Title: Hatfield v. NEW MEXICO STATE BOARD OF REG., ETC.
Citation: 290 P.2d 1077, 60 N.M. 242
Docket Number: 5875
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 1955

290 P.2d 1077 (1955) 60 N.M. 242 C.R. HATFIELD and L.W. Hitchcock, Petitioners-Appellees, v. NEW MEXICO STATE BOARD OF REGISTRATION FOR PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS, Respondent-Appellant. No. 5875. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 29, 1955. Rehearing Denied September 13, 1955. Rehearing Denied January 3, 1956. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Standley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles D. Harris, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Wilson &amp; Whitehouse, Albuquerque, for appellees. SADLER, Justice. The question for decision is whether L. 1935, c. 45, § 23, 1953 Comp. § 67-21-21, purporting to confer power on the State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors to revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant who is found guilty by the board after trial before it of gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of professional engineering or land surveying, is unconstitutional as an unlawful attempt to delegate legislative powers to an administrative board. The appeal is from a judgment of the district court of the first judicial district, the Honorable David W. Carmody presiding, sitting within and for Santa Fe County *1078 wherein, after hearing on a writ of certiorari to the New Mexico State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, he entered a judgment annuling and holding for naught the order of the respondent board (appellant here) canceling the licenses of appellees (petitioners below) as professional engineers and ordering the appellant board to reinstate their licenses, so cancelled. So much of the order of the State Board, omitting the specific findings, as it is presently important to recite reads, as follows: Thereafter and in due course the matter came on for hearing before the district court, all parties appearing by counsel and the hearing having been concluded, the court entered the judgment now complained of, holding the challenged portion of L. 1935, c. 45, § 23, 1953 Comp. § 67-21-21, to be an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the governing board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, contrary to the prohibition to be found in Const., Art. 3, § 1. Accordingly, the court in the decretal portion of its judgment vacated the action of appellant's governing board in the following language, to-wit: This appeal followed and on it the main and only error assigned by respondent board is that the trial court erred in ruling that L. 1935, c. 45, § 23, 1953 Comp. § 67-21-21, represents an unlawful delegation of *1079 legislative power to the governing board of respondent. This claim of error is argued under a single point, reading as follows: Counsel for appellant begin their argument with the statement that the order as made is susceptible of an interpretation that any attempted delegation by the legislature of the power to license and revoke would fall under interdiction of the constitutional provision invoked. They quickly dispel the suggested interpretation, however, and wisely so, by an assumption that appellees' objection to the challenged statute is the claimed absence of a definite standard to guide the board in revoking licenses. The governing board of appellant was created by L. 1935, c. 45, § 4, its personnel to be named by the Governor and various and sundry powers were conferred upon the board, among others, the power to license and regulate the business in which members of the profession regulated were members. Incident to regulation of the profession the board was authorized, after charges and a hearing before it, to revoke the license, or certificate of registration as it is called in the statute, of any registrant found guilty of specified acts. So far as material the pertinent section of the statute, Comp. Laws, 1953, § 67-21-21, L. 1935, c. 45, § 23, reads: Since there was no charge against appellees that they, or either of them, had been guilty of any fraud or deceit in obtaining the certificate of registration held by each, the basis of revocation is confined to the grounds listed in 1953 Comp. § 67-21-21 (b), namely, "gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct." We may safely assume these words were employed by the legislature in the sense in which they are commonly understood. Then, what is the generally understood meaning of these words and phrases? Webster defines negligence as failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand; omission of duty of doing or forbearing. Webster defines gross as plain, manifest, obvious, flagrant, shameful. 1 Bouv. Law Dict., Rawles Third Revision p. 1383 defines gross negligence as: Incompetence is defined in Webster as being the quality, state or fact of being incompetent; inadequate; specific lack of legal *1080 qualification or fitness. 1 Bouv. Law Dict., Rawles Third Revision p. 1528 defines incompetency as being the lack of ability or fitness to discharge the required duty. Webster defines misconduct as to conduct amiss; to mismanage; wrong or improper conduct. 27 Words and Phrases, p. 309, in defining misconduct states: In resolving the question before us, we should not overlook the fact that the licensing act assailed is only one of some 30 or more kindred acts regulating the licensing and conduct, as well as the revocation of licenses of the various businesses, occupations and professions in the state. Many of them have set forth as grounds for the revocation of licenses, exactly the same ones or their equivalent of those found in the act regulating professional engineering. Chapter 67 of 1953 Compilation, beginning with section 67-1-1 and continuing through section 67-24-18 is the Chapter of our Statutes which provides for the regulation and licensing of business and professional pursuits other than attorneys at law. The first article relates to the basic sciences of the healing arts and the last to real estate dealers. One has only to run through these various enactments to ascertain the common pattern recognizable in practically every one as the basis for revocation of a license. Some are in greater detail than others in enumerating grounds of revocation, to be sure, as for instance, 1953 Comp. § 67-4-10, dealing with dentistry. But we need look only at 1953 Comp. § 67-5-9, setting up as grounds for revoking the license of physicians and surgeons, namely, that the registrant has been found guilty of "immoral, dishonorable or unprofessional" conduct to be convinced that these grounds are as broad, if not even broader than those with which we are here concerned. See, also, § 67-12-3, relating to architects, exactly the same as for professional engineers; § 67-23-17, relating to certified public accountants; § 67-17-17, relating to cosmetology and so on through the list of regulated trades, businesses and professions. In certain instances the sole grounds of revocation are the same as for the engineers, or in others the same grounds, or their equivalent, are to be found along with others enumerated which themselves ordinarily would fall in the same category as the broader grounds present, in any event. The New Mexico case with the most direct bearing on the question before us, though not a case to revoke a license, is that of State v. Spears, 57 N.M. 400, 259 P.2d 356, 360, 39 A.L.R.2d 595. The action arose in a criminal prosecution of the defendant for failure to secure a license before engaging in the business of real estate broker. His counsel moved to quash the information against him and the motion having been overruled by the district court, he came before us on the claim that the statute under which he was being prosecuted constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative board. Among other things, in denying the challenge made to the law, we said: It is to be noted that in the foregoing case, the statute involved set up no standards on what the examination should cover and no qualifications for applicants for a license other than that he should be of "good moral character, honest and trustworthy." Yet, we declined to sustain the contention that the act was bad because too vague or indefinite in this particular, or amounted to an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative board. There is no distinction in principle between that case and this one. Other New Mexico decisions which we think directly or arguendo support the contention that there is here no unlawful delegation of legislative power are Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779, and State v. McKinley, 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964. In the Arnold case, we said [45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 786]: The language found in the Arnold case touching the measure being construed as one promoting the public health and safety is directly pertinent to provisions in the legislation here questioned. The very first section of the act reads: State v. McKinley, supra [53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 966] is peculiarly significant in the light of certain argument by counsel for defendant in the case at bar. They argue that without an enumeration of particular acts which constitute "gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct", sufficient to authorize revocation of license, the governing board is invested with unbridled discretion to do so on any fancied ground, however absurd or trivial, if it chances to meet the fancy of the board members. When the same argument was aimed at the Juvenile Delinquency Act defining the crime of contributing to juvenile delinquency as the commission of any act or the omission to perform any duty "which * * * tends to cause or encourage the delinquency of any person under the age of eighteen (18) years of age", we rejected the argument, and said: Many cases from other jurisdictions sustain similar language in acts regulating engineering and other professions against charges similar to that here made against ours, namely, that it represents an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative board. See Kuehnel v. Wisconsin Registration Board of Architects and Professional Engineers, 243 Wis. 188, 9 N.W.2d 630; Garman v. Myers, 183 Okl. 141, 80 P.2d 624; Klafter v. State Board of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 532; State Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d 602; Pierstorff v. Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, 68 Ohio App. 453, 41 N.E.2d 889; Prettyman, Inc., v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442; In Re Revocation of Certificate of Registration of Scott, 46 Dauph., Pa., 196, 203; M.M.M., Inc. v. Mitchell, Tex., 265 S.W.2d 584. In Klafter v. State Board of Examiners of Architects [259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 195], supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois was dealing with a statute containing language much like that found in our act, here questioned. As to its sufficiency, the court said: In the case of Pierstorff v. Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, supra [68 Ohio App. 453, 41 N.E.2d 890], the Ohio appellate court had before it an act giving the governing board power to refuse to grant, to suspend or to revoke any license "if the applicant therefor or holder has (had) been guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct," etc. In upholding the act against the attack made on it, the court said: In Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Commission, supra [92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 445], the court was dealing with the revocation of a real estate broker's license. The act was challenged as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to a county judge. In sustaining the act, the court said: It is interesting to note that in Florida where the Prettyman case was decided, there is a law for the registration of professional engineers in which one of the grounds for revocation of licenses is substantially the same as ours. If found guilty by the governing board of "malpractice, malfeasance, gross negligence or incompetency in the practice of professional engineering", the license may be revoked. Fla.St. 1953, § 471.26 F.S.A. A recent text on Professional Engineering Registration Laws (1954) by McCawley, at page 585 states: In a roll call of some 40 states and territories to be found in the work by McCawley, it is disclosed that several of the acts regulating professional engineers include the same ground for revocation as exists in New Mexico. In none of them is any effort made to define "gross negligence, misconduct or incompetency." The two cases most relied upon by counsel for the defendant are Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755, and Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N.E.2d 761. Neither is controlling here, if both were deemed in point, as we think neither is when viewed in the light of questions raised and decided. Viewed from this standpoint the earlier Illinois case of Klafter v. State Board of Examiners of Architects, supra, from which we have quoted above, is much more like the one at bar. It is certainly not overruled by the Krebs case; indeed, it is not even cited. But, as stated, if both cases so much relied upon by defendant should be deemed in point and against the conclusions we reach, they would represent a small minority of decisions so holding. The plaintiffs (appellees) have sought to raise several questions before us, other than the one error assigned by defendants (appellants), namely, that the court erred in holding the questioned statute amounts to an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative board, contrary to the prohibition found in Const. Art. 3, § 1. First, they would have us consider whether the same article of the constitution is violated as making an unlawful delegation of judicial power to an administrative board; and, likewise, whether the statute does not violate the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. *1085 There are several reasons why we can not pass upon questions not raised below. In the first place, the fact that they were not presented to and ruled upon by the trial court denies a party the right to present the questions here. In the second place, if they had been raised below and ruled against the plaintiffs, they have not sought to preserve the error, if any, as errors committed against them which, correctly decided, would support the trial court's action. So it is, the trial court's ruling that the challenged statute was an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative board in violation of Const. Art. 3, § 1, is the only one before us for decision. More than once the plaintiffs (appellees) complain they were not allowed to present evidence in their defense against the charges brought against them. The fact is, and it fairly appears from the record before us, that orders to show cause with copies of the charges against them were served on each plaintiff, noticing the matter for hearing before the board at a time and place described in the notice; that pursuant to such notice both of them appeared accompanied by their counsel and proof supporting the charges was adduced. They were given every opportunity to put on evidence. Instead of doing so, they chose to move for a continuance to some future date to produce evidence in their defense. This motion, the board denied. They then protested against the holding of any hearing, upon the ground that the board lacked jurisdiction to proceed for various legal reasons presented to the board. The fact that plaintiffs saw fit to produce no evidence may not fairly be charged to any action of defendants. They offered plaintiffs the opportunity to do so and the latter declined to avail themselves of it. It is our considered judgment that the questioned language in the statute is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the governing board of the defendants and we so hold. The trial court erred in ruling otherwise. It follows from what has been said the judgment reviewed is erroneous and must be reversed. The cause will be remanded to the district court with a direction to set aside its judgment and enter a new one affirming the action taken by the governing board of the defendants, revoking the licenses of the plaintiffs. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN, McGHEE and KIKER, JJ., concur.