Title: State v. Jeremy J. Hanson
Citation: 2001 WI 70
Docket Number: 1999AP003142-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2001

2001 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jeremy J. Hanson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 96, 617 N.W.2d 678 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 26, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 12, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca 
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Hoffmann 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by James B. Connell and Crooks, Low, Connell & Rottier, 
S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by James B. Connell. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Kathleen M. Ptacek, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2001 WI 70 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3142-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeremy J. Hanson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The defendant, Jeremy J. 
Hanson (Hanson), seeks review of a decision of the court of 
appeals upholding the circuit court's judgment convicting him of 
operating a motor vehicle while his operating privileges were 
revoked as a habitual traffic offender (HTO).1  Hanson contends 
that because his HTO status was rescinded pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
                     
1  State v. Hanson, No. 99-3142-CR, unpublished slip opinion 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 8, 2000) (affirming judgment of conviction 
and order denying a motion for post-conviction relief entered in 
the Circuit Court for Waupaca County, John P. Hoffman, Judge). 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
2 
§ 351.09 (1997-98),2 the circuit court erroneously imposed a 
criminal sentence rather than a civil forfeiture.   
¶2 
We conclude that a criminal sentence based solely upon 
Hanson's HTO status, which was rescinded under § 351.09 prior to 
his conviction, is a sentence in excess of that authorized by 
law and is invalid under Wis. Stat. § 971.13.  However, given 
the state of the record, we cannot determine whether Hanson's 
driving record supported a criminal sentence even without 
consideration of his HTO status.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
for such a determination. 
I 
¶3 
On four occasions in 1996, Hanson was convicted of 
operating a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked or 
suspended (OAR/OAS), contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1) (1995-
96).  As a consequence of the four OAR/OAS convictions, Hanson 
was classified as an HTO in December 1996 pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 351.02 (1995-96).  His HTO classification resulted in the 
revocation of his driving privileges for a period of five years. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 351.025(1) (1995-96).  The five-year HTO 
revocation was one of a number of suspensions and revocations 
imposed upon Hanson for his numerous 1996 violations.   
¶4 
While still subject to the HTO revocation, and perhaps 
to 
other 
suspensions 
and 
revocations, 
Hanson 
was 
caught 
                     
2 
Unless 
otherwise 
noted, 
all 
subsequent 
statutory 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version. 
  
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
3 
illegally driving a fifth time on October 31, 1998.  Hanson was 
charged with his fifth violation of Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1).  In 
the criminal complaint, the State listed the four 1996 OAR/OAS 
convictions and alleged that for his fifth offense Hanson was 
subject to a maximum fine of $2,500 and a potential sentence of 
one year in jail.   
¶5 
The complaint also set forth that Hanson's sentence 
was subject to enhancement due to his HTO classification.  The 
state alleged that under Wis. Stat. § 351.08, Hanson was subject 
to an additional $5,000 fine and a possible 180 additional days 
of imprisonment.   
¶6 
Following 
the issuance of 
the complaint, 
Hanson 
pursued a rescission of his HTO status through the Department of 
Transportation (Department).  As part of the 1997 legislative 
overhaul of the offense of OAR/OAS, which included the removal 
of OAR/OAS as a predicate offense that may be used to classify a 
driver as an HTO, the Department was authorized to redetermine a 
driver's 
HTO 
status 
without 
consideration 
of 
OAR/OAS 
convictions.  Wis. Stat. § 351.09; 1997 Wis. Act 84, §§ 149, 
151.  In February 1999, the Department rescinded Hanson's HTO 
status, which was based on his OAR/OAS convictions, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 351.09.3   
                     
3  In its brief to this court, the State argued that there 
was 
nothing 
in 
the 
record 
documenting 
the 
Department's 
rescission of Hanson's HTO status.  However, at oral argument 
the State acknowledged that a reference to the "release" of 
Hanson's HTO status in the abstract of Hanson's driving record 
signified the rescission of the HTO status pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 351.09.   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
4 
¶7 
Subsequent to the rescission of his HTO status, in May 
1999, the defendant entered a plea of no contest to the charge 
of OAR, fifth offense, as an HTO, as alleged in the criminal 
complaint.  During the plea colloquy, Hanson admitted that the 
OAR offense was his fifth offense and that as a result the court 
could impose a sentence of up to one year in jail.  Hanson also 
admitted that he had been adjudged an HTO in December 1996 and 
that as a consequence of his HTO status the court could impose 
an additional 180 days in jail.  Thereafter, the circuit court 
accepted his plea of no contest, imposed a fine of $300, and 
sentenced Hanson to 20 days in jail.  In rendering the sentence, 
the circuit court did not articulate whether the OAR offense, 
the HTO enhancer, or both, provided the basis for the criminal 
penalty. 
¶8 
Thereafter, Hanson pursued a post-conviction motion 
challenging the imposition of a term of imprisonment and 
requesting that the circuit court substitute the criminal 
sentence with a civil forfeiture.  His argument was premised on 
the February 1999 rescission of his HTO status.  Hanson argued 
that because his HTO status had been rescinded, it could not be 
the basis for the imposition of a criminal sentence.  He further 
advanced that in the absence of the HTO enhancer, there was no 
basis for imposing a criminal sentence.  
¶9 
The circuit court denied Hanson's motion, and Hanson 
appealed.  In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals 
concluded that Hanson had waived the right to challenge his 
conviction and sentence by the entry of his no contest plea.   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
5 
II 
¶10 In order to adequately address the parties' arguments, 
we believe a brief introduction to the recent legislative 
changes and relevant statutory scheme is necessary.   
¶11 In 1997, the Wisconsin legislature enacted sweeping 
changes to the treatment of the motor vehicle offenses of 
operating after suspension (OAS) and operating after revocation 
(OAR). 
 
These 
changes 
were 
made 
in 
response 
to 
the 
recommendations of the 1995 Governor's Task Force on Operating 
After Revocation and Operating While Intoxicated and reflect an 
intent to simplify the previously confusing and complicated law 
of OAR and OAS.   
¶12 Prior to August 1, 2000, the effective date of many of 
the relevant provisions of 1997 Wis. Act 84, operating after 
revocation and operating after suspension were treated as one 
offense (OAR/OAS).  See Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1).4  The punishment 
upon conviction was dependent upon the underlying basis for the 
revocation or suspension and the number of prior OAR/OAS 
convictions.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2).  A driver who violated 
a suspension or revocation imposed solely for failure to pay a 
                     
4 A brief synopsis of the statutory changes and their 
effective dates is provided by John Sobotik, OAR and OWS Law 
Changes Begin, Wis. Law., Feb. 2000, at 24-25.  The author is 
assistant general counsel for the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation and prepared the findings of the 1995 Governor's 
Task Force relating to OAR and OAS.  
The changes to Wis. Stat. § 343.44 were effective August 1, 
2000 pursuant to an order of the Department of Transportation.  
Wis. Admin. Reg. No. 534, 24-25 (June 2000).   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
6 
fine or forfeiture was subject only to a civil forfeiture.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(e)2.  The amount of that forfeiture 
increased with each successive OAR/OAS conviction.  A driver 
whose privileges were suspended or revoked for any other reason 
was subject to a civil forfeiture for the first offense of 
OAR/OAS, but faced potential imprisonment for all subsequent 
offenses.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2).   
¶13 Currently, as a result of the 1997 legislation, the 
offenses of OAS and OAR are individual offenses.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1)(a) & (b) (1999-2000).  The legislature has provided 
that revocation of driving privileges is to occur for more 
serious violations.  See generally Wis. Stat. § 343.30 (1999-
2000).  Consequently, OAR is treated as a criminal offense, the 
violation of which carries the potential for imprisonment.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) (1999-2000).  Suspensions, on the other 
hand, are now reserved for more minor infractions. See generally 
Wis. Stat. § 343.30 (1999-2000).  Thus, OAS is treated as a less 
serious violation, for which the only penalty is a civil 
forfeiture.  Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(a) (1999-2000).   
¶14 1997 Wis. Act 84 also made changes to chapter 351, 
which defines and regulates habitual traffic offenders.  1997 
Wis. Act 84, §§ 149-52.  Under the prior statutory scheme, a 
person who had been convicted of four OAR/OAS offenses was 
classified as an HTO pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 351.02(1)(a)4 
(1995-96).  Classification as an HTO subjects the driver to a 
five-year revocation and also serves as a penalty enhancer for 
subsequent violations of § 343.44.  Wis. Stat. § 351.025 & 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
7 
§ 351.08.  A driver classified as an HTO who is convicted of 
violating § 343.44 is subject to an additional fine of up to 
$5,000 and an additional term of imprisonment of up to 180 days 
in jail.  Wis. Stat. § 351.08.  
¶15 Consistent 
with 
the 
legislative 
intent 
to 
decriminalize OAS, 1997 Wis. Act 84 amended chapter 351 to 
alleviate the effect of prior OAR/OAS convictions on repeat 
offenders who had been classified as HTOs as a result of those 
convictions.  It did so by removing OAR/OAS from the list of 
offenses that may serve as the basis for determining HTO status. 
 1997 Wis. Act 84, § 149.   
¶16 Most important for our purposes, the legislature also 
provided for the recalculation of HTO status of those drivers 
already determined to be HTOs because of OAR/OAS convictions 
through the creation of Wis. Stat. § 351.09.  Under § 351.09, a 
driver can request that the Department recalculate a previous 
HTO determination without consideration of OAR/OAS convictions, 
and may have the HTO status rescinded and driving privileges 
reinstated, if appropriate: 
 
If the recalculation demonstrates that the person is 
not a habitual traffic offender or repeat habitual 
traffic offender, the department shall rescind the 
order declaring the applicant a habitual traffic 
offender or repeat habitual traffic offender.  Upon 
the 
completion 
of 
the 
recalculation 
under 
this 
section, the department shall provide written notice 
to the person of the result of the recalculation, of 
the order of rescission, if any, under this section 
and, if appropriate, of the process for reinstating 
the person's operating privilege. 
Wis. Stat. § 351.09.   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
8 
¶17 When it enacted 1997 Wis. Act 84, the legislature 
assigned to the Department the authority to determine the 
effective dates of the various provisions of the act.  Wis. 
Stat. § 85.515.  Many provisions, including the revisions to 
§ 343.44, did not become effective until August 1, 2000.  Wis. 
Admin. Reg. No. 534, 24-25 (June 2000).  However, the Department 
implemented 
§ 351.09 
on 
an 
earlier 
date, 
allowing 
the 
recalculation and rescission of HTO determinations to begin on 
August 1, 1998.  Note, Wis. Stat. § 351.09; Wis. Admin. Reg. No. 
510, 51-52 (June 1998).     
¶18 As a consequence of the staggered implementation of 
1997 Wis. Act 84, the case before us presents us with a blend of 
the old and the new.  Hanson was convicted under the prior 
statutory scheme.  Therefore, the definition of the offense and 
the appropriate level of punishment are defined by since-
supplanted statutory provisions.  However, because of the DOT's 
early implementation of § 351.09, this case also presents us 
with issues involving the new statutory scheme, namely the 
effect of the Department's rescission of Hanson's HTO status on 
his sentence.   
III 
¶19 At the outset, the State contends that we should not 
reach the merits of Hanson's challenge.  It argues that Hanson 
waived the challenge to the sentence by entering a plea of no 
contest.   We disagree. 
¶20 Hanson contests the imposition of criminal penalties 
by the circuit court on the grounds that the sentence imposed by 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
9 
the circuit court is a penalty in excess of that authorized by 
law.5  As such, his argument implicates the command of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.13: 
 
Excessive sentence, errors cured.  In any case where 
the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that 
authorized by law, such excess shall be void and the 
sentence shall be valid only to the extent of the 
maximum term authorized by statute and shall stand 
commuted without further proceedings. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.13.  "When a court imposes a sentence greater 
than that authorized by law, § 973.13 voids the excess."  State 
v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 155, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996) (applying 
§ 973.13 to sentence imposed upon conviction for OAR).  If the 
rescission of Hanson's HTO status precluded the use of the Wis. 
Stat. § 351.08 penalty enhancer and if the defendant was not 
otherwise subject to criminal penalties, the imposition of a 
criminal sentence would be void as it is in excess of that 
authorized by law.    
¶21 Section 973.13 requires Wisconsin courts to declare a 
sentence void "[i]n any case where the court imposes a maximum 
penalty in excess of that authorized by law."  § 973.13 
(emphasis added).  In an analogous context, our court of appeals 
concluded that the command of § 973.13 allowed a defendant to 
challenge a faulty repeater sentence despite the existence of an 
otherwise effective procedural bar.  State v. Flowers, 221 
                     
5  Hanson also frames his challenge as an attack on the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court.  However, 
because we find his challenge to the legality of the sentence 
dispositive, we need not address his jurisdictional challenge.   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
10
Wis. 2d 20, 22-23, 586 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1998).6  In 
explaining that the mandate of § 973.13 prevents the imposition 
of a sentence not authorized by the legislature, the court of 
appeals advanced the interest of justice over the interest of 
finality: 
 
To adopt the State's argument would promote finality, 
but at the expense of justice. It would raise the 
specter of a defendant being incarcerated for a term 
(possibly years) in excess of that prescribed by law 
simply because he or she failed to raise the issue 
earlier.  Such a result is in direct conflict with the 
explicit language of § 973.13.  The State is without 
authority to incarcerate individuals for a term longer 
than the maximum term authorized by law.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the express statutory mandate in 
§ 973.13 to alleviate all maximum penalties imposed in 
excess of that prescribed by law applies to faulty 
repeater 
sentences 
and 
is 
not 
"trumped" 
by 
a 
procedural rule of exclusion. 
Id. at 29.   
¶22 As in Flowers, to allow the imposition of a criminal 
penalty where none is authorized by the legislature, simply on 
the basis of waiver, would ignore the dictate of § 973.13.  We 
thus reach the merits of Hanson's challenge and determine 
whether any basis existed for the imposition of a criminal 
sentence.   
A 
                     
6  The procedural bar faced by the defendant in State v. 
Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d 20, 586 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1998), was 
that posed by Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and this court's decision 
in State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 
(1994).   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
11
¶23 Hanson 
challenges 
the 
imposition 
of 
a 
criminal 
sentence for his conviction.  He maintains that the sole basis 
for the criminal sentence was his HTO status and that because 
his HTO status was rescinded pursuant to § 351.09, the circuit 
court should have imposed a civil forfeiture rather than a 
criminal sentence.   
¶24 The resolution of this challenge hinges on the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 351.09, and in particular the 
words "rescind" and "rescission" as they are used in that 
statute.  Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that 
we review independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 
14, ¶11, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155.  The sole purpose of 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature by first examining the language of the statute.  
State v. Vennemann, 180 Wis. 2d 81, 93, 508 N.W.2d 404 (1993). 
¶25 Hanson argues that the effect of the Department's 
rescission of his HTO status was to nullify and, in essence, 
void ab initio, his HTO classification, thus precluding the 
applicability of the § 351.08 HTO penalty enhancer.  The State 
argues the rescission under § 351.09 does not relate back to the 
date of the offense, October 31, 1998, and because Hanson was an 
HTO on the date he committed the offense, he was properly 
sentenced. 
¶26 We conclude that as a consequence of the rescission of 
Hanson's HTO status, he could not be subject to the HTO penalty 
enhancer 
when 
subsequently 
convicted 
of 
a 
violation 
of 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
12
§ 343.44(1).  Accordingly, it was beyond the power of the 
circuit court to impose a criminal sentence based solely upon 
Hanson's rescinded HTO status.  We base this conclusion on the 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the words "rescind" and 
"rescission," the legal implications of those words, and the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 351.09. 
¶27 We begin with the language of the statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 351.09 directs that when recalculating a defendant's HTO 
status "[i]f the recalculation demonstrates that the person is 
not a habitual traffic offender or repeat habitual traffic 
offender, the department shall rescind the order declaring the 
applicant a habitual traffic offender."  Wis. Stat. § 351.09 
(emphasis added).  The statute also refers to the order entered 
upon such a recalculation as an "order of rescission."  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
¶28 When interpreting a statute, we must give effect to 
the ordinary and accepted meaning of the language chosen by the 
legislature.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) (1999-2000); Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  We 
thus attribute to the operative words of § 351.09, "rescind" and 
"rescission," their ordinary and accepted meaning.  
¶29 To "rescind" is commonly understood, when used by 
lawyers and non-lawyers alike, to mean "[t]o abrogate or cancel" 
or "[t]o make void, to repeal or annul."  Black's Law Dictionary 
1308 (7th ed. 1999); see The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 1534 (3d ed. 1993) ("To make void, repeal or 
annul.").  "Rescission" too shares a likeness of meaning in both 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
13
legal and non-legal contexts, and generally refers to the 
annulment 
or 
abrogation 
of 
something, 
i.e., 
the 
act 
of 
rescinding.  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1534 (3d ed. 1993).   
¶30 This court visited the meaning of the words "rescind" 
and "rescission" on a prior occasion, concluding that as a 
matter of general usage the terms relate to abrogation or 
annulment: 
 
"'Rescind' and 'rescission' are words in ordinary use 
and should have no different signification in legal 
terminology than they have in other connections.  
'Rescind' means to abrogate or annul, and may be 
applied to a variety of transactions such as a vote, a 
transfer of property or a contract." 
Illges v. Congdon, 248 Wis. 85, 95b, 20 N.W.2d 722 (1945) 
(quoted source omitted).   
¶31 The 
words 
"rescind" 
and 
"rescission" 
also 
carry 
certain legal implications, which are consistent with their 
ordinary and accepted meaning.  The legal effect of a rescission 
is an undoing from the beginning and a return to status quo 
ante.  This legal effect of a rescission is expressed most 
clearly in the realm of contract law: 
 
The effect of a rescission of a contract is to restore 
the parties to the position they would have occupied 
had no contract ever been made.  In other words, when 
a contract is rescinded the parties are placed in the 
status quo as if no contract had ever been made.   
Schnuth v. Harrison, 44 Wis. 2d 326, 339, 171 N.W.2d 370 (1969) 
(footnote omitted); see also Wagner v. Wagner, 80 Wis. 2d 299, 
302, 259 N.W.2d 60 (1977) ("[T]he right of rescission . . . will 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
14
undo 
the 
mischief 
ab 
initio 
and 
restore 
the 
parties, 
substantially to their original situation.").  The notion that 
rescission amounts to an undoing ab initio has been acknowledged 
more recently by this court: 
 
The parties have used the words "rescission ab initio" 
and "rescission" interchangeably.  Because we can find 
no difference in the meaning of either expression, we 
have done the same.  
Wisconsin Housing & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 
166 Wis. 2d 636, 643 n.2, 480 N.W.2d 490 (1992).7   
¶32 Given the accepted meaning of the language of § 351.09 
and the legal effect attributable to "rescind" and "rescission," 
we conclude that the effect of the Department's recalculation of 
Hanson's HTO status was an annulment and abrogation of that 
status from the outset of its existence.  Consequently, when the 
circuit court sentenced Hanson, it could not properly treat him 
as an HTO, or for that matter as if he ever were an HTO.  
                     
7 The State directs us to one case in which the word 
"rescind" was construed merely as a cancellation with only 
prospective application.  Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. 
Railroad Comm'n, 169 Wis. 421, 427-28, 172 N.W. 746 (1919).  In 
Milwaukee Electric Railway, this court concluded that the 
Railroad's rescission of a prior order, pursuant to statute, did 
not render the prior order void ab initio, but rather simply 
terminated the order from that time onward.  Id.  
However, the court's discussion of the meaning of "rescind" 
in Milwaukee Electric Railway is an anomaly in light of 
discussions in preceding and subsequent case law, including 
those in the case law of the period.  See, e.g., Mueller v. 
Michels, 184 Wis. 324, 332, 197 N.W. 201 (1924) ("'To rescind a 
contract is not merely to terminate it but to abrogate and undo 
it from the beginning.'").  
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
15
Hanson's rescinded HTO status can have no legal effect and 
Hanson must be treated as if it never existed.   
¶33 The ordinary and accepted meanings of the language of 
§ 351.09 and the legal implications given to those words are 
supported by the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 351.09.  As 
we explained above, § 351.09 was created by 1997 Wis. Act 84, 
which enacted the recommendations of the 1995 Governor's Task 
Force.  
See 
1997 
S.B. 
470 
(containing analysis of the 
Legislative Reference Bureau); 1997 A.B. 795.8  The task force's 
initial recommendation called for "Amnesty/Recalculation of HTO 
Status": 
 
Amnesty/Recalculation of HTO Status (Non-statutory 
provisions) 
The 
department shall 
review 
its 
orders 
revoking 
persons' operating privileges as habitual traffic 
offenders.  If the department concludes that a 
person's operating privilege would not have been 
revoked and would not be revoked as a habitual traffic 
offender 
or repeat 
habitual 
traffic offender if 
offenses 
were 
counted 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
provisions of Ch. 351, Stats., as amended by this law 
rather than the law in effect at the time of the prior 
order, the department shall recind [sic] the order.   
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1997 A.B. 795, 
Recommendations of Governor's Task Force on OAR/OWI (Oct. 24, 
                     
8  The core of the provisions that became 1997 Wis. Act 84 
began in the Wisconsin Assembly as 1997 Assembly Bill 795.   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
16
1995).  This recommendation was subsequently adopted by the 
legislature, albeit in modified form, and codified as § 351.09.9 
¶34 We find significant the use of the word "amnesty" by 
the Governor's Task Force in making its recommendation.  It 
signifies to us that the Task Force intended broad relief to 
those who had been classified as an HTO as a consequence of the 
convictions for OAR/OAS, an offense believed by the Task Force 
to be a "minor offense."  Id.  We believe that this evidence of 
an intent to provide expansive relief to those determined to be 
HTOs as a consequence of OAR/OAS convictions supports our 
interpretation of the ordinary and accepted meaning of "rescind" 
and "rescission" as those terms are used in § 351.09 and the 
legal effect attributable to those terms.  
¶35 Contrary to the conclusions we draw from our above 
language and legislative intent analysis, the State advances 
that our prior decision in State v. Orethun, 84 Wis. 2d 487, 267 
N.W.2d 318 (1978), should control.  In Orethun, the defendant, 
after being charged with operating after revocation, obtained a 
vacation of a speeding conviction on which the revocation of his 
driving privileges was based.  Consequently, the defendant 
                     
9  The primary changes in the recommendation of the 1995 
task force were that the provision allowing for rescission of 
HTO status be a statutory provision and that the rescission be 
initiated by a request of the driver.  See Wis. Stat. § 351.09. 
 These changes were initiated at the request of the Department. 
 See Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1997 A.B. 
795, Memorandum from John Sobotik, Office of General Counsel, 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Transportation, 
to 
Paul 
Nilsen, 
Legislative Reference Bureau (July 22, 1997).   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
17
argued that a statutory provision calling for "automatic 
reinstatement" of his driving privileges related back to the 
date of his OAR/OAS offense.  We disagreed, concluding that the 
reinstatement did not apply retroactively and that he was 
properly convicted of operating a vehicle while his license was 
revoked on the date of the offense.  Id. at 489.  
¶36 The State maintains that the reasoning of Orethun 
should apply to Hanson's HTO status, which was not undone until 
after he committed the OAR offense.  We do not find Orethun 
controlling in the instant case for the simple reason that 
Orethun relied upon and interpreted a different statute.  
Section 351.09, unlike the statute discussed in Orethun, calls 
for a "rescission" of Hanson's HTO status.  As we have 
explained, 
today's 
decision 
rests 
upon 
the 
operation 
of  
"rescind" and "rescission" in § 351.09.   
¶37 The State also attempts to draw distinctions between 
the automatic reinstatement of driving privileges in Orethun and 
the affirmative steps required of a driver whose HTO status has 
been 
rescinded 
to 
obtain 
reinstatement 
of 
their 
driving 
privileges under § 351.09.  We do not see how this is relevant 
to the discussion of the rescission of Hanson's HTO status and 
its use as a penalty enhancer.  This case is not about the 
reinstatement of Hanson's driving privileges.  This case 
concerns only the impact of the rescission of his HTO status on 
the appropriate penalty to be meted out for his OAR conviction.  
¶38 As a consequence of the rescission of Hanson's HTO 
status, we conclude that the circuit court could not properly 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
18
impose a criminal penalty based solely upon that status.  The 
imposition of a criminal penalty based solely upon that status 
would be in excess of that authorized by the legislature and 
must be declared void pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.13.   
B 
¶39 Having concluded that the circuit court could not 
properly impose a criminal penalty based on Hanson's rescinded 
HTO status, we must address whether Hanson was otherwise subject 
to a criminal penalty for his conviction.  Hanson was convicted 
under the prior statutory scheme.  Section 343.44 formerly 
distinguished between OAR/OAS convictions that arose solely out 
of suspensions or revocations for failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture, and those that did not.  Convictions that arise out 
of suspensions or revocations for the failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture are subject only to civil penalties, whereas other 
convictions for OAR/OAS, fifth offense, are subject to criminal 
penalties.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(e).  If the circuit court 
had concluded that Hanson's conviction had not arisen solely 
from suspensions or revocations for failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture, the court could have sentenced Hanson to up to one 
year in jail, even if he was not an HTO.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(e)1.   
¶40 The court of appeals noted in this case that the 
parties failed to discuss whether Hanson's driving record 
supported a criminal conviction, even absent consideration of 
Hanson's HTO status.  In their briefs to this court, the parties 
have referenced whether such an alternative basis for a criminal 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
19
sentence exists.  However, they have each taken seemingly 
inconsistent positions which do not assist us in deciphering the 
record and applying the law.   
¶41 The State advanced in its brief that regardless of the 
HTO penalty enhancer, Hanson was subject to a criminal penalty 
for his conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(e)1 because 
suspensions or revocations in effect at the time of his fifth 
offense were not imposed solely for the failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture.  At oral argument, however, the State made no 
argument regarding this alternative basis for imposing a 
criminal penalty in the present case, which, if it exists, would 
carry the day.   
¶42 The 
dissent 
advances 
that 
Hanson's 
failure 
to 
reinstate an April 1996 suspension provides a basis for a 
criminal sentence. That result is directly contrary to the court 
of appeals decision in State v. Muniz, 181 Wis. 2d 928, 512 
N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1994).  In Muniz, the court of appeals 
addressed the very situation the dissent describes and concluded 
that the failure to reinstate following a suspension based on 
grounds other than the failure to pay a fine or forfeiture 
cannot serve as the basis to criminalize subsequent OAR/OAS 
violations.  Id. at 932-33.   
¶43 The 
Muniz 
court 
rested 
its 
decision 
on 
the 
interpretation of the clause that recurs in § 343.44 that states 
that the civil penalties apply "'regardless of the person's 
failure to reinstate his or her operating privilege.'"  Id. at 
930-31 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b)2).  While the dissent 
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
20
relies on another court of appeals case, State v. Biljan, 177 
Wis. 2d 14, 501 N.W.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1993), which seems to 
interpret the same provision to reach a contrary result, the 
question of law the dissent resolves on its own accord has not 
been briefed by the parties.  Accordingly, we decline to reach 
out and resolve the question.10   
¶44 Hanson himself puts forth arguments that would suggest 
that not all of his prior OAR/OAS convictions were based solely 
upon the failure to pay a fine or forfeiture.  Hanson's brief 
states that his "driving privileges were suspended for point 
accumulation and failure to pay fines."11  Yet, at the same time 
                     
10 The dissent also relies on State v. Doyen, 185 Wis. 2d 
635, 518 N.W.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1994), which is not on point.  
While Doyen speaks to the failure to reinstate following a 
revocation 
or 
suspension, 
it 
provides 
no 
guidance 
in 
interpreting the civil penalties provisions of § 343.44, and 
particularly the clause appearing in § 343.44(2)(e)2 stating 
that the civil penalty applies "regardless of the person's 
failure to reinstate his or her operating privilege."  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(2)(e)2.  The dissent's reliance on State v. 
Kniess, 178 Wis. 2d 451, 504 N.W.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1993), is also 
misguided.  Kniess would be controlling only in the event that 
Hanson's HTO status was valid at the time of his conviction.  We 
have rejected that contention above.  
11 Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 18 (emphasis 
added).   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
21
Hanson argues that in the absence of the HTO enhancer, no 
criminal penalty is applicable. 
¶45 We also note that the circuit court did not delineate 
whether the suspensions that were in effect on October 31, 1998, 
arose solely from the failure to pay a fine or forfeiture.  
Because we are unable to do so, we must remand to the circuit 
court so that the parties may clarify their positions and the 
circuit court may make a proper determination as to whether a 
civil or criminal penalty is appropriate.  In doing so, it is to 
determine 
whether 
Hanson's 
conviction 
falls 
under 
§ 343.44(2)(e)2, in which case only a civil forfeiture may be 
imposed, or whether § 343.44(2)(e)1 applies and allows for the 
imposition of a criminal sentence.  
¶46 In closing we note that the difficulties faced in this 
case are a consequence of the prior statutory scheme, which the 
                                                                  
We also note that Hanson presents an argument regarding the 
legislature's intent to reserve criminal punishment for serious 
offenses, and argues that the legislature did not intend that he 
be treated criminally.  Hanson's reliance on this legislative 
intent is misplaced.  The legislative intent on which he relies 
is that of the legislature's reclassification of the offenses of 
OAR and OAS in 1997 Wis. Act 84.  While some of the provisions 
of that act, including Wis. Stat. § 351.09, were in effect on 
October 31, 1998, the date of Hanson's fifth offense, the 
reclassification of OAR and OAS did not take effect until August 
1, 2000.  Hanson therefore is not subject to the statutory 
scheme to which the proffered legislative intent applies.  
Rather, as we have explained, he is subject to the law of OAR 
and OAS under the prior statutory scheme.  Under that statutory 
scheme he can evade a criminal penalty only if the revocation or 
suspension that is the basis of the violation was imposed solely 
due to a failure to pay a fine or forfeiture.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(e)2.   
No. 
99-3142-CR 
 
 
22
1995 Governor's Task Force described as "overly complex" and a 
source of confusion "among law enforcement, DAs, attorneys, 
public defenders and the courts."  Governor's Task Force on 
Operating After Revocation and Operating While Intoxicated, 
Summary 
of 
Proceedings 
(Oct. 
1995). 
 
Fortunately, 
as 
a 
consequence of the legislative overhaul embodied by 1997 Wis. 
Act 84 and the streamlining and simplification of the law of OAR 
and OAS, these are problems that our courts will no longer be 
asked to address.  
IV 
¶47 In conclusion, we have determined that the imposition 
of a criminal penalty based solely upon Hanson's HTO status, 
which was rescinded under Wis. Stat. § 351.09 prior to his 
conviction, is a sentence in excess of that authorized by law.  
If there is no additional basis for the imposition of a criminal 
sentence, the criminal penalty is a sentence in excess of that 
authorized by law and is invalid under Wis. Stat. § 971.13.  
Because of the state of the record, however, we are unable to 
determine whether such additional basis exists.  We thus must 
remand this case to the circuit court for a determination of the 
appropriate penalty under § 343.44(2)(e).  Accordingly, the 
decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
1 
¶48 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (dissenting).  I cannot join the 
majority opinion because it abandons a long-standing rule of 
Wisconsin law——that a plea of no contest waives all non-
jurisdictional challenges.  The majority does not provide a 
valid legal reason for its failure to apply the waiver rule.  
The majority opinion also ignores clear information in the 
record when it reaches the conclusion that a remand is 
necessary.  
¶49 It is a well-established principle that a plea of no 
contest or guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defenses and 
defects.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 293, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986); State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 188, 567 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1997).  Wisconsin courts have recognized the waiver 
rule for a long time.  See State v. Princess Cinema of 
Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 651, 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980); 
Hawkins v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 443, 448, 132 N.W.2d 545 (1965).   
¶50 In this case, Hanson pled no contest to the charge of 
operating after revocation/suspension (OAR/OAS) (Plea Hr'g at 
9), and,   therefore, he waived all non-jurisdictional defenses 
or defects.  In his post-conviction motion, Hanson claimed that 
the circuit court could not impose criminal penalties for the 
OAR/OAS 
charge 
because 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, rescinded his status 
as a HTO.  This challenge is not a jurisdictional one.  
Consequently, Hanson waived such a defense or defect when he 
pled no contest to the criminal OAR/OAS charge. 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
2 
¶51 The majority opinion avoids the waiver rule, by 
holding that Wis. Stat. § 973.13 demands that we address 
Hanson's challenge to the criminal penalties.  Majority op. at 
¶22.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.13 provides that "[i]n any case 
where the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that 
authorized by law, such excess shall be void and the sentence 
shall be valid only to the extent of the maximum term authorized 
by 
statute 
and 
shall 
stand 
commuted 
without 
further 
proceedings."  According to the majority opinion, Hanson's 
criminal 
sentence 
could 
be 
void 
under 
§ 973.13, 
if 
the 
rescission of Hanson's status as a HTO prevented the application 
of the penalty enhancer.         
¶52 The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is that there 
is 
no 
legal 
justification 
for 
departing 
from 
the 
well-
established waiver rule.  The majority opinion relies upon State 
v. Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d 20, 586 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1998) to 
support its holding.  Flowers presents an entirely different 
fact situation, one that makes its holding inapplicable to this 
case.   
¶53 In Flowers, the defendant claimed that his criminal 
sentence was void as a matter of law.  221 Wis. 2d at 26.  The 
State charged the defendant, Flowers, with two counts of retail 
theft, as party to a crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.50(1m) and 939.05,  for stealing various items from a 
food store.  Id. at 23.  In addition, the State charged Flowers 
as a repeat offender, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62, because 
he was previously convicted of felony firearm possession.  Id.  
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
3 
Flowers pled guilty to one count of retail theft as a repeat 
offender, but Flowers never admitted to the prior felony 
conviction, nor did the State enter sufficient evidence of such 
conviction.  Id.  In a post-conviction motion, Flowers claimed 
that his sentence as a repeater was void as a matter of law, 
because the State failed to establish his repeater status, and 
it was undisputed that he did not admit to a prior felony 
conviction within five years.  Id. at 24-25.  The circuit court 
denied Flowers' motion and Flowers appealed.  Id. at 25.   
¶54 The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.13 permitted Flowers to challenge his sentence as a 
repeater, despite the effective procedural bar of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06(4), which provides that a defendant must raise all 
grounds for relief in the original, supplemental, or amended 
post-conviction motion.  Id. at 28.  The court of appeals 
determined that the policy articulated in State v. Escalona-
Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), did not prevent 
Flowers from challenging his criminal sentence.  Id. at 28.     
¶55 Here the majority opinion is overlooking a critical 
limitation on the Flowers holding, namely, that "if a defendant 
is sentenced . . . and the State has either failed to prove the 
prior conviction or gain the defendant's admission to such fact, 
then § 973.13 becomes applicable."  Id. (emphasis added).   
¶56 At the plea hearing in this case, Hanson admitted he 
had previously been found to be a habitual traffic offender, and 
to his prior convictions for OAR/OAS.  The circuit court judge 
specifically 
asked 
Hanson 
if 
he 
admitted 
to 
four 
prior 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
4 
convictions, and that he had been adjudged a habitual traffic 
offender.  (Plea Hr'g at 9-10).  Hanson responded "yes" to these 
questions.  (Plea Hr'g at 10).  Flowers is, therefore, clearly 
distinguishable and, as a result, the majority opinion provides 
no legal justification for departing from the long-standing rule 
that a plea of no contest waives all non-jurisdictional defenses 
and defects. 
¶57 Because the majority opinion concludes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.13 permits Hanson to challenge his sentence, the majority 
opinion does not address Hanson's claim that the circuit court 
did not have jurisdiction over his case.  Majority op. at ¶20, 
n.5.  Hanson contends that the circuit court lacked criminal 
subject matter jurisdiction over his criminal case "because his 
status as a habitual traffic offender was rescinded, and 
therefore, the offense with which he was charged was not a 
crime."  (Br. of Def.-Appellant-Pet'r at 17).  Therefore, Hanson 
argues that an exception to the waiver rule applies.   
¶58 I reject this claim, as the court of appeals did, when 
it 
relied 
on 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution which confers original jurisdiction on the circuit 
court for all matters civil and criminal within Wisconsin.  In 
State v. Aniton, 183 Wis. 2d 125, 129, 515 N.W.2d 302 (Ct. App. 
1994), it was stated that:  "[t]he circuit court lacks criminal 
subject-matter jurisdiction only where the complaint does not 
charge an offense known to law."  See also State v. Bratrud, 204 
Wis. 2d 445, 450, 555 N.W.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1996)("various facts 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
5 
relevant to a defendant's conviction are admitted when a plea is 
taken"). 
¶59 It is important to note what the record in this case 
clearly establishes.  Attached to the criminal complaint is a 
teletype which shows that on April 12, 1996, Hanson was 
suspended for two months.  There is nothing in the record to 
show that Hanson had been reinstated by the time of this offense 
on October 31, 1998, nor does Hanson claim that he had been 
reinstated by that date. 
¶60 The two-month suspension was a result of convictions 
for violation of license restriction (VOR), and that suspension 
served as the basis for three operating after suspension (OAS or 
OWS) charges that occurred on May 6 and May 29, 1996.  These 
charges 
resulted 
in 
two 
convictions 
for 
operating 
after 
suspension (or while suspended) in Waupaca County on August 27, 
1996, and in Outagamie County on July 3, 1996. 
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.44(2)(b)2 states that if a 
revocation or suspension which forms the basis of a violation 
was imposed solely due to a failure to pay a fine or forfeiture 
then a forfeiture (rather than a crime) results.  However, here 
it is clear that at least one of Hanson's suspensions that 
formed the basis for the criminal charge of OAR/OAS was 
predicated not on failure to pay a fine or forfeiture, but on a 
suspension resulting from convictions for violation of license 
restriction (VOR).  Due to that fact, his lack of reinstatement, 
and his failure to apply for rescission of his HTO status prior 
to the offense, his violation on October 31, 1998, was a 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
6 
criminal offense and criminal sanctions could be imposed.  See 
State v. Biljan, 177 Wis. 2d 14, 21-22, 501 N.W.2d 820 (Ct. App. 
1993), and State v. Doyen, 185 Wis. 2d 635, 642-43, 518 N.W.2d 
321 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶62 The majority opinion claims that this conclusion is 
contrary to the holding in State v. Muniz, 181 Wis. 2d 928, 512 
N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1994).  Majority op. at ¶42.  In Muniz, the 
defendant, Muniz, appealed the sentence that resulted from a 
conviction of second offense OAR/OAS, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1).  181 Wis. 2d at 930.  Muniz argued that the 
imposition 
of 
criminal 
penalties 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b)1 was improper because the suspension that formed 
the basis for the OAR/OAS charge was for failure to pay a 
forfeiture.  Id.  The court of appeals agreed, stating that 
"[b]ecause we conclude that the only suspension in effect at the 
time of the current violation was imposed solely for failure to 
pay a forfeiture, even though Muniz failed to reinstate his 
operating 
privileges 
after 
another 
suspension 
period 
had 
expired, 
Muniz 
should 
have 
been 
sentenced 
under 
§ 343.44(2)(b)2."  Id. (emphasis added).  
¶63 After Muniz, the court of appeals decided the case of 
State v. Doyen, 185 Wis. 2d 635, 518 N.W.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In Doyen, a group of five defendants claimed that they were not 
subject to the mandatory minimum (criminal) penalties under Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(2g) for their OAR/OAS violations because their 
suspensions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated 
(OWI) had expired by the time each committed the OAR/OAS 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
7 
offense.  185 Wis. 2d at 638.  The court of appeals rejected 
that claim, concluding that the phrase "[n]o person whose 
operating privilege has been duly revoked or suspended pursuant 
to the laws of this state shall operate a motor vehicle upon any 
highway in this state during such suspension or revocation or 
thereafter . . ." in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1) meant that a 
suspension or revocation is not limited to the initial court-
ordered period of suspension or revocation for the specific 
offense.  Id. at 641.  With respect to four of the defendants' 
suspensions for OWI, the phrase "or thereafter" meant that the 
suspensions continued until they complied with an alcohol 
assessment order.  Id. at 642.  With respect to the fifth 
defendant, classified as an HTO, the phrase "or thereafter" 
meant that the defendant's suspension for OWI continued because 
the OWI conviction, in conjunction with other convictions, 
established her as an HTO and led to the revocation of her 
license.  The court also noted that the operating privilege 
after an OWI conviction is not "automatically reinstated after 
the lapse of a specific time period."  Id. at 642-43. 
¶64 The result in Doyen is consistent with the court of 
appeals decision in State v. Kniess, 178 Wis. 2d 451, 504 N.W.2d 
122 (Ct. App. 1993).  In that case, the defendant, Kniess, 
claimed that the State could not impose criminal penalties for 
his sixth offense of OAR/OAS, because the revocation that was 
the basis for the charge was only for a failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture.  State v. Kniess, 178 Wis. 2d 451, 452, 504 N.W.2d 
122 (Ct. App. 1993).  The court of appeals reiterated the rule 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
8 
from Biljan that criminal penalties are appropriate for an 
OAR/OAS violation, if the suspension in effect at the time of 
the OAR/OAS violation was imposed "'for other than, or in 
conjunction with, the defendant's failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture.'"  Id. at 455 (quoting Biljan, 177 Wis. 2d at 20).  
Because the HTO suspension (actually revocation) was imposed on 
Kniess for reasons other than the failure to pay a fine or 
forfeiture, the court of appeals concluded that criminal 
sanctions were appropriate for his OAR/OAS conviction.       
¶65 I conclude that the reasoning of Doyen, Kniess, and 
Biljan, rather than Muniz, which is not applicable, controls the 
result of the present case.  A person such as Hanson, suspended 
as a result of VOR convictions, is not automatically reinstated. 
 At the time of the offense for OAR/OAS, Hanson had neither been 
reinstated 
after 
the 
suspension 
resulting 
from 
the 
VOR 
convictions, nor had he sought rescission of his HTO status.  
Therefore, 
Hanson's 
suspension 
resulting 
from 
the 
VOR 
convictions continued during his revocation as an HTO. 
¶66 Consequently, 
consistent 
with 
Doyen, 
Kniess, 
and 
Biljan, the civil penalty requirement for a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.44(1), set forth § 343.44(2)(b)2, is not satisfied 
in the present case.  The suspension that is the basis for 
Hanson's OAR/OAS violation was not imposed solely for the 
failure to pay a fine or forfeiture; rather, the suspension 
resulted from the VOR convictions.  In addition, Hanson had not 
reinstated his driving privileges, nor had he applied for 
rescission of his HTO status on the date of the offense.  
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
9 
Accordingly, criminal sanctions were appropriate for Hanson's 
OAR/OAS conviction. 
¶67 While his revocation as an HTO provided yet another 
basis, when Circuit Judge John P. Hoffmann convicted Hanson on 
the record of the offense of OAR/OAS, and when the written 
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence was entered, no mention was 
made of Hanson's HTO status. (Plea Hr'g at 11-12 and Record at 
10-1). 
¶68 From a thorough review of the transcript of the plea 
hearing and of the record, it becomes quite clear, however, that 
Hanson's conviction and sentence were based on the fact of prior 
convictions 
for 
OAR/OAS 
within 
a 
five-year 
period, 
his 
suspension resulting from the VOR convictions, and his lack of 
reinstatement.  His HTO status on the date of the offense, at a 
time when he had made no application for rescission, provided an 
additional factor. 
¶69 In my opinion, the contention of the majority that a 
remand is necessary (majority op. at ¶43) ignores the record 
before this court as discussed herein.  In addition to what has 
already been noted, it ignores the concession of Assistant State 
Public Defender Suzanne C. O'Neill that the charge that Hanson 
faced was a criminal charge (Plea Hr'g at 11) and further 
ignores the information provided by the plea questionnaire 
completed by Hanson and his attorney. 
¶70 From the face of that document, it is clear that 
Hanson's HTO status was not expected to play any role at 
sentencing.  Under maximum penalty, there is an entry of "$2500 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
10
+ 1 Yr Jail."  (Record at 8-1).  Among other entries initialed 
with approval by Hanson there were the following:  "I am giving 
up my right to raise any defense I may have to these charges and 
to have another court review any non-jurisdictional defects in 
these proceedings.  If the judge accepts my plea, I can be found 
guilty of the criminal charge(s) to which I am pleading."  Id. 
¶71 Thorough review of the entire record makes it clear 
that the conviction of Hanson under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1) made 
him subject to the criminal penalties provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b)-(e).  He received a sentence well within the 
maximum penalties provided by those provisions.  Even if his 
conviction had been for a second, rather than a fifth, 
conviction within a five-year period, his sentence would have 
been a valid one within the maximums provided.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(2)(b)1. 
¶72 Clearly, Wis. Stat. § 973.13 has no applicability 
under such circumstances.  The circuit court had criminal 
subject-matter jurisdiction over Hanson, and, in addition, he 
waived all non-jurisdiction defects and defenses by entry of his 
plea of no contest.  The circuit court did not impose "a maximum 
penalty in excess of that authorized by law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.13. 
¶73 Contrary to the statement of the majority opinion 
(majority op. at ¶43), the State did argue, both in its brief 
and during oral argument, that criminal penalties for a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 343.44 are appropriate, when the 
suspension or revocation in effect at the time of the OAR/OAS 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
11
offense is based on grounds other than the failure to pay a fine 
or forfeiture, relying on State v. Kniess, 178 Wis. 2d 451, 504 
N.W.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1993).  (State's Br. at 14-15).  The State 
claimed that Hanson admitted that the predicate suspensions to 
the OAR/OAS charge were not based solely on the failure to pay a 
fine or forfeiture.  Id.  In addition, the State noted that 
Hanson was suspended in April, 1996, for VOR.  Id. at 15.  The 
State claimed that this suspension established that a portion of 
the predicate suspensions to the OAR/OAS offense were not 
imposed solely for failure to pay a fine or forfeiture.  Id.  
The State argued that, as a result, Hanson was subject to a 
criminal penalty, regardless of the HTO penalty enhancer.  Id. 
¶74 This case was correctly decided based on the record, 
the Wisconsin Constitution, the case law on subject-matter 
jurisdiction, and the waiver doctrine.  I would, therefore, 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals, and, therefore the 
conviction of Hanson for OAR/OAS, since it is clear that his 
violation on October 31, 1998, was a criminal offense, and, 
therefore, criminal sanctions could be, and were, properly 
imposed.    
¶75 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
and Justice DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  99-3142.npc 
 
1