Title: Village of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc.
Citation: 2003 WI 150
Docket Number: 2002AP000236
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 2003

2003 WI 150 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0236 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Village of Lannon,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wood-Land Contractors, Inc.,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Mary L. Barnekow,  
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 7 
259 Wis 2d. 879, 659 N.W.2d 95 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 4, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and CROOKS, J.J., join concurrence.     
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert F. Klaver, Jr., James J. Carrig and Niebler, Pyzyk, 
Klaver & Wagner LLP, Menomonee Falls, and oral argument by James 
J. Carrig. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Mark G. 
Blum and Hippenmeyer, Reilly, Moodie & Blum, S.C., Waukesha, and 
oral argument by Mark G. Blum. 
 
 
2003 WI 150 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0236  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 1186) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village of Lannon,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wood-Land Contractors, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Mary L. Barnekow,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 4, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    In this action to collect 
unpaid personal property taxes, Wood-Land Contractors, Inc., 
(Wood-Land) seeks review of a court of appeals' decision that 
affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the Village of Lannon (Lannon).1  It contends that its 
                                                 
1 Village of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI 
App 7, 259 Wis. 2d 879, 659 N.W.2d 95 (affirming a decision of 
the circuit court for Waukesha County, J. Mac Davis, Judge). 
No. 
02-0236   
 
2 
 
equipment is tax exempt under Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) (1999-
2000).2   
¶2 
Specifically, Wood-Land argues that the court of 
appeals erred in applying the "primary purpose" of the business 
test rather than the use of the equipment test.  We agree, and 
conclude that neither the language of the statute nor our prior 
cases supports the adoption of the "primary purpose" of the 
business test here.  Rather, the use of the equipment test 
should be applied in determining whether this equipment is 
exempt from taxation.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court. 
I 
¶3 
Wood-Land 
is 
a 
closely 
held 
family 
corporation 
headquartered in Lannon, Wisconsin.  It contracts to cut and 
clear trees on the property of its customers.  As part of its 
operations, Wood-Land removes all of the timber from the site 
and produces forest products, such as saw logs, wood chips, and 
firewood.  Wood-Land advertises both its land clearing services 
and sale of firewood and wood chips to the general public.  
¶4 
Wood-Land owns approximately 1.3 million dollars in 
equipment.  The most expensive item is a Timbco T-425 Feller 
Buncher 
machine. 
 
The 
Timbco's 
cost 
to 
Wood-Land 
was 
approximately 
$210,000, plus 
$127,000 
for 
its 
specialized 
tractor and transport trailer.  Wood-Land uses the Timbco to cut 
                                                 
2 All references are to the 1999-2000 version of the 
Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-0236   
 
3 
 
trees with girths up to 33 inches, which are generally of a 
height 80 feet or greater.   
¶5 
For smaller trees, Wood-Land uses more conventional 
timbering 
machinery, 
including 
skidsters 
with 
grappling 
attachments, brush hogs, and chain saws.  In addition to this 
type of equipment, Wood-Land also claimed an exemption for 
several of its office items including a typewriter, copier, 
telephones, calculators, and carpeting.  
¶6 
After Wood-Land cuts a tree, it either chips it on-
site or loads it onto log racks.  Wood-Land cuts desirable trees 
to lengths as saw logs and sells them to mills.  It processes 
less desirable trees for wood chips and firewood that it sells 
to the public.  Wood-Land maintains an eight-acre property where 
it prepares and sells firewood and wood chips.  
¶7 
In 2000, Wood-Land had a total revenue of $749,678.90.  
Of this total, $72,655.85 came from the sale of saw logs, wood 
chips, and firewood.  Thus, Wood-Land's sale of "forest 
products" represented nearly ten percent of its revenue that 
year. 
¶8 
Lannon commenced an action in May 2001 to collect 
unpaid personal property taxes on Wood-Land's equipment.  Wood-
Land brought a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment 
action with respect to its exemption rights under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.111(20).  Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the 
circuit court concluded that the material facts were not in 
dispute.   
No. 
02-0236   
 
4 
 
¶9 
In its decision, the circuit court recognized that the 
commercial use of forest products was a "substantial purpose" of 
Wood-Land's operations.  It further acknowledged that it was 
"beyond dispute that much of Wood-Land's equipment was used to 
'cut trees,' to 'transport trees in logging areas,' or to 'clear 
land of trees.'"  The court refused to grant the exemption, 
however, because Wood-Land's "primary purpose" was not to 
harvest forest products, but rather to clear land for its 
customers.  Accordingly, it granted judgment to Lannon based on 
the 
"primary 
purpose" 
of 
Wood-Land's 
business 
and 
never 
addressed the use of the office equipment or any other specific 
piece of equipment. 
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision.  It acknowledged that "there are no prior cases in 
Wisconsin adopting the 'primary purpose' test."  Village of 
Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI App 7, ¶17, 259 
Wis. 2d 879, 659 N.W.2d 95.  Nevertheless, it concluded that it 
should adopt the test here.   Id., ¶16.  The court reasoned: 
We are convinced that the legislature crafted a narrow 
exemption for the logging industry whose existence is 
based upon cutting forest products in logging areas or 
cutting and clearing land in forests so that it can 
use the fruits of its labor for some commercially 
viable use.  The legislature did not intend to grant 
this exemption to businesses outside the logging 
industry. 
Id. 
 
¶11 Applying the "primary purpose" of the business test, 
the court of appeals determined that Wood-Land did not qualify 
No. 
02-0236   
 
5 
 
for the exemption.  Id., ¶17.  It explained, "Any incidental 
value [Wood-Land] gets from commercially selling the felled 
trees it carries from developers' property is collateral to its 
main occupation.  Wood-Land is not engaged in the systematic 
occupation of logging."  Id., ¶13. 
II 
¶12 Our essential inquiry in this case is one of statutory 
interpretation.  The interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law subject to independent appellate review.  Meyer 
v. School Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 
(1999).   
¶13 When interpreting a statute, our purpose is to discern 
legislative intent.  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 
Wis. 2d 112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).  To this end, we look 
first to the language of the statute as the best indication of 
legislative intent.  Id.  Additionally, we may examine the 
statute's context and history.  Id.  
¶14 Because exemption from the payment of taxes is an act 
of legislative grace, the party seeking the exemption bears the 
burden of proving entitlement.  Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of 
Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 80, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).  Exemptions 
"shall be strictly construed . . . with a presumption that the 
property in question is taxable . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 70.109.  
In interpreting tax exemption statutes, we apply a "strict but 
reasonable construction."  Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 80.   
III 
No. 
02-0236   
 
6 
 
¶15 The issue in this case is whether the court of appeals 
erred in applying the "primary purpose" of the business test to 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20).  We conclude that it did, as neither 
the language of the statute nor our prior cases supports the 
adoption of that test.   
¶16 Lannon maintains that Wood-Land is not entitled to the 
tax exemption under the subsection's plain language.  It 
contends that the legislature incorporated a "use" component 
that specifically qualifies the exempt equipment "for the 
commercial use of forest products."  According to Lannon, Wood-
Land does not clear the land to sell and process the trees that 
it cuts; rather, it clears the land for the development of 
property.  As a result, Wood-Land's ancillary sales cannot 
transform its equipment into tax-exempt property.   
¶17 The problem with Lannon's reading, as adopted by the 
court of appeals, is that it shifts the focus of the statute 
from the use of the equipment to the nature of the business 
seeking the exemption.  We believe that such a reading runs 
contrary to legislative intent.   
¶18 We begin our analysis with an examination of the 
statute.  Wis. Stat. § 70.111 describes personal property that 
is exempted from general property taxation.  It consists of 25 
total 
subsections 
reflecting 
various 
public 
policy 
considerations made by the legislature.  The statute provides in 
relevant part: 
The property described in this section is exempted 
from general property taxes: 
No. 
02-0236   
 
7 
 
. . .  
(20) LOGGING EQUIPMENT.  All equipment used to cut 
trees, to transport trees in logging areas or to clear 
land of trees for the commercial use of forest 
products. 
¶19 Both parties agree that the phrase, "commercial use of 
forest products," modifies each of the three types of logging 
equipment specified in the statute.  We too subscribe to this 
construction.  To read the phrase as modifying only equipment 
used to clear land would render an exemption for nearly every 
saw in 
this 
state.  Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that the 
legislature intended no such construction.   
¶20 Where the parties disagree is whether the "primary 
purpose" 
of 
Wood-Land's 
business 
is 
a 
proper 
test 
for 
determining the tax exempt status of its equipment.  We believe 
it is not under Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20).  On its face, the 
statutory exemption contains no language that the equipment be 
used by a certain business model or industry.  Moreover, the 
exemption contains no language that the user's "primary purpose" 
is to harvest forest products.   
¶21 We read the focus of the exemption to be solely on the 
use of the equipment.  Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
equipment is used: (1) to cut trees for the commercial use of 
forest products, (2) to transport trees in logging areas for the 
commercial use of forest products, or (3) to clear land of trees 
for the commercial use of forest products.   
¶22 If 
the 
legislature 
had 
intended 
to 
narrow 
the 
exemption in the way that Lannon suggests, it could have easily 
No. 
02-0236   
 
8 
 
done so.  In looking at this exemption in the context of the 
whole statute, we note that several of the 24 other subsections 
in the statute contain examples of qualifying language.  Such 
limiting language is not found in the exemption at hand.   
¶23 For example, in the subsection entitled "TOOLS AND 
GARDEN MACHINES," the legislature chose to narrow the exemption 
to equipment "used in" or "used by" a particular business model 
or industry.   Wis. Stat. § 70.111(9).  Under it, "tools" are 
exempt if they are "kept and used in the mechanic's trade."  Id.  
(Emphasis added.)  Moreover, "garden machines," are exempt if 
they are "owned and used by any person in the business of 
farming or in the operation of any orchard or garden."  Id.  
(Emphasis added.)  The "used by" qualifier is also employed in 
Wis. Stat. §§§ 70.111(14), 70.111(24), and 70.111(25).3 
¶24 The legislature adopted a variation of this language 
in the subsection entitled, "FARM MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(10).  Below its definition of "Machine," the 
exemption 
specifies, 
"Tractors 
and 
machines; 
including 
accessories, attachments, fuel and repair parts for them; 
                                                 
3 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 
70.111(14) 
entitled 
"MILKHOUSE 
EQUIPMENT" 
provides, 
"Milkhouse 
equipment 
used 
by 
a 
farmer . . . ."  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.111(24) entitled "MOTION 
PICTURE THEATER EQUIPMENT" provides, "Projection equipment, 
sound systems and projection screens that are owned and used by 
a motion picture theater."  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.111(25) 
entitled "DIGITAL BROADCASTING EQUIPMENT" provides, "Digital 
broadcasting equipment owned and used by a radio station or a 
television station . . . ." 
No. 
02-0236   
 
9 
 
whether owned or leased, that are used exclusively and directly 
in farming . . . ."  Id.   (Emphasis added.) 
¶25 Finally, the legislature provided yet another example 
of limiting language in the subsection entitled "CAMPING 
TRAILERS 
AND 
RECREATIONAL 
MOBILE 
HOMES." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.111(19)(b).  It states, "Mobile homes, as defined in s. 
66.0435, that are no larger than 400 square feet and that are 
used primarily as temporary living quarters for recreational, 
camping, travel or seasonal purposes."  Id.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶26 Clearly the legislature has demonstrated an ability to 
use qualifying language which limits an exemption, as evidenced 
by these different subsections.  Therefore, what Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.111(20) does not say is also significant when interpreting 
its meaning.  
¶27 We consider next the subsection's legislative history.  
Admittedly, the history of § 70.111(20) is silent on the 
policies underlying the exemption.  Nevertheless, we find 
support for our interpretation.   
¶28 We note that an earlier draft of the exemption, 1983 
A.B. 38 states:  "All equipment used to cut trees for lumber, to 
transport trees in logging areas or to clear land of trees in 
lumbering."  (Emphasis added.)  The phrase "in lumbering" was 
removed in the later draft and replaced with the phrase "for the 
commercial use of forest products."  We do not view the 
subsequent 
change 
as 
still 
referring 
exclusively 
to 
the 
lumbering or logging industry.  Rather, we view the new language 
No. 
02-0236   
 
10 
 
as 
removing 
the 
industry 
component 
from 
the 
subsection 
altogether.  
 
¶29 In sum, we find nothing in the exemption's language, 
context, or history to support Lannon's construction.  To the 
contrary, such an examination reveals that the use of the 
equipment test is applied under Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) when 
determining whether the equipment is exempt from taxation. 
¶30 A review of the relevant cases also supports our 
interpretation.  The court of appeals acknowledged that, "there 
are no prior cases in Wisconsin adopting the 'primary purpose' 
test."  Wood-Land, 259 Wis. 2d 879, ¶17.  It found support, 
however, in the logic of Village of Menomonee Falls v. Falls 
Rental World, 135 Wis. 2d 393, 400 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1986).  
Id., ¶¶15-16.  The court also cited as foundation for its 
conclusion the "function or use" cases of Ladish Malting Co. v. 
DOR, 98 Wis. 2d 496, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1980), and DOR v. 
Greiling, 112 Wis. 2d 602, 334 N.W.2d 118 (1983).  Id., ¶17.    
¶31 What the court of appeals failed to address, however, 
was its decision in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Town of Bradley, 132 
Wis. 2d 310, 392 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1986).  That case was 
decided after both Ladish and Greiling and rejected the 
application of the "primary purpose" test. 
¶32 In Owens-Illinois, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue 
advanced an argument very similar to Lannon's.  It claimed that 
Owens-Illinois' boiler and power house were not entitled to tax-
exempt status because their "primary purpose" was to produce 
steam and heat for use in industrial production rather than to 
No. 
02-0236   
 
11 
 
eliminate pollution.  Id. at 315.  The exemption in dispute was 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(21)(a), "TREATMENT PLANT AND POLLUTION 
ABATEMENT EQUIPMENT."  Id.  It required two things: "(1) that 
all exempt property be purchased or constructed as a waste 
treatment facility; and (2) that exempt property be approved by 
the department of revenue for the purpose of abating or 
eliminating pollution."  Id.  
¶33 The court of appeals concluded that nowhere in the 
language of the exemption was there a requirement that "the 
primary purpose of a waste facility be pollution abatement in 
order to qualify for exemption."  Id.  Accordingly, it rejected 
the application of the "primary purpose" test.  Id.   
¶34 We find Owens-Illinois instructive in the present 
case.  As with Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20), the exemption in Owens-
Illinois focused on the use of equipment and not the "primary 
purpose" of its user.  As a result, the court of appeals 
determined that Owens-Illinois' motivation or purpose for using 
the equipment was irrelevant in evaluating the exemption claim.  
See id. at 315-316.  We believe that Wood-Land's motivation or 
purpose for using its logging equipment is similarly irrelevant 
here.  All the subsection requires is that the equipment be 
"used to cut trees, to transport trees in logging areas or to 
clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest products."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20). 
¶35 In adopting the "primary purpose" of the business 
test, the court of appeals relied on the logic of Falls Rental 
World.  Wood-Land, 259 Wis. 2d 879, ¶¶15-16.  The sole issue on 
No. 
02-0236   
 
12 
 
appeal in that case was whether goods held out for rent could be 
classified as "merchants' stock-in-trade," thereby qualifying it 
as tax exempt under § 70.111(17).  Falls Rental World, 135 Wis. 
2d at 395.  Falls Rental World based its claim on the fact that 
it occasionally removed property from its rental group and sold 
it.  Id.  The court concluded that the property at issue was not 
"stock-in-trade" under the plain meaning of the statute.  Id. 
¶36 The court of appeals' reliance on Falls Rental World 
is misplaced.  Nothing about that decision supports the adoption 
of the "primary purpose" of the business test in the present 
case.  Indeed, the focus of Falls Rental World was the property 
held out for rent.  Id.  To the extent that the court examined 
the nature of the business, it did so only to give meaning to 
the entity described in the statute, that is, "merchant."  Id. 
at 398.  Here, the subsection at issue contains no corresponding 
business entity.  It is a different exemption with a focus on 
the use of equipment.  
 
¶37 Likewise, we believe neither Ladish nor Greiling 
supports the adoption of the "primary purpose" test here.  In 
Ladish, a malting company contended that its attemporators, 
kilns, and malt elevators were exempt under the so-called "M&E" 
exemption.  98 Wis. 2d at 498.  The "M&E" exemption applied to 
"[m]anufacturing machinery and specific processing equipment, 
exclusively and directly used by a manufacturer in manufacturing 
tangible personal property."  Id.  It excluded, however, 
"materials, supplies, buildings or building components."  Id.  
The department of revenue argued that Ladish was not entitled to 
No. 
02-0236   
 
13 
 
the exemption because its structures were not "machines" but 
rather "buildings."  Id. at 499.  The court of appeals 
disagreed, applying the "function or use" test over the more 
narrow "physical appearance" test.  Id. at 510.   
¶38 In 
Greiling, 
this 
court 
faced 
a 
similar 
issue 
involving a greenhouse.  A taxpayer claimed that his greenhouse 
was a "machine" used in floriculture, thereby qualifying its 
components for an exemption.  112 Wis. 2d at 605.  The court 
agreed, noting that, "a greenhouse such as the one in this case 
does not function simply as a shelter or storage area for 
plants. 
 
Instead, 
it 
actively 
produces 
the 
artificial 
environment necessary to produce plants for commercial use and 
as such could be considered a machine."  Id. at 606.  The court 
cited Ladish and stated, "We believe that the ['function or 
use'] test should be determinative when resolving use tax 
exemption issues."  Id. at 607.  
¶39 We fail to see how either Ladish or Greiling provides 
foundation for the court of appeals' decision in the present 
case.  The issue in both cases was whether a disputed structure 
or structures could be considered "machines" for the purposes of 
tax exemption.  Accordingly, the court's focus was on the 
"function or use" of the property, not the "primary purpose" of 
the business or taxpayer claiming the exemption.   
¶40 In sum, we do not find support in our prior case law 
for the application of the "primary purpose" of the business 
test here.  To the contrary, the case of Owens-Illinois, in 
interpreting a similar exemption, rejected such an approach. 
No. 
02-0236   
 
14 
 
¶41 In addition to the above discussion of the statutory 
language and our prior case law, we note the difficulty in the 
practical application of the "primary purpose" test.  Because 
the test is subjective in nature, it places an enormous burden 
on assessors or courts applying the exemption.  First, they must 
ascertain whose "purpose" they are to consider.  In a case 
involving two companies——one logging and one processing——this 
could be a troublesome task.  Second, they must determine the 
individual business' "primary purpose" for each taxable year.  
We can imagine scenarios in which fluctuating markets could 
alter Wood-Land's percentage of forest products sales and 
transform otherwise non-exempt equipment into exempt equipment.  
We conclude the legislature did not intend such a result.   
¶42 Having established that § 70.111(20) requires a use of 
the equipment test, we consider next the application of that 
test in this case.  In its decision, the circuit court 
recognized 
that 
"much" 
of 
Wood-Land's 
equipment 
met 
the 
requirements of the statute.  Nevertheless, it applied the 
"primary purpose" test and rejected the claimed tax exemption 
because it determined that Wood-Land's "primary purpose" was 
clearing land for its customers.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
granted summary judgment without addressing which pieces of 
equipment met the statutory use requirements. 
¶43 On remand, the circuit court should consider what 
equipment of Wood-Land's is used: (1) to cut trees for the 
commercial use of forest products, (2) to transport trees in 
logging areas for the commercial use of forest products, or (3) 
No. 
02-0236   
 
15 
 
to clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest 
products.  Wood-Land will bear the burden of proving entitlement 
to the exemption.  Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 80. 
¶44 At oral argument, both parties advanced a "strict but 
reasonable" standard for applying tax exempt statutes.  They 
relied upon Deutsches Land in support of this standard. 
¶45 In Deutsches Land, we considered whether property 
owned by benevolent associations devoted to the preservation of 
German culture was entitled to exemption from property taxes 
under § 70.11 (1995-96).  Id. at 76.  In construing the statute, 
we rejected the notion that the term "exclusively" brooked no 
exceptions.  Id.  We explained that such an inflexible and 
strict interpretation would frustrate the intent of the statute.  
Id. at 83.  In essence, we recognized that "inconsequential or 
incidental uses of the property for gain" by a benevolent 
organization 
did 
not 
destroy 
an 
exemption 
calling 
for 
"exclusive" use.  See id. at 83.   
¶46 Although Deutsches Land involved the exemption of real 
property, we nevertheless find it useful in the present case.  
The personal property exemption at issue is subject to the same 
"strict but reasonable" construction.  See id. at 80.  Without 
such a construction, we believe that the exemption would invite 
subterfuge 
or 
sham 
in 
claims 
involving 
de 
minimis 
use.  
Accordingly, we recognize the corollary to the above principle 
here: de minimis uses of the property are not sufficient to 
invoke this exemption.   
No. 
02-0236   
 
16 
 
¶47 We are mindful that our holding today may appear to 
run contrary to the legislative directive that exemptions "shall 
be strictly construed . . . with a presumption that the property 
in question is taxable . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 70.109.  However, 
we are impelled to our conclusion by the language of the 
statute.  We believe that if the legislature intended to limit 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) to the logging industry, it would have 
explicitly said so, as it has done in several of the other 
subsections.  Indeed, if the legislature still wishes to narrow 
the exemption, it can amend it at any time by adding a few words 
to identify a specific business model or, if it so chooses, a 
"primary purpose."   
¶48 In sum, we determine that the court of appeals erred 
in adopting the "primary purpose" of the business test.  We 
agree with Wood-Land that § 70.111(20) is defined by the use of 
the equipment.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court to determine what equipment is 
entitled to a tax exemption under the statutory provision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.  
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with Judge Nettesheim's dissent that summary judgment is not 
appropriate in the present case.  I, like Judge Nettesheim, 
agree with the test set forth by the court of appeals.  He and I 
conclude that competing reasonable inferences can be drawn on 
the question of whether Wood-Land's primary business activity is 
logging or whether it is the clearing of land with timbering as 
an ancillary activity.  Like Judge Nettesheim, I would remand 
the cause to the circuit court for trial on that question. 
¶50 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.111 provides a conglomeration of 
numerous tax exemptions.  The statute does not set forth a 
seamless web of tax exemptions.4  The exemptions do not divulge a 
pattern or theme.  Subsection (20) of § 70.111 provides a 
personal property tax exemption for "[a]ll equipment used to cut 
trees, to transport trees in logging areas or to clear land of 
trees for the commercial use of forest products."5 
¶51 The statutory language to be interpreted in the 
present case is the phrase "for the commercial use of forest 
products."  The phrase "for the commercial use of forest 
products" modifies each of the three uses of equipment specified 
                                                 
4 As the court explained in Columbus Park Housing Corp. v. 
City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, chapter 70 "is not a comprehensive, perfectly woven 
web 
of 
tax 
exemptions . . . rather 
it 
represents 
a 
conglomeration of exemptions granted to specific and well-
delineated entities and property used in a certain fashion."  
The majority opinion's or the concurring opinion's comparison of 
this exemption with other statutory exemptions and other tax 
cases is not persuasive. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20). 
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
2 
 
in the statute: cutting trees, transporting trees in logging 
areas, and clearing land of trees.6  Wood-Land focuses on the 
phrase "to clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest 
products."   
¶52 The sole issue before the court is whether "for the 
commercial use of forest products" means that the primary 
business purpose of the entity claiming the exemption is 
cutting, transporting or clearing land of trees for the 
commercial use of forest products or whether, as the majority 
opinion puts it, the entity merely utilizes its equipment for 
some commercial use of forest products.7 
¶53 That the statute requires equipment to be used for the 
commercial use of forest products rather than a commercial use 
of forest products suggests that the first, highest, or foremost 
purpose of the business using the equipment, or of the use of 
the equipment itself, is for the commercial use of forest 
products.8  Use of the definite article in the statute rather 
than the indefinite article, coupled with the various references 
to "logging" in both the title and body of the statute, and 
general rules of interpreting tax exemptions lead me to believe 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶19. 
7 The court of appeals concluded that "the statute was 
designed to give an exemption for those systematically involved 
in the logging business, not to those who incidentally cut logs 
and sell the products as a small part of an altogether different 
kind of business."  Village of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, 
Inc., 2003 WI App 7, ¶1, 259 Wis. 2d 879, 659 N.W.2d 95.    
8 See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 
N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 2000). 
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
3 
 
that the legislature sought to craft a very narrow exemption 
limiting the business entities capable of claiming an exemption 
to those that are part of the logging industry. 
¶54 The court of appeals read the title of the statute, 
which refers to "logging equipment,"9 along with the text, 
including the provision referring to the transport of trees in 
logging areas, and concluded that the legislature intended that 
the exemption apply to entities involved in the logging 
industry.10  The court of appeals concluded on review of a 
summary judgment that the primary purpose of Wood-Land was to 
clear the land for development, not to make commercial use of 
forest products.11  The dissent in the court of appeals agreed 
with the test expressed by the majority but concluded that the 
summary judgment record supported competing inferences drawn by 
both parties as to whether Wood-Land is engaged in the logging 
business and urged that the matter should go to trial.12   
¶55 I agree with the court of appeals that the legislature 
crafted a narrow exemption for those in the business of clearing 
forest land for the express purpose of using the fruits of their 
                                                 
9 The title of a statute may be persuasive of the 
interpretation to be given the statute and legislative intent.  
Mireles v. LIRC, 2000 WI 96, ¶60 n.13, 237 Wis. 2d 69, 613 
N.W.2d 875 (quoting Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'l Farmers 
Org., 64 Wis. 2d 241, 253, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974)). 
10 Wood-Land, 259 Wis. 2d 879, ¶¶13, 16. 
11 The income Wood-Land derived from the sale of forest 
products in the present case was less than 10% of its business 
revenue.   
12 Wood-Land, 
259 
Wis. 2d 879, 
¶20 
(Nettesheim, 
J., 
concurring). 
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
4 
 
labor for eventual commercial use.  The legislature did not 
intend to grant the exemption to businesses outside the logging 
industry.  The question for me, then, is whether Wood-Land is 
engaged in the systematic business of logging and using this 
equipment in that business.   
¶56 The 
majority 
opinion 
rejects 
this 
approach,13 
concluding that the statute need not consider Wood-Land's 
motivation or purposes for using its logging equipment and looks 
only to determine whether the use of the equipment is for a 
commercial use of forest products.14   
¶57 The majority opinion states it is adopting a "use of 
equipment test" but never explains the test.  It remands the 
matter to the circuit court to decide the exemption but merely 
reiterates the words of the statute in instructing the circuit 
court on remand.  According to the majority opinion, on remand 
the circuit court should consider "what equipment of Wood-Land's 
is used: (1) to cut trees for the commercial use of forest 
products, (2) to transport trees in logging areas for the 
commercial use of forest products, or (3) to clear land of trees 
for the commercial use of forest products."15  
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶34. 
14 The tax cases the majority opinion relies on and 
distinguishes do not interpret the tax exemption in the present 
case.  All the cases the majority opinion cites, including 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Town of Bradley, 132 Wis. 2d 310, 392 
N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1986), which reject a "primary purpose" 
test, relate to different exemptions with different focuses.   
15 Majority op., ¶43. 
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶58 The only guidance the majority opinion gives to the 
circuit court in applying the statute on remand is that sham 
claims involving de minimis use of equipment for commercial use 
of forest products are not sufficient to sustain an exemption.  
The majority opinion thus interprets the statute to exclude from 
the exemption inconsequential uses of the designated equipment 
for the commercial use of forest products.16 
¶59 In doing so, the majority opinion injects a quantity 
element into § 70.111(20) at the same time as it objects to the 
court of appeals' insertion of a quantity element into the 
statute.  The majority opinion carefully avoids commenting on 
how de minimis is de minimis and how equipment used for dual 
purposes should be treated.17  Indeed, this case may very well 
present a case in which much of Wood-Land's equipment is used 
for dual purposes.  If one of the majority's criticisms is that 
the court of appeals decision is difficult to apply, the same 
criticism 
can 
be 
levied 
against 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
interpretation.  
¶60 Perhaps the tests set forth in the majority opinion 
and in the decision of the court of appeals are distinctions 
without a difference.  Regardless of whether courts are required 
to determine whether an entity is a logging enterprise and has 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶¶45-46. 
17 Wood-Land's equipment is, at best, used for a dual 
purpose: to clear land at the request of persons who hire it and 
to obtain forest products for commercial use.  Brief and 
Appendix 
of 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
Wood-Land 
Contractors, Inc., at 22.   
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
6 
 
as its primary business purpose cutting, transporting, or 
clearing land of trees for the commercial use of forest 
products, or whether courts must evaluate whether the equipment 
is used solely, partly, or de minimis for a commercial use of 
forest products, the tests ultimately require a determination of 
how much use must be for commercial use of forest products in 
order to qualify for a tax exemption.  
¶61 Having concluded that both tests introduce a quantity 
element into the statutory language, I am not persuaded that the 
"use" interpretation adopted by the majority opinion is any 
better than the "primary purpose" interpretation adopted by the 
court of appeals.  Indeed I think the majority opinion may be 
more difficult to apply. 
¶62 To determine under the "primary purpose" test whether 
a business entity is in the logging industry will require 
consideration of several factors.  These factors include, but 
are not limited to, whether an entity holds itself out as being 
a logging business and the amount or percentage of revenue 
generated from the entity's cutting trees, transporting trees in 
logging areas, and clearing of land for commercial use of forest 
products.   
¶63 The majority opinion acknowledges that its holding 
"may appear to run contrary to the legislative directive."18  In 
light 
of 
the 
legislature's 
explicit 
command 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.109 
that 
exemptions 
"shall 
be 
strictly 
construed . . . with a presumption that the property in question 
                                                 
18 Majority op., ¶47. 
No.  02-0236.ssa 
 
7 
 
is taxable,"19 and our interpretive rule that tax exemption 
statutes be given a strict but reasonable interpretation,20 I 
conclude 
that 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
contrary 
to 
the 
legislature's intent and our interpretive rule.   
¶64 The burden is on the taxpayer to show that its 
construction is supported by clear evidence of legislative 
intent; 
"any 
doubt 
under 
the 
'strict 
but 
reasonable' 
construction rule must be resolved against the party seeking the 
exemption."21 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation 
of 
§ 70.111(20) to include a "primary purpose" of the business test 
more accurately effectuates the language of the statute and the 
intent of the legislature than does the majority opinion's.  
Accordingly, I concur and would, for the reasons set forth by 
Judge Nettesheim, remand the cause to the circuit court for 
trial. 
 
                                                 
19 See Wis. Stat. § 70.109. 
20 Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 
80, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999). 
21 Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 80-81. 
02-0236.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶65 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.     (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion with reservation because of the statutory 
directive that property tax exemptions "shall be strictly 
construed in every instance."  Wis. Stat. § 70.109.  This 
directive, which was inserted into the statutes in 1998, is even 
more 
pointed 
than 
the 
modern 
formulation 
of 
the 
strict 
construction rule.  See Sisters of St. Mary v. City of Madison, 
89 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 278 N.W.2d 814 (1979); Friendship Village 
of 
Greater 
Milwaukee, 
Inc. 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
181 
Wis. 2d 207, 220, 511 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶66 The concurrence of the Chief Justice asserts that the 
majority opinion never explains the "use of equipment" test.  
Concurrence, ¶57.  There is some legitimacy in this criticism.  
In the wake of the court's decision, a property owner may be 
able to secure a property tax exemption for certain equipment 
merely by demonstrating that the equipment is used to cut trees 
for the commercial use of forest products, to transport trees 
for the commercial use of forest products, or to clear land for 
the commercial use of forest products, so long as use of the 
equipment for one or more of these purposes is not de minimis.  
This may be a broader exemption than the legislature intended. 
¶67 On the other hand, the problem with the "primary use" 
test is that it could nullify the exemption on logging equipment 
under Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) if less than 50 percent of the 
income generated by the equipment in the previous year came from 
cutting trees for the commercial use of forest products, 
transporting trees for the commercial use of forest products, or 
02-0236.dtp 
 
2 
 
clearing land for the commercial use of forest products.  As a 
result, the viability of a taxpayer's exemption could depend 
upon the fluctuating market value of forest products or the 
varying and unpredictable utilization of logging equipment as 
new work becomes available. 
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.111 contains multiple exemptions 
for personal property, including horses,22 tools and garden 
machines,23 and rented personal property.24  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 70.112(5) contains an exemption for motor trucks, truck 
tractors, 
similar 
motor 
vehicles, 
and 
trailers 
used 
in 
connection with these vehicles.  These exemptions overlap the 
exemption for logging equipment, regardless of how the exemption 
for logging equipment is construed.   
¶69 Thus, even if the court of appeals' interpretation of 
§ 70.111(20) were affirmed, a person who used a horse or motor 
truck to clear land for development would have a property tax 
exemption for the horse or truck, irrespective of whether any 
affected forest products had commercial value.  Similarly, 
"logging equipment" for rental would normally be exempt for the 
rental business, no matter how the equipment was used.  This 
would produce an inexplicable patchwork of exemptions for 
identical "logging equipment," with potentially inequitable 
consequences. 
                                                 
22 Wis. Stat. § 70.111(7). 
23 Wis. Stat. § 70.111(9). 
24 Wis. Stat. § 70.111(22). 
02-0236.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶70 Against this background, I conclude that the majority 
opinion represents the proper interpretation of the exemption.  
The legislature is entitled to clarify its intent. 
 
 
No.  02-0236.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶71 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion.  However, 
I write separately to point out that the majority opinion’s 
statutory analysis of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) is a departure 
from that which has been this court’s mode of statutory analysis 
and that it is not one that the court has discussed and decided 
to adopt.   
¶72 Our jurisprudence has repeatedly explained that the 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
de novo.  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 
112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997); Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. DPI, 
202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).  Our goal in 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the 
legislature’s intent.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d at 121; Ball v. 
Dist. No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical and Adult Educ., 
117 Wis. 2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984).  We begin our 
interpretation with the language the legislature has chosen to 
use in the statute.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d at 121.  We give 
that language its plain and ordinary meaning.  Id. at 121; Bruno 
v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 
N.W.2d 656.  If the language is clear on its face, we need go no 
further and we simply apply it.  Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶20.  
As a general rule, we do not review extrinsic sources unless 
there is an ambiguity in the statute.  However, if the language 
is ambiguous, we consult the “scope, history, context, subject 
matter and object of the statute” in order to ascertain 
legislative intent.  Ball, 117 Wis. 2d at 537-38.  A statute is 
No.  02-0236.pdr 
 
2 
 
ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable 
interpretations.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d at 121.   
¶73 The majority opinion employs the analytic framework 
for a statute that is ambiguous, while purposely not analyzing 
whether Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) is ambiguous.  This is a change 
in our traditional analysis, which is set out above.  I offer no 
opinion about whether our mode of statutory analysis ought to be 
changed.  However, when we change the statutory analysis in a 
majority opinion without explaining that the majority of the 
court has not decided to change its analysis, we lead our 
readers to conclude that we have changed.  This can cause 
confusion among those we write to assist and make our opinions 
less useful to the public.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  02-0236.pdr 
 
1