Title: Stevenson v. State and Manley v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 214, 2000, 31, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DAVID STEVENSON,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§ No. 31, 2000
Appellant,
§
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v.
§ of the State of Delaware in and
§ for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ ID No. 95-1100-6992
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
MICHAEL R. MANLEY,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§ No. 214, 2000
Appellant,
§ 
§  
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ for New Castle County
§ ID No. 95-1100-7022
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: April 10, 2001
Decided:
May 30, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and
STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court En Banc.
Appeal from Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Leo John Ramunno, Esquire Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant
David Stevenson.
2
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire (argued) and Joseph A. Gabay, Esquire,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Michael R. Manley.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Chief of Appeals Division, Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
WALSH, Justice:
3
These capital murder appeals from the denial of postconviction relief
in the Superior Court have been consolidated for argument and disposition.
As originally filed, each appeal sought review of the Superior Court’s
rejection of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Additionally, in
Stevenson v. State, the appellant asserted that the Superior Court trial judge
should have recused himself from consideration of the postconviction relief
hearing because of alleged bias or appearance of impropriety stemming from
the trial judge’s participation in a suppression hearing involving the victim.
During oral argument in the Stevenson appeal, two questions were
raised by the Court, sua sponte, directed to the recusal claim: (a) what is the
general procedure by which Superior Court judges are assigned to capital
cases and (b) what procedure was used to assign the trial judge in the
Stevenson/Manley joint trials.  This Court remanded the Stevenson appeal to
the Superior Court for submission of reports from both the President Judge
and the trial judge to the questions above noted.  Following the submission of
these reports, the Court directed further briefing and argument, in both
Manley and Stevenson, on the question of whether the procedure that led to
4
the assignment of the trial judge in these cases was improper or created the
appearance of impropriety.
On the expanded record now before us, we conclude that the trial
judge’s contact with the victim in this case, coupled with the judge’s request
for assignment of the murder cases — a request apparently made before
indictment and not disclosed on the record of the proceedings in the Superior
Court —  created an unacceptable appearance of impropriety.  In view of the
trial judge’s personal and independent role in the imposition of the death
penalty under Delaware law, including the rendering of a victim impact
assessment, the trial judge’s individual actions undermined the appearance of
fairness which is a prerequisite for the imposition of capital punishment.
Accordingly, we are obligated to invalidate the imposition of capital
punishment in both cases and remand for a new penalty hearing.
Additionally, we conclude that the appearance of impropriety precluded
participation by the trial judge in the postconviction proceedings challenging
the guilt phase of the joint trials.  Accordingly, upon remand the appellants
are entitled to re-present their postconviction claims to a different judge of the
Superior Court.
5
I
The events leading to the present appeal are set forth in separate
decisions of this Court upholding the convictions of both appellants on direct
appeal.  See Stevenson v. State, Del. Supr., 709 A.2d 619 (1998) and Manley
v. State, Del. Supr., 709 A.2d 643 (1998).  The appellants, David Stevenson
and Michael R. Manley, were indicted on charges of Murder in the First
Degree for the killing of Kristopher Heath on November 13, 1995.  At a joint
trial, the State presented evidence sufficient to satisfy a jury that Stevenson
and Manley plotted the death of Heath to prevent Heath from testifying
against Stevenson who was to be tried in the Superior Court on theft charges.
The charges against Stevenson arose from his employment at Macy’s
where Heath worked as a security officer.  The killing took place in the early
morning on the date Stevenson’s trial was to begin.  Manley accompanied
Stevenson to Heath’s residence and was captured with Stevenson after fleeing
the scene of the killing.  At least one witness testified that a person answering
Manley’s description was observed running from the scene of the shooting.
Neither defendant testified at trial although each presented evidence in support
of an alibi defense.
6
After deliberation, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to both Manley
and Stevenson on all counts in the indictment: Murder in the First Degree,
Conspiracy in the First Degree, Aggravated Act of Intimidation, Conspiracy
in the Second Degree, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission
of a  Felony.  After a penalty hearing, the jury unanimously  concluded, as
to each defendant, that four statutory aggravating circumstances existed.  As
to Stevenson, the jury determined that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances by a vote of eight to four, and, as to
Manley, by a vote of seven to five.  In an extensive written opinion, the trial
judge concluded that both defendants were deserving of the death penalty.
In his direct appeal to this Court, Stevenson argued, inter alia, that the
trial judge should have recused himself from presiding over Stevenson’s
capital murder trial because he had conducted a suppression hearing in the
theft case against Stevenson during which the trial judge heard the testimony
of the murder victim, Heath.  In rejecting that claim, this Court, applying a
plain error standard of review, ruled that because the alleged disqualifying
factor did not stem from an extra-judicial source, i.e., the trial judge’s
familiarity with Heath was entirely attributable to the trial judge’s
7
participation in a related criminal case, recusal was not required under the
standards announced by this Court in Los v. Los,  Del. Supr., 595 A.2d 381,
384 (1991) and later applied in Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 684 A.2d 745,
753 (1996).
In his postconviction petition in the Superior Court, filed pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, Stevenson again raised the question of the
trial judge’s role in the suppression hearing in seeking recusal of the trial
judge from participation in the postconviction claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel.  One of the grounds of ineffective assistance advanced by
Stevenson was that his trial counsel “failed to file a motion for recusal of the
trial court as requested by the Defendant.”  Specifically, Stevenson faulted his
trial counsel for failing to file a recusal motion based on the appearance of
partiality.  To establish a factual basis for his recusal claim, Stevenson
argued:
One of the ways to establish an appearance of []partiality is to
attempt to determine if the trial court requested the trial or if it
was assigned the case randomly.  That would require an
evidentiary hearing to determine the method used to assign the
judge and whether the case was assigned randomly or whether
there was a request or an assigned [sic] based on some other fact
in the case.  (Stevenson Mot. for Recusal at 3).
8
The trial judge denied Stevenson’s motion to recuse, ruling that under
both the subjective and objective tests for determining judicial
disqualifications, there was no basis for an evidentiary hearing.  Inexplicably,
the court noted that Stevenson’s petition was “silent as to the content of the
desired testimony.”  State v. Stevenson, Del. Super., No. 9511006992, at 12,
1999 WL 167779 (Jan. 8, 1999) (Mem. Op.).  In a separate decision, the trial
judge denied Stevenson’s petition for postconviction relief without granting
an evidentiary hearing.  State v. Stevenson, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. IN95-11-
1047-R1, 1999 WL 1568333 (Dec. 21, 1999).  The court characterized
Stevenson’s arguments as “at best conclusory, if not fanciful or frivolous.”
Id. at 39.  This appeal followed.
II
A.
As a result of this Court’s order of remand to the Superior Court, two
reports were filed.  The first report, dated December 5, 2000, from the
President Judge of the Superior Court, outlined the general standards that
govern the assignment of Superior Court judges to capital cases and
9
commented specifically on the assignment of the Stevenson/Manley cases to
the trial judge.  The report notes that all first degree murder cases, including
capital cases, are individually assigned by the President Judge, “as a matter
of judicial administrative discretion” and that “[i]n the event a party objects
to the assignment of a judge in a particular case a motion to recuse may be
filed.”  The report outlines the factors that guide the assignment to a
particular judge, which include the “trial judge’s training, experience, judicial
temperament, trial time availability, caseload, special trial considerations and
a judge’s willingness to devote the extraordinary time and attention demanded
by these cases.”  Assignments are made “promptly after an indictment is
returned by the Grand Jury.”
With respect to the specific assignment of the Stevenson/Manley cases,
the President Judge’s report recited:
4.
Assignment of Stevenson and Manley cases.
Stevenson and Manley were indicted by the Grand Jury on
December 18, 1995.  At the time of the assignment of these
cases, [the trial judge] was assigned to Criminal Division II, had
no other capital case pending trial, and requested assignments of
these cases which were related to the theft proceeding over
which he had presided previously.  These circumstances and [the
trial judge’s] training, experience, judicial temperament, trial
time availability, caseload, speedy trial considerations, and his
willingness to devote the extraordinary time and attention
10
demanded by these cases were the circumstances surrounding the
assignment of them to him.
The trial judge, in his report, noted his prior involvement in the
suppression hearing in which the victim, Heath, appeared as a witness and
outlined the circumstances of the assignment to the capital cases:
The capital murder trial.  Following the murder of Mr.
Heath, I discussed the situation with President Judge Ridgely,
informing him of my familiarity with the case due to having
presided over the suppression hearing.  I requested the
assignment of the case.  While I am cloudy on this, my law clerk
. . .  specifically recalls that President Judge Ridgely told me to
send him a memorandum as a reminder for him pertaining to my
request for assignment.
On December 27, 1995, per his request, and following the
indictment of Manley and Stevenson, I sent a memo to President
Judge Ridgely asking that the case be assigned to me.  On
January 2, 1996, President Judge Ridgely, by memorandum,
assigned the case to me for all purposes until final disposition.
At the time of my request, I had no pending capital murder
trials.  President Judge Ridgely strives to divide murder cases
equally among the judges and, quite naturally, considers
volunteers in assigning high profile cases.  I volunteered for two
reasons.  First, I had no capital cases assigned to me at the time,
and second, I was familiar with the facts surrounding the Macy’s
theft case.  I have always been impressed with the willingness of
the Superior Court judges to volunteer for difficult assignments
and to share in the onerous work load.  I have tried to play my
part.
11
Although not requested to respond to any claim of impropriety, the trial
judge added the following conclusion to his report:
Conclusion.  My familiarity with the theft case did not
induce me to prejudge Stevenson and Manley on the murder
charges.  In fact, taking the murder case seemed to be an
efficient and orderly step in the administration of justice.  I had
no extra-judicial knowledge of the events or parties involved in
the case.  I had no extra-judicial interest in the outcome.  This
case fell within the scope of my responsibilities as a Superior
Court judge, and I approached it with the same objectivity that
I have brought to all my cases during the tenure on the Court. 
While it is necessary for a judge to answer for his or her
actions when there is an appearance of impropriety, I find no
case law or other precedent to suggest that there was any
appearance of impropriety in the manner in which the
Stevenson/Manley murder case was handled throughout the
judicial process.  On Stevenson’s postconviction relief motion,
I readily dispensed with his contention regarding judicial
impropriety because I found it to be totally lacking in merit, if
not frivolous.  I reiterate that belief now.
Attached to the trial judge’s report are two memoranda.  The first,
dated December 27, 1995, from the trial judge to President Judge Ridgely
referencing the Stevenson/Manley cases,  is as follows:
The defendants in the above capital murder case have now
been indicted.  (See attached copy of indictment.)  As we
1This memorandum does not show copies to any other individuals and apparently
was not made part of the file in the Superior Court nor is it reflected on the Superior Court
docket.
12
discussed, I request that this case be specially assigned to me for
pretrial and trial purposes.  Thank you.1
President Judge Ridgely sent a memorandum dated January 2, 1996 to the
trial judge, which recited in pertinent part: “These capital first degree murder
cases are specially assigned to you for all purposes until final disposition.”
Copies of the President Judge’s assignment memorandum were sent to the
prosecutor and defense counsel for Stevenson and Manley, as well as the New
Castle County Prothonotary.  Neither the trial judge nor President Judge
Ridgely forwarded the trial judge’s December 27, 1995 memorandum to
counsel or the Prothonotary.
B.
Following receipt of the two Superior Court reports, this Court
requested additional briefing from both Stevenson and Manley, with a
response from the State, on the question of whether the circumstances
underlying the assignment of the trial judge demonstrated prejudice to the
defendants.
13
Both Manley and Stevenson now argue that the trial judge’s actions in
requesting the assignment of the murder cases after his participation in the
previous suppression hearing at which the victim testified, coupled with the
nondisclosure of that request, created an appearance of impropriety which, at
a minimum, invalidate the trial judge’s personal participation in the capital
murder process under Delaware law.  The State responds that the willingness
of the trial judge to accept the case is a legitimate consideration in the
assignment process and the trial judge’s consent to that assignment would be
irrelevant to a reasonable person.  Moreover, the State argues, even if recusal
was initially appropriate, the appellants have failed to demonstrate specific
prejudice resulting from the assignment.
The standards that guide Delaware judges in dealing with the sensitive
question of disqualification are generally based on the Delaware Judges Code
of Judicial Conduct (the “Code”), which is modeled after the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct adopted in 1990.  While Canon
2 of the Code admonishes generally that a judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities, Canon 3C places upon the
judge the direct responsibility to avoid participation in proceedings through
14
the exercise of disqualification whenever “the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”  The Canon proceeds to list certain situations that
may require the judge to exercise disqualification.  See Canon 3C(a)-(e).
The specific instances prompting disqualification that are set forth in the
Code do not exhaust all situations in which a judge’s impartiality may be
reasonably questioned.  See Los v. Los, Del. Supr., 595 A.2d 381, 384
(1991).  When a situation arises that is not covered by one of the designated
instances specified in Canon 3C, a judge must engage in a two-part analysis
to determine whether disqualification is appropriate.  See id. at 384-85; see
also Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 684 A.2d 745, 752-53 (1996).  This
analysis includes a subjective and objective component.   See id.  First, the
judge must be satisfied, “as a matter of subjective belief,” that he or she can
proceed to hear the matter free of bias or prejudice.  Id.  Second, even if the
judge believes that he or she is free of bias or prejudice, the judge must
objectively examine whether the circumstances require recusal because “there
is an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge’s
impartiality.”  Id. at 385.  On appeal from a judge’s recusal decision, the
2To clarify any potential inconsistency arising from our decision in Los, we note
that this Court will review a trial judge’s decision under the subjective prong of the Los test
for an abuse of discretion.  A claim of appearance of impropriety, however, implicates a
view of how others perceive the conduct of the trial judge, presenting this Court with a
question of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal.   
15
appellate court must be satisfied that the trial judge engaged in the subjective
test but the appellate court “will review the merits of the objective test.”2  Id.
When the issue of the trial judge’s participation was before this Court
in Stevenson’s direct appeal, it was presented under a plain error standard
because there had been no request during trial that the trial judge recuse
himself.  This Court rejected that disqualification claim because it appeared
that the trial judge’s familiarity with Heath was entirely attributable to Heath’s
appearance as a witness during the suppression hearing in the Macy’s theft
case and did not stem from an extra-judicial source.  Stevenson, 709 A.2d at
135.  The present challenge to the participation of the trial judge is posed on
a different and expanded record and implicates the appearance of  impropriety
— the objective test under Los.  Thus, we do not view this claim as foreclosed
by our previous ruling in the direct appeal.
The appearance of impropriety is conceptually distinct from the
subjective approach of a judge facing a possible disqualification challenge and
does not depend on the judge’s belief that he or she is acting properly.  See
16
Liteky v. United States, 570 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994) (“The judge does not
have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.”)
(emphasis in original). Indeed, in certain circumstances, the appearance of
impropriety may arise where the judge is acting  in utmost good faith.  The
Supreme Court of the United States has cast the rationale for the appearance
of partiality in due process terms:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.  Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in
the trial of cases.  But our system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness.  To this end no
man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.  That interest
cannot be defined with precision.  Circumstances and
relationships must be considered.  This Court has said, however,
that [e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter
due process of law.  Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar
trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
contending parties.  But to perform its high function in the best
way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.
In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1995).  (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
More recently, the Supreme Court examined the appearance of
partiality standard in construing the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455, the
17
statutory standard for the disqualification of federal judges.  These norms,
adopted by Congress in 1974 to conform with the earlier version of Canon
3C, require disqualification of a judge “in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  In Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988), the Court noted that  § 455(a)
may be violated even if the judge is ignorant of the basis for disqualification,
if those facts create an appearance of impropriety. 
 When a judge knows, or as soon as a judge discovers, facts that would
lead a reasonable person to question his or her impartiality in a particular
matter, it is essential that he or she promptly disclose that information.
Following the prompt disclosure of such information, a judge should engage
in the two-part inquiry under Los.  In addition, prompt disclosure of such
information permits the timely filing of a motion for recusal, which would
require the trial judge to engage in the objective analysis of the appearance of
impropriety mandated by Los.   In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court found it
“remarkable – and quite inexcusable” that the trial judge failed to recuse
himself after learning of the basis for disqualification.  Moreover, the Court
noted that the judge’s failure to disclose this information deprived the affected
18
party of the timely opportunity to file a recusal motion before judgment.
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 866.  
The record before us demonstrates that the trial judge: (a) became
aware of the killing of Heath by Stevenson and Manley before the defendants
were indicted; (b) discussed an assignment of the murder trial to himself with
the President Judge prior to the indictment; and, (c) did not place on the trial
record the substance of his discussion with the President Judge or file the
December 27, 1995 memorandum with the Prothonotary.  It also appears that
the President Judge’s assignment memorandum of January 2, 1996 does not
indicate that it was in response to the trial judge’s written request for
assignment nor does it mention the earlier, pre-indictment discussion with the
trial judge.  Although this memorandum was filed with the Prothonotary and
copies were sent to trial counsel, it is incomplete, not reflective of prior
communications between the trial judge and the President Judge, and not
sufficient to place trial counsel on notice of the request for assignment.
In his report to this Court, the President Judge indicates that the trial
judge was assigned to these cases because of his “training, experience,
judicial temperament, trial time availability, caseload, speedy trial
3The record before us does not support a finding of actual impropriety and we need
not decide whether there was actual bias or bad faith in the assignment request or the
assignment process.  Our holding rests on the appearance of impropriety, which tends to
undermine public trust and confidence in the judicial process.  Where the appearance of
impropriety is present, any inquiry into actual bias is irrelevant.
19
considerations, and his willingness to devote the extraordinary time and
attention demanded by these cases.”  While these are pertinent considerations
in the case assignment process, they do not supersede the demands of the
appearance of impropriety mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct.  See
Canon 3C.  The willingness of a judge to accept an assignment carries no
implication of impropriety, but a trial judge’s initiation of the request for
assignment may raise questions concerning motivation.  Under the unusual
circumstances now revealed, we are forced to conclude that the trial judge
should not have requested the murder case assignment prior to indictment in
view of his prior contact with the victim in the suppression hearing.  The trial
judge’s conduct raises a serious question concerning whether his continued
participation created the appearance of partiality, particularly if the disclosure
of the trial judge’s December 27, 1995 memorandum likely would have
prompted a recusal motion.3  
Furthermore, the importance of the timely disclosure of any potential
basis for disqualification is illustrated by this case.  Stevenson and Manley did
4  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the trial judge did not disclose this
information in connection with his ruling on Stevenson’s postconviction motion for recusal.
20
not file recusal motions at trial because neither party knew of the
circumstances surrounding the trial judge’s assignment to this case.
Presumably, the trial judge did not disclose this information because he did
not believe that it created the appearance of impropriety.4  Whenever there are
facts or circumstances, however, that have the potential to create the
appearance of impropriety or partiality, a judge must disclose those facts
promptly to permit the party to file a recusal motion.  Had the trial judge’s
memorandum to President Judge Ridgely been disclosed to the parties prior
to trial, a timely recusal motion could have been filed by defense counsel.
Indeed, the failure to file such a motion later became one of the claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel asserted against Stevenson’s trial attorney in
the postconviction proceedings.  
Moreover, had there been appropriate and timely disclosure of the
request for assignment, a recusal motion based on the appearance of
impropriety would have required the trial judge to engage in the objective test
under Los and, more importantly, would have established a different basis for
21
review of the recusal claim in Stevenson’s direct appeal.  That information did
not surface, however, until after the defendants’ convictions and death
sentences had been affirmed on direct appeal.  
III
The State argues that even if recusal was the appropriate outcome,
neither defendant is entitled to a new trial or penalty hearing unless they can
articulate specific prejudice attributable to the participation of the trial judge.
But inquiry into the effect of participation by a judge under the appearance of
partiality prong is not limited to a search for discrete rulings demonstrating
prejudice.  The test is whether, in the words of the Canon 3C, the judge’s
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”  In rejecting a similar
contention by the government concerning post-trial comments made by a
sentencing judge, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted: “But in
determining whether a judge had the duty to disqualify him or herself, our
focus must be on the reaction of the reasonable observer.  If there is an
appearance of partiality, that ends the matter.”  United States v. Antar, 3d
Cir., 53 F.3d 568, 576 (1995).  As the Court noted in Liljeberg, in
22
considering whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of the
appearance of partiality standard “it is appropriate to consider the risk of
injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief
will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the judicial process.”  486 U.S. at 864. 
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court uses the term “risk” in
evaluating the effects of appearance of impropriety violations.  It is, of
course, difficult to quantify the extent to which the appearance factor results
in injustice in a particular case where the judge appears to have acted in an
even-handed fashion and, where, as here, the trial results have been subject
to a searching review on appeal.  But we are not required to find that the trial
judge was influenced by bias, only that his conduct created the unacceptable
risk that a reasonable observer would so conclude.
Any inquiry into the question of whether a judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned is case specific.  Where the claim of appearance of
impropriety is based on the risk that the judge has evidenced a personal
interest in the outcome of the case, the extent of the judge’s personal
involvement in the outcome of the proceedings is an important factor.  The
23
risk that injustice might result from a judge’s participation in a proceeding
despite the appearance of partiality is particularly acute in a capital murder
prosecution where the ultimate fixing of the sentence is in the hands of the
trial judge. 
Under Delaware’s capital punishment procedures, the trial judge
occupies a unique role in the sentencing calculus.  While the jury alone
determines guilt, the imposition of the sentence is a shared responsibility with
the judge exercising ultimate responsibility.  See 11 Del. C. § 4209(c) & (d).
While the jury is required to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
at least one aggravating circumstance and determine by a preponderance of
the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, its “affirmative and negative votes on each question” are
merely  recommendations.  Id. § 4209(c)(3).  The sentencing judge must
engage in the same exercise but is not bound by the jury’s recommendation.
See id. § 4209(d).
As to Manley, the jury concluded, by a vote of seven to five, that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  The jury
reached the same result as to Stevenson by a vote of eight to four.  In a
24
lengthy written decision, the trial judge made his findings and determined that
“the calculated and cowardly execution of a State’s witness constitutes a case
calling for [the death penalty]” State v. Manley, Del. Super., No. 951107022,
at 43, 1997 WL 27094 (Jan. 10, 1997) (Findings After Penalty Hearing).  He
referred to the killing of Heath as “nothing less than a witness elimination
murder.” Id.
The trial judge elaborated at length on the circumstances that led to
Heath’s murder.  The judge referred to Heath as “a young man, equally
talented and possessing the same ambitions for life which [the defendants]
held” but commented that Heath “was expendable” because he was the
security officer who had participated in the investigation that led to
Stevenson’s arrest.  Id. at 41.  Later, the trial judge stated: 
This Court cannot recall a more chilling and premeditated,
execution-style murder than was conclusively proven in this case.
A security officer was preparing to go to court to seek redress on
behalf of his employer.  That this route was short-circuited by
his elimination constitutes an attack upon the very foundation of
our judicial branch of government.  
Utter contempt and disdain for the judicial process were
evidenced by Manley’s and Stevenson’s premeditated and
outrageously cold blooded assassination of a wholly innocent
witness to a crime.
25
Id. at 42.
It is obvious that the trial judge harbored strong feelings about the
murder of Heath whom he had observed as a witness in the suppression
hearing.  Of more concern, however, is that the trial judge apparently viewed
the murder of Heath as an attack on the judicial process — the very process
in which the trial judge had personally participated as the judge handling the
suppression hearing.  While the trial judge’s repulsion at the killing of an
innocent witness is understandable, his sentencing findings carry a tone of
personal affront.  In the context of a capital punishment case, this is
troubling, particularly when viewed in light of the trial judge’s personal
request for assignment of the Manley-Stevenson murder cases even before the
defendants were indicted.
As this Court recently commented in Barrow v. State, Del. Supr., 749
A.2d 1230, 1249 (2000), “The imposition of the death penalty requires
scrupulous adherence to the constitutional standards that authorize its use.”
Our review of capital punishment cases has been marked by a close scrutiny
to insure that the process is not only fair but appears fair.  This heightened
26
scrutiny springs from the recognition that capital punishment is “unique in its
severity and irrevocability.”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
In the capital punishment calculus under Delaware law, the judge, more
than the jury, acts on the conscience of the community.  In this case the
exercise of the decision to impose capital punishment is subject to serious
question given the trial judge’s intervention in the assignment process.  
The Court is aware that there is extended debate at the national and
local level concerning whether the death penalty is fairly imposed and that
there are calls for a moratorium on its use.  While the adoption of the death
penalty as an appropriate form of punishment is a legislative prerogative, the
judiciary has a special obligation to ensure that the standards governing its
application are applied fairly and dispassionately and, just as important,
appear to be so.  Indeed, this Court is required by statute to automatically
review the imposition of death sentences to ensure they are not arbitrarily
imposed or that due process was not lacking, even where the defendant
sentenced to death has not appealed.  See 11 Del. C. § 4209(g).
The trial judge’s participation in the sentencing process is not subject
to a harmless error analysis, since, given the closeness of the jury vote, we
5Reports of sentencing judges in capital murder cases filed in this Court reflect
instances where judges have imposed life imprisonment following jury recommendations
of the death penalty with votes approximating those returned in these cases.  See State v.
Cabrera, Del. Supr., 747 A.2d 543 (2000) (Per Curiam)(vote of 7 to 5);  State v. Govan,
Del. Supr., No. 363, 1993, Walsh, J. (Jan. 30, 1995) (ORDER) (vote of 7 to 5, 6 to 6,
8 to 4 and 8 to 4 on separate counts of first degree murder); State v. Rodriguez, Del.
Supr., No. 466, 1993, Walsh, J. (Nov. 29, 1994) (ORDER) (vote of 9 to 3); State v.
Baker, Del. Supr., No. 306, 1992, Holland, J. (Dec. 30, 1993) (ORDER) (vote of 9 to 3);
State v. Dickerson, Del. Supr., No. 353, 1992, Veasey, C.J. (Dec. 21, 1993) (ORDER)
(vote of 9 to 3); State v. Jones, Del. Supr., No. 293, 2000 (Pending) (vote of 7 to 5). 
6“The Due Process Clause ‘may sometimes bar trial judges who have no actual bias
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending
parties.  But to perform its high function in the best way, ‘justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.’”   Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
27
cannot say with confidence that another Superior Court judge would impose
the death penalty after considering the jury’s recommendation.5  In short, the
appearance of partiality evident in this case creates too great a risk that a
constitutional violation has occurred in the imposition of the death penalty.6
Although the impetus for examining the assignment process of the trial
judge was Stevenson’s postconviction claim that the trial judge should have
recused himself from ruling upon Stevenson’s postconviction relief petition
under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61, any remedy to correct the problem, must
extend to Manley, as well.  The defendants were indicted, tried and sentenced
jointly and any taint of partiality extends to both.  Therefore, we conclude that
granting a new penalty hearing as to each defendant is necessary to ensure that
28
the defendants were not deprived of due process in the sentencing phase and
to advance public confidence in the administration of justice. 
We recognize that the remedy directed in this matter, a new penalty
hearing, is not the result of evidentiary rulings or errors that occurred during
the penalty hearing and that may have affected the jury’s recommendation.
Compare Barrow, 749 A.2d at 1249.  The capital sentencing procedure
mandated by 11 Del. C. § 4209 is a unitary process, however, involving a
“hearing conducted by the trial judge before a jury,” § 4209(b)(2), with the
judge imposing sentence “after considering the recommendation of the jury,”
§ 4209(d).  Thus, to correct any appearance of impropriety that occurred
through the personal participation of the trial judge in the sentencing process,
we have no alternative but to order a new penalty hearing to be conducted by
a different judge who, in turn, will be required to consider, anew, the
recommendation of a jury.
Our direction for a new penalty hearing does not necessarily end the
matter because there remain the Rule 61 postconviction relief petitions of both
Stevenson and Manley, the rejection of which by the trial judge prompted this
7  As was previously noted, it was Stevenson’s petition for postconviction relief that
sought recusal of the trial judge from participation in the Rule 61 proceedings. 
29
appeal.7  Each of those petitions contains claims directed to the guilt phase of
the trial, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.   Moreover, on
both appeals to this Court, the defendants complain of the trial judge’s refusal
to grant them an evidentiary hearing on their postconviction claims.  Our
present ruling is limited to the recusal issue and its effect on the penalty
hearing and we do not consider the merits of any claims directed to the guilt
phase.  Because we have concluded that the trial judge’s role in the sentencing
process created the appearance of impropriety, the judge’s participation
beyond that point cannot be condoned.  The merits of claims directed to the
guilt phase must be considered by a new judge, ab initio, with leave granted
to the defendants to amend their petition, if necessary in the light of the
present ruling.  
While a new penalty hearing is required in any event, the successor
judge should first consider the reasserted postconviction petitions in order to
determine whether relief involving the guilt phase is also required.  We
express no opinion on that matter and we emphasize that our ruling that the
trial judge should not have participated in the sentencing process does not
30
suggest that the trial judge’s participation in the guilt phase resulted in any
specific prejudice to the defendants.  The appellants have not identified any
instance of such prejudice and our decision in the direct appeal found no error
with respect to the claims there asserted.
The decision of the Superior Court denying postconviction relief is
REVERSED and these appeals are REMANDED to the Superior Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.