Title: Walter J. Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove
Citation: 2008 WI 51
Docket Number: 2005AP002257
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2008

2008 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2257 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Walter J. Olson, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Town of Cottage Grove, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  298 Wis. 2d 548, 727 N.W.2d 373 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Angela B. Bartell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioners there were briefs 
by Constance L. Anderson, Paul G. Kent, and Abigail C.S. Potts 
and Anderson & Kent, S.C., Madison, and oral argument was by 
Paul G. Kent. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by John A. 
Kassner III, Matthew D. Moeser and Murphy Desmond S.C., and oral 
argument by John A. Kassner III. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson on 
behalf of Wisconsin REALTORS® Association. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2257   
(L.C. No. 
2004CV2821) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Walter J. Olson, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Cottage Grove, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing a 
summary judgment issued by the Dane County Circuit Court, Angela 
B. Bartell, Judge.  The circuit court dismissed a declaratory 
judgment action filed by plaintiff Walter Olson (Olson).   
¶2 
Olson is a real estate developer who owns 69.72 acres 
of land in the Town of Cottage Grove (Town) in Dane County 
                                                 
1 Olson 
v. 
Town 
of 
Cottage 
Grove, 
No. 
2005AP2257, 
unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006). 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
2 
 
(County). 
 
Olson 
brought 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
action 
challenging the legality of the Town's Land Division and 
Planning Code § 15.15 (the ordinance or § 15.15).  Olson sought 
to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional on various 
grounds, and he sought other relief, including approval of a 
final subdivision plat and compensation for the alleged taking 
of his property. 
¶3 
The circuit court granted the Town's motion for 
summary judgment on the basis that Olson's suit for declaratory 
judgment was not ripe, and therefore not justiciable.  Olson 
appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  Olson v. Town of 
Cottage Grove, No. 2005AP2257, unpublished slip. op., ¶25 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006).  We granted the Town's petition for 
review.   
¶4 
We are asked to address two questions: (1) What is the 
appropriate standard of review for a circuit court's decision 
granting summary judgment in a declaratory judgment suit on the 
basis that the suit is not ripe?; and (2) Is Olson's suit ripe 
for declaratory judgment, and therefore justiciable?   
¶5 
We determine that the appropriate standard of review 
in these circumstances is de novo review.  Applying this 
standard of review to the record before us, we conclude that 
Olson's declaratory judgment suit is ripe for adjudication, and 
therefore justiciable.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
3 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Since 1996 Olson has been the owner of a 69.72 acre 
parcel of land in the Town, commonly known as the Klosterman 
Farm (property).  On December 27, 2001, Olson filed a zoning 
petition (No. 8357) with the County to rezone his property from 
A-1 EX Exclusive Agricultural to R-1 Residential in order to 
subdivide his property into 15 residential lots. 
¶7 
On June 7, 2002, Olson submitted a preliminary plat of 
his proposed subdivision development——Highlands Addition to 
American 
Heritage——to 
the 
Town 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 236.11(1)(a) (2001-02).2 
¶8 
On July 15, 2002, the Town amended its Land Division 
and Planning Code to include § 15.15, entitled "Transfer of 
Development Rights Program (TDR)."  The ordinance's TDR program 
incorporates the Land Use Element of the Town's Smart Growth 
Comprehensive Plan——2020.  The TDR program was created to serve 
several purposes, including allowing owners of farmland to 
capture 
a 
reasonable 
development 
value 
for 
their 
land, 
preserving the farmland and rural characteristics of the area, 
and directing new residential development toward areas of 
existing development.  Another purpose of the program is to 
"maintain community separation between the Village of Cottage 
Grove and the City of Madison." 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
4 
 
¶9 
Under the TDR program, some land use districts are 
designated as "sending areas" and others as "receiving areas."  
Sending areas include land designated as agricultural or open 
space/park districts.  Receiving areas include residential 
districts, which are designated as a "Conservation Residential 
District," a "Medium Density Residential District," or a "High 
Density Residential District" to reflect their intended density 
and use.  Using these classifications, the TDR program creates 
an additional step for receiving area landowners who seek to 
develop their property. 
¶10 Persons hoping to develop property in a receiving area 
must acquire a requisite number of transfer development rights 
(TDRs), which amount to ownership interests in sending area 
property.  Under the TDR program, owners of land in sending 
areas may sell their TDRs to owners of land in receiving areas.  
A TDR easement is then established by a deed entered into among 
the developer, the Town, and the County.  Through these 
easements, land interests from sending areas are "sent" to 
receiving areas to make up for the subsequent increase in 
density due to residential development in receiving areas.  
Hence, the ordinance sets forth procedures to assure that 
rezoning and division of land in a receiving area is not 
approved without first obtaining the requisite number of TDRs 
and recording a TDR easement. 
¶11 Under the TDR program enacted by the Town in July 
2002, Olson's property falls within a Medium Density Residential 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
5 
 
District 
receiving 
area 
and 
is 
zoned 
A-1 
EX 
Exclusive 
Agricultural, which precludes residential development. 
¶12 On October 28, 2002, Olson filed a second, separate 
zoning petition (No. 8598) with the County and requested to 
increase the number of proposed lots from 15 to 58 while still 
seeking 
to 
rezone 
the 
property 
from 
A-1 
EX 
Exclusive 
Agricultural to R-1 Residential. 
¶13 On January 14, 2003, the Dane County Zoning and 
Natural Resources Committee (ZNR) reviewed Olson's second zoning 
petition and recommended approval.  On January 23, 2003, the 
Dane County Board of Supervisors (County Board) adopted the 
ZNR's 
recommendation, 
granting 
Olson 
conditional 
rezoning 
effective February 14, 2003.  The petition was granted subject 
to two conditions.  Olson was required to: (1) withdraw zoning 
petition No. 8357; and (2) record a final plat in the office of 
the Dane County Register of Deeds within one year of rezoning 
approval by the County. 
¶14 On September 19, 2003, Olson submitted a final plat 
application for the Highlands Addition to American Heritage.  
The Town conditionally approved this final plat at a Town Board 
meeting on November 3, 2003.  The Town's approval of the plat 
was subject to the requirement that Olson acquire 10 TDRs and 
transfer them to the Town and County to comply with § 15.15. 
¶15 Olson did not then own, and claimed that he was unable 
to acquire, the 10 TDRs necessary to satisfy the ordinance.  
Olson claimed that to acquire 10 TDRs would require the purchase 
of 350 acres of farmland in a sending area at a cost of 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
6 
 
approximately $750,000.  Olson also claimed that to finish his 
redevelopment project would require the total acquisition of 700 
acres of farmland. 
¶16 On January 20, 2004, the Dane County Planning and 
Development Commission reminded Olson that zoning petition No. 
8598 had a delayed effective date of February 14, 2004, provided 
that a plat was recorded in the office of the Dane County 
Register of Deeds no later than that date.  Olson did not record 
a final plat before February 14, 2004. 
¶17 On February 5, 2004, the County Board addressed zoning 
petition No. 8598 at a regular meeting.  The record in the 
present case includes minutes of the Proceedings of the Dane 
County Board of Supervisors, Vol. 90, April 2003-2004, which 
read in part: 
MOTIONS FROM PREVIOUS MEETINGS 
 
The question before the Board was Supervisor 
Wiganowsky's motion at the last County Board meeting 
to rescind action on Zoning Petition 8832——Town of Sun 
Prairie.  Motion carried.  Moved by Supervisor 
Wiganowsky, seconded by Supervisor Wendt, to refer 
Petition 8832 to the Zoning & Natural Resources 
Committee.  Motion carried.   
The question before the Board was Supervisor 
Hulsey's motion at the last County Board meeting to 
rescind action 
on Zoning Petition 8598——Town of 
Cottage Grove.  Motion carried.  Moved by Supervisor 
Hulsey, seconded by Supervisor O'Loughlin, to extend 
for one year the delayed effective date.  Motion 
carried.  (Emphasis added.)3 
                                                 
