Title: Commonwealth v. Ralph R.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13249
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13249 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RALPH R., a juvenile.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2022. - November 10, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Jury and Jurors.  Constitutional Law, Jury.  Practice, Criminal, 
Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, Deliberation of jury. 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on June 2, 2014. 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Suffolk County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on September 4, 2014. 
 
The cases were tried before Joseph F. Johnston, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Lisa M. Lana, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the juvenile. 
Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Chauncey B. Wood & Sara E. Silva, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by a 
fair and impartial jury.  The juvenile asserts that this right 
was twice undermined at his trial:  first, when the judge failed 
to respond adequately to two jurors sleeping; and second, when 
the judge failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry into a 
preverdict report by the jury foreperson that "discriminating 
comments" were made during jury deliberations.  We conclude that 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in addressing the 
sleeping juror issues.  On the other hand, we conclude that, in 
light of the judge's statement that he did not know what the 
foreperson meant by her report, it was an abuse of the judge's 
discretion not to conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine 
whether the foreperson's statement amounted to a credible report 
of racial, ethnic, or other improper bias in the deliberation 
room.  Because we cannot be certain that such bias did not 
materially influence the verdicts, the juvenile's conviction as 
a youthful offender and his adjudications of delinquency must be 
vacated and set aside.2 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Citizens 
for Juvenile Justice, New England Innocence Project, and Fred T. 
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality. 
3 
 
1.  Background.  The juvenile was charged by delinquency 
complaint with several firearm-related offenses, and 
subsequently he was indicted as a youthful offender for two of 
those offenses.3  At the juvenile's trial, a number of jury 
issues arose, three of which are relevant to this appeal. 
First, during the Commonwealth's direct examination of its 
first witness, the judge called the prosecutor, defense counsel, 
and juror no. 8 to sidebar because he had observed that juror 
sleeping.  At sidebar, the judge asked the juror whether she was 
sleeping, and if she had missed the entirety of the witness's 
testimony.  The juror confirmed that she had fallen asleep, 
stating that she had "asthma and bronchitis."  She stated that 
her "eyes just went," but she denied sleeping through all of the 
witness's testimony.  The judge emphasized the importance of the 
juror's attention to the evidence, and ultimately allowed her to 
return to her seat on the jury.  The judge informed the parties 
 
3 The delinquency complaint charged the juvenile with 
carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a loaded firearm 
without a license, possession of a large capacity feeding 
device, possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification card, and receiving stolen property.  The 
juvenile was indicted as a youthful offender on charges of 
unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a 
large capacity feeding device.  Those charges, as well as the 
charge of receiving stolen property, were dismissed from the 
delinquency complaint prior to trial, at the Commonwealth's 
request. 
4 
 
that it would "be a live, fluid issue" that he would continue to 
monitor. 
That afternoon, after the jury had retired for the day, the 
judge informed counsel that he was satisfied with juror no. 8's 
attentiveness.  The judge inquired whether either attorney 
wished to be heard on the issue.  The prosecutor stated that he 
had not "noticed anything of note since the initial sidebar," 
and defense counsel agreed, commenting:  "She was awake the rest 
of the time."  The judge then clarified for the record that 
juror no. 8 was "right in [his] line of sight" and was sleeping 
for "really a fleeting . . . moment."  The judge further stated 
that he had "been watching [juror no. 8] very closely throughout 
just to be sure," as well as another juror who had earlier 
claimed she was not feeling well, and discerned no additional 
problems.  He continued:  "If counsel has anything different 
than that, please let me know, otherwise, we'll just continue as 
we are with our [fourteen] jurors."  Neither voiced any concerns 
about juror no. 8 or any other juror. 
The second issue arose the following morning and concerned 
a different juror.  Before the jury were brought into the court 
room, the judge met with counsel to discuss unrelated issues 
concerning two other jurors.4  During this discussion, defense 
 
