Title: PENROD v HOSKINSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13251
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 1977

No. 13251 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 JEANETTE PENROD, P l a i n t i f f , -VS - WILLIAM S. HOSKINSON, M.D., Defendant . C e r t i f i e d by: U.S. D i s t r i c t Court Honorable James F. B a t t i n , U.S. D i s t r i c t Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For P l a i n t i f f : Cate, T,ynaugh, Fitzgerald and Huss , B i l l i n g s , Montana George W. Huss argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Defendant : Anderson, Symrnes, Forbes, Peete and Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana Richard F. Cebull argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: June 3, 1976 Decided : J U L 2 1 1976 Filed : $fJb 2 1 1 G7C'; M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an o r i g i n a l proceeding f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment pursuant t o Rule 1 of t h e Rules of t h e Montana Supreme Court. It is based upon t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Hon. James F. B a t t i n , United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Judge, presiding i n a c i v i l cause i n United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e D i s t r i c t of Montana e n t i t l e d " J e a n e t t e Penrod, p l a i n t i f f , v. William S. Hoskinson, M.D., defendant." The c e r t i f i c a t i o n states t h a t such l i t i g a t i o n involves a c o n t r o l l i n g question of Montana l a w a s t o which t h e r e is a sub- s t a n t i a l ground f o r a d i f f e r e n c e of opinion, v i z . whether s e c t i o n 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947, a s amended, o r s e c t i o n 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, i s t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n . Judge B a t t i n has f u r t h e r c e r t i f i e d t h a t adjudication of t h i s question by t h e Montana Sup- reme Court w i l l m a t e r i a l l y advance u l t i m a t e termination of t h e f e d e r a l l i t i g a t i o n . The p r e c i s e question f o r determination a s c e r t i f i e d by Judge Battin: " I s § 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947, a s amended, enacted i n 1971, o r is 9 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, t h e applic- a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n i n a medical malpractice a c t i o n i n which t h e a l l e g e d negligent a c t took p l a c e i n May of 1969, t h e p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d l y having discovered t h e negligence i n September of 1973, and t h e a c t i o n having been f i l e d on A p r i l 23, 1975?" Judge B a t t i n has c e r t i f i e d t h e following f a c t s giving rise t o t h i s issue: "On May 6, 1969, p l a i n t i f f underwent surgery i n t h e Holy Rosary Hospital i n Miles City, Montana, where she underwent a hysterectomy, g a l l bladder removal, and i n c i d e n t a l appendectomy. The doctor who performed t h e surgery was t h e defendant i n t h i s case, WILLIAM S. HOSKINSON, M.D. O n September 21, 1973, during a r o u t i n e physical examination, plain- t i f f was advised by a physician a t t h e Holy Rosary Hospital t h a t it appeared on X-ray t h a t she had a s u r g i c a l d r a i n i n t h e a r e a of her spleen. "On August 15, 1974, p l a i n t i f f underwent surgery a t Holy Rosary Hospital f o r removal of t h e d r a i n . " P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a Complaint charging t h e defend- a n t with malpractice on o r about t h e 23rd day of April, 1975." Defendant has f i l e d a motion f o r summary judgment i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t a c t i o n , claiming t h e a c t i o n is barred by s e c t i o n 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947. P l a i n t i f f has opposed t h e motion f o r summary judgment on t h e ground t h a t s e c t i o n 93-2605(3), R.C.M. 1947, i n conjunction with t h e "discovery d o c t r i n e " set f o r t h i n Johnson v. S t . P a t r i c k ' s Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469, makes t h e f i l i n g of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint timely. The question f o r determination involves a f i n d i n g of t h e s t a t u t o r y law of Montana, upon which t h e r e i s no guiding opinion, and s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l s with t h e r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947. Judge B a t t i n has c e r t i f i e d t h a t t h e answer t o t h e question is c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h e a c t i o n before him and t h a t adjudication thereof by t h e Montana Supreme Court w i l l m a t e r i a l l y advance u l t i m a t e termination of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t l i t i g a t i o n . W e accepted j u r i s d i c t i o n on March 19, 1976, provided f o r t h e f i l i n g of b r i e f s , heard o r a l argument on June 3, 1976 and took t h e matter under advisement. W e observe t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e a l l e g e d malpractice on May 6, 1969, t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n was t h e general t o r t s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, providing i n p a r t : "93-2605. Within t h r e e years. Within t h r e e years: " * * * " 3 . A n a c t i o n upon an o b l i g a t i o n o r l i a b i l i t y , not founded upon an instrument i n w r i t i n g , o t h e r than a c o n t r a c t , account, o r promise." I n 1966 we held t h a t an a c t i o n f o r malpractice does not accrue u n t i l t h e p a t i e n t l e a r n s of it o r i n t h e e x e r c i s e of reasonable c a r e should have learned of it. Johnson v. S t . P a t r i c k s Hos- p i t a l , supra. I n 1971 before p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n had become barred by s e c t i o n 93-2605, t h e Montana L e g i s l a t u r e enacted a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e t o medical malpractice a c t i o n s . This s t a t u t e has been c o d i f i e d as s e c t i o n 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947, and provides i n p a r t : "93-2624. Actions f o r medical malpractice. Action f o r i n j u r y o r death a g a i n s t a physician o r surgeon * * * based upon such person's a l l e g e d professional negligence, o r f o r rendering profes- s i o n a l s e r v i c e s without consent, o r f o r e r r o r o r omission i n such person's p r a c t i c e , s h a l l be commenced within t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r s a f t e r t h e d a t e of i n j u r y o r t h r e e (3) years a f t e r t h e p l a i n t i f f discovers, o r through t h e use of reasonable d i l i - gence should have discovered, t h e i n j u r y whichever occurs last, but i n no c a s e may such a c t i o n be commenced a f t e r f i v e (5) y e a r s from t h e d a t e of i n j u r y . However, t h i s t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s h a l l be t o l l e d f o r any period during which such person has f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e any a c t , e r r o r , o r omission upon which such a c t i o n i s based and which is known t o him, o r through t h e use of reasonable d i l i g e n c e subsequent t o s a i d act, e r r o r o r omission would have been known t o him." I n 1973 t h i s s t a t u t e was f u r t h e r amended t o enlarge t h e c l a s s of persons s u b j e c t t o t h e s t a t u t e , b u t t h i s amendment i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r e s e n t case. The general t h r e e year t o r t s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n i n s e c t i o n 93-2605 has a t a l l t i m e s r e - mained i n ef f ec t. The g i s t of p l a i n t i f f ' s contention i s t h a t s e c t i o n 93- 2624 should n o t be given r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t and applied t o bar p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n because t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d not s o intend. Instead, p l a i n t i f f argues, t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of t h e a l l e g e d malpractice, s e c t i o n 93-2605, i n conjunction with t h e "discovery d o c t r i n e " of Johnson , governs p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n and p r e s e n t s no bar. The p r i n c i p a l contention of defendant is t h a t s e c t i o n 93-2624 is t h e applicable s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n because t h e language e x h i b i t s a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t it be applied t o claims a r i s i n g p r i o r t o 1971, t h e d a t e of i t s enactment. De- fendant argues t h a t s o applied, p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n i s barred because f i v e years had expired before it w a s f i l e d . A t t h e o u t s e t we note s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947, which provides : "No l a w contained i n any of t h e codes o r o t h e r s t a t u t e s of Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e unless expressly SO declared." This s t a t u t e c r e a t e s a presumption a g a i n s t construing a s t a t u t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y . Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula, Mont . , 548 P.2d 1383, 33 St.Rep. 372, 376, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . The r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s presumption was f i r s t expressed by t h i s Court i n Sullivan v. C i t y of Butte, 65 Mont. 495, 498, 2 1 1 P. 301, and quoted with approval i n Dunham: "'While our Constitution does n o t f o r b i d t h e enactment of r e t r o s p e c t i v e laws generally, it is a r u l e recognized by a u t h o r i t i e s everywhere t h a t r e t r o s p e c t i v e laws a r e looked upon with d i s f a v o r . It is a maxim s a i d t o be a s o l d as t h e law i t s e l f t h a t a new s t a t u t e ought t o be prospective, n o t r e t r o s p e c t i v e , i n its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation i n t h e pre- sumption t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e does n o t intend t o make a new r u l e f o r p a s t t r a n s a c t i o n s and every reasonable doubt w i l l be resolved a g a i n s t a r e t r o s p e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n . ' " The i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o g i v e a s t a t u t e r e t r o - a c t i v e e f f e c t a s required by s e c t i o n 12-201, must be determined by t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f and from no o t h e r source. C i t y of Harlem v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 149 Mont. 281, 425 P.2d 718. W e f i n d nothing i n s e c t i o n 93-2624 e x h i b i t i n g a l e g i s - l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t it be applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y . Absent such i n t e n t , it is applicable only prospectively. The remedy v. r i g h t d i s t i n c t i o n drawn i n G i l l e t t e v. Hibbard, 3 P4ont. 412 and Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 399 P.2d 757, does not mandate r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 93-2624. This d i s t i n c t i o n is s i g n i f i c a n t only i n determining t h a t t h e r e a r e no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y o b s t a c l e s t o l e g i s l a t i v e enactment of s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g t o remedies which a r e r e t r o a c t i v e operation. The d i s t i n c t i o n is i r r e l e v a n t determination of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t a s t a t u t e apply r e t r o a c t i v e l y . Guiterman v. Wishon, 21 Mont. 458, 54 P. 566, is d i s - tinguishable and o f f e r s no solace t o defendant. There t h e former f i v e year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n on a c t i o n s on account was repealed and a new t h r e e year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n enacted. e If t h e new s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n w a s n o t given r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t t h e r e would be no s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n a t a l l on a c t i o n s on account. Under such circumstances, t h i s Court found a l e g i s - l a t i v e i n t e n t t o make t h e new s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n r e t r o a c t i v e . Defendant cites t h e Arkansas c a s e of S t e e l e v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 123 S.W.2d 520, 120 A.L.R. 754, where a contrary r e s u l t was reached i n support of h i s p o s i t i o n here. The r u l i n g i n S t e e l e is based on t h e proposition t h a t a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a - t i o n s a f f e c t s t h e remedy, not t h e r i g h t , and is t o be applied t o a l l cases t h e r e a f t e r brought i r r e s p e c t i v e of when t h e cause of a c t i o n a r o s e , s u b j e c t t o a reasonable period t h e r e a f t e r i n which t h e r i g h t can be a s s e r t e d . This is d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y t o Montana's s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 12-201, which p r o h i b i t s r e t r o a c t i v e operation of s t a t u t e s "unless expressly s o declared". The F l o r i d a c a s e s of DeLuca v. Mathews, (Fla.App. 1974) 297 S.2d 854, and (Fla.App. 1974) Maltempo v. Cuthbert,/288 S.2d 517, c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f , a r e more persuasive i n view of our s t a t u t e s and c a s e law. Accordingly, w e hold t h a t s e c t i o n 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, is t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n i n a medical m a l - p r a c t i c e i n which t h e a l l e g e d negligent a c t took place i n May 1969, t h e p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d l y having discovered t h e negligence i n September 1973, and t h e a c t i o n having been f i l e d on A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 7 5 , pursuant t o t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of f a c t s and i s s u e s herein. J u s t i c e W e concur: Hon. Edward Dussualt, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.