Title: In re Detention of Samuelson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85469
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2000

Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of this state's recently 
enacted Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. 
(West 1998)), which authorizes the indefinite involuntary commitment of 
individuals found to be sexually violent persons.
The case comes before us after the State initiated proceedings in March of 
1998 to commit David Samuelson under the new law. Samuelson is an inmate in the 
Department of Corrections who was about to be released from prison following 
completion of his sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse, and exhibiting harmful material. Following various 
developments not relevant here, the court conducted a hearing to determine 
whether there was probable cause to believe that Samuelson was a sexually 
violent person within the meaning of the Act. Based on the material presented at 
that hearing, the circuit court determined that probable cause existed and 
ordered that Samuelson be transferred to the Sheridan Correctional Center 
pending trial. 725 ILCS 207/30 (West 1998).
Before the trial commenced, the circuit court dismissed the State's petition 
on Samuelson's motion, holding that the Act is unconstitutional. The circuit 
court's order constituted a final judgment and had the effect of invalidating 
the Act. The State therefore appealed directly to our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 
302(a). We stayed the circuit court's judgment pending the appeal. For the 
reasons that follow, we now reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. 
(West 1998)), which took effect in January of 1998, allows the State to extend 
the incarceration of criminal defendants beyond the time they would otherwise be 
entitled to release if those defendants are found to be "sexually violent." 
Under the Act, a person is deemed to be a "sexually violent person" and 
therefore subject to extended incarceration if he or she
For the purposes of this statute, a "sexually violent offense" is defined to 
mean criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998)), aggravated criminal 
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West 1998)), predatory criminal sexual assault 
of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)), or aggravated criminal sexual abuse 
(720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West 1998)); first degree murder, if it is determined by the 
agency with jurisdiction to have been sexually motivated; or any solicitation, 
conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the foregoing crimes. 725 ILCS 207/5(e) 
(West 1998). A "[m]ental disorder" means "a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 
engage in acts of sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 1998).
The provisions of the Act are triggered when a defendant who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, adjudicated delinquent on the basis of 
a sexually violent offense, or been found not guilty of a sexually violent 
offense by reason of insanity is nearing release or discharge from custody. If 
the defendant "may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person," the agency with authority to release or discharge him or her is 
required to notify the Attorney General and the relevant State's Attorney "as 
soon as possible beginning 3 months prior to the applicable date of" the 
defendant's anticipated release or discharge. 725 ILCS 207/10 (West 1998).
After the requisite notice is given, a petition alleging that the defendant 
is a sexually violent person may be filed by the Attorney General or, if the 
Attorney General elects not to proceed, by the relevant State's Attorney. 725 
ILCS 207/15 (West 1998). Proceedings on the petition are characterized by the 
law as civil in nature (725 ILCS 207/20 (West 1998)), but at the trial on the 
merits, "all rules of evidence in criminal actions apply" and "[a]ll 
constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding" are 
available (725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 1998)). A jury trial can be requested by the 
defendant, the defendant's attorney, the Attorney General or the State's 
Attorney. 725 ILCS 207/25(d) (West 1998). The defendant has the right to an 
attorney and the court must appoint one for him if he is indigent. He has the 
right to remain silent, the right to be present and to cross-examine witnesses, 
and the right to have the hearing recorded by a court reporter. In addition, if 
the defendant is required to submit to an examination, he is entitled to retain 
experts or professional persons of his own to perform an examination. If the 
defendant is indigent, the court shall, at the defendant's request, appoint a 
"qualified and available expert or professional person to perform an 
examination." 725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 1998).
Upon the filing of the petition, the court is required to make a 
determination as to whether the defendant should be detained and to hold a 
hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant is a sexually violent person. If probable cause is not established, 
the petition must be dismissed. If probable cause is shown and if the defendant 
is not already in custody, the court must order the defendant taken into custody 
pending trial. 725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West 1998).
At trial, the State has the burden of proving the allegations in its petition 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 725 ILCS 207/35(d)(2) (West 1998). If the court or 
jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a sexually 
violent person, the court must dismiss the petition and direct that the 
defendant be released, unless the defendant is under some other lawful 
restriction. 725 ILCS 207/35(f) (West 1998). If, on the other hand, the court or 
jury finds that the defendant is a sexually violent person, the court is 
required to enter judgment on that finding and order the defendant to be 
committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services "for control, care 
and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent 
person." 725 ILCS 207/40(a) (West 1998).
The initial commitment order is to be made following a hearing. The hearing 
to be held as soon as practicable after the circuit court's entry of judgment. 
In the order, the court must specify either institutional care in a secure 
facility or conditional release. 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(2) (West 1998). If the 
defendant is committed to institutional care, the Department of Human Services 
is required to place the defendant in a facility provided by the Department of 
Corrections. 725 ILCS 207/50 (West 1998).
After a defendant has been committed to institutional care, the Department of 
Human Services is to conduct an examination of his mental condition within six 
months of the initial commitment and again thereafter at least once every 12 
months. The purpose of the periodic examinations is to determine whether the 
defendant has made sufficient progress to be conditionally released or 
discharged. 725 ILCS 207/55 (West 1998).
A defendant who has been committed to institutional care may petition the 
court to authorize conditional release once certain time requirements are met. 
725 ILCS 207/60(a) (West 1998). If the defendant files the petition without 
counsel, the court must serve the Attorney General or State's Attorney and, if 
the defendant is indigent, appoint counsel to represent him. 725 ILCS 207/60(b) 
(West 1998).
Once the defendant has filed his petition for conditional release, the court 
must appoint one or more examiners to examine the defendant and make a written 
report. After the report has been submitted, the court, sitting without a jury, 
must hear the petition and must grant it
For a defendant to obtain discharge rather than conditional release, three 
different procedures are available. The first involves the Secretary of the 
Department of Human Services. If the Secretary determines, at any time, that the 
defendant is no longer a sexually violent person, the Secretary must authorize 
the defendant to petition for discharge. As with hearings on petitions for 
conditional release, the hearing on such a petition for discharge is before the 
court, sitting without a jury. The State has the right to have the defendant 
examined by an expert or professional person and has the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is still a sexually violent 
person. If the State cannot meet that burden, the defendant must be discharged. 
725 ILCS 207/65(a) (West 1998).
The second mechanism for discharge is triggered whenever the defendant 
undergoes one of the periodic examinations required by the statute. At the time 
of each such examination, the defendant must be given written notice that he has 
the right to petition for discharge over the Secretary's objection. If the 
defendant does not affirmatively waive that right, the court must set a probable 
cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing on whether 
the defendant is still a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 
1998).
If the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant 
is no longer a sexually violent person, it must set a hearing on the issue. 
Again, the hearing is to take place before the court, sitting without a jury, 
and the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant is still a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 
1998). If the State fails to meet that burden, the defendant is entitled to be 
discharged. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(3) (West 1998).
Finally, the defendant may petition for discharge at times other than the 
periodic examinations and may do so without the approval of the Secretary. If 
the defendant has not previously filed a petition for discharge without the 
Secretary's approval, the court must set a probable cause hearing and, if 
appropriate, proceed in accordance with the same procedures governing unapproved 
petitions for review filed at the time of the statutorily mandated periodic 
examinations. If, on the other hand, the defendant did previously file a 
petition for discharge without the Secretary's approval and the court determined 
based on review of the petition or following a hearing that the petition was 
frivolous or that the defendant was still a sexually violent person, an 
important limitation applies. The court is required to dismiss the petition 
without a hearing unless the petition contains facts that would support a 
finding that the defendant has so changed that a hearing is warranted. 725 ILCS 
207/70 (West 1998).
The case before us today is at a relatively early stage in this process. As 
previously indicated, the State filed a petition alleging that defendant is a 
sexually violent person, a hearing was held on that petition, the circuit court 
determined that there is probable cause to believe that defendant is a sexually 
violent person, and the court ordered defendant detained pending trial. Trial on 
the State's petition has not yet taken place.
There is no dispute that defendant is subject to the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) by virtue of his 
criminal convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse. There is no dispute that the proceedings thus far have 
been in accordance with the Act. There is no dispute that the circuit court had 
probable cause to believe that defendant is a sexually violent person within the 
meaning of the law. At this point in the proceedings, defendant's arguments are 
addressed solely to the validity of the statute itself. Defendant contends that 
the law is fatally infirm and cannot be enforced because it denies due process 
and equal protection; contravenes the prohibition against double jeopardy; 
violates ex post facto principles; and infringes on the rights secured 
by article I, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides 
that "[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain 
inviolate." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §13.
In assessing defendant's arguments, we begin with the well-established rule 
that all statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. Where, as 
here, the circuit court has found a statute to be unconstitutional, this court 
conducts de novo review of its determination. Arangold Corp. v. 
Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). The party challenging a statute bears 
the burden of clearly establishing that it is unconstitutional. Our court will 
uphold a statute whenever reasonably possible, and any doubts will be resolved 
in favor of the law's validity. People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 
111 (1995).
There is no merit to defendant's contention that the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act contravenes the prohibition against double jeopardy and violates 
ex post facto principles. On these questions, the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), is dispositive. In Hendricks the court 
addressed the constitutional validity of a Kansas statute similar to the 
Illinois law at issue here. The court held that the law was civil rather than 
criminal in nature and that involuntary confinement pursuant to the law's 
provisions is not punitive. Accordingly, the court concluded that initiation of 
its commitment proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution for double 
jeopardy purposes. Because the law does not impose punishment, the court 
likewise concluded that it raises no ex post facto concerns. The court 
held that the ex post facto clause is not implicated for the additional 
reason that the law does not have retroactive effect. It permits involuntary 
confinement only where the defendant is currently suffering from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder and is likely to pose a future danger to the 
public. Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 369-71, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 519-21, 117 S. Ct.  at 2085-86.
The points raised by the United States Supreme Court apply with equal force 
to Illinois' version of the law. As with proceedings under the Kansas statute 
considered in Hendricks, proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act are civil rather than criminal in nature. The statute so states 
(725 ILCS 207/20 (West 1998)), and our appellate court has so recognized. See, 
e.g., In re Detention of Tiney-Bey, 302 Ill. App. 3d 396, 
398-99 (1999); In re Detention of Anders, 304 Ill. App. 3d 117, 122 
(1999). In addition, as with the Kansas statute, the law has no retroactive 
effect. A defendant cannot be involuntarily committed based on past conduct. 
Involuntary confinement is permissible only where the defendant presently 
suffers from a mental disorder and the disorder creates a substantial 
probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence in the future. 725 
ILCS 207/15 (West 1998). The Act is therefore not subject to challenge on either 
double jeopardy or ex post facto grounds.
There is likewise no merit to defendant's contention that the Act violates 
article I, section 13, of our state's constitution, which deals with the right 
to trial by jury. As our summary of the legislation has indicated, a defendant 
who is the subject of a petition under the Act has an express right to request 
that a jury determine whether he is a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 
207/25(d) (West 1998). The problem with this provision, according to defendant, 
is that the law does not afford him the concomitant right to have his case 
decided by the court, sitting without a jury. Even if he does not request a jury 
and does not want one, the proceedings may still be presented to a jury if the 
Attorney General or the State's Attorney so requests. 725 ILCS 207/25(d) (West 
1998). The only way for a defendant to proceed to a bench trial is if the State 
acquiesces in his desire to forgo a jury.
Defendant's challenge to this scheme is premised on the principle that in 
criminal cases, the right to a jury trial encompasses the right to waive a trial 
by jury. If a criminal defendant wishes to forgo a jury, that desire cannot be 
overridden by the State. See People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 222 (1988). The flaw in defendant's analysis is that this is not a criminal 
case. As we have just discussed, proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act are civil rather than criminal in nature.
Defendant makes a separate and distinct challenge under article I, section 
13, of the 1970 Constitution to those portions of the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act governing petitions for conditional release or discharge filed 
after the initial commitment. The defect defendant claims with respect to those 
provisions is the converse of the one he raises with respect to initial 
commitment proceedings. Instead of failing to give a defendant the right to 
waive a jury trial when he does not want one, the provisions governing 
conditional release or discharge do not afford a defendant the option of 
requesting a jury trial when he does want one. Unlike initial 
commitment proceedings, the rules governing petitions for conditional release or 
discharge do not authorize jury trials at all. The petitions can only be heard 
by the court, sitting without a jury. 725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 1998); 725 ILCS 
207/65(b)(2) (West 1998).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that juries are not available on 
petitions for conditional release or discharge does not render the legislation 
infirm under article I, section 13. The right to a jury trial secured by article 
I, section 13, only attaches in those actions where such right existed under the 
English common law at the time the constitution was adopted. Article I, section 
13, was not intended to guarantee trial by jury in special or statutory 
proceedings unknown to the common law. Martin v. Heinold Commodities, 
Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 73-74 (1994). Petitions for conditional release or 
discharge under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act are such 
proceedings. They are a new statutory creation. Accordingly, defendant cannot 
claim that the provisions for conditional release or discharge are invalid under 
article I, section 13, for failing to provide the option of trial by jury.
We turn next to defendant's contention that the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act violates equal protection under the state and federal 
constitutions. Our court applies the same analysis to equal protection claims 
brought under the Illinois Constitution of 1970 as it does to equal protection 
claims under the United States Constitution. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 450 (1998). The right to equal protection of the laws requires the 
government to treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. It
When we review legislation under equal protection analysis, the level of 
scrutiny applied depends on the type of legislative classification at issue. 
Classifications based on race or national original or affecting fundamental 
rights are strictly scrutinized. McLean v. Department of Revenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341, 354 (1998). Intermediate scrutiny applies to discriminatory 
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. In all other cases, the court 
employs the rational basis test. Committee for Educational Rights v. 
Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (1996).
This court (People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 321 (1976)) and our 
appellate court (People v. McDougle, 303 Ill. App. 3d 509, 521 (1999); 
People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 967-68 (1999)) have held that 
the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 (West 1998)) is subject to 
the rational basis test. We discern no reason why the same standard should not 
apply to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The statutory 
classifications assailed by defendant are not based on race, national origin, 
sex or illegitimacy, nor do they implicate fundamental rights.
Under the rational basis test, judicial review of legislative classifications 
is limited and generally deferential. The court simply inquires whether the 
method or means employed in the statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of 
the legislation is rationally related to that goal. If any set of facts can 
reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be upheld. In 
re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 38 (1998).
Defendant's equal protection arguments are not well defined and have changed 
over time. Before our court, his principle contention appears to be that the law 
is invalid because it does not afford defendants the same rights available to 
defendants in criminal cases or to persons facing involuntary admission to a 
mental health facility pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental 
Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1998)). This 
contention is without merit. As our survey of the law has indicated, the 
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act does afford defendants a wide range of 
protections available to individuals facing criminal prosecution. See 725 ILCS 
207/25, 35(b) (West 1998). Although disparities do exist, statutory proceedings 
under the Act are civil rather than criminal in nature, and it is by no means 
irrational for the General Assembly to treat civil litigants different from 
criminal ones.
That differences exist between the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act 
and the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code likewise presents no 
equal protection problems. In People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 
321-22 (1976), our court considered a similar challenge involving the Sexually 
Dangerous Persons Act. There, as here, the claim was made that the statute was 
invalid because there were substantial differences between commitment 
proceedings under the Act and proceedings under what was then known as the 
Mental Health Code. We rejected that argument by noting that persons subject to 
the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act possess characteristics which set them apart 
from the greater class of persons who fall within the Mental Health Code , and 
such persons present different societal problems. These same considerations are 
equally applicable here. The provisions governing involuntary admission of 
adults to mental health facilities under the Mental Health and Developmentally 
Disabilities Code apply generally to individuals suffering from mental illness. 
