Title: Kent v. Sims
Citation: 460 So. 2d 144
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1984

460 So. 2d 144 (1984)
Jereme Lynn KENT, a minor of the age of 4 years, and his father and next friend, Gary Lynn Kent
v.
Howard Lee SIMS, Jr.
83-376.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 7, 1984.
After Remand November 21, 1984.
*145 Judy D. Thomas, Oneonta, for appellants.
Alexander M. Smith, Oneonta, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
The issue presented on this appeal is whether the trial court, in a non-jury action, erred in granting a motion for a "directed verdict" in favor of the defendant in a dog bite case.
Appellant Gary Lynn Kent filed a complaint on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor son as father and next friend of Jereme Lynn Kent, alleging that appellee Howard Lee Sims, Jr. was negligent in failing to keep his dog properly confined. The Kents further alleged that the dog in question had a reputation for dangerous propensities, and that the owner of the dog, Sims, knew of these dangerous propensities. Young Jereme Lynn Kent was bitten by the dog on February 28, 1982, while he and his father were in Sims's home. The father testified that the child was lying on the floor next to the dog, a Doberman, when the incident occurred. After the child was bitten, he was taken to Blount Memorial Hospital for treatment.
Pictures depicting the child's injuries were introduced into evidence.
The father testified that he had known the dog in question approximately ten months and had the opportunity to observe the dog "a couple of hundred times." He testified that on several occasions prior to this incident he had seen the dog fighting with other dogs, but admitted he had never before seen the dog attack a person. Kent and his family had been frequent visitors in the Sims home and each time the dog was present, but was not confined.
The case was tried without a jury, and at the conclusion of the Kents' evidence, Sims moved for a "directed verdict," which we will treat as a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) Ala.R.Civ.P., because the case was tried without a jury. This motion was granted. The Kents' motion for a new trial was denied.
As previously stated, the issue is whether the trial court erroneously entered a judgment in favor of the dog owner, Sims. In comparing a Rule 41(b) motion to a motion for a directed verdict, the Chaney court stated that "[a] Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss is not the equivalent of a Rule 50 motion for a directed verdict, nor is the role of the trial court the same." Chaney v. General Motors Corporation, 348 So. 2d 799, 801 (Ala.Civ.App.1977). The committee comments to Rule 41 elaborate on this distinction as follows:
The Kents claim that the trial court should have viewed the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to their position. In Chaney, supra, a case similar to the case at bar, the plaintiff raised the same argument. Addressing this argument, the Chaney court stated:
Quoting Allred v. Sasser, 170 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1948).
This rule must be read in conjunction with the ore tenus rule. Thus, the trial court's ruling need only be supported by credible evidence and will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous or palpably wrong or unjust. Peterson v. Jefferson County, 372 So. 2d 839 (Ala.1979). In Peterson, this Court addressed the scintilla evidence rule, which the Kents contend should have been applied in this case. In Peterson, the Court held:
372 So. 2d  at 844.
The trial court granted Sims's motion on the grounds that the Kents failed to prove negligence or actual expenses incurred as damages. The trial court's judgment is supported by credible evidence.
Recently, this court summarized the elements necessary to impose liability in dogbite cases:
"`* * * *
"`Appellant cites Owen v. Hampson, in which this Court, quoting from a previous opinion, stated:
White v. Law, 454 So. 2d 515 (Ala.1984).
Here, the only evidence presented at trial relating to the vicious propensities of this *147 animal was that the animal would fight with other dogs. The father of the child bitten admitted that he had observed the dog in question "a couple of hundred times" but had never before seen it attack a person and admitted that he did not know of any such incident involving the dog prior to this incident. The trial court was authorized to find from the evidence that the dog's prior actions were insufficient to place Sims on notice or give him any reason to know of the dog's dangerous propensities. Consequently, we will affirm the trial court's finding that the owner of the dog was not liable for the injury if the case was tried on the theory of common law liability for negligence.
The Kents contend, however, that the case should be decided on appeal by considering the provisions of Code 1975, § 3-6-1, which create liability for the owner of a dog for injuries to a person who is bitten by the dog while on the owner's premises. The owner of the dog, Sims, in his brief on appeal, contends that the Kents are attempting to have the appeal considered on a theory different from the theory upon which the original trial was had. It is, of course, the law that a case will not be reviewed here on a theory different from that on which it was tried below. Bailey v. City of Mobile, 292 Ala. 436, 296 So. 2d 149 (1974).
It appears that the case was tried on the theory of common law liability for negligence, but we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the Kents did not argue the applicability of Code 1975, § 3-6-1, et seq. in the trial court.
The defendant Sims, in his motion for a directed verdict, set forth a ground that "[t]he plaintiff has totally failed to prove the elements of a common law negligence case, specifically there has been no proof of negligence or the breach of any duty owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff."
The trial judge, in his order, made the following findings and conclusions:
The plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the order and grant them a new trial, and in their motion for new trial stated that "[t]his Court ruled that Sections 3-6-1, 3-6-2, and 3-6-3 of the 1975 Code of Alabama are unconstitutional, and this ruling is not reflected in the court order granting the directed verdict motion of the defendant." The trial court, on November 8, 1983, entered an order which stated: "After hearing arguments from both counsel on Motion for New Trial, be it ordered that Motion for New Trial be denied."
Because we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the case was not tried on the theory of liability set out in Code 1975, § 3-6-1, et seq., we conclude that it would be just to remand the cause to the trial court with directions to certify to this Court within 28 days (4 weeks), the theory upon which the case was tried. After we receive the certificate from the trial court, we will decide the case based upon the theory upon which the case was tried below.
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, Justice.
After remand, the trial court certified to us the following order:
"The Plaintiffs' pleadings in the case at bar set forth a common law negligence action demanding damages on behalf of both the minor child and his father for injuries sustained by the minor child as the result of a dog bite inflicted by an animal belonging to the Defendant. All of the Plaintiffs' evidence offered at the time of trial was directed to proof of the common law negligence action. The Court granted the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict since the Plaintiff failed to prove by competent evidence all of the requisite elements of a common law negligence action.
"The Plaintiff did not plea[d] nor offer any proof of the cause of action existing by virtue of Section 3-6-1, et seq., Code of Alabama, 1975, as amended. The Plaintiff and the Defendant joined issue on the Plaintiff's pleadings and the Plaintiff offered no proof of the elements of the statutory cause of action set forth in Section 3-6-1 during the presentation of the Plaintiff's case. The Plaintiff did not interject the statutory code provisions until the Plaintiff had rested his case and there was oral argument on the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict.
"The issue of liability under Title 3-6-1, et seq., of the 1975 Code of Alabama, was not raised by the Plaintiff until after resting of Plaintiff's case and during arguments on Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict. This court carefully considered the applicability of said Code Section to the proof offered in said cause and is of the opinion that there was no evidence presented that would justify a verdict in behalf of the Plaintiff. Under the provisions of Section 3-6-1, et seq., the Plaintiff failed to offer the necessary proof to justify relief in behalf of Plaintiff as an invitee on the premises of the Defendant nor did the Plaintiff offer any evidence as to the actual expense as provided in Section 3-6-3, 1975 Code of Alabama.
Upon consideration of this order, we affirm, having already determined that the Kents are precluded from recovery on a theory of common law negligence.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.