Title: Chiofalo v. New Jersey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2019

Chiofalo v. New Jersey Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Frank Chiofalo, a then-member of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP), filed a complaint under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) against his employer and certain supervisors (collectively, defendants). As the Assistant Administrative Officer of Troop B of the NJSP, Chiofalo was required to log documents that came in and out of headquarters and to collect reports from the Troop B commander. Chiofalo alleges he was subjected to adverse employment actions as retaliation for his engagement in protected activity related to two incidents. The first pertained to a claimed refusal to destroy internal NJSP documents. In 2012, a sergeant and a trooper participated in an unsanctioned escort on the Garden State Parkway, for which they later became subjects of internal review. Chiofalo claimed that the second protected activity occurred during an interaction with the Troop B Commander, in which he accused the Commander of not reporting his vacation time. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Chiofalo failed to set forth a prima facie case under CEPA. The court denied the motion. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded Chiofalo compensatory and punitive damages. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court judgment, stating, with respect to the validity of a CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), a plaintiff had to first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true. The appellate court concluded that Chiofalo failed to do so and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that basis. Specific to the timekeeping claim, the Appellate Division added that Chiofalo’s statement to the Commander “was hardly 'whistleblowing’ as contemplated by CEPA.” The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in part, finding the trial court did not er in refusing to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on one of plaintiff's two bases for whistleblowing charges. The Court affirmed with respect to the alleged timesheet violation. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Sergeant First Class Frank Chiofalo v. State (A-30-18) (081607)Argued April 23, 2019 -- Decided July 16, 2019PER CURIAM Plaintiff Frank Chiofalo, a then-member of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP), filed a complaint under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, against his employer and certain supervisors (collectively, defendants). The sole issue in this whistleblower appeal is whether the trial court erred in not dismissing this matter in its entirety on summary judgment prior to trial. As the Assistant Administrative Officer of Troop B of the NJSP, Chiofalo was required to log documents that came in and out of headquarters and to collect reports from the Troop B commander. Chiofalo alleges he was subjected to adverse employment actions as retaliation for his engagement in protected activity related to two incidents. The first pertained to a claimed refusal to destroy internal NJSP documents. On March 20, 2012, a sergeant and a trooper participated in an unsanctioned escort on the Garden State Parkway, for which they later became subjects of internal review. A “letter of appreciation” from one of the escorted civilians extended thanks for the officers’ help (the Civilian Letter). On April 18, 2012, Major Edward Cetnar, Deputy Branch Commander of Field Operations, sent an internal memorandum (the Cetnar Memo) noting that the Civilian Letter had been included in the trooper’s personnel file and adding, “[p]lease convey to [the trooper] my appreciation for a job well done.” On April 23, 2012, the officers were suspended without pay pending investigation into the escort. On Friday, April 27, 2012, the Civilian Letter and the Cetnar Memo were received by Chiofalo, who presented them the following Monday to Major Robert Cuomo, the commander of Troop B, and asked what to do with the documents. Cuomo stated he would reach out to Cetnar and provide further instructions. The next week, having received no instructions, Chiofalo went to Cuomo to discuss what he should do with the documents. In his deposition, Chiofalo stated “[Cuomo] said 'It does not exist,’” to which Chiofalo replied, [“I]t does exist I have it in my hand. . . . I’m not going to get rid of it.[”] According to Chiofalo, that exchange made it “pretty clear” to him that Cuomo was asking Chiofalo “to get rid of” the documents, and that in stating he was “not going to get rid” of the documents, he was refusing to participate in a criminal or fraudulent act. 1 Chiofalo claimed that the second protected activity occurred during an interaction with Cuomo in which he accused Cuomo of not reporting his vacation time. According to Chiofalo, Cuomo “questioned why [Chiofalo] was taking two weeks off in July.” In response, Chiofalo stated that “[he] earned [his] vacation time and when [he] take[s] it, they dock it out of [his] bank” and that “[he] take[s] [his] time, unlike others.” According to Chiofalo, when he stated “unlike others” he was referring to Cuomo and to his suspicion that Cuomo was not properly reporting all of the time that he took off. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Chiofalo failed to set forth a prima facie case under CEPA. The court denied the motion. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded Chiofalo compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants appealed the denial of summary judgment and of the post-trial motions they filed. In addition to failure to state a claim, defendants also argued that Chiofalo failed to identify a specific law or policy that prohibited Cuomo’s conduct. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court judgment, stating, with respect to the validity of a CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), that a plaintiff must first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true. The appellate court concluded that Chiofalo failed to do so and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that basis. Specific to the timekeeping claim, the Appellate Division added that Chiofalo’s statement to Cuomo “was hardly 'whistleblowing’ as contemplated by CEPA.” The Court granted Chiofalo’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 220 (2018). Although Chiofalo initially alleged CEPA violations under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c), he conceded at oral argument that his case now rests on N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(2) alone.HELD: The Court does not agree that the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendants summary judgment on plaintiff’s CEPA claim related to the alleged refusal to destroy documents, but affirms as to the fraudulent timekeeping allegations.1. CEPA was enacted to cement New Jersey’s commitment to protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and should be construed liberally to effectuate its important social goal. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 sets forth the statute’s essential prohibition of employer retaliation for an employee’s protected activities, which are identified in three subsections. Subsection (c)(2) protects employees who “[o]bject[] to, or refuse[] to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes . . . is fraudulent or criminal.” Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3), respectively, protect employees who take similar action with regard to activities, policies, or practices they reasonably believe are “in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law” or are “incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy.” (pp. 15-17) 2 2. In a seminal case, the Court addressed a plaintiff’s CEPA claims brought under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) and (3). Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461-69 (2003). There, the Court summarized generally what a plaintiff must set forth to establish a prima facie case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). The Court stated that either “the court or the plaintiff” must identify the statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complained-of conduct. Id. at 464 (emphasis added). The identification requirement assists trial courts in weeding out those cases that only concern the most trivial or benign employee complaints. Importantly, Dzwonar notes that a plaintiff need not “allege facts that, if true, actually would violate that statute, rule, or public policy.” Id. at 463. A plaintiff is required only to “set forth facts that would support an objectively reasonable belief that a violation has occurred.” Id. at 464. (pp. 17-20)3. While Dzwonar would seem to impose some identification expectation for CEPA claims brought under either N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1), (2), or (3), the Court is unaware of any New Jersey court that has explicitly imposed this requirement under subsection (c)(2). Only Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 214 N.J. 518 (2013), has analyzed N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(2) post-Dzwonar, and it does not mention any express or implied obligation to identify some legal source rendering activity fraudulent. That said, the better practice in CEPA actions brought under (c)(2) surely is to identify the statutory or other basis for claiming objected-to behavior is criminal or fraudulent. “Criminal” or “fraudulent” activity is often apparent and commonly recognizable, which distinguishes (c)(2) claims from those brought under (c)(1) and (3). But the parties and the court need to have a common understanding of the legal principle that the plaintiff reasonably believed was being violated to enable joinder. And if a defendant questions the source of law relied on by the plaintiff, that source should be provided by the plaintiff. (pp. 20-23)4. At no point during the trial or post-trial motions did defendants here argue that the CEPA claim was deficient for plaintiff’s failure to identify a specific law, rule, regulation or public policy. It is unfair to reassess the summary judgment record based on arguments that were not advanced and that relate to a point the parties appeared to take for granted -- namely, that refusal to participate in the destruction of documents would support a CEPA claim if plaintiff reasonably believed that the destruction was ordered or occurred. The Court therefore reverses the Appellate Division to the extent that it vacated the jury award based on the claim as to the destruction of internal documents. The Court agrees, however, that Chiofalo’s alleged statement to Cuomo that “[he] take[s] [his] time, unlike others” was simply too amorphous to constitute “'whistleblowing’ as contemplated by CEPA.” The Court therefore does not disturb the Appellate Division’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim related to timekeeping. (pp. 23-25) AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 2018 081607 Sergeant First Class Frank Chiofalo, a member of the New Jersey State Police (Badge No. 4772), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of New Jersey, Division of State Police of the State of New Jersey, and Department of Law and Public Safety, 1 Defendants-Respondents, and Robert Cuomo and Joseph R. Fuentes, Defendants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided April 23, 2019 July 16, 2019 George T. Daggett argued the cause on behalf of appellant (Law Offices of George T. Daggett, attorneys; George T. Daggett, on the brief).1 The caption has been revised to reflect the appropriate agency title. 1 Stephanie J. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause on behalf of respondents (Gurbir S. Gewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton-Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Adam Robert Gibbons, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). Alan H. Schorr argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Schorr & Associates, attorneys; Alan H. Schorr, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff, a then-member of the New Jersey State Police, filed acomplaint under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A.34:19-1 to -14, against his employer and certain supervisors. The sole issue inthis whistleblower appeal is whether the trial court erred in not dismissing thismatter in its entirety on summary judgment prior to trial. The AppellateDivision concluded it was error and vacated the jury verdict in plaintiff’sfavor. Other issues raised by defendants on appeal were not reached by theappellate court. We granted plaintiff’s petition for certification and now reverse in part.We do not agree that the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendantssummary judgment on one of plaintiff’s two bases for whistleblowing charges.Accordingly, we remand to the Appellate Division for consideration ofdefendants’ unaddressed appellate issues. 2 I. A. Because this appeal centers on the correctness of the denial of summaryjudgment, we review the facts -- as presented at the close of discovery whendefendants filed their motion -- in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Brill v.Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). Plaintiff Frank Chiofalo was an officer in the New Jersey State Police(NJSP). At all relevant times, he was the Assistant Administrative Officer ofTroop B of the NJSP, holding the rank of Sergeant First Class with thedesignation of Sergeant Major. His assignment stationed him at the Troop BHeadquarters in Totowa. As the Assistant Administrative Officer, Chiofalo’s duties required himto receive and track documents and other forms of communication to and fromTroop B. He was responsible for the collection and tracking of reports andother paperwork, managing inter-office and external mail, maintenance ofpersonnel folders, and managing incoming phone calls. Pertinent to thisappeal, his position required him to log documents that came in and out ofheadquarters and to collect reports from the Troop B commander in which thecommander would specify where he intended to be the following day. 3 Chiofalo’s initial complaint -- filed at the beginning of January 2013against the NJSP, the Department of Law and Public Safety, and individualmembers of the NJSP (collectively, defendants) -- alleged that he wassubjected to adverse employment actions at or around the end of July 2012.The actions complained of included being transferred to a less desirableassignment (allegedly a demotion) and being blocked from a promotion toLieutenant. Shortly after filing the initial complaint, Chiofalo filed forretirement from the NJSP, requesting an effective date of June 1, 2013. 2 Chiofalo claimed that the NJSP’s adverse employment actions violatedCEPA because they were retaliation for Chiofalo’s engagement in protectedactivity. The alleged protected activity related to two incidents. 1. The first protected action identified by Chiofalo pertained to a claimedrefusal to destroy internal NJSP documents in his possession. This claim hasroots in an incident that involved other members of the State Police. On March 20, 2012, Sergeant First Class Nadir Nassry and TrooperJoseph Ventrella participated in an unsanctioned high-speed escort of a2 Chiofalo’s retirement actually became effective on July 1, 2013. Despite the closeness in time between the alleged adverse employment action and filing for retirement, Chiofalo’s retirement is not in issue. He does not allege constructive discharge. 4 collection of high-end sports cars on the Garden State Parkway. Both Nassryand Ventrella were stationed in the Totowa headquarters. When the escortlater became publicly known, Nassry and Ventrella, as well as others, becamesubjects of internal review. As far as the record reveals, the following sequence of events occurred.A letter dated April 4, 2012, was sent to the NJSP, addressed to ColonelFuentes, the Superintendent of the NJSP. This “letter of appreciation” fromone of the escorted civilian drivers extended thanks and appreciation forNassry and Ventrella’s help with the escort (the Civilian Letter). The CivilianLetter was stamped as received in the Superintendent’s office on April 13,2012. On April 17, 2012, a Superintendent’s Action Memo from ColonelFuentes -- a preprinted buck slip -- identified the Civilian Letter by a “DocTrack” number. A box was checked on the form to note the letter was beingsent to Field Operations, and the form included the following handwrittendirection: Forwarded for information and appropriate action HR: For inclusion in personnel file C: Col. Fuentes A box at the bottom, “For Your Further Action,” was also checked off. On April 18, 2012, Major Edward Cetnar, Deputy Branch Commander ofField Operations, sent an internal memorandum to the Troop Commander of 5 Troop C, noting that the Superintendent’s Action Memo had been received andthe Civilian Letter had been included in Ventrella’s personnel file. MajorCetnar’s memorandum also stated, under its Comments section, “[p]leaseconvey to [Ventrella] my appreciation for a job well done.” On April 23, 2012, Nassry and Ventrella were suspended without paypending investigation into their participation in the escort. On Friday, April 27, 2012, the Civilian Letter and the Cetnar Memo,which had been misdirected to Troop C, were received by Chiofalo in Troop Bvia interoffice mail. As the Assistant Administrative Officer responsible forreceipt and tracking incoming correspondence and related directives, it was hisjob to act on those documents, which arrived days after the suspension offellow troopers from Troop B. Chiofalo presented the documents to MajorCatullo, then-commander of Troop B, and asked for instructions on whataction should be taken. According to Chiofalo, Catullo stated that he neededto look into the matter and would follow up with further instructions.However, later that same day, Catullo was abruptly transferred from Troop B. The following Monday, April 30, 2012, Major Robert Cuomo reported toTroop B as Catullo’s replacement. Chiofalo presented Cuomo with theCivilian Letter and Cetnar Memo and asked Cuomo for instructions on what todo with the documents. Cuomo stated he would reach out to Cetnar and 6 provide further instructions. The next week, having received no furtherinstructions, Chiofalo again went to Cuomo to discuss what he should do withthe documents. In his deposition, Chiofalo stated, [Cuomo] said [“]It does not exist.[”] That totally caught me off guard, I think I probably froze and just stood there and looked at him for a second, but it felt like 15 seconds, and I said, [“I]t does exist I have it in my hand.[”] I said, [“]I’m not going to get rid of it.[”] And he -- he didn’t say much, but he was -- [“]do not approach me with it again.[”] According to Chiofalo, that exchange made it “pretty clear” to him thatCuomo was asking Chiofalo “to get rid of” the documents, and that in statinghe was “not going to get rid” of the documents, he was refusing to participatein a criminal or fraudulent act. 2. Chiofalo claimed that the second protected activity occurred during aninteraction with Cuomo in which he accused Cuomo of not reporting hisvacation time. Chiofalo alleged there were discrepancies between the reportsCuomo gave him listing where he would be the following day and what Cuomoreported to payroll. Because of those discrepancies, Chiofalo believed thatCuomo was underreporting his time off. Chiofalo alleged that he confronted Cuomo about that underreporting inlate June 2012. According to Chiofalo, Cuomo “questioned why [Chiofalo] 7 was taking two weeks off in July.” In response, Chiofalo stated that “[he]earned [his] vacation time and when [he] take[s] it, they dock it out of [his]bank” and that “[he] take[s] [his] time, unlike others.” According to Chiofalo,when he stated “unlike others” he was referring to Cuomo and to his suspicionthat Cuomo was not properly reporting all of the time that he took off. 3. After the filing of Chiofalo’s initial complaint, the NJSP opened aninternal affairs investigation, which, among other things, implicated Chiofalofor not internally reporting the behavior that Chiofalo attributed to Cuomo inhis initial complaint. Chiofalo filed an amended complaint in April 2013,claiming that the investigation was retaliatory for filing his initial CEPAcomplaint. The amended complaint, like the initial complaint, alleged that theadverse employment actions he suffered constituted CEPA violations under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c). At oral argument, plaintiff conceded his case nowrests on N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(2) alone. B. Following the close of discovery, on February 23, 2016, defendants fileda motion for summary judgment, alleging that Chiofalo failed to set forth aprima facie case under CEPA. In relevant part, defendants argued thatCuomo’s statements regarding the Civilian Letter and Cetnar Memo, and 8 Chiofalo’s response, were too vague to constitute an order to destroy thedocuments and a refusal; that an order to destroy the Civilian Letter would nothave been a violation of “a law, statute, or regulation that has the force ofpublic policy” because the “commendation” was unsigned and therefore likelyautomatically generated by NJSP staff; and that Chiofalo had not providedevidence to show that his belief that Cuomo was underreporting his time offwas reasonable. Responding to plaintiff’s argument that CEPA is remediallegislation entitled to liberal construction and that the facts must be viewedfrom the perspective of whether plaintiff reasonably believed he was beingtold to destroy documents, defendants argued the following to the trial court: [Y]es, CEPA by law is to be determined liberally, but not unreasonably, Your Honor. What the Court -- what the plaintiff is asking here is for this Court to unreasonably believe that these innocuous statements that are not clear, that are not direct, are intended to either destroy a document that the major knows it exists because he sent it where it was supposed [to go] and that the statement, unlike others, means him, he’s keeping false pay records, it doesn’t meet the statute. Immediately thereafter, the court issued an oral decision denying themotion for summary judgment. Responding directly to the argumentadvanced, the court stated that, taking the facts in the light most favorable tothe plaintiff, “the fact is that the letter came in . . . [a]nd the direction was thatit doesn’t exist.” The court noted that whether Chiofalo “c[ould] connect it or 9 not connect it at trial is a different question” but that, giving Chiofalo “thebenefit of the doubt,” it was “at least a disputed issue of fact.” Accordingly,the court determined that it had “to let [the matter] go to a jury.” Defendantsfiled a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, noting that thearguments raised did not differ from those advanced at the initial summaryjudgment motion. C. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded Chiofalo $305,400 incompensatory damages 3 and $150,000 in punitive damages. Defendants filedfor judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 4:40-2, for a newtrial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1, and, in the alternative, remittitur. The trial courtdenied all three motions. D. Defendants appealed the denial of summary judgment and the post-trialmotions.4 They raised a number of issues, including the continued claim that3 This total amount was identified in the jury verdict sheets as $5400 in past wage loss, $50,000 in future wage loss, and $250,000 in pension loss. 4 Defendants’ Notice of Appeal referred to only the November 18, 2016 order denying their post-verdict motions. However, because their accompanying case information statement identified the April 1, 2016 order denying their summary judgment motion, and both parties briefed the issue of the denial of summary judgment, the Appellate Division reviewed both orders. 10 plaintiff failed to satisfy several elements of a prima facie case for a CEPAclaim. For the first time, however, defendants also argued, as summarized bythe Appellate Division, that Chiofalo’s CEPA claims were deficient “becausehe failed to 'identify a specific law or policy that prohibited . . . Cuomo’sconduct.’” (omission in original). Plaintiff’s response contended that it was“self-evident, that official police records should not be destroyed, and that anemployee should not be falsifying timesheets.” In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trialcourt judgment. The appellate court stated with respect to the validity of aCEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), “as a threshold matter, [a plaintiff]must 'first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, orthe clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts asalleged are true.’” (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 463 (2003)(emphasis omitted)). Therefore, when the plaintiff fails to do so a “trial courtcan and should enter judgment for a defendant.” (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J.at 463). Here, the appellate court determined that Chiofalo failed to identify atthe summary judgment stage any law or regulation that he believed Cuomoviolated in allegedly ordering Chiofalo to destroy documents. Nor, in thecourt’s view, did Chiofalo provide legal support for his claim that misreporting 11 vacation time violates a clear mandate of public policy. On that basis, theappellate court concluded that defendants were entitled to summary judgment.Specific to the timekeeping claim, the Appellate Division added thatChiofalo’s statement to Cuomo about the documentation of vacation time “washardly 'whistleblowing’ as contemplated by CEPA.” As a result of those deficiencies, the Appellate Division vacated thejudgment in favor of Chiofalo and remanded the matter for entry of an orderdismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. We granted Chiofalo’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 220 (2018).We also granted amicus curiae status to the National Employment LawyersAssociation of New Jersey (NELA). II. A. Chiofalo argues that the Appellate Division erred because itmisunderstood both the factual record and the specific CEPA provision underwhich he was bringing his claim. He argues that the Appellate Divisionapplied the standards for N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) to his claim, instead of N.J.S.A.34:19-3(c). And, he argues, the Appellate Division erred in holding that hewas required to identify a specific law or rule, when that statute requires onlythat the plaintiff believe the employer’s action to be fraudulent or criminal. 12 Moreover, according to Chiofalo, the error was compounded by the AppellateDivision’s failure to appreciate that the documents Chiofalo reasonablybelieved he had been asked to get rid of -- to destroy -- were not just theCivilian Letter but also the Cetnar Memo. The Cetnar Memo -- a high-rankingofficer’s commendation of Ventrella for his work on the now-controversialescort -- could be relevant evidence in future disciplinary or any other relatedproceedings involving Ventrella and the NJSP. Chiofalo argues that aninstruction to destroy it was plainly criminal or fraudulent behavior, as was thefalsification of timesheets filed by Cuomo. B. NELA supports plaintiff’s contention that the Appellate Division erredin its analysis. NELA specifically disagrees with the appellate court’sconclusions about Chiofalo’s claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). It also arguesthat various statutes, as well as provisions in the administrative code, governedCuomo’s alleged request to destroy the Civilian Letter and Cetnar Memo: N.J.S.A. 47:3-15 to -32 (the New Jersey Destruction of Public Records Law),N.J.A.C. 13:92-10.4(b) (requiring the retention of government personnelrecords for specific time periods), and N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (criminalizing thedestruction of evidence in a proceeding that the actor believes is about to beinstituted). NELA acknowledges that Chiofalo did not identify any of those 13 sources of law, but argues that once a plaintiff alleges wrongdoing it is thenthe court’s responsibility to determine whether the alleged wrongdoing isreasonably related to a source of law. In this instance, NELA contends, thetrial court effectively did that. C. Defendants argue that the Appellate Division correctly identified a fatalflaw in Chiofalo’s claim: the failure to identify a specific law, rule, regulationor public policy that he reasonably believed defendants violated. They arguethat, contrary to Chiofalo’s assertion, that failure defeats claims brought under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c) like those brought under other sections of the statute.They further reject NELA’s argument that the identification of a source of lawis a responsibility of the court. Finally, defendants contend that any factualmistake by the Appellate Division regarding the documents at issue wasirrelevant because the nature of the documents was not pertinent to theAppellate Division’s reasoning. III. An appellate court reviews a summary judgment decision by the samestandard that governs the motion judge’s determination. RSI Bank v.Providence Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat v. 14 Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)). In this review of the denial of summaryjudgment, we focus on the arguments of the parties that concentrate on CEPA. Chapter 105 of the Laws of 1986, otherwise known as CEPA, wasenacted in the wake of this Court’s opinion in Pierce v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980), to cement this State’s commitment to “protect andencourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities.”Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 461 (quoting Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. ofEduc., 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994)). CEPA ensures that employees are“protected from retaliation and employers are deterred from activities that areillegal or fraudulent, or otherwise contrary to a clear mandate of publicpolicy.” D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 120 (2007).CEPA is a remedial statute, and as such it “should be construed liberally toeffectuate its important social goal.” Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 555 (2013) (quoting Abbamont, 138 N.J. at 431). CEPA’s critical substantive provisions are contained in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. Section 3 sets forth the statute’s essential prohibition of employerretaliation for an employee’s protected activities, which are identified in threesubsections. Pertinent to this appeal, 5 CEPA provides as follows:5 Subsection (b) is not at issue in this matter. 15 An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following: a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity . . . ; or (2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any activity, policy or practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity; .... c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity . . . ; 16 (2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any activity, policy or practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity; or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment. [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.] Some of the subsections’ requirements have been subject to judicialelaboration. In the seminal Dzwonar case, the Court addressed a plaintiff’sCEPA claims brought under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) and (3). 177 N.J. at 461-69. There, the plaintiff -- a former arbitration officer/representative for aunion -- filed suit under CEPA alleging that she was terminated in retaliationfor expressing a reasonable belief that the executive board’s failure toadequately inform the general membership of its actions violated the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act and the union’s bylaws. Id. at 456.The jury found that the defendants had violated CEPA, but the AppellateDivision set aside the verdict. Ibid. We affirmed the Appellate Division’sdecision, concluding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s asserted belief thather employer’s conduct violated a law or public policy was not objectivelyreasonable. Ibid. 17 First, we summarized generally what a plaintiff must set forth toestablish a prima facie case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). Id. at 462. Westated that a plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a “whistle-blowing” activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19- 3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Ibid. (citing Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 476 (App. Div. 1999)).] Then we expanded on how a plaintiff who pursues CEPA claims under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) and (3) can satisfy the first prong of a prima face case.Ibid. We stated that either “the court or the plaintiff” must identify the statute,regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complained-ofconduct. Id. at 464 (emphasis added). That identification is important forother parts of the analysis, so “when no such law or policy is forthcoming,”judgment can and should be entered for the defendant. Id. at 463. Satisfactionof the identification requirement enables the trial court to “make a thresholddetermination that there is a substantial nexus between the complained-ofconduct and [the] law or public policy identified by the court or the plaintiff.” 18 Id. at 464. If the required substantial nexus is not shown, the case should notproceed to a jury. See ibid.; see also Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8,32-33 (2014) (noting the importance of the identification requirement set forthin Dzwonar for “provid[ing] a standard against which the conduct of thedefendant may be measured”). In short, the identification requirement assiststrial courts in “distinguish[ing] an employee’s objection to, or reporting of, anemployer’s illegal or unethical conduct from a routine dispute in the workplaceregarding the relative merits of internal policies and procedures,” Hitesman, 218 N.J. at 31 (citing Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 467-69), and thus helps in theweeding out of those cases that only “concern[] the most trivial or benignemployee complaints,” id. at 32 (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613-14 (2000)). Importantly, Dzwonar notes that a plaintiff need not “allege facts that, iftrue, actually would violate that statute, rule, or public policy.” 177 N.J. at 463. A plaintiff is required only to “set forth facts that would support anobjectively reasonable belief that a violation has occurred.” Id. at 464. Thestatute’s salutary public policy is not furthered by any implied requirement “tomake lawyers out of conscientious employees”; rather, and more accurately, itsdesign is “to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to 19 employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful.” Ibid. (quotingMehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193-94 (1998)). IV. We begin our analysis in this matter with the principle expressed in theDzwonar decision, that “when a plaintiff brings an action pursuant to N.J.S.A.34:19-3(c), the trial court must identify a statute, regulation, rule, or publicpolicy that closely relates to the complained-of conduct.” 177 N.J. at 463.While that general language would seem to impose some identificationexpectation for CEPA claims brought under either N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1), (2),or (3), we are unaware of any New Jersey court that has explicitly imposed thisrequirement on plaintiffs proceeding under subsection (c)(2). Only Battaglia, 214 N.J. 518, has analyzed N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(2) post-Dzwonar. That case involved a claim by a long-time employee that he wasdemoted after complaining about his supervisor’s alleged misuse of corporatecredit cards, which he referred to at trial as the “fraudulent use” of creditcards. Id. at 530. However, the facts at trial revealed that the complaint whichallegedly led to the plaintiff’s demotion was an anonymous letter to humanresources phrased in only general terms and containing no reference to thesupervisor’s use of credit cards. Id. at 531, 536. 20 At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendants moved unsuccessfully fordismissal for failure to state a prima facie case under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(2)and a verdict was ultimately entered in plaintiff’s favor, which the AppellateDivision affirmed. Id. at 536-37, 540-42. Our Court engaged in a carefulexamination of the facts after framing the issue as “whether [the] plaintiffreasonably believed that the activities surrounding the use of credit cardsamounted to fraudulent activity as defined by CEPA.” Id. at 557. We statedthat the focus needed to be “on whether the employee making the complaintreasonably believed that the activity was occurring and that it amounted tofraud.” Ibid. (citing Roach, 164 N.J. at 613). In elaborating, we cautioned that trial courts “must be alert to thesufficiency of the factual evidence and to whether the acts complained of couldsupport the finding that the complaining employee’s belief was a reasonableone,” and “must take care to ensure that the activity complained about meetsthis threshold.” Id. at 558. Those principles “demonstrate that it is critical toidentify the evidence that an aggrieved employee believes will support theCEPA recovery with care and precision.” Id. at 559. As the Court explained,“[v]ague and conclusory complaints, complaints about trivial or minor matters,or generalized workplace unhappiness” are not protected under CEPA. Ibid. 21 In Battaglia, we did not mention any express or implied obligation toidentify some legal source rendering activity fraudulent. That was notdiscussed in the opinion; rather, fraud was treated, under the circumstances ofthe case, as something that was readily apparent if factually supported.Further, we are aware of no case that requires plaintiff to precisely cite thestatutory source of perceived criminal activity. That said, the better practice in CEPA actions brought under (c)(2), or itssimilarly worded counterpart in (a)(2), surely is to identify the statutory orother basis for claiming objected-to behavior is criminal or fraudulent.Ordinarily, the relevant law or basis should be identified with enoughspecificity to allow the court to connect the facts to the reasonableness of theperception, as Dwoznar expects. We acknowledge that “criminal” or“fraudulent” activity is often apparent and commonly recognizable. Thatdistinguishes such claims from CEPA’s references in sections (c)(1) and (3) toviolations of a more general “law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuantto law” or of “a clear mandate of public policy,” which can be more obscure.But, in a CEPA action, the parties and the court need to have a commonunderstanding of the legal principle that the CEPA plaintiff reasonablybelieved was being violated. That enables a true joinder of issues on theCEPA claim. 22 We reiterate, however, that we do not expect whistleblower employeesto be lawyers on the spot; once engaged in the legal process, and with theassistance of counsel or careful examination by the court, however, the legalunderpinnings for claimed behavior that is perceived as criminal or fraudulentshould be able to be teased out sufficiently for identification purposes. Indeed,we note that NELA had no difficulty identifying statutory and regulatoryprovisions that pertained in this matter. That said, we acknowledge that therecertainly are areas where conduct is so obviously criminal that one need notpinpoint a Title 2C provision to avoid dismissal of a CEPA claim. However,even in those areas, if a defendant questions the source of law relied on by theplaintiff, that source should be provided by the plaintiff. The latter observation guides us in this matter. At no point during thetrial or post-trial motions did defendants argue that the CEPA claim wasdeficient for plaintiff’s failure to identify a specific law, rule, regulation orpublic policy that was violated by the alleged acts. More specifically,defendants never asked for a criminal code citation to support a claim under(c)(2) or some legal citation to support the claim of fraud. The transcript of the summary judgment argument before the trial courtreveals that the parties were not arguing about whether it was illegal to destroythe documents. Instead, the argument advanced by the State at the summary 23 judgment return date was whether there was an order to destroy the documentsand whether there could be a reasonable belief on plaintiff’s part that he hadbeen asked to destroy or get rid of documents based on his exchange withCuomo. It is unfair to reassess the summary judgment record based onarguments that were not advanced and that relate to a point the partiesappeared to take for granted -- namely, that refusal to participate in thedestruction of documents would support a CEPA claim if plaintiff reasonablybelieved that the destruction was ordered or occurred. The trial court’s focuswas on the facts presented, and on that basis we cannot say that the denial ofsummary judgment with respect to document destruction was in error. Wetherefore reverse the Appellate Division to the extent that it vacated the juryaward based on plaintiff’s claim that one form of his protected activity wasthat he opposed the destruction of internal documents. That said, we agree with the Appellate Division that Chiofalo’s allegedstatement to Cuomo that “[he] take[s] [his] time, unlike others” was simply tooamorphous to constitute “'whistleblowing’ as contemplated by CEPA.” SeeBattaglia, 214 N.J. at 531, 560 (concluding that a vague letter to humanresources alleging there were “so many examples [of] poor and unacceptable,unethical behavior” was not sufficient to “put defendant on notice that plaintiffwas trying to blow the whistle about credit card fraud” (alteration in original)). 24 Therefore, we do not disturb the Appellate Division’s judgment with respect toplaintiff’s claim related to his alleged protected activity of reporting fraudulenttimekeeping. V. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, which overturnedthe denial of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s CEPA claimrelated to the alleged refusal to destroy documents. We affirm the AppellateDivision’s reversal of summary judgment based on the fraudulent timekeepingallegations. We remand this matter to the Appellate Division to addressdefendants’ remaining challenges to the trial and to the judgment awarded toplaintiff. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion. 25