Title: People v. Jackson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88474
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2001

Docket No. 88474-Agenda 3-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								LAWRENCE JACKSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 20, 2001.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Lawrence Jackson, appeals from an order of the
circuit court of Cook County dismissing his amended petition for
post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Because
defendant was sentenced to death for his underlying convictions,
his appeal lies directly with this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of defendant's
post-conviction petition.

BACKGROUND
	At a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, eight-year-old Urica Winder testified that defendant and codefendant Bobbie
Driskel came to her family's apartment at 1850 West Washington
late in the evening on September 24, 1986. The two men stabbed
to death her mother, Vernita Winder, her four-year-old sister,
Dana, her mother's boyfriend, Mark Brown, and her mother's
friend, Shirley Martin, and then stole a television set and VCR.
Urica, too, was brutally stabbed, but survived the attack by
pretending to be dead.(1)
	Based on Urica's testimony and other evidence, including
defendant's own inculpatory statements to police, defendant was
convicted on June 23, 1988, on four counts of first degree murder,
one count of attempted murder, one count of aggravated battery of
a child, five counts of home invasion, five counts of armed
robbery, and one count of residential burglary. Following the
convictions, a death penalty sentencing hearing was held. The jury
found defendant eligible for the death penalty and, after hearing
evidence in aggravation and mitigation, found that the mitigation
evidence did not preclude imposition of the death penalty. On
September 7, 1988, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death,
and imposed terms of imprisonment for the nonmurder
convictions. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on
direct appeal. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991).
	After our decision issued, defendant petitioned for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. In response, the
Supreme Court remanded the matter to this court for further
consideration in light of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). See Jackson v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 802, 121 L. Ed. 2d 5, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992). Thereafter, on
September 26, 1991, this court issued a judgment affirming
defendant's convictions and nondeath sentences. In accord with
Morgan, however, defendant's death sentence was vacated and the
cause remanded to the circuit court for a new death penalty
sentencing hearing.
	A new sentencing hearing was held and defendant again was
found eligible for the death penalty based on three aggravating
factors: multiple murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(3)); felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(6)), and murder of a child under the age of 12 when "the
death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(7)). The resentencing jury also determined that the
mitigating evidence was insufficient to preclude imposition of the
death penalty. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g). Therefore,
on April 24, 1995, defendant was resentenced to death. On May
23, 1995, defendant filed a notice of appeal directly to this court.
	On August 29, 1996, while the direct appeal was still pending,
defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition, challenging the
effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel and the fairness of
his death penalty sentencing hearing. Upon receipt of the petition,
the circuit court appointed the office of the State Appellate
Defender to represent defendant. Nothing further was filed,
however, until this court issued an opinion on defendant's direct
appeal, affirming the imposition of the death penalty upon
resentencing. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998). Thereafter,
on March 12, 1999, with the assistance of counsel, defendant filed
an amended post-conviction petition, raising 14 claims. A fifteenth
claim was added later.
	Upon the State's motion, the trial court dismissed defendant's
petition without an evidentiary hearing. Because this is a capital
case, defendant seeks review of the dismissal of his post-conviction petition by this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). Before this
court, defendant asks that an evidentiary hearing be held on the
following nine claims: (1) whether he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at resentencing because his attorney failed to
investigate and present evidence of a family history of mental
illness; (2) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his appellate attorney failed to argue on direct appeal that
he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to the introduction of
victim impact evidence concerning unrelated offenses; (3) whether
his constitutional rights were violated when the State used
peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who expressed
reservations about the death penalty; (4) whether he was denied a
fair sentencing hearing due to (a) judicial bias, (b) the presentation
of hypnotically enhanced testimony, and (c) erroneous rulings; (5)
whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentence in this case;
(6) whether the court questioned prospective jurors in a manner
which suggested that the jury would have to find unanimously that
mitigation evidence outweighed aggravation evidence; (7) whether
a new sentencing hearing is required because of the cumulative
effect of all of the constitutional violations alleged above; (8)
whether the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it has
no burden of persuasion; and (9) whether the death penalty statute
is unconstitutionally discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious
because it precludes the imposition of death in cases where an
individual requires "special forms of communicative assistance"
at trial.
	The evidence presented at defendant's second death penalty
hearing is presented in detail in our opinion on defendant's direct
appeal and will not be recounted here. We will discuss only those
facts necessary to the disposition of this appeal.

ANALYSIS
	 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)) is a statutory vehicle which provides
criminal defendants with an opportunity to obtain relief from
substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights
that occurred at trial or sentencing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A petition filed under the Act is not an appeal,
but a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction or sentence.
People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142 (2001); People v. Williams,
186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). Consequently, the purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is not to determine guilt or innocence, but
to inquire into constitutional issues which have not been, and
could not have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73 (1997); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501
(1991). Matters that were raised and decided on direct appeal are
res judicata, and matters that could have been raised on appeal,
but were not, will ordinarily be deemed waived. People v. McNeal,
194 Ill. 2d 135 (2000); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
	In a capital case, once a post-conviction petition is filed, the
circuit court has 90 days in which to examine the petition and, if
the petitioner is without counsel or the means to procure counsel,
appoint counsel for him. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 2000).
The petition is then docketed for further consideration and the
State must "answer or move to dismiss." 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West
2000). If the State seeks dismissal of the petition, the circuit court
must rule on the sufficiency of the allegations, without engaging
in any fact finding and taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People
v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998). Unless the circuit court
finds that the allegations in the post-conviction petition, supported
where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits,
make a substantial showing that the defendant's constitutional
rights have been violated, the petition may be dismissed without
an evidentiary hearing. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425
(1999); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381; People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 304 (1997). A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing as of right. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	A circuit court's ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations
contained in a post-conviction petition is a legal determination.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388. We review de novo a post-conviction
petition that has been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142 (2001); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 389.
	With these principles in mind, we address defendant's claims
in the order that they were raised.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	In his first two claims, defendant contends that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, first at his resentencing hearing
and then when his death sentence was appealed directly to this
court. The right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by
our federal and state constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV;
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8), applies to appellate and sentencing
proceedings, as well as trial proceedings, and violations of this
right are cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 361 (2000).
	Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by
the familiar Strickland standard, which is composed of two
prongs: deficiency and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984) . To establish the deficiency prong, defendant must show
that his counsel's performance, objectively measured against
prevailing professional norms, was so deficient that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 317 (2000); People
v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 108-09 (1992). Defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or
inaction might have been the product of sound trial strategy.
People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73-74 (1997).
	To establish the prejudice prong, defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 74. However, the prejudice
prong of Strickland is not simply an "outcome-determinative" test
but, rather, may be satisfied if defendant can show that counsel's
deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or
the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 362.
	In the case at bar, defendant first claims that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his capital resentencing
hearing. Defendant contends that his attorneys conducted a
"superficial" investigation and, as a result, failed to discover and
present to the sentencing jury evidence that defendant's family has
an extensive history of mental illness. In support of this claim,
defendant attached to his amended post-conviction petition a 39-page amended mitigation report by forensic social worker Alice
Washington. Washington's report, supported by the affidavits of
several of defendant's family members, reveals that mental illness
has affected several generations on both sides of defendant's
family. At least 13 members of defendant's family, including one
sibling, aunts and uncles, and several cousins, have been
diagnosed as suffering from mental illness, predominantly
paranoid schizophrenia, which has in some instances been
accompanied by episodes of extreme violence. In further support
of his claim, defendant also attached to his petition a five-page
neuropsychological assessment prepared by developmental
psychologist Dr. James Garbarino and a one-page letter from
psychiatrist Dr. Henry Conroe. It is defendant's position that the
allegations in his claim, supported by the documents which he
attached to his petition, make a substantial showing that his
resentencing counsel's failure to present evidence of his family
history of mental illness constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel and that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine
whether his constitutional rights were violated. We disagree.
	In the context of a second-stage capital sentencing hearing,
the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of
counsel requires a defendant to show "(1) that his attorney's
performance at the sentencing hearing did not constitute
reasonably effective assistance, judged by prevailing professional
norms (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.
at 2065), and (2) there is reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant death
(Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct. at
2069)." People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 195-96 (1998); see
also People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000). Counsel has an
obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation into potential
sources of mitigating evidence to present at the capital sentencing
hearing, or must have a legitimate reason for failing to make a
particular investigation. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 510
(1998); Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 86. However, if an adequate
investigation was conducted, counsel will not be deemed
ineffective merely because a particular item of evidence was not
introduced. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 510; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 86.
	In the present case, defendant cannot satisfy either prong of
the Strickland test. As to the first prong-deficiency-the record
does not support defendant's claim that the investigation into
potential sources of mitigating evidence was inadequate, nor does
it show that counsel was deficient for having failed to uncover
evidence of a family history of mental illness. Defendant's
attempts to draw a comparison between this case and People v.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491 (1998), are unavailing.
	In Towns, the record showed that counsel conducted no
investigation into mitigating evidence and, instead, relied solely on
a pretrial sanity report. In the present case, however, a review of
the record reveals that the resentencing defense attorneys
employed the services of mitigation specialist, Alvin Hill.
Although Hill did not testify at the resentencing hearing, he
prepared a lengthy mitigation report after interviewing the
defendant and at least 10 other persons. Due in part to Hill's
extensive investigations, the defense team was able to present
mitigation evidence at the second sentencing hearing which had
been unavailable at the first sentencing hearing. For instance,
family members who earlier had been unwilling to testify or whose
testimony at the first sentencing hearing failed to include family
background came forward at the resentencing hearing and
revealed, for the first time, the nature of defendant's life during his
formative years. Through the testimony of witnesses such as Alicia
Jackson, Donald Jackson, and George Rowe, Jr., the resentencing
jury learned that defendant led an impoverished childhood which
was chaotic, turbulent, and punctuated by frequent episodes of
extreme abuse and neglect. These witnesses explained that
defendant's natural father abandoned the family when defendant
was young, leaving him and his siblings to be raised by an
alcoholic mother and her abusive boyfriends. As a child, defendant
also witnessed several disturbing incidents of violence, including
his brother being struck and killed by a car.
	In addition to this newly discovered family background
evidence, defendant's attorneys introduced new evidence that
defendant exhibited abnormal brain functioning, which was likely
a result of head injuries defendant had suffered. Dr. Michael
Gelbort, a clinical psychologist with a specialty in
neuropsychology, testified that he examined defendant and
performed numerous tests, including intelligence tests, which
allowed him to assess various aspects of defendant's brain
functioning. From these tests, Dr. Gelbort concluded that
defendant suffered from organic brain dysfunction with cognitive
abnormalities. The abnormalities seemed to be most severe in the
frontal lobes of the brain, which control problem-solving and
reasoning ability. According to Dr. Gelbort, the frontal lobes
operate as the "gas pedal" and "brake pedal" of behavior-allowing
a person to initiate appropriate behavior and preventing a person
from acting inappropriately. The abnormalities to defendant's
frontal lobes suggested that defendant's judgment as to appropriate
behavior would be impaired.
	By comparing the evidence presented at defendant's first
sentencing hearing with the evidence presented at resentencing, it
is clear that the attorneys who assisted defendant at his
resentencing conducted a reasonable investigation into potential
sources of mitigating evidence. Neither the investigation, nor the
presentation of mitigation evidence at defendant's resentencing,
was superficial.
	Moreover, there is good reason why defense counsel failed to
uncover and present evidence of defendant's family history of
mental illness. In an affidavit dated March 10, 1999, and
submitted by the defense in support of defendant's post-conviction
petition, mitigation specialist Alice Washington stated, "That at
the time of the initial sentencing hearing, and those subsequent
thereof, [sic] no one had knowledge of the family history of mental
illness because it was the family's dark secret." According to
Washington, defendant's family, apparently due to embarrassment,
had been disinclined to reveal information regarding the family's
widespread affliction with mental illness. In a previous affidavit
dated January 21, 1999, Washington stated, "It has been a very
difficult task trying to convince [defendant's] family that the
family history of mental illness needs to be explored and presented
to the court."
	We conclude that the failure to discover the family history of
mental illness cannot be attributed to any deficiency of counsel.
Defendant's family withheld this information due to a desire to
keep this "family secret" private. Consequently, defendant has
failed to satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland test. In light
of the record in this case, defendant has not made a substantial
showing that his counsel was deficient because evidence of a
family history of mental illness was not discovered or presented at
his resentencing hearing.
	Having made this determination, it is not necessary to
consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Nevertheless,
it is clear to this court that defendant cannot make a substantial
showing of prejudice and, consequently, the lack of prejudice is an
additional reason for finding that defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was properly dismissed without an evidentiary
hearing.
	To show prejudice, defendant must be able to show a
reasonable probability that, had evidence of his family history of
mental illness been presented, the sentencing jury would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors
would not warrant death. Defendant cannot meet this standard,
however, because no correlation has been shown between the
history of mental illness in defendant's family and his own mental
condition.
	Experts who examined defendant in 1987 and 1988, prior to
defendant's first trial and sentencing, found that defendant did not
suffer from a mental illness. Dr. Ziporyn, a psychiatrist called by
the defense, diagnosed defendant as having a passive-aggressive
personality disorder and testified that "at the time I examined
[defendant] there were no marked or major mental issues." Dr.
Ziporyn's findings were confirmed by Dr. Reifman, the director of
the Psychiatric Institute of the circuit court of Cook County, who
was called by the State at trial. Based on the results of
psychological testing and his own observations of defendant, Dr.
Reifman diagnosed defendant as having a mixed personality
disorder with antisocial passive-aggressive tendencies, influenced
by drug abuse. Dr. Reifman found defendant to be "oriented,
relevant, coherent, logical" and concluded that defendant was not
suffering from a mental disease, defect, or mental condition.
	These experts have not been contradicted by anything in
defendant's post-conviction petition or the documents attached to
the petition. The report prepared by mitigation specialist Alice
Washington suggests that the high incidence of paranoid
schizophrenia in defendant's family raises "a reasonable question
as to whether or not [defendant] suffers from the same mental
illness which has afflicted his relatives." But Washington is only
speculating and her speculation is not evidence which can defeat
the earlier expert testimony that defendant does not suffer from
mental illness or defect.
	Furthermore, this court is unable to discern from any of the
documents attached to defendant's post-conviction petition how
defendant's family history of mental illness mitigates his criminal
behavior in this case. Dr. James Garbarino states in his five-page
report: "The mental illness evident in [defendant's] family and the
cognitive limitations noted in the various reports would tend to
contribute to the problems [defendant] would face in drawing
appropriate conclusions from social realities." Thus, according to
Dr. Garbarino, defendant's family history of mental illness may
have some tangential relevance to defendant's ability to draw
"appropriate conclusions from social realities." To the extent that
this is true, however, it is cumulative of the evidence already heard
by the resentencing jury from Dr. Gelbort, who testified that
defendant's organic brain dysfunction impaired his ability to make
appropriate behavior choices. We are unpersuaded that there is a
reasonable probability that defendant's sentencing jury, after
considering Dr. Garbarino's report and other evidence of
defendant's family history of mental illness, would conclude the
balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would not warrant
a death sentence.
	Nor is this conclusion altered by the letter from Dr. Henry
Conroe. Dr. Conroe, it appears, examined defendant on February
17, 1988, prior to defendant's initial trial and sentencing. In a
letter, dated May 15, 1999, and attached to the post-conviction
petition, Dr. Conroe writes:
		"At the time that I examined [defendant] on 2/17/88, I did
not have access to information about his family, his
growing up, the history of physical and mental abuse, his
history of head injuries, and neuropsychological testing.
After being provided this information, I conclude that if
this evidence were made available to me initially, my
assessment of him would have been different. Beyond the
diagnoses of Substance Abuse and a Mixed Personality
Disorder with Anti-social and Passive Aggressive
features, I would have focused on the effects of his family
history, his early environment and the 'diffuse
neurocognitive dysfunction' described in Dr. Michael
Gelbort's report on the defendant's behavior at the time of
the crime."
	Significantly, Dr. Conroe does not modify his opinion that
defendant suffers from a personality disorder rather than a mental
illness. Moreover, Dr. Conroe does not focus on the mental illness
of defendant's family as the basis for changing his assessment of
defendant. Rather, he states that his opinion of defendant would
have been influenced by the spectrum of "information about his
family, his growing up, the history of physical and mental abuse,
his history of head injuries, and neuropsychological testing." Of
particular interest to Dr. Conroe was the evidence of defendant's
"diffuse neurocognitive dysfunction" described by Dr. Gelbort. All
of the evidence which Dr. Conroe found meaningful had been
presented to and considered by the resentencing jury.
	Finally, defendant cannot show prejudice because defendant's
family history of mental illness is not inherently mitigating and
could be interpreted as aggravating. See People v. Montgomery,
192 Ill. 2d 642, 673 (2000); People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 101
(1999). Washington's 39-page report indicates that some of
defendant's family members who suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia have committed serious criminal acts. Two relatives
were in mental institutions after being found not guilty by reason
of insanity, one for first degree murder and the other for armed
robbery. Another family member was reputed to have killed a
child and thrown the body into Lake Michigan. Thus, the family
history evidence could suggest defendant's future dangerousness-a
factor which may be considered in aggravation. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 
at 101; People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1996); People v.
Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467 (1995); People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 335-37 (1992).
	In sum, we conclude that defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing that his resentencing counsel was deficient or
that he was prejudiced by any perceived deficiencies of counsel.
Consequently, the claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at resentencing was properly dismissed without an
evidentiary hearing.
	Defendant next claims he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel when he appealed to this court after his
resentencing hearing. When determining whether defendant has
made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights have been
violated by appellate counsel's incompetence, we again employ
the Strickland test. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999). To
succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
defendant must show that the failure to raise a particular issue was
objectively unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced the
defendant. People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179 (2000). "Appellate
counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal,
and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues
which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel's
appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. Accordingly, unless the
underlying issues are meritorious, defendant has suffered no
prejudice from counsel's failure to raise them on appeal." People
v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 328-29 (2000).
	In the case at bar, defendant contends that his appellate
counsel was incompetent because he failed to raise on appeal the
improper admission of victim impact evidence for unrelated
offenses, which was found to be error in People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39 (1998).
	In Hope, the defendant was convicted for the February 5,
1982, murder of a police officer on a CTA bus. During the
eligibility phase of the defendant's capital sentencing hearing, the
State presented evidence that the defendant also had been
convicted for the January 11, 1982, murder of a security guard at
a McDonald's restaurant. Later, at the aggravation/mitigation stage
of the sentencing proceedings, the State introduced victim impact
statements from victims of the McDonald's shooting. This court
held:
		"[The Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725
ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1994))] does not contemplate,
and we will not condone, an expansion of victim impact
statements to include evidence from victims other than the
victims of the offense on trial." Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at 49.
	Later, this court went on to hold:
			"While the details of prior crimes are considered
relevant aggravation because they illuminate the character
and record of a capital defendant (see People v. Edgeston,
157 Ill. 2d 201, 235-37 (1993)), the unforeseen effects of
those prior crimes on their victims are of no such
assistance. *** [V]ictim impact statements regarding [an
unrelated] offense are simply too attenuated to be
relevant." Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at 52.
	Thus, Hope stands for the proposition that victim impact
statements, submitted pursuant to the Rights of Crime Victims and
Witnesses Act and which detail the effects that an unrelated,
collateral offense has had on a victim or victim's family, are
inadmissible at a second-stage capital sentencing hearing.
	In the case at bar, defendant identifies two witnesses as the
sources of improper victim impact evidence-Officer Kelly Byrne
and Dr. Demetra Soter. However, neither Officer Byrne nor Dr.
Soter gave a "victim impact statement," as that term is defined in
the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1
et seq. (West 2000). The Act states:
			"In any case where a defendant has been convicted of a
violent crime or a juvenile has been adjudicated a
delinquent for a violent crime except those in which both
parties have agreed to the imposition of a specific
sentence, and a victim of the violent crime is present in
the courtroom at the time of the sentencing or the
disposition hearing, the victim upon his or her request
shall have the right to address the court regarding the
impact which the defendant's criminal conduct or the
juvenile's delinquent conduct has had upon the victim. If
the victim chooses to exercise this right, the impact
statement must have been prepared in writing in
conjunction with the Office of the State's Attorney prior
to the initial hearing or sentencing, before it can be
presented orally or in writing at the sentencing hearing.
In conjunction with the Office of the State's Attorney, a
victim impact statement that is presented orally may be
done so by the victim or his or her representative."
(Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 2000).
	In the present case, Officer Byrne, a correctional officer with
the Cook County sheriff's department, was called to testify by the
State in aggravation. She testified that, between 1985 and 1986,
she worked the midnight shift at Division 2 of the county jail,
where defendant was incarcerated after being convicted on a
burglary charge. On January 21, 1986, Officer Byrne filed a
disciplinary report against defendant and, as a result, defendant
was confined to segregation for two to three days. When defendant
returned to Division 2, he began a campaign of intimidation
against Officer Byrne and, as his release date approached, began
making verbal threats to her. On one occasion, defendant told
Officer Byrne, "I will get you. I will find you, and I will get you."
On another occasion, defendant came up behind Officer Byrne in
the hallway and asked, in a threatening tone, how her little girl was
doing. At the time Officer Byrne had an 18-month-old daughter,
but she did not know how defendant had obtained this
information.
	Defendant admits that Byrne's testimony, up to this point, was
properly admitted. The offending "victim impact" testimony of
which he complains consists of a single answer to a question
posed by the State, which the court allowed over defendant's
objection:
			"Q. [prosecutor] Ms. Byrne, tell the Ladies and
Gentlemen of the jury how you changed your conduct
upon the release of [defendant] from Cook County Jail?
			A. [Officer Byrne] Prior to my incident with
[defendant], I very seldom carried an off-duty weapon.
After his release, I carried one consistently. I also changed
my route home from work every day. When I get [sic] off
in the morning, I took a different route home.
			As I said I was working midnight, and I had a retired
woman that would stay at my house during the night to
babysit, and I instructed her to know where my off-duty
weapon was and make sure she knew how to use it if it
would be necessary."
	As stated, Officer Byrne's testimony was not a formal victim
impact statement presented pursuant to the Rights of Crime
Victims and Witnesses Act. Nor do we construe Officer Byrne's
testimony as victim impact evidence. The remarks made by
Officer Byrne contain none of the typical elements of victim
impact evidence. She does not describe any physical,
psychological, or financial difficulties experienced by her or her
family as a result of a crime perpetrated on her by the defendant.
Rather, Officer Byrne's testimony regarding her altered conduct
simply informed the jury that she had taken defendant's threats
seriously.
	We also find no merit to defendant's argument that Dr. Soter
presented victim impact evidence in violation of Hope. Dr. Soter
was Urica Winder's treating physician. He was called by the State
to testify regarding Urica's wounds, the subsequent surgical
procedures she endured, and the possible long-term effects of the
injuries on Urica's physical and emotional well-being. In a vain
attempt to characterize the attack on Urica as an "unrelated
offense," defendant points out that the evidence indicated that
codefendant Bobbie Driskel, and not defendant, inflicted Urica's
wounds.
	The fact that defendant did not wield the knife which caused
Urica's injuries does not make her attack an unrelated offense. The
attack on Urica was part of the entire incident which resulted in
the murders for which defendant was being sentenced. Thus, not
only is defendant legally accountable for Urica's injuries, her
injuries reflect on defendant's moral character. While defendant
may not have inflicted Urica's injuries, neither did he take steps to
prevent the attack. Rather, his behavior at the time of the incident
suggests that he tacitly approved of the attack on her. Thus, the
concern in Hope, that the victim impact evidence would be too
attenuated to be relevant to the sentencing jurors' inquiry into the
defendant's character and record, is not present here.
	Because defendant has been unsuccessful in his attempt to
show that the testimony of Officer Byrne and Dr. Soter was
unrelated victim impact evidence admitted in violation of Hope,
it follows that appellate counsel could not have been deficient for
failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Furthermore, because
defendant has not made a substantial showing that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim was properly dismissed
without an evidentiary hearing.

II. Witherspoon Violation
	Defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right
to an impartial jury and his "due process right to a jury from which
no jurors have been systematically removed." The basis for this
claim is the State's use of peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire individuals who expressed reservations about imposing
the death penalty. In particular, defendant claims that the State
excused Dale Larsen, Albert Efkman, and James Lofgren based on
a perception that they were "weak as far as the death penalty" and,
thus, the State "seated a hanging jury" by removing these men who
were "otherwise well qualified" to sit on the jury.
	Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776,  88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), and its progeny, it is unconstitutional
to remove for cause a prospective juror who expresses a general
objection to the death penalty on moral or religious grounds. This
court has repeatedly held, however, that Witherspoon does not
limit the State's use of peremptory challenges. People v. Coleman,
168 Ill. 2d 509, 549 (1995); People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1,
55-56 (1994); People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 136-38 (1991).
While defendant acknowledges these decisions, he urges us to
reconsider them. Yet, he has provided this court with no
persuasive reasons for departing from our earlier holdings.
	But even if this court were inclined to revisit this issue, it
would be unnecessary in this case. Defendant contends the State
unconstitutionally exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude
Dale Larsen, Albert Efkman, and James Lofgren. However, these
men were members of the venire at defendant's first sentencing
hearing. The death sentence which was imposed following the first
sentencing hearing was vacated. Defendant received a new
sentencing hearing, where the evidence was heard by an entirely
new sentencing jury. Thus, whether the State improperly excluded
these venirepersons is a moot issue, which we need not consider.
See People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 281 (1990).
	Defendant does not contend that any venire members at his
second sentencing hearing were improperly excluded.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing that his constitutional rights to an impartial
sentencing jury were violated. This claim was properly dismissed
without an evidentiary hearing.

III. Fairness of the Sentencing Hearing
	Defendant next claims that his due process and equal
protection rights were violated because his sentencing hearing was
fundamentally unfair. In particular, he contends that (a) the judge
who presided over his sentencing hearing was biased, (b)
inadmissible "hypnotically enhanced" testimony was presented,
and (c) under the heading of "other claims," eight additional errors
denied him a fair sentencing hearing.

(a) Judicial Bias
	Defendant attached to his post-conviction petition two
affidavits in support of his claim that the judge who presided over
his sentencing hearing was biased against him. The first affiant
was Martha Fitzsimmons, an attorney employed by the Cook
County public defender's office, who represented defendant at his
second sentencing hearing. Fitzsimmons attested to the fact that
she had visited the judge's chambers and saw "prominently
displayed on the wall, a framed and matted souvenir."
Fitzsimmons said she later learned that this "souvenir" had been
given to the judge by the assistant State's Attorneys who had
originally tried defendant's case. The framed "souvenir" held a
picture of two girls-Urica Winder and her sister-and a handwritten
letter from Urica. According to Fitzsimmons, the letter said
"something to the effect of ... thank you Judge Urso for helping me
during the trial and putting those bad men away for good."
Fitzsimmons stated that she informed appellate counsel of this
"evidence of prejudice," but that the issue of judicial bias was not
raised on appeal.
	The second affiant was Steven Clark, an attorney employed by
the office of the State Appellate Defender and defendant's counsel
for both of defendant's direct appeals to this court and for his
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Clark averred that he
had been present in the courtroom on several occasions during
defendant's second death penalty hearing and
		"on 5 to 10 occasions during the proceedings, in the
presence of the jury, Judge Urso reacted to objections and
requests for side bars by defense counsel by at various
times frowning, raising the volume of his voice, rolling
his eyes, looking at the ceiling, or abruptly moving his
arms or body. Each of these reactions indicted that the
Judge was angry with defense counsel."
	 As stated, a post-conviction petition is not an appeal, but a
collateral proceeding, and issues that could have been presented on
direct appeal, but were not, may be deemed waived. People v.
Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d 472 (1995); People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 372 (1988). Waiver will apply unless principles of
fundamental fairness require review of the issue. People v. Owens,
129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989). " ' "Fundamental fairness" requires
courts to review procedurally defaulted claims in collateral
proceedings only when a defendant shows cognizable "cause" for
his failure to make timely objection, and shows "actual prejudice"
flowing from the error now complained of.' " People v. Hudson,
195 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (2001), quoting Owens, 129 Ill. 2d  at 317,
citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977). See also People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154
(2000). As detailed in Hudson:
			" '[C]ause' denotes  ' " 'some objective factor external
to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts' to raise
the claim" in an earlier proceeding.' People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (1992), quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 544, 111 S. Ct. 1454,
1470 (1991), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
488, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397, 408, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has identified
objective factors that constitute cause to include
' " 'interference by officials' " that makes compliance
with the State's procedural rule impracticable, and "a
showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not
reasonably available to counsel." [Citation.] In addition,
constitutionally "[i]neffective assistance of counsel ... is
cause." [Citation.] Attorney error short of ineffective
assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause
***.' McCleskey, 499 U.S.  at 493-94, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at
544, 111 S. Ct.  at 1470. To establish actual prejudice, a
petitioner 'must show "not merely that the errors at ... trial
created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to
his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his
entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." '
Murray, 477 U.S.  at 494, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 412, 106 S. Ct. 
at 2648, quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
170, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816, 832, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596
(1982)." Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d  at 123-24.
	In the present case, judicial bias was not raised in defendant's
direct appeal. While we acknowledge that the waiver rule is less
rigidly applied where the basis for the objection is the conduct of
the trial judge (People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990)),
principles of fundamental fairness do not require that we ignore
the procedural bar in this case.
	Although defendant fails to mention it, a substitution of judge
motion was filed prior to defendant's resentencing hearing. In this
motion, allegations of Judge Urso's lack of impartiality were
premised, primarily, on the framed photograph and letter from
Urica which Judge Urso kept in his chambers. The motion was
heard by Judge Gaughan, who held an evidentiary hearing on the
matter. At this hearing, the court heard testimony which
established that the framed letter stated simply, "Judge Urso,
Thank you. Urica." Furthermore, other witnesses testified that this
framed keepsake was only one of many pictures, artists' sketches,
and pieces of memorabilia which cluttered the judge's chambers.
After hearing argument on the motion, Judge Gaughan denied the
substitution motion.
	When Clark represented defendant in his direct appeal
following the resentencing, he did not challenge the correctness of
this ruling. Nor did Clark raise judicial bias as an issue on appeal,
even though Clark now claims to have witnessed the judge
exhibiting body language during the sentencing hearing which
suggested that the judge was not being impartial.
	Under the circumstances, the claim of judicial bias which is
being raised in the post-conviction petition is not based on "new
evidence" unknown to appellate counsel, nor can defendant show
that efforts to raise the issue of judicial bias in a timely fashion
were impeded. Thus, he cannot show cognizable cause.
	Moreover, defendant cannot show a reasonable possibility that
he was prejudiced as a result of judicial bias. The trial court, after
an evidentiary hearing, decided that the framed keepsake was not
a basis for disqualifying Judge Urso from presiding over the
sentencing hearing. We agree.
	Disqualification of a judge is not a decision to be made
lightly. People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239 (1997); People v. Vance,
76 Ill. 2d 171 (1979). A judge is presumed to be impartial even
after extreme provocation. People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 407
(1986). It is assumed that judges, regardless of their personal
backgrounds and experiences in life, will be able to set aside any
biases or predispositions they might have and consider each case
in light of the evidence presented. People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1
(1990). "[O]nly under the most extreme cases would
disqualification for bias or prejudice be constitutionally required."
People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 541 (1995); People v. Del
Vecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265, 275 (1989).
	The "thank you" note and picture were apparently given to
Judge Urso soon after defendant's initial trial, which took place in
1988. There is no evidence that Judge Urso had any contact with
Urica closer in time to the resentencing hearing, which took place
years later. Under the circumstances, the keepsake is not evidence
that Judge Urso could not remain impartial in the subsequent
resentencing hearing.
	Clark's affidavit is equally unpersuasive in demonstrating
judicial bias. Allegations of judicial bias must be viewed in
context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge's
specific reaction to the events taking place. See People v. Hannon,
48 Ill. 2d 462 (1971) (when evaluating bias based upon a judge's
comment, reviewing court will review entire context of comment);
People v. Martin, 285 Ill. App. 3d 623 (1996). Here, this court is
unable to consider the judge's reactions in context because Clark's
affidavit fails to identify the location in the record where Judge
Urso's reactions allegedly took place. Moreover, the fact that
Judge Urso may have displayed irritation with defense counsel is
not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against defendant. See
People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239 (1997) (a judge's displeasure with
counsel's behavior is not a basis for automatic recusal). Nothing
that has been presented to this court suggests that Judge Urso was
unable to "hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State
and the accused." See People v. Del Vecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265, 275
(1989), citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 71 L. Ed. 749,
758, 47 S. Ct. 437, 444 (1927). Since principles of fundamental
fairness do not require a relaxation of the procedural bar, the issue
of judicial bias is waived.

(b) Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony
	Defendant next contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether he was denied a fair resentencing
hearing because "hypnotically enhanced" testimony was
introduced through Urica Winder. An evidentiary hearing is
warranted, however, only when the allegations in the petition,
supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated. People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179 (2000); People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998).
In the case at bar the record and supporting documents do not
support a finding that Urica Winder's testimony was "hypnotically
enhanced."
	Defendant relies on a July 10, 1988, Chicago Tribune article
as evidence that "dream analysis" may have been used on Urica.
However, the article contains only Dr. Soter's recollection of a
dream that Urica once told him about. Dr. Soter was Urica's
treating physician and he provided no psychological counseling or
therapy. The article is not evidence that hypnosis or "dream
analysis" were techniques employed in any therapy Urica might
have received.
	Furthermore, the record does not support defendant's
assertion that Urica's testimony "evolved and became more
detailed over the course of time." Our review of the record
indicates that Urica was consistent in her testimony throughout all
of the proceedings. We conclude that defendant's claim that the
State employed Urica's "artificially enhanced" testimony at his
sentencing hearing is speculative and does not rise to the level of
a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.

(c) Other Claims
	Defendant presents, in list form, eight additional claims of
error. However, his argument is directed only to his eighth claim,
in which he contends that his constitutional rights were violated
because he was denied the right of allocution at his resentencing.
	On several occasions, this court has held that a defendant has
no statutory or constitutional right to allocution in a capital
sentencing hearing. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1 (2000); People v.
Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348 (2000); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484
(1996). As to the remaining claims, we decline to address them.
Our rules provide that an appellant's brief must contain
"[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant
and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the
pages of the record relied on" and "[p]oints not argued are
waived." 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Consequently, the remaining
claims of error are waived.
	Because defendant has failed to make a substantial showing
that his constitutional right to a fair sentencing hearing was
violated, we find that the trial court properly dismissed these
claims without an evidentiary hearing.

IV. Appropriateness of the Death Penalty
	It is defendant's contention that death is not an appropriate
penalty in this case. He argues that, "when proper consideration is
given to the circumstances of the crime in this case, as well as to
[defendant's] life history, it is evident that he is not the type of
person who should be permanently eliminated from society."
Noting that his codefendant received a natural life sentence,
defendant asks this court to vacate his death sentence and remand
for a sentence other than death.
	Clearly, the legislature never intended that every defendant
who is eligible for the death penalty receive a death sentence
(People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338 (1996)), and this court has
not hesitated to vacate a death sentence where the circumstances
did not indicate that death was an appropriate sentence (see People
v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253
(1989); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v.
Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145 (1980)). However, whether a death
sentence is excessive or inappropriate depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case (People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 26-27
(1990)), and we cannot say, based on our review of the record, that
a death sentence is excessive or inappropriate in this case.
	The horrific facts of this case have been detailed in
defendant's two direct appeals. See People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991);  People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998). Briefly,
however, the record reveals that defendant and his friend, Driskel,
while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, went to the
apartment of an acquaintance (Mark Brown) after devising a plan
to steal Brown's belongings, which they intended to sell to obtain
money for more drugs. Before entering Brown's apartment,
defendant gave Driskel a knife and, upon entering the apartment,
they began stabbing Mark Brown, without provocation or warning,
as Brown lay asleep on the couch. When Brown's fiancé, Vernita
Winder, saw what was happening, she tried to escape with her
four-year-old and six-year-old daughters to a back bedroom.
Vernita and her friend, Shirley Martin, tried desperately to hold the
bedroom door closed against defendant and Driskel. Defendant,
however, broke down the door and began stabbing the women,
while Driskel stabbed the children. Four individuals, including a
four-year-old child, died as a result of multiple stab wounds.
Collectively, they received over 115 incise wounds. Urica, who
was only six years old, also was stabbed repeatedly and left for
dead.
	Additional evidence in aggravation showed that defendant had
a criminal history and an extensive prison disciplinary record.
There was evidence that, while incarcerated, defendant threatened
correctional officers and assaulted both guards and inmates on
several occasions. One correctional officer, who had 27 years of
experience, testified that he would rank defendant fourth in terms
of dangerousness out of more than a thousand prisoners he had
contact with.
	Defendant, who was 22 at the time of the murders, never held
a legitimate job. He had supported himself by selling drugs. There
was also evidence that defendant had been involved with gangs
both inside and outside of prison.
	In mitigation, the defense showed that defendant had been
severely abused as a child and that he suffered from abnormal
brain functioning, most probably as a result of head injury.
Although defendant had obtained a GED, he had a borderline IQ
and had never done well in school. He used drugs and alcohol
since the age of nine.
	On balance, we cannot say that the mitigation evidence
outweighs the seriousness of the crimes and the additional
aggravating evidence presented. Furthermore, we have already
considered, and rejected, the argument made in defendant's direct
appeal that his death sentence is unreasonably disparate from his
codefendant's life sentence. For these reasons, we do not find that
the sentence of death was excessive or inappropriately applied in
this case.

V. Improper Questions Posed to the Venire
	In this claim, defendant argues that he was denied a fair death
penalty sentencing hearing because the trial court, when
questioning the venire, "suggested that a jury would have to be
unanimous as to any findings of mitigating factors."
	The State correctly argues that this issue is procedurally
defaulted because defendant failed to raise this issue on direct
appeal. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). It is
necessary, however, to consider whether principles of fundamental
fairness require that we review the issue.
	As stated, fundamental fairness is essentially a cause and
prejudice test (see People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 173
(2000)), with "cause" defined as "an objective factor that impeded
defense counsel's efforts to raise the claim on direct review" and
"prejudice" defined as "an error which so infected the entire trial
that the defendant's conviction violates due process." People v.
Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1995). Upon review of the record in
this case, we have determined that defendant is unable to satisfy
the prejudice prong of the "cause and prejudice" test. Even if some
of the questions posed to members of the venire were misleading,
as defendant contends, the likelihood that this had an effect on the
sentencing jury's verdict is too remote to require reversal.
	The purpose of voir dire is not to instruct the jury, " '[t]he
purpose of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about
prospective jurors' beliefs and opinions so as to allow removal of
those members of the venire whose minds are so closed by bias
and prejudice that they cannot apply the law as instructed in
accordance with their oath.' " People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467,
476 (2000), quoting People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96
(1993). Defendant does not contend that the trial court failed to
adequately screen the venirepersons for bias. The members of the
venire who were selected to sit on the jury were fully and properly
instructed on their duties with regard to imposition of the death
penalty. Thus, any confusion that might have arisen due to the
court's preliminary inquiries to members of the venire would have
been cured when, at the close of the aggravation/mitigation phase
of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued to the jury that
"[a]ll of you don't have to decide that there is a mitigating factor,
just one," and "it only takes just one to say that there are sufficient
mitigating factors which will prevent [defendant] from receiving
death" and when the trial court instructed the jury and provided it
with verdict forms which accurately stated the requirements for
imposition of the death penalty. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 471-72 (1996). There is no reasonable probability that
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the voir dire questioning,
which occurred long before the jury ever heard any evidence or
determined whether defendant was eligible for the death penalty.
Defendant's claim of error is waived.

VI. Cumulative Effect of the Above Errors
	Recognizing that each of the claims of error raised in his post-conviction petition and in this appeal, standing alone, may be
insufficient to warrant relief, defendant asks this court to assess
the fairness of his trial and sentencing hearing after looking at the
totality of the circumstances. He asks this court to decide whether
these errors, which individually may be deemed harmless,
cumulatively amount to a denial of due process.
	 This court has recognized that individual errors may have the
cumulative effect of denying a defendant a fair hearing (People v.
Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 350 (2000); People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992)) and has reversed convictions and sentences when
it was clear that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the
defendant of due process (see People v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 502,
516-17 (1982); People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 341-42 (1982);
People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d 315, 319-20 (1967)). However, this
case does not present such a situation.
	None of the claims of error raised by defendant here were
found to be of any merit. Thus, whether considered individually or
in the aggregate, defendant's claims do not demonstrate a
substantial violation of his constitutional rights. There is no basis
for granting defendant an evidentiary hearing or any alternate relief
requested.

VII. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant next contends that the Illinois death penalty statute
is unconstitutional because it lacks a burden of persuasion, thus
making the death penalty mandatory where the State has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance
and no mitigating evidence is offered.
	On more than one occasion, this court has considered and
rejected the identical argument presented in this appeal. See
People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 429 (2000); People v. Brown,
172 Ill. 2d 1, 62-63 (1996); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117,
152 (1996); People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 227 (1989); People
v. Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d 96, 130 (1987); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 265-66 (1983). We adhere to our prior decisions.
	Furthermore, we note that when a similar argument was
presented in defendant's second direct appeal, this court upheld
the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute, finding
that the statute places a burden of persuasion on both the State and
the defendant, with the primary burden being on the State to
persuade " 'the jury that, as the statute states, there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the sentencer from
imposing the sentence of death for which the defendant is
eligible.' " Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 94-95, quoting People v. Bean,
137 Ill. 2d 65, 139 (1990). Defendant's claim here must fail.

VIII. Exemption From Death Penalty for Persons Who Require
Special Forms of Communicative Assistance
	Section 104-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/104-22 (West 2000)) recognizes that defendants with
certain disabilities, who may otherwise be unfit to stand trial, may
become fit if special provisions are made or assistance provided.
However, the legislature has also determined that any defendant
"convicted following a trial under Section 104-22 shall not be
subject to the death penalty." 725 ILCS 5/104-26(b) (West 2000).
Defendant contends that this exemption renders the death penalty
statute unconstitutionally discriminatory, arbitratry and capricious
because it exempts from the death penalty a defendant who
requires "a translator or needs special assistance because of
unfitness due to a physical disability."
	The argument posited by defendant has been rejected by this
court on previous occasions. This court has held that the death
penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it exempts persons
in need of special assistance. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123
(1989); People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 90 (1988); People v.
Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 94-95 (1985). Furthermore, this court, in
construing section 104-10, has held that the statutory scheme does
not intend that those defendants who are merely unable to speak
or understand English be exempted from the death penalty. People
v. Britz, 123 Ill. 2d 446 (1988). See also People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 294 (1988); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 202-03
(1988); People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 105 (1987). In fact, this
court has held that any interpretation of sections 104-22 and
104-26(b) that would allow for such an exemption reflects "a
serious misunderstanding" of the statutory scheme. People v.
Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201, 212 (1985). Because defendant's premise
is flawed, there is no merit to his argument that the death penalty
statute is unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County dismissing defendant's amended
petition for post-conviction relief. We direct the clerk of this court
to enter an order setting Tuesday, March 12, 2002, as the date on
which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook
County is to be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the
manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1994)). The
clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this
case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where
defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	The proceedings which culminated in Jackson's sentence of
death were fatally flawed because they did not comport with the
new rules enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in
which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set
forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, No. 87286
(September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures
contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an
accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to
all capital cases now coming before us. Because Jackson was tried,
convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his
convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause
should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Jackson were not entitled to the benefit of the new
rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void
and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Jackson's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j)
(West 1994). Because he was convicted of murdering more than
one victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural life. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994).
 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe this cause
should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with
the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents,
the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's adoption of the
new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For this reason, I
believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
 



1.      1A detailed account of the murders can be found in the opinions
issued by this court in defendant's direct appeals. See People v.
Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998).