Title: State v. Jesse Timmendequas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-109-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 2001

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). ZAZZALI, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal addresses defendant's claim that his death sentence is disproportionate. On 9/29/94, defendant lured his seven-year-old neighbor, Megan Kanka, into his house, ostensibly to play with his puppy. Defendant drew her into his bedroom where he attempted to sexually assault her. Megan screamed and tried to escape but defendant, fearing detection, would not let her leave. Defendant strangled Megan with a belt and, during the struggle, hit her face on a dresser and her head on the floor, causing bleeding. To avoid stains on the carpet, defendant placed a plastic bag over Megan's head. Defendant then sexually assaulted her. Believing Megan to be dead, defendant placed her body in a toy box and carried it downstairs. When he put the box in his truck, he thought he heard Megan cough. Defendant drove to Mercer County Park, took Megan's body out of the box, and placed her in tall weeds. Before he left, he sexually assaulted her again. Megan's family called police when she did not return home. Officers arrived and joined neighbors in the search. Defendant participated, handing out fliers with Megan's picture. Defendant gave conflicting statements to police and Megan's family, however, about when he had last seen Megan. He also gave conflicting statements concerning his whereabouts during the time of Megan's disappearance. The following day, at the prompting of his roommate, defendant told police that Megan was dead and led them to her body. In a formal statement, he confessed to the murder and some, but not all aspects of the sexual assault. After police presented him with the results of the autopsy, defendant provided further details of the sexual assault and Megan's other injuries. Defendant did not testify or present witnesses at the guilt phase of the trial, and the jury found him guilty of murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault. At the penalty phase, defendant offered two witnesses who presented evidence of mitigating circumstances in his background. A social worker testified that defendant's mother was a promiscuous alcoholic who had ten children by seven different men, and that defendant's father was a violent drinker with a criminal history. Based on information provided by defendant's mother, the social worker testified that defendant was raised in poverty and was often cold, dirty, hungry and without adequate medical care. Other sources told the social worker that defendant's father had sexually abused defendant and his brother, that the brothers saw their father rape a seven-year-old girl, and that the father tortured and killed their pets. Defendant's second expert, a psychologist, relied on the report of the social worker. He found that defendant suffers from pedophilia, borderline mental retardation, fetal alcohol effect, and schizoid personality disorder. The psychologist expressed the opinion that at the time of the crime, defendant was under extreme emotional disturbance. Megan's death, said the psychologist, was caused by a reflexive response to the panic defendant felt when the victim attempted to flee. The State presented a psychiatrist as a rebuttal witness. He testified that there was no evidence to support defendant's claims of extreme emotional disturbance and diminished capacity. He said that defendant's I.Q., seventy-four, showed a borderline intelligence that did not prevent him from functioning or appreciating the nature of his conduct. Defendant gave an allocution statement in which he said he was sorry for what he had done and that he prayed for Megan and her family every day. He asked the jury to let him live so that someday he could have an understanding why something like this could happen. The jury unanimously found the c(4)(f) (escape detection) and c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) aggravating factors. Some jurors found mitigating factors of extreme emotional disturbance and diminished capacity. Jurors in varying degrees also found catchall mitigating factors arising out of defendant's violent and unstable childhood. Nonetheless, the jury unanimously found that each aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence on direct appeal. HELD: Defendant's death sentence is not disproportionate. 1. Proportionality review focuses on whether a specific defendant's death sentence is inconsistent with the penalty imposed in comparable cases. To aid in this process, the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) maintains a database of all death-eligible cases. The AOC subdivides the cases into thirteen distinct categories of comparison cases. With the concurrence of the parties, defendant has been placed in the sexual assault category. (Pp. 11-17) 2. The first step in comparing defendant's case to other sexual assault cases is to perform frequency analysis, which now consists exclusively of the salient-factors test. This test allows the Court to measure the relative frequency of a death sentence in factually-similar cases to determine whether there is a societal consensus that death is the appropriate remedy. A review of the data reveals that a greater percentage of sexual assault cases advanced to penalty trial and received the death sentence than did all death-eligible defendants. This demonstrates that sexual- assault murders are considered more deathworthy than other death-eligible homicides. (Pp. 17-20) 3. The next step is to conduct precedent-seeking review, which is the traditional, case-by-case form of review in which the Court compares similar death-eligible cases. The Court first examines the criminal culpability of the defendant, which has three components: moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization, and the character of the defendant. Consideration of defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization of Megan and her family, and defendant's character leads the Court to conclude that defendant is highly deathworthy. (Pp. 20-27) 4. The Court then analyzes the comparison cases in defendant's category to determine if defendant is more or less deathworthy than the comparison defendant. If defendant is less deathworthy than a life-sentenced defendant, that conclusion supports defendant's claim of disproportionality. If defendant is more deathworthy than a life-sentenced defendant, that detracts from defendant's claim. Although defendant's death sentence is arguably disparate compared to the life sentences imposed on several other defendants, disparity alone does not demonstrate disproportionality. Proportionality review seeks to assure that a death sentence is not an aberration; it is not intended to ensure that one killer's sentence is identical to all other similarly categorized killers. The fact that defendant is more culpable than the bulk of the defendants in his comparison group demonstrates that his death sentence is not an aberration. (Pp. 27-44) JUSTICE LONG, dissenting, acknowledges that any normal heart responds to defendant's unspeakable crime with a cry for vengeance. She points out, however, that proportionality review does not question whether an individual sentence is deserved on a moral level, but whether a defendant has been singled out unfairly for capital punishment. She expresses the view that at present, there is no meaningful way to distinguish between one grotesque murder and another to determine why one defendant has been granted a life sentence and another is awaiting execution. She suggests that proportionality review be scrapped and a moratorium declared on the death penalty until a meaningful process is developed. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate, dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JESSE TIMMENDEQUAS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 12, 2000 -- Decided February 1, 2001 On proportionality review of a death sentence imposed in the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County. Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Wilensky and Claudia Van Wyk, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. This appeal concerns the capital sentencing of Jesse K. Timmendequas, who was convicted of the 1994 murder of seven-year- old Megan Kanka. We affirmed defendant's conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 640 (1999) (Timmendequas I). We also acknowledged his request for proportionality review. Ibid. We now conclude, upon review, that defendant's death sentence is not disproportionate when compared to the sentences imposed in similar cases. The notoriety of this case renders our effort to evaluate defendant's claim that his death sentence is disproportionate all the more critical. One can say with certainty that the crime committed by Jesse Timmendequas was horrific, so uniformly condemned that it changed the legal landscape for sex offenses nationwide. Timmendequas I, supra, 161 N.J. at 650 (Handler, J., dissenting). The murder of Megan Kanka sparked outrage after the public learned that defendant had been twice convicted of sex offenses against children, and that Megan's community had not been made aware of those convictions. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110, 118 S. Ct. 1039, 140 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1995); Timmendequas I, supra, 161 N.J. at 641 (Handler, J., dissenting). Megan's parents, Maureen and Richard Kanka, successfully pressed for a law requiring notification when sexual predators become neighbors. Timmendequas I, supra, 161 N.J. at 569; See L. 1994, c. 133 (enacting Megan's Law registration requirements, later codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -5); L. 1994, c. 128 (enacting community notification requirements, later codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:7-6 to - 11). Megan's murder also inspired a similar effort across the country. E.B., supra, 119 F.3d at 1081; Timmendequas I, supra, 161 N.J. at 569. That movement culminated in a 1996 federal Megan's Law. E.B., supra, 119 F.3d at 1082 n.1 (discussing Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996), which was codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 14071). We set forth that background because it underscores the importance of a careful and comprehensive proportionality review, as an improper death sentence would result in the ultimate injustice. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 374 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting). Sensitive to that concern, our single task in this appeal is to determine if defendant's death sentence is disproportionate when compared to the sentences of other similar offenders. [Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 84 (quoting David S. Baime, Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court: Proportionality Review Project at 10 (Apr. 28, 1999) (Baime Report)).] We thus consider all death-eligible cases, rather than only death-sentenced cases. We also consider death-eligible cases whether or not they were capitally prosecuted, State v. Harris, 165 N.J. 303, 315 (2000) (Harris II), because the decision not to seek the death penalty is not necessarily a reflection of [the] defendant's lack of deathworthiness. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 27. Thus, all cases in which the defendant was eligible for the death penalty comprise the universe under consideration. In order to aid our proportionality review process, the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) maintains a database of all death-eligible cases. The AOC has subdivided the cases into thirteen distinct categories of comparison cases. State v. Cooper, 159 N.J. 55, 71 (1999) (Cooper II), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2000). The AOC assigns cases for comparison to the following categories: (A) Victim is a Public Servant; (B) Prior Murder Conviction without A above; (C) Contract Killing without A-B above; (D) Sexual Assault without A-C above (subdivided into (1) aggravated and (2) other); (E) Multiple Victims without A-D above (subdivided into (1) aggravated and (2) other); (F) Robbery without A-E above (subdivided into (1) home, (2) business, and (3) other); (G) Torture/Depravity without A-F above; (H) Abduction without A-G above; (I) Arson without A-H above; (J) Escape Detection without A-I above; (K) Burglary without A-J above; (L) Grave Risk without A-K above; (M) Victim Under 14 Years Old without A-L above. [Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 316.] Category D includes defendants who commit murders involving a sexual assault. The Attorney General and Public Defender concur that defendant should be assigned to D-1, a subcategory of D. Subcategory D-1 comprises defendants who have committed sexual-assault murders with particular violence or terror. Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 88. Generally, [those] cases . . . include murders that involve multiple wounds from a gun, knife or physical beating, murders that involve mutilation or wounds intended to cause pain, and murders involving a minor victim. Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 317. The D-2 subcategory consists of non-aggravated sexual-assault murders. Id. at 316-17. A threshold question concerns whether we should in this case consolidate the D-1 and D-2 subcategories. In Harris II, this Court consolidated the D-1 and D-2 subcategories for proportionality analysis. Id. at 317-19. The original rationale for the distinction was that juries and prosecutors tended to view [D-1] defendants as more deathworthy than a simple sexual-assault-murder defendant. Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 317 (citing Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 88). Nevertheless, Harris II states: Trying to create objective criteria that consistently distinguish among sexual assault murders on the basis of the degree of particular violence and terror is problematic. Cases of this nature inherently involve subjective factors, particularly when the determinative linedrawing is supposed to focus on particular violence or terror. [Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 318.] Harris II concluded that consolidation of the entire D category offers a more appropriate sampling of cases like defendant's to assess deathworthiness. Id. at 319. We agree that we should consolidate the categories in this case as well. D-2 cases simply may not be substantially less deathworthy than D-1 cases. As Harris II noted, the D-2 category has so few cases with which to compare [a] defendant. Id. at 318-19. At present, fifty-nine cases fall within the composite D category; forty-seven cases comprise subcategory D-1; and twelve cases comprise subcategory D-2. We now compare defendant's case to similar cases within the entire D category. We first conduct frequency analysis, and then we apply precedent-seeking review. State v. Feaster, 165 N.J. 388, 398 (2000) (Feaster II); State v. Morton, 165 N.J. 235, 244 (2000) (Morton II); Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 70; Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 77. As we explained in Cooper II: [F]irst, we use a frequency analysis that includes both mathematical and statistical calculations to compare defendant's case to other cases with similar fact patterns or similar levels of culpability in order to ascertain the rate of death sentencing in those similar cases; second, we engage in precedent-seeking review in which we compare all relevant factors in factually similar cases to determine whether defendant's death sentence appears to be disproportionate in comparison to the sentences imposed on other defendants who committed comparable homicides. Although defendant concedes that victimization is high, he asserts that it is not as high as it could have been because Megan's pain was not prolonged. For Megan, however, those moments of suffering likely seemed an eternity. Coupled with the sexual assault that preceded the fatal strangulation, as well as the terror and fright that Megan endured, the victimization is extremely high. c. Character of Defendant The final consideration in determining overall culpability, defendant's character, is a catchall category that warrants consideration of defendant's prior criminal history, unrelated acts of violence, cooperation with authorities, remorse and capacity for rehabilitation. Feaster II, supra, 165 N.J. at 406; see also Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 211; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366. Those factors substantially augment defendant's blameworthiness. Defendant's criminal record reflects both a 1980 conviction for attempted aggravated sexual contact and a 1982 conviction for sexual assault and aggravated assault. That criminal record increases his culpability. Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 314- 15. Defendant acknowledges that his pedophilic urges prevent rehabilitation. Finally, his deceit in connection with the investigation, particularly his distribution of the photos of Megan during the search for her whereabouts, compounds the felony, in both a literal and figurative sense. It is true that certain factors mitigate. Timmendequas's first confession exhibited some remorse, as evidenced by his statement that he felt guilty when he observed Megan's parents and neighbors searching for her. In his allocution, he expressed further remorse. There was also some evidence of cooperation. Defendant's evasion and lies, however, minimize the value of cooperation as a mitigating factor. He omitted significant details from his first statement. It appears that the autopsy results, rather than any pang of conscience, prompted a more complete confession. During the confession, defendant also blamed Megan for biting his hand and causing him pain. Notably, the jury unanimously rejected a proposed mitigating factor that his cooperation demonstrated the acceptance of responsibility. After a careful consideration of his moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization of Megan and her family, and defendant's character, we conclude that defendant is highly deathworthy. 2. CASE COMPARISONS We review the comparison cases to determine if those similarly culpable to or more culpable than defendant generally receive life sentences rather than death sentences. See Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210. Such a finding would support a claim of disproportionality, because it would provide evidence of a societal consensus that the death penalty is not imposed in cases similar to this one. We consider each comparison defendant's motive, premeditation, justification or excuse, evidence of mental disease, defect, or disturbance, knowledge of the victim's helplessness, knowledge of the effects on nondecedent victims, age, involvement in planning the murder, violence and brutality of the murder, injury to nondecedent victims, prior record, other unrelated acts of violence, cooperation with authorities, remorse, and capacity for rehabilitation. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 155. With regard to the actual mechanics, we analyze each case to determine if defendant is more or less deathworthy than the comparison defendant. If defendant is less deathworthy than a life-sentenced defendant, that conclusion supports defendant's claim of disproportionality. If, however, defendant is more deathworthy than a life-sentenced defendant, that detracts from defendant's claim. After we compare defendant to all of the comparison cases, we determine if the results demonstrate that cases more deathworthy than defendant's generally receive life sentences, which would strongly indicate disproportionality. The parties have agreed upon fourteen comparison cases. We base our discussion of the comparison cases on the AOC records of those cases, which are summarized in Appendix A. In our discussion of the cases, we omit reference to irrelevant factors. a. Agreed-Upon Cases We first address cases in which the comparison defendants have been sentenced to death, in order to determine if defendant is more or less culpable than those defendants. 1) Death Sentences Defendant is more culpable than David Cooper, whose death sentence was not disproportionate. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 116. Defendant and Cooper both sexually assaulted and strangled a young girl, and denied involvement until police confronted them with the evidence against them. Both had mothers who drank heavily during pregnancy, and both had abusive and unstable childhoods. There were some contrasts between defendant and Cooper. Cooper was an alcoholic who claimed to have been drunk during the murder; however, he presented no evidence of his alleged intoxication at trial. Although Cooper was on parole at the time of the murder, he had no prior violent or sexual offenses. Defendant presented evidence demonstrating that he was sexually abused as a child and diagnosed as a pedophile as an adult. In addition, defendant was a prior sex offender. On balance, defendant's prior record renders him slightly more deathworthy than Cooper. Therefore, Cooper's death sentence weakens defendant's disproportionality claim. Turning to the other death-sentenced case, the victimization in Joseph Harris's revenge killing was significant. Not only did Harris sexually assault Ron Ellison's wife and two young daughters, causing incredible victimization to them, he did so while Ellison was tied up, powerless to stop the attacks. Furthermore, Ellison feared for his life before Harris shot him. Harris heard voices and was diagnosed as a schizoid and with inadequate personality disorder, but his jury rejected the proposed c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) and c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factors. Based on the additional victimization, Harris is more deathworthy than defendant. The dissent agrees, and concludes that Harris's death sentence supports defendant's claim of disproportionality. Post at __ (slip op. at 15-16). We also reach that conclusion, but to a lesser degree than the dissent. The dissent's thesis is that because we reserve the death penalty for the most heinous cases, and Harris is more deathworthy than defendant (and therefore his case more heinous), Harris's case is appropriate for the death penalty and defendant's is not. That approach misapplies concepts of proportionality review. Two defendants, both sentenced to death, may have different degrees of culpability. Proportionality review is not undertaken to ensure that those two defendants are similarly deathworthy. Its purpose is instead to ensure that one defendant's death sentence is not aberrational