Title: Collazo v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12557
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2020

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SJC-12557 
 
RAYMOND COLLAZO  vs. 
  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
January 9, 2020. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy.  Practice, 
Criminal, Mistrial, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Raymond Collazo appeals from a judgment of the county 
court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
Collazo was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree 
and other offenses arising from the death of his five month old 
infant son James (a pseudonym).  After a jury trial in the 
Superior Court, the jury were unable to reach a unanimous 
verdict on the murder charge.1  The trial judge declared a 
mistrial.  Collazo unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the murder 
indictment and for a required finding of not guilty, arguing 
that a retrial was barred by double jeopardy principles because 
the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to 
warrant a conviction.  His G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought 
relief from the denial of that motion.  We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
"So long as the Commonwealth 'presents evidence legally 
sufficient to convict' at the first trial, double jeopardy will 
                                                          
 
 
1 At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the trial judge 
entered a required finding of not guilty on so much of the 
indictment as charged murder in the first degree based on 
deliberate premeditation, leaving it for the jury to consider 
whether Collazo committed murder in the first degree with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  Other charges were dismissed at the 
Commonwealth's request.  In addition, the jury acquitted Collazo 
of one indictment charging assault and battery. 
 
not generally 'bar retrial after a mistrial [is] declared 
because of a "hung jury."'"  Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 
470, 473 (2012), quoting Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 
794, 798-799 (1985).  "In making a determination whether the 
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to warrant a finding 
of guilt, '[the] question is whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Berry, supra at 794, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  
The trial evidence meets this standard. 
 
 
Collazo argues that double jeopardy principles bar retrial 
for two reasons:  first, because the evidence was insufficient 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that James died as a 
result of inflicted injuries, rather than illness or some other 
cause, and second, because, assuming James did die from 
inflicted injuries, the evidence was in equipoise as to whether 
the defendant or James's mother was the perpetrator.   
See 
Berry, 393 Mass. at 796, citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 306 
Mass. 141, 147 (1940) ("When the evidence tends equally to 
sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them 
can be said to have been established by legitimate proof").  
Neither contention has merit. 
 
 
As to the cause of death, the Commonwealth presented ample 
expert testimony to establish that James died due to injuries 
that were inflicted on him.  The medical examiner who performed 
James's autopsy testified to her findings, which included a 
blood clot on James's brain that was not old enough to have 
formed a membrane and become adherent, bruising on the inside 
of his scalp, and fractures to his extremities.  The witness 
also gave her opinion, based on these findings, that James died 
as a result of abusive head trauma.  Other experts testified 
for the Commonwealth as well.  For example, a pediatric 
radiologist who examined James's bones and took high-detail 
images of them testified that James had several fractures, some 
of which showed evidence of healing and others that showed no 
such signs, indicating that the fractures were of different 
ages.  One fracture was described as a "classic metaphyseal 
lesion," which the radiologist testified is a type of fracture 
strongly associated with child or infant abuse.  Another 
expert, a neuropathologist who examined James's brain, 
testified to injuries that occurred due to lack of oxygen and 
to acute hemorrhaging, including hemorrhaging in the junction 
between the brain and the spinal cord.  We need not belabor 
all the testimony.  To the extent that Collazo argues that his 
 
own experts offered different opinions as to the cause of 
death, the jury were free to discount those opinions or to 
discredit them entirely.2  Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to warrant the 
jury in finding that James died as a result of inflicted 
injuries. 
 
 
As to the identity of the perpetrator, we disagree with 
Collazo's argument that, as in Berry, 393 Mass. at 796, the 
evidence, even when viewed in the best light for the 
Commonwealth, equally supported two inconsistent propositions:  
that Collazo himself inflicted the injuries, or that James's 
mother did so.  The evidence warranted a finding that James 
suffered his fatal injuries between approximately 1 A.M., when 
James's mother fed him, observed his condition to be normal, 
and went back to sleep, and approximately 6:50 A.M., when 
James was found unresponsive in his crib and emergency services 
were called.  The jury could have found that, throughout that 
time period, Collazo was James's sole caretaker while James's 
mother slept.  In these circumstances, there was a clear basis 
in the evidence for the jury to find that it was Collazo, not 
James's mother, who was responsible for his death.  The jury 
were not left to speculate between two equally likely 
propositions. 
 
 
Conclusion.  Because the evidence was sufficient to 
warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree based on 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, double jeopardy principles do not 
bar Collazo's retrial on that charge.  The single justice 
neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
David B. Hirsch for the petitioner. 
 
John A. Wendel, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                                                          
 
 
2 While we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, we recognize that the defendant offered, through 
expert testimony, evidence that James died from natural causes, 
based in part on evidence of pneumonia in his lungs at the time 
of death.  The defendant also raised questions about, inter alia, 
the thoroughness of the original autopsy.