Title: GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE v DISTRICT COU
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-093
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 1980

No. 79-93 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 T H E G R E A T FALLS TRIBUNE, a c o r p o r a t i o n , P e t i t i o n e r , -vs- T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA, et a l . , Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana Randall Swanberg argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Robert J. Vermillion argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Judge H. W i l l i a m Coder argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Daniel Donovan argued, M m v - - ' c L , - Great F a l l s , Montana James A. Lewis argued , - W - - + r ~ ) j e ~ t , Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: January 17, 1980 Decided : #m? 19 E@b F i l e d : Mr. Chief Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. The question before this Court is whether the District Court's order closing to the press and public the individual voir dire examination of prospective jurors in a criminal case should be affirmed under the circumstances of this case. Our order of January 18, 1980,vacated the closure and directed that the press and public be permitted to attend the voir dire examination with a written opinion to follow. This opinion constitutes the reasons for our decision. Gene Andrew Austad was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide, robbery, sexual intercourse without consent, and aggra- vated burglary allegedly committed on April 21, 1978. His preliminary hearing could not be held until September 18, 1978, because of injuries he sustained in an accident follow- ing the crimes with which he was charged. Shortly after the al- leged and as yet undiscovered crimes with which he was later charged, Austad was stopped by Great Falls police for a traffic violation, fled the scene of the traffic stop, and a high speed chase ensued culminating in a wreck in which he was severely injured. Follow- ing the wreck, authorities discovered evidence of the commission of other offenses which led to the discovery of the body of Mabel Wald, age 69, the victim of the crimes of which Austad was charged. Following the preliminary hearing, Austad was bound over to the District Court of Cascade County. On October 18, 1978, the District Court denied his motion for an order controlling alleged prejudicial publicity. Austad was arraigned on December 27, remained silent, and a not guilty plea to all charges was entered in his behalf. In February, 1979, Austad was released from the hospital. His bail was reduced permitting him to be taken to the home of his parents to be given the personal care required by his condition. On May 31 the defendant filed a motion for change of place of trial. On June 1 he moved for sequestration of prospec- tive jurors during voir dire examination and during trial. On June 4 defendant moved for individual voir dire examination of prospective jurors. On ~ugust 24 following a psychiatric and medical examin- ation of defendant to determine his fitness to proceed, an in camera hearing was held by the District Court in its chambers to determine defendant's fitness to proceed to trial, his ability to assist and communicate with his counsel, and the extent to which the State's evidence could be reconstructed. On October 2 the District Court found that defendant's physical condition made it possible for him to proceed to trial with certain limitations and set a trial date of November 20. On October 15 defendant moved to close pretrial proceed- ings. On November 1, following a hearing closed to the press and public, the District Court entered orders denying defendant's motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct and granting defen- dant's motion to close pretrial proceedings calendered for October 29 to the press and public. The trial was continued to December 3 at which time an initial panel of 50 prospective jurors were sworn. At the com- mencement of voir dire examination, the District Court directed that the individual voir dire examination of prospective jurors be closed to the press and public. On December 14, the Great Falls Tribune filed an original proceeding in this Court seeking a writ of supervisory control (1) directing the presiding judge to permit a Tribune reporter to attend and observe the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, and (2) directing the presiding judge to hold a hearing and there- after issue findings of fact and conclusions of law showing that defendant's right to a fair trial was jeopardized. On the same date this Court issued an order directing the presiding judge to hold a hearing and submit to us his findings and conclusions concerning his reasons for closing the voir dire examination to the press and public and staying further proceedings in jury selection. On January 10, 1980 following hearing, the presiding judge filed his findings, conclusions and order closing the voir dire examination to the press and public. In summary, the presiding judge concluded that such closure was required to ensure the right of the defendant to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury in Cascade County. The closure was based upon findings of sub- stantial prejudicial publicity, misstatements of fact, disclosure of defendant's prior criminal record, and disclosure of evidence not generally known to the public originating in part from the prosecution and police appearing in the Tribune. The presiding judge examined certain alternatives to closure--sequestration of prospective jurors, change of venue, and continuance of trial to a later date--and re.jected each for various reasons. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss this proceeding which we denied. Briefs were filed by defendant, the State and the Tribune. Oral argument was heard on January 18. Thereafter this Court entered an order vacating the closure with a full written opinion to follow as time permitted. We do not have a transcript of the District Court hearing as time would not permit its preparation prior to hearing. How- ever, we do have 92 exhibits filed by the Tribune and defendant relating to press coverage including news items in the Tribune, letters to the editor printed in the Tribune, and scripts of radio- television broadcasts. They cover the time period from April 23, 1978 to December 14, 1979. In short, they depict a murder in which a 29 year old defendant is alleged to have raped a 69 year old victim, cut her throat, and stuck a knife in her chest; his fleeing from police in an automobile chase at speeds up to 89 miles per hour after being stopped for a routine traffic inves- tigation; and repokting subsequent events in the criminal prose- cution with republication of events leading to defendant's arrest and the charges filed. At the outset we observe the existence of a common law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings in the courts of this country. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale (1979), U.S. I 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L Ed 2d 608 and authorities cited therein. The public and the press have "traditionally had access to criminal proceedings and history supports the notion that public trials are the norm." Rapid City Journal Company v. Circuit Court (1979), S.D. , 283 N.W.2d 563; Gannett v. DePasquale, supra, and cases cited therein. We additionally note that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal Constitution does not require that a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence be open to the public and that the press has no federal constitutional right of access to such a proceeding. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra. However, the situation is considerably different under the Constitution of this State. Article 11, Section 9 of the 1972 Montana Constitution provides: "Section 9. Right to know. No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies- or agencies of state government and its subdi- visions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." (Emphasis added.) The language of this provision speaks for itself. It applies to all persons and all public bodies of the state and its subdivi- sions without exception. Under such circumstances, it is our duty to interpret the intent of the framers from the language of the provision alone and not to resort to extrinsic aids or rules of construction in determining the intent of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Keller v. Smith (1976), 170 Mont. 399, 404, 554 P.2d 1002; Cashmere v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175, 500 P.2d 921, cert.den. 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L Ed 2d 593; Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1932), 109 Mont. 52, 96 P.2d 420; Sections 1-2-102 and 1-4-103, MCA. Art. 11, Sec. 9 clearly provides that any person has the consti- tutional right to observe court proceedings unless the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure. The merits of public access to criminal proceedings are many and substantial. It protects the accused from "secret in- quisitional techniques" and unjust persecution by public officials and "goes far toward insuring him a fair trial, to which he is entitled." Westchester Rockland Newspapers v . Leggett (1979), 423 NYS2d 630, and cases cited therein. It promotes justice for the accuser as well--the police and prosecutors who must enforce the law and the victims of crime who suffer when the law is not enforced fairly, impartially and vigorously. Westchester Richland Newspaper, supra. Open public proceedings have long been recog- nized as a cornerstone in preserving the quality and integrity of the judicial process. Rapid City Journal Co. v . Circuit Court, supra. Closure of judicial proceedings breeds suspicion and mis- trust in the minds of the public and respresentatives of the media. Such closure is simply censorship at the source--a denial of the right to know. Frequently it is counterproductive; it focuses public attention on the accused and the crime by generating publicity which neither would otherwise merit. However, this right of access or right to know is not ab- solute. Our Montana Constitution provides an exception in cases where the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure. It also guarantees the defendant the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. Art. 11, Sec. 24, 1972 Montana Constitution. A balancing of these competing rights is required. We proceed to analyze this case in this context. We have examined the 92 exhibits of pretrial media coverage. We note that the Tribune has published and republished the background of the case--that defendant is charged with raping and murdering the 69 year old victim, cutting her throat, sticking a knife in her chest and subsequently being apprehended by police after a high speed chase. Television and radio broadcasts are of the same tenor. In our view these items are factual reporting without editorializing and are no more inflammatory than background in- formation on any other brutal crime. One article appeared in the Tribune tending to link defendant with a house burglary five years earlier. This article appeared five to six days after the crime and one and a half years before jury selection. The District Court found that the news articles contained misstatements of fact giv- ing as an example the implication that the high speed chase by police resulted from defendant's fleeing the scene of the crimes rather than fleeing from a routine traffic investigation. We find nothing in the news articles, in the scripts of radio and television broadcasts, or in subjecting the prospective jurors to an open and public voir dire examination that would deny or impair defendant's right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury under Federal and State Constitutional guarantees. No con- tention is made that the publicity in this case was massive or pervading to the extent of exerting an influence upon jurors to insure a conviction as in Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L Ed 2d 600 or Estes v. Texas (1965), 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L Ed 2d 543. In the modern world it is impossible to create an arti- ficial, antiseptic environment from which prospective jurors may be drawn who have heard nothing of a serious crime committed in their midst. People read newspapers. They listen to radio and television newscasts. It is only where they form fixed opinions on the guilt or innocence of the defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court that they become disqualified as jurors. Irvin v . Dowd (1961), 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L Ed 2d 751, 756; State v. Lewis (1976), 169 Mont. 290, 546 P.2d 518. A probing voir dire examination of prospective jurors is the judicial mechanism for determining this. The pur- pose of voir dire in a criminal proceeding is to determine the existence of bias and prejudice on the part of prospective jurors and to enable counsel to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. State v. Stuit (1978) , Mon t . , 576 P.2d 264, 35 St-Rep. 313. In this case separate, segregated and individual voir dire of prospective jurors was ordered by the Court, but we fail to see just how closing such examination to the public is nec- essary to guarantee the defendant a fair trial. If during the course of voir dire it should become necessary to allude to inadmissible evidence or similar matters, the presiding judge could briefly close the voir dire for those questions and answers alone, an alternative not considered by the court in this case. From the foregoing it is apparent that the Montana Consti- tution imposes a stricter standard in order to authorize closure than does the United States Constitution. Art. 11, Sec. 9 of the Montana Constitution has no counterpart in the Federal Constitution. In Gannett the United States Supreme Court left open the question of whether a stricter state constitutional standard is permissible under the Federal Constitution. " . . . But we are not asked here to declare whether open proceedings represent beneficial social policy, or whether there would be a con- stitutional barrier to a state law that imposed a stricter standard of closure than the one here employed by the New York count . . ." U.S. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2912-2913, 61 L ~ d 2 d a t 630. We note that Gannett is distinguishable from the present case. Gannett involved closure of a pretrial suppression hearing; this case involves closure of the entire voir dire examination of all prospective jurors. In our view pretrial suppression hear- ings involve a special risk, i.e. disclosure of tainted evidence. Although it is not entirely clear, there is reason to believe that the holding in Gannett may not be applicable to closure of the trial itself. Here the voir dire examination is an integral part of the trial itself. See Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee (Ark. 1977), 553 S.W.2d 270; 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law S260; United States v . Woods (3rd Cir. 1966), 364 F.2d 481. Closing any part of the trial is simply the first step down that primrose path that leads to destruction of those societal values that open, public trials pro- mote. Nothing short of strict and irreparabze necessity to ensure defendant's right to a fair trial should suffice. These are the reasons for our order of January 18, 1980, vacating the closure of the voir dire examination and directing that the press and public be permitted to attend. Chief Justice M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy dissenting: On January 18, 1980, the majority of t h i s Court entered i t s per curiam order d i r e c t i n g t h e respondent D i s t r i c t Court t o proceed forthwith with v o i r d i r e examination of prospec- t i v e t r i a l jurors i n t h e criminal case a g a i n s t Gene Andrew Austad, and vacating an e a r l i e r order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t t h e p r e s s and public be excluded from such v o i r d i r e examination. W e dissented t o t h a t order and now state our reasons. W e have no testimonial record before us i n t h i s case. Such f a c t s a s may be r e c i t e d here are gleaned from the a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e p e t i t i o n , the responses t h e r e t o , and the e x h i b i t s which have been f i l e d . What w e say here respecting t h e purported f a c t s i s n o t t o be construed i n any present o r f u t u r e proceedings a s an i n d i c a t i o n by us t h a t we have prejudged what t h e f a c t s may eventually turn o u t t o be. O n A p r i l 27, 1978, an information was f i l e d i n t h e District Court, Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cascade County, a g a i n s t Gene Andrew Austad. H e was charged with f i v e f e l o n i e s , alleged t o have been committed on April 2 1 , 1978 i n Great F a l l s , including two counts of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and one each of robbery, sexual intercourse without consent, and aggravated burglary. I n t h e e a r l y morning hours of April 2 2 , 1978, Austad suffered severe i n j u r i e s t o h i s person as a r e s u l t of an accident i n o r near Great F a l l s , which occurred while ust tad was engaged i n a high-speed chase between an automobile he was driving and one operated by the Great F a l l s police. H e had been stopped f o r a t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , attempted t o leave t h e scene, and t h e chase ensued, ~ o l l o w - i n g t h e accident i n which Austad w a s i n j u r e d , t h e a u t h o r i t i e s discovered evidence of t h e commission of another offense, and t h e subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s p o s s i b l e offense l e d t o t h e discovery of t h e body of Mabel Wald then aged 69, t h e victim of t h e o f f e n s e s charged a g a i n s t Austad i n t h e information above d e t a i l e d . Because of t h e i n j u r i e s which Austad received i n t h e accident, he was h o s p i t a l i z e d i n Great F a l l s . H i s condition was such t h a t a preliminary hearing i n the criminal case a g a i n s t him was n o t had u n t i l September 18, 1978. On October 4 , 1978, t h e defendant, through h i s counsel from t h e p u b l i c defenders o f f i c e f i l e d a motion f o r an order t o c o n t r o l p r e j u d i c i a l p u b l i c i t y . That motion w a s denied by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on October 18, 1978, t h e c o u r t then f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p r e t r i a l coverage by t h e p r e s s had n o t prejudiced t h e defendant. Austad was arraigned on December 27, 1978, remained s i l e n t , and t h e c o u r t entered h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y t o a l l of t h e charges. Since t h e r e was a question as t o t h e physi- c a l f i t n e s s of t h e accused t o proceed, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i r e c t e d h i s p s y c h i a t r i c and medical examination. I n e a r l y February, 1979, Austad w a s r e l e a s e d from t h e h o s p i t a l . The D i s t r i c t Court reduced h i s b a i l s o t h a t he could be taken t o t h e home of h i s p a r e n t s and be given t h e personal c a r e required by h i s then physical condition. On May 31, 1979, defendant f i l e d a motion f o r change of p l a c e of t r i a l . O n June 1, 1979, defendant f i l e d a motion f o r t h e s e q u e s t r a t i o n of j u r o r s during v o i r d i r e examination and during trial. O n June 4 , 1979, t h e defendant moved f o r i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e examination of t h e prospective j u r o r s , which l a t t e r motion w a s granted by t h e c o u r t . O n J u l y 9 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered memoranda from a l l p a r t i e s and from t h e S t a t e and defendant's counsel t o advise him on t h e question of defendant's f i t n e s s t o proceed r e l a t i n g t o t h e i s s u e s of h i s a b i l i t y t o be of a s s i s t a n c e t o h i s counsel and t o communicate with him; t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e S t a t e ' s evidence could be reconstructed, n o t only a s t o t h e o f f e n s e i t s e l f , b u t a s t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e defense of a l i b i ; and f o r any f u r t h e r comment on t h e p s y c h i a t r i c , medical and neurological r e p o r t s which t h e c o u r t had received. A hearing on t h i s order was held on August 2 4 , 1979 i n chambers before t h e c o u r t i n camera. 7 O n October 2 , 1979, t h e c o u r t made f i n d i n g s determining t h a t t h e defendant's physical condition made it p o s s i b l e f o r him t o proceed t o t r i a l with c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s , and ordered jury t r i a l t o commence on November 26, 1979. He f u r t h e r set a l l pending motions f o r decision on October 29, 1979. On October 15, 1979, Austad moved t o c l o s e t h e p r e t r i a l pro- ceedings. On October 29, 1979, t h e hearing was closed t o t h e p r e s s and public, and t h e r e a f t e r , on November 1, 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court made t h e following orders: ( a ) Denied Austad's motion f o r funds t o h i r e a profes- s i o n a l survey team t o conduct a telephone survey i n Great F a l l s regarding t h e Gene Austad case. (b) Denied various motions of t h e defendant t o dismiss on grounds of misconduct of t h e prosecution. (c) Granted defendant's motion t o c l o s e proceedings t o t h e p r e s s and public. The jury t r i a l d a t e was continued t o December 3 , 1979 and on t h a t d a t e , an i n i t i a l panel of 50 jurors were sworn. The c o u r t determined t h a t examination of t h e prospective j u r o r s would be i n d i v i d u a l , and then r e l e a s e d t h e jury panel u n t i l f u r t h e r c a l l of t h e court. O n December 4 , 1979, a t t h e beginning of v o i r d i r e , t h e c o u r t d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e examination of t h e prospective j u r o r s be closed t o t h e p u b l i c and t h e p r e s s . On December 1 4 , 1979, t h e Great F a l l s Tribune f i l e d with t h i s Court a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l d i r e c t i n g t h e Honorable H. William Coder t o permit a Tribune r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o a t t e n d t h e v o i r d i r e proceeding, o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o hold a hearing and e n t e r f i n d i n g s and conclu- s i o n s which would show t h a t t h e defendant's r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l was jeopardized. When t h e Tribune f i l e d i t s p e t i t i o n , v o i r d i r e examina- t i o n of t h e j u r o r s i n t h e Austad t r i a l was then under way. On t h e same d a t e as t h e p e t i t i o n w a s f i l e d , w e issued an order s t a y i n g a l l f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h e Austad t r i a l , and d i r e c t e d Judge Coder t o hold a hearing and t o submit t o us f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w as t o h i s reasons f o r c l o s i n g t h e t r i a l proceedings t o t h e p r e s s and public. The hearing has been provided by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. On January 10, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i l e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law and order. I n summary, Judge Coder concluded t h a t t h e r i g h t of t h e accused, Austad, t o a speedy p u b l i c t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l jury i n Cascade County required i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e examination of t h e prospective j u r o r s closed t o t h e p r e s s and public u n t i l such t i m e as t h e jurors and a l t e r n a t e s are duly sworn and empaneled. Counsel f o r Austad f i l e d a motion t o dismiss t h e s e proceedings on December 18, 1979. The Tribune f i l e d i t s o b j e c t i o n t o s a i d motion. The Cascade County Attorney has a l s o f i l e d a b r i e f i n t h i s matter. W e ordered o r a l argument on t h e findings of f a c t and conclusions of law submitted by t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court t o be held before us on January 18, 1980. he p o s i t i o n of t h e Tribune had n o t been changed, t h a t no reason e x i s t e d f o r t h e exclusion of t h e p r e s s and p u b l i c from the v o i r d i r e examination of t h e prospective j u r o r s i n t h e criminal t r i a l . The p o s i t i o n of t h e County Attorney is t h a t he would n o t a t t a c k t h e order of t h e d i s t r i c t judge and so he took no p o s i t i o n pro o r con a s t o t h e order. The p o s i t i o n of counsel f o r Austad, while supportive of t h e d i s t r i c t judge, i n d i c a t e s r a t h e r s t r o n g l y t h a t they would p r e f e r t h a t t h e t r i a l of Austad be moved t o another county. Judge Coder himself, a s a named respondent i n t h i s a c t i o n , appeared and argued i n support of t h e order t h a t he issued. The foregoing r e c a p i t u l a t i o n summarizes t h e proceedings had i n t h e District Court and before t h i s Court t h a t l e d t o our order of January 18, 1980 vacating t h e c l o s u r e s t r i c t u r e imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e b e l i e v e from t h e m a t e r i a l s before u s t h a t Gene Andrew Austad, age 29 a t t h e t i m e of t h e crimes charged a g a i n s t him, i s a Great F a l l s r e s i d e n t who i s severely physically incapacitated. H e sustained closed-head i n j u r i e s which have r e s u l t e d i n retrograde and anterograde amnesia which i s permanent; d y s a r t h i a , t h a t i s d i f f i c u l t y with speech due t o t h e weakness of h i s voice muscles; double vision; s p a s t i c quadraparesis, which n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e use of a wheelchair although he i s a b l e t o stand and walk very s h o r t d i s t a n c e s with t h e a s s i s t a n c e of two a i d e s ; and a mild degree of d i f f u s e c e r e b r a l dysfunction. The ~ i s t r i c t Court found t h a t i n s p i t e of h i s amnesia, which r e l a t e s p a r t i c u - l a r l y t o t h e i n c i d e n t s involving t h e crimes charged, he i s nevertheless mentally a b l e t o attend t r i a l . H e communi- c a t e s i n some degree with h i s counsel so t h a t he i s a b l e t o a i d i n h i s own defense; b u t h i s physical condition i s such t h a t he would n o t be a b l e t o be present i n t h e courtroom f o r an e n t i r e day. Therefore, t h e t r i a l i s scheduled t o be conducted on a part-day b a s i s and i s "programmed" f o r 8 weeks. Defendant's counsel has f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court 92 e x h i b i t s r e l a t i n g t o p r e s s coverage of t h e defendant and h i s t r i a l . They include news i t e m s running i n t h e Great F a l l s Tribune, s c r i p t s of t e l e v i s i o n broadcasts r e l a t i n g t o Austad, and l e t t e r s t o t h e e d i t o r printed i n the Tribune. I n s h o r t , they d e p i c t a murder i n which t h e 29 year o l d defendant i s alleged t o have raped a 69 year old woman, and then murdered her by c u t t i n g her t h r o a t and s t i c k i n g a butcher k n i f e i n her chest; h i s f l e e i n g from the p o l i c e i n t h e high speed auto chase a t speeds up t o 89 m i l e s per hour; t h e termination of t h e chase when the Austad vehicle r a n i n t o 9 parked automobiles a t a Great F a l l s auto dealership; h i s subsequent confinement t o the h o s p i t a l f o r s e v e r a l months before he w a s a b l e t o be arraigned. There i s no need t o embellish those f a c t s f o r a sensational e f f e c t . Their very r e c i t a t i o n arouses a v i n d i c t i v e ire i n the r e a d e r ' s mind. N o playwright, not Shakespeare himself, could devise a scene more packed with high drama i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l face- o f f than i s presented here. O n the one hand, the press, towering # a n d r- majestic, robed i n t h e F i r s t and Fourteenth Amendments. O n t h e o t h e r , t h e defendant, cowering and p a t h e t i c , crippled and charged a s despicable, uncomfortable i n the poorly-lighted and low-heated Sixth Amendment. I n t h e middle, t h e d i s t r i c t judge, flowering with r h e t o r i c , defend- i n g h i s reach f o r a surgically-clean vacuum i n which t o achieve a f a i r trial. Had t h i s s e t t i n g been f i c t i o n , it had seemed implausible. I t i s r e a l i t y , and stranger than f i c t i o n it has escaped t h e grasp of the majority of t h i s Court. Let us dispose a t the o u t s e t of t h e nonissues t h a t cropped up i n t h i s case. F i r s t , t h e v o i r d i r e examination of prospective t r i a l jurors is a p a r t of t h e t r i a l i t s e l f . That i s too c l e a r f o r c a v i l . It i s announced by every t r i a l judge i n every jury case when a t t h e o u t s e t before t h e jury panel i s sworn, he asks of t h e p a r t i e s i f they a r e ready f o r t r i a l . This i s a nonissue because, as w e s h a l l demonstrate, every United S t a t e s Supreme Court j u s t i c e b u t one has agreed t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t has the power t o c l o s e a l l o r a p a r t of t h e criminal t r i a l t o t h e public. That holding must include t h e jury v o i r d i r e examination. The Great F a l l s Tribune i t s e l f does not dispute t h i s power, as o r a l argument revealed. The second nonissue i s whether t h e pervasive p r e s s s t o r i e s on t h e purported f a c t s of t h e c r i m e w e r e misrepre- sentation. Of course, i f t h e press were culpable, it would be e a s i e r t o r u l e , b u t it is not necessary t o look f o r c u l p a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of t h e p r e s s i n a case l i k e t h i s . That is not the i s s u e which determines whether t h e v o i r d i r e examination should be closed. What must be examined i s whether the f a c t s of the crime a s printed o r broadcast, t r u e o r f a l s e , make it l i k e l y t h a t an i m p a r t i a l jury cannot be empaneled i n the a r e a from which a jury w i l l be drawn. Thus i f t h e press had misrepresented t h e f a c t s , b u t t h e jury panel atmosphere was n o t befouled thereby, no r i g h t would e x i s t t o c l o s e t h e v o i r d i r e examination. Conversely, i f t h e reported f a c t s without misrepresentation c r e a t e an atmosphere in which a fair jury cannot be found, defendant's right to a fair trial would require some action by the ~istrict Court to ensure a fair trial. The permeating overriding query remains: did the press stories prevent a fair impartial jury? If yes, the district judge acted prop- erly and constitutionally; if not, he acted improperly and unconstitutionally. The third nonissue relates to the fact that when the District Court announced that he was closing the proceedings to the press (as he did on a previous occasion in the same circumstances) the reporter left the room without objection. We would hold, and Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale (1979), U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608, does hold that the lack of objection by the reporter is not binding on the press or the publisher of the paper and properly so, for it is not within the ostensible authority of a reporter to waive First Amendment rights of his newspaper unless speci- fically authorized. Since the Great Falls Tribune has granted in oral argument, whether one is considering the federal or the state constitution, that a ~istrict Court does have the power under proper circumstances to close all or a part of the criminal trial, the real issue of the case boils down merely to a difference of opinion as to whether such proper circumstances exist: the Tribune is of the opinion that its coverage is truthful, nonsensational, and not overdone; therefore, it cannot be excluded from voir dire examination even if press coverage did create an unfavorable jury climate for the defendant. The trial judge is of the opinion that the facts have been misrepresented in the press, overempha- sized, and unabatedly published; that the demands of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , s t a t e o r f e d e r a l , f o r a f a i r t r i a l i n t h i s case r e q u i r e two things: (1) i n d i v i d u a l examination of prospec- t i v e j u r o r s o u t s i d e t h e presence of t h e rest of t h e panel; and, ( 2 ) exclusion of t h e p r e s s from such i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e examination t o preserve i t s s a n c t i t y . Which opinion does t h e record i n t h i s c a s e support? Clearly, t h e d i s t r i c t judge. A t l e a s t 70 e x h i b i t s of Tribune articles and t e l e v i s i o n s c r i p t s , a l l i n t h e Great Falls a r e a , show a repeating p a t t e r n of r e c i t a t i o n t h a t t h e defen- d a n t i s charged with raping and k i l l i n g a 69 year o l d woman on A p r i l 21, 1978. Some a r t i c l e s r e p o r t her body w a s found with a k n i f e protruding from her chest. Others s t a t e t h a t t h e defendant, following t h e crime engaged t h e p o l i c e i n a high speed a u t o chase (it i s on t h i s p o i n t t h a t t h e d i s - t r i c t judge charges misrepresentation) t h a t ended when h i s a u t o crashed and overturned, i n j u r i n g him t o h i s p r e s e n t condition. The a r t i c l e s have continued unabatedly i n t h e paper and on t e l e v i s i o n t o t h e t i m e of t h e t r i a l i t s e l f , and even through t h e period while t h e matter has been before t h i s Court. The p u b l i c a t i o n s , i n time-span, volume, and modes of media, exceed by f a r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n s described by J u s t i c e Blackmun i n Gannett. Moreover, a t t h e hearing before t h e d i s t r i c t judge requested by t h e Tribune and granted by us, a psychologist t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n d i v i d u a l examination of t r i a l j u r o r s and v o i r d i r e presented t h e b e s t chance f o r honest, candid, complete answers from jury candidates. Ordinarily p r e s s coverage of such p r i v a t e i n d i - v i d u a l examinations would destroy t h e i r objective. Against t h i s impressive a r r a y of pervasive jury-contaminating i n f l u - ences, t h e Tribune o f f e r e d n o t one smidgen of evidence i n t h e hearing it had requested. Based on t h e record before us, t h e d i s t r i c t judge made findings and conclusions f o r submission t o us. I n a matter of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l weight, t h i s Court need not surrender t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h e ultimate power of findings of f a c t t h a t o r d i n a r i l y would be accorded under Rule 52, M.R.Civ.P. ( i d e n t i c a l t o Rule 52, F.R.Civ.P.). Especially i s t h i s t r u e i n an o r i g i n a l proceedings i n t h i s Court, such as t h i s case. But w e owe, i n courtesy t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court, some l o g i c a l and d e t a i l e d explanation why h i s findings a r e overruled by us on a record such a s t h i s . H e i s a f t e r a l l a t t h e scene of t h e t r i a l , with a f e e l f o r what i s taking place i n t h e case he i s supervising. He has t h e experience now of t h e v o i r d i r e examination of some 30 jury panel members. H i s opinion i s e n t i t l e d t o a good d e a l of weight, i n t h e l i g h t of h i s record as a t r i a l judge. The Tribune argues nonetheless t h a t t h e record here of prejudice i s d e f i c i e n t ; t h a t no a f f i d a v i t has been f i l e d by persons claiming they have been prejudiced by t h e p r e s s coverage; t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court has merely assumed pre- judice; and t h a t t h i s Court has held t h a t a juror with a pre-formed opinion may y e t serve a s a juror i f he t e s t i f i e s t h a t he can s e t a s i d e the prejudice and decide upon the evidence of t h e case. W e could answer t h a t 10 of the 30 p l u s persons who have been examined have s a i d they are i n - deed prejudiced and have been excused f o r cause. That i s n o t t h e kind of response w e should make however, because it does n o t r e a l l y m e e t t h e t r u e l e g a l i s s u e i n the case. The Tribune would have us adopt a s a prevailing r u l e t h a t t h e test of a befouled jury atmosphere i s t h e same a s t h a t applied t o determine t h e i m p a r t i a l i t y of a jury candi- date. Not so. I n the d i s s e n t i n Gannett upon which t h e Tribune so strongly r e l i e s , J u s t i c e Blackmun set o u t a three-fold test f o r t h i s type of case which should be deter- minative. I t i s a test w e could adopt here, and i f adopted, we would perforce support t h e d i s t r i c t judge and a c t per- f e c t l y i n accordance with t h e state and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s . The Gannett case (Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale (1979), U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608) i s t h e what measuring s t i c k on/our decision should be here. I t i s recent, it i s on a l l - f o u r s , and w e have w r i t t e n comment by a t l e a s t 4 of t h e 9 Supreme Court j u s t i c e s on the matter. Even without agreeing with the majority i n Gannett, one can see i n t h i s case t h a t Judge Coder m e t t h e minimum but more strict test f o r closure t h a t the minority i n Gannett postu- l a t e d . W e w i l l examine Gannett i n d e t a i l t o demonstrate t h i s . The f a c t s i n Gannett, when compared with those of Austad, show t h a t t h e Austad case p r e s e n t s a f a r more com- p e l l i n g reason f o r t h e closure of the v o i r d i r e examination. Gannett involved t h r e e defendants, two men and an un- i d e n t i f i e d woman, who w e r e charged i n Seneca County, New York, with the crimes of second degree murder, robbery and grand larceny, t h e woman being indicted only on t h e count of grand larceny. I t appears t h a t t h e victim, Wayne Clapp, had disappeared while on a boat r i d e with t h e defendants on Lake Seneca. Shots had been heard, and b u l l e t holes found i n the boat which indicated t h a t Clapp has been t h e victim of f o u l play. There w e r e 1 4 news a r t i c l e s covering t h e events from J u l y 20 t o August 6 of t h e year i n question, reported by two newspapers owned by Gannett, the Democrat And Chronicle, t h e morning paper, and t h e Times-Union, t h e evening paper. Some of the fourteen s t o r i e s were iden- t i c a l i n t h e two papers. Public i n t e r e s t i n the case w a s aroused because t h e S t a t e was proposing t o t r y t h e defen- dants without having found the body of t h e victim. From J u s t i c e Blackmun's d i s s e n t (61 L.Ed.2d a t 639) we l e a r n t h a t from 90 days preceding t h e hearing on a motion t o suppress confessions, t h e r e were no publications. It a l s o appears t h a t the s t o r i e s consisted e n t i r e l y of straightforward reporting of the investigation, arrests, and charges; no " e d i t o r i a l i z i n g " and nothing t h a t a fair-minded person could describe as sensational journalism. There w a s one photograph. The headlines were f a c t u a l ; nothing i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s t o r i e s w e r e placed on t h e page within t h e paper so as t o play up the murder investigation. The s t o r i e s w e r e r e l a - t i v e l y b r i e f , appeared only i n connection with each develop- ment of t h e investigation, and gave no i n d i c a t i o n of being published t o s u s t a i n popular i n t e r e s t i n t h e case. A t t h e hearing on t h e motion t o suppress the confes- sions, defense counsel moved t o exclude t h e press from t h e hearings. The d i s t r i c t attorney d i d not o b j e c t and t h e c o u r t forthwith entered a closure order. Those a r e t h e f a c t s i n Gannett. For t h e purpose of t h i s discussion on t h e Austad case, w e may concede t h a t the a r t i c l e s appear t o be s t r a i g h t - forward reporting of t h e f a c t s surrounding t h e investiga- t i o n , a r r e s t and charges a g a i n s t Austad. There does n o t appear t o be any attempt t o " e d i t o r i a l i z e " o r t o e n t e r i n t o sensational journalism; t h e s t o r i e s a r e f a i r l y placed i n t h e successive i s s u e s of t h e Tribune, t h e headlines are f a c t u a l , t h e s t o r i e s r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f . Nearly every t i m e , f o r r e f e r - ence, t h e s t o r i e s r e f l e c t t h a t Austad i s charged with t h e rape-murder of Mabel Wald, age 69. W e have mentioned o t h e r i t e m s appearing i n t h e Tribune s t o r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e Tribune s t o r i e s , t h e r e was t h e t e l e v i s i o n news coverage of which s c r i p t s have been supplied i n t h i s record. Nothing i n t h e Gannett case shows us what t h e t e l e v i s i o n coverage w a s a s t o t h e Clapp murder. The t e l e v i s i o n coverage of t h e Austad case continued i n much t h e same manner a s t h e Tribune coverage, r e p o r t i n g each succeed- i n g development i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a r r e s t , arraignment and prospective t r i a l of Austad. The pervasiveness of t h e p u b l i c a t i o n s i s g r e a t e r i n Austad than it w a s i n Gannett. W e f i n d from Gannett t h a t t h e two newspapers i n question are published i n Rochester, Monroe County, New York, 40 miles from t h e Seneca County l i n e . The c i r c u l a t i o n of t h e newspapers i s primarily i n Monroe County. There are subscribers however, i n Seneca County. I n 1976, when t h e case arose, t h e Democrat And - Chronicle had a Seneca County d a i l y c i r c u l a t i o n of 1,022 and t h e Sunday c i r c u l a t i o n 1,532, The Times-Union published only a d a i l y e d i t i o n and had only one subscriber i n Seneca County. Seneca County's 1976 population was s e t by t h e Bureau of Census a t 34,000. I t appears from a footnote t h a t t h e only record o f f e r e d i n t h e Gannett case r e l a t e d t o t h e p u b l i c a t i o n s t h a t appeared i n these two newspapers. There was nothing about t h e t e l e v i s i o n coverage o r o t h e r news- papers i n Seneca County a t t h e t i m e . Compare t h a t with t h e Austad case. The Great F a l l s Tribune i s the s i n g l e d a i l y newspaper published i n Cascade County. Its reported d a i l y c i r c u l a t i o n i s approximately 45,000 though it must be admitted t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of i t s c i r c u l a t i o n goes o u t s i d e of Cascade County. However, t h e Tribune enjoys a considerable s a t u r a t i o n of t h e house- holds i n Cascade County. The County i t s e l f had a 1970 population of 81,804 persons and an estimated January 1, 1979 population of 85,100 persons. Seven r a d i o s t a t i o n s operate i n Great F a l l s , 3 F.M. and 4 A.M. There a r e two t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n s a l s o broadcasting i n G r e a t F a l l s . O n a comparable b a s i s , t h e r e f o r e , from what appears i n Gannett, and what w e see i n Austad, t h e p r e s s coverage of t h e i n c i d e n t i n Austad was g r e a t e r and more pervasive and reached more p o t e n t i a l jurors. Added t o t h i s conclusion i s t h e f a c t t h a t i n Gannett, a s J u s t i c e Blackmun pointed o u t , t h e publication w a s n o t unabated, t h e r e being 90 days of no p u b l i c a t i o n between t h e l a s t newspaper a r t i c l e and the hearing on t h e motion t o suppress. H e r e i n Austad, t h e p u b l i c a t i o n has continued unabated and t h e proceedings of t h e t r i a l a r e being reported even now. W e do not decry t h i s continuous publication of f a c t s t h a t t h e p u b l i c has a l e g i - timate i n t e r e s t t o receive; w e simply state t h a t t h e publi- c a t i o n s have occurred f o r t h e purpose of showing t h e back- ground facing Judge Coder when he decided t h a t t o o b t a i n a f a i r jury, he had t o c l o s e t h e v o i r d i r e examination. The j u s t i c e s making up t h e majority of t h e c o u r t i n Gannett were Stewart, who d e l i v e r e d t h e opinion of t h e Court, with concurring opinions by Burger, Powell and Rehnquist, and Stevens who joined t h e p r i n c i p a l opinion. The d i s s e n t i n g opinion was w r i t t e n by Blackmun, and Brennan, White and Marshall joined i n t h e d i s s e n t which by t h e way a l s o con- curred i n p a r t with t h e majority. There i s no doubt t h a t t h e majority s u s t a i n s t h e r i g h t of a t r i a l c o u r t t o take p r o t e c t i v e measures t o i n s u r e a f a i r t r i a l . The majority s a i d : "This c o u r t has long recognized t h a t adverse p u b l i c i t y can endanger t h e a b i l i t y of a defendant t o receive a f a i r trial. [Citing cases.] To safeguard t h e due process r i g h t s of t h e accused, a t r i a l judge has an a f f i r m a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l duty t o minimize t h e e f f e c t s of p r e j u d i c i a l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . [Citing a case.] And because of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s per- vasive concern f o r those due process r i g h t s , a t r i a l judge may s u r e l y take p r o t e c t i v e measures even when they a r e n o t s t r i c t l y and inescapably necessary." 99 S.Ct. a t 2904, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 620. The majority i n Gannett then went on t o examine t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claim t h a t t h e p r e s s had a r i g h t of access as a p a r t of t h e p u b l i c t o criminal t r i a l s a t any s t a g e of t h e proceedings. The majority found t h a t t h e provisions of t h e S i x t h Amendment giving t o t h e defendant a " r i g h t t o a speedy and p u b l i c t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l jury" is f o r the b e n e f i t of t h e defendant and t h e r e i s n o t t h e s l i g h t e s t suggestion t h a t t h e r e is any c o r r e l a t i v e r i g h t i n members of t h e p u b l i c t o i n s i s t upon a p u b l i c trial. I t agreed t h a t a defendant does n o t have t h e r i g h t t o command a p r i v a t e t r i a l b u t s e t t l e d on t h e i s s u e t h a t members of t h e p u b l i c do n o t have an enforce- a b l e r i g h t t o a p u b l i c t r i a l t h a t could be a s s e r t e d inde- pendently of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e l i t i g a t i o n . 99 S.Ct. a t 2906, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 624. I t f u r t h e r found t h a t t h e r e was no common law r i g h t on t h e p a r t of t h e p u b l i c t o a t t e n d t h e criminal t r i a l and t h a t t h e h i s t o r y of t h e common law demon- s t r a t e d only t h e existence of a common l a w r u l e of open, c i v i l and criminal proceedings. 99 S.Ct. a t 2908, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 624. It then went on t o f i n d t h a t t h e S i x t h and Four- t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e Constitution do n o t g r a n t any r i g h t t o a t t e n d such p r e t r i a l proceedings which a s were before t h e Court i n Gannett. 99 S . C t . a t 2911, 6 1 L.Ed.2d a t 628. F i n a l l y , i n examining t h e F i r s t and Fourteenth Amendments, it found no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impediment i n those amendments because t h e p r e s s a t any rate would eventually have t h e r i g h t t o access t o a t r a n s c r i p t and f u r t h e r because t h e d e n i a l of access was only temporary. 99 S.Ct. a t 2912, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 629. The concurring opinions are of i n t e r e s t . Chief J u s t i c e Burger, i n concurring, emphasized t h a t t h e motion t o sup- p r e s s evidence was n o t a t r i a l , b u t a p r e t r i a l proceedings. For t h a t reason, we do n o t count him a; supporting t h e proposition of t h e majority t h a t t r i a l proceedings i n any event may be closed by a c o u r t without v i o l a t i n g f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . J u s t i c e Powell, i n concurring, set t h e question a s w e b e l i e v e it should be posed: ". . . The question f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t , t h e r e f o r e , i n considering a motion t o c l o s e a p r e t r i a l suppression hearing i s whether a f a i r t r i a l f o r t h e defendant i s l i k e l y t o be jeopardized by p u b l i c i t y , i f members of t h e p r e s s and p u b l i c a r e p r e s e n t and f r e e t o r e p o r t p r e j u d i c i a l evidence t h a t w i l l not be presented t o t h e jury." 99 S.Ct. a t 2916, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 634. J u s t i c e Rehnquist, i n h i s concurring opinion, cautioned t h a t t h e r e i s no set procedure t o be employed by a t r i a l c o u r t t o determine whether o r n o t a p a r t of t h e t r i a l should be closed. H e said: ". . . To t h e contrary, i n m y view and, I t h i n k , i n t h e view of a majority of t h i s Court, t h e lower c o u r t s a r e under no con- s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t e i t h e r t o accept o r r e j e c t those procedures. They remain, i n t h e b e s t t r a d i t i o n of our f e d e r a l system, f r e e t o determine f o r themselves t h e question whether t o open o r c l o s e t h e proceeding. Hopefully, they w i l l decide t h e question by accommodating competing i n t e r e s t s i n a judicious manner. But s o f a r as t h e Constitution i s concerned, t h e question i s f o r them, n o t us, t o resolve." 99 S.Ct. a t 2918-19, 6 1 L.Ed.2d a t 637-38. W e a d v e r t now t o t h e finding of Judge Coder i n Austad which i l l u s t r a t e s why he reached t h e same conclusion a s d i d t h e majority i n Gannett: "The evidence submitted t o t h e c o u r t i n support of defense motions t o c o n t r o l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y , change of place of t r i a l , s e q u e s t r a t i o n , continuance and r e l a t e d matters i n d i c a t e d , among o t h e r things, t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y has been sub- s t a n t i a l ; t h a t it o r o t h e r p o r t i o n s of it o r i g i n a t e d from t h e prosecution and p o l i c e ; t h a t it d i s c l o s e s evidence n o t g e n e r a l l y known t o t h e public; t h a t it d i s c l o s e s t h e accused's p r i o r criminal record, and speculates on h i s involvement i n s i m i l a r criminal a c t i v i t i e s ; f u r t h e r t h a t such p u b l i c i t y c o n t a i n s m a t e r i a l misrepresentations of known f a c t s ; t h a t such misrepresentations by t h e very n a t u r e a r e highly p r e j u d i c i a l and by t h e very r e p e t i t i o n and continued r e p u b l i c a t i o n , up t o and including t h e t i m e of t h e jury s e l e c t i o n , can only be viewed by an attempt t o influence t h e p u b l i c and prospective jurors regarding the g u i l t of t h e accused Austad." Findings, X X I I ( 1 ) . I f J u s t i c e Rehnquist i s c o r r e c t i n h i s view of t h e majority of the United S t a t e s Supreme Court, Judge Coder w a s under no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t e i t h e r t o have f u r t h e r hearings on t h e matter o r t o look t o t h i s Court f o r guidance; he was " f r e e t o determine f o r [himself] t h e question [of] whether t o open o r c l o s e t h e proceeding". 99 S.Ct. a t 2919, The foregoing demonstrates t h a t under t h e majority view i n Gannett, t h e o r d e r of Judge Coder c l o s i n g t h e v o i r d i r e examination i n t h i s case should have been sustained. W e w i l l now demonstrate t h a t even under t h e view of t h e minority i n t h e Gannett case, he would likewise be sustained. J u s t i c e Blackmun, w r i t i n g f o r t h e d i s s e n t i n g j u s t i c e s , disagreed with t h e majority i n t h a t he found t h a t t h e p u b l i c t r i a l provisions of t h e S i x t h Amendment provided a r i g h t of access t o t h e p u b l i c t o trials. H e saw l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e i n a p r e t r i a l suppression hearing and t h e t r i a l i t s e l f f o r t h e purpose of t h e S i x t h Amendment. 99 S.Ct. a t 2934, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 657. Nonetheless, he s a w t h a t t r i a l c o u r t s i n c e r t a i n circumstances must have t h e r i g h t t o c l o s e t r i a l s t o t h e public. H e said: ". . . Because of t h e importance w e a t t a c h t o a f a i r t r i a l , it i s c l e a r t h a t whatever r e s t r i c - t i o n s on access t h e S i x t h Amendment may p r o h i b i t i n another context, it does n o t prevent a t r i a l c o u r t from r e s t r i c t i n g access t o a p r e t r i a l sup- pression hearing where such r e s t r i c t i o n i s neces- s a r y i n order t o i n s u r e t h a t a defendant not be denied a f a i r t r i a l a s a r e s u l t of p r e j u d i c i a l p u b l i c i t y flowing from t h a t hearing [ c i t i n g a case]." 99 S.Ct. a t 2936, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 659. J u s t i c e Blackmun then proposed a three-fold test t o support a finding t h a t t h e f a i r t r i a l r i g h t of a defendant would be i r r e p a r a b l y damaged i f t h e proceeding were con- ducted i n public. Under t h a t test, t h e accused would e s t a b l i s h : " F i r s t , he should provide an adequate b a s i s t o support a finding t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i r r e p a r a b l e damage t o h i s f a i r t r i a l r i g h t w i l l r e s u l t from conducting t h e proceeding i n public. This showing w i l l depend on t h e f a c t s . . . "Second, t h e accused should show a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e s t o c l o s u r e w i l l n o t p r o t e c t adequately h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . One may suggest numerous a l t e r n a t i v e s , b u t I t h i n k t h e following should be considered: continuance, severance, change of venue, change of - venire, v o i r -- d i r e , p e r e m p t o r ~ c h a l l e n g e s , s e q u e s t r a t i o n , and admonition of t h e jury. . . "Third, t h e accused should demonstrate t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t c l o s u r e w i l l be e f f e c t i v e i n p r o t e c t i n g a g a i n s t t h e per- ceived harm. . . " I f , a f t e r considering t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t determines t h a t t h e accused has c a r r i e d h i s burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t c l o s u r e i s necessary, t h e S i x t h Amendment i s no b a r r i e r t o reasonable r e s t r i c t i o n s on p u b l i c access designed t o m e e t t h a t need, any r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed, however, should extend no f u r t h e r than t h e circumstances reasonably require. . ." (Empha- sis added.) 99 S.Ct. a t 2937-39, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 660-62. Judge Coder has m e t t h e t e s t s proposed by t h e minority i n Gannett. Having determined t h a t t h e adverse p u b l i c i t y was prejudicial, he considered the alternatives. He examined the possibility of sequestration and determined it would be necessary to sequester 75 to 100 at the outset. He calcu- lated the sequestration of 75 jurors would cost the county $3,225 per day and projected a prospective cost for a three week trial of $32,000 simply for sequestration. On the basis of cost, the logistical problems involved, and the unconscionable burden on the prospective jurors that would be called for in sequestration, he discarded that as a possibility. He next looked at the possibility of a change of venue. The law requires the removal to a county not adjoining the county in which the crime was committed. Here he had a defendant confined to a wheelchair who required daily assistance to get to and from the proceedings, and required help in the performance of the simplest physical functions. Again, the trial could only be conducted for 3-1/2 hours per day because of the defendant's physical condition. Sixty witnesses are listed on the information of which all but two are residents of the Great Falls area. He therefore discarded the possibility of a change of venue. A continuance was out because already 20 months had elapsed since the date of the crime. He therefore determined that individual examination on voir dire was necessary, and that publication of the voir dire would be detrimental to the defendant, saying: "By reason of the nature of the offenses charged and the quantity and quality of pretrial publicity the voir dire of the prospective jurors will be extensive, and by necessity will involve examin- ation not only on the grounds for disqualification for cause as enumerated by statute, but also the individual jurors opinions, feelings, biases and prejudice, whether inherent or traumatically induced, anent the offenses charged. That such examination by both the defense and prosecution is unquestionably necessary to the intelligent exercise of their peremptory challenges. "To expose t h e s e jurors, t h e i r responses t o such v o i r d i r e questions, together with t h e i r names and addresses would have such a c h i l l i n g e f f e c t on t h e i r candor and willingness t o a p p r o p r i a t e l y respond t o such questions a s t o render nugatory t h e purposes of i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e . " W e submit t h a t the temporary p r o t e c t i v e measure taken by t h e D i s t r i c t Court was s t r i c t l y and inescapably necessary and would have been supported, even by t h e minority i n Gannett . W e have demonstrated t h a t whether one agrees with t h e minority i n Gannett t h a t t h e S i x t h Amendment provides t h e p u b l i c a r i g h t t o access t o a criminal t r i a l , o r with t h e majority, t h a t t h e r e i s no such r i g h t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court offended no f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of t h e Tribune i n making i t s temporary c l o s u r e order. However, t h e Tribune a l s o contends t h a t under A r t i c l e 11, 89, of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n t h e i r r i g h t t o a t t e n d t h e v o i r d i r e examination e x i s t s a p a r t from t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . A r t i c l e 11, 89, s t a t e s : "Section 9. Right t o know. N o person s h a l l be deprived of t h e r i g h t t o examine documents o r t o observe t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of a l l p u b l i c bodies o r agencies of state government and i t s subdivisions, except i n cases i n which t h e demand of i n d i v i d u a l privacy c l e a r l y exceeds t h e m e r i t s of p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e . " I f w e w e r e t o construe A r t i c l e 11, 89 as an a b s o l u t e requirement t h a t t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e be open t o t h e p u b l i c a t a l l t i m e s , w e would run a f o u l even of t h e minority opinion i n Gannett, which holds t h a t a t t h e l e a s t , t h e r e must be a hearing t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e c l o s u r e i s s t r i c t l y and inescapably necessary. There i s no need t o so hold i n t h i s case, however, because t h e Tribune has conceded i n o r a l argument t h a t it does n o t contend t h a t c o u r t s may never c l o s e t h e i r proceedings t o public s c r u t i n y . Again, it i s a matter of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l balance. The p u b l i c ' s r i g h t t o know, set f o r t h i n t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , must i n t h i s case, g i v e way t o t h e defendant's f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l ; Indeed, A r t i c l e 11, S9 of the Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n must be balanced with A r t i c l e 11, S24 of t h e same c o n s t i t u t i o n which g i v e s an accused a r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l "by an i m p a r t i a l jury of t h e county i n which t h e offense i s a l l e g e d t o have been committed." I m p l i c i t i n t h a t l a s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i s the duty and a u t h o r i t y of a c o u r t t o take such p r o t e c t i v e measures a s may be neces- s a r y t o i n s u r e t h e accused i s given a t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l jury. The majority opinion l e a n s heavily on t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e 11, Section 9, t h e " r i g h t t o know" provision. W e a r e n o t persuaded t h a t t h e f e d e r a l guaranty of a f a i r t r i a l , a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t accruing t o an i n d i v i d u a l , can be overridden by a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision which i s a t b e s t a d e c l a r a t i o n of s t a t e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l policy. The supremacy of t h e f e d e r a l Constitution, declared i n A r t i c l e V I and recognized f u l l y by a l l c o u r t s , precludes any i n t r u s i o n i n t h e g u i s e of s t a t e a c t i o n t h a t would invade o r degrade t h e f e d e r a l f a i r t r i a l guaranty. Even i f t h e state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i s n o t expressly designed t o impair t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t s , t h e Supremacy Clause b a r s t h a t e f f e c t where necessary. See as an example, G r i m e s v. Hoschler (1974), 1 2 Cal.3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, cert.den. 420 U.S. 973, 95 S.Ct. 1394, 4 2 0 u.S. 973. A s members of t h i s Court, and personally, w e are com- mitted t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e p u b l i c ' s r i g h t t o know. However, w e cannot concur t h a t such r i g h t i s absolute, and t h a t it overrides a defendant's r i g h t t o an impartial jury. W e cannot and do not p r e d i c t the future; b u t it may well t u r n o u t t h a t i n t h e Austad case, t h i s Court has i n v i t e d d i s a s t e r , a s the d i s t r i c t judge s t a t e d i n h i s o r a l argument. To c l o s e , we must remind ourselves t h a t , important a s may be the r o l e of t h e p r e s s i n keeping c i t i z e n s informed, it i s n o t i n so doing exercising a governmental function. The press is s t i l l the Fourth Estate. Its power and r i g h t a r e not on a par with the governmental power and r i g h t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , a power derived d i r e c t l y from t h e c i t i z e n s through t h e i r duly adopted c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n a l l cases where the duty of t h e press t o keep c i t i z e n s informed c o l l i d e s with the duty of t h e c o u r t t o ensure an accused a f a i r t r i a l , the duty of t h e c o u r t must prevail. J u s t i c e I concur i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t n f i 1