Title: Guyoungtech USA, Inc. v. Dees
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120505
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2014

REL:06/06/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120505
____________________
Guyoungtech USA, Inc.
v.
Elaine Dees
Appeal from Conecuh Circuit Court
(CV-11-900045)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
Elaine Dees sued Guyoungtech USA, Inc. ("Guyoungtech"),
in the Conecuh Circuit Court, alleging retaliatory discharge.
See § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975. A jury awarded Dees $1
million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive
1120505
damages. 
The 
trial 
court 
denied 
Guyoungtech's 
posttrial 
motion
for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") or, alternatively,
for a new trial but remitted the awards to $300,000 in
compensatory damages and $900,000 in punitive damages, which
Dees accepted. Guyoungtech appeals. Because we conclude that
Guyoungtech is entitled to a new trial, we do not address the
denial of its motion for a JML.
I. Facts
    Guyoungtech manufactures automotive parts for Hyundai
Motors Manufacturing Alabama ("HMMA") at a plant in
Castleberry. On November 17, 2010, Guyoungtech hired 
Dees, 
who
was then 28 years old, to inspect parts shipped to the plant
from South Korea. Dees worked a 12-hour shift from 6:30 a.m.
to 6:30 p.m. six days a week and was paid a base rate of $9.25
per hour. 
On March 14, 2011, nearly four months after being hired,
Dees fell and injured her left wrist while performing her job.
Guyoungtech sent Dees to Dr. Mark Roberts for an examination.
She returned to work in a partial cast but was able to use her
left hand and arm. At a follow-up visit on April 4, Dr.
Roberts placed Dees's left arm in a splint, referred her to an
2
1120505
orthopedic specialist, and ordered that she work no more than
eight hours a day and not lift more than three pounds. As a
result, when she returned to work on April 5, Dees could
effectively work with only one arm. On April 6, Dees was laid
off.
Previously, on October 23, 2010, citing receipt of "a lot
of defective parts" from Guyoungtech, HMMA had informed
Guyoungtech that it would be reducing its orders of the
affected parts by 50% and acquiring those parts from other
suppliers. To compensate for this loss of business,
Guyoungtech reduced its workforce through layoffs and
attrition from 300 employees in November 2010 to 212 in May
2011. Guyoungtech contends that Dees was laid off as part of
this reduction in force and not because she had applied for
worker's compensation benefits.
II. Standard of Review
"In a motion for a new trial, the movant normally tests
the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency." Shadwrick v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 578 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Ala. 1991).
The trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial "should
not be disturbed on appeal unless the record plainly and
3
1120505
palpably shows that the trial court erred and that some legal
right has been abused." McBride v. Sheppard, 624 So. 2d 1069,
1070-71 (Ala. 1993). "[W]e review a ruling on a question of
law de novo." Parker Bldg. Servs. Co. v. Lightsey, 925 So. 2d
927, 930 (Ala. 2005).
III. Discussion
A. Liability
Dees claims that her employment was terminated in
retaliation for her filing a worker's compensation claim.
Alabama is an at-will-employment state. Thus, an employment
contract of indefinite duration "may be terminated by either
party with or without cause or justification." Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987).
However, the legislature has created the following exception:
"No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because
the employee has instituted or maintained any action against
the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits ...."
§ 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). A violation of
this section is answerable in damages according to general
tort principles. Caraway v. Franklin Ferguson Mfg. Co., 507
So. 2d 925, 926 (Ala. 1987).
4
1120505
Guyoungtech argues that Dees's employment was terminated
as part of a bona fide and continuing layoff resulting from a
reduction in the orders of parts by HMMA. See Yates v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 908 (Ala. 1995)
(holding that a layoff caused by a corporate downsizing
unrelated to a worker's compensation claim is not actionable
under § 25-5-11.1). Dees presented evidence from which the
jury reasonably could infer that Guyoungtech's stated reason
for the layoff was a mask to conceal an illegal firing. See
Yates, 670 So. 2d at 909 (stating that if the employer
presents a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge, "the
plaintiff must then present evidence indicating that the
stated reason was not the true reason"). 
Dees argues that the proximity between her return to work
on April 5 with hour and weight-lifting restrictions and her
discharge the next day permits an inference that she was fired
because of her injury and resulting worker's compensation
claim. Although "mere closeness in time typically is not
sufficient evidence of a retaliatory discharge," Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. Consol. v. Hollander, 885 So. 2d 125, 131 (Ala.
2003), Dees also points to evidence indicating that the
5
1120505
Guyoungtech executive who initiated her layoff most likely
knew of her injury, even though he denied such knowledge.
Further, the plant manager, who also served as safety director
for the plant, denied knowing that Dees had been injured when
he laid her off. The jury was entitled to find this testimony
implausible. "It is settled law that the credibility of the
witnesses is the province of the jury." Floyd v. Broughton,
664 So. 2d 897, 900 (Ala. 1995). Dees also presented evidence
indicating that Guyoungtech, contrary to Alabama law, had
ceased reporting nondisabling injuries to its workers'
compensation insurer in an effort to reduce its premium costs.
