Title: Dwaine Woodson v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-56
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-56 
____________ 
 
DWAINE WOODSON,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 16, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We originally accepted review of Woodson v. State, 864 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the 
Second District’s decision in Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).  
See Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Upon closer inspection of these two cases, we 
have determined that no genuine conflict exists between them because they are 
factually and legally distinguishable. 
 
Accordingly, this case is hereby dismissed. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs. 
 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring. 
 
I concur with the decision to dismiss because of the factual differences in the 
cases.  I write to point out that, as observed by the Fourth District in Mills v. State, 
840 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the underlying issue in all cases dealing 
with failure to actively participate in sexual offender treatment is whether the 
defendant’s conduct in failing to participate and complete the program was willful.   
The parameters of sexual offender probation are statutorily defined as a form 
of intensive supervision with an individualized treatment plan.  See § 948.001(7), 
Fla. Stat. (2004).  The critical component of sexual offender probation is the active 
participation and completion of a sexual offender treatment program.  See § 
948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004) (previously codified at section 948.03(5)(a)(3), 
Florida Statutes (2003)).  It is only because the defendant agrees to participate in 
active treatment that the privilege of probation is extended.  As Judge Sawaya 
expressed in the opinion below, “[r]eleasing a sex offender, untreated, does not 
alleviate the concern that he or she will reoffend and affords no protection to 
society.”  Woodson v. State, 864 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).   
 
- 3 - 
Because each treatment plan is individualized, it is not always realistic for 
the trial judge to specify time parameters for completion at the time of sentencing.  
Nevertheless, the probation officer should clearly communicate to the defendant, 
both in writing and verbally, the specific details of the individualized treatment 
plan so that there is no question that the defendant is specifically on notice of 
exactly what is expected and when.  
BELL, J., concurs. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D03-71 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and A. S. Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, 
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Pamela J. Koller and 
Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent