Title: Dawn Alt v. Ernesto L. Acosta
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP000029-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
96-3356: 
In re the Imposition of Sanctions in 
Dawn Alt et al v. Richard S. Cline et al: 
 
George Burnett, 
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Dawn Alt, Mark Alt and Cody Alt, 
 
Respondents. 
96-3588: 
Dawn Alt, Mark Alt and Cody Alt, a minor, by his 
guardian ad litem, James A. Johnson,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
Dr. Ernesto L. Acosta,  
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Richard S. Cline, M.D., Charles J. Green, M.D., 
Women's Health Specialists, S.C., Appleton 
Medical Center, Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin, Sentry Insurance Company, Outagamie 
County Department of Human Services, State of 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social 
Services, and Wisconsin Patients Compensation 
Fund,  
 
Defendants.  
98-0029-W 
State of Wisconsin ex rel Dawn Alt, Mark Alt and 
Cody Alt, a minor, by his guardian ad litem, 
James A. Johnson, 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Dr. Ernesto L. Acosta, Richard S. Cline, M.D., 
Charles J. Green, M.D., Women's Health 
Specialists, S.C., Appleton Medical Center, 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, 
Sentry Insurance Company, Outagamie County 
Department of Human Services, State of Wisconsin 
Department of Health and Social Services, and 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
Respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96-3356 and 96-3588: 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 203, 572 N.W.2d 895 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
98-0029-W:PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 18, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 13, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Outagamie 
 
COUNTY: 
Circuit 
 
JUDGE: 
Dee R. Dyer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (Opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins  
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the appellant-petitioner-respondent, Dr. 
Ernesto L. Acosta, there was briefs by George Burnett and 
Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay and oral 
argument by George Burnett. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Thomas Kent Guelzow, Michael L. Laufenberg, and 
Guelzow & Laufenberg, LTD, Eau Claire and James A. Johnson and 
Johnson & Houlihan, S.C., Rhinelander and oral argument by Thomas 
Kent Guelzow. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Richards S. 
Cline, M.D., Women’s Health Specialists, S.C., Physicians 
Insurance Company of Wisconsin and Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, there was a brief by Paul H. Grimstad, John F. 
Mayer and Nash, Spindler, Dean & Grimstad, Manitowoc, and oral 
 
argument by Paul Grimstad. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Appleton Medical 
Center, there was a brief by Jonathan M. Menn and Menn, Nelson, 
Sharratt, Teetaert & Beisenstein, Ltd., Appleton and oral 
argument by Jonathan M. Menn. 
 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark L. Thomsen 
and Cannon & Dunphy, Brookfield for the Wisconsin Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark L. Adams 
and State Medical Society of Wisconsin, and Jeffrey J. Kassel and 
LaFollette & Sinykin, all of Madison for the State Medical 
Society of Wisconsin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Imposition of Sanctions in Dawn 
Alt et al v. Richard S. Cline et al: 
 
George Burnett, 
 
  
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Dawn Alt, Mark Alt and Cody Alt, 
 
 
Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 18, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Dawn Alt, Mark Alt and Cody Alt, a minor,  
by his guardian ad litem, James A.  
Johnson,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Dr. Ernesto L. Acosta,  
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard S. Cline, M.D., Charles J. Green,  
M.D., Women's Health Specialists, S.C.,  
Appleton Medical Center, Physicians  
Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Sentry  
Insurance Company, Outagamie County  
Department of Human Services, State of  
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social  
Services, and Wisconsin Patients  
Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendants.  
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel Dawn Alt, Mark  
Alt and Cody Alt, a minor, by his  
 
 
 
 
guardian ad litem, James A. Johnson,  
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Dr. Ernesto L. Acosta, Richard S. Cline,  
M.D., Charles J. Green, M.D., Women's  
Health Specialists, S.C., Appleton  
Medical Center, Physicians Insurance  
Company of Wisconsin, Sentry Insurance  
Company, Outagamie County Department of  
Human Services, State of Wisconsin  
Department of Health and Social Services,  
and Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
 
          Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals and PETITION 
for supervisory writ.  Reversed; supervisory writ denied. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Ernesto L. Acosta, M.D. and 
his attorney, George Burnett, appeal a decision of the court of 
appeals requiring Dr. Acosta to answer a certain question posed 
to him at a deposition and affirming sanctions on Burnett for 
instructing Dr. Acosta not to answer it.  Burnett claims that 
the question posed required the expert opinion of Dr. Acosta and 
that Dr. Acosta, although an expert, was not required to answer 
it.  He argues that the sanctions were an erroneous exercise of 
the circuit court’s discretion because he was substantially 
justified in directing his client not to answer.  We agree.  
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.  
¶2 
The plaintiffs, Dawn and Mark Alt and their son, Cody 
Alt, for the first time on appeal have requested that this court 
issue a supervisory writ ordering the circuit court to enter a 
default judgment against defendants as a sanction for alleged 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
2 
discovery abuses.  We deny granting a supervisory writ because 
in 
addition 
to 
failing 
to 
follow 
the 
proper 
procedure, 
plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing to justify a 
supervisory writ.   
¶3 
The issues in this case arise from a deposition taken 
of Dr. Acosta by the plaintiffs when, at the direction of his 
attorney Mr. Burnett, Dr. Acosta refused to answer the question, 
“No matter what the cause, a patient with a history of term 
pregnancy and a gush of blood[,] that’s abnormal?”  The refusal 
presents three issues:  1)  Did the question require the expert 
opinion of Dr. Acosta?  2)  If so, did Dr. Acosta have a legal 
privilege to refuse to answer it?  3)  Were the sanctions 
imposed by the circuit court on attorney Burnett for directing 
Dr. Acosta to refuse to answer an erroneous exercise of 
discretion?   
¶4 
These issues generate from a case with a complex 
history.  On October 2, 1989, plaintiff Dawn Alt went into labor 
and by a cesarean section performed by Dr. Richard S. Cline, 
gave birth to Cody Alt.  Cody was born with catastrophic 
injuries including brain injury and other severe temporary and 
permanent injuries.  Cody’s parents, Dawn and Mark Alt, and 
Cody, by his guardian ad litem (collectively the “Alts” or 
“plaintiffs”), sued various parties including Dr. Cline who 
performed the cesarean section delivery, and the medical clinic 
at which Dawn Alt delivered the baby.  The Alts alleged that the 
defendants were negligent in their duties in the delivery of 
Cody. 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
3 
¶5 
During discovery, the plaintiffs named a number of 
medical doctors as expert witnesses, including Dr. Acosta.  Dr. 
Acosta had provided prenatal care to Dawn and wrote her 
discharge summary after Cody Alt’s birth.  Dr. Acosta was not 
present at Cody’s delivery, and he was not named as a defendant 
in the case. 
¶6 
At his first deposition on September 20, 1993, Dr. 
Acosta appeared with attorney Paul Grimstad who represented Dr. 
Cline and the medical clinic.  The deposition ended when 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys disagreed regarding a line 
of questioning which Grimstad characterized as requesting Dr. 
Acosta’s expert opinion rather than a recounting of his personal 
observations.   
¶7 
The plaintiffs then filed a motion to compel discovery 
and to remove Grimstad as counsel for Dr. Acosta.  The Outagamie 
County Circuit Court, Judge Dee R. Dyer, presiding, granted the 
motion, determining that the line of questioning in dispute was 
proper and disqualifying Grimstad as Dr. Acosta’s counsel.  The 
circuit court also imposed sanctions against Grimstad.  The 
court of appeals affirmed.1   
¶8 
Dr. Acosta then hired his own counsel, attorney George 
Burnett.  In a series of correspondence between Burnett and 
plaintiffs’ counsel, Burnett attempted to clarify the scope of 
questions that would be posed to Dr. Acosta at a second 
                     
1 Alt v. Cline, No. 94-2076, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 6, 1995). 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
4 
deposition.  Plaintiffs’ counsel, attorney Thomas K. Guelzow and 
guardian ad litem, attorney James A. Johnson, indicated that 
absent a protective order, they would question Dr. Acosta to the 
full extent allowed by Wisconsin’s liberal discovery rules.  
Attorney Burnett did not request a protective order.  
¶9 
Dr. Acosta’s second deposition on July 23, 1996, again 
ended when attorney Burnett directed Dr. Acosta to not answer 
questions that he asserted asked for information based on Dr. 
Acosta’s expert opinion rather than his personal observations.  
Specifically, Burnett objected to the following questions: 
 
Q. And if you were the OB that was treating this woman 
at the time knowing that there had been an 
ultrasound done and wanting to see that report, what 
would you have done? 
 
. . . [and] . . .  
 
Q. No matter what the cause, a patient with a history 
of term pregnancy and a gush of blood[,] that’s 
abnormal? 
¶10 Plaintiffs’ counsel again filed a motion, requesting 
an order to compel discovery and for sanctions.  The circuit 
court made its decision orally from the bench during the motion 
hearing.  The court determined that the first question regarding 
what Dr. Acosta would have done need not be answered.  That 
determination is not the subject of this appeal.  It is the 
second question that is before us.  The court determined that 
the second question regarding whether a gush of blood was 
abnormal should have been answered.    
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
5 
¶11  The circuit court also granted plaintiffs’ motion for 
an order imposing sanctions pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2) 
and imposed sanctions of $2,335 against Burnett. 
¶12 Dr. Acosta and Burnett appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed both circuit court orders.  Burnett v. Alt, 215 
Wis. 2d 203, 214, 216, 572 N.W.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶13 Burnett and Dr. Acosta petitioned this court for 
review.  Plaintiffs also petitioned this court for a supervisory 
writ pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ (Rule) 809.51 and 809.71, 
ordering the circuit court to enter a default judgment against 
defendants on the grounds of discovery abuse.  This court 
granted both petitions.  
¶14 In addition to the issue regarding the supervisory 
writ, which we do not grant, three issues are presented: 1) Did 
the question posed to Dr. Acosta require his expert opinion?  We 
hold that it did. 2) Did Dr. Acosta, a non-party physician, have 
a legal privilege to refuse to answer it?  We hold that under 
the circumstances presented he did.  3) Did the circuit court 
erroneously exercise its 
discretion 
in 
imposing 
sanctions 
against Burnett for directing Dr. Acosta to not answer the 
allegedly objectionable question?  Because Dr. Acosta was not 
required 
to 
answer 
the 
question, 
attorney 
Burnett 
was 
substantially justified in directing him not to answer it.  
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in imposing sanctions.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the court of appeals’ decision. 
I. 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
6 
¶15 We must first determine whether the question posed to 
Dr. Acosta asked for his expert opinion.  At the second 
deposition of Dr. Acosta on July 23, 1996, he was asked the 
following question: “No matter what the cause, a patient with a 
history of term pregnancy and a gush of blood[,] that’s 
abnormal?”  Stated another way, the question in essence was:  
“Is a gush of blood occurring to a patient with a history of 
term pregnancy an abnormal condition?” 
¶16 A circuit court has discretion whether to compel 
discovery.  Borgwardt v. Redlin, 196 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 538 
N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1995).  This court will uphold a 
discretionary decision if the court reviewed the facts and 
applied the proper standard of law.  Id.  However, to determine 
whether the circuit court applied the proper standard of law in 
this case, we must determine whether the question asked for Dr. 
Acosta’s expert opinion.  
¶17 A question asks for expert testimony if it requires 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02 (1993-94),2 to answer the question.  Such 
specialized knowledge is that which is not within the range of 
ordinary training or intelligence.  State v. Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 
561, 564, 196 N.W.2d 717 (1972) (citing Pollock v. Pollock, 273 
Wis. 233, 77 N.W.2d 485 (1956) and Cramer v. Theda Clark Mem. 
Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969)).  Asking for 
                     
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
7 
expert 
testimony 
“call[s] 
upon 
[persons] 
of 
exceptional 
experience and qualifications to give their opinion . . . .”  
Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 214, 120 N.W. 829 
(1909).   
¶18 There can be no doubt that the question posed called 
for an expert opinion.  Whether a gush of blood in a person with 
a history of term pregnancy is normal or abnormal can only be 
answered in any meaningful and relevant way by a trained 
physician.  What is normal?  What is abnormal?  Certainly a lay 
person, medically untrained and uneducated, is in no position to 
answer such a question with anything other than a speculative 
guess.     
¶19 The question called for Dr. Acosta’s opinion, an 
opinion 
which 
could 
only 
be 
based 
upon 
his 
specialized 
knowledge, knowledge not within the range of ordinary training 
and intelligence.  Accordingly, it was a question asking for an 
expert opinion. 
II. 
¶20 Having determined that the question at issue asked for 
Dr. Acosta’s expert opinion, we now turn to the second issue 
presented by this case: whether Dr. Acosta has a legal privilege 
to refuse to provide his expert opinion.  We conclude that under 
the circumstances presented the answer is yes.   
¶21 Whether a witness has a legal privilege to refuse to 
provide expert testimony is a question of law which this court 
reviews de novo.  See Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 329, 
572 N.W.2d 450 (1998). 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
8 
¶22 As a general rule, no person has a privilege to refuse 
to give evidence.  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 provides: 
 
905.01  Privileges recognized only as provided.  
Except as provided by or inherent or implicit in 
statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or 
required by the constitution of the United States or 
Wisconsin, no person has a privilege to:  
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or 
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or 
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or 
(4) Prevent 
another 
from 
being 
a 
witness 
or 
disclosing any matter or producing any object or 
writing. 
¶23 Privileges 
are 
the 
exception, 
not 
the 
rule.  
“[P]arties 
in 
litigation 
are 
entitled 
to 
every 
person’s 
evidence, except when a person from whom evidence is sought has 
a privilege not to give evidence that is “‘inherent or implicit 
in statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or required 
by the constitution of the United States or Wisconsin.’”  
Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 350-51 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 905.01). 
 See also Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a) (reprinted in part below).3 
¶24 Having a right to refuse to provide certain testimony 
is a privilege.  To determine whether an expert has a legal 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.01(2)(a) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) SCOPE OF DISCOVERY.  Unless otherwise limited by 
order of the court in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(a) In general.  Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding 
any 
matter, 
not 
privileged, 
which 
is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of 
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense 
of any other party . . . . 
(b)  
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
9 
privilege to refuse to provide an expert opinion we must 
determine whether a statute, supreme court rule or the federal 
or state constitutions expressly or implicitly provides for a 
testimonial privilege for experts.  Although we find no express 
provision in the statutes, supreme court rules or constitutions 
granting a privilege in all cases for expert testimony, there is 
an express statement in the statutes regarding court-appointed 
experts.   
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.06 regarding court-appointed 
experts provides in pertinent part: “(1) APPOINTMENT.  . . . The 
judge may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the 
parties, and may appoint witnesses of the judge’s own selection. 
 An expert witness shall not be appointed by the judge unless 
the expert witness consents to act.” (emphasis supplied) This 
provision was included in § 907.06 as originally enacted.  
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R215.  The language 
of this rule is clear and unambiguous.  Reasonable people could 
not differ regarding the meaning of this rule.  A judge may not 
appoint an expert unless the expert consents to so act.   
¶26 We 
conclude 
that 
this 
express 
grant 
implies 
a 
privilege to refuse to testify if the expert is called by a 
litigant.  If a court cannot compel an expert witness to 
testify, it logically follows that a litigant should not be able 
to so compel an expert.  It makes little if any sense to 
conclude that a litigant has greater rights than a court with 
respect to obtaining testimony from experts.   
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
10
¶27 We conclude that a witness’s privilege to refuse to 
provide expert testimony is inherent in Wis. Stat. § 907.06.  
Any other result would be inconsistent and fly in the face of 
logic.4  
¶28 Having determined that a witness has a legal privilege 
to refuse to provide expert testimony, we must determine the 
extent of such privilege.  Dr. Acosta argues that an expert has 
an absolute privilege not to testify or, in the alternative, a 
qualified privilege.   
¶29 Cases across the country vary in the approach to 
compelling experts to testify.  Some states have adopted an 
absolute privilege for experts.  Under the absolute privilege 
the witness is only required to testify regarding his or her 
observations, just as any other witness.  The witness is not 
compelled to give expert testimony even if the witness had 
formed opinions prior to the deposition and without additional 
study, experimentation, thought or reflection.  See Ondis v. 
Pion, 497 A.2d 13 (R.I. 1985); People v. Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d 165 
(N.Y. 1947); Stanton v. Rushmore, 169 A. 721 (N.J. 1934).  
¶30 Other courts, including this court nearly 90 years 
ago, have adopted a narrow qualified privilege for experts.  
                     
4 We note that the circuit court implicitly recognized an 
expert witness privilege when it determined that attorney 
Burnett appropriately made an objection to the first question 
posed to Dr. Acosta, regarding what he would have done.  The 
Alts did not challenge this circuit court determination.  
Because we determine that the question regarding whether a gush 
of blood is abnormal also asks for Dr. Acosta’s expert opinion, 
Dr. Acosta also did not have to answer that question.    
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
11
Under the narrow qualified privilege, a witness may not be 
compelled to give expert testimony if doing so requires any 
amount 
of 
study, 
experimentation, 
thought 
or 
reflection.  
Philler, 139 Wis. at 215.  See also Reed v. Fetherston, 785 F. 
Supp. 1352, 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1992).  If, however, a witness 
already has an opinion, formed without the need for further 
study, experimentation, thought or reflection, that opinion is a 
fact to which the witness must testify.  Philler, 139 Wis. at 
215. 
¶31 Some courts have adopted a broader qualified privilege 
for experts.  Under this broader qualified privilege, an expert 
may be forced to provide expert testimony but only if the 
compelling party “affirmatively demonstrate[s] some compelling 
necessity for an expert’s testimony that overcomes the expert’s 
and the public’s need for protection.  Additionally, an adequate 
plan of compensation must be presented.”  Mason v. Robinson, 340 
N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa 1983).  See also, Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb 
& Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1984).  Furthermore 
an expert only can be compelled to give previously formed 
opinions and cannot be required to engage in any out-of-court 
preparation.  Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 242-43.   
¶32 The appropriate scope of expert privilege requires a 
balance between the right of expert witnesses to be free from 
testifying against their will and the needs of the court and 
litigants for testimony.  A person who has expended resources to 
attain specialized knowledge should not be forced to part with 
that knowledge upon demand, absent compelling circumstances.  We 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
12
do not force lawyers to provide services to anyone who walks in 
the door.  We do not force other professionals to provide their 
services absent compelling circumstances.  We see no reason to 
treat experts in a court of law any differently. 
¶33 On the other hand, the general maxim that everyone has 
a right to every person’s evidence, is premised on the need of 
the judicial system to have access to all information needed to 
reach the truth.  State v. Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d 576, 587, 489 
N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).  See also Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 242.  In 
some situations, it is conceivable that a particular expert’s 
testimony is uniquely necessary.  “Although the duty to testify 
requires sacrifices from a citizen, the inconvenience to the 
witness may be overborne by the need of the court and litigant 
for the testimony.”  Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 242.  See also 
Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 563.  The cornerstone of expert testimony 
is the need for such testimony to assist the trier of fact.  
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  An expert’s testimony is generally based 
on applying the expert’s specialized knowledge to a certain set 
of facts to then draw conclusions and render an opinion.  Mason, 
340 N.W.2d at 242.   
¶34 As appears to be the case here, there can be a number 
of people within a field with similar specialized knowledge 
capable of rendering an expert opinion on the question or 
questions asked.  In such instance, the opinion of one 
particular 
expert 
is not 
irreplaceable. “[U]nlike factual 
testimony, expert testimony is not unique and a litigant will 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
13
not be usually deprived of critical evidence if he cannot have 
the expert of his choice.”  Id.   
¶35 We believe that the broad qualified privilege for 
experts, adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in Mason, properly 
strikes the balance between the competing interests of the needs 
of the court and litigants for testimony and the implied 
privilege of expert witnesses to be free from testifying against 
their will.   Accordingly, we hold that absent a showing of 
compelling circumstances, an expert cannot be compelled to give 
expert testimony whether the inquiry asks for the expert’s 
existing opinions or would require further work.5  In addition to 
demonstrating a compelling need for the expert’s testimony, the 
party seeking the expert’s testimony must present a plan of 
reasonable compensation.  Finally, if the party seeking an 
expert’s opinion is able to show a compelling need for the 
expert’s opinion, an expert can only be compelled to give 
existing opinions.  Under no circumstances can an expert be 
required to do additional preparation.  We believe that this 
approach strikes a balance between a litigant’s need for 
irreplaceable or unique testimony, and the expert’s right to be 
free from compulsion. 
                     
5 Our holding does not affect the circuit court’s ability to 
“order further discovery [of an opposing expert expected to 
testify at trial] by other means, subject to such restrictions 
as to scope and such provisions . . . concerning fees and 
expenses as the court may deem appropriate.”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.01(2)(d)1.  
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
14
¶36 In the present case, the Alts did not show a 
compelling need for Dr. Acosta’s testimony with respect to the 
particular question asked.  They argue that he is a unique 
witness because he provided prenatal care to Dawn Alt and wrote 
her discharge summary.   We disagree.  Dr. Acosta may be unique 
with respect to the prenatal care provided to Dawn Alt and he 
must testify as to his observations in that role.  However, he 
does not appear to be unique with respect to the question asked. 
 Dr. Acosta’s prenatal care of Dawn Alt and authoring her 
discharge summary make him no more and no less qualified than 
any other obstetrician to give an expert opinion about whether a 
gush of blood in a patient who has a history of term pregnancy 
is abnormal.  
¶37 The Alts argue that the testimony to which an expert 
can be compelled to testify was established nearly 90 years ago 
in Philler.  They assert that according to Philler an expert 
must testify regarding existing opinions although he or she 
cannot be compelled to engage in further study, experimentation, 
thought or reflection.  Philler, 139 Wis. at 215.  We agree that 
this is the directive of Philler but contrary to the Alts’ 
assertion, Philler is no longer the law in Wisconsin.   
¶38 With the adoption of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 
a privilege which existed at common law is no longer valid 
unless adopted by the legislature or a supreme court rule, or 
required by the state or federal constitution.  Davison v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 202, 248 N.W.2d 433 
(1977); Wis. Stat. § 905.01.   
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
15
 
[I]f there existed a prior common law privilege . . . 
, unless such privilege was provided by or was 
inherent or implicit in statutes, or in the rules of 
the supreme court, or was required by the United 
States or Wisconsin constitution at the time the 
appellant asserted the privilege, this court could 
not, after the enactment of sec. 905.01, recognize 
such a privilege. 
Id.  The common law rule as expressed in Philler that an expert 
may be compelled to testify to an opinion he or she has already 
formed, Philler, 139 Wis. at 215, was not provided by, or 
inherent or implicit in the statutes, supreme court rules, nor 
required by the state or federal constitution.  Therefore, after 
the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 905.01, the court cannot recognize 
the common law privilege as expressed in Philler.6  As discussed 
above, the concepts of Philler were modified and recreated when 
the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 907.06, prohibiting courts 
from appointing experts without their consent.  Unlike Philler 
which required experts to testify regarding existing opinions, 
§ 907.06 makes no such requirement.   
III. 
                     
6 As support for its determination that the narrow privilege 
for expert witnesses recognized in Philler should not be 
overruled, the dissent asserts that Philler has been cited with 
approval several times since the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence 
were enacted.  Dissent at 9.  However, our opinion regarding the 
narrow privilege recognized for expert witnesses does not 
overrule the provisions of Philler regarding county payment of 
subpoenaed witnesses, Payment of Witness Fees in State v. 
Huisman, 167 Wis. 2d 168, 172-73 n.2, 482 N.W.2d 665 (Ct. App. 
1992), or that employment of experts is governed by contract 
law, Secura Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp., 156 
Wis. 2d 730, 735, 457 N.W.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1990).   
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
16
¶39 At this point, we have determined that the question 
posed to Dr. Acosta about whether a gush of blood was abnormal 
asked for his expert opinion.  We have also determined that 
absent compelling circumstances Dr. Acosta has a qualified 
privilege to refuse to answer the question.  We now turn to the 
third issue presented by this case: whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in imposing sanctions 
against Burnett for directing Dr. Acosta not to answer the 
question. 
¶40 A circuit court has discretion to impose sanctions for 
discovery abuses.  Paytes v. Kost, 167 Wis. 2d 387, 393, 482 
N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Allis Chalmers 
Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 273, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991)).  “A 
discretionary decision will be sustained if the circuit court 
has examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of 
law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.”  Paytes, 167 
Wis. 2d at 393.  Because we concluded above, as a matter of law, 
that absent compelling circumstances a witness has a qualified 
privilege to refuse to provide expert testimony, we conclude 
that the circuit court did not apply the proper standard of law. 
  Accordingly, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in imposing sanctions.  
¶41 In response to Burnett and Dr. Acosta’s conduct at the 
second deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to compel 
discovery pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 804.12(1) and (2) and for 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
17
sanctions pursuant to § 804.12(2).  Section 804.12(2) provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
(2) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER.  (a) If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a 
person designated under s. 804.05(2)(e) or 804.06(1) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order 
to provide or permit discovery, including an order 
made under sub. (1) or s. 804.10, the court in which 
the action is pending may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: 
. . .  
(b) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, the court shall require the party 
failing to obey the order or the attorney advising the 
party 
or 
both 
to 
pay 
the 
reasonable 
expenses, 
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
In other words, if the deponent fails to comply with an order to 
provide or permit discovery, e.g., fails to answer a deposition 
question, the court may impose various sanctions including the 
imposition of reasonable expenses.   
¶42 It is not clear in the record whether the circuit 
court imposed sanctions on Burnett only under Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.12(2) as a sanction for failing to comply with the court’s 
prior order to compel discovery or if it also imposed expenses 
under Wis. Stat. § 804.12(1) (reprinted below)7 as a sanction for 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.12(1) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY.  A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons 
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling 
discovery . . . 
. . .  
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
18
granting 
plaintiffs’ 
second 
motion 
to 
compel 
discovery.  
However, regardless of the basis for the court’s imposition of 
sanctions, 
our 
determination 
is 
the 
same 
because 
both 
§§ 804.12(1) and (2) allow the court to deny a motion to impose 
sanctions 
if 
the 
non-compliant 
party 
was 
substantially 
justified. 
¶43 Parties can obtain discovery regarding any relevant 
matter that is not privileged.  Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a).  
Although the circuit court should not rely on the judgment of 
the attorneys involved for their self-interested determination 
that a privilege exists, Franzen v. Children’s Hospital, 169 
Wis. 2d 366, 386-87, 485 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1992), a 
substantiated 
assertion 
of 
privilege 
is 
substantial 
justification for failing to comply with an order to provide or 
permit discovery. 
¶44 At Dr. Acosta’s second deposition, the Alts’ attorney 
asked Dr. Acosta whether a gush of blood was abnormal for a 
patient with a history of term pregnancy.  Contrary to the 
dissent’s assertion that there was no substantiated assertion of 
an expert witness privilege, dissent at 15, the record shows 
                                                                  
(c) Award of expenses of motion.  1.  If the motion 
is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney 
advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless 
the court finds that the opposition to the motion was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
  
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
19
that Dr. Acosta’s attorney, Burnett, specifically objected on 
the grounds that the question asked for an expert opinion: “Let 
me object to the form of the question.  Again, that asks the 
doctor for expert opinion and I’m going to direct him not to 
answer that question.”  Attorney Burnett explained that he was 
unwilling to allow Dr. Acosta to give “wide-open expert 
testimony” regarding the care and treatment provided by the 
physician and others present at the child’s birth.  For this, 
the circuit court imposed sanctions. 
¶45 Were we to uphold sanctions in this case, we would be 
forcing Burnett and Dr. Acosta to make a choice between 
protecting a privilege and avoiding sanctions.  Had Dr. Acosta 
answered the question regarding whether a gush of blood was 
abnormal, his privilege to refuse to provide expert testimony 
would have been violated.  Although sanctions would then have 
been avoided, and even though a reviewing court might later 
strike the answer, this might be little consolation to the 
expert who for whatever reason was forced to testify against his 
or her will.   We cannot put attorneys and deponents in this 
untenable situation.   
¶46 We caution attorneys that our holding in this case is 
not a license to assert unsubstantiated privileges.  An 
unsubstantiated and unfounded privilege is not substantial 
justification for not imposing sanctions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.12(2).  See B&B Investments v. Mirro Corp., 147 Wis. 2d 
675, 687-88, 434 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
20
¶47 In sum, because we have concluded, as a matter of law, 
that Dr. Acosta was not required to answer the question, we 
determine that Burnett was substantially justified in objecting 
to the question and directing Dr. Acosta to not answer it.  
Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in imposing sanctions because it did not apply the 
proper standard of law.  We reverse the court of appeals’ 
decision. 
IV. 
¶48 We now reach the fourth issue presented by this case: 
whether granting a supervisory writ ordering the circuit court 
to enter a default judgment against the defendants in this case 
is appropriate.  We conclude that a supervisory writ is not 
appropriate for two reasons.  First, plaintiffs failed to follow 
the proper procedure by first petitioning the court of appeals 
for a supervisory writ as required by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.71.  Second, plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing 
to justify a supervisory writ.   
¶49 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.71 
requires that before this court can grant a supervisory writ, 
the moving party must first “file a petition for a supervisory 
writ in the court of appeals under s. 809.51 unless it is 
impractical to seek the writ in the court of appeals.”  § (Rule) 
809.71.  See also Judicial Council Notes1981, Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.71 (West Stat. Ann. 1994).  There is nothing in the 
record, the briefs filed with the court of appeals, or the court 
of appeals’ decision, Alt, 215 Wis. 2d 203, that indicates 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
21
plaintiffs 
ever 
petitioned 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
a 
supervisory writ.  The plaintiffs also have not demonstrated 
that it was impractical to first seek a supervisory writ in the 
court of appeals. 
¶50 Even if the plaintiffs had followed the proper 
procedure, the plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing to 
justify a supervisory writ ordering the circuit court to enter a 
default judgment against defendants.   
 
A petition for a supervisory writ will not be granted 
unless: (1) an appeal is an inadequate remedy; (2) 
grave hardship or irreparable harm will result; (3) 
the duty of the trial court is plain and it must have 
acted or intends to act in violation of that duty, and 
(4) the request for relief is made promptly and 
speedily. 
State ex rel. Oman v. Hunkins, 120 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 352 N.W.2d 
220 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing State ex rel. Beaudry v. Panosian, 
35 Wis. 2d 418, 426, 151 N.W.2d 48 (1967)).   
¶51 Regarding the first criterion for a supervisory writ, 
that an appeal is an inadequate remedy, the plaintiffs argue 
that the circuit court and court of appeals have recognized the 
discovery abuses occurring in this case.  They assert, however, 
that neither court has imposed adequate sanctions.  We disagree. 
 As discussed above, imposing sanctions is a decision within the 
circuit court’s discretion.  Paytes, 167 Wis. 2d at 393.  A 
discretionary decision will not be overturned by an appellate 
court if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied 
the proper standard of law and, using a rational process 
demonstrated in the record, reaches a conclusion that a 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
22
reasonable judge could reach.  Id.  Imposing monetary sanctions 
is one of many sanctions available to the circuit court to 
enforce discovery orders.  Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2).  Because it 
is within the circuit court’s discretion to determine which of 
the 
available 
sanctions 
appropriately 
addresses 
the 
non-
compliance, we cannot determine that an appeal is an inadequate 
remedy.  
¶52 Regarding the second criterion in Oman that grave or 
irreparable harm will result, plaintiffs argue that Dr. Acosta’s 
testimony is irreparably tainted by the discovery abuses of his 
attorney and the defendants’ attorneys.  We disagree.  We do not 
understand 
plaintiffs’ 
insistence on 
obtaining 
the 
expert 
testimony of Dr. Acosta.  We recognize that he was Dawn Alt’s 
treating physician and wrote her discharge summary.  However, 
Dr. Acosta has not disputed that he must testify to his 
observations as a witness.  Regarding his expert testimony, the 
record shows that plaintiffs have named many other medical 
experts.  Although the record is not clear about the exact 
nature of the testimony of each of these named expert witnesses, 
there are undoubtedly other experts in the world who could 
testify regarding obstetrical procedures.  While plaintiffs may 
not attain the testimony they hoped for from Dr. Acosta, there 
are countless other experts on whom they could call. 
¶53 Turning to the third criterion listed in Oman, 
plaintiffs have not shown that the circuit court acted or 
intends to act in violation of a plain duty.  Dismissal as a 
sanction for discovery abuses, as the plaintiffs request, is 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
23
proper only when the moving party shows that the non-compliant 
party acted in bad faith or engaged in egregious conduct.  
Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 275 (citations omitted).  There is no 
doubt that the attorneys in this case have unfortunately 
developed a contentious relationship.  However, we find nothing 
in the record that indicates Burnett’s actions rose to the level 
of egregious conduct.  Furthermore, Burnett was correct in 
asserting that the question posed by plaintiff’s counsel during 
deposition asked for Dr. Acosta’s expert opinion.   
¶54 There is also nothing in the record to indicate that 
the action of the attorneys for the defendants in this case rose 
to the level of egregious conduct or actions made in bad faith. 
 Rather the attorney for defendants, Dr. Cline and the Women’s 
Health Specialists, ceased all communications with Dr. Acosta in 
compliance with the circuit court order following Dr. Acosta’s 
first deposition.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not have a 
plain duty to impose 
sanctions beyond what 
it, in its 
discretion, determined was appropriate in this case, monetary 
sanctions. 
¶55 Finally, the fourth Oman criterion for a supervisory 
writ is if the request for relief is made promptly and speedily. 
 Plaintiffs made a request for sanctions pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.12(2), along with their motion to compel discovery.  
Although dismissal of the action is an available sanction under 
§ 804.12(2)(a)3, 
plaintiffs 
never 
specifically 
requested 
dismissal as a sanction.  While plaintiffs made the request for 
No. 96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W 
 
24
sanctions promptly and speedily, this factor standing alone is 
not enough to convince us that a supervisory writ is warranted. 
¶56 In sum, the plaintiffs have not made a sufficient 
showing that a supervisory writ entering default judgment 
against the defendants is appropriate.  We accordingly deny 
plaintiffs’ request for a supervisory writ. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed; the petition for a supervisory writ is denied. 
  
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
1 
¶57 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (Dissenting).  Today 
the 
majority announces the discovery of an evidentiary privilege 
previously unheard of in this state.  Although unrecognized to 
date by the bench, bar, or legal scholars, the majority claims 
that this privilege really has been in existence for the last 25 
years.  Because the majority ignores the requirement for express 
legal authority to create such an evidentiary privilege, 
needlessly discards precedent, and wastes an opportunity to 
meaningfully address the continuing problem of incivility in the 
discovery process, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
A. 
¶58 The majority first missteps because it ignores the 
requirement 
for 
definite 
legal 
authority 
to 
create 
an 
evidentiary privilege.  Prior to 1973 a court was reluctant to 
adopt or expand privileges unless such action was a transcendent 
public good.  See, e.g., State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 706, 
193 N.W.2d 851 (1972); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  After 1973, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 905.01 this court lost that ability in 
its entirety.  Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 
Wis. 2d 190, 204, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977).  It is statutorily 
prohibited from creating new privileges.  Davison, 75 Wis. 2d at 
202-04; State v. Beno, 110 Wis. 2d 40, 46-47, 327 N.W.2d 712 
(Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 
N.W.2d 668 (1983). 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
2 
¶59 As the majority correctly notes, Wis. Stat. § 905.01 
recognizes three types of privileges:  (1) those explicitly 
created by statute; (2) those "inherent or implicit" in explicit 
statutes; and (3) those required by the federal or state 
constitutions.  Most certainly, there is no express "expert 
witness privilege" in the statutes of this state, or in any 
constitutional provision.8  The majority recognizes as much.  
However, the majority contends that a solitary sentence in 
§ 907.06(1) preventing a court from appointing an expert witness 
to a case unless that witness consents to act is an explicit 
statute which implicitly or inherently creates a broad expert 
privilege under § 905.01.  Majority op. at 9.9  That sentence 
                     
8 Even 
if 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.01 
recognized 
privileges 
"available at common law" the majority's action today would have 
been no less contrary to the statute.  An expert witness 
privilege did not exist at common law.  23 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Evidence, § 5431, p. 
825-26 (1980). 
9 The majority fails to offer any discussion, let alone 
rationale, for its interpretation of the phrase "inherent or 
implicit."  According to the Judicial Council's notes on Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01, the phrase "inherent or implicit" was inserted, 
not to give a court some device with which to "interpret" 
additional privileges.  Rather, the notes strongly suggest that 
the phrase was inserted solely to protect the "work-product 
privilege"a privilege the court created prior to 1973 in State 
ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 
(1967).  Judicial Council Committee Notes, Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R101 (1973). 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
3 
provides as follows:  "An expert witness shall not be appointed 
by the judge unless the expert witness consents to act." 
¶60 This is a slender reed on which to place such great 
weight.  I am unconvinced that a rather tangential sentence in a 
statute discussing the relationship between an expert and the 
court can be extrapolated to also regulate conduct between a 
party and an expert.  Read in its entirety Wis. Stat. § 907.06 
says little about a court compelling an expert to testify and 
absolutely nothing about a party compelling an expert to 
testify.   
¶61 Yet, without citation to any authority and with only 
two sentences of analysis to justify its result, the majority 
leaps from the solitary sentence in Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1) to 
the conclusion that a witness has a legal privilege to refuse to 
provide expert testimony.  What the majority opinion lacks in 
legal authority and analysis, it attempts to make up with the 
bald assertion that "[a]ny other result would . . . fly in the 
face of logic."  Majority op. at 10.  I submit that such a 
result "fl[ies] in the face" of the rule of law that privileges 
are to be strictly construed. 
                                                                  
This latter interpretation is consistent with the tenor of 
the rule:  new privileges are not to be created except by 
legislation or Supreme Court rule.  Davison v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 205-06, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 is not a license for courts to create, 
modify, or expand privileges; that task must be accomplished by 
legislative or rule-making action. 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
4 
¶62 Moreover, 
to 
reach 
its 
conclusion 
the 
majority 
necessarily rides roughshod over a basic presumption in this 
area of law:  In the face of silence or confusion regarding the 
existence of a privilege, the party must testify.  Wright v. 
Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("The 
administration of justice requires testimony of all persons 
unless reasons are established to the contrary.").  In a 
conflict between testimony and privilege, a "tie" goes to 
testimony. 
 
As 
the 
majority 
itself 
succinctly 
states, 
"Privileges are the exception, not the rule."  Majority op. at 
8.  There is no statute that duplicates the restrictions Wis. 
Stat. § 907.06 places on a court to a party.  The exercise of 
such creative license in this area defies the statutory and case 
law prohibition from creating new evidentiary privileges. 
¶63 Undeterred by this prohibition, the majority advances 
its discovery of this evidentiary privilege based on a rationale 
heretofore unrelied upon by any other jurisdiction in this 
country.  I can find no other court that has bought the argument 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
5 
the majority today advances.10  For example, the court in Kaufman 
v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 818 (2d. Cir. 1976), concluded that 
Federal Rule 706(a), which contains essentially the same 
sentence 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.06, 
applied 
only 
to 
court 
compulsion and not to party compulsion of an expert witness.  
The court stated 
 
[t]he situation of the court appointed expert who is 
expected to delve deeply into the problem and arrive 
at an informed and unbiased opinion differs utterly 
from that of an expert called by a party to state what 
facts he may know and what opinion he may know and 
what opinion he may have formed without being asked to 
make any further investigation.  If any inference is 
to be drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is 
thus against the claim of privilege by an expert, not 
for it.   
Id.  Similarly the court in Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 874-75, drew 
a sharp distinction between expert testimony compelled by a 
                     
10 While 
some 
courts 
have 
adopted 
an 
expert 
witness 
privilege, I can find none that have done so on the statutory 
basis articulated by the majority.  Two of the three cases the 
majority cites as recognizing "absolute" expert privileges were 
decided prior to any codification akin to Wis. Stat. § 907.06.  
See People v. Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d 165 (N.Y. 1947); Stanton v. 
Rushmore, 169 A. 721 (N.J. 1934).  Thus, these opinions did not 
attempt to tie the expert privilege to some statutory provision, 
but rather looked to the common law to ascertain the "better 
rule."  See, e.g., Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d at 166.  The court in the 
third absolute privilege case, Ondis v. Pion, 497 A.2d 13 (R.I. 
1985), also did not attempt to tie its decision to any statutory 
provision.  Instead it noted that it would not "lightly depart" 
from a 1959 decision in which it adopted the absolute privilege. 
 Id. at 18.  Additionally, in Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236 
(Iowa 1983), the Iowa case the majority finds so persuasive, the 
court 
did 
not 
explicitly 
indicate 
where 
the 
"qualified" 
privilege emanated from, only saying that it was reviewing a 
trial court's discretionary act.  Id. at 241-43.   
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
6 
court and that compelled by a partynamely that Rule 706(a) 
prohibited the former but, in its silence, allowed the latter.  
Id. at 874.  See also Snyder v. American Motors Corp., 115 
F.R.D. 211, 213 (Ariz. 1987) (noting that expert's claim of 
privilege is incorrect).11 
¶64 The contrast between the majority's opinion and the 
decisions from these other jurisdictions is striking.  No other 
jurisdiction supports the majority's rationale for discovery of 
this privilege.  Equally striking is the contrast between 
today's announced discovery of an evidentiary privilege and the 
legal pedigree of other evidentiary privileges in this state.  
No other privilege in this state has as obscure an origin as the 
stealthy expert witness privilege of the majority that lay 
dormant for the past 25 years. 
¶65 The 
creation 
and 
modification 
of 
the 
"great" 
privileges spans the course of centuries.  Privileges are 
glaciers movinginching, bit by bitalong the surface of the 
                     
11 While no court, aside from the majority, has concluded 
that a rule prohibiting a court from compelling expert testimony 
also by implication prohibits a party from compelling expert 
testimony, some courts have been willing to quash a subpoena 
duces tecum as being overly burdensome on the expert.  See, 
e.g., Snyder v. American Motors Corp., 115 F.R.D. 211, 214-16 
(Ariz. 1987); Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 
152 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding district court's quashing of the 
subpoena). 
 
However, 
as 
will 
be 
seen 
shortly, 
in 
the 
overwhelming number of cases where an expert was relieved of his 
or her duty to testify for any reason, that expert was not 
intimately involved with the facts precipitating the litigation. 
 See Janet Fairchild, Right of Independent Expert to Refuse to 
Testify as to Expert Opinion, 50 A.L.R.4th 680, § 6(d), p. 693-
95.   
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
7 
Anglo-American legal tradition.  For example, the attorney-
client privilege dates back almost to the time of Shakespeare 
when testimony at trial first came into practice.  Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 
§ 2290.  The "modern" spousal privilege came into existence in 
the middle part of the nineteenth century. Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2333.  
Where the common law was silent, legislatures acted to create 
the privileges we commonly recognize today.  See 3 Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence, § 514.11 (noting that three-fourths of states 
adopted physician-patient privilege since New York passed such 
legislation in 1828); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2394 (noting that 
priest-penitent privilege is largely a legislative creature of 
the early twentieth century).  But see Michael J. Mazza, 
Comment, Should Clergy Hold the Priest Penitent Privilege?, 82 
Marq. L. Rev. 171, 175-82 (1998) (discussing commentators 
arguing that priest-penitent privilege extends perhaps to the 
sixteenth century).   
¶66 Such privileges have evolved in our Anglo-American 
legal tradition and have been expressly codified in our rules of 
evidence.  Likewise, evidentiary privileges of a more recent 
vintage come with express statutory codification.12  Not so with 
the majority's expert witness privilege.  If I understand the 
majority's reasoning, this privilege has existed since the 
                     
12 See, e.g., 1987 Act 355, § 68 (creating "mediation" 
privilege at Wis. Stat. § 905.035); § 8, ch. 319, Laws of 1979 
(creating "polygraph" privilege at Wis. Stat. § 905.065). 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
8 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1973 as both Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01 and § 907.06 were enacted at that time.  The 
unusual circumstances surrounding the 
recognition of 
this 
privilege, when compared with every other privilege ever known 
in this state, assures me that the majority is mistaken in its 
new discovery. 
B. 
¶67 For the sake of argument, however, I will assume that 
the majority is correct that the alchemy between Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.01 and § 907.06 somehow has created an expert witness 
privilege.  If this were so, I still would most certainly not 
conclude that somehow this alchemy overruled Philler v. Waukesha 
County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909).13   
¶68 While there is nothing remarkable about this court's 
overruling of its prior case law, at least we normally explain 
why we are doing so.  See, e.g., State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 
194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (overruling Pickens v. State, 96 
Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980)); State v. Harris, 206 
                     
13 Because the majority treats Philler as creating a 
qualified privilege, for the sake of refuting its argument I 
will treat Philler likewise.  However, I do not consider 
Philler's holding to constitute a privilege.  First, the word 
"privilege" is not used at all in the opinion, a sharp contrast 
from other privilege cases.  Second, Philler stands for the 
simple proposition that "every [person] owes a duty to attend 
and testify to the material facts that he [or she] knows."  
Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 214, 120 N.W. 829 
(1909).  Philler treats all testimony alike.  If a witness has 
information, he or she must testify.  Philler's holding that an 
expert witness cannot be compelled to do additional work is the 
same as saying that he or she need not obtain additional 
information so as to make themselves knowledgeable.  
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
9 
Wis. 2d 243, 257, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996) (overruling State v. 
Howard, 176 Wis. 2d 921, 501 N.W.2d 9 (1993)).  Here, the 
majority claims that it did not overrule Philler for, lo and 
behold, the legislature's enactment of the Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence overruled Philler.  Thus, the majority asserts that 
both the overruling of Philler and the creation of an expert 
privilege were results occasioned by legislative enactments of 
1973.   
¶69 Until today's announcement by the majority of the 
overruling of Philler, neither the bench nor the bar have been 
aware of Philler's demise.  Since 1973, courts have continued to 
cite it with approval.  See, e.g., Payment of Witness Fees in 
State v. Huisman, 167 Wis. 2d 168, 172-73 n.2, 482 N.W.2d 665 
(Ct. App. 1992); Secura Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Public Service 
Corp., 156 Wis. 2d 730, 735, 457 N.W.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1990).  
¶70 This continued reference subsequent to 1973 undermines 
the majority's assertion that the enactment of the Wisconsin 
Rules of Evidence overruled Philler.  As I noted above, it is 
the majority's prerogative to overrule cases, but it ought to at 
least admit its actions and explain its rationale.  The 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence did not overrule Philler; the 
majority did.   
¶71 Likewise, the existence of the evidentiary expert 
witness privilege has gone unnoticed by legal scholars.  In a 
review of the treatises on Wisconsin evidence, there is no 
reference to the existence of such an expert privilege in this 
state.  See Thomas H. Barland & Thomas D. Bell, The Wisconsin 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
10
Rules of Evidence (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books, 1998); 
Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Evidence (West 1998); Ralph 
Adam Fine, Fine's Wisconsin Evidence (Butterworth, 1997).  The 
alchemy between Wis. Stat. § 905.01 and 907.06 did not create an 
evidentiary expert privilege; the majority did. 
C. 
¶72 Assuming that the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence created 
an expert witness privilege and assuming that Philler was 
overruled in the process, I still cannot understand why the 
majority, faced with the choice of two qualified privileges, 
chose the qualified privilege outlined in Mason v. Robinson, 340 
N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1983), over Philler.  Rather, faced with such a 
choice I believe that Philler is the far superior rule.   
¶73 Philler's premise is simple:  The administration of 
justice requires witnessesbe they "expert" or "lay"to testify 
as to what they know.  However, Philler makes equally clear that 
this duty does not extend so far as to require a witness to 
affirmatively undertake any additional preparation, for "study, 
reflection, etc., is not the function of the ordinary witness." 
 Id. at 215.  The duty requires witnesses only to provide 
information that they already possess and does not require 
witnesses to supplement their existing knowledge.  
¶74 In contrast to the Philler rule's articulated and 
identified basis in law, the Mason rule appears to have been the 
result of Solomonic wisdom unconcerned with ascertaining the 
basis in either statutory enactments or common law traditions.  
Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 242 (stating that the court chose to "take 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
11
a 
middle 
ground" 
between 
an 
absolute 
privilege 
and 
no 
privilege); id. at 243 (Larson, J., dissenting) ("[The Mason] 
result does not proceed from a recognition of an established 
'expert witness' privilege, because there is none.").  Even if 
the Mason rule's legal foundation was more recognizable, it 
nonetheless creates considerable difficulties in practice that 
serve to protract and increase the costs of litigation.   
¶75 This case reflects that concern.  As I read the 
majority opinion, the Alts would not be completely prevented 
from deposing Dr. Acosta.  Because Acosta was Dawn Alt's 
treating physician and wrote her discharge summary, the majority 
opinion allows the Alts to compel him to testify about his 
observations and the facts surrounding those events.  What the 
majority opinion does not allow the Alts to do is compel 
Acosta's expert opinion as a physician.   
¶76 While on paper the majority's distinction between 
"transaction" testimony and "expert" testimony, see Reed v. 
Fetherston, 785 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1992), appears 
clear, in practice I think that it is not so clear.  In many 
cases, the two types of testimony will inevitably spill one into 
the other and in the process create an inseparable mixture.  
Under the rule of the majority, courts and parties will be asked 
to unmix the mixturea task that may be difficult and inexact. 
¶77 In contrast, the Philler rule is far easier for courts 
and parties to follow and therefore has the result of reducing 
the expense and delay of litigation to parties and reducing the 
burden of oversight on courts.  Under Philler a witness must 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
12
answer a question if he or she has the knowledge to do so.  
There is no gamesmanship of trying to categorize a question as 
either transaction or expert testimony so as to either compel or 
protect an answer.  Rather, if a witness has an answer to a 
question, he or she must give it.14   
D. 
¶78 Finally, assuming that the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence 
created an expert witness privilege, assuming that Philler was 
overruled in the process, and even assuming that I could adopt 
the Mason rule, I still could not join the majority's mandate in 
this case reversing the court of appeals.  In comparing the 
facts of this case with those in Mason I conclude that the court 
of appeals must be affirmed. 
¶79 For all the abstract talk about compelling expert 
witnesses to testify, we cannot lose sight of one simple fact:  
Acosta was significantly involved in this case prior to the 
Alts' attempt to depose him.  This appeal is not based on the 
Alts' attempt to compel an uninvolved expert to testify but 
rather is about the Alts' attempt to obtain the full testimony 
of a witness substantially involved in the events both leading 
up to and following after the alleged negligence.   
                     
14 As Philler recognized, this rule may well be of limited 
benefit to a party seeking to compel testimony from an expert 
witness because in many situations, an expert will not be able 
to give an answer absent review and study. Philler v. Waukesha 
County, 
139 
Wis. 
211, 
215-16, 
120 
N.W. 
829 
(1909).  
Nevertheless, Philler is in theory and in practice superior to 
Mason.  
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
13
¶80 Acosta's involvement in Dawn Alt's care distinguishes 
this case from Mason and, even under Mason's rule, necessitates 
an affirmance of the court of appeals.  In Mason, the plaintiffs 
attempted to compel the testimony of a professor whose entire 
connection with the case consisted of a solitary conversation 
with one of the defendant doctors.  Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 238. 
¶81 In deciding that the plaintiffs could not compel Mason 
to testify, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that "generally an 
expert 
witness, 
absent 
some 
other 
connection 
with 
[the] 
litigation, is free to decide whether or not he wished to 
provide opinion testimony for a party."  Id. at 242 (emphasis 
added).  This "unrelatedness requirement" was hardly an after-
thought on the part of the Mason court.  Id. at 240 (citing 
Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 823 (2d Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, 
J., concurring)); id. at 242 ("In contrast to factual witnesses 
who 
possess 
knowledge 
which 
is 
unique 
and 
many 
times 
irreplaceable, expert testimony is not based on any singular 
personal knowledge of the disputed events.").  Based on my 
reading of the emphasis the Mason court placed on the facts of 
that case, I conclude that were the Mason court faced with these 
facts, it would have reached a different result than today's 
majority. 
¶82 Moreover, even the jurisdictions that have adopted an 
absolute privilege have overwhelmingly done so in cases where 
the expert was wholly unrelated to the litigation.  See, e.g., 
Gilly v. City of New York, 508 N.E.2d 901, 902 (N.Y. 1987); 
Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 827 (Mass. 1975); 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
14
Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d 165, 166 (N.Y. 1947); 
Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal. App. 1959).  See also 
Shurpit v. Brah, 30 Wis. 2d 388, 397-98, 141 N.W.2d 266 (1966). 
¶83 In contrast, the majority opinion takes us into 
relatively uncharted waters.  Under its opinion expert witnesses 
are not only given a nearly impenetrable shield of protection 
against unwillingly rendering their opinions when they are 
unrelated to the litigation, but are also given that same 
protection when they are deeply involved with factual details 
that lie at the heart of the litigation.  This sets neither the 
correct nor proper course. 
II. 
¶84 Finally, I address the issue of sanctions and the 
continuing problem of incivility in the legal profession, 
especially as it manifests itself in the discovery process.  
This court has commented recently on the perceived decline in 
civility and how this decline increases costs to the parties, 
adds to the burdens of already burdened courts, and depreciates 
the opinion of the legal profession in the eyes of the general 
public.  Chevron Chemical Co. v. Deloitte & Touche, 176 Wis. 2d 
935, 945-46, 501 N.W.2d 15 (1993); Johnson v. Allis Chalmers 
Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 281-82, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991).   
¶85 To the extent that perception meets reality this court 
must find itself on the front lines of this struggle, doing what 
it can to fashion zealous but civil advocacy.  See State ex rel. 
Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 103, 454 N.W.2d 770 
(1990) (opinion of Bablitch, J.).  Yet the majority wastes this 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
15
opportunity to meaningfully address the continuing problem of 
incivility. 
¶86 I note at the outset that although the majority 
opinion says much about the evidentiary "privilege" of expert 
witnesses and the extent of that privilege, it incorrectly 
assumes that privilege was ever asserted in the circuit court.  
The majority opinion announces that "a substantiated assertion 
of privilege is substantial justification for failing to comply 
with an order to provide or permit discovery."  Majority op. at 
18.  Here there was no substantiated assertion of an evidentiary 
expert witness privilege. 
¶87 This case already has a long history without ever 
having gone to trial.  The alleged negligence underlying this 
case occurred in October of 1989.  Over nine years later, the 
case has yet to go to trial.  In the intervening years, the 
discovery disputes between the Alts and the defendantsand 
between the Alts and Acostahave taken on a life of their own.  
This case has generated a score of circuit court rulings, two 
occasions of sanctions, two appeals to the court of appeals, and 
now a supreme court opinion all before any evidence has been put 
before a finder of fact.   
¶88 Yet no mention of the word "privilege" can be found in 
the transcripts of Acosta's depositions, or at the motion 
hearings, or in the memoranda to the circuit court.  It appears 
that the majority has failed its own test of requiring a 
"substantiated assertion" of privilege.  Because the word is 
nowhere to be found in the voluminous record on the issues of 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
16
discovery and sanctions in the circuit court, it can hardly be 
maintained that there was a "substantiated assertion" of an 
evidentiary privilege.  The majority's conclusion that there was 
substantial justification for failing to comply with a discovery 
order is based on a foundation not "substantiated" by this 
circuit court record. 
¶89 Our concern on this appeal, of course, only focuses on 
Acosta's second deposition and its aftermath.  Even with this 
narrow focus, the tenor of the entire litigation is apparent.  
¶90 At his second deposition, Acosta's new attorney, 
George Burnett, objected and instructed his client not to answer 
the questions when the Alts' attorney probed issues relating to 
statements Acosta made on the discharge summary.  This was 
essentially 
the 
same 
issue 
that 
halted 
Acosta's 
first 
deposition, was essentially the same issue that the circuit 
court 
concluded 
should 
have 
been 
answered 
at 
the 
first 
deposition, and was essentially the same issue that played a 
part in the circuit court's award of sanctions after Acosta's 
first deposition.  Moreover, at the time that Burnett objected 
during the second deposition, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys 
specifically read aloud the circuit court's decision indicating 
that this line of questioning was permissible.15  Nevertheless, 
                     
15 The Alt's attorney read the following from the circuit 
court's order:  
Therefore [the discharge summary] is an entirely 
appropriate area of inquiry.  Dr. Acosta's deposition 
shows that Attorney Grimstad effectively precluded 
Plaintiffs' counsel from exploring the basis of the 
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
17
Burnett persisted in his refusal to allow Acosta to testify 
about these matters. 
¶91 We have on numerous occasions reiterated that a 
circuit court is given substantial discretion to award sanctions 
in part because that court is in a significantly superior 
position to appreciate the conduct of the parties.  See Standard 
Theatres, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 
747, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984).  That is especially evident in a 
convoluted case such as this one.  Yet, though the path was 
littered with motions, affidavits, briefs, orders, and opinions, 
the circuit court was able to succinctly state what occurredor 
more accurately, what did not occurduring Acosta's second 
deposition:  "Dr. Acosta should have answered the questions 
once.  He now should have answered the questions twice."   
¶92 We have in the past said that "[t]he authority to 
impose sanctions is essential if circuit courts are to enforce 
their orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits."  
Chevron, 176 Wis. 2d at 946.  See also Aspen Services, Inc. v. 
IT Corp., 220 Wis. 2d 491, 497-99, 583 N.W.2d 849 (Ct. App. 
1998).  Apparently, the circuit court believed that we meant 
what we wrote.  It is unfortunate that the majority opinion 
undermines that belief.  The majority "caution[s] attorneys" 
                                                                  
doctor's opinion relating to a material issue in this 
action.  Evidence objected to at a deposition shall be 
taken subject to objections. . . . The opinion of Dawn 
Alt's primary treating physician during her pregnancy 
and during her hospitalization following Cody's birth, 
which is contained in the discharge summary, is highly 
relevant.  
96-3356, 96-3588, 98-0029-W.awb 
 
18
that 
its 
"holding . . . is 
not 
a 
license 
to 
assert 
unsubstantiated privileges."  Majority op. at 19.  Considering 
that the majority rewards just such action in this case where 
the record reflects no substantiated assertion of privilege, its 
warning rings hollow.   
III. 
¶93 In sum, the majority's attempt to mask its creation of 
an evidentiary expert witness privilege as merely a construction 
of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence is unpersuasive.  There was 
no evidentiary expert witness privilege at common law and 
nothing in the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence has altered that 
fact.  Moreover, the majority needlessly discards applicable 
precedent, asserting that its overruling is the handiwork of the 
legislature.  Unfortunately, the discarded precedent is both in 
principle and practice superior to the rule the majority instead 
adopts.  Finally, the majority wastes an opportunity to 
meaningfully address the continuing problem of incivility in the 
discovery process.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
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