Title: Commonwealth v. Roberts
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11825
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2015

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SJC-11825 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH L. ROBERTS. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 7, 2015. - July 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Sentence, Waiver.  Due 
Process of Law, Plea.  Constitutional Law, Waiver of 
constitutional rights. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 8, 2002. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and for a new trial, 
filed on February 10, 2012, was heard by Raymond P. Veary, Jr., 
J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Jeanne M. Kempthorne for the defendant. 
 
Jeffrey G. Harris, for William J. Sylvester, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In 2005, the defendant pleaded guilty to several 
sexual offenses, including forcible rape, committed against 
2 
 
three children.  Neither his defense counsel nor the judge who 
accepted his guilty pleas informed the defendant that his sexual 
offense convictions could, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, serve as a 
predicate for civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person 
for from one day to life.  Although each conviction of forcible 
rape of a child carried a maximum sentence of life in prison, by 
pleading guilty to them the defendant obtained a sentence of 
from not less than nine to not more than thirteen years in the 
State prison. 
 
Subsequently, after learning of the possibility of a 
lifetime of civil confinement, the defendant moved to withdraw 
his guilty pleas.  A judge in the Superior Court allowed the 
defendant's motion on the ground that the failure of the plea 
judge to inform the defendant of possible civil commitment 
violated due process and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (B), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004) (rule 12).1  The fulcrum of 
the judge's decision was an analogy to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 369 (2010), a case in which the United States Supreme 
Court held that the failure of counsel to advise a noncitizen 
that his or her guilty plea likely would lead to deportation 
                                                          
 
 
1 In relevant part, Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (B), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004) (rule 12), provided that a 
judge accepting a guilty plea "shall inform the defendant on the 
record, in open court . . . of any different or additional 
punishment based upon subsequent offense or sexually dangerous 
persons provisions of the General Laws, if applicable." 
 
3 
 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
We conclude that the analogy to Padilla is inapt.  
Nonetheless, given the significant deprivation of liberty at 
stake, we also conclude that the defendant may withdraw his plea 
if he can establish a reasonable probability that he would not 
have pleaded guilty had he been informed by the judge of the 
possibility of future civil confinement as required by rule 12.  
Because the record is not fully developed on this point, we 
vacate the order allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty 
pleas and remand the matter for further findings and rulings 
germane to the correct legal standard.2 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the material facts in the 
record, reserving certain details for the issues raised on 
appeal.  In November, 2002, the defendant was indicted on five 
counts of rape of a child under sixteen years of age by force, 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A; four counts of rape of a 
child under sixteen years of age, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23; four counts of indecent assault and battery of a child 
under fourteen years of age, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13B; and one count of assault and battery, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a).  The indictments were premised on a 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus curiae brief submitted by 
William J. Sylvester. 
 
4 
 
series of sexual acts committed against three children over a 
period of six years. 
 
According to the affidavits and other materials submitted 
in support of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, in April, 2003, he first met with the attorney whom he 
hired to represent him in defending against these charges.  His 
attorney was frequently unreachable by telephone to discuss the 
case, missed several court dates, and did not meet with the 
defendant again until around January, 2005.3  On February 1, 
2005, the defendant met with the attorney for about five minutes 
in a hallway in the court house.  The attorney advised him that 
he was not prepared to go to trial, that he had "brokered" a 
deal with the judge, and that the defendant had to plead guilty 
to get the deal.  He did not advise the defendant that pleading 
guilty could serve as a predicate for his civil confinement as a 
sexually dangerous person pursuant to G. L. c. 123A. 
 
The next day, the defendant pleaded guilty to each of the 
fourteen counts.  A judge in the Superior Court (plea judge) 
conducted a colloquy in which she advised the defendant of 
several consequences of his pleas, but did not mention the 
possibility of civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person.  
The judge inquired whether the defendant was under the influence 
                                                          
 
 
3 The attorney was publicly reprimanded by the Board of Bar 
Overseers in connection with his performance in this case. 
 
5 
 
of alcohol or drugs; the defendant stated that he had taken only 
prescribed medications and confirmed that he understood the 
consequences of his pleas.  The judge accepted the pleas and 
sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms resulting in an 
aggregate sentence of not less than nine to not more than 
thirteen years in the State prison.  The defendant was also 
sentenced to five years of probation, ordered to participate in 
sexual offender treatment, and notified of his obligation to 
register as a sexual offender. 
 
