Title: Commonwealth v. Russell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11602
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2015

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SJC-11602 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GERALD RUSSELL. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 3, 2014. - January 26, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Reasonable Doubt.  Practice, Criminal, Reasonable doubt, 
Instructions to jury, Lesser included offense.  Supreme 
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  Rape.  
Indecent Assault and Battery. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 18, 1990. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Eric S. Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Alex G. Philipson, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Bruce Ferg, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  "Then, what is reasonable doubt? It is a term 
often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily 
2 
 
defined."  Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320 (1850).  So 
begins the venerable Webster charge on reasonable doubt.  The 
Webster charge informs the jury that a reasonable doubt exists 
when "they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a 
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge" (emphasis 
supplied).  Id.  For more than 150 years, this charge has 
delivered the preferred language for explaining reasonable doubt 
to jurors sitting on criminal trials in the Commonwealth.  Yet, 
it has never been required and, in this case, it was eschewed in 
favor of an instruction that permitted a conviction if the jury 
were "firmly convinced" of the defendant's guilt. 
 
The defendant was acquitted on eighteen counts of statutory 
rape, but convicted on seven counts of the lesser included 
offense of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age 
of fourteen.  He appeals his convictions on grounds that the 
charge on reasonable doubt was constitutionally inadequate and 
that the lesser included offenses should not have been submitted 
to the jury.  With respect to the former, he argues that, even 
if the charge was constitutionally sound, we should exercise our 
general superintendence power to require the Webster charge in 
all criminal trials. 
 
We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate 
review and now conclude that the judge's instruction on 
reasonable doubt passed constitutional muster and that there was 
3 
 
no error in the submission of the lesser included offenses to 
the jury.  Nonetheless, we also conclude that, pursuant to our 
superintendence power, a modernized version of the Webster 
charge must be given in criminal trials on a prospective basis.  
The defendant is not entitled to a special retroactive 
application of this new rule.  Consequently, we affirm the 
judgments of conviction.1 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence presented at 
trial, reserving certain details for discussion of the issues on 
appeal.  In 1980, the defendant, who was then the boy friend and 
later the husband of the victim's mother, began living with the 
victim and her family.  The victim was six years of age at that 
time.  According to the victim, it was not long before the 
defendant began sexually abusing her.  It began with the 
defendant's touching of the victim's breasts and vaginal area 
while she was in the bathtub.  The victim testified that the 
abuse steadily became more invasive:  the defendant placed his 
fingers between the folds of her genital opening, rubbed his 
penis between her buttocks and in her vaginal area, performed 
oral sex on her, and required her to perform oral sex on him. 
 
The victim also testified that, over the course of the 
abuse, she observed the defendant choke, slap, and punch her 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of Bruce Ferg and Alex G. 
Philipson. 
4 
 
mother, throw objects at her, and rip hair out of her head.  The 
defendant told the victim that he would stop abusing her mother 
if the victim submitted to his advances.  He said that if she 
told anyone about his sexual advances, the victim and her 
siblings would be placed in foster homes and their mother would 
go to jail.  Nonetheless, in 1985, the victim told her mother 
that the defendant had been "touching" her.  The victim's mother 
confronted the defendant, who denied the allegation. 
 
The character of the abuse escalated in May, 1987, when the 
victim was approximately thirteen years of age.  It was then, 
the victim alleged, that the defendant began having full vaginal 
intercourse with her in addition to the other acts previously 
described.  The final act of abuse occurred on October 31, 1989.  
As a condition to going out on Halloween, the victim alleged 
that she was required to perform oral sex on the defendant.  The 
victim did not return home, instead seeking the refuge of a 
friend -- to whom she then revealed her history of sexual abuse 
at the hands of the defendant. 
 
On September 19, 1990, an Essex County grand jury returned 
six indictments, each charging the defendant with three counts 
of statutory rape, G. L. c. 265, § 23.  Each indictment 
reflected a distinct period of time during which the rapes were 
alleged to have occurred, with each charge representing a 
distinct mode of rape during the time frame of the corresponding 
5 
 
indictment.2  Rather than stand trial, the defendant fled to 
Mexico and did not return until 2010.  In 2012, the defendant 
was tried by jury in the Superior Court.  The judge instructed 
the jury, sua sponte and over the defendant's objection, on the 
lesser included charge of indecent assault and battery as to 
seven counts reflecting the earliest incidents of alleged penile 
and digital penetration.3  The judge reasoned that, "given [the 
victim's] state of development . . . there may be an issue as to 
whether there was penetration or not.  That does not include 
                                                          
 
 
2 The indictments were based on the following periods:  (i) 
March 1, 1980, to July 31, 1982; (ii) July 1, 1983, to November 
30, 1983; (iii) February 1, 1984, to April 30, 1984; (iv) 
January 1, 1985, to August 31, 1985; (v) March 1, 1986, to May 
31, 1988; and (vi) June 1, 1988, to November 1, 1989.  The gaps 
between the indictments represented the various periods in which 
the victim was not living with the defendant.  The victim lived 
with her father for approximately ten months, in a foster home 
for approximately four months, and with her grandmother for ten 
weeks.  At other points, the victim's mother moved the family 
away from the defendant out of fear for herself and her 
children.  On each occasion, however, they resumed living with 
the defendant, at which time, the abuse of the victim resumed as 
well. 
 
 
3 The jury were given special verdict slips listing the 
lesser included offense with respect to the following charges: 
charge no. 2 (fingers in genital opening between March 1, 1980, 
and July 31, 1982); charge no. 3 (penis in genital opening 
between March 1, 1980, and July 31, 1982); charge no. 5 (fingers 
in genital opening between July 1, 1983, and November 30, 1983); 
charge no. 8 (fingers in genital opening between February 1, 
1984, and April 30, 1984); charge no. 9 (penis in genital 
opening between February 1, 1984, and April 30, 1984); charge 
no. 11 (fingers in genital opening between January 1, 1985, and 
August 30, 1985); and charge no. 12 (penis in genital opening 
between January 1, 1985, and August 30, 1985). 
 
6 
 
those charges that specify oral intercourse . . . because there, 
again, there's not a real issue of penetration there." 
 
The judge also gave what he said was his "traditional 
instruction" as to what is meant by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Defense counsel objected to the instruction, 
specifically requesting the language of the Webster charge that 
in order to convict the jurors must feel "an abiding conviction 
to a moral certainty of the truth of the charges."  The judge 
overruled the objection and submitted the case to the jury.  
During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of the 
reasonable doubt standard.  Defense counsel again asked that the 
jury be given the Webster charge.  The judge again denied the 
request, electing instead to repeat his initial instruction. 
 
On each of the eighteen counts of statutory rape, the jury 
found the defendant not guilty.  However, on each of the seven 
counts of indecent assault and battery on a child, the jury 
found the defendant guilty.  The defendant was sentenced to 
three consecutive and three concurrent terms of not less than 
nine but not more than ten years in the State prison, as well as 
a consecutive term of five years of probation. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  The reasonable doubt instruction.  In 
a criminal case, due process requires that the Commonwealth 
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 Mass. 341, 342 (1995), citing In 
7 
 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  The defendant in this 
case contends that the judge's charge on reasonable doubt 
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights by diluting the Commonwealth's burden of 
proof and by shifting it, in part, to the defendant.  "A 
constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction amounts 
to a structural error which defies analysis by harmless error 
standards."  Pinckney, supra at 342.4 
 
"[T]he Constitution does not require that any particular 
form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's 
burden of proof."  Pinckney, 419 Mass. at 342, quoting Victor v. 
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994).  However, the words used must 
"impress[] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective 
state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused."  Pinckney, 
supra at 344.  See Victor, supra at 15, quoting Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).  In 1850, Chief Justice 
Lemuel Shaw elaborated on the proof required to create such near 
certitude: 
 
"Then, what is reasonable doubt?  It is a term often 
used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily 
defined. It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing 
                                                          
 
 
4 A substantially similar instruction was given in 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 219 & n.6 (2014).  Yet, 
because the defendant in that case failed to object, we reviewed 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. 
at 221. 
8 
 
relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, 
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that 
state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and 
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of 
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of 
the charge.  The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. 
All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in 
favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be 
innocent until he is proved guilty.  If upon such proof 
there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is 
entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal.  For it is 
not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong 
one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact 
charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but 
the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a 
reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces 
and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and 
judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it.  This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; 
because if the law, which mostly depends upon 
considerations of a moral nature, should go further than 
this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude 
circumstantial evidence altogether." 
 
Webster, 5 Cush. at 320.  These carefully selected words became 
known as the Webster charge, which, with minor modification, has 
since been "the preferred and adequate charge on the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof."  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 433 
Mass. 539, 546-547 (2001).5 
                                                          
 
 
5 During the years 1850-1900, the Webster charge received 
the approval of numerous State supreme courts and the United 
States Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 
U.S. 304, 309, 312 (1880); Mose v. State, 36 Ala. 211, 230-231 
(1860); People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 151, 155 (1866); Lovett v. 
State, 30 Fla. 142, 162-163 (1892); King v. Ahop, 7 Haw. 556, 
560-561 (1889); Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181, 192 (1894); 
State v. De Rance, 34 La. Ann. 186, 195 (1882); State v. Staley, 
14 Minn. 105, 122-123 (1869); Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 698-
699 (1897); Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio St. 371, 377 (1891); 
9 
 
 
That is not to say, however, that the Webster charge -- 
and, in particular, its "moral certainty" language -- has been 
immune to criticism.  In Victor, 511 U.S. at 13-16, the United 
States Supreme Court traced the lineage of the phrase "moral 
certainty" and concluded that "the common meaning of the phrase 
has changed since it was used in the Webster instruction, and it 
may continue to do so to the point that it conflicts with the 
Winship standard."  Id. at 16.  Notwithstanding this admonition, 
the Court held that, in the context of the Webster charge as a 
whole, the phrase did not suggest "a standard of proof lower 
than due process requires or as allowing conviction on factors 
other than the government's proof."  Id. 
 
In a concurring opinion in the Victor case, Justice 
Ginsburg extolled the virtues of the Federal Judicial Center's 
Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 21 (1998), which provides, in 
relevant part: 
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you 
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt.  There are very 
few things in this world that we know with absolute 
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require 
proof that overcomes every possible doubt.  If, based on 
your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly 
convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged, you must find him guilty.  If on the other hand, 
you think there is a real possibility that he is not 
guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find 
him not guilty." 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 514 (1855); Kollock v. State, 
88 Wis. 663, 665-666 (1894). 
10 
 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), quoting 
Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 21.  
According to Justice Ginsburg, the "firmly convinced" standard 
of Instruction 21 represents a marked improvement over the 
"anachronism of 'moral certainty'" set forth in the Webster 
charge.  Id. at 26.  Several State supreme courts and Federal 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have likewise endorsed Instruction 21.6 
 
Here, the trial judge's instruction on reasonable doubt, 
which is set forth in the margin,7 incorporated elements of both 
                                                          
 
 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133 (1998); United 
States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131-132 & n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S 891 (1994); State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 
596 (1995); Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902 (Ind. 1996); 
State v. Frei, 831 N.W.2d 70, 78-79 (Iowa 2013); State v. Reyes, 
116 P.3d 305, 314-315 (Utah 2005). 
 
 
7 The judge explained reasonable doubt to the jury as 
follows: 
 
 
"The term is often used and it probably is pretty well 
understood by jurors, but it's not easy for judges to 
define it to jurors. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in 
the lives of human beings is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt. 
 
"On the other hand, it is not enough for the 
Commonwealth to establish a probability, even a strong 
probability, that the defendant is more likely to be guilty 
than not guilty. That is not enough. 
 
"So what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  Well, 
ladies and gentlemen, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's 
guilt.  There are very few things in this world that we 
know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases, the 
11 
 
the Webster charge and Instruction 21.  Notably, he omitted the 
"moral certainty" and "abiding conviction" language found in the 
Webster charge and, in its place, inserted the "firmly 
convinced" and "real possibility" language found in Instruction 
21. 
 
The defendant argues that the firmly convinced standard is 
too similar to the clear and convincing evidence standard, which 
sets the burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the 
evidence but lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 871 
(1975).  This position finds support in State v. Perez, 90 Haw. 
113, 128-129 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd in relevant part, 90 Haw. 
65, 67 (1999).  In that case, the Intermediate Court of Appeals 
of Hawaii opined that "it is possible to be firmly convinced of 
a fact, yet still retain a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 128.  
Under Hawaii law, the clear and convincing evidence standard is 
satisfied by a "firm belief of conviction."  Id.  Given the 
similarity of that phrase to the phrase "firmly convinced," the 
court concluded that the latter communicated a burden of proof 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
law does not require proof that overcomes every possible 
doubt.  If, based on your consideration of the evidence, 
you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of 
the crime charged, you must find him guilty.  If, on the 
other hand, you think there is a real possibility that the 
defendant is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of 
the doubt and find him not guilty.  This is what we mean by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
12 
 
below proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required under the due 
process clause of the Hawaii State Constitution.  Id. at 129. 
 
The reasoning of the Perez case has not gained traction in 
other jurisdictions.  Some courts have distinguished the Perez 
case as unique to Hawaii law.  See, e.g., Williams v. State, 724 
N.E.2d 1093, 1096 & n.2 (Ind. 2000).  In State v. Jackson, 283 
Conn. 111, 120-124 (2007), the Connecticut Supreme Court flatly 
rejected it, noting the growing support for Instruction 21 and 
the unlikelihood that jurors in a criminal case even would be 
aware of the clear and convincing standard.  Moreover -- and 
akin to the Supreme Court's analysis of moral certainty in 
Victor -- the Jackson court observed that, in the context of the 
entire charge, there was not a reasonable likelihood that use of 
the phrase "firmly convinced" lowered the prosecution's burden 
of proof.  Jackson, 283 Conn. at 124-125. 
 
We join those courts in declining to follow the Perez case. 
In addition to Justice Ginsburg's endorsement of Instruction 21, 
see Victor, 511 U.S. at 26-27, the Federal Courts of Appeals 
have consistently upheld it under the due process clause.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 146 (1st Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1152 (1999); United States v. 
Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 1133 (1998); United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131-
13 
 
132 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 (1994); 
United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
It bears noting, however, that the question under the Federal 
Constitution "is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based 
on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard."  Victor, 
511 U.S. at 6.  In contrast, in evaluating a reasonable doubt 
instruction under art. 12, we employ a standard that is more 
favorable to the criminal defendant, looking instead "for 
possible misunderstandings by reasonable jurors."  Commonwealth 
v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 27 n.10 (1996), and cases cited.  We do 
not perceive such a possibility in this case. 
 
Unlike the Hawaii standard for clear and convincing 
evidence, our cases and instructions on clear and convincing 
evidence are not cast in terms of the "firmness" of the jury's 
conclusions.  Rather, the instructions endorsed by this court in 
Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 372 Mass. 582, 588 
(1977), inform the jury that: 
"The burden [of persuasion] is not a burden of convincing 
you that the facts which are asserted are certainly true or 
that they are almost certainly true, or are true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  It is, however, greater than a burden of 
convincing you that the facts are more probably true than 
false.  The burden imposed is to convince you that the 
facts asserted are highly probably true, that the 
probability that they are true or exist is substantially 
greater than the probability that they are false or do not 
exist.  If then you believe upon consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case that there is a 
14 
 
high degree of probability that the facts are true you must 
find that the fact[s] have been proved." 
 
Id. at 588 n.3, quoting McBaine, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of 
Belief, 32 Cal. L. Rev. 242, 263-264 (1944).  Even if the jury 
in this case were familiar with the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, they specifically were instructed that even a 
"strong probability" of the defendant's guilt would not support 
a conviction.  See Jackson, 283 Conn. at 123-124 (jury unlikely 
to confuse firmly convinced standard with clear and convincing 
standard). 
 
Moreover, we disagree with the defendant that requiring a 
"firm" conviction of guilt sets a lower burden of proof than 
requiring an "abiding" conviction.  The word "firm" is defined 
as "not subject to change, revision, or withdrawal," "fixed," 
"settled," "definite," and "established."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 856 (2002).  The word "abiding" is 
defined as "continuing or persisting in the same state without 
changing or diminishing."  Id. at 3.  In short, the words convey 
the same concept to the jury.  Viewed in context, we do not 
think a reasonable juror would have misunderstood the 
Commonwealth's burden to be anything less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
We also disagree with the defendant that the "real 
possibility" language diluted and shifted the burden of proof in 
15 
 
this case.  In Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 145, the jury were 
instructed that "[e]verything in our common experience is open 
to some possible or imaginary doubt. . . . On the other hand, if 
you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not 
guilty of the charges, you must give the defendant the benefit 
of that doubt and find him not guilty."  The court explained 
that a "trial judge may require a 'real possibility' of doubt 
because '[a] fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt.'"  Id. at 
146, quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 17.  Viewing the charge in its 
totality, the court concluded that "the likelihood of juror 
confusion or mistake [was] extremely remote."  Rodriguez, supra.  
See Victor, 511 U.S. at 27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("'firmly 
convinced' standard for conviction, repeated for emphasis, is 
further enhanced by the juxtaposed prescription that the jury 
must acquit if there is a 'real possibility' that the defendant 
is innocent"). 
 
In State v. Putz, 266 Neb. 37, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1013 
(2003), the jury were "instructed several times that the burden 
of proof rested on the State, and . . . explicitly told that 
this burden never shifts."  Id. at 48.  The Nebraska Supreme 
Court concluded that in light of "the context of the overall 
charge to the jury considered as a whole, the jury could not 
have interpreted the 'real possibility' language as shifting the 
burden of proof to [the defendant]."  Id.  See Williams, 724 
16 
 
N.E.2d at 1096, quoting Taylor, 997 F.2d at 1557 ("the trial 
court had 'charged the jury on the presumption of innocence and 
the government's burden of proof, thus eliminating any concern 
that the jury might think the defendant was required to show a 
"real possibility" of his own innocence'"). 
 
Here, the instructions accompanying the "real possibility" 
language were not unlike those in the Rodriguez and Putz cases.  
The jury were instructed that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in 
the lives of human beings is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt"; and that "[t]here are very few things in this world that 
we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases, the law 
does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt."  
The jury also were reminded repeatedly that the Commonwealth 
bore the sole burden of proof of each of the crimes charged and 
that the defendant did not have to prove anything.  In light of 
these instructions, it is clear that the phrase "real 
possibility" was offered in contrast to the possibility of 
"imaginary doubt."  See Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 146.  A 
reasonable juror listening to the entire charge would not have 
mistaken the level or locus of the burden of proof. 
 
Consistent with the clear majority view, we conclude that 
the charge on reasonable doubt given by the judge in this case 
adequately "impress[ed] upon the [jury] the need to reach a 
17 
 
subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused."  
Victor, 511 U.S. at 15, quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315.  See 
Welch, "Give Me That Old Time Religion": The Persistence of the 
Webster Reasonable Doubt Instruction and the Need to Abandon It, 
48 New Eng. L. Rev. 31, 44-45 (2013) (collecting cases).  As 
such, the instruction met the minimum requirements of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and art. 12.  See Victor, 
511 U.S. at 15; Pinckney, 419 Mass. at 344. 
 
Yet, mere threshold adequacy is not a sufficient basis to 
endorse an instruction of such importance -- particularly where 
a preferable alternative is readily available.  See State v. 
Bennett, 161 Wash. 2d 303, 315 (2007) (en banc) ("While the 
instruction may meet constitutional muster, it does not mean 
that it is a good or even desirable instruction").  The 
reasonable doubt standard "provides concrete substance for the 
presumption of innocence -- that bedrock 'axiomatic and 
elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation 
of the administration of our criminal law.'"  Winship, 397 U.S. 
at 363, quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 
(1895). 
 
In Bennett, 161 Wash. 2d at 312-313, the Supreme Court of 
Washington reviewed a similar reasonable doubt instruction 
derived from Instruction 21.  Finding no constitutional error, 
the court affirmed the judgment of conviction.  Id. at 318.  
18 
 
Nonetheless, the court observed that, "[e]ven if many variations 
of the definition of reasonable doubt meet minimal due process 
requirements, the presumption of innocence is simply too 
fundamental, too central to the core of the foundation of our 
justice system not to require adherence to a clear, simple, 
accepted, and uniform instruction."  Id. at 317-318.  Relying on 
its inherent supervisory power, the court then directed the 
Washington trial courts to use only the approved pattern jury 
instructions on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 318. 
 
We agree with the reasoning of the Bennett case.  We have 
cautioned that "[w]here issues as important as reasonable doubt 
are concerned, judges would do well to follow approved models,"  
Commonwealth v. Riley, 433 Mass. 266, 271 n.9 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 81 (1997), and that 
individualized embellishments among judges "can only create 
uncertainty and breed needless appeals."  Commonwealth v. 
Therrien, 371 Mass. 203, 208 (1976).  Although we have 
previously declined to require the use of particular words, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Powell, 433 Mass. 399, 405 (2001), such a 
requirement is well within the scope of our general 
superintendence power over the courts.  See G. L. c. 211, § 3; 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 448 (2004) 
(mandating jury instruction pursuant to superintendence power). 
19 
 
 
For more than a century, the Webster charge has served as 
the gold standard against which instructions on reasonable doubt 
have been measured.  See Watkins, 433 Mass. at 546-547.  The 
enduring virtue of the Webster charge has been that it conveys 
to the jury not only the degree of certitude required, but also 
"the proper solemn consideration," in reaching a judgment of 
conviction.  Rosa, 422 Mass. at 29.  Indeed, it is "hard to 
imagine, without recourse to prolixity, a charge more reflective 
of the solemn and rigorous standard intended."  Lanigan v. 
Maloney, 853 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1007 (1989). 
 
The air of solemnity imparted by the Webster charge 
underscores the moral consequence of sitting in judgment of 
one's peers, while "prevent[ing] the jury from disregarding the 
high standard of proof required or from improperly determining 
guilt based on the ethics or morality of the defendant's 
conduct."  Watkins, 433 Mass. at 547.  The jury aptly have been 
described as "the oracle of the citizenry in weighing the 
culpability of the accused, and should [they] find him guilty 
[they] condemn[] him with the full legal and moral authority of 
the society."  United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 101 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 927 (1993).  The United States 
Supreme Court has deftly explained how a juror's duty to 
20 
 
determine the facts intertwines with his or her moral authority 
to determine the defendant's guilt: 
"Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of 
reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative 
gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions 
but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the 
inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an 
honest verdict. . . . Jury duty is usually unsought and 
sometimes resisted, and it may be as difficult for one 
juror suddenly to face the findings that can send another 
human being to prison, as it is for another to hold out 
conscientiously for acquittal.  When a juror's duty does 
seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a defendant has 
thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract 
statements ever could, not just to prove a fact but to 
establish its human significance, and so to implicate the 
law's moral underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit 
in judgment.  Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to 
place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a 
story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to 
convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally 
reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of 
a defendant's legal fault." 
 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-188 (1997), citing 
Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 100-102.  We conclude that it would be 
imprudent to endorse a reasonable doubt instruction that glosses 
over the moral underpinnings of the jury's work in a criminal 
case, and we decline to do so. 
 
We appreciate the risk, articulated by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, that "[m]oral certainty 
could be interpreted to mean that the certainty is based on a 
feeling, i.e., moral conviction, rather than facts."  United 
States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 721 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).  Accordingly, we have recognized 
21 
 
that "references to 'moral certainty' made in isolation and 
without further explanation may amount to an erroneous 
instruction on reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 
Mass. 617, 622 (2004).  By the same token, our cases hold that 
the "use of the term does not constitute reversible error when 
the instruction includes other language giving the term an 
appropriate context."  Id.  Although the traditional Webster 
charge has been and continues to be a constitutionally 
sufficient source of such context, we are mindful of the 
criticism surrounding some of the outmoded language employed 
therein.8 
 
For all of these reasons, we now exercise our inherent 
supervisory power to require a uniform instruction on proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that uses more modern language, but 
preserves the power, efficacy, and essence of the Webster 
charge.  G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We conclude that the model Webster 
charge nearly accomplishes this task, but would benefit from 
                                                          
 
 
8 See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 23 (1994) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) ("It was commendable for Chief Justice Shaw to 
pen an instruction that survived more than a century, but, as 
the Court makes clear, what once might have made sense to jurors 
has long since become archaic"); see also Welch, "Give Me That 
Old Time Religion": The Persistence of the Webster Reasonable 
Doubt Instruction and the Need to Abandon It, 48 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 31, 31-32 (2013) ("Despite the Supreme Judicial Court's 
reverence for the definition of 'reasonable doubt' as described 
in the 1850 Commonwealth v. Webster decision, courts should use 
the cut and paste feature on their word processors, abandon the 
outmoded portions of that instruction, and define this most 
important concept in comprehensible, everyday language"). 
22 
 
further clarification of the phrase "moral certainty."  See 
Instruction 2.180 of the Model Jury Instructions for Use in the 
District Court (2009).  Therefore, going forward, Massachusetts 
judges sitting on criminal trials are to instruct the jury as 
follows: 
 
"The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the 
charge(s) made against him (her). 
 
 
"What is proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  The term is 
often used and probably pretty well understood, though it 
is not easily defined.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for 
everything in the lives of human beings is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt.  A charge is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered 
all of the evidence, you have in your minds an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true.  
When we refer to moral certainty, we mean the highest 
degree of certainty possible in matters relating to human 
affairs -- based solely on the evidence that has been put 
before you in this case. 
 
 
"I have told you that every person is presumed to be 
innocent until he or she is proved guilty, and that the 
burden of proof is on the prosecutor.  If you evaluate all 
the evidence and you still have a reasonable doubt 
remaining, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that 
doubt and must be acquitted. 
 
 
"It is not enough for the Commonwealth to establish a 
probability, even a strong probability, that the defendant 
is more likely to be guilty than not guilty.  That is not 
enough.  Instead, the evidence must convince you of the 
defendant's guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty; a 
certainty that convinces your understanding and satisfies 
your reason and judgment as jurors who are sworn to act 
conscientiously on the evidence. 
 
 
"This is what we mean by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
 
23 
 
In consequence of this decision, the traditional Webster charge 
should no longer be used as the instruction on reasonable doubt 
in this Commonwealth.9 
 
Relying on Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 666-667 
(2005), the defendant contends that he is entitled to the 
benefit of this new instruction because he preserved the issue 
below and argued for it on appeal.  It is clear, however, that 
"there is no constitutional requirement that the new rule or new 
interpretation be applied retroactively, and we are therefore 
free to determine whether it should be applied only 
prospectively."  Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10 
(2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005).  In this vein, the 
Commonwealth casts the Adjutant case as an exception applied 
only in the context of some prejudicial error otherwise 
avoidable by application of the new rule. 
 
In the Adjutant case, a defendant on trial for manslaughter 
was precluded from introducing evidence of the victim's prior 
acts of aggression.  The court created a new rule of evidence 
allowing trial judges the "discretion to admit evidence of 
specific acts of prior violent conduct that the victim is 
                                                          
 
 
9 It follows that the model instructions on reasonable doubt 
presently in effect, as well as the instructions on reasonable 
doubt found in Martin Glennon & O'Sullivan Smith, Instructions 
Common to All Criminal Cases, Massachusetts Superior Court 
Criminal Practice Jury Instructions § 1.1 (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Educ. 2d ed. 2013), should no longer be used. 
24 
 
reasonably alleged to have initiated, to support the defendant's 
claim of self-defense."  Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664.  Had this 
new rule been applied at trial, "it may have been enough to 
create reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt."  Id. at 666.  
Given that the defendant argued for the new rule on appeal, we 
concluded that he was entitled to a new trial with the benefit 
of our decision. 
 
We are persuaded that the Adjutant case is distinguishable 
and that the defendant is not entitled to the exception 
triggered by the circumstances of that case.  Unlike in 
Adjutant, here we are not concerned that in the absence of the 
new rule there may have been a miscarriage of justice because, 
as explained above, a reasonable jury would not have 
misunderstood the reasonable doubt instruction that was given.  
To the extent that the omission of the "moral certainty" and 
"abiding conviction" language stripped that instruction of the 
solemnity so strongly reinforced by the Webster charge, we "view 
the charge in its entirety since the adequacy of instructions 
must be determined in light of their over-all impact on the 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 231-232 (1980). 
 
Although, in other circumstances, we have disapproved of 
instructions that "trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to 
determine whether the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt," Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 129 
25 
 
(1977), in this case, other aspects of the charge adequately 
expressed the seriousness of the proceedings to the jury.10  The 
defendant suffered no prejudice by the instructions given.  
Contrast Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 666.  The only commonality 
between this case and the Adjutant case is the successful 
request for a new rule, which, standing alone, is insufficient 
to merit a retroactive application. 
                                                          
 
 
10 For example, the judge instructed the jury: 
 
 
"You have heard the closing arguments of counsel, you 
have heard all the evidence, and you are about to decide 
this case.  But I think it's appropriate for you and I to 
stand alone, together in this courtroom, to reflect upon 
our roles in this trial.  You have noticed that whenever 
you come into the courtroom, everyone else stands up.  Why 
do they show you that sign of respect? . . .  It's out of 
respect for your role here.  Because you and I are the only 
ones who have taken an oath to decide this case.  I've 
taken an oath to decide the legal aspects of the case 
fairly.  You have taken an oath to decide the facts of this 
case fairly. 
 
 
"Now, ladies and gentlemen, that is a burden that we 
place on you, because no one likes to sit in judgment.  No 
one does.  But we know, ladies and gentlemen, that you can 
meet that burden, that you can handle that responsibility. 
And why do we know that?  Well, history teaches us that. 
Because for over 200 years here in Essex County, jurors 
just like you have been listening to evidence just like 
this, looking at and listening to the same types of 
witnesses, the same types of evidence, and then using your 
common sense to determine, what do I believe, what is 
important, what's a reasonable inference to draw.  They 
search for the truth.  And there's no reason to think you 
can't do that just as well as all those jurors who have 
come before you.  You are asked to be responsible citizens, 
placed in a responsible situation, and there is no reason 
to think you can't do it." 
26 
 
 
b.  Lesser included offense instruction.  The defendant 
argues that the judge committed error by instructing the jury on 
the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery.  
Although the defendant seems to have invited the instruction by 
moving for a required finding of not guilty on grounds of 
insufficient evidence of penetration, he preserved the issue by 
objecting to the instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 
Mass. 326, 334 (2000). 
 
"Our case law on lesser included offense instructions has 
consistently inquired 'whether the evidence at trial presents a 
rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the crime charged 
and convicting him of the lesser included offense.'"  
Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 536 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Donlan, 436 Mass. 329, 335 (2002).  Where, as 
here, "the issue is whether the judge erred in giving a lesser 
included instruction rather than whether the judge erred by 
failing to give such an instruction:  it is not error to give a 
lesser included offense instruction 'if on any hypothesis of the 
evidence, the jury could have found the defendant[] guilty of 
[the lesser included offense]' and not guilty of the greater 
offense."  Porro, supra at 537, quoting Commonwealth v. Thayer, 
418 Mass. 130, 132 (1994).  "In determining whether there was a 
hypothetical basis for the jury to conclude that the defendant 
was guilty of the lesser included offense, but not the offense 
27 
 
charged, the judge may consider the possibility that the jury 
reasonably may disbelieve the witnesses' testimony regarding an 
element required of the greater, but not the lesser included, 
offense."  Porro, supra. 
 
The defendant points out that, in Donlan, 436 Mass. at 337-
338, we held that an indecent assault and battery instruction 
was inappropriate on similar facts.  Yet, in that case, error 
was alleged in the omission of a lesser included offense 
instruction, id. at 338, a posture in which relief "depends not 
only on the existence of a possible factual scenario justifying 
a conviction of the lesser but not the greater offense, but also 
on evidence of a dispute at trial about the element that 
distinguishes the two offenses."  Porro, 458 Mass. at 536.  In 
contrast, we have held that giving "a lesser included 
instruction is not error where, for example, a jury reasonably 
could be convinced by the victim's testimony that the defendant 
sexually assaulted her but not be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that penetration occurred, even where the victim was not 
cross-examined as to penetration and the defense attorney did 
not mention it in closing argument."  Id. at 537 n.10. 
 
The Commonwealth submits that this case fits squarely 
within the paradigm described in the Porro case, as the victim 
testified not only to acts of penetration, but also to more 
general contact between the defendant and the victim's vaginal 
28 
 
area.  Defense counsel's strategy was to suggest that the victim 
fabricated the allegations of abuse in order to protect her 
mother from the physical abuse being inflicted on her by the 
defendant.  The Commonwealth reasons that this strategy was 
partially successful, as the verdicts suggest that the jury 
credited the allegations of abuse but discredited the testimony 
regarding penetration. 
 
The defendant contests that conclusion, reciting the 
familiar rule that "the jury's right to selective credibility 
does not permit [them] to distort or mutilate any integral 
portion of the testimony to permit them to believe an unfounded 
hypothesis."  Commonwealth v. Perez, 390 Mass. 308, 314 (1983), 
S.C., 442 Mass. 1019 (2004).  The defendant cites Commonwealth 
v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 458 (2009), which we find 
instructive.  In that case, we held that the jury reasonably 
could not believe testimony that the shooter was positioned to 
the right of the victim, where the evidence unequivocally 
established that the victim was shot in the left side of the 
head.  Id. 
 
Here, the defendant characterizes the case put to the jury 
as "a pure 'up or down' question on credibility -- whether the 
alleged conduct did or did not occur."  We disagree.  Unlike in 
the Zanetti case, evidence of penetrating contact would not have 
made it illogical for the jury in this case to conclude that 
29 
 
there was also evidence of nonpenetrating contact.  If there was 
indeed evidence of both nonpenetrating and penetrating contact, 
the jury were free to believe the former and disbelieve the 
latter.  See Porro, 458 Mass. at 537 n.10; cf. Commonwealth v. 
Hunton, 168 Mass. 130, 132 (1897) ("jury are absolutely free to 
believe what is unfavorable to a prisoner in his statement, and 
to disbelieve all that is favorable, if the character of the 
statement has that effect upon their minds").  We therefore turn 
to the evidence put before the jury. 
 
With respect to the charges in question, there was 
certainly evidence of penetration.  The question, then, is 
whether there also was sufficient evidence to support inferences 
of indecent touching that fell short of penetration.  On the 
second and third charges, the victim testified that the 
defendant "touched me with his fingers on my vaginal area" and 
"rubb[ed] up against me with his penis area."  On the fifth 
charge, she testified that, "it started right back up -- the 
abuse on me. . . .  [T]he touching, the fondling, the above, all 
that stuff started again."  On the eighth and ninth charges, she 
testified that the abuse was "[m]ore of the same -- touching, 
fond -- fondling . . . rubbing his penis on me -- my butt . . . 
[a]nd in my vagina area."  On the eleventh and twelfth charges, 
she testified that it was "[m]ore of the same"; "it was never 
anything really different"; and [i]t was a lot of groping, like, 
30 
 
I don't know how to say -- rubbing against my -- on my butt 
[and] . . . on my -- in my -- like in between my legs from 
behind, penis to my vagina." 
 
Viewing the victim's testimony as a whole, we agree with 
the Commonwealth that a reasonable jury could have found 
indecent touching that fell short of penetration.  Although the 
victim did not testify expressly to nonpenetrating contact 
during each period, the jury could have inferred such contact 
from her testimony that "the above, all that stuff started 
again," that the touching was "more of the same," and that it 
"was never anything really different."  The jury also could have 
inferred that the defendant's penis came into contact with the 
victim's vaginal area -- without penetrating her vagina -- when 
he was rubbing up against her and placing his penis between her 
legs and buttocks, a finding consistent with other testimony 
that he "rubb[ed] his penis . . . in [her] vagina area." 
 
Moreover, with respect to the testimony regarding actual 
penetration, the jury properly could have considered the age of 
the victim, who was between six and fifteen years old, depending 
on the indictment.  The jury also could have had reasonable 
doubt as to the extent of the contact described by the victim.  
For example, at one point the victim testified that the 
defendant would "put[] his fingers inside me in my vagina."  
When the prosecutor sought clarification:  "His fingers, you 
31 
 
said, in your vagina?," the victim replied:  "Not -- not 
completely penetrating yet."  The prosecutor again asked for 
clarification: "Not yet?," to which the victim repeated:  "Not 
yet."  A reasonable juror could have taken this to mean that the 
victim was exaggerating when she stated that the defendant 
placed his fingers "inside [her] in [her] vagina." 
 
Although exaggeration was not the defendant's precise 
theory of the case, it is not necessarily inconsistent with that 
theory.  The jury may have thought that the victim exaggerated 
the penetration aspects of her account because her first 
complaint -- that the defendant "touched" her -- failed to 
induce her mother to leave the defendant.  Contrast Zanetti, 454 
Mass. at 458.  We need not tarry long, however, on the jury's 
deliberative process.  "It is sufficient that the evidence 
permitted the inference which the jury obviously drew . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 370 Mass. 192, 203 (1976).  Compare 
Porro, 458 Mass. at 537 n.10 ("jury reasonably could be 
convinced by the victim's testimony that the defendant sexually 
assaulted her but not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that penetration occurred"), with Commonwealth v. Roderiques, 
462 Mass. 415, 425 (2012) ("no view of the evidence" supported 
instruction on lesser included offense).  It was not error for 
the judge to submit the lesser included offenses to the jury. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.