Title: Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44770
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2000

Filed:  July 21, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

ARLEEN E. WADDILL,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
ANCHOR HOCKING, INC.,a Delaware corporation,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 9405-03390; CA A91012; SC S44770)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted October 12, 1999.
	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner
on review.  With her on the briefs were Maureen Leonard and D.
Lawrence Wobbrock, Portland.
	Robert H. Riley, of Schiff Hardin &amp; Waite, Chicago, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the briefs were Catherine
M. Masters and Neil Lloyd, Chicago, and Stephen S. Walters, of
Stoel Rives, LLP, Portland.
	John Paul Graff, of Graff &amp; O'Neil, Portland, filed the
briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	William Gaylord, of Gaylord &amp; Eyerman, P.C., Portland, filed
a brief on behalf of amici curiae William A. Gaylord, Linda K.
Eyerman, Gaylord and Eyerman, P.C.; Arthur Johnson, Johnson,
Clifton, Larson &amp; Corson, P.C.; Mark Bocci, Pippin &amp; Bocci;
Jeffrey P. Foote; Jeffrey B. Wihtol; Larry N. Sokol, Larry N.
Sokol &amp; Associates; Ray Thomas, Swanson, Thomas &amp; Coon; Lawrence
Baron; Elden Rosenthal, Rosenthal &amp; Greene, P.C.; Bernard Jolles,
Jolles, Bernstein &amp; Garone; Michael Williams, Williams &amp;
Troutwine, P.C.; Peter Preston, Robert Udziela, Robert Neuberger,
Pozzi Wilson Atchison, LLP; Charles Paulson and Jan Baisch,
Paulson and Baisch Trial Lawyers, P.C.; and Charles Tauman.
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,
	 Robert P. Jones, Judge.
	 149 Or App 464, 944 P2d 957 (1997).
		VAN HOOMISSEN, J. 						
		Plaintiff Arleen Waddill brought this action alleging
strict liability and negligence claims for personal injury.  She
challenges a Court of Appeals decision reversing a circuit court
judgment in her favor and remanding for a new trial.  Waddill v.
Anchor Hocking, Inc., 149 Or App 464, 944 P2d 957 (1997).  For
the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.  
		We take the following facts from the Court of Appeals'
opinion and the record: 
	"Plaintiff purchased a two-gallon glass fishbowl
manufactured by defendant.  There is no evidence that
the product was defective when manufactured.  Because
of normal use after purchase, the fishbowl developed a
small crack that could not be seen easily.  After use
for several months, plaintiff cleaned the fishbowl,
filled it with water and carried it, cradled in both
hands, to place it on a table.  As she lowered the
fishbowl, it shattered before it came into contact with
the table.  The broken glass injured plaintiff's hands
and wrists. 
		"As a result of her injuries, plaintiff filed this
action.  Over defendant's pretrial motion in limine to
exclude evidence, the trial court admitted evidence
about three previous complaints that had been filed
against defendant involving shattered fishbowls and
personal injuries to hands and wrists.  At the
conclusion of the trial, plaintiff moved to amend her
complaint to conform to the evidence that defendant had
been negligent in the manner in which it maintained
records of the three prior complaints.  The trial court
allowed the motion over defendant's objection, and the
following specification of negligence was added to the
complaint:  '[D]efendant was negligent * * * [i]n
failing to keep records of prior lawsuits for personal
injury due to breakage of the fishbowl.'  The jury
returned a general verdict finding defendant liable for
plaintiff's injuries."
Id. at 466.
		After the trial court entered judgment, defendant moved
to dismiss plaintiff's original failure-to-warn claims and her
newly added "negligent record-keeping" claim.  Relying on ORCP 21
A(8), (1) defendant argued that plaintiff had failed in each
instance to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a
claim.  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and
defendant appealed.
		The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had
stated failure-to-warn claims under both negligence and strict
liability.  Id. at 474, 476.  However, the court also concluded
that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for negligent record-keeping.  Id. at 478.  Because the court could not tell from the
jury's general verdict whether the jury found defendant liable
based on the negligent record-keeping claim or based on one or
more of plaintiff's other claims, the court applied the "we can't
tell" rule of Whinston v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 309 Or 350,
357, 788 P2d 428 (1990), and reversed and remanded for a new
trial.  Waddill, 149 Or App at 478-79.  We allowed plaintiff's
petition for review.
		Plaintiff argues on review that the Court of Appeals
should not have reached the merits of defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim because that motion was not
timely.  In the alternative, plaintiff argues that the court
erred in concluding that her negligent record-keeping allegations
failed to state a claim.  Finally, plaintiff argues that, in any
event, the court erred in applying Whinston.
		We begin with plaintiff's first argument.  Plaintiff
argues that defendant waived its right to attack the legal
sufficiency of her claims when defendant allowed the case to
proceed to judgment without raising the sufficiency issue to the
trial court.  Defendant responds that it raised the issue of the
legal sufficiency of the negligent record-keeping claim when it
objected to plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint.  At trial,
defense counsel objected to the addition of the negligent record-keeping wording to the complaint on the ground that "it's
evidence of the record issue, but that's not a specification of
negligence."  The context of defendant's argument to the trial
court does not persuade us that defendant put squarely before
that court the issue whether plaintiff had stated a legally
cognizable claim.  
		ORCP 21 A requires parties to state the grounds on
which a defense of failure to state a claim is based
"specifically and with particularity."  Defendant, however,
neither referred to ORCP 21 A(8) nor worded its objection to
resemble the wording contained in that rule:  "failure to state
ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim * * *."  Although
defendant could have elaborated on what it had said in a manner
that properly would have raised an ORCP 21 question, examination
of the colloquy between the court and counsel shows that
defendant was arguing something quite different.  The trial judge
apparently understood defendant to have argued that, because the
evidence of negligent record-keeping had been objected to in
limine, plaintiff's complaint should not have been amended to
conform to that evidence.  During that colloquy, defendant did
not clarify its position.  
		Because we conclude that defendant's objection did not
raise the issue of failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to
constitute a claim, we must consider whether, as plaintiff
claims, defendant's failure to raise that issue before the trial
court entered judgment precludes defendant from attacking on
appeal the sufficiency of plaintiff's claims.  Resolution of that
issue requires us to determine when, if ever, a party forfeits
the right to challenge the legal sufficiency of an opponent's
allegations.  At the trial court level, ORCP 21 governs that type
of challenge. 
		ORCP 21 G(3) provides: 
		"A defense of failure to state ultimate facts
constituting a claim * * * may be made in any pleading
permitted or ordered under Rule 13 B or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the
merits." 
(Emphasis added.)  We interpret Oregon's Rules of Civil Procedure
in the same manner in which we interpret Oregon's statutes. 
State v. Arnold, 320 Or 111, 119, 879 P2d 1272 (1994).  Adhering
to the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), we first
look to the text and context of the rule.  
		The text of the rule identifies three times at which a
party may assert the defense:  (1) in any pleading permitted or
ordered under Rule 13 B; (2) by motion for judgment on the
pleadings; and (3) at the trial on the merits.  Applying the
maxim of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ("the inclusion of
one is the exclusion of the other," see Fisher Broadcasting, Inc.
v. Dept. of Rev., 321 Or 341, 353, 898 P2d 1333 (1995) (applying
maxim to text of statute at first level of interpretive
analysis)), we conclude that the specification of those three
times indicates an intent on the part of the Council on Court
Procedures to limit the times at which a party may raise that
defense to those three and to make the defense otherwise
unavailable. (2)  As a practical matter, therefore, a party may not
raise an ORCP 21 A(8) defense after the last of those three
times, i.e., the trial on the merits, has passed.  In this case,
then, we must determine whether the trial on the merits had
concluded when defendant made its motion.  
		Here, both parties refer to defendant's motion to
dismiss as a "post-trial" motion and, without deciding precisely
when a trial on the merits ends, we assume, as do the parties by
their terminology, that the trial on the merits has ended at
least by the time when judgment is entered.  As noted, the motion
here followed entry of judgment.  The motion, therefore, was
untimely under ORCP 21 G(3). 
		Defendant argues that, before ORCP 21 became effective
on January 1, 1980, Oregon court decisions had allowed a party to
raise the defense of failure to state a claim for the first time
on appeal.  See, e.g., Fulton Ins. v. White Motor Corp., 261 Or
206, 210, 493 P2d 138 (1972) (so allowing).  Defendant reasons
that, if the defense of failure to state a claim can be raised
for the first time on appeal, surely it can be raised for the
first time while the case is pending in the trial court, albeit
after entry of the judgment.  In Richards v. Dahl, 289 Or 747,
752, 618 P2d 418 (1980), decided in October 1980, this court
repeated the rule found in those earlier decisions.  The issue
whether the court's pre-ORCP rule survived the adoption of the
ORCP was not raised by the parties, however, and the decision in
that case contained no analysis of the issue.  We now analyze the
effect of ORCP 21 on the rule recited in Richards. 
		Historically, the defenses of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim were linked in Oregon
law.  See McIntosh Livestock Co. v. Buffington, 108 Or 358, 363,
217 P 635 (1923) ("[e]xcept where the complaint fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or where the
court has no jurisdiction * * * of the subject matter of the
action, to which objection may be raised for the first time upon
appeal, this court will not pass upon a question which was not
presented to [the trial court]"); McKay v. Freeman, 6 Or 449, 453
(1877) (court followed practice of considering whether trial
court had subject-matter jurisdiction and whether complaint
stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, whether
or not such questions were assigned in notice of appeal).  In
Carver v. Jackson County, 22 Or 62, 63-64, 29 P 77 (1892), this
court stated that the reason for those rules was that, 
	"in a case where the court below was without
jurisdiction or where it acted upon a pleading which
was utterly destitute of legal merit, that is, which
entirely failed to state a cause of action or defense, 
the court was without power to render a judgment that
would be of any validity[.]" 
		The Council on Court Procedures, however, did not treat
those two defenses identically in 1978 when it promulgated
subsection G of ORCP 21. (3)  As discussed, the defense of failure
to state a claim was included in ORCP 21 G(3), a category of
defenses that a party may raise only in certain circumstances,
viz.,
	"in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 13 B
or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the
trial on the merits."  
The defense of failure to state a claim was not paired with the
defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  That latter
defense was set out separately in ORCP 21 G(4), which provides
that,
		"[i]f it appears by motion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." 
		Subparagraph G(4) does not specify when the defense of
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised.  However, this
court has determined that a party may raise that defense at any
time, including for the first time on appeal.  See, e.g., SAIF v.
Shipley, 326 Or 557, 561 n 1, 955 P2d 244 (1998) (so noting). 
		Our reading of the text of ORCP 21 indicates that the
Council on Court Procedures intended the defense of failure to
state a claim to be waivable by a party's failure to assert it in
a timely manner, but did not intend the defense of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to be waivable.  We find no
contextual provisions that raise any questions with respect to
what we perceive to be the clear meaning of ORCP 21 G(3).  The
adoption of ORCP 21 G(3) has superseded the rule recited in
Richards.  It follows from the foregoing that defendant's motion
was not timely, and defendant thus waived the defense of failure
to state a claim under ORCP 21 A(8).
 		We hold that ORCP 21 G(3) both specifies and limits the
times when the defense of failure to state a claim may be raised. 
Oregon appellate courts will not consider on appeal the legal
sufficiency of a claim unless a defense on that basis was raised
to the trial court before or during the trial on the merits in
the manner prescribed by ORCP 21 G(3).  We further hold that,
because defendant here did not timely raise the issue of the
legal sufficiency of plaintiff's claims and, therefore, waived
that defense, the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 

1. 	ORCP 21 A provides in part:
	"[T]he following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion to dismiss: * * * (8) failure
to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a
claim * * *."

2. 	The legislature created the Council on Court Procedures
in 1977 to promulgate, subject to legislative disapproval or
amendment, rules of civil procedure.  ORS 1.725 through 1.735. 
Thus, unless the legislature amended the rule at issue in a
particular case in a manner that affects the issues in that case,
the Council's intent governs the interpretation of the rule. 
See Lake Oswego Review, Inc. v. Steinkamp, 295 Or 607, 610-11,
695 P2d 565 (1985) (looking to intent of Council to interpret
rule).

3. 	On December 2, 1978, the Council promulgated 58 rules
(numbered 1 through 64, reserving six rule numbers for
expansion).  Those rules were submitted to the 1979 Legislature
and took effect, as amended, on January 1, 1980.  Another series
of promulgated rules took effect on January 1, 1982, as ORCP 65
through ORCP 85.