Title: Avendano v. Shaw
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1210125
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 2022

Rel: August 19, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2022 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210125 
_________________________ 
 
Angel Avendano and Sandy Knowles  
 
v.  
 
Victoria Shaw 
 
 
 
Appeal from Dale Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900110) 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
This case stems from the serial fraud of Brandy Murrah, the former 
owner of a drug-screening laboratory who is now in prison for falsifying 
1210125 
2 
 
test results.  The plaintiffs, Angel Avendano and Sandy Knowles, claim 
to be victims of Murrah's fraud and allege that social worker Victoria 
Shaw conspired with Murrah to falsify the results of their drug tests.  
Shaw moved to dismiss the claims against her, and the Dale Circuit 
Court granted that motion.  Avendano and Knowles now appeal.  Because 
we conclude that Avendano and Knowles's complaint states some viable 
claims against Shaw, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.   
Facts and Procedural History1 
 
Angel Avendano is the father of two children who, during the time 
frame relevant to this case, had been placed in foster care.  Though the 
children's foster parents were their primary caregivers, Avendano 
retained visitation rights and would regularly host the children at his 
home.  Avendano's employer, Sandy Knowles, was close with Avendano 
and would help care for the children while they were staying with him.   
During the children's time in foster care, one of the foster parents 
came to believe that the children's biological mother (Avendano's ex-wife) 
 
1For purposes of this appeal, we view the record in the light most 
favorable to Avendano and Knowles, and we resolve factual disputes and 
ambiguities in their favor to the greatest reasonable extent.  See Nelson 
v. Megginson, 165 So. 3d 567, 571 (Ala. 2014).   
1210125 
3 
 
had been using illegal drugs around the children.  The foster parent 
decided to give the children an at-home drug test, which allegedly turned 
up positive.  The Dale County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") 
-- the agency charged with providing child-protective services and 
overseeing the county's foster-care system -- soon launched an 
investigation.  As part of that investigation, DHR social worker Victoria 
Shaw (who all parties agree is an employee of the State of Alabama for 
purposes of this appeal) went to Avendano's house, accompanied by 
Brandy Murrah, and asked Avendano and Knowles to submit to drug 
tests administered by Murrah.  Believing that the tests were legitimate, 
Avendano and Knowles agreed.   
Murrah administered the tests and then reported that both 
Avendano 
and 
Knowles 
were 
positive 
for 
"amphetamines 
or 
methamphetamines."  Avendano and Knowles insisted that the test 
results must be wrong.  To prove it, they procured their own drug tests 
from an independent laboratory, which showed that they were drug-free.  
Avendano and Knowles presented the negative test results to Shaw, but 
to no avail -- Shaw relied on Murrah's test results to restrict Avendano's 
and Knowles's ability to see the children.   
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4 
 
According to Avendano and Knowles, their loss of contact with the 
children caused them to experience severe anguish and emotional 
distress.  They further allege that the false accusations of illegal drug use 
and unfit parenting or caretaking impugned their reputations within 
their community and crippled Knowles's business.  
It eventually came to light that Murrah was a serial fraudster who 
had, on multiple occasions, falsified the results of tests submitted to her 
lab.  In 2020, Murrah confessed her crimes and was sentenced to several 
years in prison.  Shortly after Murrah's conviction, Avendano and 
Knowles brought this lawsuit against Shaw and several unknown and 
fictitiously named defendants, seeking damages as well as injunctive 
relief.  They claim that their drug tests were among the many tests that 
Murrah had falsified, and they further claim that Shaw knew about and 
willfully participated in Murrah's illegal conduct.   
Although portions of their complaint are inartfully drafted,2 it 
appears that Avendano and Knowles have pleaded four claims against 
 
2Avendano and Knowles filed both an initial complaint and an 
amended complaint.  The amended complaint is the operative complaint 
for purposes of this appeal, and we refer to it as "the complaint" 
throughout this opinion.   
 
1210125 
5 
 
Shaw in her individual capacity: outrage, fraud, conspiracy to commit the 
tort of outrage, and conspiracy to commit fraud.3  Avendano and Knowles 
have also pleaded an official-capacity claim against Shaw, in which they 
seek to compel Shaw to take various steps to remove any mention of their 
drug tests from State records.   
 
Shaw moved to dismiss all claims against her, and, following a 
hearing, the trial court granted that motion in an unexplained order.  
Avendano and Knowles filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the 
judgment, which the trial court denied.  This appeal followed.   
Standard of Review 
In reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, we review 
legal questions de novo but resolve factual disputes and ambiguities in 
favor of the plaintiffs to the greatest reasonable extent.  Nelson v. 
Megginson, 165 So. 3d 567, 571 (Ala. 2014).  If the plaintiffs could 
plausibly prove any set of circumstances that would entitle them to relief, 
we must reverse the judgment of dismissal.  Id.    
 
3The complaint also lists three individual-capacity "counts" (Counts 
I, V, and VI) that are not actually claims but rather arguments related to 
the claims mentioned above.  In their briefing before this Court, 
Avendano and Knowles acknowledge that those "counts" are not claims, 
so we do not analyze them further.   
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6 
 
Analysis 
A.  Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Before turning to the merits of Avendano and Knowles's complaint, 
we must ensure that this Court and the trial court have subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  Shaw says that we lack jurisdiction for two independent 
reasons: she argues first that Knowles lacks standing to bring suit and, 
second, that she is entitled to State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama 
Constitution, see Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. I, § 14 ("[T]he 
State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or 
equity.").  We disagree on both counts.   
First, this Court has held for nearly a decade that jurisdictional 
"standing" analysis has no place in private-law claims, such as the 
individual-capacity claims at issue here.  Ex parte BAC Home Loans 
Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 31, 44 (Ala. 2013).   Even if standing analysis 
were applicable to the official-capacity claim (a question the parties do 
not address and on which we express no view), Avendano and Knowles's 
allegations would satisfy the traditional requirements for establishing 
standing to sue: (1) actual injury, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.   
See Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So. 2d 288, 293 (Ala. 2007).  Here, 
1210125 
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Knowles and Avendano each alleged (1) actual injuries (including 
financial harms and emotional distress), (2) caused by Shaw (who 
allegedly participated in and ratified Murrah's fraud), which are (3) 
redressable by a favorable judicial decision (namely, an injunction).  
Nothing more is required to establish standing to sue in the jurisdictional 
sense.  Id. 
Second, Shaw is not entitled to State immunity.  State immunity 
prohibits suits against the State itself, but it does not bar claims against 
State officers (even in their official capacity) unless those claims seek to 
impair a contract or property right of the State or to recover money from 
the State.  See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1132 (Ala. 2013).  
Avendano and Knowles's official-capacity claim against Shaw seeks to 
have the trial court compel Shaw to correct certain official records, but it 
does not demand damages from the State or otherwise attack a State 
contractual or property right.4  That claim is therefore " 'not considered 
 
4The complaint does contain a generalized demand for attorney fees 
and costs.  While such an award is sometimes appropriate against an 
individual defendant sued in his or her personal capacity, we have held 
that such a demand cannot be enforced against the State or its agencies 
consistent with § 14, even if the underlying claim is permitted.  Ex parte 
Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1211-12 (Ala. 2006). 
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8 
 
to be [an] action[] " 'against the State' for § 14 purposes." ' " Id. (citations 
omitted).  
The same logic governs our analysis of the individual-capacity 
claims against Shaw.  Those claims (unlike the official-capacity, 
injunctive-relief claim) do seek damages, but they seek damages from 
Shaw's personal accounts, not from the State treasury.  As we recently 
explained in Ex parte Pinkard, [Ms. 1200658, May 27, 2022] ___ So. 3d 
___ (Ala. 2022), "State immunity does not bar claims that name and seek 
relief only from individual officers in their personal capacity," id. at ____, 
as Avendano and Knowles's individual-capacity claims against Shaw do.  
In her briefs before the trial court and on appeal, Shaw relied on our 
decision Barnhart v. Ingalls, 275 So. 3d 1112 (Ala. 2018), to argue that 
State-immunity foreclosed the individual-capacity claims against her, 
but our intervening decision in Pinkard expressly overruled the portion 
of Barnhart on which Shaw relied.  See Ex parte Pinkard, ___ So. 3d at 
____ (repudiating Barnhart and its progeny).  State immunity is no 
obstacle to the claims against Shaw.   
Satisfied that we have jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits.   
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9 
 
B.  The Official-Capacity Claim 
Count IV of the complaint, which contains the official-capacity 
claim against Shaw, characterizes that claim as a claim for "injunctive 
relief."  Shaw argued to the trial court, and continues to argue on appeal, 
that dismissal of that claim is justified because injunctive relief is a 
remedy rather than an "independent cause of action."  Shaw further 
argues that Avendano and Knowles have not identified any cause of 
action that would authorize the injunctive relief demanded in Count IV 
(namely, an order requiring Shaw to correct State records).  Avendano 
and Knowles do not address this argument in either their opening brief 
or their reply brief and, thus, have failed to meet their burden of 
demonstrating that the trial court erred.  Mottershaw v. Ledbetter, 148 
So. 3d 45, 54 (Ala. 2013).  We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal 
of the official-capacity claim against Shaw.   
C.  The Individual-Capacity Claims  
1.  State-Agent Immunity Does Not Justify Dismissal 
Shaw argues that even if she is not entitled to the jurisdictional 
protection of State immunity with respect to the individual-capacity 
claims against her, she is nonetheless entitled to the more limited, 
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10 
 
nonjurisdictional affirmative defense of State-agent immunity, which 
protects State employees from personal liability for certain actions 
undertaken in the performance of their official duties.  See § 36-1-12, Ala. 
Code 1975; Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality 
opinion); Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177-78 (Ala. 2000) (adopting 
Cranman's State-agent-immunity restatement in a majority opinion).  
There is an exception to State-agent immunity, however, for actions or 
conduct undertaken "willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, 
beyond [the agent's] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the 
law."  § 36-1-12(d)(2); Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.   
In support of her State-agent-immunity defense, Shaw insists that 
the bad-faith and other exceptions cannot apply to her because she knew 
nothing about Murrah's misconduct.  She further argues that Avendano 
and Knowles's contrary allegations are too "conclusory" to give rise to a 
plausible inference that she conspired with Murrah or otherwise acted in 
bad faith.  Shaw's argument on this point seems to assume that 
Avendano and Knowles, as plaintiffs, bear the burden of anticipating and 
pleading around her State-agent-immunity defense, but we have held 
that the opposite is true: 
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"[I]n pleading a claim against a State agent, a plaintiff's 
initial burden is merely to state a cause of action against the 
defendant. The plaintiff need not anticipate a State-agent-
immunity defense by pleading with particularity a Cranman 
exception. Therefore, unless the inapplicability of all the 
Cranman exceptions is clear from the face of the complaint, a 
motion to dismiss based on State-agent immunity must be 
denied." 
 
Odom v. Helms, 314 So. 3d 220, 229 n.3 (Ala. 2020).  
Under Odom, a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., dismissal premised on 
State-agent immunity would be proper only if it were obvious from the 
face of the complaint that Shaw did not act willfully, maliciously, 
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond her authority, or under a mistaken 
interpretation of the law.  That standard is difficult to meet, see Ex parte 
Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 
813-14 (Ala. 2002), and is not satisfied here.  
Here, the complaint alleges that Shaw worked closely with Murrah, 
personally directed Murrah in the performance of her job duties, was 
physically present while Murrah performed the drug tests on Avendano 
and Knowles, and ignored independent lab results showing that 
Murrah's tests were inaccurate.  Nothing about these allegations 
affirmatively rules out the possibility that Shaw acted maliciously, 
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond her authority, or under a mistaken 
1210125 
12 
 
interpretation of the law.  Thus, State-agent immunity cannot be an 
appropriate basis for dismissal.     
2.  Section 26-14-9 Immunity Does Not Justify Dismissal 
Shaw also points to a third possible basis for immunity:  § 26-14-9, 
Ala. Code 1975, which shields from liability persons who participate in 
"the making of a good faith report" in child-abuse removals, 
investigations, or judicial proceedings.  Even if the drug-test report at 
issue here qualifies as a report related to child-abuse proceedings (a 
conclusion that Avendano and Knowles dispute and about which we 
express no opinion), we have just explained that the complaint leaves 
room for the possibility that Shaw's actions related to that report were 
not undertaken in "good faith."  Accordingly, § 26-14-9 immunity is not 
an appropriate basis for dismissal. 
3.  Shaw's Remaining Arguments In Support of Dismissal Fail 
Shaw next presents several additional theories for dismissal that, 
she says, vindicate the trial court's judgment.  For the reasons given 
below, none of those alternate theories is viable.   
To begin, Shaw asserts that Avendano and Knowles "failed to state 
a claim of outrage under Alabama law as previously set forth by this 
1210125 
13 
 
Court," but she does not explain -- and we do not see -- why that it so.  
Although it is true that the "tort of outrage is an extremely limited cause 
of action," Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000), we have held 
that an outrage claim can proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage if the 
complaint alleges conduct " 'so extreme in degree as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized society.' "  Wilson v. University of Alabama 
Health Servs. Found., P.C., 266 So. 3d 674, 677 (Ala. 2017) (quoting 
Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990)); 
see also American Rd. Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 364-65 (Ala. 
1980) (noting that the tort of outrage "does not recognize recovery for 
'mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or 
other trivialities' " (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d 
(Am. L. Inst. 1965)).  A plaintiff can satisfy this rigorous standard by 
plausibly alleging that the defendant's conduct (1) was intentional or 
reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused severe 
emotional distress that a reasonable person could not be expected to 
endure.  American Rd. Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 364-65.     
1210125 
14 
 
In our view, Avendano and Knowles's allegations clear this high 
hurdle, because the complaint alleges that Shaw: (1) "intentional[ly] and 
malicious[ly]" colluded with Murrah (2) to fabricate positive drug-test 
results and to use those fabricated results to falsely smear Avendano and 
Knowles as drug addicts unfit to be around children, and that (3) this 
conduct caused severe and unbearable emotional distress by stripping 
Avendano and Knowles of their parental and caretaking rights, 
respectively, and by clouding their reputations within their community.   
The same allegations also support a claim of conspiracy to commit the 
tort of outrage, because Avendano and Knowles contend that Shaw 
conspired with Murrah to perpetrate this unlawful scheme.  See Eidson 
v. Olin Corp., 527 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. 1988) ("Civil conspiracy is a 
combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful end (by 
civil law standards) or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means."). 
Shaw next argues that the complaint fails to state a claim of fraud.  
Fraud requires (1) a false representation (2) of a material fact (3) relied 
upon by the plaintiff (4) who was damaged as a proximate result of the 
misrepresentation.  See § 6-5-101, Ala. Code 1975; Standard Furniture 
Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 572 So. 2d 389, 391 (Ala. 1990).  Shaw contends that 
1210125 
15 
 
the complaint fails to satisfy the first of those elements because, she says, 
it does not allege that "false representations were made by Shaw to 
[Avendano and Knowles]."  Again, we disagree.  The complaint alleges 
that "Shaw represented … that the [drug] tests were legitimate tests that 
would be properly processed to determine the results" and that this 
representation was "false."  The complaint further alleges that Avendano 
and Knowles relied on Shaw's false representation to their detriment.  
Those allegations, taken together, satisfy all the elements of a fraud 
claim.  Avendano and Knowles have also stated a viable claim of 
conspiracy to commit fraud by alleging that Shaw "willful[ly], 
intentional[ly], and malicious[ly]" colluded with Murrah to perpetrate the 
fraudulent scheme.  See Eidson, 527 So. 2d at 1285.  
Finally, Shaw argues that the outrage, fraud, and conspiracy claims 
against her must fail because, she says, Avendano's and Knowles's 
injuries were caused solely by the criminal conduct of a third party, 
Murrah, who acted without Shaw's knowledge or approval.  Again, this 
assertion flatly contradicts the complaint, which alleges that Shaw was 
Murrah's coconspirator.  A defendant's bare assertion of innocence cannot 
1210125 
16 
 
justify dismissal when that assertion conflicts with the plaintiffs' well-
pleaded factual allegations.   
Conclusion 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with respect to the 
official-capacity claim against Shaw and is reversed with respect to the 
individual-capacity claims against her.  The case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs. 
 
Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.