Title: Isaac Wright v. State of New Jersey et als.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-54-00
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2001

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue before the Court is whether pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), the State of New Jersey is vicariously liable for the actions of the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO) employees and whether the State is required to indemnify and defend them. In August 1989, after a lengthy investigation, Isaac Wright was indicted and charged with leading a drug trafficking network, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, maintaining or operating a narcotics production facility, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In 1991, Wright was found guilty by a jury of all charges and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. In July 1991, Wright and his wife filed a civil lawsuit against the State and several law enforcement agencies and employees, including employees of the SCPO. The complaint alleged, among other things, false arrest, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and loss of consortium. Wright also alleged that defendants beat him at the time of his arrest, suborned perjury, and illegally searched his prison cell. Wright claimed that former Somerset County Prosecutor, Nicholas Bissell, Jr., and several employees of the SCPO, including Veronica Nolan (Assistant Prosecutor), Stuart Buckman (Detective), and Robert Smith (Deputy Chief of Detectives), among others, acted to effect his false arrest and invade his privacy. In 1995, the Appellate Division affirmed all of Wright's convictions except the conviction for leading a narcotics trafficking network. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Wright subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief seeking to have the remaining convictions reversed, alleging prosecutorial and police misconduct throughout the investigation, arrest, grand jury proceedings, and trial. In December 1997, the trial court reversed Wright's remaining convictions, finding that high-ranking Somerset County law-enforcement officials concealed evidence of an illegal search and seizure of cocaine used at Wright's trial; and that Somerset County Prosecutor Bissell knew about but concealed the terms of a favorable plea agreement with one of Wright's co- defendant's, a State witness at Wright's trial. The indictment against Wright was dismissed without prejudice. In February 1997, prior to the State's joinder in a third-amended complaint, Somerset County's request to the Attorney General (AG) that the State represent and indemnify the SCPO-employee defendants was denied. In September and October 1998, Nolan, Buckman, Smith, and other prosecutorial and municipal defendants, filed cross-claims demanding that the State provide them with indemnification and legal representation. Thereafter, the State moved for summary judgment dismissing Wright's third-amended complaint and all cross-claims demanding defense and indemnification. Nolan, Buckman, Smith, and others cross-moved for summary judgment against the State for vicarious liability, indemnification, and defense costs. In August 1999, the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, finding that Somerset County was liable for defense and indemnification of the SCPO employees. The court dismissed the State's motion and the cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability, declining to decide the issue because discovery was incomplete. Thereafter, the trial court denied Somerset County's request for reconsideration but amended its August 1999 order to require that indemnification and defense costs be resolved between the county and its prosecutorial employees. A month later, the trial court issued its interlocutory opinion granting summary judgment to the State on all vicarious liability claims. The Appellate Division denied interlocutory review of both orders. Somerset County, Veronica Nolan, Stuart Buckman, and Robert Smith each filed a motion before the Supreme Court seeking reversal of each Appellate Division order denying interlocutory review, which were granted. HELD: The State of New Jersey may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the Somerset County Prosecutor's office prosecutors and investigative subordinates during the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Isaac Wright and the State may be required to indemnify and defend those prosecutors and subordinates in respect of the claims alleged by Wright in his civil action. 1. Under the TCA, a public entity is vicariously liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. A public entity's liability under the TCA flows from the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is based on the control of the master over the servant. Under the control test, a master-servant relationship exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct what and how something is to be done. (Pp. 12-16) 2. The AG has the power to supersede a county prosecutor in any investigation, criminal action, or proceeding. A county cannot be held liable for the actions of the county prosecutor and his detectives when their tortious conduct arose out of the investigation of criminal activity. Prosecutors hold a hybrid status; when they engage in classic enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State but when they are performing administrative functions, they act on behalf of the county. (Pp. 16-25) 3. The Court relies exclusively on the provisions of the TCA, as well as related case law, to resolve the defense and indemnification issue. Because the acts of the county prosecutors and their subordinates were committed within the scope of their employment, the question of defense and indemnification turns on whether the SCPO employees can be considered State employees, pursuant to the TCA. If so, the State must defend and indemnify the county employees. (Pp. 26-36) 4. The control test is neither dispositive nor persuasive on the issue of the State's vicarious liability. Rather, the Court relies on statutory interpretation and relevant case law related to the vicarious liability provisions of the TCA. County prosecutors and their subordinates act as agents or officers of the State when investigating criminal activity and enforcing the law. No further discovery is necessary to determine that all of Wright's causes of action clearly relate exclusively to the county prosecutors' investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. (Pp. 36-39) 5. Because law enforcement is a basic State function, and because county prosecutors are uniquely subject at all times to the AG's statutory power to supervise and supersede them, it is appropriate and consonant with legislative intent to construe the vicarious liability provisions of the TCA as imposing vicarious liability on the State for the tortious actions of county prosecutorial employees in the performance of their law enforcement duties. Moreover, case law provides that a county cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of prosecutorial defendants related to the investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. (Pp. 39-41) 6. Because of their hybrid status, the focus of the determination of whether the county prosecutorial employees should be State employees within the meaning of the defense and indemnification provisions of the TCA should be on whether the function that these prosecutorial employees were performing during the alleged wrongdoing is a function that has been understood to be a State function subject to State supervision in its execution. When county prosecutors are involved in the investigation and enforcement of the State's criminal laws, they perform a function that has traditionally been the responsibility of the State for which the AG is ultimately responsible. (Pp. 41-45) 7. The statutory language in the TCA did not take into account the unique role of county prosecutorial employees, who are paid by the county, but who perform a State law-enforcement function under State supervisory authority. To vindicate the legislative purpose of providing defense and indemnification to public employees performing an essential State function, the defense and indemnification provisions of the TCA are interpreted to apply to county prosecutorial employees sued on the basis of actions taken in the discharge of their law enforcement duties. (Pp. 45-48) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUDGE SKILLMAN, temporarily assigned, dissents, noting that the Legislature has mandated that each county bear the financial responsibility for operation of the county prosecutor's office; thus, the obligation to pay for the defense and indemnification of prosecutorial employees should rest within the county unless the TCA contains a clear and unequivocal expression of a contrary legislative intent. Judge Skillman does not find that the TCA reflects such legislative intent. JUSTICES COLEMAN and LONG, and APPELLATE DIVISION JUDGE PRESSLER, temporarily assigned, join in JUSTICE STEIN'S opinion. APPELLATE DIVISION JUDGE SKILLMAN, temporarily assigned, filed a separate dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA and ZAZZALI did not participate. ISAAC WRIGHT, ADRIEL McNAIR, A/K/A SUNSHINE WRIGHT and SANDRA WRIGHT, guardian for TIKEALLA WRIGHT, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent, and THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF SOMERSET COUNTY; THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY; THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF PASSAIC COUNTY; MIDDLESEX COUNTY, NJ; PASSAIC COUNTY, NJ; FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP, NJ; EDISON TOWNSHIP, NJ; PASSAIC CITY, NJ; BARBARA J. BISSELL, EXECUTRIX of the Estate of NICHOLAS L. BISSELL, JR.; PETER DEMARCO, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD THORNBURG, individually and in his official capacity; ANDREW RACZ, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD A. MYERS, individually and in his official capacity; JAMES DUGAN, individually and in his official capacity; SCOTT FABIANO, individually and in his official capacity; RUSSELL KINGSLAND, individually and in his official capacity; LINDA WISHART, individually and in her official capacity; SAM DEBELLA, individually and in his official capacity; TIMOTHY WENZEL, individually and in his official capacity; NANCY DONALON, individually and in her official capacity; RONALD KUSHNER, individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH KRIZA, individually and in his official capacity; KEN EUBER, individually and in his official capacity; THOMAS MALTESE, individually and in his official capacity; CHRIS INGRAM, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN ZANKOWICK, individually and in his official capacity; LOUIS KIRSH, individually and in his official capacity; JAMES FERGUSON, individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH LOMBARDO, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN KENNY, individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH FEZZA, individually and in his official capacity; OTIS DANIELS, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN CARAVANNA, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD HURLEY; TERRENCE D. DZURA; MICHAEL R. IMBRIANI, individually and in his official capacity; BEN TANG; JOSEPH RHETTO; AUTO SPORT VOLVO, INC.; ACME MOTORS; JOHN DOE (S) (1-100), individually and in his official capacity; JANE DOE (S) (1-100), individually and in her official capacity and ABC BUSINESS ENTITIES (1-10); Defendants, and SOMERSET COUNTY, NJ; VERONICA NOLAN, individually and in her official capacity; ROBERT SMITH, individually and in his official capacity and STUART BUCKMAN, individually and in his official capacity; Defendants-Appellants. Argued April 30, 2001 -- Decided July 31, 2001 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Somerset County. Arthur S. Goldstein argued the cause for appellant Somerset County, NJ (Wolff &amp; Samson, attorneys; Mr. Goldstein and Kenneth N. Laptook, of counsel; Andrew C. Samsonand Junie Hahn, on the briefs). Larry R. Etzweiler, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Jeffrey J. Miller and Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel). Sonya M. Longo submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of appellant Robert Smith (Budd Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg &amp; Sade, attorneys). Steven L. Klepper submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of appellant Veronica Nolan (Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman &amp; Leonard, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. This is an interlocutory appeal arising from a civil action for false arrest, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and other causes of action against several defendants including thirteen employees of the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO). We must determine whether pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, the State of New Jersey is vicariously liable for the actions of the SCPO's employees and whether the State is required to indemnify and defend them. The trial court held that the State was neither vicariously liable for the SCPO's employees' conduct nor required to defend and indemnify them. The Appellate Division denied appellants' motions for interlocutory review. We reverse. We hold that the State may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the SCPO's prosecutors and investigative subordinates during the investigation, arrest and prosecution of Isaac Wright and that the State may be required to indemnify and defend those prosecutors and subordinates in respect of the claims alleged by Wright in this litigation. ISAAC WRIGHT, ADRIEL McNAIR, A/K/A SUNSHINE WRIGHT and SANDRA WRIGHT, guardian for TIKEALLA WRIGHT, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent, and THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF SOMERSET COUNTY; THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY; THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF PASSAIC COUNTY; MIDDLESEX COUNTY, NJ; PASSAIC COUNTY, NJ; FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP, NJ; EDISON TOWNSHIP, NJ; PASSAIC CITY, NJ; BARBARA J. BISSELL, EXECUTRIX of the Estate of NICHOLAS L. BISSELL, JR.; PETER DEMARCO, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD THORNBURG, individually and in his official capacity; ANDREW RACZ, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD A. MYERS, individually and in his official capacity; JAMES DUGAN, individually and in his official capacity; SCOTT FABIANO, individually and in his official capacity; RUSSELL KINGSLAND, individually and in his official capacity; LINDA WISHART, and SOMERSET COUNTY, NJ; VERONICA NOLAN, individually and in her official capacity; ROBERT SMITH, individually and in his official capacity and STUART BUCKMAN, individually and in his official capacity; Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________________ SKILLMAN, P.J.A.D. (t/a), dissenting I am unable to reconcile the Court's conclusion that the State must defend and indemnify employees of a county prosecutor's office for claims brought under the Tort Claims Act with the legislative mandate that the counties must bear all expenses of operation of the prosecutors' offices. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7 provides: All necessary expenses incurred by the prosecutor for each county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws shall, upon being certified to by the prosecutor and approved, under his hand, by a judge of the superior court, be paid by the county treasurer whenever the same shall be approved by the board of chosen freeholders of such county. The amount or amounts to be expended shall not exceed the amount fixed by the board of chosen freeholders in its regular or emergency appropriation, unless such expenditure is specifically authorized by order of the assignment judge of the superior court for such county. [Emphasis added.] This statute expresses a "legislative policy that the county [shall] bear all costs and expenses . . . incident to employment of county detectives[,]" as well as other employees of a county prosecutor's office. Dunne v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 69 N.J. 244, 251-52 (1976). In view of the legislative mandate that counties must bear all financial responsibility for operation of the county prosecutors' offices, the obligation to pay for the defense and indemnification of employees of a prosecutor's office should rest with the county unless the Tort Claims Act contains a clear and unequivocal expression of a contrary legislative intent. However, the Act does not reflect a legislative intent to treat the expenses of defending and indemnifying employees of a prosecutor's office differently from other expenses incurred in connection with the operation of a prosecutor's office. To the contrary, the pertinent provisions of the Act and the commentary to the proposed Act reflect a legislative intent to extend the State's defense and indemnification obligations only to "traditional state employees." From all the foregoing it may be seen that the county-county detective relationship is that of employer-employee for certain administrative and remunerative purposes. This finding is not inconsistent with our conclusion [in Cashen] that in preparing and executing the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based and conducting the search, [the detectives] were "agents of the State." At the same time they were also employees of and there existed an employer-employee relationship with the County. . . . . . . A detective then is a county employee who carries out his functions as such for the prosecutor. The status of the plaintiffs literally satisfies the definition in the Fireman's Fund policy. This result conforms with the legislative policy that the county bear all costs and expenses, including liability insurance premiums, incident to employment of county detectives. Subsequent to Dunne, the Appellate Division squarely held that the State has no obligation to assume responsibility for the defense of a county prosecutor's office detective who is joined as a defendant in an action arising out of a criminal investigation. Township of Edison, supra, 156 N.J. Super. at 144. In the course of its opinion the court noted: Although a prosecutor and prosecutor's detectives may be considered as agents of the State for some purposes (Cashen [supra, 66 N.J. at 552]), they are not employees of the State for certain administrative and remunerative purposes, for the financial burdens of the prosecutor's office are imposed on the county. See Dunne [supra, 69 N.J. at 248-251]. [Id. at 141.] The Court also relies upon a federal district court decision that concluded, attempting to reconcile Cashen with Dunne, that the State is not responsible under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 and N.J.S.A. 59:10-1 for defending or indemnifying employees of county prosecutor's office for torts committed in the course of their employment, but that the State might be held vicariously liable for their conduct. Michaels, supra, 968 F. Supp. at 232-38. The court noted that this result would create "a practical anomaly whereby the State could be held vicariously liable for the actions of . . . the same individual whom the county must indemnify and defend[.]"See footnote 55 Id. at 238 n.12. However, the court was not called upon to reconcile this anomaly because the case did not involve any issue concerning the State's vicarious liability. See id. at 237 n.10. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed "[f]or substantially the reasons set out in the district court's opinion," based on its "predict[ion] that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would hold that under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 the State is required to provide indemnification and defense for only 'those persons "generally" and "traditionally" considered the State's employees.'" Michaels, supra, 150 F.3d at 258-59. The other Third Circuit decision relied upon by the Court, Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1084, 117 S. Ct. 754, 136 L. Ed. 2d 691 (1997), involved the question whether the State or county could be liable for an act of employment discrimination committed by a prosecutor. The court concluded, without citing the Tort Claims Act, that only the county could be held liable for a county prosecutor's personnel decisions. Id. at 1499. In short, neither Cashen nor the federal decisions relied upon by the Court provide a definitive interpretation of the vicarious liability of public entities under N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a. Cashen was based on pre-Tort Claims Act common law, and Coleman did not involve an interpretation of the Act. Although Michaels involved an issue of a county's vicarious liability under N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a, the court's decision rested solely on its prediction of how the Court ultimately would decide this state law issue. See Becker v. Baron Bros., 138 N.J. 145, 165 (1994) (noting that the Court is "not bound by [federal court] decisions in respect of our own State law."). Consequently, I disagree with the Court's view that "Cashen, Coleman and Michaels establish that a county cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of prosecutorial defendants related to the investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws of the State[.]" Ante at ___ (slip op. at 39). In my view, the resolution of this issue is not constrained by prior case law. One of the essential rationales for imposing vicarious liability upon an employer for the torts of its employees is that the employer "is better able [than the injured party] to bear the burden of the losses resulting from such tortious acts by absorbing them as an incident of the operation of [its] enterprise." McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 192 (1960). The mandate of N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7 that the county shall pay "[a]ll necessary expenses" incurred in the operation of the prosecutor's office constitutes a legislative policy determination that the cost of operation of this public enterprise shall be borne by the county. Thus, a county's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for any loss that may be incurred as a result of a tortious act by an employee of a prosecutor's office, like the cost of premiums to insure against such loss, see Dunne, supra, is simply "an incident of the operation of [this] enterprise." McAndrew, supra, 33 N.J. at 192. Therefore, consistent with the narrow interpretation of "State employee" reflected in N.J.S.A. 59:1-3, N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1, N.J.S.A. 59:10-1 and the Attorney General's commentary to the proposed Act, I would conclude that employees of a county prosecutor's office are county rather than State employees for the purpose of imposition of vicarious liability under N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a. The Court's conclusion that this appeal is not controlled by N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7 and that the Legislature intended to impose an obligation for defense and indemnification and vicarious liability upon the State for tortious conduct of employees of a prosecutor's office is inconsistent with long-standing administrative practice. In the nearly thirty years since enactment of the Tort Claims Act, L. 1972, c. 45, counties have routinely provided representation to employees of a county prosecutor's office who are sued under the Tort Claims Act or Federal Civil Rights Act. See Michaels, supra, 968 F. Supp. at 235. Although counties have occasionally attempted to shift this responsibility to the State, the Appellate Division has repeatedly rejected arguments similar to the ones advanced by appellants and upheld the State's position that employees of a prosecutor's office are county rather than State employees and that the county bears the responsibility of defending them. See, e.g., Township of Edison, supra; Steele v. State, A-225-81T3 (decided Feb. 10, 1982); Ruvoldt v. County of Hudson, A-5281-80T3 (decided Feb. 10, 1982), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 226 (1982).See footnote 66 More commonly, the counties have simply provided representation to employees of county prosecutors' offices either directly through county counsel or the prosecutor's office or indirectly through private counsel, without raising any issue concerning their obligation to provide such representation. See, e.g., Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1243 (3d Cir. 1994); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1981); Carter v. Chief of Police, 437 F.2d 413, 414 (3d Cir. 1971); Muhammed v. Coburn, 535 F. Supp. 736, 737 (D.N.J. 1980); Sczyrek v. County of Essex, 324 N.J. Super. 235, 236 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 75 (2000); Van Engelen v. O'Leary, 323 N.J. Super. 141, 143 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 486 (1999); Seneca v. Bissell, 274 N.J. Super. 613, 615 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 272 (1994); Hayes v. County of Mercer, 217 N.J. Super. 614, 617 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 643 (1987). This long- standing administrative practice is entitled to substantial weight in construing the Tort Claims Act. See New Jersey Ass'n on Correction v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 214-15 (1979). Although the record does not indicate the number of state tort and federal civil rights claims brought against employees of county prosecutors' offices, it may be anticipated that the Court's decision will require the Attorney General's office to assume responsibility for a substantial number of additional cases and impose a significant new expense upon the State. The county prosecutors' offices employ a large number of assistant prosecutors, investigators, and other personnel who perform a variety of investigative and prosecutorial duties that may give rise to claims for money damages. Any such claim, including a personal injury action arising out of the alleged negligent operation of an automobile in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, will now presumably have to be defended by the Attorney General, and the State would then have to pay any judgment that may be entered. N.J.S.A. 59:10-1. Therefore, in the absence of a compelling showing that the long- standing administrative practice of counties providing defense and indemnification to employees of county prosecutors' offices is contrary to existing law, I believe that any decision to shift these responsibilities to the State should be made by the Legislature. The Court has previously recognized that the characterization of a public employee as a State agent or officer should not be determinative of an issue concerning the allocation of financial responsibility for the employee's alleged wrongdoing. In Godfrey v. McGann, 37 N.J. 28 (1962), the question was whether the State or Essex County was responsible for the payment of claims arising out of the embezzlement of money by the cashier of the Essex County Probation Department. The trial court held that the Probation Department is "an arm of the state judiciary" and consequently its officials are State "servants, agents and employees." Godfrey v. Board of Freeholders of County of Essex, 65 N.J. Super. 213, 214-15 (Law Div. 1961). On that basis, the trial court concluded that the State should bear responsibility for reimbursement of the money embezzled by the cashier. However, the Court held that the allocation of this financial responsibility should not turn on whether employees of a county probation department are characterized as "State" or "county" agents, but rather on whether the Legislature intended the State or county to be responsible for expenses incurred as a result of the cashier's wrongdoing. The county is an agency of the State to administer state power and authority. One of the county's principal roles is to help provide for the operation of the state judicial system within its borders. Accordingly, the taxpayers of the county bear a proper share of the cost of administering the judicial system within the county. The allocation of expenses to be paid by the taxpayers of the whole State and those to be paid by taxpayers of a county is a matter for legislative decision. . . . . . . . [T]he Legislature made each county responsible for meeting the expenses incurred in the operation of its Probation Department. N.J.S.A. 2A:168-8. Therefore, at least as far as monetary support is concerned, the Probation Department is a county subdivision. . . . . . . . [P]robation officers and employees of the Probation Department cannot be specifically identified as county or state agents. Therefore, the label attached to individuals is of no help in solving the present issue. Hence, this case cannot turn upon whether officers and employees of the Probation Department are "state" or "county" agents. The issue framed is whether the Legislature intended the State or the county to be chargeable with the losses caused by embezzlements of such agents. [37 N.J. at 34-36.] The Court concluded, based on statutory provisions authorizing the County Board of Freeholders to investigate the accounts of Probation Department employees and imposing responsibility upon the county to pay the premium on an "honest accounting" bond "as a necessary expense" of the Probation Department, that there was a "legislative design" to impose financial responsibility for the misappropriation of funds by a member of the Probation Department upon the county. Id. at 37. As in Godfrey, the question in this case is not whether employees of a county prosecutor's office are agents or officers of the State, but rather whether the Legislature intended to treat the expenses of defending and indemnifying these officials differently than the other expenses of operation of a prosecutor's office. The Tort Claims Act does not contain any expression of such a legislative intent. To the contrary, the provisions of the Act governing the State's defense and indemnification obligations and the Attorney General's commentary on the proposed Act clearly reflect a legislative intent to limit these obligations to traditional state employees. Furthermore, in the nearly thirty years since enactment of the Tort Claims Act, the State and counties have followed this view of the legislative intent, and the State has never been required to provide defense and indemnification or been held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an employee of a prosecutor's office. The Court has not demonstrated any basis for departing from this long-standing administrative practice. Accordingly, I would affirm the orders of the trial court dismissing appellants' defense and indemnification claims against the State. NO. A-54/55/56/57/58/59 ISAAC WRIGHT, ADRIEL McNAIR, A/K/A SUNSHINE WRIGHT and SANDRA WRIGHT, guardian for TIKEALLA WRIGHT, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 31, 2000 Justice Stein