Title: People v. Martinez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S219970
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2017

1 
Filed 5/25/17 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S219970 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E057976 
DENNIS TERRY MARTINEZ, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FMB1200197 
 
____________________________________) 
 
After defendant Dennis Terry Martinez pleaded guilty to leaving the scene 
of an injury accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) 
(Vehicle Code section 20001(a), commonly known as ―hit and run‖), the trial 
court sentenced him to three years in state prison.  The trial court further ordered 
him to pay $425,654.63 to the victim as restitution for injuries suffered as a result 
of the accident.  Defendant contends, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the trial 
court erred in fixing the amount of restitution.  We agree as well. 
Where, as here, a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced to state 
prison, section 1202.4 of the Penal Code (section 1202.4) provides that the 
defendant must pay restitution directly to the victim for losses incurred ―as a result 
of the commission of a crime.‖  (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Giordano 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651–652 (Giordano).)  ―To the extent possible,‖ direct 
victim restitution is to be ordered in an amount ―sufficient to fully reimburse the 
victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the 
defendant‘s criminal conduct.‖  (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)  Application of these 
2 
provisions depends on the relationship between the victim‘s loss and the defendant‘s 
crime.  Here, defendant‘s crime was not being involved in a traffic accident, nor 
does his conviction imply that he was at fault in the accident.  Defendant‘s crime, 
rather, was leaving the scene of the accident without presenting identification or 
rendering aid.  Thus, under section 1202.4, the trial court was authorized to order 
restitution for those injuries that were caused or exacerbated by defendant‘s criminal 
flight from the scene of the accident, but it was not authorized to award restitution 
for injuries resulting from the accident itself. 
I. 
Defendant was driving his pickup truck during the early evening of April 
26, 2012, when he was involved in a collision with a 12-year-old boy riding on a 
scooter.  Defendant stopped his truck and checked on the boy, who had been 
seriously injured in the accident.  The victim‘s mother rushed to the scene.  When 
she arrived, defendant returned to his truck.  Defendant later told police that he 
waited there until he saw the boy loaded into an ambulance, then drove off.  At the 
time of the accident, defendant was unlicensed and on felony probation.  He told 
officers that he left the scene because he was afraid that he had violated his 
probation by driving without a license. 
The victim sustained multiple facial fractures and a fractured clavicle and 
was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury.  He was hospitalized in intensive care 
for nine days before being transferred to a rehabilitation center.   
Police ultimately identified the vehicle involved in the accident and traced 
the vehicle to defendant, at which point defendant came forward.  In an interview 
with police, defendant admitted to his involvement in the accident and that he left 
the scene.  Defendant reported that he was not intoxicated at the time of the 
accident; he stated that he had used medical grade marijuana at 8:00 a.m. on the 
3 
day of the accident but that its effects had worn off by 11:00 a.m., approximately 
seven and a half hours before the accident.  Defendant apologized and told officers 
that he understood he had committed a crime by fleeing the scene. 
Defendant was charged with one felony count of leaving the scene of an 
injury accident.  (Veh. Code, § 20001(a).)  He pleaded guilty and the trial court 
sentenced him to a three-year term of imprisonment with 192 days of credit for 
time served and good conduct.  The parties stipulated that the felony complaint 
and police report would provide a factual basis for the plea.  At the sentencing 
hearing, the victim‘s mother stated that her son had collided with the truck and 
that the collision was an accident.  Defendant reported that the victim hit 
defendant‘s vehicle when the victim failed to stop on his scooter.  The trial court 
made no findings concerning defendant‘s responsibility for the accident. 
Several months after sentencing, the trial court considered whether 
defendant could be ordered to pay restitution for the medical costs that the victim 
incurred as a result of the accident.  The trial court answered that question in the 
affirmative, relying on People v. Rubics (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 452 (Rubics).  In 
Rubics, the Court of Appeal upheld a direct restitution award of $44,414 in funeral 
expenses against a defendant convicted of leaving the scene of the accident that 
resulted in the victim‘s death.  Echoing the reasoning of Rubics, the trial court 
ruled that the victim in this case was entitled to restitution for losses incurred as a 
result of the accident because ―even if it was just a pure accident,‖ involvement in 
an accident ―is still an element of the crime.‖  Following the trial court‘s ruling, 
the parties entered into a stipulated agreement fixing $425,654.63 — the amount 
of the victim‘s bill for his stay in intensive care — as the amount of direct victim 
restitution. 
4 
The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order.  It concluded that the 
trial court erred because ― ‗[t]he gravamen of a section 20001 offense . . . is not the 
initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification 
or rendering aid.‘ ‖  (Quoting People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 
1509 (Escobar).)  The court disagreed with Rubics,  which it characterized as ―an 
anomaly in an otherwise ‗unbroken line of cases stretching back more than 50 
years‘ ‖ that have characterized the offense in the same manner.  (Quoting People 
v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82, 89 (Valdez).)  The court concluded that the 
trial court lacked the power to order restitution for injuries caused by the accident 
itself because ―defendant was not convicted for any offense involving 
responsibility for the actual accident and no factual determination of his 
responsibility for the collision or the victim‘s injuries ha[d] been made.‖  The 
court remanded the matter to permit the People to seek restitution for any losses 
caused or exacerbated by defendant‘s flight. 
We granted review to resolve the conflict about whether, in imposing a 
sentence for a violation of Vehicle Code section 20001(a), a trial court may order 
direct restitution for injuries the victim suffered as a result of the underlying 
accidental collision.   
II. 
A. 
Under California law, ―[c]onvicted criminals may be required to pay one or 
more of three types of restitution.‖  (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 651.)  They 
may be required to pay a restitution fine into the state Restitution Fund, to pay 
restitution directly to the victim, or to pay restitution as a condition of probation.  
The statutory requirements vary depending on the type of restitution at issue.  (Id. 
at pp. 651–652.)  
5 
This case concerns an order of direct victim restitution.  Under the 
California Constitution, as amended in 1982 by Proposition 8 (commonly known 
as The Victims‘ Bill of Rights), every crime victim has a right to be compensated 
by the defendant for losses incurred as a result of the defendant‘s crime.  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13).)  At the time Proposition 8 was passed, ―victims 
had some access to compensation through the Restitution Fund, and trial courts 
had discretion to impose restitution as a condition of probation.‖  (Giordano, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 652.)  Courts did not, however, have general statutory 
authority to order the defendant to pay restitution directly to the victim of his or 
her crime.  (See People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1072–1074 
(Broussard).)  In passing Proposition 8, the electorate expanded victims‘ access to 
compensation by declaring an ―unequivocal intention . . . that all persons who 
suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from 
the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer,‖ and instructing the 
Legislature to adopt legislation to implement this directive.  (Prop. 8, adding Cal. 
Const., art. I, former § 28, subd. (b), as enacted June 8, 1982, reprinted at 1 Stats. 
1982, p. A–186.)  
The Legislature‘s response, currently codified in section 1202.4, similarly 
declares that it is the Legislature‘s intent ―that a victim of crime who incurs an 
economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution 
directly from a defendant convicted of that crime.‖  (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).)1  To 
                                              
1 
Because Proposition 8 was not self-executing, the Legislature enacted 
several statutes to implement the new law, including Penal Code former 
section 1203.04 and Government Code former section 13967.  These statutes were 
ultimately repealed and consolidated into Penal Code section 1202.4, which now 
governs restitution orders in all criminal cases, except those in which the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
6 
that end, section 1202.4 provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, 
―in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the 
defendant‘s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to 
the victim or victims.‖  (Id., subd. (f).)  The statute further provides that the court‘s 
restitution order shall, ―[t]o the extent possible . . . fully reimburse the victim or 
victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the 
defendant‘s criminal conduct.‖  (Id., subd. (f)(3).)  This provision, as the Courts of 
Appeal have uniformly held, and as the People agree, authorizes trial courts to 
order direct victim restitution for those losses incurred as a result of the crime of 
which the defendant was convicted.  (See, e.g., People v. Lai (2006) 138 
Cal.App.4th 1227, 1247–1248; People v. Woods (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1045, 
1051–1052; see also People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 147 [―The 
only limitation the Legislature placed on victim restitution is that the loss must be 
an ‗ ― ‗economic loss‘ ‖ ‘ incurred as a result of the defendant‘s criminal 
conduct.‖].) 
In this respect, the restitution power conferred by section 1202.4 stands in 
contrast to a court‘s power to order restitution as a condition of probation.  As we 
explained in People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 (Carbajal), ―[i]n granting 
probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster 
rehabilitation and to protect public safety,‖ including the power to ―regulate 
conduct ‗not itself criminal‘ ‖ but ― ‗reasonably related to the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted or to future criminality.‘ ‖  (Id. at pp. 1120–1121, 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
defendant is sentenced to probation.  (Pen. Code, § 1203.1; Giordano, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at pp. 652–654.) 
7 
quoting People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486; see Pen. Code, § 1203.1, 
subd. (j).)  This discretion, we noted, has long been held to include the power to 
order restitution ―even when the loss was not necessarily caused by the criminal 
conduct underlying the conviction,‖ including in cases in which ―the loss was 
caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction [citation], by conduct 
underlying dismissed and uncharged counts [citation], and by conduct resulting in 
an acquittal [citation].‖  (Carbajal, at p. 1121.)  We held in Carbajal that this 
power was unaffected by the passage of Proposition 8 or its implementing 
legislation, neither of which manifested an intent to abrogate courts‘ discretion to 
order restitution as a condition of probation ―where the victim‘s loss was not the 
result of the crime underlying the defendant‘s conviction, but where the trial court 
finds such restitution will serve‖ the purposes of probation.  (Carbajal, at p. 1122.)  
A trial court‘s power to order restitution in probation cases is thus broader than its 
power to order direct victim restitution under section 1202.4 in cases in which the 
defendant receives a nonprobationary sentence.  (See People v. Anderson (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 19, 29 [―Trial courts continue to retain authority to impose restitution 
as a condition of probation in circumstances not otherwise dictated by 
section 1202.4. . . .  When section 1202.4 imposes its mandatory requirements in 
favor of a victim‘s right to restitution, the statute is explicit and narrow.  When 
section 1203.1 provides the court with discretion to achieve a defendant‘s 
reformation, its ambit is necessarily broader[.]‖].) 
In Carbajal, we concluded that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in 
a hit-and-run case by conditioning the defendant‘s probation on the payment of 
restitution to the owner of property damaged in the underlying accident.  Such a 
condition, we explained, ―can be reasonably related to the offense underlying the 
conviction and can serve the purposes of rehabilitating the offender and deterring 
8 
future criminality.‖  (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1119; see id. at pp. 1124–
1125.)  We did not have occasion to address the distinct question whether, when a 
defendant is convicted of a hit-and-run offense and sentenced to state prison, a 
trial court may order direct victim restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f), 
for losses incurred as a result of the underlying accident.  It is to that question that 
we now turn. 
B. 
Section 20001(a) of the Vehicle Code provides:  ―The driver of a vehicle 
involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or 
herself, or in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene 
of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004.‖  
Vehicle Code sections 20003 and 20004, in turn, require the driver to stop and 
provide identification and render aid to the victim, as well as to report the accident 
to authorities if there is no police officer present.  Failure to comply with these 
requirements is a criminal offense.  (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) 
As courts have repeatedly observed, although the Vehicle Code 
section 20001(a) offense is commonly referred to as a ―hit and run,‖ the term is 
something of a misnomer; the offense is ―more accurately described as fleeing the 
scene of an injury accident.‖  (Valdez, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.)  That is to 
say, ― ‗the act made criminal‘ ‖ under the statute ― ‗is not the ―hitting‖ but the 
―running.‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 87.)  ― ‗The legislative purpose of sections 20001 and 
20003 is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident 
from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical care and 
from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by 
failing to identify oneself.‘ ‖  (Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1510.) 
9 
Under Vehicle Code section 20001(a), ―[t]he occurrence of an injury 
accident is a condition precedent‖ to the imposition of a duty to stop, provide 
identification, and render aid — ―but [it] is not an element of the crime‖ in the 
sense that it constitutes part of the conduct forbidden by the statute.  (Corenbaum 
v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1340.)  Nor is any degree of fault 
required for conviction; a defendant who flees the scene of an injury accident has 
committed a crime even if the accident was solely the result of the victim‘s own 
negligence.  (Veh. Code, § 20001(a).)  As the United States Supreme Court once 
explained in upholding Vehicle Code section 20001 against constitutional 
challenge, ―it is not a criminal offense under California law to be a driver 
‗involved in an accident.‘  An accident may be the fault of others; it may occur 
without any driver having been at fault.‖  (California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 
424, 431 (plur. opn. of Burger, C. J.) [rejecting argument that a driver‘s disclosure 
obligations under California‘s hit-and-run statute create a ―substantial risk of self-
incrimination‖ in violation of the Fifth Amendment].) 
The answer to the question in this case follows directly from this long-
settled understanding of the crime made punishable by Vehicle Code 
section 20001(a):  Restitution for losses incurred ―as a result of the commission of 
a crime‖ includes losses incurred as a result of the defendant‘s unlawful flight 
from the scene of the accident in which he or she was involved, but not losses 
incurred solely as a result the accident itself. 
The People acknowledge that ―the occurrence of the accident, in itself, is 
not [independently] punishable as a criminal act‖ under Vehicle Code 
section 20001.  They argue, however, that restitution for injuries resulting from an 
accident is nevertheless recoverable under Penal Code section 1202.4 because 
involvement in the collision is an element of the offense — that is, a fact that the 
10 
prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction.  This argument draws heavily on 
Rubics, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pages 454, 462, in which the Court of Appeal 
upheld a direct restitution order for accident-related losses in a case in which the 
defendant fled the scene of an accident that resulted in the victim‘s death.  The 
court in that case acknowledged that while the ― ‗gravamen of a section 20001 
offense . . . is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without 
presenting identification or rendering aid,‘ ‖ a ―necessary element of 
section 20001 is that [the defendant] was involved in an accident that caused 
serious injury or death.‖  (Id. at pp. 458–459.)  ―Thus, although a primary focus of 
section 20001 may be the act of leaving the scene,‖ the court reasoned, ―a 
conviction also acknowledges the fleeing driver‘s responsibility for the damages 
he or she has caused by being involved in the accident itself.‖  (Id. at p. 459.)  The 
court upheld the restitution order after determining that substantial evidence 
supported the conclusion that the defendant had been at fault in the accident.  (Id. 
at p. 462.)  Relying on Rubics, the People argue that because involvement in an 
accident is an element of the hit-and-run offense, ―it necessarily occurs in ‗the 
commission of [that] crime‘ (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1)), and a court 
therefore can impose victim restitution for the injury to the extent it was caused by 
‗defendant‘s conduct‘ (id., subd. (f)).‖ 
Of course, as previously noted, a conviction under Vehicle Code section 
20001 does not, in fact, require any showing of ―the fleeing driver‘s 
responsibility‖ for the underlying accident.  (Rubics, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 459.)  And if restitution for accident-related injuries required nothing more than 
proof that the driver was ―involved in an accident that caused serious injury or 
death,‖ then section 1202.4 would authorize an award of restitution even in cases 
in which the victim was solely at fault.  To permit such an award based solely on 
11 
the defendant‘s passive involvement in the accident would serve no recognized 
restitutionary purpose.  And, indeed, to require the defendant to compensate the 
victim for injuries for which the defendant bears no responsibility — much less for 
injuries the victim has in effect inflicted on him or herself — could raise 
significant constitutional questions.  (Cf., e.g., Paroline v. United States (2014) 
___ U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 1710, 1726] [noting that the excessive fines clause of 
the Eighth Amendment may place limits on restitution awards].)  We are aware of 
no appellate ruling that has countenanced such a result.  (See State v. Domingo 
(Hawaii Ct.App. 2009) 216 P.3d 117 [reversing trial court restitution award where 
victim, whose blood-alcohol level was nearly three times the legal limit, caused 
accident from which defendant fled].) 
Seeking to avoid that result here, the People insist that accepting their theory 
―does not mean that a defendant will be liable for the losses in every hit-and-run 
case.‖  Rather, in the People‘s view, whether a particular defendant will be required 
to pay restitution for losses resulting from the accident is ―a determination to be 
made by the sentencing judge at the restitution hearing,‖ presumably based on the 
sentencing judge‘s view of whether the defendant was at fault in the accident, and 
therefore can be said to have ―caused‖ the victim‘s injuries through his or her 
―conduct‖ within the meaning of section 1202.4, subdivision (f). 
Whatever the merits of the People‘s argument as a policy matter, it cannot 
be squared with the plain language of section 1202.4.  Section 1202.4 refers to 
losses incurred ―as a result of the commission of a crime,‖ not as the result of 
attendant facts or circumstances the prosecution must prove in order to obtain a 
conviction.  Involvement in an accident is precisely such a circumstance; it forms 
no part of the conduct proscribed by Vehicle Code section 20001(a), but instead 
describes an event that gives rise to the statutory duty to stop, provide 
12 
identification, and render aid.  Thus, even if defendant had been at fault in the 
accident — and the evidence in the record does not establish that he was — his 
negligence might well give rise to civil tort liability, but it would not give rise to 
an obligation to make direct victim restitution for injuries caused by a collision 
that involved no criminal wrongdoing. 
Nor does the reference to losses resulting from the ―defendant‘s conduct‖ in 
section 1202.4, subdivision (f), suggest a different result, as the People‘s argument 
might suggest.  In the very same subdivision of the provision, the Legislature made 
clear that restitution is measured by the ―dollar amount that is sufficient to fully 
reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the 
result of the defendant‘s criminal conduct.‖  (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), italics added.)  
Read in context, the statute‘s reference to losses resulting from the ―defendant‘s 
conduct‖ (id., subd. (f)) is not plausibly read to expand the scope of direct victim 
restitution to encompass losses resulting from noncriminal conduct, solely because 
that conduct gives rise to a duty the breach of which is punishable as a crime.2 
                                              
2  
As defendant notes, every state high court to address this question under a 
comparably worded restitution statute has reached the same conclusion.  (See, e.g., 
State v. Williams (Fla. 1988) 520 So.2d 276, 277; State v. Starkey (Iowa 1989) 437 
N.W.2d 573, 575; State v. Beaudoin (Me. 1986) 503 A.2d 1289, 1290; State v. 
Steinolfson (N.D. 1992) 483 N.W.2d 182, 184; State v. Joyce (S.D. 2004) 681 
N.W.2d 468, 470–471; State v. Eastman (Or. 1981) 637 P.2d 609, 612, abrogated 
by Or. Rev. Stat., § 811.706 (1995); see also State ex rel. McDougall v. Superior 
Court (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996) 920 P.2d 784, 786.)  Only the Montana Supreme Court 
has reached a different conclusion in a somewhat analogous setting, but it did so 
because Montana‘s restitution statute had been revised to ―eliminat[e] the words 
requiring a victim to be a victim ‗of the offense‘ and the victim‘s loss to be ‗as a 
result of the offense.‘ ‖  (State v. Ness (Mont. 2009) 216 P.3d 773, 778 [upholding 
restitution order as part of sentence for tampering with evidence following a hit-
and-run accident resulting in victim‘s death].)  The court in that case concluded 
that the Montana Legislature intended to ―relax in some fashion the requirement 
that victim losses be a ‗result‘ of the offense,‖ and thus held that the statute 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
This straightforward reading of the statutory text does not, as the People 
argue, cast any doubt on whether direct victim restitution is available when the 
victim‘s losses are caused by conduct that does, in fact, constitute a crime.  If, for 
example, a thief steals a car and a third party reckless driver damages it, we do not 
doubt that the owner would be entitled to reimbursement from the thief under 
section 1202.4, subdivision (f).  But that is because the owner has incurred losses 
resulting from the thief‘s criminal conduct (namely, the unlawful deprivation of 
his or her property) — and not because the law provides general authorization to 
order restitution for losses caused by noncriminal behavior (including involvement 
in an accident) that is related in some way to the commission of a crime. 
Nor does this reading of the text cast doubt on whether a court may order 
restitution for losses incurred as a result of the means by which the defendant 
committed the offense.  (Richardson v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 813, 817; 
People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1257.)  So, for example, if a burglar 
breaks a window to enter a home, he or she may be ordered to pay for the broken 
window in victim restitution, even though the burglary statute requires the 
prosecution to prove only that the defendant entered the house with the intent to 
commit a felony.  (See Pen. Code, § 459.)  If the burglar happens to have 
committed the prohibited entry by some means that causes damage to the home, a 
trial court certainly can — and must — take the damage into account in ordering 
restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f).  But the authority to order 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
requires only that the restitution order have ― ‗some correlation or connection to 
the underlying offense‘ for which [the defendant is being] sentenced.‖  (Id. at 
pp. 778, 777.)   
14 
restitution for losses caused by criminal conduct — in this example, the burglar‘s 
unlawful entry into the home — does not imply the authority the People assert 
here:  that is, the power to order restitution for losses caused by noncriminal 
conduct that took place before the commission of any crime but gave rise to the 
duty that defendant ultimately breached. 
C. 
The People argue limiting direct victim restitution in hit-and-run cases to 
losses incurred by the crime itself — that is, the defendant‘s flight from the scene 
of the accident — undermines Vehicle Code section 20001(a)‘s purpose of 
deterring negligent drivers from seeking to avoid potential liability for injuries and 
damage they have caused.  To preclude direct victim restitution for accident-
related injuries, they argue, would incentivize at-fault drivers to flee the scene in 
hope of evading responsibility altogether or of covering up evidence of their fault. 
The People are, of course, correct that Vehicle Code section 20001(a) is 
designed in part to deter drivers from seeking to avoid responsibility for accidents 
in which they are at fault.  (See Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1510.)  But 
the means the Legislature chose to effectuate that purpose was to make leaving the 
scene of an accident a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment.  The 
Legislature made no provision for direct restitution for losses caused by the 
underlying collision.  And the Legislature that enacted Vehicle Code 
section 20001(a) in 1959 (Stats. 1959, ch. 3, § 20001, p. 1661) certainly would not 
have assumed that such restitution would otherwise be available; no statute 
provided general authority to award direct victim restitution in any amount until 
legislation implementing Proposition 8 was enacted more than two decades later.  
(See Broussard, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1072–1074.) 
15 
As the Legislature that enacted Vehicle Code section 20001(a) undoubtedly 
understood, even if direct victim restitution for accident-related injuries is not 
available, that does not mean that an at-fault driver will escape responsibility for 
the losses he or she has caused.  Once the perpetrator has been identified, the 
victim of a hit and run who believes the other driver was at fault may obtain civil 
damages in a tort suit, just as he or she would if the driver had stopped and 
provided identification as required by law.  And although fleeing the scene may 
permit drivers to attempt to hide evidence of their fault in the accident, the law 
accounts for this problem by permitting the trier of fact in a civil action to consider 
the failure to stop as some evidence of consciousness of responsibility for the 
accident.  (Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 676.)  A 
driver who breaches the duty to stop thus runs the risk not only of criminal 
prosecution and possible prison time, but of incurring a material disadvantage in a 
civil suit as well. 
We acknowledge the costs to the victims of hit-and-run offenses of 
instituting separate civil proceedings against a defendant whose negligence may 
have caused the underlying accident.  Such costs are, however, unavoidable in a 
statutory scheme that limits mandatory direct victim restitution to losses incurred 
―as a result of the commission of a crime.‖  (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).)  Even giving 
broad and liberal construction to section 1202.4 (People v. Garcia (2010) 185 
Cal.App.4th 1203, 1208), we must give effect to the unambiguous language the 
Legislature has chosen.   
16 
 
 
By its terms, section 1202.4 authorizes — indeed, requires — courts in 
Vehicle Code section 20001 cases to award direct victim restitution for losses 
resulting from the defendant‘s crime:  that is, flight from the scene of the accident 
without identifying himself or herself, rendering aid, or otherwise fulfilling the 
statutory requirements.  (Veh. Code, § 20001(a).)  Where the flight leads to a 
delay in the victim‘s access to medical care, for example, and the victim‘s injuries 
are exacerbated as a result, those costs are properly characterized as the ―result of 
the commission of a crime‖ for the purposes of a restitution order.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).)  Similarly, the cost of tracking down a defendant who has 
fled the scene of the accident may be recoverable because such losses, too, result 
from the defendant‘s unlawful flight.  Section 1202.4 does not, however, permit 
courts to order direct victim restitution for losses that occur as a result of an 
underlying accident that involves no criminal wrongdoing.3   
                                              
3 
A different result might obtain if the defendant‘s crimes included an 
offense, such as reckless driving (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, 23104) or driving under 
the influence (id., §§ 23152, 23153), that caused the accident that resulted in the 
victim‘s injuries.  Defendant in this case was neither charged with nor convicted of 
such an offense.  The People argue that the trial court‘s order was nevertheless 
justified because defendant could have been charged (but was not) with unlicensed 
driving.  The People did not raise this argument in their petition for review, and 
we do not address it. 
 
People v. Rubics, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 452, is disapproved to the extent 
it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
17 
 
III. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, and the case remanded for 
recalculation of the amount of victim restitution in accordance with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Martinez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 226 Cal.App.4th 1156 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219970 
Date Filed: May 25, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Daniel W. Detienne 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Thomas E. Robertson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Melissa Mandel, Meredith S. White, Lise S. Jacobson and Michael Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas E. Robertson 
225 Broadway, Suite 1460 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 544-9911 
 
Michael Pulos 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9041