Title: Angel Diaz v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-2259
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
 
Nos. SC06-2259 & SC06-2305 
____________ 
 
ANGEL NIEVES DIAZ, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-2313 
____________ 
 
ANGEL NIEVES DIAZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES MCDONOUGH, etc. 
Respondent. 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-2325 
____________ 
 
ANGEL NIEVES DIAZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA  
Respondent. 
 
[December 8, 2006] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Angel Nieves Diaz, a prisoner under sentence of death and an active death 
warrant, appeals the circuit court’s orders denying his successive motions for 
postconviction relief and requests for public records.  Diaz has also filed petitions 
with this Court pursuant to our authority to issue writs of habeas corpus and all 
writs necessary to the complete exercise of our jurisdiction.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (7), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm 
the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief and the denial of the public records 
request.  We also deny the petitions for habeas corpus and all writs. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The execution of Angel Diaz is set for December 13, 2006.  The factual 
background and procedural history of this case are detailed in this Court’s opinion 
on Diaz’s direct appeal.   See Diaz v. State, 513 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 1987).  
The case involves a murder that occurred in Miami twenty-seven years ago.  Diaz 
was convicted of first-degree murder, four counts of kidnapping, two counts of 
armed robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of possessing a 
firearm during the commission of a felony based on his participation in the holdup 
of a Miami bar in 1979.  The majority of the bar patrons and employees were 
confined to a restroom.  The bar manager Joseph Nagy was shot and killed during 
 
- 2 -
the holdup by three men.1  No one witnessed who actually shot the victim, but each 
of the robbers discharged his gun during the robbery. 
 
Diaz conducted his own defense, with standby counsel, from opening 
statements through conviction.  He was represented by counsel during jury 
selection and the penalty phase.  The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to 
four.  The judge followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Diaz to death.  
The trial court found five aggravating factors:  the defendant was under sentence of 
imprisonment at the time of the crime; the defendant had previously been 
convicted of a violent felony; the murder was committed during the commission of 
a kidnapping; the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and the defendant 
knowingly caused great risk of danger to many persons.  The trial court found no 
mitigating circumstances.  This Court affirmed Diaz’s sentence of death on direct 
appeal.  Id. at 1049. 2  The United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ 
of certiorari.  Diaz v. Florida, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988). 
                                          
 
 
1.  Diaz’s co-defendant Angel “Sammy” Toro was sentenced to life 
imprisonment based on a plea agreement with the State. 
 
2.  On direct appeal, Diaz raised the following claims of error:  (1) the denial 
of an ore tenus defense motion for a continuance; (2) excusing two jurors for cause 
based on their opposition to the death penalty, thereby creating a conviction-prone 
jury; (3) the jury was biased by the security measures at trial and Diaz’s 
appearance in shackles; (4) allowing Diaz to proceed pro se when his request was 
not timely, he needed an interpreter, and his movement before the jury drew 
attention to his shackles; (5) all death sentences are cruel and unusual punishment; 
(6) failure to instruct the jury on the intent necessary to support a sentence of death 
under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); (7) the aggravating circumstance 
 
- 3 -
 
Diaz sought executive clemency in June 1988, which was denied by the 
signing of a death warrant in August 1989.  Execution was scheduled for October 
1989.  This Court issued an indefinite stay to give Diaz an opportunity to seek 
postconviction relief. 
 
Diaz’s case has been before the trial court for four separate proceedings and 
before this Court four times prior to the instant case.  Diaz filed his initial 
postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in October 
1989, raising twenty-five issues and numerous subissues.3  After conducting an 
                                                                                                                                        
of knowingly caused a great risk of danger to many persons was improperly found; 
(8) the proportionality of the death sentence based on insufficient evidence that 
Diaz shot the victim and that codefendant Toro received a life sentence; and (9) the 
court made a prejudicial remark during the sentencing phase. 
 
3.  Diaz claimed error on the following points: (1) the trial court’s denial of 
several claims without an evidentiary hearing and without attaching portions of the 
record to the order; ex parte communication between the State and the court; (2) 
his competency to stand trial; (3) an inadequate mental health exam; (4) a violation 
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (5) a violation of Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806 (1975); (6) ineffective assistance of pretrial and guilt phase counsel; 
(7) disqualification of the trial judge; (8) public records disclosure; (9) ineffective 
assistance of penalty phase counsel; (10) the weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances; (11) the denial of his right to self-representation in the 
penalty phase; (12) interference with attorney-client relationship; (13) his absence 
from critical stages of the proceedings; (14) an inadequate competency hearing; 
(15) the denial of his right to present a defense; (16) prejudice from the trial 
security measures; (17) ineffective assistance of counsel in accepting the State's 
proffer to seek death; (18) improper instructions on the aggravating circumstances; 
(19) a violation of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); (20) a violation of 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (21) the consideration of 
nonstatutory aggravating factors; (22) the failure to find mitigating circumstances; 
(23) improper burden shifting; (24) erroneous instruction concerning jury majority 
vote; and (25) ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. 
 
- 4 -
evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the 
penalty phase, the trial court denied relief.  This Court affirmed the denial and also 
denied Diaz’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.4  Diaz v. Dugger, 719 So. 2d 865 
(Fla. 1998).  Thereafter, Diaz sought federal habeas relief in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.  The district court denied the 
petition on January 23, 2004, and Diaz appealed.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.  Diaz v. Sec’y for the 
Dep’t of Corr., 402 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2005).  The United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari on December 5, 2005.  Diaz v. Crosby, 126 S. Ct. 803 (2005). 
 
During the pendency of his federal habeas proceedings, Diaz filed a second 
petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court in June 2000.  Diaz argued that 
the Court had applied the wrong standard in reviewing his claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in his previous habeas petition.  The Court issued 
an order denying the petition on the merits.  Diaz v. Moore, 828 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 
2001).  In February 2003, Diaz filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus with 
this Court.  Diaz raised a variety of claims to Florida’s death penalty sentencing 
scheme based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002).  The Court denied the habeas petition, finding that all of 
                                          
 
 
4.  In his habeas petition to this Court, Diaz claimed ineffective assistance by 
appellate counsel on essentially the same issues raised in his postconviction 
motion.   
 
- 5 -
Diaz’s claims had already been considered by the Court in other cases and decided 
adversely to him.  Diaz v. Crosby, 869 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 854 (2004). 
 
In September 2006, Diaz filed a successive motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and filed an amended 
motion and an amendment to the amended motion in November 2006.  Diaz 
challenged Florida’s lethal injection statute and lethal injection procedure as 
unconstitutional.  He also claimed that he is exempt from execution because he 
suffers from severe mental illness.  Diaz also filed numerous requests for 
additional public records from various state agencies pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.852. 
 
During the pendency of Diaz’s postconviction proceedings at the trial court, 
Governor Jeb Bush signed a death warrant setting Diaz’s execution for December 
13, 2006.  In response to the warrant, this Court issued an order setting deadlines 
for the resolution of any matters pending in the trial court and for the filing of an 
appeal in this Court. 
 
On November 21, 2006, the trial court issued orders denying Diaz’s motion 
for postconviction relief and denying his public records requests.  Diaz filed a 
notice of appeal on the following day, seeking review of these orders.  However, 
before the parties filed their briefs in this Court, Diaz filed a successive motion for 
 
- 6 -
postconviction relief in the trial court, alleging that newly discovered evidence 
required a new penalty phase proceeding.  Diaz also filed a motion asking this 
Court to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for consideration of this 
postconviction motion.  On November 29, 2006, this Court issued an order 
relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court.  The circuit court heard argument on 
Diaz’s newly discovered evidence claim and his requests for public records on 
November 30, 2006.  On December 1, 2006, the circuit court issued orders denying 
postconviction relief on the newly discovered evidence claim and the requests for 
public records related to that claim.  Diaz now appeals the trial court’s denial of 
both postconviction motions and his requests for public records.  He has also filed 
petitions for habeas corpus and all writs relief with this Court.   
RULE 3.851 APPEAL 
 
Diaz raises several issues in his appeal of the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief.  Diaz challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal 
injection statute and the procedures that the state uses for lethal injection.  He also 
contends that his conviction and sentence of death must be vacated in light of 
newly discovered evidence.  He claims that he is exempt from execution because 
he suffers from severe mental illness.  He also argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his various requests for public records.  We consider each of these claims 
in turn below. 
 
- 7 -
 
Lethal Injection 
 
Diaz challenges Florida’s lethal injection statute, section 922.105, Florida 
Statutes (2006), on several grounds.  He argues that the statute violates the 
separation of powers doctrine in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution 
because it improperly delegates legislative authority to the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) to create the lethal injection protocol and exempts these 
procedures from the procedural safeguards of Florida’s Administrative Procedure 
Act in chapter 120 Florida Statutes (2006).  He further argues that the statute 
violates the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in article I, 
section 17 of the Florida Constitution and amendment 8 of the United States 
Constitution.  Additionally, Diaz contends that the current lethal injection protocol 
inflicts cruel and unusual punishment. 
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which codifies the 
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, prohibits the members of one 
branch of government from exercising “any powers appertaining to either of the 
other branches unless expressly provided herein.”  This Court has traditionally 
applied a “strict separation of powers doctrine,” State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 
353 (Fla. 2000), which “encompasses two fundamental prohibitions.”  Chiles v. 
Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991). “The first is that no 
 
- 8 -
branch may encroach upon the powers of another. The second is that no branch 
may delegate to another branch its constitutionally assigned power.”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 
This second prohibition generally precludes the Legislature from delegating 
“the power to enact a law or the right to exercise unrestricted discretion in applying 
the law.”  Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000).  Diaz claims that the 
lethal injection statute gives DOC “unrestricted discretion in applying the law,” 
presumably because the statute simply states that the means of execution shall be 
by lethal injection without providing a definition of the procedure or the drugs to 
be used.  However, as we stated in Sims,  
[T]he Legislature may “enact a law, complete in itself, designed to 
accomplish a general public purpose, and may expressly authorize 
designated officials within definite valid limitations to provide rules 
and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement of the law 
within its expressed general purpose.”  
Id. at 668 (quoting State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 47 So. 969, 976 (Fla. 
1908)).  
We rejected the same separation of powers challenge in Sims, finding that 
Florida’s lethal injection statute “is not so indefinite as to constitute an improper 
delegation of legislative power.”  Id. at 670.  We cited four reasons for our 
conclusion:  
First, the statute clearly defines the punishment to be imposed (i.e., 
death).  Thus, the DOC is not given any discretion to define the 
 
- 9 -
elements of the crime or the penalty to be imposed.  Second, the 
statute makes clear that the legislative purpose is to impose death. 
[The Secretary of the Department of Corrections] testified that the 
purpose of the DOC’s execution day procedures were to achieve the 
legislative purpose “with humane dignity.”  Third, determining the 
methodology and the chemicals to be used are matters best left to the 
Department of Corrections to determine because it has personnel 
better qualified to make such determinations.  Finally, we note that the 
law in effect prior to the recent amendments stated simply that the 
death penalty shall be executed by electrocution without stating the 
precise means, manner or amount of voltage to be applied. 
Id.   Thus, the trial court properly denied relief on this aspect of Diaz’s challenge to 
the statute. 
 
Diaz also argues that the Legislature gave DOC “unfettered discretion to 
legislate” when it exempted the DOC’s policies and procedures for execution from 
the administrative safeguards of chapter 120, Florida’s Administrative Procedure 
Act.  See § 922.105(7), Fla. Stat. (2006).  We find no merit to this claim.  Even 
though the execution procedures may not be challenged through a chapter 120 
proceeding, they can and have been challenged through postconviction 
proceedings under rule 3.851.  See, e.g., Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 582-83 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1441 (2006).  In light of the exigencies inherent in 
the execution process, judicial review and oversight of the DOC procedures is 
preferable to chapter 120 administrative proceedings.  We conclude that the 
statutory exemption does not give DOC “unfettered discretion” as to lethal 
injection procedures. 
 
- 10 -
Diaz challenges both the lethal injection statute and the protocol as violating 
the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  This Court 
considered the constitutionality of lethal injection in Florida after a full evidentiary 
hearing in Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000).  We subsequently rejected 
similar claims in cases where the trial courts summarily denied the claims.  See 
Rolling v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S667, S668 (Fla. Oct. 18, 2006); Rutherford v. 
State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1113 (Fla.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1191 (2006); Hill v. 
State, 921 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1441 (2006). 
In Hill, Rutherford, and Rolling, the defendants argued that a research study 
published in April 2005 in The Lancet presented new scientific evidence that 
Florida’s procedure for carrying out lethal injection may subject the inmate to 
unnecessary pain.  See Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in 
Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 Lancet 1412 (2005).  The defendants also 
argued that this study had not been available to this Court when it decided Sims 
and thus an evidentiary hearing was required.  We found the study to be 
“inconclusive” and not requiring an evidentiary hearing.  Hill, 921 So. 2d at 583; 
see also Rutherford, 926 So. 2d at 1113-14; Rolling, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S668.  
As we explained in Hill, the study in The Lancet
does not assert that providing an inmate with “‘no less than two’ 
grams” of sodium pentothal, as is Florida's procedure, is not sufficient 
to render the inmate unconscious.  Nor does it provide evidence that 
an adequate amount of sodium pentothal is not being administered in 
 
- 11 -
Florida, or that the manner in which this drug is administered in 
Florida prevents it from having its desired effect. 
Hill, 921 So. 2d at 583 (quoting Sims, 754 So. 2d at 665 n.17). 
Diaz asserts that the Court should reconsider the information contained in 
the study in light of “newly discovered evidence” relating to lethal injection.  In 
September 2005, Dr. Richard Weisman and others wrote a letter commenting on 
the study and citing data indicating that the effects of the drug sodium thiopental 
on a dying individual undergoing lethal injection are not comparable to its actions 
on a ventilated surgical patient.  Based on this study data, Dr. Weisman speculated 
that “current thiopental protocol might not provide adequate thiopental anesthesia 
during the execution of prisoners.”  The trial court concluded that the Weisman 
letter is not newly discovered evidence as the authors’ conclusions are based on 
data from a study conducted in 1950.  Not only is the information in the Weisman 
letter not new evidence, the authors’ conclusions are speculative.  We find nothing 
in this letter that would require us to reconsider the information in The Lancet. 
Diaz also cites the orders and transcripts in Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. 
Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal., 2006), as well as orders filed in cases from other 
jurisdictions, as “newly discovered evidence” relating to his lethal injection claim.  
Diaz contends that because the protocols at issue in Morales and the other cases are 
either similar to or the same as Florida’s, these cases constitute new information 
that requires an evidentiary hearing.  After reviewing the materials and transcript 
 
- 12 -
from the Morales proceedings, the trial court concluded that these same issues had 
been litigated in Sims and denied relief to Diaz on this claim. 
Our review of the motions, arguments, and records in this case confirms the 
trial court’s conclusion that this aspect of Diaz’s lethal injection claim was litigated 
and addressed by this Court in the Sims case.  At the evidentiary hearing in 
Morales on the California lethal injection procedures, witnesses presented various 
testimonies on the procedure, the drugs used, and the effects of the drugs on the 
human body that culminates in death.  We conclude that this evidence is essentially 
the same and consistent with that presented at the evidentiary hearing in Sims.  See 
Sims, 754 So. 2d at 667-68. 
Thus, neither the Weisman letter nor the California proceeding presents new 
information that would require this Court to reconsider the issue.  As this Court has 
explained in the past, the republication of existing information in a new form does 
not make the information newly discovered.  See Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 
250 (Fla. 2001) (concluding that claim of racial profiling in drug stops was not 
newly discovered as defendant’s exhibits in support of the claim included a 
certificate from a criminal defense lawyer who asserted that he had been litigating 
such claims for ten years).  As we did in Rolling, Rutherford, and Hill, we affirm 
the trial court’s summary denial of this claim in Diaz’s case. 
 
 
- 13 -
Newly Discovered Evidence  
 
Diaz asserts two issues involving the trial court’s summary denial of claims 
based on newly discovered evidence.  The newly discovered evidence asserted 
includes a recent report by the American Bar Association on Florida’s death 
penalty system and an affidavit by a witness who testified at Diaz’s trial.  A 
successive postconviction motion predicated on “newly discovered evidence” is 
authorized by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2)(A).  However, “[i]f 
the motion, files and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is 
entitled to no relief, the motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing.”  
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B); see also McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954 (Fla. 
2002).   
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements:  First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial 
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant 
or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  Newly 
discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it “weakens the 
case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his 
culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  
 
- 14 -
If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the 
newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones 
v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991). 
Diaz contends that the American Bar Association’s report entitled 
Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in the State Death Penalty System: The Florida 
Death Penalty Assessment Report, published September 17, 2006, constitutes 
newly discovered evidence proving that imposition of the death penalty is cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  The trial court summarily denied this claim. 
We recently addressed this issue in Rutherford v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly 
S647 (Fla. Oct. 12, 2006), wherein we concluded that the ABA Report is not newly 
discovered evidence because it “is a compilation of previously available 
information related to Florida's death penalty system and consists of legal analysis 
and recommendations for reform, many of which are directed to the executive and 
legislative branches.”  Id. at S649.  We further held that nothing in the report 
would cause this Court to recede from its past decisions upholding the facial 
constitutionality of the death penalty, and that the defendant did not allege how any 
of the conclusions in the report would render his individual death sentence 
unconstitutional.  Id.; see also Rolling v. State, 31 Fl. L. Weekly S667, S668-69 
(Fla. Oct. 18, 2006) (rejecting same newly discovered evidence claim based on 
 
- 15 -
ABA report).  Unlike Rutherford, Diaz did allege that many of the failures of the 
Florida death penalty system cited in the ABA Report were applicable in his case.  
However, this does not change the conclusion that the report is not newly 
discovered evidence.  Furthermore, the “failures” that Diaz cites as applying to his 
case either have been or could have been litigated by him in his direct appeal and 
postconviction proceedings.  Thus, we affirm the circuit court's summary denial of 
this claim. 
Diaz’s second claim of newly discovered evidence involves a recent 
affidavit by Ralph Gajus, a witness who testified at Diaz’s trial.  Diaz argues that 
the affidavit recants Gajus’ trial testimony and constitutes newly discovered 
evidence that entitles him to a new penalty phase proceeding.  The trial court 
denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing, finding that Diaz’s allegations do 
not meet the standard for newly discovered evidence or recantation of testimony.  
We agree. 
Gajus was an inmate housed in the cell across from Diaz prior to trial.  Gajus 
alerted the police to an escape being planned by Diaz and others.  Gajus also told 
the police about conversations he had with Diaz about the robbery and shooting in 
Diaz’s case.  Gajus testified at trial that Diaz talked about his involvement in the 
robbery and also indicated through his gestures that he had shot the victim in the 
chest. 
 
- 16 -
Gajus’ affidavit does not recant his trial testimony on the critical issue of 
whether Diaz made a statement about being the shooter.  In his affidavit, Gajus 
states that Diaz never said in words that he shot the victim, but acted out the 
shooting through gestures.  This is entirely consistent with Gajus’ trial testimony in 
which he specifically stated that Diaz never said the words “I shot the man in the 
chest,” but instead Gajus had inferred this from Diaz’s hand motions.  Diaz, 513 
So. 2d at 1048. 
While the affidavit contains information not presented at trial regarding  
Gajus’ motivation for testifying against Diaz, Diaz was well aware of this 
information and filed a motion to prevent it from being revealed to the jury.  The 
affidavit states that Gajus was angry with Diaz because Gajus learned that Diaz 
was not going to take him along during a planned escape and that Gajus would be 
in danger during the escape.  At his 1986 trial, Diaz filed a motion to preclude the 
State from introducing evidence about the escape plan.  At the hearing on the 
motion, the trial court heard argument about the agreement between Gajus and the 
State in return for Gajus’ assistance in exposing Diaz’s escape plan.  The court 
ruled that while the State could not present testimony about the escape plot, Diaz 
would have to avoid asking Gajus about the agreement or run the risk of opening 
the door to questions about the escape plan.  As all of this is contained in the 
hearing transcripts in the record on appeal, it can hardly be new evidence to Diaz. 
 
- 17 -
Additionally, in his first postconviction motion in 1989, Diaz claimed that 
the State had committed Brady5 violations in regard to Gajus’ testimony by 
withholding information about an alleged agreement between Gajus and the State 
for his testimony.  Diaz further alleged that Gajus “informed [his postconviction] 
counsel that Mr. Diaz never admitted complicity to him and that Mr. Diaz’s 
English was very, very poor – facts contravening what [Gajus] said at trial.”  Diaz 
raised this claim in his postconviction appeal to this Court as well.  Thus, the very 
inconsistencies that Diaz now asserts as “newly discovered evidence” were 
asserted in 1989.  Diaz offers no explanation why these inconsistencies should be 
considered “newly discovered” now. 
Finally, even if the Gajus affidavit was considered a recantation of the trial 
testimony, it would not probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones v. State, 
591 So. 2d at 915.  On direct appeal, this Court determined that Diaz’s major 
participation in the robbery combined with his reckless indifference to human life 
was sufficient to satisfy the Enmund/Tison6 culpability requirement to support a 
death sentence, “even assuming insufficient evidence that Diaz shot the victim.”   
Diaz, 513 So. 2d at 1048-49.  Furthermore, we rejected Diaz’s proportionality 
argument based on “insufficient evidence that he shot the victim and his 
                                          
 
 
5.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
6.  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 
(1987). 
 
- 18 -
codefendant received a life sentence.”  Id. at 1049.  Thus, we affirmed Diaz’s death 
sentence without direct evidence of who actually fired the fatal shot during the 
robbery. 
 
Moreover, the postconviction court relied on the fact that in the sentencing 
order the trial judge indicated that whether Diaz was the shooter did not impact the 
final sentence.  The court said: 
Moreover, the sentencing order specifically found that whether Diaz was 
actually the shooter or not did not impact the final result.  The overwhelming 
evidence presented at trial conclusively showed that Diaz’s involvement in 
the crime supported the judgment and sentence: 
 
[O]ther testimony presented by the defendant’s girlfriend, 
[Candace] Braun, indicated that a co-defendant was the shooter, 
and that the defendant was an accomplice.  Assuming, 
arguendo, [sic] that the defendant was not the shooter, the Court 
nevertheless finds that this mitigating circumstance does not 
apply.  This defendant was not a minor participant in the 
incident at the Velvet Swing Lounge.  The evidence is 
overwhelming that the defendant was a major participant in the 
robberies and kidnappings which led to the murder at the bar.  
The defendant knew of the plan to rob the lounge prior to 
leaving his residence.  The defendant armed himself with a 
large caliber weapon equipped with a silencer.  The defendant 
cased the bar from the vantage point of his seat for a long 
period of time prior to committing the robbery.  The defendant 
brandished his weapon and fired shots within the establishment, 
one of which almost struck a lady who was dancing on a stage.  
The defendant forcibly removed property from the patrons at 
the bar, and then participated in their armed removal to a place 
of confinement so as to avoid detection and identification.  The 
defendant also participated in the armed abduction of Gina 
Fredericks, a waitress, back to the office area so that the safe’s 
contents could be secured.  Finally, upon arriving back at his 
 
- 19 -
residence the defendant divided the booty from this crime 
among his cohorts. 
This Court finds that even though the defendant may have been 
an accomplice as to actual killing of Joseph Nagy, his 
participation was not minor and this mitigating circumstance 
does not apply.  The Court is aware that mitigating 
circumstances need not be proven beyond and to the exclusion 
of a reasonable doubt.  This Court does not believe that the 
evidence submitted as to this mitigating circumstance rises to 
the level necessary to persuade the Court that the mitigating 
circumstance should be weighted and, therefore, the Court does 
not consider it a mitigating circumstance.  See White v. State, 
403 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1981). 
[Sentencing Order, February 14, 1986, Supreme Court Record on Appeal 
1986 pg. 325-326.]  (Emphasis in original and added.)  The standard of 
Jones requires that Gajus’ recanted testimony would have caused a different 
result.  The sentencing order clearly shows that Gajus’ testimony, and 
whether Diaz was actually the shooter, did not effect the final result. 
 
For all these reasons, we agree with the trial court’s rejection of the newly 
discovered evidence claim.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's summary 
denial of relief on this claim. 
Public Records  
Diaz asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on 
his claims arising from public records requests.  On November 1, 2006, in relation 
to his lethal injection claims, Diaz sought records from the medical examinations 
of the last three inmates to be executed by lethal injection, Clarence Hill, Arthur 
Rutherford, and Danny Rolling; records from the Department of Corrections, the 
Attorney General’s Office, and the warden of Florida State prison concerning 
 
- 20 -
every item, individual, and protocol involved in the executions of the nineteen 
inmates who have been executed by lethal injection in Florida; and any documents 
from the Governor’s Office relating to lethal injection procedures.  On November 
17, 2006, after the death warrant was signed, Diaz made requests for additional 
public records from the Miami-Dade County Department of Corrections, the 
Miami-Dade County Medical Examiner’s Office, the State Attorney’s Office for 
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, the Miami-Dade County Police Department, the 
Florida Department of Health, the Office of Executive Clemency, the Florida 
Division of Elections, the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Office of the 
Attorney General, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Florida 
Department of Corrections. 
On November 21, 2006, after hearing argument on these requests, the circuit 
court denied Diaz’s motions for production of additional records.  The court found 
the requests either to be overly broad, not seeking relevant information, unlikely to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, or asking for documents that Diaz 
had received in the past.  
On November 27, 2006, in relation to Diaz’s subsequent claim based on the 
Gajus affidavit, Diaz requested additional public records from the Miami-Dade 
Police Department and the Office of the State Attorney.  On November 30, 2006, 
the circuit court heard argument from the parties on these additional records 
 
- 21 -
requests and denied them as well.  The court concluded that Diaz had not stated 
how the records are related to a colorable claim for postconviction relief and that 
the requests are overly broad because they seek all information held by the 
agencies regarding Gajus.  Furthermore, the court noted that everything regarding 
any agreement between Gajus and the State had been discussed at length during a 
motion hearing in Diaz’s 1986 trial and during the November 30, 2006, hearing 
and there is nothing more that Diaz could uncover that would be relevant to this 
postconviction claim. 
In reviewing the trial court’s denial of Diaz’s public records requests, this 
Court applies the abuse of discretion standard.  See Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579 
(Fla. 2006).  The first request made on November 1, 2006, was pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(i).  Rule 3.852(i) deals with the limitation on 
postproduction requests for additional records.  Specifically, subdivision (i)(2) 
requires the public records to be produced upon a finding of each of the following:  
  (C) the additional public records sought are either relevant to the subject 
matter of a proceeding under rule 3.851 or appear reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and  
  (D) the additional records request is not overly broad or unduly 
burdensome. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i)(2).   
The record in this case reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Diaz’s pre-warrant requests for public records.  The requests were made 
 
- 22 -
for documents relating to the lethal injection procedure. The trial court held that 
this request was unduly burdensome and overbroad.  A review of Diaz’s requests 
for these documents shows that the trial court’s finding was supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  The requests ask for “any and all documents”, 
which is in violation of rule 3.852(i)(2)(D), as it only provides for the production 
of additional records upon a finding that request is “not overly broad or unduly 
burdensome.”  Diaz’s requests were much broader than necessary to obtain 
information pertinent to an evaluation of the lethal injection procedure in Florida.  
See Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Hill’s demands for public records on the grounds 
that they were overly broad).   
 
Further, the record also reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Diaz’s post-warrant requests for public records.  The post-warrant 
requests were made on November 17, 2006, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.852(h)(3).  Rule 3.852(h)(3) requires the request for production of 
public records to be made within ten days of the signing of a death warrant.  This 
request must be made to a person or agency from whom collateral counsel has 
previously requested public records.   
In this case, the trial court held that the various post-warrant requests were 
either of questionable relevance, not likely to lead to discoverable evidence, or 
 
- 23 -
overbroad.  The record supports these findings by the trial court.  Similar to the 
pre-warrant requests made on November 1, the November 17 requests broadly 
asked for “any and all files.”  Examples of their sweeping breadth include requests 
that the Miami-Dade Police Department produce records relating to Diaz, his co-
defendant Toro, and forty-two other individuals, that the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement produce records of any and all information pertaining to forty-
four listed individuals, and that the State Attorney’s Office produce records 
relating to Diaz, Toro, and forty-two other individuals.  The trial court denied other 
post-warrant requests because the records demanded were not likely to lead to 
discoverable evidence.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this 
determination, as some of the requests relate to issues that Diaz previously raised 
and litigated unsuccessfully.  Examples of these requests include demands that the 
Division of Elections and the Judicial Qualifications Commission produce records 
pertaining to the circuit court judge presiding over Diaz’s case.  However, the issue 
of purported judicial bias was litigated years ago and denied.  Furthermore, this 
Court has held that the production of public records is not intended to be a 
“procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable 
claim for postconviction relief.”  Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1116 (Fla. 
2006) (quoting Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000)).   
 
- 24 -
Diaz’s last request for additional public records pertains to the “newly 
discovered evidence” of the Gajus affidavit.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying this request.  These requests also asked for the production of 
“any and all files” and “any and all documents” relating to the Gajus investigation, 
arrest, charges, and conviction, without specifying the type of documents sought.  
See Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547, 552 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying a request for further production of public 
records where the record supported the trial court’s finding that the demands were 
overly broad, of questionable relevance, and unlikely to lead to discoverable 
evidence); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002) (same).  Additionally, 
Diaz requested “any and all” documents “regardless of form” in the personnel files 
of specified attorneys in the State Attorney’s Office, presumably to look for 
information about an alleged “agreement” made with Gajus.  However, the request 
merely parrots the language of the rule without further explanation of the relevance 
of these records.  Thus, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the 
requests are overbroad.   
Additionally, the trial court denied the requests because Diaz failed to show 
how the documents would lead to admissible evidence or relate to a “colorable 
claim” for postconviction relief.  The court noted that it had denied Diaz’s motion 
for postconviction relief based on the Gajus affidavit.  As discussed at the 
 
- 25 -
November 30, 2006, hearing on the postconviction motion and records requests, 
the records from Diaz’s trial fully discussed the Gajus plea agreement in the escape 
case and his cooperation with the police in Diaz’s case.  It was by Diaz’s choice 
that this information was not revealed at trial, in order to keep out information 
about the escape plan.  Further, as discussed at the November 30 hearing, the claim 
relating to Gajus’ trial testimony and an alleged “agreement” was argued in Diaz’s 
first postconviction motion in 1989.  Thus, these records could have and should 
have been requested previously.  Even so, any claim relating to Gajus has been 
fully argued and ruled upon in previous proceedings and the records would not 
reveal anything new.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
these requests. 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm all of the trial court orders 
denying Diaz’s public records requests. 
Mental Illness 
Diaz asserts that he cannot be executed because he is mentally ill.  Diaz  
contends that he has been diagnosed as suffering from borderline personality 
disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and schizoid personality disorder.  
However, as the circuit court pointed out in its order denying this claim, 
personality disorders are not mental illnesses and a diagnosis of a personality 
disorder is insufficient to establish mental disease or defect.  See Patton v. State, 
 
- 26 -
878 So. 2d 368, 375 (Fla. 2004) (“The difference between a disorder and a disease 
is not insignificant.”). 
The legal test for insanity in Florida in criminal cases has long been the 
“M’Naghten Rule.”7  See, e.g., Cannady v. State, 620 So. 2d 165, 168 n.1 (Fla. 
1993); Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla. 1959); Davis v. State, 32 So. 822, 
826 (Fla. 1902).  Under M’Naghten, an accused is not criminally responsible if, at 
the time of the alleged crime, the defendant, by reason of a mental disease or 
defect, (1) does not know of the nature or consequences of his or her act; or (2) is 
unable to distinguish right from wrong.  See Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817, 
820 (Fla. 1984); Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1977).  A defendant 
can be found not guilty by reason of insanity if he or she commits an unlawful act, 
but by reason of a mental infirmity, disease, or defect is unable to understand the 
nature and quality of his or her act, or its consequences, or is incapable of 
distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the incident.  See Hall v. State, 568 
So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990).  Moreover, even an individual who does not meet the legal 
test for insanity and is found guilty and sentenced to death at trial, may not be 
executed while insane.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811.  A person is insane for purposes 
of execution “if the person lacks the mental capacity to understand the fact of the 
impending execution and the reason for it.”  Id. 3.811(b). 
                                          
 
 
7.  The rule is so named because it is derived from an early English decision, 
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
 
- 27 -
 
However, none of these restrictions on execution are applicable to Diaz.  He 
was not found insane at trial and he does not allege that he meets the legal standard 
in rule 3.811.  Instead, Diaz seems to be asserting that his personality disorders are 
sufficiently akin to being mentally retarded so as to exempt him from execution.  
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally 
retarded offenders constitutes “excessive” punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment).  He cites to the American Bar Association Resolution 122A, issued 
in August 2006, recommending that each jurisdiction that imposes capital 
punishment implement policies and procedures to prevent severely mentally ill 
defendants from being executed.  However, neither this Court nor the Supreme 
Court has recognized mental illness as a per se bar to execution.  Instead, mental 
illness can be considered as either a statutory mental mitigating circumstance if it 
meets that definition (i.e., the crime was committed while the defendant “was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance”) or a nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstance.  See § 921.141(6), Fla. Stat. (2006).  Such mental 
mitigation is one of the factors to be considered and weighed by the court in 
imposing a sentence. 
 
In Diaz’s case, there was no evidence of mental illness presented at trial.  
Three mental health experts did examine Diaz during the trial proceedings and 
found him competent to proceed.  Diaz represented himself, with standby counsel, 
 
- 28 -
from opening statements through conviction.  Diaz, 513 So. 2d at 1046.  He was 
represented by counsel during jury selection and the penalty phase.  Id.  The 
counsel who represented Diaz pretrial and during jury selection requested 
appointment of a mental health expert for the penalty phase and an expert was 
appointed.  Penalty phase counsel, who also served as standby counsel during the 
guilt phase, requested the services of an investigator to locate individuals from 
whom pretrial counsel had taken statements.  Penalty phase counsel also indicated 
that he spoke to Diaz about these character witnesses.  Diaz refused to let penalty 
phase counsel contact his family in Puerto Rico or to present argument at the 
penalty phase. 
During the initial postconviction proceedings in 1989, three mental health 
experts diagnosed Diaz as suffering from various personality disorders and one 
opined that Diaz was mentally ill and was not competent to stand trial while 
representing himself.  Diaz presented this evidence in conjunction with his claim 
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of trial by 
failing to present statutory mitigating evidence about Diaz’s mental health and 
family background.  Psychiatrist and forensic psychologist Dr. Anastasio Castiello, 
one of the experts who evaluated Diaz for competency to stand trial, also testified 
as a State witness at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Castiello testified 
that Diaz suffers from anti-social personality disorder, but disagreed with the 
 
- 29 -
diagnoses of borderline personality disorder and schizoid personality disorder.  He 
also testified that “no one in the world” recognizes a personality disorder as a 
mental illness.  After the evidentiary hearing on this claim, the trial court 
concluded that Diaz failed to establish ineffective assistance under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  On appeal, this Court found no merit to this 
claim.  Diaz, 719 So. 2d at 868. 
 
In light of this record, Diaz has not even shown that he suffers from a mental 
illness.  And even if he could, this would not automatically exempt him from 
execution as there is currently no per se “mental illness” bar to execution.  Thus, 
we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
HABEAS PETITION 
 
Diaz has also filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus from this 
Court.  He raises two claims in his petition:  (1) his death sentence is 
disproportionate; and (2) he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding based on an 
alleged violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), that occurred 
during the penalty phase of trial.  We address each issue in turn below. 
Proportionality of death sentence 
 
Diaz argues that his death sentence is disproportionate in light of the life 
sentence that his codefendant Toro received.  Diaz contends that Toro was the 
actual shooter of the victim and thus the more culpable defendant.  Diaz raised this 
 
- 30 -
very claim in his direct appeal to this Court.  See Diaz, 513 So. 2d at 1049.  We 
rejected the claim on appeal.  First, “even assuming insufficient evidence that Diaz 
shot the victim,” we determined that death was an appropriate sentence under 
Enmund/Tison.  Second, prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining with 
accomplices does not violate the principle of proportionality. 
Thus, to the extent that this claim was raised and rejected on direct appeal, it 
is procedurally barred in this habeas petition.  Habeas may not used as a vehicle to 
re-address an issue that has already been considered and resolved on direct appeal.  
See Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 377 (Fla. 2004). 
However, Diaz contends that the Gajus affidavit is newly discovered 
evidence that requires this Court to reconsider its proportionality analysis.  We find 
no merit to this claim.  As discussed in the analysis of rule 3.851 appeal above, the 
Gajus affidavit is not newly discovered evidence.  Furthermore, we found Diaz’s 
death sentence to be proportionate without direct evidence of who actually fired 
the fatal shot during the robbery.   
Crawford v. Washington Claim 
 
Diaz contends that certain hearsay statements admitted during the penalty 
phase of his trial violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth 
 
- 31 -
Amendment of the United States Constitution,8 as explained in the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington.  In Crawford, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a testimonial hearsay statement is 
inadmissible at trial unless the declarant is shown to be unavailable and the party 
against whom the statement is admitted had an opportunity for cross-examination.  
Id. at 68.  Diaz asserts that it was error for the trial court to allow a police detective 
to testify about Diaz’s previous conviction in Puerto Rico based on investigative 
witnesses’ statements. 
 
Initially, we note that this Court has determined that Crawford does not 
apply retroactively to cases, such as Diaz’s, that were final at the time the opinion 
was issued.  Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 382 (2006).  However, even if Crawford were retroactive in application, it 
would not warrant relief in Diaz’s case. 
During direct examination of Detective Jose Pizarro, the State asked about 
the detective’s investigation of the murder for which Diaz was convicted in Puerto 
Rico.  Pizarro begin his explanation of the investigation by stating, “The 
investigation revealed, according to what the witnesses manifested--,” at which 
point defense counsel objected and argued that the testimony was based on 
                                          
 
 
8.  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in all 
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right “to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 
- 32 -
hearsay.  The trial court reminded the State that the testimony had to be limited to 
what Detective Pizarro’s investigation revealed and not what was said by any 
witnesses.  Throughout the remainder of the State’s direct examination, the State 
confined its questions to the detective’s own investigation and the detective 
answered accordingly.  Therefore, there was no Crawford violation as Diaz alleges. 
 
Moreover, any possible Crawford violation would be subject to a harmless 
error analysis.  See Rodgers v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S705 (Fla. Oct. 26, 2006).  
As this Court stated in Rodgers, “an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
when, after considering all the permissible evidence, a court concludes that there is 
no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury’s recommendation of 
death.”  Id. at S707.  Similar to the instant case, Rodgers involved hearsay 
testimony about a prior conviction presented during the penalty phase of trial.  
While we found that the testimony of a former police officer and a former 
prosecutor about eyewitness statements regarding the prior crime constituted 
testimonial statements under Crawford, we also concluded that this violation of 
Rodgers’ Sixth Amendment confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We explained that the State’s introduction of a certified copy of Rodgers’ 
prior manslaughter conviction established the prior violent felony conviction 
aggravator and rendered any testimonial error harmless.  Id. at S707.   
 
- 33 -
In the instant case, the State introduced a certified copy of Diaz’s second-
degree murder conviction that was the subject of Detective Pizarro’s testimony.  
Thus, even if Crawford applied retroactively and even if the detective presented 
testimonial hearsay, the introduction of this certified copy of the conviction 
rendered any error harmless.   See Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 45 (Fla. 
2000) (“[I]n many cases, any error in admitting the hearsay testimony has been 
considered harmless because the certified copy of the conviction itself conclusively 
establishes the aggravator.”). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Diaz is not entitled to habeas relief on this 
claim. 
ALL WRITS PETITION 
 
Diaz has also filed a petition under the Court’s constitutional all writs 
authority, in which he claims that section 27.702, Florida Statute (2006), is 
unconstitutional both facially and as applied in his case.  We find no merit to this 
claim. 
 
Section 27.702 specifies the duties of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel in 
representing individuals convicted and sentenced to death in Florida in “collateral 
actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed.”  Id. § 
27.702(1).  Pursuant to the statute, CCRC attorneys “shall file only those 
postconviction or collateral actions authorized by statute.”  This Court has held that 
 
- 34 -
the “postconviction or collateral actions authorized by statute” do not include civil 
rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 
2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1998). 
Diaz contends that his due process rights have been violated because his 
CCRC attorneys cannot file a section 1983 action in federal court to challenge 
Florida’s lethal injection procedures and lethal injection as a method of execution.  
Diaz further alleges that he has no other avenue available to bring such a federal 
challenge in light of the holding in Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).  
We conclude that Diaz has misinterpreted the Hill decision. 
In Hill, the defendant filed a federal action under section 1983 to challenge 
the lethal injection procedure as cruel and unusual punishment.  The federal district 
court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals both denied Hill’s claim, holding 
that his section 1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a habeas petition.  
Because Hill had sought federal habeas relief earlier, his section 1983 action was 
deemed successive and thus procedurally barred.  Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2097.  
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed and held that a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the lethal injection procedure did not have to be brought in 
a habeas petition, but could proceed under section 1983.  Id. at 2098.  However, 
contrary to Diaz’s assertions here, the United States Supreme Court did not hold 
 
- 35 -
that a constitutional challenge to lethal injection procedures could not be brought 
under a habeas petition. 
Accordingly, Diaz did have an alternative avenue for challenging the lethal 
injection procedure in federal court, but did not utilize it.  In 1999, Diaz filed a 
federal habeas petition in federal district court.  The petition was pending until 
January 2004.  On January 14, 2000, section 922.105 was amended to provide for 
lethal injection as the method of execution in Florida.  See ch. 2000-2, § 3, at 4, 
Laws of Fla.  Also, while his federal habeas petition was pending, Diaz filed two 
habeas petitions in this Court.  See Diaz v. Moore, 828 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2001); 9 
Diaz v. Crosby, 869 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2003).10
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a 
federal court may be granted if the applicant has exhausted the remedies available 
in the state courts.  Thus, had Diaz raised a lethal injection claim in either of his 
two state habeas petitions that were filed after lethal injection was adopted as the 
method of execution in Florida, he could have then raised the claim in his initial 
federal habeas petition that was pending from 1999 until 2004.  However, Diaz did 
not utilize this avenue that was available to him.  Thus, it was due to his own lack 
of diligence that he missed the opportunity to challenge execution by lethal 
                                          
 
 
9.  This petition was filed in June 2000 and denied by this Court in July 
2001. 
 
10.  This petition was filed in February 2003 and denied by this Court in 
October 2003. 
 
- 36 -
injection in a federal habeas action.  Accordingly, we find no violation of Diaz’s 
due process rights and no basis for striking down section 27.702 as 
unconstitutional.  We deny Diaz’s petition for all writs relief.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief under rule 3.851 and the denial of Diaz’s public records 
request.  We also deny Diaz’s petitions for habeas corpus and all writs relief. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
Four Cases: 
 
Two Appeals from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Amy Steele Donner, Judge - Case No. 83-18931-B 
An Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
And an Original Proceeding – All Writs 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Southern Region, Suzanne 
Myers Keffer, and Barbara L. Costa, Assistant CCRC, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
 
 
- 37 -