Title: Jimetta Claypool v. Mark R. Levin, M.D.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002457
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2457 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Jimetta Claypool, Marvin Claypool and  
 
 
 
Jennifer Claypool,   
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,  
 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
Mark R. Levin, M.D. and Wisconsin Patients  
 
 
 
Compensation Fund,   
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners,  
 
 
 
AA Insurance Company and Columbia  
 
 
 
Hospital,   
 
 
 
 
Defendants,  
 
 
 
Russell Goldstein and Wisconsin Lawyers  
 
 
 
Mutual Insurance Company,   
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants.  
  
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  195 Wis. 2d 535, 536 N.W.2d 206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 9, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 29, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE:  
WILLIAM D. GARDNER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
Geske, J., joins 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiffs-petitioners there were briefs by 
Ted M. Warshafsky, Edward E.Robinson and Warshafsky, Rotter, 
Tarnoff, Reinhardt & Bloch, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by 
Ted M. Warshafsky. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there were briefs 
by Michael J. Pfau, Susan R. Tyndall and Hinshaw & Culbertson, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Susan R. Tyndall. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by Terry E. 
Johnson, Peter F. Mullaney and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.  94-2457 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Jimetta Claypool, Marvin Claypool and 
Jennifer Claypool, 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Mark R. Levin, M.D. and Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-
Petitioners, 
 
AA Insurance Company and Columbia Hospital, 
 
 
 
Defendants, 
 
Russell Goldstein and Wisconsin Lawyers 
Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
May 9, 1997 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on 
petitions for review filed by Mrs. Jimetta Claypool, Mr. Marvin 
Claypool, 
and 
Ms. 
Jennifer 
Claypool 
(collectively 
the 
"Claypools"), and Dr. Mark Levin, M.D.  The petitioners seek 
review of a published court of appeals decision, Claypool v. 
Levin, 195 Wis. 2d 535, 536 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1995), that 
reversed a circuit court judgment.  The Circuit Court for 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
2
Milwaukee County, William D. Gardner, Judge, granted summary 
judgment to Dr. Levin for the Claypools' medical malpractice 
claim against him on the grounds that the statute of limitations 
had expired.  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
circuit court and remanded for further proceedings.  We reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The issue on review is when, pursuant to the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) 
(1993-94),1 Mrs. Claypool discovered or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered her injury.  We hold 
                     
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references are 
to the 1993-94 volume.  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1) provides in part: 
 
(1) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an action 
to recover damages for injury arising from any treatment 
or operation performed by, or from any omission by, a 
person who is a health care provider, regardless of the 
theory on which the action is based, shall be commenced 
within the later of: 
 
 
(a) Three years from the date of injury, or 
 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years 
from the date of the act or omission. 
  
(2) If a health care provider conceals from a patient a 
prior act or omission of the provider which has resulted 
in injury to the patient, an action shall be commenced 
within one year from the date the patient discovered the 
concealment or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the concealment or within the 
time limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is 
later. 
 
(3) When a foreign object which has no therapeutic or 
diagnostic purpose or effect has been left in a 
patient's body, an action shall be commenced within one 
year after the patient is aware or, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have been aware of the presence 
of the object or within the time limitation provided by 
sub. (1), whichever is later. 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
3
that for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) Mrs. Claypool did 
discover or in the exercise of reasonable diligence she should 
have discovered her injury at some point in March or early April 
of 1989.  We also hold that once an injury is discovered it 
cannot be "undiscovered."  Thus, the Claypools' claims against 
Dr. Levin are barred by the statute of limitations. 
¶3 
The material facts necessary for our determination are 
undisputed.  On March 6, 1989, Mrs. Claypool was hospitalized on 
an emergency basis at Columbia Hospital.  At the time she was 
hospitalized, she was very ill and her symptoms included vision 
problems.  Between March 6 and April 6, 1989, she was treated by 
the defendant, Dr. Levin, an ophthalmologist.  While Mrs. 
Claypool was at the hospital, Dr. Levin treated her eyes with 
antibiotics and an intravitreous injection.  During this period, 
her vision deteriorated until she became permanently blind on 
March 8, 1989. 
¶4 
On April 10, 1989, four days after her release from 
the hospital, Mrs. Claypool and her husband retained Attorney 
Russell Goldstein to investigate whether her blindness was 
attributable 
to 
negligence 
of 
the 
health 
care 
providers 
including Dr. Levin. Goldstein had the Claypools sign a retainer 
agreement and medical authorizations.  Goldstein subsequently 
obtained several pages of Mrs. Claypool's hospital records, but 
did not have them reviewed by an expert. 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
4
¶5 
Although Goldstein failed to contact the Claypools, 
Mr. Claypool called him regarding the status of the case on two 
or three occasions between April 10, 1989, and July of 1992.  On 
each occasion Goldstein told Mr. Claypool that he was "checking 
out" the case.  Sometime prior to 1992, while Mr. Claypool was 
on jury duty at the Milwaukee County Courthouse, he encountered 
Goldstein and inquired about the status of the case.  Goldstein 
advised Mr. Claypool that the doctor with whom he had consulted 
had concluded that there was no cause of action.  Mr. Claypool 
subsequently relayed this information to his wife. 
¶6 
Sometime more than three years after Mrs. Claypool was 
treated by Dr. Levin, Mr. Claypool was asked by a co-worker 
about his wife's condition.  When Mr. Claypool responded that 
she had lost her vision, the co-worker recommended that the 
Claypools contact the Warshafsky law firm.  In the summer of 
1993, Mrs. Claypool contacted attorneys from the Warshafsky law 
firm who subsequently advised her that she did have a viable 
medical malpractice claim against Dr. Levin. 
¶7 
Four and one half years after Dr. Levin's last 
treatment of Mrs. Claypool, on October 14, 1993, the Claypools, 
now represented by the Warshafsky law firm, commenced this 
lawsuit alleging that both Dr. Levin and Goldstein were 
negligent.  The plaintiffs sought recovery from Dr. Levin if the 
statute of limitations had not expired, or, in the alternative, 
from Goldstein if the statute of limitations had expired. 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
5
¶8 
Dr. Levin subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting that the Claypools' claims were time barred 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1).  Goldstein opposed the motion 
asserting that any failure on his part to exercise due diligence 
should not be imputed to the Claypools.  In granting Dr. Levin's 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded: 
 
The only issue before this Court involves the discovery 
rule.  It is Goldstein's position that discovery did not 
occur until the attorneys subsequently retained by the 
Claypools advised the Claypools that they had a viable 
claim for medical negligence.  This position flies in 
the face of reason, common sense and the law. This court 
concludes that the undisputed facts can lead to but one 
reasonable inference, that is, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence plaintiffs should have discovered 
the probable cause of the injury within a reasonably 
short period of time after the injury.  The injury was 
immediately known and the potentially responsible health 
care providers were known almost immediately after the 
injury.  Counsel was retained within weeks of the injury 
to conduct an investigation regarding the potential 
cause or causes of the injury.   
¶9 
Goldstein appealed and the court of appeals reversed. 
 In addressing the conclusion of the circuit court, the court of 
appeals stated: 
 
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that "the only 
reasonable inference" is that the Claypools "possessed 
sufficient information within a relatively short span 
of time from the injury to form an objective belief 
that Dr. Levin's treatment was the cause of the 
injury" was an accurate expression of the Claypools' 
understanding at the point at which they presented 
their case to Goldstein.  That, however, does not 
logically end the analysis because the Claypools' 
"discovery" as a matter of law was not necessarily 
locked in time by their initial belief given the 
subsequent events.  To conclude otherwise would be to 
ignore the "ordinary person" standard of Borello and 
require the claimant "to take extraordinary steps to 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
6
secure a 
full medical 
analysis" 
beyond 
whatever 
counsel has obtained. 
Claypool, 195 Wis. 2d at 551-52, citing Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 
130 Wis. 2d 397, 414, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).  The court of 
appeals went on to hold that although Dr. Levin was not entitled 
to summary judgment, there was not sufficient evidence to 
conclude that, as a matter of law, the Claypools did not 
discover their cause of action until they received advice from 
the Warshafsky law firm. 
¶10 This 
court 
must 
now 
determine 
whether 
it 
was 
appropriate for the trial court to grant Dr. Levin's motion for 
summary judgment.  We review a grant of summary judgment by 
applying 
the 
same 
standards 
used 
by 
the 
circuit 
court.  
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 630, 547 
N.W.2d 602 (1996).  These standards are set forth in Wis. Stat. 
802.08(2).  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Linville v. City of Janesville, 
184 Wis. 2d 705, 714, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  Whether Dr. Levin 
is entitled to summary judgment depends upon whether the 
Claypools' claims against Dr. Levin are barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
¶11 The 
relevant 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1), provides that claims against health care 
providers must be brought within three years from the date of 
injury or within one year from the date that the injury was 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
7
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence the injury 
should have been discovered.  The summons and complaint in this 
case were filed on October 14, 1993.  As Dr. Levin's treatment 
of Mrs. Claypool occurred in March and April of 1989, the 
Claypools' claim was not brought within three years of the date 
of injury.  Thus, whether the claims against Dr. Levin are 
barred by the statute of limitations depends upon whether Mrs. 
Claypool either discovered or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury at sometime before 
October 14, 1992. 
¶12 We must first determine what constituted discovery for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
 § 893.55(1). 
 
In 
making 
this 
determination, we must look both at the language of the statute 
and at relevant case law.  Goldstein argues that this court's 
decision in Borello and the definition of the discovery rule 
detailed in that case control the outcome of the present case.  
To adequately address this contention, we must consider the 
history of the discovery rule in Wisconsin. 
¶13 Prior to 1983, this court consistently declined to 
adopt the discovery rule on the basis that such a change in the 
law should be enacted by the legislature.  See Peterson v. 
Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973); Olson v. St. Croix 
Valley Memorial Hospital, 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972); 
Holifield v. Secto Industries, Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 
177 (1969); McCluskey v. Thranow, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
8
(1966); Reistad v. Manz, 11 Wis. 2d 155, 105 N.W.2d 324 (1960). 
 The facts of McCluskey are representative of those pre-
discovery rule cases. 
¶14 In McCluskey, the defendant doctor performed surgery 
on the plaintiff on May 1, 1956.  McCluskey, 31 Wis. 2d at 248. 
 An x-ray was taken on May 4, 1956, by another doctor who 
prepared a report for the defendant doctor.  Id.  This report 
made no mention of foreign objects in the abdominal area.  Id.  
Additionally, the plaintiff apparently felt no abnormal pain 
after the operation; however, on June 13, 1962, when the 
defendant doctor saw for the first time the x-ray taken on May 
4, 1956, it revealed that a hemostat was in the plaintiff's 
body.  Id.  The defendant doctor shortly thereafter informed the 
plaintiff of the situation and on January 6, 1965, the 
instrument was removed.  Id.  The plaintiff commenced the action 
against the defendant doctor on April 28, 1965, alleging, among 
other things, that the defendant doctor was negligent in failing 
to remove the hemostat.  Id.  The applicable statute of 
limitations was three years.  Id. at 249-50.  Despite the 
meritorious claim presented to this court in McCluskey, this 
court concluded that such a change in the statute of limitations 
should be made, not by the court, but by the legislature.2  Id. 
at 250-51. 
                     
2  In another pre-discovery rule case, this court strongly urged 
the legislature to amend the statute of limitations: 
 
We conclude that this is a matter peculiarly for 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
9
¶15 In 1979, the legislature responded by adopting a 
discovery rule for medical malpractice claims.  Wis. Stat. § 
893.55(1)(b).  It is the interpretation of this statutory 
discovery rule that is at issue in this case.  The statute 
provides: 
 
(1) . . . an action to recover damages for injury . . . 
shall be commenced within . . . : 
 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years 
from the date of the act or omission. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1).3  However, this discovery rule did not 
apply to non-medical malpractice tort claims. 
                                                                  
legislative determination.  Because of the numerous 
cases in which the present three-year requirement for 
commencing an action by a party who is the victim of 
medical malpractice is too short, we strongly recommend 
to the legislature that the basic three-year statute for 
negligence actions due to medical malpractice be 
amended. 
Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973). 
3  This law was part of a comprehensive statute of limitations 
revision law that was conceived by the Judicial Council Committee. 
 The drafting record for this law reveals that the medical 
malpractice section was designed to address the outcome of "Olson 
v. St. Croix."  See Olson, 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972). 
In Olson, the plaintiff alleged that she was given the wrong type 
of blood in a blood transfusion that she received in 1962. Olson, 
55 Wis. 2d at 630.  On December 1, 1966, the plaintiff gave birth 
to a child that died seven hours later.  Id.  On December 9, 1969, 
she delivered a stillborn child.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that 
the deaths of the children were the result of negligence by the 
hospital and that she did not discover that the wrong type of 
blood had been given to her until the still birth of the second 
child.  Id. at 630-31.  The relevant statute of limitations 
provided that the action must be brought within three years of the 
injury.  Id. at 631.  This court first concluded that the alleged 
injury occurred at the time of the blood transfusion.  Id. at 632-
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
10
¶16 Subsequent to the legislature's adoption of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1), this court recognized a common law discovery rule 
for those tort cases not already covered by the statutory 
discovery rule.  This common law discovery rule was first 
recognized by this court in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Inc., 113 Wis. 
2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  In Hansen, the plaintiff 
commenced a suit on June 24, 1981, against the manufacturer of a 
"Dalkon Shield" intrauterine device that was inserted into her 
uterus on May 28, 1974.  Id. at 553.  In May of 1978, the 
plaintiff began to suffer symptoms and sought the advice of a 
doctor on June 13, 1978.  Id.  The doctor failed to accurately 
diagnose the problem.  Id.  On June 26, 1978, the plaintiff 
sought the advice of another doctor who correctly diagnosed the 
problem.  Id. at 553.  The applicable statute of limitations in 
Hansen provided that the action had to be brought within three 
years of the date on which the action had accrued.  Id. at 553-
54.   
¶17 The Hansen court recognized that this court had 
previously held that a cause of action accrues on the date of 
injury.  Id. at 554.  The court then noted that "using the date 
of injury as the benchmark for accrual of claims can yield 
                                                                  
33.  The court then declined to adopt the discovery and thus held 
that suit was barred by the statute of limitations.  Id. at 633-
34.  In so holding this court stated: "While, as we pointed out in 
McCluskey, there may be merit to the discovery rule, the state of 
the facts presented herein is not conducive to modification of the 
present holdings of this court." Id. at 633. 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
11
extremely harsh results."  Id. at 556.  The court also 
acknowledged that the legislature had adopted a discovery rule 
for medical malpractice cases, Wis. Stat. § 893.55, but noted 
that a general discovery rule did not exist: 
 
The legislature has not taken similar ameliorative 
action for tort claims outside the realm of medical 
malpractice.  We believe the time has come to consider 
adoption of the discovery rule for such claims. 
 
Id. at 557.  The Hansen court also made clear that the 
discovery rule it was adopting was distinct from the one 
that the legislature had already adopted in Wis. Stat. § 
893.55: 
In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness, we 
adopt the discovery rule for all tort actions other than 
those already governed by a legislatively created 
discovery rule.  Such tort claims shall accrue on the 
date the injury is discovered or with reasonable 
diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs first. 
All cases holding that tort claims accrue at the time of 
the negligent act or injury are hereby overruled. 
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
¶18 In reaching the decision to adopt a common law 
discovery rule in Hansen, this court relied heavily on public 
policy 
considerations. 
 
The 
Hansen 
court 
identified 
two 
conflicting public policies associated with the discovery rule: 
"(1) That of discouraging stale and fraudulent claims, and (2) 
that of allowing meritorious claimants, who have been as 
diligent as possible, an opportunity to seek redress for 
injuries sustained."  Id. at 558, quoting Peterson v. Roloff, 57 
Wis. 2d 1, 6, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973).  In deciding that the 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
12
discovery rule did not severely infringe on the public policy of 
discouraging stale and fraudulent claims, this court stated: 
 
Although the discovery rule will allow actions to be 
filed more than three years after the date of injury, it 
will not leave defendants unprotected from stale and 
fraudulent claims.  Under the rule a claim accrues when 
the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been 
discovered.  Therefore, it does not benefit claimants 
who negligently or purposefully fail to file a timely 
claim.  
Id. at 559.  This passage illustrates that the court was 
attempting to strike a balance between the conflicting public 
policies rather than completely subordinating the public policy 
of discouraging stale and fraudulent claims.  The court 
explained the significance of the public policy of allowing 
meritorious claims as follows: 
 
It is manifestly unjust for the statute of limitations 
to begin to run before a claimant could reasonably 
become aware of the injury.  Although theoretically a 
claim is capable of enforcement as soon as the injury 
occurs, as a practical matter a claim cannot be enforced 
until the claimant discovers the injury and the 
accompanying right of action.  In some cases the claim 
will be time barred before the harm is or could be 
discovered, making it impossible for the injured party 
to seek redress.  Under these circumstances the statute 
of limitations works to punish victims who are blameless 
for the delay and to benefit wrongdoers by barring 
meritorious claims.  In short, we conclude that the 
injustice of barring meritorious claims before the 
claimant knows of the injury outweighs the threat of 
stale or fraudulent actions. 
Id. From this language it is apparent that the common law 
discovery 
rule 
was 
intended 
to 
introduce 
practical 
considerations into the operation of the relevant statutes of 
limitation.   
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
13
¶19 The application of the Hansen common law discovery 
rule was further explored by this court in Borello.  In that 
case, the plaintiff had a furnace installed in her home in 
December of 1977.  Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 400.  In a December 
19, 1977, letter to the furnace company, Mrs. Borello complained 
of physical symptoms.  In describing the letter, the Borello 
court stated, "the most that can be gleaned from the 1977 letter 
is that she was not able to attribute her symptoms to the old 
furnace, the new one, or to any furnace but perhaps instead to 
some other cause."  Id. at 401.  During this same period, the 
plaintiff sought medical advice and was told by various 
physicians that her ailments were not caused by the furnace.  
Id. On February 5, 1979, the plaintiff entered the hospital 
where she was misdiagnosed with a systemic viral infection. Id. 
at 402.  When she returned home from the hospital on February 
20, 1979, the flat surfaces of her home were covered with a red 
dust.  Id. On March 12, 1979, the plaintiff consulted with 
another physician who wrongly determined that her symptoms were 
not related to the furnace.  Id.  Finally, on October 30, 1979, 
a different physician concluded that the furnace was the source 
of the plaintiff's ailments which were identified as metal fume 
fever.  Id. at 402-03. 
¶20 On November 25, 1981, the plaintiff commenced an 
action against the furnace company.  Id.  The statute of 
limitations applicable to the plaintiff's claims was the same 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
14
three-year statute of limitations that the court considered in 
Hansen. Applying the common law discovery rule adopted in 
Hansen, this court held that the cause of action did not accrue 
until she was diagnosed with metal fume fever on October 30, 
1979.  Id. at 414-15.  The Borello court stated:  
 
[T]he statute of limitations did not commence to run 
against [the plaintiff's] claim until she had a basis 
for objectively concluding that metal fume fever from a 
furnace 
installed 
by 
the 
U.S. 
Oil 
Company 
and 
manufactured by The Williamson Company was probably the 
cause of her symptoms. . . . the statute began to run 
when the claimant knew or ought to have known the nature 
of the disability and its relation to the defendant's 
conduct. 
 
Id.   
¶21 Goldstein argues that this case is governed by the 
holding in Borello.  Goldstein further asserts that Mrs. 
Claypool, like the plaintiff in Borello, did not have an 
objective basis for concluding that Dr. Levin was responsible 
for Mrs. Claypool's blindness until she consulted the Warshafsky 
law firm.  However, in presenting this argument, Goldstein fails 
to consider the importance of Clark v. Erdmann, 161 Wis. 2d 428, 
468 N.W.2d 18 (1991), in which this court directly considered 
the relevance of the Borello holding in determining when 
discovery occurs pursuant to Wis. Stat. 893.55(1).4 
                     
4  In relying on Borello, Attorney Goldstein also fails to 
consider this court's most recent description of the common law 
discovery rule.  Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 
2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  In that case, the plaintiff 
brought suit for damages stemming from alleged sexual assault by a 
priest that had occurred in the 1950s.  Id. at 307.  Although the 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
15
¶22 In Clark, the plaintiff argued that "under [Borello] 
no 
'discovery' 
[had 
taken] 
place 
for 
purposes 
of 
sec. 
893.55(1)(b), and the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run, until July 1988, after [the] action was commenced, when she 
[claimed] first to have received 'objective verification' of her 
injury and its cause . . ."  Id. at 444-45.  The defendant, Dr. 
Erdmann, argued that based on Fritz v. McGrath, 146 Wis. 2d 681, 
431 N.W.2d 751 (Ct. App. 1988), and Kempfer v. Evers, 133 Wis. 
2d 415, 395 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1986), there was a reasonable 
likelihood that the plaintiff had an objective belief of the 
                                                                  
plaintiff did not commence her action until November 12, 1992, she 
argued "that her claim [was] saved by the discovery rule because 
'she [had] suppressed and [was] unable to perceive the existence, 
nature or cause of her psychological and emotional injuries until 
approximately April, 1992.'"  Id. at 315.  This court rejected her 
argument: 
 
We conclude that Ms. Pritzlaff's claim does not qualify 
for the tolling of the statute of limitations provided 
by the discovery rule because Ms. Pritzlaff knew of all 
of the elements of her underlying claim against Fr. 
Donovan, at the latest, by the time the relationship 
between the two ended. 
Id.  The Pritzlaff court further stated: 
 
[T]he discovery rule is so named because it tolls the 
statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or 
with reasonable diligence should have discovered that he 
or she has suffered actual damage due to wrongs 
committed by a particular, identified person.  Until 
that time, plaintiffs are not capable of enforcing their 
claims either because they do not know that they have 
been wronged or because they do not know the identity of 
the person who has wronged them.  Accordingly, 
"'[d]iscovery' in most cases is implicit in the 
circumstances immediately surrounding the original 
misconduct."  
(citations omitted) Id. at 315-16.   
 
 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
16
injury and its cause such that plaintiff discovered her injury 
no later than 1985.  Clark, 161 Wis. 2d at 447.  This court 
agreed with Dr. Erdmann: 
 
While Borello is applicable to medical malpractice 
actions, it should not be read to say, as Clark asserts, 
that an "objective belief" sufficient to constitute 
"discovery" 
requires 
a 
plaintiff 
"officially" 
be 
informed by an expert witness of her injury, its cause 
or the relation between the injury and its cause.   
 
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).  Thus, in Clark, this court made 
clear that the same analysis should be used to determine when 
discovery occurs under the statutory discovery rule contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) and the common law discovery rule 
established in Hansen.  However, the Clark court also clarified 
how Borello should be read and thus how such a determination 
should be made.   
¶23 This court stated in Clark that discovery occurs when 
the "plaintiff has information that would constitute the basis 
for an objective belief of her injury and its cause . . . ."  
Id. In other words, discovery occurs when a potential plaintiff 
has information that would give a reasonable person notice of 
her injury and its cause.  This does not mean that if there is 
more than one reasonable cause of the injury that discovery 
cannot occur.  This standard also does not require that the 
potential plaintiff know with certainty the cause of her injury. 
  
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
17
¶24 The Clark decision also suggests that the question of 
when Mrs. Claypool's discovery should have occurred does not 
hinge on the actions of her attorney in evaluating the case: 
 
We thus approve of the language of the court of appeals 
in Fritz and Kempfer.  While an unsubstantiated lay 
belief is not sufficient for discovery to occur, the 
existence of a reasonable likelihood for an objective 
belief as to an injury and its cause does not require 
any sort of formalistic approach as is suggested by 
Clark.  If a plaintiff has information that would 
constitute the basis for an objective belief of her 
injury and its cause, she has discovered her injury and 
its cause.  It does not matter whether her objective 
belief resulted from information "officially" obtained 
from an expert witness.  Nor, as Fritz and Kempfer 
suggest, does it necessarily always matter whether the 
objective belief resulted at all from information 
obtained from any "expert" person. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The language of Kempfer approved of in 
Clark further indicates that a valid legal opinion is not 
necessary for discovery to occur: 
 
Accrual is based on the person's knowledge that he or 
she has been injured.  [Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 539].  It 
is true that when the source of injury is unclear and 
the injured person has exercised reasonable diligence, 
the time of accrual may be extended until a causal 
connection can be established. [citing Borello, 130 Wis. 
2d at 411].  However, neither Hansen nor Borello provide 
any authority for the proposition that the cause of 
action cannot accrue until the injured person is advised 
of his or her legal rights. 
 
Id. at 447, citing Kempfer, 133 Wis. 2d at 419.  Thus, 
based on Clark and Kempfer, discovery occurs when the potential 
plaintiff has information that would give a reasonable person 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
18
notice of her injury and its cause regardless of whether she has 
been given a misleading legal opinion.  
¶25 In addition, once a person either discovers the injury 
or 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence 
should 
have 
discovered the injury, nothing, including a misleading legal 
opinion, can cause the injury to become "undiscovered."  The 
court of appeals stated that “the Claypools' ‘discovery’ as a 
matter of law was not necessarily locked in time by their 
initial belief given the subsequent events.” Claypool, 195 Wis. 
2d at 551.  We explicitly reject this conclusion as contrary to 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1). 
 
¶26 A reading of Wis. Stat.  § 893.55(1) proves that once 
discovery occurs, it is, in fact, locked in time.  Sections 
893.55(1) and 893.55(1)(a) essentially provide that an action to 
recover damages for certain types of injuries must be commenced 
within one year from the date the injury was discovered or in 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence 
should 
have 
been 
discovered.  These sections do not provide that this one year 
period is tolled if the injury is "undiscovered."  To hold 
otherwise ignores the plain meaning of the statute. 
¶27 In this case, the record does not provide us with 
sufficient facts to conclude as a matter of law that discovery 
did occur or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
occurred on a particular day.  Without a more complete record, 
we are unable to answer certain questions.  What was the state 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
19
of Mrs. Claypool's vision when she entered the hospital?  Did 
Dr. Levin give her a prognosis?  Did any other conversations 
take place between Mrs. Claypool and Dr. Levin?  We are able to 
glean from the record that Mrs. Claypool entered the hospital on 
March 6, 1989.  At the time she entered the hospital she was 
very ill and had been suffering problems with her vision.  She 
was treated by Dr. Levin from March 7 until April 6 when she was 
released from the hospital.  The treatment included Dr. Levin 
administering 
intravitreous 
injections 
or 
shots 
to 
Mrs. 
Claypool's eyes.  When she left the hospital, on April 6, she 
was permanently blind.  Just four days after her release from 
the hospital, on April 10, Mrs. Claypool and her husband 
retained attorney Goldstein to investigate whether her blindness 
was attributable to Dr. Levin.  We believe these facts are 
sufficient to establish that Mrs. Claypool discovered or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered her 
injury in March or early April of 1989. 
¶28 At some point in March or early April of 1989 Mrs. 
Claypool had information sufficient to give a reasonable person 
notice of her injury and its cause.  The fact that Goldstein 
told Mrs. Claypool that she did not have a claim can not defeat 
the fact that she had such an objective basis for knowledge of 
her injury and its cause.  If she did not in fact discover her 
injury in March or early April of 1989, then in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence she should have discovered her injury 
 
No. 94-2457 
 
 
 
 
20
during that period.  Accordingly, Mrs. Claypool did not bring 
her claim within one year from the date that in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence the injury should have been discovered or 
within three years from the date of injury.  Thus, her claim is 
barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1) and Dr. Levin is entitled to 
summary judgment. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
 
¶29 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting). 
This case is before us on review of a summary judgment. I 
dissent because I conclude that the record on Dr. Levin's motion 
for summary judgment shows that there is a genuine issue as to a 
material fact. Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.08 (1995-96). This is not 
a case in which the summary judgment record allows for but one 
reasonable conclusion such that a court can resolve the issue as 
a matter of law. I conclude, therefore, as did the court of 
appeals, 
that 
a 
jury 
must 
determine 
when 
the 
Claypools 
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, Mrs. Claypool's injury.  
¶30 This action was filed on October 14, 1993, roughly 
four and one-half years after the alleged negligent conduct of 
Dr. Levin. Dr. Levin treated Mrs. Claypool between March 6 and 
April 19, 1989. For the Claypools' claim to survive Dr. Levin's 
statute of limitations defense, the Claypools must show that 
they did not discover, nor in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should they have discovered, the cause of Mrs. 
Claypool's injury before October 14, 1992.  
¶31 The Claypools5 contend that they did not have reason to 
know of the cause of Mrs. Claypool's injury until an attorney 
opined in the summer of 1993 that they had a cause of action 
against Dr. Levin. It is uncontested that the Claypools filed 
this action within one year of that attorney's report and within 
                     
5 As the majority opinion makes clear, the Claypools allege, in 
the alternative, that their claim against Dr. Levin was timely, 
but it was Attorney Goldstein, with the most at stake, who 
opposed Dr. Levin's motion for summary judgment. 
 
No. 94-2457.ssa 
 
 
 
 
2
five years of the alleged negligent acts. Dr. Levin contends 
that the Claypools discovered or should have discovered the 
injury in April 1989, when they asked their first attorney to 
advise them whether they had a cause of action against Dr. 
Levin. 
¶32 The majority opinion concludes that the Claypools 
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, Mrs. Claypool's injury at some point in March 
or early April of 1989. Thus the majority opinion concludes that 
an action for malpractice was time-barred. 
¶33 I agree with the approach of the court of appeals 
which framed the inquiry as whether the Claypools exercised 
reasonable diligence to discover the cause of Mrs. Claypool's 
injury if they did not discover the cause until the summer of 
1993. See also Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co, 181 Wis. 2d 815, 819, 
512 N.W.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1994). Although a jury might find that 
the Claypools should have discovered the cause of the injury in 
March or early April 1989, I conclude that the summary judgment 
record demonstrates that a jury might reasonably find that the 
Claypools did not discover the cause of the injury until the 
summer of 1993 and that they exercised reasonable diligence in 
doing so. 
 
I. 
 
No. 94-2457.ssa 
 
 
 
 
3
¶34 I first address the law relating to the discovery 
rule. Under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) a plaintiff has one year 
to commence an action from the time that the plaintiff 
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, "not only the fact of injury but also that the 
injury was probably caused by the defendant's conduct." Borello 
v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). It 
is settled that whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable 
diligence to discover the cause of injury is ordinarily a fact 
issue for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., Goff v. Seldera, 202 
Wis. 2d 601, 613, 550 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1996). Only when the 
summary judgment record allows for but one reasonable conclusion 
about when a plaintiff discovered the injury and its cause may 
the court resolve the issue as a matter of law. Goff, 202 Wis. 
2d at 613 and n.8; see also Awve, 181 Wis. 2d at 823. 
¶35 I agree with the majority opinion that once discovered 
an 
injury 
cannot 
be 
"undiscovered." 
I 
do 
not, 
however, 
understand the court of appeals to have suggested otherwise. The 
court of appeals simply held that regardless of what the 
Claypools suspected or understood at the time they first 
contacted Attorney Goldstein, the Claypools may have exercised 
reasonable diligence in continuing to explore the cause of the 
injury given that they were advised by their attorney that they 
had no cause of action against Dr. Levin. Claypool v. Levin, 195 
Wis. 2d 535, 551, 536 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1995).  
 
No. 94-2457.ssa 
 
 
 
 
4
¶36 The court of appeals' phrase "not necessarily locked 
in time" could be understood to suggest that a plaintiff might 
"undiscover" what he or she had previously discovered. Yet, in 
context, it is evident that the court of appeals intended to 
restate the unremarkable proposition that the advice one 
receives from those to whom one entrusts the investigation of a 
possible cause of action is relevant to whether a subsequent 
delay in discovering the cause of the injury is an exercise of 
reasonable diligence. This point has long been recognized.  
¶37 In Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 403-04, the plaintiff 
"believed, suspected, or had a hunch" a short time after having 
a new furnace installed that the furnace was causing her 
physical distress and she promptly began to solicit professional 
advice. Nonetheless, because doctors and other professionals 
initially told her that her injury was not caused by the 
furnace, the court held that her cause of action against the 
furnace company did not accrue until she received a subsequent 
report from a doctor that the furnace indeed was the cause of 
her injury.  
¶38 Subsequent cases have not disturbed this holding of 
Borello. In Clark v. Erdmann, 161 Wis. 2d 428, 448, 468 N.W.2d 
18 (1991), relied on in the majority opinion, the court 
explicitly distinguished Borello on these grounds: "[U]nlike the 
plaintiff in Borello, Clark was never told by medical experts 
that her injury was not caused by what she ultimately determined 
 
No. 94-2457.ssa 
 
 
 
 
5
to be its cause." I agree with the court of appeals, therefore, 
that "in this important regard Borello [rather than Clark] 
corresponds more exactly to the instant case." Claypool, 195 
Wis. 2d at 550. 
¶39 I see no basis for the majority opinion's unsupported 
conclusion that, based on Clark and Kempfer v. Evers, 133 Wis. 
2d 415, 395 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1986), discovery occurs 
"regardless of whether [the plaintiff] has been given a 
misleading legal opinion." Majority op. at 18. Rather, I would 
adopt the analysis of the court of appeals which is more 
consistent with Borello. 
 
II. 
¶40 I turn now to the facts set forth in the record and 
the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. 
An appellate court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment 
independently, applying the methodology of Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 802.08. "On summary judgment the court does not decide the 
issue of fact; it decides whether there is a genuine issue of 
fact. . . . Doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact should be resolved against the party moving for 
summary judgment." Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 
N.W.2d 473 (1980).  
¶41 Although 
the majority opinion states 
the 
proper 
methodology of review, I believe it fails to apply that 
 
No. 94-2457.ssa 
 
 
 
 
6
methodology. The majority opinion ignores the competing factual 
inferences presented in this record. Two sets of competing 
factual inferences require determination by a fact finder. 
¶42 First, the summary judgment record suggests that the 
Claypools may not have had reason to believe that Mrs. 
Claypool's 
blindness 
was 
caused 
by 
Dr. 
Levin's 
conduct. 
According to Mrs. Claypool's deposition testimony, and Attorney 
Goldstein's notes of his conversation with the Claypools, Mrs. 
Claypool's 
blindness 
began 
before 
she 
first 
entered 
the 
hospital.6 A jury might find it reasonable for the Claypools not 
to have known until 1993 whether her blindness was caused by 
disease or by malpractice. 
¶43 Second, it is uncontested that the Claypools contacted 
their family attorney soon after Mrs. Claypool's treatment by 
Dr. Levin and that Attorney Goldstein told the Claypools they 
did not have a cause of action against Dr. Levin. The summary 
judgment materials do not resolve the time at which Attorney 
Goldstein provided this report.7 I agree with the court of 
                     
6 Although the testimony is conflicting, Mrs. Claypool testified 
in her deposition as follows: "I suppose I wasn't seeing when 
they took me to the hospital." R. 16 at 13. When asked if she 
saw Dr. Levin at the hospital, Mrs. Claypool responded that she 
did not: "Because I couldn't see." R. 16 at 13-14. 
Attorney Goldstein's notes for the morning of Mrs. Claypool's 
admission to the hospital include the following: "Took her to 
Columbia Hospital 1:30 AMCouldn't see anythingAdmitted to 
hospital." R. 14 at 13.  
7 Mr. Claypool testified in his deposition that he did not 
remember when he was given this information by Attorney 
Goldstein but that it was not in 1992. 
 
No. 94-2457.ssa 
 
 
 
 
7
appeals that "the uncertainty surrounding the nature and timing 
of the communication between Goldstein and the Claypools leaves 
the issue of the Claypools' reasonable diligence appropriate for 
a jury's determination." Claypool, 195 Wis. 2d at 553. 
¶44 The record leaves open competing inferences with 
regard to when the Claypools, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the cause of Mrs. Claypool's 
blindness. I believe the majority improperly assumes the role of 
fact finder and resolves the competing factual inferences 
presented in the summary judgment record. The majority opinion 
acknowledges that the record on summary judgment is insufficient 
to resolve several significant questions. Majority op. at 19. 
The issue then is whether the competing factual inferences which 
can be drawn from the insufficient record raise a genuine issue 
of material fact. I conclude that they do and that the competing 
factual inferences cannot be resolved as a matter of law. 
¶45 I would affirm the court of appeals and remand the 
cause for a jury's determination of whether the Claypools 
exercised reasonable diligence when they did not discover the 
cause of the alleged injury until the summer of 1993.  
¶46 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶47 I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske 
joins this opinion.