Title: Donis v. American Waste Services, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12842
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2020

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SJC-12842 
 
ELMER DONIS & others1  vs.  AMERICAN WASTE SERVICES, LLC, 
& others.2 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     February 13, 2020. - July 21, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Labor, Wages, Public works.  Public 
Works, Wage determination.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 1, 2012, and February 21, 2013. 
 
 
After consolidation, a motion for partial summary judgment 
as to liability only was heard by Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Robert J. Cordy (Annabel Rodriguez also present) for 
American Waste Services, LLC, & another. 
Nicole Horberg Decter (Paige W. McKissock also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                                                          
 
 
1 Juan Florian, Melvin Granados, Wilfrido Monterroso, Edgar 
Ruiz, Ismael Sabrano, Edvin Sambrano, Enrique Sarceno, Victor 
Serrano, and Obdulio Albeno. 
 
 
2 Christopher Carney and Michael Galvin. 
2 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Karla E. Zarbo, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the Attorney General. 
Joseph Michalakes & Hannah Tanabe for Immigrant Worker 
Center Collaborative. 
Kevin C. Merritt for Massachusetts Building Trades Council 
& another. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In this appeal, we further define the remedies 
available to aggrieved employees under the Wage Act, G. L. 
c. 149, §§ 148, 150, and the Prevailing Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, 
§§ 26-27H.  The employee plaintiffs assert that, for a period of 
several years, they were paid less than the wages required by 
the Prevailing Wage Act.  They brought suit against their 
employer, American Waste Services, LLC (AWS), as well as two 
officers of AWS, Christopher Carney and Michael Galvin, to 
remedy this statutory violation.  A final judgment was granted 
to the plaintiffs on their claims under both statutes, on the 
ground that by violating the Prevailing Wage Act, the defendants 
violated the Wage Act as well.  The defendants appealed, 
challenging in part whether the plaintiffs could recover under 
the Wage Act for a violation of the Prevailing Wage Act. 
 
We conclude that the plaintiffs may not do so.  Allowing 
the plaintiffs to recover under the Wage Act would provide them 
with a duplicative means of recovering for the defendants' 
purported failure to pay their employees at rates required only 
by the Prevailing Wage Act.  This would render the remedies 
3 
 
provided by the Prevailing Wage Act meaningless.  Moreover, 
under the Wage Act, the plaintiffs may recover directly from the 
officer defendants for underpayment of wages, whereas, under the 
applicable provision of the Prevailing Wage Act, they may not.  
Therefore, to preserve the Legislature's intent in enacting 
these separate statutes, the plaintiffs may not avoid the 
limitations that the Prevailing Wage Act places on their 
recovery by pursuing an otherwise duplicative claim under the 
Wage Act.3 
 
1.  Background.  The essential facts are not contested.  
Defendant AWS is a Massachusetts limited liability company 
engaged in waste collection, recycling, and disposal.  The 
officer defendants, Carney and Galvin, were the managers of AWS; 
Carney was its president, and Galvin its vice-president.  The 
plaintiffs were employed by AWS as "shakers" on waste disposal 
trucks.  They loaded waste into trucks and operated hydraulic 
levers to compact the material. 
 
From 2006 to 2011, AWS had waste disposal contracts with 
the towns of Foxborough, Franklin, Medway, and Wrentham; Galvin, 
as vice-president of AWS, signed the contracts with these 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General; the New England Legal Foundation; the Immigrant Worker 
Center Collaborative; and the Massachusetts Building Trades 
Council and the Foundation for Fair Contracting of 
Massachusetts. 
4 
 
municipalities.  All four of the contracts required compliance 
with the prevailing wage laws.  The Department of Labor 
Standards issued prevailing wage determinations (PWDs) to 
municipalities per budget year, based on wages in collective 
bargaining agreements between employers and organized labor 
engaged in the waste services industry.  During the period of 
the contracts at issue, prevailing wages varied by municipality, 
ranging from $18.15 to $24.81 per hour. 
 
Both Galvin and Carney were responsible for overseeing 
services under these municipal contracts.  Galvin paid or 
supervised payment, and averred that he complied with the 
Prevailing Wage Act for the town of Foxborough.  Despite these 
assurances, all of the plaintiffs actually were paid less than 
the prevailing wage; they received between sixteen dollars and 
seventeen dollars per hour. 
 
The plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court 
against all of the defendants, seeking back wages due to a 
failure to pay the shakers on the municipalities' routes the 
prevailing wages for the period from 2006 to 2011.4  They argued 
that defendants Galvin and Carney, in their roles as managers, 
were jointly and severally liable for all damages.  In July of 
                                                          
 
 
4 The plaintiffs also brought claims for unpaid overtime 
compensation, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum 
meruit. 
5 
 
2015, the plaintiffs were granted partial summary judgment.  The 
motion judge concluded that the defendants' "chronic 
underpayment of the [p]laintiffs constituted a plain violation 
of G. L. c. 149, § 27F, as a matter of law," and that the 
defendants' failure to pay the plaintiffs at the prescribed wage 
rates also constituted a violation of the Wage Act, G. L. 
c. 149, § 148. 
 
Prior to the commencement of a jury trial, the parties 
reached a stipulated judgment against the defendants for 
violations of the Wage Act and Prevailing Wage Act, and breach 
of contract, and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss with prejudice 
the related contract claims.  A final judgment was entered in 
2017, and the defendants timely appealed.  In May of 2019, the 
Appeals Court affirmed the entry of judgment on the statutory 
claims, but reversed judgment on the plaintiffs' breach of 
contract claims.  See Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 95 
Mass. App. Ct. 317 (2019).  The defendants sought further 
appellate review, and we granted their petition, limited to the 
question whether the plaintiffs could recover, under the Wage 
Act, for the defendants' failure to pay wage rates required by 
the Prevailing Wage Act. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendants contend that the motion 
judge erred by concluding that the plaintiffs could pursue their 
underpayment claims under both the Wage Act and the Prevailing 
6 
 
Wage Act.  The crux of the defendants' argument is that G. L. 
c. 149, § 27F, of the Prevailing Wage Act, provides a 
comprehensive scheme for regulating the payment of certain wage 
rates to the workers for whom it applies.  They argue that it 
therefore precludes the plaintiff workers from pursuing a 
duplicative cause of action, including under the Wage Act, G. L. 
c. 149, §§ 148, 150, to recover for the underpayment of those 
wage rates. 
 
In response, the plaintiffs maintain that the motion judge 
and the Appeals Court rightly concluded that the expansive 
language of the Wage Act allows employees to recover under it 
when employers fail to pay prevailing wage rates.  Otherwise, 
they argue, the remedial purposes of both the Prevailing Wage 
Act and Wage Act would be frustrated. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  "As the case was decided below on 
motions for summary judgment on an undisputed record, 'one of 
the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"  
Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 627 
(2019), quoting Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. 
Berkshire Bank, 475 Mass. 839, 841 (2016). 
Whether the Prevailing Wage Act precludes the plaintiffs 
from proceeding under the Wage Act "is a question of statutory 
interpretation, and therefore one that we review de novo."  
Rosnov v. Molloy, 460 Mass. 474, 476 (2011).  "Where two 
7 
 
statutes appear to be in conflict, we do not mechanically 
determine that the more recent or more specific statute . . . 
trumps the other.  Instead, we endeavor to harmonize the two 
statutes so that the policies underlying both may be honored."  
(Quotations and citations omitted.)  George v. National Water 
Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 378 (2017). 
 
In construing the Wage Act and the Prevailing Wage Act, we 
"must ascertain the intent of [each] statute from all its parts 
and from the subject matter to which it relates, and must 
interpret the statute[s] so as to render the legislation 
effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense."  
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 
445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  See Wheatley v. Massachusetts 
Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 
Mass. 197 (2013) ("our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 
to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it" 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  See also Ropes & Gray LLP v. 
Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412–413 (2009). 
 
b.  Statutory provisions.  General Laws c. 149, § 148, of 
the Wage Act requires that "[e]very person having employees in 
his [or her] service shall pay . . . each such employee the 
wages earned by him [or her]" within a prescribed time period.  
"The president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers 
or agents having the management of such corporation shall be 
8 
 
deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation 
within the meaning of this section."  Id.  Certain employees, 
such as "employee[s] of a hospital which is supported in part by 
contributions from the commonwealth," are expressly exempted 
from the coverage of the Wage Act.  Id.  Otherwise, the Wage Act 
provides that "[n]o person shall by a special contract with an 
employee or by any other means exempt himself [or herself] from 
[the Wage Act]."  Id. 
 
"Whoever violates this section shall be punished or shall 
be subject to a civil citation or order as provided in [G. L. 
c. 149, § 27C]."  G. L. c. 149, § 148.  General Laws c. 149, 
§ 27C, sets forth criminal penalties for varying levels of 
misconduct, and provides that "[a]s an alternative to initiating 
criminal proceedings . . . the attorney general may issue a 
written warning or a civil citation."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 27C (b) (1). 
 
In addition to these penalties, a separate section of the 
Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 150, creates a private right of action 
for employees.5  It provides that 
                                                          
 
5 "No employee shall be penalized by an employer in any way 
as a result of any action on the part of an employee to seek his 
or her rights under the wages and hours provisions of this 
chapter."  G. L. c. 149, § 148A.  Should an employer attempt 
such retaliation, the employer "shall have violated this section 
and shall be punished or shall be subject to a civil citation or 
order as provided in [§] 27C."  Id. 
9 
 
"an employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of 
. . . [§] 148 . . . may, [ninety] days after the filing of 
a complaint with the attorney general, or sooner if the 
attorney general assents in writing, and within [three] 
years after the violation, institute and prosecute in his 
own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for 
others similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive 
relief, for any damages incurred, and for any lost wages 
and other benefits . . . .  An employee so aggrieved who 
prevails in such an action shall be awarded treble damages, 
as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other 
benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the 
litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees." 
 
 
This private right of action expressly applies to 
violations of several wage-related statutes.  Notably, neither 
§ 27F nor any other section of the Prevailing Wage Act is among 
them.  See G. L. c. 149, § 150. 
 
The Prevailing Wage Act is structured very differently from 
the Wage Act.  Rather than provide the same protections to 
nearly all workers across the Commonwealth, the Prevailing Wage 
Act applies only to workers employed on certain public works 
projects.  See G. L. c. 149, §§ 26-27H.  For each kind of 
project to which it applies, the Prevailing Wage Act provides a 
mechanism for setting and enforcing minimum wage rates.  Under 
the section of the Prevailing Wage Act applicable here,6 
"[n]o agreement of lease, rental or other arrangement, and 
no order or requisition under which a truck or any 
automotive or other vehicle or equipment is to be engaged 
in public works by the commonwealth or by a county, city, 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendants do not contest that shakers like the 
plaintiffs operate "equipment" on waste trucks, and thus are 
employees within the meaning of G. L. c. 149, § 27F, of the 
Prevailing Wage Act when engaged in public works. 
10 
 
town or district, shall be entered into or given by any 
public official or public body unless said agreement, order 
or requisition contains a stipulation requiring prescribed 
rates of wages, as determined by the commissioner [of the 
Department of Labor Standards], to be paid to the operators 
of said trucks, vehicles or equipment." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 27F.  "Whoever pays less than said rates of 
wages . . . and whoever accepts for his own use, or for the use 
of any other person . . . any part or portion of said wages or 
health and welfare funds, shall have violated this section 
. . . ."  Id. 
 
As with the Wage Act, whoever violates the Prevailing Wage 
Act "shall be punished or shall be subject to a civil citation 
or order as provided in [§] 27C."  Id.  Unlike § 148 of the Wage 
Act, however, § 27F is not one of the statutes to which the 
private right of action established in G. L. c. 148, § 150, 
applies.  Instead, § 27F of the Prevailing Wage Act provides its 
own distinct private right of action.7  See G. L. c. 149, § 27F.  
This cause of action carries the same three-year statute of 
limitations and entitlement to treble damages and reasonable 
attorney's fees as is provided under the Wage Act.  See id.  
Section 27F of the Prevailing Wage Act does not, however, 
expressly include corporate officers and agents within the 
definition of "employer," while the Wage Act does. 
                                                          
 
 
7 The Legislature added a private cause of action to the 
Prevailing Wage Act, along with other new provisions, in 1993.  
See St. 1993, c. 110, § 177. 
11 
 
 
c.  Purposes of the Wage Act and Prevailing Wage Act.  
Although both the Wage Act and Prevailing Wage Act apply to the 
payment of wages to employees, they address distinct concerns.  
"The purpose of the Wage Act is 'to prevent the unreasonable 
detention of wages.'"  Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 245 
(2013), quoting Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 170 
(2012).  To further that end, the Legislature has expanded the 
types of employees covered by the Wage Act, see Melia, supra 
at 171; extended liability to include corporate officers, see 
St. 1932, c. 101, § 1; and, more recently, created the private 
right of action under which the plaintiffs seek to recover, see 
St. 1993, c. 110, § 182.  We repeatedly have rejected 
constructions of the Wage Act that would impose "a limitation 
where the statutory language does not require it."  Depianti v. 
Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 621 (2013), 
quoting Psy–Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 708 (2011). 
 
The Prevailing Wage Act serves a more narrow purpose; it 
"govern[s] the setting and payment of wages on public works 
projects,"  McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 370 (2005) (Sosman, 
J., concurring).  Its primary goal is "to achieve parity between 
the wages of workers engaged in public construction projects and 
workers in the rest of the construction industry" (citation 
omitted).  Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 
532 (2008).  In so doing, the Prevailing Wage Act not only 
12 
 
protects an employee's interest in receiving a wage commensurate 
with his or her labor, it also prevents a contractor from 
"offer[ing] its services for less than what is customarily 
charged by its competitors for nonpublic works contracts."  Id. 
at 533.8 
 
d.  Whether the Prevailing Wage Act and the Wage Act 
conflict.  Because the Prevailing Wage Act and the Wage Act 
address related, but distinct, concerns, these statutes often 
can work in tandem.  Our decision in Fernandes v. Attleboro 
Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 127 (2014), provides a useful 
analogue.  There, we held that a housing authority employee 
could recover under the Wage Act where his employer failed to 
pay him the wage rates required by civil service law.  Id. 
(interpreting wage requirements under G. L. c. 121B, § 29, and 
G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150).  By so doing, we rejected the 
defendant's argument that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was 
to file a complaint with the Civil Service Commission, as 
permitted under G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45.  Id. 
                                                          
 
 
8 As the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit has recognized, the Prevailing Wage Act is analogous to 
the Davis-Bacon Act, which sets minimum prevailing wages on 
Federal construction projects.  See American Steel Erectors, 
Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, 
Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 74 n.5 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (referring to Prevailing Wage Act as "Little Davis-
Bacon Act"); 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3144. 
13 
 
 
In Fernandes, 470 Mass. at 125, "the central thrust of [the 
plaintiff's] action was [his employer's] purported violations of 
the Wage Act, and not its alleged failure to act with 'just 
cause' [in violation of G. L. c. 31, § 41]."  "Although the 
Commissioner of Labor and Industries is authorized under G. L. 
c. 121B, § 29, to 'determine rates of wages' for each 
classification of work performed by laborers for a housing 
authority, neither that statutory provision nor G. L. c. 31, 
§§ 41–45, address the unlawful withholding of earned wages by an 
employer.  It is the Wage Act that speaks to and provides 
remedies for such prohibited employer conduct."  Id. at 127.  
Thus, we concluded that the plaintiff's Wage Act claims 
presented a distinct cause of action under which he could 
recover without duplicating other statutory remedies available 
to him.  Id.  Otherwise, the plaintiff would have been entitled 
to a statutorily mandated wage rate, but would have had no 
recourse by which to recover it.  See G. L. c. 121B, § 29. 
 
Similarly, while the Prevailing Wage Act establishes what 
rates of wages are owed to certain employees, and provides a 
private right of action for the failure to pay those rates, it 
provides no recourse when an employer withholds the timely 
payment of wages, or takes adverse actions against an employee 
14 
 
seeking to recover those wages.9  As the defendants acknowledge, 
under those circumstances, the plaintiffs could pursue claims 
under both the Prevailing Wage Act and the Wage Act to remedy 
distinct violations.  Each statute would play its own role, and 
there would be no conflict between them. 
 
Here, however, the "central thrust" of the plaintiffs' 
action is that the defendants failed to pay them at the rates 
required by the Prevailing Wage Act.  They put forward no basis 
for their Wage Act claims other than this violation of the 
Prevailing Wage Act, which itself already provides its own 
remedy.  Permitting a plaintiff to recover under the Wage Act 
for a violation of the Prevailing Wage Act would thus render the 
private right of action created by the Prevailing Wage Act 
utterly unnecessary, thereby violating the canon of statutory 
construction against superfluity.  See Monell v. Boston Pads, 
LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 576 (2015) ("wherever possible, no provision 
of a legislative enactment should be treated as superfluous" 
[citation omitted]). 
                                                          
 
 
9 Unlike some statutes, § 27F of the Prevailing Wage does 
not state expressly that it is the exclusive remedy for any 
improper employer actions related to the payment of prevailing 
wages.  Compare G. L. c. 149, § 27F, with G. L. c. 152, § 24.  
We have recognized, however, that a statutory remedy nonetheless 
may be exclusive by implication.  See, e.g., Whalen v. Worcester 
Elec. Light Co., 307 Mass. 169, 175 (1940) (interpreting G. L. 
c. 84, § 15, as exclusive remedy). 
15 
 
 
Had the Legislature intended for violations of the 
Prevailing Wage Act to be remedied under the Wage Act, it could 
have structured these statutes to reflect that intent.  As noted 
supra, the Legislature could have included § 27F or other 
sections of the Prevailing Wage Act amongst the statutory 
violations punishable under G. L. c. 149, § 150, of the Wage 
Act.  Or, the Legislature simply could have omitted a private 
cause of action from the Prevailing Wage Act, thus implying that 
aggrieved employees would have to look elsewhere for a remedy, 
including under the Wage Act.  Instead, the Legislature opted to 
create a unique cause of action for violations of § 27F of the 
Prevailing Wage Act; we will not adopt unnecessarily a 
construction of these statutes that effectively would undo this 
legislative decision. 
 
Moreover, permitting recovery under the Wage Act would 
eliminate meaningful limitations on the plaintiffs' ability to 
proceed under the Prevailing Wage Act.  While the plaintiffs may 
recover directly from certain individuals who are not otherwise 
deemed employers under the Wage Act for failure to pay wages in 
accordance with that act, under § 27F of the Prevailing Wage 
Act, they may not.10 
                                                          
 
 
10 Section 27F of the Prevailing Wage Act does establish 
individual liability for officers and agents, in specific 
circumstances, for "whoever accepts for his own use, or for the 
use of any other person, as a rebate, gratuity or in any other 
16 
 
 
While the Wage Act expressly provides that certain 
corporate officers and agents may be held liable for failing to 
pay wages in accordance with that statute, see G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148, § 27F of the Prevailing Wage Act does not.  "[T]he 
omission of particular language from a statute is deemed 
deliberate where the Legislature included [the] omitted language 
in related or similar statutes" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 482 Mass. 830, 835 (2019).  "If the 
Legislature intentionally omits language from a statute, no 
court can supply it."  Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of 
Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 128 (1995). 
 
Although § 27F of the Prevailing Wage Act states that 
"[w]hoever pays less than said rates of wages . . . shall have 
violated this section," the term "whoever"11 does not, by itself, 
expand liability beyond the employer.  We do not read the broad 
phrase "whoever fails to pay" in isolation; rather, we look to 
the broader statutory context to discern its meaning.  See 
                                                          
 
guise, any part or portion of said wages."  G. L. c. 149, § 27F.  
The plaintiffs do not contend that either of the individual 
defendants separately violated this anti-kickback provision.  We 
do not interpret this provision as applying to circumstances 
where the sole claim is that the defendants failed to pay 
prevailing wage rates.  Doing so would render the cause of 
action for a failure to "pay[] less than said rates of wages" 
redundant.  See id. 
 
 
11 In general, the term "whoever," like the term "person," 
"includ[es] corporations, societies, associations and 
partnerships."  G. L. c. 4, § 7. 
17 
 
LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 333 (1999).  The same phrase 
describing liability -- "whoever fails to pay" -- also appears 
in another section of the Prevailing Wage Act.  See G. L. 
c. 149, § 27.  As under the Wage Act, this section of the 
Prevailing Wage Act was amended expressly to include certain 
corporate officers and agents within the definition of 
"employer."  See St. 1998, c. 236, § 6.  If the preexisting term 
"whoever" already encompassed these corporate officers and 
agents, then this amendment to G. L. c. 149, § 27, would be mere 
surplusage.  See City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 
Mass. 784, 790 (2019) ("[T]he canon against surplusage is 
strongest when," as here, "an interpretation would render 
superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
Further, the legislative history of § 27F of the Prevailing 
Wage Act reflects that omitting nonemployer personal liability 
was a deliberate choice on the part of the Legislature.  As 
noted supra, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 149, § 27, in 1998 
to redefine the term "employer" expressly to include certain 
officers and agents.  See St. 1998, c. 236, § 6.  This new 
definition applied to several sections of the Wage Act, 
including provisions regarding employees working on public 
construction works.  See G. L. c. 149, §§ 26-27.  Notably, 
however, this new definition did not extend to § 27F, and 
18 
 
employees operating trucks and related equipment on public works 
projects.  See St. 1998, c. 236, § 6 (expanding definition of 
"employer" under G. L. c. 149, §§ 26-27B, of Prevailing Wage 
Act).  In a different section of that act, the Legislature made 
other amendments to § 27F, but left the definition of "employer" 
untouched.  See St. 1998, c. 236, § 8.  The Legislature was 
cognizant of the provisions of § 27F, and readily could have 
extended the broader definition of "employer" to it, but 
apparently chose not to do so.12 
                                                          
 
 
12 The background of the 1998 amendments sheds some light on 
the reasons why the Legislature might have made corporate 
officers and agents liable for violations of some sections of 
the Prevailing Wage Act, but not others.  These amendments 
occurred while the Central Artery/Tunnel construction project 
(the so-called "Big Dig") was underway, at a time when the 
"enforcement of prevailing wage laws [was] a problem on some Big 
Dig contracts."  It's obvious who's man of the House, Boston 
Globe, Apr. 22, 1998.  Indeed, that year, the Attorney General's 
office created a special "Big Dig" "enforcement team" to combat 
perceived ongoing violations of the Prevailing Wage Act and 
other labor laws.  Yearly Report of the Office of the Attorney 
General, at 19 (1998).  In the face of these problems, the 
Attorney General and leaders of major labor unions, including 
the AFL-CIO and Massachusetts Builder Trades Council jointly 
authored a bill that became St. 1998, c. 236.  See 1998 Senate 
Doc. No. 25.  This bill created officer and agent liability 
under the sections of the Prevailing Wage Act that deal with the 
construction of public works like the "Big Dig," thus granting 
the Attorney General greater enforcement powers and offering new 
protections to workers, including union members, employed on 
such projects.  Given this historical context, it is not 
surprising that the Legislature opted not to do the same for 
provisions of the Prevailing Wage Act that are unrelated to 
construction projects, such as G. L. c. 149, § 27F. 
19 
 
 
Accordingly, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed against the 
individual defendants under a Wage Act claim, where they could 
not under the Prevailing Wage Act, would vitiate the 
Legislature's decision to create different scopes of liability 
for those who are not employers under these statutes. 
 
e.  Whether the Prevailing Wage Act precludes the 
plaintiffs' Wage Act claims.  Whereas the Prevailing Wage Act 
and the Wage Act provide conflicting mechanisms to recover the 
same underpayment of wages, we must consider whether the 
plaintiffs nonetheless may proceed under both.  Our prior 
precedents dictate that, in this instance, the plaintiffs may 
recover solely under the Prevailing Wage Act. 
 
When analyzing the statutory scheme of the Prevailing Wage 
Act, we have noted that claims under it present a situation 
"where an employee would have no recognized cause of action but 
for the statutes' imposition of obligations on employers."  
Lipsitt, 466 Mass. at 247 n.11.  Indeed, some Federal courts 
have concluded that, because the Prevailing Wage Act is 
"seemingly intended to cover the whole subject to which it 
relates, including a remedy for its infraction, other provisions 
of the common law, including such as are remedial in nature, are 
thereby superseded."  O'Leary v. New Hampshire Boring, Inc., 323 
F.R.D. 122, 127 (D. Mass. 2018).  See George v. National Water 
20 
 
Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D. 168, 187–188 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(accord). 
 
We have recognized that "a plaintiff should not be allowed 
to circumvent procedural or other requirements imposed by a 
particular statute by pleading a common-law cause of action that 
asserts a right created under that statute and not previously 
recognized at common law."  Lipsitt, 466 Mass. at 247 n.11 & 
249.  See Huff v. Holyoke, 386 Mass. 582, 585 (1982) ("An 
elaborate and comprehensive statutory system has been 
established fully and completely dealing with the subject 
matter . . . .  It was intended to be an exclusive remedy.  The 
legislative intent cannot be thwarted by calling the defect a 
nuisance . . . [and] seeking to recover damages far in excess of 
those fixed by the statute").  Here, the plaintiffs seek to do 
this very thing, but by pursuing a claim under another statute 
rather than pursuing a common-law cause of action.  We see no 
reason why a plaintiff should be able to evade procedural 
limitations that the Legislature has adopted, simply by stating 
a duplicative statutory claim. 
 
Our interpretation of the Wage Act and the overtime pay 
provisions of G. L. c. 151, § 1A, in Crocker v. Townsend Oil 
Co., 464 Mass. 1 (2012), further suggests that these plaintiffs 
may not proceed under the Wage Act.  There, we addressed whether 
the plaintiffs could recover for their employer's failure timely 
21 
 
to pay wages, including statutorily mandated overtime payments, 
under the Wage Act.  Although the overtime pay provision of 
G. L. c. 151, § 1A, establishes its own private right of action, 
the shorter two-year limitations period in that statute had 
lapsed.  Crocker, supra at 6-7.  We concluded that the 
plaintiffs nonetheless could "recover" under the Wage Act 
"compensation earned for the hours they worked, including the 
overtime hours they worked but for which they were not paid" 
(emphasis added).  Id. at 3.  The plaintiffs were limited, 
however, to recovering those unpaid wages at the ordinary rates 
provided by the Wage Act, and not the overtime premiums 
established by G. L. c. 151, § 1A.  This limitation struck "a 
balance between the Legislature's intent behind the Wage Act 
that employees receive timely payment of wages" and "the 
Legislature's intent to draw a nominal distinction between 
overtime wages and regular wages by establishing different 
statute of limitations periods."  Crocker, supra at 7. 
 
