Title: People v. Sexton
Citation: 461 Mich. 746, 609 N.W.2d 822
Docket Number: 115216
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2000

609 N.W.2d 822 (2000)
461 Mich. 746
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Corey Edward SEXTON, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No. 115216.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
April 25, 2000.
*823 Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel L. Lemisch, Chief, Appellate Division, and Kathryn G. Barnes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, MI, for the people.
Robyn B. Frankel, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for the defendant-appellee.
PER CURIAM.
On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for second-degree murder and felony-firearm on the ground that two of five statements made by the defendant to the police were involuntary. For the reasons stated by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, we reverse the judgment of that Court and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
When this case came before us two years ago, 458 Mich. 43,46-47, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998),[1] we set forth the facts:
After the polygraph was completed, the examiner advised Sexton that in his opinion defendant's answers had not been truthful. Defendant's response was monitored and he admitted that he intentionally shot Phillips. Sexton was then placed under arrest and again advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant stated that he understood the rights and did not want to talk to a lawyer before further questioning. Defendant gave a recorded statement in which he again admitted that he intentionally shot his cousin. This final statement was given at 11:35 P.M.
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The defense filed a motion to suppress the defendant's inculpatory statements, but the trial court found that the statements were freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made, and denied the motion.[6]
Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; MSA 28.549, conditioned on a right to challenge the admissibility of the confessions on appeal. Sexton was sentenced to twenty to forty years for the offense, plus two years for the felony-firearm violation.
While defendant's appeal was pending, this Court decided People v. Bender [452 Mich. 594, 551 N.W.2d 71 (1996) ]. In an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 20, 1996 (Docket No. 177061), the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that suppression was mandated regarding all statements made after 5:30 P.M.[7] We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. [456 Mich. 852, 568 N.W.2d 669 (1997).]
In our 1998 opinion, we held that the decision in Bender[8] applied only to interrogations *825 that occurred after July 23, 1996, and that the defendants' statements should not have been suppressed. We remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with our 1998 opinion. 458 Mich. at 69, 580 N.W.2d 404.
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed. 236 Mich.App. 525, 601 N.W.2d 399 (1999). Over the dissent of Judge Murphy, the majority concluded:
The majority remanded the case to circuit court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The prosecutor has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Murphy explains the majority's error. We agree with his analysis and adopt his opinion as our own:
"[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of *826 the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.
For those reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court. MCR 7.302(F)(1).[9]
WEAVER, C.J., and TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
*827 MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I cannot join the majority. It is the second rung on an analytical ladder descending from the precedent established in People v. Bender, 452 Mich. 594, 551 N.W.2d 71 (1996). The first step away from Bender occurred when this Court gave Bender prospective application only. People v. Sexton, 458 Mich. 43, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998). At that time, I shared Justice Brickley's misgivings about the decision to limit Bender. Those misgivings have not disappeared with the passage of time.
In Bender, a majority of this Court held that a suspect has a constitutional right to be advised of the fact that counsel has been retained. Bender, supra at 621, 551 N.W.2d 71 (Brickley, C.J., concurring). Bender recognized that the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination guarantee not only that an accused be informed that he is entitled to counsel, but also that he has counsel. Id. In the present case, the police kept an accused away from his attorney during an interrogation. I cannot support an approach that purposely shields the light that Bender provided.
This defendant's statements should have been suppressed. The majority reaches its result by determining that the defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Voluntariness is only one part of a two part test; waiver must also be knowing and intelligent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The voluntariness issue would not now be before this Court had the Court previously applied the Bender rule.
This defendant was afflicted by the same wrongs that gave rise to this Court's Bender decision. Those wrongs have not diminished even in the face of this Court's decision to handcuff Bender. Neither have the defendant's fundamental rights disappeared. I joined Justice Brickley's well-composed dissent when this Court decided that Bender should be given prospective application. Sexton, supra at 69, 580 N.W.2d 404 (Brickley, J., dissenting). The concerns Justice Brickley enunciated in that dissent are equally present today.
MARILYN J. KELLY, J., concurred with MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J.
[1]  Cert. den. sub. nom. Young v. Michigan, 525 U.S. 1126, 119 S. Ct. 912, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999).
[2]  The police questioned the defendant and two other men while sitting in a patrol car. According to the testimony of Officer Keith Lehr, the questioning was done in the police car to facilitate note taking. Lehr never told the defendant that he was under arrest.
[3]  Before being questioned, the defendant was given an atomic absorption test.
[4]  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
[5]  Detective Marchlones first became aware of Miller's presence at 10:30 P.M.
[6]  Judge Andrews held on the basis of Justice Brickley's concurrence in People v. Wright, 441 Mich. 140, 490 N.W.2d 351 (1992), that the failure of the police to tell the defendant about a retained attorney was just one among many factors to consider using a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
[7]  The Court of Appeals held that statements taken after Mr. Miller's telephone call must be suppressed. The issue of whether telephone contact is sufficient to invoke the protection of Bender is not before us. However, we note without comment that only Justices Cavanagh, Levin, and Mallett wrote to extend the per se rule to alternative forms of police contact. Id. at 617, 551 N.W.2d 71.
[8]  The lead opinion in Bender states the issue and a holding that was supported by three justices of this Court:

In this case, we are asked to consider whether, under Michigan law, a suspect's waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel is valid when the police fail to inform him, before he gives a statement, that a specific, retained attorney is immediately available to consult with him. We hold that Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17 requires the police to inform the suspect that a retained attorney is immediately available to consult with him, and failure to so inform him before he confesses per se precludes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel. [452 Mich. at 597, 551 N.W.2d 71 (opinion of CAVANAGH, J.).]
In an opinion presented as a concurrence, but which actually was a majority opinion, this Court stated:
I agree with the result arrived at in the opinion for affirmance, but write separately to express my reasons for doing so.
The case rather clearly implicates both the right to counsel (Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20) and the right against self-incrimination (Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17). I conclude that rather than interpreting these provisions, it would be more appropriate to approach the law enforcement practices that are at the core of this case in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court approached the constitutional interpretation task in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); namely, by announcing a prophylactic rule. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974). [452 Mich. at 620-621, 551 N.W.2d 71 (opinion of BRICKLEY, J.).]
[9]  We acknowledge the prosecutor's argument that we should overrule People v. Bender, 452 Mich. 594, 551 N.W.2d 71 (1996). However, we decline to address that argument because Bender has no application here, where the interrogation took place before Bender was decided. People v. Sexton, 458 Mich. 43, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998).

We note that the dissent mischaracterizes our holding in Bender. The dissent states:
In Bender, a majority of this Court held that a suspect has a constitutional right to be advised of the fact that counsel has been retained. Bender, supra at 621, 551 N.W.2d 71 (Brickley, C.J., concurring). [Op. at 827.]
However, in People v. Sexton, we held to the contrary, stating:
[T]he ultimate holding of the Court [in Bender ] was not that the rule was required by either Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17 or § 20.[Id. at 53, 580 N.W.2d 404.]
[T]he Bender majority expressly and unequivocally described the new rule as being prophylactic in nature, declining to find that the Michigan Constitution required it. [Id. at 54, n. 13, 580 N.W.2d 404.]
It is apparent that the dissent wishes to overrule Sexton. However, because we are not persuaded, nor presented with any arguments, that Sexton was wrongly decided, there is no need to determine whether stare decisis principles would nevertheless counsel against overruling Sexton.