Title: New Jersey v. Burkert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2017

New Jersey v. Burkert Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary William Burkert and Gerald Halton were corrections officers, who held positions in different unions representing distinct classes of officers. Their relationship became strained after Burkert read online comments attributed to Halton’s wife that Burkert felt insulted him and his family. Angered by the insulting online comments, Burkert retaliated by downloading the Haltons’ wedding photograph, copied it and made two flyers, writing lewd dialogue in speech bubbles over the faces of the bride and groom. Halton testified that when he arrived at the employee garage of the Union County Jail and saw papers “blowing all over the place.” He picked one up and discovered Flyer #1. The next day, when Halton arrived at work, a sergeant handed him Flyer #2, which the sergeant had found in the area of the officers’ locker room. Halton identified the handwriting on both flyers as Burkert’s. Halton was engaged in union negotiations, a lieutenant handed him Flyer #2, stating, “This came out the other night.” Halton indicated that he “was a mess in negotiations,” went home, and never returned to work. Halton explained that he felt embarrassed and concerned for his safety and received psychological counseling and treatment. Ten months after the flyer incidents, Halton filed criminal harassment charges against Burkert. During the county’s investigation into the flyers, Burkert admitted that he had prepared the flyers but denied circulating them. Though a municipal court found Burkert guilty of harassment, a panel of the Appellate Division reversed Burkert's conviction, finding the commentary added to the wedding photograph as constitutionally protected speech. The panel also found that the vulgar commentary on the flyers did not constitute criminal harassment. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed: "Burkert’s intent to annoy was not a crime, and he did not engage in the type of repetitive acts contemplated by the statute. Therefore, Burkert is not guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, although he may be subject to workplace discipline or a civil tort action. The language on the flyers, despite its vulgarity and meanness, is constitutionally protected from a criminal prosecution for harassment." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. William Burkert (A-6-16) (077623)Argued September 11, 2017 -- Decided December 19, 2017ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. This case tests the limits to which a broadly worded harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), can criminalize speech. William Burkert and Gerald Halton were corrections officers, who held positions in different unions representing distinct classes of officers. Their relationship became particularly strained after Burkert read online comments attributed to Halton’s wife that Burkert felt insulted him and his family. Angered by the insulting online comments, Burkert retaliated. Burkert downloaded the Haltons’ wedding photograph. He then copied the photograph and made two flyers, writing lewd dialogue in speech bubbles over the faces of the bride and groom. Halton testified that on January 8, 2011, he arrived at the employee garage of the Union County Jail and saw papers “blowing all over the place.” He picked one up and discovered Flyer #1. The next day, when Halton arrived at work, a sergeant handed him Flyer #2, which the sergeant had found in the area of the officers’ locker room. Halton identified the handwriting on both flyers as Burkert’s. On January 11, while Halton was engaged in union negotiations, a lieutenant handed him Flyer #2, stating, “This came out the other night.” Halton indicated that he “was a mess in negotiations,” went home, and never returned to work. Halton explained that he felt embarrassed and concerned for his safety and received psychological counseling and treatment. Ten months after the January incidents, Halton filed criminal harassment charges against Burkert. Halton stated that he filed the charges only because the county had failed to properly discipline Burkert. He also filed a civil lawsuit against Burkert. During the county’s investigation into the flyers, Burkert admitted that he had prepared the flyers but denied circulating them. Burkert explained that he expressed himself through the flyers rather than “get physical with the guy.” Burkert retired as a corrections officer in September 2012. The municipal court entered a guilty verdict against Burkert for harassing Halton on January 8 and 11 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The court found that Burkert made and circulated the flyers in the garage and locker room, that the bubble dialogue inscribed on the Haltons’ wedding photograph was “lewd and obnoxious,” and that such language would “seriously annoy any person, in this case Mr. Halton.” In a de novo trial before the Law Division, the court found Burkert guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing acts of harassment. A panel of the Appellate Division reversed Burkert’s conviction, concluding that “the commentary [Burkert] added to [Halton’s] wedding photograph was constitutionally protected speech.” 444 N.J. Super. 591, 594 (App. Div. 2016). The panel accepted the argument that “the altered photograph . . . was not directed to [Halton],” but rather to an audience of possibly willing listeners—other corrections officers. Id. at 601-02. The panel determined that the evidence did not support a finding that the flyers “were a direct attempt to alarm or seriously annoy” Halton or to invade his privacy rights. Id. at 601. The panel also found that the vulgar commentary on the flyers did not constitute criminal harassment. Id. at 603. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 227 N.J. 377 (2016).HELD: To ensure that N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not exceed its constitutional reach in cases involving the prosecution of pure speech, repeated acts to “alarm” and “seriously annoy” must be read as encompassing only repeated communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or security or that intolerably interfere with that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 1 1. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 distinguishes between “communications” and “language” that violate the statute in subsection (a), and “conduct” and “acts” that do so in subsection (c). Although a “course of alarming conduct” or “repeatedly committed acts” can occur through communications and language alone, it is far from clear that the Legislature had in mind offensive speech as the object of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). That the primary thrust of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) is not to interdict speech, but rather conduct, is reinforced in State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997). (pp. 15-21)2. Criminal laws touching on speech must give fair notice of where the line is set between what is permissible and proscribed and must be drawn with appropriate definiteness. A court can invalidate a statute that is substantially overbroad on its face if the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Such a drastic remedy, however, is not the only—and not even the preferred—approach. Provided that a statute is reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that will render it constitutional, courts must construe the statute to conform to the Constitution. (pp. 21-28)3. The vaguely and broadly worded standard in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not put a reasonable person on sufficient notice of the kinds of speech that the statute proscribes. The statute’s vagueness also gives prosecuting authorities undue discretion to bring charges related to permissive expressive activities. That, in turn, means that the statute—if not more narrowly defined—has the capacity to chill permissible speech. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), a person who, with the purpose to seriously annoy another, does seriously annoy another is guilty of harassment. Speech, however, cannot be transformed into criminal conduct merely because it annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt. The First Amendment protects offensive discourse, hateful ideas, and crude language because freedom of expression needs breathing room and in the long run leads to a more enlightened society. Outside of the category of obscenity, courts should not play the role of censor by engaging in a weighing of an expression’s value or relative social costs and benefits. Speech cannot be criminalized merely because others see no value in it. Nonetheless, neither the First Amendment nor Article I, Paragraph 6 of our State Constitution prohibits the State from criminalizing certain limited categories of speech, such as speech that is integral to criminal conduct, speech that physically threatens or terrorizes another, or speech that is intended to incite imminent unlawful conduct. The First Amendment also does not bar states from enacting laws that punish expressive activity when substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. (pp. 28-33)4. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 provides: “[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he: . . . (c) Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.” In cases based on pure expressive activity, the amorphous terms “alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy” must be defined in more concrete terms consonant with the dictates of the free-speech clauses of our Federal and State Constitutions. Narrowly reading the terms alarm and annoy will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. Therefore, for constitutional reasons, the Court will construe the terms “any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy” as repeated communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or security or that intolerably interfere with that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. That standard applies only in those cases where the alleged harassing conduct is based on pure expressive activity. (pp. 33-36)5. The prosecution in this case targeted purely expressive activity and therefore the Court applies the heightened standard of subsection (c) set forth above. Neither the municipal court nor Law Division judge who sat in this case had the benefit of the standard developed in this opinion. They applied the statute as written. Although in other circumstances a remand might be appropriate, the Court sees no point here because even the most indulgent view of the record favoring the State would not support a harassment conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). (pp. 36-38) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE SOLOMON, DISSENTING IN PART, agrees with the majority’s conclusion that N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(c) required clarification because subsection (c)’s language is impermissibly vague. However, even under the majority’s clarification of the statutory requirements for subsection (c), Justice Solomon finds that defendant Burkert’s conduct violates the harassment statute. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 6 September Term 2016 077623STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.WILLIAM BURKERT, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 11, 2017 – Decided December 19, 2017 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 444 N.J. Super. 591 (App. Div. 2016). Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the briefs). Steven J. Kaflowitz argued the cause for respondent (Caruso Smith Picini, attorneys; Steven J. Kaflowitz on the briefs and Timothy R. Smith, of counsel and on the briefs). Edward L. Barocas argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic Center for Law & Justice, attorneys; Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero, Alexander R. Shalom, and Ronald K. Chen, of counsel and on the brief). J. Gregory Crane and Eugene Volokh of the California bar, admitted pro hac vice, submitted briefs on behalf of amicus curiae 1 Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment (Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment Clinic, UCLA School of Law, attorneys; J. Gregory Crane and Eugene Volokh, on the briefs). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The free-speech guarantees of our Federal and StateConstitutions safeguard not only polite and decorousconversation and debate but also speech that we hate -- speechthat is crude, obnoxious, and boorish. A commitment to freediscourse requires that we tolerate communication of which westrongly disapprove. This case tests the limits to which abroadly worded harassment statute can criminalize speech. William Burkert and Gerald Halton were correctionsofficers, who held positions in different unions representingdistinct classes of corrections officers. Their relationshipbecame particularly strained after Burkert read online commentsattributed to Halton’s wife that Burkert felt insulted him andhis family. In response, Burkert downloaded a weddingphotograph of Halton and his wife that was posted on socialmedia and then inscribed degrading and vile dialogue on copiesof the photograph. Copies of those photographs were foundstrewn in the employee parking garage and locker room of theUnion County Jail. Halton filed three complaints in municipal court chargingBurkert with harassment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), 2 which makes it an offense to have engaged in a “course ofalarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose toalarm or seriously annoy [a] person.” Halton’s private attorneyprosecuted this quasi-criminal offense on behalf of the Statewhile Halton contemporaneously pursued a civil action againstBurkert. A municipal court judge found Burkert guilty ofharassment on two of the complaints, as did a Law Division judgeafter a trial de novo on the record. The Appellate Division vacated Burkert’s conviction,determining that although the flyers were wholly unprofessionaland inappropriate for the workplace, they did “not amount tocriminal harassment” in light of our constitutional free-speechguarantees. We affirm. Criminal laws targeting speech that are notclearly drawn are anathema to the First Amendment and our stateconstitutional analogue because they give the government broadauthority to prosecute protected expressive activities and donot give fair notice of what the law proscribes. Such laws alsochill permissible speech because people, fearful that theirutterances may subject them to criminal prosecution, may notgive voice to their thoughts. To ensure that N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not exceed itsconstitutional reach in cases involving the prosecution of purespeech, repeated acts to “alarm” and “seriously annoy” must be 3 read as encompassing only repeated communications directed at aperson that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety orsecurity or that intolerably interfere with that person’sreasonable expectation of privacy. We consider that approach tobe faithful to the legislative purpose in enacting subsection(c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 and consonant with the constitutionalguarantees of free speech. Burkert’s intent to annoy was not acrime, and he did not engage in the type of repetitive actscontemplated by the statute. Therefore, Burkert is not guiltyof a petty disorderly persons offense, although he may besubject to workplace discipline or a civil tort action. Thelanguage on the flyers, despite its vulgarity and meanness, isconstitutionally protected from a criminal prosecution forharassment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division,which dismissed the charges against Burkert. I. A. On September 30, 2011, Halton filed three separatecomplaints, alleging that Burkert committed the petty disorderlypersons offense of harassment on January 8, 9, and 11, 2011, inviolation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). 1 A three-day trial was held in1 A petty disorderly persons offense is punishable by up to thirty days in jail. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8. 4 the Elizabeth Municipal Court. Halton’s privately retainedattorney prosecuted the case on behalf of the State. 2 At trial, Halton and Burkert testified, as did two othercorrections officers. The testimony, much of which wasundisputed, elicited the following. As of January 2011, Halton and Burkert had both worked asUnion County correctional officers for more than twenty years.Halton served as a sergeant and also as the vice president ofthe Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), a union representing high-ranking corrections officers. Burkert served as a correctionsofficer and also as the treasurer of the Policemen’s BenevolentAssociation (PBA), a union representing rank-and-filecorrections officers. The rivalry between those two unionsevidently caused friction in their personal relationship. Thetension became much more acute when Burkert learned thatHalton’s wife was posting derogatory comments about him and his2 Our court rules do not permit an attorney to appear as a private prosecutor on behalf of the State, except in cases involving cross-complaints, and then only on motion to the municipal court after review of “an accompanying certification submitted on a form approved by the Administrative Director of the Courts.” R. 7:8-7(b). No objection was made to Halton’s attorney acting as the prosecutor in the municipal court. After the conclusion of the municipal court proceedings, the Union County Prosecutor’s Office represented the State in all matters concerning this case. Going forward, our municipal courts must strictly enforce Rule 7:8-7(b), which has the beneficent purpose of ensuring that quasi-criminal actions brought in the name of the State proceed in a disinterested manner. 5 family on a public internet forum. Halton’s wife referred toBurkert and his two brothers -- who also were correctionsofficers -- as bullies. According to Burkert, the postings alsodescribed him as “fat” and one of his brothers as “quirky” and“kind of retarded.” Angered by the insulting online comments, Burkertretaliated. Burkert downloaded the Haltons’ wedding photograph,which Halton’s wife apparently had posted on a social mediawebsite. He then copied the photograph and made two flyers,writing lewd dialogue in speech bubbles over the faces of thebride and groom. On Flyer #1, over Halton’s face were thewords, “I know I’m a pussy with a little dick. Don’t do theinmates please Laura,” and over his wife’s face were the words,“I wish you had a cock like the inmates.” On Flyer #2, overHalton’s face, the writing stated, “Fam, I got me anotherwhore.” According to Halton, “fam” is a term denoting thecorrections officers as family, and the dialogue on the flyersobliquely referenced his prior wife, a former correctionsofficer who he claimed had relations with another officer and aninmate. Halton testified that on January 8, 2011, at approximately10:45 p.m., he arrived at the employee garage of the UnionCounty Jail, parked his vehicle, and saw papers “blowing allover the place.” He picked one up and discovered Flyer #1. 6 Halton was offended and humiliated by the scurrilous writingover his wedding photograph. As he approached the gun lockerarea, Burkert and his brother, Sergeant Kevin Burkert, stood inhis path. As he walked between them, Halton asked, “What’s up,”and Burkert replied, “You’re what’s up.” Later, while Haltonwas working at the booking area, he received a call fromBurkert. During their conversation, Burkert mentioned thatHalton’s wife had called him fat; Halton denied having anyknowledge of it. When asked, Burkert denied knowing about theflyers. The conversation came to an inconclusive end. The next day, January 9, when Halton arrived at work, asergeant handed him Flyer #2, which the sergeant had found inthe area of the officers’ locker room. Halton identified thehandwriting on both flyers as Burkert’s. On January 11, while Halton was off his usual schedule andengaged in union negotiations for the FOP, a lieutenant handedhim Flyer #2, stating, “This came out the other night.” Theflyer was the same one turned over to Halton two days earlier. 3Halton indicated that he “was a mess in negotiations,” wenthome, and never returned to work. Halton explained that he feltembarrassed and concerned for his safety and received3 Lieutenant Patricia Mauko testified that she found twenty to thirty copies of one of the flyers during a routine inspection of the corrections officers’ locker room on January 11. 7 psychological counseling and treatment. He received workers’compensation benefits for this work-related injury and retiredon November 1, 2011. Halton acknowledged that he did not knowwho was responsible for placing the flyers in the variouslocations. Ten months after the January incidents, Halton filed thecriminal harassment charges. Halton stated that he filed thecharges only because the county had failed to properlydiscipline Burkert. 4 He also filed a civil lawsuit againstBurkert. During the county’s investigation into the flyers, SergeantStephen Pilot interviewed Burkert. Sergeant Pilot advisedBurkert that a refusal to give a statement would jeopardize hisemployment. Burkert admitted to Pilot that he had prepared theflyers but denied circulating them. 54 Burkert received a work-imposed suspension for his conduct. 5 At trial, Burkert claimed that the admission of his statement violated Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). The Garrity rule generally stands for the proposition that a statement taken from a public employee, threatened with termination from employment if he refuses to cooperate, is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution on the ground that such official coercion “interferes with the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 450 (1972). The municipal court did not formally rule on the defense’s objection and did not reference Sergeant Pilot’s testimony in its factual findings. The Garrity issue is not before us. 8 Burkert testified that he had been friends with Halton andbecame angry when he discovered that Halton’s wife had beenposting insulting comments about him and his brothers on awebsite for more than two years. While on the website, Burkertclicked a link to the wife’s screen name, and the Haltons’wedding photograph appeared. He admitted downloading thephotograph, inscribing the bubble dialogue over the Haltons’faces, and attaching the two flyers to the wall behind his deskin his union office. He denied, however, circulating the flyersthat were later discovered in the garage and locker room.According to Burkert, on the evening of January 8, after thetelephone conversation earlier described by Halton, he went tosee Halton and said, “Here. I made the pictures. This ispayback for what you did to my family.” Burkert explained thathe expressed himself through the flyers rather than “getphysical with the guy.” Burkert retired as a correctionsofficer in September 2012. No testimony was elicited that Burkert worked either onJanuary 9 or 11, 2011. The municipal court entered a guilty verdict againstBurkert for harassing Halton on January 8 and 11 in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). 6 The court found that Burkert made and6 Although the court made no mention of the complaint relating to the January 9 incident, the municipal court disposition sheet 9 circulated the flyers in the garage and locker room, that thebubble dialogue inscribed on the Haltons’ wedding photograph was“lewd and obnoxious,” and that such language would “seriouslyannoy any person, in this case Mr. Halton.” The court imposedfines of $500 for each conviction and additional financialassessments and costs. B. In a de novo trial on the record before the Law Division,the court found Burkert guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ofcommitting acts of harassment on January 8 and 11. The courtdetermined that Burkert created and circulated the photographsand did so with the purpose to harass, and further that theharassing conduct was not protected by the First Amendment.More specifically, the court held that Burkert’s intent inplacing the vulgar language on the photos was to seriously annoyHalton in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The Law Divisionimposed the same fines, assessments, and costs as the municipalcourt. C. A panel of the Appellate Division reversed Burkert’sconviction, concluding that “the commentary [Burkert] added toindicates that complaint was “merged” into the two other charges. 10 [Halton’s] wedding photograph was constitutionally protectedspeech.” State v. Burkert, 444 N.J. Super. 591, 594 (App. Div.2016). 7 The panel accepted the argument that “the alteredphotograph . . . was not directed to [Halton],” but rather to anaudience of possibly willing listeners -- other correctionsofficers. Id. at 601-02. The panel determined that theevidence did not support a finding that the flyers “were adirect attempt to alarm or seriously annoy” Halton or to invadehis privacy rights. Id. at 601. The panel stated that the“uncouth annotations to [Halton’s] wedding photograph” amountedto “constitutionally protected expression, despite its boorishcontent, which bothered or embarrassed [Halton].” Ibid. Thepanel also found that the vulgar commentary on the flyers,although “unprofessional, puerile, and inappropriate for theworkplace,” did not constitute criminal harassment. Id. at 603.The panel did not address whether the flyers exposed Burkert toemployment discipline. Ibid. We granted the State’s petition for certification. 227 N.J. 377 (2016). We also granted the motions of thePennsylvania Center for the First Amendment and the American7 The Appellate Division did not consider the Garrity question because of its finding that Burkert’s “conduct was non- actionable protected speech.” Id. at 599. 11 Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) to participate asamicus curiae. II. A. The State argues that the Appellate Division erred invacating Burkert’s harassment conviction on First Amendmentgrounds and that Burkert’s conduct in creating and distributingthe flyers was sufficient to justify the conviction. Accordingto the State, “[t]he harassment statute restricts conduct, notspeech,” and the right to free speech “does not encompass aright to abuse or annoy another person intentionally.” TheState contends that “speech or writing used as an integral partof the harassing conduct is not entitled to First Amendmentprotection.” The State rejects the notion that Burkert engagedin permissible speech with an audience that included willinglisteners, suggesting that inmates may have been part of thataudience and that a “workplace audience is 'captive.’” TheState emphasizes that N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) requires that adefendant act with the purpose to harass -- “with a consciousobject . . . to annoy” -- to demonstrate that permissible speechwill not fall within the statute’s sweep. To establish thatBurkert’s “course of conduct was alarming and injurious,” theState points to Burkert’s admission that “he made the flyers asan alternative to physically assaulting Halton” and, from that 12 admission, reasons that Burkert intended “the flyers to have thesame effect as a fight.” B. Burkert contends that the Appellate Division properlyvacated his conviction, reasoning that “[u]nder the FirstAmendment, the State cannot prosecute an individual for publiclytaunting another, even if done through crude language and withan intent to annoy.” Burkert asserts that the speech on theflyers constituted an opinion and cannot be criminalized bylabeling it conduct. Burkert asks this Court to “reaffirm” that“the mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings,offense, or resentment does not render the expressionunprotected.” C. Amicus Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment submitsthat the Appellate Division correctly reversed Burkert’sconviction for the following reasons: (1) New Jerseyjurisprudence has “applied the criminal harassment statute onlyto repeated communication to an unwilling listener, not speechabout an unwilling listener”; (2) the flyers at issue conveyedwords and pictures -- traditional means of speech -- and cannotbe reclassified as conduct to evade the protections of the FirstAmendment; (3) the speech here did not fall into the category ofspeech integral to a criminal offense because the flyers were 13 not ancillary to other conduct -- rather, the expressions on theflyers were the only target of the prosecution; (4) speech doesnot lose its First Amendment protection, however vulgar thecontent, even when its purpose is simply to offend; and (5)Burkert’s speech was no less deserving of constitutionalprotection because the matters addressed were personal ratherthan political. D. Amicus ACLU-NJ proposes that this Court adopt a “sensibleconstruction” of the language “purpose to harass” in N.J.S.A.2C:33-4(c) that will keep the statute within constitutionalbounds. The ACLU-NJ contends that a defendant’s use of speechwith the intent “to insult, embarrass or even humiliate” shouldnot be sufficient to justify a harassment conviction underN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), even though such conduct may trigger civilconsequences, such as a private tort action or employmentdiscipline. The ACLU-NJ suggests that we construe N.J.S.A.2C:33-4(c) to require that a “defendant have the consciousobject to cause in the victim the fear or apprehension ofintrusion into the victim’s safety, security, or seclusion.”According to the ACLU-NJ, that interpretation is consistent withour case law and will make clear that the statute cannotcriminalize “insulting and even vulgar communications” of the 14 type in this case that are an inevitable part of theaggravations of daily existence. III. The issue before us is whether Burkert is guilty ofharassment because, as he intended, the lewd flyers seriouslyannoyed Halton. In addressing that issue, we must determinewhether the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) tocriminalize the type of speech in this case. To understand the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), we mustlook not only to the statutory language, but also to relatedprovisions in surrounding statutes. State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 452 (2006) (“[W]e do not read [statutory words] in avacuum, but rather 'in context with related provisions so as togive sense to the legislation as a whole.’” (quoting DiProsperov. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005))). We begin with N.J.S.A.2C:33-4, which provides: [A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he: a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or 15 c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. The statute distinguishes between “communications” and“language” that violate the statute in subsection (a), and“conduct” and “acts” that do so in subsection (c). Likewise, insurrounding statutes, the Legislature has clearly indicated whenlanguage and communication can be the basis for a criminalprosecution. The “disorderly conduct” statute targets“unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language”in a public place, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b) (emphasis added), and the“cyber-harassment” statute targets certain online“communication[s],” N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1 (emphasis added). TheLegislature has made clear when its primary objective is toclassify speech as criminal in nature. Although a “course of alarming conduct” or “repeatedlycommitted acts” can occur through communications and languagealone, it is far from clear that the Legislature had in mindoffensive speech as the object of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). Thispoint comes into better focus by examining the Model Penal Code(MPC) Section 250.4, which is the source of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; 1 The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report§ 2C:33-4 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971); State v.Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606 (2014) (“When a provision of the 16 Code is modeled after the MPC, it is appropriate to consider theMPC and any commentary to interpret the intent of the statutorylanguage.”). MPC Section 250.4, which is entitled “Harassment,”provides: A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he: (1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or (2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response; or (3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or (4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or (5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor. Subsections (1) through (3) of MPC Section 250.4 correspondto N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). The MPC Commentaries indicate that“[s]ubsections (1) through (3) of [MPC Section 250.4] proscribeharassment by communication.” Model Penal Code (MPC) § 250.4cmt. 6 (Am. Law Inst. 1962). On the other hand, MPC Section250.4(5), which directly corresponds to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c),primarily prohibits “harassment by action rather than bycommunication,” ibid., and does not apply to harassment covered 17 by the other subsections, id. § 250.4 cmt. 5. The MPC draftersprovide three illustrations of conduct proscribed by subsection(5): “burning a cross on the lawn of a black family,” “leavinganimal carcasses on a neighbor’s stoop,” and “shining aspotlight into a parked car in order to embarrass or frightenthe occupants.” Ibid. Those examples suggest that subsection(5) focused on conduct intended to cause fright and threaten aperson’s safety, security, or reasonable expectation of privacy. Under subsection (5), the MPC drafters acknowledge apotential scenario “of harassing conduct [that] is so imbuedwith expressive content as to implicate first-amendmentconcerns.” Id. § 250.4 cmt. 6. Nevertheless, the draftersbelieved that such concerns “would probably be excluded by thestatutory requirements that the action serve no legitimatepurpose of the actor and that there be a purpose to harass.”Ibid. Unlike MPC Section 250.4(5), N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) allows fora harassment conviction based on conduct that “seriously annoys”another. As a consequence, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) criminalizes amuch broader swath of conduct than the MPC. Additionally,unlike the MPC, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not limit prosecutionsto expressive acts or conduct that have “no legitimate purpose.”Overall, compared to our state harassment statute, MPC Section250.4(5) is more narrowly drawn to insulate it from potential 18 First Amendment concerns. That the primary thrust of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) is not tointerdict speech, but rather conduct, is reinforced in State v.Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997). In that case, we found that adefendant who ripped up a court support order and sent it to hisestranged wife did not constitute harassment under N.J.S.A.2C:33-4(a). Id. at 584. In rendering that decision, wedistinguished subsection (c) from subsection (a) of N.J.S.A.2C:33-4. We explained that [t]he purpose of subsection (c) is to reach conduct not covered by subsections (a) and (b). For example, if a person were to ring a former companion’s doorbell at 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, flash bright lights into her windows on Monday at 6:00 p.m., throw tomatoes into her front door on Tuesday at 6:30 p.m., throw eggs on her car on Wednesday, and repeat the same conduct over a two-week period, a judge could find that subsection (c) has been violated. We do not imply by that example that five or more episodes are required to establish a course of alarming conduct. [Id. at 580-81.] The example given in Hoffman indicates that the Courtconsidered subsection (c) -- which makes unlawful a “course ofalarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose toalarm or seriously annoy” -- as targeting harassment by action.Despite the Hoffman example, we do not doubt that, in certainclearly defined circumstances, speech can take the form ofconduct and therefore be the appropriate focus of a subsection 19 (c) prosecution. It is evident, however, that the Legislaturewas not homing in on speech in subsection (c). In the cyber-harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1, whichbecame effective in 2014, the Legislature made it a crime when adefendant, through an online electronic communication,“threatens to inflict injury or physical harm”; “threatens tocommit any crime against [a] person or [a] person’s property”;or knowingly sends lewd or obscene material with the “intent toemotionally harm a reasonable person.” The cyber-harassmentstatute limits the criminalization of speech mostly to thosecommunications that threaten to cause physical or emotional harmor damage. The cyber-harassment statute’s precise and exactingstandard thus stands in contrast to the more loosely wordedlanguage of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). One further observation. At the time the Legislaturepassed the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1to 104-9, it repealed New Jersey’s last criminal libel statute,N.J.S.A. 2A:120-1. L. 1978, c. 95, § 2C:98-2 (eff. Sept. 1,1979). In doing so, the Legislature signaled that the criminallaw would not be used as a weapon against defamatory remarks,thereby aligning our new criminal code with the Model PenalCode. The MPC Commentaries reveal that a criminal libel provisionwas not included in the MPC because “penal sanctions cannot be 20 justified merely by the fact that defamation is evil or damagingto a person in ways that entitle him to maintain a civil suit.”Model Penal Code (MPC Tentative Draft) § 250.7 cmt. 2 (Am. LawInst., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961). Criminal laws are usuallyreserved “for harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs thecommunity’s sense of security,” not for “personal calumny.”State v. Browne, 86 N.J. Super. 217, 228 (App. Div. 1965)(quoting MPC Tentative Draft § 250.7 cmt. 2). 8 Accordingly, the Legislature framed the New Jersey Code ofCriminal Justice with a conscious deference to the right of freeexpression. We now turn to the constitutional constraintsplaced on overly broad criminal statutes that threaten the rightto free speech. IV. A. The First Amendment protects “freedom of speech,” U.S.Const. amend. I., as does Article I, Paragraph 6 of the NewJersey Constitution, which states that “[e]very person mayfreely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,being responsible for the abuse of that right.”8 Defamatory speech that is protected from criminal prosecution may nonetheless be subject to a civil action and damages. New Jersey, like many other states, has made tort remedies available to those who suffer such affronts. See, e.g., Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469 (2008). 21 Laws may “not transgress the boundaries fixed by theConstitution for freedom of expression.” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 515 (1948). Accordingly, “the scrutiny to beaccorded legislation that trenches upon first amendmentliberties must be especially scrupulous.” State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 592 (1985). The constitutional guarantee of freespeech, moreover, imposes higher “standards of certainty” oncriminal laws than civil laws. Winters, 333 U.S. at 515.“Penal laws . . . are subjected to sharper scrutiny and givenmore exacting and critical assessment under the vaguenessdoctrine than civil enactments.” Cameron, 100 N.J. at 592. Criminal laws touching on speech must give fair notice ofwhere the line is set between what is permissible and proscribedand must be drawn “with appropriate definiteness.” Winters, 333 U.S. at 515 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 , 311(1941)); accord Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 304(1940). Vague and overly broad laws criminalizing speech havethe potential to chill permissible speech, causing speakers tosilence themselves rather than utter words that may be subjectto penal sanctions. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 , 871–72 (1997);NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , 433 (1963). Such laws also givegovernment authorities undue prosecutorial discretion, thusincreasing “the risk of discriminatory enforcement.” See Reno, 22521 U.S. at 872 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telcomms. Consortiumv. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)). “A court can invalidate a statute that is substantiallyoverbroad on its face” if “the statute 'reaches a substantialamount of constitutionally protected conduct.’” State v.Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 530 (1994) (quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 , 458-59 (1987)). Such a drastic remedy, however, isnot the only -- and not even the preferred -- approach. StateChamber of Commerce v. Election Law Enf’t Comm’n, 82 N.J. 57, 81(1980) (holding that “narrow and discriminate construction ofthe key terms of the legislation serves to overcome its majoroverbreadth objections” and is done “to salvage theLegislature’s own product”). When a statute’s constitutionalityis subject to doubt because of ambiguity in its wording, weproceed under “the assumption that the legislature intended toact in a constitutional manner.” State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 540-41 (2001) (quoting Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 311 (1982)). Provided that a statute is “reasonablysusceptible” to an interpretation that will render itconstitutional, we must construe the statute to conform to theConstitution, thus removing any doubt about its validity. Statev. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 350 (1970); see also State Bd. ofHigher Educ. v. Bd. of Dirs. of Shelton Coll., 90 N.J. 470, 478(1982). 23 In short, we must construe a statute that criminalizesexpressive activity narrowly to avoid any conflict with theconstitutional right to free speech. For example, in State v.Rosenfeld, this Court affirmed the overturning of thedefendant’s conviction under N.J.S.A. 2A:170-29(1) for usingfoul language (the words “Mother F ing”) in a schoolauditorium during a municipal discussion on racism. 62 N.J. 594, 603-04 (1973). N.J.S.A. 2A:170-29(1) -- a predecessorstatute to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 and -4 -- made it an offense for aperson to “utter[] loud and offensive or profane or indecentlanguage in any . . . place to which the public is invited.”The Court noted, “the State has no right to cleanse publicdebate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to themost squeamish among us.” Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. at 603 (quotingCohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 25 (1971)). The Courtconstrained the broadly worded statute so that it only“prohibits indecent language which is spoken loudly in a publicplace and is of such nature as to be likely to incite the hearerto an immediate breach of the peace.” Ibid. (emphasis added). In rendering its decision, the Rosenfeld Court citedextensively to Gooding v. Wilson, in which the United StatesSupreme Court vacated the conviction of a defendant who violateda Georgia misdemeanor statute that prohibited the use of“opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a 24 breach of the peace.” Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. at 600 (quotingGooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 519 (1972)). The United StatesSupreme Court found the statute unconstitutionally overbroadbecause the statute made it a misdemeanor “merely to speak wordsoffensive to some who hear them.” Ibid. (quoting Gooding, 405 U.S. at 527). Significantly, this Court has construed the language insubsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 -- which proscribescommunications made in any “manner likely to cause annoyance oralarm” -- as encompassing, “for constitutional reasons, onlythose modes of communicative harassment that 'are also invasiveof the recipient’s privacy,’” Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,404 (1998) (quoting Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 583), and thatconstitute threats to safety, see id. at 414-15. In that vein,our courts have upheld harassment convictions pursuant toN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) where a defendant scrawled raciallyoffensive graffiti on a victim’s home, Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517,made persistent unwanted telephone calls, which included aracial slur, to the victim’s workplace, State v. Fin. Am. Corp.,182 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 1981), and repeatedly knocked onthe door and rang the doorbell of a home in which thedefendant’s physically abused wife had sought shelter, State v.Reyes, 172 N.J. 154 (2002). B. 25 How courts in other states have addressed harassmentstatutes is also instructive. In People v. Norman, the Colorado Supreme Court declaredthe state’s harassment statute unconstitutional due tovagueness. 703 P.2d 1261 , 1267 (Colo. 1985). Colo. Rev. Stat.Section 18-9-111(1)(d) (1978) (repealed, H.B. 90-1118, 57th Gen.Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1990)) -- like N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c)-- provided that a person commits the crime of harassment if,“with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person,” he“engages in conduct or repeatedly commits acts that alarm orseriously annoy another person and that serve no legitimatepurpose.” The Colorado high court found the statuteconstitutionally infirm on due process grounds because itprovided no limiting standards “to assist citizens, courts,judges or police personnel to define what conduct is prohibitedand, conversely, what conduct is permitted” and gave prosecutors“unfettered” discretion. Norman, 703 P.2d at 1267. Norman followed an earlier Colorado Supreme Court decisionthat struck down a subsection of Colorado’s harassment statutesimilar to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80 ,84 (Colo. 1975). The Court found that the statute wasimpermissibly overbroad and impinged on free-speech rights.Ibid. The Court determined that the terms “annoy” and “alarm”were so vague that even innocuous comments about noteworthy but 26 unpleasant topics might subject a person to criminalprosecution. Id. at 82-83. Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the FifthCircuit struck down on vagueness grounds a Texas harassmentstatute similar to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit found that theabsence of clear enforcement guidelines gave prosecutors“unbounded discretion” and subjected the exercise of FirstAmendment rights to an “unascertainable standard.” Ibid. In People v. Dietze, the New York Court of Appeals declareda subsection of New York’s harassment statute, N.Y. Penal Law§ 240.25(2) (1988) (current version at N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26),overbroad and therefore unconstitutional because of itspotential infringement on free-speech rights. 549 N.E.2d 1166,1167 (N.Y. 1989). N.Y. Penal Law Section 240.25(2) stated: “Aperson is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass,annoy or alarm another person . . . [i]n a public place, he usesabusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture.” Inoverturning subsection (2), the Court of Appeals cautioned that“any proscription of pure speech must be sharply limited towords which, by their utterance alone, inflict injury or tendnaturally to evoke immediate violence or other breach of thepeace.” Dietze, 549 N.E 2d at 1168. 27 Those cases reinforce the notion that harassment statutesmust be written with sufficient precision to ensure thatprotected speech does not fall within the realm of a potentialcriminal prosecution and to give fair notice of where freespeech ends and criminal conduct begins. V. A. We conclude that the vaguely and broadly worded standard inN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not put a reasonable person onsufficient notice of the kinds of speech that the statuteproscribes. The statute’s vagueness also gives prosecutingauthorities undue discretion to bring charges related topermissive expressive activities. That, in turn, means that thestatute -- if not more narrowly defined -- has the capacity tochill permissible speech. Although patterned after the MPC, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) ismore broadly written than its MPC counterpart and therefore morelikely to impinge on protected expressive activities. WhereasN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) permits the conviction of a person who actswith the purpose to “seriously annoy” another person, under thecorresponding MPC provision a conviction may be premised only on“alarming conduct.” Unlike its MPC counterpart, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) is not restricted to conduct that serves “no legitimatepurpose of the actor.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). 28 The circularity of the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4,moreover, does not place limits on the statute. Under N.J.S.A.2C:33-4, an accused may not be convicted unless he acts “withthe purpose to harass.” However, one common definition ofharass is to annoy. See Black’s Law Dictionary 784 (9th ed.2009); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1031 (1981).Accordingly, the words “harass” and “annoy” are interchangeable.By that reckoning, under subsection (c), a person who, with thepurpose to seriously annoy another, does seriously annoy anotheris guilty of harassment. Speech, however, cannot be transformed into criminalconduct merely because it annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt.See Houston, 482 U.S. at 461 (stating that speech cannot bepunished unless it is “likely to produce a clear and presentdanger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above publicinconvenience, annoyance, or unrest” (quoting Terminiello v.Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 , 4 (1949))); cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 , 458 (2011). “There is no categorical 'harassmentexception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.” Saxev. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir.2001). The First Amendment protects offensive discourse, hatefulideas, and crude language because freedom of expression needsbreathing room and in the long run leads to a more enlightened 29 society. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. Outside of thecategory of obscenity, courts should not play the role of censorby engaging in a weighing of an expression’s value or “relativesocial costs and benefits.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 , 470 (2010); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 , 792-93 (2011). Speech cannot be criminalized merelybecause others see no value in it. “The First Amendmentgenerally prevents government from proscribing speech, or evenexpressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideasexpressed.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , 382 (1992)(citations omitted). Nonetheless, neither the First Amendment nor Article I,Paragraph 6 of our State Constitution prohibits the State fromcriminalizing certain limited categories of speech, such asspeech that is integral to criminal conduct, speech thatphysically threatens or terrorizes another, or speech that isintended to incite imminent unlawful conduct. See United Statesv. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012); cf. Hamilton AmusementCtr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 264 (1998). For example, arobber’s command that a victim turn over money is unprotectedspeech because the expressive activity is integral to thecommission of a crime. Likewise, laws that punish threats ofphysical harm are constitutional because the State has a stronginterest in “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, 30 from the disruption that fear engenders, and from thepossibility that the threatened violence will occur.” R.A.V.,505 U.S. at 388; see also United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411,420-21 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that defendant’s threateningstatements to judges, despite political content, were notprotected by First Amendment). The First Amendment also does not bar states from enactinglaws that punish expressive activity when “substantial privacyinterests are being invaded in an essentially intolerablemanner.” See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. Although the “presence ofunwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically tojustify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense,” thegovernment, for example, may “prohibit intrusion into theprivacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot betotally banned from the public dialogue.” Ibid. A speakerusing a bullhorn in a town square may voice objectionable ideasto passing members of the public who are seemingly a captiveaudience without offending the First Amendment, but theConstitution will not protect the speaker with a bullhornbellowing outside a home in the early morning hours. See Frisbyv. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 , 484 (1988) (noting that although“[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection ofthe unwilling listener,” “'we are often “captives” outside the 31 sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech’”(quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 , 738 (1970))). In Hoffman, we determined that the catchall language ofN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) -- “any other manner likely to causeannoyance or alarm” -- was intended to “encompass only thosetypes of communications that also are invasive of therecipient’s privacy,” a purpose that would not run amiss of anyconstitutional proscription. See 149 N.J. at 583-84. Accordingto another court, the constitutional right to free expressiondoes not protect one who “repeatedly invade[s]” another person’sreasonable expectation of privacy “through the use of acts andthreats that evidence a pattern of harassment designed toinflict substantial emotional distress.” People v. Borrelli, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851 , 859-60 (Ct. App. 2000). Recognizing that the First Amendment and Article I,Paragraph 6 of our State Constitution allow the State to punishthreatening speech or speech that invades a person’s reasonableexpectation of privacy in an intolerable manner informs ouranalysis in construing the broad language of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c)within constitutional bounds. B. Unlike some of our sister jurisdictions that have struckdown overly broad and vague harassment statutes, our approach isto conform subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 “to the 32 Constitution in a way that the Legislature would have intended.”See State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485-86 (2005). In adoptingN.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), which was patterned after its MPCcounterpart, the Legislature’s apparent intent was to addressharassment by action rather than communication. See MPC § 250.4cmt. 6. We cannot say that the Legislature intended tocriminalize speech that poses no threat to a person’s safety orsecurity or speech that does not intolerably interfere with aperson’s reasonable expectation of privacy. We have come tothat conclusion by comparing subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4to subsection (a), to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and to the cyber-harassment statute; by our analysis of the MPC Commentaries; andby our review of case law, including the example given inHoffman of conduct proscribed by subsection (c). We also findthe limitations that we have placed on the catch-all provisionof subsection (a) instructive. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404,414-15; Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 583. The constraint we place on the overbroad language ofsubsection (c) is compelled by the principles animating ourfree-speech guarantees. We now return to the specific languageof the statute at issue. C.N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 provides: 33 [A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he: . . . c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. In cases based on pure expressive activity, the amorphousterms “alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm orseriously annoy” must be defined in more concrete termsconsonant with the dictates of the free-speech clauses of ourFederal and State Constitutions. Narrowly reading the termsalarm and annoy -- as we have done in past cases involvingsubsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 -- will save the statute fromconstitutional infirmity. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404 (statingthat “provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) prohibiting conductcommunicated in any manner likely to cause annoyance or alarmencompasses, for constitutional reasons, only those modes ofcommunicative harassment that 'are also invasive of therecipient’s privacy’” (quoting Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 583)). Webelieve the Legislature would prefer a subsection (c)prohibiting verbal harassment that conforms to the FirstAmendment than no such provision at all. Therefore, for constitutional reasons, we will construe theterms “any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with 34 purpose to alarm or seriously annoy” as repeated communicationsdirected at a person that reasonably put that person in fear forhis safety or security or that intolerably interfere with thatperson’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Of course, theLegislature may decide to amend subsection (c) with otherlanguage that conforms to the requirements of our free-speechclauses. To be clear, the standard set forth above applies only inthose cases where the alleged harassing conduct is based on pureexpressive activity. Under that standard, repeated threats ormenacing communications that reasonably place a person in fearfor his safety or security are not protected expressiveactivities. Likewise, a person who repeatedly makes unwantedcommunications to a subject, thereby intolerably interferingwith his reasonable expectation of privacy, will not findshelter behind the First Amendment. Thus, a person who everyday, over the course of a week, either repeatedly yells outsidean ex-partner’s house during the night, or repeatedly followsclosely next to a woman importuning her for a date or makingother unwanted comments, despite constant demands to stop, wouldviolate subsection (c). Subsection (c) was never intended to protect against thecommon stresses, shocks, and insults of life that come fromexposure to crude remarks and offensive expressions, teasing and 35 rumor mongering, and general inappropriate behavior. The aim ofsubsection (c) is not to enforce a code of civil behavior orproper manners. The prosecution in this case targeted purely expressiveactivity and therefore we apply the heightened standard ofsubsection (c) set forth above. VI. We recognize that neither the municipal court nor LawDivision judge who sat in this case had the benefit of thestandard developed in this opinion. They applied the statute aswritten. Although in other circumstances a remand might beappropriate, we see no point here because even the mostindulgent view of the record favoring the State would notsupport a harassment conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). First, we note that, based on the issuance of separatesummonses, Burkert was charged with and convicted of committingacts of harassment on discrete dates, January 8 and 11, 2011.However, a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) requires thefinding of a “course of alarming conduct or of repeatedlycommitted acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy.”Neither the municipal court nor Law Division judge specificallyfound that Burkert engaged in a course of conduct or repeatedlycommitted acts. 36 The record soundly supports the municipal court’s findingthat Burkert circulated the flyers in the correctionalfacility’s garage on January 8. Although the municipal courtfound that Burkert distributed the flyers discovered in thelocker room on January 11, no testimony was offered that Burkertworked on that date. The record unquestionably supports the finding of themunicipal court -- echoed by the Law Division -- that the bubbledialogue Burkert scribbled on Halton’s wedding photograph was“lewd and obnoxious” and seriously annoyed Halton as it wouldhave any reasonable person. Burkert clearly intended toseriously annoy Halton because he believed that Halton’s wifehad insulted Burkert and members of his family on an internetwebsite. The issue is not whether Burkert’s expressive activity-- placing offensive dialogue on Halton’s wedding photograph andthen circulating the flyers -- was boorish, crude, utterlyunprofessional, and hurtful. Of that there can be no doubt.Within a workplace setting, such conduct was grosslyinappropriate. However, our task here is to determine whether Burkertviolated a criminal statute. Even assuming that the circulationof the flyers constituted a course of conduct or repetitiveacts, the State did not present sufficient evidence to support aconviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The flyers were intended 37 to and did humiliate Halton. The flyers, however, did notthreaten or menace him. Nothing in the record suggests thatHalton’s safety or security were put at risk by the flyers, orthat any inmates got ahold of them. The record, moreover, does not establish that Burkert hadrepeated unwanted communications with Halton. Burkert’s onlydirect interaction with Halton concerning the flyers occurred onJanuary 8. The rude and loutish dialogue on the flyersobliquely referred to a matter apparently of common knowledgeamong many corrections officers -- that Halton’s former wifeallegedly had relations with a corrections officer and inmate.Although Burkert displayed appalling insensitivity, he did notengage in repeated unwanted communications with Halton thatintolerably interfered with his reasonable expectation ofprivacy. The facts in this case -- even when viewed in the lightmost favorable to the State -- do not satisfy the elementsnecessary for a subsection (c) violation of the harassmentstatute. Having come to that conclusion does not foreclose otherpotential remedies or sanctions for the behavior at issue inthis case. Indeed, workplace discipline was imposed on Burkert,and Halton filed a civil action. VII. 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of theAppellate Division, which dismissed the harassment charges. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part. 39 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 6 September Term 2016 072467STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.WILLIAM BURKERT, Defendant-Respondent Justice Solomon, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(c) (harassment statute) required clarification becausesubsection (c)’s language is impermissibly vague when viewedthrough the lens of First Amendment free speech protections.However, even under the majority’s clarification of thestatutory requirements for subsection (c), I find that defendantBurkert’s conduct violates the harassment statute. Thus, Irespectfully dissent as to the majority’s conclusion thatBurkert escapes prosecution under the Court’s clarification ofN.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(c)’s statutory requirements. Preliminarily, as a reviewing court, we cannot “disturb thefactual findings . . . of the trial judge unless we areconvinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or 1 inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonablycredible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.” RovaFarms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).“However, legal issues are subject to de novo review; theappellate court owes no deference to legal conclusions drawn bythe trial court.” H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 215 (2015)(citing M.S. v. Millburn Police Dep’t, 197 N.J. 236, 246 n.10(2008)). Here, Burkert admitted under oath that he created,posted, and personally handed the offensive flyers to Halton.The trial court found that Burkert circulated the flyers in theparking garage of the correctional facility and in the employeelocker room. Burkert further admitted under oath that hecreated and posted these flyers only “as payback for what[Halton] did to [Burkert’s] family.” As the majority concedes,“Burkert clearly intended to seriously annoy Halton.” Ante at___ (slip op. at 37). Burkert’s conduct conflicts with the majority’s enunciatedrequirements of subsection (c)(1) -- “constru[ing] the terms'any other course of alarming conduct’ and 'acts with purpose toalarm or seriously annoy’ as any repeated communicationsdirected at a person that reasonably puts that person in fearfor his safety or security.” The flyers were copied and posted in the men’s locker roomand in the employee parking lot of Halton’s place of employment, 2 the Union County Jail, where Halton worked as a sergeant. As asergeant, Halton had frequent contact with inmates and held aposition of authority over other correctional officers.Moreover, Burkert knew Halton’s position and duties within thejail because they worked together for twenty years. Thus,Burkert knew that Halton’s safety could reasonably be threatenedby posting the flyers within the jail where co-workers andinmates could easily see them. The content of the flyers, see ante at ___ (slip op. at 6),was such as to inspire mockery and potential disobedience byinmates. Halton testified that the flyers made him fearfulbecause inmates might have seen or redistributed the flyers.Halton testified that “inmates clean [the locker room] . . .[s]o I was afraid that an inmate got a hold of it . . . part ofmy anxiety [was] that they got a hold of it and they wereshowing it to all the inmates in the jail and that my authoritywas going to be undermined.” Halton also testified that he feltthe flyers undermined his authority with co-workers as well,which led him to fear that his safety at the jail was injeopardy. As this Court stated in Cesare v. Cesare, although“courts should not consider the victim’s actual fear, courtsmust still consider a plaintiff’s individual circumstances andbackground in determining whether a reasonable person in thatsituation would have” felt fearful. 154 N.J. 394, 403 (1998). 3 Here, it was reasonable to find that Halton feared for hissafety considering he worked in a position of authority in acounty jail where Burkert distributed the two profane flyers. I now turn to the majority’s contention that the flyerswere not “repeated communications.” New Jersey jurisprudencehas scant instruction on the boundaries of what constitutes“repeated” conduct in the context of harassment. Whatinstruction is available points toward a broad definition of“repeated communications.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(2)(defining “[r]epeatedly” as conduct “on two or more occasions”in the context of stalking); Webster’s Second New CollegeDictionary 939 (2d ed. 2001) (defining “repeat” as “[t]o do orsay something again”). Therefore, “repeated” conduct, asgenerally understood by a person of ordinary intelligence, isconduct done more than once. See State v. Goodwin, 224 N.J. 102, 112 (2016) (noting that, in construing statutes, courts“ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning andsignificance” and view those words in context (quoting State v.Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 452 (2006))). Although the majority does not directly cite to State v.Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997), to support a narrow constructionof “repeatedly,” Hoffman must be distinguished to avoidconfusion. In Hoffman, this Court did not come to its holdingbased on the number of mailings (two) the defendant sent to the 4 victim. 149 N.J. at 583. Rather the Court found the twomailings were insufficient to run afoul of N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(a)because the mailings “were not sent anonymously, or at anextremely inconvenient hour, or in offensively coarse language”-- thus, the mailings did not invade the victim’s privacy.Ibid. However, as noted by the majority, N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(c) wasmodeled after Model Penal Code (MPC) Section 250.4(5). SeeState v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606 (2014). The comments toMPC Section 250.4(5) provide three illustrations of conduct thatwould fall within the subsection and be considered harassment.MPC § 250.4 cmt. 5 (Am. Law Inst. 1980). The illustrationsinclude “burning a cross on the lawn of a black family,”“leaving animal carcasses on a neighbor’s stoop,” and “shining aspotlight into a parked car in order to embarrass or frightenthe occupants.” Ibid. Using the majority’s logic in this case,the MPC illustrations would not be harassment if the perpetratordid not directly interact with the black family regarding thecross burning or if the spotlight shone into the car illuminatedconduct that was “common knowledge” to some of the community.The majority’s interpretation adds unreasonable and illogicalrequirements to “repeated communication” under N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(c). 5 Burkert’s conduct also conflicts with the majority’s newrequirements for subsection (2) -- “repeatedly makes unwantedcommunications to a subject that intolerably interfere with thatperson’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” New Jerseyrecognizes a limited right to privacy in the workplace. SeeStengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 322 (2010)(finding plaintiff had reasonable expectation of privacy in “e-mails . . . exchanged with her attorney on her personal,password-protected, web-based e-mail account, accessed on acompany laptop”); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 102 (1992) (finding employer’s safety concerns couldoverride employee’s right to privacy in mandating drug testingin workplace); Bresocnik v. Gallegos, 367 N.J. Super. 178, 183(App. Div. 2004) (finding “a single hand-delivered letter to awork place does not illegally invade privacy”). New Jersey also recognizes the common law tort of intrusionupon seclusion. Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 94. Although that tortis not at issue here, its elements are instructive and are asfollows: an “intentional[] intru[sion], physical[] orotherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or hisprivate affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would behighly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement (Second)of Torts, § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977). Because New Jersey caselaw regarding privacy in the workplace focuses on the limits of 6 illegal searches, intrusion upon seclusion is an illustrativeparallel to this case. I believe that, under New Jersey jurisprudence, it is clearthat Halton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in hispersonal relationship with his wife. Included in thatexpectation of privacy is the expectation that his personal lifewould not be brought into his place of employment for all of hisco-workers, and possibly inmates, to see, discuss, and ridicule.Furthermore, unlike cases that have balanced an employer or thepublic’s interest against the employee’s interest in privacy,the employer in this case does not have a competing interest.The flyers in this case served no overarching purpose orinterest other than to harass Halton. Thus, following subsection (2), Burkert’s conductconstitutes the criminal act of harassment. The communicationsfound in the flyers were “unwanted” by Halton. Thecommunications were repeated, as previously discussed. And thecommunications “intolerably interfere[d] with [Halton’s]reasonable expectation of privacy.” It is clear to me that Burkert’s conduct falls squarelywithin the prohibited conduct of N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4(c) asinterpreted by the majority. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 7