Title: In re Steele
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S114551
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2004

1
Filed 3/8/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
) 
S114551 
In re 
 
) 
 
 
) 
RAYMOND EDWARD STEELE 
) 
 
) 
Shasta County 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 88-6508 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Petitioner Raymond Edward Steele is under a judgment of death.  He has 
filed in this court a motion for postconviction discovery pursuant to recently 
enacted Penal Code section 1054.9 (section 1054.9).  We issued an order to show 
cause to resolve important procedural and substantive issues regarding that 
section. 
Procedurally, we conclude that those who seek discovery under section 
1054.9 because they are preparing to file or have filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus challenging a judgment of death or life without the possibility of parole 
should generally first make the discovery motion in the trial court that rendered 
the judgment.  After the trial court has ruled, either party may challenge that ruling 
by a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. 
Substantively, we conclude that section 1054.9’s discovery includes, and is 
limited to, specific materials the prosecution or law enforcement authorities 
involved in the case currently possess that the defendant can show fall into any of 
these categories:  (1) materials the prosecutor provided at time of trial but have 
 
 
2
since become lost to the defendant, (2) materials the prosecution should have 
provided at time of trial, or (3) materials the defendant would have been entitled to 
at time of trial had the defendant specifically requested them. 
In this case, the prosecution had no obligation at time of trial to provide the 
discovery materials petitioner seeks—evidence regarding his own behavior in 
prison that was relevant neither to the charged crime nor to any of the prosecution 
evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase—absent a specific defense request.  
However, if the defense had specifically requested the materials at time of trial 
(the record is unclear), the prosecution would have been obligated to provide them 
if it possessed them.  Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner is entitled to 
discovery of materials within the scope of the current request that petitioner does 
not now possess but that the prosecution and law enforcement authorities involved 
in the case currently possess, if any exist. 
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder with the special 
circumstance of a prior murder conviction and sentenced to death in the Shasta 
County Superior Court.  We affirmed the judgment.  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 1230.)  Details of the underlying crime are not here pertinent.  It suffices 
to say that petitioner murdered a young woman in 1988 and had previously been 
convicted of the 1971 murder of another young woman.  In aggravation, the 
prosecution presented evidence of other crimes petitioner committed before he 
was arrested for the first murder.  Petitioner presented a mental defense at the guilt 
phase and additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence 
that he had provided to prison authorities valuable information about the Nuestra 
Familia, a prison gang, while in prison for the first murder. 
Petitioner filed the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 
court challenging the judgment.  He also filed in this court a motion for 
 
 
3
postconviction discovery under section 1054.9.  He asks us to order the 
“prosecution to provide . . . [a]ny and all reports, memoranda, notes, tape 
recordings, statements, transcripts, confidential files, debriefing documents, and/or 
summaries documenting or referring to petitioner’s leaving the Nuestra Familia; to 
information provided by petitioner regarding the Nuestra Familia, its members and 
associates, and non-member collaborators; and to assistance provided by petitioner 
in prosecutions pursued by the State of California and/or local prosecutors against 
the Nuestra Familia and others accused of collaborating with the Nuestra Familia 
in the commission of crimes.”  He alleges that his current counsel “has conducted 
a good faith review of trial counsel’s files and interviewed trial counsel and has 
ascertained that the materials sought here were not provided to trial counsel”; and 
that, accordingly, “despite his good faith efforts, habeas counsel . . . has been 
unable to obtain the requested materials from trial counsel . . . .”  He has also 
provided a declaration from current counsel supporting these allegations.  He 
argues that although he presented some evidence in mitigation at trial regarding 
his prison behavior, more such evidence existed, and the prosecution was and 
remains obligated to provide it to him. 
The Attorney General’s opposition to the motion and petitioner’s reply to 
that opposition showed substantial disagreement regarding the scope of discovery 
the statute provides.  In order to resolve the question, we ordered the Director of 
Corrections to show cause why the discovery motion should not be granted.  In 
addition to other relevant matters the parties chose to brief, we directed them to 
brief the questions of which court should first hear the discovery motion and 
“what is the scope of the prosecution’s duty, if any, to provide discovery of 
materials unrelated to the charged crimes or prosecution evidence in aggravation 
but that might provide penalty phase mitigating evidence.”  The Attorney General, 
representing the Director of Corrections, has filed a return to the order to show 
 
