Title: Crockett v. Scott
Citation: 284 S.W.2d 289
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 1955

284 S.W.2d 289 (1955) Annie Read CROCKETT et al. v. Edwyna SCOTT et al. Supreme Court of Tennessee. June 10, 1955. Rehearing Denied December 9, 1955. *290 John D. Martin, Jr., of Memphis, C.S. Carney, Jr., Ripley, Stegall &amp; Laroche, of Murfreesboro, for appellants. Holmes &amp; Holmes, of Trenton, for appellees. BURNETT, Justice. This suit involves the proper construction of a paragraph of the will of Mary C. Person, it is as follows: The Chancellor in a very able opinion held that this provision of the will violated the rule against perpetuities and was therefore *291 void. An appeal has been seasonably prayed, able briefs filed and arguments heard. In addition to reading and considering these briefs along with the opinion of the Chancellor we have spent several days reading a number of cases from various jurisdictions, and text books, on the question. We have done this because of the importance of applying the rule here to the facts of this particular will and because of the interest that we had in the question. We now have the matter for determination. The cases involving the application of various facts to this rule are legion. It is one of the methods adopted by the judiciary, in the interest of public policy, to prohibit the undue limitation and prolongation of estates. Mr. Gray, in his work on the matter, the rule against perpetuities, says (page 2) that the rule is a mode "adopted by the common law for forwarding the circulation of property which it is its policy to promote." We will not attempt to trace the development of the rule because the law books are full of it and the excellent treaties of Mr. Gray cover the subject. We will say only that the limit, under the rule, for the creation of executory interests to commence, is "within the period of a life or lives in being and 21 years, allowing for the period of gestation." Eager v. McCoy, 143 Tenn. 693, 228 S.W. 709; Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36, and a host of others. The controlling rule of interpretation of wills is that the intent of the testator is to govern, and this intent is to be carried out if not in conflict with some rule of law. Burton v. Kinney, 191 Tenn. 1, 231 S.W.2d 356, 19 A.L.R.2d 36. When there is such a conflict the will must fail of effect insofar as it violates the rule, not because the intent of the testator does not control his construction, but because the law will not permit this intent to be accomplished. Harris v. France, 33 Tenn. App. 333, 340, 232 S.W.2d 64; Gray: Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd Edition, Sects. 629, 633. The rule against perpetuities is not a rule of construction but of law, and is to be applied even if the accomplishment of the express intent of the testator is thereby made impossible. Hassell v. Sims, 176 Tenn. 318, 141 S.W. (2d) 472. A will speaks from the death of the testator, and the general rule is that a limitation is void because in violation of the rule against perpetuities unless it is certain at the time of his death that the estate will vest within the period required by the rule, and, if by any possibility the event upon which the estate is limited may not occur within that time, the limitation is too remote. Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities, Sec. 214 (supra); Tiffany On Real Property, Sec. 180; Brown v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 277, 6 S.W. 869, 7 S.W. 640; 41 Am. Jur., p. 59. The rule is concerned only with the time in which the title vests and not with the postponement of enjoyment of the estate. Any interest which vests is not affected by the rule however remote the time of enjoyment may be. 41 Am. Jur., Sec. 23, p. 67. Harris v. France, supra; Hassell v. Sims, supra. The possibility that the property may vest within the rule is fatal. Hassell v. Sims, supra. And in considering whether a future interest might vest beyond the expiration of the time covered by the rule both men and women are considered as capable of having issue as long as they live. Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d 984. The testatrix died in 1880. At the time of her death the first life taker Mrs. Sanford was 50 years old. At that time Mrs. Sanford had six children, one of whom died prior to the death of his mother. Cora Field was a niece of the testatrix, she being the daughter of a brother of the testatrix, Charles G. Field. At the time of the death of the testatrix Cora Field was 13 years of age and was younger than the older Sanford children and older than some of the younger children. Cora Field is the mother of the appellants here. She lived in the home of her aunt, Mrs. Sanford, from the date of the testatrix' death until her marriage some 10 years later. By decree of the County Court of Lauderdale County, in 1893, it was adjudged that E.E. Sanford and Mary Person (appellees predecessors *292 in title) were the owners in fee of the land by controversy each owning an undivided one-half interest. By a chain of deeds and devises title passed from these persons to the several appellees. Cora Field conveyed her interest in this property to some of the predecessors in title of the present appellees after she reached her majority. So says the Chancellor in his very able opinion. We concur and agree fully to his conclusions thus expressed. We now come to consider the provisions of this will under the well settled principles as are governed by the rule against perpetuities hereinbefore set forth. And in consideration of this will under those provisions the following very pertinent statement of the Chancellor is applicable: See authorities above cited on this question as well as Eigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353, 39 S.W. 525, 38 L.R.A. 679; 41 Am. Jur. Sec. 26, p. 71; 2 Blackstone, page 125. We have again in the last two paragraphs quoted from the excellent opinion of the Chancellor the obvious and only reasonable conclusion from the will when considered in the light of the rule against perpetuities. The appellees relied below and here upon our case of Hassell v. Sims, supra. The Chancellor thought this case in point, as do we. Certain points of similarity in the two are of interest. In the Hassell v. Sims case there was a deed creating a life estate in the wife with a second life estate to the children of the grantor and the wife equally and then the fee over to the grandchildren of the grantor in the deed. In this case this Court, speaking through the late Mr. Justice McKinney, held that the deed in that case was void as creating an estate contrary to the rule against perpetuities. In the case now before us we have a will which creates a life estate in Mrs. Sanford; the second life estate "per capita" in her children and Cora Field and then third we have a fee to the grandnieces and nephews of the testator or to whatever children of the children of Jean M. Sanford and Cora Field might leave. Obviously there is quite a similarity in facts. Thus we can readily see how the Chancellor followed this case. Just one quotation from Hassell v. Sims, supra [176 Tenn. 318, 141 S.W.2d 473]: Counsel for the appellants argue very forcefully that there is quite a difference between the two cases, primarily because of the difference between a deed, in the Hassell v. Sims case, and the will in the instant case. As we gather from reading the authorities the difference only comes about in the computation of time, since the deed becomes effective at delivery, while the will takes effect at the death of the testator. This distinction is recognized in the last page and paragraph of the opinion in the Hassell v. Sims case and in that case this difference is pointed out by showing that the grantor in the deed in question was still alive yet the deed had been made some 30 years before this litigation, in the Hassell v. Sims case, arose. Obviously this of course, under a factual situation, would make a good deal of difference but we must remember that the rule against perpetuities is a positive rule of property, and is applicable alike to conveyances by deed or will or otherwise. We might illustrate this difference by the suggestion that in a devise to the children of a testator for life with remainder to their children would be perfectly valid because at the time the will becomes effective (that is the death of the testator) it would not be possible that he have other children. We take the case of the deed, which becomes effective at delivery, the donor or grantor, as in the Hassell v. Sims case, might have other children. This is really the only distinction. In the case that we now have for decision, it is not the children of the testatrix who are to take, but the children of a sister of the testatrix, Jean M. Sanford, who was living at the effective date of the will and *294 who could, legally, give birth to other children. And again the able Chancellor says: This is the primary insistence of the appellants before us and is the question that has given us most concern and the one in which we have made a rather extensive, independent investigation. Counsel for the appellants quotes and relies upon what Mr. Gray in his Rules Against Perpetuities, 3rd Edition, p. 342 says: Again he states, page 343: Still again, page 345: This brings us to a study as to what the intention of the testatrix was in bestowing her bounty. The Chancellor says: We thoroughly agree with this statement and reasoning. There is one other reason that seems to us, from the stipulation and under the will, that places Cora Field in exactly the same relationship *295 to Jean M. Sanford as were Jean M. Sanford's children, in the view of the testatrix. This is the fact that Cora Field lived with the Sanford children and was obviously considered just as one of these children. Here the testatrix in bestowing her bounty on her relatives picked out her sister Jean M. Sanford and then the children of Jean M. Sanford and threw in another niece who was making her home with these children to share on an equal basis. To state this rule, in view of the factual situation which we have stated above, is to answer the able argument of the appellants. These bequests are so interwoven and connected as to us seem to be inseparable for reasons above stated. In 70 C.J.S., Perpetuities § 16, p. 595 we find language which is indeed very applicable to that herein, which is supported by decisions from many jurisdictions. The writer of this work says: We think that the statements of Mr. Gray above in reference to separability are those that are applied "When interests or estates in property are limited to the members of a class of persons in such terms that the amount or extent of the interest given to each member is unaffected by the number of members or the existence or nonexistence of the other members, a gift or share which will necessarily vest, if at all, in one member of the class within the limits specified by the rule against perpetuities is not rendered objectionable to that rule by the remoteness of a gift to another member." 70 C.J.S., Perpetuities, § 16, p. 596. We have read a number of these cases and can readily see the distinction that can be made from a case of the kind from the factual situation under the will before us. Having given the matter quite a lot of study and considerable thought we are satisfied that the interests under the will now before us are not separable so as to avoid the rule here invoked. For the reasons above stated we have concluded that the Chancellor was correct in the decree rendered below. It is therefore affirmed with costs against the appellants and the sureties on their prosecution bond.