Title: Ex parte Anthony Rogers. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Anthony Rogers v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080880
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2010

REL: 12/30/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1080880
____________________
Ex parte Anthony Rogers
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Anthony Rogers
v.
Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-06-560;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2070985)
MURDOCK, Justice.
1080880
2
Anthony Rogers petitioned for certiorari review after the
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a judgment denying his claim
for 
unemployment-compensation 
benefits. 
 
We 
granted 
certiorari
review to reconsider prior Alabama decisions holding that the
claimant has the burden of proving the absence of a
disqualification for misconduct.
Facts and Procedural History
Rogers was employed by Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.,
for several years as a customer-service representative.  His
duties included pumping fuel into trucks leased to Penske's
customers.  Rogers was accused of helping Christopher Bibb
(not an employee or a customer of Penske) steal fuel from
Penske.  Bibb drove a large truck that was not leased from
Penske.  With the assistance of one or more Penske employees,
Bibb arranged to have his truck fueled at Penske's Montgomery
facility using billing codes assigned to trucks leased to
Penske customers.  
In October 2005, the fuel-stealing scheme was discovered
and the Montgomery police began investigating.  On October 31,
2005, Rogers was arrested by the Montgomery police for theft
of fuel based on receipts found in Bibb's truck that bore
1080880
Between January 2006 and January 2007, Bibb pleaded
1
guilty and agreed to testify against Rogers.
In February 2006, Rogers filed a malicious-prosecution
2
action against Penske and one of its supervisory employees.
A summary judgment was entered for the defendants; that
judgment was affirmed on appeal.  Rogers v. Penske Truck
Leasing Co., L.P., 37 So. 3d 780 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
3
Rogers's initials and employee-authorization code.  On the
afternoon of Rogers's arrest, Penske fired him for his alleged
participation in Bibb's scheme to steal fuel from Penske.
Rogers denied that he had participated in stealing any fuel
from Penske. 
In January or February 2006, the charges against Rogers
were nol-prossed.  In January 2007, Rogers was indicted for
theft of fuel in connection with the events of October 2005.1
In June 2007, Rogers was tried on the theft charges and was
acquitted.  
2
After 
Rogers 
was 
fired, 
he 
filed 
a 
claim 
for
unemployment-compensation 
benefits 
with 
the 
Alabama 
Department
of Industrial Relations ("DIR").  Penske challenged the claim
on the basis that Rogers had been discharged for a dishonest
and criminal act and was therefore disqualified from receiving
unemployment-compensation benefits.  The claims examiner
awarded benefits to Rogers and  stated that "[t]he employer
1080880
Section 25-4-95, Ala. Code 1975, provides that on appeal
3
to the circuit court the case is tried de novo.
4
has failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate
actual misconduct."  Penske appealed and DIR's hearing officer
affirmed the award of benefits. 
Penske appealed to the Montgomery Circuit Court.   Before
3
the circuit court, the parties allowed the court to decide the
case based on the evidence previously filed by the parties.
The circuit court denied benefits, stating that 
"[w]hen, as here, an employee is terminated for
misconduct, he bears the burden of proving he is not
subject to the disqualification for benefits.  Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hepp, 882 So. 2d 329, 333 (Ala.
2003).
"The Court further finds that [Rogers] failed to
meet his burden of proof."
(Emphasis added.)  Rogers appealed.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the circuit court's
judgment, without an opinion, apparently concluding that it
was bound by decisions of this Court that place on the
claimant 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
the 
absence 
of 
a
disqualification 
for 
unemployment-compensation 
benefits.
Rogers v. Penske Truck Leasing Co. (No. 2070985, April 3,
1080880
5
2009), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (table).  This
Court granted Rogers's petition for the writ of certiorari.
Standard of Review
"An appellate court reviews the burden of proof applied
at trial and other legal issues ... without a presumption of
correctness."  Ex parte USX Corp., 881 So. 2d 437, 441 (Ala.
2003). 
Legal Analysis
In affirming the decision of the circuit court, the Court
of Civil Appeals apparently considered itself bound by prior
Alabama decisions that appear to indicate that the burden is
on the unemployment-compensation claimant to prove the absence
of a disqualification.  In this regard, the cases cited by the
Court of Civil Appeals in its order affirming the circuit
court's judgment include Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hepp, 882
So. 2d 329, 333 (Ala. 2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Smitherman, 743 So. 2d 442, 445-47 (Ala. 1999); and Department
of Industrial Relations v. Jaco, 337 So. 2d 374, 376-77 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1976). 
As discussed in more detail below, the prior Alabama
cases provide little support for a rule that is contrary to
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6
the rule in most or all the other states that have addressed
the issue before us.  The Alabama rule referenced in these
cases would require the claimant to prove a negative, a
requirement the law generally is reluctant to impose.  It is
a rule that is inconsistent with the treatment of affirmative
defenses generally and ultimately with the beneficent purposes
of the unemployment-compensation act.   
I.  The Relevant Provisions of the Unemployment-
Compensation Act
Section 
25-4-77, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
sets 
forth 
the
eligibility 
requirements 
for 
receiving 
unemployment-
compensation benefits and provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) An unemployed individual shall be eligible
to receive benefits ... only if the director finds
that:
"(1) He has made a claim for benefits
with respect to such week in accordance
with such regulations as the director may
prescribe. 
"(2) He has registered for work at,
and thereafter continued to report at, a
state employment office ....
"(3) He is physically and mentally
able to perform work of a character which
he 
is 
qualified 
to 
perform 
by 
past
experience or training, and he is available
for such work ....
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7
"(4) He has been totally or partially
unemployed in such week. 
"(5) He has made a reasonable and
active effort to secure work which he is
qualified to perform by past experience and
training ...."
Section 25-4-78, Ala. Code 1975, sets forth various
disqualifications and provides, in part, as follows:
" An individual shall be disqualified for total
or partial unemployment:
"(1) 
Labor 
dispute 
in 
place 
of
employment. For any week in which his total
or partial unemployment is directly due to
a labor dispute still in active progress in
the establishment in which he is or was
last employed.  ...
"(2) Voluntarily quitting work. If he
has left his most recent bona fide work
voluntarily without good cause connected
with such work. 
".... 
"(3) Discharge for misconduct. 
"a. If he was discharged or
removed from his work for a
dishonest 
or 
criminal 
act
committed in connection with his
work or for sabotage or an act
endangering the safety of others
or [drug-related misconduct]. 
"....
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Other disqualifying circumstances set forth in the
4
statute include:  revocation or suspension of a required
license; failure to accept available suitable work; receipt of
backpay award; receipt of, or application for, workers'
compensation benefits; employment by public-works agency,
etc.; self-employment; receipt of, or application for,
training allowance under various governmental retraining
programs; and participation in professional sports.
With respect to the administrative-review process,
5
regulations issued by DIR pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 25-4-
111, impose on the claimant the burden of proving availability
for work, Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Industrial
Relations), r. 480-4-3-.15, and on the employer the burden of
proving, for purposes of disqualification for testing positive
for illegal drugs, that a drug policy is "otherwise reliable."
Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Industrial Relations), r. 480-
4-3-.28.  Neither of those regulations is directly relevant to
the present case.  The administrative regulations do not
address the burden of proof as to disqualification for
misconduct generally.
8
"b. If he was discharged
from his most recent bona fide
work for actual or threatened
m i s c o n d u ct 
committed 
in
connection with his work (other
than acts mentioned in paragraph
a. 
of 
this 
subdivision 
(3))
repeated after previous warning
to the individual. ...
"c. If he was discharged
from his most recent bona fide
work for misconduct connected
with his work [other than acts
mentioned in paragraphs a. and b.
of this subdivision (3)]...."4
Sections 25-4-77 and -78 do not address the allocation of
the burden of proof.  
5
1080880
9
 
II.  Prior Alabama Cases Suggesting That the Claimant
Bears the Burden of Proof as to the Absence of a
Disqualification
At best, Smitherman and Hepp, cited by the Court of Civil
Appeals, provide only weak support for a rule allocating to
the claimant the burden of proof as to the absence of a
disqualification.  Neither Smitherman nor Hepp, nor the cases
on which they rely, contain any substantial legal analysis or
discussion of applicable principles, and most of the cases
they 
cite 
fail 
to 
distinguish 
between 
eligibility,
disqualifying 
circumstances, 
and 
justifications 
or 
excuses 
for
a disqualifying circumstance.
 Moreover, Smitherman and Hepp did not directly involve
an unemployment-compensation appeal, and the comments in those
cases as to the allocation of the burden of proof appear to be
dicta.  The issue in both Smitherman and Hepp was whether the
doctrine 
of 
collateral 
estoppel 
barred 
a 
retaliatory-discharge
action brought pursuant to a provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, when an
unemployment-compensation 
claim 
had 
previously 
been
adjudicated 
against 
the employee in an administrative
proceeding.  In Smitherman, this Court stated: 
1080880
10
"Under Alabama's Unemployment Compensation Act, a
claimant has the burden of proving that he or she is
eligible to receive benefits under Ala. Code 1975,
§ 25-4-77, and that he or she is not disqualified
from receiving benefits by § 25-4-78. See Davenport
v. State Dep't of Indus. Relations, 692 So. 2d 851,
852 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). '"The claimant assumes
the risk of nonpersuasion."' State Dep't of Indus.
Relations v. Downey, 380 So. 2d 906, 908 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1980) (quoting Department of Indus. Relations
v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 145, 36 So. 2d 496, 497
(1948))."
743 So. 2d at 445-46.  The Smitherman Court noted that, in the
related 
unemployment-compensation 
case, 
it 
had 
been 
determined
that the claimant was partially disqualified from receiving
unemployment-compensation benefits because of misconduct.  It
held that that determination barred the claimant from
relitigating in the retaliatory-discharge action the reason
for her termination.  Thus, the decision in Smitherman did not
turn on which party had the burden of proof in the
unemployment-compensation case, but simply on the fact that
the issue had been litigated to a conclusion. 
Further, the cases cited by Smitherman with respect to
the burden of proof address only the eligibility for
unemployment-compensation benefits, and not disqualification.
Consequently, Smitherman provides little, if any, guidance for
1080880
We pretermit any further discussion of Hepp because Hepp
6
merely quoted Smitherman with respect to the allocation of the
burden of proof and reached the same result.  Hepp, 882 So. 2d
at 333.
Eligibility is not an issue in the present case, only
7
disqualification.
11
an allocation of the burden of proof on issues other than
eligibility.   
6
Smitherman indirectly quoted Department of Industrial
Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36 So. 2d 496 (1948),
for the proposition that a claimant "'"assumes the risk of
nonpersuasion."'"  743 So. 2d at 445.  Tomlinson, however,
addressed only eligibility for benefits under the predecessor
to § 25-4-77 and did not address disqualification under the
predecessor to § 25-4-78.  The Tomlinson Court concluded that
the claimant was not eligible for unemployment-compensation
benefits because he did not make a reasonable effort to find
new employment and was not available for work.   
7
Similarly, in Department of Industrial Relations v.
Downey, 380 So. 2d 906, 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), the court,
applying Tomlinson, held that the claimant had failed to meet
her burden of proof because she had not established her
eligibility for benefits.  Specifically, the court concluded
1080880
12
that "[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that appellee was
available for work as required by the statute, nor is there
any evidence that appellee made any effort to comply with the
unemployment qualification statutes."  380 So. 2d at 908.
Thus, neither Downey nor Tomlinson addressed the burden of
proof as to the issue of disqualification or made any
distinction between eligibility and disqualification.
  
In Jaco, the other case cited by the Court of Civil
Appeals, the issue was whether the claimant left his
employment voluntarily without good cause when he was
discharged for excessive absences after a warning (one of the
disqualifying circumstances set forth in § 25-4-78).  The Jaco
court affirmed the trial court's judgment that the claimant
was partially disqualified from receiving unemployment-
compensation benefits by reason of misconduct that was not
deliberate, but declined to conclude that excessive absences
were tantamount to leaving the job voluntarily.  With respect
to the burden of proof, the court stated merely that "[t]he
claimant has the burden of proving he is eligible under Sec.
213 and not disqualified under Sec. 214 [Code of Alabama
(1940)]."  Jaco, 337 So. 2d at 376-77.
1080880
13
The decision in Jaco cited only a single case regarding
the burden of proof: Department of Industrial Relations v.
Thomas, 55 Ala. App. 712, 318 So. 2d 739 (1975).  Thomas
concerned only the issue of eligibility; the references in
that opinion to the burden of proof as to disqualification
must be considered  dicta.  In Thomas, the circuit court found
that the claimant was eligible for unemployment-compensation
benefits and that she was not disqualified.  On appeal, the
Court of Civil Appeals stated that the claimant has the burden
of proving both eligibility for benefits and lack of
disqualification, but it reversed the circuit court's judgment
based only on lack of eligibility.  Significantly, the only
authority cited by the Court of Civil Appeals in Thomas was
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of
Industrial Relations, 42 Ala. App. 351, 165 So. 2d 128 (1964),
an eligibility case that did not squarely address the burden
of proof and that involved a statutory provision specifically
addressing maternity leave. 
In summary, the decisions in Smitherman, Hepp, Jaco, and
the other Alabama cases cited by Penske do not provide an
adequate legal analysis of why the burden of proof in
1080880
14
unemployment-compensation cases should be allocated as those
cases suggest.  Such discussion as is provided by those cases
suffers in some instances from being dicta.  Further, those
cases do not address, or even acknowledge, any distinctions as
to 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
eligibility, 
disqualifying
circumstances, and justifications or excuses for what would
otherwise be disqualifying circumstances.
III.  A Contrary Line of Alabama Cases
In addition to the above-described shortcomings, the
cases discussed in Part II fail to discuss -- and are
inconsistent with -– a different line of Alabama cases.  This
other line of cases places on the employer the burden of proof
as to whether an employee is disqualified from receiving
unemployment-compensation benefits under s 25-4-78(1) because
the claimant's unemployment "is directly due to a labor
dispute."  This was true for example in United States Steel
Corp. v. Wood, 40 Ala. App. 431, 433, 114 So. 2d 533, 535
(1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 Ala. 5, 114 So. 2d 551
1080880
In Wood, the Court of Appeals held that the claimants
8
were not disqualified under § 25-4-78(1) because their local
union was not directly involved in the strike.  This Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals based on its
interpretation of the statute as to the scope of labor
disputes within the meaning of the statute.   This Court's
opinion did not address the burden of proof.
15
(1959),  in which the Court of Appeals premised its discussion
8
as follows:
"[W]e take it that Wood met the burden of showing
himself eligible for each week for which he has
filed 
a 
claim 
(see 
Department 
of 
Industrial
Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36 So. 2d 496
[(1948)]), and that the burden of persuasion has
shifted 
to 
his 
employer 
or 
the 
Director 
of
Industrial Relations (as trustee of the Unemployment
Compensation Fund) to show he is disqualified, if he
is 
to 
be 
denied 
benefits 
because 
of 
a
disqualification."
(Emphasis added.)  See also United States Steel Corp. v.
Glasgow, 40 Ala. App. 424, 427, 114 So. 2d 565, 567 (1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 269 Ala. 8, 114 So. 2d 567 (1959)
("[T]he claimant is required to show himself eligible.  Under
§ 214, subd. A, [Code of Alabama (1940),] the burden falls on
either the Director of Industrial Relations, as trustee, or
the employer with an adverse interest to show that an eligible
claimant is disqualified.").
1080880
16
In Ex parte Flowers, 435 So. 2d 76, 78 (Ala. 1983), this
Court held, consistent with the holding in Wood, as follows in
a case addressing disqualification under § 25-4-78(1):
"Also relevant, is the rule in Holmes v. Cook, 45
Ala. App. 688, 236 So. 2d 352 (1970), that the
'provisions of disqualification from benefits [in
the Unemployment Act] should be narrowly construed.'
A further guideline for our consideration of these
claims is the procedural rule which provides that
the 
employer 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
any
disqualification 
under 
[§ 
25-4-78(1)] 
of 
the
Unemployment Compensation Act. See United States
Steel Corp. v. Glasgow, 40 Ala. App. 424, 114 So. 2d
565 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. United
States Steel Corp. v. Curry, 269 Ala. 8, 114 So. 2d
532 (1959)."
