Title: State v. Parks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101905
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2012

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,905 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
PERRY PARKS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The refusal of a criminal suspect who has received Miranda warnings to have his 
or her statement to law enforcement memorialized in a certain way, e.g., by 
videorecording, is not the legal equivalent of an exercise of the suspect's right to remain 
silent and thus does not implicate Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 
49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976).  
 
2. 
 
A police detective's reference to finding "some marijuana" at a defendant's house 
at the time of the defendant's arrest, despite violating a pretrial order in limine, does not 
require reversal of the defendant's convictions for felony murder and an underlying 
aggravated robbery, when:  (a) the reference was very brief; (b) its vagueness limited its 
persuasive power; (c) the misbehavior it implied—possession of marijuana—was minor 
when compared to the seriousness of the crimes charged; (d) the district judge, as 
requested by the defense, directed the jury to disregard the testimony; and (e) the 
evidence against the defendant on the charged crimes was strong. 
 
2 
 
 
 
3.  
 
When a district court judge provides a criminal defendant exactly the opportunity 
the defendant seeks to conduct a limited voir dire of a State witness on the witness' 
undocumented immigration status and whether there has been an assurance of favorable 
immigration treatment in exchange for the witness' testimony, and the voir dire turns up 
no evidence of such an assurance, the inquiry comes to its natural end. This court will not 
reach the distinct issue of whether the district judge abused his or her discretion by 
limiting the defendant's general cross-examination of the witness before the jury on the 
witness' undocumented immigration status, when that sort of general cross-examination 
was not sought by the defense.  
 
4. 
 
The giving of a modified Allen-type instruction before the jury began its 
deliberations was error but not clearly erroneous, on the record of this case. 
 
5. 
 
Aggravated robbery is not a lesser included offense of a felony murder with the 
aggravated robbery as the underlying felony, and a defendant may be convicted of and 
sentenced on both offenses.  
 
6. 
 
The cumulative error rule does not require reversal of the defendant's convictions 
for felony murder and aggravated robbery on the record of this case, despite violation of a 
pretrial order in limine and the giving of a modified Allen-type instruction before the jury 
began its deliberations. 
 
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7. 
 
A criminal defendant's sentencing to the upper limit of the applicable Kansas 
Sentencing Guidelines Act grid box does not first require a jury to find the existence of 
an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
8. 
 
A criminal defendant's sentencing based on his or her criminal history does not 
first require a jury to find the existence of the criminal history beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JOHN J. MCNALLY, judge. Opinion filed July 20, 2012. 
Affirmed. 
 
Carl A. Folsom, III, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Michael A. Russell, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Robbin L. Wasson, 
assistant district attorney, Jerome Gorman, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  This direct appeal challenges defendant Perry Parks' convictions and his 
consecutive hard 20 life and 247-month sentences for the first-degree felony murder and 
aggravated robbery of Everett Suits in Kansas City in May 2008.  
 
Parks raises eight questions on this appeal:  (1) Did the district judge err in 
admitting evidence of Parks' post-Miranda silence? (2) Did violation of an order in 
limine prohibiting reference to Parks' possession of illegal drugs violate Parks' right to 
fair trial? (3) Was Parks' right to confrontation violated by limitation of his counsel's 
4 
 
 
 
cross-examination of a State's witness about the witness' immigration status? (4) Was the 
district judge's inclusion of an Allen-type instruction reversible error? (5) Did cumulative 
error deprive Parks of a fair trial? (6) Did the district judge err in sentencing Parks for 
both first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated robbery and 
for aggravated robbery? (7) Did the district judge err in sentencing Parks to the term of 
imprisonment at the upper limit of the applicable Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid 
box without requiring a jury to find the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt? and (8) Did the district judge err by sentencing Parks based on 
criminal history that was not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
We affirm Parks' convictions and consecutive sentences. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Before trial, Parks' counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent the State 
from introducing evidence that marijuana was found at Parks' residence when he was 
arrested. The district court judge granted the motion.  
 
At trial, Parks admitted to killing Suits but argued he did so in self-defense. The 
State's theory was that Parks shot and robbed Suits over a debt. Four eyewitnesses to the 
shooting and the argument that led to it testified at trial. 
 
Jeff Aleksaites testified that he observed a confrontation between Parks and Suits 
from his apartment window. Aleksaites saw the men standing in a parking lot by a pickup 
truck where they were arguing about money. When Suits attempted to leave in his truck, 
Parks prevented him from doing so and brandished a weapon. There was a brief struggle 
over the gun, and then Parks shot Suits. Aleksaites testified that Suits had a briefcase at 
the beginning of the argument; and, although Aleksaites never saw Parks with the 
5 
 
 
 
briefcase, he saw him reach for it at one point and knew the briefcase was missing after 
the shooting. 
 