Soon thereafter, the defendant had second thoughts about 
the sentences he received and contacted his attorney, who filed 
a motion to revoke and revise the sentences, which motion was 
denied.  The defendant was then provided with appellate counsel 
by the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS).  Although 
civil confinement proceedings had not -- and have still not -- 
been commenced, the defendant learned of the possibility that he 
could be confined as a sexually dangerous person as a 
consequence of his convictions.  The defendant requested that 
his appointed appellate counsel file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas on the grounds that, inter alia, his plea counsel 
was ineffective and that he was never advised of the possibility 
of civil confinement as a consequence of his pleas.  Appellate 
counsel declined to include these arguments in the motion 
because they detracted from what counsel viewed as the 
6 
 
defendant's strongest argument, which was that the defendant was 
not mentally competent at the time of his guilty pleas.  The 
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas was denied without a 
hearing.  In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its 
rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed, and we denied the 
defendant's application for further appellate review.  See 
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1116, S.C., 453 Mass. 
1107 (2009). 
 
Subsequently, in 2009, the defendant filed pro se a second 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, this time asserting the 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the judge's 
failure to advise him of the possibility of civil confinement.  
The defendant was appointed new counsel and an evidentiary 
hearing was held on the defendant's motion.  A judge in the 
Superior Court (not the judge who accepted the guilty pleas)  
allowed the defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas on the 
ground that the plea judge's failure to advise the defendant of 
the possibility of civil confinement violated due process and 
rule 12.4  The motion judge did not address the defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument.  The Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
4 The plea judge retired prior to the defendant's first 
motion to withdraw his pleas, which was therefore decided by a 
different judge.  A third judge held the hearing on the 
defendant's second motion to withdraw his pleas, but retired 
prior to deciding it.  The fourth judge rendered his decision 
based on the hearing held by the third judge. 
 
7 
 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Waiver.  "A postsentence motion to 
withdraw a plea is treated as a motion for a new trial."  
Commonwealth v. Berrios, 447 Mass. 701, 708 (2006), cert. 
denied, 550 U.S. 907 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Conaghan, 
433 Mass. 105, 106 (2000).  Any grounds for relief not raised by 
the defendant in his original or amended motion for a new trial 
are "waived unless the judge in the exercise of discretion 
permits them to be raised in a subsequent motion, or unless such 
grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the original or 
amended motion."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (2), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  "The rule of waiver 'applies equally to 
constitutional claims which could have been raised, but were not 
raised' on direct appeal or in a prior motion for a new trial."  
Commonwealth v. Watson, 409 Mass. 110, 112 (1991), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Deeran, 397 Mass. 136, 139 (1986).  We have 
recommended that judges restrict the exercise of their 
discretion to review previously unraised claims to "those 
extraordinary cases where, upon sober reflection, it appears 
that a miscarriage of justice might otherwise result."  Id., 
quoting Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 107-108 (1989). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the motion judge abused his 
discretion by considering the new arguments contained in the 
8 
 
defendant's second motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  We 
disagree.  It was undisputed that the plea judge failed to 
properly inform the defendant pursuant to rule 12 regarding the 
possibility of a future civil confinement, and that plea counsel 
had been reprimanded in connection with his representation of 
the defendant in the underlying proceedings.5  The defendant 
specifically requested that his appointed appellate counsel make 
arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and the 
failure of the plea judge to advise him of possible civil 
confinement.  When counsel declined to do so, the defendant 
complained to CPCS and was told that he had to accept his 
attorney's judgment or proceed without the assistance of CPCS. 
 
Although the judge did not address the Commonwealth's 
waiver argument in his decision, it strikes us as rather harsh 
that a defendant -- who suffered from significant mental health 
                                                          
 
 
5 The Commonwealth makes much of the defendant's failure to 
submit an affidavit from plea counsel stating that he did not 
advise the defendant of the possibility of civil confinement.  
However, the judge was entitled to consider the fact that plea 
counsel was incarcerated at the time of the second motion to 
withdraw his plea and, as a result, the defendant had difficulty 
communicating with him.  The motion judge, who was not the plea 
judge, was also entitled to consider the letter sent to the 
defendant by his plea counsel's attorney, indicating that a 
flood had destroyed certain files relating to the defendant's 
case.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Colon, 439 Mass. 519, 530 (2003) 
("where the judge, the defendant, and the prosecutor could not 
remember the 1994 plea hearing, no weight should be given to the 
fact that the defendant's attorney from the 1994 hearing did not 
testify as to any recollection of the 1994 hearing"). 
 
9 
 
conditions -- would be required to choose between being 
represented by appointed counsel and asserting a claim that 
affected substantially his liberty interest, particularly where 
that claim derived from deficiencies that were apparent in the 
record.  See Commonwealth v. Pariseau, 466 Mass. 805, 808 (2014) 
(civil confinement implicates liberty interest and due process 
protections).  Considering the unusual circumstances presented 
by this case, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
considering the new arguments presented in the defendant's 
second motion to withdraw his pleas.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 56 (1976). 
 
b.  Failure to explain possibility of civil confinement.  A 
judge has discretion to allow a defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas "at any time if it appears that justice may not 
have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  See Berrios, 447 Mass. at 708.  As a matter 
of constitutional due process, "[j]ustice is not done, and a new 
trial is therefore warranted, where a defendant pleads guilty 
without an understanding of the proceedings."  Commonwealth v. 
Nikas, 431 Mass. 453, 456 (2000).  Absent such constitutional 
concerns, "a judge should only grant a postsentence motion to 
withdraw a plea if the defendant comes forward with a credible 
reason which outweighs the risk of prejudice to the 
Commonwealth" (footnote omitted).  Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 
10 
 
Mass. 481, 486 (1982).  Judges are to apply this standard 
"rigorously."  Id. at 487. 
 
Rule 12 describes the procedure for entering a guilty plea.  
At the time of the defendant's plea, rule 12 (c) (3) (B) 
provided that the judge accepting the plea "shall inform the 
defendant on the record, in open court . . . where appropriate, 
of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, and where 
appropriate, the possibility of community parole supervision for 
life;[6] of any different or additional punishment based upon 
subsequent offense or sexually dangerous persons provisions of 
the General Laws, if applicable; where applicable, that the 
defendant may be required to register as a sex offender; and of 
the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge" (emphasis 
added).  The Reporters' Note to rule 12 offers valuable insight 
into its intended application: 
"[I]f the defendant is subject to commitment as a sexually 
dangerous person, see G. L. c. 123A, the judge must include 
notice of that possibility prior to accepting the plea or 
admission.  This provision has been part of Rule 12 since 
its adoption, changing the practice that prevailed prior to 
1979.  See Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 606 
(1973) (being subject to the 'sexually dangerous person' 
provision 'is but one of many contingent consequences of 
being confined' after conviction, and therefore need not be 
                                                          
 
 
6 Rule 12 has since been revised to remove the requirement 
that judges inform defendants of the possibility of community 
parole supervision for life pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 133D 
(c), which was held unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Cole, 
468 Mass. 294, 308 (2014).  See generally Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, 
as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015). 
 
11 
 
explained to a defendant).  Since a 2004 amendment to G. L. 
c. 123A, § 12, makes a defendant subject to commitment as a 
sexually dangerous person despite the nature of the offense 
to which the defendant is pleading guilty, so long as the 
defendant has been convicted any time in the past of a 
designated sex offense, a warning of the possibility of 
commitment under c. 123A should be included as a matter of 
routine unless it is clear from the defendant's prior 
record that it is not relevant." 
 
Reporters' Note to Rule 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, at 1495 (LexisNexis 2014).7  It was the 
view of the motion judge in this case that the admonition set 
forth in the Reporters' Note anticipated the holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 369 (2010) (failure to advise noncitizen that guilty plea 
                                                          
 
 
7 There is no specific statute that, like rule 12, requires 
a judge to inform a defendant pleading guilty to a sexual 
offense that he or she could be civilly confined as a sexually 
dangerous person as a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.  
Contrast G. L. c. 6, § 178E (d) ("Any court which accepts a plea 
for a sex offense shall inform the sex offender prior to 
acceptance and require the sex offender to acknowledge, in 
writing, that such plea may result in such sex offender being 
subject to [provisions regarding registration as a sex 
offender].  Failure to so inform the sex offender shall not be 
grounds to vacate or invalidate the plea"); G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (d) ("prior to accepting a guilty plea for any qualifying 
offense listed in subsection [b], the court shall inform the 
defendant that a . . . plea of guilty for such an offense 
implicates the habitual offender statute and that upon . . . 
plea of guilty for the third or subsequent of said offenses:  
[1] the defendant may be imprisoned in the state prison for the 
maximum term provided by law for such third or subsequent 
offense; [2] no sentence may be reduced or suspended; and [3] 
the defendant may be ineligible for probation, parole, work 
release or furlough, or to receive any deduction in sentence for 
good conduct.  No otherwise valid plea . . . shall be vacated 
based upon the failure to give such warnings"). 
 
12 
 
likely would result in deportation was constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel).  We do not share this view.8 
 
Due process requires that "[a] 'plea is valid only when the 
defendant offers it voluntarily, with sufficient awareness of 
the relevant circumstances . . . and with the advice of 
competent counsel.'"  Berrios, 447 Mass. at 708, quoting Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-749, 758 (1970).  
"Generally, under Massachusetts law, failure to inform a 
defendant of collateral or contingent consequences of a plea 
does not render a plea involuntary."  Commonwealth v. Shindell, 
63 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 505 (2005).  Cf. Steele v. Murphy, 365 
F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 893 (2004), 
quoting Brady, supra at 755 ("defendant need only be 'fully 
aware of the direct consequences' of such a plea").  In Morrow, 
                                                          
 
 
8 The case of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), 
arose in a context very different from the circumstances 
described in the Reporters' Note and presented by this case.  In 
Padilla, an attorney advised his noncitizen client that pleading 
guilty to certain drug charges would not have adverse 
immigration consequences.  That advice was incorrect.  Id. at 
368.  The defendant pleaded guilty and, as a consequence, was 
subjected to deportation proceedings.  The United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires a criminal defense attorney to provide 
accurate advice regarding the near certain deportation 
consequences arising from a guilty plea.  Id. at 368-369.  
Defense counsel's failure to provide such advice was, therefore, 
a "constitutional deficiency" that satisfied the first prong of 
the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Padilla, supra 
at 369. 
 
13 
 
363 Mass. at 606, we held that civil confinement was a 
contingent consequence of a conviction and that the failure to 
advise a defendant of such a possibility did not render his 
guilty plea constitutionally infirm.  The adoption of rule 12 in 
1980 was intended to modify judicial practice by broadening the 
scope of the duty to advise a criminal defendant of the 
implications of a guilty plea, but that did not transform civil 
confinement into a direct consequence of a conviction for 
constitutional purposes.  See Reporters' Note to Rule 12, supra 
at 169, quoting Commonwealth v. Nolan, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 
495 (1985) ("not every omission of a particular from the 
protocol of the rule . . . entitles a defendant at some later 
stage to negate his plea and claim a trial").  See also Steele, 
365 F.3d at 17 ("possibility of confinement for life as a 
sexually dangerous person [under G. L. c. 123A] is a collateral 
consequence of pleading guilty").  Nor did the Padilla case 
effect any such transformation.9 
                                                          
 
 
9 The defendant contends that the Padilla case cast doubt on 
the continued viability of Morrow, pointing to the Supreme 
Court's observation that deportation's close connection to the 
criminal process made it "uniquely difficult to classify as 
either a direct or a collateral consequence."  Padilla, 559 U.S. 
at 366.  However, at the core of the Court's analysis in Padilla 
was a series of changes in Federal immigration law that 
eliminated the authority of the Attorney General and sentencing 
judges to grant discretionary relief from deportation.  Id. at 
361-362.  As a result of these changes in the law, the 
defendant's decision to follow his attorney's incorrect advice 
14 
 
 
Civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person, although 
tangentially connected to the criminal process, is not a 
"virtually mandatory" consequence of a sexual offense 
conviction.  Contrast Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.  Conviction of a 
sexual offense is but one element of the government's case.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 580, cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 150 (2014).  A person may be confined as a sexually 
dangerous person only if, in addition to being convicted of a 
sexual offense, the person suffers from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder that renders him or her a menace to the 
health and safety of others and is likely to engage in sexual 
offenses if not confined.  G. L. c. 123A, §§ 1, 14.  In contrast 
to deportation proceedings, the government has discretion 
whether to initiate confinement proceedings and, even then, only 
on a finding of probable cause to believe the person is a 
sexually dangerous person.  G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), (c).  The 
person has a right to a jury trial in which the government bears 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person 
is a sexually dangerous person.  G. L. c. 123A, § 14.  Simply 
put, the connection between civil confinement and the criminal 
process is not so close that it becomes "uniquely difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and plead guilty "made his deportation virtually mandatory."  
Id. at 359. 
 
15 
 
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence."  
Padilla, supra at 366. 
 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has made clear, an 
attorney's obligations under the Sixth Amendment to advise his 
or her client of consequences of a guilty plea are broader than 
the judge's obligations under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution to ensure that the 
plea is voluntary.10  Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-
51 (1995).  The Sixth Amendment analysis in Padilla did not 
erode the well-settled principle that a judge's failure to 
inform a defendant of a collateral consequence -- such as civil 
confinement -- is, without more, insufficient to render a 
defendant's guilty plea involuntary under the due process 
clause.  See United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 
2012) ("advising of the possibility of civil commitment . . . 
does not fall within the scope of a [D]istrict [C]ourt's due 
process obligations because the concerns expressed by the 
Supreme Court in Padilla as to deportation in the context of 
                                                          
 
 
10 Although the defendant raised an ineffective assistance 
of counsel argument in his motion, the judge did not rule on it 
and the issue is not before us here.  However, to the extent 
that it could be argued that the Padilla case implicates the 
"advice of competent counsel" aspect of the due process inquiry, 
it is clear that the Court's holding was limited to the context 
of deportation.  See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 
1110 (2013) (emphasizing that unique nature of deportation drove 
Padilla decision). 
 
16 
 
adequate counsel under the Sixth Amendment do not apply to such 
a remote and uncertain consequence as civil commitment"); Hamm 
v. State, 403 S.C. 461, 465 (2013) ("rationale under Padilla 
does not extend to a person's civil commitment under the 
[Sexually Violent Predator] Act").  Consequently, the failure of 
the judge in this case to advise the defendant of the 
possibility of civil confinement did not rise to the level of 
constitutional error. 
 
This is not to say that a judge's failure to accurately 
inform a defendant of the possibility of civil confinement is 
irrelevant to the merits of a defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea under rule 30.  The failure to provide information 
(as required by our rules) to a defendant with respect to a 
matter as significant as the possibility of a c. 123A commitment 
may provide a basis for withdrawing the plea, so long as the 
defendant shows that he or she was prejudiced by the omission.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 360 (2014) 
("claim of prosecutorial nondisclosure require[s] the defendant 
to make some showing of prejudice or materiality").  Cf. 
Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1983) 
("defendant seeking to set aside a guilty plea must at the very 
least show that correct information would have made a difference 
in his decision to plead guilty").  In some circumstances, 
information about the possibility of civil confinement might be 
17 
 
quite relevant to a defendant's decision to plead guilty, 
whereas in other circumstances, it might not.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 580 (2001) ("Each case must 
be analyzed individually to determine whether compliance with 
rule 12 would have made a difference in the decision of the 
defendant to plead guilty").  Accordingly, we hold that where a 
judge improperly neglects to inform a defendant of the 
possibility that his or her conviction could serve as a 
predicate for civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person, 
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but 
for the judge's error he or she would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.  Where such a 
showing is made, the magnitude of the deprivation of liberty 
potentially arising from what the defendant was not told may be 
sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether justice has been done.  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b). 
 
Although, at a minimum, the defendant must aver facts 
suggesting prejudice, the averment must be credible in the sense 
that the decision not to plead guilty would have been rational 
under the circumstances.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 356; DeMarco, 
387 Mass. at 486 & n.11.  "Factors to consider in deciding 
whether the defendant's reason for withdrawing his pleas is 
credible include whether the defendant asserted his legal 
innocence; referenced weaknesses in the Commonwealth's case or a 
18 
 
possible defense; and whether the parties had reached a plea 
agreement."  Commonwealth v. Murphy, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 67 
(2008).  A judge may also consider "the timing of [the] request 
to vacate the plea," id.; "whether '[t]he defendant was 
represented by, and had the advice of, able counsel 
throughout,'" id., quoting Rodriguez, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 583;11 
the sentence the defendant received versus the maximum allowable 
sentence had he or she gone to trial, see Commonwealth v. Furr, 
454 Mass. 101, 112 (2009); "the force and plausibility of the 
proffered reason," Rodriguez, supra at 580 n.10, quoting United 
States v. Gray, 63 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1995); and, in sexual 
offense cases, the likelihood of civil confinement in light of 
any evidence relevant to the other elements of sexually 
dangerous person status.  See Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 505 
n.3 ("there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
defendant meets the remaining portion of the definition of 
'sexually dangerous person' set out in [G. L. c.123A, § 1].  
                                                          
 
 
11 Where, for example, counsel has informed the defendant of 
the possibility and parameters of civil confinement as a sexual 
offender, the prospect of prejudice arising from the judge's 
omission will be diminished significantly.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 583 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Russell, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 157 (1994), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1094 (1995) ("Representation and 
consultation with counsel are significant factors in determining 
whether a guilty plea . . . not accompanied by a [sufficient 
plea colloquy] was, nonetheless, knowingly and voluntarily 
made"). 
 
19 
 
Therefore, it seems unlikely that advisement of the possibility 
of proceedings pursuant to c. 123A would have made any 
difference in the decision to plead guilty").  "Ultimately, a 
defendant's decision to tender a guilty plea is a unique, 
individualized decision, and the relevant factors and their 
relative weight will differ from one case to the next."  Scott, 
supra at 356. 
 
Here, the motion judge's memorandum of decision did not 
include findings as to whether knowledge of the possibility of 
civil confinement would have affected materially the defendant's 
decision to plead guilty.  The judge did not engage in an 
analysis of the credibility of the defendant's reason for 
withdrawal, including, for example, the fact that the defendant 
faced the possibility of multiple life sentences had he been 
convicted following a trial on the fourteen indictments and, by 
pleading guilty, reduced his maximum time in prison to thirteen 
years.  See Furr, 454 Mass. at 112 ("highly generous sentence 
recommendation that the defendant received in light of the 
offenses with which he was charged strongly supports the 
conclusion that the defendant chose voluntarily to plead to 
those offenses").  It is, thus, unclear on the present record 
whether the defendant has established a reasonable probability 
that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been informed of 
the possibility of civil confinement.  Accordingly, the matter 
20 
 
must be remanded for further findings and rulings on the merits 
of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  See 
Gibney v. Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 146, 148 (1978) ("arguments 
raised by the petitioners are based on factual questions that 
are best left for resolution in the first instance by the trial 
judge on a motion for new trial"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his pleas is vacated, and the matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further findings and rulings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.