Title: Razor v. Hyundai Motor America
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98813
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2006

Docket No. 98813. 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
 
SHANTE RAZOR, Appellee, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
Opinion filed February 2, 2006. 
 
 
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Thomas and Justices McMorrow, Fitzgerald, 
Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and 
opinion. 
 
 
OPINION 
 
This 
appeal 
involves 
the 
federal 
Magnuson-Moss 
WarrantyBFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Act) (15 
U.S.C. '2301 et seq. (2000)) and the Illinois Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) (810 ILCS 5/1B101 et seq. (West 2000)). The only 
issues raised concern the propriety of the damages awarded to the 
plaintiff. The primary question is whether the circuit court acted 
properly in refusing to enforce a contractual clause prohibiting the 
award of consequential damages. There is also a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge to the court=s award of warranty damages. We 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
-2- 
Plaintiff Shante Razor purchased a new Hyundai Sonata from 
Gartner Buick, Inc. (Gartner), on August 4, 2001. At the time she 
purchased the car, plaintiff also bought an optional remote starter and 
alarm system from an Aoptions@ booklet shown to her by the Gartner 
salesman. Gartner subcontracted the installation of this starter to 
Professional Sound Installers (ProSound). ProSound did not install it 
on the date plaintiff purchased her vehicle, but a few weeks later, on 
August 30, 2001. 
 The Sonata was the first new car plaintiff had ever purchased. It 
came with a five-year, 60,000-mile warranty, a copy of which was 
introduced into evidence. In pertinent part, the warranty provided as 
follows: 
AWHAT IS COVERED 
Repair or replacement of any component originally 
manufactured or installed by Hyundai Motor Company or 
Hyundai Motor America (HMA) that is found to be defective 
in material or workmanship under normal use and 
maintenance, except any item specifically referred to in the 
section >What is Not Covered.= 
* * * 
WHAT IS NOT COVERED 
* Damage or failure resulting from: 
BNegligence of proper maintenance as required in the 
Owner=s Manual. 
BMisuse, abuse, accident, theft, water/flooding or fire. 
* * * 
B Any device and/or accessories not supplied by Hyundai. 
* * * 
*INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOSS OF TIME, 
INCONVENIENCE, LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, OR 
COMMERCIAL LOSS. 
*The duration of any implied warranties, including those 
for MERCHANTABILITY and FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, are limited to the duration of this 
limited warranty. 
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an 
 
 
-3- 
implied warranty lasts, or the exclusion or limitation of 
incidental and consequential damages, so the limitations or 
exclusions set forth regarding this limited warranty may not 
apply to you. You may also have other rights which vary 
from state to state.@ 
In late September 2001, plaintiff began experiencing difficulties 
with the vehicle. On September 26, plaintiff had the vehicle towed to 
Gartner for service because it failed to start when she turned the key. 
She experienced the same problem and again had the vehicle towed 
to Gartner for service on October 6, October 16, and October 25. On 
the latter occasion, Gartner kept the vehicle for more than two weeks, 
providing plaintiff with a rental car to use during the time the vehicle 
was out of her possession. Nevertheless, the problem happened again 
on November 21, the day before Thanksgiving, when plaintiff had 
taken the day off from work to go shopping for the holiday. After a 
technician came to her home and was himself unable to start the car, 
the vehicle was yet again towed to Gartner for attempted repairs. 
Sometimes after being towed to Gartner the vehicle started 
normally, other times it did not. Gartner technicians attempted 
various different repairs on the different occasions that the car 
appeared before them, including replacing the starter, replacing the 
AECU power relay,@ replacing the remote starter with an updated 
system, and replacing the Atrans range switch@ and Astarter relay.@ 
Additionally, after the October 25 no-start, when the vehicle was kept 
for more than two weeks, ProSound removed the remote starter it had 
originally installed on plaintiff=s vehicle and replaced it with an 
updated model. Plaintiff was not charged for any of the attempted 
repairs. 
In December 2001, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, Hyundai 
Motor America (Hyundai). Plaintiff made claims against Hyundai 
pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. '2301 et 
seq. (2000)) for breach of written warranty and breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability. Plaintiff also alleged that Hyundai had 
violated the Illinois New Vehicle Buyer Protection Act (815 ILCS 
380/1 et seq. (West 2000)). 
The case initially went to arbitration. The arbitration panel found 
in plaintiff=s favor, and entered an award of $6,500, plus attorney fees 
and costs. Hyundai rejected this award and demanded trial. 
 
 
-4- 
The case went to trial in February 2003. Plaintiff was the sole 
witness for her case, and most of the above undisputed facts are 
drawn from her testimony. In addition, plaintiff testified that she 
never saw the actual warranty until after she had purchased the car, 
because the warranty was contained in the owner=s manual, which she 
saw for the first time in the glove box of her vehicle when she drove 
it off the lot. Plaintiff=s purchase contract, a copy of which was 
introduced into evidence, does not appear to contain or refer to the 
vehicle warranty. When asked on cross-examination if she had seen 
the warranty on a placard at Gartner Hyundai, plaintiff testified that 
she had not. Plaintiff testified that she had performed all required 
maintenance on her car, had never been in an accident or been the 
victim of vandalism, and that no one other than Gartner Hyundai had 
ever performed any repairs on the vehicle. 
During plaintiff=s direct examination, defense counsel objected 
when plaintiff=s counsel inquired regarding her purchase of prior 
automobiles. During a lengthy sidebar, counsel explained that he was 
attempting to lay a foundation in order to ask her how much the car=s 
value to her had decreased because of the problems she had with it. 
The court ruled that plaintiff could not answer such a question. The 
court indicated that plaintiff could testify Aas to what her feelings 
were, what her frame of mind was and the impact of the slow [sic] 
start situation on her personal feelings. *** But as to >the value of the 
vehicle would have been such and such because of the no start 
conditions,= I don=t see how you=re going to go that far with it.@ 
Plaintiff was permitted to testify that the purchase price of her Sonata 
was $16,522, and that she would eventually have paid a total of 
$21,249 for the car, including finance charges. 
Plaintiff testified that the vehicle did not provide her the type of 
transportation she expected. She testified, A[I]t=s a brand new car. I 
expected it to be perfect, flawless or minimal problems, certainly not 
the ones that I encountered here.@ She testified that she would not 
purchase the same vehicle today, because it was Aproven unreliable,@ 
and she would not today pay the price she had originally paid for the 
vehicle, because Agiven the problems that this vehicle B that I have 
had with this vehicle or the problems the vehicle has had, that=s like a 
used car. I would not pay that for a new car with used problems as it 
were.@ Plaintiff also testified that the problems she had with the car 
had caused her considerable inconvenience, including missing days 
 
