Title: City of Central v. Axton
Citation: 373 P.2d 300
Docket Number: 19977
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 1962

373 P.2d 300 (1962) The CITY OF CENTRAL, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff in Error, v. William L. AXTON, individually, and doing business as the Glory Hole Tavern, Defendant in Error. No. 19977. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. July 9, 1962. Albert B. Dawkins, City Atty., Denver, for City of Central. Fugate, Mitchem, McGinley &amp; Hoffman, Richard L. Whitworth, Denver, for defendant in error. SUTTON, Justice. This writ of error involves the question of whether the City of Central was authorized under its charter to enact an ordinance imposing an occuaptional tax on the business of William L. Axton. The parties are here in the same order as in the trial court where the City was plaintiff and Axton defendant. We will so refer to the parties. The City was incorporated by virtue of a charter granted by the Territorial Legislature in 1864. Under C.R.S. '53, 139-1-1, a city or town incorporated previous to July 3, 1877, can choose to retain its charter organization and operate in accordance therewith; or under C.R.S. '53, 139-8-1, can choose to reorganize under the general statutes pertaining to cities and towns. The City has chosen to retain its charter and such charter is the sole source of authority under which it operates. Article V of the City's charter provides in pertinent part that the city council shall have authority: "Sec. 17. To license, tax and regulate auctioneers, merchants, peddlers, *301 retailers, grocers, taverns, ordinaries, hawkers, brokers, pawnbrokers, and money changers." Pursuant to the above charter provision the city council on March 1, 1957, enacted Ordinance No. 133 entitled "An Ordinance Establishing An Occupation Tax In and For The City of Central." The ordinance provides in pertinent part as follows: The defendant Axton operates a business in the City known as the Glory Hole Tavern. The premises on which this business is operated consists of a room containing a bar and tables, and an adjoining room containing a service bar and additional tables. In both rooms alcoholic beverages and food are sold by Axton to patrons. On April 15, 1960, Axton received notice from the City of an occupational tax levy of $200.00 for the year 1960. Upon Axton's subsequent refusal to pay the tax the City brought this action. Its complaint alleged, inter alia, that although failure to pay the occupational tax entitled the City to recover three times the amount of the tax plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs, the City was only claiming the sum of $300.00. After various proceedings not pertinent to this writ of error the county court on June 20, 1961, entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in which the court found that Axton "conducts a restaurant and incidentally sells liquor by the *302 drink or conducts a tavern, which incidentally sells food" and that "the Charter does not give express authority to tax either." The complaint was accordingly dismissed and a motion for a new trial denied. The sole issue for determination here is whether the City is authorized by its charter to impose an occupational tax on Axton's business. In their briefs both parties raise additional issues pertaining to the constitutionality of the ordinance under which the tax in question was imposed. The arguments addressed to these constitutional issues proceed from the assumption that the charter did confer authority upon the City to tax the type of business conducted by Axton. Although these issues were also raised at the trial, the court refrained from passing on them, preferring rather to dispose of the case on the ground that there was no authorization by the charter to impose the occupational tax. In the absence of a determination by the trial court of such constitutional questions, we refrain from comment thereon. See Scott v. Bohe, 81 Colo. 454, 458, 256 P. 315, 317 (1927); Flank Oil Co., d/b/a Oriental Refining Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, d/b/a Bay Petroleum Company, et al., 141 Colo. 554, 571, 349 P.2d 1005, 1015 (1960). Also we refrain from determining whether the application of the tax would be confiscatory or discriminatory since these matters are questions of fact to be determined by the trier thereof. We thus turn to the question of whether the occupational tax was authorized by the charter. The trial court based its finding on the ground that Axton "conducts a restaurant and incidentally sells liquor by the drink, or conducts a tavern which incidentally sells food." If the city charter authorizes the taxation of either or both of such businesses, then the ordinance in question, regardless of other constitutional questions pertaining thereto, was not invalid and the judgment should be reversed. Accepting the trial court's characterization of Axton's business as a restaurant which incidentally sells liquor, it is at least arguable that the taxation of a restaurant was authorized under Article V, Section 17 of the charter empowering the city council to tax "ordinaries." An ordinary has been defined as an eating house where regular meals are served. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961). It has also been defined as a place of eating where the prices are settled. Werner v. Washington, 29 Fed.Cas. 705, 707 (Cir.Ct. D.C.1854). And, an ordinary is not the same as a restaurant for the former is distinguished from the latter in at least one respect, namely, that the meals served in an ordinary are regular ones at a fixed price, which from common knowledge we must recognize is not a feature of restaurants generally. Compare: Potson v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill.App. 50, 52, aff'd 304 Ill. 222, 136 N.E. 594 (1922). At least one case indicates that the furnishing of lodging, as well as food, to the traveler and his beast, was characteristic of an ordinary. Talbott v. Southern Seminary, Inc., 131 Va. 576, 578, 109 S.E. 440, 441, 19 A.L.R. 534 (1921). Interesting as a further examination of the etymology of "ordinary" might prove, it is unnecessary to a disposition of this case. For Article V, Section 17 of the charter of the City expressly authorizes the city council to tax "taverns" and the trial court alternatively characterized Axton's business as "a tavern, which incidentally sells food." The fact that Article V, Section 17 of the charter generally provides for the taxation of "taverns" and does not specifically mention "taverns which incidentally sell food" cannot serve as a basis for a determination that a "tavern which incidentally sells food" is beyond the purview of the charter authorization. We are aware that a municipal charter is to be strictly construed, and that no powers are to be exercised by the municipality except those expressly conferred or necessarily implied. Bernheimer v. City of Leadville, 14 Colo. 518, 520, 24 P. 332 (1890). This is not to say, however, that the charter must spell out each and every *303 incident of a business which is otherwise expressly subject to taxation under the charter, in order that a tax might be imposed upon the business offering other incidental services. Moreover, the serving of food appears not only to be a common characteristic of a "tavern" under present usage of that term, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra; Murray et al. v. Hagens, 143 So. 505, 506 (La.App.1932); City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 659, 232 P. 1044, 1046 (1925), but is also required by Art. XXII, Sec. 1, of the Colorado Constitution which since 1932 has authorized the sale of intoxicating liquors but expressly prohibits saloons. Undoubtedly at the time of the adoption of the City's charter in 1864 taverns were even then serving food as well as drink. For the above reasons the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the complaint and proceed to trial upon the issues formed by the pleadings. HALL, FRANTZ and McWILLIAMS, JJ., not participating.