3 The parties dispute the meaning of "rescind action on 
Zoning Petition 8598," and the circuit court premised its 
determination 
that 
Olson's 
case 
was 
not 
ripe 
on 
its 
interpretation of this language.  We address this dispute below. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
7 
 
¶18 On September 13, 2004, Olson filed the instant 
declaratory judgment action against the Town to challenge the 
validity of § 15.15.  Olson's complaint alleged that § 15.15 was 
enacted without statutory authority, violated several provisions 
of the Wisconsin Statutes, was applied to his property ex post 
facto, and constituted an uncompensated taking under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.4  Olson's 
complaint sought the following relief: (1) a declaration that 
§ 15.15 is void and of no effect; (2) an order directing the 
Town to immediately approve Olson's plat of the Highlands 
Addition to American Heritage; and (3) supplemental relief in 
the form of just compensation for the temporary taking of 
Olson's land. 
¶19 On April 11, 2005, the Town filed a motion for summary 
judgment, asking that Olson's case be dismissed with prejudice 
for lack of justiciability.  The Town's motion argued that Olson 
could not pursue declaratory relief with regard to the ordinance 
because his case was not ripe for adjudication, and therefore 
not justiciable. 
¶20 On July 21, 2005, the circuit court granted the Town's 
motion for summary judgment.  In a 16-page decision, the court 
determined that Olson's declaratory judgment action was not ripe 
for adjudication, and therefore not justiciable.  The court held 
                                                 
4 The merits of these allegations are not before this court, 
and we offer no analysis regarding their validity. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
8 
 
that "[b]ecause there are no material facts in dispute and the 
Town has provided a defense that defeats Olson's claim as a 
matter of law, summary judgment is granted to the Town." 
¶21 The circuit court granted summary judgment because it 
determined that the controversy between Olson and the Town was 
not justiciable.  Therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over 
Olson's claim for declaratory relief.  The court cited Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 410, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) (citing 
Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 26-57 (2d ed. 1941) 
(hereinafter Declaratory Judgments)), for the four factors 
necessary to determine that a controversy is justiciable: 
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it.  (2) The controversy must be between persons whose 
interests 
are 
adverse. 
 
(3) 
The 
party 
seeking 
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the 
controversy——that is to say, a legally protectible 
interest.  (4) The issue involved in the controversy 
must be ripe for judicial determination. 
Only the fourth factor, ripeness, was disputed by the parties; 
therefore, the court found no need to address the first three 
factors.  
¶22 The circuit court held that the Town had demonstrated, 
and Olson failed to rebut, a prima facie showing that Olson's 
action for declaratory judgment was not ripe based on the fact 
that "the County's conditional rezoning approval had been 
rescinded at the time Olson filed" his declaratory judgment suit 
on September 30, 2004.  The ordinance itself was "of no 
consequence" because Olson had not submitted a new petition for 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
9 
 
rezoning with the County after the delayed effective date for 
conditional approval of zoning petition No. 8598 had expired.  
The circuit court stated:   
At the time Olson filed the current action, he had 
lost the conditional zoning approval on his petition 
for rezoning.  Thus, Olson stands in no different 
position than any other owner of land zoned A-1 EX 
Exclusive Agricultural in the Town of Cottage Grove 
who would like to rezone his or her land in the 
future.  
The circuit court added: 
Thus, this court's ruling on the validity of § 15.15 
would not "affect legal relations" between Olson and 
the Town. . . .  The court would essentially be 
saying, "If Olson gets approval from the County to 
rezone his land from agricultural to residential, then 
§ 15.15 should/should not bar the Town's approval of 
his plat."  Since there is no guarantee that the 
[County] Board will authorize the rezoning of Olson's 
land in the future and Olson does not have a vested or 
inherent right [to] have his property rezoned, this 
court's opinion as to the validity of § 15.15 is 
immature. 
. . . . 
Because Olson has failed to secure the necessary 
approvals to rezone his land, a declaration of the 
validity of § 15.15 will not have an immediate impact 
on Olson, and its future impact is too contingent to 
satisfy the ripeness element of justiciability. 
Finally, 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
Olson 
"ha[d] 
not 
demonstrated . . . any genuine issues of material fact that 
entitle[d] him to a trial."  Therefore, the circuit court 
granted summary judgment to the Town. 
¶23 Olson appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Olson, No. 2005AP2257, unpublished slip. op., ¶25.   
No. 2005AP2257 
 
10 
 
¶24 The court of appeals addressed the standard of review.  
It said the standard to review the circuit court's decision was 
de novo because the circuit court's decision hinged upon a 
question of law, namely ripeness.  Id., ¶8 (citing Commercial 
Union Midwest Ins. Co. v. Vorbeck, 2004 WI App 11, ¶7, 269 
Wis. 2d 204, 674 N.W.2d 665).  The court of appeals acknowledged 
that "[a] circuit court's decision to grant or deny declaratory 
relief is within its discretion."  Id. (citing Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 
48 
v. 
Milwaukee 
County, 
2001 
WI 
65, 
¶36, 
244 
Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866).  Nonetheless, the court of appeals 
concluded that de novo review was appropriate because a circuit 
court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo.  
Id., ¶9 (citing Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987)). 
¶25 The court of appeals next addressed whether Olson's 
declaratory judgment action was ripe.  In concluding that 
Olson's 
claim 
was 
ripe 
for 
adjudication, 
and 
therefore 
justiciable, the court of appeals held that "the possibility 
that the Town will apply the land division ordinance to Olson" 
was "real, precise, and immediate."  Id., ¶21 (citing Putnam v. 
Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. P'ship, 2002 WI 108, ¶47, 
255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626).  The court of appeals 
concluded that the declaratory relief sought by Olson "would 
resolve the uncertainty Olson and other developers will continue 
to face in the future development of their properties"; 
therefore, the court held that Olson's claim was ripe for 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
11 
 
adjudication, reversed the circuit court, and remanded.  Id., 
¶¶24-25. 
¶26 The Town petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on April 17, 2007.  
II. ANALYSIS 
¶27 This case presents a complex standard of review issue 
and a relatively simple substantive issue under Wisconsin's 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04 (the 
Act).  The Act provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Scope.  Courts of record within their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed.  No action 
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground 
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.  
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative 
in form and effect; and such declarations shall have 
the 
force 
and 
effect 
of 
a 
final 
judgment 
or 
decree. . . . 
(2) Power 
to 
construe, 
etc. 
Any 
person 
interested . . . whose rights, status or other legal 
relations 
are 
affected 
by 
a 
statute, 
municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined 
any question of construction or validity arising under 
the 
instrument, 
statute, 
ordinance, 
contract 
or 
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status 
or other legal relations thereunder.  No party shall 
be denied the right to have declared the validity of 
any statute or municipal ordinance by virtue of the 
fact that the party holds a license or permit under 
such statutes or ordinances. 
. . . . 
(6) Discretionary.  The court may refuse to 
render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where 
such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would 
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving 
rise to the proceeding. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
12 
 
(7) Review.  All orders, judgments and decrees 
under this section may be reviewed as other orders, 
judgments and decrees. 
. . . . 
(12) Construction.  This section is declared to 
be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be 
liberally construed and administered. 
¶28 A 
court 
must 
be 
presented 
with 
a 
justiciable 
controversy before it may exercise its jurisdiction over a claim 
for declaratory judgment.  This is so because the purpose of the 
Act is to allow courts to anticipate and resolve identifiable, 
certain 
disputes 
between 
adverse 
parties. 
 
Putnam, 
255 
Wis. 2d 447, ¶43 (citing Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12); Lister v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 72 Wis. 2d 282, 307, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976)).  "The underlying philosophy of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act is to enable controversies of a 
justiciable 
nature 
to 
be 
brought 
before 
the 
courts 
for 
settlement and determination prior to the time that a wrong has 
been threatened or committed."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 307.  
Therefore, before one may seek declaratory relief pursuant to 
the Act, he must demonstrate that his cause of action is 
properly before the court——namely, that it is justiciable.  Loy, 
107 Wis. 2d at 409-10. 
 
¶29 The leading Wisconsin case on declaratory judgments is 
Loy, which emphasized that a declaratory judgment is fitting 
when a controversy is justiciable.  Id. at 410.  A controversy 
is justiciable when the following four factors are present: 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
13 
 
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it. 
(2) The controversy must be between persons 
whose interests are adverse.   
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must 
have a legal interest in the controversy——that is to 
say, a legally protectible interest. 
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must 
be ripe for judicial determination.   
Id. (citing Declaratory Judgments, supra, at 26-57).  "If all 
four factors are satisfied, the controversy is 'justiciable,' 
and it is proper for a court to entertain an action for 
declaratory judgment."  Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case, 
162 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 470 N.W.2d 290 (1991).   
 
¶30 Only factor (4), ripeness, is at issue here. The 
circuit court determined that Olson's suit challenging the 
validity of § 15.15 was not ripe for adjudication, and therefore 
not justiciable.  The court of appeals reversed, applying a de 
novo standard of review because: (1) the circuit court's 
decision hinged on a question of law; and (2) the procedural 
posture of the case was review of a grant of summary judgment by 
the circuit court.  Olson, No. 2005AP2257, unpublished slip. 
op., ¶¶8-9.   
¶31 Before we can evaluate the circuit court's decision to 
grant summary judgment to the Town, we must establish the 
appropriate standard to review a grant of summary judgment when 
declaratory relief is sought and the underlying claim is 
determined to be unripe, and therefore not justiciable.   
No. 2005AP2257 
 
14 
 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶32 The 
standard 
of 
review 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
complicated 
by 
the 
fact 
that 
ripeness 
is 
a 
necessary 
prerequisite to reaching the merits of and entertaining a 
declaratory judgment action.  See Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶41.  
Ripeness, as a component of justiciability, is a threshold 
jurisdictional question.  See 1 Walter H. Anderson, Actions for 
Declaratory Judgments § 16, at 65-66 (2d ed. 1951).  We cannot 
say that the circuit court asserted its jurisdiction, reached 
the merits of Olson's suit, and denied declaratory relief 
pursuant to the Act because the circuit court neither granted 
nor denied relief pursuant to the Act.  Instead, the court 
concluded 
that 
it 
lacked 
jurisdiction 
to 
grant 
or 
deny 
declaratory relief because Olson's suit was not ripe, and it 
subsequently held that the Town was entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law.5  For this reason, we review the circuit 
                                                 
5 This 
court's 
decision 
in 
Loy 
v. 
Bunderson, 
107 
Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982), conflated the evaluation of 
the factors necessary to reach the merits of a declaratory 
judgment and the granting or denying of declaratory relief on 
the merits.  See id. at 409 ("We have frequently stated the 
standards for the exercise of trial court discretion to 
entertain and decide an action for declaratory relief.").   
No. 2005AP2257 
 
15 
 
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, premised upon the 
court's legal conclusion that Olson's case was not ripe.  We do 
not review for an erroneous exercise of discretion.6   
¶33 The language of the Act is instructive.  The Act 
states that "[a]ll orders, judgments and decrees under this 
section may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees."  
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(7).  Accordingly, a summary judgment 
pursuant to the Act, particularly one that turns upon a question 
of law, should be reviewed as any other summary judgment. 
¶34 In this appeal, we examine a circuit court's decision 
granting summary judgment, which is subject to de novo review.  
Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315-17.  A party is entitled 
                                                                                                                                                             
Determining whether a suit is or is not ripe is a legal 
inquiry separate and distinct from determining whether to grant 
or deny declaratory relief on the merits.  The circuit court 
here determined that Olson's suit was not ripe; as a result, it 
did not expressly deny declaratory relief, either on ripeness 
grounds or on the merits.  Instead, it granted summary judgment 
to the Town as a matter of law because the suit was not ripe.  
Therefore, the appropriate standard of review here is de novo 
because the circuit court's decision turned upon a question of 
law.  See Jones v. Secura Ins. Co., 2002 WI 11, ¶19, 249 Wis. 2d 
623, 638 N.W.2d 575 (indicating that the circuit court's 
decision to grant declaratory relief turned upon the legal 
question of what damages an insured could recover in a bad faith 
action, which is reviewed de novo); Commercial Union Midwest 
Ins. Co. v. Vorbeck, 2004 WI App 11, ¶7, 269 Wis. 2d 204, 674 
N.W.2d 665 (indicating that the circuit court's decision to 
grant declaratory relief turned upon the construction of an 
insurance contract, which is reviewed de novo). 
6 In Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case, 162 Wis. 2d 684, 
470 N.W.2d 290 (1991), we applied a de novo standard to review a 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that 
the underlying action was not ripe for adjudication.  Id. at 
693-94.  This standard should apply to Olson's case as well. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
16 
 
to summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Everson v. Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, ¶9, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 
N.W.2d 298; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶35 Review of a declaratory judgment is different.  We 
have stated the standard of review for a declaratory judgment as 
follows: 
A decision to grant or deny declaratory relief falls 
within the discretion of the circuit court.  The 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
to 
grant 
[or 
deny] 
declaratory relief will not be overturned unless the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
This court will uphold a discretionary act if the 
circuit court "examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated 
rational 
process, 
reached 
a 
conclusion 
that 
a 
reasonable judge could reach." 
Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶40 (quoting Milwaukee Dist. Council 
48, 244 Wis. 2d 333, ¶36) (emphasis added).  See also Wis. Educ. 
Ass'n Council v. Wis. State Elections Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 151, 161, 
456 N.W.2d 839 (1990) ("The decision to grant or deny relief in 
a declaratory judgment action is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court."); State ex rel. Lynch v. 
Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976) ("The granting 
or denying of relief in a declaratory judgment action is a 
matter within the sound discretion of the court." (citations 
omitted)).  
¶36 The language of the Act indicates a discretionary 
standard to grant or deny declaratory relief.  Wisconsin 
Stat. §806.04(6) reads: "(6) Discretionary.  The court may 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
17 
 
refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where 
such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not 
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the 
proceeding."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶37 A ripeness determination, on the other hand, is a 
legal conclusion and therefore reviewed as a question of law.  
The Town argues that the question we must ask regarding ripeness 
should be: "How ripe is ripe enough?"  This question implies 
circuit court discretion to determine whether a case is timely 
based upon a continuum of ripe outcomes.7  We disagree that this 
is the question courts must ask because ripeness should not be 
conceptualized as a sliding scale of possibilities.  The proper 
question is simply: "Is the action ripe?" This question requires 
the circuit court to make a legal conclusion——"ripe" or "not 
ripe"——based upon the facts at hand and the standards set forth 
by the Act and our precedents.  
 
¶38 We find support for our conclusion that de novo review 
is the proper standard to review a ripeness determination in 
cases from other jurisdictions.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
reviewing the dismissal of a declaratory judgment suit, recently 
stated: "We regard the matter of whether a proceeding is ripe as 
a question of law, as to which our standard of review is de 
                                                 
7 The Borchard treatise also seems to espouse this view of 
the ripeness determination.  See Edwin Borchard, Declaratory 
Judgments, at 61 (2d ed. 1941) ("Judicial Discretion. Whether 
the facts are ripe enough for determination is usually a matter 
confided to the discretion of the court.  Opinions may differ on 
such questions.") (emphasis added). 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
18 
 
novo, and our scope of review is plenary."  Twp. of Derry v. Pa. 
Dep't of Labor & Indus., 932 A.2d 56, 59 (Pa. 2007).  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion: "On appeal, 
the question as to whether there was a complete absence of a 
justiciable issue shall be reviewed de novo on the record of the 
trial court."  McKinnon v. Norris, 231 S.W.3d 725, 732 n.6 (Ark. 
2006).  The Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits also review 
ripeness determinations in declaratory judgment actions under a 
de novo standard of review.  Wyatt, Virgin Is., Inc. v. Gov't of 
the Virgin Is. ex rel. Virgin Is. Dep't of Labor, 385 F.3d 801, 
805 (3rd Cir. 2004) ("We exercise plenary review over whether a 
cause of action is ripe."); Venator Group Specialty v. Matthew, 
322 F.3d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that "this court 
reviews de novo the question of whether a controversy is ripe 
for adjudication"); Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 
F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We review de novo . . . the 
question of ripeness . . . "); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson 
v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Ripeness is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.").  We agree with 
these courts and conclude that ripeness, as it pertains to 
declaratory judgments, is a legal conclusion subject to de novo 
review. 
¶39 Whether we focus our analysis on the circuit court's 
ultimate decision——to grant summary judgment to the Town——or on 
the legal predicate for that decision——the determination that 
Olson's case was not ripe, and therefore not justiciable——our 
standard of review is the same, de novo.  See Miller Brands-
No. 2005AP2257 
 
19 
 
Milwaukee, 162 Wis.2d at 693-94.  However, we find it more 
appropriate to base our holding on the circuit court's ripeness 
determination because it is the narrowest indicator of the 
circuit court's reasoning to grant summary judgment to the Town.  
Therefore, we review the circuit court's legal conclusion that 
Olson's cause of action was not ripe, and therefore not 
justiciable, de novo. 
B. 
Ripeness 
¶40 We now address whether the circuit court properly 
granted the Town's motion for summary judgment because it 
determined that Olson's suit for declaratory judgment was not 
ripe, and therefore not justiciable.   
¶41 We agree with the court of appeals' assessment that 
"[t]he nature of this controversy is precisely the type to be 
resolved by a declaratory judgment."  Olson, No. 2005AP2257, 
unpublished slip. op., ¶15 (citing Weber v. Town of Lincoln, 159 
Wis. 2d 144, 148, 463 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1990)).  The Act 
expressly provides for the declaration of rights with regard to 
municipal ordinances: 
Any person interested . . . whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have 
determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, 
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2) (emphasis added).   
¶42 The Act is to be liberally construed and administered 
to achieve a remedial purpose.  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12).  The 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
20 
 
Act's stated purpose is "to settle and to afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and 
other legal relations."  Id.  We have stated that "[t]he 
preferred view appears to be that declaratory relief is 
appropriate wherever it will serve a useful purpose."  Lister, 
72 Wis. 2d at 307.  Here, Olson's suit will serve the useful 
purpose of settling the uncertainty that Town landowners face 
with regard to whether they must first comply with the ordinance 
to obtain final plat approval and, subsequently, rezoning 
approval.  Olson's declaratory suit was an effort to avoid 
subjecting himself to financial loss due to compliance with an 
ordinance he believed the Town had no legal or constitutional 
authority to impose.   
¶43 We have previously commented on the legal question of 
ripeness in the declaratory judgment context.  By definition, 
the ripeness required in declaratory judgment actions is 
different from the ripeness required in other actions.  Putnam, 
255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶44 (citing Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 244 
Wis. 2d 333, ¶41).  In State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, this court 
analyzed a declaratory judgment involving a forfeiture statute.  
Lynch, 71 Wis. 2d at 674.  It declared that potential defendants 
"may seek a construction of a statute or a test of its 
constitutional 
validity 
without 
subjecting 
themselves 
to 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
21 
 
forfeitures or prosecution."  Id. (citations omitted).8   Thus, a 
plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment need not actually suffer 
an injury before availing himself of the Act.  Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 48, 244 Wis. 2d 333, ¶41.  What is required is that the 
facts 
be 
sufficiently 
developed 
to 
allow 
a 
conclusive 
adjudication.  Id.; Lynch, 71 Wis. 2d at 674 (citing Declaratory 
Judgments, supra, at 56).  As we stated in Miller Brands-
Milwaukee, "the facts [must] be sufficiently developed to avoid 
courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreements."  162 
Wis. 2d at 694 (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 412, 414).  The facts 
on which the court is asked to make a judgment should not be 
contingent or uncertain, but not all adjudicatory facts must be 
resolved as a prerequisite to a declaratory judgment.  Miller 
Brands-Milwaukee, 162 Wis. 2d at 694-95 (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d 
at 412). 
¶44 Olson brought this declaratory judgment action to 
determine the validity of § 15.15, which created the TDR 
provisions of the Town's Land Division and Planning Code.  He 
argues that the ordinance impacts him and that his cause is ripe 
because he seeks to acquire rezoning of his property, located in 
a "receiving area" under § 15.15, so that he can subdivide and 
develop it.  The County conditioned rezoning approval upon Olson 
acquiring final plat approval from the Town within one year of 
                                                 
8 One commentator has noted that declaratory judgment 
actions must give property owners a means to determine "their 
legal rights before they subject[] themselves to damages and 
loss . . . ."  4 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning § 30:1, at 740 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis added).   
No. 2005AP2257 
 
22 
 
the County's conditional rezoning approval.  The Town then 
conditioned final plat approval upon Olson acquiring 10 TDRs and 
transferring them to the Town and County, to comply with 
§ 15.15.  Olson alleges that compliance with the TDR provisions 
of § 15.15 would come at an expense he cannot afford.  Olson 
advances several legal theories to challenge the validity of 
§ 15.15.9 Specifically, Olson's complaint alleges that: (1) the 
                                                 
9 At oral argument the parties addressed whether Olson's 
lawsuit was a facial or an as-applied challenge to § 15.15.  
Black's Law Dictionary defines "as-applied challenge" as: "A 
lawsuit claiming that a law or governmental policy, though 
constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, 
usually because of a discriminatory effect; a claim that a 
statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or 
to a particular party."  Black's Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed. 
1999).  "Facial challenge" is defined as: "A claim that a 
statute is unconstitutional on its face——that is, that it always 
operates unconstitutionally."  Id.  One commentator has stated 
the following with regard to facial and as-applied challenges: 
If a court holds a statute unconstitutional on its 
face, 
the 
state 
may 
not 
enforce 
it 
under 
any 
circumstances, unless an appropriate court narrows its 
application; in contrast, when a court holds a statute 
unconstitutional as applied to particular facts, the 
state 
may 
enforce 
the 
statute 
in 
different 
circumstances. 
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1994).   
No. 2005AP2257 
 
23 
 
ordinance imposes an illegal exaction upon land division as a 
final condition of plat approval without statutory authorization 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 236; (2) the ordinance constitutes an unlawful 
impact fee under Wis. Stat. § 66.0617; (3) the Town lacked the 
County's authorization or approval to adopt the ordinance 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 60.62(3); (4) the Town's application of 
the ordinance constituted an uncompensated taking in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
                                                                                                                                                             
In reviewing Olson's complaint, we observe that Olson's 
declaratory judgment suit encompasses both facial and as-applied 
challenges to § 15.15.  Olson's complaint seeks to have § 15.15 
declared 
universally 
invalid 
as 
it 
applies 
to 
all 
Town 
landowners because the Town has exceeded its statutory authority 
in enacting the ordinance and because the ordinance violates 
both the state and federal constitutions.  Olson's complaint 
also alleges that the ordinance has been applied to him in an 
unconstitutional 
manner 
because 
there 
is 
no 
rational 
relationship between his desire to develop his land and the 
Town's imposition of the TDR program's "exaction."  Olson's 
complaint also states an as-applied challenge that the ordinance 
has been applied to his property ex post facto because it was 
enacted after he requested preliminary plat approval. 
The fact that Olson's suit includes both facial and as-
applied challenges does not substantially impact our analysis 
nor alter our conclusion that his suit is ripe.  As an as-
applied challenge, Olson's suit is ripe, in part, because the 
"government entity charged with implementing the [ordinance] has 
reached a final decision regarding the application of the 
[ordinance] to the property at issue."  Williamson County Reg'l 
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).  The 
Town conditioned Olson's final plat approval upon compliance 
with the ordinance, and Olson was left with no administrative 
option to challenge this decision.  As a facial challenge, 
Olson's suit is ripe because it challenges the very enactment of 
the ordinance and its application to all Town landowners.  Such 
challenges to ordinances are generally ripe the moment the 
challenged ordinance is passed.  See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997). 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
24 
 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; (5) the Town's ex post facto application of the 
ordinance to Olson's property violated his rights to substantive 
and procedural due process pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (6) the ordinance 
amounts to a public taking of private property for a private 
purpose, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Olson asserts that these allegations 
and the facts of his case meet the standard for ripeness under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04 and the Wisconsin precedents addressing 
ripeness in the declaratory judgment context.  
¶45 The Town insists that Olson's suit is not ripe, and 
therefore not justiciable.  It asserts that Olson's interests, 
if any, are too contingent and uncertain to be ripe.  The Town 
contends that Olson's interest in rezoning is a "future 
contingent interest," which is not sufficient for purposes of 
the Act.  The Town asserts that since the property in question 
has not yet been rezoned, Olson has no vested interest in 
developing his property because "the ordinance imposes no 
obligations on Olson unless and until the County changes the 
zoning from agricultural to residential."  Furthermore, the Town 
contends, the conditional zoning change granted by the County 
has expired, so that Olson is now no different from any other 
landowner in the Town that may pursue development in the future.  
The Town notes that even if § 15.15 were applied to Olson, there 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
25 
 
is no factual evidence in the record that compliance with 
§ 15.15 would come at any great expense to Olson. 
¶46 The Town also argues, but cites no authority, that 
Olson's case is now moot because "development conditions in Dane 
County [are] changing" and because the Town's TDR ordinance has 
been amended twice since 2002, most recently on May 7, 2007. 
¶47 We agree with Olson and conclude that, under the facts 
of record, Olson's claim for declaratory relief is ripe, and 
therefore justiciable.  In support of this conclusion, we must 
clear up a factual dispute in the record, which the court of 
appeals chose not to address.10   
¶48 As noted above, the parties disagree over whether 
Olson's second zoning petition was rescinded at a County Board 
meeting held on February 5, 2004.  The record includes minutes 
of the proceedings, which read in part: 
The question before the Board was Supervisor 
Hulsey's motion at the last County Board meeting to 
rescind action 
on Zoning Petition 8598——Town of 
Cottage Grove.  Motion carried.  Moved by Supervisor 
Hulsey, seconded by Supervisor O'Loughlin, to extend 
for one year the delayed effective date.  Motion 
carried. 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals noted that the parties "appear to 
dispute whether the extension of time the County Board gave 
Olson was effective."  Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, No. 
2005AP2257, unpublished slip. op., ¶6 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
28, 2006).  The court of appeals did not view this issue as 
germane and chose not to address it.  Id.   
We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that this 
fact is unimportant. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
26 
 
Proceedings of the Dane County Board of Supervisors, Vol. 90, 
April 2003-2004 (emphasis added). 
¶49 The circuit court reasoned that the underlined portion 
of this excerpt indicates that Olson's second zoning petition, 
No. 8598, was rescinded by the County Board and that the 
succeeding motion to extend the delayed effective date of the 
conditional rezoning approval by Supervisor Hulsey was a 
nullity. 
 
The 
circuit 
court's 
reasoning 
and 
conclusions 
regarding these actions were erroneous because they misconstrued 
the intent of the County Board. 
¶50 In this case, the circuit court correctly ascertained 
that Olson's second zoning petition was rescinded by the County 
Board.  However, the circuit court misinterpreted the meaning of 
that action because it did not take into account the reality 
that the term "rescind" can have a different meaning in a 
legislative body's lexicon. 
¶51 The history of Olson's second petition is clear.  The 
minutes of the County Board's meeting on January 23, 2003, read 
in part as follows:   
PETITION 8598——ZONING CHANGE IN THE TOWN OF 
COTTAGE GROVE——ZONING ORD. AMDT. 8598   
Petition 8598 by Walter J. Olson to change the 
zoning from A-1 EX Exclusive Agricultural district to 
the R-1 Residential district on property located 
north, east, and south of 4500 and 4506 Kennedy Road 
in part of the SW 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 3, and NW 1/4 NE 
1/4, Section 10——Town of Cottage Grove.   
The 
Zoning 
& 
Natural 
Resources 
Committee 
recommends that Petition 8598 be granted as modified, 
including the [c]ondition below, and includes the 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
27 
 
condition that an approved plat be recorded within one 
year, and Zoning Ord. Amdt. 8598 be adopted.  Motion 
carried.   
Condition:   
1. 
That the applicant withdraw petition 8357 as 
a condition of approval of petition 8598. 
¶52 On January 20, 2004, Norbert Scribner of the Land 
Division Review Department of the Dane County Planning and 
Development Commission reminded Olson that zoning petition No. 
8598 had a delayed effective date of February 14, 2004, provided 
that an approved plat was recorded in the office of the Dane 
County Register of Deeds no later than that date. 
¶53 On January 22, 2004, Supervisor Hulsey moved to 
"rescind action on Zoning Petition 8598-Town of Cottage Grove."  
The minutes reflect that the motion "will be on the Calendar for 
the next regular meeting of the County Board." 
¶54 On February 5, 2004, the County Board approved 
Supervisor Hulsey's motion to rescind, whereupon he moved, with 
a second from Supervisor O'Loughlin, "to extend for one year the 
delayed effective date.  Motion carried."11 
                                                 
11 At oral argument, counsel for Olson indicated that after 
he left the County Board meeting on February 5, 2004, he 
believed that the Board had extended Olson's prior conditional 
rezoning approval and that his client had one more year to 
acquire ultimate rezoning by filing a final plat with the Town.  
Counsel asserted that, after this meeting, the Town tried to 
help him acquire the TDRs necessary for final plat approval.  
When Olson filed his suit on September 30, 2004, his counsel 
believed that Olson had conditional rezoning, based upon what 
transpired at the February 5, 2004, County Board meeting.  The 
record reflects that this belief was not unfounded. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
28 
 
¶55 The County Board's action implies that it voted to 
give Olson an additional year to record the plat.  Such an 
action would have been consistent with the helpful reminder from 
the Dane County Planning and Development Commission.  It would 
have responded to Olson's request for an extension.  It would 
not have cut short the time that the County Board had already 
given Olson.  It would not have made the County Board's next 
action a nullity. 
¶56 The legislative jargon at play is contained in the 
Dane County Board Rules for the 2002-2004 term.  Rule 7.65 
reads, in its entirety:   
7.65 COUNTY BOARD MEETINGS; RECONSIDERATION AND 
RESCISSION.  
(1) The motion to reconsider any action may be 
made 
only 
by 
a 
supervisor 
who 
voted 
with 
the 
prevailing side, and it must be seconded.   
(2) A motion to reconsider shall be made on the 
day the action to be reconsidered took place and the 
clerk shall record the motion in the minutes.  
(3) The motion to reconsider shall then become 
an item of business on the calendar of the next 
meeting of the board under the heading "Motions to 
reconsider," unless the motion is acted on, on the day 
made, by suspension of the rules.  
(4) A member shall not be allowed to speak more 
than once on a motion for reconsideration, for not 
more than 5 minutes.  
(5) The rule that a motion to reconsider shall 
become an item of business at the next meeting of the 
board shall not apply to a motion to reconsider action 
taken on an amendment to a measure pending before the 
board at that time, only to the main measure an 
amendment is supposed to amend.  
No. 2005AP2257 
 
