Title: Daniel Hendrie v. WCAB (Henkels & McCoy, Inc.) (Dissenting Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: & 62 W.D. APPEAL DOCKET 1999; J-31-2000, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 & 64 MAP 2000
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2001

[J-169-00][M.O. - Cappy, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT HENKELS & MCCOY, INC., Appellant v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (HENDRIE), Appellee HENKELS & MCCOY, INC. v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (HENDRIE) APPEAL OF: DANIEL HENDRIE DANIEL HENDRIE v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (HENKELS & MCCOY, INC.) APPEAL OF: HENKELS & MCCOY, INC. DANIEL HENDRIE, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 61 MAP 2000 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 8/5/99 at 3414 CD 98 reversing/affirming in part the Order of the WCAB entered on 11/25/98 at A-97-3598 No. 62 MAP 2000 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 8/5/99 at 3414 CD 99 reversing/affirming in part the Order of the WCAB entered on 11/25/98 at A-97-3598 No. 63 MAP 2000 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 8/5/99 at 6 CD 99 reversing/affirming in part the Order of the WCAB entered on 11/25/98 at A-97-3598 No. 64 MAP 2000 Appeal from the Order of the [J-169-00][M.O. - Cappy, J.] - 2 v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (HENKELS & MCCOY, INC.) Appellee : : : : : : : Commonwealth Court entered on 8/5/99 at 6 CD 99 reversing/affirming in part the Order of the WCAB entered on 11/25/98 at A-97-3598 Argued: December 4, 2000 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: July 19, 2001 While confinement in a mental health facility, an available form of intermediate punishment under the Sentencing Code, see 42 Pa.C.S. §9763(b)(5), may constitute the type of incarceration warranting a suspension of benefits under Section 306(a)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act,1 in my view, the record in this case, in its present state, does not support such a determination. Significantly, in imposing the judgment of sentence upon Claimant, the trial court did not expressly invoke Section 9763. Rather, in addition to sentencing Claimant to five years of probation, the court set forth the commitment in a section devoted to remarks, citing to Sections 304 and 305 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. §§7303, 7304, the civil confinement provisions, while making no mention of the sections of that enactment governing individuals charged with a crime or serving a sentence. See 50 P.S. §§7401-7408. Section 306(a)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which precludes a claimant from receiving benefits while incarcerated following a conviction, see 77 P.S. §511(2), constitutes a specific exclusion of benefits. Consistent with the humanitarian purposes 1 Indeed, Section 401(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act provides that a period of involuntary treatment “shall be credited as time served on account of any sentence to be imposed on pending charges or any unexpired term of imprisonment,” 50 P.S. §7401(b), thus equating a commitment with incarceration in certain circumstances. [J-169-00][M.O. - Cappy, J.] - 3 to be achieved through the workers’ compensation scheme, such exclusion should be narrowly construed, with “incarceration” being defined according to its ordinary and approved usage.2 Where, as here, the criminal nature of a commitment is questionable, the self-executing provision of Section 306(a)(2) should not be read so broadly as to effect a suspension of benefits without consideration of the underlying circumstances, particularly in light of Claimant’s assertion that the mental condition is work-related.3 Accordingly, I would reverse that portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order that reversed the reinstatement of Claimant’s benefits as of March 10, 1994. 2 While I recognize that the Court has previously indicated that inpatient custodial rehabilitation may constitute imprisonment for purposes of affording credit for time served related to offenses under the Vehicle Code, that holding was based primarily upon consideration of the purposes sought to be obtained through the mandatory sentencing scheme--rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment--which were served by the particular rehabilitation program in that case. See Commonwealth v. Conahan, 523 Pa. 199, 203-04, 589 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1991). Significantly, the underlying purposes served by civil commitment can be quite different. See 50 P.S. §7102 (emphasizing, inter alia, the goal of ensuring availability of adequate treatment for mentally ill individuals to protect those individuals and others). Accordingly, and considering the legislative intent of the workers’ compensation scheme, including its humanitarian objectives and the narrow constuction of borderline interpretations against the cessation of benefits, see Sporio v. WCAB (Sponger Constr. Co.), 553 Pa. 44, 50, 717 A.22d 525, 527 (1998), in my view a more restrictive construction of the term incarceration is warranted in the civil confinement context. 3 This is not to say that an employer is obligated to pay benefits ad infinitum for an institutionalized claimant. Rather, if an employer can demonstrate that the claimant’s loss of earnings is no longer attributable to the work injury, and that work would be available but for an unrelated mental illness, benefits may be appropriately suspended. See generally Kachinski v. WCAB (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516 Pa. 240, 251, 532 A.2d 374, 379 (1987). Although a connection between Claimant’s back injury and mental illness may seem unlikely, Employer evidently did not proceed under this theory of suspension. That being the case, and in the absence of pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law by the WCJ, I do not view it as the role of an appellate court to make such a determination. Thus, I do not believe that Employer’s entitlement to a suspension of benefits should be resolved at this time.