Title: Strickland v. City of Wichita
Citation: 203 Kan. 954, 457 P.2d 162
Docket Number: 45,661
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 1969

203 Kan. 954 (1969)
457 P.2d 162
ELLA STRICKLAND, et al., Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WICHITA, et al., Appellees. MINNIE SCHRAMM, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF WICHITA, et al., Appellees.
No. 45,661

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 17, 1969.
Grey Dresie, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
Eugene L. Pirtle, First Assistant City Attorney, argued the cause, and John Dekker, City Attorney, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, C.J.:
These actions  consolidated in the court below  were to enjoin the City of Wichita from levying and collecting special asessments against lands owned by plaintiffs  such assessments arising out of the construction of a sewer.
Judgment was for defendant city, and plaintiff landowners have appealed.
No procedural problems are involved. As we view the case the basic question concerns the factors (or lack thereof) taken into consideration by the city-appointed appraisers in fixing the values of plaintiffs' lands.
The applicable statute (K.S.A. 12-608) under which the city proceeded, reads in part 
Plaintiff Strickland owned a tract of 58 acres of farm land in the area involved. For general tax purposes it was valued at approximately $12,000.00, and was used exclusively for farming purposes. Its actual value was about $600.00 per acre. The city appraisers valued it at $209,065.00  which resulted in a special assessment of $49,033.48.
Plaintiff Schramm owned a tract of 57 acres of farm land in the area involved. For general tax purposes it was valued at approximately $11,000.00, and was used exclusively for farming purposes. Its actual value was about $600.00 per acre. The city appraisers valued it at $224,630.00  which resulted in a special asessment of $52,686.20.
All of the lands in the large area involved had been zoned  ranging from "AA Single Family" to "F Heavy Industrial".
Plaintiffs' tracts, together with a number of others  were included in the portion zoned "heavy industrial".
As will be shown later, the appraisers applied a per square foot price based on zoning.
Plaintiffs then brought these actions  contending the appraisal so based was incorrect and unrealistic, that it was made without regard to the value of their lands as compared to adjacent lands within the same zoning, and that such appraisal  based solely upon mathematical computation  resulted in an unreasonable, arbitrary and grossly excessive assessment  all of which entitled them to injunctive relief.
The pretrial order  among other matters  included the following question for determination:
There was no material dispute in the evidence relating to actual land values. As earlier stated  the underlying question concerns the factors  or lack of them  taken into consideration by the appraisers in fixing values for purposes of the special assessment.
The method and procedure used by the appraisers can best be shown by quoting portions of the testimony  on both direct and *956 cross-examination  of the witness Arnold (one of the appraisers) as abstracted in the Record on Appeal:
..............
..............
..............
..............
..............
There was evidence that land owned by two existing heavy industrial users was worth $1,500.00 and $3,500.00 per acre.
The formula adopted by the appraisers and applied to the entire area, was as follows:
In its findings of fact the court found the values and assessments placed on plaintiffs' lands to be as related earlier in this opinion.
The court further found that the use of zoning as a measure of value was utilized by the appraisers to equalize values, and that the value of each parcel was determined according to zoning and the rate was applied and values were determined according to the square footage contained in each such parcel, and that thereafter the total costs were used as a basis of arriving at a factor, and from this factor the square footage in each parcel was assessed its proportionate share of the cost of construction.
The court's conclusions of law were for the most part general statements of law pertaining to the levy of special assessments, the presumptions of validity surrounding such proceedings, and the power of courts to interfere with the administrative process  concerning which no complaint is made.
In addition, the court held 
Injunctive relief was denied and judgment entered for the city. This appeal followed.
Although the brief of plaintiffs contains numerous statements *958 of points  their contentions actually narrow down to the one main point  that the "appraisal" was based solely on zoning without regard to actual land values  all of which resulted in such an unjust and arbitrary assessment as to entitle them to injunctive relief.
The statute (K.S.A. 12-608) provides that the values are to be determined without regard to the buildings or improvements  and it appears the appraisers followed that mandate. Concededly, zoning is a factor to be considered in arriving at value in a matter of this kind  but it is not the only one. The evidence is undisputed that other lands in the same zoning were worth $1,500.00 and $3,500.00 per acre, and yet those lands were valued by the appraisers on the same square-footage basis as the lands of plaintiffs  which, under the evidence, were worth approximately $600.00 per acre.
The case of Mullins v. City of El Dorado, 200 Kan. 336, 436 P.2d 837, is relied on by the city in support of the judgment. We believe the general statements of law contained in the syllabus of that case are correct  and that under the facts of that case were correctly applied. It is to be borne in mind, however, that in the Mullins case the appraisers did not arrive at values based solely on zoning  as was done here. There is another distinguishing feature  and we quote from page 346 of the opinion 
To sum up  while it appears the appraisers here gave "lip service" to other factors such as location, topography and the like  it is clear they ended up by basing values solely on zoning  the end result being to saddle plaintiffs' lands with an unreasonable and arbitrary assessment. For this reason we believe the trial court erred in denying injunctive relief.
The judgment is reversed.
FONTRON, J., concurring:
While I concur in the disposition of the appeal and agree with the legal principles stated and applied, I am unable to assent to any blanket endorsement of the result reached in Mullins v. City of El Dorado, 200 Kan. 336, 436 P.2d 837, in which I dissented without opinion. Now, as then, lack of time precludes elaboration.