Title: State Ex Rel. Preimsberg v. Rosenblatt
Citation: 112 Ariz. 461, 543 P.2d 773
Docket Number: 12267
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 1975

112 Ariz. 461 (1975) 543 P.2d 773 The STATE of Arizona ex rel. Charles E. PREIMSBERG, Yavapai County Attorney, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Paul G. ROSENBLATT, Judge of the Superior Court of Yavapai County, and George R. O'BARTS and Belva O'Barts and Granite Development Company, an Arizona corporation, Real Parties in Interest, Respondents. No. 12267. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 19, 1975. Rehearing Denied January 27, 1976. Charles E. Preimsberg, Yavapai County Atty. by W. Michael Kelley, Deputy County Atty., Prescott, for petitioner. Stan A. Lehman, Prescott, for respondents. HOLOHAN, Justice. Respondents George R. O'Barts, Belva O'Barts and Granite Development Company were indicted for fraud. The motion by respondents to quash the indictment was granted by the respondent judge. We accepted jurisdiction of the petition by the state for a special action. The issue presented is whether Rule 16.7 of the 1973 Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the trial court to test the factual sufficiency of an indictment. The record reflects that, despite the designation of the motion as one to quash, the matter was correctly treated as a motion to dismiss, and the record further reflects that the issue was narrowed to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the Grand Jury. Rule 16.7(b) provides: There was no intention in the adoption of Rule 16.7 to change the long established rule that an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1956); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910). A trial court has no power to inquire into or weigh the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury from which an indictment resulted. It is abundantly clear from the record that the trial judge was concerned and troubled by the lack of evidence and the type of testimony presented to the grand jury. Much of the criticism leveled against the grand jury system arises out of presentations of cases in the manner followed in this case. The trial judge gave the prosecutor good advice, but this does not mean that the trial court had the authority to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence for indictment is a decision which history and the Constitution leave to the judgment of the citizens chosen to serve as members of the grand jury. The order dismissing the indictment is set aside, the indictment is reinstated, and the period of time from the order of dismissal to the receipt of the mandate by the *463 superior court shall be deemed an excluded period under Rule 8.4, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. CAMERON, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ.