Title: Hill v. Dept. of Corrections
Citation: 513 So. 2d 129
Docket Number: 69016
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 1987

513 So. 2d 129 (1987)
Jesse HILL, Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
No. 69016.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 24, 1987.
Gregg J. Ormond of Lisk &amp; Ormond, P.A., and Haggard &amp; Kirkland, P.A., Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Thomas H. Bateman, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles F. Mills, *130 Dept. of Corrections, South Miami, for respondent.
OVERTON, Justice.
This is a petition to review a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal reported as Department of Corrections v. Hill, 490 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
Id. at 120. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
The facts, set out in detail in the district court opinion, reflect that the petitioner in this action, Jesse Hill, filed a complaint against the respondent, Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging false imprisonment, negligence, and a violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the conduct of a probation supervisor in asserting that Hill had violated his probation. The trial court dismissed the civil rights action, but submitted the claims of negligence and false imprisonment to the jury with a special interrogatory verdict. The parties agreed to a specific instruction on the verdict form which read:
Id. at 119. The jury found DOC liable for false imprisonment and 75 percent comparatively negligent, and awarded Hill $750,000 in damages. Reasoning that comparative negligence is not a defense to false imprisonment, the trial court entered judgment for the total amount of damages. DOC, after the time had run for a motion for new trial, sought relief from the asserted erroneous instruction by motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 which was denied by the trial court.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Hill's section 1983 civil rights claim, reasoning that for purposes of section 1983 the state has not waived its sovereign immunity, and certified that question to this Court; on the rule 1.540 motion, the district court held that the trial court's instruction misled the jury to DOC's prejudice. Although the court found DOC liable for the full amount of any damages caused by false imprisonment, it reversed the cause for a new trial on damages.
In order to answer the certified question, it is first appropriate to consider the effect of the eleventh amendment on suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution expressly provides:
This language bars suit by a citizen of one state against another state. The United States Supreme Court, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890), clarified the language of the amendment to grant states immunity from suit by any person, regardless of what state citizenship they enjoyed. The Hans Court expressly rejected the proposition that the eleventh amendment allows a state to be sued by its own citizens under a federal statute. Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley stated:
Id. at 15-16, 10 S. Ct.  at 507.
In order for a damage suit to be brought against a state in federal court, one of two situations must occur. First, Congress, by explicit legislative enactment, may abrogate the state's immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has held that section 1983 did not constitute a Congressional abrogation of a state's eleventh amendment immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974).
The second situation arises when the state itself consents to be sued in federal court, thereby waiving its eleventh amendment immunity. The United States Supreme Court in Edelman, stated:
415 U.S.  at 673, 94 S. Ct.  at 1360 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S. Ct. 458, 464, 53 L. Ed. 742 (1909).
With this background, we then consider whether a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought against the state and one of its agencies in a Florida court. Hill correctly points out that the eleventh amendment immunity is inapplicable because it pertains only to suits filed in federal court. Hill contends first that the state has no common law immunity against a suit brought under federal law alleging the violation of a federal constitutional right. We reject this argument.
At the outset, we note that even though Quern was a federal court action involving the eleventh amendment, the United States Supreme Court made the statement in that case that Congress, in enacting section 1983, did not intend "to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." 440 U.S.  at 341, 99 S. Ct.  at 1145. Moreover, this position has also been adopted by a number of courts throughout the country.
In Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 104 N.M. 302, 720 P.2d 1243 (N.M.App.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986), the court addressed the question by first explaining:
104 N.M. at 307, 720 P.2d  at 1248. The court then reasoned that since Congress in enacting section 1983 did not intend to destroy the state's eleventh amendment immunity from suits brought in federal court, it logically followed that Congress also did not intend to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity from section 1983 suits brought in state courts.
In concluding that the State of Michigan retained sovereign immunity with respect to section 1983 actions, the court in Karchefske v. Department of Mental Health, *132 143 Mich. App. 1, 371 N.W.2d 876 (1985), stated:
143 Mich. App. at 8-9, 371 N.W.2d  at 881 (footnote omitted).
In Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania State College, 68 Pa.Cmmw. 287, 448 A.2d 717 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 504 Pa. 92, 470 A.2d 482 (1983), the court said:
68 Pa.Cmmw. at 292-93, 448 A.2d  at 720-21 (emphasis in original). Accord De Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982); Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 423 N.E.2d 782 (1981); Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1983).
Thus, we hold that the common law immunity of the state of Florida and its agencies has not been abrogated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, just as in cases involving the eleventh amendment, it is also necessary to consider whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity. Florida's statute on waiver of sovereign immunity is section 768.28, Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part:
The question of whether section 768.28 constituted a waiver of Florida's eleventh amendment immunity against suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was addressed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida in Shinholster v. Graham, 527 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D.Fla. 1981). After a complete analysis of section 768.28 and its legislative history, the court concluded:
Id. at 1331-32.
This issue was also considered on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Gamble v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 779 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir.1986). That court rejected the suggestion that section 768.28 represents a broad waiver of sovereign immunity, finding instead that the abrogation was limited to traditional torts; specifically, those in which the state would be liable if it were a private person. The court concluded:
Id. at 1515.
We agree with these federal interpretations of our statute and find them fully applicable with respect to whether Florida has waived its common law immunity against civil rights actions filed in state courts. While Florida is at liberty to waive its immunity from section 1983 actions, it has not done so. The recovery ceilings in section 768.28 were intended to waive sovereign immunity for state tort actions, not federal civil rights actions commenced under section 1983. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative.
We turn next to Hill's claim that the district court erred in ordering a new trial on damages as a result of the allegedly misleading jury instruction and verdict form. The record reflects that the challenged instruction was prepared and submitted by DOC and read at its request upon agreement by both parties. DOC did not object to the instruction at trial, nor did it raise the issue on a motion for new trial. Rather, DOC attempted later, by a rule 1.540 motion, to secure relief from the final judgment and obtain a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, noting that rule 1.540, which addresses clerical mistakes, fraud, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, etc., was an inappropriate vehicle by which to seek relief.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.470(b), titled "Instructions to Jury," provides:
We have expressly held that where no objection is made to the form of the verdict, any defect as to form is waived. See Higbee v. Dorigo, 66 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1953).
In a similar case concerning a verdict form, the Second District Court of Appeal determined that appellants waived any ambiguities when they failed to object to the form of the verdict. Rosario v. Melvin, 446 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Likewise, the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted in Keller Industries, Inc. v. Morgart, 412 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982):
Id. at 951. It is unrefuted that the allegedly misleading verdict form was agreed to by both parties. We hold its use did not constitute fundamental error and the granting of relief on the basis of rule 1.540 was improper. We note the verdict form was consistent with the dictates of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions and the model verdict forms.
For the reasons expressed, we find Florida has not waived immunity to a federal statutory civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the district court improperly granted a new trial on damages. Accordingly, we approve that portion of the district court decision finding no waiver of sovereign immunity, but we quash that portion of the decision which orders a new trial on damages.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES AND KOGAN, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, J., concurs with an opinion.
EHRLICH, Judge, concurring.
I concur with the Court's opinion but wish to add an additional reason why a new trial was improperly granted by the district court.
While the court's instruction was technically in error, the jury was told to determine the total amount of plaintiff's damages and not to "make any reduction because of negligence." The "negligence" aspect of the charge was in error. The jury found DOC liable for false imprisonment and that finding supports the damage award. The further finding that DOC was "75 percent comparatively negligent" can be ignored.