Title: Hartung Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Buffi's Automotive Equipment and Supply Company, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170482
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 2018

Rel: December 7, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1170482
____________________
Hartung Commercial Properties, Inc.
v.
Buffi's Automotive Equipment and Supply Company, Inc.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-11-901557)
BRYAN, Justice.
Hartung Commercial Properties, Inc. ("Hartung"), appeals
from a summary judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court
("the circuit court") in favor of 
Buffi's Automotive Equipment
1170482
and Supply Company, Inc. ("Buffi's Automotive").  For the
reasons set forth herein, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
Hartung was formed in early 2003 by Wayne Hartung, and,
around that time, Hartung bought a piece of commercial
property that had an auto-body collision, repair, and paint
shop ("the body shop") on the premises.  Wayne also formed
Har-Mar Collisions, Inc. ("Har-Mar"), in late 2003 or early
2004 to operate the body shop.  Hartung subsequently entered
into a lease with Har-Mar pursuant to which Har-Mar leased the
body shop.  Wayne had a custom-built paint booth installed in
the body shop and hired Buffi's Automotive to make the paint
booth operational once it was installed.  On January 24, 2011,
the body shop was completely destroyed by a fire.
On 
July 
8, 
2011, 
Hartung 
sued 
Har-Mar, 
Buffi's
Automotive, and several fictitiously named defendants in the
circuit court asserting claims of negligence and wantonness
related to their alleged roles in causing the fire that
destroyed the body shop.  Specifically, Hartung alleged that,
on or about January 5, 2011, Buffi's Automotive performed
repairs to the paint booth located in the body shop that
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required 
"bypassing 
and/or 
overriding the 
safety 
cutoff 
and/or
control regarding the heating system" of the paint booth; that
Har-Mar continued to use the paint booth through January 24,
2011; and that, on or about January 24, 2011, a fire destroyed
the body shop as a result of the negligence and wantonness of
Har-Mar and Buffi's Automotive.  Hartung subsequently amended
the complaint to add Ira Lewis as a defendant.
On September 6, 2013, Buffi's Automotive moved for a
summary judgment as to all claims pending against it.1 
Buffi's Automotive alleged that, sometime after the fire
destroyed the body shop, Hartung ordered what remained of the
body shop and all the equipment inside it –- including the
paint booth and all its electrical components –- to be
demolished without notifying Buffi's Automotive that the body
shop was going to be demolished and without giving Buffi's
1Buffi's Automotive's motion for a summary judgment
indicates (1) that Hartung had filed an amended complaint
alleging 
claims 
of 
negligent 
and 
wanton 
entrustment, training,
and supervision against Buffi's Automotive, and (2) that Har-
Mar 
had 
filed 
cross-claims 
against 
Buffi's 
Automotive 
alleging
claims of negligent and wanton entrustment, training, and
supervision.  Those pleadings are not included in the record
on appeal.  However, it appears that Hartung and Har-Mar both
alleged that Buffi's Automotive was liable for improper
repairs to the paint booth made by Ira Lewis, an agent or
employee of Buffi's Automotive.
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Automotive the opportunity to inspect the body shop or the
paint booth before they were demolished. Buffi's Automotive
argued that Hartung allowed the body shop to be demolished
even though it believed at that time that Buffi's Automotive
had caused the fire; that Buffi's Automotive "was named as a
defendant only after the evidence was destroyed"; and that
Buffi's Automotive "should have been placed on notice of the
claim and allowed to inspect the premises with its own experts
prior to destruction of the evidence."
Har-Mar and Hartung filed separate motions opposing
Buffi's Automotive's motion for a summary judgment, and they
each adopted the arguments made in the other's opposition. See
note 1, supra.  Citing the fact that the fire scene "had
already been inspected by a large group of experts" and that
some of the experts who had examined the fire scene had not
concluded that the cause or origin of the fire implicated
Buffi's Automotive, Har-Mar argued that "Buffi's has offered
no showing that with the information and resources available
to it ... Buffi's [Automotive's] defense of this case is
impaired in any manner by the clearing of the property."
Hartung argued that Ira Lewis was "an agent, servant and/or
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employee of Buffi's [Automotive]" and that, because Lewis
"inspected the fire loss and spoke with various law
enforcement and fire experts" before the body shop was
demolished, there was no "spoliation problem."
The following evidence was presented to the circuit
court.  In early January 2011, approximately one week before
the fire, Har-Mar telephoned Buffi's Automotive seeking a
repair to the paint booth because the "oven" in the paint
booth would not turn on. It is undisputed that Lewis came to
the body shop that day and that, after speaking on the
telephone with the company that had manufactured the paint
booth, Lewis determined the cause of the problem in the paint
booth.  Although Lewis had to order a replacement part for the
paint booth, there was evidence indicating that Lewis "hot-
wired" the paint booth so that Har-Mar could continue using it
until the replacement part arrived.  The body shop was
destroyed by the fire before Lewis was able to install the
part.
One of the insurance companies involved in investigating
the fire hired Cam Cope to determine the origin and cause of
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the fire.2  Cope inspected the scene on February 10 and 11,
2011. His initial assessment was that the fire occurred
"within the heat exchanger that was used for the painting
booth."  Cope spoke to Lewis during his investigation, and
Lewis told him that he had removed a faulty part from the
paint booth and that he, essentially, "hot-wired" that
component so Har-Mar could continue using the paint booth. 
Apparently, based on that conversation, Cope concluded that
Lewis's faulty repairs to the paint booth caused the fire. 
Cope indicated that he believed the fire was caused by some
type of electrical failure in the paint booth, but he admitted
that he did not have an electrical engineer examine any part
of the fire scene and that it was not within his area of
expertise to determine exactly which electrical component had
failed. Cope testified that he expected either Buffi's
Automotive or Har-Mar "to get an electrical person there" and
that he made that recommendation to the insurance company that
had initially hired him.
2Although Cope's initial investigation of the fire scene
was done at the behest of an insurance company, Wayne later
hired Cope to serve as his expert in the underlying
litigation.
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Lewis went to the body shop the day after the fire, and
the manager of the body shop told Lewis that it could not have
been the paint booth that caused the fire because the manager
had turned off the breakers, i.e., the power, to the paint
booth before he left the body shop the night of the fire. 
Lewis went to the body shop a second time a day or two after
the fire to speak with certain individuals who were
investigating the cause of the fire.  A couple of weeks after
the fire, Lewis went to the body shop with a camera because he
thought he needed a picture of the breakers in the "off"
position, but the breakers had already been removed from the
scene. There is no indication in the record that Lewis
actually took any photographs of the fire scene. 
Once Wayne's insurance companies informed him that their
investigation of the fire scene was complete, Wayne hired
someone to demolish the body shop and to clear the property. 
Wayne did not direct anyone to save any part of the paint
booth or any electrical components that were still in the body
shop. No part of the fire scene was preserved except the
breaker box, which had already been removed; however, Wayne
did not know where the breaker box was at the time of the
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underlying litigation.  After the fire scene was cleared,
Wayne was left "with a big vacant piece of property" with no
structures remaining.  
There was undisputed evidence that the fire was
investigated by the Mobile Fire Department, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"), Cope, and Cliff
Carlisle, who investigated the fire on behalf of an insurance
company.  Wayne testified that "a lot of pictures were taken"
of the fire scene and that he knew that there were pictures of
all the electrical components in the paint booth, although he
conceded that the components themselves had not been
preserved.  Wayne testified that the fire marshal believed
that the fire began in one of the vehicles parked inside the
body shop but that the fire marshal ultimately held that the
cause of the fire was undetermined.
Wayne testified that the possibility that Lewis had "hot
wired" the paint booth had come to his attention before the
body shop was demolished.  Wayne also testified that in his
last conversation with Lewis after the fire, before the body
shop was demolished, he told Lewis that Lewis "did something
[he] shouldn't have done and [he] put me out of business." 
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Buffi's Automotive, through Beth "Buffi" Peter, one of
the owners, testified that Buffi's Automotive had no employees
and that Buffi's Automotive had not done business with Wayne
or Har-Mar since approximately September 2008. Beth stated
that an entity known as "Ira Lewis Contracting" performed the
repair work to the paint booth in January 2011. However, Lewis
testified that he and Beth had been partners working on paint
booths for approximately 10 years, that he and Beth shared
office space, and that they worked on several jobs together
after the fire at the body shop in January 2011. Lewis stated
that both he and Beth referred to one another as partners in
front of people they did business with and that, if the part
needed to fix the paint booth had been delivered on time and
was installed, Lewis would have expected to split the profits
from that job with Beth.  Wayne testified that "there hasn't
ever been any separation between Buffi's [Automotive] and 
Ira,
other than the woman's name being Buffi[, i.e., Beth].  We
would call Buffi's [Automotive], we would get her and Ira, or
her coming by for a bill."
The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion for
a summary judgment on March 7, 2014.  At that hearing, counsel
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for Hartung argued that Buffi's Automotive had not produced
any 
expert 
testimony 
indicating 
that 
the 
information
available, which was essentially the reports written and
photographs taken by individuals who had investigated the
fire, was insufficient for a defense. Buffi's Automotive
argued that it was denied the opportunity to hire its own
expert to investigate the cause and origin of the fire and
that, because of Wayne's actions, it was left with no physical
evidence to examine.
On November 4, 2014, the circuit court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Buffi's Automotive based on spoliation of
the evidence.  The circuit court found: (1) that "the evidence
leaves no doubt that the evidence destroyed by Hartung and
Har-Mar is essential to 
Buffi's [Automotive's] ... defenses in
this case"; (2) that, given that Hartung and Har-Mar believed
that Buffi's Automotive and/or Lewis was responsible for the
fire, "the importance of preserving the scene should have been
readily apparent"; (3) that "[f]undamental fairness dictates
that Buffi's [Automotive] ... should have been placed on
notice of the claim and allowed to inspect the premises with
its own experts prior to the destruction of the evidence"; (4)
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that it was "convinced that there exist no alternative sources
of the information contained in the destroyed evidence"; and
(5) that "[t]here are no other possible sanctions less severe
than dismissal that would be effective in this case." 3  
Hartung filed a motion to reconsider the summary
judgment, arguing that "countless pages of photographs and
documents generated by state, local, and 
federal agencies more
than 
provide 
sufficient 
alternative 
sources 
of 
information for
[Buffi's Automotive] to dispute that the fire started with the
paint booth." After conducting a hearing, the circuit court,
on March 23, 2015, denied Hartung's motion to reconsider.  On
February 12, 2016, Hartung and Har-Mar filed a second motion
to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of Buffi's
Automotive.  On September 7, 2016, the circuit court denied
Hartung and Har-Mar's second motion to reconsider.  On January
12, 2018, the circuit court certified the summary judgment in
favor of Buffi's Automotive as a final judgment pursuant to
3The summary judgment was entered as to all claims against
Buffi's Automotive filed by both Hartung and Har-Mar.  The
order did not address Hartung's and Har-Mar's claims  against
Lewis or Hartung's claims against Har-Mar.
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Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Hartung filed a notice of appeal
on February 22, 2018.4
Standard of Review
"'In reviewing the disposition of a
motion for summary judgment, "we utilize
the same standard as the trial court in
determining whether the evidence before
[it] made out a genuine issue of material
fact," Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d
860, 862 (Ala. 1988), and whether the
movant was "entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Wright v. Wright, 654 So.
2d 542 (Ala. 1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence
creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust
Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797–98 
(Ala. 
1989). 
Evidence 
is
"substantial" if it is of "such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment 
can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact
sought to be proved." Wright, 654 So. 2d at
543 
(quoting 
West 
v. 
Founders 
Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further
subject to the caveat that this Court must
review the record in a light most favorable
to the nonmovant and must resolve all
reasonable 
doubts 
against 
the 
movant. 
Wilma
Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc.,
613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993); Hanners v.
Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413
(Ala. 1990).'
4Har-Mar did not appeal.
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"Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d
341, 344 (Ala. 1997). Further, in determining
whether the summary judgments for the defendants
were proper on the ground of spoliation of the
evidence, we consider whether the trial court
exceeded its discretion in entering the summary
judgments. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy
Gas, Inc., 585 So. 2d 822 (Ala. 1991); Iverson v.
Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989); and
Copenhagen Reinsurance Co. v. Champion Home Builders
Co., 872 So. 2d 848 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)."
Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., 901 So. 2d 84,
88–89 (Ala. 2004).
Analysis
This Court has evaluated the entry of a summary judgment
on the ground of spoliation of the evidence as essentially
imposing the sanction of dismissal.  See Vesta Fire, supra;
see also, e.g., Story v. RAJ Props., Inc., 909 So. 2d 797, 802
(Ala. 2005).  In reviewing such a judgment, this Court has
approved a trial court's consideration and weighing of five
factors in analyzing a spoliation-of-the-evidence issue: "(1)
the importance of the evidence destroyed; (2) the culpability
of the offending party; (3) fundamental fairness; (4)
alternative sources of the information [that would have been
available] from the evidence destroyed; and (5) the possible
effectiveness of other sanctions less severe than dismissal."
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Story, 909 So. 2d at 802–03.  Hartung argues that the evidence
presented as to the five factors does not support the summary
judgment 
dismissing 
Hartung's 
claims 
against 
Buffi's
Automotive.  We agree.
Hartung first argues that "Buffi's [Automotive] failed to
show the importance of the evidence [destroyed].  Nowhere in
the record does it appear as to why the evidence is important
or that [Buffi's Automotive has] an expert testifying to the
importance of the lost evidence." Hartung's brief, at 23. 
Buffi's Automotive presented evidence indicating that every
piece of physical evidence relevant to this case was either
lost or destroyed.  However, although that fact clearly
carries some weight, that fact alone is not necessarily
decisive.  This Court has held that the first factor, the
importance of the evidence destroyed, "must be evaluated in
the context of the importance of the evidence that was
preserved or otherwise available." Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at
95 (emphasis added).  In that regard, Hartung argues that
Buffi's Automotive failed to present evidence that would
support a finding in its favor as to factor four, i.e., the
inadequacy of "alternative sources of the information"
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available 
to 
Buffi's 
Automotive; 
specifically, 
the
investigations performed by the Mobile Fire Department, ATF,
and Cope, which produced "reports, diagrams, photographs and
other documents" regarding the cause of the fire and the fire
scene.  Hartung's brief, at 23-24.  Further, Hartung argues,
Buffi's Automotive failed to establish that factor three,
fundamental fairness, required dismissal of Hartung's claims,
particularly in light of the lack of evidence as to factor one
and factor four.  
After carefully reviewing the record, we agree that
Buffi's Automotive failed to present evidence to support a
finding in its favor as to factors one, three, and four.  We
note that Buffi's Automotive had at its disposal several
individuals who had investigated the fire and had taken
photographs and written reports detailing their findings, and
it very well could be that, after deposing those individuals
or hiring its own expert, Buffi's Automotive is able to
present evidence from which the circuit court could conclude
that the available evidence is not an adequate alternative to
the destroyed evidence and that it would not be fundamentally
fair to allow Hartung's claims to proceed in light of its
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destruction of evidence.  However, the circuit court was not
presented with evidence to support such a conclusion at this
stage of the proceedings. 
Notably, in each of the three cases Buffi's Automotive
primarily relied upon as analogous cases in its motion for a
summary judgment and in its appellee's brief before this
Court, the defendants presented expert testimony as to the
relative importance of the destroyed evidence and the
insufficiency of the alternative sources of information
available to the non-spoliating party.  See Story, 909 So. 2d
797; Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smedley, 614 So. 2d 439 (Ala.
1993); and Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585 So.
2d 822 (Ala. 1991).
In Story, the trial court entered, and this Court
affirmed, a summary judgment against the plaintiff based on
the plaintiff's spoliation of the evidence.  The plaintiff
filed a claim against a home builder and other defendants
alleging defects in the material used in the construction of
the plaintiff's house. Approximately two 
or 
three months after
he filed his complaint, the plaintiff began extensive repair
work on his house.  The plaintiff took photographs of the
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alleged damage and had an expert inspect his house and prepare
a report of his findings before the repairs were made, but the
plaintiff did not notify the defendants that he was making
repairs to his house.  The defendants moved for a summary
judgment based on spoliation of the evidence and argued that
their experts were unable to investigate the plaintiff's house
before the repairs were made; the experts testified, among
other things, that they were "unable to determine the extent
or cause of the damage to [the plaintiff's] house based on the
existing photographs." Story, 909 So. 2d at 803.  After
discussing the evidence submitted by the defendants that
refuted 
the 
plaintiff's 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
the
photographs provided a sufficient alternate source of
information for the defendants, this Court held that "[t]he
trial court had before it evidence indicating that the
evidence destroyed was important, if not essential, to the ...
defendants' defense," and this Court concluded that the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in entering a summary
judgment for the defendants on the ground of spoliation of the
evidence. 909 So. 2d at 804 (emphasis added).
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In Smedley, supra, an insurance company filed a claim
against the seller of a vehicle that caught fire as it was
being operated by the insurance company's insured.  Soon after
the fire, the insurance company hired an investigator to
determine the cause and origin of the fire; the investigator
took photographs of the vehicle and wrote a report detailing
his findings.  The insurance company had the vehicle destroyed
before it filed suit against the seller of the vehicle.  The
seller's expert testified that the investigator's photographs
and report were inadequate for various reasons and that he
could not make a determination as to the cause and origin of
the fire without inspecting the vehicle.  On appeal of a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, this Court held that the
trial court should have dismissed the case based on spoliation
of the evidence.  
Similarly, in Synergy Gas, supra, another spoliation-of-
the-evidence case, 
the trial court was presented with evidence
from an expert hired by the defendant who testified that she
was "'unable to draw any conclusions as to the cause of the
fire due to [the] lack of preservation of the evidence by the
plaintiffs.'" 585 So. 2d at 824.  The trial court dismissed
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the claims against the defendant, and this Court reversed that
judgment only to extent that physical evidence related to one
of the plaintiffs' claims had been preserved; however, the
judgment was affirmed as to all claims based on evidence that
had not been preserved.  
Thus, each case relied upon by Buffi's Automotive is
distinguishable from the present case in that, in each of
those cases, the party seeking the sanction of dismissal
presented actual evidence to support its allegations that the
evidence destroyed was important or essential to its claims or
defense, even in the context of evidence otherwise available,
and that the alternative sources of information still
available were not an adequate substitute for the destroyed
evidence.  Further, without any evidence indicating that the
alternate sources of information were not an adequate
substitute for the destroyed evidence or any evidence
indicating the extent of the prejudice Hartung's actions have
caused, Buffi's Automotive did not demonstrate that it would
be fundamentally unfair to require it to defend against
Hartung's claims. See Chancellor v. White, 34 So. 3d 1270,
1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that, although there was
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evidence indicating that the plaintiff was culpable in
destroying relevant evidence, the 
summary judgment in favor of
the defendant based on the plaintiff's spoliation of the
evidence was due to be reversed because the defendant failed
to present any evidence indicating that it would be impossible
to determine the extent or cause of any damage to the
plaintiff based on photographs and an inspector's report
detailing the damage to the plaintiff's house).
Our analysis thus far has touched on the factors related
to the importance of the evidence, fundamental fairness, and
alternative sources of information.  Our review of the
evidence in light of the two remaining factors –- culpability
of the offending party and the possibility of sanctions less
severe than dismissal –- does not convince us that Buffi's
Automotive has nevertheless established that it was entitled
to the sanction of dismissal.  As to the culpability factor,
Hartung argues that there was "[n]o evidence ... presented to
the trial court that Hartung willfully or maliciously
destroyed evidence." Hartung's brief, at 23.  However,
evidence of malicious intent in the destruction of relevant
evidence is not required.  "In cases in which parties
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destroyed relevant evidence before filing their complaints,
our supreme court has considered, as evidence of the factor of
culpability, the fact that the parties knew or should have
known that litigation would ensue and that the evidence would
be relevant to that litigation."  Thompson v. Gardner, 889 So.
2d 596, 607 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (citing Smedley and Synergy
Gas, supra).  Compare Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 95
("[W]illfulness is not shown where the party disposing of an
item neither knew or should have know that the item would be
key evidence in the case." (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 176 (Ala. 2000))).  In the present
case, Wayne conceded that he believed that Lewis, who he
alleged was acting on behalf of Buffi's Automotive, was
responsible for the fire before he allowed the body shop,
including the paint booth, to be demolished.  Thus, there was
evidence that would support a finding that Wayne appreciated
that he was destroying evidence that would be relevant in
future litigation, even if he did not destroy the evidence
with malicious intent.  Nevertheless,  in light of the lack of
evidence as to factors one, three, and four, we cannot
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conclude that Wayne's culpability is in itself sufficient to
support the sanction of dismissal of Hartung's claims.
As to the fifth and final factor, the possibility of
sanctions less severe than dismissal, this Court has held, in
the context of a summary judgment entered in favor of a
defendant based on 
the 
plaintiff's spoliation of the evidence,
"'that the sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction
that a court may apply. ... Dismissal orders must be carefully
scrutinized 
and 
the 
plaintiff's 
conduct 
must 
mandate
dismissal.'" Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 95 (quoting Iverson v.
Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82, 87 (Ala. 1989)).  For the
reasons set forth above, the summary judgment in favor of
Buffi's Automotive does not pass scrutiny.  Absent evidence as
to factors one, three, and four, the circuit court could not
properly conclude that the sanction of dismissal, as opposed
to some lesser sanction, was mandated in the present case.  As
noted above, Buffi's Automotive might be able to present such
evidence on remand.  However, based on the record before us at
this time, we are simply not convinced that Buffi's Automotive
met its burden in this case.  This Court has "a long-
established and compelling policy objective of affording
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litigants a trial on the merits whenever possible." Iverson,
553 So. 2d at 89 (citing Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer
Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988), and Jones v. Hydro-
Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524 So. 2d 610 (Ala. 1988)).  After
considering the evidence presented in light of the five
factors set forth in Story, we conclude that the circuit court
exceeded its discretion in applying "'the most severe sanction
that a court may apply.'" Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 95
(quoting Iverson, 553 So. 2d at 87).  Accordingly, the summary
judgment must be reversed.5
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the summary judgment in
favor of Buffi's Automotive is reversed and the case is
remanded 
for 
further 
proceedings consistent 
with 
this 
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.  
Stuart, C.J., and Parker and Main, JJ., concur.
Mendheim, J., concurs specially.
5Because we are reversing the summary judgment based on
Buffi's Automotive's failure to present evidence to support
the dismissal of Hartung's claims based on spoliation of the
evidence, we pretermit discussion of Hartung's remaining
arguments in favor of reversal.
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MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring specially).
I write separately to express my concern about the
development of some of our precedent as to the pertinent
standard of review in a case dismissed on the basis  of
spoliation of the evidence.  
Courts have considered spoliation of evidence in several
procedural contexts: "(1) a cause of action in tort (for
either intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence); (2) a
defense to recovery; (3) an evidentiary inference or
presumption; and (4) a discovery sanction."  Robert L. Tucker,
The Flexible Doctrine of Spoliation of Evidence: Cause of
Action, Defense, Evidentiary Presumption, and Discovery
Sanction, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 67, 67 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).  In those contexts, this Court has acknowledged the
existence of an independent cause of action in tort for
spoliation only as to a third party,6 and we have not
6In Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000),
this Court noted that "jury charges that presume missing
evidence 
weighs 
against 
the 
spoliator, 
and 
discovery
sanctions" are "both ... available when spoliation is charged
against an opposing party."  See also Christian v. Kenneth
Chandler Constr. Co., 658 So. 2d 408, 413 (Ala. 1995)
("Although a few jurisdictions have recognized a new
independent tort based on spoliation of 
evidence, the majority
of courts considering the issue have declined to adopt such a
new cause of action.  Moreover, as discussed above, the
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addressed spoliation as a defense to recovery outside the
context of the sanction of dismissal.  Our cases have
discussed spoliation in the contexts of an evidentiary
inference or presumption and of a discovery sanction.  The
right to a jury instruction as to an evidentiary inference to
be drawn from spoliation has long been acknowledged.  In
McCleery v. McCleery, 200 Ala. 4, 75 So. 316 (1917), this
Court stated regarding an instrument of conveyance that had
been destroyed:
"To state but one of many applications of the rule
of the maxim:  Against a party who has purposely and
wrongfully destroyed documentary evidence that the
spoliator knows is pertinent and material to the
interest of his opponent, whether an action is then
pending or not, a rebuttable evidence presumption
arises, or, as some state it, an inference is
indulged, unfavorable to the spoliator.  ...  When
the bases for this unfavorable presumption or
inference are established without dispute or to the
reasonable satisfaction of the jury, the jury is
authorized to presume or infer that the instrument
was duly executed, whatever the legal requirements
to that end, and that the contents thereof was of a
character and effect of the utmost favor to the
particular facts of this case make it inappropriate for us to
consider recognizing a new cause of action [against a party]
at this time." (footnotes omitted)).  We further noted in
Smith that those remedies "are not available to remedy the
injustice caused by spoliation when the spoliator is a third
party," and we recognized a cause of action against a third
party for negligent spoliation of evidence.  771 So. 2d at
438.
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spoliator's adversary and of the utmost disfavor to
the spoliator's interest.  The rule's inspiration is
the result of the common experience and judgment
that men will not ordinarily withhold or destroy
evidence beneficial to themselves."  
200 Ala. at 5-6, 75 So. at 317-18; see also, e.g., May v.
Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 603 (Ala. 1982); cf. Notes on Use to
Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions –- Civil § 15.12 (3d ed.
2017)("The 
instruction 
[on 
spoliation, which 
authorizes 
a 
jury
to draw an inference against a party who has committed the
spoliation,] should not be confused with a situation when the
court imposes sanctions against a party for spoliation."). 
The present case (though couched in terms of a summary
judgment), and my concerns, arise out of the context of a
discovery sanction for spoliation, particularly the dismissal
of a party's claims.  
Our cases have sometimes discussed a dismissal as a
sanction for spoliation of evidence using the standard of
review for a summary judgment, but I am uncertain as to why
this Court has concluded that the summary-judgment standard of
review is proper in the context of a discovery sanction. 
Specifically, I note that in Vesta Fire Insurance Corp. v.
Milam & Co. Construction, 901 So. 2d 84 (Ala. 2004), the trial
court entered summary judgments for the defendants based on
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its "determination that the plaintiffs' conduct had resulted
in spoliation of the evidence."  901 So. 2d at 88.  After
stating the standard of review applicable to an appellate
court's review of a summary judgment, this Court stated: 
"Further, 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
summary
judgments for the defendants were proper on the
ground of spoliation of the evidence, we consider
whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in
entering 
the 
summary 
judgments. 
See, 
e.g.,
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585 So. 2d
822 (Ala. 1991); Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553
So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989); and Copenhagen Reinsurance
Co. v. Champion Home Builders Co., 872 So. 2d 848
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003), all discussed infra."   
901 So. 2d at 89.
I note that two of the cases relied upon by this Court in
support of the foregoing proposition from Milam & Co. were not
cases addressing the issue whether summary judgment was proper
based on spoliation of evidence, i.e., whether there was no
disputed issue of material fact and a party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.  Instead, those cases addressed
the issue whether a trial court had erred by dismissing claims
as a discovery sanction pursuant to Rule 37, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
At issue in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585
So. 2d 822 (Ala. 1991), was "[t]he ... question of what
sanctions, if any, are 
appropriate where the plaintiff permits
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or allows the apparatus made the subject of a lawsuit to be
lost or destroyed prior to the filing of the complaint."  585
So. 2d at 824-25.  This Court addressed the issue whether,
pursuant to Rule 37, the trial court had exceeded its
discretion in dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims as a
discovery sanction for the destruction of pertinent evidence. 
This Court found "no abuse of discretion on the trial court's
part in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims that were based on
the alleged malfunction of those components of the gas system
that were destroyed by the plaintiffs."  585 So. 2d at 827.  
Likewise, Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82
(Ala. 1989), involved the review of a trial court's order of
dismissal entered as a discovery sanction pursuant to Rule 37,
not the review of a summary judgment.  The trial court in
Iverson conducted an evidentiary hearing as to whether
dismissal was proper for the plaintiff's alleged spoliation of
evidence, and this Court even noted the application of the
ore tenus rule to its review of the trial court's judgment of
dismissal, a rule that does not apply to a summary judgment. 
