Title: Parson v. Carroll
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052600
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2006

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
THOMAS WESLEY PARSON, IV 
 
v.  Record No. 052600   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 3, 2006 
ROBERT PATTON CARROLL 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 
Samuel E. Campbell, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in awarding summary judgment in a defamation action to a 
defendant, who was a victim of several crimes, in an action 
brought by the perpetrator of those crimes who earlier pleaded 
guilty to the offenses under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25 (1970).  We review the circuit court’s application of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel in this procedural and factual 
context. 
Thomas Wesley Parson, IV, and Robert Patton Carroll became 
friends in 2001 through their involvement in church activities.  
Parson “took [Carroll] under his wing[]” and paid him to perform 
various tasks such as house cleaning and yard work.  In October 
2004, Carroll informed his minister, Robin Jones, that Parson 
had made sexual advances toward Carroll.  At that time, Carroll 
was a minor about 16 years of age and Parson was 50 years old. 
Based on Carroll’s complaint, the Commonwealth initiated 
criminal proceedings against Parson.  In November 2004, Parson 
 
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pleaded guilty to six counts of sexual battery.  His guilty 
pleas were “Alford pleas,” in which he asserted his innocence 
but stipulated that the evidence presented, if credible, was 
sufficient to convict him.  See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38.  At 
the time of Parson’s guilty pleas and sentencing, the 
Commonwealth summarized the evidence it would have presented at 
trial: 
Around October of 2002, the defendant began to make 
sexual overtures to the victim and was touching him 
inappropriately at various times.  He would also hit him 
with whips and riding props at various times. 
 
The victim’s grandmother became sick and had a stroke 
in 2002.  At this time the victim continued to go back to 
the defendant’s house on a regular basis, although these 
things were happening to him.  Because, number one, he was 
receiving an income from the jobs he was doing and he did 
need the money.  And, number two, he still believed the 
defendant to be his friend. 
 
The victim went to the defendant’s home around October 
. . . [2004,] when the defendant touched him 
inappropriately and the victim left and never went back. 
 
Subsequently, the victim told his minister who would 
also [have] testified today.  And, also the Greensville 
County sheriff’s department was called.  Officer Chris 
Robinson investigated the matter and took statements from 
the individuals.  Mr. Parsons [sic] never admitted that he 
ever touched the defendant in any inappropriate manner.  
But, the officer did find several riding props and whips in 
an umbrella stand as the victim had described. 
 
The circuit court accepted Parson’s Alford pleas and asked 
Parson if he would like to make a statement.  Parson responded, 
“That, you know, everything was just so far in the past.  This 
was years ago.” 
 
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The circuit court sentenced Parson to 12 months in jail for 
each of the six counts of sexual battery and suspended the 
entire sentence.  Additionally, the court imposed a fine of $200 
for each offense. 
 
Less than five months later, Parson brought a defamation 
action against Carroll.1  Parson alleged that Carroll told Jones 
that Parson and Carroll “had engaged in various intimate, 
sexual, and/or illegal acts including: (a) [Carroll] rubbing 
lotion on [Parson’s] body, (b) [Parson] whipping [Carroll] with 
a horse whip, his hand or with a stick, and (c) kissing each 
other.”  Parson further alleged that since March 27, 2004, 
Carroll related to other members of the community that Parson 
had assaulted Carroll and that Parson and Carroll had engaged in 
intimate or sexual activities.  Parson asserted that Carroll’s 
statements were false. 
 
In his grounds of defense, Carroll admitted he told Jones 
that Parson had physically and sexually abused him.  Carroll 
further admitted that he told “others” about Parson’s illegal 
and abusive actions as part of the criminal investigation that 
ultimately led to Parson’s conviction.  Carroll asserted that 
all the statements he made regarding Parson were privileged and 
true. 
                     
1 Prior to Parson’s action, Carroll brought a civil action 
against Parson seeking monetary damages based on Parson’s acts 
of sexual abuse. 
 
3
 
Carroll later filed a motion for summary judgment.  After 
conducting a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted 
Carroll’s motion, holding that Parson’s Alford pleas barred the 
defamation action.  The circuit court stated: 
 
The Court heard the criminal case, the Court took the plea 
. . . . There’s no question in my mind that when you make 
an Alford plea, you admit that the evidence is so 
sufficient that you can’t overcome it. 
 
. . . It’s an admission of guilt when you’re doing that, 
the Court makes a finding on that evidence that it’s 
sufficient to find guilt.  The Court finds that as a block, 
and the Court is granting the motion for summary judgment. 
 
On appeal, Parson asserts that the circuit court erred in 
applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on his Alford 
pleas and the transcript containing those pleas to decide 
Carroll’s summary judgment motion.  In support of his argument, 
Parson relies on our decision in Bentley Funding Group, L.L.C. 
v. SK&R Group, L.L.C., 269 Va. 315, 609 S.E.2d 49 (2005).  He 
argues that under the holding in Bentley Funding Group, the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel may be applied only when the 
position sought to be estopped is a position of fact, rather 
than a position of law.  Parson argues that he did not make any 
factual concessions when entering his Alford pleas and that, 
therefore, the circuit court erred in relying on those pleas as 
concessions of fact in applying judicial estoppel to decide 
Carroll’s summary judgment motion. 
 
