Title: Ex parte Roy Price and Price Ceiling, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: H. L. Bean v. Roy Price and Price Ceiling, Inc.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1090619
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2010

REL: 05/07/10
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
_________________________
1090619
_________________________
Ex parte Roy Price and Price Ceiling, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  H.L. Bean
v.
Roy Price and Price Ceiling, Inc.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-09-900878)
WOODALL, Justice.
Roy Price and Price Ceiling, Inc. (hereinafter referred
to collectively as "Price"), petition this Court for a writ of
1090619
2
mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to transfer
the civil action H.L. Bean filed against Price and others to
Chilton County. We deny the petition.
Bean was employed by Price in the construction industry
from 1975 until October 2008, when Price terminated Bean's
employment. In his complaint, Bean alleges that, as part of
his employment, Price "guaranteed [him] a sum certain of
yearly compensation."  According to Bean, if he "did not reach
this sum certain based on his hourly wage earnings, Price ...
would make up the difference at year's end." In his complaint,
Bean included a claim against Price asserting breach of his
employment contract and seeking to recover lost wages for
Price's alleged "fail[ure] to compensate [him] for the work he
had performed."  
Price filed a motion to transfer the case to Chilton
County.  Price argued that venue was improper in Montgomery
County and that, therefore, the trial court had to transfer
the case to Chilton County, an appropriate venue.  See Rule
82(d)(1) and (3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Alternatively, Price argued
that, should the court find that venue was proper in
Montgomery County, it should nevertheless transfer the case to
1090619
3
Chilton County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See
§ 6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975.  
Bean opposed the motion to transfer.  He argued that
venue in Montgomery County was proper under § 6-3-3, Ala. Code
1975, which states, in pertinent part: "In all actions for
work and labor done or breaches of contracts ..., the action
may be commenced in the county in which the work was done
...."  Also, Bean denied that a transfer was required by the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.  In support of his
arguments, Bean attached his own affidavit, stating that,
during his employment by Price, he had "performed work and
labor in various locations within the state of Alabama, a
substantial amount of which was performed in Montgomery
County."  
The trial court, by written order, denied Price's motion
to transfer.  It found venue proper in Montgomery County under
"the plain language of" § 6-3-3.  Further, the trial court
found that the transfer of the case to Chilton County would
not be "in the interest of justice," as that phrase in § 6-3-
21.1(a) has been construed.  Price timely petitioned this
Court for mandamus relief. 
1090619
4
First, we must decide whether venue is appropriate in
Montgomery County.  "'The burden of proving improper venue is
on the party raising the issue, and on review of an order ...
refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus will not be granted
unless there is a clear showing of error on the part of the
trial court.'" Ex parte Harper, 934 So. 2d 1045, 1048 (Ala.
2006) (quoting Ex parte State Bd. for Registration of
Architects, 574 So. 2d 53, 54 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (citations
omitted)). "The burden of proof on factual issues in a venue
dispute is upon the party or parties challenging venue in the
forum." Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Ala. 1999).
All "[a]ctions for work and labor may properly be
commenced in the county where the work was done."  Rush v.
Thomas Duckett Constr. Co., 380 So. 2d 762, 764 (Ala. 1980)
(citing § 6-3-3, Ala. Code 1975).  Consequently, "[p]roper
venue in an action for work and labor will ... depend on a
determination of where that work was done.  The burden of
proving improper venue is upon the party making such a claim."
Ex parte Adamson, 408 So. 2d 151, 153 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
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5
Price argues that venue in Montgomery County is not
proper under § 6-3-3, because, according to Price, Bean's
complaint "does not state a claim for work and labor done."
Petition, at 11 (emphasis in original).  In other words,
according to Price, "[t]here is no allegation in [Bean's]
complaint that he has not been paid for work already
performed."  Petition, at 11.  However, Price mischaracterizes
the nature of the complaint, because, as Bean argues, the
"complaint clearly and specifically claims that [Price]
breached the [employment] contract by failing to pay Mr. Bean
for work and labor done by him."  Bean's brief, at 7.  Indeed,
the complaint specifically alleges that, although Bean
"performed 
his 
duties 
and 
responsibilities 
under 
the
contract," Price "breached this contract by ... failing to
compensate [Bean] for the work he had performed."  (Emphasis
added.) For this alleged breach, the complaint claims "lost
wages." 
Because the complaint contains a claim based on work and
labor already performed, the burden was on Price, the party
claiming that venue is improper in Montgomery County, to show
that no "substantial" amount of the work was done in
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6
Montgomery County.  Ex parte Adamson, 408 So. 2d at 153.
However, Price offered no evidence indicating that Bean,
Price's employee, had not performed a substantial amount of
his work in Montgomery County. In its reply brief, Price
faults Bean for offering "insufficient" evidence indicating
that a "'substantial amount' of the work he performed" was
done in Montgomery County.  Reply brief, at 3.  However, as
previously stated, the burden of proof on this factual issue
was upon Price, the party challenging venue, not upon Bean.
See Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d at 1074.
Now, we must address whether the trial court exceeded its
discretion by refusing to transfer the case to Chilton County
pursuant to § 6-3-21.1(a), the forum non conveniens statute.
"[T]his Court reviews mandamus petitions challenging a ruling
on venue on the basis of forum non conveniens by asking
whether the trial court exceeded its discretion."  Ex parte
Kane, 989 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. 2008). 
With respect to civil actions filed in a proper venue,
the circuit court "shall, for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action ... to any court of general jurisdiction in which the
1090619
7
action might have been properly filed." § 6-3-21.1(a).  "'A
defendant moving for a transfer under § 6-3-21.1 has the
initial burden of showing that the transfer is justified,
based on the convenience of the parties or witnesses or based
on the interest of justice.'" Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d at 511
(quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789
(Ala. 1998)). 
In denying Price's motion to transfer the case on the
basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial court
addressed only the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1(a).
More specifically, the trial court found that a transfer to
Chilton County was not required in the interest of justice,
because "a substantial amount of the work performed by [Bean]
occurred in Montgomery County, [thereby giving] [t]he citizens
of Montgomery County ... an interest in determining the rights
and liabilities of the parties to the suit." (Internal
quotation marks and citation omitted.)  
Rule 21(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P., requires that a
petition for the writ of mandamus "shall contain ... a
statement of the reasons why the writ should issue, with
citations to the authorities and the statutes relied on."  A
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8
failure to cite authority supporting an argument "provides
this Court with an ample basis for refusing to consider th[e]
argument[], and [a] petition could properly be denied on that
basis."  Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001).
All the cases cited by Price in support of its forum non
conveniens argument deal with only the interest-of-justice
prong of § 6-3-21.1(a); none deal with the convenience prong
of the statute.  Therefore, we will limit our analysis to the
interest-of-justice prong under the facts of this case.
"[I]n analyzing the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-
21.1, 
this 
Court 
focuses 
on 
whether 
the 
'nexus' 
or
'connection' between the plaintiff's action and the original
forum is strong enough to warrant burdening the plaintiff's
forum with the action."  Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 911 (Ala. 2008).  The trial court
concluded "that a substantial amount of the work performed by
[Bean] occurred in Montgomery County," and, as already
discussed, Price offered no evidence indicating that Bean had
not performed substantial work in Montgomery County during the
months immediately before his employment was terminated.
Surely the residents of Montgomery County have, as the trial
1090619
9
court recognized, an interest in seeing that persons are paid
properly for work and labor performed in their county.
Indeed, by providing in § 6-3-3 that "actions for work and
labor done ... may be commenced in the county in which the
work was done," the legislature has recognized a strong enough
connection between an action for work and labor done and the
county in which the work was done to justify burdening the
trial court in that county with the action.
Price has not demonstrated that the trial court exceeded
its discretion in denying its motion to transfer on forum non
conveniens grounds; therefore, Price's petition for the writ
of mandamus is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.