Title: Green v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families / Division of Family Service
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 189, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOEL GREEN,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 
THEIR FAMILIES/DIVISION OF 
FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 189, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below–Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File Nos. 23-02-4TK 
§                   
§  Petition No. 23-03411       
§   
§   
§                         
§               
 
Submitted: November 3, 2023 
Decided: 
January 22, 2024 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of counsel’s non-merit brief filed under Supreme Court 
Rule 26.1(c), her motion to withdraw, the appellee’s response, the Children’s 
Attorney’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
(1) 
By order dated May 1, 2023, the Family Court terminated the parental 
rights of the appellant, Joel Green (“Father”), in his two children—G.G. (a boy, born 
in 2014) and A.G. (a girl, born in 2015) (together, the “Children”).2  Father appeals. 
(2)  
On appeal, Father’s counsel has filed an opening brief and motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26.1(c).  Counsel asserts that she has conducted a conscientious 
review of the record and the relevant law and has determined that Father’s appeal is 
wholly without merit.  Counsel informed Father of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c), 
provided him with a copy of counsel’s motion to withdraw and the accompanying 
brief, and advised him that he could submit in writing any additional points that he 
wished for the Court to consider.  Father did not respond to counsel’s motion but 
later submitted argument directly to the Court.  The appellee, the Department of 
Services for Children, Youth and Their Families/Division of Family Services 
(“DSCYF”), and the Children’s Attorney have responded to counsel’s Rule 26.1(c) 
brief and argue that the Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed. 
(3) 
In 2020, DSCYF opened a treatment case for Father and the Children’s 
mother (“Mother”) because of concerns about, among other things, their history of 
domestic violence and their substance-abuse and mental-health issues.  DSCYF 
approved a safety plan under which the Children would live with Mother and their 
 
2 The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s mother, who is not 
a party to this appeal.  We refer only to facts in the record that relate to Father’s appeal. 
3 
 
maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”).  At the time, Mother had a 
protection-from-abuse order against Father and there was an active no-contact order 
between Father and his father (“Paternal Grandfather”).  After Maternal 
Grandmother informed DSCYF that she could no longer care for the Children 
because of her medical issues, Father, Mother, Maternal Grandmother, Paternal 
Grandfather, and the Children’s maternal aunt convened for a team-decision-making 
meeting on November 12, 2021.  The parties agreed that the Children and Mother 
would live with Paternal Grandfather and that Father would not have contact with 
Paternal Grandfather.  DSCYF explained that it would petition for custody of the 
Children if the safety agreement was violated.  On November 27, 2021, DSCYF 
made an unannounced visit to Paternal Grandfather’s house and discovered Father 
hiding in a bedroom closet.  DSCYF thereafter successfully petitioned for custody 
of the Children.   
(4) 
With the filing of DSCYF’s dependency-and-neglect petition, the 
mandated hearings followed.3  Father, who had eight outstanding capiases, failed to 
appear at the preliminary protective hearing, and the Family Court found that the 
Children were dependent in his care.  The court also found that DSCYF had made 
reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of the Children from their 
 
3 When a child is removed from home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court is 
required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute and 
the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. Pro. Rs. 212-219. 
4 
 
home, noting that Paternal Grandfather had failed to protect the Children from Father 
and that Maternal Grandmother was no longer a placement option.  At the 
adjudicatory hearing, the Family Court found that the Children continued to be 
dependent in Father’s care based on his outstanding legal issues.  The Children were 
adjusting to their foster home.  Both G.G. and A.G were diagnosed with and 
medicated for ADHD, and G.G. suffered from insomnia and gastrointestinal issues.  
The Family Court found that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the 
unnecessary removal of the Children from their home.    
(5) 
In February 2022, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing via 
Zoom to review the case plan that DSCYF had developed to facilitate Father’s 
reunification with the Children.  Father’s case plan prioritized his mental-health and 
substance-abuse issues and required him to (i) undergo a mental-health evaluation 
and heed all follow-up recommendations; (ii) continue substance-abuse treatment, 
provide DSCYF with random urine screens, and sign a consent form to allow 
DSCYF to obtain information regarding his treatment; and (iii) undergo a domestic-
violence assessment and follow all recommended treatment.  The plan also called 
for Father to resolve his pending criminal charges and not acquire new ones, attend 
parenting classes, work with a family interventionist, and maintain (and show proof 
of) stable employment.  Finally, because Father continued to live with Paternal 
5 
 
Grandfather in violation of the no-contact order, the case plan required Father to 
locate safe and appropriate housing.  The Family Court approved Father’s case plan.  
(6) 
As of the May 4, 2022 review hearing, Father, who had been out of 
state for the dispositional hearing, had returned to Delaware in April and had re-
engaged with DSCYF.  He had been attending a substance-abuse treatment program 
for approximately one week and had submitted two dirty urine screens.  Because 
Father had not been working with DSCYF until recently, he was still waiting on 
referrals for a mental-health evaluation and a family interventionist.  Father had 
cleared his capiases and signed up for domestic violence classes.  Father was no 
longer living with Paternal Grandfather but was homeless.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Family Court found that it was in the Children’s best interests for them 
to remain in DSCYF custody.   
(7) 
As of the June 28, 2022 six-month review hearing, Father had made 
minimal progress on his case plan.  Although Father had completed a mental-health 
evaluation and signed up for domestic violence classes, he (i) had not spoken to his 
caseworker in one month; (ii) claimed to be receiving unemployment benefits, but 
had not provided proof to DSCYF; (iii) had not been compliant with his substance-
abuse treatment; and (iv) had not signed up for parenting classes.  The Children were 
doing well in foster care, although G.G. was struggling somewhat in school.  A 504-
plan meeting had been scheduled for September.  Although DSCYF had advised 
6 
 
