Title: Mark Anthony Poole v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-1770
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2008

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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC05-1770 
MARK ANTHONY POOLE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
[December 11, 2008] 
PER CURIAM. 
Mark Anthony Poole was indicted, tried, and convicted of attempted first-
degree murder, armed burglary, armed robbery, sexual battery, and first-degree 
murder.  Poole appeals his conviction and his sentence of death for the first-degree 
murder. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
stated below, we affirm Poole‘s convictions but vacate his sentence of death and 
remand for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mark Anthony Poole was convicted of the first-degree murder of Noah 
Scott, attempted first-degree murder of Loretta White, armed burglary, sexual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
battery of Loretta White, and armed robbery.  Poole was convicted based on the 
following facts presented at trial.  On the evening of October 12, 2001, after 
playing some video games in the bedroom of their mobile home, Noah Scott and 
Loretta White went to bed sometime between 11:30 p.m. and 12 a.m. Later during 
the night, White woke up with a pillow over her face and Poole sitting on top of 
her. Poole began to rape and sexually assault her as she begged Poole not to hurt 
her because she was pregnant.  As White struggled and resisted, Poole repeatedly 
struck her with a tire iron.  She put her hand up to protect her head, and one of her 
fingers and part of another finger were severed by the tire iron.  While repeatedly 
striking White, Poole asked her where the money was.  During this attack on 
White, Scott attempted to stop Poole, but was also repeatedly struck with the tire 
iron.  As Scott struggled to defend White, Poole continued to strike Scott in the 
head until Scott died of blunt force head trauma.  At some point after the attack, 
Poole left the bedroom and White was able to get off the bed and put on clothes but 
she passed out before leaving the bedroom.  Poole came back in the bedroom and 
touched her vaginal area and said ―thank you.‖  White was in and out of 
consciousness for the rest of the night.  She was next aware of the time around 8 
a.m. and 8:30 a.m. when her alarm went off. 
When her alarm went off, White retrieved her cell phone and called 911.  
Shortly thereafter, police officers were dispatched to the home.  They found Scott 
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unconscious in the bedroom and White severely injured in the hallway by the 
bedroom.  White suffered a concussion and multiple face and head wounds and 
was missing part of her fingers.  Scott was pronounced dead at the scene. 
Evidence at the crime scene and in the surrounding area linked Poole to the 
crimes.  Several witnesses told police officers that they saw Poole or a man 
matching Poole‘s description near the victims‘ trailer on the night of the crimes.  
Stanley Carter stated that when he went to the trailer park around 11:30 that night, 
he noticed a black male walking towards the victims‘ trailer.  Carter‘s observations 
were consistent with that of Dawn Brisendine, who knew Poole and saw him 
walking towards the victims‘ trailer around 11:30 p.m.  Pamela Johnson, Poole‘s 
live-in girlfriend, testified that on that evening, Poole left his house sometime in 
the evening and did not return until 4:50 a.m.  
Poole was also identified as the person selling video game systems owned 
by Scott and stolen during the crime.1 Ventura Rico, who lived in the same trailer 
park as the victims, testified that on that night, while he was home with his 
cousin‘s girlfriend, Melissa Nixon, a black male came to his trailer and offered to 
sell him some video game systems.  Rico agreed to buy them for $50, at which 
point the black male handed him a plastic trash bag.  During this exchange, Nixon 
1. White testified that Scott owned a Sega Genesis, Sega Dreamcast, and 
Super Nintendo. 
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got a good look at the man and later identified Poole when the police showed her 
several photographs.  Nixon testified that the next morning, when her son was 
going through the trash bag, he noticed that one of the systems had blood on it.  
Pamela Johnson also testified that on the same morning, she found a game 
controller at the doorstep of Poole‘s house, she handed it to Poole, and Poole put it 
in his nightstand.  She indicated that she had never seen that game controller before 
that morning and did not know what it would be used for because neither she nor 
Poole owned any video game systems.  During the search of Poole‘s residence, the 
police retrieved this controller.  In addition, the police retrieved a blue Tommy 
Hilfiger polo shirt and a pair of Poole‘s Van shoes, shoes Poole said he had been 
wearing on the night of the crimes.  A DNA analysis confirmed that the blood 
found on the Sega Genesis box, Super Nintendo, Sega Dreamcast box and 
controller matched the DNA profile of Scott.  Also, a stain found on the left sleeve 
of Poole‘s blue polo shirt matched White‘s blood type.  The testing of a vaginal 
swab also confirmed that the semen in White was that of Poole.  A footwear 
examination revealed that one of the two footwear impressions found on a 
notebook in the victims‘ trailer matched Poole‘s left Van shoe.  The tire iron used 
in the crimes was found underneath a motor home located near the victims‘ trailer.  
A DNA analysis determined that the blood found on this tire iron matched Scott‘s 
DNA profile. 
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Based on this evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Poole guilty on all 
charges, including first-degree murder.  Following the penalty phase, the jury 
recommended death by a vote of twelve to zero.  The trial court followed the jury‘s 
recommendation and sentenced Poole to death.  The trial court found two statutory 
aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another 
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, 
and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  The court also 
found three statutory mitigators and numerous nonstatutory mitigators.  The 
statutory mitigators were: (1) the crime for which Poole was to be sentenced was 
committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance (moderate weight); (2) Poole‘s capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired (moderate weight); and (3) Poole 
had no significant history of prior criminal activity (little weight).  The 
nonstatutory mitigators were: (1) Poole is of borderline intelligence (some weight); 
(2) Poole received a head injury, which created dementia (little weight); (3) 
Poole‘s age at the time of the crime linked with mental deficiency and lack of 
serious criminal history (moderate weight); (4) Poole dropped out of school due to 
his low intelligence and learning disabilities (little weight); (5) Poole lost Mr. 
Bryant, his ―best friend, father figure, employer,‖ and that had an emotional effect 
on Poole and led to his drug use (some weight); (6) Poole sought help for his drug 
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problem in the past (little weight); (7) Poole had an alcohol abuse problem at the 
time of the crime (little weight); (8) Poole had a drug abuse problem at the time of 
the crime (little weight); (9) Poole does not have antisocial personality disorder nor 
is he psychopathic (some weight); (10) Poole has and can continue a relationship 
with his son (minimum weight); (11) Poole has a strong work ethic (little weight); 
(12) Poole has a close relationship with his family (moderate weight); (13) Poole is 
a religious person (little weight); and (14) the murder and rape were impulsive 
excessive acts, not premeditated acts (little weight).  The trial court determined that 
these mitigating factors did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and, as a 
result, the trial court sentenced Poole to death on the count of first-degree murder. 
The trial court also sentenced Poole to consecutive life sentences for the attempted 
first-degree murder of Loretta White, armed burglary, sexual battery of Loretta 
White, and armed robbery.  
In this appeal, Poole raises four issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Poole‘s motion for mistrial when the prosecutor repeatedly 
commented during closing argument on Poole‘s failure to testify at trial and his 
silence after his arrest; (2) whether the prosecutor violated Poole‘s right to a fair 
penalty phase proceeding by cross-examining defense witnesses about unproven 
prior arrests, the unproven content of a tattoo, and lack of remorse; (3) whether the 
prosecutor violated Poole‘s right to a fair penalty phase proceeding by misleading 
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the jurors about their responsibilities in recommending a sentence; and (4) whether 
Florida‘s death penalty statute violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.  
ANALYSIS  
Prosecutorial Comments during Guilt Phase  
Poole first asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial 
when the prosecutor repeatedly commented in closing argument during the guilt 
phase on Poole‘s failure to testify at trial and his silence after his arrest.  In making 
this argument, Poole cites several statements made by the prosecutor before 
defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial.  We find that the first two 
comments were not contemporaneously objected to and, as a result, are not 
properly preserved for appellate review.  We also find that although the last 
comment was an erroneous prosecutorial comment on silence, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 
The prosecutor began by stating that the defense‘s argument came from 
―Fantasy Land.‖  A few sentences later, the prosecutor stated, ―Well, there is no 
evidence in this case that at any time, either in this trial or anywhere else, Mr. 
Poole ever acknowledged that he did anything.‖  A few paragraphs later, the 
prosecutor continued: 
Mr. Poole talked to the police. And Mr. Poole—so that there‘s this 
other guy that was involved.  Well, there‘s no evidence.  Keep in mind 
what‘s evidence and what‘s argument.  Mr. Dimmig is arguing all 
these things, but there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Poole ever 
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said, hey, somebody else was there before me and these people‘s 
heads were bashed in.  There is no evidence of that.  
And there‘s no evidence that Mr. Poole ever said, well, I went 
in there and raped her and left her and then somebody else came in 
and beat their heads in.  There‘s no evidence of that either.  That‘s 
argument.  But when you look at what the testimony is and what the 
physical evidence is and what the photographs are, there is no 
evidence to support that theory. 
. . . . 
And if Mr. Poole wants to tell the state and Detective Grice that 
somebody helped him commit this crime, then let him come forward 
because— 
At this point, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the 
prosecutor‘s comments violated Poole‘s right to remain silent.  The prosecutor 
argued that defense counsel‘s argument that Poole admitted to three of the crimes 
opened the door.  After the prosecutor stated that he would not take the argument 
any further, the trial judge denied the motion for mistrial. 
The first two comments that Poole alleges were improper were not followed 
by an objection.2 We have consistently held that ―the failure to raise a 
contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are made 
waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review.‖  Card v. State, 
803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001).  However, we have carved out an exception to the 
2. The first comment was: ―Well, there is no evidence in this case that at 
any time, either in this trial or anywhere else, Mr. Poole ever acknowledged that he 
did anything.‖  The second comment started with the prosecutor stating, ―Mr. 
Poole talked to the police‖ and ending with ―there is no evidence to support that 
theory.‖ 
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contemporaneous objection rule when the unobjected-to comments rise to the level 
of fundamental error, that is, an error that ―reaches down into the validity of the 
trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty or jury recommendation of death 
could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‖ Id. at 
622.  Neither of the two comments rises to the level of fundamental error because 
both comments were invited responses to the defense‘s closing argument.  During 
his closing argument, defense counsel stated that Poole acknowledged that he 
committed the crimes of sexual battery, robbery, and burglary but denied that he 
was the person who inflicted the injuries on White and Scott.  In response, the 
prosecutor was arguing that there was no evidence in the case to support the 
argument that Poole acknowledged that he committed those crimes or to support 
the argument that someone else inflicted the injuries on the victims.  Because the 
prosecutor‘s comments were invited responses, the comments cannot be deemed 
improper.  See Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1166 (Fla. 2006); see also Dufour 
v. State, 495 So. 2d 154, 160-61 (Fla. 1986).  Therefore, these comments do not 
warrant reversal. 
The final comment—―And if Mr. Poole wants to tell the state and Detective 
Grice that somebody helped him commit this crime, then let him come forward 
because . . . .‖ —was objected to.  Moreover, we find that this comment was an 
improper comment on Poole‘s failure to testify.  Under article I, section 9 of the 
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Florida Constitution, a defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify 
against himself in a criminal proceeding.  Therefore, ―any comment on, or which is 
fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant‘s failure to testify 
is error and is strongly discouraged.‖ Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1985)).  In the instant 
case, the prosecutor‘s comment impermissibly suggested a burden on Poole to 
prove his innocence by stating that he had to come forward and testify. Although 
this was an erroneous comment on Poole‘s silence, we find that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial because in light of the 
evidence linking Poole to the crimes, the error was not ―so prejudicial as to vitiate 
the entire trial.‖  Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 464-65 (Fla. 2004).3 The 
evidence presented demonstrates that Poole was seen heading towards the victims‘ 
trailer on the night of the crime; Poole sold video games like those taken from the 
victims‘ residence immediately after the attack; the semen found in White matched 
3. We recognize that generally, the proper standard of review for an 
overruled objection based on a comment on a defendant‘s right to remain silent or 
defendant‘s failure to testify is a harmless error test.  See Heath v. State, 648 So. 
2d 660 (Fla. 1994); see also State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1985). 
However, this standard does not apply here because after defense counsel 
simultaneously objected and moved for a mistrial, the trial judge never ruled on the 
objection, but simply denied defense counsel‘s motion for mistrial.  As a result, the 
trial court‘s ruling on the motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 464-65 & n.5 (Fla. 2004)  
(citing Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1997)). 
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Poole; Poole‘s shoeprint matched a shoeprint left inside the victims‘ trailer; and a 
stain found on Poole‘s shirt matched White‘s DNA profile. 
Accordingly, relief is not warranted on this claim. 
Prosecutor’s Cross-Examination of Defense Witnesses 
Poole next contends that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair penalty 
phase by cross-examining defense witnesses about unproven prior arrests, the 
unproven content of a tattoo, and lack of remorse.  The questions regarding Poole‘s 
lack of remorse were not followed by a contemporaneous objection, and therefore 
the claim is unpreserved.  However, the trial court erred in overruling defense 
counsel‘s objection after the prosecutor asked questions regarding unproven prior 
arrests and the unproven content of a tattoo.  These errors were not harmless and 
require a new penalty phase proceeding. 
Poole first argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to use 
references to Poole‘s prior criminal record to impeach a defense mitigation 
witness, Joe Poole, Jr., who was Poole‘s older brother.  During the prosecutor‘s 
cross-examination of Joe Poole, Jr., the following questions were asked: 
Q: If you‘re that close to your brother, do you know if this was the 
first time he ever got arrested when he got arrested for this crime? 
A: No. 
Q: You don‘t know? 
A: No, it‘s not his first time getting arrested. 
Q: He got arrested in Georgia, South Carolina, Texas. 
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Defense counsel objected based on improper impeachment and argued that the line 
of questioning was improper because the defense was not asking for lack of prior 
criminal history and defense counsel specifically indicated this in his motion for 
limine before the penalty phase. The prosecutor argued that the line of questioning 
was appropriate not only because the question went to the credibility issue of how 
well Poole‘s older brother knew Poole, but also because the defense had put on 
evidence of Poole‘s reputation.  The trial judge overruled the objection but directed 
the prosecutor not to go into any further details. 
The prosecutor‘s line of questioning regarding Poole‘s prior criminal history 
was improper, and the trial court erred in overruling the defense objection.  At the 
beginning of the penalty phase, the defense filed a motion to exclude evidence of 
Poole‘s prior criminal activity, which also indicated that the defense would not ask 
for the mitigator of no significant prior criminal history.  The State agreed that the 
motion should be granted and also agreed that they would not bring up Poole‘s 
criminal history unless the defense tried to put on such evidence.  The trial court 
granted the motion by stipulation.  Defense counsel followed through with the 
motion and did not put on any evidence of Poole‘s prior criminal history.  
However, the prosecutor still improperly presented inadmissible evidence of 
Poole‘s prior criminal activity under the guise of witness impeachment.  Under 
section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2007), the State is only permitted to present 
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evidence of those aggravators listed under subsection 5, which does not include a 
defendant‘s convictions for nonviolent felonies.  See Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 
2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1996) (―[T]he State is not permitted to present evidence of a 
defendant‘s criminal history, which constitutes inadmissible nonstatutory 
aggravation, under the pretense that it is being admitted for some other purpose.‖). 
The trial court‘s error of overruling defense counsel‘s objection to this line 
of questioning was not harmless.  See Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 
2000) (finding that the proper standard of review for an overruled objection is a 
harmless error standard).  First, contrary to the State‘s argument, while Joe Poole, 
Jr. did not answer the last question in this line of questioning, he did state that 
Poole had been arrested before; then the prosecutor explicitly listed the states 
where Poole had been arrested for other crimes.  By this point, the damage had 
been done and the jury knew that Poole had a criminal history.  Although 
information about Poole having committed burglaries came out through the 
testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. William Kremper, we cannot 
say whether, in the absence of prosecutor‘s questions to Joe Poole, Jr., the jury 
would have still heard about this history through Dr. Kremper‘s testimony.  Dr. 
Kremper‘s testimony followed Joe Poole, Jr.‘s testimony, and we cannot now 
determine whether defense counsel would have presented such evidence if the 
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prosecutor had not elicited testimony from Joe Poole Jr. about the defendant‘s 
criminal history.  
This error cannot be deemed harmless because the prosecutor‘s questions to 
Poole, Jr. suggested that Poole was a career felon in numerous states, and he 
created a risk that the jury would give undue weight to such information in 
recommending a death sentence.  We have consistently held that where the State 
presents evidence that constitutes inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation, the error 
is not harmless.  See, e.g., Perry v. State, 801 So. 2d 78, 89 (Fla. 2001) (holding 
that the introduction of evidence that constituted impermissible nonstatutory 
aggravation was not harmless because the evidence was highly inflammatory and 
could have unduly influenced the penalty phase jury); see also Kormondy v. State, 
703 So. 2d 454, 463 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that the admission of impermissible 
evidence of nonstatutory aggravation was not harmless error and stating that ―[t]he 
jury is charged with formulating a recommendation as to whether [the defendant] 
should live or die [and] turning a blind eye to the flagrant use of nonstatutory 
aggravation jeopardizes the very constitutionality of our death penalty statute‖); 
Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157, 1162-63 (Fla. 1992); Maggard v. State, 399 So. 
2d 973 (Fla. 1981).  
The prosecutor also improperly asked Joe Poole, Jr. questions regarding the 
content of a tattoo on Poole‘s body.  During cross-examination, the prosecutor 
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asked Joe Poole, Jr. if Poole had tattoos on his body.  Defense counsel objected 
and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the line of questioning was irrelevant.  The 
prosecutor argued that the defense opened the door by making Poole look like an 
―angel‖ and that the ―Thug Life‖ tattoo would show that there is another side to 
him.  The trial court overruled the objection and found that the questions went to 
Joe Poole, Jr.‘s credibility because he stated that he knew Poole better than 
anybody.  The prosecutor then continued to ask Joe Poole, Jr. questions about the 
tattoo: 
Q: Do you know how many tattoos Mark‘s got? 
A: No, sir, I do not.  I know of one. 
Q: What‘s one say? 
A: It should [say] ―MP.‖  I have ―JLP.‖  That‘s the first one we put on 
and wished we never did that because we got in much, much trouble 
behind that. 
Q: From your parents? 
A: From our parents. 
Q: Okay.  Well, doesn‘t he have a tattoo that says Thug Life right 
across his abdomen? 
A: I haven‘t looked at his stomach, sir. 
Q: So although you know him as well as you told this jury, you didn‘t 
know he had that? 
A: No. I haven‘t examined his body. 
Q: Okay.  Well, but you said you just saw him a few years ago. 
A: Right.  Well, he had clothes on.  He wasn‘t naked. 
Defense counsel objected again and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the 
prosecutor was improperly testifying to factual issues after Joe Poole, Jr. said he 
did not know about the ―Thug Life‖ tattoo.  The trial court overruled the objection 
again and denied the motion. 
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Similar to the questions regarding Poole‘s prior criminal activity, these 
questions regarding the ―Thug Life‖ tattoo were improper because they constituted 
inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation.  While the State argues that the questions 
went to Joe Poole, Jr.‘s credibility, we reiterate the rule that the State cannot 
introduce inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation under the guise of impeachment.  
See Geralds, 601 So. 2d at 1162.  This error was not harmless because the 
information regarding the tattoo prejudiced Poole in the eyes of the jury and could 
have unduly influenced the jury in recommending the death penalty. 
Poole also asserts that the prosecutor‘s questions to Poole‘s mother, older 
sister, and nephew about Poole‘s lack of remorse were improper because lack of 
remorse is an inadmissible nonstatutory aggravator. This claim is unpreserved for 
appellate review because there was no objection made in the trial court.  See Card, 
803 So. 2d at 622.  Defense counsel failed to object to any of the prosecutor‘s 
questions regarding Poole‘s lack of remorse during the testimony of the witnesses.  
It was during a short recess, after all three witnesses testified, that defense counsel 
raised the issue about the lack of remorse questions.  In fact, defense counsel did 
not object, but simply raised a concern that the prosecutor had impermissibly asked 
questions about Poole‘s lack of remorse when the defense had not raised remorse 
as a mitigator.  The prosecutor responded that defense counsel failed to object at 
any point during these questions, but agreed to stop asking such questions.  
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Because defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor‘s questions on 
lack of remorse, this claim can only be raised on appeal if the alleged error is 
fundamental. Id.; see also McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1999).  
Having reviewed the unobjected-to questions asked by the prosecutor, we conclude 
that none of the questions were so egregious as to reach ―down into the validity of 
the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty or jury recommendation of death 
could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‖  Urbin v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 
895, 898 (Fla. 1996)).  After defense counsel raised the concern regarding the 
prosecutor‘s questions, the prosecutor stated that he would not continue to ask such 
questions.  A review of the penalty phase proceeding demonstrates that the 
prosecutor did not in fact continue to ask any defense witness whether Poole was 
remorseful for his actions.  The prosecutor also did not argue lack of remorse in his 
closing arguments. However, we continue to caution prosecutors that this type of 
questioning should not take place when the defendant has not made remorse an 
issue in the penalty phase. 
While the questions on Poole‘s lack of remorse do not individually amount 
to fundamental error, we find that the cumulative effect of this error and the error 
of presenting inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation of Poole‘s criminal history and 
the content of his tattoo deprived Poole of a fair penalty phase.  The combination 
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of these errors had the effect of unfairly prejudicing Poole in the eyes of the jury 
because these errors created a risk that the jury would give undue weight to this 
information in recommending the death penalty. 
Accordingly, we vacate Poole‘s sentence of death and remand for a new 
penalty phase. 
Prosecutorial Comments During Penalty Phase 
Poole contends that he was denied a fundamentally fair penalty phase 
because the prosecutor made several improper comments during the penalty phase 
closing arguments. While Poole argues that the prosecutor made several improper 
comments, defense counsel only objected to the following comment that the 
prosecutor made near the end of his closing argument: 
I don‘t think when you look at it from the perspective that this 
decision is any more difficult than the other.  I‘m only thinking that 
when you go back in that room and make that vote and you head for 
your car this afternoon, you‘re not going to find yourself feeling the 
same way. You‘re just going to find that you did your job just like 
you promised to do when you raised your right hand and swore to that 
oath. 
Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor‘s 
comment suggested that it was the jury‘s duty to recommend death.  The trial court 
denied the motion. 