when compared to other similar defendants. See Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 319 ( Proportionality review seeks only to assure that defendant's sentence is not an aberration. It is not intended to ensure that one killer's sentence is identical to all other similarly categorized killers. ) (citation omitted). Even if Timmendequas is the least deathworthy of the death-sentenced defendants, we must affirm provided his death penalty is not aberrational. Moreover, little can be inferred from Harris's death sentence. Harris's sentence indicates that the jury found his case sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Harris's sentence does not, however, create any necessary inference about whether defendant's case is sufficiently serious to warrant that penalty as well. The most that can be said is that in light of defendant's lesser deathworthiness, imposition of the death sentence on defendant may have been somewhat less likely than it was for Harris. To that extent, we agree with the dissent. That vague notion, however, does not provide substantial support for defendant's claim of disproportionality. 2) Life Sentences The bulk of the comparison cases resulted in life sentences. Thus, if defendant is less culpable than the defendants in most of those cases, he has arguably demonstrated that his death sentence was an aberration. If he is more culpable than most of those cases, his disproportionality claim is diminished. The case of Vincent Brown is similar to defendant. Brown sexually assaulted a young girl and strangled her to death. He confessed to sexual assault and murder after unsuccessfully attempting to deceive the police. Brown's criminal record included violent offenses. During his youth, he was physically and sexually abused. In one respect, Brown is more culpable than defendant: Brown left his victim to die in a ditch as she screamed for help. Nevertheless, defendant is more deathworthy than Brown. Unlike defendant, Brown did not penetrate his victim. In addition, Brown suffered from major depression with psychotic features and was declared incompetent to stand trial. On the other hand, Jerome Dennis's life sentence supports defendant's disproportionality claim. Dennis stabbed a fourteen year-old girl twenty-four times and raped her. Although his victim was less vulnerable than Megan and he did not kill to avoid apprehension, Dennis's murder entailed more victimization than defendant's murder. Dennis, a prior sex offender, committed murder two weeks after he was released on parole. He killed four more people in the following four months. Moreover, there is no indication that Dennis was sexually abused or suffered from any mental illnesses. The substantial victimization, Dennis's prior record, and the lack of mitigating evidence make him more deathworthy than defendant. Ralph Edwards's victim was nearly as vulnerable as Megan. Like defendant, Edwards had a history of psychological illness, and his jury found the c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor. However, no juror in Edwards's case found the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) mitigating factor. In contrast to defendant, Edwards was only eighteen years old and had no prior criminal record. Those factors render defendant more deathworthy than Edwards. James Henderson and Gary Lippen caused extraordinary victimization. Henderson raped the victim while Lippen held her down, and Lippen may have also raped her. They crushed her throat with a stick, and Henderson stabbed her several times and broke her legs. Henderson had a history of mental illness. There is no indication that Henderson had an abusive childhood or that he expressed remorse for what he had done. Henderson's case included mitigating evidence not present in defendant's case: Henderson was illiterate, and apparently had only one drug conviction in his prior record. Henderson also did not kill to escape detection for the rape. Moreover, the seventeen-year-old victim in that case was not nearly as vulnerable as Megan; however, Henderson and Lippen neutralized the victim's ability to resist the rape when Lippen held her down while Henderson raped her. Overall, Henderson and defendant are similarly deathworthy. In contrast, Lippen is less culpable than defendant. Lippen claimed that his participation in the murder was due to his fear of Henderson. That situation is distinct from Morton II, in which we held that a defendant's culpability should not be diminished because a co-defendant primarily planned the crime when the defendant willingly participated. Morton II, supra, 165 N.J. at 252. Lippen's allegation was that he participated in the crime because he feared Henderson. He did not willingly participate, contrary to the dissent's suggestion. Post at __ (slip op. at 19-20). In addition, Lippen may have been intoxicated, did not kill to escape detection, had no prior convictions, and was only nineteen years old. Although he did not have a history of mental illness, Lippen is less deathworthy than defendant. Michael Manfredonia inflicted gratuitous pain on his fourteen-year-old victim whom he stabbed twenty-six times and sexually assaulted. The victimization in Manfredonia's case was substantial, as his victim suffered more than Megan. The c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor was not present in Manfredonia's case. Like defendant, Manfredonia was extremely emotionally disturbed and had borderline intelligence. In addition, he was nineteen years old and suicidal, had no prior record except for a disorderly persons theft offense, and allegedly felt provoked by the victim's verbal insults. Also, the victim was seven years older than Megan. Manfredonia's and defendant's culpability are comparable. The similarities between the rape-murders Rasheed Muhammad and defendant committed are striking. They both kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and lethally strangled young girls. As children, both Muhammad and defendant were physically and sexually abused, neglected, and raised in homes replete with violence. Muhammad did not attempt to establish the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) and c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factors; however, pursuant to the c(5)(h) (catchall) factor, the jury found that Muhammad was emotionally unstable and had twice attempted suicide. Muhammad's jury rejected the c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factor. Muhammad's prior record included property-crime convictions, but no sexual or other violent offenses. Furthermore, it appears that Muhammad confessed without attempting to outwit the police and the victim's family by giving a false statement to the police or feigning assistance with searching for the victim. Therefore, defendant is slightly more deathworthy than Muhammad. Defendant is also more culpable than Frederick Ritchie. Evidence of Ritchie's intent to kill his twelve-year-old victim was disputed; no direct evidence contradicted Ritchie's claim that the drunken victim accidentally fell into a washing machine and walked into a tree and that the impact of colliding with the tree caused him to fall into a creek. The strength of the evidence may have induced the prosecutor to plea bargain for an aggravated manslaughter conviction. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 100. In addition, Ritchie's victimization was not as great as in this case. Furthermore, Ritchie was a veteran who suffered from Crohn's disease and alcoholism. Ritchie drank while committing the crimes, and demonstrated, to some extent, diminished capacity. Ritchie's prior record included a burglary as well as sex crimes. Based on those factors, Ritchie is less deathworthy than defendant. A. Kevin Conley One night, Conley entered the eighty-seven-year-old victim's home and beat, raped, stabbed, and fatally strangled her. The victim suffered blunt force trauma and stab wounds to her face, neck, and extremities and a fracture of her nasal bones and her right zygomatic arch. The victim was found the following morning wearing a torn, pink nightgown, with a telephone line, which had been cut, draped across her body. Her stomach was oily and shiny, and a toppled bottle of baby oil rested on the night stand. Conley was apprehended nearly sixteen months later because his fingerprints matched those found on the baby oil bottle. Apparently, there was no other evidence connecting Conley to the crime. Conley was a twenty-nine-year-old college graduate who had completed thirteen credits toward a master's degree. He spent eight years in the Army Reserves. He had no prior criminal record. He worked for a rental car company and used alcohol occasionally. The State tried Conley noncapitally. A jury convicted him of purposeful-or-knowing murder, felony murder, aggravated sexual assault, burglary, and a weapons offense. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life imprisonment plus twenty-six years with a thirty-eight-year parole disqualifier. B. Frank Masini 1 Masini stopped at his eighty-five-year-old aunt's home purportedly to use her telephone. While washing out a soda glass in the kitchen sink, he saw a knife. He repeatedly stabbed his aunt in the neck, killing her. He also vaginally and anally raped her. Masini had no prior criminal history, but this was one of four fatal stabbings he committed against elderly people. In the months before this murder, Masini experienced detachments from reality. Masini pled guilty to murder and received a life sentence with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. C. Frank Masini 3 Two weeks after killing his aunt, Masini was at the home of his eighty-year-old relative. After talking with her in the kitchen, he grabbed a knife from the kitchen counter, grabbed the victim from behind, stabbed her repeatedly in the neck, sexually assaulted her, and stole her ring. She died from the stab wounds. Masini pled guilty to the murder and received another life sentence and thirty-year parole bar, which ran concurrently to the sentence he received for killing his aunt and to the consecutive life sentences he received for murdering an elderly couple. D. Samuel Mincey Mincey broke into the home of the victim, who was seventy three years old. He beat her severely, raped her, and strangled her. He stole two oriental dolls and a television. Mincey was arrested six years later. Mincey had sixteen prior convictions, including convictions for aggravated assault, assault and battery, burglary, auto theft, receiving stolen property, and escape. The State did not prosecute Mincey capitally, perhaps because the prosecutor believed that the statute of limitations barred a capital prosecution. A jury convicted Mincey of murder and felony murder. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. E. Rafael Rivera Rivera lived next door and had a close relationship with the victim, who was a seventy-eight-year-old widow. She often babysat for Rivera's children, who called the victim their grandmother. While the victim was visiting Rivera and his girlfriend, Rivera went into her apartment and looked for money. The victim returned to her apartment and surprised Rivera. A struggle between Rivera and the victim ensued. Rivera struck her many times in the face, forearms, ribs, and back. He tore her vagina with either his hand or her cane. The cause of death was strangulation. Rivera had prior convictions for possessing a stolen car, entry with intent to steal, receiving stolen property, weapons possession, and eleven disorderly persons offenses. He had a history of abusing cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. He was seen drunk shortly before the murder. A jury convicted Rivera of capital murder, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, and burglary. The jury found the c(4)(c) (torture or depravity) and c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) aggravating factors and the c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) and c(5)(h) (catchall) mitigating factors. It rejected the c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factor and the c(5)(c) (age) mitigating factor. The jury could not agree on whether the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier for the murder. F. Otis James On May 11, 1994, a woman awoke to find James lying on the floor next to her bed. He placed his hand over her mouth, motioned for her to be quiet, and began to fondle her. The woman screamed for her daughter, prompting James to flee, knocking over the woman's daughter as she entered the room. James left through the bathroom window. While investigating the burglary, police noticed that a window in an upstairs apartment was open. The police found an eighty-two-year-old female in the upstairs apartment lying on her bed stomach-down, nude below the waist. Her legs were spread apart and a gel had been spread over her vaginal and anal area. A chair had been pulled up to the bed next to the woman's exposed genitalia. It was determined that the woman had been sexually assaulted and was killed by asphyxia due to smothering and compression of the neck. James claims he was drunk and high when he committed the offense, and only intended to steal money or property to support his drug habit. He claims not to remember sexually assaulting the eighty-two-year-old woman or noticing that she was dead. Despite participating in several substance-abuse treatment programs, he abused alcohol and cocaine daily. James apparently started drinking at age five. James never met his father and his mother died in a car accident when he was eleven. After his mother's death, James and his two siblings were raised by different relatives. James dropped out of high school after tenth grade. He obtained a truck driving certificate but was unemployed at the time of the offense. He once attempted suicide, and was subsequently hospitalized and diagnosed with depression. At the time of the offense, James was twenty-eight years old and living with his sister. He had prior convictions for robbery, burglary, attempted burglary, theft, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and shoplifting. He was on parole when he committed the murder. James was arrested on September 29, 1995, for the attempted murder of another woman. He was identified as the culprit in the May burglary and murder through fingerprints and similarities between the May and September crimes. James was charged with two counts of burglary, felony murder, murder, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, attempted sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual contact. He pled guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with thirty years parole ineligibility. G. Carlos Vasquez (Subcategory B-1) Purportedly by talking to her about religion, Vasquez lured the victim, a thirteen-year-old girl, into his apartment. While in his apartment, he held her down, raped her, and fatally strangled her with a towel. While living in Puerto Rico, Vasquez was convicted of murder. He was paroled six years before this murder. He denied having mental health problems or abusing drugs or alcohol. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JESSE TIMMENDEQUAS, Defendant-Appellant. LONG, J., dissenting. Megan Nicole Kanka is frozen in our collective consciousness because of her beauty, her innocence and the horrific way in which she died. She is remembered as well because of the stalwart efforts of her parents who spearheaded the enactment of Megan's Law in an effort to save other children from their daughter's fate. To trivialize, even obliquely, the crime against Megan Kanka would be unspeakable. Indeed any normal heart responds with a cry for vengeance when faced with an offense like this. But it is precisely in matters such as the one before us that we must set aside our deepest emotions and plumb the depths of our core of rationality in order to account for our stewardship. That stewardship entails the task of proportionality review - a unique exercise in our law. Unlike direct review, proportionality review does not question whether an individual death sentence is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case or whether, in the abstract, the sentence imposed on a defendant is deserved on a moral level. On the contrary, its role is to place the sentence imposed for one terrible murder on a continuum of sentences imposed for other terrible murders to ensure that the defendant has not been 'singled out unfairly for capital punishment.' State v. Cooper, 159 N.J. 55, 88 (1999) (Cooper II) (citing to State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 47 (1994) (Martini II), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S. Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2000). When that very particularized assignment is undertaken in the bright light of reason, it is evident that Jesse Timmendequas should not have been condemned to death. 165 N.J. 206, 234 (2000) (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). NO. A-109 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JESSE TIMMENDEQUAS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED