Title: Brenda Mani v. James J. Mani
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-53-03
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2005

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES J. MANI, Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 13, 2004 Decided April 6, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Dale E. Console argued the cause for appellant. Patrick T. Collins argued the cause for respondent (Franzblau Dratch, attorneys). Bonnie C. Frost argued the cause for amicus curiae, New Jersey State Bar Association (Edwin J. McCreedy, President, attorney; Ms. Frost and Stephen P. Haller, on the brief). JUSTICE LONG delivered the opinion of the Court. The appeal in this family law case presents the issue of whether marital fault is a factor in the determination of alimony and the award of counsel fees. We hold that marital fault is irrelevant to alimony except in two narrow instances: cases in which the fault has affected the parties economic life and cases in which the fault so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice. The former may be considered in the calculation of alimony and the latter in connection with the initial determination of whether alimony should be allowed at all. We likewise hold that marital fault is irrelevant to a counsel fee award. I The facts and procedures that gave rise to this appeal are as follows: Plaintiff, Brenda Mani and defendant, James Mani met in 1970 when she went to work for him in his seasonal amusement business on the Seaside Heights boardwalk. James, a college graduate, was at the time, a half-owner of the boardwalk business and a partner in a travel agency in Florida that later failed; Brenda was a college student. Brenda graduated in 1971 and taught preschool for two years while working with James at his business during the summer. Before the parties were married in 1973, they purchased their first home at 400 Lexington Avenue in Toms River for $30,000. They jointly contributed $5,000 or $6,000 out of profits from the boardwalk business to buy the property. The balance of the purchase price was financed by a $25,000 mortgage held by Brenda s father. The house was purchased in Brenda s name with the intention that it would be used as the marital home. After their wedding, the parties, who have no children, worked full time together side by side at the boardwalk business 100 hours a week, from Memorial Day through Labor Day each year. They also worked weekends in the fall, over Christmas, and in the late spring but spent the remaining months at trade shows or vacationing in Florida and Mexico. During the early years of the marriage, Brenda s father gave her and her siblings significant gifts of money and investments, including checks for $10,000 a year. Brenda also received tax-free bonds from her father, which, per her father s instructions, were always kept solely in her name. In 1981, Brenda received a gift of stock from her father in a family-owned business, Ultimate Corporation, that later traded publicly. As a condition of the Ultimate stock gift, Brenda s father required each of his children and their spouses to sign a waiver stating that the spouses were not entitled to share in the stock. Over the years, the stock rose in value and split several times, eventually appreciating to $1.7 million in 1991. Brenda s investment income was needed to pay for the couple s expenses because income from the boardwalk business was not enough to support their comfortable lifestyle. At some point Brenda began to sell her shares of Ultimate stock and, with the proceeds, purchased tax-free bonds in her own name. According to Brenda, she made those stock sales under the direction and advice of her father. Although she discussed her investments with James, Brenda testified that she made all final decisions about investing only after speaking with her broker and financial adviser. James, on the other hand, claimed that he was a knowledgeable investor whose ideas were the impetus for the stock sales. In the early 1980 s, Brenda s father formed a partnership called BAS for his five children and made investments of bonds and stocks in the BAS account. Every year, Brenda received roughly $40,000 from the partnership and the parties used that money for living expenses. In 1987, Brenda liquidated her interest in BAS in an amount just over $500,000, which she then placed in a stock account. Again, the parties dispute the role of James financial advice in Brenda s decision to liquidate the stock. In 1986, the parties purchased a second home in Toms River for $145,000 using proceeds from Brenda s Ultimate Stock and $129,000 from the sale of the Lexington Avenue house. That property, at 22 Central Avenue, was conveyed to the parties as husband and wife. Later, title was transferred to Brenda. The parties razed the existing house on that lot and built another in its place, ultimately spending between $500,000 and $750,000 in improvements on a lavish new home. In addition to the house on Central Avenue, Brenda purchased vacation and rental properties in Florida with funds generated from her investments. She testified that the Florida properties were ultimately a financial loss and that, as a result, she sold them to pay her mortgage. In 1993, when they were in their 40 s, the parties retired from the boardwalk business and lived, in the words of the trial judge, an extravagant lifestyle almost exclusively out of Brenda s investment income. Their monthly budgetary expenses ranged from $7,360 [Brenda s estimate] to $13,143 [James estimate]. Following the conclusion of the boardwalk operation, James, who had obtained a real estate license in Florida, worked briefly for real estate brokers. Although he provided a few referrals, he never showed a property for the firms and earned only about $20,000 in income in all. The couple spent seven years together in retirement before Brenda discovered that her husband was having an affair with a woman with whom the parties socialized. Brenda filed a complaint for divorce alleging adultery and extreme cruelty. The trial judge granted James motion for pendente lite relief, awarding $1,006 per week as spousal support and $7,000 as counsel fees, subject to allocation at the time of the final hearing. The case proceeded to trial. James claimed entitlement to a permanent alimony award of $68,320 per year and Brenda sought to deny alimony altogether. By the time of trial, Brenda s investment assets were valued at $2.4 million. James assets consisted of an IRA with a value of $80,000 as of 1999. He also had a partial interest in accounts held jointly by the couple and a shared interest in property from his father s estate valued at $50,000. The trial judge determined that the property at 22 Central Avenue, which at the time of trial was under contract for sale for $500,000, was subject to equitable distribution but that Brenda s remaining assets were immune. With regard to Central Avenue, the judge determined that James was entitled to thirty percent of the net proceeds ($141,000). In immunizing Brenda s remaining assets from distribution, the judge found that James investment advice was of little significance and import and that it did not contribute to the growth of Brenda s assets. The judge also denied James request for counsel fees. With respect to alimony, the judge awarded James $610 per week based in substantial part on the defendant s economic dependency. In reaching that conclusion, the judge attributed to James the ability to earn a minimum of $25,000 annually and denominated the alimony award as necessary to maintain the marital standard of living. James appealed, claiming that the alimony award was insufficient to maintain the marital standard. He contended that even with the additional $25,000 earning capacity attributed to him by the trial judge, he would still be $4,000 short each month in meeting his self-described budgetary needs. He also argued that the distribution of the marital residence was inequitable because he was entitled to half of the sale proceeds, and that he should have been awarded counsel fees based on his need, good faith, and Brenda s superior ability to pay. Brenda cross-appealed, arguing that James was not entitled to any alimony and should have received no more than sixteen percent of the proceeds from the marital residence because that was the percentage of the purchase price attributable to the sale of the house on Lexington Avenue. She further contended that alimony was inappropriate because James did not contribute non-remunerative activities to the marriage, and his economic dependency was not occasioned by the marriage, but by his own indolence. The Appellate Division affirmed and held that there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge s permanent alimony award; that though the alimony award may be insufficient for defendant to maintain his relaxed marital lifestyle, the reduction in his living standard is justified, in part, by the finding that plaintiff established he was adulterous and committed acts of extreme cruelty; that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allocating the parties interests in the property at 22 Central Avenue; and that the denial of the counsel fee application was proper in light of the substantial pendente lite award and the finding of marital fault. In reaching its conclusions, the court observed that [t]he Manis standard of living was not the result of the parties joint efforts, but rather solely due to gifts from plaintiff s father. The panel also noted that although the trial court did not specifically mention adultery and extreme cruelty as factors in the alimony analysis, it did find that the Brenda had proven the grounds asserted in her complaint. According to the Appellate Division, James adultery was significant and his marital indiscretions warrant consideration in the amount of that award. The court also cited marital fault as a factor in the denial of counsel fees. We granted James petition for certification on issues of alimony and counsel fees, Mani v. Mani, 178 N.J. 453 (2004), and accorded amicus status to the New Jersey State Bar Association. [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).] As is obvious, the words marital fault and responsibility for the breakdown in the marriage do not appear in the statute, although the so-called catch all category arguably permits a court to consider any other factor it may deem relevant. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(g) further guides the court s determination of alimony: In all actions for divorce other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(g) (emphasis added).] The genesis of that provision bears on the issue before us. C. In the late 1960 s, the California Legislature launched the modern-day reform movement in divorce laws by adopting the first no-fault divorce law in the United States and eliminating the concept of fault in marriage dissolution actions. Larry R. Spain, The Elimination of Marital Fault in Awarding Spousal Support: The Minnesota Experience, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 861, 861 (2001). New Jersey followed suit in 1971 when it enacted a comprehensive divorce reform package (L. 971, c. 212, (the Divorce Reform Act )), that endeavored to adequately respond to the felt needs of our present day society in the area of divorce law. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 203 (1974). Before the passage of the Act, the Legislature created the Divorce Law Study Commission ( Commission ) with an eye toward incorporating into the law modern concepts of divorce and sociological aspects of marriage, including many changes in viewpoint. L. 1967, c. 57 (amended by L. 1968, c. 170 and L. 1969, c. 25); see also Painter, supra, 65 N.J. at 203 (recounting history of New Jersey s revision of divorce law). The Commission issued a Final Report that contained findings about existing divorce law in New Jersey, and proposed a Divorce Reform Bill. See Divorce Law Study Commission, New Jersey, Final Report to the Governor and The State (1970) [hereinafter Final Report]. In very large part the resulting statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, was based upon the proposed Divorce Reform Bill contained in the Final Report. Painter, supra, 65 N.J. at 203-04. Because New Jersey law prior to 1971 only provided for divorce on the grounds of fault, the focus of the Commission was the need for legal recognition of no-fault divorce on grounds of separation. Final Report, supra, at 5-6, 99 100. The Commission proposed such a new ground where there is no prospect for reconciliation between the parties. Id. at 5. That recommendation was based on the policy objective of mak[ing] it legally possible [for parties] to terminate dead marriages without requiring litigants to resort to the hypocrisy of accusing one or the other of a marital wrong recognized by our present statutes. Id. at 6. The Commission also concluded that mutuality of fault should not be a bar to divorce because such a restriction would only serve as an unjustified punishment by the State. Ibid. Presumably the Legislature agreed with those conclusions because a central feature of the final Divorce Reform Act was the allowance of divorce on no-fault grounds. Painter, supra, 65 N.J. at 205. That statutory initiative gave couples in New Jersey the right to divorce after eighteen months of separation, regardless of which party caused the breakdown in the marriage. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(d). As we noted in Painter, the separation provision represented a move away from the concept of fault on the part of one spouse as having been solely responsible for the marital breakdown, toward a recognition that in all probability each party has in some way and to some extent been to blame. 65 N.J. at 205. However, unlike the approach taken by some other jurisdictions that eliminated fault grounds for divorce altogether, the Commission Report stated, [t]he Commission does not recommend, at this time, the complete elimination of fault as a consideration in marriage termination. Final Report, supra, at 6-7. The Legislature followed suit, preserving the traditional fault-based grounds for divorce, although somewhat liberalizing the requisites for their availability. Id. at 205-06. In addition to the Commission s no-fault based proposals, the Final Report and proposed bill also briefly addressed the relationship between fault and alimony. The Commission noted that fault, where so asserted as a ground for relief, will be a proper consideration for the judiciary in dealing with alimony and support. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The proposed bill language presented by the Commission reflected that position: In all actions for divorce, divorce from bed and board, or nullity, the court may award alimony to either party and in so doing shall consider the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and the duration of the marriage. In all actions for divorce other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable, and just. [Id. at 93, 112 (stating proposed language for N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23)(emphasis added).] In its comments on the bill s alimony provisions, the Commission explained: [A]n attempt is made by [the proposed language] to direct the courts attention to economic factors and the duration of the marriage as primary considerations in setting an amount of alimony that is fit, reasonable, and just. The court retains discretion, the factors enumerated are but guidelines, but their importance is stressed. The last sentence of the proposed amendment permits the court to deny alimony to a spouse who is guilty of one of the fault grounds for divorce. As long as fault grounds are retained, it is traditional logic that fault also should affect judicial discretion in awarding alimony. After further study a new Commission may conclude that fault has no place in either the provision of grounds for divorce or in determining alimony but for the time being the substance of existing law is retained. [Final Report, supra, at 94 95 (emphasis added).] In an Appendix to the Final Report, the Commission recognized the tension between considering fault in awarding alimony and the modern notion of no-fault divorce. Id. at 129-30. According to the Commission, the concept of fault is prominent in the determination of alimony in many jurisdictions and, therefore, litigating the question of fault may be necessary. Id. at 130. Although the Commission noted that recent trends gave greater weight to other factors, such as the needs of the parties and their private estates and earning capacities, it apparently viewed the retention of fault-based grounds for divorce as an obstacle to the development of that trend in New Jersey. It concluded that perhaps the penalty should fit the crime, i.e., the flagrant offender, whether plaintiff or defendant (husband or wife) may be subject to equitable principles when alimony, custody and property rights are determined. Id. at 8. The Commission did not, however, further define flagrancy. The Legislature adopted the relevant language in the Commission s proposed Bill, word for word, in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(g), evidencing its apparent intention that courts should have discretion to consider fault in awarding alimony. Whether it incorporated the notion of the flagrant offender referred to by the Commission is unclear, as is the Legislature s intent in respect of how the court is to calculate the impact of fault on an alimony award. Since the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and despite the Commission s stated hope that further study would refine the subject, no subsequent body has been charged with the duty of revisiting the fault-alimony connection and the language of the statute has remained unchanged in the face of several statutory amendments over the years. See footnote 1 That is the legislative backdrop of our inquiry. D. Judicial interpretations of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(g) have varied. In Greenberg v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. Super. 96, 99-100 (App. Div. 1973), the trial court increased the amount of alimony to be awarded to an economically dependent wife because her husband s extreme cruelty caused the dissolution of the marriage. The Appellate Division reversed, characterizing the economic roots of alimony as its sole basis, holding N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(g) fault neutral and declaring that it does not bespeak legislative intendment that marital misconduct may generate an award for alimony in excess of that which might be supported by long-established and traditional bases for such grants. Greenberg, supra, 126 N.J. Super. at 99 (emphasis added). The following year, in Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 194 n.4 (1974), we paraphrased the Final Report and observed that although it is not an appropriate criterion for consideration in equitable distribution, fault where so stated as a ground for relief, will be a proper consideration for the judiciary in dealing with alimony and support. Thereafter, Mahne v. Mahne, 147 N.J. Super. 326, 329 (App. Div. 1977), presented the inverse of Greenberg insofar as it involved a proposal to bar alimony altogether to a blameworthy spouse. In Mahne, a divorce was granted to the husband on the fault-based ground of adultery after the wife had an affair with her husband s best friend. Id. at 327-28. The trial judge awarded alimony to the wife in the amount of $300 a month. Ibid. The husband appealed, arguing that the award was excessive in light of his wife s marital infidelity. Id. at 328. The Appellate Division agreed, and reversed the grant of alimony based on the wife s fault. Shortly thereafter, in Nochenson v. Nochenson, 148 N.J. Super. 448, 449-50 (App. Div. 1977), the Appellate Division clarified its decision in Mahne, stating that, although dictum in that case could be read to support an alimony bar based on fault, the holding actually went no further than accepting fault as a consideration or factor in determining the grant or denial of alimony. Nochenson suggested that lurid details about the nature of Mrs. Mahne s adultery though largely unspecified justified a denial of alimony. Ibid. Later cases have taken the lead of Chalmers and Nochenson and recognized that fault may be considered as one factor in an alimony analysis but have moved in the direction of circumscribing such consideration. For example, Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 333 (App. Div. 1979), involved a wife who committed, by her admission, many acts of adultery, beginning a few months after her husband deserted the marital residence. The trial judge ruled in favor of the husband, a physician, and denied alimony altogether to the wife, who earned only $50 a week publishing a newsletter. Id. at 146. In reversing and remanding for reconsideration of alimony, the Appellate Division cited Chalmers and the Final Report, and noted that although marital fault is a proper consideration, Mrs. Lynn s admitted post-desertion sexual conduct was in our view hardly such egregious fault as to equitably preclude her right to claim alimony under the Mahne-Nochenson standard. Id. at 336-37. Lynn focused on the economic considerations that arise in the dissolution of a marriage, stating that a paramount reason for alimony is to permit a wife to share in the economic rewards occasioned by her husband s income level (as opposed merely to assets accumulated), reached as a result of their combined labors, inside and outside the home. Ibid. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Appellate Division employed a similar analysis in Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 140 (App. Div. 1978), where the husband argued that the trial judge erred in awarding alimony to the adulterous wife. In affirming, the Appellate Division acknowledged that although fault is a factor for consideration, the circumstances of the adulterous activity in that case did not warrant a denial of alimony. Ibid. Rather, the court suggested that marital fault comes into play only when it relates to the economics of a breakdown in the marriage or when there is egregious harm to the other party. In addition, that panel suggested that fault is a less important factor than the earning capacity of the parties and the length of the marriage. Id. at 141. See also Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 252 N.J. Super. 230, 240 (Ch. Div. 1991) (holding discovery regarding alimony limited to economic aspect of defendant s adulterous acts). We commented on the limited role of fault in an alimony analysis in Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 285 (1997), where the husband filed for divorce on the ground of the wife s extreme cruelty, including allegations of verbal abuse and bizarre behavior. The wife counterclaimed on the ground of extreme cruelty, including allegations of physical abuse. Id. at 286. Although the issue before us in Kinsella was not an alimony award (the case involved the release of psychological records), we discussed the significance of fault in matrimonial proceedings after passage of the Divorce Reform Act, noting that the practical consequences of succeeding in a divorce action on fault-based grounds, as opposed to separation, are minimal. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added). After recounting that fault is irrelevant to equitable distribution, child support and custody, we addressed N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and stated that the focus of the decision regarding alimony is generally on the financial circumstances of the parties and that in today s practice, marital fault rarely enters into the calculus of an alimony award. Kinsella, supra, 150 N.J. at 314-315 (emphasis added). Recapping, although our case law has consistently recognized that, under our statutory scheme, fault may be considered in calculating alimony, for over a quarter of a century, courts have declined to place their imprimatur on a wide-ranging use of fault in that context. Ruprecht, for example, adopted a narrow model allowing consideration of economic fault only. Lynn and Gugliotta refused to consider non-egregious fault. Kinsella attempted to reconcile the statute with the cases by pointing out that the focus of the decision regarding alimony is generally on the financial circumstances of the parties ; the practical consequences of succeeding . . . on fault based grounds . . . are minimal ; and marital fault rarely enters into the calculus of an alimony award. Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added). We reaffirm Kinsella s approach. The thirteen alimony factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) clearly center on the economic status of the parties. That is the primary alimony focus. However, the Legislature adopted both the spirit and the language of the Final Report that stated that fault, where so asserted as a ground for relief will be a proper consideration for the judiciary in dealing with alimony and support. (Emphasis added). Thus in Kinsella we rendered congruent those seemingly discordant themes by recognizing, on the one hand, the potential for considering fault, and on the other, the rarity of such use in an alimony analysis. That judicial gloss on the alimony statute has existed for over seven years, and reflects the direction of our jurisprudence for a much longer period. During that time, the Legislature has, on several occasions, undertaken to amend the divorce law in other respects. We take that as some indication that the Legislature is satisfied with the general approach adopted in Kinsella and its forebears. See Massachusetts Mut. Life v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 116 (1991)(stating Legislature's failure to modify judicial determination is some evidence of legislative support for judicial construction of statute ). E. It is noteworthy that the statutory provision permitting consideration of the proofs made in a fault-based divorce does not specify how judges are to weigh proof of fault in establishing alimony. In order to avoid the exercise of wholly unguided discretion by trial judges and in the interest of uniformity and predictability in decision-making, our task in this case is to search for a principled approach to the relationship between fault and alimony consistent with legislative intent. To do so, we have scoured the approaches taken by our sister states. Many jurisdictions, without restriction, allow fault to be factored into an alimony award. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359 (La. 1994); Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So. 2d 653 (Miss. 1992); Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. App. 1991); Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975). Many others prohibit any consideration of fault. See, e.g., Oberhansley v. Oberhandsley, 798 P.2d 883 (Alaska 1990); In re Marriage of Bultman, 740 P.2d 1145 (Mont. 1987); In re Williams Marriage, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1977). Those approaches are not particularly helpful because the legislative and judicial backdrop on which our case is to be considered does not justify an all-or-nothing approach. We have looked, as well, at the words of legal writers on the subject. Like the states, they reflect the full spectrum of approaches. For example, one commentator argues that even in the era of no-fault divorce, there should be consideration of fault in determining alimony to morally coerce better marital conduct. Adrian M. Morse, Jr., Fault: a Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 605, 651 (1996). Another contends that legal recognition of fault may provide protection and compensation for victims of abuse or spousal trust. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 Geo L.J. 2525, 2529-30 (1994). Other scholars counter that the potentially valid functions of a fault principle are better served by the tort and criminal law, and attempting to serve them through a fault rule risks serious distortions in the resolution of the dissolution action. Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 26 Ariz. St. L.J. 773, 808-09 (1996). That view aligns with the most recent report of the American Law Institute on Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations. 8 Duke J. Gender L. Pol y at 59. That report concluded that economic fault is a valid alimony factor, but that consideration of non-economic fault should be avoided because of its deleterious effect on the dissolution action. More particularly, the ALI report notes that, in a scheme such as ours, in which alimony has economic roots, [i]t will be the unusual case in which the fairness of the result will be improved by a judicial inquiry into the relative virtue of the parties intimate conduct. In some [cases] the result will become less fair. And the rules that invite such misconduct claims will surely increase the cost and degrade the process in many other cases, even those in which the claim is ultimately cast aside. [Id. at 60 (2000).] We agree and hold that in cases in which marital fault has negatively affected the economic status of the parties it may be considered in the calculation of alimony. By way of example, if a spouse gambles away all savings and retirement funds, and the assets are inadequate to allow the other spouse to recoup her share, an appropriate savings and retirement component may be included in the alimony award. Our conclusion flows purely from a relevance perspective. Relevant evidence is evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. N.J.R.E. 40l; see also State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 (1994) (noting that probative value of evidence is tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove ). Given the economic basis of alimony, there can be no quarrel over the notion that fault that has altered the financial status of the parties is relevant in an alimony case. See, e.g., Noah v. Noah, 491 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 1986) (holding adultery not cognizable in alimony award unless it depleted family resources ); Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1979) (holding court in alimony case may consider fault of one spouse in creating economic hardship facing couple). The same relevance notion does not apply to the ordinary fault grounds for divorce that lurk in the margins of nearly every case and therefore those grounds should not be interjected into an alimony analysis. To do so would distort the application of the principles the Legislature has adopted to secure economic justice in matrimonial cases. Moreover, without concomitant benefit, considering non-economic fault can only result in ramping up the emotional content of matrimonial litigation and encouraging the parties to continually replay the details of their failed relationship. Not only is non-economic fault nearly impossible to factor into an alimony computation, but any attempt to do so would have the effect of generating complex legal issues regarding the apportionment of mutual fault, which is present in nearly all cases. That, in turn, would result in the protraction of litigation and the undermining of the goals of no-fault divorce, again without a corresponding benefit. See footnote 2 Thus we hold that to the extent that marital misconduct affects the economic status quo of the parties, it may be taken into consideration in the calculation of alimony. Where marital fault has no residual economic consequences, it may not be considered in an alimony award. G. In this case, there was no allegation that James marital fault had any economic consequences or that it was, in any way, egregious. Indeed the trial judge did not weigh fault in the alimony calculus. Yet, the Appellate Division relied on his marital misconduct to justify the trial judge s alimony award. Because the alimony award was a close call, (the Appellate Division stating that it may be insufficient to support James in the marital life style), we do not know whether the court would have reached the same conclusion in the absence of the fault consideration. We therefore reverse and remand the case to the Appellate Division for reconsideration of alimony without regard to fault, giving due deference to the trial judge s findings and conclusions. IV One final note on the alimony-fault intersection. This is nothing more than a case involving statutory interpretation. Neither the purposes underlying alimony, the words of the alimony statute, nor the legislative history behind the act can be said to provide clear guidance as to the kind of fault that is to be considered in an alimony calculus. The dissent misperceives the Court s role in such a case - we are not free to abdicate our responsibility to interpret legislation consistent with its language and with precedent that supplies content to broad statutory pronouncements. Indeed, because our case law over the last thirty years has soundly rejected the wide-ranging use of fault and because the Legislature has declined to intervene, we take it that it is satisfied with the way our cases have construed the statute. This case codifies what has been the nearly universal practice in our courts. It is hard to fathom how the dissent can suggest that our lower courts approach has served us well enough to warrant our inaction, and, at the same time, urge that we discard the very conclusion that most courts have reached: that ordinary fault should not play a part in an alimony award. Finally, we reject the dissent s suggestion that the narrow use of fault we have approved today will create far more mischief than it will ever resolve. Given the choice that has come to us as a result of a legislative ambiguity, affording matrimonial litigants more weapons to use against each other is not a decision we should make. By delimiting the kinds of fault that may be taken into account in an alimony calculus, we have not only created a template for uniformity and predictability in decision-making but have relieved matrimonial litigants and their counsel from the need to act upon the nearly universal and practically irresistible urge for retribution that follows on the heels of a broken marriage. How that will create more mischief than the endless trials that will inevitably flow out of the dissent s scheme, in which the opening salvo and concomitant response in every single matrimonial case will be a replay of the grievances of the marriage, is hard to fathom. V We turn next to the issue of attorneys fees. In awarding attorney s fees, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 requires a court to consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party. R. 5:3-5(1)(c) in turn provides: (c) Award of Attorney Fees. Subject to the provisions of R. 4:42-9(b), (c), and (d), the court in its discretion may make an allowance, both pendente lite and on final determination, to be paid by any party to the action, including, if deemed to be just, any party successful in the action, on any claim for divorce, nullity, support, alimony, custody, parenting time, equitable distribution, separate maintenance, enforcement of interspousal agreements relating to family type matters and claims relating to family type matters in actions between unmarried persons. A pendente lite allowance may include a fee based on an evaluation of prospective services likely to be performed and the respective financial circumstances of the parties. The court may also, on good cause shown, direct the parties to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber or pledge marital assets to the extent the court deems necessary to permit both parties to fund the litigation. In determining the amount of the fee award, the court should consider, in addition to the information required to be submitted pursuant to R. 4:42-9, the following factors: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award. R. 4:42-9(b) further provides in relevant part: (b) Affidavit of Service . Except in tax and mortgage foreclosure actions, all applications for the allowance of fees shall be supported by an affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(a). The affidavit shall also include a recitation of other factors pertinent in the evaluation of the services rendered, the amount of the allowance applied for, and an itemization of disbursements for which reimbursement is sought. If the court is requested to consider the rendition of paraprofessional services in making a fee allowance, the affidavit shall include a detailed statement of the time spent and services rendered by paraprofessionals, a summary of the paraprofessionals' qualifications, and the attorney's billing rate for paraprofessional services to clients generally. No portion of any fee allowance claimed for attorneys' services shall duplicate in any way the fees claimed by the attorney for paraprofessional services rendered to the client. For purposes of this rule, "paraprofessional services " shall mean those services rendered by individuals who are qualified through education, work experience or training who perform specifically delegated tasks which are legal in nature under the direction and supervision of attorneys and which tasks an attorney would otherwise be obliged to perform. In a nutshell, in awarding counsel fees, the court must consider whether the party requesting the fees is in financial need; whether the party against whom the fees are sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad faith of either party in pursuing or defending the action; the nature and extent of the services rendered; and the reasonableness of the fees. Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233 (1971) (stating when awarding counsel fees courts focus on several factors, including wife's need, husband's financial ability to pay and wife's good faith in instituting or defending action ) ; Mayer v. Mayer, 180 N.J. Super. 164, 169-70 (App. Div. 1981) (noting award of counsel fees involves critical review of nature and extent of services rendered, complexity and difficulty of issues determined, and reasonableness and necessity of time spent by counsel rendering legal services). The parties agree, as do we, that bad faith for counsel fee purposes relates only to the conduct of the litigation and that there is nothing in the statutory scheme to suggest that the underlying issue of marital fault is a consideration. Yeoh v. Yeoh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 460-61 (App. Div. 2000); Borzillo v. Borzillo, 259 N.J. Super. 286, 292-93 (Ch. Div. 1992). Here, the trial judge did not explain the denial of James application for counsel fees. Nevertheless, the Appellate Division, pursuant to an exercise of its original jurisdiction (R. 2:10-5) affirmed the denial for the following reasons: The judge ordered plaintiff to advance to defendant counsel fees in the amount of $7,000 in his pendente lite order dated March 23, 2001. We conclude from the evidence and the judge s other findings that [James] was financially able to pay his counsel. In light of the substantial pendente lite award and the proved grounds for divorce, the judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering each party to pay their own attorney. [(Emphasis added).] We take the proved grounds for divorce language to be an unwarranted reference to marital fault. We therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remand the case to that court to reconsider the issue of alimony without regard to fault. We are equally concerned about the claim that no Affidavit of Services was proffered by James. It is curious to us that neither the trial judge nor the Appellate Division commented on the absence of an Affidavit, if indeed that is the case. It may be that, because there was a legitimate issue over whether counsel fees were warranted at all, the parties agreed to allow the filing of an affidavit if the judge was theoretically inclined to grant fees. We simply do not know. Because the issue of counsel fees has already been remanded for reconsideration without regard to fault, we expect the Appellate Division to resolve the issue of the missing affidavit as well. VI The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The matter is remanded for reconsideration of the issues of alimony and counsel fees based on the principles to which we have adverted. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE LONG s opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE has filed a separate, concurring opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES J. MANI, Defendant-Appellant. WALLACE, JR., concurring. I concur in the result. Unlike the majority, I find no need to refine and expand upon when it is appropriate to use marital fault in determining an alimony award. I am satisfied with the view we expressed in Kinsella, supra, that marital fault rarely enters in the calculus of an alimony award. 150 N.J. at 315. Our trial judges have consistently complied with that admonition as evidenced by the paucity of appeals in which fault is an issue in determining the amount of the award of alimony. Moreover, in the present case, the trial judge did not consider fault in computing the alimony award. I find no abuse of discretion in that regard. In all other respects I concur with the majority opinion. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES J. MANI, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Today this Court announces two new rules of law concerning the interpretation and application of the Divorce Act of 1971, as amended, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1, et seq.: (1) in the exercise of their statutory discretion in determining an alimony award, trial courts are now barred from considering marital fault save for two narrow instances: cases in which the fault has affected the parties economic life and cases in which the fault so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice, ante, ___ N.J. ___, and (2) in the trial court s exercise of statutory discretion in awarding counsel fees, marital fault is irrelevant to a counsel fee award. Ante, ___ N.J. ____. Preliminarily, I address these issues in that order. My main disagreement with the majority stems from its conclusion that trial courts are to be restricted in their computation of alimony awards solely to the types of fault the majority finds abhorrent. According to the majority, this result is compelled by what the majority views as its obligation to put some flesh onto Kinsella s [Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276 (1997)] bones. Ante, ___ N.J. ___. I simply cannot read Kinsella s dicta in the same manner or with the same import the majority does. I also cannot ignore the plain reading of a statute, disregard completely its clear legislative history and jettison over thirty years of our own jurisprudence. Further, this Court is not the proper forum for the relief sought, as it should be sought from the Legislature. Finally, even assuming that the majority s legal analysis is correct, that the majority s conclusion is consonant with the statute and its legislative and decisional history, and that this branch of government is the proper forum for this decision, the construct tendered by the majority is unworkable. As to the latter issue, while I concur with the majority s conclusion that marital fault is irrelevant to a counsel fee award, I do so for reasons different from those espoused by the majority. In my view, the only factors relevant to a counsel fee award are those specifically enumerated in the Divorce Act of 1971. I also concur with the majority s conclusion that it is unclear whether the time for the filing of an affidavit of services had passed and, hence, a remand on that issue is appropriate. [L. 1969, c. 25, 1 (amending L. 1967, c. 57, 8 and L. 1968, c. 170, 1).] Whether marital fault should be retained as an element of alimony was a matter of debate before the Divorce Law Study Commission, with strong opposition advanced against retaining marital fault as part of the alimony formula. See 1969 Hearing, at 71 ( [T]he alimony concept should be retained, but it should not be awarded on the basis of fault. ); id. at 26A ( I would try to eradicate the fault element because this is what perverts and distorts alimony in many states. ). In its final report, the Divorce Law Study Commission struck a compromise. It started from the premise that fault, where so asserted as a ground for relief [for divorce], will be a proper consideration for the judiciary in dealing with alimony and support, New Jersey Divorce Law Study Commission, Final Report to the Governor and the Legislature, at 7 (May 11, 1970) (Final Report), and concluded with the aspirational thought that perhaps the penalty should fit the crime, i.e., the flagrant offender, whether plaintiff or defendant (husband or wife), may be subject to equitable principles when alimony, custody and property rights are determined. Id. at 8. That conclusion, however, was couched in terms of what the Commission thought the Legislature -- and not the judiciary -- should consider in connection with future changes to the Divorce Law. Ibid. The compromise reached by the Divorce Law Study Commission was straightforward and fairly grounded on the Divorce Law Study Commission s recommendation that a new no fault ground for divorce -- separation -- be adopted as part of New Jersey s legal landscape. ( This revision proposes that 2A:34-23 be amended to permit the fault of the parties to be considered in awarding alimony but that such element should be excluded when the divorce is based upon the new separation ground. Id. at 64-65.) The Final Report s conclusions on this matter are worthy of review at length: The last sentence of the proposed amendment permits the court to deny alimony to a spouse who is guilty of one of the fault grounds for divorce. As long as fault grounds are retained, it is traditional logic that fault also should affect judicial discretion in awarding alimony. After further study a new Commission may conclude that fault has no place in either the provision of grounds for divorce or in determining alimony but for the time being the substance of existing law is retained. Where both parties make out a ground for divorce the court may deny alimony to either party. There is no automatic bar, as in New York, nor disregard of matrimonial fault, as under the new California law. Thus, the adulterous, deserting, or extremely cruel wife may be deprived of alimony at the court s discretion. Fault is irrelevant, however, where the non-fault ground of separation is the ground for divorce, and in such cases the economic factor and the duration of the marriage will be the determinants as to alimony. The objective of the proposed amendment is to adapt section 2A:34-23 to the new and revised grounds for divorce with the least possible amount of disruption pending a full scale study by a new Commission of the present law of alimony and matrimonial property. The major change in policy is the granting of discretion to award alimony where both parties make out a cause for divorce. In other words, giving cause for divorce would not be an automatic bar to alimony where there was actual need and ability to pay, but the court may consider it in the exercise of its judicial discretion. In the case of the non-fault separation ground, it appears to be logically consistent to make fault irrelevant both as to the ground and the possible grant of alimony. [Id. at 94-95 (emphasis in the original and supplied).] The Divorce Law Study Commission thus expressed a well-founded confidence in our trial courts, and therefore commended marital fault as a factor to be considered by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion in determining alimony. The Divorce Law Study Commission emphasized that any future consideration of whether fault plays a part in an alimony award was reserved to the Legislature, either directly or by again creating a Commission to examine the question. When the Legislature considered the work and recommendations of the Divorce Law Study Commission, it also heard from individual members of the Divorce Law Study Commission. Among the matters on which the Legislature focused was the retention of fault as a factor in alimony awards. In response to a question from the Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, the then-Chairman of the Divorce Law Study Commission made clear that: [t]he three factors that will be considered [in determining alimony] in all cases are: actual need of both parties, ability to pay or resources of both parties, and the duration of the marriage. Where fault is introduced under one of the traditional grounds, whether affirmatively or by way of defense, that will be the fourth factor to be considered by the court. That was a policy judgment by the Commission, espoused very vigorously by Senator Beadleston that the Commission ultimately adopt it, that under certain circumstances fault should appropriately be considered. [Statement of Assemblyman Richard W. DeKorte, Chairman of the Divorce Law Study Commission, Public Hearing before the New Jersey Legislature, Assembly Judiciary Committee, on Assembly Bill No. 1100, at 30A-31A (Oct. 30, 1970).] Based on the recommendations of the Divorce Law Study Commission, the Legislature adopted N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g which, as noted earlier, now as then provides that [i]n all actions for divorce other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation [that is to say, either adultery, desertion, extreme cruelty, voluntarily induced drug or alcohol addiction, institutionalization for mental illness for more than twenty-four consecutive months, incarceration for eighteen or more consecutive months, and non-consensual voluntary deviant sexual conduct] the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g. It is most telling that, when it enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g, the Legislature adopted - word for word -- the language submitted by the Divorce Law Study Commission. Compare N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g with Final Report, at 93, 112. Since then, and although the Legislature has revisited the alimony and support provisions of the Divorce Act of 1971 five different times since its enactment -- in 1980, 1983, 1988, 1997 and 1999 -- the Legislature chose not to amend the language now codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g. It is on this rather plain expression of legislative intent that today we engraft a new - and, in my view, wholly unwarranted limitation, requiring that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g now be read as follows: In all actions for divorce where judgment is granted on the fault ground of adultery, desertion, extreme cruelty, voluntarily induced drug or alcohol addiction, institutionalization for mental illness for more than 24 consecutive months, incarceration for 18 or more consecutive months, and non-consensual voluntary deviant sexual conduct, but not separation, the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just, but only to the extent that such fault ground either (1) affected the parties economic life or (2) so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice. This brings us quickly to Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276 (1997). As even the majority acknowledges, Kinsella is not an alimony case, but one dealing with whether the psychologist-patient privilege may be invoked by a patient to prevent discovery of psychotherapeutic treatment records in the context of three aspects of matrimonial litigation: a marital tort claim against the patient, an extreme cruelty claim for divorce by the patient, and a child custody dispute between the patient and his spouse. BRENDA MANI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES J. MANI, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED April 6, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto