Title: Davis v. State
Citation: 160 S.E.2d 697, 273 N.C. 533
Docket Number: 575
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1968

160 S.E.2d 697 (1968) 273 N.C. 533 Clifford Delain DAVIS v. STATE of North Carolina. No. 575. Supreme Court of North Carolina. May 1, 1968. *700 Irvin B. Tucker, Jr., Raleigh, for petitioner Davis. Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Staff Atty. Ralph H. White, Jr., Raleigh, for the State. PARKER, Chief Justice. We have examined the records and briefs in the first appeal in this case, which are of record in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court. On that appeal there was no assignment of error and no contention that the verdict rendered was invalid or improper or ambiguous and that the verdict did not support the judgment. Defendant appealed from the judgment of imprisonment imposed upon the first appeal. This is stated in 1 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Appeal and Error, § 26: The verdict here, as in all cases tried in our Superior Courts, appears on the face of the record proper. While the opinion on the first appeal did not discuss the verdict rendered in the instant case, the fact that we found no error in the trial was tacit affirmation that we had examined the record proper, and that the verdict was not invalid or ambiguous or uncertain but was definite and certain, and that the verdict rendered supported the sentence of imprisonment. With respect to the question which the clerk asked the jury"What say you, is he guilty of assault with intent to commit rape or not guilty?"to which the jury merely responded "Yes," the defendant contends *701 that "the Presiding Judge should have sent the jury back into their chambers with instructions to bring out a verdict which was meaningful. However, he did not do this, and, instead, the Clerk put her own interpretation on what the jury verdict was and recorded it as a verdict of guilty of assault with intent to commit rape." Defendant also contends "that a poll would not cure a void verdict which has been suggested or dictated by the Clerk. * * * The jury, after having been told by the clerk in open court what their verdict should be, and having given in to the clerk in open court, would naturally answer the poll of the jury in favor of the verdict they had been committed to by the dictation of the Clerk." Defendant further contends that the clerk's interpretation of the meaningless jury verdict has deprived him of his right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 13, of the North Carolina Constitution. To support his argument, defendant relies on the decisions of State v. Godwin, 260 N.C. 580, 133 S.E.2d 166, and State v. Gatlin, 241 N.C. 175, 84 S.E.2d 880. State v. Godwin, supra, is factually distinguishable. In that case the defendant pleaded not guilty. The record discloses the following in respect to the verdict: Upon the verdict the court sentenced the defendant to prison. Defendant assigned as error the verdict as rendered upon which the judgment was based on the ground that the trial judge told them in effect what their verdict should be. This Court agreed that that contention was good and awarded defendant a new trial. The decision was clearly right. In the first place the judge told the jury in effect what the verdict should be, and in the second place, so far as the record of the trial discloses, which is on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the jury was not polled. State v. Gatlin, supra, is also factually distinguishable. The case on appeal as reported in our Reports has this statement: The Supreme Court was clearly right in awarding a new trial on the ground that the judge improperly suggested to the jury what their verdict should be. The Court in its opinion states this language: So far as is shown by the record, which is on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the jury was not polled in the Gatlin case. These principles of law are well settled in this State: While a verdict is a substantial right, it is not complete until accepted by the court for its records. State v. Rhinehart, 267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651; State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869. Verdicts in criminal cases ought to be clear and free from ambiguities and uncertainties, State v. Rhinehart, supra; State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 47, 40 S.E.2d 458. The enforcement of the criminal law and the liberty of citizens demands exactitude. State v. Jones, supra. In accepting or refusing a verdict the trial judge cannot exercise unrestrained discretion. The trial judge should examine a verdict with respect to its form and substance to prevent a doubtful and insufficient verdict from becoming the record of the court, but his power to accept or refuse the jury's finding is not absolute. State v. Perry, supra; State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the verdict should be taken in connection with the issue being tried, the evidence, and the charge of the court. State v. Tilley, 272 N.C. 408, 158 S.E.2d 573; State v. Thompson, 257 N.C. 452, 126 S.E.2d 58; State v. Smith, 226 N.C. 738, 40 S.E.2d 363; State v. Cody, 225 N.C. 38, 33 S.E.2d 71; State v. Gregory, 153 N.C. 646, 69 S.E. 674. From the opinion in the first appeal, State v. Davis, supra, and from the charge of the court as it appears in the record of this case which is on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, it is shown that the court instructed the jury that they might return one of the following verdicts: Guilty of rape, guilty of rape with recommendation of life imprisonment, guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, guilty of assault on a female (defendant being a male person over the age of 18 years), or not guilty. As appears from the "Memorandum Opinion and Order" transmitted to us by Judge Larkins, and from the original record in this case which is on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, when the jury returned with its verdict and after the clerk, according to the practice in this jurisdiction, called over the names of the jury and asked them if they had all agreed on a verdict, the jury replied, "Yes." The clerk then said to the jury, "Who shall speak for you?" The jury replied, "Mr. Eldridge." The clerk then told the defendant, according to the practice in our courts, to stand up and hold up his right hand, and then the clerk addressed the jury as follows: "Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, look upon the prisoner. What say you, is he guilty of the felony of rape whereof he stands indicted or not guilty?" That was the proper question for the clerk at that stage of the proceeding to address to the jury. The jury replied, "Not guilty of that." (Emphasis ours.) It is clear and manifest that that means that the jury found the defendant not guilty of the capital offense of rape, but it does not mean that the jury found a verdict of not guilty of all the charges. Immediately thereafter the clerk addressed the jury, "What say you, is he guilty of assault with intent to commit rape or not guilty?" The jury replied, "Yes." The clerk then said to the jury, "Harken to your verdict, as the Court recordeth it. You say Clifford Delain is guilty of assault with the intent to commit rape, whereof he stands charged?" The jury replied, "Yes." The clerk then said, "So say you all?" Each juror answered, "Yes." Immediately after that had been done, defendant requested that the jury be polled and the record before us reads as follows: "Upon inquiry by the Clerk, each juror answered that he found for his verdict that the defendant, Clifford Delain Davis, was guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, that that was his verdict, and that he did still assent thereto." *703 When the jury answered "Yes" to the question propounded by the clerk, "What say you, is he guilty of assault with intent to commit rape or not guilty?" it was certainly not a verdict of acquittal on that charge of an assault with intent to commit rape. The trial judge should examine a verdict with respect to its form and substance to prevent a doubtful and insufficient verdict from becoming a record of the court. When the clerk said to the jury, "Harken to your verdict, as the Court recordeth it. You say Clifford Delain is guilty of assault with the intent to commit rape, whereof he stands charged?", the jury replied, "Yes." The clerk then said "So say you all?" Each juror answered, "Yes." That was not a verdict that was suggested or dictated by the clerk. It was merely an inquiry to ascertain what the verdict of the jury was and whether it was clear and free from ambiguities and uncertainties. The question asked the jury by the clerk was certainly a permissible interpretation of the answer "Yes" to the question. When this took place, counsel for defendant asked that the jurors be polled. This was done, and upon the polling of the jury each juror answered that he found for his verdict that the defendant, Clifford Delain Davis, was guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, that that was his verdict, and he did still assent thereto. If there was any uncertainty in the verdict, that uncertainty was completely removed by the polling of the jury and their answers to the court upon the polling. We do not agree with the contention of defendant that the jury, after having been told by the clerk in open court what his verdict should be, and having given in to the clerk in open court, would naturally answer the poll of the jury in favor of the verdict that they had been committed to by the dictation of the clerk, for three reasons: First, upon the face of the record proper, there is no proof that the clerk dictated or suggested what the verdict should be, but she merely addressed to them an inquiry; second, the record shows plenary proof tending to show the defendant's guilt of the capital charge of rape, and the jury mercifully convicted him of a lesser charge; and third, as anyone knows who has had long experience upon the trial bench in this State, juries are not so easily swayed as defendant contends. As stated above, it is well settled in his jurisdiction that a verdict should be taken in connection with the issue being tried, the evidence, and the charge of the court. In our opinion, and we so hold, if there is any irregularity in the taking of the verdict, which we do not admit, this irregularity was completely cured by the polling of the jury. The verdict was legal and proper and supports the judgment of imprisonment imposed in this case. When requested in apt time, both defendant and the solicitor for the State have a legal right to demand that the jury be polled. State v. Dow, 246 N.C. 644, 99 S.E.2d 860; State v. Cephus, 241 N.C. 562, 86 S.E.2d 70; State v. Young, 77 N.C. 498. Article I, section 13, of the North Carolina Constitution provides: "No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful persons in open court. * * *" The right of a defendant to poll the jury which has returned a verdict of guilty against him, when made in apt time, has been widely recognized and accorded. Commonwealth v. Martin, 379 Pa. 587, 109 A.2d 325. The procedure had its genesis in ancient common law. See 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 299. The polling of the jury, which was the procedure in the instant case, is a procedure whereby the jurors are asked individually the finding they have arrived at. The practice requires each juror to answer for himself, thus creating an individual response. The object is to give each juror an opportunity, before the verdict is recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict which the foreman has returned, and thus to enable the court and the parties to ascertain with certainty that a unanimous verdict has been in fact reached and that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree to a verdict to which he has not fully assented. State v. Dow, supra; State v. Young, supra; Commonwealth v. Martin, supra; *704 Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 371; 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1392. As far back as 1877 we said in State v. Young, supra: The facts about the rendition of the verdict in State v. Walls, 211 N.C. 487, 191 S.E. 232, cert. den. 302 U.S. 635, 58 S. Ct. 18, 82 L. Ed. 494, are not identical with the facts in the instant case but are apposite. In that case the Court said: In State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 556, 11 S.E.2d 567, the facts about the rendition of the verdict are not identical but are apposite. In that case the defendant was tried on an indictment containing two counts: First, a charge of the capital offense of rape, and second, a charge of feloniously and carnally knowing and abusing a female child over 12 years and under 16 years of age who had never before had sexual intercourse with any person, defendant being a male person over 18 years of age. The jury was impaneled. The solicitor announced that he would not ask for conviction of the capital offense of rape charged in the first count but of such lesser degree of crime as the evidence might appropriately present. With this announcement the case went to trial upon the two-count indictment. *705 The Supreme Court in its opinion said this about the verdict in the case: In State v. Sears, 235 N.C. 623, 70 S.E.2d 907, the facts as to the rendition of the verdict are not identical with the facts in the instant case but they are apposite. In that case the Court said: The Attorney General in the case of State v. Gatlin, supra, in his brief relied upon State v. Watts, supra; State v. Wilson, supra; and State v. Sears, supra. The factual situation in the Gatlin case was not similar to the factual situation in the three cases upon which the Attorney General relied. In its opinion in the Gatlin case, the Supreme Court said in connection with the cases relied upon by the Attorney General: "However, careful consideration of the factual situations in these cases leads to the conclusion that they are not out of harmony with the principles hereinabove set forth. But if they were, this Court would not be inclined to follow them, and deviate from the salutary principles,long safeguarded in the pages of our decisions." The opinion in the Sears case was written by the same judge who wrote the opinion in the Gatlin case. Certainly the Supreme Court did not overrule the decisions in the Walls, the Wilson, and the Sears cases. The last sentence quoted from the Gatlin case is pure dictum. We agree with the decision in the Gatlin case that the decisions in the Walls, the Wilson, and the Sears cases are not out of harmony with the decision in the Gatlin case, and we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision in the instant case is not out of harmony with the decisions in the Gatlin case and the Godwin case. In State v. Brown, 204 N.C. 392, 168 S.E. 532, this is said about the verdict: *708 Defendant has not been denied, as he contends, his right to a jury trial as guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, section 13, of the North Carolina Constitution. If there was any irregularity in the taking of the verdict, which we do not concede, what the verdict was was made crystal clear by the jury when the jury was polled. The verdict in this case was fixed, definite, and certain, as shown by the poll of the jury and otherwise, and the punishment of imprisonment was within the permissible limits fixed by the North Carolina statute for a conviction of assault with intent to commit the crime of rape. G.S. § 14-22. We are of the same opinion that we were on the first appeal in this case. Our opinion then and now is that in the trial of this case, and particularly in the rendition of the verdict, there is No error.