Poole now contends that this comment improperly suggested that the jurors 
promised and took an oath to recommend the death penalty.  On the other hand, the 
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State argues that the prosecutor was asking the jurors to weigh the evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation.  We find that that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defense‘s motion for mistrial because the prosecutor was not 
suggesting that it was the jurors‘ sworn duty to recommend death.  Throughout the 
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the aggravators had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt and also attempted to rebut some of the mitigators.  At 
the conclusion of making these arguments, the prosecutor, as an advocate for the 
State, was attempting to persuade the jury that based on the aggravators and 
mitigators, they should recommend a death sentence.  The prosecutor made the last 
comment to inform the jury that they should do their jobs as they promised to do 
when they took the oath, which is to weigh the mitigators and aggravators.  This 
type of comment is not improper.  
Defense counsel failed to contemporaneously object to the other comments 
that Poole now contends were improper.  As a result, these claims were not 
properly preserved for appellate review.  Additionally, because none of these 
comments rise to the level of fundamental error, there are no grounds for reversal. 
See Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1064 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 73 
(2008). 
As to the first alleged improper comment, Poole argues that the prosecutor 
misled the jury by misstating the law concerning the weighing of aggravating and 
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mitigating circumstances.4 The first part of the comment was not improper 
because in discussing the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravator, the prosecutor 
was attempting to argue that this aggravator should be given significant weight, 
and that it alone outweighed the defense‘s case in mitigation due to the 
overwhelming evidence that proved the aggravator.  However, the second part of 
the comment was improper because the prosecutor was suggesting that unless the 
mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances, the jury had 
to vote for a death sentence.  We have repeatedly held that a jury is not required to 
recommend a sentence of death when the aggravators outweigh the mitigators.  See 
Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2000); Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 
1996).  While this comment was improper, the comment still does not amount to 
4. The prosecutor stated: 
What sets this crime apart so much from other crimes that the 
death penalty is the only conclusion you can come to?  The fourth 
aggravating factor, heinous, atrocious and cruel. 
. . . I submit to you that it is an overwhelming aggravating 
circumstance that can never be overcome in a case like this. 
. . . . 
So now what weighs against that?  I say to you that that scale is 
so far down here that there is nothing—and the judge will tell you 
once you find that sufficient aggravating circumstances exists [sic] to 
warrant the death penalty, unless you find that the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh them . . . unless something is going to push 
this scale back down, then your vote has got to be for the death 
penalty.  I tell you that [it] has to be twelve to nothing again. 
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fundamental error.  The prosecutor did not repeat this statement during the rest of 
his closing arguments.  Moreover, at the end of closing arguments, the trial judge 
read the standard jury instructions, which included an accurate statement of the 
law. 
Poole next alleges that the prosecutor belittled evidence in mitigation and 
commented on matters not in evidence.5 This comment was not improper because 
the prosecutor was attempting to rebut mitigating evidence argued by the defense. 
During the penalty phase, defense counsel admitted into evidence a photograph of 
Poole when he was a child and a photograph of the church Poole‘s family attended.  
Defense counsel used these photographs and asked Poole‘s family members 
questions about attending church to demonstrate in mitigation that Poole was a 
good, loving person who came from a good family.  The prosecutor responded 
during his closing argument that although Poole was a child who went to church at 
one time, he was not a child anymore, but a thirty-nine-year-old man who 
committed a crime.  
5. The prosecutor argued: 
This is what you saw.  A picture of a church, isn‘t that nice.  When 
did he go to this church? When he was like 12, 16, 19.  He is 39 years 
old when he murdered this boy.  39.  Does it matter what he looked 
like in this picture? Was Ted Bundy okay in the fourth grade? I don‘t 
care, and I think you shouldn‘t care what he was doing in the fourth 
grade. A nice little picture in the fourth grade. 
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Lastly, Poole alleges that the prosecutor misstated the law concerning brain 
damage as a mitigating circumstance: ―You—you are free to reject it if you want 
and say I don‘t think brain damage mitigates against the death penalty.‖  When we 
consider this comment in the context in which it was made, we find that the 
comment was not improper.  The prosecutor acknowledged that it was 
uncontroverted that Poole had brain damage, but was arguing that it was not 
enough to recommend a life sentence.  In fact, the prosecutor even emphasized that 
the jury should accept the brain damage mitigator as proven if there was evidence 
to demonstrate that Poole did, in fact, have brain damage.  
Because the prosecutor‘s comments were either not improper or did not 
constitute fundamental error, we deny relief on this claim. 
Constitutionality of Section 921.141 
Poole asserts that Florida‘s death penalty statute violates the Sixth 
Amendment because it does not require express unanimous findings of aggravating 
circumstances by the jury.  Poole argues that the United States Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), requires that all aggravators 
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty must be found by the jury.  Poole 
also requests that we reconsider our holding in State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 
2005), in which we held that the finding of at least one aggravator is implicit in the 
jury‘s recommendation of death.  
- 22 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the Court‘s decision in Ring does not require a finding that Florida‘s 
capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.  In Steele, we not only concluded, 
consistent with prior case law, that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2007), does 
not require jury findings on aggravating circumstances, but we specifically held 
that it is a departure from the essential requirements of law to use a special verdict 
form detailing the jury‘s determination on the aggravating circumstances.  921 So. 
2d at 544-48.  Moreover, since the Ring decision, we have rejected similar 
arguments that Florida‘s death penalty statute is unconstitutional based on Ring. 
See Marshall v. Crosby, 911 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 
2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002).  
Moreover, the jury unanimously found that Poole committed the crimes of 
attempted first-degree murder of White, sexual battery of White, armed burglary, 
and armed robbery, during the course of the first-degree murder of Scott.  We have 
repeatedly found that the prior violent felony conviction aggravator takes a case 
outside the scope of Ring. Guardado v. State, 965 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2007), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1250 (2008); Smith v. State, 866 So. 2d 51, 68 (Fla. 2004); 
Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 286 (Fla. 2003) (finding that the existence of a 
prior violent felony conviction satisfied the constitutional mandates because the 
conviction was heard by a jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Accordingly, relief is not warranted on this claim. 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Poole has not argued the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
conviction.  Nonetheless, it is our duty to independently review the entire record.  
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6); see also Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2007).  
It is abundantly clear from the physical evidence and eyewitness testimony that 
Poole committed the murder of Scott, as well as the attempted murder of White, 
sexual battery of White, robbery, and burglary.  Therefore, we uphold the first-
degree murder conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Poole‘s convictions.  However, 
based on the prosecutor‘s improper cross-examination of defense witnesses, we 
vacate his sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court to conduct a new 
penalty phase proceeding consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion in which ANSTEAD, J., 
concurs. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
- 24 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result only. 
I concur with the majority‘s opinion vacating the death sentence as a result 
of reversible error based on the cumulative effect of the State presenting 
inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation of Poole‘s criminal history and the content 
of his tattoo, as well as the questions on lack of remorse.  The majority‘s opinion is 
that the combination of these errors deprived Poole of a fair penalty phase. See 
majority op. at 17. 
I concur in result only because of my disagreement with the majority‘s use 
of the mistrial standard rather than the harmless error standard as to the objected-to 
portions of the closing argument in the guilt phase on Poole‘s failure to testify at 
trial and his silence after arrest.  For the reasons more extensively set forth in my 
special concurrence in Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2008), I do not agree 
with the majority‘s use of the mistrial standard in this case because counsel both 
objected and moved for a mistrial.  See majority op. at 10.  Instead, the majority 
should employ the harmless error standard because Poole preserved the issue for 
review by objection and motion for mistrial.  This standard is especially 
appropriate here where there is a clearly impermissible comment on Poole‘s 
constitutional right to remain silent. 
There are at least two reasons for using the harmless error standard.  First, it 
is consistent with our precedent in Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2004).  
- 25 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, the standard applied by the majority in this case is virtually identical to 
that for fundamental error so essentially we are applying the same standard to 
objected-to error in combination with a motion for mistrial and unobjected-to error.  
See majority op. at 10.  ―Fundamental error is error that reaches ‗down into the 
validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‘‖  Jones v. State, 949 So. 2d 
1021, 1037 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996)).  
Similarly, ―[a] motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.‖  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 
(Fla. 2006).  We should not equate objected-to error with unobjected-to error, 
particularly where the prosecutor makes a clearly impermissible comment on the 
right to remain silent and the defense objects. 
Consider what happened in this case.  In closing argument, after stating that 
the defense argument came from ―Fantasy Land,‖ the prosecutor made two 
comments that were not objected to and could be characterized as ―invited error‖ 
as explained by the majority.  But then the prosecutor remarked: 
And if Mr. Poole wants to tell the state and Detective Grice that 
somebody helped him commit this crime, then let him come forward 
because— 
It was at this point that defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing 
that the prosecutor‘s comments violated Poole‘s right to remain silent. 
- 26 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The prosecutor attempted to justify his argument by claiming that defense 
counsel had ―opened the door,‖ but then told the trial judge ―he would not take the 
argument any further.‖  The trial court never sustained the objection and only 
denied the motion for a mistrial.  Thus, the jury heard the objection but never 
learned that the comment was impermissible.6 
I would therefore review the error based on the harmless error standard.  The 
harmless error test properly ―places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of 
the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.‖  State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 
2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986).  As this Court explained in DiGuilio, comments on the 
right to remain silent are high-risk errors but the errors are not per se reversible.  
Id. at 1135. 
In the end, however, I concur with the majority‘s result in affirming the 
conviction, because I conclude that the prosecutor‘s improper comment was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, the impermissible remark was not 
6. As the majority explains, the final objected-to comment was an 
impermissible comment on Poole‘s failure to testify.  As pointed out by the 
majority, ―any comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as 
referring to, a defendant‘s failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged.‖  
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting State 
v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1985)).  
- 27 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
repeated or emphasized.  See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 517 (Fla. 
2005) (determining that witness‘s improper comment on defendant‘s silence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was overwhelming permissible 
evidence of the defendant‘s guilt, the comment was neither repeated nor 
emphasized, and the trial judge expressly indicated the lack of importance he 
believed the jury attributed to the remark).  Second, the improper comment was 
later followed by the trial court‘s instruction to the jury that the burden rested with 
the State and that ―[t]he defendant is not required to present evidence or prove 
anything.‖  The court also instructed the jury that Poole had the right not to testify 
and that the jury must not view Poole‘s failure to testify as an admission of guilt or 
be influenced by his decision in any way.  See, e.g., Hitchcock v. State, 755 So. 2d 
638, 643 (Fla. 2000) (concluding that prosecutor‘s erroneous comments during 
closing arguments about what the jury could consider in mitigation were harmless 
where the comments were followed by a correct explanation of mitigation and 
where the judge gave the mitigating circumstance at issue ―some weight‖ in 
sentencing).  
Third, although the amount of evidence is not the test of harmless error, in 
this case there was overwhelming permissible evidence of Poole‘s guilt.  Cf. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138 (finding improper comment on post-arrest silence to 
be harmful error in part because ―the permissible evidence was not clearly 
- 28 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conclusive‖).  The evidence demonstrated that Poole was seen by a neighbor 
walking towards the victims‘ trailer on the night of the crimes; Poole sold video 
games like those taken from the victims‘ residence immediately after the attack; 
and Poole‘s live-in girlfriend found a game controller on the porch of Poole‘s 
residence the following morning.  Moreover, the State presented physical evidence 
linking Poole to the crimes, including semen found in victim Loretta White 
matching Poole‘s genetic profile, a shoeprint on a notebook in the victims‘ trailer 
matching Poole‘s shoeprint, a stain found on the sleeve of Poole‘s shirt matching 
White‘s DNA profile, and blood found on three game systems and a game 
controller, which were possessed by Poole after the crimes, matching victim Noah 
Scott‘s DNA profile. 
Nevertheless, I emphasize that what we made clear over two decades ago 
about the harmless error test bears repeating: 
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not 
clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a 
clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test. 
Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute 
itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence. The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  The question is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
verdict.  The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on 
the state.  If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition 
harmful. This rather truncated summary is not comprehensive but it 
does serve to warn of the more common errors which must be 
avoided. 
- 29 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138.  And, as we emphatically stated in DiGuilio: ―We 
wish to emphasize that any comment, direct or indirect, by anyone at trial on the 
right of the defendant not to testify or to remain silent is constitutional error and 
should be avoided.‖  Id. at 1139.  
Clearly, this prosecutor did not get the message of DiGuilio and its progeny, 
and he risked reversal of the guilt phase by making this impermissible closing 
argument.  In this case, an objection was made to the impermissible comment and 
the trial court should have acted on it.  What we stated in Bertollotti v. State, 476 
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985), rings true today, especially in death penalty cases: 
Moreover, we commend to trial judges the vigilant exercise of 
their responsibility to insure a fair trial.  Where, as here, prosecutorial 
misconduct is properly raised on objection, the judge should sustain 
the objection, give any curative instruction that may be proper and 
admonish the prosecutor and call to his attention his professional duty 
and standards of behavior. 
Id. at 134. 
For these reasons, I concur in the majority‘s opinion vacating the death 
sentence, and concur in result only in the majority‘s opinion affirming on the issue 
of the prosecutor‘s improper comments on Poole‘s failure to testify at trial and his 
silence after arrest. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County, 
J. Dale Durrance, Judge – Case No. CF01-7078A-XX 
- 30 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
for Appellant 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott A. Browne, 
Assistant  Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
for Appellee 
- 31 -