Title: State v. Puckett
Citation: 240 Kan. 393, 729 P.2d 458
Docket Number: 59,284
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1986

240 Kan. 393 (1986)
729 P.2d 458
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
JOHN DAVID PUCKETT, Appellee.
No. 59,284

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 5, 1986.
Bruce W. Beye, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and Dennis W. Moore, district attorney, were with him on the brief for appellant.
J.R. Russell, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This is an appeal by the State pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1) from an order discharging the defendant John David Puckett at the end of his second preliminary hearing on a *394 criminal complaint charging one count of making a terroristic threat (K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 21-3419).
The facts are not in dispute. On the evening of August 30, 1985, the prosecutrix, Nancy Schall, met her former boyfriend, the defendant John Puckett, while out socializing. Puckett was intoxicated at the time and Schall allowed him to accompany her home and sleep on her couch. When Puckett was awakened the next morning, he was belligerent and refused to leave Schall's residence for over an hour. Ultimately, Schall drove the defendant to his residence, dropped him off and returned to her home. Shortly thereafter Puckett returned and entered Schall's home without authorization. Schall was frightened and when the defendant reached for her she fled to a neighbor's home and called the police. When the police arrived, Puckett had left the residence.
A short time later, and while the police were still at her home, Schall began to receive threatening calls from the defendant. The calls persisted and the victim estimated that she received between fifteen and twenty calls. She testified Puckett repeatedly threatened to kill her. A complaint was filed on September 19, 1985, charging Puckett with making a terroristic threat, and a preliminary hearing was held October 31, 1985. At the conclusion of that hearing the magistrate judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The State then refiled the charge on November 14, 1985, and a second preliminary hearing was held March 4, 1986.
On cross-examination at the March 4, 1986, preliminary hearing, Schall testified that on the third weekend of October, 1985, she and the defendant had spent a weekend together vacationing at the Lake of the Ozarks. In addition, the victim acknowledged that Puckett had spent Christmas Day 1985 at her parents' house.
At the conclusion of testimony, the district judge dismissed the charge of terroristic threat and in doing so stated:
....
The only issue raised by the State is whether the judge erred in failing to bind the defendant over for trial.
The State claims that probable cause existed under the testimony outlined above to require the judge to bind the defendant over to the district court for trial. Probable cause at a preliminary hearing has been defined as evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt. State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146, 697 P.2d 1305 (1985). We agree with the State that probable cause existed to bind the defendant over for trial.
K.S.A. 22-2902 provides in part:
....
In the present case the judge acknowledged that the State had established sufficient probable cause that the crime alleged had been committed. Having found probable cause, the judge was required by the statute to bind the defendant over for trial. Compare State v. Jones, 233 Kan. 170, 660 P.2d 965 (1983). It is not the function of the judge or magistrate at a preliminary hearing to determine the wisdom of the prosecuting attorney's decision to file and pursue the charges against a defendant. Neither is it the function of the trial judge to conclude that there should be no prosecution because the possibility of a conviction may be remote or virtually nonexistent. State v. Hunter, 232 Kan. 853, 658 P.2d 1050 (1983). While the court's analogy of the present facts to the defense of condonation in a divorce or marital case appears rational, and has a certain amount of appeal from a commonsense standpoint, there is no such defense to a criminal charge. Nancy Schall was not a party to this case. The action is between the State of Kansas and the defendant and her wishes or actions subsequent to August 31, 1985, do not control whether a prosecution should be pursued. When the State has established the necessary probable cause at a preliminary hearing, it is the duty of the judge to bind the defendant over for prosecution regardless of the wishes of the alleged victim or the personal assessment of the judge as to the merits of the action.
The judge erred when he failed to bind the defendant over for trial.
Defendant on appeal asserts that further prosecution is barred because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. It is argued that subjecting the defendant to two preliminary *397 hearings constitutes double jeopardy when there was no additional or different evidence offered at the second preliminary hearing. It has often been held that the discharge of a defendant at a preliminary hearing does not constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution on the same charges. State v. Hunter, 232 Kan. at 854; State v. Bloomer, 197 Kan. 668, 671, 421 P.2d 58 (1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 911 (1967). The argument lacks merit.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint.