Title: Eastlack v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100650
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2011

PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., 
and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
DAVID HILL EASTLACK 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100650          SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
June 9, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jan L. Brodie, Judge 
 
 
This appeal presents the question whether a defendant in a 
criminal case who has been found not guilty by reason of 
insanity may invoke the provisions of Code § 19.2-392.2 to 
obtain expungement of the police and court records pertaining to 
his criminal case. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  In 2005, David Hill 
Eastlack (Eastlack) was arrested by Fairfax County police 
officers for malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51, 
a Class 3 felony.  The charge was certified to the Circuit Court 
of Fairfax County.  Before it came to trial, however, defense 
counsel furnished evidence of the defendant’s mental condition 
to the Commonwealth.  Further evaluations were undertaken and 
ultimately the Commonwealth and the defense entered into a 
stipulation that Eastlack met the standard of legal insanity at 
the time of the offense.  Based on the stipulation and further 
evidence, the court found Eastlack “not guilty by reason of 
insanity.” 
 
The circuit court ordered Eastlack into the custody of the 
Commissioner of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services 
(the Commissioner) to determine the extent to which he might 
require mental health treatment and monitoring.  In 2006, the 
court ordered a conditional release of Eastlack from custody, 
requiring him to obtain employment and undergo further mental 
health treatment. 
 
In 2009, Eastlack filed a petition in the circuit court for 
expungement of the police and court records pertaining to the 
malicious wounding charge pursuant to Code § 19.2-392.2.  By a 
letter opinion, followed by an order dated January 4, 2010, the 
court denied the petition.  We awarded Eastlack an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
Code § 19.2-392.2(A) provides in pertinent part that a 
person charged with commission of a crime may seek expungement 
of the police and court records pertaining to that charge in any 
of three circumstances:  (1) he has been acquitted of the crime, 
(2) the prosecution has taken a nolle prosequi of the charge, or 
(3) the charge has been “otherwise dismissed.”  In any 
proceeding for expungement, the petitioner has the burden of 
establishing the existence of one of those three criteria as a 
prerequisite to his right to seek expungement.  In Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 92, 677 S.E.2d 220 (2009), we described 
that prerequisite as a “threshold determination” that the court 
 
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must make when considering any petition for expungement under 
Code § 19.2-392.2.  Id. at 98, 677 S.E.2d at 223 (quoting Daniel 
v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 523, 530, 604 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2004)).  
After determining that a petitioner has the right to seek 
expungement by finding the existence of one of those three 
criteria, the court must then consider whether the continuing 
existence and possible dissemination of the information 
contained in the records may cause “manifest injustice” to the 
petitioner as contemplated by Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  Id. at 103, 
677 S.E.2d at 226. 
 
Eastlack contends that he meets the first of the three 
criteria above in that he was “acquitted” of the malicious 
wounding charge.  Alternatively, he argues that the charge was 
“otherwise dismissed” within the meaning of the statute.  We 
will not consider the latter argument because the charge was 
never dismissed in any sense of the word.  Because no nolle 
prosequi was taken, we confine our analysis to the question 
whether Eastlack was “acquitted” within the meaning of Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A)(1). 
 
A person who has been found “not guilty by reason of 
insanity” of a criminal charge has not been acquitted in the 
sense that he has been determined to be innocent of the 
commission of the criminal act charged.  Rather, he has been 
excused from criminal responsibility for the act because his 
 
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mental condition at the time of the offense crossed the 
borderline of legal insanity, precluding a finding that he 
possessed the mens rea requisite for conviction:   
[A]n individual may be excused from penalty if he is 
insane at the time he commits a criminal act.  As 
here, he may do the act with every intention of 
consummating it, but when it is shown that he was 
mentally ill, he is excused from the imposition of the 
usual sanctions.  “The absence of punishment, however, 
does not retrospectively expunge the original 
intention.” 
Johnson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 232 Va. 340, 348, 350 
S.E.2d 616, 621 (1986) (quoting Colonial Life & Accident Ins. 
Co. v. Wagner, 380 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Ky. 1964)). 
 
Consequently, a person found not guilty by reason of 
insanity is not discharged from the constraints imposed upon him 
by law as a result of his criminal act.  He is not free to 
resume his life in the community as he would be if he had been 
acquitted in the usual sense.  Code § 19.2-182.2 requires the 
trial court, after such a verdict is returned, to place the 
acquitted person in the temporary custody of the Commissioner 
for evaluation by skilled professionals.  Code § 19.2-182.3 
provides for a judicial hearing upon the report of the 
evaluators.  Although the hearing is a “civil proceeding,” the 
acquitted person is to be represented by counsel.  If, at the 
conclusion of the hearing, the court finds that the acquitted 
person has a mental illness or retardation and is in need of 
 
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inpatient hospitalization, the court must order the involuntary 
commitment of the acquitted person to a mental hospital.  Id.  
Otherwise, the court may grant the acquitted person a 
conditional release from custody, subject to such conditions as 
the court may prescribe within the statutory guidelines.  Id.  
Further provisions require the trial court to revisit its 
commitment decision after 12 months, then yearly for five years, 
then every other year thereafter.  See Code § 19.2-182.5(A).  
Code § 19.2-182.8 further provides that the court may revoke its 
conditional release of the acquitted person at any time the 
court determines that he has violated the conditions of his 
release or if it finds that he is no longer a proper subject for 
conditional release.  
 
In addition to the foregoing restraints upon the acquitted 
person’s liberty, Code § 18.2-308.1:1 makes it a crime for him 
to knowingly purchase, posses, or transport a firearm at any 
time, unless granted permission in a judicial proceeding.  Code 
§ 19.2-368.20 provides that any proceeds or profits he receives 
either directly or indirectly as a result of his criminal act, 
or because of its notoriety, shall be subject to a special order 
of escrow for the benefit of the victims of the crime. 
 
Eastlack correctly points out that the Code sections 
discussed here refer to a person found not guilty by reason of 
insanity as a person “acquitted by reason of insanity” and as an 
 
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“acquittee.”  Thus, he argues, he is entitled to obtain 
expungement by the express language of the first criterion 
expressed in the expungement statute.  
 
If the word “acquitted” in the expungement statute, Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A) is interpreted to include acquittals by reason 
of insanity, an anomaly results.  A person found not guilty by 
reason of insanity could, immediately after the entry of 
judgment, seek expungement and, if successful, avoid all the 
constraints upon his liberty imposed by the “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” laws.  Those laws were enacted for the 
purpose of protecting society and we will not attribute to the 
General Assembly an intention to repeal them by implication or 
to have enacted them in vain.*  See, e.g., Hughes v. Cole, 251 
Va. 3, 14, 465 S.E.2d 820, 828 (1996) (repeal of a statute by 
implication is not favored, and there is a presumption against a 
legislative intent to repeal where express terms indicating such 
intent are lacking) (citations omitted). 
 
We are assisted by three well-settled principles of 
statutory construction.  First, statutes concerning the same 
                     
 
*The expungement laws, Title 19.2, Chapter 23.1 of the Code, 
were enacted in 1977.  1977 Acts ch. 675.  The laws governing 
the evaluation and treatment of persons found not guilty by 
reason of insanity, Title 19.2, Chapter 11.1 of the Code, were 
1991 amendments and reenactments of former laws.  1991 Acts ch. 
427. The firearm statute, Code § 18.2-308.1:1, was enacted in 
1990.  1990 Acts ch. 692, and amended in 2008, 2009 and 2010.  
The escrow law, Code § 19.2-368.20, was enacted in 1990.  1990 
Acts ch. 549, and amended in 1992, 2006, and 2011. 
 
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subject are to be read together, and construed, wherever 
possible, so as to avoid conflict between them and to permit 
each of them to have full operation according to their 
legislative purpose.  See, e.g., Hood v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 
526, 541-42, 701 S.E.2d 421, 430 (2010); Waller v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 731, 737, 685 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2009).  Second, where there 
is a clear conflict between statutes, the more specific 
enactment prevails over the more general.  Conger v. Barrett, 
280 Va. 627, 631, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010).  Third, statutes 
are to be construed so as to avoid an absurd result.  
Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 230, 682 S.E.2d 906, 908-09 
(2009). 
 
Each of those principles leads to the conclusion that the 
General Assembly did not intend the term “acquitted” in the 
expungement law to include acquittals by reason of insanity.  If 
the term were to be construed to include such acquittals, an 
irreconcilable conflict would exist among the statutes dealing 
with the same subject.  The general statute, Code § 19.2-392.2, 
which provides for expungement of criminal records of all kinds, 
would prevail over the statutes specifically tailored to deal 
only with acquittals by reason of insanity, and the absurd 
result would follow that the General Assembly would have, by 
enacting the expungement law, made all its enactments relating 
to acquittals by reason of insanity potentially unenforceable.  
 
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We will not attribute such an intent to the General Assembly.  
Therefore, we hold that the term “acquitted” in Code § 19.2-
392.2(A)(1) does not include acquittals by reason of insanity. 
Conclusion 
 
Because the circuit court correctly decided the question 
and for the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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