Title: P. v. Maury
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S012852
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2003

1 
Filed 4/24/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S012852 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
ROBERT EDWARD MAURY, 
) 
 
) 
Shasta County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 87-8250 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Robert Edward Maury for the first degree 
murders (Pen. Code, § 187)1 of Averill Weeden, Belinda Jo Stark and Dawn 
Berryhill, the assault on Stark with intent to commit rape (§ 220), the robbery 
(§ 211) of Berryhill, and the forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (2)) of Jacqueline H.  It 
found true special circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(3)) and robbery murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)).  After a penalty trial, the 
jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court imposed that sentence.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  As will appear, we affirm the judgment 
in its entirety. 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  The Prosecution’s Case 
a.  Introduction 
The prosecution presented a fact-intensive, circumstantial case of 
defendant’s guilt, which interconnected three murders and the rape of a fourth 
victim. 
A central element in the case was the Shasta County Secret Witness 
program (Secret Witness), which was established as a telephone “hotline” to 
receive information from citizens about crimes committed in the county.  A month 
after Weeden’s disappearance in 1985, an anonymous caller called the Secret 
Witness with information on the location of Weeden’s body in exchange for 
reward money.  This information led to the discovery of Weeden’s body.  
Although the police suspected that defendant, Weeden’s roommate, had been 
involved in her disappearance and was possibly the Secret Witness caller, there 
was insufficient evidence of his involvement in Weeden’s death or that he was the 
caller. 
In 1986, defendant called the Secret Witness about seeking a reward for 
information on an unrelated burglary.  During the call, defendant identified 
himself by name.  The operator believed that he was the same person who had 
previously provided information on Weeden.  
At the end of June 1987, Berryhill and Stark disappeared.  Soon afterwards, 
the Secret Witness operator received a series of telephone calls from an 
unidentified caller, whom she believed to be the previous caller.  He provided 
information leading to the discovery of the women’s bodies, which were later 
located in the same rural area, within three-tenths of a mile of each other.  The 
3 
caller again received monetary rewards for the information provided.  When the 
caller retrieved the reward money at a designated drop-off point, the police 
identified him as defendant.  After the police later confronted defendant with this 
information, he made a series of incriminating statements, which eventually led to 
his arrest.   
b.  Weeden’s disappearance 
In May 1985, Weeden lived in Redding and rented a room in her house to 
defendant.  On Thursday, May 23, Eula Chartier, Weeden’s mother, spoke to 
defendant several times on the telephone inquiring about her daughter’s 
whereabouts.  Defendant related that Weeden was at the store.  On the last call, 
defendant exclaimed, “How in the hell am I supposed to know where she is.”  
Unable to locate Weeden, Chartier reported to the police that her daughter was 
missing.   
While searching for his sister, Bill Chartier asked defendant where she was.  
Defendant gave conflicting stories.  Ray Morris, who was with defendant at the 
Weeden house on one occasion, told Chartier that he last saw Weeden riding off 
with defendant on the back of his motorcycle.   
Assigned to investigate the disappearance of Weeden, Redding Police 
Detective Dave Mundy spoke with defendant at the police department on June 3, 
1985.  Defendant appeared to be “relaxed and self-assured” and denied any 
involvement in Weeden’s disappearance.  He related that the last time he had seen 
Weeden was “either Thursday, Friday, or a Saturday.”  At that time, defendant 
drove Weeden on his motorcycle to a telephone booth, left her there while he went 
to another location to pick up some drugs for Weeden, returned to pick her up, and 
drove her back to her house.  A week later, Detective Mundy spoke again with 
defendant, who confirmed this account.   
4 
c.  The 1985 Secret Witness telephone calls and discovery of 
Weeden’s body 
On June 19, 1985, an anonymous person called the Secret Witness, 
inquiring as to how much he would receive for information on the location of 
Weeden’s body.  Shirley Landreth, who answered most of the incoming calls for 
the Secret Witness, spoke to this person.   
On August 8, 1985, the same person (whose voice Landreth recognized) 
called and asked again about the amount of reward money he would receive for 
information on the location of Weeden’s body.  This time, having received 
authorization to pay the reward money, Landreth agreed with the caller on the 
amount.  The caller then gave precise directions to a wooded area located off a 
trail behind an automobile body shop in Redding.  In relating the distances, he 
used the term “meters.”  Claiming that he knew the identity of the person 
responsible for the Weeden killing, the caller offered to give information about the 
“responsible” person if he received his reward money in a timely manner.  He also 
related that there were six unsolved murders in Shasta County and he could give 
information to solve two others.   
Based on the information provided by the caller, the police found Weeden’s 
badly decomposed body.  It had been covered with cardboard and what appeared 
to be an old carpet.  An autopsy, performed on August 23, 1985, revealed that 
Weeden’s skull and the bone at the top of her throat had been fractured “at or near 
the time of death.”  The medical examiner opined that Weeden died from multiple 
traumatic injuries; either fracture, independently, or both fractures in conjunction, 
could have caused Weeden’s death.  The fractured bone in Weeden’s throat was 
consistent with manual strangulation.   
After the discovery of Weeden’s body, Landreth received four more 
telephone calls from the same caller in August 1985.  On August 12, the caller 
5 
said that the person who had lived with Weeden was responsible for her death.  
Although the caller refused to talk with Detective Mundy, he said he would call 
back and answer questions that the officer gave to Landreth.   
On August 15, 1985, the Secret Witness caller telephoned Landreth as 
promised.  Responding to Detective Mundy’s questions, the caller related that the 
person responsible for Weeden’s death was named “Robert” or “Bob” and had 
rented a room from Weeden; he knew this because he was “sort of with him”; he 
was Bob’s drug connection and had gone with him to collect the money; Bob had 
provided drugs to Weeden; and when Weeden could not pay for the drugs, Bob 
went out of control and strangled her with a nylon clothesline obtained from 
Weeden’s backyard.  The caller further related that the killing occurred Thursday 
night on a trail and the body was dragged to where it was found.  He refused to 
admit that he had observed the killing.  Landreth asked, “If Bob denies [the 
involvement], how can we nail him?”  The caller responded, “Tell Bob that Dave 
has talked to Frank” and that “it will scare the hmm [later described as a ‘four-
letter word’] out of him.”2   
On August 15, 1985, the Secret Witness caller telephoned Landreth again 
and responded to more questions provided by Detective Mundy.  The caller related 
that Weeden was picked up at dusk and killed with a six- to eight-inch rock at 7:00 
or 8:00 p.m. on Thursday; he knew it was Thursday because it had been a 
relative’s birthday; and Bob drove Weeden on his motorcycle while the caller 
drove his own car.  The caller reiterated that Weeden had been strangled beside 
the trail, dragged to where she was eventually found, hit with a rock to make sure 
that she was dead, and covered with leaves and branches.  Bob returned later and 
                                             
 
2  
People who knew defendant testified that he used the term “Frank” to refer 
to a liar.   
6 
covered Weeden’s body with an object such as a blanket, towel, or rug.  In 
describing where the police could find Weeden’s glasses, the rope, and the rock, 
the caller again used the term “meters.”  When Landreth related that the police 
were unable to find the rope near the location of the body, the caller said that it 
could be found next to a shed in Weeden’s backyard.  The police later found a 
nylon clothesline there.  The caller said that he would check the next day and 
warned that if he did not receive his reward money, they would not hear from him 
again.   
On August 26, 1985, the same caller telephoned Landreth again.  
Responding to more questions provided by Detective Mundy, the caller described 
the clothing Weeden had worn and said that Bob covered the body with a rug.  
When asked if anyone had seen Bob return to the body, the caller responded that 
he did not know, although Bob had gone back several times on his dirt bike.   
d.  Defendant’s additional statements to the police about Weeden’s 
death 
On September 4, 1985, Detective Mundy spoke with defendant again at 
defendant’s house.  Defendant reiterated that he had driven Weeden on his 
motorcycle to a telephone booth, left her there while he retrieved some drugs, 
returned to Weeden, and then brought her back to her house.  He believed this 
occurred on Friday night, May 24, because he recalled that the next day he 
attended a birthday party for his brother’s children.   
In November 1985, defendant telephoned Shasta County Sheriff’s 
Detective Chester Ashmun.  This time, he offered information on the cause of 
Weeden’s death to the effect that she had been strangled and hit on the head.  He 
wanted consideration on a possession of stolen property charge in an unrelated 
case and immunity in the Weeden case.  Detective Ashmun responded that he 
might be able to help defendant on the unrelated case.  After Detective Ashmun 
7 
related this information, Detective Mundy telephoned defendant.  Defendant 
offered to talk, conditioned upon receiving immunity on the Weeden case.  
Detective Ashmun responded that only the district attorney could grant immunity.   
The next day, November 21, 1985, Detective Mundy and Shasta County 
District Attorney Steve Carlton interviewed defendant at defendant’s house.  
Defendant stated that close to the time of his nephews’ birthdays, he returned to 
Weeden’s house and found Morris strangling Weeden with a rope.  Upon seeing 
defendant, Morris dropped Weeden.  Defendant believed that she was dead.  
Another man, whom defendant did not know, pointed a gun at defendant.  Morris 
used the same rope to tie defendant’s hands.  Morris and the other man placed 
defendant in the back of Weeden’s truck with Weeden’s body.  They drove to the 
woods where they dumped Weeden’s body.  Although Weeden was already dead, 
Morris threw rocks at her body.  Defendant convinced Morris not to shoot him by 
promising the men anything they wanted.  After returning to Weeden’s house, 
Morris threatened that if defendant turned them in to the police, they would kill 
him.3   
On December 10, 1985, Detective Mundy spoke with defendant again.  
Defendant repeated how Weeden had been strangled, but said he was not sure if 
Weeden was dead when Morris dropped her.  This time, however, defendant 
claimed that Morris forced him, at gunpoint, to strike Weeden on the head with a 
rock to disguise how she died.  During the interview, defendant used the term 
“meters,” which led Detective Mundy to suspect that defendant was the Secret 
Witness caller.  When asked if he was the caller, defendant denied it.   
                                             
 
3  
By November 1985, the police suspected that defendant was responsible for 
Weeden’s death. 
8 
e.  The 1986 Secret Witness telephone calls 
On September 11, 1986, over a year after receiving the last telephone call 
from the Secret Witness caller, Landreth received a telephone call from a person 
offering information on a burglary, unrelated to the Weeden case, in exchange for 
a reward.  Landreth recognized the person’s voice as the same caller who had 
made the 1985 anonymous calls regarding Weeden.  The caller identified himself 
as “Bob” or “Robert Maury.”   
A week later, the same person who had called Landreth about the unrelated 
burglary, and whom Landreth believed had also called in 1985, called again.  He 
wanted immunity on the Weeden case.  The Secret Witness calls from this person 
stopped, but as shown below, resumed in August 1987, after the disappearances of 
Berryhill and Stark. 
In the spring of 1987, defendant called Detective Mundy.  Upset because 
his name had been leaked as a possible informant in an unrelated robbery trial, 
defendant taunted Mundy that he would never really know what had happened to 
Weeden and would “take Averill Weeden’s death to [Mundy’s] grave.”   
f.  The Jacqueline H. rape 
On June 20, 1987, defendant began talking to Jacqueline H. and introduced 
himself as “Maury as in hooray.”  Defendant drove Jacqueline H. on his 
motorcycle to her friend’s house, where she stayed for a few hours.  She returned 
home and then left her house at about dusk to go to a fair.  About one and one-half 
blocks from her house, Jacqueline H. saw defendant parked on the side of the 
road.  She wondered why he was there since she had not divulged her home 
address.  Defendant invited Jacqueline H. to a friend’s party at the bike trails in 
Happy Valley.  She accepted and he drove her on his motorcycle to the bike trails.  
Defendant then turned onto a dirt road off Happy Valley Road, drove on some 
smaller dirt trails for about a mile, and stopped in a clearing in the woods.   
9 
When Jacqueline H. saw that there was no one around, she became scared 
and asked to be taken home.  Fearing that she would be killed, Jacqueline H. took 
her driver’s license from her purse and hid it in her back pocket.  Initially, 
defendant said that they should wait for a few minutes.  He then placed a rope 
around Jacqueline H.’s neck and demanded that she remove her clothes as he 
tightened the slip knot around her neck.  After Jacqueline H. removed her clothes, 
defendant ordered her to lie down.  When she complied, he raped her.  Afterwards, 
he drove Jacqueline H. home.  Because Jacqueline H. felt that she had no one to 
turn to, she did not immediately tell anyone about the rape.   
In early August 1987, Jacqueline H. told her new boyfriend, Gary 
Minoletti, about the rape.  In late August, after the disappearance of Berryhill, 
Jacqueline H. saw defendant drive up to a liquor store on his motorcycle.  
Recognizing him, Jacqueline H. asked defendant if his name was Bob; he said it 
was.  Defendant asked Jacqueline H. if she was Berryhill.  She then went inside 
the store and told Minoletti that the man who had raped her was outside.  When 
Minoletti confronted him, defendant acknowledged that he was Bob Maury and 
asked, “Is that Dawn?”  When Minoletti replied no, defendant commented that 
Jacqueline H. looked “just like” Berryhill.  Minoletti wrote down defendant’s 
license plate number and reported the rape to the police that night.   
Detective Mundy was in charge of the rape investigation and never told 
Jacqueline H. about the murder of Berryhill.   
g.  The disappearance of Berryhill 
On Monday, June 22, 1987, two days after the rape of Jacqueline H., 
Berryhill disappeared.  Earlier that morning, Berryhill kicked her boyfriend, Mike 
Brumett, out of her South Market Street apartment.  Later, Diana Williams 
(Berryhill’s mother) was baby-sitting Berryhill’s six-month-old baby at Berryhill’s 
10 
apartment and answered the telephone.  The caller identified himself as “Bob” and 
wanted Berryhill to wait for him because he would be a few minutes late.  He 
asked if Berryhill was still living with her boyfriend.  When Williams replied no, 
defendant commented “good,” because he intended to rent Berryhill an apartment 
and would not rent it to her if she was still with her boyfriend.4   
About 2:00 p.m., not long after receiving a second telephone call from 
“Bob,” Williams left Berryhill’s apartment to find her daughter.  She saw Berryhill 
talking to defendant in a park, about two blocks from the apartment.  Defendant 
was sitting on a dark “Honda-type” motorcycle.  Berryhill returned to the 
apartment with Williams.  She told Williams that she was going to meet “Bob” at 
8:00 p.m., that she had already been with him that day, and that they were going to 
“Big Mama’s house” to buy “pot.”  Williams left Berryhill’s apartment at 3:00 
p.m., after giving her $100.  That was the last time Williams saw her daughter.   
Goldie Lane lived above Berryhill’s apartment.  At about 9:00 p.m., on 
June 22, 1987, Berryhill asked Lane for a ride to buy some marijuana.  Lane 
replied that her car’s lights were not working, but offered to baby-sit for Berryhill 
if she could get a ride with someone else.  Berryhill accepted and said that she 
could get a ride with a guy on a motorcycle at the liquor store across the street.  
Several minutes later, Berryhill brought her baby to Lane’s apartment and told 
Lane that she was going to “cop some dope.”  Lane offered some money, but 
Berryhill declined because she had enough money.  Berryhill showed Lane a roll 
of money, put it back in her purse, and left.  That was the last time Lane saw 
Berryhill.   
                                             
 
4  
At trial, Williams testified that defendant personally questioned her at the 
preliminary hearing.  She recognized defendant’s voice as the person with whom 
she spoke on the telephone.   
11 
That night, Bill Koeller went to Berryhill’s apartment to retrieve some of 
Brumett’s clothes for Brumett.  Because Brumett thought Berryhill would become 
upset if he appeared, Koeller dropped Brumett down the street before proceeding 
to Berryhill’s apartment.  Koeller spoke to Berryhill in front of her apartment.  
When it was getting dark, he saw defendant approaching them from the liquor 
store across the street.  Berryhill waved defendant over to her.  After defendant 
approached them and spoke to Berryhill, Koeller decided to leave.  As Koeller left 
the area, he saw Berryhill leaving with defendant, on his “Honda-like” motorcycle.   
Just before dusk on June 22, 1987, James Horan saw Berryhill in an 
alleyway near her apartment.  Horan wanted to buy marijuana, but Berryhill said 
she did not have any to sell at that time.  While they were conversing, Horan saw 
Berryhill wave at a man crossing the street toward them.  Although Horan gave a 
general description of the man at trial, he could not identify defendant as that man; 
he was too far away.   
Because defendant matched the description of the man seen crossing the 
street toward Berryhill and leaving on the motorcycle, Detective Mundy 
questioned defendant about Berryhill several days after her disappearance.  
Defendant admitted that he knew a Dawn that lived across the street from the 
liquor store on South Market Street and that he had also met her in the park a 
couple of times.   
h.  The disappearance of Stark 
Stark also disappeared at the end of June 1987.  Before her disappearance, 
Stark was staying with her friend, Lucy Gray, in Fall River Mills.  Gray last saw 
Stark on June 24, 1987, two days after Gray’s birthday.  On Gray’s birthday, Stark 
showed Gray a small chrome-colored gun that she carried in her purse.   
12 
Gary Evans, Stark’s boyfriend, last saw Stark around June 25, 1987.  At 
that time, Stark told Evans that she was going to Nevada City to appear in court 
two or three days later for a traffic violation.  Stark never appeared for her court 
appearance in Nevada City, scheduled on June 29, 1987.  Because Stark 
anticipated that she might have to spend some time in jail and she had a “habit of 
coming and going,” Evans did not become concerned when she failed to contact 
him.  No one reported her disappearance to the police. 
i.  More Secret Witness calls, discovery of defendant as the Secret 
Witness caller, and discovery of remains of Stark and Berryhill   
On August 8, 1987, Landreth received a Secret Witness call from someone 
asking how much money he would receive for revealing the location of the body 
of a Gretchen Olsten.  Landreth recognized the caller’s voice as the same person 
who had made the 1985 telephone calls about Weeden and the 1986 call on an 
unrelated burglary.  She related that she needed to contact the program’s 
coordinator about a reward.  Landreth then obtained authorization to offer a 
reward to the caller.   
On August 17, 1987, the same person called several times.  He told 
Landreth that Olsten’s death had occurred about one and one-half months ago.  He 
stated that if he gave directions to the body’s location, he wanted to be paid that 
day without an autopsy confirmation of the person’s identity.  After Landreth and 
the caller agreed on a reward amount for an unidentified body, the caller gave 
specific directions to the body’s location in a wooded area in Happy Valley.  
Landreth related this information to the Sheriff’s Office.  The caller called back 
that same day; Landreth said that the police could not locate the body.  When she 
asked if there was a power line in the area, the caller replied that they were on the 
wrong road.  The caller stated that when he picked up the reward money, he would 
13 
leave information about the person responsible in an envelope.  He volunteered 
that the “boyfriend was responsible.”   
Wanting to confirm her identification of the caller, Landreth taped “one or 
two sentences” during a telephone conversation.  She played the tape for Detective 
Mundy over the telephone and played it again for him in person.  Having spoken 
to defendant before, Detective Mundy identified defendant as the person on the 
tape.   
As prearranged, Detective Francis Brewer of the sheriff’s office left $500 
reward money for the caller at the pickup point in the office of a title company in 
Redding.  Detective Brewer was told that in exchange for the reward money, the 
caller would leave information on the identity of the killer.  Defendant entered the 
office and gave the title company’s director an envelope in exchange for an 
envelope containing the reward money.5  Brewer retrieved the envelope left by 
defendant and discovered it was empty.  It was later determined that defendant’s 
fingerprint was on the envelope.   
Based on the information provided by the Secret Witness caller, on August 
17, 1987, the police found scattered, decomposed human bones in the Happy 
Valley area, the same general area where Jacqueline H. had been raped.  Although 
the caller had indicated that the body was that of “Olsten,” the remains were later 
identified on October 16, 1987, as those of Stark.   
The coroner could not determine the cause of death, but testified that 
photographs of the crime scene showed that Stark had been sexually assaulted and 
died of an unnatural death.  In examining the body, the coroner noted that the 
victim had suffered blunt trauma force to the upper jaw, which caused the 
                                             
 
5  
At trial, the title company’s director positively identified defendant as the 
person who had claimed the reward money that day.  
14 
dislodgement of one of her teeth.  He opined that because of the severity of the 
injury and the lack of evidence that the body had responded to the injury, the 
injury had occurred at or near the time of death.   
Sergeant Wooden discovered a blanket about 130 yards from where Stark’s 
remains had been found.  At trial, two women who had lived with defendant in 
1985 identified the blanket.  Although the blanket found was in worse condition, 
one woman viewed the blanket as identical, while the other woman thought that 
the blanket was similar to one they had seen in defendant’s trailer.   
After the discovery of Stark’s unidentified body, Detectives Mundy and 
Newsome interviewed defendant about Berryhill’s disappearance on August 26.  
Defendant theorized that Berryhill’s boyfriend “killed her or whatever,” but then 
later said he had “no idea” what had happened to her.  He admitted that on the day 
he last saw Berryhill, he had taken her to buy marijuana, but that she was unable to 
buy any because no one was home.  He said that he had returned Berryhill, at 
noon, to her apartment where her mother was baby-sitting.  Defendant denied that 
he took Berryhill anywhere that night and claimed that, instead, he had been on a 
date with a Leanne Thurman that night.  Before his date, he was with his friend 
Dave Hancock at the home of Hancock’s boss and told Hancock he wanted to be 
back home by 8:30 p.m. for his date.6   
                                             
 
6  
Hancock testified that during the summer of 1987, he and defendant were at 
his boss’s ranch.  After defendant announced that he was late for a date, he and 
Hancock returned to their home in Happy Valley.  Several minutes later, when it 
was “almost dark,” defendant drove off on his maroon Yamaha motorcycle.  
Sometime later, defendant revealed to Hancock that the date was with Berryhill, 
but that she had already left with someone else before he got there.  Although 
Hancock did not know anyone by the name of Dawn Berryhill, defendant further 
related that the police had spoken to defendant about her disappearance.   
15 
On September 15, 1987, Landreth received another telephone call from the 
person whom she recognized as the Weeden and “Olsten” caller.  The caller 
wanted reward money for information regarding the body of Berryhill.  The next 
day, the same person called Landreth three times.  During the course of these 
telephone conversations, Landreth offered $500 for the location of an 
“unidentified body.”  The caller replied that he had already divulged the body’s 
identity the previous day.  They finally agreed that if the caller’s information led 
to Berryhill’s body, he would receive $1,250, but that if it led to an unidentified 
body or the body was not Berryhill’s, he would receive $500.  The caller said that 
they would know it was Berryhill by her hair.  When asked if Berryhill was no 
longer alive, he replied that he saw her boyfriend “do it to her.”  The Secret 
Witness program’s advisory committee instructed Landreth to cooperate with law 
enforcement regarding any calls about Berryhill.   
On the morning of September 22, 1987, the same caller telephoned 
Landreth five times.  Detective Mundy monitored and taped two of the telephone 
conversations.  During the course of the monitored conversations, Landreth lied 
and said that the call was not being recorded.  She assured the caller that she could 
not recognize a person’s voice since she talked to so many people every day.  The 
caller described the area in Happy Valley where Berryhill’s body was located and 
said that Berryhill had been strangled with a scarf.  Mundy again recognized 
defendant’s voice.   
On September 22, 1987, based upon the information received from the 
caller, the police found a decomposed body in the Happy Valley area, about three-
tenths of a mile from Stark’s body and close to the area where Jacqueline H. had 
been raped.  The body (later identified as Berryhill’s) was under a mattress and 
surrounded by dense brush and pine needles that had fallen from overhead trees.  
It appeared that the mattress had been placed over the body some time after the 
16 
body had been placed there.  There were pine needles in between the body and 
mattress, but relatively few pine needles on top of the mattress.  A scarf was 
wrapped around the body’s neck.  It was later determined that Berryhill died from 
strangulation.  The police found a .22-caliber bullet slug near the victim’s feet.   
Later that day, after the body was found, Detective Mundy set up a 
surveillance at the title company office, the prearranged site where the caller 
would pick up the reward money.  Detective Mundy saw defendant enter the office 
where defendant picked up the reward money.  An officer took photographs of 
defendant entering and exiting the title company office.  At trial, the title 
company’s director positively identified defendant as the person who retrieved the 
reward money that day.   
On September 23, 1987, the police found Berryhill’s purse.  The purse was 
unzipped and contained no money.  Its contents, including documents with 
Berryhill’s name, were scattered around the purse.  It appeared that the purse had 
been there for awhile; the top of the purse and the scattered contents had been 
bleached by the sun.   
On September 30, 1987, the police searched defendant’s briefcase at his 
brother’s house.  Inside, they found a flat boot string, which was no more than five 
feet in length.  One end of the boot string was knotted while the other end was 
pulled through the opening of the knot to form a sliding loop.   
On October 5, 1987, Detectives Newsome and Mundy interviewed 
defendant again.  They showed defendant the boot string from his briefcase and a 
photograph of him entering the title company office, and accused him of killing 
the three women.  At one point, Detective Newsome agreed to fix $580 in traffic 
tickets for defendant if he gave them the name of Jane Doe One, the unidentified 
corpse that was later identified as Stark.  Defendant admitted that he knew “all 
kinds of girls” who were missing, including Olsten, but denied that he killed 
17 
anyone.  When Newsome commented that defendant would need help if he had 
committed the murders, defendant asked to see a psychiatrist.  A psychiatrist 
would confirm that he did not commit the murders.   
On October 14, 1987, Landreth received two more telephone calls from the 
same Secret Witness caller.  The caller was extremely upset that his anonymity 
had not been guaranteed and complained that the police had taken photographs of 
him picking up the Secret Witness reward money.  He asked to meet with the 
Secret Witness coordinator to complain about the breach of the program’s promise 
of anonymity to its callers.  Landreth responded that she would try to reach the 
coordinator and asked him to call back.   
The police asked Roy Del Carlo, a member of the Secret Witness’s board of 
directors, to meet with defendant and impersonate himself as the program’s 
director.  Because the remains of the two people had not been identified yet, Del 
Carlo was asked to try and discover the identities of the bodies and the perpetrator.  
The caller called back and identified himself as Robert Maury.  Landreth told 
defendant that she had arranged for him to meet with Del Carlo, the Secret 
Witness’s coordinator, on the following day.   
On the next day, defendant called Del Carlo.  Identifying himself as Robert 
Maury, defendant suggested that they meet that same morning.  During their 
meeting, defendant was extremely upset that the police had photographed him 
claiming the Secret Witness reward money and had seized some of his personal 
items.  He was also irate because the police had questioned his family members 
and had accused him of being homosexual; his family thought he was a murderer.  
Defendant demanded that unless the police apologized and returned his items, he 
would print and post 10,000 posters and place an advertisement in the paper 
discrediting the Secret Witness.  When Del Carlo asked if he could provide 
additional information about Stark’s still unidentified body, defendant replied that 
18 
a purse containing identification could be found near the body.  Defendant wanted 
a reward for this information; Del Carlo promised to pay defendant if the 
information proved to be accurate and the purse was found.   
Later that day, defendant took Del Carlo to the purse.  Defendant pointed to 
an object underneath some brush.  When they got closer, Del Carlo saw that the 
object was a purse or handbag.  When asked about additional evidence that would 
help the police, defendant replied that he could find a nickel-plated gun at that 
location.  During the search for the gun, defendant became nervous when he heard 
a dirt bike and abandoned the search.  On the ride back, defendant claimed that his 
girlfriend’s brother told him about the bodies, that he took defendant to the bodies, 
and that they took money and evidence from some of the purses.  Defendant 
offered to take Del Carlo to the brother to be arrested if the identification revealed 
that the purse belonged to somebody that defendant knew.   
With the police, Del Carlo returned to and retrieved the purse, which was 
eight-tenths of a mile from Stark’s body.  The purse contained Stark’s wallet, 
driver’s license, and address book.  Defendant’s fingerprints were on pieces of 
paper inside the wallet.  “Bob” had been written next to a telephone number on the 
back of the address book.  “Nick” was also written in parentheses.  The police 
later determined that defendant had given that same telephone number to others to 
contact him.  The purse did not contain any money or a weapon.   
On October 16, 1987, Del Carlo arranged to meet defendant to pay him 
$250 reward for the purse.  Defendant said he would take Del Carlo to the gun.  At 
the meeting, defendant again demanded an apology, and wanted his motorcycle 
back and some tickets fixed.  He said that the Secret Witness had paid him $1,250 
for the last body he had turned in.  When Del Carlo asked how much it would cost 
to recover the gun, defendant replied that there would be no extra charge because 
it was part of the original deal.  He was confident that the purse would identify 
19 
Jane Doe One (Stark).  He indicated that there were more bodies and evidence in 
the Happy Valley area and referred to another body that had been recovered with a 
rope or scarf tied around the neck.   
On October 19, 1987, defendant spoke with Del Carlo on the telephone 
again.  Defendant inquired if they could identify the victim from the identification 
in the purse; Del Carlo responded that he did not know.  Defendant commented 
that he knew what the identification was, and it would identify the body.  
Defendant and Del Carlo met later that day.  Defendant gave Del Carlo two traffic 
tickets to fix and showed him some anti-Secret Witness fliers that he intended to 
post.   
On October 20, 1987, defendant called Del Carlo.  He said that because he 
had received his motorcycle back, he would not post the fliers.  Defendant agreed 
to sign a document releasing the Secret Witness from liability for having divulged 
his identity as the caller.   
On October 21, 1987, defendant met Del Carlo and signed the release.  
Because the police could not locate a gun, Del Carlo inquired about it again.  
Defendant assured him that the gun was “out there” and that it was nickel-plated.  
He related that he would try to get a better location on the gun from his girlfriend’s 
brother, and would take him there so that he would leave his footprints and the 
police could catch him.  Defendant denied that he knew Stark.  The police never 
found a gun near Stark’s body.   
At defendant’s suggestion, Detective Newsome arranged for Dr. Angela 
Curiale, a psychologist, to meet defendant on October 23 and 30, 1987.  In 
between these two interviews, on October 26, Newsome spoke with defendant on 
the telephone and asked him about the cause of Stark’s death.  Defendant replied 
that Newsome already knew it.  When Newsome guessed that she was strangled, 
defendant responded, “That’s what I heard.”  During this conversation, defendant 
20 
said that he would tell Dr. Curiale what he knew about Stark’s death, and where he 
had been told the murder weapon was located.  Detective Newsome then met with 
defendant in person after defendant demanded that the police return his property 
taken from his brother’s house.  During this meeting, defendant further 
represented that he would give up Stark’s murder weapon when he met Dr. Curiale 
on October 30.   
During the interviews with Dr. Curiale, defendant claimed he did not know 
the cause of Stark’s death.  At the end of the October 30, 1987 session, Dr. Curiale 
saw defendant pull out what appeared to be a flat boot string from his pocket and 
quickly put it back.  He commented that she should have searched his jacket while 
she had the chance; it would have given her some insight into who he was.   
j.  Defendant’s arrest and subsequent events 
On November 6, 1987, the police arrested defendant.  They searched 
defendant’s residence and found a Yamaha motorcycle and a Honda motorcycle.   
On November 7, 1987, Sandra Morton saw a newspaper article about 
defendant’s arrest, which contained photographs of Stark and defendant.  Morton, 
a bartender, recalled that defendant, Stark, and Evans had been in her bar in the 
Fall River Mills Hotel toward the end of June 1987.  At the time, defendant was 
sitting alone with his chair leaning back against the wall and staring toward Stark.  
Morton noticed defendant because he had a “strange face” and was sitting alone in 
a generally friendly atmosphere.  Morton called the sheriff’s office and positively 
identified defendant’s photograph from a photographic lineup as the person she 
had seen in the bar staring at Stark.  At trial, she also positively identified 
defendant as the person she had seen in the bar.   
Patricia Huff and Evelyn Snipes also recognized defendant’s photograph in 
the newspaper.  Huff recalled that she had seen defendant and Stark talking with 
21 
each other in a liquor store one afternoon in late June or early July of 1987.  Later 
that evening, she saw Stark and Evans together in the Fall River Mills Hotel bar, 
while defendant was seated by himself and staring in the direction of Stark.  
Snipes, a clerk at a market in Fall River Mills, recalled that she had seen defendant 
and Stark together at the market two or three times during the summer of 1987.   
At defendant’s request, Detective Newsome met with defendant at the 
county jail on November 18, 1987.  When Detective Newsome advised defendant 
of his Miranda rights, defendant said he wanted to talk, but only hypothetically, 
and insisted that the conversation not be taped.  After they signed an agreement 
that defendant wrote to that effect, defendant discussed how he was going to 
“beat” each criminal charge.  Defendant claimed that Nick Pinada was a possible 
suspect and offered that if the prosecution granted him immunity on two or three 
of the cases, he would testify against Pinada regarding the murders of Stark and 
Berryhill.  He related that Pinada knew Stark and had killed more than one 
person.7   
On January 28, 1988, the day after the preliminary hearing in this case was 
held, a newspaper reporter interviewed defendant in county jail.  During the 
interview, defendant claimed that he had not been in Fall River Mills since 1977 
and that he had never seen Stark “in his life.”  When asked about his fingerprints 
that were found inside Stark’s purse, defendant admitted that he had opened her 
purse.  When asked about his fingerprints found on the envelope that was left at 
the Secret Witness drop-off location, defendant said he did not know how they got 
                                             
 
7  
The defense claimed that the writing “Nick” on the back of Stark’s address 
book was a reference to Nick Pinada, who was married to Cheryl Stapley.  Before 
their marriage, defendant had lived with Stapley during the first three months of 
1987.  The telephone number on the back of Stark’s book was Stapley’s telephone 
number.  Pinada testified that he had never met anyone named Belinda Jo Stark.   
22 
on the envelope, but conceded that they were his fingerprints.  Defendant claimed 
that “the real killer,” an acquaintance of his, told him the location of the two 
women’s bodies found in the Happy Valley area and that he had killed them.  He 
also claimed that Morris had used “a rope or something” to strangle Weeden.   
k.  Other admissions made by defendant 
At trial, several witnesses testified regarding incriminating statements made 
by defendant.  Norma Schwartz testified that on August 23, 1985, she worked with 
defendant in a restaurant and had an argument with him.  He then threatened, 
“Listen bitch, I have killed before.  And you’ll [be] just one more.  And I’m going 
to snuff you out.”  Schwartz became frightened and reported the threat to her 
manager.   
Beth Von Millanich (defendant’s former girlfriend) testified that sometime 
in 1985, defendant related that his landlord had been murdered, that he was a 
suspect, and that he was excited that he was a suspect.  Defendant appeared happy 
about his status as a suspect.  
In the summer or fall of 1986, defendant was in county jail on an unrelated 
matter.  As a jail trustee, defendant delivered towels to other inmates in their cells.  
Defendant told Tracy Trantham, one of the inmates, that he knew who had killed 
Weeden and that she was a “snitch” and “any snitch deserved to die.”  Several 
times, he said that he fantasized about “strangulation with sexual relations.”  Once, 
he asked Trantham if she had ever killed anyone.  When she replied no, he related 
that he had.  Defendant also told Trantham that he hated women and that “they had 
done a lot of things to burn him.”   
In February and March 1987, defendant had a sexual relationship with 
Stapley, who lived next door to him in Happy Valley.  While having sex together, 
defendant said that “they” had killed the landlady and that he had been brought in 
23 
for questioning on it.  He laughed that he had “got off of that” and bragged that the 
police could not “get him for nothing” and that he “can get off of anything.”  
Defendant made her promise not to tell anyone about the landlady.  At the time, 
Stapley thought defendant was lying because she had neither heard nor read 
anything about a landlady being murdered.   
In the summer or fall of 1987, defendant and Shelley Sly were at a bar 
while the movie Platoon was playing.  Defendant told Sly that when he was in 
Vietnam he had to kill lots of men and women.  He related that he had to strangle 
one and she died.   
2.  The Defense’s Case 
The primary theory of the defense at trial was that the prosecution had not 
proven its case against defendant.  Regarding the Weeden murder charge, the 
defense relied on defendant’s extrajudicial statements to Detective Mundy and 
District Attorney Carlton that Morris killed Weeden and forced defendant to strike 
her with a rock after she was already dead.  To support that defense, defendant 
presented evidence that Weeden had bought drugs with counterfeit money, that 
Morris had been involved with her in buying drugs, that he possessed Weeden’s 
truck after her disappearance, that he disassembled the truck and sold its parts, and 
that he had been subpoenaed as a witness in defendant’s trial, but disappeared 
before trial.  The defense theorized that Morris strangled Weeden over drugs and 
that he stole her truck after the killing.  Defendant disputed that he made the 1985 
Secret Witness calls regarding Weeden.  He attempted to impeach Landreth’s 
voice identification by establishing that her answering service took in 2,000 calls 
per day and that one month before the preliminary hearing, she received a 
telephone call and could not identify whether the caller was defendant, his brother, 
or someone else.   
24 
Regarding the Jacqueline H. rape charge, defendant attempted to impeach 
Jacqueline H. by presenting evidence that she had prior convictions and current 
charges for theft-related offenses, that she was addicted to methamphetamine, and 
that she had failed to seek medical attention or report the alleged rape until over 
one month afterwards.  A defense psychologist testified that acute paranoia may 
be caused by heavy use of methamphetamine.   
Regarding the Berryhill and Stark charges, the defense theory was that 
defendant discovered the bodies accidentally while taking routine walks in the 
Happy Valley area and that he made the Secret Witness calls to obtain reward 
money, consistent with his history of helping the police as a paid informant.  To 
support his theory that Berryhill’s boyfriend, Brumett, killed Berryhill, defendant 
presented evidence that Brumett was angry at Berryhill for throwing him out of 
the apartment, that he had threatened to kill Berryhill, and that he was waiting for 
Berryhill outside her apartment on the night of her disappearance.  Defendant also 
attempted to impeach Koeller’s identification of him as the last person seen with 
Berryhill by presenting evidence that Koeller could not identify defendant in a 
photographic lineup soon after Berryhill’s disappearance and that a witness might 
have seen Berryhill on the following day.8   
To support his defense that the prosecution failed to prove how or when 
Stark died and that her death resulted from a homicide, defendant presented 
testimony that several witnesses estimated they may have seen Stark in early July 
and that Stark had suffered a facial injury in a car accident before her 
disappearance.  He denied that he knew Stark and attacked the reliability of the 
identifications of his presence with Stark.  
                                             
 
8  
On rebuttal, Koeller explained that he did not identify defendant’s 
photograph because he did not want to be a snitch.   
25 
B.  The Penalty Phase 
1.  The Prosecution’s Case 
In addition to relying on the circumstances of the charged offenses, the 
prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s two prior felony convictions for 
receiving stolen property.   
2.  The Defense’s Case  
The defense presented evidence relating to his mental condition, marijuana 
abuse, and his family background, including the mental and physical abuse 
inflicted on him and his siblings by his alcoholic father.  In addition, defendant 
read a statement to the jury in which he claimed he had a “normal childhood,” 
denied that he suffered from depression, and declared, “You found me guilty of 
three murders, one rape, one attempted rape and one robbery.  It’s totally 
unrealistic for you to give me life in prison without parole.  If you think I’m guilty, 
you give me the death penalty.”   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection Issues  
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting several of the 
prosecutor's challenges for cause and in denying two of his challenges for cause.  
Whether the contention is that the trial court erred in excluding prospective jurors 
who exhibited an anti-death-bias, or erred in failing to exclude prospective jurors 
who exhibited a pro-death-bias, the same standard applies.  (People v. Bradford 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318.)  “A prospective juror may be challenged for cause 
based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views 
would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror’s duties as 
defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”  (People v. Cunningham 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 
424.)  “On review of a trial court’s ruling, if the prospective juror’s statements are 
26 
equivocal or conflicting, that court’s determination of the person’s state of mind is 
binding.  If there is no inconsistency, the reviewing court will uphold the court’s 
ruling if substantial evidence supports it.”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
469, 488.) 
1.  Grant of Prosecutorial Challenges 
 
The prosecutor challenged nine prospective jurors for cause.  The trial court 
granted eight of those challenges.  Defendant now claims that the court erred in 
granting six of the eight challenges for cause.  As will appear, because the 
challenged prospective jurors indicated either that they could not apply the death 
penalty under any circumstance, or were not prepared to impose the death penalty 
and were undecided as to their ability to do so, the trial court did not err in 
excusing them.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 980-982.)  
Moreover, at the most, the potential jurors’ statements were equivocal and 
conflicting regarding their ability to render a death verdict.  Thus, we must defer to 
the trial court’s determination of their states of mind.   
a.  Prospective Juror Fred R. 
 
In his questionnaire and in response to the trial court’s questions, 
Prospective Juror Fred R. stated that he might have problems applying the law to 
the case because he has opposed the death penalty as an appropriate punishment 
for “most of [his] adult life.”  Further voir dire revealed the extent of Fred R.’s 
opposition against the death penalty:  he stated that society’s imposition of capital 
punishment was “in a sense committing murder” and that he could not participate 
in a procedure that imposes the death penalty on a person.  On the other hand, he 
related that there was an “extremely remote” possibility that he could impose a 
death verdict, but that the decision would be an emotional one, rather than one 
based on his “own reasoned conscience.”  (See People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 
27 
Cal.4th at pp. 980-981 [prospective juror who could apply death penalty only if 
victim was family member was properly excused].) 
 
Exploring this discrepancy, defense counsel asked Fred R. which factor 
weighed more heavily, the prospective juror’s desire to comply with the law or his 
personal feelings about capital punishment.  Fred R. replied, “That’s very difficult 
because I don’t believe in the law in this particular case.”  He could conceive of a 
situation that would cause him to follow the law as instructed and impose the 
death penalty, but “it would be a surprise.”  During questioning by the prosecutor, 
Fred R. reaffirmed his belief that capital punishment was “society’s version of 
murder,” but stated that as a juror, he would have to take part in that process.  To 
further clarify Fred R.’s views, both the prosecutor and defense counsel asked him 
whether he could sign a verdict form imposing death if he was the foreman.  Fred 
R. said he could not.  Upon realizing that he would be required “to take complete 
responsibility” for something that he could not justify, Fred R. stated that he did 
not feel qualified within the law to sit as a juror in this case.  He explained that his 
initial opinion that he could be seated as a juror in a capital case, although 
difficult, had been modified to the belief that he would not be qualified to sit as a 
juror.  Juror Fred R. was properly excused.  (See People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 980 [prospective juror properly excused for cause when he stated that 
he could not look at defendant and inform him that he had decided defendant 
should die, and that he did not want to go through such proceedings].) 
b.  Prospective Juror Wyonne W. 
 
Prospective Juror Wyonne W. stated that she could follow the law, and 
maintain an open mind and be willing to listen impartially to the evidence at the 
penalty phase.  However, she later expressed doubts of her ability to “be a part of 
putting somebody to death, even if that person was a part of many deaths.”  When 
28 
asked if she could entertain the idea of putting defendant to death after 
determining that he was guilty of three murders and listening to more evidence, 
Wyonne W. replied, “I don’t think so.”  Juror Wyonne W. was properly excused.  
c.  Prospective Juror Curtis B. 
 
Prospective Juror Curtis B. expressed uncertainty as to whether he could 
apply the law and impose the death penalty.  His uncertainties appeared to stem 
from the fact that his wife and friends knew defendant and he feared that he would 
“have to answer” in his afterlife for a decision that would hurt someone else.  
When asked by defense counsel if he could impose the death penalty if, after 
rendering a guilt verdict and considering the evidence at the penalty phase, he 
concluded that it was warranted and the appropriate punishment, Curtis B. replied 
that he could not promise that.  Juror Curtis B. was properly excused.  (Cf. People 
v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 428 [voir dire question whether prospective juror 
could promise to vote for death if she felt that death was the appropriate verdict 
properly sought a commitment from her to perform her duty].) 
d.  Prospective Juror Joe T. 
 
When asked if he could vote for the death penalty “no matter what the 
circumstances were,” Prospective Juror Joe T. replied, “I don’t believe so.  I’m not 
certain.”  After further questioning, he stated that he could not envision any 
situation, as a juror, in which he could impose the death penalty.  Juror Joe T. was 
properly excused. 
e.  Prospective Juror Lori D. 
 
Expressing some uncertainty as to whether she could impose the death 
penalty, Prospective Juror Lori D. stated that she had taken an anti-death-penalty 
stance in recent years, that she did not think it was right to impose the death 
penalty, and that it could be “morally” wrong.  Defense counsel asked if she would 
29 
be able to vote for death if, after listening to all the evidence, she determined that 
the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison to the mitigating 
circumstances that it warranted death.  Lori D. replied, “I don’t think so.”  She was 
properly excused.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 981 
[prospective juror properly excused because she could not personally impose death 
penalty despite viewing it as an appropriate punishment].)    
f.  Prospective Juror Joe H. 
 
When initially asked if he had strong feelings about the death penalty, 
Prospective Juror Joe H. responded that since he had never been asked about that 
subject, he could not say.  Although Joe H. once agreed that he could impose 
verdicts of death or life without the possibility of parole, he later equivocated and 
said that he did not know if he could impose either penalty.  Upon further 
questioning, Joe H. stated that he could not vote to impose the death penalty.  He 
explained that he had never had to think about the subject, but that, upon 
reflection, he could not impose death.  Juror Joe H. was properly excused. 
2.  Denial of Defense Challenges   
 
Defendant challenged Jurors Scott S. and Curtis L. for their alleged pro-
death-penalty bias.  Defendant faults the trial court for denying those challenges 
for cause.  Here, the record shows that defendant accepted the jury after having 
exercised 23 of the 26 peremptory challenges allotted to him.  To preserve a claim 
based on the trial court’s overruling a defense challenge for cause, a defendant 
must show (1) he used an available peremptory challenge to remove the juror in 
question; (2) he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges or can justify the 
failure to do so; and (3) he expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately 
selected.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 976; People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121.)  Defendant failed to satisfy any of these 
30 
requirements.  Therefore, his claim of error is not preserved for appeal.  (People v. 
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 634.)     
 
Nevertheless, defendant asserts that his claim is preserved because he was 
justified in failing to use his available peremptory challenges to excuse the two 
jurors.  He argues that given the large number of prospective jurors who had been 
exposed to pretrial publicity, it was likely that Scott S. and Curtis L., who had not 
been so exposed, would have been replaced with two jurors who were prejudiced 
by the pretrial publicity.  However, defendant fails to give any record support for 
that claim.  Moreover, defense counsel expressed no dissatisfaction with the jury.  
Thus, his argument is simply speculative.  (See People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 121 [if defendant claims that the trial court wrongly denied challenge 
for cause, he must demonstrate that the right to fair and impartial jury thereby was 
affected].) 
 
Even if the issue were cognizable, defendant would not prevail.  As shown 
below, defendant ultimately passed for cause one of the jurors he now contests.  
The other juror’s statements were, at most, conflicting.  Accordingly, we must 
defer to the trial court’s determination of his state of mind. 
a.  Juror Scott S. 
 
When asked by defense counsel to assume that defendant was found to 
have committed three deliberate and premeditated murders, and a rape and robbery 
without justification, Scott S. replied that the death penalty would be appropriate.  
However, he also said that he could keep an open mind regarding penalty.  After 
questioning Scott S., defense counsel challenged him for cause.  The record 
reflects that the trial court did not rule on the challenge at that time, but asked the 
prosecutor if he had any questions of Scott S.  Apparently sensing that Scott S. 
was confused regarding the trial process, the prosecutor reviewed the guilt and 
31 
penalty phases in more detail.  He explained that the law required that the jurors be 
“neutral” on penalty at the start of the penalty phase and make their determination 
based on the evidence, including circumstances of the crime and defendant’s 
background, presented at the penalty phase.  After the explanation, Scott S. stated 
that he “probably could keep an open mind” at the penalty phase.   
 
After the trial court noted the inconsistent answers given to defense counsel 
and the prosecutor, Scott S. assured the court that he could keep an open mind on 
the penalty regardless of the findings made at the guilt phase.  When defense 
counsel asked why his opinion had changed as to the appropriateness of the death 
penalty, Scott S. explained that when he initially responded, he did not know that 
defendant’s background was a relevant factor at the penalty phase.  He assured 
defense counsel that even if he found defendant guilty of three murders, a robbery, 
and a rape, he could remain “completely neutral” regarding penalty.  After the 
second round of questioning, defense counsel passed Scott S. for cause.  Thus, it 
appears that after further questioning of Scott S., defense counsel changed his 
mind about Scott S.’s ability to remain fair.  Under these circumstances, defendant 
cannot now complain of the trial court’s failure to grant his challenge of Scott S. 
for cause.  (People v. King (1970) 1 Cal.3d 791, 804 [any challenge for cause must 
be seasonably made or is waived].) 
b.  Juror Curtis L.  
 
When asked by defense counsel whether he could consider imposing either 
death or life without parole if he concluded that defendant committed three 
premeditated and deliberate murders without justification, Curtis L. indicated 
twice that the decision would be hard, but that he would probably lean in favor of 
the death penalty.  In addition, when asked if he could assure the parties that he 
would keep an open mind regarding punishment if he were convinced beyond a 
32 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed “three heinous, premeditated, 
deliberate killings,” Curtis L. responded, “No, I couldn’t.”  Later, the juror 
qualified those answers by emphasizing repeatedly that he believed he was an 
open-minded person and could remain so, that the appropriate punishment would 
depend on the circumstances, the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the 
crime, and the evidence presented, and that he would follow the instructions.  
Moreover, Curtis L. stated that he was not opposed to the death penalty, but that 
he believed it should not be imposed “lightly” and without “much thought and 
soul searching.”  The trial court denied defendant’s challenge for cause because 
Curtis L. stated he could keep an open mind and follow the instructions.  We find 
that the trial court’s retention of Curtis L. is amply supported by the record. 
B.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Suppression Motion  
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to 
suppress evidence, pursuant to section 1538.5.  He argues that the trial court 
should have suppressed all evidence of his Secret Witness telephone calls to 
Landreth relating to the three murder victims, including the content of those 
conversations, and all evidence resulting from the Secret Witness calls, including 
evidence of his identity as the caller.  We find no error. 
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence of the 1985 Secret Witness 
telephone calls regarding Weeden and the 1987 Secret Witness telephone calls 
regarding Berryhill and Olsten/Stark, including evidence of defendant’s identity as 
the Secret Witness callers.  In alleging a Fourth Amendment violation, defendant 
relied on representations that the Secret Witness program guaranteed anonymity to 
its callers.  He argued that the police violated that guarantee of anonymity when 
they illegally taped his telephone conversations with Landreth without a search 
33 
warrant, and illegally took photographs of and surveilled defendant at the title 
company drop-off point for the purpose of establishing his identity as the Secret 
Witness caller.   
The following uncontradicted evidence was presented at the suppression 
hearing:  The Secret Witness program of Shasta County was established by the 
Soroptimists, a private service organization, to aid law enforcement in 
investigating crimes.  The program allows citizens to report information on 
crimes, with the possibility of receiving a reward.  The program’s advisory board 
consists of private citizens and representatives from various law enforcement 
agencies.  Based on recommendations by various law enforcement agencies, the 
board decides the reward offers to be made in specific criminal cases and the 
proposed payoffs for information provided.  The listed crimes and approved 
reward offers are publicized in the newspapers, and on television and radio.  The 
board has the authority to deny requests for cooperation from law enforcement.  
Landreth, the owner of an answering service, contracted with the Secret Witness 
program to receive calls and information from tipsters, assigned tipsters a code 
number for identification purposes, and relayed information to the appropriate law 
enforcement agency.  Funding for the program was not provided by law 
enforcement, but by various service organizations.   
The police began recording the telephone calls between defendant and 
Landreth on September 21, 1987.  Before that time, none of the calls between the 
Secret Witness caller and Landreth had been recorded or monitored by the police.  
However, the police decided to solicit the help of the Secret Witness program and 
monitor the telephone calls after they began to suspect that defendant was the 
Secret Witness caller on the August 1987 Olsten/Stark calls and on the September 
1987 Berryhill calls. 
34 
On August 8, 1987, Landreth received an inquiry about the reward money 
for the location of Olsten’s body and recognized the caller’s voice as the same 
person who had made the 1985 Weeden calls.  She recorded one of the telephone 
calls on August 17 and played it for Detective Mundy to see if he could identify 
the voice independently.  He too recognized the voice and believed that defendant 
was the caller.   
On September 15, 1987, Landreth received a new inquiry about the reward 
money for the location of Berryhill’s body and again recognized the caller’s voice 
as the same person who had made the 1985 Weeden calls and the August 1987 
Olsten/Stark calls.  In addition, the caller referenced distances in terms of meters.  
Landreth contacted Detective Brewer of the sheriff’s office regarding the caller’s 
request for reward money in exchange for information on the location of the 
Berryhill body.   
On September 17, 1987, the Secret Witness board authorized payment of 
the reward money.  Also, in response to the request by Detective Brewer, the 
board authorized Landreth to cooperate with law enforcement in the homicide 
investigations, including monitoring and recording the Secret Witness calls 
relating to Olsten/Stark, Berryhill, and Weeden and help in arranging the 
surveillance of defendant.  Detective Brewer informed the board that the police 
suspected defendant had been the Secret Witness caller on all three homicide cases 
and, based on the known circumstances, considered him a suspect in at least one, 
if not all, of those homicides.  They also believed defendant was using the Secret 
Witness program for financial gain in committing the criminal acts.  To determine 
the identity of the Secret Witness caller, the police then taped subsequent Secret 
Witness calls and had Landreth arrange for defendant to pick up the reward money 
at a prearranged drop-off point on September 22.  The police took photographs of 
defendant entering and exiting the drop-off point.   
35 
The media has reported that the Secret Witness program assures anonymity 
to its witness callers.  Also, when a tipster makes a call to Landreth, she relates 
that the caller’s identity will remain confidential, but that the information will be 
used by law enforcement.  The reason the Secret Witness program guarantees 
anonymity is to provide a means for reluctant witnesses to provide information on 
crimes to the police.  The Secret Witness board members, including those from 
various law enforcement agencies, agreed that the program guarantees anonymity 
only to witnesses, and not criminals or tipsters who the police suspect are 
providing information on their own crimes.  To guarantee anonymity to such a 
criminal would be contrary to the purpose of the Secret Witness program, i.e., to 
solve crimes.  The coordinator of the Secret Witness program testified that 
although the program guarantees anonymity to a Secret Witness caller, a caller’s 
identity remains confidential only as long as the caller keeps it a secret.   
The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion on the grounds that 
(1) no caller to the Secret Witness program could have had a reasonable 
expectation that the information divulged, or the caller’s identity, would remain 
confidential if that information led the police to suspect the caller was the actual 
perpetrator, and (2) defendant waived any expectation of privacy as to his identity 
when he revealed his name during the 1986 call.  The Attorney General argues 
that we need not decide the waiver issue because defendant’s claimed subjective 
expectation of privacy was objectively unreasonable.  We agree.  
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress is well established.  We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express 
or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.  In determining whether, on 
the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.”  (People v. Glaser (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) 
36 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 353.)  Its purpose is to 
“safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials.”  (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528.)  
“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 
‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ”  (California v. 
Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211.)  The analysis consists of a two-part inquiry: 
“first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search?  Second, is society willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable?”  (Ibid.)  “Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a 
place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to 
keep them to himself has been exhibited.  On the other hand, conversations in the 
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”  (Katz, supra, 389 U.S. 
at p. 361 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).)  “What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”  (Id. at p. 351.)  Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment only protects 
against those government intrusions without warrant or probable cause that violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  (Oliver v. United States (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 
177-178.) 
In arguing that the content of all his conversations with Landreth, as well as 
his identity as the caller, should have been suppressed, defendant does not 
distinguish between the pre-September 21, 1987, conversations that were not taped 
and the conversations that were taped, on and after that date.  Regarding the 
untaped conversations, we perceive no governmental intrusion.  Defendant called 
the Secret Witness program and provided Landreth all of the information 
37 
voluntarily.9  Regarding the taped conversations, the police intrusion or 
surveillance was lawful:  they monitored the telephone calls because they 
suspected that defendant was the Secret Witness caller and the killer of all three 
victims.  (§  633.5.)10  Moreover, any expectation that the police would not 
monitor a telephone call voluntarily initiated by defendant to the Secret Witness 
program, presumably a law enforcement agent, is simply not an expectation that is 
objectively reasonable, warranting Fourth Amendment protection.  Similarly, the 
police surveillance and photographing of defendant entering and exiting the drop-
off point is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection since defendant 
knowingly exposed his whereabouts in public. 
By not differentiating between the unrecorded and unmonitored telephone 
calls and the recorded and monitored ones, it appears that defendant is really 
arguing that Secret Witness program’s promise of anonymity and its breach by 
law enforcement violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and is therefore a 
search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.  We reject that argument for a 
number of reasons. 
                                             
 
9  
At the suppression hearing, defendant argued that the Secret Witness 
program acted as an agent of law enforcement.  For purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis, the trial court adopted that assumption.   
10  
Section 633.5 provides, in pertinent part: “Nothing in Section 631, 632, 
632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 prohibits one party to a confidential communication from 
recording the communication for the purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably 
believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication of the 
crime of . . . any felony involving violence against the person . . . .  Nothing in 
Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 renders any evidence so obtained 
inadmissible in a prosecution for . . . any felony involving violence against the 
person, . . . or any crime in connection therewith.”  
38 
First, we fail to see how this alleged breach of a promise of anonymity rises 
to a Fourth Amendment violation, i.e., a governmental intrusion or interference 
that infringes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the challenged search.   
Second, defendant’s claim that the Secret Witness program promised 
“complete anonymity” to all tipsters, including callers providing tips about crimes 
they have committed or are suspected of committing, is not supported by the 
record.  Indeed, the trial court impliedly found otherwise.  In its denial order, the 
trial court stated:  “No caller to a secret witness program could have a reasonable 
expectation that the information he divulged would remain confidential.  The term 
confidential communication as defined in Evidence Code Section 632, 
[subdivision] (c) includes only those communications carried on in circumstances 
that would reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desired it to be 
confined to the parties thereto.  The obvious primary and publicized purpose of the 
secret witness program is to gather information helpful to law enforcement in 
apprehending and convicting persons responsible for criminal acts.  The 1985 and 
1989 newspaper clippings submitted in evidence as defendant’s ‘M-1’ and ‘M-2’ 
provide, just prior to the guarantee of anonymity, that ‘information provided will 
be used by police and sheriffs’ investigators to gather evidence.’  Any reasonable 
caller would know that the information provided would be passed on to law 
enforcement.   
“[I]n the view of this Court, under present Federal Law, society is not 
prepared to recognize as reasonable or justifiable any expectation of anonymity by 
a caller to an anonymous witness program, such as Secret Witness, under 
circumstances in which the information the caller divulges reasonably gives law 
enforcement probable cause to believe that the caller may be the perpetrator of a 
serious crime to which the information relates.  The primary purpose of such 
anonymous witness programs is the apprehension and conviction of criminals.  
39 
The promise of anonymity is offered only for the purpose of inducing reluctant 
informers to provide information which assists in this primary purpose.  The 
inducement derives from the protection from publicity or retaliation that the 
informer receives by remaining anonymous.  People v. Callan, 194 [Cal.App.]3d 
563, partially quoted by defendant in brief, also stresses that ‘It is the promise of 
anonymity which allays the fear of criminal retaliation which otherwise 
discourages citizen involvement in reporting crime.’   
“Any reasonable voluntary provider of information to such a program must 
know that such information will be used to identify and apprehend the criminal 
perpetrator.  If that information logically leads to an investigation of the caller as a 
suspected perpetrator, the reason for the promise of anonymity disappears, and the 
promise can no longer justifiably be relied upon by the caller, certainly not to the 
extent of evidence exclusion under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.”   
Although the trial court couched the expectation of privacy analysis in 
constitutional terms, it appears that the trial court was also making findings of fact.  
By finding that no reasonable person would believe that a suspect’s identity would 
remain anonymous simply because he or she provided information, the trial court 
impliedly found that the Secret Witness program did not, in fact, guarantee 
anonymity under all circumstances.  The evidence supports that implied finding of 
fact.  A flier publicizing the program stated: 
“Are you a witness to a crime . . . but afraid to tell anyone?  Then ‘Secret 
Witness’ is for you.  Are you a concerned citizen?  Do you have knowledge of a 
crime?  Are you afraid that if you tell, you’ll be in danger? . . .  
“If you have any information on a crime, the Secret Witness Program has a 
telephone answering service you can call or a post office box you can write.  You 
can remain anonymous and not give your name. 
40 
“If a Secret Witness reward has been posted for a certain crime that needs 
to be solved and the information you reported leads to the arrest and conviction of 
the individual responsible, the Secret Witness Program will pay you an award. 
“And . . . 
“You will remain unknown.  This is Guaranteed! . . . 
“You will not be involved. – The authorities will develop their own 
evidence from your information. . . .”   
Thus, the flier assures anonymity to those witnesses who fear retaliation if 
they come forward with information, and states that an award will be paid if the 
reported information leads to the arrest and conviction of the individual 
responsible.  When the stated purpose of anonymity (protection of fearful 
witnesses) and the intended purpose for the information (arrest and conviction of 
perpetrators) are considered together, the flier cannot reasonably be understood to 
assure readers that a criminal, by providing information on a crime, would be 
shielded from prosecution and conviction for that same crime.  Moreover, the 
uncontradicted testimony at the suppression hearing reflects that the people 
associated with the Secret Witness program understood that the program only 
guarantees anonymity to witnesses, and not criminals or tipsters who the police 
suspect are providing information about their own criminal activities.  
Accordingly, we also reject defendant’s claim that he did not voluntarily consent 
to the “search and seizure,” i.e., the acquisition and use, of his Secret Witness 
statements, because they were obtained by fraud, subterfuge, and trickery.   
Finally, we reject defendant’s Fifth Amendment and due process claim.  He 
argues that his Secret Witness statements to Landreth, including his admission or 
confession to Landreth that “Bob” had killed Weeden, were involuntary because 
they were improperly induced by promises of anonymity and rewards.   
41 
At trial, defendant failed to object to admission of his statements and raise 
the involuntariness claim on the constitutional grounds he now asserts.  Thus, he 
has forfeited his claim on appeal.  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 [a 
claim of involuntariness generally will not be addressed for the first time on 
appeal]; People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 172 [same].) 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel’s failure to preserve his current 
challenge to his Secret Witness statements amounts to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  We disagree.  For the reasons stated above, defendant’s claim that he 
was induced by promises of complete anonymity is unfounded.  Moreover, the 
Secret Witness program’s offers of rewards and anonymity were not coercive, and 
a suppression motion could not have been properly granted on this ground.  
Coercive activity by the state is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession or admission is not voluntary.  (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 
157, 163;  People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 989, fn. 14.)  Here, defendant 
initiated and instigated the negotiations for a reward, which had been generally 
offered to the public, in return for information about the missing victims.  
Defendant named his own terms in exchange for his statements, decided for 
himself with whom he would negotiate, and solicited and received the reward he 
wanted as a consideration for telling what he knew.  Thus, defendant’s desire to 
provide information to obtain a reward was entirely self-motivated.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 550;  People v. Barker (1986) 182 
Cal.App.3d 921, 933; People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 582; see 
also Hunter v. Swenson (D.C.Mo. 1974) 372 F.Supp. 287, 301-302.)    Under such 
circumstances, defendant’s statements were clearly voluntary.   
42 
2.  Alleged Incompetence of Counsel—Failure to Renew Change of 
Venue Motion   
 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew a 
motion for change of venue after jury voir dire.  On June 28, 1988, before voir 
dire, defendant filed a motion for a change of venue.  After an evidentiary hearing, 
the trial court denied the motion without prejudice to renewal during jury 
selection.  Following the denial, defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate, which 
was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal.  Defendant filed a petition for 
review in this Court (Maury v. Superior Court, S008628, Jan. 17, 1989), which 
was also summarily denied on March 2, 1989.  A jury was then selected on June 9, 
1989.  Defendant did not renew the motion for change of venue after selection of 
the jury.   
 
“[W]hen a trial court initially denies a change of venue motion without 
prejudice, a defendant must renew the motion after voir dire of the jury to preserve 
the issue for appeal.  Here, although expressly invited by the court to renew the 
motion after jury selection, defendant failed to do so.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 635, 654-655; see also People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 598; 
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 312.)  Recognizing the procedural default, 
defendant claims that his counsel was incompetent for failing to renew the motion 
after jury voir dire.  The record fails to reveal any incompetence. 
 
Defendant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.  
(People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 33.)  To prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant “ ‘must establish not only deficient 
performance, i.e., representation below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
but also resultant prejudice.’ ”  (People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 623.)  A 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.  (Strickland v. Washington 
43 
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689.)  Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, 
and counsel’s decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available 
facts.  (Id. at p. 690.)  To the extent the record on appeal fails to disclose why 
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, we will affirm the 
judgment unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, 
or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.  (People v. Mendoza 
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.)  Moreover, prejudice must be affirmatively 
proved; the record must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 
694.)  
 
In passing on a motion for change of venue, the trial court looks to the 
following factors, among others:  the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of 
the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the 
victim, and the nature and extent of the publicity.  (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 475, 505.)  Defendant argues that because there was a reasonable 
likelihood that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Shasta County, 
defense counsel should have renewed the motion for change of venue.  Reiterating 
many of the same arguments that had been presented to the trial court on the initial 
motion for change of venue, defendant points to the gravity and nature of the 
crimes, the small size of the community, and the extensive media coverage, 
including newspaper articles and television and radio broadcasts.  
 
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard the testimony of two 
defense experts who had reviewed the publicity about the case and conducted a 
public opinion survey in Shasta County.  According to the survey’s results, 90 
percent of those surveyed recognized defendant’s case.  Of those who had heard of 
44 
the case, 54 percent believed that defendant was guilty.  One of the defense 
experts opined that, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, there was a reasonable 
likelihood that defendant would not get a fair trial in Shasta County.  The 
prosecution’s expert attacked the survey’s validity and accuracy.  In denying the 
motion for change of venue, the trial court found that the survey’s results were 
inaccurate and biased and that the expert’s opinion regarding the unlikelihood of a 
fair trial was also entitled to little weight.  The court also found that there would 
be at least a year between the occurrence of most of the publicity and the start of 
trial, the publicity about the case was “neither slanted against the defendant nor 
reflect[ed] a spirit of revenge in the community,” and the victims and the 
defendant were not prominent members of the community.   
 
Defendant does not claim that defense counsel was incompetent in 
presenting the initial change of venue motion.  Indeed, he now relies extensively 
on the same newspaper articles and television and radio broadcasts presented to 
the trial court by defense counsel.  Rather, he argues that because many of the 
prospective jurors (including the actual jurors) had been exposed to some pretrial 
publicity, he could not receive a fair trial and counsel should have renewed the 
motion.  Although, as defendant points out, seven of the 12 jurors and three of the 
five alternates had been exposed to pretrial publicity, our independent evaluation 
of the record reveals that, for the most part, few jurors recalled the specifics and 
none had formed a resolute impression of defendant’s guilt.  Instead, all of the 
jurors and alternates expressed that they could be fair and impartial. 
 
In light of these responses, counsel could have recognized that the effect of 
the publicity had not been as substantial as feared, especially after a year and one-
half interim, and that a renewed motion to seek a change of venue would have 
been futile.  (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 314.)  Indeed, defendant used 
only 23 of his 26 allotted peremptory challenges to excuse jurors from the panel 
45 
and only three of his five challenges to excuse alternate jurors.  “ ‘The failure to 
exhaust peremptories is a strong indication “that the jurors were fair, and that the 
defense itself so concluded.”  [Citation.]’  (People v. Price [(1991)] 1 Cal.4th 
[324,] 393.)  This last point can be decisive.  (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 
815, 853-854 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].)”  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 468, 524; cf. Gallego v. McDaniel (9th Cir. 1997) 124 F.3d 1065, 1071-
1072 [absence of actual prejudice evidenced by seven jurors who were passed over 
for cause].)   
 
Because defense counsel could have reasonably decided not to renew the 
motion for a change of venue, and because the record indicates that the pretrial 
publicity did not affect the jurors’ ability to decide the case fairly, defendant has 
failed to establish error or prejudice.  (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 
at pp. 266-267.)  We will not second-guess counsel’s preference for this particular 
jury over another, unknown jury panel.  (See People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 314; White v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 1996) 473 S.E.2d 539, 543; Solomon v. 
Commissioner of Correctional Services (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 786 F.Supp. 218, 227.) 
3.  Contentions Regarding Severance Motions  
a.  General principles 
 
Defendant makes several arguments complaining of the joinder of the 
Weeden murder and Jacqueline H. rape charges.  Joinder and severance of 
different criminal charges against the same defendant are governed by section 954, 
which states that an “accusatory pleading may charge two or more different 
offenses connected together in their commission, . . . or two or more different 
offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, . . . provided, that the court in 
which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in 
its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory 
46 
pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said 
groups tried separately.”  As we have held, “Offenses falling within this 
description, but charged in separate pleadings, may be consolidated for trial in 
order to promote judicial efficiency (see People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 
935 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950]), and a trial court’s rulings on joinder are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 
1283-1284 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1]).”  (People v. Koontz (2002)  27 
Cal.4th 1041, 1074.)   
b.   Severance of the Weeden murder   
 
Defendant made no motion to sever the Weeden murder count from the 
other charges.  Defendant now claims that the trial court erred in failing, sua 
sponte, to sever his trial on the Weeden murder or to give limiting instructions, 
and that this error violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
analogous provisions of the California Constitution.  He also argues that he was 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move 
for severance and to request the appropriate limiting instruction.  As explained 
below, we reject those claims.   
i.  Failure to sever or to request severance 
 
People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939-940, disposes of defendant’s 
claim that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to sever.  There, we stated:  
“Section 954, however, imposes no sua sponte duty of severance on trial courts.  
That section, as quoted above, requires the defendant to make a showing of ‘good 
cause’ in order to obtain severance, and defendant’s failure to request a severance 
waives the matter on appeal.  Nor do we find any authority to support defendant’s 
argument that the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
47 
States Constitution, or their California counterparts, impose such a duty.”  (Id. at 
p. 940.)  Because defendant failed to request severance of the Weeden murder 
count, he has forfeited his claim.  
 
Regarding defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we find 
neither incompetence of counsel nor prejudice resulting from his attorneys’ failure 
to move for severance.  (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-
694.)  Defendant argues that a motion to sever, had it been made, should have 
been granted because the joinder of the Weeden murder case, which was “very 
weak,” with the other charges, unfairly prejudiced him.  In addition, he argues that 
his sole defense of duress could not be raised because the joinder of the multiple 
murder charges allowed the prosecution to allege the multiple-murder special 
circumstance, which resulted in the classification of the Weeden homicide as a 
death-eligible crime.  However, the trial court would not have abused its discretion 
by denying a motion to sever. 
 
First, the murder offenses fall within the same class of crimes and thus were 
properly joined.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1315 [murder 
offenses belong to the same class of crimes].)  Second, there was a common and 
distinctive modus operandi in all of the murders.  To be admissible to demonstrate 
a distinctive modus operandi, the evidence must disclose common marks or 
identifiers, that, considered singly or in combination, support a strong inference 
that the defendant committed the crimes.  (Id. at p. 1316.)  The victims were 
females who were acquainted with defendant.  There was evidence that all three 
murder victims died from strangulation.  Landreth testified that the same Secret 
Witness caller requested reward money in exchange for information on the 
location of the bodies of all three victims.  Apart from these three victims, the 
Secret Witness program had never received any other requests for reward money 
in return for a tip on the location of a body.  Moreover, the caller waited until after 
48 
the bodies had decomposed to make the Secret Witness calls.  Thus, evidence of 
the distinctive Secret Witness calls made by the same person on all three offenses 
reflected common elements of substantial importance. 
 
Further, evidence relating to the Berryhill and Stark offenses would have 
been admissible at a separate Weeden murder trial on the issue of the identity of 
the Weeden caller.  The evidence strongly indicated, particularly the surveillance 
of defendant at the Secret Witness drop-off point, that he made the Berryhill and 
Stark telephone calls.  Indeed, defendant conceded that he had made these calls.  
On the other hand, defendant denied making the Weeden calls.  Because Landreth 
believed that the same person made the Weeden, Berryhill, and Stark calls, 
evidence that defendant made the Berryhill and Stark calls was relevant to show 
that defendant made the Weeden calls.   
 
Thus, the similarities of the offenses together with evidence that defendant 
made all of the Secret Witness calls, were sufficient to establish a common modus 
operandi, raising a strong inference that defendant killed Weeden.  Because 
evidence of the murders was cross-admissible, any likelihood of prejudice was 
dispelled.  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126.)  For that reason alone, no 
abuse of discretion would have occurred in denying severance.  (Id. at p. 128.) 
 
Moreover, defendant’s assertions of prejudice are not supported by the 
record.  First, the evidence in the Weeden murder case was far from weak.  
Defendant made inconsistent statements to the police.  Initially, he denied any 
involvement in Weeden’s disappearance, but then claimed that he was present 
during her murder and forced to strike her with a rock.  Defendant made numerous 
admissions to Landreth (that Weeden’s roommate “Bob” or “Robert” had killed 
her), Detective Ashmun (that Weeden had been strangled and hit on the head with 
a rock), and Detective Mundy (that Morris had strangled Weeden and forced him 
to strike her with a rock).  He made more admissions to Norma Schwartz (that he 
49 
had killed before), Beth Von Millanich (that he was happy and excited about being 
a suspect in the murder of his landlord), Tracy Trantham (that he knew who had 
killed Weeden, that she was a “snitch,” that any “snitch deserved to die,” and that 
he had killed before), and Cheryl Stapley (that he had killed his landlady, that he 
had been brought in for questioning and laughed that he had “got off of that,” and 
that he “can get off of anything”).  Finally, defendant told two or three different 
stories to Bill Chartier and taunted Detective Mundy that he would never really 
know what had happened to Weeden, and Mundy would take her death to his 
grave.   
 
Second, although the joinder of the murder charges gave rise to the special 
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), we will reject defendant’s claim 
that he was entitled to and thereby improperly deprived of a duress defense.  (See, 
post, at pp. 86-88.)  Thus, defendant has failed to show prejudice from the joinder 
and the resultant conversion of the Weeden murder into a death-eligible crime.   
 
Because much of the incriminating evidence in the Stark and Berryhill 
charges would have been used in a separate Weeden murder trial to prove identity 
and defendant has failed to establish prejudice from the joinder, the trial court 
would not have abused its discretion by refusing to grant a motion to sever had 
such a motion been made.  No reasonable probability existed that, had defense 
counsel moved for severance, the motion would have been granted.  Accordingly, 
defendant has failed to establish prejudice from counsel’s omission.   
ii.  Failure to give limiting instruction 
 
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to provide sua 
sponte an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the Stark and Berryhill 
crimes in deciding defendant’s guilt of the Weeden murder.  The trial court has no 
sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on cross-admissible evidence in a 
50 
trial of multiple crimes.  (People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 942.)  We 
similarly reject the claim that defense counsel was incompetent for failing to 
request a limiting instruction on the cross-admissible evidence.  A reasonable 
attorney may have tactically concluded that the risk of a limiting instruction 
(suggesting to the jury that the evidence supporting the Stark and Berryhill 
murders was relatively strong) outweighed the questionable benefits such 
instruction would provide.  (Ibid.) 
c.  Severance of the Jacqueline H. rape   
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever 
the Jacqueline H. rape count.  He claims that the prosecution argued and the trial 
court incorrectly agreed that the evidence on the charges relating to Weeden, 
Berryhill, and Stark was admissible in the Jacqueline H. case to identify defendant 
as the rapist.  Defendant argues that the evidence was not relevant in the rape case 
because the issue there involved consent, not identity.  He mischaracterizes the 
basis for both the prosecution’s argument and the trial court’s ruling. 
 
Immediately before Jacqueline H.’s testimony, defendant moved for 
judgment of acquittal of the assault with intent to commit rape charge relating to 
Stark and also moved to sever the rape charge relating to Jacqueline H.  He 
explained that the purpose of the motion for acquittal was to “set up a basis for 
severance.”  He conceded that there were “clear grounds” to join the rape count 
with the assault with intent to commit rape count, but argued that, because there 
was insufficient evidence to support the assault charge, the trial court should 
dismiss that charge.  He further argued that, once the assault count disappeared, 
there would be no basis to join the rape charge with the three murder cases.  The 
prosecution responded that the motion for severance was untimely because it 
should have been made before trial, but that, in any event, evidence relating to the 
51 
Jacqueline H. rape was relevant as to the identity of the murderer of the three 
victims.   
 
The trial court denied both motions.  Although the court found the 
severance motion untimely, it then proceeded to rule on the merits.  It found that 
evidence on the rape count would have been cross-admissible in a separate trial on 
the murder charges to establish the identity of the perpetrator and that the 
probative value of the cross-admissible evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect 
of joinder.  Specifically, it found that the rape and the murders had the following 
similarities:  defendant tightened a rope around Jacqueline H.’s neck before he 
raped her; Weeden and Berryhill were strangled with a clothesline rope and scarf, 
respectively; defendant told Detective Newsome that he had heard that Stark had 
been strangled; and the bodies of Berryhill and Stark were found and Jacqueline 
H. was raped in the same general remote area of Happy Valley.  In addition, the 
court found that the boot string that defendant showed Dr. Curiale was cross-
admissible evidence on the murder and rape charges and that the evidentiary 
strengths of the murder and rape charges were relatively similar.   
 
Because the trial court correctly ruled on the merits, we need not decide the 
timeliness issue.  Murder and rape are assaultive crimes against the person and, as 
such, are “offenses of the same class of crimes” within the meaning of section 954 
and were properly joinable.  (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 127; People 
v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188.)  Because the statutory requirements for 
joinder were met, defendant can establish error only on a clear showing of 
prejudice.  (People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1075.)  He has failed to meet 
that burden.   
 
As the trial court ruled, the evidence of the rape would have been cross-
admissible in separate trials on the murder charges.  In addition to the similarities 
described by the court, there were other similarities relating to the murder and rape 
52 
offenses.  Berryhill, Stark, and Jacqueline H. were young, small, and slim women 
who knew defendant.  Berryhill and Stark’s disappearances and Jacqueline H.’s 
rape occurred within a short period of time of each other.  Thus, the incidents 
disclosed a distinctive modus operandi tending to establish the killer’s identity.  
(People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1316; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1, 28.)  Also, as with the Jacqueline H. offense, there was evidence that the 
attack on Stark was sexually motivated.  Thus, evidence in support of the offenses 
against Stark and Jacqueline H. was cross-admissible on the issue of intent.  
(Marshall, supra, at p. 28; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 508.)  Because 
evidence of the murders and rape was cross-admissible, no abuse of discretion 
occurred in failing to sever.  (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 128.)   
C.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Sufficiency of the Evidence   
 
Defendant contends the evidence, in several respects, was insufficient to 
support the judgment.  In reviewing a criminal conviction challenged as lacking 
evidentiary support, “ ‘the court must review the whole record in the light most 
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 
evidence––that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value––
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 496.)  The same 
standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on 
circumstantial evidence (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11), and to 
special circumstance allegations (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 413-
414).  An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have 
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.  (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 11.)  As will 
appear, we reject defendant’s attempts to reargue the persuasiveness of the 
53 
evidence and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support (1) the Stark 
murder and assault with intent to commit rape convictions, (2) the Berryhill 
murder and robbery convictions and robbery-murder special-circumstance finding, 
and (3) the Jacqueline H. rape conviction. 
a.  Stark murder conviction  
 
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions for  Stark’s murder and the assault of Stark with intent to commit rape.  
We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support both convictions. 
 
Disputing that he even knew Stark, defendant claims that there was not 
enough evidence to prove that Stark’s death resulted from a homicide, as opposed 
to an accidental death or suicide, or that he killed her.  To the contrary, evidence 
of defendant’s connection to Stark’s death was overwhelming.  First, evidence of 
the Secret Witness calls and the similarities of the victims established a pattern 
linking defendant with the killings.  The jury could reasonably infer that defendant 
made all of the Secret Witness calls and provided information that only the killer 
or an eyewitness would know about Weeden, Stark, and Berryhill.  On August 8, 
1987, someone telephoned the Secret Witness program seeking a reward for 
information on the location of a body.  Landreth recognized the caller’s voice as 
the same person who had called with information on Weeden.  She also believed 
that the caller was the same person who had called on September 11, 1986, and 
identified himself as defendant. 
 
On August 17, 1987, when the caller gave directions to the body, he stated 
that the death occurred about one and one-half months ago, which coincided with 
the date of Stark’s disappearance.  He also related to Landreth that the boyfriend 
was responsible for the death and that he would leave information about the 
person responsible in an envelope when he retrieved the reward money.  Although 
54 
defendant left an empty envelope without any information as promised, the police 
found defendant’s fingerprint on the envelope.  Thus, defendant’s fingerprint 
corroborated Landreth’s belief that defendant was the Stark case Secret Witness 
caller.   
 
Almost three months after Berryhill’s disappearance, beginning on 
September 15, 1987, Landreth of the Secret Witness program began receiving a 
series of anonymous telephone calls relating to Berryhill.  The caller had 
information on the location of Berryhill’s body and began negotiating for reward 
money in return for that information.  Landreth recognized the caller’s voice as the 
same person who had previously called regarding Weeden and Olsten/Stark and 
decided to tape two of the telephone calls on September 22, 1987.  Detective 
Mundy listened to the taped conversations and confirmed that the caller’s voice 
belonged to defendant.  In return for providing information on the whereabouts of 
Berryhill’s body, the caller picked up the reward money at the title company office 
on September 22, 1987, as prearranged.  During the surveillance, the police 
confirmed defendant’s identity as the Berryhill case Secret Witness caller.  Thus, 
there was ample evidence that defendant was the Secret Witness caller regarding 
all three women and that he knew that Stark had been killed.   
 
Moreover, the similarities of the victims further linked defendant to the 
killings.11  Weeden, Stark, Berryhill, and Jacqueline H. were small, petite women 
that defendant knew.  The disappearances of Stark and Berryhill occurred only one 
                                             
 
11  
Defendant failed to object to the admissibility of “other crimes” evidence or 
ask for a limiting instruction.  Consequently, he has forfeited his claim that 
evidence of the other two murders and one rape could not be used to prove 
identity.  Because the evidence was admissible to prove identity, intent, and 
motive, we reject defendant’s incompetence of counsel claim.  (People v. Ewoldt 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403; People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 856-
858.) 
55 
week and two days after the Jacqueline H. rape and their bodies were found in the 
same general area where Jacqueline H. had been raped.  Also, it was undisputed 
that defendant was familiar with and took walks in that area.  Moreover, two 
residents saw a man matching defendant’s general description drive his 
motorcycle into the wooded area where Stark and Berryhill’s bodies were later 
found.  One witness testified that he saw the man at least twice, while the other 
witness said she saw him about five times and that he stayed in the woods for 
about an hour.  The visits occurred about a month or two before the police 
searched the area.  Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that, before and/or during 
the Secret Witness calls, defendant periodically checked to make sure the bodies 
were still there to ensure that he would receive his reward money.  It could further 
reasonably infer that the reward money motivated defendant, at least in part, to kill 
the women.  
 
Second, defendant’s actions and statements to the police and others amply 
supported a finding of guilt.  Several days after Stark’s body had been found, 
defendant spoke with Detective Newsome.  Despite the fact that the identity and 
gender of the body had not been determined, defendant noted similarities between 
that case and the Weeden case:  both bodies were female and had been discovered 
in the woods.  Also, despite the fact that Stark’s purse was not close to her body, 
defendant took Del Carlo to Stark’s purse and knew that the purse contained 
material that would identify the body.  When asked by Del Carlo if there was 
additional evidence that would help the police in solving the crime, defendant 
related that he could show him the location of a .357-caliber nickel-plated gun.  
Although Stark owned such a gun, the police did not find it in her purse.  
Defendant’s brother described a small pistol similar to the one owned by Stark; he 
told the police that defendant had asked him to dispose of it.  A blanket, similar to 
one owned by defendant, was found close to Stark’s body. 
56 
 
On October 26, 1987, defendant told Detective Newsome that he had heard 
Stark was strangled and that he would reveal the location of the murder weapon 
when he met with Dr. Curiale on October 30.  Yet, during the interview with Dr. 
Curiale, defendant claimed he did not know anything about Stark’s death.  At the 
end of the interview on that date, defendant pulled out a boot string from his jacket 
and commented that Dr. Curiale should have searched his jacket because it would 
have given her some insight into who he was.  Thus, the jury could reasonably 
infer from defendant’s admissions, as well as the inconsistencies of his statements, 
that he had strangled Stark with a boot string and left her body in the woods. 
 
Finally, the jury could reasonably reject defendant’s claim that he did not 
know Stark and discovered the body accidentally.  Defendant told a newspaper 
reporter that he had never seen Stark and had not been in Fall River Mills since 
1977.  However, three witnesses testified that they had seen defendant in Fall 
River Mills, either staring at Stark or with her before her disappearance.  He also 
told the same reporter and Del Carlo that the “real killer” had confessed to the 
killings of Stark and Berryhill and that defendant discovered the location of their 
bodies from the killer.  Thus, defendant’s extrajudicial statements conflicted with 
the testimony of impartial witnesses and with his own defense.   
 
Defendant makes much of the fact that the experts could not determine the 
cause of Stark’s death.  However, the prosecution and defense experts agreed that 
Stark died of unnatural causes.  Also, the evidence at the scene reasonably 
supported an inference of sexual activity or an effort to that end.  Dr. Boyd 
Stephens, the coroner, concluded that someone besides Stark had removed her 
pants:  her pants and underpants were away from the area where her body had 
decomposed and were not stained with decomposition fluids; one of her pant legs 
was partly reversed with the pant leg rolled up; the pants zipper had been zipped 
down completely and her panties were completely inside out; and one of her socks 
57 
and shoes were still on her foot.  Further, there was no evidence explaining why 
Stark would be in a wooded, remote area by herself or that she frequented or ever 
visited the area.  Moreover, it was undisputed that she had planned to travel to 
Nevada City from Fall River Mills to attend a court appearance on June 29, 1987, 
but never made it.  Her boyfriend testified that he last saw Stark on or about June 
25, 1987, when she told him of her travel plans.  Her friend, Lucy Gray, believed 
that she last saw Stark on June 24, 1987.  In light of defendant’s extrajudicial 
admissions, Dr. Stephens’s testimony, and the circumstances of Stark’s 
disappearance, defendant’s assertion that Stark’s death resulted from an accident 
or suicide is simply speculative.   
 
Accordingly, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that 
defendant knew, strangled, and killed Stark; that he waited several months for the 
body and the evidence to decompose before attempting to gain reward money; that 
he was the Secret Witness caller who provided details about Stark that only the 
killer would know; and that he lied to the police, revealing a consciousness of 
guilt. 
b.  Stark assault with intent to commit rape conviction   
 
Sufficient evidence also supported the conviction for assault with intent to 
commit rape.  “ ‘The essential element of [assault with intent to commit rape] is 
the intent to commit the act against the will of the complainant.  The offense is 
complete if at any moment during the assault the accused intends to use whatever 
force may be required.’ ”  (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 509.)  “ ‘[I]f 
there is evidence of the former intent and acts attendant to the execution of that 
intent, the abandonment of that intent before consummation of the act will not 
erase the felonious nature of the assault.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 509-510.) 
58 
 
Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the person 
responsible for the assault, that Stark did not consent to sexual intercourse, that 
someone intended to rape Stark, and that any sexual assault occurred before 
Stark’s death.  Based on Stark’s clothing, as reflected above, Dr. Stephens 
concluded that someone besides Stark had removed her pants and that the scene 
was consistent with the occurrence of a sexual assault.  Although defendant argues 
that the scene is also consistent with consensual sex, the jury could reasonably 
infer an assault from the evidence that Stark had suffered a fractured jaw at or near 
the time of death, that she was strangled and killed by defendant, and that nothing 
consensual had occurred.  Moreover, the prosecution was not required to prove 
that a rape had occurred, but only that Stark had been assaulted with an intent to 
commit rape.  Based upon Dr. Stephens’s testimony and evidence that defendant 
forcibly raped Jacqueline H. in the same area less than a week before the assault, 
the jury could reasonably infer that defendant assaulted Stark with the intent to 
rape.12  (See People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 509-510.) 
c.  Berryhill murder conviction  
 
Defendant argues that the evidence does not support the Berryhill murder 
conviction.  He is wrong.  First, there is credible evidence that Berryhill was last 
                                             
 
12  
Sergeant Wooden testified that, although there were no decomposition fluid 
stains on Stark’s pants, he detected a “light odor” of decomposition and saw a 
grease-like stain on the pant leg.  Defendant argues that the “light odor” and stain 
is conclusive evidence of the presence of decomposition fluid, which establishes 
that Stark’s pants were removed after her death.  Not so.  There was no scientific 
evidence linking the “light odor” and stain to decomposition fluid.  The jury could 
reasonably conclude that they were caused by something other than human 
decomposition fluid.  Moreover, defendant’s argument that the pants were 
removed after Stark’s death is not dispositive; the jury could still reasonably 
conclude that Stark had been assaulted while alive and that defendant intended to 
rape her during the assault.  
59 
seen with defendant before her disappearance and that she planned to meet with 
defendant on the night of June 22, 1987, to buy some marijuana at “Big Mama’s 
house.”   
 
Second, defendant told different stories about his plans on the night 
Berryhill disappeared.  Defendant admitted to the police that he had been with 
Berryhill on the day of her disappearance, but denied that he took her anywhere 
that night.  Defendant claimed that on the night Berryhill disappeared, he had been 
on a date with a Leanne Thurman and that he had been late for his date because he 
had been with his friend Dave Hancock at the home of Hancock’s boss.  Although 
Hancock could not remember the precise date, he testified that, during the summer 
of 1987, he and defendant were at his boss’s home when defendant related that he 
needed to return home because he was late for a date that night.  Defendant drove 
off on his maroon Yamaha motorcycle for the date.  Sometime afterwards, 
defendant revealed to Hancock that the date was with Berryhill, but that she had 
already left by the time he arrived.  Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant lied about his date with Thurman and that he was really with Berryhill 
on the night she disappeared.  
 
Third, as with the Stark crimes, the jury could reasonably consider the 
similarities of the victims and infer that defendant made all of the Secret Witness 
calls and provided information that only the killer or an eyewitness would know 
about Weeden, Stark, and Berryhill.   The caller (defendant) described the location 
of the body and said that Berryhill had been strangled with a scarf.  When the 
police found Berryhill’s body that same day, her body was covered with a mattress 
and pine needles.  After removing the mattress, the police determined that a scarf 
was wrapped around the neck area of the vertebra; however, the scarf was not 
immediately evident.  Goldie Lane, Berryhill’s neighbor, identified the clothing 
and scarf found on Berryhill’s body as the same items she had worn on the night 
60 
of her disappearance.  Finally, defendant’s extrajudicial statement to Landreth that 
he “saw her boyfriend do it to [Berryhill]” conflicted with his defense.   
 
Accordingly, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that 
defendant was the last person seen with Berryhill on the night before her 
disappearance; that he strangled her that night with the same scarf she wore when 
she left the house; that he waited several months for the body and the evidence to 
decompose before attempting to gain reward money; that he was the Secret 
Witness caller who provided details about Berryhill that only the killer would 
know; and that he lied to the police thereby revealing a consciousness of guilt.  
d.  Berryhill robbery conviction and robbery-murder special-
circumstance finding   
 
Defendant asserts that the robbery conviction should be reversed because of 
insufficient evidence that Berryhill had any money on her when she was killed or 
that any money was taken by force or fear.  (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 
20, fn. 8, disapproved on another ground in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 
543, fn. 5.)  Similarly, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
robbery-murder special-circumstance finding because the evidence showed the 
perpetrator’s primary criminal goal was not to steal but to kill and the robbery was 
merely incidental to the murder.  (Morris, supra, at p. 21.)  To the contrary, there 
was substantial evidence that Berryhill was robbed and that she was murdered 
while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery.  
 
On the day of her disappearance, Berryhill told her mother that she was 
going to meet “Bob” at 8:00 p.m. and go to “Big Mama’s house” to buy 
marijuana.  Williams gave her daughter $100.  Before leaving the house on the 
night of her disappearance, Berryhill asked Lane for a ride to buy some marijuana.  
When Lane offered to baby-sit instead, Berryhill said she could get a ride from “a 
guy on a motorcycle.”  Berryhill said she had enough money to buy “some dope,” 
61 
showed Lane a roll of money, and placed it in her small hand purse.  Soon 
afterwards, Berryhill was last seen riding off with defendant on his motorcycle.  A 
larger purse was located near Berryhill’s body.  Lane testified that Berryhill 
carried her marijuana in the larger purse.  Although Berryhill did not put her 
money in that purse, Lane stated that the purse with the money could fit inside the 
larger one.  Because there was no marijuana in Berryhill’s marijuana purse and the 
purse with the money was missing, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant 
stole either the money or marijuana from Berryhill.  Moreover, because Berryhill 
was killed by strangulation with her own scarf, and only two days earlier 
defendant had forced Jacqueline H. to submit to rape by threatening to strangle 
her, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant strangled and killed Berryhill 
while engaged in the commission of a robbery.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) 
 
“ ‘[W]hen one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, 
it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery.’ ”  
(People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357.)  Even “ ‘[i]f a person commits a 
murder, and after doing so takes the victim's wallet, the jury may reasonably infer 
that the murder was committed for the purpose of obtaining the wallet, because 
murders are commonly committed to obtain money.’ ”  (Ibid.)  That defendant 
may have harbored a concurrent intent to kill does not invalidate the robbery-
murder special circumstance.  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1160.)  
Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the robbery conviction and the 
robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. 
e.  Jacqueline H. rape conviction  
 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for the rape of Jacqueline H. on two grounds.  First, he argues that 
Jacqueline H.’s testimony was incredible, based on the absence of visible injuries 
62 
and evidence that Jacqueline H. failed to report the rape or seek help afterwards, 
had a reputation as a liar, was a drug addict and convicted thief, and may have 
suffered from drug-induced paranoia.  In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we ask whether “ ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 
272.)  Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not 
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge 
or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts 
upon which a determination depends.  (People v. Huston  (1943) 21 Cal.2d 690, 
693.)  We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for 
substantial evidence.  (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)  The finding 
of guilt was amply supported by Jacqueline H.’s testimony. 
 
Second, defendant contends that, even if Jacqueline H.’s testimony is 
believed, she never expressly stated that the act of sexual intercourse was against 
her will.  Thus, he argues, the evidence was insufficient to show lack of consent.  
Defendant’s claim is based on the remarkable and unsupported assertion that, 
because lack of consent and force or fear are separate elements, the same evidence 
cannot be used to prove “non-consent” and “force or fear.”  Contrary to his claim, 
evidence of force or fear is directly linked to the overbearing of a victim’s will; the 
prosecution is required to demonstrate that the act of sexual intercourse was 
accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, or fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury.  (People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 
856.)  We agree with the Attorney General that there is ample evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably infer that Jacqueline H. did not consent to sexual 
intercourse, i.e., her testimony that she feared for her life, that defendant rejected 
her request to take her home, that she disrobed and lay on the ground only after he 
63 
placed and tightened a rope around her neck and ordered her to do so, and that, 
after the act of intercourse, she grabbed a screwdriver from a leather pouch 
attached to the motorcycle to protect herself. 
2.  Evidentiary Issues—Voluntariness of Defendant’s Statements 
 
Defendant contends that his statements to the district attorney and police in 
1985 and to Dr. Curiale were involuntarily made.   
a.  General principles 
 
In reviewing the voluntary character of incriminating statements, “ ‘[t]his 
court must examine the uncontradicted facts surrounding the making of the 
statements to determine independently whether the prosecution met its burden and 
proved that the statements were voluntarily given without previous inducement, 
intimidation or threat.  [Citations.]  With respect to the conflicting testimony, the 
court must “accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to 
the extent that it is supported by the record.” ’  ([People v. Hogan (1982) 31 
Cal.3d 815,] 835.)”  (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166.)  “In order 
to introduce a defendant’s statement into evidence, the People must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntary.  [Citation.]  
. . . When, as here, the interview was tape-recorded, the facts surrounding the 
giving of the statement are undisputed, and the appellate court may independently 
review the trial court’s determination of voluntariness.”  (People v. Vasila (1995) 
38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873.) 
 
A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of “ ‘a rational intellect 
and free will.’ ”  (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398.)  The test for 
determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “will 
was overborne at the time he confessed.”  (Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528, 
534.)  “ ‘The question posed by the due process clause in cases of claimed 
64 
psychological coercion is whether the influences brought to bear upon the accused 
were “such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions 
not freely self-determined.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  In determining whether or not 
an accused’s will was overborne, ‘an examination must be made of “all the 
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details 
of the interrogation.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Thompson, supra, 50 
Cal.3d at p. 166.) 
 
A finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a 
confession was involuntary under the federal and state Constitutions.  (People v. 
Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778, citing Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 
p. 167.)  A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or 
violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of 
improper influence.  (Benson, supra, at p. 778.)  Although coercive police activity 
is a necessary predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it “does not itself 
compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.”  (People v. Bradford 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041.)  The statement and the inducement must be 
causally linked.  (Benson, supra, at pp. 778-779.) 
b.  Admissibility of defendant’s November 21, 1985, statements to 
district attorney and police  
 
On November 21, 1985, Detective Mundy and District Attorney Carlton 
interviewed defendant.  During the tape-recorded interview, defendant related that 
he walked in on the murder of Weeden by Morris and another man, that they tied 
defendant up at gunpoint and took him with them to dispose of Weeden’s body 
and threatened to kill him if he told anyone about their involvement in the murder.  
The trial court allowed the jury to hear the taped interview and admitted the tape 
recording and transcript of the interview into evidence.  Defendant contends that 
because his November 21 statements were involuntarily made, the trial court 
65 
violated his due process rights in admitting them into evidence.  His claims lack 
merit. 
 
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to rule expressly 
on the voluntariness of his November 21, 1985, statements.  However, the record 
reflects no error.  As part of his section 1538.5 pretrial motion to suppress 
evidence, defendant moved to suppress his November 21 statement.  In rejecting 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim and denying the suppression motion 
relating to that statement, the trial court expressly found that the November 21 
statements were “voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.”  During trial, the trial 
court asked the parties whether the voluntariness of the November 21 statements 
was a “contested issue.”  The following discussion occurred: 
 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I don’t think we have any problem with the 
statements made in ’85.  Now, the defense is constrained fromor at least we do 
not wish to stipulate to the admission of any of these statements.   
 
“THE COURT:  Right. 
 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Then, again, we don’t wish to be obstreperous 
either, so I don’t think there’s an issue of voluntariness as to the ’85 statements.”   
 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Let me suggest that the parties get together and 
I think we can agree at least to disagree and form the issues so it can be done 
quickly Tuesday morning, if necessary.  And whatever rulings would be 
necessary––I certainly don’t expect anything on the ’85 tape.   
 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  You don’t expect anything what? 
 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Challenge on the voluntariness.”   
 
Later, when the prosecutor introduced the tape and transcript of the 
interview into evidence, defense counsel objected only to the accuracy and use of 
the transcript.  Although the trial court did not expressly find that the November 
21 statements were voluntarily made, such finding was implied from the court’s 
66 
order admitting the statement into evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (c) [“[a] 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever finding of fact is 
prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is unnecessary unless required by 
statute”]); People v. Daniels (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 367, 374.)  In light of 
defendant’s failure to object to admission of the evidence on voluntariness 
grounds, the lack of an express finding on that issue was not error. 
 
Defendant argues that if the trial court’s admission implies a finding of 
voluntariness, such finding was erroneous.  He claims that the November 21 
statements were involuntary as a matter of law because they were induced by a 
promise of leniency on an unrelated possession of stolen property charge and an 
agreement that defendant’s statements would not be used against him on the 
Weeden murder.  The record fails to support defendant’s claim. 
 
In November 1985, before his court appearance on the unrelated stolen 
property case, defendant spoke to Shasta County Sheriff’s Detective Ashmun.  
Defendant volunteered that he had information on the Weeden homicide, and 
wanted “consideration” on the case he was currently facing and “immunity” on the 
Weeden case.  Defendant stated that Weeden had been strangled and hit in the 
head.  After defendant’s statements, Detective Ashmun said he might help 
defendant on the stolen property case if he had helpful information on the Weeden 
case.  Detective Ashmun told Detective Mundy, the investigator on the Weeden 
case, that defendant had information about the Weeden murder and was willing to 
talk about it.   
 
Detective Mundy met with defendant on November 20, 1985.  Defendant 
told Detective Mundy that he would be willing to talk to him “conditionally” and 
that he wanted to talk about “immunity.”  Detective Mundy responded that he 
“could not grant immunity, that it would have to come from the district attorney.”  
The detective arranged to have another interview with defendant on the next day.   
67 
 
On November 21, 1985, Detective Mundy and District Attorney Carlton 
interviewed defendant at his residence.  At the beginning of the interview, 
defendant informed them that he had pleaded guilty to the crime of possession of 
stolen property and was facing county jail time on the conviction.  He further 
stated that Detective Ashmun seemed to think that “if I cooperated in this 
investigation, then I might not get no jail time . . . and that was one of the things I 
would like to get out of this, assuming I know anything that can help you.”  (Italics 
added.)  When District Attorney Carlton began to reply, “I can’t tell you before 
. . .” defendant interrupted and said, “Right, I’m not asking.”  The district attorney 
continued to say that he could not tell defendant whether he would benefit before 
they heard his statement and determine its truthfulness.  Defendant then 
acknowledged, “Well, I’ll start off by telling you what happened that day,” and 
“you can answer a couple of my questions.”   
 
Defendant gave a lengthy statement in which he blamed Morris and another 
man for Weeden’s death.  At the end of the interview, defendant explained that, if 
not for the impending jail commitment, he would never have come forward with 
the information.  He reiterated that he wanted to avoid jail time and that Detective 
Ashmun said he “might be able to get off easy.”  (Italics added.)  Although, as 
defendant argues, his motivation was to avoid jail time on the unrelated case, his 
further claim that the authorities promised consideration on the unrelated case in 
return for information on the Weeden case is unavailing.13   
 
Similarly, no promises of immunity were made as to the Weeden case.  At 
the beginning of the interview, defendant said he did not want to be arrested and 
                                             
 
13  
Although there were no promises made, defendant received three years’ 
probation on a felony conviction of possession of stolen property without a county 
jail commitment.   
68 
jailed immediately for telling them “things that somebody else might not know.”  
He stated, “I know I can’t get charged with murder because I didn’t do it, a, 
immunity that way, I’m not really worried about it, immunity that anything, see if 
I was to come up with some information that not very many people should know, I 
don’t want that used against me, saying I did it just because I know that.”  (Italics 
added.)  The district attorney informed defendant that immunity had “not been 
granted to you,” that “you’re not being offered immunity,” and that “I don’t have 
the power to give you immunity anyway, you understand that.”   
 
Defendant replied, “I understand that, but I don’t wanna be thrown in jail 
for an accessory that I had nothing to do with, j – just because . . . . 
 
“[CARLTON]:  Okay. 
 
“[DEFENDANT]:  I happened to walk in on something, there’s no reason I 
should have to go to jail for it. 
 
“[CARLTON]:  Okay, I’m not, I’m not questioning that, what I’m trying to 
talk to you about is, there has been some mention of, of immunity in this case and 
immunity has not been granted and you don’t have immunity.”   
 
“[DEFENDANT]:  [Inaudible], I realize that. 
 
“[CARLTON]:  And if a, if it ever came to be, that we wanted to give you 
immunity, we’d have to hear what you had to say and we’d have to evaluate and 
investigate to determine whether we thought it was truthful or not.  Do you 
understand that? 
 
“[DEFENDANT]:  Yes sir. 
 
“[CARLTON]:  Okay. 
 
“[DEFENDANT]:  So I have nothing. 
 
“[CARLTON]:  Well, I’m not, I’m not saying that . . . I’m  not saying that 
you, a, that immunity won’t sometime be offered to you, but immunity would 
never be offered to you until we knew what we were getting.”  (Italics added.) 
69 
 
Focusing on isolated fragments of the conversation, defendant argues that 
the district attorney implicitly assured defendant twice that the information would 
not be used against him.  Twice, when defendant stated his desire that the 
volunteered information would not be used against him, the district attorney 
merely prefaced his responses with “Okay.”  We fail to see how that phrase 
equates to such an agreement, especially in light of Carlton’s express and repeated 
statements that immunity was not being granted at that time.   
 
Finally, defendant contends that the district attorney engaged in “unethical 
conduct” by violating then rule 7-103 of the California Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which provided, in pertinent part, that “A member of the State Bar shall 
not communicate directly or indirectly with a party whom he knows to be 
represented by counsel upon a subject of controversy without the express consent 
of such counsel. . . .”  (Italics added.)  However, defendant was represented by 
counsel only on an unrelated charge and not on the Weeden murder.  (See People 
v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 527 [Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-
specific,” i.e., it attaches only to those offenses for which adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings have begun].)  He fails to establish the applicability of the 
rule to the district attorney’s conduct or how an alleged breach of the ethical rule 
affected the verdict.  Indeed, we fail to see how admission of defendant’s 
statements “seriously undermined his defense,” as defendant claims, since his 
extrajudicial statements to the police formed the evidentiary basis for his defense 
that Morris killed Weeden.14 
                                             
 
14  
Defendant also alleges that defense counsel were incompetent for failing to 
object to his “involuntary” statements to Detective Ashmun that Weeden had been 
strangled and hit in the head.  As with the November 21, 1985, interview, no 
promises were made in exchange for information on the Weeden case.  Detective 
Ashmun simply said he might help defendant on the unrelated case.  Because the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
70 
c.  Admissibility of defendant’s statements to Dr. Curiale   
 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
admitting certain statements that he made to Dr. Curiale, a psychologist with the 
Department of Corrections, on the grounds that they were made involuntarily and 
were privileged (Evid. Code, § 1012).  Dr. Curiale interviewed defendant on 
October 23 and 30, 1987.  At trial, defendant objected to admission of all of his 
statements during the interviews on the ground that they were made involuntarily 
and were more prejudicial than probative, under Evidence Code section 352.  
After an evidentiary hearing, which included a review of the entire taped 
interviews, the trial court concluded that defendant’s statements were voluntarily 
made.  It made the following findings:  “I think [defendant] voluntarily put himself 
in the position of being interrogated, with full knowledge that he was waiving his 
rights, and he fully understood what Dr. Curiale’s position was and what her 
intentions were, and he demonstrated that constantly throughout the tapes.”   
 
The trial court ruled that, under Evidence Code section 352, portions of the 
interviews were irrelevant and playing the entire tapes would be time-consuming.  
It instructed the prosecutor to edit the tapes.  The court allowed the jury to hear 
limited portions of the taped interviews and admitted an edited transcript of those 
limited portions.   
 
After reviewing the record, we find that defendant’s statements were 
voluntarily made.  It is undisputed that defendant’s statements to Dr. Curiale were 
made during noncustodial interviews.  At the evidentiary hearing, Detective 
Newsome testified that during a September 29, 1987, interview with defendant at 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
claim lacks merit and because his statements formed the basis for his defense, 
counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object. 
71 
his brother’s house, defendant initiated a discussion about talking to a psychiatrist 
and said he would be willing to talk to one if the police made the arrangements 
and payment.  At another interview on October 5, defendant offered to talk to a 
psychiatrist again.  When the police accused defendant of the murders and asked if 
he needed help, defendant denied that he killed anyone, declared that they could 
not prove it, and encouraged Detective Newsome to find “the best criminal 
psychologist or psychiatrist” because he or she would say defendant was “not 
capable of these things.”  He also challenged Detective Newsome to “take [him] to 
a jury trial to prove that [he] did it.”   
 
The police asked Dr. Curiale to interview defendant to assist them in 
determining if defendant committed the crimes and in obtaining information, 
evidence, or, if possible, a confession from defendant.  On October 23, 1987, 
defendant met Dr. Curiale and Detective Newsome at the lobby of the Shasta Inn, 
but then spoke with Dr. Curiale alone.  At the beginning of the interview, 
defendant stated:  “You’re going to tell me that . . . things that I can say, can will 
be used against me and maybe you’re not going to read me my rights, but you are 
going to advise me of the fact that whatever information you might get from me 
will be used against me and these will be turned over to the police whether it turns 
up people or not.  I already know all that.  I, I don’t have to be here talking to 
you.”  Dr. Curiale responded, “Right,” and emphasized that, because she was 
working for law enforcement, the privilege and confidentiality “rests with them.”  
Defendant replied that he understood.  Also, at some point, defendant commented 
that the interview was probably being taped.  Before the interview ended, they 
agreed to meet again.   
 
On October 30, 1987, defendant met Dr. Curiale in the same lobby.  During 
the interview, Dr. Curiale commented that defendant had not told her anything 
more than what she had read in the police reports or newspapers.  Defendant 
72 
responded, “I told you the first time I met you that I would never tell you anything 
that I knew would be a mistake or could get me thrown in jail . . . there’s no way 
that I’m gonna ever tell you anything that you’re gonna be able to use to throw me 
in prison, I have not lied to you in that respect.”  When Dr. Curiale responded, 
“No you haven’t, you’ve been very consistent in that, but I’m not interested in 
what gets you to prison,” defendant expressed his skepticism by stating, “Sure you 
are, because whatever I tell you, you’ll tell them, now if I was to hire you, and a, 
or the County was to hire you on my behalf or whatever and the anonymity and 
everything laid with between us, well then, you know, might be a different story.  
But right now, they’re pulling your strings, not me and not the County, well I 
guess in a way the County, but like a mental health program.”  Detective 
Newsome and Dr. Curiale testified that defendant ended both interviews himself 
and left.   
 
Thus, the evidence reflects that defendant offered to talk with a 
psychologist, voluntarily met with Dr. Curiale twice, knew that he was not 
required to talk with her, was not in custody during the interviews, and was free to 
end the interview and leave at any time, which he did.  Even though he understood 
that his statements were not confidential, would be related to the police, and could 
be used against him, defendant freely spoke with Dr. Curiale.  (People v. 
Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 97-98.) 
 
Nevertheless, defendant claims that his statements were involuntary 
because (1) he was intoxicated by marijuana during the interviews, (2) Dr. Curiale 
used psychological manipulation to coerce his incriminating statements, and (3) 
law enforcement coerced defendant into seeing a psychologist by harassing him 
and his family.  The evidence reflects otherwise.  Regarding the intoxication 
allegation, both Dr. Curiale (who saw and heard defendant during the interviews) 
and Detectives Newsome and Mundy (who overheard defendant during the 
73 
interviews) testified that he did not appear to be under the influence of a drug, that 
he appeared to understand the questions asked of him, that he responded and asked 
questions appropriately, and that his conversations were coherent and intelligent.  
Although defendant smoked a cigarette that he said was marijuana during the 
October 30, 1987, interview, Dr. Curiale stated that his behavior did not change 
after smoking it.  Moreover, absent state coercion, defendant cannot complain that 
any self-induced intoxication rendered his statements involuntary.  (See Colorado 
v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 163.)  
 
Regarding the psychological manipulation claim, although the evidence 
reflects that Dr. Curiale tried to trick defendant into admitting his guilt, defendant 
recognized the attempted ruse and refused to succumb to any deception.  In an 
attempt to get more information from defendant, Dr. Curiale represented that she 
was “off duty,” implying that she was no longer working for the police.  Also, Dr. 
Curiale attempted to elicit incriminating evidence by comparing defendant to a 
notorious killer who had received much publicity and by promising that defendant 
would be in her book.  As the trial court correctly found, the evidence reflects that 
defendant did not believe her and was not influenced by Dr. Curiale’s techniques.  
Deception does not necessarily invalidate an incriminating statement.  (People v. 
Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 167; see also Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 
292, 297 [“mere strategic deception” not coercive].)  “The courts have prohibited 
only those psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive 
that they tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable.”  
(People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 340.)  In this case, Dr. Curiale’s ploys do 
not fall into that category. 
 
Regarding defendant’s harassment claim, there is conflicting evidence.  
Defendant’s brother testified that Detectives Newsome and Mundy repeatedly 
accused defendant of being gay, illiterate, and a mass murderer, and having a split 
74 
personality.  On the other hand, although the detectives told defendant and his 
family they believed he was guilty of one or more of the murders, they denied 
making the first three accusations.  With respect to this conflicting testimony, we 
must accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the 
extent that it is supported by the record.  (People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 
p. 166.)  On the other hand, the detectives admitted that they considered the 
possibility that defendant may have had a split personality (“good Bob/bad Bob”) 
and may have mentioned that possibility to defendant and his family.  Even if the 
police had mentioned to defendant and his family of their belief in a “good 
Bob/bad Bob,” this does not amount to official coercion.  Defendant initiated the 
topic of a psychiatrist and offered to talk to one for the purpose of exonerating 
himself.  Indeed, during the interview, he repeatedly denied any responsibility for 
the murders, in accordance with his planned purpose.  Thus, defendant’s will was 
not overborne when he spoke to Dr. Curiale.  (Lynumn v. Illinois, supra, 372 U.S. 
at p. 534.) 
 
On the claim of privilege, because defendant failed to object to admission 
of his statements on this ground, it is forfeited.  (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); 
People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 448; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 
49.)  In any event, the claim is meritless.  The evidence is uncontradicted that Dr. 
Curiale’s and the police’s purpose for the interview was to obtain information and 
evidence from defendant, and not to conduct psychological treatment or a 
psychological evaluation or diagnosis.  (People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at 
pp. 97-98; People v. Cabral (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 820, 826-828.) 
 
Finally, even if defendant’s statements were involuntary, their admission 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 
279; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510.)  Although the taped 
statements were lengthy, the prosecution admitted only limited portions of the 
75 
interviews.  During the edited version, which the jury heard, defendant stated that 
he had “no conscience,” and that, although he did not serve in Vietnam, he wanted 
to “rape, burn, pillage, kill” the Viet Cong.  He commented that the Secret Witness 
program “bred crime by paying people to turn in bodies” and that “a person could 
almost make a living by killing people and later turning in their bodies for the 
reward.”  At the end of the interview, defendant pulled out what appeared to be a 
boot string from his pocket and told Dr. Curiale that she should have searched his 
coat while she had the chance because it would have given her insight into who he 
was.  However, defendant steadfastly denied any responsibility for the murders 
and offered no information about them.  Given the overwhelming evidence against 
defendant, admission of his statements was not prejudicial. 
d.  Admissibility of polygraph evidence   
 
Defendant challenges the exclusion of evidence that he passed a polygraph 
examination.  According to defendant’s offer of proof, he “passed” the polygraph 
test regarding the death of Weeden.  He argued that evidence of the test results 
was relevant to identify Weeden’s murderer and he sought to introduce the 
polygraph evidence to support his extrajudicial statements that someone else killed 
Weeden.  Defendant requested an evidentiary hearing to establish the “validity” of 
the polygraph examination and the examiner’s “expert qualification.”  Relying on 
Evidence Code section 351.1, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for an 
evidentiary hearing.  Defendant claims that the trial court’s refusal to hold an 
evidentiary hearing violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present 
a defense and call favorable witnesses.   
 
Evidence Code section 351.1 provides that the results of a polygraph 
examination or the opinion of a polygraph examiner “shall not be admitted into 
76 
evidence in any criminal proceeding . . . unless all parties stipulate to the 
admission of such results.”   
 
Here, the trial court properly excluded the expert testimony regarding 
defendant's polygraph examination.  Excluding such evidence does not violate 
defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.  (United States v. Scheffer 
(1998) 523 U.S. 303, 312 [per se military rule excluding all polygraph evidence in 
court-martial proceedings does not abridge defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment 
rights to present defense].)  In finding that a per se rule excluding all polygraph 
evidence was not arbitrary or disproportionate in promoting the legitimate interest 
of ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, the high court stated:  
“[T]here is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.  To this day, 
the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of 
polygraph techniques.”  (Id. at p. 309.)  “This lack of scientific consensus is 
reflected in the disagreement among state and federal courts concerning both the 
admissibility and the reliability of polygraph evidence.”  (Id. at pp. 310-311, fn. 
omitted.)  Implicit in the Legislature’s passage of  Evidence Code section 351.1 is 
the conclusion that “[L]ie detector tests themselves are not considered reliable 
enough to have probative value.”  (People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 764, 
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 
12.)  A per se rule excluding polygraph evidence is a “rational and proportional 
means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence.”  
(Scheffer, supra, at p. 312.) 
 
Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, his defense was not significantly 
impaired by exclusion of the polygraph examination results.  Although defendant 
chose not to testify, exclusion of the polygraph evidence did not preclude him 
from introducing any factual evidence of the charged offense and did not prohibit 
him from testifying on his own behalf.  (United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. 
77 
at pp. 316-317; see also People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 818 [exclusion 
under Evid. Code, § 351.1 of defendant’s offer to take a polygraph test did not 
violate due process; defendant was not foreclosed from effectively challenging 
prosecution’s case or from presenting crucial exculpatory evidence].)  Rather, 
defendant was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster 
his own credibility, in support of his extrajudicial statements.  (Scheffer, supra, at 
p. 317.)  “A polygraph is not so crucial that its absence precludes a defendant from 
mounting a defense.”  (In re Aontae D. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 167, 175.)   
 
In People v. Wilkinson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 72, review granted 
December 11, 2002, S111028, we will decide whether Evidence Code section 
351.1’s exclusion of polygraph evidence is absolute or whether a defendant, on a 
proper showing, is entitled to a Kelly/Frye hearing regarding the admissibility of 
proposed defense polygraph evidence.  (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-
32; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013, 1014.)  Even if the 
Kelly/Frye test remains applicable to polygraph evidence notwithstanding the 
enactment of Evidence Code section 351.1, we note that defendant’s offer of proof 
was woefully inadequate.  He failed to present an offer of proof that polygraph 
evidence was generally accepted in the scientific community.  (People v. Ayala 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 264; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1212; 
People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1122.)  Defendant merely asserted that he 
would proffer evidence of the “competency” of the polygraph examination results, 
without saying what that evidence was or what he specifically sought to show.  
Thus, he is in “ ‘ “no position to assign error in the trial court’s ruling.” ’ ”  
(Jackson, supra, at p. 1212.) 
78 
3.  Alleged Ineffectiveness of Counsel    
 
Defendant contends that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 
(1) failing to object to evidence of Landreth’s voice identification of defendant as 
the Weeden case Secret Witness caller, (2) failing to request a cautionary jury 
instruction relating to voice identifications, (3) failing to object to hearsay 
statements, and (4) failing to object to Jacqueline H.’s testimony.  These 
contentions lack merit. 
a.  Failure to object to preliminary hearing voice identification 
 
At the preliminary hearing, defendant cross-examined Landreth, while 
acting as his own cocounsel.  At trial, Landreth testified that at the preliminary 
hearing, she recognized defendant’s voice as the same person who had called the 
Secret Witness program in regard to Weeden, “Olsten,” and Berryhill.  There was 
no objection to this testimony.  Defendant argues that counsel should have 
objected because Landreth’s voice identification at the preliminary hearing (which 
she made “only to herself”) was unreliable and the identification procedure was 
impermissibly suggestive.  The Attorney General responds that because the 
identification procedure during the preliminary hearing was not unduly suggestive 
and Landreth’s voice identification of defendant was reliable, counsel was not 
required to object since an objection would have been futile.  We need not decide 
the merits of the claim because the record reveals that counsel’s failure to object to 
testimony regarding Landreth’s voice identification can reasonably be attributed to 
a choice of trial tactics because it was not critical evidence.  
 
In 1985, Landreth spoke with the Secret Witness caller about the Weeden 
case at least six times.  On September 11, 1986, Landreth received a telephone call 
from someone she recognized as the same person who had made the 1985 Secret 
Witness calls.  The caller gave her information regarding an unrelated burglary 
and revealed his name.  Landreth recalled that the caller may have said, “Well, this 
79 
is Bob” or may have said his name was “Robert Maury.”  A week later, on 
September 19, the same person called again, this time asking Landreth for 
immunity on the Weeden case.  She realized that the September 11 caller, who 
identified himself as “Bob” or “Robert Maury,” was the same person as the 
Weeden case Secret Witness caller. 
 
In August 1987, Landreth began receiving a series of telephone calls from 
the same caller regarding the location of “Olsten’s” body.  Landreth recognized 
that the voice belonged to the same person as the caller on the Weeden case and 
the unrelated burglary.  She taped one of the telephone calls and played it for 
Detective Mundy to confirm that the voice belonged to the same Robert Maury 
whom she had spoken to before.  Detective Mundy confirmed Robert Maury was 
the person on the tape.   
 
During closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly attacked as unreliable 
Landreth’s recognition of defendant’s voice during the series of telephone calls.  
Thus, the record indicates that counsel believed that Landreth’s recognition of 
defendant’s voice in 1985 to 1987 was the critical evidence, and not her voice 
identification at the preliminary hearing.  Whether to object to arguably 
inadmissible evidence is a tactical decision; because trial counsel’s tactical 
decisions are accorded substantial deference, failure to object seldom establishes 
counsel’s incompetence.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1121.)  We 
cannot say that counsel’s decision not to object to evidence of Landreth’s 
preliminary hearing voice identification was not a legitimate tactical choice.  
(People v. Davis (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 841, 844 [failure to object to lineup 
procedure may have been legitimate tactical decision].)  
 
In addition, because other independent evidence established that defendant 
was the Weeden case Secret Witness caller, counsel’s failure to object to  
Landreth’s preliminary-hearing voice identification was not prejudicial.   
80 
b.  Failure to request cautionary instruction 
 
Defendant claims that counsel was incompetent for failing to request a 
pinpoint instruction for Landreth’s preliminary-hearing voice identification, 
similar to CALJIC No. 2.92 (eyewitness identification).  Because her voice 
identification was not crucial evidence, the failure to give a cautionary instruction 
as to that evidence was not prejudicial. 
c.  Failure to object to hearsay statements of Morris 
 
Bill Chartier, Weeden’s brother, testified that Morris related that he saw 
Weeden riding off with defendant, on the back of defendant’s motorcycle, and 
“that’s the last time she was ever seen.”  Defense counsel did not object to this 
testimony.  Defendant now claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to Morris’s hearsay statement.   
 
Here, given the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant’s guilt of 
the Weeden murder, it is not reasonably probable that a determination more 
favorable to defendant would have resulted, in the absence of counsel’s omission.  
(Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)  The evidence reflected that 
defendant was the Secret Witness caller regarding all three murder victims.  He 
knew the location of the bodies of the victims and used this information for 
financial gain.  In addition, defendant made numerous admissions regarding 
Weeden’s death to Landreth, Detective Ashmun, Detective Mundy, and various 
acquaintances, and gave several conflicting stories to Chartier regarding Weeden 
after her disappearance.  Defendant argues that Morris’s hearsay statement was the 
only direct evidence that rebutted defendant’s assertion that Morris killed Weeden.  
Not so.  In the spring of 1987, after he had told Detective Mundy that Morris 
killed Weeden, defendant declared that Detective Mundy “would never really 
know what happened to Averill Weeden” and that Mundy would take her death to 
his grave.  Because defendant has failed to establish prejudice, the issue of 
81 
deficient performance need not be reached.  (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 
at p. 1126.) 
d.  Failure to object to Jacqueline H.’s testimony 
 
Defendant contends that defense counsel were incompetent for failing to 
object to Jacqueline H.’s testimony on the ground that her testimony was coerced 
by the district attorney, in violation of his right to due process.  Analogizing to 
accomplice testimony cases, defendant claims that Jacqueline H. agreed to testify 
in conformity with her preliminary hearing testimony in return for benefits 
promised by the district attorney.  The evidence fails to support his claim. 
 
“ ‘ “[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution’s case depends 
substantially on accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either 
by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular 
fashion.”  [Citation.]  Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to 
the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given 
to police [citation], or that his testimony result in defendant’s conviction [citation], 
the accomplice’s testimony is “tainted beyond redemption” [citation] and its 
admission denies defendant a fair trial.  On the other hand, although there is a 
certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, 
it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and 
truthfully is valid.’  (Fn. omitted.)”  (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 
358.) 
 
At trial, the district attorney asked Jacqueline H. if any promises were made 
to her in return for her testimony.  Jacqueline H. replied, “I have been offered 
nothing. . . .  Except for not having to do time in jail, in the same jail with 
[defendant].”  At the time of trial, a burglary charge and bad check charge were 
pending against Jacqueline H.  Both crimes had occurred and, obviously, both 
82 
charges had been filed after Jacqueline H.’s preliminary hearing testimony in 
which she testified that defendant had raped her.  Jacqueline H.’s attorney, 
representing her on both criminal cases, confirmed that the district attorney 
promised only that Jacqueline H. would not serve any time in the same jail with 
defendant in return for her testimony.  Thus, the district attorney’s promise was 
not conditioned on Jacqueline H. testifying in a particular fashion or on the 
testimony’s achieving a particular result. 
 
Moreover, unlike the accomplice cases, there was not “a certain degree of 
compulsion” inherent in Jacqueline H.’s agreement with the district attorney.  She 
did not avoid prosecution or receive a favorable criminal disposition in exchange 
for her testimony.  Instead, as the Attorney General points out, Jacqueline H. was 
simply receiving an express assurance that the prosecution would make every 
effort to protect her from her assailant, an assurance any victim would reasonably 
expect from the prosecution.15 
Nothing about the agreement was improperly coercive.  Thus, counsel were 
not ineffective for failing to object to Jacqueline H.’s testimony on that ground.  
(People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 617.) 
4.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct   
 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed various acts of 
misconduct during both the guilt and penalty phases, including misconduct during 
                                             
 
15  
We reject defendant’s claim that there were “unacknowledged” agreements 
that Jacqueline H. testify in a certain manner.  Although bail had been reduced and 
the preliminary hearing had been delayed in Jacqueline H.’s criminal cases, 
defendant fails to establish any causal connection between these events and her 
testimony in this case.  The fact that the district attorney filed criminal charges 
against Jacqueline H. after her preliminary hearing testimony indicates that 
Jacqueline H. did not receive “unacknowledged” benefits in exchange for her trial 
testimony. 
83 
opening and closing arguments and introducing inflammatory and prejudicial 
evidence.16  However, he did not object to any of these instances at trial.  Because 
an objection could have cured any harm, the contentions are not cognizable on 
appeal.17  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 501.) 
 
Defendant argues that there was no waiver because objections would have 
been futile.  We have reviewed the comments defendant cites and find no 
pervasive misconduct indicating the futility of objecting.  (People v. Hillhouse, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 501-502; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1212-
1213.)  Many of the prosecutors’ comments were fair inferences drawn from the 
evidence.  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 700.)  Moreover, the 
prosecutors’ use of “I believe” before their argument that death was the 
appropriate penalty was not an improper injection of their personal beliefs, but 
simply a permissible “rhetorical device” to urge the jury, after weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to return a verdict of death.  (Id. at p. 
722 [“ ‘I think,’ ” preceding the argument that defendant should “ ‘have no 
                                             
 
16  
Although this claim involves both the guilt and penalty phases, we consider 
the entire claim here because the arguments are related. 
17  
In addition to the forfeited prosecutorial misconduct claims, defendant 
contends that the Secret Witness program’s payment to him for information on the 
location of the victims’ bodies constituted outrageous government conduct in 
violation of his due process rights because it provided the incentive for murder.  
Because defendant failed to raise this claim or present evidence to support it, the 
claim is forfeited.  In any event, it would fail.  Even assuming the Secret Witness 
program acted as a government agent, its conduct fell far short of government 
conduct “ ‘so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense 
of justice’ ”  (United States v. Restrepo (9th Cir. 1991) 930 F.2d 705, 712.)  There 
was no direct and continuous government involvement in the creation and 
maintenance of criminal operations.  (See United States v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 1990) 
915 F.2d 521, 525-526 [due process prevents conviction where undercover agents 
engineer and direct the criminal enterprise from start to finish].)   
84 
recourse to our sympathies,’ ” did not improperly inject prosecutor’s personal 
beliefs into the argument].)  
 
Regarding some of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, 
defendant claims defense counsel were ineffective for not objecting.  However, 
deciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will 
rarely establish ineffective assistance.  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 
502; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1223.)  As we explain, this is not one 
of those rare cases. 
 
First, defendant claims that defense counsel should have objected to the 
prosecutor’s “serial killer theme” during the opening and closing arguments in 
which the prosecutor often improperly referred to the crimes as “murders,” to the 
perpetrator as a “killer,” to the murders as part of a series of killings by the same 
person, and to defendant as a “serial killer.”  These references appear to be apt 
descriptions of the crime and the person who committed them.  (People v. 
Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 840 [use of the word “execution” was an apt 
description of the crime].)  Moreover, counsel could have reasonably concluded 
that the prosecutor’s comments, as well as his characterizations of the defense 
expert’s testimony, were fair inferences drawn from the evidence.  Thus, counsel 
cannot be faulted for failing to object.  (People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 387 
[counsel not ineffective for failing to make futile objections].) 
 
Second, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly introduced various 
statements defendant made to Landreth, the police, Dr. Curiale, and Shelley Sly, 
and that defense counsel was incompetent for failing to object to these statements 
as inflammatory and prejudicial, improperly reinforcing the prosecutor’s “serial 
killer theme.”  However, these statements were parts of interviews or 
conversations in which defendant made admissions establishing consciousness of 
guilt or made false statements as part of his attempt to evade detection and deceive 
85 
the police.  Evidence Code section 356 permits introduction of statements “on the 
‘same subject’ ” or which are necessary for the understanding of the statements 
already introduced.  (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 302.)  The isolated 
statements defendant cites were themselves either admissions or necessary to 
understand the context of defendant’s admissions, and were relevant to show a 
culpable state of mind.  Thus, counsel could reasonably have chosen not to object 
to the evidence or to the prosecutor’s reference to such evidence during argument. 
 
Third, defendant faults defense counsel for failing to object to the 
prosecutor’s comparison of defendant to Nazi leaders Adolf Eichmann (during 
closing argument at the guilt phase) and Adolf Hitler (during closing argument at 
the penalty phase).  However, the prosecutor’s reference to “one of the main 
executioners at a Nazi concentration camp,” without reference to a specific name, 
was made only to point out that multiple murderers can look like “common, 
ordinary looking” people, such as defendant.  (People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
119, 180 [prosecutor’s references to notorious murderers who committed heinous 
crimes for irrational purposes but apparently were legally sane was not 
misconduct], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 
823, fn. 1.)  Nor did the prosecutor refer to Hitler by name or compare defendant 
to Hitler.  He simply noted that the anniversary of the beginning of World War II 
fell on that day of trial and argued that defendant “waged a war on society and 
society had to struggle back,” as it did during World War II.  The prosecutor did 
not suggest that the offenses charged against defendant were as heinous as those 
committed by Eichmann or Hitler.  (Jones, supra, at p. 180.)  Counsel was not 
incompetent for failing to object.  (People v. Harpool (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 877, 
886 [counsel is not required to make futile objections or motions merely to create 
a record impregnable to assault for claimed inadequacy of counsel].) 
86 
 
Fourth, defendant claims that, during the penalty phase closing argument, 
the prosecutor improperly argued that defendant “forfeited his right to sympathy 
and redemption.”  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecutor did not tell the 
jury it could not consider sympathy, but properly argued that under the facts of the 
case, defendant does not deserve sympathy.  “Although a jury is entitled to 
consider sympathy in its penalty determination—and it would be improper to 
suggest otherwise [citation]—the jury is not required to feel sympathy for 
murderers.  The prosecution may properly argue that the particular facts do not 
warrant sympathy; the defense may properly argue the opposite.”  (People v. 
Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 840.)  Again, counsel was not incompetent for 
failing to object.   
 
Finally, contrary to defendant’s claim, the three murders were not “close” 
cases.  Rather, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming.  Any reasonable 
jury would have reached the same verdicts in the absence of the alleged instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct.  (People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214.) 
5.  Instructional Issues 
a.  Duress instruction  
 
At trial, defendant claimed that he struck Weeden with a rock under duress 
because he feared that Morris would shoot him if he did not do so.  The trial court 
instructed that “A person is not guilty of a crime when he engages in conduct, 
otherwise criminal, when acting under threats and menaces under the following 
circumstances:  [¶]  1.  Where the threats and menaces are such that they would 
cause a reasonable person to fear that his life would be in immediate danger if he 
did not engage in the conduct charged and  [¶]  2.  If such person then believed 
that his life was so endangered.”  (See CALJIC No. 4.40 (5th ed. 1988).)  The 
court also instructed that such threats are not a defense “[w]here a person commits 
87 
a crime punishable with death” and that “[a] first degree murder with a special 
circumstance is a crime punishable with death.”  (See CALJIC No. 4.41 (5th ed. 
1988).) 
 
Defendant contends that the limitation in CALJIC No. 4.41 deprived him of 
a duress defense to the Weeden murder in violation of the Eighth Amendment and 
his right to due process.  He argues that the multiple-murder special-circumstance 
allegation permitted classifying the Weeden homicide as a crime punishable by 
death under section 26 and that, had he been tried separately on that charge before 
the deaths of Berryhill and Stark, he would have been entitled to a duress defense 
without limitation.  However, duress is not a defense to any murder.  (People v. 
Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 770, 780.)  Because the instructions were unduly 
favorable to defendant, he cannot complain. 
 
Although duress cannot reduce murder to manslaughter by negating malice 
(People v. Anderson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 770, 781-784), the court nevertheless 
gave instructions that authorized the jury to consider the effect of threats on the 
mental states requisite to murder and manslaughter.  The jury was told that to 
establish that a killing is murder, the prosecution had the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the “act which caused the death was not done . . . 
in a killing punishable by death, in the honest belief in the necessity to protect 
oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, whether or not that 
belief was reasonable or unreasonable.”  It was further told that “there is no malice 
aforethought in a killing punishable by death if the killing occurred in the honest 
belief in the necessity to protect oneself against imminent peril to life or great 
bodily injury, whether or not that belief was reasonable or unreasonable” and that, 
in such instance, the offense is voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.  Again, 
because the instructions were unduly favorable to defendant, he cannot complain. 
88 
Although defendant was deprived of the complete defense of duress, he was 
permitted to use the same underlying facts to mitigate the crime.  Thus, in finding 
defendant guilty of murdering Weeden, the jury necessarily rejected defendant’s 
duress defense.  (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 86-87; People v. 
Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721, overruled on other grounds in People v. 
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 149.)   
b.  Unanimity instruction   
 
Defendant contends that the trial court was required to instruct sua sponte 
in the language of CALJIC No. 17.01 that, before finding defendant guilty of the 
murder of Weeden, the jurors had to agree unanimously on the act or acts that 
caused her death.  He claims that the instruction was mandatory because the 
evidence reflected that Weeden’s death could have resulted from either 
strangulation or being hit on the head with a rock, or from the combination of both 
injuries.  We reject that claim. 
 
The medical examiner testified that Weeden’s death was caused by 
strangulation, a blow to the head, or a combination of both injuries.  Initially, 
defendant called the Secret Witness program and told Landreth that “Bob” 
strangled Weeden with a nylon clothesline on a trail and dragged her body to the 
location where it was found.  In a later telephone call to Landreth, defendant 
repeated that information, but added that she had been hit with a rock to ensure her 
death.  Defendant later told the police that Morris strangled Weeden to death with 
a rope, that Morris dumped her body in the woods, and that he threw rocks at her 
body even though she was already dead.  Still later, defendant told the police that 
although Morris strangled Weeden, he forced defendant to strike her on the head 
with a rock.  Defendant was not sure if Weeden was dead when he struck her.  The 
prosecution’s theory was that defendant killed Weeden by strangulation or a 
89 
combination of strangulation and a blow to the head.  The defendant’s theory was 
that he did not strangle Weeden, but merely struck her with a rock under duress.   
 
A requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to acts that could have 
been charged as separate offenses.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 
1025; People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 92.)  A unanimity instruction is 
required only if the jurors could otherwise disagree which act a defendant 
committed and yet convict him of the crime charged.  (Beardslee, supra, at p. 93.)  
Here, the evidence did not reflect multiple independent acts, any of which could 
have led to Weeden’s death.  Rather, the evidence showed that the ligature 
strangulation contributed, at least in part, to her death.  The prosecution contended 
that defendant committed both acts and that Weeden’s death was caused by 
strangulation or strangulation in combination with the blow to the head.  
Defendant did not contest that Weeden’s death was caused, at least in part, by the 
strangulation.  Instead, he claimed that a man named Morris strangled her and that 
Morris forced him to throw a rock at her.  Thus, the two theories were based on a 
continuous course of conduct, whose acts were so closely connected in time as to 
form part of one transaction.  (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875, 
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-
365; People v. Dominick (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1208.)   
 
Defendant argues that a unanimity instruction was necessary because some 
jurors might have decided that defendant strangled her, while others might have 
determined that he inflicted a death blow to the head without strangling her.  
However, even if some of the jurors believed that defendant strangled Weeden, 
they would have concluded that he was the actual perpetrator.  If some jurors 
believed that defendant only threw a rock at Weeden’s head after she was already 
dead, they would have found no causation.  But if some of the jurors believed that 
defendant only threw a rock at Weeden while she was still alive, while rejecting a 
90 
duress defense, they would have concluded that he was an aider and abettor.  
Thus, defendant’s conduct as an aider and abettor or as a direct perpetrator could 
result only in one criminal act and one charge.  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 1025.)  “Under these circumstances, ‘[j]urors need not unanimously 
agree on whether the defendant is an aider and abettor or a principal even when 
different evidence and facts support such conclusion.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 1025-1026; see 
also People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 931 [two theories that defendant 
was the actual perpetrator and aider and abettor were based on a single course of 
conduct]; People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 93 [same].) 
c.  Reasonable but mistaken belief in consent   
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct, sua 
sponte, on the defense of reasonable and good faith mistake of fact regarding a 
person’s consent to sexual intercourse (CALJIC No. 10.65; People v. Mayberry 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153-158).  Our review of the record shows no substantial 
evidence to trigger a sua sponte obligation to give such an instruction.  
 
“The Mayberry defense has two components, one subjective, and one 
objective.  The subjective component asks whether the defendant honestly and in 
good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual 
intercourse.  In order to satisfy this component, a defendant must adduce evidence 
of the victim’s equivocal conduct on the basis of which he erroneously believed 
there was consent.  [¶]  In addition, the defendant must satisfy the objective 
component, which asks whether the defendant’s mistake regarding consent was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Thus, regardless of how strongly a defendant 
may subjectively believe a person has consented to sexual intercourse, that belief 
must be formed under circumstances society will tolerate as reasonable in order 
91 
for the defendant to have adduced substantial evidence giving rise to a Mayberry 
instruction.”  (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 360-361, fn. omitted.) 
 
A trial court’s duty to instruct, sua sponte, on particular defenses arises 
“ ‘only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is 
substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not 
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.’ ”  (People v. Barton (1995) 
12 Cal.4th 186, 195, citing People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716; People v. 
Rhoades (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1367; People v. Romero (1985) 171 
Cal.App.3d 1149, 1156.)  Here, defendant concedes that he did not rely at trial on 
the defense of mistake of fact.  Rather, defendant contends that the prosecution’s 
evidence supported such a defense and that the defense was consistent with his 
theory of the case.  We disagree. 
 
The prosecution’s evidence showed that Jacqueline H. agreed to 
accompany defendant only after defendant tricked her by saying that her friend 
was having a party and offering to take her there.  After defendant drove her to a 
deserted area, Jacqueline H. became scared and asked defendant to take her home.  
Defendant then placed and tightened a rope around her neck, and demanded that 
she take off her clothes.  Defendant then ordered her to lie down and raped her.  A 
defendant relying on a Mayberry defense must produce some evidence of the 
victim’s equivocal conduct that led him reasonably to believe she consented to the 
act.  (People v. Bruce (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1099, 1104; People v. Romero, 
supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 1156.)  However, here, we see no substantial evidence 
of the victim’s “equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably 
and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”  (People v. Williams, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 362.) 
 
Moreover, defendant offered no evidence showing he believed that 
Jacqueline H. had consented to sexual intercourse.  To warrant a court’s giving 
92 
CALJIC No. 10.65, the record must contain evidence, whether direct or 
circumstantial, of the defendant’s state of mind at the time the offense was 
committed.  (People v. Simmons (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 573, 581; People v. 
Rhoades, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1369.)  Defendant did not testify.  He 
presented neither circumstantial evidence of his state of mind at the time of the 
offense nor evidence that controverted the victim’s testimony regarding the 
circumstances of the offense.  Instead, defendant presented only evidence of 
Jacqueline H.’s dishonest character, drug addiction, and motive to lie.  During 
closing argument, he argued that Jacqueline H. lied about the rape and surrounding 
events, and suffered from drug-induced paranoia at the time of the offense.  
Indeed, defendant never admitted that he engaged in sex with Jacqueline H., 
consensual or otherwise.  (See People v. Gonzalez (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 786, 
793 [Mayberry instruction need not be given sua sponte if defendant does not 
testify and the “only ‘evidence’ concerning his belief was his counsel’s theory 
[mistake of fact] in closing argument”].)  Thus, an instruction on the defense of 
reasonable but mistaken belief in consent would have been inconsistent with 
defendant’s theory of the case. 
 
Accordingly, under these circumstances, the trial court had no sua sponte 
duty to instruct on the Mayberry defense.  (People v. Rhoades, supra, 193 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1369 [no sua sponte duty to give Mayberry instruction where 
“[d]efendant’s counsel never suggested he was relying on the mistake of fact 
defense, tendered no evidence to support such a defense, and did not request the 
instruction defendant now claims it was error to withhold”].) 
93 
d.  Reasonableness of fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury   
 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to 
instruct sua sponte on an “essential element of the rape charge,” that Jacqueline 
H.’s fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury had to be reasonable.   
 
We rejected a similar claim in People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633.  
There, the defendant argued that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the 
jury as to the requisite force or fear as necessary elements of the crime of robbery.  
We responded as follows: “[Defendant] does not, however, challenge the content 
of the robbery instructions given, nor did he request any additional instructions at 
the trial.  [¶]  Defendant’s contention essentially is that the instructions given 
needed amplification or explanation; but since he did not request such 
amplification or explanation, error cannot now be predicated upon the trial court’s 
failure to give them on its own motion.”  (Id. at p. 639.) 
 
Similarly, here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the general 
principles of law governing the rape charge.  In giving CALJIC No. 10.00 (5th ed. 
1988), the trial court instructed on the specific elements of rape, including the 
requirement that the act of sexual intercourse “was accomplished by means of 
force, violence, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.”18  Since the 
instruction given did not omit or withdraw an element from the jury’s 
determination, defendant was required to request an additional or clarifying 
instruction if he believed that the instruction was incomplete or needed 
                                             
 
18  
The trial court read to the jury the fifth edition of CALJIC No. 10.00 
(1988), which did not include amplifying language regarding the reasonableness 
of the victim’s fear.  CALJIC No. 10.00 (6th ed. 1996) now adds:  “[The fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury must be actual and reasonable under the 
circumstances [, or if unreasonable, the perpetrator must have known of the 
victim’s fear and taken advantage of it].]” 
94 
elaboration.  (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 669; People v. Bell (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 502, 550.)  This he failed to do. 
 
Moreover, the failure to give a clarifying instruction could not have 
affected the outcome.  Given Jacqueline H.’s testimony that she was alone and 
“scared to death” when defendant tightened the rope around her neck and forced 
her to disrobe and lie down, it is inconceivable that the jury would have 
determined that Jacqueline H.’s fear, before and during the sexual assault, was 
unreasonable.  In addition, the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that 
the rape was accomplished by the other alternative means of force and  violence.19  
e.  Variance between information and rape instruction  
 
The amended information charged defendant with “FORCIBLE RAPE, in 
violation of Section 261(2) of the Penal Code, a felony” and alleged that he 
committed the willful and unlawful act of sexual intercourse “by means of force 
and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.”  The jury was instructed that it 
could find defendant guilty of rape by determining that he had accomplished the 
act of sexual intercourse “by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury.”  Defendant claims that his Sixth Amendment right to 
                                             
 
19  
Defendant argues that the jury could have believed part of her testimony, 
that she became afraid that defendant was going to kill her during the motorcycle 
ride to the Happy Valley area, but disbelieved that defendant forced her, with a 
rope tied around her neck, to submit to sexual intercourse.  If so, it could have 
further determined that the fear of being killed during the motorcycle ride was 
unreasonable and was the sole reason Jacqueline H. submitted to sexual 
intercourse.  Aside from being speculative, defendant’s argument ignores the 
defense theory of the case at trial.  Defense counsel argued that Jacqueline H. may 
have experienced drug-induced paranoia causing her to “see things different than 
reality” and think “that she’s being raped.”  Counsel never conceded that an act of 
sexual intercourse ever took place between defendant and Jacqueline H.    
95 
notice and his right to due process were violated because the jury might have 
convicted him of an uncharged offense, rape by means of violence.  We disagree.   
 
First, defendant has forfeited his right to object to an alleged variance 
between the pleading and the proof by failing to raise the objection in the trial 
court.  (People v. Blankenship (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 60, 66, disapproved on 
other grounds in People v. Collins (1960) 54 Cal.2d 57, 60.)   
 
Second, contrary to defendant’s assertion, rape by means of violence is not 
a different offense from rape by means of force or fear; these terms merely 
describe different circumstances under which an act of intercourse may constitute 
the crime of rape.  (See People v. Collins, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 59.) 
 
Third, defendant has failed to show or even assert that he was prejudiced by 
the variance.  (People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 828, 830.)  “The test of the 
materiality of variance in an information is whether the pleading so fully and 
correctly informs a defendant of the offense with which he is charged that, taking 
into account the proof which is introduced against him, he is not misled in making 
his defense.”  (People v. Guerrero (1943) 22 Cal.2d 183, 187.)  Here, the 
information charged defendant with forcible rape, in violation of former section 
261, subdivision (2).  That section defined rape in 1987 as “an act of sexual 
intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator . . . 
[w]here it is accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, or 
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.”  (As 
amended by Stats. 1986, ch. 1299, § 1, p. 4592.)  Thus, defendant was put on 
notice by the information that he was being charged with an offense that could be 
accomplished “by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury.”  Moreover, Jacqueline H.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing 
gave defendant notice of the particular circumstances of the offense, i.e., that her 
96 
testimony could support a finding of rape by means of violence, as well as by 
means of force or fear.  (Thomas, supra, at pp. 829-830.) 
 
Finally, the variance was not of such a substantial character as to have 
misled defendant in preparing his defense.  (People v. Collins, supra, 54 Cal.2d at 
p. 60.)  Here, in finding defendant guilty of rape, the jury found Jacqueline H.’s 
testimony credible.  That evidence equally supported findings of rape by means of 
force, violence, or fear.  It is inconceivable that the jury would have found 
defendant guilty of rape by means of violence, but not by means of force or fear.  
Under these circumstances, the variance was immaterial. 
f.  Reasonable doubt issues  
 
Without objection, the trial court gave the standard instructions on (1) 
circumstantial evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.01 [sufficiency of circumstantial 
evidence–generally], 2.02  [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove 
specific intent], 8.83 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove the special 
circumstance], and 8.83.1 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove mental 
state]); (2) the credibility and weight of the evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2 
[witness willfully false] and 2.22 [weighing conflicting testimony]); and (3) the 
definition of reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.90).  Defendant claims that those 
instructions given, singly and collectively, impermissibly diluted the reasonable 
doubt standard.   
 
Regarding the instructions on circumstantial evidence, we have repeatedly 
rejected defendant’s argument.  Those instructions, which refer to an interpretation 
of the evidence that “appears to you to be reasonable” and are read in conjunction 
with other instructions, do not dilute the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 346-347; People v. 
97 
Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 678-679; People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 
347-348.) 
 
Regarding CALJIC No. 2.21.2, defendant argues that it lowers the standard 
of proof for conviction by permitting the jury to assess the testimony of 
prosecution witnesses under a “probability of truth” standard.20  We have rejected 
a similar claim that the instruction, as applied to the defendant’s testimony, 
increases the burden of proof from raising a reasonable doubt to meeting a 
“probability of truth.”  (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 94.)  “The 
qualification attacked by defendant as shifting the burden of proof (‘unless from 
all the evidence you shall believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in 
other particulars’) is merely a statement of the obvious—that the jury should 
refrain from rejecting the whole of a witness’s testimony if it believes that the 
probability of truth favors any part of it.  [¶]  Thus CALJIC No. 2.21 does nothing 
more than explain to a jury one of the tests they may use in resolving a credibility 
dispute.”  (Beardslee, supra, at p. 95.)  Although defendant here attacks the 
instruction as applied to prosecution witnesses, the same rationale applies.  
(People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1502-1503; People v. Wade (1995) 
39 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493-1494; People v. Foster (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 766, 
772-776.)  When CALJIC No. 2.21.2 is considered in context with CALJIC Nos. 
1.01 (consider instructions as a whole) and 2.90 (burden of proof), “the jury was 
adequately told to apply CALJIC No. 2.21.2 ‘only as part of the process of 
determining whether the prosecution had met its fundamental burden of proving 
                                             
 
20  
CALJIC No. 2.21.2 provides:  “A witness, who is willfully false in one 
material part of his or her testimony, is to be distrusted in others.  You may reject 
the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material 
point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his 
or her testimony in other particulars.” 
98 
[defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’  [Citation.]” (Foster, supra, at p. 
775.) 
 
Regarding CALJIC No. 2.22, defendant argues that it impermissibly dilutes 
the reasonable doubt standard because it allows the jury to resolve conflicting 
testimony by weighing “the convincing force of the evidence.”21  Again, when this 
instruction is considered with CALJIC Nos. 1.01 and 2.90, “ ‘[I]t is apparent that 
the jury was instructed to weigh the relative convincing force of the evidence 
(CALJIC No. 2.22) only as part of the process of determining whether the 
prosecution had met its fundamental burden of proving [defendant’s] guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt . . . .’ ”  (People v. Clay (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 433, 461-462; 
People v. Salas (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 151, 157.) 
 
Finally, with respect to former CALJIC No. 2.90, we have repeatedly held 
that the phrases “depending on moral evidence” and “to a moral certainty” 
correctly define reasonable doubt.  (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 203; 
People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 385-386.)  Because the instruction, 
individually, correctly defines reasonable doubt, we reject defendant’s claim that 
this instruction, when considered together with the other complained-of 
instructions, was improper.  (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 678-679.) 
                                             
 
21  
CALJIC No. 2.22 provides: “You are not bound to decide an issue of fact in 
accordance with the testimony of a number of witnesses, which does not convince 
you, as against the testimony of a lesser number or other evidence, which appeals 
to your mind with more convincing force.  You may not disregard the testimony of 
the greater number of witnesses merely from caprice, whim or prejudice, or from a 
desire to favor one side against the other.  You must not decide an issue by the 
simple process of counting the number of witnesses [who have testified on the 
opposing sides].  The final test is not in the [relative] number of witnesses, but in 
the convincing force of the evidence.” 
 
99 
g.  Alleged Carlos error  
 
In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, we incorrectly held that 
intent to kill was a necessary element of the felony-murder special circumstance, 
and in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, we extended the Carlos holding to 
the multiple-murder special circumstance.  In People v. Anderson (1987) 43 
Cal.3d 1104, 1149, we overruled both Carlos and Turner, dispensing with the 
requirement of an intent to kill by the actual killer.  Because the murders here 
occurred during the “window period” between Turner and Anderson, the intent to 
kill requirement of Turner applies to the multiple-murder special circumstance 
charged in connection with those murders.  (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 
45.)   
 
In accordance with Turner, the trial court instructed on the multiple-murder 
special-circumstance allegation as follows: 
 
“To find the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as 
multiple murder convictions, is true, it must be proved: 
 
“1.  The defendant has in this case been convicted of at least one crime of 
murder of the first degree and one or more crimes of murder of the first or second 
degree. 
 
“2.  That the defendant intended to kill a human being or intended to aid 
another in the killing of a human being in one first degree murder of which you 
have found him guilty and in at least one other murder of which you have found 
him guilty.”  (Italics added; see CALJIC No. 8.81.3.) 
 
Regarding the above instruction, defendant does not claim that the trial 
court incorrectly instructed on the intent requirement for the actual killer.  Rather, 
he contends that the court erroneously instructed on the intent requirement with 
respect to aider-and-abettor liability.  He argues that the instruction did not 
necessarily require the jury to find that the aider and abettor intended to kill, 
100 
because one may intend to aid another who happens to kill someone but not intend 
to kill that person.  However, based on the instructions given and the evidence 
presented, we conclude that, if the jury predicated murder liability on an aiding 
and abetting theory, it necessarily found that defendant intended to kill.   
 
Of all three murders, the evidence supported an aiding and abetting theory 
only on the Weeden murder count.  That evidence consisted solely of defendant’s 
extrajudicial statements to the police that he happened to come upon Morris as he 
was strangling Weeden.  Initially, defendant stated that he believed Weeden was 
dead after Morris strangled and dropped her, but later stated that he was not sure if 
she was dead at that time.  He also related that Morris forced him at gunpoint to 
strike Weeden on the head with a rock so no one would know how she died. 
 
On the remaining murder counts, there was no evidence that defendant 
aided and abetted another in the killings of Berryhill or Stark.  Based on the 
evidence, the jury could only find defendant guilty of murder as the actual killer of 
those victims.  Yet the jury was properly instructed that the actual killer must have 
intended to kill a human being as an element of the multiple-murder special 
circumstance.  Thus, if the jury predicated its multiple-murder special-
circumstance finding on the Berryhill or Stark murder conviction, it was correctly 
instructed that intent to kill was an element.  Indeed, as defendant concedes, the 
jury expressly found that the first degree murder of Berryhill was “perpetrated by 
a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” and thus necessarily determined that 
defendant intended to kill Berryhill.  Because the multiple-murder special-
circumstance finding required the jury to have found at least two intentional 
killings and we are not sure which two murder convictions the jury used to support 
that finding, we examine whether the jury could have determined that defendant 
intended to aid and abet Morris in the killing of Weeden without intending to kill 
her, as defendant asserts.  
101 
 
The jury was instructed, in the language of CALJIC No. 3.00,  that “The 
persons concerned in the commission of a crime who are regarded by law as 
principals in the crime thus committed and equally guilty thereof include:  [¶]  
1.  Those who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime, or  [¶]  
2.  Those who aid and abet the commission of the crime.”  The trial court further 
instructed, in the language of CALJIC No. 3.01, that “A person aids and abets the 
commission of a crime when he (1) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the 
perpetrator and (2) with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or 
facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or advice aids, promotes, 
encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”  The challenged instruction 
told the jury that a multiple-murder special-circumstance finding required that 
defendant “intended to kill a human being or intended to aid another in the killing 
of a human being.”  But in the context of all of the instructions given, the jury was 
also told that to find aider and abettor liability, it must find both that defendant 
intended to commit the “aiding” act of killing Weeden and that he did so with 
knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose, i.e., to kill her.  (People v. 
Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1242.) 
 
Moreover, there was no evidence to support a finding that defendant aided 
Morris in killing Weeden without knowing that Morris intended to kill her.  
According to defendant’s story to the police, Morris forced defendant to strike 
Weeden on the head with a rock to mask the cause of death.  Thus, if the jury 
believed defendant and found that he intentionally aided and abetted the actual 
killer, as required by the challenged instruction, it necessarily found, under the 
instructions and evidence given, that he knew he was aiding in an intentional 
killing.  The jury could not have found that defendant “aided” the killing only 
accidentally or unintentionally.  (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 192-193; 
People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 790-791.)  On the other hand, if the jury 
102 
found defendant was the actual killer of Weeden, it was properly instructed on 
intent to kill.  Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the jury 
necessarily found defendant intended to kill in at least two of the murders.  
(People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 852; Hardy, supra, at pp. 192-193.)   
 
Even if error had occurred, it was harmless.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 6 
Cal.4th at pp. 44-46.)  Given defendant’s admissions, his many inconsistent 
statements, and his attempts to capitalize financially from the killings, 
overwhelming evidence existed of his intent to kill all his victims. 
D.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence  
 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of the 
polygraph result regarding Weeden’s death violated his right, under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, to have relevant mitigating evidence presented to the 
jury.   
 
At trial, defendant argued that evidence that he “passed” the polygraph test 
regarding Weeden’s death was admissible as a factor in mitigation and to establish 
lingering doubt.  The trial court denied the request to admit the evidence, relying 
on Evidence Code sections 351.1 and 352.  It found that any “possible probative 
value” of the polygraph evidence was outweighed by its “doubtful reliability” and 
the fact that its admission would be “potentially cumbersome and time-
consuming.”   
 
The Attorney General argues that “the unambiguous language of Evidence 
Code section 351.1, subdivision (a), prohibits the admission of the polygraph 
results in the present case.”  He asserts that United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 
U.S. at pages 309-316, disposes of defendant’s claim.  Relying on Paxton v. Ward 
(10th Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 1197, defendant responds that a state court’s rule of 
103 
evidence may not be mechanically applied to infringe on a defendant’s rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to present mitigating evidence in a 
capital case.  (Paxton, supra, at p. 1214; but cf. Goins v. Angelone (4th Cir. 2000) 
226 F.3d 312, 326, fn.7 [“ ‘[U]nder current controlling precedent, the Constitution 
does not mandate admission of polygraph results in capital sentencing 
proceedings’ ”].)  Paxton ruled that Scheffer is distinguishable because it did not 
involve a capital defendant’s constitutional right to present mitigating evidence.  
(Paxton, supra, at p. 1215.)  Unlike Paxton, here the trial court did not deny 
admission of the polygraph results based on a mechanical application of Evidence 
Code section 351.1.  Rather, the court exercised its discretion under Evidence 
Code section 352, finding that any “possible probative value” of the polygraph 
evidence was outweighed by its “doubtful reliability.” 
 
If Evidence Code section 351.1 permits a defendant to make a Kelly/Frye 
showing (see ante, at p. 77), as in the guilt phase, defendant failed to present an 
offer of proof that polygraph evidence was generally accepted in the scientific 
community.  Because such an offer of proof is necessary to preserve the issue for 
appeal, defendant cannot assign error in the trial court’s ruling.  (People v. Fudge, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1122; see also People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 
870.)  Without the threshold showing of reliability, polygraph evidence is not 
“highly relevant” to the question of proper punishment.  (Fudge, supra, at pp. 
1122-1123 [polygraph evidence was not “highly relevant” mitigating evidence 
demonstrating good character or supporting a lingering doubt of guilt].)  In 
addition, defendant failed to show that the particular polygraph test results being 
proffered were reliable.  Unlike this case, in Paxton, the reliability of the excluded 
polygraph evidence in that individual case was demonstrated by the fact that the 
state relied on it in dismissing an earlier charge against defendant.  (Paxton v. 
Ward, supra, 199 F.3d at p. 1214.)   
104 
 
Defendant claims that the polygraph evidence was relevant mitigating 
evidence on the issue of relative culpability.  He argues that some jurors, at the 
guilt phase, could have based their first degree murder verdict on the finding that 
defendant did not kill Weeden, but only aided and abetted Morris in the 
commission of felony robbery during which Weeden was killed.  Thus, he argues, 
the polygraph test results showing that defendant did not kill Weeden would 
support his lack of culpability.  However, there was no evidence that defendant 
aided and abetted Morris in the commission of a robbery, but only evidence that 
he aided and abetted Morris in the commission of murder, i.e., defendant’s 
extrajudicial statement that Morris forced him to throw a rock at Weeden.  
Although there was evidence that Morris took Weeden’s truck, there was no 
substantial evidence that Weeden’s killing was committed to take her truck.  Thus, 
exclusion of the polygraph test results was not “highly relevant” to the question of 
proper punishment. 
2.  Denial of Mistrial Motion   
 
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant his motion for a mistrial after the jury foreman was replaced with an 
alternate juror during the penalty phase.  On appeal, we review the trial court’s 
denial of a motion for mistrial under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  
(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 756.)  The decision whether to 
investigate possible juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct, as well as the 
ultimate decision whether to retain or discharge a juror, rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1351.)  If 
any substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, 
the court’s action will be upheld on appeal.  (Ibid.)  Here, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
105 
 
On Thursday afternoon, August 24, 1989, the jury returned its guilt phase 
verdicts and special circumstance findings.  On the following day, the jury 
foreman, Jimmie K., informed the clerk that he had concerns about the trial.  On 
Tuesday, August 29, the trial court questioned Jimmie K. about his concerns.  The 
foreman related that after the proceedings had been adjourned on Thursday 
afternoon following the guilt phase verdicts, he overheard a female bartender 
telling someone that she knew defendant.  When Jimmie K. asked how she knew 
defendant, the bartender responded that defendant had choked and attempted to 
rape her in 1984 or 1985.  The trial court granted defendant’s challenge of the 
foreman.  Jimmie K. then informed the court that another juror, Annette S., was 
present during part of his conversation with the bartender.  Because he left without 
discussing the conversation with Annette S., he did not know if she overheard it.  
Jimmie K. assured the court that he had not discussed the bartender incident with 
any of the other jurors, including Juror Annette S.   
 
On Wednesday, August 30, 1989, defendant moved for a mistrial on the 
penalty phase, which the trial court denied.  Later that day, the court examined 
Juror Annette S.  The juror informed the court that she overheard the bartender say 
that she had a “run-in” with defendant and that “he was supposed to have choked 
her.”  When asked how that discussion affected her, Annette S. replied, “I don’t 
know.  You can’t believe everything you hear.”  Defendant challenged Annette S.  
The prosecutor opposed the challenge and proposed that the court inform her that 
the prosecution investigated what the bartender had related and determined it was 
not true.  When the juror returned to the courtroom, the court told Annette S. that 
the prosecution determined that defendant was not the person that the bartender 
had been talking about.  Annette S. assured the court that she accepted the fact that 
defendant had not been involved in that incident and could disregard the 
106 
information she overheard.  The court admonished Annette S. not to discuss the 
bartender incident with any of the other jurors.   
 
On the following day, the trial court deferred ruling on the defense 
challenge of Annette S.  After the parties had rested, but before the penalty phase 
deliberations, the defense renewed the challenge to Annette S.  The court granted 
the motion and replaced Annette S. with an alternate juror.   
 
Defendant now argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial 
because Jurors Jimmie K. and Annette S. might have spoken to the other jurors 
about the bartender’s statement that defendant choked and attempted to rape her.  
Defendant argues that Jimmie K. told the court that he had discussed “this matter” 
in superficial ways with the other jurors and that “this matter” was a reference to 
the bartender’s statement.22  The People respond that defendant misreads the 
record and points out that, after the guilt phase verdict, the trial court adjourned 
the proceedings and the jury did not return to court for the penalty phase until 
Thursday, August 31, 1989.  Because the bartender’s remark occurred after the 
guilt phase verdicts and adjournment and the jury did not return to court until after 
the court had questioned Jimmie K. on August 29, the juror’s reference to this 
matter must have been to the guilt phase portion of trial, which had just been 
completed before the jurors’ separation on August 24.  For the same reasons, the 
People state that Juror Annette S. could not have spoken to the other jurors about 
                                             
 
22  
Defendant relies on the juror’s response during the following exchange: 
 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Q.  Mr. [K.], did you find occasion to discuss 
this case with any other juror prior to the deliberations? 
 
“A.  No, sir. 
 
“Q.  And how about after the verdict, did you discuss this matter with any 
juror after the verdict? 
 
“A.  No, sir.  In other than superficial ways, no; going down the stairs, 
because we all separated there.”  (Emphasis added.)  
107 
the outside information because the court questioned her on August 30, a day 
before the jury returned to court.   
 
In his reply brief, defendant concedes that the People’s chronology is 
correct and that the evidence reflects that the two jurors could not have related the 
bartender’s statements to the other jurors in the courthouse.  Nevertheless, he 
maintains that the trial court’s failure to ask Annette S. if she had already spoken 
to other jurors about the outside information and to make similar inquiries of the 
remaining jurors was prejudicial error.  He argues that since Jimmie K. and 
Annette S. socialized at the bar, they may have socialized and spoken with the 
other jurors outside of court about the incident.  In light of the record, this 
argument is speculative.   
 
Second, defendant complains that, because the 10 remaining original jurors 
had already found him guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and were 
so “entrenched” in their views of guilt, the two replacement jurors could not freely 
deliberate and express opposing views of the evidence.  We fail to see how that 
argument supports his claim that the substitution of two jurors denied him a fair 
and impartial jury.  Indeed, if his premise is true, that the 10 guilt phase jurors 
could not fairly and impartially deliberate as to the appropriate penalty, defendant 
would be better off with two replacement jurors who were not so “entrenched” in 
their views. 
 
Third, defendant contends that the 10 remaining original jurors, who had 
found defendant guilty of the charged offenses, could not possibly have 
disregarded past guilt phase deliberations and begun deliberations anew as related 
to the issue of lingering doubt.  In light of the instructions given, that argument is 
simply speculative.  Because deliberations on the guilt phase of trial were 
complete and verdicts of guilt had been returned, the jury was instructed that “you 
are not required to again render verdicts as to the guilt or innocence of the 
108 
defendant nor truth of the special allegations.  Those verdicts have already been 
rendered in the guilt portion of the trial.”  However, as to the deliberations relevant 
in determining penalty, the jury was instructed that “The People and the defendant 
have the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the 12 jurors who 
return the verdict.  This right may be assured only if you begin your deliberations 
again from the beginning.  You must, therefore, set aside and disregard all past 
deliberations and begin deliberating anew.  This means that each remaining 
original juror must set aside and disregard the earlier deliberations as if they had 
not taken place.”  The jurors were further told that they were to consider the 
“circumstances of the crimes of which defendant was convicted” and “all of the 
evidence which has been received during any part of the trial.”  As to lingering 
doubt, the jurors were instructed that “[t]o the extent that you have any lingering 
or residual doubts as to the defendant’s guilt of the crimes of which he has been 
convicted in this case, or the existence of any circumstances found to be true in 
this case, you may consider such lingering or residual doubts as the basis for 
determining that life imprisonment without possibility of parole is the appropriate 
penalty.”   
 
Thus, “the instructions made clear not only that lingering doubts as to guilt 
could be considered in mitigation, but also that the penalty phase jury was to 
deliberate on this question as an integrated whole, to set aside any previous 
discussion on the question, and to review in its common deliberations any relevant 
guilt phase evidence.”  (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 67.)  In other 
contexts, we have rejected defendant’s underlying premise that jurors, who had 
previously returned guilty verdicts in the guilt phase of trial, could no longer be 
impartial.  (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1354-1355; People v. 
Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1029.)  If we were to accept defendant’s 
argument, substitution of jurors at the penalty phase could never occur under any 
109 
circumstances, resulting in automatic mistrials.  We decline to do so because, as in 
this case, “unforeseen circumstances may require substitution of a juror at the 
penalty phase of a capital trial, even though the alternate did not take part in the 
guilt phase deliberations.”  (People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 351, fn. 9.) 
 
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. 
3.  Factor (a) Instruction  
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in instructing the penalty phase jury 
that before considering section 190.3, factor (a) (circumstances of the crime), as a 
circumstance in aggravation, each “juror must be satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant, in fact, committed such charged crime or crimes.”  
(Italics added.)  He argues the instruction precluded full participation in penalty 
deliberations by any substitute juror who did not participate in the guilt verdict 
because that juror might have had a doubt about defendant’s guilt.  The claim fails.   
 
The trial instructions specifically directed each juror to “decide the matter 
for yourself after a careful discussion of the evidence and the instructions with the 
other members of the jury.”  The jury was also informed that “[t]he People and the 
defendant have the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the 12 
jurors who return the verdict.”  (Italics added.)  Viewed as a whole, there is no 
reasonable likelihood the jury misconstrued or misapplied  the instructions, and 
therefore no federal constitutional violation occurred.  (See People v. Barnett, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1161; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 833; 
People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th  394, 417.)  
 
Even assuming error, prejudice to defendant is not identified, or apparent, 
from an instruction that would allow a substitute juror to believe he or she was not 
bound by the jury’s guilt verdict in determining the ultimate penalty.  The jury in 
110 
this case unanimously returned a verdict in favor of death.  It is unimaginable that 
a penalty phase juror who entertained a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt 
would favor death over life imprisonment, or that the challenged instruction could 
somehow have increased the likelihood of a death verdict.  Under any standard of 
harmless error, no prejudice is discernable. 
4.  District Attorney’s Discretion to Charge Capital Punishment  
 
Defendant contends the judgment should be reversed because the district 
attorney improperly exercised his discretion to seek the death penalty against 
defendant for reasons contaminated by bias and conflict of interest arising from 
the district attorney’s personal and emotional involvement in the case, and 
“motivated purely by his own self-interest.”   The available remedy, which 
defendant did not seek below, is provided under section 1424, governing motions 
to disqualify the prosecuting attorney for conflict of interest or other evidence of 
overriding bias.  (See People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 123.)23  Defendant’s 
failure to move to disqualify the district attorney in the trial court bars appellate 
review of  the claim.   
 
 We also observe that the district attorney has broad prosecutorial discretion 
in deciding whether to seek the death penalty.  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
                                             
 
23  
Section 1424 provides that a motion to disqualify a district attorney “may 
not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that 
would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.”  Section 
1424 establishes “a two-part test:  (i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the 
conflict so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?  Thus, while a 
‘conflict’ exists whenever there is a ‘reasonable possibility that the DA’s office 
may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner,’ the conflict 
is disabling only if it is ‘so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will 
receive fair treatment.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 
594, fn. omitted; see also People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 123.)  
111 
1230, 1269; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078.)  Absent proof of 
invidious discrimination (see People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 971; 
Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 300) or vindictive prosecution 
because of a defendant’s exercise of his legal rights (In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 
865, 874-877), neither of which defendant alleges in this case, “as a general matter 
a defendant who has been duly convicted of a capital crime under a constitutional 
death penalty statute may not be heard to complain on appeal of the prosecutor’s 
exercise of discretion in charging him with special circumstances and seeking the 
death penalty.”  (People v. Lucas (1995 ) 12 Cal.4th 415, 477.)  “[T]o the extent 
defendant is claiming a violation of due process in the charging decision, 
defendant did not make a motion to dismiss or to strike the special circumstances 
on this basis, and should not be permitted to raise the matter for the first time here.  
(People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 827 [claim of vindictive prosecution 
not preserved for appeal unless it was a basis for motion to dismiss in trial 
court].)”  (Lucas, supra, at p. 477.) 
5.  Constitutionality of the Death Penalty24   
 
Defendant challenges the sentencing scheme under California’s 1978 death 
penalty law for reasons previously rejected by this court in other cases.  He raises 
no basis for reconsideration of those rulings. 
 
Specifically, a jury’s finding of aggravation based on the circumstances of a 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a), does not impermissibly permit consideration 
of a factor that is vague and overbroad, or allow guilt phase crimes to be counted 
more than once as aggravating factors, thereby unfairly weighting sentencing 
                                             
 
24  
Defendant does not raise Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [122 S.Ct. 
2428]. 
112 
deliberations in favor of death.  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 404-
405; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1179; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 156.)  In itself, introduction of evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
activity under section 190.3, factor (b), does not offend the federal Constitution.  
(People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 863; People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 457, 478.)  Application of the words “extreme” and “substantial” in 
section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), does not impermissibly limit consideration of 
mitigating factors in violation of the federal Constitution.  (People v. Barnett, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 
276; People v. Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1227-1228.)  Because the jury was 
instructed on miscellaneous sympathy evidence under section 190.3, factor (k), 
“[t]he temporal language in section 190.3, factors (d) and (h) (consideration of any 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance or impairment from mental disease or 
defect or the effects of intoxication at the time of the offense ), [does] not preclude 
the jury from considering any such evidence merely because it did not relate 
specifically to defendant’s culpability for the crimes committed.”  (People v. 
Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, fn. 33.) 
 
Even when requested, there is no error in the trial court’s failure to delete as 
inapplicable mitigating factors (e) (whether victim participated in crime) and (f) 
(moral justification for crime) of section 190.3 from the standard statutory 
instructions, if the jury, as in this case, was properly instructed to consider and be 
guided by all the factors “ ‘if applicable,’ ” since “we assume the jury properly 
followed the instruction and concluded that mitigating factors not supported by 
evidence were simply not ‘applicable.’ ”  (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 
79; see also People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1027; People v. Turner, supra, 
113 
8 Cal.4th at pp. 207-208.)25  No rule of constitutional law requires that aggravating 
factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that aggravating factors must 
outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Koontz, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 1095; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1178; People v. 
Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 684.)  The burden of proof for mitigating and 
aggravating factors need not be specified, except for “other crimes” evidence.  
(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 417-418; People v. Samayoa, supra, 
15 Cal.4th at pp. 852-853, 862.)  Sentencing instructions are not unduly vague 
because they fail to identify which factors are aggravating and which are 
mitigating, or to explain to the jury how to treat any inapplicable factors.  (People 
v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 207-208.)   Because the appropriate penalty is 
not presumed and is a question for each individual juror, no presumption exists in 
favor of life or death in determining penalty in a capital case.  (Samayoa, supra, at 
pp. 852-853; see also Holt, supra, at p. 684 [“capital sentencing is a moral and 
normative process”].) 
 
The trial court is not required to give an instruction that the meaning of 
“life without possibility of parole” actually means life in prison without possibility 
of parole, since such an instruction would be inaccurate.  (People v. Arias, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at pp. 172-173; see also People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 903; 
People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190.)  Jury unanimity is not required 
on aggravating circumstances, which are not elements of an offense.  (People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782;  People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 268; 
                                             
 
25  
Defendant appears to characterize factors (e) and (f) of section 190.3 as 
potentially applicable in aggravation.  Those factors, however, have been 
consistently and correctly viewed only as mitigating.  (See People v. Marshall, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 856-857.) 
114 
People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 147, judg. vacated and cause 
remanded (1992) 506 U.S. 802.)  Written findings and reasons for the jury’s death 
verdict are not constitutionally required.  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 405; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1078; People v. Turner, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at p. 209; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 178-180.)  Finally, 
defendant’s claim that this court’s appellate review process is impermissibly 
influenced by political considerations is rejected for the reasons explained in 
recent cases addressing the same claim.  (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 
1140-1141; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 406.)    
6.  Disproportionate Punishment  
 
Defendant asserts that his death judgment for murdering three people 
should be set aside because it is disproportionate to his personal culpability.  The 
claim rests in part on the contention that he murdered his victims because the 
government provided him with reward money for turning in their bodies, thereby 
effectively making the government the instigator.  He also relies on the mitigating 
evidence presented to the jury during the penalty phase relating to his family 
background, mental condition, and marijuana abuse.  Although we decline to 
conduct an intercase proportionality review (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 1029; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 476), we do undertake an 
intracase review to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to 
defendant’s personal culpability.   
 
That process requires us to “examine the circumstances of the offense, 
including its motive, the extent of the defendant’s involvement in the crime, the 
manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of the 
defendant’s acts. The court must also consider the personal characteristics of the 
defendant, including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities.  [Citation.]  If 
115 
the court concludes that the penalty imposed is ‘grossly disproportionate to the 
defendant’s individual culpability’ [citation], or, stated another way, that the 
punishment ‘ “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 
dignity’ ” ’ [citation], the court must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional.”  
(People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1078.)  
 
Even assuming the validity of defendant’s contention that the government 
bears responsibility for what he did because it enabled him to make money 
murdering people (a contention we find dubious), intracase proportionality review 
examines “ ‘ “whether [a] defendant’s death sentence is proportionate to his 
individual culpability, irrespective of the punishment imposed on others.”  
[Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 961, overruled on other 
grounds in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1; People v. Hill (1992) 
3 Cal.4th 959, 1014, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)  The guilt or culpability of codefendants or third 
parties does not affect that analysis.  (Hill, supra, at p. 1014; see also People v. 
Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1223; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 476.) 
 
Here, defendant’s sentence is not disproportionate to his personal 
culpability, even if he was not the most heinous murderer or his crime the most 
abominable.  (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 406; People v. 
Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 962;  People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 
938.)  Defendant brutally murdered three people, in part, to collect money.  On 
this record, the sentence of death is not disproportionate to defendant’s personal 
responsibility and moral guilt.  (See Marshall, supra, at p. 938.)  
7.  Effect of Delay Between Sentence and Execution; Constitutionality 
of Lethal Injection  
 
Defendant argues that his sentence must be vacated because of (1) 
unconstitutional delay in the length of time his automatic appeal has been pending, 
116 
and (2) the method used in carrying out the death sentence (lethal injection).  
These claims have been raised and rejected in other capital cases.  (People v. 
Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1096; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 462-
463.)  No reason appears for revisiting those decisions. 
8.  Other Challenges to Penalty Phase Instructions   
 
Defendant claims error in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury sua 
sponte on the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard26 for “other crimes” that were 
not directly alleged under section 190.3, factor (b), but implicitly raised as 
aggravating circumstances by the prosecution.  Defendant points to the 
prosecution’s closing argument asking the jury to base its penalty decision on the 
evidence presented in both the guilt and the penalty phases.  The prosecution also 
characterized defendant as a serial killer and inferentially referred to Adolf Hitler 
and Adolf Eichmann.  Defendant contends that the result may have been that the 
jury considered section 190.3, factor (b), aggravation from defendant’s various 
statements, reported in the guilt phase, suggesting he committed more than the 
three killings for which he was charged and convicted.   
                                             
 
26  
CALJIC No. 8.87, which defendant asserts should have been given, 
instructs the jury as follow:  “Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of 
showing that the defendant has committed the following criminal [act[s]] 
[activity]: []which involved [the express or implied use of force or violence] [or] 
[the threat of force or violence].  Before a juror may consider any criminal [act[s]] 
[activity] as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [] did in fact commit such criminal  
[act[s]] [activity].  A juror may not consider any evidence of any other criminal  
[act[s]] [activity] as an aggravating circumstance.  [¶]  It is not necessary for all 
jurors to agree.  If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity as a fact in 
aggravation.  If a juror is not so convinced, that juror must not consider that 
evidence for any purpose.”   
117 
 
The claim fails.  First, in the absence of a request, the trial court is under no 
duty to give an instruction at the penalty phase regarding evidence received at the 
guilt phase.  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 588; People v. Lang 
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1039.)  Even when section 190.3, factor (b), criminal 
activity is expressly alleged, which was not the case here, “the rule absolving the 
court of a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of crimes introduced under 
[section 190.3,] factor (b) ‘ “is based in part on a recognition that, as [a] tactical 
matter, the defendant ‘may not want the penalty phase instructions . . . [to] lead the 
jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of 
whether he should live or die.’  [Citations.]” ’ ”  (Anderson, supra, at p. 588.)  If a 
trial court need not instruct a jury sua sponte as to the elements of alleged other 
crimes, given the possible undue emphasis, which the defense may fear the jury 
will place on them (People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 963-964), a trial 
court is obviously under no sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury on the 
prosecution’s burden of proving other crimes that are not clearly introduced under 
section 190.3, factor (b).  (See People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1040; People 
v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1121-1122; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 
341; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1147.)  
 
Second, even assuming the prosecution’s closing argument could be 
deemed to invite jury consideration of unalleged “other crimes” evidence, 
something we do not accept, the jury was expressly directed under CALJIC No. 
8.86, relating to defendant’s prior felony conviction for receiving stolen property, 
that it “may not consider any evidence of any other crime as an aggravating 
circumstance except as otherwise provided in these instructions.”  In assessing the 
instruction to determine whether the jury was adequately guided under the Eighth 
or Fourteenth Amendment, we look to whether it is reasonably likely the jury 
understood the instruction and correctly applied it.  (See People v. Barnett, supra, 
118 
17 Cal.4th at p. 1161.)  In doing so, we conclude there was no reasonable 
likelihood the jury considered or relied on “other crimes” evidence, which it was 
expressly told not to consider unless directed otherwise. 
 
Defendant also contends that the failure to label each factor as either 
aggravating or mitigating rendered the factors unconstitutionally vague because 
the jury was left without guidance about their meaning and application, allowing 
the jury to consider in aggravation such factors as intoxication and mental 
impairment, which may be considered only in mitigation.  The claim does not 
survive the United States Supreme Court ruling in Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 
512 U.S. 967, 975-979, upholding section 190.3, factors (a), (b), and  (i), against a 
challenge that the factors were unconstitutionally vague because the sentencer was 
not instructed on how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing 
decision.  “Indeed, we have repeatedly held that ‘trial courts are not required to 
identify particular sentencing factors as aggravating or mitigating and that the 
1978 death penalty law is constitutional despite the absence of such a 
requirement.’ ” (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 208; see also People v. 
Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 973.)   
 
Defendant adds that the penalty phase instructions in his case allowed the 
jury to consider previous guilt instructions on voluntary intoxication (CALJIC 
Nos. 4.20, 4.22), which informed the jury that intoxication did not negate the 
criminality of defendant’s actions for the purpose of determining guilt.  Defendant 
argues that, notwithstanding penalty instructions to the jury that it could consider 
whether intoxication impaired defendant’s mental capacity in determining penalty, 
the jury could still view intoxication as one of the circumstances of the crime, and 
therefore treat it as aggravating, despite case law identifying intoxication as 
mitigating.  But the mitigating nature of section 190.3, factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), 
and (k), “is clear even in the face of contrary argument.”  (People v. Montiel 
119 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 944.)  Here, it should be noted, the record reflects no 
argument by the prosecution that intoxication, whether from alcohol or marijuana, 
or any mental or emotional disturbance, should be considered as anything but 
mitigating.  No reasonable likelihood appears that the jury misunderstood or 
misapplied the penalty instructions.  (See People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
pp. 857-858 [despite trial court error in failing to instruct jury to consider evidence 
of defendant’s intoxication in determining penalty, prosecution argument did not 
misdirect jury from considering relevant evidence of defendant’s consumption of 
alcohol prior to offense].)        
9.  Cumulative Prejudice in Guilt and Penalty Phases   
Defendant concludes his challenge to the penalty judgment by asserting that 
the cumulative effect of the errors he raises mandates reversal.   Our review of the 
record leads us to a different conclusion.  No errors are discernable.  No 
reasonable possibility exists that the sentencing jury would have reached a 
different result absent any of the alleged errors. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Maury 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S012582 
Date Filed: April 24, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Shasta 
Judge: William R. Lund 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Joseph E. Chabot, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell and Stanley Cross, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joseph E. Chabot 
639 Front Street, 4th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Stanley Cross 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5158