Title: Lewis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 368, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
COREY LEWIS, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 368, 2015 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1306017893 
§   
§   
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  August 5, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  October 12, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of October 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Corey Lewis, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm 
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Lewis’ opening 
brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.  
(2) 
In July 2013, Lewis was indicted for Carrying a Concealed Deadly 
Weapon (“CCDW”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, 
2 
 
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Receiving a Stolen 
Firearm, Driving a Vehicle with a Suspended or Revoked License, No Proof of 
Insurance, and Spinning Tires.  These charges arose from a traffic stop.  On 
December 2, 2013, Lewis pled guilty to CCDW and PFBPP.  As part of the plea 
agreement, the State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges, to 
seek habitual offender sentencing for the CCDW count but not the PFBPP count, 
and to cap its sentence recommendation at thirteen years of Level V incarceration.  
Lewis agreed that he was a habitual offender.   
(3) 
 On February 14, 2014, Lewis was declared a habitual offender and 
sentenced to a total of sixteen years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 
thirteen years for decreasing levels of supervision.  Lewis did not file a direct 
appeal. 
(4) 
On January 7, 2015, Lewis filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief under Rule 61.  Lewis argued that his counsel was ineffective because he 
failed, despite Lewis’ request, to file a motion to suppress a gun discovered during 
an inventory search of the car that Lewis was driving, without a license, at the time 
of his arrest.  Lewis also requested an evidentiary hearing and filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel. 
(5) 
On April 14, 2015, a Superior Court Commissioner recommended that 
the Superior Court deny Lewis’ motion for postconviction relief, request for an 
3 
 
evidentiary hearing, and motion for appointment of counsel.  The Commissioner 
found that Lewis’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim was barred by his 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.  The Commissioner also found that 
Lewis had not established grounds for appointment of counsel. 
(6) 
On June 3, 2015, Lewis filed a motion to amend his motion for 
postconviction relief.  Lewis sought to add a prosecutorial misconduct claim based 
on differences between the affidavit of the car owner included with his motion for 
postconviction relief and the police report.  Lewis claimed that the differences 
showed that the police officer who found the gun during the inventory search 
committed perjury.   
(7) 
In an order dated June 15, 2015, the Superior Court accepted the 
Commissioner’s recommendation, found the motion to amend to be without merit, 
and denied Lewis’ motion for postconviction relief.  On June 26, 2015, Lewis filed 
a motion for reconsideration.  Lewis stated that he had not received the 
Commissioner’s recommendation and he would have objected to the 
recommendation if he had received it.  In a letter dated July 2, 2015, the Superior 
Court sent Lewis the Commissioner’s recommendation and denied his motion for 
reconsideration as not ripe.  This appeal followed. 
(8) 
As the State points out, Lewis filed his notice of appeal from the 
Superior Court’s July 2, 2015 order denying his motion for reconsideration, rather 
4 
 
than the Superior Court’s June 17, 2015 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief.  Lewis, however, filed his notice of appeal within thirty days 
of the June 17, 2015 order denying his motion for postconviction relief and the 
argument section of his brief is devoted to the substantive merits of his motion for 
postconviction relief and his motion to amend his motion for postconviction relief.  
Under these circumstances, we address the substantive merits of Lewis’ arguments 
that the Superior Court erred in concluding that his motion to amend was without 
merit and in denying his motion for postconviction relief.      
(9) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1  The procedural requirements of 
Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.2  In his 
opening brief, Lewis argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
file a motion to suppress a gun discovered during an inventory search.  Lewis also 
argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct because the police officer who 
conducted the search lied in the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant and in his 
police report.   
                                                 
1 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 
 
(10) Both of Lewis’ claims are barred by his knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary guilty plea,3 which Lewis does not challenge.  The Truth-in-Sentencing 
Guilty Plea Form, plea agreement, and plea colloquy reflect that Lewis knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea for CCDW and PFBPP.  During 
the guilty plea colloquy, Lewis’ counsel stated that he had explained the trial rights 
Lewis was waiving by pleading guilty and the collateral consequences of the plea.  
Lewis affirmed that he reviewed and discussed the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea 
Form with his counsel, he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, he 
understood the range of sentences, and he was guilty of CCDW and PFBPP.  In the 
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Lewis is bound by these 
statements.4   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED 
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 2009 WL 1640021, at *1 (Del. June 9, 2009) (holding defendant’s 
voluntary guilty plea barred claim that his counsel was ineffective in suppression proceedings);  
Cooper v. State, 2008 WL 2410404, at *1 (Del. June 16, 2008) (concluding ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file motion to suppress was barred by knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea). 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 2008).