Title: Midland Cogeneration Venture, LP v. Naftaly
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140814
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2011

FILED MAY 23, 2011 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MIDLAND COGENERATION VENTURE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140814 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
IRON MOUNTAIN INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140817 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
 
 
 
2
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
JAMES RUSHTON, in his capacity as 
Pittsfield Charter Township Assessor, and 
PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
CVS PHARMACY, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140818 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
GLENN LEMMON, in his capacity as 
assessor for the city of Novi, and CITY OF 
NOVI, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
NES RENTAL HOLDINGS, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140819 
 
 
 
3
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
LINDA BADE, in her capacity as assessor 
for the city of Detroit, and CITY OF 
DETROIT, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
IRON MOUNTAIN INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140820 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
LINDA BADE, in her capacity as assessor 
for the city of Detroit, and CITY OF 
DETROIT, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
IRON MOUNTAIN INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140821 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
SHERRON SHULTZ, in her capacity as 
assessor for the city of Livonia, and CITY 
OF LIVONIA, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
IRON MOUNTAIN INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140822 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
5
SHERRON SCHULTZ, in her capacity as 
assessor for the city of Livonia, and CITY 
OF LIVONIA, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
IRON MOUNTAIN INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140823 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
TOM YACK, in his capacity as Canton 
Township Supervisor, and CANTON 
TOWNSHIP, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
IRON MOUNTAIN INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, INC.,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 140824 
 
ROBERT NAFTALY, in his capacity as 
chairperson of the State Tax Commission, 
DOUGLAS ROBERTS and FREDERICK 
 
 
 
 
6
MORGAN, in their capacities as members of 
the State Tax Commission, and STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
 
LINDA BADE, in her capacity as assessor 
for the city of Detroit, and CITY OF 
DETROIT, 
 
                      Defendants. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARILYN KELLY, J.  
In these consolidated cases, we must determine whether circuit courts have subject 
matter jurisdiction over appeals from the State Tax Commission (STC) regarding 
property classifications.  We conclude that they do.   
We hold that, because they constitute final decisions that are quasi-judicial and 
affect private rights, STC property-classification decisions fall within the ambit of article 
6, § 28 of the Michigan Constitution, which guarantees judicial review.  The Legislature 
lacks the authority to abolish the right to judicial review by enacting a statute.  As a 
consequence, we declare the final sentence of MCL 211.34c(6) unconstitutional because 
it denies appeal in the courts of STC classification decisions.  And because the 
Legislature has not provided other means for judicial review of STC classification 
decisions, we hold that the circuit courts have jurisdiction over such appeals pursuant to 
MCL 600.631. 
 
 
 
7
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal involves nine consolidated cases.  All the plaintiffs own property that 
is subject to property taxes in Michigan.  They describe the property as machinery and 
equipment.  For 2008, the tax year in question, the local assessors classified the property 
for tax-assessment purposes as industrial real property1 or commercial personal property.2  
Plaintiffs timely petitioned the relevant boards of review to reclassify the property as 
industrial personal property.3  That reclassification would permit them to take advantage 
of recently enacted tax exemptions or credits.4  In each instance, the board denied the 
request.  Plaintiffs thereafter individually petitioned the STC to reclassify the property.   
In each case, the STC denied the request to reclassify the property.  Plaintiffs then 
individually sought and obtained relief in various circuit courts.  Defendants appealed the 
judgments in the Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal and consolidated the 
individual cases.  The Court reversed each of the circuit court judgments and remanded 
                                              
1 MCL 211.34c(2)(d). 
2 MCL 211.34c(3)(b).  In the Midland Cogeneration case (Docket No. 140814), the 
Midland assessor classified plaintiff’s property as industrial real property.  In all the other 
cases (Docket Nos. 140817 through 140824), the property in question was classified as 
commercial personal property.   
3 MCL 211.34c(3)(c). 
4 Changes to the Michigan Business Tax Act (MBTA), MCL 208.1101 et seq., effective 
in tax year 2008 provide for credit against MBTA liability for property taxes paid on a 
tax parcel classified as industrial personal property.  MCL 208.1413.  In addition, recent 
amendments of the Revised School Code provide exemptions for industrial personal 
property and commercial property from taxes levied under the State Education Tax Act.  
See MCL 380.1211. 
 
