Title: Etherington v. State
Citation: 144 N.E.2d 717, 237 Ind. 251
Docket Number: 29,415
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 1957

237 Ind. 251 (1957)
144 N.E.2d 717
ETHERINGTON
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,415.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 24, 1957.
*252 Joseph A. Noel, Jump, Noel &amp; Lacey and Robert J. Kinsey (of counsel), all of Kokomo, for appellants.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Owen S. Boling and Merl M. Wall, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
LANDIS, J.
Appellant was charged with reckless homicide. After a jury trial he was convicted, his fine fixed at $500.00, and his imprisonment, 180 days at the penal farm. He appeals from the judgment rendered on the verdict.
Appellant's only contention of error on this appeal according to his brief is that the trial court erred in overruling the motion to quash, alleging the affidavit does not state the offense with sufficient certainty.
The affidavit charging reckless homicide is as follows (Tr. p. 9, l. 28 to Tr. p. 11, l. 1.):
The statute defining reckless homicide and containing pertinent provisions as to the offense upon which the affidavit was based is as follows:
Appellant contends the affidavit is for the most part drafted in the statutory language and contains allegations only by way of conclusion and vague generality, and that it is impossible to determine what acts of appellant are relied on as constituting reckless disregard of the safety of others and what acts are claimed to have been the proximate cause of the death of decedent.
It is apparent that the affidavit charging reckless homicide in this case is not one to be held out as a model of grammatical construction or a gem of literary excellence. A more concise and clear-cut statement of the charge could doubtless have been made, but it is well settled that ungrammatical, or awkwardly constructed sentences will not destroy an affidavit where the meaning is plain. See: Ellis v. The State (1895), 141 Ind. 357, 40 N.E. 801.
Appellant's contention that the affidavit is insufficient in being drafted in the statutory language and only containing allegations of conclusion and vague generality is not borne out by an examination of the affidavit.
*255 The affidavit, after charging appellant with driving an automobile with reckless disregard for the safety of decedent and the public, and at such an unreasonably high rate of speed under the circumstances as to endanger the safety of others and in a manner heedless of probable injury to the safety of others, avers specifically that appellant drove said vehicle on Center Road while racing with another vehicle at a high, dangerous and reckless rate of speed during the night time and without restricting his speed as necessary to avoid colliding with vehicles traveling on U.S. Highway 35 and by disregarding a stop sign at such intersection and by colliding with a car traveling on said U.S. Highway 35 carrying decedent. (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant suggests the term "racing" in the affidavit could refer to accelerating the vehicle's motor while the gears were disengaged. However, the language in the affidavit plainly states appellant drove "said vehicle on Center Road while racing with another vehicle at a high, dangerous ... rate of speed." This phraseology does not reasonably admit of the construction that appellant in racing another vehicle was only "racing his motor."
Appellant says that disregarding a stop sign is not equivalent to alleging a failure to stop. We disagree. The verb "disregard" is defined as meaning "to pay no regard or respect to"[1] and it is difficult to conceive of how else one would pay no regard or respect to a stop sign except by failing to stop.
Appellant next contends the affidavit fails to allege the death of a human being was the proximate result of acts committed by appellant.
*256 The affidavit in charging that appellant "did then and there cause the death of" decedent by "driving into and against with great force and violence another motor vehicle" in which decedent was "then and there a passenger" sufficiently alleges facts indicating appellant's driving was the proximate cause of the death.
Nor are we able to conclude from an examination of the affidavit and appellant's several contentions leveled against it that the accused was not apprised of the character and nature of the charge against him. See: Kennedy v. State (1936), 209 Ind. 287, 196 N.E. 316.
Finding no error in the overruling of appellant's motion to quash for insufficient certainty, the judgment is affirmed.
Arterburn, C.J., and Achor, Bobbitt and Emmert, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 144 N.E.2d 717.
[1]  The New Century Dictionary, p. 436.