Title: Senkirik v. ROYCE
Citation: 192 Or. 583, 235 P.2d 886
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1951

Reversed September 26, 1951.
*586 H.H. Phillips, of Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Griffith, Peck, Phillips &amp; Coughlin, and Norman L. Easley, of Portland.
W.A. Franklin argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Anderson &amp; Franklin, of Portland.
Before HAY, Acting Chief Justice, and LUSK, LATOURETTE, WARNER and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action for damages for personal injuries claimed to have been suffered as the result of the negligent operation of a taxicab, brought by Louis Senkirik, as plaintiff, against Ezra Royce, Isabell Royce, and Dora Royce, d.b.a. Yellow Cab Company, as defendants. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff in the total sum of $9,000. Defendants appeal.
At the time and place of the accident involved herein a taxicab owned by defendants was being operated by their employe, one Robert G. Carlton, upon the business of defendants.
The accident occurred about 5:30 p.m. on November 28, 1948, at or near the intersection of Northeast Williams avenue and Northeast Holladay street in the *587 city of Portland, Oregon. Northeast Williams avenue is a four-lane, through highway running in a general northerly and southerly direction and one of the principal thoroughfares for vehicular traffic between downtown Portland and the north and northeast sections of said city. Northeast Holladay street runs in a general easterly and westerly direction and intersects Northeast Williams avenue. There are no marked crosswalks at this intersection. At the southwest corner of the intersection there is located a beer tavern known as "Handy Corner," with its main entrance fronting on Northeast Holladay street. At the time of trial it was stipulated between the parties that this intersection lies within what is known as a "residential district" as defined by statute. § 115-301 (y), O.C.L.A., as amended by ch. 279, Oregon Laws 1947.
A few minutes prior to the accident the plaintiff, a pedestrian, had gone to the Handy Corner to purchase a quart bottle of beer. While there, he drank one glass of beer. He then left the tavern and stepped to the southwest corner of the intersection, preparatory to proceeding easterly across Northeast Williams avenue. At the time there was a heavy traffic by motor vehicles along said avenue, most of them proceeding in a northerly direction, as is usual at that period of the day. If not raining at the time, it had been shortly before, and the pavement was wet. It was dark enough to require traveling motor vehicles to have the front lights burning. Plaintiff was dressed in dark clothing.
Because of the heavy traffic along said avenue, particularly from the south, plaintiff was compelled to pause for awhile to permit the traffic to clear the intersection so that he might proceed safely across. *588 Before stepping off the sidewalk to cross the avenue, plaintiff states that he looked both to the north and south and did not start until it appeared to him that he had ample time to make the crossing in safety. He testified that when he started to cross, he saw the taxicab coming from the north, and that it was then about a block and a half away. He noticed the taxicab again when it was a block away and stated that at the time he thought there was sufficient room for the taxicab to pass behind him and gave his attention to the south.
The taxicab was being operated in a southerly direction along said avenue in the left-hand lane for southbound traffic, that is, in the lane of travel next to the center line of the highway. There is a dispute in the evidence as to the speed at which the taxicab was being operated, the estimates varying from 25 to 40 miles per hour. At or near the south boundary line of the intersection the taxicab struck plaintiff, who was then at approximately the center of the avenue, throwing him several feet and to the pavement with great force, then proceeding for some distance before stopping. The taxicab left rear-wheel skid marks of approximately 54 feet in length and front-wheel marks of approximately 61 feet in length. The driver of the taxicab testified that he did not see plaintiff until just before striking him, and that, immediately after he saw him, he set the brakes on his vehicle. Plaintiff was seriously injured as the result of the accident.
There is a sharp dispute in the testimony as to whether plaintiff at the time of the accident was walking (or had stopped) within that part of the intersection defined as the crosswalk. He contended that he was crossing within the boundaries of the crosswalk. On *589 the other hand, defendants produced testimony by eyewitnesses, including the driver of the taxicab, that at the time plaintiff was at a point from 10 to 20 feet south of the south boundary line of the crosswalk. This dispute formed the principal issue of the case, involving, as it did, the question of statutory right of way.
We do not assume to give a complete statement of the facts in the case, but the foregoing is sufficient for the purposes of this opinion.
In his complaint plaintiff charged defendants with negligence in the following particulars:
In their answer defendants specifically denied the several acts of negligence charged against them and after affirmatively alleging the adoption of Ordinance No. 75607, known as the Traffic Code of the city of Portland, by the city council of said city on July 10, 1941, charged plaintiff with negligence as follows:
Plaintiff replied, denying all the allegations of new matter contained in the answer inconsistent with or contradictory to the allegations of his complaint.
The several assignments of error have to do with certain instructions given by the court to the jury, and with the failure of the court to give certain other instructions requested by defendants.
1. As their first assignment of error defendants contend the trial court erred in giving the following instruction:
An exception was duly taken to the giving of this instruction.
Section 115-320 (b), O.C.L.A., as amended by ch. 458, Oregon Laws 1941, in part provides as follows:
The basic rule referred to above as being contained in subdivision (a) reads as follows:
In taking their exception to the foregoing instruction, defendants stated:
Manifestly, the part of the charge above emphasized is an erroneous statement of the law. Under the express provisions of the statute, traveling in excess of the indicated speed is a violation of the law only if, in so doing, the traveler violates the basic rule. The statute simply provides that exceeding the designated speed is prima facie evidence of the violation of such rule, but in every case, before a jury would be justified in finding one guilty of negligence on account of such speed, it would be necessary for it first to find that the basic rule had in fact been violated by reason thereof. Here, the jury was instructed that speed in excess of 25 miles per hour in and of itself constituted negligence, whereas, at most, it could only be taken as prima facie evidence of such negligence, subject to being overcome by other evidence. There is a vast difference between an act in and of itself constituting negligence, or being merely prima facie evidence of negligence. The statute simply provides a rule of evidence.
Under the statutes of this state (with certain exceptions unnecessary to mention here) there are no "speed limits" as such, traveling in excess of which will, in and of itself, constitute a violation of law. Speed of motor vehicles is regulated entirely by the provisions of the basic rule. Obviously, indicated speeds are not "speed limits," as was indicated in the court's questioned instruction.
The last few lines of the instruction are most confusing. In effect, it is stated that "a violation of the *593 indicated speed is prima facie evidence of a violation of the indicated speed." That doesn't mean anything.
2, 3. In all cases where applicable the court may and, if requested, should instruct the jury respecting indicated speeds in accordance with the provisions of the statute and, in so doing, should also explain what is meant by prima facie evidence. It is noted that in the instant case there was no such explanation, but no exception was taken on account thereof; therefore, the question is not before us. Mercer v. Risberg, 182 Or. 526, 188 P.2d 632.
We have given careful attention to the entire charge of the court to the jury and do not find anything therein that would correct the error above noted.
4. Defendants also contend the trial court erred in refusing their request to take from the jury the question of permanent injury.
We have examined the testimony with respect to plaintiff's injuries. We note the fact that plaintiff's attending physician, upon whose testimony, to the effect that he "thought" plaintiff would fully recover from his injuries, defendants place their principal reliance in support of their contention, testified that he had not seen plaintiff during a period of approximately three months immediately prior to the trial. There was testimony at the time of trial that plaintiff still suffered severe pain and swelling in his injured leg. His leg and the scar thereon, caused by the compound fracture which he suffered, and showing swelling, were exhibited to the jury. The accident occurred, as we have before observed, on November 28, 1948. The trial commenced and plaintiff testified on March 2, 1950. Many X-rays showing plaintiff's injuries were admitted in evidence. In the light *594 of the entire record, we are of the opinion there was sufficient evidence justifying submission to the jury of the question respecting the permanence of plaintiff's injuries, and that there is no merit in defendants' contention in this regard.
5, 6. As their third assignment of error defendants maintain that the trial court erred in refusing to give the following instruction requested by them:
Defendants excepted to the court's failure to give this instruction, in connection therewith stating:
However, the court did not call the jury back and give this or any other instruction, nor had it covered the matter by any instructions it did give.
*595 The requested instruction was a proper statement of the law. Walker v. Penner, 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d 316; Johnson v. Updegrave, 186 Or. 196, 206 P.2d 91; Peters v. Johnson et al., 124 Or. 237, 264 P. 459. And it should have been given, particularly so because the court did give such an instruction respecting the plaintiff. The failure of the court to give such instruction constituted error. Spence, Adm'x, v. Rasmussen et al., 190 Or. 662, 688, 226 P.2d 819.
As their assignment of error numbered four, defendants contend the court erred in giving repetitious instructions respecting the right of way between plaintiff and defendants, and that the instructions as given prejudiced defendants. We agree that the instructions upon this issue were to some extent repetitious, but we do not believe the giving thereof constitutes error. It is unnecessary to encumber the record by quoting these. Upon another trial such repetition may and should be avoided.
7, 8. Defendants next contend the court erred in refusing to give the following requested instruction:
It will be recalled that one of the specifications of negligence charged by defendants against plaintiff was that he had failed to maintain a proper lookout. The above instruction correctly states the law and was applicable to a material issue of the case. It should *596 have been given. Sherrard v. Werline, 162 Or. 135, 91 P.2d 344; Cerrano v. Portland Ry. L. &amp; P. Co., 62 Or. 421, 427, 126 P. 37.
The court instructed the jury specifically respecting each charge of negligence made by plaintiff against defendants, including that regarding lookout. As to lookout, the court said:
9. Plaintiff maintains that, in considering whether error was committed by the trial court in failing to give the requested instruction in question, the court's entire charge to the jury must be considered, and if the subject matter of the requested instruction has been adequately covered by the court's own instructions, *597 no error has been committed. We agree with this contention. This court has so stated in many decisions which it is unnecessary to cite.
10. The question is whether the trial court actually did cover the matter contained in this specific request of defendants. Plaintiff contends that it did and invites our attention to certain portions of the instructions given the jury. Plaintiff states in his brief:
The foregoing excerpts from the court's instructions fall far short of covering the matter contained in defendants' request. Where do we find any specific direction to the jury that plaintiff, like the motor vehicle operator, was required to maintain a lookout? Certainly, the matter is not specifically covered by the general language used in the last instruction above quoted. If that type of instruction suffices in negligence cases where the request for a specific instruction material to the issues is made, then it follows that in every such case the law would be satisfied by the court simply calling attention to the charges and countercharges contained in the pleadings, without defining the respective duties of the parties. That would indeed be a dangerous practice; it would at once plunge the jury into the field of pure speculation. We cannot subscribe to any such proposition. It was error for the court not to give the requested instruction.
Finally, defendants assign as error the refusal of the court to give the following requested instruction:
*599 11. On July 10, 1941, the city of Portland adopted § 19-1201 (e) of Ordinance No. 75607, which provides as follows:
Section 115-340, O.C.L.A., as amended by § 8 (5) of ch. 428, Oregon Laws 1941, provided as follows:
Section 115-340, O.C.L.A., was again amended by ch. 407, Oregon Laws 1947, but no change was made in the foregoing provision contained in § 8 (5) of the act of 1941.
Under the authority conferred by § 115-340, O.C.L.A., as amended, the city of Portland had the power to adopt the provision of Ordinance No. 75607 hereinabove quoted.
12, 13. In the instant case defendants seriously contended that plaintiff at the time of and immediately preceding the accident was walking (or had stopped) near the center of Northeast Williams avenue at a point several feet south of the unmarked crosswalk. If that is the fact, then plaintiff was guilty of a violation of the ordinance in question. Such a violation constitutes negligence per se. If such negligence on the part of plaintiff contributed proximately to the happening of *600 the accident, even though slightly, it would bar his recovery. Defendants were entitled to have their theory of the case submitted to the jury, and it was error for the court to refuse the requested instruction.
At no place in its instructions did the court tell the jury that it was unlawful for a pedestrian to cross a street at any point other than an intersection, or that such a crossing outside an intersection would constitute negligence as a matter of law. This sort of instruction was important to the defense in this case, particularly so in the light of the following instruction which the court did give:
14. We have repeatedly held that a right of way is not absolute, and that having the right of way does not relieve one from the duty of using due care in the exercise of such right. This rule applies to both pedestrians and motor vehicle operators.
However, if plaintiff was crossing the street at a point other than within the boundaries of a marked or unmarked crosswalk, he was not exercising due care as a matter of law; he was negligent. Obviously, one cannot be in the exercise of due care and negligent at one and the same time. It is noted that the last clear chance doctrine was not invoked in this case.
It is manifest that the errors committed were prejudicial to defendants. Judgment reversed.