See Iverson, 553 So. 2d at  86.  This Court noted that "the
trial court is vested with broad and considerable discretion
in controlling the discovery process ..., including the
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authority to make such rulings as are necessary to protect the
integrity of the discovery process."  553 So. 2d at 87.  We
further noted that, "deeply rooted in the common law is the
court's power to manage its affairs in order to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases, including the
authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions for
failure to comply with discovery."  Id.  It concluded:  "The
choice of discovery sanctions is within the trial court's
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent gross
abuse of discretion, and then only upon a showing that such
abuse of discretion resulted in substantial harm to
appellant."  553 So. 2d at 87 (citations omitted).
The third case relied on in Milam & Co.,  Copenhagen
Reinsurance Co. v. Champion Home Builders Co., 872 So. 2d 848
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003), did address the issue whether a summary
judgment had been properly entered on the ground of
spoliation, but, in so doing, the Court of Civil Appeals
quoted from its earlier decision in Vesta Fire Insurance Corp.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 705 So. 2d 382 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(also a summary-judgment case), which in turn was relying on
this Court's decision in Cincinnati Insurance Co.  See
Copenhagen Reinsurance Co., 872 So. 2d at 852-53 ("Under
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similar facts in Vesta Fire Insurance Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 705 So. 2d 382 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), this Court
stated: 'The facts of this case are indistinguishable from the
facts in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585
So. 2d 822 (Ala. 1991).'").  As noted above, however,
Cincinnati 
Insurance 
Co. 
addressed 
the 
issue 
whether
spoliation would support the sanction of dismissal under
Rule 37, not whether a summary judgment might be permissible
on the ground of spoliation.  In addition to relying on
Cincinnati Insurance Co. (a Rule 37 sanctions case) the Sears,
Roebuck & Co. court relied on Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Smedley, 614 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1993).  But, like Cincinnati
Insurance Co., Capitol Chevrolet addressed the issue whether
the sanction of dismissal was proper, and the Capitol
Chevrolet Court relied on Iverson (a Rule 37 sanctions case)
and Cincinnati Insurance Co. (a Rule 37 sanctions case) in
addressing the spoliation issue.  Although the Capitol
Chevrolet Court made no reference to Rule 37, that is likely
because no discovery order had been issued in that case.  614
So. 2d at 442-43 ("[I]n this case no court had ordered
discovery. Rather, the destruction of evidence occurred 11
months before this action was filed. ...  The stark result is
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that relevant evidence was irreparably lost by the actions of
Auto Owners.  We conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in not dismissing the case.").  Thus, Capitol
Chevrolet appears to reflect an expansion of the discovery-
sanction rule to situations arising outside the context of a
motion filed pursuant to Rule 37; Capitol Chevrolet did not
involve a summary judgment.
Based on the foregoing, I am concerned about the
propriety of using our precedent reviewing a judgment of
dismissal as a sanction for spoliation as a review of a
summary judgment.  Where a sanction of dismissal is imposed
for spoliation, it appears to me that the proper standard of
review is the standard discussed in Iverson and that the five
factors this Court has approved in Story v. RAJ Properties,
Inc., 909 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 2005), for consideration as to
spoliation should be reviewed in light of that standard. 
Indeed, Story all but approves of that approach without
attempting to 
clarify 
that 
using 
the 
summary-judgment standard
is improper.  909 So. 2d at 802 (stating, in response to
Story's argument that issues of material fact precluded the
entry of a summary judgment:  "The issue Story asserts to be
in dispute ... is not one requiring a determination by the
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factfinder; it does not go to the merits of his case. 
Instead, the issue Story says is in dispute goes to whether
the sanction of a summary judgment entered on the ground of
spoliation 
of 
the 
evidence 
was 
appropriate. 
 
That
determination is one for the trial court to make."). 
Notwithstanding my concern, Buffi's Automotive Equipment
and Supply Company, Inc., filed its motion for a summary
judgment using the path this Court has approved in previous
cases, and neither party has requested that we clarify or
overrule our precedent on this issue.  Also, because I agree
with the main opinion that Buffi's Automotive failed to
satisfy its evidentiary burden as to the five factors at
issue, the judgment of dismissal is due to be reversed,
regardless of which standard should apply in the present case. 
Accordingly, I concur.
32