Title: Sheri Gould v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP000074
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 1996

No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-0074 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Sheri Gould, Scott Gould, 
and St. Croix County, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
American Family Mutual 
Insurance Company, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JAN 30, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded with directions. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Both the plaintiffs, Sheri and Scott 
Gould, and the defendant, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company, seek review of a court of appeals' decision which 
reversed and remanded a judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Croix 
County, Eric J. Lundell, Judge.  The judgment imposed liability 
against American Family for personal injuries caused by its 
insured, Roland Monicken, who was institutionalized suffering from 
Alzheimer's disease.  The Goulds assert that the court of appeals 
erred by abandoning the objective reasonable person standard and 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
2 
adopting a subjective mental incapacity defense in negligence 
cases.  American Family challenges the need for a remand.   
 
While we affirm the court of appeals' reversal of the 
judgment, we do so on other grounds.  We hold that an individual 
institutionalized, as here, with a mental disability, and who does 
not have the capacity to control or appreciate his or her conduct 
cannot be liable for injuries caused to caretakers who are 
employed for financial compensation.  Because the Goulds, in 
essence, admit that it would be impossible to rebut the evidence 
of Monicken's incapacity, we reverse the part of the court of 
appeals' decision remanding the case to the trial court for a 
determination of Monicken's capacity. 
 
Monicken was 
diagnosed 
with Alzheimer's 
disease 
after 
displaying bizarre and irrational behavior.  As a result of his 
deteriorating condition, his family was later forced to admit him 
to the St. Croix Health Care Center.  Sheri Gould was the head 
nurse of the center's dementia unit and took care of him on 
several occasions.  
 
Monicken's records from St. Croix indicate that he was often 
disoriented, resistant to care, and occasionally combative.  When 
not physically restrained, he often went into other patients' 
rooms and sometimes resisted being removed by staff.  On one such 
occasion, Gould attempted to redirect Monicken to his own room by 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
3 
touching him on the elbow.  She sustained personal injuries when 
Monicken responded by knocking her to the floor.1  
 
Gould and her husband brought suit against Monicken and his 
insurer, American Family.  American Family admitted coverage and 
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Monicken was 
incapable of negligence as a matter of law due to his lack of 
mental capacity.  An affidavit of Monicken's treating psychiatrist 
filed in support of the motion stated that Monicken was unable to 
appreciate the consequences of his acts or to control his 
behavior.  The trial court denied American Family's summary 
judgment motion and the liability portion of the bifurcated trial 
was tried to a jury. 
 
After presenting its case, American Family proposed giving 
instructions and a special verdict that directed the jury to 
decide, as a threshold question of law, whether Monicken had the 
mental capacity to understand and appreciate the duty to act with 
reasonable care at the time of the incident based on his 
Alzheimer's disease.  The trial court denied this request.  
Pursuant to Wis JI—Civil 1021, the court instructed the jury to 
disregard any evidence related to Monicken's mental condition and 
to determine his negligence under the objective reasonable person 
                     
     1  Gould has no recollection of exactly how she was injured. 
 However, Monicken does not dispute that he either pushed or 
struck Gould. 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
4 
standard.2   The jury found Monicken totally negligent and a 
judgment of liability was entered against American Family.3 
 
The court of appeals granted American Family's interlocutory 
appeal and reversed the judgment, holding that "a person may not 
be held civilly liable where a mental condition deprives that 
person of the ability to control his or her conduct."  Gould v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 187 Wis. 2d 671, 673, 523 N.W.2d 
295 (Ct. App. 1994).  The court remanded the case "for a 
determination of whether there is a disputed issue of material 
fact as to whether Monicken's mental condition prevented him from 
controlling or appreciating the consequences of his conduct."  Id. 
at 680. 
 
Both the Goulds and American Family petitioned this court for 
review.  The Goulds argue that the court of appeals abandoned 
clear, 
long-standing 
precedent 
in 
determining 
that 
mental 
disability may constitute a defense to negligence.  American 
                     
     2  The trial court instructed the jury in part as follows: 
 
 
Evidence has been received and it appears without dispute 
that the defendant at the time of the incident was mentally 
and physically ill.  It is the law that a person who is 
mentally and physically ill is held to the same standard of 
care as one who has normal physical and mental conditions, 
and in your determination of the question of negligence, you 
will give no consideration to the defendant's mental or 
physical condition. 
 
See Wis JI—Civil 1021, "Negligence of Mentally Ill." 
     3  The damages portion of the bifurcated trial has not been 
tried to date. 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
5 
Family agrees with the court of appeals' holding, but petitioned 
for cross review to reverse the court's remand mandate.  American 
Family asserts that a remand is unnecessary because Monicken's 
mental incapacity was virtually conceded at trial.  
 
It is a widely accepted rule in most American jurisdictions 
that mentally disabled adults are held responsible for the torts 
they commit regardless of their capacity to comprehend their 
actions;  they are held to an objective reasonable person 
standard.  See generally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B 
(1965);  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts, § 135 (1984).  Legal scholars trace the origins of this 
rule to an English trespass case decided in 1616, at a time when 
strict liability controlled.  Id. at 1072, citing Weaver v. Ward, 
80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).   
 
When 
fault-based 
liability 
replaced 
strict 
liability, 
American courts in common law jurisdictions identified the matter 
as a question of public policy and maintained the rule imposing 
liability on the mentally disabled.  Although early case law 
suggested 
that Wisconsin 
followed 
this 
trend,4 
this 
court 
                     
     4  For example, in Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 237, 238 
(1863), an action involving the civil liability of an infant, the 
court commented in dicta that "a lunatic is as liable to 
compensate in damages as a man in his right mind."  In Karow v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 56, 64, 15 N.W. 27 (1883), the court 
held that an insurance company was not relieved from liability 
when its insured burned his own property in a state of insanity, 
but stated in dicta that "the same act of burning another's 
property might subject such person to damages . . . on the 
principle that where a loss must be borne by one of two innocent 
persons, it should be borne by him who occasioned it." (Emphasis 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
6 
specifically adopted the common law rule and the public policy 
justifications behind it in German Mut. Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Meyer, 
218 Wis. 381, 385, 261 N.W. 211 (1935). 
   
In Meyer, the defendant was criminally charged with arson to 
a barn but was committed to a mental hospital after he was found 
to be insane.  In the civil claim filed by the insurer who covered 
the loss, the defendant pled his insanity as a defense.  Meyer, 
218 Wis. at 382-85.  The court primarily relied on cases from 
other jurisdictions to conclude that insanity was not a defense 
for tort liability.  Id. at 385-90. 
 
In doing so the court quoted with approval the following 
statement of the general rule and public policy rationale behind 
it: 
 
It is the well settled rule that a person non compos 
mentis is liable in damages to one injured by reason of 
a tort committed by him unless evil intent or express 
malice 
constitutes 
an 
essential 
element 
in 
the 
plaintiff's recovery.  This rule is usually considered 
to be based on the principle that where a loss must be 
borne by one of two innocent persons, it shall be borne 
by him who occasioned it, and it has also been held that 
public policy requires the enforcement of the liability 
in order that those interested in the estate of the 
insane person, as relatives or otherwise, may be under 
inducement to restrain him and that tort-feasors may not 
simulate or pretend insanity to defend their wrongful 
acts causing damage to others. . . .   
Id. at 385 (quoted source omitted).  Meyer forms the basis of the 
present day jury instruction concerning the primary negligence of 
the mentally ill, Wis JI—Civil 1021. 
(..continued) 
in original; quoted source omitted.) 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
7 
 
This court did not have occasion to address the issue again 
until Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 
N.W.2d 619 (1970).  In Breunig, Erma Veith was overcome with a 
mental delusion while driving and crossed the center line of a 
roadway, striking the plaintiff's vehicle.  The plaintiff sued 
Veith's automobile liability insurer, and a jury returned a 
verdict finding her causally negligent on the theory that she had 
knowledge or forewarning of her mental delusions.  Id. at 538. 
 
On appeal, the insurer argued that Veith could not be 
negligent as a matter of law because she was unable to drive with 
a conscious mind based on the sudden mental delusion.  This court 
created a limited exception to the common law rule, holding that 
insanity could be a defense in the rare case "where the [person] 
is suddenly overcome without forewarning by a mental disability or 
disorder which incapacitates him from conforming his conduct to 
the standards of a reasonable man under like circumstances."  Id. 
at 543.  However, because this court concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Veith had 
forewarning of the mental delusions, she was not entitled to use 
her condition as a defense.  Id. at 545.  
 
The court of appeals in the present case relied on expansive 
dicta in Breunig to hold that Breunig overruled Meyer.5  It 
                     
     5  We note that prior to this case, the court of appeals also 
relied on Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 
N.W.2d 619 (1970), to suggest that a mental disability could be a 
defense to negligence.  See Burch v. American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 171 Wis. 2d 607, 492 N.W.2d 338 (Ct. App. 1992).  We reserve 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
8 
interpreted Breunig as a turning point in the law.  See Gould, 187 
Wis. 2d at 677-78.  We disagree.  In contrast to the broad dicta 
found in Breunig, the actual holding was very limited: 
All we hold is that a sudden mental incapacity equivalent in 
its effect to such physical causes as a sudden heart 
attack, epileptic seizure, stroke, or fainting should be 
treated alike and not under the general rule of 
insanity. 
Breunig, 45 Wis. 2d at 544.  Breunig was not a turning point in 
the development of the common law, but rather it was a limited 
exception to the Meyer rule based on sudden mental disability. 
 
The court of appeals erroneously perceived the underlying 
premise of Breunig to be that a person should not be held 
negligent where a mental disability prevents that person from 
controlling his or her conduct.  Gould, 187 Wis. 2d at 678.   By 
limiting its holding to cases of sudden mental disability, the 
Breunig court chose not to adopt that broad premise.  We also 
decline to do so. 
 
We are concerned that the adoption of the premise, as set 
forth by the court of appeals, would entail serious administrative 
difficulties.  Mental impairments and emotional disorders come in 
infinite types and degrees.  As the American Law Institute 
recognized in its Restatement of Torts, a legitimate concern in 
formulating a test for mentally disabled persons in negligence 
(..continued) 
further discussion of the facts and circumstances of Burch for 
that opinion.  See Burch v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 94-
0947 (S. Ct. Jan. 30, 1996). 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
9 
cases is "[t]he difficulty of drawing any satisfactory line 
between mental deficiency and those variations of temperament, 
intellect and emotional balance which cannot, as a practical 
matter, be taken into account in imposing liability for damage 
done."  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 283B, cmt. b.1.   
 
The difficulties encountered by the trier of fact in 
determining the existence, nature, degree, and effect of a mental 
disability may introduce into the civil law some of the issues 
that currently exist in the insanity defense in criminal law.  We 
are wary of establishing a defense to negligence based on 
indeterminate 
standards 
of 
mental 
disability 
given 
the 
complexities of the various mental illnesses and the increasing 
rate at which new illnesses are discovered to explain behavior.  
See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 195 Wis. 2d 388, 536 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (discussing relevance of expert testimony regarding 
post-traumatic stress disorder based on defendant's "psycho-
social" history).  
 
Further, while the traditional public policy rationale relied 
on by this court in Meyer in support of the common law rule are 
subject to criticism,6 we remain hesitant to abandon the long-
standing rule in favor of a broad rule adopting the subjective 
standard for all mentally disabled persons.  Generally, the public 
                     
     6  See Stephanie I. Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally 
Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 Yale L.J. 153, 158-60 & n.30 (1983) 
(citing law review commentaries criticizing the law). 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
10 
policy rationale, in varying degrees, remain legitimate concerns. 
Accordingly, we turn our discussion to how those rationale apply 
to the facts before us.  
 
American Family does not dispute that Monicken committed an 
act that was a substantial factor in causing Gould's injury.  
Rather, it asserts that Monicken cannot be held liable for his 
alleged negligence as a matter of law based on his lack of mental 
capacity. 
 
Even though the jury determined that Monicken was negligent 
and that his negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries, 
liability 
does 
not 
necessarily 
follow. 
 
Public 
policy 
considerations may preclude liability.  Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 
Wis. 2d 526, 540-41, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  See also Morgan v. 
Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660 
(1979).  Whether public policy considerations should preclude 
liability in this instance is a question of law which we review de 
novo.  Rockweit v. Senecal, No. 93-1130, op. at 15 (S. Ct. Dec. 
20, 1995). 
 
One recognized public policy reason for not imposing 
liability despite a finding of negligence is that allowance of 
recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent 
tortfeasor.  Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 737.  As explained in detail 
below, this court concludes that the circumstances of this case 
totally negate the rationale behind the Meyer rule imposing 
liability on the mentally disabled, and therefore application of 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
11 
the 
rule 
would 
place 
an 
unreasonable 
burden 
on 
the 
institutionalized mentally disabled tortfeasor. 
 
The first rationale set forth in Meyer is that "where a loss 
must be borne by one of two innocent persons, it shall be borne by 
him who occasioned it."  Meyer, 218 Wis. at 385.  The record 
reveals that Gould was not an innocent member of the public unable 
to anticipate or safeguard against the harm when encountered.  
Rather, she was employed as a caretaker specifically for dementia 
patients and knowingly encountered the dangers associated with 
such employment.  It is undisputed that Gould, as head nurse of 
the dementia unit, knew Monicken was diagnosed with Alzheimer's 
disease and was aware of his disorientation and his potential for 
violent outbursts.  Her own notes indicate that Monicken was angry 
and resisted being removed from another patient's room on the day 
of her injury.   
 
By analogy, this court in Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 48 
Wis. 2d 321, 326-27, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970), relied on public 
policy considerations to exonerate negligent fire-starters or 
homeowners 
from 
liability 
for 
injuries 
suffered 
by 
the 
firefighters called to extinguish the fire.  This court held that 
to make one who negligently starts a fire respond in damages to a 
firefighter who is injured placed too great a burden on the 
homeowner because the hazardous situation is the very reason the 
fireman's aid was enlisted.  Id. at 324, 327. 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
12 
 
Likewise, Gould, as the head nurse in the secured dementia 
unit and Monicken's caretaker, had express knowledge of the 
potential danger inherent in dealing with Alzheimer's patients in 
general and Monicken in particular.  Holding Monicken negligent 
under these circumstances places too great a burden on him because 
his disorientation and potential for violence is the very reason 
he 
was 
institutionalized 
and 
needed 
the 
aid 
of 
employed 
caretakers.  Accordingly, we conclude that the first Meyer 
rationale does not apply in this case. 
 
The second rationale used to justify the rule is that "those 
interested in the estate of the insane person, as relatives or 
otherwise, may be under inducement to restrain him . . . ."  
Meyer, 218 Wis. at 385.  This rationale also has little 
application to the present case.  Monicken's relatives did 
everything they could to restrain him when they placed him in a 
secured dementia unit of a restricted health care center.  When a 
mentally disabled person is placed in a nursing home, long-term 
care facility, health care center, or similar restrictive 
institution for the mentally disabled, those "interested in the 
estate" of that person are not likely in need of such further 
inducement. 
 
The third reason for the common law rule set forth in Meyer 
is to prevent tortfeasors from "simulat[ing] or pretend[ing] 
insanity to defend their wrongful acts . . . ."  Id.  This 
rationale is likewise inapplicable under the facts of this case.  
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
13 
To suggest that Mr. Monicken would "simulate or pretend" the 
symptoms of Alzheimer's disease over a period of years in order to 
avoid a future tort liability is incredible.  It is likewise 
difficult to imagine circumstances under which persons would feign 
the symptoms of a mental disability and subject themselves to 
commitment in an institution in order to avoid some future civil 
liability. 
 
In sum, we agree with the Goulds that ordinarily a mentally 
disabled person is responsible for his or her torts.  However, we 
conclude that this rule does not apply in this case because the 
circumstances totally negate the rationale behind the rule and 
would 
place 
an 
unreasonable 
burden 
on 
the 
negligent 
institutionalized mentally disabled.  When a mentally disabled 
person injures an employed caretaker, the injured party can 
reasonably foresee the danger and is not "innocent" of the risk 
involved.  By placing a mentally disabled person in an institution 
or similar restrictive setting, "those interested in the estate" 
of that person are not likely to be in need of an inducement for 
greater restraint.  It is incredible to assert that a tortfeasor 
would "simulate or pretend insanity" over a prolonged period of 
time and even be institutionalized in order to avoid being held 
liable for damages for some future civil act.  Therefore, we hold 
that 
a 
person 
institutionalized, 
as 
here, 
with 
a 
mental 
disability, and who does not have the capacity to control or 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
14 
appreciate his or her conduct cannot be liable for injuries caused 
to caretakers who are employed for financial compensation.7  
 
We next address American Family's challenge to the need for a 
remand.  The court of appeals here remanded the case to the trial 
court to determine whether there is a disputed issue of fact 
regarding whether Monicken's mental capacity prevented him from 
controlling or appreciating the consequences of his conduct.  
Gould, 187 Wis. 2d at 680.  American Family alleges that 
Monicken's total incapacity was virtually conceded at trial and 
therefore a remand is not necessary.  Although the Goulds request 
a remand, in their brief they admit, in essence, that upon remand 
it would be impossible to rebut the evidence of Monicken's 
incapacity.  Based on our review of the record, we reach a similar 
conclusion. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse that part of the decision of the 
court of appeals remanding the case to the trial court for a 
determination on the issue of Monicken's mental capacity.  We 
                     
     7  We note that other courts have rejected the common law 
rule within the limited context of severely mentally disabled 
persons confined in institutions based on similar public policy 
considerations.  Mujica v. Turner, 582 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1991); Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
15 
remand to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for 
American Family in accordance with this decision. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part; the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in accordance 
with this decision.  
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-0074 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Sheri Gould, Scott Gould and St. Croix County, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  187 Wis. 2d 670, 523 N.W.2d 295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 30, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 1995  
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix 
 
JUDGE: 
ERIC J. LUNDELL 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Michael J. Neitzke, Don Paul Novitzke and Novitzke, 
Gust & Sempf, Amery and oral argument by Michael J. Neitzke. 
 
No. 94-0074 
 
 
94-0074   Gould v. American Family 
 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross petitioner there was a 
brief by Nancy J. Sixel and Tinglum & Sixel, S.C., River Falls and 
oral argument by Nancy J. Sixel. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Betsy J. Abramson and 
William P. Donaldson, Madison for the Elder Law Center of the 
Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups and the Board on Aging and 
Long Term Care of the State of Wisconsin.