Title: MASCARENA v BOOTH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13279
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 1977

No. 13279 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 T H O M A S M A S C A R E N A , a Minor Child and U R B A N 0 TORRES, guardian and l i t e m , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs- DARRELL BOOTH e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert PJilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: C a t e , Lynaugh, F i t z g e r a l d & Huss, B i l l i n g s , Montana Thomas Lynaugh argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondents: Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson and Gallagher, B i l l i n g s , Montana Jack S. Ramirez argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: March 18, 1977 Decided: hbc 2 4 , s l n F i l e d : J3\j i' " I ) ! Mr.'Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from an order and f i n a l judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County,granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and decreeing that judgment be entered in favor of defendants and against p l a i n t i f f . The sole issue on appeal is whether defendants are entitled t o summary judgment considering the underlying question of whether 339(b) (c) , Restatement, Second, Torts, presentsquestions of law or fact. P l a i n t i f f , an eleven year old child a t the time t h i s action arose, and h i s grandfather, the child's duly appointed guardian ad litem, f i l e d a complaint in the d i s t r i c t court alleging that on September 1;?, 1973, a t approximately 6:00 p.m., p l a i n t i f f slipped from a monkey bar or parallel bar apparatus located a t Orchard School, within School District No. 2, Billings, Montana. A t the time of the accident plaintiff and two friends were engaged i n an activity where they would take turns riding their stingray bicycles beneath the monkey bar, reaching up and grabbing the horizontal bar, while swinging off t h e i r bicycles, allowing the bicycles t o continue in a forward direction. O n the f i f t h or sixth occasion on which plaintiff engaged in t h i s activity on the day i n question, plaintiff grabbed the horizontal bar a s he rode beneath it on h i s bicycle, but h i s hands slipped and he f e l l t o the asphalt surface, striking the right rear side of h i s head, fracturing h i s skull. I n h i s complaint plaintiff contends defendants were negligent in maintaining a monkey bar or parallel bar apparatus anchored i n an asphalt surface and in allowing such a dangerous condition t o exist on school premises in an area where defendants knew the apparatus was freely accessible t o children. Plaintiff further contends defendants were negligent in failing t o supervise and control the use of the monkey bar or parallel bar apparatus and i n failing t o l i m i t access to the apparatus during after-school hours. ~efendants' answer generally denied p l a i n t i f f ' s allega- tions, specifically denying any negligence on the part of the Board of Trustees and asserted the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Subsequent t o the f i l i n g of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint and defendants' answer, motions were f i l e d , interrogatories were submitted and answered, stipulations were f i l e d and depositions were taken. O n March 20, 1975, defendants f i l e d a motion for summary judgment asserting there were no genuine issues a s t o any material facts and defendants were entitled t o judgment a s a matter of law. Plaintiff took additional depositions and briefs were f i l e d in support of and i n opposition t o the motion for summary judgment. O n August 29, 1975, the d i s t r i c t court issued i t s order granting defendants ' motion for summary judgment and judgment was entered in favor of defendants on September 4, 1975. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. is controlling on the granting o r denial of a motion for summary judgment. In pertinent part Rule 56 provided : "(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. * * * The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith i f the pleadings, depositions, answers t o interrogatories, and admissions on f i l e show that there is no genuine issue as t o any material fact and that the moving party i s entitled t o a judgment as a matter of law. * * *" The general rule of law a s stated i n 6 Pt.2 Moore's Federal Practice 756.17 [42], p. 56-946, is that: "* * * issues of negligence, including such related issues as wanton or contributory negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or against the claimant, but should be resolved by t r i a l in the ordinary manner." See: Mally v. Asanovich, 149 Mont. 99, 423 P.2d 294 (1967). However, where the d i s t r i c t court finds it appropriate t o grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment i n a negligence action, the moving party must clearly establish there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled See t o judgment as a matter of law. / ~ a r l a n d v. Anderson, 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613, 33 St. Rep. 363 (1976), for a discussion of summary judgment under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. This Court notes here that the d i s t r i c t court failed t o issue any opinion o r memorandum of decision in support of i t s ruling in the instant case. Since w e do not have the benefit of the d i s t r i c t court's rationale, w e w i l l examine defendants' briefs in support of the motion for summary judgment and from them determine those argu- ments asserted in support of the motion. Defendants contend that for plaintiff t o recover against defendants on a negligence theory plaintiff must establish a duty of care owed the plaintiff by defendants. Any duty of care i s determined by the relationship between p l a i n t i f f and the school d i s t r i c t a t the time of the accident, i.e., the status of the plaintiff while playing on the school ground a f t e r school hours, Defendants assert that from the three possibilities of status - trespasser, licensee and invitee, p l a i n t i f f stands a s a licensee, i.e,, one who enters the property by implied per- mission or by sufferance, but only for h i s own pleasure, convenience or benefit. Defendants contend that absent application of the doctrine of attractive nuisance, defendants would not be l i a b l e for p l a i n t i f f ' s injuries since, under Montana law, a landowner's duty of care to a licensee i s simply t o refrain from acts of willful or wanton negligence. Furthermore, even i f the doctrine of .attractive nuisance is applicable, p l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h elements of the doctrine and a s a matter of law defendants a r e e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment. W e note defendants' i n t e r e s t i n distinguishing p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t u s a t the time of t h e accident. I f the child could recover i f he were trespassing he would be i n no worse position i f he were a licensee o r an invitee on the premises. The e f f e c t is t h a t consideration must be given t o the c h i l d ' s a b i l i t y o r i n a b i l i t y t o understand and appreciate the purported danger and t o the c h i l d ' s propensity f o r meddling. See: Ranard v. OINeil, 166 Mont. 177, 531 P.2d 1000; 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises L i a b i l i t y , 5 143. The American. Law I n s t i t u t e drafted 5 339, Restatement, Second, Torts, t h a t section departed from the theory of allurement t o trespass and treated the rule a s one of ordinary negligence l i a b i l i t y . Restatement, Second, Torts 5339, provides: "339. A r t i f i c a l Conditions Highly Dangerous To Trespassing Children. "A possessor of land i s subject t o l i a b i l i t y f o r physical harm t o children trespassing thereon caused by an a r t i f i c i a l condition upon the land i f "(a) the place where the condition e x i s t s i s one upon which the possessor knows o r has reason t o know t h a t children a r e l i k e l y t o trespass, and "(b) the condition i s one which the possessor knows o r has reason t o know and whdch he realizes o r should r e a l i z e w i l l involve an un- reasonable r i s k of death o r serious bodily harm t o such children, and "(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the r i s k involved i n intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and "(d) the u t i l i t y to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the r i s k t o children involved , and '' (e) the possessor f a i l s t o exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children ." Restatement, Second, Torts, 5339 was adopted by Montana as part of the attractive nuisance rule previously i n effect. Gagnier v. Curran Const. Co., 151 Mont. 468,'443 P.2d 894; Nichols v. Consolidated Dairies of Lake County, Inc., 125 g Mont. 460, P. 2d \ Defendants contend "substantial questions exist a s t o several of the elements of the doctrine of attractive nuisance." Defendants i n s i s t "elements (b) and (c) [of $3391 do not exist as a matter of law and consequently the defendants were entitled t o summary judgment1,' since recovery is premised on p l a i n t i f f establishing each of the elements. Subparagraph (b) of 9339 requires the condition to be one which involves an unreasonable r i s k of death or serious bodily harm. While defendants admit there is some r i s k of bodily harm attributed t o activity involving the monkey bar apparatus, they conclude it is not an unreasonable r i s k of death or serious bodily harm. Defendants further argue subparagraph (c) of 5339 requires that the child not discover the condition o r realize the r i s k involved. I n the instant case, defendants contend p l a i n t i f f w a s of such an age or mentality that he should, or could reason- ably be expected to, understand, appreciate and avoid the danger or hazard of the condition t o which he was exposed o r that plaintiff did i n fact understand and appreciate the condition, but nevertheless exposed himself t o it. Defendants summarize t h e i r argument by l i s t i n g three c r i t e r i a which purportedly e n t i t l e defendants t o judgment as a matter of law: 1. The monkey bar apparatus, as it existed on the day of the accident, did not, as a matter of law, involve an unreasonable r i s k of death or serious bodily harm t o an eleven year old boy. 2. A s a matter of law, an eleven year old boy of the intelligence of p l a i n t i f f should have perceived the danger of falling and hurting himself. 3. Plaintiff did perceive the danger of falling and hurting himself. W e note defendants' conclusions of law are based upon determinations of f a c t involving the character of the instru- mentality which caused the injury and p l a i n t i f f ' s a b i l i t y t o observe, understand, appreciate and avoid the danger of the instrumentality. These are the very questions of fact which 5339 considers. Our inquiry a t t h i s juncture i s whether the p l a i n t i f f ' s a b i l i t y or failure to establish the elements of 5339 i s a question of fact or a question of law. Our research mrraled the majority of jurisdictions which have considered t h i s question concluded that whether the conditions of Restatement, Second, Torts 5339 were met is a question of fact for the jury t o determine. MacNeil v. Perkins, 84 Ariz. 74, 324 P.2d 211; Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419, 1 7 1 A. 2d 411; Ridgewood Groves, Inc. v. Dowel1 (Fla.App.) , 189 So.2d 188; Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 1 1 N.J. 559, 95 A.2d 388; Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 271 App.Div. 122, 63 N.Y.S.2d 597; Stanolind O i l & Gas Co. v. Jamison, 204 Okla. 93, 227 P.2d 404, 23 ALR2d 1141; Nechodomu v. Lindstrom, 273 Wis.313, 77 N.W.2d 707, 62 ALR2d 884, rehoden. 273 W i s . 327a, 78 N.W.2d 417, 62 ALR2d 896. Furthermore, we find additional questions of material fact which remain unresolved and act to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment. An example of such a fact question is whether the school custodian's observation of the children's afterschool activities on the monkey bar apparatus put defendants on notice children were engaging in activities involving a risk of serious bodily harm. This issue concerns subparagraphs ( a ) and ( b ) of 5 339 which seek a determination of the land possessor's knowledge of the presence of the trespassing children and realization the dangerous condition exists. Another factual question to be resolved is whether the burden of defendants eliminating the dangerous condition by procuring protective ground coverings, which are manufactured for use beneath playground equipment, was slight as compared to the risk of children being injured by defendants maintaining the monkey bar apparatus in its present condition. This issue concerns subparagraph ( d ) of 5339 which balances the utility of the possessor maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger, as compared to the risk of harm. We find genuine issues of material fact exist. Such a holding defeats defendants' conclusion that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be determined and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants rely heavily on Callahan v. Buttrey, 1 8 6 F.Supp, 715 (D.C.Mont. 1960), affirmed 300 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1962), for the proposition that whether the conditions of Restatement, Second, Torts 5339 have been met is a question of law. We dis- tinguish Callahan from the present case. In Callahan a seven year old boy was attempting to recover against landlords for injuries sustained when the boy f e l l from a second story roof deck to asphalt paving below, The deck was protected by a guardrail which p l a i n t i f f alleged was negligently constructed. A t the close of the evidence defendants moved for a directed verdict and were denied. The court submitted the case t o the jury and when the jury failed t o return a verdict, the jury was discharged. Defendants then moved the court for judgment in accordance with t h e i r motion for directed verdict previously made and denied. The motion was granted and judgment was entered for defendants. After a careful review of Judge Jameson's opinion i n Callahan, it is clear the presiding judge's concern a t the time the jury failed t o return a verdict was t o review the sufficiency of the evidence i n determining whether the motion for directed verdict had merit. I n weighing the sufficiency of the evidence the court was s i t t i n g the t r i e r of fact a s well as the t r i e r of law. The concluding paragraph of the opinion supports the position that, had the jury been able t o arrive a t a verdict or had the t r i a l judge seen f i t t o grant a new t r i a l , questions of fact would have properly been determined by the jury and not by the judge: "I a m unable t o find that Joe's injury was proximately caused by the breach of any duty owed t o him by the defendants. The motion for directed verdict accordingly must be granted. Prior t o submission t o the jury, it seemed advisable t o defer a ruling on the legal questions herein discussed. N o w that the jury has failed t o agree, no useful purpose would be served by a r e t r i a l prior to f i n a l determination of the questions considered Yn t h i s opinion. I f m y conclusions are erroneous and the appellate court should order a new t r i a l , a l l issues may then be submitted to the jury i n accordance with the views of the appellate court ." 186 F.Supp. 715, 723. Our evaluation of the significance of the United States District Court opinion i s further supported by the United States Court of Appeals' comment on the d i s t r i c t court opinion: I 1 I n essence, the opinion held t h a t under Montana law there was no evidence t h a t the defendants breached a duty owing t o Joe. The t r i a l judge thought the f a c t s did not lay the b a s i s f o r l i a b i l i t y e i t h e r outside o r within the a t t r a c t i v e nuisance doctrine." 300 F.2d 899, 900. Thus, we distinguish t h i s federal case where the t r i a l court ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence i n deciding t h e merit of a motion f o r directed verdict and the i n s t a n t case where the d i s t r i c t court granted a motion f o r summary judgment when genuine issues of material f a c t remained t o be decided and the moving party was not e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of law. Therefore, the order and judgment of the d i s t r i c t court is reversed and the cause i s remanded f o r t r i a l on the merits, consis t e n t with t h i s opinion. We Concur: I / # , #,Z.--> / , y..+...=/ , , - ' ,&:iC4[,-4d Chief Justice t , / 1 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I dissent.