Title: Paynter v. ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP000739
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2019

2019 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP739 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
David W. Paynter and Kathryn M. Paynter, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Company, James 
A. Hamp and American Physicians Assurance 
Corporation, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Continental Casualty Company, Wisconsin Injured 
Patients and Families Compensation Fund, Keith 
A. Henry and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 381 Wis. 2d 239,911 N.W.2d374 
PDC No:2018 WI app 27 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 7, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 1, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. concurs and dissents  
(opinion filed).  
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs and dissents, joined by 
KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by D. James Weis, Susan R. Tyndall, and Habush 
Habush & Rottier S.C., Waukesha. There was an oral argument by 
Eric J. Ryberg.  
 
For the defendants-respondents (James A. Hamp, M.D., and 
American Physicians Assurance Corporation), there was a brief 
 
 
2
filed by Jason J. Franckowiak, Lori Gendelman, and Otjen, 
Gendelman, Zitzer, Johnson & Weir, S.C., Waukesha. There was an 
oral argument by Jason J. Franckowiak. 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents 
(Proassurance 
Wisconsin 
Insurance Company), there was a brief filed by Mark E. Larson, 
Bradley S. Foley, and Gutglass, Erickson, Bonville & Larson, 
S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Mark E. Larson.  
 
 
2019 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP739 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV80) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David W. Paynter and Kathryn M. Paynter, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Company, James 
A. Hamp and American Physicians Assurance 
Corporation, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Continental Casualty Company, Wisconsin Injured 
Patients and Families Compensation Fund, Keith 
A. Henry and Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 7, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of 
the Circuit Court for Ashland County, Robert E. Eaton, Judge, 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
2 
 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondent Dr. 
James A. Hamp. 
¶2 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners David and Kathryn 
Paynter live in Bessemer, Michigan, a city located near the 
Wisconsin-Michigan border.  The Paynters sued Dr. Hamp, a 
medical doctor who practiced in both Wisconsin and Michigan, 
alleging that he negligently failed to diagnose Mr. Paynter with 
cancer.  The Paynters also allege that Dr. Hamp violated Mr. 
Paynter's right to informed consent. 
¶3 
Dr. Hamp moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
Paynters' claims are "foreign cause[s] of action" pursuant to 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.07 (2015-16).1   
¶4 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute adopts the limitations 
rule of a foreign jurisdiction and applies it to any "foreign 
cause of action" as if it were Wisconsin's own statute, provided 
that 
the 
foreign 
period 
of 
limitation 
is 
shorter 
than 
Wisconsin's period of limitation.2 
¶5 
Dr. Hamp argues that pursuant to Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute, Michigan's statute of limitations applies to the 
Paynters' claims.  It is undisputed that if Michigan's statute 
of limitations applies, the Paynters' claims are untimely.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 893.07; Guertin v. Harbour Assur. Co. of 
Bermuda, Ltd., 141 Wis. 2d 622, 624 n.1, 415 N.W.2d 831. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
3 
 
¶6 
The Paynters argue that their claims are not "foreign 
cause[s] of action" under the borrowing statute.  Thus, they 
argue that Wisconsin's statute of limitations applies to their 
claims.  It is undisputed that if Wisconsin's statute of 
limitations applies, the Paynters' claims are timely.  
¶7 
The circuit court granted Dr. Hamp's motion for 
summary 
judgment. 
 
It 
considered 
five 
factors 
that 
are 
traditionally used to resolve choice-of-law questions and 
concluded that those factors favored applying Michigan's statute 
of limitations.  The Paynters appealed. 
¶8 
The court of appeals, applying a different analysis 
than the circuit court, affirmed the circuit court's order 
granting summary judgment to Dr. Hamp.  The court of appeals 
announced that "in cases involving an injury or injuries that 
allegedly occurred in multiple states, the plaintiff's cause of 
action is not foreign, for purposes of the borrowing statute, 
when the first instance of injury occurred in Wisconsin."3   
¶9 
The court of appeals held that because the Paynters 
lived in Michigan during the four-year period between Dr. Hamp's 
alleged misdiagnosis and Mr. Paynter's discovery of his injury, 
the Paynters' negligence claim was "foreign" for purposes of the 
borrowing statute.  The court of appeals further held that the 
Paynters' informed consent claim was "foreign" for purposes of 
the borrowing statute because Mr. Paynter was located in 
                                                 
3 Paynter v. ProAssurance Wis. Ins. Co., 2018 WI App 27, 
¶29, 381 Wis. 2d 239, 911 N.W.2d 374. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
4 
 
Michigan at the time his right to informed consent was allegedly 
violated.  Accordingly, the court of appeals applied the 
Michigan statute of limitations to both claims and affirmed the 
circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. 
Hamp.  The Paynters petitioned this court for review. 
¶10 On this issue of first impression, we hold that in 
medical malpractice cases involving a negligent misdiagnosis 
that results in a latent, though continuous, injury, whether the 
action is "foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute is determined by whether the plaintiff's first injury 
occurred outside of Wisconsin.   
¶11 We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the borrowing statute applies to the Paynters' negligence claim.  
On the record before the court, Mr. Paynter's place of first 
injury appears to be beyond ascertainment to any reasonable, 
non-speculative degree.  When the plaintiff's place of first 
injury is unknowable, as in the instant case, Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute does not apply.   
¶12 However, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
Paynters' informed consent claim is "foreign" for purposes of 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute.  Therefore, we apply Michigan's 
statute of limitations to the Paynters' informed consent claim 
and conclude that the claim is untimely.  Dr. Hamp is entitled 
to summary judgment as to that claim.  
¶13 Accordingly, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  We remand the cause to 
the court of appeals in order to address the Paynters' argument 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
5 
 
that the circuit court erred by determining that an insurance 
policy issued to Dr. Hamp by Defendant-Respondent ProAssurance 
Wisconsin Insurance Company did not provide coverage for the 
Paynters' claims.4 
I 
¶14 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are 
undisputed. 
¶15 David Paynter and his wife, Kathryn Paynter, live in 
Bessemer, Michigan, a city located near the Wisconsin-Michigan 
border.  In April 2010, Mr. Paynter saw Dr. Peter Areson, a 
Wisconsin physician, regarding a growth on the upper right side 
of his neck.  Dr. Areson referred Mr. Paynter to Dr. Hamp, an 
ear, nose, and throat specialist, who practiced both in Ashland, 
Wisconsin, and Ironwood, Michigan. 
¶16 On June 10, 2010, Dr. Hamp performed an aspiration5 of 
the growth on Mr. Paynter's neck.  The aspiration was performed 
in Dr. Hamp's Michigan office.  Dr. Hamp's staff transported the 
samples from Mr. Paynter's growth to Wisconsin to be analyzed by 
a pathologist. 
                                                 
4 Paynter, 381 Wis. 2d 239, ¶3 n.3 ("Because we conclude the 
circuit court properly dismissed the Paynters' claims on other 
grounds, we need not address the Paynters' insurance coverage 
argument."). 
5 In this context, the term "aspiration" refers to the 
"[w]ithdrawal of fluid from a cavity by suctioning off with an 
aspirator" for the purpose of "obtain[ing] specimens."  Paynter, 
381 Wis. 2d 239, ¶5 n.4. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
6 
 
¶17 On June 14, 2010, Dr. Hamp's office received the 
pathologist's report, which indicated that Mr. Paynter's growth 
was cancerous.  That same day, Dr. Hamp called the Paynters' 
home telephone in Michigan and told Mr. Paynter that the growth 
was not cancerous and that Mr. Paynter did not need any further 
treatment.6 
¶18 Four years later, on June 19, 2014, Mr. Paynter had 
surgery to remove the growth and was diagnosed with cancer the 
same day.  The doctor who performed the surgery requested that 
the pathology materials from the procedure be compared to the 
slides from the aspiration Dr. Hamp performed in June 2010.  The 
following week, the doctor informed Mr. Paynter that his cancer 
had been present in June 2010.   
¶19 The Paynters mailed a request for mediation7 to 
Wisconsin's Medical Mediation Panels in May 2015.8  On August 31, 
2015, the Paynters filed the instant lawsuit in Ashland County 
                                                 
6 As the court of appeals noted, certain facts relating to 
the telephone call appear to be in dispute.  In his briefing 
before this court, Dr. Hamp does not appear to dispute that the 
call was made, at least for purposes of our review.   
We assume that the call was made on June 14, 2010, and we 
note that Dr. Hamp's location at the time the call was made does 
not affect our analysis. 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 655.44(4) 
tolls 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions "on the 
date of mailing if [the request is] sent by registered mail." 
8 The parties dispute the exact date that the Paynters 
mailed their request for mediation.  The dispute does not affect 
our analysis. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
7 
 
Circuit Court against Dr. Hamp; his Michigan medical malpractice 
insurer, 
American 
Physicians 
Assurance 
Company; 
and 
his 
Wisconsin medical malpractice insurer, ProAssurance Wisconsin 
Insurance Company.9   
¶20 Mr. Paynter alleged that as a result of Dr. Hamp's 
negligent failure to diagnose his cancer in June 2010, he was 
required to undergo extensive surgery and radiation, resulting 
in permanent injuries and damages, including facial paralysis.  
Mrs. Paynter alleged that as a result of injuries sustained by 
Mr. Paynter, she was deprived of the society and companionship 
of her spouse.   
¶21 During his deposition, Dr. Hamp admitted that "[Mr. 
Paynter's] survival and prognosis would be improved if he had 
been treated in 2010 versus 2014."  On this point, Dr. Hamp was 
confident, testifying: "I'm not guessing."   
¶22 Dr. Hamp claimed in his deposition that he did not see 
the pathologist's report, but that if he had, he would have 
recommended that Mr. Paynter have the growth on his neck 
surgically removed regardless of whether it was malignant 
because even benign growths will continue to expand and, 
                                                 
9 The Paynters' complaint named two other physicians and 
their respective insurers as defendants.  However, the Paynters 
stipulated to the dismissal of their claims against one of those 
physicians and his insurer, and they did not oppose the other 
physician's motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court 
granted. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
8 
 
eventually, get to the point where they will break down the 
skin. 
¶23 Mr. Paynter also alleged that Dr. Hamp violated his 
right to informed consent, resulting in permanent injuries and 
damages.  Mrs. Paynter alleged that as a result of Dr. Hamp's 
violation of Mr. Paynter's right to informed consent, she was 
deprived of the society and companionship of her spouse. 
¶24 The Paynters asserted in their complaint that Mr. 
Paynter first knew or should have known of his injury on or 
after June 19, 2014. 
¶25 ProAssurance moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
the policy it issued to Dr. Hamp did not provide coverage for 
the Paynters' claims.  The circuit court denied ProAssurance's 
motion, 
stating 
that 
"if 
there 
was 
failure 
to 
provide 
information that fell short of the standard of care that failure 
occurred in Wisconsin, and it wasn't because the biopsy was done 
in a manner that fell beyond the professional standard.  It is 
clearly the interpretation and communication of the results.  
And none of that happened in Michigan . . . ."   
¶26 Based on these statements, the Paynters and Dr. Hamp 
believed that they were entitled to summary judgment on the 
coverage issue.  The Paynters moved for summary judgment, and 
Dr. Hamp joined the Paynters' motion.   
¶27 This time, however, the circuit court concluded that a 
"professional incident" occurred in Michigan because Dr. Hamp 
gave Mr. Paynter a preliminary opinion that the growth was 
benign 
immediately 
after 
the 
aspiration 
was 
performed.  
No. 
2017AP739   
 
9 
 
Accordingly, the circuit court granted summary judgment to 
ProAssurance.  After additional arguments regarding what actions 
Dr. Hamp took in Wisconsin, the circuit court indicated that the 
Paynters should file a motion for reconsideration. 
¶28 Before the circuit court decided the Paynters' motion 
for reconsideration, Dr. Hamp moved for summary judgment, 
arguing 
that 
Wisconsin's 
borrowing 
statute 
required 
the 
application 
of 
Michigan's 
statute 
of 
limitations 
to 
the 
Paynters' claims, and under Michigan's statute of limitations, 
the Paynters' claims were untimely. 
¶29 The circuit court granted Dr. Hamp's motion for 
summary 
judgment. 
 
It 
considered 
five 
factors 
that 
are 
traditionally used to resolve choice of law questions10 and 
concluded that those factors favored applying Michigan's statute 
of limitations.  Having granted Dr. Hamp's motion for summary 
judgment, the circuit court never addressed the Paynters' motion 
for reconsideration regarding whether the ProAssurance policy 
covered their claims against Dr. Hamp.  The Paynters appealed. 
¶30 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order, but on different grounds.  The court of appeals announced 
that "in cases involving an injury or injuries that allegedly 
                                                 
10 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 2002 WI 
31, ¶53, 251 Wis. 2d 561, 641 N.W.2d 662 (setting forth the 
following 
factors: 
(1) 
predictability 
of 
results; 
(2) 
maintenance 
of 
interstate 
and 
international 
order; 
(3) 
simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the 
forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the 
better rule of law). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
10 
 
occurred in multiple states, the plaintiff's cause of action is 
not foreign, for purposes of the borrowing statute, when the 
first instance of injury occurred in Wisconsin."11   
¶31 Before determining where the "first injury" occurred, 
the court of appeals first sought to determine when the first 
injury occurred.  In determining when Mr. Paynter's first injury 
occurred, the court of appeals observed that in negligent 
misdiagnosis cases, "an actionable injury occurs when the 
misdiagnosis causes a greater harm than existed at the time of 
the misdiagnosis."12 
¶32 The court of appeals concluded that in the instant 
case, Dr. Hamp made a prima facie showing that Mr. Paynter's 
first injury occurred in Michigan because the record showed that 
the Paynters resided in Michigan during the four-year period of 
time between Dr. Hamp's alleged misdiagnosis and Mr. Paynter's 
discovery of his injury.  The court of appeals further concluded 
that Mr. Paynter's averment that he "was frequently in Wisconsin 
in between the years 2010 and 2015" failed to rebut Dr. Hamp's 
prima facie case that the Paynters' suit was a "foreign cause of 
action" under Wisconsin's borrowing statute.  The court of 
appeals stated that the Paynters did not provide sufficient 
evidence to "establish——or even suggest——at what point in time 
                                                 
11 Paynter, 381 Wis. 2d 239, ¶29. 
12 Id., ¶3 (citing Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶25, 242 
Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
11 
 
[Mr. Paynter] first experienced a greater harm than that which 
existed at the time of the misdiagnosis."13   
¶33 The court of appeals further concluded that the 
Paynters' informed consent claim was "foreign" for purposes of 
the borrowing statute. The court noted that Dr. Hamp first 
allegedly violated Mr. Paynter's right to informed consent 
during the June 14, 2010 phone call, and it is undisputed that 
Mr. Paynter was located in his Michigan home when he received 
that call.  "Because [Mr. Paynter] was located in Michigan at 
that time, his alleged injury——i.e., the loss of the opportunity 
to choose his course of treatment——occurred in Michigan, not 
Wisconsin."14 
¶34 Accordingly, the court of appeals applied the Michigan 
statute of limitations to both claims and affirmed the circuit 
court order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Hamp.15  
The Paynters petitioned this court for review. 
II 
                                                 
13 Id., ¶36. 
14 Id., ¶39. 
15 Before the court of appeals, the Paynters conceded that 
the viability of Mrs. Paynter's derivative claims depends on the 
viability of Mr. Paynter's claims.  Because the court of appeals 
concluded that Mr. Paynter's claims were untimely, it further 
concluded that the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment to Dr. Hamp on Mrs. Paynter's claims.  Paynter, 381 
Wis. 2d 239, ¶44 n.13. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
12 
 
¶35 This court applies the same method of analysis to a 
motion for summary judgment as does the circuit court.16  Summary 
judgment is appropriate under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) where "the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."17   
¶36 Our review of the instant case also requires us to 
interpret and apply Wisconsin's borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.07.  "[S]tatutory construction is a question of law, which 
we review de novo, even though we benefit from the analyses of 
the circuit court and the court of appeals."18  
III 
A 
¶37 Dr. Hamp argues that the Paynters' claims are "foreign 
cause[s] of action" pursuant to Wisconsin's borrowing statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.07.  As such, Dr. Hamp contends that Michigan's 
statute of limitations applies to the Paynters' claims.  It is 
undisputed that if Michigan's statute of limitations applies, 
the Paynters' claims are time barred. 
                                                 
16 Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶8. 
17 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
18 Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶10 (citing Czapinski v. St. 
Francis 
Hosp., 
2000 
WI 
80, 
¶12, 
236 
Wis. 2d 316, 
613 
N.W.2d 120). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
13 
 
¶38 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"19 
¶39 Wisconsin's borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.07, 
provides as follows: 
(1) 
If an action is brought in this state on a 
foreign cause of action and the foreign period of 
limitation which applies has expired, no action 
may be maintained in this state. 
(2) 
If an action is brought in this state on a 
foreign cause of action and the foreign period of 
limitation which applies has not expired, but the 
applicable Wisconsin period of limitation has 
expired, no action may be maintained in this 
state. 
¶40 The meaning of the phrase "foreign cause of action" is 
far from plain.  The phrase "foreign cause of action" is not, 
and has never been, expressly defined in Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute.  The phrase also appears to be unique to the borrowing 
statute; that is, the phrase appears nowhere else in the 
Wisconsin statutes.   
¶41 In Guertin v. Harbour Assurance Company of Bermuda, 
Ltd., 141 Wis. 2d 622, 415, N.W.2d 831 (1987), this court was 
required to determine whether the plaintiff's cause of action 
constituted a "foreign cause of action" pursuant to Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute.  The plaintiff, Frank Guertin, was a 
                                                 
19 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
14 
 
Wisconsin resident who was injured in the state of Illinois when 
he slipped and fell off the fuel tank of a semi-trailer he was 
employed to drive.20 
¶42 We determined that the phrase "foreign cause of 
action" was ambiguous, and therefore, we turned "to extrinsic 
sources to determine what the legislature meant by the phrase."21  
Before turning to extrinsic sources, however, we examined the 
statutory history of Wisconsin's borrowing statute.   
¶43 We 
observed 
that 
"[i]n 
1979, 
the 
legislature 
restructured Chapter 893, Limitations of Commencement of Actions 
and Proceedings and Procedure for Claims Against Governmental 
Units."22  In that revision, the Judicial Council redrafted 
Wisconsin's 
borrowing 
statute, 
then 
numbered 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.205, and renumbered it Wis. Stat. § 893.07. 
¶44 Former Wis. Stat. § 893.205(1) did not use the phrase 
"foreign cause of action," but instead referred to "injuries to 
the person, received without this state."23   
¶45 We then examined the Judicial Council Committee's Note 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.07 to help us determine the significance of 
the changes to the statutory text and derive meaning from the 
                                                 
20 Guertin v. Harbour Assur. Co. of Bermuda, Ltd., 141 
Wis. 2d 622, 624-25, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987). 
21 Id. at 628; see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶50. 
22 Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 628. 
23 Wis. Stat. § 893.205(1) (1977-78); Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d 
at 629. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
15 
 
newly enacted language.  Although the revised version of the 
statute substantively changed the borrowing statute in ways that 
are not relevant to the present case,24 the Committee observed 
that other provisions of ch. 893 retained the same form in which 
they had previously existed and were "redrafted only for greater 
clarity and ease of application[.]"25   
¶46 We 
concluded 
that 
it 
was 
"apparent 
from 
the 
Committee's comments that the Council considered the phrase 
'foreign cause of action' to be synonymous with the language of 
the former borrowing statute, sec. 893.205(1), Stats. (1977), 
which barred actions 'for injuries to the person, received 
without this state.'"26   
¶47 Accordingly, we declared that a cause of action is 
"foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing statute if the 
plaintiff's injury occurred outside of Wisconsin.27   
¶48 We then applied the "place of injury" test.  This was 
a simple task, given that the injury in Guertin was immediate 
and discrete.  Mr. Guertin fell off his semi-trailer and 
                                                 
24 For example, the revisions changed the law of prior Wis. 
Stat. § 893.205(1), which had provided that a resident in 
Wisconsin could sue in Wisconsin state courts to recover damages 
for personal injuries experienced outside of Wisconsin even if 
the foreign period of limitation had expired.  Guertin, 141 
Wis. 2d at 629. 
25 Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 629. 
26 Id. at 630. 
27 Id. at 630-31. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
16 
 
sustained injuries in Illinois.  Therefore, Mr. Guertin's claims 
were "foreign cause[s] of action" pursuant to Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute.  The Illinois statute of limitations for 
personal injury actions applied to his claims, and therefore, 
they were properly dismissed as untimely. 
B 
¶49 Although it was clear how to apply the "place of 
injury" test under the facts of Guertin, application of the test 
in subsequent cases proved more difficult.  The test needed 
additional gloss to cleanly apply to other claims and fact 
scenarios where the plaintiff's "place of injury" was not easily 
pinned down to one particular time and location. 
¶50 For example, in Abraham v. General Casualty Company of 
Wisconsin, 217 Wis. 2d 294, 576 N.W.2d 46 (1998), we had to 
decide whether Wisconsin's borrowing statute applied to contract 
actions.   
¶51 In the Abraham case, the plaintiff, Paul Abraham, was 
injured by an automobile while riding his bicycle in the state 
of Florida.28  After exhausting the tortfeasor's liability 
insurance policy limits, Mr. Abraham notified his insurer, 
General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, that he intended to seek 
underinsured motorist benefits.29  When General Casualty refused 
                                                 
28 Abraham v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 217 Wis. 2d 294, ¶3, 
576 N.W.2d 46 (1998). 
29 Id., ¶¶4-7. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
17 
 
to pay the underinsured motorist benefits, Mr. Abraham sued 
General Casualty in Wisconsin for breach of contract.30 
¶52 We held that the borrowing statute applied to contract 
actions,31 but we were mindful that determining the location of 
the plaintiff's injury "may be more difficult 'in the case of a 
dispute over a contract, whose 'location' is not easily pinned 
to a particular state if, for example, as is common, the 
contract is negotiated in one state, signed in another, and 
performed in a third.'"32   
¶53 After "wad[ing] into [a] morass of arguments and 
precedent,"33 we determined that the location of "the final 
significant event giving rise to a suable claim" should be the 
determinative factor in deciding whether a claim sounding in 
contract constitutes a "foreign cause of action" for purposes of 
the borrowing statute.34  
¶54 We 
explained 
that 
this 
standard 
was 
"not 
only 
consistent 
with 
Guertin's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
30 Id., ¶¶7-8. 
31 Id., ¶15. 
32 Id., ¶21 (quoting Johnson v. Deltadynamics, Inc., 813 
F.2d 944, 946 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
33 See Abraham, 217 Wis. 2d 294, ¶¶21-31. 
34 Id., ¶35; see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-
Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966); 
Terranova v. Terranova, 883 F. Supp. 1273 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
18 
 
§ 893.07," but also clarified, if imperfectly,35 how that 
interpretation was to apply "to causes of action sounding in 
contract where it is frequently difficult to attach the 
plaintiff's contractual 'injury' to any one locale."36   
¶55 Applying this framework to the facts of Abraham, we 
concluded that the "final significant event" giving rise to a 
suable 
claim 
for 
underinsured 
motorist 
benefits 
was 
the 
insurance company's refusal to pay the benefits upon Mr. 
Abraham's request.  That denial occurred in Wisconsin, and 
therefore, 
Mr. 
Abraham's 
claim 
for 
underinsured 
motorist 
benefits was not a "foreign cause of action" under Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute. 
¶56 Likewise, in Faigin v. Doubleday Dell Publishing 
Group, Inc., 98 F.3d 268 (7th Cir. 1996), it was not obvious how 
to properly apply Wisconsin's borrowing statute and our "place 
of injury" test in the context of a multi-state defamation suit. 
¶57 In Faigin, sports agent A.J. Faigin represented James 
E. Kelly, a former quarterback for the National Football 
League's Buffalo Bills.37  Mr. Kelly spoke unfavorably of Mr. 
                                                 
35 See Abraham, 217 Wis. 2d 294, ¶35 n.7 (recognizing "that 
in certain factual situations," the final significant event test 
"would not be without ambiguity," but emphasizing that, "as with 
any judicial standard, no one 'test' can give complete certainty 
to future litigants.'"). 
36 Id., ¶35. 
37 Faigin v. Doubleday Dell Pub. Grp., Inc., 98 F.3d 268, 
269 (7th Cir. 1996). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
19 
 
Faigin in an autobiography published by the defendant, Doubleday 
Dell 
Publishing 
Group.38 
 
Of 
the 
28,600 
copies 
of 
the 
autobiography that were sold to bookstores, only 41 of them were 
sold to bookstores in Wisconsin; that is, "a staggering 99.86 
percent occurred outside Wisconsin."39 
¶58 When Mr. Faigin sued Doubleday for defamation in the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin, Doubleday argued that Mr. 
Faigin's suit was a "foreign cause of action" under Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute.  The district court agreed and granted 
summary judgment to Doubleday, concluding "that when the 
plaintiff's injury has occurred in more than one state, it 
amounts to a 'foreign' cause of action governed by Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute, notwithstanding the fact that Wisconsin is 
one of the states in which injury occurred."40 
¶59 The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
reversed. 
 
It 
stated 
that 
determining 
the 
locations 
of 
Mr. 
Faigin's 
injuries 
was 
"straightforward enough."41  There was evidence supporting the 
conclusion that Mr. Faigin was injured in Wisconsin, albeit 
minimally, and there was also evidence supporting the conclusion 
that Mr. Faigin was injured in other states where the 
autobiography was sold.42  The Faigin court explained that 
                                                 
38 Id. at 269. 
39 Id. at 273 (Evans, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 269-70. 
41 Id. at 270. 
42 Id. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
20 
 
"[t]his is a quirk of libel law: the plaintiff is generally 
considered to be injured wherever the defamatory writing is 
published.  In other words, although it is clear where Faigin 
allegedly was injured, the place of injury cannot be narrowed to 
one state."43 
¶60 This "quirk of libel law" forced the Seventh Circuit 
"to decide between a rule that deems all multi-state libel 
claims foreign or all of them not[.]"44  The Faigin court 
ultimately decided "that the latter is the better of two 
imperfect choices[.]"45  "As it stands," the Faigin court 
explained, "the Wisconsin statute asks one question: did the 
injury occur inside Wisconsin?"46  Because the answer in Faigin 
was "yes, if not exclusively[,]" Mr. Faigin's defamation claim 
did not constitute a foreign cause of action for purposes of the 
borrowing statute.47 
C 
¶61 Our discussion of the case law above illustrates that 
both state and federal courts construing Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute have focused on the location of the plaintiff's injury 
in determining whether a cause of action is "foreign" for 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 272. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
21 
 
purposes of the borrowing statute.  Generally speaking, the 
plaintiff's injury is the "final significant event" giving rise 
to a cause of action, and it is the plaintiff's location when 
that injury is sustained that determines whether the cause of 
action is "foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute.  Although the "place of injury" test has not always 
been easy to apply, the focus has always remained on identifying 
the location in which the plaintiff suffered his or her injury.    
¶62 Like Abraham and Faigin, the instant case provides 
another example of a category of cases in which the "place of 
injury" test requires more gloss.  Unlike the single, discrete 
injury at issue in Guertin (the plaintiff's fall from his truck 
in Illinois) and the multiple, discrete injuries in Faigin (the 
sale of libelous books in multiple states, including Wisconsin), 
the instant case involves an alleged negligent misdiagnosis that 
resulted in a latent, though continuous, injury. 
¶63 We have previously determined what constitutes an 
actionable "injury" in negligent misdiagnosis cases for purposes 
of triggering the medical malpractice statute of limitations, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m). 
¶64 In Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 
N.W.2d 860, an arteriovenous malformation (AVM) in Jennifer 
Paul's brain ruptured, causing extensive hemorrhaging and, 
eventually, her death.48  Jennifer's parents and Jennifer's 
                                                 
48 Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶5, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 
N.W.2d 860. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
22 
 
estate sued two of Jennifer's doctors, claiming that the doctors 
misdiagnosed the cause of Jennifer's recurring headaches, 
resulting in the ruptured AVM.49 
¶65 The doctors maintained that Jennifer's "injury" was 
the alleged misdiagnosis.50  They argued that because the Pauls' 
claims were not brought within three years of Jennifer's last 
complaint about her headaches, the Pauls' claims were time 
barred. 
¶66 The Pauls, on the other hand, maintained that what 
triggered the statute of limitations was not the alleged 
misdiagnosis, but rather the rupture of the AVM and the 
resultant hemorrhaging.51  They argued that their claims were 
timely because they were brought within three years of the 
rupture of Jennifer's AVM.52  The Pauls additionally submitted, 
in opposition to the doctors' motion for summary judgment, an 
affidavit from an expert witness, who concluded to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that had Jennifer's AVM "been 
properly diagnosed at any time prior to May 1, 1995, it [was] 
more likely than not that [Jennifer] would not have sustained 
the injury and disability she ultimately experienced on May 22, 
1995."53  
                                                 
49 Id., ¶1. 
50 Id., ¶12. 
51 Id., ¶13. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
23 
 
¶67 In resolving what event constituted the actionable 
"injury," 
we 
relied 
on 
persuasive 
authority 
from 
other 
jurisdictions that had previously faced the same issue and 
concluded that "[a] misdiagnosis, in and of itself, is not, and 
cannot, be an actionable injury[]" because "[t]he misdiagnosis 
is the negligent omission, not the injury."54  We explained that 
"[t]he actionable injury arises when the misdiagnosis causes a 
greater harm than existed at the time of the misdiagnosis."55  
¶68 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the 
Paul court concluded that Jennifer's actionable injury occurred 
"either at the time that Jennifer's AVM ruptured, or at the time 
that Jennifer's AVM could no longer be treated."56  Because both 
of these events would have occurred within the applicable three- 
year statute of limitations, we held that the Pauls' claims were 
timely.57 
D 
¶69 The Paynters maintain that the Seventh Circuit's 
reasoning in Faigin should apply to their medical malpractice 
claims.  That is, because Dr. Hamp admitted that Mr. Paynter's 
                                                 
54 Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶25; see St. George v. Pariser, 
484 S.E.2d 888, 891 (Va. 1997) (concluding that the plaintiff's 
injury was not the failure to diagnose a mole as cancerous, but 
rather, "the change in her cancerous condition" from a curable 
state to a potentially fatal state). 
55 Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶25. 
56 Id., ¶45. 
57 Id. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
24 
 
growth would continue to expand unless and until it was 
surgically removed, Mr. Paynter was essentially suffering one 
continuous injury as his growth expanded.  Put another way, "the 
misdiagnosis cause[d] greater harm than existed at the time of 
the misdiagnosis" in a continuous fashion as the cancer grew.58  
Thus, they argue, if Mr. Paynter entered Wisconsin during the 
four-year period of time between the misdiagnosis on June 10, 
2010 and the growth's removal on June 19, 2014, "at least some" 
of Mr. Paynter's injury occurred in Wisconsin.59 
¶70 We reject the Paynters' invitation to apply Faigin's 
reasoning to the facts of the instant case.  While we do not 
comment on the merits of the Seventh Circuit's legal analysis in 
Faigin as applied to multi-state libel suits, it is clear to us 
that Faigin's analysis turned on the unique "quirk" of libel law 
that generally considers a plaintiff to be injured wherever the 
defamatory writing is published.  That is, as the court of 
appeals correctly pointed out, "Faigin involved multiple, 
discrete injuries in different states[,]" whereas here, "the 
Paynters have asserted a single, continuous injury, which they 
allege was ongoing for the entire period between June 2010 and 
June 2014, during which time David was physically present in 
both Michigan and Wisconsin."60  
                                                 
58 See id., ¶25.    
59 See Faigin, 98 F.3d at 270-72. 
60 Paynter, 381 Wis. 2d 239, ¶26. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
25 
 
¶71 The Paynters' proposed analysis, if adopted, would 
render non-foreign virtually all medical malpractice cases 
involving the failure to diagnose cancer.  Given that one of the 
primary purposes underlying Wisconsin's borrowing statute is to 
prevent forum shopping,61 we cannot accept the ease with which a 
negligent misdiagnosis claim could be transformed from a 
"foreign" cause of action to a non-foreign one under the 
Paynters' theory.  Such an interpretation would, without 
limitation, apply the Wisconsin statute of limitations to anyone 
who simply travels to Wisconsin, regardless of the frequency or 
duration of such travel.  
¶72 Instead, we agree with the court of appeals that in 
medical malpractice cases involving a negligent misdiagnosis 
that results in a latent, though continuous, injury, whether the 
action is "foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute is determined by whether the plaintiff's first injury 
occurred in Wisconsin.   
¶73 In our view, the "first injury" test best comports 
with the case law construing Wisconsin's borrowing statute and 
the case law describing when a plaintiff suffers an actionable 
"injury" in the context of a negligent misdiagnosis.  As in 
other cases in which the phrase "foreign cause of action" needed 
additional gloss to determine whether and how Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute should apply in a particular context,62 the 
                                                 
61 Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 631. 
62 See supra ¶¶50-60 (describing Abraham and Faigin). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
26 
 
"first injury" test focuses on when a misdiagnosed plaintiff has 
a suable claim.  A tort becomes "complete" when the plaintiff is 
injured, and the plaintiff in a negligent misdiagnosis case 
becomes injured when he or she first experiences greater harm as 
a result of the misdiagnosis than existed at the time of the 
misdiagnosis.63  If the plaintiff is located outside of Wisconsin 
when this occurs, the action is "foreign" for purposes of 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute.64  
                                                 
63 See Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶25 
64 In addition to being grounded in statutory history and 
our prior cases interpreting Wisconsin's borrowing statute, 
tying 
the 
application 
of 
the 
borrowing 
statute 
to 
the 
plaintiff's place of first injury provides the highest degree of 
certainty to the party most in need of that certainty, i.e., the 
plaintiff bringing the action. 
Plaintiffs need to know whether the borrowing statute 
applies so that they can timely file their claims.  Generally 
speaking, plaintiffs are more likely to know where their injury 
occurred because they are in control of their own movements and 
actions.  For example, if Mr. Paynter did not leave the state of 
Michigan during the four-year period of time relevant to the 
instant case, he would know that regardless of when his first 
injury occurred, it occurred in Michigan because he never left 
the state.  He would know with a significant degree of certainty 
that the borrowing statute applied to his claim. 
However, in addition to lacking support in the statutory 
history and our case law, alternative approaches also provide 
lesser, not greater certainty from the perspective of a 
plaintiff.  If operation of the borrowing statute depended on 
whether 
every 
element 
of 
the 
claim 
occurred 
outside 
of 
Wisconsin, plaintiffs who first suffered an injury at a 
reasonably discernable time and place outside of Wisconsin would 
be left with the additional (and difficult) task of determining 
where the other elements of their claim occurred.   
No. 
2017AP739   
 
27 
 
¶74 As we explain more fully below, however, the time and 
location of plaintiff's "first injury" must be capable of 
ascertainment to a reasonable, non-speculative degree.  When the 
plaintiff's place of first injury is unknowable, but could have 
occurred within or outside of Wisconsin, Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute does not apply.   
IV 
A 
¶75 We first address the Paynters' negligence claim. 
¶76 Dr. Hamp argues, and the court of appeals agreed, that 
he made a prima facie showing that Mr. Paynter suffered his 
first injury in Michigan by presenting evidence that the 
Paynters lived continuously in Michigan during the four-year 
period of time between Dr. Hamp's alleged misdiagnosis and Mr. 
Paynter's discovery of his injury.    
¶77 Dr. Hamp further argues, and the court of appeals 
agreed, that Mr. Paynter's averment that he "was frequently in 
Wisconsin in between the years 2010 and 2015" fails to rebut Dr. 
Hamp's prima facie case because, as the court of appeals held, 
the Paynters did not provide sufficient evidence to "establish——
or even suggest——at what point in time [Mr. Paynter] first 
experienced a greater harm than that which existed at the time 
of the misdiagnosis," and where Mr. Paynter was located when he 
experienced that greater harm.65 
                                                 
65 See Paynter, 381 Wis. 2d 239, ¶36. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
28 
 
¶78 We conclude that, on the record before the court, Mr. 
Paynter's place of first injury is beyond ascertainment to any 
reasonable, non-speculative degree.  In such circumstances, 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute does not apply.   
¶79 In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the 
court of appeals' decision in Brusa v. Mercy Health System, 
Inc., 2007 WI App 166, 304 Wis. 2d 138, 737 N.W.2d 1. 
¶80 In Brusa, it was alleged that a negligent delay in 
correctly diagnosing Mr. Brusa with colon cancer caused Mr. 
Brusa's death.66  Mr. Brusa's son, Joseph, who was four months 
old at the time of his father's death, brought a derivative suit 
against the doctor.67 
¶81 The right to pursue a derivative claim for medical 
malpractice is determined by the plaintiff's status at the time 
of the patient's injury.68  The court of appeals, therefore, was 
tasked with determining Mr. Brusa's "date of injury" and 
deciding whether Joseph had been conceived by that date.69 
¶82 After a discussion of this court's decision in Paul,70 
the court of appeals stated: 
                                                 
66 Brusa v. Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2007 WI App 166, ¶1, 
304 Wis. 2d 138, 737 N.W.2d 1. 
67 Id., ¶1. 
68 Id. (citing Conant v. Physicians Plus Med. Group, Inc., 
229 Wis. 2d 271, 274, 600 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
69 Brusa, 304 Wis. 2d 138, ¶15. 
70 See supra ¶¶64-68. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
29 
 
Here, Brusa's date of injury has not been established 
and is not ascertainable from the record.  An 
injurious change may have occurred shortly after Brusa 
first consulted with Dr. Fasano, it may have occurred 
four weeks later when Brusa was to have had a 
colonoscopy, it may have occurred at some later date, 
or it may be that Brusa's cancer was untreatable even 
before he first consulted Dr. Fasano.  Even if we 
accept Dr. Fasano's concession of negligence, which 
was offered only for the sake of argument on appeal, 
this 
question 
remains: 
When 
did 
Dr. 
Fasano's 
misdiagnosis cause Brusa "greater harm" than existed 
on December 27, 2002?[71] 
¶83 In this respect, the record in the instant case is 
similar 
to 
Brusa. 
 
When 
Dr. 
Hamp's 
alleged 
negligent 
misdiagnosis caused Mr. Paynter "greater harm" than existed at 
the time of the misdiagnosis appears to be unknowable.  We can 
think of no test by which a finder of fact could determine the 
location of Mr. Paynter's first injury without speculating.  
¶84 Dr. Hamp admitted in his deposition that Mr. Paynter's 
prognosis would have been improved had Mr. Paynter been treated 
in 2010 as opposed to 2014; that is, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Paynter suffered an injurious change in condition at some point 
between June 2010, when Dr. Hamp is alleged to have negligently 
failed to diagnose Mr. Paynter's cancer, and June 2014, when Mr. 
Paynter discovered that his cancer had been present in June 
2010.  
¶85 Dr. Hamp's argument that Mr. Paynter suffered his 
first injury in Michigan rests entirely upon the fact that the 
Paynters resided in Michigan during the four-year period of time 
                                                 
71 Brusa, 304 Wis. 2d 138, ¶14. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
30 
 
in which Mr. Paynter suffered his first injury.  There is 
nothing 
in 
the 
record 
showing 
that 
the 
Paynters 
were 
continuously in the state of Michigan for four years.  In fact, 
the opposite is true.  Mr. Paynter averred that he was 
frequently in Wisconsin during that four-year period of time.     
¶86 On the record before the court, when and where Mr. 
Paynter 
suffered 
his 
first 
injury 
appears 
to 
be 
beyond 
ascertainment to any reasonable, non-speculative degree.  The 
record is insufficient to make a reasonable inference one way or 
the other.72  Wisconsin's borrowing statute applies only to 
"foreign cause[s] of action," and if the plaintiff's place of 
                                                 
72 Although we acknowledge that the first injury test may 
result in some degree of uncertainty in particular cases, 
especially when the period of time between misdiagnosis and 
discovery of the injury is extensive, no judicial standard can 
give complete certainty to future litigants.  Abraham, 217 
Wis. 2d 294, ¶35 n.7.   
Additionally, we note that not every fact scenario will 
result in complete uncertainty as to the time and location of 
the plaintiff's first injury.  For example, in Paul, the period 
of time between the last misdiagnosis and the plaintiff's first 
injury was, at most, five weeks.  It does not appear that it 
would have been an impossible task to determine where the 
plaintiff was located during those five weeks had it been 
relevant to decide the issue.   
However, the record before this court is an example of a 
set of facts under which the plaintiff's place of first injury 
is unknowable, and when the record is such that a fact finder 
can only speculate as to the location of the plaintiff's first 
injury, the borrowing statute does not apply. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
31 
 
first injury is unknowable, as in the instant case, the 
borrowing statute does not apply.73 
¶87 Because the borrowing statute does not apply to the 
Paynters' 
negligence 
claim, 
we 
apply 
Wisconsin's 
medical 
malpractice statute of limitations to that claim.   
¶88 Dr. Hamp concedes, and we agree, that the Paynters' 
negligence claim is timely under Wisconsin's medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m). 
¶89 Section 893.55(1m) provides that: 
                                                 
73 That is not to say that every plaintiff whose place of 
first injury is unknowable may bring an action in Wisconsin 
courts.   
Separate and apart from whether the borrowing statute 
applies to the Paynters' claims, the jurisdictional requirements 
set forth in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945), must still be met. 
In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that due process requires that a defendant "have 
certain minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice'".  Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 
316. 
The parties did not brief this issue.  Nonetheless, we have 
no trouble concluding that Dr. Hamp had the requisite "minimum 
contacts" with Wisconsin.  Dr. Hamp is licensed to practice 
medicine in Wisconsin.  He maintains an office in Ashland, 
Wisconsin.  Although Dr. Hamp performed the aspiration on Mr. 
Paynter's growth in his Michigan office, Dr. Hamp sent the 
samples to Wisconsin where they were analyzed by a pathologist.  
Given these contacts with the state of Wisconsin, it does not 
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice" to subject Dr. Hamp to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin 
state courts. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
32 
 
[A]n action to recover damages for injury arising from 
any treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been discovered, except 
that an action may not be commenced under this 
paragraph more than 5 years from the date of the 
act or omission. 
¶90 It is undisputed that Mr. Paynter first discovered his 
injury on June 19, 2014.  It is also undisputed that the 
Paynters mailed their request for mediation to the Wisconsin 
Medical Mediation Panels sometime during May 2015, which was 
within one year of June 19, 2014, and was not more than five 
years after the act giving rise to the Paynters' injury——i.e., 
the June 14, 2010 misdiagnosis. 
¶91 Accordingly, the Paynters' negligence claim against 
Dr. Hamp is timely.  Dr. Hamp is not entitled to summary 
judgment as to that claim. 
B 
¶92  Next, we address the Paynters' claim that Dr. Hamp 
violated Mr. Paynter's right to informed consent.   
¶93 Dr. Hamp argues that, to the extent Dr. Hamp violated 
Mr. Paynter's right to informed consent, that injury occurred in 
Michigan because Mr. Paynter was in Michigan when Dr. Hamp 
allegedly informed him that his growth was not malignant and 
needed no further treatment. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
33 
 
¶94 The Paynters urge us to apply the reasoning set forth 
in Abraham74 and conclude that their informed consent claim is 
not foreign because the "last significant event" giving rise to 
their claim——i.e., Dr. Hamp's conveyance of his incorrect 
diagnosis——occurred in Wisconsin. 
¶95 We agree with Dr. Hamp and conclude that the Paynters' 
informed consent claim is a "foreign cause of action" for 
purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing statute. 
¶96 In reaching our conclusion, we are guided by the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin's decision in Studio & Partners, 
s.r.l. v. KI, No. 06-C-628, 2007 WL 3342597 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 
2007). 
¶97 In Studio & Partners, plaintiff Studio & Partners 
(S&P), an Italian company, claimed that KI, a Wisconsin company, 
unlawfully misappropriated S&P's design for a chair used in 
schools and other academic settings.75  S&P argued that it 
sustained injuries in Wisconsin because that is where KI 
allegedly: (1) misappropriated S&P's design; (2) concealed its 
misappropriation; (3) sold the products; (4) caused the filings 
for fraudulent patents; and (5) earned profits on the stolen 
design.76 
                                                 
74 See supra ¶¶50-55. 
75 Studio 
& 
Partners, 
s.r.l. 
v. 
KI, 
No. 
06-C-628, 
2007WL3342597, *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2007). 
76 Id., *3. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
34 
 
¶98 The Eastern District of Wisconsin rejected S&P's 
argument, explaining that "it is apparent that these events 
reflect where the alleged injury was caused, not where it 
occurred."77  The court in Studio & Partners concluded that the 
injury occurs where it is felt rather than where it originates, 
and it was undisputed that "S&P became poorer (if at all) in 
Italy, not Wisconsin."78 
¶99 We agree with the reasoning set forth in Studio & 
Partners.  To the extent Dr. Hamp violated Mr. Paynter's right 
to informed consent, that injury was felt in Michigan because 
Mr. Paynter was in Michigan when Dr. Hamp allegedly informed him 
that his growth was not malignant and needed no further 
treatment.  As the court of appeals explained, "[b]ecause [Mr. 
Paynter] was located in Michigan at that time, his alleged 
injury——i.e., the loss of the opportunity to choose his course 
of treatment——occurred in Michigan, not Wisconsin."79   
                                                 
77 Id. (emphasis in original). 
78 Id. 
79 Paynter, 381 Wis. 2d 239, ¶39. 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
35 
 
¶100 Dr. Hamp proved that the Paynters' informed consent 
claim is a "foreign cause of action" for purposes of Wisconsin's 
borrowing statute.  Accordingly, we apply Michigan's medical 
malpractice statute of limitations.   
¶101 Michigan's 
statute 
of 
limitations 
applicable 
to 
medical malpractice actions requires a plaintiff to file suit 
within the later of: (1) two years from the date his or her 
claim accrued;80 or (2) six months after the plaintiff discovered 
                                                                                                                                                             
Basing the applicability of the borrowing statute on 
whether the test in International Shoe is met is not helpful.  
The 
jurisdictional 
test 
set 
forth 
in 
International 
Shoe 
addresses a different issue than the borrowing statute, namely, 
the former addresses a court's personal jurisdiction over a 
particular defendant while the latter addresses what statute of 
limitations applies to a claim that is lawfully brought in a 
Wisconsin court.  If the International Shoe test is met, then 
the claim may be brought in Wisconsin, but that does not answer 
the question of whether the borrowing statute applies to the 
claim.  If the International Shoe test is not met, then the 
claim may not be brought in Wisconsin at all.  Under such a 
test, no claim lawfully brought in Wisconsin will ever be 
considered a "foreign cause of action" under the borrowing 
statute. 
Moreover, as we explained more fully in footnote 64 supra, 
our approach supplies the highest degree of certainty possible 
to plaintiffs.  Mr. Paynter knew where he was located when he 
allegedly 
lost 
the 
opportunity 
to 
choose 
his 
course 
of 
treatment.  However, that certainty would be undermined if the 
applicability of the borrowing statute turned on where Dr. Hamp 
was located when he committed the allegedly tortious act.  Given 
the increased utilization of telemedicine in our healthcare 
system, Mr. Paynter and similarly situated plaintiffs should not 
be tasked with divining where their physician happened to be 
located when the alleged tortious act was committed.  
80 Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8) (2018). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
36 
 
or should have discovered the existence of his or her claim.81  
In Michigan, a claim for medical malpractice "accrues" when the 
malpractice occurs.82 
¶102 Again, it is undisputed that the Paynters mailed their 
mediation request in May 2015, which was more than two years 
after the June 14, 2010 misdiagnosis.  It is further undisputed 
that the Paynters discovered or should have discovered the 
existence of their claim on June 19, 2014, but they did not mail 
their mediation request within six months of that date. 
¶103 Accordingly, the Paynters' informed consent claim 
against Dr. Hamp is untimely.  Dr. Hamp is entitled to summary 
judgment as to this claim. 
V 
¶104 Finally, before concluding, we address the Paynters' 
appeal from the circuit court's order determining that an 
insurance policy issued to Dr. Hamp by Defendant-Respondent 
ProAssurance 
Wisconsin 
Insurance 
Company 
did 
not 
provide 
coverage for the Paynters' claims.  The court of appeals did not 
resolve the coverage issue because it concluded that all of the 
Paynters' claims were time barred. 
¶105 The Paynters' petition for review raised the insurance 
coverage issue only to preserve it.  Their petition states that 
"[b]ecause the unique policy language in issue does not meet 
                                                 
81 Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5838a(2) (2018). 
82 Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5838a(1) (2018). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
37 
 
this court's criteria for review, the Paynters request that this 
issue be remanded to the appellate court upon reinstatement of 
their cause of action." 
¶106 ProAssurance did not state a preference as to which 
court (i.e., this court or the court of appeals) should resolve 
the insurance coverage dispute, if the issue was reached at all.  
To the extent ProAssurance did state a preference as to which 
court should decide the issue if the issue were revived, 
ProAssurance admitted that the insurance coverage issue "d[id] 
not by itself warrant acceptance of the petition for review."  
Dr. Hamp, ProAssurance's insured, did not address the issue at 
all in his response to the Paynters' petition. 
¶107 It was surprising, then, to see ProAssurance spend a 
significant portion of its response brief83 addressing the merits 
of the insurance coverage issue.  The Paynters did not address 
the merits of the coverage issue in their brief-in-chief.  By 
waiting until its response brief to raise arguments on the 
merits of the insurance coverage issue, ProAssurance placed the 
Paynters in the unenviable position of deciding whether to 
address the merits of the insurance coverage issue in the 
limited space available in their reply brief.84   
¶108 More importantly, ProAssurance's actions deprived Dr. 
Hamp of any opportunity to address the insurance coverage issue 
                                                 
83 Approximately 8 pages of a 20-page argument. 
84 See Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.19(8)(c)2. & 809.63. 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
38 
 
to this court in writing.  It is for this reason that arguments 
raised for the first time in reply briefs are generally not 
addressed——"[i]t prevents the opposing party from having an 
adequate opportunity to respond."85 
¶109 We therefore decline to address the insurance coverage 
issue.  We instruct the court of appeals to resolve this issue 
on remand in such a fashion that is consistent with this 
opinion. 
VI 
¶110 On this issue of first impression, we hold that in 
medical malpractice cases involving a negligent misdiagnosis 
that results in a latent, though continuous, injury, whether the 
action is "foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute is determined by whether the plaintiff's first injury 
occurred outside of Wisconsin.   
¶111 We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the borrowing statute applies to the Paynters' negligence claim.  
On the record before the court, Mr. Paynter's place of first 
injury 
is 
beyond 
ascertainment 
to 
any 
reasonable, 
non-
speculative degree.  When the plaintiff's place of first injury 
is unknowable, as in the instant case, Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute does not apply.   
¶112  However, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
Paynters' informed consent claim is "foreign" for purposes of 
                                                 
85 A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 
492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
2017AP739   
 
39 
 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute.  Accordingly, we apply Michigan's 
statute of limitations to the Paynters' informed consent claim 
and conclude that the claim is untimely.  Dr. Hamp is entitled 
to summary judgment as to that claim. 
¶113 Finally, we decline to address the Paynters' appeal 
from the circuit court's order determining that an insurance 
policy issued to Dr. Hamp by Defendant-Respondent ProAssurance 
Wisconsin Insurance Company did not provide coverage for the 
Paynters' claims.  Instead, we remand the cause to the court of 
appeals to resolve the insurance coverage issue in such a 
fashion that is consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 
the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2017AP739.awb 
 
1 
 
¶114 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (Concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the 
borrowing statute1 does not apply to the Paynters' negligence 
claim.  Majority op., ¶11.  Additionally, I agree that the case 
should be remanded to the court of appeals to address the 
Paynters' 
argument 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
its 
determination that Dr. Hamp's insurance policy did not provide 
coverage for the Paynters' claims.  Id., ¶13. 
¶115 I part ways with the majority, however, in its 
treatment of the Paynters' informed consent claim.2  In my view, 
the majority's proffered test is unworkable. 
¶116 Instead of applying Wisconsin's statute of limitations 
to an informed consent claim when the injury is "felt" in 
Wisconsin, I would turn to the familiar International Shoe test.3  
Applying that test, I determine that the Paynters' informed 
                                                 
1 The borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.07, provides: 
(1) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign 
cause of action and the foreign period of limitation 
which applies has expired, no action may be maintained 
in this state. 
(2) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign 
cause of action and the foreign period of limitation 
which applies to that action has not expired, but the 
applicable Wisconsin period of limitation has expired, 
no action may be maintained in this state. 
2 Accordingly, I join the majority opinion with the 
exception of part IV.B. 
3 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945). 
No.  2017AP739.awb 
 
2 
 
consent cause of action is not a "foreign cause of action" for 
purposes of the borrowing statute and therefore can proceed. 
¶117 Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
I 
¶118 The alleged violation of Mr. Paynter's right to 
informed consent occurred during the phone call of June 14, 
2010.  Majority op., ¶33.  During this phone call, Dr. Hamp told 
Mr. Paynter that the growth on his neck was not cancerous and he 
did not need any further treatment.  Id., ¶17.  It is undisputed 
that Mr. Paynter was located in his Michigan home when he 
received this phone call.  Id., ¶33. 
¶119 Analyzing these facts, the majority endeavors to 
determine whether the informed consent cause of action is 
"foreign" for purposes of the borrowing statute.  In doing so, 
it relies on an unpublished federal case setting forth the legal 
test as follows:  "the injury occurs where it is felt rather 
than where it originates . . . ."  Id., ¶98 (citing Studio & 
Partners, s.r.l. v. KI, No. 06-C-628, 2007 WL 3342597, *3 (E.D. 
Wis. Nov. 7, 2007)). 
¶120 Applying this test, the majority determines that the 
Paynters' informed consent claim is a "foreign cause of action" 
pursuant to the borrowing statute.  Majority op., ¶95.  In the 
majority's view, "[t]o the extent Dr. Hamp violated Mr. 
Paynter's right to informed consent, that injury was felt in 
Michigan because Mr. Paynter was in Michigan when Dr. Hamp 
allegedly informed him that his growth was not malignant and 
needed no further treatment."  Id., ¶99.  "Because [Mr. Paynter] 
No.  2017AP739.awb 
 
3 
 
was located in Michigan at that time, his alleged injury——i.e., 
the loss of the opportunity to choose his course of treatment——
occurred in Michigan, not Wisconsin."  Id. 
¶121 In 
my 
view, 
the 
majority's 
proffered 
test 
is 
unworkable.  Given the rise of telemedicine, the majority's 
focus on where the injury is "felt" creates unreasonable and 
unpredictable results. 
¶122 For example, what if a patient gets a call from the 
doctor while traveling in another country?  Does that mean the 
foreign country's statute of limitations applies?  What if the 
call comes in when the patient is on an airplane?  What if 
medical test results are transmitted electronically?  What if 
the notice that those results have been transmitted is received 
in one state but the results are first viewed in another? 
¶123 Patients and doctors are more mobile than ever before, 
and technology now allows us to be connected worldwide at all 
times of the day and night.  Rather than tethering the statute 
of limitations for a patient's informed consent cause of action 
to the patient's location at the time of the alleged violation, 
I would use a predictable and familiar guide.  Namely, I would 
answer this question using the test set forth in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
¶124 Thus, 
I 
conclude 
that 
Wisconsin's 
statute 
of 
limitations applies to a cause of action premised on a violation 
of a patient's right to informed consent if the defendant has 
"certain minimum contacts with [Wisconsin] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
No.  2017AP739.awb 
 
4 
 
fair play and substantial justice."  See id. (citations 
omitted).  This approach provides predictability and workability 
that the majority's "where the injury is felt" standard lacks. 
¶125 Applying the International Shoe test to the facts of 
this case, I determine that Dr. Hamp had the requisite minimum 
contacts so as to make Wisconsin's statute of limitations 
applicable to the informed consent cause of action.  As the 
majority acknowledges, Dr. Hamp is licensed to practice medicine 
in Wisconsin and maintains an office in Ashland.  Majority op., 
¶86 n.73 (explaining that "we have no trouble concluding that 
Dr. Hamp had the requisite 'minimum contacts' with Wisconsin" 
based on his medical licensure and maintenance of an office 
within the state). 
¶126 Accordingly, I conclude that Wisconsin's statute of 
limitations applies to the informed consent cause of action in 
addition to the negligence cause of action.  Thus, the Paynters 
should be able to continue their pursuit of both of these 
claims. 
¶127 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
 
 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶128 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the 
borrowing statute does not bar the Paynters' negligence claim, 
but not with the tests the majority adopts for determining 
whether 
Wisconsin's 
borrowing 
statute 
applies 
in 
medical 
malpractice cases alleging a negligent failure to diagnose or a 
violation of a patient's right to informed consent.  The tests 
embraced by the majority lack statutory support and will result 
in absurdities.  Unlike the majority, I would remand the 
informed consent claim to the circuit court to consider whether 
the Paynters state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
I 
¶129 If a plaintiff brings a foreign cause of action into a 
Wisconsin court, Wisconsin's borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.07, commands the application of whichever statute of 
limitations——Wisconsin's or the foreign state's——is shorter: 
(1) If an action is brought in this state on a 
foreign cause of action and the foreign period of 
limitation which applies has expired, no action may be 
maintained in this state.  
(2) If an action is brought in this state on a 
foreign cause of action and the foreign period of 
limitation which applies to that action has not 
expired, but the applicable Wisconsin period of 
limitation has expired, no action may be maintained in 
this state.  
The purpose of Wisconsin's borrowing statute is to reduce forum 
shopping, preclude stale claims, encourage expedient litigation, 
and ensure litigants know whether their claims are timely 
without having to ask a court to decide.  Guertin v. Harbour 
Assurance Co., 141 Wis. 2d 622, 631-32, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987).  
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
2 
 
The statute discourages suits arising in other states from being 
filed in Wisconsin courts when they would be time-barred in the 
foreign venue.  The statute does not define "foreign cause of 
action." 
¶130 The majority says whether a medical malpractice 
misdiagnosis-of-cancer action is "foreign" for purposes of 
Wisconsin's borrowing statute is determined "by whether the 
plaintiff's 
first 
injury 
occurred 
outside 
of 
Wisconsin."  
Majority op., ¶10.  Consequently, if the plaintiff happens to be 
outside of Wisconsin when the injury caused by the misdiagnosis 
arises, the case will be considered a foreign cause of action 
even if the plaintiff resides in Wisconsin and the allegedly 
negligent physician treated the plaintiff in Wisconsin.  The 
majority derives this test not from the text of the statute but 
from three cases applying the borrowing statute but having 
nothing else in common with medical malpractice misdiagnosis-of-
cancer cases:  (1) Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d 622; (2) Abraham v. 
General Cas. Co., 217 Wis. 2d 294, 576 N.W.2d 46 (1998); and (3) 
Faigin v. Doubleday Dell Publ'g Grp., Inc., 98 F.3d 268 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
¶131 Guertin involved a resident of Wisconsin who was 
injured during a slip and fall in Illinois.  Guertin, 141 
Wis. 2d at 624-25.  Abraham extended the borrowing statute to 
contract cases, holding that the action is foreign if the "final 
significant event giving rise to a suable claim occurs outside" 
Wisconsin, reasoning that in a contract dispute, "location [in a 
contract case] is not easily pinned to a particular state."  
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
3 
 
Abraham, 217 Wis. 2d at 305, 311 (quoted source and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Faigin involved a multi-state 
defamation action in which the Seventh Circuit held that because 
some injury occurred in Wisconsin, the cause of action was not 
foreign.  Faigin, 98 F.3d at 272.  None of these cases support 
adopting a place-of-first-injury test for applying the borrowing 
statute in a medical malpractice misdiagnosis-of-cancer case. 
¶132 The typical impossibility of pinpointing when the 
injury first occurs following a cancer misdiagnosis makes a 
place-of-first-injury 
test 
unworkable. 
 
When 
cancer 
goes 
undiagnosed, it is often unfeasible to know the exact moment the 
patient suffers a "greater harm"1 than existed at the time of the 
misdiagnosis.  Whether the cancer cells multiplied seconds, 
minutes, hours, days, or months after the misdiagnosis is 
generally unknowable.  All that can be established is that the 
injury surfaced sometime between the date of misdiagnosis and 
the date on which the plaintiff was later diagnosed with cancer.  
Even if the moment of greater harm could be ascertained to any 
degree of certainty, the physical location of the patient at 
that exact moment should not determine whether the patient's 
case constitutes a foreign cause of action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.07.  The statutory text does not suggest such a test and 
logic counsels against it. 
                                                 
1 The majority, citing Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶25, 242 
Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860, correctly notes that in medical 
malpractice cases involving misdiagnoses, Wisconsin law holds 
that the test for "actionable injury" is the time "when the 
misdiagnosis causes a greater harm than existed at the time of 
misdiagnosis."  Majority op., ¶67 & n.55. 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶133 For example, if a patient was on vacation in Florida 
at the time of "first injury," then under the majority's test, 
the action would be foreign even if the patient was a resident 
of Wisconsin, all treatment occurred in Wisconsin, and the 
doctor practiced only in Wisconsin.  So too for the patient who 
is retired and spends half the year in Arizona, was treated only 
in Wisconsin by a doctor practicing only in Wisconsin, but who 
was first injured while in Arizona.  And for the patient who is 
a Wisconsin resident, was treated in Wisconsin by a Wisconsin 
doctor, but is a college student studying abroad when the injury 
emerges.  Under the majority's test, a lifelong Wisconsin 
resident, 
treated 
in 
Wisconsin 
by 
a 
Wisconsin-licensed 
physician, would have his medical misdiagnosis case deemed a 
foreign cause of action just because the date of his first 
injury coincides with his presence on a cruise ship touring the 
world.  Consider the inconsistency of the borrowing statute's 
application under the following scenario:  a Wisconsin doctor 
sees two patients in his Wisconsin office on the same day and 
the doctor fails to diagnose each patient's cancer.  Each 
patient's injury first appears four years after the missed 
diagnosis.  At that time, the first patient is in Wisconsin, so 
he can seek redress in a Wisconsin court applying the Wisconsin 
statute of limitations.  But the second patient's injury arises 
while visiting relatives in Michigan so his case would be deemed 
a foreign cause of action.  Limitless scenarios demonstrate the 
irrationality of the place-of-injury test adopted by the 
majority in medical malpractice misdiagnosis-of-cancer cases. 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶134 Extending a "place-of-first-injury" test to medical 
malpractice 
misdiagnoses-of-cancer 
cases 
contravenes 
the 
judicially-divined purpose of the statute by elevating the 
physical location of the patient at the moment the misdiagnosis 
causes "greater harm" above every other element comprising a 
medical malpractice claim.  A Wisconsin patient who treats only 
with Wisconsin physicians would be barred from pursuing a claim 
that is timely under the Wisconsin statute of limitations simply 
because her injury surfaced when she happened to be on vacation 
in another place with a shorter statute of limitations.  
Wisconsin residents treated only by Wisconsin doctors but who 
happen to be beyond Wisconsin's borders when their injuries 
arise are not forum shoppers.  Nevertheless, under the rule the 
majority adopts, each patient's cause of action will be deemed 
foreign and subject to the shorter statute of limitations 
controlled by the physical place each patient happened to be at 
the 
moment 
their 
injuries 
materialize. 
 
The 
majority's 
interpretation of the borrowing statute will thereby deprive 
Wisconsin residents of the benefit of Wisconsin laws whenever 
they happen to be outside of Wisconsin at the time their 
respective injuries surface.  A fortuitous event will lead to 
different statutes of limitation for identically situated 
patients, depending solely upon the geographic location of each 
patient when the misdiagnosis causes "greater harm."  The rule 
of law cannot be based upon such happenstance. 
¶135 Instead of squeezing medical malpractice misdiagnosis-
of-cancer cases into an ill-fitting test designed for immediate, 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
6 
 
discrete, 
and 
visible 
injuries, 
the 
unique 
nature 
of 
misdiagnosis-of-cancer cases demands a different test.  In the 
context of a missed cancer diagnosis, the test could be linked 
to the easily-ascertainable location of the actual alleged 
negligent treatment.  Alternatively, only when every element of 
the claim occurred outside of Wisconsin would the cause of 
action be deemed foreign.  Given the fact that Wis. Stat. 
§ "893.07 operates as a legislative choice of law" the test 
could appropriately employ a choice-of-law analysis.  Wenke v. 
Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶14, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  
Nothing in the borrowing statute's text suggests the fluke of 
wherever a patient happens to be physically located at the 
moment of first injury as its foundation, no case commands a 
test based on pure happenstance, and using the place-of-first-
injury test in misdiagnosis-of-cancer cases defies common sense 
and reasonableness. 
¶136 The majority asserts the place-of-first-injury test 
"provides the highest degree of certainty to the party most in 
need of that certainty, i.e., the plaintiff bringing the 
action."  Majority op., ¶73 n.64.  The majority reasons that 
"plaintiffs are more likely to know where their injury occurred 
because they are in control of their own movements and actions."  
Id.  This rationale for the majority's test contradicts the 
majority's conclusion that the borrowing statute does not apply 
to the Paynters' negligence claim because the moment of 
Paynter's injury is unknowable.  Id., ¶¶74, 83.  The majority 
"can think of no test by which a finder of fact could determine 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
7 
 
the location of Mr. Paynter's first injury without speculating,"2 
thereby undermining the suitability of the majority's place-of-
first-injury test in cancer misdiagnosis cases.  The nature of 
missed cancer diagnosis cases makes detecting the moment the 
cancer 
creates 
a 
"greater 
harm" 
virtually 
impossible.  
Consequently, perhaps the borrowing statute is incapable of 
being applied in any cases involving a misdiagnosis of cancer.3 
¶137 I agree with the majority that the borrowing statute 
does not apply to the Paynters' medical malpractice claim and 
therefore the Paynters' negligence claim is not time-barred.  I 
reject the majority's adoption of a place-of-first-injury test 
in misdiagnosis-of-cancer cases.  The majority "cannot accept 
the ease with which a negligent misdiagnosis claim could be 
transformed from a 'foreign' cause of action to a non-foreign 
one" if the patient entered Wisconsin between the time of the 
misdiagnosis and the time of its discovery.  Majority op., ¶71.  
The majority's concern applies equally to the ease with which 
its test results in a Wisconsin resident having her claim 
transformed into a foreign cause of action based merely on her 
temporary absence from Wisconsin at the time her injury happens 
to emerge. 
II 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶83. 
3 Although the majority notes that the moment of "greater 
harm" in some misdiagnosis cases may be possible to determine, 
citing Paul v. Skemp, that case did not involve a cancer 
misdiagnosis.  See majority op., ¶86 n.72. 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶138 The majority also errs in basing the application of 
the borrowing statute to medical malpractice informed consent 
claims on where the resulting injury was "felt."  The majority 
deems the Paynters' informed consent claim foreign because 
Paynter "felt" the effect of Dr. Hamp's alleged violation of 
Paynter's right to informed consent in Michigan where he 
received a phone call from the doctor, who allegedly told 
Paynter the pathology report revealed no malignancy.  The 
majority takes this test from an unpublished federal district 
court case, Studio & Partners, s.r.l. v. KI, No. 06-C-628, 2007 
WL 3342597 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2007), involving a dispute between 
two feuding businesses over economic losses.  The majority's 
"injury is felt" test makes no more sense than the majority's 
place-of- first-injury test. 
¶139 Besides being an unpublished federal district court 
case and therefore not binding on this court, Studio & Partners 
is inapposite.  Studio & Partners involved a dispute between KI, 
a 
Wisconsin 
furniture 
manufacturer/seller, 
and 
Studio 
& 
Partners, a furniture design company based in Italy, over a 
chair.  Id. at *1.  Studio & Partners sued KI in Wisconsin 
alleging KI misappropriated its chair design, illegally patented 
the design, and profited $50 million from selling the chairs.  
Id. at *1-*2. The district court concluded the case constituted 
a foreign cause of action and applied Italy's statute of 
limitations because Studio & Partners' injuries were economic 
losses suffered in Italy, not in Wisconsin.  Id. at *3.  Under 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
9 
 
this holding, when the injury is economic, courts look to where 
the "economic effects were felt."  See id. 
¶140 An informed consent claim does not involve lost 
profits.  Paynter characterizes his injury as a "loss of the 
opportunity to choose his course of treatment."  Majority op., 
¶33.  Lost opportunity to choose treatment is not an economic 
loss and should therefore not be controlled by where the loss is 
"felt."  Using a test based on where an injury is "felt" may 
make sense for an economic loss, but in the context of medical 
malpractice informed consent cases it results in the same 
randomness and suffers from the same irrationality as the place- 
of-first-injury test in medical misdiagnosis cases. 
¶141  Wisconsin Stat. § 448.30 governs informed consent and 
provides: 
Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the 
patient about the availability of reasonable alternate 
medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and 
risks of these treatments. The reasonable physician 
standard is the standard for informing a patient under 
this 
section. 
The 
reasonable 
physician 
standard 
requires 
disclosure 
only 
of 
information 
that 
a 
reasonable physician in the same or a similar medical 
specialty 
would 
know 
and 
disclose 
under 
the 
circumstances. The physician's duty to inform the 
patient under this section does not require disclosure 
of: 
(2) Detailed technical information that in all 
probability a patient would not understand. 
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient. 
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might 
falsely or detrimentally alarm the patient. 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
10 
 
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to 
provide treatment would be more harmful to the patient 
than treatment. 
(6) Information in cases where the patient is 
incapable of consenting. 
(7) Information about alternate medical modes of 
treatment for any condition the physician has not 
included in his or her diagnosis at the time the 
physician informs the patient. 
Informed consent is unique to the medical field.  The injury 
from a physician's failure to comply with the informed consent 
statute is not lost profits or other economic loss.  The injury 
is a patient's inability to make an informed treatment choice 
because the physician failed to fully present all options.  Any 
test for applying the borrowing statute to an informed consent 
claim must be linked to the treating physician's alleged 
tortious act.  A "feel" test is imponderable. 
¶142 The "feel" test in Studio & Partners may be suitable 
in cases involving economic losses because where the economic 
losses a business suffers may be objectively measured.  "Feel" 
in the informed consent context cannot.  By "feel," the majority 
really means where Paynter happened to be when he took the phone 
call from Dr. Hamp.  This test produces the same fortuity 
problem 
as 
the 
majority's 
place-of-first-injury 
test 
for 
misdiagnosis claims. 
¶143 The Defendants-Respondents allege in their Answers to 
the Paynters' complaint that the Paynters' informed consent 
claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Because the issues presented to this court relate solely to the 
borrowing statute, none of the parties address whether Paynter 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
11 
 
can assert an informed consent claim under these facts (namely 
that Dr. Hamp did not treat him because Dr. Hamp believed there 
was no malignancy) and the majority does not decide it.  
Accordingly, I decline to address it further.  I would remand 
this claim to the circuit court to do so. 
III 
¶144 Although I agree with the majority's decision to 
remand the insurance coverage issue to the court of appeals, I 
disagree with the majority's decision to base this disposition 
on (1) ProAssurance's decision to brief the merits of coverage 
despite Dr. Hamp's failure to address the issue in his response 
to the Paynters' petition for review and (2) ProAssurance's 
statement in its response to the petition that the insurance 
coverage issue alone did not warrant this court's review.  
ProAssurance is the Wisconsin insurer for Dr. Hamp, but Dr. Hamp 
and ProAssurance have separate counsel because of the insurance 
coverage dispute. 
¶145 The majority expresses "surpris[e]" that ProAssurance 
spent "a significant portion of its response brief addressing 
the merits of the insurance coverage issue."  Majority op., ¶107 
(footnote omitted).  The majority suggests that by doing so, 
ProAssurance 
prevented 
the 
other 
parties 
from 
having 
an 
opportunity 
to 
respond. 
 
The 
majority's 
criticism 
of 
ProAssurance is unwarranted. 
¶146 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
to 
ProAssurance on coverage.  The operative policy language in 
ProAssurance's policy provides: 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
12 
 
We will neither defend nor pay damage for any 
liability arising from, relating to, or in any way 
connected with the rendering or failure to render 
professional services by James A. Hamp, M.D., at the 
following location(s):  in the State of Michigan 
and/or outside the State of Wisconsin. 
(Emphasis added.)  The court of appeals did not address coverage 
because it disposed of the case on other grounds.  The Paynters' 
petition for review to this court raised the coverage issue 
solely to preserve it: 
The Paynters also raise an insurance coverage issue 
not addressed by the appellate court (see Paynter, 
2018 WL 1512092, ¶3, n. 3) to preserve this issue.  
Because the unique policy language in issue does not 
meet this court's criteria for review, the Paynters 
request that this issue be remanded to the appellate 
court upon reinstatement of their cause of action. 
¶147 In its response to the Paynters' petition for review, 
ProAssurance refuted the substance of the Paynters' claims based 
on Wis. Stat. § 893.07 and asserted "the issue of insurance 
coverage is moot and does not by itself warrant acceptance of 
the petition for review." 
¶148 In their initial brief, the Paynters do not argue the 
merits of the coverage issue:  "The Paynters have raise[d] the 
insurance coverage issue to preserve this issue and request that 
this issue be remanded to the appellate court upon reinstatement 
of their cause of action."  In response, ProAssurance devoted 
relatively little of its response brief to the merits of the 
coverage issue. 
¶149 It is disingenuous for the majority to ground its 
decision to remand the coverage determination to the court of 
appeals on the basis that ProAssurance included an insurance 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
13 
 
coverage argument in its merits brief to this court despite 
asserting in its response to the Paynters' petition for review 
that the coverage issue alone did not warrant granting of the 
petition.  There was no reason for ProAssurance to make a 
coverage argument at the petition-for-review stage of the 
proceedings.  The Paynters did not argue coverage existed, but 
simply preserved the issue.  ProAssurance, at that point, had a 
coverage determination in its favor from the circuit court, as 
well as a favorable court of appeals decision that did not 
address coverage because the court of appeals disposed of the 
case under Wis. Stat. § 893.07 and the statute of limitations. 
¶150 When this court granted the Paynters' petition for 
review, however, ProAssurance's counsel had no reasonable choice 
but to argue the merits of coverage even though the Paynters and 
Dr. Hamp did not.  Insurance coverage is an issue of law, which 
this court reviews independently.  Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., 
Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶12, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 
881 N.W.2d 285.  Although neither the Paynters nor Dr. Hamp 
argued the merits of coverage, it was among the issues presented 
in the Paynters' petition this court granted for review.  
Accordingly, this court could have chosen to decide insurance 
coverage.  A reasonable reading of ProAssurance's brief reveals 
that it included its insurance coverage argument so that if this 
court chose to decide the issue, ProAssurance's position was 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
14 
 
presented.  ProAssurance did not ask this court to decide 
coverage; instead, it asked us to affirm the court of appeals.4 
¶151 Given the procedural posture of this case, it is 
proper to remand the insurance coverage decision to the court of 
appeals, before which the issue can be thoroughly briefed and 
argued before a decision is rendered.  It is unreasonable for 
the majority to suggest that ProAssurance's presentation of the 
issue somehow necessitated remand. 
¶152 For these reasons, I respectfully concur with the 
majority in allowing the Paynters' negligence claim to proceed 
although I do not join its reasoning.  I also agree that the 
insurance coverage issue should be remanded to the court of 
appeals.  I dissent from the majority's application of the 
borrowing statute to bar the informed consent claim.  I would 
instead remand the issue of whether the Paynters' informed 
consent claim states a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
¶153 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The majority criticizes an insurer's lawyer for spending 
eight pages of a 32-page brief arguing against coverage, based 
on the language of the policy.  The only thing "surprising" is 
the majority's expectation that an insurance coverage lawyer 
would not make a coverage argument. 
No.  2017AP739.rgb 
 
 
 
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