Title: Town of Delafield v. Eric Winkelman
Citation: 2004 WI 17
Docket Number: 2002AP000979
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2004

2004 WI 17 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0979 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Town of Delafield,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Eric Winkelman and Christine Winkelman,  
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 92 
Reported at: 264 Wis. 2d 264, 663 N.W.2d 324 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert G. Mawdsley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by H. Stanley Riffle, Julie A. Aquavia and Arenz, Molter, Macy & 
Riffle, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument by H. Stanley Riffle. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by James W. 
Hammes and Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Waukesha, and oral 
argument by James W. Hammes. 
 
2004 WI 17 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 02-0979  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 492) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Town of Delafield,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric Winkelman and Christine Winkelman,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, Town of 
Delafield ("Town"), seeks review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals that reversed the summary judgment granted by 
the circuit court in favor of the Town.1  After a zoning 
violation had been proven in a separate proceeding, the Town 
brought this enforcement action seeking, as sanction for the 
                                                 
1 Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2003 WI App 92, 264 
Wis. 2d 264, 663 N.W.2d 324 (reversing a decision of the circuit 
court for Waukesha County.  Judge Patrick L. Snyder issued the 
oral ruling to the issue on appeal.  As a result of judicial 
rotation, Judge Robert G. Mawdsley issued the written order 
implementing the oral ruling.).  
No. 
02-0979   
 
2 
 
violation, a raze order for the removal of a legal nonconforming 
rental unit from the Winkelmans' property. 
¶2 
The Town urges this court to clarify whether the 
circuit court had the power to consider equitable arguments in 
this enforcement action.  It asserts that even if the circuit 
court generally has such power, it should not be exercised here 
because the Winkelmans already received a full opportunity to 
challenge the equities in the certiorari review.  The Winkelmans 
counter 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacked 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction to consider the Town's enforcement action.   
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter the orders.  We also agree with the court 
of appeals that the circuit court had the power to consider the 
Winkelmans' 
equitable 
arguments 
in 
the 
context 
of 
this 
enforcement action.  Moreover, we determine that the circuit 
court may properly exercise that power here.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The Winkelmans own a lot in the Town of Delafield 
containing two houses.  Both are legal, but nonconforming 
structures based on their location on the lot.  The houses are 
also legal, but nonconforming uses due to zoning restrictions 
that permit only one residence per lot.  At all times relevant 
to these proceedings, the Winkelmans used one of the houses as 
their own residence and the other as a rental unit.2 
                                                 
2According to the Town's petition for review, the Winkelmans 
no longer use one home as a residence; they now live elsewhere.  
No. 
02-0979   
 
3 
 
¶5 
In 1991, the Winkelmans obtained a building permit for 
interior remodeling of the two houses.  After construction 
began, the new Town building inspector discovered that the 
remodeling involved work on a legal nonconforming structure and 
issued a stop-work order.  As a result of the stop-work order, 
the Winkelmans applied for a variance from the Town zoning 
board. 
¶6 
On September 30, 1994, the Town zoning board granted 
the Winkelmans' request for a variance in part, but placed 
certain conditions on its approval.  One of the conditions 
required the Winkelmans to remove the rental residence from the 
property within three years of the date of the board's decision. 
¶7 
The Winkelmans thereafter sought certiorari review of 
the board's decision.  Among other arguments, the Winkelmans 
claimed that the board's action was unreasonable because their 
mortgage financing was contingent upon the rental income of the 
second residence.  The certiorari court rejected this argument, 
noting that the Winkelmans provided no evidence to support it.  
Accordingly, the court upheld the board's decision, and the 
Winkelmans did not appeal. 
¶8 
After 
certiorari 
review, 
the 
Town 
extended 
the 
deadline for removing the rental residence from March 1998 to 
April 1999.  When the Winkelmans did not remove the rental house 
by April 1999, the Town's zoning board brought a motion 
requesting the certiorari court to order the Winkelmans to raze 
the house or, in the alternative, allow the Town to do so.  The 
No. 
02-0979   
 
4 
 
certiorari court granted the board's motion, and the Winkelmans 
appealed. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed the certiorari court.  
Winkelman v. Town of Delafield, 2000 WI App 254, ¶1, 239 Wis. 2d 
542, 620 N.W.2d 438 (Winkelman I).  It did so on the ground that 
the board needed to obtain jurisdiction over the Winkelmans for 
the enforcement action either by serving a summons and complaint 
or by serving an appropriate original writ.  Id.  
¶10 Following the decision of the court of appeals, the 
Town commenced this action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8) 
(2001-02)3 by filing a complaint requesting forfeitures along 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8) 
provides: 
(8) 
OTHER 
MEASURES 
OF 
ENFORCEMENT 
AND 
REMEDIES; 
PENALTY. 
 
Any 
building 
erected, 
constructed 
or 
reconstructed 
in 
violation 
of 
this 
section 
or 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto shall be deemed 
an unlawful structure, and the building inspector or 
city attorney or other official designated by the 
council may bring action to enjoin such erection, 
construction 
or 
reconstruction, 
or 
cause 
such 
structure to be vacated or removed.  It shall be 
unlawful 
to erect, 
construct or 
reconstruct any 
building or structure in violation of this section or 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto.  Any person, 
firm or corporation violating such provisions shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
thereof shall be fined not more than $500.  Each and 
every 
day 
during 
which 
said 
illegal 
erection, 
construction or reconstruction continues shall be 
deemed a separate offense.  In case any building or 
structure is or is proposed to be erected, constructed 
or reconstructed, or any land is or is proposed to be 
used in violation of this section or regulations 
adopted pursuant thereto, the building inspector or 
the city attorney or any adjacent or neighboring 
No. 
02-0979   
 
5 
 
with an order directing the Winkelmans to remove the rental 
residence.  The Town then moved for summary judgment. 
¶11 The circuit court granted the Town's motion for 
summary judgment and rejected the Winkelmans' argument that 
under Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 N.W.2d 715 
(1998), it was required to hear their equitable argument.  In 
its oral decision, the court concluded that it did not have the 
equitable power in the context of the enforcement action to deny 
the injunctive relief.  It explained: 
But now we're back on an independent action and I have 
no power to change the – actually, the position taken 
by the Town which was upheld by Judge Mawdsley, not 
appealed on that issue.  There is now a judgment 
entered that approves of the variance . . . .  I have 
no alternative but to grant this motion for summary 
judgment  . . . and enter an [o]rder allowing the Town 
to raze the building if the Winkelmans do not. 
¶12 The circuit court subsequently imposed a forfeiture of 
$25 per day from April 8, 1999, until January 31, 2002.  The 
oral ruling granting the raze order and a forfeiture was later 
reduced to a written order.  The Winkelmans again appealed. 
 
