Title: In Re Decuir
Citation: 654 So. 2d 687
Docket Number: 95-O-0056
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1995

654 So. 2d 687 (1995) In re Oswald A. DECUIR. No. 95-O-0056. Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 22, 1995. *688 Nancy C. Chachere, Steven R. Scheckman, Hugh M. Collins, for applicant. Oswald A. Decuir, Harry S. Hardin, III, for defendant. VICTORY, Justice.[1] This is a disciplinary proceeding against Judge Oswald A. Decuir, Court of Appeal, Louisiana Third Circuit. The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (the "Commission") conducted a hearing, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended public censure for violating Canons 1, 2, 2 A, 2 B and 3 B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, La.R.S. 18:1481, et seq. La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). After reviewing the record before us, we conclude that the charges are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that public censure is warranted. Judge Decuir was elected to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in 1992, and assumed office on October 30, 1992. Sometime thereafter, complaints of judicial misconduct were lodged against him with the Commission. Upon inquiry, it was determined that the allegations were well founded and not frivolous, and a preliminary investigation was conducted to determine whether a hearing should be held on the question of discipline. Supreme Court Rule 23, Section 3(a). After investigating the matter, the Commission concluded that a hearing should be held, and a formal complaint was lodged against Judge Decuir. Prior to the hearing before the Commission, special counsel to the Commission and Judge Decuir agreed, in lieu of conducting a full evidentiary hearing, to stipulate to the *689 facts surrounding each of the charges. Judge Decuir admitted that the stipulated facts constituted violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Campaign Finance Act. However, he reserved his right to have the Commission review the misconduct and recommend appropriate punishment. Pursuant to this agreement, Judge Decuir and special counsel to the Commission filed several documents into evidence at the December 15, 1994 hearing, including a "Supplemental and Amending Complaint," filed by special counsel to the Commission; an "Answer to the Supplemental and Amending Complaint," filed by Judge Decuir; and a document entitled "Factual Basis," jointly filed by special counsel to the Commission and Judge Decuir, setting forth the stipulated facts. After considering the evidence contained in the documents described above, the Commission issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were substantially based upon the "Factual Basis" jointly filed by Judge Decuir and special counsel to the Commission. The following information may be gleaned from the foregoing evidentiary filings and the Commission's findings: Based on its findings, the Commission recommended public censure, pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 25(C), and that Judge Decuir be required to reimburse the Commission for $3,964.25 in costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the case. Supreme Court Rule 23, Section 22. As provided in La. Const. art. V, § 25(C), the Louisiana Supreme Court is the court of original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary proceedings. As such, we are vested with the power to make original determinations of fact based upon the evidence presented. In other words, we are not bound by the findings and recommendations made by the Commission, and may afford them whatever weight we choose. Nevertheless, because this Court is ill equipped to receive evidence, no new evidence is presented to us and only that evidence adduced at the hearing before the Commission is considered. In Re Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291, 1298 (La.1985). The grounds for disciplinary action against a judge are set forth in Louisiana Const. art. V, § 25(C), which provides, in pertinent part: In addition to these constitutional grounds, this Court, under its supervisory authority over all lower courts, adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, effective January 1, 1976. This Code is binding on all judges, and violations of the Canons set forth therein may serve as a basis for the disciplinary action provided for by La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). In re Wilkes, 403 So. 2d 35, 40 (La.1981); In re Babineaux, 346 So. 2d 676, 680-681 (La. 1977), certiorari denied, Berry v. Judiciary Commission of La., 434 U.S. 940, 98 S. Ct. 431, 54 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1977). Judge Decuir and special counsel to the Commission stipulated to the facts, including those in mitigation, surrounding the charges. Judge Decuir also admitted that the stipulated facts establish violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, we are left only with the task of deciding the appropriate measure of discipline in this case.[4] Before the Commission, and before us, Judge Decuir argued that the appropriate discipline for these violations should be private censure, *693 not the public censure recommended by the Commission. Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution sets forth four punishment alternatives for disciplining a judge. We may: (1) censure; (2) suspend the judge with or without salary; (3) remove the judge from office; or (4) retire the judge involuntarily. Although these four alternatives differ with respect to the severity of the punishment, they are similar in that each appears to contemplate "public" discipline. By their very nature, suspension from office, removal from office, and involuntary retirement are always public. Analogizing from the other three modes of discipline and from the rules applicable to lawyer discipline, we find that a "censure" in judicial disciplinary proceedings should also be public. Supreme Court Rule 19, § 10(A) sets forth the modes of punishment available in lawyer discipline proceedings. Under this provision, lawyers are subject to: (1) disbarment; (2) suspension; (3) probation; (4) reprimand; and (5) admonition.[5] Subsection (D) of Supreme Court Rule 19, § 10, states that the "disposition of lawyer discipline shall be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, probation, and reprimand," while subsection (A) specifically defines "admonition" as a mode of private discipline that occurs before the filing of formal charges with the Disciplinary Board of the Louisiana State Bar Association. Unlike Supreme Court Rule 10, Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution does speak of admonishment of a judge in a disciplinary proceeding. The most lenient punishment that may be issued is "censure," which by virtue of its definition, is synonymous with "reprimand." Black's Law Dictionary 203 (5th ed. 1979) generally defines "censure" as a type of reprimand: In similar manner, Black's Law Dictionary 1170 (5th ed. 1979) defines a "reprimand" as a type of censure: We find judicial "censure" under Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution akin to the "reprimand" of a lawyer, which is public. Once the Commission holds its hearing, determines that "good cause" exists for the disciplining of the judge, and makes its recommendation to this Court, the matter automatically becomes public. See Supreme Court Rule 23, Sections 12, 14 and 23. If we find, as we do in this case, that the violations are serious enough to merit the most lenient type of discipline by the Court, we censure the violator in a public opinion. Accordingly, it is ordered that Judge Oswald A. Decuir, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, be, and he hereby is, censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. It is further ordered that Judge Oswald A. Decuir reimburse the Louisiana Judiciary Commission $3,964.25,[6] representing costs incurred during the investigation and prosecution of the case. Supreme Court Rule 23, Section 22. [1] Judge Henry L. Yelverton, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, participating as Associate Justice Pro Tempore, in place of Associate Justice James L. Dennis, not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2. [2] Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, entitled "A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary," provides: An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective. As a necessary corollary, the judge must be protected in the exercise of judicial independence. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, entitled "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities," provides: A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. B. A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interest of others; nor should a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge should not testify voluntarily as a character witness. [3] Canon 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, entitled "A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Office Impartially and Diligently; Administrative Responsibilities," provides: A judge should require staff and court officials subject to his or her direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge. [4] Judge Decuir argues that we have no jurisdiction to consider the violations reflected by Charge II because the conduct complained of occurred prior to the date he took office, October 30, 1992. However, in Whitaker, 463 So. 2d at 1294-1295, we held that while the conduct of a judge prior to assuming office may not form the sole basis for judicial disciplinary proceedings, it may be considered in cases that also involve instances of misconduct occurring while the judge was in office. The three additional charges at issue occurred after Judge Decuir assumed office. Therefore, we may consider the prejudicial conduct comprising Charge II in determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Additionally, we note that Canon 7B of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that candidates for judicial office and their employees should adhere to the same ethical standards imposed on judges. While campaigning for a seat on the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, "candidate" Decuir was bound by the same standards that "Judge" Decuir is now obliged to follow. [5] Lawyers are also subject to restitution, reimbursement of costs, and/or limitation of the nature of the lawyer's future practice. However, these modes of discipline are not relevant to our inquiry in this case. [6] Judge Decuir and special counsel to the Commission stipulated to this figure.