Title: BRADLEY REALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY v. Shwartz
Citation: 357 P.2d 638
Docket Number: 18799
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 1960

357 P.2d 638 (1960) BRADLEY REALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation, Plaintiff in Error, v. Harry SHWARTZ, Defendant in Error. No. 18799. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. December 19, 1960. *639 Jackson M. Seawell, Harold D. Torgan, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Joseph N. Lilly, Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. We will refer to plaintiff in error as Bradley or plaintiff, and to defendant in error as Shwartz or defendant. Bradley filed his complaint in three counts seeking recovery of a commission of $3,750 alleged to have been earned by him for procuring a buyer for real estate (first count); and recovery of a commission of $4,725 alleged to have been earned by him for procuring a tenant for real estate (second and third counts in the alternative). At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion for dismissal, discharged the jury, entered its written findings and order, and directed the entry of judgment for defendant. For reversal it is urged that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff as to each count, and that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case. The evidence discloses the following facts: In 1947, Bradley, a licensed real estate broker, obtained an oral nonexclusive listing to sell an unimproved tract of land owned by Shwartz, located on Colorado Boulevard between East Arkansas and East Florida Avenues in Denver. The tract has a frontage along Colorado Boulevard of 730 feet, with a depth of 299 feet. For convenience of discussion, this tract has been divided into two parcelsParcel A relating to Bradley's first cause of action and Parcel B relating to Bradley's second and third causes of action. In the beginning, Bradley was authorized to sell the entire tract at a list price of $20,000, however as time progressed and the economic picture in the vicinity changed with the growth of the area, the manner and method of dealing with the property and the list price was frequently changed by Shwartz; and, in 1950, Shwartz declared that he no longer desired to sell Parcel B but said he would lease it. Thereafter the parties dealt with the tract as two separate pieces of property and discussed various propositions both as to the sale of Tract A and the leasing of Tract B. In 1955, Tract A then had a list sale price of $80,000 and in the summer of that year Bradley found a prospective purchaser for $75,000 cash. This information was communicated *640 to Shwartz by Bradley through a telephone conversation. Mr. Bradley, who was the only witness called for the plaintiff, testified inter alia as follows with reference to what was said to defendant concerning the $75,000 offer: Defendant was called for cross-examination as an adverse witness and stated with reference to this conversation, as follows: "Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you give Mr. Bradley as your reason for not going through with the deal, the fact there would be very heavy income *641 taxes for you to pay, which you had been advised of after he brought the contract out? A. Well, it had some bearing, and, also, the price I was supposed to have gotten, which was $5,000 different." The question thus raised was whether defendant had accepted the offer made by plaintiff's prospect. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant had agreed to sell for $75,000 cash, and that plaintiff was authorized to proceed on that basis. The trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the claim of plaintiff relating to this transaction. The evidence raised an issue of fact which should have been determined by the jury. In Nelson v. Centennial Casualty Co., 130 Colo. 66, 273 P.2d 121, 122, this court stated, inter alia: The instant case is well within the coverage of this language. With reference to the claim of plaintiff for a commission allegedly due upon consummation of a lease of parcel B between the defendant and one Myers, the witness Bradley testified, inter alia: Several months thereafter, without any showing of effort on the part of plaintiff, defendant and Myers entered into an 18-year lease of the property referred to as plot A, which is the same property involved in the first claim of plaintiff, being the plot on the corner of the intersection. We think the instant case is governed by the rule applied in Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 139 Colo. 40, 337 P.2d 383, 385. In that case we quoted from Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120, as follows: Plaintiff's evidence falls short of meeting the above requirements in connection with the leasing of parcel A, and the trial court was right in dismissing the claim based thereon at the close of plaintiff's case. As to this phase of the case the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded with directions to submit to a jury for determination the issues framed by the first claim. KNAUSS and FRANTZ, JJ., concur.