¶13 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision.  Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2003 WI App 92, ¶1, 
264 Wis. 2d 264, 663 N.W.2d 324 (Winkelman II).  It observed 
that when a governmental entity seeks equitable relief such as 
                                                                                                                                                             
property owner who would be specially damaged by such 
violation, may, in addition to other remedies provided 
by law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or 
any other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent 
or enjoin or abate or remove such unlawful erection, 
construction or reconstruction.  
No. 
02-0979   
 
6 
 
an injunction or abatement, the law appeared to provide property 
owners with "two kicks at the cat": first, to defend against the 
claim that there is a violation and, second, to defend against 
enforcement of a sanction for that violation.  Id., ¶14.  
Although the court questioned the wisdom of this approach, it 
determined that Goode mandated consideration of the equitable 
arguments.  Id., ¶15.  Moreover, it rejected the Town's 
assertion that the Winkelmans had already made their equitable 
arguments during the certiorari review.  Id., ¶18.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals remanded the case back to the circuit court 
for a hearing on the equities.  Id., ¶20.  It prohibited the 
Winkelmans from reasserting the argument previously rejected by 
the certiorari court, however, under the doctrine of issue 
preclusion.  Id.   
II 
¶14 As a threshold matter, we must examine the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction of a particular action is a question of law, 
subject to independent appellate review.  See Gonzales v. AM 
Cmty. Credit Union, 150 Wis. 2d 773, 777, 442 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
¶15 Additionally, 
this 
case 
provides 
us 
with 
an 
opportunity to review the circuit court's power to consider 
equitable arguments in the context of an enforcement action.  It 
also allows us to determine whether the court may consider 
equitable arguments which have been previously rejected by a 
certiorari court.  These issues are raised in the context of 
No. 
02-0979   
 
7 
 
summary judgment.  We review a circuit court's grant or denial 
of summary judgment independently, applying the same methodology 
as the circuit court.  O'Neill v. Reemer, 2003 WI 13, ¶8, 259 
Wis. 
2d 
544, 
657 
N.W.2d 
403 
(citing 
Torgerson 
v. 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 524, 536, 563 N.W.2d 472 
(1997)).   
¶16 Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Id., ¶8.  Here, there are no 
material facts in dispute that are relevant to the issue before 
us.  Therefore, we are presented with a question of law, which 
is subject to independent appellate review.  Id.  (citing Lewis 
v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 60, ¶9, 243 Wis. 2d 648, 
627 N.W.2d 484.) 
III 
 
¶17 We begin with the inquiry of whether the circuit court 
had subject matter jurisdiction.  In their brief, the Winkelmans 
assert that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to consider the Town's enforcement action.  Specifically, they 
contend that the jurisdiction of the Town's ordinance did not 
extend to them, as their property is actually controlled by the 
Waukesha County Shoreland Code.  In the case's nine-year 
history, this is the first time the Winkelmans have raised the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
¶18 The principal authority the Winkelmans rely upon for 
their argument is Wis. Stat. § 59.692(2)(b).  The statute 
provides, 
"[i]f 
an 
existing 
town 
ordinance 
relating 
to 
No. 
02-0979   
 
8 
 
shorelands is more restrictive than an ordinance later enacted 
under this section affecting the same shorelands, it continues 
as a town ordinance in all respects to the extent of the greater 
restrictions, but not otherwise."  Wis. Stat. § 59.692(2)(b).  
The Winkelmans argue that by the application of the statute, the 
Town zoning ordinance could regulate their shoreland property 
only to the extent that it imposed a greater restriction than 
does 
the 
County ordinance. 
 An 
examination 
of the two 
ordinances, they maintain, reveals that it does not.  Thus, they 
argue the Town's ordinance does not apply to their property.  
Consequently, the court does not have jurisdiction over this 
claimed violation. 
¶19 The problem with the Winkelmans' argument is that it 
confuses the jurisdiction of the zoning board with that of the 
court.  In Wisconsin, circuit courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction.  Mack v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 287, 294, 286 N.W.2d 
563 (1980).  They have subject matter jurisdiction of all 
matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in the constitution or 
prohibited by law.  Id.  (citing Dumer v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 590, 
595, 219 N.W.2d 592 (1974)).  This includes the authority to 
hear zoning enforcement actions arising from either town or 
county ordinances. 
¶20 The Winkelmans' claim is better understood as an 
attack on the Town's jurisdiction to regulate their property in 
the first place.  This attack, however, should have been made at 
the initial certiorari review.  After all, one of the issues 
certiorari courts determine is whether the Town kept within its 
No. 
02-0979   
 
9 
 
jurisdiction.4  Because the Winkelmans did not timely object to 
the Town's jurisdiction, we do not address the merits of the 
issue and deem it as waived. 
IV 
¶21 We next address whether the circuit court had the 
power to consider the Winkelmans' equitable arguments in the 
context of an enforcement proceeding.  The relevant precedent is 
Goode and the series of cases culminating in Lake Bluff Housing 
Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 150, 246 Wis. 
2d 785, 632 N.W.2d 485 (Lake Bluff IV).  We examine these cases 
in turn.  
¶22 In Goode, this court was asked to determine whether a 
circuit court retained equitable power to deny injunctive relief 
after a zoning violation has been proven.  219 Wis. 2d at 656.  
There, the County initiated an enforcement action pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11)5 against Goode for noncompliance with a 
                                                 
4 Common-law certiorari is limited to determining: (1) 
whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it 
acted according to law; (3) whether its actions were arbitrary, 
oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might 
reasonably make the order of determination in question.  Hanlon 
v. Town of Milton, 2000 WI 61, ¶23, 235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 N.W.2d 
44.  
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.69(11) provides: 
(11) 
PROCEDURE FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF 
COUNTY 
ZONING 
ORDINANCE. 
 
The 
board 
shall 
prescribe 
rules, 
regulations and administrative procedures, and provide 
such 
administrative 
personnel 
as 
it 
considers 
necessary for the enforcement of this section, and all 
ordinances enacted in pursuance thereof.  The rules 
and regulations and the districts, setback building 
No. 
02-0979   
 
10 
 
zoning order.  Id. at 656-57.  The County requested assessment 
of forfeitures and an injunctive order compelling Goode to 
relocate his house to comply with a 50-foot setback requirement.  
Id. at 656.  In the County's view, the statute in question did 
not give circuit courts discretion over whether to require 
compliance with zoning ordinances.  Id. at 663.  This court 
disagreed. 
¶23 After construing Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11), we concluded 
that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the traditional 
equitable powers of the circuit court.  Id. at 657.  Therefore, 
we held that "when a circuit court is asked to grant injunctive 
relief for a proven zoning ordinance violation, § 59.69(11) 
[did] not eliminate the circuit court's equitable power to deny 
injunctive relief in a particular case."  Id.  Accordingly, we 
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the 
order to relocate Goode's house and remanded the matter for a 
hearing on the equities.  See id.  
 
¶24 In the subsequent series of Lake Bluff cases, the 
court of appeals considered whether the analysis in Goode 
applied to situations where relief is sought pursuant to a 
                                                                                                                                                             
lines and regulations authorized by this section, 
shall be prescribed by ordinances which shall be 
declared to be for the purpose of promoting the public 
health, safety and general welfare.  The ordinances 
shall 
be 
enforced 
by 
appropriate 
forfeitures.  
Compliance with such ordinances may also be enforced 
by injunctional order at the suit of the county or an 
owner of real estate within the district affected by 
the regulation. 
No. 
02-0979   
 
11 
 
different enforcement provision for zoning violations, Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(8).  See Lake Bluff IV, 246 Wis. 2d 785, ¶3; Lake 
Bluff Housing Partners v. City of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 2d 222, 
231-32, 588 N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1998) (Lake Bluff III).  There, 
Lake 
Bluff 
Housing 
Partners 
purchased 
property 
with 
the 
intention of using it for multi-family buildings.  Lake Bluff 
IV, 246 Wis. 2d 785, ¶3.  Before any building permits were 
issued, however, South Milwaukee rezoned the property for 
single-family residences.  Id.  Lake Bluff filed suit, claiming 
that it had vested rights in the property.  Id., ¶¶3, 4.   
¶25 Lake Bluff was successful in its argument before both 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  Lake Bluff Housing v. 
City of South Milwaukee, 188 Wis. 2d 230, 233, 525 N.W.2d 59 
(Ct. App. 1994) (Lake Bluff I).  This court, however, reversed, 
concluding 
that 
because 
Lake 
Bluff 
"never 
submitted 
an 
application for a building permit conforming to the zoning and 
building code requirements in effect at the time of the 
application," it did not acquire any vested rights.  Lake Bluff 
Housing v. City of South Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 182, 540 
N.W.2d 189 (1995) (Lake Bluff II).  While the City sought review 
in this court, Lake Bluff had finished construction on its 
project.  Lake Bluff IV, 246 Wis. 2d 785, ¶5.   
¶26 After this court issued its decision, Lake Bluff filed 
a declaratory action in circuit court, arguing that the City 
should be equitably estopped from initiating an enforcement 
action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8).  Id., ¶¶6-7.  The 
circuit court agreed.  Id., ¶6.  The court of appeals, however, 
No. 
02-0979   
 
12 
 
reversed the circuit court's decision.  Lake Bluff III, 222 Wis. 
2d at 224.  In doing so, it remanded the case for a 
determination as to whether Goode's analysis applied to an 
analysis of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8), and, if so, whether "there 
[were] compelling equitable reasons" that the requested order of 
abatement should not be issued.  Id. at 231-32.   
¶27 On appeal after remand, the court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court had properly weighed the equitable 
considerations under Goode and affirmed the judgment ordering 
Lake Bluff to remove its buildings.  Lake Bluff IV, 246 Wis. 2d 
785, ¶1.  Therefore, while not explicit, Lake Bluff IV extended 
Goode's analysis to cases where relief is sought pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8), the statute relied upon by the Town in 
the present case. 
¶28 In sum, we agree with the court of appeals' reading of 
Goode and Lake Bluff that when a governmental body exercises its 
authority pursuant to either Wis. Stat. §§ 59.69(11) or 62.23(8) 
and seeks injunctive relief, the circuit court retains the power 
to deny the relief sought and the property owners can defend 
themselves in equity.  Winkelman II, 264 Wis. 2d 264, ¶14.  
Thus, we determine that the circuit court erred in concluding 
that it had no such power. 
V 
¶29 Having clarified that circuit courts have the power to 
consider 
equitable 
arguments 
in 
enforcement 
actions 
for 
injunctive relief, we next address whether that power may be 
exercised here.  The Town contends that, unlike the property 
No. 
02-0979   
 
13 
 
owners in Goode and Lake Bluff, the Winkelmans already had an 
opportunity to present their equitable arguments before the 
certiorari court and in fact did so.  It warns that the decision 
of the court of appeals to remand in the case, "wreaks havoc on 
the orderly processes of judicial administration."  The Town 
explains: 
The equity hearing ordered by the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals 
creates the extraordinary situation of one circuit 
court exercising appellate powers over another circuit 
court's decision.  Not only does this additional 
review 
grant 
the 
equity 
court 
power 
over 
the 
previously entered certiorari decision, it denies 
finality to the certiorari court's decision and upsets 
the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. 
 
¶30 The difficulty we have with the Town's position is its 
premise 
that 
certiorari 
review 
is 
a 
proper 
forum 
for 
consideration of the equities.  By its nature, certiorari review 
is limited in scope.  Unless otherwise provided by statute, the 
traditional standards of common-law certiorari review apply.  
Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 2000 WI 61, ¶23, 235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 
N.W.2d 44.  These include determining (1) whether the board kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; 
(3) 
whether 
its 
actions 
were 
arbitrary, 
oppressive 
or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and 
(4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make 
the order of determination in question.  Id.  (citing State ex 
rel. Ruthenberg v. Annuity & Pension Bd., 89 Wis. 2d 463, 472, 
474, 278 N.W.2d 835 (1979)).  Although the Town maintains that 
the third prong of certiorari review reflects the same criterion 
No. 
02-0979   
 
14 
 
that is required for making decisions on equitable arguments, we 
are not persuaded.   
 
¶31 In its decision, the court of appeals noted, "we find 
no authority, and counsel at oral argument was unable to cite to 
any, that says that courts sit in equity in certiorari actions."  
Winkelman II, 264 Wis. 2d 264, ¶19.  Like the court of appeals, 
we too have discovered no precedent that allows certiorari 
courts to sit in equity.  Indeed, the Town acknowledges in its 
brief that, "Wisconsin Courts have developed no legal authority 
with regard to this issue."  As a result, we agree with the 
court of appeals that, "[w]hile in certain circumstances a 
certiorari 
court 
has 
the 
authority 
to 
take 
additional 
evidence . . . simply allowing a court to add to the record does 
not mean that the court is then sitting in equity."  Id.  
(citation omitted). 
 
¶32  Despite the limitations of certiorari review, the 
court of appeals prohibited the Winkelmans from reasserting the 
argument previously rejected by the certiorari court concerning 
the contingency of their mortgage upon the rental income of the 
second residence.  Id., ¶20.  It did so under the theory of 
issue preclusion.  Id.  In its brief, the Town maintains that, 
"issue preclusion should not have been applied in this instance.  
Rather, claim preclusion was the appropriate doctrine to involve 
so as to prevent continuing piecemeal attack on the variance."  
We examine each of these doctrines in turn. 
 
¶33 Under 
claim 
preclusion, 
"'a 
final 
judgment 
is 
conclusive in all subsequent actions between the same parties as 
No. 
02-0979   
 
15 
 
to all matters which were litigated or which might have been 
litigated in the former proceedings.'"  Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 
2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994) (quoting DePratt v. West Bend 
Mutual Insurance Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306, 310, 334 N.W.2d 883 
(1983)).  The doctrine requires: (1) identity of the parties; 
(2) identity of the causes of action in the two suits; and (3) 
final 
judgment 
on 
the 
merits 
in 
a 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction.  Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 
541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995).   
¶34 Issue preclusion, by comparison, is a more narrow 
doctrine.  It is designed to limit the relitigation of issues 
that have been actually litigated in a previous action.   
Michele T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 687, 495 N.W.2d 327 
(1993).  The modern approach to issue preclusion requires courts 
to conduct a "fundamental fairness" analysis.  Id. at 689.  For 
this analysis, courts may consider several factors in deciding 
whether issue preclusion is equitable in a particular case.6  
                                                 
6 Courts may consider some or all of the following factors 
to protect the rights of all parties to a full and fair 
adjudication of all issues involved in the action: 
(1) Could the party against whom preclusion is sought, as a 
matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment; 
(2) Is the question one of law that involves two distinct 
claims or intervening contextual shifts in the law; 
(3) 
Do 
significant 
differences 
in 
the 
quality 
or 
extensiveness of proceedings between the two courts warrant 
relitigation of the issue; 
(4) Have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that the 
party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of persuasion in the 
first trial than in the second; or 
No. 
02-0979   
 
16 
 
 
¶35 In the end, we reject the use of either doctrine in 
this case.  Claim preclusion is inapplicable as there is no 
"identity of the causes of actions in the two suits."  In the 
first action, the Winkelmans sought certiorari review to 
challenge the Town zoning board's decision to impose a raze 
condition on a variance.  In the second, the Town brought suit 
to enforce that condition.  Although there may have been some 
overlap in the arguments of the two cases, the claims themselves 
were separate and distinct. 
 
¶36 Issue preclusion is also inappropriate for two of the 
reasons set forth in Crozier.  First, we recognize that 
"significant differences in the quality or extensiveness of 
proceedings between the two courts warrant relitigation."  Id.  
As noted above, certiorari review is limited in scope.  The 
traditional criteria by which certiorari courts review a board's 
decision do not involve consideration of equitable arguments.  
The circuit court in an enforcement action for injunctive 
relief, by contrast, can consider all equitable issues. 
 
¶37 Second, in general, property owners in the Winkelmans' 
position may have an "inadequate opportunity or incentive to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(5) 
Are 
matters 
of 
public 
policy 
and 
individual 
circumstances involved that would render the application of 
collateral 
estoppel 
to 
be 
fundamentally unfair, 
including 
inadequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair 
adjudication in the initial action? 
Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 688-89, 495 N.W.2d 327 
(1993) 
(citing 
the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments, 
"Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion" sec. 28 at 
273-74). 
No. 
02-0979   
 
17 
 
obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action."  Id.  
The reason for this is that they have no way of knowing for 
certain at the certiorari review what relief the Town will be 
seeking.  Here, there was over a three-year period between the 
initial certiorari review and enforcement action.  Ultimately, 
the Town sought to enforce the razing condition of the variance.  
It could have, however, sought forfeitures, pursued alternative 
relief, or simply declined to pursue relief altogether.  The 
Winkelmans should not have to prepare equitable defenses for all 
possible relief.      
VI 
¶38 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter the orders in this action.  
Additionally, we agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court had the power to consider the Winkelmans' 
equitable arguments in the context of this enforcement action.  
Further, we determine that the circuit court may properly 
exercise that power here.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  02-0979.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶39 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in the belief that it correctly applies the 
court's decision in Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 
N.W.2d 715 (1998).  The opinion states that the circuit court 
may "consider all equitable issues" in a zoning enforcement 
action under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8).  Majority op., ¶37. 
¶40 I write 
separately 
because 
the majority opinion 
implies that the decision in Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. City 
of South Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 150, 246 Wis. 2d 785, 632 
N.W.2d 485 (Lake Bluff IV), which extended the principles of the 
Goode case to enforcement actions under a different statute, is 
copacetic.  It is not, and it should have been reversed. 
¶41 In Lake Bluff IV, the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court "properly engaged in the equitable analysis 
under Goode.  Its written decision addresses all the pertinent 
factors."  Lake Bluff IV, ¶29 (emphasis added).  In fact, 
however, the circuit court determined that some equitable 
factors——that is, equitable factors that had been raised and 
rejected in prior legal proceedings——could not be considered de 
novo by the court in an equity proceeding because the prior 
legal 
determinations 
were 
the 
law 
of 
the 
case. 
 
This 
determination by the circuit court in 2000, implicitly approved 
by the court of appeals in Lake Bluff IV, is plainly 
inconsistent with the holding and sound reasoning in this case. 
¶42 This court declined to review Lake Bluff IV on January 
31, 2002.  My unpublished dissent to the denial of the petition 
No.  02-0979.dtp 
 
2 
 
for review is attached to this concurrence as Exhibit 1, so as 
to explain in detail my reservations about Lake Bluff IV. 
¶43 For the foregoing reasons I concur. 
 
 
 
 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
1 
 
Exhibit 1 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  On June 6, 2000, 
the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County ordered Lake Bluff Housing 
Partners (Lake Bluff) to raze and remove two apartment buildings 
located on property overlooking Lake Michigan in the City of 
South Milwaukee.  The two buildings contain 56 apartment units.  
As part of the court's judgment, Lake Bluff was ordered not to 
renew the leases of the 82 adults and 29 children, a number of 
whom are disabled, who were then living in these affordable-
housing units, so that the two buildings could be torn down. 
¶2 
The circuit court acknowledged that its order would 
cost Lake Bluff the $4.2 million it had spent to construct the 
two buildings ($2.7 million of which was still owed on a 
mortgage), plus an additional $300,000 or more to raze the 
buildings and restore the land to a dust-free, erosion-free 
condition.  It also acknowledged hardship and inconvenience to 
the tenants who would be displaced.  Nonetheless, the court 
found that the equities favoring Lake Bluff were outweighed by 
the equities favoring the City of South Milwaukee.  It concluded 
that 
requiring 
compliance 
with 
the 
City's 
R-A 
zoning 
classification, 
which 
limited 
the 
site 
to 
single 
family 
residences, 
would 
vindicate 
municipal 
authority 
to 
adopt 
comprehensive zoning ordinances and produce "more open area 
(about double the current green space)" and "greater access to 
air and light for area residents."  In its lengthy decision, the 
circuit court found that Lake Bluff did "not have clean hands," 
that good faith did "not weigh in Lake Bluff's favor," that Lake 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
2 
 
Exhibit 1 
Bluff's economic predicament was "self-created," and that Lake 
Bluff had made a calculated business decision to construct the 
buildings in violation of the zoning ordinance and consequently 
assumed all risks of its decision.  These findings contradicted 
previous findings by other courts.  The circuit court concluded 
that it could not consider several factors that had been relied 
upon by these other courts. 
¶3 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.  Lake Bluff 
Housing Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 150, 
246 Wis. 2d 785, 632 N.W.2d 485.   
¶4 
Lake Bluff now petitions this court for review, but 
its petition is denied.  Because Lake Bluff's petition raises 
important legal issues for this court's consideration, and 
because the ultimate decision to raze two relatively new 
apartment 
buildings 
at 
enormous 
economic 
loss 
and 
great 
inconvenience is astounding in light of the entire circumstances 
of the case, I dissent from our determination not to grant 
review. 
I 
¶5 
This dispute has lasted for nearly a decade and 
resulted in four published decisions from two separate cases.  
The first case led to Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. City of 
South Milwaukee, 188 Wis. 2d 230, 525 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(Lake Bluff I), reversed by Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. City 
of South Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1995) (Lake 
Bluff II).  The second case produced Lake Bluff Housing Partners 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
3 
 
Exhibit 1 
v. City of South Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 2d 222, 588 N.W.2d 45 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (Lake Bluff III), and Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. 
City of South Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 150 (Lake Bluff IV), and is 
the litigation presently before this court.  Since 1993 three 
different circuit judges have ruled on the dispute.  This court 
resolved the first case but has not reviewed the legal issues in 
the second case. 
II 
¶6 
To understand the issues presented by the petition for 
review, one must understand the complete facts.  The two 
apartment buildings ordered demolished are located on land that 
was zoned C-2 from 1965 until November 2, 1993.  C-2 zoning 
permits multi-family development.  Consistent with that zoning, 
other apartment complexes are situated in the immediate vicinity 
of the project. 
¶7 
In October 1992 Lake Bluff applied for a tax credit 
from the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority 
(WHEDA).  Its intent was to construct a multi-family affordable- 
housing development on the land if it received the tax credit. 
¶8 
In December 1992 WHEDA awarded Lake Bluff a $266,903 
site-specific credit and Lake Bluff then acquired the land for 
$294,000.  Lake Bluff paid WHEDA a non-refundable fee of $16,314 
to reserve the credit, understanding that the project had to be 
built and certificates of occupancy issued by December 31, 1994.  
Lake Bluff also had the property surveyed at a cost of $1150 and 
contracted with an architect to prepare project plans at a cost 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
4 
 
Exhibit 1 
of $29,513.  Prior to purchase of the land, Lake Bluff confirmed 
that the zoning was consistent with multi-family development. 
¶9 
In February 1993 Lake Bluff representatives met with 
the 
mayor, 
city 
administrator, 
building 
inspector, 
city 
engineer, and local alderperson of South Milwaukee to review 
initial plans for the project.  Lake Bluff's initial plan was to 
build seven apartment buildings, each consisting of eight units.  
Over time, the plan evolved into a two-building project totaling 
56 units.  This evolution appears to have been influenced by 
changes required by the City.  The City advised Lake Bluff that 
to obtain a building permit along the lake it would have to 
provide a bluff assessment establishing that the project would 
not cause bluff erosion for 100 years.  The City also advised 
Lake Bluff that South Milwaukee parking requirements had changed 
and that Lake Bluff would have to modify its plans to meet the 
new requirements.  Lake Bluff then modified its parking plans 
and commissioned a bluff erosion study at a cost of $4590. 
¶10 At 
the 
February 
1993 
meeting, 
city 
officials 
reconfirmed that a multi-family project was a permitted use in 
that zone. 
¶11 On April 28, 1993, a South Milwaukee resident, William 
J. Fox, III, sent a letter to a South Milwaukee alderman 
requesting that Lake Bluff's property be rezoned from C-2 to R-A 
for single-family unit development.  On May 6, 1993, the City 
referred 
the 
Fox 
letter 
to 
its 
Plan 
Commission 
for 
recommendation and report.  The Plan Commission considered Mr. 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
5 
 
Exhibit 1 
Fox's request at a May 24, 1993 meeting and recommended to the 
Common Council that no building permits be issued while the 
rezoning request was under consideration.  Lake Bluff was not 
informed of these developments and did not learn that South 
Milwaukee was considering a moratorium on the issuance of 
building permits for this specific property until June 22, 1993, 
almost two months after receipt of the Fox letter.  As a result, 
Lake Bluff did not have the opportunity to participate in the 
May meetings of the Plan Commission and Common Council. 
¶12 On July 6, 1993, the Common Council adopted a 
resolution imposing a moratorium on the issuance of building 
permits——solely on Lake Bluff's property——during consideration 
of the request to rezone the property.7 
                                                 
7 South 
Milwaukee's 
city 
attorney 
advised 
the 
Plan 
Commission that a moratorium on building permits for the 
property could be imposed by a resolution of the common council.  
Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 188 Wis. 
2d 230, 235-36, 525 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1994) (Lake Bluff I).  
At oral argument before the court of appeals, however, the city 
attorney advised the court of his doubts regarding the legality 
of the moratorium.  He indicated that, in all likelihood, a 
moratorium enacted by ordinance would have been lawful but a 
moratorium by resolution was of dubious legality.  Id. at 236 
n.1.  Likewise, in Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. City of South 
Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 163 n.2, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1995) (Lake 
Bluff II), this court noted that "counsel for defendant [City of 
South Milwaukee] stated that this moratorium was of questionable 
legality."  However, the court went on to say that because "the 
moratorium was never challenged . . . we will accept it as valid 
for purposes of this review."  Id.  Lake Bluff insists now that 
it did challenge the legality of the moratorium.  See Petition 
for Review at 15 n.3.  In any event, this court accepted the 
moratorium as valid only for purposes of its review in the 1995 
case. 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
6 
 
Exhibit 1 
¶13 On August 5, 1993, the Wisconsin Department of 
Industry, Labor and Human Relations approved Lake Bluff's 
architectural plans, entitling Lake Bluff to seek a footing and 
foundation permit from South Milwaukee.  Obtaining this approval 
authorized Lake Bluff to begin construction of the buildings if 
it secured a building permit.  That day, Lake Bluff submitted 
its application for a building permit to the City's building 
inspector, Michael Vesperman.  The application was denied 
immediately because of the moratorium. 
¶14 Circuit Judge John S. McCormick later found that 
following this denial, "Lake Bluff made several attempts to 
learn from city officials whether there were any deficiencies in 
its application" for the building permit or "whether the 
moratorium" against the property formed the sole basis for the 
denial.  He further found that "[d]espite Lake Bluff's efforts 
to secure a review of its plans and specifications, South 
Milwaukee did not conduct a review and did not notify Lake Bluff 
of 
any 
deficiencies 
in 
its 
plans, 
specifications 
and 
application," even though the City normally processed such an 
application within one month of receipt. 
¶15 On October 7, 1993, the City held a public hearing on 
the request to change the zoning of the property from C-2 to R-
A.  Then, on November 2, 1993, the Common Council passed an 
ordinance changing the zoning classification.  This ordinance, 
which was intended to preclude multi-family development, applied 
only to Lake Bluff's property. 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
7 
 
Exhibit 1 
¶16 On March 10, 1994, Lake Bluff initiated suit against 
South Milwaukee and its building inspector.  The suit sought a 
writ of mandamus directing the building inspector to issue a 
building permit.  Only after Lake Bluff commenced this suit did 
South Milwaukee conduct a comprehensive review of Lake Bluff's 
application.  In its response, the City identified a number of 
specific deficiencies in the application, all of which were 
corrected in Lake Bluff's subsequent construction. 
¶17 On April 29, 1994, Judge McCormick made an oral ruling 
and then issued a writ of mandamus as requested by Lake Bluff.  
In his written decision, Judge McCormick stated that Lake Bluff 
acquired vested rights before South Milwaukee's enactment of the 
moratorium prohibiting the issuance of building permits at the 
property.  He concluded that "South Milwaukee's actions in 
denying Lake Bluff's application for a building permit were 
arbitrary, capricious and invalid."  He also determined that 
South 
Milwaukee 
had 
knowledge 
of 
Lake 
Bluff's 
proposed 
development and of Lake Bluff's expenditure of significant sums 
of money toward accomplishing its development, before the City 
imposed the moratorium and rezoned the property. 
¶18 The City appealed.  While pursuing its appeal, the 
City did not seek a stay under Wis. Stat. § 808.07 of either the 
writ of mandamus or the judgment.  Circuit Judge Raymond E. 
Gieringer later found that, "The City knew that Lake Bluff had 
to begin construction immediately upon its receipt of the writ 
of mandamus" because the two buildings had to be completed by 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
8 
 
Exhibit 1 
December 31, 1994, in order for Lake Bluff to preserve the low-
income-housing tax credit it had been awarded by WHEDA.  Judge 
Gieringer reasoned that by appealing but not posting bond and 
seeking a stay in judgment, the City was attempting to protect 
itself from having to pay a large damage award to Lake Bluff in 
the event that the writ was sustained. 
¶19 It was in these circumstances that Lake Bluff made the 
decision to begin construction.  On October 4, 1994, in Lake 
Bluff I, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's writ.  
188 Wis. 2d 230.  However, the City's appeal undermined investor 
confidence in the credit, forcing Lake Bluff to surrender it 
back to WHEDA.8 
                                                 
8 Two appellate decisions have stated otherwise.  In Lake 
Bluff Housing Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 2d 
222, 226, 588 N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1998) (Lake Bluff III), the 
court said that "Lake Bluff was able to take advantage of the 
tax credits allocated for the development."  In Lake Bluff 
Housing Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 150, 
¶24, 246 Wis. 2d 758, 632 N.W.2d 485 (Lake Bluff IV), the court 
said that "Lake Bluff's contention that construction had to 
begin because the project needed to be completed by December 
1994 was not correct.  Lake Bluff failed to meet the deadline, 
and still secured tax credits for the project" (emphasis added). 
In the period between these two decisions, Judge Francis T. 
Wasielewski reported that Lake Bluff had to give up the credits 
before using them.  The court wrote: 
Michael Lerner testified that in 1992, Lake Bluff 
was awarded $2.6 million in credits for this project 
over a 10 year period.  To preserve its right to the 
credits, it had to build the project and obtain 
certificates of occupancy by December 31, 1994. 
This deadline was not met.  Occupancy permits for 
the 2 buildings were not issued until August and 
September, 1995.  Some time in the late summer or 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
9 
 
Exhibit 1 
¶20 After losing in the court of appeals, the City 
petitioned this court for review.  This court granted review on 
January 17, 1995. 
¶21 On November 20, 1995, eleven months after the court of 
appeals ruling, the supreme court reversed.  Lake Bluff II, 197 
Wis. 2d 157.  This decision came 19 months after Judge McCormick 
had issued the writ of mandamus and several months after the 
construction had been completed.  This court concluded that Lake 
Bluff's rights did not "vest" because it did not obtain a 
building permit or submit a completely error-free application 
for a building permit before the City succeeded in rezoning the 
site.  Id. at 182.  The court concluded: 
The theory behind the vested rights doctrine is that a 
builder is proceeding on the basis of a reasonable 
expectation. . . . Vested 
rights 
should 
only 
be 
obtained 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
strict 
and 
complete 
compliance with zoning and building code requirements, 
because 
a 
builder's 
proceeding 
in 
violation 
of 
applicable requirements is not reasonable. 
 
In this case, it is undisputed that Lake Bluff 
never submitted an application for a building permit 
which complied with either the new single-family 
zoning or with the former C-2 zoning. 
Id. at 175. 
                                                                                                                                                             
early fall of 1994, Lake Bluff surrendered its credits 
to WHEDA.  Mr. Lerner said that the continuing 
litigation over the legality of the Lake Bluff Project 
dampened the enthusiasm of potential bidders. . . .  
The continuing litigation "put a cloud over the 
financial viability of the tax credits" (emphasis 
added). 
 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
10 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
¶22 In Lake Bluff II, this court determined that the 
circuit court should not have granted the writ of mandamus 
ordering the City to issue a building permit.  It ruled that for 
purposes of showing a "clear, specific legal right which is free 
from substantial doubt," as required in a mandamus action, 
neither Lake Bluff nor the court could rely on equitable 
principles.  Therefore, it reversed, directing that the writ be 
quashed.  Id. at 182. 
 
¶23 Significantly, 
this 
court 
did 
not 
address 
the 
consequences of its decision——it did not ratify a particular 
remedy for the City.9  Rather, it put the City in a position to 
seek either demolition of the two buildings or some other 
remedy, in circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(8).  
 
¶24 The second case was commenced by Lake Bluff in an 
attempt to block the City from trying to remove the buildings.  
Although Lake Bluff initially obtained a declaratory judgment 
estopping the City from revoking its building and occupancy 
permits, its judgment was reversed in Lake Bluff III, 222 Wis. 
2d 222.  Thereafter, Circuit Judge Francis T. Wasielewski issued 
the order to raze the buildings, and his order was affirmed by 
the court of appeals in Lake Bluff IV, 2001 WI App 150. 
III 
                                                 
9 When Circuit Judge Raymond E. Gieringer considered this 
dispute, he found as fact that: "In its decision, the Supreme 
Court remanded this case to the circuit court 'with instructions 
to quash the writ.'  The Supreme Court made no Order with regard 
to the Buildings, the building permits or the occupancy 
permits."    
No. 00-1958.dtp 
11 
 
Exhibit 1 
¶25 On July 1, 1998, this court released its decision in 
Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).  
The issue in Goode was whether a circuit court retains equitable 
power to deny injunctive relief after a zoning ordinance 
violation has been proven.  This court concluded that a circuit 
court retains its equitable power to deny injunctive relief to 
enforce a zoning ordinance.   
¶26 The Goode decision came after the decisions in Lake 
Bluff I and Lake Bluff II, but shortly before the decision in 
Lake Bluff III.  Hence, in Lake Bluff III, although the court of 
appeals reversed Judge Gieringer's declaratory judgment, it 
remanded the case for consideration of Goode.  The court of 
appeals said: 
Under Forest County v. Goode, the trial court must, 
apparently, still balance the competing equities in 
determining 
whether 
an 
abatement 
order 
under 
§ 62.23(8), stats., is required. . . .   
We remand this matter to the trial court to 
consider whether Goode's analysis of § 59.69(11), 
stats., applies here, and, if so, whether Lake Bluff 
can marshal a sufficient showing that "there are 
compelling equitable reasons" why the trial court 
should not issue an order of abatement. 
Lake Bluff III, 222 Wis. 2d at 231-32 (citations omitted). 
¶27 The present petition for review raises critical legal 
questions about the circuit court's application of Goode in the 
unusual circumstances of this case.  In Goode, this court 
provided the following guidance: 
[T]he circuit court, sitting in equity, should weigh 
heavily the factors considered by boards of adjustment 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
12 
 
Exhibit 1 
in determining unnecessary hardship, as 
well as 
traditional 
equitable 
considerations. 
 
Equitable 
defenses, such as laches, estoppel, or unclean hands 
should also be weighed in appropriate cases. 
 
. . . . 
 
In deciding whether to deny a request for an 
injunction 
based 
upon 
a . . . zoning 
ordinance 
violation, the circuit court should take evidence and 
weigh 
any 
applicable 
equitable 
considerations 
including the substantial interest of the citizens of 
Wisconsin in the vigilant protection of the state's 
shorelands, the extent of the violation, the good 
faith 
of 
other parties, 
any available 
equitable 
defenses such as laches, estoppel or unclean hands, 
the degree of hardship compliance will create, and the 
role, if any, the government played in contributing to 
the violation.  This list is not meant to be 
exhaustive but only to illustrate the importance of 
the circuit court's consideration of the substantial 
public 
interest 
in 
enforcing 
its . . . zoning 
ordinances. 
 
Once a violation is established, a circuit court 
should grant the injunction except, in those rare 
cases, when it concludes, after examining the totality 
of the circumstances, there are compelling equitable 
reasons why the court should deny the request for an 
injunction. . . .  [T]he circuit court also possesses 
equitable power to fashion an injunction that does 
justice.  If the court is inclined to deny an 
injunction, it should first explore alternatives to 
the requested full injunction to determine whether a 
more 
equitably 
crafted 
injunction 
might 
be 
appropriate. 
Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 681-82, 684. 
¶28 The circuit court responded to this directive by 
concluding that it was constrained not to consider certain 
equitable factors except as they had been considered in deciding 
legal questions in previous appellate decisions.  The court 
said: 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
13 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
Insofar as the "totality of the circumstances" 
includes claims that have already been raised and 
decided by the appellate courts in this case, those 
decisions 
are 
part 
of 
the 
"totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."  For instance, it has already been 
determined by the Court of Appeals that estoppel does 
not 
prevent 
South 
Milwaukee 
from 
enforcing 
the 
provisions of sec. 66.23(8), Stats.  See Lake Bluff 
Housing, 222 Wis. 2d at 229.  Furthermore, Lake 
Bluff's claim that equitable considerations require 
nullification of the Defendant's change in zoning from 
C-2 (apartments) to R-A (single family) was rejected 
by the Supreme Court.  See Lake Bluff Housing, 197 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
179. 
 
Likewise, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
determined that Lake Bluff had no vested rights in the 
issuance of building permits under the R-A or C-2 
zoning.  Lake Bluff Housing, 197 Wis. 2d at 175.  
Moreover, South Milwaukee's building moratorium was 
found 
to 
be 
legal 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
these 
proceedings.  Lake Bluff Housing Partners, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 163.  These determinations, and others mentioned 
below, have become "the law of the case which must be 
followed in all subsequent proceedings in the trial 
court or on later appeal."  Univest Corp. v. General 
Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38 (1989).  The 
determinations of the appellate courts in this matter 
will be considered a part of the "totality of the 
circumstances" and the Goode inquiry will be made 
within the context of these decisions. 
¶29 The petitioner in this case now asks the court to 
clarify the effect of prior appellate court legal holdings on 
future equitable analyses, and to determine the implications of 
the "law of the case doctrine" on future equitable evaluations.  
These are important questions because they will determine both 
the scope of the circuit court's independent fact-finding in 
equity and whether Forest County v. Goode has potency in remand 
situations.  They probe what this court intended in Goode and 
whether the circuit court interpreted Goode too narrowly.  The 
petition argues, persuasively, that the circuit court's legal 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
14 
 
Exhibit 1 
interpretation of Goode was simply incorrect as a matter of law, 
impairing the circuit court's exercise of discretion. 
¶30 At the outset of this dispute, Circuit Judge McCormick 
found that Lake Bluff relied on existing zoning when it 
purchased the property, advised the City of its intentions, 
expended additional money after it had informed the City of its 
plans, 
and 
then 
was 
not 
timely 
alerted 
when 
the 
City 
unexpectedly began to change its position.  Judge McCormick 
found that the City did not identify the deficiencies in Lake 
Bluff's application until after Lake Bluff filed its first 
lawsuit.  Thus, because of the City's actions, Lake Bluff was 
effectively prevented from meeting the test for vested rights 
this court established in Lake Bluff II.  Judge McCormick 
concluded that the City's actions in denying Lake Bluff's 
application for a building permit were "arbitrary, capricious 
and invalid." 
¶31 Judge Wasielewski determined that these equitable 
factors simply could not 
be considered de 
novo in his 
determination of whether or not to issue the raze order.  The 
court of appeals affirmed in a published decision, ruling that 
"[b]ecause the trial court balanced all of the equitable 
considerations under Forest County v. Goode, there was no 
erroneous exercise of discretion."  Lake Bluff IV, 2001 WI App 
150 
at 
¶1 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
These 
decisions 
have 
ramifications for litigants far beyond this dispute.  They will 
No. 00-1958.dtp 
15 
 
Exhibit 1 
also affect the procedures and attitude of local officials as 
they consider zoning matters. 
¶32 In his dissent in Lake Bluff I, Judge Ralph Adam Fine 
wrote eloquently that: "The law must be sufficiently predictable 
so that men and women can conduct their business with the 
assurance that the rules are not going to change in mid-stream."  
188 Wis. 2d at 259.  Perhaps, someday, someone will explain why 
this just maxim does not apply to Lake Bluff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
 
1