Title: Andreavich v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 328, 2017
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JESSICA ANDREAVICH, 
  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
No. 328, 2017 
 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§  
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID. No. 1701002925 (N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
     
Plaintiff-Below,   
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 6, 2018 
Decided:  
June 19, 2018 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This 19th day of June, 2018, having considered the briefs and the record below, 
it appears to the Court that:    
(1) 
In October 2016, the police received a tip from a medical marijuana 
program compliance manager that Jessica Andreavich was illegally selling medical 
marijuana.1  The police investigated Andreavich’s personal Facebook page, as well 
as a business page titled “Jekka’s Folly,” listing prices and offering delivery of 
marijuana-infused edibles.  A detective messaged Andreavich through her 
                                          
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at 62 (Letter to Sgt. Allen G. Herring, New Castle Cty. Police, from Joseph 
F. Schlimer, Med. Marijuana Program Manager (Oct. 3, 2016)). 
2 
 
 
Facebook, posing as a friend of a veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, anxiety, and depression.2  Andreavich responded, offering to speak on the 
phone and set up a time to meet.  They spoke on the phone, and Andreavich asked 
the detective if she had a medical marijuana card.  The detective stated that she did 
not, but Andreavich agreed to meet with her to discuss how she could help.3  They 
met on December 20, 2016, and Andreavich sold the detective $60 worth of 
marijuana-infused edibles. 
(2) 
On January 5, 2017, the police executed a search warrant at 
Andreavich’s house, where they found marijuana and equipment for producing 
marijuana-infused edibles.  The police arrested Andreavich and she was indicted for 
aggravated possession, conspiracy second degree, possession of drug paraphernalia, 
and drug dealing.  The State entered a nolle prosequi on all charges except the drug 
dealing and conspiracy second degree charges related to the December 20th 
purchase. 
(3) 
At trial, the State presented evidence of five Facebook posts to which 
the defense objected.4  In the first post, dated September 14, 2016, Andreavich 
encouraged others to “[l]earn what I do and how to replicate and improve on my 
                                          
 
2 Id. at 3536 (Trial. Tr., State v. Andreavich, No. 17010012925, at 8083 (Del. Super. July 25, 
2017)); id. at 91.  
3 Id. at 36 (Trial Tr., at 84). 
4 Id. at 2527 (Trial Tr., at 4147). 
3 
 
 
recipes,” and listed her prices for marijuana-infused gummies, tincture, and topical 
salve.5  She explained, “I charge only enough to purchase more weed to make more 
batches.  I accept donations of flower or money from whomever wants to donate.”6  
On December 1, 2016, Andreavich posted a photo of a label on a package of 
“Marijuana Infused Gummy Leaves,” captioned, “Doing some home deliveries to 
Middletown and Bear area!!  Call me . . . if you would like to meet me and my 
crew!!!!”7  On December 16th, she posted, “Master Kush is available for anyone 
needing indicia bud and I have gummies available also on my run downstate today.  
Please contact me . . . if you would like a visit from the weed fairies.”8  On December 
19th, she posted a photo of herself and two others, captioned “Weed fairy run with 
two of my favorite fairies lol.”9  Lastly, on January 10th, after her arrest, she posted, 
“I was arrested for selling Cannabis to a Veteran who happened to be a cop who was 
in obvious distress at my home.  I am 100% guilty of this so called crime and I would 
absolutely do it again and again and again.”10  In addition, the compliance manager 
testified that Andreavich signed a document stating, “I attest that I will not deliver 
                                          
 
5 Id. at 90. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 86. 
8 Id. at 87. 
9 Id. at 88. 
10 Id. at 89. 
4 
 
 
marijuana to any individual or entity that’s not allowed to possess marijuana 
pursuant to Title 16 of the Delaware Code Chapter 49(a).”11 
(4) 
Andreavich objected to the admission of the Facebook posts, arguing 
that they “regarded other times, other alleged sales, possession with intent from other 
times,” and thus were unrelated “uncharged misconduct” and irrelevant to the 
December 20th sale.12  Andreavich also argued that the prejudicial nature of the posts 
outweighed their probative value.13  The court rejected the arguments and found the 
posts were admissible as evidence of Andreavich’s knowledge and intent.14  The 
court gave the jury detailed limiting instructions when the posts were introduced15 
and at the close of trial.16  Andreavich presented a choice of evils defense; but on 
                                          
 
11 Id. at 62 (Trial Tr., Andreavich, No. 1701002925, at 32 (Del. Super. July 26, 2018)). 
12 Id. at 26 (Trial Tr., at 42). 
13 Id. at 2627 (Trial Tr., at 4546). 
14 Id. at 26 (Trial Tr., at 43) (“Ms. Andreavich is being charged with Possession With Intent to 
Deliver, so part of the element of that is that she had the intent to deliver it.  If the Facebook posts 
product lists, in my view that is relevant to the intent to deliver element.”).  
15 Id. at 28 (Trial Tr., at 53) (“[Y]ou are being shown statements that appeared on a Facebook 
account.  These statements are not admissible to prove the defendant’s character, and you should 
not consider that evidence for such.  The evidence is admissible only to prove the defendant’s 
knowledge and intent to commit the charged crimes on December 20th, 2016.”). 
16 Id. at 81 (Trial Tr., at 10809) (“You have seen and heard some evidence in this case . . . , such 
as Facebook posts . . . .  You have heard evidence of certain acts allegedly committed by the 
defendant.  These acts are other than the alleged wrongdoing for which the defendant is not on 
trial.  You may not consider these other acts for the purpose of concluding that the defendant has 
a certain character or character trait and was acting in conformity with that trait with respect to the 
crimes charged in this case.  You may not use the evidence of other acts to conclude that the 
defendant is a bad person or has a tendency to commit criminal acts and is therefore probably 
guilty of the charged crimes.  You may use evidence related to other acts allegedly committed by 
the defendant only to determine issues relevant to the charged crimes.  In this case, the State 
contends that the evidence of other acts relates to the defendant’s intent and knowledge.  You may 
consider such evidence of other acts for this purpose only.”). 
5 
 
 
July 26, 2018, a jury found her guilty on both counts.  The court sentenced her to ten 
years at Level 5, suspended for one year at Level 3.  Andreavich appealed. 
(5) 
On appeal, Andreavich argues that the Superior Court erred by 
admitting the Facebook posts into evidence because the information was not “plain, 
clear, and conclusive,” did not provide evidence of intent, was not material to an 
issue or fact in dispute, and was more prejudicial than probative.17  We review a trial 
court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.18  However, “the question 
of whether the trial judge properly formulated and applied legal precepts governing 
the admissibility of evidence is one of law, reviewed de novo.”19 
(6) 
Rule 404(b) governs the admissibility of character evidence and 
evidence of prior conduct.  The Rule states, “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”20  However, 
it may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”21  To determine 
whether evidence of prior conduct is admissible, this Court applies the analysis set 
                                          
 
17 Opening Br. at 4. 
18 Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 79 (Del. 1993); Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 955 (Del. 1988) (“In 
deciding whether to admit evidence, the trial judge acts in his sound discretion, and his decision 
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”). 
19 Allen v. State, 644 A.2d 982, 985 (Del. 1994). 
20 D.R.E. 404(b)(1). 
21 Id. 404(b)(2). 
6 
 
 
forth in Getz v. State,22 which requires the evidence be (1) material to an issue or 
ultimate fact in dispute in the case; (2) introduced for a purpose permitted by 
404(b)(2) or “any other purpose not inconsistent with the basic prohibition against 
evidence of bad character or criminal disposition”; (3) plain, clear, and conclusive;23 
and (4) not too remote in time; and in addition, (5) the court must balance the 
evidence’s probative value against its unfairly prejudicial effect.24  The trial court 
admitted the posts under 404(b)(2), explaining that although the evidence was 
“prejudicial in a sense,” it was not unfairly prejudicial because it was “just that 
admission of guilt and probative of Ms. Andreavich’s intent and knowledge.”25   
(7) 
On appeal, Andreavich argues the court abused its discretion in 
admitting the Facebook posts because they were inadmissible prior misconduct.26  
She first argues the September 14th post was inadmissible because it is too remote 
in time and not plain, clear, and conclusive.  She explains that “under certain 
circumstances, the conduct referenced in the posts would have been legal.”27  The 
post references “sick people,” which she argues “implicat[es] that the defendant’s 
                                          
 
22 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988). 
23 See Renzi v. State, 320 A.2d 711, 712 (Del. 1974). 
24 D.R.E. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
25 App. to Opening Br. at 2527 (Trial Tr., at 4246). 
26 Opening Br. at 13. 
27 Id. 
7 
 
 
intent was to provide products and services only to medical marijuana patients.”28  
The December 20th sale, she points out was under “very specific factual 
circumstances,” rendering the September 14th post immaterial and not probative.29   
(8) 
“Evidence is too remote in time ‘only where there is no visible, plain, 
or necessary connection between it and the proposition eventually to be proved.’”30  
Here, the September 14th post occurred only three months prior to Andreavich’s 
arrest and had a visible, plain, and necessary connection to the December 20th sale.  
It corroborated the compliance manager’s tip and aided in the detective’s 
investigation.  The post was plain, clear, and conclusive because it directly showed 
Andreavich’s intent to develop and sell marijuana-infused products by listing her 
prices and stating she wanted others to learn and improve her recipes.31  While 
Andreavich argues the posts are unclear because her intended sales might have been 
legal, she provides no factual basis for this assertion.  The parties do not dispute that 
the December 20th sale was illegal, and the compliance manager testified that 
Andreavich was not permitted to sell marijuana to those without a medical marijuana 
                                          
 
28 Id. at 14. 
29 Id. at 15. 
30 Kendall v. State, 726 A.2d 1191, 1195 (Del. 1999) (quoting Lloyd v. State, 604 A.2d 418, 1991 
WL 247737, at *3 (Del. 1991) (TABLE)); see also Allen v. State, 644 A.2d 982, 988 (Del. 1994) 
(“[A] lengthy time lapse can render the evidence legally irrelevant.  Temporal remoteness 
depreciates or reduces the probative value of the evidence.” (quoting EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:08, at 8–16 (1992)). 
31 App. to Opening Br. at 90. 
8 
 
 
card.32  Thus, the September 15th post is relevant and material, and its probative 
value outweighs any prejudicial effect. 
(9) 
Andreavich next argues the December posts lacked probative value, 
were not plain, clear, and conclusive, and did not provide evidence of intent.  She 
explains that they did not express “any clear intent to engage in acts of drug dealing,” 
but “could have included legal conduct under the Delaware Medical Marijuana 
Act.”33  In addition, she points out that they referenced only interest in meeting, and 
Andreavich was “within the bounds of the law to meet with people, discuss the 
medical marijuana program, or arrange to act as an individual’s caregiver.”34  Thus, 
the posts were immaterial to the ultimate fact in dispute—whether the conduct was 
justified under a choice of evils defense—and “only tended to inflame the jury due 
to a broad scope of potential interpretation.”35  Lastly, she points out that the 
recorded conversation was sufficient to show clear evidence of intent, which was not 
“so clearly gleaned from her Facebook posts.”36   
(10) In response, the State points out that Andreavich provided no facts to 
support its contention that the meetings were legal.  In addition, the State argues, 
                                          
 
32 Id. at 6263 (Trial Tr, at. 3039); see id. at 63 (Trial Tr., at 39) (Q. “Is there ever a circumstance 
where a cardholder or caregiver or both could transfer marijuana to a noncardholder?”  A. 
“Absolutely not.”). 
33 Opening Br. at 15. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 16. 
36 Id. at 18. 
9 
 
 
posts had “independent logical relevance because they tended to make it more 
probable that Andreavich was dealing in the illegal sale of marijuana-infused 
edibles,” showing her intent and knowledge.37  The State argues the posts were plain, 
clear, and conclusive because they bore her name, picture, prices, and offers to 
deliver.  Thus, the posts were admissible under 404(b). 
(11) We agree.  Andreavich’s argument that her proposed sales might have 
been legal fails in light of the compliance manager’s testimony.38  He explained that 
only First State Compassion may legally sell and transfer marijuana in Delaware, 
and no one else.  While Andreavich could transfer marijuana to other cardholders, 
she could not sell marijuana for any profit or benefit.39  Contrary to her argument 
that the posts did not show “any clear intent” to deal marijuana—because she could 
have just been meeting with people to discuss the medical marijuana program—she 
was posting price lists and offering deliveries, displaying a clear intent to sell.  The 
posts’ probative value as to Andreavich’s intent and knowledge outweighs any 
prejudicial effect, and the jury instructions ensured proper use of the evidence.40 
(12) Lastly, Andreavich argues the January 10th post was “not the type of 
evidence intended to be admitted” under 404(b), and “simply reflects a layperson’s 
                                          
 
37 Answering Br. at 13. 
38 App. to Opening Br. at 62 (Trial Tr., at 3033). 
39 Id. at 64 (Trial Tr., at 38–39); id. at 63 (Trial Tr., at 37) (Q. “As a caregiver, is an individual 
authorized to sell marijuana?”  A. “No, ma’am.”). 
40 Answering Br. at 1213. 
10 
 
 
lack of knowledge with regard to defenses available under the factual 
circumstances.”41  Thus, she asserts, the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative 
value.  The State responded that “[i]t was a highly probative admission by 
Andreavich of her intent to deal in marijuana regardless of the consequences,” and 
it was not unfairly prejudicial.42  Andreavich does not explain why it was not the 
“type” of post intended to be admitted under Rule 404(b).  Andreavich’s admission 
was highly probative, directly showing her intent to deal marijuana with full 
knowledge that she was doing so illegally. 
(13) Our case law is consistent with this result.  In Torres v. State, the trial 
court admitted evidence of a prior uncharged drug transaction between the defendant 
and a witness.43   This Court affirmed, explaining that the evidence was admissible 
under 404(b) as evidence of intent because it showed “a continuing plan to distribute 
cocaine” and made it “more probable” that the defendant dealt a large amount of 
cocaine this time.44  In addition, the evidence was plain, clear, and conclusive 
because it was presented by direct witness testimony, and the Court found that any 
“danger of misuse” of the evidence was “properly dealt with by a limiting 
instruction.”45  Similarly, the Facebook posts established Andreavich’s “continuing 
                                          
 
41 Opening Br. at 17. 
42 Id. at 14. 
43 979 A.2d 1087, 1099 (Del. 2009). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1100. 
11 
 
 
plan” to distribute marijuana by listing prices and offering deliveries, and the 
evidence was plain, clear, and conclusive because the posts were provided to the jury 
and directly testified to by the detective.  Lastly, the trial court gave thorough 
limiting instructions to prevent any misuse of the evidence.  Therefore, like in 
Torres, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.46 
(14) In State v. Hynson, this Court reversed the Superior Court’s holding 
that evidence of prior uncharged cocaine deals was inadmissible.47  The trial court 
found the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value because the prior deals 
were not inextricably intertwined with the deal at issue, the amounts of cocaine 
differed, and there was no continuous course of dealing.48  This Court disagreed, 
explaining that “the evidence of the prior transactions is highly probative on the issue 
of the weight of the drugs” and was not unfairly prejudicial “in light of [the 
defendant’s] admission that he possessed cocaine at the time of his arrest.”49  And 
the Court explained that “any prejudice resulting from admitting the evidence could 
be reduced by a ‘cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury 
the limited purpose for which the evidence has been admitted.’”50  Similarly, the 
                                          
 
46 See also Kendall, 726 A.2d at 1195 (affirming admission of prior business misconduct as 
evidence of intent to commit fraud because it revealed a “common pattern of crime,” was presented 
by witnesses with personal knowledge, and the trial court gave limiting instructions). 
47 608 A.2d 730, 1992 WL 53419 (Del. 1992) (TABLE). 
48 Id. at *4. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (quoting Weber, 547 A.2d at 956). 
12 
 
 
Facebook posts were highly probative of Andreavich’s intent to deal marijuana, they 
were not unfairly prejudicial in light of Andreavich’s admission that the December 
20th transaction was illegal, and any prejudice was reduced by the jury instructions.  
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Facebook posts under Rule 
404(b).  
(15) Lastly, we agree with the State that “regardless of the Facebook posts 
prior to Andreavich’s arrest, there was overwhelming evidence of Andreavich’s guilt 
of drug dealing and conspiracy on December 20, 2016.”51  The compliance manager 
testified that Andreavich was not permitted to sell marijuana-infused products, the 
December 20th transaction was recorded, and the detective testified about the 
surrounding circumstances.52 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
51 Answering Br. at 1415. 
52 Howard v. State, 704 A.2d 278, 282 (Del. 1998) (“An error in admitting evidence is harmless 
where the properly admitted evidence, taken alone, is sufficient to support a conviction.”).