Title: State v. Lance Terry Konrath
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP001261-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1261-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Lance Terry Konrath,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
207 Wis. 2d 641, 559 N.W.2d 924 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996-UNPUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 22, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 20, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph E. Wimmer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Ralph A. Kalal and Kalal & Associates, Madison and oral 
argument by Ralph A. Kalal. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
1 
` 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1261-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lance Terry Konrath,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is on review from an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a 
judgment of the circuit court.  The Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, Joseph E. Wimmer, Judge, denied Lance Terry Konrath's 
("Konrath") motion to vacate the order for seizure of his motor 
vehicle 
in 
accord 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(6)(1993-94),2 
resulting from Konrath's fifth conviction for operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).   
¶2 
In his motion to vacate the seizure order, Konrath 
raised three constitutional challenges to the impending seizure 
                     
1 State v. Konrath, No. 96-1261-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1996). 
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1993-94 volume of the statutes. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
2 
and possible forfeiture of his motor vehicle.  First, Konrath 
argued that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) violates Article 1, section 
12 of the Wisconsin Constitution by permitting forfeiture of 
estate because the statute does not require a nexus between the 
motor vehicle and the crime from which the seizure and 
forfeiture result.3  Second, Konrath argued that § 346.65(6) 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution by permitting 
successive punishments because the statute does not require a 
nexus between the motor vehicle and the crime from which the 
seizure and forfeiture result.4  Third, Konrath argued that 
§ 346.65(6) violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by its 
                     
3 Article I, section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be 
passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or 
forfeiture of estate. 
4  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part: 
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
3 
failure to provide notice and hearing prior to seizure of the 
motor vehicle or a prompt post-deprivation hearing.5 
¶3 
In its response to Konrath's motion, the State did not 
address Konrath's constitutional claims but instead objected to 
the timeliness of the motion.  The State argued in part that 
Konrath's motion had been brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06.6   
¶4 
The circuit court determined that Konrath had not 
specifically sought relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, and that 
the motion could not be brought in accord with § 974.06 in any 
event because that statutory section applies to appeals and 
post-conviction relief for a prisoner in custody.  The circuit 
court dismissed Konrath's motion to vacate the seizure order 
because it was untimely under Wis. Stat. § 974.027 and no appeal 
had been taken from the original sentence.  Konrath appealed. 
                     
5 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part: 
[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(1) states: 
After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided 
in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in custody under 
sentence of a court or a person convicted and placed with a 
volunteers in probation program . . . claiming the right to 
be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in violation of the U. S. constitution or the constitution 
or laws of this state, that the court was without 
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence 
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court 
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct 
the sentence. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(1) states, in relevant part: 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
4 
¶5 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order denying Konrath's motion to vacate the seizure order.  The 
court of appeals concluded that Konrath had failed to raise his 
constitutional claims through a timely appeal from the judgment 
of conviction in accord with Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  The court of 
appeals noted that the forfeiture proceeding, which would 
commence after seizure of the motor vehicle, would afford 
Konrath 
another 
opportunity 
to 
raise 
any 
constitutional 
challenges to the seizure and forfeiture. 
¶6 
We conclude that Konrath lacks standing to assert a 
claim of forfeiture of estate as prohibited by Article I, 
section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) is constitutional as applied to Konrath, since the 
forfeiture is civil in nature and there is a nexus between the 
motor vehicle to be seized and forfeited and the crime.  Because 
§ 346.65(6) is constitutionally applied to Konrath, and his 
claims do not implicate the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Konrath may not assert a facial overbreadth 
challenge that § 346.65(6) may be unconstitutionally applied in 
instances not presently before this court.   
¶7 
Similarly, 
Konrath 
lacks 
standing 
to 
assert 
a 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and 
                                                                  
A motion for postconviction relief other than under s. 
974.06 by the defendant in a criminal case shall be made in 
the time and manner provided in ss. 809.30 and 809.40.  An 
appeal by the defendant in a criminal case from a judgment 
of conviction or from an order denying a postconviction 
motion or from both shall be taken in the time and manner 
provided in ss. 808.04(3), 809.30 and 809.40. 
 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
5 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.8  The 
forfeiture 
of 
Konrath's 
motor 
vehicle 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) is an in rem civil forfeiture.  In rem civil 
forfeitures are distinct from punishment for a criminal offense 
and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibiting multiple 
punishments is inapplicable.  Thus, since § 346.65(6) is 
constitutional as applied to Konrath, and his claims do not 
implicate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
Konrath lacks standing to assert a facial overbreadth challenge 
that § 346.65(6) may be unconstitutionally applied in instances 
not presently before this court.   
¶8 
Finally, we reject Konrath's claim that his rights 
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
                     
8 At the circuit court, Konrath did not argue that Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(6) violates the double jeopardy clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See Wis. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.  In 
his brief to this court, Konrath first states that § 346.65(6) 
"violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and 
Wisconsin 
constitutions." 
(emphasis 
supplied). 
 
We 
will 
generally not consider arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal.  See Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 
226-27 n.10, 533 N.W.2d 746 (1995).  However, our analysis of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution is similarly applicable to an analysis of 
the double jeopardy clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See 
State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 61, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).  
Therefore, 
our 
federal 
constitutional 
analysis 
necessarily 
encompasses 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
state 
constitutional 
challenge. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
6 
section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution have been violated.9  
Wisconsin Stat. 346.65(6) sets forth procedural due process 
protections including providing notice of the seizure and a 
hearing prior to forfeiture of the motor vehicle.  Moreover, 
Konrath was notified of the impending seizure and possible 
forfeiture on several occasions.  Such notification included 
written notice in the complaint, the amended complaint, the 
second amended complaint, and the judgment of conviction.  
Konrath was also notified orally at the status conference, as 
well as at the plea and sentencing hearing.  In addition, 
Konrath had an opportunity to be heard at the status conference 
and the plea and sentencing hearing before the circuit court.  
At each of these hearings, the circuit court directly discussed 
seizure and forfeiture of the motor vehicle and Konrath had an 
opportunity to respond.  Furthermore, this case presents the 
limited 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
under 
which 
immediate 
                     
9 At the circuit court, Konrath argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) violates the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution, but did not argue a violation under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Wis. Const. art. 1, § 1.  In his brief to 
this court, Konrath argues that he has been deprived of "due 
process of law" without specifically referencing the United 
States or Wisconsin Constitutions.  Assuming Konrath is now 
asserting a state constitutional challenge, we note that we will 
generally not consider arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal.  See Gorton, 194 Wis. 2d at 226-27 n.10.  However, our 
analysis of the deprivation of due process under the federal 
constitution governs both constitutions as "'[i]t is well 
settled by Wisconsin case law that the various freedoms 
preserved by sec. 1. art I, Wis. Const., are substantially the 
equivalent of the due process . . . clause[] of the Fourteenth 
amendment to the United States constitution.'"  Martin v. 
Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 198 n.6, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995)(quoted 
source omitted).  
  
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
7 
seizure 
of 
Konrath's 
motor 
vehicle 
is 
constitutionally 
permissible without preseizure notice and hearing.  After 
Konrath's motor vehicle is seized,10 he will again be provided 
notice of the seizure, and a forfeiture hearing will be held at 
which time Konrath will be given yet another opportunity to be 
heard on any claims in relation to the seizure and forfeiture of 
his motor vehicle. 
A. 
¶9 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of our review.  
On November 15, 1993, the State filed a complaint charging 
Konrath with four counts of criminal conduct, namely:  (1) 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant 
(fifth 
offense) 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a); (2) operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration (fifth offense) contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b); (3) operating a motor vehicle after license 
revocation (third offense) contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1), 
and; (4) fleeing from a traffic officer contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3).11 
¶10 Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Konrath pled 
guilty to the count of operating a motor vehicle while 
                     
10 At the time of oral argument, counsel for both parties 
acknowledged 
that 
the 
seizure 
order 
has 
not 
yet 
been 
effectuated, since the Town of Pewaukee Police Department had 
been unable to locate Konrath's motor vehicle. 
11 The State filed an amended complaint on February 23, 
1994, and a second amended complaint on February 10, 1995, both 
of which restated the same four charges. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
8 
intoxicated (fifth offense) and to the count of fleeing a 
traffic officer.  In exchange, the State moved to dismiss the 
charges of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration and operating a motor vehicle after revocation.12 
¶11 The plea and sentencing hearing was held on June 9, 
1995.  Prior to the entry of his plea, the circuit court engaged 
in a lengthy colloquy with Konrath to ensure that Konrath 
understood the nature of the charges and the potential penalties 
associated with pleading guilty.  As part of this dialogue, 
Konrath indicated to the circuit court that he was aware that 
pleading guilty to operating while intoxicated as a fifth 
offense would result, in part, in seizure and forfeiture of 
Konrath's motor vehicle in accord with Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6). 
 
 
THE COURT:  Have you gone over – have you 
received an [sic] a copy of the criminal complaint? 
 
 
DEFENDANT KONRATH:  Yes, I have. 
 
 
THE COURT:  Have you gone over the potential 
penalties of each of those particular offenses with 
your attorney? 
 
 
DEFENDANT KONRATH:  Yes. 
 
 
THE COURT:  You are aware of all the potential 
penalties, is that correct? 
 
 
DEFENDANT KONRATH:  Yes. 
 
 
THE COURT:  That includes now, the fact that 
you're aware of forfeiture of a vehicle? 
                     
12 The State also agreed to recommend a $2,000 fine, a 
three-year license revocation and a one-year jail sentence on 
the count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and to 
recommend 
a 
$2,000 
fine, 
a 
concurrent 
six-month 
license 
revocation and concurrent six-month jail sentence on the count 
of fleeing a traffic officer. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
9 
 
 
DEFENDANT KONRATH:  Yes. 
¶12 The circuit court accepted Konrath's guilty plea and 
convicted him of the counts of operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated and fleeing a traffic officer.  With respect to the 
charge of operating while intoxicated, the circuit court imposed 
a fine of $2,000 plus costs, revocation of Konrath's license for 
three years, alcohol assessment, and a 12-month jail term.  In 
addition, the circuit court ordered "that a vehicle be forfeited 
pursuant to the statute."  The judgment of conviction was 
entered on June 9, 1995.  The judgment stated in part that the 
"court orders that a vehicle be forfeited." 
¶13 On June 17, 1995, the circuit court entered a written 
order for seizure of Konrath's motor vehicle, namely, the 1988 
Pontiac Firebird that had been identified in the complaint and 
the amended complaints as the vehicle Konrath had been driving 
during the incident from which the charged offenses arose.  
Konrath brought a motion to vacate the seizure order, arguing 
that the order was unconstitutional because it resulted in 
forfeiture of estate, because it subjected him to double 
jeopardy, and because his procedural due process rights had been 
violated. 
¶14 As set forth previously in this opinion, the circuit 
court denied Konrath's motion on procedural grounds.  The 
circuit court first concluded that the motion did not qualify as 
a post-conviction motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  The 
circuit court also concluded that the motion was untimely 
because it was not filed within the time limitations for a 
direct criminal appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.02. Finally, 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
10
the circuit court concluded that the forfeiture procedure to be 
commenced under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) included the seizure of 
Konrath's motor vehicle, and that Konrath would have the 
opportunity to raise any constitutional challenges to the 
seizure and forfeiture of the motor vehicle at the forfeiture 
hearing. Konrath appealed. 
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court on the same procedural grounds.  The court of 
appeals determined that Konrath had not timely raised the 
constitutional challenges to Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) through an 
appeal of the judgment of criminal conviction in accord with 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  Furthermore, because the forfeiture 
proceeding in accord with § 346.65(6) had not yet commenced, 
Konrath 
would 
have 
another 
opportunity 
to 
raise 
any 
constitutional challenges to the seizure and forfeiture of his 
motor vehicle at that time.   
B. 
¶16 Each of Konrath's claims raises an issue of whether 
Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(6) is 
constitutional. 
 Constitutional 
challenges to a statute present questions of law which we review 
de novo.  See Matter of Estate of Barthel, 161 Wis. 2d 587, 592, 
468 N.W.2d 689 (1991).  A statute is afforded a presumption that 
it is constitutional.  See State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 
263, 
541 
N.W.2d 
105 
(1995). 
 
In 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality of a statute, a party has the burden of 
proving that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See id.   
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
11
¶17 Konrath first argues that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) is 
unconstitutional because it allows forfeiture of estate without 
requiring a nexus between the crime and the motor vehicle to be 
seized and forfeited.  The relevant language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) states: 
 
(a)2. The court shall order a law enforcement officer 
to seize a motor vehicle owned by a person . . . who 
commits a violation of s. 346.63(1)(a) or (b) . . . if 
the person . . . who is convicted of the violation has 
3 
or 
more 
prior 
suspensions, 
revocations 
or 
convictions within a 10-year period that would be 
counted under s. 343.307(1). 
 
 . . .  
 
2m.  A person who owns a motor vehicle subject to 
seizure . . . shall surrender to the clerk of circuit 
court the certificate of title issued under ch. 342 
for every motor vehicle owned by the person.  The 
person shall comply with this subdivision within 5 
working days after receiving notification of this 
requirement from the district attorney.  . . .  The 
notification shall include the time limits for that 
surrender, the penalty for failure to comply with the 
requirement and the address of the clerk of circuit 
court.  . . .  
 
3.  The court shall notify the department . . . that 
an order . . . to seize a motor vehicle has been 
entered. The registration records of the department 
shall reflect that the order has been entered against 
the 
vehicle 
and 
remains 
unexecuted. 
 
Any 
law 
enforcement officer may execute that order . . . . 
 
 . . .  
 
(b) Within 10 days after seizing  . . .  a motor 
vehicle under par. (a), the law enforcement agency 
that seized  . . . the vehicle shall provide notice of 
the seizure  . . . by certified mail to the owner of 
the motor vehicle and to all lienholders of record. 
 . . .  
 
(c)  The district attorney of the county where the 
motor vehicle was seized shall commence an action to 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
12
forfeit the motor vehicle within 30 days after the 
motor vehicle is seized.  The action shall name the 
owner of the motor vehicle and all lienholders of 
record as parties.  The forfeiture action shall be 
commenced by filing a summons, complaint and affidavit 
of the law enforcement agency with the clerk of 
circuit court.  Upon service of an answer, the action 
shall be set for hearing within 60 days after the 
service of the answer. 
 
¶18 Konrath 
asserts 
that 
the 
statutory 
language 
is 
unconstitutional because the legislature's use of the phrase "a 
motor vehicle" in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6)(a)2 means that "any 
motor vehicle" owned by an individual subject to the statute may 
be seized and forfeited, regardless of whether the motor vehicle 
was the particular vehicle utilized during the offense.  Konrath 
contends, however, that "[t]he forfeiting of property which is 
related to the commission of a crime, either as fruit, 
instrumentality, or as contraband, could be justified, in either 
the civil forfeiture or criminal forfeiture contexts, by the 
nexus between the criminal act and the forfeited property."  
Pet. brief at 24. 
¶19 Konrath concedes that the motor vehicle subject to the 
seizure order, and possible forfeiture, in the present case is 
the motor vehicle that he was operating during the incident from 
which the criminal charges resulted.  Nevertheless, Konrath 
argues that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) is unconstitutional.  At oral 
argument, Konrath's counsel stated that "[a] statute which 
requires no nexus is forfeiture of the estate, whether or not it 
happens that the targeted forfeiture is an instrumentality 
because the sole authority to forfeit is statutory." (emphasis 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
13
supplied).  It is mere "coinciden[ce] in this case [that the 
State] is pursuing the vehicle that was used." 
¶20 Before we may analyze Konrath's constitutional claim, 
we must identify the type of statutory challenge he is 
asserting.  A party may challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute 
on 
its 
face, 
or 
a 
party 
may 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of a statute as applied to that party under 
the facts presented in a given case.13 See Michael C. Dorf, 
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. 
Rev. 235, 236 (1994).  One type of facial challenge involves 
asserting that a statute is unconstitutional because it is 
overbroad.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 
(1982).  A statute is considered to be "overbroad when its 
language, given its normal meaning, is so sweeping that its 
sanctions may be applied to conduct which the state is not 
permitted to regulate."  City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 
11, 19, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980).   
¶21 With the exception of a challenge under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, a party does not 
have standing to raise a facial challenge that a statute is 
overbroad.14  See Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. 
                     
13 The difference between challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute on its face and challenging it as applied is 
important.  "If a court holds a statute unconstitutional on its 
face, the state may not enforce it under any circumstances, 
unless 
an 
appropriate 
court 
narrows 
its 
application; 
in 
contrast, when a court holds a statute unconstitutional as 
applied to particular facts, the state may enforce the statute 
in different circumstances."  Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges 
to State and Federal Statues, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1994). 
14 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
14
Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984).  The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he fact that [a legislative 
act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set 
of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, 
since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside 
the limited context of the First Amendment."  United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).15  See also, Massachusetts v. 
Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989)(concluding that as a general 
rule "a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied 
cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be 
unconstitutionally applied to others").   
¶22 As stated, Konrath argues that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) 
permits forfeiture of estate because it does not require a nexus 
                                                                  
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances. 
A facial overbreadth challenge to the constitutionality of 
a 
statute, 
if 
premised 
upon 
an 
alleged 
First 
Amendment 
violation, "is justified only by the recognition that free 
expression may be inhibited almost as easily by the potential or 
threatened use of power as by the actual exercise of that 
power."  New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 
487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988). 
15 In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), 
the United States Supreme Court noted that a facial challenge to 
a statute is extremely difficult "since the challenger must 
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
[statute] would be valid."  However, in subsequent cases, the 
United States Supreme Court has not consistently applied the "no 
set of circumstances" language.  See Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood Sioux Falls Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1582, 
1583 n. 1 (1996)(Mem.)(citing cases where the United States 
Supreme Court has not consistently applied the "no set of 
circumstances" language set forth in Salerno). 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
15
between the crime and the motor vehicle to be seized and 
forfeited.  However, he concedes that the application of the 
statute to him in the present case involves seizure and possible 
forfeiture of a motor vehicle that is directly connected to the 
crime of driving under the influence of an intoxicant.  He is 
not arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as it is 
applied to the particular set of facts presented in this case.  
Rather, he is arguing that the statute itselfon its faceis 
unconstitutional because although its language may encompass 
seizure and forfeiture of a motor vehicle used in a crime, the 
statute does not require a nexus between the motor vehicle to be 
seized and forfeited and the crime.  Essentially, he is arguing 
that § 346.65(6) is "so sweeping" that it not only permits 
seizure and forfeiture of a criminally connected motor vehicle, 
but permits seizure and forfeiture of any motor vehicle, 
regardless of whether it is connected to any criminal activity. 
 See, e.g., Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d at 19.  Konrath's constitutional 
challenge 
to 
§ 346.65(6) 
is, 
therefore, 
one 
of 
facial 
overbreadth.  
See 
id. 
 