 
4
cause and petitioner a traverse.  At our invitation, the California Habeas Corpus 
Resource Center (HCRC) has filed an amicus curiae brief addressing these issues. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, we held that a person seeking 
habeas corpus relief from a judgment of death is not entitled to court-ordered 
discovery unless and until this court has issued an order to show cause and thus 
has determined that the petition has stated a prima facie case for relief.  (Id. at pp. 
1255-1261.) 
Effective January 1, 2003, the Legislature added section 1054.9 to the Penal 
Code.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1105, § 1, enacting Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. 
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391).)  Subdivisions (a) and (b) of that section are relevant 
here.  Subdivision (a) provides:  “Upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of 
habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in which a sentence of 
death or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has been imposed, and 
on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial 
counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall, except as provided in 
subdivision (c) [which relates to physical evidence], order that the defendant be 
provided reasonable access to any of the materials described in subdivision (b).”  
Subdivision (b) provides:  “For purposes of this section, ‘discovery materials’ 
means materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.” 
In his discovery motion, petitioner specifically alleged that his current 
attorney had made a good faith, but unsuccessful, effort to obtain the discovery 
materials from trial counsel and supplied a detailed declaration from his current 
attorney supporting the allegation.  The Attorney General does not dispute this 
allegation.  Thus, the “good faith effort” requirement is not at issue here.  But 
other issues exist.  Section 1054.9 says little about the procedure a defendant 
 
 
5
should follow in seeking the discovery materials, such as the time and place for 
making the motion.  The parties also dispute the scope of permitted discovery and 
whether it extends to what petitioner seeks in this case.  We will consider first the 
procedural questions, then the substantive questions. 
A.  Procedural Questions 
 Petitioner initially filed this motion in this court.  Section 1054.9 does not 
specifically state which court should hear the motion first.  It just says that the 
“court” shall order the appropriate discovery without designating either appellate 
or trial court.  Petitioner argues in his traverse, “Because of the nature of the 
material sought in petitioner’s discovery motion, this court is a more appropriate 
forum than the trial court for the motion in this case.”  The Attorney General 
contends, “A section 1054.9 request should be addressed to the court where the 
prisoner has filed the related state habeas petition or motion to vacate judgment,” 
which in this instance is this court.  Thus, both parties argue that the motion was 
properly filed first in this court, although for different reasons.  The HCRC 
maintains that, because section 1054.9 merely says “court,” the motion may be 
filed in any court.  We agree with the HCRC that either the trial or the reviewing 
court has jurisdiction over the motion.  But, as we explain, we believe that when, 
as here, no execution is imminent, the discovery motion should first be filed in the 
trial court that rendered the underlying judgment. 
The Attorney General’s argument assumes a habeas corpus petition (or, in 
other cases, a motion to vacate a judgment) will be pending in a state court when 
the motion is filed.  The assumption is unfounded.  The statute permits the motion 
“[u]pon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus . . . .”  
(§ 1054.9, subd. (a).)  In context, we believe the Legislature used the word 
“prosecution” flexibly to include cases in which the movant is preparing the 
 
 
6
petition as well as cases in which the movant has already filed it.  In People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 1257, 1261, we said that after the judgment 
had become final, nothing was pending in the trial court to which a discovery 
motion may attach, and that the defendant had to state a prima facie case for relief 
before he may receive discovery.  Section 1054.9 modifies this rule.  Defendants 
are now entitled to discovery to assist in stating a prima facie case for relief.  But 
the only way this modification of the Gonzalez rule makes sense is to permit 
defendants to seek discovery before they file the petition, i.e., before they must 
state a prima facie case.  Reasonably construed, the statute permits discovery as an 
aid in preparing the petition, which means discovery may come before the petition 
is filed.  Thus, we believe a defendant is entitled to seek discovery if he or she is 
preparing to file the petition as well as after the petition has been filed. 
The nature of the discovery the statute permits makes the trial court 
generally the appropriate place to first file the motion.  As discussed below, the 
statute covers specific discovery that the prosecutor did provide but has become 
lost to petitioner, that the prosecution should have provided but failed to do so, and 
to which the defense would have been entitled had it requested it.  The trial court 
that rendered the judgment is far better positioned than an appellate court to make 
these determinations and then decide what specific new discovery, if any, it should 
order.  Moreover, we agree with the HCRC that “section 1054.9 should be 
interpreted to promote informal, timely discovery between parties prior to seeking 
court enforcement.”  Beginning the process at the trial level encourages the 
settlement of disputes at that level and maximizes the possibility that any 
discovery issues can be resolved with a minimum of court involvement. 
It thus makes sense for discovery motions under section 1054.9 generally to 
be filed first in the trial court that rendered the judgment, even though both trial 
and reviewing courts have jurisdiction over the motion.  Similarly, both trial and 
 
