Title: Gregory G. Phelps v. Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc.
Citation: 2009 WI 74
Docket Number: 2006AP002599
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2009

2009 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2599 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Gregory Phelps, Marlene L. Phelps, Estate of 
Adam Phelps, Deceased, by his Special 
Administrator, Gregory G. Phelps, Caroline 
Phelps and Kyle Phelps, minors, by their 
Guardian ad Litem, William M. Cannon, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
     v. 
Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., a 
Wisconsin insurance corporation and Matthew 
Lindemann, M.D., 
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 6 
Reported at: 307 Wis. 2d 184, 744 N.W.2d 880 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-cross-respondents-petitioners 
there were briefs by Michael B. Van Sicklen, Katherine C. Smith, 
and Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Michael 
B. Van Sicklen. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross-appellants there were 
briefs by William M. Cannon, Sarah F. Kaas, Edward E. Robinson, 
and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by 
William M. Cannon. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Martha H. Heidt and 
Bye, Goff, Rhode & Skow, Ltd., River Falls, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy J. Muldowney, 
Robert J. Dreps, Jennifer L. Peterson, and Godfrey & Kahn SC, 
Madison; Ruth Heitz and Wisconsin Medical Society, Madison; and 
Leonard Nelson and AMA Litigation Center, Chicago, on behalf of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Medical 
Society 
and 
the 
American 
Medical 
Association. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2599  
(L.C. No. 
1999CV7971) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gregory Phelps; Marlene L. Phelps; Estate of 
Adam Phelps, Deceased, by his Special 
Administrator, Gregory G. Phelps; Caroline 
Phelps and Kyle Phelps, minors, by their 
Guardian ad Litem, William M. Cannon, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., a 
Wisconsin insurance corporation and Matthew 
Lindemann, M.D., 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed in part and 
                                                 
1 Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2008 WI App 
6, 307 Wis. 2d 184, 744 N.W.2d 880 (Phelps III). 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
2 
 
affirmed in part a decision of the circuit court.2  There are two 
questions presented for our review:  (1) whether Dr. Matthew 
Lindemann (Lindemann) was a borrowed employee of St. Joseph's 
Hospital of Milwaukee (St. Joseph's), and was therefore an 
employee of a health care provider subject to Wis. Stat. ch. 655 
and Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) (1997-98);3 and (2) whether Gregory 
Phelps (Gregory) can recover damages caused by Lindemann's 
negligence on a theory of the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress to a bystander.  We conclude that Lindemann was a 
borrowed employee of St. Joseph's, and was therefore an employee 
of a health care provider under ch. 655.  As a result, ch. 655 
governs Gregory's claim.  We further conclude that ch. 655 does 
not permit claims arising from medical negligence other than 
those listed in Wis. Stat. §§ 655.005(1) and 655.007, and the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander is not 
one of those claims.  Therefore, Gregory's claim is not 
actionable under Wisconsin law.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals, and remand the cause to the 
circuit court to issue an order dismissing Gregory's claim. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Factual Summary 
¶2 
This is a long, drawn-out litigation that has been 
wandering through the Wisconsin court system for more than eight 
                                                 
2 The Honorable John A. Franke of Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court presided. 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
3 
 
years.  The underlying facts have been the source of three 
separate published appellate opinions.  See Phelps v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2004 WI App 91, ¶1, 273 Wis. 2d 667, 681 
N.W.2d 571 (Phelps I); Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 
Inc., 2005 WI 85, ¶¶5-13, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643 (Phelps 
II); Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2008 WI App 6, 
¶¶2-11, 307 Wis. 2d 184, 744 N.W.2d 880 (Phelps III).  Our 
summary of the relevant facts here largely restates the factual 
summaries in those prior decisions.   
¶3 
Marlene Phelps (Marlene) discovered that she was 
pregnant with twins in June 1998.  Due to medical complications, 
she was placed on strict home bed rest.  Marlene's pregnancy 
then progressed without incident until October 18, 1998, when 
another medical complication occurred.  She was admitted to St. 
Joseph's and continued her program of bed rest in the hospital.  
Two days later, an ultrasound revealed that one of the twins was 
in a breech presentation.  As a result, Marlene was deemed a 
high-risk patient who likely would require a caesarean section 
for delivery of the twins. 
¶4 
In the early morning of November 24, 1998, Marlene was 
awakened by constant suprapubic pain.  The on-call resident, 
Lindemann, was contacted.  Lindemann was an unlicensed first-
year resident and an employee of the Medical College of 
Wisconsin 
Affiliated 
Hospitals, 
Inc. 
(Affiliated 
Hospitals 
entity).  His primary duty at this time was to assess and report 
findings and differential diagnoses on St. Joseph's patients to 
a senior resident or to the attending obstetrician.  
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Lindemann ordered lactated Ringer's solution to be 
administered 
to 
Marlene 
at 
2:40 
a.m., 
for 
suspected 
contractions.  It did not alleviate Marlene's pain.  At 3:00 
a.m., Lindemann made a differential diagnosis of her pain that 
included bladder infection, labor and placental abruption.  He 
ordered a urinalysis in regard to a potential bladder infection.  
The results of that test were negative. 
¶6 
At 4:15 a.m., Marlene requested that the attending 
nurse call Lindemann again due to continued pain. Fetal heart 
monitoring showed that the twins' heart rates were within normal 
ranges.  Lindemann informed Marlene that he would take an 
ultrasound so he could consult a senior resident about her 
condition. 
¶7 
After 
the 
ultrasound, 
potent 
narcotics 
were 
administered to Marlene at 4:50 a.m. and 5:20 a.m., on 
Lindemann's orders, but he was neither seen nor heard from 
between 4:15 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.  He never satisfactorily 
explained his whereabouts during this time.  There is no 
evidence that he ever contacted a senior resident to discuss the 
ultrasound and Marlene's case. 
¶8 
Marlene was still in pain when Lindemann examined her 
again at 6:00 a.m.  At 6:45 a.m., Marlene's husband, Gregory, 
arrived at the hospital.  Marlene informed Gregory that she 
needed to defecate and asked for assistance to get to the 
commode.  At 7:00 a.m., while sitting on the commode, she 
reached down and felt toes extending from her. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Gregory rushed to the nurses' desk where he found 
another doctor, who delivered Adam Phelps at 7:20 a.m.  Adam was 
immediately rushed to the neonatal intensive care unit where 
hospital staff attempted to resuscitate him.  The efforts were 
unsuccessful, and he was pronounced dead at 7:36 a.m.  Adam's 
death was caused by asphyxia due to umbilical cord entrapment 
and placental abruption, which impaired his oxygen supply. 
¶10 While hospital staff were attempting to resuscitate 
Adam, Marlene was taken to the operating room.  The second twin, 
Kyle, was delivered at 7:43 a.m.  Afterward, the treating 
physicians 
questioned 
Lindemann 
about 
his 
decisions, 
his 
whereabouts and his diagnosis.  
B. 
Procedural History 
 
1. 
Prior appeal 
¶11 Gregory and Marlene, along with their two surviving 
children, Kyle and Caroline (collectively, the Phelpses), sued 
Lindemann and his insurer, Physician's Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin (Physicians), St. Joseph's, St. Joseph's insurer, and 
the Affiliated Hospitals entity, in Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, alleging negligence, loss of society and companionship, 
wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress.   
¶12 The Honorable Michael P. Sullivan presided over the 
initial trial proceedings.  Prior to trial, Judge Sullivan 
dismissed the Affiliated Hospitals entity from the case, 
concluding that even though Lindemann was an employee of the 
Affiliated Hospitals entity, he was not the Affiliated Hospitals 
entity's "servant" because the Affiliated Hospitals entity did 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
6 
 
not control or supervise his medical decisions performed at St. 
Joseph's.  Therefore, the Affiliated Hospitals entity could not 
be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.  This 
decision was not appealed.  The Phelpses then moved for a 
declaratory ruling that St. Joseph's was Lindemann's employer.  
Before Judge Sullivan could rule, however, the Phelpses and St. 
Joseph's settled, and St. Joseph's was dismissed from the 
litigation. 
¶13 The 
day 
before 
trial, 
Judge 
Sullivan 
struck 
Lindemann's jury demand because Lindemann's lawyer had been late 
in paying the jury fee.  A bench trial was then held.  Judge 
Sullivan found Lindemann 80% causally negligent and St. Joseph's 
20% causally negligent.  Judge Sullivan awarded the Phelpses 
$990,000, to be distributed as follows:  (1) $500,000 total to 
Gregory and Marlene for the wrongful death of Adam; (2) $200,000 
each to Gregory and Marlene for emotional distress; and (3) 
$45,000 each to Kyle and Caroline for the loss of society and 
companionship of their mother, Marlene. 
¶14 Lindemann and Physicians appealed.  The court of 
appeals held that Judge Sullivan had erred when he struck 
Lindemann's 
jury 
demand, 
and 
remanded 
for 
a 
new 
trial.  
Phelps I, 273 Wis. 2d 667, ¶18.  The court also concluded that 
the circuit court had applied an incorrect standard of care in 
concluding 
that 
Lindemann 
was 
liable. 
 
Id., 
¶¶23-25.  
Furthermore, the court held that Lindemann was not a statutory 
health care provider, and that the noneconomic damages caps set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) did not apply.  Id., ¶¶41-47.  
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
7 
 
The court of appeals also directed the circuit court to make 
factual findings on remand to determine whether some evidence 
should have been excluded under the statutory peer review 
privilege.  Id., ¶40. 
¶15 Lindemann and Physicians had argued to the circuit 
court and the court of appeals that Wis. Stat. ch. 655 barred 
the Phelpses' claims for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress to a bystander.  Id., ¶48.  Because the court of 
appeals concluded that Lindemann was not a health care provider 
under ch. 655, it did not address this argument.  Id.  However, 
the court of appeals did remand the case to the circuit court to 
make findings of fact regarding whether Lindemann was St. 
Joseph's borrowed employee, which would have rendered him an 
employee of a health care provider, thereby bringing the 
Phelpses' claims under ch. 655 and the noneconomic damages caps 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4).  Id., ¶46 n.10. 
¶16 We granted the parties' cross-petitions for review.  
Phelps II, 282 Wis. 2d 69, ¶¶2-3.  We reversed that aspect of 
the decision of the court of appeals granting defendants a new 
trial based on their failure to timely pay the jury fee.  Id., 
¶36.  Furthermore, while we agreed with the court of appeals 
that the applicable standard of care to apply to Lindemann was 
that of a first-year, unlicensed resident, we concluded that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in allocating 
80% of the negligence to Lindemann.  Id., ¶47. 
¶17 We reversed the court of appeals' decision to remand 
the case to the circuit court for further findings of fact 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
8 
 
regarding whether some evidence should have been excluded under 
the peer review privilege.  Id., ¶54.  Instead, we concluded, as 
a matter of law, that the peer review privilege did not apply to 
the facts of the case.  Id., ¶¶52-54. 
¶18 Finally, we affirmed that aspect of the court of 
appeals' decision concluding that Lindemann was not a health 
care provider under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4), and as a result, we 
concluded that the noneconomic damages cap set forth in that 
statute did not apply.  Id., ¶64.  However, acknowledging that 
"this may ultimately be dispositive of our discussion of the cap 
on noneconomic damages," id., ¶4 n.4, we remanded the matter to 
the circuit court to develop a factual record from which it 
could be determined whether Lindemann was a borrowed employee of 
St. Joseph's, and therefore an employee of a health care 
provider, id., ¶4.  If so, the noneconomic damages cap would 
apply to him because he was an employee of a health care 
provider.4  This remand on the borrowed employee question 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(4)(b), which outlines the types 
of 
claims 
to 
which 
the 
noneconomic 
damages 
caps 
in 
§ 893.55(4)(d) and (f) apply,  provides: 
The total noneconomic damages recoverable for 
bodily injury or death, including any action or 
proceeding based on contribution or indemnification, 
may not exceed the limit under par. (d) for each 
occurrence on or after May 25, 1995, from all health 
care providers and all employes of health care 
providers acting within the scope of their employment 
and providing health care services who are found 
negligent and from the patients compensation fund. 
(Emphasis added).   
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
9 
 
initiated the proceedings that are the subject of our review 
here. 
 
2. 
Present appeal 
¶19 On remand, the circuit court applied the test we set 
forth 
in 
Seaman 
Body 
Corp. 
v. 
Industrial 
Commission 
of 
Wisconsin, 204 Wis. 157, 235 N.W. 433 (1931), to determine 
whether Lindemann was a borrowed employee.  The circuit court 
made findings of fact, based on written submissions relating to 
whether:  (1) Lindemann consented to work for St. Joseph's; (2) 
Lindemann entered upon the work of St. Joseph's pursuant to 
either an express or an implied agreement to do so; (3) St. 
Joseph's had primary control over the details of Lindemann's 
work at St. Joseph's; and (4) Lindemann's work was performed 
primarily for the benefit of St. Joseph's.  Based on the 
findings it made from these evidentiary submissions, the circuit 
court concluded that Lindemann was a borrowed employee, and was 
therefore an employee of a health care provider.  These 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 655.017, which links Wis. Stat. ch. 655 
to the noneconomic damages caps set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4), provides: 
The amount of noneconomic damages recoverable by a 
claimant or plaintiff under this chapter for acts or 
omissions of a health care provider if the act or 
omission occurs on or after May 25, 1995, and for acts 
or omissions of an employe of a health care provider, 
acting within the scope of his or her employment and 
providing health care services, for acts or omissions 
occurring on or after May 25, 1995, is subject to the 
limits under s. 893.55(4)(d) and (f). 
(Emphasis added). 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
10 
 
conclusions subjected the Phelpses' claims to the noneconomic 
damages caps set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4). 
¶20 The Phelpses moved for reconsideration.  They argued 
that Lindemann could not be a borrowed employee because (1) the 
circuit court's factual finding that Lindemann consented to work 
for St. Joseph's was erroneous; and (2) the circuit court made 
no finding that the Affiliated Hospitals entity relinquished 
full and exclusive control over Lindemann.   
¶21 The circuit court denied the motion, reiterating its 
finding that even though Lindemann did not expressly consent to 
work for St. Joseph's, he impliedly did so.  In addition, the 
circuit court concluded that an employer need not relinquish 
full and exclusive control over the employee to the borrowing 
employer in order for the employee to be considered a borrowed 
employee.  As a result, the circuit court stood by its decision 
concluding that Lindemann was a borrowed employee of St. 
Joseph's. 
¶22 Between the filing of the Phelpses' initial complaint 
and before the circuit court decisions on the borrowed employee 
question, we decided several cases potentially affecting the 
outcome of this case.  See Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 
2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440; Pierce v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 14, 278 Wis. 2d 82, 
692 N.W.2d 558; Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866.   
¶23 In civil cases, we generally presume that our rulings 
apply to pending litigation.  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
11 
 
¶69, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.5  The circuit court decided 
that it was its responsibility, within the scope of our remand, 
to determine the effect of Ferdon, Pierce and Maurin on the 
Phelpses' claims,6 after concluding that Lindemann was a borrowed 
employee and subject to the noneconomic damages caps set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4).  The Phelpses argued that our 
decision in Ferdon precluded application of any damages cap to 
their claims.  However, in Ferdon, while we held that the cap on 
noneconomic damages arising from medical malpractice set forth 
in § 893.55(4)(d) was unconstitutional, Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 
¶105, we held that the cap for wrongful death, incorporated into 
§ 893.55(4)(f), was valid, id., ¶16.  Because Ferdon had no 
effect on the constitutionality of the wrongful death cap of 
§ 893.55(4)(f), 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
                                                 
5 The parties do not argue that the presumption of 
application of our rulings to pending litigation is overcome 
here.  See generally Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶¶69-75, 
274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (discussing the effect of court 
rulings on pending litigation). 
6 On their first appeal, the defendants had asked the court 
to stay its decision pending our resolution of Pierce v. 
Physicians Insurance Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 14, 278 Wis. 2d 
82, 692 N.W.2d 558, and Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 
28, 682 N.W.2d 866.  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 
Inc., 2004 WI App 91, ¶50 n.11, 273 Wis. 2d 667, 681 N.W.2d 571 
(Phelps I).  The court declined to do so.  Id.  When we decided 
Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 85, 282 
Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643 (Phelps II), we did not address the 
effect of Pierce and Maurin at all because "[s]uch issues were 
not briefed or argued by the parties."  Phelps II, 282 Wis. 2d 
69, ¶21 n.6.  Finally, we decided Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, 
after our decision in Phelps II, so its effect on the Phelpses' 
claims also was considered by the circuit court. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
12 
 
§ 893.55(4)(f)'s cap on wrongful death limited the Phelpses' 
damages. 
¶24 In Maurin, we held that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) 
incorporates a single cap on all damages for wrongful death, 
including those for conscious pain and suffering.  Maurin, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, ¶88.  For purposes of the Phelpses' claims, the 
wrongful death cap under § 893.55(4)(f) was $500,000.  As a 
result, under Maurin, the award of $500,000 to Gregory and 
Marlene for the wrongful death of Adam exhausted the cap on 
noneconomic damages for his wrongful death. 
¶25 The remaining dispute was whether the rest of the 
$490,000 in damages also was subject to the cap on wrongful 
death incorporated into Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f).  The circuit 
court concluded that Gregory's $200,000 award for damages based 
on the negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander 
was barred by § 893.55(4)(f) because Gregory's damages were 
inextricably linked to Adam's death.7  As a result, the circuit 
court vacated that portion of the $490,000 award. 
                                                 
7 The circuit court struggled with our decision in Finnegan 
v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2003 WI 98, 263 Wis. 2d 
574, 666 N.W.2d 797, where we held that the Finnegans' claims 
for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress were 
barred.  Id., ¶3.  Justice Sykes' lead opinion (joined by 
Justices Wilcox and Prosser) determined that Wis. Stat. ch. 655 
precluded bystander claims altogether, id., ¶2 (lead opinion of 
Sykes, J.), while a majority of the court concluded that even if 
ch. 655 did not bar such claims, the plaintiffs had failed to 
make an adequate showing under our decision in Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 
(1994).  Finnegan, 263 Wis. 2d 574, ¶3.   
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
13 
 
¶26 Though the same result appeared mandated for Marlene's 
bystander claim, the circuit court concluded that our decision 
in Pierce created different footings for her claim.  In Pierce, 
we concluded that a mother in childbirth, such as Marlene, 
experiences emotional distress damages in a manner different 
from that of a third person who merely witnesses the childbirth, 
such as Gregory.  Pierce, 278 Wis. 2d 82, ¶15.  Specifically, a 
mother in childbirth suffers injuries as a participant or victim 
of the medical malpractice, and her injuries are distinct from 
witnessing the injury to and death of her child.  Id.  As a 
result, a mother can pursue a separate claim for medical 
malpractice.  Id., ¶1.  In light of Pierce, the circuit court 
determined that Marlene's claim was not subject to the cap on 
noneconomic damages for Adam's wrongful death, and the court 
allowed her award of $200,000 to stand.8 
¶27 About a month after the circuit court issued its 
decision on damages, we issued our decision in Bartholomew v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 
38, 717 N.W.2d 216.  In Bartholomew, we overruled Maurin.  A 
majority of the court, via different rationales, concluded that 
the legislature had intended to adopt two damages caps, "a 
medical malpractice cap for noneconomic damages for predeath 
claims and a wrongful death cap for noneconomic damages for 
postdeath loss of society and companionship.  Claimants [could] 
                                                 
8 The circuit court also upheld the surviving children's 
awards of $45,000 each.  No argument has been raised before us 
that those awards were erroneous.   
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
14 
 
thus recover for the different damages up to the separate limits 
of the applicable respective cap."  Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 
¶127.   
¶28 In light of Bartholomew, the Phelpses filed a motion 
for reconsideration, requesting that Gregory's $200,000 award 
for damages due to the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress to a bystander be reinstated.  The circuit court 
granted the motion.  Though the court acknowledged some 
difficulty in determining whether a bystander claim "is a 
predeath or postdeath claim," the court concluded that such a 
claim ought to be considered a predeath claim, because "[t]he 
history of . . . wrongful death claims . . . is limited to 
something else."  As a result, the circuit court held that the 
noneconomic damages cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(f) did not 
apply to Gregory's claim, and it reinstated the $200,000 award. 
¶29 Following 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
on 
the 
Phelpses' second motion for reconsideration, Lindemann paid that 
portion of the damage award due to Marlene and the two children.  
He then appealed the circuit court's order reinstating Gregory's 
$200,000 award for damages due to the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress to a bystander.  The Phelpses cross-appealed, 
challenging the circuit court's findings and conclusion that 
Lindemann was a borrowed employee of St. Joseph's. 
¶30 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
ruling that Lindemann was a borrowed employee.  Phelps III, 307 
Wis. 2d 184, ¶1.  In so doing, the court of appeals concluded 
that the clearly erroneous standard of review did not apply to 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
15 
 
the circuit court's findings of fact, because those findings 
were based on a paper record.  Id., ¶20 (citing State ex rel. 
Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis. 2d 225, 241, 258 N.W.2d 700 (1977)).  
Instead, the court of appeals reviewed the circuit court's 
findings de novo.  Id.   
¶31 In applying the borrowed employee test from Seaman, 
the court of appeals found that (1) Lindemann never consented to 
be St. Joseph's employee, id., ¶25; (2) Lindemann was not 
performing the work of St. Joseph's, id., ¶¶26-27; (3) St. 
Joseph's did not control the details of Lindemann's work, id., 
¶28; and (4) Lindemann's work primarily benefited the Affiliated 
Hospitals entity, not St. Joseph's, id., ¶29.   
¶32 Because the court of appeals concluded that all of the 
Seaman factors weighed against Lindemann being a borrowed 
employee, it concluded that he was not.  As a result, Lindemann 
was not an employee of a health care provider under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4), and none of the caps on noneconomic damages set 
forth in that section applied to Gregory's claim.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals affirmed that aspect of the circuit court's 
decision reinstating Gregory's $200,000 award for bystander 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
¶33 We granted the defendants' petition for review.  In 
addition to the questions posed by the parties regarding 
Lindemann's status as a borrowed employee and the effect of that 
classification on Gregory's damages award under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4), we requested supplemental briefing from the parties 
to address two additional questions: 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
16 
 
(1) Does Wis. Stat. ch. 655 bar bystander 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims made 
against health care providers? 
(2) Did the defendant waive (forfeit) the right 
to have this issue decided in this court?   
We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶34 As the procedural history of this case indicates, 
determining whether Lindemann was a borrowed employee required 
the circuit court to make factual findings.  See Phelps II, 282 
Wis. 2d 69, ¶4 n.4 ("[B]ecause we cannot find facts, we remand 
to the circuit court the issue of whether Dr. Lindemann was a 
'borrowed employee' of St. Joseph's Hospital.")  We uphold a 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Steinbach v. Green Lake Sanitary Dist., 2006 WI 63, 
¶10, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715 N.W.2d 195. 
¶35 Once the facts relevant to the borrowed employee 
determination are found by the circuit court, application of the 
Seaman test to those facts is a question of law.  Phelps II, 282 
Wis. 2d 69, ¶100 (Prosser, J., concurring); see also Estate of 
Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2006 WI App 248, ¶¶66-75, 297 Wis. 2d 70, 
727 N.W.2d 857.  We decide questions of law independently.  
Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 2005 WI 113, ¶5, 283 Wis. 2d 
606, 699 N.W.2d 189; Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, 
¶15, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54; Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 
74, ¶5, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
17 
 
¶36 In 
addition 
to 
deciding 
the 
borrowed 
employee 
question, we interpret and apply Wis. Stat. ch. 655 and Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(4) to the facts of this case.  The interpretation 
and application of statutes are questions of law that we also 
review independently.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 
52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (citing Marder v. Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 
Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110). 
B. 
Borrowed Employee 
¶37 In order to determine whether Lindemann was the 
borrowed employee of St. Joseph's, the circuit court was 
required to make findings of fact.  The circuit court's findings 
were based on the parties' written submissions.  Because the 
basis from which the circuit court found facts was written 
exhibits and submissions, the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court's findings of fact should be reviewed de novo.  
Phelps III, 307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶20 (citing Golz, 80 Wis. 2d at 
241).  However, in Golz, we were reviewing the sufficiency of an 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
18 
 
affidavit to determine if it established probable cause.9  Golz, 
80 Wis. 2d at 240-41.  
¶38 Here, the circuit court was not concerned with the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  The circuit court was concerned 
with the meaning of the evidence.  It is within the purview of 
the fact finder to say what facts the evidence supports, which 
involves determining the meaning of disputed factual inferences 
from the evidence presented.10  Landrey v. United Servs. Auto. 
                                                 
9 We agree that the review of the sufficiency of documentary 
evidence, for a variety of purposes, is normally a question of 
law that we review de novo.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Grzelak v. 
Bertrand, 2003 WI 102, ¶7, 263 Wis. 2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 244 ("The 
legal sufficiency of [a] petition [for certiorari] is a question 
of law, which this court reviews de novo."); State v. A.S., 2001 
WI 48, ¶26, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712 ("The sufficiency of 
a criminal complaint is a question of law, which we review de 
novo."); Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶35, 235 Wis. 2d 
610, 612 N.W.2d 59 ("The legal sufficiency of a complaint 
presents an issue of law, which we review de novo."); but see 
Village of Menomonee Falls v. Veierstahler, 183 Wis. 2d 96, 101 
n.7, 515 N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State ex rel. 
Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis. 2d 225, 258 N.W.2d 700 (1977) and 
suggesting that Wisconsin law "is in conflict as to our standard 
of review of factual determinations or inferences made by a 
trial court based upon a documentary record").  
10 Justice Bradley suggests that we are sub silentio 
overruling a "long line of precedent" by refusing to apply the 
"documentary evidence exception" to the clearly erroneous 
standard of review.  Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶74.  Justice 
Bradley's contention is misguided for several reasons.   
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, the documentary evidence exception applies to 
inferences 
the 
circuit 
court 
draws 
from 
"established 
or 
undisputed facts" based solely on a documentary record.  Pfeifer 
v. World Serv. Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 567, 570, 360 N.W.2d 
65 (Ct. App. 1984); see also generally Hon. Thomas Cane & Kevin 
M. Long, Shifting the Main Event:  The Documentary Evidence 
Exception Improperly Converts the Appellate Courts Into Fact-
Finding Tribunals, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 475 (1994).  Here, where the 
underlying facts are in dispute, the circuit court resolves that 
dispute by exercising its fact-finding function, and its 
findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review 
even if they are based solely on documentary evidence.  Justice 
Bradley counters that the historical facts are essentially not 
in dispute.  Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶76.  We disagree.  As a 
preliminary matter, if the facts are not in dispute, why did a 
majority of this court previously remand this case for fact 
finding?  Phelps II, 282 Wis. 2d 69, ¶4 n.4.  In addition, the 
differing findings of the circuit court and court of appeals 
demonstrate that evidence in the record both supports and 
detracts from the determination that Lindemann was St. Joseph's 
borrowed employee.  Because the underlying facts are in dispute, 
the circuit court's resolution of that dispute is subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review.  The documentary evidence 
exception has no application in this case. 
Second, Justice Bradley's assertion that precedent is clear 
on the effect of the exception, Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶¶72-
73, is erroneous.  Veierstahler expressly noted that Wisconsin 
"law is in conflict as to our standard of review of factual 
determinations or inferences made by a [circuit] court based 
upon a documentary record."  Veierstahler, 183 Wis. 2d at 101 
n.7 
(citing 
Pfeifer, 
121 
Wis. 2d 
at 
570 
(applying 
the 
"reasonableness" standard); Golz, 80 Wis. 2d at 241 (applying 
the de novo standard)).  We do not resolve this conflict here, 
though, because we are reviewing the circuit court's resolution 
of disputed facts, not inferences drawn from undisputed facts. 
Finally, although one rationale for the clearly erroneous 
standard of review is that "the [circuit court] is in a [better] 
position to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight to 
be 
given to their testimony," Vogt, Inc. v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 270 Wis. 315, 71 N.W.2d 
359 (1955), on reargument, 270 Wis. 321b, 321i, 74 N.W.2d 749 
(1956), another important basis is the efficient use of judicial 
resources.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
20 
 
Ass'n, 49 Wis. 2d 150, 157, 181 N.W.2d 407 (1970) ("[W]here more 
than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible 
evidence, the reviewing court must accept the one reached by the 
fact finder." (quoting Ernst v. Greenwald, 35 Wis. 2d 763, 772, 
151 N.W.2d 706 (1967))).  
¶39 Furthermore, a finding of fact is clearly erroneous 
when "it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence."  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 
358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (quoting State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶21 
n.7, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277).  Therefore, although 
evidence may have presented competing factual inferences, the 
circuit court's findings are to be sustained if they do not go 
"against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  Id.; Steinbach, 291 Wis. 2d 11, ¶10. 
                                                                                                                                                             
[E]ven where the [trial] judge's full knowledge of the 
factual setting can be acquired by the appellate 
court, that acquisition will often come at unusual 
expense, 
requiring 
the 
court 
to 
undertake 
the 
unaccustomed task of reviewing the entire record, not 
just to determine whether there existed the usual 
minimum support for the merits determination made by 
the factfinder below, but to determine whether urging 
of the opposite merits determination was substantially 
justified. 
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988).  It saves the 
citizens of Wisconsin time and money for us to apply the clearly 
erroneous standard to the circuit court's findings, even when 
they are based solely on documentary evidence.  We acknowledge 
the value inherent in this efficient use of judicial resources. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
21 
 
¶40 The parties do not challenge the finding of the first 
circuit court11 that Lindemann was employed by the Affiliated 
Hospitals entity, and that under the applicable statutory scheme 
at the time of Lindemann's negligence, the Affiliated Hospitals 
entity was not a statutory health care provider.  Therefore, 
under the facts of this case Lindemann is an employee of a 
health care provider only if he was a borrowed employee of St. 
Joseph's12 at the time of the Phelpses' injuries.13   
¶41 We determine whether Lindemann was a borrowed employee 
of St. Joseph's by answering the following questions: 
(1) Did the employee actually or impliedly consent to 
work for a special employer? (2) Whose was the work he 
was performing at the time of injury? (3) Whose was 
the right to control the details of the work being 
performed? (4) For whose benefit primarily was the 
work being done? 
Seaman, 204 Wis. at 163. 
                                                 
11 The Honorable Michael P. Sullivan presided before the 
case was transferred to the Honorable John A. Franke. 
12 Ironically, the Phelpses had initially argued that 
Lindemann was an employee of St. Joseph's, in order to hold the 
hospital liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  They 
dropped this argument after St. Joseph's settled their claims.  
The Phelpses now have adopted a somewhat contradictory position, 
arguing that Lindemann was not a borrowed employee of St. 
Joseph's, in order to avoid having Gregory's claim brought under 
the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 655. 
13 In 
2005, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 655.002(2)(c) 
(2005-06), 
which 
permits 
graduate 
medical 
education programs, such as the one operated by the Affiliated 
Hospitals entity, to opt into the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 
655.  The Affiliated Hospitals entity has since taken that step.   
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
22 
 
 
1. 
Employee consent 
¶42 In regard to the first question posed by the Seaman 
test, whether Lindemann actually or impliedly consented to work 
for St. Joseph's, the circuit court made the following finding 
of fact: 
I find that Doctor Lindemann clearly consented to 
work for St. Joseph's Hospital.  I'm not sure how long 
he was there for but he went to work there and was in 
any reasonable sense of the phrase working for the 
hospital.  That's embodied in another subsequent 
finding perhaps, but in terms of his consent, he 
clearly consented to this both by engaging in the 
trainee program and in responding to the particular 
assignment to St. Joseph's.  That's what he was going 
there to do.  [The Affiliated Hospitals entity] had no 
direct interest in serving the patients of St. 
Joseph's, other than that it would provide a training 
opportunity for medical students or medical residents. 
This finding is not "against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence."  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶12 
(quoting Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 741, ¶21 n.7).  It is difficult to 
imagine how Lindemann could not have consented to work for St. 
Joseph's when everything that he did took place there in 
furtherance of St. Joseph's purposes. 
¶43 However, the court of appeals made a contrary finding 
of fact, asserting "[t]here is no evidence that Dr. Lindemann 
left [the Affiliated Hospitals entity]'s employment and agreed 
to become a St. Joseph's employee."  Phelps III, 307 Wis. 2d 
184, ¶31.  The court of appeals' factual finding contradicts the 
circuit court's finding of fact that Lindemann consented to work 
for St. Joseph's, which finding of the circuit court can be 
overturned only if it was clearly erroneous.  As quoted above 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
23 
 
from the circuit court's finding, there was sufficient evidence 
in the record from which the circuit court could properly find 
that 
Lindemann 
had 
consented 
to 
work 
for 
St. 
Joseph's.  
Furthermore, it is not necessary, as the court of appeals 
erroneously assumed, that a borrowed employee leave the employ 
of his or her general employer in order to become the borrowed 
employee of another.  DePratt v. Sergio, 102 Wis. 2d 141, 142 
306 N.W.2d 62 (1981).14  An employee can remain in the employ of 
both employers.  Id. 
¶44 When the Phelpses moved for reconsideration of the 
circuit court's finding on this point, while still before the 
circuit court, they argued that there could be no consent 
because there was no express contract between Lindemann and St. 
Joseph's.  However, there is no requirement of an express 
contract between a borrowed employee and a borrowing employer.  
Seaman, 204 Wis. at 163.  As we stated in Seaman, the question 
is, "Did the employee actually or impliedly consent to work for 
a special employer?"  Id.  The circuit court recognized this 
distinction: 
While in some respects Lindemann remained an employee 
of [the Affiliated Hospitals entity], I found that he 
consented, perhaps not expressly but certainly quite 
clearly, to also become an employee of St. Joseph's 
Hospital. 
¶45 Furthermore, although there may not have been an 
express agreement between Lindemann and St. Joseph's, there was 
                                                 
14 See further discussion of DePratt v. Sergio, 102 Wis. 2d 
141, 306 N.W.2d 62 (1981), at ¶53 infra. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
24 
 
an express agreement between the Affiliated Hospitals entity and 
St. 
Joseph's. 
 
"[T]he 
existence 
of 
an 
arrangement 
or 
understanding between a general employer and a borrowing 
employer is relevant to the issue of an employee's consent to 
enter into a new employment relationship with the borrowing 
employer."  Borneman v. Corwyn Transp., Ltd., 219 Wis. 2d 346, 
360, 580 N.W.2d 253 (1998).  Therefore, this agreement further 
supports the circuit court's finding that Lindemann consented to 
work for St. Joseph's, which finding is not clearly erroneous.  
2. 
Work performed 
¶46 In regard to the second question posed by the Seaman 
test, whether Lindemann was performing St. Joseph's work at the 
time of injury, the circuit court explained, "I find that 
[Lindemann] did actually enter[] upon the work of St. Joseph's 
Hospital . . . . 
 
