Title: Richardson v. Braxton-Bailey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980324
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CRAIG RICHARDSON 
 
v.  Record No. 980324     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 8, 1999 
VALERIE BRAXTON-BAILEY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
Valerie Braxton-Bailey filed a motion for judgment 
against Craig Richardson seeking $60,000 for injuries that she 
allegedly sustained in an automobile accident caused by 
Richardson's negligence.  Following a jury trial, the trial 
court set aside a $3,265 verdict in favor of Braxton-Bailey, 
finding it "inconsistent with the law and the evidence," and 
the case was retried on the issue of damages only.  The second 
trial resulted in a jury verdict of $1,270, which the trial 
court also set aside as "contrary to the evidence and law" and 
"inadequate as a matter of law."  Following a third trial on 
damages alone, the trial court entered judgment on a jury 
verdict in the amount of $35,000.  Richardson appealed, 
asserting that the first two verdicts were not inadequate as a 
matter of law and that the third verdict was excessive as a 
matter of law.  We will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court because we conclude that the trial court erred in 
setting aside the first verdict. 
In reviewing the trial court's action in setting aside 
the jury verdict of $3,265, we apply the following familiar 
principles:  (1) the amount of a verdict is within the jury's 
discretion, and when arrived at upon competent and proper 
instructions, is inviolate, Taylor v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 
224 Va. 562, 567, 299 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1983); (2) when 
evaluating the amount of the jury verdict, all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the verdict rendered, 
Hall v. Hall, 240 Va. 360, 363, 397 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1990); 
and (3) if, based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to 
believe that only a portion of the damages claimed were 
reasonably related to the accident, then the verdict cannot be 
set aside by the trial court as inadequate as a matter of law, 
Brown v. Huddleston, 213 Va. 146, 147, 191 S.E.2d 234, 235 
(1972). 
 
Braxton-Bailey was injured when Richardson failed to stop 
at a red traffic signal, and his vehicle hit the rear 
passenger side of Braxton-Bailey's vehicle.  The impact spun 
her vehicle around, causing a flat rear tire.  There was no 
other damage to her vehicle. 
The day after the accident, Braxton-Bailey, complaining 
of soreness in her neck, shoulder blades, right wrist, and 
right arm, went to see Dr. Leon J. Brown, Jr., a doctor 
recommended by her attorney.  Dr. Brown testified that 
 
2
Braxton-Bailey's injuries were caused by the accident. He also 
testified that there were no objective symptoms of her 
injuries and that his diagnosis was based solely on what 
Braxton-Bailey told him.  The injuries were muscular in 
nature, did not involve nerve damage, and were not permanent.  
Dr. Brown treated Braxton-Bailey with prescribed exercises, 
heat packs, anti-inflammatory medication and electric 
stimulation over the course of six weeks.  Braxton-Bailey 
introduced medical bills of $1,225 for Dr. Brown's services 
and $45.59 for prescription medications. 
Dr. Brown testified that he initially anticipated that 
Braxton-Bailey could return to her work as a teacher 
approximately two weeks after the accident, but that 
"additional problems" prevented her from doing so.  He 
testified that "on several occasions we tried to get her back 
to work," but that she did not finally return to work until 
five weeks after the accident.  Braxton-Bailey asserted that 
she incurred $5,905.20 in lost wages.  
 
The jury's verdict of $3,265 was clearly less than the 
approximately $7,200 in special damages claimed by Braxton-
Bailey.*  In setting aside the verdict on the basis that it was 
                     
* Counsel for Richardson stipulated that the amounts 
claimed by Braxton-Bailey were incurred subsequent to the 
accident; however, the record does not support the conclusion, 
asserted by Braxton-Bailey, that Richardson's counsel agreed 
 
3
"inconsistent with the evidence and law," the trial court did 
not disagree with the jury's obvious conclusion that only a 
portion of Braxton-Bailey's damages were reasonably related to 
the accident.  The trial court's action was based on its 
belief that the amount awarded reflected "an award of the 
medical expenses and two of the five weeks claimed for lost 
wages" and that the jury thus made "[n]o allowance" for the 
other damage elements such as pain, suffering, and 
inconvenience which were contained in the jury instructions.  
The trial court erred in setting aside the verdict based on 
this assumption. 
 
When the evidence permits a jury to conclude that only 
some of the damages claimed resulted from the accident, a 
verdict in an amount less than or approximating a portion of 
the special damages does not justify the conclusion that the 
jury failed to consider other damage elements such as pain, 
suffering, and inconvenience.  Walker v. Mason, 257 Va. ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___ (1999)(this day decided); Doe v. West, 222 Va. 
440, 446, 281 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1981).  The quality of the 
evidence is dispositive, not a comparison between the amount 
of the verdict and the special damages claimed.  See Doe v. 
West, 222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 852-53.  Based on this 
                                                                
or stipulated that those damages were proximately caused by 
the accident.  
 
4
record, we conclude that the jury was permitted to conclude 
that not all the damages claimed by Braxton-Bailey were 
incurred as a result of the accident.  The verdict was not 
based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence; 
therefore, the trial court erred in setting it aside. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court, reinstate the jury verdict of $3,265 in favor of 
Braxton-Bailey, and enter final judgment here on that verdict.  
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
5