Title: Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist.
Citation: 535 P.2d 804, 85 Wash. 2d 348
Docket Number: 43482
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 1975

85 Wn.2d 348 (1975) 535 P.2d 804 JAMES M. GAYLORD, Appellant, v. TACOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 10 et al, Respondents. No. 43482. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. May 15, 1975. *349 Christopher E. Young and William R. Creech (of Peterson, Bracelin, Creech &amp; Young), for appellant. Ronald L. Hendry, Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard A. Monaghan and Philip Brandt, Deputies, for respondents. UTTER, J. James Gaylord was dismissed from his position as a teacher in Tacoma School District No. 10 when the district learned he was a homosexual. He appealed the district's action to superior court pursuant to RCW 28 A. 58.480, and also filed a complaint for damages and reinstatement. The court upheld the action of the school district and declined to reinstate him. He appeals. [1] One of the pivotal issues at the trial of this case was whether appellant was discharged for "sufficient cause" pursuant to RCW 28 A. 58.100, which provides in part: "Every board of directors, unless otherwise specially provided by law, shall: (1) Employ for not more than one year, and for sufficient cause discharge all certificated and noncertificated employees ..." The term "sufficient cause" was early defined as conduct which would affect the teacher's efficiency. Browne v. Gear, 21 Wash. 147, 57 P. 359 (1899); Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. 402, 10 Wn. App. 69, 516 P.2d 1080 (1973). Mr. Gaylord contends he was an excellent teacher up until the day he was discharged despite the alleged public knowledge of his status as a homosexual. He stresses the trial court's finding of fact that "There is no allegation or evidence that James Gaylord has ever committed any overt acts of homosexuality. The sole basis for his discharge is James Gaylord's status as a homosexual." He argues to this court that expert testimony showed overwhelmingly that, even if knowledge of his status as a homosexual became public, he would be able to function efficiently as a teacher without risk of harm to the school or to the pupils. The school district, on the other hand, presented testimony at trial by its administrative staff that when knowledge of appellant's status as a homosexual became known to the students and their parents, the resulting complaints would *350 affect appellant's teaching efficiency and injure the school. This crucial question of fact was resolved in favor of the school district by the trial judge. He found the public knowledge of Gaylord's status would "impair the optimum learning atmosphere in the classroom." This finding, however, was based on conclusion of law No 3, in which the judge held he had to give special emphasis to the school administrators' testimony inasmuch as "[p]ursuant to RCW 28 A. 58.1011, this court is required to give the highest consideration to the judgment of the qualified, certified educators regarding conditions necessary to maintain the optimum learning atmosphere." The court's oral opinion reflects the significance of this holding: "In the court's opinion under the evidence, and taking the evidence of the people who have to live with this, who seek under the statute to create the optimum learning atmosphere, the Court is going to rule for the Respondent. I feel I have no choice. I can say this, that I expect and I hope that this matter is taken further and that we have a clarification under our own state law on this one question. I don't think it's open and shut, and I think this would be a good vehicle for having that question tested." [2, 3] The burden of proof in this case should be placed upon the district. Its decision to discharge must be based "solely upon the cause or causes for discharge specified in the notice of probable cause ... and established by a preponderance of evidence at the hearing ..." RCW 28 A. 58.450. The interpretation of RCW 28 A. 58.101 (1) made by the trial court would lessen the burden of proof required of the district by law. The language of RCW 28 A. 58.101 (1) does not support the interpretation urged by respondent and made by the trial court. RCW 28 A. 58.101 provides: RCW 28 A. 58.1011 in turn provides: By its own terms RCW 28 A. 58.1011 only applies to those situations where rules are adopted pursuant to RCW 28 A. 58.101. The only portion of the latter statute requiring adoption of rules is subsection (2), relating to pupil conduct, discipline and rights. Subsection (1), regarding rules and regulations governing certificated employees, deals with the enforcement of those rules and regulations enacted by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The rules dealing with certificated personnel, such as appellant, are not adopted pursuant to RCW 28 A. 58.101, and the trial court's application of the mandate of RCW 28 A. 58.101 regarding weight to be given the testimony of qualified certificated educators was therefore inappropriate. This case is remanded to the trial court to enter findings of fact based upon the application of the proper statutory burden of proof of the district. WRIGHT, BRACHTENBACH, and HOROWITZ, JJ., concur. STAFFORD, C.J. (concurring specially) The trial court's finding that the teacher's status would "impair the optimum learning atmosphere in the classroom" is basic to an *352 affirmance of the district's action. The finding is necessary for a determination of the issue on appeal as well. In resolving the factual dispute that gave rise to this critical finding, the trial court relied on RCW 28 A. 58.1011 and gave added weight to the school administrators' testimony. As the majority points out, the trial court misinterpreted the requirements of RCW 28 A. 58.1011. The weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses is a judgmental matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact. Such judgmental process is neither changed nor controlled by RCW 28 A. 58.1011. In the final analysis, the district must establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 28 A. 58.450. Whether the trial court will reach the same or a contrary result, after an unfettered evaluation of the testimony, remains to be seen. Without question, there are other matters of considerable interest that await eventual resolution. I note the desire of the dissent to meet them now. But, the nature of the potential issues involved and the manner of their presentation can be considered in a proper light only after the trial court has reevaluated the testimony and entered its findings of fact. An attempt to resolve these tempting potential issues before the trial court has fulfilled its duty will short-circuit the judicial process. The cause should be remanded for reconsideration of the testimony of the several witnesses after properly weighing it, unfettered by RCW 28 A. 58.1011. The trial court should thereafter enter findings of fact based upon the burden of proof required by RCW 28 A. 58.450. FINLEY, WRIGHT, and HOROWITZ, JJ., concur with STAFFORD, C.J. RINGOLD, J.[*] (concurring in part and dissenting in part) I agree that RCW 28 A. 58.1011 was misinterpreted by the trial court. *353 I disagree with the majority as to the nature of the remand. James Gaylord attended the University of Washington on a scholarship and was named "outstanding senior" in the political science department. He graduated in 1956 with a Phi Beta Kappa award. He began teaching at Wilson High School in Tacoma in 1960. In the academic year 1967-68, while on a sabbatical leave, he returned to the University of Washington and earned a master's degree in librarianship. By letter dated November 21, 1972, he was notified that probable cause for his discharge had been found by the Board of Directors of the school district, the letter in part stating as follows: The plaintiff requested a hearing before the Board of Directors which was held on December 19, 1972. The board made the following findings and conclusions: I. II. III. IV. V. *354 I. II. III. As required by state law, the defendant board had adopted written policies for discharge. It was stipulated that the plaintiff was discharged under policy 4119 reading in part: The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, pursuant to RCW 28 A. 88.015 for a trial de novo. After 3 days of trial, the trial court entered its findings of fact: I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. The court then made the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. The assignments of error are directed solely to the entry of conclusions of law Nos. 2 through 11. A teacher may be discharged only for "sufficient cause" and the burden of proof is upon the district to establish cause for discharge. The majority has concluded that the conclusions of law are not supported by the findings of fact. No useful purpose would be served by sending the case back to the trial court for additional findings or evaluation. There are no other relevant facts which can be found. It is the obligation of this court to arrive at the appropriate conclusions of law which flow from the findings of fact. The allegations of "immorality" as sufficient cause for discharge were not maintained at the trial and not seriously argued in this court. The substance of defendant's argument interpreted most strongly in the school board's favor is that: 1. Plaintiff was not discharged for "immorality" per se; 2. Plaintiff was discharged for a "status," and the improper conduct in making "known" his status. *359 The trial court's decision is grounded in the misapplication of RCW 28 A. 58.1011, which leads him to conclusion of law No. 6: As noted by the majority, the "decision to discharge must be based `solely upon the cause or causes specified in the notice of probable cause ... and established by a preponderance of evidence at the hearing ...' RCW 28 A. 58.450." The trial court did not sustain the cause of discharge to be "immorality." "Sufficient cause" for discharge, as determined by the trial court is predicated solely on conclusion of law No. 4: Though the trial must be de novo, the statute mandates a reversal. The discharge was based upon a cause not specified in the letter of November 21, 1972, and defined by the stipulation of the parties as coming within policy 4119 "(5) immorality." In view of the majority's disposition of this matter, we must inquire whether a new determination by the trial court that the plaintiff's discharge may be sustained upon the basis that his status "would `impair the optimum learning atmosphere in the classroom,'" constitutes legally sufficient cause. The only requirement that an "optimum learning atmosphere" shall be maintained is found in RCW 28 A. 58.1011. We have concluded that the trial court was in error in its application of the statute. RCW 28 A. 58.1011 by its terms does not purport to establish cause for teacher discipline. It does not apply to proceedings to discharge a teacher. It cannot be read into RCW 28 A. 58.450. *360 The early case of Browne v. Gear, 21 Wash. 147, 151-52, 57 P. 359 (1899), defined sufficient cause as follows: Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. 49, 9 Wn. App. 857, 862, 516 P.2d 1099 (1973), points out that RCW 28 A. 67.065, requires every school board to establish evaluative criteria and procedures and: Wojt reemphasizes the requirement that sufficient cause for discharge must be based on conduct of the teacher which has adverse effects upon the "teacher's fitness to teach." Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. 402, 10 Wn. App. 69, 516 P.2d 1080 (1973), which is unique, does not alter Wojt's requirement that sufficient cause for discharge be based on conduct of the teacher affecting adversely his fitness to teach.[1] Even if it were determined that the statute intended to *361 establish a cause for discharge, it would not meet the constitutional due process test of specificity. The adjective "optimum" is defined as "best or most favorable." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (1964) and Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966). The precatory language of RCW 28 A. 58.1011 is no more than a well-intentioned legislative statement of the laudatory but seldom attainable goal. The desire to maintain the best learning atmosphere possible is not a sufficiently definite standard to deprive a teacher of his right to continue teaching. As applied in this case, RCW 28 A. 58.1011 must fail as "void for vagueness" under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285, 82 S. Ct. 275 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377, 84 S. Ct. 1316, (1963); Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405, 423 P.2d 522, 25 A.L.R.3d 827 (1967). There is no evidence nor findings of fact which can sustain the burden of proof necessary to establish sufficient cause for discharge. The matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the appellant in his position and to determine the other issues raised by the complaint. HUNTER, J. (dissenting) The majority has remanded this case to the trial court for a reevaluation of the testimony upon the theory that giving the highest consideration to the judgment of qualified certificated educators regarding conditions necessary to maintain the optimum learning atmosphere, as required by RCW 28 A. 58.1011, does not apply unless it relates to a rule adopted by the board of directors regarding pupil conduct; that a teacher who admits being a homosexual does not violate a rule regarding pupil conduct. Hence the above statutory requirement as to the weight to be given to the judgment of qualified educators, as exercised in this case, does not apply. I disagree. *362 This is reading RCW 28 A. 58.1011 out of context and disregards the entire purpose of the statute. The plain language of the statute does not limit the conditions necessary to maintain the optimum learning of the classroom to pupil conduct. It is clear that the manifest purpose of the statutory mandate is to maintain an optimum learning atmosphere in the classroom and to say this must be limited to the conduct of pupils and that it does not apply to that of a teacher, strains logic and credulity. Implicitly, it was the intention of the legislature to protect the optimum learning atmosphere in the classroom from subversion whether it be by a teacher's conduct, by his example or otherwise or by the conduct of the pupils. In this case the principal, the assistant principal, and the former assistant superintendent of personnel were unanimous in their opinion that a teacher holding himself out as a homosexual would be damaging to the optimum learning atmosphere of the classroom. Mr. John Beer, assistant principal at Woodrow Wilson High School, testified as follows: *363 High School Principal, Maynard Ponko, testified as follows: Mr. Trygve Blix, recently retired Assistant Superintendent of Personnel, Tacoma Schools, testified as follows: The foregoing testimony of qualified certificated educators clearly supports the trial court's conclusion that the school board acted properly in dismissing the appellant from the Tacoma school system. The trial court was fully justified in carrying out the purpose and intent of the statute, RCW 28 A. 58.1011, by giving the highest consideration to the testimony of these qualified certificated educators to insure that conditions necessary for the optimum learning atmosphere of the classroom are maintained. To send this case back to the trial court can serve no *364 useful purpose and will only cause undue delay in the final disposition of the case. The trial court should be affirmed. HAMILTON, J., concurs with HUNTER, J. Petition for rehearing denied August 12, 1975. [*] Justice Ringold is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38). [1] The evidence does not go beyond a conclusion that in the opinion of some school administrators the optimum learning atmosphere would be impaired. The prediction of a future event, which might not take place cannot constitute "conduct adversely affecting the teacher's classroom performance" which would be the basis for discharge.