 
-5- 
of work. However, on cross-examination, plaintiff admitted she was 
still driving the car at the time of trialBMay 2003Band had not 
experienced any difficulties with it since December 2001. 
Plaintiff offered her exhibits into evidence and rested. Hyundai 
moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied in its entirety. 
During argument on the motion, the court initially ruled that 
Hyundai=s disclaimer of incidental and consequential damages was 
not unconscionable, but shortly thereafter the court reversed itself and 
ruled that the disclaimer was unconscionable and would not be 
enforced. When defense counsel inquired of the court as to the basis 
for its ruling that the disclaimer was unconscionable, the court 
responded: 
ATHE COURT: The number of attempts that the plaintiff 
attempted for repairs. The fact that the plaintiff needed, used 
or intended to use the vehicle for transportation to and from 
work. The fact that the plaintiff was unable to use the vehicle 
for the time period in question for it=s [sic] intended use.@ 
After the court denied Hyundai=s motion for a directed verdict, 
the defense called its sole witness, Randy Wood. Wood is treasurer 
and part owner of ProSound, the company which installed plaintiff=s 
alarm and remote starter system. He testified that ProSound had 
inspected the system installed on plaintiff=s vehicle on more than one 
occasion, and no problem was ever found. Although ProSound did 
replace plaintiff=s system with the newest model, this was for 
customer satisfaction purposes only, because ProSound never found 
anything wrong with plaintiff=s system. He did admit on redirect 
examination that plaintiff=s vehicle Amay have@ had a weak signal 
coming through its Atack [sic] wire,@ and if that condition existed it 
could cause problems for the ProSound system. Wood also testified 
that the system could itself prevent the car from starting, if one 
attempted to start it with the key after locking the car with the remote 
control. 
After the defense rested, Hyundai renewed its motion for a 
directed verdict, including specifically arguing that the court should 
not have reversed its initial conclusion regarding the enforceability of 
the consequential damages disclaimer. The court denied Hyundai=s 
motions and submitted the case to the jury. 
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on the breach of warranty 
claims, awarding her $5,000 in warranty damages for the diminished 
 
 
-6- 
value of the Sonata due to the defects, and $3,500 in consequential 
damages for aggravation and inconvenience and loss of use. The jury 
also answered Ayes@ to a special interrogatory which asked, ADid 
plaintiff prove the aftermarket remote starter-alarm system was not 
the cause of the no-start condition?@ The jury found in defendant=s 
favor, however, on plaintiff=s claim under the New Vehicle Buyer 
Protection Act. The court awarded plaintiff $12,277 in attorney fees 
and costs. 
The appellate court affirmed in all respects. 349 Ill. App. 3d 651. 
Hyundai petitioned for leave to appeal to this court (see 155 Ill. 
2d R. 315(a)), which we granted. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Before this court the issues have been pared down. Hyundai 
neither challenges the jury=s conclusions regarding causation nor 
contends that plaintiff failed to prove that the warranty failed of its 
essential purpose. Plaintiff does not cross-appeal the jury verdict in 
Hyundai=s favor on her New Vehicle Buyer Protection Act claim. 
Neither party raises any issues regarding the circuit court=s conduct of 
the trial. 
 Rather, the arguments now focus exclusively on damages. 
Hyundai first argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to enforce 
the contractual exclusion of incidental and consequential damages. 
Hyundai argues that the mere fact that its warranty failed of its 
essential purpose does not invalidate the consequential damages 
disclaimer, and contends that plaintiff introduced no evidence to 
support the circuit court=s ruling that the disclaimer should not be 
enforced. Second, Hyundai contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury=s warranty damage award. Finally, 
Hyundai argues that if this court reverses both damage awards, we 
must also reverse the circuit court=s award of fees and costs. Plaintiff 
raises no additional arguments. Thus, these are the only issues before 
us. 
 
 
I. Enforceability of Hyundai=s Disclaimer of 
Incidental/Consequential Damages 
The main issue before this court is the enforceability of Hyundai=s 
 
 
-7- 
disclaimer of incidental and consequential damages. Hyundai argues 
that the disclaimer is independent of the limited remedy, and the 
disclaimer may stand even if its limited remedy failed of its essential 
purpose. Hyundai contends that the disclaimer may be overridden 
only if it is itself unconscionable, a standard which Hyundai argues 
has not been met in the instant case. Plaintiff responds that the 
disclaimer should fall with the limited warranty, and contends that 
even if this court finds them to be severable, the disclaimer in this 
case was unconscionable. 
 
A. AIndependent@ vs. ADependent@ Approach to Provisions Limiting 
Remedy and Excluding Consequential Damages 
As previously noted, plaintiff=s claim was brought under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. '2301 et seq. (1994)). 
Under the Act, consumers who have been damaged by any 
warrantor=s failure to comply with its obligations under a written 
warranty may bring suit Ain any court of competent jurisdiction in any 
State or the District of Columbia.@ 15 U.S.C. '2310(d)(1)(A) (1994). 
The Act itself does not determine the enforceability of the 
consequential damages disclaimer, however. The Act does supersede 
state law, but only to the extent that state law is inconsistent with the 
Act. 15 U.S.C. '2311 (1994); see Sorce v. Naperville Jeep Eagle, 309 
Ill. App. 3d 313, 323 (1999). The warranty at issue in this case was a 
limited warranty, and the Act does not set out requirements for 
limited warranties.1 Rather, the Act merely prescribes certain 
requirements with which warranties must comply in order to be 
called Afull@ warranties. See 15 U.S.C. '2303(a) (1994) (a warranty 
which meets the standards set forth in section 4 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 
'2304 (1994)) Ashall be conspicuously designated a >full (statement of 
duration) warranty,= @ and a warranty which does not meet the 
standards set out in section 4 of the Act Ashall be conspicuously 
designated a >limited warranty= @). 
                                                 
     1The Act does permit the Federal Trade Commission to establish general 
disclosure requirements for the terms and conditions of all warranties, e.g., 
that they must clearly identify the warrantors, the warrantees, the products 
or parts covered, etc. See 15 U.S.C. '2302 (1994). However, the Act itself 
does not directly establish any such disclosure requirements, nor do the 
parties raise any arguments regarding any requirements the FTC may have 
established. 
 
 
-8- 
Accordingly, to determine the enforceability of a consequential 
damages disclaimer in a limited warranty, we look to state law. See 
Lara v. Hyundai Motor America, 331 Ill. App. 3d 53, 62 (2002); 
Sorce, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 325. In Illinois, the sale of goods is 
governed by article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 810 
ILCS 5/1B101 et seq. (2000). Central to this case is section 2B719 of 
the UCC, which governs AContractual modification or limitation of 
remedy@: 
A(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of 
this Section and of the preceding section on liquidation and 
limitation of damages, 
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in 
addition to or in substitution for those provided in this 
Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages 
recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer=s 
remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the 
price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming 
goods or parts; and 
  
 
 
 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless 
the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which 
case it is the sole remedy. 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited 
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as 
provided in this Act. 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded 
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. 
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person 
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable 
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is 
not.@ 810 ILCS 5/2B719 (West 2000). 
In this case, Hyundai=s limited warranty contained both a 
limitation of remedy and an exclusion of consequential damages. The 
warranty expressly limited the buyer=s remedies to repair and 
replacement of nonconforming parts, as permitted under section 
2B719(1)(a). However, the warranty additionally provided that 
incidental or consequential damages were Anot covered,@ as permitted 
under section 2B719(3). 
Plaintiff claimedBand the jury foundBthat the Hyundai limited 
remedy had failed of its essential purpose because of the persistence 
 
 
-9- 
of the no-start problem with plaintiff=s car. Hyundai does not question 
this factual determination in this appeal. Thus, according to section 
2B719(2) of the UCC, plaintiff was entitled to remedy Aas provided in 
this Act.@ 810 ILCS 5/2B719(2) (West 2000). See also 810 ILCS Ann. 
5/2B719, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1, at 488 (Smith-Hurd 
1993) (Aunder subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable 
clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to 
deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must 
give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article@). 
This does not end the inquiry insofar as consequential damages 
are concerned, however. Subsection (3) of section 2B719 is part of 
Athis Act@Bi.e., the UCCBand subsection (3) permits a seller to limit 
or exclude consequential damages unless to do so would be 
unconscionable. It still must be determined, therefore, whether a 
limited remedy failing of its essential purpose defeats a disclaimer of 
consequential damages. 
 There are two main schools of thought on the issue. Some courts 
and commentators conclude that a limited remedy failing of its 
essential purpose operates to destroy any limitation or exclusion of 
consequential damages in the same contract. This approach is known 
as the Adependent@ approach, because the enforceability of the 
consequential damages exclusion depends on the survival of the 
limitation of remedy. 
Our appellate court issued one of the seminal cases for the 
dependent approach, Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388 
(1970). There, the plaintiff purchased a tractor, pursuant to a 
purchase agreement which limited his remedy to repair and 
replacement and also disclaimed consequential damages. The tractor 
had severe mechanical problems and was in a repair shop for over a 
year. Plaintiff filed suit, seeking consequential damages for the 
business he claimed to have lost because defendants were Awilfully 
dilatory or careless and negligent in making good their warranty.@ 
The court concluded: 
AThe limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable 
from the obligations of the warranty. Repudiation of the 
obligations of the warranty destroys its benefits. The 
complaint alleges facts that would constitute a repudiation by 
the defendants of their obligations under the warranty, that 
repudiation consisting of their wilful failure or their careless 
 
 
-10- 
and negligent compliance. It should be obvious that they 
cannot at once repudiate their obligation under their warranty 
and assert its provisions beneficial to them.@ Adams, 125 Ill. 
App. 2d at 402-03. 
In defense of the dependent approach, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois has reasoned: 
A[P]laintiff also was entitled to assume that defendants would 
not be unreasonable or wilfully dilatory in making good their 
warranty in the event of defects in the machinery and 
equipment. It is the specific breach of the warranty to repair 
that plaintiff alleges caused the bulk of its damages. This 
Court would be in an untenable position if it allowed the 
defendant to shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty 
when it has allegedly repudiated and ignored its very limited 
obligations under another segment of the same warranty, 
which alleged repudiation has caused the very need for relief 
which the defendant is attempting to avoid.@ Jones & 
McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43-44 
(N.D. Ill. 1970) (applying Illinois law). 
See also, e.g., Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243, 247 n.7 
(Mo. App. 1978) (and cases cited therein); Pierce v. Catalina Yachts, 
2 P.3d 618, 622 n.14 (Alaska 2000) (collecting cases). 
Plaintiff suggests that the dependent approach is followed by a 
majority of jurisdictions to consider the issue. While this may have 
been true 15 to 20 years ago2 (see D. Goetz, Special Project: Article 
Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1159, 1307 (1987) (AA majority of cases have answered 
correctly that the failure of an exclusive remedy voids the 
consequential damages exclusion clause@)), it is no longer the case. 
Rather, the majority of jurisdictions now follow the other of the two 
main approaches, the Aindependent@ approach. 1 E. Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts '4.28(a), at 605-06 (3d ed. 2004) (Asome 
                                                 
     2We note that all of the law review articles and all but one of the non-
Illinois court decisions plaintiff cites were decided in 1990 or before. The 
sole post-1990 foreign authority plaintiff cites, Bishop Logging Co. v. John 
Deere Industrial Equipment Co., 317 S.C. 520, 455 S.E.2d 183 (1995), did 
not follow the dependent approach, but rather the Acase-by-case@ approach. 
Bishop Logging, 317 S.C. at 533-37, 455 S.E.2d at 191-93. 
 
 
-11- 
courts have gone so far as to hold that if UCC 2B719(2) applies, 
related limitations on remedies should all fall like a house of cards, so 
that a provision barring recovery of consequential damages would 
also be invalidated. However, most courts have rejected this view@); 
Pierce, 2 P.3d at 622 (Athe majority of jurisdictions view these 
subsections to be independent@) (collecting cases). This school of 
thought holds that a limitation of consequential damages must be 
judged on its own merits and enforced unless unconscionable, 
regardless of whether the contract also contains a limitation of 
remedy which has failed of its essential purpose. 
A representative case adopting the independent approach is 
Chatlos Systems v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law). There, the court rejected the 
dependent approach, holding: 
A[T]he better reasoned approach is to treat the 
consequential damage disclaimer as an independent 
provision, valid unless unconscionable. This poses no logical 
difficulties. A contract may well contain no limitation on 
breach of warranty damages but specifically exclude 
consequential damages. Conversely, it is quite conceivable 
that some limitation might be placed on a breach of warranty 
award, but consequential damages would expressly be 
permitted. 
The limited remedy of repair and a consequential 
damages exclusion are two discrete ways of attempting to 
limit recovery for breach of warranty. [Citations.] The [UCC], 
moreover, tests each by a different standard. The former 
survives unless it fails of its essential purpose, while the latter 
is valid unless it is unconscionable. We therefore see no 
reason to hold, as a general proposition, that the failure of the 
limited remedy provided in the contract, without more, 
invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement excluding 
consequential damages. The two are not mutually exclusive.@ 
Chatlos Systems, 635 F.2d at 1086. 
See also Pierce, 2 P.3d at 622-23 (adopting independent approach), 
622 n.16 (collecting cases). 
A third approach, Aapplied relatively infrequently,@ is the Acase by 
case@ approach. D. Hagen, Note, Sections 2B719(2) & 2B719(3) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: The Limited Warranty Package & 
 
 
-12- 
Consequential Damages, 31 Val. U.L. Rev. 111, 131 (1996). Under 
this approach, A[a]n analysis to determine whether consequential 
damages are warranted must carefully examine the individual factual 
situation including the type of goods involved, the parties and the 
precise nature and purpose of the contract.@ AES Technology Systems, 
Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1978). 
Neither of the parties to this appeal argues in favor of the case-by-
case approach, which has been criticized as Anot supported by the 
[UCC] or its official comments.@ 31 Val. U.L. Rev. at 132. The 
authorities espousing it have sometimes confused it with the 
Aindependent@ approach (see, e.g., Smith v. Navistar International 
Transportation Corp., 957 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(erroneously stating that Chatlos Systems had adopted the case-by-
case approach). Moreover, although one of the factors cited in favor 
of the case-by-case approach is that it Aallows some measure of 
certainty@ (Smith, 957 F.2d at 1444), it has been observed that it in 
fact Aprovides less predictability than the dependent or independent 
approaches.@ (Emphasis added.) 31 Val. U. L. Rev. at 131. 
Additionally, notwithstanding that the case-by-case approach 
might appear to tread a middle ground between the dependent 
approach (which is generally more favorable for buyers) and the 
independent approach (which is generally more favorable for sellers), 
this is not necessarily so. In AES Technology, where the case-by-case 
approach originated, the contract at issue contained no disclaimer or 
limitation of consequential damages, only a limitation of remedy. The 
court affirmed the trial court=s conclusion that the limited remedy had 
failed of its essential purpose. AES Technology, 583 F.2d at 940. 
However, the court inferred a consequential damage disclaimer from 
the limitation of remedy (AES Technology, 583 F.2d at 941 n.9) and 
proceeded to enforce that inferred disclaimer against the buyer even 
though the limited remedy had failed of its essential purpose, because 
Athe express provisions of the contract and the factual background@ 
indicated that the parties intended for the buyer to Abear the risk of 
the project@ (AES Technology, 583 F.2d at 941). The court inferred a 
consequential damages disclaimer where none existed, struck the 
language from which the disclaimer was inferred, then enforced the 
disclaimer against the buyer anyway, based on the court=s 
understanding of Athe factual background.@ This result could not have 
been reached under either the dependent or independent approach, 
and we find the analysis difficult to reconcile with the UCC itself. 
 
 
-13- 
We find the case-by-case approach injects uncertainty into the 
UCC, an area of the law in which uniformity and certainty are highly 
valued. See 810 ILCS 5/1B102(2)(c) (West 2000); Connick v. Suzuki 
Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1996). It leads to results which are 
difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the UCC, and has been 
criticized as having no basis in the UCC or its comments. 31 Val. 
U.L. Rev. at 132. We decline to adopt it. 
Rather, we agree with the reasoning in Chatlos Systems, and 
adopt the independent approach. The independent approach is more 
in line with the UCC and with contract law in general. Nothing in the 
text or the official comments to section 2B719 indicates that where a 
contract contains both a limitation of remedy and an exclusion of 
consequential damages, the latter shares the fate of the former. See J. 
Eddy, On the AEssential@ Purposes of Limited Remedies: The 
Metaphysics of UCC 2B719(2), 65 Cal. L. Rev. 28, 92 (1977) (failure 
of essential purpose is separate and independent from validity of 
consequential damage disclaimer); E. Eissenstat, Note, Commercial 
Transactions: UCC '2B719: Remedy Limitations and Consequential 
Damage Exclusions, 36 Okla L. Rev. 669, 677 (1983) (Aa 
consequential damages disclaimer should be governed by its own 
[UCC] standard of unconscionability, independent of whether a 
limited remedy has failed@). To the contrary, as noted in Chatlos 
Systems, the different standards for evaluating the two 
provisionsBAfailure 
of 
essential 
purpose@ 
versus 
Aunconscionability@Bstrongly suggest their independence. See also 1 
White and Summers= Uniform Commercial Code '12B10(c), at 668 
(4th ed. 1995) (endorsing the independent approach as most in accord 
with considerations of freedom of contract). 
When a contract contains a limitation of remedy but that remedy 
fails of its essential purpose, it is as if that limitation of remedy does 
not exist for purposes of the damages to which a plaintiff is entitled 
for breach of warranty. See 810 ILCS 5/2B719(2) (West 2000) 
(Aremedy may be had as provided in this Act@). When a contract 
contains a consequential damages exclusion but no limitation of 
remedy, it is incontrovertible that the exclusion is to be enforced 
unless unconscionable. 810 ILCS 5/2B719(3) (West 2000). Why, 
then, would a limitation of remedy failing of its essential purpose 
destroy a consequential damages exclusion in the same contract? We 
see no valid reason to so hold. 
 
