Title: Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thigpen
Citation: 448 So. 2d 314
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 1984

448 So. 2d 314 (1983)
COTTON STATES MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
Janice THIGPEN.
82-474.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 2, 1983.
As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing April 6, 1984.
Benjamin R. Rice of Williams, Spurrier, Rice, Henderson &amp; Grace, Huntsville, for appellant.
Winston V. Legge, Jr. of Patton, Latham, Legge &amp; Cole, Athens, for appellee.
EMBRY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $15,000 to Janice Thigpen on claims for fraud and deceit. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company contends the trial court erred in denying its respective motions for summary judgment, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We cannot agree.
The single question posed by this appeal is whether Thigpen proffered any evidence, when viewed in its most favorable light, which supports her case. Ex parte Bennett, 426 So. 2d 832 (Ala.1982); Casey v. Jones, 410 So. 2d 5 (Ala.1981).
Section 6-5-101, Code of 1975, articulates the definition of legal fraud in Alabama:
Regardless whether the representations were made willfully, recklessly or mistakenly, actionable fraud exists upon showing (1) a false representation, (2) concerning a material existing fact, (3) upon which the plaintiff relies, (4) and is damaged as a proximate result. Cecil Crews Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Williams, 394 So. 2d 912, 914 (Ala.1981); International Resorts, Inc. v. Lambert, 350 So. 2d 391 (Ala. 1977).
Section 6-5-103, Code of 1975, provides for a right of action in deceit:
The evidence of record is replete with testimony which, if believed by the jury, supports a claim for actionable fraud or deceit. For example, Thigpen testified that Cotton States' agent, Steve Klepper, told her she could have her automobile repaired at Mac Campbell's Body Shop and Cotton States would pay the repair bill. She further testified that the representation induced her to both authorize repairs as well as to forgo filing a claim for repairs with her own insurance carrier. Klepper conceded on cross-examination that he had no intention of paying the repair bill until Thigpen signed a property damage release. However, Klepper never communicated this intention to Thigpen.
Thigpen further testified that while her car was being repaired, Klepper informed her "I'm not giving you nothing until you settle with me." In fact, Klepper never paid the repair bill. Consequently, Thigpen claimed she was forced to rent a car for this period in order to provide for her transportation needs.
After viewing the evidence of record in a light most favorable to Thigpen, we hold the evidence presented by Thigpen was sufficient to withstand motions for summary judgment, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See e.g. Cecil Crews Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Williams, supra. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied each of Cotton States' respective motions. Ex parte Bennett, 426 So. 2d  at 834. The judgment of the trial court is due to be, and is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.