Title: State v. Tunick
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC18262
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2010

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STEPHEN TUNICK
(SC 18262)
Rogers, C. J., and Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille, Zarella and McLachlan, Js.
Argued March 15—officially released April 20, 2010
Richard Emanuel, for the appellant (defendant).
Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John Smriga, state’s
attorney, and Pamela Esposito, assistant state’s attor-
ney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, Stephen Tunick, was
convicted, after a jury trial, of one count of sexual
assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Stat-
utes § 53a-73a (a) (2). He appealed to the Appellate
Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. State
v. Tunick, 109 Conn. App. 611, 616, 952 A.2d 103 (2008).
This court then granted the defendant’s petition for
certification to appeal limited to the following issue:
‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly affirm the defen-
dant’s conviction, without first remanding the case to
the trial court for a hearing on the question of whether
the trial judge had actively participated in pretrial nego-
tiations?’’ State v. Tunick, 289 Conn. 943, 959 A.2d 1011
(2008). We conclude that certification was improvi-
dently granted and dismiss the appeal.
The Appellate Court’s opinion sets forth the following
facts and procedural history. ‘‘The defendant was
arrested on June 15, 2006, at which time he hired attor-
ney William Taylor to represent him.1 On September
12, 2006, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
Several continuances were granted, and, finally, on
November 17, 2006, the case was scheduled for trial to
commence on November 20, 2006.2 On November 18,
2006, attorney John R. Williams filed an appearance
with the court via facsimile in lieu of Taylor’s appear-
ance. For no explained reason, the Superior Court
clerk’s office did not enter Williams’ appearance in the
court’s file by the morning of November 20, 2006, so
that when court was convened on that day, the court
file still reflected that Taylor represented the defendant.
‘‘When the case was called, neither the defendant,
nor Taylor or Williams were present. The court, Ginoc-
chio, J., promptly ordered that the defendant be rear-
rested. Later in the day, attorney Joseph M. Merly, a
member of Williams’ law firm, appeared in court with
the defendant. The court vacated the rearrest order and
reinstated the bond. The court further asked Merly to
counsel with his client to determine if it was his client’s
intent to apply for accelerated rehabilitation or to go
to trial.
‘‘On November 21, 2006, Williams filed his motion for
recusal . . . .3 [The court held a hearing on the motion,
at which Williams stated]: ‘Your Honor has participated
in plea negotiations in this case; you have demonstrated
an appearance of bias; you have made representations
on the record of facts, which, in fact, are not correct,
and I have with me an attorney, a member of the bar
. . . prepared to swear that in fact, representations you
made yesterday putting this case in here for trial as of
this morning are contrary to representations you made
to him in January.’4 The court denied the defendant’s
motion to disqualify.’’ State v. Tunick, supra, 109 Conn.
App. 612–13.
The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court
claiming that the trial court improperly had denied his
motion to disqualify itself because the court had partici-
pated in pretrial discussions and negotiations; id., 614;
and because the court was biased against him. Id., 616.
The Appellate Court rejected these claims and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. Id. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims on appeal that the Appellate
Court improperly affirmed the defendant’s conviction,
without first remanding the case to the trial court for
a hearing on the question of whether the trial court
had actively participated in pretrial negotiations. After
examining the entire record on appeal and considering
the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have
determined that the appeal in this case should be dis-
missed on the ground that certification was improvi-
dently granted.
The appeal is dismissed.
1 The defendant was arrested and charged with sexual assault in the fourth
degree in connection with an incident that took place on June 12, 2006, during
which the defendant slapped the victim on the buttocks. In accordance with
our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse,
and because the information is not relevant to this appeal, we decline to
identify the victim or to describe the circumstances surrounding the assault.
See General Statutes § 54-86e.
2 ‘‘The discussions that took place on November 17, 2006, were done in
chambers, and no transcript is available for that day. The events of that day
later were recorded by virtue of the court’s explanation made during a
discussion of the defendant’s motion to disqualify, which took place on
November 21, 2006.’’ State v. Tunick, supra, 109 Conn. App. 612 n.1.
3 ‘‘The defendant’s motion to disqualify, filed on November 21, 2006, states:
‘The defendant respectfully moves to disqualify Hon. James P. Ginocchio
from sitting on the trial of this action for the reason that Judge Ginocchio
has participated in pretrial settlement matters in this case and has used his
judicial office in an attempt to coerce the defendant to accept a bargain
with the state and waive his sixth amendment right to a trial by jury.’ ’’ State
v. Tunick, supra, 109 Conn. App. 613 n.2.
4 Immediately after Williams made this statement, the trial court asked
whether the prosecutor wanted to be heard. The prosecutor responded,
‘‘There’s not a lot of information in that argument. I’d like to be heard after
. . . Williams fills in the details.’’ The trial court then asked Williams, ‘‘Well
that’s your argument . . . ?’’ Williams responded, ‘‘[M]y argument is set
forth in the papers that I filed and I would stand on those papers. [I]f you
choose not to read them I guess that will be taken up at a later time.’’ There
was then a pause in the proceedings while the trial court read the papers
that Williams had submitted.
In support of the motion to disqualify, Williams had submitted an affidavit
in which he stated that Merly had indicated that the trial court had engaged
in improper conduct during the court proceedings on November 20, 2006.
Williams did not indicate in the affidavit that the trial court had engaged in
pretrial discussions or negotiations in the case.