Title: Baskin v. P.C. Richard Son, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2021

Baskin v. P.C. Richard Son, LLC Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiffs filed a putative class action on behalf of themselves and “[a]ll consumers to whom [d]efendants, after November 17, 2013, provided an electronically printed receipt” listing the expiration date of the consumer’s credit or debit card in violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA). Plaintiffs’ only alleged injury was exposure to an increased risk of identity theft and credit/debit card fraud. The complaint alleged that “there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., two thousand or more) of members that comprise the Class.” The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint based on its determination that plaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 4:32-1’s numerosity, predominance, or superiority requirements for class certification. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal as it pertained to the class action claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding plaintiffs sufficiently pled the class certification requirements to survive a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for class action discovery to be conducted pursuant to Rule 4:32-2(a), so that the trial court could determine whether to certify the class. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Ellen Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC (A-77-19) (084257)Argued January 4, 2021 -- Decided May 5, 2021FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In this case, the Court considers whether plaintiffs, who suffered no actual harm and are seeking statutory damages, sufficiently pled a class action against defendants for noncompliance with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) such that their complaint should have survived a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e). Plaintiffs filed a putative class action on behalf of themselves and “[a]ll consumers to whom [d]efendants, after November 17, 2013, provided an electronically printed receipt” listing the expiration date of the consumer’s credit or debit card in violation of FACTA. Plaintiffs’ only alleged injury was exposure to an increased risk of identity theft and credit/debit card fraud. The complaint alleged that “there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., two thousand or more) of members that comprise the Class.” The complaint also noted that common questions -- including whether defendants’ receipts violated FACTA, whether defendants’ conduct was willful, and whether the class is entitled to damages -- predominated over any individual questions. It further alleged that a class action is superior to other means of adjudicating these claims because the prospective damages are too small to incentivize individual litigation and because numerous small claims give rise to inconsistent results, redundancy, and delay. The complaint sought an order certifying the class, as well as statutory and punitive damages and costs and attorney’s fees. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint based on its determination that plaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 4:32-1’s numerosity, predominance, or superiority requirements for class certification. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal as it pertained to the class action claims. 462 N.J. Super. 594, 619 (App. Div. 2020). The Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification pertaining to the class certification issues. 242 N.J. 503 (2020).HELD: Plaintiffs sufficiently pled the class certification requirements to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court remands the matter for class action discovery to be conducted pursuant to Rule 4:32-2(a) so that the trial court may determine whether to certify the class. 1 1. A class action allows one or more individuals to act as plaintiff or plaintiffs in representing the interests of a larger group of persons with similar claims. A class action can create an incentive for individuals to band together when their claims in isolation are too small to warrant recourse to litigation. The policy goals of judicial economy, consistent treatment of class members, and protection of defendants from inconsistent results are furthered through the class action device. Rule 4:32-1(a) requires a putative class to satisfy four general prerequisites: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs pursuing class certification must also satisfy one of the three requirements of Rule 4:32-1(b). Of importance to this case are the subsection (b)(3) requirements, pursuant to which the court must “find[] that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” (pp. 14-17)2. Rule 4:32-1 does not specify a minimum number of class members necessary to satisfy the numerosity requirement of subsection (a). New Jersey courts frequently describe that requirement without numerical precision. To determine predominance under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3), the court decides whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. That determination requires an assessment of various factors, including: the significance of the common questions; whether the benefit of resolving common and presumably some individual questions through a class action outweighs doing so through individual actions; and whether a class action presents a common nucleus of operative facts. Whether a class action is superior to individual actions or some other alternative procedure involves considerations of fairness to the putative class members and the defendant, and the efficiency of one adjudicative method over another. One factor that should be considered is whether any one individual who has suffered a wrong will have the financial wherewithal or incentive to prosecute a claim that might cost more than its worth. (pp. 17-21)3. When FACTA was enacted in 2003, one of its purposes was to prevent criminals from obtaining access to consumers’ private financial and credit information in order to reduce identity theft and credit card fraud. FACTA prohibits any business that accepts credit or debit cards from “print[ing] . . . the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). FACTA imposes civil liability on persons or businesses that are negligently or willfully noncompliant with its terms. If willfully noncompliant, as plaintiffs allege here, a business will be subject to civil liability for “any actual damages sustained by the consumer” or statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000; “punitive damages as the court may allow”; and “the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (a)(3). (pp. 22-23) 2 4. The Court applies the principles of Rule 4:32-1 to the FACTA claim alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint while searching the complaint with liberality and giving plaintiffs the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact therein. The Court finds plaintiffs’ allegation that there are a minimum of two thousand members of the class sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss with respect to Rule 4:32-1(a)’s numerosity requirement. That estimate is supported by the class period pled, which spanned two years and nine months. In that time period, it is reasonable that the class could contain at minimum two thousand members, given that anyone who received a noncompliant receipt from one of defendants’ stores would be an eligible member. Absent discovery of defendants’ sales records, plaintiffs have no way to know how many credit and debit card transactions defendants conducted during the relevant period. (pp. 23-25)5. The Court finds plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss on the issue of predominance at this stage because the class is seeking statutory damages. In order to prove that defendants violated FACTA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants willfully printed receipts containing credit or debit card expiration dates. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(g)(1), 1681n. The common nucleus of operative facts is, as plaintiffs pled, whether defendants programmed their equipment to print the expiration dates of customers’ credit/debit cards on receipts; the answer to that question will apply to all class members. If plaintiffs are successful in establishing defendants’ willful noncompliance with FACTA, then statutory damages are available to all class members uniformly. (pp. 25-26)6. The Court concludes plaintiffs sufficiently pled superiority to survive a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs sufficiently addressed in their complaint considerations of fairness to the parties and judicial efficiency, as well as of class members’ financial wherewithal or incentive to pursue a claim that might cost more than its worth. FACTA’s willfulness requirement makes it more difficult for an individual plaintiff to bring a FACTA claim for statutory damages because it is unlikely a plaintiff appearing pro se in small claims court will know how to demonstrate willfulness. Moreover, individual damages are likely to be small and, as a result, individual class members are unlikely to have the financial wherewithal or incentive to bring a claim. Additionally, if forced to proceed individually, there is nothing stopping one attorney from bringing numerous plaintiffs into small claims court and trying each claim one at a time. Such an approach would not foster judicial efficiency; nor would it be fair to defendants, who could be exposed to inconsistent results. Given those considerations, and at this stage of litigation before discovery has been conducted, plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss on the question of superiority. (pp. 26-30) REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 77 September Term 2019 084257 Ellen Baskin, Kathleen O’Shea, and Sandeep Trisal, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, d/b/a P.C. Richard & Son, and P.C. Richard & Son, Inc., d/b/a P.C. Richard & Son, Defendants-Respondents. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 462 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2020). Argued Decided January 4, 2021 May 5, 2021Chant Yedalian, of the California bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellants (Lite DePalma Greenberg and Chant & Company, attorneys; Bruce D. Greenberg, and Chant Yedalian, on the briefs).William S. Gyves argued the cause for respondents (Kelley Drye & Warren, attorneys; William S. Gyves, Glenn T. Graham, and Robert N. Ward, on the briefs). 1 Bruce H. Nagel argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Nagel Rice, attorneys; Bruce H. Nagel, of counsel and on the brief, and Randee M. Matloff, on the brief). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the Court considers whether plaintiffs sufficiently pled theclass certification requirements to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e). Ellen Baskin, Kathleen O’Shea, and Sandeep Trisal (plaintiffs) filed aclass action complaint against defendants P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, and P.C.Richard & Son, Inc., alleging defendants violated the Federal Fair andAccurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) by printing plaintiffs’credit or debit card expiration dates on their receipts. Although plaintiffs didnot suffer identity theft, fraud, or third-party disclosure as a result of theinformation on the receipts, they allege that defendants’ noncompliance withFACTA has placed them at an increased risk of harm and seek statutorydamages. FACTA prohibits any business that accepts credit or debit cards from“print[ing] more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration dateupon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale ortransaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). FACTA imposes civil liability onbusinesses that are willfully noncompliant with its terms. Id. § 1681n. If 2 plaintiffs can establish defendants’ willful noncompliance, statutory damagesranging from $100 to $1,000 will be awarded to each plaintiff. Id.§ 1681n(a)(1)(A). Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint, arguing thatplaintiffs could not meet the superiority requirement for class certificationbecause statutory damages available under FACTA were sufficient toincentivize individual actions. The trial court granted the motion, finding: (1)plaintiffs failed to establish numerosity because they did not specify how manymembers were in the class; (2) predominance was not satisfied because someclass members may have suffered actual damages and liability would thereforehave to be determined on a case-by-case basis; and (3) superiority was notestablished because FACTA’s statutory award sufficiently incentivizedplaintiffs to bring suit individually. The Appellate Division affirmed thedismissal as it pertained to the class action claims and to the individual claimsof O’Shea and Trisal; however, the appellate court reversed the dismissal ofBaskin’s individual claim. In light of our standard of review at this stage, we disagree with the trialand appellate courts and reverse the grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss.Giving plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences here, we find theysufficiently pled the class certification requirements to survive a motion to 3 dismiss. Specifically, we conclude that: (1) an exact or specific number ofclass members need not be pled to satisfy numerosity; (2) questions as towhether defendants were willfully noncompliant with FACTA andprogrammed their equipment to print credit or debit card expiration datespredominated because plaintiffs are seeking only statutory and punitivedamages; and (3) the class action vehicle seems to be the superior means ofadjudicating plaintiffs’ claims because it is unlikely a plaintiff will have thefinancial wherewithal to bring these claims individually in small claims court. However, we are not certifying the class at this time. Instead, we areremanding the matter for class action discovery to be conducted pursuant toRule 4:32-2(a) so that the trial court may determine whether to certify theclass. I. A. In April 2018, plaintiffs Kathleen O’Shea and Sandeep Trisal, New Yorkresidents, joined New Jersey resident Ellen Baskin to file this putative classaction in New Jersey state court on behalf of themselves and “[a]ll consumersto whom [d]efendants, after November 17, 2013, provided an electronicallyprinted receipt” listing the expiration date of the consumer’s credit or debit 4 card in violation of FACTA. 1 Baskin alleged that on May 24, 2016, shereceived a receipt containing her card’s expiration date from one ofdefendant’s retail stores in Brick, New Jersey. Plaintiffs’ only alleged injurywas exposure to an increased risk of identity theft and credit/debit card fraud. The complaint alleged that “there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., twothousand or more) of members that comprise the Class,” and that “[t]he exactsize of the Class and identities of individual members thereof are ascertainablethrough [d]efendants’ records.” The complaint also noted that commonquestions -- including whether defendants’ receipts violated FACTA, whetherdefendants’ conduct was willful, and whether the class is entitled todamages -- predominated over any individual questions. It further alleged thata class action is superior to other means of adjudicating these claims becausethe prospective damages are too small to incentivize individual litigation andbecause numerous small claims give rise to inconsistent results, redundancy, 1 In 2016, O’Shea and Trisal filed a similar class action complaint against defendants in the Southern District of New York. O’Shea v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9069, 2 017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122424, at *3-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017). As part of that matter, O’Shea and Trisal alleged defendants were aware of their noncompliance because, in 2015, O’Shea had (a) served defendants with a cease-and-desist letter demanding defendants update their printing practices to comply with FACTA and (b) attached a draft complaint to the letter. Id. at *3-*4. Ultimately, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss because plaintiffs could not establish Article III standing. Id. at *18. 5 and delay. The complaint sought an order certifying the class, as well asstatutory and punitive damages and costs and attorney’s fees. In September 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure tostate a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that plaintiffs had notalleged they “sustained any ascertainable harm”; defendants also contendedthat plaintiffs’ FACTA claims should not be litigated as a class action becauseplaintiffs could not satisfy the superiority prong of Rule 4:32-1(b)(3).Defendants argued, finally, that New Jersey courts lack personal jurisdictionover O’Shea and Trisal’s New York-based claims. Plaintiffs opposed themotion. After hearing oral argument, the trial court issued a written opiniongranting defendants’ motion to dismiss based on its determination thatplaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 4:32-1’s numerosity, predominance, orsuperiority requirements. The trial court concluded that the numerosity requirement was notsatisfied because plaintiffs failed to allege a potential number of classmembers “except to contend that there could be 'thousands of people whosecredit card information was exposed on improper receipts.’” The trial court held that predominance was not established becauseplaintiffs’ failure to claim they suffered actual damages from identity theft or 6 credit/debit card fraud put their “claims at odds with the legislative purpose ofFACTA” and indicates “an overall lack of demonstrable damages” as to theseparticular plaintiffs. Therefore, because other consumers who fall into theproposed class may have actually been victims of identity theft or fraud, “[t]hepotential[ly] disparate nature of damages . . . require[s] courts to adjudicate[d]efendants’ liability on a case-by-case basis,” which “cuts directly againstthe purpose of Rule 4:32-1’s class certification predominance and superiorityprongs.” The court determined that superiority was not established becauseprevailing New Jersey law dictates that “adjudication of claims on anindividual basis in small claims court is 'a far superior method to vindicationof any rights and protection of the public than any certification or class action’in situations where a statutory damage award incentivizes a party to act in hisor her interest.” (quoting Local Baking Prods., Inc. v. Kosher Bagel Munch,Inc., 421 N.J. Super. 268, 272 (App. Div. 2011)). The court then detailed theprocess of filing an individual claim pro se in small claims court. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to satisfy therequirements of class certification. The court also concluded that it did nothave personal jurisdiction over O’Shea and Trisal’s claims. 7 B. The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court’sdenial of class certification and dismissal of the complaint as it pertained toO’Shea and Trisal, but it reversed the dismissal of Baskin’s claim, remandingit to be reinstated as an individual action. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 462 N.J. Super. 594, 619 (App. Div. 2020). The Appellate Division concluded that numerosity had not been satisfiedbecause plaintiffs “failed to sufficiently articulate the size of the class”because they did not “name the number of potential class members, and onlyvaguely stated that there could be 'thousands of people whose credit cardinformation was exposed on improper receipts.’” Id. at 607-08. The court likewise held that plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient toestablish predominance, noting that “the sheer amount of uncertainties inrespect of the amount of potential FACTA claims against defendants, and anyharm that arose from such violations, renders it difficult to determine acommon nucleus of operative facts.” Id. at 615. Regarding superiority, the court determined plaintiffs failed to make aprima facie showing that a class action was superior to individual actions insmall claims court. Id. at 601, 608-13. The Appellate Division relied upon thereasoning of Local Baking and the dismissal of O’Shea and Trisal’s New York 8 action when assessing whether plaintiffs met the superiority requirement. Id.at 608-13. We granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification pertaining to the classcertification issues. 242 N.J. 503 (2020). We also granted the New JerseyAssociation for Justice’s (NJAJ) motion to appear as amicus curiae. II. A. Plaintiffs assert the trial and appellate courts imposed three barriers toclass certification at the pleading stage, each of which on its own has the effectof precluding class action lawsuits in this State. Those barriers concern thenumerosity, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 4:32-1. Plaintiffs submit that they more than adequately pled numerosity in theircomplaint by alleging “that there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., twothousand or more) of members that comprise the class” given that the classperiod pled was a span of two years and nine months. Plaintiffs argue that byrefusing to certify the class because plaintiffs failed to state the size of theproposed class with specificity, the trial and appellate courts created a newpleading requirement that contravenes this Court’s decision in Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496, 505 (2010). 9 Next, plaintiffs note that predominance was also determined sua sponteby the trial and appellate courts. They argue this case is ideal for classtreatment because the major question that predominates is whether defendantsprogrammed their equipment to print expiration dates on customer receipts ,willfully or not -- a question whose answer will not vary from one classmember to the next. Relying on Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super. 169, 190(App. Div. 1993), plaintiffs assert that class certification can still beappropriate even if individual damages need to be calculated as long as“common questions as to liability predominate.” They add that potential classmembers who may have incurred actual damages as a result of defendants’actions can opt out of the class. Regarding superiority, plaintiffs take issue with the trial and appellatecourts’ conclusion that because statutory damages are recoverable in smallclaims court, a class action cannot be a superior method of enforcement.Plaintiffs argue that the trial and appellate courts’ and defendants’ reliance onLocal Baking for that proposition is misplaced because that case dealt with anarrow issue involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227. Plaintiffs distinguish the TCPA claims in LocalBaking from the FACTA claims here, pointing to the differences between the 10 elements of the respective claims and between the legislative histories of bothActs. Additionally, plaintiffs rely on United Consumer Financial Services Co.v. Carbo, 410 N.J. Super. 280, 295 (App. Div. 2009), to support their positionthat a class action is superior here because, although there are numerousclaims, any individual’s recovery would likely be small. Plaintiffs also notethe Carbo court specifically addressed and rejected defendants’ argumentregarding superiority and statutory violations for which a statutory civilpenalty is available. Plaintiffs further argue that small claims court is not an appropriate orsuperior method of adjudicating FACTA claims because it does not allow theextensive discovery needed to prove a willful violation and because successfulplaintiffs may be entitled to damages and attorneys’ fees that exceed the$3,000 jurisdictional limit of small claims court. B. Amicus NJAJ aligns itself with plaintiffs and emphasizes that “the classaction rule should be liberally construed.” Applying traditional principles ofliberal construction, NJAJ argues, a motion court is required to meticulouslysearch the pleadings to find even a suggested cause of action when a motion todismiss on the pleadings is filed; if a suggested cause of action cannot be 11 found, NJAJ adds, then leave to amend should be granted. NJAJ reiteratesplaintiffs’ arguments that the trial and appellate courts effectively endedplaintiffs’ class action claims when they sua sponte “expanded the grounds ofdismissal to include pleading deficiencies on the issues of numerosity andpredominance.” C. Defendants contend that, because numerosity was not at issue in Lee,plaintiffs’ argument that the Appellate Division’s holding on numerosity is inconflict with that decision cannot be correct. With respect to predominance,defendants argue plaintiffs mischaracterize the holding in Delgozzo and relyon dicta. Specifically, defendants note the predominance issue in Delgozzoinvolved conflict-of-law considerations that are not present here; thus, indefendants’ view, there is no intersection between Delgozzo and the holdingsin this case. Defendants’ main argument concerns superiority. They argue that,contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, the trial and appellate decisions here did nothave the broad effect of barring class actions for claims involving statutorydamages. Relying on Local Baking, defendants argue that FACTA providesfor a statutory remedy that is sufficient to incentivize an individual to act in hisor her own interest. Defendants also argue plaintiffs misread Carbo because 12 the argument rejected there is not the same as the argument defendants makehere -- that FACTA’s statutory remedy sufficiently incentivizes an aggrievedconsumer to bring a claim individually. Defendants assert that extensive discovery is not needed here becausewillfulness under FACTA does not require proof of defendants’ subjective badfaith or intent; rather, claims for statutory damages under FACTA require onlythat plaintiffs present the court with a noncompliant receipt and provedefendants had some knowledge of FACTA to receive statutory damages.Thus, defendants assert, plaintiffs’ FACTA claims are not so complex that theycannot be addressed in small claims court. Lastly, defendants contend that the small claims court’s $3,000jurisdictional cap would cover any damages and attorneys’ fees, adding that,should the cap be surpassed, plaintiffs could then file, in or seek to be removedto, the Law Division. III. The issue presented by this appeal is whether plaintiffs, who suffered noactual harm and are seeking statutory damages, sufficiently pled a class actionagainst defendants for noncompliance with FACTA such that their complaintshould have survived a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e). 13 Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon whichrelief can be granted are reviewed de novo. Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus,Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019). Areviewing court must examine “the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on theface of the complaint,” giving the plaintiff the benefit of “every reasonableinference of fact.” Id. at 107 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. SharpElecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). The complaint must be searchedthoroughly “and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a causeof action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunitybeing given to amend if necessary.” Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div.1957)). “Nonetheless, if the complaint states no claim that supports relief, anddiscovery will not give rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed.”Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107. IV. A. With that standard in mind, we turn to the principles of classcertification. A class action allows “one or more individuals to act as plaintiffor plaintiffs in representing the interests of a larger group of persons withsimilar claims.” Lee, 203 N.J. at 517. A class action can create an incentive 14 for a large number of individuals who may have similar valid claims to “bandtogether” when “those claims in isolation are 'too small . . . to warrantrecourse to litigation.’” Ibid. (omission in original) (quoting In re CadillacV8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412, 435 (1983)). That is especially true whenthe alleged perpetrator of the wrong is a “corporate entity that wieldsenormous economic power”; by allowing plaintiffs to “band together,” classactions can level the playing field and “thus provid[e] 'a procedure to remedya wrong that might otherwise go unredressed.’” Id. at 517-18 (quoting In reCadillac, 93 N.J. at 424). Put simply, the class action device permits “'anotherwise vulnerable class’ of diverse individuals with small claims access tothe courthouse.” Id. at 518 (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 120 (2007)). Additionally, the policy goals of “judicial economy,” “consistenttreatment of class members,” and “protection of defendants from inconsistent[results]” are furthered through the class action device. Ibid. (alteration inoriginal) (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 104). Accordingly, “a court should beslow to hold that a suit may not proceed as a class action” and should rarelydeny a class action based on the face of the complaint. Riley v. New RapidsCarpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 228 (1972). That said, pre-discovery dismissal of aclass action is permitted if the court determines that discovery would not 15 provide a basis for relief. See Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 473-81 (App. Div. 2015) (affirming pre-discovery dismissal because theplaintiffs’ claims depended on non-uniform contracts between each plaintiffand the defendant, as well as on steps taken by each plaintiff leading up to thedefendant’s alleged breach). Rules 4:32-1 and -2 govern class actions in New Jersey. Rule 4:32-1sets forth the requirements for maintaining a class action. Subsection (a) ofthat rule requires a putative class to satisfy four general prerequisites in orderto sue as a class: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. [R. 4:32-1(a).]Those prerequisites are “frequently termed 'numerosity, commonality,typicality and adequacy of representation.’” Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 47 (2017) (quoting Lee, 203 N.J. at 519). In addition to the prerequisites of subsection (a), plaintiffs pursuing classcertification must also satisfy one of the three requirements of subsection (b). 16 Of importance to this case are the subsection (b)(3) requirements, pursuant towhich the court must find[] that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The factors pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability in concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. [R. 4:32-1(b)(3).] 