Title: VALERIA HALIW V CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 115686
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2001

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C 
hief Just ice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 12, 2001  
VALERIA HALIW and  
ILKO HALIW,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v  
No. 115686  
THE CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS, 
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We 
granted 
defendant 
city 
of 
Sterling 
Heights’  
application for leave to appeal in this case to decide the  
proper application of the “natural accumulation” doctrine to  
municipal liability.  Because we conclude that the natural  
accumulation of ice or snow on the sidewalk at issue does not  
give rise to an actionable breach of defendant’s duty, and the  
claimed depression in the sidewalk was not an independent  
defect, plaintiff cannot prove the elements required to  
  
establish a negligence claim against a governmental agency.1  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals,  
and remand to the Macomb Circuit Court for entry of an order  
granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
On January 29, 1996, plaintiff was walking on a snow­
covered sidewalk located in her neighborhood.  Plaintiff  
claims that she slipped and fell on a patch of ice that had  
formed on the sidewalk.2  Apparently, the ice had formed in a  
depressed portion where two sections of the sidewalk met.  
According to plaintiff, it had snowed before the incident, and  
the sidewalk had not yet been shoveled.  
Anna Marson, plaintiff’s neighbor and the homeowner  
nearest the portion of sidewalk at issue here, stated that,  
although the depression at the joint of the two cement slabs  
allowed water to settle, there was no raised edge or gap  
between the two slabs, and neither slab was actually broken.  
According to Marson, even in the winter, when “it just snows  
it would melt and there would be nothing [i.e., no ice] there.  
1 Throughout this opinion, "plaintiff" refers to Valeria 
Haliw. The loss of consortium claim of Ilko Haliw, plaintiff's 
husband, is derivative in nature.  
2 At her deposition, plaintiff admitted that she slipped 
on the ice patch; she did not trip on, or over, anything 
relating to the actual physical condition of the sidewalk 
itself.  
2  
But this [time], it happened to rain [before plaintiff’s slip  
and fall] and there was ice . . . .”  Marson, who provided aid  
to plaintiff just after her fall, stated that plaintiff told  
her that she had slipped on the ice that had formed on the  
sidewalk.  
Plaintiff retained an engineering expert, Theodore  
Dziurman, who performed an inspection of the portion of  
sidewalk upon which plaintiff claimed ice had formed.3  
According to Dziurman, there was a “depression” where two  
slabs of the concrete sidewalk met, although he stated that  
there was no separation between the two slabs, and that “it  
[was] not any different than [a] normal joint, not unusual.”  
It was Dziurman’s opinion that, because of the presence of the  
depression, water was allowed to “pond” at that point  
resulting in the formation of ice under the proper weather  
conditions.
 When Dziurman was asked if the depression  
presented a dangerous or defective condition in the sidewalk  
in the absence of ice, the following colloquy ensued:  
Q. When there is no rain and no freezing, is 
there anything particularly defective or dangerous 
about that condition in and of itself?  
A.
 It could be dangerous to someone that 
wasn’t expecting a depression there that could 
throw them off stride when they are walking causing 
them to stumble or fall.  Someone riding on a  
3 
 We note that Theodore Dziurman’s inspection of the 
sidewalk occurred on July 2, 1997.  
3  
  
  
  
bicycle if they are going real fast, they could hit 
the bottom of that thing and cause the bike to go 
out of control.  There are possibilities of other 
accident 
potential 
because 
of 
that 
sunken  
condition.  
Q.  Do you have any information any of those 
things ever happened to that sidewalk slab?  
A. No, I don’t.  
Q. 
Your statements about what could happen 
are theoretical; correct?  
A. I think you asked me that.  
As a result of her fall, plaintiff suffered a broken  
ankle that required surgical intervention and thereafter  
initiated 
a 
lawsuit 
against defendant.  In response, defendant  
filed a motion for summary disposition, brought pursuant to  
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10).  The trial court denied defendant’s  
motion, and the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion,  
affirmed, stating that  
[i]n addition to the presence of snow and ice, 
plaintiffs allege there was a defect in the  
sidewalk itself, and therefore their claim is not 
barred by the natural accumulation doctrine . . . . 
Here, plaintiffs presented evidence creating a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
the sidewalk where [plaintiff] fell was reasonably 
safe for public travel. [Issued October 5, 1999 
(Docket No. 206886), slip op at 1-2.]  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review the grant or denial of summary disposition de  
novo. 
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817  
(1999).
 “MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests whether a claim is barred  
4  
  
  
 
 
 
because 
of 
immunity 
granted by law, and requires consideration  
of all documentary evidence filed or submitted by the  
parties.” Glancy v Roseville , 457 Mich 580, 583; 577 NW2d  
897 (1998).  
In reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought  
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must consider the affidavits,  
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence  
filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light  
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Quinto v  
Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).  
Summary 
disposition 
may 
be 
granted 
if 
the 
evidence  
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue with respect to  
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to  
judgment as a matter of law. Id.  As with motions for summary  
disposition, 
we 
also 
review 
questions 
of 
statutory  
construction de novo as questions of law.  Donajkowski v  
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY  
The governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et  
seq., provides immunity for governmental agencies, including  
municipalities like defendant.  It is well settled in this  
state that governmental agencies are immune from tort  
liability while engaging in a governmental function unless an  
5  
 
 
  
exception applies.4  MCL 691.1407; Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd  
Comm, 463 Mich 143, 156; 615 NW2d 702 (2000); Suttles v Dep’t  
of Transportation, 457 Mich 635, 641; 578 NW2d 295 (1998);  
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 591;  
363 NW2d 641 (1984). The immunity conferred on governmental  
agencies is broad, and the exceptions narrowly drawn.5  
Nawrocki, supra at 149; Ross, supra at 618.  
The only exception implicated in the present case is the  
so-called “highway exception” to governmental immunity, which  
is set forth in MCL 691.1402, and provides in part:  
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction  
over a highway shall maintain the highway in 
reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel. A person who sustains 
bodily injury or damage to his or her property by 
reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep 
a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable 
repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit 
for travel may recover the damages suffered by him 
or her from the governmental agency.[6]  
4 The five statutory exceptions to governmental immunity 
are: 
the 
“highway 
exception,” MCL 691.1402, the “motor vehicle 
exception,” 
MCL 
691.1405, 
the 
“public 
building 
exception,” 
MCL 
691.1406, the “proprietary function exception,” MCL 691.1413, 
and the “governmental hospital exception,” MCL 691.1407(4).  
5 
 Although governmental agencies may be under a wide 
variety of duties, with regard to services that they provide 
to the public, only those enumerated within the statutorily 
created exceptions are legally compensable if breached. MCL  
691.1407; Nawrocki, supra at 157.  
6 
 Plaintiff’s accident occurred on January 29, 1996. 
Accordingly, 
the 
statutory language applicable in this case is 
that found in 1990 PA 278, § 1, effective December 11, 1990, 
rather than the current statutory language, which was enacted 
(continued...)  
6  
 
 
Pursuant to subsection 1402(1), the duty to maintain public  
sidewalks in “reasonable repair” falls on local governments,  
including cities, villages, and townships.  See Chaney v Dep’t  
of Transportation, 447 Mich 145, 172, n 2; 523 NW2d 762  
(1994); Mason v Wayne Co Bd of Comm'rs, 447 Mich 130, 136, n  
6; 523 NW2d 791 (1994).  Accordingly, a municipality’s  
maintenance and repair of its sidewalks is the performance of  
a governmental function. MCL 691.1401(f).7  
However, as we noted in Suttles, simply asserting that an  
action falls within the “highway exception” to governmental  
immunity is not the end of the analysis:  
In every instance where a plaintiff alleges a 
cause of action based on the highway exception to 
governmental 
immunity, 
MCL 
691.1402(1); 
MSA  
3.996(102)(1), the court must engage in a two-step 
analysis. [Id. at 651, n 10.]  
First, it must be determined whether the plaintiff has pleaded  
6(...continued) 
by 1999 PA 205, and which became effective regarding causes of 
action arising on or after December 21, 1999.  
7 For purposes of application of the highway exception to  
a municipality, MCL 691.1401 provides: (1) “governmental 
agency” means the state or a “political subdivision”; (2) 
“political subdivision” means a “municipal corporation”; and 
(3) “municipal corporation” means a “city, village, or  
township.” Subsection 1401(a),(b),(d). Moreover, “highway” 
means a public highway, road, or street that is open for 
public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, 
crosswalks, and culverts on the highway.  Subsection 1401(e).  
“Governmental 
function,” as used in the  governmental immunity 
act,  is “an activity that is expressly or impliedly mandated 
or authorized by constitution, statute, local  charter or  
ordinance, or other law.” Subsection 1401(f).  
7  
  
 
a cause of action in avoidance of governmental immunity.  
Second, where a plaintiff successfully pleads in avoidance of  
governmental immunity, i.e., that the alleged injury occurred  
in a location encompassed by MCL 691.1402(1), the plaintiff  
must still prove, consistent with traditional negligence  
principles, the remaining elements of breach, causation, and  
damages contained within the statute. Id., see also Nawrocki,  
supra at 172, n 29. The statute at issue contains the duty  
element of these principles; namely, the duty of a  
municipality to “maintain” the sidewalk “in reasonable repair  
so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public  
travel.” MCL 691.1402(1).8  See Johnson v Pontiac, 276 Mich  
103, 105; 267 NW 795 (1936), explaining that “[t]he liability  
of cities for this class of cases is statutory . . . and it is  
the duty of defendant to keep its sidewalk in repair.”  
Concepts such as the “natural accumulation” doctrine, see  
below, are pertinent to this second step of the analysis.  See  
Johnson, supra, stating that a plaintiff cannot recover if an  
injury is due “solely to the presence of ice or snow”  
(emphasis added).  
8 “Courts should take care not to confuse their separate 
inquiries 
into 
[governmental] 
immunity 
and 
negligence.” 
 
Canon  
v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326, 335; 422 NW2d 688 (1988).  
8  
 
 
 
IV.  THE NATURAL ACCUMULATION DOCTRINE  
“It has long been the law in this state . . . that a  
governmental 
agency’s 
failure 
to 
remove 
the 
natural  
accumulations of ice and snow on a public highway does not  
signal negligence of that public authority.” Stord v  
Transportation Dep’t, 186 Mich App 693, 694; 465 NW2d 54  
(1991).  The following cases present an overview of the  
“natural accumulation” doctrine as it relates to public  
sidewalks, and municipal defendants.  
In Mayo v Village of Baraga, 178 Mich 171; 144 NW 517  
(1913), the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for  
injuries sustained as a result of falling on ice and snow on  
a sidewalk. This Court determined that  
[i]f a liability exists, it is because of a defect 
in the [sidewalk]; and, if ice frozen upon a 
sidewalk is a defect when it is caused by water 
flowing from a roof, why should it not be when it 
flows from a vacant lot, or when it falls upon the 
[side]walk, or is caused by the melting of snow 
upon or adjoining such a walk?  If the liability of 
a city for damages resulting from a failure to keep 
its highways in a reasonably safe condition for 
travel extends to cases where such condition is not  
ascribable to defects in the construction and  
maintenance of the way, or to the action of the 
officers to the city or their negligence in the 
performance of a duty, it may be contended that 
cities must cause the streets to be patrolled, in 
search of bricks or coals that fall from wagons, 
for the treacherous banana peel, upon which the 
unwary are sure to slip, and for tacks or bits of 
glass or other rubbish, which puncture the tires of 
bicycles.  [S]uch are not defects in the highway.  
[Id. at 173-174.]  
9  
 
 
In Hopson v Detroit, 235 Mich 248; 209 NW 161 (1926), a  
case involving facts similar to the instant one, the plaintiff  
was walking on a public sidewalk. There was a depression in  
the 
sidewalk 
where 
the concrete had settled and disintegrated;  
this condition made the sidewalk lower in the center.  In this  
depression, water from natural causes had settled, with ice at  
the bottom and a thin layer of water on top.  The plaintiff  
slipped on the ice that had formed in the depression, fell and  
was injured.  The plaintiff’s theory of liability was that  
when two causes combine to produce an injury to a traveler  
upon a public sidewalk, both of which are in their nature  
proximate–the one being a defect in the sidewalk, and the  
other 
some 
occurrence 
for 
which 
neither 
party 
is  
responsible–the municipality is liable, provided the injury  
would not have been sustained but for the defect.  Id. at 250.  
This Court concluded that the defendant was not liable for the  
plaintiff’s injury.  
Stating that “[i]n order to employ the doctrine of a  
slippery place precipitating into an unsafe place, there must  
be an unsafe place to slip into,” this Court held that the  
rule obtaining in Michigan places no liability upon the  
municipality for ice forming in this way.  Id. Rather, the  
rule under which a plaintiff could recover is that where two  
causes combine to produce an injury to a pedestrian using a  
10  
 
 
  
 
sidewalk, one of the causes at least must be a defect in the  
sidewalk 
rendering 
the sidewalk not reasonably safe for public  
travel at any time. 
“Ice on a sidewalk, whether on level  
places or in depressions, constitutes no defect entailing  
liability.” Id. at 250-251 (emphasis added). The depression,  
no matter what caused it, did not render the sidewalk out of  
repair “within the meaning of our statute relative to the duty  
of defendant to keep the walk in repair and reasonably safe  
for public travel.” Id. at 251.  
In determining that the plaintiff in Hopson could not  
prevail, this Court stated that  
wherever ice or snow is the sole proximate cause of  
the accident, there shall be no liability, but 
where at the time of the accident there is any 
other defect to which, as a proximate cause, the 
accident is in part attributable, there may be a 
liability notwithstanding the fact that it also may 
be attributable in part to ice or snow.  This other  
defect, however, is not a proximate cause within  
the meaning of this rule, simply because it causes  
the accumulation of the ice or snow.
 In  
considering whether, “at the time of the accident, 
the 
way 
is 
otherwise 
reasonably 
safe 
and  
convenient,” the attention is to be directed to the 
actual physical condition of the way for the  
purpose of ascertaining whether there is at that 
time any other danger to the steps of the traveler 
than that arising from the presence of ice or snow; 
if there be no other danger, then for the time 
being the way is “otherwise reasonably safe and 
convenient.” 
[Id. 
at 
252, 
quoting 
Newton 
v  
Worcester, 
174 
Mass 
181, 
187; 
54 
NE 
521  
(1899)(emphasis added).]  
In Johnson, 
supra, the plaintiff suffered injuries as the  
11  
  
result of a fall sustained while walking over or around a  
piece of defective sidewalk.  There was an accumulation of ice  
and snow upon the sidewalk.  The claimed defect in the  
sidewalk, an upheaval, was likely caused by the roots of a  
nearby tree.  Applying 1929 CL 4223, which established a duty  
within the defendant to keep its sidewalks in reasonable  
repair, this Court determined that where the plaintiff’s slip  
and fall was due solely to the presence of the ice and snow,  
she could not prevail in her cause of action against the  
governmental agency. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the natural accumulation doctrine provides  
that a governmental agency’s failure to remove ice or snow  
from a highway does not, by itself, constitute negligence.  
Pursuant to this doctrine, plaintiff must prove that there was  
an existing defect in the sidewalk rendering it not reasonably  
safe for public travel.  
V. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION  
Turning to the present case, we apply this longstanding  
rule and conclude that the natural accumulation of ice on the  
sidewalk, without more, did not constitute a breach of  
defendant’s statutory duty to maintain the sidewalk in  
reasonable repair. Further, plaintiff cannot prove that her  
injuries resulted from a defect on the sidewalk, as distinct  
12  
 
 
 
  
from the accumulation of ice.9
 Although plaintiff has  
9 
  The dissent’s dominant theme is that we have invaded  
the province of the finder of fact by concluding that the 
accumulation of ice at this location was natural.  In support 
of this, the dissent asserts that “[a] determination whether 
the sidewalk was in ‘reasonable repair’ is a precursor to the 
issue whether the accumulation was natural, which is a  
precursor 
to 
application 
of 
the 
natural 
accumulation  
doctrine.”
 Slip op at 5. 
The dissent also sets forth  
plaintiff’s 
expert’s 
reference to the accumulation of ice that 
occurred here as an “unnatural accumulation,” and further 
asserts that whether the claimed depression was a defect 
rendering the sidewalk not reasonably safe was a question of 
fact. Slip op at 6-7.  This, in our judgment, is an incorrect 
analysis of the law.  
In Hopson 
this 
Court rejected the dissent’s argument that 
a depression that allows water to accumulate and freeze is an 
underlying defect precluding application of the natural 
accumulation doctrine. “Ice on a sidewalk, whether on level 
places or in depressions, constitutes no defect entailing 
liability.” 
Id. at 250-251 (emphasis added).  The Court  
continued: “[t]he rule, and the only rule, under which 
plaintiff could recover is that, where two causes combine to  
produce an injury to a pedestrian using a sidewalk, one of the 
causes at least must be a defect in the walk, rendering the 
walk not reasonably safe for public travel at any time.” Id.  
at 250 (emphasis added). 
As the Supreme Court of  
Massachusetts observed in Newton, supra at 187, a case upon 
which Hopson relied:  
[T]he real question is not simply whether the 
way, with no ice or snow upon it, is defective, but 
whether, if there be such a defect, it was  
operative as such at the time of the accident, and 
was in part the proximate cause of it. If there be  
such an operative defect, then there may be a 
liability, even although the accident be due in 
part to ice or snow; otherwise, there is no such 
liability, even if the defect was the cause of the 
accumulation of ice or snow.  
Therefore, an independent defect, other than the accumulation 
of ice or snow, must be at least a proximate cause of a 
plaintiff’s injury in order for the plaintiff to recover under 
the statute.  It is clear from the testimony of plaintiff, 
(continued...)  
13  
  
 
 
 
properly pleaded that her claim falls within the “highway  
exception” to governmental immunity found in MCL 691.1402(1),  
she cannot establish an injury caused by a defect in the  
sidewalk 
under 
traditional 
negligence 
principles.  
Specifically, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the claimed  
depression was a proximate cause of her slip and fall for  
purposes of the highway exception under the rule set forth in  
Hopson, supra.  
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a  
plaintiff must be able to prove four elements: (1) a duty owed  
by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty,  
(3) causation, and (4) damages. Schultz v Consumers Power Co,  
443 Mich 445, 449; 506 NW2d 175 (1993).  Proof of causation  
requires both cause in fact and legal, or proximate, cause.  
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475  
(1994); Davis v Thornton, 384 Mich 138, 145; 180 NW2d 11  
(1970).  Cause in fact requires that the harmful result would  
not have come about but for the defendant's negligent conduct.  
Skinner, supra at 163, citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th  
ed), § 41, p 266).  “On the other hand, legal cause or  
9(...continued) 
plaintiff’s expert, and the eyewitness, that there was no such 
defect 
that 
proximately caused plaintiff’s fall in the instant 
case. Thus, we conclude in accord with Hopson, that plaintiff 
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether 
a defect, rather than the accumulated ice alone, caused her 
injury.  
14  
 
  
‘proximate 
cause’ 
normally 
involves 
examining 
the  
foreseeability 
of 
consequences, 
and 
whether 
a 
defendant 
should  
be held legally responsible for such consequences.”  Skinner,  
supra at 163. 
Here, in our judgment, plaintiff cannot  
demonstrate that her injury was caused by a breach of the duty  
set forth in MCL 691.1402(1).  
As in Hopson, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that it was  
the combination of ice and a defect in the sidewalk that  
caused her to slip and fall. See id. at 250-252. Plaintiff  
admitted, with Anna Marson’s testimony supporting the  
admission, that she slipped on the ice that was present on the  
sidewalk; she did not trip over, or lose her balance in any  
way because of the claimed depression in the sidewalk. The  
sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s slip and fall was the ice;  
there was no persistent defect in the sidewalk rendering it  
unsafe for public travel at all times that, in combination  
with the ice, caused the incident.10  
10 Even if we were to assume that the claimed depression 
here represented a condition that rendered the sidewalk not 
“reasonably safe for public travel” at all times, under the 
facts of the present case the natural accumulation of ice in 
the depression effectively vitiated the unsafe condition 
presented by the depression itself.  
This point, perhaps, is better illustrated by way of 
example.  Under the first scenario, a six-foot deep hole  
exists in the middle of a sidewalk.  Water naturally 
accumulates in the top of the hole and, because of the weather 
conditions, freezes so that, in effect, the hole no longer 
exists.  While walking upon the sidewalk, an individual steps 
(continued...)  
15  
 
 
 
Simply put, a plaintiff cannot recover in a claim against  
a governmental agency where the sole proximate cause of the  
slip and fall is the natural accumulation of ice or snow.  
This is true even where the ice or snow naturally accumulates  
in a portion of the highway (i.e., sidewalk) that was  
otherwise not “reasonably safe and convenient for public  
travel . . . .” Hopson, supra at 250. 
Rather, there must  
exist the combination of the ice or snow and the defect that,  
in tandem, proximately causes the slip and fall. Thus, even  
if we accept plaintiff’s claim, in the present case, that a  
depression in the sidewalk allowed the ice to form and be  
present, we conclude that such a depression, under the facts  
here, did not render the sidewalk out of repair within the  
meaning of subsection 1402(1).11  
10(...continued) 
on the ice, slips, and falls, thereby incurring injury.  Under  
this scenario, it can only be said that the sole proximate 
cause of the slip and fall was the presence of the natural 
accumulation of ice.  A different outcome, however, would 
present under a scenario where the same six-foot hole in the 
sidewalk is present, but the ice forms several inches below 
the top of the hole.  While walking upon the sidewalk, an 
individual steps on the edge of the hole, which causes him to 
momentarily lose his balance.  While attempting to remain 
upright, this individual slips on the ice that had naturally 
accumulated in the hole.  Under this scenario, it must be said 
that, in tandem, the defect and the natural accumulation of 
ice combined to proximately cause the slip and fall.  
11  The prevailing rule from Hopson, supra at 250-51,and  
Johnson, supra at 105, is that a plaintiff cannot recover if 
an injury is due solely to the presence of ice on the 
sidewalk, even if a depression in the sidewalk caused the 
(continued...)  
16  
 
  
  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The claimed sidewalk depression in the present case  
merely allowed the natural accumulation of ice to form, and  
factually presented no “other danger to the steps of the  
traveler than that arising from the presence of the ice . . .  
.” 
Hopson, supra at 252. 
As in Hopson, we reject the  
proposition that the presence of ice alone, which naturally  
accumulates and which is the sole proximate cause of a slip  
and fall, satisfies the remaining elements of the negligence  
analysis employed in actions against governmental agencies.  
In the absence of a persistent defect in the highway (i.e., a  
sidewalk), rendering it unsafe for public travel at all times,  
and which combines with the natural accumulation of ice or  
snow to proximately cause injury, a plaintiff cannot prevail  
against an otherwise immune municipality.  
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and we  
remand this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for entry of an  
order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, 
TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred  
11(...continued) 
accumulation.  In such cases, the depression is not a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Hopson, supra at  
250-251.  Our law has developed this test specifically in the 
context of the natural accumulation doctrine and the highway 
exception to governmental immunity. 
MCL 691.1401(e). 
Hopson’s formulation of proximate cause is limited to those 
cases that have arisen in this specific context.  
17  
 
with MARKMAN, J.  
18 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
VALERIA HALIW and  
ILKO HALIW,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 115686  
THE CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I believe that plaintiffs established questions of fact  
about whether (1) the claimed depression in the sidewalk  
rendered the sidewalk no longer reasonably safe, (2) the ice  
or snow on which Valeria Haliw fell was a "natural  
accumulation," 
and 
(3) her injuries were proximately caused by  
the sidewalk's condition.  
The 
majority's 
resolution of these factual disputes is an  
impermissible invasion into the province of the finder of  
fact. Because the issues should be left for the finder of  
fact, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that upheld  
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary  
disposition.  
I  
In the proceedings below, defendant moved for summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10). It argued that  
summary 
disposition 
was 
proper 
because 
the 
natural  
accumulation doctrine barred plaintiffs' claim, and there was  
no defect in the sidewalk in question. Plaintiffs retorted  
that there were questions of fact whether the sidewalk was  
defective because the depression in it created an unnatural  
accumulation of ice and snow. Therefore, they  contended, the  
natural accumulation doctrine has nothing to do with the case.  
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court stated:  
The Court: It seems [plaintiff] does have 
someone who seems to have expertise–a great deal of 
expertise who is saying it is a year-around defect, 
not just an accumulation of ice and no defect if it 
is a constant problem and he is going to testify to 
that, and if that–from that this Court's specific 
perspective raises an issue of fact, you are saying 
that by a preponderance that doesn't meet the 
standard?  
I am not disposed to agree with your position 
on that, so you have something else you would like 
to make me aware of regarding why this isn't 
something that a jury must listen to?  
[Defendant's counsel]: I have nothing else 
with regard to the expert, your honor. . . .  
The Court: . . . 
[T]his Court does believe 
that plaintiff has shown–this fact issue has been 
raised by provisions raised by the expert and his 
credentials and you [defendant] may provide your  
2  
own expert, but if a finder of fact should have the 
opportunity, then, to weigh the issues in this 
case, and I will deny the motion for summary 
disposition.  
In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's  
claim 
that 
the 
natural 
accumulation 
doctrine 
barred  
plaintiffs' claim.1 It reasoned:  
Defendant's argument fails, however, because 
plaintiffs do not allege that Valeria Haliw fell 
because of a natural accumulation of ice and snow.  
Rather, plaintiffs claim that the fall was caused 
by an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow  
resulting from a depression in the sidewalk. Thus, 
in addition to the presence of snow and ice, 
plaintiffs allege that there was a defect in the 
sidewalk itself, and therefore their claim is not 
barred by the natural accumulation doctrine. [Slip 
op, pp 1-2 (citation omitted).]  
The appellate court disagreed, also, with defendant's  
position that the alleged defect was insufficient to support  
the imposition of liability. It reasoned that a factual  
dispute existed whether the sidewalk where Valeria Haliw fell  
was reasonably safe for public travel. It rejected as  
unpersuasive defendant's argument disputing plaintiffs'  
evidence, explaining that a court "may not assess credibility  
or determine facts when considering a motion for summary  
disposition." Id. at 2.  
II  
This Court reviews a trial court's decision concerning a  
1Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 5, 1999, 
(Docket No. 206886).  
3  
 
 
summary disposition motion de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich  
109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is proper  
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) where a claim is barred because of  
immunity granted by law.  
A 
motion 
under 
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support  
of a plaintiff's claim. See Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460  
Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). In reviewing it, the court  
considers the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary  
evidence filed or submitted by the parties in the light most  
favorable to the nonmoving party. The motion is granted if the  
documentary evidence shows that no genuine issue of material  
fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as  
a matter of law. See Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich  
331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Courts may not determine facts  
on a motion for summary disposition. Questions of fact must be  
settled by the finder of fact. See Zamler v Smith, 375 Mich  
675, 679; 135 NW2d 349 (1965); Miller v Miller, 373 Mich 519,  
526; 129 NW2d 885 (1964).  
III  
A government agency has a statutory duty to keep highways  
under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair so that they are  
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. MCL  
691.1402(1). At least in a municipal setting, a "highway" is  
defined to include sidewalks. MCL 691.1401(e).  
4  
 
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiffs' claim falls  
within the "highway exception" to governmental immunity found  
in 
MCL 
691.1402(1). 
Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
determines 
that  
summary disposition in favor of defendant is proper. It  
reasons that the "claimed depression in the sidewalk was not  
an independent defect . . . ." It asserts, also, that the  
natural accumulation of ice or snow on the sidewalk does not  
give rise to an actionable breach of defendant's duty. Slip op  
at 1.  
I agree that the presence of a natural accumulation of  
ice or snow does not, itself, constitute a breach of the  
municipality's statutory duty. However, it is debatable  
whether the accumulation in the present case can be deemed  
"natural." A determination whether the sidewalk was in  
"reasonable repair" is a precursor to the issue whether the  
accumulation was natural, which is a precursor to application  
of the natural accumulation doctrine.2 Therefore, a proper  
resolution of this case must begin with a decision whether, as  
a question of fact, the sidewalk was in "reasonable repair."  
In opposition to defendant's summary disposition motion,  
plaintiffs introduced a report from their expert, Theodore  
2See Whinnen v 231 Corporation, 49 Mich App 371, 376-377; 
212 NW2d 297 (1973), discussing the relevance of photographs 
to the issue of "the combination of defective construction, 
inadequate maintenance [of a sidewalk], and a consequent 
unnatural or artificial accumulation of ice or snow."  
5  
 
 
 
Dziurman. Dziurman noted that his inspection of the sidewalk  
revealed the following:  
The second and third slabs north of the  
driveway [the site where plaintiff fell3] had 
settled about 2 inches. Water would accumulate in  
this depression.  
He then recited what he thought transpired in this case:  
Based on [plaintiff's] deposition transcript, 
she 
most 
likely 
slipped 
on 
an 
"unnatural"  
accumulation of ice which caused her to fall.  
However, on the date of the accident, there was 
also a trip hazard at the same location . . . .  
* * *  
. . . I believe that [plaintiff's] apparent 
slip and fall occurred due primarily to "defects in 
the walking surface." Due to either poor compaction 
of the "base" material beneath the sidewalk and/or 
due to past tree root growth, at least 2 of the 
sidewalk slabs at this location had settled  
resulting in an unnatural depression in the  
sidewalk.  
Finally, Dziurman summarized his findings as follows:  
There were several defects in the sidewalk in  
front of 36225 Arlene, Sterling Heights, Michigan, 
in January of 1996. These defects had existed for 
several years. The most significant defect was a  
settlement of two slabs resulting in a depression  
that would pond water or ice in a 2 or 3 square  
foot area. This depression was not normal and if  
the sidewalk sections had been properly constructed  
and maintained, there would not have been a  
depression in the sidewalk sections noted on  
3In the complaint, plaintiffs claimed that Valeria fell 
because of a depression in the sidewalk, among other things. 
Anna Marson, the homeowner nearest the sidewalk, testified 
that she helped Valeria to her feet after she fell and thought 
that she had gone down where the depression existed in the 
sidewalk.  
6  
 
 
 
January 29, 1996 which created an unnatural  
accumulation of ice.  
Based on weather data for January of 1996, 
there was a source and proper temperatures to allow 
ice to form. In the a.m. of January 29, light snow 
had obscured the ice. As [plaintiff] walked along 
the public sidewalk in front of 36225 Arlene, her 
foot 
accidentally 
landed 
on 
the 
unnatural  
accumulation of unseen ice causing her to slip and 
fall. . . .  
The defects in the walking surface allowed ice 
to form and these defects were the proximate cause 
of [plaintiff's] accident. [Emphasis added.]  
In support of its motion, defendant argued that the  
report was insufficient to create a factual dispute regarding  
the sidewalk's condition. Also, it introduced testimony from  
the homeowner nearest the sidewalk, who stated that there was  
nothing dangerous about the sidewalk absent snow or ice.  
Plaintiffs countered with Dziurman's testimony that the  
sidewalk, without snow or ice, "could be dangerous" to  
pedestrians 
or 
bicyclists who were not expecting a depression.  
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to  
plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties below, a jury could infer  
that the sidewalk's depression rendered it out of "reasonable  
repair."4  Thus, a question of fact existed whether defendant  
4See Cornell v City of Ypsilanti, 212 Mich 540, 547; 180 
NW 405 (1920), recognizing that "while a municipality is not 
liable, as matter of law, for slight depressions in its 
sidewalks, such depressions may be of such size, shape and 
character as to make the question one of fact" for the jury to 
determine. See also Williams v Bay City, 126 Mich 156, 156­
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
 
breached its statutory duty under MCL 691.1402. See Miller,  
supra at 525 (Souris, J., concurring), citing Grand Trunk R Co  
v Ives, 144 US 408, 417; 12 S Ct 679; 36 L Ed 485 (1892),  
stating that "[u]nless a judge can properly say that all  
reasonable men would agree from the undisputed evidentiary  
facts that there was or was not negligence, the issue must be  
submitted for jury determination . . . ."5  
The 
factual 
dispute regarding whether the sidewalk was in  
reasonable repair consequently creates a question of fact  
whether there was a "natural accumulation" in this case. See  
Navarre v Benton Harbor, 126 Mich 618, 619-620; 86 NW 138  
(1901), holding that whether the defendant city breached its  
statutory duty to keep its sidewalks in reasonable repair must  
4(...continued) 
157; 85 NW 458 (1901).  
5See Pappas v Bay City, 17 Mich App 745, 752-753; 170 
NW2d 306 (1969), where the plaintiff introduced evidence that 
she stepped on ice covered by snow that had accumulated in a 
depression of a sidewalk of at least 2-3/8 inches. The court 
held that this evidence created a question for the jury (1) 
whether the defendant city breached its statutory duty to keep 
the sidewalk in reasonable repair, (2) whether the defect, if 
it existed, caused the accumulation of ice, and (3) whether 
this was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Cf. 
Hopson v Detroit, 235 Mich 248, 251; 209 NW 161 (1926), where 
the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated in 
a depression in a public sidewalk. The plaintiff sued the 
defendant city, claiming that it was liable for breaching its 
duty to keep its sidewalk in reasonable repair. We held that 
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant city was proper 
because the plaintiff had failed to establish a "culpable 
defect in the [side]walk."  
8  
 
 
be left for the jury. In that case, the evidence justified the  
jury's inference that the sidewalk's "depressed condition . .  
. was such as to induce the formation of ice in unusual  
quantities . . . ."6 Therefore, by determining that the  
sidewalk was not defective and that this case concerns a  
"natural accumulation" of ice or snow, the majority has  
impermissibly invaded the province of the factfinder. See  
Zamler, supra at 679; Miller, supra at 524.  
Alternatively, the majority asserts, even if the  
depression in the sidewalk rendered it no longer reasonably  
safe, the natural accumulation of ice or snow here  
"effectively vitiated the unsafe condition." Slip op at 15, n  
10. This assertion is flawed because it is based on a premise  
that the accumulation here was "natural." Again, the question  
of fact regarding the defective nature of the sidewalk  
precludes making such a determination. See Zamler, supra at  
679.  
Finally, 
the 
majority 
states 
that 
summary 
disposition 
for  
defendant 
is 
appropriate 
because 
plaintiffs 
cannot 
demonstrate  
6See also Whinnen, supra at 377, "[i]n almost every case 
whether the condition was due to a natural accumulation or an  
artificial or unnatural accumulation or condition is one of  
fact for the jury." Cf. Woodworth v Brenner, 69 Mich App 277, 
281; 244 NW2d 446 (1976), summary disposition in favor of the 
defendant city was proper where the only defect that the 
plaintiff alleged in the sidewalk was the presence of ice; the 
plaintiff failed to allege some defect in the sidewalk itself.  
9  
 
 
 
 
 
that the claimed depression was the proximate cause of the  
fall under Hopson, supra. The trial court made no findings  
regarding proximate cause. The parties never argued this  
issue. 
Instead, 
their 
arguments 
concerned 
whether 
the 
sidewalk  
was in reasonable repair and whether the natural accumulation  
doctrine applied. Therefore, I believe it improper to decide  
the instant matter on proximate cause grounds. See Miller,  
supra.7  
Nevertheless, given the evidence presented below,  
particularly although not exclusively Dziurman's report, a  
factual dispute exists whether Valeria Haliw's injuries were  
proximately caused by the condition of the sidewalk. Thus,  
defendant is not entitled to summary disposition on this  
basis, either.8  
IV  
Plaintiffs 
established 
a 
genuine 
factual 
dispute  
7Moreover, 
the 
majority's 
reliance 
on 
Hopson 
is  
misplaced. Hopson held that there was no evidence of an actual  
defect in the sidewalk. See id. at 251; see also Pappas, supra 
at 752, stating that, to reconcile Hopson with other cases  
from this Court, it should be read as holding that no actual 
defect was shown. Hence, Hopson does not control where, as 
here, there is evidence of an actual defect in the sidewalk.  
8See Johnson v Marquette, 154 Mich 50, 53-54; 117 NW 658 
(1908), finding whether a sidewalk's condition was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury was a question 
properly left for the jury. The record showed that the 
sidewalk contained an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow.  
See also Pappas, supra at 752-753.  
10  
 
regarding whether the sidewalk at issue was in reasonable  
repair.  Consequently, there is also a question of fact  
whether Valeria Haliw slipped on a "natural accumulation" of  
ice or snow and whether her injuries were proximately caused  
by the sidewalk's condition. Accordingly, I would affirm the  
Court of Appeals decision to uphold the trial court's denial  
of defendant's summary disposition motion.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
11