Title: Coles v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050107
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2005

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
COREY DION COLES 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
 v.  Record No. 050107                 November 4, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Indicted for the attempted capital murder of a law-
enforcement officer, in violation of Code § 18.2-25, defendant 
Corey Dion Coles was convicted by the trial court sitting 
without a jury, and was sentenced to 50 years imprisonment 
with 30 years suspended. 
 
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia denied defendant's petition for appeal 
insofar as he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the conviction for attempted capital murder.  Coles v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 2053-03-1 (April 12, 2004).  We 
awarded the defendant an appeal from the Court of Appeals' 
judgment to consider the question whether the evidence was 
sufficient to prove premeditation and the necessary intent to 
kill to support that conviction. 
 
According to settled principles of appellate review, we 
shall consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.  When a 
 
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defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain his conviction, the appellate court has the duty to 
examine the evidence that tends to support it, and to affirm 
the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidentiary support.  Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 
466, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998). 
 
And, when the sufficiency of the evidence is attacked on 
appeal, the judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury 
is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.  McCain v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 492, 545 S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001). 
 
Employing these rules, we shall summarize the facts 
adduced at trial.  In the City of Norfolk on October 8, 2002, 
near 3:00 a.m., having received report of the theft of a 1997 
Honda Accord automobile, Officer H. E. Warren was patrolling 
in his police cruiser and observed the stolen vehicle with two 
occupants being operated on a city street. 
 
After other officers were alerted to Warren's discovery, 
he began to follow the vehicle.  As the Honda was traveling 
north on Wide Street approaching its intersection with East 
Princess Anne Road, another police cruiser, operated by 
Officer R. D. Lean, had stopped headed east on Princess Anne 
Road, partially blocking the two northbound lanes of Wide 
Street.  From behind the Honda, Warren then "activated" the 
 
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lights on his vehicle, the Honda stopped, and its driver 
(later identified as the defendant) remained in the vehicle. 
 
At this point in time, the Honda was in the right-hand 
northbound lane of Wide close to the intersection.  Lean's 
marked police cruiser was to the right side of the right-hand 
eastbound lane of Princess Anne at a 45-degree angle, facing 
generally southeast. 
 
Then, according to Warren's testimony, "Officer Lean got 
out of his car and was starting to walk around the front of 
[his] vehicle."  At this moment, the defendant "raised his 
hands in a surrender position."  As Lean "started moving 
toward" the Honda, according to Warren, the defendant "grabbed 
the steering wheel again, put it in gear," accelerated, and 
"drove his vehicle into the police unit."  Upon impact, the 
police cruiser "was pushed towards Officer Lean, and at that 
point the [Honda] turned east – to go eastbound, right-hand 
turn, on Princess Anne Road," testified Warren. 
 
Officer Lean, who was the subject of the indictment, 
testified that he joined the pursuit of the stolen vehicle 
and, while traveling east on Princess Anne, observed the Honda 
followed by Warren moving north on Wide approaching the 
intersection.  Lean, accompanied by another officer, 
positioned his cruiser in the northbound lane of Wide, leaving 
enough space for the "small" Honda "to get by."  He said:  "I 
 
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didn't block the intersection because that's against our 
policies and procedures." 
 
According to Lean, he "exited" his car, "started walking 
around the vehicle," and recognized the defendant as the 
Honda's driver.  Lean testified:  "He . . . come rolling up.  
I looked right at him.  He placed his hands up.  The other 
police cars were coming up. . . . I made a statement . . . I 
thought we ended the pursuit at that time." 
 
Continuing, Lean testified that defendant "put his hands 
down.  He hit the gas.  He nudged into my police vehicle, came 
out, took a right . . . heading eastbound on Princess Anne 
Road."  Lean said defendant "didn't slam into [the police 
vehicle].  He accelerated.  [The Honda is] not a very powerful 
car.  I have a very heavy police cruiser.  It hit it, pushed 
it out back toward me."  At the time of impact, the Honda was 
traveling "five to ten miles" per hour, "heading straight for 
the police cruiser before it swerved," according to Lean. 
 
Lean said that, at the time the Honda began accelerating 
toward him, he was standing in front of the number on the 
driver's side of the vehicle, "basically right in front of 
that between the door and front tire, on the side of the 
vehicle."  A photograph received in evidence shows the number 
on the left side of the police vehicle to be directly above 
the left front tire. 
 
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At impact, Lean said he "was at a very bad spot" 
performing "a felony stop," which he ordinarily executes from 
behind a vehicle, but this time he "happened to be in front of 
it." 
 
Another police officer involved in the pursuit testified 
that after Lean positioned his cruiser "in front of the 
suspect vehicle," Lean "got out to approach the suspect 
vehicle" and was "ordering the driver to stop, show him his 
hands."  According to the witness, "At that point I could see 
Officer Lean react toward – walked toward his car.  The 
suspect vehicle rammed the front of his police car, then took 
off eastbound on Princess Anne Road."  Defendant was 
apprehended about 15 minutes later. 
 
Code § 18.2-31(6) provides that the "willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated killing of a law-enforcement officer . . . 
when such killing is for the purpose of interfering with the 
performance of his official duties" shall constitute capital 
murder.  Code § 18.2-25 provides that any person who "attempts 
to commit an offense which is punishable with death" shall be 
guilty of a Class 2 felony. 
 
In this appeal, defendant contends the Court of Appeals 
erred in determining that the trial court correctly found 
there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and intent to 
kill to support the charge of attempted capital murder of 
 
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Officer Lean.  He contends that the "premeditation at issue is 
not just premeditating the act that leads to the killing (or 
attempted killing), but the actual result of death must be 
premeditated."  He also argues that the evidence fails to show 
that defendant "reflected" with a view to determine whether he 
would kill or not, and that he decided to kill as a result of 
that reflection. 
 
Continuing, defendant says "the evidence is more 
consistent with" the hypotheses either that there was "a 
simple attempt to escape" or "an attempt to disable the 
[police] cruiser." 
 
While we agree with defendant that the actual result of 
death must be premeditated, we disagree with defendant's 
remaining contentions.  Initially, we observe that the issue 
upon appellate review in a case like this is not whether there 
is some evidence to support defendant's hypotheses.  Rather, 
the issue is whether a reasonable fact finder, upon 
consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected 
defendant's theories and found him guilty of the charged 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 
Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). 
 
Several additional general principles are applicable 
here.  An attempt to commit a crime is composed of the intent 
to commit it and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its 
 
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commission.  Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 657, 180 
S.E. 395, 397 (1935).  Intent is the purpose formed in a 
person's mind, which may be shown by circumstantial evidence 
including the person's conduct.  Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 
Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977). 
 
"A motor vehicle, wrongfully used, can be a weapon as 
deadly as a gun or a knife."  Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
273, 281, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984).  Indeed, we have 
recognized that the premeditated use of an automobile to kill 
can be first-degree murder.  Harrison v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 
394, 401, 32 S.E.2d 136, 139-40 (1944). 
 
"Premeditation is an intent to kill that needs to exist 
only for a moment."  Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 104, 
580 S.E.2d 834, 847 (2003).  Accord Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 
Va. 460, 477, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 (1994).  It usually is a 
factual issue.  Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 134, 321 
S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984). 
 
Finally, a person must have the specific intent to kill 
in order to be guilty of an attempt to commit murder.  
Merritt, 164 Va. at 660, 180 S.E. at 398. 
 
When each of the foregoing factors is applied to the 
present case, the evidence manifestly is sufficient to prove 
premeditation and the specific intent to kill. 
 
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Important are the relative positions of the Honda, Lean's 
cruiser, and Lean himself when the vehicles were stopped, and 
before defendant accelerated the Honda.  According to a 
diagram introduced in evidence by the defendant, the Honda was 
in the center of the right-hand northbound lane of Wide 
Street.  The police car was at a 45-degree angle facing 
southeast on Princess Anne Road blocking the left-hand 
northbound lane of Wide, but not the right-hand northbound 
lane.  Lean was standing near the left front of the cruiser, 
with his person exposed to the eventual path of the stolen 
vehicle.  Contrary to defendant's argument, which ignores the 
evidence, Lean was not concealed and protected behind the 
police car. 
 
As Lean was confronting the defendant, performing "a 
felony stop," defendant assumed a surrender position, and Lean 
believed the pursuit had ended.  Then, defendant obviously 
decided, in that second or two, to ram the police car, 
intending to kill the officer in order to avoid apprehension. 
 
The defendant contends he merely was trying to escape.  
This contention is belied by the clear evidence that defendant 
drove the Honda, not straight ahead where there was plenty of 
room to make a right turn, but swerved to the left and aimed 
the Honda directly toward the officer and the police vehicle.  
This maneuver enabled the small, light Honda, traveling that 
 
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short distance at five to ten miles per hour, to ram the heavy 
police cruiser and push it toward Lean, causing him to "jump 
back" to avoid injury. 
 
Thus, the defendant, using the motor vehicle as a 
dangerous weapon, premeditated after initially indicating he 
was surrendering and formed the specific intent to kill the 
police officer, in order to avoid apprehension.  Coupled with 
this intent, the defendant performed a direct but ineffectual 
act toward the killing of the police officer. 
 
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly decided the trial 
court reasonably could have concluded, upon consideration of 
all the evidence including the defendant's conduct, that he 
was guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will 
be 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE AGEE join, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  No principle is more fundamental 
in the criminal law than the requirement that the Commonwealth 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged against the accused.  That 
principle is of constitutional dimension.  In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  In the present case, in order to prove 
 
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the charge of attempted capital murder of a law-enforcement 
officer the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Corey D. Coles acted with the specific 
intent to kill Officer R. D. Lean.  Merritt v. Commonwealth, 
164 Va. 653, 660, 180 S.E. 395, 398 (1934).  In my view, when 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Coles acted with that 
intent.  This is so because a reasonable fact-finder upon 
consideration of that evidence could not have rejected Coles’ 
defense theory that he acted only to effect an escape.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 
(2003). 
 
A complete recitation of the facts which led to the 
charge of attempted capital murder of a law-enforcement 
officer against Coles need not be repeated here in light of 
their recitation by the majority.  The critical facts are 
undisputed.  When Coles was stopped, he was operating a 1997 
Honda automobile which he had recently stolen.  Coles became 
virtually surrounded by two occupied police cruisers with 
their lights activated.  One cruiser was positioned 
immediately behind the Honda and the other, operated by 
Officer Lean, was positioned so as to partially block the road 
 
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in front of the Honda.  Officer Lean recognized Coles.  While 
Officer Lean was standing near the left front of his cruiser, 
with the cruiser between him and the Honda, Coles “nudged” the 
Honda into Lean’s heavier cruiser while traveling “five to ten 
miles” per hour.*  The cruiser “was pushed towards Officer 
Lean” and he had to “jump back” in order to avoid injury.  
Coles then turned the Honda to the right and drove away while 
being pursued by the police. 
 
In addressing these facts, the trial court rejected the 
defense theory that Coles “was just trying to get away,” 
reasoning that “[t]he reasonable conclusion that can be drawn 
                     
* In previous cases where a defendant has been convicted 
of a specific intent crime for driving a vehicle toward 
another individual, there was no barrier between the 
defendant’s vehicle and the individual.  See, e.g., Holley v. 
Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 228, 604 S.E.2d 127 (2004) 
(defendant accelerated toward police officer standing in 
defendant’s path); Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 
567 S.E.2d 537 (2002) (defendant turned his vehicle toward 
police officer, who was riding a motorcycle, and accelerated 
rapidly); Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 508 S.E.2d 
354 (1998) (defendant accelerated toward a pedestrian). 
 
The fact that Lean’s police cruiser separated Coles’ 
vehicle from Officer Lean is more analogous to Haywood v. 
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 606 (1995), where 
the court held that insufficient proof of specific intent 
existed where the defendant drove toward two officers’ 
vehicles while the officers were inside the cars.  The 
evidence did not discount the hypothesis that “Haywood, who 
was in trouble with the law, merely attempted to run a 
roadblock to avoid apprehension.”  Id. at 567, 458 S.E.2d at 
608; see also Moody, 28 Va. App. at 708, 508 S.E.2d at 356 
(distinguishing Haywood by stating, “appellant was not 
attempting to run through an inanimate object; rather, the 
obstacle in his path consisted exclusively of a pedestrian.”). 
 
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is that [Coles], while in custody, decided in order to effect 
an escape, that he was going to attempt to kill a law[-
]enforcement officer engaged in his duties.  He was 
unsuccessful in doing so, only by luck, . . . because the 
police car got in his way.” 
 
“[W]here a fact is equally susceptible of two 
interpretations one of which is consistent with the innocence 
of the accused, [the trier of fact] cannot arbitrarily adopt 
that interpretation which incriminates him.”  Corbett v. 
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 304, 307, 171 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1969).  
It is difficult to construct a factual scenario more 
consistent with an attempt to escape than that established by 
the facts in this case.  Coles was operating a Honda that he 
had stolen, he was surrounded by the police, and at least one 
officer recognized him.  The officer that the Commonwealth 
asserts Coles specifically intended to kill was standing 
behind the police cruiser which Coles only “nudged” with the 
Honda.  Coles then proceeded to drive away.  That Coles merely 
intended to effect an escape by pushing the police cruiser out 
of its position in the road is just as likely as that he acted 
with the specific intent to kill the officer to effect an 
escape.  Accordingly, because the evidence is equally 
susceptible to the interpretation that Coles did not have the 
specific intent to kill Officer Lean as it is that he did, the 
 
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evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Coles acted with the necessary intent to be guilty of 
attempted capital murder. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals.