Title: Ex parte Geico Casualty Company. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Aundrea Pritchett v. Clifford Paparella and Geico Casualty Company)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1091420
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2010

REL: 09/17/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1091420
_________________________
Ex parte Geico Casualty Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Aundrea Pritchett
v.
Clifford Paparella and Geico Casualty Company)
(Clarke Circuit Court, CV-08-900104)
LYONS, Justice.
Geico Casualty Company ("Geico"), one of the defendants
in an action arising out of a vehicular accident, has filed a
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2
petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court
direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the
plaintiff's motion to set aside a previous order that granted
Geico's motion to "opt out" of these proceedings.  We grant
the petition and issue the writ.  
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History
On December 24, 2007, a vehicle driven by Aundrea
Pritchett was involved in an accident with a vehicle driven by
Clifford Paparella.  On August 29, 2008, Pritchett sued
Paparella, an uninsured motorist, and Geico, her uninsured-
motorist ("UIM") benefits carrier, alleging that Paparella
caused 
the 
collision. 
 
Pritchett's 
complaint 
alleged
negligence and wantonness.  On September 12, 2008, Geico filed
an answer and discovery requests.  When Pritchett did not
respond to Geico's discovery requests, the trial court granted
Geico's motion to compel on April 17, 2009.  Pritchett
responded in May 2009.
Geico began communicating with counsel for Pritchett and
Paparella in November 2008 about scheduling depositions.
However, Geico says, Pritchett and Paparella did not make
themselves available for deposition until March 11, 2010, and
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February 19, 2010, respectively.  Geico states that on March
16, five days after Pritchett's deposition, "after finally
having the opportunity to conduct minimal discovery necessary
to make a meaningful determination about whether to opt-out of
the litigation," it filed a motion to opt out pursuant to Lowe
v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988).
Pritchett did not oppose the motion; the trial court granted
it on March 18.
On March 30, Pritchett filed a motion to vacate the
court's order, arguing that Geico's motion to opt out was not
filed within a reasonable time after being served with the
complaint and also relying on Lowe.  Geico opposed Pritchett's
motion, but on June 23, after a hearing, the trial court
entered an order vacating its order of March 18 and concluding
that Geico had not timely exercised its right to opt out.  The
June 23 order also required Geico to appear for trial on
August 2, less than six weeks later.  Upon Geico's filing of
its petition, we ordered answers and briefs and stayed further
proceedings in the trial court.  
II. Standard of Review
"'Mandamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where
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there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court.'"
Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)).  A petition for a writ of mandamus is the
appropriate means for challenging a trial court's refusal to
grant a UIM carrier the right to opt out of litigation
pursuant to Lowe.  Ex parte Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 708 So.
2d 156 (Ala. 1998).  
III. Analysis
In Lowe, this Court set out the rights of a UIM carrier
when its insured is involved in litigation:  
"A plaintiff is allowed either to join as a party
defendant his own liability insurer in a suit
against the underinsured motorist or merely to give
it notice of the filing of the action against the
motorist and of the possibility of a claim under the
underinsured motorist coverage at the conclusion of
the trial.  If the insurer is named as a party, it
would have the right, within a reasonable time after
service of process, to elect either to participate
in the trial (in which case its identity and the
reason for its being involved are proper information
for the jury), or not to participate in the trial
(in which case no mention of it or its potential
involvement is permitted by the trial court)." 
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521 So. 2d at 1310.  
Geico argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion
when it "unilaterally overruled" Geico's right to opt out of
the litigation and, after vacating the order of March 18
allowing Geico to opt out, ordered Geico to appear for trial
in six weeks.  Geico acknowledges that whether an insurer's
request to opt out is timely made "is left to the discretion
of the trial court, to be judged according to the posture of
the case."  Lowe, 521 So. 2d at 1310.  However, Geico points
out that it was not required to opt out early in the
litigation.
"Although the insurer may elect to withdraw very
early in the case, ... Lowe does not mandate that it
do so.  We stated in Lowe that the insurer has the
option to withdraw from the case, provided that it
exercises that option within a reasonable time after
service of process.  It was also stated that whether
the insurer's motion to withdraw is timely made is
left to the discretion of the trial court, to be
judged according to the posture of the case.
Logically, the insurer would not want to withdraw
from the case too early, before it could determine,
through the discovery process, whether it would be
in its best interest to do so.  On the other hand,
the insurer cannot delay, unnecessarily, in making
its decision whether to withdraw.  We believe that
it would not be unreasonable for the insurer to
participate in the case for a length of time
sufficient to enable it to make a meaningful
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determination as to whether it would be in its best
interest to withdraw."  
Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 685 (Ala. 1989).
Geico maintains that, in light of the facts of this case,
it was reasonable for it to wait until it had the testimony of
its insured, Pritchett, and of the alleged tortfeasor,
Paparella.  Moreover, Geico contends, the delay in conducting
the 
depositions 
and 
obtaining 
sufficient 
relevant 
information,
especially regarding damage, to enable it make a meaningful
decision 
about 
opting 
out 
was 
caused 
by 
delays 
and
continuances requested by Pritchett and Paparella, proof of
which was given to the trial court.  Geico contends that it
realistically 
could 
not 
have 
had 
sufficient 
relevant
information to make a meaningful determination about opting
out until it had deposed Pritchett and Paparella.
Geico states that the record before the trial court
showed that it began trying to obtain Pritchett's deposition
in November 2008, but Pritchett did not agree to a date until
March 2010.  Geico moved to opt out within five days after the
completion of her deposition.  Moreover, Geico says, it was
necessary for it to participate in discovery beyond the
initial filing of interrogatories and requests for production
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with its answer in 2008 because Pritchett failed to respond to
those initial requests.  Geico resorted to a motion to compel
in April 2009; Pritchett responded in May 2009.  These facts,
Geico says, also show the lack of merit in Pritchett's
argument that Geico waived its right to opt out by
participating in the litigation.  Nevertheless, the trial
court granted Pritchett's motion to vacate the order of March
18 allowing Geico to opt out, and the order of June 23
required Geico to be ready for trial in six weeks.
Pritchett argues that Geico waited too long to opt out
because it had answers to discovery showing the amount of her
damage several months before the depositions were taken.  The
purpose of the "reasonable time" standard, Pritchett says, is
so that an insurer has a "length of time sufficient to enable
it to make a meaningful determination as to whether it would
be in its best interest to withdraw."  Edgar, 543 So. 2d at
685.  However, Pritchett insists, the insurer may not
unnecessarily delay its decision.  Id.  Geico submits that it
has found no Alabama case in which a motion to opt out filed
five days after the plaintiff's deposition has been taken has
been held to be untimely or unreasonably dilatory.  This
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Court's research has likewise yielded no cases that so hold.
Here, although Geico participated in the litigation for
approximately a year and a half, we do not find that Geico's
motion to opt out, coming as it did only five days after it
took the deposition of its insured, Pritchett, was untimely.
Pritchett also argues that Geico should be required to
reveal what it learned in the depositions that made its
decision to opt out appropriate.  According to Pritchett,
Geico not only unnecessarily delayed its decision to opt out
by waiting until after it took her deposition, but it also
failed to provide any proof that the discovery it claimed was
necessary before it could make a decision actually had any
impact on its decision to opt out.  Geico, she argues, has not
identified any revelation obtained in the depositions of the
parties that made opting out shortly before trial in its best
interests.  Geico states that it has found no authority to
support Pritchett's argument, reasoning that requiring it to
provide the information supporting its decision to opt out is
contrary 
to 
the 
principles 
protecting 
attorney-client
communications and the attorney-work-product doctrine.  The
decision to opt out in this case, Geico says, was based on a
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legal analysis by Geico and its counsel, and it should not be
forced to reveal information that is clearly privileged.  We
agree.  
Finally, 
Pritchett 
argues 
that 
Geico's 
continued
participation in the litigation until taking her deposition
was unreasonable because much of the delay was caused by the
defendants' seeking a change in venue and, after the trial
court denied relief in that regard, petitioning this Court for
a writ of mandamus concerning the venue question.  The real
delay, she says, was because of Geico's actions in seeking a
change of venue and then unsuccessfully petitioning this Court
for a writ of mandamus.  Geico points out that the venue
motion was initiated by Paparella, and, therefore, Geico did
not create the resulting delays in litigation while the motion
and then the petition for a writ of mandamus were pending.
Geico argues that even if it had been responsible for
challenging venue, there is no legal authority to support
divesting it of its right to opt out of the litigation because
it exercised a legal right to contest venue.  Litigants should
not be forced, Geico contends, to choose between substantive
legal rights, such as the right to contest venue, and the
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right to opt out of litigation.  Again, we agree.  We find no
caselaw or statutory provisions in Alabama that would have
required Geico to choose between joining Paparella's venue
litigation or opting out of the case.  The time during which
the case was stayed while the venue litigation was pending is
irrelevant to the timeliness of Geico's motion to opt out.  
The trial court's order of June 23, in which it vacated
its order of March 18 allowing Geico to opt out of this
litigation and required Geico to appear for trial on August 2,
is contradictory to the requirement in Lowe and its progeny
that a UIM carrier must be given a reasonable opportunity to
participate in litigation for a sufficient length of time to
allow it to make a meaningful determination as to whether its
best interests would be served by opting out of the
litigation. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
exceeded its discretion when it vacated the March 18 order
allowing Geico to opt out of this litigation.  
IV.  Conclusion  
For the reasons previously stated, we grant Geico's
petition for a writ of mandamus; we direct the trial court to
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vacate its order of June 23 and to reinstate its order of
March 18 allowing Geico to opt out of this litigation.  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.