Title: In re D.W.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97292, 98896
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2005

Docket Nos. 97292, 98896 cons.-Agenda 1-January 2005.
In re D.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v.

Lisa M., Appellant).-In re Amanda D., a Minor (The People of the 							
State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Lisa Z., Appellee).
Opinion filed March 24, 2005.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in these consolidated appeals is the constitutionality of
section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West
2000)). Under that section, a parent is irrefutably presumed unfit if the
parent "has been criminally convicted of aggravated battery, heinous
battery, or attempted murder of any child" (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q)
(West 2000)) whether or not the parent is capable of adequately
caring for his or her child. In each case before us, the State sought a
finding that the respondent mother was an unfit parent, proceeding
solely under section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act; and the circuit court
found the respondent unfit, based solely upon her conviction of an
offense listed in that provision. In each case, parental rights were
subsequently terminated after a best-interests hearing. In separate
appeals, respondents challenged the constitutionality of section
1(D)(q). The First District of the appellate court, upheld the
constitutionality of the statute in L.M.'s appeal (In re D.W., 344 Ill.
App. 3d 30); in Lisa Z.'s case, the Second District of the appellate
court held the statute unconstitutional on due process grounds (In re
Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d 941). We granted leave to appeal (177
Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated the two cases, docketing the former
as cause No. 97292 and the latter as cause No. 98896. Because we
find that section 1(D)(q) violates the equal protection rights of those
to whom it is applied, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court
in cause No. 98896 and reverse the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts in cause No. 97292, remanding the cause to the circuit
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
	The controversy in this case involves what are really two
subsections of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act which provide
alternative grounds (among many) for finding a parent unfit. 750 ILCS
50/1(D)(i), (D)(q) (West 2002). These subsections are set forth below
in context:
			"D. 'Unfit person' means any person whom the court shall
find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the
likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The
grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following,
except that a person shall not be considered an unfit person
for the sole reason that the person has relinquished a child in
accordance with the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection
Act:
* * *
			(i) Depravity. Conviction of any one of the following
crimes shall create a presumption that a parent is depraved
which can be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence: (1) first degree murder in violation of paragraph 1
or 2 of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of
1961 or conviction of second degree murder in violation of
subsection (a) of Section 9-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961
of a parent of the child to be adopted; (2) first degree murder
or second degree murder of any child in violation of the
Criminal Code of 1961; (3) attempt or conspiracy to commit
first degree murder or second degree murder of any child in
violation of the Criminal Code of 1961; (4) solicitation to
commit murder of any child, solicitation to commit murder of
any child for hire, or solicitation to commit second degree
murder of any child in violation of the Criminal Code of
1961; or (5) aggravated criminal sexual assault in violation of
Section 12-14(b)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961.
			There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved
if the parent has been criminally convicted of at least 3
felonies under the laws of this State or any other state, or
under federal law, or the criminal laws of any United States
territory; and at least one of these convictions took place
within 5 years of the filing of the petition or motion seeking
termination of parental rights.
			There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved
if that parent has been criminally convicted of either first or
second degree murder of any person as defined in the
Criminal Code of 1961 within 10 years of the filing date of
the petition or motion to terminate parental rights.
* * *
			(q) The parent has been criminally convicted of aggravated
battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child."
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i), (D)(q) (West 2002).
The constitutional issues in this case concern the omission of any
opportunity for rebuttal in section 1(D)(q), an opportunity afforded
those whom the State alleges are unfit under section 1(D)(i).
	The details of the proceedings below have been set forth with
specificity in the appellate court's opinions. We reiterate only those
facts necessary to provide a framework for our disposition. Because
of the standing issue raised in cause No. 97292, our recitation of facts
in that case is necessarily more comprehensive.

BACKGROUND
Cause No. 97292
	In 1990, respondent, Lisa M., was convicted of the attempted
murder of her infant son, D.E. Respondent was sentenced to six years'
imprisonment. At that time, respondent had three children: M.E.,
Q.E., and D.E. The children were placed in their father's custody
when respondent went to prison.
	After her release from prison, respondent gave birth to D.W. on
March 7, 1994. Court records indicate that the State filed a petition
for adjudication of wardship of D.W. on April 3, 1995, based on
respondent's prior conviction and her history of reports with the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) from 1987 to
1990. Following a temporary custody hearing, the State removed
D.W. from respondent's home, pending an adjudicatory hearing. At
the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, on February 16, 1996, the
circuit court of Cook County found that D.W. was at substantial risk
of physical injury and ordered D.W. permanently removed from
respondent's custody. However, the judgment of the circuit court was
reversed on appeal due to the circuit court's failure to conclude the
adjudicatory hearing within the time constraints set forth in section
2-14(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-14(b)
(West 1994)). In re D.W., No. 1-96-1996 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
	Thereafter, the State filed another petition for adjudication of
wardship of D.W. on April 3, 1998, alleging, under section 2-3(2)(ii)
of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1996)),
that D.W. was abused and faced substantial risk of physical injury.
The petition referenced respondent's prior conviction and her previous
contacts with DCFS. On August 28, 1998, the circuit court found that
D.W. was abused or neglected under section 2-3(2)(ii) based on
respondent's: (1) criminal conviction for the attempted murder of her
child, D.E.; (2) five prior DCFS reports of abuse and neglect; and (3)
failure to undergo recommended mental health treatment.
	On September 16, 1999, the State filed a supplemental petition
for appointment of a guardian with the right to consent to D.W.'s
adoption. The State alleged in the petition, inter alia, that respondent:
(1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
responsibility as to D.W. (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1998)); (2)
failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were
the basis for D.W.'s removal and failed to make reasonable progress
toward his return (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)); and (3) had
been criminally convicted of the attempted murder of a child (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)).
	After an abortive attempt to arrange a related adoption, the
matter proceeded to a fitness hearing on May 17, 2002. Prior to
commencement of the hearing, the State requested leave "to withdraw
all grounds except for Ground Q," electing to proceed only under
section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West
1998)). The court acknowledged that the State would thus "withdraw
[from consideration as grounds for a finding of unfitness, statutory
bases stated in subsections] B [(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1998))]
and M [(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998))]," and proceed only
under section 1(D)(q). The court so advised respondent's counsel.
Based upon that representation, respondent's counsel withdrew a
notice to compel the minor's appearance at the fitness portion of
termination proceedings. Prior to hearing testimony, the circuit court
specifically stated: "The Court grants the State leave to withdraw
other grounds that they have alleged in the petition and we'll go
forward now with the State putting forth their evidence as to Ground
Q."
	The State first called respondent to testify as an adverse witness.
Respondent testified that, in 1990, she had been convicted of
attempting to kill her son, D.E. The State introduced both a certified
copy of respondent's 1990 conviction, which stated that respondent
was guilty of attempted first degree murder, and the 1990 indictment,
in that case, which alleged that respondent was guilty of "intentionally
and knowingly" attempting to kill D.E. Finally, the State had a prior
disposition order admitted into evidence, which named respondent as
the mother of D.E. The State presented no other evidence at the
fitness hearing.
	Respondent's counsel then called respondent as a witness and
attempted to introduce evidence of respondent's rehabilitation efforts
subsequent to her conviction. The State interposed repeated
objections on relevancy grounds, maintaining that, under section
1(D)(q), there is no defense of rehabilitation. The State argued that,
under section 1(D)(q), if there is competent evidence of a
respondent's prior conviction for the attempted murder of a child,
respondent is shown conclusively unfit. The trial court agreed with the
State, and allowed respondent's counsel to proceed with a brief
testimonial offer of proof.
	Thereafter, respondent's counsel argued that the circuit court's
application of section 1(D)(q) violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
Counsel noted that a conviction for attempted murder of a child is a
ground for a finding of unfitness under either section 1(D)(q) or
section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act. Proof of the prior conviction is
conclusive evidence of parental unfitness under the former provision,
but creates only a rebuttable presumption of unfitness under the latter.
Thus, counsel observed, "By putting a specific letter on a case, [the
State] can change the parents' rights. *** That violates [respondent's
rights to] due process and equal protection."
	The State and the public guardian argued that the court's
application of section 1(D)(q) was constitutional. The State cited in
support of its position an appellate court decision which has since
been vacated by this court. In re J.B., 328 Ill. App. 3d 175 (2002),
judgment vacated &amp; appeal dismissed, 204 Ill. 2d 382 (2003). The
appellate court in J.B. held section 1(D)(q) constitutional, affirming
the circuit court's application of the statute's conclusive presumption
of unfitness to a respondent who had been convicted of the
aggravated battery of her child. In re J.B., 328 Ill. App. 3d at 195.
The public guardian argued that the statute does not preclude a parent
from presenting evidence as to parental rehabilitation, noting the J.B.
court's observation that the parent who is conclusively deemed unfit
under section 1(D)(q) can still present evidence of his or her
"rehabilitation and desire and ability to be a parent" at the "best
interests" hearing. In re J.B., 328 Ill. App. 3d at 191.
	After hearing the parties' arguments, the circuit court found that
respondent's case was "factually different" from J.B. in that the instant
case involves a conviction (attempted murder of a child) which is
addressed in two statutory sections: one containing a rebuttable
presumption (section 1(D)(i)); the other omitting any opportunity for
rebuttal (section 1(D)(q)). Thus, the court decided to allow
rehabilitation evidence at respondent's fitness hearing, stating:
			"I'm going to hear the testimony, regardless [sic] of
rehabilitation. I'm going to hear [respondent's] testimony. It
is just a matter of am I going to hear it at the unfitness
hearing or the best interest hearing.
			If I were to wait and hear it only at the best interest
hearing, it is possible that the Appellate Court might see this
case differently than they saw J.B. and say that is an equal
protection problem. Therefore, reverse the finding. ***
* * *
			The Court, assuming the statute is constitutional, noting
depravity is not alleged, has not been alleged in this case, that
the only allegation of unfitness that has been acted upon or
prosecuted or is being prosecuted by the State in Q is going
to, despite the fact that the Appellate Court has in February
upheld the constitutionality of Paragraph Q, going to allow
the natural mother to offer her evidence of rehabilitation
***."
Thus, the circuit court allowed the testimony over the relevancy
objections of the State and the public guardian.
	Respondent's evidence of rehabilitation consisted only of her
abbreviated testimony. Respondent testified that, upon her release
from prison, she "went into therapy on [her] own to seek help." For
approximately three years-from 1992 to 1995-she attended therapy
sessions at West Side Family Health Center with Dr. DeePak Kapoor.
Her therapy was "successfully terminated." Respondent also stated
that she successfully completed her parole in 1995. Moreover,
respondent testified that she attended parenting classes in 1994 at Mt.
Sinai Hospital and received a certificate at the end of the 10-week
program. Respondent stated she got a court-ordered psychological
evaluation and a drug and alcohol assessment. She was not required
to pursue any other services as a result of the drug and alcohol
assessment. She claimed she wanted to participate in family counseling
with her children, but she was not afforded the opportunity.
Respondent stated she was working at a "temp agency" and going to
school part-time.
	At the conclusion of respondent's testimony, the State argued
that, in order to establish unfitness under section 1(D)(q), the State
was only required to prove respondent's conviction for attempted
murder of a child, which was done by means of a certified copy of
conviction and the respondent's own testimony. In response,
respondent's counsel noted respondent's testimony and concluded: "I
don't believe, Judge, they have come back with sufficient evidence to
show why she should be declared unfit, just because of that
conviction."
	The circuit court then stated:
			"The Court will rule as follows: With regard to unfitness,
the Court does find that the State has met their burden of
proof in this case, which is clear and convincing evidence
with regard to Paragraph Q. The State has proved that
[respondent] was criminal [sic] convicted of the attempted
murder of a child. There is a certified copy of conviction
admitted into evidence.
			And [respondent] has herself testified and admitted she
was convicted of that crime with regard to her child ***."
* * *
			I allowed [respondent] *** the opportunity to testify to
her rehabilitative efforts, because of the arguments made by
counsel regarding the constitutionality of the statute.
			It appears to me, first of all, under In re J.B. the statute is
constitutional. As applied in this case, I think the Court
would have been correct not to allow the testimony. But I'm
considering it."
The court briefly summarized respondent's testimony and noted, even
under section 1(D)(i) of the statute, the presumption of unfitness can
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. The court
continued:
			"This Court does not believe that there has been clear and
convincing evidence presented by [respondent] to overcome
the presumption, if this case were brought under Paragraph
I, depravity. Had Dr. [Kapoor] come in and testified that he
counseled you for three years and that based on your
progress in counseling he believes that you would not be a
risk to your child, that you made sufficient progress, or it
wouldn't necessarily be Dr. [Kapoor] that would have to
testify. Perhaps somebody else who witnessed what you have
done over the years. But all I know is you attempted to kill
one of your children.
			*** I don't find that you have overcome any presumption
of unfitness that's been made in this case. And that's
assuming that there is a presumption that would be able to be
overcome.
			So, the Court is finding, so the record is clear,
[respondent] unfit pursuant to Paragraph Q of the Adoption
Act." (Emphases added.)
	The evidence adduced by the State at the best-interests hearing
is not pertinent to the issue before us. That evidence is recounted at
length in the appellate court's opinion. In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d
30. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the State presented
substantial evidence suggesting that D.W. may have been sexually
abused, that he suffered from psychological problems, and that
socially unacceptable behavior he exhibited gradually improved after
he was in foster care for a time. Respondent took the stand and
testified that she had never sexually abused D.W., that D.W. had never
"acted out" prior to being placed in a foster home, and that she
"would like nothing more than to have contact with [her] son."
	Based on the evidence presented at the fitness and best-interests
hearings, the circuit court found respondent unfit pursuant to section
1(D)(q) and determined it was in D.W.'s best interests to terminate
respondent's parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court entered an
order on May 17, 2002, terminating respondent's parental rights.
	On appeal, respondent argued that section 1(D)(q) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)) creates an
"irrebuttable presumption" that a parent is unfit if he or she has been
convicted of the attempted murder of a child, and thus the statute
violates the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. Specifically, respondent contended that section 1(D)(q)
violates due process because it does not permit the trial court to
consider such things as the passage of time since the conviction and
the ability of a parent to change as a result of parenting classes and
individual therapy. Respondent also argued that section 1(D)(q) of the
Adoption Act violates the equal protection clause of the United States
and Illinois Constitutions because it denies a parent who has been
convicted of the attempted murder of a child the opportunity to rebut
a presumption of unfitness, while section 1(D)(i) permits parents who
have been convicted of offenses such as first degree murder,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, and multiple felonies the
opportunity to rebut a presumption of unfitness.
	Initially, the appellate court rejected the argument of the State
and the public guardian that respondent lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of section 1(D)(q) "because the trial court
granted her the very opportunity which she now claims the statute
precludes, i.e., the opportunity to present evidence at the fitness
hearing regarding her rehabilitation efforts and her willingness and
ability to care for her children." In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 44.
The appellate court found respondent clearly would have had standing
"had the trial court properly applied section 1(D)(q)," as she would
have been precluded from presenting evidence of parental
rehabilitation at the fitness hearing. In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 44-45. The appellate court reasoned, "Because respondent was convicted
of the attempted murder of a child, she is still within the class of
persons as to whom the statute is allegedly unconstitutional and, as
long as respondent has minor children, she is also in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as a result of the proper enforcement of the
statute." In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 45. Thus, in the appellate
court's view, the circuit court's "misapplication" of the statute did not
deprive respondent of standing.
	On the merits, the appellate court held section 1(D)(q) violated
neither principles of due process nor equal protection. After discussing
three appellate court decisions that addressed the use of " 'per se'
factors for finding unfitness as a matter of law under the Act" (In re
D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 47-49), the court found that section 1(D)(q)
does not violate a party's due process rights "merely because the
statute requires a finding of unfitness as a matter of law based on a
prior conviction." In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 49. The court then
went on to confront "[t]he more difficult issue [of] whether amended
section 1(D)(q) of the Act is sufficiently narrowly tailored to express
the State's interest in protecting children from abuse," an issue made
more problematic-as the appellate court recognized-by the existence
of another subsection of the same statute that creates a rebuttable
presumption of unfitness for those convicted of the same or
comparable offenses. In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 49.
	The appellate court ultimately rejected respondent's due process
and equal protection challenges on two bases urged by the State and
the public guardian. First, with respect to due process and equal
protection, the court noted that those to whom section 1(D)(q) is
applied are not totally deprived of an opportunity to present
rehabilitation evidence during termination proceedings, since they may
do so during the best-interests portion of the proceedings. In re D.W.,
344 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 55. Second, with respect to equal protection,
the court observed that the potential consequences for a person
convicted of one of the listed offenses are the same under either
section 1(D)(i) or section 1(D)(q), i.e., termination of parental rights
because he or she is unfit. In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 55.
"Although, from respondent's viewpoint, section 1(D)(q) of the Act
is stricter because it requires a finding of unfitness without the
opportunity to rebut that finding, the potential consequences are the
same under either section *** ." In re D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 55.
Employing this reasoning, the appellate court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute and affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court.

Cause No. 98896
	On March 17, 1997, respondent Lisa Z. pled guilty to a charge
of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 1996)). The victim
of the battery was one of respondent's daughters, who is not involved
in the instant case.
	On December 3, 2000, Amanda D. was born. The State filed a
petition for adjudication of wardship on September 3, 2002, alleging,
inter alia, that Amanda D. was abused and neglected because
respondent left the child with respondent's paramour for two days
while she went to Chicago to use drugs; she used crack cocaine in
front of Amanda D.; she suffered from depression and was not taking
her prescribed medications on a regular basis; and she had yet to
complete a recommended substance abuse program. On December 26,
2002, the circuit court of McHenry County found that the State had
proven the allegations set forth in the petition.
	On January 30, 2003, the State filed a petition for termination of
parental rights. The sole allegation regarding respondent's unfitness
to be a parent was that respondent previously had been convicted of aggravated battery of a child. On the same date, the State moved for
summary judgment and attached to the motion a certified copy of
respondent's conviction. The trial court ultimately granted the motion
on February 25, 2003. Thereafter, a best-interests hearing was held,
and, on November 25, 2003, the trial court terminated respondent's
parental rights.
	Respondent appealed, arguing, inter alia, that section 1(D)(q) of
the Adoption Act violates due process and equal protection
guarantees of both the state and federal constitutions. The appellate
court agreed that the statute denied respondent due process, and thus
reversed the trial court's determination that respondent is an unfit
parent, vacated the subsequent order terminating her parental rights,
and remanded the cause with directions for further proceedings. In re
Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 955.
	The appellate court noted that governmental action that impairs
a fundamental right-such as the right to raise one's children-must be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. In re Amanda
D., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 946. The court observed that a statute is
" 'narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact
source of the "evil" it seeks to remedy.' " In re Amanda D., 349 Ill.
App. 3d at 946, quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 101 L. Ed. 2d 420, 432, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2503 (1988), citing Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 789-90, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2130-32 (1984). The statute
must utilize the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment
of its goal. In re Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 947, quoting In re
H.G., 197 Ill. 2d 317, 330 (2001), quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291,
303 (2001).
	The appellate court ultimately determined that the statute's
"proxy class" (people convicted of section 1(D)(q) offenses and thus
deemed per se unfit) is "broader than the class of unfit parents."
Therefore, the court concluded the statute is not narrowly tailored to
advance the state's "undeniably compelling" interest in the safety and
welfare of children. In re Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 946, 948.
The court, however, noted it "is not difficult to divine" what more
would be required "before section 1(D)(q) could pass constitutional
muster." One need only look to another subsection of the same
statute. The "rebuttable presumption" provisions of section 1(D)(i)
would allow a trial court to hear additional evidence that might
exclude an otherwise fit parent from section 1(D)(q)'s class of parents
deemed per se unfit. The appellate court noted:
		"A parent could attempt to rebut the presumption, for
example, through evidence of rehabilitation, evidence that the
offense occurred under unique circumstances, or the showing
of the passage of time during which the parent has led an
upstanding life. However, section 1(D)(q) includes no such
provisions." In re Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 949.
	The appellate court disagreed with the reasoning of In re D.W.,
344 Ill. App. 3d 30, noting that the court in D.W. had applied the
wrong standard in its due process analysis:
		"Although the [D.W.] court began its analysis by stating that
the statute was subject to strict scrutiny and was
constitutional only if narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling interest (D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 47), its analysis
of the issue reads as if it utilized the deferential rational-basis
standard, under which a statute is required only to bear a
rational relationship to the legislature's purpose in enacting
the statute (see In re D.P., 319 Ill. App. 3d 554, 557 (2001)).
Specifically, the court concluded that section 1(D)(q)
survived constitutional attack because 'section 1(D)(q)
promotes [the state's compelling interest in protecting
children] by allowing courts to consider a parent's conviction
for the attempted murder of a child when determining
whether the parent is also fit to parent his or her other current
or future children.' D.W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 49. That the
statute promotes a state interest is not enough. Any statute
that bears a rational relationship to its goal does so. What is
required when a fundamental right is at issue, however, is
that the statute promote the State's interest in a way that is
narrowly tailored to achieving that end." In re Amanda D.,
349 Ill. App. 3d at 951.
The appellate panel in Lisa Z.'s case concluded that section 1(D)(q)
was not narrowly tailored in that the statute did not utilize the least
restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its goal. Thus, the
court found section 1(D)(q) unconstitutional in that it violated
principles of due process. Given that holding, the court found it
unnecessary to address Lisa Z.'s other issues.
	Consequently, we are confronted with conflicting appellate court
decisions regarding the constitutionality of section 1(D)(q), the
provision upon which a finding of unfitness was premised in each case,
and arguments that section 1(D)(q) violates constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection.

ANALYSIS
	As a threshold matter, the State argues that Lisa M. lacks
standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1(D)(q) because
she was allowed to testify regarding her efforts to achieve parental
rehabilitation. As previously stated, section1(D)(q)-the provision
under which the State elected to proceed-contains a mandatory
conclusive presumption of parental unfitness upon clear and
convincing proof of conviction. No rehabilitative evidence is permitted
under the statutory procedure. A confluence of rather unusual
circumstances compels us to reject the State's standing argument.
	First, we are not convinced that the hearing which took place was
of the caliber respondent would have received but for the trial court's
vacillation. The State's election to proceed only under section 1(D)(q)
obviously narrowed the focus of the hearing to, essentially, proof of
respondent's prior conviction. In view of the State's representation,
respondent's counsel withdrew a notice to compel the minor's
appearance at the fitness portion of termination proceedings, and,
when the circuit court reversed itself and decided to hear evidence of
rehabilitation, counsel called only respondent as a witness. While this
was, of course, counsel's decision, it is not clear from the record the
extent to which the procedure was affected by the uncertainty
exhibited by the trial court.
	Second, the words and actions of the circuit court inspire little
confidence that respondent actually received due consideration of the
testimony that was presented. The circuit court's decision to reverse
its initial ruling and hear evidence of rehabilitation seems to have been
prompted, in part, by a fear that the appellate court might see things
differently, and by a belief that the court could simply ignore the
procedural aspects of section 1(D)(q) and hedge its rulings. We note
the following statements:
		"It is just a matter of am I going to hear [evidence of
rehabilitative efforts] at the unfitness hearing or the best
interest hearing.
			If I were to wait and hear it only at the best interest
hearing, it is possible that the Appellate Court might see this
case differently than they saw J.B. and say that is an equal
protection problem. Therefore, reverse the finding. ***
* * *
			The Court, assuming the statute is constitutional, noting
depravity is not alleged, has not been alleged in this case, that
the only allegation of unfitness that has been acted upon or
prosecuted or is being prosecuted by the State in Q is going
to, despite the fact that the Appellate Court has in February
upheld the constitutionality of Paragraph Q, going to allow
the natural mother to offer her evidence of rehabilitation
***."
The court obviously recognized only section 1(D)(i) (depravity)
would have provided the statutory authority to hear evidence of
rehabilitation during the fitness phase of termination proceedings, and
that section 1(D)(q) clearly did not; yet, though the court found
section 1(D)(q) to be constitutional, the court chose to proceed in a
manner contravening one key procedural aspect of the statute. The
court could not do so, logically or procedurally, without finding
section 1(D)(q) unconstitutional.
	Though the court permitted and purportedly considered
respondent's evidence, the court repeatedly and unequivocally stated
that its ruling, finding respondent unfit, was based solely on section
1(D)(q):
			"The Court will rule as follows: With regard to unfitness,
the Court does find that the State has met their burden of
proof in this case, which is clear and convincing evidence
with regard to Paragraph Q. The State has proved that
[respondent] was criminal [sic] convicted of the attempted
murder of a child. There is a certified copy of conviction
admitted into evidence.
			And [respondent] has herself testified and admitted she
was convicted of that crime with regard to her child ***."
The court recounted respondent's testimony in a rather cursory
manner and concluded, speaking to respondent, "[A]ll I know is you
attempted to kill one of your children." Lest there be any doubt about
the basis of its finding, the court added, yet again: "So, the Court is
finding, so the record is clear, [respondent] unfit pursuant to
Paragraph Q of the Adoption Act."
	By enacting section 1(D)(q), the legislature obviously did not
intend to provide for or allow the introduction of evidence to rebut the
statute's conclusive presumption of unfitness. Indeed, if there were
any lingering doubts, they would be put to rest by a comparison of the
clear language of section 1(D)(i) (specifically providing for rebuttal)
and section 1(D)(q) (omitting any such reference), and by application
of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning,
"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or
of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004). This
court recently employed that maxim in an analogous situation,
holding, where the legislature has expressly provided a private right
of action in a specific section of a statute, the legislature did not intend
to imply private rights of action to enforce other sections of the same
statute. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (2004). By specifically
providing an opportunity for rebuttal evidence in section 1(D)(i), the
legislature did not intend to imply a right of rebuttal in section
1(D)(q). The circuit court's actions and words indicate the court was
well aware of the differing procedural aspects of the two sections, one
of which (section 1(D)(i)) was not even alleged as a ground for
unfitness in the State's petition.
	As this court has previously stated, it is improper to terminate a
parent's rights on grounds not alleged in a petition to terminate. In re
D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296 (2004). It has been held that a
determination of unfitness may be made only upon consideration of
evidence relevant to the grounds alleged in the petition before the
court. In re V.S., 285 Ill. App. 3d 372, 375 (1996), citing In re
Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 277 (1990) (trial court is to
determine parental unfitness based on evidence relevant to the
"particular grounds of unfitness alleged"). Evidence of parental
rehabilitation was not relevant to the statutory ground before the
court.
	The constitutional source of a circuit court's jurisdiction does not
carry with it a license to act in ways inconsistent with controlling
statutory law. In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 529 (1996), citing
In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined
by Bilandic, J.). For example, in People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19,
23 (2004), this court held that a circuit court disposition not
authorized by statute is void. See also In re Austin W., Nos. 97531,
97580, slip op. at 19, 22 (January 21, 2005) (this court noted the
circuit court's "serious error," where the circuit court knew it had "no
authority"to review an administrative law judge's determination, but
did so anyway). In this case, the circuit court lacked the statutory
authorization to consider respondent's evidence of rehabilitation, and
thus could not have rendered a valid judgment on her behalf based on
that evidence. The circuit court had the authority to make a finding,
and render judgment, based solely on the sufficiency of proof that the
parent had been convicted of one of the offenses listed in section
1(D)(q). It simply had no authority to choose a statutory ground for
unfitness not alleged in the petition and proceed under that section.
	Given the coalescence of the aforementioned circumstances, we
believe Lisa M. has standing to challenge the constitutionality of
section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act. We now turn to the standards
that govern our review.
	An issue concerning the constitutionality of a statute presents a
question of law that we review de novo. In re Parentage of John M.,
212 Ill. 2d 253, 265 (2004); Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 121-22 (2004). We begin with the presumption that the
statute is constitutional. John M., 212 Ill. 2d  at 265. If reasonably
possible, this court must construe the statute so as to affirm its
constitutionality and validity. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 296.
	When confronted with a claim that a statute violates
constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection, a court
must first determine the nature of the right purportedly infringed by
the statute. People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 203 (2004); In re
R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 302. Classification of the right affected is critical
because the nature of the right dictates the level of scrutiny courts
employ in determining whether the statute in question passes
constitutional muster. Unless a fundamental constitutional right is
implicated, the rational basis test applies, and the statute will be
upheld so long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. John M., 212 Ill. 2d  at 266, quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at
302. However, where the constitutional right at issue is one
considered "fundamental," the presumption of constitutionality is
weaker, and courts must subject the statute to the more rigorous
requirements of strict scrutiny analysis. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d  at 204;
Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d  at 122. In order to survive strict scrutiny, the
measures employed by the legislature must be necessary to serve a
compelling state interest, and must be narrowly tailored thereto, i.e.,
the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the
attainment of its goal. In re H.G., 197 Ill. 2d  at 330; In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 303.
	There is no doubt that the right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children is a fundamental constitutional right. In re
R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 303. Indeed, the rights to conceive and raise one's
children have been described as among the most " 'basic civil rights of
man.' " Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558,
92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212 (1972), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 1660, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113 (1942). As the Supreme Court observed in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 56, 120 S. Ct. 2054,
2060 (2000), "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case--the interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children--is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests" recognized by
the Court. " '[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.' " Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91, 106, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989),
quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938 (1977). The liberty interest of
parents in the care, custody and management of their child " 'does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child to the State.' " In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 359 (2004), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982).
Clearly, strict scrutiny analysis applies to statutes-like the one at
issue-that are employed as part of a procedure to terminate parental
rights and dissolve the bonds between parent and child. Thus, the
statute at issue must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and must be narrowly tailored so as to use the least restrictive means
consistent with the attainment of the government's goal. In re H.G.,
197 Ill. 2d  at 330; In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 303.
	With these precepts in mind, we consider the means the
legislature has chosen in pursuit of what is undeniably the state's
compelling interest in the safety and welfare of children. See American
Federation of State, County &amp; Municipal Employees v. Department
of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 312 (1996).
	While section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act denies respondents
like Lisa M. and Lisa Z. an opportunity to rebut its presumption of
parental unfitness, based upon conviction of one of the offenses listed
therein, section 1(D)(i) of the Act allows for rebuttal, though several
of the criminal offenses set forth therein are at least as serious as
section 1(D)(q) offenses, and in some instances more serious. For
example, section 1(D)(q) lists "aggravated battery, heinous battery, or
attempted murder of any child." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 2002).
Among the offenses against children listed in section 1(D)(i) are "first
degree murder or second degree murder of any child ***[,] attempt
or conspiracy to commit first degree murder or second degree murder
of any child ***[,] solicitation to commit murder of any child,
solicitation to commit murder of any child for hire, or solicitation to
commit second degree murder of any child ***[,] aggravated criminal
sexual assault." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2000).
	So, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person who murders
a child is an unfit parent; however, there is a mandatory conclusive
(irrebuttable) presumption that a parent convicted of aggravated
battery or attempted murder of a child-offenses no more serious than
murder-is an unfit parent. Had the State alleged conviction of
attempted murder of a child under section 1(D)(i), Lisa M. would
have had an opportunity to rebut the presumption of unfitness;
however, because the State alleged conviction of attempted murder of
a child under section 1(D)(q), Lisa M. was statutorily denied the right
to offer evidence in rebuttal. Lisa Z. would have had an opportunity
to offer rebuttal evidence of parental fitness at the fitness hearing had
she been convicted of killing one of her children, because the State
would have been forced to file under section 1(D)(i); however, since
she had been convicted of aggravated battery, she had no statutory
right of rebuttal. There is no logic to this statutory scheme, much less
the use of "narrowly tailored *** '*** least restrictive means
consistent with the attainment of [the State's] goal.' " In re H.G., 197 Ill. 2d  at 330, quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 303.
	As this court has observed, statutory classifications that affect a
fundamental right violate the equal protection clause unless they are
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In re Adoption
of L.T.M., Nos. 95746, 97947, slip op. at 10 (January 21, 2005); In
re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 309. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection requires that the government treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. L.T.M., slip op. at 9, quoting In re
R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 309 (2001). In L.T.M., this court held it was a
violation of equal protection not to provide appellate counsel to an
indigent parent whose parental rights had been terminated under the
Adoption Act, "when he certainly would have had [a right to counsel
on appeal had his rights been terminated] under the Juvenile Court
Act." L.T.M., slip op. at 10. Thus, this court held it was an equal
protection violation to accord a procedural right under one act, but to
withhold it under the other. As this court noted, the consequences
under either act were the same:
		"[A] parent who stands to lose his rights under the Adoption
Act if he is found unfit is in a very similar situation to a
parent who stands to lose the very same constitutional right,
based on the very same finding, in proceedings under the
Juvenile Court Act." L.T.M., slip op. at 11.
	In L.T.M., this court defined the pertinent classification for
purposes of equal protection analysis as follows:
		"In this case, the classification is the distinction between
parents who must answer a petition to terminate their
parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act and those, like
John, who must answer under the Adoption Act." L.T.M.,
slip op. at 10.
The right to counsel is a procedural safeguard (In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 
at 365; see In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1107 (2003)) that
this court held should be afforded to similarly situated parents, facing
the prospect of termination, regardless of the provision under which
the State proceeded. L.T.M., slip op. at 9-12.
	The applicability of L.T.M.'s holding to the case at bar is
unmistakable; the reasoning of L.T.M. is even more compelling when
applied to the circumstances of this case. This court has stated that a
rebuttable presumption is a rule of procedure. First National Bank of
Chicago v. King, 165 Ill. 2d 533, 542 (1995). Thus, a respondent, like
Lisa M., who is the subject of a petition alleging unfitness under
section 1(D)(q) is denied the procedural right of rebuttal that is
afforded to a person convicted of the same offense, but alleged to be
unfit under section 1(D)(i). The offense is the same. The potential
consequences are the same. The procedural safeguards provided by
the statutes are different, for no apparent reason. To deny this
safeguard to Lisa M. and Lisa Z., while providing it to others similarly
situated is to deny them equal protection of the law.
	It is no answer to suggest that there is a unique "moral" element
to section 1(D)(i) simply because that provision is entitled
"depravity." There is no difference between the two sections, much
less a meaningful one. Sections 1(D)(i) and 1(D)(q) both base their
presumptions of parental unfitness on prior convictions of the same or
similar, specified offenses. Section 1(D)(i) contains the error-reducing
safeguard of rebuttal; section 1(D)(q) does not.
	Moreover, notwithstanding any previous statements to the
contrary, we believe, after our decision in In re D.T., there is little
force left in the argument that a respondent who has been deprived of
the opportunity to present evidence of parental fitness at a hearing
purporting to address that very issue is no worse off for having to
present such evidence at the best-interests hearing, after having been
found unfit.
	Recently, in In re D.T., this court held that parents are not
entitled to all of the same procedural safeguards at the best-interests
hearing that they enjoy at the fitness hearing. Specifically, this court
found that the clear and convincing standard of proof that applies at
the fitness hearing gives way to a lesser, preponderance, standard of
proof at the best-interests phase of termination proceedings. In re
D.T., 212 Ill. 2d  at 361, 366. The basis for the change in standards of
proof, this court noted, is a different focus at the best-interests
hearing:
			"Following a finding of unfitness *** the focus shifts to
the child. The issue is no longer whether parental rights can
be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child's
needs, parental rights should be terminated. Accordingly, at
a best-interests hearing, the parent's interest in maintaining
the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest
in a stable, loving home life." (Emphases in original.) In re
D.T., 212 Ill. 2d  at 364.
This court explained why a higher standard of proof is required at the
fitness hearing and a lesser standard of proof is permissible at the best-interests phase:
		"At the unfitness stage, the interests of the parent and the
child coincide to the extent that they both 'share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship.' Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 760-61, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at
611, 102 S. Ct.  at 1398. The alignment of these interests at
the unfitness hearing favors the use of error-reducing
procedures, i.e., use of a more stringent burden of proof than
a preponderance. See Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 760-61, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 611, 102 S. Ct.  at 1398. The same, however, is not
true at the best-interests hearing. Once the State proves
parental unfitness, the interests of the parent and the child
diverge. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 760, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 611, 102 S. Ct.  at 1398. Thus, at a best-interests hearing, the parent
and the child may become adversaries, as the child's interest
in a loving, stable and safe home environment becomes more
aligned with the State's interest in terminating parental rights
and freeing the child for adoption. Although the parent still
possesses an interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship, the force of that interest is lessened by the
court's finding that the parent is unfit to raise his or her
child." In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d  at 363-64.
Clearly, a parent found unfit at the first phase of termination
proceedings enters the second phase at a disadvantage from a
procedural and evidentiary standpoint. See In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217 (2002) (at the best-interests hearing, the "full range of the
parent's conduct" must be considered, including the grounds for
finding the parent unfit); In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 271 (2001)
(such evidence is a "crucial consideration" at the best-interests
hearing).
	A parent who is denied the opportunity to adduce evidence of
fitness at the hearing where a fitness determination will be made is
clearly at a disadvantage by the time of the best-interests hearing-a
disadvantage not faced by those who are allowed to present evidence
of their fitness at the first phase of termination proceedings. The latter
are accorded an "error-reducing" procedure that is inexplicably denied
the former. To suggest that this inequity does not exist is to ignore the
reality of results, and a fundamental requirement of due process, i.e.,
that a respondent be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 32, 96 S .Ct. 893, 902
(1976); In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 49 (2004). The operative term
here is "meaningful."
	As the Supreme Court stated in Stanley, addressing another
mandatory conclusive (irrebuttable) presumption, that also impacted
the fundamental family relationship between parent and child:
			"Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence
and care *** it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child. It therefore
cannot stand." Stanley, 405 U.S.  at 656-57, 31 L. Ed. 2d  at
562, 92 S. Ct.  at 1215.
	In L.T.M., we rejected any suggestion that controlling
expenditures was a valid basis for denying equal protection to the
class affected by the deprivation. L.T.M., slip op. at 11-12. We do so
here as well. If the argument is that the respondents can present their
evidence of fitness in any event at the best-interests hearing, it makes
no difference from the standpoint of cost if they are allowed to do so
at the first stage of termination proceedings; however, it may well
make a significant difference as to outcome.
	In short, there is no rational basis for treating persons subject to
fitness proceedings under section 1(D)(q) differently from those facing
the same proceedings under section 1(D)(i), much less a justification
that would survive strict scrutiny. We need not speculate as to how
section 1(D)(q) could be more narrowly tailored; the legislature has
provided us the model in section 1(D)(i). Therefore, we hold section
1(D)(q) unconstitutional as violative of equal protection. Given our
disposition, we need not address the parties' due process arguments.
	It remains for us to decide whether the remedy for this
constitutional violation is to require the state to extend the benefit of
timely and meaningful rebuttal to those who have been denied it under
section 1(D)(q), or to withdraw the benefit from those who have been
favored under section 1(D)(i). See L.T.M., slip op. at 12. Given that
the legislature has seen fit to extend the benefit of rebuttal to those
parents who have been convicted of murdering a child, we see no
reason to withhold that benefit from those convicted of the lesser
offenses listed in section 1(D)(q). We believe a full and fair hearing,
and an informed decision, benefits all concerned, and works to the
disadvantage of no one.
	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court in cause No. 98896. We reverse the judgments of the appellate
and circuit courts in cause No. 97292 and remand to the circuit curt
for further proceedings.

No. 98896-Appellate court judgment affirmed.
No. 97292-Judgments reversed;
 cause remanded.