Title: Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc.
Citation: 1990 WY 7, 786 P.2d 855
Docket Number: 
State: Wyoming
Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 1990

Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc. Annotate this Case Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc. 1990 WY 7 786 P.2d 855 Case Number: 89-100 Decided: 01/26/1990 Supreme Court of Wyoming REX A. BRITTON AND VERONICA K. BRITTON, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), v. BILL ANSELMI PONTIAC-BUICK-GMC, INC., APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). Appeal from the District Court, Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J. James K. Lubing of Goody & Lubing, Jackson, for appellants. Robert J. Pickett of Pickett & McKinney, Rock Springs, for appellee. Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. URBIGKIT, Justice. [¶1] This is a lemon car lawsuit where, following numerous unsuccessful attempts to have their 1983 Buick Regal repaired, appellants Rex A. and Veronica K. Britton (Britton) brought suit against the seller of the vehicle, Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc. (BAI), and the manufacturer, General Motors Corporation (GM). Their complaint sought recovery of the $15,184.84 purchase price, incurred costs and attorney fees by allegations of fraud, breach of both express and implied warranties, and failure to comply with both the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 and Wyoming's "Lemon Law", W.S. 40-17-101 (1989 Cum. Supp.). GM settled with Britton and the case proceeded to a bench trial against BAI. The district court allowed recovery for the dealership's breach of warranty, determined the Brittons had failed to establish their fraud claim or their claims under either of the two statutory causes of action, and only awarded damages of $1,500. The Brittons question contended district court errors: 1) * * * in ruling that fraud was not proven at trial when: a) ample evidence of fraud was produced at trial, and b) Appellant Veronica Britton was prohibited from testifying as to representations made to her by an agent of Appellee because of erroneous application of the hearsay doctrine? 2) * * * in not applying the Wyoming lemon law when the Appellee represented the car as a new car at the time of sale, and the car was covered under a new car warranty? 3) * * * in not applying the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act which applies to used as well as new cars? [¶2] We reverse and remand. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [¶3] On December 4, 1984, the Brittons visited the Buick-Pontiac-GMC dealership in Rock Springs, Wyoming to purchase a car. Although initially intending to buy a new vehicle, they had become curious about BAI's radio advertisements trumpeting the arrival of a number of "Brass Hat" specials. Dick Boling, company salesman and an acquaintance of the Brittons, informed them the advertisements referred to certain low-mileage vehicles which had never been privately titled and had only been used as company cars by GM executives. Because such cars, with the availability of new car financing and their 12 months/12,000 miles new car warranty, had been described as comparable to new vehicles, the Brittons permitted Boling to show them one of the "Brass Hat" specials, a 1983 Buick Regal. When they inquired about a dealer's identification sticker on the rear of the car, Boling explained that the vehicle had been used solely to transport GM executives to and from the Jackson, Wyoming airport, but that GM had permitted Teton Motors, Inc., a local Jackson dealership, to place the sticker on the car for advertising purposes. The Brittons bought the car and purchased additional warranty protection which extended the basic new car warranty to a term of 48 months/48,000 miles. [¶4] The Brittons immediately experienced problems with the vehicle. Between the purchase date and June 1985, they repeatedly attempted to have BAI repair the following items: a malfunctioning tape deck, an "adjustable" heater that would deliver only cold air or air heated to eighty-five degrees, windows that would not fully close, a defective alternator, a non-functioning gas gauge, a leaking sun roof, broken electric seats, paint that washed off when the car was hosed down, a malfunctioning turbocharger, and a leaking and slipping transmission. The Brittons claimed that, during those six months, they had the car towed a number of times, took the car back for repair fifteen times, and lost the use of the vehicle due to repairs for forty-five days. Notwithstanding the time and effort presumably put into those repair efforts, the dealership managed to fix only the alternator, and that only after three tries. Compounding the frustration and inconvenience of these unsuccessful attempts to repair the car, one of the dealership's mechanics, harboring an unrelated personal grudge against Rex Britton, threatened to make the vehicle the instrument of his vengeance.1 The Brittons, accordingly, engaged the services of an attorney. [¶5] By this time, the parties' business relationship had become nearly as irreparable as the "Brass Hat" special. The Brittons resisted suggestions of further attempts at repair. BAI's alternative offer to exchange the 1983 Buick Regal for another vehicle, because it appeared limited to vehicles of lesser value than the Buick and appeared to require further expenditures by the Brittons to obtain a car of comparable value, met with similar resistance. Negotiations were further discouraged by the Brittons' discovery that their "new" vehicle had actually been owned previously by a Jackson man who had prevailed in a suit against Teton Motors, Inc. and GM after the dealership proved unable to correct a myriad of problems with the car. Many of the defects plaguing the prior owner were identical to the problems encountered by the Brittons.2 Meanwhile, the "Brass Hat" special continued to tarnish in various garages and repair shops. On April 17, 1986, the Brittons filed the present lawsuit. PROOF OF FRAUD [¶6] At trial, the Brittons attempted to introduce both direct and circumstantial evidence that the salesman, Boling, had misrepresented the history of the purchased vehicle. The direct evidence consisted largely of the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony by Rex Britton, and Veronica Britton to the extent as purchasing owner, she was permitted to testify as to statements made by Boling. The circumstantial evidence included newspaper advertisements, published a few days after the sale, which corroborated Boling's definition of a "Brass Hat" special and which confirmed that BAI was selling the purchased vehicle under such a guise. Additionally, the Brittons introduced evidence of the dealership's guilty plea to criminal charges that those advertisements, in describing the listed vehicles as "Brass Hat" specials, were knowingly false and misleading. The district court concluded that such evidence was insufficient to establish the Brittons' case for fraudulent misrepresentation.3 [¶7] The only rationale given for that conclusion appears in the district court's decision letter of February 13, 1989 which stated: Several of the exhibits go to the wrongdoing of Bill Anselmi, Inc. in the advertising of the car as a Brass Hat Special. The company was prosecuted and convicted for the fraudulent advertising. The testimony, however, was that the Plaintiffs did not go to the dealer for a Brass Hat Special but for a new car. The actual ad in evidence which led to the conviction ran in the newspaper three days after the Brittons purchased the car. The testimony also indicated that Bill Anselmi, Inc. advertised the car the same way G.M.C. advertised it to him.[4] (Emphasis in original.) This statement suggests the district court conceived the Brittons' case for fraud to be based solely upon misrepresentations contained in the newspaper advertisements. Insofar as that characterization of the case is correct, the district court perhaps concluded: (1) the advertisements could not have induced the sale since they were not published until after the sale; (2) the advertisements could not have induced the Brittons to seek a "Brass Hat" special since they admitted that, despite the advertisements, they had gone to BAI to buy a new car; and (3) the car seller was not culpable because, having itself relied on the representations of GM, it made no knowing misrepresentations to the Brittons. We do not believe, however, that such a characterization of the Brittons' fraud case comports with the record. Their case rested, not on misrepresentations contained in the newspaper advertisements, but rather on the false statements of Boling. Because evidence regarding those statements was crucial to the Brittons' case, we turn our attention to the propriety of excluding much of that evidence.5 [¶8] When Veronica Britton was questioned about Boling's pre-sale representations, appellee entered a hearsay objection. The district court clearly erred in sustaining that objection over the Brittons' argument that statements made in Boling's capacity as BAI's agent were not hearsay. W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D) states: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay if: * * * * * * (2) Admission by Party-Opponent. - The statement is offered against a party and is * * * (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Boling's statements as a car salesman, admittedly employed by the dealership at the time he sold the 1983 Buick Regal to the Brittons, were obviously offered against his employer. Any such statements made to Veronica Britton, a prospective customer, concerning the history of that vehicle were unquestionably "matter[s] within the scope of his agency or employment." W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). Thus, those statements were not hearsay and were erroneously excluded. See Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 , 562 (Wyo. 1985). This was fundamental evidence of Brittons' case, and particularly so since, by the buyer's copy of the sales instrument, she was the only buyer. See n. 7 infra. [¶9] BAI, however, asserts on appeal that, because Rex Britton testified concerning Boling's statements, any error in excluding Veronica Britton's testimony must be harmless. We cannot agree. While the substance of her testimony might be apparent from the record, we cannot with any assurance assume that its quality or scope would have been identical to that given by her husband. Had Veronica Britton's testimony proved more convincing than her husband's, or had it been strongly corroborative of his testimony, the district court might not have so easily limited its examination of BAI's putative fraud to a consideration of the misleading newspaper advertisements. Although the district court appears to have given little weight to Rex Britton's testimony regarding the seller's pre-sale representations, focusing instead solely on the proof of its after-the-fact advertisements, we are unable to conclude that it would do so again in the face of additional testimony for it is clear the Brittons established a prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation.6 [¶10] To make such a case, the Brittons needed to introduce evidence that the BAI salesman knowingly made a false representation of a material fact with the intent of inducing them to buy the car, and that they were induced to make the purchase, to their detriment, by their reasonable reliance upon his statements. See Willmschen v. Meeker, 750 P.2d 669 , 672 (Wyo. 1988); Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407 , 410 (Wyo. 1985); and Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 , 437 (Wyo. 1985). Evidence of any active conduct or words by Boling which tended to produce an erroneous impression might sufficiently satisfy that burden if those half truths had the effect of lies. Although BAI and its salesman were under no legal duty to speak on the matter of the 1983 Buick Regal's ownership history, once they chose to speak they were obligated to fully and fairly disclose the truth of the matter. Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556 , 558 (Wyo. 1979); Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878 , 880 (Wyo. 1972); Twing v. Schott, 80 Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839 , 841 (1959). [¶11] The Brittons even met their burden without the challenged testimony of Veronica Britton. Rex Britton testified that Boling completely fabricated an account of the 1983 Buick Regal's presence in Jackson, thereby embellishing upon the false claim that it had only seen use as a GM company car. The company owner testified that no one in his organization had any such detailed knowledge of the vehicle's history. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the history of a vehicle would not be material to a prospective purchaser. Since the Brittons had gone to the automobile sales company with the intent of purchasing a new vehicle, Boling's fabrication appears to have served its obvious purpose of diverting the Brittons' plans and inducing them to purchase the used 1983 Buick Regal.7 [¶12] We recognize at bench trial it is the provence of the district court to determine whether fraud has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 , 1177 (Wyo. 1988); Duffy, 708 P.2d at 437; Meyer v. Ludvik, 680 P.2d 459 , 464-65 (Wyo. 1984). However, it has long been the position of this court that testimony favoring a party which is both uncontradicted and unimpeached cannot be wholly ignored during the district court's deliberations. Crompton v. Bruce, 669 P.2d 930 , 933 (Wyo. 1983); Creek v. Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353 , 357 (Wyo. 1983); Twing, 338 P.2d at 841. Thus, we will not ordinarily disturb its decision regarding the existence of fraud unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is against the great weight of the evidence on record. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781 , 793 (Wyo. 1989); Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219 , 1222 (Wyo. 1985); Meeker, 604 P.2d at 558. Because the Brittons' prima facie case of fraud is both unimpeached and uncontradicted, we assume that the district court gave due consideration to the evidence of Boling's statements, despite its apparent concentration on BAI's post-sale misrepresentations. We cannot intrude on what may have been merely the district court's assessment of a witness' credibility. However, we must allow for the possibility that, with the addition of Veronica Britton's testimony, the district court might find the weight of evidence shifted in the Brittons' favor. We, therefore, decline BAI's invitation to hold the erroneous exclusion on Veronica Britton's testimony harmless, and accordingly remand for further consideration of the Brittons' fraud claim. APPLICABILITY OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT [¶13] We also remand the Brittons' claim for relief under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for reconsideration by the district court. The Act provides, at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (emphasis added): (1) Subject to subsections (a)(3) and (e), a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this title * * *, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief - (A) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State * * *.[8] The Brittons were clearly "consumers" under the Act, and BAI was just as clearly a "supplier."9 Furthermore, the district court expressly found the Brittons entitled to relief under a breach of warranty theory. Although the district court's decision letter and the remainder of the record do little to clarify whether the promise the district court found breached would best be characterized under the Act as a written warranty, an implied warranty, or a service contract, we cannot help but to conclude that it must fall under one or a combination of these headings and particularly so because an extra $350 was paid for acquisition of the warranty as a result of the sales negotiations.10 We therefore hold the Brittons have established their cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and remand for a determination of their entitlement to the Act's expanded remedies.11 APPLICABILITY OF WYOMING'S "LEMON LAW" [¶14] In its decision letter, the district court makes the following comments regarding the Brittons' warranty protection: Plaintiffs are entitled to recover under a cause of action for Breach of Warranty. * * * * * * * * * * * * The warranty was not in effect when Mr. Britton "spun a rod" in December, 1987, because mileage on the vehicle exceeded 51,558 which was the limit. While this statement fails to eliminate the possibility that the district court may also have considered the Brittons entitled to relief under an implied warranty, and while the record is unclear as to whether the document referenced in that statement would more aptly be characterized a written warranty or a service contract under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, there is only one document in the record which the district court could have had in mind. That is the instrument which allegedly extended the Brittons' 12 months/12,000 miles warranty protection to a term of 48 months/48,000 miles, and which was variously described as an "extended warranty" or a "repair agreement." [¶15] Regardless of the label placed on this document, the district court identified only one characteristic of the agreement which excluded the Brittons from the protection of Wyoming's "Lemon Law," W.S. 40-17-101 (1989 Cum.Supp.). The district court's opinion letter states: As mentioned in the Summary Judgment Opinion letter, this car was not new as it had 6,558 miles on it when purchased by the Brittons. (Even the ad reflected as much.) The 1983 car was purchased in December, 1984 when new cars were 1985 models. And, although there was some conflict in testimony, the contract states "used".[12] Therefore, Wyoming's Lemon Law does not apply That is, the district court found Wyoming's "Lemon Law" inapplicable because the warranted vehicle was not "new", as that word is usually and commonly employed. [¶16] Indeed, portions of the definitional and remedial subsections of the statute suggest such a conclusion. W.S. 40-17-101(a)(iv), (b) and (c) (emphasis added) state: (iv) "Manufacturers' express warranty or warranty" means the written warranty, so labeled, of the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle, including any terms or conditions precedent to the enforcement of obligations under warranty. (b) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer within one (1) year following the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, the manufacturer, its agent or authorized dealer shall make repairs necessary to conform the vehicle to the express warranties. The necessary repairs shall be made even if the one (1) year period has expired. (c) If the manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect or condition which substantially impairs the use and fair market value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall: (i) Replace the motor vehicle with a new or comparable motor vehicle of the same type and similarly equipped; or (ii) Accept return of the motor vehicle and refund to the consumer and any lienholder as their interest may appear the full purchase price including all collateral charges less a reasonable allowance for consumer's use. Because the term "new vehicle" is undefined under the statute, one would normally be justified in adopting the position of the district court that such a vehicle is one which has had no prior owner and one which has seen only the negligible mileage associated with test driving and transport between assembly line to showroom. Such is not the case, however. [¶17] W.S. 40-17-101(a)(i)(A), (B) and (C) define a "consumer" as any person: (A) Who purchases a motor vehicle, other than for purposes [purpose] of resale, to which an express warranty applies; or (B) To whom a motor vehicle is transferred during the term of an express warranty applicable to the motor vehicle; or (C) Entitled by the terms of an express warranty applicable to motor vehicle to enforce it. It is clear from subsections (B) and (C) of this definition that a consumer need not be the first owner of a "new vehicle" to be entitled to the protection of the statute, so long as either the manufacturer gave the first owner of that vehicle an "express warranty" which is still in effect at the time of transfer to the consumer or the consumer has been given such a warranty by the manufacturer. The crucial fact is not that the vehicle has been previously owned, nor that the vehicle has been driven a substantial number of miles, but rather that the transfer of the vehicle to the consumer occurs during the term of a prior warranty or is accompanied by a new warranty. To read the definition otherwise would be to ignore the plain language of subsections (B) and (C) and to render them superfluous. This definition, however, clearly conflicts with the district court's criteria for a "new vehicle," lack of prior ownership and substantial mileage, thereby rendering the term "new vehicle" ambiguous. [¶18] This court will abide by the plain language of a statute so long as the meaning of the statute is, by such a reading, clear and unambiguous. When ambiguity arises, though, we resort to well-settled principles of statutory construction, reading all portions of the statute in pari materia under the assumption that the legislature intended no part of its enactment to be inoperative or superfluous. We construe every word, every clause and every sentence so as to avoid rendering the legislature's actions futile or absurd. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 , 231 (Wyo. 1988); Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 750 P.2d 1329 , 1331 (Wyo. 1988); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 , 1142 (Wyo. 1985). [¶19] The legislature expressed, by definition, an intent to extend the benefits of the "Lemon Law" to three classes of "consumers": (1) those who were the first purchasers of a "new vehicle" under its "manufacturer's express warranty"; (2) those who became the subsequent owner of a "new vehicle" prior to the lapse of the "manufacturer's express warranty" given to the first purchaser of the vehicle; and (3) those subsequent owners of a "new vehicle" who otherwise obtained the protection of a "manufacturer's express warranty." The common feature of each of these consumer classes is not that they were the first purchasers of a current model year vehicle with a blank odometer. Thus, we cannot use that feature to define a "new vehicle" without voiding the benefit the legislature intended to bestow. The circumstance that binds all these consumers is that the manufacturer chose to make an express "new vehicle" warranty applicable to their vehicles. Only by including all such vehicles within the definition of the term "new vehicle" can the full breadth of legislative protection find effect. Only by such means can the ambiguities of this statute be resolved to render all parts of the statute operative. [¶20] In the present case, the Brittons' 1983 Buick Regal was at least initially provided a "full new car warranty." Such being the case, it was a "new vehicle" for purposes of the Lemon Law and the Brittons were entitled to have the vendor remedy its defects according to the statutory standard. Since, as the district court found, the Brittons were damaged by BAI's failure to conform the vehicle to what the district court characterized as an express warranty, the Brittons were entitled by W.S. 40-17-101(j) to "bring a civil action to enforce this section and * * * recover reasonable attorney's fees from the manufacturer who issued the express warranty." Accordingly, they could seek any of the remedies of W.S. 40-17-101(b) and (c) set out above. The district court erred in its determination that Wyoming's "Lemon Law" was inapplicable under the facts of this case. [¶21] We reverse the decision of the district court which denied the Brittons relief under their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Wyoming's "Lemon Law," and remand for retrial. CARDINE, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. [¶22] I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case and, for the most part, concur with the reasoning by which it arrived at that result. However, because the majority has deviated from sound and customary principles of statutory construction in its treatment of Wyoming's "Lemon Law," I am compelled to take issue with that portion of the court's opinion. [¶23] W.S. 40-17-101(a)(i) (June 1989 Cum. Supp.) provides: "`Consumer' means any person: "(A) Who purchases a motor vehicle, other than for purposes [purpose] of resale, to which an express warranty applies; or "(B) To whom a motor vehicle is transferred during the term of an express warranty applicable to the motor vehicle; or "(C) Entitled by the terms of an express warranty applicable to a motor vehicle to enforce it." While I agree with the court's assertion that subsections (A), (B) and (C) of this provision clearly extend statutory protections to three distinct classes of consumers, I depart from its reasoning in distinguishing those classes. [¶24] The court's opinion assumes that all consumers protected by this statute share two characteristics: they are all "purchasers" of vehicles, and they are all entitled to enforce an express warranty. The court reasons that, if the statute's application is confined to new vehicles, little remains to differentiate between the three consumer classes. It concludes that subsections (A), (B) and (C) are redundant under such a reading, thereby rendering the statute ambiguous. Accordingly, the court abandons the plain and usual meaning of the term "new vehicle" and, instead, defines it as a vehicle carrying a "new vehicle warranty." By such means, the majority differentiates between the three classes of consumers based on three different circumstances under which they have received such warranties: (1) first purchasers of new vehicles which carry the customary new car warranty; (2) subsequent purchasers of such vehicles who become such prior to the lapse of the original new car warranty; and (3) those subsequent purchasers who obtain such vehicles from a dealer after the lapse of the original warranty but who receive equivalent warranty protection. [¶25] Because the plain meaning of the statutory language clearly delineates and distinguishes the three protected classes of consumers without redundancy or ambiguity, these contortions were wholly unnecessary. Contrary to the majority's analysis, I perceive these "consumers" to share but a single attribute: they all have some interest in a "new vehicle," as that term is commonly understood, which carries the customary new car warranty. They are not all "purchasers," as the majority suggests. In fact, the ownership interest enjoyed by a purchaser distinguishes the "consumer" defined in subsection (A) from the two alternative consumer classes defined in subsections (B) and (C). Subsection (B) refers to a non-purchasing party to whom some ownership interest in the new vehicle has nevertheless been transferred during the term of the original new car warranty. Clearly, that subsection describes the circumstances of lenders having a security interest in the vehicle. It is equally clear that subsection (C) has extended the protections of the statute to those without any such ownership interest in the vehicle. That is, the legislature has included among "consumers" not only purchasers and non-purchasing transferees of new vehicles but also those leasing new vehicles. [¶26] Reading the definition of "consumer" in this manner achieves a reasonable result from the plain meaning of the statutory language and avoids any of the redundancy or ambiguity perceived by the majority. The Wyoming "Lemon Law," W.S. 40-17-101, is restricted in its application to new cars only, providing in part as follows: "(b) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer within one (1) year following the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, the manufacturer, its agent or authorized dealer shall make repairs necessary to conform the vehicle to the express warranties. The necessary repairs shall be made even if the one (1) year period has expired. "(c) If the manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect or condition which substantially impairs the use and fair market value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall: "(i) Replace the motor vehicle with a new or comparable motor vehicle of the same type and similarly equipped; or "(ii) Accept return of the motor vehicle * * *." (emphasis added) A 1983 Buick, having 6700 miles on its odometer when purchased in 1985 by its second owner, is not a new car. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that appellant is entitled to the protection of Wyoming's "Lemon Law." [¶27] I concur in the resulting remand of this case, nevertheless, because recovery may be had by plaintiff under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. FOOT