Title: Walker v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990096
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DARICK DEMORRIS WALKER 
 
v.  Record Nos. 990096 & 990097 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 11, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
Darick Demorris Walker was indicted for the capital 
murder of Stanley Roger Beale and Clarence Threat within a 
three-year period, Code § 18.2-31(8), for four counts of the 
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Code § 18.2-
53.1, and for two counts of burglary, Code § 18.2-90.  He was 
convicted of all offenses by a jury.  After hearing evidence 
on the issue of punishment, the jury fixed the punishment for 
the capital offense at death based upon the vileness and 
future dangerousness predicates, life imprisonment on each of 
the burglaries, and a total of 18 years imprisonment for the 
firearms offenses.  The trial court, after considering the 
sentencing report of a probation officer, sentenced Walker in 
accord with the jury verdicts.  Walker appealed his capital 
murder conviction, Record No. 990096.  We have certified 
Walker's appeal of his non-capital murder convictions from the 
Court of Appeals, Record No. 990097, and have consolidated the 
two appeals. 
I.  Evidence 
 
Applying familiar principles, we recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing 
below.  See Horton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 609, 499 
S.E.2d 258, 259 (1998). 
A.  Stanley Beale 
Catherine Taylor and her children, Monique, Bianca, and 
Sidney, lived in the University Terrace Apartments with 
Stanley Beale, the children's father.  On the evening of 
November 22, 1996, Taylor heard "a boom like noise" in the 
living room.  Taylor left the bedroom where she had been with 
Sidney, an infant, and as she entered the living room, she saw 
a man kick in the locked front door.  Taylor later identified 
the man as Walker.  Walker was holding a gun yelling, "Where 
is he?"  Walker continued yelling, asking Beale "what you keep 
coming up to my door, what you looking for me for?"  Beale, 
who was standing in the doorway to the kitchen, answered that 
he did not know Walker and did not know where Walker lived.  
Bianca, who was 13 years old at the time, shouted at Walker 
that her father did not know him.  Walker began shooting at 
Beale as Taylor ushered Bianca and Monique into the bathroom 
to hide in the bathtub.  Walker shot Beale three times, 
killing him. 
 
Bianca testified that she knew Walker as "Todd" and 
subsequently identified Walker in a photo line-up as the 
 
2
person who killed her father.  Tameria Patterson, a fourteen-
year-old girl who was visiting a friend who lived in the 
University Terrace Apartments, testified that on the night of 
the murder, she saw a man she knew as "Todd" enter her 
friend's apartment and say "I shot him."  When shown a photo 
spread, Tameria identified Walker as the person who had 
entered the apartment. 
B.  Clarence Threat 
 
On the night of June 18, 1997, Andrea Noble and Clarence 
Threat were sleeping in their bedroom when they were awakened 
by a "pop" coming from the screen door, followed by a knock at 
the door.  Noble went to the door and looked outside through a 
small window in the door, but did not see anyone.  On two 
subsequent occasions she again heard a knock and went to the 
door, but did not see anyone.  Sometime after the third knock, 
the door was "kicked open."  Noble went to the living room and 
saw a person she knew as "Paul" standing with a gun.  "Paul" 
pointed the gun at Noble as she backed into the bedroom.  When 
they reached the bedroom, "Paul" hit Noble with the back of 
the gun and then shot Threat in the leg.  In the bedroom, 
"Paul" and Threat exchanged words and "Paul" shot Threat 
again.  Threat sustained a total of seven gunshot wounds.  He 
died as a result of a gunshot wound to the chest.  The shooter 
told Noble that if she told anyone "he would come back and 
 
3
kill [her] and [her] kids."  At trial, Noble identified Walker 
as the person she knew as "Paul."  
II.  Constitutionality of Virginia's  
Death Penalty Statutes 
 
 
In his first assignment of error, Walker asserts that 
Virginia's death penalty statutes, Code §§ 19.2-264.2 to -
264.5, and 17.1-313, are unconstitutional.  Specifically, he 
argues that the aggravating factors which the jury must 
consider to impose the death penalty are unconstitutionally 
vague, and that the failure to provide jury instructions 
regarding the meaning of those terms or to properly inform and 
instruct the jury on the consideration of mitigation evidence 
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Sections 9 and 11 of Article I of the 
Virginia Constitution.  We have previously considered and 
rejected these contentions, and Walker presents no basis for 
altering our prior decisions.  See M. Smith v. Commonwealth, 
219 Va. 455, 476-77, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (1978), cert. denied, 
441 U.S. 967 (1979)(rejecting contention that "vileness" and 
"future dangerousness" predicates for imposition of the death 
penalty unconstitutionally fail to guide the jury's 
discretion); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 490-91, 331 
S.E.2d 422, 438 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 
 
4
(1986)(Constitution requires only that jury be instructed to 
consider mitigating evidence.)  
 
Walker also asserts that the death penalty statutes are 
unconstitutional because they do not require the trial court 
to set aside a sentence of death upon a showing of good cause, 
they allow the trial court to consider hearsay evidence in the 
post-hearing sentence report, and the review conducted by this 
Court is inconsistent with the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment.  These assertions have previously been rejected in 
Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 
Va. 672, 701-02, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507-08, cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 871 (1988); R. Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 253, 
389 S.E.2d 871, 876, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990), 
respectively, and Walker fails to advance any reason to depart 
from these decisions. 
III.  Request for a Bill of Particulars 
 
Walker next assigns error to the trial court's denial of 
his request for a bill of particulars.  He contends that the 
information he requested was necessary to ensure his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and that 
the lack of such information undermines the "greater degree of 
reliability" that due process requires in death penalty cases. 
 
In his request for a bill of particulars, Walker sought 
 
5
identification of the grounds for the capital murder charge 
and the evidence upon which the Commonwealth would rely to 
prove the charge.  He further requested the Commonwealth to 
identify and provide a "narrowing construction" of the 
aggravating factors upon which it intended to rely in seeking 
the death penalty as well as the evidence it intended to use 
in support of the aggravating factors.  
The Commonwealth responded to Walker's request by 
reciting the grounds upon which it believed Walker was guilty 
of capital murder.  The Commonwealth further stated that, if 
Walker was convicted of capital murder, it would seek the 
death penalty based on the aggravating factors of "vileness" 
and "future dangerousness."  The Commonwealth stated that, to 
prove "vileness," it would rely on the depravity of mind and 
aggravated battery components provided in Code § 19.2-264(C).  
Finally, the Commonwealth informed Walker that in proving 
"future dangerousness," it would rely on Walker's adult and 
juvenile criminal record, the circumstances of the commission 
of the current offenses, Walker's lack of remorse, and 
evidence of other crimes whether adjudicated or unadjudicated.  
 
The information requested by Walker is virtually 
identical to that requested by the defendant in Strickler v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 944 (1991).  In Strickler, we held that where the 
 
6
indictment is sufficient, i.e., gives the accused "notice of 
the nature and character of the offense charged so he can make 
his defense," a bill of particulars is not required.  Id. at 
490, 404 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 
Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1976)). 
 
Here, there is no challenge to the sufficiency of the 
indictment.  As in Strickler, those parts of Walker's request 
for a bill of particulars seeking disclosure of the evidence 
upon which the Commonwealth intended to rely in the guilt and 
sentencing phases of the trial "are sweeping demands for 
pretrial disclosure of all the Commonwealth's evidence."  241 
Va. at 490, 404 S.E.2d at 233. 
 
However, "[t]here is no general constitutional right to 
discovery in a criminal case, even where a capital offense is 
charged."  Id. at 490-91, 404 S.E.2d at 233.  Walker, like the 
defendant in Strickler, received all the information to which 
he was entitled.  Furthermore, whether to require the 
Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars is a matter that 
falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 454, 470 S.E.2d 114, 123, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996), and Walker has not demonstrated 
an abuse of that discretion. 
 
7
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in denying Walker's request for a bill of particulars in this 
case. 
IV.  Motion for Discovery and Inspection 
 
Walker assigns error to the trial court's denial of his 
motion for discovery and inspection.  He admits that the 
Commonwealth provided him with all discovery and inspection to 
which he was entitled under state statutes and Rules of Court, 
and he does not assert that the Commonwealth improperly 
withheld any exculpatory information.  Instead, Walker argues 
that the trial court erroneously refused to extend the 
Commonwealth's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence imposed 
by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and to require the 
Commonwealth to disclose "all evidence, information and all 
other materials which the Commonwealth intended to offer to 
establish the guilt of the appellant . . . ."  Walker argues 
that such extension is required to ensure the defendant's 
right to effective assistance of counsel and to meet the due 
process requirement of reliability in the determination that 
the death penalty is the appropriate punishment.  We disagree. 
 
Neither the holding in Brady nor principles of due 
process impose any requirement on the Commonwealth to provide 
the information sought by Walker beyond that which is 
exculpatory.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976); 
 
8
see Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 303, 384 S.E.2d 785, 
791 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).  We do not 
find anything in Walker's arguments to warrant the extension 
of the holding in Brady he suggests.  Because the Commonwealth 
provided Walker all the discovery to which he was entitled, we 
find no error in the denial of his motion for discovery and 
inspection.  
V.  Additional Peremptory Challenges 
 
Walker asserts that a defendant is entitled to additional 
peremptory challenges to "ensure rights guaranteed by the 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States," and suggests that because a number of 
states and federal courts have allowed additional peremptory 
strikes the trial court erred in denying his request for 
additional strikes. 
 
However, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right 
to peremptory challenges.  Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 
424-25 (1991).  And, as we have said on numerous previous 
occasions, there is no provision in Virginia law for granting 
such additional peremptory strikes.  Strickler, 241 Va. at 
489, 404 S.E.2d at 232; Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 
84-85, 393 S.E.2d 609, 613, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); 
see Code § 19.2-262.  Walker has presented no reason for us to 
alter our previous rulings. 
 
9
VI.  Evidence of Unadjudicated Criminal Behavior 
 
On August 10, 17, and 18, 1998, pursuant to Code § 19.2-
265.3:2, the Commonwealth filed notices of its intent to 
present evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct of the 
defendant at the sentencing phase of the trial.  Walker 
asserts that admission of this evidence was error on three 
primary grounds:  (1) without a positive connection of the 
evidence to the defendant by some standard of proof, the 
evidence does not meet the test of relevancy; (2) due process 
requires proof of unadjudicated prior criminal acts beyond a 
reasonable doubt when such conduct is relied upon to expose 
the defendant to greater or additional punishment; and (3) the 
use of unadjudicated criminal acts evidence denies the 
defendant his due process rights to notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard on evidence used against him which 
also results in denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.  We reject all three 
of these arguments for the reasons discussed below. 
 
First, we have previously held that evidence of prior 
violent criminal conduct, whether or not adjudicated, is 
relevant to the determination of a defendant's future 
dangerousness because it has a tendency to show that the 
accused would commit criminal acts of violence in the future.  
Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 284-85, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-
 
10
12 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987).  Whether the 
evidence produced establishes the ultimate fact at issue must, 
of course, be tested by some standard of proof.  Here, the 
ultimate issue of fact was Walker's "future dangerousness," 
which the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Walker cites no authority for the 
proposition that each piece of evidence offered to prove the 
ultimate issue of fact must itself also be tested by some 
standard of proof.  Rather, that evidence is tested by the 
credibility or weight the fact finder chooses to give it.  See 
Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 346-47, 356 S.E.2d 157, 
175-76, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).  Therefore, we 
reject Walker's assertion that the evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal acts did not meet the test of relevancy because that 
evidence was not established by any standard of proof. 
 
Next Walker relies on and quotes from McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), for the proposition that 
evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is subject to the 
reasonable doubt standard of evidence in the sentencing phase 
of a capital murder trial because it "expose[s]" the defendant 
to greater punishment and presents a "radically different 
situation from the usual sentencing procedures." 
 
The Supreme Court in McMillan considered whether due 
process was offended by a statute which raised the minimum 
 
11
sentence if the trial court in the sentencing phase found that 
a defendant had "visibly possessed a firearm" in the 
commission of the charged offense.  The trial court's finding 
did not have to be beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant 
in that case argued that the evidentiary standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt was required because visible possession of a 
firearm was, in effect, an element of the offense.  He argued 
further that even if it was not an element of the offense, due 
process required application of the reasonable doubt standard 
because a finding of visible possession subjected the 
defendant to a greater penalty.  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
concluding that visible possession of a firearm was not an 
element of the offense charged, and that the trial court's 
finding did not subject the defendant to a greater penalty but 
only raised the minimum sentence.  Id. at 95. 
 
In the course of its discussion, the Court observed that, 
had the trial court's finding of visible possession of a 
firearm exposed the defendant to "greater or additional 
punishment," the argument that the finding was an element of 
the crime subject to the reasonable doubt standard of proof 
"would have at least more superficial appeal."  Id. at 88.  
The Court also observed that if the sentencing proceeding was 
"radically different," the reasonable doubt standard may be 
applied to post-trial findings.  Id. at 89. 
 
12
 
Contrary to Walker's assertion, these comments do not 
impose a due process requirement that the Commonwealth prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in the 
unadjudicated criminal conduct offered as evidence in the 
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.  These comments 
merely suggest that such a burden of proof may be required for 
a factual finding that exposes the defendant to greater 
punishment when such finding is made in a sentencing 
proceeding that is "radically different" from the normal 
sentencing proceeding.  Even if this suggestion were the rule, 
the Virginia death penalty sentencing statute satisfies that 
rule.  The "finding" that exposes the defendant to the death 
penalty is that of future dangerousness, or alternatively, 
vileness, which by statute must be supported by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Code § 19.2-264.4(C).  Furthermore, in 
McMillan, the Supreme Court specifically cited its holding in 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977), for the 
proposition that the state need not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt every fact it recognizes as a circumstance affecting the 
severity of punishment.  McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.  Therefore, 
we reject Walker's assertion that due process requires that 
evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct admitted to show 
the defendant's future dangerousness is subject to the 
reasonable doubt standard. 
 
13
 
Finally, Walker asserts that the use of the unadjudicated 
criminal conduct evidence denies him a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard on the evidence used against him, thus denying him 
effective assistance of counsel.  Walker had notice of the 
evidence the Commonwealth intended to introduce and the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses offering this 
evidence.  He does not claim such notice was inadequate nor 
does he contend that his counsel's performance was inadequate. 
 
Rather Walker argues, on a more general level, that 
"counsel defending against prior unadjudicated criminal 
conduct [evidence] is beyond the resources and realm of 
effective representation in defending a single capital crime."  
By this argument Walker seeks to raise a Sixth Amendment claim 
without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial.  
Whether or not such a claim might be sufficient in limited 
circumstances, it cannot prevail in this case. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has found constitutional 
error without inquiring into counsel's actual performance only 
when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of 
ineffectiveness.  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 
(1984).  For example, where counsel was totally absent, was 
prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage 
of the proceeding, or was prevented from exercising 
independent judgment in the manner of conducting the defense, 
 
14
the Supreme Court has presumed that counsel was ineffective 
and that the defendant was thus prejudiced.  See id. at 659 n. 
25; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)(attorney 
barred by law from consulting with client during overnight 
recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)(attorney 
barred by law from giving summation at bench trial); Brooks v. 
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)(requirement that defendant be 
first defense witness); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932)(counsel for defendant charged with capital offense 
appointed on day of trial). 
 
The admission of evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
conduct, unlike the cases cited above, does not present 
circumstances justifying a presumption of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  After having obtained a guilty 
verdict, the Commonwealth was burdened by statute with the 
responsibility of proving beyond a reasonable doubt either 
future dangerousness or vileness before the death penalty 
could be imposed.  As discussed above, the unadjudicated 
criminal conduct was relevant to Walker's future 
dangerousness, Walker had notice that such evidence would be 
used, and he had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses through whom the Commonwealth offered this evidence. 
 
Accordingly, we find that admission of this evidence did 
not violate Walker's due process or Sixth Amendment rights to 
 
15
effective assistance of counsel and a meaningful opportunity 
to defend himself. 
VII.  Admission of Evidence of Cartridge 
 
During the guilt phase, Detective Curtis R. Mullins 
testified that he received a cartridge from Steve Martin, who 
was the property manager of the University Terrace Apartments 
where the Beale murder occurred.  Walker lived in an apartment 
there with Karen Beech until some time after Beale's death.  
Martin found the cartridge in the apartment following Walker 
and Beech's departure and prior to the arrival of a new 
tenant.  A certificate of analysis introduced at trial 
indicated that the cartridge came from the same firearm as 
seven cartridge cases recovered at the scene of the Beale 
murder.   
 
At trial, Walker sought to exclude evidence regarding the 
cartridge on the basis that it was found three to four months 
after the murder.  Walker argues on appeal that the trial 
court erred in admitting Martin's testimony and the 
certificate of analysis into evidence because it was "neither 
relevant nor material, and its prejudicial effect far 
outweighed any possible probative value it may have had."   
Walker bases his relevancy argument on his view that the trial 
court stated from the bench that the cartridge was not 
relevant.  He concludes, therefore, that the trial court 
 
16
abused its discretion in admitting the cartridge into 
evidence. 
 
Viewed in context, however, the trial court's statement 
reveals that what it found "irrelevant" was the effect of the 
time gap between the murder and Martin's discovery of the 
cartridge on the admissibility of the evidence concerning the 
cartridge.  Every fact, however remote or insignificant, that 
tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact 
in issue, is factually relevant and admissible.  Epperly v. 
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 230, 294 S.E.2d 882, 891 (1982).  
The fact that a cartridge matching those in the Beale murder 
was found in an apartment once occupied by the defendant tends 
to implicate the defendant in that murder and is thus 
relevant.  As the trial court indicated, the four-month time 
period between the murder and discovery of the cartridge may 
affect the weight to be attached to the evidence, but it does 
not render the cartridge irrelevant and thus inadmissible. 
 
Evidence that is factually relevant must nevertheless be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 
Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).  The responsibility 
for balancing the competing considerations of probative value 
and prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear 
 
17
abuse.  Spencer, 240 Va. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 617.  Walker 
does not identify any prejudice that arose from the admission 
of the cartridge other than its tendency to show that Walker 
killed Beale.  Accordingly, we find that the trial court did 
not err by admitting evidence related to the cartridge into 
evidence. 
VIII.  Admission of Photographs 
 
During both the guilt and sentencing phases of the 
proceeding, the Commonwealth introduced photographs of the 
crime scenes and autopsy photographs of Threat.  Walker 
asserts that the photographs were "a calculated attempt to 
arouse the jurors's sympathies" and that because they were not 
"substantially necessary" to the Commonwealth's case, the 
trial court erred in admitting them into evidence.  We 
disagree.   
 
Admission of photographs is within the discretion of the 
trial court.  Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 
S.E.2d 134, 138 (1998).  Photographs of crime scenes are 
admissible to show motive, intent, method, malice, 
premeditation, and atrociousness of the crime.  Id. at 92, 501 
S.E.2d at 138.  Photographs which accurately depict the crime 
scene are not rendered inadmissible simply because they are 
gruesome or shocking.  Id.  There is no assertion that the 
 
18
photographs here were not accurate representations of the 
murder scenes.   
 
The Commonwealth offered the crime scene photographs to 
show the positioning of Beale's body and other incidents of 
his murder and to show where items of evidence were found at 
the Threat murder scene.  Such photographs are relevant and 
probative evidence for the jury to consider.  Clagett v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 87, 472 S.E.2d 263, 268 (1996), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997); Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 
S.E.2d at 126. 
 
The autopsy photographs, introduced at the penalty phase 
of the proceeding, showed the " stippling" near Threat's 
wounds, indicating the close range at which Walker shot 
Threat, and were relevant on the issue of whether Walker's 
conduct was outrageously vile.  Washington v. Commonwealth, 
228 Va. 535, 551, 323 S.E.2d 577, 588 (1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1111 (1985). 
 
As discussed above, evidence that is logically relevant 
must be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  Coe, 231 Va. at 87, 340 
S.E.2d at 823.  This balancing is left to the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent 
clear abuse of discretion.  Id.  We have examined the 
 
19
photographs and conclude that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting them into evidence. 
IX.  Toxicologist Evidence 
 
Walker assigns error to the trial court's refusal to 
admit into evidence the testimony and reports of a 
toxicologist who found the presence of drugs in the systems of 
both victims.  Walker asserts that this evidence was relevant 
because it "would be circumstantial evidence . . . of a 
possible alternative motive for the killing by someone else."  
We disagree. 
 
Only evidence which bears upon and is pertinent to 
matters in issue is relevant and should be admitted.  Coe, 231 
Va. at 87, 340 S.E.2d at 823.  Evidence of collateral facts 
and facts incapable of supporting an inference on the issue 
are irrelevant and cannot be accepted into evidence.  Id.  
There is nothing in this record which supports Walker's theory 
that the murders were drug-related, and evidence of the 
presence of drugs in the victims' systems simply does not 
support the inference that someone other than Walker committed 
the crimes.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to admit this evidence.  
X.  Testimony of Prison Conditions 
 
During the penalty phase of the proceeding, Walker sought 
to introduce the testimony of Gary Bass, Chief of Operations 
 
20
for the Virginia Department of Corrections, regarding the 
conditions of prison life, specifically life without parole in 
a maximum security prison.  Walker asserts that this evidence 
was relevant and properly admissible because it would mitigate 
against his receiving the death penalty, and therefore, the 
trial court erred in refusing to admit it.  However, we have 
previously held that such testimony is not proper mitigating 
evidence.  Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 309-10, 513 
S.E.2d 642, ___ (1999). 
XI.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
Walker asserts that the trial court should have sustained 
his motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence made at the 
close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief because the evidence 
was insufficient as a matter of law to convict Walker of the 
offenses charged.  Walker argues that the "sole" evidence 
against him is the testimony of the eyewitnesses and that this 
testimony is "inherently incredible."  With regard to the 
Beale murder, Walker argues that the ages of Bianca and 
Tameria, thirteen and fourteen respectively, made their 
testimony "suspect."  Walker asserts that their credibility is 
further undermined by the testimony of Christopher Miller, a 
witness for the Commonwealth, who stated that the person he 
saw with a gun at the apartment complex on the night of the 
 
21
murder was not bald, in contradiction to the fact that Taylor 
had described the shooter as being bald.  With regard to the 
murder of Threat, Walker claims that Noble's testimony should 
be discounted because she told the investigating officer both 
that she did not know the shooters and that one shooter was 
named "Paul."  Walker asserts that this inconsistency renders 
Noble's testimony inherently incredible. 
 
Walker's argument is based entirely on the issue of 
witness credibility.  The trier of fact is the sole judge of 
the credibility of the witnesses, Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 
Va. 201, 206, 335 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1985), unless, as a matter 
of law, the testimony is inherently incredible, Rogers v. 
Commonwealth, 183 Va. 190, 201-02, 31 S.E.2d 576, 580 (1944).  
The jury in this case resolved the credibility issues 
regarding the testimony of Bianca, Tameria, and Noble against 
the position advanced by Walker.  The ages of Bianca and 
Tameria and the conflict in testimony regarding whether the 
person seen was bald, while issues to be weighed by the fact 
finder, do not support a finding that the testimony is 
inherently incredible.  Similarly, Noble's statements to the 
investigating officer did not render her testimony inherently 
incredible.  Accordingly, we will not disturb the ruling of 
the trial court denying Walker's motion to strike the 
Commonwealth's evidence.  
 
22
B.  Evidence of Aggravating Factors 
 
Walker asserts that the Commonwealth failed to carry the 
burden imposed upon it by Code § 19.2-264.4(C) to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he would be a continuing threat to 
society, or that his conduct in committing the murders was 
outrageously vile, horrible, or inhuman, in that it involved 
depravity of mind or aggravated battery. 
 
This argument is without merit.  With regard to future 
dangerousness, the Commonwealth introduced Walker's prior 
convictions for carnal knowledge, forgery, assault, and 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  The evidence also showed 
that Walker regularly stole from friends and acquaintances 
and, in a rage, had punched a pregnant woman in the stomach.  
In addition, as the trial court noted in imposing sentence in 
accordance with the jury's recommendation, the commission of 
two brutal, unprovoked murders within a six month period is a 
"strong indication . . . that [Walker] is prone towards 
violence."  
With regard to vileness, the Commonwealth's evidence 
supports two of the alternative factors which can support a 
finding of vileness — aggravated battery and depravity of 
mind.  See Goins, 251 Va. at 468, 470 S.E.2d at 131 (proof of 
any one of these statutory components will support a finding 
of vileness).  Aggravated battery is a battery which 
 
23
"qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the 
minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder."  M. Smith 
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).  In this case Beale was 
shot three times, and any one of the shots could have been 
fatal.  Walker shot Threat seven times.  These multiple 
gunshots establish aggravated battery.  Goins, 251 Va. at 468, 
470 S.E.2d at 131. 
Walker's actions established depravity of mind, that is, 
a "degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement 
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal 
malice and premeditation."  M. Smith, 219 Va. at 478, 248 
S.E.2d at 149.  Walker shot his victims in front of their 
loved ones and family members, after having forcibly invaded 
the sanctity of their homes.  The evidence showed that the 
killings were unprovoked, premeditated, and methodical.  
Walker showed no mercy toward his victims or their loved ones.  
Based on this evidence, we conclude that the Commonwealth 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker would be a 
continuing serious threat to society and that his conduct in 
committing the murders was vile.  Accordingly, the trial court 
did not err in refusing to strike the Commonwealth's evidence 
of the aggravating factors.  
XII.  Statutory Review 
 
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Code § 17.1-313(C) requires this Court to consider 
whether the sentence of death was imposed "under the influence 
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," and 
whether such sentence is excessive or disproportionate to 
penalties imposed in similar cases, "considering both the 
crime and the defendant."  Walker presents no arguments 
asserting that his sentence resulted from passion or 
prejudice, but relies on our statutorily mandated review of 
this issue. 
Our review of the record reveals nothing to suggest that 
the sentence of death resulted from passion, prejudice or 
arbitrariness.  As we have said, the record supports the 
findings of guilt and of the aggravating factors, and there is 
nothing to suggest that Walker's sentence of death was imposed 
because of any arbitrary factor. 
 
Walker also relies on the review we must undertake to 
determine whether the sentence imposed in this case is 
excessive or disproportionate to other sentences imposed by 
sentencing bodies in this Commonwealth for similar crimes.  
This is the first case we have considered in which the death 
penalty had been imposed for the willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-
 
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year period.  Code § 18.2-31(8).*  The General Assembly 
classified this conduct as capital murder in 1996.  Acts 1996, 
ch. 959.  However, the lack of directly comparable crimes does 
not prevent our consideration of whether the sentence imposed 
in this case was disproportionate under the review mandated by 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2).  If it did, as we observed in Stewart 
v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 248, 427 S.E.2d 394, 410, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993), then "a death sentence could 
never be imposed where there are no previous cases similar to 
the one at bar." 
 
After reviewing the incidents of this crime and the 
circumstances of this defendant, we conclude that the sentence 
of death was not disproportionate to other sentences imposed 
in this Commonwealth for similar crimes.  There are a number 
of incidents of this capital murder which are comparable to 
the facts surrounding other cases in which the death penalty 
has been imposed.   
 
First, Walker invaded the homes of both of his victims 
and shot them in front of family members or a loved one.  
Juries have imposed the death penalty for the murder of 
victims in their homes and in the presence of another family 
                     
* The defendant in Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 501 
S.E.2d 134 (1998), was convicted of four charges of capital 
murder.  One of those convictions was pursuant to Code § 18.2-
 
26
member.  See Goins, 251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d 114; Burket v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 450 S.E.2d 124 (1994), cert. 
denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 
222, 427 S.E.2d 394; Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 
419 S.E.2d 656, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992). 
 
Second, as with Stewart, Goins and Burket above, the jury 
in this case found upon sufficient evidence that Walker's 
conduct in committing these murders was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, and that Walker posed a continuing serious 
threat to society.   
 
Third, the jury found upon sufficient evidence that 
Walker committed the willful, deliberate, premeditated killing 
of multiple persons.  Juries have in the past, based on the 
predicate of future dangerousness and vileness, imposed the 
death sentence upon perpetrators of multiple homicides within 
a brief time period under Code § 18.2-31(7), which makes it a 
capital crime to murder more than one person in the same 
transaction.  See Goins, 251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d 114; Burket, 
248 Va. 596, 450 S.E.2d 124; Stewart, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 
394. 
 
In the instant case, the separation of time between the 
murders arguably evidences an even greater disregard for human 
                                                                
31(8); however, the trial court dismissed the charge after 
sentencing on the other three convictions. 
 
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life.  The second murder in this case did not occur because 
that victim was located proximately to the first, as in some 
single transaction murders.  Here, Walker engaged in distinct 
complete acts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.  
The serial nature of his criminal conduct is no less egregious 
because it was not performed as part of a single transaction.  
 
Finally, the evidence Walker offered in mitigation during 
the sentencing phase, when compared to the evidence of his 
prior history and circumstances of this crime, does not 
distinguish him from defendants who have been sentenced to 
death in past cases. 
 
Based upon this review, we find that the sentence of 
death in this case is neither excessive nor disproportionate 
to sentences imposed by sentencing bodies in this Commonwealth 
for similar crimes.  Consequently, we hold that the trial 
court committed no reversible error and, based on our 
independent review of the record, conclude that the sentence 
of death was properly imposed.  Thus, we will affirm the trial 
court's judgment concerning Walker's conviction and sentence 
for capital murder.  We will also affirm the trial court's 
judgment concerning Walker's convictions and sentences for 
burglary and use of a firearm.  
Record No. 990096 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 990097 — Affirmed. 
 
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