Title: In the Matter of Moran
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12356
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2018

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SJC-12356 
 
IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT C. MORAN. 
 
 
 
April 20, 2018. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension, Deceit, 
Drafting of will. 
 
 
 
The respondent, Robert C. Moran, appeals from an order of a 
single justice of this court, acting on an information filed by 
the Board of Bar Overseers (board), suspending him from the 
practice of law for nine months.  We vacate the order and remand 
the case for the entry of an order suspending the respondent 
from the practice of law for fifteen months.1   
 
 
1.  Background.  Bar counsel filed an amended five-count 
petition for discipline with the board alleging multiple acts of 
misconduct in connection with the respondent's handling of the 
affairs of two elderly clients, both of whom are now deceased.  
Two counts alleged that the respondent charged excessive fees;2 
that he failed to inform his clients of fees for services 
rendered and fee withdrawals;3 that he held the clients' funds in 
                                                          
 
 
1 This bar discipline appeal is subject to the court's rule 
governing such appeals.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 
(2015).  We have reviewed the materials filed.  Pursuant to the 
rule, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument. 
 
 
2 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), as appearing in 459 Mass. 
1301 (2011). 
 
 
3 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 
Mass. 1338 (2004). 
 
2 
 
 
nontrust accounts;4 and that he drafted testamentary instruments 
for both clients that included substantial testamentary gifts to 
himself.5  Two other counts concerned the respondent's conduct as 
executor for the same clients' estates.  They alleged that the 
respondent failed to render diligent and competent services;6 
that he charged and collected excessive fees;7 that he failed to 
hold estate funds in segregated interest-bearing accounts;8 that 
he negotiated and withdrew estate funds before his appointment 
as executor;9 and that he intentionally misrepresented, under 
oath, the amount of estate assets in a probate court filing for 
one estate.10  The fifth count charged misconduct in connection 
with trust accounts and trust funds.11  The respondent answered 
and asserted certain facts in mitigation.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 8 (3), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009) ("[a]verments in 
the petition are admitted when not denied in the answer").   
 
 
A hearing committee of the board conducted an evidentiary 
hearing and determined that bar counsel had proved, with limited 
exceptions, the petition's allegations.  A majority of the 
committee recommended that the respondent be publicly 
reprimanded; a dissenting member found additional facts 
supporting violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8 (c), 426 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
4 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 
Mass. 1338 (2004). 
 
 
5 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8 (c), 426 Mass. 1338 (1998). 
 
 
6 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 426 Mass. 1308 (1998); Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 
426 Mass. 1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), (d) (1), as 
appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c), 
426 Mass. 1389 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. 8.4 (d), 426 Mass. 1429 
(1998). 
 
 
7 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a). 
 
 
8 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), (e) (5), as appearing 
in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). 
 
 
9 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 3.4 (c), 8.4 (d). 
 
 
10 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), 8.4 (c), (d), (h), 426 
Mass. 1383 (1998). 
 
 
11 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. 
 
3 
 
 
1338 (1998) (substantial testamentary gifts), and recommended a 
greater sanction.  Both the respondent and bar counsel appealed 
to the board.  The board adopted the dissenting hearing 
committee member's factual findings concerning the additional 
misconduct, and the hearing committee's findings as to remaining 
misconduct and the factors in aggravation.  It voted to 
recommend that the respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for nine months, as well as that a reinstatement hearing be 
required on any petition for reinstatement.  It also recommended 
that the respondent be permitted to apply for reinstatement 
after six months of suspension.  The board filed a corresponding 
information in the county court.  After a hearing, a single 
justice considered and discussed at length each of the 
respondent's contentions.  She ordered that the respondent be 
suspended for a period of nine months, with the additional 
requirement of a reinstatement hearing.  The respondent appeals.  
 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence of misconduct.  The single 
justice reviewed the record establishing the misconduct charged 
in the petition, accepted the hearing committee's role as the 
"sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented at the 
hearing," S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a), as appearing in 453 
Mass. 1310 (2009), and determined that the board's findings 
concerning the respondent's misconduct were supported by 
substantial evidence.  See Matter of Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 
1011 (2008).  On appeal, "[w]e review the single justice's 
decision (on issues other than the initial choice of a sanction 
at the disciplinary stage) to determine whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion or clear error of law."  Matter of Weiss, 
474 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2016).  There was no error.  
 
 
a.  General claims of error.  The respondent does not mount 
a substantial challenge on appeal to the weight of the evidence 
supporting the most serious charges of misconduct found by the 
board.  He contends generally that the hearing committee and the 
board improperly relied on the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct, S.J.C. Rule 3:07, 426 Mass. 1303 (1998), 
because the rules themselves were not offered in evidence at the 
hearing, and the hearing committee did not notify the parties 
that it would take notice of them, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 11 (5).  As the single justice recognized, however, § 11 (5) 
pertains to judicially noticed facts, not rules of court 
concerning attorney discipline.  The board and its hearing 
committee may take notice of the disciplinary rules as a matter 
of course.  Cf. Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 269 
(1962) (in Appellate Tax Board proceedings, "[t]he rules of the 
board are necessarily before it in all the cases which it 
4 
 
 
hears"); Mass. G. Evid. § 202 (2018) (judicial notice of law, 
including Massachusetts statutes, common law, rules of court, 
and codified regulations); M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Handbook of 
Massachusetts Evidence § 2.8.1, at 54 (2018), and cases cited 
(general or public law of Commonwealth judicially noticed 
without request).   
 
 
There was likewise no error in the hearing committee's and 
the board's reliance on the respondent's answer to the amended 
petition for discipline.  Under applicable rules, admissions 
contained in a pleading are considered established, and there is 
no additional requirement that the pleading itself be introduced 
in evidence.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (3) (a), as appearing in 
453 Mass. 1310 (2009) (averments in petition for discipline are 
deemed admitted if not denied in answer); Rule 3.15(d) of the 
Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers (2009) (same).  Cf. Mass. G. 
Evid. § 611 note on binding admissions, at 134 (2018), and cases 
cited (statement of fact or declaration in pleading is binding 
admission and relieves opposing party of need to present 
evidence on issue); Mass. R. App. P. 8 (a), as amended, 378 
Mass. 932 (1979) (record on appeal includes pleadings); 801 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.01(10)(k) (1998) (record of adjudicatory 
proceedings includes pleadings). 
 
 
The respondent's remaining arguments primarily focus on 
three issues related to the board's determination that he 
charged or collected clearly excessive fees.  See Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.5, as appearing in 459 Mass. 1301 (2011) (lawyer shall not 
"charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee").  As 
we discuss below, none of those claims has merit.  Moreover, 
from a disciplinary perspective, they are also largely beside 
the point because of the other very serious misconduct charged 
and found by the board, the consequences of which are more 
severe than those associated with charging a clearly excessive 
fee.  We therefore address the more serious allegations of 
misconduct first. 
  
 
b.  False statement.  In connection with his representation 
of one client, the respondent filed an estate inventory with the 
probate court, which he signed under oath, that knowingly 
misrepresented estate assets.  Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 
416, 422-423 (1992) (knowing misrepresentation to court 
concerning terms of pending transaction warranted one-year 
suspension).  As the board observed, the respondent's 
misrepresentation effectively obscured from the probate court's 
review certain payments that he either had made or expected to 
make, including payments to himself.  This conduct violated 
5 
 
 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), and 8.4 (c), (d), and (h), 426 
Mass. 1383 (1998).   
 
 
c.  Testamentary gifts.  Over the course of years, the 
respondent prepared a series of wills and durable powers of 
attorney for these clients, neither of whom he was related to by 
blood or marriage.  The final durable power of attorney for each 
client appointed the respondent as attorney-in-fact, and each 
will nominated him as the executor.  Each will bequeathed all of 
the client's tangible personal property to the respondent, and 
included a request that the respondent distribute the items as 
the client might subsequently indicate.  One will also made 
specific bequests to individuals and charities.  By preparing 
testamentary instruments for two clients providing for 
substantial testamentary gifts to himself, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8 (c).12  See Matter of Wainwright, 
28 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 883, 883 (2012) (public 
reprimand).  The rule strictly proscribes such gifts, even in 
the absence of undue influence, overreaching, fraud, or 
misrepresentation.  Id. 
 
 
d.  Lack of diligence.  The hearing committee's findings 
amply support its conclusion that the respondent engaged in 
lengthy delays in settling both estates.  By failing to marshal 
and liquidate estate assets promptly, resulting in unnecessary 
expense and escheat of some assets, failing to file timely 
estate inventories, and delaying distribution of estate assets 
for years, while simultaneously failing to complete probate of 
the estates, the respondent's conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.2 (a),  426 Mass. 1310 (1998) (failure to seek client's lawful 
objectives); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998) (lack 
of diligence); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 
440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (failure promptly to deliver funds to 
                                                          
 
 
12 The board correctly concluded that the testamentary gifts 
were "substantial," where they had a collective value from one 
estate of at least $7,500 (more than five per cent of the gross 
estate), and more than $8,000 from the other.  See Matter of 
Moran, 27 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 612, 612-613 (2011) (two-
month suspension for drafting instrument providing $15,000 
bequest to attorney where client's assets were in excess of 
$380,000, exclusive of home, about four per cent of assets); 
Matter of Field, 20 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 140, 142 (2004) 
(public reprimand for preparing will containing $25,000 bequest 
to lawyer's wife, where bequest represented less than two per 
cent of client's estate). 
 
6 
 
 
third parties).  See Matter of Bottomly, 2 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 19, 22 (1980) (beneficiaries harmed by lawyer's 
delay in making restitution; six month suspension warranted).  
See also Matter of Munroe, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 385 
(2010); Matter of Reardon, 22 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 640, 
646 (2006). 
 
 
e.  Trust account violations.  The amended petition for 
discipline charged the respondent with numerous client trust 
account and accounting violations.  The respondent failed to 
hold personal funds of his clients, and funds belonging to their 
estates, in trust accounts, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15 (b) (1) , as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).  
Admonition No. 05-20, 21 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 712 (2005).  
He failed to disclose to his clients the payments he made to 
himself, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. 1.15 (d), as appearing 
in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004), and failed to keep required trust 
account records.  The respondent did not dispute the majority of 
these charges, and the hearing committee found the respondent 
had violated the applicable rules.  Together, these violations 
would ordinarily support a public reprimand.  See Matter of 
Beatrice, 23 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 31 (2007); Matter of 
Soforenko, 22 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 732 (2006). 
 
 
f.  Excessive fees.  As stated, the respondent's primary 
focus is on three issues related to the board's determination 
that he charged or collected clearly excessive fees.  See Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.5.  The single justice correctly concluded that 
there was no error. 
 
 
i.  Spreadsheets.  First, the respondent contends that the 
hearing committee erred in permitting the use of certain 
spreadsheets that had been prepared as "chalks" by bar counsel 
at the hearing.  The spreadsheets summarized approximately 750 
pages of the respondent's handwritten notes describing the 
services he performed for both clients over the course of many 
years, and classified the services into various categories.  
Although the respondent contends that the choice to classify 
certain tasks as either legal or nonlegal impermissibly 
interjected bar counsel's opinion into the chalk, the 
handwritten notes themselves were admitted in evidence and the 
hearing committee conducted its own review of them.  In these 
circumstances, the single justice concluded that the hearing 
committee did not abuse its discretion in permitting the use of 
the spreadsheets as chalks, and the respondent failed to 
demonstrate prejudicial error in that regard.  See Commonwealth 
v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 581-582 (1959) ("judge could 
7 
 
 
properly find that concise schedules demonstrating the 
transactions would be helpful to the jury).  See also Mass. G. 
Evid. § 1006 (2018) ("proponent may use a summary, chart, or the 
like to prove the content of voluminous writings or records that 
cannot be conveniently examined in court").13 
 
 
ii. Expert witness.  Second, the respondent contends that 
the hearing committee erred in qualifying a witness as an expert 
at the hearing, and that there was an inadequate factual basis 
for his opinion.  The hearing committee's findings establish, 
however, that the witness has many years of experience in 
numerous aspects of probate law, and previously has been 
qualified and testified as an expert in bar discipline cases.  
The respondent has not demonstrated that the committee abused 
its discretion in qualifying the witness as an expert or in 
crediting his testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 406 Mass. 
843, 852 (1990) (tribunal has broad discretion to qualify an 
expert witness, and its determination "will not be upset on 
appeal if any reasonable basis appears for it").  Likewise, the 
respondent failed to demonstrate that there was an inadequate 
factual basis for the expert's opinion as to the 
unreasonableness of the respondent's fees.  While the expert did 
not review all 750 pages of the respondent's handwritten notes, 
he testified that he verified and cross-checked a sufficient 
portion of the materials to satisfy himself as to the accuracy 
of the spreadsheets.  Moreover, the hearing committee conducted 
its own review of the respondent's records and notes.  The 
committee was therefore within its discretion in admitting the 
expert's testimony in this regard. 
 
 
iii.  Due process.  Third, the respondent complains that 
the hearing committee failed to give him a full and fair hearing 
because, he contends, it unfairly limited his testimony and 
prohibited him from relying on the approximately 750 pages of 
                                                          
 
 
13 We recognize that the board and its hearing committee 
need not strictly apply the rules of evidence in bar discipline 
proceedings.  See Rule 3.39 of the Rules of the Board of Bar 
Overseers (admissibility of evidence governed by rules 
applicable to adjudicatory proceedings under G. L. c. 30A); 
Matter of Abbott, 437 Mass. 384, 393 (2002).  See also G. L. 
c. 30A, § 11 (2) ("agencies need not observe the rules of 
evidence observed by courts . . . .  Evidence may be admitted 
and given probative effect only if it is the kind of evidence on 
which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct 
of serious affairs"); Mass. G. Evid. § 1101(c)(3) (2018). 
 
8 
 
 
handwritten notes during his testimony.  The single justice 
correctly rejected both points.  Although nine days initially 
were allocated for the hearing, the hearing committee indicated 
that more would be scheduled if necessary.  The respondent 
concedes that he did not exhaust the initial time allotment, and 
he does not suggest anything he would have done differently if 
additional time had been scheduled.  With respect to reliance on 
the notes, the committee specifically instructed that it would 
permit the respondent to refer to them "for a particular point 
to be made," which he in fact did.  "The respondent was afforded 
notice and the opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and 
to challenge evidence against him.  He has had the opportunity 
to appeal to a panel of the board, the board, a single justice, 
and the full court."  Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 454, 
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 919 (1998).  The single justice did not 
err in concluding that the respondent was not denied a full and 
fair hearing. 
 
 
A final observation:  even if the board's characterization 
of some of the particular services rendered by the respondent as 
legal or nonlegal may be debatable, much of it is not.  There 
can be no denying, for example, that services such as snow 
shoveling, moving and house cleaning, shopping, and making 
funeral arrangements are not legal services.  See Matter of 
Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. at 452 (expert testimony not required to 
prove ethical violation of rule proscribing charging excessive 
fees).  The evidence established that the respondent charged for 
these and other nonlegal services as if they were legal 
services, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (lawyer shall 
not "charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee").  
A "lawyer may not bill nonlawyer services at lawyer rates, no 
matter who performs them."  E.J. Bennett, E.J. Cohen, & H.W. 
Gunnarsson, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 81 
(8th ed. 2015).  See Matter of Moore, 29 Mass. Att'y Discipline 
Rep. 461 (2013); Matter of Chignola, 25 Mass. Att'y Discipline 
Rep. 112, 112-113 (2009) (public reprimand for charging and 
collecting fees for nonlegal services and trust account 
violations); Matter of Harbeck, 23 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
262, 262-263 (2007) (charging for nonlegal work at legal rates 
constitutes excessive fee); Matter of Kliger, 18 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 350 (2002).   
 
 
3.  Appropriate sanction.  The findings adopted by the 
board amply support the conclusion that the respondent 
repeatedly violated multiple rules of professional conduct.  We 
therefore turn to the question of sanction.  In reviewing the 
single justice's choice of sanction, we inquire whether it is 
9 
 
 
"markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered by the various 
single justices in similar cases."14  Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 
153, 156 (1983).  In this case, considering the "cumulative 
effect of the several violations committed by the respondent," 
Matter of Palmer, 413 Mass. 33, 38 (1992), we conclude that a 
fifteen-month suspension is appropriate.  See Matter of Gordon, 
385 Mass. 48, 58 (1982) (while the board's recommendation as to 
sanction is entitled to substantial deference, "ultimate duty of 
decision rests with this court").  Although we give substantial 
deference to the board's recommendation, see Matter of 
Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. at 455, we ultimately "decide every case 
'on its own merits [such that] every offending attorney . . . 
receive[s] the disposition most appropriate in the 
circumstances."  Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. 345, 356 (2006). 
 
 
The respondent here knowingly misrepresented estate assets 
on an inventory he filed, under oath, in the probate court, the 
effect of which was to obscure from the probate court's 
consideration payments the respondent had made or intended to 
make to himself and others.  An intentional misrepresentation to 
a court typically warrants a suspension of at least one year.  
See Matter of an Application for Admission to the Bar, 431 Mass. 
678, 682 n.6 (2000); Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 431-432 
(1993); Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. at 422-423.  Where the 
misrepresentation is made under oath, a longer suspension is 
warranted.  See Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1020 (2016) 
(twenty-seven month suspension for misconduct including charging 
clearly excessive fee and false statements to tribunal); Matter 
of Finneran, 455 Mass. 722, 731 n.13 (2010) (two-year suspension 
for false testimony under oath); Matter of Shaw, 427 Mass. 764, 
769-770 (1998) (two-year suspension for multiple false 
statements under oath).  Cf. Matter of Smoot, 26 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline R. 637, 643 (2010) (six-month suspension where 
misrepresentation did not bear on substantive merits of client's 
case). 
 
 
In addition, the respondent engaged in other serious 
misconduct.  He charged and collected clearly excessive fees 
from two clients and, after their deaths, from their estates.  
He did so both as a lawyer and an attorney-in-fact acting under 
a durable power of attorney during the lifetimes of his clients, 
and as an attorney and executor after their deaths.  Considered 
individually, any one of those actions would warrant a public 
reprimand.  See Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481 (1996), cert. 
                                                          
 
 
14 In the county court, bar counsel requested that the 
single justice impose a suspension of eighteen months or more. 
10 
 
 
denied sub nom. Fordham v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel, 519 U.S. 
1149 (1997).  See also Grimes v. Perkins School for the Blind, 
22 Mass. App. Ct. 439 (1986).  Additionally, although no undue 
influence, overreaching, fraud, or misrepresentation was found, 
the respondent prepared testamentary instruments for both 
clients, which provided for substantial testamentary gifts to 
himself.  Conduct of this nature also warrants a public 
reprimand.  Matter of Wainwright, 28 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
at 883.  Considered individually, any of the remaining 
categories of misconduct discussed above also would warrant at 
least a public reprimand.  See Matter of Fordham, supra.   
 
 
a.  Factors in mitigation.  The hearing committee 
considered in mitigation that the respondent's "actions were not 
engineered to deprive [clients] of their property or to take 
advantage of them but rather to provide for them and give them a 
sense of peace in their last days, which they would not have 
received anywhere else or from anyone else."  The committee 
therefore recommended "a downward departure of the appropriate 
sanction based on his providing personal services to these two 
elderly women."  It also considered the extensive and detailed 
client notes the respondent maintained, as well as that he did 
not conceal his actions.  While we acknowledge these 
considerations, they are not the type of "special" factors that 
we consider in mitigation of misconduct.  Although the 
respondent evidently provided necessary personal services for 
his clients, he also charged and collected excessive fees for 
performing them and did not provide appropriate notice to them.  
In addition, keeping detailed client records and cooperating 
with bar counsel in an investigation are actions that are to be 
expected of attorneys, not factors to be weighed in mitigation 
of sanction.  Finally, although the respondent corrected the 
misrepresentation to the probate court after bar counsel raised 
the issue, the fact remains that the misrepresentation was 
intentional.  "As an officer of the court, an attorney . . . is 
bound to uphold the integrity of that system by being truthful 
to the court."  Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. at 423.  In the 
circumstances, the correction does not mitigate the misconduct.   
 
 
b.  Factors in aggravation.  Although we find no special 
mitigating factors, there are factors to be weighed in 
aggravation.  The respondent was admitted to the practice of law 
in 1977, and since 1999 has been engaged in a solo law practice 
focusing primarily on probate and estate matters.  His 
substantial experience in the practice of law, including in the 
practice area in which the misconduct occurred, properly was 
considered an aggravating factor.  See Matter of Luongo, 416 
11 
 
 
Mass. 308, 311-312 (1993).  In addition, he engaged in multiple 
acts of misconduct over the course of years.  Matter of 
Kerlinsky, 428 Mass. 656, 666, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160 
(1999).  Both clients were particularly vulnerable, given their 
ages, infirmity, and needs, and the lack of relatives to monitor 
their affairs.  See Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. at 354; Matter of 
Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 480 (2005); Matter of Palmer, 423 Mass. 
647, 651 n.1 (1996).  Finally, as the board observed, the 
respondent has not demonstrated an understanding about the 
wrongful nature of the misconduct.  See Matter of Bailey, 439 
Mass. 134, 152 (2003); Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. at 457; 
Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654, 657 (1988) (attorney's 
"persistent assertions that he did nothing wrong . . . 
demonstrated that he 'continue[d] to be unmindful of certain 
basic ethical precepts of the legal profession'").  Lastly, at 
least as of the time of the board's decision, the respondent had 
not refunded or repaid excessive fees received from the clients 
or their estates.  Matter of Eisenhauer, supra. 
 
 
4.  Disposition.  The court system depends on the integrity 
of attorneys who appear before it.  Considering the substantial 
misconduct in this case, including intentional misrepresentation 
to the probate court, charging and collecting clearly excessive 
fees, lack of diligence in the probate of two estates, as well 
as the other substantial violations of the rules of professional 
conduct, together with the aggravating factors discussed above, 
we conclude that a term suspension of fifteen months is 
appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
 
Robert C. Moran, pro se. 
 
Susan A. Strauss Weisberg, Assistant Bar Counsel.