29 
 
(6) If the matter to be reconsidered is of such 
a nature that it requires final immediate action, the 
motion to reconsider shall be taken up immediately.  
(7) A motion to rescind an action may be made by 
any member at any time but such motion requires the 
support of the majority of all supervisors elected, 
provided, however, that such rescission will not be 
inconsistent with actions that have been commenced 
because of the action to be rescinded and will not 
result in consequences inimical to the interests of 
the public or the county. 
Dane County, Wis., County Board Rules, (2002-04 term) (rev. Apr. 
30, 2002). 
¶57 Rule 
7.65 
provides 
for 
reconsiderations 
and 
rescissions.  "A motion to reconsider shall be made on the day 
the action to be reconsidered took place and the clerk shall 
record the motion in the minutes."  (Emphasis added.)  "The 
motion to reconsider shall then become an item of business on 
the calendar of the next meeting of the board."  By contrast, 
motions to rescind an "action" may be made "at any time" with 
certain conditions.  In other words, a motion to rescind is 
effectively a motion to reconsider an "action," but it is a 
motion to "reconsider" made on a day sometime after the day when 
the "action" to be reconsidered took place.  Repealing or 
amending an ordinance is not a matter covered by this rule.   
¶58 Under the Dane County Board Rules, rescinding an 
"action" on, say, a petition, reopens consideration of that 
petition.  It does not kill the petition.  A follow-up motion is 
likely to show a new disposition of the "action" on the 
petition.  Thus, on February 5, 2004, we see immediately above 
Supervisor Hulsey's motion the following: 
 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
30 
 
The question before the Board was Supervisor 
Wiganowsky's motion at the last County Board meeting 
to rescind action on Zoning Petition 8832——Town of Sun 
Prairie.  Motion carried.  Moved by Supervisor 
Wiganowsky, seconded by Supervisor Wendt, to refer 
Petition 8832 to the Zoning & Natural Resources 
Committee.  Motion carried.  
Proceedings of the Dane County Board of Supervisors, Vol. 90, 
April 2003-2004 (emphasis added). 
¶59 Clearly, Supervisor Wiganowsky's second motion effects 
a different disposition of a petition than Supervisor Hulsey's 
second motion did.   
¶60 In State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 
358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983), this court considered an original 
action for a declaratory judgment that "the State of Wisconsin 
Operating Notes of 1983 when issued, sold and delivered in the 
manner provided by the Authorizing Resolution issued by the 
State 
Building 
Commission . . . will 
be 
valid 
enforceable 
contractual obligations of the State of Wisconsin."  Id. at 360-
61.  The respondents contended that 1983 Wisconsin Act 3, upon 
which the Authorizing Resolution was based, was invalid because 
the legislature had violated its own procedure.  Id. at 361.  
This court said that it "will not determine whether internal 
operating rules or procedural statutes have been complied with 
by the legislature in the course of its enactments."  Id. at 
364.  If we did, it "would imply that this court will review 
legislative conduct to ensure the legislature complied with its 
own procedural rules or statutes in enacting the legislation. . 
. . [W]e conclude we will not intermeddle in what we view, in 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
31 
 
the absence of constitutional directives to the contrary, to be 
purely legislative concerns."  Id.   
¶61 The same principle applies in this case.  Here, the 
circuit court concluded, in essence, that the County Board did 
not know what it was doing.  In so holding, the court implied 
that the County Board——in violation of Rule 7.65——shortened the 
time for Olson to file a plat and then took a meaningless, 
ineffectual action to extend the life of something that was 
already dead.  If this were a correct reading of the law, it 
would jeopardize any zoning actions that were "rescinded" at 
some point without being explicitly reapproved, as well as 
countless other "actions" that may have been "rescinded" along 
the line before the legislative process was complete.  The Dane 
County Board is entitled to make its own rules of procedure, so 
long as they do not conflict with some explicit constitutional 
directive, and courts should not second-guess the County Board's 
procedural rules. 
¶62 The circuit court simply misinterpreted the County 
Board's action.  The County Board passed a motion to "rescind 
action on" a petition, reflecting a common practice by the 
board.  Therefore, contrary to the circuit court, we conclude 
that the County Board did not eliminate conditional approval of 
Olson's second zoning petition during its February 5, 2004, 
meeting, but instead extended the delayed effective date of 
conditional approval for one year. 
 
¶63 This fact is important because it demonstrates that 
Olson, possessing conditional rezoning approval from the County, 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
32 
 
was subject to compliance with § 15.15 when he filed his suit on 
September 30, 2004.  This is so because Olson was required to 
file a final plat with the Town to receive ultimate rezoning 
approval from the County, and the Town required Olson to first 
comply with § 15.15 by acquiring 10 TDRs before it would allow 
him to file his final plat.  Therefore, Olson's efforts to 
rezone, subdivide, and develop his property were directly 
impacted by application of the ordinance when he filed his suit.   
¶64 We note that Olson's interest, and the impact of the 
ordinance on him individually, differs from the interest of any 
receiving area landowner in the Town who had not yet put the 
wheels in motion to secure conditional rezoning and plat 
approval from the County and Town.  The Town characterizes 
Olson's 
interest 
in 
rezoning 
his 
property 
as 
a 
"future 
contingent interest," but this label ignores the fact that Olson 
received conditional rezoning approval from the County and 
conditional 
plat 
approval 
from 
the 
Town, 
both 
of 
which 
distinguish him from a receiving area landowner who had no 
interest in seeking to rezone his property for purposes of 
development.  As both the Town and Olson recognized in their 
briefs, "ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing."  Reg'l 
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974); see 
also Mich. Chiropractic Council v. Comm'r of Office of Fin. and 
Ins. Servs., 716 N.W.2d 561, 571 (Mich. 2006); Herbst Gaming, 
Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1230-31 (Nev. 2006).  A 
declaratory judgment action filed by a receiving area landowner 
who had taken no steps to: (1) obtain final rezoning approval; 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
33 
 
or (2) proceed with development after receiving final rezoning 
approval, would present a different and much more difficult 
question.  Olson's final rezoning approval was expressly 
conditioned upon compliance with § 15.15, so that his cause of 
action challenging the ordinance was timely and ripe for 
adjudication. 
¶65 We disagree with the Town's assertion that Olson's 
declaratory judgment suit is untimely because it is premised 
upon a "future" zoning change.  It is undisputed that Olson has 
not yet been granted final rezoning of his property.  Clearly, 
if final rezoning were granted, Olson's development project 
would be subject to the ordinance, as his property lies in a 
"receiving area."  However, it is plain from the record that the 
ultimate zoning change Olson desires will come only if he first 
complies with § 15.15.  Adopting the Town's argument would place 
Olson in the unenviable position of having no right to avail 
himself of the Act to challenge the ordinance, which the Town 
demands he first comply with in order to avail himself of the 
Act.  The absurdity of this circular reasoning is self-evident 
and emphasizes the catch-22 that the Town is trying to 
perpetuate.  Olson need not suffer an injury, namely compliance 
with the ordinance by purchasing TDRs, in order to bring a 
declaratory judgment action pursuant to the Act.  See Putnam, 
255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶44.  The Town has placed the impediment of 
compliance with § 15.15 in the way of Olson securing rezoning 
from an agricultural to a residential zone.  Olson need not 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
34 
 
first comply with the ordinance to pursue a judicial declaration 
that he need not comply. 
¶66 We also find irrelevant the Town's assertion that 
Olson has not demonstrated that compliance with § 15.15 will 
come at great expense to him.  If Olson were to succeed on the 
merits of his declaratory judgment suit, any and all expenses 
directly related to compliance with § 15.15 would be unjust 
because the ordinance would be declared invalid.  The fact that 
Olson allegedly does not possess the financial means to comply 
with an ordinance he asserts is illegal is of no import to 
determining the ripeness of his claim. 
¶67 Olson's declaratory judgment suit is ripe, much like 
the suits of the plaintiffs in Putnam and Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 48.  In Putnam, this court reviewed the declaratory 
judgment suit of a group of cable television customers of Time 
Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, LP (Time Warner), who 
sought a declaration of rights and an injunction to prevent Time 
Warner from imposing a $5 late-payment fee on cable customers 
who failed to pay their monthly cable bills on time.  Putnam, 
255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶4.  The circuit court dismissed the customers' 
suit with prejudice on the grounds that the suit was not ripe, 
and therefore not justiciable.  Id., ¶7.  We reversed, 
concluding that the customers' suit was ripe and justiciable.  
Id., ¶52.  In doing so, we rejected Time Warner's argument that 
the late-payment fees might never be imposed because customers 
control whether their bills are paid on time.  Id., ¶45.  We 
concluded that there was no "absence of certainty" that the 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
35 
 
late-payment fee would be applied to Time Warner customers, id., 
because the plaintiffs alleged (and Time Warner did not dispute) 
that, on average, 10 to 15 percent of Time Warner customers paid 
the late fee each month.  Id., ¶46.  The plaintiffs' suit 
challenging Time Warner's legal right to impose the fee was ripe 
because application of the fee to cable customers was "real, 
precise, 
and 
immediate," 
not 
"hypothetical, 
abstract, 
or 
remote."  Id., ¶47.   
¶68 In Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, this court reviewed a 
declaratory judgment suit brought by a labor union against 
Milwaukee County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board.  
Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 244 Wis. 2d 333, ¶20.  The union's 
suit alleged that the county was misconstruing a pension 
ordinance and labor agreement to mean that if an employee is 
terminated for "cause" after ten years of service, the employee 
is disqualified from receiving a deferred vested pension.  Id.   
We addressed the justiciability of the suit and concluded that 
it was both ripe and justiciable.  Id., ¶¶42, 46-47.  We 
rejected the arguments of the county that the matter was not 
ripe because a named plaintiff had not officially been denied a 
pension and "because a pension cannot vest under its agreement 
with the employees before an employee has completed honorable 
service for the county."  Id., ¶42.  We concluded that the 
union's claim was ripe because it sought "a declaration of law 
concerning the procedural due process available to an employee 
to contest termination of employment and loss of pension when 
the 
determination 
of 
one 
may 
lead 
automatically 
to 
the 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
36 
 
determination of the other."  Id., ¶43.  Furthermore, we held 
that "[a]n employee need not have been denied pension benefits 
to satisfy the ripeness required in this type of action."  Id., 
¶44 (citing Lynch, 71 Wis. 2d at 674).  
¶69 Olson's case is similar to both Putnam and Milwaukee 
Dist. Council 48.  In Putnam, we observed that 10 to 15 percent 
of customers would be impacted by the late-payment fee in 
question.  Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶46.  Here, we observe that 
all receiving area landowners who must acquire rezoning to 
develop their properties will be subject to the ordinance and 
required to obtain TDRs.  Like the plaintiffs in Putnam, Olson 
faces the "real, precise, and immediate," id., ¶47, certainty 
that his financial interests will be impacted, either positively 
or negatively, by a circuit court's declaration regarding the 
validity of the ordinance.  If the ordinance is declared valid, 
Olson will face the prospect of choosing between: (1) acquiring 
TDRs to receive final plat and rezoning approval; or (2) not 
acquiring 
TDRs 
and 
abandoning 
his 
original 
subdivision 
development project.  If the ordinance is declared invalid by 
the circuit court, Olson will be saved the expense of having to 
purchase TDRs to obtain final plat approval and rezoning and can 
proceed with his project once final rezoning is settled.  Both 
of these potential outcomes are certain to have a direct and 
immediate financial impact on Olson. 
¶70 Olson's case is also similar to Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 48 because the ordinance validity issue here, like the 
procedural due process issue in that case, stands as a "prelude" 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
37 
 
to the ultimate question of whether Olson can obtain rezoning 
approval from the County.  See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 244 
Wis. 2d 333, ¶43.  Because the Town has made compliance with the 
ordinance a prerequisite to obtaining final rezoning approval, 
Olson must currently clear the preliminary hurdle of acquiring 
enough TDRs to obtain plat approval to receive final rezoning of 
his property.  Therefore, the validity of the ordinance directly 
impacts the likelihood that Olson's project will go forward.  
Furthermore, our observation in Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 that 
"[a]n employee need not have been denied pension benefits to 
satisfy the ripeness required," id., ¶44, is applicable by 
analogy here; Olson need not first suffer the financial injury 
of purchasing TDRs for his suit to be ripe.  Although the law 
does not require Olson to suffer injury to challenge § 15.15, we 
agree with the court of appeals' statement that "a reasonable 
view of Olson's experience in attempting to redevelop his land 
is that he has indeed suffered injury."  Olson, No. 2005AP2257, 
unpublished slip. op., ¶17.   
¶71 The Town's final argument that Olson's claim is moot 
because § 15.15 has been amended during the pendency of this 
litigation is not persuasive.  The Town's statement that "[a] 
declaratory judgment action on an ordinance that is now 
different will be of limited, if any, value" misses the point.  
Olson's suit seeks the right to challenge § 15.15 as it existed 
at the time of his lawsuit to resolve the uncertainty regarding 
the validity of the ordinance faced by him and other landowners 
concerning the future development of their properties.  The 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
38 
 
Town's application of that version of § 15.15 to Olson is not 
"contingent or uncertain."  Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶44.  The 
Town has expressly conditioned Olson's final plat approval upon 
compliance with the ordinance; it is certain that Olson will 
have 
to 
comply with the ordinance to proceed with his 
subdivision project.  Therefore, Olson's suit is ripe.12 
¶72 In sum, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
to the Town, premised upon the legal conclusion that Olson's 
suit was not ripe, and therefore not justiciable, was error.  
Under this court's standards for justiciability, Olson's action 
for declaratory relief is ripe, and therefore justiciable. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶73 We conclude that the appropriate standard to review a 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment premised upon the 
legal conclusion that a declaratory judgment action is not ripe, 
and therefore not justiciable, is de novo review.  Applying this 
standard to the record before us, we conclude that Olson's cause 
of action challenging Town of Cottage Grove, Wis., Land Division 
and Planning Code § 15.15 is ripe, and therefore justiciable.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that the ordinance has been amended as 
recently as May 7, 2007.  However, this does not impact whether 
Olson's September 30, 2004, lawsuit, challenging the ordinance 
as it existed then, was ripe upon filing.  The ripeness of a 
future suit by Olson challenging the most recent version of the 
ordinance or its applicability to Olson's property is not at 
issue here, and we need not address this concern. 
No. 2005AP2257 
 
39 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶74 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I concur 
in the court's mandate. I agree with the majority opinion that 
Olson's rezoning petition was approved, conditional upon his 
compliance with the ordinance that he challenges, when he filed 
his action.1  Olson's efforts to rezone his property were 
therefore, as the majority opinion states, "directly impacted by 
application of the ordinance when he filed his suit."2  I 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by resting its determination of ripeness on an 
erroneous standard of law.  The circuit court's determination 
rested on its erroneous interpretation of the Dane County 
Board's decision to "rescind action" on Olson's zoning petition 
and to extend the petition's delayed effective date.3  
¶75 I write separately to protest the majority opinion's 
conclusion that a circuit court's determination of ripeness is a 
legal 
conclusion 
and 
therefore 
reviewed 
by 
this 
court 
independently of the circuit court as a question of law.4  The 
majority opinion disregards clear Wisconsin precedent that the 
question whether an issue is ripe for judicial determination 
under the Declaratory Judgments Act lies within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.     
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶62.   
2 Id., ¶63. 
3 See id., ¶¶48-62.  
4 Id., ¶¶37-39.   
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶76 I begin with Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 
N.W.2d 175 (1982), "[t]he leading Wisconsin case on declaratory 
judgments."5  Loy held that the question whether a controversy is 
ripe for judicial determination under the Declaratory Judgments 
Act lies within the circuit court's discretion.  The Loy court 
emphasized 
the 
importance 
of 
permitting 
a 
"trial 
judge . . . discretion to examine the controversy before him to 
determine the imminence of the controversy or the ripening of 
the dispute" and stated that the issue of ripeness is "exactly 
the area in which judicial discretion should be allowed to 
operate."6   
¶77 In support of its decision, the Loy court adduced 
Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 61 (2d ed. 1941), the 
cited page of which explains that in declaratory judgment 
actions, "[w]hether the facts are ripe enough for determination 
is usually a matter confided to the discretion of the court."  
We also characterized the entire matter of justiciability 
(including ripeness)7 as "[t]he ultimate fact to be found by a 
circuit court in the exercise of its discretion."8    
                                                 
5 Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 2002 WI 108, ¶41, 
255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 254.  
6 Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414, 320 N.W.2d 175 
(1982). 
7 As the majority opinion states, majority op., ¶29, 
"ripeness" is the final factor in a list of four required for 
the controversy underlying an action for declaratory judgment to 
be justiciable.  A controversy is justiciable under the 
Declaratory Judgments Act when each of the following conditions 
is met: 
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶78 The Loy court used the standard language to describe 
this court's review of a circuit court's discretionary decision: 
"While, as in all discretionary acts of a court, reasonable 
persons may sometimes differ in the outcome, all that this court 
need find to sustain a discretionary act is that the trial court 
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."9      
¶79 The majority opinion pays full-voiced tribute to the 
Loy decision in the body of the opinion yet renounces the 
decision in the whisper of a footnote.  In its main text, the 
majority 
opinion 
properly 
identifies 
Loy 
as 
the 
leading 
Wisconsin case on declaratory judgments and relies upon Loy's 
seminal discussion of justiciability.10  In a footnote the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) a claim of right is asserted against one who has 
an interest in contesting it; 
(2) the controversy is between persons whose interests 
are adverse; 
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief has a legal 
interest in the controversy——that is to say, a legally 
protectible interest; and  
(4) the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for 
judicial determination.   
Majority op., ¶21. 
8 Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 410.   
9 Id. at 414-15.  See also State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, 
¶30, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24 (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 
414-15, as authority stating the standard of review for a 
circuit court's discretionary determination). 
10 Majority op., ¶29.   
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
4 
 
majority opinion then laments that Loy "conflated the evaluation 
of the factors necessary to reach the merits of a declaratory 
judgment and the granting or denying of declaratory relief on 
the merits."11     
¶80 Further on, the majority opinion silently overrules 
Loy's core holding that whether an issue is ripe for judicial 
determination under the Declaratory Judgments Act lies within 
the circuit court's discretion.  The majority opinion now 
declares that the standard of review of the circuit court's 
determination that Olson's case was not ripe is the same as the 
standard of review of a decision to grant summary judgment: de 
novo.12  
¶81 Nor is Loy the only decision silently overruled by the 
majority opinion in the present case.  There are more. 
¶82 In 
Wisconsin 
Education 
Association 
Council 
v. 
Wisconsin State Elections Board, 156 Wis. 2d 151, 456 N.W.2d 839 
(1990) (hereinafter WEAC I), we reviewed under a discretionary 
standard the circuit court's determination of ripeness in a 
declaratory judgment action.  The circuit court in WEAC I 
refused to address the plaintiff's "as-applied" constitutional 
challenge to a statute on the ground that the issues raised by 
the plaintiff were not ripe for determination.13  The court 
sustained the circuit court's decision, holding that "the 
                                                 
11 Id., ¶32 n.5.   
12 Id., ¶39. 
13 Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Wis. State Elections Bd. 
(WEAC I), 156 Wis. 2d 151, 154, 456 N.W.2d 839 (1990) 
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
5 
 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
the case was not ripe for determination."14  We explained that 
"[o]ur review of the record persuades us that the circuit court 
reasonably 
concluded 
that 
the 
instant 
controversy 
was 
sufficiently 
contingent 
and 
uncertain 
so 
as 
to 
preclude 
declaratory relief."15  
¶83 In Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern 
Wisconsin, 2002 WI 108, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626, this 
court again reviewed under a discretionary standard the circuit 
court's determination of ripeness in a declaratory judgment 
action.  The circuit court in Putnam granted Time Warner's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
plaintiff's 
claim 
for 
declaratory 
judgment, having concluded that the controversy was not ripe for 
resolution because the plaintiff's amended complaint failed to 
allege a present harm.16   
¶84 The issue presented for review in Putnam was whether 
"the circuit court erroneously exercise[d] its discretion when 
it concluded that the [plaintiff's] request for a declaration of 
rights and injunctive relief . . . was not justiciable because 
the [plaintiff] failed to allege a present harm."17  In 
determining whether the circuit court had erroneously exercised 
its discretion in determining justiciabilty, the court applied 
                                                 
14 Id. at 154.   
15 Id. at 162.   
16 Putnam v. Time Warner, 2002 WI 108, ¶7, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 
649 N.W.2d 626.  
17 Id., ¶2.   
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
6 
 
the usual test for appellate review of a circuit court's 
exercise of discretion: "This court will uphold a discretionary 
act if the circuit court 'examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational 
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach.'"18  
¶85 In 
keeping 
with 
this 
standard 
for 
reviewing 
discretionary decisions of a circuit court, the Putnam court 
concluded that the circuit court had erroneously exercised its 
discretion because the circuit court had made an error of law: 
"Because the circuit court misapplied the governing law by 
dismissing the [plaintiff's] claims for declaratory relief on 
the basis that it did, we conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion."19     
¶86 Although not focused on the issue of ripeness, 
Wisconsin Education Association Council v. Wisconsin State 
Elections Board, 2000 WI App 89, 234 Wis. 2d 349, 610 N.W.2d 108 
(hereinafter WEAC II), is also put in jeopardy by the majority 
opinion in the present case.  In WEAC II, the court of appeals 
applied a discretionary standard when reviewing the circuit 
court's determination that an action for declaratory judgment 
presented a justiciable controversy.  The court of appeals 
stated that "in a declaratory judgment action, if the trial 
court carefully examines all the facts of record in considering 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶40 (quoting Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee 
County, 2001 WI 65, ¶36, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866).        
19 Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶52.   
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
7 
 
the four [components of the test for justiciability], and 
reasonably concludes that a controversy is justiciable, we must 
uphold that conclusion."20   
¶87 Although the WEAC II court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's judgment on the basis that the first two 
conditions of a justiciable controversy were unfulfilled as a 
matter of law,21 the standard of review set forth by the court of 
appeals 
expressly 
applied 
to 
all 
four 
conditions 
of 
justiciability, including ripeness.  
¶88 The majority opinion finds support for its conclusion 
that de novo review is proper in case law from other 
jurisdictions.22  Case law from other states is merely of 
persuasive weight.  Prior Wisconsin case law is precedent.  The 
approach the majority opinion should be taking is to follow 
binding precedent of this court or to explain why it is 
deviating from precedent.   
¶89 Applying the clear, binding precedent of this court 
and the court of appeals, I conclude that the question whether 
an 
issue 
is 
ripe 
for 
judicial 
determination 
under 
the 
Declaratory Judgments Act lies within the discretion of the 
circuit court and that this court should review the circuit 
                                                 
20 Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Wis. State Elections Bd. 
(WEAC II), 2000 WI App 89, ¶9, 234 Wis. 2d 349, 610 N.W.2d 108 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
21 Id., ¶10.   
22 Majority op., ¶38. 
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
8 
 
court's 
decision 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion. 
¶90 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.   
¶91 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2257.ssa 
 
 
 
1