Following Crocker, we hold that the plaintiffs may not 
recover under the Wage Act, where their only contention is that 
the defendants failed to pay the wage rates mandated by the 
Prevailing Wage Act.  If, as in Crocker, the plaintiffs had 
argued that the defendants did not pay them for the hours they 
had worked, the plaintiffs' Wage Act claims would represent a 
distinct cause of action under which they could seek recovery.  
22 
 
Where, however, the sole basis for their claim is a violation of 
the Prevailing Wage Act, the plaintiffs may not restate their 
claims under the Wage Act to evade the limitations of the 
Prevailing Wage Act on the scope of potentially liable 
defendants.  This determination strikes the proper balance 
between achieving the remedial purposes underlying these 
statutes, while respecting the Legislature's expressed intent to 
create distinctions between them. 
 
f.  Whether precluding the plaintiffs' Wage Act claims 
frustrates the purpose of these statutes.  The plaintiffs 
maintain that denying them recovery under both the Wage Act and 
the Prevailing Wage Act will bar them from recovering the full 
measure of the wages that they are owed.  They assert that if 
they cannot proceed against the officer defendants, the 
protections of the Prevailing Wage Act could be evaded through 
misuse of the corporate or limited liability company form. 
 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that defendants would 
have incentives to set up limited liability companies and 
ordinary corporations as nominal employers, but intentionally 
leave those entities with little in the way of assets.  Then, in 
the event that a Prevailing Wage Act claim were brought against 
such an entity, the undercapitalized employer entities would be 
incapable of paying any recovery, and the responsible 
individuals would pay nothing. 
23 
 
 
While we are mindful that foreclosing the plaintiffs' 
claims under the Wage Act theoretically could have an impact on 
their ability to recover, it is not clear that requiring the 
plaintiffs to proceed solely under the Prevailing Wage Act would 
produce a different recovery in most cases.  Under several 
sections of the Prevailing Wage Act, plaintiffs are able to 
recover against officers and agents to the same extent as they 
would under the Wage Act.  See G. L. c. 149, § 27.  For those 
plaintiffs, the inability to proceed under the Wage Act for a 
violation of the Prevailing Wage Act would have no impact on 
their recovery at all. 
 
Even in cases under § 27F of the Prevailing Wage Act, where 
plaintiffs are limited to recovering against their employer, 
plaintiffs have tools at their disposal to facilitate that 
recovery.  The plaintiffs in this case, for example, sought and 
received both an order of attachment, and a preliminary 
injunction and an accounting, against their employer, AWS.  
Further, if corporate officers and agents abuse the corporate 
registration process in an attempt to avoid paying damages under 
the Prevailing Wage Act, plaintiffs may be able to pursue 
recovery against those officers and agents through piercing the 
corporate veil.13  See Lipsitt, 466 Mass. at 253–254 (Wage Act 
                                                          
 
 
13 "The doctrine of corporate disregard is an equitable tool 
that authorizes courts, in rare situations, to ignore corporate 
24 
 
claim against individual defendant should not have been 
dismissed where complaint plausibly pleaded basis for veil 
piercing). 
 
In any event, we will not override the will of the 
Legislature by reading into these statutes additional 
protections for employees that their authors did not choose to 
provide.  See Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't 
of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 
126 (2006) ("We do not read into the statute a provision which 
the Legislature did not see fit to put there, nor add words that 
the Legislature had an option to, but chose not to include").  
To the extent that more expansive liability might be desirable 
as a matter of public policy, that argument is best addressed to 
the Legislature. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the plaintiffs' motion 
for partial summary judgment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
formalities, where such disregard is necessary to provide a 
meaningful remedy for injuries and to avoid injustice . . . [or] 
to carry out legislative intent and to avoid evasion of 
statutes" (citation omitted).  Attorney Gen. v. M.C.K., Inc., 
432 Mass. 546, 555 (2000).