Title: Greenway v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961996
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1997

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JACKIE G. GREENWAY, JR. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 961996 
JUNE 6, 1997 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In a bench trial, Jackie G. Greenway, Jr. was convicted in 
the Circuit Court of Prince George County on two counts of 
involuntary manslaughter arising out of a fatal motor vehicle 
accident.  On appeal, Greenway asserts that the trial court erred 
in admitting the opinion testimony of a 12-year-old witness 
concerning the speed of Greenway's vehicle immediately prior to 
the accident.  Greenway further asserts that the evidence was not 
sufficient to sustain a finding of criminal negligence necessary 
to support his convictions for involuntary manslaughter. 
 
Background
 
Because the Commonwealth prevailed in the trial court, we 
will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Parks 
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981). 
 
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on May 29, 1994, the Sunday of 
Memorial Day weekend, Greenway drove a blue Ford Bronco south in 
Prince George County on Interstate 95 in heavy traffic.  At 
trial, Thomas Hawick testified that he observed Greenway "coming 
up behind me real fast" in the left southbound lane of the 
Interstate.  Hawick, who was driving his vehicle at the 65 mile 
per hour speed limit, estimated the Bronco's speed at "eighty, 
ninety miles an hour . . . [m]aybe faster."  Hawick believed that 
Greenway's vehicle would strike the rear of his vehicle and so he 
"mashed on the gas." 
 
According to Hawick, Greenway then pulled into the right 
lane of the Interstate, passed Hawick's vehicle, and "plowed into 
the vehicle in the right lane."  This vehicle, a maroon Bronco, 
"flipped twice, and then it just shot right into the woods."  
Kimberly Dawn Wray, the driver of the maroon Bronco, died at the 
scene of the accident; Angela Nicole Yerovsek, a passenger in the 
maroon Bronco, died at the Medical College of Virginia Hospital 
emergency room where she was transported for treatment of her 
injuries.  Hawick further testified that following the collision 
Greenway then "weaved to the left, in the left lane, and he went 
on the shoulder a little bit, then he got back in the right lane, 
and then he was going real fast." 
 
Rhonda Thacker testified that on the morning of the accident 
she was stopped for a red light on the Route 301 overpass of 
Interstate 95.  Justin Thacker, her 12-year-old son, called her 
attention to Greenway's vehicle, saying that it was going to hit 
the maroon Bronco.  Rhonda Thacker estimated Greenway's speed at 
"a minimum of eighty-five" miles per hour.  She further testified 
that Greenway's vehicle "was like in the middle . . . not in one 
lane or the other, it was more like in the middle of the white 
[line] that divides the two [lanes]." 
 
Justin Thacker testified that he observed Greenway's vehicle 
as it crossed under the overpass "going pretty fast."  The 
Commonwealth's Attorney then asked Justin if he had "been in cars 
all [his] life as a passenger."  Justin stated that he had.  The 
Commonwealth's Attorney then asked Justin if he knew "how fast or 
do you have an opinion of how fast [Greenway's] vehicle was 
going?"  Justin gave a contradictory answer, stating, "No, sir, I 
don't.  He was going, say, ninety." 
 
Greenway's counsel then objected, asserting that Justin was 
incompetent to testify as to the speed of the vehicle.  
Greenway's counsel argued that "a 12-year-old boy, who is not 
even eligible and won't be for four more years to even have a 
driver's license, [could not] estimate speed."  The Commonwealth 
responded that such evidence was "totally admissible.  The weight 
it would be given is for the Court to determine."  The trial 
court ruled that Greenway could "challenge it on cross" and 
permitted the Commonwealth to continue its examination. 
 
In response to a question from the Commonwealth, Justin 
confirmed his estimate of Greenway's speed at ninety miles per 
hour.  He further testified that Greenway's vehicle was "swerving 
. . . before it got up close to the [maroon] Bronco it would 
. . . try to get in that lane then come back, then go and then 
come back, and then it just hit it."  On cross-examination, 
Greenway's counsel asked Justin to describe in detail the 
swerving motion of Greenway's vehicle, but did not further 
question Justin on the issue of speed or the basis for his 
estimate of the speed of Greenway's vehicle. 
 
Additional evidence showed that approximately half a mile 
from the accident scene, Greenway's vehicle left the Interstate, 
crossed a gully and service road, entered the front yard of a 
private residence, and struck a tree.  When interviewed at the 
scene, Greenway told police investigating the accident that he 
believed he had hit Hawick's vehicle which "got squirrly," and 
when Greenway tried to stop "he must have hit the accelerator" 
instead.  Although stating that he was tired and had been awake 
since 3:30 a.m., Greenway did not assert at that time that he had 
fallen asleep while driving.  However, when subsequently 
interviewed by a State Police trooper at Southside Regional 
Hospital, Greenway asserted that he had struck Hawick's vehicle 
after falling asleep while driving. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Greenway 
made a motion to strike, asserting that the evidence was 
consistent with the assertion that Greenway had fallen asleep 
while driving.  The trial court ruled that "on a prima facie 
standard" the evidence showed that Greenway was able to control 
his vehicle to avoid a collision with Hawick's vehicle.  Based 
upon that evidence, the trial court rejected the theory that 
Greenway had fallen asleep. 
 
Greenway called only one witness, Robert D. Maclin, who 
testified that he saw Greenway's vehicle go "out to pass" and 
strike the maroon Bronco.  Although he could not give an opinion 
of the speed of Greenway's vehicle, Maclin stated that he was 
travelling fifty-five to sixty miles per hour and did not 
remember being passed by Greenway or any other vehicle. 
 
The trial court overruled Greenway's renewed motion to 
strike, holding that Maclin's testimony failed to "shed any 
light" on the question whether Greenway had fallen asleep.  
Reviewing the evidence of Greenway's excessive speed, erratic 
driving, his ability to avoid hitting Hawick's vehicle, and his 
flight from the accident scene, the trial court convicted 
Greenway of two counts of involuntary manslaughter.  After 
receipt of a pre-sentence report, the trial court sentenced 
Greenway to consecutive seven-year prison terms for the 
convictions. 
 
Greenway appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
challenging, inter alia, the trial court's admission of Justin's 
testimony concerning Greenway's speed and the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the finding that Greenway's conduct amounted 
to criminal negligence.  In an unpublished order, the Court of 
Appeals refused Greenway's petition for appeal, holding that 
Justin's testimony was properly admitted under Moore v. Lewis, 
201 Va. 522, 525, 111 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1960).  The Court further 
held that the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth was adequate to sustain the trial court's finding of 
criminal negligence.  King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 607, 231 
S.E.2d 312, 316 (1977).  We awarded Greenway this appeal. 
 
Competency of Child Witness to Testify Concerning Speed
 
Our decisions follow the mainstream of authority which holds 
that expert knowledge is not required for a witness to be 
considered qualified to make an estimate of speed.  As we said in 
Moore: 
 
"An estimate of the speed at which an automobile was 
moving at a given time is generally viewed as a matter 
of common observation rather than expert opinion, and 
it is accordingly well settled that any person of 
ordinary experience, ability, and intelligence having 
the means or opportunity of observation, whether an 
expert or nonexpert, and without proof of further 
qualification may express an opinion as to how fast an 
automobile which came under his observation was going 
at a particular time.  The fact that the witness had 
not owned or operated an automobile does not preclude 
him from so testifying.  Speed of an automobile is not 
a matter of exclusive knowledge or skill, but anyone 
with a knowledge of time and distance is a competent 
witness to give an estimate; the opportunity and extent 
of observation goes to the weight of the testimony." 
 
Moore, 201 Va. at 525, 111 S.E.2d at 790 (citations omitted).   
 
However, "[i]n order to be competent to testify on the 
subject the witness must have had a reasonable opportunity to 
judge the speed of the automobile."  Id., 111 S.E.2d at 791.  
Accordingly, before any witness, regardless of age or driving 
experience, is permitted to offer an opinion concerning the speed 
of a vehicle, the record must show both that the witness has 
sufficient knowledge of time and distance to determine speed, and 
that the witness observed the vehicle in motion over a period of 
time and distance adequate to make that determination.  Once 
these threshold qualifications are established, the witness' 
degree of knowledge and the duration and quality of the witness' 
observations become matters of credibility, not competence.  
Thus, in Moore we held that the testimony of an adult witness who 
was just learning to drive and had many years experience of 
automobile travel as a passenger "was admissible for such weight 
as the jury thought it should have."  Id.  
 
We have not previously considered the standard of competency 
required for a child witness to offer an opinion as to the speed 
of a vehicle.  In Meade v. Meade, 206 Va. 823, 147 S.E.2d 171 
(1966), we did not reach the question whether a 14-year-old boy 
was competent to offer an opinion as to a vehicle's speed because 
the evidence showed that he had not actually seen the vehicle in 
motion prior to the accident, but had only heard the sound of the 
vehicle.  Accordingly, the boy's lack of a reasonable opportunity 
to judge the vehicle's speed, not his youth, was the basis for 
finding his testimony incompetent.  Id. at 828-29, 147 S.E.2d at 
175. 
 
As a general proposition, however, we have long held that a 
child is competent to testify if he or she possesses the capacity 
to observe, recollect, communicate events, and intelligently 
frame answers to the questions asked of him or her with a 
consciousness of a duty to speak the truth.  Cross v. 
Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 64, 77 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1953).  
Similarly, we have held that: 
 
The competency of a child as a witness to a great 
extent rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge 
whose decision will not be disturbed unless the error 
is manifest.  It is the duty of the trial judge to 
determine such competency after a careful examination 
of the child.  In deciding the question the judge must 
consider the child's age, his intelligence or lack of 
intelligence, and his sense of moral and legal 
responsibility. 
Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 619, 79 S.E.2d 652, 657 (1954).   
 
In the present case, it was not asserted that the child 
witness did not have a reasonable opportunity to observe the 
movement of Greenway's vehicle prior to the accident, or that he 
could not truthfully recollect or communicate what he had 
observed.  To the contrary, the defense relied upon Justin's 
testimony that Greenway's vehicle was swerving to support its 
argument that Greenway had fallen asleep while driving.  
Greenway's only objection was that Justin was not competent to 
estimate speed because he was not himself a driver and, thus, 
lacked sufficient knowledge of time and distance to form a 
reliable estimate of speed. 
 
Prior to eliciting Justin's estimate of the speed of 
Greenway's vehicle, the Commonwealth's Attorney only asked Justin 
whether he had "been in cars all [his] life as a passenger."  
This was the extent to which the Commonwealth attempted to 
establish that Justin had sufficient knowledge of time and 
distance as these concepts relate to a determination of the speed 
of a motor vehicle.  When asked whether he knew or had an opinion 
as to the vehicle's speed, Justin stated that he did not, but 
then offered an estimate of ninety miles per hour.  While 
arguably Justin merely intended to say that he could not be sure 
of the exact speed, his testimony was at best equivocal as to how 
he arrived at his estimate. 
 
Upon this record, we cannot say that the Commonwealth laid a 
foundation that Justin had sufficient knowledge of time and 
distance to give a reliable estimate of the speed of Greenway's 
vehicle.  Accordingly, it was error to admit that evidence.  This 
error, however, does not require reversal if the error was 
harmless. 
 
Improper admission of evidence does not create reversible 
error when it is merely cumulative of other competent evidence 
properly admitted.  Freeman v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 301, 316, 
288 S.E.2d 461, 469 (1982).  Contrary to an assertion made during 
oral argument on appeal by Greenway's counsel, Justin's testimony 
was not the sole basis upon which the trial court could have 
determined the issue of Greenway's speed.  Hawick testified that 
Greenway's speed was "ninety miles an hour . . . [m]aybe faster," 
and Justin's mother estimated Greenway's speed at a minimum of 
eighty-five miles per hour.  This evidence supports the trial 
court's finding that Greenway was travelling at an "extremely 
high speed."  Thus, the evidence improperly admitted was merely 
cumulative and did not deprive Greenway of a fair trial.  See 
Code § 8.01-678; Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 203, 208, 454 
S.E.2d 725, 728 (1995). 
 
Evidence of Criminal Negligence
 
In King, 217 Va. at 607, 231 S.E.2d at 316, we defined 
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor vehicle as 
an "accidental killing which, although unintended, is the 
proximate result of negligence so gross, wanton, and culpable as 
to show a reckless disregard of human life."  Under this 
definition, involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor 
vehicle in this Commonwealth "should be predicated solely upon 
criminal negligence proximately causing death."  Id.
 
Greenway contends that the Commonwealth's evidence failed to 
establish that he had actual or constructive knowledge that his 
actions would place the lives of others in danger, either because 
the accident resulted from his falling asleep while driving or 
because his negligence was predicated solely upon excessive 
speed.  We disagree. 
 
The trial court expressly found that the evidence did not 
support a finding that Greenway had fallen asleep while driving. 
 Rather the trial court found that Greenway, though driving 
erratically, was making a conscious effort to maneuver his 
vehicle through traffic.  Since the record supports this finding 
of fact, it will be upheld on appeal.  Code § 8.01-680. 
 
Accordingly, we turn to Greenway's contention that the trial 
court's determination of criminal negligence was improperly 
predicated solely upon his driving at an excessive speed.   
 
What distinguishes a speeding violation from the 
misdemeanor of reckless driving, and the misdemeanor 
from the felony of involuntary manslaughter, is the 
likelihood of injury to other users of the highways.  
And the degree of the hazard posed by a speeding 
automobile depends upon the circumstances in each case. 
Mayo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 644, 648, 238 S.E.2d 831, 833 
(1977). 
 
Greenway's contention is based on the presumption that a 
speed of eighty-five to ninety miles per hour on an interstate 
highway, while constituting civil negligence, does not rise to 
the level of a criminal disregard for the safety of others.  The 
fallacy of his contention is that it views speed in isolation 
while ignoring the attendant circumstances of the accident, of 
which speed was merely a factor. 
 
In addition to Greenway's excessive speed, the evidence 
showed that Greenway was weaving through heavy holiday weekend 
traffic, straddling the lane markers, that he was aware of a 
near-miss of another motor vehicle, and that he continued 
shifting lanes abruptly rather than adjusting his speed to the 
flow of traffic.  Viewed in the context of these circumstances, 
the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Greenway's 
actions showed a reckless disregard for human life constituting 
criminal negligence sufficient to support the convictions for 
involuntary manslaughter. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
 
Affirmed.