4 The first issue concerned an altercation wherein one 
juror, a breastfeeding mother, was provided accommodations to 
5 
 
counsel remarked, "If we had those two jurors excused, then we 
have two other jurors sitting there intermittently falling 
asleep because the gentleman with the white hair at times he'll 
just be asleep; yesterday, he was snoring.  I -- it -- it's 
going to be tricky excusing jurors."  This was the first mention 
of anyone other than juror no. 8 sleeping.  In that moment, the 
prosecutor interjected that he had not observed the "gentleman 
with the white hair having issues."  The "gentleman with the 
white hair" presumably was juror no. 3.5  The judge and defense 
counsel then had the following exchange: 
The judge:  "Well, I'll say this, I've -- I was eyeballing 
[the] juror in seat 8 the whole -- one eye did not leave 
her. . . .  And after we had our discussion at sidebar if 
that continued.  Then, at one point, I noticed the 
gentleman, whether it's three or four I'm not sure, and 
this is the point when the first witness you had -- you put 
up the video -- you had put up the video, and I looked down 
and his eyes were closed and his head was down, and I 
actually made sort of an announcement to the jury, 'Can 
everyone see the video?' something like that, and 
[thirteen] of the [fourteen] nodded or said 'yes.'  He 
didn't.  And then within seconds of that, though, he was 
then looking at the screen.  So, in my mind, was this 
someone that was just kind of putting their head down and 
 
use a breast pump in a private locked court room during the 
lunch break, and another juror became aggressive and hostile 
that she could not use the court room to eat her lunch, 
upsetting other jurors.  The second issue involved a juror who 
ultimately was excused for religious reasons. 
 
5 Although the transcript does not make entirely clear which 
juror was "the gentleman with the white hair," for the purpose 
of the appeal, the parties assume it was juror no. 3 because the 
judge referred to the gentleman as either juror no. 3 or juror 
no. 4, and juror no. 4 was a woman. 
6 
 
kind of concentrating and then looking up?  So that's what 
I observed.  Now, if you think that's worth inquiry?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yeah, [(indiscernible)] but I think that 
happened twice and, I mean, I --"6 
 
The judge:  "I didn't see the other.  I didn't see the 
other one.  Just as an offer of proof, what did you see?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Same thing that you just described.  I -
-" 
 
The judge:  "No, but you said, you heard -- you said it's -
-" 
 
Defense counsel:  "I don't remember exactly but I do 
remember you were trying to wake him up by -- I -- because 
I assume that's what you were trying to do." 
 
The judge:  "That obvious, huh?" 
 
Thereafter, the judge instructed the court officer to alert him 
if she noticed any jurors sleeping, and the discussion reverted 
to unrelated matters.  The trial proceeded with no further 
discussion of sleeping jurors. 
 
The third juror issue occurred during deliberations, which 
began on a Thursday afternoon.  On Friday morning, the jury sent 
the judge a note that they "ha[d] not reached a unanimous 
decision."  As the judge instructed the jury to continue 
deliberating, the jury foreperson raised her hand to speak to 
 
6 Many portions of sidebar discussions at trial are deemed 
"indiscernible" in the transcript due to low audio.  The 
defendant bears the burden to reconstruct the record of 
indiscernible portions of the trial if they are relevant to his 
claims on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 
582 n.10 (2007). 
7 
 
the judge.  At sidebar, with counsel present, the foreperson 
told the judge she had "concerns" that any decision would be 
"based on individual[s] who are using personal issues, personal 
matters into this case -- dominating the conversations and just 
not trying to put -- look at the case with an open mind"; she 
expressed doubt that the jury were going to reach a unanimous 
decision.  The judge instructed the foreperson to continue 
deliberating, and he noted privately to counsel that a Tuey-
Rodriquez7 instruction might be warranted.  Shortly thereafter, 
the judge called the jury back into the court room to adjourn 
for the day, with instructions to return on Monday.  The 
foreperson again requested to speak with the judge. 
 
Prior to speaking to the foreperson, the judge consulted 
with counsel, noting that he wanted to avoid discussing 
deliberations, but he recalled that the foreperson may have had 
a work conflict preventing her from serving after Monday.  At 
sidebar, the judge prefaced his conversation with the 
foreperson:  "[I]f you have a question that's personal to you 
regarding any situation that you might have relative to family 
or otherwise, I will -- I'll address that with you right now.  
 
7 See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 
(1973) (Appendix A); Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2-3 
(1851). 
8 
 
What I don't want to do is address anything relative to any 
deliberations."  In response, the foreperson stated, 
"It just -- my work obligation and I -- I can't be on this 
jury, on this case.  There is a lot of discriminating 
comments among us. . . .  A lot of discriminating comments 
among the group and they won't -- they not gonna reach a 
decision [(indiscernible)], doesn't matter.  It's not a 
time problem." 
 
At this point, the judge interrupted the foreperson's 
explanation and asked about her work commitments.  The 
foreperson reiterated: 
"I cannot afford to go on this jury for more than it should 
right now.  One, for my personal, I can't be here next week 
and, two, from what I am hearing from this group, we're not 
gonna reach a decision on Monday.  There has to be some 
shoveling on this group.  We not gonna reach a decision on 
Monday." 
 
The judge conferred with counsel, and all agreed that the 
foreperson should be instructed to return on Monday. 
In their discussion, defense counsel remarked that the 
foreperson's concerns "sound[ed] like a combination of things."  
The judge agreed, and the prosecutor noted, "[I]t makes a 
difference if it's one person because there is case law on 
removing a disruptive juror, and if she says there's 
discriminating statements being thrown out, but I don't know 
what she means."  The judge responded, "I have no idea."  After 
the foreperson left for the day, the judge stated to counsel, 
"She struck me as being not sincere with the concern that she 
expressed."  Neither disagreed or objected. 
9 
 
On Monday, the jury resumed deliberations.  Two hours into 
deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge that they were 
deadlocked.  The prosecutor requested that the judge inquire 
which jurors the foreperson was speaking about the previous 
Friday, seemingly referencing the foreperson's report of 
"discriminating comments," and requested that he ask those 
jurors "if they [were] able to deliberate based on the facts and 
circumstances of this case."  The judge declined to do so, but 
he agreed to provide a Tuey-Rodriquez instruction.  After the 
instruction was given, the jury resumed deliberations. 
 
Just a few hours later, the jury submitted another note 
asking whether they were required to be unanimous on all of the 
charges.  While the judge was conferring with counsel about how 
to respond, the jury notified the court officer that they had 
reached unanimous verdicts, but that one juror still wanted the 
question answered.  Before taking the verdicts, the judge 
instructed the jury that they were required to address the four 
charges separately, and that they could reach a unanimous 
decision as to one or more of the charges but not reach a 
unanimous decision as to the others.  The jury then briefly 
resumed deliberations before returning with unanimous verdicts 
of guilty on all charges.8 
 
8 At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the judge had 
dismissed the youthful offender component of the indictment 
10 
 
 
The juvenile appealed, and a divided panel of the Appeals 
Court concluded that the judge abused his discretion by failing 
to conduct a voir dire of juror no. 3 in response to defense 
counsel's report that the juror had been sleeping and further 
erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into the foreperson's 
report of "discriminating comments" being made during 
deliberations.9  See Commonwealth v. Ralph R., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 
150, 151 (2021).  The Appeals Court accordingly vacated the 
judgment and adjudications of delinquency, and set aside the 
verdicts.  Id. at 165.  We allowed the Commonwealth's 
application for further appellate review.10 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sleeping jurors.  To protect the 
juvenile's and the public's right to "decisions made by alert 
and attentive jurors, . . . [a] judicial observation that a 
juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to 
that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention."  
Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643-644 (2015), quoting 
 
charging the juvenile with possession of a large capacity 
feeding device.  See Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 
866 n.8 (2001). 
 
9 The Appeals Court also concluded that the judge conducted 
a proper inquiry of juror no. 8, and that the evidence at trial 
was sufficient to support the juvenile's conviction as a 
youthful offender and the adjudications of delinquency.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ralph R., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 151 (2021). 
 
10 We denied the juvenile's application for further 
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
11 
 
Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78 (2010).  However, "not 
every complaint regarding juror attentiveness requires a voir 
dire."  McGhee, supra at 644, quoting Beneche, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 478 Mass. 1007, 1008 n.1 (2017).  
"[I]f a judge receives a complaint or other information 
suggesting that a juror was asleep or otherwise inattentive, the 
judge must first determine whether that information is 
'reliable.'"  Id. at 1007, quoting McGhee, supra. 
In assessing the reliability of the information received, 
"the judge must consider the nature and source of the 
information presented, as well as any relevant facts that the 
judge has observed from the bench."  McGhee, 470 Mass. at 644.  
"If the judge determines that the information is not reliable, 
no intervention is necessary."  Villalobos, 478 Mass. at 1007.  
"If, however, the judge does find the information reliable, he 
or she 'must take further steps to determine the appropriate 
intervention.'"  Id. at 1008, quoting McGhee, supra. 
The appropriate intervention typically involves 
"conduct[ing] a voir dire of the potentially inattentive juror, 
in an attempt to investigate whether that juror 'remains capable 
of fulfilling his or her obligation to render a verdict based on 
all of the evidence.'"  Villalobos, 478 Mass. at 1008, quoting 
McGhee, 470 Mass. at 644.  However, "[j]udges have substantial 
discretion in this area," McGhee, supra, and they may readily 
12 
 
exercise that discretion to determine "the remedy best suited to 
address the situation,"11 Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 471 
Mass. 179, 191 (2015).  "The burden is on the defendant to show 
that the judge's response to information about a sleeping juror 
was 'arbitrary or unreasonable.'"  Villalobos, supra, quoting 
McGhee, supra. 
The juvenile argues that the judge failed to respond 
reasonably to information suggesting that juror no. 8 and juror 
no. 3 were sleeping at trial and that, as a result, a new trial 
is required.  We conclude that the juvenile has not met his 
burden as to either juror. 
i.  Juror no. 8.  Upon personally observing juror no. 8 
sleeping, the judge promptly intervened and conducted a voir 
dire to determine whether that juror "had in fact fallen asleep 
and, if so, what portions of the evidence [she] might have 
missed."  See Villalobos, 478 Mass. at 1008.  The juror 
explained that, although she had fallen asleep, it had been 
brief, and she had not missed all of the witness's testimony.  
The judge -- who could see the juror from the bench -- found on 
the record that she had been asleep only for a "fleeting 
 
11 "The judge's decision can best be assessed if the judge 
makes a record of his or her findings, initially as to the 
reliability of the information presented, and subsequently . . . 
as to whether the juror in question was indeed asleep or 
inattentive . . . ."  McGhee, 470 Mass. at 644. 
13 
 
moment."  See Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 Mass. 398, 413 (2015) 
("We defer to the findings of the trial judge on a claim 
alleging a sleeping juror").  Even so, the judge continued to 
"closely watch[] the juror, and monitor[] the situation."  See 
Beneche, 458 Mass. at 79.  The judge satisfied himself that 
juror no. 8 was attentive and alert for the remainder of the 
trial, and further consulted with counsel regarding their 
observations; both agreed that the issue was isolated and 
nonrecurring.  There was no error or abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115, 139 & n.18 (2014) (no abuse 
of discretion where, after voir dire, judge was satisfied that 
sleeping juror "could fairly participate in deliberations"). 
 
ii.  Juror no. 3.  The juvenile argues that the judge 
abused his discretion in failing to conduct a voir dire of juror 
no. 3 in response to his own observations of the juror, as well 
as defense counsel's report that that juror had been sleeping 
twice on the previous day. 
The judge indicated that the previous day he initially had 
noticed juror no. 3's head down and eyes closed, but it was not 
obvious to him that the juror was sleeping.  See Commonwealth v. 
Keaton, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 87 (1994) ("Meditation may be 
mistaken for somnolence").  See, e.g., McGhee, 470 Mass. at 643 
("judge pointed out that '[s]ome people, when they concentrate, 
they close their eyes'").  To determine whether the juror was 
14 
 
paying attention or was asleep, the judge intervened by asking 
all of the jurors whether they could see the screen as the 
Commonwealth was showing a video exhibit.  In the judge's own 
words, juror no. 3 was looking at the screen "within seconds" of 
the judge's statement. 
"Although it is true that a judge must take action when 
confronted with evidence of a sleeping juror, the nature of that 
action is within the judge's discretion," Vaughn, 471 Mass. at 
412, and need only be proportional to the information presented, 
see Commonwealth v. Alleyne, 474 Mass. 771, 778 (2016).  As we 
have said, "further steps" must be taken to "determine the 
appropriate intervention," but not every instance of juror 
inattentiveness calls for a voir dire.  See Villalobos, 478 
Mass. at 1008 & n.1.  Here, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in determining that a voir dire of juror no. 3 was 
not warranted at that point.  See Alleyne, supra ("Where a judge 
has only tentative information that a juror may be sleeping, it 
is sufficient to note the report and monitor the situation"). 
We also conclude that the juvenile has failed to establish 
that the judge abused his discretion by not conducting a voir of 
juror no. 3 in response to defense counsel's belated report that 
he "think[s] that happened twice."  Defense counsel did not 
provide any specific information regarding the alleged second 
instance of that juror sleeping.  See Beneche, 458 Mass. at 78-
15 
 
79 (uncertainty of report bearing on reliability).  The report 
about the juror came the day after defense counsel purportedly 
had made the observation, without any explanation for the delay, 
and despite counsel's opportunity to raise any juror concerns at 
a bench conference held the previous day.  Because of the 
several juror issues, including juror no. 8 sleeping, the judge 
had been watching the jury "closely" the day before and did not 
observe juror no. 3's attention wane a second time.  See Vaughn, 
471 Mass. at 412 (report not "reliable enough to warrant further 
action, particularly where counsel said that the juror slept 
during the judge's instructions to the jury and the judge would 
necessarily have been looking at the jury"); Commonwealth v. 
Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 47 (2009) (judge is entitled to rely on 
personal observations of jury regarding question of juror 
attentiveness). 
The judge apparently was dubious of defense counsel's 
report, which is evidenced by his request for an offer of proof.  
Cf. Villalobos, 478 Mass. at 1008 (judge "did not give any 
indication that he doubted the reliability of the prosecutor's 
reports," and thus should have conducted voir dire of jurors).  
The offer of proof did nothing to bolster the report's 
credibility.  Defense counsel described the second instance only 
as the "same thing" as the first, in that the judge tried to 
awaken the juror, but counsel could not "remember exactly" what 
16 
 
had occurred.  Given the report's lack of specificity, its 
timing, and the absence of corroboration, it was reasonable for 
the judge to conclude that the report lacked sufficient 
reliability to require a voir dire of juror no. 3.  See id. at 
1007.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Dyous, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 
513 (2011) (because report provided "ample basis for believing 
that one of the jurors was asleep during the trial," and 
subsequent colloquy with counsel "raise[d] a real doubt whether 
the juror was attentive" for short trial, judge should have 
conducted voir dire).  We disagree with the juvenile that the 
judge necessarily found the report reliable because he 
instructed the court officer to bring any sleeping jurors to his 
attention.  Considering the myriad juror issues at this trial, 
doing so was a reasonable, cautious, and proactive response.  
See Beneche, 458 Mass. at 79. 
b.  Report of "discriminating comments."  The juvenile 
argues that, on receipt of the foreperson's report of 
"discriminating comments" being made during jury deliberations, 
the judge was required to conduct a preliminary inquiry to 
determine what the foreperson meant by her statement and that 
the failure to do so constituted nonwaivable structural error.12  
We agree that, where the judge indicated that he did not know 
 
12 The juvenile is Hispanic. 
17 
 
what the foreperson meant by her comment, it was error for the 
judge not to investigate the meaning of her statement.  We 
disagree that the error is nonwaivable; however, in this case, 
we cannot say that the judge's failure to inquire did not create 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
"A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by an 
impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights."  Commonwealth v. McCalop, 485 Mass. 790, 798 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Heywood, 484 Mass. 43, 44 (2020).  See 
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 223 (2017).  "The 
presence of even one juror who is not impartial violates a 
defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury."  Commonwealth 
v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 494 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Long, 419 Mass. 798, 802 (1995).  Consequently, the possibility 
that racial or ethnic bias has infected jury deliberations 
"cannot be ignored."  McCalop, supra at 790, 798-799, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991).  "[T]o ignore 
concerns about the influence of racial bias in the jury room 
'might well offend fundamental fairness.'"  McCalop, supra at 
799, quoting Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 155 n.25, 
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). 
At the same time, "inquiry into jury deliberations is 
prohibited."  Commonwealth v. Moore, 474 Mass. 541, 545 (2016), 
18 
 
S.C., 489 Mass. 735 (2022).  We have stressed that, when 
speaking to a deliberating juror, a judge must take extreme 
caution to avoid delving into deliberations.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 886 (2021) (Appendix); 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 486 Mass. 646, 656 (2021); Moore, 
supra at 545-548.  Recognizing that this is "no easy task," we 
have guided judges to instruct deliberating jurors that they may 
not tell the judge about deliberations and that, if they do, the 
judge will have to interrupt them.  See Williams, supra.  
Indeed, we have "emphasize[d] that the moment a juror suggests 
that there may be a disagreement among the jurors, the judge 
must interrupt the juror and firmly reiterate that the juror 
must not reveal any information regarding deliberations."  Id.  
This is because "[t]he secrecy of jury deliberations has served 
as a bedrock of our judicial system, and inquiry into the 
'jury's deliberative processes . . . would intrude improperly 
into the jury's function.'"  Moore, supra at 548, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. 398, 403 (1990). 
These "two lines of precedent" -- although often difficult 
to reconcile and implement -- "need not conflict."  Peña-
Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 223.  If handled delicately, a judge may 
investigate the potential of racial or ethnic bias in the jury 
room without invading the jury's deliberative process.  See 
Commonwealth v. Quiles, 488 Mass. 298, 316 (2021), cert. denied, 
19 
 
142 S. Ct. 1237 (2022).  For example, in Tavares, 385 Mass. at 
153-156, the judge employed a procedure whereby, upon receipt of 
preverdict allegations that one juror made a racist comment 
about the defendant and another juror used a racist term to 
describe a witness, the judge conducted an inquiry of each 
deliberating juror to determine whether the remarks were in fact 
made and, if so, whether the jurors could nevertheless fairly 
and impartially render a verdict.  We concluded that the judge 
did not err in doing so, reasoning that, in such circumstances, 
a judge has "broad discretion to make 'such order as he [or she] 
deems appropriate for the administration of justice.'"  Id. at 
155, quoting Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 203 (1979).  
Following the inquiry in Tavares, the judge found that at least 
one of the reported racial remarks had been made, but the judge 
determined that the jury's ability to render an impartial 
verdict had not been affected.  Tavares, supra at 154, 156.  We 
concluded that the judge was in the "best position" to make such 
a finding and determined there was no error.  Id. at 156, 
quoting New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 
671, 675 (1977). 
More recently, in Quiles, we approved a judge's use of the 
procedure set forth in Tavares in response to a preverdict 
report of jury bias.  See Quiles, 488 Mass. at 315-316.  There, 
one juror reported that another juror had made "racist comments" 
20 
 
during deliberations.  Id. at 314.  After conducting an 
individual voir dire of the deliberating jurors, the judge found 
that the juror had indeed made the racist comments; the judge 
dismissed that juror, but otherwise found the remaining jurors 
indifferent.  Id.  We concluded that the judge appropriately 
"investigat[ed] the comments without prying into the jury's 
deliberations," and did not err in allowing the remaining jurors 
to deliberate.  Id. at 316.  Notably, we declined to extend the 
more rigorous test for postverdict allegations of juror 
misconduct set forth in McCowen, 458 Mass. at 496-497,13 to 
preverdict allegations, stating that "[t]he preverdict procedure 
in Tavares affords a trial judge necessary flexibility in 
determining what steps need to be taken to ensure the defendant 
is tried by an impartial jury."  Quiles, supra. 
 
We do not suggest that an individual inquiry of each 
deliberating juror is required in every instance where there is 
a preverdict allegation of jury bias.  Judges are afforded broad 
discretion in addressing issues concerning juror impartiality 
 
13 The case of McCowen, 458 Mass. at 496-497, set forth a 
two-part test for postverdict allegations of juror bias:  first, 
the defendant "bears the initial burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the jury were exposed to 
statements that infected the deliberative process with racially 
or ethnically charged language or stereotypes"; and second, 
"[i]f the defendant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to 
the Commonwealth to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the jury's exposure to these 
statements." 
21 
 
that arise during trial.  See Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 
837, 848-849 (2013).  Indeed, "[b]ecause the [judge's] 
'determination of a juror's impartiality is essentially one of 
credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor, [a 
reviewing] court give[s] a trial judge's determination of 
impartiality great deference.'"  Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 
Mass. 162, 168 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 
Mass. 20, 30 (2016).  However, to do so in instances where the 
jury's impartiality has been called into question sufficiently 
during trial, there must be a finding of impartiality supported 
by facts in the record.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488 Mass. 
597, 608 (2021) ("When a trial judge learns that the jury were 
exposed to an extraneous influence, the judge is required to 
determine whether the jurors are able to remain impartial"); 
Philbrook, supra at 31 ("we give deference to the judge's 
conclusion, arrived at following extensive individual voir dire, 
that the remaining jurors had not been influenced by the 
comments [by three jurors suggesting premature deliberations] 
and continued to be impartial"). 
We recognize that, in this trial riddled with juror issues, 
the judge was careful and patient in dealing with these 
challenges.  The judge once more was placed in a difficult 
position when the foreperson approached him during 
deliberations.  Despite the judge's prefatory instruction 
22 
 
against divulging information about deliberations, the 
foreperson disclosed issues personal to her, matters concerning 
deliberations, and a report of "discriminating comments" in the 
jury room.  Although the judge, in keeping with his careful 
approach to the many juror issues, followed our guidance in 
Williams, 486 Mass. at 656, and interrupted the foreperson when 
she began to discuss deliberations, the issue of potential 
discrimination in the jury room had already been revealed.  
Confronted with this information, the judge needed to take steps 
to understand what the foreperson meant in order to determine 
whether further inquiry was required to assess whether the 
jury's impartiality had been affected. 
We disagree with the Commonwealth that the foreperson's use 
of the term "discriminating," as opposed to "discriminatory," 
was insufficient to signify potential discrimination of some 
nature during deliberations.  It is a reasonable inference from 
the context in which the statement was made that the foreperson 
likely meant "discriminatory."14,15  Importantly, the judge 
 
14 The term "discriminating" is first defined in Webster's 
Dictionary as "making a distinction" or "distinguishing."  See 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 362 (1985).  While not 
inconceivable, it is improbable that the foreperson was 
complaining that the jury were making comments of a judicious or 
discerning nature.  Notably, included as part of the second 
definition for "discriminating" is "discriminatory."  See id. 
 
15 The Commonwealth also asserts that there is nothing to 
suggest that the foreperson's report referred specifically to 
23 
 
himself stated that he did not know what the foreperson meant by 
the report.  Without further inquiry, the judge deemed the 
report insincere.  Although judges are entitled to make 
credibility determinations regarding juror inquiry, and we will 
defer to those determinations absent clear error, see 
Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 388 (2005), a judge must 
do so fully equipped with the information necessary to make such 
a determination, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cassino, 474 Mass. 
85, 97-98 (2016) (no abuse of discretion where, after voir dire 
of two jurors reported to be biased, judge concluded report 
lacked credibility and found two jurors impartial). 
 
racial discrimination, or even discrimination based on some 
other improper characteristic.  But that is precisely the 
problem with the judge's failure to inquire.  The term 
"discriminatory" without the use of a qualifier often refers to 
discrimination on the basis of a person's membership in a 
protected group.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 
455, 458 (2022) (discussing framework for determining whether 
peremptory strike was made for "discriminatory purpose" where 
such challenges are prohibited only when made on basis of 
membership in "discrete" group under art. 12); Bulwer v. Mount 
Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 680 (2016) (referring to employee's 
burden to show that adverse employment action was made with 
"discriminatory animus," where discrimination is prohibited only 
when made on basis of classes protected by G. L. c. 151B).  See 
also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 648 (2002) 
(providing illustration of use of word "discriminatory" as 
"attitudes toward minority groups").  While it is possible that 
the foreperson was not referring to statements reflecting 
discrimination on this basis, without further inquiry, that 
could not be determined by the judge and cannot now be 
determined on appeal. 
24 
 
It is true that the foreperson approached the judge twice 
during deliberations, and the judge was certainly reasonably 
suspicious that her motive in doing so was to be relieved from 
jury service.  Clearly, "[a] trial judge is in a better position 
than an appellate court to ascertain a potential juror's 
credibility and demeanor, and to determine whether the juror 
. . . is merely trying to convince the judge to excuse him or 
her from serving."  Long, 419 Mass. at 804 n.7.  Here, however, 
the judge's statement that the foreperson "struck [him] as being 
not sincere" cannot be reconciled with his statement minutes 
earlier that he had "no idea" what the foreperson meant by her 
report, particularly where the judge took no intermediate steps 
to investigate the statement.16 
In order to safeguard a defendant's right to an impartial 
jury, when a judge receives preverdict information that 
reasonably suggests that a statement reflecting racial, ethnic, 
or other improper bias was made during jury deliberations, the 
information "cannot be ignored."  Laguer, 410 Mass. at 97.  See 
also Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 225 ("A constitutional rule 
that racial bias in the justice system must be addressed . . . 
 
16 We note that theoretically it is possible for a judge not 
to credit a comment that the judge does not understand 
considering the context and, perhaps, previous interaction with 
that juror.  The judge made no such credibility determination 
here. 
25 
 
is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury 
verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth 
Amendment trial right"). 
Given the seriousness in which we treat inquiry of 
deliberating jurors, the judge must first determine whether the 
report is credible such that further inquiry is required.  Where 
there is any question concerning the credibility of the report, 
the judge must conduct a preliminary inquiry "to determine the 
truth or falsity of the . . . allegations."  McCowen, 458 Mass. 
at 494.  The possibility presented by such a report that the 
jury may not be impartial, which is a fundamental right, must 
also be treated seriously, see id., and thus this threshold 
credibility determination should not be a difficult one to 
satisfy.  Any uncertainty by the judge about the credibility of 
the reported information or its content should be resolved in 
favor of conducting a preliminary inquiry of the juror who made 
the allegations. 
The proper scope and form of the preliminary inquiry will 
remain within the judge's discretion, but may include, for 
example, simply asking the reporting juror for more information.  
See Tavares, 385 Mass. at 155.  Following such an inquiry, once 
the judge better understands the nature and extent of the 
information reported, the judge has the discretion to determine 
whether further investigation is required, which may include an 
26 
 
individual voir dire of the deliberating jurors.  See Quiles, 
488 Mass. at 316. 
Of course, each situation will be fact-specific, and a 
reviewing court will defer to a judge's credibility 
determinations regarding whether the reported statement was made 
and, if so, whether it affected the jury's impartiality.  See 
Quiles, supra.  If, however, the judge decides not to conduct 
any inquiry based on a determination that the initial report 
lacks credibility, as the Commonwealth contends was the case 
here, the judge should explain on the record the basis for that 
credibility determination.  See Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 462 
Mass. 761, 772 n.13 (2012) ("if a judge does not find credible 
the allegations of extraneous influence, he or she may deny the 
defendant's motions for juror inquiry"). 
Because, here, the judge indicated that he did not know 
what the foreperson meant by her report of "discriminating 
comments" in the jury room, and did not ask, he did not have the 
necessary information to determine meaningfully whether the 
foreperson's statement amounted to a credible report of 
statements by deliberating jurors reflecting racial, ethnic, or 
other improper bias.  It constituted an abuse of the judge's 
discretion to not conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine 
what the foreperson meant in order to assess whether the jury 
remained capable of impartially rendering a verdict. 
27 
 
Having concluded that there was error, we turn to the 
proper standard of review.  "Because the right to be tried by an 
impartial jury is 'basic to a fair trial,' errors that undermine 
the right to an impartial jury are structural errors."  
Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 464 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 455 (2019).  Yet "even 
structural error is subject to the doctrine of waiver."  Mains 
v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 33 n.3 (2000).  See Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 268 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 
1145 (2016) ("the right to a public trial, like any structural 
right, can be waived").  The juvenile argues that, because of 
the risk of indelible harm presented by the possibility that 
racial or ethnic bias influenced jury deliberations, the onus 
should be on the judge to ferret out such claims.  The juvenile 
asserts, as a result, that a judge's failure to investigate 
preliminarily a claim that raises the possibility of racial or 
ethnic bias among the jury should be deemed structural error 
that is not waivable by the defendant's failure to object. 
We do not agree.  "[S]tructural errors can be procedurally 
waived just like any other constitutional error, and . . . 'the 
term "structural error" carries with it no talismanic 
significance as a doctrinal matter.'"  Commonwealth v. Francis, 
485 Mass. 86, 108 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021), 
quoting Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017).  
28 
 
Where a defendant objects to a judge's response to an allegation 
of juror bias, the judge has the opportunity to investigate the 
claim or explain his or her reasoning for deciding not to do so.  
See Weaver, supra at 1912.  However, where a defendant fails to 
object, the judge "is deprived of the chance to cure the 
violation," id., and a reviewing court is left without a 
developed record to review the claim on appeal, see Commonwealth 
v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 151 (2018).  "To presume prejudice 
in this context would ignore the distinction, one long 
recognized by this court, between properly preserved and waived 
claims."  See Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 
(2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 922 (2015) (violation of public 
trial right is structural error subject to waiver).  Therefore, 
where the defendant failed to object at trial, we review for a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Francis, 
supra at 103. 
"An 'error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice unless we are persuaded that it did not 'materially 
influence[]' the guilty verdict[s]."  Commonwealth v. Horne, 476 
Mass. 222, 228 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 
8, 13 (1999).  "A guilty verdict arising from racial or ethnic 
bias not only poses a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice but also, 'if left unaddressed, would risk systemic 
injury to the administration of justice.'"  McCalop, 485 Mass. 
29 
 
at 791, quoting Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 224.  Based on this 
record, we cannot be certain whether comments reflecting racial, 
ethnic, or other improper bias were made and, if they were, 
whether they created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
3.  Conclusion.  The juvenile's conviction as a youthful 
offender and his adjudications of delinquency are vacated and 
set aside.  The case is remanded to the Juvenile Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.