Title: Commonwealth v. Allen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11850
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2016

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SJC-11850 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES ALLEN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 10, 2015. - April 20, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Defense of Others.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury.  License.  Constitutional Law, Right 
to bear arms. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 1, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Matthew V. Soares for the defendant. 
 
Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney (Jennifer J. 
Hickman, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Levi W. Swank, of the District of Columbia, & David A.F. 
Lewis & Stephen D. Poss, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 CORDY, J.  On March 21, 2012, a jury convicted the 
defendant, James Allen, of murder in the second degree,1 and of 
carrying a firearm without a license, possession of ammunition 
without a firearms identification card, and possession of a 
large capacity firearm feeding device without a license.2  At 
trial, his defense was that he was justified in using deadly 
force because he was coming to defense of a friend (Shawn 
Buchanan) who was being threatened with deadly force by the 
victim, Senai Williams. 
 
The defendant timely appealed his conviction, and we 
granted his application for direct appellate review.  On appeal, 
he raises several claims.  First, he argues that the trial 
judge's instruction to the jury on defense of another was 
incorrect because it improperly suggested that the defendant may 
have had a duty to retreat, and because it negated the 
possibility of a finding of so-called excessive force 
manslaughter by instructing that the defendant was required to 
avail himself of available alternatives before employing deadly 
force and that if the Commonwealth proved that the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, 
and the jury was instructed on murder in the first degree by 
reason of deliberate premeditation. 
 
 
2 The defendant was tried together with Shawn Buchanan.  
Buchanan was acquitted of being an accessory after the fact to 
the offense of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, and of several firearms charges. 
3 
 
used excessive force then it had proved that he did not act in 
lawful defense of another.  The defendant also claims error 
based on misstatements by the prosecutor in closing argument; 
the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial testimony; 
insufficient evidence supporting the firearms convictions; and 
constitutional violations in connection with the firearm 
indictments.  We conclude that portions of the jury instructions 
concerning excessive force manslaughter were erroneous and 
prejudicial.  Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's conviction 
of murder in the second degree and remand the case for a new 
trial on that charge.  We affirm the defendant's remaining 
convictions.3 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence.  On November 
18, 2010, the defendant shot and killed the victim.  The 
shooting arose from a dispute between two groups of neighbors 
and their associates residing at 20 and 23 Homestead Street in 
the Roxbury section of Boston.  The 20 Homestead Street group 
included the victim; his girl friend, Shaquice Herring; and her 
mother, brothers, and cousins.  The 23 Homestead Street group 
included the defendant; his friend, Shawn "Lucky" Buchanan; 
Buchanan's mother; his girl friend; and his half-brother, 
Rellindo Stephens. 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
 
The events that culminated in the shooting began that 
afternoon, when Stephens and some friends were looking for a 
place to smoke marijuana.  Because his mother was home, Stephens 
decided to smoke in the hallway of 20 Homestead Street.  
Herring's mother, who had received complaints from her landlord 
about marijuana smoke in the hallway, told the victim and two 
others in their group to go downstairs to tell Stephens and his 
friends they could not smoke in the hallway.  Following a tense 
exchange of words, the victim grabbed Stephens and forced him 
out the door. 
 
As Stephens crossed the street to return to his house, he 
saw Herring in her window and called her a bitch.  Angered, she 
went outside to confront him.  The victim eventually separated 
the two, but not before Herring slapped and punched Stephens in 
the face. 
 
Stephens called his brother, Buchanan, about the incident.  
Buchanan, accompanied by the defendant, went to Homestead 
Street.  By the time they arrived, night had fallen and the 
street lights were on.  When Buchanan got to Homestead, he 
beckoned to Herring and the victim to come down to the street.  
Eventually, Stephens joined the three, who were speaking calmly 
with one another.  The conversation became more heated as they 
began to discuss the earlier incident with Stephens.  Someone 
asked if the victim had hit Stephens, and Herring told Buchanan 
5 
 
that she, and not the victim, had hit him.  The victim attempted 
to demonstrate the manner in which he had made contact with 
Stephens in the hallway; Stephens, however, was still upset and 
demanded that the victim take his hands off of him.  Likewise, 
Buchanan told the victim he did not need to touch Stephens to 
explain.  The defendant, who was standing on the porch of 20 
Homestead, said to Buchanan, "Handle your business, Luck."  At 
this time, the victim moved to the side of Herring and then 
reached over her, trying to punch Buchanan. 
 
A number of people had converged on their porches and 
sidewalk to watch the escalating confrontation, including other 
members of the two groups.  A neighbor living at 21 Homestead 
also watched the confrontation from her porch.  The defendant 
and others suggested that the victim and Buchanan have a "fair 
one," a one-on-one fist fight. 
 
While the defendant stood on the front porch of 20 
Homestead, Buchanan and the victim began to fight.  They 
repeatedly swung at each other without making contact.  At one 
point, the two men were getting close to an automobile belonging 
to the neighbor's father, which was parked on the street; at her 
request, they moved away from the vehicle.  It appeared to the 
neighbor that "they . . . didn't really want to fight."  Around 
this time, the defendant came down the front steps of 20 
Homestead into the street. 
6 
 
 
The testimony about what happened next, in the moments 
prior to the shooting, is in conflict.  Herring testified that 
both Buchanan and the victim pulled out knives, and that she 
made the victim walk away from Buchanan at that point.  She also 
testified that the latch on the victim's knife was broken, so 
that the blade would not stand up straight.  Others testified 
that Buchanan pulled out a knife and then the victim pulled out 
a knife.  Still another witness testified that the victim never 
had a chance to get his knife out of his pocket. 
 
Stephens, however, testified that Buchanan had been holding 
a cellular telephone when the fight broke out and that when he 
went to put it in his pocket, the victim asked if Buchanan was 
"reaching."  He further testified that the victim began "jumping 
at [Buchanan], like breasting," that he had a knife in his hand, 
and that Buchanan began backing away from the victim.  Another 
witness testified that she saw a knife in the victim's hand, 
although Buchanan's back was to her so she could not see if he 
was holding anything. 
 
The testimony concerning the distance between Buchanan and 
the victim is also in conflict, with some witnesses testifying 
the two men were a little more than an arm's length apart and 
another testifying that they were at least one automobile length 
apart.  According to one witness, as the victim backed away from 
Buchanan, the defendant came around a vehicle in a creeping 
7 
 
fashion, pulled a gun, and fired it over Buchanan's shoulder.  
The victim fell to the ground.  Some witnesses heard the 
defendant say something like, "You don't bring a knife to a 
gunfight."  Herring heard the defendant say this before he fired 
the gun; the others heard him say it after the gun had been 
fired. 
 
The victim got up and ran to the rear of 20 Homestead, 
having been shot once in the right lower back.4  He was taken to 
the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.  The defendant fled 
toward Walnut Avenue, while Buchanan ran into 23 Homestead. 
 
When the police arrived, Herring screamed, "[H]urry up, 
hurry up, he's dying," and ran to the back of the building.  
Shortly thereafter, based on a description of the shooter, 
officers stopped the defendant near the Jackson Square subway 
station.  The defendant told the officers that he had just 
gotten off the bus, that he was coming from his girl friend's 
apartment in Somerville, and that he was going to see his 
sister. 
 
The defendant was subsequently arrested.  The K-9 unit 
searched 23 Homestead the next day and recovered the firearm 
                                                          
 
 
4 The medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified 
that he was not able to determine the angle that the victim was 
at when he was shot. 
8 
 
used in the shooting, concealed behind a box inside a small 
storage area in the basement. 
 
The police also recovered the victim's knife.  A Boston 
police department criminologist testified that the knife's blade 
did not stay up because the knife was missing its "innards."  
She also testified that she did not know if the knife worked 
before she examined it. 
 
2.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that the 
judge's instruction on defense of another (1) erroneously 
conflated principles of self-defense and defense of another by 
suggesting that the defendant had a duty to retreat; and (2) 
improperly negated the possibility of a finding of so-called 
excessive force manslaughter by stating, among other things, 
that the defendant was required to avail himself of available 
alternatives before employing deadly force.5,6  The ambiguous, 
                                                          
 
 
5 For the first time on appeal, the Commonwealth argues that 
the defendant was not entitled to the defense of another 
instruction.  Notwithstanding the untimeliness of this argument, 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, see Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 68 (2015), 
was sufficient to require the instruction, especially given the 
conflicting testimony about whether both the victim and Buchanan 
had knives, who took his knife out first (if at all), and 
whether either man was backing away from the other at the moment 
of the shooting.  See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 131, 141 
(2012) (instructions on defense of another warranted where 
evidence is sufficient to create reasonable doubt as to whether 
defendant reasonably believed intervention was necessary to 
prevent harm to third party). 
 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
6 The instruction was, in relevant part, as follows, with 
added emphasis to the challenged portions: 
 
 
"In order to defend another person with a dangerous 
weapon likely to cause serious injury or death, or in other 
words to use deadly force, the person using the weapon or 
deadly force must have a reasonable apprehension that the 
other person is in danger of great bodily harm or death, 
and a reasonable belief that no other means would suffice 
to prevent such harm. 
 
 
"Put another way, the proper exercise of defense of 
another person means that a person in the defendant's 
circumstances, Mr. Allen's circumstances, would reasonably 
believe that the other person was about to be attacked and 
that the other person was in immediate danger of being 
killed or seriously injured, and, and that there was no 
other way to avoid the attack.  A person using a dangerous 
weapon or deadly force in defense of another must also have 
actually believed, actually believed that the other person 
was in imminent danger of serious harm or death.  The 
person may not use force in defense of another person until 
he has availed himself of all proper means to avoid 
physical combat.  A person who reasonably but mistakenly 
believes that the other person is in imminent danger of 
serious bodily harm or death, and that he has used all 
proper means to avoid the use of force, may still use 
deadly force to defend the other person. . . . 
 
 
"[T]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not, did not act in defense of 
another.  The Commonwealth may satisfy that burden by 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt any one, any one of the 
following propositions.  Number one, the defendant did not 
subjectively believe that Shawn Buchanan was in imminent 
danger of serious injury or death.  Or, or, number two, 
even if the defendant, Mr. Allen, believed Mr. Buchanan was 
in such danger, the defendant's belief was not objectively 
reasonable.  Or, number three, the defendant failed to 
avail himself of other available alternatives before 
employing deadly force.  If the Commonwealth has proved any 
one of those things, then it has proved that the defendant 
did not act in defense of another. 
 
 
10 
 
confusing, and contradictory nature of the instructions, argues 
the defendant, warrants reversal of his conviction.  We agree, 
although for somewhat different reasons than those proffered by 
the defendant. 
 
Because the defendant raised a timely objection to the 
judge's instruction to the jury, we review his claim for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 687 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
"Now there is one additional way in which the 
Commonwealth may prove that the defendant did not act in 
lawful defense of another.  You will recall that I told you 
when I was explaining the legal concept of defense of 
another that a person may use no more force than is 
reasonably necessary in all of the circumstances to defend 
another person.  If a person uses unreasonable force or 
excessive force, then he is not acting in lawful defense of 
another.  Thus, if the Commonwealth proves that the 
defendant used excessive force in defending Shawn Buchanan, 
then it has proved that the defendant did not act in lawful 
defense of another.  However, . . . excessive force in 
otherwise lawful defense of another is a mitigating 
circumstance, a mitigating circumstance that reduces the 
offense of murder to manslaughter.  Manslaughter is the 
unlawful killing of a human being using excessive force in 
defense of another. 
 
 
"Thus, if the Commonwealth has failed to prove any one 
of the three things that I previously explained, number 
one, that the defendant did not subjectively believe that 
Shawn Buchanan was in imminent danger of serious injury or 
death, or number two, even if the defendant, Mr. Allen, 
believed Mr. Buchanan was in such danger, the defendant's 
belief was not objectively reasonable, or, number three, 
the defendant failed to avail himself of other available 
alternatives before employing deadly force, but . . . the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant used excessive force in self-defense, then you 
would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter." 
 
11 
 
(2015).  We determine "whether the instructions were legally 
erroneous, and (if so) whether the error was prejudicial."  Id. 
at 688, quoting Kelly v. Foxboro Realty Assocs., LLC, 454 Mass. 
306, 310 (2009).  We will not find prejudice where an error "did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect . . . .  
But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all 
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the 
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, [then] it is impossible to conclude that substantial 
rights were not affected."  Kelly, 470 Mass. at 688, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  We 
evaluate jury instructions "as a whole, looking for the 
interpretation a reasonable juror would place on the judge's 
words . . . rather than scrutinizing bits and pieces removed 
from their context" (citations, quotations, and alterations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Harris, 464 Mass. 425, 434 (2013). 
 
The elements of defense of another are well settled:  "An 
actor is justified in using force against another to protect a 
third person when (a) a reasonable person in the actor's 
position would believe his intervention to be necessary for the 
protection of the third person, and (b) in the circumstances as 
that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third 
person would be justified in using such force to protect 
himself."  Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 (2012), 
12 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 (1976).7  The 
jury need not find that the third person was entitled to use 
force in self-defense, "however, the intervening defendant must 
have had a reasonable belief that the third person was being 
unlawfully attacked."  Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 68 
(2015).  "The reasonableness of the belief may depend in part on 
the relationships among the persons involved."  Martin, supra at 
649.  "[I]f the defendant uses deadly force in order to protect 
another where that amount of force was unwarranted, the 
defendant's conduct will not be fully excused and he or she may 
                                                          
 
 
7 At the time of the defendant's trial, the model jury 
instructions provided: 
 
 
 
"A homicide is also excused and is therefore not a 
crime, if it results from the proper exercise of the 
defense of a third person.  A person may lawfully use a 
dangerous weapon (or deadly force) in defense of a third 
person when a reasonable person in the actor's position 
would believe that such intervention was necessary for the 
protection of the third person, and in the circumstances as 
that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third 
person would have been justified in using a dangerous 
weapon (or deadly force) to protect himself. 
 
 
"The defense of another instruction should mirror the 
self-defense instructions. 
 
 
"The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did not act in defense of a third 
person.  If the Commonwealth fails to [do so] . . . then 
you must find the defendant not guilty."  (Emphasis in 
original.) 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 58 (1999). 
13 
 
still be found guilty of manslaughter."  Okoro, supra at 68, 
citing, Martin, supra. 
 
a.  Duty to retreat.  We first consider the defendant's 
argument that the instruction on defense of another was 
erroneous because it intermingled principles of self-defense 
with defense of another, creating the improper suggestion that 
the defendant had a duty to retreat before using force in 
defense of another.  Specifically, the defendant takes issue 
with the following instruction: 
 
"The person [claiming defense of another] may not use 
force in defense of another person until he has availed 
himself of all proper means to avoid physical combat.  A 
person who reasonably but mistakenly believes that the 
other person is in imminent danger of serious bodily harm 
or death, and that he has used all proper means to avoid 
the use of force, may still use deadly force to defend the 
other person." 
 
 
The defendant argues that this language deviates from the 
model jury instructions and is careless in its use of the 
pronoun "he," creating ambiguity as to which actor, the aider 
(the defendant) or the aided (Buchanan), must "avail himself of 
all proper means to avoid physical combat."  Moreover, says the 
defendant, the instruction, contrary to Massachusetts law, 
imposes both a duty to exhaust available alternatives before 
using deadly force as well as a duty to retreat when defending 
another.  The defendant also posits that the ambiguity and error 
were compounded by the judge's repeated use of this language, 
14 
 
which essentially added a "third prong" to the established 
elements of the defense of another defense.  Although we agree 
that the instructions were flawed and confusing as to these 
points, and we disapprove of the inclusion of the "third prong" 
language,8 we disagree that the instruction, taken as a whole, 
constitutes reversible error. 
 
Although this court has not had occasion to address the 
precise issue raised by the defendant, we have found two cases 
from the Appeals Court that addressed the issue whether 
instructions on defense of another improperly imposed a duty of 
retreat.  See Commonwealth v. Hakala, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 921 
(1986); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 981 (1984).  
These cases are instructive, as the defendants there, as here, 
argued that the jury instructions, though somewhat differently 
formulated, erroneously imposed a duty of retreat on a defendant 
claiming defense of another. 
 
In Sullivan, the defendant argued it was erroneous for the 
judge to "employ[] the words 'self defense' in his explanation 
                                                          
 
 
8 The judge indicated that he believed our decision in 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 879, 885 n.3 (2008), 
required the inclusion of this language.  We take this 
opportunity to clarify that Williams, which dealt with 
instructions on self-defense, does not impose such a requirement 
with respect to instructions on defense of another.  Rather, 
judges should look to the 2013 Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide, which provide a clear formulation of when deadly force 
may be employed in defense of another. 
15 
 
of the defense of another principle," and by doing so, 
"incorporated in the latter principle the idea that the 
defendant had to take reasonable means to avoid combat."  
Sullivan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 981-982.  Similarly, in Hakala, 
the defendant claimed error in the judge's statements that there 
was a "duty to avoid physical contact" and that "a person must, 
before resorting to deadly force to defend himself or another, 
take advantage of all proper and reasonable means to avoid the 
use of deadly force."  Hakala, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 922. 
 
In both cases, the Appeals Court found no error, noting 
that a jury was unlikely to construe the instructions as 
imposing a duty to retreat because "coming to the aid of another 
involves intervention and necessarily is irreconcilable with 
retreat."  Sullivan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 982.  See Hakala, 22 
Mass. App. Ct. at 922-923.  And, insofar as the instructions 
went to the occasion to use a deadly weapon, the statement that 
a defendant must "take advantage of all proper and reasonable 
means to avoid the use of deadly force," id. at 922, was 
appropriate because "[i]f words would avert that occasion, they 
should be used; the permissible use of force scaling up to 
deadly force follows a rule of reason."  Id. at 923.  "The test 
. . . is reasonableness under all the circumstances."  Id. at 
922. 
16 
 
 
Likewise, the instructions here, although abstruse, do not 
require reversal insofar as they blend together principles of 
self-defense and defense of another.  Nowhere in the instruction 
did the judge say anything about "retreat."  See id. at 922-923.  
Taken as a whole, the judge's charge properly conveyed that the 
Commonwealth bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of another.  
Moreover, given the incompatible nature of intervention and 
retreat, we do not conclude that reasonable jurors would have 
construed the instructions as imposing a duty to retreat.9  See 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 457 Mass. 69, 75 (2010) ("[W]e consider 
the jury charge as a whole, looking for the interpretation a 
reasonable juror would place on the judge's words" [quotations 
and citation omitted]).  Additionally, we concur with the court 
in Hakala that incorporating language from the self-defense 
instructions is appropriate to convey the point that the 
defendant was required to avail himself of other available 
                                                          
 
 
9 Massachusetts, unlike the Model Penal Code and a small 
minority of jurisdictions, has never adopted a rule of retreat 
in connection with the defense of others.  See 2 Criminal Law 
Defenses § 133, at 104 & n.6 (1984) (discussing § 3:05 of Model 
Penal Code and relevant State statutes).  We decline to do so 
now, as we agree that "the retreat rule itself [is] unnecessary.  
In this context, the obvious inability of a person in a defense 
of others situation to even understand, let alone apply, such 
complex retreat and surrender rules further supports the view 
that they should be done away with."  Id. at § 133, 104. 
 
17 
 
alternatives before employing deadly force was appropriate 
inasmuch as it went to the circumstances in which a deadly 
weapon might be used, and its reasonableness.  We agree that, as 
a matter of principle, intervention with a deadly weapon is an 
act of last resort, and that a jury may consider whether other 
actions would have "avert[ed] the occasion" to use deadly force.  
Hakala, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 923.  The policy underlying the 
defense of another defense is "to discourage indifference to the 
plight of strangers."  Young, 461 Mass. at 208.  The defense 
promotes "the social desirability of encouraging people to go to 
the aid of third parties who are in danger of harm as the result 
of the unlawful actions of others."  Commonwealth v. Monico, 373 
Mass. 298, 303 (1977).  The facts in this case present a murkier 
scenario than one where an innocent party is set upon by an 
attacker.  The victim and Buchanan were engaged in mutual combat 
when the defendant fired his gun at the victim.  The policy 
underlying the defense of another intrinsically comprehends a 
distinction between circumstances that justify coming to the aid 
of another, and those where the actions of the aider, rather 
than minimizing the effect of unlawful violent acts, aggravate 
it, and it is for the fact finder to differentiate between these 
scenarios.  Given these considerations, it was not inappropriate 
for the judge to instruct the jury to consider whether the 
defendant had no other alternatives than to employ deadly force.  
18 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the instructions, though imperfect 
and confusing, did not constitute reversible error. 
 
b.  Excessive force instruction.  The defendant also argues 
that the judge's instructions were erroneous because they 
negated the possibility of a finding of so-called excessive 
force manslaughter by first stating that the defendant was 
required to avail himself of available alternatives before 
employing deadly force and then instructing the jury as follows: 
 
"[T]here is one additional way in which the 
Commonwealth may prove that the defendant did not act 
in lawful defense of another.  You will recall that I 
told you when I was explaining the legal concept of 
defense of another that a person may use no more force 
than is reasonably necessary in all of the 
circumstances to defend another person.  If a person 
uses unreasonable force or excessive force, then he is 
not acting in lawful defense of another.  Thus, if the 
Commonwealth proves that the defendant used excessive 
force in defending Shawn Buchanan, then it has proved 
that the defendant did not act in lawful defense of 
another.  However, . . . excessive force in otherwise 
lawful defense of another is a mitigating 
circumstance, a mitigating circumstance that reduces 
the offense of murder to manslaughter." 
 
 
We agree with the defendant that the instructions 
erroneously suggested that if he used excessive force, the 
killing was murder and not manslaughter.  The instructions 
plainly state that a person who uses "excessive force" did not 
act in "lawful defense of another," and thus, inferentially, is 
not entitled to the benefit of the defense and is thus guilty of 
some degree of murder.  This formulation is contrary to the 
19 
 
settled law.  "The proper rule, of course, is that where 
excessive force is used in defense of another, the crime may be 
mitigated from murder to manslaughter."  Young, 461 Mass. at 
212. 
 
Put differently, "the use of excessive force in defense of 
another does not cause the defendant to lose the benefit of the 
defense entirely . . . but instead may warrant a finding of 
manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 371 
(1992).  Although a person who uses excessive force in defense 
of another loses the justification for using force and is 
therefore not relieved of criminal liability, in such cases, 
"the degree of criminal liability becomes the issue, and the 
defendant's guilt may be mitigated if, in the circumstances, he 
had a right to use force in defense of another, but used 
excessive force."  Id. at 373.  Here, we conclude that the 
judge's instructions failed to distinguish adequately between 
"justification and mitigation . . . [leaving the jury] with no 
correct understanding of the defendant's principal . . . 
defense."  Id. at 373. 
 
The judge went on to explain that if the Commonwealth 
failed to prove that the defendant did not subjectively believe 
that Buchanan was in imminent danger of serious injury or death, 
or that his belief was not objectively reasonable, and that the 
defendant failed to avail himself of other available 
20 
 
alternatives before employing deadly force, but that "the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant used excessive force in self-defense [sic], then you 
would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter." 
 
This part of the instruction did not cure the misstatement 
of law in the preceding paragraph.  Although the second 
instruction is mostly correct, the judge appears to have 
mistakenly used the term "self-defense" instead of "defense of 
another."  In addition to being confusing, the second 
instruction also failed to "make it clear to the jury that it 
carried more weight than . . . the incorrect one" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lapage, 435 Mass. 480, 484 
(2001).  Nor did the judge acknowledge or tell the jury that his 
initial instruction on manslaughter was erroneous.  Id. at 485.  
This error was exacerbated by the imprecise quality of the 
instructions as a whole. 
 
We conclude that these errors were prejudicial.  Although 
the insertion of self-defense principles into the instructions 
on defense of another did not, in this case, constitute 
reversible error, the confusing nature of the instructions on 
both defense of another and excessive force manslaughter, taken 
together, created a strong possibility that the jury believed 
that if the defendant used excessive force in defense of 
21 
 
another, he did not act in the lawful defense of another, and a 
finding of murder in the second degree was required.  See Kelly, 
470 Mass. at 688.  Accordingly, there must be a new trial.10 
 
3.  Defendant's firearm convictions.  a.  Commonwealth's 
burden of proof.  Citing the dissent in Powell v. Tompkins, 783 
F.3d 332, 349 (1st Cir. 2015) (Torruella, J., dissenting), the 
defendant argues that he was entitled to a required finding of 
not guilty on his firearm convictions because the Commonwealth 
presented no evidence that he lacked the required firearm 
licenses, and thus failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he did not have a license to carry.  We have addressed this 
issue on several occasions, and consistently reaffirmed "that 
under Massachusetts law, licensure is an affirmative defense, 
not an element of the crime."  Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 
at 145.  See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 802–808 
(2012); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 582 (2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1739 (2012) (affirming Powell v. Tompkins, 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant makes two other arguments that we need not 
belabor given that we have ordered a new trial.  First, the 
parties agree that the prosecutor misstated certain aspects of a 
witnesses' testimony in her closing argument.  We conclude that 
these statements, though careless, did not impact the jury's 
verdict, and assume that the misstatements will be avoided at a 
retrial.  Second, any improper appeal to sympathy intended by 
the testimony of the victim's family member did not "make 
plausible an inference that the [jury's] result might have been 
otherwise but for the error."  Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 
8, 13 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 
10, 21 (1986). 
22 
 
supra at 335); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406 (1977).  
Accordingly, the defendant bore the burden of producing evidence 
that he held a license, and he failed to carry that burden.  The 
Commonwealth was therefore not required to prove that he did not 
have a license, and the defendant was not entitled to a required 
finding of not guilty. 
 
b.  Second Amendment challenge.  The defendant also 
contends that the firearms indictments should be dismissed 
because the statutes banning large capacity magazines violate 
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  In cases raising similar claims, we have held that a 
defendant may not challenge his convictions under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1), as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment 
where he has not otherwise made a showing that he has applied 
for (and was denied) a firearm identification card.  See Powell, 
459 Mass. at 589-590; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 58 
(2011); Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 460 Mass. 723, 725 (2011).  
Those rulings apply in equal force to the defendant's case, and 
his challenges to the licensing statute accordingly fail. 
 
For these reasons, we reverse the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the second degree and remand the matter for a new 
trial.  His remaining convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting).  The court reverses the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree because it 
concludes that the following jury instruction "failed to 
adequately distinguish between 'justification and mitigation,'" 
ante at    , and "created a strong possibility that the jury 
believed" that they were precluded from finding the defendant 
guilty of manslaughter if they found that the defendant used 
excessive force in defense of another, ante at    : 
 
"[T]here is one additional way in which the 
Commonwealth may prove that the defendant did not act in 
lawful defense of another.  You will recall that I told you 
when I was explaining the legal concept of defense of 
another that a person may use no more force than is 
reasonably necessary in all of the circumstances to defend 
another person.  If a person uses unreasonable force or 
excessive force, then he is not acting in lawful defense of 
another.  Thus, if the Commonwealth proves that the 
defendant used excessive force in defending Shawn Buchanan, 
then it has proved that the defendant did not act in lawful 
defense of another.  However . . . excessive force in 
otherwise lawful defense of another is a mitigating 
circumstance, a mitigating circumstance that reduces the 
offense of murder to manslaughter." 
 
 
 
I dissent because this instruction was not erroneous, and 
is consistent in substance with the Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide approved by this court on March 21, 2013, approximately 
one year after this case was tried. 
 
 The judge's instructions made clear that the Commonwealth 
bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in defense of another.  The judge properly 
instructed the jury that, where a defendant used deadly force in 
2 
 
 
 
defense of another, "the proper exercise of defense of another 
person" requires that:  (1) the defendant actually believed that 
another person was in imminent danger of serious harm or death, 
(2) the defendant's belief was objectively reasonable, (3) 
"there was no other way to avoid the attack" except with deadly 
force, and (4) the use of deadly force was not excessive, that 
is, the defendant used "no more force than [was] reasonably 
necessary in all of the circumstances to defend another person."  
The judge also made clear that, because all four of these 
propositions are required for the proper exercise of defense of 
another, the Commonwealth may satisfy its burden of showing that 
the defendant did not act in "lawful defense of another" by 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt "any one of the following 
propositions": 
 
(1) the defendant did not believe that Shawn Buchanan was 
in imminent danger of serious injury or death; 
 
(2) if the defendant believed Buchanan was in such danger, 
the defendant's belief was not objectively reasonable; 
 
(3) the defendant failed to avail himself of available 
alternatives before using deadly force; or 
 
(4) the defendant used unreasonable or excessive force in 
defending Buchanan. 
 
This is a correct statement of law.  If the Commonwealth 
were to prove any of these four propositions beyond a reasonable 
3 
 
 
 
doubt, the defendant did not act in lawful defense of another, 
and therefore was not justified in using deadly force and may be 
found guilty of a crime, provided the elements of that crime are 
proven.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 210 (2012) 
("defense of another tracks the law of self-defense"); 
Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008) (describing 
Commonwealth's burden where there is evidence of self-defense).  
See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 33-35 (2013). 
 
The judge also informed the jury that, if the Commonwealth 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used 
excessive force, then the defendant did not act in lawful 
defense of another but the jury "would be warranted in finding 
the defendant guilty of manslaughter."1  The judge earlier had 
explained that "excessive force in otherwise lawful defense of 
another is a mitigating circumstance . . . that reduces the 
offense of murder to manslaughter." 
 
These are correct statements of law.  See Commonwealth v. 
Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 525-526 (2009) ("One of the elements of 
self-defense is the reasonableness of the force used to defend 
                                                          
 
 
1 The judge misspoke here in that he told the jury that, if 
the Commonwealth were to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
"the defendant used excessive force in self-defense, then you 
would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter" (emphasis added).  But where the judge had just 
told the jury to focus on the defendant's defense of Shawn 
Buchanan, not himself, there is no material risk that the jury 
were confused by this mistaken reference to self-defense. 
4 
 
 
 
oneself, and if the Commonwealth fails to disprove all the 
elements of self-defense except the element of reasonableness of 
the force used, i.e., that the defendant used excessive force in 
self-defense, then self-defense does not lie, but excessive 
force in self-defense will mitigate murder to voluntary 
manslaughter").  Where the Commonwealth proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant used excessive force in 
defense of another, two separate legal consequences are 
triggered:  the defendant's claim that he was justified in using 
deadly force is defeated and therefore he is not entitled to an 
acquittal but, if the defendant was otherwise justified in 
defending another but for his excessive use of force, the crime 
of murder is mitigated to manslaughter. 
 
Our current Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, which, as 
noted earlier, had not been approved when this case was tried, 
are structured differently from the judge's instructions in that 
the model instructions separate justification from mitigation, 
but the judge's instructions here are consistent with their 
substance.  Where there is evidence of self-defense (but no 
evidence that the defendant was the initial aggressor),2 our 
model jury instructions provide in relevant part: 
                                                          
 
 
2 Because our model homicide instruction regarding defense 
of another "is premised on the jury having earlier been 
instructed as to the law of self-defense," Model Jury 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
"A person is not guilty of any crime if he acted in 
proper self-defense.  It is the Commonwealth's burden to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not 
act in proper self-defense.  . . . If the Commonwealth 
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did not act in proper self-defense, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"The Commonwealth satisfies its burden of proving that 
the defendant did not act in proper self-defense if it 
proves any one of the following four . . . propositions 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 
"1.  The defendant did not actually believe that he 
was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm 
from which he could save himself only by using deadly 
force.  Deadly force is force that is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily harm. 
 
 
"2.  A reasonable person in the same circumstances as 
the defendant would not reasonably have believed that he 
was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm 
from which he could save himself only by using deadly 
force. 
 
 
"3.  The defendant did not use or attempt to use all 
proper and reasonable means under the circumstances to 
avoid physical combat before resorting to the use of deadly 
force. 
 
 
"4.  The defendant used more force than was reasonably 
necessary under all the circumstances" (footnotes omitted). 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 19-21 (2013). 
 
Our model jury instructions separately discuss excessive 
use of force in self-defense or defense of another as a 
mitigating circumstance that the Commonwealth must negate beyond 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Instructions on Homicide 32 (2013), it is simpler to refer to 
our instruction regarding self-defense than defense of another.  
See Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 210 (2012). 
6 
 
 
 
a reasonable doubt to prove a defendant guilty of murder in the 
first or second degree.  Our instructions provide, "A killing 
that would otherwise be murder in the first or second degree is 
reduced to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter if the 
defendant killed someone under mitigating circumstances."  Id. 
at 42.  In describing excessive use of force in self-defense or 
defense of another as a mitigating circumstance, our model jury 
instructions provide in relevant part: 
 
"As I have explained to you earlier, a person is not 
guilty of any crime if he acted in proper self-defense [or 
defense of another].  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the 
proper exercise of self-defense [or defense of another].  
If the Commonwealth fails to do so, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty because [with the exception of felony-
murder] an element of the crime that the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant did 
not act in the proper exercise of self-defense [or defense 
of another]. 
 
 
"In this case, you must consider whether the defendant 
used excessive force in defending himself [or another].  
The term excessive force in self-defense means that, 
considering all the circumstances, the defendant used more 
force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself [or 
another]. . . . 
 
 
"I have already told you that to prove the defendant 
guilty of murder, the Commonwealth is required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in 
the proper exercise of self-defense [or the defense of 
another].  If the Commonwealth proves that the defendant 
did not act in proper self-defense [or in the proper 
defense of another] solely because the defendant used more 
force than was reasonably necessary, then the Commonwealth 
has not proved that the defendant committed the crime of 
murder but, if the Commonwealth has proved the other 
required elements, you shall find the defendant guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter" (footnotes omitted). 
7 
 
 
 
 
Id. at 69-71. 
 
To be sure, our model jury instructions regarding excessive 
use of force in defense of another are clearer than the judge's 
instructions regarding this issue, but the judge did not have 
the benefit of those instructions when this case was tried and 
his instructions are consistent with them.  The judge's 
instructions are also consistent with the Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide that were in effect at the time of 
trial, which were no clearer than the judge's instructions.3  If 
the jury were confused by this instruction, they could have 
listened to the recording of the instructions provided to them 
by the judge (with the tape recorder made available to them), or 
                                                          
 
 
3 The Model Jury Instructions on Homicide in effect at the 
time of trial declared, "A homicide is excused and is therefore 
not a crime if it results from the proper exercise of self-
defense."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 55 (1999).  In 
describing the law of self-defense, the model jury instructions 
later provided, "A person may use no more force than is 
reasonably necessary in all of the circumstances to defend 
himself."  Id. at 57.  Separately, the model jury instructions 
provided: 
 
 
"The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense.  If the 
Commonwealth fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
absence of self-defense, your verdict must be not guilty 
with respect to the crimes of murder or voluntary 
manslaughter.  If, however, the Commonwealth does prove 
excessive force in an effort to defend oneself, you would 
be justified in finding the defendant guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter." 
 
Id. at 30. 
8 
 
 
 
they could have sought clarification through a jury question 
(none were asked). 
 
Having chaired the committee that redrafted the Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide, I can attest that it is very difficult 
to explain clearly to a jury that a defendant does not act in 
lawful defense of another where he uses excessive force, but if 
the use of excessive force is the only reason why the killing 
was not lawful, the defendant is guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, not murder in the first or second degree, provided 
the elements of that offense have been proven.  The judge's 
instructions regarding this challenging issue were not a model 
of clarity, but they were not erroneous.  Nor were they so 
confusing that a reasonable jury could not understand them.  
Nor, where the judge explicitly told the jury that "excessive 
force in otherwise lawful defense of another is a mitigating 
circumstance, a mitigating circumstance that reduces the offense 
of murder to manslaughter" (emphasis added), can it reasonably 
be said that these instructions "created a strong possibility" 
that the jury believed that they were precluded from finding the 
defendant guilty of manslaughter if they believed that the 
defendant used excessive force in defense of another.  Ante at    
.  For these reasons, I would not reverse this conviction 
because of those instructions.