Title: Tristan Hilton v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-438
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 5, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-438 
____________ 
 
TRISTAN HILTON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[July 5, 2007] 
 
LEWIS, C.J. 
 
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following 
question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: 
MAY A POLICE OFFICER CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDUCT A 
SAFETY INSPECTION STOP UNDER SECTION 316.610 AFTER 
THE OFFICER HAS OBSERVED A CRACKED WINDSHIELD, 
BUT BEFORE THE OFFICER HAS DETERMINED THE FULL 
EXTENT OF THE CRACK? 
 
Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We rephrase the certified question to more 
closely relate to the applicable statute and facts as follows: 
WHETHER A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER MAY STOP A 
VEHICLE FOR A WINDSHIELD CRACK ON THE BASIS THAT 
THE CRACK RENDERS THE WINDSHIELD “NOT IN PROPER 
ADJUSTMENT OR REPAIR” UNDER SECTION 310.610 OF THE 
FLORIDA STATUTES (2001).   
 
We answer this question in the negative and hold for the reasons discussed below 
that a cracked windshield violates section 316.610 only if it renders the vehicle in 
“such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property.”  § 316.610, Fla. 
Stat. (2001).  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On January 25, 2002, Clearwater police officers Sena and Harrison stopped 
Hilton’s car after noticing that it had a crack in the windshield.  The officers 
checked Hilton’s identification for outstanding warrants and determined that Hilton 
was on probation for previously committing a felony.  During the encounter, 
Officer Matthews, who had responded to the scene as backup, observed what 
initially appeared to be a rifle in plain view on the floor of the back seat of Hilton’s 
car.   
While escorting Hilton from the vehicle to the curb for purposes of taking 
him into custody for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, Officer 
Harrison smelled the odor of marijuana.  Officer Harrison commenced a pat-down 
search of Hilton, and then another responding officer, Officer Dawe, observed a 
large bulge near the waistband of Hilton’s shorts and proceeded to search Hilton as 
well.  Officer Dawe’s search revealed what was later determined to be forty-two 
 
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bags of marijuana.  Hilton was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana 
with intent to sell.  Once the “rifle” was actually retrieved and removed from 
Hilton’s vehicle and secured in the police cruiser, it was determined to be only a 
BB gun.1   
Hilton filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the stop was improper 
because the crack in the windshield “was barely visible and located in the lower 
right corner of the windshield and did not obstruct any view of the driver” and 
because “[t]he rifle, at the scene, was determined to be a Daisy pump action air 
rifle.”  During a pretrial hearing, Officer Harrison indicated that the length of the 
crack was approximately seven or eight inches long.  However, the testimony as to 
when Officers Harrison and Sena observed the crack was in severe conflict.2  
Additionally, Officer Harrison testified that no glass was falling from the crack, 
and when asked if the crack would have obstructed the driver’s view, he replied, 
“No, not as far as I know.  I don’t know.”  Officer Harrison also stated that prior to 
the discovery of what initially appeared to be a rifle, his intention after checking 
Hilton’s identification was solely to issue Hilton a warning for the cracked 
windshield and a seatbelt violation.  Officer Sena testified that he knew Hilton was 
                                          
 
1.  Hilton ultimately was not charged with being a convicted felon in possession 
of a firearm.   
 
2.  Officer Harrison testified that he and Sena observed the crack as Hilton 
drove by their stopped police cruiser.  Officer Sena testified that they observed the 
crack while driving behind Hilton.   
 
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a convicted felon prior to the stop because he “worked a little over five years in the 
North Greenwood community in the community policing unit there, so I knew 
[Hilton] from the community.”  Officer Sena further testified that he and Harrison 
would not have stopped Hilton but for the crack in the windshield.   
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the judge admitted that he had concerns 
about the conflicting testimony of the officers.  Nevertheless, the trial judge denied 
the motion, stating: 
[O]n reflection and review and consideration of the law . . . I think I 
have to at this point accept the testimony of the officers, 
notwithstanding conflict and notwithstanding that I can think of other 
possibilities, that I think the proper standard would be to accept that 
they observed the crack in the windshield, which was supported by the 
ultimate finding of the crack in the windshield, and that was the 
objective basis of the stop.   
Hilton subsequently pled no contest to possession of marijuana, but reserved his 
right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.   
On appeal, the Second District initially held that the officers had no 
authority to stop Hilton’s car and reversed his conviction.  See Hilton v. State, 29 
Fla. L. Weekly D1475, D1476 (Fla. 2d DCA June 18, 2004) (Hilton I).  The court 
initially stated that while section 316.2952 of the Florida Statutes (2001) mandates 
that cars be equipped with a windshield and have working windshield wipers, the 
section says nothing about cracks.  See id. at D1475.  The Second District noted in 
its first opinion that section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes provides that it is a 
 
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traffic violation to drive a car that either is unsafe or does not contain equipment in 
the proper condition.  See id.  However, because section 316.2952 merely requires 
a car to have a windshield, but does not contain requirements for the “proper 
condition” of the windshield, the initial panel of the Second District reasoned that 
driving with a cracked windshield would be a traffic violation only if it violated the 
“unsafe condition” portion of section 316.610.  See id.  The court concluded that 
“the evidence did not show that the crack in Hilton’s windshield blocked the 
driver’s view or otherwise placed the car in such unsafe condition as to endanger 
any person or property.”  Id. at D1476.   
 
However, the Second District subsequently granted rehearing en banc and 
then affirmed Hilton’s conviction, concluding that because section 316.2952 of the 
Florida Statutes requires a windshield on every motor vehicle, the officers lawfully 
stopped Hilton because his cracked windshield constituted a noncriminal traffic 
infraction.  See Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155, 156-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) 
(Hilton II).  On rehearing, the Second District noted that section 316.610(1) of the 
Florida Statutes authorizes a police officer to stop a driver and submit a vehicle to 
an inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is 
“unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its equipment is not in proper 
adjustment or repair.”  Id. at 157 (quoting § 316.610(1)).  The court reasoned from 
this statutory language that the Legislature did not intend to limit the authority of 
 
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the police only to cases in which the defective equipment created an immediate or 
heightened level of risk.  See id.  In further support of its conclusion on rehearing, 
the Second District quoted the opening paragraph of section 316.610, which 
provides: 
It is a violation of this chapter for any person to drive . . . any vehicle . 
. . which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or 
property, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times 
equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition 
and adjustment as required in this chapter, or which is equipped in any 
manner in violation of this chapter . . . . 
Id. (quoting § 316.610(1)).  The Second District concluded that because a 
windshield is required by section 316.2952, it is a violation of section 316.610 to 
drive a vehicle with a windshield that is not in proper condition.  See id.  The 
Second District also noted that because subsection (2) of section 316.610 
authorizes an officer to give a driver written notice to repair a vehicle equipment 
defect even where that defect does not present unduly hazardous operating 
conditions, officers may properly stop a vehicle to give such a notice.  See id.   
The Second District additionally held on rehearing that section 316.610(1) 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  See id.  The court concluded that this 
statute was not created by the Legislature as a means of criminal investigation; 
rather, the Legislature intended “to create a noncriminal safety stop to permit 
police to perform a quick vehicle-specific safety inspection that is cheaper and less 
intrusive, and arguably more effective, than methods of mandatory, annual vehicle 
 
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inspection.”  Id. at 157-58.  Moreover, the Second District concluded that even if a 
cracked windshield constitutes a traffic violation only if it creates an unsafe 
condition, an officer may be reasonable in his or her belief that the crack met such 
criterion, although an examination of the windshield after the stop ultimately 
revealed that the crack did not.  See id. at 159.   
 
