Title: Lagola v. Thomas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 566, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
REGINA LAGOLA,
§
§
Defendant-Below,
§
Appellant,
§
No. 566, 2003
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§
Court Below:  Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware, 
v.
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in and for New Castle County
§
WALTER F. THOMAS,
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No. 01C-01-096
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Plaintiff-Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: October 6, 2004
Decided: January 31, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, RIDGELY,
Justices, constituting the court en banc. 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Kenneth M. Doss, Esq., of Casarino, Christman & Shalk, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
Michael D. Bednash, Esq., of Kimmel, Carter, Roman & Peltz, Bear, Delaware,
for Appellee.
RIDGELY,  Justice, for the majority:
658 A.2d 1000 (Del. 1995). 
1
2
Appellant, Regina Lagola, seeks reversal of a judgment of the Superior Court
awarding damages of one million dollars in a personal injury case arising from an
automobile accident.  The Superior Court concluded that Lagola was not entitled to
a new trial.  In this appeal we expressly overrule Laws v. Webb  to the extent it
1
permitted testimony from a police officer about the “primary contributing
circumstances” of an accident.  Absent qualification of the witness as an expert in
accident reconstruction, opinion testimony on the “primary contributing circumstance”
of an accident is inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 701.  Because the
admission of this opinion testimony jeopardized the fairness of the trial in this case,
we reverse and remand this matter for a new trial.
I.  Factual Background
On February 7, 1999, an automobile accident occurred on Appleby Road in
New Castle, Delaware.  Thomas and Lagola were the parties involved in this two car
accident.  Thomas, traveling west on Appleby Road in his 1986 Ford F-150 pick-up
truck, came to a complete stop behind a van that was stopped to make a left-hand turn.
As he was waiting for the van to turn, Thomas’ truck was struck in the rear by a 1992
Pontiac Grand Prix driven by Lagola.  Thomas testified that he could see Lagola’s car
3
coming at him in his rear view mirror and was able to observe the front end of
Lagola’s car dip with its headlights going toward the ground.  The accident caused
Thomas’ pick-up truck to move forward, but without striking any other vehicle.  Both
vehicles suffered damage as a result of the accident.     
At the time of the accident, it was sleeting and raining.  However, Thomas
testified that the road was wet but not icy.  Patrolman Charles H. Shepard of the New
Castle County Police Department, the investigating officer, also testified that the road
was wet but not icy.  Lagola, on the other hand, testified that the road was icy.
Lagola’s sister, Christine Burgess, a passenger in Lagola’s vehicle, testified that it had
been raining and sleeting since that morning and that she remembered slipping as she
was walking toward Lagola’s car earlier that day.
Thomas was taken by ambulance from the scene of the accident to Christiana
Hospital.  He had complaints of neck pain and left hand numbness.  After his
discharge from the hospital, Thomas sought and received treatment from numerous
physicians.  Thomas’ family physician, Gregory Papa, M.D., referred Thomas to a
chiropractor, with whom he began receiving treatment three times a week.  Thomas’
chiropractic treatment lasted several months.  Thomas also sought treatment from John
E. Hocutt, Jr., M.D., a family and sports medicine physician.  However, after Thomas’
neck and left arm problems continued to worsen, Doctor Papa referred Thomas to a
4
neurosurgeon, Matthew J. Eppley, Jr., M.D.  On August 23, 1999, Doctor Eppley
performed cervical surgery on Thomas.  Following surgery, Thomas completed
physical therapy and was treated by various doctors.  Thomas also received trigger
point injections underneath his left shoulder blade, but these injections did not
improve his condition.  At the time of trial, the only doctor treating Thomas was
Doctor Papa, whom Thomas saw monthly for medication.       
Before and after the accident, Thomas was employed as a tractor-trailer driver
hauling steel on flat bed trailers.  This position required him to tie down the steel, a
job that he has been performing for over eighteen years before the accident.
Immediately following the accident, Thomas was out of work for over a month.  He
returned to work until the date of his surgery on August 23, 1999, after which he was
out of work until December 1999.  When Thomas returned to work after surgery, he
experienced daily neck pain and required the assistance of others to tie down the steel
loads.  As a result of his daily neck pain, Thomas, in December 2001, gave two weeks
notice and ceased his employment as a tractor trailer driver.     
The case proceeded to a four day trial by jury.  The first witness called by
Thomas’ counsel was Patrolman Shepard.  He testified on the issue of the “primary
contributing circumstance” to the accident, over the objection of defense counsel, as
follows:
5
Q.
All right.  Now, on your report, did you indicate what the primary
contributing circumstance to the accident was?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q. 
And what did you indicate there?
A.
In Block 8, which is speed too fast.
Q.
Speed too fast?
A.
Speed too fast, yes.  
Thomas’ counsel next called Jack Fink, an actuarial expert, who testified to
Thomas’ future lost wages.  Thomas then testified on his own behalf.  On the second
day of trial, Joel Castro, a vocational expert, testified for Thomas regarding Thomas’
pre and post-injury earning capacity.  Thomas then presented the video depositions
of Doctors Eppley and Hocutt.  During the course of the plaintiff’s case, only counsel
questioned the witnesses.
Lagola put on her defense starting on the third day of trial, and was the first
witness to testify on her own behalf.  During Lagola’s testimony, the trial judge began
questioning Lagola in front of the jury.  He questioned Lagola about the timing of
when she observed Thomas’ pick-up truck, her distance at that point and when she
started breaking. 
Lagola then called Kirk L. Thibault, Ph.D., to testify as her biomechanical
6
expert on the forces involved in the accident and the forces exerted upon Thomas
during the accident.  At the end of Dr. Thibault’s testimony, the trial judge questioned
that expert witness in the presence of the jury.  Dr. Thibault’s testimony ended with
the trial judge questioning whether the speed of Lagola’s vehicle could be determined
given the available evidence.  After Dr. Thibault acknowledged that speed was not
part of his analysis, the trial judge questioned him about the speed of the vehicle.  The
testimony of Burgess then followed, and the day concluded with the video testimony
of Thomas’ biomechanical expert, Steven C. Batterman, Ph.D. 
On the last day of trial, Lagola’s case concluded with the live testimony of
Michael L. Brooks, M.D., a neuroradiologist.  Doctor Brooks testified that after
reviewing films of Thomas (including x-rays, CT scans and an MRI), he found
multiple degenerative changes to the cervical spine, all of which predated the accident.
Doctor Brooks opined that none of Thomas’ conditions related to this accident.  At
this point, the trial judge interrupted and asked Dr. Brooks whether a traumatic event
such as the accident occurring on February 7, 1999 might have exacerbated Thomas’
preexisting condition.  After the trial judge completed his questioning of Doctor
Brooks, Lagola concluded her case with the video testimony of Richard A. Fischer,
M.D.  
Thomas moved for a directed verdict, but this motion was denied. Thereafter,
7
Lagola’s counsel expressed concern with the trial judge’s questioning of the defense
witnesses and the appearance it presented to the jury.  The trial judge responded:
Well, I have an obligation to -- to make sure that issues I feel are
confusing is presented to the jury in the best light, as they can help make
a decision.  I don’t intentionally interfere with counsel’s presentation of
the case.  I’m not an activist in that regard.  I seldom ask questions,
unless either the language that was being used was confusing to me.
And perhaps I thought it would be confusing to the jury, or it was an
issue I was concerned that the impression that was being left was perhaps
not balanced.  And so I’ve asked a few questions.  If the Supreme Court
thinks I’ve asked them improperly, they will tell me that.
The parties’ closing arguments followed.  During Thomas’ closing argument,
his counsel referred to Patrolman Shepard’s testimony that the speed of Lagola’s
vehicle was the “primary contributing circumstance” of the accident.  Specifically,
Thomas’ counsel argued:
“So, number one, we think all the evidence shows it wasn’t icy.  It
wasn’t icy.  The defense is entirely predicated upon the road being icy.
If you assume the road was icy, she drove her car too fast for the road
conditions.  And we feel that’s why you should answer yes to No. 1.”
