Title: The Florida Bar v. Edward C. Vining, Jr. (Corrected Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90-645
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC90645
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
EDWARD C. VINING, JR.,
Respondent.
[May 11, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the complaint of The Florida Bar and the referee's report
regarding alleged ethical breaches by Edward C. Vining, Jr.  We have jurisdiction. 
Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We approve the referee's report and her recommendation
that Vining be disbarred.
The Florida Bar filed a two-count complaint against Vining based upon his
representation of Iliana Michelson during her dissolution of marriage proceedings.
Count I alleged that Vining failed to set a hearing for attorney's fees on Michelson's
1 Rule 4-1.5 (e) provides:
  When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or
rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing,
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
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behalf and failed to keep her informed of the status of her claim.  When judgment
was entered in Michelson's favor in June 1993 in her dissolution proceedings, the
court reserved jurisdiction to determine her entitlement to attorney's fees, suit
monies, and costs.  Although Vining represented to Michelson that he would obtain
a hearing on these remaining issues, she never received notification of a hearing date
despite her numerous inquiries for nearly two years.  When Michelson expressed
her dissatisfaction in a certified letter dated May 2, 1995, Vining responded four
months later that he had filed a motion for a hearing date in October 1994. 
However, Vining never scheduled a hearing on that motion.
Count II involves Vining's failure to clearly communicate his fee to Michelson
in violation of rule 4-1.5(e)1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.   Michelson
paid Vining $15,000 as a retainer and was repeatedly told that this fee would cover
her legal fees for the entire proceeding.  Michelson arrived at a settlement with her
former husband regarding the issues of attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the
husband.  The settlement agreement was premised on Michelson's belief that she
owed Vining no additional fees.  However, Vining subsequently claimed in a letter
2 Rule 4-1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client."
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that Michelson owed him an additional $20,000 in fees.  Vining provided no
statements regarding his legal services, submitted no bills to her prior to the letter,
and submitted no itemized basis for the billing.
After conducting a two-day hearing, the referee, County Court Judge Victoria
S. Sigler, found that Vining had failed to provide detailed billing information to
Michelson, did not keep contemporaneous hourly time records regarding her case,
and manufactured the records after being ordered by the referee to show them to the
Bar.  The referee further found that the client had requested that Vining pursue a
hearing date on the remaining issues in her case and that Vining had failed to do so. 
As to Count I, the referee recommended that Vining be found guilty of violating the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar:  rule 4-1.32 for failing to schedule a
hearing on the attorney's fees claims within a reasonable period following the
dissolution order and for failing to keep detailed and contemporaneous written
records of the work performed and the hours involved in support of the client's claim
3 Rule 4-1.4(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information."
4 Rule 4-1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."
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for attorney fees; and rules 4-1.4(a)3 and 4-1.4(b)4 for failing to keep the client
informed of the status of her attorney's fees claim and her responsibility for
attorney's fees in excess of the $15,000 retainer and for failing to respond to the
client's repeated requests for information about fees and the hearing.  As to Count II,
the referee recommended that Vining be found guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(e) for
failing to provide the client with an accounting of the time and charges accumulated
and the basis or rate of his fees, for failing to tell the client that his fee exceeded the
retainer when expressly asked to do so, and for failing to advise the client of the
outstanding fees owed when she was negotiating a settlement with her former
husband.
The referee recommends that Vining be disbarred.  The referee noted that
Vining has substantial experience in the practice of law since he was admitted to the
Bar in 1959, possesses good legal skills, and has a good reputation in the legal
community.  However, the referee also noted that Vining has exhibited a pattern of
disregard and contempt for his clients and the opposing counsel during the course of
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the three-year disciplinary proceedings; is currently serving a three-year suspension;
has another pending disciplinary proceeding; and has refused to admit any
wrongdoing in his conduct with this client or in refusing to respond to the Bar's
requests for information.  She further noted that although Vining possesses good
legal skills he has lost sight of his responsibility to serve as a counselor for his
clients and to put the client's interest first.
Vining petitioned this Court to review the referee's report and the
recommendation of disbarment.  He also requested oral argument, which was
granted by the Court.
Vining makes several arguments regarding the referee's factual findings.  A
referee's findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of correctness that
should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.  See
Florida Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So. 2d 457, 459 (Fla. 1992); Florida Bar v. Vannier,
498 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1986).  If the referee's findings are supported by
competent, substantial evidence, this Court is precluded from reweighing the
evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the referee.  See MacMillan, 600
So. 2d at 459.  The party contending that the referee's findings of fact and
conclusions as to guilt are erroneous carries the burden of demonstrating that there
is no evidence in the record to support those findings or that the record evidence
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clearly contradicts the conclusions.  See Florida Bar v. Miele, 605 So. 2d 866, 868
(Fla. 1992).
First, Vining contends this case is purely a fee dispute over which the Bar has
no jurisdiction.  Thus, he argues, none of the evidence or testimony regarding the
retainer agreement or fees should have been admitted.  We find no merit to this
claim.  While the underlying issues involved the attorney's fees issue, the Bar
complaint was founded on Vining's lack of diligence, his failure to keep Michelson
informed about the status of her representation, his failure to explain  the matter so
that Michelson could make informed decisions regarding the settlement, and his
failure to communicate the basis or rate of his fee to Michelson.  Thus, the referee
properly admitted the evidence relating to the retainer agreement and fees.
Vining also argues that Michelson testified that the retainer was a flat fee and,
if this was her understanding, he had no obligation to keep detailed billing
information or submit bills to the client.  However, Michelson actually testified that
she knew that the retainer was not the full fee and repeatedly asked for detailed
billing from Vining.  Both Michelson and her sister testified that Vining repeatedly
assured Michelson that she had not exceeded the retainer amount and that he would
inform her if she did.  Based on these assurances, Michelson negotiated a settlement
with her ex-husband, believing that she had completely settled all of her debts with
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Vining.  Only after Michelson informed Vining of the settlement and the termination
of his services did he bill her for an additional $20,000 in fees.
As to the claims of lack of diligence and failure to keep Michelson apprised
as to the status of her representation, Vining testified that he was just following
Michelson's wishes not to schedule a hearing.  However, Michelson testified that
she repeatedly sought information on the status of the fee claim, only to be assured
by Vining that he was working on the matter and taking care of it.
Vining essentially argues that there is not competent, substantial evidence of
his guilt because his testimony contradicted the testimony of other witnesses. 
However, a party does not satisfy his or her burden of showing that a referee's
findings are clearly erroneous by simply pointing to the contradictory evidence
where there is also competent, substantial evidence in the record that supports the
referee's findings.  See Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1998);
Florida Bar v. de la Puente, 658 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 1995).  Moreover, the referee's
report explains in detail how the referee resolved the conflicting recitation of events
given by Vining and by Michelson and her sister.  Because the referee was in the
best position to resolve this conflict and there is both record and logical support for
her conclusion, this Court will not disturb those findings of fact as to guilt.  See
MacMillan, 600 So. 2d at 459.
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The Court's scope of review of a referee's recommended discipline, however,
is broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction.  See Florida Bar v. Niles, 644
So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1994).  Yet, the Court "will not second-guess a referee's
recommended discipline so long as that discipline has a reasonable basis in existing
caselaw."  Florida Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (Fla . 1997).
Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 4.41(b) states that
disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a
client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client.  Standard 8.1 
provides that disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer has been suspended for
similar conduct and intentionally engages in it again.  Additionally, as explained in
the commentary to standard 2.2, "[d]isbarment serves the purpose of discipline in
that the public is protected from further practice by the lawyer; [and] the reputation
of the legal profession is protected by the action of the bench and bar in taking
appropriate actions against unethical lawyers."  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 2.2
commentary at 35 (1994).
In determining the appropriate discipline, this Court considers prior
misconduct and cumulative misconduct, and treats more severely cumulative
misconduct than isolated misconduct.  See Florida Bar v. Adler, 589 So. 2d 899
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(Fla. 1991); see also Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.22 (d) (multiple offenses are
one factor that may justify an increase in degree of discipline imposed).  Disbarment
is appropriate where, as here, there is a pattern of misconduct and a history of
discipline.  See Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So. 2d 788, 794 (Fla. 1998).  Additionally,
cumulative misconduct of a similar nature warrants an even more severe discipline
than might dissimilar conduct.  See Florida Bar v. Bern, 425 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla.
1982); see also Florida Bar v. Orta, 689 So. 2d 270, 273-74 (Fla. 1997) (concluding
that commission of multiple offenses involving dishonesty while still under
suspension for similar misconduct warranted disbarment).
Vining was suspended for three years for "dishonest, fraudulent, and
deceitful" conduct before the circuit court in obtaining disputed attorney fees
relating to his representation of a client in another dissolution proceeding.  The
client filed a civil action against Vining and was awarded compensatory and
punitive damages for conversion and civil theft.  See Florida Bar v. Vining, 707 So.
2d 670 (Fla. 1998).  Vining has another disciplinary proceeding currently pending
before this Court.  Vining also has another previous disciplinary action in which he
received a six-month suspension to run concurrently with the three-year suspension. 
See Florida Bar v. Vining, 721 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1998) (finding Vining guilty of
continued representation of a client after being discharged, failing to abide by the
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client's decisions concerning the objective of representation and to consult with the
client as to the means by which the objectives are to be pursued, and representing
the client even though his independent professional judgment was materially limited
by his own interest).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Vining's latest transgression is the
proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back."  Vining has obviously lost sight of
his important legal duty to his clients.  Thus, we agree with the referee that
disbarment is the appropriate discipline in this case.
Edward C. Vining, Jr. is hereby disbarred.  This disbarment shall be effective
retroactive to June 22, 1998, the date the referee's report was entered in this case. 
Because Vining is already under suspension, we need not provide the usual
thirty-day time period for him to close out his practice.   We also enter judgment
against Edward C. Vining, Jr., in favor of The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for costs in the amount of $5,415.28, for which sum let
execution issue.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.
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Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Arlene Kalish Sankel, Bar Counsel and Gregg David
Wenzel, Co-Bar Counsel, Miami, Florida,
for Complainant
Edward C. Vining, Jr., pro se, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent