Title: People v. Davidson
Citation: 2022 IL 127538
Docket Number: 127538
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2023

2023 IL 127538 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 127538) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.  
LANCE M. DAVIDSON, Appellant. 
 
Opinion filed January 20, 2023. 
 
 
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, and Holder White 
concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justices Cunningham and Rochford took no part in the decision. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
   The State charged defendant, Lance M. Davidson, in the circuit court of 
Montgomery County with aggravated battery in violation of section 12-
3.05(d)(4)(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) 
(West 2018)). A jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to a term 
of 3½ years’ imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove him 
 
 
 
 
 
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State failed to present any evidence 
that his conduct insulted or provoked the victim. The appellate court affirmed (2021 
IL App (5th) 190217-U), and we allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). For the following reasons, we affirm the 
appellate court’s judgment. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
The State charged defendant by information with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 
5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018)). The information alleged that on March 28, 2018, 
defendant knowingly, without legal justification, pushed Correctional Officer Jim 
Stitt in the chest with his hands, knowing Officer Stitt to be a correctional institution 
employee engaged in the execution of his official duties. 
¶ 4 
 
At a jury trial, Officer Stitt testified that on March 28, 2018, he was employed 
and on duty at the Montgomery County Jail. Officer Stitt was stationed in the 
booking area when he heard loud banging coming from the hallway. He went into 
the hallway and noticed that a dry erase board had been knocked off the wall. 
Officer Stitt proceeded down the hallway to the “North Day 2” area. 
¶ 5 
 
As Officer Stitt approached North Day 2, he observed defendant standing 
directly behind the door, looking out the window while screaming and swearing. 
Officer Stitt explained that any yelling or screaming at the jail needed to be stopped 
immediately to reduce the likelihood of escalation among the inmates. Officer Stitt 
asked defendant to explain the situation, but defendant continued to scream and 
swear. Officer Stitt told defendant to calm down. Defendant refused to stop, so 
Officer Stitt informed him that he would be placed on lockdown. Defendant refused 
to comply and told Officer Stitt he “would have to make [him] go on lock down.” 
¶ 6 
 
Officer Stitt called dispatch to open the cell door. He stepped inside the cell and 
told defendant he would be placed on lockdown. Defendant ran to the other side of 
the cell when Officer Stitt stepped toward him. As Officer Stitt moved toward 
defendant, defendant jumped across the table in the cell. Officer Stitt stepped over 
to block defendant from running back across the cell. Defendant pushed out his 
hands and shoved Officer Stitt in the chest, which caused Officer Stitt to take a step 
 
 
 
 
 
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backwards. However, Officer Stitt managed to spin defendant around, lock his 
arms, and escort him into his individual cell for lockdown. 
¶ 7 
 
Officer Stitt was not physically injured by defendant. Officer Stitt did not testify 
that he felt insulted or provoked by defendant’s push. He also did not testify as to 
any outward reaction he made in response to defendant’s actions. However, Officer 
Stitt knew that defendant had recently returned from court. Officer Stitt believed 
that something must have happened in court that made defendant upset because 
defendant’s behavior started after he returned from court. 
¶ 8 
 
Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant admitted to yelling and 
swearing because he learned in court that he would not be released from prison that 
day. This, combined with family problems, caused defendant to act out. Defendant 
denied hitting Officer Stitt but admitted to running away from Officer Stitt and 
refusing lockdown. 
¶ 9 
 
Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery. The trial court 
sentenced defendant to 3½ years’ imprisonment. 
¶ 10 
 
On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 2021 IL App (5th) 190217-U, ¶ 12. Defendant contended that the 
State failed to present evidence that Officer Stitt was insulted or provoked by the 
contact. Id. The appellate court affirmed, noting that it was not necessary for a 
victim to testify that he was insulted or provoked. Id. ¶ 15 (citing People v. 
Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, ¶ 55). The court explained that the trier of 
fact must consider the context of defendant’s conduct when determining whether 
the contact was insulting or provoking. Id. (citing People v. Fultz, 2012 IL App (2d) 
101101, ¶ 49). 
¶ 11 
 
The appellate court found that the physical contact in this case was precipitated 
by defendant’s intentional disregard of Officer Stitt’s verbal command to lock down 
and subsequent taunting of Officer Stitt by his statement that Officer Stitt would 
have to “ ‘make him’ ” go into lockdown. Id. ¶ 16. The court concluded that 
defendant amplified the situation by moving directly toward Officer Stitt and 
contacting Stitt with the intention of avoiding capture and lockdown. Id. In this 
context, the court concluded that it would be reasonable for the jury to infer that 
defendant’s act of defiance was insulting. Id. The court also explained that it would 
 
 
 
 
 
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be equally reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant’s escalation to physical 
contact would be considered as provoking Stitt into a physical altercation. Id. 
 
¶ 12 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 13 
 
In this court, defendant maintains that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt for the offense of aggravated battery. The narrow issue in this 
appeal involves the parties’ dispute regarding the proof required to establish 
defendant made “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with” Officer 
Stitt. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2018)). Defendant contends the State must 
present evidence proving Officer Stitt subjectively found the physical contact 
insulting or provoking. By contrast, the State asserts that it need only present 
evidence that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have found the 
physical contact insulting or provoking. This is a question of statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo. In re Jarquan B., 2017 IL 121483, ¶ 21. 
¶ 14 
 
The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect 
to the General Assembly’s intent. People v. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 41. The best 
indicator of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory 
language. In re Hernandez, 2020 IL 124661, ¶ 18. When the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we will apply it as written without resort to aids of statutory 
construction. People v. Williams, 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 15. 
¶ 15 
 
The relevant statutory provisions provide that a person commits aggravated 
battery when, “in committing a battery, *** he or she knows the individual battered 
to be *** [a] correctional institution employee *** performing his or her official 
duties.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018). A person commits a battery if 
“he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means *** makes physical 
contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” Id. § 12-3(a). 
¶ 16 
 
We find the clear and unambiguous language of section 12-3(a) of the Code 
demonstrates that the question of whether the contact is insulting or provoking is 
an objective inquiry. The use of the noun “nature” after the adjectives “insulting” 
and “provoking” means that those terms describe the requisite “nature” of the 
contact, taking it outside the scope of the victim’s subjective view. The plain 
meaning of “nature” in this context reflects an intent to look outside the victim’s 
 
 
 
 
 
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viewpoint and to that of a reasonable person’s perspective. Put another way, it is 
the nature of the contact, not the actual impact on the victim, that must be 
established. Consequently, we hold that the trier of fact is asked to determine 
whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would find the physical 
contact insulting or provoking in nature. See e.g., People v. Williams, 2020 IL App 
(4th) 180554, ¶ 50. 
¶ 17 
 
The legislature could have, but did not, expressly provide that an individual’s 
physical contact must cause a victim to feel insulted or provoked. Had the 
legislature intended this, it would have used the same language it used when 
defining battery involving bodily harm. Battery involving bodily harm is 
committed if the individual knowingly “causes bodily harm to an individual.” 
(Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2018). Battery involving insulting or 
provoking contact, however, is committed if the individual knowingly “makes 
physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” (Emphasis 
added.) Id. By defining the first type of battery in terms of the result of the action 
and the second by the nature of the action, the legislature expressed an intention to 
distinguish the two forms of battery. Therefore, whether the victim subjectively 
found the contact insulting or provoking is not necessary to establish that defendant 
committed this form of battery. 
¶ 18 
 
To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. There are many reasons why a 
victim may not display an emotional reaction or deny being insulted or provoked. 
For example, “[v]ictims of domestic violence might not show outward emotion 
because of stoicism, fear of reprisal, pride, shame, humiliation, or even feelings of 
guilt and self-loathing.” People v. Ward, 2021 IL App (2d) 190243, ¶ 102 (Zenoff, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, such a holding would 
foreclose prosecution in cases where an unconscious victim is physically contacted 
in an insulting or provoking way. Williams, 2020 IL App (4th) 180554, ¶ 51. There 
may also be instances where the victim is unable to comprehend or understand if 
certain contact is insulting or provoking. And in the instance case, Officer Stitt 
testified that any yelling or screaming at the jail needs to be stopped immediately 
to reduce the likelihood of escalation among the inmates, so it is certainly 
understandable that a correctional officer would try to limit any outward reaction 
to behavior like defendant’s for the same reason. Applying a reasonable person 
 
 
 
 
 
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standard is consistent with the plain language of the statute and avoids absurd 
results. 
¶ 19 
 
With the above interpretation in mind, we address the split in our appellate court 
districts concerning whether the victim must subjectively find the contact insulting 
or provoking. The court in Williams held that that an objective, reasonable person 
standard applied. Id. ¶ 50. The Ward court, which defendant relied upon in support 
of his argument, held that the State must prove that the victim subjectively found 
the contact insulting or provoking. Ward, 2021 IL App (2d) 190243, ¶ 50. The 
decision in Ward is flawed for several reasons. First, the Ward court’s analysis is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Second, the Ward court 
determined that focusing on the nature of the contact under a reasonable person 
standard precluded a consideration of the context in which the contact occurred. Id. 
¶ 52. The Ward court was under the mistaken assumption that the reasonable person 
standard limited the trier of fact’s consideration to only the type of physical contact 
that occurred without consideration of the context. The opposite is true. “Nature” 
is defined, in relevant part, as “a kind or class usually distinguished by fundamental 
or 
essential 
characteristics.” 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nature (last visited Jan. 10, 2023) 
[https://perma.cc/H359-75SM]. Determining the “essential characteristics” of the 
physical contact requires a consideration of the surrounding context. To the extent 
the appellate court in Ward held that the inquiry is a subjective question, that 
decision is overruled. See Ward, 2021 IL App (2d) 190243, ¶ 50. 
¶ 20 
 
Defendant also calls our attention to the decisions in Fultz, 2012 IL App (2d) 
101101, Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, People v. DeRosario, 397 Ill. App. 
3d 332 (2009), People v. Peck, 260 Ill. App. 3d 812 (1994), People v. d’Avis, 250 
Ill. App. 3d 649 (1993), and People v. Dunker, 217 Ill. App. 3d 410 (1991). He 
contends these decisions demonstrate that nearly every case construing the phrase 
“insulting or provoking” agrees the statute requires evidence that the victim finds 
the contact insulting or provoking. We disagree; the court in these decisions was 
not asked to determine whether the victim must subjectively feel insulted or 
provoked by the contact, so any reliance on these cases for that proposition is 
misplaced. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 21 
 
Additionally, we believe that defendant’s reading of d’Avis, Peck, and 
DeRosario is too broad. These decisions all stand for the proposition that the 
context must be considered when determining if the contact was insulting or 
provoking in nature, which is true under the reasonable person standard. Notably, 
the court in these decisions focused the analysis on the nature of the physical 
contact without mention of the victim’s subjective reaction. See d’Avis, 250 Ill. 
App. 3d at 651 (“Thus, it was perfectly reasonable for the trial court to have found 
that the otherwise noninsulting medical procedure performed on Lopez became an 
insulting and provoking contact once Lopez realized that d’Avis was using the 
rectal examination as a vehicle to bring about his own sexual gratification.”); Peck, 
260 Ill. App. 3d at 814-15 (“Although we can envision contexts in which a 
defendant’s spitting might not constitute insulting or provoking behavior, 
defendant’s spitting in the face of a police officer in this case clearly amounts to 
insulting or provoking contact.”); DeRosario, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 334 (“[T]he trial 
court reasonably concluded that defendant intentionally sat where he was bound to 
come in contact with the victim and that he knew that this conduct would provoke 
her.”). 
¶ 22 
 
We acknowledge that the court in Wrencher, Fultz, and Dunker considered the 
context of the physical contact in terms of its subjective effect on the victim. See 
Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, ¶ 55 (“The victim does not have to testify he 
or she was provoked; the trier of fact can make that inference from the victim’s 
reaction at the time.” (citing Dunker, 217 Ill. App. at 415)); Fultz, 2012 IL App (2d) 
101101, ¶ 50 (“The jury could also have reasonably inferred that Horton was 
insulted and/or provoked where he reacted by pushing defendant aside.”). 
However, the defendants in these decisions never raised this issue, and the court 
proceeded under the assumption that the State must prove the victim subjectively 
found the contact to be insulting or provoking. To the extent those decisions can be 
read as requiring the State to prove the victim was insulted or provoked by the 
contact, those decisions are overruled. 
¶ 23 
 
Having found that the State must prove that a reasonable person would find the 
physical contact insulting or provoking, this court need not address defendant’s 
additional argument that the evidence in this case was insufficient. His argument is 
based on his belief that the State must prove that the victim subjectively found the 
physical contact insulting or provoking. Since we have rejected defendant’s 
 
 
 
 
 
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interpretation, we need not address this argument. We therefore affirm the appellate 
court’s decision affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence. 
 
¶ 24 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 25 
 
The State is not required to prove that a victim of a battery subjectively felt 
insulted or provoked by the contact. Instead, the State need only prove that a 
reasonable person would have felt insulted or provoked by the physical contact. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court affirming defendant’s 
conviction and sentence. 
 
¶ 26 
 
Affirmed. 
 
¶ 27 
 
JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM and ROCHFORD took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case.