Father of A.G.’s kindergarten graduation and offered to transport him to the 
ceremony, Father did not attend.  The Family Court found that it remained in the 
Children’s best interests for them to remain in DSCYF custody. 
(8) 
On October 19, 2022, the Family Court held a nine-month review 
hearing.  Father had undergone a psychological evaluation and had been diagnosed 
with Opiate and Methamphetamine Substance Use Disorder by Dr. Patrick Zingaro.  
Dr. Zingaro testified that Father’s diagnosis affects his ability to care for the 
Children.  Dr. Zingaro recommended that Father receive individual therapy and 
undergo a psychiatric evaluation and an anger-management evaluation.  Father 
tested positive for methadone on August 11, 2022.  After the treatment provider 
decided to supervise Father’s urine screens, Father asked to be discharged from the 
program.  Father then angrily left the office and spun his tires in the parking lot. The 
Children continued to do well in foster care.  Maternal Grandmother testified that 
the Children had witnessed a lot of domestic violence between Father and Mother.  
She opined that the Children were safer with the foster family and that Paternal 
Grandfather enables Father.  The Family Court found that the Children were 
dependent in Father’s care and that it was in their best interests for them to remain 
in DSCYF custody. 
(9) 
The Family Court held a permanency hearing over two days in 
December 2022.  As of the permanency hearing, Father had (i) revoked his consent 
7 
 
to share his substance-abuse treatment records with DSCYF, (ii) admitted to 
submitting someone else’s urine instead of his own for testing, (iii) failed to follow 
up with Dr. Zingaro’s treatment recommendations, (iv) cancelled several visits with 
his family interventionist, (v) was only attending half of his scheduled visits with the 
Children, (vi) was on probation for driving under the influence (“DUI”), (vii) had 
not yet taken domestic violence classes, (viii) had not provided DSCYF with proof 
of his income, and (ix) had not attended any of the Children’s medical appointments.  
Because Father appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the 
second day of the permanency hearing, the Family Court ordered Father to submit 
to a supervised drug test after the hearing.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Family Court changed the permanency plan to the concurrent goals of reunification 
and termination of parental rights for purposes of adoption. 
(10) At the March 31, 2023 termination-of-parental-rights (“TPR”) hearing, 
the Family Court heard testimony from Lieutenant Susan Kline, two family 
interventionists, the Children’s foster care and adoption worker, Father’s treatment 
worker, the treatment worker’s supervisor, the permanency worker’s supervisor, 
Paternal Grandfather, Father, Mother, the Children’s foster mother, and the 
Children’s court appointed special advocate.  The evidence presented fairly 
established that Father and Mother had a history of domestic violence, with the 
police responding to several incidents at Paternal Grandfather’s home, including one 
8 
 
involving Father and Mother immediately after the permanency hearing on 
December 27, 2022, and one involving Paternal Grandfather and Father in early 
2023.  
(11) Father’s treatment worker testified that although Father was initially 
not engaged with DSCYF, he had attempted to complete elements of his case plan.  
Three days before the TPR hearing, Father met with his treatment worker’s 
supervisor, Amanda Niblet-Boggs.  Father provided Niblet-Boggs with proof that he 
had completed parenting classes as of January 4, 2023.  Father also gave Niblet-
Boggs a letter from Dover Comprehensive Treatment Center (“Dover 
Comprehensive”) stating that Father had enrolled in substance-abuse treatment in 
February 2023 as well as proof of what he claimed were clean urine screens from 
November 2022 through January 2023.4  Because Father had not signed a release 
with Dover Comprehensive, however, DSCYF could not confirm that Father was, in 
fact, enrolled in treatment there.  Notably, Father had not submitted to a drug test as 
ordered by the court following the permanency hearing.  Nor had Father completed 
domestic violence classes, complied with the conditions of the DUI first-offender 
program, followed up with Dr. Zingaro’s treatment recommendations, or provided 
tax verification of his self-employment.  And Father had only recently moved out of 
 
4 Two of the test results were odd: one was positive, but Father alleged (without proof) that it was 
a false positive; and one was negative for Suboxone, which Father had been prescribed and was 
presumably taking. 
9 
 
Paternal Grandfather’s home.  Finally, the evidence established that the Children 
were thriving in their foster home and had bonded with their foster parents, who are 
adoptive resources.   
(12) On May 1, 2023, the Family Court issued a written order terminating 
the parental rights of Father in the Children.  The Family Court first found that 
DSCYF had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to plan 
adequately for the Children’s care under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) by failing to satisfy 
the substance-abuse-treatment, mental-health-treatment, and domestic-violence 
components of his case plan.  When the statutory basis for termination is failure to 
plan, there must be proof of at least one additional statutory factor.5  Here, the Family 
Court found proof that the Children had been in DSCYF care for a period in excess 
of one year.6  Turning to the best-interests factors as defined by 13 Del. C. § 722, 
the Family Court found that five factors favored termination of Father’s rights (the 
Children’s interactions with their parents and other significant people in their lives; 
the Children’s adjustment to their home, school, and community; Father’s past and 
present compliance with his parental responsibilities to the Children; Father’s 
domestic violence history; and Father’s criminal history).  The court then found by 
 
5 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)(1)-(5) (listing additional conditions). 
6 Id. § 1103(a)(5)(a)(1). 
10 
 
clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the 
Children’s best interests.  This appeal followed. 
(13) On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as 
well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.7  We review legal 
rulings de novo.8  We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial 
court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly 
erroneous.9  If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, then our standard of 
review is abuse of discretion.10  On issues of witness credibility, we will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.11 
(14) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate 
parental rights requires two separate inquiries.12  First, the court must determine 
whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.13  
When the statutory basis for termination is failure to plan, the Family Court must 
also find proof of at least one additional statutory condition14 and proof that DSCYF 
 
7 Wilson v. Div. of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010).   
8 Id. at 440.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.   
11 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
12 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).   
13 Id. at 537. 
14 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)(1)-(5) (listing additional conditions). 
11 
 
made bona fide reasonable efforts to preserve the family unit.15  If the Family Court 
finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, the court must determine 
whether, under 13 Del. C. § 722, severing parental rights is in the best interests of 
the child.16  Both of these requirements must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.17 
(15) On appeal, Father argues: (i) the Family Court judge should have 
recused herself because she attended Niblet-Boggs’ wedding; (ii) his treatment 
worker was unprofessional; (iii) he satisfied the substance-abuse-treatment 
component of his case plan because he provided DSCYF with clean drug screens 
and did not test positive while he was in weekly counseling; (iv) he satisfied the 
parenting-class component of his case plan; (v) he has video to prove that his visits 
with the Children were productive; and (vi) he satisfied the housing component of 
his case plan because Mother is not living at Paternal Grandfather’s home.  Father’s 
claims are unavailing. 
(16) As a preliminary matter, to the extent that Father wants to supplement 
the record with evidence not introduced below—specifically, that he has satisfied 
the housing component of his case plan because Mother is no longer living at 
 
15 In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989). 
16 Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 536-37. 
17 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 
2008). 
12 
 
Paternal Grandfather’s house—he cannot.18  And Father’s arguments concerning the 
parenting component of his case plan would not change the outcome here—the 
Family Court found that Father had substantially completed this portion of his case 
plan based on his completion of parenting classes and his active participation in his 
visits with the Children.   Next, we have carefully considered Father’s claim that he 
satisfied the substance-abuse-treatment component of his case plan and conclude 
that the record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that he did not.  At a 
minimum, Father does not allege that he ever submitted to a supervised drug 
screen—even after he acknowledged submitting false samples for testing and being 
court-ordered to do so. 
(17) Turning to Father’s claim that his treatment worker was unprofessional 
because she invited him to eat dinner with her on one occasion, the record reflects 
that Father was advised of the procedure to follow if he sought the assignment of a 
different treatment worker to his case.  He did not seek reassignment.  In any event, 
Father does not maintain, and the record does not reflect, that this isolated incident 
affected in any way DSCYF’s bona fide reasonable efforts to reunify Father with the 
Children. 
 
18 See Del. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Duphily, 703 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Del. 1997) (“It is a basic tenet of 
appellate practice that an appellate court reviews only matters considered in the first instance by a 
trial court.”). 
13 
 
(18) Finally, there is no merit to Father’s argument that the Family Court 
judge should have recused herself.  The TPR transcript19 reflects that the Family 
Court judge advised the parties that Niblet-Boggs was her husband’s godchild and 
that she had presided over Niblet-Boggs’ wedding.  The Family Court judge then 
took a brief recess to give the parties time to discuss whether they thought her 
relationship with Niblet-Boggs created a problem.  Because the parties did not raise 
any such objection, we review Father’s claim for plain error.20  We find no plain 
error here.  Indeed, to the extent that Father claims that the Family Court judge 
unduly credited Niblet-Boggs’ testimony, we note that Niblet-Boggs’ testimony was 
largely favorable to Father:  she testified that Father had satisfied the parenting-class 
component of his case plan and that he had re-engaged with substance-abuse 
treatment in the weeks before the TPR hearing. 
(19) Having carefully reviewed the parties’ positions and the record on 
appeal, we find that the Family Court’s factual findings are supported by the record, 
and we can discern no error in the court’s application of the law to the facts.  We 
therefore conclude that Father’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
arguably appealable issues.  And we are satisfied that Father’s counsel made a 
 
19 Niblet-Boggs did not testify at any of the earlier proceedings. 
20 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
14 
 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that 
Father could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court be AFFIRMED.  Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice