Title: Hughes v. Pair
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 1035
Docket Number: S157197
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2009

1 
Filed 7/2/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SUZAN HUGHES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S157197 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B194307 
CHRISTOPHER PAIR, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC338385 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
An employer who sexually harasses an employee can be liable for damages 
under both federal law (title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)) and 
California law (the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)) when the sexually 
harassing conduct is so pervasive or severe that it alters the conditions of 
employment.  (See Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 264, 283-284 (Lyle).)   
At issue here is California‟s Civil Code section 51.9, which prohibits sexual 
harassment in certain business relationships outside the workplace.  This statute, 
enacted after the federal law‟s Title VII and California‟s FEHA, expressly limits 
liability to harassing conduct that is “pervasive or severe,” the same words used to 
define liability under Title VII and the FEHA.  Considering the presence of those 
words in section 51.9 to be significant, the trial court in this case granted 
defendant‟s motion for summary judgment, which the Court of Appeal affirmed in 
a two-to-one decision.  Both courts concluded that by its use of the words 
2 
“pervasive or severe,” California‟s Legislature intended to incorporate into section 
51.9 the liability limitations governing workplace sexual harassment suits brought 
under Title VII and the FEHA.  We agree, and we affirm the Court of Appeal‟s 
judgment.   
I 
 
In reviewing a trial court‟s grant of summary judgment, we apply the 
following rules:  “ „[W]e take the facts from the record that was before the trial 
court when it ruled on that motion‟ ” and “ „ “ „review the trial court‟s decision de 
novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers 
except that to which objections were made and sustained.‟ ” ‟ ”  (Lonicki v. Sutter 
Health Central (2008) 43 Cal.4th 201, 206, quoting Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)  In addition, we “ „liberally construe the evidence 
in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts 
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.‟ ‟‟  (Ibid.) 
 
In 1998, Suzan and Mark Hughes ended their marriage.  They had a son, 
Alex, who was then a minor.  Under their marital dissolution agreement, Mark, the 
founder of Herbalife International, Inc., a nutritional supplements company, was to 
pay Suzan, the third of his four wives, spousal support of $400,000 each year for 
10 years, ending in March 2008. 
 
On May 21, 2000, Mark Hughes died, leaving some $350 million in trust 
for the sole benefit of Alex.  Named as trustees were Conrad Klein, Jack 
Reynolds, and defendant Christopher Pair, who had been a high-ranking executive 
at Herbalife and became its president after Mark‟s death.  Since June 2001, 
plaintiff Suzan Hughes, as Alex‟s guardian, has initiated several lawsuits against 
the trust and its trustees.   
 
On June 13, 2005, plaintiff requested on Alex‟s behalf that the trust provide 
$160,000 for a two-month rental of a beach house in Malibu.  Three days later, the 
3 
trustees unanimously rejected the request, agreeing to $80,000 for one month‟s 
rental.  On June 22, 2005, the trustees conveyed this information to plaintiff‟s 
attorney, who so advised plaintiff sometime before June 27. 
 
On June 27, in the late afternoon, plaintiff received a telephone call from 
defendant, to whom she had not spoken for at least three years.  Defendant said he 
was calling to invite Alex, who was then 13 years old, to accompany him and his 
nine-year-old son to a private showing of the King Tut exhibit that evening at the 
Los Angeles County Museum of Art.  The sponsor of the event was an investment 
bank, Goldman Sachs, which managed the assets of Alex‟s trust.   
 
During the conversation, defendant called plaintiff “sweetie” and “honey,” 
and said he thought of her “in a special way, if you know what I mean.”  When 
plaintiff asked why the trustees had authorized payment for the Malibu house 
rental for just one month, defendant suggested that he could be persuaded to cast 
his vote for an additional month if plaintiff would be “nice” to him.  He added:  
“You know everyone always had a thing for you.  You are one of the most 
beautiful, unattainable women in the world.  Here‟s my home telephone number 
and call me when you‟re ready to give me what I want.”  Responding to plaintiff‟s 
retort that his comments were “crazy,” defendant said:  “How crazy do you want 
to get?”   
 
That evening, plaintiff took Alex to the private showing at the museum.  
Defendant was there with his son.  After greeting Alex, defendant told plaintiff:  
“I‟ll get you on your knees eventually.  I‟m going to fuck you one way or 
another.”   
 
In August 2005, plaintiff sued defendant.  Her complaint alleged that 
defendant‟s June 27 statements, first on the telephone and later that evening at the 
museum, constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as sexual 
harassment under Civil Code section 51.9.  Defendant, in answering the 
4 
complaint, denied making the statements.  He then moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that even if it were assumed that the complaint‟s allegations were true, 
plaintiff had stated no claim for relief.  (See Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 
529, 532.)  The trial court granted the motion, and it dismissed the case.   
 
A divided Court of Appeal panel affirmed.  The majority concluded that 
because defendant‟s statements underlying plaintiff‟s claim of sexual harassment 
were not “pervasive” or “severe” within the meaning of either federal or California 
employment discrimination law, those statements were likewise insufficient to 
meet Civil Code section 51.9‟s express requirement that the complained-of 
conduct be “pervasive or severe” before liability for sexual harassment can be 
imposed.  It also held that the statements in question were insufficient to support a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 
In the view of the dissenting justice, however, the presence of the words 
“pervasive or severe” in Civil Code section 51.9 did not indicate an intent by the 
Legislature to import into that statute the holdings of court decisions that have 
construed California and federal employment discrimination laws as imposing 
liability for sexual harassment only when the conduct is “pervasive” or “severe.”  
That justice would have allowed the case to proceed to a jury trial on the 
complaint‟s causes of action for sexual harassment under section 51.9 and for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
 
We granted plaintiff‟s petition for review.  
II 
We begin with a brief overview of the federal and California laws 
prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. 
A.  Federal Law  
Enacted in 1964, Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) defines as “an 
unlawful employment practice” discrimination by an employer based on an 
5 
applicant‟s or employee‟s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  (42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), italics added.)  The prohibition covers employment 
decisions and conduct affecting “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.”  (Ibid.)   
An employer violates Title VII by refusing to hire or promote someone 
solely because of that person‟s gender.  (Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, 197.)  Such conduct is sex discrimination.  (Ibid.) 
Title VII treats sexual harassment as another form of sex discrimination.  
(Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 64 (Meritor).)  Just as an 
employee who is subjected to the loss of some “ „economic‟ or „tangible‟ ” job 
benefit as the result of sex discrimination can sue under Title VII (Meritor, supra, 
at p. 64), so can an employee who is subjected to “ „[u]nwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature‟ ” (id at p. 65).  As the high court explained in Meritor:  “ „Sexual 
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one 
sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality.  Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a 
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and 
make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial 
epithets.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 67.)   
Federal law recognizes two forms of sexual harassment.  One is a demand 
for sexual favors in return for a job benefit; this is known as “quid pro quo 
harassment.”  (Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 742, 752 
(Ellerth).)  The other is sexually harassing conduct that, although not resulting in 
the loss of or denial of any job benefit, is so “severe or pervasive” as to create a 
hostile work environment.  (Id. at p. 752.)  The terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile 
work environment” are not in Title VII‟s text; they first turned up in academic 
6 
literature, found their way into federal appellate decisions, and after their mention 
by the high court in Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. 57, “acquired their own [legal] 
significance.”  (Ellerth, supra, at p. 752.)   
Under Title VII, sexual harassment is considered “severe or pervasive” only 
when it “ „ “alter[s] the conditions of [the victim‟s] employment and create[s] an 
abusive working environment.” ‟ ”  (Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden (2001) 
532 U.S. 268, 270.)  Taken into account must be the surrounding circumstances, 
such as the “ „ “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee‟s work performance.” ‟ ”  (Id. at 
pp. 270-271.)  Thus, “ „simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents 
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes‟ ” in 
employment conditions.  (Id. at p. 271; see also Faragher v. Boca Raton (1998) 
524 U.S. 775, 787-788.) 
B.  California Law 
Like federal law, California law prohibits sexual harassment in the 
workplace.  Originally enacted in 1980, Government Code section 12940 is part of 
the FEHA.  (See Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.)  It defines “an unlawful employment 
practice” as an employer‟s refusal to hire, employ, or select for a training program 
leading to employment, any person because of that person‟s “race, religious creed, 
color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical 
condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation.”  (Gov. Code, § 12940, 
subd. (a), italics added.)  Since 1985, the FEHA has prohibited sexual harassment 
of an employee.  (See Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).)   
With respect to sexual harassment in the workplace (see Gov. Code, 
§ 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C)), the prohibited conduct ranges from expressly or 
impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to, or tolerance of, 
7 
unwelcome sexual advances to the creation of a work environment that is “hostile 
or abusive to employees because of their sex.”  (Miller v. Department of 
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462 (Miller).)  Thus, similar to the federal 
law‟s Title VII, California‟s FEHA “recognize[s] two theories of liability for 
sexual harassment claims . . . „. . . quid pro quo harassment, where a term of 
employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances . . . 
[and] hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so 
as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work 
environment.‟ ”  (Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 
Cal.App.4th 142, 149 (Herberg); accord, Miller, supra, at pp. 461-462.)   
Although there are some differences in the wording of the federal law‟s 
Title VII and California‟s FEHA, these laws share the same antidiscriminatory 
goals and serve the same public policies.  (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th 264, 278.) 
In construing California‟s FEHA, this court has held that the hostile work 
environment form of sexual harassment is actionable only when the harassing 
behavior is pervasive or severe.  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462.)  This 
limitation mirrors the federal courts‟ interpretation of Title VII.  (Miller, at 
p. 462.)  To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under California‟s 
FEHA, an employee must show that the harassing conduct was “severe enough or 
sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work 
environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their 
sex.”  (Miller, supra, at p. 462; see Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 121, 130.)  There is no recovery “for harassment that is occasional, 
isolated, sporadic, or trivial.”  (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 283.)  
Courts that have construed federal and California employment 
discrimination laws have held that an employee seeking to prove sexual 
harassment based on no more than a few isolated incidents of harassing conduct 
8 
must show that the conduct was “severe in the extreme.”  (Herberg, supra, 101 
Cal.App.4th at p. 151; accord, Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284, citing Herberg 
with approval; see Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist. (9th Cir. 1992) 975 
F.2d 588, 590 [isolated incidents of sexual horseplay over number of years held 
insufficient]; Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 526, 528, 
534-535 [summary judgment for defendant upheld where defendant rubbed and 
kissed plaintiff on one occasion and groped her on another].)  A single harassing 
incident involving “physical violence or the threat thereof” may qualify as being 
severe in the extreme.  (Herberg, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 151; accord, Lyle, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284.)  
Under California‟s FEHA, as under the federal law‟s Title VII, the 
existence of a hostile work environment depends upon “the totality of the 
circumstances.”  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462.)  We said in Lyle, supra, 38 
Cal.4th at page 284, that “[t]o be actionable, „a sexually objectionable 
environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive.‟ ”  Therefore, “a 
plaintiff who subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or abusive will not 
prevail . . . if a reasonable person . . . considering all the circumstances, would not 
share the same perception.”  (Ibid.) 
III 
In part II, ante, we briefly summarized the federal law‟s Title VII and 
California‟s FEHA insofar as they deal with sexual harassment in the workplace.  
We now turn to sexual harassment in certain business relationships outside the 
workplace.  In California, there is a specific statute, Civil Code section 51.9, that 
covers that topic.   
In 1994, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 51.9 to address 
“relationships between providers of professional services and their clients.”  (Stats. 
9 
1994, ch. 710, § 1, p. 3432.)1  The statute sets out a nonexclusive list of such 
providers, which includes physicians, psychiatrists, dentists, attorneys, real estate 
agents, accountants, bankers, building contractors, executors, trustees, landlords, 
and teachers; also falling within the statute‟s reach is sexual harassment in any 
“relationship that is substantially similar to” those specifically listed.  (Civ. Code, 
§ 51.9, subd. (a)(1)(A)-(F).)   
Under Civil Code section 51.9, a plaintiff must establish not only that a 
qualifying “relationship” (Civ. Code, § 51.9, subd. (a)(1)) exists, but also that the 
relationship is one that the plaintiff cannot “easily terminate” (id., subd. (a)(3)).  
And the plaintiff must show both that “[t]he defendant has made sexual advances, 
solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual compliance by the plaintiff, or 
engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a 
hostile nature based on gender, that were unwelcome and pervasive or severe” 
(id., subd. (a)(2), italics added) and that such conduct caused some “economic loss 
or disadvantage or personal injury” (id., subd. (a)(4)).  The statute further 
provides:  “The definition of sexual harassment and the standards for determining 
liability set forth in this section shall be limited to determining liability only with 
regard to a cause of action brought under this section.”  (Id., subd. (d).)  
Civil Code section 51.9, which became law 30 years after the enactment of 
Title VII by the United States Congress and nine years after California‟s 
Legislature decreed sexual harassment to be a violation of the FEHA, limits 
                                              
1   
Civil Code section 51.9 has sometimes been described as being part of the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act, presumably because of that statute‟s close proximity in 
the Civil Code to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which appears in section 51 of the 
Civil Code.  (See Brown v. Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767, 774-775.)  But Civil 
Code section 51 is the only statute comprising the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  As that 
statute states, “This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act.”  (Civ. Code, § 51, italics added; see Gatto v. County of Sonoma 
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 757.)  
10 
liability to sexually harassing conduct that is “pervasive or severe.”  As discussed 
earlier, this is the same test that the courts have applied to actionable hostile work 
environment claims under both Title VII and the FEHA.   
Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant‟s conduct violated Civil Code section 
51.9.  In affirming the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment for defendant, the 
Court of Appeal majority concluded that his alleged statements to plaintiff, all 
occurring on one day, were neither “pervasive” nor “severe” within the meaning 
of section 51.9.  In so holding, the Court of Appeal gave the terms “pervasive” and 
“severe,” that appear in section 51.9 — which deals with sexual harassment in 
certain professional relationships outside the workplace — the same meaning that 
federal and California courts have given to those identical terms in the context of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.  Defendant urges us to adopt the reasoning of 
the Court of Appeal majority.   
Plaintiff, by contrast, wants us to agree with the dissenting Court of Appeal 
justice that those court decisions pertaining to sexual harassment in the workplace 
are not controlling when, as here, the sexually harassing conduct occurs in a 
professional relationship outside the workplace.  Under this view, the phrase 
“pervasive or severe” appearing in Civil Code section 51.9, subdivision (a)(2), has 
no defined meaning and thus is not tethered to the terms “pervasive” and “severe” 
as used in the employment setting.  Rather, according to the dissenting Court of 
Appeal justice, the determination whether the alleged sexually harassing conduct 
here was “pervasive or severe” presents a factual question for the jury.   
In construing the terms “pervasive or severe” in Civil Code section 51.9, 
we apply well-established rules.  Our task is to ascertain legislative intent so we 
can “effectuate the purpose of the law.”  (Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 262, 268; accord, Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 876, 888.)  We begin with the statutory language, which is usually the 
11 
most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  (Miklosy, supra, at p. 888; City of 
Burbank v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 625.)  
Ordinarily, if that language is susceptible of only one meaning, “ „we presume the 
Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.‟ ”  
(Miklosy, supra, at p. 888; see Esberg v. Union Oil Co., supra, at p. 268.)  When 
statutory language is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation, however, 
we may consider “extrinsic aids, such as legislative history.”  (Miklosy, supra, at 
p. 888; see Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 209-210.)  
But we also look to legislative history to confirm our plain-meaning construction 
of statutory language.  (Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional 
Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 943; Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 
40 Cal.4th 1121, 1137.) 
When statutory language includes words or terms that courts have 
previously construed, “the presumption is almost irresistible” that the Legislature 
intended them to have the same “precise and technical” meanings given by the 
courts.  (City of Long Beach v. Payne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 184, 191; accord, 
Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050; People v. Lawrence 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 231.)   
Subdivision (a)(2) of Civil Code section 51.9 allows liability for instances 
of sexually harassing conduct that qualify as either “pervasive or severe.”  Those 
terms are not defined in the statute.  As discussed earlier, those words have long 
been associated with workplace sexual harassment law embodied in the federal 
law‟s Title VII and in California‟s FEHA.  Applying here the legal presumption 
that a statute‟s use of terms that have a well-settled judicial construction indicates 
the Legislature‟s intent that the terms retain the same meaning that the courts have 
placed upon them (Richardson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1050), 
we agree with the Court of Appeal majority, and defendant, that the words 
12 
“pervasive or severe” in section 51.9 should be given the same meaning that those 
words have in the employment context.  This conclusion also finds ample support 
in the statute‟s legislative history, as discussed below.  
Civil Code section 51.9, as originally enacted in 1994, included these 
requirements for liability:  “The defendant has made sexual advances, 
solicitations, sexual requests, or demands for sexual compliance by the plaintiff 
that were unwelcome and persistent or severe, continuing after a request by the 
plaintiff to stop.”  (Civ. Code, former § 51.9, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)  In 1999, 
the Legislature made several changes to the statute.  Notably, it amended the 
statute‟s subdivision (a)(2) to read as it does now, by replacing the word 
“persistent,” italicized above, with “pervasive,” and by deleting the above-
italicized phrase “continuing after a request by the plaintiff to stop.”  (Stats. 1999, 
ch. 964, § 1.)  In addition, after the words “sexual compliance by the plaintiff” in 
the same subdivision, the Legislature added this phrase:  “or engaged in other 
verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based 
on gender.”  (§ 51.9, subd. (a)(2).)  Thus, as amended in 1999, subdivision (a)(2) 
of section 51.9 now imposes liability when “[t]he defendant has made sexual 
advances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual compliance by the 
plaintiff, or engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature 
or of a hostile nature based on gender, that were unwelcome and pervasive or 
severe.” 
The 1999 amendments to Civil Code section 51.9 also deleted a 
requirement in former subdivision (d) that the plaintiff‟s complaint be verified, 
and deleted the phrase “without tangible hardship” formerly contained in 
subdivision (a)(3), which now provides simply that the plaintiff must show “an 
inability . . . to easily terminate” the sexually abusive relationship.   
13 
The 1999 amendments to Civil Code section 51.9 were authored by 
Assemblywoman Dion Aroner as Assembly Bill No. 519 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.).  
The analysis by the Senate Rules Committee described the bill as “revis[ing] the 
Civil Code prohibitions against sexual harassment in professional and business 
settings to generally conform to the legal standards for filing sexual harassment 
claims in the employment setting.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 519 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 10, 1999, p. 1 (Senate Analysis of Assembly Bill 519).)  The 
analysis noted that the original version of section 51.9 had “established standards 
for sexual harassment in the Civil Code which do not comport with other 
California and federal sexual harassment prevention measures.”  (Sen. Analysis, at 
p. 3.) 
With respect to the bill‟s substitution of the word “pervasive” for the term 
“persistent,” which appeared in the original version of Civil Code section 51.9, the 
legislative analysis explained:  “Section 51.9 currently uses the term „persistent‟ 
when setting forth the showing required to prove sexual harassment.  This term is 
not used by federal or state courts, or any administrative agency, in either 
employment or housing cases.  Instead, both state and federal decisions have 
uniformly required a showing that the harassment be „pervasive‟ but not 
necessarily of a „persistent‟ nature.  (See Fisher v. San Pedro Community Hospital 
(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608.)  [¶]  The traditional analysis was provided by 
the court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 . . .  „For 
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive “to 
alter the conditions of [the victim‟s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.” ‟ ”  (Sen. Analysis of Assem. Bill 519, at p. 4.)  The legislative 
analysis further noted that the bill‟s proponents “assert that the bill is needed in 
order to prevent the conflicting definitions of sexual harassment contained in the 
14 
Civil and Government Codes from causing interpretation problems in the courts.”  
(Id., at p. 8.)   
This history of the amendments to Civil Code section 51.9 leaves no doubt 
of the Legislature‟s intent to conform the requirements governing liability for 
sexual harassment in professional relationships outside the workplace to those of 
the federal law‟s Title VII and California‟s FEHA, both of which pertain to 
liability for sexual harassment in the workplace.  Under both laws, an employee 
plaintiff who cannot prove a demand for sexual favors in return for a job benefit 
(that is, quid pro quo harassment) must show that the sexually harassing conduct 
was so pervasive or severe as to alter the conditions of employment.  With respect 
to liability under section 51.9, which covers a wide variety of business 
relationships outside the workplace, the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged 
sexually harassing conduct was sufficiently pervasive or severe as to alter the 
conditions of the business relationship.  This inquiry must necessarily take into 
account the nature and context of the particular business relationship.  With this 
analytical framework in mind, we now consider plaintiff‟s claim of sexual 
harassment under section 51.9. 
IV 
 
As just explained, the Legislature intended to conform Civil Code section 
51.9 to the California and federal laws pertaining to sexual harassment in the 
workplace.  Therefore, we find guidance in the holdings and reasoning of court 
decisions dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace in determining whether 
plaintiff here has a viable cause of action under section 51.9, which applies to 
professional relationships outside the workplace. 
 
We first consider whether plaintiff‟s factual allegations are sufficient to 
establish a claim for the hostile environment form of sexual harassment.  Like both 
California and federal employment discrimination law, Civil Code section 51.9 
15 
provides a remedy for this form of sexual harassment only if the harassing conduct 
was either “pervasive or severe.”   
 
Here, defendant‟s sexually harassing conduct, as plaintiff has described it, 
was not “pervasive” within the meaning of Civil Code section 51.9 — that is, it 
was not so egregious as to alter the conditions of the underlying professional 
relationship.  (See Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, supra, 532 U.S. at 
p. 270; Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 67; accord, Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 462.)  To be pervasive, the sexually harassing conduct must consist of “more 
than a few isolated incidents.”  (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284.)  That standard 
has not been met here.  As we have explained, the alleged sexual harassment 
consisted only of comments defendant made to plaintiff during a single telephone 
conversation and a brief statement defendant made to plaintiff in person later that 
day during a social event at a museum. 
 
Nor was defendant‟s alleged conduct “severe” within the meaning of Civil 
Code section 51.9.  As noted earlier (p. 8, ante), employment law acknowledges 
that an isolated incident of harassing conduct may qualify as “severe” when it 
consists of “a physical assault or the threat thereof.”  (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 
p. 284, italics added; see Herberg, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 151.)  Here, 
plaintiff contends that defendant threatened her with physical violence when he 
told her at the museum:  “I‟ll get you on your knees eventually.  I‟m going to fuck 
you one way or another.”  We disagree with plaintiff‟s characterization.  Although 
vulgar and highly offensive, this remark, which was made in the presence of other 
people attending a private showing at a museum, would not plausibly be construed 
by a reasonable trier of fact as a threat to commit a sexual assault on plaintiff.  
(See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856.)  Most 
reasonably construed, defendant‟s comment was a threat, not of physical violence, 
but of financial retaliation:  that he would use his power as a trustee to thwart 
16 
plaintiff‟s requests to allocate funds from the trust established for her son Alex.  
But such a threat will not support a claim under section 51.9 for the hostile 
environment form of sexual harassment, because it does not constitute “severe” 
harassing conduct.  (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284; Herberg, supra, 101 
Cal.App.4th at p. 151.)    
 
We consider next whether plaintiff has alleged facts establishing a violation 
of Civil Code section 51.9 based on the quid pro quo form of sexual harassment.  
As we explain below, plaintiff‟s factual allegations are insufficient under this 
theory as well. 
 
Civil Code section 51.9 prohibits “solicitations, sexual requests, [and] 
demands for sexual compliance,” thus allowing a plaintiff to sue for the quid pro 
quo form of sexual harassment.  As noted earlier, both Title VII and the FEHA 
impose liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment in the workplace.  (See pp. 5-
7, ante.)  To establish quid pro quo sexual harassment under these employment 
laws, a plaintiff must show “that a tangible employment action resulted from a 
refusal to submit to a supervisor‟s sexual demands.”  (Ellerth, supra, 524 U.S. 
742, 753; see also Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 461; Kohler v. Inter-Tel 
Technologies (9th Cir. 2001) 244 F.3d 1167, 1179 [a plaintiff seeking to establish 
quid pro quo harassment based on rejection of a defendant‟s request for sexual 
favors must show a causal connection between that rejection and some adverse 
employment action]; Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co. (8th Cir. 1995) 49 F.3d 466, 
473 [same]; Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc. (6th Cir. 1992) 970 F.2d 178, 186 
[same].)  But a claim involving “only unfulfilled threats . . . should be categorized 
as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or 
pervasive conduct.”  (Ellerth, supra, at p. 754.) 
 
In this case, plaintiff‟s factual allegations provide two potential bases for a 
claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment:  First, plaintiff alleges that defendant 
17 
made comments to her near the end of their June 27, 2005 telephone conversation 
that if she would be “nice” to him, he could, in his capacity as one of three trustees 
of the $350 million trust fund that plaintiff‟s deceased former husband had 
established for their young son, be persuaded to vote to approve another $80,000 
for a second month‟s rental of the beach house in Malibu.  (See pp. 2-3, ante.)  
Second, she has alleged that defendant told her he would “fuck [her] one way or 
another.”  As we explained (see pp. 15-16, ante), this crude statement, considered 
in the context in which it allegedly was made, is most reasonably construed as a 
threat that, unless plaintiff granted him sexual favors, he would use his authority, 
as a trustee of the trust set up for plaintiff‟s son Alex, to deny plaintiff‟s requests 
for funds.  (See pp. 15-16, ante.) 
 
These allegations are insufficient to establish quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, however, because they amount at most to unfulfilled threats.  Plaintiff 
has not alleged that, because she rejected his sexual overtures, defendant thereafter 
followed through on his alleged threat by using his authority, as one of three 
trustees administering the trust that plaintiff‟s deceased former husband had set up 
for their young son, to cause financial injury or hardship to plaintiff or to her son.  
Because plaintiff has identified no tangible retaliatory conduct by defendant in the 
context of their professional relationship, plaintiff‟s claim is properly treated as a 
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.  (Ellerth, supra, 524 U.S. at 
p. 754.)  As we have already concluded, plaintiff‟s factual allegations fail to 
establish the “severe” or “pervasive” conduct necessary to pursue a claim of 
hostile environment sexual harassment under Civil Code section 51.9.   
V 
 
Our grant of review included the issue whether the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment on plaintiff‟s claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  The Court of Appeal majority held that it did.  We agree.   
18 
 
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when 
there is “ „ “ „(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 
distress; (2) the plaintiff‟s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and 
(3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant‟s 
outrageous conduct.‟ ” ‟ ”  (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 965, 1001; see Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)  
A defendant‟s conduct is “outrageous” when it is so “ „ “extreme as to exceed all 
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” ‟ ”  (Potter, at p. 1001.)  
And the defendant‟s conduct must be “ „ “intended to inflict injury or engaged in 
with the realization that injury will result.” ‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress “ „does not extend 
to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 
trivialities.‟  (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.)”  (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 1092, 1122, overruled on another ground in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th 826, 853, fn. 19; see Intel. Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 1342, 1347 [harassing e-mails might constitute intentional infliction of 
emotional distress]; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 
790, 809 [anonymous e-mails graphically threatening physical harm insufficient]; 
see Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 
229-330 [threats of harm or death to plaintiff and his family for failure to sign new 
union agreement sufficiently “outrageous”].)  If properly pled, a claim of sexual 
harassment can establish “the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula 
Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 618.)   
 
With respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show severe emotional 
distress, this court has set a high bar.  “Severe emotional distress means 
19 
„ “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no 
reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” ‟ ”  
(Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1004.)   
 
The Court of Appeal here concluded that plaintiff failed to establish two of 
the three elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress:  either extreme or outrageous conduct by defendant, or that plaintiff 
suffered severe or extreme emotional distress.  We agree.  Viewed in the context 
of plaintiff‟s legal battles, over a five-year span, with defendant and the two other 
trustees regarding their allocation of the trust funds, defendant‟s inappropriate 
comments fall far short of conduct that is so “outrageous” that it “ „ “exceed[s] all 
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” ‟ ”  (Potter v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1001.)  In addition, plaintiff‟s assertions 
that she has suffered discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and 
agitation as the result of defendant‟s comments to her on the telephone and at the 
museum on June 27, 2005, do not comprise “ „ “emotional distress of such 
substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized 
society should be expected to endure it.” ‟ ”  (Id. at p. 1004.)   
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Hughes v. Pair 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 154 Cal.App.4th 1469 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S157197 
Date Filed: July 2, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Andria K. Richey 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Hillel Chodos and Deborah Chodos for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Knee, Ross & Silverman and Melanie C. Ross for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
June Babiracki Barlow, Neil Kalin and Grant Michiaki Habata for California Association of Realtors as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Hillel Chodos 
1559 S. Sepulveda Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 473-8666 
 
Melanie C. Ross 
Knee, Ross & Silverman 
2049 Century Park East, Suite 4250 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 551-0909