Title: State v. Kassabian
Citation: 243 P.2d 264
Docket Number: 3649
State: Nevada
Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 1952

243 P.2d 264 (1952) STATE v. KASSABIAN. No. 3649. Supreme Court of Nevada. April 28, 1952. Ralli, Rudiak &amp; Horsey, of Las Vegas, for appellant. W. T. Mathews, Attorney General; John C. Mowbray, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County; and Robert E. Jones, of counsel on brief, for respondent. MERRILL, Justice. On November 22, 1950, defendant Kassabian, following jury trial, was adjudged guilty of the crime of attempt to produce a miscarriage, commonly known as the crime of abortion. From that judgment and from order of the trial court denying new trial he has appealed. The matter with which we are here concerned is an assignment of misconduct on the part of counsel. The woman upon whom the offense was alleged to have been committed (whom we shall call Patricia) was at the time of the alleged offense 16 years of age. Defendant was a duly licensed physician and surgeon, whose specialty was the treatment of venereal disease. He admitted treating her. He asserted, however, that his examination of Patricia *265 disclosed that she was not pregnant but was suffering from venereal disease and from retroflexion of the uterus and that it was for those matters that he treated her. Defendant's principal contention upon this appeal is that there was not, as a matter of law, sufficient corroboration of Patricia's testimony under the requirement of sec. 10975, N.C.L. 1929, that "the defendant shall not be convicted upon the testimony of the woman upon * * * whom the offense shall have been committed unless she is corroborated by other evidence." In this regard defendant contends that such corroboration as was presented, when taken by itself and without recourse to Patricia's testimony, is as consistent with defendant's story as with Patricia's. It must be conceded that the corroborative evidence is circumstantial and may, if one accepts the defendant's theory of the case, be considered as consistent with his story. Whether it was as consistent with innocence as with guilt was for the jury to consider. Their task in reaching the truth as to the actions of the defendant in the privacy of his office was not, therefore, an easy one and demanded a dispassionate, careful and analytical examination and weighing of all of the evidence. Further adding to its problems, this was a case in which the jury might most naturally succumb to influences of sympathy, passion or prejudice. In close cases of this character where counsel's argument to the jury by virtue of the uncertain state of the evidence is magnified in importance, the importance of avoiding the misleading of the jury and of avoiding undue appeals to sympathy, passion and prejudice are likewise magnified. Unfortunately it is likewise true that it is in just such cases that a prosecuting attorney with a sincere conviction of the guilt of the defendant may most easily and understandably commit misconduct. However, as stated in State v. Rodriguez, 31 Nev. 342, 347; 102 P. 863, 865: The closing argument to the jury by the prosecuting attorney, with which we are here concerned, may without exaggeration be characterized as inflammatory. All of the natural appeals to sympathy which the case presented were constantly emphasized. These facts are stated merely to provide background for the actions assigned as misconduct, against which background the extent of prejudice resulting from such actions may more clearly appear. In 53 Am.Jur. 386, (Trial, sec. 480), it is stated: In the course of cross-examination of the defendant by the prosecuting attorney we find the following: *266 The defendant thus testified: First, that he did not employ a nurse; Second, that it was not the usual custom among doctors to have someone present while they examined a woman. No attempt was made to dispute this testimony upon either point and it remains uncontradicted in the record. If, in fact, the usual custom was otherwise it would have been an extremely simple matter to establish. Two other doctors gave testimony but neither was examined upon this point. In the course of his closing argument to the jury the prosecuting attorney made the following statement: Objection was promptly made and argued by counsel for defendant and the record continues: Under the court's ruling relative to these comments we find the prosecuting attorney encouraged to continue in the same vein. Relative to corroboration, itself one of the closest and most difficult determinations for the jury, the argument was made, Again it was argued: And again relating to the lack of an eyewitness: In both State v. Rodriguez, supra, and State v. Cyty, 50 Nev. 256, 256 P. 793, 52 A.L.R. 1015, this court reversed for misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in argument to the jury. In both cases the misconduct involved statements of fact beyond the scope of the record. In the instant case the prosecuting attorney introduced into his argument a statement of fact not only unsupported by the record but flatly contrary to the evidence before the jury: the statement that ordinarily doctors have a nurse present to witness such treatments. This was presented as an assertion of fact and not of belief or opinion and was clearly improper. Here, too, the objection to the statement and to inferences drawn therefrom was not sustained and the jury admonished as in the Rodriguez case. (See also: State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 108 P. 934.) The trial court here upheld the prosecuting attorney in his comments and conclusions. While correctly stating the record in one respect the judge still demonstrated a wholly understandable lack of recollection *267 as to the precise state of the record. The jury was thus inadvertently further assisted if not directed into an erroneous conception of the state of the evidence before it. The state attempts to justify the statement of counsel upon the basis that it is supported by common knowledge and common sense. Even accepting the statement as having some basis in fact, it can hardly be said to be common knowledge. Any knowledge upon the subject possessed by any one individual is more likely to be based upon her personal knowledge as to the practice of a single doctor than upon a general knowledge as to the practice of the medical profession as a whole. The experience by which such knowledge is gained is not an experience generally common to all mankind; nor is it an experience which, when had, is commonly shared. On the contrary, it is an experience private in the extreme. We must, accordingly, reject the state's contention. From this statement of a fact which the record denies, the prosecuting attorney then proceeds to draw the inference that the failure by the defendant to follow the "customary medical practice" implies that his unwitnessed actions were improper. Even accepting the customary medical practice as having been established, such an inference cannot be allowed. Accept that it is wise and prudent for a doctor to protect himself against unwarranted charges of improper conduct. Accept that it is common practice to take such protective measures. Can the failure of a doctor so to protect himself with a witness be made to constitute affirmative evidence of impropriety? Are doctors thus to be presumed guilty of impropriety unless they can, by positive proof of an eyewitness, establish the contrary? This indeed would violate a most fundamental principle of justice. Should a doctor employ a nurse and for no apparent reason deliberately exclude her from customary participation in an examination, the situation might well be a different one. Some inference of impropriety might well be drawn depending not upon common knowledge or common medical practice but upon the practice in that office and the particular circumstances of the case. In the instant case, regardless of whether the customary medical practice might be as the state contends, the defendant positively stated that it was not the practice in his office. Thus the inference of impropriety, even if generally proper, has in this case been dispelled by undisputed testimony that defendant did not employ a nurse and that his reason was that his practice was not big enough. Certainly it cannot be said that common knowledge or common sense will controvert this testimony. On the contrary it appeals to us as common sense that there may well be struggling medical practitioners unable to afford the services of an office nurse. Clearly the inference of impropriety on the part of the defendant was not justified under the state of the record. Yet, in the prosecuting attorney's final comment with reference to the matter, the inference superimposed upon the original factual statement is extended still further and emerges as a clear implication that the defendant did employ a nurse but deliberately excluded her on the occasions in question. This implication arises from a statement also made as one of fact and not qualified as opinion or belief: a statement of fact which, if true, might well justify an inference of impropriety and support the state's contention that it contributed to the required corroboration. The prosecuting attorney by one improper step after another has lifted himself by his bootstraps to a point where the jury, if it accepted his argument without self-admonition, must have believed the absence of a nurse to be highly incriminating; to be direct corroboration of Patricia's testimony upon the crucial fact at issue; to be corroboration, moreover, inconsistent with any theory of innocence. We cannot but regard the comments of the prosecuting attorney as misconduct highly prejudicial in character. It must follow that it was reversible error to permit them to be made. Reversed and remanded for new trial. BADT, C.J., and EATHER, J., concur.