Title: Internet Solutions Corporation v. Tabatha Marshall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-272
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-272 
____________ 
 
INTERNET SOLUTIONS CORPORATION,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
TABATHA MARSHALL,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 17, 2010] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
Tabatha Marshall, a resident of the State of Washington, owns and operates 
a website on which she posts about consumer-related issues.  According to Internet 
Solutions Corporation (ISC), Marshall made posts on her website in which she 
accused ISC, an employment and recruiting firm, of ongoing criminal activity.  
ISC, whose principal place of business is in Florida, sued Marshall for defamation 
in a federal district court in Florida.  The only issue in this case is whether 
 
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Marshall‘s allegedly defamatory posts on her website subject her to personal 
jurisdiction in Florida under this state‘s long-arm statute.1  
 
We rephrase the question certified to us by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals to narrowly focus on the issue of whether defamatory posts about a 
Florida corporation on an out-of-state website by the operator of the website 
constitute the commission of a tortious act within Florida under the long-arm 
statute, specifically section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007).2  Accordingly, 
we rephrase the certified question as follows: 
DOES A NONRESIDENT COMMIT A TORTIOUS ACT WITHIN 
FLORIDA FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 48.193(1)(b) WHEN HE 
OR SHE MAKES ALLEGEDLY DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS 
ABOUT A COMPANY WITH ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF 
BUSINESS IN FLORIDA BY POSTING THOSE STATEMENTS 
ON A WEBSITE, WHERE THE WEBSITE POSTS CONTAINING 
THE STATEMENTS ARE ACCESSIBLE AND ACCESSED IN 
FLORIDA? 
                                          
 
1. We have jurisdiction because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
certified a question to this Court, which is ―determinative of the cause and 
for which there is no controlling precedent.‖  Art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. 
2.  The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to this Court: 
DOES POSTING ALLEGEDLY DEFAMATORY STORIES AND 
COMMENTS ABOUT A COMPANY WITH ITS PRINCIPAL 
PLACE OF BUSINESS IN FLORIDA ON A NON-COMMERCIAL 
WEBSITE OWNED AND OPERATED BY A NONRESIDENT 
WITH NO OTHER CONNECTIONS TO FLORIDA CONSTITUTE 
COMMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT WITHIN FLORIDA FOR 
PURPOSES OF FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(b)? 
Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 
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We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative.  We conclude 
that posting defamatory material on a website alone does not constitute the 
commission of a tortious act within Florida for purposes of section 48.193(1)(b), 
Florida Statutes.  Rather, the material posted on the website about a Florida 
resident must not only be accessible in Florida, but also be accessed in Florida in 
order to constitute the commission of the tortious act of defamation within Florida 
under section 48.193(1)(b).  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
ISC is a Nevada for-profit corporation, which alleged that its principal place 
of business is in Orlando, Florida.  ISC operates a number of websites that deal 
with employment recruiting and Internet advertising.  Tabatha Marshall is a private 
individual who resides in the State of Washington.  Marshall owns and operates 
tabathamarshall.com, a noncommercial website on which she posts information 
about consumer-related issues.  The website permits third parties to comment on 
Marshall‘s posts, with the comments appearing on the same webpage as the 
original post.  In August 2007, Marshall made a post on her website about 
VeriResume, one of the websites operated by ISC, entitled ―Something‘s 
VeriRotten with VeriResume…‖  This post included a listing of affiliates of 
VeriResume, including ISC, and listed Florida addresses.  Third parties posted 
comments on this post, and Marshall responded to some of the comments.  From a 
 
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review of the exhibits attached to the complaint, several of the commenters 
appeared to be from Florida (―Mrs. C near OrlandoFL,‖ ―Suzanne C–Orlando, 
FL,‖ and ―anonymous–Orlando, FL‖).  Contact information for VeriResume and 
other ISC affiliates also appeared to be listed on a separate part of the website, 
including Florida addresses for ISC.  Printouts of these webpages were attached to 
ISC‘s complaint. 
ISC filed a diversity action against Marshall in the Middle District of 
Florida, alleging several causes of action, including a claim for defamation.  ISC 
contended that the court had personal jurisdiction over Marshall because she had 
entered into the State of Florida to commit a tortious act3 and should have known 
that her repeated defamatory statements would subject her to litigation in Florida. 
Regarding the allegedly defamatory statements, ISC asserted that Marshall‘s posts 
contained statements alleging that ISC ―was, and is, engaged in on-going criminal 
                                          
 
3.  Section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida‘s long-arm statute provides: 
 
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, 
who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in 
this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a 
natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing 
of any of the following acts:  
 
 
. . . . 
(b) Committing a tortious act within this state. 
§ 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007).  
 
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activity, specifically ‗phishing‘[4] and consumer fraud through ‗scamming‘ and 
other actionable conduct to defraud consumers,‖ that Marshall posted statements 
alleging that ISC ―is engaged in on-going criminal activity of obtaining consumers‘ 
personal information and illegally selling it to third parties,‖ and that Marshall‘s 
websites ―contain numerous defamatory statements designed to expose [ISC] to 
public contempt and ridicule and injure [ISC] in its businesses. . . .  Particularly . . . 
[ISC‘s] businesses are ‗scams‘ and are ‗phishing‘ operations utilize [sic] to steal 
personal information for the purposes of identity theft.‖  ISC further asserted that 
the individual statements contained in the posts, ―when taken as a whole, inculpate 
[ISC] with moral turpitude and charge [ISC] with unfitness and lack of integrity in 
the performance of its businesses.‖  Id.  ISC asserted that Marshall knowingly 
published these statements with the intent to harm ISC‘s business reputation.  
 
Marshall filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  Specifically, she contended that she had not committed a tortious act 
in Florida for purposes of Florida‘s long-arm statute.  She also asserted that even if 
ISC could satisfy Florida‘s long-arm statute, subjecting her to personal jurisdiction 
                                          
 
 
4.  ―Phishing‖ is ―a scam by which an e-mail user is duped into revealing 
personal or confidential information which the scammer can use illicitly.‖  
Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phishing 
(last visited June 3, 2010). 
 
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in Florida would violate federal due process.  As part of this motion, Marshall filed 
a declaration detailing her lack of contacts with Florida.5  
  
The district court granted Marshall‘s motion and dismissed the case for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.  Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, No. 6:07-cv-1740-
Orl-22KRS, 2008 WL 958136 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2008).  The court recognized that 
the determination of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consists of 
a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate under 
Florida‘s long-arm statute; and (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
would violate due process.  Id. at *2.  In determining whether Marshall was subject 
to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) of the long-arm statute, the 
district court noted that the Eleventh Circuit had established that an out-of-state 
defendant‘s commission of a tort that produces an injury in Florida was sufficient 
                                          
 
 
5.  Specifically, Marshall stated the following: she had been a resident of 
Washington since 2000, she had never been a resident of Florida, she had never 
owned or leased any real estate in Florida, she had no bank accounts or 
investments in Florida, and she had only visited Florida once—a three-day work-
related trip in 2004 that was unconnected with her website.  She also declared the 
following: she was the owner and host of the website from her home in 
Washington, had never sold any products or services in connection with the 
website, had never placed any advertisements on the website, had never solicited 
or received any business, advertising, or donations within Florida in connection 
with the website, had never contracted with an Internet service provider located 
within Florida, had never provided a capability on the website to distinguish or 
target Florida individuals or companies, had never received any income or 
compensation in connection with the website, and had never directed any 
communication (telephonic or written) into Florida for business purposes in 
connection with the website. 
 
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for purposes of section 48.193(1)(b).  Id. at *2 (citing Horizon Aggressive Growth, 
L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1168 (11th Cir. 2005)).  The court 
assumed that the tortious conduct element had been satisfied and held that 
Marshall had not adequately rebutted ISC‘s allegations that a tort was committed 
in Florida that resulted in injury in Florida.  Id. at *3. 
However, the district court determined that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction would violate due process.  The court stated that the minimum contacts 
required for due process must be purposeful contacts and concluded: 
[T]here is no evidence that Marshall specifically targeted Florida 
residents.  Marshall‘s website was not only made available to Florida 
residents, but the website was equally accessible to persons in all 
states. . . .  In addition, the postings do not specifically mention 
Florida or its residents nor do they amount to purposeful 
availment. . . .  Marshall has not made Florida-specific contacts.  The 
mere fact that Marshall‘s website was accessible to residents 
everywhere and a resident of Florida responded does not amount to 
purposeful availment.   
Id. at *4.  The district court further concluded that ―[t]he fact that Marshall posted 
comments on her website . . . , which were accessible to residents everywhere does 
not indicate that Marshall could reasonably anticipate being haled into a Florida 
court.‖  Id.  The district court did not address the specific issue of whether the fact 
that ISC alleged that its principal place of business was in Florida or the fact that 
Marshall listed Florida addresses for ISC on her website would be evidence of 
targeting a Florida resident, but rather concluded that ―there is no evidence that 
 
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Marshall specifically targeted Florida residents.‖  Id. at *4.  The district court then 
dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id. at *3-5.  ISC appealed the 
district court‘s dismissal. 
 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals set out the two-step 
inquiry to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant is proper:  
First, we examine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
appropriate under that state‘s long-arm statute.  ―Second, we examine 
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.‖  The due process inquiry requires us to 
determine whether ―the defendant ha[s] minimum contacts with the 
forum state‖ and if the district court‘s exercising of jurisdiction over 
that defendant would ―offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.‖ 
Internet Solutions Corp., 557 F.3d at 1295-96 (citations omitted) (quoting Horizon 
Aggressive Growth, 421 F.3d at 1166). 
 
Regarding the first part of the inquiry, the Eleventh Circuit stated that 
Florida‘s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a cause of 
action arising out of a tortious act committed within Florida.  Id. at 1296 (citing § 
48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008)).  The Eleventh Circuit recognized that Florida law 
provides that, for purposes of the statute, the defendant does not have to be 
physically present in Florida for the tortious act to occur in Florida.  Id.  Also, a 
defendant could commit a tortious act within Florida by sending telephonic, 
 
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electronic, or written communications into Florida, provided the cause of action 
arose from those communications.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that 
―Marshall thus would be subject to jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b) if her 
allegedly defamatory postings on her website constituted electronic 
communications ‗into Florida.‘ ‖  Id.  However, ―[t]he Florida Supreme Court has 
yet to address whether the posting of information on an out-of-state website about 
a company with its principal place of business in Florida would meet the statutory 
requirements for long-arm jurisdiction.‖  Id.  After reviewing both Florida case law 
and federal district court case law, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that ―Florida law 
is unsettled regarding whether Marshall‘s actions would meet the requirements of § 
48.193(1)(b).‖  Id.  Because the case involved a question of Florida law for which 
there is no clear controlling precedent, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question 
that is before this Court.  The Eleventh Circuit did not address the second step of 
the jurisdictional inquiry, which is whether the exercise of jurisdiction would 
violate due process.  
ANALYSIS 
We first distinguish the subject of the certified question from the issue of 
whether exercising jurisdiction over Marshall would violate due process.  We next 
examine the relevant provision of Florida‘s long-arm statute.  Then we review the 
relevant case law interpreting section 48.193(1)(b).  After this review, we conclude 
 
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that allegedly defamatory material about a Florida resident placed on the Web and 
accessible in Florida constitutes an ―electronic communication into Florida‖ when 
the material is accessed (or ―published‖) in Florida.  Finally, we apply that 
interpretation to this case. 
The rephrased certified question from the Eleventh Circuit involves whether 
the facts of this case, as alleged in the complaint, would satisfy Florida‘s long-arm 
statute.  Specifically, the rephrased certified question asks this Court whether a 
nonresident commits a tortious act within Florida for purposes of the long-arm 
statute when he or she makes allegedly defamatory statements about a company 
with its principal place of business in Florida by posting those statements on a 
website, where the website posts containing the statements are accessible and 
accessed in Florida.6 
We begin by recognizing that the question of whether the alleged 
defamatory material in this case satisfies the requirements of Florida‘s long-arm 
statute is separate from the federal due process inquiry.  Similar to the analysis 
                                          
 
 
6.  We do not decide the broader issue of whether injury alone satisfies the 
requirement of section 48.193(1)(b).  We do recognize that the federal courts have 
adopted this broad construction of section 48.193(1)(b), holding that the 
commission of a tortious act out of state that causes an injury to an in-state resident 
satisfies Florida‘s long-arm statute.  See, e.g., Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 
1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216-17 
(11th Cir. 1999).  However, we note that in certifying the question to this Court, 
the Eleventh Circuit did not mention this broad construction of the long-arm statute 
in its opinion and did not ask us to consider it, and, accordingly, we limit our 
analysis to the question asked. 
 
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employed by the Eleventh Circuit, this Court has articulated a two-step inquiry for 
determining whether long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper:  
First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges 
sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within 
the ambit of the statute; and if it does, the next inquiry is 
whether sufficient ―minimum contacts‖ are demonstrated 
to satisfy due process requirements. 
 
The first prong—i.e., the statutory prong—of the Venetian 
Salami standard is governed by Florida‘s long-arm statute and 
bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts.  A court can exercise 
personal jurisdiction, inter alia, whenever a foreign corporation 
commits a ―tortious act‖ on Florida soil.  The second prong—i.e., the 
constitutional prong—is controlled by United States Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause and imposes a more 
restrictive requirement.  A court can exercise personal jurisdiction 
only if the foreign corporation maintains ―certain minimum contacts 
with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‗traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‘ ‖ 
Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Execu-Tech Bus. 
Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)).  In Venetian 
Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989), this Court recognized that 
the federal due process analysis is not built into Florida‘s long-arm statute:  ―The 
mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 
as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy 
the due process requirement of minimum contacts.‖  Id. at 502.  At issue in this 
case is the first prong—that is, whether ISC‘s complaint alleges sufficient 
jurisdictional facts to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida‘s long-arm statute.   
 
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ISC contends that jurisdiction over Marshall is proper under section 
48.193(1)(b) of Florida‘s long arm statute.  Specifically, ISC alleges that Marshall 
committed a tortious act within Florida by posting defamatory material about a 
Florida company on her noncommercial out-of-state website. 
 
Florida‘s long-arm statute was first enacted in 1973, and subsection (1)(b) 
has not been amended since that time.  Thus, the Florida Legislature has never 
specifically considered the impact of the explosion of the World Wide Web on 
personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.  Accordingly, it is our 
responsibility to construe the statute based on the actual language as guided by our 
precedent.  
 
We now turn to an examination of the relevant case law, discussing first the 
relevant case law applying section 48.193(1)(b) in the non-Web context and then 
the cases involving section 48.193(1)(b) in the Web context. 
Relevant 193(1)(b) to Telephonic,  
Electronic, or Written Communications 
In Wendt, this Court considered the meaning of ―[c]ommitting a tortious act 
within this state‖ under section 48.193(1)(b).  Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1258.  In 
particular, the question before this Court in Wendt was whether ―making 
telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida from outside of the 
State can constitute ‗committing a tortious act‘ under section 48.193(1)(b).‖  Id.  In 
that case, Wendt, a Florida resident and resident agent for an out-of-state 
 
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corporation who solicited investors for the corporation, filed a third-party 
complaint against a nonresident attorney and law firm, claiming that he had relied 
to his detriment on the attorney‘s legal advice.  Id. at 1254-55.  Wendt asserted that 
the attorney had committed a tortious act in Florida by negligently responding in 
writing to an investigation by the Division of Securities relating to the alleged sale 
of unregistered securities and negligently drafting loan documents that were 
knowingly intended to be evidence of loans to be made by Florida investors to the 
corporation.  Id. at 1255.  The attorney moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, asserting that his contacts with Florida only involved telephonic or 
mail correspondence and never involved travel to Florida.  Id.  The trial court 
denied the motion to dismiss and, on appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
held that no tortious act was committed in Florida because the alleged acts were 
performed in Michigan.  Id. at 1256.  
After reviewing relevant case law, this Court held that a defendant‘s 
physical presence is not necessary to commit a tortious act in Florida.  Id. at 1260.  
Rather, ― ‗committing a tortious act‘ in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can 
occur through the nonresident defendant‘s telephonic, electronic, or written 
communications into Florida.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  ―However, the cause of 
action must arise from the communications‖—―[t]his predicate finding is necessary 
because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1).‖  Id.   
 
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In this case, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that, under Wendt, Marshall 
would be subject to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if her allegedly 
defamatory posts on her website constituted electronic communications ―into 
Florida.‖  Internet Solutions Corp., 557 F.3d at 1296.  The determination of 
whether certain acts constitute communications into Florida is straightforward 
when the case concerns telephonic communications, written communications, or 
electronic communications in the form of e-mails or facsimiles, because those 
communications are directed to reach a specific recipient in a specific forum; in 
other words, it is clear that the nonresident defendant‘s communications were 
made into Florida.  For example, in Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So. 2d 665, 670 
(Fla. 2003), this Court held that ―allegedly defamatory phone calls made into 
Florida by a nonresident could be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction‖ on 
the basis of Wendt.  In Acquadro, a defamation claim was brought against the 
nonresident defendant based upon a telephone call from Massachusetts to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff‘s sister, and another third party in Florida in which the 
defendant stated that the plaintiff ―had AIDS.‖  Id. at 668.  The Court noted in a 
footnote that although the record was not completely clear, it appeared that the 
telephone call was a conference call in which the third party called the defendant in 
Massachusetts, and they proceeded to call the defendant in Florida.  Id. at 668 n.7.7 
                                          
 
 
7.  Justice Wells, in his dissent, stated, ―It does not appear that the defendant 
 
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Other courts, both state and federal, applying Florida law have also held that 
communications made during a telephone call between a person in Florida and an 
out-of-state defendant constitute telephonic communications into Florida and 
confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under section 
48.193(1)(b), provided the cause of action arose from the telephonic 
communication as required by the statute and clarified in Wendt.  The cases 
considering whether a telephonic communication constituted a tortious act in 
Florida have not explicitly hinged a finding of jurisdiction on whether or not the 
nonresident defendant initiated the phone call into Florida.  Rather, the cases focus 
on whether the nonresident defendant made the subject communications during a 
phone call between the out-of-state defendant and someone in Florida.  See, e.g., 
Hou v. United Airlines Corp., No. 806CV-1502-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 2884963, at 
*2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that alleged fraudulent statements by the 
defendants that occurred during a telephone call initiated by the plaintiff satisfied 
section 48.193(1)(b) (citing Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260)); OSI Indus., Inc. v. 
Carter, 834 So. 2d 362, 364-65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that a nonresident 
defendant who called plaintiff in Florida and allegedly made misrepresentations 
during the conversation satisfied 48.193(1)(b)).   
                                                                                                                                        
initiated the call into Florida.‖  Id. at 677.  
 
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In a case on a similar topic but with distinguishable facts, the Second 
District Court of Appeal in an en banc decision held that the out-of-state recording 
of a phone call originating in Florida did not constitute the commission of a 
tortious act within the state.  Kountze v. Kountze, 996 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008).  The court receded from a previous case in which it had decided that the 
defendant‘s ―interception‖ of the telephone call occurred at the point of origin in 
Florida and not at the point of reception and recording in the foreign state.  Id. at 
247.  The court instead concluded that a Florida statute that created a private cause 
of action for the nonconsensual interception of a communication originating within 
Florida could not transform the nonresident defendant‘s out-of-state recording into 
a ―tortious act within the state‖ for jurisdictional purposes.  Id. at 248.  The court 
was ―admittedly influenced by the fact that the act was not illegal in the state 
where the defendant actually committed it and was not illegal under the federal law 
that would apply to interstate telephone calls.‖  Id. at 252.  In its holding, the court 
distinguished the case from cases in which a conversation was directed into Florida 
over an interstate telephone call that was defamatory, fraudulent, or otherwise an 
element of a traditional intentional tort under the common law.  Id. at 248.   
 Courts have also held that electronic communications over the Internet in 
the form of e-mails and chat room conversations into Florida give rise to personal 
jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) on the basis of Wendt.  In the e-mail 
 
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context, a Fifth District Court of Appeal case applied section 48.193(1)(b) to an 
out-of-state defendant who sent an e-mail that allegedly defamed a Florida resident 
to various members of a veterans‘ association, some of whom lived in Florida.  
Price v. Kronenberger, 24 So. 3d 775, 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).  The nonresident 
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that personal jurisdiction 
could not be asserted over him because he addressed the e-mail only to the 
association members generally and did not specifically target Florida residents as 
recipients.  Id.  The court stated that ―[a] complaint that alleges a nonresident 
committed a tortious act based on communications directed into Florida 
telephonically, electronically, or in writing sufficiently alleges personal jurisdiction 
under section 48.193(1)(b).‖  Id. (citing Acquadro, 851 So. 2d at 670; Wendt, 822 
So. 2d at 1260).  The court held that the plaintiff‘s complaint ―did just this when it 
alleged the [nonresident defendant] sent the e-mail to various members of [the 
association], some of whom live in Florida.‖  Id.   
In the chat room context, a Fourth District Court of Appeal case specifically 
addressed the issue of whether defamatory statements in a chat room constituted 
electronic communications into Florida under Wendt.  Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 
So. 2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  In Becker, the plaintiff, a licensed physician 
practicing in Florida, filed a complaint alleging that the out-of-state defendant was 
a moderator of an Internet chat room and had ―posted numerous defamatory 
 
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comments about him that were targeted to Florida residents, or people likely to 
seek medical care in the state of Florida, which resulted in injury to his reputation 
and business.‖  Id. at 561.  The district court quoted this Court‘s decision in Wendt 
that a defendant‘s physical presence is not required and that committing a tortious 
act in Florida can occur through the nonresident defendant‘s telephonic, electronic, 
or written communications into Florida.  Id. at 562-63.  The Fourth District 
concluded that the alleged defamatory comments in the chat room were sufficient 
to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b) because ―the communications that form the basis of 
the allegations in this case are analogous to cases previously decided by this court 
and certainly fit within the recent Supreme Court‘s discussion of electronic 
communications.‖  Id. at 563.  Although the chat room conversation took place 
over the Internet, we note that statements made in a chat room, such as in Becker, 
are easily analogized to a conference telephone call because a person typing 
comments in a chat room is directing his or her communication to a specific group 
of individuals, much like a person speaking during a telephone conference call, as 
in Acquadro, or a person sending an e-mail to multiple recipients, as in Price. 
Relevant 193(1)(b)  
to the World Wide Web 
 
The question of whether a posting on a website, which is located on the 
World Wide Web, constitutes an electronic communication into Florida is a more 
difficult one than telephone calls, e-mails, chat rooms, and facsimiles because the 
 
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posting is typically accessible from any state and is not directed by the alleged 
tortfeasor into a particular forum in the same way as a phone call, letter, e-mail, 
chat room, or facsimile.  As explained by a Connecticut court, ―Unlike the letter or 
e-mail cases,‖ a posting on a website ―is not sent anywhere in particular, but rather 
can be accessed from anywhere in the world.‖  Rios v. Fergusan, 978 A.2d 592, 
598 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2008) (quoting Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E.2d 12, 19 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2008)).  Whereas telephone calls, letters, e-mails, chat rooms, and facsimiles 
are easily analyzed as to whether the communication was sent into Florida, the 
World Wide Web is a more pervasive and complicated communication medium for 
the purpose of contemplating whether there is a communication into the state.   
A brief overview of the nature of the Internet and the World Wide Web is 
helpful.  At the outset, it is important to note that the Internet and the World Wide 
Web are not synonymous.  The Internet is the world‘s largest computer network.  
Christopher W. Meyer, Note, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction 
Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1269, 1275-76 (1997).  
There are multiple ways to transmit and receive information across the Internet, 
including e-mails, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web.  See id.  ―[T]he Web 
constitutes the body of information available, and the Internet refers only to the 
means by which one can access that information.‖  Todd A. Nist, Note, Finding the 
Right Approach:  A Constitutional Alternative for Shielding Kids from Harmful 
 
- 20 - 
Materials Online, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 451, 456 n.27 (2004).  ―Individuals commonly 
access the Internet through a commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP) and then 
use a browser to access resources and information on the World Wide Web.‖  Lora 
M. Jennings, Note, Finding Legal Certainty for E-Commerce: Traditional Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Scope of the Zippo Sliding Scale, 44 Washburn L.J. 381, 386 
(2005) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).  The World Wide Web, 
which ―has become one of the most popular and most used Internet programs,‖ has 
been further explained as follows: 
The World Wide Web consists of a vast number of documents stored 
in different computers located throughout the world.  The technology 
underlying the World Wide Web created links between individual 
computers so that documents, audio, and video files can be accessed 
from anywhere on the Internet.  To access information located on the 
World Wide Web, a user may enter the exact known Internet address 
of a specific Web page into the browser or use a search engine.  
Additionally, a user may navigate the World Wide Web by accessing 
a series of hyperlinks.  Because this structure facilitates easy access to 
information stored throughout the world, the World Wide Web has 
become one of the most popular and most used Internet programs.  
Id. 
With the unique context of the Web in mind, we now review the cases that 
have applied section 48.193(1)(b) in this context.  In Renaissance Health Publ‘g, 
LLC v. Resveratrol Partners, LLC, 982 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), a Florida 
corporation sued the nonresident defendants for trade libel and two related 
statutory violations, all arising from statements made on the defendants‘ website 
 
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allegedly disparaging the plaintiff corporation‘s products.  Id. at 740.  The 
complaint alleged that the defendant sold publications about food supplements 
(both in a traditional paper format and as e-books) and falsely and intentionally 
disparaged the quality of the plaintiff corporation‘s product (a red wine extract).  
Id. at 742.  The Fourth District began by referring to its Becker decision.  Id. 
(citing Becker, 841 So. 2d at 563).  The court then held that the statements on the 
website constituted a tortious act committed in Florida, reasoning that ―[t]he 
defendants‘ interactive web site which sells product to Florida residents is akin to 
the chat room in Becker.‖  Id.  Thus, ―[a]pplying Wendt and Becker,‖ the court 
held that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the Florida long-arm 
statute.  Id.  The court appeared to focus on the fact that the comments posted in 
the chat room in Becker were ―targeted‖ at Florida residents or people likely to 
seek medical care in Florida as well as the fact that the website in Renaissance was 
interactive and sold products to Florida residents, presumably reasoning that the 
website was ―targeted‖ at Florida residents or people likely to purchase the 
plaintiff‘s product in Florida. 
Although no other Florida courts have addressed this issue, federal district 
courts interpreting Florida‘s long-arm statute have confronted the issue.  In 
Whitney Information Network, Inc. v. XCentric Ventures, LLC, 347 F. Supp. 2d 
1242 (M.D. Fla. 2004), the federal district court examined whether the defendant‘s 
 
- 22 - 
website was ―passive‖ or ―active‖ in order to resolve the issue.  The difference 
between a passive website and an active website has been described as follows: ―A 
passive web site only makes information available to those interested in viewing 
the web site in foreign jurisdictions whereas an active web site allows for those 
interested in foreign jurisdictions to enter into contracts over the Internet with the 
defendant.‖  Miami Breakers Soccer Club, Inc. v. Women‘s United Soccer Ass‘n, 
140 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
In Whitney, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for, inter alia, defamation, 
alleging that defendants operated a website, www.ripoffreport.com, the purpose of 
which was to publish consumer complaints, which the defendants actively 
solicited, and to imply that the company named in the complaint was ―ripping off‖ 
consumers.  347 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.  The defendants also allegedly advertised 
items for sale and solicited donations from consumers.  Id.  While on the 
www.ripoffreport.com website, a consumer could click on a link to a second 
website, www.ripoffrevenge.com, at which defendants sold either a service or do-
it-yourself kits.  Id.  The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants published 
more than a dozen false stories about them and subjected them to false and 
defamatory articles.  Id. at 1243-44.  
 
The federal district court held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to 
satisfy section 48.193(1)(b), stating: 
 
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While . . . Xcentric does not transact any business, have any agents in 
Florida, or maintain any offices in Florida, this is not determinative 
under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b).  Its website ―www.ripoffreport.com‖ 
allows consumers to target an individual state by inviting them to 
―Pick any state!‖ for information.  The website promises to contact 
individual consumers with certain information (―We will contact you 
if a lawsuit is being considered or has been filed which you may want 
to be a party to‖), e-mail victims to contact other victims and 
attorneys interested in pursuing class action lawsuits, and to put 
consumers in contact with the media.  The website asserts that it has 
assisted, and continues to assist, many government agencies from 
around the country, and that many television stations ―from all around 
the country‖ come to the Ripoff Report for information.  The website 
offers businesses the opportunity to file a rebuttal to any report it 
publishes.  The website ran at least nine reports concerning plaintiffs‘ 
activities in Florida, and specifically solicited information from the 
named business in a ―Rebuttal Box‖ on the website.  The website sold 
advertising space, and solicited advertisers with reduced rates and a 
feature which allowed them to ―Pick any state!‖  In an example of its 
advertising service, the website specifically referred to advertising 
business in Florida and the presence of reports from Florida. 
Id. at 1244-45 (record references omitted).  The court concluded that these facts 
were sufficient to satisfy the Florida long-arm statute, reasoning that ―[t]he activity 
takes defendants‘ conduct beyond a mere passive website, and allows the Court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction.‖  Id. at 1245 (citing Toys ―R‖ Us, Inc. v. Step Two, 
S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3rd Cir. 2003); Nw. Healthcare Alliance, Inc. v. 
Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 F. App‘x. 339 (9th Cir. 2002)).   
 
Other federal district court cases have discussed the issue without an 
analysis of whether the website was ―passive‖ or ―active.‖  In Alternate Energy 
Corp. v. Redstone, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2004), the plaintiff, a non-
 
- 24 - 
Florida resident, brought suit, alleging claims for libel, slander, defamation, and 
violations of state law, arising out of information published on the nonresident 
defendant‘s website.  Id. at 1381.  The defendant published an independent Internet 
website that monitored the hydrogen fuel cell industry.  Id.  Part of the defendant‘s 
website was open to the public, but the remainder was available to subscribers 
only; the defendant did not sell merchandise through his website, which offered 
only information.  Id.  According to the complaint, the defendant harmed the 
plaintiff by publishing negative information on the restricted portion of the 
defendant‘s website.  Id.  The defendant sold a small number of the subscriptions 
to the restricted portion of the website to Florida residents.  Id. at 1383.  The court 
held that long-arm jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(b) was not proper, finding that 
―selling subscriptions to an internet site to an unknown, relatively small number of 
Florida residents, without more, does not . . . constitute the commission of a 
tortious act in Florida under § 48.193(1)(b).‖  Alternate Energy Corp., 328 F. Supp. 
2d at 1383.  The court distinguished the case from Becker and Wendt because they 
involved instances where Florida courts found that personal 
jurisdiction existed under § 48.193(1)(b).  However, the fact that the 
plaintiffs in both Becker and Wendt were Florida residents and the 
defendants had specifically targeted their actions toward the state of 
Florida factored prominently into the respective courts‘ 
determinations that the out-of-state defendants had allegedly 
committed tortious acts in Florida.  Conversely, in the instant case, 
Plaintiff is an out-of-state resident, and there is no indication that 
Defendant‘s actions caused more harm to Plaintiff in Florida than 
anywhere else. 
 
- 25 - 
Id. at 1384 (citations omitted). 
In a recent case, Richards v. Sen, No. 07-14254-CIV, 2008 WL 4889623 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2008), the federal district court focused only on whether a 
posting on a website was ―an electronic communication accessible to Florida 
residents,‖ id. at *4, not whether the nonresident defendants intended for the 
communication to be directed at Florida residents.  In that case, the plaintiffs 
brought suit for, inter alia, defamation, slander of title, and injurious falsehood 
claims.  Id.  The plaintiffs‘ claims appeared to be based on the defendants‘ filing of 
a patent application that led to the Patent and Trademark Office‘s (PTO) issuance 
of a patent; the plaintiffs contended that the application tortiously omitted them as 
inventors or assignees.  Id.  The federal district court stated that ―Florida‘s long-
arm statute enables the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant for 
defamation, slander and libel claims when the injurious information or material is 
circulated or published to a third party within the state.‖  Id.  Accordingly, the 
court held that, assuming that the statements were sufficient to support the alleged 
causes of action, ―the PTO‘s publication of the [patent] on the internet is sufficient 
to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute because 
publication of the allegedly injurious statements and omissions is an electronic 
communication accessible to Florida residents.‖  Id. (citing § 48.193(1)(b), Fla. 
Stat.; Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1253).  The court concluded, however, that the exercise 
 
- 26 - 
of jurisdiction would not comport with due process, because the defendants ―did 
not have fair warning that filing the patent application, which led to the PTO‘s 
subsequent grant of the [patent], would subject them to suit in Florida. . . .  
Defendants did not purposely direct any activity towards Florida by filing the 
[patent] application.‖  Id. at *5.   
A review of the relevant case law reveals that courts interpreting Florida law 
in the context of the Web have applied differing approaches.  Some courts appear 
to have interpreted Wendt‘s statement that ― ‗committing a tortious act‘ in Florida 
under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant‘s 
telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida,‖ 822 So. 2d at 
1260, as requiring that the defendant direct the communications into Florida or 
otherwise target Florida.  Renaissance Health Publ‘g, LLC, 982 So. 2d at 740 
(interactive website that sells product to Florida residents targeted Florida 
residents); see Whitney Info. Network, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1245 (defendant‘s 
website was not a mere passive website).  At least one other court, however, has 
taken a far more expansive view by holding that merely posting material online ―is 
an electronic communication accessible to Florida residents.‖  Richards, 2008 WL 
4889623, at *4. 
 
- 27 - 
 Having reviewed the relevant case law interpreting section 48.193(1)(b), we 
now turn to an analysis of when a nonresident defendant commits the tortious act 
of defamation within Florida in the unique context of the Web. 
Interpretation of Section 48.193(1)(b) in the Context of the World Wide Web 
The operative statutory language is ―committing a tortious act within the 
state.‖  § 48.193(1)(b).  In Wendt, this Court interpreted section 48.193(1)(b) to 
include electronic communication ―into‖ the state.  The tortious act that ISC 
alleges Marshall committed within Florida is defamation, and a review of 
applicable defamation law as it pertains to personal jurisdiction is helpful.  
―Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a 
negligent act to one other than the person defamed.‖  Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 
So. 2d 1010, 1016 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Tort § 577 
(1977)).  Under Florida law, the tort of libel is not completed until the statements 
are published.  See Silver v. Levinson, 648 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).8  
As explained in Silver:  
[B]ecause the threshold question of personal jurisdiction turns on 
whether defendant committed an intentional tort in Florida, we must 
                                          
 
 
8.  The elements of a claim for defamation are as follows: ―(1) publication; 
(2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity 
on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter 
concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be 
defamatory.‖  Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008). 
 
- 28 - 
also necessarily review the complaint to determine whether it states a 
cause of action for libel.  If the complaint does not set forth a cause of 
action for the tort of libel, then assertion of personal jurisdiction 
predicated on the commission of that specific tort would be improper. 
 
 
. . . . 
Under Florida law, the tort of libel is not completed until the 
statements are published.  In this case, the final element of the tort 
was not satisfied until the letters were received . . . in Florida.  Until 
that time, no tort had been ―committed.‖ 
 
Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted).  Further, the tort of defamation is committed in 
the place where the defamatory material is published.  Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood 
Equity Partners, L.P., 960 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (―A telephonic, 
electronic, or written communication is deemed ‗published‘ in Florida, subjecting 
the publisher to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida 
Statutes if the communication was made into this state by a person outside the 
state, even if that person has no other contacts with the state.‖ (citing Wendt, 822 
So. 2d at 1258)). 
We conclude that allegedly defamatory material about a Florida resident 
placed on the Web and accessible in Florida constitutes an ―electronic 
communication into Florida‖ when the material is accessed (or ―published‖) in 
Florida.  In the context of the World Wide Web, given its pervasiveness, an alleged 
tortfeasor who posts allegedly defamatory material on a website has intentionally 
made the material almost instantly available everywhere the material is accessible.  
By posting allegedly defamatory material on the Web about a Florida resident, the 
 
- 29 - 
poster has directed the communication about a Florida resident to readers 
worldwide, including potential readers within Florida.  When the posting is then 
accessed by a third party in Florida, the material has been ―published‖ in Florida 
and the poster has communicated the material ―into‖ Florida, thereby committing 
the tortious act of defamation within Florida.  This interpretation is consistent with 
the approach taken regarding other forms of communication. 
Marshall contends that this Court should apply First Amendment principles 
to Florida‘s long-arm statute in defamation actions and that we should consider 
issues of fairness when construing the long-arm statute.  We decline to do so 
because we have never construed the first prong of the jurisdictional analysis with 
a constitutional overlay.  As stated previously by this Court, the statutory prong of 
the jurisdictional analysis ―bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts.  A court 
can exercise personal jurisdiction, inter alia, whenever a foreign corporation 
commits a ‗tortious act‘ on Florida soil.‖  Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1257 (quoting 
Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc., 752 So. 2d at 584).  Issues of due process and fairness 
are properly considered in the second prong, which ―imposes a more restrictive 
requirement.‖  Id. (quoting Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc., 752 So. 2d at 584).  
Further, we decline to make the policy decision that defamation actions should be 
 
- 30 - 
treated differently under Florida‘s long-arm statute.9  As explained by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, ―the potential chill on protected First Amendment activity 
stemming from libel and defamation actions is already taken into account in the 
constitutional limitations on the substantive law governing such suits.‖  Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).  Thus, ―[t]o reintroduce 
those concerns at the jurisdictional stage would be a form of double counting.‖  Id.  
Accordingly, we too ―reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter 
into the jurisdictional analysis.‖  Id. 
This Case 
Applying this approach, Marshall‘s posting of allegedly defamatory material 
about a Florida company that was accessible in Florida constitutes committing a 
tortious act within Florida, provided that the material was accessed—and thus 
published—in Florida. 
                                          
 
 
9.  Marshall notes that New York‘s long-arm statute specifically exempts 
defamation actions.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2009) 
(―As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a 
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor 
or administrator, who in person or through an agent: . . . commits a tortious act 
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising 
from the act . . . .‖).  Florida‘s long-arm statute, however, does not include a 
similar exemption.  Florida courts have applied section 48.193(1)(b) to defamation 
causes of action, and the Legislature has not amended the statute to include a 
defamation exemption or afford special treatment for defamation claims. 
 
- 31 - 
Marshall asserts that her acts were completed in the State of Washington and 
nothing on the website could be published to a Florida computer ―unless (and until) 
the reader reached up into Washington and retrieved it.‖10  We reject this argument 
because it ignores the nature of the Web, which is fundamentally different from a 
telephone call, an e-mail, or a letter—by posting on her website, Marshall made the 
material accessible by anyone with Internet access worldwide.  Thus, once the 
allegedly defamatory material is published in Florida, Marshall has committed the 
tortious act of defamation within Florida for purposes of Florida‘s long-arm 
statute.11 
We emphasize that we are only asked to address the first step of the 
inquiry—whether section 48.193(1)(b) applies to confer personal jurisdiction.  The 
second step is a more restrictive one, precluding suit in any situation where the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would violate due process.  
This question is not before us in the certified question and we do not deem it 
necessary to broaden the question in order to address the due process inquiry.  
CONCLUSION 
                                          
 
 
10.  Under Marshall‘s view, even a website posting that is directed at Florida 
or targets Florida is still not sent ―into‖ Florida or anywhere in particular. 
11.  We note that the issues of whether Marshall targeted a Florida resident, 
whether Marshall purposefully directed her post at Florida, or whether Marshall‘s 
website is ―active‖ or ―passive‖ could be properly considered in the due process 
analysis. 
 
- 32 - 
  
For the reasons explained above, we answer the rephrased certified question 
in the affirmative.  A nonresident defendant commits the tortious act of defamation 
in Florida for purposes of Florida‘s long-arm statute when the nonresident makes 
allegedly defamatory statements about a Florida resident by posting those 
statements on a website, provided that the website posts containing the statements 
are accessible in Florida and accessed in Florida.  Having answered this question, 
we return this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
  
It is so ordered.  
QUINCE, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 08-12328-FF 
 
Keith E. Kress and Myra P. Nicholson, Orlando, Florida, and Kevin W. 
Shaughnessy and Caroline M. Landt of Baker and Hostetler, LLP, Orlando, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Marc J. Randazza, Miami, Florida 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Terry M. Sanks and Kevin W. Wimberly of Beusse, Wolter, Sanks, Mora, and 
Maire, P.A., Orlando, Florida, on behalf of Media Bloggers Association, Inc.; and 
Lyrissa C. Barnett Lidsky of University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, 
 
- 33 - 
Florida, and Gregory A. Beck of Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, 
D.C., on behalf of Public Citizen, 
 
  
as Amici Curiae