Title: Echols v. Wells
Citation: 510 S.W.2d 916
Docket Number: B-4423
State: Texas
Issuer: Texas Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 1974

510 S.W.2d 916 (1974) Hugh T. ECHOLS, Petitioner, v. Von S. WELLS, Respondent. No. B-4423. Supreme Court of Texas. June 19, 1974. *917 Byrnes, Myers, Adair, Campbell &amp; Sinex, Ronald G. Byrnes, Houston, for petitioner. Engel, Groom, Miglicco &amp; Gibson, David A. Gibson and Jerry W. Russell, Houston, for respondent. STEAKLEY, Justice. This is a suit by Von S. Wells, Respondent here, against H. T. Echols, George B. Harrop and Robert E. Best. As it reaches us, the suit is to recover accumulated run payments from the sale of oil and gas from certain land located in Lea County, New Mexico. Harrop filed an interpleader and paid the accumulated run payments amounting to $12,813.37 into the Registry of the Court. After withdrawing the case from the jury, the circumstances of which occasioned the granting of writ of error, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing Harrop and Best as Defendants, and, as relevant here, ordered recovery by Wells of the interpleaded sum. This was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 508 S.W.2d 118. As indicated, writ of error was granted at the instance of Defendant-Petitioner Echols upon his point of error urging that the intermediate court erred in affirming the right of the trial court to withdraw the case from the jury without allowing him opportunity to offer evidence in support of his pleadings. Among other things, Echols alleged that Wells had been acting in a fiduciary capacity for him since he, Echols, had invested approximately $6,000 in what was called the first "Bagley Well", and that he was entitled to reimbursement in such amount. The error of the trial court in withdrawing the case from the jury was urged by Echols in his motion for new trial and by point of error in the intermediate court. It was the view of the latter court, however, that reversible error could not be established in the absence of a showing, by bill of exception, or other means, of the evidence Wells would have offered. We disagree in view of the sequence of events as recorded in the Statement of Facts: (The following took place without the presence of the jury.) It is apparent that after hearing the testimony offered by Plaintiff-Wells, the trial judge determined that no facts could be disputed and that the evidence he anticipated would be offered by Defendant-Echols in support of his claim for reimbursement would not be admissible. He thereupon dismissed the jury on his own motion. Following this, the trial judge called on counsel for Echols to stipulate that his claim for reimbursement did not rest on an instrument in writing; and that the evidence Echols would offer would not be admissible under the Statute of Frauds, Tex. Bus. &amp; Comm. Code Ann. § 26.01, V.T.C. A. (Tex.UCC 1968). In response, counsel for Echols stipulated "there is no written instrument evidencing" the claim of Echols for reimbursement; he did not further stipulate, as requested by the trial judge, that the evidence supporting the claim would not be admissible. Notwithstanding, the trial judge ruled that the testimony supporting *919 the claim of Echols would have been excluded by him. Having thus been foreclosed, we do not think it was incumbent upon counsel for Echols to insist upon making a record of this testimony by bill of exception or that his doing so was prerequisite to a showing of reversible error. The assertion of Echols in his application for writ of error that he was not allowed to offer evidence was not challenged by Wells in his reply and, indeed, was not challenged before the intermediate court. See Rule 419, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, it appears there were fact issues to be resolved and we must indulge every inference that may properly be drawn from the evidence against the action of the trial judge in withdrawing the case from the jury and in instructing a verdict against Echols. Cf. Adams v. Slattery, 156 Tex. 433, 295 S.W.2d 859 (1956); Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Harrison-Wilson-Pearson, 151 Tex. 635, 253 S.W.2d 422 (1952); White v. White, 141 Tex. 328, 172 S.W.2d 295 (1943); William D. Cleveland &amp; Sons v. Smith, 102 Tex. 490, 119 S.W.2d 843 (1909). Wells himself testified that he thought Echols had invested funds in the well in question. Wells also called Echols as an adverse witness and he testified that he was claiming his "original risk money" out of the lease and that he had asserted this interest in some of the funds Wells was receiving from the lease. The record indicates that Echols was not seeking an overriding royalty interest but only that he be reimbursed out of funds derived from the oil runs in a specified amount of drilling cost expenditures. It is not clear that evidence in support of his right to such reimbursement would have been inadmissible as violative of the Statute of Frauds. At the least, Echols was entitled to offer his evidence and to a trial of the issue. The judgments below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.