Title: POEPPEL v FISHER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13461
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1977

No. 13461 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 RICHARD 0. POEPPEL, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- VIRGIL FISHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana James I. Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Morrison, Hedman and ~rieweiler, Whitefish, Montana Terry ~ r i e w ~ i l e r argued, Whitefish, Montana - Submitted: September 28, 1977 Decided: OEC 16 l g r Filed : r~ka: ~ ' 3 Kt-( M r . Justice Gene B . Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant Virgil Fisher appeals from the f i n a l judgment of the District Court, Flathead County, s i t t i n g with a jury. Plain- t i f f Richard 0. Poeppel brought t h i s c i v i l action against defendant seeking money damages for assault and battery. The jury returned a verdict i n p l a i n t i f f ' s favor, awarding $5,000 damages. This cause of action a r i s e s out of an altercation that occurred on April 20, 1972, i n the Central School, Whitefish, Montana. P l a i n t i f f , a school teacher, alleged he was attacked and struck by defendant, a fellow school teacher, a f t e r p l a i n t i f f had physically ejected a student from h i s classroom. Plaintiff f i l e d a timely complaint i n the District Court. B y stipulation of the parties, adjudication of p l a i n t i f f ' s claim was stayed pending f i n a l determination and appeal of the cause e n t i t l e d Reliance Insurance Co. v. Virgil Fisher, Richard 0. Poeppel and Horace Mann Insurance Lo., 164 Mont. 278, 521 P.2d 193. This Court's decision i n that cause released both insurance companies from any duty to defend o r t o pay any damages that might be awarded i n the present action. Defendant subsequently f i l e d an answer to p l a i n t i f f ' s amended complaint and a demand for jury t r i a l . Pursuant t o Rule 16, M.R.Civ.P., the District Court ordered a p r e t r i a l conference and the preparation of p r e t r i a l orders. O n February 1 7 , 1976, the District Court issued i t s p r e t r i a l order presenting, among other things, these issues of fact and law t o be litigated a t t r i a l : Issues of Fact. 1. Whether the conduct of defendant was provoked by. the plaintiff . 2. Whether plaintiff was beating a child and defendant came t o the child's rescue. - 2 - 3. Whether the plaintiff threatened defendant and defendant was acting i n self -defense. 4. Whether defendant's attack was malicious and wanton. 5. The nature and extent of p l a i n t i f f ' s injuries. Issues of Law. 1. The applicability of self-defense or the defense of another t o the instant case. 2. Whether punitive damages a r e applicable in t h i s situation. The District Court then ordered: "IT I S HEREBY ORDERED that t h i s p r e t r i a l order s h a l l supersede and supplement the pleadings and govern the course of the t r i a l i n t h i s cause, unless modified t o prevent manifest injustice. "IT IS F U R T H E R ORDERED that a l l pleadings herein s h a l l be amended to conform t o t h i s p r e t r i a l order." The matter was tried before the District Court on April 12, 1976. O n April 14, 1976, the jury returned its verdict finding i n favor of plaintiff and assessing p l a i n t i f f ' s damages i n the amount of $5,000. The jury found plaintiff was not entitled t o exemplary or punitive damages. Defendant subsequently f i l e d a motion for entry of judgment for defendant. Defendant based h i s motion on the contention that plaintiff was not entitled t o recover from defendant as a matter of law since section 92-204, R.C.M. 1947 (subsequently amended and repealed by section 92-204.1, R.C.M. 1947; approved March 29, 1973; Section 2, Chapter 493, Laws 1973) provided i n pertinent part: "* * * Further provided, that whenever such employee shall receive an injury while performing the duties of h i s employment and such injury or injuries, so received by such employee, are caused by the inten- tional and malicious a c t o r omission of a servant or employee of h i s employer, then such employee, o r i n case of h i s death, h i s heirs or personal representatives, shall i n addition t o the right t o receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, have a right t o prosecute any cause of action he may have for damages against such servants or employees of h i s employer, causing such injury. In the event said employee s h a l l prosecute an action for damages for or on account of such injuries so received, he shall not be deprived of h i s right t o receive compensation but such compensation shall be received by him i n addition to and independent of h i s right t o bring action for such damages * * * . I ' Plaintiff filed a memorandum i n opposition to defendant's motion f o r entry of judgment contending that defendant's post- t r i a l motion for judgment notwithstandtng the verdict,l should be denied since it was based upon an affirmative defense, injury by a fellow servant, which was never plead nor proved a t t r i a l . Plaintiff further f i l e d a post-trial motion and memorandum i n support of additur. Defendant f i l e d objections and a motion t o s t r i k e p l a i n t i f f ' s memorandum of costs on the ground p l a i n t i f f was untimely i n f i l i n g h i s memorandum of costs and disbursements. The District Court denied a l l post-trial motions and judgment on the verdict was f i l e d June 22, 1976. Notice of entry of judgment was f i l e d June 24, 1976. Defendant deposited a sum of money i n the amount of judgment with the clerk of the District Court as supersedeas bond and the District Court entered an order staying execution of judgment pending appeal t o t h i s Court. The following issues are presented for review: 1. Whether plaintiff may recover actual damages by jury verdict i n a third party action against a fellow employee for assault and battery when the jury was not instructed on the provisions of section 92-204, R.C.M. 1947, and did not find the tortfeasor acted with malice? 2. Whether plaintiff must claim his costs within five days of a jury verdict? 3 . Whether defendant brought t h i s appeal without substan- t i a l o r reasonable grounds, thereby e n t i t l i n g plaintiff t o recover damages pursuant t o Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P.? I n resolving the f i r s t issue, defendant contends the jury's failure t o award exemplary or punitive damages t o plaintiff is a bar t o p l a i n t i f f ' s recovery of actual damages since section 92-204, R.C.M. 1947, provided plaintiff could recover damass from a coemployee causing injury t o plaintiff only when such injuries were caused by the intentional and malicious a c t of the coemployee. In the instant case, the jury's failure to award exemplary or punitive damages is not a bar to the award of actual or compensa- tory damages. Exemplary or punitive damages a r e awarded a t the discretion of the jury, even though fraud o r malice i s shown, and are not recoverable as a matter of right. The sufficiency of the p l a i n t i f f ' s allegation and cause of action is determined independent of p l a i n t i f f ' s claim for exemplary or punitive damages. Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966); Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mont. 75, 214 P. 606 (1923), reversed i n part i n Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 239, 211 P.2d 420 (1949); 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages $ 5 240,241. Therefore, the jury's failure t o award exemplary or punitive damages i n the instant case i s not equivalent to a finding of no malice. Furthermore, it is a well accepted proposition of law that malice i n law i s implied where defendant's conduct is unjustifiable. Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211 P.2d 420 (1949); Cashin v. Northern Pac. R.Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Moelleur v. Moelleur, 55 Mont. 30, 173 P. 419 (1918). The jury's finding in favor of plaintiff and assessing damages a t the sum of $5,000 is equivalent t o a finding that defendant committed the alleged assault and battery, absent justifiable excuse, privilege o r defense. Such an assault and battery is an intentional, unjustified a c t and malice i n law is implied. The jury's failure t o award exemplary or punitive damages only implies that the a c t complained of was not found to be i n the s p i r i t of mischief o r criminal indifference t o c i v i l obligations, but an intentional, unlawful, injurious a c t was the basis for the jury's award of actual or compensatory damages p l a i n t i f f ' s favor. Defendant's second issue concerns the timeliness of p l a i n t i f f ' s submission of a memorandum of costs and disburse- ments. Section 93-8619, R.C.M. 1947, i s controlling: "The party i n whose favor judgment is rendered, and who claims h i s costs, must deliver t o the clerk, and serve upon the adverse party, within five days a f t e r the verdict or notice of the decision of the court o r referee or, i f the entry of the judgment on the verdict or decision be stayed, then before such entry is made, a memorandum of the items of h i s costs and necessary disbursements i n the action or proceeding, which memorandum must be verified by the oath of the party, o r h i s attorney or agent, or by the clerk of h i s attorney, stating that to the best of h i s knowledge and belief the items a r e correct, and that the dis- bursenents have been necessarily incurred i n the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within five days a f t e r notice of f i l i n g of the b i l l of costs, f i l e and serve a notice of a motion t o have the same taxed by the court i n which the judgment was rendered, o r by the judge thereof a t chambers." Here, the jury verdict for plaintiff was announced and f i l e d on April 14, 1976. O n April 20, 1976, defendant f i l e d h i s motion for entry of judgment for defendant. Plaintiff filed h i s memorandum of costs and disbursements, and other post-trial motions on April 26, 1976. O n M a y 4, 1976, the District Court issued its order denying a l l post-trial motions. O n May 6, 1976, defendant f i l e d h i s objections and motion t o s t r i k e memorandum of costs with supporting brief. The District Court denied defendant's motion t o s t r i k e p l a i n t i f f ' s memorandum of costs and disbursements on June 21, 1976. O n June 22, 1976, judgment on the jury verdict was f i l e d and notice of entry of judgment was f i l e d on June 24, This Court has held t h a t the f i v e day period allowed f o r f i l i n g of a memorandum of costs and disbursements "is computed from t h e day the court enters judgment, not from the day the court o r a l l y announces i t s decision." Davis v. Trobough, 139 Mont. 322, 326, 363 P.2d 727 (1961). The D i s t r i c t Court's ruling on post-trkal'motions delayed entry of judgment u n t i l June 24, 1976. P l a i n t i f f f i l e d h i s memorandum of costs and disbursements p r i o r t o entry of judgment, on April 26, 1976, and such f i l i n g was timely. Defendant's t h i r d issue i s p l a i n t i f f ' s claim f o r damages i n accord with Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P. W e f a i l t o find sub- t h a t s t a n t i a l evidencelthis appeal was taken without s u b s t a n t i a l o r reasonable grounds o r only f o r purposes of delay. Therefore, damages under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P., a r e denied. The j udgmen t the D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. / J u s t i c e W e Concur: A Chief J u s t i c e I Justices.