Title: PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL LEWIS PHILLIPS JR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119429
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 25, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 119429  
PAUL LEWIS PHILLIPS, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
CAVANAGH, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine  
whether MCR 6.201 permits a trial judge to compel a party in  
a criminal case to create reports from an expert witness when  
no such report exists.  The plain language of MCR 6.201(A)  
applies only to providing reports that already exist.  
Therefore, we conclude that a trial court may not compel a  
party in a criminal case to create an expert witness report.  
 
 
We also conclude that while MCR 6.201(I) permits modification  
of the requirements or prohibitions of MCR 6.201 upon a  
showing of “good cause,” such good cause was not demonstrated  
in this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals that the  
trial court abused its discretion in compelling defendant to  
create an expert report where none existed is affirmed.  
I. Facts and Proceedings  
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, MCL  
750.317, arising out of a single-vehicle accident that  
resulted in the death of defendant’s passenger.  A preliminary  
examination was held in February 2000, and defendant was bound  
over for trial. Defendant engaged three expert witnesses to  
testify at trial.  On February 28, 2000, the prosecutor filed  
a request for discovery, asking for reports produced by or for  
any expert witness defendant intended to call at trial.  No  
reports existed at that time.  The prosecutor moved to strike  
the defense expert witnesses on the basis that defendant had  
not turned over all reports or curricula vitae of the experts.  
On May 15, 2000, the trial judge ordered defendant to  
comply with MCR 6.201 by providing to the prosecutor any  
reports of defendant’s expert witnesses.  In August 2000, the  
prosecutor filed a second motion to strike and again alleged  
that defendant had not complied with the discovery requests.  
The prosecutor complained that there were no reports from any  
2  
of defendant’s expert witnesses.  
The trial judge signed an order on September 11, 2000,  
which, in part, ordered defendant to “obtain reports from the  
defense expert and provide them within thirty (30) days, to  
the People.”  Defendant’s motion for reconsideration was  
denied on October 20, 2000.  In its order, the trial court  
stated that “the Court believes that [MCL 767.94a] and MCR  
6.201 provide the Court with the discretion to order the  
creation of such reports.”  
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the  
Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals granted leave and  
reversed the order of the trial court.  246 Mich App 201; 632  
MW2d 154 (2001).  The Court concluded that there was no  
requirement in MCR 6.201 that an expert actually create a  
written report that could be produced.  Further, because  
nonwritten observations and conclusions are not discoverable,  
the Court cited People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 759, 762; 614  
NW2d 595 (2000), for the proposition that the prosecutor was  
not entitled to defendant’s expert witnesses’ unwritten  
observations.
 The Court of Appeals also rejected the  
prosecutor’s argument that the trial judge had the authority  
to modify the rules.  The Court noted that MCR 6.201(I)  
states: “On good cause shown, the court may order a  
modification of the requirements and prohibitions of this  
3  
  
rule.” Because the trial court did not find that good cause  
existed and, instead, based its decision on its own  
discretion, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial  
court abused its discretion in compelling defendant to create  
expert reports where none existed.  
The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal to this Court.  
Instead of granting leave, this Court remanded the case to the  
Saginaw Circuit Court for a “good cause” determination under  
MCR 6.201(I). 636 NW2d 139 (2001).  
On February 6, 2002, on remand, the trial court issued an  
opinion and order outlining “good cause” for modifying the  
discovery mandated by MCR 6.201(A).  The trial court noted  
that defendant did not comply with the trial court’s order for  
discovery 
and 
defendant’s failure to comply provided a legally  
sufficient reason for “good cause.”  This Court granted leave  
to appeal on July 10, 2002.1  
1The grant order directed the parties to brief among the
issues: 
(1) [W]hether MCR 6.201 or MCL 767.94a allows 
a trial court to compel creation of a report from a 
proposed defense expert witness, (2) whether the 
court rules authorize a trial court to compel 
disclosure of a defense, (3) whether the court 
rule, MCR 6.201, or the statute, MCL 767.94a, 
controls discovery in a criminal case, and (4) 
whether MRE 705 gives the trial court discretion to 
order disclosure of a defense expert’s opinion. 
[466 Mich 891 (2002).]  
4  
 
II. Standard of Review  
A trial court’s decision regarding discovery is reviewed  
for abuse of discretion.  People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643,  
680; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Interpretation of a court rule is  
treated like interpretation of a statute, it is a question of  
law that is reviewed de novo.  CAM Const v Lake Edgewood  
Condominium Ass’n, 465 Mich 549, 553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002).  
III. Analysis  
A.  The court rule, MCR 6.201, not the statute, MCL 767.94a, 
controls discovery in a criminal case.  
The question that logically must be answered first is  
whether the court rule, MCR 6.201,2 or the statute, MCL  
2MCR 6.201 provides, in pertinent part: 
(A) Mandatory Disclosure. 
In addition to  
disclosures required by provisions of law other 
than MCL 767.94a; MSA 28.1023(194a), a party upon 
request must provide all other parties:  
(1) the names and addresses of all lay and 
expert witnesses whom the party intends to call at 
trial;  
(2) any written or recorded statement by a lay 
witness whom the party intends to call at trial, 
except that a defendant is not obliged to provide 
the defendant’s own statement;  
(3) any report of any kind produced by or for 
an expert witness whom the party intends to call at 
trial;  
(4) any criminal record that the party intends 
to use at trial to impeach a witness;  
(continued...) 
5  
767.94a,3 controls discovery in a criminal case. 
Both the  
2(...continued)
(5) any document, photograph, or other paper 
that the party intends to introduce at trial; and  
(6) a description of and an opportunity to 
inspect any tangible physical evidence that the 
party intends to introduce at trial. On good cause 
shown, the court may order that a party be given 
the opportunity to test without destruction such 
tangible physical evidence.  
3MCL 767.94a provides as follows: 
(1) A defendant or his or her attorney shall 
disclose to the prosecuting attorney upon request 
the following material or information within the 
possession or control of the defendant or his or 
her attorney:  
(a) The name and last known address of each 
witness other than the defendant whom the defendant  
intends to call at trial provided the witness is 
not listed by the prosecuting attorney.  
(b) The nature of any defense the defendant 
intends to establish at trial by expert testimony.  
(c) Any report or statement by an expert 
concerning a mental or physical examination, or any 
other test, experiment, or comparison that the 
defendant intends to offer in evidence, or that was 
prepared by a person, other than the defendant, 
whom the defendant intends to call as a witness, if 
the report or statement relates to the testimony to 
be offered by the witness.  
(d) Any book, paper, document, photograph, or 
tangible object that the defendant intends to offer 
in evidence or that relates to the testimony of a 
witness, other than the defendant, whom the  
defendant intends to call.  
(2) The defendant or his or her attorney shall 
comply with the disclosure provisions of subsection 
(continued...) 
6  
prosecutor 
and 
defendant maintain that the court rule governs.  
We agree that the court rule is currently the governing  
provision.
 As both parties correctly point out, in  
conjunction with issuing MCR 6.201, this Court issued  
Administrative Order No. 1994-10.  The administrative order  
provided that “discovery in criminal cases heard in the courts  
of this state is governed by MCR 6.201, and not by MCL  
767.94a; MSA 28.1023 (194a).” AO 1994-10. Therefore, we do  
not need to determine whether MCL 767.94a would permit a trial  
court to compel creation of an expert report because MCR  
6.201, not MCL 767.94a, governs discovery in criminal cases.4  
B. MCR 6.201  
Having determined that MCR 6.201 governs discovery in  
criminal cases, we must now determine whether MCR 6.201(A)  
3(...continued)
(1) not later than 10 days before trial or at any 
other time as the court directs.  
(3) A defendant shall not offer at trial any 
evidence required to be disclosed pursuant to 
subsection (1) that was not disclosed unless  
permitted by the court upon motion for good cause 
shown. A motion under this subsection may be made 
before or during trial.  
4We intend to study discovery in criminal cases in
connection with our review of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in Administrative File 2003-04.  We need not address the issue 
in this opinion because we are not persuaded that the court
rule and statute conflict in relevant respects for the
purposes of this case. 
7  
allows a trial court to compel creation of a report from a  
proposed expert witness.  The prosecutor contends that the  
trial court can compel creation of a report.  We reject the  
prosecutor’s contention because it is contrary to the plain  
language of MCR 6.201(A).  In CAM Const, supra at 554, we  
reiterated the proper mode of interpreting a court rule, which  
was articulated in Grievance Admin v Underwood, 462 Mich 188,  
193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000):  
When called on to construe a court rule, this 
Court applies the legal principles that govern the 
construction and application of statutes. McAuley  
v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 
282 (1998).  Accordingly, we begin with the plain 
language of the court rule. When that language is 
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, 
without 
further 
judicial 
construction 
or  
interpretation.
 See Tryc v Michigan Veterans’  
Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). 
Similarly, common words must be understood to have 
their everyday, plain meaning.  See MCL 8.3a . . .; 
see also Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 
609; 608 NW2d 45 (2000).  
MCR 6.201(A)(3) provides that a party must provide “any  
report of any kind produced by or for an expert witness whom  
the party intends to call at trial.”  The plain meaning of the  
words at issue is as follows.  A “report” is defined as: “1.  
An account presented usually in detail.  2. A formal account  
of the proceedings or transactions of a group. . . .  The  
American Heritage Dictionary (2d college ed).  To “produce” is  
defined as: “1. To bring forth; yield.  2. 
To create by  
mental or physical effort.  3. To manufacture.  4. To cause  
8  
to occur or exist; give rise to.  5. 
To bring forward;  
exhibit.  6. 
To sponsor and present to the public. . . .  
Id.”5  
According to the plain meaning of the words, a “report”  
is an account of something.  A report that has been “produced”  
has already been brought forth or created.  In other words,  
the report must already exist.  There is nothing in the plain  
language of MCR 6.201(A) that permits a trial court to compel  
such a report to be created when it does not exist.  
Our holding in this regard is consistent with a recent  
case from this Court, People v Elston, supra. In Elston, the  
defendant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual  
conduct.  The trial court denied the defendant’s request to  
suppress evidence of sperm fragments found in the victim  
because neither party learned of their existence until the  
first day of trial.  The trial court denied the motion to  
suppress.
 The Court of Appeals reversed. 
This Court  
reinstated the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress,  
stating:  
Apart from the wet swab sample and the wet 
swab laboratory report, the only other “evidence of  
5This definition is consistent with the definition in 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), which defines “produce” as:
“1. To bring into existence; to create.  2. 
To provide (a
document, witness, etc.)  In response to subpoena or discovery 
request.  3. To yield (as revenue).  4. To bring (oil, etc.)
To the surface of the earth.” 
9  
sperm” not disclosed to defendant before trial was 
Dr. Randall’s own personal observations. Clearly, 
this 
information 
was 
outside 
the 
scope 
of  
discovery.  Because Dr.  Randall did not make notes  
of his observations, they were not subject to 
mandatory 
disclosure 
under 
MCR 
6.201(A)(3). 
[Elston at 762.]  
The same is true in this case. Defendant has consulted  
experts, but he maintains that the experts have not generated  
any reports.  Therefore, nothing exists that could be subject  
to mandatory disclosure under MCR 6.201(A)(3).  
The plain language of MCR 6.201(A) does not permit a  
trial court to compel creation of a report from either party’s  
expert witnesses where no report exists.  We, therefore,  
affirm the Court of Appeals holding that only existing reports  
that have been “produced,” or created, by an expert witness  
are required to be disclosed pursuant to MCR 6.201(A).  
C. Good cause  
MCR 6.201(I) provides: “On good cause shown, the court  
may order a modification of the requirements and prohibitions  
of this rule.”  
Before 
granting 
the 
prosecutor’s 
application 
for 
leave 
to  
appeal in this case, we remanded the case to the trial court  
for a good-cause determination under MCR 6.201(I). On remand,  
the trial court found that defendant “failed to fully comply  
with the discovery requests and orders by failing to initially  
disclose the addresses of experts and failure to provide  
10  
information from the experts.” The court stated:  
[I]n attempting to fashion an appropriate 
remedy for the discovery violation caused by the 
Defendants(sic), [the court] took into account the 
Defendant’s due process rights to a fair trial, the 
Prosecutor’s interest in obtaining convictions on 
relevant and admissible evidence and the Court’s  
interest in expeditiously administering justice and 
maintaining judicial integrity.  
Therefore, the court ordered that defendant “shall provide a  
Cirriculum Vitae of [each of] defendant’s experts and a basic  
report on each of the experts’ findings and conclusions.”  
We agree that a trial court may modify the requirements  
or prohibitions of MCR 6.201 if good cause is shown.  We do  
not believe, however, that the trial court’s stated reason  
constituted “good cause” under the court rule.  Defendant may  
not have adequately responded to the prosecutor’s discovery  
requests pertaining to his expert witnesses’ curricula vitae.  
However, as we indicated above, MCR 6.201(A)(3) only requires  
provision to the opposing party reports “produced by or for an  
expert witness.”  Because a party is not obligated to disclose  
reports that do not exist, the fact that defendant did not  
disclose such reports does not constitute “good cause” to  
modify the requirements of MCR 6.201(A).  We recognize that  
there may be circumstances where good cause does exist to  
permit a trial court to compel a party to create expert  
witness reports.  For example, good cause may exist when a  
trial court believes a party is intentionally suppressing  
11  
reports by an expert witness.6  However, such circumstances  
are not present here. Therefore, we conclude that the trial  
court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to create  
expert reports with the experts’ findings and conclusions.  
IV. Conclusion  
For these reasons, we conclude that the plain language of  
MCR 6.201(A) requires disclosing only reports that already  
exist.  A trial court may not compel a party in a criminal  
case to create a report from an expert witness, absent the  
good cause required in MCR 6.201(I).  We also conclude that  
the requisite “good cause” to modify the requirements in the  
court rule was not demonstrated in this case. Therefore, we  
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
6There has been no such claim here and no such finding by
the trial court. 
12