Title: REEVES v ILLE ELECTRIC CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13191
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 1976

No, 13191 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1976 JOHN 0. REEVES, Administrator of the Estate of Douglas M. Reeves, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - ILLE ELECTRIC C O M P A N Y , Y E L L O I f i 7 S T O N E ELECTRIC C O M P A N Y , and O S b J A L D BERG, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable W, W, Less ley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Morrison & Hedman, Whitefish, Montana J e r r y Trieweiler argued, Whitefish, Montana or Respondent : Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana R. D. Corette Jr, argued, Butte, Montana Berg, Angel, Andriolo & Morgan, Bozeman, Montana Charles F. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana Keller, Reynolds and Drake, Helena, Montana Glen L. Drake argued, Helena, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald Smith appeared, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted: April 21, 1976 Decided :.J UN 8 1 1976 Filed: ,ji~[j 2 1976 X r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. The administrator of decedent's e s t a t e brought a survival action against three defendants seeking damages f o r personal in- juries and death of decedent, who was electrocuted i n a whirlpool bath. The d i s t r i c t court, Gallatin County, entered a judgment of dismissal a s t o one defendant and separate summary judgments i n favor of the other two defendants. P l a i n t i f f appeals from these judgments. P l a i n t i f f Reeves i s the father of decedent Douglas H. Reeves and the administrator of h i s e s t a t e . Decedent was a student a t Montana State University a t Rozeman, Montana i n 1973. I n October of that year, he was taking a whirlpool bath i n the University f i e l d house when an e l e c t r i c a l charge emanated from the machine, e l e c t r i f i e d the water and electrocuted him. Defendant I l l e Electric Company, a foreign corporation, manu- factured the whirlpool bath machine involved here and shipped it t o Yontana State University. It was i n s t a l l e d i n the f i e l d house by defendant Yellowstone Electric Company. The Montana S t a t e University f i e l d house was designed by a r c h i t e c t Oswald Berg. The i n s t a l l a t i o n of the whirlpool machine and construction of the f i e l d house were sub- s c a n t i a l l y completed prior t o 1960. The complaint alleges I l l e furnished the whirlpool machine with a ten foot cable and plug e l e c t r i c a l connection. In i n s t a l l i n g the whirlpool, Yellowstone made the e l e c t r i c a l connection by plugging the cable and plug i n t o a wall receptacle,designed by Berg, The allegations of negligence upon which l i a b i l i t y i s predicated are : I) ILle failed t o warn the purchaser of inherent dangers i n che machine with respect t o e l e c t r i c a l connections and f a i l e d t o provide unmistakable instructions f o r proper i n s t a l l a t i o n ; and provided the whirlpool with an e l e c t r i c a l cord rather than a d i r e c t wiring apparatus. 2 ) Yellows~one failed t o w i r e the whirlpool d i r e c t l y , and insralled the cord and plug i n a manner which created the condition causing the electrocution of decedent. 3) Berg f a i l e d t o design a d i r e c t wiring system f o r the whirlpool and designed and approved the e l e c t r i c a l wall receptacle t o which the whirlpool was connected. P l a i n t i f f seeks recovery of income t o decedent's e s t a t e l o s t as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the concurring negligence of defendants, i n the amount of $900,000. The issues i n t h i s case turn on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y and applicability of section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, commonly referred t o a s the "architects' and builders' statute" which defendants contend bars t h i s s u i t . Berg moved t o dismiss the complaint on the basis of section 93-2619, which provides: " ~ x c e p t a s provided i n sections 2 and 3 [93-2620 and 93- 26211 of t h i s a c t , no action t o recover damages (other than an action upon any contract, obligation, o r l i a b i l i t y , founded upon an instrument i n writing) resulting from o r a r i s i n g out of the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, o r observation of construction o f , o r land surveying done i n connection with, any improvement t o r e a l property s h a l l be commenced more than ten (10) years a f t e r completion of such improvement. 11 The d i s t r i c t court granted erg's motion without leave t o amend, on t h e grounds the conduct complained of took place p r i o r t o 1960 and the action was not commenced u n t i l 1975, more than ten years a f t e r completion of the improvement. O n September 19, 1975, judgment was entered i n favor of Berg. Subsequently, separate summary judgments were entered i n favor of Yellowstone and I l l e based on the same s t a t u t e . The thrust of p l a i n t i f f ' s appeal is a broad constitutional a t t a c k on section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947. He c i t e s cases from other s t a t e s on the same questions with respect t o t h e i r "architects' and builders' statutes1'. H e a l s o questions the summary judgment a s t o I l l e , assuming the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of section 93-2619. Specifically, the issues a r e : 1 . Is section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, unconstitutional in violation of: a . Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana Constitution, by denying plaintiff access to the courts, and denying him a speedy remedy for the injuries and damages to the estate which he represents? b. Article V, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution, by embracing more than one subject and by not clearly expressing that subject in the title of the act7 c. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the United States Constitution, by granting immunity from suit to one class of defendants and denying immunity to other possible defendants3 , d. The due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 11, Section 17, 1972 Montana Constitution, by depriving plaintiff of a common law right without providing a reasonable substitute? 2 . If section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, is constitutional does it bar a claim against the manufacturer of personal property once that property is attached to real property? We commence inquiry into the constitutional questions with the well-settled rule that when the constitutionality of a statute is under scrutiny, the statute is presumed to be constitutional and the party attacking it has the burden of proving its invalidity. In the matter of Estate of Kujath, Mont . 9 545 P . 2d 662, 33 St.Rep, 117. This presumption of validity applies to all legislative enactments and it is the duty of the court to resolve all conceivable doubts in favor of validity whenever possible. State Highway Commission v . Chapman, 152 Mont. 79, 446 P.2d 709; State ex rel. Abel v. District Court, 140 Mont. 117, 368 P.2d 572. Additionally, some forty-two state legislatures and the United States Congress for the District of Columbia, have enacted architects' and builders' statutes similar to Montana's. The f i r s t challenge invokes Article T I , 9ection 16, 1972 Xontana Constitution, which provides i n pertinenr part: I I The administration of justice. Courts of J u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, o r character, JC >Y +r" P l a i n t i f f contends section 93-2619 violates Article 11, Section 16, by barring p l a i n t i f f ' s cause of action before it arose. Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana Constitution has not been interpreted by t h i s Court. However, Article 111, Section 6 , 1889 Xontana Constitution, i n pertinent part contains i d e n t i c a l language. This language was interpreted i n Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 55 Yont. 522, 532, 179 P. 499. In Shea it was argued t h e workmen's Compensation Act was repugnant t o A r t i c l e 1 1 1 of the 1889 Constitution in t h a t it denied injured workmen the r i g h t t o maintain an action i n the courts. This Court stated: I I But counsel a r e i n e r r o r i n supposing t h a t f o r t h i s reason the Compensation Act is repugnant t o the section of the Constitution quoted. Their contention i s based upon a misconception of the scope of the guaranty therein contained. A reading of the section discloses t h a t it i s addressed exclusively t o the courts, The courts a r e i t s sole subject matter and it r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y t o the duties of the j u d i c i a l department of the government. It means no more nor l e s s than t h a t under the provisions of the Constitution and laws constituting them, the courts must be accessible t o a l l persons a l i k e , without discrimination, a t the time o r times and the place o r places appointed f o r t h e i r s i t t i n g , and afford a speedy remedy f o r every wrong recognized by law a s being remediable i n a court. The 1 term injury' a s therein used, means such an injury a s the law recognizes o r declares t o be actionable. * * * I f the contention of counsel should be upheld, the consequence would be t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e would be stripped of a l l power t o a l t e r or repeal any portion of the common law r e l a t i n g t o accidental i n j u r i e s o r the death of one person by the negligence of another. It i s t r u e the l e g i s l a t u r e cannot destroy vested rights. Where an injury has already occurred for which the injured person has a r i g h t of action, the legislature cannot deny him a remedy. But a t t h i s l a t e day it cannot be controverted t h a t the remedies recognized by the common law i n t h i s c l a s s of cases, together with a l l r i g h t s of action t o a r i s e i n future may be a l t e r e d o r abolished t o the extent of destroying actions f o r i n j u r i e s or death a r i s i n g from negligent accident, so long a s there i s no impairment of r i g h t s already accrued. This necessarily follows from the proposition, well established by the courts everywhere, t h a t no one has a vested r i g h t i n any r u l e of the common-law.* * *" See also: Stewart v. Standard Publishing Co., 102 Mont. 43, Assuming arguendo, t h a t p l a i n t i f f would have a claim under common Law, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y prohibited from eliminating a common law r i g h t a s i t did i n Shea and Stewart. In section 93-2619, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d not i n t e r f e r e with any vested r i g h t of p l a i n t i f f , but simply c u t o f f accrual of t h e r i g h t t o sue a f t e r ten years. Additionally, section 93-2620, R.C.M. 1947, grants an a d d i t i o n a l year t o sue a s t o any accrued r i g h t s within the ten year period. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, p l a i n t i f f ' s alleged cause of a c t i o n arose more than ten years a f t e r completion; hence t h e s t a t u t e is a v a l i d b a r t o h i s s u i t a g a i n s t defendants protected by it. P l a i n t i f f asserts section 93-2619 v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e V, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution, because t h e s t a t u t e embraces more than one subject, one of which i s not c l e a r l y expressed i n i t s t i t l e . However, p l a i n t i f f invokes p a r t of Section 1 1 without abiding by another of i t s provisions: "(6) A law may be challenged on t h e grounds of non- compliance with t h i s section only within two years a f t e r i t s e f f e c t i v e date." A r t i c l e V, Section 11(6), 1972 Montana Constitution. Section 6, Chapter 60, Laws of Montana 1971, provided section 93-2619 became e f f e c t i v e on January 1, 1972. This case was commenced June 5 , 1975, over t h r e e years l a t e r . Because section 93-2619 was not challenged within two years a f t e r i t s e f f e c t i v e date, p l a i n t i f f is precluded from t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge. The equal protection a t t a c k upon s e c t i o n 93-2619 i s based on the f a c t t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o those who a r e responsible f o r making improvements t o r e a l property but does n o t b a r a c t i o n s a g a i n s t nzaterialmen and owners of real property who may l a t e r be made t o answer f o r negligently made improvements. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s t h r e e cases which hold t h a t such a d i s t i n c t i o n is i r r a t i o n a l c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n v i o l a t i v e of t h e equal protection clause of t h e Fourteenth Amendment, United S t a t e s Constitution. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588; Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P,2d 568; Kallas Xillwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wisc.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454. However, this Court finds other contrary authorities more persuasive and compatible with Montana law. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662; Grissom v. North Amer- ican Aviation, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 465; Josephs v. Burns, 260 0r.493, 491 P.2d 203; Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108; Good v. Christensen, (Utah 1974), 527 P.2d 223; Housing Authority of Town of Limon v. Leo A. Daly Co., (Colo.App. 1975), 533 P.2d 937; Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920, cert.den. 401 U.S. 901, 91 S . Ct. 868, 27 L ed 2d 800. In Carter, the Arkansas Supreme Court con- sidered the contention that a statute similar to section 93-2619, violated due process, was discriminatory, contravened equal protection of the laws, and was local and special legislation. The court stated: his Act only cuts off action after fdur years. But, even then, if an accident or injury occurs before the expiration of that four year period, it may still be brought within an additional 12 months against those furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observa- tion of construction, or the construction and repairing of any improvement to real property. All of the defendants in this action are within this definition. However, it does not include owners of buildings or materialmen who -are not othefiise involved. Such materialmen and the owners of buildings or structures who are in sole control of premises after completion of the work are not similarly situated with the defendants in this case. They are not in the same class with those described in the act. Parti- cularly is this true after construction is substantially completed and accepted by the owners. Part of acceptance is to accept some future responsibility for the condition of the premises. "We have carefully considered Skinner v . Anderson, 38 I11.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588, (1967), concerning this appeal. In all deference and in respect to the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, we cannot apply its reasoning to this case. That court held the Illinois Statute, there challenged, to be discriminatory against others similarly situated. * * * Further, a vital distinction, nonetheless, exists between owners or suppliers and those engaged in the professions and occupations of design and building. This is not arbitrary or unreasonable. It is a legitimate and practical exercise of the legislative function. 11 The reasoning in Carter is consistent with the law of Montana. The test of the constitutionality of class legislation is whether the classification has some reasonable, just and practical basis and whether the law operates equally upon every person within the class. Gullickson v.Mitchel1, 113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106; City of Missoula v . Swanberg, 116 Mont. 232, 149 P.2d 248. A statute will not be stricken down upon constitutional grounds unless its violation of the fundamental law is clear and palpable, and the classification it makes is illusory and unreal. Victor Chemical v . Silver Bow County, 130 Mont. 308, 301 P.2d 730. Applying these tests, section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, does not violate equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff's fourth constitutional attack upon section 93-2619 I I is that the statute impairs due process" guarantees by depriving plaintiff of a common law right without providing a reasonable substitute. This argument is without merit. Section 93-2621, R.C.M. 1947, part of the same enactment as section 93-2619 (Ch.60, Laws 1971), states: "The limitation prescribed by this act shall not affect the responsibility of any owner, tenant, or person in actual possession and control of the im- provement at the time a right of action arises. I1 The plain words of section 93-2621, refute the implication of plaintiff's argument that he is without a remedy. As indicated in Shea and Stewart, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited from eliminating common law rights which have not accrued or vested. The Constitution does not freeze common law rights in perpetuity. For these reasons, we hold section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, consti- tutional. The final issue is whether Ille is immune from this suit by virtue of its inclusion in the class protected by section 93-2619. The section by its terms applies to those involved in the "design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of construction of * 7k * any improvement to real property,* * * . ' I Ille contends that it is sued as part of the design or con- struction team, therefore it is protected by the statute. Ille also I1 emphasizes the whirlpool in question was a fixture1' and "improvement" a t the time o f che e l e c t r i c a l charge which i s alleged t o have caused the death of p l a i n t i f f ' s decedent. O n the other hand, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t I l l e i s sued a s a manufacturer of a hazardous machine and t h a t inherent defects existed p r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n the University f i e l d house. P l a i n t i f f characterizes I l l e a s a materialman, excluded from the application of the a r c h i t e c t s ' and builders' s t a t u t e . A review of cases concerned with the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a r c h i t e c t s ' and builders' s t a t u t e s reveals t h a t the courts, whether finding t h e i r respective s t a t u t e s unconstitutional o r not, recog- nize t h a t materialmen a r e not within the c l a s s protected by t h e sLatute. See the language of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Carter, heretofore s e t out. Thus, we look t o p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint t o determine whether I l l e was sued a s a materialman; we find t h a t it was. I l l e took no part i n the construction of the f i e l d house or i n the related phases of the whirlpool i n s t a l l a t i o n , It simply manufactured the whirlpool machine and shipped i t t o Montana State University. P l a i n t i f f alleges negligence i n f a i l u r e t o warn of inherent dangers, f a i l u r e t o notify and i n s t r u c t a s t o proper in- s t a l l a t i o n , and negligence i n design of the whirlpool machine by providing only a cable and plug r a t h e r than a d i r e c t wiring system. These allegations r e l a t e t o design and manufacture of the I l l e I l l e was whirlpool machine,/no part of the f i e l d house construction team. I l l e simply furnished an appliance t h a t was subsequently i n s t a l l e d i n the f i e l d house. A s such, I l l e was simply a materialman whose product was incorporated i n the construction. Accordingly, plain- t i f f has s t a t e d a claim against I l l e not barred by section 93-2619. The d i s t r i c t court erred i n granting summary judgment i n favor of I l l e . (This Court, of course, expresses no opinion a s t o the u l t i - mate l i a b i l i t y of I l l e i n t h i s case.) W e affirm the judgment of dismissal i n favor of Berg and he summary judgment i n favor of Yellowstone. W e reverse the summary judgment i n favor of I l l e E l e c t r i c Company and remand t o the d i s t r i c t court of Gallatin County f o r further proceedings. J u s t i c e W e Concur: - Hon . ~ob%?t-~T~elson , - ~ y s t r i t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. J u s t i c e C a s t l e s concurring and d i s s e n t i n g , i n p a r t . I concur i n t h e opinion of t h e majority except a s it a p p l i e s t o t h e f i n a l i s s u e concerning defendant, I l l e E l e c t r i c Co. The t h r u s t of t h e complaint is a g a i n s t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e whirlpool machine over which I l l e E l e c t r i c had no c o n t r o l . To hold t h a t over 13 years a f t e r i n s t a l l a t i o n , and summary judg- ment f o r t h e o t h e r two defendants, I l l e E l e c t r i c remains l i a b l e under t h e s t a t u t e s involved is not proper. I would a f f i r m t h e judgments. R . J . N e l s o n , J u d g e o f t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f H o n o r a b l e James T . H a r r i s o n , c o n c u r r i n g and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t . I c o n c u r i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y e x c e p t a s i t a p p l i e s t o t h e f i n a l i s s u e c o n c e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t , I 1 l e E l e c t r i c Company. I w o u l d a f f i r m t h e J u d g m e n t s .