Title: State v. McKellips
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP000827-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2016

2016 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP827-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Rory A. McKellips, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 361 Wis. 2d 773, 864 N.W.2d 106) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No: 2015 WI App 31 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Moran 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.   
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Scott A. 
Swid, Benjamin J. Krautkramer, and Swid Law Offices, LLC, 
Mosinee and oral argument by Scott A. Swid. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
 
2016 WI 51 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP827-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF645) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Rory A. McKellips, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   The State appeals the court 
of appeals published decision1 reversing Rory A. McKellips' 
conviction after a jury found McKellips guilty of using a 
computer to facilitate a child sex crime contrary to Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 See State v. McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, 361 Wis. 2d 773, 
864 N.W.2d 106. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
2 
 
§ 948.075(1r) (2013-14).2  The main issue in this case is whether 
the element, use of a "computerized communication system" in 
§ 948.075(1r), was satisfied when McKellips used his flip-style 
cellphone to exchange texts with, and receive picture messages 
from, the fourteen-year-old victim.3  We also address whether 
Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is unconstitutionally vague, whether the 
jury instruction on this charge was erroneous, and if so, 
whether this instruction was harmless, and whether the court of 
appeals erred when it exercised its discretionary authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 to reverse McKellips' conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
¶2 
We hold the State satisfied its burden of proving the 
element, use of a "computerized communications system," because 
McKellips 
used 
his 
cellphone 
as 
a 
computer 
to 
send 
communications to the victim over the computer system used by 
their cellphones so that he could have sexual contact with her.  
We also hold that Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is not unconstitutionally 
                                                 
2 The jury also convicted McKellips of restricting or 
obstructing an officer, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), but 
McKellips did not challenge that conviction in the court of 
appeals and does not do so here.  In addition, the jury 
acquitted McKellips of repeated sexual assault of a child and 
exposing genitals or pubic area, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.025(1)(e), 939.50(3)(c), 948.10(1) and 939.50(3)(i).  The 
Honorable Michael K. Moran presided in the circuit court. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The communications started when the victim was fourteen 
years old but continued after she turned fifteen years old. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
3 
 
vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would understand 
that using a cellphone to text or picture-message a child to 
entice sexual encounters violates the statute, and because the 
statute is capable of objective enforcement.  Further, we hold 
that the jury instruction given here, although not perfect, when 
read as a whole, accurately stated the law.  Even if the  
instruction were erroneous, it was harmless error.  Finally, we 
hold that the court of appeals erred when it exercised its 
discretionary authority under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 to reverse 
McKellips' conviction.  The real controversy was fully tried in 
this case; moreover, discretionary reversals under § 752.35 are 
limited to exceptional cases. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Athens High School hired 56-year-old McKellips to 
coach the varsity girls' basketball team for the 2010-11 season.  
The Athens team was struggling to win games and McKellips had 
successfully coached other teams to state championships.  In 
addition to coaching high school basketball, McKellips worked at 
Wausau Paper as a coal unloader. 
¶4 
In 
selecting 
the 
team 
for 
the 
2010-11 
season, 
McKellips chose two talented freshman to play on the varsity 
team:  C.H. and her friend, T.R.  During the season, McKellips 
called C.H.'s mother's home phone to praise C.H.'s basketball 
talent.  He also called C.H.'s cellphone to tell her how well 
she played and talk to her about her potential to receive a 
college basketball scholarship.  At the end of one of these 
phone calls, McKellips said "I love you."  C.H. told T.R. about 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
4 
 
this and realized McKellips was not having the same type of 
frequent contact with T.R. 
¶5 
After high school basketball season ended, C.H. 
continued to play basketball with an Amateur Athletic Union 
(AAU) tournament team.  McKellips' cellphone contact with C.H. 
increased and expanded beyond the topic of basketball.  In May 
2011, C.H.'s AAU team played in a tournament in Minnesota.  
While in Minnesota, C.H.'s mother noticed C.H. talking on C.H.'s 
cellphone.  When C.H. told her mother she was talking to 
McKellips, her mother told her to get off the phone and told 
C.H. that if her coach wanted to talk to C.H., he should call 
their home phone.  C.H.'s father also told C.H. the same thing——
that if her coach wanted to talk to her, he should call the home 
phone.4  When C.H. told McKellips that he had to call the home 
phone to talk to her, McKellips bought C.H. a Motorola flip-
style TracPhone without her parents' knowledge or permission. 
¶6 
On June 10, 2011, the Athens Varsity Softball Team 
played in the sectional playoff game in Wausau.  C.H. was on the 
team.  McKellips attended the game and met C.H. and her family 
at a restaurant afterwards.  McKellips snuck the cellphone to 
C.H. at the restaurant. 
¶7 
On June 11, 2011, C.H. played in an AAU basketball 
game, during which she tore her ACL.  Her mother picked her up 
and arranged to take her to McKellips' home because her mother 
                                                 
4 C.H.'s parents were divorced and remarried.  C.H. split 
time equally between her mother's and father's homes. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
5 
 
had other plans, did not want C.H. to be alone, and felt 
McKellips could help reassure C.H. regarding injury recovery.  
As McKellips helped C.H. into the car, he kissed C.H. on the 
cheek.  After this, McKellips started calling her endearing 
names like "baby doll" and "sweetheart" and gave her gifts.  
Over the next several months, according to C.H., she engaged in 
a secret sexual relationship with McKellips. 
¶8 
On Labor Day in September 2011, the relationship ended 
when C.H.'s father found her secret cellphone.  C.H. admitted 
McKellips had bought it for her.  C.H. texted McKellips using a 
texting app on her iPod to warn him that her father had found 
the cellphone and to reassure McKellips that she would keep 
their secret.  Over the next two days, C.H. told her parents 
about her relationship and sexual contact with McKellips.  On 
September 7, 2011, C.H. told the police her accounting of what 
happened with McKellips.  On September 9, 2011, Police Officer 
Matt Wehn went to talk to McKellips about what C.H. reported.  
When Wehn arrived at McKellips' workplace, Wehn asked for 
McKellips' cellphone.  McKellips told Wehn that he had just 
dropped the cellphone in a coal pit but would try to recover it 
later that day.  McKellips later admitted, however, that he lied 
about losing his cellphone, had hid the cellphone, and did not 
want to turn it over to police.  Wehn took McKellips into the 
police station for questioning.  McKellips denied having any 
sexual contact with C.H. 
¶9 
Police searched McKellips' workplace to look for his 
cellphone in the coal pit, but no phone was found.  Three days 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
6 
 
later, McKellips returned to his workplace to retrieve his phone 
from where he hid it.  In May 2012, he gave his phone to his 
attorney who turned it over to police.  The police investigation 
showed that between December 18, 2010 and July 27, 2011, there 
were 8,324 total contacts between McKellips' cellphone and 
C.H.'s regular cellphone (4,816 texts from C.H. to McKellips and 
3,184 texts from McKellips to C.H.).  Between June 10, 2011 and 
July 27, 2011, records show 2,426 total contacts between 
McKellips' cellphone and C.H.'s secret cellphone.  McKellips' 
cellphone, when received by police, however, had no content on 
it from November 16, 2010 through July 28, 2011.  Text messages 
between McKellips and C.H. on July 29-30, 2011 were recovered.  
These included an exchange of "love you" and McKellips' text to 
C.H., "Morning beautiful day yesterday."  Police also recovered 
C.H.'s and McKellips' contacts on C.H.'s iPod from the day the 
secret cellphone was discovered. 
¶10 The State charged McKellips with repeated sexual 
assault of a child, exposing genitals or pubic area, use of a 
computer to facilitate a child sex crime, and resisting or 
obstructing an officer.  McKellips pleaded not guilty and the 
case was tried to a jury. 
¶11 The State called 16 witnesses.  C.H. testified first.  
She described how her relationship with McKellips developed.  It 
started when he selected her to play for the varsity high school 
basketball team.  Calls and texts from McKellips during that 
season generally focused on basketball.  There was only one 
unusual call where he ended by saying "I love you."  When the 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
7 
 
season ended, the contacts with McKellips increased, and both of 
her parents told her this cellphone contact needed to stop.  
While in Minnesota for an AAU tournament, her mother got upset 
with her for talking to McKellips and told her he was her coach 
and could call the home phone.  When C.H. told McKellips that, 
he said he would buy C.H. a cellphone so they could continue the 
contacts without her parents' knowledge.  McKellips slipped her 
the newly-purchased cellphone when they met after a softball 
game.  It was a Motorola flip-style TracFone that she activated 
and to which she added minutes so she could secretly communicate 
with McKellips.  After C.H. tore her ACL, she convinced her 
mother to let her spend time with McKellips and his wife who 
were going to a grandson's baseball game.  C.H. testified that 
this is when the first physical contact occurred:  as McKellips 
helped her to the car and with his wife not around, McKellips 
kissed her on the cheek.  After this incident, their cellphone 
contacts increased and McKellips started using relationship 
terms when talking to her such as "baby doll" and "sweetheart."  
He told her he loved her. 
¶12 C.H. described four incidents of sexual contact: 
(1) 
June 2011.  McKellips picked her up and took her 
to his house where they were going to make pies 
with his wife.   McKellips' wife was not home and 
the pies were already made.  C.H. testified that 
they sat on the couch in the living room where 
they kissed on the lips, he touched her under her 
clothes, and he pulled down his pants to expose 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
8 
 
