Title: O'Hara v. Board of Parole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055839
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2009

FILED: March 5, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
THOMAS EDWARD O'HARA,
Petitioner
on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent
on Review.
(CA A130572; SC S055839)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
December 10, 2008.
Kristin A. Carveth,
Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioner on review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, Salem.
Jeremy Rice, Assistant
Attorney General, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision for further proceedings.
*On judicial review
from the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. 218 Or App 229, 179
P3d 752 (2008).
BALMER, J.
This administrative case raises a
small but important issue respecting the procedures by which a party before an
administrative agency can obtain witnesses to testify on his behalf.  The Board
of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board) denied petitioner Thomas O'Hara's
request to present the testimony of eyewitnesses at a hearing on charges that
he had violated the conditions of his post-prison supervision, concluding that
the testimony would not be relevant.  The board found that petitioner had
violated the conditions and imposed a sanction of 45 days in jail.  The Court
of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  O'Hara v. Board of Parole, 218 Or
App 229, 179 P3d 752 (2008).  We allowed review and now reverse.
The facts pertinent to the issue
before us are not disputed.  Petitioner was convicted of various crimes and
sentenced to prison.  After his release from prison, he was placed on
post-prison supervision status.  His supervision conditions, among other
things, required him to answer his parole officer's questions truthfully and prohibited
him from associating with known drug users and from possessing weapons.  On
March 9, 2005, petitioner's parole officer, Tyler Frederickson, apparently
accompanied by two other parole officers,(1)
visited petitioner at home.  One of the officers asked petitioner if there were
"any violations" in his residence.  Petitioner responded that there
was alcohol on the premises; however, petitioner was not prohibited from having
alcohol.  Petitioner consented to a search of his residence.  Petitioner's girlfriend,
Carey Bailey, was present.  After an inquiry, the parole officers discovered
that there was an outstanding warrant for Bailey's arrest.  The parole officers
called for assistance and then awaited the arrival of a Salem Police Officer.  The
officers searched the house and found petitioner's friend, Eddie Cortez, hiding
in petitioner's closet.  Cortez was on post-prison supervision status for rape
and drug offenses and also was wanted for a parole violation.  The officers
searched Cortez and found marijuana.  They also searched petitioner and found a
folding knife.  Petitioner was charged with violating the conditions of his
post-prison supervision status by associating with a known drug user, possessing
a weapon, failing to answer all questions truthfully, and failing to report for
sex offender treatment.
On March 15, 2005, a hearings officer
met with petitioner to review his rights in the parole violation process.  See
ORS 144.343(3) (describing manner in which notice of rights is given before
parole-violation proceeding).(2) 
Petitioner filled out the appropriate sections of a notice-of-rights form, indicating
that he wanted a hearing.  He supplied the names or identities of six witnesses
who he wanted to testify at the hearing:  Bailey, Cortez, Frederickson, the two
parole officers, and the Salem Police Officer who also was present at
petitioner's arrest.  
The hearings officer confirmed that
petitioner had reviewed and signed the notice-of-rights form.
  She acknowledged that petitioner wished to call the
six persons who were present at petitioner's home on March 9, 2005, and stated
that she planned to request the presence of parole officer Frederickson, but she
rejected petitioner's request to call as witnesses the other parole officers
and the police officer.  At that point, petitioner interrupted and said,
"But essentially the people who were there
at the time, I can't call as witnesses is what you're telling me."  The
hearings officer responded that parole officer Frederickson would be there to
"represent what happened."  Petitioner countered, "So the other people
who were there who may contradict him when questions are [raised], I'm not
going to be allowed to call [them]?"  She responded, "No.  It's not
relevant to the -- the allegations."  Petitioner insisted, "Actually
-- actually it is relevant." 
The hearings officer assured petitioner that she would explain to him why the witnesses were not relevant.  Finally, when
asked if he had anything to add to the record, petitioner stated, "Just
that I'll object to any denial of any witnesses."  From that colloquy, it
appears that the hearings officer also rejected petitioner's request to call
Bailey and Cortez.(3)
On
March 28, 2005, a violation hearing was conducted before the same hearings
officer who had conducted petitioner's notice-of-rights hearing.  The hearings
officer noted petitioner's previous request to call Bailey, Cortez, and the
officers (other than Frederickson) as witnesses and again denied the request,
concluding that the testimony of those witnesses was not relevant to the issues
to be examined.  Petitioner objected to the denial of his request, asserting
that "each one would give testimony as to what they saw at that time for
their part in the actions that Mr. Frederickson has deemed to be violations."
 Petitioner further indicated that he would address each matter as it came up
and "tell what each one of those witnesses would have presented and the questions
that I would have asked them, and what they may have stated at that time[.]" 
Later in the hearing, petitioner stated that Bailey, if she had been allowed to
testify, would have stated that she never had told petitioner that she had any
outstanding warrants.  Petitioner did not, however, make any particular
statements about the anticipated content of Cortez's testimony.
Petitioner also testified on his own
behalf.  He stated that the knife found on his person was used in his 
work cleaning carpets, in preparing food, and in
carving wood(4)
 He claimed that he did not know that Cortez was wanted for a parole
violation or that Cortez possessed marijuana.  He also stated that he did not know
that Cortez had a conviction for a drug offense, although he thought that Cortez
was a sex offender.  Petitioner admitted that he knew that Cortez was present
in the home, but did not want to "snitch" on him.(5)

The hearings officer found that
petitioner had possessed a weapon and had not answered his parole officer's
questions truthfully when he failed to disclose that he was in violation of
several conditions.(6)
 The hearings officer recommended a 45-day jail sentence as a sanction.  The
board adopted the hearings officer's findings and recommendation.  Petitioner
timely sought administrative review of the sanction order, and the board denied
relief in an Administrative Review Response.  Petitioner sought judicial review,
and, as noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  Petitioner then sought
review in this court, which we allowed.
Orders of the board are subject to
judicial review under ORS 144.335(1), and appellate courts review those orders
under the standards set out in ORS 183.482(8).  See ORS 144.335(3) (so
stating).  ORS 183.482(8)(b)(C) provides that the court shall remand an order
to the agency issuing the order if the agency action was "in violation of
a constitutional or statutory provision."
Before turning to petitioner's
substantive arguments regarding whether petitioner's proffered witnesses likely
would have provided relevant information and whether the board was therefore
required to issue subpoenas for those witnesses, we address whether petitioner
adequately preserved those issues in the parole revocation proceeding.  The board
argues that the dispute about petitioner's proffered witnesses was not preserved
because petitioner did not make an offer of proof at the hearing as to the
testimony that the witnesses would have given.  In the alternative, the board
asserts that any offer of proof by petitioner was inadequate.  Petitioner
maintains that he adequately informed the hearings officer about the
individuals that he wanted to call as witnesses and why he wanted to call them. 
Assuming, without deciding, that an unrepresented party in an administrative
hearing must make something analogous to an offer of proof, for the reasons set
out below, we hold that what petitioner did here was sufficient.
Rules of preservation in court
proceedings serve several purposes, including encouraging the parties to
sharpen the issues and to present them fully and fairly to the trial court in
the first instance, so that the trial court has an opportunity to make an
informed ruling and develop an adequate record and the opposing party and the reviewing
court are not taken by surprise later.  See Peeples v. Lampert,
345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008) ("Preservation gives a trial court the
chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error
altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need
for an appeal."); State v. Affeld, 307 Or 125, 128, 764 P2d 220
(1988) ("The purpose of this rule [requiring an offer of proof] is to
assure that appellate courts are able to determine whether it was error to
exclude the evidence and whether any error was likely to have affected the
result of the case."); ORAP 5.45(1) (claimed error must be preserved in
lower court).  In making the determination that an issue has been preserved,
"an appellate court must view the facts in light of the purposes of
fairness and efficiency that underlie the requirement."  State v.
Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122, 970 P2d 215 (1998). 
Petitioner's statements at the
notice-of-rights hearing and the subsequent violation hearing -- whether
characterized as an "offer of proof" or otherwise -- were sufficient
to satisfy the purposes that the preservation requirement serves, namely,
providing the hearings officer with sufficient information to make an informed
decision as to the admissibility of the proffered testimony and providing
procedural fairness to the opposing party.  As discussed, petitioner requested specific witnesses, the request was denied, and
petitioner attempted to explain the relevance of the proffered testimony based
on his limited knowledge of what the witnesses might say.  That information was
sufficient as to Bailey, for example, because Bailey's anticipated
testimony, as petitioner described it, would have impeached Frederickson's
statements about petitioner's knowledge of Bailey's outstanding warrants and
because petitioner implied that her testimony otherwise would have supported his
version of the facts.  Although petitioner did
not specifically recount the testimony that Cortez would have given, he stated
that Cortez was present at the house during the events in question, and it is
apparent from petitioner's request to call him as a witness that he thought that
Cortez would support petitioner's version of what had occurred and perhaps
petitioner's asserted lack of knowledge about Cortez's drug conviction.  Petitioner's
objections adequately informed the hearings officer of the relevance of the proffered
witnesses' testimony, given that the hearings officer knew that the witnesses
were present during the parole officer's visit to petitioner's apartment and
that petitioner had maintained that the witnesses would present testimony that
"dealt specifically with each violation and their part in that."  
Moreover,
the board cannot claim surprise that petitioner would request those witnesses
to testify.  Petitioner first requested the attendance of his witnesses six
days after he was taken into custody, when the hearings officer met with him to
review his notice of rights.  Thus, the board had notice of whom petitioner
wished to call as witnesses before the parole revocation hearing. 
The
board contends that petitioner failed to make a formal offer of proof as to the
anticipated testimony of the witnesses who he wanted to testify on his behalf. 
That might be an appropriate objection in formal litigation.  An
informal administrative hearing, however, does not require the same level of
formality as litigation in a court of law.  The parole revocation proceeding at
issue here is conducted in accordance with a statute and administrative rules,
rather than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, see generally ORS
144.343 (describing procedure for parole-revocation hearing), and the offender
frequently is not represented by counsel.  See ORS 144.343(3)(f), (4)(d)
(describing requirements for right to court-appointed counsel).  No rule or case law applicable to this proceeding requires
an offer of proof of the kind one encounters in litigation in court, and,
indeed, such a requirement might be difficult to administer.  In civil or
criminal litigation, an attorney would have an opportunity to investigate and
speak with potential witnesses and could be expected to provide an offer of
proof if the proffered evidence were rejected.  Here, petitioner was taken into
custody at the same time that Bailey and Cortez were arrested.  There is no
indication that petitioner had the ability to communicate with those witnesses
or arrange for their participation at his hearing without the assistance of the
hearings officer or board.  Neither is there any indication that the board or
the hearings officer offered petitioner any such assistance -- indeed, the
record suggests to the contrary.
The
board concedes that Cortez was a witness who possessed relevant information,
but criticizes petitioner's failure to preserve his arguments for review,
because he failed to make an offer of proof with sufficient specificity.  It
was insufficient, the board argues, for petitioner to tell the hearings officer
nothing more than the fact that Cortez was present when the parole officer
searched the home and would testify concerning what he saw.  The board further
argues that petitioner's argument that Bailey's testimony could be used to
impeach the parole officer's credibility "is not preserved * * * because
he never presented that theory of admissibility to either the hearings officer
or the Court of Appeals."  There is no requirement, however -- in statute,
rule, or case law -- that a party offer a "theory of admissibility" to
support the testimony of an eyewitness to the very events at issue in the
informal hearing.  The board faults the level of specificity of petitioner's arguments
but fails to address the fact that he
made straightforward and accurate statements about the relevance of the testimony
of particular witnesses who, the board concedes, were eyewitnesses to the events
at issue. 
Petitioner
sufficiently preserved his arguments for review by providing enough information
to demonstrate that the witnesses who he wanted to call likely had some
knowledge of relevant facts.  The hearings officer responded by asserting that
the requested witnesses knew nothing that was relevant -- a blanket assertion
that even the board now recognizes was too sweeping.  In the face of the
hearings officer's unwavering resistance to petitioner's request, petitioner did
not have to do more to preserve the relevance issue for review.
We
turn to the issue whether petitioner had a right to present the proffered
testimony.  Even prior to the hearing, petitioner was entitled to be informed
of, among other rights, his "right to present * * * persons with relevant
information at the hearing unless it has been determined that informants would
be subject to risk of harm if their identity were disclosed."  ORS
144.343(3)(d); see also OAR 255-075-0025 (detailing notice-of-rights
requirements).  At the revocation hearing itself, petitioner had the right
"[t]o present evidence on [his] behalf," including "the right to
present * * * persons with relevant information regarding the alleged
violations[.]"  ORS 144.343(4)(a).  Similarly, OAR 255-075-0036(3) provides,
"The offender may present witnesses who have relevant information[.]" 
In sum, petitioner had a right to present the witnesses' testimony as long as
that testimony was "relevant" to the issues to be resolved in the
hearing.
Relevance does not pose a high
standard for admissibility.  We agree with the parties that whether information
is relevant for purposes of the statutes and rules that apply to this
proceeding is determined by the same definition of "relevant
evidence" that appears in Rule 401 of the Oregon Evidence Code:  "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."   
Petitioner contends that
testimony from Cortez would have been relevant because Cortez was present and
because Cortez would have testified about petitioner's knowledge of Cortez's
drug history and possession of drugs, which would have provided a defense to the
charge that petitioner was associating with a known drug user.  Likewise,
petitioner asserts that Bailey would have provided testimony about petitioner's
knowledge of Cortez's drug possession and Bailey's own outstanding warrants, as
well as testimony regarding petitioner's defense that the knife found in his possession
was used for work.  Given the nature of the allegations against petitioner and
the undisputed fact that both witnesses were present at the time of the parole
officer's visit, we conclude that those witnesses reasonably could have been expected
to provide relevant evidence.  Whether or not Bailey and Cortez would have been
useful percipient witnesses of the events that transpired when petitioner was
arrested -- and their testimony regarding those events might have been useful
to petitioner -- they would have offered some evidence of petitioner's state of
mind with respect to two of petitioner's alleged violations of the conditions
of post-prison supervision, associating with known drug users and possessing
weapons.  The hearings officer and the board erred in concluding that the
testimony of Cortez and Bailey would not have been relevant to the issues at
the hearing.(7)
The state next argues that any error
by the board in executing the proffered testimony was harmless.  The state
contends that, even if Cortez and Bailey had testified as petitioner hoped they
would and the hearings officer had credited their testimony, petitioner still would
have been found in violation of one or more of his post-prison supervision
conditions because that testimony would not have rebutted every fact on which
the board based its revocation decision.  That argument misses the point.  Even
assuming that, notwithstanding the testimony of the witnesses that he
requested, petitioner would have been found in violation of one or more
conditions, the testimony of those witnesses would have been relevant to the
sanction imposed.  The number of conditions that petitioner violated, the
number of instances in which the hearings officer concluded that petitioner had
not told the truth to his parole officer, and petitioner's mental state as to
the possession of the knife or the status of Cortez and Bailey all would have
been relevant to the severity of the sanction that the hearings officer
imposed.
The final issue is whether the board
erred in failing to issue subpoenas for petitioner's witnesses.  ORS 144.347(1)(8)
and OAR 255-075-0036(9)
provide for the issuance of subpoenas to require the attendance of witnesses on
a "proper" showing of the "relevance and reasonable scope"
of the anticipated testimony.  If, at the notice-of-rights hearing, petitioner
made a sufficient showing of relevance and reasonable scope, the board was
obligated to subpoena the witnesses on his behalf.  See ORS 144.347(1)
("upon a proper showing * * * the board or its designated representatives shall
issue subpoenas") (emphasis added).  Whether subpoenas should have been
issued depends on the relevance of the witnesses' testimony and whether that
testimony would have been "reasonable [in] scope."  We already have concluded
that the witnesses would have offered relevant testimony.  And nothing in this
record indicates that their testimony would not have been reasonable in scope. 
As described by petitioner, that testimony would have focused on the events in
petitioner's home, petitioner's understanding of the permissible scope of his
use of the knife, and what petitioner knew about the status of Bailey and Cortez. 
To the extent that a particular witness may have started to wander too far
afield in testifying or to present testimony that was cumulative or redundant,
the hearings officer could have stepped in to control the focus of the
testimony.  
The board argues that petitioner
never asked the hearings officer to issue subpoenas.  While it is correct that petitioner
did not use the term "subpoena," he expressed a clear desire at the
notice-of-rights hearing that certain witnesses should be made to appear at his
violation hearing.  The hearings officer thus was sufficiently apprised of what
petitioner wanted, despite the fact that petitioner did not, in so many words,
ask that subpoenas be issued.  Accordingly, the hearings officer should have
issued subpoenas for petitioner's witnesses or explained why petitioner was not
entitled to have the witnesses subpoenaed, as is contemplated by ORS 144.347(1).
In denying petitioner's request to
call witnesses who petitioner specifically identified and who possessed relevant
evidence, without providing a sufficient reason, the board deprived petitioner
of the procedural rights set out in ORS 144.343(4)(a).  In failing to issue
subpoenas, the board failed to provide petitioner the rights granted by ORS
144.347(1).  Although the hearings officer and the board have discretion in the
conduct of parole revocation hearings, that discretion must be exercised
consistently with statutory requirements.  The board failed to adhere to those
statutory requirements in this case.  The board's order therefore must be reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings.  See ORS 183.482(8)(b)(C)
(court shall remand to agency when agency's exercise of discretion violates
statutory provision).  We therefore reverse and remand so that the board may conduct
another hearing at which it considers the relevant testimony of petitioner's requested
witnesses.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision for further proceedings.
1. From
the record, it is clear that at least two parole officers -- Frederickson and
another officer -- arrived at petitioner's house together.  It is also clear
that, later in the evening, a total of three parole officers were present at
petitioner's house, Frederickson and two others.  It is not clear, however, if
the third officer arrived at the same time as the first two or if he arrived
later, after Frederickson had called for assistance.
2. Petitioner
was found to be in violation of the condition of his post-prison supervision,
rather than in violation of parole conditions.  However, for purposes of this
opinion, the same law applies to post-prison supervision and parole
proceedings.  See ORS 144.108(2) (requiring hearing that complies with ORS
144.343 and 144.347).  For ease of reference, we refer to the "parole
violation process" rather than the "post-prison supervision violation
process."
3. Indeed,
at petitioner's subsequent parole-revocation hearing, the hearings officer
stated that she had already denied petitioner's request to call Bailey, Cortez,
and the other officers.   
4. The
parole officer indicated that permission to use the knife was limited to work
and concluded that petitioner's possession of the knife at home was a
violation.
5. Petitioner
stated at the hearing, "I may not have said, 'He's in the closet,' but I
didn't have a problem with them searching the closet, and told them so."  
6. The
charge for the failure to tell the truth was based on not disclosing the knife
when asked if he had "any violations" and failing to indicate
Cortez's presence in the house.
7. The
hearings officer, of course, like a trial judge, has the authority to exclude
even relevant testimony for various reasons, including that the cumulative
nature of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.  See OEC
403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
8. ORS
144.347(1) provides:  
"Upon request of any party to the hearing
provided in ORS 144.343 and upon a proper showing of the general relevance and
reasonable scope of the testimony to be offered, the board or its designated
representatives shall issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses.  In any case, the board, on its own motion, may issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses."
9. OAR
255-075-0036(1) provides:  
"Offenders shall make their own
arrangements for calling and presenting witnesses.  However, upon the request
of any party to the hearing, and upon a proper showing of the relevance and
reasonable scope of the testimony to be offered, the Sanction Authority or
Hearings Officer shall issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of witnesses.  In addition, the Sanction Authority or the Hearings Officer may
subpoena documents when relevant."