 
7
appellate courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions, but a reviewing 
court has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was 
not filed first in a proper lower court.  (In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312, 
1314, 1320; see People v. Superior Court (Jimenez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 806, 
fn. 3.)  Thus, we conclude that when no execution is imminent, a person seeking 
specific discovery under section 1054.9 should first file the motion in the trial 
court that rendered the judgment.1  A reviewing court can, and generally should, 
deny without prejudice a discovery motion that was not first filed in the trial court.  
We are confident that most discovery matters can be resolved expeditiously in the 
trial court (or informally between the parties).  But if necessary, after the trial 
court has ruled, either party may challenge that ruling by a petition for writ of 
mandate in the Court of Appeal.2 
                                             
 
1  
The considerations are different when the federal courts have denied relief 
on habeas corpus (or the time for the petitioner to seek federal habeas corpus relief 
has passed), and the superior court has set a specific execution date.  At this late 
stage of the proceedings, to expedite our consideration of any final challenges to 
the judgment, a petitioner may, and usually should, file any discovery motion in 
this court in the first instance. 
2  
Section 1054.9 provides no time limits for making the discovery motion or 
complying with any discovery order.  We believe the statute implies that the 
motion, any petition challenging the trial court’s ruling, and compliance with a 
discovery order must all be done within a reasonable time period.  We will 
consider any unreasonable delay in seeking discovery under this section in 
determining whether the underlying habeas corpus petition is timely.  (See 
generally In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750.)  
We would consider a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s 
order filed within 20 days after that order to be filed within a reasonable time for 
these purposes.  Moreover, as we are directing in this case, any discovery ordered 
pursuant to section 1054.9 should be provided within a reasonable time, which 
might vary depending on the nature of the order.  We will also consider the date of 
compliance with the order in considering the timeliness of any petition for writ of 
habeas corpus that might be filed in light of the discovery. 
 
 
8
Because petitioner filed this motion in this court first, we could simply 
deny it without prejudice to filing it in the Shasta County Superior Court.  
However, to provide guidance to that court and future courts confronting similar 
discovery motions, we believe it appropriate to consider the merits of this motion 
at this time.  Accordingly, we turn to the substantive questions. 
B.  Substantive Questions 
1.  The Scope of Section 1054.9 
Section 1054.9 provides that if the defendant shows that good faith efforts 
to obtain the materials from trial counsel failed, the court should order the 
defendant be given access to “discovery materials,” defined as “materials in the 
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same 
defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.”  (§ 1054.9, subd. (b).)  The 
Attorney General argues that this statute is only a “file reconstruction statute,” and 
the discovery it permits is limited to replacing materials that the defense once 
possessed but has since lost.  We disagree.  Although permitting defendants to 
reobtain items they once possessed but have lost is one purpose, perhaps even the 
main purpose, of the statute, the statutory language is not so limited. 
“The plain language of the statute establishes what was intended by the 
Legislature.”  (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 690.)  Here, the statute 
defines the covered discovery as including materials to which the defendant 
“would have been entitled at time of trial.”  (§ 1054.9, subd. (b).)  It does not limit 
the discovery to materials the defendant actually possessed to the exclusion of 
materials the defense should have possessed.  If the Legislature had intended to 
limit the discovery to file reconstruction it could easily have said so. 
The Attorney General points out that a trial attorney is obligated to turn 
over the litigation file to the client or new counsel once that attorney’s 
 
 
9
representation has terminated.  (Rose v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 646, 655.)  
Thus, he argues, the statutory requirement that the defendant make a good faith 
effort to obtain the materials from trial counsel “only makes sense when section 
1054.9 is read as a means to reconstruct defendants’ trial files when trial counsel 
have failed to fulfill their duties.”  Again, we disagree.  The reason for the good 
faith effort requirement of section 1054.9, subdivision (a), is not difficult to 
discern—to prevent defendants from clogging the courts with requests to obtain 
materials they could simply get from trial counsel.  The requirement does not 
modify the definition of discovery materials contained in subdivision (b) of that 
section. 
The Attorney General also argues that, as we pointed out in People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 1260-1261, prosecutors have a continuing 
duty to disclose information favorable to the defense, and we expect and assume 
that they will perform this duty promptly and fully; and, moreover, that “[i]t is 
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”  (Evid. Code, § 664.)  
Accordingly, he urges, any interpretation of section 1054.9 that extends to 
discovery the prosecution should have provided at time of trial makes it redundant 
of other law.  However, the expectation and assumption we stated in Gonzalez 
merely mean that normally, and unless the defendant overcomes Evidence Code 
section 664’s presumption as to specific evidence, there will be no discovery for 
the trial court to order that the prosecutor should have provided at trial.  None of 
this changes the plain meaning of the statute’s inclusion of materials to which the 
defendant “would have been entitled.” 
The Attorney General also cites legislative history materials in support of 
his narrow reading of section 1054.9.  Although legislative history often can help 
interpret an ambiguous statute, it cannot change the plain meaning of clear 
language.  (Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 269; Torres v. 
 
