Title: State v. Barrett
Citation: 278 S.C. 92, 292 S.E.2d 590
Docket Number: 21722
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1982

278 S.C. 92 (1982) 292 S.E.2d 590 The STATE, Respondent, v. James BARRETT, Appellant. The STATE, Respondent, v. Harry F. OLSON, Appellant. (two cases). 21722 Supreme Court of South Carolina. June 8, 1982. Charles W. Boyle, Atlanta, Ga., and Franchot A. Brown, Columbia, for appellants. Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes, Asst. Attys. Gen. Lindy P. Funkhouser and Martha *93 L. McElveen, and Sol. James C. Anders, Columbia, for respondent. June 8, 1982. LITTLEJOHN, Justice: These two obscenity cases have been consolidated for the purpose of this appeal. The separate briefs are substantially identical. The two Defendants were indicted in April of 1981 and found guilty of a violation of § 16-15-260, et. seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. From the convictions and sentences both have appealed, submitting the same issues as questions for this court. The proscribing statute is as follows: It is well established that obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or the corresponding provision of the Constitution of South Carolina. *94 Section 16-15-260 undertakes to define obscenity, in relevant part, as follows: The first issue submitted to the Court, as taken from the briefs of the Appellants, is as follows: *95 In the brief of Appellants, the following admission is made: The case of Miller referred to in counsel's brief is Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed. (2d) 419 (1973). In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States attempted to clarify the law for the state and federal law makers and courts in the problem of dealing with obscenity and pornography. It is obvious that the Court fully appreciated the legislative problems of defining obscenity when it said: We hold that the guidelines set forth in Miller to regulate obscenity have not been infringed by the statute and its application here. It is obvious that the Legislature has conscientiously followed the guidelines of Miller with only minor variations, one of which (complained of) actually is advantageous to the Appellants. Our statute includes in the definition of "prurient interest" a requirement that the matter also be "... reflective of an arousal of lewd and lascivious desires and thoughts." Contrary to the argument of counsel, we think that this portion of the definition increases the burden of the government before conviction may be had. *96 Appellants contend that subsection (c) is unconstitutional because of a substitution of community standards of decency and propriety for community standards of tolerance, citing Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F. (2d) 1020 (5th Cir.) (1981). In this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to declare a similar statute unconstitutional. It can be forcefully argued that obscenity must be obscenity in every state or in none. At the same time, it is the law, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, that contemporary community standards may be considered, and, accordingly, state legislatures, courts, and juries are allowed certain latitude all under the same constitution. Obscenity, like many other words, may be defined correctly in different ways. No particular verbiage is required to define obscenity. Certainly the Supreme Court of the United States has not undertaken to specify the verbiage to be used by the respective legislatures. Here, as is typical in obscenity cases, counsel "picketh then nit." Squabbles over technicalities and definitions have lured the courts to write fluently, resulting, ofttimes, in overdefining obscenity. We appreciate the fact that obscenity is difficult to define; fortunately, it is not so difficult to detect. The printed material in contest here was not entered as exhibits in this Court, but quotations therefrom appear in the record. It is difficult to conceive of any definition which would not cover that which is printed in the record. Obviously, jurors applying contemporary community standards, concluded that the matter was obscene and proscribed. We, applying the same standards, agree. Our statute is not so broad as to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. We refuse to declare it invalid. The Appellants next contend that: *97 Code § 16-15-270, in relevant part, is as follows: It is apparent that this code section is designed to protect merchants of printed material from searches and seizures *98 which might be determined unwarranted. The protection is a limitation on search and seizure; it is not a limitation on prosecution. The undisputed facts in this case are that police officers went to the stores where the Appellants worked, bought and paid for printed material. They proceeded to prosecute the Appellants in the usual fashion. It is their contention that they were entitled to a judicial determination of whether the material was obscene "... prior to their seizure or prior to criminal prosecution relating to such materials." They argue that no prosecution can be had before the materials are submitted to a circuit judge and found to be obscene. In The State v. Oxendine, 268 S.C. 328, 233 S.E. (2d) 118 (1977), in construing a similar statute now repealed, this Court held that: While the statute involved in Oxendine is not exactly the statute involved here, we think that the rationale is similarly applicable. In cases, such as here, where there is no seizure, a determination by a circuit judge is not required. We think that a reasonable interpretation of the statute, quoted hereinabove, is that a judicial hearing by a circuit judge must be held prior to seizure, but if not held prior to seizure, at least must, upon request, be held after seizure prior to "... criminal prosecution relating to such materials." It is obvious that the Legislature recognizes that the rights of a dispenser of literature are different when property is taken against the will of the owner and, on the other hand, when the owner parts with the same in exchange for money. We find all exceptions without merit and the verdicts and sentences of the lower court are, hereby Affirmed. LEWIS, C.J., and NESS, GREGORY and HARWELL, JJ., concur.