Title: Carter v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 040939
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2005

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL ANTHONY CARTER 
 
v.  Record No. 040939     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 14, 2005 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Michael Anthony Carter was convicted of assault on a 
police officer in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C).  In this 
appeal, he challenges his conviction, asserting that an 
assault requires the present ability to inflict bodily injury 
and that no such ability existed in this case.  We will affirm 
Carter's conviction because the applicable definition of 
assault does not require that an assailant have the actual 
ability to inflict bodily harm. 
Facts 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  On December 29, 1998 at 
approximately 11:00 p.m. in an area of frequent drug activity 
in the City of Charlottesville, Officer Brian N. O'Donnell 
made a routine traffic stop of a car for speeding.  Once the 
car was stopped, Officer O'Donnell saw two individuals in the 
car.  He approached the driver's side of the vehicle with his 
weapon holstered but "unsnapped."  He noticed that the 
passenger in the vehicle, Carter, had "his right hand down by 
his right leg."  As Officer O'Donnell talked with the driver, 
Carter made a sudden movement with his right arm arcing it "up 
 
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and across his body."  Carter's hand was in a fist with his 
index finger pointing out and his thumb pointing up in the 
shape of a gun.  Officer O'Donnell backed away from the 
vehicle because he believed Carter had a weapon and was going 
to shoot him until Carter said, "Pow."  At that point, Officer 
O'Donnell realized "it was only his finger."  Officer 
O'Donnell testified that he was terrified and that if he could 
have gotten to his weapon he would have shot Carter. 
 
Because Officer O'Donnell did not know if he could charge 
Carter with any crime, he did not arrest Carter.  A few days 
later, he obtained a warrant for Carter's arrest for 
assaulting a police officer. 
Proceedings 
 
Carter was indicted for assaulting a police officer in 
violation of Code § 18.2-57(C).  Following a bench trial, the 
trial court found Carter guilty of the charge and sentenced 
him to three years in prison.  A divided panel of the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction.  Carter v. Commonwealth, 41 
Va. App. 448, 452, 585 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2003).  Carter was 
granted a rehearing en banc.  The Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc, affirmed the conviction.  Carter v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. 
App. 681, 696, 594 S.E.2d. 284, 292 (2004) (en banc).  Carter 
timely appealed to this Court. 
Discussion 
 
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The issue in this case is whether the present ability to 
inflict bodily harm is an element of assault for purposes of 
Code § 18.2-57(C).  Because the statute does not define 
assault, we look to the common law definition of the term.  At 
common law, assault was both a crime and a tort.  The common 
law crime of assault required an attempt or offer committed 
with an intent to inflict bodily harm coupled with the present 
ability to inflict such harm.  Hardy v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. 
(17 Gratt.) 592, 600-01 (1867).  The common law tort of 
assault could be completed if the tortfeasor engaged in 
actions intended to place the victim in fear of bodily harm 
and created a well-founded fear in the victim.  Koffman v. 
Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 16, 574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2003).  Over the 
years, many jurisdictions have merged the common law crime and 
tort of assault so that today, a common law assault occurs 
when either set of elements is proved.  See Wayne R. LaFave, 
Criminal Law § 16.3, at 823 (4th ed. 2003); Model Penal Code 
§ 211.1 cmt. (1)(b), at 177-78 (1980); Rollin M. Perkins, An 
Analysis of Assault and Attempts to Assault, 47 Minn. L.Rev. 
71, 74 (1962). 
As the parties agree, this Court has not directly 
addressed the merger of the crime and tort of common law 
assault.  Based on a review of our prior cases, we conclude 
that, like the majority of jurisdictions, our prior cases 
 
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compel the conclusion that a common law assault, whether a 
crime or tort, occurs when an assailant engages in an overt 
act intended to inflict bodily harm and has the present 
ability to inflict such harm or engages in an overt act 
intended to place the victim in fear or apprehension of bodily 
harm and creates such reasonable fear or apprehension in the 
victim. 
In one of the earliest cases considering the crime of 
assault, Berkeley v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 1017, 14 S.E. 916 
(1892), the Court was not called upon to determine the 
elements of the crime, but in the course of the opinion 
recited a definition of assault that included the present 
ability to inflict injury.  Id. at 1017-18, 14 S.E. at 916.  
The Berkeley definition of assault, particularly the 
requirement of a present ability to inflict harm, was 
clarified in Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 769, 109 S.E. 418 
(1921).  In that case, a prosecution for offering "ardent 
spirits" for sale, the defendant sought to use the definition 
of assault recited in Berkeley for the proposition that, like 
an assault's dual requirement of an attempt to do bodily harm 
and the present ability to inflict such harm, an attempt or 
offer to sell "ardent spirits" also requires the present 
ability to complete the sale.  Lynch, 131 Va. at 774-75, 109 
S.E. at 420.  The Court rejected the defendant's argument and 
 
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stated that Berkeley did not hold that an attempt in all cases 
must "be accompanied with the present ability" to accomplish 
the thing attempted.  Id. at 775, 109 S.E. at 420. 
In explaining its interpretation of Berkeley, the Court 
cited the example that one would be guilty of assault if he 
"menacingly points at another with a gun, apparently loaded, 
yet not in fact" because a well-founded apprehension was 
created.  Id. at 774, 109 S.E. at 420.  The Court then 
proceeded to recite the "correct rule" of assault: 
'There must be some power, actual or apparent, of 
doing bodily harm; but apparent power is 
sufficient.  In the instance we are referring to, 
the person assaulted is really put in fear . . . .  
It has been said that the gun must be within 
shooting distance; but plainly if it is not, yet 
seems to be so to the person assaulted, or danger 
otherwise appears imminent, it will be sufficient.' 
 
Id. (quoting 2 Joel Prentiss Bishop, New Commentaries on the 
Criminal Law § 32.2, at 19-20 (8th ed. 1892) (Bishop)). 
This rule was again cited as the "correct doctrine" in 
Burgess v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 697, 708, 118 S.E. 273, 276 
(1923).  In Burgess, the Court affirmed the defendant's 
conviction of assault on a police officer for shooting a 
pistol in the officer's direction, even though the jury 
instruction did not require that the defendant have an intent 
to strike the victim.  Id. at 705, 708, 118 S.E. at 275-76.  
In resolving the case, the Court discussed the "irreconcilable 
 
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conflict in the authorities" regarding the assailant's intent 
to do bodily harm, placing the victim in actual peril, and 
putting the victim in well founded fear or apprehension of 
harm.  Id. at 706-07, 118 S.E. at 275.  After reviewing the 
conflicts, the Court adopted this principle: 
'. . . There is no need for the assailed party to 
be put in actual peril, if only a well founded 
apprehension is created.  For this suffering is 
the same in the one case as in the other, and the 
breach of the public peace is the same.' 
 
Id. at 708, 118 S.E. at 276 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Bishop 
§ 32.1, at 19). 
 
The elements of common law assault as described in these 
cases reflect the adoption of the principle that the actual 
present ability to harm was not a prerequisite for conviction.  
Apparent ability or, put another way, well-founded fear or 
apprehension of harm, combined with an intent to instill that 
fear, was sufficient to support a conviction for common law 
assault.  That understanding reflected the general trend of 
combining the elements of common law criminal assault and 
common law tort assault to form the definition of common law 
assault. 
 
Carter suggests that the statements in Lynch and Burgess 
are not persuasive because the present ability to inflict harm 
was not the specific question before the Court when these 
statements of the law were recited and because definitions of 
 
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assault contained in subsequent opinions by this Court 
continue to include the present ability to inflict harm as an 
element of assault.  We disagree with Carter. 
Carter can take no solace in the proposition that neither 
Burgess nor Lynch involved the specific question posed in this 
case.  None of the cases cited by Carter in support of his 
position – Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 585 S.E.2d 
538 (2003), Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723, 85 S.E.2d 249 
(1955), and Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395 
(1935) – involved the specific issue presented here either. 
In Merritt, the issue was whether an indictment reciting 
that the defendant pointed a loaded pistol at a victim within 
"carrying distance" of the pistol was sufficient to charge and 
support a conviction for attempted murder.  164 Va. at 655-56, 
180 S.E. at 396.  The Court concluded that the acts alleged 
did not support a specific intent to kill or an inference of 
such intent.  Id. at 658, 180 S.E. at 397.  The Court noted 
that the acts alleged supported an assault and recited a 
definition of assault in that context.  Id. at 658-59, 180 
S.E. at 397-98.  That definition included the present ability 
to inflict the bodily harm threatened, but the definition was 
not part of, or necessary to, the Court's holding.  Id.  
Similarly in Harper, the definition of assault was not 
critical to the issue before the Court.  The Court referred to 
 
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a definition of assault in the context of a challenge to a 
jury instruction on self-defense.  Harper, 196 Va. at 732-33, 
85 S.E.2d at 255. 
Finally, the issues in Zimmerman, like the issue in 
Burgess, involved the intent of the assailant.  Zimmerman, 266 
Va. at 387, 585 S.E.2d at 539-40; Burgess, 136 Va. at 705-06, 
118 S.E. at 275.  In both cases, the assailant had the present 
ability to harm the victim and thus that factor was not the 
focus of the inquiry.  Zimmerman, 266 Va. at 388, 585 S.E.2d 
at 540; Burgess, 136 Va. at 705-06, 118 S.E. at 275. 
Definitions of assault have been used by this Court in 
various settings for various purposes.  But only Burgess 
engaged in a discussion of the elements that constituted the 
common law crime and tort of assault for purpose of criminal 
prosecution.  See Burgess, 136 Va. at 706-07, 118 S.E. at 275-
76.  After considering the competing arguments, the Court in 
Burgess adopted a definition of assault that was not 
restricted to the common law crime of assault.  See id. at 
708, 118 S.E. at 276.  The subsequent cases cited by Carter 
with specific fact situations unrelated to the issue here did 
not eliminate the Burgess analysis simply by reciting a 
limited definition of assault when such definition was 
consistent with the facts in a particular case.  The 
definition in Burgess remains valid.  That definition does not 
 
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require the present ability to inflict harm when, as here, an 
assailant acts in a manner intended to put the victim in 
reasonable fear or apprehension and causes the victim such 
reasonable fear or apprehension. 
The definition of assault used by the trial court in this 
case is consistent with the elements of assault we have just 
discussed.  Carter has not challenged the trial court's 
conclusion that when Carter made the arcing motion with his 
arm and pointed his fist and finger, Officer O'Donnell's fear 
of bodily harm was reasonable.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Carter's 
assault conviction. 
Affirmed.