Question No. 1 to the jury was “Do you find that defendant, Regina Lagola, was
negligent in a manner which proximately caused the accident of February 7 , 1999.”
th
Thomas’ counsel also reviewed the opinions of the parties’ biomechanical experts and
requested that the jury use their “common sense” in reviewing Lagola’s biomechanical
expert’s testimony.    
The jury returned a verdict in Thomas’ favor.  Question No. 1 was answered
8
“yes” as Thomas’ counsel had urged.  When the jury foreman was asked: “What do
you find to be fair and reasonable compensation to Walter Thomas for injuries
sustained as a proximate result of the accident on February 7, 1999?”, the foreman
replied “Five dollars - - one million dollars.”  Lagola claims that the jury laughed and
that the foreman was smiling when the verdict was returned.  The record shows that
the trial judge noted that the verdict sheet indicated one million dollars and that when
the jury was questioned, it agreed with this figure for damages. 
II.  Discussion
Lagola raises several issues on appeal.  We discuss two of these issues, and
conclude that Lagola is entitled to a new trial.  The first issue is the admissibility of
the police officer’s testimony concerning the “primary contributing circumstance” of
the automobile accident.  This issue turns on whether that testimony is admissible
factual testimony or an inadmissible lay opinion.  We conclude that absent Patrolman
Shepard being qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction, his testimony on the
“primary contributing circumstance” of the accident was inadmissible under Delaware
Rule of Evidence 701.  It is undisputed that the officer was not an accident
reconstruction expert qualified to testify on matters of causation.  We conclude that
it was error to admit such testimony and that a new trial is warranted.
The second issue we address presents the question of whether the trial judge
Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994). 
2
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Norman Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc., 596
3
A.2d 1358, 1356 (Del. 1991) (quoting Delaware Rule of Evidence 103(a)). 
9
abused his discretion in his manner of questioning defense witnesses in front of the
jury.  While we need not decide whether the trial judge’s questions warrant reversal
because we have decided already that a new trial is warranted, we emphasize that a
trial judge must exercise extreme caution and self-restraint in the questioning of
witnesses before a jury because of the potential influence such questioning may have
upon the jury.  Caution and self-restraint should be exercised by the trial judge at the
new trial. 
A.  Patrolman Shepard’s testimony concerning the “primary contributing
circumstance” of the accident
We turn first to the issue of the admissibility of Patrolman Shepard’s testimony
regarding the “primary contributing circumstance” of the accident.  We review a trial
judge’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.   Reversible error in the admission
2
of evidence occurs only if there is an “error in the ruling” and “a substantial right of
the party is affected.”3
Delaware Rule of Evidence 701 states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
Delaware Rule of Evidence 701.  
4
Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 372 (Del. 1999).  
5
829 A.2d 117 (Del. 2003).
6
Id. at 121-22 (emphasis added). 
7
Black’s Law Dictionary 212 (17th ed. 1999).  
8
10
determination of a fact in issue and (c) not based on scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.4
“A lay witness may only express an opinion when the perception of the witness cannot
be communicated accurately and fully without expressing it in terms of an opinion ...”5
Patrolman Shepard’s testimony that the “primary contributing circumstance”
of the accident was that Lagola was driving “too fast” was not testimony based upon
facts he perceived but, rather, was a conclusion based on his opinion as a layman.
Here, the required foundation to admit such a lay opinion was not established.
Because Patrolman Shepard did not testify to the facts he perceived as a result of his
investigation of the accident, his lay opinion testimony was inadmissible under
Delaware Rule of Evidence 701.  Our holding in this case is consistent with 
Alexander v. Cahill,  in which we held that a state trooper’s testimony attributing the
6
cause of an automobile accident to the defendant motorists was an inadmissible lay
opinion.   
Lagola argues that “primary contributing circumstance” and “proximate
7
cause” are entirely different concepts.  She points to the definitional differences
between the terms cause and circumstance.  “Cause” is defined as “something that
produces an effect or result,”  whereas “circumstance” is defined as “an
8
Black’s Law Dictionary 236 (17th ed. 1999).  
9
658 A.2d 1000 (Del. 1995).  
10
Id. at 1010.  
11
11
accompanying or accessory fact, event, or condition, such as a piece of evidence that
indicates the probability of an event.”   Lagola maintains that this difference in
9
definitions distinguishes this case from Alexander.  She argues that this case is much
more similar to Laws v. Webb.   In Laws, we concluded that a trial judge did not
10
abuse his discretion where the officer “did not testify that [the defendant motorist’s]
improper crossing was the legal or proximate ‘cause’ of the accident for purposes of
[the] negligence action, but rather, the officer testified that at the time of the accident,
he merely filled in the ‘primary cause’ box on his report with the phrase ‘improper
crossing.’”  
11
We do not find Lagola’s argument persuasive, nor do we believe that a
reasonable juror would appreciate the distinction that Lagola strives to make.  We
conclude that there is little to distinguish between the terms “primary cause” and
“primary contributing circumstance.” Both pertain to what primarily brought about
the accident.  And both involve matters of opinion.  We therefore expressly overrule
Laws v. Webb to the extent it is inconsistent with our holding in Alexander v. Cahill.
Applying the teachings of Alexander, it is undisputed here that Patrolman
Shepard was not qualified in accident reconstruction.  His testimony that  Lagola’s
12
speed was the “primary contributing circumstance” of the accident went to the heart
of the case in which the testimony of the parties was in conflict.  Given the conflicting
testimony on road conditions, we find that the admission of this opinion testimony of
the investigating police officer jeopardized Lagola’s substantial right to a fair trial.
We therefore conclude that Lagola is entitled to a new trial.   
B.  The trial judge’s questioning of three defense witnesses
The trial judge’s questioning of defense witnesses in this case started with the
defendant and continued throughout the defendant’s case.  While Lagola was not an
expert witness, she was a key witness who was a party to the accident and the
litigation.  The trial judge’s questions concerned the timing of when Lagola observed
Thomas’ pick-up truck, her distance at that point from Thomas’ pick-up truck, and
when she started braking.  Lagola argues that the trial judge’s questions focused on
crucial areas of her testimony about defenses of unavoidable accident and sudden
emergency, and that those precise areas had already been the subject of direct and
cross-examination.  Lagola contends that while the questions were not abusive per se,
they nonetheless, in context, created doubt as to her earlier testimony on distance,
visibility and reaction.  
Dr. Thibault, who testified next for the defense, was also subjected to the trial
judge’s examination.  The trial judge questioned Dr. Thibault about whether the speed
13
of Lagola’s vehicle could have been determined given the available evidence.  After
Dr. Thibault acknowledged that speed was not part of his analysis, the trial judge
continued to ask about an “outside estimate” of Lagola’s speed.    
The trial judge also questioned Doctor Brooks, Lagola’s  medical expert.  At
trial, Thomas was claiming a neck injury with nerve impingement resulting in pain
flowing from his neck down his left arm.  Doctor Brooks was called as an expert to
dispute the claim that Thomas’ pain resulted from the accident.  Doctor Brooks
testified that Thomas’ pain, surgery and discontinuance from work resulted from
degenerative conditions to his spine which existed prior to the accident.  Doctor
Brooks formed his opinion after reviewing Thomas’ x-rays, CT scans and an MRI.
The trial judge’s questions of this witness focused on whether a traumatic event might
have exacerbated Thomas’ preexisting conditions.  Lagola contends that the judge’s
repeated questions of her defense witnesses called their credibility into issue. 
Initially, we note that Lagola’s counsel did not express any concern about the
trial judge’s questioning of three defense witnesses until after Thomas’ motion for a
directed verdict was denied.  Absent plain error, we will not review claims that are not
DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8.
12
Price v. Blood Bank of Delaware, Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1210 (Del. 2002).  
13
Id. (citing M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Bean, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999)).  
14
Id.  
15
Id. at 1212.
16
Delaware Rule of Evidence 614(b).  
17
Price, 790 A.2d at 1210.  
18
Id.  
