Title: PEOPLE OF MI V THEODORE MUTTSCHELER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 136199
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2008

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 18, 2008 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 136101 
THEODORE MUTTSCHELER,
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 136199 
THEODORE MUTTSCHELER,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MEMORANDUM OPINION. 
In this case, we are called on to interpret the intermediate-sanction 
sentencing statute, MCL 769.34(4)(a), and decide whether a defendant whose 
recommended minimum sentence range requires the imposition of an intermediate 
sanction may be sentenced to serve time in prison, rather than jail.  The Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Appeals held that, absent a departure supported by substantial and compelling 
reasons, a trial court may not impose an indeterminate prison sentence on a 
defendant for whom the sentencing guidelines require an intermediate sanction 
because an “intermediate sanction does not include a prison sentence.”  People v 
Muttscheler (On Reconsideration), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 
Appeals, issued March 25, 2008 (Docket No. 275411), p 2.  In lieu of granting 
either the prosecution’s or defendant’s application for leave to appeal, we affirm 
that judgment. 
While defendant was incarcerated in prison, guards found a crude weapon 
in his cell during a routine search.  Defendant pleaded guilty of attempted 
possession of a weapon by a prisoner, in exchange for the prosecution’s dismissal 
of an habitual-offender notice and the imposition of a sentence within the 
applicable sentencing guidelines range.  Under the guidelines, defendant’s 
recommended minimum sentence range was 5 to 17 months.  The trial court 
sentenced him to 12 to 30 months in prison, to be served consecutively to the 
sentences he was already serving.1  Defendant then moved to withdraw his plea, 
1 Because defendant was incarcerated when he committed the offense, 
MCL 768.7a(1) requires a consecutive sentence.  Specifically, the relevant part of 
the statute provides: 
A person who is incarcerated in a penal or reformatory 
institution in this state, or who escapes from such an institution, and 
who commits a crime during that incarceration or escape which is 
punishable by imprisonment in a penal or reformatory institution in 
this state shall, upon conviction of that crime, be sentenced as 
provided by law. The term of imprisonment imposed for the crime 
(continued…) 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
but the trial court denied his motion.  On leave granted, the Court of Appeals 
reversed in a split decision.  The Court held that defendant was entitled to an 
intermediate sanction, which would at most be a jail term of no more than 12 
months.  Id. It remanded the case for resentencing within the guidelines, in 
accordance with the plea agreement.  If the trial court could not agree to that, the 
Court held, defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea.  Id. 
As noted, under the sentencing guidelines, defendant’s recommended 
minimum sentence range was 5 to 17 months.  MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides: 
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence 
range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set 
forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an 
intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a 
substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the 
jurisdiction of the department of corrections. An intermediate 
sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit 
of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, 
whichever is less. [Emphasis added.] 
Furthermore, MCL 769.31(b) defines “intermediate sanction” as “probation 
or any sanction, other than imprisonment in a state prison or state reformatory, that 
may lawfully be imposed.”  The statute identifies a variety of possible 
intermediate sanctions, such as community service, probation, a jail sentence, a 
fine, house arrest, etc., but it unequivocally states that a prison sentence is not an 
intermediate sanction. See also People v Stauffer, 465 Mich 633, 635; 640 NW2d 
(…continued) 
shall begin to run at the expiration of the term or terms of 
imprisonment which the person is serving or has become liable to 
serve in a penal or reformatory institution in this state. 
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869 (2002).  Stauffer implies that when the guidelines require an intermediate 
sanction, even if the length of the sentence does not exceed the statute’s 12-month 
maximum, the sentence is an upward departure if the defendant is required to 
serve it in prison, rather than in jail. Id. at 636. Accordingly, the trial court cannot 
impose a prison sentence unless it identifies substantial and compelling reasons for 
the departure. Id. 
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the trial court erred by relying on 
People v Weatherford, 193 Mich App 115; 483 NW2d 924 (1992).  Weatherford, 
predating the enactment of the legislative sentencing guidelines, was decided in 
the “era” of the judicial sentencing guidelines, 1983 through 1998.  See People v 
Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). Because the minimum 
sentence ranges recommended by the judicial guidelines were not the product of 
legislative action, sentencing courts could not be required to adhere to them.  Id. 
Courts could sentence outside the guidelines simply by articulating a reason why 
such a sentence should be imposed.  Id.; Michigan Sentencing Guidelines (2d ed, 
1988), p 7. Thus, what the Court of Appeals determined to be a sufficient reason 
for the departure in Weatherford is inapplicable to a sentence imposed under the 
legislative sentencing guidelines. 
More importantly, the sentence in Weatherford was imposed after a jury 
trial. The trial court there was not bound by any plea agreement to sentence within 
the guidelines, as the trial court was in the present case.  Because the parties here 
agreed to a sentence within the guidelines, the trial court violated the agreement 
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not only by sentencing defendant to prison, but also by imposing an indeterminate 
sentence, under which defendant could be imprisoned for longer than the 12­
month maximum allowed by the intermediate-sanction statute. 
Finally, we conclude the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that 
defendant will be allowed to withdraw his plea only if the trial court cannot agree 
to a sentence within the guidelines.  As the Court noted, defendant does not assert 
his innocence; the heart of his argument is that the prosecution did not fulfill its 
end of the bargain. Muttscheler, supra at 2.2  Accordingly, enforcement of that 
bargain is the proper remedy. 
Affirmed. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
2 We note that this issue is simplified somewhat by the fact that defendant’s 
new sentence must be served consecutively to the existing sentence.  If the 
sentences could have been served concurrently, defendant might have chosen to 
agree to a departure in order to serve his new term in prison while he 
simultaneously served his existing prison term.  Agreeing to such a departure from 
an intermediate sanction would waive an appellate challenge, unless the length of 
the sentence also exceeded 12 months, as it did in this case.  People v Wiley, 472 
Mich 153, 154; 693 NW2d 800 (2005). 
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