Accordingly, 
if 
the 
statute is 
constitutional as applied to him, he has no standing. See 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; State v. Lee, 192 Wis. 2d 260, 270, 
531 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶23 In United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 
2135 (1996), the United States Supreme Court considered the 
forfeiture of property used to facilitate an illegal drug 
transaction 
under 
a 
federal 
statute 
providing 
for 
such 
forfeiture.  The Supreme Court noted that "[since] the earliest 
years of this Nation, [the Government has been authorized] to 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
16
seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal 
prosecutions based upon the same underlying events."  Id. at 
2140.  The legal theory behind in rem civil forfeiture is that 
it is the property that has committed the crime and is therefore 
found guilty.  See id. at 2141.   
¶24 In Ursery the Supreme Court applied a two-prong test 
to determine whether the forfeiture statute at issue allowed for 
in rem civil forfeiture or whether the statute was criminal in 
nature and imposed punishment.  See id. at 2142.  First, the 
Supreme Court attempted to discern congressional intent by 
analyzing traditional in rem civil forfeitures, the range of 
property to which the statute was applicable, and the remedial 
nature of the statute.  See id. at 2147.  Second, the Supreme 
Court looked to whether there was "clear[] proof" that the 
purpose and actual effect of the forfeiture statute was so 
punitive as to negate any congressional intent to establish an 
in rem civil forfeiture.  See id. at 2148.16 
¶25 In this case, there is no need to engage in the in-
depth two-prong analysis set forth in Ursery to determine 
whether seizure and forfeiture of Konrath's motor vehicle 
                     
16 This court has previously adopted and applied the two-
prong test set forth in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 
116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).  In State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 30, 
43, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996), this court concluded that "the best 
way to determine whether a statute is criminal and punitive, or 
civil and remedial, is through an analysis under the two-prong 
[] test as advocated by the Supreme Court in . . . Ursery."  A 
"court must consider 1) whether the legislature intended [the 
statute] to be a remedial civil sanction, and 2) whether there 
are aspects of [the statute] that are so punitive either in 
effect or nature as to render the overall purpose to be one of 
punishment."  Id. at 43-44. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
17
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) constitutes an in rem civil 
forfeiture 
proceeding. 
 
Konrath 
concedes 
that 
the 
constitutionality of an in rem civil forfeiture is characterized 
by the nexus between the property and the crime.  See Pet. reply 
brief at 12.  Konrath also conceded at oral argument that the 
motor vehicle subject to the seizure and possible forfeiture in 
this case is the motor vehicle identified in the complaint as 
the motor vehicle he was driving at the time of the incident at 
issue.  Because there is a nexus between the motor vehicle and 
Konrath's commission of the offense of driving while under the 
influence of an intoxicant, this proceeding is an in rem civil 
forfeiture proceeding.  Therefore, the seizure and forfeiture 
under § 346.65(6) is constitutional as applied to Konrath.  
 
 
¶26 Notwithstanding our determination that an analysis 
under the two-prong Ursery test is not necessary here, we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) constitutes a remedial in 
rem civil forfeiture proceeding even under Ursery given the 
facts in this case. 
¶27 With respect to the first prong of the Ursery test, we 
conclude that the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) 
evinces that the legislature intended seizure and forfeiture to 
be remedial.  The original draft of the statute provided that 
any vehicle in which the statutory violation was committed was 
subject to seizure and forfeiture.  See 1991 S.B. 308.  A 
subsequent letter from the Legislative Fiscal Bureau to the 
Joint Committee on Finance dated March 12, 1992, which in turn 
referenced a memo prepared by the Department of Transportation, 
stated in part that approximately "85% of [drivers who violated] 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
18
OWI and implied consent [laws] were driving their own vehicles 
when stopped."  Based upon this data, the report estimated that 
"7,126 repeat offenders were driving their own vehicle[s] when a 
second or subsequent offense occurred."   
¶28 With the benefit of the data from the DOT, the 
legislature ultimately chose to target a motor vehicle owned by 
the offender.  As stated, the majority of repeat drunk driving 
offenders are driving their own vehicles at the time of the 
offense.  Seizing and forfeiting a vehicle owned by a repeat 
drunk driving offender is the legislature's attempt to remove 
from the offender's use a vehicle that has the highest 
probability of being used in any future offense.  This decision 
is consistent with the primary purpose of the statute, which is 
to keep the highways safe and protect the public.  Cf.  State v. 
McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 30, 45, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996) (license 
suspension 
and 
revocation 
for 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
19
§ 346.63(1) intended as "a civil remedial sanction[s] to protect 
innocent people on the highways").17 
¶29 Our conclusion that the legislature intended Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(6) to be remedial is not altered by the fact that 
legislature used the term "penalty" in Wis. Stat. § 346.65.  The 
term "penalty" may be used to reference "both criminal and civil 
sanctions" and is not solely indicative of a legislative intent 
to create a criminal sanction.  United States v. One Assortment 
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 n.6 (1984).   
¶30 Applying the second prong of the Ursery test to the 
facts of the present case, we conclude that the motor vehicle 
seizure and forfeiture in accord with Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) is 
not so punitive in effect as to render the statutory purpose one 
of punishment.  The vehicle subject to seizure and potential 
                     
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(6) excludes "innocent owners."  
Under the language used in the statute, only a vehicle owned by 
the offender is subject to seizure and forfeiture, even if the 
offender was driving a motor vehicle owned by an individual 
other than him/herself at the time of the offense.  We are not 
persuaded that this renders § 346.65(6) punitive in nature as to 
the offender.  In Van Oster v. State of Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 
467 (1926), the United States Supreme Court recognized that "a 
state in the exercise of its police power may forfeit property 
used by its owner in violation of state laws."  (citations 
omitted).  Subjecting an innocent owner's property to seizure 
and forfeiture merely "builds a secondary defense against a 
forbidden 
use" 
of 
the 
property. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature's decision to exclude this "secondary defense," 
however, 
does 
not 
necessarily 
evince 
a 
punitive 
intent.  
Statutory in rem forfeiture, even though civil and remedial in 
nature, generally serves a punitive purpose in part.  See, e.g. 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 
(1974).  Any attendant punitive purpose served by § 346.65(6) 
does not outweigh the legislature's intent to serve the remedial 
purpose of keeping Wisconsin's highways safe by targeting motor 
vehicles generally used in drunk driving offenses. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
20
forfeiture in the present case is the vehicle Konrath was 
driving at the time he was stopped and cited for violations of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1).  We agree with other jurisdictions that 
have determined that seizure and forfeiture of a motor vehicle 
used by a repeat drunk-driving offender at the time of the 
offense does not render the seizure and forfeiture proceeding 
punitive in nature.18  See, e.g., City of Pine Springs v. One 
1992 Harley Davidson, 555 N.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996); Davis v. Municipality of Anchorage, 945 P.2d 307, 310 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1997).  Thus, even under an analysis of the 
Ursery test, the seizure and possible forfeiture in the present 
case is an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding that is remedial 
in its purpose and effect. 
¶31 Konrath's claim that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) permits 
forfeiture of estate does not implicate the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  Accordingly, Konrath has no 
standing to assert a facial overbreadth challenge to § 346.65(6) 
as permitting forfeiture of estate.  See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
745; Lee, 192 Wis. 2d at 270. 
C. 
¶32 Konrath next argues 
that 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause because the statute permits 
                     
18 We emphasize that our analysis regarding the second prong 
of Ursery is based upon the facts presented in this case.  
Although we conclude the Wisconsin Legislature intended seizure 
and forfeiture under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) to be remedial, the 
actual effect of the proceeding may arguably be punitive in a 
situation where the targeted motor vehicle is not the motor 
vehicle that was used in the crime. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
21
multiple punishments for his criminal offense by providing for 
seizure and forfeiture of a motor vehicle without requiring a 
nexus between the criminal conduct and the motor vehicle to be 
seized and forfeited.  As stated, he argues that § 346.65(6) 
permits seizure and forfeiture of any motor vehicle owned by an 
individual subject to the statute. 
¶33 Notwithstanding Konrath's argument to the contrary, we 
conclude that his double jeopardy argument is also one of facial 
overbreadth.  Konrath implicitly concedes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) as applied in this case involves in rem civil 
forfeiture 
by 
stating 
that 
"[c]ivil 
in 
rem 
forfeiture . . . requires a nexus between the unlawful act and 
the property."  Pet. brief at 34. However, he argues that 
although there is a nexus between the motor vehicle and the 
crime in the present case, the language of § 346.65(6) on its 
face 
permits 
seizure 
and 
forfeiture 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
regardless of whether there is a nexus.  His double jeopardy 
challenge does not implicate the First Amendment to the United 
States 
Constitution. 
 
Therefore, 
if 
the 
statute 
is 
constitutional as applied to him, he has no standing. See 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. 
¶34  In Ursery, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that it had on numerous occasions "considered the application of 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
to 
civil 
forfeitures, 
[and] 
consistently conclud[ed] that the Clause does not apply to such 
actions because they do not impose punishment."  116 S. Ct. at 
2140.  An in rem civil forfeiture, as distinct from a criminal 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
22
forfeiture, is "a proceeding in rem to forfeit property used in 
committing an offense."  Id. at 2141. 
 
"This forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem.  It is 
the property which is proceeded against, and, by 
resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned 
as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and 
insentient.  In a criminal prosecution it is the 
wrongdoer 
in 
person 
who 
is 
proceeded 
against, 
convicted, and punished.  The forfeiture is no part of 
the 
punishment 
for 
the 
criminal 
offense. 
 
The 
provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
in respect of double jeopardy does not apply." 
Id. at 2140 (quoting Various Items of Personal Property v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931)). 
¶35 Konrath agrees that an in rem civil forfeiture 
proceeding is characterized by the nexus between the property 
and the crime.  The motor vehicle seizure and forfeiture in 
accord with Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) as applied to Konrath is an 
in rem civil forfeiture because it is a proceeding to seize and 
forfeit the property used in the commission of the crime, 
namely, operating the motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant.  The Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable to in 
rem civil forfeiture proceedings because in rem civil forfeiture 
proceedings do not impose punishment.  See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 
2141.   Hence, as applied to Konrath, § 346.65(6) does not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.   "[A] person to 
whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard 
to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably 
be applied unconstitutionally." Lee, 192 Wis. 2d at 270.  As 
such, Konrath lacks standing to assert a facial challenge to 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
23
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6)(a)2 as violative of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.19 
D. 
¶36 Finally, Konrath argues that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) 
permits an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due 
process of law because it does not require notice of the seizure 
and an opportunity to be heard, nor does it require a prompt 
                     
19 Konrath argues that even if Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) 
required a nexus between the crime and the motor vehicle, he 
would still assert a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
because § 346.65(6) requires a criminal conviction prior to 
forfeiture. Konrath's argument is not well-developed, and he 
cites no authority in support of his argument.  Konrath is 
apparently arguing that the forfeiture is criminal punishment 
regardless of whether there is a nexus, because the forfeiture 
of property is premised on "the status of its owner, rather than 
by virtue of its use."  Pet. brief at 34. 
Konrath correctly asserts that it is the property to be 
seized and forfeited that is guilty in an in rem civil 
forfeiture proceeding, not the charged defendant. See Bennis v. 
Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446-49 (1996).   Nevertheless, in many 
cases at common law, "'the right of forfeiture did not attach 
until the offending person had been convicted . . . '  In other 
words, at common law, not only was it the case that a criminal 
conviction did not bar a civil forfeiture, but, in fact, the 
civil forfeiture could not be instituted unless a criminal 
conviction had already been obtained."  Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 
2141 (citing Various Items of Personal Property v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931)).  It is not necessary that the 
defendant 
be 
found 
guilty 
of 
criminal 
conduct 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt prior to the State initiating an in rem civil 
forfeiture proceeding.  See United States v. One Assortment of 
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984).  However, there must be 
some finding by the trier of fact regarding the existence of a 
crime, either by proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal 
proceeding or by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
forfeiture proceeding.  See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 
342, 349 (1990) (citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 361).  The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature's decision to 
require 
an 
underlying 
conviction prior to seizure and forfeiture does not render Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(6) unconstitutional. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
24
post-deprivation hearing.20 Due process generally "requires that 
notice and an opportunity to be heard be provided before a 
constitutional [property] deprivation occurs."  Irby v. Macht, 
184 Wis. 2d 831, 843, 522 N.W.2d 9 (1994).   
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. §  346.65(6) contemplates notice and a 
hearing, 
and 
there 
are 
several 
procedural 
due 
process 
protections set forth in the language of the statute.  For 
example, 
under § 346.65(6)(a)2m, the 
district 
attorney is 
required to notify an individual whose motor vehicle is subject 
to seizure and possible forfeiture that the individual must 
                     
20 We reach Konrath's constitutional due process claim 
without consideration of any potential procedural time bars 
because the State does not argue that this court should adopt 
the reasoning of the court of appeals.  That is, the State does 
not argue that Konrath's challenge to the seizure was untimely 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.02, nor does the State argue that any 
constitutional challenge to the forfeiture of the motor vehicle 
is premature.  At oral argument, this court engaged in the 
following 
discussion 
with 
the 
assistant 
attorney 
general 
representing the State: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  You're not saying the court 
should not entertain it [i.e. the constitutional claims]? 
ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL:  That's correct. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  You're not supporting the court 
of appeals' decision? 
ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL:   That's correct. 
 . . .  
CHIEF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  Your [response to the] petition 
for review said though that you did agree with the court of 
appeals.  . . .  The State's position is not that any longer, I 
gather? 
ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL:   That's correct. 
 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
25
"surrender to the clerk of circuit court the certificate of 
title" for every motor vehicle owned by the individual.  
Pursuant to § 346.65(6)(a)2, the circuit court may not order a 
motor vehicle to be seized until an individual has been 
convicted of an underlying statutory violation.  In addition, in 
accord with § 346.65(6)(b) and (c), an individual must receive 
written notice of the seizure within 10 days of the seizure, and 
the district attorney has 30 days to commence a forfeiture 
action in which a hearing shall be held. 
¶38 Konrath 
was 
provided 
sufficient 
notice 
of 
the 
impending seizure and possible forfeiture of his motor vehicle, 
and was also afforded an opportunity to assert any challenges.  
 The original complaint, as well as the amended complaint and 
the second amended complaint, all provided written notice that 
"a vehicle owned by the defendant shall be seized and forfeited, 
pursuant to Section 346.65(6)(a)2 and (c), Wisconsin Statutes." 
 At the status conference on June 9, 1995, Konrath was orally 
notified by the circuit court that "the potential penalties that 
would be involved in this particular case includ[e] the fact 
that a car shall be seized and forfeited," and he had an 
opportunity to raise any challenges.  Thereafter, at the plea 
and sentencing hearing, the circuit court again provided oral 
notice to Konrath by asking him if he was "aware [that] 
forfeiture of a vehicle" was a potential penalty for pleading 
guilty to the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicants.  Konrath responded "yes" to the 
circuit court's inquiry and had an opportunity to raise any 
challenges.  The judgment of the circuit court also provided 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
26
written notice that the "Court orders a vehicle be forfeited."21 
 Konrath therefore had ample notice and opportunity to raise a 
challenge to the circuit court regarding the seizure and 
possible forfeiture of his motor vehicle. 
¶39 Although Konrath was provided adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6), we 
additionally recognize that there are limited circumstances 
under which "immediate seizure of a property interest, without 
an 
opportunity 
for 
prior 
hearing, 
is 
constitutionally 
permissible."  Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663 (1974).  In Calero-Toledo, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed a due process challenge to a Puerto Rican 
statute that allowed for immediate seizure of a yacht that was 
used to transport a controlled substance.  See id. at 665-66.  
The Puerto Rican government had seized the yacht without prior 
notice to its owner or a prior adversary hearing.  See id. at 
667.   
¶40 In addressing the due process challenge in Calero-
Toledo, the Supreme Court considered three circumstances that 
must be present before immediate seizure of property may be 
constitutionally permissible.   
                     
21 Although the judgment of conviction ordered that a motor 
vehicle be "forfeited" as opposed to "seized," it is evident 
that the circuit court intended that the motor vehicle be seized 
and forfeited in accord with Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6).  The 
complaint, amended complaint, and second amended complaint all 
indicated that a motor vehicle "shall be seized and forfeited." 
 The circuit court indicated to Konrath at the status conference 
that a motor vehicle "shall be seized and forfeited," and the 
circuit court discussed "forfeiture pursuant to the statute" at 
the plea and sentencing hearing which necessarily includes 
seizure as part of the statutory proceeding. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
27
 
Such circumstances are those in which 'the seizure has 
been 
directly 
necessary 
to 
secure 
an 
important 
governmental or general public interest.  Second, 
there has been a special need for very prompt action. 
 Third, the State has kept strict control over its 
monopoly of legitimate force:  the person initiating 
the 
seizure 
has 
been 
a 
governmental 
official 
responsible for determining, under the standards of a 
narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and 
justified in the particular instance.' 
Id. at 678 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)). 
 Concluding that these elements had been met, the Calero-Toledo 
Court reasoned: 
 
First, seizure under the Puerto Rican statutes serves 
significant governmental purposes:  Seizure permits 
Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the 
property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, 
thereby fostering the public interest in preventing 
continued illicit use of the property and in enforcing 
criminal sanctions.  Second, preseizure notice and 
hearing might frustrate the interests served by the 
statutes, since the property seized—-as here, a yacht—
-will often be of a sort that could be removed to 
another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if 
advance warning of confiscation were given.  And 
finally . . . seizure 
is 
not 
initiated 
by 
self-
interested parties; rather, Commonwealth officials 
determine whether seizure is appropriate under the 
provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes.  In these 
circumstances, we hold that this case presents an 
'extraordinary' situation in which postponement of 
notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny 
due process. 
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679-80. 
 
¶41 We conclude that the elements discussed in Calero-
Toledo for immediate seizure have also been met in this case.  
First, as in Calero-Toledo, the State is attempting to seize 
Konrath's motor vehicle in conjunction with an in rem civil 
forfeiture proceeding, thereby serving the public interest of 
impeding any further illegal use of the motor vehicle.  Second, 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
28
as in Calero-Toledo, preseizure notice and hearing may frustrate 
the purpose served by Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) because the motor 
vehicle is mobile.  This concern is particularly evident in the 
present case since the Pewaukee Police Department has been 
unable to locate Konrath's motor vehicle to effectuate the 
seizure.  Third, as in Calero-Toledo, this case is not one in 
which a private party is trying to seize property.  Rather, 
governmental officials are attempting to seize Konrath's vehicle 
in accordance with the provisions of § 346.65(6).  Thus, this 
case presents the extraordinary limited circumstances under 
which immediate seizure is constitutionally permissible without 
preseizure notice and hearing.  Within 10 days after the motor 
vehicle is seized, Konrath will be provided notice of the 
seizure, and a forfeiture action will be commenced and set for a 
hearing.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6)(b) and (c). 
¶42 Because Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) provides procedural due 
process protections, and because Konrath was afforded notice, 
both written and oral, that his motor vehicle would be seized 
and forfeited, and because he was provided an opportunity to be 
heard, we reject his claim that his due process rights under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution have been 
violated.  See Irby, 184 Wis. 2d at 843.  In addition, this case 
presents the limited extraordinary circumstances under which 
immediate seizure of Konrath's motor vehicle is constitutionally 
permissible without preseizure notice and hearing.  See Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679-80.   
E. 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
29
¶43 In sum, we conclude that Konrath lacks standing to 
assert a claim of forfeiture of estate as prohibited by Article 
I, section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) is constitutional as applied to Konrath since the 
forfeiture is civil in nature and there is a nexus between the 
motor vehicle to be seized and forfeited and the crime.  Because 
his claims do not implicate the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, Konrath may not assert a facial overbreadth 
challenge that § 346.65(6) may be unconstitutionally applied in 
instances not presently before this court.   
¶44 Similarly, 
Konrath 
lacks 
standing 
to 
assert 
a 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The 
forfeiture of Konrath's motor vehicle under Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) is an in rem civil forfeiture.  In rem civil 
forfeitures are distinct from punishment for a criminal offense 
and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibiting multiple 
punishments is inapplicable.  Since his claims do not implicate 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Konrath 
lacks standing to assert a facial overbreadth challenge that 
§ 346.65(6) may be unconstitutionally applied in instances not 
presently before this court.   
¶45 Finally, we reject Konrath's claim that his rights 
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution have been violated. 
Wisconsin Stat. 346.65(6) sets forth procedural due process 
No. 96-1261-CR 
 
