Title: Commonwealth v. Arias
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12510
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2019

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SJC-12510 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE L. ARIAS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 7, 2018. - March 15, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause.  Search 
and Seizure, Probable cause, Exigent circumstances, 
Emergency, Multiple occupancy building, Protective sweep, 
Plain view.  Probable Cause.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Interlocutory appeal, Appeal by Commonwealth.  
Evidence, Informer.  Witness, Police informer.  Controlled 
Substances. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 14, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary-
Lou Rup, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Esther J. Horwich (Stephen J. Wright also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
David R. Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we confront the scope of two 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that have resulted in some 
confusion in previous jurisprudence in the Commonwealth:  the 
emergency aid exception and the exigent circumstances exception.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts found 
by the motion judge following an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's motion to suppress, supplemented by uncontroverted 
and undisputed facts in the record that were implicitly credited 
by the judge and that do not detract from the judge's ultimate 
findings.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 
(2015).  We reserve some details for later discussion. 
 
On the evening of March 4, 2014, the Lawrence police 
department received a tip from an unnamed 911 caller.2  The 
caller stated that she was "coming down the street" when she saw 
two "Spanish guys" "with a gun . . . going up to the building" 
located at "7 Royal Street" in a residential neighborhood in 
Lawrence.  The caller stated that "they . . . had a hat on," and 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
2 The record does not contain precise times concerning when 
the 911 call occurred or when officers responded to the scene.  
Notably, when the officers responded, they were working the 
"night shift," which began at 5 P.M. and ended at 1 A.M. 
 
 
3 
were wearing "a jacket and a coat," one of which "was gr[a]y and 
the other was black."  The caller "heard . . . one of them load 
the gun," and saw the men enter the building.  The caller said 
that "there's always a little movement in that building," and 
acknowledged that she was "not really sure what's going on."  In 
addition, the caller stated that she was new to the 
neighborhood, and that she had not seen the men previously.  She 
provided the dispatcher with her home address, and the 
dispatcher indicated to the caller that he was aware of the 
caller's telephone number. 
 
A dispatcher subsequently issued the following report:  
"Any detective or any available north car [near the specified 
address], caller said she saw two Hispanic males enter a house, 
one in a gray jacket, one in a black jacket, the male was 
loading gun, was loading a cli[p] to a handgun."3 
 
The motion judge credited that, during the general period 
in which the 911 call was made, the Lawrence police department 
was investigating a "rash" of "home invasions" believed to be 
the work of a "crew" from New York.  The judge noted, however, 
that the evidence did not indicate "how recently or where" the 
home invasions had occurred, or if any home invasion had 
                     
 
3 The judge found that both the 911 caller and the police 
dispatcher "provided very general descriptions" of the men who 
entered the building. 
 
 
4 
"occurred in the immediate vicinity or neighbor[hood] of" the 
particular street. 
 
Multiple police officers responded to the dispatch.  The 
address given was one of two numbers associated with a four-unit 
apartment building.  The building had a single front door, 
marked with the number "5" on the right side of the door and the 
number "7" on the left side of the door.  The building contained 
two apartments on the ground floor, numbered "5A" and "7A," and 
two apartments on the upper floor, numbered "5B" and "7B."  At 
the rear of the building, there was a porch with two entrances. 
 
Sergeant Michael Simard of the Lawrence police department 
was the supervising patrol sergeant that evening.  He arrived at 
the scene in a marked cruiser and was wearing a uniform.  Simard 
saw no one outside the building.  He and a number of other 
officers monitored the front entrance. 
 
Sergeant Joseph Cerullo of the Lawrence police department's 
special operations division arrived at the scene in a marked 
cruiser; he, too, was wearing a uniform and a badge.4  Cerullo 
and four other officers, including two members of the canine 
unit of the Essex County sheriff's department, moved to the rear 
of the building. 
                     
 
4 In his role with the special operations division, Sergeant 
Joseph Cerullo was responsible for emergency responses. 
 
 
5 
 
At the front of the building, Simard spoke to residents of 
unit 7A, the first-floor apartment located across the hall from 
unit 5A.  The residents of unit 7A denied seeing or hearing 
anything out of the ordinary, and said that they did not know 
who lived in unit 5A.  The residents did describe, however, the 
"layout of the apartment [at unit 5A] as far as what door leads 
to where."  Simard commented that the residents of unit 7A were 
scared because of the "[fifteen] police officers with their guns 
drawn."  Simard also stated that, except for the residents of 
unit 7A, no residents of the building appeared to be at home. 
 
After obtaining the telephone number of the 911 caller, 
Simard spoke with her by telephone.5  The caller told Simard that 
                     
 
5 The judge found that the record did not make clear whether 
Sergeant Michael Simard spoke first to the residents of unit 7A 
or to the 911 caller.  We analyze the judge's findings as to 
this point based on the record that was before her, and we do 
not address later-discovered evidence that the judge did not 
consider.  Were we to consider this evidence, it would not 
change the result we reach. 
 
 
At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of 
a compact disc (CD) that contained audio recordings captured on 
a single audio track.  The recordings were of the initial 911 
call and the dispatch provided to responding officers.  The 
judge listened to those recordings; she also was provided a copy 
of a CD that contained only those recordings.  In its brief to 
the Appeals Court, however, the Commonwealth submitted a CD that 
contained additional audio recordings of police communications 
that had not been before the motion judge, and that were not 
transcribed in the filings in the Superior Court or on appeal.  
In particular, one of the recordings contains a telephone 
conversation between an employee of the Lawrence police 
department and the 911 caller that highlights a discrepancy as 
to when Simard spoke with the 911 caller.  The judge made no 
 
 
6 
she had seen three males whom she did not recognize talking on 
the front step of the building located at "5-7" on that street.  
The caller stated that she had heard the sound of a "rack" being 
pulled back on a semiautomatic handgun,6 a sound she recognized 
because she was "from Lawrence."  According to Simard, the 
caller did not see a firearm.  The caller was nervous, and was 
aware of recent armed robberies "in the area."  The judge found 
that the "officers at the scene learned the above-described 
information within minutes of their arrival."7 
 
The caller told Simard that the men likely had a key to the 
building because they entered the front door "easily."  Cerullo 
                     
findings as to that discrepancy, evidence of which was not 
before her. 
 
6 "Racking" a handgun involves pulling the slide back to 
load a round into the chamber.  See Commonwealth v. Arias, 92 
Mass. App. Ct. 439, 447 n.9 (2017).  Although the officers did 
not determine whether anyone living in the building was licensed 
to carry a firearm, the judge credited testimony that a firearms 
license check would have taken a significant amount of time. 
 
 
7 Cerullo testified that he and Simard "convers[ed] back and 
forth" and that Simard shared information he had learned from 
the 911 caller.  The judge found that "Cerullo and Simard 
discussed the information."  According to Cerullo, Simard's 
"knowledge from the [911] caller was enough for [Cerullo] to 
make [his] determination to enter the building" because "[t]he 
knowledge of one would be the knowledge of all."  It does not 
appear, however, that Simard shared all the information he had 
learned from the 911 caller.  Cerullo testified that he 
"possibly heard" that there were "three individuals out front" 
of the building, as the 911 caller ultimately told Simard.  He 
testified also that he was not made aware that those individuals 
likely had a key to the building.  In any event, Simard, not 
Cerullo, ultimately made the decision to enter unit 5A without a 
warrant. 
 
 
7 
acknowledged that he and the other officers did not consider 
whether the men who allegedly entered the building with a 
firearm were residents of the building. 
 
At the rear of the building, Cerullo observed a Hispanic 
male leave the building from the left rear door.  The man had 
facial hair and was "wearing a black and gray sweater."  He was 
identified at the evidentiary hearing as "Wascar Bievenido 
Guerrero Diaz." 
With his firearm drawn, Cerullo shouted, "Lawrence Police.  
Show me your hands."  From the front of the building, Simard was 
able to hear Cerullo.  Diaz appeared "shocked" and "quickly went 
back inside" the building, "closing the door behind him."  
Cerullo and another officer attempted to enter the building 
through the door Diaz had used, but, as the judge determined, 
they "found it locked."8  According to Cerullo, the door was 
associated with apartment "number 5."  Cerullo did not specify 
whether he was referring to apartment 5A, 5B, or both. 
Cerullo moved to the front of the building to discuss the 
situation with Simard, while four officers remained at the rear 
of the building.  Focusing their attention on unit 5A, Cerullo 
                     
 
8 The judge did not find that Diaz locked the door to 
prevent officers from entering the building. 
 
 
 
8 
and Simard made the decision to enter that unit without a 
warrant.9 
 
Within approximately three to eight minutes after police 
arrived at the scene, Cerullo "entered the front door 
forcefully," and then led a number of officers through the front 
door of the building and into unit 5A.  Conducting a "protective 
sweep" for any injured persons and the Hispanic male he had seen 
earlier at the rear of the building, Cerullo moved through the 
living room toward the rear of the building.  Other officers 
searched different areas of the apartment.  They did not find 
any people, but they did observe in plain view what appeared to 
be illegal narcotics, a scale, and plastic bags strewn on the 
floor.  The officers did not seize anything at that point. 
 
At the rear of the apartment, Cerullo encountered a door 
leading to a hallway outside unit 5A.  In the hallway, he saw 
another door.  The officers believed that this was the door that 
Diaz had used minutes earlier.  Cerullo also saw a stairway 
leading up to unit 5B and down to a basement; a light was on in 
the basement.  After confirming the absence of any people inside 
unit 5A, Cerullo, other officers, and several canine unit dogs 
searched the basement; they found and arrested three 
                     
9 The judge found that there was no basis for the officers 
to have focused their attention on unit 5A.  In addition, the 
judge noted that the officers were unaware of anyone who lived 
in that apartment. 
 
 
9 
individuals.  They did not search anywhere else in the building 
for the suspected home invaders. 
 
Based on observations made during the warrantless search of 
unit 5A, officers obtained a search warrant.  Pursuant to the 
warrant, they searched unit 5A again and seized items from the 
apartment. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, on the ground 
that the warrant was predicated on observations made during an 
unconstitutional search.  Following an evidentiary hearing, a 
Superior Court judge allowed the motion.10  The Commonwealth 
filed a petition seeking leave to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal, and a single justice of this court allowed the appeal to 
proceed in the Appeals Court.  In a split decision, a panel of 
the Appeals Court reversed the motion judge, after concluding 
that the warrantless search was permissible under the emergency 
aid doctrine.  See Commonwealth v. Arias, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 
449 (2017).  We allowed the defendant's application for further 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
                     
 
10 Although the judge allowed the motion to suppress as to 
the defendant and a codefendant, this appeal pertains only to 
the defendant. 
 
 
10 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of [the 
judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  
Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 616 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
 
A "warrantless government search of a home is presumptively 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights."  Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 213 (2012), 
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).  See Kentucky v. King, 563 
U.S. 452, 459 (2011); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006).  "The presumption against warrantless searches reflects 
the importance of the warrant requirement to our democratic 
society."  Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 683 (2010).  
"Under the exclusionary rule, evidence seized pursuant to an 
unreasonable search generally will be suppressed."  Commonwealth 
v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 584 (2017).  "Warrantless searches 
may be justifiable, however, if the circumstances of the search 
fall within an established exception to the warrant 
requirement."  Id. 
 
a.  Emergency aid exception.  The emergency aid doctrine 
establishes one such "narrow exception to the warrant 
requirement."  See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 754, 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 224 (2014).  The emergency aid 
exception applies when law enforcement officers enter a dwelling 
 
 
11 
to provide emergency assistance.  See Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 
Mass. 766, 774, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999) (entry is 
reasonable under emergency aid exception when made "not to 
gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an 
emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
To fall within the narrowly construed emergency aid 
exception, "a warrantless entry and protective sweep must meet 
two strict requirements."  See Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 
818, 823 (2009).  First, at the time of entry, there must be an 
objectively reasonable basis for the officers to believe that an 
emergency exists.  See Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 213.  Second, 
after the entry, the conduct of the officers must be reasonable 
under the circumstances, id. at 216; in other words, the search 
must not exceed the scope of the emergency.  See Peters, supra.  
"Where these two conditions have been satisfied, warrantless 
entry into a home is permissible."  Duncan, 467 Mass. at 751.  
The "burden rests with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that a 
warrantless search . . . fits within the emergency aid exception 
to the warrant requirement."  Entwistle, supra at 215, quoting 
Peters, supra.  See Snell, 428 Mass. at 774-775. 
 
i.  Objectively reasonable belief.  To meet its burden, the 
Commonwealth first must demonstrate objectively reasonable 
grounds to believe that an emergency existed at the time of 
 
 
12 
entry.  See Peters, 453 Mass. at 823.  See also Hill v. Walsh, 
884 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2018) (warrantless entry into dwelling 
requires "objectively reasonable basis for believing" that 
"immediate aid" is required by someone within [citation 
omitted]). 
 
In determining whether a warrantless entry is objectively 
justified, we evaluate it "in relation to the scene as it could 
appear to the officers at the time, not as it may seem to a 
scholar after the event with the benefit of leisured 
retrospective analysis" (citation omitted).  Peters, 453 Mass. 
at 825.  A reviewing court does not consider officers' 
subjective motivations in entering a house.  See, e.g., 
Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 214.  See also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 
U.S. 45, 47 (2009). 
 
The reasonableness of an entry is evaluated under the 
totality of the circumstances.  Compare Tuschall, 476 Mass. 
at 585-588 (warrantless entry was unreasonable when fumes 
adversely affected neighbor and her pet, but did not threaten 
imminent injury, death, or explosion, and there was no 
indication anyone inside dwelling required emergency 
assistance), with Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 426 
(2009) (warrantless entry was reasonable where dwelling was 
victim's last known location, her vehicle was parked outside, 
she had not been seen or heard from in days, and she had missed 
 
 
13 
scheduled visits with her children and her roommate).  See, 
e.g., Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 210, 215-216 (warrantless entry 
was reasonable where victim had not been seen or heard from in 
days, had uncharacteristically missed multiple appointments with 
family and friends, and victim's dog could be heard barking 
inside house); Snell, 428 Mass. at 768-769, 775 (warrantless 
entry was reasonable where victim's vehicle remained parked 
outside house for multiple days, victim had not answered 
multiple telephone calls from her children, and victim had not 
called to wish her son's wife happy birthday). 
 
Entering officers "do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely 
serious, life-threatening' injury," Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 214, 
quoting Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49, in order for a warrantless entry 
to be reasonable under the circumstances.  In addition, because 
the entry is made "to prevent harm stemming from a dangerous 
condition, not to investigate criminal activity," a reviewing 
court "does not require that police have probable cause that a 
crime has been committed."  Tuschall, 476 Mass. at 585.  See 
Duncan, 467 Mass. at 750; Hill, 884 F.3d at 23.  It is 
sufficient where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates 
objectively reasonable grounds to believe that emergency 
assistance is needed to prevent imminent physical harm, to 
provide assistance to one who is injured, or to protect life or, 
 
 
14 
in some circumstances, property.11  See, e.g., Entwistle, supra 
at 214, 216. 
 
ii.  Reasonableness of police conduct inside the dwelling.  
To rely upon the emergency aid doctrine, the Commonwealth also 
must demonstrate that the conduct of the officers after they 
entered the premises was reasonable under the circumstances.  
See Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 216.  To be reasonable, the 
warrantless conduct of the officers inside the dwelling must be 
"strictly circumscribed" by the circumstances of the emergency 
that justified entry.  See Commonwealth v. Lewin (No. 1), 407 
Mass. 617, 622 (1990), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
393 (1978).  Thus, a protective sweep made pursuant to the 
emergency aid exception "must be limited in scope to its 
purpose," Peters, 453 Mass. at 823, e.g., to preventing imminent 
harm, protecting life or property,12 or providing aid to one who 
is injured. 
 
In addition, to be reasonable under the emergency aid 
doctrine, the officers' conduct after entry "may not be expanded 
                     
 
11 In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the United 
States Supreme Court addressed a narrow context in which 
protection of property may support warrantless entry pursuant to 
the emergency aid exception.  There, the Court held that 
firefighters who enter a building to extinguish a fire 
"require[] no warrant, and that once in the building, [they] may 
remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of 
the blaze."  Id. at 511. 
 
 
12 See note 11, supra. 
 
 
15 
into a general search for evidence of criminal activity."  See 
Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 217, citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 
321, 325 (1987).  See also Lewin (No. 1), 407 Mass. at 622.  
Therefore, if, after entry, officers no longer have an 
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 
exists, it is unreasonable to continue searching.  See Mincey, 
437 U.S. at 393 (warrantless search was unreasonable when 
conducted after officers had located all persons in dwelling 
during prior protective sweep); Commonwealth v. Kaeppeler, 473 
Mass. 396, 403 (2015) ("continued police presence in the 
defendant's home without his consent after he was transported to 
the hospital for medical treatment and the subsequent seizure of 
[evidence in plain view] was unreasonable," because emergency 
concerning "the defendant's well-being had ended," and evidence 
was seized for "an investigative purpose"); Peters, 453 Mass. 
at 820 (warrantless search of dwelling was unconstitutional 
after protective sweep eliminated objectively reasonable basis 
to believe that emergency existed). 
 
After completing a protective sweep, however, if officers 
continue to have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that 
an emergency exists, a subsequent sweep that is limited to the 
scope of the emergency may be justified.  See Entwistle, 463 
Mass. at 215-219 (two instances of law enforcement entry coupled 
with protective sweeps were justified under emergency aid 
 
 
16 
exception, because each was supported by objectively reasonable 
bases to believe that emergency existed, and officers' conduct 
during each sweep was reasonably limited to scope of emergency 
at hand); Peters, 453 Mass. at 825 ("We do not declare a 'one 
sweep rule'" . . .). 
 
Undoubtedly, when officers have an objectively reasonable 
basis to believe that an emergency exists, and they reasonably 
circumscribe the scope of their conduct after entry, "[e]vidence 
observed in plain view may be seized," Peters, 453 Mass. at 823, 
provided that the officers "have not violated the Fourth 
Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of 
the evidence is made," King, 563 U.S. at 463; the "incriminating 
character" of the evidence is "immediately apparent" (citation 
omitted), Kaeppeler, 473 Mass. at 405; and the evidence actually 
is in plain view.  See, e.g., Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324-325, 328 
("a truly cursory inspection -- one that involves merely looking 
at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it -- is 
not a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes," but disturbing or 
moving objects in plain view constitutes "a 'search'" for which 
warrant is required); Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 217 (observation 
of content of printed bill fell within scope of emergency aid 
exception where "[t]he officer did not open a bill still in its 
envelope or search for it in a file or drawer; he merely read 
 
 
17 
what was in plain view from an already opened bill that lay on 
the kitchen table"). 
 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the search at 
issue. 
 
iii.  Initial search of unit 5A and basement.  The 
defendant maintains that the officers who entered unit 5A and 
the basement without a warrant lacked objectively reasonable 
grounds to believe that an emergency existed.  The Commonwealth, 
for its part, acknowledges an "absence of precedent" justifying 
the officers' warrantless entry under the emergency aid 
doctrine. 
 
As the motion judge noted, the "Commonwealth's claim that 
the officers had reason for concern that an armed man was 
present inside the apartment building is not completely without 
merit."  "[P]olice need not wait for screams from within in 
order to fear for the safety of occupants or themselves."  
United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 841 (2003).  Entry into unit 5A pursuant to the 
emergency aid exception, however, required an objectively 
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed.  See, 
e.g., Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47; Tuschall, 476 Mass. at 585.  The 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the entry into 
unit 5A did not support such a basis. 
 
 
18 
 
When the officers arrived at the scene in response to the 
911 call, they saw and heard no signs of disturbance, and 
detected no signs of forced entry.  To the contrary, they 
observed that the doors to the building, and to unit 5A, were 
closed and intact.  Moreover, when Simard spoke with the 
911 caller, she said that the men had entered the building 
"easily," because they likely had a key.  The officers 
interviewed residents of unit 7A and learned that the residents, 
too, had seen and heard nothing suspicious or out of the 
ordinary.  No one else informed the officers of any commotion, 
noises, or sounds coming from unit 5A.  As the motion judge 
found, the officers had no knowledge of any residents or victims 
inside unit 5A, and the only residents of any unit the officers 
knew were present were the unharmed residents of unit 7A. 
 
The fact that Diaz was observed at the back of the building 
does not transform the situation into an emergency.  There was 
no indication that he was injured, in need of emergency 
assistance, armed, or about to harm others, or that he had 
harmed others. 
 
Regardless of whether the officers had sincerely held 
beliefs as to the existence of an armed home invasion or hostage 
situation, their subjective beliefs at the scene cannot justify 
a search under the emergency aid exception.  See, e.g., Stuart, 
547 U.S. at 404; Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 214.  The totality of 
 
 
19 
the circumstances at the time of entry here did not establish a 
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed in 
unit 5A.13  See Tuschall, 476 Mass. at 585-587.  Therefore, the 
warrantless search was not justified under the emergency aid 
exception. 
 
Our analysis does not end there, however.  We turn to 
consider whether the entry was justified for some other reason, 
i.e., under the probable cause and exigent circumstances 
exception. 
 
b.  Probable cause and exigent circumstances exception.  
The judge concluded that, under the exigent circumstances 
doctrine, the facts confronting the officers did not establish 
the existence of an exigency, or probable cause of an armed home 
invasion or hostage situation in progress. 
 
Pursuant to both art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment, the 
exigent circumstances doctrine establishes another "well-
recognized," King, 563 U.S. at 460, yet "narrow" exception to 
the warrant requirement, see Tyree, 455 Mass. at 691.  See also 
                     
 
13 As to the second prong of the emergency aid exception, 
the reasonableness of the scope of the search, the judge found 
that "credible evidence showed that the police conducted only a 
limited protective sweep."  The defendant argues, however, that 
the search of the basement was unreasonable, as the officers had 
found no sign of an emergency in unit 5A.  Because the officers 
lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency existed anywhere in the building, a protective sweep 
was unjustifiable under the emergency aid doctrine, regardless 
of the scope of that sweep. 
 
 
20 
Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981) ("Exigencies 
which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow 
category and must be established by the Commonwealth . . ."); 
Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800 (1975) ("the standards 
as to exigency are strict"). 
 
"In the absence of a warrant, two conditions must be met in 
order for a nonconsensual entry to be valid" under the exigent 
circumstances doctrine:  (1) "there must be probable cause" and 
(2) "there must be exigent circumstances."  Commonwealth v. 
DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 619 (2003).  See Figueroa, 468 Mass. 
at 211-212.  In this way, "[t]he exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement may be more appropriately denominated 
the exception for probable cause and exigent circumstances" 
(emphasis in original).  J.A. Grasso, Jr. & C.M. McEvoy, 
Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 14-1[a] (2017).  
See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) 
("police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus 
exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a 
home").  Put differently, when probable cause exists to believe 
that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or will occur 
imminently, warrantless entry is justified only if exigent 
circumstances also are present.  See Figueroa, supra at 213.  
Conversely, without probable cause, the existence of an exigency 
 
 
21 
is insufficient to permit warrantless entry into a dwelling.  
See id. 
 
The Commonwealth "bears the burden of proof" to establish 
that a warrantless search was proper.  See Young, 382 Mass. at 
456.  See also Tyree, 455 Mass. at 684 ("Given the high value 
that our Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions assign to the 
warrant requirement, particularly in relation to a dwelling, we 
impose a heavy burden on the Commonwealth to justify every 
warrantless search:  in the absence of consent, the Commonwealth 
must prove both probable cause to enter the dwelling and the 
existence of exigent circumstances" [footnote omitted]). 
 
When entry is lawful under the exigent circumstances 
doctrine, "the police, in accordance with the rule of 'plain 
view,' [may] take into their possession material having apparent 
evidential connection to the criminal activity they were in 
course of investigating" (footnote omitted).  Young, 382 Mass. 
at 458.  See, e.g., King, 563 U.S. at 463 ("[i]t is . . . an 
essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the 
evidence could be plainly viewed" [citation omitted]); Forde, 
367 Mass. at 807 ("the police had no legal justification for 
being present in the apartment and [therefore] cannot rely on 
 
 
22 
the 'plain view' doctrine for a warrantless seizure of 
contraband"). 
 
We begin with the question of exigency. 
 
i.  Exigency.  A warrantless entry is justified only if, in 
addition to the existence of probable cause, exigent 
circumstances are present.  See Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 213.  See 
also King, 563 U.S. at 470 ("Any warrantless entry based on 
exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine 
exigency").  "[A]bsent exigent circumstances, the firm line at 
the entrance to the house . . . may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant" (quotations and citation omitted).  See Kirk, 
536 U.S. at 635. 
 
For exigent circumstances to exist, officers must have 
"reasonable grounds to believe that obtaining a warrant would be 
impracticable under the circumstances."  Figueroa, 468 Mass. 
at 213.  Impracticability arises in the context of the exigent 
circumstances doctrine when the delay caused by obtaining a 
warrant would create "a significant risk" that "the suspect may 
flee," "evidence may be destroyed," or "the safety of the police 
or others may be endangered."  Id.  See Tyree, 455 Mass. at 685-
691. 
 
"In determining whether a warrantless search falls within 
the narrow exception of exigent circumstances, we consider 'the 
circumstances in their totality' . . ." (citation omitted). 
 
 
23 
Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 212.  See King, 563 U.S. at 464.  We 
review those circumstances objectively.  See Young, 382 Mass. at 
456.  Thus, "whether an exigency existed" is a matter "to be 
evaluated in relation to the scene as it could appear to the 
officers at the time," not as the scene might appear in 
hindsight.  Id.  See Figueroa, supra; DeJesus, 439 Mass. at 620 
n.3.  The subjective beliefs or motives of an officer form no 
part of this inquiry.  See King, supra.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 485 (2007). 
 
In the circumstances here, for the same reasons that the 
officers lacked objectively reasonable grounds to believe that 
residents of unit 5A were in danger, pursuant to the emergency 
aid doctrine, the officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe 
that they or others were at risk of imminent harm, pursuant to 
the exigent circumstances doctrine.  See Figueroa, 468 Mass. 
at 213.  At the scene, officers encountered no indications of 
violence or forced entry.  They were unaware of any resident or 
victim inside unit 5A.  Indeed, the only residents known to 
officers, those of unit 7A, were unharmed, and had neither seen 
nor heard anything suspicious.  In addition, when Diaz was seen 
at the rear of the building, there was no indication that he, 
the police, or anyone else was at risk of imminent injury.  We 
therefore agree with the motion judge that there was "nothing 
 
 
24 
indicative of an imminent threat of danger to persons inside the 
building or to the officers." 
 
In addition, because the building was surrounded by 
officers, there was little risk of a suspect's flight from 
within.  See Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 213.  Further, the record 
provides no basis for officers to have believed that evidence of 
an armed home invasion or hostage situation was at risk of 
destruction.  See id. at 214. 
 
The investigation of a crime, even a serious crime such as 
an armed home invasion, does not itself establish an exigency.  
See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 ("We decline to hold that the 
seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates 
exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth 
Amendment justify a warrantless search"); id. at 393 ("If the 
warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not 
the warrantless search of the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a 
burglary?  No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment 
suggests any point of rational limitation of such a doctrine" 
[quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
Because officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe that 
an exigency existed in unit 5A, the warrantless search was 
impermissible.  See DeJesus, 439 Mass. at 620.  Even had the 
officers reasonably believed that an exigency existed, for the 
warrantless entry to be permissible, there also had to be 
 
 
25 
probable cause that a crime was being committed inside the 
building. 
 
ii.  Probable cause.  To justify an entry into a dwelling 
pursuant to the exigent circumstances doctrine, the Commonwealth 
must demonstrate the existence of probable cause.  See Tyree, 
455 Mass. at 684.  "[P]robable cause exists where . . . the 
facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police are 
enough to warrant a prudent person in believing that [an] 
individual . . . has committed or was committing an offense" 
(citation omitted).  Washington, 449 Mass. at 481.  Accordingly, 
"an objective test is used to determine whether probable cause 
exists."  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 629 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Franco, 419 Mass. 635, 639 (1995). 
 
"In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with 
probabilities.  These are not technical; they are . . . 
practical considerations of everyday life, on which reasonable 
and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act."  Commonwealth 
v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 283 (2017), quoting Jewett, 471 
Mass. at 629.  "Probable cause does not require . . . that 
police [have] resolved all their doubts."  Cartright, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 90 (1994).  
Rather, probable cause "requires more than mere suspicion but 
something less than evidence [that would be] sufficient to 
 
 
26 
[sustain] a conviction."  Cartright, supra, quoting Jewett, 
supra. 
 
A.  Informant's tip.  Where, as here, police seek to 
establish probable cause based on an informant's tip, they must 
show, pursuant to the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test, both that 
the tip is grounded in a basis of knowledge, and that it is 
reliable.  See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 375 (1985).  
See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 438 
Mass. 372, 374 (2003).  With respect to informant tips, "the 
test for determining probable cause is stricter under art. 14 
. . . than under the Fourth Amendment."  Upton, supra at 364. 
 
In accordance with the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the 
Commonwealth first must establish the basis of knowledge 
underlying an informant's tip.  See Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 
374; Upton, 394 Mass. at 375.  In general, the basis of 
knowledge prong is satisfied where the information provided 
springs from an informant's firsthand observations or knowledge.  
See Alfonso A., supra.  In addition, where an informant's tip is 
sufficiently detailed, a reviewing court reasonably may infer 
that the informant had a direct basis of knowledge.  Id. at 374-
375. 
 
If an informant's basis of knowledge is established, to 
justify the warrantless entry, the Commonwealth then must 
 
 
27 
demonstrate that the tip was credible.  See Alfonso A., 438 
Mass. at 375; Upton, 394 Mass. at 375.  Although a 911 caller's 
telephone number may be visible to, or determinable by, the 911 
operator, under art. 14, that alone does not demonstrate 
sufficiently the reliability of a tip.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Depiero, 473 Mass. 450, 454-455 (2016) (in context of 
reasonable suspicion, where showing "less rigorous" than 
probable cause is permissible, this court was "not 
inclined . . . to attribute veracity to all 911 callers").  
Rather, "[w]hen assessing the reliability of [private 
individuals] who report apparent violations of the law, we 
accord more weight to the reliability of those who are 
identified . . . by name and address," because they are not 
protected "from the consequences of prevarication that anonymity 
would afford, and consequently may be subject to charges of 
filing false reports and risk retaliation" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 628-629 (2011).  See 
Depiero, supra at 455 ("The veracity test is more difficult for 
the Commonwealth to satisfy where . . . the caller was 
anonymous.  Because the caller was anonymous, there could be no 
evidence regarding the caller's past reliability or reputation 
for honesty" [citation omitted]). 
 
At the same time, "[i]t is important to recognize that 
[private individuals] who report criminal activity justifiably 
 
 
28 
may be concerned for their own safety if their identity becomes 
known to the persons subsequently investigated or arrested, and 
for this reason may wish to remain anonymous."  Cavitt, 460 
Mass. at 629.  Such circumstances "should not stand as an 
insurmountable impediment to a favorable assessment of [the 
informant's] reliability" (citation omitted).  Id.  Therefore, 
an unidentified informant who nonetheless is "identifiable" by 
officers, see id., and who is aware that officers are able to 
identify him or her may receive greater credence than a fully 
anonymous informant.  See, e.g., Depiero, 473 Mass. at 455 
("even if the police are able to recover the telephone number 
and identity of 911 callers, it proves absolutely nothing unless 
. . . the anonymous caller was aware of that fact.  It is the 
tipster's belief in anonymity, not its reality, that will 
control his [or her] behavior" [emphasis in original; quotation 
and citation omitted]). 
 
In addition, the reliability of a tip may be adduced from 
the extent to which an informant provides factual details.  See 
Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 375 ("it is especially important that 
the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient 
detail that the [court] may know that [it] is relying on 
something more substantial than a casual rumor . . . or an 
accusation" [citation omitted]).  See also Depiero, 473 Mass. 
at 457 ("details provide a level of corroboration beyond that of 
 
 
29 
'innocent' or easily obtainable facts"); Alfonso A., supra 
at 376 ("While . . . detail, by itself, does not ordinarily 
suffice to establish reliability, . . . it remains a factor in 
the over-all assessment of the informant's reliability"). 
 
Each prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test "must be separately 
considered and satisfied or supplemented in some way."  Upton, 
394 Mass. at 375.  If an informant's tip fails to satisfy both 
prongs, other corroborating evidence, such as independent police 
corroboration, may be able to "make up for deficiencies in 
either or both prongs."  Id. at 376. 
 
B.  Analysis.  Our inquiry into the issue of probable cause 
begins with the 911 call.  We are satisfied that the judge's 
subsidiary findings are substantiated by the record.  Although 
this case presents a close question of probable cause, we 
conclude, as the judge found, that the circumstances confronting 
the officers at the scene did not corroborate the caller's tip. 
 
As to the basis of knowledge prong, we note that the 
911 caller informed the Lawrence police dispatcher that she saw 
two men "going up to the building" located at the specified 
address, and that she heard one of the men load the gun before 
he and his companion entered the building.  Thus, the basis of 
the 911 caller's firsthand knowledge was apparent from the 
initial tip itself. 
 
 
30 
 
Of course, carrying a firearm is not itself a crime in the 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 423 Mass. 
266, 269 (1996).  But loading a handgun in public prior to 
entering a residential building does raise valid concerns about 
the possibility of imminent criminal conduct.  See Commonwealth 
v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 793-794 (2003) (under less stringent 
standard for reasonable suspicion, as compared to standard for 
probable cause, "the act of publicly loading a handgun is an 
event that creates a reasonable suspicion that a crime may be 
about to take place").  Thus, the 911 caller claimed to have 
seen and heard what could have been criminal activity. 
 
The more difficult question, however, is whether the 
officers had an adequate basis to conclude that the 911 caller's 
tip was reliable.  In this regard, the caller provided details 
adverse to a determination of probable cause.  She commented 
that the men talked calmly before entering the building, which 
they entered "easily" because they likely had a key.  In 
addition, although she said that she had never seen the men 
before, she acknowledged that she was new to the neighborhood 
and was unsure of what the men were doing.  The caller also 
provided details that, due to their conflicting nature, 
undermined her reliability.  She initially said that two men 
entered the building, but later told Simard that three men had 
entered the building.  Of course, the details provided by the 
 
 
31 
caller constitute an important aspect of our assessment of her 
reliability.  See Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 376.  Those details 
undercut the reliability of her tip. 
 
Despite remaining unnamed, however, the 911 caller did give 
the dispatcher her home address.  She therefore was aware that 
officers could identify her.  See Depiero, 473 Mass. at 455.  In 
addition, police had the ability to trace the 911 call to the 
caller's telephone number.  Indeed, the dispatcher informed the 
caller that her telephone was associated with an address in 
Boston.  And Simard ultimately spoke with the caller by 
telephone to discuss her observations.  The 911 caller was 
therefore aware that another important component of her identity 
was known to officers.  We note, however, that "knowledge of the 
informant's 'identity' and 'whereabouts,'" are generally 
"not . . . adequate standing alone to confirm the informant's 
reliability."  See Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 376. 
 
As indicated, either prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test may 
be supplemented by corroborating evidence.  See, e.g., Upton, 
394 Mass. at 375.  See also Depiero, 473 Mass. at 456 ("the 
Commonwealth can . . . establish a caller's reliability through 
independent corroboration by police observation or investigation 
of the details of the information provided by the caller" 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  Because the details of the 
911 caller's tip undermined her reliability, the establishment 
 
 
32 
of probable cause required independent corroboration.  Here, 
however, the officers discovered no corroborating evidence of 
criminal conduct; when they did not, the absence of probable 
cause became clear. 
 
As discussed supra, Simard knew that the residents of 
unit 7A were unaware of any suspicious activity in unit 5A.  
Moreover, he was aware that the men who entered the building did 
so "easily," and that this was most likely because they had a 
key.  No witness said that there had been any sound or sign of 
trouble in unit 5A; and no officer observed any sound or sign of 
struggle, violence, forced entry, or damaged property.  We agree 
with the motion judge that "nothing . . . indicated that the men 
who entered" the building "did not reside there." 
 
The judge also found that Diaz, who had facial hair and 
left the building dressed in a gray and black sweater, did not 
match the 911 caller's "very general descriptions of two 
Hispanic men" who had entered the building, one of whom wore a 
gray jacket and the other of whom wore a black jacket, and 
neither of whom had facial hair.  See Commonwealth v. Warren, 
475 Mass. 530, 535-536 (2016) ("general description of the 
perpetrator and his accomplices" as "two black males 
wearing . . . 'dark clothing,' and one black male wearing a 'red 
hoodie'" made it unreasonable for police "to target the 
defendant or any other black male wearing dark clothing as a 
 
 
33 
suspect").  Except for Diaz's gender and ethnicity, he did not 
match the 911 caller's general description of the men who had 
entered the multiunit apartment building earlier that evening.  
Moreover, while the Commonwealth characterizes Diaz's retreat 
into the building as evidence of guilt, "evasive conduct in the 
absence of any other information," id. at 538, is insufficient 
to support probable cause. 
 
We acknowledge that this case presents a difficult question 
of probable cause, and that officers are at times required to 
make split-second decisions to avert violence.  The racking of a 
firearm in public prior to entering a residential building is 
indeed a troubling suggestion of possible violent activity.  In 
the circumstances here, however, given the absence of 
independent corroborating evidence, the reliability of the 911 
caller's testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause 
under art. 14. 
Order allowing motion to 
  suppress affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that "the 
warrantless search was not justified under the emergency aid 
exception."  Ante at   .  I also agree that the search was not 
justified under the probable cause and exigent circumstances 
exception "[b]ecause officers lacked a reasonable basis to 
believe that an exigency existed in unit 5A."  Id. at    .  But 
unlike the court, I am convinced that the officers had probable 
cause to enter the apartment. 
 
"Reasonableness must be evaluated in relation to the scene 
as it could appear to the officers at the time, not as it may 
seem to a scholar after the event with the benefit of leisured 
retrospective analysis" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Kaeppeler, 473 Mass. 396, 402-403 (2015), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 425-426 (2009).  When police act on 
information from a private citizen, "the Commonwealth must show 
the basis of knowledge of the source of the information (the 
basis of knowledge test) and the underlying circumstances 
demonstrating that the source of the information was credible or 
the information reliable (veracity test)."  Commonwealth v. 
Depiero, 473 Mass. 450, 454 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 622, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012). 
 
Here, the court concedes that "the basis of the 911 
caller's firsthand knowledge was apparent from the initial tip 
itself."  Ante at    .  However, the court then concludes that 
2 
 
 
the caller's veracity has not been established.  Id. at     .  I 
disagree. 
 
The court acknowledges that the caller "was aware that 
officers could identify her" and that Sergeant Michael Simard of 
the Lawrence police department "ultimately spoke with the caller 
by telephone to discuss her observations."  Ante at    .  It 
then concludes that "'knowledge of the informant's "identity" 
and "whereabouts,"' are generally 'not . . . adequate standing 
alone to confirm the informant's reliability.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 438 Mass. 372, 376 (2003).  But this 
is not a situation in which the police merely knew the 
informant's identity.  Nor is it a situation in which the 
informant knew theoretically that the police had the ability to 
contact her by telephone.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 
510, 517 (2007) (reliability of caller who knew "that her call 
was being recorded, and that the number she was calling from had 
been identified, . . . should have been accorded greater weight 
than that of an anonymous informant").  Here, police did contact 
the informant by telephone, and the informant responded by 
continuing to cooperate and by providing significant additional 
information.  The caller also used a technical term, "racking," 
to describe what she heard, and she explained that she was 
familiar with the sound because of personal experience.  See 
3 
 
 
Alfonso A., supra (use of detail "remains a factor in the over-
all assessment of the informant's reliability").1 
 
This reliable informant told police that she had observed 
two men with a gun enter a building at a specified address, and 
she claimed to have heard one of the men load a gun.2  It is 
unusual for an individual to load a gun on the threshold of a 
private residence.  To do so in broad daylight accompanied by 
another individual only increases the unlikeliness that the 
firearm was being loaded for innocent purposes.  As the court 
correctly observes, "loading a handgun in public prior to 
entering a residential building . . . raise[s] valid concerns 
                     
 
1 I assume for purposes of my analysis, as does the court, 
that the conversation Sergeant Michael Simard of the Lawrence 
police department had with the caller took place before the 
officers entered the apartment.  A recording with which we were 
provided, but to which the motion judge did not have access, 
suggests that this conversation might have occurred after the 
warrantless entry.  See ante at note 5. 
 
 
2 The court states that, "[a]ccording to Simard, the caller 
did not see a firearm."  Ante at    .  But according to the 
motion judge's factual findings, which we must accept unless 
clearly erroneous, "[t]he caller reported that while coming down 
her street she observed 'two guys with a gun' at 7 Royal 
Street."  That finding was not clearly erroneous.  Although 
Simard testified that the caller never said she had observed a 
gun, Sergeant Joseph Cerullo of the Lawrence police department 
testified that the caller did say she had observed a gun.  The 
motion judge was free to credit Cerullo's testimony over that of 
Simard.  Moreover, the 911 recording, which was played in open 
court, confirms that the caller said, "I seen two guys with a 
gun." 
4 
 
 
about the possibility of imminent criminal conduct."  Ante 
at    . 
 
In addition to having reliable information from the caller 
that a gun was being loaded in public, the police also knew 
about an ongoing investigation into home invasions in Lawrence.  
And when they reached the address that the caller named, a man 
emerged from the building, only to retreat inside when an 
officer with a drawn gun told him to show his hands.  The police 
tried to open the door that the man had reentered, but it was 
locked.  There are many reasons why an individual might flee in 
the presence of the police.  See Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 
Mass. 530, 540 (2016) (observing that black male, "when 
approached by the police, might just as easily be motivated by 
the desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially 
profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity").  
Nonetheless, it would seem to be an unusual occurrence when a 
person who is told by a police officer with a drawn weapon to 
show his hands ignores the command and reenters a residence, 
locking the door behind him.  The fleeing man here, combined 
with the tip that a gun was being loaded in public and the 
knowledge of prior home invasions, gave the police probable 
cause.3 
                     
 
3 That the caller believed the men had a key to the premises 
does not alter my conclusion.  It is not unusual for a crime in 
5 
 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
                     
a home to be perpetrated by individuals who know the victims or 
have a means peaceably to enter the premises.  See Commonwealth 
v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 629 (2013) (defendant entered 
residence with key); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 285 
(2011) (same).  See also Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 
113, 114, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018) (defendant, who 
had previously bought drugs from resident, entered when resident 
opened door for him); Commonwealth v. Doucette, 430 Mass. 461, 
462-463 (1999) (defendant, who had been resident's friend, 
entered through unlocked door).