Title: Hubbard v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 279, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANEL HUBBARD, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 279, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 0900621444 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  February 17, 2011 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  April 12, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Aaronson, Collins & Jennings, LLC, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
2 
 
The defendant-appellant, Anel Hubbard (“Hubbard”), was arrested by 
City of Wilmington police officers in connection with a shooting that 
occurred on West 5th Street.  Hubbard was subsequently indicted by a grand 
jury for the following offenses:  one count of Attempted Murder in the First 
Degree,1 two counts of Robbery in the First Degree,2 one count of 
Carjacking in the First Degree,3 one count of Conspiracy in the Second 
Degree,4 one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree,5 one count 
of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited,6 and five counts 
of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.7 
Following a six-day trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on eleven of 
the indicted offenses.  The remaining charge, Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon by a Person Prohibited, had been severed and heard simultaneously 
at a separate bench trial.  After the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge 
found Hubbard guilty of that separate charge as well. 
 
Prior to sentencing, the State filed a motion to declare Hubbard a 
habitual offender.  The Superior Court granted the State’s motion.  Hubbard 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 531. 
2 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 832. 
3 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 836. 
4 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 512. 
5 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 604. 
6 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 1448. 
7 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 1447. 
 
3 
 
was sentenced to twelve life terms of incarceration without the possibility of 
any reduction in those sentences. 
 
In this direct appeal, Hubbard argues that the Superior Court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress his custodial statement to a police detective 
because the waiver of his Miranda8 rights was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  In support of that argument, Hubbard relies on three factual 
assertions:  first, the detective’s “rapid” recitation of Hubbard’s Miranda 
rights; second, the detective’s failure to “more affirmatively ascertain” 
whether Hubbard wanted to give a statement before proceeding with 
questioning; and third, the detective’s failure to ascertain whether Hubbard 
was competent to understand the rights he was waiving because of 
Hubbard’s representation that he had been intoxicated the previous night.  
According to Hubbard, “these three factors did not allow him to fully 
comprehend the nature of his Miranda rights and the consequences of 
abandoning those rights.” 
 
The record reflects that Hubbard’s arguments are without merit.  
Accordingly, the Superior Court properly denied the motion to suppress.  
Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
 
 
                                          
 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
 
4 
 
Facts 
 
On June 25, 2009, at approximately 12:30 a.m., John Walker 
(“Walker”), and Waldemar Ortiz (“Ortiz”) left the Ortiz residence located on 
5th Street in Wilmington, Delaware, and walked toward the driveway where 
Walker’s motorcycle was parked.  As Walker was getting on his motorcycle 
and preparing to go home, two black males approached.  One of the men 
ordered Walker to get off the motorcycle, while the other man pointed a 
handgun at both Walker and Ortiz.  The gunman ordered them to lay face 
down on the ground.   
The unarmed man was unable to start the motorcycle.  Walker got up 
from the ground, explained how to start the motorcycle, and helped put it in 
gear.  As the unarmed man began to drive away, the gunman started 
shooting at Ortiz and Walker.  Walker was shot once in the jaw, twice in the 
thigh, and once on the calf.  Ortiz ran away, uninjured, toward his house.  
The gunman then fled.  Ortiz returned and drove Walker to St. Francis 
Hospital.   
 
When Wilmington Police arrived at the shooting scene, they observed 
surveillance cameras at the adjacent Latin American Community Center.  
The officers were able to view the surveillance videotape.  It depicted 
Walker and Ortiz being approached by two black males, one appearing to 
 
5 
 
have a gun in his hand.  One of the men got onto the motorcycle while 
Walker was face down on the ground.  The videotape does not show the 
shots actually being fired.  It does show the armed man running away and 
Walker crawling toward the garage. 
 
After viewing the surveillance videotape, Wilmington Police went to 
St. Francis Hospital.  There, an officer interviewed Ortiz who gave a 
description of the perpetrators and the motorcycle.  Following Ortiz’s 
interview, the police observed the stolen motorcycle at a WaWa on North 
DuPont Highway in New Castle, Delaware.  The black male sitting on the 
motorcycle, identified as Isaiah Taylor (“Taylor”), matched one of Ortiz’s 
descriptions and was taken into custody. 
 
Ortiz was interviewed later on the morning of June 25, 2009, by 
Detective Peter Leccia (“Detective Leccia”) at the Wilmington Police 
Department.  A photographic lineup was created and shown to Ortiz who 
positively identified Taylor as the man who rode away on the motorcycle.  
Ortiz was unable to identify the gunman from a photographic lineup. 
 
A Wilmington police officer also attempted to interview Walker on 
June 25, 2009.  While he was unable to speak due to his injuries, he 
positively identified Taylor from a photographic lineup as the individual 
 
6 
 
who stole the motorcycle.  Walker was not able to make an identification of 
the gunman. 
 
Following his apprehension, Taylor was interviewed at the 
Wilmington Police Department by Detective Leccia.  Taylor admitted that 
he and another man, later identified as Hubbard, stole the motorcycle from 
the victim.  According to Taylor, Hubbard began firing shots at the victims 
as Taylor drove away. 
 
Based on Taylor’s statement, a search warrant was issued for the 
home where Hubbard was believed to reside.  Hubbard was taken into 
custody as he was leaving the residence.  A handgun was recovered from the 
ceiling tiles of the room in the residence that Hubbard occupied.  The 
handgun was later examined by a forensic firearms examiner who was 
unable to conclusively establish that the five shell casings recovered from 
the scene were fired from the handgun.  The forensic firearm examiner did, 
however, determine that a bullet found at the crime scene had been fired by 
the handgun. 
 
Hubbard was brought to the Wilmington Police Department where he 
was interviewed by Detective Leccia at approximately 1:00 p.m. on the 
afternoon of June 25, 2009.  Detective Leccia advised Hubbard of his 
Miranda rights.  Hubbard stated that he understood those rights.   
 
7 
 
Instead of invoking his right to remain silent, Hubbard began to 
answer Detective Leccia’s questions.  Initially, Hubbard denied any 
involvement in the shooting and related a fictitious story about his 
whereabouts the previous night, also claiming to have been “drunk and 
high.”  As the interrogation progressed, however, Hubbard ultimately 
admitted his role in the shooting. 
Miranda Warnings and Waiver 
 
The following are the relevant portions of Hubbard’s statements to 
Detective Leccia for purposes of our Miranda analysis:9  
Hubbard:   I was wondering when ya’ll caught me with um 
with the dope I had got probation for that so I had violated 
probation that I just got out in October. 
 
Detective:   Yeap.  Alright um I’m gonna talk to you about 
some, some stuff that happened last night.  But before we go 
over everything I got advise you your rights.  OK?  You have 
the right to remain silent. 
 
Hubbard:  
 I’m under arrest? 
 
Detective:   Anything you say.  I’m just advising your rights.  
Whenever I’m talking to you.  I don’t know what you’re going 
to say. 
 
Hubbard:  
Oh, see. 
  
Detective:   OK? 
 
Hubbard:   Oh I thought I was under arrest. 
                                          
 
9 The emphasis is supplied. 
 
8 
 
 
Detective:   Well right right now you’re just being detained 
right now okay.  I got stuff that I have to get from you.  But uh 
you have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and 
will used against you in a court of law.  You have the right to 
remain you have a right to have an attorney present during any 
and all uh questioning.  If you can’t afford an attorney the State 
will provide you one free of charge.  At anytime during 
questioning you you have, you have the right to invoke that and 
then stop answering questions at anytime. 
 
Hubbard:   Uh huh. 
 
Detective:   Do you understand the rights I’ve explained to 
you? 
 
Hubbard:   Yes sir. 
 
Detective:   Okay with your rights in mind do you wanna talk 
to me? 
 
Hubbard:   Hum? 
 
Detective:   Do you wanna talk to me?  It’s about an incident 
that happened last night on uh… 
 
Hubbard:   Where at? 
 
Detective:   On uh it was on the uh Hilltop okay. 
 
Hubbard:   Hilltop? 
 
Detective:   OK?  Something happened last night right after 
midnight. 
 
Hubbard:   Inaudible. 
 
Detective:   I gotta know if you wanna talk to me about what 
you were doing last night. 
 
 
9 
 
Hubbard: 
I don’t care.  I was with a girl. 
 
Detective:   Be cool to talk, and so that’s a yes, you’ll talk to 
me? 
 
Hubbard:   Yeah.  I was with I was with a girl.  Yeah. 
 
Detective:   Ok.  What who were you with last night? 
 
Hubbard:   Lonyea Smith. 
 
Miranda’s Procedural Safeguards 
 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that all custodial interrogations create “compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where 
he would not otherwise do so freely.”10  To ameliorate those inherent 
pressures and safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, Miranda “imposed on the police an obligation to follow 
certain procedures in their dealings with the accused.”11  
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other 
fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of 
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it, the following measures are required.  Prior to any 
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of 
an attorney, either retained or appointed.  The defendant may 
                                          
 
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467.   
11 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986). 
 
10 
 
waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.12 
 
 
The two-part test to determine whether a suspect has effectively 
waived his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda rights, set forth in Moran v. 
Burbine,13 is stated as follows:   
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary 
in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.  Second, 
the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of 
the decision to abandon it.  Only if the “totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an 
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may 
a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been 
waived.14 
 
When the admission of a custodial interrogation statement is challenged, the 
burden is on the State to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the suspect’s Miranda rights have been waived.15   
Miranda Rights Waived 
 
Hubbard does not contest the voluntariness of his statements under the 
first part of the Moran test for waiver.  Hubbard’s sole contention is that he 
did not understand his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving 
                                          
 
12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. 
13 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
14 Id. at 421. 
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475; DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. 
1995). 
 
11 
 
them.  For a waiver to withstand judicial scrutiny under the second part of 
the Moran test, the defendant must comprehend the “plain meaning of his 
basic Miranda rights.”16  In analyzing the second part of the Moran test, the 
totality of the circumstances must be examined, including “the behavior of 
the interrogators, the conduct of the defendant, his age, his intellect, his 
experience, and all other pertinent factors.”17   
 
Hubbard’s first argument is that he “did not have a full awareness of 
the nature of the rights he was abandoning and the consequences of that 
important decision to abandon those rights.”  According to Hubbard, 
Detective Leccia’s recitation of his Miranda rights, in approximately 
twenty-one seconds, was “rushed and haphazard.”  Hubbard also argues that 
Detective Leccia failed to affirmatively ascertain whether Hubbard wanted 
to give a statement before he proceeded with questioning.  In support of the 
latter contention, Hubbard notes that Detective Leccia did not advise him of 
his Miranda rights in writing and did ask him to sign a written waiver of 
those rights.  Accordingly, Hubbard contends that the waiver of his Miranda 
rights was invalid.   
                                          
 
16 Bennett v. State, 992 A.2d 1236 at *3 (Del. Mar. 18, 2010).   
17 Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 
369 (1979). 
 
12 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no “precise 
formulation” necessary to satisfy the requirements of Miranda’s procedural 
safeguards.18  Although Detective Leccia’s recitation of Hubbard’s Miranda 
rights did not take very long, Hubbard has cited no authority that requires 
Miranda to be given at a certain pace.  There is no doubt that written 
Miranda waivers are a best police practice.19  They are not required, 
however, as a matter of law.20  The best evidence of a valid waiver of 
Miranda rights is a videotaped recording and that is what the State presented 
in Hubbard’s case. 
 
Pursuant to the holding in Miranda, before questioning suspects in 
custody, law enforcement officials must inform them that:  they have the 
right to remain silent; their statements may be used against them at trial; they 
have the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and if they 
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them.21  That 
information does not have to be stated exactly as it is written in the Miranda 
                                          
 
18 Florida v. Powell, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010). 
19 See id. at 1204-05 (waiver form stating that defendant had both “the right to talk to a 
lawyer before answering any . . . questions” and “the right to use any of these rights at 
any time .. . during this interview” reasonably conveyed defendant’s “right to have an 
attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times”).  
20 Compare State v. Casto, 375 A.2d 444, 449 (Del. 1977) (holding that a written waiver 
is required prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea in any criminal case in the Justice of 
the Peace Court.). 
21 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.   
 
13 
 
opinion.  However, law enforcement officials must convey the complete 
substance of Miranda’s safeguard to a suspect.22 
The record reflects that the Miranda warnings recited by Detective 
Leccia at the outset of the videotaped interview informed Hubbard about all 
of the procedural safeguards required by the holding in Miranda:  “[the] 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used against 
him and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.”23 The record also reflects that not only were the Miranda 
warnings conveyed to Hubbard by Detective Leccia, but that Hubbard 
affirmatively acknowledged that he understood his rights.   
Detective Leccia then asked Hubbard “with your rights in mind do 
you wanna talk to me?”  Hubbard responded “I was with a girl.”  Detective 
Leccia then asked Hubbard for clarification of that answer:  “[S]o that’s a 
yes you’ll talk to me[?] and Hubbard replied, “Yeah.  I was with a girl.  
Yeah.”  Hubbard then proceeded to answer several hundred questions posed 
by Detective Leccia.  Ultimately, during the course of the interrogation, 
Hubbard admitted his involvement in the crime.  
 
The record establishes that the warnings given to Hubbard by 
Detective Leccia were adequately conveyed.  After the warnings were given, 
                                          
 
22 Id. at 467.      
23 Id. at 444. 
 
14 
 
Hubbard stated that he understood his rights.  The Superior Court reviewed 
the videotape in which the warnings were given, which enabled the Superior 
Court to evaluate Detective Leccia’s recitation of those warnings and 
Hubbard’s response to those warnings.  In addition to reviewing the 
videotape of the interview, the Superior Court was entitled to consider 
Hubbard’s age, intellect, and experience in the criminal justice system.24  At 
the time of his arrest, Hubbard was twenty-seven years old and had 
significant experience with the criminal justice system.  The record indicates 
that Hubbard made an express waiver of his Miranda rights by his words 
and his actions.25 
Hubbard was Competent to Waive his Miranda Rights 
 
 
The State has the burden of showing that not only did Hubbard make 
an express waiver of his Miranda rights, but that he “knowingly and 
intelligently waived those rights.”26  Hubbard’s final argument is that 
Detective Leccia failed to inquire whether Hubbard was competent to 
understand the rights he was waiving and the consequences of such a waiver.  
According to Hubbard, Detective Leccia was under an obligation to inquire 
                                          
 
24 Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d at 1351. 
25 Acts that are inconsistent with a defendant’s exercise of his or her Miranda rights are 
deemed to be “a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.”  
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010).   
26 Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180 (Del. 1983). 
 
15 
 
into Hubbard’s competency after Hubbard admitted to drug and alcohol use 
the prior night. 
 
This Court has recognized that prior intoxication does not, per se, 
invalidate an otherwise proper waiver of Miranda rights.27  Instead, the 
appropriate inquiry is “whether [defendant] had sufficient capacity to know 
what he was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it.”28  In Howard 
v. State, this Court found that a defendant, who had been intoxicated nine 
hours earlier, was sufficiently competent to waive his Miranda rights.29  In 
affirming the admission of the defendant’s custodial statement in Howard, 
this Court held that “[t]he detailed nature of the statement and his 
recollection of his arrest belie any suggestion that his mental capacity was 
impaired when he was questioned.”30  In addition, this Court noted that the 
defendant’s “selective admissions and denials” in his statement were also 
indicative of his capacity and intent.31  Accordingly, in Howard, the 
defendant was found to have knowingly and intelligently waived his 
Miranda rights.32 
                                          
 
27 Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Del. 1983). 
28 Id. 
29 Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180 (Del. 1983). 
30 Id. at 1183. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
 
16 
 
 
Similarly, in Hubbard’s case, the record reflects that Hubbard 
possessed the requisite mental capacity to waive his Miranda rights.  
Hubbard was interrogated at approximately 1:00 p.m. on June 25, 2009 by 
Detective Leccia.  At the start of the interview, Hubbard told Detective 
Leccia that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol the night prior.  
That statement was made at the same time in the interview when Hubbard 
was giving Detective Leccia false accounts of his activities during the prior 
evening.   
At no point during the interview did Hubbard claim to be presently 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  After reviewing the videotape of the 
interrogation, the Superior Court found that “if [Hubbard] was under the 
influence, it wasn’t affecting his ability to communicate and to understand 
and appreciate what was going on.”  The record supports the Superior 
Court’s determination that Hubbard was competent to waive his Miranda 
rights.33 
 
 
                                          
 
33 See id.  See also U.S. v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d Cir. 1995) (confession 
voluntary despite defendant’s recent consumption of 40 ounces of malt liquor because no 
credible evidence defendant was under the influence).   
 
17 
 
Conclusion 
 
The State met its burden of demonstrating that Hubbard was 
competent and waived his Miranda rights.34  The motion to suppress the 
admission of Hubbard’s statement into evidence was properly denied.  The 
judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                          
 
34 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479 (absent proof that proper warnings were given 
and valid waiver of rights was made by the accused, evidence obtained through custodial 
interrogation is inadmissible at trial).