Title: Easterday v. State
Citation: 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901
Docket Number: 369S62
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 1970

254 Ind. 13 (1970)
256 N.E.2d 901
EASTERDAY
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 369S62.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed April 14, 1970.
*14 R.D. Reading, of Wabash, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General and Aaron T. Jahr, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
HUNTER, C.J.
Appellant was charged by affidavit in the Wabash Circuit Court on two counts of the offense of sodomy. Upon a plea of not guilty, trial was had by jury and a verdict of guilty was returned. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana Reformatory for a term of not less than two (2) nor more than fourteen (14) years.
On this appeal, the sole assignment of error is that the trial court erroneously overruled appellant's motion for new trial. Because of the result reached by this court, it will be necessary to discuss only two issues raised by that motion, namely whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to require the prosecutrix to submit to a psychiatric examination, and whether appellant has a constitutional right to be tried for an infamous crime only on grand jury indictment.
Due to the nature of the facts in this case, we will refrain from reciting the evidence except insofar as is absolutely necessary to substantiate our holding. Suffice it to say that appellant was convicted of the charge against him on the uncorroborated testimony of a ten year old child. Prior to the swearing of the jury, appellant filed his motion to require the prosecutrix to submit to a psychiatric examination. No action was taken on the motion by the trial court apparently until a *15 good portion of the child's testimony had been admitted. At that time it was overruled.
This court, in the case of Burton v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892, indicated the importance of allowing for a psychiatric examination of the prosecutrix in cases involving sex offenses. Several factors are present which clearly demonstrate the need for such an examination. See generally, 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 924(a) (3rd Ed. 1940); Report, A.B.A. Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence (1937-1938); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach (1960), 48 Cal. L. Rev. 648; Note, 44 Ind. L.J. 106 (1968).
In the Burton case, the defendant had been charged with sodomy and was convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a 10 year old girl. This court, in reversing, held that it could not place itself in the position of the trial judge in determining credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence, yet it must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict. The clear implication was that some convictions, standing only on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix, would not be upheld unless the prosecutrix first be subjected to a psychiatric examination.
The Burton case was overruled insofar as it purported to require any complaining witness to be examined for the purpose of ascertaining her competency before testifying by the case of Wedmore v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649:
...
As recognized by the Wedmore court, competency is a question for the trial court and it could, within its sound discretion, order a psychiatric examination upon the request of the defendant. No such request was made in that case. It would appear that the Burton rationale was left intact, however, and that a conviction could be reversed where the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix, under the facts and circumstances of the case, was insufficient to support a verdict. Wedmore merely frees the court from any affirmative duty of determining competency by way of a psychiatric examination.
In the case of Lamar v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98, this court held that the trial court's refusal to appoint a psychiatrist for the purpose of examining the prosecuting witness was not error where the court had specifically noted the demeanor and testimony of the witness and concluded that no examination was necessary. Clearly the Lamar case restated the principle set forth in Wedmore, namely that it is not mandatory upon the trial court to order the examination, but discretionary.
Finally, the case of Binder v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 30, 221 N.E.2d 886, added a qualification to the holding in Wedmore by stating that any request for a psychiatric examination, to be considered, must be made before the prosecutrix' testimony is in the record. As was there held, defendant cannot wait and hear the evidence to determine whether it is favorable or unfavorable before objecting to the competency of the witness.
From the above cited cases, it is apparent that the defendant has no right to subject a prosecuting witness, in a trial *17 on a sex offense, to a psychiatric examination. The trial court can, however, on timely motion of the defendant, order such an examination where in its sound discretion it determines one to be necessary.
Looking to the case at bar, we note several factors which indicate the necessity of an examination, all of which were apparent from appellant's motion for psychiatric examination or would have become apparent to the trial judge had he conducted a hearing on the prosecutrix's competency prior to allowing her to testify. To begin with, the prosecutrix, at the time of trial, was just two weeks past her tenth birthday. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1603 (1956 Repl.) by virtue of Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1714 (1968 Repl.), makes any child under ten years of age incompetent to testify at a criminal prosecution unless it appears that he understands the nature and obligation of an oath. Although the prosecutrix here was ten years old and beyond the statutory age limitation, her borderline age should certainly have weighed heavily in the trial judge's mind when passing on her competency to testify at this type of trial.
Coupled with the above is the fact that the prosecutrix had implicated other men in acts of sexual misconduct, a fact brought to the attention of the trial judge by appellant's motion. In addition to appellant, the prosecutrix claimed that her brothers and an uncle had molested her. In fact, from the evidence adduced at trial, it appears that one of her brothers was at that time serving a prison sentence for such misconduct.
Further, evidence clearly shows that the prosecutrix admitted telling "stories" some of which directly related to the type of activity for which appellant is on trial. On cross examination, the prosecutrix testified:
On re-cross, it was further testified
Again, had the trial judge conducted a hearing prior to allowing the prosecutrix to testify, her propensity to tell "stories" might well have been made apparent.
Finally, it must be presumed that the trial judge was aware of the opinion held by various legal scholars on the subject of competency when it relates to a female witness testifying at a trial of a sex offense:
It may be true, as was stated in the Wedmore case that the prosecuting witness takes the witness stand clothed with a presumption of competency. It may also be true as was there stated that the question of the stability and mental condition of the prosecuting witness is a matter for the court to determine. To hold, however, that in no cases would there ever be a requirement to order such a psychiatric examination would be to make the presumption of competency conclusive and talk of a trial court's duty to determine such competency mere rhetoric.
If indeed the trial judge must pass on the competency of a witness, and we are to take seriously the caveats of the various psychiatrists and legal scholars as to the nature of a female witness in such a case, how is the trial judge to make his determination? Would a lay-person, not versed in the subtleties of the human psychic be able to ascertain a deviant personality? The dangers inherent in glibly allowing a prosecuting witness to testify have been amply documented:
In light of the manifest possibilities for injustice it seems only reasonable that a trial judge take advantage of the knowledge and expertise of those more qualified to speak on the question of competency:
The report or testimony of an examining psychiatrist would provide an invaluable aid to the trial judge in making the threshold determination as to the witness' competency to testify. It is imperative, however, that the determination as to competency be made before the witness takes the stand, if the defendant is not to be unduly prejudiced.
Consequently we hold that, in view of the particular facts and circumstances of this case as heretofore outlined, the trial judge's refusal to grant appellant's timely request for a psychiatric examination of the prosecutrix was in this case not based on sound judicial discretion.
The resulting prejudice being manifestly obvious, a new trial must be ordered.
We next address ourselves to the question of whether appellant can in fact be retired in view of his allegation that he may be constitutionally tried for an infamous crime only on grand jury indictment. Appellant relies on the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which reads in pertinent part as follows:
This state long ago provided an alternative to the grand jury system:
Such action was expressly sanctioned in the recent case of Beck v. Washington (1962), 369 U.S. 541, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98 wherein it was said:
Clearly, appellant has no recognized constitutional right to be charged and tried solely by virtue of a grand jury indictment.
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and a new trial ordered.
Judgment reversed.
Arterburn, DeBruler and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 256 N.E.2d 901.