Title: Robert Pasko v. City of Milwaukee
Citation: 2002 WI 33
Docket Number: 1999AP002355
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2002

2002 WI 33 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2355 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robert Pasko, Scott Warren, Michael Wolfgram, 
Elizabeth Pridmore-Dahlke, Patrick LaBelle, 
Gertie Gilliam, Terese Ulickey, Henry Zimmerman, 
Anna Merhalski, Alfonso Salinas, Richard 
Thompson, Jean Docter, Charlene Guiliani, Harold 
Davis, David Granica, Audrey Warren, Mary 
Sikora, Linda Scholler, Joseph Suttle, Vicki 
Kakonis, Jeanne Sirna, Timothy Ridgway, Pamela 
Holmes and the Milwaukee Police Association,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
City of Milwaukee, Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners City of Milwaukee, Milwaukee 
Employes' Retirement System and Annuity and 
Pension Board and Milwaukee Police Chief Arthur 
Jones, in his official capacity,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 55 
Reported at:  241 Wis. 2d 226, 624 N.W.2d 859 
(Published) 
OPINION FILED: 
April 24, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 10, 2001 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners the cause was 
argued by Leonard A. Tokus, assistant city attorney, with whom 
on the briefs was Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
 
 
2
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by John F. 
Fuchs, 
Marcia 
A. 
Snow 
and 
Fuchs 
Snow 
DeStefanis, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by John F. Fuchs. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jeffrey P. Sweetland 
and Shneidman Hawks & Ehlke, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Association of Law Enforcement Allied Services Personnel, Local 
218, IUPA, AFL-CIO. 
 
 
2002 WI 33 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  99-2355  
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 009535) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert Pasko, Scott Warren, Michael  
Wolfgram, Elizabeth Pridmore-Dahlke,  
Patrick LaBelle, Gertie Gilliam, Terese  
Ulickey, Henry Zimmerman, Anna Merhalski,  
Alfonso Salinas, Richard Thompson, Jean  
Docter, Charlene Guiliani, Harold Davis,  
David Granica, Audrey Warren, Mary  
Sikora, Linda Scholler, Joseph Suttle,  
Vicki Kakonis, Jeanne Sirna, Timothy  
Ridgway, Pamela Holmes and the Milwaukee  
Police Association,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, Board of Fire and  
Police Commissioners City of Milwaukee,  
Milwaukee Employes' Retirement System and  
Annuity and Pension Board and Milwaukee  
Police Chief Arthur Jones, in his  
official capacity,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 24, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
No. 
99-2355   
 
2 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The City of Milwaukee, City 
of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, Milwaukee 
Employes' Retirement System and Annuity and Pension Board, and 
City of Milwaukee Police Chief Arthur Jones appeal from a court 
of appeals' decision that held that the Milwaukee Police 
Association was not barred from bringing its writ of mandamus 
action based on claim preclusion despite a similar action 
previously brought by its union members.  The court of appeals 
concluded that claim preclusion did not apply because there was 
no privity between the union members in the first action and the 
union in this case.  We agree.  However, we disagree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that, based on the current record, 
the Milwaukee Police Association was entitled to a writ of 
mandamus compelling the promotions of police officers to 
vacancies within the police department.  Instead, we conclude 
that remand is appropriate on this issue to determine whether 
the collective bargaining agreement requires such promotions to 
occur, whether vacancies exist for such promotions, and whether, 
as the statute requires, such vacancies constitute "newly 
created offices."  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' 
decision and remand for additional proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.   
I.  PASKO I 
¶2 
On November 8, 1993, Robert Pasko and 22 other City of 
Milwaukee police officers (officers) commenced an action in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court against defendants City of 
Milwaukee, the City of Milwaukee Police Department, and Philip 
No. 
99-2355   
 
3 
 
Arreola, the former City of Milwaukee Police Chief.  The 
officers alleged that, from approximately 1984 to 1995, they 
worked regularly as police alarm operators under a process known 
as "underfilling," 
which 
entailed 
assigning 
lower ranking 
personnel to carry out duties of higher ranking personnel rather 
than filling vacancies at those higher positions.  See Pasko v. 
City of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 2d 274, 277, 588 N.W.2d 642 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (Pasko I).  Despite working at the police alarm 
operator rank, the officers failed to receive pay commensurate 
with this rank.  Id.  Instead, they were paid at the lower rate 
applicable to police officers.  Id.  The officers therefore 
sought to recover the difference between their compensation as 
police officers and the higher compensation they would have 
received as police alarm operators.  Id. at 277-78.  They also 
sought promotion to the rank of police alarm operators so that 
they would not lose future compensation at the appropriate rank.  
Id. at 278. 
¶3 
The 
complaint alleged several causes 
of action, 
including 
breach 
of 
contract 
and 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) (1991-92).  Under the breach of contract 
claim, the officers alleged that the defendants breached the 
1991-1992 collective bargaining agreement between the City of 
Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Police Association by requiring the 
officers to work as police alarm operators without promoting 
them to that rank or paying them for their employment in that 
capacity.  The officers primarily relied on a section of the 
agreement that provided for different rates of base salary for 
No. 
99-2355   
 
4 
 
police officers and police alarm operators.1  Under the statutory 
claim, the officers alleged that Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) (1991-92) 
required the defendants to fill all vacancies at the police 
alarm operator rank as they occurred and that the failure to 
fill these positions constituted a violation of the statute.  
This statute provides: 
 
All 
vacancies 
in 
either 
[the 
police 
or 
fire] 
department shall be filled and all new appointments 
shall be made by the respective chiefs with the 
approval of the board.  Where vacancies in old offices 
                                                 
1 This section stated in relevant part: 
ARTICLE 10 
BASE SALARY 
1.  Commencing Pay Period 1, 1991 (December 23, 1990), 
the biweekly base salary paid to employees shall be as 
follows: 
a. 
Police Officer 
 
Police Matron 
 
Policewoman 
 
 
Step 1. 
$  998.92 
 
Step 2. 
$1,098.44 
 
Step 3. 
$1,227.21 
 
Step 4. 
$1,276.63 
 
Step 5. 
$1,339.29 
. . . 
c. 
Court Liaison Officer 
 
Identification Technician 
 
Narcotics Control Officer 
 
Police Alarm Operator 
 
 
Step 1.  $1,326.03 
 
Step 2.  $1,368.68 
 
Step 3.  $1,413.15 
No. 
99-2355   
 
5 
 
or newly created offices can, with safety to the 
department, be filled by the promotion of officers or 
persons already in the service and who have proved 
their fitness for the promotion, the vacancies in 
newly created offices shall be so filled by promotion 
by the respective chiefs with the approval of the 
board.   
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) (1991-92).   
¶4 
The officers moved for summary judgment.  The circuit 
court, the Honorable Patrick J. Madden presiding, granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims except 
on the breach of contract claim.  On the breach of contract 
claim, the court concluded that there were disputed issues of 
fact as to whether the defendants had breached the collective 
bargaining agreement, and therefore, summary judgment was not 
appropriate at that time.  The court dismissed the officers' 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) (1991-92), concluding that the 
statute did not specifically require the defendants to make any 
promotions, and as a result, no violation of the statute 
occurred.  The officers did not appeal the court's dismissal of 
this statutory claim.  Instead, they proceeded with the breach 
of contract claim.   
¶5 
The parties again moved for summary judgment on the 
breach of contract claim.  This time, the circuit court, the 
Honorable Frank T. Crivello presiding, granted summary judgment 
to the officers, concluding that the defendants' failure to pay 
the officers according to the rank of police alarm operator 
constituted a breach of the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  The court concluded: 
 
No. 
99-2355   
 
6 
 
There is no applicable legal definition of the 
term underfilling in statutes or case law and the 
contract is silent on the issue.  The contract 
requires 
that 
Police 
Officers 
and 
Police 
Alarm 
Operators receive different rates of pay.  It does not 
address the issues of a timeline for promotion or the 
filling of vacancies.  The contract also does not 
specifically address when or how an employee is 
assigned to a particular classification.  However by 
looking at the plain language of the contract and the 
intent of the parties represented by that language, it 
appears that employees performing the duties and 
responsibilities 
of 
another 
classification 
on 
a 
regular basis should be paid the amount agreed to in 
the contract for that classification.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Underfilling in and of itself is a permissible 
practice when done on an occasional and temporary 
basis, however, when coupled with an undisputed, yet 
unofficial, policy of not promoting anyone to those 
positions on a permanent basis, its [sic] stops being 
temporary underfilling, and turns into a permanent 
practice that violates the terms of the contract. 
 . . . The apparent policy of the city and department 
to not promote anyone into these positions for the 
past 
ten 
years 
goes 
beyond 
the 
practice 
of 
underfilling, and is a breach of the term of the 
contract setting the applicable pay scale for the 
performance of such duties.   
Based on this analysis, the court granted summary judgment to 
the officers.  The court noted that the officers requested 
damages in the amount of the difference between the rate of pay 
as a police officer and the rate of pay as a police alarm 
operator, and it concluded that such relief was appropriate.   
¶6 
The court of appeals affirmed in an October 8, 1998, 
published decision, concluding that the circuit court correctly 
granted summary judgment on the officers' breach of contract 
No. 
99-2355   
 
7 
 
claim.  Pasko I, 222 Wis. 2d at 276.  Specifically, the court 
held: 
 
The collective bargaining agreement is clear.  It 
specifies different ranks and different pay scales.  
It is undisputed that the plaintiff officers have been 
assigned to work as police alarm operators on a 
permanent basis, but have been denied the rank and 
additional compensation of police alarm operators.  
Requiring police officers to work permanently as 
police alarm operators without promoting them or 
paying them to do so violates the agreement.   
Id. at 281.  The court affirmed the circuit court's order 
awarding back pay to the officers.  It did not specify any other 
relief, namely promotions, to which the officers were entitled, 
even though the opinion indicated that the failure to promote 
the 
officers 
constituted 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 276, 281. 
II.  PASKO II 
¶7 
On December 8, 1998, the same officers from Pasko I 
and the Milwaukee Police Association filed an action in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court in part against the City of 
Milwaukee, 
City 
of 
Milwaukee 
Board 
of 
Fire 
and 
Police 
Commissioners, and the Milwaukee Police Chief Arthur Jones 
(collectively "City").  The Milwaukee Police Association (MPA) 
is the certified collective bargaining unit for all City of 
Milwaukee police officers in non-supervisory ranks.  In their 
complaint, the officers and the MPA alleged that vacancies 
remained at the rank of police alarm operator and that the City 
was 
required 
to 
fill 
these 
vacancies 
pursuant 
to 
No. 
99-2355   
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) (1997-98).2  The MPA and the officers also 
noted that Pasko I held that the failure to fill these vacancies 
constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.  
They requested a writ of mandamus from the court compelling the 
City to effectuate promotions to unfilled police alarm operator 
positions within the Milwaukee Police Department.   
¶8 
The 
complaint also 
named 
the 
Milwaukee Employes 
Retirement System and Annuity and Pension Board (MERS/BOARD) as 
a defendant.  The complaint alleged that the MERS/BOARD erred by 
allowing some of the officers, including Robert Pasko, to retire 
at a police officer's pay instead of at a police alarm 
operator's pay.  The officers sought a writ of mandamus ordering 
the MERS/BOARD to grant the officers who had since retired the 
pay applicable to a police alarm operator.   
¶9 
The defendants sought a dismissal based on the 
doctrine of claim preclusion in their answer.  The officers and 
the MPA then moved for summary judgment.   
¶10 The circuit court, the Honorable Patricia D. McMahon 
presiding, ruled that the officers and the MPA were both barred 
from proceeding based on claim preclusion.  In applying the 
doctrine, the court noted that the determinative issue was 
whether there was an identity between the parties in the first 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(9)(1997-98) is identical to the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9)(1991-92), which was enumerated 
above.   
No. 
99-2355   
 
9 
 
and second actions.  The court held that the officers were 
clearly barred because they were the exact same officers as in 
the first suit.  With respect to the MPA, the court held that, 
even though the union was not a party in the first action, it 
was still barred from proceeding.  The court based its decision 
on the fact that the MPA was the collective bargaining agent 
that negotiated the contract that was at the heart of both 
cases.  To conclude otherwise, the court stated, would be to 
place form over substance.  Because the claims were barred, the 
court did not directly decide the merits of the claims and 
instead granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  
The MPA appealed. 
¶11 In 
a 
published 
decision, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded that the MPA's action against the City was not barred 
by the doctrine of claim preclusion.3  Pasko v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 55, ¶11, 241 Wis. 2d 226, 624 N.W.2d 859 
(Pasko II).  The court based its decision on the lack of privity 
between the officers who brought the first suit and the MPA in 
the second suit.  Id.  Because claim preclusion did not apply, 
the court of appeals then addressed the MPA's writ of mandamus 
claim.  Id. at ¶¶12-18.  After finding that the criteria for a 
writ were satisfied, the court held that the MPA was entitled to 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals noted that the individual officers 
had conceded that claim preclusion applied to them and barred 
their claims.  Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 55, ¶1 
n.2, 241 Wis. 2d 226, 624 N.W.2d 859.  Therefore, on appeal, the 
court addressed only the circuit court's ruling affecting the 
MPA's claims against the City. 
No. 
99-2355   
 
10 
 
a writ compelling the City to fill the vacancies in the rank of 
police alarm operator with qualified officers.  Id. at ¶¶13-18.  
In turn, the court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment against the MPA and instead remanded to the circuit 
court for an entry of a writ of mandamus.  Id.    
¶12 We address two issues.  First, we examine whether the 
MPA is barred from bringing its writ of mandamus action under 
the doctrine of claim preclusion.  We conclude that the claim is 
not barred under this doctrine.  Second, we address whether the 
MPA is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the City to 
promote, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9), qualified police 
officers to vacancies in the rank of police alarm operator.  On 
this issue, we conclude that § 62.50(9) does not create a 
positive and plain duty for the City to fill any such vacancies 
by promotion as they occur, and therefore, standing alone, the 
statute does not require us to issue a writ in this case.  We 
recognize, however, that the collective bargaining agreement 
may, when read alone or in conjunction with the statute, 
incorporate language that requires promotions to vacancies as 
they occur.  In this case, however, the record is incomplete as 
to whether the collective bargaining agreement requires such 
promotions.  Further, the record is unclear as to whether such 
vacancies currently exist at the rank of police alarm operator 
and whether these vacancies are, as § 62.50(9) requires, "newly 
created offices."  We therefore remand to the circuit court for 
factual determinations on these issues.   
III.  CLAIM PRECLUSION 
No. 
99-2355   
 
11 
 
¶13 We first address whether the MPA is barred from 
bringing its writ of mandamus action based on the doctrine of 
claim preclusion.   
¶14 The doctrine of claim preclusion states that "a final 
judgment is conclusive in all subsequent actions between the 
same parties [or their privies] as to all matters which were 
litigated or which might have been litigated in the former 
proceedings."  DePratt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 
Wis. 2d 306, 310, 334 N.W.2d 883 (1983).  Before an earlier 
proceeding will act to preclude a claim in another action, three 
factors must be present:  "(1) an identity between the parties 
or their privies in the prior and present suits; (2) an identity 
between the causes of action in the two suits; and, (3) a final 
judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction."  
Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 551, 525 
N.W.2d 723, 727 (1995).   
¶15 This case turns on the first prong of the analysis, 
that is, whether there was an identity between the parties or 
their privies in the first and second suits.  In short, we 
examine whether there was privity between the officers in Pasko 
I and the MPA in this action requiring preclusion of MPA's 
action.   
¶16 Privity exists when a person is so identified in 
interest with a party to former litigation that he or she 
represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the 
subject matter involved.  See Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply 
Co., 244 U.S. 294, 298 (1917); see also Restatement (First) of 
No. 
99-2355   
 
12 
 
Judgments, § 83, cmt. a (1942).  The question of whether the MPA 
is in privity with its members is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  See Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 
226-27, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999).  The burden of proving claim 
preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability.  
Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 37, 179 N.W.2d 836 
(1970). 
¶17 The City argues that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that there was no privity between the officers in 
Pasko I and the MPA in this case.  It asserts that privity was 
established between the parties by the collective bargaining 
agreement.  This agreement, the City contends, was entered into 
by the MPA for the benefit of the officers.  The officers were 
third-party beneficiaries to the agreement and brought their 
action in Pasko I based on their interest in the agreement.  The 
MPA is now bringing a similar action on behalf of its members 
based again on the collective bargaining agreement.  The City 
contends that the contractual relationship between the officers 
and the MPA establishes privity between them for purposes of 
claim preclusion.  We disagree.   
¶18 The contractual relationship between the MPA and the 
officers does not, in and of itself, determine privity for 
purposes of claim preclusion.  Instead, as the court of appeals 
concluded, "'[i]n order to be in privity with a party to a 
judgment, [a nonparty] must have such absolute identity of 
interests that the party to the earlier action represented the 
same legal interest as the non-party to that first action.'"  
No. 
99-2355   
 
13 
 
Pasko II, 2001 WI App 55, ¶10 (quoting Amber J.F. v. Richard B., 
205 Wis. 2d 510, 516, 557 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1996)); Chad M.G. 
v. Kenneth J.Z., 194 Wis. 2d 689, 695, 535 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 
1995).  In other words, privity compares the interests of a 
party to a first action with a nonparty to determine whether the 
interests of the nonparty were represented in the first action.  
In turn, although the contractual relationship between the 
officers and the MPA may provide evidence to show that the 
parties' interests were similar, the relationship itself is not 
necessarily determinative on the privity question.  See Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 
1995) ("Whether there is privity between a party against whom 
claim preclusion is asserted and a party to prior litigation is 
a 
functional 
inquiry 
in 
which 
the 
formalities 
of 
legal 
relationships provide clues but not solutions.").   
¶19 On this issue, the court of appeals concluded that 
"[t]he officers and the MPA do not share the requisite 'absolute 
identity of interests.'"  Pasko II, 2001 WI App 55, ¶10.  The 
court opined as follows: 
 
 
Although the interests of the officers and the 
MPA are overlapping, they are not identical.  In both 
the preceding action and the instant action, the 
individually 
named 
officers' 
interests 
were 
exclusively personal.  In the first suit, "[t]he 
officers sought to recover the difference between 
their compensation as police officers and the higher 
compensation they would have received as police alarm 
operators," as well as "promotion to the rank of 
police alarm operators."  However, in the instant 
action, 
while 
the 
MPA's 
interests 
include 
the 
promotion of the individually named officers as MPA 
members, its interests extend beyond the litigating 
No. 
99-2355   
 
14 
 
officers to the rest of its members qualified to hold 
the rank of Police Alarm Operator.  In other words, 
the MPA is seeking to compel the City to promote any 
of its qualified member-officers, not necessarily the 
incumbent officers.   
Id. at ¶11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
¶20 We agree the interests of the officers and the MPA are 
different in this case.  In Pasko I, the officers brought an 
action 
to 
obtain 
relief 
for 
themselves 
based 
on 
their 
underfilling at the rank of police alarm operator.  They sought, 
based on state statute and the collective bargaining agreement, 
back pay and promotions for themselves, arguing that the City 
could not require them to work as police alarm operators without 
promoting them or paying them for their work in that capacity.  
Once the circuit court determined that the statute did not 
require the promotions of the officers to this rank, the 
officers abandoned this claim and instead pursued their claim 
under the collective bargaining agreement, again seeking payment 
and promotions for themselves.  Eventually, they gained relief 
in the form of payment for their services based on the 
agreement.   
¶21 Unlike the officers, the MPA seeks a determination 
based solely on state statute, arguing that the statute requires 
the promotion of any qualified officer to vacancies in the rank 
of police alarm operator.  Thus, as the court of appeals noted, 
the MPA is seeking a determination on behalf of all of its 
members, that is, for any qualified officer that is entitled to 
promotion to police alarm operator vacancies.  The union's 
interest in filling such vacancies is not based on the 
No. 
99-2355   
 
15 
 
unfairness of any individual officers underfilling in these 
positions.  Instead, the union's interest is based on ensuring 
that a classification for which it specifically bargained is 
recognized by the City by filling any vacancies in this 
classification.  Further, it is based on the union's interest in 
ensuring that the City follows its obligations under state 
statute.  Individual officers may not pursue such a claim with 
the same zealousness as the union if the officers themselves are 
not guaranteed the promotion.  Indeed, in this case, the 
officers' failure to pursue the statutory claim beyond the 
circuit court suggests that the officers believed that, even if 
promotions were required under the statute, they may not have 
been awarded the promotions.  Thus, the MPA's pursuit of such 
promotions is based on different objectives and interests, 
focusing primarily on the interests of all members.  Cf. Abels 
v. Titan Int'l, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933-35 (S.D. Iowa, 
2000) (union members were not precluded from bringing an action 
against their employer seeking declaratory relief under ERISA to 
clarify rights to future benefits under their pension plan even 
though their union had recently voluntarily dismissed a similar 
action seeking a declaration of rights under the collective 
bargaining agreement; the court found no privity between the 
parties because they had different interests).   
¶22 Further, we conclude that claim preclusion should not 
apply because such application would result in unfairness to the 
MPA.  Normally nonparties to an action are not bound to a 
judgment therein based on the principle that everyone should 
No. 
99-2355   
 
16 
 
have their day in court.  McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 
611, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958); see also Richards v. Jefferson 
County, 517 U.S. 793, 795 (1996).  We have therefore recognized 
that, when deciding whether to apply claim preclusion to a 
nonparty's action, it is appropriate to consider whether such 
application will result in unfairness to the nonparty.  F.P.R. 
v. J.M., 137 Wis. 2d  375, 382, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987); McCourt, 
4 Wis. 2d at 611; Desotelle v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 136 Wis. 2d 13, 
21, 400 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1986).  In other words, claim 
preclusion should be applied so as not to deprive a party of a 
full and fair determination of an issue.  Id. at 21-22.  Under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that to 
hold that each member of the union is bound by an action taken 
by 23 individual members would be unfair to the other members of 
the union.  The overall interests of the union were not of 
primary concern in the first action, and in order to provide the 
members with their fair day in court, we conclude that claim 
preclusion should not apply in this instance. 
IV.  WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
¶23 Because we conclude that the action in this case is 
not precluded, we next examine whether a writ of mandamus is 
warranted to compel the City to fill vacancies in the rank of 
police alarm operator.  The MPA argues that the writ is 
warranted based on Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9).  The interpretation of 
§ 62.50(9) is a question of law that we determine independently, 
while benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and the 
No. 
99-2355   
 
17 
 
court of appeals.  See Patients Comp. Fund v. Lutheran Hosp.-
LaCrosse, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 439, 454, 588 N.W.2d 35 (1999).   
¶24 A writ of mandamus may be used to compel public 
officers "'to perform duties arising out of their office and 
presently due to be performed.'"  Law Enforcement Standards Bd. 
v. Village of Lyndon Station, 101 Wis.2d 472, 494, 305 N.W.2d 89 
(1981).  In order for a writ of mandamus to be issued, four 
prerequisites must be satisfied:  "(1) a clear legal right; (2) 
a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and (4) no 
other adequate remedy at law."  Id.   
¶25 The court of appeals concluded that a writ was 
required in this case.  The court specifically held that 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) created a positive and plain duty upon the 
City to fill the vacancies, noting that the statute's use of the 
word "shall" placed a ministerial obligation on the part of the 
City to fill vacancies.  Pasko II, 2001 WI App 55, ¶14.  The 
court opined as follows: 
 
Section 
62.50(9) 
indicates 
that 
"[a]ll 
vacancies . . . shall 
be 
filled," 
and 
that 
where 
vacancies can be filled by promotion, "the vacancies 
 . . . shall be so filled."  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) 
(emphasis added).  The statute's use of the word 
"shall" as opposed to "may" places a ministerial, 
rather than a discretionary, obligation on the City to 
fill vacancies within a reasonable time whenever 
possible via promotion.  Therefore, we conclude that 
§ 62.50(9) requires the City to take reasonable steps 
to promote qualified officers in order to fill 
available 
Police 
Alarm 
Operator 
positions, 
thus 
creating a "positive and plain duty."   
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  We disagree with this 
interpretation of the statute. 
No. 
99-2355   
 
18 
 
¶26 When interpreting a statute, we look to the plain 
language.  See State v. T.J. Int'l, Inc., 2001 WI 76, ¶20, 244 
Wis. 2d 481, 628 N.W.2d 774.  If we can determine the meaning of 
the statute based on its plain language, we need not look any 
further.  Id.  The MPA relies primarily on the following 
language in the statute:  "All vacancies in either [the police 
or fire] department shall be filled and all new appointments 
shall be made by the respective chiefs with the approval of the 
board."  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9).  The MPA argues, like the Pasko 
II court of appeals, that the legislature's use of the word 
"shall" in the statute requires the City to fill all vacancies 
in the department as they occur.  We disagree and instead 
conclude that the circuit court in Pasko I correctly interpreted 
this section of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) as a grant of power, 
rather than a mandate to the chief.  The court stated: 
 
[A] review of § 62.50(9) shows that the legislature 
has merely designated who has the authority to fill 
any vacancies.  It is not a mandate to the chief, but 
rather a grant of power.  This is clear when "[a]ll 
vacancies" is read in conjunction with "all new 
appointments".  The legislature is clearly granting 
police chiefs the authority to determine who will be 
on their departments, subject to board approval.   
In other words, this sentence only designates who must fill 
vacancies and new appointments in the department, not when the 
vacancies must be filled.  Therefore, it does not create a 
positive and plain duty to, as the MPA argues, fill vacancies as 
they occur. 
No. 
99-2355   
 
19 
 
¶27 The circuit court also correctly noted that, when 
comparing 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9) 
to 
other 
subsections 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50, it is clear that the legislature intended to 
delineate authority between the board and the chief of police 
under § 62.50(9).  Other subsections clearly direct the board or 
another person to act.  Compare § 62.50(9)("All vacancies in 
either department shall be filled and new appointments shall be 
made by the respective chiefs with the approval of the board.") 
with § 62.50(6) ("If a vacancy exists in the office of chief of 
police or in the office of chief engineer of the fire 
department, the board by a majority vote shall appoint proper 
persons to fill such offices respectively."); § 62.50(7)(a) ("If 
a vacancy exists in the office of assistant chief, the chief of 
police shall nominate and, with the approval of the board, shall 
appoint a person to a term of office . . . ."); § 62.50(7)(b) 
("If a vacancy exists in the office of inspector of police or 
captain of police, the chief of police shall nominate and, with 
the approval of the board, shall appoint a person to the 
office . . . ."); § 62.50(8) ("If a vacancy exists in the office 
of the first assistant engineer of the fire department, the 
chief engineer shall nominate and with the approval of the board 
shall appoint a suitable person to the office . . . ."). 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(9) also includes the following 
language: 
 
Where vacancies in old offices or newly created 
offices can, with safety to the department, be filled 
by the promotion of officers or persons already in the 
service 
and 
who 
have 
proved 
their 
fitness 
for 
No. 
99-2355   
 
20 
 
promotion, the vacancies in newly created offices 
shall be so filled by promotion by the respective 
chiefs with the approval of the board.   
The Pasko II court of appeals determined that this language also 
constituted a mandate to the chief of police to fill vacancies 
by promotion as they occur.  We disagree.  This sentence 
essentially expands on the previous sentence.  Whereas the 
previous sentence granted authority to the chief to fill all 
vacancies in the department, this sentence specifies the manner 
in which the chief is to fill vacancies in "newly created 
offices."  It provides that vacancies in "newly created offices" 
shall be filled "by promotion," but only when such promotions 
can occur with safety to the department.  The determination of 
whether a vacancy can be filled by promotion with safety to the 
department is a matter of discretion for the chief.  If the 
chief determines that such vacancies can be filled by promotion 
with safety to the department, the chief must fill these 
positions "by promotion."  However, the statute does not require 
the chief to fill these positions at any certain time.  The 
circuit court noted as much, stating:  "Further, § 62.50(9) has 
no temporal element.  A chief would arguably be violating 
§ 62.50(9) each day a vacancy goes unfilled.  This would be an 
absurd result."  The statute only requires that, if these 
vacancies are filled, they must be filled by promotion.   
¶29 Alternatively, the 
chief 
may determine 
that the 
vacancies in such "newly created offices" cannot be filled by 
promotion without doing damage to the department.  In such an 
event, the statute does not specify how the chief is to fill 
No. 
99-2355   
 
21 
 
these vacancies.  Presumably then, the chief may fill these 
vacancies through means other than by promotion or may choose 
not to fill the positions at all.  On the whole, the statute 
requires 
the 
chief 
to 
make 
a 
threshold 
discretionary 
determination, and if this determination is met, it designates 
only the manner in which the chief must fill these vacancies, 
that is, "by promotion."  Thus, we conclude that the statute 
alone does not create a positive and plain duty for the chief 
to, as the MPA argues, fill these vacancies by promotion as they 
occur.   
¶30 The Pasko II court of appeals concluded that, based on 
the statute, the collective bargaining agreement, and the Pasko 
I decision, the MPA had a "positive and plain duty" and "clear 
legal right" to the promotions.  The court of appeals reached 
this determination even though the MPA based their argument for 
mandamus solely on Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9), not the collective 
bargaining agreement or Pasko I.4  Nevertheless, we recognize 
that the statute must be interpreted in conjunction with the 
collective 
bargaining agreement because 
the 
agreement may 
contain language, when either read alone or in conjunction with 
§ 62.50(9), requiring the City to fill such vacancies as they 
occur.  We, however, conclude that, based on the current facts 
in the record, we cannot make any such determination in this 
                                                 
4 During the summary judgment hearing on the writ of 
mandamus, the MPA's attorney argued as follows:  "And the only 
order I'm seeking, and I'm seeking it on behalf of the Milwaukee 
Police Association, is that the chief and fire and police 
commission be ordered under 6250 to fill those positions."   
No. 
99-2355   
 
22 
 
case.  To begin with, the whole collective bargaining agreement 
is not contained in the record.  Moreover, there is currently a 
factual uncertainty as to whether any police alarm operator 
vacancies currently exist or whether this position is considered 
a "newly created office."  As a result, we remand to the circuit 
court for a determination on these issues.  On a final note, we 
conclude that, although Pasko I stated that the City's practice 
of underfilling the police alarm operator positions on a 
permanent basis without paying or promoting the officers 
violated 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement, 
we 
do 
not 
interpret this decision as making a clear determination as to 
whether 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
specifically 
required the City to immediately promote officers to any current 
vacancies.  In turn, remand is appropriate.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 In sum, we conclude that the MPA is not precluded from 
pursuing its writ of mandamus action at this time.  However, 
from the facts currently presented in the record, we cannot 
conclude, as the court of appeals did, whether the MPA is 
entitled to a writ of mandamus at this time.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded. 
No. 
99-2355   
 
 
 
1