Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Charles Glynn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP003058-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3058-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charles Glynn, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
 
Complainant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Charles Glynn, 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GLYNN 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 27, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
December 3, 1998 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Bablitch & Prosser, J.J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-cross respondent the 
cause was submitted on the briefs of briefs by David J. Cannon 
and Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross appellant 
the cause was submitted on the briefs of Robert G. Krohn and 
Roethe, Krohn, Pope & McCarthy, LLP, Edgerton. 
 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3058-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charles Glynn, Attorney at Law. 
Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility,  
 
 
Complainant-Respondent-Cross- 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
v.  
Charles Glynn, 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
 
 
Respondent. 
FILED 
 
APR 27, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney’s 
license 
suspended. 
¶1 
PER CURIAM   Attorney Charles Glynn appealed from the 
referee’s conclusion that he engaged in dishonest conduct when 
he 
paid 
himself 
excessive 
and 
unauthorized 
fees 
in 
two 
guardianship matters and attempted to justify those payments by 
false itemized statements and by documents falsely indicating 
that he was reimbursing the estates for disbursements he had 
made to himself without court approval. He did not contest the 
referee’s conclusions that he charged unreasonable fees and 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
2 
failed 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation 
and 
act 
with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in each of those matters. 
Attorney Glynn also appealed from the referee’s recommendation 
that his license to practice law be suspended for six months as 
discipline for his professional misconduct. The Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) cross-appealed 
from the referee’s recommendation of discipline, arguing that 
the seriousness of the misconduct warrants a one-year license 
suspension.  
¶2 
We determine that the referee properly concluded that 
Attorney Glynn engaged in dishonest conduct in the guardianship 
matters and that a one-year suspension of his license to 
practice law is the appropriate discipline to impose for the 
totality of his misconduct. By collecting unreasonable fees from 
three clients without the approval of the court in which their 
matters resided, by failing to file the necessary reports with 
the court in those matters and act competently and timely in 
them, and by using false statements and documents to justify his 
excessive fees and to mislead the person investigating his 
conduct, Attorney Glynn has demonstrated a willingness to place 
his own pecuniary interests above the interests of the clients 
whose representation he undertook by court appointment and to 
create false documents to prevent that conduct from being 
discovered.  
¶3 
Attorney Glynn was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in 1991 and practices in Milwaukee. He has not been 
the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding. Pursuant to a 
No. 
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3 
stipulation 
of 
the 
parties 
and 
evidence 
presented 
at 
a 
disciplinary hearing, the referee, Attorney Michael Ash, made 
findings of fact concerning Attorney Glynn’s conduct as guardian 
of two estates and as conservator of a third.  
¶4 
Shortly after being admitted to the bar in 1991, 
Attorney Glynn began receiving appointments as guardian ad litem 
from the Milwaukee county probate court. Except for the three 
matters considered in this proceeding, none of his appointments 
involved the handling of other persons’ funds.  
¶5 
In the first matter, Attorney Glynn was appointed by 
the court as guardian of the estate of an incompetent in 
November 1992. The guardianship estate, valued at approximately 
$114,000, was intended to help the ward’s daughter pay rent and 
other college expenses. Attorney Glynn often failed to provide 
checks timely for those payments. The second matter concerned 
Attorney Glynn’s conduct as guardian of the estate of another 
incompetent, to which he was appointed in April 1993. The 
guardianship estate of approximately $100,000 to $125,000 was to 
make $1200 per month payments for the support of the ward’s 
minor child. The parties in this proceeding stipulated that 
Attorney Glynn was relatively inexperienced in guardianship 
matters and that each of these guardianships was relatively 
simple and had no significant complications. 
¶6 
In those two matters, Attorney Glynn received court-
approved fees of $2,750 and $2,000, respectively, for services 
rendered up to the summer of 1993. Thereafter, he paid himself 
fees that were not approved by the court for additional services 
No. 
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4 
for 1993 through 1995: $31,600 and $40,925, respectively. The 
referee found that the additional fees Attorney Glynn paid 
himself in each of those estates were not reasonable.  
¶7 
In each of those estates, Attorney Glynn did not file 
an inventory and filed only one annual account, covering the 
period April through December 1993. In one of them, his failure 
to file annual accounts, despite repeated requests to do so from 
the Veterans Administration Hospital where the ward resided, led 
to the ward’s temporary loss of VA benefits. Attorney Glynn 
filed in each of the estates, as part of the annual account he 
did file, a list of disbursements he had made to himself. In one 
of them, he filed a petition and proposed order approving fees 
and expenses, 
indicating 
that he 
had 
made 
a 
number of 
substantial disbursements to himself for fees, but the court 
declined to approve any fees at that time.  
¶8 
Soon after declining to approve his fees, the court 
asked an attorney with extensive experience in similar matters 
to look into Attorney Glynn’s activities in those two estates 
and appointed that attorney guardian ad litem for each of the 
wards on November 14, 1995. After Attorney Glynn resigned as 
guardian of the estates in mid-February 1996, the investigating 
attorney reported to the court that there were problems with 
Attorney Glynn’s handling of the estates but no assets were 
unaccounted for. That attorney also informed the Board of 
Attorney Glynn’s conduct in those matters.  
¶9 
On February 22, 1996, Attorney Glynn wrote the court 
about his work in the two estates, stating his intention to give 
No. 
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5 
the successor guardian in each a check for all fees he paid to 
himself without court approval. However, no such checks were 
forthcoming.  
¶10 In early March 1996 Attorney Glynn prepared, dated and 
signed letters addressed to the successor guardian of the two 
estates, together with three checks payable to each, ostensibly 
as reimbursement of the fees he had taken without court 
approval. However, Attorney Glynn never sent the letters or 
checks to the successor guardian, and no checks or payment of 
restitution were ever sent or received. Yet, Attorney Glynn sent 
copies of the letters and checks to the attorney investigating 
his conduct. That attorney then believed for a time, albeit 
wrongly, that Attorney Glynn had made substantial restitution to 
the two estates.  
¶11 At the disciplinary hearing, Attorney Glynn testified 
that he sent those copies to the investigating attorney, without 
any cover letter, explanation, or prior arrangement, simply for 
his review and approval. He insisted that he did not intend to 
mislead that attorney. The referee found Attorney Glynn’s 
testimony in that respect not credible.  
¶12 The investigating attorney informed the court that 
Attorney Glynn was entitled to some fees for his work in each of 
the estates and told Attorney Glynn he would have to provide an 
itemized substantiation of the work he did in each of them. In 
early 1996 the investigating attorney sought a court order for 
payment to each of the estates from Attorney Glynn and the 
company that had provided his bond for excessive attorney fees 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
6 
Attorney Glynn had paid himself. The court orders that issued in 
July 1996 acknowledged that Attorney Glynn was entitled to 
reasonable guardian fees for the years in which he served but 
held him and the bonding insurer jointly liable to the estates 
in the amounts of $48,367.03 and $38,397.54 plus interest, less 
a reasonable amount of fees for which Attorney Glynn was to 
submit a detailed request.  
¶13 Thereafter, Attorney Glynn provided the investigating 
attorney two itemized statements purportedly listing the dates 
on which he had done work connected with each of the estates, 
the type of work done, and the time spent doing it. The 
investigating attorney concluded that those statements were not 
truthful. The referee found that they falsely indicated that 
Attorney Glynn had spent substantial time on the estates that in 
fact he had not spent.  
¶14 The investigating attorney wrote Attorney Glynn that 
he would not approve a request for attorney fees based on those 
itemized statements but would not contest a fee of $2500 in each 
of the two estates. Subsequently, that attorney showed Attorney 
Glynn some of the evidence supporting his rejection of the 
itemized statements and invited Attorney Glynn to submit an 
affidavit addressing the reasonableness, necessity, and amount 
of work he claimed to have done. Attorney Glynn said he would 
prepare such affidavit but never did.  
¶15 Thereafter, the attorney for the bonding insurer wrote 
Attorney Glynn that absent complete reimbursement by him of 
funds it was required to pay, the company would seek to have 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
7 
certain “fraud” language included in the court orders awarding 
it judgments against him. Shortly before one of the estate 
matters was to go to hearing, Attorney Glynn sent a letter to 
the investigating attorney stating that he would not request any 
compensation in either of the estates and would not object to 
the entry of the proposed orders. The court then entered final 
orders in each of the estates for surcharge and judgment against 
Attorney Glynn and the bonding insurer, including language that 
the judgments were for “money obtained by false pretenses” or 
for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity 
or embezzlement or larceny,” each as defined under federal 
criminal statutes.  
¶16 The 
third 
matter 
considered 
in 
this 
proceeding 
concerns Attorney Glynn’s conduct as court-appointed conservator 
commencing September 1993. The conservatee, 93 years old and 
suffering from dementia, initially lived in her own apartment 
but eventually was placed in a nursing home. This was a 
relatively simple matter with no significant complications 
warranting other than a customary charge.  
¶17 Over a period of two and one-half years, Attorney 
Glynn paid himself $10,950 out of the conservatorship estate, 
some of that without court approval. His records of time spent 
in the matter set forth activity that was unnecessary for the 
proper performance of his duties. He ultimately repaid the 
conservatorship $5000 as ordered by the court.  
¶18 The first inventory in that conservatorship was due 
March 22, 1994, but was not filed until January 6, 1995. 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
8 
Attorney Glynn failed to pay nursing home bills timely and did 
not obtain a bond despite a court order that he do so. Attorney 
Glynn also failed to file a federal benefits form properly when 
the conservatee’s money was exhausted, and he had problems 
valuing and cashing savings bonds she owned, causing the 
conservatorship to have cash flow and federal benefits problems.  
¶19 On the basis of those facts, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Glynn engaged in professional misconduct as 
follows:  
¶20 He charged unreasonable fees in each of the two 
guardianships and in the conservatorship, in violation of SCR 
20:1.5(a).1 By failing to seek court approval at all times for 
                     
1  SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part: Fees 
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include 
the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client;  
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
9 
his fees, by failing to file inventories and annual accounts 
timely, by failing to submit bills timely in support of his 
fees, and by failing to educate himself regarding guardianship 
and conservatorship proceedings, he failed to provide competent 
representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.1,2 and failed to act 
with 
reasonable 
diligence 
and 
promptness 
in 
representing 
clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.3 In one of the guardianship 
matters, by providing legal services without the necessary 
experience and by failing to pay rental checks to the ward’s 
daughter timely, he failed to provide competent representation, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.1. In the conservatorship matter, by 
failing to pay nursing home bills timely and obtain a bond, by 
failing to file application for federal benefits properly and 
value and cash savings bonds properly, and by not taking steps 
necessary 
to 
educate 
himself 
concerning 
conservatorship 
proceedings, he failed to provide competent representation and 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
                                                                  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer 
or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or continent.  
2  SCR 20:1.1 provides: Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.  
3  SCR 20:1.3 provides: Diligence 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.  
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
10
client, in violation of SCR 20:1.1 and 1.3. By paying himself 
excessive and unauthorized fees in the two guardianship matters 
and attempting to justify those payments by false itemized 
statements and by sending the investigating attorney documents 
falsely indicating that he was reimbursing the estates for 
disbursements he made to himself without court approval, he 
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).4  
¶21 In addition to the suspension of his license to 
practice law for six months, the referee recommended that 
reinstatement of that license be conditioned upon Attorney 
Glynn’s making “satisfactory progress” toward satisfying the 
judgments obtained by the bonding insurer. Finally, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Glynn be required to pay the costs of 
this proceeding.  
¶22 The referee explicitly rejected the Board’s position, 
reasserted in its cross-appeal, that the misconduct established 
in this proceeding warrants a one-year license suspension. The 
referee stated that he does not believe that Attorney Glynn is 
“irredeemably dishonest.” The referee noted that Attorney Glynn 
had not been disciplined previously, that three circuit court 
                     
4  SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
 . . .  
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation;  
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
11
judges testified to his “excellent reputation for truthfulness 
and honesty,” and that he cooperated in the disciplinary 
proceeding. At the same time, while noting that Attorney Glynn 
acknowledged the wrongful nature “of at least some of his 
conduct,” the referee emphasized that he “reaped substantial 
financial 
benefits 
from 
the 
modest 
Estates 
of 
persons 
effectively unable to protect themselves, while performing no 
services of commensurate value, and  . . .  was not completely 
honest 
and 
consistently 
truthful.” 
He 
expressly 
rejected 
Attorney Glynn’s contention that his misconduct was the result 
of his youth and inexperience. The referee determined that a 
six-month license suspension was required in order that Attorney 
Glynn not be able to return to the practice of law without this 
court’s approval.  
¶23 In his appeal, Attorney Glynn presented no meritorious 
argument for his contention that the referee erred in concluding 
that he engaged in dishonest conduct by preparing, dating, and 
signing letters and checks purporting to repay two guardianship 
estates but never sending them to the successor guardian, using 
copies of them instead to mislead the investigating attorney 
appointed by the probate court into believing that he had made 
restitution. Also without merit is his argument that a public 
reprimand 
is 
sufficient 
discipline 
for 
his 
professional 
misconduct, based on his lack of prior discipline, the testimony 
of three judges in respect to his reputation for truthfulness 
and 
honesty, 
his 
cooperation 
with 
the 
Board 
in 
its 
investigation, and his acknowledgment of the wrongful nature of 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
12
his conduct. In respect to the latter, he ignored the referee’s 
finding that his insistence that his sending of a letter and 
checks purporting to show he made restitution was not intended 
to be deceptive and that his itemized statements of services 
were truthful and substantially accurate “suggest[s] that he has 
not come to grips completely with his wrongdoing.”  
¶24 Attorney Glynn’s reliance on prior disciplinary cases 
to support his contention that a public reprimand is sufficient 
is misplaced. While in each of the cases he cited that resulted 
in a license suspension of 90 days or more the attorney failed 
to cooperate in the Board’s investigation, had prior discipline, 
or both, none of those cases dealt with professional misconduct 
similar to his. His argument in that respect totally ignores the 
seriousness of his misconduct and the harm, actual or potential, 
that it caused.  
¶25 We 
adopt 
the 
referee’s 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law and determine that the seriousness of 
Attorney Glynn’s misconduct warrants the suspension of his 
license to practice law for one year. Over a period of 
approximately two and one-half years, he paid himself $31,600 as 
guardian of a ward’s estate valued at approximately $114,000, 
after already having been paid a court-approved $2750, and paid 
himself without court approval almost $41,000 from another 
ward’s estate valued at approximately $125,000, after having 
been paid a court-approved $2900. He also took almost $11,000, 
some of it without court approval, for services he acknowledged 
had been based on inaccurate time records that reflected 
No. 
97-3058-D 
 
13
excessive hours for unnecessary services. Moreover, he created 
documents purporting to show a court-appointed investigator that 
he had made restitution to the successor guardian of two wards. 
The large sums taken by Attorney Glynn from vulnerable victims 
and the purposeful pattern of deception he employed require a 
meaningful disciplinary response not only as a measure of the 
seriousness of that misconduct but also to protect the legal 
system and the public from similar misconduct by Attorney Glynn 
or any other attorney who might engage in similar misconduct.  
¶26 In addition to the license suspension, we require that 
Attorney Glynn make restitution to the clients and the bonding 
company for the harm his professional misconduct caused them. 
His license to practice law will not be reinstated until he has 
made that restitution.  
¶27 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Charles Glynn to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for one year, effective 
June 14, 1999.  
¶28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his license, Charles Glynn make restitution to 
those harmed by his professional misconduct established in this 
proceeding.  
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Charles Glynn pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility 
the costs 
of this 
proceeding, 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time 
specified and absent a showing to this court of his inability to 
pay the costs within that time, the license of Charles Glynn to 
No. 
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14
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further 
order of the court.  
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Charles Glynn comply with 
the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
¶31 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and DAVID T PROSSER, JR., JJ., did 
not participate.  
 
 
1