Concluding that the issue presented by this case “affects the power of law 
enforcement throughout the state,” the Second District certified the above-quoted 
question to this Court as one of great public importance.  See id. at 160. 
ANALYSIS 
It is a question of statutory interpretation as to whether section 316.610 of 
the Florida Statutes permits a stop for a cracked windshield on the basis that the 
crack renders the windshield “not in proper adjustment or repair,” even if the crack 
does not otherwise render the vehicle unsafe.  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law subject to de novo review.  See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 
So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003).  
Section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes, a general statute addressing 
defective equipment on vehicles, provides, in pertinent part: 
316.610. Safety of vehicle; inspection.––It is a violation of this 
chapter for any person to drive . . . any vehicle or combination of vehicles 
which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property, or 
which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such 
lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in 
this chapter, or which is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter, 
 
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or for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required 
under this chapter. 
(1) Any police officer may at any time, upon reasonable cause 
to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, 
or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the 
driver of the vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection 
and such test with reference thereto as may be appropriate. 
(2) In the event the vehicle is found to be in unsafe condition or 
any required part or equipment is not present or is not in proper repair 
and adjustment, and the continued operation would probably present 
an unduly hazardous operating condition, the officer may require the 
vehicle to be immediately repaired or removed from use.  However, if 
continuous operation would not present unduly hazardous operating 
conditions . . . the officer shall give written notice to require proper 
repair and adjustment of same within 48 hours . . . .  
§ 316.610(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2001).  Section 316.2952 of the Florida Statutes, 
which enumerates the specific windshield requirements for Florida vehicles, 
provides: 
(1) A windshield in a fixed and upright position, which 
windshield is equipped with safety glazing as required by federal 
safety-glazing material standards, is required on every motor vehicle 
which is operated on the public highways, roads, and streets, except 
on a motorcycle or implement of husbandry. 
(2) A person shall not operate any motor vehicle on any public 
highway, road, or street with any sign, sunscreening material, product, 
or covering attached to, or located in or upon, the windshield, except 
the following:  [exceptions listed]. 
(3) The windshield on every motor vehicle shall be equipped 
with a device for cleaning rain, snow, or other moisture from the 
windshield, which device shall be constructed as to be controlled or 
operated by the driver of the vehicle. 
(4) Every windshield wiper upon a motor vehicle shall be 
maintained in good working order. 
(5) [Addressing grove equipment] 
 
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(6) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, 
punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318. 
§ 316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001). 
In holding that the stop of Hilton was proper under section 316.610, the 
Second District noted that under section 316.610(1), officers have the authority to 
stop a vehicle if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that vehicle is “unsafe 
or not equipped as required by law or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment 
or repair.”  Hilton II, 901 So. 2d at 157.  The Second District reasoned that a 
visible crack in a windshield provides a legal basis for a traffic stop because the 
windshield is not in proper repair.  See id.  Further, the Second District concluded 
that since a windshield is required by section 316.2952, a cracked windshield is a 
violation of section 316.610 because the windshield is not in proper condition and 
adjustment.  See id.   
Under the tenets of statutory construction and our interpretation of section 
316.610 in prior case law, we conclude that the Second District’s analysis is 
incorrect.  This Court has held that “[i]t is an elementary principle of statutory 
construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, 
sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be 
construed as mere surplusage.”  Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 
So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003).  As noted earlier, the introductory paragraph of 
316.610 provides that it is a violation for a vehicle to be driven “which does not 
 
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contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter.”  § 
316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied).  The section of chapter 316, Florida 
Statutes, governing windshields requires only: (1) that a vehicle have a windshield 
in a fixed and upright position that is equipped with safety glazing; (2) that the 
windshield be equipped with a driver-controlled device for cleaning moisture from 
the windshield; and (3) that windshield wipers be maintained in good working 
order.  See § 316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Thus, any other problems with 
windshields, such as chips, dings, or cracks, are not within section 316.2952 and 
do not constitute a traffic violation under that statute.  To conclude that any defect 
or damage renders a vehicle’s equipment “not in proper adjustment or repair,” and, 
therefore, subject to stop and inspection by law enforcement officers pursuant to 
section 316.610(1), would ignore the language in the introductory paragraph of the 
statute which provides that it is a violation for a vehicle not to have equipment that 
is in proper condition or adjustment “as required in this chapter.”  § 316.610, Fla. 
Stat. (2001); see also Hechtman, 840 So. 2d at 996. 
Further, even though section 316.610(1) lacks the “as required in this 
chapter” language that is contained in the unnumbered introductory paragraph, see 
§ 316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001), and permits stops where an officer has reasonable 
cause to believe that a vehicle’s “equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair” 
 
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without specifying that the equipment be statutorily required, we conclude that 
subsection (1) does not give officers the authority to stop a vehicle for any 
equipment defect or damage.  This Court has recognized as axiomatic the principle 
that “all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent 
whole.”  Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550, 557 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Forsythe v. 
Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle is permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment only where there is a reasonable suspicion that either the 
vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law.  See Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).  Thus, for a stop to be constitutional under the 
“not in proper adjustment or repair” section of 316.610(1), the equipment defect or 
damage must be in violation of the law.  See id. at 663.  However, it is the 
unnumbered introductory paragraph of 316.610, not subsection (1), that provides 
the types of equipment defects which constitute a violation under the statute.  See § 
316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Therefore, subsection (1) must be read in conjunction 
with its introductory paragraph to ensure that the statute is internally consistent and 
to ensure that traffic stops comply with Fourth Amendment mandates.  See Prouse, 
440 U.S. at 663; Clines, 912 So. 2d at 557.  The section of chapter 316 that 
enumerates the requirements for windshields does not prohibit the operation of a 
vehicle with a crack in the windshield, see § 316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001); therefore, 
 
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an officer may stop a vehicle for a windshield crack only if the crack poses a safety 
hazard.  An officer is not authorized under section 316.610 to stop a vehicle for 
just any windshield crack under the “not in proper adjustment or repair” provision 
of subsection (1).  
Moreover, to determine the types of equipment defects which authorize an 
officer to stop a vehicle and submit it to a purported safety inspection pursuant to 
section 316.610(1), we have previously held that “[s]ection 316.610 . . . must be 
read in conjunction with those statutes which delineate the specific equipment 
requirements for vehicles.”  Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 1992).  In 
Doctor, the officers’ alleged reason for stopping a vehicle was a cracked taillight.  
See id.  While the lens cover/reflector of the taillight did have a crack, the vehicle 
still had working taillights on each side of the rear of the vehicle.  See id. at 446-
47.  This Court determined that the relevant statute only required taillights to emit 
a red light that is visible from a certain distance, and the crack in the lens cover/ 
reflector did not violate the statute.  Therefore, the stop was improper.  See id. at 
446-47.  We rejected the State’s argument that section 316.610 authorizes law 
enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for malfunctioning equipment, “even if the 
equipment is not required by statute, poses no safety hazard, or otherwise violates 
no law.”  Id. at 447.  In doing so, we reasoned that “[s]uch an interpretation of 
section 316.110 [sic] would allow police to stop vehicles for malfunctioning air 
 
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conditioners or even defective radios, a result clearly beyond the statute’s intended 
purpose of ensuring the safe condition of vehicles operating on our state’s streets 
and highways.”  Id.3  The present case is no different. 
                                          
 
 
3.  In addition to the aforementioned statutory analysis, this Court in Doctor 
stated that it would “not allow officers to get around the fourth amendment’s 
mandate by basing a detention upon a pure pretextual stop.  The state must show 
that under the facts and circumstances a reasonable officer would have stopped the 
vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose.”  596 So. 2d at 446 (quoting Kehoe v. 
State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1988)).  In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of a 
traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual, subjective 
motivations of the individual officers involved in conducting the stop; rather, the 
only concern under the Fourth Amendment is the validity of the basis asserted by 
the officer involved in the stop.  See id. at 813.  In Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 
(Fla. 1997), we recognized that Whren overruled the reasonable officer test “in 
favor of a strict objective test which asks only whether any probable cause for the 
stop existed.”  Id. at 759.  However, Whren did not overrule this Court’s utilization 
of principles of statutory interpretation to address whether section 316.610 of the 
Florida Statutes permits law enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for any type of 
malfunctioning equipment.  See Hilton II, 901 So. 2d at 163 (Northcutt, J., 
dissenting) (“Whren did not, and could not, abrogate the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of a Florida statute . . . .”).  To the extent that our decision today 
relies on Doctor, it is only with regard to the statutory analysis employed in that 
decision.  
Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, see dissenting op. at 43 n.13, we solely 
rely upon Doctor for purposes of determining what constitutes a traffic violation 
under Florida law.   Judge Northcutt correctly noted in his dissent in Hilton II that 
“Doctor controls the interpretation of subsection 316.610(1) notwithstanding the 
majority’s refusal to recognize it.”  Hilton II, 901 So. 2d at 164 (Northcutt, J., 
dissenting).  Additionally, although the dissent relies upon State v. Burke, 902 So. 
2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review granted, 919 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2006), to 
criticize our analysis, see dissenting op. at 43 n.13, the dissent fails to acknowledge 
that the Fourth District in Burke concluded that Doctor was still good law with 
regard to the interpretation of Florida traffic statutes and adopted the reasoning of 
Judge Northcutt in his dissent.  See Burke, 902 So. 2d at 957. 
 
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In his dissenting opinion in Hilton II, Judge Northcutt relied on the 
aforementioned analysis in Doctor to conclude that the mere existence of a 
windshield crack alone is not a valid basis for a stop: 
Although the law does not require vehicles to be equipped with 
air conditioners or radios, the supreme court as easily could have 
made its point with hypothetical examples that clearly do fall within 
chapter 316.  For instance, section 316.251(1) provides that “[e]very 
motor vehicle of net shipping weight of not more than 5,000 pounds 
shall be equipped with a front and a rear bumper such that when 
measured from the ground to the bottom of the bumper the maximum 
height shall be as follows[,]” and then sets forth the maximum bumper 
heights for vehicles of various weights.  Under the majority’s decision 
today, an officer would be permitted to stop a motorist who is driving 
with a dented bumper simply because the law requires that vehicles be 
equipped with bumpers.  Under Doctor, the dent would not justify a 
stop because the statute delineating the specific bumper requirements 
for vehicles does not require that bumpers be free of dents.  In other 
words, a bumper may be dented and still comply with section 316.610 
if it is “in proper condition and adjustment as required in this 
chapter.”  
See 901 So. 2d at 163-64 (Northcutt, J., dissenting).  We conclude that Judge 
Northcutt’s analysis accurately interprets this Court’s holding in Doctor with 
regard to the necessary interaction between section 316.610 and other sections of 
chapter 316.   
In Doctor, the relevant statute required taillights on vehicles, but did not 
prohibit cracks in the lens covers/reflectors of taillights.  See 596 So. 2d at 446.  
Similarly, section 316.2952 requires a windshield on vehicles, but does not address 
or prohibit cracks in windshields.  See § 316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001).  As we noted 
 
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in Doctor, interpreting section 316.610 to authorize traffic stops for just any type of 
equipment malfunction, even if such equipment is not required by law, would 
permit officers to stop vehicles for such defects as a broken radio antenna or a dent 
in the passenger door of the vehicle.  Further, even where certain equipment is 
required by statute, section 316.610 would permit stops where the equipment is in 
compliance with the statute but possesses some defect which is not specifically 
addressed or prohibited by the statute.  For example, section 316.252 of the Florida 
Statutes requires that trucks or semi-trailers of certain weights be “equipped with 
fenders, covers, or other splash and spray suppressant devices.”  § 316.252(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2005).  Under the State’s interpretation of section 316.610, if a truck is 
equipped with fenders, but those fenders are dented, law enforcement officers 
would be authorized to initiate a traffic stop.  As this Court concluded unanimously 
in Doctor, placing such a broad interpretation on section 316.610 would produce 
results “clearly beyond the statute’s intended purpose of ensuring the safe 
condition of vehicles operating on our state’s streets and highways.”  596 So. 2d at 
447.   
Therefore, under the analysis adopted by this Court in Doctor, and under 
principles of statutory construction, see Hechtman, 840 So. 2d at 996; Clines, 912 
So. 2d at 557, we conclude that the provision of section 316.610 which authorizes 
vehicle stops for equipment that is “not in proper adjustment or repair,” § 
 
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316.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2001), does not encompass windshield cracks.  Thus, a stop 
for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes 
that the crack renders the vehicle “in such unsafe condition as to endanger any 
person or property.” § 316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001).4   
Based on the foregoing analysis, we must next consider whether the facts of 
the instant case support a conclusion that a reasonable officer would have believed 
that the crack in Hilton’s windshield violated the “unsafe” requirement of section 
316.610, and, therefore, whether the stop of Hilton’s vehicle was constitutionally 
valid.5  This Court has stated that “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 
comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness and, as the reviewing court, 
we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived 
therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”  
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 605 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Murray v. State, 692 So. 
2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1997)).  Nevertheless, “mixed questions of law and fact that 
ultimately determine constitutional rights should be reviewed by appellate courts 
                                          
 
4.  To the extent that the dissent contends that the law permits a traffic stop 
for any windshield crack, it is merely disagreeing with our interpretation of the 
interplay between sections 316.610 and 316.2952 and agreeing with the 
interpretation adopted by the Second District in Hilton II, an interpretation that we 
reject today.   
5.  None of the parties in this proceeding contends that Hilton’s vehicle was 
equipped in violation of chapter 316 or that Hilton did any act forbidden or failed 
to perform any act required under chapter 316.   
 
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using a two-step approach, deferring to the trial court on questions of historical fact 
but conducting a de novo review of the constitutional issue.”  Id.  
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of 
Florida’s Declaration of Rights guarantee citizens the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  See U.S. Const. amend IV; art. I, § 12, Fla. 
Const.  The Florida Constitution expressly provides that the right shall be 
construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.  See art. I, § 12, 
Fla. Const.  Items obtained in violation of Florida’s constitutional protection shall 
be excluded from evidence if such items would be excluded pursuant to United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence.  See id.  Under the exclusionary rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, “the Fourth Amendment bar[s] the 
use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.”  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)).   
The United States Supreme Court has explained that automobiles are 
afforded less Fourth Amendment protection than an individual’s home or office: 
[T]he inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such 
exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the 
warrant requirement is impossible. . . .  Besides the element of 
mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the 
expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is 
significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.  In 
discharging their varied responsibilities for ensuring the public safety, 
law enforcement officials are necessarily brought into frequent contact 
 
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with automobiles.  Most of this contact is distinctly noncriminal in 
nature.  Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and 
continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic 
inspection and licensing requirements. . . .  
The expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further 
diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel. 
. . .  
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor 
vehicle because its function is transportation and it 
seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of 
personal effects. . . .  It travels public thoroughfares 
where both its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view. 
 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (citations, internal 
quotation marks, and footnote omitted) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 
590 (1974)).  At the same time, the High Court has recognized that individuals do 
not abandon Fourth Amendment protections upon entering a vehicle: 
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of 
transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and leisure activities.  
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on 
the streets.  Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy 
in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by 
pedestrian or other modes of travel.  Were the individual subject to 
unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the 
security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously 
circumscribed. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63.  In light of the foregoing, the United States Supreme 
Court has concluded that “stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute a ‘seizure’ ” under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 653, and unless “there 
is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that . . . either the vehicle or an 
 
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occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an 
automobile and detaining the driver . . . are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 663; see also Nelson v. State, 578 So. 2d 694, 695 (Fla. 1991) 
(“Stopping a motor vehicle and detaining the occupant constitutes a seizure within 
the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, even though the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention is quite brief.  As such the stop must comport 
with objective standards of reasonableness, whether that amounts to probable cause 
or a less stringent test.” (quoting State v. Conger, 439 A.2d 381, 384 (Conn. 
1981))).   
The United States Supreme Court has explained that while reasonable 
suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a 
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth 
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making 
the stop.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).  In considering whether 
an officer had a reasonable suspicion, the High Court looks to the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether “the detaining officer [had] ‘a particularized 
and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”  United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 
(1981)). 
 
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In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the reasonableness of a traffic stop depends solely on the validity of 
the basis asserted by the officer involved in the stop, and the officer’s subjective 
intentions are not involved in the determination of reasonableness.  See id. at 813.  
Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that a 
traffic stop based upon an officer’s incorrect but reasonable assessment of the facts 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and “so long as the circumstances 
confronting a police officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has 
committed even a minor traffic offense, the officer has probable cause to stop the 
driver.”  United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000)).   
Despite the foregoing, a number of federal courts have held that an officer’s 
mistake of law as to what constitutes a traffic violation, no matter how reasonable, 
cannot provide objectively reasonable grounds for reasonable suspicion.  For 
example, in Chanthasouxat, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a stop where the 
officer erroneously believed that an Alabama statute required vehicles to be 
equipped with a rear view mirror inside of the vehicle.  See 342 F.3d at 1279.  The 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the officer’s mistake of law was reasonable in that 
“Officer Carter testified that he considered the lack of an inside rear-view mirror a 
violation based on his training, [a] magistrate’s interpretation of the statute, and the 
 
- 20 -
fact that he had written over 100 tickets for the same violation.”  Id. at 1274.  
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit held that the officer’s mistake of law could not 
provide the reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.  See id. at 1279.   
The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that the good-faith exclusionary rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984),6 should not be extended to excuse a vehicular search based on an 
officer’s mistake of law: 
We also agree with the . . . Ninth Circuit that . . .  
there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
for police who do not act in accordance with governing 
law.  To create an exception here would defeat the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the 
incentive for police to make certain that they properly 
understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and 
obey. 
[United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)]. 
We also note the fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to “the 
traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,” Bryan v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), while allowing those “entrusted to 
enforce” the law to be ignorant of it. 
342 F.3d at 1279-80 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 
274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Whren provides law enforcement officers broad leeway 
                                          
 
 
6.  In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule would not bar the use of evidence obtained by 
officers who were acting in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that 
is ultimately found to be invalid.  See 468 U.S. at 905.  In the instant case, the State 
has never claimed that if the officers made a mistake of law regarding whether 
Hilton’s windshield crack constituted a traffic violation, the exclusionary rule 
should not apply.  
 
- 21 -
to conduct searches and seizures regardless of whether their subjective intent 
corresponds to the legal justifications for their actions.  But the flip side of that 
leeway is that the legal justification must be objectively grounded.” (footnote 
omitted)).   
As reflected above, in strict “mistake of law” cases, the conduct that the 
officer believed to be in violation of the law was not statutorily prohibited.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (officer 
erroneously believed that it was a code violation not to display a vehicle 
registration sticker so that it is visible from the rear); United States v. Lopez-
Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999) (officer erroneously believed that a cracked 
taillight constituted a violation of Texas law); Gordon v. State, 901 So. 2d 399 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (officer mistakenly believed that air fresheners hanging from 
rear view mirror constituted traffic violation under Florida law).  However, in 
Florida, a cracked windshield can constitute a traffic violation only if it renders the 
vehicle in “such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property.”  § 
316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Accordingly, and unlike the aforementioned “mistake 
of law” cases, whether a cracked windshield constitutes a violation of Florida law 
is variable and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, even though 
Officers Sena and Harrison may have been mistaken in the belief that they could 
stop Hilton for the mere existence of a windshield crack, if the crack as it existed 
 
- 22 -
and as it was observed by the officers would have created an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that Hilton’s vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 
316.610, then the stop would be valid.  See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (constitutional 
reasonableness of a traffic stop is an objective inquiry).   
When a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the government 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the search or seizure was reasonable.  See 
United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995).  In considering the 
objective reasonableness of a stop for a cracked windshield, state and federal 
courts have reviewed the evidence presented to the trial court.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a 
windshield crack of twelve inches across and six inches high gave officer 
“reasonable articulable suspicion––a particularized and objective basis––to believe 
that the crack substantially obstructed [the driver’s] view of the street”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Cashman, 216 F.3d at 587 (upholding stop based on 
cracked windshield where “the crack in the Blazer’s windshield was substantial . . . 
between seven and ten inches long, and extended above the bottom of one of the 
resting windshield wipers” and “a trooper . . . could readily and reasonably think 
that the crack met the administrative criteria for excessive cracking”);7 Ivory v. 
                                          
 
 
7.  The dissent relies on Cashman for the proposition that “if the officer sees 
a crack in a windshield that he or she reasonably believes may pose a risk or 
impairs the driver’s vision, the officer is clearly permitted to stop the vehicle in 
 
- 23 -
State, 898 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (upholding stop where officer 
testified that windshield crack was “substantial . . . and not a hairline crack or 
chip”); State v. Pease, 531 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stop valid 
where “the damage was sufficiently extensive to lead a reasonably prudent person 
to believe that the vehicle, when driven, created a dangerous situation for those 
entering the area where the driver’s peripheral vision is obscured by the 
                                                                                                                                        
order to ascertain the risk.”  Dissenting op. at 48-49.  It should be noted that the 
Wisconsin statute at issue in Cashman did not require that a windshield crack 
render a vehicle unsafe or impair the vision of the driver to constitute a traffic 
violation.  Rather, the statute in Cashman prohibited a windshield from being 
excessively cracked or damaged.  The Second Circuit explained: 
 
Excessive cracking or damage is defined, inter alia, as “a crack inside, 
or which extends inside, the windshield critical area” or “cracks which 
extend into any area more than 8 inches from the frame.”  [Wis. 
Admin. Code] § Trans. 305.34(3)(a) and (b).  The “windshield critical 
area” is in turn defined as “that portion of a motor vehicle windshield 
normally used by the driver for necessary observations to the front of 
the vehicle[,] . . . includ[ing] the areas normally swept by a factory 
installed windshield wiper system.” Id. § Trans. 305.05(43). 
216 F.3d at 586.  The Second Circuit ultimately concluded that if the officer in 
Cashman reasonably believed that the windshield was excessively cracked or 
damaged as defined under the statute, the officer could constitutionally initiate a 
traffic stop of the vehicle, even if it was later determined that the windshield did 
not meet the definition of excessive cracking or damage.  See id. at 587.  Similarly, 
if an officer reasonably believes that a windshield crack renders a vehicle unsafe 
under section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes, the officer may constitutionally 
initiate a stop, and the propriety of that stop does not depend on whether the crack 
actually rendered the vehicle unsafe.  Thus, even though the dissent relies on 
Cashman to support the claim that our decision today is inconsistent with federal 
law, closer inspection demonstrates that our decision is in complete accord with the 
analysis in Cashman. 
 
- 24 -
breakage”); Commonwealth v. Schuck, 2004 WL 2366681 at *5 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2004) (unpublished decision) (“[V]iewed objectively, it was not reasonable . . . to 
have concluded that these particular cracks could have reasonably interfered with a 
driver’s ability to see out of the windshield so as to interfere with the rights of 
other traffic or endanger public safety.”); Muse v. State, 807 A.2d 113, 116, 119 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (concluding that a twenty-four-inch crack across the 
front of the windshield could cause an officer to be reasonably concerned that the 
crack rendered the vehicle unsafe); State v. Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2001) (“Since Utah law requires a crack of at least 24 inches for a violation, a 
sparkle alone is insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the windshield 
was a safety equipment violation.”); State v. Flowers-Roscoe, 2005 WL 470424 at 
*2 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished decision) (stop reasonable where officer 
testified that windshield crack “looked like a ‘glow stick’ when light reflected off 
of it, causing obstruction and distraction for the driver”).   
In the instant case, most of the testimony focused exclusively on the 
existence of a crack in Hilton’s windshield, and there was virtually no testimony as 
to the location or the nature of the crack.  The trial court only stated in ruling on 
the motion to suppress, “I’ve observed the photographs.  I’ve observed and 
confirmed from the photograph that there is a clearly visible crack in the 
windshield of about the approximate length the officer testified to.  Something of 
 
- 25 -
seven or eight inches . . . .”  The trial court made no findings and provided no 
conclusions with regard to whether the crack in the windshield rendered Hilton’s 
vehicle unsafe.  In fact, the only testimony with regard to any safety aspect of the 
windshield was offered by Officer Harrison, who testified that there was no glass 
falling out of the crack, and that he was not sure whether the crack would obstruct 
the driver’s view.8   Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was 
insufficient evidence presented at the hearing to provide “a particularized and 
objective basis” to suspect that the crack in Hilton’s windshield rendered his 
vehicle unsafe in violation of section 316.610.  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.  The State 
presented no evidence that the vehicle was in an unsafe condition to endanger 
person or property and, correspondingly, no evidence that would support an 
objectively reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was unsafe in violation of the 
statute.  Therefore, the State has failed to support its burden of demonstrating that 
the stop of Hilton was objectively reasonable, and we conclude that the stop was 
illegal under the Fourth Amendment.  See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Johnson, 63 
F.3d at 245.   
                                          
 
8.  Cf. State v. Burke, 902 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review 
granted, 919 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2006) (holding that State failed to meet burden of 
demonstrating that windshield crack posed a safety problem where “one of the 
detectives first testified that the windshield was badly cracked and that it was very 
noticeable, but on cross-examination he was unable to say where on the windshield 
the crack was located or the length, size or shape of the crack. . . .  The second 
detective remembered that there was a crack in the windshield but he was unable to 
recall any other detail about it.”).   
 
- 26 -
To the extent that the dissent challenges the preceding analysis, the opinion 
appears to take two inconsistent positions.  In one portion of its opinion, the dissent 
concludes that only those windshield cracks that pose a safety risk violate section 
316.610.  See dissenting op. at 48 (“As Chanthasouxat makes clear, there is a 
significant difference between a crack in a taillight cover, which could never 
constitute a violation of the law, and a cracked windshield, which may constitute a 
violation of the law, depending on the circumstances of the crack.”).  However, the 
dissent later appears to agree with the analysis of the Second District in Hilton II 
that any crack in a windshield renders a vehicle subject to a traffic stop under 
section 316.610.  See dissenting op. at 50 (“I cannot agree with Judge Northcutt’s 
assertion in his dissent in the Second District’s decision that ‘Florida law did not 
prohibit Hilton to drive with a cracked windshield.’ ”).   Therefore, it is unclear 
what position the dissent is taking in contending that our analysis is erroneous.  
Further, the dissent states:  “The issue is whether the officers’ observation of 
the crack in the windshield of Hilton’s vehicle was an objectively reasonable basis 
to stop Hilton.”  Dissenting op. at 44.  This statement in itself is ambiguous.9  Is 
                                          
 
 
9.  The dissent asserts that “this Court has consistently used this standard 
when applying the Whren analysis.”  Dissenting op. at 44 n.14.  However, the 
cases upon which the dissent relies for this proposition, Holland v. State, 696 So. 
2d 757 (Fla. 1997), and Dobrin v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor 
Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2004), did not involve issues of statutory 
interpretation with regard to the conduct that would constitute a traffic violation 
under Florida law.  In Holland and Dobrin, it was absolutely clear as to the conduct 
 
- 27 -
the dispositive issue whether the officers reasonably believed that they we
authorized by statute to stop Hilton’s vehicle for any windshield crack, or whether 
an objectively reasonable basis existed for the officers to believe that the crack in 
Hilton’s windshield rendered his vehicle unsafe?  Regardless, under either 
interpretation, the dissent’s assertion that we have somehow misapplied 
re 
Whren 
fails.  With regard to the former interpretation, we have determined that section 
310.610 only permits a stop for a crack in a windshield that renders a vehicle 
unsafe.  Therefore, under the holding of Whren, for a stop to be constitutionally 
valid, the evidence must demonstrate an objective basis for concluding that the 
crack rendered the vehicle unsafe.   The misconception that a vehicle may be 
stopped for any windshield crack or imperfection constitutes a mistake of law, and 
such a mistake cannot provide objective grounds for reasonable suspicion.  See 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279.  Therefore, if the dissent is contending that the 
officers’ belief that any windshield crack provided a reasonable basis for stopping 
Hilton’s vehicle, the dissent is essentially asserting that the officers’ reasonable, 
but incorrect, interpretation of the law justified the stop.   However, this standard is 
contrary to case law, and disregards the objective inquiry mandated by Whren.  See 
517 U.S. at 813; Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279.    
                                                                                                                                        
which constituted a traffic violation (running a stop sign and failure to maintain a 
single lane).  In the context of the precise issue that we must decide today, an issue 
which involves the interplay of statutory and constitutional law, this statement by 
the dissent is clearly subject to two different interpretations. 
 
- 28 -
On the other hand, if the dissent is contending that the issue to be determined 
is whether an objectively reasonable basis existed for the officers to believe that 
the crack in Hilton’s windshield rendered his vehicle unsafe, we agree with this 
assertion.   See majority op. at 22-23 (“[I]f the crack as it existed and as it was 
observed by the officers would have created an objectively reasonable suspicion 
that Hilton’s vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610, then the stop 
would be valid.”).  Here, however, neither the State nor the officers provided any 
evidence to support an objectively reasonable belief that the crack in Hilton’s 
windshield “pose[d] a safety risk or impair[ed] the driver’s vision.”  Dissenting op. 
at 48.   Indeed, the testimony presented by Officer Harrison indicated that the 
windshield did not pose a safety hazard.  While we agree with the dissent that 
“[c]ourts must give ‘great deference’ to the judgment of trained law enforcement 
officers,” dissenting op. at 48, who often must make split-second decisions with 
regard to initiating a traffic stop, this does not mean that the State may be relieved 
of its burden “to show that the search or seizure was reasonable.”  Johnson, 63 
F.3d at 245.  Moreover, we cannot presume that a stop is constitutionally valid 
based solely on an officer’s subjective belief that a windshield crack, regardless of 
the length or location of that crack, justified a traffic stop.   Although the dissent 
contends that we are “writ[ing] out of the standard of review any deference to the 
trial judge,” dissenting op. at 45, the dissent fails to acknowledge that the trial 
 
- 29 -
judge operated under an incorrect presumption of the law that any windshield 
crack would justify a traffic stop, stating, “I think the proper standard would be to 
accept that they observed the crack in the windshield, which was supported by the 
ultimate finding of the crack in the windshield, and that was the objective basis of 
the stop.”  Since we have concluded upon de novo review that such an 
interpretation of the statute is erroneous, we need not, and indeed cannot, defer to 
the trial judge’s misapplication of the law with regard to the validity of the stop.  
Were we to do so, we would be abdicating our duty on review to determine the 
applicable law in the context of the existing facts. 
Finally, to the extent that the dissent cites cases from the district courts in 
support of its analysis, a close review of these cases demonstrates that these 
decisions do not compel a different holding.  In some of the cases, the trial courts 
properly reviewed whether evidence of the crack demonstrated an objectively 
reasonable basis for an officer to believe that the vehicle was unsafe in violation of 
section 316.610.  See Ivory, 898 So. 2d at 186; State v. Howard, 909 So. 2d 390, 
392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (trial court granted Howard’s motion to suppress because 
“the 14-inch ‘hairline crack’ on the passenger’s side of the windshield did not 
create a safety issue”).10  In State v. Breed, 917 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), 
                                          
 
 
10.  Although the dissent contends that “the Howard decision does not 
indicate whether the trial court reviewed the stop to determine whether the crack 
demonstrated an objectively reasonable basis for an officer to believe that the 
 
- 30 -
although the Fifth District concluded that stopping the vehicle for a cracked 
windshield was valid, the court did not discuss the crack in any detail and instead 
focused on the length of the detention after the stop.  Therefore, the dissent’s 
reliance upon this case for purposes of interpreting section 316.610 is dubious.  
Finally, other cases mentioned by the dissent rely upon the reasoning in Hilton II in 
concluding that the traffic stop was valid under section 316.610, see, e.g., State v. 
Schuck, 913 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); however, today we disapprove the 
analysis of the Second District in Hilton II.  In light of the foregoing, none of these 
cases compels a different conclusion from that which we reach today.   
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the Second District erred in 
concluding that any visible crack in a windshield provides a legal basis for a traffic 
                                                                                                                                        
vehicle violated the law,” dissenting op. at 42 n.12, the First District noted that the 
trial court in Howard construed not only Hilton I, but also “the evidence of record 
to require granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.”  Howard, 909 So. 2d at 392 
(emphasis supplied).  With regard to whether “a reasonable officer could have 
concluded that the crack rendered the windshield unsafe,” dissenting op. at 42 
n.12, the First District does not indicate whether an officer testified about the 
appearance of the windshield, or if a safety concern prompted the traffic stop.  On 
the other hand, the father of the defendant testified that “the location and size of 
the crack did not present an unduly hazardous condition that would endanger any 
person or property under the statute.”  Howard, 909 So. 2d at 392.  Moreover, with 
respect to whether the crack would have provided an objective basis for law 
enforcement officers to conclude that the vehicle was unsafe, the officer’s actions 
speak volumes.  According to the First District, a family member of the defendant 
was allowed to drive the vehicle home after the stop, and no citation was issued for 
the crack in the windshield.   See id. at 390. 
 
- 31 -
stop.  We answer the revised certified question in the negative based on the 
statutory provisions, quash the decision of the Second District affirming the trial 
court’s denial of Hilton’s motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., 
concurs. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring. 
 
I fully concur in the majority’s analysis.  I write separately to also note my 
concurrence in the scholarly and cogent opinion of Judge Northcutt in his dissent 
below.  While that opinion is comprehensive and thorough in its analysis, I find its 
conclusion particularly compelling: 
 
Certainly, a crack that hinders the driver’s view of the road can 
present an unsafe condition that endangers persons or property.  But 
that possibility is merely academic in this case, because in the 
proceedings below the State did not assert safety concerns as a 
justification for stopping Hilton  See State v. Klein, 736 So. 2d 9, 10 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that state could not assert new theory to 
justify traffic stop for first time on appeal) [n.5].  Indeed, the officers 
did not testify that they stopped Hilton because they believed the 
crack in his windshield rendered his car unsafe.  Manifestly, it did not.  
At just seven inches long, and located almost completely within the 
 
- 32 -
sunscreen strip at the top of the windshield on the passenger side––an 
area that likely would be obscured by a turned-down sunvisor––the 
crack did not impede Hilton’s view of the road.  The crack simply 
could not reasonably have caused the officers to believe that Hilton’s 
vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610. 
 
 
[N.5.]  This fact renders the last phrase of the majority’s  
 
 
certified question academic, as well. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The notion that Florida law requires that windshields be free of 
cracks is a myth, unsupported by any Florida statute or case law.  That 
being so, the officers’ stop of Tristan Hilton was unlawful.  For this 
reason, the law required the circuit court to suppress the evidence 
seized as a result of the stop.  We should reverse Hilton’s conviction 
and remand with instructions to discharge him. 
901 So. 2d at 167-68 (Northcutt, J., dissenting). 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
I fully concur in the majority opinion.  I write separately to address Justice 
Wells’ dissent.  Justice Wells’ view is that the officers made at most a “mistake of 
fact” that does not render the traffic stop for a cracked windshield illegal.  I agree 
that if an officer reasonably suspects that a cracked windshield renders a vehicle 
unsafe to drive, a traffic stop is lawful.  Here, the officers never so testified.   
 
Further, as the majority observes, the State presented no evidence 
objectively demonstrating that the crack rendered operation of the vehicle unsafe.  
The State bears the burden of proving that the stop was justified.  Construing the 
 
- 33 -
officer’s decision to stop the vehicle as evidence that the officers reasonably 
concluded that the crack rendered the vehicle unsafe is an insupportable inference 
which is inconsistent with the State’s obligation to produce evidence justifying a 
warrantless seizure.  Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the State failed to 
demonstrate that the traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 
Justice Wells concludes that the majority “simply disagree[s] with the trial 
court’s determination that the crack in the windshield was an objective basis for the 
stop and substitutes [its] judgment[] for that of the trial court.”  Dissenting op. at 
44-45.  This statement is incorrect.  Although this Court routinely defers to the trial 
court on findings of fact, the Court has an obligation to review matters of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  See Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263, 1269 (Fla. 2006).  
In addition, on constitutional questions, specifically those arising under the Fourth 
Amendment, “important policy concerns requir[e] an appellate court to 
independently review a trial court’s legal conclusions in mixed questions of law 
and fact.”  Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).  The trial court’s 
finding that the crack was an objective basis for the stop was based on an 
erroneous interpretation of the statute; specifically, that an officer is authorized 
under our statutory scheme to stop a vehicle for any windshield crack, regardless 
of whether the officer reasonably believes that the cracked windshield has rendered 
 
- 34 -
the vehicle unsafe to drive.  The majority is not substituting its judgment for the 
trial court.  Rather, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the majority has now 
concluded that the trial court’s legal determination was erroneous.    
 
For this same reason, our decision is not in conflict with Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on whether “the 
police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,” not on 
the motivations of the officers involved.  Under the majority’s interpretation of 
section 316.610(2), Florida Statutes (2001), an officer must have a reasonable 
belief that a cracked windshield renders a vehicle unsafe to drive to constitute 
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.           
 
I also take this opportunity to respond to Justice Wells’ statement in the 
dissent that he finds it “extraordinary that the majority of this Court stands against 
the overwhelming weight of reasoning in the decisions of all of our district courts.”  
Dissenting op. at 43.  Certainly, in matters of statutory interpretation and Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, as in other areas, this Court benefits from a careful 
review of the reasoning contained in the decisions of all of our district courts of 
appeal.  Those opinions are an extremely helpful starting point for any analysis.  
 
But the suggestion that it is “extraordinary” for this Court to disagree with 
the district courts because of the “overwhelming weight of reasoning” creates the 
 
- 35 -
misimpression that the Court counts the number of district court judges who agree 
with a specific interpretation before deciding a question of law.  Many times, once 
a particular district court of appeal takes the lead, other district courts of appeal 
simply adopt the first court’s reasoning.  Although there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this approach, this is one reason why we cannot simply defer to the 
interpretation that has garnered the most support.  This is especially true when we 
are dealing with the first-time construction of a statute.   
 
In this case, we had the advantage of thoroughly reasoned majority and 
dissenting opinions.  After careful consideration, we adopted the reasoning 
contained in Judge Northcutt’s dissenting opinion.  Further, other than the Second 
District’s opinion in Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and the 
First District’s decision in State v. Howard, 909 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), 
which adopts Hilton, there is a decided lack of “reasoning” in the district court 
decisions cited by Justice Wells.  Particularly unpersuasive is the Third District’s 
decision in D.E.M. v. State, 916 So. 2d 65, 65-66 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), a per 
curiam affirmance with citations to Howard, Hilton and State v. Perez-Garcia, 917 
So. 2d 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), among others.  Interestingly, the Third District’s 
decision in Perez-Garcia, which involved an inoperative rear brake light, rested on 
the court’s conclusion that “a vehicle traveling the highway with an inoperable 
brake light is a vehicle in an ‘unsafe condition’ within the meaning of . . . section 
 
- 36 -
316.610.”  917 So. 2d at 897.  The same cannot be said of a cracked windshield, 
which may or may not pose a safety risk depending on the circumstances.  
 
For all of these reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.  
 ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
WELLS, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent because the majority has adopted the distinctly minority position in 
deciding the issue in this case, a position which is not consistent with Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1997); 
and Dobrin v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 
2d 1171 (Fla. 2004).  Moreover, the majority gives an unreasonable construction to 
section 316.610, Florida Statutes (2001), and section 316.2952, Florida Statutes 
(2001). 
 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Whren, this Court 
first applied the “reasonable officer” test as set forth in Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 
1094 (Fla. 1988).  In that case, the officers observed the defendants engaging in 
suspicious behavior when loading a boat onto a trailer: there was an unusually long 
wait for the boat to arrive at an unusually early hour; the boat lacked any 
registration numbers; the back of the truck was loaded with the heavy items which 
could help pull up a heavy load from the ramp; and the boat was loaded onto the 
 
- 37 -
trailer and driven away without draining or securing it.  The officers also observed 
a tag violation on the truck and stopped it, at which time they discovered a 
significant amount of drugs in the boat.  Id. at 1095.  The defendants asserted that 
the traffic stop was illegal because the tag was used as a pretext for the stop, as 
opposed to their suspicions of drug trafficking.  After noting that the totality of the 
circumstances provided a founded suspicion which justified the stop in and of 
itself, the Court addressed the issue relating to pretextual stops, setting forth the 
reasonable officer test: in order to show the stop was proper, “[t]he state must show 
that under the facts and circumstances a reasonable officer would have stopped the 
vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose.”  Id. at 1097. 
This test was the underpinning in the Court’s opinion in Doctor v. State, 596 
So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1992).  In that case, the officer stopped a vehicle based on a small 
crack in the taillight.  Because the car’s windows were heavily tinted, the officer 
asked the occupants, including the passenger, Doctor, who was attempting to 
conceal a large package of cocaine, to exit the car.  The Court ultimately found the 
evidence of cocaine should have been suppressed because the initial stop was 
illegal.  Id. at 446.  In reaching this decision, the Court relied heavily on the test set 
forth in Kehoe, noting that the officers who stopped Doctor conceded that they had 
no reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity until after the stop.  Their major 
purpose on the night of the stop was to intercept drugs by stopping all traffic law 
 
- 38 -
violators.  To that end, they stopped Doctor’s car because of a cracked lens cover 
on one of his car’s taillights, a condition which allegedly violated section 316.610, 
Florida Statutes (1987).  Id. at 446.  This Court held that the stop was illegal 
because a reasonable officer should have known that Doctor’s vehicle was in 
compliance with the law: the cracked lens cover did not violate the statutory 
requirements for a vehicle’s taillight; the vehicle had at least two taillights in 
working order; the vehicle posed no safety hazard; and there were no other 
violations of the law.  Id. at 447. 
The Court undertook a more exhaustive discussion of pretextual stops in 
State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1995), reaffirming the reasonable officer 
test.  There, an officer stopped the defendant after observing a large crack in the 
defendant’s windshield and a windshield wiper which was stuck directly across the 
driver’s view.  Daniel was unable to present a valid driver’s license, so the officer 
arrested him and found illegal drugs during the pat down.  This Court, after noting 
a three-way split of authority among federal jurisdictions relative to what 
constitutes an impermissible pretextual traffic stop,11 reviewed numerous United 
                                          
 
 
11.  As the Court explained, the three approaches were: (1) the “subjective 
test,” which “attempts to inquire into the actual subjective reasons why the officer 
made the stop;” (2) the “objective test,” which “ignores subjective matters and asks 
only if the officer was objectively authorized and legally permitted to make the 
stop in question without regard to any pretextual motive;” and (3) the “reasonable 
officer test,” which “refines the objective test by also asking whether the stop—if 
 
- 39 -
States Supreme Court cases and held that the reasonable officer test appeared to be 
more consistent with certain decisions of the nation’s highest Court.  Accordingly, 
this Court affirmatively re-endorsed its prior decision in Kehoe establishing the 
reasonable officer test until such a test was overruled or modified by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Id. at 1047.  After reviewing all of the evidence, the Court 
held that there was competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 
determination that the stop was valid. 
 
This line of cases was called into question when the United States Supreme 
Court decided Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  The High Court 
recognized that while the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable stops of 
vehicles, “[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 
occurred.”  Id. at 810.  After discussing the three main approaches relative to what 
constitutes an impermissible pretextual traffic stop for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, the Court soundly rejected both the subjective test and the reasonable 
officer test, holding that both were too subjective.  Instead, the Court adopted the 
objective test, declaring that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not so 
variable as to turn upon the individual police enforcement practices which vary 
greatly from place to place and from time to time.  Id. at 815. 
                                                                                                                                        
occasioned by a minor infraction—was of a kind falling within the usual practices 
of the same or similar agencies.”  Id. at 1041-42. 
 
- 40 -
This Court explicitly acknowledged that the reasonable officer test set forth 
in Daniel, Doctor, and Kehoe was overruled by the objective test of Whren.  See 
Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1997).  Accordingly, courts ask only if 
the officer was objectively authorized and legally permitted to make the stop in 
question without regard to any pretextual motive.  In Dobrin v. Florida Department 
of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2004), this Court 
again affirmed the objective test as set forth in Whren as the present applicable 
test: 
In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic 
stop under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual, 
subjective motivations of the individual officers involved in 
conducting the stop.  The only concern under the Fourth Amendment 
is the validity of the basis asserted by the officer involved in the stop.  
The Court thus rejected a consideration of whether a reasonable 
officer under similar circumstances would have initiated the traffic 
stop, noting that it seems “easier to figure out the intent of an 
individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law 
enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable officer’ 
would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.”  Id. at 815. 
Id. at 1173. 
 
Four of our district courts have approved the denial of motions to suppress 
involving cracks in a car windshield, following Whren, Holland, and Dobrin in 
setting out the standard by which a traffic stop is to be reviewed.  See State v. 
Howard, 909 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (recognizing Whren and holding that 
 
- 41 -
cracked windshield on defendant’s car justified stop);12 Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 
155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (recognizing Whren and holding that officers could stop 
vehicle based on cracked windshield); D.E.M. v. State, 916 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2005) (citing to State v. Howard, 909 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and 
State v. Perez-Garcia, 917 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), both of which rely on 
Whren); State v. Breed, 917 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing Whren 
and holding that law enforcement officer was justified in making traffic stop after 
he saw that defendant’s motor home had cracked windshield); Ivory v. State, 898 
So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing Whren and holding that deputy had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop and inspect windshield). 
 
The sole district court decision to be contrary to the Second District Court of 
Appeal’s en banc decision in this case is the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
                                          
 
 
12.  Contrary to the majority’s statement, the Howard decision does not 
indicate whether the trial court reviewed the stop to determine whether the crack 
demonstrated an objectively reasonable basis for an officer to believe that the 
vehicle violated the law—instead, Howard indicates only that the trial court 
concluded that the crack “did not create a safety issue,” 909 So. 2d at 392, and 
hence under the Second District’s panel decision, Hilton I required it to grant the 
motion to suppress.  See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (holding 
that a trial court is bound to follow the decision of a district court on the same point 
of law, absent any inter-district conflict).  Again, it is important to recognize the 
difference in standards between a trial court determining whether there was a 
violation in fact (i.e., that the vehicle was unsafe) and whether a reasonable officer 
could have concluded that the crack rendered the windshield unsafe.  The First 
District in Howard recognized this distinction on the basis of the en banc decision 
in Hilton II. 
 
 
- 42 -
decision in State v. Burke, 902 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  In that decision, 
the Fourth District relied upon this Court’s decision in Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 
442 (Fla. 1992).  However, the Fourth District questioned whether Doctor is still 
good law in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren.13  Interestingly, a 
different panel of the Fourth District, in State v. Schuck, 913 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2005), limited the court’s earlier decision in Burke and wrote approvingly of 
the Second District’s en banc decision in Hilton, holding that the “legislature 
clearly did not limit the authority of the police to only those cases in which the 
equipment created some immediate or heightened level of risk.”  Schuck, 913 So. 
2d at 71 (citing Hilton, 901 So. 2d at 157).  I recognize the majority opinion states 
that these decisions do not compel a different holding.  However, I find it to be 
extraordinary that the majority on this Court stands against the overwhelming 
weight of reasoning in the decisions of all of our district courts, including an 
                                          
 
 
13.  The majority also relies on Doctor, although it asserts that it uses this 
case solely in relation to its decision on statutory construction.  But as the Fourth 
District noted in Burke, whether Doctor is still good law in respect to an objective 
basis versus reasonable basis for a traffic stop is at the heart of the issue here.  That 
Doctor is no longer controlling on this issue is the key to a proper analysis.  In this 
case, the trial court below clearly found that the testimony established the officers 
observed the crack before stopping the vehicle and that the crack constituted an 
“objective basis” for the stop.  The majority reverses the trial court’s ruling 
because the trial court made no findings “with regard to whether the crack in the 
windshield rendered Hilton’s vehicle unsafe.”  This does not follow Whren and 
Dobrin, in which the issue to be reviewed is whether the crack would provide an 
objective reason to stop the vehicle and inspect the windshield as the First District 
correctly held in Howard. 
 
 
- 43 -
eleven-to-two en banc majority of the Second District in the case under review in 
light of Whren, Holland, and Dobrin, and the determination by the trial court that 
the crack in the windshield was an objective basis for the stop. 
The issue is whether the officers’ observation of the crack in the windshield 
of Hilton’s vehicle was an objectively reasonable basis to stop Hilton.14  This issue 
is straightforward and does not require pages of complicated statutory construction.  
As the Second District’s en banc majority and the First, Third, and Fifth District 
Courts of Appeal have decided, I would affirm the trial court’s determination in the 
present case as set forth in the majority opinion that the crack was an objective 
basis to stop the vehicle so the windshield could be checked.  Judge Northcutt’s 
dissent and the concurring opinion in this Court simply disagree with the trial 
court’s determination that the crack in the windshield was an objective basis for the 
                                          
 
 
14.  The majority contends this statement of the issue is “ambiguous.”  
Contrary to such characterization, however, this Court has consistently used this 
standard when applying the Whren analysis.  See Holland, 696 So. 2d at 759 
(“When applying the objective test, generally the only determination to be made is 
whether probable cause existed for the stop in question.”); Dobrin, 874 So. 2d at 
1174 (“The correct test to be applied is whether the particular officer who initiated 
the traffic stop had an objectively reasonable basis for making the stop.”)  By 
attempting to rephrase the relevant question, the majority is failing to adhere to this 
Court’s precedent in Dobrin and Holland in which this Court set out the relevant 
issue.  The majority attempts to analyze whether, after the stop, there could be a 
determination that the crack violated the law, as opposed to whether the seven- to 
eight-inch crack in the windshield was an objective basis upon which to stop the 
vehicle so that the officer could determine whether the crack made the vehicle 
unsafe. 
 
 
- 44 -
stop and substitute their judgments for that of the trial court.  The majority and 
Justice Pariente’s concurring opinions write out of the standard of review any 
deference to the trial judge who resolved conflicting evidence in favor of the 
determination that there was an objective basis for the stop, which an en banc 
district court found by an eleven-to-two vote was correct.15 
It is important to focus on the correct question.  In a case arising under 
Wisconsin law, the United States Court of Appeals made the essential point: 
The focus of Cashman’s argument [that the crack was not 
excessive under Wisconsin law] is, however, misplaced.  For purposes 
of the probable cause analysis, we are not concerned with the precise 
length or position of the crack.  The propriety of the traffic stop does 
not depend, in other words, on whether Cashman was actually guilty 
of committing a traffic offense by driving a vehicle with an 
excessively cracked windshield.  The pertinent question instead is 
                                          
 
 
15.  Moreover, I find the majority’s complicated statutory construction to not 
fit with the evident statutory intent.  I conclude that the statute intends for 
equipment required by the statute, including windshields, to be in “proper 
condition and adjustment,” and when the equipment does not meet this standard, a 
traffic officer can cite the driver for the equipment violation under section 316.610.  
Pursuant to section 361.6105, the person cited can mitigate the civil fine by getting 
the defect corrected.  As the Fourth District wrote in Schuck: 
 
Section 316.610(1) expressly gives a police officer the authority 
to require the driver of a vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an 
inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the 
vehicle is “unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its 
equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair” (emphasis added).  
Thus, the legislature clearly did not limit the authority of the police to 
only those cases in which the equipment created some immediate or 
heightened level of risk. 
Schuck, 913 So. 2d at 71. 
 
- 45 -
whether it was reasonable for Trooper Spetz to believe that the 
windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree.  United States v. 
Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1996). 
United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  
The Eleventh Circuit elaborated on the distinctions between Cashman, where the 
Seventh Circuit held that the cracked windshield could justify a stop, as opposed to 
United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999), where the Fifth 
Circuit held that a stop was not justified for a cracked lens cover on a taillight.  As 
the Eleventh Circuit recognized, for Fourth Amendment purposes in determining 
whether a stop was proper based on an alleged violation of the law, it is critical that 
courts distinguish between a mistake of fact, which may provide the objective 
ground to justify a traffic stop, and a mistake of law, which cannot be used to 
justify a stop: 
a. An Officer’s Mistake of Fact and the Fourth Amendment 
A traffic stop based on an officer’s incorrect but reasonable 
assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001); United States v. Garcia-Acuna, 
175 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 
955, 966 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 
1503 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th 
Cir.1994); United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1006 (11th 
Cir.1992). 
Thus, if an officer makes a traffic stop based on a mistake of 
fact, the only question is whether his mistake of fact was reasonable.  
Great deference is given to the judgment of trained law enforcement 
officers “on the scene.”  See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-206 (discussing 
excessive force claims while noting that excessive force and probable 
cause questions are subject to the same Fourth Amendment analysis). 
“The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion 
 
- 46 -
or probable cause will be . . . viewed from the standpoint of an 
objectively reasonable police officer . . . .”  Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696.  
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990), the Supreme Court 
noted that “what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the 
government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they always 
be reasonable.” 
. . . . 
For example, in Cashman, on which the government relies, the 
Seventh Circuit found that an officer had probable cause to stop a car 
with a seven to ten inch crack in the windshield under a state law that 
required that no vehicle’s windshield be “excessively cracked or 
damaged.”  Cashman, 216 F.3d at 586 (quoting Wis. Admin. Code § 
Trans. 305.34(3) (1997) (internal quotations omitted)).  The 
Wisconsin Code further specified exactly what constituted an 
excessive crack or damage, and Cashman argued that the crack in his 
windshield did not meet that criteria.  Id. at 586-87.  The Seventh 
Circuit held that even if “[c]areful measurement after the fact . . . 
reveal[ed] that the crack” was not excessive, the police officer still 
had probable cause to stop Cashman: “the Fourth Amendment 
requires only a reasonable assessment of the facts, not a perfectly 
accurate one.”  Id. at 587.  The Seventh Circuit also held that the 
“propriety of the traffic stop does not depend . . . on whether [the 
defendant is] actually guilty of committing a traffic offense . . . .  The 
pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for [the officer] 
to believe that [a traffic offense had been committed].”  Id. (citing 
United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir.1996)).  The 
Seventh Circuit also noted that “so long as the circumstances 
confronting a police officer support the reasonable belief that a driver 
has committed even a minor traffic offense, the officer has probable 
cause to stop the driver.”  Id. at 586. 
b. An Officer’s Mistake of Law and the Fourth Amendment 
The government’s reliance on Cashman is misplaced however, 
because Cashman involved an officer’s possible mistake of fact, not a 
mistake of law.  In the case before us, the officer’s mistake was one of 
law.  Relying on Lopez-Soto and Lopez-Valdez, the Defendants argue 
that under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s mistake of law cannot 
provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause required to justify a traffic stop. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
- 47 -
In Lopez-Valdez, an officer stopped the defendant for a broken 
taillight.  The plastic cover of the taillight was broken, but the bulb 
itself was intact.  178 F.3d at 284-85.  However, because of a previous 
case regarding the same statute ten years earlier, the Fifth Circuit 
noted that “no well-trained Texas police officer could reasonably 
believe that white light appearing with red light through a cracked red 
taillight lens constituted a violation of traffic law.”  Id. at 289.  
Therefore, the traffic stop was not “objectively reasonable.”  Id. at 289 
n.6.  In addition, the Fifth Circuit held that the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule should not be extended to cover an officer’s 
mistake of law.  Id. at 289. 
 
United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2003).  As 
Chanthasouxat makes clear, there is a significant difference between a crack in a 
taillight cover, which could never constitute a violation of the law, and a cracked 
windshield, which may constitute a violation of the law, depending on the 
circumstances of the crack.  Courts must give “great deference” to the judgment of 
trained law enforcement officers and keep in mind that “an officer’s mistaken 
assessment of facts need not render his actions unreasonable because what is 
reasonable will be completely dependent on the specific and usually unique 
circumstances presented by each case.”  Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1276-77.  It 
would be nearly impossible to require that police make an accurate assessment of 
which cracks in the windshield pose a risk to safety when each car is traveling at 
highway speeds.  Instead, if the officer sees a crack in a windshield that he or she 
reasonably believes may pose a safety risk or impairs the driver’s vision, the 
 
- 48 -
officer is clearly permitted to stop the vehicle in order to ascertain the risk.16  The 
question is not whether after stopping the vehicle and observing it on close 
inspection, the officer still believes that the crack could pose a safety risk or 
obstructs the driver’s view. 
 
Moreover, reasonable statutory construction dictates that the requirement of 
section 316.2952 for a windshield includes that the windshield be in good repair so 
that the driver can see out of the vehicle.  This is the very reason that section 
316.2952 requires a device to keep the windshield cleared from moisture and for 
windshield wipers.  In order to safeguard the user of the motor vehicle, as well as 
passengers and pedestrians, the provisions of section 316.610 allow police officers 
to stop cars that do not appear to be in good repair or may be unsafe.  Obviously, a 
motor vehicle’s windshield, which is integral to the safe operation of the vehicle, is 
included within the equipment to which section 316.610(1) refers.  Any 
interpretation of the statutory scheme which equates air conditioners or radios to 
windshields is simply a strained and unreasonable construction of the statute, as 
should be recognized by any driver of a motor vehicle. 
                                          
 
 
16.  In fact, in Cashman, a case to which the majority also cites, the Seventh 
Circuit found that a crack which was almost the same length as the crack at issue 
here was “substantial” and could support an officer’s reasonable belief that it 
constituted “excessive cracking.”  See Cashman, 216 F.3d at 587.  Although 
excessive cracking of a windshield may not always render a car unsafe, it does 
provide an officer with a reasonable basis to believe that the car may be unsafe. 
 
- 49 -
I cannot agree with Judge Northcutt’s assertion in his dissent in the Second 
District’s decision that “Florida law did not prohibit Hilton to drive with a cracked 
windshield.”  901 So. 2d at 162.  I do not believe his analogy to the cracked 
taillight in Doctor is correct.  There is a significant difference as to whether a 
cracked taillight can be considered a danger, as opposed to a cracked windshield.  
As a driver and user of the public streets and highways, I know I do not want 
another vehicle with a cracked windshield to be on the public highways and streets, 
endangering me, my family, friends, or anyone else, not to mention endangering 
the safety of the occupants of the vehicle in question.  I conclude that this is the 
reason that the Legislature gave police officers the power to stop a vehicle whose 
equipment is not in proper repair.  A windshield is clearly within such equipment. 
In sum, I would hold that the overwhelming majority (eleven to two) of the 
en banc Second District was correct in its decision in the present case and would 
likewise approve the decisions of three of the other four district courts that have 
decided the issue.  In fact, after its Burke decision, even the Fourth District reached 
a similar result, holding: 
Section 316.610(1) expressly gives a police officer the authority 
to require the driver of a vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an 
inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the 
vehicle is “unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its 
equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair” (emphasis added).  
Thus, the legislature clearly did not limit the authority of the police to 
only those cases in which the equipment created some immediate or 
heightened level of risk.  See Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155, 157 
 
- 50 -
 
- 51 -
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“By necessary implication, the stop of a vehicle 
is proper even if the equipment violation does not create an unduly 
hazardous operating condition.”).  A stop is lawful under section 
316.610 where the vehicle reasonably appears to have an equipment 
violation.  See, e.g., State v. Snead, 707 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1998) (holding that stop was reasonable where officer had probable 
cause to believe that appellee’s taillight and brake light were 
inoperable). 
Schuck, 913 So. 2d at 71.  For all of the above reasons, I would approve the 
decision of the Second District in this case. 
CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D02-5436 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Anthony C. Musto, Special 
Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill, McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent