Title: State v. Yakich
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001833-CR, 2019AP001832-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2022

2022 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Christopher W. Yakich, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 396 Wis. 2d 195,956 N.W.2d 465 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 16, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 8, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca   
 
JUDGE: 
Vicki L. Clussman   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Cary Bloodworth, assistant state public defender.  There 
was an oral argument by Cary Bloodworth.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by Scott 
E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Kara Lynn Janson, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 8 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR 
(L.C. Nos.   
2018CF169 & 2018CF301) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher W. Yakich, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 16, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Yakich, 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jan. 14, 2021), affirming the Waupaca County circuit court's1 
orders committing Christopher W. Yakich to the Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services for a total period of five years. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Vicki L. Clussman presided.  
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
2 
 
¶2 
In two separate cases, Yakich pleaded guilty to three 
counts of bail jumping and one count of phone harassment.  In the 
first case, he pleaded guilty to one count of bail jumping and one 
count of phone harassment, and in the second case, he pleaded 
guilty to two counts of bail jumping.  The circuit court accepted 
Yakich's pleas in both cases at the same hearing.  After the 
parties agreed that Yakich was not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect ("NGI")2 for all four of his offenses, the court 
ordered a five-year NGI commitment period.  In so doing, the 
circuit court ordered a two-year term of commitment for one of 
Yakich's cases and a three-year term of commitment for the second 
case.  The commitment periods were ordered to run consecutively.    
¶3 
On appeal, Yakich argues that the circuit court's two 
commitment 
orders 
must 
run 
concurrently 
and 
cannot 
run 
consecutively.  However, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 971.17 (2017-
18)3 provides circuit courts with the statutory authority to impose 
consecutive periods of NGI commitment.  Because the circuit court 
properly exercised its authority to impose consecutive NGI 
                                                 
2 In Wisconsin, individuals can be found "not guilty by reason 
of mental disease or defect" of a criminal charge.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.15 (2019-20) (explaining the standard for asserting the 
defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect).  
"This is known in common parlance as the 'insanity' defense."  
State v. Burton, 2013 WI 61, ¶42, 349 Wis. 2d 1, 832 N.W.2d 611.  
Thus, "NGI," for "not guilty by reason of insanity," is used as a 
shorthand.  
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.   
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
3 
 
commitment periods, the circuit court and the court of appeals are 
affirmed.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
There are two criminal cases at issue.  In May 2018, 
Yakich called his mother to tell her that he intended to assault 
his brother and burn his brother's house to the ground.  At the 
time of the phone call, Yakich was on a signature bond for 
unrelated criminal charges.  He was subsequently charged in Waupaca 
County circuit court with one count of phone harassment and one 
count of felony bail jumping, and he was released again on 
signature bond.4  This is the first criminal case at issue.   
 
¶5 
In August 2018, while on bond, Yakich called the Waupaca 
County Department of Health and Human Services distressed and 
contemplating suicide.  Police went to Yakich's apartment to 
conduct a welfare check.  When the police arrived, they found the 
front door barricaded; Yakich refused to answer the door.  After 
the police attempted to enter the apartment through use of a 
battering ram, Yakich exited his apartment through a back entrance.  
The police quickly apprehended Yakich behind his apartment, and he 
was handcuffed and searched.  Yakich began yelling frantically, 
casting profanities, and accusing police of sexual assault.  Once 
Yakich was arrested, police entered his apartment and, in plain 
view, officers observed drug paraphernalia and suspected illegal 
narcotics.  After obtaining a search warrant, police seized drug 
                                                 
4 Waupaca County Case No. 2018CF169.   
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
4 
 
paraphernalia and controlled substances in Yakich's possession; 
marijuana and traces of cocaine were discovered.   
¶6 
As a result of the events in August 2018, the State 
charged Yakich in Waupaca County circuit court with two counts of 
felony bail jumping and one count each of misdemeanor bail jumping, 
telephone harassment, obstructing an officer, possession of 
tetrahydrocannabinols ("THC"), disorderly conduct, and possession 
of drug paraphernalia.5  This is the second criminal case at issue 
in the instant dispute.  
¶7 
After Yakich was charged in both cases, he entered into 
a global plea agreement to resolve his outstanding charges.  He 
pleaded guilty to felony bail jumping and phone harassment in the 
first case, and he pleaded guilty to two counts of felony bail 
jumping in the second case.  Yakich then pleaded NGI to those same 
counts.6  The State chose to not object to Yakich's NGI plea.  At 
a hearing in December 2018, the circuit court accepted Yakich's 
guilty and NGI pleas for both criminal cases.   
¶8 
At the December 2018 hearing, the State argued that the 
court should impose a two-year NGI commitment period for the first 
case and a three-year NGI commitment period for the second case.  
In total, the State asked that the court order five years of NGI 
                                                 
5 Waupaca County Case No. 2018CF301. 
6 NGI pleas are "bifurcated into two phases: the guilt phase 
and the responsibility phase."  State v. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, ¶¶26-
27, 386 Wis. 2d 76, 924 N.W.2d 469.  The defendant proceeds to an 
NGI determination only after he is "found guilty of the elements 
of the crime(s)."  Id. 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
5 
 
commitment, with the two commitment periods running consecutively.  
Yakich opposed the State's proposal.  He argued that the circuit 
court could run the two NGI commitment orders only concurrently, 
and thus, according to Yakich, a total commitment period of three 
years was warranted.   
¶9 
The circuit court agreed with the State.  It imposed a 
five-year commitment period, running a two-year period in the first 
case consecutive to a three-year period in the second case.  
Further, 
the 
circuit 
court 
ordered 
that 
Yakich 
be 
institutionalized in order to receive proper mental health 
treatment.  
¶10 Yakich appealed the circuit court's orders, arguing that 
the circuit court lacked authority to run the two NGI commitment 
orders consecutively.  On January 14, 2021, the court of appeals 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Yakich, 
Nos.  
2019AP1832—CR & 2019AP1833-CR.  The court of appeals noted that in 
State v. C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d 137, 434 N.W.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1988), 
it had held that NGI commitment periods under Wis. Stat. § 971.17 
(1987-88) could total the maximum period of commitment that the 
defendant would have received had the defendant been subject to 
traditional 
criminal 
sentencing, 
"taking 
into 
account 
that . . . sentencing court[s] . . . have authority to impose 
consecutive prison sentences."  Yakich, Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 
2019AP1833-CR, ¶¶19-23.  Thus, "a commitment period encompassing 
multiple criminal counts" may "add[] together the maximum terms of 
imprisonment for all of those counts."  Id., ¶22.  Because it was 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
6 
 
concerned over whether NGI commitments could run consecutively to 
criminal confinement, the court of appeals stated that combined 
NGI commitment periods would not technically be "consecutive."  
Id., ¶¶9-14.  Instead, the court of appeals reasoned that combined 
terms would be "a single commitment period" with no consecutive 
NGI 
commitment 
terms.7 
 
Id., 
¶23. 
 
Nonetheless, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded that the holding of C.A.J. was still binding law, despite 
amendments to Wis. Stat. § 971.17 since the 1988 case was decided.  
Therefore, Yakich's five-year commitment period was affirmed.   
¶11 Yakich petitioned this court to review the court of 
appeals decision.  On June 16, 2021, we granted the petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that we review de novo, although we benefit from the analyses of 
the circuit court and the court of appeals."  Estate of Miller v. 
Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  
"[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.  Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
                                                 
7 As explained below, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.17 
authorizes consecutive NGI commitment periods.  Thus, we do not 
adopt the court of appeals' framing of the issue, nor do we accept 
its reasoning that circuit courts are prohibited from running 
multiple NGI commitment terms consecutively.  
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
7 
 
special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations and quotations omitted).  In addition, "statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶13 Yakich argues that courts cannot impose consecutive 
periods of NGI commitment, and his two commitment orders must run 
concurrently.  He argues that a statute must provide circuit courts 
with the authority to impose consecutive NGI commitments, and Wis. 
Stat. § 971.17, the NGI commitment statute, fails to do so.  In 
response, the State argues that the court of appeals correctly 
applied its binding precedent in C.A.J.  According to the State, 
the court of appeals accurately concluded in C.A.J. that 
consecutive NGI commitment periods are appropriate, just as 
consecutive terms of confinement are appropriate in criminal 
sentencing.  Even though § 971.17 has been amended since C.A.J., 
the State claims the reasoning underlying the decision remains 
sound.  
¶14 We agree with the State and conclude that circuit courts 
may impose consecutive periods of NGI commitment.  
 
A.  The Authority To Impose Consecutive  
NGI Commitment Periods 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17(1) establishes the commitment 
periods for individuals found NGI.  Under the statute, commitment 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
8 
 
periods are set by reference to the category of offense and when 
the offense occurred:  
 
(a)  Felonies committed before July 30, 2002.  
Except as provided in par. (c), when a defendant is found 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect 
of a felony committed before July 30, 2002, the court 
shall commit the person to the department of health 
services for a specified period not exceeding two-thirds 
of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed 
against an offender convicted of the same felony, 
including imprisonment authorized by any applicable 
penalty enhancement statutes, subject to the credit 
provisions of s. 973.155. 
 
(b)  Felonies committed on or after July 30, 2002.  
Except as provided in par. (c), when a defendant is found 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect 
of a felony committed on or after July 30, 2002, the 
court shall commit the person to the department of health 
services for a specified period not exceeding the 
maximum term of confinement in prison that could be 
imposed on an offender convicted of the same felony, 
plus imprisonment authorized by any applicable penalty 
enhancement statutes, subject to the credit provisions 
of s. 973.155. 
 
(c)  Felonies punishable by life imprisonment.  If 
a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or mental defect of a felony that is punishable 
by life imprisonment, the commitment period specified by 
the court may be life, subject to termination under sub. 
(5). 
 
(d)  Misdemeanors.  When a defendant is found not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of 
a misdemeanor, the court shall commit the person to the 
department of health services for a specified period not 
exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment 
that could be imposed against an offender convicted of 
the same misdemeanor, including imprisonment authorized 
by any applicable penalty enhancement statutes, subject 
to the credit provisions of s. 973.155. 
 
§ 971.17(1). 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
9 
 
¶16 Thus, the maximum commitment period for felonies 
committed prior to July 30, 2002, is tied to the "maximum term of 
imprisonment that could be imposed against an offender convicted 
of the same felony," while felonies committed on or after July 30, 
2002, have a maximum period tied to "the maximum term of 
confinement in prison" that could be imposed in traditional 
criminal sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(a), (b).  A felony 
punishable by life imprisonment has a maximum commitment period of 
life, and the maximum commitment period for misdemeanors is based 
on "two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment" that could be 
imposed in criminal sentencing.  § 971.17(1)(c), (d). 
¶17 All four categories of NGI commitment, by the plain text 
of the statute, are tied to and directly dependent on the lengths 
of sentences in criminal proceedings.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  NGI commitment orders are limited by how long an "offender 
convicted of the same [offense]" may be "imprison[ed]" or 
"confin[ed] in prison."  Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(a), (b), (d).  
Instead of setting out an independent basis by which courts may 
determine the length of NGI commitments, the legislature made NGI 
commitment lengths dependent upon criminal sentencing lengths.  
Under § 971.17(1), to determine the length of NGI commitments, 
courts must look to criminal terms of imprisonment and confinement, 
as well as criminal "penalty enhancement statutes," and nowhere 
else.  Id.  Further, the statute allows NGI committees to reduce 
their period of commitment by the terms of Wisconsin's criminal 
sentence credit statute.  See id. (explaining that periods of NGI 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
10 
 
commitment are "subject to the credit provisions of s. 973.155").  
The statute does not limit or define lengths of NGI commitment for 
multiple offenses.  Instead, under the plain terms of § 971.17, 
the length of NGI commitment is based on the total length of prison 
terms the individual could receive in traditional criminal 
proceedings. 
¶18 The legislature certainly could have written the statute 
differently.  For instance, in Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2), the 
legislature explicitly outlined "the minimum and maximum 'original 
term of probation' that may be imposed for different quantities 
and classes of misdemeanor and felony offenses."  State v. Dowdy, 
2012 WI 12, ¶40, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 808 N.W.2d 691 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(2) (2009-10)).  Under § 973.09(2), courts are 
provided identified ranges for probation, and those ranges vary 
based on whether the individual was convicted of one misdemeanor, 
"not less than 2 nor more than 4 misdemeanors," "5 or more 
misdemeanors," a felony, or "2 or more crimes, including at least 
one felony."  § 973.09(2)(a), (b).  The probation statute itself 
defines lengths of probation and bases them on the type, and 
number, of offenses committed.  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 971.17, 
§ 973.09 does not rely on lengths of incarceration as established 
under criminal sentencing statutes.  In § 971.17, the legislature 
took a different approach.  It cited and relied on the criminal 
sentencing system to define the lengths of NGI commitments.  See 
§ 971.17(1).   
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
11 
 
¶19 In line with Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)'s statutory 
directive, we have repeatedly recognized that the length of NGI 
commitments is intimately tied to traditional criminal sentencing.  
See, e.g., State v. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, ¶47, 386 Wis. 2d 76, 924 
N.W.2d 469 ("In Wisconsin, NGI commitment terms may not exceed the 
maximum confinement term of the charged criminal offense."); State 
v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 808-09, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) ("[NGI] 
commitment may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which 
could have been imposed for the offenses charged.").  As the court 
of appeals accurately explained in C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 140, 
"the legislature intended to prohibit a person found not guilty by 
reason of mental defect or disease from being committed any longer 
than the underlying offense," i.e., how the person would have been 
sentenced if the NGI defense had failed.   
¶20 When a defendant is criminally sentenced, a circuit 
court has the authority to impose consecutive terms of confinement.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2).  For decades, courts have understood that 
NGI commitment lengths, by the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.17, are 
dependent on the lengths of criminal sentences.  Accordingly, 
courts have recognized that the maximum NGI commitment term a court 
can impose is the total length of consecutive criminal sentences 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
12 
 
for the same offenses.8 See C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 139 (concluding 
that the maximum term of NGI commitment "reflects the maximum 
length of time under consecutive sentences that [the defendant] 
could have been imprisoned"); State ex rel. Helmer v. Cullen, 149 
Wis. 2d 161, 163, 440 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that 
"the maximum period of [NGI] commitment must be based on 
consecutive terms"). 
¶21 In C.A.J., the court of appeals provided sound reasons 
for permitting NGI commitment based on the lengths of consecutive 
criminal sentences.  The court of appeals recognized that Wis. 
Stat. § 971.17(1) tied NGI commitments to the length of the 
"offense charged."  C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 139.  However, the court 
of appeals correctly noted that when the legislature uses a 
singular noun in a statute such as "offense," both the singular 
and the plural are generally included.  Id. at 140; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1) 
(stating 
that 
"[i]n 
construing 
Wisconsin 
laws . . . [t]he singular includes the plural").  This is true 
unless the result is "inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature."  § 990.001.  Because § 971.17(1) by its plain terms 
prevents NGI commitments from exceeding criminal sentences, it did 
not conflict with the statute to impose NGI commitment for periods 
                                                 
8 Under Wis. Stat. § 971.17, courts take into account the 
distinction between confinement before and after Truth-in-
Sentencing.  NGI commitment terms for felonies committed prior to 
July 30, 2002, and for misdemeanors cannot exceed "two-thirds of 
the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.17(1)(a), (d).  For felonies committed on or after 
July 30, 2002, NGI commitment terms cannot exceed "the maximum 
term of confinement in prison."  § 971.17(1)(b).  
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
13 
 
equal to that of criminal imprisonment.  C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 
140.  It is well accepted that circuit courts can impose 
consecutive criminal sentences, and thus, NGI commitment periods 
can run consecutively.  Id.; see Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a) ("[T]he 
court may impose as many [criminal] sentences as there are 
convictions and may provide that any such sentence be concurrent 
with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time 
or previously.").  This reasoning is well-supported and correct.  
¶22 The court of appeals in C.A.J. continued and explained 
that the legislature could have easily limited NGI commitment terms 
to the maximum criminal sentence for the most serious offense.  
This would have detached NGI commitments from traditional criminal 
sentencing, and, in the process, prohibited consecutive NGI 
commitment periods.  In fact, the legislature demonstrated the 
ability to set lengths of commitment based on the most serious 
offense when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 971.14, which governs 
competency proceedings.  Under § 971.14, unlike Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.17(1), commitments to obtain competency to participate in 
legal proceedings are limited to "a period not to exceed 12 months, 
or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense 
with which the defendant is charged, whichever is less."  
§ 971.14(5).  If NGI commitment periods are based on the maximum 
sentence for the most serious offense, circuit courts would not be 
permitted to impose consecutive NGI commitments and criminal 
sentencing rules would not control.  We adopt this reasoning in 
full.    
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
14 
 
¶23 Similarly, the legislature could have limited the length 
of NGI commitments to specifically delineated terms, and varied 
the length based on the number of offenses of which the defendant 
was convicted.  As explained above, the legislature did this with 
probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2).  
¶24 The legislature in Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1) did not limit 
NGI commitments to "a period not to exceed 12 months, or the 
maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with which 
the defendant is charged, whichever is less," as it did in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14, nor did it limit commitment periods based on the 
number of offenses, as it did in Wis. Stat. § 973.09.  Instead, it 
unambiguously based NGI commitment periods on the "maximum term" 
of confinement in prison "that could be imposed on an offender 
convicted of the same [offenses]," enhanced by "any applicable 
penalty enhancement statutes" and reduced by "the [criminal 
sentence] credit provisions of s. 973.155."  § 971.17(1)(a), (b), 
(d).  As the court of appeals explained in C.A.J., the legislature 
has plainly demonstrated the ability to limit the use of 
consecutive NGI commitments.  148 Wis. 2d at 140.  In § 971.17, it 
declined to do so, and we must give effect to the legislature's 
choice.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 ("We assume that the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language."); 
Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶¶36-37, 
341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 (explaining that "the legislature 
knew how to draft [different] language" in a statute, and the court 
"must respect the text" as written);  United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
15 
 
WI 44, ¶¶15-16, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317 (comparing the text 
of two statutory provisions and noting that the "legislature knows 
how" to write different statutory language). 
¶25 A circuit court's authority to impose consecutive NGI 
commitment periods is not affected by the existence of separate 
orders.9  In this case, Yakich's five-year NGI commitment was set 
forth in two orders.  In his first case, involving bail jumping 
and phone harassment, he was ordered to three years of NGI 
commitment.  In his second case, involving two counts of bail 
jumping, he was ordered to two years of NGI commitment.10  Although 
the offenses at issue were not included in a single criminal charge 
and thus the NGI commitments were separated into two orders, that 
does not alter Wis. Stat. § 971.17's language permitting 
consecutive NGI commitments.  There is no indication in § 971.17 
that periods of NGI commitment vary depending on whether charges 
are brought under one or more criminal complaints.  In fact, there 
may be victims and crimes that occur over the course of years, and 
                                                 
9 Yakich does not appear to dispute that circuit courts can 
impose consecutive NGI commitment periods for multiple counts 
included in the same case.  In briefing, he contended that Wis. 
Stat. § 971.17 "arguably . . . authorizes the court to calculate 
the overall commitment period in [a single] case based on 
consecutive terms of confinement for each count in that case."   
10 The parties do not dispute that these orders were well 
within the statutory range for confinement had Yakich been 
criminally sentenced.  The maximum term of confinement for a Class 
H felony, including felony bail jumping to which Yakich pleaded 
NGI on three counts, is three years.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b); Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)8.  Had Yakich not been 
found NGI, he could have received a sentence of at least nine years 
of confinement.     
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
16 
 
in distinct factual circumstances.  It is entirely possible that 
individuals requiring NGI treatment can be subject to multiple 
commitment orders, perhaps from different courts at different 
times.  Circuit courts retain discretion to impose consecutive NGI 
commitments, whether the commitments are mandated in the same order 
or mandated in separate orders.  Yakich's total commitment period 
of five years, set forth in two orders, was appropriate.11   
B.  Yakich's Arguments On Appeal 
¶26 Yakich makes several arguments in favor of his position 
on appeal.  First, he accurately notes that Wis. Stat. § 971.17 
does not explicitly state that circuit courts may run NGI 
commitments consecutively.  The court of appeals noted this fact 
in C.A.J.  See C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 139 (explaining that "the 
statute's language does not specifically indicate whether the 
maximum term of commitment may be based on consecutive terms").  
It did not impact C.A.J. when it was decided, and it does not 
impact the analysis now.  The plain text of the statute ties NGI 
commitment periods to the length of confinement that would have 
occurred if the defendant were not NGI.  § 971.17(1).  Criminal 
terms of confinement can run consecutively, and so can NGI 
commitment terms.  If the legislature wanted to limit NGI 
                                                 
11 This does not necessarily mean that Yakich will be 
institutionalized for five years.  "[A] defendant who succeeds on 
an NGI defense and is committed may file a petition for conditional 
release every six months, and if on conditional release, may file 
a petition to terminate the underlying order of commitment."  
Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶29 (citing Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4), (5) 
(2015-16)).  
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
17 
 
commitment in a way that it did not similarly limit criminal 
sentencing, it could have delineated the length of commitment for 
multiple offenses, as it did for probationary terms.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(2).  Alternatively, it could have explicitly limited 
commitment periods to the maximum sentence the circuit court could 
have imposed for the most serious offense, as it did with 
competency proceedings.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5).  The plain text 
of § 971.17 supports the conclusion that circuit courts may impose 
consecutive NGI commitment periods.  
¶27 Yakich also cites court of appeals decisions holding 
that terms of probation and juvenile dispositions cannot run 
consecutively.  See State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, ¶15, 246 
Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240 ("[T]he concept of consecutive 
sentences is foreign in the context of juvenile adjudications and 
dispositions."); State v. Schwebke, 2001 WI App 99, ¶29, 242 Wis. 
2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213 ("[W]e have repeatedly held that probation 
cannot be made consecutive to probation.").  Yakich argues that 
the same logic should apply to NGI commitments.  Nonetheless, the 
text of the probation statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2), explicitly 
defines and limits the length of probationary terms when an 
individual is convicted of multiple offenses.  Section 973.09 is 
readily distinguishable from Wis. Stat. § 971.17.  Further, 
"[a]lthough the juvenile system is similar in some respects to the 
criminal system, we have specifically rejected an exact equation 
of institutional placement of a juvenile with the incarceration of 
an adult."  E.C. v. DHSS, 142 Wis. 2d 906, 918, 420 N.W.2d 37 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
18 
 
(1988).  That is very different from § 971.17, which by its terms 
ties the length of NGI commitments to maximum terms of criminal 
incarceration.   
¶28 We will not opine on the correctness of the decisions 
cited by Yakich.  It suffices to note that probation and juvenile 
dispositions are distinguishable and not at issue in this case; 
Wis. Stat. § 971.17 provides circuit courts authority to impose 
consecutive NGI commitments.  
¶29 Yakich targets his argument more narrowly and cites a 
court of appeals decision that prohibited criminal sentences from 
being run consecutively to NGI commitments.  See State v. Harr, 
211 Wis. 2d 584, 587-88, 568 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1997).  The court 
of appeals in Harr interpreted Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2) (1995-96), 
which allows circuit courts to impose criminal sentences 
"consecutive to any other sentence."  Id.  The court of appeals 
held that because an NGI commitment was not a "sentence," § 973.15 
did not permit a circuit court to impose a criminal sentence 
consecutive to the commitment.  That analysis is not relevant to 
the question at issue in this case.  Whether a circuit court may 
impose a criminal sentence consecutively to an NGI commitment under 
§ 973.15 has simply no bearing on whether a circuit court may 
impose consecutive NGI commitments under Wis. Stat. § 971.17.   
¶30 Finally, Yakich argues that the court of appeals 
decision in C.A.J. is no longer good law because the legislature 
has amended Wis. Stat. § 971.17 several times since C.A.J. was 
decided.  At the time C.A.J. was decided, § 971.17 stated: 
 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
19 
 
When the maximum period for which a defendant could 
have been imprisoned if convicted of the offense charged 
has elapsed, subject to s. 53.11 and the credit 
provisions of s. 973.155, the court shall order the 
defendant discharged subject to the right of the 
department to proceed against the defendant under ch. 
51. If the department does not so proceed, the court may 
order such proceeding. 
§ 971.17(4) (1987-88).  
¶31 Like it does now, Wis. Stat. § 971.17 when C.A.J. was 
decided based the maximum time in which a defendant could be 
subject to NGI commitment to the maximum term of criminal 
imprisonment.  At that time, the maximum term of criminal 
imprisonment included the possibility of consecutive terms.  
C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 140.  There is no dispute that remains true 
today.12  See Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2).  Furthermore, we are not 
bound by court of appeals decisions.  As the state's highest court, 
we interpret legal questions independently.  See State v. Lira, 
2021 WI 81, ¶45, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605 ("While respecting 
court of appeals precedent is an important consideration, it is 
not determinative.").  To the extent that § 971.17 may have changed 
since C.A.J., applying de novo review, the logic underlying the 
court of appeals decision nonetheless remains convincing.  
                                                 
12 In fact, the language included in Wis. Stat. § 971.17 at 
the time of C.A.J. is almost identical to the language included in 
the statute today.  Compare § 971.17(4) (1987-88) (limiting NGI 
commitment to "the maximum period for which a defendant could have 
been imprisoned if convicted of the offense charged"), with 
§ 971.17(1) (2017-18) (stating that NGI commitment periods must be 
based on "the maximum term of imprisonment [or confinement in 
prison] that could be imposed against an offender convicted of the 
same felony [or misdemeanor]").  
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
20 
 
Independently interpreting § 971.17, we agree with C.A.J.'s 
reasoning. 
¶32 Yakich contends that the statutory history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.17 indicates that the legislature has rejected the reasoning 
in C.A.J.  After C.A.J. was decided, the legislature amended 
§ 971.17 to allow circuit courts to commit NGI defendants 
for a specified period not exceeding two–thirds of the 
maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed under 
s. 973.15(2) against an offender convicted of the same 
crime or crimes, including imprisonment authorized by 
ss. 161.48, 939.62, 939.621, 939.63, 939.64, 939.641 and 
939.645 and other penalty enhancement statutes, as 
applicable, subject to the credit provisions of s. 
973.155.  
1989 Wis. Act 334, § 5 (emphasis added).   
¶33 Beginning in the late 1990s, Wisconsin transitioned to 
automatic bifurcated sentences under Truth-in-Sentencing laws.13  
Replacing the more indeterminate system of parole, under Truth-
in-Sentencing, circuit courts were "required to impose a 
bifurcated sentence consisting of a term of confinement in prison 
followed by a term of extended supervision."  State v. Stenklyft, 
2005 WI 71, ¶¶16-17, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769; see Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01.  As part of this reform, the legislature in 2001 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin enacted Truth-in-Sentencing in two phases.  "The 
first phase, TIS–I, was enacted in June 1998 and applied to 
offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999.  See 1997 Wis. 
Act 283.  The second phase, TIS–II, was enacted in July 2002 and 
became effective February 1, 2003.  See 2001 Wis. Act 109."  State 
v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶16, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769 
(quoting State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶7 n.3, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
678 N.W.2d 197)).  Bifurcated sentencing was enacted in the first 
phase.  Id.  
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
21 
 
amended § 971.17 to tie NGI commitments for felonies committed 
after July 2002 (and subject to Truth-in-Sentencing) to "the 
maximum term of confinement in prison that could be imposed," i.e., 
the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence.  § 971.17(1)(b).  
The legislature kept the original language for NGI commitments 
based on felonies committed prior to July 2002 as well as 
misdemeanors; felonies subject to life imprisonment remained 
subject to lifetime NGI commitment.  See, e.g., § 971.17(1)(a) 
("[T]he court shall commit the person to the department of health 
services for a specified period not exceeding two-thirds of the 
maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed . . . ."). 
¶34 Yakich points out that the legislature removed the 
reference to Wis. Stat. § 973.15 when it made its reforms in 2001.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17 no longer contains the language "under s. 
973.15(2)" in the portion of the statute setting the maximum length 
of NGI commitment.   
¶35 Yet it is well accepted that "[w]hen the legislature 
enacts a statute, it is presumed to act with full knowledge of the 
existing laws."  Hoffer Props., LLC v. DOT, 2016 WI 5, ¶35, 366 
Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533.  C.A.J. provided thorough and 
convincing analysis on statutory language contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.17, and the version in existence at the time of C.A.J. did 
not materially differ from the version of the statute enacted after 
2001, namely neither cross references the criminal sentencing 
statute.  Section 971.17 was changed in 1989 to include explicit 
statutory cross references to Wis. Stat. § 973.15, but, even after 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
22 
 
1989, the statute continued to include language tying NGI 
commitment to the length of criminal sentences.  When the explicit 
cross reference was removed in 2001, the legislature could have 
accompanied the 2001 changes with an express statement that NGI 
commitments must run concurrently, or other amendments that would 
serve to prohibit consecutive commitment periods.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14(5) (stating that commitment to obtain competency 
cannot extend longer than "a period not to exceed 12 months, or 
the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with 
which the defendant is charged, whichever is less"); see also 
Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶¶17-23, 236 
Wis. 2d 316, 
613 
N.W.2d 120 
(holding 
that 
newly 
imposed 
limitations on medical malpractice damages did not implicitly 
repeal the decision of "[n]umerous Wisconsin courts" limiting the 
class of individuals entitled to recover for loss of society and 
companionship in medical malpractice suits, noting the lack of 
express language to the contrary); Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, 
¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 (reiterating that legislative 
enactments are made in the context of caselaw and reasoning that 
changes in the statutory proof of intent for punitive damages did 
not alter prior cases interpreting the meaning of intent).  
Instead, the legislature chose to retain language largely tracking 
the statute interpreted in C.A.J., which, by 2001, had become 
accepted jurisprudence in Wisconsin. 
¶36 While statutory history can be helpful when interpreting 
the meaning of a statute, in this case the legislature did not 
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
23 
 
enact the substantial change Yakich advances through the removal 
of a Wis. Stat. § 973.15 cross reference.  State v. Williams, 2014 
WI 64, ¶17, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467.  With knowledge of 
existing caselaw, the legislature reverted Wis. Stat. § 971.17 to 
the language interpreted by the court of appeals in C.A.J.  In so 
doing, the legislature made no express statement or change in the 
functioning in the statute to override decades of accepted 
Wisconsin jurisprudence.14  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17, as it did 
when C.A.J. was decided, permits consecutive NGI commitment terms.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 In two separate cases, Yakich pleaded guilty to three 
counts of bail jumping and one count of phone harassment.  The 
circuit court accepted Yakich's pleas in both cases at the same 
hearing.  After the parties agreed that Yakich was NGI for all 
four of his offenses, the court ordered a five-year commitment 
period.  In so doing, the circuit court ordered a two-year term of 
                                                 
14 Yakich devotes much of his energy to the statutory history 
argument.  Instead of the dramatic legal shift Yakich attempts to 
ascribe to the 2001 change, the statutory history is better read 
as a reform-minded effort of clarifying and systematizing NGI 
commitments after the new regime of Truth-in-Sentencing was 
passed.  The legislature removed numerous other cross references 
in Wis. Stat. § 971.17, outside of Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2).  It 
also removed citations to all other penalty provisions, including 
Wis. Stat. §§ "161.48, 939.62, 939.621, 939.63, 939.64, 939.641 
and 939.645."  As part of this clean-up endeavor, the legislature 
clarified that felonies committed prior to Truth-in-Sentencing 
have NGI commitments based on "two-thirds of the maximum term of 
imprisonment that could be imposed," and felonies committed after 
Truth-in-Sentencing have NGI commitments based on "the maximum 
term of confinement in prison that could be imposed" for a 
bifurcated sentence.  § 971.17(1)(a), (b).   
Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR   
 
 
24 
 
commitment for one of Yakich's cases and a three-year term of 
commitment for the second case.  The commitment periods were 
ordered to run consecutively.    
¶38 On appeal, Yakich argues that the circuit court's two 
commitment 
orders 
must 
run 
concurrently 
and 
cannot 
run 
consecutively.  Nonetheless, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 971.17 
provides circuit courts the statutory authority to impose 
consecutive periods of NGI commitment.  Because the circuit court 
properly exercised its authority to impose consecutive NGI 
commitment periods, the circuit court and the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶39 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  Defendants who 
are found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) 
are by definition not guilty.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 971.165(3)(b) 
and  971.17.  For this reason, we have repeatedly emphasized that 
NGI commitments are not criminal sentences.  See State v. Fugere, 
2019 WI 33, ¶29, 386 Wis. 2d 76, 924 N.W.2d 469; State v. 
Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, ¶7 n.3, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998); see 
also State v. Harr, 211 Wis. 2d 584, 587, 568 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. 
App.  1997).  The majority's holding that circuit courts may impose 
consecutive NGI commitments is contrary to this basic premise, 
unsupported by the text and structure of § 971.17, and will likely 
be unworkable in practice.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶40 When a defendant is found NGI, the circuit court must 
"commit the person to the department of health services" for a 
specified period.  See § 971.17(1).  Circuit courts have some 
discretion to determine the appropriate period, but the commitment 
cannot exceed the maximum time periods specified in § 971.17(1).  
Different offenses carry different maximum commitment periods, 
depending on whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor and 
whether the offense occurred before or after July 30, 2002.  See 
generally id.  For felonies committed after July 30, 2002, 
§ 971.17(1)(b) authorizes circuit courts to commit the defendant 
for "a specified period not exceeding the maximum term of 
confinement in prison that could be imposed" on a person convicted 
of the same crime, after accounting for any applicable penalty 
enhancements and sentencing credit.  For misdemeanors, the 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
commitment period is limited to "a specified period not exceeding 
two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be 
imposed against any offender convicted of the same misdemeanor," 
subject to the same penalty-enhancement and sentencing-credit 
adjustments as felonies.  § 971.17(1)(d).1   
¶41 Applying § 971.17 is relatively easy when the defendant 
pleads NGI to one charge in one case.  Yakich's case, however, is 
more complicated because he pleaded NGI to four charges in two 
cases:  one count of felony bail jumping and one count of 
misdemeanor phone harassment in one case; two counts of felony 
bail jumping in a separate case.2  The circuit court handled this 
                                                 
1 There is no relevant distinction for this case between terms 
of "confinement" for felonies and terms of "imprisonment" for 
misdemeanors.  
2 In general, NGI proceedings are split into a guilt phase 
and a responsibility phase.  See Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶¶26-27.  
Admitting guilt in the "guilt phase" does not mean the same thing 
as pleading guilty.  In the NGI context, a defendant "is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as 
a result of mental disease or defect the person lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her 
conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.15(1).  By contrast, in a criminal case, a 
defendant who pleads guilty admits to all the elements of the 
charged offense, including criminal responsibility.  This 
distinction animates Wis. Stat. § 971.06(1)(d), which allows a 
defendant to plead NGI and to accompany that NGI plea with a plea 
of not guilty.  An NGI plea that is not accompanied by a plea of 
not guilty "admits that but for lack of mental capacity the 
defendant committed all the essential elements of the offense 
charged."  Id.  Section 971.06(1)(d) does not allow a defendant to 
plead guilty and then plead NGI.    
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
complication by entering two separate commitment orders at the 
same time, one in each case.  In the first case, the circuit court 
committed Yakich for two years for one count of felony bail-jumping 
and the phone-harassment misdemeanor.  In the second case, Yakich 
was committed for three years on the other two counts of felony 
bail jumping.  The circuit court specified that the orders would 
run consecutively for a total of five years——longer than Yakich 
could have been imprisoned for any one of the crimes to which he 
pleaded NGI.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) (specifying that the 
maximum term of confinement in prison for bail jumping is three 
years); Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3) (providing for a maximum term of 90 
days' imprisonment for phone harassment).  In reviewing those 
orders, the court of appeals implied that imposing consecutive 
commitments was not permitted by § 971.17.  See State v. Yakich, 
Nos. 2019AP1832 & 2019AP1833, unpublished op., ¶¶23-24 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jan. 14, 2021).  Nevertheless it affirmed the circuit court, 
reasoning that the five-year commitment term was allowable under 
State v. C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d 137, 434 N.W.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1988).   
¶42 In C.A.J., the court of appeals addressed how to 
calculate the maximum length of a commitment when a defendant is 
found NGI on multiple counts in the same case.  It did so by 
analyzing the then-current version of § 971.17, which provided 
                                                 
Although the circuit court transcript reflects that Yakich 
pleaded "guilty" and then pleaded NGI, the so-called "guilty" plea 
was an admission that but for his lack of mental capacity, he 
committed all the essential elements of the offense.  See 
§ 971.06(1)(d).  Yakich pleaded NGI, he did not plead guilty.  
Accordingly, that is how I refer to his plea throughout this 
opinion. 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
that NGI commitments could not exceed "the maximum period for which 
a defendant could have been imprisoned if convicted of the offense 
charged."  See § 971.17(4) (1987-88).  The question was whether, 
in a multiple offense case, the "maximum period" was equal to the 
maximum period of imprisonment based on consecutive sentences or 
the maximum period of imprisonment for only the most serious single 
offense.  The court of appeals opted for the former, holding that 
the maximum commitment period under § 971.17 should be calculated 
by adding together the maximum terms of imprisonment for each 
offense, assuming those terms ran consecutively.  C.A.J., 148 
Wis. 2d at 139-40.  C.A.J. did not hold, however, that consecutive 
NGI commitments are permitted by § 971.17; only that the maximum 
length of an NGI commitment was equal to the maximum consecutive 
sentence the defendant could have received had he been convicted.  
Put another way, in a multiple-offense case, C.A.J. allows for a 
single commitment order that is no longer than the amount of time 
the defendant could have been imprisoned had he been convicted and 
sentenced to consecutive terms.  See Yakich, unpublished slip 
op., ¶23.   
¶43 As the court of appeals pointed out in this case, there 
is "more than [a] semantic" difference between the approach adopted 
in C.A.J. and allowing consecutive NGI commitments.  Id., ¶24.  
The majority, however, ignores the difference altogether.  It holds 
that § 971.17 authorizes consecutive commitments, while stating 
that it "agree[s] with C.A.J.'s reasoning."  Majority op., ¶31.  
This unresolved tension appears to stem from the majority's 
mischaracterization of C.A.J. as holding that "consecutive NGI 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
commitment periods are appropriate, just as consecutive terms of 
confinement are appropriate in criminal sentencing."  See 
id., ¶13; see also id. ¶14.  But, as explained above, that's not 
what C.A.J. held.   
¶44 Moreover, the majority's misreading of C.A.J. is a 
symptom of a bigger problem:  it wrongly treats NGI commitments as 
if they were criminal sentences.  Indeed, the majority erroneously 
concludes that by "cit[ing] and rel[ying] on the criminal 
sentencing system to define the lengths of NGI commitments," the 
legislature thus incorporated into the NGI context all other 
aspects of our approach to criminal sentencing.  See majority 
op., ¶18.  And because the "criminal sentencing system" allows 
criminal sentences to run consecutively, see § 973.15(2)(a), the 
majority concludes that NGI commitments can do the same. 
¶45 That approach is contrary to our precedent, which has 
established in no uncertain terms that an NGI commitment is not a 
criminal sentence.  See Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, ¶7 n.3; see 
also Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶29.  For that reason, the criminal 
sentencing statutes apply in the NGI context only as specified 
in § 971.17.  See Grobarchik v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 461, 467, 307 
N.W.2d 170 (1981) ("If the authority to fashion a particular 
criminal disposition exists, it must derive from the statutes.").  
Section 971.17 specifies that the appropriate length of an NGI 
commitment is determined by considering the "maximum term of 
confinement in prison" for felonies, the "maximum term of 
imprisonment" for misdemeanors, applicable penalty enhancers, and 
the sentencing-credit provisions of Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Each of 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
these sentencing considerations are defined by statute, and do not 
reference or otherwise incorporate the concept of consecutive 
sentencing, which is separately authorized by § 973.15.  Because 
neither § 971.17 nor any other statute authorizes or even mentions 
consecutive NGI commitments, circuit courts may not impose 
consecutive commitments.  See Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 467. 
¶46 This conclusion is consistent with how courts treat 
probation and juvenile dispositions, both of which are not criminal 
sentences and therefore cannot run consecutively.  See State v. 
Schwebke, 2001 WI App 99, ¶29, 242 Wis. 2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213 
("[P]robation cannot be made consecutive to probation."); In re 
Commitment of Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, ¶15, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 621 
N.W.2d 240 ("[T]he concept of consecutive sentences is foreign in 
the context of juvenile adjudications and dispositions.").  The 
majority attempts to distinguish probation from NGI commitments by 
pointing out that, unlike § 971.17, the probation statute 
specifies what a circuit court should do when a probationer is 
convicted 
of 
more 
than 
one 
offense. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(2)(a)2.  But the text of § 973.09 makes clear that 
courts may only extend the original term of probation, not run 
probation terms consecutively.  For example, § 973.09(2)(a)2. 
specifies that "[i]f [a] probationer is convicted of not less 
than 2 nor more than 4 misdemeanors at the same time, the maximum 
original term of probation may be increased by one year."  The 
statute contains no language authorizing circuit courts to impose 
consecutive periods of probation.  Likewise, ch. 938, which governs 
juvenile proceedings, says nothing about authorizing consecutive 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
juvenile dispositions.  The majority offers no reason why the 
legislature's silence about consecutive commitments in § 971.17 
should somehow have a different result.   
¶47 The statutory history of § 971.17 provides further 
evidence for why the majority's interpretation is wrong.  In 1989, 
the legislature amended § 971.17 to allow NGI commitments to run 
"for a specific period not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum 
term of imprisonment that could be imposed under s. 973.15(2) 
against an offender convicted of the same crime or crimes."  1989 
Wis. Act 334, § 5 (emphasis added).  In 2001, however, the 
legislature removed the reference to § 973.15 when the state 
adopted Truth-in-Sentencing.  2001 Wis. Act 109, §§ 1106-07.  That 
deletion suggests that the legislature meant to remove from the 
NGI commitment-period calculation any consideration of consecutive 
criminal sentences.  See, e.g., DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 189-90, 515 N.W.2d 88 (1994), abrogated on other 
grounds by State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 
Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996).   
¶48 The majority's alternative explanation again falls back 
on its misreading of C.A.J.  It contends that the legislature's 
removal of this explicit cross-reference to § 973.15 was simply an 
effort to "revert[]" to the "accepted Wisconsin jurisprudence" 
that arose following C.A.J.  See majority op., ¶36.  But because 
C.A.J. did not hold that consecutive NGI commitments are permitted, 
what the majority claims as "accepted jurisprudence" never 
existed.  Moreover, if § 971.17 already authorized consecutive NGI 
commitments at the time C.A.J. was decided, then it is unclear why 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
the legislature would bother to add an explicit reference 
to § 973.15 one year later.    
¶49 The majority offers one more hypothesis for why removing 
the cross-reference to § 973.15 has no effect on how we should 
interpret § 971.17.  It speculates that the legislature's deletion 
of the cross-reference "is better read as" part of a "reform-
minded" "clean-up endeavor" to clarify and systematize NGI 
commitments after the adoption of Truth-in-Sentencing.  See 
majority op., ¶36 n.14.  It is true that the cross-reference 
to § 973.15 was deleted at the same time as other changes 
associated 
with 
Truth-in-Sentencing. 
 
See 
2001 
Wis. 
Act 109, §§ 1106-07 
(removing 
the 
citation 
to 
§ 973.15 
from § 971.17 and adding language to distinguish between NGI 
commitments for offenses committed before and after the effective 
date of Truth-in-Sentencing).  But the majority does not explain 
why implementing Truth-in-Sentencing has anything to do with the 
removal of a reference to § 973.15.  Keeping the citation 
to § 973.15 in § 971.17 wouldn't cause any tension with Truth-in-
Sentencing.  Rather, keeping the cross-reference after adopting 
Truth-in-Sentencing would simply make clear that C.A.J. remained 
good law——that the maximum length of an NGI commitment should be 
calculated based on the maximum consecutive prison sentences that 
could be imposed for the same conduct.  The majority's conjecture 
about the legislature's intent would render the legislature's 
textual changes meaningless.   
¶50 The rest of the majority's "clean-up" theory also fails 
because it doesn't explain the legislature's other changes.  In 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
particular, it can't account for why the legislature removed the 
reference to § 973.15, but kept the references to the sentencing-
credit statute, § 973.155.  See, e.g., § 971.17(1)(a), (b).  By 
the majority's logic, the legislature's use of the terms "maximum 
term of confinement in prison" and "maximum term of imprisonment" 
in § 971.17 was enough to import Wisconsin's criminal sentencing 
statutes wholesale into the NGI commitment context.  If that were 
the case, then no cross-reference would be necessary to apply the 
rules for sentencing credit to NGI commitments.   
¶51 To be clear, the statutory history of § 971.17 is 
ambiguous at best.  On the one hand, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the legislature did not intend for its deletion of the cross-
reference to § 973.15 to make a consequential change to the method 
of calculating the maximum length of an NGI commitment, 
particularly when that change was part of an act largely focused 
on 
implementing 
Truth-in-Sentencing. 
 
Moreover, 
if 
the 
legislature's intention was to change the law, it seems odd that 
it also removed the § 973.15 cross-reference from § 971.17(1)(a), 
which applies to felonies committed before the effective date of 
Truth-in-Sentencing.  But on the other hand, the legislature's 
removal of any reference to § 973.15 has to mean something, and it 
is hard to see what it means other than to prohibit courts from 
considering consecutive criminal sentences when calculating the 
maximum time a person can be committed after being found NGI.  
Those ambiguities aside, at least one thing is clear about the 
statutory history of § 971.17:  it does not support the majority's 
conclusion that consecutive NGI commitments are permitted.  
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
¶52 The final reason for rejecting the majority's conclusion 
is that it creates tensions between § 971.17(1) and the provisions 
of § 971.17 governing the conditional release of individuals and 
the eventual termination or expiration of commitments.  See State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (directing courts to construe 
statutory text in context and to avoid "unreasonable results"). 
Individuals who are subject to NGI commitments need not serve the 
entire commitment period.  For example, under § 971.17(4)(a), a 
person committed for institutional care "may petition the 
committing court to modify its order by authorizing conditional 
release if at least 6 months have elapsed since the initial 
commitment order was entered."  In this case, the same circuit 
court imposed consecutive NGI commitments in two cases at the same 
time.  But as the majority points out, "individuals requiring NGI 
treatment can be subject to multiple commitment orders, perhaps 
from different courts at different times."  Majority op., ¶25.  
Thus, under the majority's holding, if an individual is subject to 
consecutive commitment orders from different judges, it is unclear 
whether the person has to petition one court or both for 
conditional release.     
¶53 There is a similar problem with § 971.17(5), which 
allows an individual on conditional release to "petition the 
committing court to terminate the order of commitment" if certain 
conditions are met.  Even if an individual does not petition for 
conditional release or termination, "upon the expiration of a 
commitment order under sub. (1), the court shall discharge the 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
person."  § 971.15(6)(b) (adding that the person's discharge is 
subject to the right of the Department of Health Services or a 
county health department to file a commitment petition under 
ch. 51).  How does a court comply with this requirement if there 
is a consecutive commitment order in place?  The majority provides 
no guidance for how the lower courts should deal with these and 
other questions raised by its erroneous conclusion. 
¶54 All of the majority's errors are rooted in its neglect 
of the basic premise that NGI commitment orders are not criminal 
sentences.  The majority's conclusion that § 971.17 authorizes 
consecutive commitment orders is not only contrary to that premise, 
it is unsupported by the statute's text, its history, and its 
interpretation in C.A.J.  The majority also creates tension in the 
text of § 971.17 that may result in confusion regarding how lower 
courts should apply the statute.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.    
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
Nos.  2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1