Title: GREEN v C R ANTHONY CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-066
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 1981

No. 8 1 - 6 6 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 JAY GREEN (FATAL) , MRS. BECKY L. GREEN, C l a i m a n t and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- C. R. ANTHONY COMPANY, E m p l o y e r , and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . A p p e a l f r o m : W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t , T h e H o n o r a b l e W i l l i a m E . H u n t , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t : C r o w l e y , H a u g h e y , H a n s o n , T o o l e & D i e t r i c h , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t : John Iwen, G r e a t F a l l s , N o n t a n a Submitted on B r l e f s : June 4 f 1 9 8 1 (JCT 7 1981 F i l e d ; M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court Jay Green was employed a s manager of Anthony's department s t o r e i n Plentywood. Defendant appeals from t h e determination by t h e Workers' Compensation Court t h a t Green's f a t a l i n j u r i e s a r o s e o u t of and i n t h e course of h i s employment when he was k i l l e d while r i d i n g h i s personal motorcycle approximately t h r e e miles north of Plentywood. W e a f f i r m t h e holding of t h e Workers' Compensation Court. Green had been employed a s manager of t h e Plentywood s t o r e f o r s e v e r a l years p r i o r t o the accident. The Workers' Compensation Court found t h a t on t h e d a t e of t h e a c c i d e n t Green a r r i v e d a t work a t approximately 8:00 a.m. Green s t a t e d t o one of t h e employees t h a t h i s motorcycle was n o t running properly and t h a t he suspected t h e engine might be "carboned up". A t approximately 10:30 a.m. Green advised another s t o r e employee t h a t he was going t o t h e Klothes Horse, a r e p a i r shop i n Plentywood. That employee t e s t i f i e d it was normal procedure t o have c e r t a i n goods repaired when t h e need would a r i s e . When he l e f t , Green i n d i c a t e d he expected t o be back by 1 1 : O O a.m. when t h e usual lunch breaks f o r s t o r e employees were t o commence. The testimony of t h e owner of t h e Klothes Horse i n d i c a t e d t h a t Green a r r i v e d on h i s motorcycle a t approximately 10:30 a.m. and l e f t a s i n g l e l a d i e s ' shoe f o r r e p a i r s . Green inquired how long the r e p a i r s would take. The owner advised him t h a t it would be approximately 15 t o 20 minutes. Green r e p l i e d , "That's g r e a t " and l e f t t h e s t o r e , giving t h e impression t o t h e owner of the Klothes Horse t h a t Green was expecting t o pick t h e shoe up within 15 o r 20 minutes. Based on i n q u e s t testimony, t h e Workers' compensation Court f u r t h e r determined t h a t it was apparent t h a t Green l e f t t h e Klothes Horse and proceeded o u t of Plentywood i n a n o r t h e r l y d i r e c t i o n on t h e highway. A t a p o i n t approximately t h r e e m i l e s north of Plentywood, Green l o s t c o n t r o l of h i s motorcycle, f e l l t o t h e pavement and sustained f a t a l i n j u r i e s . Testimony a t t h e i n q u e s t revealed t h a t t h e decedent w a s t r a v e l i n g i n excess of 70 mph and n o t wearing a c r a s h helmet, and t h a t Green probably l o s t c o n t r o l of h i s motorcycle because t h e damper bar was o u t of adjustment. Green's d i s t r i c t manager t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s t o r e manager's d u t i e s customarily involved supervising employees, a s s i s t i n g with s a l e s , handling inventory, customer r e l a t i o n s and c r e a t i o n of good w i l l . H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t Green's motorcycle w a s n o t a company v e h i c l e and t h a t the decedent was not paid mileage o r reimbursement o r per diem of any type. H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r i s k which he perceived i n r i d i n g on t h e motorcycle was not a r i s k o r d i n a r i l y associated with a s t o r e manager's work. O n t h e o t h e r hand, he was a l s o aware t h a t Green had a motorcycle and d i d use it i n t h e course of h i s work a s manager. I n i t s conclusions of l a w , t h e Workers' Compensation Court included t h e following: " 4 . . . . However, i n deviating from h i s employment t o r i d e h i s motorcycle, it appears t o t h i s Court t h a t t h e decedent may w e l l have been removing carbon from t h e motorcycle and thereby improving i t s per- formance, an errand which can be construed from t h e s e f a c t s as a b e n e f i t t o both himself and t h e employer. The decedent has used h i s motorcycle f o r t h e Company i n t h e p a s t , n o t only t h e s a m e day of t h e a c c i d e n t , b u t on o t h e r occasions and while n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y approved by t h e employer it was n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y prohibited. "5. Taking a l l t h e f a c t s most favorable t o t h e defendant t h e conclusion of t h i s Court i s t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t i n question d i d occur within t h e course and scope of t h e decedent's employment. Any o t h e r explanation makes less sense i n view of the decedent's t o t a l dedication t o h i s employment and t h e high esteem i n which he w a s held by both t h e community and by h i s employers. While t h e r e was some c o n f l i c t i n t h e time t h e decedent might r e t u r n t o h i s job a s t e s t i f i e d t o by t h e various witnesses, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t h i s employer and h i s employees considered him t o be on duty a t t h e time of h i s accident and t h a t o t h e r s a l s o believed him t o be on duty." I n i t s judgment t h e c o u r t then determined t h a t t h e de- cedent Green's widow i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l b e n e f i t s provided by t h e Workers' Compensation Act. Simply s t a t e d , t h e s i n g l e i s s u e t h i s c a s e presents i s whether t h e f a t a l accident arose o u t of and i n t h e course of Green's employment. Our function i n reviewing a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court i s t o determine whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions of t h a t court. W e cannot s u b s t i t u t e our judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence on questions of f a c t . Where t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Workers' Compensation Court, t h i s Court cannot overturn t h e decision. S t e f f e s v. 93 Leasing Co., Inc., (1978), 177 Mont. 83, 580 P.2d 450. This case i s s i m i l a r t o t h e S t e f f e s c a s e i n t h a t t h e defendant claims t h e r e i s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e conclusion t h a t t h e death occurred within t h e course and scope of employment. The Workers1 Compensation Court found t h a t Green was on an errand which can be construed from t h e f a c t s as a b e n e f i t both t o himself and t h e employer. I t i s apparent t h a t t h e c o u r t thought t h e Green case comes within t h e "dual purpose" r u l e , which w a s described i n S t e f f e s , 580 P.2d a t 454, a s follows: "'The dual purpose d o c t r i n e i s t h a t an employee may, while t r a v e l i n g , be on an errand of h i s own, b u t i f he i s a t t h e same t i m e on some s u b s t a n t i a l mission f o r h i s employer, he may be s a i d t o be within t h e ambit of h i s employment. The r u l e was o r i g i n a l l y l a i d down by J u s t i c e Cardozo, i n t h e case of Marks' Dependents v. Gray [(1929), 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181, 182-1831, i n which it was said: 'To e s t a b l i s h l i a b i l i t y , t h e inference must be permissible t h a t t h e t r i p would have been made though the p r i v a t e errand had been cancelled. . . The test i n b r i e f i s t h i s : i f t h e work of the employee creates t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t r a v e l , he i s i n t h e course of h i s employment, though he i s serving a t the same time some purpose of h i s own. . . I f , however, t h e work has had no p a r t i n c r e a t i n g t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t r a v e l , i f t h e journey would have gone forward though t h e business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon f a i l u r e of t h e p r i v a t e purpose, though t h e business errand was undone, t h e t r a v e l i s then personal, and per- sonal t h e r i s k . ' " "'The d o c t r i n e has been c o n s i s t e n t l y followed.' B l a i r , Reference Guide t o Workmen's Compensation Law, 59.21." I n t h i s case t h e evidence shows t h a t a s manager of t h e s t o r e , Green i n t h e course of h i s employment l e f t t h e s t o r e with the shoe f o r r e p a i r and took it t o t h e r e p a i r shop. There can be no question t h a t up t o t h i s p o i n t , he was within t h e course and scope of h i s employment. Having been t o l d t h a t t h e shoe would be repaired i n 15 o r 20 minutes, Green concluded t h a t he should d r i v e north of Plentywood, having given a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he planned t o be back t o pick up t h e shoe and t o be back a t the s t o r e w i t h i n l e s s than 30 minutes, t h a t i s by 1 1 : O O a.m. W e do n o t know t h e p r e c i s e purpose f o r h i s t r a v e l i n g approximately t h r e e miles north of Plentywood. Because of Green's comment about h i s motorcycle engine having carboned up, it i s reasonable t o conclude t h a t h i s purpose was t o f r e e t h e engine of carbon so t h a t it would run b e t t e r . The circumstances of t h e accident a r e a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with t h a t objective. I n A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation - Law 521.74 (1978) t h e r e i s an extensive discussion of cases covering l u l l s i n work and i n j u r i e s occurring during such periods. A t page 5- 58, t h e t e x t s t a t e s : ". . . I n t h e North Carolina c a s e of Watkins v. C i t y of Wilmington, t h e claimant fireman, while on h i s lunch break and during a 24-hour tour of duty, attempted t o c l e a n t h e o i l - b r e a t h e r cap from an automobile t h a t belonged t o a fellow employee. The p r a c t i c e of firemen making minor r e p a i r s t o t h e i r automobiles during lunch hour was w e l l known t o t h e i r supervisors. The claimant attempted t o c l e a n t h e cap by p u t t i n g g a s o l i n e on it and s e t t i n g it on f i r e . Af ter t h e f i r e had gone o u t , t h e cap was s t i l l n o t c l e a n , so t h e claimant poured more gasoline on it. A t t h a t p o i n t t h e r e was an explosion, and t h e claimant suffered f i r s t and second degree burns on h i s f a c e and upper e x t r e m i t i e s . The Supreme Court, affirming t h e Court of Appeals, held t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s cleaning of t h e o i l breather was a reasonable a c t i v i t y , and t h e i n j u r i e s sustained a s a r e s u l t of t h e explosion a r o s e o u t of the claimant's employment. This conclusion was b o l s t e r e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s kind of p r a c t i c e was w e l l known t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s supervisors, who n o t only d i d n o t o b j e c t , b u t s p e c i f i c a l l y allowed firemen t o make such minor r e p a i r s during t h e i r lunch hour. " There a r e similarities between t h e Watkins case and t h e p r e s e n t Green case. The fireman was on duty i n ~ a t k i n s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n j u r y . Green had n o t l e f t h i s employment as manager and t h e r e f o r e can a l s o be considered t o be on duty a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident. I n Watkins t h e fireman w a s working on an automobile of a fellow employee when injured. With Green w e may f a i r l y assume he w a s seeking t o remove carbon from h i s motorcycle. The Workers' Compensation Court found t h a t Green's a c t i v i t y was f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e employer a s w e l l a s himself which adds an element n o t p r e s e n t i n t h e Watkins case. With Green we note t h e accident happened during a s h o r t l u l l i n h i s employment. Green could have accomplished l i t t l e had he returned t o h i s s t o r e and been required t o leave soon enough t o r e t u r n t o t h e shoe s t o r e i n 15 o r 20 minutes. I n a d d i t i o n , Green was t h e manager of t h e s t o r e . A s a r e s u l t it would be appropriate f o r Green t o leave t h e s t o r e t o engage i n various types of a c t i v i t i e s which a r e a p p r o p r i a t e f o r s t o r e managers, and which are customarily engaged i n , t o i n c r e a s e good w i l l towards t h e s t o r e . A s an example, it would have been reasonable f o r Green t o take 15 o r 20 minutes o u t of t h e s t o r e during which he could have gone t o a r e s t a u r a n t i n Plentywood i n order t o have a cup of c o f f e e with o t h e r s i n t h e community. Had he done so, and been i n j u r e d through h i s own negligence when returning from having such cup of c o f f e e , it would be reasonable t o c l a s s t h e a c t i v i t y a s i n t h e course and scope of employment. A s f u r t h e r pointed o u t i n A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation L a w 521.74 a t page 5-56: "The leeway accorded an employee during an en- forced h i a t u s i n h i s work extends n o t only t o r e s t i n g and sleeping b u t a l s o t o a c e r t a i n amount of wandering around and even undertaking what otherwis [el might s e e m t o be d i s t i n c t l y personal a c t i v i t i e s . I n Penn Stevedoring Corporation v. e a r d i l l o ; a hauler who had discharged h i s load and had ten minutes t o w a i t before he could make another t r i p was wandering about some f l o a t s moored a t a dock watching b a l e s being unloaded and f e l l i n t o t h e water while crossing from one f l o a t t o another. Compensation was awarded. The added-risk argument was r e j e c t e d , l a r g e l y on t h e theory t h a t t h e r e was custom, acquiesced i n by t h e employer, f o r haulers t o wander about t h e dock during t h e i r i d l e periods. This case i s a good i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e growing category of s i t u a t i o n s , discussed i n general terms a t t h e o u t s e t of the chapter, i n which the 'mutual b e n e f i t ' theory i s inadequate t o explain t h e r e s u l t and i n which work connec- t i o n must be found i n a combination of known human nature and t h e p a r t i c u l a r circumstances and p r a c t i c e s of t h e employment." Larson r e f e r s t o a number of s i m i l a r cases where a workman has been i n j u r e d during a break o r h i a t u s i n h i s work and where com- pensation has been extended t o such f a c t s i t u a t i o n s . I n t h e Green c a s e w e f i n d t h a t t h e f a c t s show a c l o s e r rel-ationship t o employment than i n s e v e r a l of t h e c i t e d cases. W e f i n d t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e conclusion of t h e Workers' Compensation Court. Claimant argues t h a t i t s motion t o dismiss t h e appeal should be granted. The motion was based upon the unusual s i t u a t i o n t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d on l ( 2 n d C i r . 1 9 4 8 ) 165 F.2d 789. February 10, and on t h e same day counsel f o r claimant f i l e d a motion f o r rehearing. The notice of appeal was properly served and f i l e d . I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e f i l i n g of an appeal t o t h i s Court s t a y s proceedings, thereby removing j u r i s d i c t i o n from a D i s t r i c t Court o r Workers ' Compensation Court t o proceed f u r t h e r i n t h e matter. McCormick v. McCormick (1975), 168 Mont. 136, 541 P.2d 765. Claimant's motion t o dismiss t h e appeal i s denied. W e hold t h a t s u f f i c i e n t evidence i s p r e s e n t t o support t h e finding and conclusion t h a t the decedent's widow i s e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s provided by t h e Workers' Compensation Act, and the judgment of t h e Workers' Compensation Court i s affirmed. W e Concur: P