Title: Eau Claire County Department of Human Services v. S. E.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000894
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2021

2021 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP894 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to  
T. L. E.-C., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Eau Claire County Department of Human Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
S. E., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 726,946 N.W.2d 155 
PDC No:2020 WI App 39 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 25, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Emily Long   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in Which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas B. Aquino, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Thomas B. Aquino. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sharon L.G. McIlquham, assistant corporation counsel. There was an 
oral argument by Sharon L.G. McIlquham. 
 
2021 WI 56 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP894 
(L.C. No. 
2018TP10) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to  
T.L.E.-C., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Eau Claire County Department of Human Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
S.E., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   If a 
circuit 
court 
determines a child is in need of protection or services (CHIPS) 
due to a parent's neglect, refusal, or inability (for reasons other 
than poverty) to provide necessary care to the extent that the 
physical health of the child is seriously endangered, the circuit 
court may order the child removed from the parental home.  Wis. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
2 
 
Stat. §§ 48.13, 48.345 (2017-18).1  Wisconsin law declares that 
"instability and impermanence in family relationships are contrary 
to the welfare of children" and recognizes "the importance of 
eliminating the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of 
time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent their 
safe return to the family."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a) (emphases 
added).  Toward that end, Wisconsin law allows the filing of a 
petition to terminate parental rights if the child has remained in 
out-of-home care for at least six months.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3. 
¶2 
Although "the paramount goal" of Chapter 48 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes "is to protect children and unborn children," 
the Children's Code also aims "to preserve the unity of the family, 
whenever appropriate, by strengthening family life through 
assisting parents and the expectant mothers of unborn children, 
whenever appropriate, in fulfilling their responsibilities as 
parents or expectant mothers."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a).  In 
achieving that objective, the statutes task "[t]he courts and 
agencies responsible for child welfare, while assuring that a 
child's health and safety are the paramount concerns," with 
"assist[ing] parents and the expectant mothers of unborn children 
in changing any circumstances in the home which might harm the 
child or unborn child, which may require the child to be placed 
outside the home or which may require the expectant mother to be 
                     
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
3 
 
taken into custody."  Id.  Conditions with which the parent must 
comply in order to have her child returned to her care must be set 
forth 
in 
the 
CHIPS 
dispositional 
order. 
 
Wis. 
Stat.  
§ 48.355(2)(b)7.  Should these efforts fail to change the 
circumstances which led to the removal of the child from the 
parental home, Wisconsin law requires a petition for termination 
of parental rights (TPR) to be filed once the child has been placed 
outside of his home for 15 of the most recent 22 months.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 48.415(2)(a)3, 48.417(1)(a).  This mandate codifies 
federal law, specifically the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(ASFA).  Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
89, 111 Stat. 2115.2 
¶3 
In 
2018, 
the 
legislature 
amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3, a portion of the continuing CHIPS ground for the 
involuntary termination of parental rights.  This statutory 
amendment occurred during the pendency of Sophie's court 
proceedings involving her child, Tyler, who was removed from 
Sophie's home and adjudged CHIPS in 2016.3  Sophie's CHIPS case 
commenced under the 2016 version of the statute, and two months 
after the 2018 statutory amendment, the Eau Claire Department of 
Human Services (the Department) filed a petition to terminate 
Sophie's parental rights.  The amended version of § 48.415(2)(a)3, 
                     
2 The Adoption and Safe Families Act is codified in non-
contiguous sections in Title 42 of the United States Code. 
3 For ease of reading, we use the pseudonym "Sophie" for S.E. 
(the mother) and "Tyler" for T.L.E.-C. (the child). 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
4 
 
among other things, eliminated consideration by the factfinder of 
the likelihood the parent would meet the conditions for return of 
the child to the parent's home if the child had already been placed 
outside the parent's home for at least "15 of the most recent 22 
months."4  Sophie challenged the applicability of the amended 
version of § 48.415(2)(a)3 during her TPR proceedings.  The circuit 
court decided the new version applied.5  The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court.6 
¶4 
Sophie raises two issues:  (1) whether as a matter of 
statutory construction, the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe began 
to run only after Sophie received written notice of the amended 
version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18); and (2) whether 
starting the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe in 2016 when Sophie 
received the initial CHIPS order with written notice referencing 
the prior version of § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16) violates her due 
process rights. 
¶5 
We hold:  (1) the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe, as 
codified in the 2018 amended version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 
(2017-18), began to run when Sophie received written notice 
accompanying the initial 2016 CHIPS order; and (2) starting the 
"15 out of 22 months" timeframe in 2016 does not violate Sophie's 
                     
4 For brevity, we refer to the amended language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18) as the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe. 
5 The Honorable Judge Emily M. Long, Eau Claire County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
6 Eau Claire Cnty. DHS v. S.E., 2020 WI App 39, 392 
Wis. 2d 726, 946 N.W.2d 155.  
No. 
2019AP894 
 
5 
 
due process rights.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In May 2016, the Department received a report of a three-
year-old child, Tyler, wandering unattended on a campground with 
a full diaper.  Tyler's mother, Sophie, was on a probation hold at 
the time for methamphetamine possession.  In June 2016, the 
Department removed Tyler from Sophie's care and placed him in a 
foster home.  When the Department conducted a drug test on Tyler, 
he tested positive for methamphetamine.  Tyler's foster parents 
observed that he showed significant signs of neglect.  In August 
2016, the circuit court found Tyler to be a child in need of 
protection or services. 
¶7 
Under that initial CHIPS order, the circuit court 
provided Sophie with written notice of the potential grounds for 
termination of Sophie's parental rights to Tyler, as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  Both parties agree that the written notice 
identified continuing CHIPS as a possible ground for termination.7  
The notice referenced the three sub-parts of continuing CHIPS that 
existed in the 2016 version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) (2015-
16).  At that time, the third sub-part provided that, in order to 
                     
7 The appellate record does not include the initial CHIPS 
order from August 2016.  Nonetheless, both parties agree that the 
order contained written notice of the TPR warnings as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  The parties further agree that the notice 
listed "continuing CHIPS" among potential grounds for termination 
of parental rights and referenced the prior version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16). 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
6 
 
terminate parental rights under the continuing CHIPS ground for 
termination of parental rights, the factfinder at a TPR trial would 
need to determine that there was a "substantial likelihood" the 
parent would not meet the conditions established for the safe 
return of the child to the home within the nine-month period 
following the date of trial.  § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16).  At the 
initial hearing and at four subsequent court hearings, the circuit 
court gave Sophie written and oral notice that her parental rights 
could be terminated due to continuing CHIPS. 
¶8 
During the two years following Sophie's initial CHIPS 
order, Sophie continued her drug use and was arrested on numerous 
occasions for drug possession.  She also absconded from probation 
and refused to participate in the court-ordered services offered 
by the Department that would have aided Sophie in meeting the 
conditions for reunification with Tyler.  According to the 
Department, Sophie has not seen Tyler in person since October 2016. 
¶9 
In April 2018, the legislature amended the third sub-
part of the continuing CHIPS statute.  See 2017 Wis. Act 256, § 1; 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18).  The amended version, among 
other things, eliminated any prospective consideration of the 
likelihood the parent would meet the conditions for the safe return 
of the child to the home if the child had already been placed 
outside the parent's home for at least "15 of the most recent 22 
months." 
¶10 In June 2018, the Department filed a petition to 
terminate Sophie's parental rights to Tyler.  The petition cited 
abandonment as the ground for termination.  In September 2018, the 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
7 
 
Department amended its petition to add continuing CHIPS as a ground 
for termination.  During the pendency of Sophie's TPR proceedings, 
in October 2018 the circuit court entered another CHIPS order; 
this time, when the circuit court identified continuing CHIPS as 
a potential ground for termination of Sophie's parental rights to 
Tyler, the written notice referenced the amended version of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18).8 
¶11 In April 2019, prior to a trial in the grounds phase of 
Sophie's TPR proceedings,9 the parties disputed whether the 2016 
version or the 2018 amended version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 
should apply to Sophie's case.  While Sophie contended the prior 
version applied, the Department and Tyler's guardian ad litem 
                     
8 The appellate record does not contain the October 2018 CHIPS 
order.  However, the parties agree that the order contained TPR 
warnings as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  The parties 
further agree that the order identified continuing CHIPS as a 
potential ground for termination and referenced the amended 
version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18).  
9 As 
background, 
"[t]ermination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceedings involve a two-step process."  Tammy W-G v. Jacob T., 
2011 WI 30, ¶18, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854.  The first step 
involves a factfinding hearing.  Id.  "The purpose of the fact-
finding hearing is to determine . . . whether grounds exist for 
the termination of parental rights" in contested cases.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.424(1).  "The focus of this step is whether the § 48.415 
ground has been met, not the child's best interest."  Tammy W-G, 
333 Wis. 2d 273, ¶18. 
"The second-step, the dispositional hearing, occurs only 
after the factfinder finds a Wis. Stat. § 48.415 ground has been 
proved and the [circuit] court has made a finding of unfitness."  
Id., ¶19 (citation omitted).  "In this step, the best interest of 
the child is the 'prevailing factor.'  If the [circuit] court finds 
a termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest, 
termination should be ordered."  Id. (citations omitted). 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
8 
 
asserted the 2018 amended version applied.  In May 2019, the 
circuit court ruled that the amended version applied, noting: 
[Sophie] had the current warnings, the warnings that 
would be for the current law on multiple occasions with 
significant time to adjust to those warnings, that this 
has been going on for quite some time with those new 
updated warnings being given. 
Given the purpose of the statute, given the stated, 
intended, desired outcome – that is permanence of the 
child – I am going to find that the new law will apply 
in this case. 
The circuit court also concluded that the "15 out of 22 months" 
timeframe began to run in 2016 when Sophie received the initial 
CHIPS order and written notice. 
¶12 The circuit court adjourned the TPR trial to allow Sophie 
to appeal the non-final order to the court of appeals.  The court 
of appeals granted Sophie's petition for interlocutory appeal and 
affirmed the circuit court's ruling.  We granted Sophie's petition 
for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 Sophie first contends that, as a matter of statutory 
construction, the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe began to run 
only after Sophie received written notice of the amended version 
of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) (2017-18).  Resolving this issue 
requires us to interpret Wisconsin's statutes.  The interpretation 
and application of statutes present questions of law that we review 
independently, benefitting from the analyses of the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  State v. Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, ¶18, 394 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
¶14 Sophie also argues that starting the "15 out of 22 
months" timeframe in 2016 when Sophie received the initial CHIPS 
order and written notice referencing the prior version of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) (2015-16) violates her due process rights.  
Whether a statute or its application violates an individual's 
constitutional rights is a question of law this court also reviews 
independently, benefitting from the analyses of the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  See State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90; Dane Cnty. DHS v. J.R., 2020 WI App 5, 
¶51, 390 Wis. 2d 326, 938 N.W.2d 614. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  CHIPS Orders and Relevant Statutes 
¶15 We begin with an overview of CHIPS orders and the 
relevant statutes governing them.  As a general matter, when a 
child is adjudicated CHIPS and removed from the parental home, the 
Wisconsin Statutes require the circuit court to orally inform the 
parent of any grounds for termination of parental rights which may 
be applicable to the parent, and to provide this information in a 
written CHIPS order as well.  Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 48.356 
contains two provisions:  "subsection (1) sets forth the required 
oral warnings and subsection (2) sets forth the required written 
warnings."  St. Croix Cnty. DHS v. Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶16, 
368 Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107.  "Only subsection (2) is 
referenced in the TPR based on continuing CHIPS statute."  Id.; 
see Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1 (mandating that orders must 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
10 
 
"contain[] the notice required by s. 48.356(2)").  In relevant 
part, Wis. Stat. § 48.356 reads: 
(1) 
Whenever the court orders a child to be placed 
outside his or her home, . . . the court shall 
orally inform the parent or parents who appear in 
court . . . of any grounds for termination of 
parental rights under s. 48.415 which may be 
applicable and of the conditions necessary for the 
child . . . to be returned to the home . . . . 
(2) 
In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), 
any 
written 
order 
which 
places 
a 
child . . . outside the home . . . shall notify 
the parent or parents . . . of the information 
specified under sub. (1). 
(Emphases added.) 
¶16 The CHIPS dispositional order shall also list conditions 
the parent must meet in order for the child to be returned to the 
parental home.  Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).10  Additionally, the 
standard form order contains a "Notice Concerning Grounds to 
Terminate Parental Rights" listing 12 potential grounds for 
termination of parental rights, which correspond to the "grounds 
for involuntary termination of parental rights" enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415.11  The form order details the evidence necessary 
                     
10 A current version of the standard form dispositional order 
can be accessed at the following link:  https://www.wicourts.gov/
formdisplay/JC-1611T.pdf?formNumber=JC-1611T&formType=Form&forma
tId=2&language=en.   
11 Technically, the standard form dispositional order lists 
13 separate grounds for termination of parental rights because the 
form identifies "continuing CHIPS of an unborn child" as a separate 
ground.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 embeds continuing CHIPS of an 
unborn child within the continuing CHIPS ground for involuntary 
termination of parental rights, as one of 12 statutory grounds. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
11 
 
to establish each ground for termination.  Boxes precede each 
ground, and if different circumstances may establish a particular 
ground, boxes precede each array of evidence that is independently 
sufficient to prove that ground.  The form contemplates that the 
circuit court will place a checkmark next to those grounds which 
"may be most applicable to [the parent]."  The circuit court must 
provide the parent with a copy of the order, including TPR 
warnings.  Wis. Stat. §§ 48.355(2)(d), 48.356(2). 
¶17 The ground for termination of parental rights at issue 
in this case is continuing CHIPS, as set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a).12  In the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding based 
on continuing CHIPS, the factfinder must determine that the 
following three sub-parts of the continuing CHIPS ground have been 
proven: 
1. [The] child has been adjudged to be a child or an 
unborn child in need of protection or services and 
placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or 
her home pursuant to one or more court orders under 
s. 48.345, 48.347, 48.357, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 
938.357, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2). 
. . . .  
2.b. [The] agency responsible for the care of the 
child and the family or of the unborn child and 
expectant mother has made a reasonable effort to 
provide the services ordered by the court. 
3. [The] child has been placed outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant 
to an order listed under subd. 1., not including time 
                     
12 Continuing CHIPS may also be established under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(am), which is not at issue in this case. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
12 
 
spent outside the home as an unborn child; . . . the 
parent has failed to meet the conditions established 
for the safe return of the child to the home; and, if 
the child has been placed outside the home for less 
than 15 of the most recent 22 months, . . . there is 
a substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet 
these conditions as of the date on which the child 
will have been placed outside the home for 15 of the 
most recent 22 months, not including any period during 
which the child was a runaway from the out-of-home 
placement or was residing in a trial reunification 
home. 
§ 48.415(2)(a) (2017-18) (emphases added). 
¶18 Previously, the third sub-part read: 
[The] child has been outside the home for a cumulative 
total period of 6 months or longer pursuant to such 
orders not including time spent outside the home as an 
unborn child; and . . . the parent has failed to meet 
the conditions established for the safe return of the 
child to the home and there is a substantial likelihood 
that the parent will not meet these conditions within 
the 9-month period following the fact-finding hearing 
under s. 48.424. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16) (emphasis added).  This prior 
version of the statute required the factfinder to look forward 
nine months from the date of the TPR factfinding hearing to 
determine whether the parent had a "substantial likelihood" of 
meeting the conditions established for the safe return of her 
child.  Regardless of how much time the child had spent outside of 
the parent's home, the factfinder would look forward nine months 
from the date of the hearing——even if years had passed without the 
parent satisfying the court-ordered conditions for the safe return 
of the child to the parental home. 
¶19 In April 2018, the legislature amended this language, 
reconfiguring the timeframe within which the factfinder may 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
13 
 
consider the likelihood of the parent meeting the court-ordered 
conditions.  See 2017 Wis. Act 256, § 1.  The legislature replaced 
the forward-looking nine-month period with a "15 of the most recent 
22 months" timeframe.  Only if the child has been placed outside 
the home for less than 15 of the most recent 22 months may the 
factfinder consider whether there "is a substantial likelihood 
that the parent will not meet [the] conditions as of the date on 
which the child will have been placed outside the home for 15 of 
the most recent 22 months."  If the child has been placed outside 
the home for more than 15 of the most recent 22 months, the third 
subpart is satisfied by evidence proving that the parent failed to 
meet the conditions established for the safe return of the child.  
Through this statutory amendment, the legislature eliminated the 
petitioner's obligation to show a substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not meet the conditions of return within the nine 
months following the factfinding hearing if the child has been in 
out-of-home care for more than 15 months.  This amendment aligns 
with Wis. Stat. § 48.417(1)(a), which requires entities like the 
Department to file a TPR action for any child who "has been placed 
outside of his or her home . . . for 15 of the most recent 22 
months." 
B.  Statutory Construction 
¶20 Sophie's CHIPS case straddled this amendment to the TPR 
statute, although her TPR case was filed after the amendment.  
Sophie argues that the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe began to 
run only after Sophie received written notice of the amended 
version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18).  We disagree.   
No. 
2019AP894 
 
14 
 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 48.356(1) and (2) require circuit 
courts to provide parents with oral and written notice, 
respectively, of any "grounds for termination of parental rights 
under s. 48.415 which may be applicable."  (Emphasis added.)  
Proving continuing CHIPS at a TPR trial requires establishing the 
parent received such notice; the first sub-part of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a) requires proof that the "child has been adjudged to 
be a child or an unborn child in need of protection or services 
and placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or her home 
pursuant to one or more court orders . . . containing the notice 
required by § 48.356(2)."  § 48.415(2)(a)1 (emphasis added). 
¶22 Contrary to the court of appeals' rationale in this case, 
providing notice to the parent of potential grounds for TPR means 
more than just reciting "abandonment" or "continuing need of 
protection or services" or any of the other 10 grounds for TPR.   
Without more explanation, the parent would be left guessing what 
a particular ground means or how the petitioner could prove it.  A 
ground for TPR necessarily encompasses the sub-parts comprising 
that ground.  See Ground, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 
("[t]he reason or point that something (as a legal claim or 
argument) relies on for validity.").  Indeed, a notification that 
parental rights can be terminated for continuing CHIPS conveys 
little in the absence of the three sub-parts that comprise 
continuing CHIPS.  Without the three sub-parts, parents would have 
no understanding of the reasons they may lose their parental 
rights. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
15 
 
¶23 In Chapter 48, the legislature expressed one of the 
purposes of the Children's Code as "assisting parents . . . in 
fulfilling their responsibilities as parents."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01(1)(a).  Most reasonably, assisting parents in fulfilling 
the conditions for the safe return of their children requires 
providing them with notice of the particular circumstances under 
which a CHIPS adjudication may result in the termination of their 
parental rights.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶48-49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Some 
statutes contain explicit statements of legislative purpose," 
which 
are 
"perfectly 
relevant 
to 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation[.]").  In order to fulfill this purpose of the 
Children's Code, circuit courts must apprise parents of the 
circumstances that may trigger a termination of parental rights.  
The standard form dispositional order reflects this.13 
¶24 While notification "of any grounds for termination of 
parental rights" necessarily includes the statutory sub-parts 
comprising each ground, circuit courts must provide notice of only 
those grounds which "may be applicable" at the time the order is 
entered.  Wis. Stat. § 48.356(1) (emphasis added).  This phrase is 
dispositive of Sophie's case.  The phrase "may be" in this context 
most reasonably means "to be a possibility."  May, Black's Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  At the time a circuit court places a 
child outside the home or continues the child's out-of-home 
placement, the circuit court must give the parent notice of the 
                     
13 See footnote 10 supra.   
No. 
2019AP894 
 
16 
 
grounds that may form the basis for a future TPR hearing——at the 
particular time the notice is given.  See, e.g., Dane Cnty. v. 
Kelly M., 2011 WI App 69, ¶24, 333 Wis. 2d 719, 798 N.W.2d 697 
("[T]he common meaning of 'may be provided' . . . does not mean 
'is being provided' but instead means something that might happen 
in the future.") (emphasis added).  Of course, the circuit court 
cannot foresee all grounds that may be asserted in a TPR petition 
in the future.  For example, the parent of a child adjudicated 
CHIPS may later abandon the child within the meaning of Wis. Stat.  
§ 48.415(1)(a)2 by failing to visit or communicate with the child 
for three months or longer after the child was placed outside the 
home by court order, as the Department alleges Sophie has done.  
The parent would not have received an explicit warning that her 
parental rights could be terminated under that ground but that 
does not mean abandonment could not form the basis for a TPR 
proceeding against her. 
¶25 Indeed, the statute does not say that circuit courts 
must provide notice of grounds which will be applicable; this would 
assign the circuit courts an impossible task.  When a circuit court 
removes a child from the parental home or continues a child's out-
of-home placement, the legislature requires the circuit court to 
provide notice of TPR grounds that may be applicable in the future, 
and such notice is a prerequisite to the initiation of TPR 
proceedings.  "We are not at liberty to disregard the plain words 
of the statute and we will not attempt to improve the statute by 
adding words not chosen by the legislature."  Michael D., 368 
Wis. 2d 170, ¶17. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
17 
 
¶26 Sophie argues that in order for the Department to 
initiate TPR proceedings against her based on the amended 
continuing CHIPS grounds, she would first need to receive TPR 
warnings, in her CHIPS proceedings, reflecting the amended 
statutory grounds.  We disagree.  In August 2016, after the circuit 
court found Tyler to be a child in need of protection or services, 
Sophie received written notice that she could lose her parental 
rights.  The notice identified both the TPR ground "which may be 
applicable" to Sophie——continuing CHIPS——and its three applicable 
sub-parts.  Sophie's initial CHIPS order referenced the prior 
version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16), because that was 
the version in effect at the time the circuit court gave Sophie 
the TPR warnings.  The CHIPS statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.356, requires 
only that Sophie receive notice of those TPR grounds "which may be 
applicable" to her and that is, in fact, the notice she received.  
Accordingly, the first sub-part of the continuing CHIPS ground for 
terminating Sophie's parental rights was satisfied because the 
CHIPS orders "contain[ed] the notice required by s. 48.356(2)" as 
mandated by § 48.415(2)(a)1. 
¶27 It is of no import that the legislature amended the third 
sub-part of continuing CHIPS in 2018 because there is no dispute 
that each time Sophie received TPR warnings, the circuit court 
orders 
contained 
the 
requisite 
notice 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.356(2)——namely, any grounds for termination of parental 
rights "which may be applicable" to Sophie at the time the warnings 
were 
given. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
statutorily-required 
warnings 
contemplate that different grounds may form the basis for a TPR 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
18 
 
action and the parent is forewarned of this.  Sophie's notice 
needed to identify only the grounds for termination that existed 
at the time of the initial CHIPS order.  Sophie's notice did just 
that:  it included all three sub-parts of continuing CHIPS in 
effect in 2016——the grounds for termination of her parental rights 
"which may be applicable" in a future TPR proceeding.  The 
dispositional order underscores the potential for different 
grounds supporting a future TPR proceeding by cautioning the parent 
to "be aware that if any of the other[] [grounds] exist now or in 
the future, your parental rights can be taken from you."  
Accordingly, Sophie was put on notice that different grounds could 
support a TPR action against her. 
¶28 This application of Wis. Stat. § 48.356 fully comports 
with our precedent explaining the textual purpose of providing 
parents with such notice.  As this court stated in Stephen H., 
"[t]he notice required by Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) is 
meant to ensure that a parent has adequate notice of the conditions 
with which the parents must comply for a child to be returned to 
the home.  The notice is also meant to forewarn parents that their 
parental rights are in jeopardy."  Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 
2000 WI 28, ¶37, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607 (modified on other 
grounds by Michael D., 368 Wis. 2d 170).  Sophie's notices complied 
with all statutory mandates, explained the conditions for the safe 
return of Tyler to her home, and forewarned Sophie that her 
parental rights were in jeopardy.  The circuit court properly 
applied the statutory language in effect at the time TPR 
proceedings commenced.  Because Tyler had been placed outside of 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
19 
 
Sophie's home for more than "15 of the most recent 22 months" at 
the time the TPR petition was filed, the Department was not 
required to establish a substantial likelihood that Sophie would 
not in the future meet the conditions established for the safe 
return of Tyler to her home.  At that point, Tyler had been placed 
outside of Sophie's home beyond the period of time that both 
Wisconsin law (and federal law) require the state to achieve 
permanency for him. 
¶29 The textually-expressed purposes of the Children's Code 
support our conclusion.  In Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) the legislature 
commands that the interests of the child shall be "paramount" in 
interpreting the Children's Code:  "In construing [Chapter 48], 
the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of 
paramount consideration.  This chapter shall be liberally 
construed to effectuate the following express legislative 
purposes: 
(a) 
The courts and agencies responsible for child 
welfare should also recognize that instability and 
impermanence in family relationships are contrary 
to the welfare of children and should therefore 
recognize the importance of eliminating the need 
for children to wait unreasonable periods of time 
for their parents to correct the conditions that 
prevent their safe return to the family. 
. . . .  
(gr) To allow for the termination of parental rights at 
the earliest possible time after rehabilitation and 
reunification 
efforts 
are 
discontinued 
in 
accordance with this chapter and termination of 
parental rights is in the best interest of the 
child." 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
20 
 
(Emphases added.)  Tyler has been out of Sophie's care for nearly 
five years.  During that period of time, Sophie has remained 
apprised of the conditions she must meet in order to have Tyler 
returned to her home, which the circuit court communicated to her 
beginning in August 2016.  She has failed to satisfy them, despite 
being on notice that her parental rights could be terminated as 
early as six months after Tyler's out-of-home placement.  Nearly 
three years have passed since Sophie received TPR warnings 
reflecting the amended continuing CHIPS ground.  Wisconsin law 
requires the Department to file a TPR petition if a child like 
Tyler has been placed outside of the parental home for 15 of the 
most recent 22 months.  Wis. Stat. § 48.417(1)(a). 
¶30 
Accepting Sophie's argument would require us to 
disregard the fact that Tyler's out-of-home placement extended 
well beyond 15 of the most recent 22 months preceding the filing 
of the TPR petition.  Wisconsin Statutes preclude us from doing 
so.  Under Wisconsin law, such instability and impermanence is 
contrary to Tyler's welfare.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1).  For this 
reason, both Wisconsin law as well as federal law require the 
commencement of TPR proceedings once a child has spent 15 months 
in out-of-home care.  Wis. Stat. § 48.417(1)(a); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(5)(E).  Sophie's interpretation of the statutes would defeat 
the permanence mandate for children like Tyler who have spent more 
than 15 months outside the parental home.  This is contrary to the 
harmonious-reading canon, which instructs that "[t]he provisions 
of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them 
compatible, not contradictory."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
21 
 
Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012); State 
v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶29, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811 
(applying the harmonious-reading canon).  The statutory provisions 
we construe exist in harmony.  Sophie received the statutorily-
required notice of a potential TPR both before and after the 2018 
amendment.  Her desire for even more than the nearly five years 
she has had to meet the conditions for the return of Tyler to her 
care is simply not compatible with the statutory mandate to achieve 
permanence for her son. 
C.  Due Process 
¶31 Sophie next argues that starting the "15 out of 22 
months" timeframe in 2016 when Sophie received the initial CHIPS 
order and written notice referencing the prior version of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015-16) violates her due process rights.  
Sophie contends that starting the "15 out of 22 month" timeframe 
based on a CHIPS order pre-dating the legislature's amendment to 
the third sub-part of continuing CHIPS would constitute an 
impermissible retroactive application of § 48.415(2)(a) (2017-
18).14  Additionally, Sophie maintains that applying the amended 
                     
14 Although Sophie raises retroactivity as part of her 
statutory construction argument, retroactivity is better suited 
for a due process analysis.  At least in part, "[t]he 
antiretroactivity principle finds expression [in the Due Process 
Clause]."  Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).  
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he Due Process 
Clause . . . protects the interests in fair notice and repose that 
may be compromised by retroactive legislation."  Id.  Accordingly, 
we address Sophie's retroactivity argument as part of her due 
process claim.  See Dane Cnty. DHS v. J.R., 2020 WI App 5, ¶28, 
390 Wis. 2d 326, 938 N.W.2d 614 (addressing a retroactivity 
argument as part of the petitioner's due process claim). 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
22 
 
version of § 48.415(2)(a) (2017-18) would deprive her of her 
constitutionally protected right to parent her child, without 
"fair notice."  We disagree with Sophie on both arguments. 
1.  Retroactive Application 
¶32 "As a general rule, legislation is presumed to apply 
prospectively unless the statutory language reveals, by express 
language or necessary implication, an intent that it apply 
retroactively."  Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 574, 597, 456 
N.W.2d 312 (1990) (citation omitted).  This presumption is rooted 
in the "[s]trong common-law tradition" that "the legislature's 
primary function [is] declaring law to regulate future behavior."  
Id.  However, as the United States Supreme Court has held, "[a] 
statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is 
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's 
enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law."  Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994).  "Rather, the court must 
ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to 
events completed before its enactment."  Id. at 269-70. 
¶33 In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's 
instruction, we apply a two-step analysis to determine whether 
applying the amended version of a statute constitutes a retroactive 
application.  Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, 
¶¶16, 19, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842; J.R., 390 Wis. 2d 326, 
¶30.  "In the first step, we look to whether the legislature has 
expressly 
noted 
its 
intent 
that 
the 
statute 
be 
applied 
retroactively."  J.R., 390 Wis. 2d 326, ¶31.  In the second step, 
we 
determine 
"whether 
the 
amended 
version 
of 
[the 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
23 
 
statute] . . . has a retroactive effect when applied."  Id., ¶32.  
In this case, our analysis of both steps shows that Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a) (2017-18) is not being applied retroactively to 
Sophie. 
¶34 First, as Wisconsin courts have already stated, "the 
legislature did not express its intent that the amended version of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) be applied retroactively."  Id., ¶31.  
Nowhere in the legislature's amendment to the third sub-part——or 
anywhere else in § 48.415 for that matter——did it explicitly signal 
that the statute applies retroactively. 
¶35 Second, application of the amended statute has no 
retroactive effect as applied to Sophie's case.  Sophie argues 
that applying the amended version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) 
(2017-18) has "retroactive effect" because it "attaches new legal 
consequences 
to 
events 
completed 
before 
its 
enactment."15  
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70.  While it is true that a statute may 
have retroactive effect if it "creates a new obligation" or 
"imposes a new duty" with respect to past conduct, application of 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18) to Sophie's case does neither.  State v. 
Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 172, 580 N.W.2d 203 
(1998) (quoted source omitted).  The "15 out of 22 months" 
timeframe did not create any new legal obligation or consequence.  
Regardless of the legislature's amendment, Sophie remained subject 
                     
15 Unlike her argument before the court of appeals, Sophie 
makes clear that she is not asserting a "vested rights" theory of 
retroactivity.  See Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 
WI 64, ¶65 n.30, 370 Wis. 2d 500, 881 N.W.2d 702.  Accordingly, we 
need not address that argument. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
24 
 
to the exact same conditions in 2018 as she was in 2016.  Nothing 
in the amended statute changed the conditions established for the 
safe return of Tyler to her care.  The amendment itself did not 
create or alter any legal consequence affecting Sophie; her 
parental rights were in jeopardy before and after the statutory 
amendment solely because she failed to meet the court-ordered 
conditions for the return of Tyler to her home. 
¶36 As applied to Sophie, the legislature's only amendment 
to the statute eliminated the factfinder's consideration of the 
nine-month period following a factfinding hearing in a TPR 
proceeding involving a child who remained in out-of-home care for 
15 of the most recent 22 months preceding the hearing.  Sophie's 
responsibilities under the CHIPS dispositional order remained the 
same, and her failure to meet her court-ordered conditions exposed 
her to the same legal consequence:  the filing of a TPR petition 
as soon as Tyler spent six months in out-of-home care.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3.  Indeed, the statutory amendment left unchanged 
the Department's obligation to file a TPR petition once Tyler spent 
15 months in out-of-home care.  In other words, both before and 
after the amendment, Sophie was on notice that:  (1) her parental 
rights were at risk if she failed to meet the conditions 
established for Tyler's safe return to her home, and (2) the 
Department was legally obligated to file a TPR petition should she 
fail to meet those conditions within 15 months of Tyler's out-of-
home placement. 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
25 
 
2.  "Fair Notice" 
¶37 Lastly, Sophie asserts that her due process rights were 
violated because she was deprived of her constitutionally 
protected right to parent her child, without "fair notice."  In 
making this argument, Sophie relies on one case:  State v. Patricia 
A.P., 195 Wis. 2d 855, 537 N.W.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1995).  According 
to Sophie, Patricia A.P. established a due process violation any 
time a court terminates parental rights for conduct different than 
the conduct described in the notice.  Sophie's characterization of 
Patricia A.P. is inaccurate. 
¶38 In Patricia A.P., the court of appeals reversed an order 
terminating Patricia's parental rights to her son, concluding that 
the State violated her due process rights when "the notice of the 
grounds for termination she received" substantially differed from 
"the grounds the State employed to terminate her rights."  Id. at 
857-58.  The prior version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)——the one for 
which Patricia received noticed——required proof that "the parent 
has substantially neglected, willfully refused or been unable to 
meet the conditions established for the return of the child to the 
home."  Id. at 859. The amended version of the statute——the one 
the State used to terminate Patricia's parental rights——instead 
required proof that "the parent has failed to demonstrate 
substantial progress towards meeting the conditions established 
for the return of the child to the home."  Id. at 860.  Due to the 
substantial differences between the two versions, the court of 
appeals held that Patricia's due process rights were violated.  In 
relevant part, the court of appeals stated that "when the State 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
26 
 
warns a parent that his or her rights to a child may be lost 
because of the parent's future conduct, if the State substantially 
changes the type of conduct that may lead to the loss of rights 
without notice to the parent, the State applies a fundamentally 
unfair procedure."  Id. at 863 (emphasis added).  The court of 
appeals further held that, in Patricia's case, the change in the 
statute was "not merely a matter of degree.  It [was] a change in 
quality of the very nature of the acts leading to termination."  
Id. at 864 (emphases added). 
¶39 The change made to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 in 
Sophie's case differs from the statutory change in Patricia A.P.  
Unlike in Patricia A.P., the 2018 statutory amendment at issue in 
Sophie's case neither "substantially changed" nor altered "[the] 
quality of" the type of conduct leading to termination of parental 
rights.  Id. at 863-64.  In fact, the 2018 amendment to 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3 had nothing to do with past parental conduct.  As 
already explained, the legislature's amendment aligned Wisconsin 
law with federal law under ASFA with respect to children who have 
been placed outside the home for more than 15 of the most recent 
22 months.  In such cases, the petitioner seeking to terminate 
parental rights must prove that the parent failed to meet the 
conditions established for the safe return of the child, but need 
not show a substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet 
the conditions of return in the future——specifically, within the 
nine months following the factfinding hearing.  Under both the 
prior and amended versions of the statute, the past conduct of the 
parent triggering the TPR petition remains the same:  the parent 
No. 
2019AP894 
 
27 
 
has failed to meet the conditions established for the safe return 
of the child to the home. 
¶40 In Patricia A.P., that was simply not the case.  In that 
case, the legislature had removed all language pertaining to a 
parent's "culpable conduct," removing any showing of "neglect, 
willfulness, or inability" of the parent.  Id. at 864.  In light 
of the substantive differences between the legislative changes at 
issue in Patricia A.P. and the legislature's 2018 amendment to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2017-18) at issue in this case, 
Patricia A.P. has no bearing on Sophie's case.  Both before and 
after the 2018 amendment, Sophie received fair notice of the 
potential deprivation of her constitutionally protected right to 
parent her child, based on her failure to meet the court-ordered 
conditions for the safe return of Tyler to her home. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 We hold:  (1) the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe, as 
codified in the 2018 amended version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3 
(2017-18), began to run when Sophie received written notice 
accompanying the initial 2016 CHIPS order; and (2) starting the 
"15 out of 22 months" timeframe in 2016 did not violate Sophie's 
due process rights.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
1 
¶42 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  After giving 
Sophie notice of the timeframe for her to complete conditions 
necessary for the safe return of her son, the County now seeks to 
terminate Sophie's parental rights according to a new, more 
restrictive timeframe.  Because Sophie received no effective 
notice regarding this substantive change, this process violates 
the heightened statutory notice requirement in termination of 
parental rights cases as well as Sophie's due process rights.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶43 The County removed Sophie's son, Tyler, from Sophie's 
home in June 2016.  Tyler's removal was followed by a court order, 
entered in August 2016, that Tyler was a child in need of 
protection and services (a "CHIPS" order).  Such orders must 
provide the parent with notice "of any grounds for termination of 
parental rights . . . and of the conditions necessary for the 
child . . . to be returned to the home."  Wis. Stat. § 48.356.  
Along with specific conditions for Tyler's safe return home, the 
CHIPS order listed Tyler's continuing need for protection and 
services ("Continuing CHIPS") as a possible ground for terminating 
Sophie's parental rights.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  According 
to that order, the County could terminate Sophie's parental rights 
by proving both that she had not yet satisfied the safe-return 
conditions and that there was a substantial likelihood she would 
not satisfy them within the nine months following the trial.  See 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3. (2015-16). 
¶44 In April 2018, the legislature altered Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3.  See 2017 Wis. Act 256.  Instead of guaranteeing 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
2 
consideration of the nine months following the trial, the law now 
required a parent in Sophie's position to have met the safe-return 
conditions as of the trial date.1  See § 48.415(2)(a)3.  Thus, the 
timeframe for Sophie to preserve her parental rights changed and 
became more exacting. 
¶45 The County filed a petition to terminate Sophie's 
parental rights in June of 2018 and then an amended petition that 
September,2 stating that she had not met her safe-return conditions 
within the new, shortened timeframe.  At that point, however, 
Sophie had no notice of the new timeframe.  She received notice 
for the first time in a CHIPS order in October 2018, after the 
County filed the amended termination petition.  Yet the County 
maintains that the stricter timeframe should apply, and that under 
the new timeframe, Sophie receives no "look-forward" consideration 
at trial. 
¶46 Sophie responds that, by statute, her parental rights 
can be terminated only in the manner for which she had notice as 
of the time the County filed its amended petition.  Accordingly, 
she argues, the August 2016 CHIPS order controls and her parental 
rights therefore cannot be terminated unless the County also proves 
                     
1 If the child has not been placed outside the home for a full 
15 of the most recent 22 months, the parent's substantial 
likelihood to meet the safe-return conditions within the remaining 
months is considered at trial.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3.  That 
prospective consideration does not apply to Sophie since, as of 
September 2018, Tyler had been placed outside her home for more 
than 15 of the immediately previous 22 months. 
2 Initially, the County's stated ground for terminating 
Sophie's parental rights was only "abandonment."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(1).  The County's amended petition added the Continuing 
CHIPS ground at issue in this case. 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
3 
that she is not substantially likely to meet the safe-return 
conditions within nine months after trial.  She additionally argues 
that the County's attempt to terminate her parental rights under 
the new law falls short of what constitutional due process 
requires. 
¶47 Sophie is correct on both accounts.  The County's 
proceeding under the new law without first notifying Sophie 
violates 
the 
formal 
notice 
requirement 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.415(2)(a)1. and 48.356(2).  That procedure also violates her 
due process rights because the County's amended petition seeks to 
permanently extinguish Sophie's fundamental parental rights in a 
substantively different manner than that detailed in any CHIPS 
order preceding the termination petition. 
II 
¶48 Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions as to 
the "care, custody, and control" of their children.  Michels v. 
Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶15, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486 (adding that 
this is "'perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized' by the United States Supreme Court" (quoting Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000))).  The Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution prevents the government from 
terminating parental rights absent due process of law.  Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).  Due process requires 
procedural protections to be in place that afford parents a full 
opportunity to defend against losing their parental rights.  Brown 
Cnty. v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, ¶¶5 n.4, 57, 64, 286 Wis. 2d 278, 
706 N.W.2d 269.  In determining what particular process is due, we 
balance private interests against the government's and consider 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
4 
the risk of error the current procedures pose in adjudicating those 
private interests.  Id., ¶57. 
¶49 Because parental rights are fundamental, the private 
interest carries significant weight in the balancing analysis.  
Indeed, terminating parental rights is a "grievous loss" that is 
at least as great as any criminal penalty.  Shannon R., 286 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶¶58-59.  The government shares the parents' private 
interest and must "assist parents" both in meeting the safe-return 
conditions and in "fulfilling their responsibilities as parents."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a).  To be sure, the government also has 
countervailing 
interests 
in 
minimizing 
"instability 
and 
impermanence" and "eliminating the need for children to wait 
unreasonable periods of time" for a parent to meet the safe-return 
conditions.  Id.  But as important as those interests are, they 
"do[] not outweigh the requirements of fundamental fairness" and 
due process necessary to ensure that every proceeding to terminate 
parental rights is accurate and just.  Shannon R., 286 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶¶61-64, 71. 
¶50 To that end, the legislature has adopted "heightened 
legal safeguards" to ensure that parents' "constitutional and 
other legal rights" are protected during termination proceedings.  
See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(ad); State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶63, 
301 Wis. 2d 531, 734 N.W.2d 81.  These safeguards accomplish two 
related statutory goals.  One, they make sure parents have a full 
and "fair" opportunity to "preserve the unity of the family."  See 
§ 48.01(1)(a), (ad); Bobby G., 301 Wis. 2d 531, ¶¶57, 63.  And 
two, they simultaneously protect the child's best interest because 
that interest is "generally best served" when the child is 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
5 
"reunited with his or her family."  Sallie T. v. Milwaukee Cnty. 
Dep't Health & Human Servs., 212 Wis. 2d 694, 707, 570 N.W.2d 46 
(Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 219 Wis. 2d 296, 581 N.W.2d 182 (1998); 
see also Bobby G., 301 Wis. 2d 531, ¶¶57, 63. 
¶51 One important safeguard is the formal advance-notice 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 48.356.  A parent must be notified of 
both the grounds under which her parental rights can be terminated 
and the safe-return conditions she must meet to avoid that 
termination.  Id.  That notice must be delivered first orally and 
again within "any" written order placing the child outside the 
home.  Id.  Proof that such formal written notice appeared in "one 
or more" qualifying CHIPS orders is a prerequisite to terminating 
parental rights on Continuing CHIPS grounds.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)1. 
¶52 For these notice requirements to be constitutionally 
"effective," the notice itself "must inform the affected party of 
what 'critical issue' will be determined at the hearing" and "give 
the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in [the party's] 
defense."  Nnebe v. Daus, 931 F.3d 66, 88 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447 (2011) and Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974)).  As it pertains to notice 
regarding the termination of parental rights, constitutionally 
meaningful notice must include the timeframe applicable to each 
ground for termination.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.; Waukesha 
Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶37, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 
N.W.2d 607.  The timeframe is essential to achieving the goal of 
family reunification because CHIPS proceedings regularly involve 
parents confronting challenges related to mental health, substance 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
6 
abuse, financial insecurity, or any combination thereof.  Such 
major 
obstacles 
require 
long-term 
planning 
and 
sustained 
treatment, neither of which is feasible under shifting conditions 
and timeframes.  See State v. Patricia A.P., 195 Wis. 2d 855, 863, 
537 N.W.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]f the State substantially 
changes the type of conduct that may lead to the loss of rights 
without notice to the parent, the State applies a fundamentally 
unfair procedure."). 
¶53 The County's proposed procedure here meets neither the 
statutory nor the constitutional notice requirements in any 
meaningful way.  The first time Sophie received an order under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.356 containing notice of the new law's stricter 
requirements 
was 
after 
the 
County 
initiated 
termination 
proceedings.  Notice after the fact hardly qualifies as "notice" 
at all.  It certainly cannot have the meaningful effect of alerting 
a parent to the "critical issue" of how her rights might be 
terminated, as due process requires.  See Nnebe, 931 F.3d at 88. 
¶54 The majority opinion's approach papers over this 
constitutional defect.  The majority introduces a new "best guess" 
concept under which the notice required by Wis. Stat. § 48.356 has 
to include only the "grounds which 'may be applicable' at the time 
the order is entered."  Majority op., ¶24.  Not only does the 
majority impermissibly add words to the statute——"at the time the 
order is entered" is nowhere in the text——its approach also 
undermines the very purpose of notice.  See DOC v. Schwarz, 2005 
WI 34, ¶20, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 693 N.W.2d 703 ("[C]ourts should not 
add words to a statute to give it a certain meaning.").  According 
to the majority, when circumstances change such that a new ground 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
7 
applies, notice of that new ground is not required.  Under that 
approach, the County could terminate parental rights without ever 
having given notice of specifically how those rights could be 
terminated.  "[I]n the absence of effective notice," such a process 
is "fundamentally hollow" and comes nowhere near allowing parents 
the full and fair opportunity to protect their rights.  See Nnebe, 
931 F.3d at 88.  Given this potential for constitutional error, 
particularly in light of the fundamental rights at stake, the 
procedure sanctioned by the majority cannot pass constitutional 
muster. 
¶55 Due process requires that a parent must have advance, 
formal notice of how her parental rights may be terminated.  That 
notice must be given in a qualifying order identified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.356 and it must be issued before termination proceedings are 
initiated.  The County's attempt to extinguish Sophie's parental 
rights under the new, stricter timeframe without meaningful notice 
is unconstitutional.  For that reason, I respectfully dissent. 
¶56 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
 
No. 
2019AP894.rfd 
 
 
 
1