Title: Olson v. Thompson
Citation: 74 N.W.2d 432
Docket Number: 7540
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 1956

74 N.W.2d 432 (1956) Mary C. OLSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S. W. THOMPSON, as Highway Commissioner of the State of North Dakota, Defendant and Appellant. No. 7540. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 18, 1956. Rehearing Denied February 3, 1956. *433 Leslie R. Burgum, Atty. Gen., Vernon R. Pederson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ray R. Friederich, State's Atty., Conrad J. Ziegler, Asst. State's Atty., Rugby, for appellant. L. L. Butterwick, Minnewaukan, for respondent. GRIMSON, Judge. The controversy involved in this action arises out of the laying out in 1953 of state highway No. 3 through Pierce County, across the farm of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's farm consisted of the W½ and the NE¼ of the SW¼ of Section 20, and the NW¼ of the NW¼ of Section 29, all in Township 153 North, Range 72 West, a total of 160 acres. The strip of land taken for the highway crosses the northeast corner of the NW¼ of the NW¼ of Section 29, totaling 2.50 acres, and runs diagonally in a northwesterly direction, across the SW¼ of the SW¼ of Section 20, totaling 6.43 acres. The county commissioners of Pierce County were unable to make a purchase of this right of way from the plaintiff and in order to obtain title proceeded under Chapter 24-07, NDRC 1943. After a hearing they made awards of damages for the land taken in the NW¼ of NW¼ of Section 29 as follows: *434 and for the land taken in the SW¼ of SW¼ of Section 20, as follows: The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the amounts so awarded and appealed to the district court. Upon trial in district court the jury brought in a joint verdict for the plaintiff as follows: The plaintiff immediately moved for a new trial on the following grounds: The court granted the motion and From that order the defendant appeals, assigning as error that the court erred in making the order in that it was based upon an erroneous view of the facts and of the law, and "That the order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial based upon the testimony and the evidence produced is an abuse of the discretion of the court." The court in its memorandum opinion states that its action is based upon Section 28-1902, Section 6, NDRC 1943, which provides that the court may grant a new trial upon the "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or the decision, or that it is against the law." The court cites Haser v. Pape, 78 N.D. 481, 50 N.W.2d 240, 241, in which this court held that a new trial may be granted under that provision, "Where the evidence discloses that damages awarded by a jury are inadequate to a degree incommensurate with substantial justice." This court has repeatedly passed upon the matter of granting a new trial by the district court. In Crossen v. Rognlie, N.D., 68 N.W.2d 110, 112, this court said: It is only when the trial court has abused its discretion that its ruling will be disturbed. Baird v. Clooten, 60 N.D. 699, 236 N.W. 356; Pengilly v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 11 N.D. 249, 91 N.W. 63, 12 Am.Neg.Rep. 619; Ross v. Robertson, 12 N.D. 27, 94 N.W. 765; Johnson v. Patterson, 67 N.D. 132, 270 N.W. 97; Krueger v. North American Creameries, 75 N.D. 264, 27 N.W.2d 240; Kohler v. Stephens, 74 N.D. 655, 24 N.W.2d 64; Martin v. Parkins, 55 N.D. 339, 213 N.W. 574; Baird v. Unterseher, 57 *435 N.D. 885, 224 N.W. 306; State v. Hummel, 73 N.D. 308, 14 N.W.2d 368. We must, therefore, consider the evidence to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. The following plat Ex. 1, in the evidence, shows the layout of the highway across plaintiff's farm. *436 The undisputed evidence discloses that the plaintiff and her late husband homesteaded this land and have lived on it ever since. They have developed it mainly as a stock farm. About 70 acres are suitable for cultivation and are now used to raise feed grains. The plaintiff and her husband built a substantial, five room house, 16 x 16 feet with a kitchen extension 14 x 14 feet, and having an upstairs and basement. The house was built on a stone foundation, and equipped with a hot air furnace. It had electricity for both light and power, was painted and in good repair. It is now occupied by the plaintiff as a home. They built a barn 30 feet wide, and 50 feet long, with 12 foot posts, and peak 27 feet from the ground. It had a gambril roof, with cedar shingles, a concrete foundation, concrete gutters and cow stands. Then they built a combined granary and garage 16 feet wide, 22 feet long, with concrete foundation. It had a pitch roof with cedar shingles. All buildings were at the time of this action in good repair. A grove had been planted to the east and south of the house. They had a garden between the house and the grove, and had built a dam for a pool to retain water for the garden. The highway was laid out through the northeast corner of the NW¼ of the NW¼ of Section 29, cutting through the grove within 200 feet of the house, taking part of the garden, destroying the dam beside it, and leaving a triangular area, .7 of an acre in the southeast corner separated by the highway from the rest of plaintiff's land. The highway then cut diagonally across plaintiff's pasture which covers all of the SW¼ of the SW¼ of Section 20 and was fenced, leaving 8.6 acres southwest of the highway separated from 23 acres northeast of the highway. The fences at the entrances and exit of the highway were destroyed and new fences on each side of the highway were necessary. The witnesses estimated the cost of those fences from $300 to $750. Plaintiffs claimed that there was a natural spring of water in the pasture which they had developed by clearing off some surface so as to get to the sand through which they claimed the water came, and which had made a fine watering place for the stock and that there had continually been water in this spring through all the dry years sufficient to water their stock. The value of this spring to a stock farm was estimated up to $1,000. The defendant's witnesses, however, claimed that this was just an ordinary water hole. The highway was laid over this spring, destroying it entirely. The pasture and hay land was valued at from $2 to $15 per acre and the cultivated land up to $35 per acre without any improvements. Some of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the consequential damages were from $8 to $10 per acre. The defendants, however, claimed that the benefits to the farm of the highway were worth from $5 to $18 per acre. The higher figures, except in this last instance, were given by the plaintiff's witnesses who were neighbors, well acquainted with the premises. The lower figures were given by the defendant's witnesses, whose testimony was more general. It will be noticed that the verdict brought in by the jury is in the exact amount of the total award of the county commissioners. The commissioners allowed $75 for the land taken in Section 29, and $96.45 for the portion taken in Section 20, or a total of $171:45, which is the amount of the verdict for the land taken. The commissioners allowed $104 for damages to the land taken in Section 29, and $50 for the damages to the land in Section 20, a total of $154 which is the allowance for damages made by the jury. Two of the commissioners of Pierce County who made the allowances were witnesses for the defendant. One of them, Peter Hoffart, testified: After describing that land as common pasture land he was asked what other factor *437 he considered and answered, "We gave him some damage for trees and for the little fence that he had there and that is about all the damage that I could see that we done there? * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Nick Axtman, another one of the commissioners, testified: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *438 "Q. As a matter of fact you didn't take the value of the buildings into consideration at all when you fixed the value of fifteen dollars an acre on the land, did you? A. No, we appraised the land, not the buildings." The evidence shows that plaintiff's property had been developed as a farm unit for the raising of stock. That farm unit included not only the residence but also the barn, granary, garage, fences, watering place and everything necessary for the development of such a farm enterprise. The farm was established, maintained and operated as a single unit. The buildings were a part of the realty and certainly added value thereto. The improvements made it possible to operate the farm as an economic unit. In the evidence, however, the witnesses testified separately to the value of the improvements and to the value of the land without improvements. There was no evidence of the value of the farm as a whole. The question is raised as to whether the value of a farm unit like that here involved may be proven by showing the value of the buildings and improvements separately from the value of the bare land. Section 32-1522, NDRC 1943, provides that the jury must ascertain and assess damages as follows: In Lineburg v. Sandven, 74 N.D. 364, 21 N.W.2d 808, 809, this court held: In 4 Sutherland, Damages, 4th Ed., p. 4129, "Land and buildings upon it constitute but one piece of property and benefits and damages are to be ascertained by ascertaining the effect upon it as a whole." In 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., Section 726, p. 1270, it is said: In 18 Am.Jur. 892, it is said: In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 13.11(2), p. 207: Clearly the rule adopted in the Lineburg v. Sandven case is to the effect that the valuation of the buildings should be considered in connection with the farm as a whole and not separately. That rule is supported by the weight of authority. In the instant case the valuations of the buildings separately from the value of the farm were received in evidence without objection. Later that method of proving the value of the property was questioned by the defendant and is now raised in connection with the assignment that the court erred as a matter of law and of fact in granting a new trial on the theory that adding the value of the buildings separately to the value of the farm produced excessive valuation of the property which in comparison with the verdict seemed to the court wholly inadequate. Even so, the evidence does not warrant conclusion that the court erred in granting the new trial. In addition to the value of the land taken which per acre must be the value of the farm as found by the jury, the jury must also find the damages that will accrue to the remaining property by the taking of that strip for the highway. The value of those damages was allowed by the jury at $154. As separated by the board of county commissioners that was for the fence, the trees and the garden and all other damages on the NW¼ of 29, $104 and for the fence and all other damages on the SW¼ of the SW¼ of 20, $50. The evidence showed that the highway was laid out across plaintiff's yard within 200 feet of the house, injuring the grove and the garden, cutting out a triangular .7 acre of his land besides the right of way. These invasions of the yard around plaintiff's residence are elements to be considered in finding the damages. It may be a question in this automobile age whether or not it is desirable to live in the "house by the side of the road." Then there is undoubtedly damage to the plaintiff to have her pasture cut in two. The evidence shows that the fencing required on each side of the highway cost more than the $20 allowed. The destruction of the spring, if the jury found it to be a natural, permanent spring, as plaintiff claims, could hardly be recompensed, together with the fence, at $50. Clearly, there is evidence, irrespective of the value of the bare land plus the value of the improvements, to warrant more allowance for damages than was found by the jury. We have in the instant case very conflicting evidence on values. We have the testimony of the county commissioners who made the original appraisal. In making that appraisal they had failed to give any consideration to the value of the improvements and little consideration to the damages. The jury adopted their findings of value and damages. Some evidence was received that the pasture land, without improvements was worth $15 and tillable land without improvements $30 per acre. Those were the values found by the jury indicating that they may not have considered the improvements. It was the duty of the jury to determine, not only the value of the land taken, including improvements, but also whether the plaintiff suffered any detriment to his farm unit by the laying out of that highway through his farmyard and pasture and to return a verdict in an amount sufficient to compensate for the detriment, if any. Haser v. Pape, 78 N.D. 481, 50 N.W.2d 240. The district judge was in the best position to determine whether the verdict the jury returned on those questions was in accordance with justice. He had the advantage of observing the witnesses and their demeanor, and even the effect upon the jury of their testimony. He had knowledge of all matters incident to the trial itself. These matters he could take into consideration in the exercise of his discretion *440 in passing on the motion for a new trial. In Crossen v. Rognlie, N.D., 68 N.W.2d 113, it is said: In Haser v. Pape, 78 N.D. 481, 50 N.W.2d 240, 241, it was held that "Appellate courts are more reluctant to interfere with the action of a trial court in granting a new trial than where a new trial has been denied." Considering the evidence and circumstances shown in the case at bar we have come to the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted a new trial. The order of the district court is affirmed. BURKE, C. J., and JOHNSON, SATHRE, MORRIS, JJ., concur.