435 So. 2d at 78 (emphasis added).  See also Hilley v. General
Motors Corp., 800 So. 2d 167, 169 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ("The
employer has the burden of proving any disqualification under
section § 25-4-78(1)." (citing Flowers)).
The parties do not identify, and we have not located, any
cases attempting to reconcile the Smitherman/Tomlinson line of
cases and the Wood/Flowers line of cases, or to make a
principled distinction among disqualifications under the
various subsections of § 25-4-78.
1080880
See, e.g., 81A C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare
9
§ 482 (2004) ("Under a statute which disqualifies a claimant
for benefits if he or she has been discharged for job-related
misconduct, the employer has to prove misconduct by a
preponderance of the evidence."); Defense Against a Prima
Facie 
Case 
§ 
5:11 
(Rev. 
ed.) 
("Misconduct, 
as 
a
disqualification, is to be narrowly construed, and the
employer has the burden of proof."); Bean v. Montana Bd. of
Labor Appeals, 290 Mont. 496, ___, 965 P.2d 256, 260-61
(1998); Jamal v. Thurmond, 263 Ga. App. 320, 321, 587 S.E.2d
809, 811 (2003) ("Disqualification is an exception to the
statutory scheme for unemployment benefits and the employer
must 
show 
by 
a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence 
that
disqualification is appropriate."); Clark County School Dist.
v. Bundley, 122 Nev. 1440, 1447-48, 148 P.3d 750, 755-56
(2006); and Brown Hotel Co. v. Edwards  365 S.W.2d 299, 301
(Ky. 1962).
Rogers cites cases from 44 other states that appear to
place on the employer the burden of proving misconduct
justifying disqualification.  Penske does not contend that any
of the cases cited by Rogers do not support Rogers's
contention.  It does not address the law of other states
except to note that, although decisions from other states may
be persuasive authority, they are not binding.  Penske also
asks this Court to disregard the law of other states "since
Alabama law has already settled the issue raised by Rogers
...."  Penske's brief, at 22. 
17
IV.  Alabama's Position on the Burden of Proof Is
Contrary to That of Other States That Have Considered the
Issue
Alabama's 
position 
on 
the 
burden 
of 
proof 
for
disqualification is contrary to the approach adopted by most
or all the other states that have addressed the specific
issue.   See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Industrial
9
Comm'n of the State of Colorado, 756 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1988)
1080880
See also Peery v. Rutledge, 177 W. Va. 548, 552, 355
10
S.E.2d 41, 45 (1987) ("If the former employer establishes that
the unemployment compensation claimant has violated an
ordinarily reasonable job assignment directive or work rule,
the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the
claimant to show that he or she was justified, or at least
exercised good faith, in not complying with the directive or
rule.");  In re Therrien, 132 Vt. 535, 537, 325 A.2d 357, 358
(1974) ("The claimant has the burden of showing his initial
eligibility for benefits.  That eligibility is not in issue
here, and once established, the employer has the burden of
showing 
the 
claimed 
disqualification 
for 
misconduct."
(citation omitted.)).
18
(applying 
the 
following 
burden-shifting 
scheme 
to
unemployment-compensation cases:  the burden is initially on
the claimant to establish a prima facie case of eligibility;
the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the
claimant was discharged for misconduct; the claimant may
present evidence to justify the acts that led to the
discharge).10
Many of these cases recognize that placing the burden of
proving a disqualification on the employer has the advantage
of imposing the burden of proof on the party that generally
has better access to the relevant evidence.  The employer
obviously is the party with the best knowledge of the reasons
for the claimant's discharge from employment, and it has equal
or better knowledge of any policies and rules allegedly
1080880
19
violated, as well as information relevant to whether the
asserted basis for the discharge was equitably applied.  As
the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Parker v. St. Maries
Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 419, 614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980):
"The employer is in a unique position to know the
reasons for his employee's discharge and access to
the facts relating to that discharge will be more
readily obtained by the employer than the employee.
Further, as a practical matter, the task of proving
the existence of employee misconduct will be much
easier for the employer than would be the employee's
task of disproving a charge of employee misconduct.
The employee may not always know what the employer's
reasons were for discharging him." 
See also Bean v. Montana Bd. of Labor Appeals, 290 Mont. 496,
___, 965 P.2d 256, 260-61 (1998) (quoting Parker to the same
effect); Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Bundley, 122 Nev. 1440,
1447-48, 148 P.3d 750, 755-56 (2006) ("[The] employer is in
the '"unique position to know the reasons for [the] employee's
discharge."'  Further '"access to the facts relating to that
discharge will be more readily obtained by the employer than
the employee."' The practical result is that the employer can
usually more easily prove employee misconduct than the
1080880
In the present case, there does not appear to be any
11
dispute that theft, if proven, would constitute misconduct
that would disqualify Rogers from receiving unemployment-
compensation benefits.  See Scott v. Scott Paper Co., 280 Ala.
486, 195 So. 2d 540 (1967) (circuit court did not err in
determining that employee was disqualified for theft of
company property; dishonest act need not be criminal to
warrant disqualification).  In many other cases, however, the
employer's reasons for discharging the employee may be mixed,
or the employer may not have clearly identified the conduct
that led to the termination.  In such a case, the employee
could be at a serious disadvantage in attempting to prove that
he or she did not violate any of the (possibly numerous) rules
that might be at issue or to prove that he or she did not
commit some vaguely defined bad act.
20
employee can disprove the employer's assertion that she
engaged in such misconduct." (footnotes omitted)).11
V.  The Beneficent Policy Underlying the Unemployment-
Compensation Act and Other Considerations
Imposing on the employer the burden of proof as to a
claimant's disqualification for unemployment-compensation
purposes is consistent with the general principle that the
proponent of an affirmative defense or similar position  has
the burden of proof as to that position as well as with the
disinclination of the law to place upon a party the burden to
prove a negative.  This Court stated in Ex parte Ramsay, 829
So. 2d 146, 152 (Ala. 2002):
"The proponent of an affirmative defense 'bears the
burden of proving the essential elements of his
affirmative defenses.' Ex parte Blue Cross & Blue
1080880
21
Shield of Alabama, 773 So. 2d 475, 478 (Ala. 2000);
and see Ely v. Pace, 139 Ala. 293, 298, 35 So. 877,
878 (1904) ('Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit.')."
The Sixth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary explained the
parenthetical maxim as follows:
"Ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum
per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit
....  The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon
him who denies; since, by the nature of things, he
who denies a fact cannot produce any proof."
Black's Law Dictionary 516 (6th ed. 1990). 
Finally, to the extent that, after considering all the
foregoing, any uncertainty remains as to who should bear the
burden of proving the existence of a disqualifying condition,
we note that the "Unemployment Compensation Act is in the
nature of insurance for the unemployed worker and is intended
to be a remedial measure for his benefit [and] should be
liberally construed in favor of the claimant and the
disqualifications 
from 
benefits 
should 
be 
construed 
narrowly."
Jaco, 337 So. 2d at 376.  See also Ex parte Sargent, 634 So.
2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. 1993) ("Disqualification provisions in the
Unemployment 
Compensation 
Act 
should 
be 
narrowly 
construed.");
Holmes v. Cook, 45 Ala. App. 688, 236 So. 2d 352 (1970); and
Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 258, 296 N.W. 636,
1080880
Alabama's unemployment-compensation act was modeled on
12
the 
Wisconsin 
statute, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
court's
interpretation is persuasive authority.  Ex parte Williams,
646 So. 2d 22, 26-27 (Ala. 1994).
22
640 (1941) (mere mistakes, errors of judgment, etc., do not
constitute "misconduct"; otherwise, the benefit of the
unemployment-compensation statute would be defeated as to many
of "the less capable industrial workers, who are in the lower
income brackets and for whose benefit the act was largely
designed ....").12
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit
court and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in imposing on the
claimant the burden of disproving his disqualification from
unemployment compensation on the basis of misconduct.  We hold
that the employer has the burden of proving that the employee
is disqualified for reasons of misconduct, and we overrule
prior cases, including Hepp, Smitherman, and Jaco, to the
extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
1080880
23
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.