Title: Ortiz v. Jacquez
Citation: 420 P.2d 305, 77 N.M. 155
Docket Number: 7924
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1966

420 P.2d 305 (1966) 77 N.M. 155 R.P. ORTIZ and Mary A. Ortiz, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Onofre JACQUEZ and Alvina M. Jacquez, Defendants-Appellants. No. 7924. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 21, 1966. H.J. Guthmann, George A. Graham, Sr., Santa Fe, for appellants. E.P. Ripley, Santa Fe, Matias L. Chacon, Espanola, for appellees. WALDO SPIESS, Judge. Defendant, Onofre Jacquez, has appealed from an adverse judgment in an ejectment action involving land in Rio Arriba County. The action was commenced by the plaintiff Frank O. Gomez based upon a claim of title and right to possession of the land through a deed of conveyance from R.P. Ortiz. Jacquez claimed right of possession to the land based upon an oral agreement of purchase made with R.P. Ortiz, which oral agreement Jacquez alleged pre-dated the deed of conveyance to Gomez. It is further contended by Jacquez that Gomez had notice of the oral agreement when he negotiated for the purchase of the land from Ortiz. In addition to denying the allegation of the complaint in ejectment Jacquez affirmatively *306 requested the court to specifically enforce his purchase agreement as against both Ortiz and Gomez and their wives and for cancellation of the deed to Gomez. In the alternative and in the event the court declined to specifically enforce the oral agreement Jacquez asked judgment against Ortiz and wife for amounts he had paid on the purchase price of the land and costs expended by him in constructing improvements upon it. All interested parties were joined in the proceedings below and appear in this court. The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court and relevant here are as follows: It is contended by appellant that the trial court erred in both making and refusing to make a substantial number of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Reversal, however, is sought under two points. First, it is contended that the oral agreement was an enforceable contract of sale entitling appellant to specific performance or in the alternative to damage against Ortiz for improvements made to the land and monies paid on the purchase price. This point in substance amounts to an attack upon conclusions of law Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 7, and the findings of fact Nos. 8, 9 and 21. Under point II appellant asserts that Gomez was not a bona fide purchaser for value of the land without notice of oral agreement. Under this point appellant attacks findings of fact Nos. 12 and 16, and conclusions of law Nos. 5 and 6. It is fundamental that if Gomez was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of appellants' claimed interest that the oral agreement would be of no effect as to him even if it be treated as an enforceable agreement as between appellant and Ortiz. § 71-2-3, N.M.S.A. (1953); Mabie-Lowrey Hdw. Co. v. Ross, 26 N.M. 51, 189 P. 42 (1920). If point II is ruled against appellant we need not consider whether under the circumstances the oral contract was enforceable. We first consider Point II. As we have said, appellant attacks certain of the findings of fact upon which the court concluded that Gomez and wife were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. With respect to whether Gomez had notice of appellants' oral contract so as to preclude him from being a bona fide purchaser the testimony was conflicting. The testimony of certain witnesses differed from that of appellee Gomez. No helpful purpose would be served by pointing out the testimony of the various witnesses. We *308 have examined the record and conclude that the findings and conclusions are substantially supported by the evidence and in accordance with the well established rule these findings are conclusive upon appeal. Budagher v. Loe, 70 N.M. 32, 369 P.2d 485; Peugh v. Clegg, 68 N.M. 355, 362 P.2d 510; Parks v. McIntosh, 68 N.M. 324, 361 P.2d 949; Brown v. Martinez, 68 N.M. 271, 361 P.2d 152, 100 A.L.R.2d 1012. The mere fact that contrary evidence may have been introduced which would have supported a different finding or conclusion does not authorize this court to weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Addison v. Tessier, 65 N.M. 222, 335 P.2d 554; Hinkle v. Schmider, 70 N.M. 349, 373 P.2d 918. Appellant has likewise asserted that his possession of the land constituted constructive notice to Gomez of his interest. The trial court found, as we have pointed out, that at the time of purchase Gomez had inspected the land and found it to be open and unenclosed. Further, that appellant occupied the land for only approximately two weeks in the spring and two weeks in the fall. The court declined to find, as requested by appellant, that at the time Gomez purchased the land appellant was in active, open and notorious possession. Intermittent or occasional use of land is insufficient to operate as notice to a purchaser. Maxfield v. Pure Oil Company, Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 892, 895 (1936); Black v. Black, 185 Tenn. 23, 202 S.W.2d 659 (1947); Christopher v. Curtis-Attalla Lumber Co., 175 Ala. 484, 57 So. 837 (1912). Having ruled against appellant on Point II it follows that the oral contract was not subject to being specifically enforced as against appellee, Gomez, nor was the deed under which he claimed title subject to cancellation. There remains only for us to consider whether the court erred in denying appellants' claim against Ortiz for purchase money paid Ortiz and cost of improvements to the land. Here, again, the substantial evidence rule is involved. The court found in substance and concluded, and in our opinion upon substantial evidence, that appellants' claim was offset by their use of the land from the year 1955. It follows that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. It is so ordered. NOBLE and COMPTON, JJ., concur.