Title: CITIZENS FOR MORE MICHIGAN JOBS V SECRETARY OF STATE (Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 145754
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 2012

Decided 
September 5, 2012. 
 
 
Protect Our Jobs, a ballot question committee, brought an action in the Court of Appeals, 
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Board of State Canvassers and the Director of 
Elections to place on the November 2012 general election ballot its proposal for amendments of 
the Constitution that provide for and protect various collective-bargaining rights.  The board had 
approved the form of the petition and the director had found that there were sufficient valid 
signatures to qualify the petition, but the board deadlocked on whether the petition should be 
placed on the ballot, with two members voting to do so and two voting against.  Under MCL 
168.22d(2), the proposal therefore did not qualify for placement on the ballot.  In an unpublished 
order entered August 16, 2012 (Docket No. 311828), the Court of Appeals granted a motion to 
intervene filed by Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution (CPMC), another ballot question 
committee.  The Court of Appeals, OWENS, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE, J. (O’CONNELL, J., 
dissenting), granted mandamus in an unpublished opinion per curiam issued August 27, 2012 
(Docket No. 311828), and ordered the board and director to take the necessary steps to place the 
proposal on the ballot.  The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant 
CPMC’s application for leave to appeal or take other peremptory action, directing the parties to 
address whether the requirements of Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) that petitions 
set forth any other existing provisions of the Constitution that would be altered or abrogated by 
the proposed amendment had been satisfied.  492 Mich ___ (2012) (Docket No. 145748). 
 
 
Michigan Alliance For Prosperity, a ballot question committee, brought an action in the 
Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the board, the director, and the Secretary 
of State to place on the ballot its proposal for amendments of the Constitution that would require 
a ⅔ majority of both houses of the Legislature or a statewide vote to raise taxes or enact a new 
tax.  The board had voted 2-1 in favor of certifying the petition, but the proposal did not qualify 
for placement on the ballot under the requirements of MCL 168.22d(2) because at least one 
member from each major political party had not concurred.  Michigan Alliance also sought leave 
to appeal in the Supreme Court under MCR 7.302(C) before a decision by the Court of Appeals 
with respect to its complaint and further sought mandamus in the Supreme Court.  Defend 
Michigan Democracy, another ballot question committee, moved to intervene in the Supreme 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
John O. Juroszek 
Court.  The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application 
or take other peremptory action, directing the parties to address whether the requirements of 
Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) had been satisfied.  492 Mich ___ (2012) (Docket 
No. 145753). 
 
 
Citizens for More Michigan Jobs (CFMMJ), a ballot question committee, sought to place 
on the ballot its proposal for amendments of the Constitution that would expand casino gaming 
in Michigan by allowing eight additional casinos in the state.  Protect MI Constitution (PMC), 
another ballot question committee, brought an action in the Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of 
mandamus directing the Secretary of State to reject the petition.  The Court of Appeals granted 
CFMMJ’s motion to intervene in an unpublished order entered August 2, 2012 (Docket No. 
311504).  Subsequently, the Court of Appeals, OWENS, P.J., and O’CONNELL, J. (RONAYNE 
KRAUSE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), granted mandamus and ordered the 
Secretary of State to reject the petition and not allow the proposal on the ballot, concluding that 
the petition violated Const 1963, art 4, § 25, which states that a law may not be altered, revised, 
or amended without republication of the affected statutes.  Protect MI Constitution v Secretary of 
State, ___ Mich App ___ (2012).  In lieu of granting CFMMJ’s application for leave to appeal, 
the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the Court of Appeals’ mandamus order, concluding that 
Const 1963, art 4, § 25 did not apply to constitutional amendments.  The Supreme Court directed 
the Secretary of State, the board, and the director to proceed.  492 Mich ___ (entered August 24, 
2012, Docket No. 145698).  The board subsequently voted 2-1 in favor of approving placement 
of the proposal on the ballot, but the proposal did not qualify under MCL 168.22d(2) for 
placement on the ballot because at least one member from each major political party had not 
concurred.  CFMMJ and Robert J. Cannon (a qualified, registered voter) brought an action in the 
Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State, the board, and the 
director to take all steps necessary to place the proposal on the ballot and also sought leave to 
appeal in the Supreme Court under MCR 7.302(C) before a decision by the Court of Appeals 
with respect to its complaint.  PMC moved to intervene in the Supreme Court.  The Supreme 
Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other 
peremptory action, directing the parties to address whether the requirements of Const 1963, art 
12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) had been satisfied.  492 Mich ___ (2012) (Docket No. 145754). 
 
 
The People Should Decide (TPSD), a ballot question committee, brought an action in the 
Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the board, the director, and the Secretary 
of State to place on the ballot its proposal for amendments of the Constitution that would require 
a statewide vote to approve the use of state funds with respect to a new international bridge or 
tunnel.  The board subsequently voted 2-1 in favor of approving placement of the proposal on the 
ballot, but the proposal did not qualify under MCL 168.22d(2) for placement on the ballot 
because at least one member from each major political party had not concurred.  TPSD also 
sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court under MCR 7.302(C) before a decision by the Court 
of Appeals with respect to its complaint and filed a complaint for mandamus in the Supreme 
Court.  Taxpayers Against Monopolies, another ballot question committee, moved to intervene in 
the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant 
the application or take other peremptory action, directing the parties to address whether the 
requirements of Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) had been satisfied.  492 Mich ___ 
(2012) (Docket No. 145755). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN 
and MARY BETH KELLY, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) require republication of any existing 
provisions of the Constitution that a proposed constitutional amendment would alter or abrogate.  
An amendment would alter an existing provision only when the amendment would actually add 
to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision, and an amendment would 
abrogate an existing provision only when it would render that provision wholly inoperative. 
 
 
1. Const 1963, art 12, § 2 governs the amendment of the Constitution by petition and 
vote.  It requires in part that existing provisions of the Constitution that would be altered or 
abrogated by the proposed amendment be published in full as provided by law.  MCL 168.482(3) 
sets forth the requirements for a petition seeking an amendment.  It requires that the petition state 
that a constitutional provision would be altered or abrogated and further requires that the 
provision that would be altered or abrogated be inserted in the petition.  Const 1963, art 12, § 2 
and MCL 168.482(3) together establish the requirements for publishing existing constitutional 
provisions.  Petition supporters must fully comply with the requirement that the petition 
republish any existing constitutional provision that the proposed amendment would alter or 
abrogate. 
 
 
2. The phrase “existing wording” in Const 1963, art 12, § 2 refers to the actual text of an 
existing constitutional provision.  Thus, the language of the amendment itself, rather than how 
proponents or opponents of the amendment characterize its meaning, controls whether an 
existing provision would be altered or abrogated by the proposed amendment. 
 
 
3. A proposed amendment would alter an existing provision and republication is required 
only if the proposed amendment would actually (1) add words to, (2) delete words from, or (3) 
change the wording of an existing provision.  There are no de facto or indirect additions to, 
deletions from, or changes in an existing provision, however, and the fact that a proposed 
amendment might have a direct and obvious effect on the understanding of an existing provision 
is an insufficient basis from which to conclude that the proposed amendment would alter an 
existing constitutional provision.  Therefore, offering an amendment as a new provision is 
dispositive on the issue of alteration.  A new provision could not alter an existing provision 
(though it might abrogate an existing provision) when the new provision would leave the text of 
all other existing provisions completely intact. 
 
 
4. When the existing language of a constitutional provision would not be altered, 
abrogation would nonetheless occur and republication of the existing language is required if the 
proposed amendment would render the entire provision or some discrete component of it wholly 
inoperative.  This would occur if the amendment would make the existing provision a nullity or 
it would be impossible for the amendment to be harmonized with the existing provision when the 
two provisions are considered together.  An existing provision is not rendered wholly inoperative 
if it can be construed consistently with the new provision.  Determining whether the existing and 
new provisions can be harmonized requires careful consideration of the actual language used in 
both the existing provision and the proposed amendment.  Determining whether abrogation will 
occur requires consideration of not just the whole existing constitutional provision, but also the 
provision’s discrete subparts, sentences, clauses, or, potentially, single words.  An existing 
provision that uses nonexclusive language or language that is not absolute would be less likely to 
be rendered inoperative simply because a proposed new provision will introduce in some manner 
a change to the existing provision.  Rather, if the existing provision would likely continue to 
exist as it did before the amendment even though it might be affected or supplemented in some 
fashion, no abrogation would occur.  A proposed amendment would more likely render an 
existing provision inoperative if the existing provision creates a mandatory requirement or uses 
language providing an exclusive power or authority because any change to that provision would 
tend to negate the specifically conferred constitutional requirement. 
 
 
5. In Protect Our Jobs v Board of State Canvassers, the proposed collective-bargaining 
amendment would not alter an existing constitutional provision because it would leave the 
current text of both § 48 and § 49 of article 4 of the 1963 Constitution completely intact.  Nor 
would it abrogate either section because while the proposed amendment would allow collective-
bargaining agreements to limit the Legislature’s power under those sections, the Legislature 
would nonetheless retain that nonexclusive power and neither section would be rendered wholly 
inoperative. 
 
 
6. In The People Should Decide v Board of State Canvassers, the proposed bridge 
amendment, which would add a new article 3, § 6a to the Constitution, would not alter the text of 
Const 1963, art 2, § 9; art 3, § 6; or art 7, § 16.  Moreover, article 2, § 9 and article 3, § 6 would 
remain fully operative, and the scope of the Legislature’s nonexclusive powers to provide for 
various infrastructure projects under article 7, § 16 would only be limited by the requirement of a 
vote before construction of certain bridges. 
 
 
7. In Michigan Alliance for Prosperity v Board of State Canvassers, the proposed 
amendment to require a ⅔ vote to raise taxes would not alter the text of Const 1963, art 9, §§ 1, 
2, 3, 6, or 26.  Nor would it abrogate those sections.  In particular, with respect to article 9, §§ 1 
and 2, the amendment would not negate the Legislature’s power with respect to taxes, but would 
simply require a larger majority to exercise that power.  Moreover, the people reserved to 
themselves the broad power to enact laws coextensive with the power of the Legislature.  With 
respect to article 9, § 3, which requires a ¾ vote to increase ad valorem taxes for school 
operations, any vote that satisfies the existing ¾ requirement would necessarily satisfy the 
proposed ⅔ requirement. 
 
 
8. In Citizens for More Michigan Jobs v Secretary of State, the proposed casino 
amendment would not alter Const 1963, art 4, § 40, which vests exclusive control over alcoholic-
beverage traffic in the Liquor Control Commission.  Because the amendment would require the 
granting of liquor licenses to the new casinos, however, it would nullify the complete control 
currently afforded to the commission and thus would abrogate that constitutional provision.  The 
failure to republish article 4, § 40 was fatal to the proposed amendment, and mandamus could 
not be ordered. 
 
 
Court of Appeals’ judgment affirmed in Protect Our Jobs. 
 
 
Relief on complaints for mandamus granted in part in Michigan Alliance and People 
Should Decide, and defendants directed to proceed as necessary to place the proposed 
amendments on the ballot. 
 
 
Complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals dismissed in Citizens for More 
Michigan Jobs. 
 
 
Justice MARILYN KELLY, joined by Justices CAVANAGH and HATHAWAY, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, concurred in the result reached in Protect Our Jobs, Michigan 
Alliance, and People Should Decide, but dissented from the result reached in Citizens for More 
Michigan Jobs.  The amendment proposed in that case would neither alter nor abrogate Const 
1963, art 4, § 40.  The Liquor Control Commission’s control over alcoholic-beverage traffic is 
neither complete nor exclusive, but is subject to limits that the Legislature chooses to place on it, 
and if the Legislature may subject the commission’s control to limitations, then so may the 
people of this state.  The people of the state have an inherent and superior right to amend the 
Constitution and alter the authority of that legislatively created commission.  Because article 4, 
§ 40 would not be altered or abrogated, there was no need for the petition to satisfy the 
republication requirement.  Justice KELLY would have granted relief on the complaint for 
mandamus and directed the Secretary of State, the board, and the director to take the necessary 
steps to place the proposed amendment on the ballot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2012 State of Michigan 
FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 2012 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PROTECT OUR JOBS, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No.   145748 
 
BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS and 
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN’S 
CONSTITUTION, 
 
 
Intervening Defendant-
Appellant. 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR 
PROSPERITY, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No.   145753 
 
BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS, 
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, and 
SECRETARY OF STATE, 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
 
and 
 
DEFEND MICHIGAN DEMOCRACY,  
 
 
Intervenor. 
 
 
 
CITIZENS FOR MORE MICHIGAN JOBS 
and ROBERT J.  CANNON, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No.   145754 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE, BOARD OF 
STATE CANVASSERS, and DIRECTOR 
OF ELECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
 
and 
 
PROTECT MI CONSTITUTION, 
 
 
 
Intervenor. 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE SHOULD DECIDE, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No.   145755 
 
BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS, 
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, and 
SECRETARY OF STATE, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
3
TAXPAYERS AGAINST MONOPOLIES, 
 
 
Intervenor. 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
ZAHRA, J. 
Article 1, § 1 of Michigan’s Constitution states: “All political power is inherent in 
the people.  Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection.”1 
Within our Constitution, the people have allocated certain portions of their inherent 
powers to the branches of government.  But the people have also reserved certain powers 
to themselves.  Among these powers is the right to amend the Constitution by petition 
and popular vote.2  This Court has consistently protected the right of the people to amend 
their Constitution in this way, while enforcing constitutional and statutory safeguards that 
the people placed on the exercise of that right.  Nearly one century ago we recognized 
that 
[o]f the right of qualified voters of the State to propose amendments to the 
Constitution by petition it may be said, generally, that it can be interfered 
with neither by the legislature, the courts, nor the officers charged with any 
duty in the premises.  But the right is to be exercised in a certain way and 
according to certain conditions, the limitations upon its exercise, like the 
reservation of the right itself, being found in the Constitution.[3] 
These four cases, each involving a ballot proposal to amend the Michigan 
Constitution, ask us to decide whether the groups proposing the amendments properly 
                                              
1 Const 1963, art 1, § 1. 
2 Const 1963, art 12, § 2. 
3 Scott v Secretary of State, 202 Mich 629, 643; 168 NW 709 (1918). 
 
 
 
4
exercised their right to petition for constitutional amendments in compliance with the 
constitutional and statutory safeguards.  Specifically, these cases present the issue 
whether the petitions for each proposal satisfied the requirement under Const 1963, art 
12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) to republish any existing provisions of the Constitution that 
the proposed amendment would alter or abrogate.  We reaffirm our prior caselaw holding 
that an existing provision is only altered when the amendment actually adds to, deletes 
from, or changes the wording of the provision.  We further reaffirm that an amendment 
only abrogates an existing provision when it renders that provision wholly inoperative.   
Applying the meanings of “alter” and “abrogate” to the cases at hand, we conclude 
that none of the ballot proposals alter an existing provision of the Constitution because 
none of them actually “add to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the 
provision . . . .”4  In addition, we conclude that only the ballot proposal relating to casinos 
in Citizens for More Michigan Jobs v Secretary of State (Docket No. 145754) abrogates 
an existing constitutional provision.  Specifically, the casino amendment’s requirement 
that the casinos authorized by the amendment “shall be granted” liquor licenses by the 
state of Michigan renders wholly inoperative the “complete control of the alcoholic 
beverage traffic within this state” afforded to the Liquor Control Commission under an 
existing provision of the Constitution—Const 1963, art 4, § 40.  Therefore, article 4, § 40 
was required to be republished on the petition to inform the people of this abrogation.   
Accordingly, in Protect Our Jobs v Board of State Canvassers (Docket No. 
145748), we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals granting relief on the complaint 
                                              
4 Ferency v Secretary of State, 409 Mich 569, 597; 297 NW2d 544 (1980). 
 
 
 
5
for mandamus.  In Michigan Alliance for Prosperity v Board of State Canvassers (Docket 
No. 145753) and The People Should Decide v Board of State Canvassers (Docket No. 
145755), we grant relief on the complaints for mandamus in part and direct the Secretary 
of State, the Board of State Canvassers, and the Director of Elections to proceed as 
necessary to place the proposed constitutional amendments on the November 2012 
election ballot.  We deny relief in all other respects.  In Citizens for More Michigan Jobs, 
we dismiss the complaint for mandamus filed in the Court of Appeals and deny relief in 
all other respects. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In each of these four cases, ballot question committees have proposed amendments 
of the 1963 Michigan Constitution.  Each committee has obtained the required number of 
valid signatures for placement on the ballot.  But each proposal was challenged before the 
Board of State Canvassers.  Although the proposed amendments pertain to different 
subjects, the common argument challenging the proposals that we are considering 
concerns whether any of the proposed amendments will alter or abrogate an existing 
constitutional provision that was not republished on the petition.5 
In Protect Our Jobs, the ballot question committee Protect Our Jobs proposes an 
amendment that would enshrine certain collective-bargaining rights in the Constitution.  
                                              
5 On August 30, 2012, this Court heard oral argument on the applications for leave to 
appeal, addressing whether the republication requirements of Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and 
MCL 168.482(3), requiring that petitions set forth any other existing provisions of the 
Constitution that would be altered or abrogated by the proposed amendment, had been 
satisfied.  Our opinion today is based on this issue alone.  We are not persuaded that any 
party is entitled to relief on any of the other grounds raised before the Court. 
 
 
 
6
Its petition was challenged at the Board of State Canvassers by Citizens Protecting 
Michigan’s Constitution.  Because the board refused to certify the proposal for the ballot, 
Protect Our Jobs sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals.  The Court of 
Appeals granted the writ of mandamus,6 which led Citizens Protecting Michigan’s 
Constitution to file the instant application. 
In Citizens for More Michigan Jobs, the ballot question committee Citizens for 
More Michigan Jobs proposes an amendment that would allow for the construction of 
eight new casinos in Michigan and designate their locations.  Its petition was challenged 
by Protect MI Constitution, which sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
directing the Secretary of State to reject the ballot petition for a constitutional 
amendment.  The Court of Appeals granted the requested relief.7  This Court reversed the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated that Court’s order of mandamus, 
concluding that the constitutional amendment proposal is not an improper attempt to 
amend a statute and, thus, that the failure to publish an affected statute on the petition was 
not fatal to the proposal.8  This Court ordered the Secretary of State, the Board of State 
Canvassers, and the Director of Elections to proceed.9  Upon consideration by the board, 
                                              
6 Protect Our Jobs v Bd of State Canvassers, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court 
of Appeals, issued August 27, 2012 (Docket No. 311828). 
7 Protect MI Constitution v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ 
(Docket No. 311504, issued August 14, 2012). 
8 Protect MI Constitution v Secretary of State, 492 Mich ___ (Docket No. 145698, 
entered August 24, 2012). 
9 Id. 
 
 
 
7
Protect MI Constitution again challenged the proposal on alternative grounds, and the 
board refused to certify it for the ballot.  Citizens for More Michigan Jobs filed a 
complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals and an emergency bypass application 
for leave to appeal in this Court. 
In Michigan Alliance for Prosperity, the ballot question committee Michigan 
Alliance for Prosperity proposes an amendment that requires a ⅔ vote of the Legislature 
or a vote of the people before any tax increase can be approved.  At the Board of State 
Canvassers, the proposal was challenged by Defend Michigan Democracy.  The board 
refused to certify the proposal for the ballot, and Michigan Alliance for Prosperity filed a 
complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals and an emergency bypass application 
for leave to appeal in this Court. 
Lastly, in The People Should Decide, the ballot question committee The People 
Should Decide proposes an amendment that would require a popular vote before any new 
international bridge could be constructed.  The proposal was challenged at the Board of 
State Canvassers by Taxpayers Against Monopolies.  The board refused to certify the 
proposal for the ballot, and The People Should Decide filed a complaint for mandamus in 
the Court of Appeals and an emergency bypass application for leave to appeal in this 
Court.  
As stated, there is no dispute that all four proposals have garnered sufficient 
signatures to be placed on the ballot.  All that is left to decide before the proposed 
constitutional amendments may be placed on the November general election ballot is 
whether the petitions themselves complied with the constitutional and statutory 
safeguards that had to be satisfied. 
 
 
 
8
II.  ANALYSIS 
The challengers’ arguments largely center on Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 
168.482.  Article 12, § 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, which governs amendment 
of the Constitution by petition and vote, provides: 
Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the 
registered electors of this state.   Every petition shall include the full text of 
the proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state 
equal in number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast for all 
candidates for governor at the last preceding general election at which a 
governor was elected.  Such petitions shall be filed with the person 
authorized by law to receive the same at least 120 days before the election 
at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon.  Any such petition 
shall be in the form, and shall be signed and circulated in such manner, as 
prescribed by law.  The person authorized by law to receive such petition 
shall upon its receipt determine, as provided by law, the validity and 
sufficiency of the signatures on the petition, and make an official 
announcement thereof at least 60 days prior to the election at which the 
proposed amendment is to be voted upon.    
Any amendment proposed by such petition shall be submitted, not 
less than 120 days after it was filed, to the electors at the next general 
election.  Such proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution 
which would be altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall 
appear on the ballot shall be published in full as provided by law.  Copies 
of such publication shall be posted in each polling place and furnished to 
news media as provided by law.    
The ballot to be used in such election shall contain a statement of the 
purpose of the proposed amendment, expressed in not more than 100 
words, exclusive of caption.  Such statement of purpose and caption shall 
be prepared by the person authorized by law, and shall consist of a true and 
impartial statement of the purpose of the amendment in such language as 
shall create no prejudice for or against the proposed amendment. 
If the proposed amendment is approved by a majority of the electors 
voting on the question, it shall become part of the constitution, and shall 
abrogate or amend existing provisions of the constitution at the end of 45 
days after the date of the election at which it was approved.  If two or more 
amendments approved by the electors at the same election conflict, that 
 
 
 
9
amendment receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.  [Emphasis 
added.] 
The Legislature accepted the Constitution’s invitation to set forth publishing 
requirements for petitions.  Relevant here, MCL 168.482(3) provides, in part:  
If the proposal would alter or abrogate an existing provision of the 
constitution, the petition shall so state and the provisions to be altered or 
abrogated shall be inserted, preceded by the words: 
“Provisions of existing constitution altered or abrogated by the 
proposal if adopted.”  [Emphasis added.] 
Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3) together establish the requirements for 
publishing existing constitutional provisions.  In Stand Up For Democracy v Board of 
State Canvassers,10 this Court held that a petition must fully comply with mandatory 
statutory provisions that pertain to a petition’s requirements regarding form.  MCL 
168.482(3) uses the mandatory language “shall.”  Accordingly, the principle articulated 
in Stand Up applies with equal force here and, thus, the petition supporters must fully 
comply with the requirement that the petition republish any existing constitutional 
provision that the proposed amendment, if adopted, would alter or abrogate.   
This Court has addressed and consistently defined the language “altered or 
abrogated” in the context of both the Constitution and the statute.  In School District of 
City of Pontiac v City of Pontiac,11 we first addressed the meaning of “altered or 
abrogated” as those terms appeared in an analogous provision of our 1908 Constitution.12  
                                              
10 Stand Up For Democracy v Bd of State Canvassers, 492 Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d 
___ (August 3, 2012, Docket No. 145387). 
11 Sch Dist of City of Pontiac v City of Pontiac, 262 Mich 338, 344; 247 NW 474 (1933). 
12 Const 1908, art 17, § 3. 
 
 
 
10
The amendment at issue in Pontiac was designed to limit the amount of property taxes 
that the Legislature could assess.13  Its opponents argued that the amendment altered or 
abrogated provisions of the Constitution that allowed the Legislature to levy taxes, but 
the proposed amendment had failed to republish those provisions.14  This Court stated in 
response to these objections: 
That in case a proposed constitutional provision amends or replaces 
(“alters or abrogates”) a specific provision of the Constitution, that such 
provision should be published along with the proposed amendment; that 
other provisions which are still operative, though possibly they may need 
thereafter to be construed in conjunction with the amending provision, need 
not necessarily be published.[15] 
Accordingly, this Court held that because the challenged amendment created an entirely 
new section of the Constitution that left unaffected the wording of other provisions, no 
alteration or abrogation had occurred.16  
In Ferency v Secretary of State,17 this Court again addressed what it means to alter 
or abrogate an existing provision of the Constitution.  In Ferency, we dealt with a 
challenge to the proposed “Tisch Amendment” that was intended to reduce property 
taxes, holding  
that it is only where the proposed amendment would directly “alter or 
abrogate” (“amend or replace”) a specific provision or provisions of the 
                                              
13 Pontiac, 262 Mich at 341-342. 
14 Id. at 343. 
15 Id. at 344. 
16 Id. at 345. 
17 Ferency, 409 Mich 569. 
 
 
 
11
existing Constitution that the provision or provisions must be noted on the 
petitions.  An existing constitutional provision is altered or abrogated if the 
proposed amendment would add to, delete from, or change the existing 
wording of the provision, or would render it wholly inoperative.[18] 
This was a reasonable construction of those terms.  In Ferency, we also cautioned that a 
more expansive definition of “alter or abrogate” would “chill” the ability of the people to 
amend their Constitution by potentially requiring the petition circulator to append the 
entire Constitution to ensure the validity of the petition to amend the Constitution.19 
Finally, in Massey v Secretary of State,20 this Court reaffirmed our holdings in 
Ferency and Pontiac.  The Court clarified how to assess whether a proposed amendment 
would alter an existing provision, thereby requiring publication.  We held that publication 
was required only when an amendment “would add to, delete from, or change the existing 
wording” of another constitutional provision and that the phrase “the existing wording” 
referred to the actual text of the provision.21  In Massey, we concluded that the existing 
constitutional provision that set forth the qualifications for legislators was not altered by 
the addition of a new “term limits” constitutional provision, which established the 
additional qualification that a legislator not have served more than a specified number of 
prior terms in the Legislature, because the amendment did not change any words of any 
                                              
18 Id. at 597. 
19 Id. at 597-598. 
20 Massey v Secretary of State, 457 Mich 410; 579 NW2d 862 (1998). 
21 Id. at 418 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
 
12
existing provision, nor did it cause an abrogation because the amendment rendered no 
provision wholly inoperative.22 
We conclude that the constructions offered in Massey, Ferency, and Pontiac are 
sound and reaffirm those cases and that reasoning.  Thus, an existing provision is only 
“‘altered or abrogated if the proposed amendment would add to, delete from, or change 
the existing wording of the provision, or would render it wholly inoperative.’”23  
Furthermore, the phrase “the existing wording” refers to the actual text of an existing 
constitutional provision.24  
Nonetheless, because the application of these terms continues to be a cause for 
debate, we take this opportunity to provide additional clarity.  We must take care to 
enforce the constitutional and statutory petition safeguards that exist to ensure that voters 
are adequately informed as they exercise their right to amend the Constitution.  In doing 
so, we have reasoned that “the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would 
be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions 
which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, 
affected by the proposed amendment.”25 We also must use caution not to usher in an 
interpretation by which we would “effectively require a petition circulator . . . to secure a 
judicial determination of which provisions of the existing Constitution the proposed 
                                              
22 Id. 
23 Id., quoting Ferency, 409 Mich at 597.    
24 Massey, 457 Mich at 418. 
25 Pontiac, 262 Mich at 344. 
 
 
 
13
amendment would ‘alter or abrogate.’”26 With these principles in focus, we turn to the 
specific terms “alter” and “abrogate.” 
A.  “ALTER” 
For the purposes of Const 1963, art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482(3), a proposed 
amendment “alters” an existing provision if the proposed amendment would “‘add to, 
delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision . . . .’”27  The republication 
requirement applies only to alterations of the actual text of an existing provision.28  If an 
amendment actually adds words to an existing provision, then republication is required.  
If an amendment actually deletes words from an existing provision, then republication is 
required.  If an amendment actually changes the wording of an existing provision, then 
republication is required.  But there is no such thing as a de facto or an indirect addition 
to, deletion from, or change in an existing provision.  The fact that a proposed 
amendment might have a direct and obvious effect on the understanding of an existing 
provision is an insufficient basis from which to conclude that the proposed amendment 
alters an existing provision of the Constitution.    
Under this standard, which is consistent with almost 80 years of jurisprudence in 
Michigan, offering an amendment as a new provision is dispositive on the issue of 
alteration.  A new constitutional provision simply cannot alter an existing provision 
                                              
26 Ferency, 409 Mich at 598. 
27 Massey, 457 Mich at 418, quoting Ferency, 409 Mich at 597. 
28 Massey, 457 Mich at 418 (“The phrase ‘the existing wording’ should be taken 
literally.”). 
 
 
 
14
(though it may abrogate an existing provision) when the new provision leaves the text of 
all existing provisions completely intact. 
B.  “ABROGATE” 
Because any amendment might have an effect on existing provisions, the 
“abrogation” standard makes clear that republication is only triggered by a change that 
would essentially eviscerate an existing provision.  Our caselaw establishes that an 
existing provision of the Constitution is abrogated and, thus, must be republished if it is 
rendered “wholly inoperative.”29  An existing constitutional provision is rendered wholly 
inoperative if the proposed amendment would make the existing provision a nullity30 or if 
it would be impossible for the amendment to be harmonized with the existing provision 
when the two provisions are considered together.  That is, if two provisions are 
incompatible with each other, the new provision would abrogate the existing provision 
and, thus, the existing provision would have to be republished.  An existing provision is 
not rendered wholly inoperative if it can be reasonably construed in a manner consistent 
with the new provision, i.e., the two provisions are not incompatible. 
Determining whether the existing and new provisions can be harmonized requires 
careful consideration of the actual language used in both the existing provision and the 
proposed amendment.  An existing provision that uses nonexclusive or nonabsolute 
language is less likely to be rendered inoperative simply because a proposed new 
                                              
29 Id. 
30 See id.; Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action & Integration v Bd of State Canvassers, 
262 Mich App 395, 402; 686 NW2d 287 (2004).   
 
 
 
15
provision introduces in some manner a change to the existing provision.  Rather, when 
the existing provision would likely continue to exist as it did preamendment, although it 
might be affected or supplemented in some fashion by the proposed amendment, no 
abrogation occurs.  On the other hand, a proposed amendment more likely renders an 
existing provision inoperative if the existing provision creates a mandatory requirement 
or uses language providing an exclusive power or authority because any change to such a 
provision would tend to negate the specifically conferred constitutional requirement.    
Massey helps to illustrate this distinction.  Article 4, § 7 of the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution contains a list of qualifications for members of the Legislature.  Because that 
list did not purport to be exclusive, the term-limit amendment—which added an 
additional qualification to article 4, § 54 of the Michigan Constitution, limiting the length 
of time a legislator could serve—did not abrogate article 4, § 7 because the original 
qualifications remained fully in effect.  However, had the existing list of qualifications 
purported to be the exclusive list of qualifications, then the new qualification contained in 
article 4, § 54 would have abrogated the existing provision because it would have been 
impossible to harmonize the additional qualification with an exclusive list of 
qualifications, i.e., the two provisions would have been incompatible.  Thus, if the 
existing and new provisions can be harmonized, the amendment does not render the 
existing provision wholly inoperative. 
This abrogation analysis requires consideration of not just the whole existing 
constitutional provision, but also the provision’s discrete subparts, sentences, clauses, or 
even, potentially, single words.  If the proposed amendment renders wholly inoperative 
any one of those discrete components, then the petition must republish the entire 
 
 
 
16
provision. For example, if a proposed constitutional amendment sought to reduce the age 
of eligibility to become a Michigan senator or representative, article 4, § 7, would have to 
be republished because the existing age-eligibility requirement, 21 years of age, is a 
discrete constitutional mandate even though it is included in a sentence that contains 
several additional eligibility requirements.  In contrast, the term-limit amendment 
considered in Massey created no direct conflict with the specific eligibility requirements 
but merely added an additional one. 
III.  APPLICATION  
A.  COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AMENDMENT—DOCKET NO. 145748 
Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution (CPMC), which opposes the 
collective-bargaining initiative, alleges that the proposed amendment will alter or 
abrogate article 4, §§ 48 and 49 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution.  The proposed 
amendment would neither alter nor abrogate either of those sections.  First, the proposed 
amendment would leave the current text of both sections completely intact.  Even if a 
proposed amendment’s new provision specifically refers to or quotes an existing 
constitutional power and then proceeds to limit that power, as the proposed collective-
bargaining amendment does with § 49, there would be no alteration of the existing 
provision because the text of the existing provision itself would remain unchanged.  
Thus, it would not alter the existing provisions. 
Likewise, the proposed amendment would not abrogate either existing section in 
question because neither would be rendered a nullity.  Section 49 provides that “[t]he 
legislature may enact laws relative to the hours and conditions of employment.”  
Similarly, § 48 provides that “[t]he legislature may enact laws providing for the 
 
 
 
17
resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified 
civil service.”  CPMC alleges that these sections are abrogated by the Protect Our Jobs 
proposal, which declares that “[n]o existing or future law of the state or its political 
subdivisions shall abridge, impair or limit” the collective-bargaining rights secured by 
other portions of the proposed amendment.  But CPMC misapprehends the meaning of 
abrogation in the context of the established petition law of this state.  Under the existing 
constitutional language, the legislative power is broad, but it is neither absolute nor 
exclusive.  Neither section suggests that this power cannot be limited or affected by other 
provisions of the Constitution.  Therefore, the Legislature may still enact the laws 
provided for in §§ 48 and 49, but should the amendment pass, the power to do so could 
be limited by collective-bargaining agreements.  Because the Legislature retains the same 
nonexclusive grant of power, neither section would be rendered wholly inoperative. 
B.  BRIDGE AMENDMENT—DOCKET NO. 145755 
Taxpayers Against Monopolies (TAM) opposes the amendment proposed by The 
People Should Decide (TPSD).  TAM argues that the TPSD proposal would alter or 
abrogate three sections of the Constitution.  Again, we respectfully disagree. 
TAM argues that the new proposed constitutional provision would alter or 
abrogate article 2, § 9 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, which provides the procedures 
for voting on an initiative or referendum, because it incorporates the procedures of article 
2, § 9 by reference but then modifies those procedures when exercised with regard to 
votes on international bridge projects.  The text of article 2, § 9 would remain untouched 
if the amendment passes, and thus no alteration would occur.  Furthermore, the substance 
 
 
 
18
of article 2, § 9 would be completely unchanged by the proposal.  It would be neither 
negated nor rendered inoperative, so no abrogation would occur. 
TAM next argues that TPSD’s amendment would alter or abrogate article 3, § 6 of 
the 1963 Michigan Constitution, governing the state’s interest in internal improvements, 
because TPSD chose to situate its proposed amendment as article 3, § 6a.  Importantly, 
TPSD has not proposed modifying § 6 itself.  Instead, it has proposed a wholly new 
section that, in TPSD’s view, is best located in Michigan’s constitutional scheme between 
§ 6 and § 7 of article 3.  Because it would be a new section of the Constitution, there 
would be no alteration of the text of any existing provision.  The mere fact that the 
proponents of the amendment chose to situate a new section between two existing 
sections of the Constitution would not, by itself, alter the existing sections.  Furthermore, 
there would be no abrogation because § 6 remains fully operative. 
Lastly, TAM argues that the proposal would alter or abrogate article 7, § 16 of the 
1963 Michigan Constitution, which provides the Legislature with the nonexclusive 
authority to provide for various infrastructure projects.  Here again, there would be no 
alteration because the text of the existing provision would be unaffected by the proposed 
amendment.  There would also be no abrogation.  The relevant text of article 7, § 16 
reads: 
The legislature may provide for the laying out, construction, 
improvement and maintenance of highways, bridges, culverts and airports 
by the state and by the counties and townships thereof; and may authorize 
counties to take charge and control of any highway within their limits for 
such purposes.  The legislature may provide the powers and duties of 
counties in relation to highways, bridges, culverts and airports; may provide 
for county road commissioners to be appointed or elected, with powers and 
duties provided by law.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
 
19
Each grant of power in this section is open-ended; no specific or discreet grant is made.  
The Legislature may still provide for any project as before, though the scope of this 
nonexclusive power might be limited by the proposed amendment requiring a popular 
vote before construction of a bridge.  So clearly the power would not be rendered wholly 
inoperative. 
C.  TWO-THIRDS VOTE TO RAISE TAXES AMENDMENT—DOCKET NO. 145753 
Defend Michigan Democracy (DMD) is challenging the amendment proposed by 
Michigan Alliance for Prosperity (MAP).  DMD argues that MAP’s proposal requiring a 
⅔ vote in the Legislature to effectuate a tax increase would alter or abrogate several 
existing sections.  Like TPSD, MAP styled its proposed amendment as a number and 
letter combination, specifically article 9, § 26a.  Again, this would not be an alteration or 
abrogation of article 9, § 26 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution.  Instead, it is a proposal 
that places the proposed amendment in a particular, chosen place in the Constitution, and 
in doing so takes advantage of terms and definitions that apply only to a certain range of 
sections.  However, it would neither alter nor abrogate § 26.  Therefore, the petition did 
not need to republish § 26. 
Additionally, MAP was not required to republish article 9, § 3 of the 1963 
Michigan Constitution, which calls for a ¾ vote to increase ad valorem taxes for school 
operation.  That section would not be altered because its text would suffer no deletion, 
addition, or change.  Furthermore, § 3 would not be abrogated because it would remain 
fully operative.  Article 9, § 3 established a minimum vote requirement for an increase in 
ad valorem taxes.  That minimum would remain operative and could be harmonized with 
the new amendment, especially given that the proposed amendment expressly leaves 
 
 
 
20
existing, more burdensome hurdles in place.  Any vote that satisfies the ¾ requirement 
will necessarily satisfy the ⅔ requirement.  Therefore, this section will not be abrogated if 
the amendment is adopted. 
Similar logic applies to DMD’s argument that MAP was required to republish 
article 9, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution.  This section of the Constitution states, 
in part, that property taxes may be increased “if approved by a majority of the electors, 
qualified under Section 6 of Article II of this constitution, voting on the question.”  This 
section applies to local millages, not state taxes, but even if it were to be affected by the 
proposed amendment, it did not need to be republished.  The text would be untouched by 
the amendment so there would be no alteration.  There would also be no abrogation 
because the procedures in § 6 do not purport to be exclusive.  That the proposed 
amendment would require the vote by the electors to be in November would not abrogate 
§ 6; it would merely add a more specific requirement to the existing procedure.  
Likewise, the addition of a second means to raise these taxes (by a ⅔ vote of the 
Legislature) is permissible without republication when the existing provision did not 
purport to be the exclusive procedure. 
DMD’s argument that the proposed amendment will alter or abrogate article 9, 
§§ 1 and 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, is without merit.  Section 1 empowers the 
Legislature to impose taxes, and § 2 states that the power shall not be “surrendered, 
suspended or contracted away.” The text of both sections would remain unchanged and, 
therefore, unaltered.  The proposed amendment would abrogate neither section because 
both sections would continue to empower the Legislature in the same manner as before 
the passage of the amendment.  The Legislature’s power would not be negated; the 
 
 
 
21
proposed amendment would simply require a larger majority to exercise that power.  
DMD further argues that these sections would be abrogated by allowing a majority of the 
electors to enact or raise taxes, which had previously been the exclusive province of the 
Legislature.  But contrary to DMD’s assertion, the Legislature has never held this power 
to the exclusion of the people. Indeed, article 2, § 9 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution 
has always reserved to the people the power to enact any law the Legislature could enact, 
including a tax.  Logically, when the people have already reserved to themselves the 
broad power to enact laws coextensive with the power of the Legislature, the assertion of 
that power cannot be deemed an abrogation. 
D.  CASINO AMENDMENT—DOCKET NO. 145754 
Protect MI Constitution argues that the Citizens for More Michigan Jobs 
(CFMMJ) proposal will alter or abrogate article 4, § 40 of the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution.  This section states in part: 
Except as prohibited by this section, (t)he legislature may by law 
establish a liquor control commission which, subject to statutory 
limitations, shall exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic 
within this state, including the retail sales thereof.  [Emphasis added.] 
The proposed amendment would not alter § 40 because it would not add to, subtract 
from, or change the text of § 40.  
However, the proposed amendment would abrogate § 40.  The proposed 
amendment states in part: 
All of the casinos authorized by this section shall be granted liquor 
licenses issued by the state of Michigan to serve alcoholic beverages on the 
premises.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
 
22
It is undisputed that part of the Liquor Control Commission’s “complete control of 
the alcoholic beverage traffic within this state, including the retail sales thereof” entails 
the granting of liquor licenses.31  Furthermore, § 40 expressly states that the 
commission’s control is “complete.”  Because complete control necessarily 
communicates the exclusivity of control, any infringement on that control abrogates that 
exclusivity; an amendment that contemplates anything less than complete control 
logically renders that power in § 40 inoperative.  The proposed section would nullify the 
“complete” control currently established by the Constitution by taking specific decisions 
whether to grant or deny a liquor license to the newly established casinos out of the 
“control” of the commission.32  Because the proposed amendment would abrogate article 
4, § 40, republication of that section on the petition was necessary to comply with the 
republication requirement of MCL 168.482(3).  The failure to do so is fatal to the 
proposed amendment, and we must therefore deny mandamus. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In concluding, we reiterate our holdings so that the people will hereafter know 
with all the certainty and precision that is reasonably possible what is required to properly 
petition to amend the Constitution: 
                                              
31 Const 1963, art 4, § 40 (emphasis added). 
32 Even though the amendment affects only a small fraction of the power to control 
alcoholic beverage traffic, which power itself is only a portion of Const 1963, art 4, § 40, 
a provision of § 40 has been negated and, thus, abrogated, thereby requiring republication 
of the entire constitutional section.  At oral argument on this application, even CFMMJ’s 
counsel conceded that the proposed amendment would erode the exclusive and total 
control of the commission, thereby constituting an abrogation of § 40. 
 
 
 
23
1.  When the existing language of a constitutional provision would be altered or 
abrogated by the proposed amendment, republication of the existing provision is 
required. 
2.  The language of the amendment itself, rather than how proponents or 
opponents of the amendment characterize its meaning, controls whether an existing 
provision would be altered or abrogated by the proposed amendment. 
3.  When the existing language of a constitutional provision would not be altered, 
but the proposed amendment would render the entire provision or some discrete 
component of the provision wholly inoperative, abrogation would occur and 
republication of the existing language is required. 
4.  When the existing language would not be altered or abrogated, but the 
proposed amendment would only have an effect on the existing language, and the new 
and existing provisions can be harmoniously construed, republication of the existing 
provision is not required. 
5.  When the existing language would not be altered or abrogated, but the 
proposed amendment would only have an effect on the existing language, thereby 
requiring that the new and existing provisions be interpreted together, republication of the 
existing provision is not required. 
Accordingly, in Protect Our Jobs we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
granting relief on the complaint for mandamus.  In Michigan Alliance for Prosperity and 
The People Should Decide, we grant relief on the complaints for mandamus in part, and 
direct the Board of State Canvassers, the Secretary of State, and the Director of Elections 
to proceed as necessary to place the proposed constitutional amendments on the 
 
 
 
24
November 2012 election ballot.  We deny relief in all other respects.  In Citizens for 
More Michigan Jobs we dismiss the complaint for mandamus filed in the Court of 
Appeals and deny relief in all other respects.   
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), we direct the Clerk of the Court to issue the 
judgment orders forthwith.  No motion for rehearing will be entertained. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PROTECT OUR JOBS, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No.   145748 
 
BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS and 
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN’S 
CONSTITUTION, 
 
 
Intervening Defendant-
Appellant. 
 
 
 
MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR 
PROSPERITY, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No.   145753 
 
BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS, 
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, and 
SECRETARY OF STATE, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and  
 
DEFEND MICHIGAN DEMOCRACY,  
 
Intervenor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
CITIZENS FOR MORE MICHIGAN JOBS 
and ROBERT J. CANNON, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v 
No.   145754 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE, BOARD OF 
STATE CANVASSERS, and DIRECTOR 
OF ELECTIONS, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees 
and 
 
PROTECT MI CONSTITUTION, 
 
Intervenor. 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE SHOULD DECIDE, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No.   145755 
 
BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS, 
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, and 
SECRETARY OF STATE, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
 
and 
 
TAXPAYERS AGAINST MONOPOLIES, 
 
 
Intervenor. 
 
 
 
MARILYN KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with the result reached in Protect Our Jobs v Board of State Canvassers 
(Docket No. 145748), Michigan Alliance for Prosperity v Board of State Canvassers 
 
 
 
3
(Docket No. 145753), and The People Should Decide v Board of State Canvassers 
(Docket No. 145755).  But I respectfully dissent from the result reached in Citizens for 
More Michigan Jobs v Secretary of State (Docket No. 145754).   
The proposed constitutional amendment involved in Citizens for More Michigan 
Jobs neither alters nor abrogates article 4, § 40 of the state Constitution.1  Because that 
section would not be altered or abrogated, there is no need for the petition to satisfy the 
republication requirement.2  Accordingly, I would grant mandamus and direct the Board 
of State Canvassers, the Secretary of State, and the Director of Elections to take the steps 
necessary to place the proposed amendment on the November 2012 general election 
ballot. 
The law governing this case is clear and was established long ago.  If a proposed 
amendment would directly abrogate existing language in our Constitution, the existing 
language must appear on the petition.  Thirty-two years ago, this Court held that a 
constitutional provision will be abrogated if a proposed amendment would render the 
provision “wholly inoperative.”3  For an existing provision to be wholly inoperative, the 
                                              
1 Const 1963, art 4, § 40. 
2 See Const 1963, art 12, § 2. 
3 Ferency v Secretary of State, 409 Mich 569, 597; 297 NW2d 544 (1980). 
 
 
 
4
provision would have to be rendered a nullity4 or it would have to be impossible to 
harmonize it with the proposed amendment.   
Article 4, § 40 of our Constitution states that the Legislature “may by law establish 
a liquor control commission which, subject to statutory limitations, shall exercise 
complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this state, including the retail 
sales thereof.”5  The majority reasons that the proposed constitutional amendment would 
abrogate the “complete control” language of this provision because it would grant liquor 
licenses to eight new casinos.6  The majority posits that  
[b]ecause complete control necessarily communicates the exclusivity of 
control, any infringement on that control abrogates that exclusivity . . . .  
The proposed section would nullify the “complete” control currently 
established by the Constitution by taking specific decisions whether to 
grant or deny a liquor license to the newly established casinos out of the 
“control” of the commission.[7] 
This reasoning is flawed.  If § 40 is read in its entirety, it becomes apparent that 
the “complete control” of the Liquor Control Commission (LCC) is neither complete nor  
exclusive.  Rather, it is subject to limits that the Legislature chooses to place on it.8   
                                              
4 See Massey v Secretary of State, 457 Mich 410, 418; 579 NW2d 862 (1998); Coalition 
to Defend Affirmative Action & Integration v Bd of State Canvassers, 262 Mich App 395, 
402; 686 NW2d 287 (2004).   
5 Const 1963, art 4, § 40. 
6 The proposed amendment states, in part, that “[a]ll of the casinos authorized by this 
section shall be granted liquor licenses issued by the state of Michigan to serve alcoholic 
beverages on the premises.”   
7 Ante at 22. 
8 Const 1963, art 4, § 40; Scott v Arcada Twp Bd, 268 Mich 170, 173; 255 NW 752 
(1934) (quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Bundo v City of Walled 
 
 
 
 
5
 
If the Legislature may subject the LCC’s control to limitations, then so may the 
people of this state.  The people have an inherent and superior right to amend the 
Constitution and to alter the authority of the legislatively created LCC.9  Should the 
voters pass the proposed constitutional amendment, it would be controlling by its nature, 
irrespective of whatever authority the Legislature has bestowed on the LCC.  Moreover, 
because the LCC’s “complete control” is subject to limitation both by statute and by the 
people, a constitutional amendment affecting that control cannot render the language of 
§ 40 a nullity.  Therefore, the proposed amendment cannot abrogate it.   
 
Clearly, constitutional language limits the control of the LCC over alcoholic-
beverage traffic in the state.  Even if one were to pretend that it does not, the Court must 
give effect to the intent of the people in adopting constitutional provisions.10  Therefore, 
should one conclude that the proposed amendment, if adopted, would collide with article 
4, § 40, the Court is obliged to seek a construction that harmonizes the two.  And in this 
case, harmonization is perfectly possible.    
The proposed constitutional amendment would create eight new casinos.  It is 
within the authority of the people to create the casinos and require the LCC to issue a 
                                              
Lake, 395 Mich 679, 702-703 (1976) (“The control conferred upon the liquor control 
commission under the constitutional proviso is subject to statutory limitations.”). 
9 Citizens can petition for a constitutional amendment in accordance with the 
requirements of Const 1963, art 12, § 2.    
10 “It is a maxim that the object of construction [of constitutional language], is to 
ultimately ascertain and give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it.”  Sch Dist of 
City of Pontiac v City of Pontiac, 262 Mich 338, 346; 247 NW 474 (1933). 
 
 
 
6
liquor license to each of them.  The authority of the LCC to decide whether to issue 
liquor licenses is qualified by statute and by the people.  Hence, the existing 
constitutional provision and the proposed constitutional amendment may be read in 
harmony to give effect to the intent of the people if the people pass the amendment. 
It should be noted, moreover, that the proposed constitutional amendment does not 
grant a perpetual liquor license to each casino.  It merely states that the casinos “shall be 
granted liquor licenses . . . .”  The licenses would be subject to the liquor laws enforced 
by the LCC through the control that the Legislature has granted it.11 
For all these reasons, I would allow the proposed amendment in Citizens for More 
Michigan Jobs to go to a vote of the people. 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Diane M. Hathaway 
                                              
11 See MCL 436.1103 et seq.