Title: Valle v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-1387
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 23, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1387 
____________ 
 
MANUEL VALLE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[August 23, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Manuel Valle, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the denial of his 
amended successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  On June 30, 2011, the Governor signed a death warrant for Valle, and he 
was scheduled to be executed on August 2, 2011.  Valle subsequently sought 
postconviction relief in the circuit court, raising numerous claims, including an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to the Florida Department of Correction‘s (DOC) 
June 8, 2011, lethal injection protocol, which replaced the first drug in its three-
drug sequence, sodium thiopental, with another drug, pentobarbital sodium 
 
- 2 - 
(pentobarbital).  Under this claim, Valle primarily argued that due to ―serious 
concerns‖ regarding the efficacy of pentobarbital to render an inmate unconscious, 
the DOC‘s use of that drug in the protocol constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  After the circuit court summarily denied relief on his claims, this 
Court granted Valle‘s motion for a stay of execution, in part, until September 1, 
2011, and temporarily relinquished jurisdiction for the narrow purpose of holding 
an evidentiary hearing on Valle‘s claim regarding the efficacy of pentobarbital as 
an anesthetic in the amount prescribed by Florida‘s protocol.  Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court again denied relief.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we now affirm the circuit court‘s orders and vacate the temporary stay of 
execution. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1978, Valle was charged with the first-degree murder of police officer 
Louis Pena, the attempted first-degree murder of police officer Gary Spell, and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon arising from an April 2, 1978, 
shooting in Coral Gables, Florida.  Since the date of the crime, Valle‘s case has 
had a complex procedural history.1  Despite this history, the facts of Valle‘s case 
                                          
 
 
1.  In a prior decision, we succinctly summarized the procedural history as 
follows: 
Valle was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, 
and possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to death for the 
 
- 3 - 
have never been disputed and were set forth in Valle v. State (Valle IV), 581 So. 
2d 40 (Fla. 1991), following the appeal from his third and final penalty phase: 
On April 2, 1978, Officer Louis Pena of the Coral Gables 
Police Department was on patrol when he stopped [Valle] and a 
companion for a traffic violation.  The events that followed were 
witnessed by Officer Gary Spell, also of the Coral Gables Police 
Department.  Officer Spell testified that when he arrived at the scene, 
[Valle] was sitting in the patrol car with Officer Pena.  Shortly 
thereafter, Spell heard Pena use his radio to run a license check on the 
car [Valle] was driving.  According to Spell, [Valle] then walked back 
to his car and reached into it, approached Officer Pena and fired a 
single shot at him, which resulted in his death.  [Valle] also fired two 
shots at Spell and then fled.  He was picked up two days later in 
Deerfield Beach.  Following his jury trial, [Valle was found guilty of 
the first-degree murder of Pena.  He] was also found guilty of the 
attempted first-degree murder of Spell and after a non-jury trial, he 
was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
 
Id. at 43 (quoting Valle II, 474 So. 2d at 798).  This Court affirmed Valle‘s 
                                                                                                                                        
murder charge.  Valle v. State [(Valle I)], 394 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 
1981).  On direct appeal, this Court reversed the convictions and 
sentences and remanded for a new trial.  Id.  On retrial in 1981, Valle 
was again convicted on those three counts and again sentenced to 
death.  The convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court in 
Valle v. State [(Valle II)], 474 So. 2d 796, 806 (Fla. 1985).  The 
United States Supreme Court subsequently vacated Valle‘s death 
sentence and remanded the case to this Court for further consideration 
in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), regarding the 
admissibility of model prisoner testimony.  Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 
1102 (1986).  We remanded for a new sentencing hearing before a 
new jury.  Valle v. State [(Valle III)], 502 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1987).   
 
Valle v. State (Valle V), 705 So. 2d 1331, 1332-33 (Fla. 1997) (parallel citations 
omitted). 
 
- 4 - 
convictions in 1985.  Valle II, 474 So. 2d at 806.2 
In 1988, Valle was resentenced.  The jury recommended a sentence of death 
by a vote of eight to four.  Valle IV, 581 So. 2d at 43.  The sentencing court found 
that the evidence established the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Valle 
had been previously convicted of another violent felony; (2) the murder was of a 
law enforcement officer; (3) the murder was for the purpose of preventing lawful 
arrest; (4) the murder was committed to hinder the enforcement of laws; and (5) 
the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated.  Id.  The sentencing court 
merged factors (2), (3), and (4) together, treating them as a single aggravating 
factor.  Id.  The court found no evidence of statutory mitigation and concluded that 
either the evidence did not establish nonstatutory mitigation or the nonstatutory 
mitigation was outweighed by the aggravating factors.  Valle V, 705 So. 2d at 1333 
n.1.  This Court affirmed Valle‘s sentence of death in 1991.  Valle IV, 581 So. 2d 
at 49. 
In December 1993, Valle filed an amended motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The circuit court summarily 
denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, and Valle appealed.  
Valle V, 705 So. 2d at 1333.  This Court affirmed in part, but reversed and 
                                          
 
 
2.  Valle also pled guilty to automobile theft.  See Valle I, 394 So. 2d at 
1005. 
 
- 5 - 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on two of Valle‘s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Id. at 1333-34.3  After conducting the requisite evidentiary hearing 
on remand, the circuit court denied Valle‘s remaining rule 3.850 claims, and this 
Court affirmed.  Valle v. State (Valle VI), 778 So. 2d 960, 964, 967 (Fla. 2001). 
In December 2001, Valle petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus 
based on the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  This Court denied 
the petition.  See Valle v. Moore (Valle VII), 837 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2002).  In 
February 2003, Valle filed a successive habeas petition in this Court, raising a 
claim under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which this Court summarily 
denied.  See Valle v. Crosby, 859 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2003) (unpublished table 
decision).  He petitioned to the United State Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 
which was also denied.  See Valle v. Crosby, 541 U.S. 962 (2004).   
Valle later filed an amended federal habeas petition, raising claims 
previously addressed by this Court.  See Valle v. Crosby (Valle VIII), No. 03-
20387CIV, 2005 WL 3273754 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2005).  The federal district 
court denied his petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed.  See Valle v. Sec‘y for the Dep‘t of Corr. (Valle IX), 459 F.3d 
                                          
 
 
3.  This Court reversed for an evidentiary hearing on the claim that counsel 
was ineffective for presenting model prisoner evidence and for failing to move for 
a mistrial and disqualification of the resentencing judge after the judge allegedly 
kissed the victim‘s widow in front of the jury.  See id. 
 
- 6 - 
1206 (11th Cir. 2006), reh‘g en banc denied, 478 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).  
Thereafter, Valle sought review of the Eleventh Circuit‘s affirmance by the 
Supreme Court through a petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied on 
October 1, 2007.  See Valle v. McDonough, 552 U.S. 920 (2007).  
On June 30, 2011, Governor Rick Scott signed a death warrant, and Valle‘s 
execution was set for August 2, 2011.  Twenty-two days prior, on June 8, 2011, the 
DOC had promulgated a revised lethal injection procedure, replacing the first drug 
in its three-drug protocol, sodium thiopental, with another barbiturate, 
pentobarbital.4  The DOC‘s recent substitution of the drug comes more than three 
years after this Court upheld the August 2007 three-drug protocol against a 
constitutional challenge in Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007), 
and after a majority of the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a similar protocol in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).5  The 
parties agree that aside from substituting pentobarbital for sodium thiopental, the 
DOC‘s lethal injection protocol has remained unaltered. 
In response to the signing of the death warrant, Valle filed a successive 
                                          
 
 
4.  Pentobarbital is also known by its brand name, Nembutal. 
 
5.  See Schwab v. State, 995 So. 2d 922, 924-33 (Fla. 2008) (approving and 
adopting the trial court‘s analysis, which concluded that Florida‘s August 2007 
lethal injection protocol was ―substantially similar‖ to the Kentucky protocol at 
issue in the Baze decision). 
 
- 7 - 
amended motion for postconviction relief, raising six claims.6  Among other issues, 
he argued that due to ―serious concerns‖ regarding the efficacy of pentobarbital to 
render an inmate unconscious, the DOC‘s use of that drug in the protocol 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth 
Amendment.  After the State filed its response, the circuit court held an initial 
hearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(h)(6) on July 11, 
2011, to determine whether an evidentiary hearing would be held.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court summarily denied all of Valle‘s claims, 
and Valle appealed the summary denial to this Court.7  A majority of the Court 
                                          
 
 
6.  The circuit court permitted Valle to amend only his claim regarding the 
constitutionality of Florida‘s lethal injection procedures.  His postconviction 
motion, as amended, raised the following claims: (1) he is being denied full and 
fair postconviction proceedings in violation of his right to due process as a result of 
the expedited process and truncated schedule set by the circuit court following the 
signing of his death warrant; (2) in light of the DOC‘s change in the lethal injection 
protocol on June 8, 2011, substituting the drug pentobarbital for sodium thiopental, 
Florida‘s lethal injection statute and the existing procedure the State utilizes for 
lethal injection are unconstitutional facially and as applied; (3) he was 
unconstitutionally denied a clemency investigation and proceedings and denied the 
assistance of counsel to prepare a clemency petition; (4) the arbitrary and 
standardless process by which the Governor signs a death warrant renders Florida‘s 
capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional; (5) his thirty-three year incarceration 
on death row violates the Eighth Amendment and is prohibited under Lackey v. 
Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); and (6) as a Cuban national, he was deprived his 
right under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of consular notification upon his 
arrest. 
 
7.  Valle‘s claims on appeal are largely duplicative of his postconviction 
claims and include the following: (1) he has been denied access to public records 
to which he is entitled in violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 and 
 
- 8 - 
determined that Valle‘s claim as to the use of pentobarbital as an anesthetic in the 
amount prescribed by Florida‘s protocol warranted an evidentiary hearing.  Chief 
Justice Canady dissented, with whom Justices Lewis and Polston joined.  This 
Court therefore granted a stay of execution until September 1, 2011, and 
temporarily relinquished jurisdiction for the purpose of holding an evidentiary 
hearing on that discrete issue alone.  The Court also directed the DOC to produce 
correspondence and documents it had received from the manufacturer of 
pentobarbital, Lundbeck, Inc., concerning the drug‘s use in executions, including 
those materials addressing any safety and efficacy issues. 
Pursuant to this Court‘s order, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on July 28 and August 2, 2011, during which Valle presented the 
testimony of Dr. David Waisel, an anesthesiologist, and federal public defender 
Matt Schulz, who witnessed the June 16, 2011, execution of his client, Eddie 
Powell, in Alabama.  Valle also offered into evidence several letters, which were 
written by Lundbeck to the DOC and Governor Scott regarding the company‘s 
                                                                                                                                        
Chapter 119, Florida Statutes; (2) Florida‘s lethal injection procedures violate the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (3) the 
circuit court erred in summarily denying his claim that he was denied a clemency 
investigation and proceeding and was denied the assistance of counsel to prepare 
for such a proceeding; (4) the circuit court erred in summarily denying his claim 
that the Governor‘s arbitrary decision to sign a death warrant is unconstitutional; 
(5) the amount of time he has served on death row constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment; and (6) as a Cuban national, he was deprived his right under Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention of consular notification upon his arrest. 
 
- 9 - 
opposition to the use of its drug in executions.  In rebuttal, the State presented the 
testimony of Dr. Mark Dershwitz, an anesthesiologist, and John Harper and Dr. 
Jacqueline Martin, both of whom witnessed the June 23, 2011, execution of Roy 
Blankenship in Georgia.  
Following the presentation of this evidence, the circuit court entered its 
order denying Valle‘s claim that the substitution of pentobarbital as an anesthetic 
violated the Eighth Amendment.  Jurisdiction has since returned to this Court, and 
we now consider all pending issues on appeal.8 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality of Florida’s Lethal Injection Procedures 
In this claim, Valle raises various challenges to the constitutionality of 
Florida‘s lethal injection procedures, but the bulk of his argument focuses on the 
DOC‘s June 8, 2011, substitution of five grams of pentobarbital for five grams of 
sodium thiopental as the first of three drugs used in the lethal injection protocol.  In 
Florida, the first drug is used to anesthetize the condemned inmate prior to the 
administration of the final two drugs in the three-drug sequence, pancuronium 
bromide (a paralytic agent that can stop respiration) and potassium chloride (a 
substance that will cause the heart to stop).  Valle acknowledges that aside from 
                                          
 
 
8.  Valle also argues that because the circuit court made erroneous 
evidentiary rulings during the relinquishment proceedings, he was denied a full and 
fair hearing. 
 
- 10 - 
substituting pentobarbital for sodium thiopental, both of which are barbiturates, 
Florida‘s lethal injection protocol has remained unaltered since this Court‘s 
decision in Lightbourne, which upheld the August 2007 lethal injection protocol 
against a similar constitutional challenge.  He therefore argues that the DOC‘s plan 
to use pentobarbital constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because as a result of 
the substitution, he may remain conscious after being injected with pentobarbital, 
thereby subjecting him to significant pain during the administration of the final two 
drugs.  As presented, the DOC‘s recent replacement of sodium thiopental with 
pentobarbital in Florida‘s three-drug lethal injection sequence is the primary claim 
underlying Valle‘s Eighth Amendment challenge.  
Pursuant to this Court‘s order of relinquishment, the circuit court conducted 
a two-day evidentiary hearing, which included the admission of expert testimony 
from both parties, letters authored by Lundbeck, and eyewitness testimony from 
individuals who were present during the executions of Alabama inmate Eddie 
Powell and Georgia inmate Roy Blankenship.  After receiving this evidence, the 
circuit court denied relief, concluding that the substitution of pentobarbital as an 
anesthetic did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the evidence failed to 
establish that the intravenous administration of pentobarbital creates a substantial 
risk of serious harm.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the circuit 
court‘s denial. 
 
- 11 - 
This Court has previously recognized its duty ―to ensure that the method 
used to execute a person in Florida does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.‖  Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 349.  To fulfill its obligation, this Court 
is guided by article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that 
―[a]ny method of execution shall be allowed, unless prohibited by the United 
States Constitution.‖  Specifically, Florida‘s provision on the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment ―shall be construed in conformity with decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.‖  Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.  Therefore, in accordance with our state 
constitution, this Court is bound by the precedent of the Supreme Court regarding 
challenges to this state‘s chosen method of execution.  See Lightbourne, 969 
So. 2d at 335 (―[W]e must evaluate whether lethal injection is unconstitutional ‗in 
conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court.‘ ‖ (quoting art. 1, § 
17, Fla. Const.)). 
The parties agree that Valle‘s various challenges to the DOC‘s lethal 
injection procedures are governed by the Supreme Court‘s plurality decision in 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), which defined the contours of a condemned 
inmate‘s burden of proof for mounting a successful Eighth Amendment challenge 
 
- 12 - 
to a state‘s lethal injection protocol.9  Although acknowledging that ―subjecting 
individuals to a risk of future harm—not simply actually inflicting pain—can 
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment,‖ the Supreme Court in Baze explained 
that to prevail on such a claim, condemned inmates must demonstrate that ―the 
conditions presenting the risk must be ‗sure or very likely to cause serious illness 
and needless suffering,‘ and give rise to ‗sufficiently imminent dangers.‘ ‖  553 
U.S. at 49-50 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35 (1993)) 
(plurality opinion); see also Brewer v. Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. 445, 445 (2010) 
(―[S]peculation cannot substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is ‗sure or 
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.‘ ‖ (quoting Baze, 553 
U.S. at 50)).  That is, ―there must be a ‗substantial risk of serious harm,‘ an 
‗objectively intolerable risk of harm‘ that prevents prison officials from pleading 
that they were ‗subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.‘ ‖  
                                          
 
 
9.  In Lightbourne, which predates the Supreme Court‘s decision in Baze, 
this Court held that inmate Lightbourne failed to establish that Florida‘s August 
2007 lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment since he did not 
show ―a substantial, foreseeable or unnecessary risk of pain in the DOC‘s 
procedures for carrying out the death penalty through lethal injection.‖  
Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 353.  After Baze was decided, this Court rejected the 
notion that Baze required reconsideration of our decision in Lightbourne and 
concluded that Florida‘s 2007 procedures passed constitutional muster under any 
of the risk-based standards.  See Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla. 2009) 
(―Florida‘s current lethal-injection protocol passes muster under any of the risk-
based standards considered by the Baze Court (and would also easily satisfy the 
intent-based standard advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia).‖). 
 
- 13 - 
Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 
(1994)).  This standard imposes a ―heavy burden‖ upon the inmate to show that 
lethal injection procedures violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 53 (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)). 
Cognizant of this standard, we now turn to Valle‘s challenge to the DOC‘s 
substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental.  In the lethal injection context, 
―the condemned inmate‘s lack of consciousness is the focus of the constitutional 
inquiry.‖  Ventura, 2 So. 3d at 200; see also Schwab, 995 So. 2d at 924, 927 
(adopting the trial court‘s order, which stated that ―the critical Eighth Amendment 
concern is whether the prisoner has, in fact, been rendered unconscious by the first 
drug‖).  As we explained in Lightbourne, ―[i]f the inmate is not fully unconscious 
when either pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride [the second and third 
drugs in the protocol] is injected, or when either of the chemicals begins to take 
effect, the prisoner will suffer pain.‖  969 So. 2d at 351; see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 
53 (―[F]ailing a proper dose of sodium thiopental that would render the prisoner 
unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation 
from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of 
potassium chloride.‖). 
In order to show the risks of using pentobarbital as a substitute, Valle relies 
extensively on the testimony of Dr. Waisel, who testified that pentobarbital and 
 
- 14 - 
sodium thiopental are not interchangeable barbiturates, that five grams of sodium 
thiopental are not proportionally equivalent to five grams of pentobarbital, and that 
due to a lack of research, he would be unable to determine a dose of pentobarbital 
that would properly anesthetize an individual.  Instead, he could only testify as to 
the amount needed to sedate someone.  According to Dr. Waisel, a sedated patient 
may still be responsive while an anesthetized patient may be unconscious enough 
to undergo an open-chest surgery.  In his opinion, the allowable upper dose needed 
to sedate a person would fall between 200 and 500 milligrams of pentobarbital, but 
he acknowledged that the amount used by the DOC for anesthetizing an inmate is 
5000 milligrams.  Although Dr. Waisel identified the use of pentobarbital to induce 
anesthesia as ―off label,‖ since the drug‘s package insert10 does not mention 
induction of anesthesia as an indication, he testified that there are legitimate ―off-
label‖ uses for drugs.  In fact, Dr. Waisel agreed that pentobarbital is used as part 
of physician-assisted suicide and animal euthanasia procedures.  In sum, Dr. 
Waisel opined that because there is insufficient data regarding the use of 
pentobarbital as an anesthetic, there would be no way to know, in any given case, 
how an overdose of the drug will affect healthy inmates. 
                                          
 
 
10.  Dr. Waisel testified that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approves the package insert, which accompanies a manufacturer‘s drug as 
distributed.  He further explained that the FDA approves the indications for a drug 
based on studies submitted by the drug‘s manufacturer. 
 
- 15 - 
In opposition, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Dershwitz, who 
testified that 5000 milligrams of pentobarbital, as provided for in the DOC‘s lethal 
injection protocol, is ―far in excess of the dose that would be used in a human for 
any reason.‖  According to Dr. Dershwitz, that dosage of pentobarbital is lethal 
standing alone, and when administered, the drug will induce a total flat line on the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) in brain activity, meaning that the person into whom 
the drug is injected will have no perception or sensation.  Although Dr. Dershwitz 
acknowledged that the FDA had not approved pentobarbital for use in lethal 
injections, like Dr. Waisel, he explained that its use for such purposes was 
considered ―off label‖ and that using a drug in an ―off-label‖ manner is ―common 
in medicine.‖ 
In reviewing this portion of Valle‘s claim, the circuit court credited the 
testimony of Dr. Dershwitz over that of Dr. Waisel, specifically finding Dr. 
Dershwitz‘s testimony to be ―credible and persuasive‖ and Dr. Waisel‘s testimony 
to be ―based on speculation‖ and ―therefore, inherently unreliable.‖  As we have 
previously explained, where ―the trial court‘s findings are supported by competent 
substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the 
weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.‖  Provenzano v. State, 761 
So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 
 
- 16 - 
(Fla. 1997)); see id. at 1098-99 (applying competent, substantial evidence standard 
to review Provenzano‘s Eighth Amendment challenge to Florida‘s lethal injection 
procedure following an evidentiary hearing on the issue).  In applying this 
standard, ―[w]e recognize and honor the trial court‘s superior vantage point in 
assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.‖  Porter v. 
State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001).  This stems from our recognition that ―the 
trial court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and 
appellate courts are obligated to give great deference to the findings of the trial 
court.‖  Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 562 (Fla. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 10-10518 (U.S. May 10, 2011).   
Based upon the testimony presented, the circuit court concluded that Dr. 
Dershwitz ―refuted any suggestion that the dose of pentobarbital in the Florida 
lethal injection protocol would leave an inmate conscious and able to experience 
pain and suffering during the lethal injection process.‖11  The circuit court‘s 
findings are borne out by the testimony and are well-supported by the record. 
While Dr. Waisel opined that he would be unable to determine whether 
pentobarbital would produce its intended effect (i.e., to anesthetize the inmate 
before the administration of the last two drugs in the three-drug sequence), in the 
                                          
 
 
11.  We note that the condemned inmates in Baze actually proposed a one-
drug, barbiturate-only protocol, using either pentobarbital or sodium thiopental.  
See Baze, 553 U.S. at 56-58. 
 
- 17 - 
end, he did not testify that the drug would fail to do so.  By asserting that no 
evidence exists concerning whether pentobarbital will render an inmate 
unconscious, Valle has failed to meet his burden of proof.12  As the circuit court 
correctly recognized, Dr. Waisel‘s asserted lack of knowledge about 
pentobarbital‘s effects falls short of the heavy burden of affirmatively showing that 
the drug is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering or that 
its use will result in a substantial risk of serious harm.  See DeYoung v. Owens, 
No. 11-13235, 2011 WL 2899704, at *4 n.4 (11th Cir. July 20, 2011) (―DeYoung 
also alleges that pentobarbital has not been sufficiently tested for its ability to 
cause an anesthetic coma in fully conscious persons.  However, DeYoung‘s expert 
candidly admits he does not know how the State‘s dosage of pentobarbital will 
affect inmates because he claims there is no way to know.  This asserted lack of 
knowledge obviously cannot satisfy DeYoung‘s burden of affirmatively showing 
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists.‖).13  
                                          
 
 
12.  Valle also overlooks the fact that the portion of Florida‘s lethal injection 
protocol ensuring that an inmate is unconscious prior to the administration of the 
second and third drugs has not been altered since we approved the August 2007 
protocol in Lightbourne.  Under the current protocol, if the administration of 
pentobarbital does not render Valle unconscious, he will not be injected with the 
final two drugs, and the execution will be suspended until Valle is unconscious. 
 
13.  To the extent Valle asserts that the use of pentobarbital creates a risk of 
serious harm in light of the fact that it may be from a foreign source or lacks FDA 
approval for use in lethal injections, we reject these claims, as other courts have 
similarly done.  See Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 445 (vacating a stay of execution that 
 
- 18 - 
Despite Dr. Dershwitz‘s testimony, Valle also relies on a collection of letters 
sent from Lundbeck, the manufacturer of pentobarbital, to the DOC and the 
Governor stating that the use of pentobarbital outside of the approved label has not 
been established, and that consequently, Lundbeck could not assure the associated 
safety and efficacy profiles in such instances.  These letters further requested that 
this state stop using pentobarbital to execute prisoners.14   
                                                                                                                                        
was based upon a finding that the inmate had a substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits regarding his claim that the use of sodium thiopental manufactured by a 
foreign source and not approved by the FDA created a substantial and unnecessary 
risk of serious harm); Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(―Cook relies on his allegations that Arizona‘s sodium thiopental is imported and 
not approved by the FDA.  But Landrigan . . . advises that these facts are not 
sufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim.‖).  As to his claim that 
pentobarbital may be procured illegally, we deny this claim as speculative and 
insufficiently pled since Valle has failed to allege how this fact would create a 
substantial risk of serious harm. 
 
14.  Lundbeck‘s April 21, 2011, letter to the DOC specifically provided as 
follows: 
 
Lundbeck is adamantly opposed to the use of Nembutal [i.e., 
pentobarbital], or any product for that matter, for the purpose of 
capital punishment. 
We recognize that we cannot control how licensed health care 
professionals use this or any pharmaceutical product.  Nevertheless, 
we urge you to refrain from using Nembutal in the execution of 
prisoners in your state because it contradicts everything we are in 
business to do—provide therapies that improve people‘s lives. 
 
In the company‘s June 8, 2011, letter to the DOC, Lundbeck stated that ―[t]he use 
of pentobarbital outside of the approved labeling has not been established‖ and that 
―Lundbeck cannot assure the associated safety and efficacy profiles in such 
instances,‖ causing ―concern[] about its use in prison executions.‖   
 
- 19 - 
The circuit court concluded that these letters carried no weight and exhibited 
no legal value because ―[t]here was no mention of medical evidence or anything 
relevant to the court‘s inquiry.‖  We agree.  The experts for both Valle and the 
State recognized that a variety of drugs have acceptable ―off-label‖ uses.  
Lundbeck‘s opposition to the use of pentobarbital and asserted lack of information 
as to the drug‘s efficacy and safety for use in lethal injections do nothing to 
establish a substantial risk of serious harm.  See, e.g., West v. Brewer, No. CV-11-
1409-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 2836754, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 18, 2011) (finding the 
manufacturer‘s ―warning‖ against the use of pentobarbital in executions 
unpersuasive since it did not establish a substantial risk of harm), aff‘d, No. 11-
16707, 2011 WL 2811304 (9th Cir. July 18, 2011); Powell v. Thomas, No. 2:11-
CV-376-WKW, 2011 WL 1843616, at *8 n.7 (M.D. Ala. May 16, 2011) 
(―Williams emphasizes that the manufacturer of pentobarbital has pronounced that 
it is opposed to its drug being used for executions, but fails to demonstrate how 
that fact is in any way relevant to the issues and his burden.‖), aff‘d, 641 F.3d 1255 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2487 (2011). 
                                                                                                                                        
A May 16, 2011, letter from Lundbeck to Governor Scott referencing a letter 
it had previously sent to the DOC noted that the DOC had failed to respond to its 
letter and requested that the Governor take immediate action to stop the use of 
pentobarbital as a means to end lives.  A June 8, 2011, letter to Governor Scott is 
duplicative of the June 8 letter Lundbeck sent to the DOC. 
Valle also alleges that Lundbeck published position papers to the same 
effect. 
 
- 20 - 
To further buttress his assertion that the drug‘s substitution amounts to an 
Eighth Amendment violation, Valle points to the recent executions of Alabama 
inmate Eddie Powell and Georgia inmate Roy Blankenship.  Valle contends that 
Alabama‘s and Georgia‘s use of pentobarbital to execute inmates resulted in 
botched executions or executions that did not go according to plan.  With respect to 
the Powell execution, Valle presented the testimony of Powell‘s attorney, Matt 
Schulz, who was able to observe Powell‘s left side, face, and right arm during the 
execution.  As Schulz explained, after the warden permitted Powell to recite his 
last words, the warden walked behind Powell and made an announcement that the 
execution was to be carried out; the intravenous (IV) lines ran into a wall, which 
led to a room outside the execution chamber.  Schulz testified that he could not see 
the drugs being administered and did not know when the injections began.  After 
the warden left the execution chamber, Schulz explained, a chaplain took Powell‘s 
left hand and spoke to Powell for around thirty seconds to a minute, during which 
Powell turned to Schulz, ―nodded a little bit and then took a deep breath and laid 
his head back.‖   
By Schulz‘s account, approximately one minute later, Powell suddenly 
jerked his head up, it appeared as though his upper body was pressing against the 
restraints, and he looked around with confusion.  Schulz asserted that Powell 
clenched his jaw, flexed his muscles, and his arteries bulged.  This episode lasted 
 
- 21 - 
approximately one minute, and then Powell‘s eyes glazed over, rolled back into his 
head, and then his head rested.  As Schulz described it, after a few minutes, a guard 
approached Powell, yelled his name three times, and then ran his finger over 
Powell‘s left eyelash; Powell did not respond to the guard‘s actions.  After a couple 
of minutes, Schulz noticed that Powell‘s eyes were slightly opened, although 
Schulz did not actually see at what point they opened.  Schulz also did not see 
Powell‘s eyes close, but remembered that by the end of the procedure, which lasted 
around twenty to twenty-five minutes, Powell‘s eyes were fully closed. 
The circuit court rejected Schulz‘s testimony as speculative and concluded 
that ―[e]ven if the entire situation lasted one minute, it certainly does not establish 
that [Powell] suffered to establish an Eighth Amendment claim.‖  As the circuit 
court more fully explained: 
The only witness testifying about the execution of Powell did 
not know when the pentobarbital was administered.  The relationship 
between the supposed short term movements reported and the 
administration of pentobarbital is totally speculative.  Nor was Schulz 
aware of the amount of drugs used in that instance.  Schulz stated that 
the inmate did not move after the consciousness check was done by 
the prison officials.  This same consciousness check is included in the 
Florida protocol.  If after the initial administration of pentobarbital the 
inmate shows any signs [of] responsiveness, more anesthetic 
(pentobarbital) is administered.  No additional drugs were necessary 
for Powell, according to the testimony, suggesting that the inmate was 
unconscious and the pentobarbital was effective in rendering him 
unconscious. 
 
We accept the circuit court‘s findings as supported by competent, substantial 
 
- 22 - 
evidence. 
As to the Blankenship execution, Valle again relies on the testimony of Dr. 
Waisel, who was not present at the execution but testified that Blankenship 
―suffered extremely.‖  After reviewing various materials,15 Dr. Waisel opined that 
based on reports, Blankenship looked at his arms with discomfort and pain, 
grimaced, jerked his head up, and continued breathing and mouthing words for up 
to what was reported to be three minutes.  Dr. Waisel explained that Blankenship‘s 
movement should have stopped fifteen seconds after the pentobarbital reached his 
body, and given that Blankenship‘s body movements lasted for three minutes, the 
drug did not work as it was intended.  Dr. Waisel never opined as to what time the 
pentobarbital was actually administered. 
To rebut Dr. Waisel‘s testimony, the State presented the eyewitness 
testimony of John Harper and Dr. Jacqueline Martin.  According to Harper, who 
works for the Georgia Department of Corrections, Blankenship had an IV line 
running into each of his arms.  Harper observed Blankenship look at his left arm 
about five seconds after the start of the first syringe, which was injected into 
                                          
 
 
15.  In reaching his opinion on this matter, Dr. Waisel relied on the 
following collateral information: (1) an affidavit and interview of Greg Bluestein, a 
reporter who witnessed the execution; (2) affidavits of other purported 
eyewitnesses who were also reporters, including Eddie Ledbetter and Mitchell 
Pearce; (3) the 2007 and 2011 Florida lethal injection protocols; (4) letters from 
Lundbeck; and (5) affidavits described as being from Georgia Department of 
Corrections employees or other state officials, without further elaboration. 
 
- 23 - 
Blankenship‘s right arm.  Harper testified that within ten seconds of the first drug‘s 
administration, Blankenship appeared to be unconscious, and other than 
Blankenship looking at his left arm and making what he described as a ―grunt‖ 
sound, he did not observe anything else.  Similarly, Dr. Martin stated that two or 
three minutes after the warden left the execution chamber, Blankenship looked at 
his left arm, moved his mouth, looked at his right arm, put his head down on a 
pillow, and then did not move.  She observed no obvious signs of distress or facial 
features indicating pain, and in her medical opinion, Blankenship was not in pain 
during the execution. 
In reviewing the above testimony, the circuit court determined that the State 
presented two ―very credible witnesses‖ who testified consistently with one 
another and found that that there was no indication that Blankenship experienced 
pain or suffering.  The court more fully explained: 
Of all the witnesses on the issue of the Blankenship execution, 
Harper [was] the most credible on this topic.  He actually could hear 
and could see the pushing of the syringes and was keeping a time log.  
His testimony [was] in keeping, ironically, with the acceptable 
parameters testified to by Dr. Waisel.  Waisel stated that if the 
pentobarbital were to work properly that it would take effect within 
fifteen (15) seconds.  That it did, according to the only witness able to 
testify with any degree of certainty as to the timing of the 
administration of the drugs and rendering of unconsciousness. 
. . . . 
 
Dr. Martin‘s testimony [was] consistent with that of Mr. 
Harper.  She is a medical professional who could see Blankenship‘s 
actions and facial features.  Her interpretation of his reactions to the 
drugs substantiate that Blankenship in no way experienced pain or 
 
- 24 - 
suffering. 
 
After noting that Dr. Waisel was not present at the execution, but rather relied 
upon the affidavit of a reporter who was not called to testify, the circuit court 
further found as follows: 
 
The testimony of the witnesses to Blankenship‘s execution 
differed with regard to the amount and nature of the movement by 
Blankenship.  No one could testify conclusively about the relationship 
between the reported movement and the administration of 
pentobarbital with the exception of the state‘s witness, John Harper.  
He reported only minimal movement and within seconds of the 
pushing of the syringe.  There is no indication that the inmate was in 
any discomfort much less pain or suffering; only that he glanced at his 
arm and gave a grunt.  Within ten (10) seconds the inmate was 
unconscious, according to Harper, who was not only in a more 
advantageous place to see and note what was taking place.  He also 
kept a time log. 
 
To the extent that the witnesses differed in their testimony, this 
court resolves credibility issues in favor of Mr. Harper who is 
accustomed to watching executions and thus, has a more objective 
view.  He testified quite credibly and persuasively.  Further, there was 
no movement of the inmate reported by any witnesses after the prison 
official‘s consciousness check. 
 
The circuit court‘s resolution of this issue is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.   
Valle attempts to use the Powell and Blankenship executions to show that 
the administration of pentobarbital does not adequately render an inmate 
unconscious.  However, the record before this Court supports the circuit court‘s 
findings to the contrary.  Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that problems 
arose during the course of the Blankenship and Powell executions, the United 
 
- 25 - 
States Supreme Court has advised that ―an isolated mishap alone does not give rise 
to an Eighth Amendment violation, precisely because such an event, while 
regrettable, does not suggest cruelty, or that the procedure at issue gives rise to a 
‗substantial risk of serious harm.‘ ‖  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 842).  Thus, Valle has failed to satisfy the Baze standard, which requires 
proof that the replacement of the drug is ―sure or very likely to cause serious 
illness and needless suffering.‖  Id. (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 34). 
Valle does not, however, premise his Eighth Amendment claim solely on the 
DOC‘s recent substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental.  Rather, Valle 
contends that the substitution of the drug, coupled with inadequate procedural 
safeguards and a cavalier attitude toward lethal injection, puts him at risk of 
serious harm.  Specifically, Valle notes the existence of various inadequacies in 
Florida‘s lethal injection procedures, including how the drugs are administered and 
the manner in which consciousness is assessed and monitored.  Referring to what 
he describes as Florida‘s unique history of deviating from written execution 
protocols and citing to the Angel Diaz execution in 2006 as one example, Valle 
also asserts inadequate qualifications, certification, training, and experience of 
execution team members, inadequate monitoring of the IV lines, and the DOC‘s 
failure to conduct a meaningful review and certification of its process. 
Because Valle agrees that other than replacing sodium thiopental with 
 
- 26 - 
pentobarbital, the DOC‘s June 2011 protocol is identical to the August 2007 lethal 
injection protocol that this Court upheld in Lightbourne, the circuit court did not 
err in summarily denying this portion of Valle‘s claim.  The factual circumstances 
surrounding the execution of Diaz were thoroughly litigated in Lightbourne, and 
since that time, there have been five executions without subsequent allegations of 
newly discovered problems with Florida‘s lethal injection process.  See Tompkins 
v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081-82 (Fla. 2008) (affirming summary denial of 
challenge to lethal injection procedures and noting that after the Lightbourne 
decision, two executions had been conducted in Florida with no subsequent 
allegations of problems giving rise to the investigations following the Diaz 
execution).  The remaining aspects of the protocol to which Valle currently takes 
issue were rejected on the merits in Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 350-53, and in 
subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Baze, 553 U.S. at 53-61 (rejecting claims regarding 
the inadequate administration of the lethal injection protocol, the risk that the 
procedures will not be properly followed, the absence of additional monitoring by 
trained personnel, inadequate training, issues with the placement and monitoring of 
IV lines, the lack of professional medical experience, and the need for a significant 
consciousness test); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 839-40 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting 
Troy‘s claims regarding deficiencies in Florida‘s lethal injection protocol including 
that the protocol fails to require that the execution team and the medical personnel 
 
- 27 - 
who perform lethal injection have appropriate training, credentials, and 
supervision, fail to require adequate record-keeping and an adequate review and 
certification process, and fail to require adequate standards to manage 
complications inherent in the procedure).16 
As recognized above, the Baze standard requires proof that Florida‘s lethal 
injection procedures are sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering or will result in a substantial risk of serious harm.  See 553 U.S. at 50.  
After reviewing the evidence and testimony presented below, we conclude that 
Valle has failed to satisfy the ―heavy burden‖ that Florida‘s current lethal injection 
procedures, as implemented by the DOC, are constitutionally defective in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  We thus affirm the 
circuit court‘s orders. 
Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Based upon several adverse evidentiary rulings the circuit court made during 
the relinquishment period, Valle argues that he was denied a full and fair 
                                          
 
 
16.  To the extent that Valle‘s claims are not duplicative of those in 
Lightbourne and later cases, we conclude that Valle ―is not entitled to relief under 
the analogous and comprehensive analysis we undertook in Lightbourne.‖  Troy, 
57 So. 3d at 840.  In Troy, we reaffirmed the principle that ―[a] claim that the 
protocol can be improved and the potential risks of error reduced can always be 
made,‖ but ―this Court‘s role is not to micromanage the executive branch in 
fulfilling its own duties relating to executions.‖  Id. (quoting Lightbourne, 969 So. 
2d at 351). 
 
- 28 - 
evidentiary hearing.  We disagree and find no error in the circuit court‘s rulings. 
Valle first argues that the circuit court improperly excluded seven witnesses 
employed by the DOC whose testimony he wished to present during the 
evidentiary hearing to discuss the ―safety and efficacy‖ of pentobarbital in 
executions.17  He supports this claim, however, by misconstruing our order of 
relinquishment.  ―It is well settled that ‗[t]he admissibility of evidence is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court‘s determination will not be 
disturbed on appellate review absent a clear abuse of that discretion.‘ ‖  Rimmer v. 
State, 59 So. 3d 763, 774 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 188 
(Fla. 2005)).  The court granted the State‘s motion to strike the defense‘s witnesses 
on the grounds that the testimony was not relevant, citing the narrow scope of this 
Court‘s relinquishment order.  We agree and hold that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
By the order‘s express terms, we relinquished jurisdiction ―for the narrow 
purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing solely on Valle‘s claim regarding the 
efficacy of pentobarbital as an anesthetic in the amount prescribed by Florida‘s 
                                          
 
 
17.  In his amended witness list, Valle sought to elicit testimony from the 
following individuals: (1) Russell Hosford, who is alleged to be the Director of the 
Office of Institutions for DOC; (2) Jennifer Parker, who is employed by the DOC; 
(3) Timothy Cannon, who is alleged to be the execution team leader for lethal 
injection executions; (4) Edwin Buss, who is the Secretary of the DOC; (5) Rana 
Wallace, who is employed by the DOC; (6) the primary executioner; and (7) the 
secondary executioner. 
 
- 29 - 
protocol‖ and prohibited Valle from raising any other claims.  Valle v. State, No. 
SC11-1387 (Fla. Sup. Ct. order filed July 25, 2011).  This Court‘s concern focused 
on evidence relating to whether the drug would sufficiently render an inmate 
unconscious before the administration of the last two drugs in the three-drug 
sequence.  Valle has failed to establish how his witnesses—who he alleges would 
have testified regarding the DOC‘s response after receiving letters from Lundbeck, 
the source of pentobarbital, or the procedure by which the DOC assesses 
consciousness during an execution—were relevant to the narrow purpose of the 
evidentiary hearing.  As noted above, this Court agrees with the circuit court‘s 
conclusion that the Lundbeck letters are of no legal value and irrelevant to our 
Eighth Amendment inquiry.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in striking Valle‘s witnesses. 
Next, Valle argues that the circuit court improperly excluded the affidavits 
of two reporters, Greg Bluestein and Eddie Ledbetter.  Attached to these affidavits 
were newspaper articles written by the affiants chronicling their eyewitness 
accounts of the Blankenship execution.  Regardless of the information contained 
therein, these items constitute inadmissible hearsay.  See Robinson v. State, 707 
So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998) (holding that codefendant‘s affidavit recanting 
testimony and proffered by the defendant constituted inadmissible hearsay because 
the codefendant failed to appear at the hearing and affidavit did not come within 
 
- 30 - 
any hearsay exception); Dollar v. State, 685 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) 
(―A newspaper article, introduced to prove the truth of out of court statements 
contained therein, constitutes inadmissible hearsay.‖).  Although Valle generally 
references the journalistic privilege and the manner in which to authenticate 
business records, he fails to explain why these documents do not constitute hearsay 
or fall within any applicable hearsay exception.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these items from consideration. 
Lastly, Valle contends that because the circuit court excluded the Bluestein 
and Ledbetter affidavits, the court erred in allowing the State to present the 
testimony of John Harper and Dr. Jacqueline Martin, both of whom gave 
eyewitness accounts of the Blankenship execution.  Valle sought to strike these 
witnesses, asserting that their sole purpose was to rebut the defense‘s affidavits, 
which were not admitted into evidence.  In his lethal injection claim, however, 
Valle candidly acknowledges that he presented evidence regarding Blankenship‘s 
execution through Dr. Waisel, who relied on Bluestein‘s and Ledbetter‘s reports in 
forming his opinion.  Contrary to Valle‘s contention, the State‘s witnesses did not 
become irrelevant after the exclusion of the Bluestein and Ledbetter affidavits; 
instead, their testimony served to rebut Dr. Waisel‘s account of the execution.  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Valle‘s 
motion to strike the State‘s witnesses. 
 
- 31 - 
Denial of Public Records Requests 
In conjunction with Valle‘s challenge to Florida‘s lethal injection 
procedures, we next address his contention that the circuit court erred in denying 
his various requests for public records needed to establish this claim.  Specifically, 
Valle challenges the circuit court‘s denial of his request for records from the DOC, 
the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Governor, and the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE).  He asserts that compliance with such 
records requests was essential to obtain information regarding Florida‘s lethal 
injection procedures. 
The circuit court granted, in part, Valle‘s demands for public records.  As a 
result, Valle was provided with information regarding the substitution of the first 
drug and how the new procedures would be implemented.  The State provided 
Valle‘s counsel with a copy of the new lethal injection protocol, which sets forth in 
detail how the drug is to be administered.  Valle was also provided with training 
logs for execution trainings that occurred in 2010 and 2011, with the most recent 
exercise occurring in May 2011.  In compliance with the circuit court‘s order, the 
Office of the Attorney General provided records to Valle regarding that agency‘s 
approval and review of changes to the protocol.18  The records disclosed included 
                                          
 
 
18.  The Office of the Governor represented that it did not have records 
regarding the constitutionality of the procedures leading up to the promulgation of 
the June 2011 protocol. 
 
- 32 - 
the following: a November 18, 2010, affidavit from Dr. Dershwitz criticizing Dr. 
Waisel‘s opinion; an expert report authored by Dr. Dershwitz in which he opines 
that there is negligible risk that if five grams of pentobarbital are administered, the 
inmate would experience any pain and suffering associated with the administration 
of the subsequent two drugs; and research studies regarding the use of high-dose 
barbiturate therapy, and in particular, pentobarbital.  The DOC also provided Valle 
with records pertaining to the 2007 and 2011 lethal injection procedures and 
various checklists regarding the procedure for executing a condemned inmate. 
While the State did disclose many records, Valle contends that further 
disclosures will assist him in establishing an Eighth Amendment violation because 
they will essentially reveal the following: (1) that sodium thiopental and 
pentobarbital were illegally obtained or from a foreign country, casting doubt on 
the deference this Court bestows upon the executive branch to carry out executions 
in a humane and competent manner; and (2) deviations from protocol when the 
DOC administered the previous five executions.19  Valle has failed to establish 
                                          
 
 
19.  Valle‘s contention that the disclosure of records will reveal letters from 
the drug‘s manufacturer to State agencies regarding its concern over the safety of 
using pentobarbital in executions is now moot.  In our order of relinquishment, we 
directed the DOC to produce these documents, and the DOC complied with this 
Court‘s order. 
Additionally, the record directly refutes Valle‘s claim that there is a lack of 
evidence showing that the State conducted research into the efficacy of 
pentobarbital prior to its implementation.  The State disclosed its records detailing 
a medical doctor‘s opinion on the use of the drug and research articles about such 
 
- 33 - 
how the production of such records relates to a colorable Eighth Amendment 
challenge. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(i)(2), which limits postconviction 
requests for additional records, requires production of public records upon a 
finding of the following: 
(A) collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent search of 
the records repository; 
(B) collateral counsel‘s affidavit identifies with specificity 
those additional public records that are not at the records repository; 
(C) the additional public records sought are either relevant to 
the subject matter of a proceeding under rule 3.851 or appear 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; 
and 
(D) the additional records request is not overly broad or unduly 
burdensome. 
 
The circuit court has the discretion to deny public records requests that are ―overly 
broad, of questionable relevance, and unlikely to lead to discoverable evidence.‖  
Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002).  As this Court has emphasized, 
rule 3.852 ―is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for 
records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.‖  Id. (quoting 
Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 2001)).  This Court reviews the circuit 
court‘s denial of a public records request for an abuse of discretion.  Hill v. State, 
921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006).   
                                                                                                                                        
drugs.  Those documents are dated November 2010, and the new protocol went 
into effect over six months later in June 2011. 
 
- 34 - 
With respect to Valle‘s assertion that undisclosed records could show that 
sodium thiopental and pentobarbital were obtained from a foreign country, such 
information would be of questionable relevance, and he has failed to demonstrate 
how its disclosure would relate to a colorable Eighth Amendment claim.  First, any 
allegations regarding the obtainment of sodium thiopental are irrelevant to the 
instant litigation since sodium thiopental is no longer part of Florida‘s lethal 
injection protocol and will not be used in Valle‘s execution.  Second, as to the 
DOC‘s procurement of pentobarbital, the Supreme Court recently announced that 
―speculation cannot substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is ‗sure or very 
likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.‘ ‖  Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 
445 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50); see id. (vacating a stay of execution that was 
based upon a finding that the condemned inmate had a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits of his claim that the use of sodium thiopental by a foreign 
source and not approved by the FDA creates a substantial and unnecessary risk of 
serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment).  In requesting these 
materials, Valle simply posits a hypothetical argument, but he does not explain 
why these facts will result in a substantial risk of serious harm.   
As to Valle‘s requests for records to demonstrate that pentobarbital may 
have been procured illegally, his pleadings in this regard are speculative and 
conclusory.  Because he has failed to allege how this information would lead to 
 
- 35 - 
evidence related to his claim, Valle‘s requests on this issue appear to be no more 
than a ―fishing expedition‖ for which rule 3.852 is not intended.  Consequently, the 
circuit court did not err in denying Valle‘s requests to produce these records. 
Valle also requests records on the DOC‘s administration of executions for 
the last five inmates executed.  Instead of asserting why this information would be 
relevant to proving a substantial risk of serious harm, Valle points to the botched 
execution of Angel Diaz and contends that such documentation is essential for 
establishing deviations from the protocol and why this Court cannot presume the 
DOC is acting in accordance with its protocol as written.  As noted above, in Baze, 
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the prisoners‘ argument that the risk that a 
state would not properly follow its protocol constitutes an Eighth Amendment 
violation, see 533 U.S. at 53-54, and we thoroughly considered the factual 
circumstances surrounding the Diaz execution in Lightbourne.  Therefore, the 
records sought are not related to a colorable Eighth Amendment claim, and the 
circuit court did not err in denying Valle‘s requests. 
Denial of Clemency Proceeding 
In his next claim, Valle contends that he was denied a clemency proceeding 
and effective assistance of clemency counsel to which he is entitled.20  We affirm 
                                          
 
 
20.  Valle moved to amend his postconviction motion as to this claim, but 
the circuit court denied leave to amend. 
 
- 36 - 
the circuit court‘s denial of relief because this claim is speculative and 
insufficiently pled. 
Valle acknowledges that a clemency hearing was requested by Governor 
Chiles on February 6, 1992, and that it appears attorney Mark Evans was appointed 
to represent him during the clemency proceeding.  He argues, however, that there 
is no indication that any clemency investigation or proceeding was actually 
conducted ―[d]ue to changes in policies and procedures instituted by Governor 
Chiles in the early 1990s.‖  Valle‘s assertion that no clemency proceeding was ever 
conducted is based on the fact that he does not have any files showing that a 
proceeding was ever held.  However, he acknowledges that clemency counsel was 
appointed and that he does not have clemency counsel‘s files.   
Valle‘s inability to determine whether he was given a clemency proceeding 
or whether attorney Evans did in fact represent him appears to be the result of 
Valle‘s failure to adequately investigate and present the factual basis for this claim.  
Although Valle complains that he requested records regarding the clemency 
investigations and that he cannot more fully plead these facts because he was 
denied access to those records, he does not assert to this Court that the circuit court 
erred in sustaining agency objections or that he was improperly denied public 
 
- 37 - 
records to which he was entitled.21  Rather, Valle speculates that no clemency 
proceeding was held because Governor Chiles subsequently changed the policies 
and procedures and no records reflect that a proceeding was held.  However, 
―[p]ostconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or possibility.‖  Maharaj v. 
State, 778 So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000).  His alternative claim—that if a proceeding 
was held, it was not conducted according the executive rules and he was not 
allowed to participate—is also insufficiently pled.  Valle does not allege a factual 
basis for this claim other than the above lack of records. 
As with his previous clemency allegation, Valle‘s claim that he was denied 
effective representation at his clemency proceeding because clemency counsel was 
incompetent or ineffective is vague and conclusory.  Valle does not allege any 
facts to support this claim, and the documents attached to the postconviction 
motion do not pertain to Evans‘ representation of Valle, nor do they support this 
claim.22  Again, ―[p]ostconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or 
                                          
 
 
21.  He does not assert any error with respect to clemency records in either 
this claim or his public records claim. 
 
22.  The attached documents were the following: (a) a letter from attorney 
Evans in 1993 to then-Chief Justice Barkett concerning complaints filed by two 
former clients, Robert Heiney and James Card, and which explains that the 
complaints arose from a misunderstanding; (b) a copy of a letter from Heiney and 
Card stating that they were ―tricked‖ into withdrawing from a case by Evans; and 
(c) a copy of a civil complaint filed by Card, Heiney, and Amos King, which 
alleged that they were tricked into requesting the courts to appoint Evans as their 
 
- 38 - 
possibility,‖ Maharaj, 778 So. 2d at 951, and ―vague and conclusory allegations on 
appeal are insufficient to warrant relief,‖ Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482 
(Fla. 2008). 
 
As his final clemency-related claim, Valle argues that, assuming a clemency 
proceeding was conducted pursuant to Governor Chiles‘ original request, it did not 
serve the ―fail-safe‖ purposes for which clemency is intended because it was done 
before his postconviction proceedings.  In Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 24 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 459 (2010), we squarely rejected this claim: 
Johnston next contends that the clemency proceeding he was 
provided in 1987 was inadequate because it was held before the 
postconviction proceedings were concluded and before his mental 
health issues and life history were fully developed for consideration in 
the clemency process. . . .  Johnston argues that clemency in Florida 
does not provide the ―fail safe‖ that clemency is envisioned to be by 
the United States Supreme Court. . . .  We conclude that the clemency 
system in Florida performed as intended in providing a ―fail safe‖ for 
Johnston.  He was given a full clemency hearing in 1987 at which he 
was represented by counsel.  When the death warrant was signed on 
April 20, 2009, it stated that ―it has been determined that Executive 
Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida 
Constitution, is not appropriate.‖  Thus, clemency was again 
considered by the executive branch prior to the signing of the warrant 
in this case. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‘s summary denial of relief on all 
aspects of this claim. 
                                                                                                                                        
attorney and which requested $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in 
punitive damages. 
 
- 39 - 
The Governor’s Discretion to Sign Death Warrants 
Next, Valle asserts that Florida‘s death penalty structure violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments because by being able to sign a death warrant, the 
Governor has the absolute discretion to decide who lives and who dies.  This, Valle 
contends, is contrary to the Eighth Amendment requirement that there be a 
principled way to distinguish between who is executed and who is not.  In Marek 
v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1129-30 (Fla. 2009), we rejected a similar constitutional 
challenge to Florida‘s clemency process and declined to ―second-guess‖ the 
application of the exclusive executive function of clemency.  While our decision in 
Marek was pending, Marek filed another successive postconviction motion, 
specifically contending that the manner in which the Governor determined that a 
death warrant should be signed was arbitrary and capricious.  This Court affirmed 
the denial of relief, explaining in more detail:  
Marek argues that Florida‘s clemency process, particularly the 
Governor‘s authority to sign warrants, is unconstitutional because it 
does not provide sufficient due process to the condemned inmate.  He 
asserts that public records documenting that the Governor reviewed 
Marek‘s case in September 2008 without input from Marek 
demonstrate that he was denied due process.  Marek contends that 
because he did not obtain the public records until April 27, 2009, he 
could not have raised this claim in a prior proceeding.  However, 
Marek did raise this claim in his second successive postconviction 
proceeding.  In that proceeding, Marek analogized the Governor‘s 
decision to sign his death warrant to a lottery and contended that 
Florida‘s clemency process was one-sided, arbitrary, and standardless. 
This Court rejected Marek‘s challenges as meritless.  The current 
claim raises the same legal challenge this Court previously 
 
- 40 - 
considered. 
 
Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 998 (Fla.) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
(citing Marek, 8 So. 3d at 1129-30), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 40 (2009). 
 
In essence, Valle raises a claim similar to Marek‘s and is asking this Court to 
second-guess the Governor‘s decision in determining when to sign Valle‘s death 
warrant because other inmates were also eligible for a death warrant.  However, 
this Court has always proceeded very carefully in addressing such a claim since it 
triggers separation of powers concerns.  See, e.g., Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 26 (―[W]e 
decline to depart from the Court‘s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of 
powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the 
executive on matters of clemency in capital cases.‖); In re Advisory Opinion of the 
Governor, 334 So. 2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. 1976) (―This Court has always viewed the 
pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly within the domain 
of the executive branch of government.‖).  Here, Valle has not provided any reason 
for this Court to depart from its precedents, and we therefore affirm the circuit 
court‘s denial of relief. 
Length of Time on Death Row 
Valle next contends that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his 
claim that the thirty-three years he has spent on death row constitutes cruel and 
 
- 41 - 
unusual punishment.23  Under this Court‘s clear precedent, Valle‘s claim is facially 
invalid, and the circuit court did not err in summarily denying relief.  In Tompkins, 
this Court observed that ―no federal or state court has accepted the argument that a 
prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, especially 
where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.‖  994 So. 2d at 1085 
(quoting Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007)).  In line with Tompkins, 
this Court has repeatedly held this claim to be meritless.  See, e.g., id. (rejecting 
claim that twenty-three years on death row constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment); Booker, 969 So. 2d at 200 (rejecting claim that almost thirty years on 
death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 
1257, 1276 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim that twenty-three years on death row 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 805 (Fla. 
2001) (holding as without merit cruel and unusual punishment claim of death row 
inmate under death sentence since 1977).  
Furthermore, while Valle asserts that the State repeatedly botched his trials 
and resentencings during his first ten years on death row, thereby extending the 
length of his incarceration, he has contributed to the remaining twenty-three years 
of delay in his execution.  Since his death sentence became final in 1991, Valle has 
                                          
 
 
23.  Valle also moved to amend his postconviction motion as to this claim, 
but the circuit court denied leave to amend. 
 
- 42 - 
continued to exercise his constitutional rights in challenging his convictions and 
sentence.  He filed a postconviction motion in state court, multiple habeas petitions 
in this Court, and a habeas petition in federal court, the denial of which was 
affirmed on appeal in 2006.  Valle ―cannot now contend that his punishment has 
been illegally prolonged because the delay in carrying out his sentence is in large 
part due to his own actions in challenging his conviction[s] and sentence.‖  
Tompkins, 994 So. 2d at 1085.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in 
summarily denying Valle‘s claim. 
Vienna Convention 
 
Lastly, Valle contends that because he is a Cuban national, the State‘s failure 
to advise him of the right to notify his consulate of his arrest and to consult with 
that consulate or a diplomatic officer without delay under Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations entitles him to relief.  This substantive claim is 
procedurally barred because Valle could and should have raised it on direct appeal.  
See, e.g., Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3d 1, 17 (Fla. 2008) (denying as procedurally barred 
allegation that arrest in the Bahamas by Bahamian police violated Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention because the Bahamian police failed to contact the U.S. 
Consulate in the Bahamas or advise defendant of his right to contact that consulate 
since it could have been raised on direct appeal); Maharaj, 778 So. 2d at 959 
(denying as procedurally barred allegation that State failed to comply with its 
 
- 43 - 
international obligation to inform the consulate that a British citizen had been 
charged with a capital crime because it could and should have been raised on direct 
appeal); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 512 n.8 (2008) (citing Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), for the proposition that the Vienna 
Convention does not preclude the application of state procedural bars).   
Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Valle‘s claim is also without merit.  In 
Maharaj, this Court denied an identical claim on the merits where the defendant 
―failed to establish that he [had] standing‖ since ―treaties are between countries, 
not citizens.‖  778 So. 2d at 959.  Rather than arguing why Maharaj‘s holding is 
inapplicable to the instant case, Valle instead points out that a federal bill has been 
proposed, but not yet signed into law, that would provide death row inmates a 
process by which to assert such a violation.  In Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 
(2011), the Supreme Court rejected the same argument when denying an 
application for a stay of execution made by Humberto Leal Garcia, a Mexican 
national.  Recognizing that international precedent mandating that a foreign 
national be advised of such rights would require legislative implementation, the 
Court denied the application for stay and held that ―[t]he Due Process Clause does 
not prohibit a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted 
legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.‖  Id. 
at 2867; see also Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2008) (denying application 
 
- 44 - 
for stay of execution when similar argument was advanced).  Thus, under the 
authority of both Maharaj and Garcia, we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in summarily denying relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In accordance with our analysis above, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief.  No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court.  
The mandate shall issue immediately.  We hereby lift the temporary stay imposed 
by this Court on July 25, 2011. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Jacqueline Hogan Scola, Judge – Case No. F78-5281A 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Suzanne Keffer, Chief 
Assistant CCR Counsel, Paul Kalil, Assistant CCR Counsel, and M. Chance 
Meyer, Staff Attorney, Region South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee