Title: In re D.T.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 96229
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 2004

Docket No. 96229-Agenda 4-May 2004.
In re D.T., A Minor (The People of the State of Illinois et al., 							
Appellants, v. Brenda T., Appellee).
Opinion filed October 21, 2004. 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this appeal we determine the proper standard of proof
applicable during the "best-interests" portion of a proceeding to
terminate parental rights. The circuit court of Cook County terminated
respondent mother's parental rights based on the court's "sound
discretion," declining to hold the State to a clear and convincing
burden of proof, as urged by respondent. The appellate court
reversed. Although also rejecting a clear and convincing standard, the
appellate court held that the State must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in
the minor's best interests, and that the State had failed to meet its
burden in this case. 338 Ill. App. 3d 133. For the reasons discussed
below, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	On February 1, 1998, respondent, Brenda T., took her four-year-old son, D.T., to the emergency room of Ravenswood Hospital. D.T.
was in severe pain from an injury to his scrotum inflicted by
respondent's boyfriend at least 48 hours earlier. The injury was caused
by repetitive blunt blows to the scrotum. D.T. was transferred to
Children's Memorial Hospital, where he underwent surgery to
determine whether castration would be necessary. In addition to this
injury, multiple bruises to D.T.'s face, arm, back, buttock and thigh
were apparent. A linear bruise on his cheek had the characteristic
appearance of a mark left by an open-hand slap. D.T. tolerated the
surgery well, and although castration was unnecessary, the injury left
D.T. with an increased risk of infertility later in life.
	D.T. was discharged from the hospital on February 4, 1998, and
taken into protective custody. The trial court later placed guardianship
of D.T. in the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
and appointed the Cook County public guardian as D.T.'s attorney
and guardian ad litem (GAL). After living in a group home for several
months, in August, 1998, D.T. was placed in a foster home, where he
resided continuously through at least June 2001. At the time of the
underlying proceedings, D.T. was participating in individual therapy
and performing well academically, but was experiencing some
problems socially in school. The foster mother expressed her desire to
adopt D.T.
	Following the removal of D.T. from respondent's custody,
respondent participated in parenting classes, individual therapy, and
domestic abuse counseling in accordance with the DCFS client service
plans. Respondent attended all scheduled visits with D.T. and was
rated satisfactory on service plan tasks. She reportedly made slow but
steady progress in therapy.
	On July 19, 1999, the State filed a petition seeking termination of
respondent's parental rights and appointment of a guardian with the
right to consent to adoption. Hearing on the unfitness portion of the
State's petition began in September 2000. Completion of the unfitness
hearing was delayed pending a determination of the applicability of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. §1901 et seq. (1994)).
Ultimately, on April 6, 2001, after hearing testimony from respondent,
the foster mother, the DCFS investigator, case workers, counselors,
and other service providers, the trial court determined that the State
had demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
was unfit in that she failed to protect D.T. from an environment
injurious to his welfare. Hearing on the best-interests portion of the
State's petition commenced the following month, and on June 8,
2001, the trial court found, within its "sound discretion," that it was
in D.T.'s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights.(1) At
the time of the hearing, respondent was not able to parent D.T.
without supervision. Respondent appealed, challenging the trial
court's finding of unfitness, as well as its decision to terminate
parental rights.
	The appellate court affirmed the finding of unfitness and held that
a preponderance of the evidence standard, which the State had failed
to satisfy, applies at a best-interests hearing. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's order terminating parental rights and
remanded the matter for further proceedings. 338 Ill. App. 3d at 154-55. We allowed the GAL's petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315), and permitted the Cook County State's Attorney to join in
that appeal. We also allowed the Loyola Childlaw Center and the
National Coalition for Child Protection Reform leave to file a joint
amicus curiae brief in support of respondent. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
We note that respondent has requested cross-relief, pressing her claim
that a clear and convincing standard of proof is required at the best-
interests hearing. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(g); 155 Ill. 2d R. 318(a).
Respondent does not challenge the appellate court's decision affirming
the trial court's finding of unfitness. Because our determination of the
appropriate standard of proof at a best-interests hearing involves an
issue of law, our review proceeds de novo. See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 203 (2001).

ANALYSIS
	Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed principally
by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West
2000)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2000)).
Generally, under the Juvenile Court Act, where a child is adjudicated
abused, neglected or dependent, and the State seeks to free the child
for adoption, unless the parent consents, the State must first establish
that the parent is "unfit" under one or more of the grounds set forth
in the Adoption Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2000); 750 ILCS
50/1(D) (West 2000). If the trial court finds the parent to be unfit, the
court then determines whether it is in the best interests of the minor
that parental rights be terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2000).
	The State does not dispute that it bears the burden of proof when
it files a petition to terminate parental rights. The Juvenile Court Act
expressly sets forth the State's burden during the first step of the
termination process, the unfitness hearing. The statute states that
parental unfitness must be based upon "clear and convincing
evidence." 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2000). Although the
Juvenile Court Act does not expressly set forth the State's burden
during the second step of the termination process, the best-interests
hearing, the statute does provide some guidance. The Juvenile Court
Act states: "The standard of proof and the rules of evidence in the
nature of civil proceedings in this State are applicable to proceedings
under this Article." 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2000). "[T]his
Article" refers to article II of the Juvenile Court Act, titled "Abused,
Neglected or Dependent Minors," and includes the section under
which the termination petition in this case was filed. See 705 ILCS
405/2-29 (West 2000). The standard of proof in civil proceedings
typically is either a "preponderance" or "clear and convincing." See
M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence
§301.6 (8th ed. 2004); Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 212-13
(1995). Thus, the language of the Juvenile Court Act suggests that
one of these two standards of proof must apply at a best-interests
hearing.(2) The appellate court determined that a preponderance
standard is appropriate. 338 Ill. App. 3d at 154.
	The GAL and the State, however, argue that the appropriate
standard of proof is "sound discretion." Under this standard, as
explained by the State, a trial judge's decision to terminate parental
rights would not rest on a quantitative measure of the evidence.
Indeed, according to the State, "sound discretion" permits the trial
court "to reject perhaps all of the evidence submitted by a party
without risk of being reversed based on some perceived balance of the
evidentiary scale." The GAL adds that the trial judge's best-interests
ruling would be "presumptively correct" on review.
	In support of their position, the State and the GAL note that the
trial court, in making a best-interests determination, is charged with
the daunting task of weighing and balancing the following statutory
factors, all in light of the child's age and developmental needs:
			"(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child ***;
			(b) the development of the child's identity;
			(c) the child's background and ties ***;
			(d) the child's sense of attachments, including:
				(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and
a sense of being valued ***;
				(ii) the child's sense of security;
				(iii) the child's sense of familiarity;
				(iv) continuity of affection for the child;
				(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the
child;
			(e) the child's wishes and long-term goals;
			(f) the child's community ties, including church, school,
and friends;
			(g) the child's need for permanence ***;
			(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;
			(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute
care; and
			(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the
child." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2000).
The State and the GAL reason that the difficulty and delicacy of a
best-interests decision requires that such decision rest within the trial
court's discretion. They argue that imposition on the State of a
"traditional" or "formalistic" standard of proof, like the preponderance
standard adopted by the appellate court, will only impede the trial
judge's decision.
	Although we agree that determination of a child's best interests
presents a difficult and delicate task, requiring a nuanced analysis of
the statutory factors, we disagree that the difficulty of the task facing
the trial court justifies relieving the petitioner-here, the State-of its
burden to demonstrate its entitlement to the relief it seeks. We also
disagree with the suggestion that "sound discretion" is some sort of
"nontraditional" standard of proof. "Sound discretion" is simply not
a standard of proof-traditional, nontraditional, or otherwise.
"Standards of proof are concerned with the quantum and quality of
proof that must be presented in order to prevail on an issue." M.
Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L.
Rev. 469, 469 (1988). As the United States Supreme Court explained:
			"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of
factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree
of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.' " Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 329, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (1979), quoting In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 379, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1076 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§2497 through 2498 (Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1981) (discussing the "Measure of Jury's Persuasion" in
criminal and civil cases). "Sound discretion" says nothing about the
degree of confidence the trial judge must have in the correctness of his
or her factual conclusions concerning the child's best interests. Rather,
as discussed more fully below, sound discretion implies the degree of
deference the trial court's decision will be given by a reviewing court.
Thus, "sound discretion" is tied to the standard of review; it does not
identify a standard of proof.
	Although the State argues that the trial court's best-interests
determination should not rest on a quantitative measure of the
evidence, the State nonetheless argues that it presented "enough"
evidence for the trial court to find that termination of respondent's
parental rights was in D.T.'s best interests. The State thus effectively
concedes that the trial court's decision must be supported by some
quantum of evidence. The question remains-how much evidence is
"enough" evidence? "Sound discretion" does not provide an answer.
	We also find the State's sound discretion standard difficult to
reconcile with the nature of the trial court's ruling. When a trial court
finds that the best interests of the child warrants termination of
parental rights and enters an order to that effect, the parent-child
relationship is permanently and completely severed. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 
at 208, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 610, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); see also 750 ILCS 50/17
(West 2002) (after entry of an order terminating parental rights, the
parents "shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child
and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child"). If this
ruling is a matter of judicial discretion, as the State and the GAL
argue, then it is reviewable only for an abuse of that discretion. See 2
Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Appeal &amp; Error §751, at 688 (1953).
	"Abuse of discretion" is the most deferential standard of
review-next to no review at all-and is therefore traditionally reserved
for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom
or in maintaining the progress of a trial. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998). For example, a trial judge's decision whether to
allow or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
(Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 521 (1996)), as is his or her
decision to limit discovery (People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 234
(2004)), impose a sanction for a discovery violation (Sullivan v.
Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100, 110-11 (2004)), disqualify counsel
(People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 360 (2004)), accept or reject a
negotiated plea (People v. Henderson, 211 Ill. 2d 90, 103 (2004)),
and deny a forum non conveniens motion (Dawdy v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2003)). Accordingly, a trial judge's
evidentiary rulings during a best-interests hearing are subject to an
abuse of discretion standard of review. See C.N., 196 Ill. 2d  at 223;
In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773 (2002). But a trial judge's ruling
on the ultimate issue at a best-interests hearing-whether the parent-child relationship should be permanently and completely severed-is
plainly not the type of ruling to which the highly deferential abuse of
discretion review traditionally applies.
	The State and the GAL cite to various appellate court cases
which state that termination of an individual's parental rights rests
within the sound discretion of the trial judge and/or that termination
orders are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. E.g., In re D.W., 344
Ill. App. 3d 30, 55-56 (2003); In re Diane L., 343 Ill. App. 3d 419,
425 (2003); In re Jeffrey S., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1101 (2002); In
re B.C., 317 Ill. App. 3d 607, 614 (2000); In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App.
3d 291, 295 (1999); In re J.J., 307 Ill. App. 3d 71, 76 (1999); In re
Allen, 172 Ill. App. 3d 950, 959 (1988); In re Hollis, 135 Ill. App. 3d
585, 588-89 (1985); In re Dalton, 98 Ill. App. 3d 902, 913 (1981). A
review of the cited cases, however, reveals no analysis as to the origin
or reason behind the appellate court's application of the sound
discretion standard. Even in those cases in which the appellate court
expressly rejected a clear and convincing standard of proof in favor of
sound discretion, the appellate court undertook no review of the
propriety of the sound discretion standard itself. See In re Precious
W., 333 Ill. App. 3d 893, 901-02 (2002); In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d
262, 270-71 (2001); In re G.V., 292 Ill. App. 3d 301, 308-09 (1997);
In re Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d 385, 393 (1996); In re V.O., 284 Ill. App.
3d 686, 691 (1996). Mere repetition of a purported rule of law does
not establish its validity. Moreover, when this court becomes aware
that an erroneous burden of proof has become entrenched in the case
law, we will not hesitate to correct the error. See People v. Trainor,
196 Ill. 2d 318, 332-38 (2001) (holding that the State bears the
burden of proof at a recovery proceeding under the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act, notwithstanding 30 years of precedent
placing the burden on the defendant). We do so now and hold that
"sound discretion" does not define the State's burden of proof at the
best-interests stage of a proceeding to terminate parental rights.
	We turn to the issue of whether the preponderance standard,
adopted by the appellate court, or the clear and convincing standard,
urged by respondent, is applicable. Respondent renews her argument,
rejected by the appellate court, that the Supreme Court's decision in
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388
(1982), mandates imposition of a clear and convincing standard of
proof at a best-interests hearing.
	At issue in Santosky was the constitutionality of a New York
statute that permits the state to terminate parental rights upon a
finding, supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the
child is "permanently neglected." The New York statute, as described
by the Court, bifurcates permanent neglect proceedings into a "fact-finding" hearing and a "dispositional" hearing. At the fact-finding
hearing, the State is required to prove permanent neglect, as defined
in the statute.(3) At the subsequent dispositional hearing, the court
determines what placement would serve the child's best interests.
Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 748, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 603, 102 S. Ct.  at 1392.
The order terminating the Santoskys' parental rights was entered at
the subsequent dispositional hearing. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 752, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 605, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394. The Supreme Court sustained the
parents' challenge to the New York statute and held that the due
process clause required proof of permanent neglect by clear and
convincing evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 769, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 617,
102 S. Ct.  at 1403.
	The Court noted its longstanding recognition that "freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the liberty
interest of parents in the care, custody and management of their child
"does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents
or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State." Santosky,
455 U.S.  at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394-95. Thus,
state action to terminate the relationship between a parent and child
must be accomplished by procedures that comport with due process.
Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394.
"When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Santosky,
455 U.S.  at 753-54, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 102 S. Ct.  at 1395.
	Whether the preponderance standard of proof employed under
the New York statute satisfied due process turned on the Court's
balancing of the three public and private interest factors identified in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976): "the private interests affected by the proceeding;
the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the
countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged
procedure." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 754, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 607, 102 S. Ct.  at 1395. The Court determined that the Mathews factors weighed
against New York's preponderance standard. The Court explained, in
relevant part, that a preponderance standard allocates the risk of error
in roughly equal fashion between the parents and the State, but that
such allocation is constitutionally intolerable because the possible
injury to the parents from an erroneous finding is significantly greater
than any harm to the State. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 768, 71 L. Ed. 2d 
at 616, 102 S. Ct.  at 1402. An evidentiary standard greater than a fair
preponderance is required to reduce the risk of erroneous termination
orders. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 764-65, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 614, 102 S. Ct. 
at 1400-01. The Court went on to hold that a "clear and convincing"
standard of proof, rather than a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
satisfied due process. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 769, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 617,
102 S. Ct.  at 1403.
	Respondent maintains that New York's fact-finding hearing-the
first stage of its bifurcated termination proceeding-is comparable to
both steps of Illinois' two-step termination proceeding and that, in
accordance with Santosky, a clear and convincing standard of proof
must be imposed at an Illinois best-interests hearing. We disagree. If
a comparison is to be made between the two proceedings, we
conclude, as did the appellate court, that New York's "fact-finding"
hearing, during which the court considers whether the child is
"permanently neglected" (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 748, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at
603, 102 S. Ct. at 1392), is comparable to the "unfitness" portion of
an Illinois termination proceeding, during which the court considers
whether the parent is "unfit." New York's subsequent "dispositional"
hearing, during which the court considers what placement will serve
the child's best interests (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 748, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at
603, 102 S. Ct. at 1392), is comparable to the "best-interests" portion
of an Illinois proceeding. Thus, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard adopted in Santosky for New York's fact-finding hearing is
applicable only to Illinois' unfitness hearing. We note that following
issuance of Santosky, the Illinois legislature amended the Juvenile
Court Act, raising the State's evidentiary burden necessary to support
a finding of parental unfitness from a preponderance of the evidence
to clear and convincing evidence. See Pub. Act 83-138, eff. August
19, 1983, amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 705-9(2).
	In addition to her contention that Santosky is dispositive,
respondent contends that "[b]ecause the parent-child relationship still
exists at the best-interests stage of a termination proceeding, Due
Process requires that the burden of proof be clear and convincing."
We agree with respondent that, until an order is entered terminating
parental rights, the parent-child relationship exists. See In re C.W.,
199 Ill. 2d 198, 216 (2002). We disagree, however, that parents are
entitled to the same procedural safeguard, i.e., the same standard of
proof, at the best-interests hearing that they are entitled to at the
unfitness hearing.
	In any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof the due
process clause permits reflects the weight of the private and public
interests affected, as well as a societal judgment about how the risk of
error should be allocated between the parties. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at
755, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 607, 102 S. Ct.  at 1395. "The more stringent the
burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk
of an erroneous decision." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 245, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1990). For example, in a criminal case the private
interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that society imposes
the risk of error almost entirely on itself by requiring the State to
prove the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." Addington,
441 U.S.  at 423-24, 60 L. Ed. 2d  at 329, 99 S. Ct.  at 1808. This high
standard of proof reduces the risk of finding an innocent person guilty,
but increases the risk of acquitting a guilty person. Lyon v.
Department of Children &amp; Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 279
(2004).
	In contrast, civil cases generally require the lesser
"preponderance" standard of proof. This standard allocates the risk of
error roughly equally between the litigants (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 755,
71 L. Ed. 2d  at 607, 102 S. Ct. at 1395), reflecting the view that the
interests at stake are of relatively equal societal importance (Lyon, 209
Ill. 2d at 281). In some civil cases, however, the interests at stake are
deemed to be more substantial, requiring a higher standard than a
preponderance. In these cases, a clear and convincing standard is
imposed. Addington, 441 U.S.  at 424, 60 L. Ed. 2d  at 329-30, 99 S. Ct.  at 1808; Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d  at 213. The clear and convincing
standard requires proof greater than a preponderance, but not quite
approaching the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d  at 213. A party burdened with a clear and
convincing standard shoulders a greater share of the risk of an
erroneous determination. See Cruzan, 497 U.S.  at 283, 111 L. Ed. 2d 
at 245, 110 S. Ct.  at 2854.
	In determining whether, as argued by respondent, a clear and
convincing standard is the minimum burden of proof at a best-interests
hearing that the due process clause will allow, we apply the test
developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). See In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (2003)
(evaluating challenged procedure at parental rights termination
proceeding under Mathews); In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 364-65
(2001) (same). Under Mathews, the dictates of due process require
consideration of three factors: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 903.
	Two private interests are at stake in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights: the parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody and management of his or her child (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at
758-59, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 610, 102 S. Ct.  at 1397; M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at
365), and the child's interest in a "normal family home" (Santosky,
455 U.S.  at 759, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 610, 102 S. Ct. at 1398), or, as our
appellate court described it, an "interest in a loving, stable and safe
home environment" (338 Ill. App. 3d at 152). See also People v. R.G.,
131 Ill. 2d 328, 354 (1989) ("[t]he minor also has a private interest in
his or her own well-being and in a stable environment"). At the
unfitness stage, the interests of the parent and the child coincide to the
extent that they both "share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 760-61, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 611, 102 S. Ct.  at 1398. The alignment of these
interests at the unfitness hearing favors the use of error-reducing
procedures, i.e., use of a more stringent burden of proof than a
preponderance. See Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 760-61, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at
611, 102 S. Ct.  at 1398. The same, however, is not true at a best-interests hearing. Once the State proves parental unfitness, the
interests of the parent and the child diverge. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at
760, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 611, 102 S. Ct.  at 1398. Thus, at a best-interests
hearing, the parent and the child may become adversaries, as the
child's interest in a loving, stable and safe home environment become
more aligned with the State's interest in terminating parental rights
and freeing the child for adoption. Although the parent still possesses
an interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship, the force of
that interest is lessened by the court's finding that the parent is unfit
to raise his or her child.
	The second Mathews factor requires us to consider the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the parent's and child's interests resulting
from the use of a preponderance standard and the likelihood that a
higher evidentiary standard-clear and convincing-would reduce the
risk of error. See Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 761, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 612, 102 S. Ct.  at 1399. At the unfitness hearing, the focus is on the parent's
conduct relative to the ground or grounds of unfitness alleged by the
State. The trial court is not permitted to consider the child's interests.
In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). A clear and convincing
standard underscores the importance of the parent's interest and the
fact that such interest will not be extinguished lightly. M.H., 196 Ill. 2d  at 365. A clear and convincing standard reduces the risk that a fit
parent will be found unfit.
	Following a finding of unfitness, however, the focus shifts to the
child. The issue is no longer whether parental rights can be
terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child's needs, parental
rights should be terminated. Accordingly, at a best-interests hearing,
the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must
yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life. See In re
G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18, 24 (2002); In re A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d 522,
531 (1991); Allen, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 959. The stricter clear and
convincing burden of proof would place a greater share of the risk of
an erroneous determination on the State, operating to the benefit of
the parent, but to the detriment of the child. This is so because an
erroneous finding that termination of parental rights is not in the
child's best interests results in preservation of the parent-child
relationship, to the obvious favor of the unfit parent. Such an
erroneous finding, however, would also deprive the child of the
opportunity for permanency, one of the stated goals of the Juvenile
Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2000)), and subject the child
to the frequently uncertain and fluctuating world of foster care. Thus,
application of a clear and convincing burden of proof at the best-
interests hearing does not adequately safeguard the interest of the
child in a "normal family home" (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 759, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 610, 102 S. Ct. at 1398). Imposition of a preponderance
standard, however, would distribute the risk of error relatively equally,
reflecting the roughly equal interest the parents, the State, and the
child have in the outcome of the proceeding.
	Turning to the final Mathews factor, two governmental interests
are at stake in a parental rights termination proceeding: the state's
"parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of
the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost
and burden of such proceedings." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 766, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 615, 102 S. Ct.  at 1401. Use of a clear and convincing
standard of proof at the best-interests hearing would likely not impose
an increased fiscal burden on the state, since the higher evidentiary
burden is already required at the unfitness hearing. Further, unlike
other procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel in criminal
proceedings, no additional state resources would be called into play
simply by virtue of a stricter evidentiary standard.
	Use of a clear and convincing standard at the best-interests
hearing would, however, frustrate the state's parens patriae interest
in protecting the welfare of its children. Although the state's parens
patriae interest generally favors preservation of the minor's family
ties, it may also encompass an interest in severing family ties. 705
ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2000); see also Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 767 n.17,
71 L. Ed. 2d  at 615 n.17, 102 S. Ct.  at 1402 n.17. As this court has
recognized, "once a court has found by clear and convincing evidence
that a parent is unfit, the state's interest in protecting the child is
sufficiently compelling to allow the termination of parental rights." In
re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 308 (2001). The increased burden on the
State resulting from imposition of a clear and convincing standard of
proof will hinder this substantial public interest.
	Based on the foregoing analysis of the Mathews factors, we
conclude, as did the appellate court, that due process does not require
imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof at a best-
interests hearing, and that the preponderance standard of proof
adequately ensures the level of certainty about the court's factual
conclusions necessary to satisfy due process. In the present case, the
trial court declined to recognize a particular burden of proof and
instead indicated that its best-interests ruling was based on its "sound
discretion." The trial court erred.
	To remedy this error, the appellate court conducted its own
review of the evidentiary record. Applying a manifest weight standard
of review, the appellate court held that the State had failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent's
parental rights was in D.T.'s best interest. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's termination order and remanded for further
proceedings. 338 Ill. App. 3d at 154-55. Although we agree that
remand is appropriate, we conclude that it was improper for the
appellate court to conduct its own review of the evidence. This
conclusion is guided by our decision in In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124
(1988). In Enis we considered whether an order terminating parental
rights, which required clear and convincing evidence of unfitness,
could be based upon prior findings of abuse supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. The parents challenged the
termination order on due process grounds. The appellate court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In re Enis, 145 Ill.
App. 3d 753 (1986). Relying on the Supreme Court's Santosky
opinion discussed above, we affirmed the appellate court's decision.
Significantly, this court did not undertake its own review of the
evidence. Rather, we remanded the matter to the trial court for a new
hearing.
		"Because the trial court judged the evidence by the improper
standard of proof, we order a new hearing on the State's
petition to be conducted under the constitutionally proper
standard, i.e., clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v.
Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 770, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 617,
102 S. Ct. 1388, 1403; In re Urbasek (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 535,
543." Enis, 121 Ill. 2d  at 134.
In similar fashion, we remand this matter to the trial court for a new
best-interests hearing to be conducted under the constitutionally
proper standard-a preponderance of the evidence.
	We are aware that more than six years have passed since this case
first entered the system, more than three years have passed since the
trial court rendered its decision on the State's termination petition,
and a new hearing will delay the ultimate disposition of this case and,
importantly, D.T.'s placement. We are also aware that a new hearing,
which necessarily includes evidence of D.T.'s current circumstances,
creates the potential for a new round of appeals delaying still further
a final decision on D.T.'s status. This court is not insensitive to the
plight of children like D.T. We have on numerous occasions
emphasized the time-sensitive nature of proceedings under the
Juvenile Court Act and the need for expedited consideration of cases
like the one at bar. E.g., In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 231 (2003); In re
D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000). Indeed, this court recently adopted a
rule expressly providing for expedited appeals in child custody cases.
Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 2004), R. 306A, eff.
July 1, 2004. Accordingly, we wish to impress upon the parties the
need to remove D.T. from legal limbo. D.T., who is now 10 years old,
has been forced to confront years of uncertainty about whom he
should call "mom" and what place he should call "home." His best
interests must be the impetus for the parties' conduct and the
proceedings on remand.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	I agree that if a standard of proof applies to a best-interests
determination, then it is the preponderance of the evidence. As the
majority notes, "sound discretion" does not identify a standard of
proof.
	It is clear that two questions that the majority decides-whether
"sound discretion" is a standard of proof and whether the correct
standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence-both
presuppose an affirmative answer to the more basic question whether
any standard of proof applies. Until that basic question is decided, it
is premature to decide the standard of proof. The parties have failed
to squarely raise and brief the question. Further, the majority opinion
does not resolve the issue. I would require the parties to submit
supplemental briefs addressing specifically whether there should be
any standard of proof at a dispositional hearing, or whether the State's
burden is to present sufficient relevant evidence to enable the court to
exercise its discretion to select the most appropriate alternative.
	The majority points out the State claims it presented "enough"
evidence to support the decision to terminate respondent's parental
rights. Slip op. at 6. However, the majority falsely assumes that only
a standard of proof can answer the question how much is enough. To
say the State must present "enough" evidence may mean that the State
bears a burden of production, not that the State also bears the burden
of persuading the court. That is, it may be the State's burden is to
present sufficient evidence relevant to the applicable legal criteria to
provide an evidentiary basis upon which the court may exercise its
discretion. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2000) (listing factors
court must consider in determining best interests). See also Boatmen's
National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993)
(stating that reviewing court must look to applicable legal criteria to
determine whether trial court abused its discretion). Because it is
possible the State's burden is merely a burden of production, the
majority has prematurely assumed some standard of proof is required.
	Another of the majority's arguments suffers from the same
defect. The majority points out the statute provides that, " 'The
standard of proof and the rules of evidence in the nature of civil
proceedings in this State are applicable to proceedings under this
Article.' " Slip op. at 4, quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2000).
From this the majority concludes the statute "suggests" that one of the
two standards of proof typical in civil proceedings must apply to a
best-interests hearing. Slip op. at 4. However, this assumes and does
not prove that a best-interests hearing is the sort of proceeding in
which some standard of proof must apply.
	In addition to offering arguments that assume some standard of
proof must apply, the majority also argues that a best-interests
determination should not be within the court's discretion. The
majority correctly points out that the decision to terminate parental
rights is a very serious one and that, if it is a matter of judicial
discretion, it may be reviewed only for abuse of that discretion. Slip
op. at 7. The majority then suggests that judicial rulings reviewed for
abuse of discretion traditionally concern only control of the courtroom
and maintaining the progress of litigation. Slip op. at 7 (providing
examples of rulings within the court's discretion). The majority
concludes that the decision to permanently and completely sever a
parent-child relationship "is plainly not the type of ruling to which the
highly deferential abuse of discretion review traditionally applies." Slip
op. at 7.
	I agree the decision whether to terminate parental rights is a very
grave one. However, the majority's list of discretionary decisions
suffers from a glaring omission. In a criminal case, the decision to
impose a particular sentence within the range permitted by statute is
a matter of judicial discretion. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 492
(1981). It seems beyond dispute that sentencing decisions are often
every bit as grave as the decision whether to terminate parental rights.
Nevertheless, "[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard evidence
and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all."
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67, 80, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (1986). Moreover, it is noteworthy that, just as a
person may be punished for a crime only after he is convicted
according to the standard of proof required by due process, parental
rights may be terminated only after the parent is found unfit by clear
and convincing evidence, the standard of proof that due process
requires. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2000) (requiring finding
of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 769, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 617, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1403
(1982) (holding that due process requires finding of permanent neglect
under New York law be supported by clear and convincing evidence).
Finally, in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the sentencing hearing is
a best-interests hearing, albeit one in which the best interests of both
the juvenile and the public are considered. 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1)
(West 2002). In sum, because of the analogy with sentencing, which
the majority fails to discuss, it is far from clear that the best-interests
determination is not a matter of discretion to which no standard of
proof applies.
	Not only do I believe the majority's arguments are insufficient, I
find at this point some positive reason to believe that discretion is
appropriate at a best-interests hearing. The majority correctly notes
that a standard of proof has to do with "the degree of confidence the
trial judge must have in the correctness of his or her factual
conclusions concerning the child's best interests." Slip op. at 6.
However, the ultimate decision about a child's best interests does not
appear to be primarily a matter of "factual conclusions." Of course,
the court's decision should be based on facts. However, the ultimate
decision is largely a matter of weighing conflicting values and applying
policy judgments to the facts. The factors the statute directs courts to
consider support that conclusion. Courts must consider, inter alia,
"the development of the child's identity" (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(b)
(West 2000)), and "the uniqueness of every family and child" (705
ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(h) (West 2000)). I suggest questions of
"identity" and "uniqueness," and perhaps other factors as well, are
largely value judgments. These are values chosen by the legislature
and embodied in the statute. Identifying and weighing the values at
stake is a matter of judgment. If the best-interests determination is
largely a matter of judgment and not merely fact-finding, then it seems
a standard of proof, which relates to factual conclusions, may impair
the ability to achieve the goal that best serves the child's interests.
	Finally, the potential consequences of the majority's decision
should give us pause. The majority's decisions heightens the scrutiny
reviewing courts apply to best-interests rulings. In the face of more
intense review, courts will likely be more reluctant to take the step of
terminating parental rights. Because the majority has made its decision
without adequate briefing on a crucial question, I fear we may
needlessly hamper our trial courts in the exercise of their duty to
protect children like D.T.
	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.                The trial court also terminated the parental rights of 
D.T.'s father. He is not a party to this appeal.
2.              
         We recognize that certain proceedings, although considered civil in nature, nonetheless require 
application of the criminal standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." E.g., 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2002) (commitment proceeding under 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320-21 (1995) (juvenile delinquency proceeding). Application of this 
more stringent standard in a civil proceeding is the exception. Respondent does not argue that this standard is appropriate at a 
best-interests hearing.
3.          A finding of "permanent 
neglect" under the New York statute requires the State to establish, among other things, "that for more than a year after the child entered 
state custody, the agency made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.' [Citation]. The State must further 
prove that during that same period, the child's natural parents failed substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact 
with or plan for the future of the child although physically and financially able to do so.' [Citation]." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 748, 
71 L. Ed. 2d  at 603, 102 S. Ct.  at 1392.