Title: Johnson v. Delhaize American, LLC, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 632, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2016

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KANESHIA JOHNSON, 
 
Appellant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DELHAIZE AMERICA, LLC and 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 
BOARD, 
 
Appellees Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 632, 2015 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. N15A-11-001  
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 4, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
May 5, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 5th day of May 2016, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Kaneshia Johnson, filed this appeal from a November 
18, 2015 Superior Court order dismissing her appeal of a November 13, 2014 
decision of the Industrial Accident Board (“IAB”) as untimely.1  We find no merit 
to Johnson’s appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.   
(2) 
This case arises from injuries Johnson suffered while she was 
employed by Food Lion, which is owned by the appellee, Delhaize America, LLC 
                                                 
1 Johnson v. Delhaize America, LLC, 2015 WL 776473 (Del. Nov. 18, 2015). 
2 
 
(“Employer”).  In an order dated April 14, 2014, the Superior Court affirmed an 
August 9, 2013 decision of the IAB enforcing a settlement and commutation 
agreement (“Agreement”) between Johnson and her former Employer.  Johnson 
did not appeal the Superior Court’s judgment.   
(3) 
Despite the Superior Court’s April 14, 2014 order, Johnson still 
refused to sign the commutation documents.  The Employer filed another motion to 
enforce the Agreement.  After a hearing on November 13, 2014, the UIAB granted 
the motion and executed an order approving the Agreement.  On November 17, 
2015, Johnson filed a notice of appeal from the IAB’s November 13, 2014 order in 
the Superior Court.  In the notice of appeal, Johnson stated that the time to appeal 
had passed because an audio transcript was sent to New York.   
(4) 
On November 18, 2015, the Superior Court dismissed Johnson’s 
appeal as untimely under Superior Court Civil Rule 72(i) and 19 Del. C. § 2349.2  
The Superior Court found that the sending of the audio transcript to New York was 
not a valid reason for Johnson’s untimely appeal because the thirty-day time period 
to appeal ran from the mailing of the November 13, 2014 order.3  This appeal 
followed.  On appeal, Johnson mostly makes arguments unrelated to the untimely 
filing of her appeal, but appears to argue that her untimely appeal should be 
                                                 
2 Johnson, 2015 WL 776473, at *2. 
3 Id. 
3 
 
excused because different case numbers appear on the IAB documents and 
transcripts of the IAB hearings were sent to New York.    
(5) 
We review the Superior Court’s legal determination de novo.4  As the 
Superior Court recognized, Rule 72 and Section 2349 govern the filing of an 
appeal from a decision of the IAB.  Under Rule 72, a party may appeal a board 
decision by filing a notice of appeal with the Prothonotary within the time 
prescribed by statute.5  Section 2349 provides that in the absence of fraud an IAB 
award is final unless a party files a notice of appeal to the Superior Court within 
thirty days of the day the notice of award was mailed to the parties.6    “The timely 
filing of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.”7   
(6) 
Johnson filed her notice of appeal almost one year after the IAB’s 
November 13, 2014 order.  Johnson does not contend that the November 13, 2014 
order was not mailed to the parties or that she filed her appeal within thirty days of 
the mailing of the November 13, 2014 order.  As to Johnson’s explanations for her 
untimely appeal, the Superior Court correctly found that the sending of a transcript 
to New York did not excuse Johnson’s delay because the time to appeal ran from 
the mailing of the IAB’s November 13, 2014 order, not the transcript of the 
                                                 
4 CCS Investors, LLC v. Brown, 977 A.2d 301, 319-20 (Del. 2009). 
5 Super. Ct. Civ. 72(b). 
6 19 Del. C. § 2349. 
7 Draper King Cole v. Malave, 743 A.2d 672, 673 (Del. 1999) (dismissing appeal of IAB 
decision for lack of jurisdiction where appeal was filed more than thirty days after mailing of 
IAB decision). 
4 
 
November 13, 2014 IAB hearing.8  Johnson also fails to explain how different file 
numbers on IAB documents had any effect on her ability to file a timely notice of 
appeal from the November 13, 2014 order.  Although the Superior Court did not 
follow all of the procedures set forth in Rule 72 when it dismissed Johnson’s 
appeal,9 none of the reasons Johnson gave in her notice of appeal or the briefs in 
this Court for her untimely appeal excuse her failure to file a timely appeal of the 
IAB’s November 13, 2014 order.  Having carefully reviewed the positions of the 
parties and the record on appeal, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in 
dismissing Johnson’s notice of appeal as untimely.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Rule 72(i) provides that if the Superior Court determines sua sponte that an appeal should be 
dismissed, then the Prothonotary shall send a notice directing the appellant to show cause why 
the appeal should not be dismissed for the reasons stated in the notice.  After review of the 
response, the Superior Court may enter an order dismissing the appeal or maintaining 
jurisdiction.  Super. Ct. Civ. 72(i).  In this case, the Superior Court dismissed Johnson’s notice of 
appeal, which did include an explanation for the lateness of the appeal, without the Prothonotary 
issuing a notice to show cause.