested voir dire in this case.8 
 
The defendant points to the fact that multiple jurors were 
excused based on the judge's questions as proof that the jury 
pool was tainted with anti-Hispanic bias.  Evidence that one 
question proved effective in uncovering bias does not by itself 
demonstrate that a different question would have proved more 
effective, or that jurors who did not disclose any bias were 
being untruthful.  See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 
221 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013) (where some 
jurors indicated that they could not be impartial in response to 
voir dire questions on pretrial publicity, there was no reason 
to conclude that jurors who stated they could remain impartial 
were being dishonest). 
 
In sum, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
decision not to pose to the venire during juror voir dire the 
requested question on anti-Hispanic bias. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant urges 
us to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt 
                     
 
8 Indeed, the judge opted to ferret out racial or ethnic 
bias by asking each potential juror whether the juror could be 
impartial notwithstanding that the defendant required an 
interpreter.  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 181 n.16 
(2019) (judge excused juror who, during individual voir dire, 
stated that defendant's reliance on interpreter would affect 
juror's ability to remain impartial). 
22 
 
pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
reviewed the entire case pursuant to our statutory obligation, 
we conclude that there is no basis to grant the requested 
relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.