Title: In Re Grand Jury Investigation
Citation: 287 So. 2d 43
Docket Number: 43644, 43649
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1973

287 So. 2d 43 (1973)
In re GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION.
In re Frank COBO, Movant.
Nos. 43644 and 43649.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 5, 1973.
*44 Tobias Simon and Elizabeth J. duFresne, Stephens &amp; McMillen, Miami, for appellant-petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Barry Scott Richard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee-respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us, both on direct appeal from the Circuit Court, Volusia County,[1] and on petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, First District.[2] In response to the direct appeal, appellee has filed a motion to dismiss. As to the petition for writ of certiorari, we have ordered that action thereupon be deferred pending the disposition of the appeal. On September 11, 1973, this Court heard oral argument on the direct appeal and, on the basis of the record, briefs of counsel and said argument, we hereby dispense with further briefs, record and oral argument in Case No. 43,649. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
The movant primarily questions denial by the Circuit Court of Volusia County of his motion to strike and suppress any and all evidence obtained in a Dade County authorized *45 wiretap during 1972, where such evidence related to crimes other than those enumerated in F.S. § 934.07, F.S.A.
The First District Court of Appeal phrased movant's thrust on two points, as follows:
Point two was stated as follows:
The First District Court of Appeal decided against the movant[3] on the first point and therefore declined to rule on point two. Of course, a ruling on one point is inclusive of the other in this particular case.
Under consideration is F.S. Chapter 934, F.S.A., relating to Security of Communications.
F.S. § 934.06, F.S.A., provides as follows:
F.S. § 934.09(9)(a), F.S.A., provides as follows:
The First District Court recognized that in a wiretap case under F.S. § 934.06, F.S.A., supra, the disclosure of any information derived therefrom in violation of Chapter 934 should not be received by a grand jury, but, nevertheless, concluded that the movant had no standing as a witness (called to testify before the grand jury) to move to suppress such violative information because F.S. § 934.09(9)(a), F.S.A., supra, did not include the words "grand jury". This conclusion was arrived at by analogy to the United States Supreme Court case of Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S. Ct. 2357, 33 L. Ed. 2d 179, decided in 1972. Gelbard was decided upon the Supreme Court's "interpretation of intent" of the United States Congress' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
The District Court's conclusion, however, overlooks several factors. First, our *46 Legislature in 1969 could have simply through inadvertence failed to include the words "grand jury" in F.S. § 934.09(9)(a), F.S.A., supra. Second, the Legislature could have deemed it not necessary to use "grand jury" since it granted the right to move to suppress to any aggrieved person in a wiretap case in "any ... proceeding in or before any court. . .", which in turn then depends upon this State's interpretation of such language.
Clearly, the movant was an "aggrieved person" within the definition of F.S. Chapter 934, F.S.A., which a casual review will reveal. Next follows the question: was the movant (aggrieved person) involved in any proceeding in or before any court? Answer: yes.
As long ago as 1900, this Court, in defining the nature of a grand jury proceeding in Craft v. State, 42 Fla. 567, 29 So. 418, 419, stated:
Next, in State ex rel. Guyton v. Croom, 48 Fla. 176, 37 So. 303, 306 (1904), our Court held:
Then, in Rivers v. State, 121 Fla. 887, 164 So. 544, 545, our Court further stated:
For a fair and apt discussion of the function and nature of our grand jury system and its blood kinship to being a proceeding in or before a court, 15 Fla.Jur., Grand Jury, Secs. 2 and 3, states in pertinent part:
Thus, we conclude that the movant in this case was an aggrieved party involved in a proceeding before a court and has status to move to suppress wiretap information violative of F.S. Chapter 934, F.S.A.
It may be argued that such a conclusion may impede justice by forestalling unencumbered inquiry; however, of equal weight to all people is the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against the invasion of privacy. If this guarantee is enforced, it tends to destroy any excitement to commit an act designed to invade or destroy the right of privacy.
Notwithstanding our conclusion on this singular issue, another point remains *47 patently clear. If as per the District Court of Appeal's conclusion, F.S. § 934.06, F.S.A., supra, that no unauthorized wiretap information is to be received by a grand jury, but F.S. § 934.09(9)(a), F.S.A., supra, does not permit an aggrieved person to question it prior to indictment or information, then who supervises the plain intent and meaning of F.S. § 934.06, F.S.A., supra, to prohibit unauthorized wiretap information going to the grand jury? Obviously, someone must have that responsibility. Otherwise, a dichotomy exists and our system of justice would be operating in a vacuum, unleashed and subjecting persons, and families, to embarrassment, humiliation and possible loss of jobs and reputations arising through unwarranted indictments or informations. Clearly, this responsibility lies with the officers of our courts, i.e. the judges and prosecutors primarily (because of the ex parte nature of a grand jury proceeding). Such should be and is the result sub judice which is as clear as an electrical impulse flashed to the eye.
Now, therefore, we can turn to the primary focal point in issue. The movant wishes to suppress or preclude presentment to the grand jury of any wiretap communication involving him or which could or might tend to involve him with any offense other than those specifically authorized under the wiretap statute by F.S. § 934.07, F.S.A. Is he entitled to this sanction or protection? Answer: yes.
That part of the Florida Statutes dealing with "Security of Communications", Chapter 934, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and more particularly F.S. § 934.07, F.S.A., authorizing interception of wire or oral communications of persons, is a statutory exception to the constitutional (federal and state) right to privacy. Therefore, as an exception to a constitutional right it must be strictly construed and narrowly limited in application to the uses delineated by the Florida Legislature.
Apropos, it is noted that the State, in its brief filed with the First District Court of Appeal, conceded, "Petitioners accurately point out that the Florida wiretap statute is limited in its applicability to certain enumerated crimes."
Thus, in determining the use of the wiretaps in question we must first look to the scope and extent to which the statute, supra, authorizes them. In so doing, we find the statute limited to the "investigation of the offense" when "such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of", the following:
Obviously, the statute sets the stage for the permissive use of authorized wiretaps, which otherwise are impermissible in use, directly or indirectly. See Blau v. United States, 1950, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S. Ct. 223, 95 L. Ed. 170, which suppressed attempts to compel the petitioner in that case to testify before a grand jury, and in so doing held:
Accordingly, as it is clear that the "wiretap" statute abridges the right of privacy, it is also clear that it must be construed strictly and limited in application according to the dictates of its language. Thus, any "investigation of the offense" or any information derived from the wiretaps in question which may directly or indirectly "provide ... evidence of the commission of the offense ..." relative to any person or persons is limited directly and indirectly to only those offenses specifically set forth in the authorizing statute and enumerated above.
Our conclusion on this point finds absolute comfort in the equally "exclusive" rationale of State v. Sullivan, 37 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1948), treating the immunity statute, wherein our Court decided that immunity could only be granted for those specifically enumerated proceedings. Therein, we stated:
Therefore, the petition for writ of certiorari in Case No. 43,649 is granted and the decision of the First District Court of Appeal is quashed, and said cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. Inasmuch as the issues treated in the certiorari proceeding are the same as those raised in the direct appeal, Case No. 43,644, it is unnecessary to consider the same, and accordingly said appeal is therefore dismissed.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, ERVIN, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.
CARLTON, C.J., dissents and concurs with BOYD, J.
BOYD, Justice (dissenting):
I must dissent.
This cause is before us, both on direct appeal, and on petition for writ of certiorari. A motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed by appellee. The motion to dismiss the appeal should be granted, and the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied. The decision of the majority, to hear this cause on the merits, is, as will be shown below, contrary to: 1) the Florida Constitution; 2) the Florida Statutes; 3) Florida case law; and, 4) United States Supreme Court case law, and is in violation of the most basic principles of this Court's jurisdiction.
In the direct appeal, movant sought review of the following Order by the Honorable James T. Nelson, Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit:
*49 The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to that specifically enumerated in Article V, Section 3(b)(1), of the Constitution of the State of Florida:
It is clear that the foregoing order of Chief Judge Nelson simply does not fall within the confines of Article V, Section 3(b)(1)'s specifically enumerated classes of cases we may hear on direct appeal. For these reasons, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed. See Ogle v. Pepin;[1] P.C. Lissenden Co. v. Board of County Commissioners;[2] Armstrong v. City of Tampa;[3] State v. Moss;[4] State ex rel. Sentinel Star Company v. Lambeth;[5] Green v. Peters.[6]
By his petition for writ of certiorari, movant sought review of a per curiam opinion of the First District, entered upon a petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court, Volusia County.[7] The pertinent facts, as reported by the First District, were as follows:
In its preliminary opinion, the First District held as follows:
Expanding upon this holding in its formal opinion, the First District further explained:
The certiorari jurisdiction of this Court is limited to that specifically enumerated in Article V, Section 3(b)(3), of the Constitution of the State of Florida:
Movant alleges conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan,[12] and State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee.[13] In Benemovsky, we held that a statute immunizing from prosecution those who gave testimony in an investigation of charges for bribery, burglary, larceny, gaming, or any of the statutes against the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, could not, by judicial construction, be extended to cover prosecution for criminal Communism. Clearly, the most that can be said of Benemovsky vis-a-vis the instant case is that the two cases are somewhat analogous  but, just as clearly, they are not in constitutionally-requisite direct conflict. Additionally, it must be noted that Benemovsky arose upon a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a relator who had been imprisoned for contempt for refusal to answer questions propounded by the county solicitor. Movant's clear lack of standing, as properly noted in the foregoing portions of the First District's opinion, serves as another fatally distinguishing factor between the instant case and Benemovsky.[14]
As to the Kennedy case, movant alleges that the following language, appearing in Justice Roberts' specially concurring opinion, conflicts with the decision of the First District, sub judice:
*52 In Kennedy, of course, this Court simply held that the State Constitution did not preclude any Justice of this Court from issuing an order for the interception of wire and oral communications, pursuant to Sections 934.02 and 934.09, Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A. The above-quoted language from Justice Roberts' opinion was but an accurate restatement of a generally-accepted principle of the right of privacy. It is, once again, apparent that the holdings of this Court in Kennedy, and of the First District in the instant case, are not in constitutionally-requisite direct conflict.
It is clear that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, simply does not fall within the confines of Article V, Section 3(b)(3)'s specifically enumerated classes of cases we may hear on writ of certiorari. The petition for writ of certiorari, therefore, must be denied. See Kyle v. Kyle;[15] Nielsen v. City of Sarasota;[16] Ansin v. Thurston.[17]
Parenthetically, I must admit that the majority opinion in this cause may well become a landmark decision. The majority, in support of its position, has failed to cite a single case where the use of pre-indictment motions to suppress has been allowed  as the majority has allowed in this case. Perhaps, this is because there is absolutely no authority  federal or state  that has ever allowed such motions. The issue here, of course, is standing, and I believe that what is proper standing in this cause has been accurately described by the First District, and I would adopt the portion of the First District's opinion dealing with that question.[18] The First District, unlike the majority, chose not to ignore the case that must be considered the controlling precedent in this area, the United States Supreme Court's 1972 case of Gelbard v. United States.[19]Gelbard was the latest case to interpret a similar provision found within the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, adopted by the Congress of the United States, and the Act upon which the Florida Security of Communications Act is based. The First District noted:
In response to this overwhelming weight of authority, the majority, however, replies:
Briefly, to assume that the Legislature "could have simply through inadvertance failed to include the words `grand jury'" in the statute, flies in the face of every former pronouncement by this Court on the limits of judicial construction. Where the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute, and the courts need only give effect to the plain meaning of its terms. Alligood v. Florida Real Estate Commission.[21] This Court, in Van Pelt v. Hilliard,[22] held:
Simply stated, if it is not in the statute, it is just not there.
As to the majority's argument that "the Legislature could have deemed it not necessary to use `grand jury' since it granted the right to move to suppress to any aggrieved person in a wiretap case in `any ... proceeding in or before any court ...', which in turn then depends upon this State's interpretation of such language," it certainly seems strange that the majority would choose to bottom its conclusion upon three very old cases, none of which concerned pre-indictment motions to suppress,[24] instead of relying upon the one case in the country dealing with essentially the same statute, and with *56 exactly the same question, that of pre-indictment motions to suppress. The case, of course, was Gelbard v. United States, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1972, on all fours with the case sub judice, and reaching a result directly opposite to that reached by the majority today.[25]
If there was ever any question that the position of the majority in the instant case was incorrect, that question has certainly been erased by the recent case of the Supreme Court of the United States, United States v. Calandra,[26] which held that a witness summoned to appear and testify before a Grand Jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure  because the exclusionary rule is not applicable to Grand Jury proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.
CARLTON C.J., concurs.
[1]  Case No. 43,644.
[2]  Case No. 43,649.
[3]  In re: Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Evidence Obtained by Court Authorized Wiretaps, 276 So. 2d 234 (Fla.App.1st 1973), issued April 6, 1973, wherein the First District noted: "A formal opinion setting forth in detail the issues, findings, conclusions, and the authorities relied upon by the court will be filed at an early date." Said formal opinion was duly issued on May 1, 1973, and is reported at 276 So. 2d 235.
[1]  273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973).
[2]  116 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1959).
[3]  106 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1958).
[4]  206 So. 2d 692 (Fla.App.2d 1968).
[5]  192 So. 2d 518 (Fla.App. 4th 1966).
[6]  140 So. 2d 601 (Fla.App.2d 1962).
[7]  In re: Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Evidence Obtained By Court Authorized Wiretaps, 276 So. 2d 234 (Fla.App. 1st 1973).
[8]  276 So. 2d  at 235-236.
[9]  Id. at 236.
[10]  Id. at 235. (Emphasis supplied.)
[11]  Id. at 236-237. (Emphasis supplied.)
[12]  37 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1948).
[13]  274 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973).
[14]  Movant's clear lack of standing also serves as the fatally distinguishing factor between the instant case and those with which the majority finds "conflict": Craft v. State, 42 Fla. 567, 29 So. 418 (1900); State ex rel. Guyton v. Croom, 48 Fla. 176, 37 So. 303 (1904); and, Rivers v. State, 121 Fla. 887, 164 So. 544 (1935). In Craft and Rivers, supra, indictments had already been handed down against the defendants and so there was no question of standing. There was no question of standing at all in Guyton, supra, because Guyton wasn't even a criminal case.
[15]  139 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1962).
[16]  117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
[17]  101 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1958).
[18]  See notes 10 and 11, supra.
[19]  408 U.S. 41, 92 S. Ct. 2357, 33 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1972).
[20]  276 So. 2d  at 237-239 (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) See also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S. Ct. 1416, 16 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1955); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910).
[21]  156 So. 2d 705 (Fla.App.2nd 1963). See also State ex rel. Green v. City of Pensacola, 126 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1961); State ex rel. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. State Racing Commission, 112 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1959); Ervin v. Capital Weekly Post, Inc., 97 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1957); Gough v. State ex rel. Sauls, 55 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1951); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950); Smith v. Ryan, 39 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1949); Miami Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commission, 155 Fla. 366, 20 So. 2d 356, cert. denied 325 U.S. 867, 65 S. Ct. 1405, 89 L. Ed. 1987 (1945); Clark v. Kreidt, 145 Fla. 1, 199 So. 333 (1940); State ex rel. Southern Roller Derbies v. Woods, 145 Fla. 296, 199 So. 262 (1940); Richardson v. City of Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sutherland, 125 Fla. 282, 169 So. 679 (1936); Taylor v. State, 117 Fla. 706, 158 So. 437 (1934); A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1931); Osborne v. Simpson, 94 Fla. 793, 114 So. 543 (1927); State v. Beardsley, 84 Fla. 109, 94 So. 660 (1922); State v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61 (1920); Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533 (1917); Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18 (1908); Adams v. Dickinson, 264 So. 2d 17 (Fla.App.1st 1972); Owen v. Cheney, 238 So. 2d 650 (Fla.App.2nd 1970); City of Sarasota v. Burch, 192 So. 2d 9 (Fla.App.2nd 1966), cert. quashed 200 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1967); Biddle v. State Beverage Dept., 187 So. 2d 65 (Fla.App.4th 1966); Platt v. Lanier, 127 So. 2d 912 (Fla.App.2nd 1961).
[22]  75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).
[23]  78 So.  at 694-695.
[24]  See note 14, supra.
[25]  See note 20, supra.
[26]  ___ U.S. ___, 94 S. Ct. 613, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (Jan. 8, 1974).