Title: In re Jaffee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S35948
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 2000

Filed:  December 14, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In Re:
Complaint as to the Conduct ofKENNETH MILES JAFFEE,
Accused.
(OSB 98-40, 98-123, 98-128, 98-132; 
SC S35948; S47246)

(Consolidated for review and decision)

	En Banc
	On review of the decisions of trial panels of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Submitted on the record and briefs April 14, 2000.
	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Oregon State
Bar, Lake Oswego, and Richard D. Adams, Bar Counsel, Grants Pass,
filed the briefs for the Oregon State Bar.
	No appearance for accused.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the date of
the filing of this decision.
		PER CURIAM
		These two lawyer discipline proceedings, which involve
the same lawyer, have been combined for purposes of review and
decision.  The proceedings are before this court on briefs
submitted by the Oregon State Bar and on the record made before
two trial panels of the Disciplinary Board.  See ORAP 11.25(3)(b)
(permitting submission of matter to court on that basis when
accused lawyer fails to file petition or brief within time
allowed).  In each proceeding, the trial panel determined that
the accused had committed serious breaches of the disciplinary
rules and that he should be disbarred.  Because of the severity
of that sanction, review by this court is automatic.  BR 10.1. 
On de novo review, ORS 9.536(2), BR 10.6, we agree with the trial
panels that the accused violated the disciplinary rules and that
he should be disbarred.
   		The first proceeding against the accused arises out of
an October 1998 formal complaint that alleged two unrelated
causes of complaint.  The second proceeding arises out of a July
1999 formal complaint that alleged two additional unrelated
causes of complaint.  We consider the four causes of complaint,
and the episodes on which they are based, in turn.
PRACTICING WHILE SUSPENDED

		The Bar alleged, in its October 1998 amended formal
complaint, that the accused was suspended from the practice of
law on April 11, 1997, for failure to make an installment payment
to the Professional Liability Fund (PLF).  The Bar further
alleged that the accused performed legal services for certain
designated clients during the ensuing period of suspension, i.e,
between April 11, 1997, and May 1, 1997, and that, in doing so,
the accused falsely represented to clients and courts that he was
authorized to practice law.  The Bar asserted that that conduct
violated three disciplinary rules and one statute:  (1) DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation); (2) DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice); (3) DR 3-101(B) (lawyer shall not
practice in jurisdiction when doing so would violate regulations
of profession in that jurisdiction); and (4) ORS 9.160 (only
active members of Bar may practice law and represent themselves
as qualified to practice law).         
		On de novo review, we find that the Bar has established
all four of the violations charged in connection with this
episode by the requisite clear and convincing evidence.  See BR
5.2 (setting that standard of proof).  It is undisputed that the
accused was suspended from the practice of law and that he
practiced law during that period.  In addition, and although the
accused denied it, the evidence supports a conclusion that the
accused was aware of the suspension at the time that it
occurred. (1) We therefore find that the accused violated ORS
9.160, which provides that "no person shall practice law or
represent that person as qualified to practice law unless that
person is an active member of the Oregon State Bar."  We also
find that, by continuing to practice law in Oregon after he was
suspended, the accused violated DR 3-101(B), which provides that
a lawyer "shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so
would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that
jurisdiction." 
		The accused also violated DR 1-102(a)(3), which
provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  
"Misrepresentation," under that rule, can include an intentional
failure to disclose a material fact.  In re Hiller, 298 Or 526,
532, 694 P2d 540 (1985).  We have noted in the past that a
lawyer's eligibility to practice law is material in the context
of an attorney-client relationship and that a lawyer who renders
legal services to a client while intentionally failing to
disclose his or her suspended status violates the rule.  See In
re Whipple, 320 Or 476, 487, 886 P2d 7 (1994) (illustrating
rule).  Under that precedent, the accused's conduct involved
misrepresentation to the clients whom he purported to serve
during the time that he was suspended.  The accused also violated
DR 1-102(A)(3) by implicitly representing to the courts before
whom he appeared and to the opposing counsel against whom he
appeared that he was eligible to practice law.
		Finally, this court has held that a misrepresentation
made by a lawyer to a court may be prejudicial to the
administration of justice within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(4). 
See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 126, 849 P2d 509 (1993) (so
stating).  In that case, this court indicated, however, that such
a misrepresentation must involve "prejudice," i.e., either (1)
repeated conduct causing some harm to the administration of
justice; or (2) a single act causing substantial harm to the
administration of justice.  Id.  Here, the accused's conduct
involved prejudice of the first sort, i.e., he repeatedly
appeared before a number of courts and administrative bodies
during his suspension.  We agree with the Bar that the accused's
conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and,
therefore, violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
FAILURE TO OBEY ORDERSOF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

		The Bar's second cause of complaint in its October 1998
amended formal complaint alleged:
	"On or about September 13, 1991, judgment was
entered in favor of the United States of America
against the Accused in the amount of $13,625, in the
matter of United States of America v. Kenneth M.
Jaffee, Case No. 90-6431-HO (hereinafter, 'Court
Action').
	"On or about February 27, 1997, the court entered
an order requiring the Accused to appear for a judgment
debtor examination in the Court Action on April 28,
1997.  The Accused was served in the manner provided by
law and received a copy of the order.
	"On or about April 25, 1997, the U.S. Attorney's
Office contacted the Accused to determine if he would
appear for the judgment debtor examination scheduled
for April 28, 1997.  The Accused advised that he did
not plan to do so, but would try to provide the
required documents and other information.
	"As a result of the Accused's April 25, 1997,
communication, the judgment debtor examination in the
Court Action was rescheduled for July 14, 1997.  The
Accused was served with a copy of the Order
Rescheduling the Judgment Debtor Examination on June
18, 1997.  The Accused failed to produce the required
documents and information and failed to appear as
required by the court's order.
	"On or about July 18, 1997, the court entered an
order in the Court Action, requiring the Accused to
appear on August 14, 1997, to show cause why a warrant
for his arrest should not be issued and why he should
not be held in contempt of court.  The Accused was
served with the Order to Show Cause on July 25, 1997. 
The Accused failed to appear and a warrant for his
arrest was issued by the court.
	"Between February 1997 and January 1998, the
accused failed to produce documents and information as
ordered by the court in the Court Action."
Because the accused did not respond to that second cause of
complaint, the trial panel entered an order of default.  For
purposes of review, we deem the facts alleged in the Bar's
amended complaint that pertain to the second cause of complaint
to be true.  See In re Bourcier, 322 Or 561, 564, 909 P2d 1234
(1996) (when accused does not answer and makes no other
appearance, court deems facts alleged in Bar's formal complaint
to be true).
		The trial panel found that the accused's conduct
violated DR 7-106(a) and DR 1-102(A)(4).  We agree.
		DR 7-106(a) provides:
"A lawyer shall not disregard or advise lawyer's client
to disregard * * * a ruling of a tribunal made in the
course of a proceeding[,] but the lawyer may take
appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of
such rule or ruling."
The Bar's allegations show that the accused was aware that the
United States District Court repeatedly had ordered him to appear
and to produce certain information, and that he had not done so. 
By knowingly and intentionally disregarded several rulings of a
court, the accused violated DR 7-106(A). 
		As noted, DR 1-102(A)(4) prohibits lawyers from
engaging in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of
justice."  Conduct falls within that proscription if it causes
harm either to the procedural functioning of a legal proceeding
or to the substantive interests of a party in the proceeding.  In
re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-47, 801 P2d 818 (1990).  The conduct at
issue caused substantial harm of both kinds.  It placed an
unnecessary burden on the judicial system -- so much so that the
district court ultimately issued an order for the accused's
arrest.  It also harmed the substantive interests of the opposing
party, the United States government, in that it forced the
government to expend a great deal of time and energy
investigating and collecting its judgment against the accused. 
The accused's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4).         
CRIMINAL INTERFERENCE WITH PEACE OFFICERS

		The Bar's July 1999 formal complaint alleged that the
accused was arrested on July 8, 1998, and subsequently was
convicted on a charge of Interfering with a Peace Officer, a
violation of the Medford Municipal Code.  The trial panel found
that the conduct that led to that arrest and conviction was
professional misconduct under DR 1-102(A)(2).  DR 1-102(A)(2)
provides that it is professional misconduct to "[c]ommit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law."  
		There is no question that the accused was convicted on
December 4, 1998, of the offense of Interfering with a Peace
Officer under the Medford Municipal Code § 5.175.  That ordinance
provides, in part:
		"(2) No person shall refuse to leave the area of
an arrest, custody, or stop * * * after being directed
to leave the area by a person known to him to be a
peace officer."
		The trial panel summarized the facts supporting the
conviction as follows:
	"On July 11, 1998, Medford Police Officers Lytle
and Young stopped a motor vehicle driven by a Kim
Pemberton.  Ms. Pemberton didn't have a driver's
license and was uninsured.  During the course of the
investigation, Officer Lytle discovered that Ms.
Pemberton was driving with a suspended license under
circumstances that made her subject to arrest.  Officer
Lytle took Ms. Pemberton into custody.  The location of
the traffic stop was within a few blocks of the home
that Ms. Pemberton shared with the Accused at the time.
	"(2) During the course of the investigation with
Ms. Pemberton, the Accused arrived on foot and 'walked
right up into the middle' of the situation, which was
'very threatening to the officers.'  He had his fists
'clenched down at his sides.'  The Accused came to
within approximately 6 inches of the officers and began
demanding to speak to Ms. Pemberton and to question the
actions of the police officers.   The officers were in
uniform.  Ms. Pemberton was in custody at the time and
was handcuffed.  The Accused's behavior caused the
officers to become concerned 'for our own safety.' 
Officer Young testified that he thought the Accused
might create an 'assaultive situation' and that 'I
believed this was going to turn into a physical
confrontation by his demeanor.' The Accused was 'very
close in [the officers'] faces['s].  The officers
ordered the Accused approximately ten times to 'step
back,' to 'get away,' and to 'stop.'  The accused heard
the officers repeated commands.  He refused to comply."
(Citations to transcript omitted.)
		Although the fact and circumstances of the criminal act
are proven, the question remains whether that act is of the sort
that reflects adversely on the accused's "fitness to practice
law." (2)  Not every criminal act reflects adversely on a lawyer's
"fitness to practice law" within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(2). 
As this court noted in In re White, 311 Or 573, 589, 815 P2d 1257
(1991), "[t]here must be some rational connection other than the
criminality of the act between the conduct and the actor's
fitness to practice law."  White identified a number of
"pertinent considerations" with respect to whether a criminal act
adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law:  
"[T]he lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the
act demonstrates disrespect for the law or law
enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim; the
extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and
the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal
conduct."
Id.  Applying those factors, the accused certainly demonstrated a
"disrespect for * * * law enforcement."  The accused's physical
intrusion into Pemberton's arrest also threatened to turn an
unpleasant but peaceful act of law enforcement into a violent
confrontation, with the officers as potential victims.  There was
no actual physical injury, and no pattern of criminal conduct,
but lawyers are supposed to respect and vindicate the traditional
process of reviewing the propriety of police actions in court,
not attempt to circumvent those processes by initiating
confrontations in the street.  The accused's acts reflect
directly on his fitness to practice law.  We find that he
violated DR 1-102(A)(2).
AUGUST 1998 TRAFFIC STOP

		The Bar alleged, and the evidence shows, that, during a
routine traffic stop on August 21, 1998, the accused supplied the
police with incorrect information about his address and about
whether he had liability insurance coverage.  Specifically, the
accused verified that he lived at the address listed on his
driver license when he did not, in fact, live there, and he told
the police that his vehicle was covered under his father's motor
vehicle insurance policy, when it was not.  Based on that
incident, the accused was convicted of the crimes of Giving False
Information to a Police Officer, ORS 807.620, and Giving False
Information about Liability Insurance to a Police Officer, ORS
806.055. (3)  
		The Bar contends that the accused's conduct violated DR
1-102(A)(3), because it involved "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation."  We agree.  Conviction under both ORS 806.620
and 807.055 required the trier of fact to find that the accused
"knowingly" gave "false" information to a police officer.  At the
very least, the convictions support a conclusion that the
accused's conduct was dishonest.  
		The accused suggested, in his testimony before the
trial panel, that his statement that he was covered by his
father's insurance "technically" was correct (4) and that the police
officer never asked whether the address on his driver license was
correct.  However, as the trial panel noted, that testimony is
contradicted by the father's statement that the accused was not
covered by his insurance and by the police officer's trial court
testimony that he did ask the accused if the listed address was
correct.  Under DR 1-102(A)(3), "dishonesty" and
"misrepresentation" can arise out of a failure to disclose a
material fact.  In re Leonard, 308 Or 560, 569, 784 P2d 95
(1989).  The evidence shows that the accused knew that he did not
live at the address stated on his license, that he had not
obtained insurance for the vehicle that he was driving, that he
had not discussed the vehicle or insurance for the vehicle with
his father, and that he had no reason to know or believe that the
vehicle in fact was covered by his father's insurance.  Under
those circumstances, the accused's representations that he lived
at the listed address and that the vehicle was insured were
misrepresentations within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(3).
FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE BAR

		Also in its July 1999 formal complaint, the Bar alleged
that the accused repeatedly failed to respond to its requests for
explanations of the incidents described in the first and second
causes of complaint, and that the accused failed to respond to
requests by the Jackson/Josephine County Local Professional
Responsibility Committee (LPRC) to contact its investigator and
schedule an appointment to discuss the complaint.  In his answer,
the accused admitted "for lack of any knowledge to the contrary,
the allegations of actions by the various Bar entities, but
denie[d] that he failed to respond to the request for
explanation."  The trial panel concluded that the accused had
admitted to some of the instances of unresponsiveness that the
Bar had alleged and found that the accused had violated DR 1-103(C).
    		DR 1-103(C) provides:
	"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."
Even if a lawyer ultimately chooses to cooperate with an
investigation, his or her initial failure to cooperate may
violate the rule.  In re Vaile, 300 Or 91, 101, 707 P2d 52 (1985)
(illustrating proposition;  In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 425, 939
P2d 39 (1997) (same).    
		We find clear and convincing evidence that the accused
repeatedly failed to comply with reasonable requests by the Bar
and the LPRC.  For example, and although the accused eventually
did submit an explanation of his July 22, 1998, arrest to the
Bar, he did so only after two deadlines set by the Bar had passed
and after the Bar had submitted the matter to the LPRC for
investigation.  Similarly, the accused ignored two letters from
an LPRC investigator who wrote to the accused, asking him to call
and set up an appointment to discuss his conduct.  The requests
from the Bar (for an explanation) and the LPRC (for contact) were
reasonable and did not require the accused to waive any right or
privilege.  We conclude that the accused violated DR 1-103(C) as
charged in the Bar's July 1999 formal complaint. 
SANCTION

		In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer's
ethical violations, we begin with the analytical framework set
out in the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (Amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  Under
that framework, we arrive at an initial presumptive sanction
based on: (1) the ethical duty violated, (2) the lawyer's mental
state; and (3) the actual or potential injury caused.  We then
adjust that presumptive sanction based on a fourth factor, the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  See ABA
Standard 3.0 and at 5-6.  Finally, we consider whether that
adjusted sanction is consistent with Oregon case law.  In re
Huffman, 328 Or 567, 587-88, 983 P2d 534 (1999).
DUTIES VIOLATED

		The accused violated duties to the public, the legal
system, the profession, and his clients.  The community has a
right to expect lawyers to live up to the highest standards of
honesty and integrity.  Lawyers fail in their duty to the public
when they engage in dishonest conduct and in their duties to the
public and the legal system when they engage in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
MENTAL STATE 

		The ABA Standards recognize three mental states: 
intent, knowledge, and negligence.  A lawyer acts with "intent"
if he or she acts with the conscious objective or purpose of
accomplishing a particular result.  A lawyer acts with 
"knowledge" if he or she is consciously aware of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct, but does not have a
conscious objective of accomplishing a particular result.  ABA
Standards at 7.  
		The evidence establishes that the accused acted
intentionally when he practiced law while suspended and when he
interfered with law enforcement authorities.  The evidence
further establishes that the accused acted knowingly when he
disregarded orders of the United States District Court and
requests for information from the Bar and LPRC investigators, and
when he provided false information about his address and motor
vehicle insurance to the police.
INJURY

		The ABA Standards recognize both actual and potential
harm.  "Potential harm" is harm to a client, the public, the
legal system, or the profession that reasonably is foreseeable at
the time of the lawyer's misconduct and that probably would have
resulted but for some intervening factor or event.  ABA Standards
at 7.  The accused caused potential injury to his clients by
performing legal services for them without the required
malpractice insurance.  The accused also caused potential injury
to the legal system by practicing law when he was not authorized
to do so.
		The accused's conduct also caused actual harm.  He
harmed the legal system by interfering with police officers as
they attempted to perform their duties.  He placed an unnecessary
burden on the judicial system by failing to respond to court
orders.  He diminished the reputation of all members of the legal
profession by repeatedly engaging in criminal conduct and by
flouting orders of a federal court.      
		Based on the foregoing, we find that the following
standards are relevant to the disciplinary violations arising out
of the accused's practice of law while suspended:  
	"7.0  Violations of Duties Owed to the Profession
	"7.1  Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a
duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a
benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious
or potentially serious injury to a client, the public,
or the legal system. 
	"7.2  Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a
duty owed to the profession and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system."
		The following standard is relevant to the disciplinary
violations arising out of the accused's failure to respond to the
orders of the United States District Court:
	"6.2 Abuse of the Legal Process
	"* * * * *
	"6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or
potential injury to a client or a party, or
interference or potential interference with a legal
proceeding."
		Finally, the following standards are relevant to the
disciplinary violations that relate to the accused's criminal
convictions:    
	"5.1 Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity.  
		"Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
upon application of the factors set out in Standard
3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate
in cases involving the commission of a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respect, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:
	"5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
		"(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct
a necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice,
false swearing, misrepresentation, * * *; or 
		"(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
	"5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that
seriously adversely reflects on the fitness to practice
law."         
		Based on the factors of duties violated, mental state
of the accused, and injuries caused, our initial determination is
that, aggravating and mitigating circumstances aside, either a
lengthy period of suspension or, possibly, disbarment, would be
the appropriate sanction for this particular combination of
disciplinary violations. 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

		There is no evidence in the record of any mitigating
circumstances.  However, the record suggests a number of
aggravating circumstances.  First, the rule violations are based
on four separate episodes of misconduct that, when taken
together, demonstrate a pattern of misconduct.  ABA Standard
9.22(c), (d).  Second, the accused has an extensive prior record
of discipline.  ABA Standard 9.22(e).  In 1986, while practicing
in California, the accused was suspended from the practice of law
for one year and placed on probation for one year for neglect of
client matters and other unprofessional conduct.  In 1989, the
accused again was suspended from practice in California after he
disclosed to the California State Bar that he had been convicted
in Oregon of manufacturing a controlled substance, ORS
475.992(1)(a), a Class A felony.  Also while practicing in
California, the accused was jailed for contempt of court,
relating to his presentation of the defense in a criminal trial. 
On another occasion, he was fined by a court under similar
circumstances. (5) Third, the accused has substantial experience in
the practice of law, having been admitted to practice in
California in 1975, and in Oregon in 1994.  ABA Standard 9.22(i). 
Fourth, his criminal conduct in supplying false information to
the police appears to have arisen out of dishonest or selfish
motives.  ABA Standard 9.22(b).
		In view of those aggravating factors, we conclude that 
suspension would be inadequate and that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for the accused's misconduct.  Having made
that determination, we turn to whether imposing that sanction is
consistent Oregon case law.  Nothing in that case law dissuades
us from our view that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in
this case.  
		The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the
date of the filing of this decision. 



1. 	In that regard, we find the following evidence to be
significant:  (1) the Bar repeatedly warned the accused that he
would be suspended effective April 11, 1997, if he did not pay
the PLF assessment; (2) on or around April 11, 1997, the Bar sent
documents to the accused that would have notified him that the
suspension had occurred; and (3) when, on April 24, 1997, the
accused was confronted by a judge who had received notice of the
suspension, the accused responded in a manner that led that judge
and another lawyer who heard the exchange to believe that the
accused knew that he was suspended.

2. 	Most cases under that rule concern criminal acts that
demonstrate dishonesty.  See In re White, 311 Or 573, 588, 815
P2d 1257 (1991) (noting that fact).  This one does not.

3. 	ORS 806.055(1) provides:
	"A person commits the offense of giving false
information about liability insurance to a police
officer if the person knowingly gives false information
about the person's motor vehicle liability insurance
coverage to any police officer who is enforcing motor
vehicle laws."
	ORS 807.620(1) provides:
	"A person commits the offense of giving false
information to a police officer, if the person
knowingly uses or gives a false or fictitious * * *
address * * * to any police officer who is enforcing
motor vehicle laws." 

4. 	The accused testified, specifically, that he previously
had used a vehicle that was covered by his father's insurance and
that the policy allowed for coverage of a replacement vehicle.  

5. 	The foregoing history prompted the Oregon State Bar to
contest the accused's application for admission to that Bar and
also prompted this court to reject his application on one
occasion before his eventual admission.  In re Jaffee, 319 Or
172, 874 P2d 1291 (1994).