Title: Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. Edward Hall
Citation: 2006 WI 13
Docket Number: 2004AP000688
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2006

2006 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP688 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Edward Hall, 
          Defendant, 
General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 17 
Reported at: 278 Wis. 2d 499, 692 N.W.2d 355 
(Ct. App. 2004 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 7, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Rick E. Hills, Michelle M. Stoeck, and Hills Legal Group, Ltd., 
Waukesha, and oral argument by Rick E. Hills. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Stuart B. 
Eiche and Eiche & Frakes, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Stuart B. Eiche. 
 
 
2006 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP688  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV3229 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Edward Hall, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 7, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Progressive 
Northern Insurance Company, seeks review of a court of appeals 
decision affirming the circuit court's judgment dismissing 
Progressive's action for a declaratory judgment against General 
Casualty Company of Wisconsin.1  The insurance companies dispute 
                                                 
1 See Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 2005 WI App 17, 278 
Wis. 2d 499, 692 N.W.2d 355 (affirming a judgment of the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Clare L. Fiorenza, Judge). 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
2 
 
which of them is primary, that is, which is liable to pay the 
first $100,000 under the uninsured motorist coverage set forth 
in their respective policies.  The issue before us is whether 
Progressive's "other insurance" clause, which provides that 
uninsured motorist coverage is primary for a named insured but 
excess for certain occupancy insureds, violates Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3)(a) (2003-04).2 
¶2 
Initially, we determine that § 632.32(3)(a) applies to 
uninsured motorist coverage.  Because Progressive cannot save 
the other insurance clause by casting it as an "exclusion" under 
subsection (5)(e) of the statute and because Progressive's 
policy fails to provide uninsured motorist coverage for an 
occupancy insured in the same manner as the named insured, we 
further determine that the clause violates § 632.32(3)(a).  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Edward Hall 
was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his brother, Richard 
Hall.  They were involved in an accident with another vehicle 
operated by an uninsured driver.  Edward sustained injuries as a 
result of the accident. 
¶4 
Edward was insured under a policy issued by General 
Casualty, and Richard was insured under a policy issued by 
Progressive.  Each policy provided uninsured motorist coverage 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
3 
 
potentially applicable to Edward.  In addition, each policy also 
contained an "other insurance" clause describing when uninsured 
motorist coverage would be primary and when it would be excess. 
¶5 
The "other insurance" clause in the General Casualty 
policy stated that "[a]ny insurance we provide with respect to a 
vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any collectible 
insurance providing such coverage on a primary basis."  The 
"other insurance" clause in the Progressive policy stated that 
"[a]ny insurance we provide shall be excess over any other 
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, except for bodily 
injury to you or a relative when occupying a covered vehicle."  
(Emphasis added.)  Although Edward and Richard are brothers, 
Edward was not a "relative" under Richard's policy with 
Progressive 
because 
Edward 
did 
not 
reside 
in 
Richard's 
household. 
¶6 
Progressive 
filed 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
action 
against Edward and General Casualty, seeking a determination 
that General Casualty was obligated to provide uninsured 
motorist coverage to Edward on a primary basis.  General 
Casualty countered that Progressive's "other insurance" clause 
was unenforceable under § 632.32 because it provided primary 
coverage for a named insured and driver while providing only 
excess coverage for a passenger.  The circuit court agreed with 
General Casualty, as did the court of appeals.  Progressive 
petitioned for review. 
 
 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
4 
 
II 
¶7 
The parties agree that Edward is potentially entitled 
to uninsured motorist coverage under both policies.  They also 
agree that if the language of both policies is given full 
effect, then Progressive's coverage is excess to General 
Casualty's.  The parties disagree, however, on the validity of 
Progressive's "other insurance" clause under § 632.32. 
¶8 
The policy limits for uninsured motorist coverage 
under the Progressive policy are $100,000.  Under the General 
Casualty policy, the limits for uninsured motorist coverage are 
$500,000.  Thus, the dispute is over who pays the first $100,000 
in coverage for Edward. 
¶9 
The issue we must address is whether Progressive's 
"other insurance" clause, which provides that uninsured motorist 
coverage is primary for a named insured but excess for certain 
occupancy 
insureds, 
violates 
§ 632.32(3)(a). 
 
This 
issue 
requires that we interpret and apply statutory provisions to 
undisputed facts and that we interpret an insurance policy.  
These are questions of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  Beerbohm v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 
105, ¶8, 235 Wis. 2d 182, 612 N.W.2d 338. 
¶10 We initially determine that § 632.32(3)(a) applies to 
uninsured motorist coverage.  In addition, we determine that 
Progressive's "other insurance" clause violates § 632.32(3)(a) 
because it fails to provide that occupancy insureds are covered 
in the same manner as the named insured and because Progressive 
cannot cast its other insurance clause as an "exclusion" under 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
5 
 
subsection (5)(e) of the statute in order to save the clause 
from the requirements of subsection (3)(a). 
III 
¶11 We begin with the language of § 632.32(3)(a).  It 
provides: 
(3) Required provisions.  Except as provided in 
sub. (5), every policy subject to this section issued 
to an owner shall provide that: 
(a) 
Coverage provided to 
the named 
insured 
applies in the same manner and under the same 
provisions to any person using any motor vehicle 
described in the policy when the use is for purposes 
and in the manner described in the policy. 
"Using," 
in 
turn, 
includes 
"riding 
in" 
a 
vehicle 
under 
§ 632.32(2)(c).  For purposes of § 632.32(3)(a), Edward was 
therefore "using" Richard's vehicle when he was riding in it at 
the time of the accident. 
¶12 We 
first 
address 
whether 
the 
requirements 
of 
§ 632.32(3)(a) 
extend 
to 
uninsured 
motorist 
coverage.  
Progressive argues that they do not because uninsured motorist 
coverage is indemnity insurance, not liability insurance, and 
because § 632.32 does not apply to indemnity insurance.  In 
support of its argument, Progressive cites the following 
language 
in 
§ 632.32(1), 
which 
delineates 
the 
scope 
of 
§ 632.32's applicability: 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided, 
this 
section 
applies to every policy of insurance issued or 
delivered 
in 
this 
state 
against 
the 
insured's 
liability for loss or damage resulting from accident 
caused by any motor vehicle . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  
No. 
2004AP688   
 
6 
 
¶13 We 
determine 
that 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
§ 632.32(3)(a) applies to uninsured motorist coverage does not 
turn on whether such coverage is categorized as liability 
insurance or indemnity insurance. 
¶14 Every policy of insurance insuring against liability 
under § 632.32 must include uninsured motorist coverage "therein 
or supplemental thereto" pursuant to § 632.32(4).  Thus, 
§ 632.32(4) mandates that "every policy of insurance issued or 
delivered in this state against the insured's liability for loss 
or damage resulting from accident caused by any motor vehicle" 
must include uninsured motorist coverage.  Section 632.32(1); 
see also Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶10, 234 
Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467 ("Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) 
mandates that every policy of automobile insurance issued in the 
state include uninsured motorist coverage.").   
¶15 In 
other 
words, 
every 
policy 
insuring 
against 
liability 
under 
§ 632.32 
must 
include 
uninsured 
motorist 
coverage.  Section 632.32(3)(a) plainly applies to every policy 
subject to § 632.32.  Thus, we conclude that § 632.32(3)(a) 
applies to uninsured motorist coverage, regardless of whether 
such 
coverage 
is 
categorized 
as 
liability 
or 
indemnity 
insurance.  
¶16 Progressive relies on Martin v. Milwaukee Mutual 
Insurance Co., 146 Wis. 2d 759, 433 N.W.2d 1 (1988), in arguing 
that § 632.32(3)(a) cannot apply to uninsured motorist coverage.  
We determine, however, that Martin is not controlling. 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
7 
 
¶17 In Martin, this court briefly discussed § 632.32(3)(a) 
in addressing whether an occupancy insured in a vehicle involved 
in an accident may benefit from uninsured motorist coverage 
carried by the named insured on another vehicle not involved in 
the accident.  Martin, 146 Wis. 2d at 766, 770-71.  The court in 
Martin 
questioned 
the 
applicability 
of 
§ 632.32(3)(a) 
to 
indemnity insurance, and it characterized uninsured motorist 
coverage as indemnity insurance.  Id. at 770.  However, the 
court did not definitively determine whether § 632.32(3)(a) may 
apply to uninsured motorist coverage.  Rather, the court said: 
Section 632.32(3)(a), Stats., has been primarily 
interpreted as dealing with liability insurance rather 
than indemnity insurance such as uninsured motorist 
coverage.  Even if sec. 632.32(3)(a), Stats., did 
apply to indemnity insurance, it . . . would not apply 
in this case.  The policy of an involved auto is 
applied to both the driver and occupant.  Both are 
able 
to 
recover 
under 
that 
uninsured 
motorist 
provision.  The uninvolved auto's policy, however, is 
not subject to the statute because the Martins are not 
covered by it; not being occupants they were not 
occupancy insureds.  The statutes do not state that 
"occupancy insureds are entitled to all applicable 
insurance protection the named insured has procured 
for himself." 
Id. at 770-71 (citations omitted). 
¶18 Thus, the court in Martin observed that § 632.32(3)(a) 
had been "primarily" interpreted as dealing with liability 
insurance rather than indemnity insurance but avoided deciding 
whether § 632.32(3)(a) applied to uninsured motorist coverage in 
general.  Instead, the court reasoned that § 632.32(3)(a) did 
not apply to the extent that the occupancy insured was not 
"using" another vehicle that was not involved in the accident.  
No. 
2004AP688   
 
8 
 
The court concluded that an occupancy insured in a vehicle 
involved in an accident could not benefit from uninsured 
motorist coverage carried by the named insured on another 
vehicle.  Neither the Martin court's conclusion nor its 
reasoning precludes us from determining that § 632.32(3)(a) 
applies to uninsured motorist coverage.  
¶19 In support of its position, Progressive also cites to 
the court of appeals' decisions in American Hardware Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Steberger, 187 Wis. 2d 682, 523 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 
1994), and Peabody v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 220 
Wis. 2d 340, 582 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1998).  In American 
Hardware, the court of appeals relied primarily on Martin in 
determining that, despite § 632.32(3)(a), an insurance policy 
could provide underinsured motorist coverage that was higher for 
specifically 
named 
insureds 
than 
for 
a 
permissive 
user.  
American Hardware, 187 Wis. 2d at 683, 686-86.  In Peabody, the 
court of appeals rejected the application of § 632.32(6)(b)1. to 
underinsured motorist coverage, suggesting that § 632.32 applies 
only to liability policies.  Peabody, 220 Wis. 2d at 350-51. 
¶20 Both 
American 
Hardware 
and 
Peabody 
involved 
underinsured motorist coverage.  Those cases do not necessarily 
dictate 
the 
applicability 
of 
§ 632.32(3)(a) 
to 
uninsured 
motorist coverage, which is required in every insurance policy 
subject to § 632.32. 
¶21 In any event, subsequent to both American Hardware and 
Peabody, this court determined that it is appropriate to apply 
provisions of § 632.32 to underinsured motorist coverage, at 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
9 
 
least when that coverage is part of a liability policy.  Mau v. 
North Dakota Ins. Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶30 & n.13, 248 
Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45.  In Mau, making specific reference 
to Martin and Peabody, the court called into question the 
vitality 
of 
earlier 
cases 
which 
suggested 
that 
certain 
provisions of § 632.32 apply only to liability policies.  Id., 
¶30. 
¶22 In a footnote, the court in Mau further suggested that 
any 
distinction 
between 
liability 
coverage 
and 
indemnity 
coverage 
does 
not 
matter 
for 
purposes 
of 
§ 632.32 
when 
underinsured motorist coverage is issued as part of a policy 
containing liability insurance: 
Liability 
coverage 
"requires 
the 
insurer 
to 
shield the insured from making payment on a claim for 
which the insured is liable."  Blazekovic v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶38, 234 Wis. 2d 587, 610 
N.W.2d 467.  "In contrast, uninsured motorist coverage 
[indemnity coverage] seeks to compensate the insured 
after the insured has sustained an actual loss."  Id.  
Similar to uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured 
motorist coverage is indemnity coverage.  
Here 
the 
distinction 
between 
liability 
and 
indemnity coverage does not change our conclusion as 
to the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 632.32.  The 
excess policy falls within the scope of § 632.32 
because it is a liability policy.  Mau was covered 
under the excess policy because he bought the IEP 
Option.  According to the rental jacket, "EP [Extended 
Protection] provides both LIS [Liability Insurance 
Supplement] and UM protection."  The excess policy, 
therefore, is a liability policy with uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, ¶30 n.13. 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
10 
 
¶23 The court's determinations in Mau are consistent with 
our determination today that § 632.32(3)(a) applies to uninsured 
motorist coverage in an automobile insurance policy issued in 
this state, regardless of whether uninsured motorist coverage is 
categorized as indemnity insurance or liability insurance.  This 
is because, as we have explained, in Wisconsin every policy 
insuring against liability under § 632.32 must include uninsured 
motorist coverage.3 
¶24 Having 
determined 
that 
§ 632.32(3)(a) 
applies 
to 
uninsured motorist coverage, we turn to the statute's qualifying 
language.  Section 632.32(3)(a) imposes certain requirements on 
                                                 
3 In 
its 
brief, 
General 
Casualty 
cautions 
against 
classifying uninsured motorist coverage as indemnity insurance.  
It notes that: 
Uninsured 
motorist 
coverage 
is 
typically 
termed 
"indemnity" insurance because, like fire and health 
insurance, it most often pays the person who pays for 
the policy.  However, unlike other such "first party" 
insurance  coverages, the insurer's obligation to pay 
uninsured motorist benefits depends on a liability 
comparison between the insured and a "third party," 
and the insurer often pays less than 100% of the 
insured's actual loss.  In this respect, uninsured 
motorist 
coverage is 
not 
typical 
of 
"indemnity" 
insurance.  While useful in some contexts, labeling 
insurance coverage as one type or another is a tricky 
proposition at best, and doing so as a primary basis 
for a published appellate court decision requires 
special caution. 
We need not address this concern here because we determine that 
the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3)(a) to uninsured 
motorist coverage does not turn on whether such coverage is 
categorized as liability insurance or indemnity insurance. 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
11 
 
every policy subject to § 632.32 "[e]xcept as provided in sub. 
(5)." 
¶25 Progressive 
asserts 
that, 
even 
if 
§ 632.32(3)(a) 
applies to uninsured motorist coverage, we must still ask 
whether the "other insurance" clause is permissible under 
subsection (5)(e) of the statute.  Subsection (5)(e) states: 
A 
policy 
may 
provide 
for 
exclusions 
not 
prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable law.  Such 
exclusions are effective even if incidentally to their 
main purpose they exclude persons, uses or coverages 
that could not be directly excluded under sub. (6)(b). 
According to Progressive, its "other insurance" clause is 
permissible under § 632.32(5)(e).  
¶26 We are not persuaded by Progressive's reliance on 
§ 632.32(5)(e).  In order for subsection (5)(e) to apply to a 
term in an insurance policy, there is a threshold question as to 
whether that term is an "exclusion."   Here, we determine that 
Progressive cannot cast its "other insurance" clause as an 
"exclusion" under (5)(e) in order to save the clause from the 
requirements of subsection (3)(a) of the statute. 
¶27 An "other insurance" clause generally does not have 
the same purpose as an "exclusion."  The purpose of an "other 
insurance" clause is to define which coverage is primary and 
which 
coverage 
is 
excess 
between 
policies. 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1); Remiszewski v. American Family Ins. Co., 2004 WI 
App 
175, 
¶29, 
276 
Wis. 2d 167, 
687 
N.W.2d 809 
(citing 
§ 631.43(1)). 
 
"'Other 
insurance' 
clauses 
govern 
the 
relationship between insurers, they do not affect the right of 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
12 
 
the insured to recover under each concurrent policy."  15 Couch 
on Insurance, § 219.1, at 219-8 (3d ed. 1999). 
¶28 An exclusion, in 
contrast, 
determines 
whether a 
particular policy provides coverage at all.  It is a provision 
that eliminates coverage under a particular policy where, were 
it not for the exclusion, coverage would have existed under that 
policy.  Bortz v. Merrimac Mut. Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 2d 865, 871, 
286 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Stubbe v. Guidant Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2002 WI App 203, ¶13, 257 Wis. 2d 401, 651 N.W.2d 318. 
¶29 Progressive apparently did not consider its "other 
insurance" clause to be an exclusion when it drafted its policy.  
The "other insurance" clause is found in the section of the 
policy entitled "OTHER INSURANCE," after the section called 
"LIMITS 
OF 
LIABILITY" 
and 
before 
the 
section 
called 
"ARBITRATION."  The policy has a separate section entitled 
"EXCLUSIONS."  That section of the policy includes several 
exclusions and explains to the insured, consistent with the law, 
that 
"IF 
AN 
EXCLUSION 
APPLIES, 
COVERAGE 
WILL 
NOT 
BE 
AFFORDED . . . ." 
¶30 Indeed, Progressive seems to be of two minds as to 
whether 
its 
"other 
insurance" 
clause 
is 
an 
exclusion, 
considering the clause to be an exclusion to the extent that it 
benefits Progressive and considering the clause to be something 
else to the extent that it does not.  Although Progressive is 
plainly arguing that the clause is a permissible provision under 
§ 632.32(5)(e), which refers to "exclusions," Progressive also 
explains at one point in its brief that "Edward Hall is not 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
13 
 
being excluded from coverage; rather he is being offered 
coverage on an excess rather than a primary basis."  (Emphasis 
in original.) 
¶31 We recognize, of course, that the label given to a 
term in an insurance policy is not necessarily controlling.  For 
example, we have previously invalidated a definitional provision 
of an insurance policy as an impermissible "exclusion" under 
§ 632.32(5)(e) after determining that the purpose of the 
definition was to exclude coverage.  Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, 
¶¶31-38. 
¶32 The provisions of § 632.32 addressed both here and in 
Mau are remedial in nature and must be construed broadly to 
increase rather than to limit coverage.  See Greene v. General 
Cas. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 152, 161, 576 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1997).  
The court in Mau correctly recognized that an insurer should not 
be able to avoid the protections that § 632.32(5)(e) provides to 
insureds by calling an exclusion something else. 
¶33 Similarly, we determine that Progressive cannot use 
§ 632.32(5)(e) to avoid the protections that both subsections 
(3)(a) and (5)(e) provide to insureds by attempting to cast its 
"other insurance" clause as an "exclusion" under subsection 
(5)(e).  Stated another way, Progressive cannot cast its "other 
insurance" clause as an "exclusion" under subsection (5)(e) in 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
14 
 
order to save the clause from the requirements of subsection 
(3)(a).4 
¶34 Having determined that Progressive cannot cast its 
"other insurance" clause as an "exclusion" under § 632.32(5)(e) 
in order to save the clause, we turn to examine what subsection 
(3)(a) requires.  Subsection (3)(a) mandates that, except as 
provided in subsection (5), coverage provided to the named 
insured must apply "in the same manner and under the same 
provisions" to any person riding in any motor vehicle described 
in the policy.  See also, e.g., Smith v. National Indem. Co., 57 
Wis. 2d 706, 713, 205 N.W.2d 365 (1973); Carrell v. Wolken, 173 
Wis. 2d 426, 433-34, 496 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992). 
¶35 Contrary 
to 
what 
§ 632.32(3)(a) 
requires, 
Progressive's 
"other 
insurance" 
clause 
operates 
so 
that 
Progressive's policy provides primary coverage for a named 
insured while providing only excess coverage for an occupancy 
insured who is not also a "relative" as defined in the policy.  
The clause states that "[a]ny insurance we provide shall be 
excess over any other uninsured or underinsured motorist 
coverage, except for bodily injury to you or a relative when 
occupying a covered vehicle."  Thus, the policy does not provide 
                                                 
4 We therefore need not reach the question of whether, even 
if Progressive's "other insurance" clause could be considered an 
"exclusion" under § 632.32(5)(e), the clause would still be 
"prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable law."  Section 
632.32(5)(e).  Likewise, we need not reach the question of 
whether "incidentally to [its] main purpose" the clause would 
"exclude persons, uses or coverages that could not be directly 
excluded under sub. (6)(b)."  Id. 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
15 
 
uninsured motorist coverage for "any person using" a vehicle in 
the same manner as such coverage is provided for the named 
insured.  Accordingly, we conclude that Progressive's "other 
insurance" clause violates § 632.32(3)(a). 
¶36 As a final matter, we address the effect of our 
determination 
that 
Progressive's 
"other 
insurance" 
clause 
violates § 632.32(3)(a).  The court of appeals concluded that 
the clause is "void and unenforceable" because it violates 
§ 632.32(3)(a) and that, "[a]s a result, Progressive will have 
to pay the first $100,000 in damages."   
¶37 Progressive 
asserts 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision swept too broadly and that voiding the entire clause is 
not the proper remedy.  We question whether the court of 
appeals' decision sweeps as broadly as Progressive suggests.  To 
the extent it could be read so broadly, however, General 
Casualty acknowledges that the proper remedy here is not to 
nullify Progressive's entire "other insurance" clause.  It notes 
that 
"[a]ny 
immaterial 
language 
in 
Progressive's 
'other 
insurance' clause need not be 'invalidated.'" 
¶38 We determine that the proper remedy here is to treat 
Progressive's policy as if Edward, the occupancy insured in this 
case, had the same coverage as Richard, the named insured.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 631.15(3m) 
(insurance 
policy 
"that 
violates 
a 
statute or rule is enforceable against the insurer as if it 
conformed to the statute or rule"); Brunson v. Ward, 2001 WI 89, 
¶14, 245 Wis. 2d 163, 629 N.W.2d 140.  We therefore treat 
Progressive's policy in this case as if the uninsured motorist 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
16 
 
coverage is primary for Edward, just as it would have been for 
Richard.  General Casualty's uninsured motorist coverage is 
excess in this case.  Accordingly, we agree with the court of 
appeals that Progressive must pay the first $100,000 of any 
uninsured motorist coverage to which Edward is entitled. 
IV 
¶39 In sum, we have determined that § 632.32(3)(a) applies 
to 
uninsured 
motorist 
coverage. 
 
In 
addition, 
because 
Progressive cannot save the other insurance clause by casting it 
as an "exclusion" under subsection (5)(e) of the statute and 
because Progressive's policy fails to provide uninsured motorist 
coverage for an occupancy insured in the same manner as the 
named 
insured, 
we 
determine 
that 
the 
clause 
violates 
§ 632.32(3)(a).  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 
2004AP688   
 
 
 
1