 
10
Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.)  The plain language 
here does not limit the discovery materials to materials the defense once actually 
possessed to the exclusion of materials the defense did not possess but to which it 
would have been entitled at time of trial.  Moreover, the legislative history does 
not strongly support a narrow interpretation.  Various committee reports on the bill 
that became section 1054.9 discuss the problem that occurs when a defendant’s 
files are lost or destroyed after trial; they note that the bill would provide a means 
to reconstruct destroyed or missing files.  The reports do not mention other 
problems such as the possibility that prosecutors did not fulfill their duty to 
provide discovery.  But this circumstance simply means that the bill’s main focus 
was to permit reconstruction of lost files, not that the bill was limited to solving 
that problem.  Indeed, one of the reports the Attorney General cites also states, 
“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a reasonable avenue for 
habeas counsel to obtain documents to which trial counsel was already legally 
entitled.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill 1391, 
as amended Aug. 26, 2002, p. 5.)  Obtaining documents to which trial counsel was 
legally entitled is broader than mere file reconstruction. 
Thus, the Attorney General’s interpretation is too narrow.  But section 
1054.9 does provide only limited discovery.  It does not allow “free-floating” 
discovery asking for virtually anything the prosecution possesses.  
(People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1256.)  First, it includes only materials 
“in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities,” which we 
take to mean in their possession currently.  The statute imposes no preservation 
duties that do not otherwise exist.  It also does not impose a duty to search for or 
obtain materials not currently possessed.  The statute also covers only materials to 
which “defendant would have been entitled at time of trial” but does not currently 
possess.  As the Attorney General notes, the limited nature of the discovery 
 
 
11
materials becomes clear on comparing the ultimate statute with an earlier version 
of the bill.  As amended on April 10, 2002, Senate Bill 1391 defined the discovery 
materials as including materials “to which the defendant was entitled at time of 
trial, or to which the defendant would have been entitled had the discovery 
materials been known . . . .”  (Italics added.)  The italicized language was deleted 
before the bill became law.  Thus, the statute is limited to materials to which the 
defendant would have been entitled at the time of trial.  We must decide exactly 
what types of materials this includes. 
As the Attorney General acknowledges, section 1054.9 clearly permits 
record reconstruction; thus, the defendant is entitled to materials the prosecution 
provided at trial but that the defendant can show have since been lost.  We believe 
it also includes materials to which the defendant was actually entitled at time of 
trial, but did not receive.  This category includes specific materials that the 
defendant can show the prosecution should have provided (but did not provide) at 
the time of trial because they came within the scope of a discovery order the trial 
court actually issued at time of trial or a statutory duty to provide discovery.  (See 
Pen. Code, § 1054 et seq.)3  Additionally, “The prosecution has a duty under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to disclose evidence to a criminal 
defendant” that is “both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or 
punishment.”  (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543; see also Brady v. 
Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).)  Finally, this category includes materials 
the prosecution should have provided at time of trial because the defense 
specifically requested them at that time. 
                                             
 
3  
Penal Code section 1054 et seq. is a comprehensive statutory scheme 
governing discovery at trial.  (See generally Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 356.)  It was enacted on June 5, 1990, during the penalty phase of the trial 
in this case, and hence did not govern pretrial discovery here. 
 
 
12
But section 1054.9 is not limited to these materials.  The statute includes 
not just materials to which the defendant was actually entitled, but “materials in 
the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the 
same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  
Use of the subjunctive mood—“would have been”—indicates the Legislature 
intended broader discovery than just materials to which the defendant was entitled.  
This gives rise to another category of materials we believe the statute covers:  
materials that the prosecution would have been obligated to provide had there been 
a specific defense request at trial, but was not actually obligated to provide 
because no such request was made.  These are materials to which the defendant 
would have been entitled had he or she requested them.  We conclude that the 
Legislature has required the prosecution and related law enforcement authorities to 
disclose specific materials currently in their possession that they would have been 
obligated to turn over at time of trial had there been a specific defense request. 
The statute also presents the question of exactly who must possess the 
materials for them to come within its scope.  Section 1054.9, subdivision (b), 
refers to “materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities . . . .”  Thus, the materials include not only those the prosecution itself 
possesses but those that law enforcement authorities possess.  The discovery 
obligation, however, does not extend to all law enforcement authorities 
everywhere in the world but, we believe, only to law enforcement authorities who 
were involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case.  This conclusion 
becomes clear on reading the statue in context.  Section 1054.9 is part of the 
general discovery provisions of Penal Code section 1054 et seq.  Those provisions 
limit trial discovery to materials the prosecutor possesses or knows “to be in the 
possession of the investigating agencies . . . .”  (Pen. Code, § 1054.1, italics 
added.)  They also provide that the statutory provisions are the only means for the 
 
 
13
defendant to compel discovery “from prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement 
agencies which investigated or prepared the case against the defendant, or any 
other persons or agencies which the prosecuting attorney or investigating agency 
may have employed to assist them in performing their duties.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1054.5, subd. (a).)  Section 1054.9 does not require that the prosecutor know the 
materials are in the possession of the investigating agencies, but we believe the 
reference to “law enforcement authorities” in section 1054.9, subdivision (b), must 
be read in light of these other provisions.  At trial, these discovery obligations do 
not extend to materials possessed by law enforcement agencies that were not 
involved in investigating or preparing the case against the defendant.  Section 
1054.9, subdivision (b), should not be read as creating a broader postconviction 
discovery right. 
This conclusion is consistent with the scope of the prosecution’s 
constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory information.  “The scope of this 
disclosure obligation extends beyond the contents of the prosecutor’s case file and 
encompasses the duty to ascertain as well as divulge ‘any favorable evidence 
known to the others acting on the government’s behalf . . . .’ ”  (In re Brown 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879, italics added, quoting Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 
U.S. 419, 437.)  “As a concomitant of this duty, any favorable evidence known to 
the others acting on the government’s behalf is imputed to the prosecution.  ‘The 
individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all information gathered 
in connection with the government’s investigation.’ ”  (In re Brown, supra, at p. 
879, italics added, quoting U.S. v. Payne (2d Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 1200, 1208.)  
Thus, the prosecution is responsible not only for evidence in its own files but also 
for information possessed by others acting on the government’s behalf that were 
gathered in connection with the investigation.  But the prosecution cannot 
reasonably be held responsible for evidence in the possession of all governmental 
 
 
14
agencies, including those not involved in the investigation or prosecution of the 
case.  “Conversely, a prosecutor does not have a duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence or information to a defendant unless the prosecution team actually or 
constructively possesses that evidence or information.  Thus, information 
possessed by an agency that has no connection to the investigation or prosecution 
of the criminal charge against the defendant is not possessed by the prosecution 
team, and the prosecutor does not have the duty to search for or to disclose such 
material.”  (People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 
1315.) 
Accordingly, we interpret section 1054.9 to require the trial court, on a 
proper showing of a good faith effort to obtain the materials from trial counsel, to 
order discovery of specific materials currently in the possession of the prosecution 
or law enforcement authorities involved in the investigation or prosecution of the 
case that the defendant can show either (1) the prosecution did provide at time of 
trial but have since become lost to the defendant; (2) the prosecution should have 
provided at time of trial because they came within the scope of a discovery order 
the trial court actually issued at that time, a statutory duty to provide discovery, or 
the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) the prosecution should 
have provided at time of trial because the defense specifically requested them at 
that time; or (4) the prosecution had no obligation to provide at time of trial absent 
a specific defense request, but to which the defendant would have been entitled at 
time of trial had the defendant specifically requested them. 
2.  Application to this Case 
Petitioner argues that he was entitled at trial to the discovery he seeks 
because it was “Brady material.”  (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83.)  As noted, Brady 
and other cases have made clear that the prosecution has a general duty to disclose 
 
 
15
evidence favorable to the defense.  That this duty extends generally to evidence 
favorable on punishment as well as guilt was made clear in Brady itself, which 
referred to evidence “material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .”  (Brady, 
supra, at p. 87.)  “Such evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.’ ”  (Strickler v. Green (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280, 
quoting United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682.) 
Petitioner argues that information regarding his behavior in prison was 
mitigating evidence, and thus the prosecution had a duty to disclose it at trial.  We 
disagree that the prosecution had the duty to disclose such evidence at trial absent 
a specific defense request for that information. 
In a capital case, evidence favorable to the defendant bearing on 
punishment is of two kinds.  First is evidence that mitigates the impact of the 
prosecution evidence, in other words, evidence that either reduces the defendant’s 
culpability for the charged crimes or other crimes the prosecution proves at the 
penalty phase or weakens the strength of other aggravating evidence the 
prosecution presents.  The prosecution’s duty clearly extends to providing 
favorable evidence of this kind.  If the prosecution proves a crime against the 
defendant or presents other aggravating evidence, it has a duty to disclose any 
evidence on these matters materially favorable to the defendant.  Brady, supra, 
373 U.S. 83, provides an example of this type of evidence relating to punishment.  
In Brady, Brady and a companion, Boblit, were convicted of first degree murder 
and sentenced to death.  The prosecution had withheld from Brady evidence that 
Boblit had admitted actually committing the homicide.  This evidence did not 
materially aid Brady regarding guilt, for both perpetrators could properly be 
convicted of first degree murder under state law without being the actual killer.  
(Id. at pp. 88, 90.)  However, by suggesting that Boblit, and not Brady, was the 
 
 
16
actual killer, the admission was relevant to punishment, i.e., to whether Brady 
should have received the death penalty for the murder.  (Id. at pp. 87-88; see 
United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 105-106 [explaining this aspect of 
Brady].) 
But evidence favorable to the defendant in a capital case can extend beyond 
evidence relating to the prosecution evidence or theory of the case.  It includes a 
second kind of evidence:  anything regarding the defendant personally that he or 
she offers as mitigating.  “The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
sentencer in a capital case not be precluded from considering any relevant 
mitigating evidence, that is, evidence regarding ‘any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ ”  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 894, 1015, quoting Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, italics 
added.)  The second kind of evidence reflected in the italicized language permits 
the defendant to introduce “a broad range of evidence mitigating imposition of the 
death penalty.”  (People v. Frye, supra, at p. 1015.) 
Petitioner has not cited, and we are unaware of, authority holding that the 
prosecution has a duty, absent a specific request, to disclose evidence of the 
second kind, that is, evidence relevant solely to a defendant’s character or record.4  
                                             
 
4  
The HCRC cites three cases it claims supports the argument that the duty 
extends to evidence relating solely to the defendant.  Two of the cases include 
language referring to evidence material to punishment similar to the language of 
Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at page 87, but they too involved evidence relevant to the 
charged crime or other prosecution evidence and not evidence relating only to the 
defendant personally.  (U.S. v. Frank (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 11 F.Supp.2d 322, 326-328; 
U.S. v. Beckford (E.D.Va. 1997) 962 F.Supp. 804, 807-811.)  The third case does 
include broad language that the duty extends to evidence relating to mitigating 
factors including the defendant’s background or character.  (U.S. v. Storey (D.Kan. 
1997) 956 F.Supp. 934, 939-940.)  But that case refers to no such specific 
evidence and, because the prosecution agreed to provide the defendant essentially 
 
 
17
The broad statement in Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at page 87, that the duty extends to 
evidence material to punishment must be read in context.  Brady involved 
evidence relevant to the defendant’s culpability for the crime and not just evidence 
regarding the defendant unrelated to the charged crime or any other prosecution 
evidence.  Its purpose was to prevent the obvious unfairness of allowing the 
prosecution to withhold information that undermines its own case.  Implicitly, 
Brady requires the prosecution to disclose only evidence that is favorable and 
material under the prosecution’s evidence or theory of the case.  Otherwise, the 
prosecution effectively would be required to do what Brady does not require, that 
is, to “deliver [its] entire file to defense counsel” (United States v. Bagley, supra, 
473 U.S. at p. 675) in order to avoid withholding evidence that may, or may not, 
become favorable and material depending on whatever unknown and unknowable 
theory of the case that the defendant might choose to adopt. 
The duty of disclosure exists to avoid “an unfair trial to the accused” 
(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87) or “to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does 
not occur” (United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 675).  Requiring the 
prosecution, on its own, to disclose information that might fit some defense theory 
but is irrelevant to the prosecution evidence or theory of the case is generally not 
necessary to ensure a fair trial.  Because mitigation is often “ ‘ “in the eye of the 
beholder” ’ ” (Burger v. Kemp (1987) 483 U.S. 776, 794), the defense will know 
far better than the prosecution what evidence fits its theory of the case and what 
evidence does not.  Because the defense can offer virtually anything about the 
defendant personally that it considers mitigating, virtually anything regarding the 
defendant can be exculpatory if the defense considers it so.  Thus, evidence whose 
                                                                                                                                      
 
everything it had, it does not discuss the point.  The court simply denied the 
discovery request as moot in light of the prosecution’s representations that it had 
provided all such evidence. 
 
 
18
exculpatory nature is not obvious might become exculpatory whenever the defense 
so claims.  But the duty to disclose evidence cannot extend to evidence the 
prosecution had no reason to believe the defense would consider exculpatory.  
Requiring the prosecution to, as the high court put it, “assist the defense in making 
its case” (United States v. Bagley, supra, at p. 675, fn. 6) is unnecessary when it 
comes to potential mitigating evidence regarding the defendant personally.  It 
would also be overly burdensome.  It is one thing to expect the prosecution to 
know about its own case and to provide the defense with evidence weakening that 
case.  It is quite different to expect it to be alert to information unrelated to its case 
that might support a defense theory, especially given the unlimited range of 
potentially mitigating evidence. 
If the defendant had specifically asked the prosecution to provide this 
information, the situation may be different.  In some circumstances, the obligation 
to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant may require the prosecution to 
provide materials that the defendant specifically requests as potential exculpatory 
materials even if their potential exculpatory nature would not otherwise be 
apparent to the prosecution. 
In general, “the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though 
there has been no request by the accused . . . .”  (Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 
U.S. at p. 280.)  The high court has stated that its test for materiality is 
“sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’ ‘general request,’ and ‘specific 
request’ cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the 
accused:  The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, 
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  (United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 682 (plur. 
opn. of Blackman, J.); see also id. at p. 685 (conc. opn. of White, J.).)  But the 
presence or absence of a specific request at trial is relevant to whether evidence is 
 
 
19
material under this test.  “The Government notes that an incomplete response to a 
specific request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the 
effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist.  In reliance 
on this misleading representation, the defense might abandon lines of independent 
investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.  
[Citation.] [¶] We agree that the prosecutor’s failure to respond fully to a Brady 
request may impair the adversary process in this manner.  And the more 
specifically the defense requests certain evidence, thus putting the prosecutor on 
notice of its value, the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume from the 
nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pretrial and trial 
decisions on the basis of this assumption.”  (Id. at pp. 682-683 (plur. opn. of 
Blackman, J.).)  Accordingly, in determining whether evidence was material, “the 
reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that the prosecutor’s 
failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the 
defendant’s case.”  (Id. at p. 683 (plur. opn. of Blackman, J.).) 
Another reason a request may be significant is that the request can inform 
the prosecution that certain evidence is potentially exculpatory when the 
exculpatory nature of the evidence would not otherwise be apparent.  Then the 
prosecution would be on notice both that the defense considered the evidence 
potentially exculpatory and that the defense did not have it and presumably could 
not get it by itself.  In such a case, the prosecution could cull through the evidence, 
viewing it in light of the defendant’s request as well as its own theory of the case.  
Thus, if the defense requests at trial specific evidence relevant to mitigation that 
the prosecution possesses, the prosecution should disclose it whether or not it 
relates to any of the prosecution evidence.  But absent a specific request at trial, 
the Brady duty does not extend to evidence that relates solely to the defendant 
 
 
20
personally and whose exculpatory nature would therefore not otherwise be 
apparent to the prosecution.  Such evidence is not material in the Brady sense.5 
The information petitioner seeks here involves his own behavior in prison.  
But the prosecution’s case had nothing to do with petitioner’s prison behavior.  
The instant charge was a murder committed after he was released from prison.  
The prosecution case in aggravation involved entirely of crimes committed before 
he was in prison.  Prison officials did not investigate or help prosecute any of these 
crimes.  Thus, the prosecution was generally not responsible for information 
prison officials possessed that might help the defense.  (See People v. Superior 
Court (Barrett), supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1305 [the prosecutor’s duty to disclose 
information favorable to the defense does not extend to information the California 
Department of Corrections possesses unrelated to the charges].) 
In this case, it appears the prosecution did provide the defense with some 
documents regarding petitioner’s behavior in prison although, petitioner claims, 
not everything.  This circumstance suggests, as petitioner argues, that defense 
counsel may have requested some such records at time of trial.  But the defense 
was not misled into believing that no other information existed.  In his reply to the 
opposition to the discovery motion, which he adopted by reference in his traverse, 
petitioner attached a copy of a report that he says the prosecutor disclosed to the 
defense before trial.  The report was by a prosecution investigator stating that he 
                                             
 
5  
Another example of when the prosecution might have to disclose 
potentially exculpatory evidence only on request is when, unknown to the 
prosecution, the defendant intends to present a defense that a certain third person, 
rather than the defendant, committed the charged crime, and the prosecution 
possesses information about that person’s prior record that might assist this 
defense.  If the prosecution had no reason to suppose the third person had any 
connection to the case, it cannot be expected to disclose that information on its 
own.  However, if the defendant specifically requests that information as 
potentially exculpatory, the prosecution might, in that circumstance, have to 
disclose it. 
 
 
21
and the prosecutor had reviewed prison records regarding petitioner.  The two of 
them “went through all of these papers and picked out various ones that were felt 
to be relevant,” and arranged for them to be copied and forwarded to the district 
attorney’s office.  This document clearly indicated that the investigator did not 
obtain all the records regarding petitioner, but only those the prosecution felt were 
relevant.  Of course, what the prosecution felt was relevant may be very different 
from what the defense feels is relevant as possible mitigating evidence.  By giving 
the defense documents that it found relevant, the prosecution did not assume, 
absent a specific request, the obligation to provide all prison records that the 
defense may have found relevant. 
On the instant record, it is not clear whether petitioner specifically 
requested additional records at time of trial.  Whether the defense did make such a 
request does not matter for purposes of discovery under section 1054.9.  If the 
defense had specifically requested the prosecution to provide all of petitioner’s 
prison records in its possession, assuming the records were otherwise material, the 
prosecution would have been obligated to provide them.  The request would have 
informed the prosecution the records might be exculpatory.  Accordingly, this is 
information to which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial had 
the defendant specifically requested them.  The current request—to provide 
documentary and similar evidence regarding “petitioner’s leaving the Nuestra 
Familia”; “information provided by petitioner regarding the Nuestra Familia, its 
members and associates, and non-member collaborators”; and “assistance 
provided by petitioner in prosecutions pursued by the State of California and/or 
local prosecutors against the Nuestra Familia and others accused of collaborating 
with the Nuestra Familia in the commission of crimes”—is also reasonably 
specific.  This is not just a free-floating request for anything the prosecution has 
 
 
22
that may be relevant to the case, but a focused request for specific information.  
Accordingly, this information comes within the scope of section 1054.9. 
For these reasons, we believe petitioner is entitled to a discovery order.  We 
have no reason to suppose there will be any difficulty with compliance or 
enforcement of the order, but if further proceedings are necessary, they should be 
conducted in the trial court, which can resolve any difficulties much easier than 
this court.  Accordingly, we will remand the matter to the trial court with 
directions to issue the discovery order. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We remand the matter to the Shasta County Superior Court with directions 
to order the respondent to provide to petitioner, within a reasonable time, materials 
petitioner does not now possess regarding “petitioner’s leaving the Nuestra 
Familia”; “information provided by petitioner regarding the Nuestra Familia, its 
members and associates, and non-member collaborators”; and “assistance 
provided by petitioner in prosecutions pursued by the State of California and/or 
local prosecutors against the Nuestra Familia and others accused of collaborating 
with the Nuestra Familia in the commission of crimes” that the prosecution or law 
enforcement agencies involved in the investigation or prosecution of this case 
possess today, if any exist. 
 
 
23
Because it has served its purpose, we also discharge the order to show 
cause. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I concur entirely in the majority opinion, with one exception:  I find its 
suggestion that a petitioner having an execution date “may, and usually should” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 1), file any discovery motion in this court in the first 
instance not readily inferable from Penal Code section 1054.9.  Notwithstanding 
its persuasive rationale for directing petitioners generally to file discovery motions 
in the superior court in the first instance (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-7), the majority 
seemingly fails to recognize that the filing of a discovery motion directly in this 
court would be more expeditious in only those exceptional instances when the 
motion is patently meritorious or nonmeritorious as a matter of law.  At any rate, 
however sound the suggestion as a matter of judicial convenience, and irrespective 
of whether the Judicial Council might have the power to adopt suitable rules 
pertaining thereto, the suggestion—which, in not even purporting to bind 
petitioners, seems scarcely likely to “expedite” in any reliable way “our 
consideration of any final challenges to the judgment” (id. at p. 7, fn. 1)—is one 
that more appropriately should be implemented by legislative amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Steele on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114551 
Date Filed: March 8, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Shasta 
Judge: William R. Lund, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Gregory Marshall, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Raymond Edward Steele. 
 
Michael Laurence, Jeannie R. Sternberg and Cristina Bordé for Habeas Corpus Resource Center as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Raymond Edward Steele. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell and Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gregory Marshall 
P. O. Box 996 
Palo Cedro, CA  96073 
(530) 549-4836 
 
Cristina Bordé 
Habeas Corpus Resource Center 
50 Fremont Street, Suite 1800 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 348-3800 
 
Eric L. Christoffersen 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5264