Title: Vera Hutson v. State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission
Citation: 2003 WI 97
Docket Number: 2001AP002959
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2003

2003 WI 97 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2959 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Vera Hutson,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 249 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 900, 654 N.W.2d 465 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David Hansher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Alan C. 
Olson and Alan C. Olson & Associates, S.C., New Berlin, and oral 
argument by Alan C. Olson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard Briles 
Moriarty, 
assistant 
attorney 
general, 
and 
Peggy 
A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections. 
 
2003 WI 97 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2959  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 8299) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Vera Hutson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case involves interpretation 
of Wisconsin's so-called "whistleblower" law.  The State of 
Wisconsin Personnel Commission (Commission) seeks review of a 
published court of appeals decision, Hutson v. Personnel 
Commission, 2002 WI App 249, 257 Wis. 2d 900, 654 N.W.2d 465, 
which 
reversed 
a 
circuit 
court 
judgment 
upholding 
the 
Commission's dismissal of an action for unlawful retaliation 
against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) and 
remanded the case for additional proceedings.   
¶2 
The main question presented in this case is whether an 
employee's identification of a single management action is 
No. 
01-2959   
 
2 
 
sufficient to qualify as a disclosure of information relating to 
"mismanagement" and trigger protection from retaliation under 
the whistleblower law, Wis. Stats. §§ 230.80 to 230.89 (1995-
96).1   
¶3 
Vera Hutson filed a complaint against the DOC with the 
Commission, alleging, among other things, unlawful retaliation 
against her because of her participation in activities protected 
by the whistleblower law.  She claimed that she was given a 
written reprimand in retaliation for a memo she wrote to her 
supervisor complaining of mismanagement.2  Following a five-day 
hearing, the Commission issued a decision and order dismissing 
the complaint, finding that Hutson's memo was insufficient to 
                                                 
1 Subchapter III of ch. 230 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 
including 
Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80 
to 
230.89, 
is 
entitled 
"Employe[e] Protection" and is more commonly known as the 
"whistleblower" law because it includes provisions intended to 
encourage employees to disclose certain types of information and 
protect employees from retaliation that might result from such 
disclosures.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 230.83, 230.85. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Throughout the appellate process, Hutson has argued that 
this memo alone was not the sole protected action alleged.  We 
accept the conclusion reached by the Commission, circuit court, 
and court of appeals that the memo is the sole basis alleged for 
the whistleblower claim.  While, as the Commission and court of 
appeals 
explained, 
it 
is 
appropriate 
to 
consider 
the 
circumstances surrouding an alleged "disclosure," based on 
Hutson's post-hearing brief, only the February 5 memo was an 
alleged protected Whistleblower activity.  Further discussion of 
this point is included as part of the analysis section.  Unlike 
the court of appeals, however, we find that the record in this 
case does not support the assertion of a "pattern" as required 
under Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7). 
No. 
01-2959   
 
3 
 
satisfy the requirements of a "disclosure" of "information" 
relating to "mismanagement" defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7) as 
a "pattern of incompetent management actions."   
¶4 
Hutson then sought review of the decision in circuit 
court, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, David A. Hansher, 
Judge, affirmed the Commission's decision.  Hutson appealed, and 
the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, finding 
that Hutson's memo fit the definition of "mismanagement" and was 
a 
protected 
disclosure 
of 
information 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5).  We accepted the Commission's petition 
for review.  We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
Commission's 
statutory 
interpretation is correct.  "Mismanagement" as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7) requires identification of more than a 
single management action, and Hutson's memo does not otherwise 
satisfy 
the 
requirements 
for 
a 
protected 
disclosure 
of 
information under whistleblower law.   
I 
¶5 
The Commission's lengthy opinion included extensive 
findings of fact.  Based on those findings, we discuss those 
facts, undisputed on appeal, that relate to and assist in 
clarifying the issue relating to Hutson's whistleblower law 
claim.   
¶6 
Vera Hutson began working for the DOC as a probation 
and parole officer in 1990.  On October 2, 1995, Hutson began 
working in Unit 033, a new unit set up in the Milwaukee region 
specifically for the purpose of implementing a new statewide 
No. 
01-2959   
 
4 
 
"administrative minimum" program approved by the legislature, 
under which the DOC could supervise low-risk offenders via a 
telephone call-in system.  Hutson's immediate supervisor in Unit 
033 was James Wake.  Wake, in turn, reported to Kathleen Ware, 
an assistant chief for the Milwaukee region.  Ware's immediate 
supervisor was Allan Kasprzak, the chief for the Milwaukee 
region, 
and 
Kasprzak 
reported 
to 
Eurial 
Jordan, 
the 
administrator for the Department of Corrections Division of 
Probation and Parole.  At the top of the DOC chain of command 
was Michael Sullivan, the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department 
of Corrections.   
¶7 
Hutson felt that there were management problems in the 
unit and that the caseload for agents in Unit 033 was excessive.  
At least two other agents in the unit shared her feelings 
regarding the caseload.  At the times relevant to this case, 
caseloads for probation and parole agents were generally 
calculated on a point system "designed to reflect the amount of 
time spent by the agent supervising offenders," meaning that 
cases with higher supervision levels generated more points.  
Under a memo of understanding between the agents' union and 
management effective during the time period at issue here, the 
maximum caseload was 260 points.  However, the point system had 
no category for situations in which the agent was not required 
to meet with the offender on a scheduled basis. 
¶8 
On February 5, 1996, Hutson wrote a memo to Wake, with 
copies to Ware and two union officials, stating: 
No. 
01-2959   
 
5 
 
I am writing this correspondence to request workload 
relief and/or authorized overtime of one hour per 
every 5.5 points over the 260 point caseload cap per 
our 
union 
contractual 
agreement 
for the 
1995-97 
contract year.  I am currently supervising a total of 
559 cases, 475 under my agent number and 84 for a co-
worker who will be out on sick leave for the next four 
to seven weeks.  I am 319 points over the 260 maximum 
caseload cap.  According to the [DOC] manual CC/SD 
standards cases classified as minimum are weighted as 
one point per case.  I am aware of the fact that some 
specialized units are excluded from the 260 point 
caseload cap maximum.  However, the exclusion only 
takes effect after a mutual agreement is reached 
between [DOC], AFSCME Council 24 and the local union.  
To my knowledge that has not occurred.  Therefore I am 
fully covered under the 1995-97 contract and the 
agreement of a 260 workload cap maximum. 
Due to the excessive workload and a caseload that 
continues to grow without a foreseeable end, coupled 
with the lack of clarity under a supervisory style 
that is extremely arbitrary and capricious, I have 
found the work environment to be highly stressful and 
terribly distracting to try to manage my caseload 
adequately and professionally.  I am at this time 
requesting that reasonable guidelines be established 
that would enable me to perform my job to best meet 
the needs of the protection of the community, the 
[DOC] 
and 
myself 
as 
agent 
in 
the 
Minimum/Administrative unit. 
Your timely response will be appreciated; 
Sincerely, 
Vera Hutson 
¶9 
On February 9, 1996, Wake responded to Hutson's memo 
with a memo scheduling a meeting to discuss Hutson's concerns.  
Ware also received a copy of Wake's memo.  When Hutson 
subsequently informed Wake of a scheduling conflict, Wake 
rescheduled the meeting.   
No. 
01-2959   
 
6 
 
¶10 Before any meeting took place, however, Wake and 
Hutson got into a heated argument.  Hutson was out on medical 
leave from February 7, 1996, to February 19, 1996.  According to 
a memo from Wake to Ware, on February 19, Hutson shouted at Wake 
and accused him of harassment and racism when Wake approached 
her regarding a case and directed her to take a particular 
course of action to remedy a problem that had occurred while she 
was gone.  In response to this argument, Wake contacted two of 
Hutson's 
previous 
supervisors 
to 
find 
out 
about 
their 
experiences with Hutson.  In talking with Wake, both of these 
previous supervisors noted problems working with Hutson.   
¶11 On February 21, 1996, Wake filed a complaint with the 
DOC's Affirmative Action office, alleging that Hutson was 
harassing him and creating a bad work environment.  As a result 
of the argument on February 19, 1996, Wake began a separate file 
on the interactions he had with Hutson lest Hutson should file a 
complaint against him.  From that point on, Wake communicated 
with Hutson in writing or made sure that a third party was 
present when speaking with her. 
¶12 On February 29, 1996, Wake, Ware, and Hutson met 
regarding Hutson's "workload relief" memo.  Ware asked Hutson to 
describe the problems she observed in the unit.  After hearing 
Hutson's comments on such issues as an absence of guidelines and 
problems with Wake's management of the unit, Ware explained Unit 
033 was not subject to the point limits regarding caseload that 
applied to other units under the union memo of understanding.  
No. 
01-2959   
 
7 
 
Wake and Ware also met with agents Michelle McKinstry and Vicki 
Turner on the "workload relief" issue.   
¶13 On March 5, 1996, Ware sent a memo to Hutson, 
McKinstry and Turner, stating, in relevant part: 
As Supervisor James Wake and I have concluded meeting 
with each of you regarding your request for workload 
relief I want to advise you that no formal action to 
reassign workload or reduce the number of cases 
assigned will be taken at this time.  The reasons for 
this are as follows: 
-No point classification is assigned to cases within 
the unit at this time.  As you were advised, the 
legislature 
removed 
workload 
credit 
for 
minimum/administrative from the CC/SD system effective 
Jan. 1, 1996. 
-In your request you indicated that per manual chapter 
02.03.01-.02 cases at minimum are assigned 1 point.  
As you were advised, you are not required to meet the 
manual standards of face to face contact or home 
visits as appropriate which based on a time study 
generated 1 point. 
-At present the unit does not have an exemption to the 
memorandum of understanding; however, the process has 
been started. 
¶14 Wake held a unit meeting on March 13, 1996, regarding 
procedures, practices, and issues within the unit.  Wake 
terminated the meeting after Hutson stated to Wake:  "You are 
treating us like slaves." 
¶15 On March 15, 1996, Hutson wrote a memo to Allan 
Kasprzak.  She sent copies of this memo to Wake, Ware, and a 
union representative.  This memo stated, in part: 
Allan I am sending this correspondence to you out of 
[f]ear and frustration.  It seems no one is willi[n]g 
to listen to our concerns regarding Jim Wake.  I gave 
No. 
01-2959   
 
8 
 
a memo to you, Kathy Ware and Jim regarding workload 
relief.  Every [sic] since I give [sic] that memo 
Jim['s] behavior towards me has escalated in very 
intimidating, harrassing [sic] and vindictive actions.  
The memo of 2-6-96 was addressed in a meeting with 
Kathy Ware and Jim and myself on 2-29-96.  However, as 
I stated to Kathy and in the meeting with Jim present 
the issues were not just workload relief.  The issues 
were also Jim's behavior as a Supervisor.  I have 
gotten to the point that I fear for my personal 
safety.  Especially since 3-13-1996 when Jim angrily 
and abruptly stopped our unit meeting. . . .   Jim's 
demeanor has [been] and is causing the environment in 
the unit to be very tense.  Other agents have voiced 
their concerns of fear for their personal safety.  
Something is very, very wrong down here.  We should 
not have to work in such an environment.  I am asking 
for your help in trying to resolve the concerns we 
have in this unit.  As well as the above issues there 
are 
definite 
issues 
of 
favoritism 
and 
probably 
nepotism.  There is a definite divide in the unit 
created by Jim.  Due to my fearing for my personal 
safety, I feel the need to inform others about the 
concerns in this unit.  I have gotten to the point 
that I can't focus on my work, I am very stressed when 
I leave work and I am starting to lose sleep because 
the conditions in this unit are very unsafe, unstable, 
and Jim Wake does not allow ANY of us to discuss the 
issues. 
¶16 Hutson also wrote a memo to Wake on March 15, 1996, 
stating: 
Jim I am leaving to go home.  I will use personal 
time.  I am afraid for my personal safety in regards 
to 
your 
behavior 
towards 
me. 
 
I 
feel 
very 
uncomfortable to the point it is affecting my job. 
¶17 In response to 
Hutson's 
memo, Kasprzak promptly 
organized a meeting.  On March 19, 1996, three meetings took 
place related to Hutson's complaints.  The first meeting was 
attended by Kasprzak, Wake, Ware, Hutson, McKinstry, Turner, a 
union representative, and another assistant regional chief, John 
No. 
01-2959   
 
9 
 
Barian.  Topics at this meeting included the workload and other 
unit issues.   
¶18 The second meeting was attended by Hutson, Wake, Ware, 
Kasprzak, and a union representative.  Here the topic was 
Hutson's allegation that Wake made her workplace unsafe.   
¶19 Kasprzak, Wake, and Ware also gathered for a third 
meeting that day.  Wake took contemporaneous notes at this 
meeting.  The notes describe Kasprzak's comments regarding 
Hutson, Turner, and McKinstry.  These notes, described by the 
Commission as "accurately describ[ing] Mr. Kasprzak's comments" 
state, in part: 
-I am a wimp for saying that I was extremely upset and 
hurt by remarks Vera has made.  He said he would not 
move me, even temporarily, this would [undecipherable] 
like caving in to them. 
. . . .  
-It was like a pack of dogs seeing someone in fear if 
I was to show hurt or weakness - the "dogs" would 
attack me if they saw weakness. 
. . . .  
-The strategy is to separate them (the trouble makers) 
and grind them down one by one[.] 
-The way to beat a bully is to beat him senseless. 
 . . . . 
I just ignore harassment complaints against me.  The 
Dept will ride it out and the complainant will be 
bought off and the reward to them (complainant is 
piddly).  They gave [an agent] $7000.  After attorney 
fees she got nothing. 
This is all part of being a manager. 
No. 
01-2959   
 
10 
 
Wake reported these comments to Eurial Jordan.  Jordan later 
spoke with Kasprzak, telling him that the comments at the March 
19 meeting were inappropriate. 
¶20 In a memo dated March 19, 1996, Kasprzak memorialized 
the "outcomes" of the meetings, stating, among other things, 
that the caseload classification would be checked on and members 
of the unit pledged to work on attaining a harassment free work 
environment. 
¶21 On March 29, 1996, Hutson spoke with DOC Secretary 
Michael Sullivan regarding Unit 033.  Hutson then sent Sullivan 
a memo on April 22, 1996, with the subject "Re:  Harassment, 
[R]etaliation, Intimidation & Racial Discrimination from Kathy 
Ware [Assistant] Chief, James Wake Unit Supervis[or]" and 
requesting assistance with the issues relating to Wake and Ware. 
¶22 In a memorandum dated April 19, 1996, Ware directed 
Hutson to report for an investigatory interview related to 
allegations that Hutson violated several work rules.  An 
investigatory interview was conducted on April 30, 1996.  Hutson 
attended with a union representative.  Ware prepared a report 
summarizing the results of the interview that she submitted to 
Eurial Jordan in a memorandum dated May 6, 1996.  Ware 
recommended that there be a pre-disciplinary hearing for 
violation of work rules. 
¶23 Sometime in April 1996, Hutson filed a complaint 
alleging discrimination based on race and military status with 
the 
DOC 
Affirmative 
Action 
office. 
 
This 
complaint 
was 
No. 
01-2959   
 
11 
 
subsequently investigated and resulted in a finding of "no 
probable cause."  
¶24 Hutson was out on medical leave from May 9 to June 10, 
1996.  Effective June 10, 1996, Hutson transferred out of Unit 
033. 
¶25 In May 1996, Hutson was directed to report for a pre-
disciplinary hearing.  Hutson objected to Ware presiding over 
the proceeding, so Assistant Chief John Barian handled the 
hearing.  The hearing took place sometime during the summer of 
1996, and Barian issued a pre-disciplinary report to Jordan on 
August 6, 1996, finding that "[t]he investigation supports just 
cause and mitigation seems to be more of offering excuses" and 
recommending that Hutson be disciplined.  On August 19, 1996, 
Hutson received a written reprimand.  The reprimand states that 
Hutson violated three work rules: 
Work Rule A-1:  "Insubordination, disobedience, or 
failure to carry out assignments or instructions." 
Work Rule A-4: "Negligence in performance of assigned 
duties." 
Work Rule A-13:  "Intimidating, interfering with, 
harassing (including sexual or racial harassment), 
demeaning, 
or 
abusive 
language 
in 
dealing 
with 
others."   
The reprimand included a list of seven violations including 
harassment of an offender, accusing a co-worker of spying for 
management, and failing to take appropriate action in several of 
her cases.  According to the Commission's findings, Hutson 
No. 
01-2959   
 
12 
 
appealed the discipline to arbitration, but the imposition of 
the written reprimand was upheld. 
¶26 Hutson filed a complaint with the Commission against 
the DOC on June 6, 1996, alleging that she was discriminated 
against on the basis of her military status and race and that 
she was retaliated against in violation of the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act (FEA), Wis. Stats. §§ 111.31-111.395, and the 
whistleblower law, Wis. Stats. §§ 230.80-230.89.  Later, the 
parties agreed that the issue to be resolved by the Commission 
was 
narrowed 
to 
whether 
she 
was 
retaliated 
against 
for 
activities protected under the FEA or the whistleblower law. 
¶27 Between May 11, 1999 and June 24, 1999, the Commission 
held a five-day hearing on Hutson's claims.  On August 28, 2000, 
the Commission dismissed the complaint, finding:  1) that Hutson 
"failed 
to 
engage 
in 
a 
protected 
activity 
under 
the 
whistleblower law;" and 2) the violations alleged against Hutson 
were supported in the record, the disciplinary process for the 
violations began before Hutson engaged in activity protected 
under the FEA, and therefore, the decision to reprimand Hutson 
was not based on the FEA protected activities. Specifically 
related to Hutson's whistleblower law claims, the Commission 
found that her February 5, 1996 memo failed to satisfy the 
statutory requirements of a disclosure of "information" relating 
to "mismanagement."  The Commission found that there was no 
"pattern of incompetent management actions" as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7), because the statutory language "reflects 
a clear legislative intent to provide the protections of the 
No. 
01-2959   
 
13 
 
whistleblower law to only those employees who identify a series 
of incompetent management actions, i.e. more than an isolated 
instance of alleged mismanagement." (Emphasis in original.) 
¶28 Hutson sought review of the Commission's decision in 
circuit court.  The circuit court affirmed the Commission's 
ruling on September 20, 2001.  Hutson again appealed the ruling 
regarding her whistleblower claim.3  On September 10, 2002, the 
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the 
Commission, finding that a "pattern" could be established by a 
single act and that, therefore, the Commission erred in its 
determination that Hutson's February 5, 1996 memo was not a 
protected disclosure of information under the whistleblower law.  
We accepted the State's petition for review on December 10, 
2002.  We now reverse. 
II 
¶29 We must first address the proper standard of review.  
An agency's findings of fact will not be overturned as long as 
they are supported by substantial evidence; "we may not 
substitute our judgment for that of [the agency's] as to the 
weight of the evidence."  Kannenberg v. LIRC, 213 Wis. 2d 373, 
384, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Jicha v. DILHR, 
169 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 485 N.W.2d 256 (1992).   
                                                 
3 Hutson did not appeal the ruling upon her Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act claims.  Also, those claims have not been raised 
in the appeal to this court.  Hutson has therefore waived these 
claims and we do not address them. 
No. 
01-2959   
 
14 
 
¶30 This case also requires us to interpret the statutory 
language of the whistleblower law, Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-230.89.  
The purpose of statutory construction is to discern the intent 
of the legislature.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 
247, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992) (quoting Terry v. Mongin Ins. Agency, 
105 Wis. 2d 575, 583, 314 N.W.2d 349 (1982)).   
¶31 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
review de novo, and as such, we are not bound by an agency's 
interpretation.  Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 
659, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); Sauk County v. WERC, 165 Wis. 2d 406, 
413, 477 N.W.2d 267 (1991); Kannenberg, 213 Wis. 2d at 384.  
However, this court has generally applied one of three levels of 
deference 
to 
agency 
conclusions 
of 
law 
and 
statutory 
interpretation:  great weight, due weight, or de novo.  See Sauk 
County, 165 Wis. 2d at 413-14; Jicha, 169 Wis. 2d at 290-91.  
The 
degree 
of 
deference 
given 
to 
an 
agency's 
statutory 
interpretation 
depends 
upon 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
the 
"administrative agency's experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and 
application of the statute."  Kelley Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 244; 
see also State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699, 
517 N.W.2d 449 (1994) (the level of deference "depends on the 
comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the 
court and the administrative agency").   
¶32 This court has found that "great weight," the highest 
level of deference, is appropriately accorded when certain 
conditions are met: 
No. 
01-2959   
 
15 
 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
(2) 
[] 
the 
interpretation of the statute is one of long-standing; 
(3) 
[] 
the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; 
and (4) [] the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute. 
UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) 
(quoting Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 660).  Further, 
"[w]here 
a 
legal 
question 
is 
intertwined 
with 
factual 
determinations or with value or policy determinations . . . a 
court 
should 
defer 
to 
the 
agency 
which 
has 
primary 
responsibility for determination of fact and policy."  Sauk 
County, 165 Wis. 2d at 413 (quoting West Bend Education Ass'n v. 
WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984)).  The "great 
weight" standard has been called the general rule in Wisconsin.  
Id.  Under this standard, as long as the agency interpretation 
is reasonable and not contrary to the clear meaning of the 
statute, it will be upheld, even if the court finds that another 
interpretation is more reasonable.  UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 286-87; 
Kannenberg, 213 Wis. 2d at 385. 
¶33 The middle level of deference is known as "due weight" 
or "great bearing."  Kelley Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 244.  The "due 
weight" standard is used "if the agency decision is 'very 
nearly' one of first impression."  Sauk County, 165 Wis. 2d at 
413-14. 
 
Put 
another 
way, 
we 
give 
"due 
weight" 
under 
circumstances where "the agency has some experience in an area, 
but has not developed the expertise which necessarily places it 
in 
a 
better 
position 
to 
make 
judgments 
regarding 
the 
No. 
01-2959   
 
16 
 
interpretation of the statute than a court."  UFE, 201 
Wis. 2d at 286.  As we have noted previously, deference to the 
agency's 
interpretation 
under 
these 
circumstances 
is 
not 
warranted based on the agency's expertise per se; rather, it is 
based on the fact that the legislature entrusted enforcement of 
the particular statute to the agency.  Id.  We have further 
explained the reasoning behind and application of this standard: 
Since in such situations the agency has had at least 
one opportunity to analyze the issue and formulate a 
position, a court will not overturn a reasonable 
agency decision that comports with the purpose of the 
statute unless the court determines that there is a 
more reasonable interpretation available. 
Id. at 286-87. 
¶34 The lowest level of deference accorded is de novo 
review, under which the agency's interpretation is given no 
weight at all.  Sauk County, 165 Wis. 2d at 414.  This standard 
is only applied when the issue is "clearly one of first 
impression" for the agency or "when an agency's position on an 
issue has been so inconsistent so as to provide no real 
guidance." 
 
UFE, 
201 
Wis. 2d at 
285 
(internal 
citations 
omitted). 
¶35 The Commission argues that its interpretation is 
entitled to "great weight" deference.  There does appear to be 
some support for such deference.  First, the legislature has 
charged the Commission with enforcement of the whistleblower law 
provisions.  Second, although the Commission only cited to one 
of its prior cases in analyzing Hutson's whistleblower claim, 
Pfeffer v. UW (Parkside), 96-0109-PC-ER, 3/14/97, the Commission 
No. 
01-2959   
 
17 
 
has, in several additional cases, interpreted the sufficiency of 
disclosures 
under 
the 
whistleblower 
law, 
including 
cases 
requiring interpretation of the terms "pattern of incompetent 
management actions."  See Duran v. DOC, 94-0005-PC-ER, 10/4/94; 
Sadlier v. DHSS, 87-0046, 0055-PC-ER, 3/30/89; Kortman v. UW-
Madison, 94-0038-PC-ER, 11/17/95; Elmer v. Dept. of Agriculture, 
Trade & Consumer Protection, 94-0062-PC-ER, 11/14/96 (dealing 
more generally with sufficiency of a claim of protection under 
the 
whistleblower 
law). 
 
Several 
of 
these 
cases 
are 
distinguishable in that they deal with motions to dismiss where 
the standards applied are more lenient; nevertheless, the 
Commission has had cause, over a period of years, to examine the 
standards for a protected disclosure of "information" relating 
to "mismanagement."  In Sadlier, 87-0046, 0055-PC-ER, 3/30/89, 
at 43, for example, the Commission explicitly found that a 
grievance did not qualify as a protected disclosure, meeting the 
definition of "mismanagement," because the complaint referred to 
only one action as opposed to "'a pattern' of actions."  The 
Commission noted there was no indication in the case that the 
interview complained of was one of a series of interviews.  Id.  
Third, applying the Commission's interpretation would lend 
uniformity and consistency to application of this statute.  
Finally, the Commission has, at least arguably, dealt with a 
policy determination related to the whistleblower law by 
interpreting "pattern" to require more than one incompetent 
management action. 
No. 
01-2959   
 
18 
 
¶36 Because several of the Commission's precedents have 
dealt with the less stringent standards relating to motions to 
dismiss and are distinguishable on that ground,4 and because the 
Commission has not necessarily developed or employed any 
"special expertise" in applying the statutory language, we apply 
a "due weight" standard.  Even applying such a standard, 
however, we conclude that the Commission's interpretation of the 
statutory language is correct and should be upheld, because its 
interpretation is more reasonable than that argued by Hutson.  
Even if they were equally reasonable, we would uphold the 
Commission's interpretation, because, as we noted in UFE, 201 
Wis. 2d at 287 n.3, "[u]nder either due weight or great weight 
deference, an equally reasonable interpretation of a statute 
should not be chosen over the agency's interpretation." 
III 
¶37 The 
policy 
behind 
Wisconsin's 
whistleblower 
law, 
Subchapter III of Chapter 230 of the Wisconsin Statutes and 
entitled "Employe[e] Protection," was to protect employees from 
retaliation and encourage disclosure of certain information.  
Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2).  However, the statutes provide specific 
                                                 
4 In Canter(Kihlstrom) v. UW-Madison, 86-0054-PC-ER, 6/8/88, 
at 4-5, the Commission explained its analysis for a motion to 
dismiss:  "The respondent's motion for failure to state a claim 
requires the Commission to analyze the complainant's allegations 
liberally in favor of the complainant and to grant the motion 
only if it appears with certainty that no relief can be 
granted."  If the motion is denied, the respondent is free to 
raise the contention again during subsequent hearings.  See id. 
at 8; Duran v. DOC, 94-0005-PC-ER, 10/4/94, at 8. 
No. 
01-2959   
 
19 
 
parameters for protection.  Although these protective statutes 
are to be liberally construed, see Wis. Stat. § 230.02, only 
certain disclosures made a particular way and regarding a 
subject 
matter 
covered 
in 
the 
statute 
will 
qualify 
for 
protection.  As the Commission has noted in interpreting the 
whistleblower law: 
[T]he whistleblower law covers only certain specific 
kinds of disclosures made in specific ways.  The 
legislature obviously 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
provide 
blanket protection for any kinds of employe utterances 
which might result in retaliation by the employing 
agency. 
Elmer, 94-0062-PC-ER, 11/14/96 at 4. 
¶38 In order to gain protection under the whistleblower 
law, an employee must meet the requirements laid out in the 
relevant 
statutory 
provisions.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
230.83(1) 
provides:  "No appointing authority, agent of an appointing 
authority or supervisor may initiate or administer, or threaten 
to initiate or administer, any retaliation against an employee."  
"Retaliatory action" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8) and 
includes disciplinary action taken because "[t]he employee 
lawfully disclosed information under s. 230.81 or filed a 
complaint under s. 230.85(1)." 
¶39 Before an employee is entitled to protection, the 
employee must make a disclosure of information in writing, 
typically to his or her supervisor.  Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1)(a).  
"Information" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5): 
No. 
01-2959   
 
20 
 
"Information" means information gained by the 
employe 
which 
the 
employe 
reasonably 
believes 
demonstrates: 
(a)  A violation of any state or federal law, 
rule or regulation. 
(b)  Mismanagement or abuse of authority in state 
or local government, a substantial waste of public 
funds or a danger to public health and safety. 
Mismanagement 
is, 
in 
turn, 
more 
precisely 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7): 
"Mismanagement" means a pattern of incompetent 
management actions which are wrongful, negligent or 
arbitrary and capricious and which adversely affect 
the efficient accomplishment of an agency function.  
"Mismanagement" does not mean the mere failure to act 
in accordance with a particular opinion regarding 
management techniques. 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, only disclosures of "information" that 
meet the statutory criteria qualify for protection under the 
whistleblower law.   
¶40 Before proceeding to examine the merits of Hutson's 
claim, we note that Hutson has consistently disputed the 
Commission's findings regarding the basis for her claims.  We 
must clarify exactly what "disclosures" Hutson has claimed are 
protected by the whistleblower law and further, what type of 
"information" she has alleged the disclosures to contain.  Under 
the definition of "information" in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5)(a), an 
employee is protected for disclosures of information that relate 
to one of four issues:  mismanagement, abuse of authority in 
state or local government, substantial waste of public funds, or 
danger to public health and safety.  The only claim made in this 
case is mismanagement.  At oral argument in this case, there was 
No. 
01-2959   
 
21 
 
some discussion regarding whether or not the information Hutson 
disclosed might fit the "public health and safety" category.  We 
need not decide that issue.  The record from the Commission 
makes clear that Hutson only made claims under the FEA and under 
the 
whistleblower 
law. 
 
Regarding 
the 
whistleblower 
law 
allegations, the record also makes clear that Hutson's only 
claim was that of mismanagement.  Since other potential claims 
or characterizations of the information were not argued before 
the Commission, Hutson may not now attempt to raise such 
arguments here.  Thus, this court only examines whether Hutson 
disclosed information related to "mismanagement" that triggers 
protection from retaliation under Wis. Stat. § 230.83. 
¶41 We must also establish what specific disclosure of 
information Hutson claims is protected under whistleblower law.  
Throughout the appellate process, Hutson has claimed that her 
February 5, 1996 memo is but one of several disclosures that 
should be protected under the whistleblower law.  However, the 
Commission argues that the only disclosure at issue is the 
February 5 memo.  The circuit court and the court of appeals 
No. 
01-2959   
 
22 
 
examined only the February 5 memo.5  We agree with the Commission 
and find that the only issue before us is whether the February 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that the court of appeals determined that 
it need not consider subsequent communications because it found 
the February 5 memo alone qualified as a protected disclosure.  
Even the court of appeals, though, found that Hutson "has 
offered nothing to rebut the Commissioner's statement" that 
Hutson identified only the February 5 memo as her protected 
activity under the whistleblower law.  See Hutson v. Personnel 
Commission, 2002 WI App 249, ¶19 n.8, 257 Wis. 2d 900, 654 
N.W.2d 465.  The Commission in this case explicitly recognized 
in its decision that the adequacy of the disclosure was not 
limited to the "four corners of the disclosing document," but 
nonetheless found that the references in the February 5 memo 
were insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements.  
In Elmer v. DATCP, 94-0062-PC-ER, 11/14/96, at 3, the 
Commission 
found 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5), 
the 
"information" disclosed must "have a specific, substantive 
content" in order to be eligible for protection.  The Commission 
in Elmer found that a note scheduling a meeting could not 
"somehow utilize its connection with the meeting to become a 
protected disclosure under the law."  Id.  While the Commission 
acknowledged, in both Elmer and the present case, that there is 
some flexibility to the specificity required and that the 
surrounding 
circumstances 
may 
be 
considered, 
substantive 
allegations are necessary.  Here, the Commission considered only 
whether the February 5 memo was a protected activity under the 
whistleblower 
law. 
 
However, 
the 
Commission 
expressly 
acknowledged in its opinion that the "the meaning and extent of 
the 
disclosure 
can 
be 
informed 
by 
the 
surrounding 
circumstances."  Hutson v. DOC, 96-0056-PC-ER, 8/28/2000, at 34 
n.10, 36 n.12.  We have reviewed the record in this case and 
considered the surrounding circumstances, but find, as did the 
Commission, that the allegations are insufficient to establish a 
"pattern" as required under the whistleblower law.  Everything 
in this case emerged from Hutson's February 5 memo requesting 
"workload relief."  Her later meetings and even her later 
written complaints about Mr. Wake do not help clarify and 
establish 
the 
"pattern of 
incompetent 
management actions" 
required under Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7).   
 
No. 
01-2959   
 
23 
 
5, 1996 memo written by Hutson was sufficient to satisfy the 
statutory requirements for protection.  In footnote 11 of its 
decision, the Commission explicitly stated why it only examined 
the single disclosure:  "There was some discussion at hearing of 
other possible protected activities, but complainant has, in her 
brief, clearly identified the February 5th 'work relief' memo as 
the basis for her claim of whistleblower protection."  Indeed, 
Hutson's post-hearing brief does indicate that the February 5 
memo alone is the basis for her whistleblower claim.  As such, 
we address only whether that memo qualifies as a protected 
disclosure under Wis. Stats. §§ 230.80 to 230.89. 
¶42 As noted, on February 5, 1996, Hutson wrote a memo to 
her supervisor, Wake, stating: 
I am writing this correspondence to request workload 
relief and/or authorized overtime of one hour per 
every 5.5 points over the 260 point caseload cap per 
our 
union 
contractual 
agreement 
for the 
1995-97 
contract year.  I am currently supervising a total of 
559 cases 475 under my agent number and 84 for a co-
worker who will be out on sick leave for the next four 
to seven weeks.  I am 319 points over the 260 maximum 
caseload cap.  According to the [DOC] manual CC/SD 
standards cases classified as minimum are weighted as 
one point per case.  I am aware of the fact that some 
specialized units are excluded from the 260 point 
caseload cap maximum.  However, the exclusion only 
takes effect after a mutual agreement is reached 
between [DOC], AFSCME Council 24 and the local union.  
To my knowledge that has not occurred.  Therefore I am 
fully covered under the 1995-97 contract and the 
agreement of a 260 workload cap maximum. 
Due to the excessive workload and a caseload that 
continues to grow without a foreseeable end, coupled 
with the lack of clarity under a supervisory style 
that is extremely arbitrary and capricious, I have 
No. 
01-2959   
 
24 
 
found the work environment to be highly stressful and 
terribly distracting to try to manage my caseload 
adequately and professionally.  I am at this time 
requesting that reasonable guidelines be established 
that would enable me to perform my job to best meet 
the needs of the protection of the community, the 
[DOC] 
and 
myself 
as 
agent 
in 
the 
Minimum/Administrative unit. 
¶43 Hutson argues that the Commission erred by concluding 
that she did not disclose a "pattern" of incompetent management 
actions 
as 
required 
by 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
mismanagement, Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7).  Hutson contends that the 
word "pattern" should be interpreted to include a continuous 
course of conduct.  She argues that the excessive workload 
complained of in her memo was a continuous and ongoing problem 
of 
mismanagement. 
 
Citing 
federal, 
state, 
and 
agency 
discrimination decisions applying "continuous course of conduct" 
theories, Hutson asserts that her contention of an excessive 
caseload describes ongoing conduct sufficient to constitute a 
"pattern of mismanagement."  For example, Hutson cites, among 
other sources, two Wisconsin administrative agency decisions, 
Rudie v. DHSS & DER, 87-0131-PC-ER, 9/19/90, and Kortman v. UW-
Madison, 94-0038-PC-ER, 11/17/95, to support her argument that 
the continuing violation theory has been applied.  She argues 
that in Kortman, a whistleblower case, the Commission has 
already applied the "continuing violation" theory.  See Kortman, 
94-0038-PC-ER, 11/17/95, at 5. 
¶44 We find that Hutson's dependence upon the Kortman case 
is misplaced.  Although the opinion does discuss application of 
a "continuing violation theory," the issue was the statute of 
No. 
01-2959   
 
25 
 
limitations.  Further, this case, like many of the other 
relevant Commission decisions, deals with a motion to dismiss.  
Finally, the Commission states:   
[W]here 
the 
complainant 
alleges 
a 
pattern 
of 
harassment or a pattern of actions designed to achieve 
a particular result . . . the Commission has applied a 
continuing violation theory if at least one of the 
actions falls within the statutory time period and as 
long as there is not a sufficient length of time 
between actions to "break the chain" which links the 
pattern of actions together.   
Kortman, 94-0038-PC-ER, 11/17/95, at 5.  This explanation still 
suggests that multiple actions must occur for a "pattern" to 
exist.  The Commission uses the phrase "at least one of the 
actions" and "pattern of actions."  (Emphasis added.)  Even if 
one must fall within the statutory time period, the statement 
suggests more than one action must have occurred. 
¶45 The Commission found that Hutson raised several topics 
in her February 5 memo, including the "supervisory style that is 
arbitrary and capricious," the lack of guidelines, and the 
excessive workload.  At least in her court of appeals brief, 
Hutson agreed that the Commission addressed the correct topics, 
but asserted that the Commission erred in finding they were 
insufficient to show a "pattern of incompetent management 
actions."  The Commission first found that the references to an 
arbitrary and capricious supervisory style and a lack of 
guidelines were too general and conclusory to satisfy the 
requirements for a disclosure of information within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 230.80.  The Commission found these references 
No. 
01-2959   
 
26 
 
might relate to the "general concept" of mismanagement defined 
in the statute, but were so general and conclusory that "it is 
impossible to say that these references in her February 5th memo 
describe mismanagement." 
¶46 The other topic in the memo is Hutson's allegation of 
an excessive caseload.  The Commission expressed serious doubts 
about whether, in fact, the workload was excessive, but assumed 
for purposes of its analysis that it was excessive and as such, 
constituted a wrongful or negligent management action as 
described in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7).  It also assumed that the 
claim was not merely a difference of opinion over management 
techniques, 
which 
would 
fall 
outside 
the 
whistleblower 
protections because of the exclusion in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7).  
The Commission, citing its decision in Pfeffer, 96-0109-PC-ER, 
3/14/97, found that the disclosure did not describe a "pattern" 
of incompetent management actions, noting that protection was 
provided only to those employees disclosing a "series" of 
incompetent management actions, not merely isolated incidents. 
¶47 We agree with the Commission's determination regarding 
the first topics in the February 5 memo.  The references to 
"arbitrary and capricious" supervision and a lack of guidelines, 
lack any specific description of mismanagement.  Inasmuch as 
these relate to the alleged excessive caseload, they add no 
further explanation of the claim.  These raw allegations do not 
even provide enough information to determine if they might 
reflect a simple disagreement over management techniques.   
No. 
01-2959   
 
27 
 
¶48 That conclusion leaves us to define the term "pattern" 
and, 
more 
broadly, 
a 
"pattern 
of 
incompetent 
management 
actions."  We do not dispute that, in the abstract, "pattern" 
might have a variety of meanings, including the meaning used by 
by the court of appeals in this case.  The court of appeals, 
citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993), 
defined "'pattern'" as "'a fully realized form, original, or 
model accepted or proposed for imitation:  something regarded as 
a normative example to be copied.'"  Hutson, 257 Wis. 2d 900, 
¶36.  Based on that definition, the court of appeals concluded 
that "obviously" a pattern could be established by a single act.  
We do not disagree that "pattern" has that meaning in some 
contexts.  However, we do not agree that this definition makes 
sense in the context of this statute.  We believe the language 
of the statute is clear. 
¶49 The first step in any statutory analysis is to look at 
the language of the statute.  See Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 
201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  "When construing 
statutes, meaning should be given to every word, clause and 
sentence in the statute, and a construction which would make 
part of the statute superfluous should be avoided wherever 
possible."  Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 563, 313 
N.W.2d 47 (1981) (internal citation omitted).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 230.80(7) provides, in relevant part: 
"Mismanagement" 
means 
a 
pattern 
of 
incompetent 
management actions which are wrongful, negligent or 
arbitrary and capricious and which adversely affect 
the efficient accomplishment of an agency function. 
No. 
01-2959   
 
28 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The language of this statute suggests the 
interpretation taken by the Commission is correct.  First, the 
definition uses the plural term "actions."  Second, if the term 
"pattern" means what the court of appeals suggests, it is 
essentially rendered superfluous to the statute.  If pattern 
means "a model" and therefore, one action is enough to trigger 
protection, the term "pattern" is unnecessary.  Were the statute 
to read: "Mismanagement means incompetent management actions 
which are wrongful, negligent or arbitrary and capricious," the 
same effect would be had, because a single example of an 
incompetent management action would be sufficient to satisfy the 
definition.   
¶50 Finally, according to Black's Law Dictionary 1149 (7th 
ed. 1999), a "pattern" means:  "A mode of behavior or series of 
acts that are recognizably consistent . . . ."  Consistency 
suggests that there must be a comparison, a reference of one 
action to another that suggests similarity.  Clearly, under this 
definition, one action would be insufficient to establish a 
"pattern." 
¶51 Even 
if 
one 
were 
to 
believe 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7) 
is 
ambiguous, 
and 
accept 
Hutson's 
argument that "pattern" could be interpreted to include ongoing 
violations and that her allegation was sufficient to describe an 
ongoing violation, under the "due weight" level of deference we 
apply, the agency's interpretation would still be upheld.  So 
long as the agency's interpretation is at least as reasonable as 
Hutson's, under "due weight," the agency interpretation is 
No. 
01-2959   
 
29 
 
accepted.  We cannot accept that the plural connotation of the 
term "pattern" is unreasonable, or that it is not at least as 
reasonable as Hutson's interpretation.  As such, even were we to 
find the statute ambiguous, the agency's interpretation should 
be upheld.   
¶52 Although a more liberal standard is used by the 
Commission for motions to dismiss, several of the Commission's 
cases 
deal 
with 
the 
term 
"pattern" 
and 
support 
the 
interpretation the Commission took in the present case.  At 
least one case interpreted "pattern" outside the context of a 
motion to dismiss.  As previously noted, in Sadlier, 87-0046, 
0055-PC-ER, 3/30/89, at 43, the Commission found that a 
disclosure failed to meet the definition of a protected 
disclosure of "mismanagement" because it did not relate to a 
"pattern" of actions; it did not allege the act was one of a 
series.  In the context of a motion to dismiss, in Duran, 94-
0005,PC-ER, 10/4/94, at 4, the Commission noted the requirement 
that a disclosure describe "'a pattern of incompetent management 
actions.'"  (Emphasis in original.)  In the Duran case, the 
Commission found that, at least in the context of a motion to 
dismiss and "giving the memo a liberal reading," the disclosure 
could satisfy the definition because it related to various 
pieces of equipment at two separate offices.  Id.  Similarly, in 
Pfeffer, 96-0109-PC-ER, 3/14/97, at 6, the Commission found that 
the requirement of a "pattern" of "incompetent management 
actions" was not met because the disclosure only related to "a 
disagreement by certain UW-Parkside custodians with a decision 
No. 
01-2959   
 
30 
 
by management to transfer all third shift custodians to the day 
shift."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the Commission noted there was 
only a singular decision by management.  In addition, the 
Commission found the allegations failed because they referenced 
only a disagreement regarding management techniques.  Id. 
¶53 We 
now 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
Commission's 
interpretation taken in Hutson's case is reasonable.  According 
to this court's decision in Parker, 184 Wis. 2d at 700 n.36,  
An agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable 
if it accords with the language of the statute, the 
statute's legislative history and the legislative 
intent and if the interpretation is consistent with 
the statute read as a whole, and the purpose of the 
statute; and if the interpretation is consistent with 
judicial analyses of the statute.  
(Internal citation omitted.)  We have already examined the 
language of the statute.  The legislative history of the statute 
provides even more support for the agency's interpretation.  The 
drafting record for 1983 Wisconsin Act 409, the bill creating 
the whistleblower law, indicates that early drafts did not even 
contain a definition of mismanagement.  During the drafting 
process, at least two agencies, the Department of Administration 
and 
the 
Department 
of 
Employment 
Relations, 
requested 
a 
definition be added and proposed language for such an amendment.  
A letter from the Department of Administration, included in the 
drafting record for 1983 Wisconsin Act 409, proposed that 
"mismanagement" means "a pattern of incompetent management acts 
taken over a period of time, not based solely on a difference of 
opinion as to proper management courses of action."  Most of 
No. 
01-2959   
 
31 
 
this 
language 
became 
what 
is 
today 
the 
definition 
of 
mismanagement in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7).  The court of appeals 
made much of the fact that the phrase "taken over a period of 
time" was not put into the statute, indicating that the 
elimination of this phrase supports the interpretation that a 
single act is enough.  We disagree.  As the Commission points 
out, a drafter's note in the drafting record, indicates that the 
drafter of the bill already felt the provisions were overly 
wordy.  The drafter's note states:  "I've done the best I could 
with language you know I consider unnecessarily wordy."  The 
phrase may well have been eliminated because the drafter felt a 
"pattern of incompetent management actions" inherently required 
a period of time to occur and thus, the phrase would be 
redundant.  Whether or not that is true, one thing is clear, the 
word "pattern" did not end up in the definition by mistake.  The 
drafting record is replete with cost analyses.  The legislature 
did 
not 
want 
to 
create 
provisions 
that 
would 
lead 
to 
unreasonable 
administrative 
costs. 
 
Limiting 
mismanagement 
claims to those where a "pattern" can be shown would reduce 
enforcement costs and avoid a flood of frivolous complaints 
about one-time management errors.   
¶54 We readily acknowledge that the purpose of the 
whistleblower law is to encourage employees to disclose certain 
information 
and 
protect 
such 
employees 
from 
retaliation.  
Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2).  Limiting the meaning of "pattern" in 
the definition of mismanagement is not inconsistent with that 
No. 
01-2959   
 
32 
 
purpose.  The whistleblower provisions have built-in limitations 
designed to protect employees under certain circumstances. 
¶55 Our conclusion that the Commission's interpretation is 
reasonable is supported by caselaw.  In Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977), the United States Supreme 
Court held that to show a "pattern" in the context of a 
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the government had "to prove more than the mere occurrence 
of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts."  
The Court quoted an explanation by Senator Humphrey:  "single, 
insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single 
business 
would 
not 
justify 
a 
finding 
of 
a 
pattern 
or 
practice. . . . "  Id. at 336 n.16 (internal quotation omitted).   
¶56 Similarly, in interpreting a statute requiring a 
pattern of real estate sales be established, this court held:  
"'Pattern' suggests that, even though one be in the business of 
selling, more than an isolated instance or two of selling must 
occur before a broker's license is required."  State ex rel. 
Real Estate Exam. Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis. 2d 701, 712, 159 
N.W.2d 622 (1968). 
¶57 Hutson's claim of an ongoing violation may also be 
viewed 
as 
an 
attempt 
to 
re-characterize 
the 
"management 
decision" at issue in this case.  The Commission interpreted the 
management decision as one act, a decision not to reduce the 
caseload.  We agree with this characterization.  Hutson's 
February 5 memo refers to one particular decision that she 
wanted changed.  She believed the caseload exceeded the DOC's 
No. 
01-2959   
 
33 
 
own limits and wanted it reduced or wanted to be paid overtime.  
Applying 
the 
"due 
weight" 
level 
of 
deference 
here, 
the 
Commission's interpretation is certainly at least as reasonable 
as that put forth by Hutson.  As we have noted, if there are 
equally reasonable interpretations, the agency's interpretation 
will be upheld.  See UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 287 n.3.  
IV 
¶58 Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude 
that a "pattern of incompetent management actions" under 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(7) requires more than a claim of a single 
act of incompetent management.  We find that Hutson's February 5 
memo is not a disclosure of information protected under the 
whistleblower law, and for that reason, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.   
¶59 The Commission also requested this court to review the 
court of appeals' application of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(4) and 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35.6  The court of appeals suggested that these 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(4), dealing with a court's scope 
of review when examining an administrative agency decision, 
provides: 
 
The court shall remand the case to the agency for 
further action if it finds that either the fairness of 
the proceedings or the correctness of the action has 
been impaired by a material error in procedure or a 
failure to follow prescribed procedure. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35, 
a 
statute 
allowing 
for 
discretionary reversal by the court of appeals, provides: 
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
No. 
01-2959   
 
34 
 
statutes combined to allow for a court to send back a decision 
to an agency on "fundamental fairness" grounds.  We agree with 
the 
Commission's 
argument 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(4) 
only 
allows remand in the event that an appellate court finds "that 
either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the 
action has been impaired by a material error in procedure or a 
failure to follow prescribed procedure."  In Chicago and North 
Western Railroad v. LIRC, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 612-13, 297 N.W.2d 819 
(1980), this court explicitly held that the discretionary review 
statute "is not applicable to a judicial review under ch. 227."  
To the extent that the court of appeals implies a substantive 
ground for remanding a case to an administrative agency based on 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(4), we disagree.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 227.57(4) allows for remand on procedural grounds.   
                                                                                                                                                             
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
It should be noted that there is almost identical language in 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06, 
which 
describes 
the 
supreme 
court's 
discretionary 
reversal 
authority. 
 
This, 
rather 
than 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35, was the statute referenced in Chicago and 
North Western Railroad v. LIRC, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 612-13, 297 
N.W.2d 819 (1980). 
No. 
01-2959   
 
35 
 
¶60 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the court of 
appeals' decision should be reversed and the decision by the 
Commission upheld. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No. 
01-2959   
 
 
 
1