Title: Watson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 688, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TERRANCE WATSON,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 688, 2014 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1202008234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 30, 2015 
Decided: 
March 30, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 30th day of March 2015, upon careful consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior 
Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Terrance Watson, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s November 19, 2014 order that summarily dismissed his 
motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 
(“Rule 61”).  The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
2 
 
Watson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and 
affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that, following his arrest in February 2012 
and three-count indictment in April 2012, Watson agreed to plead guilty to 
Possession of a Non-Controlled Prescription Drug, and the State agreed to 
enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining two charges.  On June 20, 2012, the 
Superior Court accepted Watson’s guilty plea and sentenced him to six 
months at Level V suspended after four months and then discharged as 
unimproved. 
(3) 
It appears from the record that, at the time of his arrest in 
February 2012, Watson was on parole from a life sentence imposed in 
1985.2  At a parole hearing on August 28, 2012, Watson’s parole was 
revoked, and he was ordered to return to prison to serve the balance of the 
1985 sentence, subject to reapplying for parole in twenty-four months.3 
(4) 
In October 2012, Watson began filing a series of motions 
seeking a modification of the sentence imposed on June 20, 2012.  By order 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the Superior Court docket in State v. Watson, Del. 
Super., Cr. ID No. 85000384DI. 
3 See docket at 42, State v. Watson, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 85000384DI (Aug. 30, 2012). 
3 
 
dated June 21, 2013, the Superior Court denied the latest motion as moot 
because, by that time, Watson had completed the six-month sentence. 
(5) 
On June 2, 2014, Watson filed a motion for postconviction 
relief under Rule 61.  Watson sought to have his 2012 drug conviction 
vacated based on a claim that the State was required, under Brady v. 
Maryland (hereinafter “Brady claim”), to disclose alleged misconduct in the 
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”).4  By order docketed on 
November 19, 2014, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Watson’s 
postconviction motion after determining that the Brady claim was 
unavailing, and that Watson no longer had standing to file for relief under 
Rule 61.  We agree and affirm.   
(6) 
Watson raises a Brady claim based on alleged misconduct in 
the OCME.  A similar claim was recently addressed and rejected by this 
Court in Brown v. State.5  In Brown we held that: 
By pleading guilty, Brown gave up his right to trial 
and his right to learn of any impeachment 
evidence.  Brown is bound by the statements he 
made to the Superior Court before his plea was 
accepted, and Ruiz prevents him from reopening 
his case to make claims that do not address his 
                                          
 
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing that a defendant has a right to 
receive exculpatory material from prosecutors at trial).  
5 Brown v. State, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 WL 307389 (Del. Jan. 23, 2015). 
4 
 
guilt, and involve impeachment evidence that 
would only be relevant at trial.6 
 
In Watson’s case, as in Brown, the Brady claim alleged in Watson’s 
postconviction motion was effectively waived by his preceding guilty plea.  
Moreover, Watson has not asserted that the prescription drug providing the 
basis for his 2012 conviction was ever sent to the OCME for testing.   
(7) 
Generally, under Delaware law, once a criminal sentence is 
completed, any postconviction claim with respect to that conviction is moot 
because the defendant is no longer “in custody under [the] sentence.”7  In 
this case, the Superior Court determined that Watson is no longer in custody 
under the sentence imposed for the 2012 drug conviction that was the 
subject of Watson’s motion for postconviction relief.  Watson does not 
specifically identify a right lost or burden imposed as a result of the 2012 
conviction to overcome the general rule mooting his claim for relief.8  Under 
these circumstances, the Court agrees with the Superior Court that Watson 
lacked standing to seek postconviction relief under Rule 61.  
                                          
 
6 Id., at *5 (Del. Jan. 23, 2015) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) 
and United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002)). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) (providing that “[t]his rule governs the procedure 
on an application by a person in custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set 
aside the judgment of conviction”).  Paul v. State, 2011 WL 3585623, at *1 (Del. Aug. 
15, 2011) (quoting Rule 61(a)(1)). 
8 Paul v. State, 2011 WL 3585623, at *1 (Del. Aug. 15, 2011) (quoting Gural v. State, 
251 A.2d 344, 344-45 (Del. 1969)). 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice