Title: Meyer v. Bradbury
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S53693
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 2006

FILED: September 7, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ANDREA R. MEYER
and DAVID FIDANQUE,
Respondents on Review,
v.
BILL BRADBURY,
Secretary of State for the State of Oregon,
Petitioner on Review,
and
DAVID E. DELK,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 04C20669; CA A127935; SC S53693, SC S53840)
(Consolidated for decision)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted August 29, 2006.
Charles E. Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review Bill Bradbury.  With
him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General, and Philip Schradle, Special Counsel
to the Attorney General.
Daniel W. Meek, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review David E. Delk.
Charles F. Hinkle, Portland, argued the cause for
respondents on review.  With him on the briefs was ACLU
Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
John DiLorenzo, Jr. and Gregory A. Chaimov, Portland, filed
briefs on behalf of amici curiae Center To Protect Free Speech,
Inc. and Fred VanNatta.
Thomas M. Christ, Portland, filed an amicus curiae brief. 
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Claudia M. Burton, Judge. 205 Or App 297, 134 P3d 1005 (2006).
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the Secretary
of State from placing on the November 2006 general election
ballot an initiative -- Initiative Petition 8 (2006) (IP 8) --
that would amend the Oregon Constitution to permit the state to
regulate campaign contributions and expenditures.  Plaintiffs
asserted that, as proposed, the initiative contained two or more
constitutional amendments that, under the separate-vote
requirement set out in Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, must be voted on separately. (1)  The trial court
disagreed and granted summary judgment to both the Secretary of
State and the initiative's chief petitioner (who had intervened
as a defendant in the case).  The Court of Appeals reversed that
judgment, however, concluding that IP 8 did, indeed, violate the
separate-vote requirement.  Meyer v. Bradbury, 205 Or App 297,
134 P3d 1005 (2006).  We allowed the petitions for review of the
Secretary of State and the initiative's chief petitioner and now,
for the reasons that follow, reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
We take the relevant facts from the Court of Appeals
opinion:
"Defendant Delk, the chief petitioner for IP 8,
gathered the requisite 25 elector signatures and
submitted IP 8 to defendant Secretary of State for
review.  Defendant Secretary of State accepted comments
on IP 8, including one from plaintiffs, who objected to
IP 8 on the ground that it violates the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1.  Defendant
Secretary of State disagreed and engaged the Attorney
General to draft a ballot title for IP 8. Defendant
Secretary of State received no objections to the form
of the ballot title and subsequently approved IP 8 for
circulation.
"Plaintiffs then brought this action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant
Secretary of State, again arguing that he should not
have approved IP 8 for circulation, on the ground that
it violates the separate-vote requirement.  Defendant
Delk intervened in the action and raised several
affirmative defenses, including lack of standing and
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Defendant
Delk also joined defendant Secretary of State in
asserting that IP 8 does not violate the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1.  All parties
agreed that there were no disputed issues of fact, and
each moved for summary judgment.  The trial court
denied plaintiffs' motion, granted defendants', and
entered judgment accordingly."
Meyer, 205 Or App at 300-01.
As noted, plaintiffs appealed that judgment.  In the
decision that followed, the Court of Appeals held that (1) under
this court's decision in Foster v. Clark, 309 Or 464, 790 P2d 1
(1990), initiative challenges based on the separate-vote
requirement properly could be brought before an election, Meyer,
205 Or App at 301-03; (2) plaintiffs possessed the necessary
standing to bring their action, id. at 304; and (3) to the extent
that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative
remedies before initiating their action, they had done so in this
case.  Id. at 306.
Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals then
examined the text of IP 8, the full text of which is as follows:
"Be it enacted by the People of the State of
Oregon, there is added an Article II, Section 24, of
the Constitution of Oregon, as follows: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Constitution, the people through the initiative
process, or the Legislative Assembly by a three-fourths
vote of both Houses, may enact and amend laws to
prohibit or limit contributions and expenditures, of
any type or description, to influence the outcome of
any election." (2)
To determine whether IP 8 violated the separate-vote requirement
of Article XVII, section 1, the Court of Appeals drew on this
court's decision in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49
(1998), inquiring under the paradigmatic phrase from that opinion
"whether, if adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes
to the constitution that are substantive and that are not closely
related."  Id. at 277.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that IP 8
proposed two or more substantive changes to the Oregon
Constitution that were not closely related.  To reach that
conclusion, the Court of Appeals viewed IP 8 as two sets of
proposed changes to the Oregon Constitution:  one that would
amend the right to freedom of expression set out in Article I,
section 8, and one that would amend Article IV, section 25. (3) 
Meyer, 205 Or App at 308-09.  The court found the first change
easy to explain:
"The first proposed change is straightforward. [The
initiative] would create an exception to Article I,
section 8, for 'laws to prohibit or limit contributions
and expenditures, of any type or description, to
influence the outcome of any election.'  Under IP 8,
both the people, through the initiative process, and
the legislature may enact such laws." (4)
Id. at 308. 
Respecting the second change, however, the court found
the task more difficult:
"The proposed change to Article IV, section 25, is
more complicated in that it would impact legislative
power in several distinct ways.  IP 8 provides that
'the Legislative Assembly by a three-fourths vote of
both Houses, may enact and amend laws to prohibit or
limit contributions and expenditures, of any type or
description, to influence the outcome of any election.' 
Thus, under IP 8, the legislature would be prohibited
from passing such laws, except by a three-fourths
majority.  It would also be prohibited from amending
any such legislation that it passed, except by a
three-fourths majority.  Finally, it would be
prohibited from amending any such legislation that was
adopted by the people through the initiative process,
except by a three-fourths majority.  As an example,
under IP 8, the people could adopt legislation (by a
simple majority under the initiative process)
prohibiting campaign contributions, and the legislature
would be powerless to amend that legislation, except by
a three-fourths majority.
 "We cannot say that the proposed change to
Article IV, section 25 -- which would have the profound
effect of shifting the balance of power from the
legislature to the people, through the initiative
process, in matters related to campaign finance -- is
closely related to the change carving out an exception
to Article I, section 8, for laws that prohibit or
limit contributions and expenditures to influence the
outcome of an election.  We therefore conclude that IP
8 violates the separate-vote requirement in Article
XVII, section 1." 
Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).  As a result, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment.  Both the Secretary
of State and intervenor sought review of that decision, which we
allowed.
On review, intervenor reiterates his position on
several preliminary matters.  Intervenor first argues, as he did
before the Court of Appeals, that the preenactment status of IP 8
renders the controversy nonjusticiable and that plaintiffs lack
standing to bring the present action because they failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies.  The Court of Appeals
found both those arguments unavailing.  For the reasons stated in
the Court of Appeals opinion, we agree with that court's
assessment of intervenor's arguments regarding justiciability and
standing and decline to examine those particular issues
further. (5) 
The Secretary of State and intervenor also argue that
the supermajority rule that IP 8 would add to Article IV, section
25, is not a substantive constitutional "change" in the same
sense as this court used that term in Armatta.  In addition, both
the Secretary of State and intervenor argue, as they did below,
that, if the potential for multiple constitutional changes is
present in IP 8, then those changes are "closely related" as this
court used that phrase in Armatta and therefore do not offend the
Oregon Constitution's separate-vote requirement.  In response,
plaintiffs argue that, because IP 8 would change separate and
unrelated provisions of the constitution in substantive ways, the
Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the proposed
measure violates the separate-vote requirement.  For the reasons
that follow, we agree with the Secretary of State and intervenor
that the changes proposed by IP 8 are "closely related" and do
not offend the Article XVII, section 1, separate-vote
requirement.
As noted, Article XVII, section 1, provides, in part:
"When two or more [constitutional] amendments shall be
submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this
state at the same election, they shall be so submitted
that each amendment shall be voted on separately."  