By contrast, far more specific criteria must be met to qualify as a sexually 
violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The defendant 
must have been convicted of a sexually violent offense or been adjudicated a 
delinquent for a sexually violent offense or been found not guilty of a sexually 
violent offense by reason of insanity and he must suffer from a mental disorder 
that makes it substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual 
violence in the future. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998). If sexually dangerous 
persons present different societal problems than those whose conduct is subject 
to the larger, more inclusive class as defined by the Mental Health and 
Developmentally Disabilities Code, the same is surely true of defendants who 
meet the foregoing criteria and qualify as sexually violent persons. 
Accordingly, we cannot say that the classification formulated by the legislature 
is unreasonable.
Defendant's final argument is that the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment 
Act is invalid because the procedures for post-commitment discharge do not 
satisfy the requirements of due process. This argument was adopted by the 
circuit court and appears to have been the primary basis for its decision. 
According to the circuit court, the post-commitment discharge proceedings set 
forth in the Act are constitutionally infirm because such proceedings are not 
automatic, they require defendants to make an initial showing that there is 
probable cause to believe that they are no longer sexually violent persons in 
cases where the petition has not been authorized by the Secretary of the 
Department of Human Services, they reduce the State's burden of proof from 
beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, and they do not afford 
defendants the option of having the matter tried before a jury.
In cases of involuntary civil commitment, due process does not require the 
State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The State may confine a 
mentally ill person if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the 
individual is mentally ill and dangerous. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437, 448, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992); Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979). Because due 
process does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the initial 
commitment, it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in subsequent 
discharge proceedings. The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is therefore 
not subject to challenge on this basis.
With respect to the remaining deficiencies cited by the circuit court, 
defendant has not presented and the circuit court did not cite any authority to 
support a finding that due process has been violated. In view of the limited 
argument presented to us on this issue, we are reluctant to issue a blanket 
pronouncement that the post-commitment discharge procedures present no due 
process problems. We hold simply that the defendant in this case has failed to 
meet his burden of clearly establishing that those procedures are 
unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and 
this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority's conclusion that respondent(1) 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) violates 
either the equal protection clause or the due process clause. I do not agree, 
however, with the majority's decision to address other arguments not raised in 
respondent's brief. The majority addresses respondent's contentions that the Act 
contravenes the prohibition against double jeopardy; violates ex post 
facto principles; and violates article I, section 13, of the Illinois 
Constitution. Although respondent raised those arguments at the trial court 
level, he abandoned them on appeal when he failed to include them in his brief. 
These arguments therefore are waived (see 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 341(e)(7), (f)), and 
this court should not address them.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: 
Defendant David Samuelson pled guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault 
and aggravated criminal sexual abuse on March 1, 1990. He was sentenced to 
concurrent terms of 15 and seven years in the penitentiary. Defendant was 
subsequently scheduled to begin supervised release on March 5, 1998. One day 
before his release, however, the State instituted proceedings to further 
incarcerate him under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 
ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)), which first became law in 1998. The 
Act authorizes the State to commit defendants found to be"[s]exually violent 
person[s]" for an indefinite period of time after the completion of their 
criminal sentences. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998).
Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution's provision 
that a person shall not "be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" (Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §10) because the Act imposes a second punishment upon a 
criminal defendant who has already served his sentence. Defendant also argues 
that applying the Act to defendants such as himself, who committed their crimes 
before its effective date, violates the Illinois Constitution's provision 
against ex post facto, or retroactive, criminal laws. Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, §16. The majority rejects both of these arguments by characterizing the 
confinement authorized by the Act as civil rather than criminal in nature. The 
majority's characterization is incorrect.
There are a multitude of compelling reasons to conclude that confinement 
under the Act is criminal punishment rather than a mere civil remedy. The most 
obvious is that the Act is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. See 
725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998). More importantly, the Act 
explicitly affords defendants against whom it is enforced "[a]ll constitutional 
rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 
1998). The Act also mandates the use of criminal rules of evidence. 725 ILCS 
207/35 (West 1998). Although the General Assembly is to be commended for 
providing these criminal procedural safeguards within the Act, their inclusion 
serves to underscore the criminal character of the Act. Moreover, defendants 
adjudicated sexually violent under the Act are confined in Department of 
Corrections facilities. 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 1998).
Yet another indication of the criminal character of the Act is that, in the 
vast majority of cases, it applies only to defendants who have been convicted 
of, and are already serving a sentence for, a criminal sexual offense.(2) 725 
ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998). In other words, a criminal charge or conviction is a 
necessary precondition for confinement under the Act. If the Act were truly 
civil, it would apply to all persons who have a mental disorder of a sexual 
nature rather than only to those who have been prosecuted for a sexual crime. 
Similarly, the fact that the Act allows the State to request continued 
confinement of a defendant whom the State has already chosen to prosecute 
criminally shows that the State is really merely seeking to impose a 
supplemental sentence of confinement. In cases such as this, the State had the 
option of seeking civil commitment in lieu of criminal proceedings at 
the time of the original charge. See 405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 
1996); 725 ILCS 205/1-0.01 Sexually Dangerous Persons Act et seq. (West 
1996). That the State in every proceeding under the Act has chosen not to 
exercise this fully available civil option contradicts the State's assertion 
that the Act's purposes are civil and demonstrates that the Act is a pretext for 
incarcerating sexual offenders for longer periods of time than the sentence 
which the Criminal Code provides. Certainly, the legislature has wide discretion 
in fixing penalties for specific crimes. Should the legislature wish to increase 
the penalties for sexual crimes, it has that option. What it may not do, 
however, is attach a second sentence subsequent to the one for which the 
defendant was initially sentenced.
Further indication that the Act's procedures are merely a proxy for imposing 
additional criminal punishment comes from the astonishing ease with which a 
convicted sex offender can be brought within the Act's provisions. Incarceration 
under the Act is premised upon a finding that a convicted sex offender suffers 
from a "mental disorder." 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998). The Act defines "mental 
disorder" as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual 
violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 1998). The facts of the instant case aptly 
demonstrate, however, that a finding of a mental disorder flows almost 
inexorably from a conviction for a violent sex offense. When asked at the 
probable cause hearing to identify the "mental disorder" from which defendant 
was suffering, the State's expert diagnosed defendant as having "pedophilia." 
When asked what factors enabled her to arrive at this diagnosis, the State's 
expert explained, "The first criteria is that over-longer than a six month 
period [defendant] engaged in sexual behavior with children in spite of any 
consequences. The second criteria is that despite consequences, personal and 
criminal consequences, he kept-in spite of that he continued his behaviors." 
Thus, the State's expert in this case was able to diagnose defendant as having a 
"mental disorder" within the meaning of the Act solely by virtue of 
defendant's having committed the acts which led to his criminal conviction and 
punishment. In light of this fact, the State's contention that the Act's 
procedures are not criminal is entirely incredible.
Finally, the indefinite nature of the confinement period under the Act is a 
telling manifestation of the Act's criminal purposes. By allowing the State to 
secure a defendant's continued incarceration even after prosecuting and 
extracting from him the full service of a criminal sentence, the Act effectively 
amends every sentencing statute applicable to sexual crimes to give the State 
the option of seeking life imprisonment whenever it is displeased with the 
sentence imposed by the court in the defendant's original prosecution. The 
Illinois Constitution cannot countenance such a perverse transmutation of the 
criminal law. If the State desires to adopt a policy mandating a life sentence 
for certain serious sexual crimes, it must do so openly within the sentencing 
provisions of the Criminal Code.
Because the Act is criminal rather than civil, it violates the Illinois 
Constitution's double jeopardy provision by imposing further punishment upon 
defendants who have already served their sentences. Furthermore, when the Act is 
applied to individuals such as defendant, who committed their crimes before it 
was passed, it also violates the Illinois Constitution's ex post facto 
clause. The majority rejects these arguments because the United States Supreme 
Court has rejected them as a matter of federal constitutional law. Fortunately, 
the United States Supreme Court has no authority to curtail the protections 
afforded by our own state constitution. See People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). The Act is unconstitutional as a matter of Illinois law. 
Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
1. 1In the majority opinion, David Samuelson is 
referred to as "defendant." Because this is a civil commitment proceeding and 
not a criminal case, I will refer to him as "respondent." 

2. 2The Act may also be applied to offenders who 
have been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity. 
725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998).