 
 
8
for the entry of orders granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor.5  It held that 
MCL 211.34c(6) bars an appeal in the courts of an STC classification decision.6   
MCL 211.34c(6) provides in pertinent part:  “An appeal may not be taken from the 
decision of the state tax commission regarding classification complaint petitions and the 
state tax commission’s determination is final and binding for the year of the petition.”  
The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the statute violates the constitutional 
guarantee of a direct appeal of administrative final decisions.  The Court held that, 
although it prevents an appeal of classification decisions in the courts, the statute does not 
prevent other review, such as seeking a refund in the Michigan Tax Tribunal. 
Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal in this Court and we granted it, limited to whether 
the circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over appeals of an STC decision 
regarding property classification.7   
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction presented in these cases involves questions 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation, which are reviewed de novo.8   
 
The General Property Tax Act9 requires local tax assessors to classify “every item 
of assessable [real and personal] property” in the local tax assessing unit according to 
                                              
5 Iron Mountain Info Mgt, Inc v State Tax Comm, 286 Mich App 616, 623; 780 NW2d 
923 (2009). 
6 Id. at 621. 
7 Iron Mountain Info Mgt, Inc v Naftaly, 486 Mich 1038 (2010); Midland Cogeneration 
Venture Ltd Partnership v Naftaly, 486 Mich 1038 (2010). 
8 Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 257; 771 NW2d 694 (2009). 
 
 
 
9
categories established in MCL 211.34c.10  It classifies real property into six broad 
categories: agricultural, commercial, developmental, industrial, residential, and timber-
cutover.11  Personal property is classified into five broad categories: agricultural, 
commercial, industrial, residential, and utility.12   
A property owner who disputes the local tax assessor’s classification “must notify 
the assessor and may protest the assigned classification to the March board of review.”13  
A property owner or the assessor may appeal a decision of the board by filing a petition 
with the STC not later than June 30 of that tax year.14  The STC is required to “arbitrate 
the petition based on the written petition and written recommendations of the assessor 
and the state tax commission staff.”15   
Under MCL 211.34c(6), a decision of the STC regarding property classification is 
final, and no appeal is permitted.  However, MCL 211.34c(7) provides that the 
Department of Treasury may appeal a classification decision to “the residential and small 
claims division of the Michigan tax tribunal not later than December 31 in the tax year 
for which the classification is appealed.” 
                                              
9 MCL 211.1 et seq. 
10 MCL 211.34c(1). 
11 MCL 211.34c(2)(a) through (f). 
12 MCL 211.34c(3)(a) through (e). 
13 MCL 211.34c(6). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
 
 
 
10
ANALYSIS 
 
In reviewing a constitutional challenge, we presume that statutes are constitutional 
as written.16  We exercise the power to declare a law unconstitutional “with extreme 
caution.”17 Plaintiffs claim that MCL 211.34c(6) violates article 6, § 28 of the Michigan 
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: 
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative 
officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are 
judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be 
subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law.  This review shall 
include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, 
findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law . . . .[18] 
Article 6, § 28 is not an absolute guarantee of judicial review of every 
administrative decision.  In order for it to apply, (1) the administrative decision must be a 
“final decision” of an administrative agency, (2) the agency must have acted in a “judicial 
or quasi-judicial” capacity, and (3) the decision must affect private rights or licenses.  
Therefore, we must determine whether STC classification decisions are final decisions of 
a judicial or quasi-judicial nature that affect private rights or licenses.   
                                              
16 Cruz v Chevrolet Grey Iron Div of Gen Motors Corp, 398 Mich 117, 127; 247 NW2d 
764 (1976) (opinion by COLEMAN, J., citing cases). 
17 Thayer v Dep’t of Agriculture, 323 Mich 403, 410; 35 NW2d 360 (1949) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
18 Const 1963, art 6, § 28.  The final sentence of this section provides:  “In the absence of 
fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any 
court from any final agency provided for the administration of property tax laws from any 
decision relating to valuation or allocation.”  The parties do not allege that property 
classifications are decisions relating to valuation or allocation.  Hence, we do not 
consider this portion of the section in this opinion. 
 
 
 
11
 
First, it is uncontested that the challenged STC decisions are final decisions of an 
administrative agency.  In each of these cases, the STC sent a letter to the plaintiff 
advising it that the STC’s decision was final because MCL 211.34c(6) provides for no 
appeal of it. 
 
Second, in order for article 6, § 28 to apply, the STC must have acted in a judicial 
or quasi-judicial capacity in rendering its classification decisions.  Decisions of the STC 
are not judicial decisions.  The dispositive question is whether they are quasi-judicial in 
nature.   
This Court has employed the term “quasi-judicial” broadly: “When the power is 
conferred by statute upon a commission such as the public utilities, or a board such as the 
department of labor and industry, to ascertain facts and make orders founded thereon, 
they are at times referred to as quasi-judicial bodies . . . .”19  The Court of Appeals has 
referred to Black’s Law Dictionary to define “quasi-judicial”:  
“A term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public 
administrative officers, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain 
the existence of facts, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their 
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”[20]   
An STC classification decision is not a general rulemaking or advisory decision.  
The STC resolves disputed factual claims on a case-by-case basis.  This entails an 
evaluation of evidence and dispute resolution, which are quasi-judicial functions.  
Furthermore, MCL 211.34c(6) styles the STC’s actions as arbitrations in which the STC 
                                              
19 People ex rel Clardy v Balch, 268 Mich 196, 200; 255 NW 762 (1934).   
20 Pletz v Secretary of State, 125 Mich App 335, 351-352; 336 NW2d 789 (1983), 
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed), p 1411.   
 
 
 
12
considers written petitions and “arbitrates” matters.21  Thus, in rendering property 
classification decisions, the STC acts as an arbitrator adjudicating disputed claims.  It is 
well settled that an arbitrator’s function is quasi-judicial in nature.22   
 
Third, in order for article 6, § 28 to apply to STC classification decisions, they 
must “affect private rights or licenses.”  This case does not involve a license.  Therefore, 
we must determine whether STC classification decisions affect private rights.   
 
Taxpayers do not have “a vested right in a tax statute or in the continuance of any 
tax law.”23  We defined a vested right as “an interest that the government is compelled to 
recognize and protect of which the holder could not be deprived without injustice.”24  In 
contrast, article 6, § 28 of the constitution recognizes and protects administrative 
decisions that “affect private rights.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “private right” as 
“a personal right, as opposed to a right of the public or the state.”25  Black’s defines 
“right” as “[t]he interest, claim, or ownership that one has in tangible or intangible 
property.”26   
                                              
21 “The state tax commission shall arbitrate the petition based on the written petition and 
the written recommendations of the assessor and the state tax commission staff.”  MCL 
211.34c(6). 
22 See Boraks v American Arbitration Ass’n, 205 Mich App 149, 151; 517 NW2d 771 
(1994); Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers v 
Greyhound Lines, Inc, 701 F2d 1181, 1185 (CA 6, 1983).   
23 Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682, 703; 520 NW2d 135 (1994). 
24 Id. at 699. 
25 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), p 1348. 
26 Id. at 1347, definition 5. 
 
 
 
13
We conclude that taxpayers have a private right to ensure that their property is 
taxed the same as similarly situated property.27  As applied to this case, the classification 
of plaintiffs’ property will determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to the same tax 
treatment received by owners of similarly classified property.  Plaintiffs have an interest 
in the proper interpretation of the statutory definitions of “industrial personal property,” 
“commercial personal property,” and “industrial real property.”  An erroneous 
interpretation of the statutory definitions could impermissibly increase their tax burden 
and thus affect their private right.  Hence, the STC classification decisions in question 
affect private rights. 
 
Aside from requiring a final quasi-judicial decision that affects private rights, 
article 6, § 28 provides that such decisions “shall be subject to direct review by the courts 
as provided by law.”28  Defendants argued that “as provided by law” means that the 
Legislature has the authority to limit the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  The Court of 
Appeals agreed and, in reliance on that language, held that MCL 211.34c(6) prevents an 
STC classification decision from being appealed in a court.  It relied solely on this 
Court’s 1977 decision in McAvoy v H B Sherman Co.29   
McAvoy held that the Legislature may “exert substantial control over the 
mechanics of how administrative decisions are to be appealed.”30  It does not stand for 
                                              
27 See Const 1963, art 9, § 3 (requiring the Legislature to provide for uniform taxation of 
property). 
28 Const 1963, art 6, § 28 (emphasis added). 
29 McAvoy v H B Sherman Co, 401 Mich 419, 443; 258 NW2d 414 (1977). 
30 Id. 
 
 
 
14
the proposition that the Legislature can limit the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  Rather, 
McAvoy held that “as provided by law” contemplates that the Legislature will provide the 
manner in which judicial review shall occur.  It recognized the Legislature’s ability to 
dictate “how,” “when,” and “what” type of appeal of an agency decision is permitted.  
Acknowledging that the Michigan Constitution mandates review, McAvoy opined that “as 
provided by law” permits the Legislature only to prescribe the details of that review.31  
For example, the Legislature can prescribe time frames for filing an appeal, dictate 
whether a party may obtain a stay pending appeal, and set forth the controlling standard 
of review.   
MCL 211.34c(6) is not an exercise of control over the “mechanics” of an appeal to 
the courts of an STC classification decision.  Rather, it is a complete prohibition of court 
review of STC classification decisions.  There is a significant difference between 
dictating the mechanics of an appeal and preventing an appeal altogether.  Thus, the 
Court of Appeals erred by concluding that MCL 211.34c(6) is concerned merely with 
mechanics.   
 
The Legislature may not eradicate a constitutional guarantee in reliance on the 
language “as provided by law.”  Because MCL 211.34c(6) eliminates any appeal of a 
final administrative decision that is quasi-judicial in nature and affects private rights, it 
runs afoul of the guarantee in article 6, § 28.  This conclusion assumes that there is no 
other mechanism for direct review by the courts.   
                                              
31 See id. 
 
 
 
15
The Court of Appeals and defendants have failed to make a persuasive case that an 
alternative mechanism exists with which to appeal an STC classification decision.  The 
Court suggested that a plaintiff could pay the tax and then seek a refund in the Michigan 
Tax Tribunal.32  However, nothing in the Tax Tribunal Act grants the Tax Tribunal 
jurisdiction over STC classification decisions.  Indeed, in 2010, the Tax Tribunal ruled 
that it lacks jurisdiction over STC classification decisions.33  Hence, as a result of that 
decision and the Court of Appeals’ opinion, plaintiffs are left with no forum in which to 
challenge STC classification decisions, notwithstanding their constitutional right to 
judicial review.   
Therefore, we hold that the phrase “as provided by law” in article 6, § 28 does not 
grant the Legislature the authority to circumvent the protections that the section 
guarantees.  If it did, those protections would lose their strength because the Legislature 
could render the entire provision mere surplusage.  And given that no other mechanism 
for review of STC classification decisions exists, the last sentence of MCL 211.34c(6) 
violates article 6, § 28.   
To cure this defect, we must determine whether the entire statute is 
unconstitutional or whether its last sentence is severable.  MCL 8.5 provides: 
                                              
32 The Court of Appeals stated: “The Legislature did not preclude review by other 
mechanisms.  For example, a party could pay the property taxes due for a subject parcel, 
and then file a claim in the Michigan Tax Tribunal for a refund of taxes paid because of 
an improper classification.”  Iron Mountain Info Mgt, 286 Mich App at 623 n 2. 
33 Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd Partnership v City of Midland, order of the 
Michigan Tax Tribunal, entered April 21, 2010 (Docket No. 383162). 
 
 
 
16
If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a court, such invalidity shall 
not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act which can be 
given effect without the invalid portion or application, provided such 
portions are not determined by the court to be inoperable, and to this end 
acts are declared to be severable.   
To determine whether severance is appropriate, we must consider whether the portion of 
MCL 211.34c(6) remaining after its last sentence has been severed is capable of 
functioning alone.34 
The subsection consists of four sentences.  The first three dictate the process by 
which a property owner may protest an adverse property classification.35  The initial 
review is made by the March board of review.  The next level of review is by the STC.  
The fourth and final sentence of MCL 211.34c(6) restricts judicial review of STC 
classification decisions.  This final sentence has no effect on the remainder of the 
subsection.  In its absence, the subsection provides for an internal appellate process 
within the administrative agency.  The internal process is separate and distinct from any 
judicial review.  Thus, MCL 211.34c(6) is capable of functioning without its final 
sentence.  Accordingly, the final sentence of MCL 211.34c(6), which shields STC 
classification decisions from judicial review, is severed and declared unconstitutional.36 
The remainder of MCL 211.34c(6) remains in full force and effect.   
Without the final sentence of MCL 211.34c(6), the General Property Tax Act is 
silent as to plaintiffs’ right to appeal an adverse STC classification decision.  As we have 
                                              
34 See Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 159; 188 NW2d 593 (1971).   
35 MCL 211.34c(6). 
36 See C F Smith Co v Fitzgerald, 270 Mich 659, 667-668; 259 NW 352 (1935). 
 
 
 
17
held, however, article 6, § 28 of the Michigan Constitution mandates that plaintiffs be 
afforded this right.  Thus, we must consider what remedy is available to plaintiffs absent 
a specific legislative directive.   
The Revised Judicature Act specifically allows appeals of decisions by state 
agencies when judicial review “has not otherwise been provided by law.”37  Because 
MCL 211.34c(6) precluded judicial review in violation of article 6, § 28, judicial review 
“has not otherwise been provided by law,” and MCL 600.631 applies.  Therefore, the 
circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over appeals of a decision of the STC 
regarding property classifications.   
CONCLUSION 
STC property-classification decisions are final decisions of an administrative 
agency that are quasi-judicial in nature and affect private rights.  Consequently, article 6, 
§ 28 of the Michigan Constitution guarantees judicial review of them, and this guarantee 
may not be jettisoned by statute.  Accordingly, because the final sentence of MCL 
211.34c(6) precludes judicial review of STC classification decisions, it violates article 6, 
                                              
37 MCL 600.631 states: 
 
An appeal shall lie from any order, decision, or opinion of any state 
board, commission, or agency, authorized under the laws of this state to 
promulgate rules from which an appeal or other judicial review has not 
otherwise been provided for by law, to the circuit court of the county of 
which the appellant is a resident or to the circuit court of Ingham county, 
which court shall have and exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto as in 
nonjury cases.  Such appeals shall be made in accordance with the rules of 
the supreme court.   
 
 
 
 
18
§ 28 of the Michigan Constitution.  We declare that sentence unconstitutional and sever 
it, leaving the remainder of MCL 211.34c(6) in full force and effect.   
The circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over appeals of a decision of the 
STC regarding property classifications. Plaintiffs may appeal the decisions in the cases 
before us in the circuit court for the county of which plaintiffs are residents or the circuit 
court for Ingham County.   
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra