Title: State v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment
Citation: 2001 WI 78
Docket Number: 1998AP001046
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2001

2001 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1046 
 
 
Complete Title 
Of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Outagamie County Board of Adjustment,  
 
Defendant, 
David and Barbara Warning,  
 
Intervening Defendants-Respondents-
 
Petitioners.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 220, 587 N.W.2d 215 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 29, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Des Jardins 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence. 
 
 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the intervening defendants-respondents-
petitioners there were briefs by Richard J. Carlson and Silton, 
Seifert, Carlson & Gamble, S.C., Appleton, and oral argument by 
Richard J. Carlson. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Jeffrey M. Gabrysiak, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John A. 
Kassner and Brennan, Steil, Basting & MacDougall, S.C., Madison, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Builders Association, and oral 
argument by John A. Kassner. 
 
2001 WI 78 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1046 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Outagamie County Board of Adjustment,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
David and Barbara Warning,  
 
          Intervening Defendants- 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This is a zoning case in which we 
review a conclusion reluctantly reached by the court of appeals 
that the law of this state may require a basement to be 
destroyed in order to save it from being flooded.  Judge Michael 
Hoover aptly noted the irony in his opinion for the court of 
appeals: "applicable law compels a harsh result" in that "we 
order the certain destruction of [a] basement in order to avoid 
the possibility that it may be damaged in a flood." State v. 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
2 
Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 98-1046, unpublished 
slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1998). 
¶2 
David and Barbara Warning own a ranch home in the Town 
of Bovina, located in the 100-year Flood Fringe District of 
Outagamie County.  The Warnings' basement floor falls below the 
flood protection elevation required by the county's floodplain 
zoning ordinance.  The Warnings wanted to add a sun porch onto 
their home, but were denied a building permit because of the 
basement floor violation.  They sought and obtained a variance 
to allow the nonconforming basement to continue to exist. 
¶3 
The State, for the Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR), initiated certiorari review in the circuit court, 
contending that the basement was illegal and the variance 
improperly granted.  The circuit court affirmed the issuance of 
the variance.  The court of appeals reversed, noting, however, 
the anomaly of using a zoning law the purpose of which is to 
protect 
basements 
to 
precipitate 
the 
likely 
regulatory 
destruction of one. 
¶4 
What compelled this anomalous result, according to the 
court of appeals, was our decision in State v. Kenosha County 
Board of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 415, 577 N.W.2d 813 
(1998), as well as Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) (Register, 
June 1996, No. 486).  Kenosha County eliminated the previous 
distinction between area and use variances and established a "no 
reasonable use of the property" standard for the issuance of 
either type of variance, thereby making all variances almost 
impossible to obtain.  The administrative rule prohibits 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
3 
outright the issuance of a variance to allow a basement floor 
that falls below the regional flood elevation to continue to 
exist.   
¶5 
Kenosha County's establishment of a single standard 
for measuring the "unnecessary hardship" required for the 
issuance of both use and area variances has practically 
eliminated the efficacy of variance procedure as a remedy 
against individual injustices caused by sweeping land use 
regulations, as the Warnings' case vividly demonstrates.  Such a 
radical change in variance law was unwarranted.  I would 
overrule the case and restore the distinction between use and 
area variances to the law of zoning in this state.  Two members 
of the court join me in this conclusion.1  Two other members of 
the court read Kenosha County differently, but nevertheless 
conclude that it is not an impediment to the Warning's variance, 
and therefore concur.2  Four members of the court3 join me in 
concluding 
that 
because 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ NR 
116.13(2) 
categorically 
prohibits 
variances 
for 
any 
deviation 
from 
basement elevation requirements in floodplains, it inexorably 
conflicts with the discretionary authority over variances vested 
in local boards of adjustment by state statute, and therefore 
                     
1 Justices William A. Bablitch and David T. Prosser, Jr. 
join this opinion in its entirety. 
2 See concurring opinion of Justice N. Patrick Crooks, 
joined by Justice Jon P. Wilcox. 
3 Justices Wilcox and Crooks join Sections IV and V of this 
opinion. 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
4 
must give way.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals, 
and reinstate the circuit court's decision affirming the 
Outagamie County Board of Adjustment's issuance of a variance to 
the Warnings. 
¶6 Before proceeding, a word about the stakes, which the 
dissent suggests I have mischaracterized.  As a practical 
matter, this case is about a too-deep basement, which may or may 
not eventually be subject to an enforcement action but presently 
is preventing a homeowner from building a sun porch.  If that 
were all there was to it, we never would have granted review.  
As a legal matter, however, the stakes are very high.  This case 
is about an erroneous precedent of this court that severely 
restricts almost to the point of eliminating the availability of 
zoning variances in this state, and a DNR rule that conflicts 
with a statute.  The dissent is therefore correct that the 
authority of the DNR and the principles of stare decisis are on 
the line. 
¶7 But more fundamentally, this case is about individual 
private property rights, the scope of the police power to 
regulate them through zoning, and the statutory authority of 
local boards to strike a balance between the two through 
variances.  My focus is not on saving the basement or allowing 
the sun porch, but on restoring balance and common sense to the 
law of zoning in this state.  The irony inherent in the notion 
of destroying a basement in order to save it only serves to 
illustrate the flaws in the erroneous precedent and the 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
5 
conflicting rule; it does not provide the ultimate justification 
for this opinion. 
I 
 
¶8 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  David and Barbara 
Warning own 1.77 acres of land in the Town of Bovina in 
Outagamie County.  The Warnings' property is located within the 
100-year Flood Fringe District of Outagamie County and is 
regulated by the Outagamie County Zoning Ordinance and the 
Outagamie Shoreland-Floodplain-Wetland Ordinance (collectively, 
"the Ordinance"). 
¶9 
The 
Ordinance defines "flood fringe" 
as "[t]hat 
portion of the floodplain outside of the floodway, which is 
covered by floodwaters during the regional flood.  It is 
generally associated with standing water rather than rapidly 
flowing water."  Ordinance § 16.05.  The Ordinance defines 
"regional flood" as a flood which, because of the area's 
physical characteristics, may be expected to occur "once in 
every 100 years."  Id.  The chance of a regional flood occurring 
in any given year, therefore, is one percent.  Id.  The 
Ordinance requires that the first floor of a residential 
building located in the flood fringe, including a basement 
floor, be two feet above regional flood elevation.  Ordinance 
§ 16.32(4)(b)1. 
 
¶10 In 1980, the Warnings applied for and received a 
conditional 
use 
permit 
from 
the 
Outagamie 
County 
Zoning 
Committee to place fill and a mobile home on their property, 
which they knew was in the Flood Fringe District.  The County 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
6 
required the placement of fill on the land so that the mobile 
home would be at the proper elevation.  The mobile home complied 
with flood proofing requirements. 
 
¶11 In 1984, the Warnings applied for and received a 
second building permit to replace the mobile home with a 
permanent single-family home.  The building inspector issued a 
building permit to the Warnings but did not advise them that 
they needed to obtain a zoning permit from the Outagamie County 
Zoning Department, and they did not do so.   
 
¶12 With the building permit in hand, the Warnings 
constructed a three-bedroom ranch house with a basement and 
attached garage.  The basement floor of the house fell 3.7 feet 
below the 100-year regional flood elevation and 5.7 feet below 
the flood protection elevation, in violation of the Ordinance 
and the Wisconsin Administrative Code.4     
¶13 In 1995, 11 years after their home was built, the 
Warnings applied for a third building permit, this time to add a 
sun porch 
to 
their home. 
 
The 
Outagamie 
County 
zoning 
administrator denied the Warnings' request because their home 
did not meet the flood protection elevation requirements due to 
the basement floor violation.  The zoning administrator informed 
the Warnings that without a variance, they could not obtain a 
                     
4 The 100-year regional flood elevation is the level to 
which flood waters will rise during a 100-year flood.  The flood 
protection elevation is an elevation two feet above the 100-year 
flood elevation.  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.03(20)(41)(June 
1996). 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
7 
building permit to add the sun porch to their nonconforming 
structure. 
¶14 The Warnings applied to the Outagamie County Board of 
Adjustment 
for 
an 
"after 
the 
fact" 
variance 
for 
their 
nonconforming basement floor.5  A hearing was held, and the DNR 
appeared and opposed the variance, arguing that the Warnings' 
home was not merely nonconforming but "an illegal structure" and 
that the variance criteria could not be met. 
¶15 The Warnings noted, and the zoning administrator 
conceded, that there were other homes in the area with basements 
below regional flood elevation, but they had apparently been 
built before the Ordinance was in place.  The Warnings also 
noted that there was no history of flooding in the area, and 
that filling in the basement or trying to sell the home without 
a variance would cause a substantial loss.  They also pointed 
out that the sun porch itself would comply with the Ordinance as 
it 
would 
be 
constructed 
on 
fill 
above 
flood 
protection 
elevation. 
                     
5 Section 16.32(4)(b)2 of the Outagamie County Shoreland-
Floodplain-Wetland Zoning Ordinance states:   
The basement floor may be placed at the regional flood 
elevation, providing it is floodproofed to the flood 
protection elevation.  Where FEMA has granted a 
community-wide exception, the basement floor may be 
placed at an elevation lower than the regional flood 
elevation providing it is in compliance with §16.37.  
If FEMA has not granted an exception, requests to 
construct 
a basement 
floor below 
regional 
flood 
elevation must be considered a variance requiring 
action of the Board of Adjustment as outlined in 
§16.40 (emphasis supplied).   
No. 98-1046 
 
 
8 
¶16 There was no community opposition to the variance; 
only the zoning administrator and the DNR representative 
objected.  They argued that the Warnings had not satisfied the 
criteria for a variance under the Ordinance.  Neither the zoning 
administrator nor the DNR representative cited § NR 116.13(2) as 
prohibiting the Board from granting any variance at all in these 
circumstances. 
¶17 The Board of Adjustment made findings and voted 
unanimously to grant the variance, reasoning that:   
 
[T]he hardship experienced by the Warnings was caused 
by the Town of Bovina and the negligence of the town 
building inspector for issuing a building permit for 
the three bedroom ranch style home in 1984.  The 
hardship is not based solely on economic gain or loss, 
the loss would be substantial. The Board also felt 
that the proposed addition to the home would comply 
with the floodproofing requirements. 
¶18  The State sought certiorari review of the Board of 
Adjustment's decision in circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.694(10) (1997-98).6  On certiorari review, the DNR argued 
for the first time that § NR 116.13(2) prohibited any variances 
for flood elevation deviations.  The circuit court affirmed the 
Board, concluding that the Warnings had at all times acted in 
good faith, that they would suffer a hardship that was not self-
created in the absence of a variance, and that the DNR had 
waived its argument that § NR 116.13(2) was more restrictive 
than the Ordinance.  Specifically as to hardship, the circuit 
                     
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.    
No. 98-1046 
 
 
9 
court applied the court of appeals' decision in State v. Kenosha 
County Board of Adjustment, 212 Wis. 2d 310, 569 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. 
App. 1997), and held that the hardship of filling in the 
basement or moving the residence "would be extremely great" and 
"unnecessarily burdensome" as compared to the benefits of 
enforcing the "strict letter of the restrictions." 
¶19 The State appealed, and shortly thereafter, this court 
reversed the court of appeals' decision in Kenosha County. Our 
decision in Kenosha County erased the longstanding distinction 
between area (or dimensional) and use variances, and instituted 
a requirement that a property owner seeking either type of 
variance establish that there is "no reasonable use of the 
property without a variance".  Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 
413-14 (emphasis added).  The Warnings, of course, had sought 
and obtained an area variance for their basement.  Before our 
decision in Kenosha County, area variances had been governed by 
the "unnecessarily burdensome" standard described in Snyder v. 
Waukesha County Zoning Board of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 475, 
247 N.W.2d 98 (1976), which the court of appeals had followed in 
its decision in Kenosha County, 212 Wis. 2d at 320.   
¶20 Evaluating an area variance against a "no reasonable 
use of the property" standard is a far cry from evaluating it 
against an "unnecessarily burdensome" standard.  Yet our 
decision in Kenosha County did not overrule or even distinguish 
Snyder, but simply declared itself "compatible" with its 
"concerns," without explaining how this could be so, when the 
earlier case had clearly distinguished between use and area 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
10 
variances and established the more flexible "unnecessarily 
burdensome" standard for the latter. The court of appeals 
reluctantly concluded that Kenosha County's new "no reasonable 
use of the property" test for area variances could not be met in 
this case.  The court also concluded that, in any event, § NR 
116.13(2) foreclosed the issuance of a variance to allow a 
basement floor below the regional flood elevation.  State v. 
Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 98-1046, unpublished 
slip op. at 8-9.   
¶21 We accepted review and heard oral argument on October 
6, 1999.  We subsequently ordered rebriefing and reargument, 
which took place on October 4, 2000. 
II 
¶22 The interpretation and reconciliation of statutes and 
ordinances involve questions of law that reviewing courts decide 
independently.  See State v. Ozaukee County Bd. of Adjustment, 
152 Wis. 2d 552, 559, 449 N.W.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1989).  The 
Wisconsin Statutes require counties to zone by ordinance all 
floodplains within 
their 
unincorporated 
areas. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 87.30(1). The purpose of floodplain zoning is to promote the 
public health, safety, and welfare and to minimize flood damage. 
  See Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1); see also § 1, ch. 614, Laws of 
1965-66 Vol. II.  Outagamie County adopted a combination 
shoreland-floodplain-wetland zoning ordinance in 1977.   
¶23 The statutes also authorize counties to create boards 
of adjustment to make special exceptions, or variances, from the 
terms of zoning ordinances in harmony with their general purpose 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
11 
and intent. Wis. Stat. § 59.694(1).7  A board of adjustment's 
authority 
to 
issue 
variances 
is 
codified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.694(7)(c), which describes the broad scope of the power in 
this way: 
 
To authorize upon appeal in specific cases variances 
from the terms of the ordinance that will not be 
contrary to the public interest, where, owing to 
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed and substantial justice done.  
 
¶24 The statute requires a person seeking a variance to 
prove that he or she will suffer an "unnecessary hardship" in 
the absence of a variance. Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 253, 469 N.W.2d 831 (1991).  The 
hardship must be unique to the property and not a condition 
personal to the landowner, such as mere inconvenience. Snyder, 
74 Wis. 2d at 479.  It cannot be self-created.  Id. at 476.  The 
hardship is evaluated against the purpose of the zoning 
restriction at issue.  Id. at 473.  A variance cannot be 
contrary to the public interest.  Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 256.  
¶25 A person aggrieved by the issuance or denial of a 
variance may commence an action in circuit court seeking the 
remedy available by certiorari, as the State did in this case.  
See Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).  A reviewing court must accord a 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
and 
validity 
to 
a 
board 
of 
                     
7 Wisconsin Statute § 59.694 is the former Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.99 (1993-94), renumbered by 1995 Wis. Act 201 (effective 
September 1, 1996). 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
12 
adjustment's decision.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476 (citing 
Richard W. Cutler, Zoning Law and Practice in Wisconsin § 15 
(1967); 4 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning 
and Planning § 42.07 (4th ed. 1995); 8A McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations § 25.237 (3d ed. 1994)).  A reviewing court may not 
substitute its discretion for that of the board, the entity to 
which the legislature has committed these decisions.  Id. at 
476; see also Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 253. 
¶26 When 
no 
additional 
evidence 
is taken, 
statutory 
certiorari review is limited to: (1) whether the Board kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct 
theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) whether the Board might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question, based on the evidence.  Arndorfer, 
162 Wis. 2d at 253.  In applying this standard, a reviewing 
court is required to defer to the decision of the board unless 
it is "unreasonable or without a rational basis. . . . Thus, the 
findings of the board may not be disturbed if any reasonable 
view of the evidence sustains them."  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476. 
III 
 ¶27  The critical threshold issue in this case is the 
proper standard for measuring unnecessary hardship in an area 
variance case.  The Warnings and amicus curiae argue that our 
decision in Kenosha County improperly altered the test for an 
area variance from the "unnecessarily burdensome" formulation 
that had existed since our 1976 decision in Snyder to the "no 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
13 
reasonable use of the property" standard that up to that point 
had generally been used only in use variance cases. 
¶28 The import of Kenosha County is that there is now in 
this state only one test for both area and use variances, and it 
is such a Draconian one that all variances——whether from area 
(dimensional) or use zoning restrictions——are nearly impossible 
to obtain.  This, the Warnings and amicus contend, is completely 
at odds with Snyder, in which we clearly established separate 
standards for area and use variances and said, for reasons 
related to the differing purposes of area and use zoning, that 
area variances are generally more readily obtainable than use 
variances.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473.  They urge that we 
overrule Kenosha County and restore Snyder's distinction between 
area and use variances. 
¶29 Kenosha County was decided unanimously a mere three 
years ago.  Ordinarily, of course, we adhere to the principle of 
stare decisis.  Respect for precedent "promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne 
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).  Fidelity to precedent 
ensures that existing law will not be abandoned lightly.  State 
v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 441, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1102 
(1995).  When existing law "is open to revision in every case, 
'deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with 
arbitrary and unpredictable results.'" Citizens Utility Bd. v. 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
14 
Klauser, 
194 
Wis. 
2d 
484, 
513, 
534 
N.W.2d 
608 
(1995) 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  Thus, we do 
not overturn precedent unless there is strong justification.  
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 420 (1983).  Changing the law is justified only when 
"precedent has become detrimental to coherence and consistency 
in the law." Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 442 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring).   
¶30 Still, the principle of stare decisis is not an 
"inexorable command,"8 and so the United States Supreme Court has 
attempted to develop an analytical framework for dealing with 
challenged precedents, identifying several factors to assist in 
the decision of whether to overrule:  
 
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its 
judgment is customarily informed by a series of 
prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to 
test the consistency of overruling a prior decision 
with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior 
case.  Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule 
has proven to be intolerable simply in defying 
practical workability; whether the rule is subject to 
a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship 
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to 
the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of 
law have so far developed as to have left the old rule 
no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or 
whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so 
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application or justification.  
                     
8 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 
(1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
15 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
854-55 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 
JJ.).9  The four justices who concurred in part and dissented in 
part in Planned Parenthood v. Casey engaged in a different sort 
of inquiry on the decision to overrule: 1) was the prior case 
correctly decided; and 2) has it produced a settled body of law? 
 Id. at 999 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
¶31 Kenosha County cannot withstand either analysis.  The 
rule 
it 
established 
defies 
practical 
workability, 
lacks 
sufficient justification, and is detrimental to the coherence of 
the law of zoning in this state.  The case, regrettably, was 
incorrectly decided.  The principle of stare decisis does not 
compel us to adhere to erroneous precedents or refuse to correct 
our own mistakes.  The United States Supreme Court "has never 
felt constrained to follow precedent" that is "unworkable or 
 . . . badly reasoned," because stare decisis "is a principle of 
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest 
decision."  Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28.  Given how long Kenosha 
County has been on the books, it has not yet produced a settled 
body of law such that overruling it would be substantially 
disruptive to the legal order. 
                     
9 Citing, respectively, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 
(1965); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 
(1924); see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989); see Burnet, 285 U.S. 393.    
No. 98-1046 
 
 
16 
¶32  Kenosha 
County 
mistakenly 
merged 
the 
previously 
distinct standards for measuring "unnecessary hardship" in area 
and use variances, overruling Snyder sub silentio and making it 
virtually impossible to get a zoning variance of any kind.  This 
has robbed boards of adjustment of the discretion explicitly 
vested in them by the legislature as a hedge against the 
individual 
injustices 
that 
occasionally 
result 
from 
the 
application of otherwise inflexible zoning regulations.  Kenosha 
County purported to be faithful to Snyder and to the rule of 
deference to the discretion of boards of adjustment, when indeed 
it was not.10  This point was not lost on Judge Neal Nettesheim, 
as he remarked on the impact of Kenosha County in State ex rel. 
Spinner v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment, 223 Wis. 2d 99, 
588 N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1998):   
 
[T]he supreme court's decision [in Kenosha County] 
demonstrates that if any feasible use of the property 
is available, a hardship cannot exist.  Although the 
supreme court acknowledged, in the same breath, that a 
board 
of 
adjustment's 
decision 
is 
presumptively 
correct, is committed to the board's discretion and is 
conclusive if any reasonable view of the evidence 
sustains the board's finding . . . these deferential 
phrases ring hollow in light of the court's ultimate 
holding.  The real effect of the court's decision is 
to significantly curtail a board of adjustment's 
discretion in such matters.  It will be a rare case in 
                     
10 Both the concurrence and the dissent insist that stare 
decisis requires us to stick with State v. Kenosha County Board 
of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998).  The 
court's fidelity to precedent, however, only goes so far.  
Nobody minded that Kenosha County effectively overruled Snyder 
v. Waukesha County Zoning Board of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 
247 N.W.2d 98 (1976).   
No. 98-1046 
 
 
17 
which a landowner will be able to meet the "no 
feasible use" test. 
 
Id. at 110 (Nettesheim, J., concurring.) 
¶33 I do not perceive that Kenosha County has engendered 
the sort of reliance that would make it inequitable, harmful, or 
disruptive to the people of this state to repudiate it at this 
early point in its doctrinal life.  Accordingly, I would 
expressly overrule it and reinstate Snyder as the proper 
formulation of the meaning of "unnecessary hardship" for 
purposes of the issuance of use and area variances.  
¶34 Wisconsin Statute § 59.694(7)(c) authorizes boards of 
adjustment to grant variances in cases in which a strict 
enforcement of the zoning code would cause an "unnecessary 
hardship."  Although the statute speaks of variances generally, 
and does not further define "unnecessary hardship," our law has 
always treated use variances differently from area variances 
because of the different purposes underlying use and area 
zoning.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473-75.  This distinction between 
use and area variances is well-recognized: 
A use variance is one that permits a use other than 
that 
prescribed 
by 
the 
zoning 
ordinance 
in 
a 
particular 
district. 
 
An 
area 
variance 
has 
no 
relationship to a change of use.  It is primarily a 
grant to erect, alter, or use a structure for a 
permitted use in a manner other than that prescribed 
by the restrictions of a zoning ordinance. 
 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
18 
3 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 21-6 (4th ed. 1979); 
see also 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning 
and Planning § 38.01 (4th ed. 1997). 
¶35 As the court of appeals in Kenosha County noted, 
statutes governing use and area variances fall into three 
categories: (1) those which allow use and nonuse (area) 
variances and which allow nonuse (area) variances to be granted 
upon a showing of practical difficulty; (2) those which allow 
use and nonuse (area) variances and require a showing of 
unnecessary hardship for both; and (3) those which do not allow 
use variances and require unnecessary hardship for the granting 
of nonuse (area) variances.  See Kenosha County, 212 Wis. 2d at 
316-17, (quoting 3 Ziegler, supra § 38.04, at 42).  Our statute 
falls into the second category, allowing both use and area 
variances upon a showing of "unnecessary hardship."   
¶36 The 
general 
rule 
throughout 
the 
United 
States 
recognizes a distinction in the level of hardship required to 
justify area and use variances.  "[I]n most states, the courts 
will approve an area variance upon a lesser showing by the 
applicant than is required to sustain a use variance."  3 
Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 20.48, at 
580 (4th ed. 1996).  Wisconsin has followed the general rule, 
and in Snyder, we discussed the reason for the distinction:  
No. 98-1046 
 
 
19 
[T]he fact that area variances are considerably easier 
to obtain than use variances creates the impression 
that a minimal showing of difficulty will establish 
the element of practical difficulty and entitle the 
landowner to a variance.  However, area variances are 
not 
more 
easily 
obtained 
because 
practical 
difficulties are something much less severe than 
unnecessary hardship, but because area variances do 
not 
involve 
great 
changes 
in 
the 
character 
of 
neighborhoods as do use variances.  This relates to 
what 
hardships or practical 
difficulties 
may be 
considered unnecessary or unreasonable in light of the 
purpose of the zoning law. 
Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473.11 
¶37 Snyder was an area variance case, and we established 
the following test for the existence of an "unnecessary 
hardship" sufficient for the issuance of an area variance: 
"'[w]hether 
compliance 
with 
the 
strict 
letter 
of 
the 
restrictions governing area, set backs, frontage, height, bulk 
or density would unreasonably prevent the owner from using the 
property for a permitted purpose or would render conformity with 
such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.'"  Snyder, 74 Wis. 
2d at 475 (quoting 2 Ziegler, supra § 45-28).  We noted that use 
variances are subject to a different, narrower measure of 
"unnecessary hardship:" 
 
In State ex rel. Markdale Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 
27 Wis. 2d 154, 133 N.W.2d 795 (1965), [a use variance 
                     
11 Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, I do not 
recommend that Kenosha County be overruled because it "prevents 
Wisconsin from joining other jurisdictions that distinguish area 
and use variances."  Dissent at ¶133. Wisconsin followed the 
majority rule in distinguishing between area and use variances 
until Kenosha County took us outside the norm.  I advocate 
overruling Kenosha County in order to return Wisconsin to the 
majority, not to join it for the first time. 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
20 
case] the court considered, in relation to an appeal 
for a use variance, the definition of unnecessary 
hardship. The court first took note of the New York 
rule 
that 
to 
justify 
a 
finding 
of 
unnecessary 
hardship, it must appear that the property cannot 
yield a reasonable return when used for the permitted 
purposes. . . . The 
court 
then 
stated: 
"A 
note 
entitled 'Zoning Variances,' 74 Harvard Law Review 
(1961), 1396, 1401, suggests the following definition 
of 'unnecessary hardship' as used in zoning statutes 
and ordinances with respect to the power of appeals 
boards to grant variances:   "Since the main purpose 
of allowing variances is to prevent land from being 
rendered useless, 'unnecessary hardship' can best be 
defined as a situation where in the absence of a 
variance no feasible use can be made of the land."   
Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 474 (citations omitted).   
¶38 Thus, because variances from use restrictions have the 
potential 
to 
bring 
about 
great 
changes 
in 
neighborhood 
character, "unnecessary hardship" in use variance cases is 
measured against a higher standard relating to the use of the 
property, that is, whether a reasonable use of the property is 
feasible without a variance.12  On the other hand, because area 
variances 
do 
not 
generally 
change 
neighborhood 
character, 
"unnecessary hardship" in area variance cases is measured 
against a lower standard relating to the nature of the area 
restriction in question, that is, whether compliance with the 
particular area restriction would "unreasonably prevent the 
                     
12 The cases seem to use the phrases "no reasonable use" and 
"no feasible use" interchangeably.  The concept is perhaps 
better expressed as I have stated it above: whether a reasonable 
use of the property is feasible without the variance.  
No. 98-1046 
 