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In response, Carroll asserts that the circuit court did not 
err in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, because the 
doctrine may be employed to prohibit a party from asserting a 
claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a position 
he has taken in an earlier legal proceeding.  Carroll contends 
that Parson’s position in the present defamation action 
contradicted his prior pleas of guilty in the criminal 
prosecution.  We disagree with Carroll’s arguments.  
We first observe that a circuit court’s decision granting a 
summary judgment motion is an extreme remedy.  Klaiber v. 
Freemason Assocs., 266 Va. 478, 484, 587 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2003); 
Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 556, 422 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1992).  
A circuit court may decide a case by summary judgment only when 
there are no material facts genuinely in dispute.  Rule 3:20; 
Klaiber, 266 Va. at 484, 587 S.E.2d at 558; Thurmond v. Prince 
William Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 265 Va. 59, 64, 574 S.E.2d 
246, 250 (2003).  In this procedural context, the issue we 
determine is whether, through application of the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel, the Alford pleas Parson entered in the 
criminal prosecution resolved against him all material issues of 
fact in the defamation action. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel is well established in 
our jurisprudence.  The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to 
protect the integrity of the judicial process and to guard it 
 
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from improper use.  See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 
749-51 (2001); Kaiser v. Bowlen, 455 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 
2006); Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th 
Cir. 2006); Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., 399 
F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 2005); King v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem'l 
Hosp., 159 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1998). 
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party is 
prohibited from assuming successive positions in an action or a 
series of actions, regarding the same fact or state of facts, 
which are inconsistent with each other or are mutually 
contradictory.  Bentley Funding Group, 269 Va. at 325, 609 
S.E.2d at 53-54; Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 268 
Va. 377, 380-81, 601 S.E.2d 648, 650 (2004).  The fundamental 
requirement for application of the doctrine is that the party 
who is the object of the estoppel request must be assuming a 
position of fact, rather than a position of law, which is 
inconsistent with a stance that the same party has taken in a 
prior litigation.  Bentley Funding Group, 269 Va. at 326, 609 
S.E.2d at 54; Lofton Ridge, 268 Va. at 382, 601 S.E.2d at 651; 
Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996). 
Here, the circuit court’s application of the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel was based on its determination that Parson’s 
Alford pleas “block[ed],” or barred, his defamation action.  
 
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This determination, however, reflects a misperception of the 
nature of the guilty pleas that Parson entered. 
In Alford, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a guilty plea in which a criminal defendant did not admit his 
participation in the acts constituting the crime.  400 U.S. at 
37-38.  The Court explained that “while most pleas of guilty 
consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of 
guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to 
the imposition of criminal penalty.”  Id. at 37.  The Court 
stated that, therefore, “[a]n individual accused of crime may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or 
unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime.”  Id.  Based on this holding in Alford, the courts in 
this Commonwealth in the exercise of their discretion have 
permitted criminal defendants who wish to avoid the consequences 
of a trial to plead guilty by conceding that the evidence is 
sufficient to convict them, while maintaining that they did not 
participate in the acts constituting the crimes.  See e.g., 
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 301, 302 n.1, 551 S.E.2d 332, 
333 n.1 (2001); Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 563 n.1, 506 
S.E.2d 787, 788 n.1 (1998); Zigta v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 
149, 151 n.1, 562 S.E.2d 347, 348 n.1 (2002); Perry v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 412-13, 533 S.E.2d 651, 652-53 
(2000). 
At the time Parson entered his Alford pleas to the several 
misdemeanor charges, the circuit court asked him, “Do you 
understand that because of [your] plea, you are admitting that 
all of the evidence could be sufficient to find you guilty of 
the amended charges, the misdemeanors?”  Parson replied, 
“Correct.”  In addition, Parson’s attorney stated that based on 
Parson’s Alford pleas, “[w]e would stipulate that the evidence 
as presented and if believable would have been sufficient.” 
By these representations in his criminal prosecution, 
Parson assumed a position of law, not a position of fact.  He 
conceded only that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of 
the offenses and did not admit as a factual matter that he had 
participated in the acts constituting the crimes. 
This concession of law did not provide a basis for applying 
judicial estoppel in the present defamation action.  See Bentley 
Funding Group, 269 Va. at 325-26, 609 S.E.2d at 53-54; Lofton 
Ridge, 268 Va. at 382, 601 S.E.2d at 651; The Pittston Co. v. 
O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 903-04, 63 S.E.2d 34, 43 (1951).  Moreover, 
judicial estoppel was not a proper remedy because Parson did not 
maintain a position of fact when he entered his Alford pleas 
and, thus, his factual allegations in this defamation action did 
not represent an inconsistent or contradictory successive 
 
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position of fact.  See Calcote v. Fraser Forbes Co., 270 Va. 
399, 406, 621 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2005); Bentley Funding Group, 269 
Va. at 326, 609 S.E.2d at 54; Lofton Ridge, 268 Va. at 382, 601 
S.E.2d at 651; Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 383-84, 541 S.E.2d 
899, 901-02 (2001). 
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel and that, as a 
result, the material factual allegations of Parson’s motion for 
judgment remained in dispute at the time the circuit court 
decided Carroll’s summary judgment motion.  Because the material 
facts of Parson’s motion for judgment were still in dispute at 
this stage of the proceedings, the circuit court further erred 
in awarding Carroll summary judgment.2
Finally, we note that Carroll has cited in his brief a 
portion of our decision in Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 404 S.E.2d 
721 (1990), in which we stated that “courts will not assist the 
participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit from the act’s 
commission.”  Id. at 34, 404 S.E.2d at 722.  In light of our 
holding, we do not reach the question whether, under Zysk, 
Parson’s criminal acts bar him as a matter of law from 
recovering any damages in this defamation action.  That issue 
                     
2 Based on our holding in this case, we do not consider 
Parson’s additional contention that his Alford pleas and 
transcript of those pleas were not admissible under Code § 8.01-
418 in this civil action. 
 
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may arise on remand of this case after the court has determined 
whether the allegedly defamatory statements concerned the same 
conduct to which Parson pleaded guilty. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings in 
accordance with the principles expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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