Title: State v. Guarnero
Citation: 2015 WI 72
Docket Number: 2013AP001754-CR, 2013AP001753-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2015

2015 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1753-CR & 2013AP1754-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Rogelio Guarnero, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 307, 848 N.W.2d 329) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 56 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.)    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Robert J. Eddington, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert 
J. Eddington. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sara 
Lynn Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1753-CR & 2013AP1754-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF2319 & 2012CF4088) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Rogelio Guarnero, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the circuit court's2 
conclusion that Rogelio Guarnero's prior federal RICO3 conspiracy 
conviction served as a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Guarnero, 2014 WI App 56, 354 Wis. 2d 307, 848 
N.W.2d 329. 
2 The Honorable Timothy G. Dugan of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
3 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2005).   
No. 
2013AP1753-CR & 2013AP1754-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 961.41(3g)(c) (2011-12)4 and therefore enhanced the penalty for 
his 
Wisconsin 
cocaine 
possession 
conviction. 
 
Under 
§ 961.41(3g)(c), a court concludes that cocaine possession is a 
second offense when a statute under which the defendant 
previously was convicted relates to controlled substances.  The 
circuit court considered the language of the RICO conspiracy 
statute and Guarnero's RICO indictment to reach its conclusion 
that 
the 
RICO 
conspiracy 
statute 
related 
to 
controlled 
substances and therefore enhanced Guarnero's cocaine possession 
to a second offense under § 961.41(3g)(c).5 
¶2 
Guarnero appealed, contending that the circuit court 
improperly enhanced the penalty for conviction of cocaine 
possession 
due 
to 
his 
prior 
RICO 
conspiracy 
conviction.  
Guarnero also argued that his felony bail-jumping conviction 
should have been a misdemeanor offense because his cocaine 
possession 
conviction 
should 
have 
been 
an 
unenhanced 
misdemeanor.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
concluding that RICO and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) (2005)6 
related to controlled substances.  State v. Guarnero, 2014 WI 
App 56, ¶8, 354 Wis. 2d 307, 848 N.W.2d 329. 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 A second or subsequent offense is a Class I felony.  Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c). 
6 All subsequent references to the United States Code are to 
the 2005 version unless otherwise indicated. 
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3 
 
¶3 
We conclude that Guarnero's prior conviction, due to 
the manner in which Guarnero violated the RICO conspiracy 
statute, 
relates 
to 
controlled 
substances. 
 
Therefore, 
Guarnero's prior RICO conviction enhances the penalty for 
cocaine possession under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) to a second 
offense as a Class I felony.  We further conclude that 
Guarnero's bail-jumping offense is properly a felony conviction.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision that 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Guarnero's motion to 
dismiss and motion for postconviction relief.7 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In 2005, a grand jury issued a 38-count indictment in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, alleging that 49 members of the Milwaukee chapter of 
the Latin Kings violated RICO.  Guarnero was one of the 49 
individuals indicted.  He was personally charged with five of 
the 38 counts:  counts 2, 20, 24, 25 and 26.   
¶5 
Count Two of the indictment alleged that Guarnero and 
others were members or associates of the Latin Kings, a criminal 
racketeering organization that "engaged in acts of violence, 
including murder, attempted murder, robbery, extortion and 
distribution of controlled substances."  Count Two of the 
indictment 
also 
alleged 
that 
Guarnero 
knowingly 
and 
                                                 
7 Guarnero, 354 Wis. 2d 307, ¶¶12, 14. 
No. 
2013AP1753-CR & 2013AP1754-CR   
 
4 
 
intentionally conspired with others to violate 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c): 
[T]o conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, 
in the conduct of the affairs of that enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity involving 
. . . multiple acts involving the distribution of 
controlled substances including cocaine, cocaine base 
in the form of "crack" cocaine and marijuana in 
violation of the laws of the United States[.] 
The indictment continued:  "It was a part of the conspiracy that 
each defendant agreed that a conspirator would commit at least 
two acts of racketeering activity in the conduct of the affairs 
of the enterprise," and that this conduct violated 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(d).  Guarnero was charged with four other counts that 
involved possession of marijuana and firearms.   
¶6 
Guarnero pled guilty to conspiracy of violating RICO 
as set out in Count Two, and the United States dismissed the 
remaining counts of the indictment.  The plea agreement 
contained a section titled "Elements," which stated: 
The parties understand and agree that in order to 
sustain the charge of Conspiracy to Commit RICO as set 
forth in Count Two, the government must prove each of 
the following propositions beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that the defendant knowingly conspired to 
conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs 
of the Milwaukee Latin Kings, an enterprise, through a 
pattern of racketeering activity as described in Count 
Two; 
Second, that the Milwaukee Latin Kings were an 
enterprise; and  
Third, that the activities of the Milwaukee Latin 
Kings would affect interstate commerce. 
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Guarnero's 
plea 
agreement 
acknowledged 
that 
Guarnero 
had 
conspired to commit at least two qualifying criminal acts, but 
the plea agreement did not specify which acts he had committed.  
The plea agreement also contained Guarnero's admission that 
police officers found marijuana in his apartment while they 
executed a firearm search warrant at Guarnero's residence.   
¶7 
In August 2012, Guarnero was arrested for possession 
of cocaine in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c), which 
contains an enhanced penalty provision.  The provision enhances 
the penalty for a cocaine possession conviction to a second or 
subsequent offense if the defendant has previously "been 
convicted of any felony or misdemeanor under this chapter or 
under any statute of the United States or of any state relating 
to controlled substances."  § 961.41(3g)(c).  The complaint 
listed Guarnero's RICO conspiracy conviction, noted that it was 
related to controlled substances, and listed the cocaine 
possession as a felony second or subsequent offense contrary to 
§ 961.41(3g)(c). 
¶8 
Guarnero filed a motion to dismiss the cocaine 
possession charge, arguing that his prior RICO conviction could 
not serve as a prior conviction to enhance the penalty for 
cocaine possession conviction to a second offense under Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c).  The circuit court denied Guarnero's 
motion to dismiss.  The court recognized the many possible bases 
for RICO convictions and concluded that RICO was related to 
controlled substances because of the specific charges in Count 
Two of the indictment.  Guarnero petitioned for leave to take an 
No. 
2013AP1753-CR & 2013AP1754-CR   
 
6 
 
interlocutory appeal of the circuit court's denial of his motion 
to dismiss.  The court of appeals denied leave.8 
¶9 
Subsequently, the circuit court found Guarnero guilty 
of violating Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c).  Guarnero stipulated to 
the facts of his possession of cocaine and his prior RICO 
conspiracy conviction.  Under the § 961.41(3g)(c) enhancement, 
Guarnero's cocaine possession constituted a felony.  The court 
also convicted Guarnero of felony bail jumping, an offense that 
occurred while Guarnero was on bail for the felony cocaine 
possession charge.   
¶10 Guarnero moved for postconviction relief, which the 
circuit court denied.  The circuit court concluded that a "RICO 
conviction can deal with drug-related activity or not be related 
to drugs or drug activity."  The court also noted that "count 
two of the federal indictment related to distribution of 
controlled substances, including cocaine and other drugs." 
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court 
orders.  Guarnero, 354 Wis. 2d 307, ¶¶1, 14.  The court referred 
to Guarnero's guilty plea and held that the RICO conspiracy 
statute related to controlled substances.  Id., ¶12.  The court 
rejected Guarnero's arguments based on the rule of lenity and 
due process.  Id., ¶13.  The court of appeals also affirmed 
Guarnero's conviction for felony bail jumping.  Id., ¶14. 
                                                 
8 At that time, the court of appeals also denied Guarnero's 
motion to consolidate Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case Nos. 
12CF2319 and 12CF4088.  The court of appeals later consolidated 
the cases on August 20, 2013. 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 We review the court of appeals' affirmance of the 
circuit court's denial of Guarnero's motion to dismiss and 
motion for postconviction relief in which Guarnero argued that 
his prior RICO conspiracy conviction was not related to 
controlled substances under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c).  In 
order 
to 
review 
the 
questions 
presented, 
we 
interpret 
§ 961.41(3g)(c).  Statutory interpretation presents a question 
of law that we independently review, while benefitting from the 
discussions of the court of appeals and the circuit court.  
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 
541, 749 N.W.2d 581.   
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶13 Our 
review 
focuses 
on 
whether 
a 
federal 
RICO 
conspiracy conviction is related to controlled substances so 
that it may serve as a prior conviction triggering penalty 
enhancement for a cocaine possession conviction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c).  When we interpret a statute, we "begin[] with 
the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We give statutory language its "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id. 
No. 
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8 
 
¶14 Our focus is on "relating to controlled substances" in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c), 
the 
statute 
that 
prohibits 
possession of cocaine, which provides:  
Cocaine 
and 
cocaine 
base. 
 
If 
a 
person 
possess[es] or attempts to possess cocaine or cocaine 
base, or a controlled substance analog of cocaine or 
cocaine base, the person shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 and may be imprisoned for not more than one 
year in the county jail upon a first conviction and is 
guilty of a Class I felony for a 2nd or subsequent 
offense.  For purposes of this paragraph, an offense 
is considered a 2nd or subsequent offense if, prior to 
the offender's conviction of the offense, the offender 
has at any time been convicted of any felony or 
misdemeanor under this chapter or under any statute of 
the United States or of any state relating to 
controlled substances, controlled substance analogs, 
narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant, stimulant, 
or hallucinogenic drugs. 
¶15 The 
statutory 
phrase, 
"relating 
to 
controlled 
substances," in Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) is undefined.  As the 
words the legislature chose are not technical or specially-
defined, we give them their "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning."  Id., ¶45.   
¶16 In order to determine the common meaning of "relating 
to," we turn to a dictionary definition of "relate."  Id., ¶54 
(referring to the dictionary definition of statutory language 
with a common meaning).  "Relate" is defined as a "connection, 
relation, or reference."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1482 (5th ed. 2011).  We conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) requires that the prior conviction be 
connected to controlled substances if a prior conviction is to 
trigger penalty enhancement under § 961.41(3g)(c).   
No. 
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¶17 Our interpretation of "relating to" is consistent with 
the court of appeals' interpretation of "relating to controlled 
substances" in State v. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 598 N.W.2d 929 
(Ct. App. 1999).9  In Moline, the parties advanced technical 
interpretations 
of 
the 
phrase, 
"relating 
to 
controlled 
substances," that were grounded in punctuation and grammatical 
nuances. 
 
Id. 
at 
41-42. 
 
The 
court 
rejected 
technical 
interpretations in favor of a commonsense reading of "relating 
to" and concluded that Moline's prior conviction for possession 
of drug paraphernalia was "linked" to controlled substances.  
Id. at 42.  We interpret Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) as requiring 
the prior conviction, here RICO conspiracy, to be connected to 
or linked to controlled substances, just as possession of drug 
paraphernalia was in Moline.10   
                                                 
9 In State v. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 41-42, 598 N.W.2d 929 
(Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals interpreted "relating to 
controlled substances" as used in Wis. Stat. § 961.48(3), which 
includes the same penalty enhancement structure as Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c). 
10 After oral argument, we ordered the parties to provide 
supplemental briefs on an issue that Guarnero asserted the State 
raised for the first time at oral argument.  He asserted that at 
oral 
argument 
the 
State 
first 
argued 
that 
"18 
U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(C)" in the RICO judgment of conviction was a 
scrivener's error and the correct statute was 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(C).  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) lists controlled 
substances offenses and penalties.   
(continued) 
No. 
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C.  Application to Federal RICO Conspiracy 
¶18 We next apply our interpretation of "relating to 
controlled 
substances" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c) 
to 
Guarnero's prior conviction for a RICO conspiracy.  Guarnero was 
convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which causes conspiring to 
violate subsections (a), (b), and (c) to be unlawful.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(d). 
 
Each 
subsection, 
(a) 
through 
(c), 
involves 
racketeering activity11 and serves to link RICO conspiracy with 
racketeering 
activities 
that 
could 
involve 
controlled 
substances.12   
¶19 The definition of racketeering activity lists many 
qualifying 
offenses, 
including 
"dealing 
in 
a 
controlled 
substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act)" and "the felonious manufacture, 
                                                                                                                                                             
In supplemental briefing, Guarnero contended that the 
scrivener's 
error 
was 
the 
inclusion 
of 
a 
reference 
to 
§ 841(b)(1)(C), regardless of the chapter number.  Guarnero 
argues that he pled guilty and was convicted of Count Two of the 
federal indictment that included 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), a RICO 
conspiracy 
charge, 
and 
that 
the 
reference 
to 
18 
U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(C) was in error.  However, neither the State's 
reference 
at 
oral 
argument 
nor 
Guarnero's 
discussion 
in 
supplemental briefing affects our approach to the issues 
presented by the parties to this review.   
11 Subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 involve a pattern of 
racketeering activity:  (a) deriving income from racketeering 
activity; (b) acquiring interest in an enterprise through 
racketeering activity; or (c) participating in an enterprise 
through racketeering activity. 
12 Count Two of Guarnero's RICO indictment clarifies that 
Guarnero's conspiracy charge was based on Guarnero conspiring to 
violate 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). 
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importation, 
receiving, 
concealment, 
buying, 
selling, 
or 
otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical 
(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), 
punishable under any law of the United States."  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1)(A) & (D).  RICO conspiracy can be related to 
controlled 
substances 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c) because RICO conspiracy in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) 
is connected to controlled substances through the racketeering 
activity definition, § 1961(1)(A) and (D).   
¶20 However, we determine which racketeering activity 
supports Guarnero's RICO conspiracy conviction, because only 
some of the multiple definitions of racketeering activity in 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1) are linked to controlled substances.  Such a 
determination is necessary to ascertain whether the unlawful 
conduct underlying his prior conviction is related to controlled 
substances.  For example, were we not to consider the unlawful 
conduct that gave rise to the RICO conviction, a defendant 
convicted of RICO conspiracy based on sports bribery could have 
his or her penalty erroneously enhanced under Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c) 
because 
sports 
bribery 
fits 
within 
the 
definition of racketeering activity, but is not related to 
controlled substances.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). 
¶21 When 
the 
statute 
underlying 
a 
prior 
conviction 
presents alternative methods of violating the statute, it is 
appropriate to consult a limited class of documents to determine 
what statutory alternative formed the basis for the defendant's 
prior conviction.  See Descamps v. United States, __ U.S. __, 
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133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013).  In this case, we can glean the 
necessary information from Guarnero's RICO conspiracy plea, 
which incorporates Count Two of his RICO indictment.   
¶22 Guarnero's RICO conspiracy plea shows that he was 
convicted of RICO conspiracy based on racketeering activity 
involving controlled substances.  To explain further, Guarnero's 
plea agreement contained his admission that as a member of the 
Latin Kings he engaged in acts that included the "extortion and 
distribution of controlled substances" because Count Two of the 
indictment is attached to his plea agreement.  Count Two 
provides that, as a member of the Latin Kings, he "engaged in" 
the "distribution of controlled substances."  These documents 
confirm that the method of racketeering activity that underlies 
the RICO conspiracy of which Guarnero was convicted related to 
controlled substances.  Because Guarnero's RICO conspiracy 
conviction was related to controlled substances within the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c), 
the 
penalty 
for 
Guarnero's cocaine possession conviction was properly enhanced.13  
                                                 
13 In a recent Supreme Court opinion, Mellouli v. Lynch, __ 
U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015), the Court discussed whether 
conviction of a state crime is a deportable offense.  Id. at 
1982-83.  Mellouli focused on whether the controlled substance 
that resulted in a state conviction was a controlled substance 
"included in one of five federal schedules."  Id. at 1984.  It 
has no application here, as it does not focus on determining 
which of several statutory alternatives formed the basis for the 
defendant's prior conviction. 
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D.  Sixth Amendment 
¶23 Guarnero also contends that his Sixth Amendment rights 
were violated by the court's examination of more than the 
elements 
of 
his 
RICO 
conviction, 
rather 
than 
a 
jury's 
consideration of the facts underlying his RICO conviction.  
Under the Sixth Amendment, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury."  U.S. Const. amend. VI.   
¶24 The United States Supreme Court has held that "any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  The Court stated that the sole exception 
is the fact of a prior conviction.  Id.  The Court revisited 
this concern in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).  
There, in reviewing a plea, the Court approved use of the 
charging document, plea agreement or transcript of a plea 
colloquy, but only to assess whether Shepard pled to violating 
the statute by a method that permitted the penalty to be 
enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Id. at 25-26.  
The transcript was not to be used "to determine 'what the 
defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual 
basis of the prior plea.'"  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284 
(quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25).  
¶25 In State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 
N.W.2d 780, we considered the effect of Apprendi and Shepard on 
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a circuit court's role in determining whether a prior conviction 
provided the basis for enhancing a defendant's sentence.   
The Shepard decision relaxed the holdings of . . . 
Apprendi . . . so that, when Shepard and Apprendi are 
read together, a trial court judge, rather than a 
jury, is allowed to determine the applicability of a 
defendant's prior conviction for sentence enhancement 
purposes, when the necessary information concerning 
the prior conviction can be readily determined from an 
existing judicial record. 
Id., ¶52.14  In our review of whether Guarnero's prior RICO 
conspiracy conviction applied to enhance his cocaine possession 
conviction, we rely on necessary information from Guarnero's 
existing judicial record, his guilty plea.  Our examination of 
Guarnero's 
guilty 
plea 
did 
not 
violate 
Guarnero's 
Sixth 
Amendment right because it is consistent with the principles 
underlying Apprendi and Shepard as we explained in LaCount.  Id.   
E.  Rule of Lenity 
¶26 Guarnero further asserts that the meaning of the 
phrase, "relating to controlled substances," in Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c) is ambiguous; and accordingly, the rule of 
lenity requires that the ambiguity be resolved in his favor.  
The rule of lenity provides that when doubt exists as to the 
meaning of a criminal statute, "a court should apply the rule of 
lenity and interpret the statute in favor of the accused."  
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  
                                                 
14 Descamps v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 
2288 (2013) confirms our conclusion in State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 
59, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780.  
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Stated otherwise, the rule of lenity is a canon of strict 
construction, 
ensuring 
fair 
warning 
by 
applying 
criminal 
statutes to "conduct clearly covered."  United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); see also United States v. Castleman, 
__ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014) (addressing the need 
for fair warning implicit in the rule of lenity).   
¶27 However, the rule of lenity applies if a "grievous 
ambiguity" remains after a court has determined the statute's 
meaning by considering statutory language, context, structure 
and purpose, such that the court must "simply guess" at the 
meaning of the statute.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1416; see 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46.  Here, applying the rule of 
lenity is unnecessary.  There is no "grievous ambiguity" or 
uncertainty in Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) that would cause a 
court to "simply guess" as to the meaning of the statute.  
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1416.  There is no grievous ambiguity 
in § 961.41(3g)(c), in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)&(D), or in 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(d).  Accordingly, we do not apply the rule of 
lenity.   
F.  Due Process  
¶28 As a final argument, Guarnero contends that he did not 
have fair notice that his guilty plea to the RICO conspiracy 
charge could subject him to sentence enhancement in a subsequent 
criminal case because no Wisconsin case had held such a 
conviction related to controlled substances.  "[D]ue process 
bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal 
statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior 
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judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope."  
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.   
¶29 Guarnero's contention misses his mark in at least two 
respects.  First, our construction of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) 
is not "novel," but rather, a commonsense reading of the words 
the legislature chose.  Second, Moline explained that "[i]f it 
is found to be related to drugs, it is very clearly an offense 
which may serve as the basis for an enhanced penalty."  Moline, 
229 Wis. 2d at 42.  Our statutory interpretation herein is 
consistent with Moline where the same plain language, "relating 
to controlled substances" that appears in § 961.41(3g)(c) was 
interpreted in Wis. Stat. § 961.48(3), thereby giving notice of 
conduct that could result in sentence enhancement.  Accordingly, 
due process does not bar enhancement of Guarnero's conviction 
under § 961.41(3g)(c).15   
                                                 
15 In a recent Supreme Court opinion, Johnson v. United 
States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the Court discussed whether part of 
the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 
that provides, "otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another," 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of 
the due process clause.  Johnson, 576 U.S. __, at 5.  Johnson is 
of even passing consideration here because a line of ACCA cases 
is analogous to the approach we have taken:  choosing between 
examination solely in terms of how the law defines an offense, 
or examination of a limited class of documents to determine what 
statutory alternative formed the basis for the defendant's prior 
conviction.  See United States v. Castleman, __ U.S. __, 134 
S. Ct. 1405, 1413-14 (2014).  The differing approaches apply to 
different parts of the ACCA language.  Id. at 1409, 1413-14; 
Johnson, 576 U.S. __, at 4.  The former approach applies to 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the latter applies to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  The Court does not decide between the two 
approaches. 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1753-CR & 2013AP1754-CR   
 
17 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶30 We conclude that Guarnero's prior conviction, due to 
the manner in which Guarnero violated the RICO conspiracy 
statute, 
relates 
to 
controlled 
substances. 
 
Therefore, 
Guarnero's prior RICO conviction enhances the penalty for 
cocaine possession under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) to a second 
offense as a Class I felony.  We further conclude that 
Guarnero's bail-jumping offense is properly a felony conviction.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision that 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Guarnero's motion to 
dismiss and motion for postconviction relief. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Court's vagueness concerns centered on the necessity of 
imagining whether an "ordinary case" of a particular crime 
involved sufficient risk.  Johnson, 576 U.S. __, at 5.  The 
Court mentioned one of the federal analogs to our analysis in 
passing, 
essentially 
noting 
that 
because 
Johnson 
was 
a 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) case, the "solely in terms of the law" 
approach applied.  Johnson does not affect the validity of the 
alternate approach, which mirrors the analysis here. 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶31 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In reading the 
five paragraphs of the majority's brief statutory analysis, one 
would never guess that the issue presented is one of first 
impression in this state.  The petition for review states the 
issue as follows: Did the court of appeals err when it looked 
"beyond the statutory elements of Guarnero's prior racketeering 
conspiracy conviction and conclude that his prior conviction was 
a second or subsequent offense." 
¶32 Nor would one likely guess that in a one-sentence 
pronouncement, tucked away in its application discussion,  the 
majority actually answers this question of first impression——
without any acknowledgement that it is doing so and without any 
analysis whatsoever. 
¶33 Our responsibility to develop and clarify the law is 
not well served by the majority's failure to acknowledge the 
issue 
and 
subject 
it 
to 
analysis. 
 
It 
is 
particularly 
problematic because this issue is not only one of first 
impression but also one of statewide importance having the 
potential to affect the interpretation of numerous criminal 
statutes. 
¶34 The court of appeals forthrightly addressed the issue 
and after a thorough analysis adopted an approach called the 
modified categorical approach, meaning in essence that in 
applying "related to" a court may look beyond the statutory 
elements of the conviction to limited extraneous documents.  The 
court of appeals, however, did not have the benefit of the most 
recent United States Supreme Court decision, which, along with 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
other precedent, appears to suggest a contrary result.  The 
majority has the benefit of Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 
(2015), decided June 1, 2015, but its opinion fails to discuss 
it, referencing the case only briefly in a single footnote.  
¶35 Regardless of whether we adopt as a matter of first 
impression the categorical approach (looking to the elements 
only) or a modified categorical approach (looking beyond the 
elements to  extraneous documents), one thing is clear: neither 
the statute, Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c), nor its legislative 
history answers the question.  They are silent on the issue of 
how broadly or narrowly the term "related to" should be defined.   
¶36 Because it is unclear if "related to" should be 
narrowly construed, limited to looking only at the statutory 
elements, 
or 
more 
broadly 
construed, 
looking 
beyond 
the 
elements, the statute is ambiguous. Given the ambiguity, I would 
apply the rule of lenity which dictates that ambiguity in penal 
statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶37 The 
majority's 
statutory 
analysis 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c) is truncated.  Consisting of a mere five 
paragraphs, it is limited to consulting a dictionary definition 
of "relate" and a case addressing the interpretation of "relate" 
with respect to a different prior offense.  Majority op., ¶¶13-
17. 
¶38 Based on its determination that "relating to" means 
"connected with" or "linked to" the majority determines that the 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
statutory language is clear.  Tucked away in its application 
discussion, and without analysis, the majority makes a one-
sentence 
pronouncement 
that 
answers 
the 
issue 
of 
first 
impression without acknowledging that it is doing so.  It  
chooses the modified categorical approach, allowing for looking 
beyond the statutory elements to a limited class of other 
documents:  "[w]hen the statute underlying a prior conviction 
presents alternative methods of violating the statute, it is 
appropriate to consult a limited class of documents to determine 
what statutory alternative formed the basis for the defendant's 
prior conviction."  Id., ¶21.   
¶39 Ultimately the majority declines to follow the rule of 
lenity, which dictates that ambiguous or uncertain penal 
statutes 
be 
interpreted 
in 
favor 
of 
defendants. 
Having 
determined that the statutory language is clear, it concludes 
that the rule of lenity does not apply.  Id., ¶27. 
                              II 
¶40 The majority's analysis of the statutory language begs 
the question.  Just as "relating to" fails to inform how broadly 
or narrowly those words should be defined, so do the substitute 
words "connected with" and "linked to."  They are mere synonyms, 
providing no additional insight into how broadly or narrowly the 
term "relating to"  should be defined.   
¶41 We are left to question if a reference to controlled 
substances in a document relating to the conviction will suffice 
to render it a conviction relating to a controlled substance, or 
if the involvement of controlled substances must be an element 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
proved in obtaining the conviction.  Thus, defining the words 
"relating to" as "to be connected with or linked to" does not 
answer the issue before us: Did the court of appeals err when it 
looked "beyond the statutory elements of Guarnero's prior 
racketeering conspiracy conviction and conclude that his prior 
conviction was a second or subsequent offense?" 
¶42 The parties debate between two possible approaches for 
answering this issue.  Guarnero contends that the categorical 
approach should govern.  Under that approach, a court's inquiry 
into a past conviction is limited to considering the elements of 
the 
statute 
violated. 
 
If 
a 
relationship 
to 
controlled 
substances is not required in order for there to be a conviction 
under the statute, then it could not be considered a conviction 
relating to controlled substances. 
¶43  In contrast, the State advocates for the modified 
categorical approach.  That approach would permit the court to 
consult a limited number of extraneous documents to determine if 
the prior conviction involved controlled substances.  
¶44  This court has not previously addressed the debate 
over whether to adopt the categorical approach or the modified 
categorical approach.  The issue is one of first impression that 
may have far-reaching effects due to the host of Wisconsin 
statutes depending on the characterization of prior offenses.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 939.615(2)(b), 939.618(2), 939.619(2), 
940.43(5), 940.45(5). 
¶45  Ignoring the debate, the majority takes an approach 
that appears to be contrary to the well-established approach 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, without 
any explanation why.  Without commenting on the lengthy briefing 
and murky case law on this issue, and without acknowledging it 
as an issue, the majority addresses it in a single sentence.  It 
announces "[w]hen the statute underlying a prior conviction 
presents alternative methods of violating the statute, it is 
appropriate to consult a limited class of documents to determine 
what statutory alternative formed the basis for the defendant's 
prior conviction."  Majority op., ¶21 (citing Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013)). 
¶46 A recent pronouncement of the United States Supreme 
Court suggests this is error.   
¶47 In Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (June 1, 2015), 
the Supreme Court considered whether a state drug conviction 
qualified as a law "relating to a controlled substance" under a 
federal deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  The 
Court observed that the definition of "controlled substance" in 
the state law included at least nine substances not included in 
the federal list of controlled substances.  Id. at 1984, 1988.  
¶48 The Court also acknowledged that there is a long 
history of limiting an assessment of a conviction to the 
language of the statute and disallowing an examination of the 
facts underlying the crime.  Id.  at 1986-87.  Following that 
history, the Court did not use the modified categorical approach 
of consulting extraneous documents.  Rather, it focused on the 
words of the statutes and determined that because the definition 
of controlled substances in the state law was broader than that 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
in the federal law, the state crime did not constitute a 
conviction relating to controlled substances.  Id. at 1988.  
¶49 This case appears analogous to Mellouli.  As with 
Mellouli, the statute that the defendant previously violated, 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(d), contains a phrase that is broadly defined such 
that a conviction under the statute may or may not be a prior 
conviction relating to controlled substances.1  As with Mellouli, 
the face of the statute Guarnero violated does not reveal which 
portion of the definition was the basis for his conviction.  
Thus, there is a strong implication that like Mellouli, the 
analysis should end there with the conclusion that Guarnero's 
prior conviction does not qualify as a crime relating to 
controlled substances.  Extraneous documents relating to his 
conviction should not be consulted. 
¶50 Rather than analyzing this case law, the majority 
supports its approach with a single citation, "See Descamps v. 
United States."  Majority op., ¶21.  However, Descamps does not 
clearly support its decision to use the modified categorical 
approach because it clarifies that the approach applies only in 
limited circumstances.   
¶51 In Descamps the Court considered whether the violation 
of a state statute prohibiting burglary qualified as a violent 
felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).  133 S. Ct. 
2276.  The state statute at issue contained a broader definition 
                                                 
1 The definition of "racketeering activity," refers to 
approximately 90 different crimes, including some involving 
controlled substances. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).   
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
of burglary than the definition in the ACCA.  The Court observed 
that when a state law defines a crime in the alternative, a 
court may "examine a limited class of documents to determine 
which of a statute's alternative elements formed the basis of 
the defendant's prior conviction."  Id. at 2284.  However, it 
stressed that this approach, referred to as the modified 
categorical approach, applies only to a "narrow range of cases."  
Id. at 2283-84 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990)).  "Our decisions authorize review of the plea colloquy 
or other approved extra-statutory documents only when a statute 
defines 
burglary 
not 
(as 
here) 
overbroadly, 
but 
instead 
alternatively . . . ."  Id. at 2286. 
¶52 Ultimately the Descamps Court determined that the 
modified categorical approach was inapplicable to the state 
statute it was considering because the statute merely defined 
burglary more broadly than the federal statute and did not 
contain alternative elements.  Id. at 2285.  Because an 
individual could violate the state statute without committing a 
violent felony, the court concluded that the state conviction 
could not qualify as a violent felony conviction.  Id. 
¶53 The majority makes no attempt to determine whether a 
crime involving a controlled substance was an element of 
Guarnero's RICO conviction or was merely part of a broad 
definition of "racketeering activity."  Descamps and Mellouli 
stress this is an important distinction because a court may not 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
apply the modified categorical approach where there is merely a 
broadly defined term.2     
III 
¶54 Regardless if it is determined as a matter of first 
impression that the categorical approach or the modified 
approach controls, I determine that the rule of lenity should be 
applied here. 
¶55 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, 
"construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need 
for fair warning."  Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 
(1990).  The rule of lenity "ensures fair warning by so 
resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to 
conduct clearly covered."  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 266 (1997).  Thus, when a criminal statute is ambiguous and 
is not clarified by resort to legislative history, that penal 
statute "should be construed strictly against the party seeking 
                                                 
2 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
also 
recently 
reaffirmed that courts must use the categorical approach when 
deciding whether a conviction constitutes a prior conviction for 
a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Johnson 
v. United States, No. 13-7120, 576 U.S. ___ (June 26, 2015).  
Both the majority and the dissent in Johnson analyzed the issue 
of which approach should be applied.  The dissent advocated for 
the modified categorical approach, but the majority of the Court 
decided otherwise.  In choosing between the two approaches it 
stated: "'[T]he only plausible interpretation' of the law, 
therefore, requires use of the categorical approach." Id. 
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).   
The analysis and discussion of the issue by both the 
majority and the dissent likewise reaffirms that selecting an 
approach requires a more detailed analysis than the majority's 
single sentence. 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
to exact statutory penalties and in favor of the person on whom 
statutory penalties are sought to be imposed."  State v. Morris, 
108 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982).   
¶56 Here, the legislative history does not shine any light 
on our inquiry.  Although Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) has been 
renumbered, the language at issue in this case has been almost 
unchanged since its initial enactment in 1971.3  It was enacted 
as part of Wisconsin's Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  That 
Act was "a product of the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)."  State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, 
¶16, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195.  Where the legislature 
enacts a uniform act provision, we consider the intent of the 
drafters of the uniform law, and "will presume the intent of the 
drafters is the intent of the legislature in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary."  Id.  A review of the comments, 
however, provides no guidance here because they do not address 
how "relating to" should be defined.  See NCCUSL, Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act § 408, Comment (1970), in Handbook of 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 161.41(2r)(b) (1971) stated:   
For purposes of this subsection, an offense is 
considered a 2nd or subsequent offense if, prior to 
his conviction of the offense the offender has at any 
time been convicted under this chapter or under any 
statute of the United States or of any state relating 
to controlled substances, narcotic drugs, marijuana or 
depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drugs. 
The only difference between this language and the current 
version of Wis. Stat. § 971.41(3g)(c) is that the words "any 
felony or misdemeanor under this chapter" have been inserted 
into the description of a conviction. 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in its Seventy-
Ninth Year (1970); NCCUSL, Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
§ 413, Comment (1990), in Handbook of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the 
Annual Conference Meeting in its Ninety-Ninth Year (1990); 
NCCUSL, Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 413, Comment (1994), 
available 
at 
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/controlled%20substances/UCSA_fin
al%20_94%20with%2095amends.pdf. 
¶57 Given the ambiguity in the statute which is left 
unanswered by the legislative history, the majority should have 
applied the rule of lenity.   There 
are 
two 
criteria 
for 
application of the rule of lenity: "(1) the penal statute is 
ambiguous; and (2) [a court is] unable to clarify the intent of 
the legislature by resort to legislative history."  State v. 
Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶73, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592.   
¶58 As discussed above, both of these requirements are 
met.  We have oft stated that "a statute is ambiguous if it is 
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 
2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c) can reasonably be interpreted in two ways: 
one that looks beyond the statutory elements, and one that 
considers only the statutory elements.  In other words, one in 
which a reference to controlled substances in extraneous 
documents relating to a conviction could suffice to render it a 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
conviction relating to a controlled substance, or one in which 
the involvement of controlled substances must be an element 
proved in obtaining the conviction.  Therefore the statute is 
ambiguous. 
¶59 The legislative history is silent on the issue.  As a 
result, the court is unable to clarify the intent of the 
legislature by resort to legislative history.  Having met both 
requirements, application of the rule of lenity is appropriate 
and Guarnero's RICO conviction should not be considered a prior 
conviction relating to controlled substances. 
¶60 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
No.  2013AP1753-CR  & 2013AP1754-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1