Title: Wiechman v. Huddleston
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 110656
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2016

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 110,656 
 
BYRON T. WIECHMAN, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MARK HUDDLESTON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
The right to appeal in a civil case is entirely statutory and not a right guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution. Kansas appellate courts have 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a civil case only if that appeal is taken within the 
time limitations and in the manner prescribed by the applicable statutes.  
 
2. 
An appellate court has no authority to create an exception to statutory 
jurisdictional requirements to allow an appeal from an order setting aside a final 
judgment in a civil case. Brown v. Fitzpatrick, 224 Kan. 636, 585 P.2d 987 (1978), is 
overruled to the extent it created a common-law "jurisdictional exception" permitting 
appeals in civil cases not otherwise allowed by statute.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 3, 2014. 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; J. PATRICK WALTERS, judge. Opinion filed April 15, 2016. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed.  
 
2 
 
 
 
Stanford J. Smith, Jr., of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., of Wichita, argued the 
cause, and Teresa L. Adams, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Ron D. Beal, of Lenexa, argued the cause, and Robert D. Wiechman, Jr., of Wichita, was with 
him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  This is an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court's decision to 
set aside a dismissal order in a personal injury lawsuit more than 4 years after that order 
was entered and the case was closed. The threshold question is whether a common-law 
exception to our statutory jurisdictional requirements remains valid, giving us the ability 
to decide this question. See Brown v. Fitzpatrick, 224 Kan. 636, 585 P.2d 987 (1978). 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, determining Brown was 
no longer viable in light of more recent caselaw from this court. Wiechman v. 
Huddleston, No. 110,656, 2014 WL 4996205, at *5 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
We agree with the panel and overrule Brown to the extent it endorsed a judicially 
created appeal right in a civil case outside of those created by statute. See Board of 
Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. City of Park City, 293 Kan. 107, 111, 260 P.3d 387 (2011) 
(holding in a civil case that appellate courts have no authority to fashion equitable 
exceptions to statutory limitations on appellate jurisdiction). This appeal must be 
dismissed because it was not brought in accordance with the statute governing 
interlocutory appeals. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2102(c); see also Supreme Court Rule 
4.01 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29). 
 
3 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This litigation began in September 2007, when Byron Wiechman sued Mark 
Huddleston for negligence after sustaining injuries in a September 2005 car accident. 
Huddleston's insurer paid Wiechman's insurer $7,135.15 for reimbursement of Personal 
Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. In March 2008, Huddleston's insurer, through its third 
party administrator, Claims Professionals Inc., sent a letter stating "today wherein we 
agreed to extend out insured's policy limit of $25,000 to you on behalf of your client." 
The letter also indicated a release for all claims against Huddleston was enclosed, and 
"[u]pon receipt of the properly executed release, we will issue payment in the amount of 
$25,000 and consider this matter resolved." 
 
In August 2008, Wiechman's attorney accepted the $25,000 offer and returned the 
completed release of claims form. In September, Wiechman's attorney notified the district 
court the case had settled. Nothing additional occurred in the case file until the court 
dismissed the litigation for lack of prosecution in December 2008. 
 
More than 4 years later, Wiechman filed a motion to set aside the dismissal order. 
He alleged that although he had accepted the settlement offer, he never received payment. 
He also filed a separate contract lawsuit alleging breach of the settlement agreement. 
These disputes were not consolidated and have been on separate tracks through the 
judicial system.  
 
On the motion to reinstate the original negligence action, the parties disputed 
whether the district court had jurisdiction to set aside the 2008 dismissal order. K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 60-260(b), which is the applicable statute, gives district courts discretion to 
relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons:  
 
4 
 
 
 
 
"(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 
 
"(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-259, 
and amendments thereto; 
 
"(3) fraud, whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or 
misconduct by an opposing party; 
 
"(4) the judgment is void; 
 
"(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an 
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no 
longer equitable; or 
 
"(6) any other reason that justifies relief." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b). 
 
Different time limitations apply depending on the reason invoked. A motion under 
subsection (b) must be made within a reasonable time, but for reasons under paragraphs 
(b)(1), (2), and (3) a movant must bring the motion no more than 1 year after the entry of 
the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(c). 
 
At the motion hearing, Huddleston argued Wiechman's claim fit within paragraph 
(b)(1) or (3), so he asserted the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 1 
year of dismissal. But Wiechman argued the motion was governed by paragraph (b)(6), 
which was not subject to the 1-year limitations period. When asked by the court why the 
effort to reopen the lawsuit was not filed sooner, counsel acknowledged:  "I probably 
should have filed it earlier but, you know, I thought we could get something worked out." 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted Wiechman's motion to 
set aside the dismissal. But in doing so, it did not address K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260 or 
whether the 4-year delay in bringing the motion was reasonable. Instead, the court 
focused on what it saw as the insurer's unfairness in not paying the settlement. 
 
5 
 
 
 
Later, at a hearing on a motion to reconsider, the district court reaffirmed its 
decision to set aside the 4-year-old dismissal order. Ruling from the bench, the district 
court suggested it was unnecessary to analyze the motion under the requirements of 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b) because the dismissal order was administrative in nature, 
apparently because it was based on a lack of prosecution. The district court held 
Wiechman had established "good cause" for setting aside the dismissal because he 
reasonably relied on the insurer's documents and phone conversations when his attorney 
told the court the case had settled. The district court again did not discuss whether the 4-
year delay was reasonable. 
 
Huddleston filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal order because Wiechman's motion was untimely 
under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(c). Huddleston did not seek certification for his 
interlocutory appeal under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2102(c) and Supreme Court Rule 4.01 
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29). Instead, he argued a common-law jurisdictional exception 
permitted an appeal from an order setting aside a final judgment, citing Brown.  
 
In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals 
acknowledged the jurisdictional exception recognized in Brown would arguably apply but 
questioned whether Brown was still good law. Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *4. 
Citing our reasoning in Park City, the panel held that judicially created exceptions 
conferring appellate jurisdiction absent statutory authority were no longer valid. 
Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *5. 
 
Huddleston petitioned for this court's review, which was granted. See K.S.A. 20-
3018(b). Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals 
decisions).   
 
6 
 
 
 
MOOTNESS 
 
At the outset, we must consider a suggestion made for the first time during oral 
argument by Wiechman's counsel that this appeal has become moot because he prevailed 
in the separate breach of contract lawsuit after the district court reinstated the negligence 
action. In essence, Wiechman's counsel represented that since his client's breach of 
contract claim had been resolved, his client no longer had any interest in this appeal's 
outcome, although it was additionally noted that issues remained outstanding over 
prejudgment interest and whether a fraud claim could be asserted against Huddleston's 
insurer. In rebuttal, Huddleston's attorney disagreed the appeal was moot and noted 
Wiechman had not dismissed the underlying negligence action that launched this 
interlocutory appeal. We agree with Huddleston. 
 
An appeal will not be dismissed for mootness unless it is clearly and convincingly 
shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that could be entered would 
be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the parties' rights. 
McAlister v. City of Fairway, 289 Kan. 391, 400, 212 P.3d 184 (2009); State ex rel. 
Slusher v. City of Leavenworth, 285 Kan. 438, 454, 172 P.3d 1154 (2007). The record on 
appeal in this case provides no such showing. 
 
In fact, just a week prior to oral arguments, Wiechman filed pleadings urging us to 
affirm the Court of Appeals ruling. In addition, the representations made at oral 
arguments by Wiechman's counsel are inconsistent with the showing required for us to 
determine the case is moot. Accordingly, we hold the case is not moot. 
 
7 
 
 
 
THE LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
Huddleston argues the panel erred when it dismissed this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. He admits K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2012(a) generally governs appeals to the 
Court of Appeals as a matter of right and further concedes his appeal is not authorized by 
that statute because the order in controversy is not a final decision. See Kaelter v. Sokol, 
301 Kan. 247, 249-50, 340 P.3d 1210 (2015) ("A 'final decision' generally disposes of the 
entire merits of a case and leaves no further questions or possibilities for future directions 
or actions by the lower court."). Instead, Huddleston argues this appeal is authorized by 
the Brown jurisdictional exception, and the panel erred when it overruled Brown. In 
contrast, Wiechman accepts the panel's view and argues Brown is no longer good law in 
light of more recent caselaw. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
An appellate court exercises unlimited review over jurisdictional issues and has a 
duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative. When the record discloses a lack of 
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the appeal. Kaelter, 301 Kan. 247, Syl. ¶ 1. But we 
also must consider whether this court's 1978 Brown decision has lost its precedential 
value, so we need to consider the doctrine of stare decisis because this court generally 
follows an established point of law in subsequent cases "unless clearly convinced it was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 
636, 653, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012). 
 
8 
 
 
 
The Brown exception is no longer valid. 
 
Huddleston agrees there is no appellate jurisdiction without application of Brown, 
so it is necessary to consider that case's rationale and holding. The litigation began when 
the plaintiff sued K.N. Fitzgerald for payment on a promissory note, and the claim was 
dismissed for lack of prosecution. More than 2 years after the dismissal, the claim was 
reinstated under a prior version of K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6). 
 
Fitzgerald filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the reinstatement, and Brown 
opposed the appeal, arguing the appellate court lacked jurisdiction because the order 
reinstating the case was not a final order under K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(4). The Brown court 
held there was a "jurisdictional exception" applying to orders under K.S.A. 60-260(b) 
when "an order granting relief under authority of K.S.A. 60-260 is challenged on 
jurisdictional grounds." 224 Kan. at 639. 
 
The Brown court principally relied on federal caselaw adopting an identical 
exception for orders entered under the analogous federal rule, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b). 
The court reasoned that since K.S.A. 60-260(b) was fashioned after the federal rule:  "in 
the interest of consistency with the federal case law this court feels the 'jurisdictional 
exception' should be extended in Kansas to orders under K.S.A. 60-260(b)." 224 Kan. at 
639. The court noted Kansas recognized a similar exception for orders granting a new 
trial under K.S.A. 60-259(a) based on federal caselaw interpreting Fed R. Civ. Proc. 
59(d). The court then observed that the exception had been criticized as unwise because it 
leads to many interlocutory appeals, citing 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Civil § 2871, p. 260 (1969). But in the end, the court concluded consistency 
with the federal caselaw trumped those concerns. 224 Kan. at 638-39. 
 
9 
 
 
 
In Huddleston's appeal, the panel recognized Brown's application but held Brown 
was no longer valid given our more recent Park City decision. Wiechman, 2014 WL 
4996205, at *4-5. In Park City, the district court granted a municipality additional time to 
file a motion seeking postjudgment relief from a summary judgment order—even though 
the district court lacked statutory authority to grant that extension. The delay rendered 
Park City's notice of appeal untimely under the applicable statute. Park City attempted to 
avoid a jurisdictional bar by invoking the doctrine of unique circumstances, which was 
another judicially created exception permitting an untimely appeal when the appellant 
reasonably relied on some judicial action that purportedly extended the time period for 
bringing the appeal. 293 Kan. at 108-09. 
 
The Park City court recognized that Kansas courts had been following the United 
States Supreme Court's lead when it adopted the unique circumstances doctrine, but this 
court further noted that the United States Supreme Court had overruled that doctrine after 
concluding Congress had exercised its constitutional authority to limit the appellate 
courts' jurisdiction and that appellate courts could not create equitable exceptions to those 
legitimate statutory requirements. 293 Kan. at 117 (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 
205, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 168 L. Ed. 2d 96 [2007]). 
 
The Park City court followed suit and overruled the doctrine in Kansas based on 
the same reasoning, stating: 
 
 
"Consequently, we reject Park City's argument that the unique circumstances 
doctrine saves its appeal. As stated in Bowles, 'Because this Court has no authority to 
create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the "unique 
circumstances" doctrine is illegitimate.'" 293 Kan. at 120 (quoting Bowles, 551 U.S. at 
214).  
 
10 
 
 
 
The rationale from Park City answers the jurisdictional question raised by 
Huddleston. We have often reiterated as a "longstanding rule" that appellate jurisdiction 
in civil cases is defined by statute, and the right to appeal is neither vested nor a 
constitutional right. 293 Kan. at 111 (collecting cases); see also Kaelter, 301 Kan. at 249 
("'Kansas appellate courts may exercise jurisdiction only under circumstances allowed by 
statute.'"); Williams v. Lawton, 288 Kan. 768, 778, 207 P.3d 1027 (2009) (same). But the 
Brown exception is inconsistent with that principle because the appeal statute, K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 60-2102, does not grant Huddleston a right to appeal the district court's order 
reinstating Wiechman's claim. And this court's rationale in Park City is easily applied to 
the Brown jurisdictional exception at issue here. As the panel held: 
 
 
"The jurisdiction exception for nonfinal orders found in Brown is directly 
analogous to the 'unique circumstances' exception reexamined in Park City. Both are 
court-made equitable exceptions to the jurisdictional requirements created by the 
legislature. Because the jurisdiction exception created in Brown circumvents the 
applicable statute—here, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-2102—it is also illegitimate under the 
rationale of Park City." Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *5. 
 
In addition, we note that since its 1978 adoption, the Brown exception has been 
rarely invoked. We are aware of only two subsequent cases applying the exception to 
establish appellate jurisdiction. See Chowning, Inc. v. Dupree, 6 Kan. App. 2d 140, 626 
P.2d 1240 (1981) (order to set aside dismissal for lack of prosecution appealable under 
the "jurisdictional exception"); In re Marriage of Ariaz, No. 105,224, 2012 WL 98490 
(Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (applying "jurisdictional exception" to allow 
appeal from K.S.A. 60-260 order challenging district court's jurisdiction to enter it). 
Based on this, overruling Brown has limited impact on the court's caselaw. 
 
We note further that the exception's wisdom continues to be questioned by legal 
commentators and some courts. See 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
11 
 
 
 
Procedure: Civil 3d § 2871, p. 591 (2012) (characterizing it as an "unwise doctrine, since 
it multiplies interlocutory appeals and requires the appellate courts to pass on the claim of 
lack of power"). This criticism led the New Mexico Court of Appeals to decline adopting 
the exception in Baca v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 121 N.M. 734, 918 P.2d 13 
(1996) (adopting the exception would "create an anomaly under New Mexico law"). On 
the other hand, the federal courts continue to apply this exception, which provides some 
authority for maintaining it in Kansas. See Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Moberly, 241 
S.W.3d 329 (Ky. 2007) (adopting the jurisdictional exception because the federal practice 
"remains viable" after 120 years); Baca, 121 N.M. at 736 (noting most federal courts of 
appeals have held there is a right to appeal from a trial court order setting aside a 
judgment, usually pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59 or 60). 
 
In our view, Brown focuses the analysis on the wrong question by allowing 
consistency with federal caselaw to trump a Kansas statute. If an appellate court lacks 
authority to adopt a jurisdictional exception, the wisdom of that exception is 
inconsequential. We conclude the best path is to abandon Brown and adhere to our 
jurisprudence that limits appellate jurisdiction in civil cases to that provided by statute. 
 
Finally, one clarification to our holding in Park City is required because that case 
dealt with a civil proceeding challenging a land annexation order. Its holding that the 
right to appeal is entirely statutory was based exclusively on civil cases that had adopted 
that same principle. See Park City, 293 Kan. at 111 (citing Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 
Kan. 476, 480-81, 153 P.3d 523 [2007]; Bruch v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 282 Kan. 
764, 773-74, 148 P.3d 538 [2006]; Jones v. Continental Can Co., 260 Kan. 547, 550, 920 
P.2d 939 [1996]; Little Balkans Foundation, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Comm’n, 247 Kan. 
180, 188, 795 P.2d 368 [1990]; Tobin Constr. Co. v. Kemp, 239 Kan. 430, 437, 721 P.2d 
278 [1986]). Accordingly, Park City's application should be viewed as limited to appeals 
in civil cases. 
12 
 
 
 
 
We affirm the panel and dismiss Huddleston's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
 
STEGALL, J., not participating.  
AMY L. HARTH, District Judge, assigned.1   
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Harth was appointed to hear case No. 110,656 vice 
Justice Stegall under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas 
Constitution.