Title: Ex parte Emiliano Rodriguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022-0845
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2023

Rel:  January 13, 2023 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.  
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023  
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0845 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Emiliano Rodriguez 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 
 
(In re: Emiliano Rodriguez 
 
v. 
 
State of Alabama) 
 
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-20-993; 
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-21-0141) 
 
WISE, Justice. 
 
 
WRIT DENIED.  NO OPINION. 
 
SC-2022-0845 
 
2 
 
Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. 
 
Parker, C.J., dissents, with opinion. 
 
Bolin, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., dissent. 
 
 
SC-2022-0845 
 
3 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
"[E]ven in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and 
forgotten." Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___, ___, 
141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020). Indeed, it is in times of greatest crisis that the 
rights in the Constitution require the most vigilant defense.  
I therefore dissent from this Court's denial of certiorari review of 
an important constitutional question: whether requiring criminal-trial 
witnesses to wear masks covering their noses and mouths while 
testifying violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. "We have a duty to defend the 
Constitution, and even a public health emergency does not absolve us of 
that responsibility." Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 
2603, 2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
Emiliano Rodriguez argues, as a material question of first 
impression under Rule 39(a)(1)(c), Ala. R. App. P., that his constitutional 
right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court required 
adverse witnesses to wear face masks while testifying during Rodriguez's 
trial. Because I conclude that there is a reasonable probability of merit 
SC-2022-0845 
 
4 
 
in Rodriguez's petition, I would grant the writ for our Court to further 
examine this issue.  
This criminal case was tried in the summer of 2021. A week before 
trial, Rodriguez moved for an order requiring witnesses to wear clear face 
shields, rather than masks, while testifying. The circuit court granted 
the motion. The day before trial, however, the court sua sponte reversed 
course and required all witnesses to wear masks, asserting that they 
were necessary because of a then-spreading variant of the COVID-19 
virus. The day of trial, Rodriguez again moved to require only face 
shields, but the court denied that motion. Rodriguez was convicted. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed by a vote of 3 to 2, holding in an 
unpublished memorandum that Rodriguez's constitutional right to 
confront witnesses had not been violated. Rodriguez v. State, [No. CR-21-
0141, July 8, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022). Judges McCool 
and Minor each dissented with an opinion.  
This issue is a question of first impression. The Court of Criminal 
Appeals itself stated in its unpublished memorandum: "This Court is not 
aware of any published Alabama cases resolving this precise issue."  And 
it is a material question. Masks were a ubiquitous reality in response to 
SC-2022-0845 
 
5 
 
the COVID-19 virus. Moreover, they have since become more common in 
our society generally, so this issue is likely to arise again, even in cases 
unrelated to COVID-19. Most importantly, as I will explain, this issue of 
mask-wearing by trial witnesses implicates a crucial constitutional right 
of the accused.1  
All constitutional analysis should begin with the constitutional 
text. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
The Alabama Constitution also protects the right of the accused "to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him." Art. I, § 6, Ala. Const. 2022. 
Our Court has emphasized that "[t]his right of the accused to be 
confronted in open court by the witnesses against him was a provision of 
Magna Charta, and was also probably recognized by the ancient common 
law." Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362, 365 (1882). The Alabama Constitution 
requires "the witnesses against the accused to be produced in open court, 
so that he may see them face to face, and have the opportunity accorded 
 
1I express no opinion whether any Confrontation Clause error here 
was harmless. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not analyze that issue. 
And even if it had, that would not have prevented this Court from 
reviewing the Confrontation Clause question independently of its 
ultimate effect on the underlying criminal case. 
SC-2022-0845 
 
