Title: Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC
Citation: 2019 IL 123895
Docket Number: 123895, 124002
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2019

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 2019 IL 123895 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
JOHN JONES et al., Appellees, v. PNEUMO ABEX LLC et al., 
Appellants. 
 
 
 
Docket Nos. 
 
123895, 124002 cons. 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
December 19, 2019 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fifth District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Richland County, the Hon. 
William C. Hudson, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Reversed and remanded. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Craig L. Unrath, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., of Peoria, 
Gary C. Pinter, of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, of Edwardsville, 
Reagan W. Simpson, of Yetter Coleman LLP, of Houston, Texas, and 
Raymond H. Modesitt, of Wilkinson, Goeller, Modesitt, Wilkinson & 
Drummy, LLP, of Terra Haute, Indiana, for appellant Pneumo Abex 
LLC. 
 
Robert H. Riley, Matthew J. Fischer, Edward Casmere, Joshua D. Lee, 
and Sarah E. Finch, of Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, of Chicago, 
for other appellant. 
 
Charles Lynn Corwin and James Wylder, of Wylder Corwin Kelly 
LLP, of Bloomington, for appellees. 
Digitally signed 
by Reporter of 
Decisions 
Reason: I attest 
to the accuracy 
and integrity of 
this document 
Date: 2021.01.29 
15:06:44 -06'00'
 
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Justices 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Burke and Justices Garman and Neville concurred in the 
judgment and opinion. 
Justice Kilbride dissented, with opinion. 
Justices Thomas and Theis took no part in the decision. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
At issue in these consolidated appeals is whether Owens-Illinois, Inc. (Owens-Illinois), and 
Pneumo Abex LLC (Pneumo Abex) may have conspired with others to suppress information 
regarding the dangers of exposure to asbestos. Twenty years ago, in McClure v. Owens 
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102 (1999), we held that jury verdicts entered against 
Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois, Inc., based on claims of civil conspiracy virtually identical 
to those asserted here could not stand and that those defendants were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Our appellate court reached the same conclusion with respect to similar claims 
of civil conspiracy leveled against Pneumo Abex. Rodarmel v. Pneumo Abex, L.L.C., 2011 IL 
App (4th) 100463; Menssen v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 2012 IL App (4th) 100904; Gillenwater v. 
Honeywell International, Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 120929 (also affirming entry of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) in favor of Owens-Illinois as well as upholding 
summary judgment for both defendants and against a spouse on a related loss of consortium 
claim). Applying the foregoing precedent, the circuit court in this case granted summary 
judgment in favor of Owens-Illinois and Pneumo Abex on plaintiffs’ claims that the companies 
had been part of a conspiracy to conceal the harmful effects of exposure to asbestos. The 
appellate court, however, reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that genuine 
issues of fact remained, precluding summary judgment. 2018 IL App (5th) 160239. For the 
reasons that follow, we now reverse the appellate court’s judgment and remand to that court 
for further proceedings. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
In February 2013, John Jones and his wife, Deborah, filed this action in the circuit court of 
Richland County to recover damages they suffered when John contracted lung cancer. The 
Joneses’ complaint alleges that John’s lung cancer resulted from his exposure to asbestos, 
“including asbestos from one or more” of the numerous companies named as defendants in the 
case, while he was involved in the construction industry “from 1962 through the 1970’s” and 
while he repaired the brakes on motor vehicles he owned during the same time period.1  
 
 
1In addition to Owens-Illinois, Inc., and Pneumo-Abex LLC, plaintiffs’ complaint named as 
defendants Akzo Nobel Paints, LLC, formerly known as The Glidden Co.; American Biltrite, Inc.; 
American Tar Products, Inc., formerly known as Koppers Products, Inc.; Ameron International 
Corporation; Bechtel Corporation; Bird Incorporated; Borg Warner Corporation “by its successor-in-
interest Borg Warner Morse Tec, Inc.”; Brand Insulations, Inc.; Caterpillar, Inc.; “CBS Corporation, 
formerly known as Viacom, Inc., Merger to CBS Corporation, formerly known as Westinghouse 
 
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¶ 4 
 
Only two of the named defendants are involved in this appeal, Owens-Illinois and Pneumo 
Abex. Both were alleged to have been “in the business of manufacturing and distributing 
asbestos and asbestos containing products.” Specifically, Pneumo Abex is claimed to have 
made some of the brake linings and pads John used when repairing his vehicles, while Owens-
Illinois manufactured Kaylo brand pipe covering, an insulation product alleged to have been 
present at construction sites where John worked.  
¶ 5 
 
The Joneses’ six-count complaint sought to hold Owens-Illinois and Pneumo Abex liable 
on various theories. Count I asserted that these defendants and others knew that asbestos was 
dangerous but conspired to misrepresent its dangers and to falsely represent that exposure to 
asbestos and asbestos-containing products was safe or nontoxic. Count I further alleged that 
Owens-Illinois and Pneumo Abex similarly conspired to “fail to provide information about the 
harmful effects of asbestos to exposed persons.”  
¶ 6 
 
Numerous specific acts were alleged to have been performed in furtherance of this 
conspiracy. Specifically, the Joneses asserted that “[o]ne or more of the Conspirators,” a group 
that included Owens-Illinois and Pneumo Abex, 
 
“a) sold asbestos products which were used at the locations where John Jones 
worked without warning of the hazards known to the seller, including the sale and use 
of products of Johns-Manville, Owens Corning, and Owens-Illinois, which exposed 
John Jones to asbestos; 
 
b) refused to warn its own employees about the hazards of asbestos known to it, 
specifically included is the refusal of Unarco and Owens Corning to warn their 
employees at the Bloomington, Illinois plant during the years 1951-1972; 
 
c) edited and altered the reports and drafts of publications initially prepared by Dr. 
Lanza concerning the hazards of asbestos during the 1930’s; 
 
d) agreed in writing not to disclose the results of research on the effects of asbestos 
upon health unless the results suited their interests; 
 
e) obtained an agreement in the 1930’s from the editors of ASBESTOS, the only 
trade magazine devoted exclusively to asbestos, that the magazine would never publish 
articles on the fact that exposure to asbestos caused disease, and sustained this 
agreement into the 1970’s; 
 
Electric Corporation”; CSR, Inc.; CSR, Ltd.; Certainteed Corporation; Chicago Gasket Company; 
Cleaver-Brooks, a Division of Aqua-Chem, Inc.; Conwed Corporation; Crane Company; Crown Cork 
& Seal USA, Inc.; DAP, Inc.; De Witt Products Co.; Domco Products Texas, L.P.; Draco Mechanical 
Supply, Inc.; Duro Dyne Corporation; Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation; General Electric Company; 
General Gasket Corporation; General Refractories Co.; Georgia Pacific Corporation; The Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Company; Homasote Company; Honeywell International, Inc.; Industrial Holding 
Corporation; J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc.; John Crane, Inc.; J.P. Bushnell Packing Supply Co.; 
Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.; Karnak Midwest, LLC; KCG, Inc.; Kelly Moore Paint Company; 
Kelsey-Hayes Company; Kimberly-Clark Corporation; McMaster-Carr Supply Co.; Mannington Mills, 
Inc.; Mechanical Insulation Co. Inc.; Metropolitan Life Insurance; National Service Industries, Inc.; 
Oakfabco, Inc.; Rapid-American Corporation; Sherwin-Williams Company; Simpson Timber 
Company; Sprinkmann Sons Corporation; SPX Cooling Technologies, Inc.; Superior Boiler Works, 
Inc.; Thiem Corporation; Trane U.S. Inc.; Tremco, Inc.; Union Carbide Corporation; Weil-McLain 
Company; Welco Manufacturing Company; York International Corporation; and Zurn Industries LLC. 
 
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f) suppressed the dissemination of a report by Dr. Gardner in 1943 which was 
critical of the concept that there was a safe level of asbestos exposure; 
 
g) through their control of the Asbestos Textile Institute (ATI), defeated further 
study of the health of workers when William Hemeon graphically demonstrated the 
need for such study and dissemination of information in the 1940’s; 
 
h) edited and altered the reports and drafts of publications regarding asbestos and 
health initially prepared by Dr. Vorwald during 1948-1951; 
 
i) suppressed the results of the Fibrous Dust Studies conducted during 1966-74 by 
the Industrial Health Foundation, Inc., Johns-Manville, Raybestos Manhattan, Owens 
Corning, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation and PPG Industries, which results 
demonstrated and confirmed that exposure to asbestos caused lung cancer and 
mesothelioma; 
 
j) acting under the name of NIMA, published a pamphlet entitled ‘Recommended 
Health Safety Practices for Handling and Applying Thermal Insulation Products 
Containing Asbestos’ in which they purported to inform readers about the health 
hazards of airborne asbestos, but withheld, among other facts, that asbestos caused 
serious disease and death, including cancer, that there was no cure for asbestos disease, 
and that there was no known safe level of exposure to asbestos; 
 
k) purchased asbestos which did not contain warnings from coconspirators, to 
which the purchaser then exposed its own employees without warning of the hazards 
known to the seller and purchaser, including the purchase of asbestos by Owens-Illinois 
from Unarco; 
 
l) refused to warn its employees who had to use asbestos-containing materials in 
the manufacture of other products of the conspirator of the hazards of exposure to 
asbestos known to the conspirator, including the refusal of Owens-Illinois to warn its 
employees who were exposed to asbestos in connection with the manufacture of glass 
products of the hazards of asbestos known to Owens-Illinois; 
 
m) purchased asbestos which did not contain warnings from co-conspirators, to 
which the purchaser then expected [sic] its own employees without warning of the 
hazards known to the seller and purchaser, including the purchase of asbestos by 
Bendix (n/k/a Honeywell) from Johns-Manville; 
 
n) refused to warn its employees who had to use asbestos-containing materials in 
the manufacture of other products for the conspirator of the hazards of exposure to 
asbestos known to the conspirator, including the refusal of Bendix to warn its 
employees who were exposed to asbestos in connection with the manufacture of 
friction products of the hazards of asbestos known to Bendix; and 
 
o) altered, including the deletion of all references to the association of asbestosis 
and lung cancer, the original report of the study performed by Braun of the Industrial 
Hygiene Foundation before the altered version was published in 1958.” 
¶ 7 
 
According to count I of the complaint, “the agreement or understanding” between the 
conspirators and the acts done in furtherance of the agreement or understanding were the 
proximate cause of John’s injuries, and defendants should be held jointly and severally liable 
for the damages he sustained. Count II of the complaint was premised on the same theory and 
was directed at the same defendants but sought relief for John’s spouse, Deborah, who claimed 
 
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that, because of John’s injury, she suffered “an injury to her husband/wife relationship and 
became obligated for the expense of the medical care” he received. 
¶ 8 
 
Counts III and IV of plaintiffs’ complaint sounded in negligence and sought damages for 
John and Deborah, respectively, on the grounds that defendants had “manufactured and sold 
asbestos containing products which were used by [John] or others in his proximity at the 
locations where [he] worked;” that John had contracted lung cancer as a result of being exposed 
to asbestos from defendants’ products; that defendants “knew, or should have known, that 
exposure to asbestos caused pulmonary fibrosis and malignancies;” and that defendants were 
negligent for having failed to warn that exposure to asbestos could cause serious disease, 
including pulmonary fibrosis and malignancies, and could result in death and for having failed 
to provide proper instruction “as to safe methods, if any existed,” for handling and processing 
products containing asbestos. Counts V and VI were to the same effect but contended that 
defendants’ conduct was willful and wanton and sought punitive as well as actual damages. 
¶ 9 
 
Following various developments not relevant here, including minor amendments to the 
complaint and dismissal of certain counts as to certain defendants, Pneumo Abex moved for 
summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/2-1005(c) (West 2014)) with respect to the claims asserted against it for civil conspiracy. As 
grounds for that motion, Pneumo Abex argued that the civil conspiracy claims leveled here 
were based on the same facts as those underlying the civil conspiracy claims advanced 
unsuccessfully by other plaintiffs in Rodarmel, 2011 IL App (4th) 100463, Menssen, 2012 IL 
App (4th) 100904, and Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929, and in numerous other cases 
resolved in Pneumo Abex’s favor at the trial court level. Pneumo Abex asserted that nothing 
new has been presented in this case that would warrant a different outcome. Accordingly, as 
in those prior cases, it contended that plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims should fail as a matter of 
law.  
¶ 10 
 
Two months later, Owens-Illinois filed its own motion for summary judgment. Its motion 
sought judgment in the company’s favor with respect to all six counts of plaintiffs’ complaint. 
Regarding counts III through VI, which were predicated on the contention that John Jones had 
been directly exposed to asbestos dust, Owens-Illinois asserted that plaintiffs’ claims must fail 
as a matter of law because there is “no evidence that Jones was ever exposed to any asbestos-
containing product manufactured or sold by Owens-Illinois, let alone evidence of exposures 
that occurred on a frequent, regular and proximate basis.”  
¶ 11 
 
As to counts I and II, which sought to impose liability based on the theory of civil 
conspiracy, Owens-Illinois contended that all of the evidence advanced by plaintiffs here has 
already been considered and found lacking by this court in McClure, 188 Ill. 2d 102, and 
various lower courts in Illinois, including the same appellate court decisions cited by Pneumo 
Abex in its motion for summary judgment, Rodarmel, 2011 IL App (4th) 100463, Menssen, 
2012 IL App (4th) 100904, and Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929. Owens-Illinois further 
noted that in the previous three years, various Illinois circuit courts and one United States 
district court had granted Owens-Illinois summary judgment more than 60 times in cases 
involving precisely the same civil conspiracy claim asserted here. As did Pneumo Abex, 
Owens-Illinois contended that the evidence presented by the Joneses is similarly insufficient 
as a matter of law to support a finding that the company had engaged in any actionable civil 
conspiracy. In addition, Owens-Illinois argued that plaintiffs’ loss of consortium counts are 
 
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fatally defective because, among other things, Deborah was not yet married to John at the time 
the actionable conduct alleged in their complaint occurred.  
¶ 12 
 
Following a hearing, the circuit court entered separate orders disposing of each of these 
summary judgment motions. With respect to the motion filed by Pneumo Abex, the circuit 
court held that the parties had “readily admitted at argument that the body of evidence in the 
instant matter is the same as that in Rodarmel v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 2011 IL App (4th) 
100463,” where the appellate court held that the circuit court should have granted Pneumo 
Abex’s motion for a directed verdict on the civil conspiracy claims asserted against it there 
“not only because of a lack of duty but also because of a lack of clear and convincing evidence 
on the agreement element of a civil conspiracy.” Rodarmel, 2011 IL App (4th) 100463, ¶ 132.  
¶ 13 
 
In the circuit court’s view, the only distinction between the record in Rodarmel and the 
record here was testimony by Dr. Arthur Frank regarding the scientific validity of the Gardner 
study referenced in plaintiffs’ complaint. As had other circuit courts in similar cases, the circuit 
court here concluded that this difference was unimportant. “[O]n the materials issues,” the 
court believed, “this matter is indistinguishable from Rodarmel.” It therefore adopted the 
findings and analysis of that case and held that, as a matter of law, Pneumo Abex did not enter 
into a conspiracy to suppress the hazards of asbestos and “[t]he alleged injury-causing conduct 
was not committed in furtherance of that conspiracy that [Pneumo] Abex allegedly joined 
because [Pneumo] Abex joined no conspiracy.” Accordingly, it entered summary judgment in 
favor of Pneumo Abex and against plaintiffs on the civil conspiracy claims. 
¶ 14 
 
With respect to Owens-Illinois, plaintiffs indicated at the hearing that they would not 
oppose entry of summary judgment against them as to counts III through VI, the direct 
exposure counts, based on the record then before the court. The circuit court’s summary 
judgment order therefore addressed only the merits of Owens-Illinois’s motion as to counts I 
and II, the civil conspiracy counts. Echoing its ruling with regard to Pneumo Abex, the court 
wrote that “[c]ounsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant readily admitted at argument that the body 
of evidence in the instant matter is the same as that in Gillenwater v. Honeywell International, 
Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 120929.” In that case, which contained the same civil conspiracy claim 
asserted here, the Fourth District concluded that, when all of the evidence was viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs and all reasonable inferences were drawn in their favor, 
the evidence so overwhelmingly favored Owens-Illinois and the other defendants that no 
verdict against them could ever stand. Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929, ¶ 123. Finding 
Gillenwater indistinguishable, the circuit court here adopted its findings and analysis and 
concluded that summary judgment in favor of Owens-Illinois was proper.  
¶ 15 
 
Although the circuit court’s summary judgment orders did not fully resolve the litigation, 
the court entered separate orders pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 
2016) in which it made express written findings that there was no just reason for delaying the 
appeals. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings, concluding that, at this stage of the proceedings, “there are no definitive answers 
to the disputed questions of fact presented by plaintiffs” regarding the existence of the 
conspiracy they claimed and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. 2018 IL App 
(5th) 160239, ¶ 23.  
¶ 16 
 
In its opinion, the appellate court cited our previous decision in McClure, 188 Ill. 2d 102, 
which overturned a jury verdict that had been entered against Owens-Illinois on a civil 
 
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conspiracy claim virtually identical to plaintiffs’ on the grounds that the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs in that case, so overwhelmingly favored 
Owens-Illinois that no contrary verdict could ever stand. The appellate court invoked McClure, 
however, only for general principles governing claims for civil conspiracy. It made no 
substantive comparison between the facts presented in that case and those asserted here. 
Indeed, after its perfunctory reference to McClure in the first paragraph of the analysis section 
of its opinion (2018 IL App (5th) 160239, ¶ 9), the appellate court never mentioned it again. 
¶ 17 
 
The appellate court also referenced two of the three appellate decisions cited by Pneumo 
Abex and Owens-Illinois in support of their summary judgment motions, Rodarmel, 2011 IL 
App (4th) 100463, and Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929. As indicated earlier in this 
opinion, those cases, like McClure, likewise included civil conspiracy claims against 
defendants based on virtually the same facts and theories as those asserted against them by 
plaintiffs here, and both were ultimately resolved in defendants’ favor. Despite this, the 
appellate court did not consider them dispositive. After undertaking a cursory examination of 
the two decisions, it found them distinguishable for one basic reason: they arose from motions 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict rather than summary judgment. In the appellate 
court’s view, applying precedent involving judgment n.o.v. “rather than the rationale and black 
letter law of summary judgment stands the concept of summary judgment on its head and 
results in our appellate court, in effect, trying the case.” 2018 IL App (5th) 160239, ¶ 23. It 
therefore determined that those decisions were not controlling.2 
¶ 18 
 
The appellate court made no mention of a third case cited by the circuit court, Menssen, 
2012 IL App (4th) 100904. That case, which involved a civil conspiracy claim against Pneumo 
Abex, was decided after Rodarmel and involved later exposure dates and additional evidence 
not considered by the Rodarmel court. After reviewing that additional evidence, the appellate 
court in Menssen determined that it was insufficient to alter the court’s previous conclusion, 
and as in Rodarmel, it concluded that Pneumo Abex was entitled to judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, reversing outright the jury’s determination that the company had conspired to 
suppress or misrepresent the health hazards of asbestos. Id. ¶¶ 49-54. Because Menssen 
involved judgment n.o.v. rather than summary judgment, we presume the appellate court here 
would have rejected it for the same reason it rejected Rodarmel and Gillenwater.  
¶ 19 
 
Shortly before the appellate court filed its opinion in August 2018, a different district of 
the appellate court decided another virtually identical civil conspiracy case involving Pneumo 
Abex and Owens-Illinois, Johnson v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 2018 IL App (3d) 160406-U. There, 
as here, the circuit court had granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. Plaintiffs, 
also a husband and wife, appealed. In contrast to the appellate court panel in this case, the 
appellate court in Johnson found Rodarmel, Menssen, and Gillenwater to be applicable. 
 
 
2While ultimately unimportant to our resolution of this case, we feel obliged to point out that the 
appellate court’s characterization of Gillenwater was inaccurate. The loss of consortium claim asserted 
by the spouse in that case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion for judgment 
n.o.v. On appeal, the appellate court agreed that summary judgment was properly entered against the 
spouse because manufacturers owe no duty to a future spouse and the couple was not yet married at the 
time of the alleged exposure. Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929, ¶ 151. As our summary of the 
case has indicated, Owens-Illinois raised the same argument in response to Deborah’s loss of 
consortium claim here. 
 
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Consistent with that precedent, it affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Pneumo Abex and Owens-Illinois and against plaintiffs. We denied plaintiffs’ petition 
for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. July 1, 2018), with one 
justice dissenting. Johnson v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, No. 123820 (Ill. Sept. 26, 2018). We 
subsequently allowed petitions for leave to appeal filed in this case by Pneumo Abex and 
Owens-Illinois and consolidated their appeals for briefing and disposition. 
 
¶ 20 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 21 
 
Because this appeal arises from the appellate court’s reversal of a circuit court order 
granting summary judgment, our review is de novo. Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians 
v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 216 Ill. 2d 294, 305 (2005).  
¶ 22 
 
As noted earlier in this opinion, the question of whether Pneumo Abex or Owens-Illinois 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to conceal the dangers of asbestos has been frequently litigated 
in the courts of this state. Such claims often fail at the summary judgment stage. In those 
instances where they have proceeded to trial before a jury and resulted in verdicts favorable to 
the plaintiffs, reviewing courts have consistently concluded that these companies could not be 
held liable for civil conspiracy as a matter of law and entered judgment notwithstanding the 
verdicts in their favor. Our opinion in McClure, 188 Ill. 2d 102, is among these decisions. So 
too are the appellate court opinions in Rodarmel, 2011 IL App (4th) 100463, Menssen, 2012 
IL App (4th) 100904, and Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929. 
¶ 23 
 
Instead of undertaking a meaningful evaluation of the applicability of the legal principles 
governing civil conspiracy as articulated in that precedent, and with no real assessment of 
whether and to what extent any factual differences between those cases and this one might 
justify a different result, the appellate court summarily distinguished the prior decisions on the 
sole grounds that the civil conspiracy claims advanced against Owens-Illinois and Pneumo 
Abex in those cases were decided in the context of motions for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, while here they were resolved on motions for summary judgment. In taking that 
approach, the appellate court committed reversible error.  
¶ 24 
 
The appellate court correctly noted that summary judgment is appropriate where the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016); 2018 IL App (5th) 160239, 
¶ 12. The problem with the appellate court’s analysis is that it subsequently failed to properly 
appreciate that this case does not present the typical summary judgment scenario, where the 
issues in dispute have yet to face the scrutiny of a trier of fact and the objective is to determine 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians, 
216 Ill. 2d at 305. Rather, it arises from a long and well-documented historical record that has 
been thoroughly explored and aggressively tested in the course of scores of lawsuits spanning 
more than two decades involving conduct that occurred long ago. Consistent with that 
background, the pleadings, affidavits, and other materials submitted by the parties, both in 
support of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment, were exhaustive. The 
parties appear to have left nothing out, and they make no claim that there is additional evidence 
that still needs to be uncovered before the matter can be properly considered by the trier of 
fact.  
 
- 9 - 
 
¶ 25 
 
In such cases, there is no practical difference between the standard for summary judgment 
and that governing directed verdicts. Even if some issue of fact is presented by the summary 
judgment motion, if “ ‘what is contained in the pleadings and affidavits would have constituted 
all of the evidence before the court and upon such evidence there would be nothing left to go 
to a jury, and the court would be required to direct a verdict, then a summary judgment should 
be entered.’ ” Cohen v. Chicago Park District, 2017 IL 121800, ¶ 27 (quoting Fooden v. Board 
of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 587 (1971)); Koziol v. Hayden, 
309 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477 (1999).  
¶ 26 
 
To be sure, McClure, Rodarmel, Menssen, and Gillenwater involved entry of judgment 
n.o.v. rather than directed verdicts. This distinction, however, is of no consequence. The 
identical standard applies in either case (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 
498-99 (1967); Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 n.1 (1992)), namely whether all of the 
evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors 
the movant that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand (Harris v. 
Thompson, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 15).  
¶ 27 
 
Under these circumstances, the appellate court clearly erred in failing to follow our 
decision in McClure and in distinguishing the various related appellate decisions involving 
civil conspiracy claims against Owens-Illinois and Pneumo Abex on the grounds that the 
standard governing defendants’ motions in this case was different. The standard is the same. 
If judgment n.o.v. were proper, summary judgment would also be proper.  
¶ 28 
 
To hold otherwise would be nonsensical. If all relevant evidence is already before the court 
and upon such evidence there would be nothing left to go to a jury so that the court would be 
required to direct a verdict, denying summary judgment to permit further proceedings to take 
place would serve no purpose. The outcome would not change.  
¶ 29 
 
This is something the appellate court here failed to grasp. It was as if it had picked up a 
suspense novel and declared the mystery unsolved based on the first few chapters without 
bothering to finish the book. Had it proceeded to the end, the answers to its questions would 
have been revealed to the extent they were capable of ever being revealed. The book was 
complete. There would have been nowhere else to look.  
¶ 30 
 
The circuit court did not make this same mistake. Rather than focus on discrete and limited 
aspects of the voluminous record, it reviewed all of the evidence, as we did in McClure and as 
the appellate court did in Rodarmel, Menssen, and Gillenwater; it applied the “clear and 
convincing” standard of proof we found applicable where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to establish 
a civil conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence (McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 134); and it 
concluded that plaintiffs could not prevail as a matter of law.  
¶ 31 
 
Contrary to the appellate court’s view, this approach does not “stand[ ] the concept of 
summary judgment on its head.” 2018 IL App (5th) 160239, ¶ 23. Rather, it is entirely 
consistent with the recognition that the use of summary judgment “in a proper case is to be 
encouraged and its benefits inure not only to the litigants, in the saving of time and expenses, 
but to the community in avoiding congestion of trial calendars and the expenses of unnecessary 
trial.” Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos., 92 Ill. App. 3d 813, 819 (1981). 
¶ 32 
 
In sum, the appellate court should not have set aside the circuit court’s judgment without 
undertaking a similarly thorough review. It must now do so. If the circuit court is correct that 
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability on defendants based on civil 
 
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conspiracy, as other courts have so often concluded in the past, remanding to the circuit court 
for further proceedings, as the appellate court did, serves no valid purpose. It merely wastes 
judicial resources and needlessly prolongs the ultimate disposition of this litigation.  
¶ 33 
 
In reaching this resolution, we hasten to add that we express no view on the merits of the 
Joneses’ appeal to the appellate court. While history and precedent present a steep hill for those 
plaintiffs to climb, nothing in this disposition should be read as foreclosing the possibility that 
their appeal may prove meritorious. Our point is simply that, in conducting its review, the 
appellate court must undertake a complete analysis in accordance with the correct legal 
standards articulated in our decisions and other established case law. 
 
¶ 34 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 35 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶ 36 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
¶ 37 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: 
¶ 38 
 
In this case, the appellate court concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist on 
whether Owens-Illinois, Inc., and Pneumo Abex LLC conspired with other companies to 
conceal information about the harmful effects of exposure to asbestos. In my view, the 
appellate court did not err in holding that genuine issues of material fact remain on this 
question, thus precluding summary judgment in favor of Owens-Illinois and Pneumo Abex. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision reversing the appellate court’s 
judgment. 
¶ 39 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-
1005(c) (West 2016). Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation, and it 
should be granted only when the movant’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. 
Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42. A motion for summary judgment should be denied 
if there is a dispute as to a material fact or if reasonable people may draw divergent inferences 
from the undisputed material facts. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 22. 
¶ 40 
 
A civil conspiracy is “ ‘a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of 
accomplishing by concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful 
means.’ ” McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 133 (1999) (quoting 
Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 12, 23 (1998)). To state a claim for 
civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege both an agreement and a tortious act in furtherance 
of that agreement. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 133 (citing Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 
62-64 (1994)). A conspiracy is almost never established by direct proof. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d 
at 134 (citing Walsh v. Fanslow, 123 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422 (1984)). Rather, it usually must be 
proven using “ ‘circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from evidence, coupled with 
common-sense knowledge of the behavior of persons in similar circumstances.’ ” McClure, 
188 Ill. 2d at 134 (quoting Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 66). The evidence of a civil conspiracy must 
be clear and convincing if it is shown by circumstantial evidence. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 134. 
 
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¶ 41 
 
I believe the appellate court correctly applied those legal principles in holding that the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Pneumo Abex and Owens-Illinois. 
Previous cases have provided a substantial amount of evidence weighing on the question of a 
civil conspiracy. See, e.g., McClure, 188 Ill. 2d 102; Gillenwater v. Honeywell International, 
Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 120929; Menssen v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 2012 IL App (4th) 100904; 
Rodarmel v. Pneumo Abex, L.L.C., 2011 IL App (4th) 100463. In my view, a reasonable person 
could conclude from that vast collection of evidence that defendants conspired with other 
companies to suppress information about the health hazards of asbestos. See McClure, 188 Ill. 
2d at 154-57 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (concluding that the evidence presented in McClure was 
sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a civil conspiracy to suppress information about the 
health hazards of asbestos). 
¶ 42 
 
Furthermore, plaintiffs have submitted additional evidence in this case on the Saranac 
Laboratory experiments. Those experiments are particularly important in this case. The 
evidence presented previously on those experiments is described in McClure, Rodarmel, and 
Menssen and is briefly summarized as follows. 
¶ 43 
 
In 1936, Pneumo Abex entered into an agreement with other companies to fund 
experiments studying the effects of asbestos dust exposure. The agreement provided that Dr. 
LeRoy U. Gardner, director of the Saranac Laboratory for the Study of Tuberculosis, would 
perform the study. After several years of study, Dr. Gardner sent Vandiver Brown, general 
counsel for asbestos producer Johns-Manville, a report stating that “certain evidence suggests 
that asbestos may actually favor development of tumors in susceptible species.” Dr. Gardner 
noted that, although the observations were “open to several criticisms,” they were “suggestive 
but not conclusive evidence of a cancer stimulating action by asbestos dust.” The report 
indicated 8 of the 11 mice that inhaled long fiber asbestos for 15 to 24 months developed 
malignant tumors. Dr. Gardner expressed a desire to repeat the experiment under controlled 
conditions “to determine whether asbestos actually favors cancer of the lung.” 
¶ 44 
 
Dr. Gardner applied for a federal research grant from the National Cancer Institute to 
conduct a controlled experiment. In his application, Dr. Gardner described the results of his 
study but admitted they “mean nothing” because the experiments were not intended to study 
the carcinogenic effects of asbestos and were not conducted with proper controls. Dr. 
Gardner’s application for funding was ultimately denied, and he died in 1946, before 
completing a final report on the asbestos dust study. 
¶ 45 
 
In 1948, Saranac Laboratory completed a final report on Dr. Gardner’s scientific findings 
and delivered it to Vandiver Brown at Johns-Manville. Brown then forwarded the report to the 
rest of the sponsoring companies with the request that it be kept confidential. Brown invited 
the companies to a meeting to discuss whether the report should be revised prior to publication. 
Pneumo Abex asked Brown to represent it at that meeting. 
¶ 46 
 
Brown subsequently informed Pneumo Abex that the sponsoring companies had voted 
unanimously to delete references to cancer and tumors in mice from the final report. Brown 
asked Pneumo Abex to return its copy of the unrevised final report because the sponsoring 
companies agreed it would be “unwise to have any copies of the draft report outstanding if the 
final report is to be different in any substantial respect.” In 1951, Saranac Laboratory published 
its report of Dr. Gardner’s experiments in the American Medical Association Archives of 
 
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Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Medicine. The published version of the final report 
deleted all references to tumors and cancer in mice. 
¶ 47 
 
In Rodarmel, the appellate court rejected the argument that the agreement among the 
sponsoring companies to alter the final report on the Saranac Laboratory experiments 
established a conspiracy to conceal the health hazards of asbestos. The Rodarmel court found 
that the tumors in the group of mice did not constitute scientific evidence that asbestos caused 
cancer and asserted “[i]t cannot be unlawful to hide information that is devoid of significance.” 
Rodarmel, 2011 IL App (4th) 100463, ¶ 124. The appellate court concluded that “absent a 
qualified expert opinion that the tumorous mice were scientific evidence of a relationship 
between asbestos and cancer *** Abex’s agreement to conceal information about the tumorous 
mice was not an agreement to perform an unlawful act and hence was not a conspiratorial 
agreement.” Rodarmel, 2011 IL App (4th) 100463, ¶ 128. The appellate court followed that 
same reasoning in Menssen, 2012 IL App (4th) 100904, ¶ 51, holding that, “without more, [the 
plaintiff] failed to provide evidence that Abex agreed with other companies to suppress or 
misrepresent the health hazards of asbestos.” Thus, the conclusion that the Saranac Laboratory 
experiments were not scientifically reliable was critical to the appellate court’s holdings in 
Rodarmel and Menssen. 
¶ 48 
 
In this case, the record includes new information on the potential scientific validity of the 
Saranac Laboratory experiments. Plaintiffs provided the deposition testimony of Dr. Arthur 
Frank, an expert in asbestos diseases, that the Saranac Laboratory experiment results would 
have been “significant scientific evidence on the issue of whether there was a relationship 
between asbestos and cancer.” Additionally, plaintiffs presented a letter written by Dr. Kenneth 
Lynch to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in 1947, stating he reviewed Dr. Gardner’s 
outline and found it “valuable and publishable as it stands.” 
¶ 49 
 
This additional evidence weighs on the decision of Pneumo Abex and the other sponsoring 
companies to delete from the report any reference to tumors and cancer in mice and on their 
joint effort to ensure no copies of the original report referencing cancer and tumors remained 
outstanding. Given the new evidence on the potential scientific validity of the Saranac 
Laboratory experiments, the agreement to delete references to cancer and tumors from the final 
published report may be more readily seen as a conspiracy to suppress valid evidence of the 
potential health hazards of asbestos exposure. The additional evidence may also cast a new 
light on the parallel industry actions to suppress the health hazards of asbestos presented in this 
and previous cases. See Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (2008) (in 
reviewing a summary judgment disposition, the court must consider all evidence together and 
construe it liberally in favor of the nonmoving party). Overall, I believe a reasonable person 
could infer from the new evidence on the scientific validity of the Saranac Laboratory 
experiments, along with all the other evidence of parallel industry conduct presented by 
plaintiffs in this and previous cases, that Pneumo Abex conspired with other companies to 
conceal information about the potential health risks of asbestos. 
¶ 50 
 
Our appellate court has also held that clear and convincing evidence shows Owens-Illinois 
and Owens Corning entered into a conspiratorial agreement to sell Kaylo insulation containing 
asbestos without providing a warning about the health risks posed by that product. Gillenwater 
v. Honeywell International, Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 120929, ¶ 96. Owens-Illinois and Owens 
Corning entered into a distributorship agreement in 1953, providing that Owens Corning would 
 
- 13 - 
 
market the Kaylo insulation manufactured by Owens-Illinois. Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 
120929, ¶ 55. The appellate court explained that “[d]uring the period of the distributorship 
agreement, 1953 to 1958, both companies knew that Kaylo dust was potentially a respiratory 
hazard, that it might scar the lungs of people who breathed it,” and the distributorship 
agreement implied an understanding that the companies would conceal the potential dangers 
of Kaylo. Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929, ¶ 96. Indeed, silence by the two companies 
about the known dangers posed by asbestos “was essential to the marketing and selling of 
Kaylo.” Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 120929, ¶ 96. 
¶ 51 
 
According to the Gillenwater court, Owens-Illinois withdrew from the conspiracy in 1958, 
when it sold its Kaylo insulation division to Owens Corning. Gillenwater, 2013 IL App (4th) 
120929, ¶¶ 107-18. The appellate court stated “[t]he record gives no basis for supposing that, 
after 1958, Owens-Illinois cared whether Owens-Corning sold any more Kaylo.” Gillenwater, 
2013 IL App (4th) 120929, ¶ 107. 
¶ 52 
 
While I agree that the evidence establishes a conspiracy between Owens-Illinois and 
Owens Corning, I believe the issue of whether and when Owens-Illinois withdrew from that 
conspiracy presents a question of material fact inappropriate for summary judgment. The 
appellate court observed that plaintiffs presented evidence indicating the two companies 
“remained close” following the sale of the Kaylo division in 1958. 2018 IL App (5th) 160239, 
¶ 17. For instance, Owens-Illinois continued to provide packaging for Kaylo insulation until 
the late 1960s, and Owens-Illinois continued to have a large financial stake in Owens Corning. 
Additionally, Owens-Illinois continued to use asbestos in its own factories during the 1970s. 
Given those facts, Owens-Illinois certainly would have continued to benefit from the 
agreement to conceal information about the health hazards of asbestos exposure.  
¶ 53 
 
In my view, summary judgment is inappropriate here because plaintiffs presented sufficient 
evidence to create a disputed question of fact on whether and when Owens-Illinois withdrew 
from the conspiracy to conceal information about the health hazards of asbestos. The totality 
of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, could be sufficient to 
establish a conspiracy by clear and convincing evidence continuing through the time of 
plaintiff’s alleged initial asbestos exposure in the 1960s. 
¶ 54 
 
In sum, defendants’ right to judgment on plaintiffs’ claims is not clear and free from doubt. 
Based on the voluminous facts presented in this case, a reasonable person could determine that 
defendants conspired with other companies to suppress information about the health hazards 
of asbestos. The drastic remedy of summary judgment is, therefore, not an appropriate means 
of disposing of this litigation. See Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42. I would affirm the appellate 
court’s reversal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of Owens-Illinois and Pneumo 
Abex. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶ 55 
 
JUSTICES THOMAS and THEIS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.