Title: Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Godsey
Citation: 824 So. 2d 713
Docket Number: 1002005
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 2001

824 So. 2d 713 (2001)
OAKWOOD MOBILE HOMES, INC., et al.
v.
Charlotte GODSEY.
1002005.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 28, 2001.
*714 Jon B. Terry of Bains &amp; Terry, Bessemer; and Hobson Manasco, Jr., Haleyville, for appellants.
Jonathan B. Lowe and Michael E. Newell of Lowe, Mobley &amp; Lowe, Haleyville, for appellee.
MADDOX, Retired Justice.
This is an appeal by several defendants from an order of the trial court denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration in a suit involving the sale and financing of a mobile home.
Charlotte Godsey sued Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Homes Corporation, Oakwood Acceptance Corporation, and Rhonda Jefferson (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Oakwood"), alleging that a mortgage allegedly executed by her to Oakwood Acceptance Corporation as security for the loan by which she purchased the mobile home was a forgery and that the forgery was a criminal offense and created a cause of action for damages. Godsey also alleged that Oakwood's conduct constituted a slander of title of her interest in the real property described in the mortgage and that Oakwood had committed the tort of outrage.
Oakwood responded to Godsey's complaint by filing a "Motion to Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration." After some discovery was conducted, the trial court set a date for a hearing on the motion, and initially entered an order compelling arbitration.[1]
Godsey subsequently filed a motion to vacate, alter, or amend the order of the *715 trial court granting Oakwood's motion to compel arbitration. The trial judge set the motion for a hearing, and on July 20, 2001, the trial judge entered an order denying Oakwood's motion to compel arbitration. Oakwood appealed.[2]
On or about July 29, 1997, Scottie Godsey, Goodsey's husband, traveled to Tupelo, Mississippi, and purchased a new mobile home from Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. Rhonda Jefferson was employed by Oakwood Mobile Homes as a salesperson and was the employee who personally dealt with Mr. Godsey. The purchase was to be financed by Oakwood Acceptance Corporation. On the date of the purchase, several documents were executed, including a purchase contract, a retail-installment contract, and other documents, including an arbitration agreement that is the subject matter of this appeal. As part of the closing of the loan transaction, Mr. Godsey executed a mortgage on a certain parcel of real property located in Winston County, Alabama, where the mobile home was to be installed. From the record before us, it appears undisputed that Charlotte Godsey did not sign any of the documents relating to the purchase of the mobile home and that, although her signature appears on the mortgage, her signature on that document was forged.
On appeal, Oakwood contends that Godsey, although not a signatory of the arbitration agreement, was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts executed by her husband, including the arbitration agreement, and that she should be equitably estopped from denying that her claims are subject to arbitration. Oakwood says that it is undisputed that the Godseys went from their home in Winston County to Tupelo, Mississippi, to purchase the mobile home and that at the time of the purchase, Godsey and her husband owned, as joint tenants, a parcel of real property located in Winston County.
Although Oakwood admits that Scottie Godsey, the husband, executed the documents relating to the purchase of the mobile home, Oakwood points out that Godsey admitted in deposition testimony that she would have signed the mortgage document if anybody had asked her to sign it.
Oakwood candidly admits that the critical issue presented on this appeal is whether Godsey, as a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement, can be compelled, as a third-party beneficiary of the contract to purchase and the financing documents for the purchase of the mobile home, to arbitrate her claims.
Oakwood argues that this Court, along with federal courts, has held that the law relating to third-party beneficiaries applies to arbitration agreements, citing Ex parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d 447 (Ala.1997); Dunn *716 Constr. Co. v. Sugar Beach Condo. Assoc., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D.Ala.1991); Ex parte Stamey, 776 So. 2d 85 (Ala.2000). In its brief, Oakwood argues that Godsey's claims arise out of, or relate to, the purchase, financing, or occupancy of the mobile home, and that her claims are "so intertwined with the purchase, occupancy and financing of this mobile home that she, as a third party beneficiary, is bound by the terms of [the] Arbitration Agreement." It bases its argument on the fact that Godsey and Mr. Godsey were joint tenants as to the real property given as additional security for the purchase of the mobile home, and that the record shows that the Godseys asked Oakwood to use their land as collateral because they did not have money for a down payment. Oakwood further argues that the record shows that Godsey's name would have been included on the documents her husband executed but for the fact that she had been through a bankruptcy proceeding and had failed to reestablish her credit. Oakwood also argues that the record shows that Godsey was the person who came to Tupelo, picked out the mobile home, and reviewed the paperwork her husband signed, and that he signed the documents because he was relying on her statement that he could sign the closing statements, which included the arbitration agreement.
Godsey claims that because she did not sign the retail-installment agreement or the separate arbitration agreement she cannot be compelled to arbitrate her claims. She cites this Court's recent case of Equifirst Corp. v. Ware, 808 So. 2d 1 (Ala.2001).
The facts in Equifirst are similar to the facts in this case. In Equifirst, Cynthia Ware sued Equifirst Corporation and others, seeking damages on claims that they had obtained title to her real property by fraud, had slandered her title, had conspired to obtain title to her real property by fraud, had conspired to slander her title, and had conspired to invade her privacy. Ware also sought equitable relief. She specifically sought a cancellation of a deed and a mortgage. Equifirst moved to compel arbitration of Ware's claims and the claims of Ware's mother, Eloise Harrington, who had not sued and who had made no claims, but who was later joined as an indispensable party.
The trial court in Equifirst, without making any findings of fact, denied Equifirst's motion to compel arbitration, and Equifirst appealed.
Because the facts in the Equifirst case are so similar to the facts in this case, we set them out as they are stated in the opinion in that case:
808 So. 2d  at 1-3. On appeal, Equifirst did not contend that Ware was a signatory to the arbitration rider or to any other arbitration agreement with Equifirst. This Court affirmed the order of the trial court refusing to compel arbitration, and stated:
808 So. 2d  at 4-6.
Oakwood, in its reply brief, states that "[a]lthough a reading of the Equifirst decision, at first blush, appears to have some application," a close reading of the factual setting, as it relates to this appeal, shows that Equifirst is distinguishable. It argues *720 that the most notable distinction is that in Equifirst a deed was executed and in this case a mortgage was executed. They argue that "[i]n Equifirst, Ms. Ware's entire title had been conveyed away," but that in this case, "Ms. Godsey's name on a mortgage only served to pass legal title to the mortgagee, leaving the mortgagor with equity of redemption, but upon payment of the debt, legal title would revest in the mortgagor, Ms. Godsey." Oakwood also argues that in the Equifirst decision, Ware knew nothing about the closing or the paperwork involved in the transaction, which, it says, is not true in this case. In fact, Oakwood argues that the facts show that Godsey knew about the transaction, and she admitted in her deposition that if she had been asked to sign the mortgage, she probably would have signed it.
Although the record in this case does show that Godsey was more familiar with the transaction than was Ware in the Equifirst case, we do not believe that the facts in this case are sufficiently different to cause us to reach a result different from the one this Court reached in Equifirst, where this Court affirmed an order of the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
This opinion was prepared by retired Justice Hugh Maddox, sitting as a Justice of this Court pursuant to § 12-18-10(e), Ala.Code 1975.
AFFIRMED.
HOUSTON, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., concurs in the result.
[1]  Oakwood states in its brief to this Court that it had previously filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, but that this Court dismissed the petition as being moot. The record does not include a copy of that petition. We have checked the records of this Court and have found that on November 13, 2000, Oakwood filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, stating that the trial court had set a trial date without ruling on Oakwood's motion to compel arbitration and asking this Court to direct the trial court to rule on its motion (case number 1000280). On May 2, 2001, the trial court granted Oakwood's motion to compel arbitration, and on June 27, 2001, Oakwood filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus, stating that the trial court had granted the motion to compel arbitration. On June 29, 2001, this Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. On May 25, 2001, Godsey filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order compelling arbitration, and on July 20, 2001, the trial court, citing "recent case-law" (Equifirst Corp. v. Ware, 808 So. 2d 1 (Ala.2001)), vacated the order of May 2, 2001, and denied the motion to compel arbitration. It is from the order denying arbitration that Oakwood now appeals.
[2]  The notice of appeal in this case was filed on August 6, 2001. Rule 4(d), Ala. R.App. P., adopted effective October 1, 2001, provides that an order either granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration will be reviewed by appeal. As the Comments to the adoption of Rule 4(d) note, before the adoption of Rule 4(d), review of an order granting a motion compel arbitration was by a petition for a writ of mandamus, while review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration was by appeal. Rule 4(d) provides that review of either the grant or the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is by appeal.