Title: Commonwealth v. Holmes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11557
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2014

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SJC-11557 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARLON HOLMES. 
 
 
September 12, 2014 
 
 
Imprisonment, Credit for time served.  Practice, Criminal, 
Sentence. 
 
 
 
This case is before the court for further appellate review.  
The Appeals Court, in a divided opinion, held that the defendant 
must be credited for time served on a sentence for a vacated 
conviction against sentences that he was serving on later 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Holmes, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 737 
(2013).  The Commonwealth argues that the defendant is not 
entitled to credit for time served on an earlier conviction that 
was unrelated to the later convictions, where he had completed 
serving the sentence before committing the new crimes.  It 
argues further that allowing credit in such circumstances 
implicates the prohibition against banking time.  We agree with 
the Commonwealth, and affirm the Superior Court's order denying 
the defendant's motion for credit.   
 
 
Background.  The facts are fully set forth in the Appeals 
Court's opinion.  Commonwealth v. Holmes, supra at 737-738.  In 
short, in 1997, the defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (class B) with intent to 
distribute.  After he completed serving his sentence on that 
conviction in 1999, he was released.  In 2003, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, both committed in 2002, and two subsequent offender 
counts in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b).  He was 
sentenced to serve two concurrent terms of from twelve years to 
twelve years and one day and credited for his pretrial 
confinement.  In 2005, while he was incarcerated for the 2003 
convictions, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea for 
2 
 
the unrelated 1997 offense on the ground of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  That motion was allowed in 2006, and the 
underlying complaint for the 1997 offense was eventually 
dismissed.1 
 
 
In 2011, while still incarcerated, he filed a motion "for 
time served on reversed or revised prior sentences under [G. L. 
c. 279, § 33A(6)]," seeking credit for the earlier sentence that 
he had completed serving on the vacated 1997 conviction.  A 
Superior Court judge denied his motion for credit.  The 
defendant appealed.  The Appeals Court reversed the denial of 
the defendant's motion and credited him for the time that he had 
served on the vacated 1997 conviction against the sentences that 
he was serving on the 2003 convictions.  Commonwealth v. Holmes, 
supra at 744. 
 
 
Discussion.  The defendant is not claiming any statutory 
right to credit.  See G. L. c. 127, § 129B; G. L. c. 279, § 33A.  
Absent a controlling statute, considerations of fairness guide 
our determination whether and to what extent credit is due.  
Chalifoux v. Commissioner of Correction, 375 Mass. 424, 427-428 
(1978), and cases cited.  Where, as here, a defendant seeks 
credit for unrelated crimes, there are two considerations in 
play:  first, a prisoner should not be required to serve "dead 
time" on a vacated sentence for which he otherwise would not 
receive credit, see Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 24 
(1998); and second, a prisoner is prohibited from using "banked 
time" from an earlier conviction toward a new conviction.  
Manning v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 
372 Mass. 387, 395-396 (1977) (Manning).  In weighing these 
equitable considerations, the banking prohibition outweighs any 
concern about dead time:  "[T]he need to prevent criminal 
defendants from 'banking time' for use against future sentences 
outweighs any fairness issues normally applicable in [dead time] 
situations."  Commonwealth v. Milton, supra at 25. 
 
 
The Appeals Court concluded that the prohibition against 
banking was not implicated by the circumstances of this case and 
that the denial of credit in these circumstances would be 
                     
1 One of the two predicate offenses for the defendant's 2003 
convictions was another 1997 conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance (class B) with intent to distribute.  
His vacated 1997 conviction was not a predicate offense.  Thus, 
he could not avail himself of the vacated 1997 conviction (and 
the time he had served on the sentence for that conviction) by 
seeking resentencing on the 2003 convictions. 
3 
 
contrary to the principles of fairness on which the dead time 
cases are based.  Commonwealth v. Holmes, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 
739.  The court relied heavily on the fact that the defendant 
did not have any knowledge that the 1997 conviction would be 
vacated when he committed the new crimes that resulted in the 
2003 convictions.  Id. at 740-741 ("Banking turns on one factor:  
commission of an offense with knowledge that a sentence 
previously served has been judged improper").  In the Appeals 
Court's view, where there were no concerns that the defendant 
committed new crimes with the knowledge that he had banked time, 
considerations of fairness required that he receive full credit 
for the time served on his vacated conviction toward his 
subsequent, unrelated sentences.  Id. at 742-743. 
 
 
The defendant's position finds some support in this court's 
discussion of banking time in the Manning case, where the 
banking prohibition did not apply when the new crime was 
committed before the earlier convictions were reversed: 
 
"[I]t is not our intention to grant prisoners license to 
commit future criminal acts with immunity.  Indeed, the 
fear of authorizing 'a line of credit for future crimes,' 
. . . has troubled a number of courts. . . . Such concerns 
are not appropriate here. . . . Credit allowed when the 
subsequent conviction is for an offense committed before 
the reversal of the first sentence in no way permits credit 
for future criminal acts." 
 
Manning, 372 Mass. at 395-396 (citations omitted).  While the 
defendant in the Manning case did not knowingly bank time before 
committing a new crime, he did serve dead time on earlier, 
related sentences.2  The court remedied the injustice of the 
                     
2 In Manning, the defendant was found guilty by a Norfolk 
County jury of various charges for which he received concurrent 
sentences.  Manning v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 
Norfolk, 372 Mass. 387, 388-389 (1977).  While he was serving 
those sentences, he was convicted of an unrelated Suffolk County 
charge for which he received a sentence to be served from and 
after the Norfolk sentences.  Id. at 389.  While serving the 
Norfolk sentences, his Norfolk convictions were reversed on 
appeal.  Id.  The defendant remained incarcerated on the Suffolk 
sentence and sought credit for the dead time that he had served 
on his vacated convictions.  Id. at 395.  In Manning, unlike 
this case, the sentences were related; the defendant received a 
sentence on the Suffolk conviction to be served from and after 
his Norfolk sentences, and a calculation of the start date for 
4 
 
defendant having served dead time on these related sentences by 
crediting that time toward the from-and-after sentence that he 
received for his new crime.  Id. at 396-397.  In the present 
case, the court considers circumstances that are similar in one 
respect to the events in Manning, i.e., the defendant did not 
have any prior knowledge that his earlier conviction would be 
vacated before he committed his new crime, but distinguishable 
in another very important respect, i.e., there was no 
substantive or temporal connection between the earlier sentence 
and new sentence. 
 
 
 There may be circumstances in which a criminal defendant 
could receive credit for time previously served on an unrelated 
crime, but we do not find those circumstances here.3  Although we 
acknowledge that the defendant will have served dead time on his 
1997 sentence, we cannot allow him credit toward his 2003 
convictions, especially where he completed serving his 1997 
sentence before committing any new crimes.  Credit for time 
served on a vacated conviction cannot be applied against time to 
be served on new and unrelated sentences in this fashion.  
Manning, 372 Mass. at 395 n.9.  Moreover, allowing credit would 
undermine an essential purpose of the prohibition against 
banking time, which is to prevent a defendant from effectively 
receiving immunity for new crimes.  See Commonwealth v. Milton, 
427 Mass. at 25, citing Manning, supra at 395.  It is true that 
the defendant could not have known with any certainty that his 
earlier conviction would be vacated before committing the new 
crimes, but that does not change the fact that he would be 
drawing on time banked from his earlier conviction, for which 
                                                                  
the Suffolk sentence was therefore dependent on the completion 
(or vacation) of his Norfolk sentences.  Id. at 389.  In those 
circumstances, considerations of fairness required that the 
defendant receive full credit for the dead time served on his 
vacated convictions toward the consecutive sentence that he was 
serving on his subsequent conviction.  Id. at 396-397. 
 
3 For example, we are not faced with circumstances where an 
earlier conviction has been vacated on the ground of actual 
innocence.  The defendant successfully sought to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the charge of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance (class B) with intent to distribute on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The criminal complaint was 
eventually dismissed.  We leave open the possibility of allowing 
credit for time served on a completed sentence for an unrelated 
crime where there is actual innocence or some other equally 
compelling circumstance. 
5 
 
his sentence had been fully served, and applying it toward his 
new convictions. 
 
 
Allowing credit in these circumstances would encourage 
defendants who previously have not filed motions for a new trial 
on their prior convictions to file such motions after they have 
already completed their sentences, solely in order to obtain a 
credit to be applied against sentences for subsequently-
committed crimes.  Only recidivists would benefit from such a 
system.  There also would be a foreseeable, yet unnecessary, 
burden on the court system in having to adjudicate these 
motions.  And, in the event such a motion is granted, the 
Commonwealth may feel obligated to pursue a new trial not for 
the purpose of obtaining a conviction for the subject offense, 
but solely for the purpose of preventing credits for unrelated 
and completed sentences from being applied toward the subsequent 
crimes.  For these reasons, where, as here, a defendant has 
fully completed his sentence on an unrelated conviction, the 
need to prevent abuses associated with banking time outweighs 
any concern about unfairness arising from dead time.  See 
Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. at 25. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant is not entitled to credit for 
time served on his vacated 1997 conviction.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Superior Court's order denying his motion for credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant.