Title: Gaines v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 38, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTHONY L. GAINES, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 38, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0002014423 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 3, 2002 
  Decided: July 9, 2002 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 9th day of July 2002, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Anthony L. Gaines, appeals his 
sentence for violation of probation (VOP).  Gaines previously had pled 
guilty and been sentenced in January 2001 for a second degree burglary 
conviction.  The Superior Court had sentenced him to five years at Level V 
incarceration, suspended after serving six months for four and a half years at 
decreasing levels of supervision.  In December 2001, the Superior Court 
found Gaines in violation of probation due to illegal drug use and sentenced 
 
2
him to four years and three months at Level V incarceration, suspended after 
serving two years years for one year and nine months at decreasing levels of 
supervision.   This appeal followed.  
(2) 
Gaines's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Gaines's counsel asserts that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Gaines's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Gaines with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Gaines also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Gaines responded with 
several points for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to 
Gaines’s points, as well as the position taken by Gaines's counsel, and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
 
 
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determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
In his letter to counsel, Gaines responded with several points 
for the Court’s consideration.  First, Gaines contends that the Department of 
Correction failed to properly credit him with twelve days he previously 
served at Gander Hill.  According to Gaines, if this time had been properly 
credited to him, he would have completed the Level IV portion of his 
sentence and, therefore, could not have been found in violation of that 
portion of his sentence.  Second, Gaines challenges the curfew violations 
alleged in the probation officer’s violation report.  Third, Gaines appears to 
contend that the Superior Court’s VOP sentence was excessive.  In support 
of this contention, Gaines seems to contend that his drug use while on 
probation was due to the Department of Correction’s failure to provide him 
with needed drug treatment.  We find no merit to any of these contentions. 
 
(5) 
There is no factual basis in this record for Gaines’s assertion 
that he was not credited with all time served at Level V.  Moreover, even 
assuming Gaines had not been properly credited with the twelve disputed 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
 
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days, that fact would not have changed the outcome of the VOP 
proceedings.  It is undisputed that the suspended portion of Gaines’s January 
2001 sentence consisted of four and a half years at decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Whether Gaines was serving the suspended portion of his 
sentence at Level IV or Level III at the time of his illegal drug use is 
irrelevant for purposes of the VOP proceeding.  With or without the disputed 
twelve days of credit time, Gaines was properly under the Department of 
Correction’s supervision at the time he used illegal drugs and, thus, was 
properly subject to having his previously suspended sentence reimposed.  
 
(6) 
Moreover, Gaines’s complaints about curfew violations are 
moot in light of Gaines’s admitted illegal drug use.  Gaines’s positive 
urinalysis for cocaine use and his admission to using illegal drugs was a 
sufficient factual basis for the Superior Court to conclude that Gaines had 
violated the terms of his probation. 
 
(7) 
Finally, we find no error in the Superior Court’s sentence.  
When a defendant is found guilty of violating his or her probation, the trial 
judge is authorized to reimpose any previously suspended prison term, i.e., 
Level V incarceration.2  Gaines’s original sentence was five years at Level V 
                                                 
2 Gamble v. State, 728 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Del. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
4334(c). 
 
 
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incarceration suspended after serving six months for four and a half years at 
decreasing levels of supervision.  Following the VOP hearing, the Superior 
Court sentenced Gaines to four years and three months at Level V 
incarceration suspended after serving two years for decreasing levels of 
supervision. The Superior Court’s VOP sentence clearly was within legal 
limits.   
(8) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Gaines’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Gaines's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Gaines could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
Justice