Guyoungtech, on the other hand, demonstrated that other
workers, including those in Dees's department, had continued
their employment at Guyoungtech despite having filed worker's
compensation claims. Because we 
must view disputed evidence in
a light most favorable to the jury verdict, Daugherty, 840 So.
2d at 156, we are not in a position to substitute our judgment
for that of the jury when evidence existed from which it could
reasonably find that Guyoungtech discharged Dees in violation
of § 25-5-11.1.
B. Compensatory Damages
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1120505
The jury awarded Dees $1 million in compensatory damages,
which the trial court remitted to $300,000. A plaintiff has
the burden of proving her damages. "The rule has long been
established that the party claiming damages has the burden of
establishing the existence of and amount of those damages by
competent evidence." Johnson v. Harrison, 404 So. 2d 337, 340
(Ala. 1981). Dees sought compensation for future lost wages1
and mental anguish. 
1. Future Lost Wages
Dees's proof of future lost wages as a result of her
discharge was scant. No expert testified as to her lack of
employability or restricted access to the labor market as a
result of the discharge. When asked at trial, almost a year
and a half after the termination of her employment, if she had
applied for work elsewhere, Dees stated: "I've been under the
treatment of the doctor and restrictions." Dees's answer,
though indicating that she felt hampered in looking for work
because of her injury, provided no evidence indicating that
the discharge itself, the subject of this action, had rendered
At trial Dees did not seek compensation for past lost
1
wages.
7
1120505
her 
less employable. Because Guyoungtech had provided her 
with
a letter stating that "[h]er last day of employment was April
6, 2011 due to a reduction in force," she did not bear the
stigma of relating to a prospective employer that she had been
fired from her previous job for any fault of her own. 
Because 
the 
trial 
court 
bifurcated 
the 
worker's
compensation 
action 
and 
the 
retaliatory-discharge 
case, 
Dees's
damages, if any, for being out of work because of her injury
were not at issue in this case. Thus, in computing damages for
retaliatory discharge, the jury could not consider the
physical effect of the injury in hindering Dees's search for
employment. Dees presented no evidence indicating that the
firing itself interfered with her ability to find other
employment. When asked if she had "been to another company,
applied for a job and at least asked them to see whether they
would take your restrictions or not," Dees answered: "No,
ma'am." Dees's failure to look for work prohibits her from
arguing that her discharge negatively impacted her ability to
find a job. See Lozier Corp. v. Gray, 624 So. 2d 1034, 1037
(Ala. 1993) (noting the absence of "evidence at trial that
[the employer's] termination of [the employee] caused [the
8
1120505
employee] to be less marketable as an employee"); Gold Kist,
Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So. 2d 826, 829-30 (Ala. 1994) (noting
that discharged employee seeking damages for retaliatory
discharge had "unsuccessfully applied for 20-25 different
jobs," thus indicating that "other potential employers would
be reluctant to hire her because she was fired after suffering
an on-the-job injury").
2. Mental Anguish
Dees also sought damages for mental anguish. She
testified to the fear and worry she experienced after losing
her job at Guyoungtech. "There is no fixed standard for
ascertaining the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded for emotional distress. The determination of how much
to award is left to the sound discretion of the jury, subject
only to review by the court for a clear abuse of that
discretion." First Commercial Bank v. Spivey, 694 So. 2d 1316,
1326 (Ala. 1997). See also Foster v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia,
656 So. 2d 333, 337 (Ala. 1994) (recognizing "that mental
anguish and emotional distress are not items for which a
precise amount of damages can be assessed"). 
9
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Recognizing the broad discretion allotted to the jury in
determining compensation 
for 
mental suffering, we note that in
retaliatory-discharge 
cases 
where 
testimony 
has 
indicated 
more
severe effects than Dees experienced the awards were
considerably lower. See Black Creek, Inc. v. Wood, 69 So. 3d
172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (upholding $30,000 award for mental
anguish where plaintiff saw a psychiatrist, took medication
for depression, and suffered a divorce); Montgomery Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Golson, 725 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Ala. Civ. App.
1998) (upholding $75,000 award for mental anguish where
plaintiff "could not pay his bills, his car was repossessed,
he was evicted from his apartment, and he and his wife
divorced"). Although Dees expressed concern for the stability
of her marriage as evidence of her mental anguish, she did not
experience a divorce. She presented no evidence indicating
that she had lost her home or vehicle or that she needed
mental-health treatment.
3. Admission of Mortality Tables into Evidence
10
1120505
Dees submitted a pretrial "Notice of Supplemental Exhibit
of Mortality Tables."  Guyoungtech objected on the ground of
2
relevancy, stating that "any alleged damages resulting from
Guyoungtech's alleged retaliatory discharge has absolutely no
relevance 
to 
[Dees's] 
life 
expectancy." 
During 
trial
Guyoungtech objected to the admission of the mortality tables
as "too speculative" a basis for calculating damages. Dees
responded that the tables were relevant to the mental-anguish
claim. Guyoungtech's counsel answered:
"And again, Your Honor, if it's just for future
anguish or mental pain and anguish, it's again pure
speculation. She may or may not have it. How can,
without other evidence from the psychiatrist or a
physician or anybody in the know, how can that be
admitted into evidence to make an argument that
she's going to have it for the rest of her life?
It's pure speculation."
Counsel for Dees replied that "[w]e believe that it's required
to be in evidence to be able to argue about mental anguish and
the effects on her life." 
The trial court admitted the mortality tables into
evidence. Guyoungtech objected to admission of the mortality
A 
mortality 
table 
is 
"[a]n 
organized 
chart 
of 
statistical
2
data 
indicating 
life 
expectancies 
...." 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary
41 (9th ed. 2009) (entry for "actuarial table").
11
1120505
tables during the jury-charge conference and also in its
motion for a JML at the close of the evidence. While arguing
in opposition to the motion for a JML, Dees's counsel stated:
"Are [the jurors] satisfied, are they reasonably satisfied
that she would have worked there for a period of time and
earned wages in the future and that's why we wanted the
mortality table." 
The trial court charged the jury as follows:
"Now one of the exhibits that's in evidence is
called a mortality table. Let me read you a charge
explaining that. Mortality tables are a means of
ascertaining the probable number of years a person
of a given age in ordinary health will live. And the
mortality table may be used by you as an aid in
computing damages if you are reasonably satisfied
from the evidence that the injuries sustained by
Mrs. Dees are permanent. Such tables are not binding
upon you and they are not conclusive."
In its posttrial "Motion to Remit Damages," Guyoungtech
argued that the admission of the mortality tables was improper
because Dees "offered no evidence that she could never work
again, for any reason, for the remainder of her life
expectancy." During argument on the motion, Guyoungtech
reiterated: "And the point being, Your Honor, there was no
basis for the mortality table[s] and no testimony as to how it
applied, no testimony that Ms. Dees would somehow be
12
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permanently precluded from obtaining work ...." The mortality
tables, Guyoungtech concluded, "[c]aused confusion and
prejudice." 
On appeal Guyoungtech argues that the mortality tables
were inadmissible to prove damages for either lost wages or
mental anguish 
because 
"no issues of permanent disability were
argued in this case" and because, it says, the issue of Dees's
physical injury was reserved for the separate worker's
compensation case. Guyoungtech's brief, at 35-36. Dees
responds that the admissibility of the mortality tables is not
reviewable because "the jury verdict form did not distinguish
between the two types of damages." Dees's brief, at 60.
"Mortality tables are admissible where there is evidence
that the 
plaintiff 
has suffered permanent personal injuries or
the question of a person's life expectancy is a material
question to be decided." Drummond Co. v. Self, 622 So. 2d 336,
337 (Ala. 1993) (citing C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence
§ 259.01(1) (4th ed. 1991)). See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Smelley, 295 Ala. 346, 349, 329 So. 2d 544, 546
(1976) ("In Alabama, mortality tables are admissible when
there is evidence (even though it may be controverted) from
13
1120505
which the jury may draw a reasonable inference that a
plaintiff's injuries are permanent."). See also Ozment v.
Wilkerson, 646 So. 2d 4, 6 (Ala. 1994) (holding that 
mortality tables were admissible where the jury "reasonably
could have concluded that [a surgical] scar constituted a
permanent 
injury"); 
Louisville 
& 
Nashville 
R.R. 
v. 
Richardson,
285 Ala. 281, 283, 231 So. 2d 316, 317 (1970) (holding that
mortality tables "are competent evidence, where the injury is
permanent"); Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 635, 93 So. 2d
138, 142 
(1956) 
(holding that mortality tables were admissible
in light of "evidence from which there is a reasonable
inference that plaintiff's injuries are permanent"). 
In Collins v. Windham, 277 Ala. 129, 167 So. 2d 690
(1964), this Court considered the use of a mortality table in
a case where the injury alleged was mental anguish. "The
specific question before us," the Court stated, "is whether
there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could draw
a reasonable inference that the plaintiff's injuries were
permanent, since the alleged injury was subjective and there
was no expert medical testimony showing the injuries to be
permanent." Collins, 277 Ala. at 131, 167 So. 2d at 692. After
14
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reviewing similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Court
concluded: 
"[W]here the injury complained of is purely
subjective, as in the present case, and where there 
is no expert medical testimony tending to show the
permanency of the alleged injury, mortality tables
are not admissible in evidence. To hold otherwise
would permit the jury to award damages based on
speculation and guesswork."
277 Ala. at 132-33, 167 So. 2d at 693-94. See also Flowers
Hosp., Inc. v. Arnold, 638 So. 2d 851, 852 (Ala. 1994)
(reversing a compensatory-damages award to a plaintiff who
fell out of a wheelchair in a hospital and developed a mental
condition dubbed "fear of hospitals" because "neither side
presented expert testimony as to whether [the plaintiff's]
fear of hospitals was permanent"); Jones v. Fortner, 507 So.
2d 908, 910 (Ala. 1987) ("It has been held that where there is
nothing from which a layman can form any well-grounded opinion
as to the permanency of the injury or where the injury is
purely subjective, expert evidence must be introduced."
(citing 25A C.J.S. Damages § 162(9), at 110 (1966))).
Testifying about the mental anguish she suffered, Dees
expressed concern about the potential effect of her discharge
15
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on the well-being of her daughters and on her relationship
with her husband, Brad.
"Q. Now, I want to ask you about how you felt when
you found out that you had been terminated, okay?
Now, first of all, how does it feel to be what you
think is wrongfully terminated? How did that feel to
you to lose your job in the way that you lost it?
"A. I was hurt.
"Q. Okay. And can you tell the jury why it hurt you?
"A. Because even -- even though I'm married, those
are not Brad's kids and I feel obligated to take
care of my girls.
"....
"Q. Now, what kind of worries has this created for
you now that you do not have a job instead of
working in the quality control department?
"A. Everything is on Brad's shoulders. I'm not able
-- like I said, those are not his children, even
though we're married. What can I -- I mean, what can
I do for my daughters? They don't look to Brad, they
look to me to provide for them, not Brad.
"Q. Well, Brad does provide for the family right
now, doesn't he?
"A. (Witness shakes head in the affirmative.)
"Q. And is Brad continuing to work at Guyoungtech?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do you worry about that?
"A. I do.
16
1120505
"Q. And why do you worry about that?
"A. I'm scared that no matter how this case go[es],
in the end they're going to let him go.
"Q. So you're worried that this case when it's over,
he's going to get fired, is that what you're saying?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And then, do you worry about what would happen
to your marriage if that happened? 
"A. Yes, sir."
Dees felt hurt about losing her job; she was afraid of
being unable to provide for her daughters, even though her
husband continued to be employed at Guyoungtech; and she
feared that Guyoungtech would eventually fire her husband,
which could adversely affect her marriage. This testimony of
a "purely subjective" injury unsupported by expert medical
evidence of its permanency failed as a matter of law to
support the admission into evidence of the mortality tables.
Jones v. Fortner, 507 So. 2d at 910. Additionally, the trial
court's instruction that "the mortality table may be used by
you as an aid in computing damages if you are reasonably
satisfied from the evidence that the injuries sustained by
Mrs. Dees are permanent" was also improper. The jury was in no
position to assess the permanency of Dees's subjective mental
17
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injury without expert medical testimony. As this Court stated
in Flowers Hospital, in the absence of expert medical
evidence, "the trial court erred in charging the jury that it
could award damages for permanent injury if it was satisfied
that [the plaintiff] suffered a permanent injury." 638 So. 2d
at 853.
In Flowers Hospital, this Court concluded: "Because we
cannot determine whether the instructions on permanent injury
affected the jury's verdict, we must reverse the judgment
based on that verdict and remand the case for a new trial."
638 So. 2d at 853. In Collins, the Court stated: "We cannot
say, in the present case, that the admission in evidence of
the mortality table did not affect the jury in arriving at the
verdict, especially in view of the argument made to the jury
and the amount of the verdict." 277 Ala. at 133, 167 So. 2d at
694. Dees's counsel did not specifically reference the
mortality tables in his closing argument, but he did argue
that "[t]here's no evidence that she wouldn't have worked for
the rest of her life" at Guyoungtech. The $15,000 verdict in
Collins was remitted by the trial court to $12,000. Given the
size of the compensatory-damages award in this case -- $1
18
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million remitted by the trial court to $300,000 -- the concern
of the Collins Court about the effect of an improperly
admitted mortality table on the size of the mental-anguish
verdict applies here.
4. Verdict Form
The verdict form distinguished between compensatory
damages and punitive damages but did not ask the jury to
itemize the individual components of the compensatory-damages
award: lost future wages and mental anguish. Thus, the
compensatory-damages award of $1 million (remitted to
$300,000) might have been entirely for either lost future
wages or mental anguish, or for 
some indiscernible combination
of the two. If the trial court's evidentiary and instructional
errors were confined solely to the calculation of lost wages
or solely to the calculation of mental-anguish damages, we
would not be in a position to review the compensatory-damages
verdict. 
In that situation, the verdict could 
have represented
solely the type of damages unaffected by the trial court's
error. 
Reviewing a case in which the verdict form did not
distinguish 
between 
compensatory 
damages 
and 
punitive 
damages,
19
1120505
this Court declined to speculate as to how the damages were
apportioned between those two components. "We cannot say
whether the [verdict] is right or wrong; we do not know what
it represents, and it could be either right or wrong, i.e.,
either appropriate or excessive." City Realty, Inc. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 623 So. 2d 1039, 1046 (Ala. 1993). In
that case, the Court also declined to remand the case for
itemization of the verdict "because the parties did not object
to the undesignated verdict at trial." Id. 
In Coastal Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cope, 697 So. 2d 48 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1996), the trial court refused the defendants'
request 
for 
a 
verdict 
form 
differentiating 
between
compensatory damages and punitive damages. The Court of Civil
Appeals, affirming the judgment entered on the verdict, found
the error to be harmless because the evidence supported
assigning the entire award either to compensatory damages or
to punitive damages. "Obviously, since both extremes of
compensatory and punitive damages are supported by the
evidence, any combination of the two also is supported by the
evidence." 697 So. 2d at 52. Conversely, in this case, because
the lost-wages and mental-anguish prongs of the compensatory-
20
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damages award are both infected by error, we may reverse
without knowing how the jury allotted damages between lost
wages and mental anguish. To paraphrase the Coastal court:
Because neither extreme of lost-wages or mental-anguish
damages is supported by the evidence, any combination of the
two also is not supported by the evidence.
5. Remedy
Dees argued at trial that the mortality tables were
offered into evidence to support both lost-wages and mental-
anguish damages. Guyoungtech objected to their use on both
grounds. The trial court's instruction did not differentiate
between the use of the mortality tables to compute the two
types of damages, stating generically that "the mortality
table[s] may be used by you as an aid in computing damages if
you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the
injuries sustained by Mrs. Dees are permanent." The mortality
tables were erroneously admitted in regard to mental-anguish
damages because the permanence of a subjective injury cannot
be determined without expert medical testimony. The mortality
table 
were 
erroneously 
admitted 
in 
regard 
to 
future-lost-wages
damages because Dees offered no evidence of permanent
21
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unemployability ascribable to 
the 
termination 
of 
her
employment at Guyoungtech. Accordingly, we reverse the award
of compensatory damages.
C. Punitive Damages
Because we are reversing the compensatory-damages award,
we must also reverse the punitive-damages award. Compensatory
or nominal damages must first be awarded before punitive
damages can be assessed. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Smith,
719 So. 2d 797, 806 (Ala. 1998). Because a jury may possibly
consider awarding punitive damages on any retrial of this
case, we offer some guidance to the trial court to avoid an
evidentiary error that affected these 
proceedings 
and 
to which
Guyoungtech objected. At trial, the foundation of Dees's
argument that punitive damages should be awarded was that
Guyoungtech 
had 
not 
timely 
reported 
many 
workers' 
compensation
claims to its insurance carrier. See Rule 480-5-1-.01, Ala.
Admin. Code (Dep't of Labor) (requiring filing of "First
Report of Injury" form within 15 days of claim). Dees
presented evidence indicating 
that this policy was a conscious
decision by management at Guyoungtech to reduce insurance
costs. As the trial court pointed out in its postjudgment
22
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order, such a policy violates Alabama law, which requires the
reporting 
of 
all 
workplace 
injuries 
to 
the 
State.
Alternatively, a company may self-insure, as Guyoungtech
apparently did for some injuries, but Guyoungtech did not meet
the legal requirements to self-insure. See Rule 480-5-2-.02,
Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Labor).
Dees argued that the evidence of nonreporting of injuries
demonstrated Guyoungtech's callousness toward injured workers
and 
was probative in particular of Guyoungtech's animus 
toward
Dees as an injured worker, thus justifying a large punitive-
damages award. Guyoungtech objected to admission of this
evidence, arguing that its failure to report small workers'
compensation claims had no effect on Dees because, it
reasoned, Guyoungtech reported Dees's injury to its carrier
and she had received worker's compensation medical and lost-
wage benefits. The trial court erred in allowing the jury to
consider behavior of Guyoungtech unrelated to Dees's claimed
injury as a basis for imposing punitive damages.
"[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of
a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of
23
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the defendant's conduct." BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
"A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the
acts upon which liability was premised, may not
serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant
should be punished for the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or
business. Due process does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against
a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis ....
"....
"... The reprehensibility guidepost does not
permit courts to expand the scope of the case so
that a defendant may be punished for any malfeasance
...."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-
24 (2003). Several years later the United States Supreme Court
reiterated that "we can find no authority supporting the use
of punitive damages awards for the purpose of punishing a
defendant for harming others." Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007). Allowing a jury to base its
punitive-damages award "in part upon its desire to punish the
defendant for harming persons who are not before the court"
"would amount to a taking of property from the defendant
without due process." 549 U.S. at 349. See also Williams v.
24
1120505
ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing
State Farm for the proposition that "courts cannot award
punitive damages to plaintiffs 
for 
wrongful behavior that they
did not themselves suffer"); § 6-11-20(a), Ala. Code 1975
(stating that to receive punitive damages a plaintiff must
prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud,
wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff" (emphasis
added)).
Guyoungtech sent a timely "First Report of Injury" for
Dees to its workers' compensation insurance carrier, who then
paid worker's compensation benefits to Dees. Although the
court allowed Dees to present evidence showing that
Guyoungtech's carrier had denied payment of benefits to
injured workers whose "First Reports of Injury" forms were
untimely filed, the jury should not have been allowed to
consider that fact in assessing punitive damages. This
conduct, 
which 
concerned 
"other 
parties' 
hypothetical 
claims,"
did not harm Dees. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. Consideration
of potential malfeasance arising from these late-filed claims
expanded the scope of the case to facts unrelated to Dees's
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injury and allowed an award of punitive damages for
"defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
The trial court allowed testimony, admitted exhibits, and
permitted argument about these dissimilar acts affecting
nonparties. Near the beginning of his opening statement,
counsel for Dees stated: "This is a case about holding this
company responsible for the way they treat this employee and
other employees." (Emphasis added.) At the close of his
opening statement, counsel for Dees reiterated: "This case is
about two things: It's about what they did to her and it's
about what they did to other people." (Emphasis added.) The
trial court instructed the jury that "you may consider the
defendant's general policy and practice with respect to other
employees" and gave an extensive critique of business
practices that did not affect Dees:
"The law of Alabama does not allow a company to
decide not to report claims and call itself
self-insured unless it is approved by the State of
Alabama Department of Industrial Relations.[3]
Effective October 1, 2012, shortly after the trial in
3
this case, the Alabama Department of Labor merged into the
Alabama Department of Industrial Relations, which was renamed
the Alabama Department of Labor. § 25-2-1.1, Ala. Code 1975.
26
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"....
"... [T]he laws of the State of Alabama do not allow
any company at any time to engage in any activity to
stop first report of injury forms from being filed
with the Department of Industrial Relations Workers'
Compensation Division."
By allowing evidence, argument, and jury instructions -- over
objections from Guyoungtech -- that permitted and encouraged
the jury to punish 
Guyoungtech 
for allegedly wrongful behavior
to other employees that caused Dees no harm, the trial court
erred.
D. Scope of a New Trial
Because the trial court erred in admitting into evidence
the mortality tables to support Dees's claim for compensatory
damages, we are reversing its judgment and remanding the case
for a new trial on both the liability and the compensatory-
damages and punitive-damages issues. "A partial new trial ...
may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears that
the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the
others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice."
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494,
500 (1931). Where "the question of damages ... is so
interwoven with that of liability that the former cannot be
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submitted to the jury independently of the latter without
confusion and uncertainty," id., a new trial should be ordered
on all issues. In this case a determination of compensatory
damages cannot be made without rehearing the evidence of
liability. A jury cannot evaluate mental-anguish damages or
lost future wages without hearing testimony about the
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
termination 
of 
Dees's
employment.
Other courts have held that the question of punitive
damages is too intertwined with the issue of liability for one
to be tried without the other. "[A]n award of punitive damages
should rest on the jury's assessment of all the evidence in
the case. Hence, the issue of punitive damages is so
intertwined with the other issues that it should be retried
with them." Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 554 F.2d
1376, 1389 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Mason v. Texaco, Inc.,
948 F.2d 1546, 1554 (10th Cir. 1991) ("A punitive damage[s]
claim is not an independent cause of action or issue separate
from the balance of a plaintiff's case. It is part and parcel
of a liability determination ...."). Under Alabama law, an
award of punitive damages requires proof "by clear and
28
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convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or
deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or
malice with regard to the plaintiff." § 6-11-20(e), Ala. Code
1975. The evidence affecting liability is thus intermingled
with the evidence necessary to determine punitive damages.
Because a determination of both compensatory damages and
punitive damages is dependent upon consideration of the
evidence that supports a finding of liability, a new trial on
all issues will best serve the ends of justice. Because "the
issues in 
this case are interrelated, thereby complicating our
separation of them, we believe justice will be best served by
a reversal and retrial of the case in its entirety."
Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of America v. Evan, 421 So. 2d 92, 98
(Ala. 1982). 
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for a new trial on all issues. We caution the trial court
that on remand evidence about business practices that caused
Dees no harm is not admissible for the purpose of assessing
punitive damages.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
29
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Wise, J., concurs.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Stuart, Bolin, and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
Parker and Main, JJ., dissent.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur.  I write separately to be clear that I do not
believe that an employee's "failure to look for work"
necessarily prohibits him or her from asserting a claim for
damages based on lost wages resulting from an unlawful
termination of the employee's employment under § 25-5-11.1,
Ala. Code 1975.  Instead, I read the main opinion's statement
regarding such a failure in the present case as simply
explaining the nature of the evidence in this particular case
and, specifically, the context within which this Court should
consider the absence in the record of any evidence indicating
that Elaine Dees's continued unemployment has been caused by
the termination of her employment by Guyoungtech USA, Inc.
I also write separately to comment upon the issue of
Guyoungtech's failure to report certain smaller workers'
compensation claims to the company that administers its
workers' compensation claims.  The main opinion correctly
notes that Dees's claim for worker's compensation benefits,
both medical and lost wages, was reported to the administrator
and, on this basis, concludes that Guyoungtech's failure to
report other employees' claims for workers' compensation
31
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benefits was not properly admissible in relation to the issue
of punitive damages.  I do not wish to be understood as
implying that I necessarily agree with the converse
proposition, i.e., that had Guyoungtech in fact failed to
report Dees's injury, that failure would have been admissible
as a basis for awarding punitive damages.  
The gravamen of the claim in this case is the termination
of Dees's employment, not some act or omission by Guyoungtech
that resulted in a denial to Dees of worker's compensation
benefits.  Accordingly, even if Guyoungtech had failed to
report Dees's injury, that omission would not have been the
conduct for which Dees seeks recovery from Guyoungtech in this
case.  As the main opinion, itself, notes, "'[a] defendant's
dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which
liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for
punitive damages.'"  ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003)
(emphasis added)).
In addition, in discussing Guyoungtech's failure to
report certain workers' compensation claims, the main opinion
quotes further from State Farm, as follows: 
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"'A defendant should be punished for the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory
individual or business.  Due process does not permit
courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to
adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical
claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis ....'"
___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423
(emphasis added)).  I am not persuaded that Guyoungtech's
failure to report certain other workers' compensation claims
warrants the application of such adjectives as "unsavory" and
"reprehensible." 
 
The 
record 
indicates 
merely 
that 
Guyoungtech
made the decision to pay certain smaller 
workers' 
compensation
claims out of its own pocket, rather than filing a claim with
its insurer (in effect, self-insuring certain claims). 
Although this may or may not be a technical violation of some
workers' compensation statute or regulation, the fact remains
that 
those 
claims 
were 
indeed 
paid 
by 
Guyoungtech. 
Accordingly, I find nothing in this practice, at least as it
related to Guyoungtech's employees such as Dees, that could be
deemed unsavory, reprehensible, or otherwise a basis for a
punitive-damages award.  More specifically, I find nothing in
this conduct to justify a conclusion that Guyoungtech 
"engaged
in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to"
33
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any such employee, as would be required for an award of
punitive damages under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a).4
Nor do I see any relationship in this case between any
4
practice 
of 
self-paying 
small 
workers' 
compensation 
claims, 
or
being late in filing such claims, and any pattern of
terminating the employment of employees who have filed such
claims. 
34
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PARKER, Justice (dissenting).
I concur with the conclusion in the main opinion that the
evidence supported the jury's finding that Guyoungtech USA,
Inc., terminated Elaine Dees's employment in violation of
Alabama's wrongful-termination statute.  I respectfully
dissent, however, from its reversal of the judgment as to
liability.  I also dissent from the portions of the main
opinion concerning the award of damages.  I would affirm the
judgment; therefore, I dissent.
 The main opinion reverses the trial court's judgment on
the compensatory-damages award based on its conclusion that
the improper admission into evidence of the mortality tables
potentially injuriously affected the substantial rights of
Guyoungtech.  In Atkins v. Lee, 603 So. 2d 937, 946 (Ala.
1992), this Court held:
"We will not reverse a judgment 'unless ... the
error 
complained 
of 
has 
probably 
injuriously
affected substantial rights of the parties.' Rule
45, Ala. R. App. P.; Bianco v. Graham, 268 Ala. 385,
388, 106 So. 2d 655, 657 (1958). The appellant bears
the burden of proof on this issue. Roubicek v.
Roubicek, 246 Ala. 442, 21 So. 2d 244 (1945)."
(Emphasis added.)  I respectfully dissent because the main
opinion has prematurely shifted the burden of proof to Dees on
35
1120505
this issue; Guyoungtech has not demonstrated that the 
improper
admission of the mortality tables probably injuriously
affected its substantial rights.  Even though Guyoungtech has
not carried its burden of demonstrating that the admission of
the mortality tables probably injuriously affected its
substantial rights, the main opinion shifts the burden to Dees
to demonstrate that the improper admission of the mortality
tables definitely did not affect Guyoungtech's substantial
rights.  The main opinion creates a new standard in that an
appellant no longer has to demonstrate that an error occurred,
but only that an error potentially occurred.
In the trial court, Dees sued Guyoungtech alleging
wrongful termination and seeking damages for lost wages and
mental anguish.  The jury returned a general verdict in favor
of Dees, awarding $1,000,000 in compensatory damages. 
Concerning the award of compensatory damages, the trial court
held as follows:
"In addition, Guyoung[tech] did not request a
special interrogatory or verdict form to itemize and
differentiate between lost wages, compensatory
damage[s,] and mental anguish damages. Alabama Code
[1975,] Section 6-11-1 on Itemization provides that
'[i]n any civil action based upon tort ... the
damages assessed by the factfinder shall be itemized
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as follows: (1) Past damages. (2) Future damages.
(3) Punitive Damages.'[ ]
5
"While 
[Guyoungtech] 
requested 
itemization
between compensatory and punitive damages, it did
not request itemization between past and future
damages related to mental anguish, and it did not
request itemization of compensatory damages for
future lost earnings. In Coastal Bail Bonds v. Cope,
697 So. 2d 48, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), the court
held that the failure to request itemization is
attributable as an error of the defendant, not the
trial judge. See, also, Green Tree Acceptance, Inc.
v. 
Standridge, 
565 
So. 
2d 
38, 
46 
(Ala.
1990)('Although there is no dispute that the jury
did not utilize itemized verdict forms, there is no
evidence that this error was brought to the
attention of the trial court.') In Dunlop Tire Corp.
v. Allen, 725 So. 2d 960, 968 (Ala. 1998), the Court
affirmed a compensatory damages award of $735,000 in
Section 6-11-1, Ala. Code 1975, states in full:
5
"In any civil action based upon tort and any
action for personal injury based upon breach of
warranty, except actions for wrongful death pursuant
to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, the damages
assessed by the factfinder shall be itemized as
follows:
"(1) Past damages.
"(2) Future damages.
"(3) Punitive damages.
"The factfinder shall not reduce any future damages
to present value. Where the court determines that
any one or more of the above categories is not
recoverable in the action, those categories shall be
omitted from the itemization."
37
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future damages where the defendant did not request
a jury form which would have addressed its concerns,
reasoning, 'if Dunlop had thought that future
damages were not recoverable in this action, it
should have asked to have that category omitted from
the itemization.'
"Finally, in Continental Eagle Corp.[ v.
Mokrzycki, 611 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1992)], such
apportionment was defined by the jury. In this case
Guyoung[tech] did not request apportionment. The
damages could be for mental anguish damages alone.
"... Dees was required to present 'evidence
tending to show the extent of damages as a matter of
just and reasonable inference.' Lindy Mfg. Co. v.
Twentieth Century Mktg., 706 So. 2d 1169, 1178 (Ala.
1997)(quoting C. Gamble, Alabama Law of Damages 7-1
(2d ed. 1988)). When proving general damages, the
standard is relevancy, not 'reasonable certainty.'
Med Plus Properties v. Colcock Constr. Group, 628
So. 2d 370, 377 (Ala. 1993)(citing Gamble, McElroy's
Alabama Evidence [§] 21.01(1) (4th ed. 1991)). The
jury properly considered the issue of damages as
submitted to them by this Court."
On appeal, Guyoungtech does not challenge the trial
court's holding that Guyoungtech failed to "request a special
interrogatory or verdict form to itemize and differentiate
between lost wages ... and mental anguish damages."  Neither
does Guyoungtech challenge the trial court's statement that
"[t]he damages [awarded by the jury] could be for mental
anguish damages alone."  In fact, there is nothing in the
clerk's record indicating what portion of the jury's award of
38
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compensatory damages was for future damages and what portion
was for past damages, and Guyoungtech offers no explanation. 
There is no way to determine from the general compensatory-
damages award whether the jury awarded any future damages; the
amount awarded could have been for her mental anguish suffered
from the time Dees was terminated from her employment until
trial.
Instead, Guyoungtech argues only that the admission of
the mortality tables was improper.  However, unless
Guyoungtech has demonstrated that its substantial rights were
probably 
injuriously affected by the improper admission of 
the
mortality tables, Guyoungtech is not entitled to have the
trial court's judgment reversed.  As set forth by the trial
court, there was a method available to Guyoungtech to
determine if its substantial rights had been injuriously
affected by the improper admission of the mortality tables,
but Guyoungtech chose not to avail itself of that protection;
it is not this Court's function to make arguments for a party
who chooses not to make those arguments for itself.
The main opinion recognizes that if the jury's verdict
"could have represented solely the type of damages unaffected
39
1120505
by the trial court's error," then "we would not be in a
position to review the compensatory-damages verdict." ___ So.
3d at ___.  The main opinion then concludes that "the lost-
wages and mental-anguish prongs of the compensatory-damages
award are both infected by error." ___ So. 3d at ___. 
However, the main opinion offers no explanation as to why an
award of mental-anguish damages would have been affected by
the improper admission of the mortality tables.
Therefore, based on Guyoungtech's failure to demonstrate
that the improper admission of the mortality tables probably
injuriously affected its substantial rights even though
Guyoungtech had available to it the protection of § 6-11-1,
Ala. Code 1975, I respectfully dissent from the holding in the
main opinion that the admission of the mortality tables was
error.  Dees should not pay the cost of Guyoungtech's failure
to properly defend the action.  The main opinion improperly
shifts to Dees the burden of proof that the law places upon
Guyoungtech.
40