Title: McGriff v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CEDRIC K. MCGRIFF,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§ No. 130, 2000
§
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ for New Castle County
§ Cr.A. No. 93002189DI
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: June 20, 2001
Decided:
September 7, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and
STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court En Banc.
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Office of Public
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department
of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
WALSH, Justice:
2
In this appeal, we consider whether the Superior Court erred in admitting
hearsay testimony regarding a child victim’s statements of sexual abuse pursuant to
11 Del. C. § 3513.  The appellant, Cedric K. McGriff (“McGriff”), contends that
the admission of the hearsay statements violated his constitutional right of
confrontation.  McGriff further contends that the trial court improperly found that
the child victim was unavailable as required by 11 Del. C. § 3513.  We conclude
that the admission of the hearsay testimony of State witnesses regarding the child’s
accounts of sexual abuse by McGriff did not violate his constitutional rights under
the Federal or State Confrontation Clauses and that the Superior Court’s
determination of unavailability is supported by the record.  Accordingly, we affirm.
I
The facts of this case are more fully set forth in this Court’s decision reversing
McGriff’s prior conviction.  See McGriff v. State, Del. Supr., 672 A.2d 1027 (1996)
(“McGriff I”).  The salient facts are as follows.  In 1992, McGriff was indicted on
charges of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree and Unlawful Sexual Contact
Second Degree.  The alleged victim was McGriff’s five year-old daughter (the
“Child”), who at the time was a special education student with an I.Q. of 55. The
3
indictments stemmed from statements that the Child made to school officials during
a six-month period.  These statements indicated that McGriff was sexually abusing
the Child.  Following a jury trial that took place in 1994, McGriff was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment.  
At McGriff’s initial trial, the Child was called as a prosecution witness, but
was declared unavailable pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3513(b)(2)a.3. & 4. after the
prosecution and trial judge were unable to elicit testimony from her regarding the
abuse or her statements pertaining to the abuse.  The prosecution then admitted the
statements made by the Child through other State witnesses.  On appeal, this Court
overturned that conviction.  See McGriff, 672 A.2d 1027.  We concluded that
McGriff’s constitutional right of confrontation was violated because the Superior
Court determined that the Child was unavailable to testify, after the Child had given
limited testimony before the jury during the State’s direct examination, without the
court affording McGriff the opportunity to cross-examine the Child.  See id. at 1030.
On remand, a pretrial hearing was held to determine whether the Child was
unavailable to testify as required by 11 Del. C. § 3513.  At the time this hearing was
conducted, the Child was 10 years old.  During the hearing, the prosecutor, defense
4
counsel, and trial judge questioned the Child about the alleged incidents of abuse and
her prior statements of abuse.  Generally, the Child responded only to questions
unrelated to the case, tangential matters such as her grade level, activities in school,
and likes and dislikes.  When asked about the abuse that had occurred or the
statements she made to school officials, the Child was reluctant to testify and
professed not to remember what had happened or what she had said.  Despite
extensive questioning from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial judge –
including requests by the court that the Child answer the questions posed to her – the
Child refused to cooperate, eventually becoming upset and totally non-responsive.
The Child was subsequently excused, the parties having agreed that further
questioning at that time would be useless.  After hearing argument from the parties,
the Superior Court determined that the Child was unavailable pursuant to 11 Del. C.
§ 3513(b)(2)a.4. because of her “persistent refusal to testify despite judicial requests
to do so.”  The Child’s statements pertaining to the sexual abuse by her father were
admitted at trial through the school officials to whom the Child had made the
statements.  McGriff was again found guilty on all counts.  This appeal followed. 
5
II
The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.  See Feleke v. State, Del. Supr., 620 A.2d 222, 225 (1993).
Whether McGriff’s constitutional rights were infringed raises a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo.  See Thomas v. State, Del. Supr., 725 A.2d 424, 427
(1999).  
McGriff argues that his right to confront the witnesses against him under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the
Delaware Constitution was infringed.   McGriff asserts that he should have been
permitted to cross-examine the Child in front of the jury during trial and not being
afforded the opportunity to do so violated his constitutional right to confront his
accuser “face to face” as the Delaware Constitution provides.  McGriff further
contends that the trial court’s finding of unavailability was not supported by the
record.  McGriff asserts that even though the Child may have been a difficult witness
at trial because of her reluctance to testify, it does not follow that the trial court was
required to find her unavailable.  The State responds that the record supports the trial
court’s finding of unavailability and that the application of the statute did not violate
McGriff’s constitutional rights.  
1  For this exception to apply, the child witness must be “under 11 years of age at the time
of the proceeding.”  11 Del. C. § 3513(a). 
2 See D.R.E. 802, stating that: “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or
by these Rules.”  
3The Superior Court’s previous finding that the Child’s statements possessed particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness in satisfaction of the statutory requirements is not an issue on this
appeal. 
6
III
Pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3513, Delaware’s “tender years” statute, a child1
victim’s prior out-of-court statements pertaining to instances of physical or sexual
abuse may be admitted even though the child does not testify and is not available for
cross-examination.  This exception to the general prohibition against the admission
of hearsay statements2 may be applied even where the child witness does not testify
if: (i) the child is declared unavailable, and (ii) the out-of-court  statements are found
to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.3 See 11 Del. C. §
3513(b)(2)a. & b.  
McGriff asserts that the Delaware Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to “face to face” confrontation, which he claims he was impermissibly
denied by operation of the statute.  Specifically, McGriff contends that “face to face”
confrontation is required where the disputed testimony does not fall within a firmly
rooted exception to the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay
4  The United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."  U.S. Const. amend.
VI.  The analogous provision of the Delaware Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused hath a right ... to meet the witnesses in their examination face to
face...."  Del. Const. art. I, § 7.  The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment is applicable
to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965).  The rights provided by the Federal Constitution represent the minimal amount of
protection that may be afforded and states are free to provide more protections.  
7
testimony.   McGriff also contends that a finding of unavailability is required where,
as here, the out-of-court statements are not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule.  McGriff further asserts that Article I, § 7 of the
Delaware Constitution should be interpreted in this case to require the child to be
cross-examined in front of the jury so that the jury can judge the witness’ demeanor
during questioning in the defendant’s presence. 
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §
7 of the Delaware Constitution afford defendants in criminal proceedings the right
to confront the witnesses who testify against them.4  U.S. Const. amend. VI;  Del.
Const. art. I, § 7. The right of confrontation affords an accused the opportunity to
subject witnesses offering adverse testimony to the rigors of cross-examination, the
“‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”  California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote and citation omitted).  Obviously,
whenever hearsay testimony is admitted it infringes upon a defendant’s ability to test
5 See Gannon v. State, Del. Supr., 704 A.2d 272, 275 (1998)(“The courts in the United
States, as in England, have adopted the general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”).  As
previously noted, exceptions to the hearsay rule are only admissible as provided by law or the
rules of evidence.  See D.R.E. 802.
8
veracity  through cross-examination.  See  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845
(1990) (“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability
of the evidence against a defendant in a criminal case by subjecting it to rigorous
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”).
Accordingly, hearsay statements admitted against a defendant must meet not only
the requirements of an exception to the general prohibition against hearsay
testimony,5 but also the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.  
The Supreme Court has determined that Sixth Amendment standards may be
satisfied where the hearsay statements are found to possess some indicium of
reliability.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  The “reliability” analysis
has developed into a general framework for determining whether the standards of the
Confrontation Clause are satisfied where hearsay testimony is received against the
accused in a criminal case.  See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990).  To
satisfy the Confrontation Clause, it must be demonstrated that: “(1)‘the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or (2) it contains ‘particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if
6  We recognized in Thomas that  “[p]resently, for Confrontation Clause purposes,
unavailability is clearly required only where the out-of-court statement was made in the course of
a prior judicial proceeding.” Thomas v. State, Del. Supr., 725 A.2d 424, 428 (1999).
9
anything, to the statements’ reliability.”  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125
(1999)(plurality opinion)(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)); see also
Capano v. State, Del. Supr., __A.2d__, Nos. 110 and 149, 1999, Veasey, C.J.
(August 10, 2001), slip op. at 101-02.  Moreover, for Sixth Amendment purposes,
there is no general requirement that the prosecutor demonstrate the unavailability of
the declarant, see United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 (1986), except where
“the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial
proceeding.”  White v. Illinois,  502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992).6  
Because 11 Del. C. § 3513 mandates a finding that the out-of-court statements
“possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” before such statements may
be admitted at trial, we have previously decided that § 3513 is facially valid under
the standards for admissibility pursuant to both the State and Federal Confrontation
Clauses.  See Thomas, 725 A.2d at 426 (“[T]he statute’s requirement of a judicial
determination of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness renders it not violative
of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution or the Delaware
Constitution.”).  McGriff contends, however, that Article I, § 7 of the Delaware
10
Constitution should be interpreted to provide more protection than its federal
counterpart.  McGriff bases this argument on language found in Article I, § 7 that
provides the accused with the right to confront “witnesses in their examination face
to face....”  Del. Const. art. I, § 7 (emphasis supplied).  McGriff argues that, where
hearsay testimony does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the
Delaware Constitution requires “face to face” confrontation. In Gannon v. State,
Del. Supr., 704 A.2d 272 (1998), we expressly left for another day the interpretation
to be accorded the phrase “face to face.”  After examining the evolution of the
Federal Confrontation Clause and the history of this State’s Confrontation Clause,
we now construe the meaning of the phrase “face to face,” in the context of
McGriff’s argument. 
  
The concept of a physical or “face to face” meeting between the declarant and
the defendant is not unique to Delaware law.  The Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause protects the right of the accused to a “face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact.”  Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).  The
clause has been interpreted to express a preference for the in-court testimony of
witnesses.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause
reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial ... and a primary interest
11
secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination.”)(citations
and internal quotations omitted).  The right to “face to face” confrontation under the
Federal Constitution is not absolute, however.  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. at
846 (“We have never held ... that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal
defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them
at trial.”). 
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a Maryland statute that permitted a child victim of sexual abuse to testify in a room
separated from the defendant with only the prosecutor and defense counsel present
with the child.  See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).
During trial, the defendant, along with the judge and jury, remained in the
courtroom where the child’s testimony was viewed through closed-circuit television.
During the examination of the child, the defendant was able to electronically
communicate with defense counsel.  Prior to trial, the trial judge determined, as
demanded by the statute, that requiring the child to testify in court will cause
“serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.”
The defendant contended on appeal that the statute impermissibly violated her
confrontation rights.  The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the right to
12
“face to face” confrontation is not absolute and must yield where it is necessary to
further an important public policy and where the reliability of the testimony is
otherwise assured.  See id. at 847-48, 850.  The Court recognized that the preference
for “face to face” confrontation at trial “‘must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’” Id. at 849 (quoting
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)); see also id. at 849-50
(recognizing the importance of “face to face” confrontation but nevertheless holding
that such a right is not an “indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of the right to confront one’s accusers”).  As a plurality of the Supreme
Court stated in Lilly, the reliability of testimony is otherwise assured when the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or possesses particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.  See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. at 125.
We are of the view that the sections of Delaware’s tender years statute at issue
in McGriff’s case satisfy the “face to face” confrontation requirement of Article I,
§ 7 of the Delaware Constitution.  Although the Delaware Constitution defines
confrontation as the right of a defendant to meet the witnesses “face to face,” the
right of confrontation necessarily implies some sort of “face to face” meeting.
Indeed, the term confrontation has been defined as “bringing face to face of an
711 Del. C. § 3511 also permits the use of videotaped testimony in lieu of live testimony
by an available witness under the age of 12 years, but the constitutionality of the statute is not
before us.
13
accused person and his accusing witnesses.”  Webster’s New International
Dictionary 477 (3d ed. 1986).
Other jurisdictions applying state constitutional confrontation provisions
requiring “face to face” meeting have reached differing results.  Some have opted
for a literal application, particularly where a videotaped interview was admitted in
lieu of direct testimony of a child, see State v. Apilando, Haw. Supr., 900 P.2d 135
(1995), or where a child was permitted to testify from a separate room outside the
presence of the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Ludwig, Pa. Supr., 594 A.2d 281
(1991).  These decisions reject the U. S. Supreme Court approval of such practices
under the Federal Confrontation Clause, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. at 844,
because they effectively denied the right of cross-examination, deemed essential to
the confrontation entitlement.7
The Delaware tender years statute, as construed in McGriff I, does afford the
right of “face to face” cross-examination at the hearing conducted by the trial court
pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3513.  At that hearing the child may be deemed
“unavailable” on certain enumerated grounds but the Court must also conclude that
14
the “child’s out-of-court statement is shown to possess particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”  11 Del. C. § 3513(b)(2)b.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39 (1997),
upheld the constitutionality of that State’s “protected persons” statute which also
permits admission of out-of-court statements of child witnesses following a hearing
to determine both the child’s “unavailability” and the reliability of the statements
offered.  The Court ruled that because the child was available for cross-examination
at the “unavailability” hearing, held out of the presence of the jury, the defendant’s
confrontation right was satisfied under the Indiana constitution which, like
Delaware’s, confers a right to “meet the witness face to face.”  In ruling that the
right of confrontation under the Indiana constitution was “not absolute,” the Court
noted that: “[t]he quest for truth sometimes requires admitting statements from
witnesses unavailable for various reasons — death and incompetence among them.”
Id. at 50.  This Court reached a same conclusion in Gannon with regard to the
Delaware Constitution.  See Gannon v. State, Del. Supr., 704 A.2d 272, 278 (1998)
(holding that statements that qualify as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule
are admissible into evidence without a demonstration that the declarant is unavailable
for federal confrontation clause purposes).
15
The ruling in Pierce strikes the appropriate balance under a “face to face”
constitutional standard because it safeguards the right of cross-examination while
accommodating the need to spare small children the emotional trauma sometimes
associated with the trial process.  Similarly, we conclude that the Delaware tender
years statute satisfies the “face to face” requirement of the Delaware Constitution
through its protection of the right of “face to face” cross-examination on both the
issue of the child’s availability and the subsequent determination of trustworthiness
of the proffered out-of-court statements.
Furthermore, as we pointed out in Gannon, certain hearsay exceptions existed
at the time the current language of the Delaware Constitution was adopted.  See
Gannon, 704 A.2d at 278 (noting that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule was recognized prior to the adoption of Article I, §7).   In addition, this Court
recently recognized the constitutionality of admitting statements of a declarant’s then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition under the Federal
and State Confrontation Clauses.  See Forrest v. State, Del. Supr., 721 A.2d 1271,
1276-77 (1999); see also Capano v. State, slip op. at 78-80.  It would be incongruent
to interpret this provision as an absolute requirement of in court, physical “face to
face” confrontation in all circumstances.  A strict reading of the phrase “face to
16
face” would virtually foreclose the State’s ability to admit hearsay testimony against
a criminal defendant, including those statements determined to be particularly
trustworthy, substantially eliminating many exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay
testimony.  As with the Federal Confrontation Clause, a literal reading of the
Delaware Confrontation Clause would “abrogate virtually every hearsay exception,
a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at
63.  The right to meet witnesses “face to face” is not mandatory in all circumstances;
rather, Article I, § 7 expresses a preference for “face to face” confrontation in
accordance with the law of the land — due process.  Gannon, 704 A.2d 272.  That
preference must yield in those hearsay situations that are consistent with due process:
firmly rooted exceptions and hearsay statements that have particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.    
The State has an interest in protecting young children from testifying.  In
addition, the State has an interest in prosecuting individuals in cases of sexual and
physical abuse involving children, cases that can be very difficult to prosecute.  See
Wheat v. State, Del. Supr., 527 A.2d 269 (1987). Often, children are reluctant to
testify in court.  See Sharon P. Brustein, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children Be Heard
and Not Seen?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (1989); see also State v. Sheppard,
17
N.J. Supr., 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1984).  This may be due to a fear of the defendant
or even the child’s belief that he or she was somehow at fault.  In other cases, as
here, the child blocks the incident or incidents from her mind and is unable to recall
what occurred or may refuse to do so in the presence of the offender.  Frequently,
the child victim is the only witness to the event.  In these situations, it is crucial to
the proper administration of justice that the child’s out-of-court statements regarding
the incidents of sexual or physical abuse be admitted.  See generally, Robert G.
Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?   The Need
for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV.J. ON
LEGIS. 207 (1995).
Of course, defendants in criminal cases have a significant constitutional right
in ensuring that the testimony admitted against them is reliable.  The right of
confrontation aids the accused in this regard, forcing adverse witnesses to appear in
court and be subject to cross-examination.  Where this right must yield because of
public policy interests, countervailing measures must be in place to ensure the
statements’ reliability, i.e., the statements must be admitted pursuant to a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule (in which case the reliability of the statement is
inferred), or must be found to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
18
See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. at 125; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.  The
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is upheld if the testimony at issue is found to
carry the indicia of reliability.  Delaware’s “tender years”statute meets that standard
and does not offend the Federal and State Constitutional protections. 
IV
We next consider McGriff’s contention that, even if the “tender years” statute
is constitutional, the Superior Court’s finding of unavailability was not supported by
the record.   A specific finding of unavailability must be made by the trial court.
The statute provides that a child witness may be declared unavailable on any of the
following grounds: 
1.
The child's death;
2.
The child's absence from the jurisdiction;
3.
The child's total failure of memory;
4.
The child's persistent refusal to testify despite judicial
requests to do so;
5.
The child's physical or mental disability;
6.
The existence of a privilege involving the child;
19
7.
The child's incompetency, including the child's inability
to communicate about the offense because of fear or a
similar reason; or
8.
Substantial likelihood that the child would suffer severe
emotional trauma from testifying at the proceeding or by
means of a videotaped deposition or closed-circuit
television;
11 Del. C. § 3513(b)(2)a. 
As the statute makes clear, a child witness may be declared unavailable where
the child persistently refuses “to testify despite judicial requests to do so,” the basis
upon which the Superior Court declared the Child unavailable in this case.  At the
pretrial hearing, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial judge attempted to
elicit testimony from the Child regarding McGriff’s sexual abuse of her and the
statements she made to school officials relating to that abuse.  In spite of numerous
requests by the trial judge throughout the hearing that the Child answer questions
posed to her, the Child for the most part remained non-responsive. 
During direct examination, the Child readily answered some questions posed
to her.  These questions mostly dealt with extraneous matters, however. The Child
was generally non-responsive when asked about the incidents of abuse or the
statements she made to school officials.  Indeed, when questioning shifted to the
abuse and the statements she made pertaining thereto, the Child became extremely
8  For example, the following exchange between the trial judge and the Child illustrates
the Child’s refusal to testify: 
The Court: [Y]ou don’t want to talk to [the prosecutor]?
The Witness:  (Witness nods head).  
The Court: Can you tell me why? ... Tell me why don’t you want to talk
to her.  
The Witness: I don’t want to say it no more. 
....
The Court: Tell me what happened. 
The Witness: (No response). 
The Court: Will you tell me?  
(continued...)
20
reserved and claimed no memory of what had occurred or what she had told her
teachers.  
On cross-examination, the Child did state that she remembered McGriff
hurting her during a time when she was living in a motel with her mother.  After
eliciting this response, however, defense counsel ceased questioning.  On redirect,
the prosecutor attempted to question the Child  further about what occurred during
that time.  The Child, however, retreated back into herself, offering monosyllabic
answers to the questions posed to her and eventually stating “I hate -- I don’t want
to do this no more....  I don’t want to stay here.”  Despite repeated requests from
the trial judge, the Child refused to answer the prosecutor’s questions.  The trial
judge then attempted to elicit testimony from the Child.  The witness, however,
remained non-responsive and refused to answer the trial judge’s questions.8  Having
8(...continued)
The Witness: (No response). 
The Court: ... Do you remember the things you told the lady that happened
to you? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: Will you tell me? 
The Witness: (No response). 
21
failed to elicit any meaningful testimony from the witness, the trial judge finally
excused the Child.  
The record demonstrates that the trial judge requested the Child to answer
questions regarding the abuse or her prior statements pertaining to the abuse.
Notwithstanding these requests, the Child declined to cooperate.  In effect, the Child
was “blocking” the incidents of abuse, refusing to recall or communicate about
them.  Moreover, at the end of the hearing the Child became visibly upset and totally
non-responsive.
The trial judge who conducted the examination was in a unique position to
determine whether further efforts to force the child to testify would be productive or
harmful to the child.  The trial judge is accorded a wide degree of discretion in
dealing with this sensitive process.  We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in determining that the Child was unavailable to testify pursuant to 11
Del. C. § 3513(b)(2)a.4.  There is no contention in this appeal that the statements did
not possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
22
 V
We conclude that the requirements of 11 Del. C. § 3513 satisfy the Federal
and State Constitutions and that the Superior Court’s determination of unavailability
pursuant to the statute was amply supported by the record.  
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Superior Court is Affirmed.