Title: BRONSON TRAILERS & TRUCKS v. NEWMAN
Citation: 139 P.3d 885, 2006 OK 46
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2006

BRONSON TRAILERS & TRUCKS v. NEWMAN Annotate this Case BRONSON TRAILERS & TRUCKS v. NEWMAN 2006 OK 46 139 P.3d 885 Case Number: 101458 Decided: 06/27/2006 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA BRONSON TRAILERS & TRUCKS, CREDIT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioners/Counter-Respondents, v. RICHARD D. NEWMAN, SR., Respondent/Counter-Petitioner and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondent. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV ¶0 A Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) judge awarded claimant benefits in accordance with the provisions of 85 O.S. Supp. 1997 § 16 (D).1 The trial tribunal, following completion of claimant's court-ordered vocational rehabilitation services, re-evaluated his compensation status and determined him to be permanently partially disabled. Claimant urges the trial judge's re-evaluation of his status was an impermissible collateral attack on a final order that implicitly determined him to be permanently totally disabled. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the trial judge's order. On certiorari granted upon claimant's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ORDER IS SUSTAINED Tracy Pierce Nester, Gary D. Long, Oklahoma City, for Petitioners/Counter-Respondents. Duke Halley, Woodward, Oklahoma, for Respondent/Counter-Petitioner.2 Opala, J. ¶1 Today's certiorari presses two questions for our decision: (1) Is a trial judge's initial award of benefits, made in accordance with the provisions of 85 O.S. Supp. 1997 § 16 (D),3 a final order that a worker is permanently totally disabled? and (2) Did the trial judge impermissibly terminate that order? We answer both questions in the negative. I. ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION ¶2 Claimant (claimant or Newman), a general repairman,4 sustained an accidental on-the-job injury to his right hand (and consequential injury to his left foot)5 while he was employed by Bronson Trailers and Trucks (together with General Credit Insurance Company to be known as employer). Employer did not dispute the injury arose out of claimant's employment and paid temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and medical expenses. Claimant returned to work but testified he was unable to continue on a permanent basis because of persistent problems with his affected limbs. Newman, who is illiterate, claimed he could no longer perform manual labor - the only work for which he is qualified - and sought permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. ¶3 On 28 December 2001 the trial judge awarded claimant what here will be referred to as § 16 (D) benefits (compensation commensurate with TTD benefits that is to be paid during the period of vocational rehabilitation with a view to evaluating permanent total disability), in accordance with the terms of 85 O.S. Supp. 1997§ 16 (D).6 The judge "reserved" (withheld) for a future date determination of claimant's permanent disability status, pending his completion of a court-ordered rehabilitation program. Following a hearing on 27 May 2004 to re-evaluate claimant's status, the trial judge found Newman to be permanently partially disabled.7 Both parties sought review of this order. COCA, by an unpublished opinion, sustained the trial judge's order.8 Claimant alone seeks certiorari review. II. CLAIMANT'S CERTIORARI ARGUMENTS ¶4 Newman's certiorari petition urges the trial judge's 2001 order that awards him benefits in accordance with the provisions of § 16 (D) is a final determination that he is permanently totally disabled unless he can be rehabilitated. The 2004 order that finds him to be permanently partially disabled is, hence, an impermissible collateral attack upon the earlier order, which violates the principle of res judicata.9 Claimant asserts that his status remains that of a permanently totally disabled person unless his vocational rehabilitation is 1) successful or 2) unsuccessful because of acts of claimant.10 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 The first question presented on certiorari calls for resolution of a legal question. Review of contested law is governed by a de novo standard.11 In its re-examination of the trial tribunal's legal rulings an appellate court exercises plenary, independent and nondeferential authority.12 The second issue pressed here deals with a question of fact. A trial judge's non-jurisdictional finding may not be disturbed on review if supported by competent proof.13 Record proof, on the basis of which the trier could have reached a contrary conclusion, has no legal impact upon the review process by which a WCC's finding is tested.14 It is only the absence of competent evidence that makes the tribunal's decision erroneous (as a matter of law) and hence amenable to appellate vacation.15 IV. A. AN INITIAL AWARD OF BENEFITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF § 16(D) IS A TEMPORARY ADJUDICATION THAT STANDS SUBJECT TO CLAIMANT'S ¶6 According to Newman's first assertion, it is implicit in law that the 2001 order was a final adjudication of his permanent total disablity.16 This must be so because the order (1) awarded him § 16 (D) benefits and (2) does not adjudicate his status to be that of being permanently partially disabled. Claimant cites language in Mangrum v. Fensco, Inc.17 for support of his position that an award of §16 (D) benefits "necessitates an initial determination that vocational rehabilitation is practicable and that the worker is at that time permanently and totally disabled."18 According to claimant, his legal status must hence be recognized as that of permanent total disability. ¶7 ¶8 Neither may some isolated passages of Mangrum's text be read to support claimant's position - that a § 16 (D) award is a final order determining one to be permanently partially (or totally) disabled. A thorough reading of its text reveals that under the provisions of § 16 (D) claimant's status is transitory. According to Mangrum, the initial "award of permanent total disability is essentially 'temporary', in that it is subject to review following vocational rehabilitation . . ." ¶9 The goal of any inquiry into the meaning of a legislative enactment is to ascertain and follow its legislative intent. ¶10 The terms of § 16 (A) plainly contemplate claimant's further evaluation by the trial court will follow to determine his/her permanent disability status. Its text reveals that a claimant is not adjudicated permanently totally disabled until he/she has been evaluated as to "the practicability of restoration to gainful employment through vocational rehabilitation services or training." ¶11 In short, a trial judge's initial award of benefits in accordance with the provisions of § 16 (D) is a temporary determination of a claimant's compensation status pending re-evaluation after vocational rehabilitation is completed. It is not a final adjudication of a worker's permanent disability status. This is plainly revealed by the statute's text and supported by the disability benefits scheme contained in the Workers' Compensation Act.29 B. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR WHEN, AFTER CLAIMANT COMPLETED REHABILITATION, HE WAS RE-EVALUATED AND ADJUDICATED PERMANENTLY PARTIALLY DISABLED ¶12 Newman next urges that his § 16 (D) benefits may be terminated only when the rehabilitation is (1) successful or (2) unsuccessful owing to claimant's own acts. He contends the services provided him were far short of those to be rendered in accordance with the trial judge's order. It was because of this, and not due to any action or inaction on his part, that his rehabilitation was unsuccessful. Because it was unsuccessful there is no basis to change his status from that of one permanently totally disabled to that of permanently partially disabled. The trial judge hence erred when she determined claimant to be permanently partially disabled. ¶13 Although COCA agreed that the rehabilitation services were lacking, it noted that the trial tribunal's order made no finding of fact about this matter.30 It hence concluded this did not serve as an adequate basis on which to predicate trial error. COCA reviewed the record and concluded the trial judge's order is supported by competent evidence.31 ¶14 The record reveals claimant presented evidence that his unsuccessful-rehabilitation outcome was due to the inadequacy of the vocational-rehabilitation services that were provided him.32 Claimant neither requested a finding of fact on the issue of the adequacy of the rehabilitation services nor did he seek additional services. The sole use of the failure-of-services argument was limited to supporting his status as permanently totally disabled. ¶15 We agree with COCA. The trial tribunal found Newman participated in the court-ordered rehabilitation program.33 Its order did not include a finding of fact dealing with the quality of services provided him. When rehabilitation services prove unsuccessful one may not, as a matter of law, draw the conclusion that a worker is hence permanently totally disabled. The trial tribunal's order found "the claimant is not permanently and totally disabled solely as a result of this accident."34 Neither do the provisions of § 16 (A)35 or (D)36 restrict the trial tribunal's authority. After evaluating the proof presented, the trial judge is free to find a claimant is only permanently partially disabled. Because there is here competent evidence to support the trial judge's finding, we must sustain her ruling. V. SUMMARY ¶16 A WCC's initial award of § 16 (D) benefits is not a final order upon claimant's permanent disability status. It is an interim disposition that a worker is at that time temporarily totally disabled and entitled to benefits at the TTD rate during the period a worker actively participates in and undergoes the court-ordered retraining or job placement program. This status is temporary. A claimant's permanent compensation status is subject to re-evaluation following completion of the rehabilitation in accordance with the terms of § 16 (D). The trial judge erred here neither in re-evaluating claimant's status nor in finding him to be permanently partially disabled. ¶17 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT