Title: State v. Stanley A. Samuel
Citation: 2002 WI 34
Docket Number: 1999AP002587-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2002

2002 WI 34 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2587-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Stanley A. Samuel,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 25 
Reported at:  240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 25, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas S. Williams   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Lara M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Robert R. 
Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Robert R. Henak. 
 
 
2002 WI 34 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-2587-CR  
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 109) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Stanley A. Samuel,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 25, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
reversing the circuit court's judgment of conviction entered 
against the defendant, Stanley Samuel, on charges of sexual 
assault, abduction, and interference with custody.1  The State 
asserts that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the 
same 
standard 
for 
suppressing 
a 
defendant's 
involuntary 
                                                 
1 See State v. Samuel, 2001 WI App 25, ¶23, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 
623 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 2000) (reversing and remanding a 
judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Winnebago County, 
Thomas S. Williams, Judge). 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
2 
 
statement should also apply when a defendant seeks to suppress 
an allegedly involuntary statement of a witness. 
¶2 
We conclude that the standards are different and that 
when a defendant seeks to suppress an allegedly involuntary 
witness statement, the coercive police misconduct at issue must 
be 
egregious 
such 
that 
it 
produces 
statements 
that 
are 
unreliable as a matter of law.  In addition, we determine that 
when a defendant seeks to suppress statements under this 
standard, the proper procedure to follow is set forth in State 
v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999).  Finally, we apply 
the test we have identified to the witness statements at issue 
and conclude that they properly were admitted into evidence.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
In January 1996, Tisha L., then a minor, left 
Winnebago County with Samuel, a 47-year-old friend.  Samuel and 
Tisha stayed in Milwaukee for about a week, then left Wisconsin 
and traveled throughout several Midwestern states.  In March 
1997, 13 months after they left Wisconsin, Samuel and Tisha were 
taken into custody by the State of Missouri. 
¶4 
Tisha was pregnant, and on March 10, the day after she 
returned to Wisconsin, her baby was born.  Two days later, March 
12, a hearing was held before a court commissioner at which it 
was determined that Tisha would be placed with her father.  
Further discussion on the issue of placement of Tisha's baby was 
left to an intake conference following the hearing.  At the 
conference, Tisha was represented by an attorney.  Others 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
3 
 
present for all or part of the conference included City of 
Oshkosh police officer Steven Sagmeister, two social workers, 
Tisha's father, and Cathy Stelzner, his girlfriend.  Although 
accounts differ as to what was said at the conference, at some 
time during or immediately following the conference, Tisha was 
told to contact Sagmeister to give him a statement with regard 
to "what had happened the previous year."  After the conference, 
Tisha was allowed to go home with her father and Stelzner, and 
the baby was temporarily placed in foster care. 
¶5 
Tisha's 
father 
and 
Officer 
Sagmeister 
made 
arrangements for Tisha to meet with Sagmeister on March 13, 
1997.  On that day, Tisha gave a tape recorded statement to 
Sagmeister and one of the social workers, Rod Schraufnagel, at 
the police station.  She said that she and Samuel had been 
sexually active in Winnebago County before they left the state.  
At the time of that sexual activity, Tisha was under age 16.2 
¶6 
The next morning, March 14, another hearing was held 
before the court commissioner, at which Tisha's baby was 
returned to her.  Following the hearing, Officer Sagmeister 
asked Tisha if she would give a second statement because the 
tape from the first day had not turned out very well.  Tisha and 
her father agreed, and Sagmeister and Schraufnagel conducted 
another recorded interview with Tisha.  Again, Tisha indicated 
                                                 
2 The information shows Tisha's date of birth as September 
7, 1980. 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
4 
 
that she had sexual relations with Samuel in 1995 prior to 
leaving Winnebago County. 
¶7 
Tisha gave a third statement on March 21, when Officer 
Sagmeister came to her residence.  After questioning Tisha, 
Sagmeister summarized her answers in a written statement that 
Tisha signed.  The written statement shows that Tisha and Samuel 
first had sexual relations in the middle of September 1995 and 
also had sexual relations twice in Milwaukee after leaving 
Winnebago County in January 1996. 
¶8 
Samuel was formally charged with interference with 
custody, abduction, and sexual assault of a child.  He moved in 
limine to suppress all of Tisha's statements.  At the hearing on 
the motion, Samuel argued that Tisha's statements should be 
suppressed because they were the result of police threats or 
coercion.  Tisha, her father, her attorney, and Stelzner 
testified with regard to the circumstances surrounding both the 
intake conference and the times at which Tisha gave her 
statements. 
¶9 
The circuit court denied the motion, determining that 
Samuel was without standing to assert that Tisha's statements 
were 
coerced 
in 
violation 
of 
her 
constitutional 
rights.  
Instead, the court concluded, it was for the jury to determine 
the credibility and weight of Tisha's statements. 
¶10 At trial, the State called Tisha as a witness, and she 
testified that she and Samuel had a sexual relationship, but 
that they did not have sexual intercourse until March or April 
1996, which was months after she left Wisconsin with Samuel.  
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
5 
 
While Tisha was still under direct examination, the State 
proceeded to impeach her with her prior inconsistent statements: 
 
Q 
Isn't it also true, however, Tisha, that you have 
given three statements prior to this date which 
indicated you became sexually active with Mr. Samuel 
in September of 1995? 
 
A 
Yes, I think I did. 
The State showed Tisha her March 21, 1997 written statement and 
asked her several questions about it.  Tisha maintained that she 
did not remember saying anything in the statement with regard to 
when, where, or how often she and Samuel had sexual relations.  
She later testified that the statements were not true, but that 
she had given them because she felt pressured to incriminate 
Samuel at the intake conference. 
¶11 Tisha's father, Stelzner, Officer Sagmeister, and 
Schraufnagel also gave testimony relevant to the circumstances 
surrounding Tisha's statements.  Although the witnesses each had 
different perceptions as to whether Tisha was improperly 
pressured, no one recalled that she was expressly told she would 
lose her baby unless she implicated Samuel. 
¶12 The jury convicted Samuel on all three charges.  
Samuel brought a postconviction motion, again arguing that 
Tisha's statements should have been suppressed because they were 
coerced.  The circuit court denied the motion.  The court 
determined that regardless of whether Tisha's statements were 
coerced, Samuel had no standing to challenge them, and the 
question of any witness coercion was best left to the jury. 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
6 
 
 
¶13 Samuel appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Citing United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 1999), the court reasoned that police methods of coercion 
that are "offensive when used against an accused do not 
magically become any less so when exerted against a witness."  
Referring to the test for involuntariness set forth in State v. 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987), the court of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
standard 
for 
suppressing 
a 
defendant's involuntary statements should also apply to the 
suppression of involuntary witness statements. 
¶14 In Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236, this court applied a 
totality of the circumstances test in order to assess whether 
confessions are involuntary.  That test requires courts to 
"balance the personal characteristics of the defendant against 
the pressures imposed upon him by police in order to induce him 
to respond to the questioning."  Id.  In determining whether a 
confession is voluntary, the essential inquiry is whether the 
confession was procured via police coercion.  Id. at 235-36.  
The court of appeals remanded Samuel's case for the circuit 
court to determine whether, under the Clappes test, Tisha's 
statements were involuntary.   
II 
¶15 We are asked to determine the proper standard under 
which a witness's involuntary statements must be suppressed at 
the trial of a criminal defendant.  Whether evidence should be 
suppressed is a question of constitutional fact.  See State v. 
Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991); State v. 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
7 
 
Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 346, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998).  
In reviewing questions of constitutional fact, we uphold a 
circuit court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but 
we 
independently 
determine 
whether 
those 
facts 
meet 
the 
constitutional standard.  State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, ¶27, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680; State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
189-90, 577 N.W.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶16 In 
making 
our 
determination 
of 
whether 
Tisha's 
statements should have been suppressed, we consider in turn the 
standards advanced by the State and Samuel.  However, we 
conclude that neither standard strikes the proper balance 
between the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process and 
the fact that witness statements that are in some sense 
compelled are frequently neither unreliable nor the product of 
egregious police misconduct.  In steering a course between the 
positions advanced by the parties and using due process as our 
guide, 
we 
recognize 
there 
are 
circumstances 
under 
which 
egregious police misconduct deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial.  
III 
¶17 The State contends that a defendant's right to due 
process is offended only where witness statements are extracted 
by "extreme coercion or torture."  United States v. Chiavola, 
744 F.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1984).  It argues that absent such 
extreme circumstances, it is the jury's role to weigh and assess 
credibility.  Samuel asserts that involuntary witness statements 
should be subject to the same rule of suppression as a criminal 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
8 
 
defendant's involuntary confession.  See Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 
222.  He argues that a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right to a fair trial bars the admission of all 
involuntary witness statements that are the product of police 
coercion. 
¶18 With due process as our touchstone, we turn first to 
the standard advanced by the State.  We are not convinced, as 
the State asserts, that a defendant's right to due process will 
be offended only where the witness statements used against the 
defendant derive from police conduct that amounts to extreme 
coercion or torture.  The "blood of the accused is not the only 
hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."  Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); see also Raphael v. State, 
994 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Alaska 2000).  Although the United States 
Supreme Court in Blackburn was referring to the defendant, we 
similarly decline to hold that the blood of a witness is a 
necessary hallmark of an unconstitutional trial.  Instead, we 
determine there are circumstances where witness statements 
derived by egregious police misconduct short of extreme coercion 
or torture must be suppressed in order to uphold fundamental 
fairness to a defendant.  In short, we reject the State's test 
as setting the bar too high to satisfy due process. 
¶19 Next, we turn to the standard advanced by Samuel, that 
witness statements should be suppressed based on the same test 
as applied to a defendant's confession.  We begin by examining 
the rights protected along with the purposes served by the 
suppression of involuntary confessions.  It is well established 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
9 
 
that confessions by criminal defendants must be voluntary in 
order to be admitted as evidence at trial.  See State v. Hunt, 
53 Wis. 2d 734, 740, 193 N.W.2d 858 (1972); see also Lynumn v. 
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). 
¶20 The 
rule 
requiring 
suppression 
of 
involuntary 
confessions has long been grounded in the defendant's due 
process rights.  See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 
(1936).  In addition, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), 
and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 n.43 (1966), the 
Supreme Court linked the rule to the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. 
¶21 Several related purposes have been cited in support of 
the rule.  These include the "deep-rooted feeling that the 
police must obey the law while enforcing the law," Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 293 (1991); the notion that the 
government should be required to produce evidence against the 
accused "by its own independent labors rather than by the cruel, 
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth," Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 460; and, a concern that statements that are the 
product 
of 
coercion 
are 
more 
likely 
to 
be 
inherently 
untrustworthy than voluntary statements, Spano v. New York, 360 
U.S. 315, 320 (1959).   
¶22 These rights and purposes do not all apply when a 
defendant seeks to suppress involuntary witness statements.  See 
LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1974); State 
v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 814 (R.I. 1980).  A nondefendant 
witness's right against self-incrimination generally is not in 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
10 
 
play at the trial of the defendant.  "When the defendant seeks 
to 
exclude 
the 
fruit 
of 
the 
coerced 
statement 
of 
another . . . the policy of protecting the defendant from being 
compelled to aid the state in convicting him is not at stake."  
People v. Badgett, 895 P.2d 877, 886 (Cal. 1995).  Likewise, the 
idea that the government must produce evidence by its own 
independent labors rather than by compelling it from the mouth 
of the accused does not seem to justify the suppression of 
statements by those other than the accused.  
¶23 Therefore, we disagree with Samuel that the Clappes 
test governing involuntary confessions can alone dictate the 
standard for suppression of involuntary witness statements.    
Because the rights protected and the purposes served by 
suppression of a defendant's confession do not all apply when 
considering the suppression of a witness's statement, something 
additional is needed before a witness's statement will be 
suppressed.  The Clappes test sets the bar for suppression of 
witness statements too low.  Although we agree that the 
suppression of witness statements requires that those statements 
be involuntary under Clappes, it also requires something more. 
¶24 Often, witness statements that are in some sense 
compelled are neither inherently unreliable nor the product of 
police misconduct.  For example, we have held that, as a general 
rule, a defendant's right to a fair trial is not violated by the 
admission of testimony by a defendant's accomplice even where 
the State has expressly granted concessions to the accomplice in 
exchange for the testimony.  State v. Nerison, 136 Wis. 2d 37, 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
11 
 
45, 401 N.W.2d 1 (1987).  "[C]ross-examination, not exclusion, 
is the proper tool for challenging the weight and credibility of 
accomplice testimony."  Nerison, 136 Wis. 2d at 45; see also 
State v. Miller, 231 Wis. 2d 447, 465, 605 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 
1999).3 
¶25 A rule suppressing witness statements must recognize 
the admissibility of evidence such as accomplice testimony and 
also protect a defendant's due process right to a fair trial.  
Although we have rejected Samuel's test as setting the bar too 
low, we acknowledge that some of the purposes served by the 
suppression of involuntary confessions apply equally in the 
context of involuntary witness statements.  Both the maxim that 
police obey the law while enforcing the law and the need to 
avoid convictions based on inherently unreliable evidence apply 
whether the statements at issue spring from the mouth of the 
criminally accused or another.  Although there is no "absolute 
                                                 
3 When the State relies on accomplice testimony, the 
defendant's right to a fair trial is protected as long as there 
is: 
(1) full disclosure of the terms of the agreements 
struck with the witnesses; (2) the opportunity for 
full cross-examination of those witnesses concerning 
the agreements and the effect of those agreements on 
the testimony of the witnesses; and (3) instructions 
cautioning the jury to carefully evaluate the weight 
and credibility of the testimony of such witnesses who 
have been induced by agreements with the state to 
testify against the defendant. 
State v. Nerison, 136 Wis. 2d 37, 46, 401 N.W.2d 1 (1987); State 
v. Miller, 231 Wis. 2d 447, 465, 605 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
12 
 
parallel" 
between 
involuntary 
confessions 
and 
involuntary 
witness statements, LaFrance, 499 F.2d at 35, there is a point 
at which some of the same considerations apply to both. 
¶26 In United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 
1985), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the 
fact that witnesses' statements were themselves unlawfully 
obtained was not alone sufficient to necessitate suppression.  
Instead, the Fifth Circuit determined that it was "egregious" 
intimidation and coercion of witnesses that would prompt the 
suppression of their statements.  Id. at 275.  Under such 
circumstances, "the government's investigation methods result[] 
in a fundamentally unfair trial."  Id. at 274.  In Merkt, the 
court discussed United States v. Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 481 
n.14 (5th Cir. 1978), in which it had reasoned that the 
fundamental fairness essential to due process is undermined when 
a 
witness's 
statement 
is 
obtained 
through 
"shocking 
and 
intentional" police misconduct. 
¶27 Likewise, this court has recognized that it is when 
police misconduct rises to an "egregious" level that it offends 
due process.  State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 211, 401 
N.W.2d 771 (1987) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 
(1986)).  In Hanson, we concluded that when a suspect has not 
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, police may 
withhold information that there is an attorney available asking 
to see him.  However, we cautioned, as did the Supreme Court in 
Burbine, 
that 
"on 
facts 
more 
egregious 
than 
those 
presented . . . police deception might rise to a level of a due 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
13 
 
process violation."  Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 211 (quoting 
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 432). 
¶28 Similarly, in Badgett, 895 P.2d at 887, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that in order for defendants to assert 
violations of their due process rights, they must allege that 
the coercive methods used to obtain a witness statement were 
such that they would actually affect the reliability of the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial. 
 
The 
court 
explained 
that 
"[t]estimony of third parties that is offered at trial should 
not be subject to exclusion unless the defendant demonstrates 
that improper coercion has impaired the reliability of the 
testimony."  Id. 
¶29 As 
this 
court 
has 
observed 
in 
the 
context 
of 
involuntary confessions, although they may in some cases be 
unreliable, in other cases they are reliable.  See State v. 
Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 173, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); J.G. v. 
State, 119 Wis. 2d 748, 760, 350 N.W.2d 668 (1984).  The same 
can be said of involuntary witness statements.  Involuntary 
confessions are suppressed regardless of the truthfulness of a 
confession in an individual case.  See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 
477, 484-85 (1972); Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d at 173.  However, 
because a defendant's right against self-incrimination is not at 
issue with regard to statements by others, the suppression of 
those statements at the defendant's trial demands a more 
rigorous standard. 
¶30 With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that 
when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
14 
 
product of coercion, the police misconduct must be more than 
that set forth in Clappes.  It must be egregious such that it 
produces statements that are unreliable as a matter of law.  The 
coercion must be egregious because, as we have shown, it is 
typically 
"egregious" 
police 
misconduct 
that 
offends 
due 
process.  Our concern is with police misconduct that, by its 
nature, undermines confidence in the reliability of a witness's 
statements.  Witness statements obtained by police methods that 
induce lying have no place in our system of justice because a 
conviction 
based 
on 
unreliable 
evidence 
undermines 
the 
fundamental fairness of a defendant's trial.  In short, due 
process demands that the State not marshal its resources against 
an accused in a manner that results in a conviction based on 
unreliable evidence obtained through egregious police practices.  
¶31 Upon an examination of the case law and the parties' 
arguments, we glean several factors to consider in determining 
whether police misconduct is egregious such that it produces 
statements that are unreliable as a matter of law.  These 
factors include (1) whether a witness was coached on what to 
say; (2) whether investigating authorities asked questions 
blatantly tailored to extract a particular answer, see Gonzales, 
164 F.3d at 1289; (3) whether the authorities made a threat with 
consequences that would be unlawful if carried out, see United 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
15 
 
States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1981);4 (4) 
whether the witness was given an express and unlawful quid pro 
quo; (5) whether the State had a separate legitimate purpose for 
its conduct, Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1337; and, (6) whether the 
witness was represented by an attorney at the time of the 
coercion or statement, see Merkt, 764 F.2d at 269.  The presence 
of the first four factors weighs in favor of suppression while 
the presence of the second two factors weighs against it.  
Application of these and other relevant factors will help to 
ensure that it is unreliable evidence that is suppressed.  It 
will also help to guarantee that the State does not obtain 
convictions based on practices that offend fundamental fairness. 
¶32 In cases where an application of the factors results 
in a determination that witness statements at issue will not be 
suppressed, the defendant nevertheless retains the ability to 
test the credibility of the witness statements through, among 
other approaches, cross-examination before the jury.  See 
Nerison, 136 Wis. 2d at 45.  Cross-examination is an essential 
tool for "sifting the conscience of the witness" and thereby 
protecting a defendant's rights at trial.  State v. Bauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 204, 208 n.3, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982) (citing Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).  The jury, of 
course, has the duty to scrutinize and weigh the testimony of 
                                                 
4 We recognize that United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 
(9th 
Cir. 
1981), 
involved 
involuntary 
confessions 
by 
a 
defendant; nevertheless, we deem its discussion helpful in 
identifying 
criteria 
that 
are 
useful 
in 
a 
suppression 
determination under the test we apply to Samuel. 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
16 
 
witnesses and to determine the effect of the evidence as a 
whole.  See Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 462, 285 N.W.2d 
868 (1979); Wis JI——Criminal 300.5  These safeguards——cross-
examination and the jury's role in weighing the evidence——help 
ensure a fair trial where due process does not require the 
suppression of witness statements. 
IV 
¶33 We next address the proper procedure for circuit 
courts and parties to follow when a defendant wishes to assert 
that witness statements should be suppressed under the standards 
we have identified.  Both Samuel and the State refer to Velez, 
224 Wis. 2d 1, as providing a model procedure.  The issue 
presented in Velez was whether a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
upon 
an 
allegation 
that 
the 
State 
intentionally "manipulated the system" to avoid juvenile court 
jurisdiction and charge a defendant as an adult.  Id. at 6.  In 
Velez, as here, it was the defendant's due process rights that 
were at issue.  See id. at 14. 
¶34 Therefore, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
parties 
that 
the 
procedures outlined in Velez should be applied in this case.  As 
the circuit court correctly observed in its decision on Samuel's 
suppression motion, although the jury is normally the sole judge 
of the credibility and weight given to witness statements, 
 
                                                 
5 Here, the jury received a version of the standard 
instruction 
on 
witness 
credibility, 
which 
includes 
an 
instruction that the jury should consider motives for falsifying 
testimony.  See Wis JI——Criminal 300.  
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
17 
 
[e]xceptions are made where a threshold finding is 
made by the court, since presentation to the jury 
would expose them to evidence which might be otherwise 
barred by constitutional principles. 
The Velez procedures will protect a defendant's due process 
rights while also preserving scarce judicial resources by 
eliminating unnecessary evidentiary hearings.  See 224 Wis. 2d 
at 12. 
¶35 Under Velez, first the defendant must bring a motion 
to suppress, alleging facts sufficient to show that a statement 
was involuntary under Clappes and that the police misconduct at 
issue is egregious such that it produces statements that are 
unreliable as a matter of law.   See Velez, 224 Wis. 2d at 18.  
If the motion alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the 
defendant to relief, then the circuit court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  Id.; see also State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  However, if the motion 
does not allege sufficient facts, the circuit court has the 
discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing upon a finding that 
any one of the following circumstances is present:  (1) the 
defendant failed to allege sufficient facts in the motion to 
raise a question of material fact; (2) the defendant presented 
only conclusory allegations; or (3) the record conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.  
Velez, 224 Wis. 2d at 17-18. 
¶36 Even where the defendant has not met this initial 
burden of production and the circuit court has the discretion to 
deny an evidentiary hearing, in order to properly exercise that 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
18 
 
discretion, it must "carefully consider the record, the motion, 
counsels' arguments and/or offers of proof, and the law."  
Velez, 224 Wis. 2d at 17 (quoting State v. Garner, 207 
Wis. 2d 520, 534-35, 558 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1996)).  Moreover, 
when there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant will 
establish the factual basis at an evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court must provide the defendant with the opportunity to 
develop the record.  Id. at 18. 
¶37 In other words, there will be cases where the court 
cannot 
properly 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
an 
evidentiary hearing without first holding a nonevidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress.  See Velez, 224 
Wis. 2d at 17.  The facts that the defendant must establish and 
the determinations the circuit court must make will be informed 
by the standard and factors we have identified. 
¶38 We must also address the question of who bears the 
burden of persuasion once the defendant has established a 
factual basis necessitating an evidentiary hearing.  Samuel 
argues that the burden of persuasion should lie with the State, 
but acknowledges that 
the 
level 
of 
that 
burden is the 
preponderance of the evidence.  We agree. 
¶39 In Velez, this court suggested that due process was 
not offended by placing a burden of production on the defendant 
because the State bore the ultimate burden of persuasion with 
regard to the government misconduct at issue.  See 224 Wis. 2d 
at 16.  Where a defendant makes a prima facie showing that a 
confession is involuntary, the State bears the burden of 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
19 
 
proving, by the preponderance of the evidence, that it is not.  
Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d at 179; State v. Williams, 220 Wis. 2d 458, 
463, 583 N.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1998).  Although we have 
identified a different substantive test for the suppression of 
witness statements, given Velez and the rule on the burden of 
proof for confessions, we discern no need to inject a different 
rule into our due process jurisprudence.  The burden of 
persuasion lies with the State, and the burden the State must 
meet is a preponderance of the evidence. 
V 
¶40 As noted earlier, the question of whether evidence 
must be suppressed under a constitutional standard is ultimately 
a question that this court determines independently.  Anderson, 
165 Wis. 2d at 447.  Upon an examination of the record in this 
case, we conclude as a matter of law that Tisha's statements 
should not have been suppressed.  No reasonable view of the 
evidence can support the conclusion that Tisha's statements were 
coerced by egregious methods that produced statements unreliable 
as a matter of law.  Indeed, the circuit court at the 
postconviction 
motion 
hearing, 
after 
hearing 
all 
of 
the 
evidence, opined that Tisha's statements were not the product of 
police coercion.  The circuit court stated: 
 
[A]nd in this case, in all honesty, the Court wouldn't 
be able to even find coercion.  This is a totally 
different type of circumstance than say a witness 
comes in and she's a mother and the police say if you 
don't tell us what we want to hear, we're taking your 
child. 
 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
20 
 
This is a case in which the mother was a minor on 
the run, who gave birth while on the run and was 
subsequently returned.  It was her acts for which the 
child was initially taken into custody . . . it was 
her acts beforehand which led to originally there 
being an issue as to whether the child would remain 
with her or not.  And in light of the fact as well 
that she was not told what to say but just to 
cooperate here, doesn't to this court say that it's 
been inferred that she has to say what they want her 
to say or she won't get her child back. 
¶41 Nonetheless, we apply the factors we have identified, 
ultimately arriving at the same result as the circuit court.6  We 
first note that there is little if any credible evidence that 
Tisha was specifically coached on what to say or that the 
authorities' questions were blatantly tailored in order to 
compel her to implicate Samuel.  On the contrary, Tisha's father 
testified that neither Officer Sagmeister nor the social worker, 
Schraufnagel, told Tisha that she needed to say anything in 
particular in order to get her baby back.  Tisha's testimony 
focused on the fact that she was repeatedly told she had to 
"cooperate" in general.  Although at one point in her testimony 
she indicated that someone said she would not get her baby back 
                                                 
6 The dissent concludes that Samuel's case should, "at the 
very 
least," 
be 
remanded 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
a 
determination of whether Tisha's allegedly coerced statements 
should be suppressed.  Dissent at ¶50. It appears to overlook, 
however, that the circuit court already opined that the 
statements were not the product of police coercion.  As noted 
above in paragraph 40, the circuit court stated that "in all 
honesty, the Court wouldn't be able to even find coercion."  It 
would be a futile exercise to remand this case for a 
determination by the circuit court of whether the coercive 
police misconduct here was egregious such that it produced 
statements unreliable as a matter of law when the circuit court 
stated it "wouldn't be able to even find coercion." 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
21 
 
until she implicated Samuel, when pressed, she could not 
remember who had said this or whether those were the exact words 
the speaker had used. 
¶42 Similarly, the record does not show that authorities 
ever expressly threatened Tisha with the loss of her baby, 
although that was a possibility regardless of whether Tisha 
implicated Samuel.  Stelzner testified that she thought there 
was "blackmail" involved, but was unable to explain in any 
detail why she so believed.  The record does not show that 
anyone presented Tisha with an illegal quid pro quo, such as a 
promise that she would be able to keep her baby if she agreed to 
implicate Samuel.  In addition, the factor of representation by 
counsel does not weigh strongly in favor of either Samuel or the 
State.  Although Tisha was represented by an attorney at the 
intake conference, she was not represented at other times in 
which Samuel alleges she was coerced.    
¶43 Finally, and perhaps most convincingly in this case, 
the authorities involved had a separate legitimate purpose for 
questioning Tisha with regard to Samuel.  They needed to 
determine the proper placement of her baby, which depended on an 
assessment of whether she was a flight risk and whether she 
could be trusted to care properly for her newborn child.  
Although we recognize there may be cases where a legitimate 
purpose for questioning a witness is transformed into an 
illegitimate pretext for a criminal investigation, the record in 
this case does not support such a conclusion. 
VI 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
22 
 
¶44 In sum, the test for the suppression of witness 
statements is a Clappes-plus test.  The court, in Clappes, 
applied a totality of the circumstances test when assessing 
whether a defendant's confession is voluntary.  The Clappes test 
requires a court to look at both the defendant’s response as 
well as the police misconduct, and to "balance the personal 
characteristics of the defendant against the pressures imposed 
upon him by the police in order to induce him to respond to the 
questioning."  136 Wis. 2d at 236. 
¶45 Because the rights protected and the purposes served 
by suppression of a defendant's confession do not all apply when 
considering the suppression of a witness's statement, something 
more is needed before a witness's statement will be suppressed.  
That something more is the degree of police misconduct. 
¶46 Thus, as in Clappes, a totality of circumstances test 
is applied when considering the suppression of a witness 
statement.  The personal characteristics of a witness must be 
balanced against the conduct of the police in pressuring a 
witness in order to induce a response.  However, we determine 
that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as 
involuntary, the coercive police misconduct must be greater than 
that 
necessary 
under 
Clappes 
for 
the 
suppression 
of 
a 
defendant's confession:  it must be egregious such that it 
produces statements that are unreliable as a matter of law. 
¶47 In addition, we determine that where the defendant 
seeks to suppress witness statements, the parties must follow 
the procedure set forth in Velez.  Finally, we conclude that on 
No. 
99-2587-CR   
 
23 
 
the record before us, Tisha's statements were not derived from 
egregious 
police misconduct 
that 
would 
produce 
statements 
unreliable as a matter of law.7  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals concluded that it was required to 
reverse Samuel's convictions for abduction and interference with 
custody because, if the circuit court were to determine on 
remand that Tisha's statements were inadmissible, the admission 
of the statements may have improperly undermined Tisha's 
credibility and tainted the jury's assessment of the evidence at 
trial.  Because we conclude that Tisha's statements were 
properly before the jury, we need not address Samuel's argument 
that the admission of the statements improperly tainted his 
conviction on the abduction and interference with custody 
charges.  For the same reason, we do not address the State's 
argument that the admission of Tisha's statements was harmless 
error with regard to those two charges. 
No.  99-2587-CR.wab 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
¶48 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority's standard which requires the suppression of 
witnesses' statements when they are coerced through egregious 
police 
misconduct 
such 
that 
the 
statements 
are 
rendered 
unreliable as a matter of law, while considering the totality of 
the circumstances.  Majority op. at ¶46.   
¶49 However, it is impossible for me to reconcile the 
enunciated standard with the failure of the majority to remand 
given the totality of the circumstances present.  This does not 
strike me as a close case at all.  As a result, lower courts 
will ask, with some degree of confusion, if these facts do not 
do it, what does? 
¶50 I conclude that this case should, at the very least, 
be remanded.  The record raises serious questions as to the 
interrogation methods employed during the intake conference and 
immediately thereafter.  A determination on whether the police 
conduct was egregious involves matters of credibility that only 
a circuit judge can determine at an evidentiary hearing.  
Further, the circuit court must examine the totality of the 
No.  99-2587-CR.wab 
 
 
 
2
circumstances when making its determination.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent to the mandate of the majority opinion.8 
¶51 The following sequence of events is telling.  On March 
10, 1997, Tisha's baby is born.  On March 12, 1997, the baby is 
taken from Tisha and placed in a foster home after Tisha 
repeatedly refuses to "cooperate" with the police.  The next 
day, Tisha "cooperates" with the police by answering questions 
that implicate Samuel with respect to her sexual relationship 
with Samuel.  Tisha's baby is returned to her on March 14, 1997. 
¶52 No one denies that Tisha was told she must cooperate 
with the police.  But cooperate how?  Was it reasonable for 
Tisha to believe that she had to implicate Samuel or lose her 
baby 
forever? 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
never 
reached 
this 
determination.  The circuit court merely determined that Samuel 
had no standing to raise an objection to the admission of 
Tisha's statement.  At the very least, this case should go back 
for an evidentiary hearing following the procedural standards 
adopted by the majority from State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 589 
N.W.2d 9 (1999).  See majority op. at ¶¶33-39. 
¶53 There is more in this record, none of which has been 
challenged, to support my view that Samuel has met his burden in 
producing evidence to show egregious conduct sufficient to force 
                                                 
8 This dissent did not "overlook," as stated in the majority 
opinion's response to the dissent, that the circuit court has 
"already opined that the statements were not the product of 
police coercion."  Majority op. at ¶41 n. 6.  The circuit court 
issued that opinion without the benefit of the new standard 
enunciated in the majority opinion.  The circuit court could 
hardly apply a standard that was not even in existence at the 
time it so opined.   
No.  99-2587-CR.wab 
 
 
 
3
an evidentiary hearing.  In particular, David Keck, Tisha's 
attorney, testified that it was his personal impression that 
Tisha had to give a statement to police regarding the unlawful 
sexual relationship with Samuel in order to get her baby back.  
In addition, Peter L., Tisha's father, testified that he spoke 
with a sexual abuse investigator with the Department of Social 
Services and was told that the police needed to know where and 
when Tisha and Samuel had sex.  Peter gave this information to 
Tisha. 
 
Finally, 
Catherine 
Steltzer, 
Peter's 
girlfriend, 
testified that she was told they would consider giving the baby 
to Tisha if she cooperated.  It was her impression that the baby 
was being used as a pawn and that this was blackmail. 
¶54 If in fact Tisha was threatened with the loss of her 
baby unless she confessed to an unlawful sexual relationship 
with Samuel, such threats, implicit or explicit, constitute 
egregious police conduct.  This record contains much evidence, 
none of it challenged, that leads to that conclusion.  I would 
send it back for the circuit court's determination of the facts 
and conclusions. 
¶55 I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  99-2587-CR.wab 
 
 
 
1