Title: P. v. Rodriguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S098821
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2002

1
Filed 7/22/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S098821
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 2/3 B142586
JOSE LUIS RODRIGUEZ,
)
)
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. PA032995
__________________________________ )
Penal Code section 288.51 punishes the continuous sexual abuse of a child
under 14 by any person residing with, or having “recurring access” to, the child.  In
this case, we must decide whether the quoted phrase has a technical meaning
requiring sua sponte jury instructions, or whether the term is so commonly
understood that no special instructions are required.  We conclude that the trial
court in the present case did not err in failing to give clarifying instructions on its
own motion.
FACTS
Jose Luis Rodriguez appeals from the judgment entered following his
conviction by jury of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child.  (§ 288.5,
subd. (a).)  He was sentenced to prison for 28 years.  The following facts are largely
taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion in this case.
                                                
1 
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Fernando V. was born in May 1983 and lived in Los Angeles County.
Defendant lived four houses from Fernando, in a trailer on the back of a lot.
Everyone who lived on the block knew defendant as a soccer coach who participated
in soccer activities with neighborhood children.  Although his mother believed
otherwise, Fernando testified he was not on defendant’s soccer team, but his older
brother was, and Fernando would watch his brother play.  Fernando would also “do
whatever [defendant] would tell him to do” and often ran errands for defendant.
Defendant first molested Fernando in 1990 when Fernando was seven years
old, and continued to molest him until he was about nine years old.  These acts
occurred on school days and weekends in the trailer and involved fondling,
masturbation, oral copulation and sodomy.  At one point, the molestations occurred
almost every day.  Defendant threatened to shoot Fernando or his mother if he told
anyone regarding the acts.  Defendant does not presently contest the sufficiency of
the evidence establishing these molestations and, accordingly, further details are
unnecessary.
Ernesto R. was born in August 1987.  From 1990 to 1998, Ernesto lived in
his grandparents’ house on the same lot where defendant’s trailer was located.
Defendant regularly used a bathroom inside this house.  Ernesto knew defendant was
a soccer coach and Ernesto’s mother viewed defendant as if he were an uncle to
Ernesto and her other children.
In about 1994 or 1995, when Ernesto was about seven or eight years old,
defendant began molesting him two to three times a week, every week, for about two
or three years.  The acts involved fondling, oral copulation and sodomy.  Defendant
threatened to hit Ernesto if he told anyone about these acts.
3
DISCUSSION
Section 288.5 was adopted in 1989 (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 4, p. 6140) to
criminalize “continuous sexual abuse of a child.”  Subdivision (a) of this section
provides in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who either resides in the same home
with the minor child or has recurring access to the child, who over a period of
time, not less than three months in duration, engages in three or more acts of
substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the
commission of the offense, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1203.066, or
three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct under Section 288, with a child
under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense is guilty of
the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16 years.”  (Italics added.)
The Legislature’s accompanying statement of purpose declared that “there is
an immediate need for additional statutory protection for the most vulnerable among
our children, those of tender years, some of whom are being subjected to continuing
sexual abuse by those commonly referred to as ‘resident child molesters.’  These
molesters reside with, or have recurring access to, a child and repeatedly molest
the child over a prolonged period of time but the child, because of age or the
frequency of the molestations, or both, often is unable to distinguish one incident
from another . . . , and as a consequence prosecutors are unable to . . . overcome . . .
constitutional due process problems . . . .”  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1, subd. (a), p.
6138, italics added, reprinted at Historical and Statutory Notes, 29B pt. 2 West’s
Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 782, p. 631.)  The Legislature also declared that it
intended the penalty for continuous sexual child abuse “shall be greater than the
maximum penalty under existing law for any single felony sex
4
offense.”  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1, subd, (b), p. 6138, reprinted at Historical and
Statutory Notes, 29B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 782, at p. 631.)
Guided by the foregoing express legislative declarations of intent, we turn to
the question before us, namely, the sufficiency of instructions that simply use the
statutory term “recurring access,” without further definition or elaboration.  As a
general rule, in the absence of a request for amplification, the language of a statute
defining a crime or defense usually is an appropriate basis for an instruction.   If a
statutory word or phrase is commonly understood and is not used in a technical
sense, the court need not give any sua sponte instruction as to its meaning.  If,
however, a word or phrase is used in a technical sense differing from its commonly
understood meaning, clarifying instructions are appropriate and should be given on
the court’s own motion.  (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 334; People v.
Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 981; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568,
574-575.)  We must decide here whether the Legislature used the phrase “recurring
access” in some technical sense that would require sua sponte instructions, i.e.,
whether the jury would have difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance.
We conclude otherwise.
In the present case, the court instructed the jury based on CALJIC No.
10.42.6, using the statutory language of section 288.5, subdivision (a), and
explaining that one element of the offense of continuous sexual abuse was
defendant’s recurring access to the minor.  Defendant failed to request amplification
of that term, and accordingly the trial court was not obligated, sua sponte, to define
the phrase unless it had a “technical sense peculiar to the law,” that is, a “statutory
definition differ[ing] from the meaning that might be ascribed to the same terms in
common parlance.”  (People v. Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 574-575.)
5
We discern no meaning, technical or otherwise, of the term “recurring
access” other than its commonly understood meaning as an ongoing ability to
approach and contact someone time after time.  (See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 6 [the term “access” means “permission, liberty, or ability
to enter, approach, communicate with, or pass to and from,” or “freedom or ability
to obtain or make use of”]; id. at p. 978 [the term “recur” means “to occur again
after an interval: occur time after time”]; cf. People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150,
155.)  As noted, the evidence here indicated defendant, a soccer coach well known in
the neighborhood, molested his two victims several times each week for several
years.  We think the jury, armed with no more than the statutory language and the
jury’s own common understanding of its meaning, would have had no difficulty
whatever in determining whether or not defendant had recurring access to his child
victims.
Defendant relies on People v. Gohdes (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1520
(Gohdes), to support his position that the court should have given additional
instructions.  There, the Court of Appeal read into section 288.5’s requirement of
recurring access a “qualitative” element focusing on the relationship between the
defendant and his victim.  (Gohdes, at p. 1529.)  In Gohdes’s view, based on its
interpretation of the legislative history of section 288.5, a mere acquaintance of the
victim such as defendant, lacking either (1) a position of authority or respect as to
his child victim, or (2) some recurring relationship with him apart from the on-going
sexual contacts, could not be found guilty of violating the section.  To the contrary,
we believe the Court of Appeal read too much into the statute and reached a
conclusion at odds with the clear legislative intent to provide additional protection
for victims of child molestation.
6
In Gohdes, the defendant had dated the victim’s sister for several years and,
on her departure from home, turned his attention on Corrine, the underage victim.
Over a period of several years, defendant secretly visited Corrine, climbing in her
window and engaging in nonforcible sexual activity with her, culminating in
intercourse when she was 14.  The Court of Appeal upheld a trial court ruling that,
despite his frequent visits, defendant had no recurring access to Corrine because he
was neither “ ‘an invited guest’ ” nor held any “ ‘position of trust’ ” with Corrine’s
family, and in fact had no “ ‘legitimate purpose’ ” in visiting her.  (Gohdes, supra,
58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524.)
The Gohdes court agreed with the trial court, finding that defendant failed to
match any of the “obvious situations” involving true recurring access, such as those
involving babysitters or “regularly visiting relatives or friends, etc.”  (Gohdes,
supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)  The court failed to explain why defendant did not
qualify as a “regularly visiting . . . friend[].”  The court reasoned, “the Legislature
must have intended a qualitative rather than a quantitative construction of the
‘recurring access’ element.  This is the only type of construction suggested in the
legislative history:  uncles, babysitters, ex-spouses, non-live-in lovers, etc.  There
are two common characteristics of these categories.  One is that in most categories
suggested, the person with recurring access to the child also is in a position of
authority over the child, or is in a position to command respect or obedience
from the child.  A second is that in each of these categories, there was an ongoing
relationship between the person with recurring access and the child separate and
apart from the relationship formed and characterized by the forbidden sexual
activity.  Even apart from the sexual activity, the uncle was still the uncle; the father,
the father; the babysitter, the babysitter; the mother's boyfriend, the mother's
boyfriend; and so forth.  There is no analogous independent relationship in the
7
instant case.  Like the magistrate and the superior court, we conclude that the
surreptitious assignations involved in this case do not meet the statutory requirement
of ‘recurring access.’  This is simply not the type of relationship to which the statute
as written is meant to apply.”  (Id. at p. 1529, italics added.)
Our review of the legislative history fails to support Gohdes’s “qualitative”
element interpretation.  The express legislative purpose in enacting section 288.5
was to provide “additional protection” for victims of child molestation by assuring
that “resident” child molesters and others who repeatedly abuse a child over a
prolonged period of time would not escape prosecution because of difficulties in
pleading and proving with sufficient precision the dates, times, and particular nature
of each molestation.  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1, subds. (a), (b), p. 6138, reprinted at
Historical and Statutory Notes, 29B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. §
782, at p. 631; People v. Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 155-156.)  It is true that, in
describing the need to enact a statute criminalizing continuous sexual abuse, some of
the legislative history materials named parents and stepparents as examples of
persons with recurring access to children.  But we find nothing in those materials to
support Gohdes’s view that the statute was not intended to apply to persons such as
defendant who, despite lack of a familial or similar relationship, nonetheless manage
to maintain repeated contact with their victims.
The Court of Appeal in the present case outlined the various letters and
memoranda from the Office of the Attorney General, which sponsored the
legislation enacted as section 288.5, material that supposedly reflects that office’s
“gradual development of a broad view, articulated in common parlance, concerning
the scope of persons governed by that section.”  Assuming, as both parties seem
willing to do, that we properly may rely on these materials (but see People v.
Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 247; Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19
8
Cal.4th 714, 726-727), we find nothing in those materials supporting Gohdes’s
interpretation of the statute.
Indeed, although initial drafts of the proposed legislation applied to persons
“who occupy positions of trust and confidence,” (Deputy Atty. Gen. Edgar Kerry,
mem. to Asst. Atty. Gen. Arnold Overoye, Aug. 25, 1988, p. 1) and persons “in a
position of special trust with continuing access” (Cal. Dept. Justice, Legis.
Proposal, Sept. 23, 1988) to the child victim, ultimately the phrase “recurring
access” was chosen by the drafters, it being deemed “broader in its scope” than the
earlier proposals.  (Deputy Atty. Gen. Edgar Kerry, mem. Nov. 14, 1988, p. 3.)  As
the present Court of Appeal opinion observed, Gohdes “resurrects ‘position of
trust’ and relationship considerations which the Attorney General rejected in his
final draft of the proposed legislation” submitted to the Legislature.
In short, as made clear by the legislative declarations accompanying it,
section 288.5 was enacted to broaden, not narrow, the reach of this state’s child
molestation laws.  To the extent inconsistent with our opinion, we disapprove
Gohdes, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 1520.
Defendant observes that section 288.5, subdivision (a), in addition to
requiring residence with or “recurring access” to the victim, also requires the
defendant to have committed, over a defined period of time, “three or more acts of
substantial sexual conduct” or “three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct”
with the child victim.  Defendant echoes the observation of an appellate case that,
accordingly, section 288.5 “is [not] aimed . . . at the stranger who happens to
encounter the same victim three times.”  (People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
1303, 1311.)  In defendant’s view, to avoid rendering the term surplusage, “recurring
access” must mean more than mere repeated contact wholly by chance.  The
Attorney General, on the other hand, argues that the Legislature merely intended the
9
requirement of three acts of sexual misconduct to constitute the “minimum number
of acts within the requisite time period” to qualify as continuous sex abuse under the
section.  As Avina states, “The three-act requirement merely sets a ‘baseline’ for
measuring the course of conduct,” although Avina doubted that mere repeated
“ ‘transient’ ” contact with the child would suffice to establish “recurring access.”
(Id. at p. 1311.)  We will reserve the “wholly by chance contact with strangers” issue
for another case.  Defendant, as a soccer coach for neighborhood children, was a
well-known and respected figure.  He was no stranger who simply happened to
encounter and sexually abuse his victims repeatedly for several years.
Despite the concerns raised by the concurring and dissenting opinion, we see
no “surplusage” problem requiring some special definition of “recurring access”
that would require sua sponte instructions.  Section 288.5 relates to “continuous
sexual abuse” and accordingly requires at least three acts of sexual misconduct with
the child victim over at least three months to qualify for prosecution of persons who
are either residing with, or have “recurring access” to, the child.  Contrary to the
concurring and dissenting opinion, not every person who manages to molest a child
three times during the requisite period necessarily would have an ongoing ability to
approach and contact the child time after time.  (See, ante, at p. 5.)
10
We conclude that “recurring access” is a commonly understood term
requiring no sua sponte definitional instructions.  The judgment of the Court of
Appeal so holding is affirmed.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I write separately to clarify my position with respect to a point of
disagreement between the majority and our concurring and dissenting colleague.  I
disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion’s implication that the statutory
term “recurring access” would be reasonably understood by jurors to denote such
intermittent “access” as is necessarily implied by discrete instances of actual
contact.  (See conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 5.)  I join the majority, rather, in its
determination that the term’s commonly understood meaning is “an ongoing ability
to approach and contact someone time after time.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5, italics
added.)  As the majority correctly points out, “not every person who manages to
molest a child three times during the requisite period necessarily would have an
ongoing ability to approach and contact the child time after time.”  (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 9.)  Accordingly, not every person who manages to molest a child three times
during the requisite period necessarily would be guilty of violating Penal Code
section 288.5, and the concurring and dissenting opinion errs to the extent it
suggests that a reasonable juror could conclude otherwise.  (See conc. & dis. opn.,
post, at p. 6.)
WERDEGAR, J.
1
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
I concur in the majority opinion’s result.  I disagree, however, with its
reasoning.  As elaborated below, if the term “recurring access” in Penal Code
section 288.5 (all statutory references are to this code) is not given a special
meaning, it will be rendered surplusage.  I therefore conclude that “recurring
access” has a particular meaning in the context of the statute that differs
significantly from the commonly understood meaning, requiring the trial court to
instruct the jury sua sponte as to that meaning.  Because I also conclude the lack of
such instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the present case, I would
affirm the Court of Appeal judgment upholding defendant’s conviction.
The rule for determining when a statute requires a supplementary sua sponte
instruction by the trial court is settled: “ ‘If the jury would have no difficulty in
understanding the statute without guidance, the court need do no more than instruct
in statutory language.’  [Citations.]  [¶]  . . .  A word or phrase having a technical,
legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that
differs from its nonlegal meaning.  [Citation.]  Thus, . . . terms are held to require
clarification by the trial court when their statutory definition differs from the
meaning that might be ascribed to the same terms in common parlance.”  (People v.
Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574-575, italics added.)
2
In the present case, we are asked to interpret the meaning of “recurring
access” in section 288.5, which provides in pertinent part: “Any person who either
resides in the same home with the minor child or has recurring access to the child,
who over a period of time, not less than three months in duration, engages in three or
more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years at the
time of the commission of the offense . . . is guilty of the offense of continuous
sexual abuse of a child . . . .”  The critical interpretive problem of this case is posed
by the apparent truism that anybody who has engaged in an act of “substantial sexual
conduct” with a child necessarily has had access to the child, and anyone who has
engaged in the three or more such acts over three or more months needed to qualify
as continuous sexual abuse of a child has had recurring access.  If that is the case,
then not only the phrase “recurring access” but the entire clause “[a]ny person who
either resides in the same home with the minor child or has recurring access to the
child” would be surplusage and the statute could have and should have simply read:
“Any person . . . who over a period of time, not less than three months in duration,
engages in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age
of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense . . . is guilty of the offense
of continuous sexual abuse of a child.”  But such a construction would be a flagrant
violation of the rule that “whenever possible, significance must be given to every
word in pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a construction
that makes some words surplusage.”  (Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (1999)
21 Cal.4th 310, 330.)
The evident solution to the surplusage problem was proposed by People v.
Gohdes (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1520.  The Gohdes court first reasoned that “[a]
construction that proof of three acts over three months is sufficient to show
‘recurring access’ would render the recurring-access element redundant.”  (Id. at p.
3
1529.)  It deduced from this that recurring access must be a distinct element of the
crime of continuous sexual abuse, requiring a showing that “there was an ongoing
relationship between the person with recurring access and the child separate and
apart from the relationship formed and characterized by the forbidden sexual
activity.”  (Ibid., italics added.)
Although the court observed that this relationship is often characterized by
the adult’s being “in a position to command respect or obedience from the child”
(Gohdes, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1529), I do not read the opinion as requiring
this type of relationship.  In order to avoid redundancy in the statute, all that is
required is that the relationship be “separate and apart from the relationship formed
and characterized by the forbidden sexual activity.”  (Ibid.)  I understand the term
“ongoing relationship” to mean simply a legitimate relationship of some kind with a
child that provides an adult with opportunities to engage in an illegitimate sexual
one.  Strictly speaking, it is more correct to say that the perpetrator must have some
legitimate “means of access to” rather than an “ongoing relationship with” the child.
Although the means of access will often be in the form of an ongoing relationship
with a child, it can also sometimes assume the form of a relationship with a child’s
parent.  But with this caveat in mind, I believe the Gohdes position is essentially
correct.
This interpretation of the phrase “recurring access” is consistent with the
declared legislative intent of section 288.5.  The Legislature stated in the uncodified
portion of the statute enacting section 288.5 that it was its intent “to provide
additional protection for children subjected to continuing sexual abuse and certain
punishment for persons referred to as ‘resident child molesters.’ ”  (Stats. 1989, ch.
1402, § 1, p. 6138, italics added.)  This statement of legislative intent also makes
clear that the statute was enacted in reaction to People v. Van Hoek (1988) 200
4
Cal.App.3d 811.  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, §  1, p. 6138.)  Van Hoek held that it was a
violation of a defendant’s due process rights to convict him based on generic
testimony of a course of sexual abuse that did not identify a specific offense,
because such testimony impaired the defendant’s ability to mount a defense. e.g. to
put on an alibi defense or cross-examine the child victim.  (Van Hoek, supra, 200
Cal.App.3d at pp. 816-817.)  Section 288.5 attempted to address these due process
concerns by criminalizing a course of conduct, while at the same time, as the
statement of legislative intent makes clear, restricting this type of criminal
culpability to “resident child molesters”  the group most likely to engage in
repeated sexual abuse.  (See People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311.)
The Legislature in its statement of intent declared that “resident child
molesters . . . reside with, or have recurring access to, a child and repeatedly molest
the child over a prolonged period of time . . . .”  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1, p.
6138.)  In other words, the term “recurring access” was part of the legislative
definition of “resident child molester.”  This context strongly indicates that
“recurring access” signifies legitimate access that is the functional equivalent to that
established by residing with the victim.
The above conclusion is also in accord with our pronouncement in People v.
Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 155 that “[t]he Legislature enacted section 288.5 to
remedy certain problems of pleading and proof that had arisen in cases involving
child molesters who engaged in repeated lewd and lascivious acts with their victims
while living with or having close and continuing contact with them.”1
                                                
1 
The majority refers to various internal memoranda from the Attorney
General’s office to demonstrate how broadly the Attorney General conceived the
term “recurring access.”  But there is no indication that these memoranda were
presented to the Legislature, and therefore they are not indicative of legislative
intent.  Moreover, nothing in these memoranda suggests that the term “recurring
access” was intended to be redundant.
5
Contrary to the majority’s implication, the Attorney General does not take
issue with Gohdes, as interpreted narrowly.  As the Attorney General states: “Insofar
as Gohdes concluded the Legislature contemplated ‘recurring access’ required
something more than access to commit the forbidden acts, it is consistent both with
the Court of Appeal opinion and respondent’s position.”  The Attorney General
argues, and the Court of Appeal held, however, that the above is not a technical
meaning, and therefore requires no sua sponte instruction.  In order to assess the
validity of this argument, we must examine more closely the commonly understood
meaning of “recurring access.”
The definition of “access” quoted by both the Attorney General and majority
is “permission, liberty, or ability to enter, approach, communicate with, or pass to
and from,” or “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of.” (Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 6.)  The term “recur” means “to occur again after
an interval: occur time after time.”  (Id. at p. 978.)  The majority apparently accepts
the Attorney General’s argument that the term means no more or less than the
dictionary definition, and would be understood as such by the jury.  But according to
that definition, anyone who has committed three or more acts of substantial sexual
conduct with a child under the age of 14 has had recurring access to that child, i.e.,
has had the “ability to . . . approach” a child “time after time.”  A reasonable juror
could therefore conclude that such a person has had “recurring access” to the child
within the meaning of section 288.5.  But as the Attorney General concedes, that
conclusion would be erroneous.  In other words, nothing in the commonly
understood meaning of the term “recurring access” would prevent a reasonable juror
from subsuming that term entirely within the “three acts” requirement, thereby
abolishing “recurring access” as an independent element of the crime.  In order to
bridge the gap between the legal meaning of “recurring access” within the context of
6
section 288.5 and the commonly understood meaning, a jury instruction is required.
(People v. Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 574.)
The majority’s response to this position is the cryptic assertion that “not
every person who manages to molest a child three times during the requisite period
necessarily would have an ongoing ability to approach and contact the child time
after time.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  Without more, it is impossible to know what
the majority has in mind.  If someone is able to molest a child three times, then he
has had recurring access, i.e., a repeated ability to approach the child  unless
perhaps if the encounters occurred wholly by chance.  This exception is evidently
not what the majority is contemplating, because it explicitly reserves the “chance
contact with strangers” issue for another case.  (Ibid.)  As such, the majority’s
formulation has no evident meaning.  Because the majority fails to define “recurring
access” so as to avoid redundancy, it also fails to address the central question of
whether that term has a technical or commonly understood meaning.
I therefore conclude that the phrase “recurring access” means some kind of
repeated legitimate means of access used to perform the sexual misconduct.  I
further conclude that this understanding of the term gives it a special meaning
requiring a sua sponte jury instruction by the trial court, so that the jury is not misled
to believe that the commission of three acts alone is sufficient to find “recurring
access.”  I now turn to the question whether the failure to so instruct in this case is
prejudicial.
Instructional error that omits an element of a crime is harmless if it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
(People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504.)  Instructional error will be found
harmless when the evidence before the jury was so overwhelming “as to leave it
beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict would have been the same had the jury been
7
instructed” on the missing element.  (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 46.)  In
this case, the evidence is overwhelming, and, indeed, undisputed, that defendant had a
legitimate means of access to his two child victims.  Defendant lived in a trailer on
the same property as Ernesto R.  He was allowed to regularly use the bathroom at
Ernesto’s house.  By virtue of his proximity and his standing as a neighborhood
soccer coach, he was viewed by Ernesto’s mother as an uncle to Ernesto, and was
allowed to take Ernesto and his siblings on outings.  Defendant lived four houses
away from Fernando.  He was a soccer coach of Fernando’s older brother.  Fernando
ran errands for defendant and Fernando’s mother entrusted defendant to take
Fernando and other children to soccer practice and other outings.  Thus, the evidence
is incontrovertible that defendant had recurring legitimate access to both victims,
and the trial court’s failure to properly define the term “recurring access” was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I would therefore require courts to issue a sua sponte instruction that
“recurring access” for purposes of section 288.5 means that the defendant had
repeated legitimate access to the victim.  I would also affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeal because the instructional error in this case was harmless.
MORENO, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Rodriguez
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 89 Cal.App.4th 546
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S098821
Date Filed: July 22, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Meredith C. Taylor
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
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Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Chung Mar, John
R. Gorey and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Athena Shudde
1762 Columbia Street
San Diego, CA  92101
(619) 234-2266
Sharlene A. Honnaka
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA  90013
(213) 897-2272