Title: Grimes v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.
Citation: 726 So. 2d 615
Docket Number: 1971795
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 1998

726 So. 2d 615 (1998)
Aura Mae GRIMES
v.
LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
1971795.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 20, 1998.
Glenda G. Cochran and John S. Campbell of Cochran &amp; Associates, Birmingham, for appellant.
Jere F. White, Jr., J. Banks Sewell III, and William H. Brooks of Lightfoot, Franklin &amp; White, L.L.C., Birmingham; James W. Gewin, Michael R. Pennington, and Matthew H. Lembke of Bradley, Arant, Rose &amp; White, L.L.P., Birmingham; and Horace G. Williams and Courtney R. Potthoff of Williams, Potthoff &amp; Williams, Eufaula, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Aura Mae Grimes appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Barbour County in which it exercised jurisdiction over matters raised in an action that she has pending in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. We affirm.[1]
Ms. Grimes is a member of the non-opt-out plaintiff class of policyholders in Robertson v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., No. CV-92-021, in which, in 1994, the Circuit Court of Barbour County entered a final judgment pursuant to a settlement agreement between the class members and the defendant Liberty National Life Insurance Company ("Liberty National"). The judgment provided in part:
(Emphasis original.)
Section III of the settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment, contained the following release:
The final judgment entered in Robertson was affirmed by this Court. See Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265 (Ala.1995).
In 1997, Ms. Grimes filed an action, which is pending in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County (CV-97-70), in which she seeks compensatory and punitive damages based on allegations of the tort of outrage, fraud, breach of contract, and bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim. She filed this present appeal after the Circuit Court of Barbour County, at Liberty National's request, issued an order enforcing the injunction that it had issued in Robertson. Liberty National sought the order out of concern that Ms. Grimes was basing at least some of her claims on statements or representations alleged to have been made by Liberty National at the time it sold Ms. Grimes her cancer policy. Specifically, the Circuit Court of Barbour County noted in its order that the release that had been incorporated into the Robertson judgment covered "any frauds or other claims, including breach of contract, which arose out of transactions involving the cancer exchange program or statements or representations made by Liberty National or its agents pursuant to such a transaction." The court went on to state:
After carefully examining the record and the accompanying briefs, we conclude that the Circuit Court of Barbour County, pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction to oversee and administer the Robertson class action, had the authority to issue its order enforcing the 1994 injunction. In Ex parte Burch, 236 Ala. 662, 665-66, 184 So. 694, 697 (1938), this Court wrote:
See, also, Ex parte Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 631 So. 2d 865 (Ala.1993); Ex parte Moore, 382 So. 2d 548 (Ala.1980); Orton v. Cheatham, 293 Ala. 639, 309 So. 2d 94 (1975); Smith v. Charles E. Jay &amp; Co., 292 Ala. 513, 296 So. 2d 885 (1974); Ex parte State ex rel. Ussery, 285 Ala. 279, 231 So. 2d 314 (1970); Rush v. Simpson, 373 So. 2d 1105 (Ala.Civ. App.1979), and the cases cited therein; Clements v. Barber, 49 Ala.App. 266, 270 So. 2d 815 (Ala.Civ.App.1972); Ex parte State Mutual Ins. Co., 715 So. 2d 207 (Ala.1997) (plurality decision recognizing, among other things, the power of a court entertaining a class action to enjoin a competing action filed after the class action); Amend. 328, § 6.04(b), Ala. Const.1901 ("[the circuit court] shall have authority to issue such writs as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its powers").
All of these decisions demonstrate the well-settled rule that where two courts have equal and concurrent jurisdiction, the court that first exercises jurisdiction in a matter has preference and is not to be obstructed in the legitimate exercise of its powers by a court of coordinate jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Barbour County was acting well within its power in enforcing its permanent injunction so as to prevent Ms. Grimes from relitigating in another forum any claims against Liberty National that she, as a member of the Robertson class, had released in 1994.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, COOK, and SEE, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., dissents.
SHORES and LYONS, JJ., recuse themselves.
[1]  Ms. Grimes also filed in this Court a "Petition for Emergency Supervisory Injunction, for Writ of Prohibition, or for Writ of Mandamus," raising the same issues that she raises on this appeal. That petition, docketed as case No. 1971597, will be dismissed.