Title: Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85857
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 1999

Davis v. Toshiba (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 85857-Agenda 9-January 1999.
Opinion filed March 18, 1999.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Sandra Davis, filed suit in the circuit court of Cook County to 
recover on a strict liability theory for an injury she sustained while operating 
a printing press designed, manufactured, and sold by defendant, Toshiba Machine 
Company, America. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the statute 
of repose had expired. The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 
297 Ill. App. 3d 440. We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal 
(166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm the appellate court.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Toshiba entered into a contract in August 1985 with R.R. Donnelley 
&amp; Sons, Inc., to design, manufacture, and sell a printing press to 
Donnelley. Toshiba delivered the printing press to Donnelley in July 1986 at the 
port of Los Angeles. On March 11, 1996, plaintiff, Sandra Davis, suffered severe 
and permanent injuries when her right hand was caught in the rollers of the 
printing press at Donnelley's Dwight, Illinois, facility, where she worked as an 
assistant press operator.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant on February 24, 1997, 11 months after 
the accident, alleging strict liability. She contended that the press was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous because the machine did not include 
shields, guards, or other protective devices between the press rollers and its 
ink levelers.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that section 13-213(b) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-213(b) (West 1996)) barred the action 
because more than 10 years had elapsed between the sale of the press to its 
initial user and the February 24, 1997, filing of the complaint. In response, 
plaintiff argued that section 13-213(d) (735 ILCS 5/13-213(d) (West 1996)) 
provided her with two years in which to bring suit, even though the repose 
period had expired in the meantime.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. 
Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded. 297 Ill. App. 
3d 440. The appellate panel held the plaintiff's action was timely because 
section 13-213(d) created an exception to the repose period, allowing plaintiff 
to bring suit within two years from the date she knew or should have known of 
her injury, as long as the injury itself occurred within the repose period. We 
granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now 
affirm the appellate court.
II. ANALYSIS
The issue in this case, involving the interpretation of sections 13-213(b) 
and (d), is one of statutory construction. The standard of review is de 
novo.
Section 13-213(b) states in part:
Section 13-213(d) states in part:
Plaintiff argues that section 13-213(d) permits her to bring suit within two 
years of the date of her injury, even if the repose period has expired in the 
meantime. Defendant contends that because plaintiff was injured within the 
repose period and knew of her injury four months before that period expired, she 
was required to bring suit within the repose period. Defendant asserts that 
section 13-213(d) applies only to latent injuries, or injuries that are not 
immediately discoverable, and does not save plaintiff's cause of action.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative 
intent by first looking at the plain meaning of the language. "Where the 
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give it effect as 
written, without 'reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the 
legislature did not express.' " Garza v. Navistar International 
Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996), quoting Solich v. 
George &amp; Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994). Courts will first look to the words of the statute, for 
the language used by the legislature is the best indication of legislative 
intent. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). When the language 
of a statute is clear, no resort is necessary to other tools of interpretation. 
Henry v. St. John's Hospital, 138 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1990).
Plaintiff was injured before the expiration of the 10-year repose period 
found in section 13-213(b) but did not bring suit until after the repose period 
expired. We believe that the plain language of section 13-213(d) means that 
plaintiff had two years in which to file the present action, even though the 
repose period expired in the meantime. Subsection (d) begins with the phrase, 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) ***, if the injury complained 
of occurs within any of the periods provided by subsection (b) ***, the 
plaintiff may bring an action within 2 years after the date on which the 
claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, of 
the existence of the personal injury ***." 735 ILCS 5/13-213(d) (West 1996). The 
word "notwithstanding" has been defined as meaning "in spite of." Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1986). Subsection (d) thus creates an 
exception to the 10-year repose period found in subsection (b) and allows a 
plaintiff to bring an action within two years from when she knew or should have 
known of her injury, even though the 10-year repose period has expired in the 
meantime. Here, plaintiff sustained an immediately discoverable injury between 
the eighth and tenth years of the repose period, and section 13-213(d) therefore 
provides her with a two-year period after the injury in which to bring an 
action.
There is no language in the statute that limits its application to latent 
injuries, as defendant contends. Accordingly, we must reject defendant's 
argument that section 13-213(d) cannot apply to immediately discoverable 
injuries like plaintiff's. Had the legislature intended to restrict the 
application of section 13-213(d) only to latent injuries, or ones that are not 
immediately discoverable, it would have inserted that limitation. Nothing in the 
plain language of the statute, however, indicates that it is unavailable in the 
circumstances alleged here.
Under the defendant's interpretation of section 13-213(d), a plaintiff 
incurring an immediately discoverable injury on the last day of the repose 
period would be required to file suit that day to bring a timely action, but a 
plaintiff incurring a latent injury would have the additional time provided in 
section 13-213(d). We find nothing in the language of the statute to suggest 
that the legislature intended the results in those cases to be different, and to 
withhold from a plaintiff who has suffered an immediately discoverable injury 
the benefit of the exception provided in 13-213(d).
In support of its position, defendant cites American Family Insurance Co. 
v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 385 (1989), and Elliot 
v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 383 (1988). Both decisions 
held that section 13-213(d) applies only to latent injuries. We disagree with 
Elliot and American Family in their construction of section 
13-213(d) as being inapplicable to immediately discoverable injuries. As the 
appellate court below concluded, the plain language of section 13-213(d) 
provides that the plaintiff may bring her action within two years of the date of 
her injury, even though the 10-year repose period found in section 13-213(b) has 
expired in the meantime. 297 Ill. App. 3d at 444. As we have stated, nothing in 
section 13-213(d) precludes its application to injuries that are immediately 
discoverable.
Defendant also relies on Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995), and Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418 (1970), in support of its contention that section 13-213(d) applies only 
to latent injuries. The defendant misconstrues our holdings in those cases. In 
both cases, this court held that the time period for bringing an action to 
recover damages for an immediately discoverable injury begins when the injury 
occurs. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 361-62; Williams, 45 Ill. 2d  at 
432. Our holding today is consistent with those decisions.
Finally, defendant cites Taylor v. Raymond Corp., 909 F.2d 225 (7th 
Cir. 1990), in support of its contention that 13-213(d) does not apply to 
immediately discoverable injuries. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, 
however, the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court in that case, did 
not reach the issue whether section 13-213(d) applies to immediately 
discoverable injuries. In dicta, the panel noted it was unanimous in 
affirming the lower court decision but said it would not resolve the split among 
the Illinois courts on the question whether section 13-213(d) applies to 
immediately discoverable injuries. Taylor, 909 F.2d  at 227.
Moreover, we note that we cited with approval the district court's analysis 
in Taylor in Garza v. Navistar International Transportation 
Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373 (1996). The district court stated that the two-year 
extension provided by section 13-213(d) may apply to plaintiffs who suffer 
immediately discoverable injuries, as long as the injury occurs within the 
repose period. Taylor v. Raymond Corp., 719 F. Supp. 738, 739 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989). "Section 13-213(d), however, says nothing about the immediate 
discoverability of an injury. *** Nowhere does subsection (d) indicate that a 
plaintiff who sustains his injury within the repose period, and discovers the 
injury when he sustains it, cannot rely on the two-year extension." 
Taylor, 719 F. Supp.  at 740.
In the case at bar, plaintiff's injury occurred on March 11, 1996, within the 
10-year repose period. Given section 13-213(d), plaintiff had until March 11, 
1998, to file an action. She filed suit on February 24, 1997, and therefore the 
action was timely.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which 
reversed the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remanded the cause 
for further proceedings.
Judgment affirmed.