6 
 
him to cross-examine them." Id. at 364-65 (emphasis added). Our Court 
has a responsibility to "prioritize analyzing the meaning of [the Alabama] 
Constitution," Young Americans for Liberty v. St. John, [Ms. 1210309, 
Nov. 18, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in 
part and concurring in result). However, because Rodriguez's arguments 
are based on the federal Confrontation Clause, I will focus only on it here. 
As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, in applying 
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, we must ground our 
understanding in how the right of confrontation was understood at the 
time of the founding. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008). The 
right is a "reference to the right of confrontation at common law." 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).  
The common-law right to confront one's accusers face to face goes 
back to the Roman Empire and ancient Israel. Id. at 43. This aspect of 
Roman law is mentioned in the Scriptures: Governor Festus stated that 
"it was not the custom of the Romans to give up anyone before the accused 
met the accusers face to face and had opportunity to make his defense 
concerning the charge laid against him." Acts 25:16 (ESV) (emphasis 
added). Likewise, the Old Testament law directed: "If a malicious witness 
SC-2022-0845 
 
7 
 
arises to accuse a person of wrongdoing, then both parties to the dispute 
shall appear before the Lord, before the priests and the judges who are 
in office in those days." Deuteronomy 19:16-17 (ESV).  
Sir William Blackstone, the leading authority on the English 
common law, emphasized that the "open examination of witnesses viva 
voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the 
clearing up of truth." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *373. He 
noted that, "by this method of examination, and this only, the persons 
who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the 
quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the 
witness." Id. at *374. Sir Matthew Hale further explained: "[M]any times 
the very manner of a witness's delivering his testimony will give a 
probable indication whether he speaks truly or falsely." Matthew Hale, 
The History of the Common Law of England 163 (Charles M. Gray, ed., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 1971). Thus, the English constitution required "that 
the person shall see his accuser." Fenwick's Case, (H.C. 1696) as reported 
in 13 T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials 537, 592 (1812) 
(statement by counsel for accused). In Fenwick's Case, a 17th-century 
English lawyer emphasized: "Our law requires persons to appear and 
SC-2022-0845 
 
8 
 
give their testimony 'viva voce'; and we see that their testimony appears 
credible or not by their very countenances and the manner of their 
delivery ...." Id.2 George Fox, founder of the Quakers, pleaded similarly 
with the royal court: 
"[W]e hope and desire that you, the King's Justices, for time 
to come, when any informers shall come to any of you with an 
information against any of us, will summon such as are 
accused to appear before you, and hear us and our accusers 
face to face; that none may suffer for what they are not guilty 
of. … Doth the law of God, or did the Roman law, or doth the 
law of the land judge any man before he and his accusers, and 
they who witness against him, be heard, face to face?" 
 
2 George Fox, A Journal or Historical Account of the Life, Travels, 
Sufferings, etc., of George Fox 294 (Isaac Collins 1800). Thus, the 
common-law right of confrontation encompassed a right of "examination," 
in which the jury has an opportunity to examine the witness's 
countenance and behavior to weigh truthfulness.  
 
2Although these statements in Fenwick's Case were by an attorney, 
not a court, they were indicators of the common law. Cf. Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 45-46 (quoting the first statement).  "[T]he weighty and earnest 
speeches in [the parliamentary] debate [in Fenwick's Case] must have 
burned into the general consciousness the vital importance of the rule 
securing the right of cross-examination, and made it impossible 
thereafter to dispute the domination of that rule as a permanent element 
in the law." 3 John Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1364, 
at 22 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1923).  
SC-2022-0845 
 
9 
 
After Independence was declared, John Adams drafted the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which recognized the right of a citizen "to 
meet the witnesses against him face to face." Art. XII, Mass. Const. 1780. 
Likewise, the Delaware Constitution of 1792 emphasized that citizens 
had the right "to meet the witnesses in their examination face to face." 
Art. I, § 7, Del. Const. 1792. Thomas Cooley, a leading expositor of the 
United States Constitution, explained that the Confrontation Clause 
requires that "the prosecution procure the presence of their witnesses in 
open court, where the jury may have opportunity to observe them." 
Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the 
United States of America 295 (1880). This right was specifically a 
requirement to confront witnesses "face to face." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
43. 
Although our primary authority is the history and text of the 
Constitution itself, decisions of the United States Supreme Court also 
provide guidance. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the Court held 
that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
against him was violated when two child witnesses who accused the 
defendant of abuse testified with a screen blocking the defendant's view 
SC-2022-0845 
 
10 
 
of them. The physical presence of the witnesses was insufficient because 
they were not visible to the defendant. The Court emphasized that "the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting 
with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Id. at 1016 (emphasis 
added).  
The Court has also emphasized an intertwined and critical aspect 
of the confrontation right: "observation of demeanor by the trier of fact," 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). The role of the 
Confrontation Clause is to provide the accused the  
"opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting 
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand 
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, 
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in 
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."   
 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (emphasis added). 
The Confrontation Clause makes "it possible for the tribunal before 
whom the witness appears to judge from his demeanor the credibility of 
his evidence." Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 
(3d Cir. 1967). The Confrontation Clause helps ensure a fair trial by 
requiring a clear view of the witness for both the defendant and the jury. 
SC-2022-0845 
 
11 
 
Upon this foundation, a Texas Court of Appeals has held that 
testimony by a disguised witness is unconstitutional. Romero v. State, 
136 S.W.3d 680, 690-91 (Tex. App. 2004). The Michigan Court of Appeals 
has held unconstitutional the wearing of a full-face mask while testifying. 
People v. Sammons, 191 Mich. App. 351, 478 N.W.2d 901 (1991). In 
response to the COVID-19 virus, a federal district court required 
witnesses to wear face shields rather than masks while testifying. United 
States v. Thompson, 543 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163-64 (D.N.M. 2021). That 
court explained: "[A]n unimpeded opportunity to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses face-to-face and in full view of the jury is core to the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation. " Id. at 1164. 
Applying these same principles, Judge McCool in his dissent below 
emphasized the importance of juries' observing the entirety of facial 
demeanor to determine credibility: "Whether a trembling lip, an 
involuntary tic of the cheek, or a snarky smile, it [is] imperative that the 
jury be able to view the face of the witness while he or she [is] testifying." 
Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at ___ (McCool, J., dissenting). The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized the same 
principles of credibility: 
SC-2022-0845 
 
12 
 
"Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the 
determination of the credibility of a witness. The innumerable 
telltale indications which fall from a witness during the 
course of his examination are often much more of an 
indication to judge or jury of his credibility and the reliability 
of his evidence than is the literal meaning of his words."  
 
Aquino, 378 F.2d at 548. Inescapably, a mask covering the nose and 
mouth obscures the lower half of all facial expressions, when those 
expressions would enable the trier of fact and the defendant to evaluate 
the testimony's authenticity and sincerity.  
Therefore, a holding that the Confrontation Clause was not 
implicated in this case would need to be founded on a conclusion that the 
masks had no effect on the jury's observation of the witnesses' demeanor. 
But no one appears to be arguing that position. As Judge McCool 
observed, even cases that have allowed masked testimony have 
acknowledged that "the masks will eliminate two aspects of demeanor for 
the jury to consider: movement of the nose and mouth," United States v. 
Crittenden, No. 4:20-CR-7, (CDL) Aug. 21, 2020 (M.D. Ga. 2020) (not 
reported in Federal Supplement). Other cases have acknowledged that to 
a "slight extent masks impinge on [a defendant's] Confrontation Clause 
right to see a witness's full facial expressions," United States v. Maynard 
No. 2:21-cr-00065, Nov. 3, 2021 (S.D. W. Va. 2021) (not reported in 
SC-2022-0845 
 
13 
 
Federal Supplement). In other words, even the cases relied on by the 
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to justify the rejection of the 
Confrontation Clause challenge acknowledged that the Confrontation 
Clause was implicated under these circumstances but argued that any 
impingement was justified by COVID-19. Thus, some impingement on 
the Confrontation Clause right is conceded by the decisions addressing 
the issue; the real question is whether such an impingement can be 
justified.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded in its unpublished 
memorandum that "'requiring [masks] is justified by important public 
policy interests to protect the health and safety of those in the courthouse 
while allowing court functions to proceed during a pandemic.'" (Quoting 
Maynard, supra.) There are two fundamental problems with that 
rationale. First, the United States Supreme Court has held that an 
infringement of the confrontation right is permissible only when the 
"denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public 
policy." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. But under that strict-scrutiny framework, 
"[t]he requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: 
The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether" the 
SC-2022-0845 
 
14 
 
infringement is necessary. Id. at 855. Thus, before any exception to the 
confrontation right is made, the burden is on the State to present 
evidence that it is necessary, and the trial court must make a case-
specific finding of necessity based on that evidence. Nothing is taken for 
granted, and the government must empirically demonstrate the necessity 
of the infringement on the right. As Judge McCool explained, "the State 
bore the burden of proving that any measures imposed were necessary to 
further the public policy under consideration." Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at 
___ (McCool, J., dissenting). Here, however, "the trial court did not make 
any individualized findings as to this public policy or the necessary 
remedy in furtherance of that policy, and no evidence regarding this issue 
was presented or considered by the trial court." Id. at ___. In fact, there 
is no indication that the State even asked for this measure to be imposed; 
the circuit court imposed it on its own initiative. As Judge Minor 
highlighted, although our Court had declared a COVID-19 state of 
emergency for the Judicial Branch of Alabama, that declaration had 
ended three weeks before the trial in this case. Id. at ___ (Minor, J., 
dissenting). Because there was no individualized fact-finding, the circuit 
SC-2022-0845 
 
15 
 
court's exception to the Confrontation Clause cannot be justified under 
the strict-scrutiny framework articulated in Craig.  
Second, as Judge Minor pointed out below, there is a strong 
argument that the above-discussed method of strict scrutiny for 
exceptions is no longer good law. See Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Minor, 
J., dissenting); United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(Sutton, J., concurring). After Craig, the Supreme Court declared in 
Crawford that it was not willing to "replac[e] categorical constitutional 
guarantees with open-ended balancing tests" based on "amorphous 
notions of 'reliability.'" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 67-68. That was because 
"[t]he text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended 
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the 
courts." Id. at 54. Rather, the Confrontation Clause is "most naturally 
read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting 
only those exceptions established at the time of the founding." Id. Thus, 
the sole question to ask to determine whether a practice that implicates 
the protections of the Confrontation Clause is permissible is whether an 
exception existed at the time of the founding under the common law.  
SC-2022-0845 
 
16 
 
I believe that this method, rather than judicially created tiers of 
scrutiny, is the best mode of constitutional analysis. Like the scope of 
rights under the Second Amendment, see New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___,  ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2130 (2022), or the 
First Amendment, see Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. ___, 
___, 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2428 (2022), the scope of the confrontation right 
under the Sixth Amendment must be determined primarily by looking to 
the history and tradition that define the content and contours of the right. 
Our role is not to "balance" constitutional safeguards like mere 
"interests," but to enforce them as definitive protections of concrete 
rights. Here, none of the federal opinions permitting masked testimony 
or the Court of Criminal Appeals' memorandum discusses any historical 
support for such an exception.  
In short, the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's right to 
have witnesses' faces visible to the defendant and the jury. The voices of 
our common-law tradition, as well as decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, strongly support this conclusion. Witnesses' wearing of 
masks that partly obscure the face inevitably impinges on that right, as 
Judge McCool thoroughly explained. In order to countenance such an 
SC-2022-0845 
 
17 
 
impingement, we ought to accept "only those exceptions established at 
the time of the founding." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. If we had granted 
certiorari review, the State and Rodriguez would have had an 
opportunity to provide evidence of such a historical exception.  
Finally, I emphasize that this case is not about the guilt or 
innocence of criminal defendants. It is about the right of every American 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him face to face. And it is about 
the right to have the jury see each witness's face and decide whether that 
witness is telling the truth. Moreover, this case is not about the danger 
of the COVID-19 virus or the best methods to mitigate it. Like the 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, the members of this Court 
and our courts of appeals "are not public health experts, and we should 
respect the judgment of those with special expertise and responsibility in 
this area." Diocese of Brooklyn, 592 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 68. But we 
have "one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and 
Crawford described)," Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. We do not have the original 
Confrontation Clause for ordinary times and a "special, improvised, 
Confrontation Clause," id., for times of crisis -- whether of heinous 
crimes, political tumult, or public-health emergencies. In all cases -- all 
SC-2022-0845 
 
18 
 
cases, even during a pandemic -- we are governed by the same 
Constitution.