Title: State v. Lisa Orta
Citation: 2000 WI 3
Docket Number: 1997AP003105-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 2000

2000 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3105-CR & 97-3106-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Lisa Orta,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Ricardo Ruiz,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  No Cite 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 19, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 10, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald P. Ptacek 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHANSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join in part. 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHANSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Lisa Orta, there 
was a brief by Mark F. Nielsen and Schwartz, Tofte & Nielsen, 
LTD., Racine and oral argument by Mark F. Nielsen. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Ricardo Ruiz, there 
was a statement by Michael P. Reisterer, Jr. and Reisterer Law 
Office, Kalamazoo, MI, that they adopt the brief of Lisa Orta. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mary E. 
Waitrovich, assistant state public defender and Nicholas L. 
Chiarkas, state public defender for the State Public Defender. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Howard B. 
Eisenberg, Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
2000 WI 4 
  
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3105-CR, 97-3106-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Lisa Orta, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
Ricardo Ruiz, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The question presented in 
these consolidated cases is whether evidence that is seized 
pursuant to a rule expounded by this court must be suppressed 
when that rule is subsequently determined by the United States 
Supreme Court to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.   
FILED 
 
      
JAN 19, 2000 
Cornelia G. Clark Acting 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3105-CR, 97-3106-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
We considered this identical issue in a separate case 
decided today, State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ____ Wis. 2d ____, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.  For the reasons set forth in Ward, we conclude that 
the evidence seized at the home of Lisa Orta and Ricardo Ruiz is 
admissible evidence.  Accordingly, the decision of the court of 
appeals is reversed. 
¶3 
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows.  In 
February 1997 City of Racine police executed a no-knock search 
warrant at a home occupied by Lisa Orta.  Orta and Ricardo Ruiz 
were present at the residence at the time the search warrant was 
executed.  The officers seized 6.7 grams of marijuana, 3.7 grams 
of cocaine in one location and .2 grams of cocaine in another, 
two guns, a digital scale and other items.  The defendants were 
each charged with violating various provisions of the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act.1 
¶4 
Subsequent to the search and while the defendants’ 
case was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  In Richards, the 
Court held it to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to 
allow a per se exception from compliance with the rule of 
                     
1 The Uniform Controlled Substances Act is contained in ch. 
961 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
No. 
97-3105-CR, 97-3106-CR 
 
 
3 
announcement2 whenever a search warrant is executed seeking 
evidence of felony drug delivery or dealing.  This court had 
established this per se exception in State v. Stevens, 181 
Wis. 2d 410 (1994) and State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 
N.W.2d 218 (1996).  Based upon the Supreme Court decision, the 
defendants in this case moved to suppress evidence seized by the 
police arguing that the police had made a no-knock entry that 
was constitutionally unreasonable.  The State conceded that the 
officers’ no-knock entry into the residence was not reasonable 
under Richards.  The circuit court granted the defendants’ 
motion to suppress evidence.  The court of appeals summarily 
affirmed the suppression order.  This court granted the State’s 
petition for review pursuant to Wis. Stat. §  (Rule) 809.62(1). 
¶5 
In Ward, we considered the impact of the Richards 
decision on evidence seized while our rule in State v. Richards 
and Stevens was the law of the land.  We concluded that evidence 
seized in compliance with our rule was admissible under both the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. I, 
§ 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Therefore, pursuant to our 
                     
2  The rule of announcement requires police to follow three 
steps prior to forcibly entering a home to execute a search 
warrant:  announce their identity, announce their purpose and 
wait for the occupants to either open the door or refuse to 
admit the officers.  State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 511 
N.W.2d 591 (1994) (quoting State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 
622, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984)). 
No. 
97-3105-CR, 97-3106-CR 
 
 
4 
reasoning set forth in Ward, we conclude that the evidence 
seized in this case is also admissible.3 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                     
3 The State also argues that the exclusionary rule does not 
generally apply to evidence seized in the execution of a search 
warrant after a violation of the rule of announcement.  As we 
noted in State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶46 n.7, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, , because defendants’ motion to suppress is denied 
on other grounds, we need not address this issue. 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
1 
¶6 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).   Although I 
agree with the result reached by the majority in this case, I 
come to that result by a different route.  This case can be 
decided without resort to any good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule because the no-knock entry of the Orta 
residence was constitutional.  Well settled law allows police to 
dispense with the rule of announcement if the officers have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be 
dangerous, futile, or inhibitory to the criminal investigation. 
 Because the officers had a substantial basis for their concerns 
in this case, I concur in the result but do not join the 
majority opinion. 
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
¶7 
This court's decision in Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 
193 N.W. 89 (1923), was a watershed in Wisconsin law.  The case 
concerned the search of an automobile for illegal alcohol.  Two 
officers detected the odor of alcohol in Hoyer's automobile 
after it had been in a collision.  The officers searched the 
vehicle without a warrant; ultimately, this court, acting on the 
law as it stood at that time, held that the five bottles of 
liquor found were the result of an unlawful search and seizure. 
 This court suppressed the evidence with an analysis that made 
Wisconsin one of the first states to adopt the exclusionary 
rulealmost 40 years before the Supreme Court applied the Fourth 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
2 
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).4 
¶8 
In Hoyer, the court wrestled with the policy issues 
surrounding the suppression of probative evidence.  It noted 
that several states had refused to examine the means by which 
such evidence was obtained and cited cases from Iowa, Nebraska, 
California, Georgia, Massachusetts, and North Dakota.  The court 
then turned to cases from the Supreme Court, namely Amos v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298 (1921), in which evidence obtained through unlawful 
searches had been suppressed.  After examining several other 
cases from lower federal courts, the court listed five cases 
from Michigan and cases from Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
and Wyoming that followed the federal exclusionary rule.  
Thereupon, the court said: 
 
For ourselves we elect to stand . . . with the federal 
and other courts which consider these provisions of 
the Bill of Rights as embodied in constitutions to be 
of substance rather than mere tinsel.  We hold, 
therefore, that the evidence challenged in this case 
was taken by the officers by unlawful search and 
seizure and contrary to sec. 11, art. I, Wis. Const. 
and was improperly received in evidence against him on 
                     
4  For a general history of the exclusionary rule and a 
discussion about how the Wisconsin rule offers more protection 
against 
unlawful 
searches 
and 
seizures 
than 
the 
federal 
exclusionary rule, see Charles David Schmidt, Comment, But What 
of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule?  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless 
Searches, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 299, 308-311 (1999). 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
3 
the trial in violation of his rights under sec. 8, 
art. I, Wis. Const.5  (citation omitted) 
Hoyer, 180 Wis. at 415. 
 
¶9 
The court declared that sec. 11, art. I of the 
Wisconsin Constitution is "a pledge of the faith of the state 
government" that all the people of the state "(with no express 
or possible mental reservation that it is for the good and 
innocent only), shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure."  
Id. at 417.   
 
This security has vanished and the pledge is violated 
by the state that guarantees it when officers of the 
state, acting under color of state-given authority, 
search and seize unlawfully.  The pledge of this 
provision and that of sec. 8 are each violated when 
use is made of such evidence in one of its own courts 
by other of its officers.  That a proper resultthat 
is, 
a 
conviction 
of 
one 
really 
guilty 
of 
an 
offensemay be thus reached is neither an excuse for 
nor a condonation of the use by the state of that 
which is so the result of its own violation of its own 
fundamental charter. 
                     
5 Between 1870 and 1981, § 8, art. I of the Wisconsin 
Constitution read as follows: 
SECTION 8.  No person shall be held to answer for a 
criminal offense without due process of law, and no 
person for the same offense shall be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.  All 
persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by 
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when 
the proof is evident or the presumption great; and the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety may require it. 
 
Historical Note, W.S.A. Const. art. 1 § 8 (West 1986). 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
4 
Id. 
 
¶10 These strong words and others in the opinion have been 
subjected to exhaustive exegesis in subsequent cases.  For 
instance, in State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 453, 388 N.W.2d 
151 (1986), the court declared that in Hoyer "we adopted an 
exclusionary rule based upon the Wisconsin Constitution," and it 
noted that the "state urges us to adopt Leon and to overrule our 
holding in Hoyer v. State" (referring to United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984)).6  Justice Abrahamson concurred in the 
decision, reasserting that the Wisconsin exclusionary rule is 
based upon the Wisconsin Constitution and is independent of an 
exclusionary 
rule 
imposed 
on 
the 
states 
by 
the 
federal 
constitution.  Id. at 455.  But Justice Steinmetz disagreed.  He 
wrote in his concurrence that: 
 
It is not a proper statement that Hoyer v. State 
established the Wisconsin exclusionary rule grounded 
exclusively in the state constitution independent of 
the United States Supreme Court with respect to fourth 
amendment violations. . . . I emphasize that there is 
no basis in our prior decisions which indicates that 
art. I, sec. 11 provides broader protection than the 
fourth amendment.  (citation omitted) 
Id. at 459.   
 
¶11 Two years later in State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 
423 N.W.2d 823 (1988), Justice Steinmetz wrote for a four-member 
majority: 
 
                     
6  Justice Ceci also disagreed with Justice Abrahamson's 
views in his own pointed concurrence.  State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 
2d 443, 461-63, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986). 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
5 
The protection of rights and the preservation of 
judicial integrity depend in reality on the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule.  Unlawful police 
conduct 
is 
deterred 
when 
evidence 
recovered 
in 
unreasonable searches is not admissible in courts.  
The Wisconsin cases discussed in Hoyer and statements 
of that 
court all 
concerned judicial 
protection 
against police oppression.  That is, the exclusionary 
rule 
developed 
as 
a 
judicial 
remedy 
to 
deter 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures.  
The 
fourth 
amendment was and is a limit on the powers of 
government. 
Id. at 133-34. 
 
¶12 The question we should address in entertaining an 
exception to the Wisconsin exclusionary rule is whether Justice 
Steinmetz was correct, that the exclusionary rule is a mere 
"judicial remedy" subject to periodic revision by courts and 
capable of tracking all the exceptions crafted or recognized by 
the Supreme Court; or, conversely, whether Chief Justice 
Abrahamson is correct, that the rule embodies a fundamental 
right embedded in the Wisconsin Constitution, a right that is 
not automatically altered to incorporate federal trends in 
criminal justice. 
 
¶13 The Steinmetz analysis in Tompkins, however attractive 
it may have been, was dictum in that case.  Moreover, his 
opinion was not correct in asserting that "the interpretation of 
the Wisconsin Constitution in Hoyer was based exclusively upon 
federal 
cases, 
particularly 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decisions interpreting the fourth amendment."  Id. at 135.  On 
the other hand, the Hoyer court proclaimed that "we elect to 
stand . . . with the federal and other courts."  Hoyer, 180 Wis. 
at 415.  The court's use of the word "elect" is quite at odds 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
6 
with a constitutional mandate.  Moreover, in light of modern 
search and seizure doctrine, the Hoyer court was dead wrong on 
the question of whether authorities could search an automobile 
without a warrant.  The court failed to anticipate Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and it made a point of 
disagreeing with the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Case, 
190 N.W. 289 (Mich. 1922), a case in which the court had 
grounded a decision upholding the search of an automobile on 
"the nature of the automobile and the extent to which it can be 
used as a means of crime."  Hoyer, 180 Wis. at 414. 
 
¶14 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___, of even date, is a new watershed in Wisconsin law.  It is a 
momentous event when this court throws over more than 75 years 
of precedent and yields to the persistent entreaties of the 
State to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  That we should use the Ward case as the vehicle for 
declaring such an exception is an abomination, because it 
vindicates substandard police performance.  That we should apply 
the new exception in this very different case is unnecessary and 
dangerous, because it implies that excellent police work was 
constitutionally deficient. 
 
¶15 It may be possible to support a limited good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule in a worthy case, with 
compelling facts, in which the court carefully articulates a 
rationale that squares with the storied Hoyer decision.  But not 
in Ward and not here. 
EXIGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF ANNOUNCEMENT 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶16 Under the circumstances of this case, police entry 
into the Orta residence without announcement was constitutional 
because police had reasonable suspicion that they were facing 
exigent circumstances. 
¶17 The general reasonableness requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment govern the common law principle of announcement.  
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).  Although police 
ordinarily must knock and announce their identity and purpose 
before entering a dwelling, not every entry "must be preceded by 
an announcement."  Id.  The announcement principle is not "an 
inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances." 
 Id.  Rather, the rule is sufficiently flexible to permit 
consideration of "countervailing law enforcement interests."  
Id.  
¶18 The 
Supreme Court 
rejected 
this 
court's blanket 
exception 
to 
the 
knock-and-announce 
requirement 
for 
drug 
investigations in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  
Nonetheless, the court upheld the unannounced entry in that case 
and allowed police to dispense with announcement when they have 
reasonable suspicion that an announcement would be dangerous or 
futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of 
the crime by allowing suspects to destroy evidence.  State v. 
Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 734-35, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (citing 
Richards, 520 U.S. at 394). 
¶19 Police can execute a no-knock search when they have a 
reasonable suspicion that, based on the particular facts, 
exigent circumstances exist.  Id. at 751; see also United States 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
8 
v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 70, 73 (1998).  Exigent circumstances 
exist when there is a reasonable belief, evaluated at the time 
of entry, that knocking and announcing will endanger the safety 
of the police or others.  Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 746 n.17.  
Exigent circumstances also arise when it is likely that evidence 
will be destroyed, or when the announcement becomes superfluous 
because the occupants of the premises already are aware of the 
police presence.  Id. 
¶20 When they review the circumstances of unannounced 
entries, courts may consider the experience and training of 
police officers in combination with the particular facts.  Id. 
at 752.  In assessing an officer's experience, we look at his or 
her familiarity with similar situations, and how the officer's 
generalized knowledge may lead to reasonable inferences.  Id. at 
752 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).  Under the 
collective knowledge doctrine, there are situations in which the 
information in the hands of an entire police department may be 
imputed to officers on the scene to help establish reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause.  State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 
625-26, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974); State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 
683, 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶21 Usually, after a circuit court has upheld a no-knock 
warrant under the overturned blanket rule, an appellate court 
will remand the case to the circuit court for a new suppression 
hearing.  Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 754; State v. Ruiz, 213 Wis. 2d 
200, 214, 570 N.W.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Ramirez, 228 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
9 
Wis. 2d 561, 570, 598 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1999).  That is 
exactly what the court of appeals ordered in this case. 
¶22 In my view, however, there already are sufficient 
facts in the record to show exigent circumstances, making a new 
hearing unnecessary.  The officers had reasonable suspicion, 
based on the particular facts of the case, that the rule of 
announcement would lead to violence and possible injury, or the 
destruction of evidence. 
¶23 The record reveals the following:  Officer John Lucci 
brought 17 years of law enforcement experience and insight to 
the investigation of Ricardo Ruiz and Lisa Orta.  At the time he 
prepared the affidavit for the search warrant, Officer Lucci was 
serving on the Racine County Metro Drug Unit (MDU) as an 
investigative agent.  Information in the possession of a 
division like the MDU may be imputed to officers making an 
arrest or executing a search warrant when the officers have the 
benefit of that information through communication with others in 
the unit and they rely on it.  See generally State v. Friday, 
140 Wis. 2d 701, 714-15, 412 N.W.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(overruled on other grounds, State v. Friday, 147 Wis. 2d 359, 
434 N.W.2d 85 (1989)). 
¶24 Prior to submitting the detailed affidavit for the 
warrant, Officer Lucci checked the MDU and Criminal Information 
Bureau files for information about Ruiz and Orta.  The files 
contained information about "eleven different complaints against 
Ricardo Ruiz for drug trafficking since 1987."  They showed he 
had been arrested on four prior occasions for delivery of 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
10
cocaine.  They indicated he had been convicted of two felonies 
related to cocaine and that Ruiz was on probation. 
¶25 Concerning Orta, the MDU files contained information 
about six different complaints against Orta for drug trafficking 
since 1987. The affidavit did not spell out the details of these 
six complaints, but one of them probably served as the basis for 
a search warrant of her residence in 1991. 
¶26 The 1997 search warrant for the Orta residence was 
obtained on February 8, 1997.  The Racine County Sheriff's 
Department SWAT team executed the warrant on February 10, 1997, 
at 8:07 a.m.  Deputy Sheriff Thomas Bauer was the first person 
through the door.  The SWAT team included Detective Prochniak.  
Also 
present 
at 
the 
scene 
were 
Investigator 
Bellovary, 
Investigator 
Birkholz, 
Investigator 
Tharinger, 
Sergeant 
Ketterhagen, Agent Lucci, Agent Simons, Agent Mich, and Agent 
Luedtke.  According to the record, at least two of the named 
individuals, Investigator Birkholz and Investigator Tharinger, 
were officers with the City of Racine, a fact that underscores 
the cooperative nature of the Racine County Metro Drug Unit.  At 
least two of the named individuals, Investigator Tharinger and 
Agent Mich, had previously executed search warrants involving 
Ricardo Ruiz and Lisa Orta. 
¶27 There were at least ten police officers at the 
residence 
when 
the 
warrant 
was 
executed, 
and 
the 
raid 
demonstrated both planning and extensive communication among the 
police agencies that make up the Racine County Metro Drug Unit. 
 The officers must have discussed the previous search warrants 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
11
for Ruiz and Orta.  On these facts, the collective knowledge 
doctrine allows officers and their agencies to pool knowledge in 
determining reasonable suspicion to enter without announcement. 
¶28 Knowledge of the facts surrounding the August 1991 
warrant and search is part of the information that may be 
imputed to all officers at the scene.  In 1991, a reliable 
confidential informant accused the girlfriend of Ricardo Ruiz of 
selling cocaine from an apartment at 1623 Prospect Street in 
Racine.  The girlfriend was Lisa Orta.  The court issued a 
warrant to search her premises on August 5, 1991, and it was 
executed two days later.  Officers observed four males sitting 
in lawn chairs on the front porch of the Orta residence.  Ruiz 
was one of the four males.  At the time, he was free on bond for 
previous cocaine charges.  One of the males sitting next to Ruiz 
attempted to throw away a small white packet as the police 
approached.  The packet was retrieved and determined to contain 
cocaine.  Police found additional cocaine in the possession of 
this male.  Police recovered $192 in cash from the person of 
Ricardo Ruiz and found an additional $129 in cash inside, along 
with numerous food stamp coupons.  They also found Ruiz's 
driver's license, and an order for Ruiz to attend a pretrial 
court hearing, in a bedroom dresser inside the apartment.  In 
the same room, they found a gram scale commonly used to prepare 
and weigh controlled substances.  Police discovered a plastic 
bag containing tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in the apartment, 
along with numerous plastic bags, fireworks, and ammunition for 
a .38 special.   
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
12
¶29 Officer 
Lucci's 
affidavit 
for 
the 
1997 
warrant 
explains how a confidential informant purchased cocaine at the 
Orta residence in a carefully monitored, controlled buy within 
five days of the warrant application.  The informant alleged 
that Ricardo Ruiz had a gram scale and packaging materials in 
his bedroom at the Orta residence, and that the informant had 
seen Ricardo Ruiz sell cocaine to other people within the 
previous two weeks at the house. 
¶30 Ruiz was present at Orta's residence in 1991 when the 
search warrant was executed.  The affidavit for the 1997 warrant 
stated that the confidential informant claimed on the basis of 
personal observation that Ruiz and Orta both resided at 2606 
Douglas Avenue, Racine, the premises to be searched.  Two 
vehicles were present at the house at the time of the search.  
Consequently, Lucci and other officers had good reason to 
believe that two long-time drug dealers who were thoroughly 
familiar with the police and the criminal justice system would 
be present at the premises when they entered the building. 
¶31 In 1997, Ricardo Ruiz had two felony convictions 
involving cocaine and was on probation.  He was steadily selling 
drugs.  The police officers could assume that Ruiz knew that his 
arrest would lead to the revocation of his probation.  His 
conviction would likely produce a lengthy prison sentence.  He 
was a repeat drug offender, a status that has the effect of 
doubling the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment for any 
drug conviction.  As a convicted felon, Ruiz could not possess a 
firearm and would be treated as a habitual offender if he were 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
13
caught with one.  Drug dealers often possess and use firearms, 
but the present case moves beyond generalities.  This particular 
drug dealer possessed ammunition for a .38 special in 1991 only 
a few months after he had been the subject of a search warrant 
and while he was out on bond on drug charges.  With this 
background, police had good reason to believe that this drug 
dealer would have firearms in 1997 and had motive to use them.  
That is why at least ten officers went to the residence, and why 
they waited until a juvenile male had left the premises for 
school before executing the warrant. 
¶32 The fact that the officers eventually seized a .32 
caliber derringer in one bedroom and a Ruger semi automatic .9 
millimeter handgun in the kitchen, plus a .9 millimeter magazine 
with two cartridges, did not itself establish reasonable 
suspicion 
for 
police 
to 
enter 
Orta's 
residence 
without 
announcement, but it did confirm the reasonableness of the 
officers' judgment.  By contrast, in the Ward case, police were 
not dealing with a convicted felon, and they found no firearms 
at Ward's house. 
¶33 Even if Ruiz and Orta did not resort to violence, they 
were likely to attempt to destroy evidence.  Lucci and the other 
officers could infer that Ruiz and Orta were familiar with the 
manner in which police execute search warrants.  Both were long-
time drug dealers facing substantial criminal sentences if 
convicted.  Both had been the target of search warrants.  Both 
were known to deal in powder cocaine.  Cocaine is readily 
disposable, and experienced dealers like Ruiz and Orta can 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
14
destroy it more easily than marijuana.  See State v. Kiekhefer, 
212 Wis. 2d  460, 478, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997).  Police 
knew that in the 1991 MDU search, the suspect sitting next to 
Ruiz had tried to get rid of incriminating cocaine evidence.  
Police knew that Ruiz and Orta had motive and experience to 
destroy evidence if given the chance and that an announcement 
could well have "inhibit[ed] the effective investigation of the 
crime."  Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. 
¶34 A combination of particular facts, such as the 
defendant's "apparent recognition of the officers combined with 
the easily disposable nature of the drugs," can justify a no-
knock entry.  Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 752 (citing Richards, 520 
U.S. at 394).  In this case the combination of particular facts 
more than supports the decision to dispense with the rule of 
announcement. 
¶35 Given the rich factual record here to support a no-
knock entry, this is not the case in which to graft the good 
faith exception onto Wisconsin's exclusionary rule.  The good 
faith 
exception 
very 
well 
may 
fuse 
elegantly 
with 
our 
exclusionary rule under a better set of facts, but not under the 
ones in this case.  The decision of the court of appeals should 
have been reversed on the grounds that the no-knock entry was 
constitutional. 
¶36 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY join the "GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIONARY RULE" section of this concurrence. 
 
97-3105-CR.dtp 
 
15
 
 
No. 97-3105.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice (dissenting).  I 
dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in State 
v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, of even 
date. 
¶38 The majority opinion in Ward holds that evidence 
seized in an unconstitutional no-knock search may be admitted 
only when an officer relies in objective good faith on a 
pronouncement of this court.  Thus a mere pronouncement of this 
court validating a no-knock search apparently is not adequate to 
admit the evidence.  An officer’s subjective good faith reliance 
on this court’s pronouncement is not sufficient to admit the 
evidence.  An officer’s reliance in objective good faith on this 
court’s pronouncement is needed to admit the evidence.  
¶39 An issue the majority opinion does not address in this 
case or in State v. Ward is what constitutes an officer’s 
reliance in objective good faith on a pronouncement of this 
court. 
¶40 Can an officer rely in objective good faith on a 
pronouncement of this court when the U.S. Supreme Court has 
agreed to review this court’s pronouncement and numerous state 
and 
federal 
courts 
have 
disagreed 
with 
this 
court’s 
pronouncement?  In February 1997 when the officers executed the 
unconstitutional no-knock entry into Ms. Orta’s residence, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had already agreed to review this court’s 
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decision in State v. Richards.7  Richards is the case that, 
according to the majority opinion, the officers had to rely upon 
in objective good faith.8  Numerous federal and state decisions 
disagreed with this court’s pronouncement in Richards.  See 
State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d at 871 n.6 (Abrahamson, J. 
concurring)(cases described). 
¶41 The majority does not apply the “rely in objective 
good faith” standard.  Why not?  Is the standard meaningless?  
¶42 I cannot join Justice Prosser’s ruling on the exigency 
exception to the rule of announcement in this case without 
asking the parties to brief and argue this issue.  The court of 
appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for a new 
suppression hearing to determine whether the officers had 
reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances existed to 
justify dispensing with the rule of announcement.  Nevertheless, 
I agree with his analysis of this state’s exclusionary rule set 
forth in State v. Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  I 
join that part of Justice Prosser’s concurrence relating to the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
¶43 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶44 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                     
7 See Richards v. Wisconsin, certiorari accepted January 3, 
1997, 519 U.S. 1052 (1997).  
8 State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996).  
  
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