Title: New Jersey in the Interest of A.R.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2018

New Jersey in the Interest of A.R. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old “Alex,” the family court admitted into evidence the "tender-years" exception to the hearsay rule: the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old “John” gave to police, in which he alleged that Alex had sexually touched him on a school bus. John, who suffered from severe developmental disabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioning was unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and who was declared incompetent as a witness by the court, was permitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). The State recalled John to the stand. He had difficulty answering simple questions. For example, he stated “It’s right,” if the prosecutor referred to a spider as a flower, and in response to a leading question, indicated that the color black might be red. John stated that Alex, whom he identified in the courtroom, touched him on “my clothes, my pee-pee and my butt.” However, John stated that a little boy named Alex sat near him and that the little boys and big boys were separated on the bus. The family court adjudicated Alex delinquent. Alex appealed. The Appellate Division held that John was effectively unavailable for cross-examination, and therefore the admission of his statement to the detective violated Alex’s federal confrontation rights. The panel did not address any state-law evidentiary claims and remanded to the family court to assess whether the State’s remaining evidence was sufficient to prove the adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-law grounds, concluding John's video-recorded statement was not admissible because the statement did not possess a sufficient probability of trustworthiness to justify its introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Striking the recorded statement from the record did not leave sufficient evidence in the record to support, on any rational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.) State in the Interest of A.R. (A-67-16) (078672)Argued February 26, 2018 -- Decided July 11, 2018ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old “Alex,” the family court admitted into evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) -- the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule -- the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old “John” gave to police, in which he alleged that Alex had sexually touched him on a school bus. John, who suffers from severe developmental disabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioning was unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and who was declared incompetent as a witness by the court, was permitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). The Court considers that determination, as well as the family court’s adjudication of Alex as delinquent of committing sexual assault. Fourteen-year-old Alex was charged in a juvenile delinquency complaint with committing sexual assault “by contact” on seven-year-old John. The complaint specifically alleged that Alex “on one occasion rubbed [John’s] penis with his hand.” The alleged assault occurred on a bus transporting eighteen special-needs children home from summer school. The family court conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements John made to a detective. John’s mother’s cousin (“Grace”) testified that on July 3, 2014, she went to the bus stop to pick up John. While walking home, John told Grace that “[Alex] touched his belly button and pee-pee.” Grace did not ask any follow-up questions. Grace later called John’s mother and had no further discussion with John about the subject. John’s mother reported the incident to the police five days later. Detective Abromaitis testified about his fourteen-minute recorded interview from July 21, 2014. The interview began with Detective Abromaitis introducing himself. In response to the first question, “What’s up,” John stated, “[Alex] touched my pee-pee.” John indicated that the touching occurred “[u]nderneath my clothes.” However, when John showed the detective where he was touched using anatomical dolls, without prompting, he stated, “He touched at me by accident.” On an anatomical drawing, John referred to his “butt” as both his belly button and his behind, and at one point he referred to his navel as his “dingaleg.” In response to a leading question, John recalled that he was at home when the touching occurred, until the detective asked another leading question, and then John recalled that he was on the bus. John told the detective that he lived with “Chowder and Clarence” (cartoon characters), his “mom,” his friend Jacob, and “dragons, too.” 1 The family court ruled that John’s recorded statement would be admissible at trial, provided that John was available to testify. The next day, at the bench trial, John had difficulty responding to simple questions in an accurate or truthful way. The court concluded that John was not “competent to testify.” Nevertheless, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), the court allowed the prosecutor to proceed with John’s direct examination. John could convey little reliable information. Although it was undisputed that John took a bus to summer school, he responded to a question about how he went to school by stating, “I was walking on the street.” Although the family court found that John lacked “competency” as a witness, it declined to exclude from evidence John’s statements to the detective or to dismiss the case. The State recalled John to the stand. He continued to have difficulty answering simple questions. For example, he stated “It’s right,” if the prosecutor referred to a spider as a flower, and in response to a leading question, indicated that the color black might be red. John stated that Alex, whom he identified in the courtroom, touched him on “my clothes, my pee-pee and my butt.” However, John stated that a little boy named Alex sat near him and that the little boys and big boys were separated on the bus. The defense presented three witnesses. The bus aide stated that the “big kids,” such as Alex, sat in the back of the bus and the “small kids” sat in the front -- and that she sat in the middle, separating the two groups. She maintained that Alex did not sit with John. The school bus driver corroborated the seating arrangement and did not see or hear anything that gave him concern. The transportation liaison confirmed that two children named Alex were on the bus that day, one of whom went to elementary school and the other to high school. The family court adjudicated Alex delinquent. Alex appealed. The Appellate Division held that John was effectively unavailable for cross-examination, and therefore the admission of his statement to the detective violated Alex’s federal confrontation rights. 447 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2016). The panel did not address any state-law evidentiary claims and remanded to the family court to assess whether the State’s remaining evidence is sufficient to prove the adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 525. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 230 N.J. 425 (2017).HELD: The Court reverses Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-law grounds, concluding that the video-recorded statement did not possess a sufficient probability of trustworthiness to justify its introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Striking the juvenile’s recorded statement from the record does not leave sufficient evidence in the record to support, on any rational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex. Accordingly, the sexual assault charge must be dismissed. The Court concludes that the incompetency proviso of the present version of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) is flawed and remands that rule for review to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence.1. The Court does not address the constitutional issues reached by the Appellate Division because this matter can be resolved by resort to New Jersey’s evidence rules, and courts should not reach a constitutional question unless imperative to the litigation. (pp. 18-19) 2 2. The source of the current tender-years exception, including its incompetency proviso, is State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348 (1988). In D.R., the Court recognized that, in a child-sex-abuse prosecution, “testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of the [State’s] case,” and determined that the evidence rules needed an additional “exception[] to the hearsay rule . . . .” Id. at 358. The Court also expressed concern that a child’s incompetency would present an insurmountable obstacle to the admission of the child-victim’s out-of-court statement. Id. at 369-70. That concern gave rise to the incompetency proviso. (pp. 19-22)3. The incompetency proviso proposed in D.R. and adopted as a rule read as follows: “no child whose statement is to be offered in evidence . . . shall be disqualified to be a witness . . . by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) [of the competency rule].” Id. at 378. It rendered inoperative only paragraph (b) of the competency rule; it did not allow a child deemed incompetent under paragraph (a) to testify. With the 1993 renumbering of the Rules of Evidence, the reference to paragraph (b) was removed. The proviso now reads: “no child whose statement is to be offered in evidence . . . shall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding by virtue of the requirements of [the competency rule].” The consequences of this expansion are significant and far-reaching because it permits the testimony of a child victim not only incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth (paragraph b) but also incapable of distinguishing between fantasy and reality and of expressing himself in a manner to be understood by a judge or jury (paragraph a). The record concerning the promulgation of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) provides no clear explanation for the removal of the reference to paragraph (b). Accordingly, the Court requests that the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence consider whether N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) should be amended. (pp. 22-26)4. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), as presently constructed, did not authorize the admission of John’s video-recorded statement. Before admitting a child’s out-of-court statement, the trial court must determine whether “there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy.” N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). The Court has identified “a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to evaluating the reliability of out-of-court statements made by child victims of sexual abuse, including [the] mental state of the declarant . . . .” State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 249 (2010). Clearly, one consideration in assessing a child’s mental state must be whether the child is able to distinguish between fantasy and reality and whether the child can communicate in a way that shows the child has the mental capacity to tell the truth and to be understood by the trier of fact. A judicial declaration that a child is incompetent to testify should also have some bearing on determining the admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement. Given the totality of the circumstances, the trustworthiness of John’s video-recorded statement is not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. John’s video-recorded statement was wrongly admitted into evidence. (pp. 27-33)5. After excising from the record John’s video-recorded statement, the remaining evidence -- even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State -- is insufficient to support a sexual-assault adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. The remaining evidence consists of John’s incompetent testimony and Grace’s hearsay testimony that, as John walked home with her after exiting the bus, he said, “[Alex] touched his belly button and pee-pee.” The 3 statement does not tell us whether the alleged touching was accidental, which of the two Alexes did the touching, or when and where the incident occurred. In addition, no competent evidence corroborates John’s single statement made to Grace. The remaining evidence is insufficient to support the sexual-assault adjudication against Alex. (pp. 33-35) REVERSED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 67 September Term 2016 078672STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., a minor. Argued February 26, 2018 – Decided July 11, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 447 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div. 2016). Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent A.R. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alison S. Perrone, on the briefs). Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for amicus curiae John J. Gibbons Fellowship in Pubic Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons P.C. (Gibbons, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg and J. David Pollock, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old Alex, thefamily court admitted into evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E.803(c)(27) -- the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule --the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old John gave topolice, in which he alleged that Alex had sexually touched him 1 on a school bus.1 John, who suffers from severe developmentaldisabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioningwas unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and whowas declared incompetent as a witness by the court, waspermitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso ofN.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). According to the proviso, “no child whosestatement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to [N.J.R.E.803(c)(27)] shall be disqualified” to testify, even though thechild witness is deemed incompetent under the requirements ofN.J.R.E. 601. Based on John’s recorded statement, his incompetenttestimony, and an utterance he made to his mother’s cousin, thefamily court adjudicated Alex delinquent of committing sexualassault. The Appellate Division found that John’s incompetency, asevident from his inability to answer truthfully even simplequestions, rendered him unavailable for cross-examination. TheAppellate Division therefore determined that the admission ofthe juvenile’s in-court testimony and the video-recordedstatement violated Alex’s confrontation rights under the SixthAmendment, as articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 1 We use fictitious names to identify the juvenile defendant and the alleged victim, and the victim’s relatives to protect their privacy. 2 (2004), and its progeny. The Appellate Division did not disturbthe juvenile adjudication but rather remanded to the familycourt to determine whether sufficient evidence remained tosupport that adjudication. We now reverse Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-lawgrounds. We conclude that the juvenile’s video-recordedstatement was not admissible because the statement did notpossess a sufficient probability of trustworthiness to justifyits introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Theresolution of the admissibility of the recorded statement basedon our evidence rules ultimately renders unnecessary theAppellate Division’s constitutional analysis and determination.Striking the juvenile’s recorded statement from the record doesnot leave sufficient evidence in the record to support, on anyrational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Divisionand hold that the sexual assault charge must be dismissed. The Appellate Division’s critique, however, has led us toconclude that the incompetency proviso of the present version ofN.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) is flawed, and therefore we remand that rulefor review to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules ofEvidence. I. A. 3 Fourteen-year-old Alex was charged in a juveniledelinquency complaint with committing an act of sexual assault“by contact” on seven-year-old John on July 3, 2014 in violationof N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). The complaint specifically alleged thatAlex “on one occasion rubbed [John’s] penis with his hand.” Thealleged assault occurred on a bus that was transporting eighteenspecial-needs children home from summer school. John has beendiagnosed with autism and attention deficit hyperactivitydisorder (ADHD), and his intellectual development correspondedto that of a three-year-old. The State’s case depended largely on a comment made by Johnto his mother’s cousin Grace after he exited the bus, John’srecorded statement given to a detective eighteen days later, andJohn’s testimony at the juvenile trial. Alex’s defenseconsisted of a general denial that the assault occurred. Amongother witnesses, Alex presented the bus aide and the bus driver,both of whom suggested that the assault could not have happenedas described by John, given the seating arrangements on the busand their observations that day. B. The family court conducted a Rule 104 hearing,2 pursuant to2 N.J.R.E. 104(a) provides the vehicle for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence that is subject to a condition before the evidence may be introduced at4 N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), to determine the admissibility of thestatements John made to Grace and the detective. The only issuebefore this Court is the admissibility of John’s recordedstatement to the detective. At the hearing, the State called Grace and Detective DavidAbromaitis of the Special Victims Unit of the Hudson CountyProsecutor’s Office, and the defense called Dr. Gerald Cooke, aboard-certified forensic psychologist. Grace testified that on July 3, 2014, she went to the busstop to pick up John from summer school. She arrived after Johnhad exited the bus. When she first observed John, Alex washolding him by the hand. That struck Grace as unusual, and shetold the bus driver that he should not have let John off the busuntil she arrived. While walking home, John told Grace that“[Alex] touched his belly button and pee-pee.” Grace did notask any follow-up questions, such as when and where the touchingoccurred or about the circumstances of the event. Grace latercalled John’s mother and had no further discussion with Johnabout the subject. John’s mother reported the incident to the Hoboken PoliceDepartment five days later. Detective Abromaitis testified about his fourteen-minutetrial. 5 recorded interview at the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office onJuly 21, 2014 -- eighteen days after the first report to Grace.The recording was played in its entirety at the hearing. The interview began with Detective Abromaitis introducinghimself as Dave, a police officer, and in response to the firstperfunctory question, “What’s up,” John stated, “[Alex] touchedmy pee-pee.” Detective Abromaitis explained that he did notconduct a pre-interview of John and met him for the first timewhen John entered the interview room -- and therefore did notprompt John’s response. When the detective followed up andasked who touched him, John responded, “[Alex] touched my pee-pee. He touched my belly button. He touched my belly button,and everybody all laughed at me.” John indicated that thetouching occurred “[u]nderneath my clothes.” He also stated,“He touched my eye. He touched my hand. He touched myeyebrows. He touched my nose like this. He touched my mouth.He touched my legs.” However, when John showed the detectivewhere he was touched using anatomical dolls, without prompting,he stated, “He touched at me by accident.” On an anatomicaldrawing, John referred to his “butt” as both his belly buttonand his behind, and at one point he referred to his navel as his“dingaleg.” In response to a leading question, John recalled that hewas at home when the touching occurred, until the detective 6 asked another leading question, and then John recalled that hewas on the bus. That colloquy is set forth below: [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:] Okay[.] [C]an you tell me where you were when [Alex] touched you? Were you at home? [JOHN:] Yes, I was at home. [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:] Or were you somewhere else? [JOHN:] Somewhere else [inaudible]. [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:] So where were you? When you say somewhere else, where’s somewhere else? [JOHN:] I don’t know. [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:] Okay[.] [W]ere you on the bus? [JOHN:] Yes[.] [Y]es.3Detective Abromaitis never asked John where he was seated on thebus or whether he was seated next to Alex. John told the detective that he lived with “Chowder andClarence” (cartoon characters), his “mom,” his friend Jacob, and“dragons, too.” In speaking with John’s mother, the detectivelearned that they lived only with John’s brother, Joe.3 The transcript of the video-recorded statement was prepared by the Prosecutor’s Office and moved into evidence. The family court, however, indicated during its admissibility ruling that it “did not hear the juvenile say that the alleged incident happened at home” when listening to and reviewing the recording. As agreed to by the parties, defense counsel cross-examined Detective Abromaitis based on the transcript. 7 Dr. Cooke criticized Detective Abromaitis’s interviewtechniques. He found fault with the detective’s failure toinquire whether John could distinguish between the truth and alie or between fantasy and reality, particularly given that thechild “cognitively” was more like a three-year-old than a seven-year-old. Dr. Cooke also criticized the detective for askingleading questions that suggested that the incident occurred onthe bus and for not making further inquiry when John said thetouching was “by accident.” The family court ruled that John’s recorded statement wassufficiently “trustworthy on the basis of the time[,] contentand circumstances of the statement” and therefore would beadmissible at trial, provided that John was available totestify. Although the court agreed with Dr. Cooke thatDetective Abromaitis broke with the “ideal” protocol by notasking John “any questions to determine whether or not heunderstood the difference between telling the truth and tellingthe lie” and acknowledged that the detective asked an improperleading question that suggested to John that he was on the bus,it nevertheless found “that the statement is probablytrustworthy in the language of [N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)].” The court also conditionally admitted into evidence thecomment John made to Grace, finding that the statement “wascompletely spontaneous” and “probably trustworthy in the 8 totality of the circumstances.” C. The next day, the family court presided over the benchtrial on the sexual assault charge lodged against Alex. Thefirst witness called by the State was John. The court askedJohn some preliminary questions to explore his competency totestify under N.J.R.E. 601. The inquiry made clear that John had difficulty respondingto simple questions in an accurate or truthful way. Forexample, the court showed John a red toy. When asked whether iftold the red toy was green that would be the truth, Johnreplied, “yes.” When asked the same question again, he said,“no.” John also identified a tie as red, but when asked if toldthat the tie was green, whether that would be the truth, heresponded, “yes.” The colloquy further developed that John haddifficulty distinguishing between what is real and not real. [COURT:] And what kind of toy is the other one, what is that? [JOHN:] Dinosaur. A dinosaur. [COURT:] A dinosaur, okay. Now if I told you that the dinosaur, if I told you that that toy that you say is a dinosaur is a chicken, would that be the truth? [JOHN:] Yes. [COURT:] It would be. Do you know the difference between the truth and a lie? [JOHN:] Yes. 9 [COURT:] You do, what is it? [JOHN:] I don’t know. [COURT:] You don’t know? [JOHN:] Yeah. Yes. John’s difficulty comprehending and responding to questionsbecame further evident during the prosecutor’s preliminaryexamination: [PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Do you know -- this is a courtroom, right? [JOHN:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] Now if I tell you we’re at McDonald’s, would that be the truth or would it be a lie? [JOHN:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] Yes, it would be the truth or a lie? [JOHN:] Yes. Yes. Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] Okay. When you talk to mommy, do you have to tell her the truth or do you tell her a lie? [JOHN:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] Which one do you do for her? [JOHN:] I don’t know. I don’t know. Based on the exchanges above, the court concluded that Johnwas not “competent to testify.” Nevertheless, pursuant toN.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), which allows a juvenile witness to testifydespite his incompetency, the court allowed the prosecutor toproceed with John’s direct examination. The brief examination 10 revealed that John could convey little reliable information.Although it was undisputed that John took a bus to summerschool, he responded to a question about how he went to schoolby stating, “I was walking on the street.” The prosecutor requested permission to recall John onanother day, a request the court subsequently granted. Thetrial resumed several days later, and the prosecutor continuedtaking testimony from John. Again, John had difficultyanswering simple questions. He stated that, “It’s right,” ifthe prosecutor referred to a spider as a flower. Additionally,the following example shows how susceptible John was to leadingquestions: [PROSECUTOR:] If I tell you that this is black, is it really black? [JOHN:] Yes. Yes. Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] It’s really black or is it red? [JOHN:] It’s red. In response to a series of questions by the prosecutor,John responded that Alex, whom he identified in the courtroom,touched him on “my clothes, my pee-pee and my butt” while seatedon the bus. [PROSECUTOR:] [John], do you know why we’re here today? [JOHN:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] Why are we here today? 11 [JOHN:] I don’t know.[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Did anything happen this summer on the school bus?[JOHN:] Yes.[PROSECUTOR:] What happened?[JOHN:] [Alex] touched me.[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. And where did he touch you?[JOHN:] Right here and right here and here.[PROSECUTOR:] When you say here, what part of your body is that?[JOHN:] My skin.[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. And exactly what part?[JOHN:] My -- my clothes, my pee-pee and my butt.[PROSECUTOR:] Were you sitting on the bus or were you standing?[JOHN:] Sitting on the bus.[PROSECUTOR:] Were there other people around?[JOHN:] Yes.[PROSECUTOR:] Who was around?[JOHN:] [Alex] and Jay. That’s it.[PROSECUTOR:] Do you see [Alex] here today?[JOHN:] Yes.[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Where do you see him?[JOHN:] On the bus.[PROSECUTOR:] Do you see him here today?[JOHN:] Yes. 12 [PROSECUTOR:] Can you do me a favor, [John]? I’m just going to ask you to stand up for one second and you tell me where you see him? [JOHN:] Right there. During the defense examination, John stated that the“little kids” were separated from the “big kids” on the bus andthat as one of the smaller kids he sat at the front of the bus.John also admitted that another boy named Alex -- not defendant-- was on the bus and sat near him. Although the family court found that John lacked“competency” as a witness, it nevertheless concluded that John’sincompetency did not render him unavailable as a witness. Thecourt therefore declined to exclude from evidence John’sstatements to the detective and Grace or to dismiss the case. The defense presented three witnesses. Leslie Dorsey-Jones testified that she was the bus aide whotraveled with Alex and John and approximately sixteen otherchildren as they returned home from school on July 3. Shestated that the “big kids,” such as Alex, sat in the back of thebus and the “small kids” sat in the front of the bus -- and thatshe sat in the middle, separating the two groups. Shemaintained that Alex “was sitting in the back, like behind me. . . , but I know he wasn’t sitting with the other little boy.I know that for a fact.” She neither heard nor saw anythingamiss. 13 Reuben Quinones, the school bus driver that day,corroborated that the little kids were seated in the front ofthe bus and big kids in the back. He identified Alex as a “bigkid” who would have been in the back. Quinones periodicallyused his overhead mirror to view the interior of the bus and didnot see or hear anything that gave him concern. The final defense witness was Lisa Cruz, the transportationliaison for the Hoboken Board of Education, who confirmed thattwo children named Alex were on the bus that day, one of whomwent to elementary school and the other to high school. At the conclusion of the case, the family court found “thatthe State established beyond a reasonable doubt that [Alex]purposely committed an act of sexual contact” by touching“[John’s] penis underneath his clothes.” The court furtherdetermined that the “intentional touching” was for the purposeof degrading or humiliating John and of sexually arousing orgratifying Alex. The court acknowledged that John had “thedevelopmental cognition of a three-year-old,” a “lack [of]competency to testify,” and “was not able to distinguish or toarticulate what his understanding was between right and wrong orthe consequences of not telling the truth.” Nevertheless, thecourt maintained that “when it came to the incident itself[John] understood the questions, and he answered coherently in aresponsive way and consistently.” 14 After adjudicating Alex delinquent, the court imposed aspecial condition that Alex attend a residential sex-offendertreatment program. D. Alex appealed, claiming that the admission of John’sstatement to the detective and his incompetent testimonyviolated our evidence rules. In particular, Alex argued thatJohn’s out-of-court statement “was not sufficiently trustworthyfor admission under the 'tender years’ hearsay exception,N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27),” and that basing a juvenile adjudication onthe uncorroborated hearsay testimony of an incompetent witnesswas reversible error. Alex also asserted that the adjudicationwas not supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally,he maintained that John’s incompetency rendered him unavailablefor meaningful cross-examination and thus the admission of hishearsay statement violated the Sixth Amendment’s ConfrontationClause, as construed by Crawford v. Washington. E. The Appellate Division held that because John wasincompetent to testify he was effectively unavailable for cross-examination, and therefore the admission of his incriminatingtestimonial statement to Detective Abromaitis violated Alex’sfederal confrontation rights. State in Interest of A.R., 447 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2016). The panel did not 15 address any of the state-law evidentiary claims that Alex arguedwere grounds for reversing his adjudication.4 Applying the dictates of the Crawford line of cases, thepanel first concluded that John’s statement to DetectiveAbromaitis was testimonial, triggering the constitutionalrequirement that John be available for cross-examination. 5 Id.at 516-21. Second, the court determined John’s incompetence didnot afford Alex a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Johnabout the accusations he made to the detective. Id. at 521,523. More broadly, the panel reached the conclusion that theincompetency proviso, when “applied to a child’s hearsaystatements made in a testimonial setting,” violates the SixthAmendment’s Confrontation Clause. Id. at 516.4 The Appellate Division recognized that “courts generally prefer to steer away from constitutional questions if their resolution is not essential to a case,” but believed that Alex “concede[d] in his brief that the hearsay statements of [John] were admissible as a matter of state evidence law under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).” A.R., 447 N.J. Super. at 515. We do not find such a concession. To the contrary, Alex asserted in his brief that John’s out-of-court statement to Detective Abromaitis “was not sufficiently trustworthy for admission under the 'tender years’ hearsay exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).” Additionally, at oral argument before this Court, Alex’s attorney asserted that the defense raised on direct appeal the unreliability of the video- recorded statement and argued it “should not have been admitted under 803(c)(27).” 5 The court noted that John’s statement to his mother’s cousin, Grace, was not testimonial and therefore admissible without the requirement of cross-examination. Id. at 521. Alex does not challenge the admission of that statement. Ibid. 16 Thus, after striking as evidence John’s video-recordedstatement and his testimony, the panel remanded to the familycourt to assess whether the State’s remaining evidence issufficient to meet its burden to prove the juvenile adjudicationbeyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 525. In the interim, theAppellate Division did not disturb the delinquency adjudication.Ibid. F. We granted the State’s petition for certification. 230 N.J. 425 (2017). The John J. Gibbons Fellowship in PublicInterest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons P.C. appeared asamicus curiae in support of Alex. II. A. In seeking reversal of the Appellate Division’s decision,the State advances two arguments.6 First, it maintains thatJohn, who functioned at the level of a three-year-old and wasdeclared incompetent to testify, did not make a “testimonialstatement” -- a statement uttered with the primary purpose thatit be used in a later criminal prosecution -- and therefore the6 The Attorney General represents the State before this Court, having superseded the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office, which represented the State before the family court and Appellate Division. 17 Confrontation Clause is inapplicable. In other words, theadmissibility of John’s recorded statement did not depend onwhether he was subject to cross-examination. Second, the Statecontends that, regardless of the declaration of incompetency,John took the stand, and the defense subjected him to cross-examination, thus satisfying the requirements of theConfrontation Clause. B. Alex counters that John’s accusatory statement to thedetective meets the standard of a testimonial statement andtherefore its admission required that John be available formeaningful cross-examination. Alex argues that meaningfulcross-examination could not and did not occur because of John’sincompetency, resulting in a violation of Alex’s confrontationrights. C. We do not address the constitutional issues reached by theAppellate Division or by the parties and amicus curiae becausethis matter can be resolved by resort to our evidence rules.7 Wehave often stated, “[c]ourts should not reach a constitutionalquestion unless its resolution is imperative to the disposition7 The state-law issues were fully briefed by the parties in the Appellate Division. 18 of litigation.” Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. County of Morris,186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006). Thus, “we do not address constitutionalquestions when a narrower, non-constitutional result isavailable.” USDA v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 500 n.4 (2008)(citing Randolph Town Ctr., 186 N.J. at 80). More particularly,admission of hearsay statements should first be resolved underour rules of evidence. See State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 354(2005); see also State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 298 (2008). Onlyif those hearsay statements satisfy the admissibilityrequirements of our evidence rules should we analyze whether theintroduction of those out-of-court statements violates theConfrontation Clause. See Branch, 182 N.J. at 354 (findinghearsay statements inadmissible under our evidence rules andtherefore opting not “to decide the constitutional challenge”advanced under Confrontation Clause). Before addressing whether John’s video-recorded statementto the detective met the admissibility requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(27), we review the origin and evolution of the tender-years exception. III. We begin with the language of the tender-years exception tothe hearsay rule. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) provides: A statement by a child under the age of 12 relating to sexual misconduct committed with or against that child is admissible in a 19 criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding if (a) the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party an intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement at such time as to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing conducted pursuant to Rule 104(a), that on the basis of the time, content and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the child testifies at the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a witness and there is offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual abuse; provided that no child whose statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding by virtue of the requirements of Rule 601. [(emphasis added).] The emphasized portion of the rule is known as theincompetency proviso. As is evident from the rule, no matterthe nature of the incompetency of a child witness, thatincompetency cannot disqualify the child as a witness when theState seeks to introduce a prior statement of the child thatmeets the rule’s other requirements. This version of theincompetency proviso differs from the one originally adopted bythis Court and the Legislature. The source of the current tender-years exception, includingits incompetency proviso, is State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348 (1988).In D.R., we recognized that, in a child-sex-abuse prosecution,“testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of 20 the [State’s] case.” Id. at 358. We determined that ourevidence rules needed an additional “exception[] to the hearsayrule to authorize under certain conditions the admissibility oftestimony relating the out-of-court statements of a childvictimized by sexual abuse.” Ibid. In fashioning a proposedrule, we looked to other jurisdictions’ rules and statutes, theAmerican Bar Association’s recommendations, and learnedcommentators for guidance. Id. at 358-63. In crafting this new exception to the hearsay rule, weacknowledged that “a prerequisite to the admissibility of achild’s out-of-court statement concerning sexual abuse is thatit possess sufficient indicia of reliability” and that any“modification of the hearsay rule must adequately recognize andprotect the substantial constitutional interests of defendantsin such proceedings.” Id. at 363. Importantly, we recognizedthat any new exception to the hearsay rule had to conform to thedemands of the Confrontation Clause, which -- in the pre-Crawford era -- “required (1) availability of the declarant forcross-examination or a demonstration of unavailability, and (2)assurances of reliability.” Id. at 366; see also Ohio v.Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 66 (1980). We also grappled with “[t]he most difficult question. . . [:] whether a child’s incompetency to testify at trialshould preclude admissibility of the child’s out-of-court 21 statement.” D.R., 109 N.J. at 365. We expressed concern that achild’s incompetency, which would bar the child’s testimony,might not constitute unavailability for purposes of Roberts andtherefore would present an insurmountable obstacle to theadmission of the child-victim’s out-of-court statement. Id. at369-70. That concern gave rise to the incompetency proviso.Although the language of today’s tender-years exception,N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), is almost identical to the one proposed inD.R. and adopted in Rule 63(33) (currently renumbered asN.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)), the incompetency proviso is different. The incompetency proviso proposed in D.R. and adopted inRule 63(33) read as follows: “provided that no child whosestatement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to this ruleshall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding byvirtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) of Rule 17.” Id. at378 (emphasis added). Importantly, for our discussion here, [w]e conclude[d] that the disqualification set forth in paragraph (b) of Evidence Rule 17 should not apply in a sexual abuse prosecution in which the victim’s out-of-court statement is offered in evidence. A finding that a child-victim is “incapable of understanding the duty . . . to tell the truth,” and thus incompetent, is difficult to reconcile with a ruling that admits into evidence, insulated from cross-examination, the out-of-court statements of the same child made several months prior to trial. [Id. at 369-70 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Evid. R. 17).] 22 The proposed language was adopted in 1989 as Rule 63(33) andlater recast as N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) in 1993 when our evidencerules were renumbered to parallel the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 17 -- the predecessor competency rule -- correspondsto our current N.J.R.E. 601. 8 Rule 17 provided: A person is disqualified to be a witness if the judge finds that (a) the proposed witness is incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him, or (b) the proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. The incompetency proviso in the tender-years exceptionadopted by D.R. rendered inoperative only paragraph (b) of thecompetency rule. That apparently was to address, in part, thenotion that “[a] child’s age in itself cannot render himincompetent as a witness,” D.R., 109 N.J. at 369 n.8, and thatthere is a difference, for a child, between understanding “theduty” to tell the truth and having the capacity to tell the8 N.J.R.E. 601, the current rule on competency provides: Every person is competent to be a witness unless (a) the judge finds that the proposed witness is incapable of expression concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury either directly or through interpretation, or (b) the proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth, or (c) except as otherwise provided by these rules or by law. 23 truth in a manner that is understandable by the trier of fact.The tender-years exception approved in D.R., however, did notallow a child deemed incompetent under paragraph (a) of Rule 17to testify. Rule 17(a) corresponds directly with N.J.R.E.601(a). In May 1989, the Legislature adopted Rule 63(33) asproposed in D.R. See Joint Res. No. 4 (1989). The ruleremained in effect, verbatim, until the 1993 renumbering of theRules of Evidence, when Rule 63(33) became N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)and Rule 17 became N.J.R.E. 601. Something more happened,however. The scope of the incompetency proviso was broadened bythe removal of the reference to paragraph (b). Thus, theproviso now reads, “no child whose statement is to be offered inevidence pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be awitness in such proceeding by virtue of the requirements of Rule601.” N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) (emphasis added). The consequencesof this expansion are significant and far-reaching because itpermits the testimony of a child victim not only incapable ofunderstanding the duty to tell the truth but also incapable ofdistinguishing between fantasy and reality and of expressinghimself in a manner to be understood by a judge or jury. Nothing in the historical record of the evolution of thetender-years exception suggests that this Court or the SupremeCourt Committee on the Rules of Evidence intended that a child 24 rendered incompetent for reasons other than an inability tounderstand the duty to tell the truth would be permitted totestify at trial. Allowing the testimony of a child witness,who is declared incompetent because he “is incapable ofexpression concerning the matter so as to be understood by thejudge and jury,” would have been a significant change toN.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), yet it is never mentioned in the EvidenceCommittee’s Report. The record concerning the promulgation of N.J.R.E.803(c)(27) provides no clear explanation or justification forthe removal of the reference to paragraph (b) of the competencyrule. When the Committee recommended an alteration to the rule,it did so explicitly. Significantly, it recommended applyingthe rule to civil and juvenile proceedings. See MeetingMinutes, Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence 2 (May17, 1993) (“N.J.R.E. 803[(c)(27)] . . . shall incorporate thepresent language of Evidence Rule 63 (33) and enlarge its scopeto make it applicable to civil and to juvenile proceedings.Approved by the Committee unanimously with one abstention.”);see also Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence,Amendatory Report (May 17, 1993). The Evidence Committee gaveno indication that it intended to provide for the admissibilityof incompetent testimony lacking indicia of reliability becauseit was uttered by a sex-abuse victim of tender years. The 25 Committee’s seeming silence on this important matter suggeststhat the Committee may not have focused on expanding theincompetency proviso in N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). The wholesale allowance of incompetent child testimonyevidently prompted the Appellate Division to address theconstitutional issue raised, in light of our currentconfrontation clause jurisprudence, which, under Crawford,prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witnesswho [does] not appear at trial unless he [is] unavailable totestify, and the defendant [has] had a prior opportunity forcross-examination.” 541 U.S. at 53-54. Another point ofconcern is the incongruence between, on the one hand, generallydisallowing incompetent child testimony, and on the other,allowing incompetent testimony without limitation if the childhas uttered a prior statement. D.R. made clear that lessexacting standards of competency should apply to a childwitness, but did not go so far as to completely suspend thecompetency rule for child testimony. Accordingly, we request that the Supreme Court Committee onthe Rules of Evidence consider whether N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)should be amended to conform to the evidence rule adopted inD.R. and whether any other amendment is advisable as a result ofthe concerns raised in this case. IV. 26 We nevertheless must address the application of the currenttender-years exception to the case before us. We cannotconclude that N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), as presently constructed,authorized the admission of John’s video-recorded statement tothe detective. Before admitting a child’s out-of-court statement pursuantto N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), the trial court must make certainfindings at a Rule 104 hearing. The court must determinewhether “on the basis of the time, content and circumstances ofthe statement there is a probability that the statement istrustworthy.” N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). The statement’sadmissibility is also conditioned on either the child testifyingor, if the child is unavailable as a witness, on thepresentation of “admissible evidence corroborating the act ofsexual abuse.” Ibid. When the child-victim’s statement is asexual accusation made to police, the statement generally willbe classified as a “testimonial statement.”9 State v. Nyhammer,197 N.J. 383, 411-12 (2009) (finding that child’s videotapedstatement alleging sexual crimes “-- given to a law enforcement9 A “testimonial statement” is defined as one made “when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 822 (2006). 27 officer investigating a crime -- constitutes testimonial hearsayfor Sixth Amendment purposes”). The admissibility of a child’stestimonial statement, therefore, will be conditioned on thechild taking the stand. State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 249 (2010)(noting that admissibility of child victim’s statement isconditioned on not only “judicial finding of trustworthiness,”but also “opportunity to cross-examine the child at trial”(quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 318 (2005))); see alsoState v. D.G., 157 N.J. 112, 124 (1999). In the present case, the primary issue under N.J.R.E.803(c)(27) is whether there was a probability that John’s video-recorded statement to the detective was “trustworthy” based on“the time, content and circumstances of the statement.” A courtmust “consider 'the totality of the circumstances’” indetermining whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy towarrant its admission. P.S., 202 N.J. at 249 (quoting State v.Roman, 248 N.J. Super. 144, 152 (App. Div. 1991)). We haveidentified “a non-exclusive list of factors relevant toevaluating the reliability of out-of-court statements made bychild victims of sexual abuse, including spontaneity, consistentrepetition, mental state of the declarant, use of terminologyunexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive tofabricate.” Id. at 249 (emphases added) (citing Idaho v.Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 821-22 (1990)). Clearly, one 28 consideration in assessing a child’s mental state must bewhether the child is able to distinguish between fantasy andreality and whether the child can communicate in a way thatshows the child has the mental capacity to tell the truth and tobe understood by the trier of fact. A judicial declaration thata child is incompetent to testify should also have some bearingon determining the admissibility of a child’s out-of-courtstatement. V. A. Before applying the legal principles to the facts, we firstset forth the standard of review that governs this appeal. A trial judge’s factual finding concerning theadmissibility of a child’s statement offered under N.J.R.E.803(c)(27) is entitled to deference by an appellate court. SeeP.S., 202 N.J. at 250-51. Specifically, “a trial judge’sfinding that a child’s statement meets the trustworthinessrequirement of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)” should not be disturbedabsent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 250. Thus, a factualfinding “supported by sufficient credible evidence in therecord” should be upheld. Ibid. (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Only if that finding is clearly mistakenshould an appellate court intervene, in the interest of justice,to correct the error. Id. at 250-51; Elders, 192 N.J. at 244. 29 In that circumstance, an appellate court may “appraise therecord . . . and make its own findings and conclusions.” P.S.,202 N.J. at 251 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244); see alsoState v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (“Appellate courts havean important role to play in taking corrective action whenfactual findings are so clearly mistaken -- so wide of the mark-- that the interests of justice demand intervention.”). B. Despite the deference that we must afford the familycourt’s findings in this case, given the totality of thecircumstances, we cannot conclude that the court’s assessment ofthe trustworthiness of John’s video-recorded statement issupported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. By the family court’s own account, John, age seven, had“the developmental cognition of a three-year-old,” a “lack ofcompetency to testify,” and “was not able to distinguish or toarticulate what his understanding was between right and wrong orthe consequences of not telling the truth.” When John enteredthe interview room and met with Detective Abromaitis for thefirst time, eighteen days after the alleged bus incident, Johnresponded to a greeting question, “What’s up,” with a targetedanswer, “[Alex] touched my pee-pee.” The detective did notsuggest that answer because he had not conducted a pre-interview, but it appears that John was primed for the response. 30 See State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 309 (1994) (“[F]actors thatcan undermine the neutrality of an interview and create unduesuggestiveness [include] . . . the use of leading questions, anda lack of control for outside influences on the child’sstatements, such as previous conversations with parents orpeers.”). During the interview, John had difficulty distinguishingbetween different body parts; for example, he called his bellybutton his “butt.” He also claimed to live with cartooncharacters, dragons, and a friend who in fact did not residewith him. Given John’s developmental disabilities, theinterview was challenging for the detective. Nevertheless, thedetective did not make the most basic inquiries to assesswhether John could tell the difference between the truth and alie, or reality and fantasy. In response to one leadingquestion, John stated that the touching occurred at home, and inresponse to another leading question, he stated it occurred onthe bus -- evidencing John’s susceptibility to suggestivequestioning. When John indicated that the touching happened byaccident, the detective did not follow up. The family court conditionally admitted the video-recordedstatement depending on John’s availability as a witness.1010 Because the juvenile case proceeded as a bench trial, there was a blending of Rule 104 hearing testimony and trial 31 During two days of questioning, John agreed with hisinterlocutor when it was suggested that a spider is a flower andthat the color black is red. John stated that he walked on thestreet to summer school, although no one disputed that he tookthe bus, and he could not articulate whether it was right totell the truth or a lie to his mother. John, moreover, agreedthat the bigger kids were separated from the smaller ones on thebus and that another boy named Alex sat near him. Against thisbackdrop, John stated repeatedly that Alex touched his pee-pee,although without much elaboration. The sheer repetition of thatclaim -- divorced from everything else -- does not make thestatement probably trustworthy. We owe the trial court’s evidentiary findings reasoneddeference, not blind deference. In viewing the totality of thecircumstances related to John’s accusations in the video-recorded statement, we do not find that sufficient credibleevidence supports the conclusion that John’s statement wasprobably trustworthy. Therefore, we hold that the family courtabused its discretion in allowing the video-recorded statementinto evidence.testimony. For instance, while conditioning the admission of John’s video-recorded statement on his availability at trial, the court allowed Grace’s testimony at the pre-trial motion hearing to serve as substantive evidence during the trial. 32 Under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), John was allowed to testify,despite his incompetence, to afford protection to Alex’sconfrontation rights given the admission of the video-recordedhearsay accusation. The general rule barring an incompetentchild witness from testifying adheres when the out-of-courtstatement is not admissible. In light of our determination thatJohn’s video-recorded statement was wrongly admitted intoevidence, his trial testimony should not have been introducedfor the purpose of confronting that statement. However, John’sincompetent testimony still was admissible because of theintroduction of John’s hearsay statement to Grace under N.J.R.E.803(c)(27). In effect, the hearsay statement serves tobootstrap into evidence the incompetent testimony. VI. Last, after excising from the record John’s video-recordedstatement, the remaining evidence -- even when viewed in thelight most favorable to the State -- is insufficient to supporta sexual-assault adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. SeeState v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967). The remaining evidence consists of John’s incompetenttestimony and Grace’s hearsay testimony that, as John walkedhome with her after exiting the bus, he said, “[Alex] touchedhis belly button and pee-pee.” Nothing more was said to Graceon the subject. The statement provides limited information and 33 no context. For example, it does not tell us whether thealleged touching was accidental, which of the two Alexes did thetouching, or when and where the incident occurred. In addition,no competent evidence corroborates John’s single statement madeto Grace.11 Weighing against that evidence is the testimony ofthe bus aide who unequivocally averred that the big kids, suchas Alex, sat in the back of the bus, and the little kids, suchas John, sat in the front. The aide testified that Alex satbehind her and that she knew “for a fact” that Alex and John didnot sit next to each other. The bus driver also confirmed thatthe children were separated by size and age, and both he and theaide stated that they neither saw nor heard anything amissduring the ride. Even John stated that the small boys sat atthe front of the bus and he sat near a little boy named Alex.Indeed, two boys named Alex -- one little and one big -- were onthe bus that day. Finally, the State provided no evidence thatthe touching -- if there was a touching -- was intentional anddone “for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim orsexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.” N.J.S.A.2C:14-1(d).1211 That big Alex was holding John’s hand outside the bus hardly counts as evidence suggestive of a sexual assault. 12 A conviction under the sexual-assault statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), requires an “intentional touching . . . for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually 34 Because we resolve this case on state-law grounds, we neednot tackle the constitutional issue at the heart of theAppellate Division’s opinion -- whether the admission of John’sincompetent testimony denied Alex his Sixth Amendmentconfrontation right. We neither address nor endorse theAppellate Division’s constitutional analysis. No purpose would be served by remanding this matter to thefamily court when we have determined that a rational factfindercould reach but one conclusion -- that the remaining evidence isinsufficient to support the sexual-assault adjudication againstAlex. VII. For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of theAppellate Division, which remanded the case to the family courtfor further factfinding based on the remaining record. Becausewe find that the record clearly establishes that there isinsufficient evidence to support the delinquency adjudication,we order that the delinquency charge against Alex be dismissed.We remand to the family court for the entry of that judgment.arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.” N.J.S.A. 2C:14- 1(d). 35 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 36