Kara Krenzer testified that she witnessed the argument that led to the shooting 
from her car in the parking lot. Krenzer said she had seen Parks once before when he 
tried to get Suits' attention for something related to work. Krenzer saw Suits come down 
a set of stairs to the lot, saw Parks greet him, and saw the men walk to Suits' truck. 
Krenzer, with her passenger, Christine Enfield, pulled her car near to Suits' truck. 
Krenzer overheard Parks asking for money and heard Parks say, "You are going to give 
me something," as he reached for Suits' briefcase. Suits pulled back on the briefcase. At 
that point, Parks reached into his pocket for a gun and pointed it at Suits through his shirt. 
Parks then looked at Krenzer and said, "Do you want to make this your problem?" 
Krenzer heard Suits say, "If you are going to shoot me, shoot me." Enfield then urged 
Krenzer to leave and call 911. Krenzer heard gunshots fired as she drove out of the lot. 
She proceeded around a corner to another parking lot and pushed an emergency call 
button to notify police. When she returned to the scene, she saw Parks walking away. At 
trial, she could not remember at trial if Parks was carrying anything with him. Krenzer 
had been unable to identify Parks in a photographic lineup pretrial, but she identified him 
as the shooter at trial. 
 
Enfield also testified about what she saw and heard at the scene of the shooting. 
Her testimony largely repeated Krenzer's, and she identified Parks as the man who argued 
with Suits. 
 
Pedro Morales testified at trial through the aid of an interpreter. Morales first 
testified outside of the presence of the jury that he was not promised anything with regard 
to his immigration status in exchange for his testimony. Before the jury, Morales said he 
was returning from work and heard a gunshot when he got out of his car. He ran toward 
6 
 
 
 
the fence separating his apartment's parking lot from that of a neighboring building, 
looked into the other parking lot, and saw the man he later identified as Parks shooting 
Suits. Morales said he heard Suits yell, "Don't shoot!" Morales then saw Parks carrying a 
briefcase away from the scene. Morales wrote down the license plate number of the truck 
Parks drove away; and, when police arrived, Morales approached them and gave them the 
license plate number.  
 
Other trial witnesses for the State included Morris Dwayne Erwin, Suits' cousin, 
who testified about Suits' construction business. Erwin knew Parks from Parks' work for 
Suits on two different job sites. Erwin testified that Parks repeatedly called Suits, because 
Suits had written Parks a bad check and owed him money. 
 
Pathologist Erik Mitchell, M.D., testified that Suits had a gunshot entry wound on 
the outside of his right arm and had two abrasions below his knees. Mitchell testified that 
Suits' arm had to have been raised at the time he was shot, but it was not possible for 
Mitchell to tell whether Suits was standing, on his knees, or lying down then.  
 
Several members of law enforcement testified for the State. 
 
One of the detectives who responded to the scene, Darren Koberlein, said he spoke 
with witnesses Aleksaites, Krenzer, Enfield, and Morales. Koberlein said that both 
Krenzer and Enfield reported that Suits had had a briefcase with him, and Krenzer told 
him she had observed Parks take the briefcase from the scene. Aleksaites told Koberlein 
he had seen a struggle over the briefcase. Morales told Koberlein that he saw the shooter 
take the briefcase. No briefcase was recovered from the scene. Nor were any spent 
cartridges or shell casings. Crime scene investigators did not examine or record findings 
about their observations of the bottom surface of Suits' truck. 
 
7 
 
 
 
Parks' vehicle was identified from the license plate number given to police by 
Morales, and Parks was arrested at his house early in the morning on the day after the 
shooting.  
 
At the time of Parks' arrest, police collected ammunition, clothing, and cleaning 
solution from Parks' house. During questioning by the prosecutor at trial, Detective Bryan 
Block mentioned that "some marijuana" was found at Parks' house. Parks' counsel 
objected and told the district judge during a conference at the bench, "I don't know that 
the jury can set that aside," because the testimony placed "a negative stigma [on] the 
defendant." The judge asked whether Parks was seeking a mistrial; Parks' counsel first 
conferred with Parks and then said, "No, Judge, but I would just ask the jury to be 
instructed . . . [t]o disregard the statement that there were any illegal drugs found in the 
defendant's residence. I don't know how to cure it. That's my only problem." Parks' 
counsel also made clear that he was not requesting a specific written instruction on the 
issue. The district judge then orally announced to the jury that the defense objection was 
sustained and directed jurors to disregard the last question and answer.  
 
Both Koberlein and Block testified about their interview of Parks after his arrest. 
 
Block testified that Parks signed an advice of rights form before beginning his 
interview. Block also testified about the police department's interview protocol, which, he 
explained, consisted of a "preinterview" to "get to the meat of the matter" and then an 
attempt to get a taped statement. The prosecutor asked Block whether he was able to get a 
taped statement from Parks, and Block said, "No." The prosecutor asked Block why, and 
Block responded, "He did not want to go on tape." 
 
At that point, Parks' counsel objected and said at a bench conference:  
 
8 
 
 
 
 
"It is fine for the State to say that he voluntarily gave a statement. It is fine for 
him to discuss the statement, but when they say he refused to give a statement, and asked 
for an attorney is what happened here, they are switching the burden to the defendant. 
They are saying he is responsible if he refuses, so we would object to him talking about 
refusing to give a further statement."  
 
The prosecutor responded to this argument by saying that Parks "declined to go on 
the record with a formal taped statement" and "[t]hat's why we have a partial videotape 
instead of a full, because the defendant ultimately refused to go on tape, didn't refuse to 
give a statement, did ask for a lawyer towards the end, and that's where the questioning is 
halted." Parks' counsel acknowledged that Parks had given a "voluntary statement" but 
said the police stopped recording when Parks invoked his right to counsel. The district 
judge asked, "If you have an explanation on what the video is, why don't you just play it 
without any reference to him refusing[?]" The prosecutor said again that the State wanted 
to be able to "explain why this tape doesn't start at the beginning," and the district judge 
said, "Yeah, that's fine." Parks' counsel then agreed, stating, "If she just wants to get out 
of them, they did a video of part of the interview, that's fine."  
 
Parks' counsel did not request that Block's earlier testimony about Parks not 
wanting to "go on tape" be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard it. The 
district judge did neither sua sponte.  
 
The videotaped portion of Parks' interview played to the jury at trial ended shortly 
after one of the two detectives conducting the interview asked, "So you don't want to give 
us a taped statement, is that what you're saying?" and Parks responded, "No. I think I 
should have a lawyer[. T]hen we'll tell the story again." 
 
Block also testified that Parks told the detectives his side of the story on the 
shooting. According to Block, Parks admitted that he had been involved in the shooting 
9 
 
 
 
but said that Suits attacked and he defended himself. Parks also stated that he went to the 
parking lot to collect money Suits owed him. His confrontation with Suits took place 
between two pickup trucks. Parks had brought a gun with him and moved it to his pocket, 
but he claimed that Suits struck him in the face and kicked him. Then the two men "got 
into a tussle" and were under one of the trucks. When Suits stood up and began trying to 
kick Parks, Parks shot Suits. 
 
Koberlein described Parks as "forthcoming" during his interview by the detectives. 
Parks told them that he went to Suits' apartment to confront him about the debt, and Suits 
attacked him. Parks said he did not usually carry a gun but took one with him to the 
scene. Parks told the detectives that Suits struck him in the face and chest, and Parks 
dropped to the ground under a truck. When Suits tried to kick him, Parks fired two shots. 
Parks told Koberlein that Suits had a briefcase with him, but Parks did not take it. 
 
Defense witnesses at trial included Parks' son, Patrick, and Parks himself.  
 
Patrick said that he had introduced Suits to his father, and Patrick and his father 
completed two jobs for Suits. On the day of the shooting, Patrick and his father discussed 
bounced checks from Suits. Patrick told his father he needed to "watch out" for Suits 
because Suits had offered Patrick drugs and Patrick believed Suits was a drug dealer.  
 
Parks' own testimony confirmed that he worked on two jobs for Suits and that 
Suits' checks bounced. On the day of the shooting, Parks said, Patrick warned him that 
Suits had tried to sell him drugs and told him to be careful. Parks had visited Suits before 
at his apartment after the first job. On the day of the shooting, after the second job, Parks 
went to collect his money from Suits. Two "girls" would not let Parks into Suits' 
apartment building, but he saw Suits come outside. Parks said that Suits told him he had 
the money and that they shook hands and then went to Suits' truck. The two girls then 
10 
 
 
 
pulled up, and Parks told them to go away because he and Suits "were trying to have a 
little bit of business." After they left, Parks said, Suits "sucker punched" Parks in the 
temple when Parks was expecting Suits to hand him the money. Parks said that he and 
Suits then started wrestling and that he got under the truck while Suits was kicking him. 
When Suits reached down and tried to pull Parks from under the truck, Parks said, Parks 
shot Suits because he was afraid for his life.  
 
Parks also testified that he was upset but not angry when he went to see Suits. He 
said he had never pointed a gun at anyone before and conceded that he could have filed a 
lawsuit to try to collect the debt from Suits. Parks testified that he did not normally carry 
a gun, but he took one with him on the day of the shooting because he was afraid of Suits. 
Parks admitted that he had never told the police that his son warned him about Suits, and 
he conceded that he never saw a weapon on Suits the day of the shooting.  
 
Parks also testified about his interview by Koberlein and Block, saying the 
detectives "went over and over the same thing over and over." Parks' counsel then asked, 
"And then ultimately you asked for an attorney and they terminated the interview?" Parks 
answered, "Yes." 
 
The written instructions given to Parks' jury before deliberations began included a 
direction to "disregard any testimony or exhibit which [the court] did not admit into 
evidence." They also included a modified Allen-type instruction, see Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896), which read: 
 
 
"Like all cases, this is an important case. If you fail to reach a decision on some 
or all of the charges, that charge or charges are left undecided for the being. It is then up 
to the state to decide whether to resubmit the undecided charges to a different jury at a 
later time. Another trial would be a burden on both sides. 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
"This does not mean that those favoring any particular position should surrender 
their honest convictions as to the weight or effect of any evidence solely because of the 
opinion of other jurors or because of the importance of arriving at a decision. 
 
 
"This does mean that you should give respectful consideration to each other's 
views and talk over any differences of opinion in a spirit of fairness and candor. If at all 
possible, you should resolve any differences and come to a common conclusion. 
 
 
"You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require and 
take all the time you feel necessary."  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Evidence of post-Miranda silence 
 
Parks argues that the State committed reversible error by introducing evidence of 
what he contends was his post-Miranda silence, citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-
19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). Specifically, Parks asserts, the State elicited 
"testimony that Mr. Parks asked to remain silent when the police wanted him to give a 
taped statement." The State responds that the testimony to which Parks points—Block's 
reference to Parks not wanting to "go on tape"—was merely an explanation for why there 
was no videorecording of the entire interview. The State argues that the detective's 
testimony about Parks' refusal to be taped is not equivalent to testimony about Parks' 
invocation of his right to remain silent. 
 
We review this legal issue de novo. State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 185, 262 P.3d 
314 (2011). 
 
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Doyle established that when a defendant invokes his or her right to remain silent, 
the State may not use that silence against the defendant at trial. State v. Kemble, 291 Kan. 
109, 123, 238 P.3d 251 (2010). As we have said:  
 
 
"The familiar recitation set forth in Miranda . . . advises a defendant that he or 
she has the right to remain silent and warns that if he or she chooses not to exercise the 
right to remain silent, then anything that he or she says can and will be used against the 
person in a court of law. The corollary is that if a duly warned person does exercise the 
right to remain silent, then anything that the person did not say, i.e., the person's silence, 
cannot and will not be used against them in a court of law." Kemble, 291 Kan. at 122. 
 
"'A Doyle violation occurs when the State attempts to impeach a defendant's credibility at 
trial by arguing or by introducing evidence that the defendant did not avail himself or 
herself of the first opportunity to clear his or her name when confronted by police officers 
but instead invoked his or her constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Brinkley, 256 
Kan. 808, 820, 888 P.2d 819 (1995).'" State v. Drayton, 285 Kan. 689, 707, 175 P.3d 861 
(2008) (quoting State v. Edwards, 264 Kan. 177, 195, 955 P.2d 1276 [1998]). 
 
Even if a defendant has "already spoken at length with the police," a Doyle 
violation can occur. "[A] defendant 'should be afforded the same right [under Doyle] after 
some discussion with the police when he remains silent as to matters later asserted at 
trial.'" State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 521, 174 P.3d 407 (2008) (quoting State v. Clark, 
223 Kan. 83, 89, 574 P.2d 174 [1977]).  
 
Parks points to this court's decisions in State v. Brinkley, 256 Kan. 808, 820, 888 
P.2d 819 (1995), and State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 685, 887 P.2d 88 (1994), as 
well as the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. DuMars, 33 Kan. App. 2d 735, 748, 108 
P.3d 448, rev. denied 280 Kan. 986 (2005), as support for his characterization of Block's 
statement as a Doyle violation. But nothing in Brinkley, Gadelkarim, or DuMars makes 
the link necessary for Parks' argument to succeed. None of these cases held that 
13 
 
 
 
testimony about a defendant's refusal to make a statement memorialized in a particular 
way—for example, by means of the videorecording at issue here—to be an impermissible 
comment on the defendant's invocation of his or her right to remain silent. See Brinkley, 
256 Kan. at 820-21 (defendant initially refused to speak to police on advice of counsel); 
Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. at 684 (defendant stated he wanted to speak with his attorney 
before answering questions); DuMars, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 747 (defendant stated she 
would not answer any more questions).  
 
In other jurisdictions, there is conflicting authority on the question of whether a 
refusal to be videotaped or otherwise recorded implicates the right to silence protected by 
the Doyle rule. 
 
In Strickland v. Lee, 471 F. Supp. 2d 557, 623 (W.D.N.C. 2007), one federal 
district court held that testimony about a defendant's refusal to write  his statement was 
permissible:  
 
 
"This Court finds that when [defendant/petitioner] indicated that he did not want 
to write out a statement going over the same information that he had just told the officers, 
Petitioner was not invoking his right to silence. Instead, [Petitioner] merely was declining 
to repeat in writing what he had just said out loud . . . . This does not imply that 
[Petitioner] was no longer willing to talk to officers about the shooting. Therefore, Agent 
Underwood's trial testimony that Petitioner declined to convert his oral statement to a 
written one was a description of the conclusion of Petitioner's voluntary conversation 
with police and not a comment on Petitioner's 'silence.'"   
 
Cf. State v. Smith, 107 Conn. App. 746, 753, 746 A.2d 926 (2008) (defendant did 
not refuse to speak to police, "conditioned his silence," stating preference to speak 
to State's attorney; Doyle inapplicable"). 
 
14 
 
 
 
On the other hand, other courts have held such a refusal to memorialize a 
statement in a certain way implicates Doyle. See, e.g., Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 
864 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a defendant can "invoke[] his Miranda rights selectively, 
with respect to a tape-recorded interrogation"); United States v. Jenkins, 499 F. Supp. 2d 
1268, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ("To be sure, there is a distinction here in that defendant did 
not invoke a right to discontinue making verbal statements. Rather, he declined to 
memorialize his verbal statements in a sworn written statement. However, this is not a 
distinction which diminishes [defendant's] Doyle position."). 
 
We are persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that hold that a defendant's 
refusal to memorialize his or her statement in a particular form is not equivalent to an 
invocation of the right to silence implicating Doyle. In this case, Parks did not invoke his 
right to remain silent. In the words of one of the detectives, he was forthcoming in his 
interview. He merely refused to commit all of the same information he had already 
relayed orally to videotape. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district 
judge's admission of Block's reference to Parks' unwillingness to "go on tape" was not 
error. 
 
Violation of Order in Limine 
 
Parks argues he is entitled to reversal of his convictions because Block's testimony 
about marijuana seized from Parks' house violated the court's pretrial order in limine. The 
State concedes the violation but insists that the violation was "an isolated incident"; "the 
court took immediate corrective action"; and the evidence against Parks was 
overwhelming. Thus, in the State's view, no prejudice resulted from the error.  
 
"Where the trial court sustains an objection and admonishes the jury to disregard 
the objectionable testimony, reversal is not required unless the remarks are so prejudicial 
15 
 
 
 
as to be incurable." State v. Angelo, 287 Kan. 262, 285, 197 P.3d 337 (2008) (citing State 
v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 642, 88 P.3d 218 [2004]). 
 
We agree with the State. In context, the violation was very brief; its vagueness 
limited its persuasive power; and the misbehavior it implied—possession of marijuana—
was minor when compared to the seriousness to the crimes charged. In addition, the 
evidence amassed against Parks was strong. He admitted he brought a gun to the scene 
and shot Suits. Four eyewitnesses described the argument leading to the shooting and the 
shooting itself. And their largely consistent observations stood in contrast to Parks' self-
defense explanation. Finally, the district judge reacted swiftly and appropriately to the 
violation of the limine order, and the curative oral instruction he gave was precisely that 
requested by the defense. Under these circumstances, reversal is not compelled. 
 
Limitation of Cross-Examination on State Witness' Immigration Status 
 
On this issue, Parks argues that he should have been allowed to cross-examine 
Morales "regarding his status as an undocumented alien to show that he had a very strong 
incentive to provide trial testimony consistent with that previously given to the police." 
Parks maintains that in this way Morales' immigration status was relevant to Morales' 
credibility, a subject Parks had a right to pursue under K.S.A. 60-420 and the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
 
The State responds that Morales testified outside of the presence of the jury that he 
was not promised anything in exchange for his testimony. This question—not whether 
Morales was in the United States illegally—was the only relevant inquiry. The State also 
argues that Parks' allegation that Morales was being untruthful was "unsubstantiated" and 
that Parks could have cross-examined Morales about his denial of an immigration-related 
incentive but did not. In the event we hold that the district judge erred in limiting cross-
16 
 
 
 
examination of Morales, the State argues that any error was harmless because Morales 
knew "details that could not have been fabricated," including Parks' license plate number 
and the fact that Parks' left the crime scene with Suits' briefcase. 
 
"The scope of cross-examination is subject to reasonable control by the trial 
court." State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 307, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 276 Kan. 920, 925, 80 P.3d 1143 [2003]). And a district court judge's "decision 
to limit cross-examination is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard." Corbett, 
281 Kan. at 307-08; see U.S.D. No. 232 v. CWD Investments, 288 Kan. 536, 568, 205 
P.3d 1245 (2009); Atkinson, 276 Kan. at 924; State v. Albright, 271 Kan. 546, 550, 24 
P.3d 103 (2001). "Discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable." State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755, 234 P.3d 1 (2010). This court has 
"unlimited review of legal conclusions upon which a district court judge's discretionary 
decision is based," and a district judge's error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Gonzalez, 290 Kan. at 755. Further, "even if a decision is entrusted to the discretion of a 
district court judge, and he or she correctly understands and applies the controlling legal 
standards, the facts upon which the discretionary decision must depend may still be 
challenged on appeal as unsupported by substantial competent evidence in the record." 
Gonzalez, 290 Kan. at 755-56. 
 
However, a party who chooses to limit questioning on cross-examination cannot 
complain of error on appeal. See State v. Herbert, 277 Kan. 61, 78, 82 P.3d 470 (2004). 
Because we conclude, after careful review of the entire record before us, that Parks got 
exactly what he requested from the district judge, we do not reach the issue of whether 
there was legal error—and therefore an abuse of discretion—in the judge's limitation of 
Morales' cross-examination. 
 
17 
 
 
 
Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine for "an order prohibiting defendant 
counsel from referencing or eliciting testimony concerning witness Pedro Morales' 
immigration status." The State argued:  "In support of such motion, the State contends 
that Mr. Morales' immigration status is irrelevant to these proceedings and any 
exploration thereof could improperly imbue racial bias concerning his testimony."  
 
During a pretrial hearing on the motion and other matters, prosecutor Robbin L. 
Wasson, defense counsel Gary Stone, and the district judge engaged in the following 
colloquy: 
 
 
"MR. STONE: Judge, also there is an individual in this case we believe is not a 
citizen of the United States and I want to verify for the record that there has been no 
assurances or other promise made to him that he is immune from INS or any other 
proceeding because he is testifying. 
 
 
"MS. WASSON:  Who is that? 
 
 
"MR. STONE: Pedro Morales. 
 
 
"MS. WASSON:  Again, if there were any conversations of that nature, Judge, I 
am unaware of them, but I can track that down. 
 
 
"THE COURT: Alright."  
 
 
No pretrial order in limine on this issue appears in the record on appeal.  
 
At trial, Morales' immigration status again was the subject of discussion among 
the court and counsel outside of the jury's presence. The prosecutor argued: 
 
18 
 
 
 
"I am concerned that Mr. Stone would reference his immigration status. Per our prior 
hearing, I did inquire of Mr. Morales, 'Did you discuss that with the detectives, did 
anyone make you any promise or anything like that?' He said no. In the process of 
responding to me, and I didn't ask him, 'What is your immigration status,' but in the 
process of responding, he happened to mention to me that he is here illegally. Judge he, 
you know, I can't imagine how that would impact his testimony, I mean, he wasn't 
approached, wasn't threatened. There is certainly nothing of that sort to be found here, 
and I think his immigration status could unduly prejudice members of the jury against his 
testimony, and I would ask that counsel be limited and prohibited from mentioning that."  
 
In response, Parks' counsel argued: 
 
 
"Judge, we would object. You know, he is living here illegally, and I understand 
the Court's initial reaction to that, but he has come to the State and he has told them, 'I am 
here illegally,' and the State has said 'You are subpoenaed and you need to appear in 
Court and you need to testify,' and I would assume that is, 'Testify truthfully according to 
what you have told the police in the past.' The problem is that I should be entitled to 
inquire if he has been promised that immigration is not going to be contacted. Implicitly I 
would assume that's what he has been told. 'Come here and testify, nothing is going to 
happen to you, nobody is to be contacted.'" (Emphasis added.) 
 
Parks' counsel then sought the district's judge's permission to ask Morales:  
 
"'You are here, you are illegal in our country,' just very limited. 'You are here illegal[ly] 
in our country, correct, and you have talked to the State and you have told them you are 
here illegally, correct, and my question to you, sir, is have you been told that nothing will 
happen to you as long as you provide truthful testimony?' If he says, 'We haven't 
discussed it,' then I am done with my question." (Emphasis added.)   
 
The district judge determined, "Well, we can do that outside the presence of the 
jury, if you want before he testifies, that would take care of your problem, and that way 
19 
 
 
 
the jury doesn't hear it." Parks' counsel responded, "That would be fine," and the State 
agreed to the suggested procedure. (Emphasis added.) 
 
As mentioned in the factual background section above, before Morales testified at 
trial before Parks' jury, he was subjected to voir dire by counsel. When questioned by the 
State, Morales said that he had not been promised anything with regard to his 
immigration status by the police, the District Attorney's office, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or any other 
governmental agency. When asked by Parks' counsel if he had conversations with the 
prosecutor regarding his immigration status, Morales responded, "No." Morales also 
responded no when asked if he ever told the prosecutor that he was in the country 
illegally. When Parks' counsel asked directly if Morales was legally in the country, 
Morales responded, "No comment."  
 
This exchange prompted the district judge to suggest that Morales' immigration 
status was not relevant in Parks' case. Parks' counsel was permitted further argument on 
the point, asserting Morales' testimony on voir dire contradicted what the prosecutor had 
said earlier about Morales' admission to her about his undocumented immigration status. 
The prosecutor denied having said that Morales made such an admission; rather, she said 
that, when she spoke to Morales, she merely "was under the impression and picked up on 
the fact that he is here illegally" and that she had been "trying to be honest with [Parks' 
counsel] about that." The prosecutor repeated her argument that it would be improper to 
question Morales about his immigration status before the jury. The district judge again 
suggested that Morales' immigration status was irrelevant, and defense counsel 
responded, "Now I am asking this witness under oath whether he has at all informed [the 
State] that he is here illegally. I understand that may not be relevant." Parks' counsel 
continued:   
 
20 
 
 
 
"Your Honor, under oath he is saying that he has not been led to believe or promised 
anything for his testimony, in our opinion, and this is why I am objecting, is not right. He 
knows he is not going to get in trouble if he comes here and testifies. He has been told, as 
long as you come here and testify, not maybe threatened or promised, but he knows 
implicitly that he is not going to be arrested or taken into custody if he comes here and 
testifies."  
 
Finally, the district judge said that counsel had made a sufficient record of the 
issue and called the jury back into the courtroom.  
 
The motion and hearing and trial transcripts demonstrate that Parks' counsel did 
not argue before the district judge that Morales' undocumented immigration status 
inevitably demonstrated his general dishonesty and therefore was admissible to impeach 
him as a matter of law. Instead, the defense argument was limited to the need for 
discovery and exposure of any assurances Morales received from law enforcement or the 
federal government regarding Morales' immigration status. Once Morales testified on the 
limited voir dire defense counsel successfully sought that Morales had received no 
promises and was subjected to no threats based on his immigration status, the inquiry 
came to its natural end. Defense counsel may not have believed Morales, but, as defense 
counsel had set the terms of the debate, there was nothing uncovered on the voir dire that 
merited placement before the jury. The decision of the district judge on this point was 
correct. 
 
Allen-type Instruction  
 
Parks did not object to the giving of the modified Allen-type instruction at trial, 
and thus he must meet a clearly erroneous standard on appeal. K.S.A. 22-3414(3); see 
State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 925, 235 P.3d 460 (2010) (citing State v. Ellmaker, 
289 Kan. 1132, 1145, 221 P.3d 1105 [2009]). Under this standard, the question is 
21 
 
 
 
"whether [the court is] firmly convinced there is a real possibility the jury would have 
rendered a different verdict if the error had not occurred." State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 
265-66, 200 P.3d 464 (2009). 
 
In particular, Parks argues that the jury would have rendered a different verdict 
absent the Allen-type instruction error because the evidence that Parks took Suits' 
briefcase was weak. The State counters that the evidence regarding the taking of the 
briefcase was not weak and that the brevity of the jury's deliberations and its lack of 
questions demonstrate its decisions to convict were not difficult.  
 
This court has examined challenges to this type of instruction in many earlier 
cases. See, e.g., Magallanez, 290 Kan. at 925-26; Salts, 288 Kan. at 264-67. Although we 
have concluded that the language "'[a]nother trial would be a burden on both sides" is 
error because it is "misleading and inaccurate," as well as "confusing," see Salts, 288 
Kan. at 266, reversal is not automatic. 
 
In this case, we are not firmly convinced that, had the error not occurred, there is a 
real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict. Despite Parks' insistence 
that he did not take Suits' briefcase, multiple witnesses placed the briefcase with Suits at 
the beginning of the altercation and with Parks after the shooting. On this record, the 
giving of the Allen-type instruction does not require reversal. 
 
Conviction and Sentencing for Both Aggravated Robbery and Felony Murder 
 
Parks' next argument on appeal challenges his conviction and sentencing for both 
aggravated robbery and felony murder. He asserts that, because the underlying felony for 
the felony murder was the aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery was also a lesser 
22 
 
 
 
included offense of felony murder; he thus argues he cannot be convicted and sentenced 
for both the greater and lesser crimes.  
 
Parks concedes that he did make this argument before the district judge but argues 
that he may mount this challenge on appeal "in order to serve the ends of justice and 
prevent a denial of fundamental rights." State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 433-34, 172 P.3d 
1165 (2007) (citing State v. Simmons, 282 Kan. 728, 743, 148 P.3d 525 [2006]; State v. 
Dubish, 234 Kan. 708, 718, 675 P.2d 877 [1984]). Accepting for purposes of argument 
that this exception excuses the requirement of issue preservation in the district court, we 
move to discussion of the merits of Parks' argument.  
 
The question of whether a crime is a lesser included offense is a question of law 
over which this court has unlimited review. State v. Sandifer, 270 Kan. 591, 599, 17 P.3d 
921 (2001). 
 
K.S.A. 21-3107(2) states:  "Upon prosecution for a crime, the defendant may be 
convicted of either the crime charged or a lesser included crime, but not both." It defines 
a lesser included crime as, among other things, "a crime where all the elements of the 
lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged." K.S.A. 21-
3107(2)(b).  
 
Parks acknowledges that this court has nevertheless held "that the legislature 
intended separate convictions and punishments for the felony murder and the collateral 
felony." He argues that K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(b) and K.S.A. 21-3436 do not support this 
earlier conclusion. Specifically, he asserts that "the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3436 only 
describe when felony murder results in conjunction with certain underlying felonies—it 
does not state when multiple convictions and multiple punishments can be imposed for 
felony murder and the underlying felony." According to Parks' reading, K.S.A. 21-
23 
 
 
 
3436(a) "merely states when felony murder can be charged"; the statute "does not discuss 
whether convictions 'merge' for purposes of multiplicity—it discusses when offenses 
merge for purposes of the felony murder doctrine." Parks argues that the current version 
of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(b) requires his aggravated robbery conviction to be reversed as a 
lesser included offense of felony murder.  
 
The State, in turn, relies upon our precedents that Parks now argues were arrived 
at in error. Quoting State v. Holt, 260 Kan. 33, 37, 917 P.2d 1332 (1996), the State argues 
that the "felony-murder doctrine is a distinct legal theory from the doctrine of lesser 
included offenses." The State also cites State v. Mims, 264 Kan. 506, 517, 956 P.2d 1337 
(1998), and State v. Rueckert, 221 Kan. 727, 733, 561 P.2d 850 (1977), for the more 
specific holding that the crimes of aggravated robbery and felony murder do not merge. 
See generally State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1032-33, 221 P.3d 525 (2009) (inherently 
dangerous felony statute, K.S.A. 21-3436, applies to felony-murder statute, K.S.A. 21-
3401(b); K.S.A. 21-3436 "provides that the homicide and the inherently dangerous felony 
are distinct and do not merge").  
 
The first-degree murder statute, K.S.A. 21-3401, defines felony murder as "the 
killing of a human being committed . . . (b) in the commission of, attempt to commit, or 
flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A 21-3436." K.S.A. 21-
3436(a)(4) provides that "aggravated robbery, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3427," is "deemed 
an inherently dangerous felony whether or not such felony is so distinct from the 
homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-3401 . . . as not to be an 
ingredient of the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-3401." 
In other words, an inherently dangerous felony such as aggravated robbery does not 
merge into felony murder, and a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both 
offenses, even when the aggravated robbery is the underlying felony for the felony 
murder. 
24 
 
 
 
 
One of our most recent rejections of Parks' interpretation of the statutory scheme 
came in State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006), an exhaustive review of 
multiplicity law in Kansas and the tandem double jeopardy concerns it can exacerbate or 
alleviate. We observed there: "The United States Supreme Court has stated that if the 
legislature has explicitly authorized multiple punishment, the judicial inquiry is at an end; 
multiple punishment is authorized and proper," including in the specific context of 
conviction "of robbery and felony murder with robbery as the underlying felony." 
Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 468, (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69, 103 S. 
Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 [1983]). 
 
We are not persuaded that we should revisit and revise our Schoonover analysis 
today. We also note that Parks' argument on this issue implicitly—and erroneously—
assumes that proof of a completed aggravated robbery is necessary to the sufficiency of 
proof of a felony murder. The felony-murder statute clearly does not require this. Rather, 
a killing committed "in commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an [underlying] 
inherently dangerous felony" such as aggravated robbery is sufficient to support a felony-
murder conviction. See K.S.A. 21-3401(b). 
 
Parks is not entitled to reversal of his aggravated robbery conviction on his 
argument that aggravated robbery was a lesser included offense of the felony murder on 
which he stands convicted.  
 
Cumulative Error 
 
Cumulative error requires reversal of a conviction "when the totality of the 
circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair 
25 
 
 
 
trial." State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 732, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing State v. Sharp, 
289 Kan. 72, 106, 210 P.3d 590 [2009]).  
 
 
"In a cumulative error analysis, an appellate court aggregates all errors and, even 
though those errors would individually be considered harmless, analyzes whether their 
cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they cannot be 
determined to be harmless. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205, 262 
P.3d 314 (2011). 
 
 
"In making the assessment of whether the cumulative errors are harmless error, 
an appellate court examines the errors in the context of the record as a whole considering 
how the district court dealt with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy, or lack of 
efficacy, of any remedial efforts); the nature and number of errors committed and their 
interrelationship, if any; and the strength of the evidence. [Citations omitted.]" Tully, 293 
Kan. at 205-06. 
 
Reversal for cumulative error is not required if the evidence against a defendant is 
overwhelming. McCaslin, 291 Kan. at 732 (citing State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 523-24, 
186 P.3d 713 [2008]). 
 
Parks argues in his brief that the multiple trial errors he asserted deprived him of a 
fair trial. We have now rejected three of his assertions of error—admission of evidence of 
post-Miranda silence, limitation of cross-examination on a State witness' immigration 
status, and conviction and sentencing for both aggravated robbery and felony murder. 
The question is therefore whether the two acknowledged instances of trial error—
violation of the limine order and the giving of the Allen-type instruction—require 
application of the cumulative error rule and compel reversal of Parks' convictions. 
 
They do not. Examining the two errors in the context of the record as a whole 
persuades us that they were relatively insignificant and bore no relationship to each other. 
26 
 
 
 
 
With regard to the limine order violation, the district judge dealt efficiently and as 
effectively as possible with the error as soon as it occurred, directing the jury to disregard 
the improper brief reference to the seizure of "some marijuana" from Parks' home. 
Although defense counsel observed at the time that it would be difficult to unring the 
drug-possession bell, the defense got the contemporaneous admonition it sought and, per 
its clear expressed preference, did not get any undue reemphasis of the particular error at 
the time the jury was instructed before deliberations. Rather, at that point, the judge 
merely gave a general instruction that testimony not admitted into evidence by him was 
to be disregarded. The Allen-type instruction error also appears to have been minor in the 
context of the entire record, especially in view of the State's strong evidence. It is rare for 
the State to have four eyewitnesses to a fatal shooting and likely that the strength of this 
line-up contributed to the jury's speedy disposition of the charges. In such circumstances, 
the erroneous language in the instruction about the burden of another trial is unlikely to 
have had much impact. For all of these reasons, Parks is not entitled to reversal and a new 
trial.  
 
Sentencing to Upper Term in Grid Box 
 
Parks challenges the imposition of the upper term in the grid box under the Kansas 
Sentencing Guidelines Act for his aggravated robbery conviction without a finding of fact 
on an aggravating factor made by a jury, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). This court has repeatedly rejected Parks' 
argument, see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 842, 848-51, 190 P.3d 207 (2008); 
and we do so again today. There was no error on this ground. 
 
27 
 
 
 
Sentencing Based on Criminal History 
 
Parks also argues that the district judge's use of his prior convictions to enhance 
his sentence without requiring the State to prove his prior convictions to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt was prohibited under Apprendi. This court has repeatedly rejected 
Parks' argument, see, e.g., State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48, 41 P.3d 781 (2002); and we 
do so again today. There was no error on this ground. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.