Title: Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP001530
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 2018

2018 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1530 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The Manitowoc Company, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
John M. Lanning, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 696, 885 N.W.2d 798 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 72 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 19, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc 
 
JUDGE: 
Gary L. Bendix 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs, joined by GABLEMAN, J. 
and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Suzanne M. Glisch, Joel S. Aziere, and Buelow Vetter 
Buikema Olson & Vilet, LLC, Waukesha.  There was an oral 
argument by Joel S. Aziere. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Oyvind Wistrom and Lindner & Marsack, S.C., Milwaukee.  There 
was an oral argument by Oyvind Wistrom.  
  
 
 
2018 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1530 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV216) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Manitowoc Company, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John M. Lanning, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 19, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing a judgment 
of the Circuit Court, Manitowoc County, Gary L. Bendix, Judge.1  
The circuit court granted the motion of The Manitowoc Company, 
Inc., the plaintiff, for summary judgment and denied the cross-
motion for summary judgment of the defendant, John M. Lanning.  
After a bench trial on damages, the circuit court awarded 
                                                 
1 Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. Lanning, 2016 WI App 72, 371 
Wis. 2d 696, 885 N.W.2d 798. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
2 
 
Manitowoc Company $97,844.78 in damages, $1,000,000 in attorney 
fees, and $37,246.82 in costs against Lanning. 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court 
judgment in favor of Manitowoc Company.  It concluded that 
Lanning's non-solicitation of employees provision (sometimes 
referred to herein as an NSE provision) imposed by Manitowoc 
Company as part of Lanning's employment agreement is governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (2013-14) and that it is unenforceable 
under the statute.2    
¶3 
The non-solicitation of employees provision prohibits 
Lanning from directly or indirectly soliciting, inducing, or 
encouraging any employee of Manitowoc Company to terminate his 
or her employment with Manitowoc Company or to accept employment 
with a competitor, supplier, or customer of Manitowoc Company.  
The scope of the non-solicitation of employees provision 
includes all of Manitowoc Company's 13,000 world-wide employees 
regardless of an employee's position within Manitowoc Company or 
the employee's connection to Lanning. 
¶4 
Two issues of law are presented on the cross-motions 
for summary judgment:3   
1. Does Wis. Stat. § 103.465, which explicitly refers to a 
"covenant not to compete," apply to the non-solicitation 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 For a discussion of cross-motions for summary judgment, 
see Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 595 
n.1, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
3 
 
of 
employees 
provision 
prohibiting 
Lanning 
from 
soliciting, inducing, or encouraging any employee of 
Manitowoc Company to terminate his or her employment with 
Manitowoc 
Company 
or 
to 
accept 
employment 
with 
a 
competitor, supplier, or customer of Manitowoc Company? 
2. If 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465 
governs 
Lanning's 
non-
solicitation of employees provision, is the provision 
enforceable under § 103.465?4  
                                                 
4 Manitowoc Company set forth five issues in its petition 
for review as follows: 
1. Whether Wis. Stat. § 103.465, which refers to a 
"covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to 
compete with his or her employer or principal during 
the term of the employment or agency, or after the 
termination of that employment or agency," governs 
non-solicitation of employees ("NSE") clauses, which 
do not prohibit any individual from competing with 
his/her former employer. 
2. Assuming, arguendo, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 governs 
NSE clauses, whether an NSE clause, which does not 
prohibit competition with the former employer, should 
be evaluated under the same legal standard(s) as a 
non-compete clause, and whether the Court of Appeals 
erred 
in 
equating 
a 
2-year 
restriction 
on 
the 
solicitation 
of 
employees, 
which 
permitted 
any 
individual to leave the employer and work for a 
competitor (as Lanning did in this case), to a 3-year 
restriction from working for a competitor in any 
capacity. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 governs 
NSE clauses, whether Lanning's NSE provision, which 
permitted him to work for Manitowoc's largest Chinese 
competitor, unreasonably restrains trade. 
4. Assuming, arguendo, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 governs 
NSE clauses, whether Lanning's NSE provision, which 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
4 
 
¶5 
In response to the first issue, the particular terms 
of the non-solicitation of employees provision at issue in the 
instant case do not appear to have been analyzed by any prior 
Wisconsin court decision.5  We conclude, as prior cases have 
concluded, that although Wis. Stat. § 103.465 explicitly refers 
to a covenant not to compete, the plain meaning of § 103.465 is 
                                                                                                                                                             
merely 
prevented 
Lanning 
from 
raiding 
Manitowoc 
employees, 
is 
"reasonably 
necessary" 
to 
protect 
Manitowoc's legitimate business interests. 
5. Assuming, arguendo, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 governs 
NSE clauses, whether the constitutional right to 
contract may be infringed upon through the use of 
aggrandized hypothetical scenarios rather than the 
undisputed facts of a case to invalidate an NSE clause 
in a contract between an employer and employee. 
The two issues we address are dispositive and in effect 
address the issues Manitowoc Company set forth.  
5 In Equity Enterprises, Inc. v. Milosch, 2001 WI App 186, 
247 Wis. 2d 172, 633 N.W.2d 662, the court of appeals analyzed 
an employment agreement containing restrictive covenants.  In 
one of those covenants, the employee agreed that he would not, 
after the termination of his employment, entice any sales 
representative 
of 
the 
employer 
to 
terminate 
his 
or 
her 
employment with the employer.  However, the parties in Milosch 
did not raise or dispute whether Wis. Stat. § 103.465 applied to 
the employee's non-solicitation provision.  The court of 
appeals' decision did not discuss or rule on the validity of the 
employee's non-solicitation provision.  Instead, it invalidated 
another restrictive covenant because it was overbroad.  That 
provision of the agreement barred the employee from doing 
business with customers of the employer after termination of 
employment.  Thus, the court of appeals invalidated the entire 
agreement.   
Lanning's contention that Milosch determined that a non-
solicitation of employee provision was governed by § 103.465 is 
not persuasive. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
5 
 
not limited to a covenant in which an employee agrees not to 
compete with a former employer.6  This court has explicitly 
stated that "it would be an exercise in semantics to overlook 
§ 103.465 merely because [a provision] of the agreement is not 
labeled a 'covenant not to compete.'"7  Rather, § 103.465 has 
been applied to agreements viewed as restraints of trade.  
¶6 
Indeed, this court has acknowledged that "the explicit 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 103.465, as plainly stated in the 
statute, is to invalidate covenants that impose unreasonable 
restraints on employees" and that § 103.465 "essentially deals 
with 
restraint 
of 
trade . . . regardless 
of 
whether 
a 
restriction is labeled a 'non-disclosure' provision or a 
'covenant not to compete.'"8    
¶7 
The court has repeatedly recognized that a restraint 
of trade may take many forms.  The court has interpreted Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 as applying not only to traditional covenants in 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 
N.W.2d 415 (1959). 
7 Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 112, 579 
N.W.2d 217 (1998). 
8 Heyde Cos., Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, 
¶13, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830 (citing Tatge, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 111-12; see also Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 
Wis. 2d 202, 218-21, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
6 
 
which an employee agrees not to compete with a former employer,9 
but also to other terms of an agreement including provisions 
barring the solicitation of the employer's customers or former 
customers,10 non-disclosure/confidentiality agreements between 
employers and employees,11 and a no-hire provision between two 
employers.12   
¶8 
These cases clearly demonstrate that the application 
of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 depends upon whether the particular 
terms of the agreement constitute a restraint of trade by 
restricting competition or imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
                                                 
9 "A covenant [not to compete] typically provides that the 
employee shall not work for a competitor or set up a competitive 
business for himself for a specified period of time in a 
designated geographical area."  Harlan M. Blake, Employee 
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 626 (1960). 
For an example of such a traditional covenant not to 
compete, see, e.g., Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 
98 N.W.2d 415 (1959). 
10 See, e.g., Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, 
¶¶19-41, 319 Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898 (holding that a 
provision barring solicitation of an employer's customers was a 
restraint of trade under Wis. Stat. § 103.465). 
11 See, e.g., Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 
Wis. 2d 202, 218, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978) (concluding that a non-
disclosure/confidentiality agreement between an employer and 
employee was an unreasonable restraint of trade governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465).   
12 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶13-16 (concluding that an 
agreement between two employers in which one employer agreed not 
to hire employees of the other employer was a restraint of trade 
because "[t]he effect of the no-hire provision [was] to 
restrict" employees' employment opportunities). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
7 
 
employees.  These cases focused on the effect of the restraint 
rather than its label.13        
¶9 
We 
conclude 
that 
Lanning's 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees provision restricts Lanning's ability to engage in the 
ordinary competition attendant to a free market, specifically 
restricting Lanning's freely competing for the best talent in 
the labor pool.  In addition, the limitation on Lanning also 
affects access to the labor pool by a competitor of Manitowoc 
Company (including Lanning's current employer, SANY America).  
Accordingly, we conclude that Lanning's non-solicitation of 
employees provision is a restraint of trade governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465.           
¶10 With regard to the second issue, we conclude that 
Lanning's 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees 
provision 
is 
unenforceable under Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  It does not meet the 
statutory requirement that the restriction be 
"reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the employer."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465.   
¶11 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause, as did the court of appeals, to 
the circuit court with instructions to enter judgment in favor 
of Lanning. 
I 
                                                 
13 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶13-14.  
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
8 
 
¶12 To the extent that the facts affect the issues before 
the court, no genuine dispute about material facts is presented.   
¶13 Manitowoc 
Company 
is 
a 
manufacturer 
with 
two 
divisions:  a food service equipment division and a construction 
crane division.  Lanning began his employment with Manitowoc 
Company in 1985 as a chief engineer in Manitowoc Company's crane 
division.  Lanning worked for Manitowoc Company for over 25 
years.  Lanning was successful, knowledgeable, and well-
connected within Manitowoc Company. 
¶14 In 2008, Lanning signed an employment agreement with 
Manitowoc 
Company 
that 
included 
provisions 
relating 
to 
confidential 
information, 
intellectual 
property, 
and 
non-
solicitation of employees.14  The validity of only the non-
solicitation of employees provision is challenged in the instant 
case.  
¶15 Lanning 
terminated 
his 
employment 
with 
Manitowoc 
Company effective January 6, 2010.  Beginning on January 8, 
2010, Lanning became the director of engineering for SANY 
America, a direct competitor with Manitowoc Company's crane 
division.  Manitowoc Company claims that Lanning engaged in a 
number 
of 
actions 
that 
violated 
the 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees provision. 
                                                 
14 Over the course of his employment, Lanning signed 
multiple employment agreements with Manitowoc Company.  The 2008 
employment 
agreement 
explicitly 
superseded 
all 
previous 
agreements, and the parties agree that the 2008 employment 
agreement is applicable in the instant case.  
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
9 
 
¶16 For example, Manitowoc Company asserts that Lanning 
communicated with at least nine Manitowoc Company employees 
about potential employment opportunities at SANY, took one 
Manitowoc Company employee out to lunch in connection with SANY 
recruitment efforts, took another Manitowoc Company employee on 
a tour of a SANY crane manufacturing plant in China, and 
participated in a third Manitowoc Company employee's job 
interview with SANY.   
¶17 Lanning's 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees 
provision 
prohibits him, for two years following termination of his 
employment, from soliciting, inducing, or encouraging any 
Manitowoc Company employee to terminate his or her employment 
with 
Manitowoc 
Company 
or 
to 
accept 
employment 
with 
a 
competitor, supplier, or customer of Manitowoc Company.   
¶18 The circuit court concluded that even if Lanning's 
non-solicitation provision is viewed as a restriction on trade 
or competition subject to Wis. Stat. § 103.465, the provision 
was reasonable and enforceable under the statute.  
¶19 The court of appeals concluded that Lanning's non-
solicitation of employees provision was a restraint of trade 
governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465.15  It further concluded that 
because the provision was not reasonable, it was not enforceable 
under the statute.  The court of appeals reversed the judgment 
of the circuit court in favor of Manitowoc Company.   
                                                 
15 Manitowoc Co., 371 Wis. 2d 696, ¶17. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
10 
 
II 
¶20 We first address the standard of review.  This court 
applies the same method of analysis to a motion for summary 
judgment as does a circuit court.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate 
where, 
based 
on 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
interrogatories, and affidavits on file, there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact, and a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Star 
Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶18; Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, 
¶13, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373; Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Mut. 
Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brass, 2001 WI App 92, ¶4, 242 
Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 648, overruled on other grounds by Star 
Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶78 n.12. 
¶21 The instant case requires us to interpret both a 
statute and a written contract.  The interpretation and 
enforceability of both a statute and a written contract 
ordinarily present questions of law that this court determines 
independently of the circuit court and court appeals while 
benefiting from the analyses of these courts.  See, e.g., 
Moustakis v. DOJ, 2016 WI 42, ¶16, 368 Wis. 2d 677, 880 
N.W.2d 142; Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶18; Streiff v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 603 n.1, 348 N.W.2d 505 
(1984). 
III 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
11 
 
¶22 The first issue of law presented is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 applies to Lanning's non-solicitation of employees 
provision.  
¶23 We begin our discussion by setting forth the texts of 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 and Lanning's non-solicitation of employees 
provision. 
¶24 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 103.465 
is 
broadly 
entitled 
"Restrictive covenants in employment contracts" and refers 
explicitly to a covenant by an employee not to compete with the 
employer during or after the term of employment.  It states as 
follows that "any covenant" described in § 103.465 imposing an 
"unreasonable restraint is illegal" even as to any part of the 
covenant that would be a reasonable restraint: 
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to 
compete with his or her employer or principal during 
the term of the employment or agency, or after the 
termination of that employment or agency, within a 
specified territory and during a specified time is 
lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the employer or principal.  Any covenant, described in 
this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of 
the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint. 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  
¶25 The agreement between Manitowoc Company and Lanning is 
entitled 
"Agreement 
Regarding 
Confidential 
Information, 
Intellectual Property and Non-Solicitation of Employees."  The 
non-solicitation of employees provision at issue does not use 
the words "covenant not to compete."  Rather, Lanning agrees not 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
12 
 
to solicit, induce, or encourage any employee(s) of Manitowoc 
Company to terminate their employment with the Company.  The 
provision states as follows: 
I agree that during my Employment by Manitowoc and for 
a period of two years from the date my Employment by 
Manitowoc ends for any reason, including termination 
by Manitowoc with or without cause, I will not (either 
directly or indirectly) solicit, induce or encourage 
any employee(s) to terminate their employment with 
Manitowoc or to accept employment with any competitor, 
supplier or customer of Manitowoc.  As used herein, 
the term "solicit, induce or encourage" includes, but 
is 
not 
limited 
to, 
any 
of 
the 
following: 
(a) 
initiating 
communications 
with 
an 
employee 
of 
Manitowoc 
relating 
to 
possible 
employment; 
(b) 
offering 
bonuses 
or 
additional 
compensation 
to 
encourage employees of Manitowoc to terminate their 
employment therewith and accept employment with a 
competitor, supplier or customer of Manitowoc; (c) 
referring employees of Manitowoc to personnel or 
agents employed or engaged by competitors, suppliers 
or customers of Manitowoc; or (d) referring personnel 
or 
agents 
employed 
or 
engaged 
by 
competitors, 
suppliers or customers of Manitowoc to employees of 
Manitowoc. 
¶26 Lanning's non-solicitation of employees provision does 
not conform to "textbook examples" of a covenant not to compete 
in which the employee is prohibited from engaging in competition 
with a former employer.  In contrast to a traditional covenant 
not to compete, Lanning is free to obtain employment with a 
competitor of Manitowoc Company.  Manitowoc Company employees 
are free to terminate employment with Manitowoc Company, be 
employed by any other employer, and compete with Manitowoc 
Company.  Lanning is restricted from "poaching" any Manitowoc 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
13 
 
Company employee.16  The provision restricting Lanning restrains 
competition by limiting a competitor's access to the labor pool.     
¶27 Manitowoc Company argues that Wis. Stat. § 103.465 
applies only to traditional covenants not to compete wherein an 
employee agrees not to engage in business activities that are 
competitive with those of the employer.  As we stated 
previously, however, our cases reveal that § 103.465 has been 
applied to provisions that constitute restraints of trade other 
than traditional covenants not to compete.  
¶28 Time and again, the case law has focused on the effect 
of the provision of an employment agreement rather than its 
label to determine whether it constitutes a restraint of trade 
governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465.17 
¶29 The cases state that "the explicit purpose of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465, as plainly stated in the statute, is to 
invalidate covenants that impose unreasonable restraints on 
employees"18 and that § 103.465 "essentially deals with restraint 
of trade . . . regardless of whether a restriction is labeled a 
'non-disclosure' provision or a 'covenant not to compete.'"19  
                                                 
16 Manitowoc Co., 371 Wis. 2d 696, ¶17. 
17 See supra ¶¶6-8. 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 "evidences a strong public 
policy against enforcement of trade restraints which are 
determined to be unreasonable upon all employees".  Tatge, 219 
Wis. 2d at 114-15. 
19 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶13 (citing Tatge v. Chambers 
& Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d , 99, 111-12, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998); 
Gary Van Zeeland Talent, 84 Wis. 2d at 218-21. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
14 
 
Whether a particular agreement constitutes a restraint of trade 
is based not upon how the agreement is labeled but upon the 
effect of the agreement on employees and competition.20  
¶30 Accordingly, courts have applied Wis. Stat. § 103.465 
to 
traditional 
non-compete 
agreements, 
non-solicitation 
of 
customer 
agreements, 
and 
non-disclosure/confidentiality 
agreements between employers and employees as well as a no-hire 
provision between two employers.21  
¶31 In 1995,22 1997,23 and 2015,24 the legislature amended 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 but chose not to amend the statute in such 
                                                 
20 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶13-14 ("[A] restrictive 
covenant may be made between employers that acts as a covenant 
not to compete on the employees. . . .  The effect of the no-
hire provision is to restrict the employment of Greenbriar's 
employees; it is inconsequential whether the restriction is 
termed a 'no-hire' provision between Dove and Greenbriar or a 
'covenant 
not 
to 
compete' 
between 
Greenbriar 
and 
its 
employees."). 
21 See supra ¶¶6-8. 
 
22 As adopted in 1957, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (1957-58) read 
as follows: 
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to 
compete with his employer or principal during the term 
of the employment or agency, or thereafter, within a 
specified territory and during a specified time is 
lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the employer or principal.  Any such restrictive 
covenant 
imposing 
an 
unreasonable 
restraint 
is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to so much of 
the covenant or performance as would be a reasonable 
restraint.   
Ch. 444, Laws of 1957. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
15 
 
a way as to undermine the court's broad application of the 
statute.  Legislative acquiescence to a judicial construction of 
a statute gives rise to a presumption, albeit sometimes a weak 
one, that an earlier judicial construction should stand.25  This 
precept of statutory interpretation reinforces the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                             
A 1995 amendment replaced "his employer" with "his or her 
employer."  1995 Wis. Act 225, § 347. 
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 was amended by 1997 Wis. Act 
253, § 81.  The changes are shown in italics: 
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to 
compete with his or her employer or principal during 
the term of the employment or agency, or after the 
termination of that employment or agency, within a 
specified territory and during a specified time is 
lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the employer or principal.  Any covenant, described in 
this subsection, imposing an unreasonable restraint is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of 
the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint. 
The note to 
§ 81 of the 
Act explains:  
"Replaces 
nonspecific references with specific references for greater 
readability and conformity with current style."   
24 In 2015, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 was amended by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau pursuant to § 35.17(2) to correct 
obvious nonsubstantive errors.  The words "in this subsection" 
were changed to "in this section."  See 2015 Wis. Act 197, § 51. 
25 See, e.g., Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶124 n.76, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 
N.W.2d 866; Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 
2012 WI 65, ¶43 n.21, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367; Wenke v. 
Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶¶32, 33, 35, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 
N.W.2d 405; State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶38, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 
627 N.W.2d 195; Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471-72, 290 
N.W.2d 510 (1980). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
16 
 
stare decisis and supports the interpretation of the statute set 
forth herein.26 
¶32 Manitowoc Company maintains that the non-solicitation 
provision does not restrict competition by Lanning or restrain 
employees.  Lanning and Manitowoc Company employees are free to 
work for anyone, including a competitor, and competitors are 
"free to hire any Manitowoc employee(s) to take any job at their 
company . . . . By 
the 
plain 
language . . . it 
was 
not 
Manitowoc's intent to prevent any employees from leaving or 
                                                 
26 In interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 103.465, the 
concurrence renounces reliance on prior judicial interpretations 
of the statute, interprets the statute anew, and would overrule 
the decision in Heyde, a decision interpreting the statute that 
has stood for 15 years and has never been repudiated by the 
legislature.  Neither Manitowoc Company nor Lanning has asked 
this court to overrule Heyde.    
The 
concurrence 
advocates 
an 
interpretive 
rule 
significantly different from the generally accepted rule that 
when 
a 
court 
interprets 
a 
statute, 
prior 
judicial 
interpretations of the statute become "as much a part of the 
statute as if plainly written into it originally."  State ex 
rel. Klinger v. Baird, 56 Wis. 2d 460, 468, 202 N.W.2d 31 
(1972).  See also Champlin v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 621, 624, 267 
N.W.2d 295 (1978) (quoting Klinger); Clean Water Action Council 
of N.E. Wis. v. DNR, 2014 WI App 61, ¶16, 354 Wis. 2d 286, 848 
N.W.2d 336 (quoting Klinger).    
Ordinarily (and in the instant case), this court should not 
reach beyond the issues presented in the petition for review and 
should not overrule a prior judicial decision that the parties 
accept as pertinent, without at least affording the parties an 
opportunity to brief the issue of the continued validity of the 
decision.  This approach to judicial interpretation of a statute 
comports with the important concepts of precedent and finality. 
Stare decisis, although not an absolute rule, is important to 
promote finality and predictability in the law and is undermined 
by the concurrence's reasoning.   
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
17 
 
joining another employer, and/or to restrict their mobility or 
ability to practice and earn a living in their chosen field.  
Rather, the intent of the clause was to limit a key employee 
like 
Lanning 
from 
raiding 
Manitowoc 
employees. . . ."27  
According to Manitowoc Company, "the harm [to the Company] is 
the loss of the employee itself——not any potential competition 
that employee could provide against Manitowoc after leaving."28       
¶33 The effect of Lanning's non-solicitation provision is 
to prevent Lanning and a Manitowoc Company competitor from 
competing fully with Manitowoc Company in the labor pool by 
soliciting Manitowoc Company employees.  The provision prevents 
Lanning from taking steps to persuade a Manitowoc Company 
employee to leave Manitowoc Company, which would limit the 
ability of Lanning and other Manitowoc Company employees from 
working together in the future.  Thus, the provision prevents 
employees of Manitowoc Company from having complete information 
regarding employment opportunities elsewhere.  It limits a 
potentially 
valuable 
professional 
resource 
Lanning 
would 
otherwise 
have 
regarding 
resources 
in 
the 
labor 
market.  
Although the law encourages the mobility of workers, Lanning's 
non-solicitation of employees provision hinders the mobility of 
                                                 
27 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 31-32 (emphasis in brief). 
28 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 39-40. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
18 
 
Manitowoc Company employees.29  This court has stated that "the 
fundamental right of a person to make choices about his or her 
own employment is well-established."30     
¶34 In 
sum, 
the 
cases 
have 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465 as including more than the "textbook example" of an 
employee covenant not to compete with his or her employer.  In 
the instant case, the effect of Lanning's non-solicitation of 
                                                 
29 "The law, however, does not protect against the raiding 
of a competitor's employees.  Rather, it encourages the mobility 
of workers."  Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brass, 2001 WI App 92, 
¶17, 242 Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 648, overruled on other grounds 
by Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d at ¶78 n.12; see also Genzyme Corp. 
v. Bishop, 460 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947 (W.D. Wis. 2006) ("[T]he 
public policy underlying Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is that Wisconsin 
law favors the mobility of workers.").  
30 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶22.   
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the ability to make 
choices about one's own employment "is an elementary part of the 
rights of personal liberty . . . ."  Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922).   
Judge Learned Hand wrote regarding an employer's ability to 
offer a job to a competitor's employee and the employee's 
ability to take the job as follows: 
Nobody has ever thought, so far as we can find, that 
in the absence of some monopolistic purpose every one 
has not the right to offer better terms to another's 
employe, so long as the latter is free to leave.  The 
result of the contrary would be intolerable, both to 
such 
employers 
as 
could 
use 
the 
employe 
more 
effectively and to such employes as might receive 
added pay.  It would put an end to any kind of 
competition. 
Triangle Film Corp. v. Artcraft Pictures Corp., 250 F. 981, 982 
(2d Cir. 1918).    
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
19 
 
employees provision is clear.  The provision restricts one form 
of competition with Manitowoc Company.  It restricts Lanning 
(and any employee of Manitowoc Company) from freely competing 
against Manitowoc Company in the labor market by insulating any 
Manitowoc Company employee from Lanning's solicitations.    
¶35 We agree with the reasoning of the court of appeals 
that Lanning's non-solicitation of employees provision is a 
restraint of trade governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  As the 
court of appeals explained: 
It is no leap of logic to conclude that a provision 
aimed 
at 
restricting 
a 
former 
employee 
from 
"systematically poaching" the valuable and talented 
employees of his former employer is a restraint of 
trade.  Lanning may not, among other things, compete 
with Manitowoc by attempting to recruit Manitowoc's 
best employees.  While the NSE provision does not 
circumscribe Lanning's own employment opportunities, 
it nevertheless limits how Lanning——now employed by a 
direct competitor——can compete with Manitowoc.  In 
short, the NSE provision does not allow for the 
ordinary sort of competition attendant to a free 
market, 
which 
includes 
recruiting 
employees 
from 
competitors. 
Lanning, 371 Wis. 2d 696, ¶17. 
¶36 Our reasoning and conclusion are in accord with 
federal courts interpreting Wisconsin law31 and with cases in 
                                                 
31 In Corporate Express Office Products, Inc. v. Brown, 2001 
WL 34381111 (W.D. Wis. July 18, 2001), the non-solicitation of 
employees provision was similar to Lanning's provision.  The 
federal district court held that although the employer had an 
interest 
in 
retaining 
experienced 
employees, 
the 
non-
solicitation provision was not necessary to advance that 
interest.  Corporate Express, 2001 WL 34381111, at *7-8. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
20 
 
other jurisdictions interpreting non-solicitation of employees 
provisions.32  These decisions have determined that similar non-
solicitation of employees provisions constitute restraints of 
trade.  These decisions are not binding on this court but are 
persuasive. 
¶37 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the non-
solicitation of employees provision at issue is a restraint of 
trade governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465. 
IV 
¶38 Having concluded that Wis. Stat. § 103.465 applies to 
Lanning's non-solicitation of employees provision, we address 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Golder Assocs., Inc. v. Edge Envt'l, Inc., 
2007 WL 987458 (D. Colo. 2007), (finding that a similar non-
solicitation of employees agreement was governed by a Colorado 
statute prohibiting "any covenant not to compete which restricts 
the right of any person to receive compensation for performance 
of skilled or unskilled labor" because "the non-solicitation 
clause at issue in this case could be interpreted to as [sic] 
having the effect of preventing the [employees] from working 
together at [competitor] and, therefore, it is covered by 
restraint 
[sic] 
of 
trade 
prohibition 
contained 
in 
[the 
statute]"); Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., P.C. v. McHugh, 28 
S.W.3d 345, 348-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a non-
solicitation of employees provision was a restraint of trade 
because 
"[c]ompetition 
in 
the 
marketplace 
encompasses 
competition in the labor market" and the provision can be used 
to restrict the flow of competitive information about the labor 
market, including the availability of opportunities and offers 
of employment to an employer's at-will workforce and has the 
effect of reducing competition in the labor market and is a 
restrictive 
covenant); 
Lazer 
Inc. 
v. 
Kesselring, 
823 
N.Y.S.2d 834, 836-39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (concluding that "a 
covenant not to solicit former co-employees is a species, albeit 
a limited one, of a covenant not to compete in the broad 
sense . . ."). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
21 
 
the second issue of law presented, namely, whether the provision 
is enforceable under § 103.465. 
¶39 Beginning 
in 
Lakeside 
Oil 
Co. 
v. 
Slutsky, 
8 
Wis. 2d 157, 162-67, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959), and continuing in the 
case law thereafter, the court has interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 as "establishing five prerequisites that a restrictive 
covenant must meet in order to be enforceable."33   
¶40 The five "prerequisites" that must be met are as 
follows.  The restraint must:  
(1) be necessary for the protection of the employer, 
that is, the employer must have a protectable interest 
justifying the restriction imposed on the activity of 
the employee;  
(2) provide a reasonable time limit;  
(3) provide a reasonable territorial limit;  
(4) not be harsh or oppressive as to the employee; and  
(5) not be contrary to public policy. 
Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶20.   
¶41 If Lanning's non-solicitation of employees provision 
fails to satisfy even one of these "prerequisites," the entire 
non-solicitation of employees provision is invalid.  By enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465, the legislature made a policy choice to 
place the burden of drafting a reasonable restrictive covenant 
on the employer, who often wields greater bargaining power and 
                                                 
33 Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶20. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
22 
 
is generally in a better position to show that a restraint is no 
broader than is necessary to protect the employer's business.34   
                                                 
34 In Streiff v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 118 
Wis. 2d 602, 608-09, 614-15, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984), the supreme 
court described the background of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 in 1957.  
It was enacted at the suggestion of a legislator who was 
critical of our decision in the second Fullerton Lumber case, 
Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 80 N.W.2d 461 
(1957), in which the court "blue-penciled," that is, judicially 
modified, an unreasonable restrictive covenant by giving it 
effect to the extent that it might be reasonable:   
The legislator wanted a restraint containing overly 
broad and invalid provisions to be struck down in its 
entirety; he apparently did not want the court to give 
effect to an unreasonable restraint to the extent it 
might be reasonable.  The objection to the "Torberg" 
practice, as the legislator noted, is that it tends to 
encourage 
employers 
possessing 
bargaining 
power 
superior to that of the employees to insist upon 
unreasonable and excessive restrictions, secure in the 
knowledge that the promise will be upheld in part, if 
not in full. 
* * * * 
Courts and commentators have engaged in debate over 
the equities of giving effect to reasonable aspects of 
restraints in a covenant.  An argument for giving 
effect to reasonable aspects of a restraint is the 
business need for restrictive covenants and the 
difficulty for larger businesses to tailor each 
covenant 
to 
the 
particular 
requirements 
of 
the 
individual employee.  A principal argument against 
giving effect to reasonable aspects of a restraint is 
that the employer can fashion ominous covenants which 
affect the mobility of employees because of their in 
terrorem effect on employees who respect contractual 
obligations and their effect on competitors who do not 
wish to risk legal difficulties.  At least where the 
restraint is indivisible, it is clear that our 
legislature has balanced the employer's business needs 
and the employee's interest in personal liberty and 
has, by the adoption of sec. 103.465, opted not to 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
23 
 
¶42 We begin with the first prerequisite, that is, that 
the 
Manitowoc 
Company 
must 
have 
a 
protectable 
interest 
justifying the restriction on Lanning's employee's activities.     
¶43 Manitowoc Company asserts that it has an interest in 
protecting itself from "the loss of the employee(s) it trained 
and invested time and capital in, and the institutional 
understanding, 
experience, 
and 
intellectual 
capital 
they 
possess."35  
¶44 The 
text 
of 
the 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees 
provision bars solicitation by Lanning of "any employee(s)" to 
terminate 
employment 
with 
Manitowoc 
Company. 
 
The 
court 
interprets and applies this language in accordance with the 
maxims adopted for the interpretation of restrictive covenants. 
                                                                                                                                                             
give effect even to so much of the covenant as would 
be a reasonable restraint.  The legislature has in 
sec. 103.465 instructed the court as to the equities 
between the parties.  Under sec. 103.465 if an 
indivisible 
covenant 
imposes 
an 
unreasonable 
restraint, 
the 
covenant 
is 
illegal, 
void, 
and 
unenforceable even as to so much of the covenant as 
would be a reasonable restraint. 
See also Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 625, 648 n.76 (1960) ("The employer, having a 
fuller 'picture' of the company's interests and needs than any 
employee, should be in a much better position to show that a 
restraint is no more burdensome than needed to protect the 
employer's legitimate interest.  The employee, on the other 
hand, would find it difficult to show that the restrain is 
unreasonable.").  
35 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 39. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
24 
 
¶45  A restraint of trade to which Wis. Stat. § 103.465 
applies is interpreted in a reasonable way to give the words 
their plain meaning, to give effect where possible to the entire 
provision, and to avoid absurd results.  Star Direct, 319 
Wis. 2d 274, ¶62.  Within this maxim, restrictive covenants are 
disfavored at law, subject to close scrutiny, and are read in 
favor of the employee.  Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶62.   
¶46 The words "any employee" in the non-solicitation of 
employees provision prohibits Lanning from soliciting every one 
of Manitowoc Company's 13,000 world-wide employees.  The words 
"any employee" mean, in common parlance, every employee.  The 
court has in a number of cases explained that a phrase modified 
by the word "any" indicates broad application.36   
¶47 The non-solicitation provision contains no limitations 
based upon the nature of the employee's position within 
Manitowoc Company.  No limitations are based upon Lanning's 
personal familiarity with or influence over a particular 
employee.  There is no limit based upon the geographical 
location in which the employee works.     
                                                 
36 State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶29, 324 Wis. 2d 586, 782 
N.W.2d 415 
(noting 
in 
its 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.19(12) that "a phrase modified by the word 'any' indicates 
broad application.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶25, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 
734 
N.W.2d 411 
(the 
word 
"any" 
modifying 
"person 
or 
"organization" in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. indicates broad 
application); Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 
103, ¶22, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781 (the broad dictionary 
definition of word "any" is used to define "any" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90(6)(b)2.). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
25 
 
¶48 Manitowoc Company asserts a protectable interest in 
protecting its investment of time and capital involved in 
recruiting, training, and developing its employee base from 
"poaching" by a "former employee who ha[s] full awareness of the 
talent and skill set of said employee base."37  At trial, 
Manitowoc Company presented evidence to establish the financial 
and non-monetary costs and harm it experienced in losing and 
trying to replace employees.38  Manitowoc Company asserts that 
the loss of employees harms the Company regardless of whether 
the employee goes to work for a competitor or a non-competitor 
of Manitowoc Company.    
¶49 The argument that Manitowoc Company has a protectable 
interest 
in 
maintaining 
its 
entire 
workforce 
flouts 
the 
generally recognized principle that the law "does not protect 
against the raiding of a competitor's employees."39  The cases 
                                                 
37 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 39. 
38 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 13-14. 
39 Brass, 242 Wis. 2d 733, ¶17, overruled on other grounds 
by Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶78 n.12.; see also Gary Van 
Zeeland Talent, 84 Wis. 2d  at 214 ("[S]o long as a departing 
employee takes with him no more than his experience and 
intellectual development that has ensued while being trained by 
another, and no trade secrets or processes are wrongfully 
appropriated, the law affords no recourse.").  
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
26 
 
and literature explain that ordinarily an employer's protectable 
interest is limited to retaining top-level employees, employees 
who have special skills or special knowledge important to the 
employer's business, or employees who have skills that are 
difficult to replace.40  Ordinarily, a stranger may entice 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Gary Van Zeeland Talent case cites Abbott Laboratories 
v. Norse Chemical Corp., 33 Wis. 2d 445, 463, 147 N.W.2d 529 
(1967) (setting forth the factors a court must consider when 
determining whether certain material qualifies as a "trade 
secret") and K.H. Larsen, Annotation, Former employee's duty, in 
absence of express contract, not to solicit former employer's 
customers or otherwise use his knowledge of customer lists 
acquired in earlier employment,  28 A.L.R. 3d 7, § 4 (1969) 
(collecting cases regarding the right of an employee to use 
general knowledge and experience gained in former employment). 
40 K.H. Larsen, Annotation, Former employee's duty, in 
absence of express contract, not to solicit former employer's 
customers or otherwise use his knowledge of customer lists 
acquired 
in 
earlier 
employment, 
28 
A.L.R. 
3d 
7, 
§ 4[a] 
(Cumulative Supp.):  
Courts 
have 
universally 
recognized 
the 
former 
employee's right to use, in competition with his 
former 
employer, 
general 
knowledge, 
skill, 
and 
experience acquired in the former employment.  
Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 625, 652 (1960) (footnotes omitted): 
It has been uniformly held that general knowledge, 
skill, or facility acquired through training or 
experience while working for an employer appertain 
exclusively to the employee.  The fact that they were 
acquired or developed during the employment does not, 
by itself, give the employer a sufficient interest to 
support a restraining covenant, even though the on-
the-job training has been extensive and costly.  In 
the absence of special circumstances the risk of 
future competition from the employee falls upon the 
employer and cannot be shifted, even though the 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
27 
 
Manitowoc 
Company 
employees 
to 
accept 
employment 
with 
a 
competitor of the Company.41  The court has declared that "[a]n 
employer is not entitled to be protected against legitimate and 
ordinary competition of the type that a stranger could give."42   
¶50 Manitowoc Company drafted the non-solicitation of 
employees provision and could have tailored the language to its 
specific needs.  It does not argue that the non-solicitation of 
employees provision is limited to Lanning's solicitation of only 
certain employees.  Manitowoc Company does not contend that it 
intended to limit the words to apply only to the solicitation of 
employees with sensitive or company-specific information or to 
                                                                                                                                                             
possible damage is greatly increased by experience 
gained in the course of the employment.  
McHugh, 28 S.W.3d at 350: 
[An employer does not have a proprietary interest in 
its employees at will or in their skills.]  The normal 
skills of a trade are not included in an employer's 
protectable interest.  Thus, the basic skill of a 
craftsman 
will 
not 
support 
a 
restrictive 
covenant. . . . The 
fact 
of 
an 
employer-employee 
relationship, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
cause a confidential relationship to exist as to 
knowledge 
which 
is 
the 
natural 
product 
of 
the 
employment.  
For a collection of cases, see 3 Louis Altman & Malla 
Pollack, 
Callmann 
on 
Unfair 
Competition, 
Trademarks 
and 
Monopolies § 16:44 (4th ed. Cum. 2017). 
41 Lakeside Oil, 8 Wis. 2d at 163.  
42 Lakeside Oil, 8 Wis. 2d at 163; see also Star Direct, 319 
Wis. 2d 274, ¶56 (citing Lakeside). 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
28 
 
the solicitation of employees with whom Lanning has worked or to 
those employees with skill sets with which Lanning was familiar.   
¶51 Rather, Manitowoc Company argues that the court should 
apply a "sliding scale" to gauge whether the non-solicitation 
provision meets the prerequisites of Wis. Stat. § 103.465, 
maintaining that because the non-solicitation of employees 
provision is less onerous than a traditional covenant not to 
compete, it should receive less-exacting scrutiny.  In other 
words, 
the 
Company 
argues 
that 
a 
less 
burdensome 
non-
solicitation of employees provision should not be held to the 
same legal requirements as a traditional covenant not to 
compete.43   
¶52 The sliding scale, Manitowoc Company argues, would 
recognize that significant restrictions imposed on an employee 
place a significant burden on the employer to justify the 
restriction by showing that the restriction is no broader than 
is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.44  Less 
significant restrictions imposed on an employee should place a 
less 
significant 
burden 
on 
the 
employer 
to 
justify 
the 
restriction, Manitowoc Company argues.   
¶53 We reject Manitowoc's proposed "sliding scale" approach 
that would subject various restraints of trade and competition 
                                                 
43 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 41. 
44 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner The Manitowoc 
Company, Inc. at 42. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
29 
 
to different legal standards.  The sliding scale approach has no 
basis in Wisconsin law.  
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 does not create separate 
legal standards applicable to traditional and non-traditional 
non-compete provisions.  Our 
legislature 
has 
balanced 
the 
employer's business needs and the employee's interest in 
personal liberty under § 103.465 and has declared that if an 
agreement imposes an unreasonable restraint, it is illegal, 
void, and unenforceable even as to so much of the covenant as 
would be a reasonable restraint.  We are bound by the 
legislature's decision.       
¶55 Because 
Lanning's 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees 
provision 
restrains 
trade 
by 
restraining 
competition 
and 
inhibiting the mobility of employees, it must meet all five 
prerequisites identified in Lakeside Oil and Star Direct in 
order to be enforceable under Wisconsin law.  Manitowoc Company 
has the burden to prove that Lanning's non-solicitation of 
employees provision meets all five prerequisites.45     
¶56 The plain language of Lanning's non-solicitation of  
employees provision creates a sweeping prohibition that prevents 
Lanning from encouraging any Manitowoc Company employee, no 
matter the employee's job or location, to terminate his or her 
employment with Manitowoc Company for any reason, or soliciting 
                                                 
45 Star Direct, 319 Wis. 2d 274, ¶20. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
30 
 
any Manitowoc Company employee to take any position with any 
competitor, supplier, or customer of Manitowoc Company.   
¶57 Lanning does not have specialized knowledge about all 
of Manitowoc Company's 13,000 world-wide employees across both 
its construction crane and food service equipment divisions. 
Lanning does not have a relationship with every Manitowoc 
Company employee.  Yet Lanning's non-solicitation of employees 
provision prevents him from encouraging any Manitowoc Company 
employee to terminate his or her employment. 
¶58 Noting the extensive reach of the language of the non-
solicitation of employees provision, the court of appeals 
explained that "Manitowoc has drafted a provision that requires 
it to prove that it has a protectable interest in preventing 
Lanning from encouraging any employee to leave Manitowoc for any 
reason, or to take any job with any competitor, supplier, or 
customer."  Lanning, 371 Wis. 2d 696, ¶30. 
¶59 In applying the prerequisites that must be met under 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, 
that the non-solicitation of employees provision is overbroad on 
its face.  Without a specified territory or class of employees, 
the provision restricts Lanning's conduct as to all employees of 
Manitowoc Company everywhere.  Lanning's non-solicitation of 
employees provision covers each of the 13,000 Manitowoc Company 
employees regardless of the business unit in which they work or 
where in the world they are located.  
¶60 We agree with the court of appeals that Manitowoc 
Company has failed to satisfy the first prerequisite, namely 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
31 
 
that Manitowoc Company does not have a protectable interest 
justifying the restriction imposed on the activity of the 
employee.  Because our conclusion as to the first prerequisite 
is dispositive, we need not and do not consider the other four 
prerequisites.   
¶61 The non-solicitation of employees provision cannot 
survive simply because Manitowoc Company seeks to enforce the 
non-solicitation provision in the instant case in a narrower 
situation than that which is compelled by the plain language of 
the agreement.46 
 Enforcing an overbroad restraint to the 
extent it can be reasonably enforced is exactly what § 103.465 
was enacted to prevent.        
¶62 A non-solicitation of employees provision may be 
enforceable under Wis. Stat. § 103.465 if it is reasonably 
necessary to protect the employer and reasonable as to time, 
geography, and type of conduct covered.47  Manitowoc Company 
failed to show that it has a protectable interest justifying the 
sweeping restriction imposed by the plain language on Lanning's 
non-solicitation 
of 
employees. 
 
Lanning's 
non-solicitation 
provision does not meet the prerequisites under § 103.465.    
¶63 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 applies to Lanning's non-solicitation of employees 
provision.  Because Lanning's non-solicitation of employees 
                                                 
46 Manitowoc Co., 371 Wis. 2d 696, ¶19.   
47 Lakeside Oil, 8 Wis. 2d at 163-67. 
No. 
2015AP1530   
 
32 
 
provision does not meet the statutory requirement that the 
restriction be "reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
employer," 
it 
is 
an 
unreasonable 
restraint 
of 
trade 
unenforceable under the statute. 
¶64 Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Lanning. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶65 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
lead opinion's decision affirming the court of appeals and its 
holding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465, 
entitled 
"Restrictive 
covenants 
in 
employment 
contracts," 
applies 
to 
Lanning's 
nonsolicitation of employees covenant (NSE).  I also agree that 
this NSE is unreasonable under the Lakeside Oil1 prerequisites.  
I write separately because the lead opinion neglects to 
undertake a textual analysis of § 103.465, instead grounding its 
interpretation of the statute almost exclusively in Wisconsin 
case law in which the court has interpreted and applied 
§ 103.465 expansively, sometimes straying far from the text in 
advancing policy choices that should be made legislatively, not 
judicially.  For example, the lead opinion liberally cites Heyde 
Cos., Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 
654 N.W.2d 830, which should be overruled as unsound in 
principle because its analysis is patently wrong.  Additionally, 
I caution that merely because the court concludes § 103.465 
applies to this NSE, not every NSE provision necessarily falls 
under the purview of that statute.   
I 
¶66 The lead opinion skips the critical first step of 
statutory analysis——examining the plain language of the text.  
In abandoning this process, the lead opinion risks reading into 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 imagined words derived from the court's 
perception of the legislature's unspoken policies and purpose.  
                                                 
1 Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 
(1959).  
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
2 
 
Of course, legislative policies and purpose may aid the court in 
its interpretative function, but only to the extent they are 
discernable from the actual text of the statute.2   
¶67 For this reason, statutory analysis must begin with 
the plain language of the statute.  State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. 
Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  "Statutory language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Where "the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."3  
Id. (citations omitted).  
Generally, statutory meaning comes from examining the text, 
context and structure of the statute.  See Wisconsin Carry, Inc. 
v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶20 n.15, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 
N.W.2d 233.   
¶68 The text of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is relatively plain.  
For the most part, the dissent correctly and succinctly examines 
the relevant words and their ordinary meanings.  Dissent, ¶¶10-
14.  In summary and in the context of the facts presented here, 
                                                 
2 "[T]he purpose must be derived from the text, not from 
extrinsic sources such as legislative history or an assumption 
about the legal drafter's desires."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 
(2012). 
3 The court does not consult extrinsic sources unless the 
statute is ambiguous, that is to say, "it is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses."  State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
3 
 
§ 103.465 governs only covenants between an employer and its 
employee in which the employee agrees not to compete with the 
employer.  The enforceability of such a covenant depends in part 
upon the inclusion of limits on its duration and territorial 
scope.  Its restrictions must also be "reasonably necessary for 
the protection of the employer." 
¶69 The crux of the issue presented in this case is 
whether this NSE constitutes a covenant not to compete within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  While I agree with the 
lead opinion's conclusion that § 103.465 governs this NSE, I 
depart from its over-expansive analysis of the statute.   
¶70 Because this court has never applied the statute to an 
NSE between an employer and an employee, it is fundamental to 
first identify what an NSE is.  Black's Law Dictionary defines a 
"nonsolicitation agreement" as "[a] promise . . . in . . . an 
employment contract, to refrain, for a specified period of time, 
from . . . enticing 
employees 
to 
leave 
a 
company."  
Nonsolicitation agreement, Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (10th ed. 
2014).  Here, Lanning entered into a nonsolicitation agreement 
by promising that he would "not (either directly or indirectly) 
solicit, induce, or encourage any employee(s) to terminate their 
employment with Manitowoc or to accept employment with any 
competitor, supplier or customer of Manitowoc."   
¶71 In order to determine if this NSE may be subject to 
close scrutiny under Wis. Stat. § 103.465, I begin with the 
types of restrictive covenants the text of the statute covers.  
The first sentence of the statute identifies as its subject 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
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matter "[a] covenant . . . not to compete."  The dissent defines 
"compete" as "the struggle for commercial advantage," equating 
competition with actions by an employee laboring for commercial 
advantage over his or her employer.  This definition broadly 
encompasses all sorts of restrictive covenants.  The dissent, 
however, does not consider the phrase "covenant not to compete" 
as a legal term of art. 
¶72 Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "covenant not to 
compete" as "[a]n agreement, generally part of a contract of 
employment . . . in which the covenantor agrees for a specific 
period of time and within a particular area to refrain from 
competition with the covenantee."  Covenant not to compete, 
Black's Law Dictionary 364 (6th ed. 1990).  The title of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 also refers to covenants not to compete as 
"Restrictive covenants in employment contracts."4  In the context 
of an employment contract, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"[r]estrictive covenant" as a provision that "limit[s] a 
contracting 
party 
after 
termination 
of 
the 
contract 
in 
performing certain work for a period of time within a certain 
                                                 
4 Under Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6), "titles to subchapters, 
subsections, paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and 
history notes are not part of the statutes."  "Although titles 
are not part of statutes, see Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6), they may 
be helpful in interpretation.  Nevertheless text must control 
over title."  Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 
68, 73, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996).  "The title and headings [of a 
statute] are permissible indicators of meaning" although "a 
title or heading should never be allowed to override the plain 
words of a text."  Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 221-22.  
Here, the title and the text are harmonious. 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
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geographic area."  Restrictive covenant, id. at 1315.  While the 
NSE does not altogether prohibit Lanning from going to work for 
a 
competitor, 
it 
does 
restrain 
Lanning 
from 
soliciting, 
inducing, or encouraging any Manitowoc employee from accepting 
employment with any Manitowoc competitor, thereby limiting 
Lanning in performing certain work——namely, recruitment for his 
new employer, a competitor of Manitowoc's.  Notwithstanding the 
NSE's label, it constitutes a restrictive covenant by an 
employee not to engage in a particular form of competition with 
the employer both during his employment and for a two-year 
period after his employment ends.  Accordingly, Lanning's NSE is 
a type of covenant "described in this section" under § 103.465. 
¶73 The dissent reaches the opposite conclusion but errs 
in adopting a cramped construction of what it means to "compete" 
with a former employer.  Proposing a definition of competition 
as "the struggle for commercial advantage," the dissent then 
inexplicably asserts the NSE "protects against only the raiding 
of Manitowoc's key employees by Lanning" but "does not prevent 
Lanning from competing with Manitowoc."  Dissent, ¶38.  The 
dissent thereby narrowly rewrites the scope of the NSE, which is 
clearly much broader.  By its very terms, the NSE applies not 
only to key employees but "any employee(s)" and the NSE 
prohibits not only "raiding" of "key" employees but also, for 
example, encouraging an entry-level employee to terminate his or 
her employment to pursue higher education.  For this reason 
(among others), the lead opinion correctly concludes that the 
NSE is not reasonably necessary for Manitowoc's protection as 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
6 
 
Manitowoc 
cannot 
demonstrate 
a 
protectable 
interest 
in 
prohibiting Lanning from encouraging an unskilled Manitowoc 
employee to retire in order to spend more time with family (an 
example aptly stated by the court of appeals in this case).  
Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, 2016 WI App 72, ¶24, 371 Wis. 2d 696, 
885 N.W.2d 798. 
¶74 The 
dissent 
proceeds 
to 
adopt 
the 
internally 
contradictory position of Manitowoc.  On one hand, it notes that 
"Lanning and SANY's recruitment efforts were successful.  Key 
employees left Manitowoc and joined SANY."  Dissent, ¶6.  The 
dissent accurately identifies the adverse effect on the employer 
(here, Manitowoc):  "the former employer will become a less 
effective competitor."  Dissent, ¶45.  Nonetheless, the dissent 
views Lanning's role as something other than competing with 
Manitowoc despite the obvious "commercial advantage" to Lanning 
individually 
in 
enhancing 
his 
new 
employer's 
competitive 
position in the marketplace at the expense of Manitowoc.  
Contrary to the dissent's construction, nothing in the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 restricts its application to covenants not 
to work for the employer's competitor and nothing in the 
statutory text exempts covenants not to compete on behalf of the 
employer's 
competitor. 
 
Logically, 
recruiting 
Manitowoc 
employees to join a Manitowoc competitor is a form of 
competition by Lanning and that aspect of the NSE's restriction 
subjects it to the close scrutiny of § 103.465. 
II 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
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¶75 While the dissent's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 is too restrictive, the lead opinion errs in the other 
direction.  Typically relying on the second sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465, referring to "any covenant described in this 
section imposing an unreasonable restraint," this court over 
time opened wide the semantic door through which an assortment 
of restrictive covenants were brought under § 103.465's purview.  
See lead op., ¶¶6-8; Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 
99, 112, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998) (reasoning that it "would be an 
exercise in semantics to overlook" § 103.465's applicability to 
different 
types 
of 
restrictive 
covenants 
"merely 
because . . . the agreement is not labeled a 'covenant not to 
compete'").  For example, in Heyde the court concluded that a 
no-hire provision between two companies "acts as a restrictive 
covenant on [the covenantee's] employees" even though the 
covenant was not made in an employment contract and was not 
otherwise made by any employee; therefore, it could not possibly 
constitute a "covenant described in this section," regardless of 
whether it in effect operated to restrict the employment 
opportunities of the covenantee's employees.   
¶76  The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 applies 
only 
to 
certain 
covenants 
between 
an 
employer 
and 
its 
"assistant, servant or agent."  As the dissent notes, "servant" 
encompasses an employee.  Dissent, ¶11.  Nothing in the text 
intimates an extension of its application beyond the employer-
employee relationship.  Nonetheless, the court in Heyde set the 
statutory text aside and divined an overriding statutory 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
8 
 
"purpose" that could be advanced only by ignoring certain words 
in the statute so as to capture contracts between two businesses 
within the ambit of § 103.465.  Relying on Heyde, the lead 
opinion in this case lends continued but unwarranted credence to 
Heyde's erroneous application of the statute by concluding 
"Lanning's nonsolicitation of employees provision is a restraint 
of trade governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465" because "the 
limitation on Lanning also affects access to the labor pool by a 
competitor of Manitowoc Company (including, Lanning's current 
employer SANY America)" and "hinders the mobility of Manitowoc 
Company employees."  Lead op., ¶¶9, 33.   
¶77 The lead opinion mistakenly emphasizes a relationship 
not contemplated by the statute, namely one between two 
employers, SANY and Manitowoc, as well as the NSE's effect on 
the mobility of Manitowoc employees generally.  Other than 
Lanning himself, no SANY or Manitowoc employees are party to the 
NSE; 
therefore, 
neither 
SANY 
nor 
Manitowoc 
workers 
are 
considerations in applying Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  Accordingly, 
we should not base our interpretation of the statute on the 
NSE's effect, if any, on SANY's ability to compete with 
Manitowoc or the mobility of its workers generally.  The focal 
relationship under § 103.465 is the one between the employer, 
Manitowoc, and the employee, Lanning.  In basing part of its 
determination regarding the statute's applicability on SANY's 
ability to compete and Manitowoc employees' mobility, the lead 
opinion further widens the rabbit hole encircling Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 by extending the statute beyond the only contract 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
9 
 
mentioned in the statute——a covenant between an employer and its 
assistant, servant, or agent.   
¶78 Because Heyde provides the foundation for courts to 
disregard the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 in order to 
apply it inappropriately in the name of good public policy, I 
would overrule it as unsound in principle.  Decisions to 
overrule prior case law depend on the presence of one or more of 
the following circumstances:  
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts; (3) there is a showing that the precedent has 
become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the 
law; (4) the prior decision is "unsound in principle;" 
or (5) the prior decision is "unworkable in practice." 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. 
Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 
(citing Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).  Although 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
predating 
Kalal 
"generat[ed] some analytical confusion," 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶43, 
the basic tenets of plain language interpretation were well 
established when this court decided Heyde.  See, e.g., Moorman 
Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 241 Wis. 200, 208, 5 N.W.2d 743 
(1942)("The meaning of a legislative act must be determined from 
what it says——not by what the framer of the act intended to say 
or what he thought he was saying."); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 8 Wis. 2d 582, 591, 99 N.W.2d 821 (1959) 
("The meaning of a legislative act must be determined from the 
language used."); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45; Wisconsin Carry, 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
10 
 
Inc., 373 Wis. 2d 543, ¶20 n.15.  See generally Daniel Suhr, 
Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 (2017). 
¶79 This 
court 
began 
its 
analysis 
in 
Heyde 
by 
acknowledging 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465 
"only 
refers 
to 
covenants between employers and employees"; nevertheless, it 
wholly ignored this language in favor of a liberal construction 
to achieve what it deemed the legislature's purpose underlying 
the statute.  258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶13-15.  The text of the statute, 
however, is devoid of any mention of this "purpose."  In 
adopting this interpretation, the Heyde court deviated from what 
already was a fundamental principle of statutory construction——
interpreting a statute to mean what the text actually says.   
¶80 The Heyde court justified its application of the 
statute to a no-hire provision in a services contract between 
two businesses because by "restricting one employer's ability to 
hire former employees of the other employer," by "indirection," 
the covenant restricted "the employees' future opportunities of 
employment."  Heyde, 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶14; id., ¶28 (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring).  This interpretation flouted the statute's 
language in order to favor "those intended to benefit from" Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465, never mind the statute's utter silence on whom 
the legislature intended to advantage.  Id., ¶15.   
¶81 Indeed, until Heyde, no Wisconsin court had ever 
applied Wis. Stat. § 103.465 to any restrictive covenant other 
than those "by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete 
with his or her employer or principal."  The Heyde court boldly 
labeled 
this 
unprecedented 
leap 
beyond 
the 
plain 
text 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
11 
 
"inconsequential."  Id., ¶14.  The Heyde court's failure to give 
effect to the actual words of the statute in order to advance 
judicial notions of the public interest propels the lead opinion 
in this case along an unsound analytical path.  Although the 
lead opinion correctly concludes that § 103.465 applies to 
Lanning's NSE, it incorrectly supports its conclusion with 
Heyde's shaky reasoning:  because the NSE hinders the mobility 
of Manitowoc employees and affects SANY's ability to compete 
with Manitowoc, the statute applies.  In order to steer the 
scope of § 103.465 back to its textual bounds, I would overrule 
Heyde as unsound in principle and reinstitute a plain language 
interpretation of the statute, confining its application to an 
employee's covenant not to compete with an employer.5   
                                                 
5 The people of Wisconsin should be wary of the lead 
opinion's suggestion that prior judicial interpretations of a 
statute become set in stone once decreed.  Lead op., ¶31 n.26.  
Reflexively cloaking every judicial opinion with the adornment 
of stare decisis threatens the rule of law, particularly when 
applied to interpretations wholly unsupported by the statute's 
text.  In evaluating whether to persist in upholding a decision 
that elevated judicially-imagined legislative purpose over the 
words the legislature actually enacted, "[i]t is well to keep in 
mind just how thoroughly [the court's opinion] rewrote the 
statute it purported to construe."  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 
480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  When a 
judicial opinion like Heyde replaces the words the legislature 
actually wrote with language the court preferred, in advancing 
the court's own policy choices, courts of last resort are duty-
bound to correct the prior court's error. 
 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
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¶82 The dissent warns that the outcome of the lead 
opinion's holding will leave employers "unable to prevent 
raiding of their key employees by a former employee."  Dissent, 
¶45.  Employers are not so hamstrung.  The NSE Lanning signed 
could have been narrowly drawn to protect a legitimate interest 
of Manitowoc and to satisfy the other prerequisites identified 
in Lakeside Oil.  Finally, while the court concludes that Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 applies to Lanning's NSE, this conclusion should 
not be interpreted to mean that § 103.465 will categorically 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, the lead opinion's conclusion that we can glean 
anything from the legislature's inaction in the 15 years 
following 
Heyde 
has 
long 
been 
discredited. 
 
"[I]t 
[is] 
impossible 
to 
assert 
with 
any 
degree 
of 
assurance 
that 
congressional failure to act represents (1) approval of the 
status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to 
alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) 
indifference 
to 
the 
status 
quo, 
or 
even 
(5) 
political 
cowardice."  Id. at 672.  "[E]ven if we were prepared to let 
members of Congress authoritatively express their collective 
ratification of a judicial decision without using the formal 
legislative process, the failure to pass an override bill is 
weak evidence of any such collective ratification.  In most 
cases, it is easy to imagine that Congress would not have 
overridden the opposite decision either.  After all, enacting a 
new statute is a lot harder than not enacting a new statute."  
Caleb 
Nelson, 
Stare 
Decisis 
and 
Demonstrably 
Erroneous 
Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 77 (2001).  The lead opinion 
invokes the importance of promoting finality and predictability 
in the law in its application of stare decisis to Heyde.  
However, Heyde "is a demonstration not of stability and order, 
but of the instability and unpredictable expansion which the 
substitution of judicial improvisation for statutory text has 
produced."  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672.  Because Heyde's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 finds no mooring in 
statutory text, it does not deserve the status of inalterable 
law that stare decisis would afford it. 
No.  2015AP1530.rgb 
 
13 
 
apply to every NSE.  Applying § 103.465 to a particular 
restrictive covenant always requires a fact-specific inquiry. 
¶83 I agree with the lead opinion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 applies to this NSE, and under the Lakeside Oil 
prerequisites, it is unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.  
Because the lead opinion looks beyond the text of the statute to 
consider the effect of this NSE on Manitowoc's workforce and 
competitors rather than solely the employee restrained by the 
covenant, I respectfully concur. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justices MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶85 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
lead opinion distorts the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 103.465, 
thereby changing it from a statute that balanced the rights of 
employees and their employers into a broad mandate that prevents 
employers from protecting their businesses from third-party 
raiding.  In so doing, it permits John M. Lanning to assist SANY 
America, Inc. in cherry picking Manitowoc Company, Inc.'s key 
employees and thereby reduces the competition that Manitowoc 
would otherwise be able to exert against SANY, as both compete 
in the same marketplace.   
¶86 Because I conclude that the Non-Solicitation of 
Employees (NSE) clause in Lanning's employment contract with 
Manitowoc does not come within the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 and is enforceable, I respectfully dissent.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶87 Manitowoc, a Wisconsin employer, participates in a 
global market, where one of its divisions manufactures and 
services large cranes.  Lanning was a contract employee of 
Manitowoc's crane division, where he worked as an engineer for 
more than 24 years.  During his employment he signed several 
contracts of employment with Manitowoc; however, all parties 
agree that the contract at issue here was signed August 11, 
2008.  
¶88 Manitowoc 
was 
concerned 
with 
protecting 
its 
confidential information that permitted it to compete in a 
global marketplace, and it emphasized that concern in Lanning's 
employment contract.  The NSE clause in Lanning's contract with 
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
2 
 
Manitowoc was preceded by the following acknowledgement that was 
set out in all caps: 
I AM EMPLOYED OR MAY BE EMPLOYED BY MANITOWOC IN A 
CAPACITY IN WHICH I MAY RECEIVE OR CONTRIBUTE TO 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.  IN CONSIDERATION OF SUCH 
EMPLOYMENT OR CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT, AND THE WAGES, 
SALARY OR COMMISSIONS AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN 
COMPENSATION FOR MY SERVICES, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF 
BEING GIVEN ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, I 
AGREE TO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING: 
¶89 As a Manitowoc employee who had access to Manitowoc's 
confidential information, Lanning agreed:   
(2) Non-Solicitation of Employees.  I agree that 
during my Employment by Manitowoc and for a period of 
two years from the date my Employment by Manitowoc 
ends 
for 
any 
reason, 
including 
termination 
by 
Manitowoc with or without cause, I will not (either 
directly or indirectly) solicit, induce or encourage 
any employee(s) to terminate their employment with 
Manitowoc or to accept employment with any competitor, 
supplier or customer of Manitowoc.   
¶90 In January 2010, Lanning terminated his employment 
with Manitowoc and went to work for SANY, a worldwide competitor 
of Manitowoc's crane division.  Shortly after joining SANY, 
Lanning and SANY began an aggressive attack on Manitowoc, as 
SANY attempted to hire Manitowoc's skilled employees.  For 
example, Lanning took a Manitowoc employee to lunch during 
SANY's recruitment efforts.  He accompanied another employee on 
a SANY plant tour in China and participated in SANY interviews 
of Manitowoc employees.  Lanning and SANY's recruitment efforts 
were successful.  Key employees left Manitowoc and joined SANY.   
¶91 Lanning has not denied that he violated the NSE clause 
in his employment contract.  The circuit court found that he 
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
3 
 
breached his contract with Manitowoc and awarded compensatory 
damages.  The court of appeals reversed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶92 This case turns on the interpretation and potential 
application of Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  Statutory interpretation 
and application present questions of law that we decide 
independently, while benefitting from the analyses of the court 
of appeals and the circuit court.  DeHart v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 
2007 WI 91, ¶8, 302 Wis. 2d 564, 734 N.W.2d 394. 
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
1.  General principles 
¶93 The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine the statute's meaning so that we can give the statute 
its proper effect.  Id., ¶12 (citing State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. 
Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110).  We begin with the language chosen by the legislature.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Statutory words are given their 
plain and ordinary meaning unless they are technical terms or 
have specific definitions within the statute.  Id.  If the 
meaning of the statute is apparent from the plain meaning of the 
words chosen by the legislature, we ordinarily stop our analysis 
and apply that plain meaning to the questions presented for our 
review.  Id.  We may use legislative history to confirm a plain 
meaning interpretation.  Id., ¶51.   
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
4 
 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 
¶94 We interpret and consider whether to apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465, which provides: 
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to 
compete with his or her employer or principal during 
the term of the employment or agency, or after the 
termination of that employment or agency, within a 
specified territory and during a specified time is 
lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the employer or principal.  Any covenant, described in 
this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of 
the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint.   
¶95 The "covenant" addressed in Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is 
the promise made by an "assistant, servant or agent" and is 
limited in scope in that he or she promises "not to compete" 
with "his or her employer" while employed by the employer or, in 
specified circumstances, after that employment has ended.  An 
employee 
is 
an 
individual 
included 
within 
the 
statute's 
protection of "servant."  Romero v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 
2016 WI App 59, ¶39, 371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 N.W.2d 591 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. g. (1958) ("explaining 
that 'servant' and 'employee' are interchangeable terms")).   
¶96 The statutory language is limited in regard to whom it 
applies.  That is, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 applies only to the 
employee who signs a contract containing such a covenant and 
"his or her employer."  A plain reading of the statute shows 
that the statute is not to be read as applying to a universe of 
employers, but rather, it is directed at one particular 
employer.   
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶97 "To compete" is not defined within the statute.  
Black's Law Dictionary defines competition as, "the struggle for 
commercial advantage."  Black's Law Dictionary 322 (9th ed. 
2009).  Accordingly, competition equates with those actions by 
an employee that evince the struggle for commercial advantage of 
the employee over his or her employer.   
¶98 The statute also says that "any covenant described in 
this section," i.e., a covenant by an employee not to compete 
with his or her employer, that imposes an "unreasonable 
restraint" is not enforceable.  On whom do we focus to determine 
if the covenant is an "unreasonable restraint?"  Plainly, we 
focus on the effect of the covenant on the employee because it 
is the individual employee who made the promise to be restrained 
in his or her actions.   
¶99 It is important to note that the term "trade" is 
nowhere to be found in Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  Nor should it be 
implied because the restraint that § 103.465 addresses is 
plainly the restraint of the employee who signed the NSE 
agreement.  As I will explain in some detail below, it is not a 
broad restraint of trade that is referenced in § 103.465, even 
though some opinions casually incorporate that term.1   
                                                 
1 The court of appeals specifically interpreted the term 
"restraint" in Wis. Stat. § 103.465 as restraining trade.  
Manitowoc Company, Inc. v. Lanning, 2016 WI App 72, ¶14, 371 
Wis. 2d 696, 885 N.W.2d 798.  This interpretation goes far 
beyond what a plain reading of the statute permits and creates a 
universe of persons to which § 103.465 may be applied that is 
much broader than that which the legislature created.     
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶100 A 
restraint 
of 
trade 
is 
prohibited 
under 
the 
provisions of Wisconsin Statutes ch. 133.  A restraint of trade 
has a broad focus.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 133.01 is grounded 
in a different scope of coverage and has a different analysis 
for alleged violations than does Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  Alleged 
restraints of trade are examined under the "rule of reason," 
wherein Wisconsin courts follow federal court analyses of 
alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  
Indep. Milk Producers Co-op v. Stoffel, 102 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7, 298 
N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1980).  Restraints of trade involve such 
matters as monopolies, that inhibit competition, sometimes 
vertically and sometimes horizontally, but on a broad basis.  
See Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, ¶¶13, 14, 284 
Wis. 2d 224, 700 N.W.2d 139.  
¶101 By inserting "restraint of trade" language into our 
opinions, we have moved little by little away from Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465's plain meaning, which addresses only the restraint of 
an employee.  In so doing, we have incrementally broadened what 
the legislature chose to regulate under § 103.465.  We did so 
with a casual reference to a broad doctrine, restraint of trade, 
without reasoning whether 
§ 103.465 actually proscribed a 
restraint of trade or something more narrow.   
¶102 For example, in 1959, in Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 
8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959), we were presented with an 
injunction against a former employee that enforced a covenant 
not to compete.  Slutsky contended that the covenant was a 
restraint of trade and therefore was illegal.  Id. at 161.  In 
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deciding 
whether 
the 
injunction 
was 
properly 
placed, 
we 
evaluated the employment contract in light of controlling 
statutes.  We concluded, the "contract on its face is not 
illegal."  Id.  The statute to which we referred when we 
reviewed whether a "restraint of trade" had occurred was Wis. 
Stat. § 133.01.  Id.  It was not Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  However, 
we noted later in the opinion that in 1957 the legislature had 
enacted § 103.465.  Id. at 161-62.  We then went on to examine 
the effect of the non-compete on the employer and employee, at 
times drawing in antitrust concerns that are properly analyzed 
under § 133.01, but not under § 103.465.  Id. at 167.   
¶103 In Behnke v. Hertz Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 818, 235 N.W.2d 
690 (1975), we addressed a non-compete agreement that National 
Car Rental required of its employee, Barbara Kreft.  The 
agreement provided: 
I agree not to work for any car rental competitor in 
the city of Milwaukee for one year if and when this 
present job is terminated. 
Id. at 820. 
¶104 We began our discussion in Behnke by recognizing that 
the contract provision at issue was controlled by Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465.  Id.  We then mused about various contract provisions 
spoken 
to 
in 
Restatement 
(Second) 
Contracts, 
picking 
up 
"restraint of trade" language from the Restatement.  Id. at 821.  
We did not discuss whether a restraint of trade was a broader 
concept than a restraint of an employee; the question was never 
presented. 
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¶105 In Zimmermann v. Brennan, 78 Wis. 2d 510, 254 N.W.2d 
719 (1977), we examined whether a profit sharing plan provision 
was unenforceable under Wis. Stat. § 103.465 when it provided 
that Zimmermann would lose the unpaid portion of his vested 
interest if he became employed by a "competitive business."  Id. 
at 512.  Zimmermann alleged that "the forfeiture provision 
contained in the plan constituted an unreasonable restraint of 
trade under sec. 103.465, Stats.," using the broad "restraint of 
trade" language found in earlier opinions.  Id.  Although the 
trial court found the provision was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade, we opined that we need not decide whether the trial 
judge's conclusion was correct because the business that 
Zimmermann engaged in subsequent to his employment by Brennan 
was not a "competing business."  Id. at 512-13.    
¶106 In Strief v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 
602, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984), we concluded that a clause in an 
insurance agent's contract was unenforceable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 as "an unreasonable restraint of trade."  Id. at 603-
04.  However, the opinion actually turns on the interpretation 
of the contractual provisions, not on an interpretation of the 
scope of § 103.465.  Id. at 611-12.    
¶107 In Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 579 
N.W.2d 217 (1998), we examined whether a wrongful discharge 
claim would lie for the discharge of an at-will employee who 
refused to sign a non-disclosure, non-compete agreement.  Id. at 
101.  We assumed that the provisions sought to restrain 
competition, and therefore, came within Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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Id. at 112.  We reasoned that § 103.465 "evidences a strong 
public policy against the enforcement of trade restraints which 
are determined to be unreasonable upon all employees."  Id. at 
114-15.   
¶108 Before concluding that no claim for wrongful discharge 
could be made, we explained that "the validity of a restrictive 
covenant is to be established by examination of the particular 
circumstances which surround it."  Id. at 116-17 (citing Rollins 
Burdick Hunter of Wis., Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 468, 
304 N.W.2d 752 (1981) ("What is reasonable varies from case to 
case, and what may be unreasonable in one instance may be very 
reasonable in another.")).  
¶109 In Heyde Cos., Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 
131, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830, we applied Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 to a contract between two corporations.  Id., ¶1.  We 
broadly stated the issue as:  "whether a no-hire provision 
contained in a contract between employers, without the knowledge 
and consent of the affected employees, is unenforceable as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade."  Id., ¶9.  This broad 
statement of the issue permitted us to ignore the plain meaning 
of § 103.465, which requires an employee covenant.  However, 
notwithstanding 
that 
little 
detail, 
i.e., 
the 
words 
the 
legislature chose, we struck down the agreement between two 
companies based on our expansion of § 103.465.  Id., ¶13.   
¶110 Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, 319 Wis. 2d 
274, 767 N.W.2d 898, is our most recent decision involving Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465.  Star Direct involved a business non-compete 
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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clause and a customer non-compete clause in Dal Pra's employment 
contract with Star Direct.  We applied § 103.465 to both 
clauses.  Id., ¶5.  No question was raised about the 
applicability of § 103.465 to these clauses.   
¶111 We started our analysis with the now common, broad 
statement:  "Restrictive covenants in Wisconsin are prima facie 
suspect as restraints of trade."  Id., ¶19. (citing Streiff, 118 
Wis. 2d at 611).  However, we did not expand our analysis 
consistent with that broad statement as we had in Heyde, but 
instead, we narrowly focused on the particular facts and 
circumstances of Star Direct and Dal Pra.  We recognized the 
legitimate concerns of an employer when a former employee is in 
possession of confidential business information.  Id., ¶47.   
¶112 Equity Enterprises, Inc. v. Milosch, 2001 WI App 186, 
274 Wis. 2d 172, 633 N.W.2d 632, contained a contract with a NSE 
clause.  However, the court of appeals did not address whether 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 applied to NSE clauses or whether it was 
relevant to Milosch's claim for commissions that he asserted 
Equity was retaining.   
¶113 In Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brass, 2001 WI App 92, 
242 Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 648, the court of appeals in meeting 
MSI's concern that Brass's new employer, American National Ins. 
Co., had raided the ranks of its career agents, reasoned that 
NSE provisions do not come within Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  Id., 
¶17.  The court of appeals said that "[t]he law [§ 103.465], 
however, does not protect against the raiding of a competitor's 
employees.  Rather, it encourages the mobility of workers."  Id.  
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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In so concluding, the court of appeals affirmed that § 103.465 
is focused on covenants that preclude the employee from 
realizing employment opportunities, but that it does not apply 
to all agreements that employees make with their employers.   
¶114 Few states have examined NSE provisions in employment 
contracts.  However, a provision similar to the NSE covenant at 
issue here was addressed in CDI Corp. v. Hough, 9 So. 3d 282 
(La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/09).  Hough was a vice-president of 
operations for CDI.  In connection with his employment he signed 
a NSE agreement that provided: 
For a period of twelve (12) months following the 
termination of your employment with the Company, you 
will not: 
(a)  Directly or indirectly hire or cause to be hired, 
or solicit, interfere with or attempt to entice 
away from the Company, any individual who was an 
employee of the Company within six (6) months 
prior to such contact, solicitation, interference 
or enticement. 
Id. at 284.   
¶115 Hough and Kyzer, another employee of CDI, decided to 
set up a competing business.  They did so and then recruited 
several CDI employees to go to work for their new company.  Id. 
at 285.   
¶116 CDI sought and obtained an injunction prohibiting 
further raiding of CDI employees.  On appeal, Hough challenged 
the injunction, claiming that it violated a Louisiana statute 
that regulated non-compete agreements between employees and 
employers.  Id. at 286.   
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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¶117 The court noted that generally parties contract as 
they see fit, and courts "will enforce the contract as written, 
provided the agreement is not contrary to good morals or public 
policy."  Id. at 287.  The court then noted that the purpose of 
the Louisiana statute was to avoid restraints on an employee's 
employment opportunities, which is not a concern of an agreement 
not to solicit an employer's employees.  Id. at 290.   
¶118 The court concluded that the NSE agreement "does not 
prevent Mr. Hough from exercising his trade, profession, or 
business.  In fact, the agreement assumes Mr. Hough will compete 
with CDI Corporation."  Id. at 292.  The court then concluded 
that the NSE agreement Hough signed with CDI is not governed by 
the statute raised by Hough and is enforceable.  Id.   
C.  The NSE Agreement 
¶119 As I consider whether the NSE agreement at issue here 
comes within the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 103.465, I note how 
the statute expresses its concerns for employees.  Section 
103.465 plainly focuses on contractual promises of an employee 
"not to compete with his or her employer."  The language chosen 
by the legislature is driven by a legislative policy choice that 
employees not be subjected to undue restraints on their 
employability or mobility.  Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 614.  
Covenants that the employee not work for a competitor, supplier 
or customer of his or her employer come within covenants not to 
compete with the employee's employer.    
¶120 However, Wis. Stat. § 103.465 also considers the 
interests of employers and their necessary business interests.  
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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For example, § 103.465 does permit employers to contract for 
restrictions 
that 
would 
limit 
their 
employees 
employment 
opportunities if the restriction is reasonable in time and place 
and reasonably necessary to protect a business interest of the 
employer.  Rollins Burdick, 101 Wis. 2d at 469.   
¶121 Lanning's contract with Manitowoc provides:  "IN 
CONSIDERATION OF BEING GIVEN ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, 
I AGREE TO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:."  The NSE clause follows.  In 
the contract, Lanning agreed that during his employment, and for 
two years thereafter, he will not try to persuade other 
employees 
of 
Manitowoc 
to 
leave 
Manitowoc 
or 
to 
accept 
employment with a competitor, supplier or customer of Manitowoc.  
¶122 On its face, the NSE clause protects against only the 
raiding of Manitowoc's key employees by Lanning, who was given 
access to Manitowoc's confidential information.  It does not 
prevent Lanning from competing with Manitowoc.  He can work for 
whomever he chooses, including a direct competitor such as SANY, 
in any place, at any time.  He can use all the engineering 
skills he possesses.  He can contact customers of Manitowoc in 
an attempt to sell or service more cranes.  Furthermore, the NSE 
clause does not prevent Manitowoc's other employees from leaving 
Manitowoc for other employment opportunities, including working 
for a competitor such as SANY.  The NSE clause simply restrains 
Lanning from raiding Manitowoc's skilled employees.     
¶123 I agree with the court of appeals in Brass; Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 
"does 
not 
protect 
against 
the 
raiding 
of 
a 
competitor's employees."  That concern is not within the purview 
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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of § 103.465.  Stated otherwise, the NSE covenant does not come 
within the provisions of § 103.465 because it is not a covenant 
that prohibits Lanning from competing with Manitowoc.   
¶124 Lanning does not question that there was consideration 
for the contract he signed.  Courts generally honor the rights 
of parties to freely contract.  Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat., 
LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶34, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111.  
Accordingly, I would honor the right to freely contract and 
enforce the agreement Lanning made.   
D.  Lead opinion 
¶125 The lead opinion gets off track by asserting that Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465 applies to "agreements viewed as restraints of 
trade."2  It cites Heyde for this proposition, and as I explained 
above, Heyde dealt with an agreement between two companies.  See 
also Heyde, 258 Wis. 2d at 47 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("The 
majority analyzes this case as though it were a lawsuit between 
an employer and a former employee, but it is not. It is a breach 
of contract lawsuit between two sophisticated businesses.").   
¶126 The lead opinion herein creates an even broader 
application of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 than that created by Heyde.  
The lead opinion states, "§ 103.465 'essentially deals with 
restraint of trade . . . regardless of whether the restriction 
is labeled a non-disclosure provision or a covenant not to 
compete.'"3  The lead concludes the NSE clause violates § 103.465 
                                                 
2 Lead op., ¶5.   
3 Id., ¶6.   
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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because it "affects access to the labor pool by a competitor of 
Manitowoc Company (including Lanning's current employer, SANY 
America)."4  By that addition, the lead includes the effect of 
the NSE on non-parties to the contract.  Essentially, the lead 
legislates new parameters for § 103.465 that are far beyond what 
the plain meaning of the statute can accommodate.  In so doing, 
it sets the stage for greater and greater judicial legislating.  
¶127 As I explained above, using "restraint of trade" as 
definitional for Wis. Stat. § 103.465, creates a much broader 
regulation than that chosen by the plain meaning of § 103.465, 
wherein "trade" is never mentioned.  Using restraint of trade as 
the matter being regulated has permitted the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court to find a violation of § 103.465 in a contract between two 
companies, where no employee was involved.  Heyde, 258 Wis. 2d 
at 47.   
¶128 Although "restraint of trade" is a term found in many 
opinions, it initially was employed when a restraint of trade, 
i.e., a violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.01, was claimed.  Lakeside 
Oil, 8 Wis. 2d at 158-59.  While many cases repeat the words, 
few expand Wis. Stat. § 103.465 with them as Heyde did and as 
the lead opinion does here. 
¶129 Employers will be harmed by the lead opinion's 
expansive 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.465 
because 
employers will be unable to prevent raiding of their key 
employees by a former employee who knows which employees are 
                                                 
4 Id., ¶9.   
No.  2015AP1530.pdr 
 
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important to the former employer's operations.  When such an 
employee joins an aggressive competitor, competition in the 
marketplace will be diminished because the former employer will 
become a less effective competitor than it was before its key 
employees were raided. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶130 The lead opinion distorts the plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 103.465, thereby changing it from a statute that 
balanced the rights of employees and their employers into a 
broad mandate that prevents employers from protecting their 
businesses from third-party raiding.  In so doing, it permits 
Lanning to assist SANY in cherry picking Manitowoc's key 
employees and thereby reduces the competition that Manitowoc 
would otherwise be able to exert against SANY as both compete in 
the same marketplace.   
¶131 Because I conclude that the NSE clause in Lanning's 
employment contract with Manitowoc does not come within the 
plain meaning of Wis Stat. § 103.465 and is enforceable, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶132 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent.    
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