1. Rule 4:32-1 does not specify a minimum number of class membersnecessary to satisfy the numerosity requirement of subsection (a). Federalcourts deciding class certification issues governed by Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 23(a), the Federal Class Action Rule -- which served as the modelfor Rule 4:32-1, see In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 424-25 -- have stated that 17 “[t]here is no set numerical cutoff used to determine whether a class issufficiently numerous; courts must examine the specific facts of each case toevaluate whether the requirement has been satisfied.” In re Toys “R” Us, 300 F.R.D. 347, 367 (C.D. Cal. 2013). However, “[a]s a general rule . . . classes of20 are too small, classes of 20-40 may or may not be big enough depending onthe circumstances of each case, and classes of 40 or more are numerousenough.” Id. at 367-68 (quoting Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 262 (S.D. Cal. 1988)). New Jersey courts frequently describe the numerosity requirementwithout numerical precision. See Dugan, 231 N.J. at 64-65 & n.12(concluding that the proposed class of 263,000 “clearly includes numerousclaimants”); Lee, 203 N.J. at 512 (determining that the trial court described theclass as sufficiently numerous because it included “well over 10,000members”); In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 425 (affirming the trial court’s findingthat “[a] class of approximately 7,500 plaintiffs is sufficiently numerous”). 2. “To determine predominance under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3), the court decides'whether the proposed class is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudicationby representation.”’” Dugan, 231 N.J. at 48 (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108).That determination requires 18 a court [to] conduct a “pragmatic assessment” of various factors. One inquiry is the significance of the common questions. That inquiry involves a qualitative assessment of the common and individual questions rather than a mere mathematical quantification of whether there are more of one than the other. The second inquiry is whether the “benefit” of resolving common and presumably some individual questions through a class action outweighs doing so through “individual actions.” A third inquiry is whether a class action presents a “common nucleus of operative facts.” [Lee, 203 N.J. at 519-20 (citations omitted) (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108).]The predominance prong is “'far more demanding’ than Rule 4:32-1(a)(2)’srequirement that there be questions of law or fact common to the class.”Dugan, 231 N.J. at 48 (quoting Castro v. NYT Television, 384 N.J. Super. 601,608 (App. Div. 2006)). “Significantly,” however, “to establish predominance,plaintiff does not have to show that there is an 'absence of individual issues orthat the common issues dispose of the entire dispute,’ or 'that all issues [are]identical among class members or that each class member [is] affected inprecisely the same manner.’” Lee, 203 N.J. at 520 (alterations in original)(quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108-09). Class certification is not necessarily precluded when individual classmembers’ degree of damages will require individualized proof. See Delgozzo, 266 N.J. Super. at 181 (“[I]t is clear that New Jersey courts will permit classcertification even though individual questions, such as the degree of damages 19 due a particular class member, . . . may remain following resolution of thecommon questions.” (citing In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 429-30)). Additionally,a proposed class may limit how individualized questions about the type orextent of harm suffered by individual class members will factor into thepredominance and superiority assessments by limiting the relief sought to atype that will not be affected by the resolution of individualized questions.See id. at 187 (“[P]laintiffs assert that they seek only economic damages,correctly noting that class members who have also suffered personal injuries asa result of using defendants’ product may, if warranted, opt out and proceedindependently on those issues. In re Cadillac lends support to the position thata class may be certified where individual members of the class may havesuffered personal injury.”). 3. “A class action plaintiff must also demonstrate that 'a class action issuperior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of thecontroversy.’” Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 (quoting R. 4:32-1(b)(3)). “Bydefinition, 'superior’ implies a comparison with alternative procedures such asa test case or joinder of claims.” In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 436. “Whether aclass action is superior to thousands of minor, individual actions or some other'alternative procedure[]’ involves considerations of fairness to the putative 20 class members and the defendant, and the 'efficiency’ of one adjudicativemethod over another.” Lee, 203 N.J. at 520 (alteration in original) (quoting Inre Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 436). One factor that should be considered in a fairness determination is“whether any one individual who has suffered a wrong will have the financialwherewithal or incentive to prosecute a claim that might cost more than itsworth.” Ibid.; accord Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 WelfareFund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 192 N.J. 372, 384 (2007) (“[I]n Iliadis, weidentified as important to the superiority analysis a consideration of the classmembers’ lack of financial wherewithal. In such circumstances, we haveexpressed a concern that, absent a class, the individual class members wouldnot pursue their claims at all, thus demonstrating superiority of the class actionmechanism.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In reCadillac, 93 N.J. at 436-37 (affirming the trial court’s determination that aclass action was superior to a test case in that matter because resolution ofissues common to the class would “require substantial discovery, experttestimony, and trial time, all of which would render uneconomical anindividual suit by a single disgruntled customer”). In Carbo, the Appellate Division considered a challenge to classcertification after the class was awarded a civil penalty of $100 for each 21 member, attorney’s fees, and costs under the Truth-in-Consumer Contract,Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). 410 N.J. Super. at 292. The courtrejected the defendants’ argument that a class action is not superior toindividual actions when plaintiffs are seeking statutory damages. Id. at 308.The court affirmed class certification, noting that “Rule 4:32-1 must beliberally construed, and a class action is the favored means of adjudicatingnumerous claims involving a common nucleus of facts for which eachindividual’s recovery will be small.” Id. at 295. B. When FACTA was enacted in 2003, one of its purposes was “to preventcriminals from obtaining access to consumers’ private financial and creditinformation in order to reduce identity theft and credit card fraud.” Credit andDebit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, § 2(a)(1), 121 Stat. 1565 (2008). As noted, FACTA prohibits any business that acceptscredit or debit cards from “print[ing] more than the last 5 digits of the cardnumber or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder atthe point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). FACTA imposes civil liability on persons or businesses that arenegligently or willfully noncompliant with its terms. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n,1681o. If negligently noncompliant, a business will be subject to civil liability 22 to the consumer for actual damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C.§ 1681o(a). If willfully noncompliant, as plaintiffs allege here, a business willbe subject to civil liability for “any actual damages sustained by the consumeras a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than$1,000”; “punitive damages as the court may allow”; and “the costs of theaction together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.” 15U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (a)(3). V. We now apply the principles of Rule 4:32-1 to the FACTA claim allegedin plaintiffs’ complaint while searching the complaint with liberality “toascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned,” PrintingMart, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting Di Cristofaro, 43 N.J. Super. at 252), andgiving plaintiffs the benefit of “every reasonable inference of fact” therein,Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107 (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746).The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motionto dismiss based on plaintiffs’ alleged failure to satisfy the numerosity,predominance, and superiority requirements. We disagree and find thatplaintiffs sufficiently pled those requirements to survive a motion to dismiss. 23 A. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division concluded plaintiffs didnot satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 4:32-1(a) because they failed tospecify the number of class members except for saying that there “could be”thousands. However, that misstates plaintiffs’ allegations in their complaint.Plaintiffs did not allege that there “could be” thousands of members, ratherthey alleged that “there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., two thousand ormore) of members that compromise the Class”; plaintiffs also stated that “[t]heexact size of the Class and identities of individual members thereof areascertainable through [d]efendants’ records.” (emphasis added). The trial andappellate courts’ determination that the class was not pled with specificity isinconsistent with our standard of review, which requires us to give plaintiffsthe benefit of “every reasonable inference of fact.” Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J.at 107 (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746). Giving the plaintiffs that benefit here requires us to accept as trueplaintiffs’ allegation that there are a minimum of two thousand members of theclass. That estimate is also supported by the class period pled, which spannedtwo years and nine months. In that time period, it is reasonable that the classcould contain at minimum two thousand members, given that anyone whoreceived a noncompliant receipt from one of defendants’ stores would be an 24 eligible member. Additionally, absent discovery of defendants’ sales records,plaintiffs have no way to know how many credit and debit card transactionsdefendants conducted during the relevant period. Therefore, because plaintiffs have not had the benefit of discovery, wefind that their allegation that “there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., twothousand or more)” of class members is sufficient to survive a motion todismiss with respect to Rule 4:32-1(a)’s numerosity requirement. B. The trial court and Appellate Division determined that plaintiffs failed tosatisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) because there weretoo many uncertainties regarding the number of claims and the harm suffered;thus, it was “difficult to determine a common nucleus of operative facts.” Wedisagree and find plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to withstand a motion todismiss on the issue of predominance at this stage because the class is seekingstatutory damages. In order to prove that defendants violated FACTA, plaintiffs mustdemonstrate that defendants willfully printed receipts containing credit or debitcard expiration dates. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(g)(1), 1681n. Accordingly, thecommon nucleus of operative facts is, as plaintiffs pled, whether defendantsprogrammed their equipment to print the expiration dates of customers’ 25 credit/debit cards on receipts; the answer to that question will apply to all classmembers. Put differently, if plaintiffs are successful in establishingdefendants’ willful noncompliance with FACTA, then statutory damages areavailable to all class members uniformly. Accepting as true plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants’ noncompliancewas a consistent result of how their receipt-printing equipment wasprogrammed, the significant questions of defendants’ conduct and willfulnesspresent a common nucleus of operative facts. See Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108.Resolving those questions as a class offers the benefit of consistency. See Lee, 203 N.J. at 520. Therefore, we disagree with the trial court and Appellate Division’sconclusion that there are too many “uncertainties” to “determine a commonnucleus of operative facts.” We instead find that plaintiffs pled sufficient factsto survive a motion to dismiss on the question of predominance. C. The trial court and Appellate Division, relying on Local Baking, foundplaintiffs did not satisfy the superiority requirement of Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) andthat filing individual claims in small claims court would be a superior methodof adjudicating plaintiffs’ FACTA claims. We disagree and find this relianceon Local Baking misplaced. Giving plaintiffs the benefit of every inference of 26 fact, we conclude they sufficiently pled superiority to survive a motion todismiss. Determining superiority necessarily involves a comparison of alternativeprocedures. In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 436. That comparison involvesconsiderations of fairness to the parties and judicial efficiency , as well as ofclass members’ financial wherewithal or incentive to pursue “a claim thatmight cost more than its worth.” Lee, 203 N.J. at 520. Plaintiffs sufficientlyaddressed those considerations in their complaint. See Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49(noting that class action plaintiffs bear the burden to “demonstrate that 'a classaction is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficientadjudication of the controversy’” (quoting R. 4:32-1(b)(3))). Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that a class action is superiorbecause individual statutory damages will be relatively small; thus, “theexpense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasibleand procedurally impracticable for each [class member] to individually seekredress for the wrongs done to them.” They further allege it is unlikely thatindividual class members will bring FACTA claims and that, even if individuallitigation were brought, the class action is still superior because individualclaims would “present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictoryjudgments and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the 27 court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues.” Th oseallegations are sufficient to establish superiority at the pre-discovery motion todismiss stage. See Carbo, 410 N.J. Super. at 295 (“Rule 4:32-1 must beliberally construed, and a class action is the favored means of adjudicatingnumerous claims involving a common nucleus of facts for which eachindividual’s recovery will be small.”). The trial court and Appellate Division, relying on Local Baking,determined that superiority was not established because, like the statutoryaward of $500 in TCPA claims, FACTA’s statutory penalty of $100 to $1 ,000sufficiently incentivized individual plaintiffs to bring claims. However, thereliance on Local Baking is misplaced because of the differences inestablishing a statutory violation under the TCPA and establishing a statutoryviolation under FACTA. For example, pursuant to the TCPA, “[a] person orentity may . . . bring in an appropriate court of that State -- an action . . . toreceive $500 in damages for each such violation.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).Pursuant to FACTA, statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000 will beawarded if plaintiffs can establish defendants’ noncompliance with FACTAwas willful or negligent. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. The significantdifference between the two Acts is FACTA’s willfulness requirement. Theimposition of the willfulness requirement makes it more difficult for an 28 individual plaintiff to bring a FACTA claim for statutory damages because it isunlikely a plaintiff appearing pro se in small claims court will know how todemonstrate willfulness. Moreover, as plaintiffs pled, individual damages are likely to be smalland, as a result, individual class members are unlikely to have the financialwherewithal or incentive to bring a claim. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rsLocal No. 68 Welfare Fund, 192 N.J. at 384 (noting the concern that, whenclass members lack the financial wherewithal to bring a claim, “absent a class,the individual class members would not pursue their claims at all, thusdemonstrating superiority of the class action mechanism”). Additionally, trying these cases individually could result in inconsistentverdicts. In fact, if forced to proceed individually, there is nothing stoppingone attorney from bringing numerous plaintiffs into small claims court andtrying each claim one at a time. Such an approach would not foster judicialefficiency; nor would it be fair to defendants, who could be exposed toinconsistent results. Rule 4:32-2(a) provides that, [w]hen a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the court shall, at an early practicable time, determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action. An order certifying a class action shall define the class and the class claims, issues or defenses, and shall appoint class counsel in accordance with 29 paragraph (g) of this rule. The order may be altered or amended prior to the entry of final judgment.Class action discovery must be undertaken so that the court has theinformation necessary to allow it to determine whether the class should becertified. Given those considerations, and at this stage of litigation beforediscovery has been conducted, plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to survive amotion to dismiss on the question of superiority. VI. In sum, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and hold thatplaintiffs sufficiently pled facts regarding Rule 4:32-1’s numerosity,predominance, and superiority requirements to survive a motion to dismiss.However, we are not certifying the class. We remand the matter for the partiesto conduct discovery related to class action certification. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 30