[T]here 
was 
an 
implied 
contract 
for 
[Lindemann] to do certain things at St. Joseph's day after day 
on a full-time basis." 
¶47 The court of appeals made a contrary finding of fact 
here too, i.e., that Lindemann did not perform the work of St. 
Joseph's, because "Dr. Lindemann provided medical services 
similar to those provided by private physicians who are not St. 
Joseph's employees."  Phelps III, 307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶31.  Again, 
this finding of fact stems from the court of appeals' erroneous 
decision to independently make findings of fact, rather than 
reviewing the circuit court's findings to determine whether the 
circuit court's findings were clearly erroneous.   
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
25 
 
¶48 Here, applying the correct standard of review, we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
factual 
finding, 
that 
Lindemann performed the work of St. Joseph's, is not clearly 
erroneous.  Lindemann was an unlicensed first-year medical 
resident.  He was not authorized to work at any location other 
than St. Joseph's.  While at St. Joseph's, Lindemann cared for 
patients admitted to St. Joseph's.  St. Joseph's purpose for 
existence was to treat the patients admitted to its facility.  
Because Lindemann assisted St. Joseph's in fulfilling its health 
care purpose by caring for St. Joseph's patients, the circuit 
court's finding that Lindemann was doing the work of St. 
Joseph's 
is 
not 
"against 
the 
great 
weight 
and 
clear 
preponderance of the evidence."  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶12 
(quoting Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7).  Accordingly, that 
finding of the circuit court is not clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶10, 273 Wis. 2d 626, 681 N.W.2d 901 
(explaining that a circuit court's findings of fact will be 
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous). 
 
3. 
Right to control 
¶49 In regard to whether St. Joseph's had the right to 
control the details of Lindemann's work, the circuit court found 
as follows: 
I find that St. Joseph's had primary control over the 
details of [Lindemann's] work to be performed and to 
determine how the work should be done. . . . 
I find that on any reasonable day-to-day basis in 
terms 
of 
hours 
and 
work 
to 
be 
performed 
and 
assignments that this was controlled by St. Joseph's 
Hospital.  There's no evidence about any specific 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
26 
 
involvement by [the Affiliated Hospitals entity] in 
the day-to-day details of Lindemann's work. . . . 
The details of the work on a day-to-day basis 
were clearly controlled by St. Joseph's, at least 
that's the overwhelming inference that I have from 
what I have read, that [St. Joseph's] decided when and 
where he worked and what patients he was working with 
and what forms he would use and that sort of day-to-
day business. 
¶50 The court of appeals once again made a contrary 
finding, determining that St. Joseph's did not have the right to 
control the details of Lindemann's work: 
[The 
Affiliated 
Hospitals 
entity] 
directed 
which 
hospital Dr. Lindemann worked at and paid him.  Dr. 
Lindemann and [the Affiliated Hospitals entity] had a 
written 
contract, 
and 
[the 
Affiliated 
Hospitals 
entity] had the sole right to terminate him. [The 
Affiliated Hospitals entity] never relinquished any 
control over Dr. Lindemann.  Indeed, as noted, while 
at St. Joseph's no hospital employee supervised Dr. 
Lindemann, and Dr. Lindemann was never given a 
handbook or any rules setting out St. Joseph's 
procedures.  Thus, the right to control Dr. Lindemann 
remained in the hands of [the Affiliated Hospitals 
entity]'s 
program 
director, 
[Affiliated 
Hospitals 
entity] senior residents and private physicians. 
Phelps III, 307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶31.  The court of appeals 
supported its finding by citing evidence in the record.  
However, this independent search of the record for evidence in 
support of a factual finding contrary to the circuit court's 
finding of fact is not the proper role of an appellate court. 
¶51 Instead, 
under 
the 
proper 
standard 
of 
review, 
appellate courts are to uphold a circuit court's findings of 
fact unless those findings go "against the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence."  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
27 
 
¶12 (quoting Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7).  Here, we once 
again conclude that the circuit court's finding of fact is not 
clearly erroneous.  The record is replete with evidence that St. 
Joseph's controlled the details of Lindemann's work.  For 
example, Lindemann testified in his deposition as follows: 
[Phelpses' Attorney]  While you were at St. Joseph's 
Hospital, was it your understanding you were required 
to comply with the policies and procedures of St. 
Joseph's Hospital in providing professional care and 
services to patients at St. Joseph's Hospital? 
[Lindemann]  Yes. 
[Phelpses' Attorney]  And did St. Joseph's Hospital 
have the right to control your day-to-day activities 
in terms of interaction with patients at St. Joseph's 
Hospital? 
[Lindemann]  Yes. 
In addition, Dr. Mahendr S. Kochar, Executive Director of the 
Affiliated Hospitals entity, stated in his affidavit: 
While 
[the 
Affiliated 
Hospitals 
entity] 
is 
the 
technical and legal employer of the residents, [the 
Affiliated Hospitals entity] has no responsibility for 
training or supervision and control of the residents 
at the various hospitals where they are placed. . . .  
[The Affiliated Hospitals entity] is, in essence a 
conduit to facilitate payments, and has no supervisory 
or control role over the residents. 
. . . 
[The Affiliated Hospitals entity] has no knowledge of 
the specific responsibilities of Dr. Lindemann or any 
other residents at various hospitals including St. 
Joseph's Hospital. 
Finally, 
Patricia 
Kaldor 
(Kaldor), 
the 
president 
of 
St. 
Joseph's, testified in her deposition as follows: 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
28 
 
[Phelpses' Attorney]  Are residents who work at St. 
Joseph's Hospital required to follow policies and 
procedures of St. Joseph's Hospital? 
[Kaldor]  Yes. 
In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the circuit 
court's finding is contrary to "the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence."  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶12 
(quoting Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7).   
¶52 When the Phelpses moved for reconsideration of the 
circuit court's decision on the borrowed employee question, they 
argued that in order for a borrowing employer to control the 
details of the borrowed employee's performance, the loaning 
employer must relinquish full and exclusive control of the 
borrowed employee.  Edwards v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 272 Wis. 54, 
64, 74 N.W.2d 606 (1956) ("If [the loaning master] can show that 
he has loaned the servant to another and surrendered to the 
borrower all direction and control over him, then the borrower 
becomes the master, who is alone liable for the acts of the 
servant." (quoting Anderson v. Abramson, 13 N.W.2d 315, 316 
(Iowa 1944))).  The circuit court responded as follows: 
The design of the residency program contemplated that 
the hospital would control the routine "details of 
[Lindemann's] work."  It also contemplated that [the 
Affiliated Hospitals entity] would not control or 
supervise 
Lindemann's 
medical 
judgment. 
 
In 
an 
affidavit, the Executive Director of [the Affiliated 
Hospitals entity] assert[ed] that [the Affiliated 
Hospitals entity] ha[d] no responsibility for training 
or supervision and control of the residents or the 
various hospitals where they are placed. . . . 
According 
to 
the 
affidavit 
[of 
the 
Executive 
Director], a first year resident would be "under the 
supervision and control of the patient's attending 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
29 
 
physician."  This evidence is not controverted in any 
material way, and it, perhaps along with other similar 
evidence, formed the basis on which Judge Sullivan 
dismissed [the Affiliated Hospitals entity] from this 
case, finding that it did not control Lindemann's 
performance as a physician. 
¶53 In DePratt, we concluded that no finding that the 
general employer relinquished full and exclusive control over 
the borrowed employee under all circumstances is required in 
order for the borrowing employer to have the right to control 
the details of the work performed for the borrowing employer.  
DePratt, 102 Wis. 2d at 142.  We explained:  
Under the borrowed servant rule, the borrowing master, 
not the loaning master, is liable for the negligent 
acts of a loaned servant if the loaned servant becomes 
the servant of the borrowing master[,] . . . even 
though the loaned servant remains in the employ of the 
loaning master and is acting within the scope of his 
employment with the loaning master. 
Id. at 142.  As the circuit court's discussion indicates, its 
finding that St. Joseph's had the right to control Lindemann's 
daily activities as he cared for St. Joseph's patients is 
supported by the record.  The only employer who reasonably could 
be 
seen 
to have 
exercised control over the details of 
Lindemann's work was St. Joseph's.  We therefore conclude that 
the circuit court's finding, that St. Joseph's had the right to 
control the details of Lindemann's work, is not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
4. 
Primary benefit 
¶54 In regard to whether Lindemann's work was performed 
for St. Joseph's primary benefit, the circuit court explained: 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
30 
 
I 
find 
that 
[Lindemann's 
work] 
was 
being 
done 
primarily for the benefit of St. Joseph's.  Obviously 
any employee works for their own benefit.  Obviously 
to the extent that [the Affiliated Hospitals entity] 
wanted 
to 
run 
a 
program 
and 
provide 
training 
opportunities, there was a benefit to [the Affiliated 
Hospitals entity].  But when one looks at the tasks 
and work performed by this person, that work was 
primarily for the benefit of St. Joseph's Hospital. 
¶55 Once again, the court of appeals made a contrary 
finding of fact and asserted that Lindemann's work did not 
primarily benefit St. Joseph's because "Dr. Lindemann's services 
benefitted the patients of the hospital and the private 
physicians[;] most of all, Dr. Lindemann's work aided [the 
Affiliated Hospitals entity] in its mission to train first-year 
residents in order to become licensed physicians."  Phelps III, 
307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶31.  This discussion fails to review the 
circuit court's finding of fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard, which, when applied, requires the reviewing court to 
uphold the circuit court's findings unless they go "against the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence."  Arias, 
311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶12 (quoting Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7).   
¶56 Applying the correct standard of review, however, we 
once again conclude that the circuit court's finding is not 
clearly erroneous.  We note that this factor, i.e., for whose 
benefit the work was primarily performed, is largely derivative 
of the other factual findings.  Lindemann's conduct was 
controlled by St. Joseph's policies and procedures; he worked to 
carry out the very purpose of St. Joseph's existence; and his 
consent to work for St. Joseph's is apparent through his 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
31 
 
conduct.  To say that Lindemann was not working for St. Joseph's 
primary benefit would be to say that no employee works for his 
or her employer's primary benefit.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's finding of fact on this point does not go "against the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence."  Id. 
(quoting Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7).  Accordingly, it is 
not clearly erroneous. 
 
5. 
Conclusion 
¶57 Because we have upheld all of the circuit court's 
findings of fact regarding whether Lindemann was a borrowed 
employee, we conclude that Lindemann was a borrowed employee, 
under the test established in Seaman.  The circuit court's 
finding makes clear that, under the first factor, Lindemann 
consented to work for St. Joseph's.  Seaman, 204 Wis. at 163.  
Under 
the 
second 
factor, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
demonstrates that Lindemann was performing the work of St. 
Joseph's at the time of the injury.  Id.  Under the third 
factor, St. Joseph's had the right to control the details of the 
work Lindemann performed.  Id.  Finally, Lindemann's work was 
performed primarily for the benefit of St. Joseph's, thereby 
satisfying the fourth Seaman factor.  Id.   
¶58 Seaman explains that when facts are found sufficient 
to satisfy the four factual parts of its test, the "relation of 
employer and employee exists as between a special employer to 
whom an employee is loaned."  Id.  Here, we conclude that 
sufficient facts were found by the circuit court for us to 
conclude, as a matter of law, that the relationship of borrowing 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
32 
 
employer and borrowed employee existed between St. Joseph's 
Hospital and Lindemann when the Phelpses' claims arose.   
¶59 That the court of appeals reached a contrary result, 
Phelps III, 307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶31, stems from its failure to 
apply the appropriate standard of review to the circuit court's 
findings of fact and from its erroneous view that an employee 
must leave the employ of a general employer before that employee 
could become the employee of a borrowing employer.  
¶60 Because Lindemann was St. Joseph's borrowed employee, 
"[t]he relation of employer and employee exist[ed]" between 
Lindemann and St. Joseph's, Seaman, 204 Wis. at 163, and 
accordingly, Lindemann was an employee of a health care provider 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. ch. 655 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4).  As a result, Gregory's claim for bystander 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is subject to those 
statutory provisions. 
C. 
Effect of Wis. Stat. ch. 655 
¶61 After we granted defendants' petition for review, we 
requested supplemental briefing from the parties to address 
whether Wis. Stat. ch. 655 bars claims brought by a bystander 
who claims that an employee of a health care provider, or the 
health care provider itself, negligently provided health care 
services to a relative of the bystander that caused emotional 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
33 
 
distress to the bystander.15  Having concluded that Lindemann is 
an employee of a health care provider because he is a borrowed 
employee of St. Joseph's, the answer to this question is 
dispositive in our determination of whether Gregory's claim is 
actionable under Wisconsin law.16   
¶62 We had the opportunity to address this very question 
in Finnegan, but a majority of the court could not agree.  See 
                                                 
15 We also asked the parties for supplemental briefing to 
address whether this issue had been waived.  Without addressing 
the relative merits of the arguments for and against waiver, we 
conclude that we have the authority to address it.  "This court 
has the discretion to review an issue that has been waived when 
it involves a question of law, has been briefed by the opposing 
parties, and is of sufficient public interest to merit a 
decision."  Gumz v. N. States Power Co., 2007 WI 135, ¶73, 305 
Wis. 2d 263, 742 N.W.2d 271 (citing Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 
217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998)).  Whether Wis. Stat. 
ch. 655 bars claims against health care providers and their 
employees 
for 
bystander negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is purely a question of law; it has been briefed by 
both parties; and we conclude that it is of considerable public 
interest.  See Finnegan, 263 Wis. 2d 574, ¶¶16-18 (lead opinion 
of Sykes, J.). 
16 In the same way that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)'s caps on 
noneconomic damages apply where the claims are brought against 
"health 
care 
providers 
and 
all 
employes 
of 
health 
care 
providers," see supra note 4, the claims for which Wis. Stat. 
ch. 655 applies are those brought against health care providers 
and employees of health care providers.  Wis. Stat. § 655.005(1) 
("Any person listed in s. 655.007 having a claim or a derivative 
claim against a health care provider or an employe of the health 
care provider, for damages for bodily injury or death due to 
acts or omissions of the employe of the health care provider 
acting within the scope of his or her employment and providing 
health care services, is subject to this chapter.")  Since 
Lindemann is a borrowed employee of St. Joseph's, and therefore 
an employee of a health care provider, ch. 655 applies to 
Gregory's claim under § 655.005(1). 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
34 
 
Finnegan v. Patients Comp. Fund, 2003 WI 98, ¶2, 263 Wis. 2d 
574, 666 N.W.2d 797 (lead opinion of Sykes, J.).  Today, we 
expressly adopt Justice Sykes' lead opinion in Finnegan, and 
hold that Wis. Stat. ch. 655 does not permit bystander claims 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from 
medical 
malpractice 
of 
health 
care 
providers 
and 
their 
employees.  As Justice Sykes noted: 
[N]either 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 655.005 
nor 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 655.007 specifically describes a [bystander] type 
claim for emotional distress or confers standing on a 
bystander 
to 
bring 
such 
a 
claim 
in 
a 
medical 
malpractice lawsuit.  Section 655.005(1) refers to all 
claims or derivative claims "for damages for bodily 
injury or death," and Wis. Stat. § 655.007 refers to 
the claims of patients and the derivative claims of 
specified relatives "for injury or death on account of 
malpractice."  Emotional distress claims arising from 
witnessing 
an 
injury-causing event as a related 
bystander constitute an entirely different class of 
claim and are not mentioned. 
 
The statutes specify that a relative's claim must 
be derivative to fall within the scope of allowable 
medical 
malpractice 
recovery, 
and 
only 
certain 
relatives are included.  See Wis. Stat. § 655.007 
("[A]ny spouse, parent, minor sibling or child of the 
patient having a derivative claim for injury or death 
on 
account 
of 
malpractice 
is 
subject 
to 
this 
chapter."); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 655.005(1) 
("Any 
person 
listed in s. 655.007 having a claim or a derivative 
claim against a health care provider . . . is subject 
to this chapter.").  Our jurisprudence outlines the 
types 
of 
claims that are considered derivative.  
Claims for the loss of society, companionship, and 
consortium are derivative even though they technically 
"belong" to the close relative making the claim.  
Korth v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 331, 
340 N.W.2d 494 (1983) (a parent's claim for loss of 
society and companionship with a child is derivative); 
Peeples v. Sargent, 77 Wis. 2d 612, 643, 253 N.W.2d 
459 (1977) ([A] claim for loss of consortium is [a] 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
35 
 
derivative personal injury right which does not pass 
to [the] bankruptcy trustee[.]); Richie v. Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 409 N.W.2d 146 (Ct. 
App. 1987) ([A] claim for loss of consortium is 
derivative in that "it derives from physical or mental 
injuries suffered by a family member."). 
Id., ¶¶25-26 (lead opinion of Sykes, J.).   
¶63 The lead opinion in Finnegan explained that a claim 
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress to a 
bystander is a direct, not a derivative, claim, because such a 
claim "does not depend on the primary tort victim's ability to 
make the claim."  Id., ¶27.  Stated otherwise, a derivative 
claim arises from the tort injury to another; it does not have 
its own elements of proof that are distinct from the negligence 
claim to which it attaches; and it must be joined in the same 
action that brings the primary personal injury claim.  Id., ¶28.  
By contrast, a claim of bystander emotional distress has 
elements that, while arising from the underlying negligence, are 
distinct and subject to separate proof.  Bowen v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 657-58, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  
As Justice Sykes explained:   
[A] 
claim 
for 
negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is not considered derivative; although it 
arises from a shared set of underlying facts, as do 
loss of society, companionship, or consortium claims[.  
N]egligent infliction of emotional distress is an 
independent tort injury suffered by the bystander 
himself or herself as a result of the shock of having 
witnessed 
an 
extraordinary 
and 
traumatic 
event.  
[Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 
657-58, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994)]. . . .  A [bystander] 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
does not depend on the primary tort victim's ability 
to make the claim. 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
36 
 
 
A plaintiff who sues for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress . . . is asserting that he or she 
has been the victim of an independent tort, not that 
he or she has a separate but dependent damages claim 
deriving from a tort injury to another, as in a 
derivative claim such as loss of consortium or society 
and 
companionship. . . .  
Unlike 
a . . . bystander 
claim, a derivative claim for loss of consortium or 
loss of society and companionship does not have its 
own elements distinct from the negligence claim to 
which it attaches; juries are instructed that loss of 
consortium or loss of society and companionship are 
categories 
of 
damages, 
not 
separate 
negligence 
inquiries. . . .  
Finnegan, 263 Wis. 2d 574, ¶¶27-28 (lead opinion of Sykes, J.).  
¶64 "Chapter 655 constitutes the exclusive procedure and 
remedy for medical malpractice in Wisconsin" against health care 
providers, as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 655.001(8), 
and their employees.  Id., ¶22 (lead opinion of Sykes, J.) 
(citing Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶14, 
236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120; Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 
659, 665, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990); State ex rel. Strykowski v. 
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 499, 261 N.W.2d 434; Ziulkowski v. 
Nierengarten, 210 Wis. 2d 98, 102, 565 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 
1997)).  Chapter 655 does not permit claims other than those 
listed in Wis. Stat. §§ 655.005(1) and 655.007.  Id., ¶30 (lead 
opinion 
of 
Sykes, 
J.). 
 
Bystander 
claims 
for 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress asserted against health care 
providers or employees of health care providers arising from 
alleged medical malpractice are governed by ch. 655.  Id.  They 
are not derivative claims, and are not among the claims listed 
in §§ 655.005(1) and 655.007.  Id.   
¶65 As Justice Sykes explained: 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
37 
 
Because Chapter 655 exclusively governs all claims 
arising out of medical malpractice [against health 
care providers and their employees], and because the 
legislature did not include [bystander] claims in Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 655.005(1) 
or 
655.007, 
. . . 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claims arising out of 
medical malpractice are not actionable under Wisconsin 
law. 
Id. 
¶66 Lindemann was a borrowed employee of St. Joseph's; 
therefore, he was an employee of a health care provider.  
Gregory's 
claim 
arises 
from 
alleged 
medical 
malpractice; 
therefore, Wis. Stat. ch. 655 applies to Gregory's claim.  
Because 
Gregory's 
claim 
is 
one 
for 
bystander 
negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and ch. 655 does not permit 
such claims, Gregory's claim is not recognized by Wisconsin law.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals, and 
remand to the circuit court to issue an order dismissing 
Gregory's claim.17 
                                                 
17 Lindemann and Physicians also argue that the record is 
insufficient to support Gregory's claim for bystander negligent 
infliction of emotional distress under the majority rationale in 
Finnegan.  The Phelpses disagree, and further argue that this 
argument has been waived.  In Finnegan, we concluded that even 
if Wis. Stat. ch. 655 permitted bystander claims, "[t]he 
hallmark of negligent infliction of emotional distress is a 
contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous sensory perception of 
a sudden, traumatic, injury-producing event." Finnegan, 263 
Wis. 2d 574, ¶54.  Lindemann argues that the Phelpses did not 
witness the injury-producing event, and accordingly, his conduct 
cannot form the basis for Gregory's claim.  Because we conclude 
that ch. 655 precludes Gregory's claim, and this conclusion is 
dispositive, we do not reach this alternative argument or the 
Phelpses' responses to it.  Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 
2008 WI 80, ¶2, 311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687 (noting that 
when resolution of one issue is dispositive, we need not reach 
other issues raised by the parties); Jankee v. Clark County, 
2000 WI 64, ¶105, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297 (same). 
No. 
2006AP2599   
 
38 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶67 We conclude that Lindemann was a borrowed employee of 
St. Joseph's, and was therefore an employee of a health care 
provider under ch. 655.  As a result, ch. 655 governs Gregory's 
claim.  We further conclude that ch. 655 does not permit claims 
arising from medical negligence other than those listed in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 655.005(1) and 655.007, and the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress to a bystander is not one of those claims.  
Therefore, Gregory's claim is not actionable under Wisconsin 
law.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, and remand the cause to the circuit court to issue an 
order dismissing Gregory's claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
1 
 
¶68 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Appellate 
standards of review define the roles of appellate courts and are 
often outcome determinative.  Here, by applying an incorrect 
standard 
of 
review, 
the 
majority 
reaches 
an 
erroneous 
conclusion.   
¶69 I write separately because (1) the majority fails to 
apply the correct appellate standard for review of a paper 
record; (2) it erroneously concludes that Dr. Lindemann was a 
borrowed employee; (3) unlike the majority, I conclude that Wis. 
Stat. ch. 655 does not bar Gregory Phelps' bystander claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶70 The majority correctly explains the usual standard for 
reviewing a circuit court's decision: The circuit court's 
findings of facts are upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, 
but the application of the test to the facts presents a question 
of law which this court reviews independently.   
¶71 Nevertheless, the usual clearly erroneous standard for 
reviewing a circuit court's factual findings does not apply in 
this case.  Here, the circuit court judge who made the factual 
findings on review was not the same judge to preside over the 
earlier proceedings.  Although this court had remanded for 
additional fact finding, the parties elected to have the circuit 
court judge decide the borrowed servant issue on the basis of 
the paper record without taking additional testimony.   
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
2 
 
¶72 The basis for deferring to a circuit court's factual 
findings disappears when the circuit court does not see or hear 
witnesses' testimony.  Vogt, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. Teamsters, 270 
Wis. 315, 71 N.W.2d 359 (1955), on reargument, 270 Wis. 321b, 
321i, 74 N.W.2d 749 (1956).  Numerous Wisconsin cases have 
recognized that when a circuit court's inferences and findings 
of fact are based solely on a paper record rather than on an 
evaluation of oral testimony, an appellate court does not apply 
the clearly erroneous standard of review to the circuit court's 
factual findings.1  This exception to the usual rule is called 
the documentary exception.        
                                                 
1 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶34-35, 249 
Wis. 2d 492, 
637 
N.W.2d 733 
(interpreting 
a 
prosecutor's 
comments at a sentencing hearing independently of the circuit 
court because the circuit court did not "base its interpretation 
of the prosecutor's comments on its recollection of the 
sentencing hearing, which would have included memories of voice 
inflections, observed facial expressions, and pauses in the 
testimony," but rather "interpreted the prosecutor's comments by 
reading 
the 
written 
record 
of 
the 
plea 
and 
sentencing 
hearings"); Lambrecht v. Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶27, 241 
Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751 ("This court and the circuit court 
are equally able to read the written record."); Cohn v. Town of 
Randall, 2001 WI App 176, ¶7, 247 Wis. 2d 118, 633 N.W.2d 674 
("We are in just as good a position as the trial court to make 
factual inferences based on documentary evidence and we need not 
defer to the trial court's findings."); Racine Educ. Ass'n v. 
Bd. Educ., 145 Wis. 2d 518, 521, 427 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1988) 
("When the evidence to be considered is documentary, as it is 
here, we need not give any special deference to the trial 
court's findings.  Our review becomes de novo."); Pfeifer v. 
World Serv. Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 567, 571 n.1, 360 
N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1984); (explaining that when evidence is 
documentary, a reviewing court is not bound by inferences drawn 
by the fact finder); State ex rel. Sieloff v. Golz, 80 
Wis. 2d 225, 241, 258 N.W.2d 700 (1977) ("[W]hen the evidence to 
be considered is documentary, a reviewing court is not bound by 
any inferences that may have been drawn by the factfinder and, 
therefore, need not afford a trial court's findings any special 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
3 
 
¶73 Court of Appeals Judge Thomas Cane and Attorney Kevin 
M. Long have written a law review article criticizing the 
documentary exception.  See Hon. Thomas Cane & Kevin M. Long, 
Shifting the Main Event: The Documentary Evidence Exception 
Improperly Converts the Appellate Courts into Fact-Finding 
Tribunals, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 475 (1993-94).  However, these 
authors recognize that the documentary exception is the law in 
Wisconsin.  See id. at 475-76.  
¶74 Nevertheless, the majority ignores this long line of 
precedent, overruling it sub silencio and without explanation.  
What ever happened to stare decisis? 
¶75 The majority's mistake in selecting the wrong standard 
of review is exacerbated by its application of that standard.  
It confuses facts and law throughout its analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
deference."); Vogt, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. Teamsters, 270 Wis. 315, 
71 N.W.2d 359 (1955), on reargument, 270 Wis. 321b, 321i, 74 
N.W.2d 749 (1956) ("[The reason for the clearly erroneous 
standard is that the] appellate court must give weight to the 
findings of a trial court made in a contested matter upon oral 
testimony where the trial judge is in a position to pass on the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 
testimony.  He has full opportunity to observe the demeanor of 
the witnesses and judge their veracity——the appellate court does 
not.  The reason for the rule disappears, however, when the 
appeal is presented upon no more than pleadings and affidavits, 
as is the case here."). 
The majority asserts that the law is in conflict regarding 
the standard for reviewing a circuit court's factual findings 
and inferences based on a documentary record.  See majority op., 
¶38 n.10.  It contends that Pfeifer, a court of appeals 
decision, demonstrates this conflict.  Pfeifer does not support 
the majority's position.  It cited Golz with approval and 
rejected the clearly erroneous standard applied by the majority 
today.  See 121 Wis. 2d at 570, 571 n.1.   
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
4 
 
borrowed employee issue.  It correctly recognizes that when 
matters of historical and evidentiary fact are undisputed or 
have been found by the court, "application of the Seaman test to 
those facts is a question of law" that this court reviews 
independently.  See majority op., ¶35.   
¶76 Although the majority insists that the underlying 
facts are disputed, majority op., ¶38 n.10, a close look at the 
majority's analysis reveals that what is really disputed are the 
legal consequences of the facts.2   The majority erroneously 
treats each element of the Seaman3 test as a question of fact and 
defers to the circuit court's "findings" regarding each element.4     
¶77 As a result, the majority erroneously treats the 
circuit court's ultimate determination of law regarding the 
Seaman test as factual determinations that an appellate court 
                                                 
2 For instance, the parties agree that there was a written 
employment agreement between MCWAH and Dr. Lindemann; that Dr. 
Lindemann 
never 
signed 
an 
employment 
agreement 
with 
St. 
Joseph's; that he received a paycheck and W-2 form from MCWAH; 
that St. Joseph's reimbursed MCWAH for the salary it paid to its 
residents; and that Dr. Lindemann was supervised and evaluated 
by program directors, who are officers of MCWAH.  The essence of 
the dispute is whether these facts establish that St. Joseph had 
the right of control over Dr. Lindemann.  
3 Seaman Body Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wisconsin, 204 Wis. 
157, 235 N.W. 433 (1931) 
4 See majority op., ¶44 (deferring to the circuit court's 
"finding" that Lindemann consented to work for St. Joseph's); 
id., ¶46 (deferring to the circuit court's "finding" that 
Lindemann was doing the work of St. Joseph's); id., ¶51 
(deferring 
to 
the 
circuit court's "finding . . . that St. 
Joseph's controlled the details of Lindemann's work"); id., ¶56 
(deferring to the circuit court's "finding" that Lindemann's 
work was performed for St. Joseph's primary benefit). 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
5 
 
must uphold unless clearly erroneous: "Because we have upheld 
all of the circuit court's findings of fact regarding whether 
Lindemann was a borrowed employee, we conclude that Lindemann 
was a borrowed employee[.]"  Majority op., ¶57.  This conclusion 
conflicts with the majority's earlier statement that application 
of the borrowed servant test presents a question of law for this 
court to decide independently. 
II 
¶78 I turn next to the question of whether Dr. Lindemann 
was a borrowed employee of St. Joseph's hospital.  In order to 
reach the result that Dr. Lindemann was a borrowed employee, the 
majority necessarily had to apply the clearly erroneous standard 
to the circuit court's conclusions of law.  By contrast, the 
court of appeals persuasively marshaled the evidence, applied 
the Seaman test to the facts, and ultimately concluded that Dr. 
Lindemann was not a borrowed employee. 
¶79 Because we have stated that consent is "the most 
critical inquiry in the Seaman test," Borneman v. Corwyn 
Transport, Ltd., 219 Wis. 2d 346, 356, 580 N.W.2d 253 (1998), I 
begin with an examination of the consent factor.  The court of 
appeals determined that the most persuasive evidence regarding 
the consent factor was "Dr. Lindemann's own testimony and the 
admissions of St. Joseph's Hospital."  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. 
Co. Wis., 2008 WI App 6, ¶25, 307 Wis. 2d 184, 744 N.W.2d 880.  
In response to requests for admission, "St. Joseph's denied 
being Dr. Lindemann's employer, denied having the right to 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
6 
 
control or supervise Dr. Lindemann and denied being legally 
responsible for Dr. Lindemann's health care services."  Id.   
¶80 The court of appeals concluded that these admissions, 
"[c]oupled with the presumption that in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, the actor remains in his or her general 
employment, there appears to be little doubt that Dr. Lindemann 
remained an employee of MCWAH."  Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  By contrast, the majority opinion simply 
opines "[i]t is difficult to imagine how Lindemann could not 
have consented to work for St. Joseph's when everything that he 
did took place there in furtherance of St. Joseph's purposes."  
Majority op., ¶42.    
¶81 With regard to the work performed factor, the court 
must determine whether there was "[a]ctual entry by the employee 
upon the work of and for the special employer pursuant to an 
express or implied contract so to do."  Borneman, 219 Wis. 2d at 
353.  The court of appeals explained that not every private 
physician who sees hospitalized patients becomes an employee of 
the hospital and that St. Joseph's did not choose to make 
residents employees.  Rather, St. Joseph contracted with MCWAH 
and its program director, who paid, assigned, and evaluated 
residents.  Phelps, 307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶27.  The majority, 
however, merely concludes that "Lindemann assisted St. Joseph's 
in fulfilling its health care purpose by caring for St. Joseph's 
patients[.]"  Majority op., ¶48. 
¶82  With regard to the right to control, the court of 
appeals concluded that St. Joseph's did not control the details 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
7 
 
of Dr. Lindemann's work.  Phelps, 307 Wis. 2d 184, ¶28.  The 
court of appeals based its determination, in part, on the 
undisputed fact that Dr. Lindemann's supervisors were doctors 
associated with the MCWAH rather than employees of St. Joseph's.  
Id. 
¶83 I need go no further to analyze the Seaman factors.  It 
is clear that the court of appeals got it right and that the 
Seaman test has not been met.   I 
agree 
with 
the 
following 
conclusion of the court of appeals: 
In sum, after addressing the Seaman factors for a 
"borrowed employee," we conclude that the test has not 
been met. There is no evidence that Dr. Lindemann left 
MCWAH's employment and agreed to become a St. Joseph's 
employee. Dr. Lindemann provided medical services 
similar to those provided by private physicians who 
are not St. Joseph's employees. MCWAH directed which 
hospital Dr. Lindemann worked at and paid him. Dr. 
Lindemann and MCWAH had a written contract, and MCWAH 
had the sole right to terminate him. MCWAH never 
relinquished any control over Dr. Lindemann. Indeed, 
as noted, while at St. Joseph's no hospital employee 
supervised Dr. Lindemann, and Dr. Lindemann was never 
given a handbook or any rules setting out St. Joseph's 
procedures. Thus, the right to control Dr. Lindemann 
remained in the hands of MCWAH's program director, 
MCWAH 
senior 
residents 
and 
private 
physicians. 
Finally, 
Dr. 
Lindemann's 
services 
benefitted 
the 
patients of the hospital and the private physicians 
but most of all, Dr. Lindemann's work aided MCWAH in 
its mission to train first-year residents in order to 
become licensed physicians. Therefore, Dr. Lindemann 
was not a "borrowed employee."   
Id., ¶31. 
III 
¶84 I turn now to the majority opinion's conclusion that 
Wis. Stats. ch. 655 bars bystander claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
8 
 
¶85 In Finnegan v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2003 WI 98, 
¶¶ 40, 43-50, 263 Wis. 2d 574, 666 N.W.2d 797, I did not take a 
position on whether a parent's claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress resulting from medical malpractice is an 
independent cause of action or a derivative cause of action and 
whether under either analysis the claim can be brought within or 
outside chapter 655.      
¶86 On rereading the Finnegan concurrence authored by 
Chief Justice Abrahamson5 and the Finnegan dissent authored by 
Justice Bablitch and joined by Justice Crooks,6 I am persuaded 
that either reasoning is reasonable and a cause of action exists 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from 
medical malpractice.    
¶87 This is a bystander case and a tortfeasor's liability 
is governed by Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 183 
Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  In Bowen this court set 
forth three factors for determining whether a plaintiff could 
recover on his or her bystander claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress: (1) "the injury suffered by the victim 
must have been fatal or severe"; (2) "the victim and the 
plaintiff must be related as spouses, parent-child, grandparent-
grandchild or siblings"; and (3) "the plaintiff must have 
observed an extraordinary event, namely the incident and injury 
                                                 
5 Finnegan v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2003 WI 98, 
¶¶43-50, 263 Wis. 2d 574, 666 N.W.2d 797. 
6 Id., ¶¶64-74. 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
9 
 
or the scene soon after the incident with the injured victim at 
the scene."  Id. at 633.   
¶88 In bystander cases, a court rules on these factors on 
a case-by-case basis.  The parties dispute whether the instant 
case satisfies the third factor.  I conclude, as did the circuit 
court, that it does.   
¶89 In Finnegan, 263 Wis. 2d 574, ¶54, the majority 
declared that the "hallmark of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is a contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous sensory 
perception of a sudden, traumatic, injury-producing event."  
Gregory Phelps arrived on the scene soon after Lindemann's 
negligence became causal of Adam's injuries.  Phelps witnessed 
the spontaneous delivery of Adam.  He witnessed the injuries and 
death of his son.  I conclude that Phelps had a first-hand 
observation of the traumatic, injury-producing event.   
¶90 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶91 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2006AP2599.awb 
 
 
 
1