 
30
protections.  Konrath was notified in writing and orally of the 
impending seizure and possible forfeiture on several occasions. 
 Konrath was also given an opportunity to be heard at the status 
conference and the plea and sentencing hearing before the 
circuit court.  Furthermore, this case presents the limited 
extraordinary circumstances under which immediate seizure of 
Konrath's motor vehicle is constitutionally permissible without 
preseizure notice and hearing in any event. 
¶46 We emphasize that our holding is premised on the facts 
presented in this case.  Here, Konrath concedes that there is a 
nexus between the motor vehicle to be seized and possibly 
forfeited and the offense of operating the motor vehicle while 
under the influence of an intoxicant.  The nexus in the present 
case is essential to our holding that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) is 
constitutional as applied to Konrath and does not constitute 
forfeiture of estate or subject him to multiple punishments.  
Our holding does not encompass cases where the motor vehicle to 
be seized and forfeited is not the motor vehicle involved in the 
charged offense.  Although we do not decide this issue, absent a 
nexus between the motor vehicle and the crime, we recognize that 
compelling constitutional challenges could be raised. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
1 
¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (Dissenting). 
There is no question that repeat drunk driving is a grave 
offense that demands drastic societal measures.  There is also 
no question that the legislature may authorize forfeiture of a 
vehicle in cases of operating a vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant.  The legislature, however, may not 
adopt an unconstitutional method to provide for forfeiture of a 
vehicle in repeat drunk driving cases.  In my opinion the 
legislature, in enacting Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6), unfortunately 
has done just that. 
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(6) provides that after a 
conviction of operating a vehicle while under the influence, the 
State may seize "a motor vehicle . . . owned by" the convicted 
driver.  It is undisputed that under § 346.65(6) the vehicle 
seized need not be the vehicle driven by the offender during the 
drunk driving offense. 
¶49 The defendant argues that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) 
creates criminal punishment and thus permits a successive 
prosecution and punishment in violation of the double jeopardy 
clauses of the federal and Wisconsin Constitutions.22  
                     
22 The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and Wisconsin 
Constitutions prohibit successive punishments for the "same 
offense."  See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); 
State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 525, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994).  
That is, the double jeopardy bar prevents the state from 
"attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same 
offense."  United States v. Ursery, 518, U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 
2135, 2139-40 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
2 
¶50 The 
majority opinion 
concludes that 
"Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) constitutes a remedial in rem civil forfeiture 
proceeding even under Ursery given the facts in this case" and 
that the double jeopardy bar is, therefore, inapplicable.  
Majority op. at 18.23  
¶51 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 
2135, 2145 (1996), sets forth a two-part test to determine 
whether a statute is a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding or 
criminal punishment under double jeopardy analysis:  (1) Did the 
legislature intend the forfeiture proceeding to be civil?  (2) 
                     
23 The majority opinion concludes that because Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) is constitutional as applied to the defendant, he 
has no standing to bring a facial challenge to the statute.  See 
majority op. at 16.  The majority opinion cites United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), which requires a showing that 
"no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would 
be valid."   
I conclude that standing is not a barrier to deciding the 
constitutionality of the statute.  The continued vitality of the 
Salerno standard has been called into question.  See Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2304-05 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (noting that appropriate standard to be applied in 
facial challenges to state statutes has been the subject of 
debate within the Supreme Court and that the Court has never 
applied Salerno standard, even in Salerno itself); Kraft Gen. 
Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue and Finance, 505 U.S. 71, 
82 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (unsuccessfully arguing 
for the application of the Salerno standard in facial challenge 
to state tax statute); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.2d 1112, 1116 
(10th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Court did not apply Salerno 
standard to facial challenge of abortion regulation statute in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)); Michael C. 
Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. 
L. 
Rev. 
235, 
239-40 
(1994) 
(asserting 
that 
the 
Court 
inconsistently applies Salerno and fails to articulate why it 
departs from Salerno).  
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
3 
If so, is there the "clearest proof" that the forfeiture 
proceeding is so punitive in form and effect as to render the 
proceeding criminal despite the legislature's intent to the 
contrary?  See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147. 
¶52 I agree with Justice Stevens that the Ursery Court's 
distinction between civil in rem forfeitures and civil in 
personam penalties is "pedantic" and does not lend itself to 
easy understanding by legislatures drafting forfeiture statutes 
or courts interpreting such statutes.  Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 
2160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
The 
Ursery 
Court 
did 
not 
engage 
in 
extensive 
statutory 
construction and thus left many questions unanswered about how 
courts are to determine whether a statute provides for a valid 
civil in rem forfeiture.  I interpret and apply Ursery as best 
as I can, relying on the two-part test and the classification of 
in rem proceedings and in personam proceedings discussed in the 
Supreme Court cases.24   
¶53 I 
dissent 
because 
I 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) imposes criminal punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. 
¶54 The first question to be answered under the Ursery 
two-part test is whether the legislature intended the forfeiture 
                     
24 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 
354 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 
U.S. 232 (1972); Various Items of Personal Property v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).  
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
4 
under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) to be civil or criminal.  See 
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.   
¶55 The majority opinion concludes that the legislature 
chose to target a motor vehicle owned by the offender and that 
the legislature, therefore, intended "to remove from the 
offender's use a vehicle that has the highest probability of 
being used in any future offense."  Majority op. at 19.  The 
majority 
opinion 
characterizes 
the 
legislative 
intent 
as 
remedial. 
¶56 The 
majority opinion 
reaches this 
conclusion by 
examining a Department of Transportation fiscal report stating 
that 85 percent of drunk drivers were driving their own cars 
when stopped by the police.  Adopting one of the State's 
positions, the majority opinion reasons that "[i]n light of 
legislative awareness that vehicle 'ownership' and 'use' tend to 
go hand in hand, the legislative decision to link forfeiture 
with ownership and not purely use suggests that 'punishment' of 
the offender was not the 'principal' purpose of sec. 346.65(6)." 
 Brief for State at 34.  Thus the majority opinion concludes 
that the legislature intended the statute to be remedial by 
making it harder for drunk drivers to have vehicles to drive.25  
¶57 The majority opinion's reasoning presents several 
problems.  First, the majority opinion fails to confront Ursery 
                     
25 The State acknowledges that 15 percent of drunk driving 
offenders "would be at risk each year for mandatory forfeiture 
of a vehicle not being driven at the time of the offense."  
Brief for State at 34 n.9.  
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
5 
and the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with civil in rem 
forfeitures.  Ursery and the other cases make clear that in a 
civil in rem forfeiture proceeding the property to be seized is, 
"by resort to a legal fiction," the defendant in the case, and 
the issue to be tried is whether the property is "guilty [of a 
crime] and condemned."  Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140 (quoting 
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 
577, 581 (1931)).26  The theory underlying a civil in rem 
forfeiture is that the property in question committed the crime 
and is, therefore, subject to punishment and forfeiture.  See 
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145.  Civil forfeiture is "designed 
primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, 
and to require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct."  
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145.   
¶58 In contrast, a forfeiture that is characterized as 
criminal is designed to impose punishment on the wrongdoer.  The 
owner of the property, who has been convicted of an offense, is 
stripped of his or her property as punishment for the offense.  
In many situations, confiscating property used in a crime and 
                     
26 The reasoning of the Ursery Court, however, is not 
entirely clear.  While discussing at length prior Supreme Court 
cases that resorted to the legal fiction that the property is 
held guilty and condemned, the majority opinion also stated, in 
response to Justice Stevens's concurring/dissenting opinion, 
that the Court does not rest its "conclusion in this case 
[Ursery] upon the long-recognized fiction that a forfeiture in 
rem punishes only malfeasant property rather than a particular 
person."  Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148 n.3. 
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
6 
punishing 
and 
deterring 
the 
wrongdoer 
are 
overlapping 
legislative purposes. 
¶59 In this case the legislature did not authorize the 
seizure of property "guilty of a crime" but instead authorized 
seizure of the offender's property to deter and punish the 
offender by confiscating a vehicle that might be used in a 
future offense.  Under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) a nexus exists 
between the seized property and the offender, but not between 
the seized property and the specific crime committed.27  
¶60 Thus 
the 
statute 
in 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
significantly different from the statutes discussed in Ursery 
and the prior Supreme Court cases.  The majority opinion in this 
case concedes that "absent a nexus between the motor vehicle and 
the 
crime, . . . compelling 
constitutional 
claims 
could 
be 
raised."  Majority op. at 30-31. 
¶61 Second, the majority opinion's characterization of the 
legislative intent contravenes the text and legislative history 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6).  I conclude, as did the State, that 
the text and legislative history are ambiguous as to the 
legislative intent.  
                     
27 The majority opinion attempts to salvage Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) by stating that the statute is remedial because it 
excludes "innocent owners."  Majority op. at 19 n.17.  The fact 
that the statute excludes "innocent owners" does not save the 
statute from being constitutionally infirm since it still 
permits in rem seizure of "innocent vehicles" (vehicles owned by 
the convicted driver but not used in the drunk driving offense).  
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
7 
¶62 The majority opinion omits any discussion of the 
statutory text in discerning the legislature's intent.  The text 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) refers to "a motor vehicle . . . owned 
by" the convicted drunk driver, not the vehicle driven by the 
driver.  The text of § 346.65(6) is silent as to legislative 
intent.  The State's brief acknowledges that "there is no clear 
expression of legislative intent in the language of sec. 
346.65(6), Stats., and the provision reflects a mixture of 
traditionally civil and criminal features."  Brief for State 
at 31.   
¶63 If the legislature had intended Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) 
to be remedial, it would have written the statute to permit 
seizure of the motor vehicle owned and driven by the convicted 
driver at the time of the drunk driving offense.  But the 
legislature did not write the statute this way, and the court 
should not interpret the statute to mean what the legislature 
did not say.28 
¶64 Finally, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion 
about 
legislative intent contradicts the legislative history.  The 
State's brief concedes that the legislative history "reflects 
                     
28 The majority opinion asserts that "the primary purpose of 
the statute . . . is to keep the highways safe and protect the 
public" and cites to State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 30, 45, 556 
N.W.2d 673 (1996), as support for this legislative purpose.  
Majority op. at 18-19.  McMaster involved Wis. Stat. § 343.305, 
an entirely different statute, and provides for in personam 
penalties in relation to intoxication tests.  The majority 
opinion makes a large, unsupported leap by equating the 
legislative purpose of § 343.305 with the legislative purpose of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6). 
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
8 
mixed remedial and punitive goals."  Brief for State at 32.  The 
majority opinion selectively ignores portions of the legislative 
history.  The full legislative history reveals that the 
legislature considered limiting forfeiture to the vehicle driven 
by the convicted driver but chose not to do so.  The drafting 
file contains several memoranda discussing the choice between 
forfeiture of the vehicle driven by the convicted driver and 
forfeiture of a vehicle owned by the convicted driver.  An early 
draft of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) provided for seizure of "the 
motor vehicle in which the violation  . . .  was committed if 
the person convicted of that violation has 3 or more prior 
convictions in a 5-year period."  A staff member of then-Senator 
Lynn Adelman, a sponsor of the bill, asked that this language be 
amended so that "[o]nly vehicles owned by the offender would be 
subject to confiscation, not necessarily the car being driven by 
the offender."   
¶65 I conclude that because Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6) permits 
seizure of a vehicle owned by the convicted driver, regardless 
of whether the vehicle was used to commit the offense, the 
legislature directed the statute to the person of the convicted 
driver and intended to deter and punish the driver; the 
legislature did not direct the forfeiture toward "the guilty 
property."  
¶66 I therefore conclude under the first part of the 
Ursery test that the legislature did not intend Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) to be a civil in rem forfeiture statute directed to 
the "guilty property."  Because I conclude § 346.65(6) is not a 
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
9 
civil in rem forfeiture statute, I need not, and do not, reach 
the second part of the Ursery test.  
¶67 The only remaining question is whether a vehicle 
forfeiture 
proceeding 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(6) 
is 
a 
successive proceeding or part of the drunk driving prosecution. 
 The 
State concedes that 
"it is 
not 
clear 
whether the 
legislature intended sec. 346.65(6), Stats, to be part of the 
original criminal prosecution (as an adjunct to sentencing) or 
to be a totally independent proceeding, because the provision 
contains a hybrid of criminal and civil features."  Brief for 
State at 24.   
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(6)(c) provides that "[t]he 
district attorney of the county where the motor vehicle was 
seized shall commence an action to forfeit the motor vehicle 
within 30 days after the motor vehicle is seized . . . .  The 
forfeiture action shall be commenced by filing a summons, 
complaint and affidavit of the law enforcement agency with the 
clerk of circuit court."  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(6)(c).  On balance 
§ 346.65(6)(c) seems to make the vehicle forfeiture proceeding a 
separate 
proceeding 
from 
the 
criminal 
prosecution. 
 
I, 
therefore, conclude that vehicle forfeiture under § 346.65(6) 
following a criminal conviction violates the double jeopardy bar 
against successive punishments. 
¶69 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this opinion. 
 
No. 96-1261.ssa 
 
 
10