Title: S.C. v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2020

S.C. v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This appeal involved the investigation into a claim that a mother, S.C., abused her seven-year-old son by corporal punishment. The New Jersey Department of Children and Families (Department) concluded, after its investigation, that the claim of abuse was “not established.” Because the abuse allegation was deemed “not established” rather than “unfounded,” it was not eligible to be expunged. S.C. appealed the Department’s action, claiming: (1) a deprivation of her due process rights because she was not afforded a hearing; and (2) that the Department’s “not established” finding was arbitrary and capricious because the record was insufficient to support a finding that her son was harmed. S.C. did not raise a direct challenge to the validity of having a “not established” finding category in the Department’s regulations, although amici urged that the category be declared illegitimate and eliminated. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded: (1) for the Department to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigation has found credible evidence to support the allegation of harm; and (2) for S.C. to have an informal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its finding. The Supreme Court rejected that due process considerations required the Department to conduct an adjudicative contested case proceeding either internally or at the Office of Administrative Law for a “not established” finding. That said, on the basis of the present record, the Supreme Court could not assess whether the “not established” finding in this instance was arbitrary or capricious. "It would be well worth the effort of the Department to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard for making a 'not established' finding as well as its processes related to such findings. Our review of this matter brings to light shortcomings in fairness for parents and guardians involved in investigations that lead to such findings and which may require appellate review." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. S.C. v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families (A-57-18) (081870)Argued November 18, 2019 -- Decided May 27, 2020LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. This appeal involves the investigation into a claim that a mother, S.C., abused her seven-year-old son by engaging in corporal punishment. The Department of Children and Families (Department) concluded, after its investigation, that the claim of abuse was “not established.” Because the abuse allegation was deemed “not established” rather than “unfounded,” it is not eligible to be expunged. S.C. appealed the Department’s action, claiming (1) a deprivation of her due process rights because she was not afforded a hearing and (2) that the Department’s “not established” finding was arbitrary and capricious because the record was insufficient to support a finding that her son was harmed. S.C. has not raised a direct challenge to the validity of having a “not established” finding category in the Department’s regulations, although some amici have urged that the category be declared illegitimate and eliminated. In May 2016, the Department received a report of suspected child abuse from an education official in a school district. The abuse allegedly concerned one of S.C.’s triplets, “Luke,” who refused to make a Mother’s Day card for S.C. and said, among other things, that his mother hits him with an open hand and with a spatula. A Department investigator interviewed Luke, his sisters, S.C., and her husband (“Martin”). The investigator also visited the children’s school. The children’s principal said that on the day that Luke made the allegation the boy was having a bad week, which was unusual for him. Although he had behavioral problems in the past, she said that Luke had “significantly improved.” She also stated that she was surprised when Luke reported that his mother hit him, adding that the parents are “very involved” and that, prior to this, school personnel had not had other concerns with the family. When the investigator interviewed Luke, he said that his mother “smacks” him, and that she has “hit him on his butt with [a] spatula[,]” but he could not remember the last time either happened. He said that his father also hits him with his hand. Luke’s sisters told the investigator that sometimes their parents hit them with an open hand, but each denied having been hit with a spatula. The investigator observed no marks or bruises on any of the children. 1 The investigator interviewed S.C. and Martin during an unannounced home visit. S.C. admitted that she has hit the children with an open hand. She denied that she has used a spatula to strike the children but “admitted that she smacks the spatula on the counter to get their attention.” Martin admitted to “lightly” spanking his children on occasion. He denied using objects and denied having seen his wife hit the children with a spatula. However, he said he has seen his wife hit a spatula on the counter to get the children’s attention. The investigator added that the home was “fully furnished, clean and well organized.” Each child had appropriate sleeping arrangements and sufficient food. The utilities were on and the investigator did not observe any hazards. The above information in the investigator’s report resulted in the Department’s classifying the allegations of physical abuse against S.C. as “not established.” That designation signifies that “there is not a preponderance of the evidence that a child is an abused or neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, but evidence indicates that the child was harmed or was placed at risk of harm.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(3). The Department sent a letter to the children’s school stating that the investigation was complete and that it had determined no need to provide services to the children. The Department also sent a letter to S.C., informing her that its investigation into the allegations was complete and that it had determined that the allegations were “Not Established.” S.C. was not allowed an administrative appeal opportunity and, apparently, had no opportunity to review, supplement, or discuss the Department’s investigatory materials before the decision issued. Thereafter she filed an appeal in the Appellate Division from the agency action finding the allegations of abuse to be “not established.” The Appellate Division was unpersuaded that an adjudicatory hearing had to be provided when an investigation results in a “not established” finding, which it regarded as “purely investigatory in nature” and which is not disseminated. The Appellate Division also held that the Department’s “not established” finding in this matter was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, pointing to facts that provided “'some evidence’ indicating that S.C. hit the children, even without a spatula, when she was upset with their behavior, leading to the possibility that she could misgauge how much force she was using and put them at risk of harm.” In a concurring opinion, Judge Messano, P.J.A.D., agreed that the denial of an administrative hearing to challenge a “not established” finding did not violate S.C.’s due process rights but wrote separately to express two concerns. First, the letter the Department sent to S.C. “did nothing but parrot the regulatory language and advise S.C. of the consequences of the findings”; “the letter fail[ed] to state, even in conclusory terms, what evidence supported the finding.” Second, the letter’s lack of information was pertinent because, although due process rights are not violated, a “not established” finding may have negative consequences in the future because the record is not subject to expunction. The Court granted S.C.’s petition for certification. 237 N.J. 165 (2019). 2 HELD: The Court reverses and remands (a) for the Department to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigation has found some evidence -- which the Court stresses must be some credible evidence -- to support the allegation of harm; and (b) for S.C. to have an informal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its finding. The Court does not address the amici’s challenge to the validity of the “not established” category but recognizes problems with the standard as presently articulated and notes that it would be well worth the effort of the Department to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard for making a “not established” finding as well as its processes related to such findings.1. When the Department receives an allegation of child abuse or neglect, it must investigate and determine “whether abuse or neglect has occurred.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10- 7.3(a) to (b). “[T]he Department representative shall make a finding that an allegation is 'substantiated,’ 'established,’ 'not established,’ or 'unfounded.’” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c). The differentiation among those four categories creates two general classes of findings. “A finding of either established or substantiated shall constitute a determination . . . that a child is an abused or neglected child,” while “[a] finding of either not established or unfounded shall constitute a determination . . . that a child is not an abused or neglected child.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(d). A finding that an allegation is “unfounded” is subject to expunction. A record containing a “substantiated,” “established,” or “not established” finding is required to be retained. (pp. 21-25)2. Prior to 2013, Department investigations could result in one of two findings: “substantiated” or “unfounded.” The current four-category system took effect in 2013 following robust public input. The Department explained its intent in differentiating between “not established” and “unfounded” when rejecting a comment that “not established” findings should be eligible for expunction: “The critical distinction . . . is that not established findings are based on some evidence, though not necessarily a preponderance of evidence, that a child was harmed or placed at risk of harm.” And to prepare for “the investigation of future allegations,” the Department determined that the “information contained in records of not established cases must be maintained.” For records the Department retains, confidentiality is the presumptive starting point, but N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a) provides for the release of information regarding reports of child abuse in twenty-two enumerated circumstances, and the Department may consider a “not established” finding in its child protection and welfare work. (pp. 25-31)3. When determining the protections due process demands in a given situation, the Court applies the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 335 (1976). Mathews recognizes that an evidentiary hearing “is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances,” so long as the person whose rights are affected is given an opportunity to assert his or her claim prior to any administrative action. Id. at 348-49. Thus, minimally, notice and opportunity to be heard are the essentials of due process. (pp. 31-33) 3 4. Here, S.C. underwent a Department investigation based on an alleged claim that she engaged in child abuse. An investigation is distinct from an adjudication of facts and gives rise to a different set of expectations. When a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Here, the Appellate Division rightly viewed S.C.’s claimed right to an adjudicatory hearing through the prism of the Department’s investigatory finding. The Department has not adjudicated facts or reached any sort of conclusion about what actually occurred when it applies a “not established” finding; rather, it merely ascribes what functions as a working label to the evidence collected through investigation. That distinction substantially lessens any private interest impact that S.C. can claim, and any claimed private interest is far outweighed by the Department’s legitimate reasons for acting knowledgeably in future investigations. The Court separately considers S.C.’s interest in the investigatory finding in connection with the exceptions and disclosures enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a. The Court concludes that due process does not compel imposition of a formalized adversarial trial-type process in the setting of a “not established” finding -- where no child abuse conclusion has been reached. (pp. 33-42)5. S.C.’s reputational interest can be properly respected without the requirement of a full-fledged adjudicatory hearing. The essential elements of notice and opportunity to be heard are what due process protects. In keeping with those essentials, when the Department is concluding an investigation into suspected child abuse or neglect and expects to issue a finding of “not established,” notice -- meaningful for due process considerations -- of that investigatory finding should be provided to the individual. The notice should include a summary of the support for the finding, and the Department’s reasoning should be transparently disclosed. Moreover, the individual must be informed of his or her opportunity to rebut the Department’s conclusion or supplement the record so that the informal opportunity to be heard before the agency is not illusory. The current process of not making a record available unless and until an appeal is filed is no substitute. (pp. 42-44)6. Here, the conclusory letter that the Department sent to S.C. failed to inform her of the basis for the Department’s “not established” finding. And there does not appear to be an adequate means of formally making known to a parent or guardian under investigation the opportunity to be heard informally and rebut or supplement the record. Corrective action by the Department in the future can solve that. (p. 44)7. With respect to the Department’s standard for making a finding of “not established,” the Court agrees with the criticism that the standard for that finding, as written now, is vague, amorphous, and incapable of any objective calibration. All that is known is that it requires less than a preponderance of the evidence and involves “some” evidence. At the very least, the “some evidence” description advanced by the Department must be understood to be “credible evidence.” Beyond that one cannot know what the Department intends by its standard and how it is to be evaluated. The Court leaves to the 4 Department the responsibility to reexamine and clarify its standard. No facial challenge is presented in this matter and the Court will not reach the issue without that. (pp. 44-46) REVERSED and REMANDED. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees with the majority that the Department’s “some evidence” standard for making “not established” determinations is vague and amorphous and has led to shortcomings in fairness for parents and guardians. However, Justice Albin would go further and strike down the “not established” category. Justice Albin writes that the Department, in creating a “not established” category, has exceeded the authority delegated to it by the Legislature. The “not established” category, in Justice Albin’s view, has allowed the Department to elide making the determination that the Legislature expects of it -- a determination whether the allegation is unfounded -- and the Department’s good intentions cannot save a regulation that undermines the Title Nine expungement statute. Justice Albin would end this case today and spare S.C. the hardship and expense of a remand because the Department’s own findings establish that the abuse and neglect allegations in S.C.’s case are “unfounded,” as defined by the Department’s own regulation.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 57 September Term 2018 081870 S.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 18, 2019 May 27, 2020Victoria D. Miranda argued the cause for appellant (Williams Law Group, attorneys; Allison Williams, of counsel and on the brief, and Victoria D. Miranda on the briefs).Peter Alvino, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General and Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Peter Alvino and Julie B. Colonna, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).Melville D. Miller Jr. argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Legal Services of New Jersey, attorneys; Melville D. Miller Jr., Mary 1 M. McManus-Smith, Jeyanthi C. Rajaraman, Chiori Kaneko, and Sylvia L. Thomas, on the briefs). Katherine Haas argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union on New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and Fox Rothschild, attorneys; Jacob S. Perskie and Victoria T. Salami, of counsel and on the brief, and Jeanne LoCicero and Alexander Shalom, on the brief). Deric Wu Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of Parental Representation (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Office of Parental Representation, attorney; T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, and Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel, and Deric Wu, of counsel and on the brief). Jeralyn L. Lawrence argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (Evelyn Padin, President, New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Jeralyn L. Lawrence, Daniel A. Burton, Thomas J. DeCataldo, Jr., and Ronald G. Lieberman, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. The Department of Children and Families (Department) is charged withthe responsibility to investigate all allegations of child abuse or neglect. 1Pursuant to its operational regulations, the Department’s investigation into1 Although the Division of Child Protection and Permanency within the Department performs this responsibility, see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11, we refer throughout to the Department, which is the named defendant-respondent. 2 such allegations can result in one of four possible determinations. Anallegation can be “substantiated,” “established,” “not established,” or“unfounded.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c). Different consequences flow from thosedesignations. This appeal involves the Department’s investigation into a claim that amother, S.C., abused her seven-year-old son by engaging in corporalpunishment. The investigation concluded that the claim of abuse was “notestablished.” The Department sent a letter informing S.C. of that finding, butthe letter provided little detail and no explanation for that determination.Because the abuse allegation was deemed “not established,” it is not eligible tobe expunged. The Legislature requires expunction only for child abuse orneglect allegations determined to be “unfounded,” see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a, andno statutory or regulatory provision authorizes expunging allegations of theother three possible determinations. Although the record and report involvingS.C.’s “not established” finding is statutorily confidential, the information canbe made available under circumstances identified by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a. S.C. appealed the Department’s action, claiming (1) a deprivation of herdue process rights because she was not afforded a hearing and (2) that theDepartment’s “not established” finding was arbitrary and capricious because 3 the record was insufficient to support a finding that her son was harmed. TheAppellate Division’s decision affirmed the Department’s action, with aconcurrence expressing a need for revision in the Department’s processes. We now reverse and require further action. We remand (a) for theDepartment to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigationhas found some evidence -- which we here stress must be some credibleevidence -- to support the allegation of harm; and (b) for S.C. to have aninformal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement therecord before the Department finalizes its finding. We reject that due processconsiderations require the Department to conduct an adjudicative contestedcase proceeding either internally or at the Office of Administrative Law for a“not established” finding. That said, on the basis of the present record, wecannot assess whether the “not established” finding in this instance wasarbitrary or capricious. S.C. has not raised a direct challenge to the validity of having a “notestablished” finding category in the Department’s regulations, although someamici have urged that the category be declared illegitimate and eliminated.We will not address an argument not raised by appellant, particularly when theDepartment advances a facially legitimate basis for such findings’ use and anargument that the regulation’s promulgation was reasonably within its 4 statutory delegation of authority. However, we recognize problems with thestandard as presently articulated. It would be well worth the effort of theDepartment to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard formaking a “not established” finding as well as its processes related to suchfindings. Our review of this matter brings to light shortcomings in fairness forparents and guardians involved in investigations that lead to such findings andwhich may require appellate review. I. A. The facts are gleaned from the Department’s investigatory file in thismatter. The file, redacted to protect identities and other information requiredby law to be kept confidential, was not made available to S.C. until this matterwas appealed to the Appellate Division. 22 This is the procedure presently used by the Department. The Department stated at oral argument that the investigative summary report is first revealed to the family on appeal, at the latest, when the statement of items comprising the record on appeal is filed. The only source of information concerning a Department investigation a parent has prior to an appeal is through discussion with a case worker during the investigation itself when information is collected or through a discussion with the Department, if the parents so choose, under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(19) (allowing release of information “only to the extent necessary” for parents to discuss Department “services,” to participate in “case plan” development or implementation, or “to understand the basis for the [D]epartment’s involvement”). After parents receive a letter from the Department reporting the agency’s findings, their recourse is appellate review. 5 On May 4, 2016, the Department received a report of suspected childabuse from an education official in a school district. The abuse allegedlyconcerned one of S.C.’s triplets. The reporting source informed theDepartment that S.C.’s son, Luke, 3 “disclosed that his mother hits him.”According to the reporter, the information was revealed when Luke “refused tomake his mother a Mother’s Day card and stated that he hated her.” Luke thensaid a number of other things: that his mother hits his “face, stomach, andbuttocks,” and that “one time his buttocks was as red as a fire truck”; that hismother hits him with an open hand and with a spatula; and that the last timeS.C. hit him was two days prior, when he refused to shower. He also “statedthat one time he said that it didn’t hurt when he was hit so he got hit again.” When Luke’s noncompliant behavior in school was noted by a schoolofficial, and a report of alleged abuse was relayed to the Department, Luke andhis sisters were within days of turning eight years old. Luke was a specialneeds student, classified as emotionally disturbed. Although Luke had beenchallenged by behavioral issues in the past (while in kindergarten, he hadripped down a shelf holding a TV monitor), according to his education casemanager, he was doing much better.3 Pseudonyms are used to protect the family’s confidentiality. 6 The day after the alleged abuse was reported, a Department investigatorinterviewed Luke, his sisters, S.C., and her husband (Martin). The investigatoralso visited the children’s school. The education case manager reiterated the allegations detailed in thereport from the previous day and added that S.C. and her husband “alwaysattend child study team meetings” and that “[t]he school had no other concernsregarding the family.” Similarly, the children’s principal told the investigatorthat on the day that Luke made the allegation the boy was having a bad week,which was unusual for him. Although he had behavioral problems in the past,she said that Luke had “significantly improved.” She also stated that she wassurprised when Luke reported that his mother hit him, adding that the parentsare “very involved” and that, prior to this, school personnel had not had otherconcerns with the family. When the investigator interviewed Luke, he told the investigator that heunderstood the difference between a truth and a lie. With respect to hismother, Luke stated that she counts “1, 2, 3” “a lot.” When asked whathappens when his mother gets to three, he responded, “It’s inappropriate.” Inparticular, he told the investigator that his mother “smacks” him, and that shehas “hit him on his butt with [a] spatula[,]” but he could not remember the lasttime either happened. Luke said that the smacks “kind of hurt[]” but he also 7 thinks it is funny. He said that his father also hits him with his hand. Duringthe interview, he reported that he has been hit on the leg and butt but deniedever being hit in the face. According to the investigator, Luke “appeared to beclean and well kept,” and the investigator did not observe any marks or bruiseson the boy. Luke’s sisters told the investigator that sometimes their parents hit themwith an open hand, but each denied having been hit with a spatula. Bothdenied being fearful of either parent, and the investigator observed no marks orbruises on either girl. The investigator interviewed Luke’s parents in an unannounced homevisit. According to the investigator, Martin was initially “hesitant” to let herinside their home. When told by the investigator why she was there, “heresponded that it is legal to hit children.” Each parent was interviewedseparately. S.C. admitted to the investigator that she has hit the children with anopen hand. When having to correct the triplets’ behavior, she said that “shethreatens the children and then does not follow through.” She explained thatthe children were getting too old for timeouts to be meaningful to correct poorbehavior. She denied that she has used a spatula to strike the children but“admitted that she smacks the spatula on the counter to get their attention.” 8 S.C. also said that her husband hits the children occasionally. Finally, shereported that it is “challenging at times” to discipline the triplets but that “shewill stick to sending the children to their rooms and removing privileges.” Shealso told the investigator that she was endeavoring to have Luke’s classifiedstatus removed. Martin admitted to “lightly” spanking his children on occasion. Hedenied using objects and denied having seen his wife hit the children with aspatula. However, he said he has seen his wife hit a spatula on the counter toget the children’s attention. The investigator added that the home was “fully furnished, clean andwell organized.” Each child had appropriate sleeping arrangements andsufficient food. The utilities were on and the investigator did not observe anyhazards. The above information in the investigator’s report resulted in theDepartment’s classifying the allegations of physical abuse against S.C. as “notestablished.” That designation signifies that “there is not a preponderance ofthe evidence that a child is an abused or neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A.9:6-8.21, but evidence indicates that the child was harmed or was placed atrisk of harm.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(3). The allegations against S.C. were 9 not reported to the prosecutor’s office. Cf. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(e)(“substantiated” findings must be forwarded to law enforcement). On May 25, 2016, the Department sent a letter to the children’s schoolstating that the investigation was complete and that it had determined no needto provide services to the children. The same day, the Department sent a letterto S.C., informing her that its investigation into the allegations was completeand that it had determined that the allegations were “Not Established.”4 Theletter stated in full: New Jersey law, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11, requires the Department of Children and Families (DCF) Division of Child Protection and Permanency (CP&P) to investigate all allegations of child abuse and neglect. On May 4, 2016 the Division’s Bergen Central Local Office received an allegation that [Luke and his sisters] were abused. CP&P conducted its required investigation and determined that the allegation was Not Established. A record of the incident will be maintained in CP&P files. Current law provides that this information may not be disclosed by the Division except as permitted by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a. A finding of Not Established is not subject to an administrative appeal. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:129-7.3c(3), the Division enters a finding of “Not Established” when some evidence indicates that a child was harmed or placed at4 The Department sent another letter, as required by N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.8(a), notifying S.C. that it would not be providing services to the children. 10 some risk of harm, but there is not a preponderance of evidence that the child has been abused or neglected per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. The Division will not be providing further services to [the children] and your family. S.C. was not allowed an administrative appeal opportunity and,apparently, had no opportunity to review, supplement, or discuss theDepartment’s investigatory materials before the decision issued. Thereafter,on July 8, 2016, she filed an appeal in the Appellate Division from the agencyaction finding the allegations of abuse to be “not established.” B. On appeal, S.C. argued that the finding of “not established” wasarbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the record was insufficient tofind the child was harmed and that her inability to challenge the Department’s“investigatory finding through the administrative process” violated her dueprocess rights. The Appellate Division rejected both arguments and affirmedthe Department’s determination. The Appellate Division acknowledged that the Department’s rules grantan administrative hearing only when finding that an abuse or neglect allegationis “substantiated” and was unpersuaded that an adjudicatory hearing had to beprovided when an investigation results in a “not established” finding. The 11 Appellate Division regarded the “not established” finding as “purelyinvestigatory in nature,” explaining that “[a]n investigator simply interviewswitnesses and examines other available evidence, reviews and analyzes thisinformation and makes a recommendation as to whether any action should betaken against the subject of the investigation,” adding, “[t]here is no definitivefinding as to the truth of the allegations by a disinterested, impartial thirdparty.” Further, because a record of a “not established” finding is notdisseminated, the court determined that the finding “does not impugn S.C.’sreputational or privacy interests to an extent that would trigger the need for anadjudicatory hearing.” The court reviewed how “not established” findings are“not made public, the accused’s name is not included in the Central Registry[,]and the finding is not disclosed in connection with a Child Abuse RecordInformation (CARI) check.” (citing N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7). Although theDepartment retains and uses records from an incident deemed “notestablished,” the court did not find a protectible due process interest violatedwhen the “information [was] kept for the use of the agency and entitiesinvolved in the protection of children.” The Appellate Division distinguishedthis case from the facts in Department of Children & Families v. R.R., 454 N.J.Super. 37, 43 (App. Div. 2018), and rejected dictum in that case about how “a 12 'not established’ finding 'is not what it seems’ and 'still permanently tars aparent with a finding that there was something to the allegation.’” The Appellate Division also held that the Department’s “not established”finding in this matter was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. TheAppellate Division pointed to the following facts: “Luke told school officialshis mother hit him with a spatula as well as with an open hand”; Luke“repeated those allegations the following day to the [Department]investigator”; Luke’s allegation that S.C. struck him with an open hand on hisbuttocks and legs was corroborated by Luke’s father, sisters, and even S.C.;even though Luke was classified as emotionally disturbed, “neither schoolofficials nor Luke’s family suggested Luke was prone to making things up”;although Luke “had significant behavioral problems in kindergarten,” hisbehavior had improved; S.C. “acknowledged she hit Luke and his sisters withan open hand” and “admitted to slapping the spatula on her kitchen counter toget the triplets’ attention and 'threatening them’ but 'not following through’”;S.C. “admitted she found [the children’s] behavior 'challenging at times’” and“expressed her frustration at the ineffectiveness of timeouts and thewithholding of privileges in moderating their behavior”; and “Luke’s principalreported that Luke claimed that once when he got hit, he said it did not hurt, sohe got hit again.” The Appellate Division concluded that “those facts provide 13 'some evidence’ indicating that S.C. hit the children, even without a spatula,when she was upset with their behavior, leading to the possibility that shecould misgauge how much force she was using and put them at risk of harm.” In a concurring opinion, Judge Messano, P.J.A.D., agreed that the denialof an administrative hearing to challenge a “not established” finding did notviolate S.C.’s due process rights but wrote separately to express two concerns. First, Judge Messano noted that he was “only convinced there is 'someevidence’ to support the finding in this case because of [the court’s] extensivereview of the record.” The letter sent to S.C. “did nothing but parrot theregulatory language and advise S.C. of the consequences of the findings”; “theletter fail[ed] to state, even in conclusory terms, what evidence supported thefinding.” The concurrence faulted the letter for another reason. Quoting from theDepartment’s own statement when creating a four-tier system of possiblefindings, having four categories was intended to “allow[] the investigativefindings and records to better reflect the circumstances of an investigation.”(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 44 N.J.R. 357(a) (Feb. 21, 2012)).According to the concurrence, here the letter reporting the Department’sfindings “hardly reflected 'the circumstances of the investigation,’ nor did it'reflect the nature’ of the investigator’s’ 'conclusions’ about S.C.’s conduct.” 14 That lack of information was pertinent, said the concurring judge,because although due process rights are not violated, a “not established”finding may have negative consequences in the future because the record is notsubject to expunction. A “not established” finding allows the Department toretain the record, which in turn “allow[s] the [Department] to have a better andmore comprehensive understanding of a family should additional referrals bereceived by the [Department] in the future.” Notably, the record is also“subject to disclosure in a host of situations,” and “the records of 'notestablished’ referrals live on forever within the [Department].” (quoting 44 N.J.R. 357(a)). The concurrence stressed the need for the Department toaccurately express “findings and conclusions in sufficient detail.” Accordingto the concurring judge, a remand for a more specific letter explanation of theresults of the investigation was not necessary because here there was “norequired dissemination to third parties” of the Department’s finding. We granted S.C.’s petition for certification. 237 N.J. 165 (2019).Thereafter, we granted amicus curiae status to the American Civil LibertiesUnion (ACLU), Legal Services of New Jersey (LSNJ), the Office of ParentalRepresentation of the Office of the Public Defender (OPR), and the NewJersey State Bar Association (NJSBA). 15 II. A. 1. S.C. argues that the Appellate Division erred in affirming theinvestigative finding of “not established” because there was no evidence thatthe children were injured or suffered impairment. S.C.’s admission that sheoccasionally spanked the children with an open hand in the past, she contends,cannot provide evidence of harm or risk of harm. A finding that children areplaced at risk of harm from an open-handed spank “permits the [Department]to find that any time a parent exercises their constitutional right to parent achild and use autonomy in determining discipline, they have to be concernedthat they will be branded as a parent who places their children at risk of harm.”She further contends that Luke’s statement that S.C. hit him with a spatula wasuncorroborated. None of the children had marks or bruises on their bodies orreported experiencing any lasting pain. Therefore, she asserts that theDepartment’s finding that the children were placed at harm or risk of harm wasarbitrary and capricious. As she argued below, S.C. also contends that her due process rights wereviolated when the Department entered an administrative finding of “notestablished” with no opportunity to challenge the evidence that was relied 16 upon. S.C. argues that the Department “impugns a parent permanently with afinding that they have harmed or placed their child at risk of harm,” whichshould trigger a due process right to a hearing. She emphasizes that records ofa “not established” finding are retained by the Department and argues that itmay be used against her in several other settings, including as an aggravatingfactor to demonstrate a pattern of abuse or neglect if ever there were a laterinvestigation of the family. Finally, S.C. argues that the Department’s letter itself failed due processrequirements. It failed to provide any meaningful explanation of the evidencerelied upon by the Department when making its finding. The lack of factualfindings also inhibits judicial review to which she is entitled as of right. 2. The Department argues that the creation of an investigatory findingcategory of “not established” is consistent with its broad statutory authorityand responsibility under Title Nine. The Department points to its obligation toinvestigate every incident and prepare a report on its findings. The “notestablished” finding enables investigators “to accurately reflect the nature oftheir conclusions” even when it finds no statutory abuse, but finds harm causedto the child. It maintains that “retention of Department records where someevidence indicates a child has been harmed or placed at risk of harm” is 17 important to the fulfillment of its mission. The “not established” finding andthe record retained as a result of that finding assist the Department in theperformance of its investigatory task by recording the concern raised by theinvestigation and, thus, allowing the Department to better assess future allegedincidents. The Department disagrees that the records may be released in manycircumstances. It asserts that “investigations are confidential and may only bedisclosed for limited purposes specified by statute,” which the Departmentreviewed and explained. Moreover, it contends that the rules of evidencefurther limit the ability of a “not established” finding to be admitted or givenweight in any subsequent action without opportunity to be heard at that time. The Department disputes that under a due process analysis S.C. isentitled to an administrative hearing for the “not established” finding. It notesthat the Appellate Division has never required an administrative hearing forother such investigatory findings. The Department emphasizes that “noconclusion has been drawn that S.C. did anything harmful to her children, theinformation at issue has not been publicly disseminated, and she has beengiven the opportunity to explain her position in the course of the[Department’s] investigation.” The Department adds that its “not established” 18 finding is ill suited to resolution in a disputed trial-type hearing because it isnot based on adjudicated facts. Finally, the Department argues that were a trial-type hearing to berequired for every “not established” finding, the number of proceedings to betransmitted to the Office of Administrative Law would be overwhelming. Outof 87,574 investigations, 62,514 resulted in “not established” findings. TheDepartment claims the State’s interest in not having over 60,000 newadministrative hearings is significant. B. The amici support S.C. on the outcome in this matter. They add to herarguments in favor of reversing the Appellate Division’s affirmance of theDepartment’s action. 1. The ACLU contends that a person enjoys a right to due processprotection of reputation without having to show tangible loss. It asserts thatbecause a “not established” finding may be disclosed to government agencies,individuals, employers, as well as others during a background check, such afinding implicates a person’s reputation and, thus, her liberty interests. TheDepartment may also use the finding as evidence in subsequent investigationsinvolving the family. Thus, the ACLU notes that although people have a right 19 to appeal agency decisions to the Appellate Division, the resulting decision issubject to the factual and credibility determinations of the agency, which aperson has no ability to refute. Regarding the present matter, the ACLUasserts that it is unclear which, if any, of Luke’s claims the Department foundcredible and that an administrative hearing would clarify the basis for theDepartment’s finding. 2. OPR agrees with S.C. that a “not established” finding is an adjudicatoryfinding that requires a hearing. OPR adds that “not established” findings aremaintained in the child abuse registry records in perpetuity and may bedisclosed or relied upon in a variety of circumstances and, therefore, requiredue process protection. Because of the reputational interest at stake in thiscase, OPR contends that an administrative hearing is required. 3. NJSBA’s position is that the standard for “not established” findings is“amorphous,” leads to arbitrary and capricious results, and should beeliminated as a possible outcome to a Department investigation. It argues that it is not clear what burden of proof a “not established”finding requires, other than that it is less than a preponderance of the evidence.Thus, “there is no objective or measurable standard to differentiate between 20 findings of 'not established,’ and findings of 'unfounded.’” NJSBA alsoasserts that a “not established” finding, based on a mere investigation, mayinterfere with parental rights and tarnish a parent’s reputation in manypotential settings, including, for example, in custody litigation whereDepartment findings may be improperly used “as a sword” to affect a spouse’sparental rights. 4. LSNJ argues that, in addition to the statutory means for disclosing “notestablished” findings, other disclosures are possible, and, therefore, the subjectof an investigation resulting in such a finding must receive due processprotections. LSNJ further argues that state statutes, legislative and regulatoryhistory, prior litigation, and federal law “combine to invalidate the currentregulatory” framework that uses a four-tier scheme and “compel a binarysystem” of possible investigatory conclusions. III. A. Declaring the safety of children to be of paramount concern, theLegislature enacted an extensive set of laws designed to protect children underthe age of eighteen from “serious injury inflicted upon them by other thanaccidental means.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a). Codified as Title Nine, the legislation 21 imposes on the Department the broad responsibility to investigate allegationsof child abuse and neglect and to take immediate action as “necessary to insurethe safety of the child.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11. Complementing regulations govern the Department’s investigations intoallegations of abuse and neglect. See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-1.1 to -8.5. Theregulations detail how the Department will conduct its evaluative investigatorytask. Whenever the Department receives an allegation, complaint, or report ofchild abuse or neglect, it must investigate and determine within a settimeframe “whether abuse or neglect has occurred.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(a) to(b). Pertinent to this appeal, N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c) requires the Department torender one of four possible findings at the conclusion of each investigation . For each allegation, the Department representative shall make a finding that an allegation is “substantiated,” “established,” “not established,” or “unfounded.” 1. An allegation shall be “substantiated” if the preponderance of the evidence indicates that a child is an “abused or neglected child” as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and either the investigation indicates the existence of any of the circumstances in N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.4 or substantiation is warranted based on consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5. 2. An allegation shall be “established” if the preponderance of the evidence indicates that a child is 22 an “abused or neglected child” as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, but the act or acts committed or omitted do not warrant a finding of “substantiated” as defined in (c)1 above. 3. An allegation shall be “not established” if there is not a preponderance of the evidence that a child is an abused or neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.21, but evidence indicates that the child was harmed or was placed at risk of harm. 4. An allegation shall be “unfounded” if there is not a preponderance of the evidence indicating that a child is an abused or neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.21, and the evidence indicates that a child was not harmed or placed at risk of harm. [N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c).] That differentiation creates two general classes of findings, which breakdown on the basis of whether a finding that a child is an “abused or neglectedchild,” under the statutory definition of that term,5 can be made based on a5 The definition of an abused or neglected child in pertinent part includes a child . . . whose parent or guardian . . . (1) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted disfigurement . . . ; (2) creates or allows to be created a substantial or ongoing risk of physical injury to such child by other than accidental means . . . (4) or a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or 23 preponderance of the evidence. That basic schematic design is captured in theregulation itself: (d) A finding of either established or substantiated shall constitute a determination by the Department that a child is an abused or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21. A finding of either not established or unfounded shall constitute a determination by the Department that a child is not an abused or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21. [N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(d).] The regulations further provide that a finding that a report, complaint, orallegation of an incident of child abuse or neglect is “unfounded” is subject toexpunction, as dictated by N.J.SA. 9:6-8.40a(a). See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(b).The Department has defined what “unfounded” means in the context of aninvestigation and has established a process for determining when such report,complaint, or allegation is deemed “unfounded,” again as it was required to dounder N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a(b). The administrative regulations codified atN.J.A.C. 3A:10-8.1 to -8.4 lay out the standards and procedure for expunction guardian, . . . by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).] 24 of records. Notably, a record containing a “substantiated,” “established,” or“not established” finding is required to be retained, as specified in N.J.A.C.3A:10-8.1(b). Those are the basic provisions of the statutory and administrativescheme in which the present appeal arises. B. In order to fully appreciate the parties’ positions on the due processchallenge raised in this matter, it is helpful to know a little about theregulatory background to the current “not established” finding that is possibleunder the present four-tier system of potential investigatory findings. Briefly, we note that, although Department regulations providing forcategories of findings in child abuse investigations have changed over time,immediately prior to 2013, Department investigations could result in one oftwo findings: “substantiated” or “unfounded.” See 45 N.J.R. 738(a) (Apr. 1,2013); 44 N.J.R. 357(a). The current four-category system took effect in 2013following robust public input through rule comment and adoption proceedings,as the Department and others have set forth in their briefing. 6 The Department 6 See 45 N.J.R. 738(a); 44 N.J.R. 2437(a) (Nov. 5, 2012). Some commenters urged return to a framework similar to the three-category system, which between 1995 and 2005 had included the additional category of “unsubstantiated”; some others strenuously argued for retaining the two - 25 asserted that adopting the present four categories of investigatory findingswould “assist in fulfilling [its] commitment” to “protecting children fromharm,” while clearly differentiating “between what is abuse and neglect andwhat is not abuse and neglect.” See 45 N.J.R. 738(a), responses to comments46, 47, 48, 81, and 82. In the regulatory record for the current regulations, theDepartment explained that its new scheme avoided shortcomings perceived ina former “not substantiated” category eliminated in 2005. An inherent failing of the three tier findings structure utilized by the Department . . . was that the “not substantiated” finding provided a means by which a determination of the occurrence of abuse or neglect’s occurrence could be avoided. . . . Findings of “substantiated” and “established” require that a preponderance of evidence supports a finding that abuse or neglect did occur; findings of “not established” and “unfounded” require determination that there is insufficient or no evidence that abuse or neglect occurred. This is consistent with the Department’s prior rationale for the elimination of the “not substantiated” finding. [Id. at response to comment 77.]finding framework. See 45 N.J.R. 738(a), comments 9, 27, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 77, 81, and 82. S.C. acknowledges that she did not advance a facial challenge to the regulatory category of “not established” applied in her investigation, unlike some amici who now argue that the category is invalid and should be eliminated. We will not be addressing that issue, which appellant has not raised. That said, we include reference to the Department’s explanation of the purpose of the “not established” finding in the four-category system it adopted. 26 Further, the Department explained its intent in differentiating between“not established” and “unfounded” when responding to, and rejecting, acomment that “not established” findings should be eligible for expunctionunder N.J.A.C. 10:129-7.7(b), presently codified at N.J.A.C. 3A:10-8.1. The critical distinction between findings of not established and unfounded is that not established findings are based on some evidence, though not necessarily a preponderance of evidence, that a child was harmed or placed at risk of harm. Because the investigation of future allegations must include consideration of past incidents in which an involved child was harmed or placed at risk of harm, the critical information contained in records of not established cases must be maintained. [Id. at response to comment 86. 7]7 According to the Department in its argument to this Court, its choice to retain and, for child protection purposes, use records from investigations resulting in “not established” findings is permissible under federal law, citing the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). CAPTA requires a state child protective services system that receives federal monies under 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a) to include procedures to facilitate the prompt expungement of any records that are accessible to the general public or are used for purposes of employment or other background checks in cases determined to be unsubstantiated or false, except that nothing in this section shall prevent State child protective services agencies from keeping information on unsubstantiated reports in their casework files to assist in future risk and safety assessment. [42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xii).] 27 C. For records the Department retains, confidentiality is the presumptivestarting point, but the same provision of Title Nine also provides for therelease of information regarding reports of child abuse in certaincircumstances. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a) provides in pertinent part: All records of child abuse reports made pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10], all information obtained by the Department of Children and Families in investigating such reports including reports received pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40], and all reports of findings forwarded to the child abuse registry pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11] shall be kept confidential and may be disclosed only under the circumstances expressly authorized under subsections b., c., d., e., f., and g. herein. The department shall disclose information only as authorized under subsections b., c., d., e., f., and g. of this section that is relevant to the purpose for whichSee also Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (DHHS), Disclosure of Confidential Child Abuse and Neglect Records (June 2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/confide.pdf. That 2017 Report, published through DHHS’s website, states, [s]tate child protective services agencies are required to maintain records of the reports of suspected child abuse and neglect that they receive. These reports include identifying information about the child, the child’s family, conditions in the child’s home environment, the nature and extent of the child’s injuries, and information about other children in the same environment [Id. at 1 (emphasis added).] 28 the information is required, provided, however, that nothing may be disclosed which would likely endanger the life, safety, or physical or emotional well-being of a child or the life or safety of any other person or which may compromise the integrity of a department investigation or a civil or criminal investigation or judicial proceeding. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a).] Further details in Department regulations specify that in a CARI check,only “substantiated” findings are released. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(a).“Unfounded” findings are expunged, generally within three years, see N.J.A.C.3A:10-8.2; and, as noted, the Department retains the findings and record forinvestigations leading to any other conclusion, N.J.A.C. 3A:10-8.1(b), subjectto the statutory direction that it be “kept confidential and may be disclosedonly [as authorized] under” the statutory enumerated circumstances, N.J.S.A.9:6-8.10a(a). The list is extensive, twenty-two in number, but in this matterthe Department categorized the types of exceptions or allowed disclosure asfollows: • Seven of the disclosures address a government agency’s need to access the information urgently. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(7), (b)(15), and (b)(20). • Two exceptions concern the release of information to a court or other tribunal, wherein the fact finder reviews the information in camera to determine its admissibility in a proceeding. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(6) and (b)(14). 29 • Two exceptions concern CARI checks and the release of information to day care organizations and other entities required by statute to consider child abuse investigations. N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.10a(b)(10) and (b)(13). Those two exceptions apply only when a finding of abuse or neglect is “substantiated.” • Three exceptions concern the release of information to parents themselves, or their legal counsel, during a discussion with the Department about the investigation or during an appeal of the Department’s actions. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(12), (b)(17), and (b)(19). Under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(19), the Department can discuss with a parent the reasons for its involvement with the family. • Three exceptions concern the Department’s ability to release information to service providers or proposed caretakers that need to know details about a child’s history. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(5), (b)(11), (b)(16), and (b)(23). • Three exceptions concern the release of information to government agencies that study child protection issues and make policy recommendations. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(8), (b)(21), and (b)(22). In such contexts, identifying information is concealed. • One exception allows release of information about the disposition of the investigation to the person that made the referral. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(18). In addition to the enumerated exceptions in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a, a “notestablished” finding also may be considered by the Department in its childprotection and welfare work. For example, it may be considered in theanalysis of a person’s suitability for providing “kinship care.” N.J.A.C.3A:51-2.1(e); see also N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(a)(6) (factors to be considered whendetermining a finding of “substantiated” or “established” include “[e]vidence 30 suggesting a repetition or pattern of abuse or neglect,” thus allowing use ofinformation from a “not established” finding). According to the Departmentwhen promulgating its current regulations, a “not established” finding is notused by the Department as an aggravating factor for a subsequent finding of“substantiated” child abuse or neglect. 45 N.J.R. 738(a) (response to comment31); see N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.4(a) (listing required findings for “substantiated”). IV. A. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensuresthat “no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without dueprocess of law.’” Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008)(quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). The New Jersey Constitution does notuse the same language, but Article I, Paragraph 1’s language -- providing thatevery person possesses the “unalienable rights” to enjoy life, liberty, andproperty, and to pursue happiness -- is construed as a “fundamental guaranteeof due process.” Ibid.; Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 442 (2006)). Due process rights are implicated “whenever an individual risksgovernmental exposure to a 'grievous loss.’” State in Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 501 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 481 (1972)(quoting, in turn, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 31 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). Such an analysis requires firsta determination that due process applies and then what process is due. Ibid.(citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 518-22(1975)). It long ago became a recognized truism to declare that due process isflexible. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. But, [t]o say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. [Ibid.] When determining the protections due process demands in a givensituation, there must occur an identification and then balancing of the “natureof the government function involved as well as . . . the private interest . . .affected by governmental action.” D.G.W., 70 N.J. at 502 (first ellipsis inoriginal) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 ,895 (1961)). We apply the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to do that. Jamgochian, 196 N.J. at 240. That test examines, [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 32 and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Ibid. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).]Mathews recognizes that an evidentiary hearing “is neither a required, noreven the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances,” solong as the person whose rights are affected is given an opportunity to asserthis or her claim prior to any administrative action. 424 U.S. at 348-49. Thus,minimally, notice and opportunity to be heard are the essentials of due process. B. S.C. claims a violation of her due process rights because she was notafforded an adjudicatory hearing on the “not established” determination fromher investigation. And she claims that the letter notifying her of theDepartment’s findings separately failed due process considerations. Weexamine first the precise interest asserted. 1. S.C. underwent a Department investigation based on an alleged claimthat she engaged in child abuse. An investigation is distinct from anadjudication of facts and gives rise to a different set of expectations. That is adistinction well recognized as a general concept, see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 , 440-41 (1960), and in the specific context of a Departmentinvestigation. 33 In Hannah, the Supreme Court held that the requirements of due processare different for adjudications of facts versus an investigation. As the UnitedStates Supreme Court explained, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact- finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. [Id. at 442.]See also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 , 427 (1969) (reaffirmingHannah’s distinction between adjudicatory and investigative action by a publicentity). With respect to the context of the present matter, in New Jersey, courtshave recognized a finding by the Department of “not established” -- like theearlier finding of “unsubstantiated” -- to be an investigatory action and not anadjudication. Twenty years ago, in In re R.P., the Appellate Division held that “[a]finding by [the Department] that child abuse charges have not beensubstantiated, but that there is some indication a child was harmed or placed at 34 risk of harm, is purely investigatory in nature.” 333 N.J. Super. 105, 117(App. Div. 2000). The R.P. court explained that “there has been nodetermination of the accuracy” of the findings, ibid., rather, the investigationconsists of interviews and “other available evidence” followed by a review andanalysis of the information, id. at 116-17. The investigator concludes with a“recommendation as to whether any action should be taken against the subjectof the investigation.” Ibid. The issue in R.P. concerned the transmittal of afinding of “unsubstantiated” to an educational entity, and in that context, thecourt required the Department to correct its practice, cautioning that “parties towhom the finding is disseminated” should be informed that there has “not beenany adjudication of those allegations.” Ibid. The Department’s role as the statutory investigator of allegations ofchild abuse and neglect cannot be disputed and has been acknowledged in avariety of settings. See, e.g., G.S. v. DYFS, 157 N.J. 161, 169-70 (1999)(referring to DYFS’s “investigative responsibilities”); In re A.I., 393 N.J.Super. 114, 119, 123 (App. Div. 2007) (analyzing “the issuance of lettersembodying findings by the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit of theDepartment of Human Services”); In re L.R., 321 N.J. Super. 444, 452 (App.Div. 1999) (“DYFS has been granted broad authority to investigate child abuseallegations, including specific authority to investigate any child abuse 35 allegation against a public school teacher and to report its findings to theteacher’s employer.” (emphases added) (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7a)). More recently, the Appellate Division specifically recognized aDepartment finding that a report of child abuse was “not established” to bemerely an investigatory determination when analyzing a due process argument. In Department of Children & Families v. D.B., two teachers wereaccused of harming two different students. 443 N.J. Super. 431, 433-34 (App.Div. 2015). Subsequent investigations led the Institutional AbuseInvestigation Unit (IAIU) of the Department to enter “not established”findings. Id. at 434. The teachers each received a letter memorializing thosefindings. Ibid. The teachers subsequently sought “to have the Department’sfindings letter changed from 'not established’ to 'unfounded.’” Ibid. Theteachers also contended that the Department’s finding that the child in eachcase “'was harmed or placed at risk of harm’ constitute[d] an adjudication an dnot a mere investigatory finding,” such that the appellants were entitled to anadjudicatory hearing. Id. at 440. In a consolidated opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the “notestablished” finding and rejected the argument that an adjudicatory hearingwas required for that investigatory finding, but reversed and remanded for theDepartment to issue new letters that revealed more information about the 36 investigation. Id. at 434, 446-47. The Appellate Division held that the“notification-of-findings process” itself did not constitute a violation of dueprocess and further held that the teachers were not entitled to an adjudicatoryhearing to challenge the “not established” finding because such finding ispurely investigatory. Id. at 443-44 (relying on Dep’t of Children & Families v.S.P., 402 N.J. Super. 255, 270 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that a teacher was“not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing to challenge a finding that child abuseallegations are not substantiated”)).8 2. In the appeal before us, the Appellate Division rightly viewed S.C.’sclaimed right to an adjudicatory hearing through the prism of the Department’s“investigatory finding.” The Department’s use of the word “finding” cannotbe allowed to obscure what the classification of “not established” actuallysignifies here: the Department has not adjudicated facts or reached any sort ofconclusion about what actually occurred when it applies a “not established”finding; rather, it merely ascribes what functions as a working label to the8 The Appellate Division reached a different conclusion with respect to an investigation that resulted in an “established” finding of the reported child abuse. See DCPP v. V.E., 448 N.J. Super. 374, 402 (App. Div. 2017) (holding that the Department’s finding that reported child abuse meeting that statutory definition of the term had been “established” by a preponderance of the evidence constituted a conclusion that child abuse occurred, entitling the person against whom the finding is made to an administrative hearing). 37 evidence collected through investigation. That distinction substantially lessensany private interest impact that S.C. can claim. And, when investigatory findings of “not established” (leaving aside forthe moment the standard for that designation), as opposed to “unfounded”(which results when no evidence of harm or risk of harm to a child is found inan investigation), are retained and used by the Department in furtherance of itsfuture child protection and welfare activities in connection with the individualinvestigated, it is difficult in this context to see an impacted private interest ofany appreciable weight. But assuming there is a private interest in that intra-agency retention anduse of its investigatory work product -- based on S.C.’s assertion of a libertyinterest in reputation for which she argues she need not show any tangible loss-- the claimed private interest is far outweighed by the Department’s legitimatereasons for acting knowledgeably in future investigations with respect to itsprior interactions with an individual, suspected of child abuse or neglect,whose investigation did not conclude with an “unfounded” finding. We see nobasis to support S.C.’s insistence on an adjudicatory, trial-type hearing in orderfor the Department to retain and internally use its own investigatory workproduct when called on to investigate the individual or family again in thefuture. Due process does not require an adjudicatory proceeding under such 38 circumstances. These are only investigatory findings. We will not require anadjudicatory hearing, to convert them into adjudicative facts, in order for theDepartment to use them in their future child protective work involving thesubject of the investigation. S.C.’s interest in the investigatory finding warrants separateconsideration when that finding is made available in connection with theexceptions and disclosures enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a, however. Withrespect to those, we also assess the governmental action against which theclaimed private interest must be balanced. The Department rightly counters that the information collected inconnection with the investigation is, by statute, kept confidential and disclosedunder limited circumstances, and further that action cannot be taken on theinformation without additional process. Indeed, several of the disclosuresrelate to the family or its legal representative, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(12),(b)(17), and (b)(19), or to service providers or caretakers who will be workingwith the child or family and need the information, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(5),(b)(11), (b)(16), and (b)(23). We fail to perceive any private protectible dueprocess interest concerning the investigatory findings in those settings. Nor is there a private due process interest that outweighs the importanceof the governmental need in the instances where the Legislature has decreed 39 that other governmental agencies have an urgent need for Departmentinvestigatory records and findings other than those that are deemed“unfounded.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(7), (b)(15),and (b)(20). The balancing of interests favors the sharing of the mereinvestigatory finding, notwithstanding the claim of reputational harm, with outimposing the pre-condition of an adjudicatory hearing before such informationmay pass from the Department to the other governmental entities. In soholding, it again must be noted that the “not established” finding does notreach any conclusion that child abuse occurred, unlike an “established”finding. To the extent that two exceptions involve the release of information to acourt or other tribunal, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(6) and (b)(14), the fact finder inthose settings will review the information in camera to determine itsadmissibility. That process provides the subject adequate opportunity to beheard on the threshold issue of admissibility and thereafter to cross-examineand offer contrary proofs, see, e.g., L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192, 204-05 (2015), obviating any present due process requirement for anadjudicatory hearing. Finally, to the extent that two other exceptions concern CARI checksand the release of information to day care organizations and other entities 40 required by statute to consider child abuse investigations, N.J.S.A. 9:6- -8.10a(b)(10) and (b)(13), the Department represents that those exceptions areimplemented in concert with N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(a), which directs theDepartment to “disclose only substantiated” findings in response to CARIchecks and thus cabins similarly all these related information release requests.We take the Department at its word and regard these two exceptions toconfidentiality as carrying the caveat that they apply when a finding of abuseor neglect is “substantiated.” 3. Upon consideration, we reject the argument that the above-reviewedstatutory scheme, which permits potential release or disclosure of “notestablished” findings in the enumerated settings, raises a due process concernthat can only be met by requiring a right to a full adjudicatory hearing. S.C.expressly asks for, essentially, a contested case proceeding to be transmittedand heard before the Office of Administrative Law, along the lines of what isprovided for “substantiated” findings. “Substantiated” findings in child abuse and neglect investigations thatare subject to claims of disputed material facts receive such formal judicializedtreatment. See N.J.A.C. 3A:5-4.3(a)(2). But no such right is afforded to “notestablished” findings by statute or regulation. We conclude due process does 41 not compel imposition of a formalized adversarial trial-type process in thesetting of a “not established” finding -- where no child abuse conclusion hasbeen reached. It is the result of an investigation, and the record and findingfrom that investigation are kept by the Department and used only as set forthby statute. Although the amici posit anecdotal settings where “notestablished” findings may also be made available, we consider here only theextant statutory uses facing S.C. as a result of a “not established” finding, andwe do not address speculative settings that are not presented in this record. C. Having rejected the obligation to provide an adjudicatory hearing whenrendering an investigatory finding that an allegation of child abuse or neglectis “not established,” we consider further S.C.’s reputational concern. To the extent that S.C. claims a reputational interest deserving of thebasics of due process protection and simple fundamental fairness, concepts tobe recognized and preserved, see Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 104-05, 108-09(1995), that interest can be properly respected without the requirement of afull-fledged adjudicatory hearing. S.C.’s reputational interest, as well as theinterests of the Department in satisfying its child protection mission now andinto the future in an effective manner, are recognized, respected, and balancedthrough (1) meaningful notice of the Department’s planned investigatory 42 conclusion of a “not established” finding and (2) affording the investigatedsubject an informal opportunity to be heard by the agency before theinvestigatory finding is finalized. Procedural flexibility is a hallmark of due process, as well asadministrative law. Adherence to formal trial procedures is not the defaultprocess. The essential elements of notice and opportunity to be heard are whatdue process protects. In keeping with those essentials, when the Department is concluding aninvestigation into suspected child abuse or neglect and expects to issue afinding of “not established,” notice -- meaningful for due processconsiderations -- of that investigatory finding should be provided to theindividual. The notice should include a summary of the support for thefinding, and the Department’s reasoning should be transparently disclosed. Nodoubt, confidentiality concerns and the need to protect the child from potentialfuture risk of harm must also be respected. Moreover, the individual must beinformed of his or her opportunity to rebut the Department’s conclusion orsupplement the record so that the informal opportunity to be heard before theagency is not illusory.9 The current process of not making a record available9 The Department’s citation to us of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(19) does not satisfy the Department’s responsibility in this regard. The regulation provides no assurance that a parent or guardian is informed of an informal opportunity to 43 unless and until an appeal is filed is no substitute for the basic notice andopportunity to be heard considerations that we recognize here. As we have been informed about the current process through this appeal,meaningful notice and an informal opportunity to be heard on the agency’sinvestigatory finding did not occur. The conclusory letter that the Departmentsent to S.C. failed to inform her of the basis for the Department’s “notestablished” finding. And there does not appear to be an adequate means offormally making known to a parent or guardian under investigation theopportunity to be heard informally and rebut or supplement the record.Corrective action by the Department in the future can solve that. With respect to the Department’s standard for making a finding of “notestablished,” we agree with the criticism that the standard for that finding, aswritten now, is vague, amorphous, and incapable of any objective calibration.All we know is that it requires less than a preponderance of the evidence andinvolves “some” evidence. At the very least, the “some evidence” descriptionadvanced by the Department must be understood to be “credible evidence.”Beyond that one cannot know what the Department intends by its standard andhow it is to be evaluated.be heard by the Department on a proposed “not established” finding and rebut or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its conclusion. 44 We leave to the Department the responsibility to reexamine and clarifyits standard. No facial challenge is presented in this matter and we will notreach the issue without that. 1010 Our dissenting colleague concludes that the evidence in this matter should compel a finding of “unfounded.” He could have ended his dissent there but instead flouts conventional principles of appellate jurisdiction by addressing an issue not raised by the appellant. He would declare the creation of a “not established” category of investigatory finding to be an ultra vires act by the Department. S.C., who brought this appeal, first to the Appellate Division and then, by way of petition, to this Court, conceded she did not raise the issue. The Appellate Division decision flagged that the issue was not raised, first in the majority opinion that identified the only two issues before that court, and then in the concurring opinion of Judge Messano, which explicitly stated that no facial challenge to the Department’s regulation was presented and pointedly declined to address an unraised facial challenge to the regulatory category of a “not established” finding. Appellate review is not unbounded. Appellate jurisdiction must be invoked, and the court rules require precise identification of the issues raised. See R. 2:6-2(a)(6) (“For every point, the appellant shall include in parentheses at the end of the point heading the place in the record where the opinion or ruling in question is located or if the issue was not raised below a statement indicating that the issue was not raised below.”). After certification is granted, an appellant may not supplement the issues before this Court. See, e.g., State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 327 n.10 (2011) (declining to consider an argument raised by the defendant through a supplemental brief); Hirsh v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 128 N.J. 160, 161-62 (1992) (declining to rule on claims first presented by appellant after the petition for certification had been granted). The dissent asserts it is not bound by those reins of normal appellate practice because amici referred to the issue, and because a question was posed from the bench on the subject. Both explanations fall short. An amicus must accept the case as presented by the parties. See State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 25 (2012); Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 91 N.J. 45 As for S.C., we remand for her to have the opportunity to rebut orsupplement the Department’s record, after the Department provides greaterclarity for its conclusion. The remand will allow development of a properrecord that can be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter isremanded for further action consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.38, 48-49 (1982). And, to suggest that the normal rules governing appellate jurisdiction could be evaded by a question from the bench would endorse a roving standard in place of the longstanding, sensible controls that have brought order to appellate practice. 46 S.C., Appellant, v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Legislature has empowered the Department of Children andFamilies (Department) to investigate child abuse allegations and determinewhether those allegations are either “substantiated” or “unfounded.” Thestatutory framework requires the expungement of “unfounded” complaints.The legislative purpose is to ensure that “unfounded” allegations do not tar thereputations and employment prospects of innocent parents. In an end-run around the statutory expungement requirement, theDepartment exercised its rulemaking authority to create a new category called“not established.” Under this regulatory regime, the Department does not haveto expunge “not established” child abuse complaints -- only “unfounded”complaints. “Not established” complaints are complaints that are not sustainedby a preponderance of the evidence, yet contain “some evidence” supportingthe abuse allegation, even though that evidence may lack credibility or 1 corroboration. That definition of “not established” is the ultimate misnomerbecause, in the Department’s lexicon, “not established” actually establishes abasis for not expunging a record. The Department’s staff workers now categorize most unproveable childabuse complaints as “not established,” rendering the expungement remedyillusory, as in the present case of S.C., a mother whose good name is sullied byuncorroborated and unsustained charges of child abuse. Undoubtedly, the Department is well intentioned in not wanting toexpunge records that it believes may be useful in the future. But theDepartment must act within the purview of the law rather than overthrow alegislative mandate. The amorphous “some evidence” standard to support “notestablished” determinations does not comport with elemental due processguarantees. Even more fundamentally, the “not established” category is atodds with the Legislature’s enabling statute. I therefore would strike down theregulatory category of “not established.” The Department can appeal to theLegislature for any ameliorative amendments that it thinks are in the bestinterests of the child welfare system. I believe that the majority’s decision clearly leads to a better system ofjustice by imposing due process requirements and calling for a new evidentiarystandard for “not established” findings, and I applaud that effort. 2 Nevertheless, I believe that the Department’s “not established” standard is sofundamentally flawed that it defies even this Court’s remedial measures tosave it. I would address the defect at the heart of the regulatory scheme -- theDepartment’s exercise of a power not delegated to it by the Legislature.Addressing that issue would come as no surprise to the Department, which hasdefended the legality of its regulatory scheme before the Appellate Divisionand this Court. Based on the record before us, the complaint against S.C. fallswithin the “unfounded” category, and therefore I would end this matterwithout a remand or any further burdens or costs imposed on this innocentmother. I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I. In May 2016, the Department began an investigation of S.C. after herseven-year-old son Luke told a school official that his mother hits him with anopen hand and a spatula on parts of his body. No bruises or marks wereobserved on Luke’s body. Luke, a triplet, is classified as an emotionallydisturbed, special needs student. He had exhibited behavioral problems in thepast in school. Although the school official “hated to call [the Department] onthis family because they [had] no other concerns,” the official indicated that 3 Luke’s “disclosure” mandated that the Department be notified. No one canquarrel with the school’s fulfillment of its statutory duty. The Department learned from school officials that S.C. and her husbandwere attentive and caring parents, who attended child study team meetings andwere very involved in their children’s lives. School officials expressed noconcern about the family and believed that Luke was having a difficult weekwhen he made the allegations. A Department investigator spoke with S.C., herhusband, Luke’s two sisters, and Luke. Luke’s father and siblings told theinvestigator that they never observed S.C. strike Luke with a spatula, and S.C.denied doing so. S.C. stated that, at times, she disciplined the children with anopen hand, and her husband admitted to lightly spanking the children onoccasion. Beyond this parental discipline, the investigation uncovered nothingthat even remotely established that these parents engaged in excessive corporalpunishment. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) (stating that a child is abused orneglected if a parent inflicts excessive corporal punishment on a child). At the conclusion of the investigation, S.C. received a letter from theDepartment stating it determined that Luke’s allegations were “notestablished.” Yet, S.C. could not take heart from what she read. The letterstated that “not established” meant that “some evidence indicates that a childwas harmed or placed at some risk of harm, but there is not a preponderance of 4 evidence that the child has been abused or neglected per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21.”(emphasis added). S.C. was advised that her family would not require the services of theDepartment and that she had no right to an administrative appeal. She wasalso told that the Department would retain the records of the investigation,which could be disclosed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a. That statute sets forth more than twenty categories for the release of“not established” complaint records. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b). For example,records may be released to authorities who are in a position to determine aparent’s fitness to have custody of her children, provide kinship care for arelative’s children, or offer a foster home for other children. See ibid. Releaseof “not established” records to service providers may permanently impair aparent’s reputational interest based on nothing more than a “some evidence”finding. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a; Dep’t of Children & Families v. R.R., 454 N.J. Super. 37, 41-42 (App. Div. 2018). That is the factual and legal landscape that brings this case before us. II. Whether the Department has the statutory authority to promulgate aregulation that allows “not established” child abuse records to be maintainedand released to certain entities is an issue that was sufficiently raised and 5 argued before this Court. Its resolution would cause no surprise or unfairnessto the parties. Admittedly, S.C. did not raise this issue in her petition, although she didadvert to this issue in her Appellate Division papers. The Department,moreover, defended the legality of the regulatory system not only before theAppellate Division but also before this Court, particularly in response to thechallenge by amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey. 1 Indeed, over theDepartment’s objection, we granted amicus status to Legal Services with fullknowledge that it was raising this specific issue. 2 Nearly twenty-seven pagesof the Department’s supplement brief was dedicated to the argument that the“not established” category was not ultra vires. It would come as no surprise tothe parties if this Court were to address an argument that it invited. We alsogranted amicus status to the New Jersey State Bar Association, which argued1 Point I of the Department’s brief to this Court is entitled: “THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES’ CREATION OF AN INVESTIGATIVE CATEGORY OF 'NOT ESTABLISHED’ IS CONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 ET SEQ.” 2 In its initial brief in support of its motion to participate as amicus curiae, Legal Services presented a challenge to a deeply flawed legal framework “involving agency regulatory and administrative actions that exceed and conflict with statutory authority.” Legal Services concluded that brief by stating that the “Department’s arrogation of authority in contradicting the binary legislative framework, creating two new very problematic categories, suggests ultra vires activity by the agency.” 6 that the “not established” category should be struck down on due processgrounds and that “[t]he standard for arriving at a 'not established’determination is not supported by statute.” Additionally, the legislativeauthority for the regulatory scheme was explored during oral argument beforethis Court. I will therefore address the foundational issue -- whether the Departmentacted within the proper ambit of its regulatory authority by creating a categoryof “not established” claims. III. One of the paramount responsibilities of the State is to protect childrenfrom the infliction of harm, even from their parents and guardians. To thatend, the Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme -- Title Nine -- thatprovides for the investigation of child abuse and neglect accusations. N.J.S.A.9:6-8.8 to -8.114. Under that scheme, a child who is subjected by his parentsto “physical injury by other than accidental means which causes or creates asubstantial risk of . . . protracted impairment of physical or emotional health”is an abused or neglected child. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(1). For example, thestatutory scheme prohibits the “infliction of excessive corporal punishment .”Id. at (4)(b). 7 The Legislature delegated to the Department the power to investigate allallegations of child abuse or neglect. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11. At the conclusionof the investigation, Title Nine confers on the Department the authority todetermine whether the claim of abuse or neglect is “substantiated” or“unfounded.” 3 See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a; N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a. Under this two-tiered system, substantiated allegations are retained and subject to disclosurepursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a and unfounded allegations are subject toexpungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a (expungement statute). Inparticular, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a(a) provides that the Department “shall expungefrom its records all information relating to a report . . . of child abuse orneglect” if the Department determines that the “allegation of the incident wasunfounded.” Before 2004, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a defined “unfounded” as acomplaint that raises “no concern on the part of the [D]ivision that the safetyor welfare of the child is at risk.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a(b) (2003). In 2004, theLegislature amended N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a, authorizing the Department topromulgate rules setting forth “[t]he definition of, and process for, making adetermination of an unfounded report.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a; L. 2004, c. 130, §32.3 When the Department finds an allegation to be “substantiated,” the regulations permit the parent or guardian to seek an administrative hearing. See N.J.A.C. 3A:5-4.3. 8 In the wake of the amendment to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a, the Departmentadopted two categories of investigative findings -- “substantiated andunfounded” -- and made the standard for those determinations “consistent withthe legal standard for fact finding hearings as expressed in [ N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46],” which provides for determinations based on the preponderance of the“competent, material and relevant evidence.” See 36 N.J.R. 4617(a) (Oct. 18,2004); see also 37 N.J.R. 282(a) (Jan. 18, 2005). Significantly, before 2004, the Department had a three-tiered regulatoryscheme -- “substantiated,” “not substantiated,” and “unfounded.” See 36 N.J.R. 4617(a). The new regulatory scheme eliminating the “not substantiatedcategory” was adopted, in part, in response to complaints that theDepartment’s investigators “tended to classify their findings in [that] category”to avoid expunging records, and that the evidentiary standard for “notsubstantiated” determinations was deficient. See ibid. Under the new regulation, an allegation of abuse or neglect notsupported by a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record wasdeemed “unfounded” and therefore subject to expungement. See 37 N.J.R. 282(a). The two-tiered system, in the words of the Department, would “resultin more definitive decisions about children’s safety and clarify outcomes forfamilies and child welfare professionals.” See 36 N.J.R. 4617(a). The two- 9 tiered system fully complied with the structure of Title Nine and theexpungement statute, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a. In 2011, the Governor vetoed a bill that would have brought back the“not substantiated” determination. See A. 4109 (2011)/S. 1570 (2010). Underthe rejected legislation, a “not substantiated” determination would be satisfiedwhen “the available information . . . provides some indication of a finding thata child has been harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm by a parent orguardian.” See ibid. The legislation would not have provided forexpungement of records related to a “not substantiated” determination. Seeibid. From 2004 to 2012, the Department conducted abuse and neglectinvestigations, making one of two possible determinations, consistent with itsstatutory mandate: “substantiated” or “unfounded.” See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a; N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a; 45 N.J.R. 738(a) (Apr. 1, 2013); 36 N.J.R. 4617(a). Forthe year 2012, the Department reported 9148 “substantiated” determinationsand 79,558 “unfounded” determinations that required expungement ofrecords.4 4 The 2012 data referenced here and later in this opinion can be found at Division of Child Protection & Permanency, Child Abuse and Neglect Reports and Substantiations (2012), https://www.nj.gov/dcf/childdata/referrals/2012- AnnualAbuseNeglectReport.pdf, by subtracting the institutional numbers from the total numbers. 10 In 2013, apparently in reaction to the high number of records beingexpunged under the two-tier system, the Department used its rulemakingauthority to create a four-tier system -- “substantiated,” “established,” “notestablished,” and “unfounded” -- for resolving abuse and neglect complaints.See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3. Of the four categories, only “unfounded” allegationsare subject to expungement. N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(b). An allegation is“'unfounded’ if there is not a preponderance of the evidence indicating that achild is an abused or neglected child . . . , and the evidence indicates that achild was not harmed or placed at risk of harm.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4). Incontrast, an allegation is “'not established’ if there is not a preponderance ofthe evidence that a child is an abused or neglected child . . . , but evidenceindicates that the child was harmed or was placed at risk of harm.” N.J.A.C.3A:10-7.3(c)(3) (emphasis added). The Department takes the position that the“evidence” referred to in the “not established” category is merely “someevidence.” 45 N.J.R. 738(a). In its brief to this Court, the Department explained that in determiningwhether there is “'some evidence’ of harm or risk of harm” under N.J.A.C.3A:10-7.3(c)(3), “[t]he credibility and veracity of the statements are not atissue -- only their existence.” Under that elastic definition, almost all abuseallegations on their face would fit within the “some evidence” standard, with 11 certain illustrative exceptions, as noted by the Department at oral argument.The “some evidence” test would not be met, according to the Department,when a child states that a parent “brought a Martian in to beat me up” or whena video shows that a parent was in another state at the time of the allegedabuse. Under that approach, almost any baseless allegation of abuse andneglect could fall within that standardless definition for “not established,” thusjustifying the non-expungement of records. There is very little differencebetween the “not established” category adopted by regulation by theDepartment and the “not substantiated” category passed by the Legislature butvetoed by the Governor. In 2017, just three years after adopting the “not established”determination, that category accounted for over seventy percent (70%) of alldeterminations. Out of 87,574 allegations, the Department reported 62,514“not established” determinations. In 2012, based on “unfounded”determinations, the Department expunged records relating to approximatelyninety percent (90%) of abuse and neglect allegations. In 2017, with the new“not established” category, the Department expunged records relating to justover twenty percent (20%) of abuse and neglect allegations. Comparing the 12 two-tiered system in 2012 to the four-tiered system in 2017, there were 60,835fewer allegations subject to expungement under the four-tier system.5 The Department has promulgated regulations to successfully circumventthe expungement statute by retaining records that are not supported by apreponderance of the evidence. The Department has transformed the term “notestablished” -- in Orwellian double-speak fashion -- to actually establish abasis for not granting expungement relief to a parent, such as the mother here,when allegations cannot be proven by the lowest evidential standard -- apreponderance of the evidence. The Legislature evidently intended “unfounded” abuse or neglectallegations to be expunged because a parent cleared of such allegations shouldnot suffer collateral civil consequences. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a. Despite thatclear legislative objective, the disclosure of “not established” allegations tosome service providers under the Department’s “some evidence” standard hasthe capacity to permanently and unfairly tar a parent’s reputation and deny thatparent meaningful opportunities. 5 The 2017 data can be found at Rutgers School of Social Work, Child Abuse/Neglect Report, https://njchilddata.rutgers.edu/portal/child-abuse- neglect-report (last visited May 12, 2020), by utilizing the filters for “Family Reports” and “Findings.” 13 IV. The majority has made a commendable effort to mend a brokenregulatory scheme that denies parents such as S.C. -- cleared of wrongdoing-- minimal standards of due process. I believe this regulatory scheme,however, directly contravenes the legislation that it is intended to advance, andtherefore nothing short of eliminating the “not established” category is a fix. An administrative agency possesses only those powers delegated to it bythe Legislature. See N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 561-62 (1978). Although the grant of that authority “is to be liberallyconstrued in order to enable the agency to accomplish its statutoryresponsibilities,” id. at 562, an agency cannot exercise powers that contravenethe statutory language or the Legislature’s intent, see A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v.Comm’r of Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 90 N.J. 666, 684 (1982). An administrativeregulation, moreover, “must be within the fair contemplation of the delegationof the enabling statute.” S. Jersey Airways v. Nat’l Bank of Secaucus, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 383 (App. Div. 1970). Title Nine directs the Department, when investigating allegations ofabuse and neglect, to determine whether those allegations are “substantiated”or “unfounded.” See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a; N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a. The Legislaturedirected the Department to expunge the records of “unfounded” allegations , 14 delegating to the Department the authority to define the term “unfounded.”See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.40a. The Department accomplished that task by adopting aregulation defining the term “unfounded” in accordance with the enablingstatute. Ibid.; 37 N.J.R. 282(a). By passing a bill that would have added acategory between substantiated and unfounded -- a bill ultimately vetoed bythe Governor -- the Legislature presumably expressed its understanding thatcreating a new category was a legislative prerogative. See A. 4109/S. 1570(vetoed by Governor Christie). In express contravention of that legislative prerogative, as well as theexpungement statute, the Department promulgated the current four-tieredsystem, adding the “not established” category that allows the Department tomaintain and share records despite a finding that a preponderance of theevidence does not support an allegation against a parent. See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c); A.A. Mastrangelo, 90 N.J. at 684 (“[W]here the enabling legislationcannot fairly be said to authorize the agency action in question, the power isdenied.”). The Department evidently was concerned that too many recordsrelating to abuse and neglect investigations were falling within the“unfounded” category, resulting in the expungement of those records. The Department’s position that abuse and neglect investigation recordsshould be maintained for the purpose of keeping track of potential repeat 15 allegations, even if the investigated allegation does not meet thepreponderance of the evidence standard, is ultimately a policy decision. TheLegislature, however, has mandated that “unfounded” allegations, which theDepartment has defined in N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4), must be expunged. If theDepartment believes that the expungement of all “unfounded” allegations isnot in the best interests of the State, it should present its case to theLegislature. It bears mentioning that federal law permits the maintenance ofabuse and neglect records of “unsubstantiated” allegations for internal useonly, see 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xii), an approach that might mitigate thedue process concerns raised in this case. V. In summary, I agree with the majority that the Department’s “someevidence” standard for making “not established” determinations is “vague,amorphous, . . . incapable of any objective calibration,” and has led to“shortcomings in fairness for parents and guardians involved in investigationsthat lead to ['not established’] findings.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 4-5, 44). Forthe reasons stated, however, I would go further and strike down the “notestablished” category. I believe the Department, in creating a “notestablished” category under N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(3), has exceeded theauthority delegated to it by the Legislature. The “not established” category has 16 allowed the Department to elide making the determination that the Legislatureexpects of it -- a determination whether the allegation is unfounded. TheDepartment’s good intentions cannot save a regulation that undermines theTitle Nine expungement statute. See A.A. Mastrangelo, 90 N.J. at 684. I would end this case today and spare S.C. the hardship and expense of aremand. The Department’s own investigative findings establish that the abuseand neglect allegations in S.C.’s case are “unfounded,” as defined by theDepartment’s own regulation. See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4) (“An allegationshall be 'unfounded’ if there is not a preponderance of the evidence indicatingthat a child is an abused or neglected child . . . , and the evidence indicates thata child was not harmed or placed at risk of harm.”). I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from thejudgment of the Court. 17