Title: Redmond v. Meier
Citation: 192 Kan. 730, 391 P.2d 39
Docket Number: 43,546
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 1964

192 Kan. 730 (1964)
391 P.2d 39
DONNA REDMOND, Appellant,
v.
HENRY H. MEIER, Appellee.
No. 43,546

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1964.
G. Leroy Warner, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Laurence S. Holmes and T.L. O'Hara, both of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Harold G. Forbes, of Eureka, argued the cause, and Thos. C. Forbes, George Forbes, and Dale L. Pohl, all of Eureka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a second amended petition for the reason that pleading was filed after the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations and the original petition did not state a cause of action.
The issue before us can best be presented if we first consider the procedure resulting in the judgment.
On July 14, 1961, plaintiff filed her petition alleging that she had sustained injuries due to the negligence of the defendant. A motion to make definite and certain and to strike was lodged against the petition. The motion was sustained in part and overruled in part. On February 27, 1962, the plaintiff filed her first amended petition. Again a motion to make definite and certain and to strike was sustained in part and overruled in part.
Plaintiff filed her second amended petition on September 14, 1962. Defendant demurred to such pleading on the ground it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against him. Thereupon, plaintiff moved the court for an order allowing her to amend the second amended petition by setting forth the width and surface of the roads at the intersection where the collision occurred and to allege definitely the point of collision between the vehicles. The court permitted these amendments. Defendant then orally moved for permission to amend his demurrer to include the additional ground that plaintiff's second amended petition, as amended, did not state a cause of action because of the running of the statute of limitations. This motion was sustained and the amendment to the demurrer was allowed. Subsequently, and on November 23, 1962, the demurrer was sustained as per the court's memorandum opinion attached to the order.
In a memorandum opinion, dealing with the question whether the second amended petition related back to the original petition, the trial court stated:
The trial court's statement, in the same opinion, as to why the original petition did not state a cause of action reads:
In view of the statements made by the trial court in its opinion it is necessary that we examine the original petition for the purpose of determining whether that pleading stated a cause of action.
Omitting formal averments identifying the parties, allegations as to the extent and nature of the injuries sustained and the prayer, the original petition alleged:
"III.
"IV.
*733 "V.
This court has announced in numerous cases that where the original petition imperfectly alleges a cause of action without sufficient detail the averments may be amplified by an amended petition and the amended petition will relate back to the original if filed after the statute of limitations had run. In Foster v. Humburg, 180 Kan. 64, 299 P.2d 46, the court stated:
*734 For another decision of like import see Rudy v. Whaley, 188 Kan. 118, 360 P.2d 863.
Before considering the specific allegations of the original petition for the purpose of determining whether it states a cause of action to which the amended petition relates back, consideration must be given to the general rules which govern its construction.
For present purposes, the original petition must be construed under the same rules as it would be construed had it been challenged by a general demurrer without a motion to make definite and certain having been lodged against it. The rule, sometimes applied, that the allegations of a petition will be strictly construed against the pleader where a proper motion to make definite and certain has been successfully resisted, has no application in considering the question before us. The rule applies only in considering the sufficiency of the amended petition, as against a demurrer, after the original petition, which stated a cause of action under the rule of liberal construction but without sufficient detail, has been motioned. The allegations of the petition must be liberally construed.
In Carpenter v. Strimple, 190 Kan. 33, 372 P.2d 571, we said:
It is not proper to segregate allegations and determine their sufficiency. Regard must be given to the context of the entire pleading and all allegations considered together. See Kitchen v. Smith, 184 Kan. 188, 334 P.2d 413; Hickert v. Wright, 182 Kan. 100, 319 P.2d 152; Fyne v. Emmett, 171 Kan. 383, 233 P.2d 496.
Finally, and most important, the general conclusions of fact, which are not challenged by a motion to make definite and certain, are admitted by a demurrer.
In Stuckey v. Shultz, 173 Kan. 343, 245 P.2d 1197, we held:
*735 And in the opinion said:
When the allegations of the original petition are considered in the light of the foregoing rules of construction we are forced to conclude that a cause of action was stated in that pleading, albeit imperfectly. Subparagraphs a to i of paragraph V thereof set out the general allegations of negligence. Paragraphs III and IV definitely informed the defendant where and how the accident occurred. *736 And subparagraphs c and d of paragraph V informed him that a collision did result from his negligence. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from these allegations, when considered together, is that the defendant collided with plaintiff's automobile.
Finally it must be determined whether the second amended petition states a cause of action. Without extending this opinion, by setting out its lengthy allegations, we do not hesitate to conclude that it does.
Defendant directs our attention to Arensman v. Kitch, 160 Kan. 783, 165 P.2d 441, which holds:
We recognize the rule above stated but doubt if it has application under the facts of this particular controversy. The record discloses that plaintiff has never challenged the general allegations contained in subparagraphs a to i of paragraph V of the petition by motion to make definite and certain.
In Garrison v. Hamil, 176 Kan. 548, 271 P.2d 307, we said:
Be that as it may, under the confronting facts and circumstances, we are convinced the second amended petition states a cause of action whether it is liberally or strictly construed. The supplement or amendment to the second amended petition took care of the trial court's suggestion that "There was no indication as to what collided or any of the circumstances of the collision." It reads:
Based on what has been heretofore stated and held, we are satisfied and therefore hold: (1) That the original petition alleged a cause of action even though imperfectly and without sufficient detail. (2) That the amended petitions only enlarged and amplified the allegations of the original petition, and no new theory or cause of action was stated. (3) That the fact the statute of limitations had run at the time the amended petitions were filed is not a bar to recovery, as the second amended petition relates back to the filing of the original petition.
It necessarily follows that the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the second amended petition and that its judgment sustaining such demurrer must be reversed with instructions to set it aside.
It is so ordered.
FONTRON, J., not participating.