Title: Brown, et al. v. E.I.DuPont DeNemours and Co., Inc Ison, et al. v. E.I.DuPont DeNemours and Co. Inc
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 298, 2002, 299, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MICHAEL BROWN and LINDSAY
§
Nos. 298/299, 2002
BROWN, as parents and natural guardians
§
(Consolidated)
of PHILIP BROWN; and MICHAEL
§
BROWN and LINDSAY BROWN,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of
Individually; GRAHAM COPLAND and
§
the State of Delaware, in and for
SUSAN COPLAND, as parents and
§
New Castle County
natural guardians of GARY COPLAND;
§
and GRAHAM COPLAND and SUSAN
§
C.A.No. 97C-07-113
COPLAND, Individually; JONATHAN
§
C.A. No. 97C-06-193
JOHNSTONE and JACQUELINE
 
§
JOHNSTONE, as parents and natural
§
guardians of JARAD JOHNSTONE, and
§
 
JONATHAN and JACQUELINE
§
JOHNSTONE, Individually; JUVERIA
§
MEMON, as parent and natural guardian
§
of KHALID MEMON, and JUVERIA
§
MEMON, Individually,
§
 
§
    
Plaintiffs Below,
§
Appellants,
§
§
              v.
§
§
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND 
§
COMPANY, INC.,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellee.
§
__________________________________
MARK ISON and KAREN ISON, as
§
parents and natural guardians of BLAKE
§
ISON; and MARK ISON and KAREN
§
ISON, Individually; ANDREA REILLY, 
§
as parent and natural guardian of JESSE 
§
HANHAM, and ANDREA REILLY,  
§
Individually,
§
Plaintiffs Below,
§
Appellants,
§
§
                v.
§
§
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND
§
COMPANY, INC.
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: January 22, 2003
Decided:
April 15, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED. 
Thomas C. Crumplar, Esquire (argued), Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Of Counsel:  James L Ferraro, Esquire, of Ferraro & Associates, P.A.,
Miami,  Florida,  for Appellants.
James W. Semple, Esquire, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Of Counsel:  Michael L. Martinez, Esquire (argued), William
L. Anderson, Esquire, Barry M. Parsons, Esquire and Katherine J. Nesbitt, Esquire,
of Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.  
VEASEY, Chief Justice:
1The children and the parents of each family are collectively referred to as “plaintiffs” in this opinion.  The
Superior Court initially dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action on the ground of forum non conveniens.  This Court
reversed that decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Ison v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 729
A.2d 832 (Del. 1999).  The issue currently before us arises on remand. 
In this appeal, we hold that the statute of limitations for an alleged injury
resulting from toxic exposure did not begin to run until the plaintiffs were on notice
that the harmful effects of the toxic exposure were possibly caused by wrongful
conduct.  The infant victims in this case were born with eye conditions that their
physicians originally believed were either genetic defects or natural occurrences.
Years later, however, a medical expert linked the birth defects to prenatal exposure to
a chemical produced by the defendant.  It was not until then that the plaintiffs were
on notice of a possible tortious act.
The applicable statute of limitations begins to run when injuries are "sustained.”
We hold that the commencement of the limitations period here is deferred until the
plaintiffs were on notice that the birth defects were potentially actionable injuries
because legal injuries were not sustained until that time.
Facts
Eight families brought products liability claims against E.I. duPont de Nemours
and Company, Inc. (“DuPont”) alleging that the exposure of pregnant mothers to
Benlate, a DuPont product, caused birth defects in their children.1  When the plaintiff
children in this case were born, physicians diagnosed the defects as either
anophthalmia or severe microphthalmia.  The children suffering from anophthalmia
2Phillip Brown was born on February 15, 1984.  Khalid Memon was born on June 24, 1985.  Jesse Hanham
was born on November 10, 1990.  Gary Copland was born on June 6, 1992.  Jared Johnstone was born on September
3, 1993.  Blake Ison was born on November 13, 1993.  
2
were born without eyes.  The children suffering from microphthalmia were born with
abnormally small eyes.2
Shortly after the children were born, the parents sought a medical explanation
for their children’s conditions.  The doctors informed the parents that the cause of the
birth defects was unknown.  At the time, scholarship in the area suggested that
anophthalmia and microphthalmia were either genetic defects or were caused by
intrauterine infections.  None of the doctors could find the condition in the parents’
family medical histories, however.  The parents assumed the abnormalities were an
act of nature.  
In the Spring of 1996, an expert linked the children’s condition to their
mothers’ prenatal exposure to benomyl, an active ingredient in Benlate, which is  a
fungicide produced by DuPont.  This product is primarily used for commercial
agricultural purposes.  The plaintiffs contend that the mothers were exposed to Benlate
during the periods in which they were pregnant by handling seedlings and flower
bulbs either soaked or dusted with Benlate while the mothers were working in a
nursery or tending to their home gardens.  
Proceedings in the Superior Court
310 Del. C. § 8119.  ("No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged personal injuries shall
be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were
sustained. . . .")
4The youngest child was born on November 13, 1993, roughly four years before a complaint was filed.  
5Ison v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 2002 WL 962205 (Del. Super.) (“Ison S.J. Op.”).  The actions of the
remaining two families were not dismissed, and therefore these families are not parties to this appeal.  One family
presented a  breach of warranty claim that the trial judge did not dismiss.  DuPont did not seek the dismissal of the other
family’s claim.  Trial for these cases is scheduled to begin this year.  
3
Two families brought a product liability action against DuPont on June 24,
1997.  Four other families brought a similar action on July 15, 1997.  The applicable
statute of limitations period is two years from the date the injuries were sustained.3
The plaintiffs contend that the complaints were filed less than two years after the
families were on notice of the possible link between Benlate and the eye
abnormalities, even though they were filed more than two years after each of the
children was born.4  The trial judge granted a motion for summary judgment in favor
of DuPont and dismissed the actions of six of the Plaintiff families as time barred by
the statute of limitations.5
Issue on Appeal
Plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred by dismissing their cause of action as
time-barred because the plaintiffs filed suit more than two years after the children
were born.  Although the statute requires a plaintiff to bring an action within two years
of the time the “injury” is “sustained,” plaintiffs argue that the limitations period did
6  10 Del. C. §  8119.
7  See Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968).  
4
not begin to run until the plaintiffs were on notice that the eye conditions might have
been related to Benlate exposure.  
The Limitations Period Did Not Begin to Run Until Plaintiffs Should Have
Known that Benlate Could Have Caused the Birth Defects
The fate of the plaintiffs’ claims depends on the proper interpretation of Title
10, Section 8119 of the Delaware Code.  Section 8119 bars any personal injury
damage action that is "brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon
which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained[.]"6  Although the
“injuries” were physically “sustained” by the children in utero, the plaintiffs ask this
Court to apply the time of discovery exception7 to their actions on the ground that the
“injuries” for purposes of Section 8119 were not "sustained"—and thus the two-year
clock did not begin running—until 1996, when the plaintiffs were first on notice of
a possible connection between the children’s eye conditions and their mothers’
exposure to Benlate. 
Summary judgment in favor of DuPont may be granted only if the facts, viewed
in a light most favorable to each of the plaintiffs, “predominate toward the conclusion
that the plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge that his harmful physical condition was
8See In re Asbestos Litig., 673 A.2d 159, 163 (Del. 1996).
9See McNutt v. Delaware Racing Ass’n, 294 A.2d 838, 839 (Del. 1972).  
10See Layton, 246 A.2d at 796.
5
attributable” to DuPont’s product.8  Plaintiffs contend that, until 1996, no one in the
medical community had characterized the birth defects as possible tortious injuries.
In accordance with the discovery exception, the trial judge should have determined
that the statute of limitations did not start to run until the children’s parents were on
notice that a legally actionable injury existed.
The Time of Discovery Exception Applies to the Plaintiffs’ Claims
Plaintiffs’ actions fall into a category of cases where Section 8119 does not
operate perfectly.  Normally, an “injury” is “sustained” when a wrongful act or
omission occurs.9   Situations arise, however, where the moment of the wrongful act
and the plaintiff’s discovery of the injury do not occur within close proximity of each
other.  In appropriate circumstances, this Court has applied an exception to the
limitations period by interpreting it to run at the time the plaintiff is on notice that he
or she has sustained a tortious injury.    As we held in Layton v. Allen, Section 8119
is ambiguous because an “injury” is “sustained” either at the time the wrongful act is
committed or at the time the plaintiff should have discovered the injury.10 
11See Condon v. A.H. Robins Co., 349 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Neb. 1984) (“It seems to us that it would be a
Hobson’s choice to suggest, on the one hand, that one could not maintain a cause of action unless and until one could
show not only a breach of duty but an injury or damage . . . and, on the other hand, to suggest that the time for bringing
that action could begin and terminate before the individual could either reasonably be aware of the injury or damage
or be able in any manner to establish its existence.”).
12Layton, 246 A.2d at 797.
13Id. at 798.
14Id.
6
The discovery exception prevents the operation of Section 8119 from presenting
the plaintiff with a Hobson’s choice.11  The General Assembly could not reasonably
have intended to “grant a remedy for a wrong but to bar the remedy before the wrong
was physically ascertainable.”12  Thus, in Layton v. Allen this Court established the
discovery exception and held that the limitations period did not begin to run when the
defendant, a surgeon, left an undetected metallic instrument in the plaintiff.13  Because
the plaintiff did not suffer any complications from the defendant’s negligent conduct
until seven years later, the “injury,” for Section 8119 purposes, could not be deemed
“sustained” until the harm manifested itself.14 
Since Layton, this Court and the Superior Court have applied the discovery
exception to defer the running of the Section 8119 limitations period in circumstances
where the plaintiff has been exposed to a toxic substance, but the nature of the injury
15  See, e.g., Christian v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 1992 WL 19948 (Del. Super.), at *1 (holding that the discovery
exception applies to latent injuries allegedly caused by exposure to cosmetics); Iocono v. Air Products, 1993 WL
318857 (Del. Super.), at *1-2 (holding that the statute of limitations was deferred for injuries arising from plaintiff’s
exposure to benzene until the plaintiff suffered coronary problems that placed him on notice of the injury); Jackson v.
Wilmington Housing Authority, 1986 WL 4567, (Del. Super.), at *1 (suggesting that the time of discovery exception
applies to injuries arising from lead-based paint poisoning).
16  See In re Asbestos Litig., 673 A.2d at 163; Bendix Corp. v. Stagg, 486 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1984). 
17Ison S.J. Op., 2002 WL 962205, at *3 (stating “there need not be a diagnosis of the cause of the injury; only
a correct diagnosis of the malady from which the plaintiff suffers") (citing Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,
319 A.2d 107, 108 (Del. 1974)). 
18See Greco v. Univ. of Delaware, 619 A.2d 900, 904-05 (Del. 1993). In Greco, the plaintiff sought medical
attention from a student health center for nausea, dizziness, and other problems.  The plaintiff had been taking an oral
contraceptive at the time.  The physician at the health center failed to connect the oral contraceptives to the symptoms
and did not advise her to stop using the contraceptive.  The plaintiff later suffered a grand mal seizure and was properly
diagnosed with mesenteric vein thrombosis, resulting from continued use of the contraceptive.  This Court held that
Section 8119 began to run at the time her symptoms began rather than the time she had been formally diagnosed with
the thrombosis.  See also Collins, 319 A.2d at 107-08.  In Collins, plaintiff experienced pain that persisted after the
defendant physician performed an operation.  The doctor was unable to provide relief and referred the plaintiff to a
specialist for further treatment.  Id.  This Court held that Section 8119 began to run at the time the plaintiff suffered the
complications rather than the time the specialist formally diagnosed her problem.  Id.
7
involves a latency period where the harmful effects of the toxic exposure are not
discoverable for several years.15  Asbestos claims are the most notable examples.16 
The trial judge here held that the statute of limitations commenced when the
children were born, noting that we have held, under different circumstances, that the
discovery exception applies only until the identification of the physical condition
rather than the cause of that condition.17  For example, the discovery exception is not
available  to  claimants  who  suffer  injury  from  an  identifiable  cause  and
nevertheless ignore their injuries during the limitations period.18  But that is not the
case before us.  The plaintiffs were not “cognizant of the fact of having sustained an
19See Cole v. Delaware League for Planned Parenthood, 530 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Del. 1987).  In Cole, the
defendant performed the plaintiff’s abortion.  Over two years later, Plaintiff discovered she was sterile because of the
defendant’s alleged negligence.  Id. at 1125.  This Court reversed the trial judge, holding that sufficient evidence did
not exist to find that plaintiff “surely knew” she had sustained an injury at the time of the abortion. Id.  Section 8119
should have been determined to run at the time plaintiff was informed of test results that would place her on notice that
she was sterile.  Id. at 1125-26.
20Ison S.J. Op., 2002 WL 962205, at *3.  
21The statute begins to run when a plaintiff is chargeable with knowing that his or her rights have been violated
rather than when he or she actually learns about the violation.  See In re Asbestos Litig., 673 A.2d at 163.  
8
injury” and could not have been expected to bring suit during the time in which they
were not on notice that a potential claim existed.19 
The trial judge correctly noted the plaintiffs face a dilemma that this Court did
not address directly in the latent injury cases.  The latent injury claims involved
circumstances where the injurious consequences of the wrongful conduct developed
over time.  Here, the birth defects appeared almost immediately, but the plaintiffs were
not on notice until years later that the defects were the possible consequences of the
alleged wrongful conduct.  The trial judge decided not to apply the discovery
exception beyond the time the children were born because the eye conditions were
manifest at birth.20  The principles developed in Layton and its progeny require us,
however, to hold that the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiffs
were on notice that the injury may be tortiously caused by the defendant's product.21
To apply the discovery exception, the court must conduct a fact-intensive
inquiry to determine whether a plaintiff was blamelessly ignorant of a potential claim
22In addressing asbestos claims, we have listed several factors to consider: (1) the plaintiff’s level of knowledge
and education; (2) the extent of his recourse to medical evaluation; (3) the consistency of the medical diagnosis; and
(4) plaintiff’s follow-up efforts during the period of latency following initial recourse to medical evaluation.  Id.
23See Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 498 A.2d 1126, 1132 (Del. Super. 1985) (noting the “special problems
surrounding latent disease cases where the same exposure may lead to separate and distinct diseases and the symptoms
of each disease may become manifest years apart”) aff’d sub nom. Keene Corp. v. Sheppard, 503 A.2d 192 (Del. 1986).
24In re Asbestos Litig., 673 A.2d at 162 (“Mere exposure to asbestos accompanied by symptomatology
associated with asbestosis may not suffice . . . to render a plaintiff chargeable with knowledge that his harm is
attributable to asbestos exposure where there is uncertainty in medical diagnosis.”).
25In re Asbestos Litig., 673 A.2d at 163.
9
or dilatory in pursuing the action.22  A plaintiff may remain blamelessly ignorant of
the potential claim even after a latent injury reveals itself through physical ailments.
The limitations period for a toxic tort does not begin immediately upon the onset of
physical problems if the symptoms are reasonably attributable to another cause and
the plaintiff is not on notice of the tortious cause.23  This Court’s decision in the case
of In re Asbestos Litigation, for example, applied the discovery exception to defer the
limitations period during the time period in which the plaintiff believed he suffered
from asbestosis but his physicians told him that his problems were unrelated to
asbestos exposure.24  In both the Asbestos Litigation and the case before us, the
plaintiffs suffered a physical condition that could not be attributed to a tortious injury
until someone from the scientific community found and revealed publicly a link
between the physical condition and the exposure to the toxic substance.25 
Plaintiffs contend that before 1996, the plaintiffs’ “injuries” were no less hidden
than a latent disease or the undiscovered implanted metal instrument discussed in
26Stagg v. Bendix Corp., 472 A.2d 40, 43 (Del. Super. 1984) aff’d 486 A.2d 1150 (Del. 1984).  See also Layton,
246 A.2d at 797 (noting that in the typical tort case the physical impact starts the limitations period because the impact
"serves to notify the plaintiff of the violation of his rights before the expiration of the period of limitations").  Several
other authorities make a similar distinction between physical injury and legal injury.  See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 789 (7th ed. 1999) (noting that the primary definition of "injury" is "The violation of another's legal
right, for which the law provides a remedy"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965) (defining "injury"
as "the invasion of any legally protected interest of another"); see also Condon, 349 N.W.2d at 627 (noting that "injury"
for purposes of a statute of limitations must be defined "in the legal sense," and legal injury does not "'occur' until it has
sufficiently manifested itself so that a reasonable person knows, or . . . should have discovered, the injury or damage").
10
Layton.  The birth defects were present when the children were born, but the “legal
injury” was not “sustained” at that time because the potential tortious cause was not
then publicly known in the scientific community.  The discovery exception, therefore,
starts the limitations period running only “when a legal injury is sustained.”26  Thus,
the statute of limitations period began to run when plaintiffs were on notice of a
potential tort claim.   
The General Assembly Has Not Expressed An Intent to Limit the Discovery
Exception Employed Under Section 8119
By applying the discovery exception to the plaintiffs’ claims, DuPont argues
that we are contradicting the intentions of the General Assembly.  According to
DuPont, if this Court fashions the discovery exception to account for a plaintiff’s
inability to establish some causal link between the injury and the breach of duty, we
will have redefined Section 8119 to operate functionally as an accrual statute because
the discovery analysis does not focus on the date of the physical injury.  DuPont notes
that while other provisions in Title 10 of the Delaware Code set the limitations period
to run when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues, the General Assembly continues
27 Compare 10 Del. C. § 8119 with 10 Del. C. § 8106 (actions subject to 3-year limitations begin upon accrual
of the cause of action); 10 Del. C. § 8107 (limitations for wrongful death begins upon the “accruing of the cause of such
action”). 
28See, e.g., Isaacson, Stolper & Co. v. Artisan’s Sav. Bank, 330 A.2d 130, 132 (Del. 1974) (noting that an
accrual statute “begins to run at the time of the wrongful act”); see also Mastellone v. Argo Oil Corp., 82 A.2d 379 (Del.
1951).  
29McNutt, 294 A.2d at 839. 
30Because in many circumstances there is little difference between the effect of an accrual statute and a time-of-
injury statute, this Court has also applied the discovery exception to accrual causes of action.  See Isaacson, 330 A.2d
at 133.  
31 In Layton, this Court cited with approval decisions from other jurisdictions that reach a result similar to the
discovery exception even though these decisions were based on an “accrual” statute.  246 A.2d at 800 (“While we do
not adopt the discovery rule as such because . . . [Section 8119] is not an ‘accrual’ statute, it is noteworthy that the result
we reach is consistent with the strong trend of modern authority on the subject.”).   
11
to employ the time of the injury as the starting point for the limitations period in
Section 8119.27  Because the General Assembly has chosen not to set the limitations
period to begin at the time the cause of action “accrues,” DuPont contends that the
discovery exception cannot be applied to circumstances where the physical ailment
is visible but the cause of the physical problem is unknown.  We disagree.
Applying the discovery exception to the plaintiffs’ claims does not transform
Section 8119 into an accrual statute.  An action “accrues” for limitations purposes at
the time of the wrongful act.28  This is also the moment at which a time-of-injury
limitations period commences.29  Absent the discovery exception, the plaintiffs’ causes
of  action  would  be time-barred  under either a time-of-injury or accrual statute.30
The accrual statutes set forth in Title 10 of the Delaware Code do not affect the
application of the discovery exception.31
3210 Del. C. § 8131.  Section 8131 provides, in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, the time limitation for an action to recover
damages for wrongful death or for personal injuries suffered by a member or former member of the
armed forces of the United States, who served as a member of the armed forces . . . in Indochina
between January 1, 1962 and May 7, 1975, inclusive, due to exposure to phenoxy herbicides,
including  but not limited to exposure to substances known as Agent Orange . . . shall not expire until
2 years has elapsed from the date that said person has been told by a licensed physician . . . that the
injuries or death may be related, in whole or in part, to exposure to phenoxy herbicides.  
33Id.  
34Bendix, 486 A.2d at 1153.
12
DuPont also argues that the enactment of an unrelated statute, Section 8131,
precludes this Court from applying the discovery exception to claims that involve
toxic exposure.  Title 10, Section 8131 sets forth the limitations period for members
of the armed services who were exposed to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War.32
The Section 8131 limitations period commences on the date the injured plaintiff is
informed by a licensed physician that his injuries may have been caused by exposure
to Agent Orange.33  DuPont argues that had the General Assembly intended to grant
a similar exception to all plaintiffs who are the victims of toxic exposure, it would not
have limited the scope of Section 8131 to apply only for service personnel. 
Because the plaintiffs’ claims do not involve “Indochina herbicide exposure,”
Section 8131 is irrelevant to our analysis.  In Bendix we noted that the General
Assembly’s adoption of a special limitations period for servicemen exposed to Agent
Orange does not evidence any intention by the General Assembly to modify Section
8119 or our interpretation of Section 8119.34   Absent a specific enactment by the
35See id. (“Until the General Assembly does so act [to create a special limitations period for specific causes of
action], we will not interpret 10 Del. C. §  8119 to do an injustice to those inflicted with an inherently unknowable
disease. . . .”).
13
General Assembly to the contrary, we will not interpret Section 8119 in a fashion that
time-bars the claims of the blamelessly ignorant plaintiffs before us.35
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand this case to that
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 18, the time within which a motion for reargument may be filed in this matter is
shortened to seven days from the date of this Opinion.