Title: DENNIS EGGLESTON V BIO MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF DETROIT INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121208
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2003

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 26, 2003  
DENNIS EGGLESTON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of LOUISA EGGLESTON, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121208  
BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF  
DETROIT, INC. and FRESENIUS 
MEDICAL CARE,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
JAMES LAWSON, D.O., and JAMES 
LAWSON, D.O., P.C.,  
Defendants.  
PER CURIAM  
This case presents the question whether a successor  
personal representative has two years after appointment to  
file an action on behalf of an estate under the wrongful death  
saving statute, MCL 600.5852, or whether the two-year period  
is measured from the appointment of the initial personal  
 
representative.  The Court of Appeals affirmed summary  
disposition 
for 
defendants, 
holding that the plain language 
of  
the statute refers only to one set of letters of authority  
issued to the personal representative.  248 Mich App 640; 645  
NW2d 279 (2001).  However, the Court of Appeals misread the  
statute and then relied on that erroneous reading in reaching  
its decision. We reverse the judgments of the circuit court  
and the Court of Appeals because the statutory language simply  
provides that the two-year grace period is measured from the  
issuance of letters of authority.  
I  
Decedent 
received 
kidney 
dialysis 
treatment 
from  
defendants-appellees on June 21, 1996.  She died the next day.  
Decedent’s widower was appointed temporary personal  
representative and issued letters of authority on April 4,  
1997. He died on August 20, 1997.  
Plaintiff, the son of the decedent and the first personal  
representative, 
was 
appointed 
successor 
personal  
representative, and letters of authority were issued to him on  
December 8, 1998.  Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging  
medical malpractice on June 9, 1999.  
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(7). Defendants argued that the action is barred by  
the two-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5838a(2), which,  
they claimed, expired on June 21, 1998, two years after  
decedent’s last treatment.  Defendants also argued that the  
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wrongful death saving statute, MCL 600.5852, does not apply  
because the complaint was not filed within two years after the  
appointment of the first personal representative on April 4,  
1997.  Plaintiff responded that another two-year period began  
when he was appointed as successor personal representative.  
The circuit court agreed with defendants and granted summary  
disposition.  
On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
The 
Court 
characterized 
plaintiff’s 
argument 
as 
one 
advocating  
an “expansive reading” of the statute, whereas the law  
requires that the saving provision be given a “narrow  
reading,” citing this Court’s decision in Lindsey v Harper  
Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 65; 564 NW2d 861 (1997).  The Court held  
that the statute should instead be construed and applied  
according to its plain terms.1  
Furthermore, the plain language of the saving 
clause refers to one set or “the” letters of  
authority, not multiple letters of authority. The  
statute applies to “the” personal representative, 
not “a” personal representative, which might 
suggest that any personal representative who  
receives letters of authority, initially or as a 
successor, has two years to file a claim. Clearly, 
if the Legislature had intended that the two-year 
grace period begin anew each time an appointment is 
terminated and a new appointment made, it could 
have easily done so by specifically stating as  
much.  Absent language to that effect, we are bound 
to construe the saving provision strictly:  the  
two-year limitation period begins when the probate 
court issues the letters of authority to the  
1 The Court of Appeals did not explain how, if at all, a 
“narrow reading” of the statute would differ from its plain 
meaning.  
3  
personal representative, regardless of whether the 
court later appoints one or more successor personal 
representatives. [248 Mich App 649.]  
Plaintiff has applied for leave to appeal.  
II  
We review de novo the interpretation and application of  
a statute as a question of law.  If the language of a statute  
is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed. Miller  
v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196, 201; 644 NW2d 730 (2002).  
III  
The question presented is of first impression.  Although  
the Court of Appeals purported to construe and apply the plain  
language of MCL 600.5852, the Court misquoted the statute by  
inserting “the” before “letters of authority.”  
If a person dies before the period of  
limitations has run or within 30 days after the 
period of limitations has run, an action which 
survives by law may be commenced by the personal 
representative of the deceased person at any time 
within 2 years after [the] letters of authority are 
issued although the period of limitations has run. 
But an action shall not be brought under this 
provision 
unless 
the 
personal 
representative 
commences it within 3 years after the period of 
limitations has run. [Id.]  
The Court relied on this misquotation in holding that a  
personal representative must bring an action within two years  
after the initial letters of authority are issued to the first  
personal representative.  This is not, however, what the  
statute says.  The statute simply provides that an action may  
be commenced by the personal representative “at any time  
within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although  
4  
  
the period of limitations has run.” Id. The language adopted  
by the Legislature clearly allows an action to be brought  
within two years after letters of authority are issued to the  
personal representative.  The statute does not provide that  
the two-year period is measured from the date letters of  
authority are issued to the initial personal representative.  
Plaintiff 
was 
“the 
personal 
representative” 
of 
the 
estate  
and filed the complaint “within 2 years after letters of  
authority [were] issued,” and “within 3 years after the period  
of limitations ha[d] run.”  MCL 600.5852. 
The action was  
therefore timely.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit  
court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the  
circuit court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
5