19
14
fairly presented to the trial court.   Our review “entails not only the substance of the
12
ruling on admissibility, but the manner in which it was formulated.”13
The trial judge “should act as a gatekeeper to all expert testimony and must
decide if the expert’s testimony ‘has a reliable basis in knowledge and experience of
[the relevant] discipline.’”   This role of the trial judge “as gatekeeper also carries
14
with it a heightened requirement of impartiality whenever the trial judge engages in
direct questioning of an expert witness[,]” particularly when it is done in the presence
of the jury “who may later be called upon to evaluate the credibility of the witness.”15
The trial judge’s role as a gatekeeper should be performed outside the presence of the
jury either through motions in limine prior to trial or during preliminary voir dire by
counsel of a proposed expert.16
A trial court is permitted to interrogate witnesses “whether called by itself or
a party.”   However, a trial judge is required to exercise self-restraint and preserve
17
an atmosphere of impartiality when questioning witnesses.   This requirement “arises
18
from the judge's absolute duty of neutrality.”   “Departure from that rule may be
19
Id.  
20
Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 416 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1969)).  
21
Id. at 1211-12.
22
15
grounds for reversal on the basis of plain error.”   Although a trial judge may instruct
20
the jury that he or she is impartial, the judge’s conduct may suggest the contrary
because the trial judge is a figure having overpowering influence upon the jury.   For
21
example, in Price, although the trial judge instructed the jury that he was impartial,
this Court held that the trial judge’s questioning of an expert witness constituted plain
error, warranting a new trial because the trial judge’s questions carried a tone of
skepticism and the judge had peremptorily rejected the expert’s initial opinion on the
ground that it lacked a scientific foundation.   Here, the trial judge’s questioning of
22
none of plaintiff’s witnesses but of almost all of the defense witnesses who appeared
in person at trial, was fraught with potential adverse implications for the jury to draw,
despite the trial judge’s subjective intention to help the jury.  Furthermore, questions
designed by the trial judge here to balance an impression being left with the jury were
more appropriate for counsel to ask.
Because we have concluded that a new trial is required on other grounds, we
need not decide whether the trial judge’s questioning in this case itself constitutes
plain error.  We do note our concern over the appearance of the questioning in this
case, however, and take this opportunity to emphasize the caution required when
Id. at 1211 (citing Block v. Target Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Ct. App. Minn.
23
1990)).  
75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 276 (2004).
24
16
questioning witnesses because of “‘the recognized extraordinary prestige of the trial
judge.’”    It is the trial judge’s duty to maintain an impartial attitude and a status of
23
neutrality and to keep his or her questions and comments in front of the jury to a
minimum,  including the questioning of witnesses pursuant to Delaware Rule of
24
Evidence 614(b).  Self-restraint in the questioning of any witness should be exercised
by the trial judge at the new trial. 
III.  Conclusion
We expressly overrule Laws v. Webb to the extent that it is inconsistent with our
holding in Alexander v. Cahill.  We conclude that a lay opinion by a police officer
who is not qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction about the “primary
contributing circumstance” of an accident contravenes  Delaware Rule of Evidence
701 and is,  therefore, inadmissible.  Because the officer’s opinion testimony related
to causation which was a critical issue in this case where the testimony was in conflict,
the admission of that opinion testimony jeopardized the fairness of the trial. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED and the case
is REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
BERGER, Justice, Concurring with whom STEELE, Chief Justice, Concurs:
     790 A.2d 1203 (Del. 2002).
25
17
Although I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse, I write separately to
address the trial judge’s questioning of Lagola and her witnesses.  The majority
expressed concern, and cautioned the trial judge to exercise self-restraint, but did not
decide whether his questions amounted to plain error.  I think it is important to decide
this issue because, although trial judges undoubtedly understand the operative
principles of self-restraint and impartiality, the general admonitions inPrice v. Blood
Bank of Delaware, Inc.  provide more guidance when applied to specific fact
25
patterns. 
This was a relatively uncomplicated personal injury claim arising from a car
accident.  Two significant issues in dispute were: i) the speed of Lagola’s car prior to
impact; and ii) whether Thomas’s pain was caused by the accident or by pre-existing
degenerative changes in his spine.  During the first two days of trial, Thomas
presented his case.  His witnesses, in addition to himself, were: i) the police officer
who responded to the accident, ii) an economist, who testified as to Thomas’s lost
earnings; iii) two doctors; and iv) a vocational expert.  The trial judge asked no
questions of any of Thomas’s witnesses.
On the third day of trial, Lagola was the first witness for the defense.  She was
examined,  cross-examined, and examined again on redirect.  The three basic points
18
covered by both sides were the road conditions at the time of the accident; her speed
at the time she saw Thomas’s car stopped in the road ahead of her; and her distance
from Thomas at the time she hit the brakes.  After counsel concluded their
questioning, the trial judge, who explained that he was trying to visualize the road and
the accident,  questioned Lagola on the same subjects.  Thomas’s attorney then
followed up with another round of questions about speed and distances.
Lagola’s second witness was Dr. Kirk Thibault, a biomechanical expert, who
testified about the force of the crash, and opined that the level of force was insufficient
to “provide the mechanism” for acute disc herniation.  After fairly extensive cross-
examination, the trial judge again asked the witness his own questions.  This time, the
trial judge explained that he was going to cover a point that had not been addressed
during the parties’ questioning.  The trial judge then elicited Thibault’s admission
that: i) it would have been possible to calculate Lagola’s speed at impact using her
testimony as to the speed she was traveling when she hit the brakes, her distance from
Thomas’s car at that moment, and an appropriate coefficient of friction for an icy
road; ii) Thibault did not perform such a calculation, but instead estimated the
collision speed at 15 mph based on the extent of damage to the vehicles; and iii) if the
collision speed was greater than 15 mph,  the force level would be higher and the
resultant damage would be greater.
19
The trial judge did not ask questions of Lagola’s next witness, who was
Lagola’s sister and the passenger in Lagola’s car at the time of the accident.  On the
following morning, however, when Lagola called her last witness, the trial judge again
participated in the examination.  Dr. Michael Brooks, a neuroradiologist, explained
how Thomas’s x-rays revealed certain degenerative changes in Thomas’s spinal cord.
Brooks opined that those changes could not have been caused by the accident because
the bone formations he observed take a long time to develop.  As Lagola’s counsel
was asking Brooks about an opposing expert’s opinion, the trial judge interrupted
counsel in mid-question to pursue his own line of inquiry.  
The judge asked, in essence, whether a sudden impact could cause small
changes in the bone or nerve alignment that would cause what had been asymptomatic
degenerative changes to become symptomatic.  After Brooks responded that there was
nothing on the x-rays to indicate any new injuries, the judge asked whether there is
some way of explaining what has happened when a patient develops pain after a
traumatic event, but the x-rays do not show anything.  Brooks responded that pain is
subjective and that his analysis was concerned with objective findings from the x-rays.
Lagola’s counsel then resumed questioning his witness, and, after cross-examination
and re-direct, the trial judge asked a few more questions.  Through his final question,
20
the judge pointed out that  radiologists assist the surgeons, who make the decision on
appropriate treatment and perform the operations.
It is apparent from the transcript that the trial judge did not question any witness
for prolonged periods, and that his demeanor was not at all hostile.  Nonetheless, I
would hold that the trial court’s questioning crossed the line and constituted plain
error.  Several factors support this conclusion.  First, the trial judge questioned only
Lagola’s witnesses, and he questioned all but one of them.  This fact, alone, strongly
suggests to the jury that the trial judge had reservations about Lagola’s case.  Second,
the trial judge interrupted counsel to question one of Lagola’s experts.  Third, the trial
judge’s effective cross-examination of Lagola’s experts cast doubt on their
conclusions.  In sum, the trial judge stepped out of his proper, neutral, position of
authority, and assumed the role of advocate.
It can be difficult for a judge to exercise self-restraint, especially if the judge
perceives any relevant areas of inquiry that the parties failed to address.  But the
“search for truth” must be conducted by the parties, not the court.  Thus, as a general
rule, the trial judge should not question witnesses in front of the jury except for the
purpose of clarifying an undisputed fact that a witness misstates, such as the date of
the accident.  If an expert’s testimony is difficult to follow, questioning by the trial
judge, even if only designed to clarify the expert’s opinion, is problematic.  Here, the
21
trial judge undoubtedly believed that he was helping to present the facts fairly.  From
the jury’s perspective, however, the judge’s questions  cast doubt on Lagola’s case.
Accordingly, I would reverse on this ground.