Title: Dewees v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 21S-CR-00410
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2022

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CR-410 
Sierra M. DeWees, 
Appellant (Defendant) 
–v– 
State of Indiana 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: October 21, 2021 | Decided: February 3, 2022 
Appeal from the Clay Superior Court, 
No. 11D01-2003-F2-306 
The Honorable Robert A. Pell, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 20A-CR-1146 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Slaughter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 03 2022, 10:28 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CR-410 | February 3, 2022 
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Goff, Justice. 
The General Assembly’s recent codification of Criminal Rule 26 and the 
adoption of evidence-based practices in the administration of bail aim to 
strike the proper balance between preserving a defendant’s pretrial liberty 
interests and ensuring public safety. But these changes call into question 
the legal standards governing pretrial release, the level of discretion 
enjoyed by trial courts, and the standard of review on appeal. 
Today, we hold that these statutory reforms enhance, rather than 
restrict, the broad discretion entrusted to our trial courts when executing 
bail. What’s more, a trial court can and should exercise that discretion to 
protect against the risk of flight or potential danger to the community. The 
trial court here did just that. And, so, we affirm its order denying the 
petitioner’s motion for bond reduction or conditional pretrial release. We 
emphasize, however, that neither our affirmance of judgment nor our 
grant of transfer affects the trial court’s order conditionally releasing the 
petitioner to pretrial electronic home detention with GPS monitoring.1 So, 
should either party seek modification of the petitioner’s conditional 
release, we remand with instructions for the trial court to conduct a 
hearing consistent with this opinion.  
Facts and Procedural History 
On March 27, 2020, Sierra DeWees drove three men—Weston Havey, 
Preston Hasler, and Blake Braun—to the home of sixty-seven-year-old 
Irving Mullins in Brazil, Indiana, believing they’d find marijuana and 
cash. When they arrived at their destination at around 1:30 AM, DeWees 
apparently remained in the car while the three men, armed with a 
shotgun, entered the home. At some point during the break-in, Mullins 
and one of DeWees’s confederates exchanged gunfire, resulting in injury 
 
1 See Amended Order on Defendant’s Motion For Reduction of Bond and/or Release with 
Conditions Set by the Court, June 26, 2020. 
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to Braun. The suspects fled, but police officers eventually arrested all four 
of them for crimes related to the incident.  
For her part, DeWees stood charged with the level-2 felony offense of 
aiding, inducing, or causing burglary with a deadly weapon. See Ind. 
Code §§ 35-43-2-1(3)(A), 35-41-2-4 (2020). Soon after the State filed its 
charging information, Clay County Court Services assessed DeWees for 
pretrial release, designating her as a “moderate” risk of re-arrest and 
failure to appear at future court hearings. App. Vol. II, p. 18. This rating, 
based on the Indiana Risk Assessment System’s Pretrial Assessment Tool 
(IRAS-PAT or IRAS), signified an assigned score of four: one point for 
DeWees’s young age, two points for her lack of employment, and one 
point for her use of illegal drugs within the most recent six months. Id.  
At an initial hearing, the trial court set DeWees’s bond at $50,000 cash-
only, with no option of paying 10 percent. After Clay County Community 
Corrections found her eligible for home detention, DeWees moved for a 
bond reduction or conditional pretrial release. At the hearing on this 
motion, the trial court heard testimony from both DeWees and Mullins.  
DeWees, an eighteen-year-old high-school senior at the time, testified 
that she had lived with her mother and stepfather in Fillmore, Indiana, 
since 2008; that she visited her biological father in Carmel at least every 
other weekend; that she had worked part-time prior to the Covid-19 
pandemic; that she had plans to attend college; that, despite occasional 
drug use in the past, she had no prior criminal or juvenile history; and 
that she agreed to obey the order barring her from contacting Mullins. 
DeWees further testified that she and her mother were saving money to 
post bond and that, should the court permit her to participate in a home-
detention program, she would abide by all conditions.  
Mullins, in turn, testified to having lived in constant fear since the 
break-in. DeWees and her co-defendants had turned his “world upside 
down,” he stated, adding that he now “sleep[s] with two guns, one on 
each side.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 15. While unsure of DeWees’s specific role in the 
burglary, Mullins insisted that she “knew what was going on” when her 
accomplices entered the home with a shotgun. Id. at 15–17. Whatever 
positive factors may have weighed in support of DeWees’s release, 
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Mullins opined, if she had “made bad choices before,” there was nothing 
to assure him that she wouldn’t “turn around and do it again.” Id. at 22. 
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court ultimately 
denied DeWees’s motion. While acknowledging DeWees’s “strong” 
family ties, her lack of criminal record, and no evidence of bad character, 
the trial court cited in support of its ruling the “extremely serious” nature 
of the crime; Mullins’ testimony that he lived in fear; DeWees’s IRAS score 
and her unemployment status; and, should she live with her father, her 
distance from the community. App. Vol. II, pp. 50–51. 
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding a 
“dearth of evidence” to show that DeWees posed a risk to the physical 
safety of Mullins.2 DeWees v. State, 163 N.E.3d 357, 366, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2021). In support of its ruling, the panel adjusted DeWees’s IRAS-PAT 
rating from moderate to low, having found the two-point assessment for 
her unemployment status “unreasonable.” Id. at 364. The panel also cited 
“evidence of substantial mitigating factors” to suggest that “DeWees 
recognized the trial court’s authority to bring her to trial.” Id. at 365–66. 
These factors, coupled with the “trial court’s inordinate reliance on 
Mullins’ testimony,” the panel concluded, justified DeWees’s release to 
pretrial home detention. Id. at 366, 367. Deviating from the certification 
process under Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the panel issued its opinion 
“effective immediately” and instructed the trial court to expedite its order. 
Id. at 367 (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 1). 
The State petitioned to transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court 
of Appeals decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Standard of Review 
An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial court’s bail 
determination. Perry v. State, 541 N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ind. 1989). A trial court 
 
2 Pending resolution of the appeal, the Court of Appeals granted DeWees’s emergency motion 
to stay and ordered her released to pretrial home detention.  
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abuses its discretion if its “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 
the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, 
and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (cleaned up).  
Discussion and Decision 
By the 1980s, the American penal philosophy had clearly shifted from a 
rehabilitative model (predominant since the early nineteenth century) to a 
retributive one. A wave of tough-on-crime policies—which expanded the 
number of offenses punishable by incarceration, introduced mandatory 
minimum sentences, and enhanced penalties for repeat offenders—sought 
to keep more criminals off the street for longer periods of time. Cecelia 
Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 537, 544–45 (2015). Contemporary bail-reform legislation, at 
both the federal and state level, played a crucial role in furthering these 
policies. Alexa van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of 
Pretrial Release: A History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 
108 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 701, 738 (2019). And courts continued to 
rely heavily on money bail while releasing fewer defendants on personal 
recognizance, casting the pretrial detention net on an even broader scale.3 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pretrial Release of Felony 
Defendants in State Courts 1–2 (2007). Unsurprisingly, then, over the last 
 
3 On any given day, nearly half a million detainees—presumptively innocent of their charged 
offenses—sit in America’s jails awaiting trial. Crim. Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law 
School, Bail Reform: A Guide for State and Local Policymakers 1 (2019). The Pew Charitable Trust 
cites a similar figure, reporting that, of the nearly 750,000 people nationwide held in the 
nation’s jails, only a third have been convicted of a crime, with the remaining two-thirds 
awaiting trial. Pew Charitable Trust, Americans Favor Expanded Pretrial Release, Limited Use of 
Jail 1 (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org [https://perma.cc/C62D-NMC4]. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CR-410 | February 3, 2022 
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several decades, the states have witnessed an exponential growth in the 
number of incarcerated persons nationwide.4  
This dramatic increase in incarceration rates came at a huge expense to 
the American taxpayer.5 Factoring in the incidental costs—including an 
overburdened court system, public-service budget cuts, and the absence of 
an income source in many families—America’s tough-on-crime policy had 
become fiscally unsustainable. The economic fallout of the Great 
Recession only compounded the problem, prompting many states to 
scrutinize their existing criminal-justice systems. Policymakers across the 
country—and across the political divide—sought new strategies designed 
to prevent crime and recidivism, enhance community safety, reduce 
reliance on incarceration (pretrial and post-conviction), and, ultimately, to 
save taxpayer dollars.  
What emerged was a new theory of detention—one that relies on 
actuarial models of prediction and evidence-based practices to determine 
offender risk. Criminal Rule 26, adopted by this Court in 2016 and 
codified by the General Assembly the following year, is emblematic of this 
new approach. At its core, the Rule aims to reduce pretrial-detention 
expenses for local jails (and taxpayers generally), enable defendants 
awaiting trial to return to their jobs and support their families, and 
enhance the benefits of reduced recidivism and improved public safety. 
Order Adopting Criminal Rule 26, No. 94S00-1602-MS-86 (Ind. Sept. 7, 
2016). Adoption of this Rule reflected the state’s new smart-on-crime 
approach to criminal-justice reform—a philosophy, in the words of one 
Hoosier statesman, designed to “separate the people we’re mad at from 
 
4 Between 1972 and 2010, the state-prison population increased 705 percent, from 174,379 
inmates in 1972 to 1,404,053 inmates as of January 1, 2010. Juliene James et. al., A View from the 
States: Evidence-Based Public Safety Legislation, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 821, 821 (2012). In 
Indiana, the number of adult offenders incarcerated in our prisons more than doubled 
between 1989 and 2009, from fewer than 14,000 to nearly 30,000. G. Roger Jarjoura et al., Am. 
Inst. for Research, Assessing the Local Fiscal Impact of HEA 1006, at 4 (2014). 
5 In Indiana, the state prison population in 2010 cost Hoosier taxpayers $679 million—a 76% 
increase from ten years prior. Hon. Randall T. Shepard, The Great Recession as a Catalyst for 
More Effective Sentencing, 23 Fed. Sent. Rep. 146, 146 (2010). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CR-410 | February 3, 2022 
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the people we’re afraid of.” Tom Davies, Ind. House Panel Backs Sentencing 
Laws Overhaul, Dubois County Herald (Jan. 17, 2013) (quoting Rep. Greg 
Steuerwald), https://www.duboiscountyherald.com 
[https://perma.cc/B5WR-DMNQ]. 
To accomplish its goals, Criminal Rule 26 urges trial courts to use “the 
results of an evidence-based risk assessment” when determining whether 
to release a defendant before trial. Ind. Criminal Rule 26. This assessment, 
“based on empirical data derived through validated criminal justice 
scientific research,” aims to assist a court in evaluating the likelihood of a 
defendant committing a new criminal offense or failing to appear in court. 
I.C. § 35-33-8-0.5. Evidence-based practices in the criminal-justice system 
have shown “considerable promise” in recent years. See Malenchick v. 
State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ind. 2010). Indeed, research indicates that the 
IRAS-PAT itself “has strong to moderate predictive validity when 
assessing risk for failure to appear and re-arrest during the pretrial stage.” 
Justice Reinvestment Advisory Council, Report on Bail Reform and Pretrial 
Issues 2 (2019) [hereinafter JRAC Bail Report].  
Despite this progress, Indiana’s recent bail-reform initiatives call into 
question the legal standards governing pretrial release, the level of 
discretion enjoyed by trial courts, and the standard of review on appeal. 
Our decision today aims to resolve these questions. To that end, we 
begin our discussion with an overview of Indiana’s statutory bail regime. 
See Pt. I, infra. Our analysis here leads us to conclude that Indiana’s recent 
bail-reform measures enhance, rather than restrict, the broad discretion 
entrusted to our trial courts. See id. Next, we analyze the bail decision 
here, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
DeWees’s request for reduction of bond or conditional pretrial release. See 
Pt. II, infra. Finally, we turn to a brief discussion of Indiana Appellate Rule 
65(E), the implications of deviating from that Rule, and the need for 
appellate courts to exercise prudence and restraint—especially in 
developing areas of the law like we’re presented with today. See Pt. III, 
infra. 
 
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I. Trial courts should consider any factor relevant to 
the detainee’s risk of nonappearance and potential 
danger to the community, and Indiana’s recent bail 
reforms enhance their discretion.  
In 1980, Indiana amended its bail statutes by prohibiting trial courts 
from setting bail “higher than that amount reasonably required to assure 
the defendant’s appearance in court.” Pub. L. No. 202-1980, § 1, 1980 Ind. 
Acts 1640, 1642 (codified at I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b)). To ensure individualized 
assessment, these amendments required courts to consider “all facts 
relevant to the risk of nonappearance,” among which included “the length 
and character” of the detainee’s “residence in the community,” the 
detainee’s “employment status and history,” his “family ties and 
relationships,” his “criminal or juvenile record,” and anything else that 
“might indicate” a lack of recognition and adherence “to the authority of 
the court to bring him to trial.” Id. 
Sixteen years later, the General Assembly enacted additional 
amendments to its bail statutes. See Pub. L. No. 221-1996, 1996 Ind. Acts 
2722. These revisions permitted trial courts to set conditions of pretrial 
release designed to “assure the public’s physical safety” upon finding by 
“clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk of physical 
danger to another person or the community.” Pub. L. No. 221-1996, § 2, 
1996 Ind. Acts at 2722–23 (codified at I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2). 
How Criminal Rule 26 affects this statutory framework is a question we 
turn to first. 
Whether in setting bail or modifying bail, a trial court must first 
consider, among “other relevant factors,” the “results of the Indiana 
pretrial risk assessment system (if available).” I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(b). If the 
trial court finds, based on the results of its assessment, that a defendant 
presents no “substantial risk of flight or danger” to himself or to others, 
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“the court shall,” with certain exceptions,6 “consider releasing the arrestee 
without money bail or surety.” Id. After considering the IRAS results, 
“other relevant factors, and bail guidelines described in section 3.8,” the 
“court may admit a defendant to bail” and require the defendant to 
execute a bail bond, restrict the defendant’s activities, place the defendant 
under supervision, or impose any other “reasonable” conditions on the 
defendant’s release. I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a).7 
These bail conditions aim to assure the defendant’s appearance at 
future proceedings and “to assure the public’s physical safety.” Id. See also 
I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b) (prohibiting the amount of bail to exceed that 
“reasonably required” to ensure future court appearances “or to assure 
the physical safety of another person or the community”). This latter goal 
requires “a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
poses a risk of physical danger to another person or the community.” I.C. 
§ 35-33-8-3.2(a). See also I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b) (specifying the same standard of 
proof). 
If the trial court considers money bail necessary as a condition of 
release, the court “shall consider,” when “setting and accepting an 
amount of bail,” the results of an IRAS (when available) “and other 
relevant factors,” along with “all facts relevant to the risk of 
nonappearance.” Id. (citing I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8). These facts include, among 
other things, the length and character of the defendant’s residence in the 
community; the defendant’s employment status and history; the 
defendant’s criminal history or juvenile record; the defendant’s family ties 
and relationships; the defendant’s character, reputation, habits, and 
mental condition; the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential 
penalty; and “any other factors” that may “indicate that the defendant 
 
6 Exceptions apply when the detainee “is charged with murder or treason,” “is on pretrial 
release” following an unrelated incident, or “is on probation, parole, or other community 
supervision.” I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(b). 
7 Other conditions may include restrictions on the defendant’s movements, associations, and 
place of residence; adherence to a no-contact order; or release on personal recognizance. I.C. § 
35-33-8-3.2(a)(2). 
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might not recognize and adhere to the authority of the court to bring the 
defendant to trial.” Id.  
Finally, a trial court may reduce the amount of bail when a defendant 
presents “evidence of substantial mitigating factors.” I.C. § 35-33-8-5(c). 
These factors, the same as those a court must consider when setting and 
accepting an amount of bail, must “reasonably” suggest “that the 
defendant recognizes the court’s authority” over him or her. Id. (citing I.C. 
§ 35-33-8-4(b)). A trial court may not reduce bail—and in fact may increase 
bail or revoke bail entirely—if it finds by “clear and convincing” evidence 
that the defendant “poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or 
the community.” I.C. §§ 35-33-8-5(b)–(d). 
Though far from a model of clarity, this statutory scheme imparts 
considerable judicial flexibility in the execution of bail. What’s more, these 
statutes clearly permit—indeed mandate—a trial court to consider all 
“relevant factors” when setting or modifying bail. See I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(a). 
See also I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b) (directing the court to “consider the bail 
guidelines described in section 3.8” along with “all facts relevant to the 
risk of nonappearance); I.C. § 35-33-8-5 (permitting modification of bail 
“based on the factors set forth in section 4(b)”). This reading comports 
with the very nature of a bail determination. Indeed, to tailor that decision 
to the individual offender, the trial court should consider the “widest 
range of relevant information in reaching an informed decision.” See 
Malenchick, 928 N.E.2d at 574 (quoting Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 
1120–21 (Ind. 2004)).  
The codification of Criminal Rule 26 and the adoption of evidence-
based practices in the administration of bail results in no change to this 
judicial flexibility. While Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.8 mandates a trial 
court to “consider the results” of an IRAS (if available), there’s nothing in 
the statute that compels the defendant’s release or that requires the court 
to rely on the results of the IRAS assessment when setting bail. See I.C. § 
35-33-8-3.8(a) (emphasis added). What’s more, the legislature qualified its 
mandate to include consideration of “other relevant factors.” I.C. § 35-33-
8-3.8(b). See also Crim. R. 26(B) (encouraging a trial court to “utilize the 
results of an evidence-based risk assessment . . . and such other 
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information as the court finds relevant”); JRAC Bail Report at 13 (“The use 
of validated, empirically-based pretrial risk assessment tools can enhance 
the pretrial decision-making process when utilized in conjunction with 
professional judgment.”). And because the IRAS-PAT measures only the 
defendant’s risk of failure to appear and risk of re-offending, Indiana’s 
Pretrial Practice Manual “encourages trial courts to use risk assessment 
results and other relevant information about arrestees”—including the 
probable cause affidavit, victim statement(s), domestic violence screeners, 
substance abuse screeners, mental health screeners, and criminal history—
to determine whether the defendant poses a “danger to self or others in 
the community.” Indiana EBDM Pretrial Work Group, Pretrial Practices 
Manual 62, 63 (2018). 
To be sure, Criminal Rule 26 strongly encourages pretrial release for 
many accused individuals awaiting trial. This is especially true for 
persons charged with only non-violent and low-level offenses. And if a 
defendant presents no “substantial risk of flight or danger” to others, the 
court must consider releasing the defendant “without money bail or 
surety,” subject to any reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the 
court. I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(a); I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a). Releasing this category of 
defendants under suitable nonfinancial conditions—such as electronic 
monitoring, community supervision, no-contact orders, and restrictions 
on activities or place of residence—will often prove sufficient to ensure 
the defendant’s appearance at trial and to ensure community safety. But 
when a person poses a risk of flight or a risk to public safety, Criminal 
Rule 26 in no way hinders a trial court’s ability to set bond in an amount 
sufficient to curtail such risks. 
II. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial 
court’s bail determination. 
DeWees argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her 
motion for reduction of bail or conditional pretrial release. She insists that 
the State presented no “objective evidence to support a finding that [she] 
posed a threat to Mullins or anyone else in the community.” Resp. to 
Trans. at 11. A victim’s statement of fear, standing alone, she contends, 
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falls short of the clear-and-convincing standard necessary for the evidence 
to support such a finding. Id. at 11–12. 
The State counters that, while the trial court got it right, the Court of 
Appeals ignored the standard of review by impermissibly reweighing 
Mullins’ testimony. Pet. to Trans. at 9–10. What’s more, the State contends, 
the panel mistakenly “concluded that there was no evidence DeWees 
posed a risk to the physical safety of the victim or that she was a flight 
risk.” Id. at 10.  
While we consider this a close case, our standard of review prompts us 
to agree with the State.  
In reaching its decision, the trial court acknowledged DeWees’s 
“strong” family ties, her lack of criminal record, and no evidence of past 
bad character. App. Vol. II, p. 50. The court also cited the “extremely 
serious” nature of the offense; DeWees’s IRAS score and unemployment 
status; and her potential distance from the community, depending on 
living arrangements. Id. at 50. These factors, the trial court ultimately 
concluded, prevented it from saying that DeWees “is not a substantial 
flight risk” or “that she is not a danger to others.” In specifically finding 
that DeWees posed a risk of physical safety to Mullins, the court relied 
“[p]rimarily” on his testimony that he lived in fear. Id. at 51. 
We find sufficient record evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.  
A. Evidence, including DeWees’s involvement in an armed 
home invasion involving gunfire and injury to a person, 
supports the trial court’s determination that DeWees 
posed a risk to the physical safety of Mullins.  
While armed with a deadly weapon, DeWees and her three accomplices 
drove to Mullins’ home under the cloak of darkness. When they arrived at 
their destination, they kicked open the door, entered the home with the 
intent to steal “weed and cash,” and exchanged gunfire with their victim 
when he awoke from the intrusion. These actions, completely 
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unprovoked, implanted in Mullins a reasonable fear for his physical 
safety. 
To be sure, we agree with DeWees that a victim’s statement of fear, 
standing alone, falls short of the clear-and-convincing standard necessary 
for the evidence to support a finding that she posed a risk of physical 
danger to others. But we understand the emphasis placed on Mullins’ fear 
by the trial court here simply as a mischaracterization of the evidence 
presented to support the risk of harm posed by DeWees. In any case, as 
our analysis below indicates, the trial court did not rely exclusively on 
Mullins’ statement of fear to support its determination.  
The trial court also relied on the “extremely serious” nature of the 
offense: level-2 felony aiding, inducing, or causing burglary with a deadly 
weapon. App. Vol. II, p. 50. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. DeWees attempts to 
shield herself from the gravity of this charge. Rather than directly 
participating in the crime, she insists that she acted only as the getaway 
driver, “never possessed a weapon, never entered the residence,” and 
fully cooperated when detained by law enforcement. Appellant’s Br. at 15. 
We find this argument unpersuasive. If convicted, DeWees’s actions make 
her just as responsible for the offense as any of her accomplices. See I.C. § 
35-41-2-4 (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or 
causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.”). And 
even if she remained in the car while the crime took place, she knew that 
Mullins faced potential harm—if not death—when her accomplices exited 
the vehicle and entered the home armed with a shotgun. 
Finally, in its written order, the court specifically noted the proximity 
(less than thirty miles) from DeWees’s hometown of Fillmore to Mullins’ 
residence in Brazil. This factor reasonably increases the likelihood that 
DeWees, despite her assurance of complying with the no-contact order, 
could inflict harm on Mullins to prevent him from testifying. 
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B. Evidence also supports the trial court’s determination 
that DeWees posed a flight risk. 
The evidence likewise supports the trial court’s determination that 
DeWees posed a flight risk. 
While noting that DeWees had “no criminal record, and therefore no 
failures to appear,” the trial court pointed to the “nature and gravity of the 
offense charged.” App. Vol. II, p. 50. The “possible penalty which might 
be imposed by reason of the offense charged,” we’ve emphasized, is a 
“primary fact to be considered in determining an amount which would 
assure the accused’s presence in court.” Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 79, 
162 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1959). See also I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b)(7) (directing trial court, 
when setting bail, to consider “the nature and gravity of the offense and 
the potential penalty faced, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk 
of nonappearance”). The crime DeWees allegedly committed carries a 
maximum penalty of thirty years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. Such a potentially 
lengthy sentence “tends to increase the risk that [the defendant] will fail to 
appear for trial” and this “cuts substantially against [the] argument that 
the trial court abused its discretion” by denying a motion to reduce bail. 
See Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1258–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing I.C. 
§ 35-33-8-4(b)(7)). 
Finally, we note that the trial court relied on DeWees’s IRAS score and 
her unemployment status, accepting her designation as a “moderate” risk 
of re-arrest and failure to appear at future court hearings. App. Vol. II, pp. 
18, 50. DeWees challenges the court’s reliance on this score, arguing that 
she was a “full-time high school student.” Resp. to Trans. at 8. The State, 
to its credit, acknowledged at oral argument that, according to one IRAS 
scoring guide, “a full-time student should be scored a zero on the 
unemployment question.” Oral Argument at 18:02–19:38. See JRAC Bail 
Report at 40 (directing pretrial-service assessors to assign a zero if the 
detainee is “currently attending a school full time (or part-time schooling 
co-occurring with a part-time job)”). 
But even if the assessor improperly assigned DeWees two points for her 
unemployment, we’ve emphasized before that, while “highly useful and 
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important for trial courts to consider as a broad statistical tool,” an 
evidence-based assessment like IRAS is no substitute for a judicial 
determination of bail but is merely supplemental to all other evidence 
informing the trial court’s decision. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 572. In other 
words, evidence-based assessment tools “do not replace but may inform a 
trial court’s sentencing determinations.” Id. at 566. 
In sum, the evidence, taken together, supports the trial court’s 
conclusion that DeWees posed a “substantial flight risk” and a “danger to 
others,” including Mullins. See App. Vol. II, p. 51. What’s more, the trial 
court’s decision—factoring in the applicable statutory factors, setting forth 
its reasons in writing, and issued after a timely hearing at which DeWees, 
represented by counsel, testified on her own behalf—rested on 
appropriate procedural safeguards necessary to protect the rights of the 
accused. 
To be sure, several factors—DeWees’s strong family ties, her lack of 
criminal record, and no evidence of past bad character—certainly militate 
against denying DeWees’s motion. But when, like here, the trial court 
followed the appropriate procedural safeguards and the evidence 
provides sufficient support for its ruling, we refrain from interfering with 
the trial court’s discretion—even when, like here, we consider it a close 
call.  
III. We urge prudence and restraint when deviating 
from Appellate Rule 65(E). 
Finally, we address the implications of issuing a precedential opinion 
effective immediately and the need for appellate courts to exercise 
prudence and restraint when deviating from Appellate Rule 65(E). 
When an appellate court issues an opinion or memorandum decision, 
the court clerk “shall serve uncertified copies” to the trial court and to all 
counsel of record and unrepresented parties. App. R. 65(E). Neither the 
trial court nor the parties may act in reliance on an uncertified opinion or 
memorandum decision. Id. And unless all parties seek earlier certification, 
the court clerk “shall certify the opinion or memorandum decision to the 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CR-410 | February 3, 2022 
Page 16 of 17 
trial court” only when “the time for all Petitions for Rehearing, Transfer, 
or Review has expired.” Id.  
An appellate court may, however, deviate from these rules, whether on 
its own motion or the motion of a party. App. R. 1. 
Our Appellate Rules, as with all rules of procedure, “were adopted in 
order to simplify and streamline prevailing procedural practice, and to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” S. 
Indiana Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Civ. City of Tell City, Perry Cty., 179 Ind. 
App. 217, 223, 384 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (1979) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Indeed, the purpose of these rules “was to liberalize the practice 
in the trial courts and courts of appeal and to reduce technical burdens, 
not increase them.” Perry v. Baron, 152 Ind. App. 29, 34, 281 N.E.2d 544, 
547 (1972). 
With these goals in mind, we’ve recognized that a blind or mechanical 
application of the rules threatens to elevate these technicalities to “the 
position of being the ends instead of the means.” Am. States Ins. Co. v. State 
ex rel. Jennings, 258 Ind. 637, 640, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1972). But the 
opposite is likewise true, as frequent deviation from the rules presents the 
risk of “defeat[ing] justice.” See id. This is especially true in developing 
areas of the law like we’re presented with today. Issuing an opinion 
“effective immediately,” and before the parties had the opportunity to 
seek rehearing, potentially deprived this Court of further briefing on the 
merits.  
To be sure, a trial court’s bail decision implicates an individual’s 
fundamental liberty interest. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 
(1987). And deviation from Appellate Rule 65(E) may very well be 
justified in the exceptional circumstance of pretrial detention. Cf. Williams 
v. State, 791 N.E.2d 193, 201 (Ind. 2003) (deviating from appellate rule 
calling for a rehearing petition in a death-penalty case). Absent such an 
exceptional circumstance, the “best practice is to comply with the rules in 
all instances,” George T. Patton, Jr., 24 Indiana Practice, § 3.1 at 53 (3d ed. 
2001), deviating from the procedural technicalities only to avoid defeating 
the “ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice,” Jennings, 258 Ind. at 640, 
283 N.E.2d at 531. 
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Page 17 of 17 
Conclusion 
Because the State met its burden of proof in showing that DeWees 
posed a flight risk and a risk to Mullins’ physical safety, and because the 
trial court applied the appropriate procedural safeguards, we affirm its 
order denying DeWees’s motion for bond reduction or conditional pretrial 
release. That said, we acknowledge the trial court (by order of the Court of 
Appeals) ordered DeWees “released to pretrial electronic home detention 
with GPS monitoring” on the condition that she “strictly obey all rules of 
Clay County Community Corrections.” App. Vol. II, p. 58. And neither 
our grant of transfer nor our affirmance of the trial court’s judgment 
changes DeWees’s status. But should either party seek modification of 
DeWees’s conditional release, we remand with instructions for the trial 
court to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
John D. Fierek 
Brownsburg, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Sierra A. Murray 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana