Title: Rumbaugh v. Vonfeldt
Citation: 190 Kan. 798, 378 P.2d 5
Docket Number: 43,195
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 1963

190 Kan. 798 (1963)
378 P.2d 5
EARL RUMBAUGH, Appellee,
v.
ANDREW F. VONFELDT, Appellant.
No. 43,195

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 26, 1963.
*799 Norbert R. Dreiling, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
Edgar M. Miner, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This appeal stems from an action to recover damages from an alleged negligent third party, for injuries to an employee compensated under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The facts are not disputed.
On January 12, 1960, Earl Rumbaugh was injured while in the course of his employment for Melvin L. Jarvis. It is contended that the injuries resulted from the negligence of a third party, Andrew F. Vonfeldt.
Rumbaugh filed a claim against his employer, Jarvis, under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Following a hearing, held on December 20, 1960, Rumbaugh was awarded $2,246.18 against Jarvis and his insurance carrier, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. The insurer paid the award and received from Rumbaugh a subrogation assignment which provided in part as follows:
Subsequently the Western Casualty and Surety Company, the liability insurer for the alleged negligent third party, Vonfeldt, reimbursed Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company for the compensation *800 award paid by it to Rumbaugh and took a release. The release was dated January 31, 1961, and signed only by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company.
The release acknowledged the receipt of $2,246.18 and further provided that the undersigned does hereby and for its,
This action was filed July 7, 1961. Earl Rumbaugh appeared in the caption as plaintiff, and the petition was signed and verified by him. In addition to allegations as to negligent injury the petition stated:
*801 The prayer of such pleading read:
The defendant (Vonfeldt) filed a demurrer to the petition in which, along with other grounds not here involved, he charged that (a) "the plaintiff, Earl Rumbaugh had no legal capacity to sue in the matter," and (b) "the petition showed on its face the plaintiff was not the real party in interest." This demurrer was overruled and the defendant filed an answer in which he renewed his demurrer with other defenses.
The district court first determined the legal questions, leaving the question of negligence and amount of damages for later determination by a jury if the legal questions were determined adversely to Vonfeldt's contentions. The matter was presented to the district court largely on a stipulation which developed the facts heretofore stated. The lower court made very complete and comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it concluded.
Vonfeldt has appealed raising only two questions for review  (1) who is the real party in interest in the action, and (2) was the cause of action barred by G.S. 1959 Supp., 44-504 because not brought within one year after the alleged injury to Rumbaugh? His contentions are summarized as follows:
We must look to the provisions of G.S. 1959 Supp., 44-504, for the determination of this controversy. So far as here pertinent such statute reads:
It is to be noted the foregoing section of the statute was amended in 1961 but the amendment did not affect the above quoted language.
The appellant misconstrues the purpose and effect of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The provisions of 44-504, supra, were not intended to shorten the two-year period in which an action must be brought for negligent injury. Nor were they intended to benefit the alleged wrongdoer.
In Sundgren v. Topeka Transportation Co., 178 Kan. 83, 283 P.2d 444, we said:
During the first year the injured workman has complete control of the tort action. If he does not see fit to bring the action within the year the right to bring it is, by the statute, assigned to the employer. The wrongdoer cannot, by reimbursing the employer for the compensation paid, destroy the cause of action accruing to the injured employee. Nor is the statutory assignment complete and in destruction of the rights of the employee to recover damages for injury in excess of the compensation paid by the employer. The rights existing between the employer and employee are clearly stated in Terrell v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 174 Kan. 633, 258 P.2d 275, which reads:
There is no requirement in the statute that the employer must have a monetary interest in order to maintain the action. The action may be brought by the employer in the name of the employee, "for their benefit as their interest may appear." That was done in this case. The employer, Jarvis, testified that he brought the action in *804 his behalf for whatever subrogation rights he might have and whatever interest Rumbaugh, the employee, might have. This is all that is required by the statute.
In Krol v. Coryell, 162 Kan. 198, 175 P.2d 423, we held:
At the time the opinion in the above case was written the application of the statute insofar as an employer was concerned was limited. However, after it was decided the legislature passed Chapter 287, Laws of 1947, now G.S. 1961 Supp., 44-504, and added the words "for their benefit (employer and employee) as their interest may appear." Thus it appears that the rule last above quoted is still the law of this state.
In the opinion in the Krol case it is said:
In Sundgren v. Topeka Transportation Co., supra, it is said:
See, also, Davis v. Reed, 188 Kan. 159, 360 P.2d 847; Lady v. Ketchum, 186 Kan. 614, 352 P.2d 21.
The right to bring the action against the wrongdoer under G.S. 1961 Supp., 44-504, is not dependent on the extent of the interest of the employee or employer. During the first year following the injury the employee may bring the action and if there is a recovery the employer is subrogated to the extent of the compensation paid. Whether or not the amount to be recovered is greater or less than the compensation paid, the right to bring the action belongs to the employee. During the second year the employer must bring the action either in his name or the name of the injured employee for their benefit as their interest may appear. The statute contains no requirements as to the extent of the employer's interest. He is the statutory representative for the injured employee for the purpose of bringing the action. The fact that the employer has been reimbursed for the compensation paid does not destroy the right nor the obligation created by the statute. The statute was not intended to destroy any existing rights of the injured employee for the benefit of the wrongdoer.
What has been heretofore stated compels us to conclude the employer (Jarvis) is authorized by the statute to bring the action and that whether he has any actual monetary interest in the results is of no consequence.
In conclusion it should perhaps be stated we have not failed to note that appellant emphasizes G.S. 1949, 60-401, which provides "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, ..." All arguments advanced by him on this point overlook the exception contained in G.S. 1949, 60-403, which adds, "or a person expressly authorized by statute ..."
See, also, Rullman v. Rullman, 81 Kan. 521, 106 Pac. 52, where it is held:
G.S. 1961 Supp., 44-504, permits the wrongdoer to make a complete defense and he is fully protected by the judgment from any further liability on the same cause.
The judgment is affirmed.