Title: Centennial Associates, Ltd., et al. v. Donald N. Guthrie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080015
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

REL: 04/17/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1080015
_________________________
Centennial Associates, Ltd., et al.
v.
Donald N. Guthrie
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-07-900259)
LYONS, Justice.
Centennial Associates, Ltd. ("Centennial"), and certain
of its limited partners appeal from a summary judgment entered
by the Jefferson Circuit Court on their claims against Donald
N. Guthrie.  We dismiss the appeal.
1080015
2
Centennial, a limited partnership, owned real property in
Hoover, on which a wedding chapel was operated. On February
28, 2007, Centennial and two of its limited partners, Edward
L. Hammond and John H. Haley, Jr., sued two of Centennial's
general partners.  The complaint alleged, in part, that the
general partners had wrongfully transferred Centennial's
interest in the property in 2001 and again in 2006 without
authorization and without disbursing payments from the
transfer to the limited partners.  Among other things, the
complaint stated claims of fraud, conversion, suppression, and
breach of fiduciary duty as to both the 2001 and the 2006
transfers.  The complaint asserted claims against several
other individuals and entities, including those entities to
whom 
Centennial's 
interest 
in 
the 
property 
had 
been
transferred in 2001 and 2006.
On August 14, 2007, Centennial, Hammond, and Haley
amended the complaint to add two other limited partners as
plaintiffs and to add Guthrie, the attorney who had prepared
the closing documents for the 2001 and 2006 transactions, as
a defendant.  The amended complaint alleged that Guthrie had
represented Centennial with respect to the 2001 and 2006
1080015
3
transactions and that he had breached the applicable standard
of care in handling both the 2001 transaction and the 2006
transaction.  The complaint stated a claim against Guthrie
under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, § 6-5-570 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the ALSLA").
Guthrie moved for a summary judgment.  On April 3, 2008,
the trial court granted that motion to the extent that the
claim against Guthrie related to events that had occurred more
than two years before the filing of the amended complaint; to
that extent, the trial court held, the claim was barred by the
two-year statute of limitations of the ALSLA.  See § 6-5-574,
Ala. Code 1975.  The trial court denied Guthrie's motion to
the extent that the claim against him related to the 2006
transaction.
Guthrie renewed his motion for a summary judgment, and on
June 12, 2008, the trial court entered a summary judgment in
Guthrie's favor.  The trial court found that the undisputed
evidence showed that Centennial owned no interest in the
property at the time of the 2006 transaction.  The trial court
concluded that Centennial and the limited partners "owned no
legal interest in the ... property and therefore did not
1080015
4
suffer any damage by any action of the defendant Guthrie."
The trial court certified its order as final, pursuant to Rule
54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., stating: "The Court further expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay and directs
that this judgment be entered as final." 
Centennial and the limited partners moved to alter or
amend the June 12, 2008, order, and the trial court denied
that motion.  Centennial and the limited partners appealed.
They assert that because the trial court certified its order
as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., this Court
has jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  Guthrie does not
challenge this assertion.  On appeal, Centennial and the
limited partners contend that the trial court erred in
concluding that Centennial did not own any interest in the
property in 2006.
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in part: 
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
1080015
5
"If a trial court certifies a judgment as final pursuant to
Rule 54(b), an appeal will generally lie from that judgment."
Baugus v. City of Florence, 968 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 2007).
Although the order made the basis of the Rule 54(b)
certification  disposes of the entire claim against Guthrie,
thus satisfying the requirements of Rule 54(b) dealing with
eligibility for consideration as a final judgment, there
remains the additional requirement that there be no just
reason for delay.  A trial court's conclusion to that effect
is subject to review by this Court to determine whether the
trial court exceeded its discretion in so concluding.  In
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey,  351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956),
dealing with the comparable federal rule, Rule 54(b), Fed. R.
Civ. P., the United States Supreme Court stated:
"But the District Court may, by the exercise of its
discretion in the interest of sound judicial
administration, release for appeal final decisions
upon one or more, but less than all, claims in
multiple claims actions. The timing of such a
release is, with good  reason, vested by the rule
primarily in the discretion of the District Court as
the one most likely to be familiar with the case and
with any justifiable reasons for delay. With equally
good reason, any abuse of that discretion remains
reviewable by the Court of Appeals."
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6
See also Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 996 (Ala. 2006)
("Whether there was 'no just reason for delay' is an inquiry
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, as
to that issue, we must determine whether the trial court
exceeded its discretion.").  
Reviewing the trial court's finding of no just reason for
delay in Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (Ala. 2006),
this Court explained:
"This Court looks with some disfavor upon
certifications under Rule 54(b).
"'It 
bears 
repeating, 
here, 
that
"'[c]ertifications under Rule 54(b) should
be entered only in exceptional cases and
should not be entered routinely.'" State v.
Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720, 725 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Baker v. Bennett, 644 So. 2d 901,
903 (Ala. 1994), citing in turn Branch v.
SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d
1373 (Ala. 1987)). "'"Appellate review in
a piecemeal fashion is not favored."'"
Goldome Credit Corp. [v. Player, 869 So. 2d
1146, 1148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)] (quoting
Harper 
Sales 
Co. 
v. 
Brown, 
Stagner,
Richardson, Inc., 742 So. 2d 190, 192 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999), quoting in turn Brown v.
Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226,
229 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)) (emphasis
added).'
"Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d
354, 
363 
(Ala. 
2004). 
Also, 
a 
Rule 
54(b)
certification should not be entered if the issues in
the claim being certified and a claim that will
1080015
7
remain pending in the trial court '"are so closely
intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an
unreasonable 
risk 
of 
inconsistent 
results."'
Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas Dist. v. Prior Energy
Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Branch
v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373,
1374 (Ala. 1987))."
In Schlarb, the defendants terminated the plaintiff's
employment, and the plaintiff sued, asserting claims of
conversion, fraud, and breach of contract.  955 So. 2d at 419.
The trial court entered a summary judgment as to the
conversion and fraud claims and certified the order as final
under Rule 54(b).  The breach-of-contract claim remained
pending.  Id.  This Court determined that the claims as to
which the Rule 54(b) certification had been entered and the
pending 
claim 
were 
too 
intertwined 
for 
Rule 
54(b)
certification.  955 So. 2d at 420.  This Court stated:
"The essence of both Schlarb's fraud claim and
her 
breach-of-contract 
claim 
is 
that 
[the
defendants] agreed to, but did not, give her an
ownership interest in [the company]. Before this
Court, in arguing that she had an interest in [the
company] 
sufficient 
to 
support 
her 
claim 
of
conversion, Schlarb relies, in substantial part,
upon her alleged discussions with [the defendants]
concerning the division of ownership in [the
company]. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that, in the interest of justice, Schlarb's fraud
and conversion claims should not be adjudicated
separately from the beach-of-contract claim."
1080015
8
955 So. 2d at 420.  Accordingly, this Court determined that
the trial court had exceeded its discretion in certifying the
judgment on the conversion and fraud claims as final under
Rule 54(b), and it dismissed the appeal as being from a
nonfinal judgment.  Id. 
Similarly, in Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co., [Ms.
1071215, Nov. 21, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008), this
Court determined that the judgments on the claims against
certain of the defendants had been improperly certified as
final under Rule 54(b), because the pending claims against the
remaining defendants depended upon the resolution of common
issues.  This Court stated: 
"[T]he trial court certified as final the judgments
entered in favor of Preston, Perry, SAPS, and
Allstate while the claims against Gonzales and the
claims made against Elizondo, asserted after the
other defendants had moved for summary judgments,
remained 
pending. 
The claims against Gonzales
specifically alleged that he was acting in the line
and scope of his employment with Preston and SAPS at
the time of the accident; the claims against
Elizondo specifically alleged that 'at all material
times' Elizondo was acting as an agent, servant, or
employee for Preston, Perry, and SAPS. It would
accordingly be contrary to the interests of justice
to 
adjudicate 
these 
remaining 
claims 
against
Gonzales and Elizondo separately from the claims
against the other defendants; the common issues are
intertwined."
1080015
9
___ So. 3d at ___.  See also Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of
Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987)(finding claim
certified as final and pending counterclaim too intertwined
for Rule 54(b) certification).  See also 10 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659 (1998):
"It is uneconomical for an appellate court to review
facts 
on 
an 
appeal 
following 
a 
Rule 
54(b)
certification that it is likely to be required to
consider again when another appeal is brought after
the district court renders its decision on the
remaining claims or as to the remaining parties.  
"An appellate court also should not hear appeals
that will require it to determine questions that
remain before the trial court with regard to other
claims."
(Footnotes omitted.)
In this case, the trial court based its summary judgment
for Guthrie on the ALSLA claim against him on the trial
court's finding that Centennial had no interest in the
property in 2006.  Before this Court, Centennial and the
limited partners argue that they presented evidence sufficient
to create an issue of fact regarding whether Centennial owned
an interest in the property in 2006.  The pending claims
against the remaining defendants relative to the 2006
transaction, specifically, but not limited to, the claims
1080015
10
alleging fraud, conversion, suppression, and breach of
fiduciary duty, will require resolution of the same issue,
i.e., whether Centennial owned an interest in the property in
2006.
Accordingly, the issues in the claim against Guthrie, the
judgment on which was certified as final under Rule 54(b), and
the claims that remain pending in the trial court "are so
closely intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an
unreasonable risk of inconsistent results."  Branch v.
SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d at 1374. As a
result, the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying
the June 12, 2008, order as final.  We therefore dismiss the
appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.