 
-14- 
Indeed, the dependent approach operates to nullify all 
consequential damage exclusions in contracts which also contain 
limitations of remedy. For if the limited remedy fails of its essential 
purpose, the consequential damages exclusion would also 
automatically fallBregardless of whether it is unconscionableBand if 
the limitation of remedy does not fail of its essential purpose, the 
buyer would not be entitled to consequential damages in any event, 
he would be entitled only to the specified limited remedy. 
The two provisionsBlimitation of remedy and exclusion of 
consequential damagesBcan be visualized as two concentric layers of 
protection for a seller. What a seller would most prefer, if something 
goes wrong with a product, is simply to repair or replace it, nothing 
more. This Arepair or replacement@ remedy is an outer wall, a first 
defense. If that wall is breached, because the limited remedy has 
failed of its essential purpose, the seller still would prefer at least not 
to be liable for potentially unlimited consequential damages, and so 
he builds a second inner rampart as a fallback position. That inner 
wall is higher, and more difficult to scaleBit falls only if 
unconscionable. 
The independent approach has not been immune to criticism, of 
course. The Eighth Circuit has rejected the independent approach 
under Minnesota law, based on the concern that Aa buyer when 
entering into a contract does not anticipate that the sole remedy 
available will be rendered a nullity, thus causing additional damages.@ 
Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 
1977) (applying Minnesota law). Additionally, one commentator has 
chastised the independent approach for Arel[ying] on imprecise 
assumptions about the parties= intent and an unpersuasive 
interpretation of section 2B719.@ K. Murtagh, Note, UCC Section 
2B719: Limited Remedies and Consequential Damage Exclusions, 74 
Cornell L. Rev. 359, 362 (1989) (concluding that independent 
approach is Ainherently weak@). This article suggests that by engaging 
in Aliteral construction of the parties= contract,@ the independent 
approach Aencourages overly formalistic drafting,@ which Aunfairly 
favors the party who can afford sophisticated bargaining techniques 
to ensure the use of his contract terms.@ 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 363. 
The article also contends that it is erroneous to conclude that the 
parties intend to shift the risk of consequential loss to the buyer, 
because A[t]he language structure itself does not indicate that the 
parties even considered the possibility of the ineffective limited 
 
 
-15- 
remedy.@ 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 364. Adams and Jones & McKnight, 
two of the earliest cases adopting the dependent approach, implicitly 
concluded that the independent approach was simply unfair to the 
buyer. See Adams, 125 Ill. App. 2d at 402-03; Jones & McKnight, 
320 F. Supp. at 43-44. 
We recognize these objections to the independent approach, but 
do not find them compelling. The reasoning in Adams and Jones & 
McKnight, for example, is based on the seller=s failure to perform 
being willful. This incorporates considerations of bad faith on the 
part of the seller. As we discuss below, the seller=s bad faith is a 
possible basis for finding enforcement of a limitation of 
consequential damages to be unconscionable. However, the 
dependent approach strips away limitations of consequential damages 
whenever a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, without 
regard to the good or bad faith of the seller, which we believe goes 
too far. 
The objections to the independent approach in Soo Line and the 
law review article noted above are similarly unpersuasive. Both argue 
that the independent approach is unfair because the buyer may not 
intend to renounce consequential damages when the limited remedy 
has failed of its essential purpose. Soo Line, 547 F.2d at 1373; 74 
Cornell L. Rev. at 364. But this seems to ignore the plain language of 
the contract in a fundamental wayBfor if the buyer does not intend to 
renounce consequential damages when the limited remedy has failed, 
in what context could the disclaimer of consequential damages 
operate? As noted above, we believe this is a fundamental defect in 
the dependent approach, that it renders the disclaimer of 
consequential damages an utter nullity. If a limited remedy has not 
failed of its essential purpose, that is of course the buyer=s only 
remedy, by definitionBthis is what it means to have a limited remedy. 
So in this circumstance a disclaimer of limited damages would be of 
no effect because it would be redundant. If, as the above critics argue, 
the disclaimer of limited damages ought not to be enforced when the 
limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, the language would 
never have any effect. Moreover, to the extent that the independent 
approach encourages parties to pay attention in the drafting process 
(see 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 363), we see this as a point in favor of the 
independent approach, rather than the contrary. 
Plaintiff objects that Illinois has always followed the dependent 
 
 
-16- 
approach, and for this court now to endorse the independent approach 
would unnecessarily reverse Athirty-five (35) years of commercial law 
in the State of Illinois law that has repeatedly embraced the 
>dependent= approach.@ We disagree with the premise of this 
argument. It is true that Adams endorsed the dependent approach over 
35 years ago. See Adams, 125 Ill. App. 2d at 402-03. But intervening 
case law from our appellate court has not consistently followed the 
dependent approach. More recently, for instance, our appellate court 
stated: 
AIn remedy limitation cases, the court must make three 
inquiries: 
>(1) whether the contract limited the remedy to repair 
or replacement; (2) whether, if the remedy were so 
limited, it failed of its essential purpose; and (3) whether, 
if the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose, 
consequential damages may be recovered because their 
exclusion is unconscionable.= @ (Emphases added.) 
Intrastate Piping & Controls, Inc. v. Robert-James Sales, 
Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 248, 256 (2000), quoting Myrtle 
Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Electric Co., 843 F. 
Supp. 1027, 1041 (D.S.C. 1993). 
Regardless of whether this language is dictum, as plaintiff argues, it 
is a clear endorsement of the independent approach. Other case law 
has evinced a confusion as to whether the independent or dependent 
approach is to be followed. Compare Lara v. Hyundai Motor 
America, 331 Ill. App. 3d 53, 61 (2002) (quoting the above Athree 
inquiries@ language from Intrastate Piping), with Lara, 331 Ill. App. 
3d at 63 (holding that A[i]f *** the limited remedy of replacement or 
repair of defective parts failed of its essential purpose, the express 
warranty=s exclusion of consequential and incidental damages will 
have no effect and those damages will be available to plaintiff 
pursuant to the UCC@). We note also that in that portion of its opinion 
which endorsed the dependent approach, the Lara courtBlike 
AdamsBcited section 2B719(2) of the UCC but failed to acknowledge 
section 2B719(3). See Lara, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 63; Adams, 125 Ill. 
App. 
2d 
at 
403. 
Illinois 
decisions 
dealing 
with 
the 
independent/dependent issue under the UCC have not been 
consistent. We believe that it is appropriate and necessary that we 
decide this question. 
 
 
-17- 
Moreover, we disagree with the reasoning, although not 
necessarily the result, in Adams. There, in refusing to enforce the 
consequential damages limitation, our appellate court focused on the 
allegedly tortious nature of defendants= conduct which caused the 
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose. The court concluded 
that defendants were entitled to none of the protections included in 
the contract because they had Arepudiat[ed] *** their obligations 
under the warranty.@ This implies that the sellers= alleged bad faith in 
repudiating their obligations under the warranty played a part in the 
analysisBbut the dependent approach does not take the seller=s good 
or bad faith into account. Under the dependent approach, the seller is 
stripped of the protection of a consequential damages disclaimer once 
a limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, regardless of the 
seller=s good or bad faith. 
A seller=s deliberate or negligent failure to supply a limited 
remedy can be taken into consideration in determining whether 
enforcement of a consequential damages waiver is unconscionable. 
The unconscionability determination is not restricted to the facts and 
circumstances in existence at the time the contract was entered into. 
Pierce, 2 P.3d at 623, quoting Chatlos Systems, 635 F.2d at 1087 (Ain 
addition to inquiring into the circumstances at the time of the sale, 
courts examine the case >from the perspective of later events= @). 
Indeed, section 2B719(3) itself expressly provides that matters which 
become known only subsequent to the drafting of the contractBi.e., 
the type of injuries suffered as a result of breachBare relevant to the 
unconscionability calculus. 810 ILCS 5/2B719(3) (West 2000) 
(ALimitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the 
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation 
of damages where the loss is commercial is not@); see also 810 ILCS 
5/2B719, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 3, at 488 (Smith-Hurd 
1993) (Aclauses limiting or excluding consequential damages *** 
may not operate in an unconscionable manner@ (emphasis added)). 
As many of the authorities favoring the dependent approach have 
noted, there is rarely any basis for concluding that when the parties 
entered into their contract, the buyer intended to assume the risk of 
the seller=s willful or negligent default on his only obligation for 
breach of warranty.3 It may well be that in a case such as Adams, 
                                                 
     3However, as we previously observed, we do not find this to be a 
compelling argument for the dependent approach itself, which strikes 
 
 
-18- 
where the defendant is alleged to have acted in bad faith, the correct 
result would be to declare a consequential damages exclusion 
unenforceable. See McNally Wellman Co. v. New York State Electric 
& Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1198 n.9 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that 
Asection 1B203 of the UCC, which states that >[e]very contract or duty 
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
or enforcement,= @ supports the conclusion that bad faith could vitiate 
a section 2B719(3) consequential damages exclusion). Accordingly, 
we believe that a plaintiff must be allowed to point to a defendant=s 
conduct, or any other circumstance which he believes would make 
enforcement of a consequential damages exclusion unconscionable. 
But the plain language of the UCC indicates that this step, of 
evaluating whether the exclusion is unconscionable, must be taken 
before a contractual consequential damages exclusion may be done 
away with. See 810 ILCS 5/2B719(3) (West 2000). 
We conclude that the independent approach is the better-reasoned 
and more in accordance with the plain language of the UCC. This 
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a majority of jurisdictions to 
consider the issue have adopted the independent approach. Illinois 
generally follows the majority interpretation of UCC provisions, in 
order to serve the underlying UCC policy of A >mak[ing] uniform the 
law among the various jurisdictions.= @ Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 
174 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1996), quoting 810 ILCS 5/1B102(2)(c) (West 
1994). Contractual limitations or exclusions of consequential 
damages will be upheld unless to do so would be unconscionable, 
regardless of whether the contract also contains a limited remedy 
which fails of its essential purpose. 
 
B. Unconscionability 
                                                                                                             
consequential damage limitations regardless of the seller=s good faith. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that the jury found the limited remedy 
to have failed of its essential purpose does not destroy the provision 
in the warranty excluding consequential damages. However, this does 
not mean that the exclusion of consequential damages will 
necessarily be upheld. Rather, that provision must be judged on its 
own merits to determine whether its enforcement would be 
unconscionable. 810 ILCS 5/2B719(3) (West 2000). 
 
 
-19- 
A determination of whether a contractual clause is 
unconscionable is a matter of law, to be decided by the court. 810 
ILCS 5/2B302(1) (West 2000); Frank=s Maintenance & Engineering, 
Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 989 (1980). 
Unconscionability can be either Aprocedural@ or Asubstantive@ or a 
combination of both. Frank=s Maintenance, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 989. 
But see Rosen v. SCIL, LLC., 343 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1081 (2003) (for 
a term to be found unconscionable, it must be both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable); 1 Farnsworth, Farnsworth on 
Contracts '4.28, at 585 (3d ed. 2004) (AMost cases of 
unconscionability involve a combination of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability,@ although contracts may be voidable 
without 
substantive 
unconscionability 
if 
the 
procedural 
unconscionability 
is 
sufficiently 
severe). 
Procedural 
unconscionability refers to a situation where a term is so difficult to 
find, read, or understand that the plaintiff cannot fairly be said to 
have been aware he was agreeing to it, and also takes into account a 
lack of bargaining power. Frank=s Maintenance, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 
989. Substantive unconscionability refers to those terms which are 
inordinately one-sided in one party=s favor. Rosen, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 
1081. 
Hyundai argues that plaintiff introduced no evidence to support 
the trial court=s determination that the consequential damages 
exclusion was unconscionable. We disagree. There are a number of 
facts immediately apparent from the record which tend to support a 
finding of unconscionability. This was a contract on a preprinted 
form, which plaintiff had no hand in drafting. The parties to the 
contractBa merchant and a consumerBhad enormously disparate 
bargaining power. Moreover, the clause in question is intended to 
limit the drafter=s liability. None of these facts are alone dispositive, 
but each one is a factor which leads this court to disfavor the clause. 
See Pierce, 2 P.3d at 623 (ACourts are more likely to find 
unconscionability when a consumer is involved, when there is a 
disparity in bargaining power, and when the consequential damages 
clause is on a pre-printed form@); Frank=s Maintenance, 86 Ill. App. 
3d at 992 (although UCC permits clauses limiting remedies, such 
clauses are disfavored and must be strictly construed). However, we 
need notBand we do notBhold that these general circumstances alone 
or in combination render the clause unconscionable. 
There is an additional fact particular to this case which tips the 
 
 
-20- 
balance in plaintiff=s favor. That is the lack of evidence that the 
disclaimer of consequential damages was present within the written 
contract itself. Neither party argues that the limited warranty and the 
disclaimer of consequential damages contained therein were not 
actually part of the parties= agreement. Rather, both parties proceed 
from the assumption that the disclaimer is a potentially enforceable 
contractual term, only differing over whether it should be enforced in 
this case. Accordingly, we will assume for purposes of analysis that 
the disclaimer is part of the parties= contract. However, the fact 
remains that the portion of the written contract which was admitted 
into evidence makes no reference to these terms, and neither party 
now objects to the circuit court=s ruling admitting the contract into 
evidence. Although the contract does mention provisions on the back 
of the page, the back of the page does not appear in the record before 
us. Moreover, plaintiff testified without contradiction that she never 
saw any part of the written warranty, much less the disclaimer of 
consequential damages, until she looked in her owner=s manual after 
she had signed the contract and driven the car off the lot. 
As previously noted, procedural unconscionability refers to a 
situation where a term is so difficult to find, read, or understand that 
the plaintiff cannot fairly be said to have been aware he was agreeing 
to it. Surely, whatever other context there might be in which a 
contractual provision would be found to be procedurally 
unconscionable, that label must apply to a situation such as the case 
at bar where plaintiff has testified that she never saw the clause and 
defendants produced no evidence that the clause is present or even 
referred to in the written contract which plaintiff signed. A[A] 
limitation of liability given to the buyer after he makes the contract is 
ineffective.@ Frank=s Maintenance, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 991 n.2. 
Moreover, if there were any question regarding pure procedural 
unconscionability, we reiterate that unconscionability can be a 
combination of circumstances substantive and procedural. Frank=s 
Maintenance, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 989. In this case the circumstances 
are: there is no evidence that the consumer plaintiff saw or could 
have seen a clause disclaiming a seller=s liability, in a form contract 
drafted by the seller, a merchant with superior bargaining power. 
To enforce the clause in these circumstances, we conclude, would 
indeed be unconscionable. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court=s 
order to that effect, as well as the $3,500 which represents that 
portion of the jury verdict intended to recompense plaintiff for the 
 
 
-21- 
consequential damages she incurred. 
 
II. Warranty Damages 
The next issue concerns the jury=s $5,000 warranty damage award 
for the decreased value of the car due to the no-start condition. 
Hyundai does not object to the jury=s conclusion that the vehicle was 
defective or that the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose. 
Rather, Hyundai contends merely that there was no evidence to 
support the jury=s damages award, and argues that because the award 
can only have represented a guess by the jury, the court should have 
entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) in Hyundai=s 
favor. Plaintiff responds that she is not required to prove damages 
with mathematical precision, and argues that there was sufficient 
evidence on damages for the case to go to the jury. 
As the appellate court noted, the standard for entry of judgment 
n.o.v. is a high one: 
AA court may enter a judgment n.o.v. only when, viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it 
so overwhelmingly favors the movant that a contrary verdict 
could not stand. [Citation.] A defendant=s motion for 
judgment n.o.v. presents > Aa question of law as to whether, 
when all of the evidence is considered, together with all 
reasonable inferences from it in its aspect most favorable to 
the plaintiffs, there is a total failure or lack of evidence to 
prove any necessary element of the plaintiff[=s] case.@ = 
[Citation.]@ 349 Ill. App. 3d at 658. 
Because the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose, 
plaintiff was entitled to pursue the other remedies afforded by the 
UCC. 810 ILCS 5/2B719(2) (West 2000). Under the UCC, AThe 
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the 
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted 
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, 
unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different 
amount.@ 810 ILCS 5/2B714(2) (West 2000). AWhile it is not 
necessary that damages for breach of warranty be calculated with 
mathematical precision [citation], basic contract theory requires that 
damages be proved with reasonable certainty and precludes damages 
based on conjecture or speculation [citation].@ Ouwenga v. Nu-Way 
Ag, Inc., 239 Ill. App. 3d 518, 523 (1992). Accord Mitsch v. General 
 
 
-22- 
Motors Corp., 359 Ill. App. 3d 99, 104 (2005); Valenti v. Mitsubishi 
Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973 (2002). See 
also Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 118 Ill. 2d 
306, 315-16 (1987) (AIn order to recover lost profits, it is not 
necessary that the amount of loss be proven with absolute certainty. 
*** However, recovery of lost profits cannot be based upon 
conjecture or sheer speculation. [Citation.] It is necessary that the 
evidence afford a reasonable basis for the computation of damages@). 
In this case there was no sufficient basis for the jury=s $5,000 
award. There was no documentary evidence submitted on the 
damages question, nor expert testimony. The only possible evidence 
of how much the vehicle=s value decreased is plaintiff=s testimony, 
and plaintiff=s only testimony which touches on the subject was that 
she would not today pay the price she had originally paid for the 
vehicle, because Agiven the problems that this vehicleBthat I have had 
with this vehicle or the problems the vehicle has had, that=s like a 
used car. I would not pay that for a new car with used problems as it 
were.@ There is simply no way for the jury to get from this testimony 
to a $5,000 award without engaging in speculation and conjecture. 
A >[I]n proving damages, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish a 
reasonable basis for computing damages.= @ Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 
2d 1, 33 (2003), quoting Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (1993). In 
this case, plaintiff failed to do so. 
Plaintiff notes that the price of the car was also entered into 
evidence and suggests that jurors have sufficient familiarity with cars 
and breakdowns that they ought to be permitted to determine for 
themselves how much a car=s value would be diminished by events of 
the type which occurred in this case. Plaintiff cites a number of cases 
which suggest that damages may be proven in any manner which is 
Areasonable,@ and also notes that our appellate court has held that 
A[w]here the right of recovery exists the defendant cannot escape 
liability because the damages are difficult to prove.@ Burrus v. Itek 
Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 357 (1977). 
We agree that damages may be proven in any reasonable manner, 
as a general proposition of law (see, e.g., Snelson, 204 Ill. 2d at 33) 
but this begs the question whether damages were proven in a 
reasonable manner in this case. The answer is clearly no. Although 
jurors are not required to check their common sense at the courtroom 
door (see People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 238 (1991)), we are not 
 
 
-23- 
prepared to endorse the proposition that jurors are as a class 
sufficiently familiar with automobiles as to be able to determine the 
degree of diminution of a particular vehicle=s value based on a 
particular defect without the need for any evidence at all. This is 
more than a matter of simple common sense. Plaintiff testified, in 
essence, that AIt wasn=t worth what I paid for it.@ There was no 
number presented, nothing for the jury to work from. 
Plaintiff argues that the Magnuson-Moss Act and the UCC are to 
be construed liberally, and argues that when a plaintiff proves he has 
suffered damages, the defendant ought not to escape liability simply 
because the precise measure of the damages is difficult to ascertain. 
See Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 357 (1977). We again 
agree with these propositions as a general matter. But regardless, 
even assuming that plaintiff suffered some damage, there must be 
some basis for a jury=s damage award, and we can see no process 
other than speculation by which the jury could have translated the 
evidence presented by plaintiff to an award of $5,000. We note that 
even in Burrus, itself a UCC case in which a dissatisfied buyer was 
attempting to recover for the value of defective goods, the record 
included Atestimony@ as to Athe actual value of the defective [goods] 
at time of acceptance.@ Burrus, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 357. In this case, by 
contrast, there is nothing, truly not a scintilla of evidence to support 
any particular verdict at which the jury might have arrivedBmuch less 
the suspiciously round number of $5,000. 
However, we feel compelled to note that plaintiff attempted to 
introduce such evidence. During plaintiff=s case in chief, the circuit 
court precluded plaintiff=s counsel=s from asking plaintiff how much 
she would have paid for the car if she had known of the defects. This 
was error, and it was only because of this error that plaintiff failed to 
prove damages. Although the decision whether a witness is 
competent to testify is a matter within the trial court=s discretion, lay 
witnesses are permitted to give their opinion as to the value of 
property if they have sufficient personal knowledge of the property 
and its value. State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Best in the West 
Foods, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 470, 483 (1996). It is true that there 
must be an adequate showing of the basis for such testimony before it 
will be allowed (Best in the West Foods, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 483), but 
in this case, the circuit court sustained defense counsel=s objection 
while plaintiff=s counsel was attempting to establish the foundation of 
plaintiff=s knowledge as to the value of the vehicle. This was clearly 
 
 
-24- 
erroneous. 
Accordingly, although plaintiff=s case failed for proof of damages, 
it would be entirely unjust to reverse the verdict outright. As 
previously noted, A[w]here the right of recovery exists the defendant 
cannot escape liability because the damages are difficult to prove.@ 
Burrus, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 357 (1977). Accord McGrady v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 136, 140 (1977). Therefore, pursuant to 
our authority under Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 
366(a)(5)), we reverse and remand for a new trial solely on the 
question of the warranty damages to which plaintiff is entitled. See 
Ford Motor Co. v. Cooper, 125 S.W.3d 794, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 
2004) (noting that Aappellate courts have reversed for a new trial 
where, among other circumstances, the plaintiff failed to show 
damages with reasonable certainty, but the interests of justice 
required the plaintiff be given an opportunity to show the proper 
measure of his or her damages,@ and remanding for new trial, where 
jury awarded plaintiff $5,000 for breach of automobile warranty 
without sufficient evidence of value as delivered). 
At this new trial, plaintiff=s counsel must not be precluded from 
attempting to lay a foundation for plaintiff=s knowledge of the value 
of the car. However, of course, the evaluation of the sufficiency of 
whatever foundation may be laid to establish plaintiff=s personal 
knowledge of the value of the car will be within the circuit court=s 
discretion (Best in the West Foods, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 483); we are 
not prejudging this question in favor of either party. 
 
III. Attorney fees 
Hyundai admits that the Magnuson-Moss Act permits the court to 
award attorney fees to a victorious plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. 
'2310(d)(2) (2000). Hyundai=s only argument here is that once we 
have reversed the entire verdict in plaintiff=s favor, plaintiff cannot be 
considered Avictorious,@ and accordingly we must also reverse the fee 
award. Hyundai does not argue nor even suggest that a partial 
reversal requires that we remand the cause to the circuit court to 
recalculate the fees to which plaintiff=s counsel would be entitled. 
However, we have not reversed the entire verdict in plaintiff=s favor. 
Accordingly, this argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, the judgment of the appellate court 
 
 
-25- 
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the 
circuit court is also affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand 
for a new trial on the issue of warranty damages. 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part; 
circuit court judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part; 
cause remanded.