 
21 
owner from using the property for a permitted purpose" or be 
"unnecessarily burdensome".13 
¶39 This 
distinction 
between 
area and 
use 
variances 
remained intact until Kenosha County.  There, the homeowner 
sought an area variance to build a deck within the 75-foot 
setback from the ordinary high water mark of Hooker Lake.  The 
Kenosha County Board of Adjustment granted the variance and both 
the trial court and the court of appeals affirmed.  This court 
reversed, citing the "unnecessarily burdensome" language from 
Snyder but not applying it, instead adopting the State's 
suggestion that the case be evaluated on the basis of the "no 
reasonable use of the property" standard which had previously 
                     
13 The dissent says that this distinction in the standards 
for use and area variances deviates from the plain language of 
the variance statute.  Dissent at ¶¶134-36. The truth is that 
any judicially created standard for evaluating "unnecessary 
hardship" will deviate from the plain language of the statute, 
because the statute does not define the term.  Snyder's separate 
standards for use and area variances are judicial gloss.  
Kenosha County's single, "no reasonable use" standard is 
judicial gloss.  I am not a proponent of judicially enhancing 
statutes beyond their text.  However, in this area at least, and 
in most states, judicial standards have been attached to 
variance enabling statutes in order to give content and meaning 
to the broad term "unnecessary hardship," to avoid invalidating 
the statutes as improper delegations of discretionary power 
without adequately defined standards.  See 3 Kenneth H. Young, 
Anderson's American Law of Zoning §§  20.08, 20.16, at 452-53 
(4th ed. 1996); 3 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 21-3 
(4th ed. 1979).  Judicially created standards for measuring 
"unnecessary hardship" in variance cases have been around since 
the inception of zoning.  It is a little late in the 
interpretive 
history 
of 
this 
statute 
to 
suddenly 
become 
fastidious about its plain language, unless one advocates no 
standard at all.  I do not read the dissent as doing that. 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
22 
been applied only to use variance cases.  Kenosha County, 218 
Wis. 2d at 413.  The court said the "no reasonable use of the 
property" test was "compatible with the concerns we expressed in 
Snyder," as well as the court of appeals decision in State v. 
Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d 836, 540 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1995). 
  Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 413. 
¶40 In 
Winnebago 
County, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
had 
evaluated an area variance against the use variance test set out 
in Snyder.  Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d at 843-45.  It did so, 
however, because the relief sought by the property owner, while 
implicating an area regulation (shoreland setback requirements), 
would have had the practical effect of changing the character of 
the neighborhood by permitting greater population density (a 
larger number of smaller lots).  The court of appeals in Kenosha 
County properly saw Winnebago County as a case of a use variance 
masquerading as an area variance, and therefore distinguished 
it: 
 
[A]lthough the relief which the landowner sought was 
necessarily area based, the core question before the 
board was the scope and degree of the future use of 
the property.  The landowner's development plans for 
the property represented a significant change in the 
use of the property.  Under those circumstances, the 
area variance request carried a significant impact on 
the future use of the property.  Rathkopf's treatise 
recognizes that in some instances an area variance is 
really a use variance in disguise: 
 
'If the variance will permit a use of the land that 
changes the character of the neighborhood, then it is 
more likely that the variance will be held to be a use 
variance.  For example, suppose a zoning ordinance 
requires 800 square feet of lot area per apartment in 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
23 
a multi-family zone, but the board of adjustment 
approves a variance for construction of an apartment 
building that would result in there being only 400 
square feet of lot area per apartment.  On its face it 
looks like an area variance, because the subject was 
area.  On the other hand, doubling the number of 
apartment units being built on one lot may have a 
substantial 
impact 
on 
the 
character 
of 
the 
neighborhood, perhaps taking it from being "moderate" 
to "dense."  Courts have found that such a variance 
was a use variance. 3 Rathkopf [The Law of Zoning and 
Planning] 
n. 
4, 
§ 38.01, 
at 
8 
[footnote 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
 
 
Although the variance sought in Winnebago County 
was an area variance, the ultimate effect of the 
variance, if granted, would have produced a marked 
change in the scope and degree of the proposed 
development.  Thus, it is not remarkable that the 
Winnebago County court saw the issue in terms of use, 
spoke to the issue in those terms, and relied on the 
"no feasible use" test set out by the supreme court in 
Snyder.   
Kenosha County, 212 Wis. 2d at 319-20. 
¶41 Viewing the area variance in Winnebago County as a use 
variance in disguise made perfect sense under the facts of that 
case.  In contrast, requiring all area variance applicants to 
meet the test for a use variance, that is, to demonstrate that 
there is no reasonable use of the property without a variance, 
makes 
little 
sense. 
 
Such 
a 
strict 
standard 
bears 
no 
relationship to the purpose of area zoning, as distinct from use 
zoning.  And, to the extent that it makes all variances nearly 
unobtainable, it is inconsistent with the language of the 
enabling statute, which vests boards of adjustment with broad 
quasi-judicial authority to grant variances for minor deviations 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
24 
from zoning restrictions in order to do substantial justice.  
See Wis. Stat. §§  59.694(1) and (7)(c), 59.692(4)(b). 
¶42 As it stands now, if an area variance applicant has 
any reasonable use of his property without a variance, a 
hardship will not exist and no variance can be issued.  What 
this means as a practical matter is that any property owner 
currently putting his property to some use is disqualified from 
obtaining a variance to legalize even a minor zoning violation, 
and is therefore effectively precluded from making otherwise 
fully legal improvements to his property.  For example, a 
property owner whose home encroaches into the side yard setback 
in a de minimus way, say, by a foot (perhaps because of a 
surveyor's error or builder's mistake), will be unable to obtain 
a building permit to remodel his kitchen or add a deck, because 
he will never be able to meet the "no reasonable use of the 
property" test for an area variance to legalize the setback 
violation.  Similarly, a lake homeowner whose home conformed to 
the shoreline setback when built but no longer does due to 
shoreline erosion, will be prevented from improving his home, at 
least to the extent that the improvements require a government 
permit and therefore a variance for the shoreline setback 
violation that developed over time due to natural causes.    
¶43 Adequate variance procedure is a practical and legal 
necessity in the day-to-day administration of modern zoning 
codes.  Use and area zoning are distinct, and exist to promote 
different types of neighborhood uniformity: uniformity of use, 
of course, in the former; and uniformity of lot and building 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
25 
size, for example, in the latter.  Floodplain zoning exists for 
the more specific purposes of promoting public health and safety 
and protecting private property from flood damage. 
¶44 "Obtaining a variance because of unnecessary hardship 
is the recognized and approved legal device by which the basic 
constitutional 
right 
of 
property 
is 
reconciled 
with 
the 
paramount right of government to protect by zoning the public 
health, safety, morals and welfare."  McQuillin, supra § 25.166. 
 Variances "are designed to afford a protective device against 
individual hardships, to provide relief against unnecessary and 
unjust invasions of the right of private property, and to 
provide a flexibility of procedure necessary to the protection 
of constitutional rights."  Id. at § 25.160.   
¶45 The unnecessary hardship standard "is neither the same 
nor as demanding as a takings analysis." 3 Yokley, supra § 21-5 
at 86 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis in original).  However, the "no 
reasonable use" test for unnecessary hardship in a use variance 
case has something of a constitutional ring to it.  See Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)(holding 
that a zoning regulation which deprives property of all 
economically beneficial or productive use is a categorical 
regulatory taking).  This is generally not true of the test for 
unnecessary hardship in an area variance case: 
 
The hardship that is required for a use variance, 
i.e., 
hardship 
that 
equates 
with 
a 
lack 
of 
a 
reasonable return or destruction of all beneficial use 
of the property, has constitutional overtones.  The 
hardship, or practical difficulty, required for a 
nonuse variance does not, in most states, have those 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
26 
constitutional overtones.  In many cases the hardship 
or 
practical 
difficulty 
necessary 
for 
a 
nonuse 
variance will consist of the unnecessary deprivation 
of the full enjoyment of a permitted use. 
3 Ziegler, supra § 38.02, at 38-22-23.   
¶46 Sensible standards for the issuance of area and use 
variances——standards that bear some relationship to the distinct 
purposes underlying area and use zoning——are critical to the 
regulatory "escape valve" function of variance procedure: 
 
It has been said that to preserve the validity of 
the zoning ordinance in its application to the 
community in general, the variance provision of the 
enabling act functions as an "escape valve," so that 
when regulations that apply to all are unnecessarily 
burdensome 
to 
a 
few 
because 
of 
certain 
unique 
circumstances a means of relief from the mandates of 
the ordinance is provided. 
Yokley, supra § 21-2, at 264. 
¶47 Clearly, then, while variance procedure exists in part 
to prevent zoning regulations from operating in such a way as to 
render private property useless (and therefore avoid regulatory 
takings), its purposes encompass far more than that alone.  "The 
purpose of variances in the broadest sense is the rendering of 
justice in unique and individual cases of practical difficulties 
or unnecessary hardships arising from literal application of 
zoning ordinances."  McQuillin, supra § 25.172. Limiting the 
availability of area variances to those situations that resemble 
regulatory takings operates to unreasonably prevent private 
property owners from making even highly beneficial, completely 
legal improvements to their property.  Requiring all area 
variance applicants to demonstrate "no reasonable use of the 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
27 
property" runs counter to the broader purposes of variance 
procedure.   
¶48 Thus, the general rule allowing area variances upon a 
lower standard than that which is required for use variances 
finds its justification in the fundamental purposes of variance 
procedure: 
 
The prime justification for requiring less of an 
applicant for an area variance than is required in the 
case of a use variance is that the former does not 
affect the use of the land.  An area variance is 
thought not to threaten adjacent land with the 
establishment of an incompatible use, or to hazard the 
maintenance of a use which will change the essential 
character of a neighborhood.  Such a variance has some 
capacity to impose an adverse effect on adjacent land, 
and standards must be imposed to insure the protection 
of neighboring property, but in the case of area 
variances, it is assumed by most courts that adequate 
protection of the neighborhood can be effected without 
the imposition of the stringent limitations which have 
been developed in the use variance cases. 
 
Young, supra § 20.48, at 581. 
¶49 Snyder 
was 
consistent 
with 
these 
longstanding 
principles 
of 
variance 
law. 
 
Kenosha 
County 
was 
not.14  
                     
14 The dissent incorrectly characterizes Kenosha County as 
merely "clarifying" the "proposed binary analysis" in Snyder.  
Dissent at ¶138.  Snyder was not a mere "proposal."  It was the 
law.  And (at the risk of overemphasizing this point), Kenosha 
County did not merely "clarify" Snyder, it overruled it sub 
silentio by adopting a single, "no reasonable use" test for all 
variances.  On this point the concurrence, too, is wrong.  
Kenosha County cannot be explained away.  Clarity in this area 
requires that the decision be overruled.  Strained attempts to 
"explain" or "clarify" an erroneous precedent in order to avoid 
the difficult step of overruling it, tend to generate confusion 
and ultimately disrespect for the law. 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
28 
Overruling the latter is not a mere exercise of judicial will, 
but a necessary and justified restoration of balance and 
coherence to variance law in this state. 
¶50 This is not to say that area variances should be, or 
are, automatic or easy to obtain.  "The power to grant a 
variance is an exceptional one and it is said should be 
sparingly exercised."  Yokley, supra § 21-4, at 83 (Supp. 2000); 
see also Young, supra § 20.23, at 497 ("courts have repeatedly 
emphasized that the exceptional power to grant variances should 
be used sparingly, and never simply to enable one landowner to 
enhance his income at the expense of his neighbors, or to the 
detriment of the community plan").  The burden is on the 
applicant to prove unnecessary hardship, and this "burden of 
proof is heavy; the reasons for granting a variance must be 
substantial."  Id. § 20.20, at 479.  It bears emphasizing that 
variances——whether from use or area restrictions——can never be 
authorized when contrary to the public interest.  
 ¶51  What remains, then, is to examine the record in this 
case against Snyder's "unnecessarily burdensome" test for an 
area variance.  Deferring as we must to the Board's discretion, 
I agree with the circuit court that the record supports the 
Board's conclusion that compliance with the strict letter of the 
basement floor elevation requirements of the Ordinance would be 
unnecessarily burdensome under the circumstances of this case. 
¶52 The State considers the Warnings' home to be an 
"illegal structure."  To bring it into compliance with flood 
elevation requirements (regardless of whether they added a sun 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
29 
porch), the Warnings would have to fill in the basement or move 
the house.  The hardship suffered under either scenario——
basically, the complete loss of the basement——is substantial, 
far outweighing the benefits of enforcing the strict letter of 
the flood elevation requirements.  True, one sure way to avoid 
basement flood damage is to get rid of the basement altogether, 
but this is such regulatory overkill under the circumstances of 
this case that the Board's action in granting the variance was 
completely justified. 
¶53 Furthermore, the hardship is unique to the property 
and not "self-created" to the extent that the Warnings built 
their home (with the nonconforming basement floor) pursuant to 
and in reliance upon a building permit duly issued by the Town 
of Bovina.  They have been unreasonably and unnecessarily 
prevented from making conforming and beneficial improvements to 
their 
property 
because 
of 
the 
basement 
floor 
violation.  
Legalizing the basement by issuing a variance is not contrary to 
the public interest and does not have a detrimental impact on 
neighborhood character.  Since the sun porch itself will comply 
with floodplain regulations, the variance does not increase the 
nonconformity and therefore does not defeat the purpose of the 
floodplain ordinance, which is to minimize flood damage and 
protect health and safety.  Accordingly, applying the proper 
variance test and standard of review, I conclude that the record 
supports the Board's finding of unnecessary hardship sufficient 
to justify a variance in this case. 
IV 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
30 
¶54 The court of appeals also held that Wis. Admin. Code 
§ NR 116.13(2) foreclosed the issuance of any variance that has 
the effect of allowing a residential basement floor below the 
regional flood elevation.  The State did not make this argument 
before the Board, but raised it for the first time in the 
circuit court.  Relying on Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 
545, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980), the circuit court held that the 
State had waived the § NR 116.13(2) argument.  The court of 
appeals disagreed, concluding that the Warnings had failed to 
address the State's argument against waiver and therefore 
conceded the issue was not waived. 
¶55 It is settled law that to preserve an issue for 
judicial review, a party must raise it before the administrative 
agency.  Judicial review of administrative agency decisions 
contemplates review of the record developed before the agency.15 
 Ordinarily an appellate court will not consider issues beyond 
those properly raised before the administrative agency, and a 
failure to raise an issue generally constitutes a waiver of the 
right to raise the issue before a reviewing court.16   
¶56 One exception to this rule permits consideration of an 
issue otherwise waived if all the facts are of record and the 
                     
15 Omernick v. DNR, 100 Wis. 2d 234, 248, 301 N.W.2d 437 
(1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 883 (1981) (citing Cobb v. PSC, 12 
Wis. 2d 441, 107 N.W.2d 595 (1961)) (referring to review 
pursuant to ch. 227).  
16 Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 545, 289 N.W.2d 270 
(1980); Gallagher v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 361, 368, 101 
N.W.2d 72 (1960). 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
31 
issue is a legal one of great importance.17  Whether § NR 
116.13(2) prohibits boards of adjustment from granting variances 
for residential floors below regional flood elevation is a 
question of law that has been briefed in this court by both 
parties and is an issue of great importance to property owners, 
the DNR, boards of adjustment and the courts.  Accordingly, we 
will look past the waiver in this case and decide the issue.  
¶57 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) provides: 
 
RESIDENTIAL USES. (a) Any structure or building 
used for human habitation (seasonal or permanent), 
which is to be erected, constructed, reconstructed, 
structurally altered or moved into the floodfringe 
area shall be placed on fill with the finished surface 
of the lowest floor, excluding basement or crawlway, 
at or above the flood protection elevation.  If any 
such structure or building has a basement or crawlway, 
the surface of the floor of the basement or crawlway 
shall be at or above the regional flood elevation and 
shall 
be 
floodproofed 
to 
the 
flood 
protection 
elevation in accordance with s. NR 116.16.  No 
variance may be granted to allow any floor below the 
regional flood elevation. An exception to the basement 
                     
17  "The usual reasons for not considering such 
questions are not present here in that there is no 
problem of an incomplete record, and the opposing 
party has had the opportunity to brief the question 
and present its arguments.  This court has said that 
whether it should review an issue raised here for the 
first time depends upon the facts and circumstances 
disclosed by the particular record.  The question is 
one 
of 
administration 
not 
of 
power. 
[citations 
omitted] 
 
Since 
the 
issue 
raised 
concerns 
the 
jurisdiction of the board of review, a subject 
properly 
reviewable on 
certiorari, 
it 
should be 
considered."  
State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 Wis. 2d 
299, 319-20, 182 N.W.2d  481 (1971). 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
32 
requirement may be granted by the department, but only 
in those communities granted such exception by the 
federal emergency management agency (FEMA) on or 
before March 1986 (emphasis added). 
¶58 The rule flatly prohibits any variance that would 
allow a residential floor below the regional flood elevation, 
unless the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has 
granted a community-wide exception, a circumstance both parties 
concede is not present here.  The court of appeals held that 
§ NR 116.13(2) prohibited the issuance of a variance for the 
Warnings' basement. 
¶59 However, the administrative rule stands in direct 
conflict 
with 
state 
statute. 
To 
the 
extent 
that 
it 
administratively prohibits all variances in a certain class of 
cases, it conflicts with the general grant of authority to 
county boards of adjustment over variance decisions.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 59.694(1) and (7). 
¶60 An 
administrative 
agency 
cannot 
exercise 
its 
rulemaking authority in contradiction of the will of the 
legislature as expressed in the statutes.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.10(2) ("[n]o agency may promulgate a rule which conflicts 
with state law") and 227.11(2)(a); Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 
76 at ¶24, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  This administrative 
rule purports to circumscribe the authority over variance 
decisions that the legislature has explicitly vested in local 
boards of adjustment. 
¶61 There is nothing in the DNR's general grant of 
authority to regulate floodplains that permits the agency to 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
33 
write rules that nullify the discretion over variance decisions 
that the legislature has specifically committed to local boards 
of adjustment. Thus, to the extent that § NR 116.13(2) prohibits 
county boards of adjustment from granting variances from flood 
elevation requirements where the proper statutory standards for 
such variances have otherwise been met, it is invalid.18  
Accordingly, the rule is no impediment to our sustaining the 
variance here. 
V 
¶62 The court of appeals decided this case on the basis of 
Kenosha County and § NR 116.13(2) and therefore did not address 
whether the issuance of the variance was consistent with the 
procedures and standards of the Outagamie County Shoreland-
Floodplain-Wetland Zoning Ordinance.  We conclude that it was. 
¶63 The Ordinance promulgates the variance statute at the 
local level, and authorizes the Board to grant variances which 
are not contrary to the public interest where, "owing to special 
conditions unique to the property, a literal enforcement [of the 
zoning code] will result in unnecessary hardship, so that the 
spirit of the chapter shall be observed, public safety and 
                     
18 The dissent characterizes this conclusion as a "judicial 
grant" 
of 
"plenary 
power" 
to 
boards 
of 
adjustment 
that 
undermines the DNR's ability to regulate floodplains.  To the 
contrary, this conclusion merely recognizes and gives effect to 
a legislative grant of power to boards of adjustment.  The DNR 
is free to regulate floodplains to its heart's content, provided 
it does so consistently with the statutes.  The legislature, 
however, has explicitly committed variance decisions to local 
boards of adjustment, not the DNR.  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(1). 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
34 
welfare 
secured 
and 
substantial 
justice 
done." 
Ordinance 
§ 16.40(2)(b); Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c).  Section 16.40(4) of 
the Ordinance sets out the procedure for the issuance of a 
variance, and also provides: 
 
In all cases, a variance: 
(a) Shall not permit any change in established flood 
elevations or profiles. 
(b) Shall not be granted for a condition that is 
common to a group of adjacent lots or premises. 
(c) Shall not be granted unless it is shown that the 
variance will not be contrary to the public interest 
or damaging to the rights of other persons or property 
values in the area.   
(d) Shall not be granted for actions which require an 
amendment 
to 
this 
chapter, 
the 
maps 
or 
other 
ordinances of the county.   
(e) Shall not have the effect of allowing or  
expanding a use or structure which is prohibited in 
that zoning district. 
(f) Shall not be granted solely on the basis of 
economic gain or loss. 
(g)  Shall not be granted for a self created hardship. 
(h) 
Shall 
not 
permit 
a 
lower 
degree 
of 
flood 
protection in the floodway area than the flood 
protection elevation, as defined in § 16.05.  In the 
flood fringe area a lower degree of flood protection 
than the flood protection elevation may be allowed 
pursuant to § 16.35(2).  
¶64 The Board concluded that the Warnings were facing a 
unique and unnecessary hardship sufficient to meet the criteria 
for a variance under the Ordinance.  The State, however, argues 
that according to § 16.40(4)(h), variances for deviations from 
floodproofing 
requirements 
are 
allowed 
only 
pursuant 
to 
§ 16.35(2), and that section does not allow variances for 
nonconforming structures that are used for human habitation.  
No. 98-1046 
 
 
35 
Thus, according to the State, the Warnings are ineligible for a 
variance under the Ordinance.  We disagree.  
¶65 Section 16.32(4)(b)(2) of the Ordinances establishes 
the zoning standards for development in flood fringe areas and 
specifically allows variances for basement floors below regional 
flood 
elevation 
in 
buildings 
used 
for 
human 
habitation, 
referring 
back 
to 
the 
variance 
procedures 
in 
§ 16.40.  
Section 16.40(4)(h) 
allows 
for 
variances 
under 
these 
circumstances, and refers back to § 16.35.  Section 16.35(2) 
provides: 
 
16.35 EXISTING STRUCTURES IN FLOOD FRINGE AREAS. (1) 
All modifications or additions to any nonconforming 
structure which do not exceed 50% of its assessed 
value adjusted to the most current equalized value for 
the municipality shall be placed on fill or protected 
by floodproofing measures pursuant to § 16.32(4) of 
this chapter.  No structural modification or addition 
to any nonconforming structure as long as such use 
continues shall exceed 50% of its assessed value for 
the municipality, unless the entire structure is 
permanently changed to a conforming structure with a 
conforming use. 
 
(2) Where compliance with the provisions of the 
above section would result in unnecessary hardship and 
only where the structure will not be either used for 
human habitation or be associated with high flood 
damage potential, the Board of Adjustment using the 
procedure in § 16.40 may grant a variance from these 
provisions in accordance with the criteria listed 
below.  Modifications or additions to structures or 
buildings which are protected to elevations lower than 
the flood protection elevation may be permitted if: 
 
(a) Human lives are not endangered. 
 
(b) Public facilities, such as water and sewer, 
are not to be installed. 
 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
36 
(c) Flood depths will not exceed 4'. 
 
(d) Flood velocities will not exceed 2' per 
second. 
 
(e) The structure will not be used for storage of 
materials described in § 16.32(4)(e) (emphasis added).  
¶66 Thus, the Ordinance seems to both allow and disallow 
variances for residential basement floors below regional flood 
elevation.  What §§ 16.32 and 16.40 expressly authorize, § 16.35 
prohibits.  The conflict between these provisions is essentially 
irreconcilable.  We generally attempt to harmonize conflicting 
statutory provisions to give effect to the leading idea behind 
the statute.  See State v. Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d 107, 110, 233 
N.W.2d 416 (1975).  Where one provision in a statute renders 
another a nullity, it is not given effect.  Yanta v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 66, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974).  We 
conclude, therefore, that §  16.35(2) is unenforceable to the 
extent that it purports to completely prohibit variances for 
residential basement floors below regional flood elevation. 
¶67 In any event, § 16.35(2) refers back to § 16.35(1), 
which, although awkwardly phrased, appears to exclude from 
variance requirements any additions to existing nonconforming 
structures which do not exceed 50 percent of the structure's 
value, so long as the addition is placed on fill or otherwise 
floodproofed.  There is no evidence that the Warnings' proposed 
sun porch exceeds 50 percent of the home's value.  Furthermore, 
the sun porch will be placed on fill at or above the flood 
protection elevation.  Therefore, the issuance of the variance 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
37 
does not increase the nonconformity in violation of the 
Ordinance. 
VI 
¶68 In summary, I would overrule Kenosha County and 
restore the distinction between use and area variances in the 
law of zoning in this state.  I conclude that "unnecessary 
hardship" for purposes of a use variance is established when it 
is shown that no reasonable use of the property is feasible 
without a variance.  "Unnecessary hardship" for purposes of an 
area variance is established when it is shown that strict 
compliance with an area restriction would unreasonably prevent 
the property owner from using the property for a permitted 
purpose or is otherwise unnecessarily burdensome. 
¶69 Both standards are considered in light of the purpose 
of the zoning restriction in question and with the goal of doing 
substantial justice as between the individual property owner and 
the community.  The reasons for granting either type of variance 
must be substantial and not contrary to the public interest or 
detrimental to the community plan.  Considered against the 
proper standard, and deferring to the discretion of the Board of 
Adjustment as the statutorily designated arbiter of local zoning 
disputes, I conclude that the Board's issuance of a variance to 
the Warnings under the circumstances of this case was justified. 
¶70 Further, we conclude that Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
116.13(2) conflicts with Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1g) and is therefore 
invalid to the extent that it prohibits all variances for 
residential floors below regional flood elevation.  Finally, we 
No. 98-1046 
 
 
38 
conclude that the Board's action complied with the procedures in 
the 
Outagamie 
County 
Shoreland-Floodplain-Wetland 
Zoning 
Ordinance.  The variance in this case is fully consistent with 
the spirit of the Ordinance, public safety and welfare, and 
substantial justice.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
   
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
1 
¶71 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring).  I concur with the 
lead opinion and mandate, but reach the conclusion to reverse 
the court of appeals and affirm the issuance of a variance by a 
different route.  I write separately because I see no reason to 
overrule State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 
396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998).  Stare decisis is a cornerstone of 
the judicial process, and, absent a compelling reason to 
overrule precedent, this court should abide by that precedent.  
CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 586-87, 579 N.W.2d 668 
(1998) (Crooks, J., concurring). 
¶72 I agree with the lead opinion's analysis of Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) and Outagamie County Shoreland-
Floodplain-Wetland Zoning Ordinances §§ 16.32, 16.35, and 16.40. 
It is with the lead opinion's interpretation of the "unnecessary 
hardship" 
standard 
that 
I 
part 
company, 
however. 
 
The 
"unnecessary hardship" standard was addressed in Snyder v. 
Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 247 
N.W.2d 98 (1976).  Prior to the time Snyder was decided, area 
variances apparently were granted based upon a showing of 
"practical difficulties" which was "something much less severe 
than unnecessary hardship."  Id. at 473.  Use variances, in 
contrast, were granted upon a showing of "unnecessary hardship." 
Id.  Snyder eliminated that distinction.  
 
[W]e think that there should be no significant 
practical 
distinction 
drawn 
between 
the 
terms 
unnecessary hardship and practical difficulties, and 
where it appears, the phrase "practical difficulty or 
unnecessary hardship" should be construed as a whole, 
for 
where 
peculiar 
and 
exceptional 
practical 
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
2 
difficulties, 
which 
justify 
a 
variance, 
exist, 
unnecessary hardship will also exist.     
Id. at 474 (citation omitted). Whether an area or use variance 
should be granted depends upon the purpose underlying the 
specific provision of the zoning code to which a variance is 
being sought.  Id. at 473.  This is evident from what the lead 
opinion has already quoted from Snyder, and it is worth 
repeating: 
 
[A]rea variances are not more easily obtained because 
practical difficulties are something much less severe 
than unnecessary hardship, but because area variances 
do not involve great changes in the character of 
neighborhoods as do use variances. This relates to 
what 
hardships or 
practical 
difficulties 
may be 
considered unnecessary or unreasonable in light of the 
purpose of the zoning law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶73 Kenosha County did not explain the differences, if any 
real differences existed after Snyder, between area and use 
variances and the applicable tests for granting such variances. 
Instead, this court specifically refused to reach that issue. 
 
Both parties, and the court of appeals, have spent 
some time trying to differentiate, either in words or 
in application, the tests for granting a use variance 
and an area variance.  [However, n]either party 
disputes that Huntoon has requested an area variance. 
Thus, for purposes of this case, we need not decide 
whether there is a difference between the two types of 
variances, and what that difference may be.   
Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 412 n.10.  Kenosha County did 
consider the parties' definitions of the unnecessary hardship 
standard in light of the purpose of the shoreland zoning 
regulations at issue.  The State proffered a "no reasonable use 
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
3 
in the absence of a variance" standard; the Board proffered an 
"unnecessarily burdensome" standard.19  Id. at 411-12.  This 
court concluded that the State's test better incorporated the 
purpose underlying the regulations, "to enforce a uniform 
setback that preserves the public's interest in shoreland and 
the navigable waters of the state."  Id. at 413. 
¶74 Kenosha County, like Snyder, reiterated that "whether 
a particular hardship is unnecessary or unreasonable is judged 
against the purpose of the zoning law."  Kenosha County, 218 
Wis. 2d at 412-13.  Within this general parameter, county boards 
of adjustment have some very real flexibility in granting 
variances.  The boards can determine, by looking to the purpose 
underlying the ordinance at issue, what reasonably constitutes 
an unnecessary hardship.  Implicit in considering the variance 
request in relation to the ordinance's purpose is consideration 
                     
19 Even though the court declined to comment on the 
difference between an area and use variance, the two tests 
proffered followed the two alternatives of Snyder's area 
variance unnecessary hardship standard. 
When considering an area variance, the question of 
whether unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty 
exists is best explained as "[w]hether compliance with 
the strict letter of the restrictions governing area, 
set backs, frontage, height, bulk or density would 
unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property 
for a permitted purpose or would render conformity 
with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome." 2 
Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 45-28 (3d ed. 
1972). 
 
Snyder v. Waukesha county Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 
468, 474-75, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976) (emphasis added). 
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
4 
of the nature of the restriction in the ordinance.  That is, 
boards 
of 
adjustment 
should 
also 
consider 
whether 
the 
restriction involves, for example, "set backs, frontage, height, 
bulk or density" (Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 475), or whatever 
restriction is at issue.  Consideration of a variance request as 
it relates to the purpose of the zoning ordinance, along with 
review of the specific restriction at issue, must necessarily 
take into account the differences resulting from the granting of 
an area or use variance.  Indeed, "because area variances do not 
involve great changes in the character of neighborhoods as do 
use variances," the purpose of the zoning ordinance may not be 
so likely undermined by an area variance as it might be by a use 
variance.   
¶75 That the county boards of adjustment have flexibility 
in granting and denying variances is reflected in the standard 
by which courts review decisions of the boards.  This, too, was 
reiterated in Kenosha County.  
 
Reviewing courts accord a decision of a board of 
adjustment a presumption of correctness and validity. 
 A reviewing court may not substitute its discretion 
for that committed to the Board by the legislature.  
However, 
when 
a 
Board 
of 
Adjustment 
acts 
on 
application for a variance, it acts in a quasi-
judicial capacity.  The Board's action must be based 
upon evidence.  On certiorari review, a reviewing 
court 
applies 
the 
substantial 
evidence 
test 
to 
ascertain whether the evidence before the Board was 
sufficient.  If any reasonable view of the evidence 
would sustain the findings of the Board, the findings 
are conclusive. 
218 Wis. 2d at 415-16 (internal citations omitted). 
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
5 
¶76 Accordingly, this court presumes that the Outagamie 
Board of Adjustment's decision is correct and valid.  At issue 
here are shoreland/floodplain/wetland ordinances which may have 
some overlapping purposes with the shoreland ordinances at issue 
in Kenosha County.  According to the Board's findings here, 
however, it did not consider the purpose underlying that 
ordinance.  The Board did not contemplate whether the Warnings' 
hardship——that they would have to fill in the basement, or be 
forced to sell the house with a non-conforming basement, or move 
the house onto a conforming basement——was unnecessary or 
unreasonable in order to protect the public health and welfare 
in the flood fringe district where the Warnings resided.20  Nor 
did the Board consider whether, per Kenosha County, there was 
"no reasonable use in the absence of a variance."  The Board may 
have concluded that the Warnings would have had some reasonable 
use of their property without a variance——that is, they need 
only fill their basement or move their house.  However, the "no 
reasonable use" language of Kenosha County should have been 
applied by the Board only after considering the purpose of the 
zoning ordinance, and the nature of the specific restriction at 
issue.  A reviewing court should then look at whether the Board 
considered such matters when applying the presumption of 
correctness and validity and the substantial evidence test.   
                     
20 The unnecessary hardship here is not that the Warnings 
are not allowed to build a sun porch.  The hardship is that they 
have a non-conforming basement, resulting in the problems noted 
herein.  
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
6 
¶77 Because the Outagamie County Board of Adjustment did 
not consider the purpose of the underlying ordinance or Kenosha 
County's "no reasonable use" test, this case might be remanded 
to the Board to determine whether the Warnings are entitled to a 
variance in consideration of the purpose of the ordinances at 
issue and the nature of the restriction involved.  However, 
remand is not necessary because the Board properly considered 
that a variance was in order, due to the fact that the Warning's 
hardship had been caused "by the Town of Bovina and the building 
inspector."21  (See Outagamie County Board of Adjustment's 
findings at ¶17 of the lead opinion.) 
                     
21 The building permit was granted by the "Town Building 
Inspector," however, the heading on the document indicates that 
it was from the Office of the Building Inspector, Outagamie 
County, and was directed to the Outagamie County Building 
Inspector. 
The Outagamie County Board of Adjustment did not find that 
the County Planning and Zoning Administration may have added to 
the Warnings' hardship, but it appears that the Board could 
have.  The Board found that the Outagamie County Zoning 
Department was not contacted, at the time that the Town had 
issued the Warnings a building permit, regarding issuance of a 
shoreland zoning permit.  (There is no indication that the 
Department 
is 
different 
than 
the 
Planning 
and 
Zoning 
Administration.)  According to 1995 correspondence from the 
Planning and Zoning Administration to the Warnings, however, the 
Administration had a "record of  . . . the building permit 
issued by the Town."  It seems apparent that the County was on 
notice, at some point, that the Warnings had a building permit, 
but not the necessary shoreland zoning permit.  Yet, the County 
did nothing until 1995.  Consequently, it appears that the 
County was as much a part of causing the Warning's hardship as 
the Town.  
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
7 
¶78 The Outagamie County Board of Adjustment apparently 
realized that the circumstances here effectively estopped the 
Board from denying the Warning's variance request.  Apparently, 
the Warnings needed, in addition to the building permit from the 
Town of Bovina, a zoning permit from the County.  Although the 
Warnings needed the additional zoning permit, there is no 
contention that the building permit issued was invalid.  The 
Town had issued a building permit, upon which the Warnings 
depended in building their house.  Consequently, we do not have 
before us the situation that existed in Snyder, where the 
variance applicant had proceeded with construction before he 
obtained a permit——which would have been an "unauthorized act[]" 
of a municipal officer and "void as issued for a structure which 
is forbidden by the ordinance."  74 Wis. 2d at 477.  Nor do we 
have before us the situation where a subordinate municipal 
officer acted erroneously, and the municipality later sought to 
enforce a zoning ordinance.22  See Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of 
                     
22 The dissent has ignored the important distinction between 
this case and Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d 468, and Willow Creek Ranch v. 
Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 
693.  In Snyder and Willow Creek, the applicant attempted to 
assert estoppel to prevent the municipality from enforcing its 
zoning ordinance.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476; Willow Creek, 2000 
WI 56 at ¶49.  "Although municipalities are not wholly immune 
from the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it is well established 
that erroneous acts or representations of municipal officers do 
not afford a basis to estop a municipality from enforcing zoning 
ordinances enacted pursuant to the police power."  Willow Creek, 
2000 WI 56 at ¶49 (citing, among others, Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 
476-77) (footnote and other citations omitted).  However, here, 
in contrast, it is the Outagamie Board of Adjustment which has 
apparently considered that it was estopped from enforcing its 
zoning ordinances.  There is nothing in Snyder, Willow Creek, or 
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
8 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693; 
Milwaukee v. Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72, 78, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966); 
see also Jelinski v. Eggers, 34 Wis. 2d 85, 94, 148 N.W.2d 750 
(1967) ("[E]stoppel should not apply to an adjacent property 
owner seeking enforcement of the ordinance who was in no way 
responsible for the issuance of the building permit.").  Rather, 
this case is closer to Russell Dairy Stores v. Chippewa Falls, 
272 Wis. 138, 74 N.W. 759 (1956), wherein the city had issued a 
permit to cut a curb and construct a driveway, and then 
subsequently rescinded the permit.  Id. at 141-42.  Here, the 
Town of Bovina issued a building permit without also, at the 
very least, notifying the Warnings that they also needed a 
zoning permit to proceed.  For the County not to grant an after-
the-fact variance——11 years after the fact——would be akin to 
rescinding a permit after the Warnings had long relied upon it. 
¶79 Typically, equitable concerns, such as estoppel, would 
be considered during an enforcement action.  See, e.g., Forest 
County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 681-82, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998). 
 However, we are faced with unique circumstances here that 
required the Outagamie Board of Adjustment to consider estoppel 
in concluding that the Warnings faced an unnecessary hardship. 
In applying the substantial evidence test, I am satisfied that a 
reasonable view of the evidence supports the Board's findings 
that the Town of Bovina and the building inspector caused the 
                                                                  
any of our other cases that suggests that a County Board of 
Adjustment cannot consider estoppel, when determining whether or 
not to grant a variance from the County's ordinance.  
No. 98-1046.npc 
 
9 
Warnings' 
predicament, 
and 
those 
findings 
are 
conclusive.  
Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 416.  Similarly, as noted 
previously, the Board's decision is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness and validity.  Id. at 415. 
¶80 In sum, I agree with the lead opinion that the 
Outagamie County Board of Adjustment correctly issued a variance 
to the Warnings.  However, I find no compelling reason to 
overrule Kenosha County.  Instead, I read Kenosha County as 
applying the rule from Snyder, that the purpose of the ordinance 
guides the determination of whether there is an unnecessary 
hardship that would warrant a variance.  I recognize that the 
Board did not consider the purpose of the ordinances at issue in 
granting the Warnings a variance for their non-conforming 
basement, in order to obtain a permit to build a sun porch.  
However, the Board "proceeded on a correct theory of law" in 
concluding, 
in 
effect, 
that 
it 
was 
estopped 
from 
doing 
otherwise.  Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 410. For these 
reasons, I respectfully concur with the lead opinion and the 
mandate. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
98-1046.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶82 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring).   I join the lead 
opinion in this case for several reasons.  First, the law on 
zoning variances must be reexamined and clarified.  Second, the 
State's reliance on Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) in these 
circumstances is disturbing.  Third, the result of an affirmance 
would be unjust. 
¶83 I wholeheartedly support the lead opinion's call to 
overrule State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 
2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998).  A strong argument can be made 
that the Kenosha County Board of Adjustment should not have 
granted a variance to the property owner in that case because 
the variance would have permitted the construction of a deck 
within 64 feet of the shoreline, thereby breaching the 75-foot 
setback standard.  Nonetheless, in overturning the Board's 
decision, the court virtually obliterated the authority of 
boards of adjustment to grant area variances under limited but 
reasonable circumstances. 
¶84 The State's reliance on the administrative rule to 
block the variance here requires more extended comment. 
 
I 
 
¶85 The Warnings received a building permit on April 25, 
1984.  They built a home relying on that permit.  Their ranch 
home with basement was constructed 96 feet back from the center 
98-1046.dtp 
 
2 
of a state highway and between 350 and 400 feet away from a 
small river. 
¶86 Eleven years later, the Warnings applied for a permit 
to add a ground level sun porch to their home.  The Outagamie 
County Zoning Administrator denied their request, indicating 
that the basement violated the Outagamie County Shoreland-
Floodplain-Wetland Ordinance (the Ordinance) because it was 
below the regional flood elevation. 
¶87 After 
they 
received 
the 
denial, 
the 
Warnings 
petitioned the Outagamie County Board of Adjustment for a 
variance to keep their basement and become eligible for a new 
building permit.23  They appeared at a public hearing on November 
1, 1996, and presented their case.  They explained that there 
had been no attempt to violate the Ordinance.  They had obtained 
a building permit and relied on the building permit.  Their 
attorney, Richard Carlson, stated that it would have been easy, 
before construction of the house, to elevate the basement by 
adding additional fill if the Warnings had only received notice. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Warning expressed surprise that basements were 
a problem. Barbara Warning commented that "all the homes in the 
neighborhood are much lower than what we are and they all have 
                     
23 Our focus here is the basement, not construction of the 
sun porch.  The variance application was a request to deviate 
from the basement flood protection elevation requirements.  
Construction of the proposed sun porch is a distinct and 
separate occurrence that would have ensued only after the 
favorable granting of the variance from basement elevation 
requirements. 
98-1046.dtp 
 
3 
full basements, but they were built before the ordinance was put 
into place."  David Warning added:  "No one knew that you could 
not have a basement there.  I mean everybody up and down the 
whole road has got basements in."  When the zoning administrator 
was asked by a board member whether there were other homes in 
the neighborhood with basements built prior to the ordinance, he 
acknowledged that there were "a lot of them."   
¶88 The zoning administrator opposed the variance.  He was 
joined 
in 
opposition 
by 
Richard 
Koch, 
Water 
Management 
Coordinator for the Lake Michigan District of the Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), who had received notice 
of the hearing, as the Ordinance requires.  In an October 31, 
1996, letter to the Board and in his personal appearance before 
the Board, Koch argued that the Warning ranch home was "an 
illegal structure" in violation of the Ordinance.  Koch wrote 
that the "Board of Adjustment cannot grant the requested 
variance because the variance criteria in section 16.40(4) of 
the ordinance cannot be met (e.g., any 'hardship' is self-
created). . . . I ask the Outagamie County Board of Adjustment 
to deny the application . . . for a variance to allow a basement 
floor to remain below the Regional flood elevation" (emphasis 
added). 
¶89 Both 
the 
zoning 
administrator 
and 
the 
DNR 
representative framed their arguments in terms of the Warnings' 
inability to satisfy the criteria for a variance under the 
Ordinance.  Neither the zoning administrator nor the DNR 
representative cited Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2)(June, 1996) 
98-1046.dtp 
 
4 
as prohibiting the Board of Adjustment from granting any 
variance in these circumstances. 
¶90 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board of 
Adjustment voted unanimously to grant the requested variance.  
The Board reasoned that the Warnings' hardship was caused by the 
Town of Bovina and its former building inspector who had 
negligently issued a building permit without obtaining clearance 
from the County.  "The hardship is not based solely on economic 
gain or loss, [but] the loss [from filling in the basement] 
would be substantial."  The Board also felt that the proposed 
addition to the home would comply with the floodproofing 
requirements because the sun porch would be two feet above the 
flood protection elevation.   
¶91 The 
State, 
at 
the 
request 
of 
the 
DNR, 
sought 
certiorari review in circuit court.  The State advanced several 
arguments but repeatedly asserted that the Board had violated 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) by granting the variance.  The 
Warnings, in turn, insisted that the State had waived that 
argument by not making it before the Board.  Circuit Judge John 
A. Des Jardins agreed with the Warnings.  In affirming the 
Board, the court found that the Warnings had at all times acted 
in good faith, that they had suffered a hardship that was not 
self-created, and that "the DNR did place into argument before 
that board a number of issues, but did not raise the issue of 
§ NR 116.13(2) being more restrictive than the Outagamie County 
Floodplain-Wetland Ordinance, and it was not raised before the 
98-1046.dtp 
 
5 
Board of Adjustment."  The court therefore concluded that the 
issue had been waived. 
¶92 Had the State stopped at this point, after having lost 
twice, this case about the legality of a 17-year-old basement 
never would have come to this court.  But the State refused to 
stop.  It appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  After 
addressing the Warnings' eligibility for a variance under the 
Ordinance, the court of appeals held that "even if the Warnings 
could meet the above requirements, we conclude that WIS. ADM. 
CODE § NR 116.13(2) forecloses the issuance of a variance to the 
Warnings for a basement that is below the regional flood 
elevation."  State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 
98-1046, unpublished slip op. at 8-9 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 
1998).  The court observed that the State had not raised this 
issue before the Board of Adjustment: 
 
The State did not raise this issue before the board.  
The State argues, disingenuously, that it did not 
waive its argument under WIS. ADM. CODE § NR 116.13(2) 
because it was not a party at the administrative 
level.  Although perhaps not a party in form, it 
certainly was in substance.  The State appeared before 
the board and advanced arguments in objection to the 
Warnings' request for a variance.  Generally, issues 
not raised before the agency cannot be raised on 
judicial review.  See Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 
537, 545, 289 N.W.2d 270, 274 (1980).  The Warnings, 
however, have failed to respond to the waiver argument 
and, therefore, it is deemed conceded.  See Charolais 
Breeding Ranches v. FPC Secs., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 
N.W.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1979). 
Id. at 9 n.5. 
II 
98-1046.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶93 After a board of adjustment has made its decision on a 
request for a variance, a person who is aggrieved by the 
decision, such as the applicant or the State, as well as an 
enumerated list of other interested persons, may commence an 
action in the circuit court "seeking the remedy available by 
certiorari."  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).24  The State followed that 
course in this case. 
¶94 In a certiorari action reviewing the decision of a 
board of adjustment, a court shall accord a presumption of 
correctness and validity to the board's decision.  Snyder v. 
Waukesha County Zoning Bd., 74 Wis. 2d 468, 476, 247 N.W.2d 98 
(1976) (citing Richard W. Cutler, Zoning Law and Practice in 
Wisconsin, § 15, at 63 (1967)).  In the context of this case, 
once the Board of Adjustment issued a variance, the State had 
the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness of the 
Board's decision. 
¶95 Subsection (10) of Wis. Stat. § 59.694 specifically 
authorizes the circuit court to take additional evidence.  In 
this case, the circuit court did not take additional evidence 
and was not urged by the State to do so.  Hence, the standard of 
review is limited to: (1) whether the Board kept within its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct theory of 
law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
                     
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.694(10) is the former Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.99(10) (1993-94).  
98-1046.dtp 
 
7 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and 
(4) whether the evidence was such that the Board might 
reasonably make the order or determination in question.  Kenosha 
County, 218 Wis. 2d at 410-11; Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 475. 
¶96 When courts apply these standards, they are not 
entitled to substitute their views for the discretion of boards. 
 In State ex rel. Brookside v. Jefferson County Board of 
Adjustment, 131 Wis. 2d 101, 120-21, 388 N.W.2d 593 (1986), this 
court said: 
 
The Snyder court interpreted these four standards as 
requiring the circuit court to defer to the decision 
of 
the 
Board 
unless 
the 
Board's 
decision 
is 
"unreasonable and without a rational basis. . . .  
Thus, the findings of the board may not be disturbed 
if any reasonable view of the evidence sustains 
them. . . . The 
court 
may 
not 
substitute 
its 
discretion for that committed to the board by the 
legislature."  74 Wis. 2d at 476.  We conclude that in 
Snyder the court adopted the same standard of review 
for statutory certiorari as for common law certiorari, 
at least when the circuit court takes no evidence. 
¶97 In certiorari review at common law, this court reviews 
the record of the board.  Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc. v. Sauk 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 515 N.W.2d 256 
(1994).  The first step in the review is to determine which 
facet of the board's action is challenged.  "We then apply the 
portion of certiorari review applicable to that facet of the 
Board's action."  Id. (citing Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476). 
¶98 In the circuit court, the State asserted that the 
Board's decision "was beyond the Board's jurisdiction, erroneous 
98-1046.dtp 
 
8 
and inadequate as a matter of law, and unsupported by the 
evidence."  
¶99 The Board's action interpreting the Ordinance was 
unquestionably subject to judicial review in line with the four 
traditional standards of review noted above.  It is very 
disturbing, however, that appellate courts have reviewed Board 
action on the basis of legal objections that never were raised 
before the Board. 
¶100 Courts normally will not review an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal.  Allen v. Allen, 78 Wis. 2d 263, 270, 
254 N.W.2d 244 (1977); Clay v. Bradley, 74 Wis. 2d 153, 161, 246 
N.W.2d 142 (1976); Segall v. Hurwitz, 114 Wis. 2d 471, 489, 339 
N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1983).  The failure to make a timely 
objection constitutes waiver of the objection.  Saenz v. Murphy, 
162 Wis. 2d 54, 63, 469 N.W.2d 611 (1991); Allen, 78 Wis. 2d at 
270. 
¶101 The waiver rule is a rule of judicial administration, 
although not an inflexible one.  Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 
444, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980); Northern State Power Co. v. Hunter 
Bd. of Supervisors, 57 Wis. 2d 118, 132-33, 203 N.W.2d 878 
(1973).  Consequently, a court should be reluctant to fault a 
board of adjustment for not considering a legal argument that 
was never made.  To expect clairvoyance from a board about an 
unstated objection to the board's action disrespects the board, 
undermines its authority, encourages gamesmanship, and alters 
the nature of certiorari review.  It also deprives an adverse 
98-1046.dtp 
 
9 
party of the opportunity to address the objection and make a 
record before the board. 
¶102 In this case, the State changed its position when it 
appeared in circuit court.  It contended that Wis. Admin. Code 
§ NR 116.13(2) was more restrictive than the County Ordinance 
and superseded the Ordinance.  The circuit court ruled that the 
State had waived this objection.  Thereafter, the State devoted 
less than two pages of its brief to the court of appeals to make 
the argument that § NR 116.13(2) is the controlling law.  
Nevertheless, the court of appeals decided that the Warnings 
constructively conceded that the State's point had not been 
waived by failing to answer the argument. 
 
III 
 
¶103 The state's decision to rely on Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
116.13(2) forces close examination of this rule, which reads: 
 
  
(2) RESIDENTIAL USES.  (a)  Any structure or 
building 
used 
for human 
habitation (seasonal or 
permanent), which is to be erected, constructed, 
reconstructed, structurally altered or moved into the 
floodfringe area shall be place [sic] on fill with the 
finished 
surface of 
the 
lowest 
floor, 
excluding 
basement or crawlway, at or above the flood protection 
elevation.  If any such structure or building has a 
basement or crawlway, the surface of the floor of the 
basement or crawlway shall be at or above the regional 
flood elevation and shall be floodproofed to the flood 
protection elevation in accordance with s. NR 116.16. 
 No variance may be granted to allow any floor below 
the regional flood elevation.  An exception to the 
basement requirement may be granted by the department, 
but only in those communities granted such exception 
98-1046.dtp 
 
10
by the federal emergency management agency (FEMA) on 
or before March 1, 1986. 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) (June, 1996). 
¶104 There should be no mistake about what the State is up 
to here.  It is seeking retroactive application of a rule that 
did not exist in its present form until after the Warnings had 
built their basement.  The present form of the rule was not 
enacted until almost two years after the Warnings' house was 
constructed. 
¶105 The rule in question, Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13, 
was part of a substantial revision of § NR 116 in 1986.  The 
change took effect March 1, 1986.  Cr. Register, Feb. 1986, No. 
362.  The revision entailed a significant toughening of § NR 
116, which is evident in a number of sections.  For example, the 
definition of "variance" was rewritten.  The pre-1986 definition 
of "variance" in § NR 116.03(29) read: 
 
VARIANCE.  A variance authorizes the construction 
or maintenance of a building or structure in a manner 
which 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
dimensional 
standards 
contained in the flood plain zoning ordinance.  A 
variance 
can 
only 
be 
granted 
by 
the 
board 
of 
adjustment/appeals.  A variance shall not permit a use 
of property otherwise prohibited by the flood plain 
zoning ordinance; 
it 
may 
permit 
deviations 
from 
dimensional standards. 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.03(29) (Register, Oct., 1985, No. 358) 
(emphasis added). 
¶106 The revised definition of "variance" reads: 
 
"Variance" means an authorization by the board of 
adjustment or appeals under s. NR 116.21(4), for the 
construction or maintenance of a building or structure 
in a manner which is inconsistent with dimensional 
98-1046.dtp 
 
11
standards 
contained 
in 
the 
floodplain 
zoning 
ordinance. 
 
Note:  A variance can only be granted by the 
board of adjustment or appeals.  A variance may not 
permit a use of property otherwise prohibited by the 
floodplain zoning ordinance or allow construction not 
protected to the flood protection elevation; it may, 
however, permit deviations from dimensional standards. 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.03(49) (June, 1996) (emphasis added). 
 The revised definition seeks to exclude elevation from the 
scope of dimensional standards so that construction for a lawful 
use that does not meet a certain elevation cannot receive a 
variance based upon inconsistency with a dimensional standard. 
¶107 The 
pre-1986 
provision 
on 
residential 
uses 
in 
floodfringe areas (outside the floodway) was contained in Wis. 
Admin Code § NR 116.14(2) and read: 
 
(2) RESIDENTIAL USES.  (a) Any structure or 
building 
used 
for human 
habitation (seasonal or 
permanent), which is to be erected, constructed, 
reconstructed, altered, or moved into the flood fringe 
area shall be placed on fill, with the finished 
surface of the first floor at or above the flood 
protection elevation.  If any such structure or 
building has a basement, it shall be flood proofed in 
accordance with s. NR 116.16.  Any community that is 
eligible for the federal flood insurance program must 
comply with the HUD standards which currently do not 
allow basements in flood plain areas.  An exception to 
that basement requirement may be granted by HUD, but 
only on a community-by-community basis. 
Wis. Admin Code § NR 116.14(2) (Register, Oct., 1985, No. 358) 
(emphasis added). 
¶108 In the old subsection, the focus is on the first floor 
elevation and floodproofing for a basement.  That is very 
different from the revised rule that contains the sentence: "No 
98-1046.dtp 
 
12
variance may be granted to allow any floor below the regional 
flood elevation."  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) (June, 1996). 
 
¶109 The 
pre-1986 provision on 
nonconforming uses in 
floodfringe areas appeared in § NR 116.15(4) and read: 
 
(4) FLOOD FRINGE AREAS.  (a) No modifications or 
additions to any existing structure or building in the 
flood fringe area shall be permitted unless such 
modifications and additions comply with the applicable 
regulations for that particular use in flood fringe 
areas as contained in the local ordinances. 
 
(b) Where compliance with the provisions of par. 
(a) would result in unnecessary hardship, and only 
where the structure will not be either used for human 
habitation or be associated with a high flood damage 
potential, the county, city or village may grant a 
variance from those provisions, using the criteria 
listed 
below. 
 
Modifications 
or 
additions 
to 
structures 
or 
buildings 
which 
are 
protected 
to 
elevations lower than the flood protection elevation 
may be permitted if: 
 
1. Human lives are not endangered; 
 
2. Public facilities, such as water or sewer, are 
not to be installed; 
 
3. Flood depths will not exceed 4 feet; 
 
4. Flood velocities will not exceed 2 feet per 
second; and 
 
5. The structure will not be used for storage of 
materials described in s. NR 116.14(6). 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.15(4) (Register, Oct., 1985, No. 358). 
 This old subsection requires compliance with a local flood 
fringe ordinance.  It authorizes prospective variances under 
certain conditions and variance to nonconforming structures for 
modifications and additions. 
98-1046.dtp 
 
13
¶110 The revised provision appears in § NR 116.15(3) and 
reads: 
 
(3) FLOODFRINGE AREAS.  (a) Except as provided in 
par. (b) or (c), no modification or addition to any 
nonconforming 
building 
or 
any 
building 
with 
a 
nonconforming use in the floodfringe area may be 
allowed unless such modification or addition has been 
granted by permit, special exception, conditional use 
or variance and the modification or addition is placed 
on fill or is floodproofed in compliance with the 
applicable regulations contained in s. NR 116.13(2). 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.15(3) (June, 1996).  This revised 
subsection refers back to § NR 116.13(2), with its "no variance" 
language. 
 
¶111 The old administrative rules allowed variances for 
basements 
under 
certain 
circumstances. 
 
The 
present 
administrative rules allow "no variances" for basements. 
¶112 What is the authority for these sweeping changes in 
Chapter NR 116?  The Department of Natural Resources explained 
that Chapter NR 116 repeals and recreates rules interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 87.30.  Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, Order 
of the State of Wisconsin Natural Resources Board Repealing and 
Recreating Rules, WR-14-84, at 1 (Nov. 22, 1985).  A careful 
review of § 87.30 reveals that nothing in the statute either now 
or in the past has absolutely prohibited variances from being 
issued by a county board of adjustment in these circumstances.  
Section 87.30 was not amended in the period before the 1986 
revision, so as to require a dramatic revision of Chapter NR 
116.  In fact, the DNR justified the changes to Wis. Admin. Code 
§ NR 116.13 as adherence to federal law: 
98-1046.dtp 
 
14
 
6. Basement and Dry Floodproofing Standards.  The 
language addressing basement development standards in 
s. NR 116.13 has been revised to more closely reflect 
what is required in the National Flood Insurance 
Program's floodplain management regulations.  As a 
result, no residential development or variances for 
such development will be allowed to occur below the 
regional flood elevation.  A community-wide exception 
to 
the 
basement 
standards 
applies 
to 
those 
municipalities which received the exception from the 
federal government prior to the effective date of the 
proposed rule. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, supra, at 2. 
¶113 This 
writer's 
research 
has 
unveiled 
no 
federal 
regulation that absolutely prohibits the issuance of a variance 
for residential basements below the base flood elevation in a 
flood fringe area.  On the contrary, 44 C.F.R. § 60.6 (2000) 
entitled, "Variances and exceptions," reads in part: 
 
(a) The 
Administrator 
does 
not 
set 
forth 
absolute criteria for granting variances from the 
criteria set forth in §§ 60.3, 60.4 and 60.5. . . .  
While the granting of variances generally is limited 
to a lot size less than one-half acre (as set forth in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section), deviations from 
that limitation may occur. 
¶114 The State cannot point either to a state statute or a 
federal 
regulation 
that 
absolutely 
prohibits 
a 
board 
of 
adjustment from granting a variance for a building used for 
human habitation in a floodfringe area.  Consequently, as the 
lead opinion observes,  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) is 
inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7) and appears to exceed 
statutory 
authority 
when 
it 
deprives 
a 
county 
board 
of 
adjustment the discretion to issue any variance in an entire 
class of cases. 
98-1046.dtp 
 
15
¶115 Over 
the 
years, 
the 
State's 
uncompromising 
administration of the floodplain protection rules has led to 
several 
legislative 
measures 
that 
preclude 
a 
literal 
interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13.  For instance, 
Wis. Stat. § 87.30 has been amended several times since 1986.  
The section now explicitly permits the repair, reconstruction, 
or improvement of a nonconforming building damaged or destroyed 
by a nonflood disaster.  Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1d).  This statutory 
allowance is inconsistent with a literal reading of the 
administrative rule.  In addition, the statute prohibits the DNR 
from promulgating any rule or imposing any restriction that: 
 
(a) Results in an ordinance or other regulation 
containing provisions for floodproofed residential 
basements that are more restrictive than those imposed 
by the federal emergency management agency. 
 
(b) Allows the department to deny an exception 
for such basements if the federal emergency management 
agency has granted an exception under 44 CFR 60.6. 
Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1g). 
¶116 Subsection 
(1g), 
authored 
by 
Representative 
John 
Ainsworth, who represents the Village of Shiocton and the Town 
of Bovina in the Wisconsin Assembly, permitted the Village of 
Shiocton to enact a floodplain ordinance with basements below 
the regional flood level after the Village received a FEMA 
exception in 1998.25  The Village of Shiocton is one-half mile 
south of the Warnings' home. 
                     
25 Sherry Breiting Rindt, Basements Are Missed When They Are 
Missing, The Post-Crescent, June 4, 1999, at B1. 
98-1046.dtp 
 
16
¶117 Thousands of buildings across the state were built in 
floodfringe 
areas 
before 
the 
enactment 
of 
floodplain 
regulations.  The language in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) 
cannot be read literally without depriving counties and the DNR 
of the ability to deal reasonably with these "existing lawful" 
structures.  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.03(34).  If the law did 
not afford some reasonable means to address variances for 
nonconforming structures, it might not pass constitutional 
muster.  Cf. Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 532, 195 N.W. 
544 (1923) (holding that an act of the legislature limiting the 
height of buildings was not applicable where substantial rights 
of a party had vested before the act was enacted); County of 
Sauk v. Trager, 113 Wis. 2d 48, 56, 334 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 
1983), aff'd, 118 Wis. 2d 204, 346 N.W.2d 756 (1984) (finding 
that where substantial rights have vested, zoning ordinances 
cannot be applied retroactively). 
 
¶118 The State has not played fair in this case.  I join 
the 
lead 
opinion 
to 
return 
some 
common 
sense 
to 
the 
administration of our law.  
 
 
 
 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶119 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
The lead opinion suggests that this case is about destroying a 
basement to save a house.26  Dramatic, but a mischaracterization 
of the stakes in this case.  
¶120 This case is not about the future of the Warnings' 
basement or house.  This case is about whether the Warnings' 
home will have a sun porch.  Giving truth to the adage that hard 
facts make bad law, this case is really about whether to 
undermine the authority of the Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) to regulate floodplains and whether to ignore the 
principles of stare decisis——all to allow a homeowner to build a 
sun porch.  This case makes bad law.  I therefore dissent. 
 
I 
 
¶121 At the outset, it is important to state what this case 
is all about.  The Warnings are not being asked to destroy their 
basement.  Neither the County nor the State has ever taken 
action to address the basement violation.27  This case is about a 
sun porch for the Warnings, but the legal principles governing 
                     
26 See lead op. at ¶¶1, 52. 
27 This is not an enforcement action commenced against an 
owner for a violation.  If this case were an enforcement action, 
consideration of the equities might be appropriate.  See Forrest 
v. Goode, 21 Wis. 2d 655, 681-82, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998) 
(considerations given to equities in an enforcement action). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
2 
this case have a significant impact on the rest of the people of 
the State. 
¶122 The lead opinion suggests that the law should not bar 
homeowners like the Warnings, whose home is a "non-conforming 
structure" in the eyes of the law (albeit through no fault of 
their own), from adding a sun porch to their homes.28 
¶123 The owners' inability to add a sun porch follows, 
however, directly from state law——state law that restricts 
development in floodplain zones.  Construction on floodplains is 
regulated by state statute, DNR rules, county, city, and village 
ordinances, and federal statutes and regulations.29  Indeed, the 
regulation of floodplains is, even to experienced practitioners 
in Wisconsin water law, a confusing amalgamation of federal, 
state, and local laws——laws not always internally consistent or 
consistent with each other.  
¶124 Nevertheless, it is clear that the legislature has 
given the DNR, not a County Board of Adjustment, ultimate 
authority over floodplains.  The applicable state statute is 
Wis. Stat. § 87.30.  The legislature declared that the purpose 
of various statutes enacted in Chapter 614 of the Laws of 1965, 
including Wis. Stat. § 87.30, is "to grant necessary powers and 
to organize a comprehensive program under a single state agency 
                     
28 See lead op. at ¶42. 
29 Federal statutes discourage floodplain development that 
will be subject to flood damage.  The federal government 
provides affordable flood insurance to property owners who meet 
federal standards. 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
3 
for the enhancement of the quality management and protection of 
all waters of the state, ground and surface, private and 
public."30  The single state agency is the DNR.  
¶125 The state floodplain zoning laws exist to protect 
human life and health and to minimize property damage and 
economic losses.31  Floodplain zoning focuses on avoiding 
obstructions to flood flows and exposure of property to flood 
damage.32  Floodplain zoning laws apply where there is a 1% 
chance of a flood's occurrence in any given year, which 
translates into a 26% chance that a flood will occur during the 
life of a 30-year mortgage.33  
¶126 The significance of the state interest in floodplain 
zoning is immediately apparent in the present case.  The State 
is the plaintiff in this case, a case that involves a county 
variance granted to a private property owner.  The State has 
been involved in this case since its earliest stages before the 
County Board of Adjustment.   
¶127 Section 87.30 requires counties, cities, and villages 
to enact floodplain zoning ordinances that conform to the 
                     
30 Section 1, ch. 614, Laws of 1965 (emphasis added). 
31 See lead op. at ¶43; Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.01(1) 
(June, 1996).  
32 See Department of Natural Resources, Bureau of Water 
Regulation & Zoning, Floodplain & Shoreland Management: A Guide 
for Local Zoning Officials 1.1 (Publication No. WZ-210-Rev88, 
1988).  
33 See Note to Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.03(41) (June, 
1996).  
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
4 
minimum standards adopted by the DNR.  If the local ordinance 
does not meet the minimum DNR standards, the DNR has authority 
to adopt an ordinance for the local government.34  The 
legislature has directed the DNR to promulgate rules defining 
"nonconforming building" and further prohibits the enactment of 
ordinances that allow certain improvements to nonconforming 
buildings.35  That the legislature intends the DNR to regulate 
residential basements in floodplains and regulate improvements 
of nonconforming buildings is evident in the statute that places 
restrictions on the DNR's powers to issue rules regarding 
                     
34 See Comments, § 1, ch. 437, Laws of 1977, reprinted in 
Wis. Stats. Ann. § 87.30, at 573 (West 2000).  See also Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 116.05 (June, 1996); Department of Natural 
Resources, Bureau of Water Regulation & Zoning, Floodplain & 
Shoreland Management: A Guide for Local Zoning Officials 3.34 
(Publication No. WZ-210-Rev88, 1988); Paul G. Kent, Wisconsin 
Water Law: A Guide to Water Rights and Regulations 42 (1994). 
Implementing floodplain zoning laws is necessary to ensure 
that the municipalities and their residents will be eligible for 
flood insurance through a federal insurance program and federal 
disaster relief.  See Paul G. Kent, Wisconsin Water Law: A Guide 
to Water Rights and Regulations 42 (1994). 
A DNR publication cautions municipalities that failure to 
meet DNR standards will cause development in that area to be 
nonconforming, which will result in prohibitions on future 
expansion or modification.  See Department of Natural Resources, 
Bureau of Water Regulation & Zoning, Floodplain & Shoreland 
Management: A Guide for Local Zoning Officials 3.34 (Publication 
No. WZ-210-Rev88, 1988). 
35 See Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1d)(a)1. and (1d)(c). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
5 
floodproofed basements.36  No statute, however, prevents the DNR 
from prohibiting variances for habitable residences with floors 
below the regional flood elevation. 
¶128 Given the broad grant of power to the DNR in Wis. 
Stat. § 87.30 and the stated purposes and policy of the adoption 
of § 87.30, the DNR has the authority to prohibit variances that 
it determines are against the public interest.  The DNR rule in 
issue 
in 
this 
case, 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ NR 
116.13(2) 
(June, 1996), provides that no variance may be granted to allow 
any floor below the regional flood elevation.37  This may be a 
wise rule; it may be an unwise one.  But the wisdom of the rule 
is not for this court to decide.  The power of the DNR to issue 
the rule is the issue. 
¶129 I disagree with the majority that the general power of 
a County Board of Adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7) to 
grant zoning variances trumps DNR's floodplain rules promulgated 
under § 87.30.  The court's decision today granting a County 
Board of Adjustment plenary power to allow variances in 
floodplains regardless of DNR rules is a judicial grant of power 
                     
36 Wisconsin Stat. § 87.30(1g)(a) limits the DNR's power to 
promulgate any rule that contains provisions for floodproofed 
residential basements that are more restrictive than those 
imposed by the federal emergency management agency.  This 
provision is not applicable to the present case because the 
Warnings' basement is not "floodproofed" as that word is used in 
the statutes. 
37 See Wis. Stat. § 87.30(1d)(a)1. and (1d)(c); 44 C.F.R. 
§ 60.3(c)(2). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
6 
to the counties that is inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 87.30 and 
is contrary to the long-standing interpretation of § 87.30.38 
¶130 The law is clear: A county may not enact a floodplain 
zoning ordinance that allows improvement of a nonconforming 
structure contrary to state statute, DNR rules, or federal law.39 
 By 
concluding 
otherwise, 
a 
majority 
of 
this 
court 
has 
transformed the County Board of Adjustment's statutory power to 
grant variances from a safety valve or escape hatch into a 
gaping hole in floodplain regulation that state authorities 
cannot plug.  
¶131 I recognize that a town employee erred in granting the 
initial permit allowing this house to be built with this 
basement.  I part company with the conclusion in Justice Crooks' 
concurrence that this error estopped the County Board of 
Adjustment from denying the Warnings the variance necessary to 
build their sun porch.  Justice Crooks' concurrence's estoppel 
theory runs afoul of long-established case law that estoppel 
does not arise when a property owner relies on a building permit 
                     
38 Chapter NR 116 of the DNR rules, including Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 116.13(2), at issue in the present case, has been in 
effect since 1986. 
39 See Wis. Admin Code § NR 116.13(2) (June, 1996); Wis. 
Stat. § 87.30(1d)(c); 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)(2).  A local community 
may adopt stricter standards than the DNR promulgates.  See 
Department of Natural Resources, Bureau of Water Regulation & 
Zoning, Floodplain & Shoreland Management: A Guide for Local 
Zoning Officials 3.50 (Publication No. WZ-210-Rev88, 1988). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
7 
issued in violation of an ordinance.40  The Warnings acknowledged 
as much in their arguments to this court.41  
 
II 
 
¶132 Having concluded that Wis. Stat. § 87.30 and Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 116.13(2) prohibit the County Board of 
Adjustment from granting the variance in this case, I now turn 
to the lead opinion's analysis of the legal standard governing 
variances authorized by a County Board of Adjustment.  In 
suggesting that we overrule a unanimous decision of this court 
that three justices apparently no longer agree with, the lead 
opinion loses sight of what the applicable statutes governing 
variances do and do not say. 
¶133 The lead opinion would overrule Kenosha County,42 
concluding that the decision prevents Wisconsin from joining 
other jurisdictions that distinguish area and use variances, 
                     
40 See Willow Creek v. Town of Selby, 2000 WI 56, ¶¶49, 55-
56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (erroneous acts or 
representations of municipal officers do not afford a basis to 
estop a municipality from enforcing zoning ordinances); Snyder 
v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd., 74 Wis. 2d 468, 476-77, 247 
N.W.2d 98 (1976) (no estoppel may arise against a municipality 
for the unauthorized acts of its officers; a building permit 
cannot confer the right to violate an ordinance). 
41 See Brief and Appendix of the Intervening Defendant-
Respondents-Petitioners David and Barbara Warning (dated May 4, 
1999) at 31. 
42 State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 
396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
8 
subjecting the former to a lesser standard than the latter.  See 
lead op. at ¶48. 
¶134 But this distinction between area and use variances is 
not visible in the Wisconsin statutes.  Indeed, as the lead 
opinion acknowledges, the Wisconsin statutes provide no basis 
for distinguishing area and use variances.43  Instead, under 
Wisconsin law, all variances are subject to the "unnecessary 
hardship" standard, set forth in but not defined in the statute. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c).  
¶135 I do not join the lead opinion in deviating from the 
plain language of the statute and adopting a distinction that 
has been created explicitly or implicitly by several courts.44  
Without more guidance as to the workability of the differences 
these courts have articulated, I am not convinced that these 
courts represent such a compelling mainstream that this court 
should overrule recent precedent to join them. 
¶136 Without statutory authority, the majority concludes 
that the law requires that the Warnings receive a variance for 
their non-conforming basement.  This conclusion is wrong for two 
reasons: (1) Wisconsin law does not allow us to read the 
"unnecessary hardship" standard differently depending on whether 
a variance is labeled as an area or use variance; and (2) even 
                     
43 See lead op. at ¶34.  
44 One commentator states that "[a] few courts have avowedly 
applied a less stringent standard to area variances and have 
articulated the difference between variances which affect area 
and those that affect use."  See Kenneth H. Young, 3 Anderson's 
Law of Zoning § 20.52, at 595 (4th ed. 1996). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
9 
if we were to apply a lesser standard for so-called area 
variances, the Warnings are not necessarily asking for an area 
(rather than a use) variance.  I address each of these points in 
turn. 
¶137 First, there is no good Wisconsin authority for the 
proposition that the reference to "unnecessary hardship" in Wis. 
Stat. § 59.694(7)(c) should be interpreted differently depending 
on whether the court is considering an area or a use variance.  
The statutes are silent regarding the differences between area 
and use variances.  The majority turns to the case law, relying 
on Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Board of Adjustment, 74 
Wis. 2d 468, 475, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976), as a basis for 
distinguishing between the area and use variances to determine 
the appropriate definition of "unnecessary hardship."  
¶138 But in Kenosha County,45 we clarified that this 
proposed binary analysis does not flow from Snyder.  Instead, 
Snyder requires Boards of Adjustment and reviewing courts to 
derive the appropriate standard for "unnecessary hardship" from 
the underlying purpose of the zoning regulation.46  As a result, 
this court held, by a unanimous vote, that we would interpret 
"unnecessary hardship" in Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c) as requiring 
a showing that the property owner could make "no reasonable use" 
of the property, regardless of whether the property owner 
                     
45 State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 212 Wis. 2d 
310, 569 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1997). 
46 Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473. 
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10
characterized the variance as an area or use variance.  Thus in 
Kenosha County, when the property owner would have a reasonable 
use of the property without the variance, the purpose of the 
shoreland zoning statute took precedence and the variance 
request for a deck was denied.47 
¶139 The lead opinion concludes that the principles of 
stare decisis are not sufficient to bind it to the result that 
follows in the present case.48  The lead opinion concludes that 
the imposition of a "no reasonable use" standard for all 
variances 
requiring 
a 
statutory 
showing 
of 
"unnecessary 
hardship" must be overruled because "the rule has proven to be 
intolerable simply in defying practical workability."49  I 
disagree.  Many states use the "no reasonable use" standard for 
variances.50  The standard of "no reasonable use" is well 
established in Wisconsin law.  Even under the lead opinion's 
view of Wisconsin case law, the standard has been applied and 
would presumably continue to be applied for use variances.  If 
the standard is "intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability," how can the three justices retain it for use 
                     
47 Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 421. 
48 See lead op. at ¶¶30-49.  Two of today's three votes to 
overrule our unanimous decision in Kenosha County come from 
justices who were not yet on the court when we decided that 
case. 
49 See lead op. at ¶¶30-31 (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 
(1992)). 
50 See Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 414 n.11. 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
11
variances?  I agree with Justice Crooks' concurrence that no 
compelling 
reason 
exists 
to 
overrule 
the 
Kenosha 
County 
precedent.51 
¶140 Second, the lead opinion has not shown that the 
Warnings requested an area rather than a use variance for their 
basement.  A variance is not necessarily an "area variance" 
simply because the relevant zoning regulations set forth 
dimensional limits.  The classification between area and use 
variance is not clear.52 
¶141 The lead opinion cogently recognizes the problems that 
arise when a use variance is "disguised" as an area variance.53  
Yet it inexplicably ignores the possibility that the variance at 
issue in this case is similarly disguised as an area variance.  
The variance in this case may be an area variance because it 
allows a deviation from the dimensions prescribed by the 
floodplain zoning regulations.  Or it may be a use variance in 
that it allows the Warnings to use their property in a way that 
is incompatible with a floodplain, namely, to improve a home 
                     
51 See Justice Crooks' concurring op. at ¶¶71, 80. 
52 See Kenneth H. Young, 3 Anderson's Law of Zoning § 20.06 
at 425 (4th ed. 1996) (describing use and area variances and 
concluding that "[c]lassification is not always clear").   
See also lead op. at ¶40 (discussing State v. Winnebago 
County, 196 Wis. 2d 836, 540 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1995) (a case of 
a use variance masquerading as an area variance)).  
53 See lead op. at ¶41. 
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12
that has a basement deeper than permitted by the ordinance.54  Or 
it may be a hybrid.55 
¶142 The difficulty in categorizing area and use variances 
is precisely the problem that our decision in Kenosha County 
helps address: namely, how to move away from artificial labels 
and apply a standard for all variances that will appropriately 
reflect the underlying purpose of the zoning laws at issue.56  
The lead opinion's call for an artificial distinction between 
use and area variances, unaccompanied by any guidance as to how 
to apply this distinction in a principled manner, itself defies 
practical workability.  
¶143 The guidance that I glean from the lead opinion is 
that a use variance is subject to a more restrictive standard 
than an area variance because use variances threaten to change 
the character of the neighborhood.57  This analysis follows from 
the principle set forth in Snyder, and confirmed in Kenosha 
County, that what constitutes an unnecessary hardship justifying 
a variance must be evaluated in light of the purpose of the 
zoning law. 
                     
54 See Kenneth H. Young, 3 Anderson's Law of Zoning § 20.06 
at 425 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that a variance to allow extension 
of a nonconforming use has been treated as a use variance).  
55 See Kenneth H. Young, 3 Anderson's Law of Zoning § 20.48 
at 579 (discussing cases that have treated a variance as both an 
area and use variance). 
56 See Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 412, n.10. 
57 See lead op. at ¶40 (quoting with approval the court of 
appeals decision in Kenosha County, 212 Wis. 2d 310, 319-20, 569 
N.W.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
No. 98-1046.ssa 
 
13
¶144 But even if it correctly reflected Wisconsin law, the 
lead opinion's analysis begs a key question: what is the purpose 
of the floodplain zoning law at issue in this case, and to what 
standard should a variance from a floodplain zoning law be 
held?58 
¶145 Elsewhere, the lead opinion tells us that the purposes 
of the floodplain zoning laws are "promoting public health and 
safety and protecting private property from flood damage."59 
¶146 The lead opinion is thus implicitly concluding that 
variances from zoning laws that promote health and safety and 
protect private property from flood damage are subject to a less 
restrictive 
standard 
than 
zoning 
laws 
that 
preserve 
the 
character of a neighborhood.  I cannot agree.  Thus, even if the 
lead opinion mustered four votes to overrule Kenosha County, 
which it did not, and this court were bound by the lead opinion, 
I could not conclude that future homeowners in the Warnings' 
position are subject to anything less than the no reasonable use 
standard.  To conclude otherwise is to fail to promote health 
and safety and protect private property from flood damage. 
¶147 So where does the law governing variances stand?  
Three members of this court want to erect a binary standard that 
reflects 
an 
artificial 
distinction 
between 
area 
and 
use 
                     
58 See lead op. at ¶36.  Indeed, as Justice Crooks' 
concurring opinion points out, Kenosha County has preserved the 
principle in Snyder that the existence of an "unnecessary 
hardship" requires consideration of the purpose of the zoning 
law.  See Justice Crooks' concurring op. at ¶76. 
59 See lead op. at ¶43. 
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14
variances.  Four members of the court read Kenosha County as 
permanently doing away with the artificial concepts of area and 
use variances.  Kenosha County thus survives another day.  To 
grant a variance, a County Board of Adjustment must conclude 
that the property owner has no reasonable use of the property, 
in light of the purpose of the applicable zoning regulations.  
¶148 Even if I were to assume that the County Board of 
Adjustment had the authority to grant the variance at issue in 
this case, which it did not, I would follow the analysis of the 
court of appeals and conclude that the County Board of 
Adjustment erroneously granted the Warnings' requested variance. 
 The Warnings did not show that without a variance that will 
allow them to add a sun porch to their home, they can make no 
reasonable use of the property.   
¶149 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶150 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.