his erect penis.  He put his hands on her head 
and brought her mouth to his penis and fluids 
came out of his penis.  C.H. said this was her 
first sexual experience ever.  She also explained 
that he touched the area where she had pubic hair 
and put his mouth on the area where she urinates.  
Afterwards, he drove her home and told her she 
could not tell anyone.  After this incident, 
their cellphone contact increased to more than 
once a day. 
(2) 
July 2011.  McKellips stopped by her mother's 
home where C.H. was babysitting her one-year-old 
brother who was asleep.  McKellips kissed her on 
the lips and slipped his hands into her pants 
touching 
her 
buttocks 
but 
on 
top 
of 
her 
underwear.  McKellips also took her hand and 
placed it over his pants on his erect penis. 
(3) 
July 29, 2011.  McKellips picked C.H. up and took 
her to his house to help prepare for a fish fry 
he was hosting.  He said his sister would be 
there helping but when they arrived at McKellips' 
home, his sister was not there.  C.H. and 
McKellips were home alone and they sat on the 
living room couch kissing.  McKellips touched her 
breasts under her shirt but over her bra, touched 
her vaginal area with his hands and mouth, and 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
9 
 
put her mouth on his erect penis until fluids 
came out. 
(4) 
August 2011.  C.H.'s family was visiting her 
grandmother who lived near McKellips' house.  
C.H. convinced her mother to let her walk to his 
home where again C.H. and McKellips were alone.  
They sat on the living room couch kissing and 
another incident of oral sex occurred. 
¶13 C.H. testified that in June and July of 2011, at 
McKellips' request, she sent him seven to ten picture messages 
of her, three of which were of her in her bra and underwear.  
After she sent the pictures, McKellips would tell her he liked 
them.  She also described what happened when her father found 
the secret cellphone on September 5, 2011: 
 She contacted McKellips to warn him that her father found 
the secret cellphone; 
 She sent McKellips texts from her iPod:  "I just told 
them the truth.  Tht we hugged and a kiss on the cheek 
nothing physical.  And idk what's going to happen bu[t] 
my parents said their not going to tell anyone just 
probably talk to u."  And, "Tht I was all just txtin and 
we never did anything just txting and talk not actually 
doing anything." 
 On September 6, 2011, at school, she borrowed her cousin 
A.B.'s cellphone to call McKellips and reassured him that 
she did not disclose the sexual nature of their 
relationship to her parents. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
10 
 
 That 
evening, 
she 
met 
with 
her 
mother, 
father, 
stepmother, and stepfather and disclosed everything that 
had happened between her and McKellips. 
 On September 7, 2011, she reported this information to 
the police and gave them her secret cellphone and her 
iPod. 
¶14 Other witnesses confirmed the details of C.H.'s 
testimony.  A.B. testified that C.H. borrowed A.B.'s cellphone 
at school on September 6, 2011, called McKellips, and talked for 
2.5 minutes.  T.R., the other freshman selected for the 2010-11 
varsity basketball team, testified that she did not receive 
frequent phone calls from McKellips and the ten to fifteen calls 
she did receive during the basketball season all pertained to 
basketball.  Both girls testified they know C.H. to be a 
truthful person. 
¶15 Guy Otte, the activities director at Mosinee High 
School, 
where 
McKellips 
previously 
coached 
varsity 
girls 
basketball, testified that he met with McKellips two times 
during McKellips' years at Mosinee to discuss the importance of 
maintaining proper boundaries with players and stressed that 
coaches should not give gifts to student athletes.  Brad Tipple, 
C.H.'s AAU coach, also testified.  He talked about how talented 
and hard-working C.H. was as a player.  He saw no evidence that 
C.H. was depressed.  As a coach, he does not have much contact 
with players outside of practice and games. 
¶16 Danielle Diedrich, a teacher at Athens High School, 
testified that she coached the junior varsity girls basketball 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
11 
 
team and assisted McKellips with the varsity team during the 
2010-11 season.  She told the jury C.H. was a great athlete who 
worked hard 100 percent of the time and did not have any mental 
health problems.  She thought it was odd that McKellips kept 
calling C.H. at the AAU Minnesota tournament when he knew that 
Diedrich, his assistant coach, was at the same tournament.  She 
also testified that she ran into McKellips at the Best Buy in 
Wausau when he bought what turned out to be the secret cellphone 
for C.H. 
¶17 C.H.'s father T.H., her mother J.B., and C.H.'s 
stepfather testified next.  T.H. testified: 
 He caught C.H. talking to McKellips and warned her to 
stop as it could lead to problems. 
 He found the secret cellphone, questioned his daughter 
and explained how upset she was——initially only admitting 
that McKellips had hugged her, kissed her on the cheek, 
and had exchanged text messages with her. 
 C.H. eventually disclosed everything that happened and 
was very upset and did not want her parents and 
stepparents to tell anyone or call the police. 
 C.H. was generally a truthful person. 
¶18 J.B. testified: 
 McKellips would call her home phone during the basketball 
season to talk about basketball games or how C.H. played. 
 He gave the family gifts including Packers' jerseys for 
the whole family, a Buddha doll, and vegetables or fish. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
12 
 
 She was upset when she learned McKellips was talking to 
C.H. on her cellphone after school basketball season 
ended and told C.H. to tell him to use the home phone. 
 She thought McKellips acted oddly when he met them at a 
restaurant in Wausau after C.H.'s sectional softball 
game. 
 She confirmed that C.H. went to McKellips' home in June 
2011 to make pies, that C.H. went to McKellips' home on 
July 29, 2011 to help prepare fish, and again in August 
when they were at the grandmother's house near where 
McKellips lived. 
 On the day the secret cellphone was discovered, J.B.'s 
phone records showed that McKellips called her multiple 
times and when she finally talked to him that day, J.B. 
did not disclose to McKellips that the secret cellphone 
had been found; McKellips told J.B. he was trying to 
reach her because he had an extra ticket for a Brewers 
game. 
 C.H. is generally a truthful person and although she was 
sad about hurting her knee, she was not depressed. 
¶19 C.H.'s stepfather testified about how much C.H. loved 
basketball, 
what 
happened 
when 
the 
secret 
cellphone 
was 
discovered, and how difficult it was to hear C.H. disclose what 
happened with McKellips.  He also described McKellips' unusual 
behavior at the Wausau restaurant. 
¶20 Steve 
Cotey 
and 
Robert 
Fochs 
both 
worked 
as 
supervisors at Wausau Paper.  Cotey testified that on September 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
13 
 
9, 2011, the front office called and said the police were there 
asking to speak with McKellips.  When Cotey told McKellips a 
police officer was asking to speak with McKellips, McKellips did 
not seem surprised.  Fochs told the jury about the Mosinee Chief 
of Police Kenneth Muelling asking for his help to search for 
McKellips' cellphone, which McKellips claimed he dropped in a 
coal pit.  After searching McKellips' work area, personal locker 
and truck, no phone was located.  Muelling's testimony confirmed 
the search with Fochs. 
¶21 Theresa Steiber testified that she was friends with 
McKellips' 33-year-old daughter, B.B., and that McKellips 
coached their basketball team in 7th and 8th grade as well as 
high school.  Steiber told the jury that as a 7th and 8th 
grader, McKellips made her feel uncomfortable because he 
expressed his love for her in letters, gave her jewelry and a 
Bulls jacket, held her hand, rubbed her leg, and gave her back 
rubs.  McKellips would say things to her like "if only he was 30 
years younger," and she tried to avoid him because of this 
conduct.  Steiber testified that McKellips' behavior stopped 
when she started high school. 
¶22 Ryan Kaiser testified for the State as a cellphone 
expert witness.  He told the jury: 
 The Mosinee police asked him to examine the flip-style 
cellphone involved in this case. 
 This type of phone had logical functions including 
"computing the data you are typing into it" and that it 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
14 
 
had predictive texting, which puts the words on the 
screen before the user is done typing them. 
 This phone had memory, took and saved pictures and 
videos, and had some internet capabilities. 
 There are internal impulses in the phone that made the 
device 
function; 
when 
the 
user 
pushed 
buttons, 
information was sent through the device creating images 
on the screen. 
 All cellphone carriers are connected to a server and use 
a computer system or computer network especially when 
sending text messages. 
¶23 The State's last two witnesses were Athens Chief of 
Police Aaron Stencil and City of Mosinee Police Officer Matt 
Wehn.  Stencil testified about taking C.H.'s statement on 
September 7, 2011 and described how C.H. was crying and upset.  
Wehn testified that: 
 He gathered all the cellphone records in this case and 
created an exhibit documenting the phone numbers and 
contacts between the various phones. 
 Between December 18, 2010 and July 27, 2011, there were 
8,324 contacts between McKellips' cellphone and C.H.'s 
regular 
cellphone. 
 
McKellips 
received 
4,816 
text 
messages and sent 3,184. 
 Between June 10, 2011 and July 27, 2011, there were 2,426 
total contacts between McKellips' cellphone and C.H.'s 
secret cellphone. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
15 
 
 McKellips activated a new cellphone on July 30, 2011 and 
the first phone call he made was to C.H.'s secret 
cellphone.  Using the new phone, between July 30, 2011 
and September 5, 2011, McKellips sent 77 texts to C.H.'s 
secret cellphone and received 191 texts.  McKellips' 
phone used 4,224 minutes during that time. 
 McKellips' cellphone received ten multimedia messages 
from C.H.'s secret cellphone.  Multimedia messages "would 
be anything from video to pictures to a voice file, an 
electronic file, as opposed to just the written word." 
¶24 Wehn also told the jury that as a part of his 
investigation, on September 9, 2011, he went to Wausau Paper to 
talk to McKellips.  When he arrived, McKellips told him he had 
dropped his cellphone in the coal pit.  Wehn learned McKellips 
had not really dropped his cellphone in the coal pit, but hid it 
because he did not want to turn it over to police.  Wehn took 
McKellips into the police station for questioning.  The audio 
recordings of McKellips' statements were played for the jury. 
¶25 In May 2012, Wehn collected McKellips' cellphone from 
his attorney and it was in good condition, but there were no 
messages from or to C.H. on the cellphone.  Wehn also testified 
about 
the 
last 
contacts 
on 
C.H.'s 
regular 
cellphone 
to 
McKellips' cellphone the night of September 5, 2011:  one text 
at 7:01 p.m. and two incoming calls from McKellips, one of which 
was answered at 7:05 p.m. 
¶26 The 
defense 
called 
four 
witnesses. 
 
McKellips' 
daughter B.B. testified that she does not remember her father 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
16 
 
acting inappropriately toward her friend, Theresa Steiber, and 
that she bought the Bulls jacket for Steiber.  C.S., McKellips' 
sister, testified that on the fish-fry night, McKellips and C.H. 
were never alone in the house or his truck.  Connie McKellips, 
McKellips' wife, testified that they treated C.H. like their own 
daughter, C.H. liked spending time with them because her parents 
were fighting, they helped C.H. with her depression, and C.H. 
was never alone in their home with McKellips.  The last defense 
witness was McKellips.  He testified: 
 He never had any sexual contact with C.H. and they were 
never alone inside his home. 
 He did give C.H. a hug and kiss on the cheek after she 
was injured. 
 He regularly called his players "baby doll" and said "I 
love you" to all of them. 
 He bought the secret cellphone for C.H. to help her 
because she was depressed and suicidal; C.H. asked for 
the phone. 
 He never downloaded any pictures from C.H. as he did not 
know how to do so. 
 He admitted lying to the police about dropping his 
cellphone in the coal pit; he lied because he believed 
C.H.'s iPod text on his cellphone would help him and he 
did not want it to get erased. 
 He never touched C.H. at her mother's house. 
 He talked to C.H. a lot because she was "needy." 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
17 
 
 He admitted C.H.'s parents did not know about the secret 
cellphone. 
¶27 After closing arguments, the trial court instructed 
the jury.  It gave the standard jury instruction on "use of a 
computer to facilitate a child sex crime," as well as a 
supplemental instruction and definition of computer: 
The third count of the information charges that 
the defendant, Rory McKellips, on or about May 1st, 
2011, to August 31st of 2011, in the City of Mosinee, 
Marathon County, Wisconsin, did use a computerized 
communication system to communicate with an individual 
who the actor believed, or had reason to believe, had 
not attained the age of 16 years, with intent to have 
sexual 
contact 
with 
the 
individual, 
or 
sexual 
intercourse with the individual. 
To this charge, the defendant has also entered a 
plea [of] not guilty, which means the state must prove 
every 
element 
of 
the 
offense 
charged 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt. 
Section 948.075 is violated by a person who uses 
a computerized communication system to communicate 
with an individual who the person believes, or has 
reason to believe, has not attained the age of 16 
years with intent to have sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with the individual.  Before you may find 
the defendant guilty of this offense, the state must 
prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the following [four] elements 
were present. 
Number 
one. 
 
That 
the 
defendant 
used 
a 
computerized communication system to communicate with 
an individual. 
Number two.  That the defendant believed or had 
reason to believe that the individual was under the 
age of 16 years. 
Number 
three. 
 
That 
the 
defendant 
used 
a 
computerized communication system to communicate with 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
18 
 
the individual with intent to have sexual contact with 
the individual. 
Number four.  That the defendant did an act in 
addition to using a computerized communication system 
to carry out the intent to have sexual contact. 
[Evidence has been received that the defendant 
communicated with a child under the age of 16 via a 
mobile or cellphone.  You must determine whether the 
phone 
described 
in 
the 
evidence 
constitutes 
a 
computerized communication system. 
To aid you in that determination, you are 
instructed that under Wisconsin law, a computer is 
defined as -- computer is defined as computer, which 
means an electronic device that performs logical, 
arithmetic, 
and 
memory 
functions 
by 
manipulating 
electronic or magnetic impulses, and includes all 
input, output, processing, storage, computer software 
and communication facilities that are connected or 
related to a computer in a computer system or computer 
network.  Computer system is defined as a set of 
related computer equipment, hardware, or software.]   
Sexual contact is an intentional touching of an 
intimate part of C.[]H. by the defendant.  The 
touching may be of an intimate part directly, or it 
may be through the clothing.  The touching may be done 
by any body part or by any object, but it must be an 
intentional touching.  Sexual contact also requires 
that the defendant acted with intent to become 
sexually aroused or gratified. 
You cannot look into a person's mind to find 
intent and belief.  Intent and belief must be found, 
if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and 
statements, if any, and from all the facts and 
circumstances in this case bearing upon intent and 
belief. 
If you are so satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that all [four] elements of this offense have been 
proven, you should find the defendant guilty.  If you 
are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
19 
 
Wis JI——Criminal 2135 (Apr. 2013)(emphases added; third set of 
brackets contains supplemental instruction). 
¶28 The jury convicted McKellips on the Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075 charge and obstruction, but acquitted him of the other 
two charges.  He was sentenced to 15 years, consisting of ten 
years of initial confinement followed by five years of extended 
supervision on the computer charge and nine months concurrent on 
the obstruction charge.  McKellips appealed the conviction to 
the court of appeals, arguing (1) he did not violate Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075 because his cellphone did not use the internet; (2) 
§ 948.075 is unconstitutional; and (3) the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it admitted other acts 
evidence.  The court of appeals did not decide these issues.  
Instead, it sua sponte held that the jury instruction on 
§ 948.075 "misdirected" the jury by asking it to determine 
whether the cellphone itself constituted the computerized 
communication system instead of asking the jury "whether 
McKellips' various alleged uses of the cell phone constituted 
communication via a computerized communication system."  State 
v. McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, ¶22, 361 Wis. 2d 773, 864 N.W.2d 
106.  The court of appeals exercised its discretionary authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 752.35, reversed McKellips' conviction, and 
ordered a new trial in the interest of justice because "the real 
controversy was not tried."  Id.  The State petitioned this 
court for review, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
20 
 
¶29 This case involves the interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.075, which is a question of law that we 
review independently.  See Shannon E.T. v. Alicia M. V.M., 2007 
WI 29, ¶31, 299 Wis. 2d 601, 728 N.W.2d 636.  Our standards for 
interpreting statutes are well-known and need not be repeated 
here.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  This case 
also involves a constitutional challenge to § 948.075, which 
likewise presents a question of law requiring our independent 
review.  See Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 
¶18, 
237 
Wis. 2d 
99, 
613 
N.W.2d 
849. 
 
"Statutes 
are 
presumptively 
constitutional. 
 
The 
court 
indulges 
every 
presumption to sustain the law if at all possible, and if any 
doubt exists about a statute's constitutionality, we must 
resolve that doubt in favor of constitutionality."  Id., ¶18 
(internal citation omitted). 
¶30 In addition, this case involves our review of the jury 
instruction on the Wis. Stat. § 948.075 charge.  Although a 
circuit court has broad discretion when instructing a jury, we 
review independently whether the instructions given accurately 
stated the law.  See State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶18, 347 
Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681.  If the jury instructions did not 
accurately state the law, then the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶9, 
317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187.  We, however, do not review a 
particular instruction in isolation; instead, we analyze the 
instructions as a whole to determine their accuracy, viewing 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
21 
 
them in the context of the overall charge.  See State v. Pettit, 
171 Wis. 2d 627, 637, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).  Finally, 
we review the court of appeals' exercise of its discretionary 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 752.35, which requires us to 
determine whether the court of appeals erroneously exercised its 
discretion in granting McKellips a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  See State v. Johnson, 149 Wis. 2d 418, 428-29, 439 
N.W.2d 122 (1989), confirmed on reconsideration, 153 Wis. 2d 
121, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990).  "Reversals in the interest of 
justice should be granted only in exceptional cases."  State v. 
Kucharski, 2015 WI 64, ¶23, 363 Wis. 2d 658, 866 N.W.2d 697 
(emphasis added). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Application of computerized communication system 
¶31 The main dispute is whether an exchange of texts and 
picture messages between flip-style cellphones constitutes use 
of 
a 
"computerized 
communication 
system" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.075(1r).  The State argues that such exchanges satisfy 
that term.  McKellips disagrees, and asserts that the term is 
only satisfied when the internet is involved.  We agree with the 
State. 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.075, entitled, "[u]se of a 
computer to facilitate a child sex crime," provides: 
(1r)  Whoever uses a computerized communication system 
to communicate with an individual who the actor 
believes or has reason to believe has not attained the 
age of 16 years with intent to have sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse with the individual in violation of 
s. 948.02 (1) or (2) is guilty of a Class C felony. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
22 
 
(2)  This section does not apply if, at the time of 
the communication, the actor reasonably believed that 
the age of the person to whom the communication was 
sent was no more than 24 months less than the age of 
the actor. 
(3)  Proof that the actor did an act, other than use a 
computerized communication system to communicate with 
the individual, to effect the actor's intent under 
sub. (1r) shall be necessary to prove that intent. 
"Computerized communication system" is not defined in this 
statute, but under statutory interpretation rules, we may apply 
the ordinary and accepted meaning of this term unless it has a 
technical or special definition.  See State ex rel. Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  In doing so, we may use a dictionary to 
establish the common meaning of an undefined statutory term.  
State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499-500, 573 N.W.2d 187 
(1998). 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
"computerized 
communication system" must be a "legislative term of art" 
because it was "unable to locate a definition for the term in 
any dictionaries or internet searches."  McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 
773, ¶12.  We are not convinced "computerized communication 
system" is a special or technical term.  Rather, it is three 
commonly 
understood 
words 
used 
together. 
 
Although 
our 
dictionary does not specifically define the term "computerized 
communication 
system," 
it 
does 
define 
"computerized," 
"communication," and "system."  Thus, we can examine the 
dictionary definitions of each of these three common words to 
ascertain their meaning when used together. 
¶33 "Computerized" is defined as:  "[o]f or relating to a 
computer or the use of a computer."  Computerized, The American 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
23 
 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 380 (5th ed. 2011).  
"Communication" is defined as:  "[t]he act of communicating; 
transmission" 
"[t]he 
exchange 
of 
thoughts, 
messages, 
or 
information, as by speech, signals, writing, or behavior."  
Communication, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 373 (5th ed. 2011).  "System" is defined as: "A group 
of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming 
a complex whole."  System, The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1768 (5th ed. 2011). 
¶34 Putting the three definitions together gives us the 
meaning of "computerized communication system":  A group of 
interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a 
complex whole used to exchange thoughts or messages through a 
computer.  Using this definition, we turn to whether McKellips' 
use of his flip-style phone to exchange texts with C.H.'s 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
24 
 
cellphone satisfies the use of a "computerized communication 
system" element of Wis. Stat. § 948.075(1r).5 
¶35 There is no doubt that modern cellphones today are in 
fact computers.  See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 
803, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2012)("a modern cell phone is a computer").  
This is true because modern cellphones contain technology 
enabling them to perform functions that a traditional computer 
does, including accessing the internet, sending and receiving 
email, using social media, word processing, gaming, storing 
pictures, and connecting to a printer.  McKellips does not 
contest this point.  Rather, he contends that the flip-style 
                                                 
5 The 
court 
of 
appeals, 
in 
attempting 
to 
define 
"computerized 
communication 
system" 
discusses 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.0125 and § 48.825, which are the two other statutes where 
that term appears.  See McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶¶11-16.  
Although neither statute gives a definition of the term, some 
examples of a computerized communication system are provided:  
Section 948.0125 uses the term 13 times.  Twelve times it refers 
to "messages sent 'on an electronic mail or other computerized 
communication system.'"  McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶13 (citing 
§ 947.0125(2)(a)-(f), (3)(a)-(f)).  The thirteenth time "refers 
to messages sent 'from any computer terminal or other device 
that is used to send messages on an electronic mail or other 
computerized communication system.'"  McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 
773, ¶13 (citing § 947.0125(3)(g)).  Section 48.825 refers to 
communications 
'by 
any 
computerized 
communication 
system, 
including by electronic mail, Internet site, Internet account, 
or any similar medium of communication provided via the 
Internet.'"  McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶15.  None of the 
examples in these statutes alters our conclusion that the 
cellphone here was used as a computer to communicate through a 
computerized cellular phone system in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075.  Rather, these statutes support our conclusion that 
the legislature included the term "computerized communication 
system" to cover situations beyond the internet or email.   
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
25 
 
cellphone involved here is not computerized because the text 
messages did not use the internet. 
¶36 Although the flip-style cellphone involved here may 
not be as advanced as some modern cellphones, McKellips' use of 
it satisfied the definition of computerized.  The State's 
cellphone expert, Ryan Kaiser, provided uncontroverted testimony 
that the flip-style cellphone met the definition of computer.  
He also testified that the cellphone had logical functions 
including "computing the data you are typing into it" and when 
you pushed buttons, information was sent through the device 
creating images on the screen.  These functions satisfy the 
definition of "computerized."  After all, this is one of the 
basic functions of a computer:  pushing buttons on a keypad or 
keyboard that sends messages through the processor, which 
results in numbers, letters, and words appearing on a screen.  
Additionally, Kaiser testified that all cellphone carriers are 
connected to a server and use a computer system or network, 
particularly when sending text messages.  Thus, the first part 
of "computerized communication system" is met. 
¶37 The middle word in this term, communication, does not 
appear to be disputed.  Certainly texts and picture messages 
constitute communication.  Both involve an exchange of messages 
by writing or image to another person.  McKellips admits that he 
communicated with C.H. via text messages.  Although he denied 
asking for or downloading the picture messages C.H. sent, there 
is evidence in the record documenting such activity.  In any 
event, McKellips admits exchanging texts with C.H. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
26 
 
¶38 The final word in the term, system, was also met 
because 
the 
cellphones 
used 
a 
system 
to 
complete 
the 
communication.  Again, Kaiser explained that all cellphone 
carriers are connected to a server and use a computer system or 
computer network, especially when sending text messages.  We 
conclude that McKellips' texts using his flip-style cellphone 
satisfied the use of a "computerized communication system" 
element of Wis. Stat. § 948.075(1r).  McKellips used his 
cellphone as a computer to send communications to the victim 
over the computer system used by their cellphones so that he 
could have sexual contact with her.  Although case law on this 
issue is still developing, at least one appellate court has 
reached the same conclusion.  See People v. Holmes, 956 N.Y.S.2d 
365, 367 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)(sending telephone text messages 
is not simply the use of a telephone, "but rather a telephone 
[that is] inextricably linked to a sophisticated computerized 
communication system"). 
¶39 We reject McKellips' position that this statute 
requires 
use 
of 
the 
internet 
for 
conduct 
to 
satisfy 
"computerized 
communication 
system." 
 
Although 
using 
the 
internet to communicate with a person who the actor believes or 
has reason to believe is not 16 years old with the intent of 
having sexual contact or intercourse certainly violates this 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
27 
 
statute,6 neither the statute, nor the definition of computerized 
communication system requires the use of the internet.  If the 
legislature had intended to limit this statute to conduct 
involving the internet, it certainly could have done so.  See 
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶¶14-15, 
316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (where the legislature does not 
limit the application of a statute, we will not insert words 
into a statute to create such a result).  By not specifically 
limiting this statute to internet uses, the legislature left 
open for prosecution the use of all computerized communication 
systems, including, as we have seen here, texts between 
cellphones. 
B.  Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 948.075 
¶40 McKellips next argues that Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is 
unconstitutionally vague.  His argument is not well-developed 
and is unconvincing. 
¶41 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to 
give fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence regarding 
what it prohibits and if it fails to provide an objective 
standard for enforcement.  See State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 
255, 276, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).  The law does not require "'the 
line between lawful and unlawful conduct be drawn with absolute 
clarity and precision.'"  State v. Colton M., 2015 WI App 94, 
                                                 
6 See State v. Olson, 2008 WI App 171, ¶1, 314 Wis. 2d 630, 
762 N.W.2d 393 (defendant use of online chat room); State v. 
Schulpius, 2006 WI App 263, ¶2, 298 Wis. 2d 155, 726 N.W.2d 706 
(defendant had computer conversations over the internet). 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
28 
 
¶7, 366 Wis. 2d 119, 875 N.W.2d 642 (citation omitted).  "[A] 
statute need not be so specific as to delineate each and every 
mode of conduct embraced by its terms[.]"  State v. Killory, 73 
Wis. 2d 400, 405-06, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976).  "'A fair degree of 
definiteness is all that is required.'"  Colton M., 366 Wis. 2d 
119, 
¶7 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
We 
presume 
statutes 
are 
constitutional, look for reasons to uphold the constitutionality 
of a statute, and place the burden on the defendant to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a statute is unconstitutional.  
See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶18-19. 
¶42 McKellips 
has 
not 
satisfied 
this 
burden.  
"Computerized communication system" is sufficiently definite in 
meaning 
based 
on 
each 
word's 
common 
usage 
and 
ordinary 
understanding to satisfy fair notice requirements.  See Killory, 
73 Wis. 2d at 407.  A person of ordinary intelligence need not 
guess at what this term means, but instead needs to simply 
consider the common meaning of each word in the term.  Such 
consideration provides fair notice that using a cellphone to 
text a child in order to entice a sexual relationship violates 
the statute.  McKellips' argument that the term does not give 
fair notice because he really did not have the intent required 
by the statute is not a constitutional argument, but a 
sufficiency of the evidence argument——an argument that was 
rejected by a jury that listened to all the testimony and 
considered all the evidence. 
¶43 McKellips also argues that the statute is so vague it 
could result in prosecutions of innocent people who are using 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
29 
 
cellphones in everyday life and extend beyond the use of 
cellphones entirely to encompass mailing letters through the 
post office.  McKellips' argument is meritless.  The statute 
clearly does not criminalize ordinary use of a cellphone.  In 
addition to the use of a computerized communication system 
discussed in this opinion, conviction under Wis. Stat. § 948.075 
also requires proof of the actor's "intent to have sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse" and "[p]roof that the actor did 
an act, other than use a computerized communication system to 
communicate with the individual, to effect the actor's intent 
under sub. (1r) . . . to prove that intent."  See § 948.075(1r), 
(3).  It is absurd to suggest that a person of ordinary 
intelligence would not read the language of § 948.075 as fair 
notice that using a cellphone to send text messages to lure a 
child into sexual activity is against the law. 
¶44 Our legislature, for good reason, has taken a strong 
stance in favor of protecting children from sex crimes.  See 
Wis. Stat. ch. 948 (Crimes against children).  "The state has 
the right to enact reasonable legislation to protect the safety 
and well-being of minors."  Killory, 73 Wis. 2d at 407.  Mindful 
of the need to protect children in a world of exponential 
technological advancement, the legislature chose an expansive 
term——"computerized communication system"——to protect children 
from falling prey to criminals taking advantage of rapidly 
changing technology before new laws can be passed.  The 
legislature employed a term that would provide fair notice, but 
also encompasses future technologies.  It selected "computerized 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
30 
 
communication system," which as explained here, is readily 
understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence.  Because 
this term satisfies the fair notice aspect of the test it does 
not render Wis. Stat. § 948.075 unconstitutionally vague on that 
basis. 
¶45 McKellips also fails to convince us that the statute 
does not provide an objective standard of enforcement.  The 
standard of enforcement within the plain language of the statute 
clearly states the elements required to prove the crime.  
McKellips 
makes 
much 
ado 
about 
the 
term 
"computerized 
communication system" not being capable of objective enforcement 
because it is not defined.  The absence of a definition does not 
make the statute incapable of objective enforcement.  As already 
explained, the term "computerized communication system" is 
readily understandable.  A search of our case law revealed ten 
other 
cases 
(besides 
McKellips') 
involving 
"computerized 
communication 
system"——none 
of 
which 
had 
any 
problems 
understanding or applying that term.  See, e.g. State v. Olson, 
2008 WI App 171, ¶1, 314 Wis. 2d 630, 762 N.W.2d 393; State v. 
Schulpius, 2006 WI App 263, ¶2, 298 Wis. 2d 155, 726 N.W.2d 706.  
The court of appeals' opinion in this case appears to stand 
alone as the only court that struggled with this terminology, 
likely because this case involved text messages between flip-
style cellphones rather than the internet or email.  As we have 
explained, the text messages satisfied the element "use[ of] a 
computerized communication system."  This terminology provides a 
clear and objective standard for enforcement.  Anyone who (1) 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
31 
 
uses a computerized communication system for purposes of text 
messaging between cellphones to communicate with "an individual 
who the actor believes or has reason to believe" is not yet 16 
years old and "with intent to have sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse" and (2) commits "an act, other than use of a 
computerized communication system . . . to effect the actor's 
intent," can be prosecuted under this statute.  McKellips has 
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. Stat. § 948.075 
is unconstitutionally vague.  We reject his constitutional 
challenge. 
C.  Jury Instruction 
¶46 McKellips next argues the jury instruction on Wis. 
Stat. § 948.075(1r), which asked the jury to determine whether 
his cellphone itself was a computerized communication system was 
misleading and not harmless.  We do not agree. 
¶47 The State points out that McKellips did not object to 
these instructions at trial or in his appeal to the court of 
appeals.  Rather, the jury instruction issue was raised sua 
sponte by the court of appeals.  Failure to contemporaneously 
object to jury instructions results in forfeiting review of the 
jury instructions.  State v. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, ¶36, 306 
Wis. 2d 52, 741 N.W.2d 267.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(3) governs 
jury instructions and requires contemporaneous objections be 
made in the circuit court.  The purpose of the rule is to give 
the opposing party and the circuit court an opportunity to 
correct any error.  Cockrell, 306 Wis. 2d 52, ¶36.  This also 
helps preserve jury verdicts and conserve judicial resources.  
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
32 
 
Despite McKellips' forfeiture, however, we choose to address 
this because the court of appeals based its entire reversal 
decision on the jury instruction, which prompted us to ask for 
briefing on the issue.  See McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶¶20-21; 
see also D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 
2008 WI 126, ¶41, 314 Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803 (we may 
address a forfeited issue at our discretion when we deem it 
important). 
¶48 McKellips concedes that Wis. JI—Criminal 2135 is an 
accurate statement of the law7 but objects to the extra 
instructions the circuit court tacked on to the end of Wis JI-
Criminal 2135 telling the jury it "must determine whether the 
phone described in the evidence constitutes a computerized 
communication system" and then instructing it on the definition 
of computer. 
¶49 We agree with McKellips that the circuit court's 
instruction advising the jury it must determine whether the 
phone itself constituted a computerized communication system 
could have been more precisely worded.  The jury could have been 
instructed to find whether the phone is a computerized device 
                                                 
7 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) 
alerting us to a potential flaw in Wis. JI-Criminal 2135.  It 
points out that the instruction's omission of the qualifying "in 
violation of s. 948.02(1) or (2)," could create an issue when 
the person being communicated with is an adult posing as a 
child.  Our analysis in this case does not impact this issue and 
therefore we do not address it.  We encourage WACDL to raise 
this issue with the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee. 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
33 
 
that was used to communicate through a computerized cellphone 
network or system to entice the sexual contact with C.H.  We do 
not agree, however, that the circuit court's phrasing rendered 
the jury instructions as a whole erroneous.  As noted, the 
circuit court correctly stated the four elements of the crime 
and informed the jury it must find each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This included instructing the jury repeatedly 
it must find that McKellips "used" a computerized communication 
system.  See supra ¶27.  In addition, the definition of computer 
given in the instruction was an accurate statement of the law 
and undoubtedly led the jury to conclude the cellphone was the 
computer McKellips used to communicate through the system.  The 
jury's finding that McKellips used his cellphone to communicate 
with C.H. necessarily means that his cellphone was used to 
access the system.  Obviously, his cellphone was not the system 
itself——rather, the cellphone and the system were connected 
together because the communications from his cellphone to C.H.'s 
cellphone could not have occurred without the use of the system.  
Under these circumstances, we are not convinced that this 
isolated wording in the extra instruction rendered the jury 
instructions as a whole inaccurate. 
¶50 Because the jury instructions accurately stated the 
law, they were not erroneous.  Even if this court were to 
conclude the extra instruction were erroneous, reversal is not 
warranted because the extra instruction was not prejudicial.  
"An error is prejudicial if it probably [and not merely 
possibly] misled the jury."  Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
34 
 
LLC, 2014 WI 72, ¶11, 356 Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 160 (citation 
omitted).  Jury instruction error is harmless when it did not 
contribute to the verdict.  See State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶48, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  Any error here did not 
probably mislead the jury and the verdict would not have changed 
if the extra instruction had been re-worded.  The elements of 
the crime were clearly stated and the evidence in the record 
sufficiently supported each element.  Cellphone expert Kaiser's 
testimony was uncontroverted that the cellphone was a computer 
and that the exchange of text messages used a computerized 
system to complete the communication.  Thus, the circuit court's 
phrasing in the extra instruction, if erroneous at all, was 
harmless error. 
D.  Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 
¶51 The last issue we address is whether the court of 
appeals erred in exercising its discretionary reversal authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 752.35, when it determined the interest of 
justice required a new trial on the ground that the real 
controversy was not fully tried.  We have already concluded that 
the wording used in the extra jury instruction did not result in 
reversible error.  Because this was the sole basis for the court 
of appeals' discretionary reversal, we must conclude it erred.  
The real controversy in this case with respect to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075(1r) 
was 
whether 
McKellips 
used 
a 
computerized 
communication system with the intent to have sexual contact with 
C.H.  As seen from the detailed facts set forth in part I., that 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
35 
 
issue was fully tried and thus, justice requires that the jury 
verdict stand. 
¶52 We make one final point with respect to Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35.  We have consistently held that the discretionary 
reversal statute should be used only in exceptional cases.  See 
Kucharski, 363 Wis. 2d 658, ¶¶23, 41; State v. Avery, 2013 WI 
13, ¶38, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60; Vollmer v. Luety, 156 
Wis. 2d 1, 11, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  In Kucharski, we 
emphasized that it is error to jump to § 752.35 as a shortcut.  
"In an exceptional case, after all other claims are weighed and 
determined to be unsuccessful, a reviewing court may determine 
that reversal is nevertheless appropriate under Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35."  Kucharski, 363 Wis. 2d 658, ¶43 (emphasis added).  
In exercising discretionary reversal, the court of appeals must 
engage in "an analysis setting forth the reasons" that the case 
may be characterized as exceptional.  Id., ¶42.  Here, the court 
of appeals did not decide the issues McKellips raised, and took 
a shortcut directly to § 752.35.  McKellips did not ask the 
court of appeals to reverse on the basis of § 752.35.  Moreover, 
the court of appeals exercised discretionary reversal authority 
without even analyzing the exceptional standard.  For these 
reasons, we conclude the court of appeals erred in reversing 
McKellips' conviction and ordering a new trial under § 752.35. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 We hold the State satisfied its burden of proving the 
element, use of a "computerized communications system," because 
McKellips 
used 
his 
cellphone 
as 
a 
computer 
to 
send 
No. 
2014AP827-CR 
 
36 
 
communications to the victim over the computer system used by 
their cellphones so that he could have sexual contact with her.  
We also hold that Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is not unconstitutionally 
vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would understand 
that using a cellphone to text or picture message with a child 
to entice sexual encounters violates the statute; moreover, the 
statute is capable of objective enforcement.  Further, we hold 
that the jury instruction given here, although not perfect, when 
read as a whole accurately stated the law.  Even if the extra 
instruction were erroneous, it was harmless error.  Finally, we 
hold that the court of appeals erred when it exercised its 
discretionary authority under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 to reverse 
McKellips' conviction.  The real controversy was tried in this 
case; moreover, discretionary reversals under § 752.35 are 
limited to exceptional cases, and the court of appeals failed to 
analyze that criterion before reversing under § 752.35. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.8 
¶54 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
                                                 
8 McKellips filed a document labeled as a petition for 
review of the denial of bail, while this case was pending, 
seeking release on cash bond based on the court of appeals' 
decision reversing his conviction and ordering a new trial.  
Because we have reversed the court of appeals, we are denying 
his request labeled as a petition for review on the bail matter 
in a separate order being issued today. 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  The instant 
case concerns the interpretation of the phrase "computerized 
communication system" in Wis. Stat. § 948.075(1r) (2013-14)1 and 
its application to Rory McKellips' exchange of phone calls, 
voicemails, and text messages with a minor, C.H.     
¶56 McKellips was charged with repeated sexual assault of 
a child, exposing genitals or pubic area, obstructing an 
officer, and use of a "computerized communication system" to 
facilitate a child sex crime.   
¶57 The jury acquitted McKellips of the sexual assault and 
exposure counts.2  Even though the jury did not find McKellips 
guilty of a child sex crime, the jury found McKellips guilty of 
using a "computerized communication system" to facilitate a 
child sex crime.  McKellips challenges this conviction in the 
instant case.3 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Although McKellips was acquitted of these counts, and the 
alleged assaults and exposure are largely irrelevant to the 
issues in the instant case, the majority opinion recounts these 
allegations and the associated trial testimony in superfluously 
graphic detail.  The sexual conduct alleged by C.H. is 
reprehensible.  If the court were called upon to condemn such 
conduct, there would be immediate and unanimous condemnation.   
Our task, however, is not to determine whether McKellips 
deserves to be punished for this alleged conduct.  Rather, we 
are called upon to analyze and apply a statute relating to use 
of a computerized communication system.   
3 The jury found McKellips guilty of obstructing an officer.  
This conviction is not being challenged. 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶58 The statute defining this crime, Wis. Stat. § 948.075, 
provides (in relevant part) as follows:  
(1r) Whoever uses a computerized communication system 
to communicate with an individual who the actor 
believes or has reason to believe has not attained the 
age of 16 years with intent to have sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse with the individual in violation of 
s. 948.02 (1) or (2) is guilty of a Class C felony. 
 
. . . . 
(3) Proof that the actor did an act, other than use a 
computerized communication system to communicate with 
the individual, to effect the actor's intent under 
sub. (1r) shall be necessary to prove that intent. 
¶59 The phrase "computerized communication system" is not 
defined in this statute or in any other statute.  I disagree 
with the majority's interpretation of this phrase. 
¶60 I address two issues raised by McKellips:  
I. 
He 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.075 
is 
unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide 
fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or provide 
objective standards for the statute's enforcement. 
In other words, he asserts that the statute is void 
for 
vagueness. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Popanz, 
112 
Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983); see also 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 
(2015).  I conclude that § 948.075 does not pass 
muster under this test in two respects:  
A. 
The ambiguity of the phrase "computerized 
communication system," the minimal guidance 
provided by the statutes, and the need for 
expert testimony regarding the functioning of 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
various communication systems demonstrate that 
Wis. Stat. § 948.075 does not provide fair 
warning of what is prohibited to persons of 
ordinary intelligence. 
B. 
The jury instruction regarding "computerized 
communication system" misstated the law.  The 
erroneous instruction demonstrates that Wis. 
Stat. § 948.075 lacks objective enforcement 
standards.    
II. After this court granted review in the instant 
case, 
McKellips 
requested 
(in 
a 
filing 
he 
characterized as either a petition for review or a 
motion) 
that 
this 
court 
release 
him 
from 
incarceration pending this review of the court of 
appeals' ruling in his favor.  The issue of his 
release from incarceration is now moot given today's 
decision of this court.  The issues McKellips 
raises, however, merit review.  
The majority opinion (at n.8) denies the petition 
for review (or motion) in a footnote and a separate 
order.  Neither provides any explanation.  Although 
this issue is moot, I would have had the court 
address it. 
¶61 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals reversing the judgment of conviction, although on 
different grounds than those relied upon by the court of 
appeals. 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶62 Therefore, I dissent and write separately.  
I 
¶63 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.075 
is 
not 
void 
for 
vagueness 
because 
the 
phrase 
"computerized communication system" is "readily understandable 
by a person of ordinary intelligence" and "capable of objective 
enforcement."4   
¶64 General principles underlying the void for vagueness 
doctrine put the instant case into legal focus.   
¶65 The United States Supreme Court has explained the 
doctrine as follows:  "The prohibition on vagueness in criminal 
statutes 'is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with 
ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law,' and 
a statute that flouts it 'violates the first essential of due 
process.'"5   
¶66 The Court has further stated:  "No one may be required 
at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the 
meaning of penal statutes.  All are entitled to be informed as 
to what the State commands or forbids."6     
                                                 
4 See majority op., ¶¶44-45.   
5 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) 
(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)).   
6 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶67 Although "[t]here is no simple litmus-paper test to 
determine whether a criminal statute is void for vagueness,"7 a 
statute may be void for vagueness if it does not (1) "give a 
person of ordinary intelligence who seeks to avoid its penalties 
fair notice of conduct required or prohibited";8 or (2) "provide 
standards for those who enforce the laws and those who 
adjudicate guilt."9   
                                                 
7 State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 
(1983); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 
§ 2.3(a), at 146 (2003) ("[T]here is no simple litmus-paper test 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
criminal 
statute 
is 
void 
for 
vagueness.").   
8 Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d at 173; see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2556; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) 
("Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning.").   
9 See Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d at 173 ("A statute should be 
sufficiently definite to allow law enforcement officers, judges, 
and juries to apply the terms of the law objectively to a 
defendant's conduct in order to determine guilt without having 
to create or apply their own standards.") (citing State v. 
Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 711, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976)); see also 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (stating that due process is 
violated when the government "tak[es] away someone's life, 
liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails 
to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, 
or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.") 
(citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).  In 
addition to these two principles, Professor LaFave identifies a 
third principle not at issue in the instant case: Whether the 
law provides sufficient space for the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.  See 1 LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.3(a), at 146.  
This court has recognized this limitation on vague criminal laws 
as well.  See City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 672-
74, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991) (stating, in a vagueness challenge to 
a noise ordinance on First Amendment grounds, that "we look to 
the face of the ordinance to guard against the possibility that 
a vague prohibition may deter or give pause to socially 
desirable conduct or expression").   
(continued) 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶68 This latter prong has been characterized as "the more 
important 
aspect 
of 
[the] 
vagueness 
doctrine,"10 
and 
is 
implicated when, among other things, "the law [is] so unclear 
that a trial court cannot properly instruct the jury."11   
¶69 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
summarized 
the 
rationale of the void for vagueness doctrine in Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972):  
Vague laws offend several important values.  First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give 
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may 
act accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning.  Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws 
                                                                                                                                                             
For further discussions of the void for vagueness doctrine, 
see, for example, 1 LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.3(a)-(d), at 144-
53; 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 21:16, at 197-241 
(Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed. 2009); 
Ryan McCarl, Incoherent and Indefensible: An Interdisciplinary 
Critique of the Supreme Court's "Void-For-Vagueness" Doctrine, 
42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 73, 74 (2014) (critiquing the void for 
vagueness doctrine as "a confusing conceptual thicket."); Orin 
S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1562, 1571-75 (2010) (describing the 
void for vagueness doctrine in general and noting that the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act "has become so broad, and computers 
so common, that expansive or uncertain interpretations" of 
certain statutory language "will render it unconstitutional."); 
John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other 
Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 Denv. U. L. Rev. 241, 
248-60 (2002) (sketching the contours of the two principles of 
the void for vagueness doctrine).   
10 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)) (internal alteration 
omitted).   
11 1 LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.3(c), at 150-51; see also 
Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d at 173.   
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them.  A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
applications (footnotes omitted). 
¶70 These important values are implicated in the instant 
case. 
¶71 Without further legislative elucidation, the phrase 
"computerized communication system" in Wis. Stat. § 948.075 does 
not provide fair notice of the conduct it prohibits.  Perhaps 
the truth of this statement is best illuminated by the fact that 
both the defendant and the State took varying positions on the 
meaning of the phrase over the course of this case. 
¶72 The majority opinion attempts to provide a definition 
of "computerized communication system" by referring to the 
dictionary.   
¶73 The 
majority's 
"plain 
meaning" 
approach 
entails 
locating the dictionary definitions of the three little words——
"computerized," "communication," and "system"12——asserting that 
"'computerized communication system' is [not] a special or 
technical term."13   
¶74 Thus, the majority opinion examines not only the 
phrase "computerized communication system" in isolation, but 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶33.   
13 Majority op., ¶32; see also majority op. ¶34.  Using the 
dictionary 
definitions, 
the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
a 
"computerized 
communication 
system" 
is 
"[a] 
group 
of 
interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a 
complex whole used to exchange thoughts or messages through a 
computer."   
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
also examines each word in isolation, before combining the 
separate dictionary definitions of each word into a single 
"plain meaning" of the phrase "computerized communication 
system."  Majority op., ¶¶33-34.   
¶75 The majority opinion's efforts at defining these 
"three little words"——"computerized communication system"——in 
isolation defy common English usage and common sense.  Sometimes 
"no other words can tell it half so clearly" as an entire 
phrase.14   
¶76 Take, for example, the phrases "smart phone," "local 
area network," "chat room," or "hard drive," all phrases used in 
discussing technology.  Defining each word in these phrases 
separately yields a definition that gives little or no insight 
into what the phrase——the words taken together——actually means. 
¶77 I do not agree with the majority opinion that a 
commonly understood, "plain" meaning of the phrase "computerized 
communication system" exists.  I agree with the court of appeals 
that the text and context of Wis. Stat. § 948.075 demonstrate 
that the phrase "computerized communication system" has a 
                                                 
14 See Sarah Vaughan, Three Little Words, on Live at the 
London House (Mercury Records 1958).    
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
particular meaning in the statutes.15  A court gives such terms 
their "technical or special definitional meaning . . . ."16 
¶78 I further disagree with the majority opinion's failure 
to read Wis. Stat. § 948.075 in context.  When interpreting a 
statute, a court looks to the context in which statutory 
language is used, "'not . . . at a single, isolated sentence or 
portion of a sentence' . . . ."17  
¶79 I would read this statute in context with two other 
statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 947.0125 and 48.825, both of which use 
the phrase "computerized communication system."  The parties 
agreed in the court of appeals that the phrase "computerized 
communication system" has the same meaning in all the statutes 
in which the legislature uses the phrase.  See State v. 
McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, ¶12, 361 Wis. 2d 773, 864 N.W.2d 106. 
¶80 These 
statutes 
use 
the 
phrase 
"computerized 
communication system" as a term of art, with a particular 
definition illuminated (albeit hazily) by their language and 
context.   
                                                 
15 See State v. McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, ¶12, 361 
Wis. 2d 773, 864 N.W.2d 106. 
16 Bruno 
v. 
Milwaukee 
Cnty., 
2003 
WI 
28, 
¶20, 
260 
Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656 (citing Weber v. Town of Saukville, 
209 Wis. 2d 214, ¶15, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997)); see also Wis. 
Stat. § 990.01(1) ("All words and phrases shall be construed 
according to common and approved usage, but technical words and 
phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall 
be construed according to such meaning.").     
17 Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 92, 673 
N.W.2d 676 (quoting Landis v. Phys. Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 
WI 86, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893).   
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶81 First, Wis. Stat. § 947.0125, entitled "Unlawful use 
of computerized communication systems" and enacted before the 
statute at issue in the instant case, provides (among other 
things) that any person who "[k]nowingly permits or directs 
another person to send a message prohibited by this section from 
any computer terminal or other device that is used to send 
messages 
on 
an 
electronic 
mail 
or 
other 
computerized 
communication system and that is under his or her control" is 
subject to a Class B forfeiture.18    
¶82 As the court of appeals reasoned,  
Wis. Stat. § 947.0125 informs the definition of 
"computerized 
communication 
system" 
in 
two 
ways.  
First, we know that one example of using such a system 
is sending email messages.  Second, paragraph (3)(g) 
informs us that a computer or other device, i.e., 
hardware, cannot itself constitute a computerized 
communication 
system 
because 
that 
paragraph 
distinguishes the two.19   
¶83 Second, Wis. Stat. § 48.825 also uses the phrase 
"computerized communication system" without defining it.  This 
statute prohibits certain kinds of advertising for purposes of 
adoption.20  
¶84 Section 48.825(1)(a) defines "advertise" to mean "to 
communicate by any public medium that originates within this 
state, including by newspaper, periodical, telephone book 
                                                 
18 Wis. Stat. § 947.0125(3)(g).   
19 McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶14.   
20 This statute was enacted after Wis. Stat. § 948.075 took 
effect.  
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
listing, outdoor advertising sign, radio, or television, or by 
any computerized communication system, including by electronic 
mail, Internet site, Internet account, or any similar medium of 
communication provided via the Internet."   
¶85 In Wis. Stat. § 48.825(1)(c), "Internet account" is 
defined 
as 
"an 
account 
created 
within 
a 
bounded 
system 
established by an Internet-based service that requires a user to 
input or store access information in an electronic device in 
order to view, create, use, or edit the user's account 
information, profile, display, communications, or stored data."   
¶86 As the court of appeals explains, Wis. Stat. §§ 48.825 
and 
947.0125 
inform 
the 
definition 
of 
"computerized 
communication system" in two similar ways:   
First, we know that use of such a system includes all 
of the examples and the category listed in the 
statute. 
 
Second, 
because 
[§ 48.825](1)(c) 
distinguishes between the "internet account" example 
of 
computerized 
communication 
system 
and 
the 
"electronic device" used to access it, we know that 
the device itself cannot constitute such a system.21 
¶87 In sum, I agree with the court of appeals that, based 
on the ways in which the legislature has used the phrase 
"computerized 
communication 
system," 
the 
phrase 
"is 
a 
legislative term of art . . . ."22   
A 
¶88 Aside from telling us (1) that e-mail is an example of 
a 
computerized 
communication 
system; 
and 
(2) 
that 
a 
                                                 
21 McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶16 (footnote omitted). 
22 See McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶12.   
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
"computerized communication system" cannot be hardware or a 
device, the statutes and case law contain nothing that provides 
additional clarity as to what constitutes a "computerized 
communication system" in Wis. Stat. § 948.075.23   
¶89 As the State acknowledged at oral argument, expert 
testimony was necessary in the instant case to establish that 
the defendant's use of a cellphone constituted use of a 
"computerized communication system."   
¶90 Although 
expert 
testimony 
is 
often 
admitted 
in 
criminal cases and can aid the jury in applying the law on which 
it is instructed, the need for expert testimony in the instant 
case (and other cases under Wis. Stat. § 948.075) demonstrates 
the lack of fair warning provided by the statute.   
¶91 The 
following 
two 
exchanges 
from 
oral 
argument 
illustrate the problem.  The first exchange was with me: 
Justice Abrahamson:  Suppose they just use voicemail?  
Does that fit within the statute?   
Assistant Attorney General:  I think it probably does.  
Justice Abrahamson:  Well, it either does or it 
doesn't.  Why do you say "probably"?   
AAG:  Well, because I don't have the facts here and I 
don't have an expert testifying as to how that works 
with voicemail.   
                                                 
23 The court of appeals concluded, "While we have not 
derived 
a 
complete 
definition 
of 
the 
term 
'computerized 
communication system,' we have discerned examples or categories 
that clearly do or do not constitute such a system."  See 
McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶17. 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶92 Later, a similar exchange occurred with Justice 
Gableman:  
Justice Gableman:  It seems to me that when I read the 
briefs, it seems to me the state is asking us to 
assume a number of things.  You [stated previously] 
well maybe there's someplace that still uses a 
switchboard.  I have no idea how the telephone company 
works . . . . Aren't you asking us to assume an awful 
lot?  Assume that by using a TracFone to call another 
person that that device has become transformed into a 
computer?  Let's start with that.   
AAG:  No.  Well, I mean, I am because that was what 
the expert testified to. . . .  If we were talking 
about a land phone like that then there would be an 
expert saying it's a phone like this and then the jury 
would say well that's not . . . .  
Justice Gableman:  So say he used the phone.  Say 
there 
are 
no 
text 
messages, 
say 
there 
are 
no 
photographs and . . . it was solely by voice by a call 
and it was solely a verbal communication . . . .  Is 
that the facilitation of a sex crime by use of a 
computerized communication system?   
AAG: 
 
Well 
and 
there's 
another 
overt 
act, 
perhaps . . . .  It could be perhaps, but you have to 
have presumably an expert testifying that there is 
some 
computer 
involved 
in 
that 
computerized 
communication system. . . .   
¶93 These exchanges expose the failure of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075 to provide fair notice to persons of ordinary 
intelligence of the prohibited conduct.  If expert testimony 
regarding the internal functioning of a land line telephone (for 
example) is necessary to determine whether its use constitutes a 
"computerized communication system," then how does Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075 "give [a] person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly?"24   
¶94 Persons of ordinary intelligence have no idea how 
cellular phones (or land line phones) function.  Likewise, 
persons of ordinary intelligence do not know whether the various 
uses of TracFones in the instant case constitute use of a 
"computerized communication system."   
¶95 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.075 is not "addressed to those 
in a particular trade or business" in which the "terms used have 
a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in that 
trade or business to apply it correctly."25   
¶96 Rather, Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is generally applicable, 
and ordinary persons in the public do not know whether by using 
a particular device in a particular manner, they may be using a 
"computerized communication system." 
¶97 As the court of appeals recognized in Town of East 
Troy v. Town & Country Waste Service, Inc., 159 Wis. 2d 694, 
707, 465 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1990), when the meaning of a 
                                                 
24 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; see also United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (describing a vague statute 
as one which fails "to provide a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice of what is prohibited . . . .") (emphasis added).    
25 See 1 LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.3(b), at 147 & n.29 
(citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (noting that the void for 
vagueness test is less strict in the context of economic 
regulation because businesses can be expected to consult 
regulation in advance); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 
U.S. 497, 501-02 (1925) (noting that "the term 'kosher' has a 
meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade 
to correctly apply it, at least as a general thing.")).    
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
statute varies from case to case based on expert testimony, "it 
raises serious constitutional vagueness questions."   
¶98 The State's argument in the instant case raises the 
same problems.  If, as the State contends, expert testimony is 
necessary to know whether Wis. Stat. § 948.075 applies, then 
Wis. Stat. § 948.075 does not give fair warning of the conduct 
it prohibits.   
B 
¶99 I now consider the jury instructions in the context of 
whether Wis. Stat. § 948.075 provides objective enforcement 
standards.  In reversing the judgment of conviction in the 
instant case, the court of appeals examined the circuit court's 
jury instructions regarding Wis. Stat. § 948.075.  The question 
is whether Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is "so unclear that a trial 
court 
cannot 
properly 
instruct 
the 
jury"26 
and 
therefore 
unconstitutionally vague. 
¶100 In the instant case, the circuit court correctly 
instructed the jury by reciting the elements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075.  Then the circuit court apparently attempted to 
explain what the statutory phrase "computerized communication 
system" means.  
¶101 The circuit court stated as follows:  
Evidence 
has 
been 
received 
that 
the 
defendant 
communicated with a child under the age of 16 via a 
mobile or cellphone.  You must determine whether the 
                                                 
26 1 LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.3(c), at 151.   
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
phone 
described 
in 
the 
evidence 
constitutes 
a 
computerized communication system. 
To aid you in that determination, you are instructed 
that under Wisconsin law, a computer is defined as——
computer is defined as computer, which means an 
electronic device that performs logical, arithmetic, 
and memory functions by manipulating electronic or 
magnetic impulses, and includes all input, output, 
processing, 
storage, 
computer 
software 
and 
communication facilities that are connected or related 
to a computer in a computer system or computer 
network.  Computer system is defined as a set of 
related computer equipment, hardware, or software.  
¶102 This instruction took the suggestion of Wis JI——
Criminal 2135, a pattern jury instruction, that other statutory 
definitions may illuminate the meaning of the undefined phrase 
"computerized communication system."   
¶103 The circuit court borrowed definitions for "computer" 
and "computer system" from another statute that defined these 
words explicitly for purposes of that section of the statutes.  
See Wis. Stat. § 943.70(1)(am), (e). 
¶104 Note 
3 
to 
the 
pattern 
instruction 
states: 
"'Computerized 
communication 
system' 
is 
not 
defined 
in 
§ 948.075. 
 
Section 
943.70, 
Computer 
crimes, 
provides 
definitions 
of 
'computer,' 
and 
'computer 
system.' 
 
See 
§ 943.70(1)(am) and (e)." 
¶105 Thus, the instruction the jury received defined only 
the words "computer" and "computer system."   
¶106 There are problems with this approach.   
¶107 First, the legislature explicitly stated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.70 that the definitions of "computer" and "computer 
system" apply "[i]n this section," i.e., in § 943.70.  The 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
legislature did not state that these definitions apply to any or 
all other sections or chapters of the statutes.  Indeed, the 
legislature made it very clear it was limiting these definitions 
to § 943.70.   
¶108 Second, neither of these definitions actually mirrors 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 948.075.  Section 948.075 refers to a 
"computerized communication system." Instructing the jury on 
what a "computer" or "computer system" is does not illuminate 
what a "computerized communication system" is.  Rather, such 
instructions might be confusing to the jury.  They seem to have 
confused the circuit court and attorneys at trial.  
¶109 The 
definition 
of 
"computer" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.70(1)(am) refers to "an electronic device."  The State and 
the court of appeals agree, however, that the circuit court 
misspoke when it told the jury to determine whether the 
cellphone described in the evidence constitutes a computerized 
communication system.27  The system and the device are different. 
According to the State, the device is used to access a 
computerized communication system. 
¶110 Likewise, the definition of "computer system" in Wis. 
Stat. § 943.70(1)(e) may have confused the jury.  The phrase 
"computerized communication system" refers to a "communication 
system," not a "computer system."  Moreover, as the State 
argued, a computer (or other similar device) is used to access a 
                                                 
27 See McKellips, 361 Wis. 2d 773, ¶21. 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
computerized communication system.  Thus, the jury might again 
be confused by the addition of this definition.     
¶111 In sum, without the addition of these two (largely 
irrelevant and potentially confusing) definitions from other 
statutes, and the circuit court's erroneous comment that the 
jury was to "determine whether the phone described in the 
evidence constitutes a computerized communication system," the 
jury would have been left with only the words "computerized 
communication system" as guidance in applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.075 to the facts of the instant case.   
¶112 Provided with a legislative term of art and no means 
of defining it, the jury is then left to decide "without any 
legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in 
each particular case."28  This would permit an unconstitutional,  
"'standardless sweep that allows . . . juries to pursue their 
personal predilections.'"29   
¶113 As a result, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is 
"so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of 
the conduct it punishes, [and] so standardless that it invites 
arbitrary enforcement."30   
¶114 Accordingly, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 948.075 is 
unconstitutional.   
                                                 
28 1 LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.3(c), at 151; see also 
(internal alteration omitted); Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d at 173.  
29 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 
575).   
30 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.   
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
II 
¶115 After this court granted the State's petition for 
review of the court of appeals' decision overturning McKellips' 
conviction, McKellips filed a motion in circuit court for 
release on bail pending review in this court.  
¶116 It appears from McKellips' filing in this court that 
the parties were unsure about how to proceed following the court 
of appeals' decision and this court's decision to grant review.  
There were also concerns over whether the circuit court had 
"subject matter jurisdiction" or "competency to proceed."   
¶117 McKellips sent a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court seeking guidance in this matter.  The Clerk advised that 
she does not provide such guidance. 
¶118 The circuit court then denied McKellips' motion for 
release on bail. 
¶119 McKellips subsequently filed a motion in the court of 
appeals seeking that court's review of the circuit court's 
denial of his request for release on bail.  The court of appeals 
dismissed the motion with the following explanation:  "Because 
this appeal is currently pending in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
the motion should be filed in that court." 
¶120 McKellips then sought relief in this court. 
¶121 A member of the court refused to allow a discussion of 
this matter at oral argument.31  Thus McKellips was incarcerated 
                                                 
31 Oral argument in the instant case took place on April 7, 
2016, 
and 
is 
available 
online 
through 
Wisconsin 
Eye 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Video-Archive/Event-Detail/evhdid/10498.  
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
until this court reached a decision on the merits of the instant 
case.  "[A]ny deprivation of liberty is a serious matter."  
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring).   
¶122 McKellips' filing raises legal questions about the 
procedure to be followed in circuit courts, the court of 
appeals, and this court when release on bail is requested 
following the reversal of a conviction by the court of appeals.   
¶123 These questions do not appear to be definitively 
resolved in the statutes or case law.  They include the 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. §§ 809.31 and 
969.01; State v. Whitty, 86 Wis. 2d 380, 398, 272 N.W.2d 842 
(1978); and Rohl v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 18, 279 N.W.2d 731 (Ct. 
App. 1979).  Moreover, these issues are likely to recur yet may, 
with the passage of time or subsequent events, become moot.  I 
would have the court address them. 
¶124 I attempted to start a discussion about these issues 
with the parties at oral argument, to no avail.  Now, the 
majority opinion denies the petition for review/motion without 
explanation.  I disagree with the way the court has managed this 
matter.  
¶125 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.  
¶126 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2014AP827-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1