In Armatta, this court characterized that provision as setting
out a "separate-vote" requirement for constitutional amendments that focused "both upon the proposed change to the constitution,
as well as the procedural form of submitted amendments."  327 Or
at 274.
Nearly 30 jurisdictions have separate-vote provisions
in their constitutions that are similar to Oregon's.  Most of
those jurisdictions have concluded that the provision should be
interpreted similarly to the "single-subject" provisions set out
in their respective state constitutions. (6)  See, e.g.,
Californians For An Open Primary v. McPherson, 38 Cal 4th 735,
763, 134 P3d 299 (2006) (stating principle).  Some of those
courts expressly interpret the single-subject provision "in an
accommodating and lenient manner."  Id. at 764.  Having done so,
they conclude that, like the single-subject requirement, their
constitution's separate-vote provision: 
"requires only a showing that the challenged provisions
are reasonably germane to a common theme, purpose, or
subject.  The separate-vote provision does not impose a
stricter standard requiring a showing of 'close' or
'functional' relatedness."  
Id. at 777.
In Oregon, however, the separate-vote requirement found
in Article XVII, section 1, has a different application and is
driven by a decidedly different rationale.  As this court
interpreted that provision in Armatta, the separate-vote
requirement serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the
concept of a constitution.  327 Or at 276.  In reaching that
conclusion, this court did not perceive any reason to elaborate
on why or how the concept of a constitution was important;
instead, it noted only that the act of amending a state's organic
law differs significantly from enacting or amending legislation. 
Id.  
What the court only implied in that passage in Armatta,
however, it has made explicit elsewhere.  For example, this court
observed in State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 542, 920 P2d 535
(1996):
"It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that
the government of this state seeks to protect and
promote, the interests represented by the state
constitution are paramount to legislative ones."
(Emphasis added.)  In our view, that hierarchy of law always must
be acknowledged and respected.  Consistently with that view, this
court expressly has held that Oregon's separate-vote provision -- 
which applies to only constitutional amendments -- imposes a
narrower requirement on the act of amending the constitution than
does its counterpart, the single-subject rule, which applies 
equally to statutory as well as constitutional measures. 
Armatta, 327 Or at 276.  To implement that narrower requirement,
we do not search simply for a unifying thread to create a common
theme, thought, or purpose from a melange of proposed
constitutional changes.  Instead, we inquire whether, if adopted,
a proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution
that are substantive and are not closely related.  If so, the
proposal violates the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII,
section 1, because it would prevent voters from expressing their
opinions as to each proposed change separately.  Id. at 277.  We
turn now to that inquiry respecting IP 8. 
As a threshold matter, a separate-vote analysis must
focus on the "particular changes made to the constitution." 
Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 609, 43 P3d 1094 (2002) (emphasis
in original).  In keeping with that rule, we begin any
separate-vote inquiry by identifying the changes, both explicit
and implicit, that a proposed measure purports to make to the
Oregon Constitution.  Id. at 606.  If there are multiple changes
we  determine whether they are "substantive."  If they are, then
we must then determine whether they are closely related.  Id. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that IP 8
proposes at least two changes to the Oregon Constitution, one
aimed at the free expression provisions of Article I, section
8, (7) and one aimed at the legislative majority provisions of
Article IV, section 25. (8)  Meyer, 205 Or App at 307.  We
agree with that general assessment, as far as it goes.  To be
precise, however, the changes proposed by IP 8 would, in fact,
alter at least three existing constitutional provisions.  If
enacted, IP 8 would, indeed, implicitly amend the aforementioned
sections of Article I and Article IV.  By its own terms, however,
IP 8 also would explicitly add a new section to Article II -- a
new section whose  distinct provisions, standing alone, still
could be susceptible to a separate-vote inquiry, even if the
implicitly affected provisions of Article I and Article IV did
not exist.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the
changes at issue here are "substantive."  Although this court's
cases have yet to define that term as it was used in Armatta, the
word nevertheless possesses a well-understood legal meaning,
viz., "An essential part or constituent or relating to what is
essential."  Black's Law Dictionary 1429 (6th ed 1990).  This
court's decisions since Armatta have applied that meaning when
conducting separate-vote inquiries.  See, e.g., League of Oregon
Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645, 673-74, 56 P3d 892 (2002)
(change to requirements for payment of just compensation to
property owners and change respecting laws restraining expression
were two substantive constitutional changes); Lehman v. Bradbury,
333 Or 231, 244, 37 P3d 989 (2002) (changes in term limits for
state executive officers and creation of such limits for state
legislators and members of Congress were two substantive
constitutional changes).  And, viewed in that light, the
potential changes at issue here -- that is, an express change to
Article II and implied changes to Article I, section 8,  and
Article IV, section 25 -- are substantive ones.  
Thus far, our analysis and that of the Court of Appeals
parallel each other.  However, we begin to part company with the
Court of Appeals when our inquiry turns to whether the potential
changes in this case are closely related.  In addressing that
question, the Court of Appeals noted that the proposed change to
Article IV, section 25, encompassed in IP 8 would "impact
legislative power in several distinct ways," Meyer, 205 Or App at
308.  Most significantly (in that court's view), was the proposed
measure's imposition of a three-quarter majority (supermajority)
requirement on the legislature to enact or amend laws regulating
campaign contributions and expenditures.  Id.  In the face of
such a requirement, the Court of Appeals opined, a simple
majority of the people could pass a citizen-backed initiative
prohibiting all campaign contributions, while the legislature
would be "powerless to amend that legislation, except by a three-fourths majority."  Id. at 309.  As noted, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that the upshot of that change would shift the balance
of lawmaking power from the legislature to the people in matters
relating to campaign contributions and expenditures.  Id.  And
that shift of power, the Court of Appeals concluded, could not be
reconciled as closely related to the changes that IP 8 would make
to the guarantee of free expression contained in Article I,
section 8.  Id.  
In our view, however, several aspects of that reasoning
are problematic.  First, the particular "legislative power" that
the Court of Appeals invoked in its opinion -- i.e., the power to 
regulate campaign contributions and expenditures -- is illusory;
it does not presently exist.  Since the inception of the Oregon
Constitution, Article I, section 8, strictly has prohibited any
legislation "restraining the free expression of opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever[.]"  Under Oregon law, both campaign
contributions and expenditures are forms of expression protected
by that constitutional provision, thus making legislatively
imposed limitations on individual political campaign
contributions and expenditures impermissible.  See Vannatta v.
Keisling, 324 Or 514, 524, 931 P2d 770 (1997) (so holding). 
Consequently, it is difficult, from both a legal and logical
perspective, to postulate a "shift" of power from one entity to
another within the legislative branch, particularly when the
power at issue never has existed at all, much less resided with
either entity.  
Second, even if the ability to enact campaign
contribution and expenditure laws were a legal reality,
describing the prospective changes to Article IV, section 25, as
"shifting the balance of power from the legislature to the
people" misapprehends the unitary nature of the legislative power
in Oregon.  Although two distinct entities may, indeed, enact
laws in this state, the source of all legislative power is the
people, and that power is exercised through a single legislative
department.  As this court put the matter long ago:
"By the adoption of the initiative and referendum into
our constitution, the legislative department of the
State is divided into two separate and distinct
lawmaking bodies.  There remains, however, as formerly,
but one legislative department of the State.  It
operates, it is true, differently than before -- one
method by the enactment of laws directly, through that
source of all legislative power, the people;  and the
other, as formerly, by their representatives[.]" 
Straw v. Harris, 54 Or 424, 430-31, 103 P 777 (1909) (emphasis
added).  As a result, although two lawmaking bodies -- the
legislature and the people -- exist, their "exercise of the
legislative powers are coequal and co-ordinate."  State ex rel.
Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or 641, 644, 270 P 513 (1928); see also
MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 126, 130 P3d 308 (2006) ("In
Oregon, the Legislative Assembly and the people, acting through
the initiative or referendum processes, share in exercising
legislative power.").  To conclude that the legislative power can
be "shifted" within a discrete area of lawmaking so as to render
it out of balance with itself ignores the unitary nature of that
power.  It creates, we think, a flaw that undermines both the
Court of Appeals' separate-vote analysis in this case and its
ultimate conclusion.    
The Court of Appeals observed that this court has
offered little guidance concerning what it means for provisions
to be "closely related" under the separate-vote analysis, other
than applying that criterion in a handful of cases.  See Meyer,
205 Or App at 308 n 5 (so stating).  But, if this court has
written little on the subject, it is because there have been few
instances in which the constitutional changes before the court
presented a close question on that issue.  In some cases, this
court has needed to focus on only the different parts of the
constitution being amended to conclude that the changes at issue
were clearly unrelated, because they involved different changes
to different fundamental rights affecting different groups of
people.  See, e.g., League of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 674-75
(amendments contained in single constitutional measure expanded
Article I, section 18, property rights for some property owners,
while simultaneously limiting Article I, section 8, free
expression rights for other property owners).  In other cases,
this court focused on the different provisions contained in the
amendatory measure itself and concluded that the changes that
they would have made to the constitution were themselves so
divergent as to render them "not closely related."  See, e.g.,
Swett, 333 Or at 597 (invalidating measure that encompassed
adding constitutional campaign contribution disclosure
requirement, as well as constitutional requirement that signature
gatherers for initiative petitions be registered to vote in
Oregon).  
In our view, however, the case before us now is
different from either of those examples.  First, IP 8 does not
change different constitutional provisions that confer different
fundamental rights on different groups of persons.  See Armatta,
327 Or at 283-84 (changes to constitutional provisions involving
separate constitutional rights granted to different persons not
closely related for separate-vote requirement); see also Lehman,
333 Or at 246 n 9 (when separate constitutional provisions
conferring separate rights on different groups are affected by
proposed amendment, it is "strong indication" that provisions not
closely related for separate-vote requirement).
Second, IP 8 is not a complicated measure.  If adopted,
IP 8 will do essentially two things: (1) create a general
authority for both the people and the legislature to enact laws
regulating campaign finances; but (2) condition the legislature's
ability in that regard through a supermajority procedural
requirement.  The supermajority requirement that IP 8 would place
on the legislature both carries out and limits the general
authority to enact contribution and expenditure laws that the
measure would create.  In other words, the supermajority
requirement is a procedural condition on which the right to
exercise substantive authority is predicated.  Viewed in that
manner, the constitutional changes proposed by IP 8 are "closely
related" and therefore do not offend the Article XVII, section 1,
separate-vote requirement.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
DURHAM, J., dissenting.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative Petition
8 (2006) (IP 8) contained two or more amendments to the Oregon
Constitution that must be submitted to and voted on separately by
the voters as Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution
requires.  I agree with that conclusion and, consequently, I
respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the
Court of Appeals.
The majority concludes that "the changes proposed by IP
8 would, in fact, alter at least three existing constitutional
provisions."  Meyer v. Bradbury, ___ Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___
(September 7, 2006) (slip op at 10).  The majority also notes
that each of those changes are substantive ones and that the
state intends to submit each of those constitutional amendments
together for a single vote in the context of IP 8.  I agree with
each of those conclusions. (9)
If we pause the legal analysis of this case at that
point, it appears beyond question that IP 8 violates the
unambiguous terms of Article XVII, section 1, which provides, in
part:
"When two or more [constitutional] amendments shall be
submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this
state at the same election, they shall be so submitted
that each amendment shall be voted on separately."
The purpose that underlies that provision is clear. 
The drafters of Article XVII, section 1, intended to preclude use
of the practice known as "logrolling," in which initiative
drafters might join more than one constitutional amendment in a
single initiative petition in order to secure sufficient
affirmative votes for the entire package.  The constitutional
drafters chose to require the submission of each proposed
constitutional amendment for a separate vote by the voters.  That
policy choice insures that the voters' voice will be expressed in
clear terms as to each proposed constitutional amendment.  If we
evaluate IP 8 under the unambiguous terms of Article XVII,
section 1, it is difficult to conceive of a clearer violation of
that constitutional requirement.
The majority, however, does not pause in its analysis
at that point but proceeds to consider whether the multiple
constitutional amendments contained in IP 8 are "closely
related."  The phrase "closely related" does not appear in
Article XVII, section 1, or in any other provision of the Oregon
Constitution.
The parties to this case and the Court of Appeals have
observed, correctly, that this court created the phrase "closely
related" in case law that applied Article XVII, section 1, but
that this court has never explained what that phrase meant.  That
is a fair criticism.  As the majority acknowledges, this court's
cases have announced little more than conclusions that various
proposed measures were not closely related and, therefore, ran
afoul of Article XVII, section 1. (10)
The majority purports to answer that criticism here by
offering the following conclusions about IP 8.  First, "IP 8 does
not change different constitutional provisions that confer
different fundamental rights on different groups of persons." 
Id. at ___ (slip op at 15).  Second, "the supermajority
requirement is a procedural condition on which the right to
exercise substantive authority is predicated."  Id. at ___ (slip
op at 16).
I do not quarrel necessarily with the accuracy of those
statements about IP 8.  However, they do not convince me that IP
8 satisfies Article XVII, section 1.  The majority's first
conclusion introduces criteria that water down the clear terms of
Article XVII, section 1, to the point that those terms are
unrecognizable.  The majority's second conclusion simply matches
one subjective conclusion -- "closely related" -- to another
equally undefined conclusion -- the term "procedural." (11)  In
my view, calling IP 8 a mere "procedural" change to the
legislature's constitutional mode of operation does not explain
why the relationship between the two amendments is "close" and
simply trivializes the significant change to the existing
requirements for legislative action that IP 8 embodies.
I emphasize that I cannot tangibly demonstrate that my
dissenting view is legally correct and that the majority opinion
is legally erroneous, because the governing criterion under
discussion -- "closely related" -- invites little more than a
subjective opinion about the existence of more than one amendment
in a proposed initiative amendment to the constitution. 
Subjective opinions by judges are not what Article XVII, section
1, calls for.  For me, the paradigm is and should remain the
clear terms of Article XVII, section 1, not an elastic,
adjectival modifier that, in truth, merely invites judges to
render subjective conclusions about constitutional requirements.
This court, in my view, intended the phrase "closely
related" to explain why a proposed alteration of more than one
phrase or clause of a constitutional provision nevertheless
constituted a single amendment.  The court's goal in using that
phrase was to implement Article XVII, section 1, not to undermine
or alter the clear terms of that provision.
The unfortunate consequence of today's decision is to
shift the focus of the single vote inquiry away from the clear
terms of Article XVII, section 1, to a court-created adjectival
phrase that is, in effect, standardless.  That shift will induce
initiative drafters to combine multiple constitutional amendments
in a way that purports to create some relationship -- perhaps a 
close one -- between separate proposed constitutional amendments. 
The proper focus, in the words of Article XVII, section 1, should
be on the presence of more than one constitutional amendment, not
on whether multiple amendments stand in some relationship to each
other and, if so, whether that relationship, in the subjective
opinion of judges, is "close."
All parties concede that IP 8 modifies Oregon's free
speech provision, Article I, section 8.  As the majority
correctly concludes, IP 8 also changes Article IV, section 25,
which provides, in part, that "a majority of all the members
elected to each House shall be necessary to pass every bill or
Joint resolution."  (Emphasis added.)  It would do so by
substituting a supermajority vote requirement for the existing
majority vote requirement for the adoption or amendment of laws
restricting campaign contributions and expenditures.
Those proposed changes do bear some relationship to
each other, in that they each concern the financing of political
campaigns in Oregon.  But the issues that those proposed
amendments raise are quite distinct.  It is easy to imagine that
some voters may desire to authorize the legislature to regulate
campaign contributions and expenditures, but object to the
creation of a supermajority voting requirement for the
legislature that necessarily will grant a legislative veto power
to a small political minority.
I cannot conclude that there is a "close" relationship
between two separate constitutional amendments, one that would
alter a significant aspect of the free speech guarantee to all
citizens in Oregon's Bill of Rights, and one that would modify
the constitutional voting requirements that now govern each house
of the Oregon Legislature.  The combination of those distinct
constitutional amendments for a single vote by the electorate
invites the very evil -- logrolling -- that the drafters of
Article XVII, section 1, intended to prevent.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that IP 8
violates the separate-vote requirement in Article XVII, section
1. (12)  The majority errs in overturning that conclusion. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
1. Article XVII, section 1, provides, in part:
"When two or more [constitutional] amendments shall be
submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this
state at the same election, they shall be so submitted
that each amendment shall be voted on separately."  
2. We note that, if IP 8 is approved by the voters,
Article II of the Oregon Constitution will have two sections
numbered 24.
3. The text of both Article I, section 8, and Article IV,
section 25, are set out post, ___ Or at ___, ___ n 7, 8 (slip op
at 10 n 7,_8). 
4. In Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 931 P2d 770
(1997), this court held that Article I, section 8, prohibits laws
restricting campaign expenditures and contributions. 
5. We also note, in passing, that this court has indicated
in the past its general concern over eleventh-hour challenges to
proposed measures that have qualified for the ballot -- a concern
that led this court to fashion strict timelines for any such
challenges.  See, e.g., State ex rel Keisling v. Norblad, 317 Or
615, 860 P2d 241 (1993) (illustrating that principle).  We do not
suggest that such precedents should (or even might) be followed
here.  We only note their existence and trust to institutional
memory that they will be raised when they appear to be pertinent.
6. The single-subject requirement set out in Article IV,
section 1 (2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"An initiative petition shall include the full
text of the proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution.  A proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters
properly connected therewith."
7. Article I, section 8, provides:
"No law shall be passed restraining the
free expression of opinion, or restricting
the right to speak, write, or print freely on
any subject whatever; but every person shall
be responsible for the abuse of this right."
8. Article IV, section 25, provides:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (2) of this section, a majority of
all the members elected to each House shall
be necessary to pass every bill or Joint
resolution.
"(2) Three-fifths of all members elected
to each House shall be necessary to pass
bills for raising revenue.
"(3) All bills, and Joint resolutions
passed, shall be signed by the presiding
officers of the respective houses."
9. I also join in the majority's conclusions that
sustained the Court of Appeals' rulings on the availability of a
pre-election challenge in this context and plaintiff's
satisfaction of any applicable requirements regarding their
standing to bring this action and their exhaustion of any
applicable administrative remedies.
10. The majority criticizes the Court of Appeals' reasoning
with respect to that court's apprehension about the tendency of
IP 8 to shift legislative power between the state legislature and
the voters exercising the power of initiative.  I agree with that
criticism.  However, that criticism by the majority does not
answer the Court of Appeals' broader conclusion that IP 8
contains multiple amendments and violates Article XVII, section
1.
11. The majority also labels both amendments as
"substantive" elsewhere in its opinion.  Id. at ___ (slip op at
11).
12. The majority also refers in a footnote to the court's
creation in a past case of a timeline for a late challenge to a
proposed measure.  Id. at ___ n 5 (slip op at 6 n 5).  The
majority appears to assert that this case raises no issue
regarding the timeliness of plaintiffs' challenge.  I agree and,
therefore, see no purpose in discussing that case law or in
inviting litigation of timeliness questions that may arise in
other cases.  For me, the question of what rules should govern
the timely filing of litigation pertaining to an election is a
matter for the legislature.