Title: Accardo v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-1445
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2014

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC11-1445 
_____________ 
 
 
LEONARD J. ACCARDO, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
GREGORY S. BROWN, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[March 20, 2014] 
 
 
 
 
 
CANADY, J. 
In this case, we consider whether the land and improvements on certain 
leaseholds in Navarre Beach on Santa Rosa Island that were created under long-
term leases granted by Santa Rosa County, are subject to the intangible personal 
property tax rather than the ad valorem real property tax.1
                                          
 
 
1.  We also decide a related case concerning the taxation of improvements 
on certain leaseholds in Pensacola Beach on Santa Rosa Island in Escambia 
County.  See 1108 Ariola, LLC v. Jones, No. SC11-2231 (Fla. Mar. 20, 2014). 
 
 
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In Accardo v. Brown, 63 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the First District 
Court rejected the claim of the petitioner taxpayers that they were entitled to the 
benefit of a statutory provision found in section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes 
(2006), under which certain leasehold or other possessory interests in real property 
owned by a political subdivision of the State are exempt from ad valorem taxation 
and subject only to taxation as intangible personal property.  The First District 
concluded that given the nature of their perpetual leasehold interests, the taxpayers 
are the equitable owners of the real property and the improvements thereon and 
that the statutory provision relied on by the taxpayers is therefore inapplicable.  
Accardo, 63 So. 3d at 801-02.  The District Court certified the following question 
as one of great public importance: 
WHETHER SECTION 196.199(2)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE 
BECAUSE APPELLANTS ARE THE EQUITABLE OWNERS OF 
THAT PROPERTY? 
Id. at 802. 
 
We determined to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under article V, 
section (b)(4), Florida Constitution.  For the reasons we explain, we answer the 
certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision reached by the First 
District. 
I.  THE LEASEHOLDS IN NAVARRE BEACH 
 
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The properties at issue in this case—consisting largely of residential 
condominiums with some single-family residential units and commercial 
properties—are located on the portion of Santa Rosa Island known as Navarre 
Beach, on lands conveyed to Escambia County by the United States in 1947.  The 
deed permitted Escambia County to lease the land for purposes it deemed to be in 
the public interest but provided that the land was “never to be otherwise disposed 
of or conveyed” by Escambia County.  These Navarre Beach lands were leased in 
1956 by Escambia County to Santa Rosa County under a lease providing for an 
initial term of ninety-nine years, “automatically” renewable for a further term of 
ninety-nine years “on the like covenants, provisions and conditions,” “including 
the right in lessee for further renewals.”  Santa Rosa County subsequently entered 
into various subleases with private parties for the development of the Navarre 
Beach lands. 
The subleases granted by Santa Rosa County—tracking the renewal 
provisions of the lease by Escambia County to Santa Rosa County—generally 
provide for an initial ninety-nine-year term and renewal for a further term of 
ninety-nine years on like terms “including an option for further renewals.”  The 
subleases provide for the payment of rentals and include no option to purchase.  
The subleases provide that title to any buildings or improvements on the land vests 
in the lessor upon the termination of the lease and prohibit the sublessee from 
 
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removing any such improvements.  The order of the trial court granting summary 
judgment to the respondents describes the undisputed features of the interests of 
the taxpayers arising under the subleases granted by Santa Rosa County: 
 
All of the [taxpayers’] interests at issue in this action are used 
for purely private purposes.  The [taxpayers] enjoy the capital 
appreciation and rental income derived from these interests.  The 
[taxpayers] have the right to convey their interests without restraint; 
they have the right to encumber their properties with mortgages; they 
bear all of the risks of ownership; they bear the responsibility for 
insurance, maintenance and repair; and they are typically responsible 
by the terms of the lease documents for taxes imposed upon their 
interests.  
II.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
As provided in section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (2013), property owned 
by governmental units is not generally subject to the ad valorem tax.  But 
government property leased to private parties may be subject to ad valorem 
taxation.  Section 196.199(2) provides generally that where government owned 
property is “used by nongovernmental lessees,” the leasehold interest in the 
government property shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the 
lessee serves or performs the governmental, municipal, or public purpose or 
function as specifically defined by law.  This rule regarding the taxation of private 
leasehold interests in governmental property is qualified by section 196.199(2)(b), 
which is specifically referenced in the certified question and is central to the 
petitioners’ argument. 
 
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Section 196.199(2) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Property owned by the following governmental units but 
used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation 
under the following conditions: 
. . . .  
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c), the exemption provided 
by this subsection shall not apply to those portions of a leasehold or 
other interest defined by s. 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes 2005, 
subject to the provisions of subsection (7).  Such leasehold or other 
interest shall be taxed only as intangible personal property pursuant to 
chapter 199, Florida Statutes 2005, if rental payments are due in 
consideration of such leasehold or other interest.  All applicable 
collection, administration, and enforcement provisions of chapter 199, 
Florida Statutes 2005, shall apply to taxation of such leaseholds.  If no 
rental payments are due pursuant to the agreement creating such 
leasehold or other interest, the leasehold or other interest shall be 
taxed as real property.  Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to 
exempt personal property, buildings, or other real property 
improvements owned by the lessee from ad valorem taxation. 
(c) Any governmental property leased to an organization which 
uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or 
charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. 
 
Section 196.199(7) provides that “[p]roperty which is originally leased for 
100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options, or property which is financed, 
acquired, or maintained utilizing in whole or in part funds acquired through the 
issuance of [certain governmental bonds], shall be deemed to be owned for 
purposes of this section.” 
The central provision of section 196.199(2)(b) is tied to section 
199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), which defines intangible personal property 
as including, subject to an exception not relevant here, “all leasehold or other 
 
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possessory interests in real property owned by [governmental entities], which are 
undeveloped or predominantly used for residential or commercial purposes and 
upon which rental payments are due.”  (Emphasis added.) 
The provisions in section 196.199(2)(b) were first adopted in 1980 and have 
not been materially altered since then.  Compare § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013), 
with § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1980). 
III.  THE TAXPAYERS’ ARGUMENTS 
The petitioners argue that because their leaseholds all are on county property 
that is either undeveloped or used for residential or commercial purposes, rental 
payments are due under their leases and their initial lease terms are for less than 
100 years, under the plain terms of section 196.199(2)(b), the leasehold interests 
are taxable only as intangible personal property.  They contend that the statute 
precludes ad valorem taxation “if a leaseholder is declared to have an ‘other 
interest,’ such as ‘equitable ownership,’ if the lessee is not an actual owner of the 
property under Florida law.”  Petitioners’ Revised Initial Brief on the Merits at 10.  
The petitioners further argue that in any event, they are not equitable owners.  
According to the petitioners, there can be no equitable ownership absent the right 
to acquire legal title.  They contend that “[i]f there were ownership, there would be 
no payment of rent, the leaseholders would have no obligation to construct, insure, 
or replace the property, and they would be free to move the improvements to 
 
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another location.”  Petitioners’ Revised Initial Brief on the Merits at 24.  They 
further argue that subjecting their renewable ninety-nine-year leases to ad valorem 
taxation is inconsistent with the provision of section 196.199(7) regarding the 
taxation of “[p]roperty which is originally leased for 100 years or more, exclusive 
of renewal options.”  The petitioners make some additional arguments that we have 
determined do not merit discussion.2
“The concept of equitable ownership in ad valorem taxation has long been a 
part of Florida law.”  Leon Cnty. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Hartsfield, 698 So. 2d 
526, 528 (Fla. 1997).  In Bancroft Investment Corp. v. City of Jacksonville, 27 So. 
2d 162, 170-71 (Fla. 1946), we held that the vendee in possession under a contract 
for deed from the United States—where the United States retained legal title as 
security—was “the owner of the taxable interest in the property in question, that 
the United States ha[d] abandoned such use of it as gave it an exemption status” 
and that the property therefore was subject to ad valorem taxation.  We recognized 
that our prior decisions had “held that the one who holds the equitable interest is 
the owner for taxing purposes.”  Id. at 171 (citing Porter v. Carroll, 92 So. 809 
(Fla. 1922) (stating that owner of property for ad valorem tax purposes was not the 
 
IV.  EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP AND AD VALOREM TAXATION 
                                          
 
 
2.  The petitioner taxpayers point out that some of the subleases are not 
perpetually renewable, but they do not make an argument that is specific to those 
leases. 
 
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person who “held the legal title only” but was instead the contract vendee who held 
“the equitable interest which is the substantial interest”); Dean v. State, 77 So. 107, 
109-110 (Fla. 1917) (holding that persons who were “vendee[s] in possession” of 
property had “an equitable freehold estate in the land” and thus were properly 
allowed to vote as freeholders—that is, ad valorem taxpayers—in election 
regarding issuance of bonds)).  Following our decision in Bancroft, the district 
courts have repeatedly applied the equitable ownership doctrine in the ad valorem 
taxation context. 
In Mikos v. King’s Gate Club, Inc., 426 So. 2d 74, 75-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1983), the Second District Court held that mobile home tenants who did not have 
legal title to the lots on which their mobile homes were located should nevertheless 
be deemed equitable owners of the lots for ad valorem tax purposes.  Fee simple 
ownership of the mobile home park real property was vested in a nonprofit 
corporation, which was prohibited from selling or leasing any lot or site in the 
park.  Id. at 74-75.  The mobile home park had 331 lots.  Id. at 75.  The corporation 
had a corresponding number of authorized memberships.  Id.  The certificates 
issued to each of the members entitled the member to locate a mobile home at a 
site designated by the corporate directors, provided for the payment of a monthly 
maintenance fee, were transferable by sale with the corporation having the right of 
first refusal, and stated that the certificate holder did not own any interest in the 
 
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land.  Id.  The district court thus recognized that “no member owns legal title to the 
site upon which his mobile home is situated.”  Id.  The court nonetheless 
concluded that the mobile home owners held equitable title to their respective lots 
by virtue of the interest conferred on them as members of the nonprofit 
corporation.  Id. at 76.  In reaching this result, the court relied on the provisions 
regarding homestead exemption in article VII, section 6(a), Florida Constitution, 
which provides that the homestead exemption is applicable to real estate that is 
held by “equitable title.”  Id.  The Second District reasoned that if the mobile home 
owners “are qualified to obtain homestead exemption on these sites, it follows that 
their interest in the respective sites is one of ownership.”  Id.  The court further 
observed that “[t]o permit the members of the [mobile home park corporation] to 
avoid the payment of real estate taxes because they maintain their interest in the 
mobile home sites through the vehicle of a nonprofit corporation would unfairly 
place a disproportionate burden on other taxpayers of the county.”  Id.  Because 
“[e]ach member has practical dominion over his designated site which is 
essentially equivalent to ownership,” the Second District held that each member’s 
interest was subject to ad valorem taxation.  Id. 
In Hialeah, Inc. v. Dade County, 490 So. 2d 998, 999-1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1986), the Third District Court specifically considered application of the version of 
section 196.199(2) then in force, along with the corresponding definition of 
 
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intangible personal property contained in section 199.023.  The circumstances 
considered by the court involved a sale-leaseback transaction in which the City of 
Hialeah purchased the land portion of the Hialeah Park Race Track from Hialeah, 
Inc., and then leased it back to Hialeah, Inc., for a thirty-year term, with lease 
payments due from Hialeah, Inc., in an aggregate amount equivalent to the 
principal and interest due on municipal revenue notes secured by a purchase 
money mortgage for the funds the city borrowed to finance the purchase.  Id. at 
998-99.  Upon the payment of the full outstanding indebtedness with an additional 
$100 payment, Hialeah, Inc., had the option to purchase the city’s fee simple 
interest in the property.  Id. at 998.  The Third District rejected the argument of 
Hialeah, Inc., that its interest in the land was subject only to the intangible personal 
property tax.  Id. at 999-1000. 
Rejecting the claim that only leasehold interests falling within the scope of 
section 196.199(7)—relating to properties originally leased for 100 years or more, 
exclusive of renewal options, or properties financed by certain governmental bonds 
—would qualify for ad valorem tax treatment, the court reasoned that the 
provisions of section 196.199 and section 199.023 concerning taxation as 
intangible personal property only came into play after a determination that the 
property was owned by the government.  Id. at 1000.  In determining whether the 
property at issue was government owned, the Third District turned to our holding 
 
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in Bancroft regarding equitable ownership: “Bancroft establishes that property is 
not government owned under applicable taxing statutes where the government 
merely holds legal title as security and a taxpayer is the beneficial owner in 
equity.”  Id. at 1000.  The court therefore concluded that the Hialeah Park Race 
Track property was “not government owned because the city holds legal title to the 
property merely as security” and that Hialeah, Inc., was “the true and equitable 
owner.”  Id. at 1001.  The property thus was subject to ad valorem taxation.  Id. 
In First Union National Bank of Florida v. Ford, 636 So. 2d 523, 527 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1993), the Fifth District Court resolved a case it described as “the reverse 
or mirror image of Hialeah, Inc.”  The case concerned taxation of property that 
Brevard County used “as its primary governmental and administrative offices.”  Id. 
at 523.  The county utilized a financing arrangement “whereby individual investors 
purchased certificates of participation to raise sufficient funds to build” the county 
governmental center on donated land.  Id. at 524.  Title to the land was held by the 
First Union Bank as trustee for the holders of the certificates of participation.  Id.  
The property was leased by the bank to the county for a projected twenty-five-year 
term, running from year to year and automatically renewable.  Id.  Rental payments 
made by the county were used solely to retire the principal and interest on the debt 
owed to the owners of the certificates of participation.  Id.  Under the terms of the 
 
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lease, once the indebtedness was paid in full, the “Bank must convey legal title to 
the property in fee to the County.”  Id. 
The Fifth District concluded “that the County has retained sufficient rights 
and duties regarding the realty and its improvements, to make it the equitable 
owner.”  Id.  The court focused on the fact that “neither the Bank nor the certificate 
holders have a right nor prospect of ever occupying or using the land and 
buildings” and reasoned that “the County holds substantially all the burdens and 
benefits of ownership relating to the property sought to be taxed.”  Id. at 524, 527.  
Accordingly, the Fifth District held that the bank was not liable for ad valorem tax 
on the property.  Id. at 527. 
In Leon County Educational Facilities Authority, we considered 
circumstances similar to those at issue in Ford and reached a result in accord with 
the result reached by the Fifth District in Ford.  The Authority, a governmental 
entity authorized “to own, lease, and finance higher educational facilities,” decided 
to undertake a dormitory and food service project.  Leon Cnty. Educ. Facilities 
Auth., 698 So. 2d at 527.  To accomplish this, a nonprofit corporation was created, 
and the Authority entered into a lease with an option to purchase agreement with 
the corporation under which the corporation “as the lessor would acquire, 
construct, and equip the project and lease it to the Authority in exchange for 
periodic rental payments.”  Id.  Certificates of participation were issued to obtain 
 
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financing for the project under the lease.  Id.  Once the indebtedness owed to the 
certificate of participation holders was satisfied, the Authority had the right to 
purchase the project for one dollar.  Id. 
After discussing Ford, Bancroft, and Hialeah, Inc., and referring to Mikos, 
we observed that “[f]airness dictates that the doctrine of equitable ownership 
should be applied evenhandedly regardless of whether a tax is being imposed or an 
exemption is being claimed.”  Id. at 529.  We rejected the argument that Ford was 
distinguishable and stated that “[t]he fact that legal title to the project does not 
automatically pass to the Authority upon the termination of the lease as in Ford is 
not significant in this instance where the Authority can acquire title by paying the 
nominal consideration of one dollar.”  Id. at 529.  Based on the facts presented, we 
held that “the project is not subject to ad valorem taxation because the Authority 
holds virtually all the benefits and burdens of ownership.”  Id. at 530. 
V.  WARD v. BROWN 
Prior to the case now before us, the taxation of leaseholds at Navarre Beach 
was dealt with most recently in Ward v. Brown, 919 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005), where the First District Court considered whether the taxpayers bringing the 
challenge were “equitable owners of the property improvements placed on their 
leaseholds,” which derived from the lease granted by Escambia County to Santa 
Rosa County.  In evaluating this question, the First District stated: 
 
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It is undisputed that appellants have the right to renew their own 
assigned interests in this land lease for the same term of Santa Rosa 
County’s lease term from Escambia County, thereby providing 
appellants with the same right to perpetual renewals.  Appellants have 
the right to use or rent the improvements, encumber their interests, 
transfer their property rights, and realize any appreciation in value 
from sale or rental income.  They must ensure and maintain the 
improvements and are responsible for the payment of any taxes. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Based on these circumstances, the First District concluded that the 
“appellants are equitable owners” of the improvements and subject to ad valorem 
taxation.  Id.  The court relied on case law establishing that the lessee under a 
perpetual lease is in effect the owner of the property.   Id. at 463-64 (citing 
Thompson v. First Nat’l Bank of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1975) (relying on definitions of “[p]erpetual lease” as “renewable forever at the 
lessee’s option” and “[a] lease of lands which may last without limitation as to 
time”); J.W. Perry Co. v. City of Norfolk, 220 U.S. 472, 478-79 (1911) 
(concluding that leases “for ninety-nine years, renewable forever” were perpetual 
leases in which the tenants were effectively the owners of the property); Wells v. 
City of Savannah, 181 U.S. 531, 544 (1901) (concluding that lessees under a 
perpetual lease had rights in the property resembling ownership rather than those 
of an ordinary tenant); Wright Runstad Props. Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 40 Fed. 
Cl. 820, 825 (1998) (stating that “where the lease term is perpetual or will outlast 
the useful life of the capital improvement for which the special assessment is 
 
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levied, the lessee may be responsible for the assessment since he or she is the sole 
beneficiary of the improvement”); Penick v. Atkinson, 77 S.E. 1055, 1057 (Ga. 
1913) (concluding that a perpetual lease is the substantial equivalent of a fee 
reserving rent)). 
The First District specifically rejected the argument that section 196.199(7) 
“provides a safe harbor from being taxed as equitable owners.”  Ward, 919 So. 2d 
at 464.  The court stated that “[t]his provision only provides a bright-line test for 
leases having an initial term of 100 years or more, by deeming them as owned 
without the need to further address whether there are sufficient rights and duties to 
consider the lessees as equitable owners.”  Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court relied on the analysis in Hialeah, Inc. concerning the scope of section 
196.199(7).  See Ward, 919 So. 2d at 464. 
The First District also rejected the appellant taxpayers’ argument that 
because they were “required to maintain and rebuild the improvements, and the 
improvements [were] required to be conveyed to Santa Rosa County at the 
termination of the lease[s]” they could not be deemed the equitable owners of the 
improvements.  Id. at 463 n.1.  The court found this argument unpersuasive 
“because there is no end to the lease.”  Id. 
VI.  THE EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP 
OF THE NAVARRE BEACH PROPERTIES 
 
 
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We conclude that Ward correctly applied the doctrine of equitable 
ownership in holding that the improvements on the leasehold properties were 
subject to ad valorem taxation.  And we conclude that there is no basis for 
declining to extend the application of the doctrine of equitable ownership to the 
underlying land that is subject to the perpetually renewable leases.  Under the 
perpetual leases, the interest of the petitioner taxpayers in the underlying land is 
not materially different from their interest in the improvements.  The taxpayers 
hold “virtually all the benefits and burdens of ownership” of both the 
improvements and the land.  Leon Cnty. Educ. Facilities Auth., 698 So. 2d at 530. 
We reject petitioner taxpayers’ argument that an equitable ownership interest 
is an “other” interest referred to in section 196.199(2)(b) and section 199.023(1)(d) 
that is subject to taxation only as intangible personal property.  This argument 
ignores the full context of the statutory provisions.  First, the argument does not 
take into account the threshold question of whether the property in question is “real 
property owned by” a governmental entity.  § 199.023(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Our 
case law regarding the application of the equitable ownership doctrine makes clear 
that the person or entity holding equitable title to real property will be deemed the 
owner of the property for ad valorem tax purposes.  See Leon Cnty. Educ. 
Facilities Auth., 698 So. 2d at 530; Bancroft, 27 So. 2d at 171.  The statutory 
provisions do nothing to alter that preexisting legal rule.  Second, the core phrase 
 
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in the definitional provision is “all leasehold or other possessory interests.”  § 
199.023(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added).  Equitable ownership is not a 
mere possessory interest.  See, e.g., Ward, 919 So. 2d at 464; Hialeah, Inc., 490 So. 
2d at 1000-01.  Accordingly, the reference to “other” interests in the definitional 
provision can have no reference to an equitable ownership interest. 
As the First District did in Ward, we also reject the petitioner taxpayers’ 
argument that equitable ownership can exist under a leasehold only where there is 
a right ultimately to acquire legal title.  The interest of a lessee under a perpetually 
renewable lease is not materially different from the interest of a lessee under a 
lease for a term of years providing the right for the lessee to obtain title for 
nominal consideration upon the termination of the lease.  In both circumstances, 
the lessee effectively has the right to exercise perpetual dominion over the 
property. 
Similarly, we reject the argument that the payment of rent and the other 
obligations imposed on the petitioner taxpayers by their leases are sufficient to 
establish that the taxpayers are not the owners of the properties for ad valorem tax 
purposes.  The payment of rent and the bearing of other obligations are typically 
incident to leaseholds under which the tenant has equitable ownership, just as the 
payment of purchase money and the bearing of other obligations is a part of a 
contract for deed under which the vendee will be deemed the equitable owner.  
 
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Furthermore, many of the obligations of the petitioner taxpayers here are like the 
obligations typically imposed on owners under a declaration of condominium or 
the restrictive covenants in a subdivision.  None of the obligations imposed on the 
petitioner taxpayers are sufficient to defeat the conclusion that they hold “virtually 
all the benefits and burdens of ownership” of the improvements and the land.  Leon 
Cnty. Educ. Facilities Auth., 698 So. 2d at 530. 
Finally, we reject the petitioner taxpayers’ argument that subjecting their 
leasehold interests to ad valorem taxation is inconsistent with the provision of 
section 196.199(7) regarding the taxation of “property which is originally leased 
for 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options.”  We agree with Ward and 
Hialeah, Inc. that it must first be determined that the governmental entity is the 
“owner” of the property—not the mere holder of bare legal title—before there is 
any reason to consider whether the bright line one-hundred-year rule of section 
196.199(7) is applicable.  Here, for ad valorem tax purposes, the “owner” of the 
property is not a governmental entity. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
We therefore conclude that the taxpayers are the equitable owners of the real 
property at issue and that section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is inapplicable 
here.  The certified question of great public importance is answered in the 
affirmative, and the decision of the First District Court is approved. 
 
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It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
First District - Case No. 1D10-4072 
 
(Santa Rosa) 
  
Danny L. Kepner of Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, Pensacola, Florida; Talbot 
D’Alemberte and Patsy Palmer of D’Alemberte & Palmer, PLLC, Tallahassee, 
Florida,  
 
for Petitioners  
 
J. Elliott Messer and Thomas Marshall Findley of Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida; Roy Van Andrews of Lindsay, Andrews & Leonard, Milton, 
Florida,   
 
for Respondents  
 
Edward Paul Fleming and Randall Todd Harris of McDonald Fleming Moorhead 
of Pensacola, Florida,  
 
for Amicus Curiae Beach Club Towers Homeowners Association, Inc.  
 
Benjamin K. Phipps, II and Adam Schuyler Brink of Phipps & Howell, 
Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Property Tax Professionals