Title: State v. Murray
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52704
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

FILED: May 25, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DENNIS MARTIN MURRAY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 02CR0274; CA A118634; SC S52704)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 7, 2006.
James N. Varner, Newberg, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.
Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. 
Williams, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Kistler, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Riggs,
J., joined.
*Appeal from Josephine County Circuit Court, Gerald C. Neufeld, Judge. 200 Or App 732, 117 P3d 297 (2005). 
GILLETTE, J.
This is a criminal case in which defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for the
offense of kidnapping in the second degree (ORS 163.225, set out
post).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, although it
remanded defendant's case to the trial court for resentencing. 
State v. Murray, 200 Or App 732, 117 P3d 297 (2005).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review and now reverse his conviction
for kidnapping.
We view the facts underlying defendant's conviction in
the light most favorable to the state.  See, e.g., State v.
Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 471, 111 P3d 1131 (2005) (identifying and
applying that standard of review for sufficiency of evidence in
kidnapping case).  The victim, Linderman, drove from her home in
Rogue River to Grants Pass to perform some errands.  One of those
errands required a stop at a Grants Pass grocery store. 
Linderman parked in an empty space on the west side of the store. 
She noticed that a man was sitting in a car parked beside hers,
but gave the matter no special thought.  After completing her
errand inside the store, Linderman returned to her car, unlocked
it, and climbed in behind the wheel.  However, before she had
time to fasten her seatbelt, she heard a voice (which turned out
to be defendant's) say, "Get over."
Defendant attempted to push his way into the driver's
side of the front seat.  Linderman, who feared that defendant
"was going to drive off with me," physically resisted, but lost
the struggle. (1)  She also screamed and honked the car horn,
but no one came to her aid.  Linderman described what happened
next:
"[PROSECUTOR]:  So he's -- continue to describe what's
happening.  He's pushing you, you're honking the horn,
you're --
"[LINDERMAN]:  Yelling and screaming, and every time I
yelled out he'd say shut up.  He said that several
times and I just kept fighting him because I thought
that he was trying to get me over into the passenger
seat, and so it was just a -- very, very frightening.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Did he -- did he move you into the
passenger seat?
"[LINDERMAN]:  Finally, he did push me over.  And then
I reached for the -- my left hand reached for the door
and opened it and got out right quick.  And then he
said get out bitch, as I was leaving the car.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Did he say that before you opened the
door?
"[LINDERMAN]:  It was just at that -- I really -- I'm
not sure.  It just all happened almost at the same time
it seemed to me.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Did he -- he ordered you or -- get out,
bitch?
"[LINDERMAN]:  He said get out, bitch."
Defendant then closed the passenger side door and drove away in
Linderman's car.  He abandoned the car a short time thereafter,
but was apprehended almost immediately.
A grand jury indicted defendant for kidnapping in the
second degree (ORS 163.225); robbery in the third degree (ORS
164.395); unauthorized use of a vehicle (ORS 164.135); and
assault in the fourth degree (ORS 163.160).  Defendant waived a
jury trial, and the case was tried to the court.  Defendant
timely asserted that the evidence was insufficient to permit him
to be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, but the trial
court disagreed.  The trial court then found defendant guilty on
all counts.  Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, again
asserting his argument respecting the insufficiency of the
evidence. (2)  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed all
defendant's convictions on the merits, although it remanded the
case for resentencing. (3)  We allowed defendant's petition for
review respecting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for kidnapping.
The indictment alleged that defendant committed
kidnapping in the second degree in that
"[t]he defendant, on or about April 23, 2002, in
Josephine County, Oregon, did unlawfully and knowingly,
without consent or legal authority, take [the victim]
from one place to another, with the intent to interfere
substantially with the said [victim's] personal
liberty."
That indictment in turn was based on ORS 163.225(1), which
provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the
second degree if, with intent to interfere
substantially with another's personal liberty, and
without consent or legal authority, the person:
"(a) Takes the person from one place to
another[.]"
This case turns entirely on whether a rational finder of fact
could conclude, from the evidence just outlined, that defendant
had "take[n]" Linderman "from one place to another."  That
inquiry necessarily involves an issue of statutory interpretation
that invokes this court's familiar methodology of examining the
words of a statute, read in relevant context, and, if no clear
interpretation emerges from that exercise, resorting to extrinsic
aids such as legislative history to determine the intent of the
legislature.  See generally PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (describing
that methodology).  
The question of what is included in the concept of
"taking" a person "from one place to another" is, at bottom, an
exercise in metaphysics.  The words "from" and "to" create no
problem here, because they clearly describe the idea of movement,
i.e., of a change of position.  And "another" simply replicates
"place" -- i.e., the statutory phrase fairly may be paraphrased
as a matter of standard English to require that a person be moved
"from place to place."  Thus, in the final analysis, this case
comes down to the question of how one is to define the term
"place" for the purposes of ORS 163.225(1)(a).
And here is where the metaphysics problem arises.  The
criminal code, of which ORS 163.225 is a part, contains no
definition of "place."  Absent a special definition, we
ordinarily would resort to dictionary definitions, assuming that
the legislature meant to use a word of common usage in its
ordinary sense.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (noting that words of
common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and 
ordinary meaning).  But resort to a dictionary gets us nowhere
here.  "Place" is defined, in Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 1727 (unabridged ed 2002), as "an indefinite region or
expanse."  Such a definition hardly can be said to clarify the
issue.  (There are many other definitions, but none comes as
close as the foregoing to addressing the problem before us.)  We
therefore turn to the legislative history of the kidnapping
statutes, to find some guidance as to legislative intent.
In State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980),
this court undertook a comprehensive examination of the
legislative history of the kidnapping statutes. (4)  We set out
the court's analysis and some of its conclusions at length,
because we find them to be well supported in the history of the
statute:
"The 1971 legislature adopted the present
kidnapping statutes as part of the complete revision of
the Oregon Criminal Code. * * * Carefully kept records
of the proceedings of the [Oregon Criminal Law
Revision] Commission[, the body that created the new
code,] and of its subcommittees were preserved and,
accordingly, provide a rich source for determination of
the drafters' intent.  The Commission's first draft of
the kidnapping sections was adopted from the Model
Penal Code and contained the following commentary:
"'Current kidnaping statutes apply to
abductions which are incidental to or an
integral part of the commission of an
independent crime such as robbery or rape * * *.  Where the detention period is brief
there is no genuine kidnaping. * * * The
Model Penal Code and the New York Revised
Penal Law have tried to exclude this type of
case from first degree kidnaping by
differentiating on the basis of the movement
and duration of detention of the victim.  The
Model Penal Code provides for kidnaping only
where the kidnaper removes the victim from
his place of residence or business, or a
substantial distance from the vicinity where
he is found * * *.'
"* * * The minutes reveal that the drafters
intended to prevent conviction and sentencing for
kidnapping when the detention was merely incidental to
a rape or robbery.  The difficulty facing the drafters,
however, was to provide the flexibility to cover
diverse kidnapping fact situations, yet rationally
restrict prosecutorial discretion to punish.
"The [wording] of the proposed kidnapping statutes
was revised three times. The commentary following each
revision included the above-quoted passage.  This
passage was also included in the tentative and final
draft commentaries, but the drafters added the
following paragraph:
"'The proposed draft solves this problem [of
excluding abductions which are incidental to or an
integral part of the commission of an independent
crime] by strictly limiting kidnapping in the
first degree to only those instances where the
actor's purpose in abducting falls within
subsection (1) of [ORS 163.235 (the statute
defining Kidnapping in the First Degree)].'
"This paragraph of commentary is less than clear. 
In the preceding paragraph of commentary, the drafters
discussed the problem of unwarranted kidnapping
convictions where the abduction is merely incidental to
a robbery or rape, citing the Model Penal Code and New
York approaches to this problem.  The 'solution,'
however, refers only to Oregon's first degree
kidnapping statute, and states that this offense is
strictly limited by the words of the statute itself.
"From this history we draw the inference that the
Commission, and subsequently the legislature, intended
that there be no conviction of the defendant for the
separate crime of kidnapping where the detention or
asportation of the victim is merely incidental to the
accomplishment of another crime, particularly that of
robbery or rape. * * *.
"The drafting technique utilized to accomplish the
legislative purpose is manifested in the definition of
the crime of kidnapping.  The Commission reasoned that
even though the malefactor's conduct offended the
statutory injunctions [against some other substantive
offense], he would be guilty of kidnapping also if in
committing [that other offense] he took the victim a
'substantial distance' or held the victim for 'a
substantial period of time.'"
Garcia, 288 Or at 416-21 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted;
brackets in original).
The foregoing discussion is useful and informative, and
the parties have not pointed to (and we are not aware of) any
better or more thorough survey of the legislative history of the
kidnapping statutes.  Neither have the parties pointed to (and we
are not aware of) any original source materials within the
legislative history that would more fully inform us. (5) 
Indeed, we think that the discussion in Garcia resolves the issue
that we have been attempting to confront, viz., the scope of the
concept of "place" in ORS 163.225(1)(a).
As Garcia suggests, the "place" in which something or
someone may be found and from which that something or someone may
be taken is situational and contextual.  It is, among other
things, a function of the object to be moved, as well as a
function of the area in which the movement occurs.  And, given
that elasticity in the concept, one fairly may argue either way
the question whether, in this case, Linderman went from one place
to another. 
But, however one may wish to characterize the
confrontation between defendant and Linderman in the car, no
evidence indicates that defendant tried to keep Linderman in the
car.  Instead, defendant drove the car away.  That means that,
even if one were to find some sort of asportation in the events
in question, it was only "incidental" -- as that word was used in
Garcia -- to defendant's theft of the car and, therefore, not the
kind of conduct that the legislature intended to permit to serve
as the basis for a separate kidnapping charge.  Put differently,
defendant did not "take" Linderman anywhere or, even if he did,
the distance that Linderman moved was not "substantial," i.e.,
was not "from one place to another."  See Garcia, 288 Or at 421
(defendant guilty of kidnapping only if, during commission of
another substantive offense, he took victim "substantial
distance").
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, as a matter
of law, the evidence pertaining to defendant's encounter with
Linderman would not support a conviction on a charge of
kidnapping in the second degree.  The trial court therefore erred
in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on that
charge, and the Court of Appeals also erred when it affirmed that
conviction.  The case must be remanded to the trial court for
entry of a verdict of not guilty on the kidnapping charge and for
such other further proceedings as may be required.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and
the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
KISTLER, J., dissenting.
The majority reverses defendant's conviction for
second-degree kidnapping, holding that no reasonable juror could
find that defendant took the victim "from one place to another."
In the majority's opinion, the state could meet that requirement
only if it proved that defendant moved the victim a "substantial
distance."  Because the majority equates two concepts that the
drafters of the kidnapping statutes specifically distinguished, I
respectfully dissent.
The victim was getting into her car after shopping.  As
she did so, defendant pushed her out of the driver's seat and
over onto the passenger seat.  Defendant got into the driver's
seat of the car, but the victim escaped before defendant could
drive away with her.  The majority holds that those facts are not
sufficient, as a matter of law, to prove second-degree kidnapping
because no reasonable juror could find that defendant took the
victim "from one place to another." (6)  The majority's holding
turns on its interpretation of the quoted phrase.  Relying on
part of the legislative history set out in State v. Garcia, 288
Or 413, 416, 605 P2d 671 (1980), the majority reasons that the
legislature did not want to punish, as second-degree kidnapping,
movements that were incidental to the commission of some other
crime, and it concludes that a movement will be incidental unless
the defendant moves the victim a "substantial distance."   State
v. Murray, 340 Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (2006) (slip op at 8-9).  
The majority's conclusion that moving a victim "from
one place to another" means moving the victim "a substantial
distance" is directly contrary to the legislative history of the
kidnapping statutes.  There were four drafts of the kidnapping
statutes. (7)  The first draft provided that a person would
commit the crime of second-degree kidnapping if, among other
things, the person moved the victim "from one place to another." 
See Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No 2,
Preliminary Draft No 1, Art 12, § 1(1) (Oct 1968) (defining
"restrain"). (8)  That draft also provided that second-degree
kidnapping would become first-degree kidnapping if, among other
things, the person moved the victim "a substantial distance from
the vicinity where he is found."  Id., § 3(1).
As those two provisions demonstrate, the drafters of
the kidnapping statutes understood that a person could move a
victim "from one place to another" without moving the victim "a
substantial distance."  Proof of the latter act elevated the
crime of second-degree kidnapping to first-degree kidnapping. 
Far from equating those two phrases, as the majority does, the
drafters understood that each phrase described a separate act and
that a person need not move the victim a "substantial distance"
in order to move the victim "from one place to another."
The second draft of the kidnapping statutes continued
that distinction.  As before, the statutes required proof that a
person move the victim "from one place to another" to establish
second-degree kidnapping.  Criminal Law Revision Commission,
Subcommittee No 2, Preliminary Draft No 2, Art 12, § 1(1) (Dec
1968) (defining "restrain").  The second draft contained three
alternate sets of elements that would elevate second-degree
kidnapping to first-degree kidnapping.  The second alternate set
would have required proof that the defendant "h[e]l[d] the victim
for a substantial period of time or remove[d] the victim a
substantial distance from the place where the victim was first
restrained * * *."  Id., § 3 (alternate 2).  The drafters
rejected that alternate set of elements because the "elements of
substantial period of time and substantial distance in Alternate
2 * * * created unnecessary problems."  Criminal Law Revision
Commission, Subcommittee No 2, Minutes, Dec 12, 1968, 5.
Ultimately, the drafters chose to use a different set
of elements -- the purposes for which the defendant kidnapped the
victim -- to distinguish first-degree kidnapping from second-degree kidnapping.  Id. at 5-6; see ORS 163.235(1) (defining
purposes that distinguish first-degree from second-degree
kidnapping).  They also deleted any reference to "a substantial
period of time" and "a substantial distance" from the text of the
kidnapping statutes.  The deletion of those phrases, however,
does not suggest some unarticulated intent to equate, as the
majority does, moving the victim "from one place to another" with
moving the victim "a substantial distance."  Rather, the drafters
carefully distinguished the act of moving the victim "from one
place to another" from the act of moving the victim "a
substantial distance."
The majority's interpretation of the phrase "from one
place to another" rests on a second, equally suspect proposition. 
As the majority recognizes, the legislature did not intend to
punish defendants for "the separate crime of kidnapping where the
detention or asportation of the victim is merely incidental to
the accomplishment of another crime."  Garcia, 288 Or at 420. 
The legislature, however, did not change the ordinary
understanding of "asportation" to accomplish that goal. (9) 
Rather, the legislature relied on the requirement that the
defendant "'inten[d] to interfere substantially' with the
victim's personal liberty" to distinguish kidnapping from conduct
incidental to another crime.  Id. at 421 (emphasis in original). 
The court's decision in Garcia makes that proposition clear.
The crime of second-degree kidnapping has two elements. 
It requires a physical act -- taking a person "from one place to
another."  It also requires proof of a mental state -- the
"intent to interfere substantially with another's personal
liberty."  In Garcia, the court explained that the legislature
wanted to avoid separate convictions for kidnapping "where the
detention or asportation of the victim is merely incidental to
the accomplishment of another crime."  288 Or at 420. 
Conversely, the "legislature perceived no reason not to prosecute
and punish a malefactor for the separate crime of kidnapping
where the detention or asportation is not merely incidental to
the commission of the underlying crime."  Id. (emphases in
original).
The court then explained that the legislature relied on
the mental state, not the physical act, to distinguish those two
situations.  The court reasoned:
"The drafting technique utilized to accomplish the
legislative purpose is manifested in the definition of
the crime of kidnapping.  The [Oregon Criminal Law
Revision] Commission reasoned that even though the
malefactor's conduct offended the statutory injunctions
against rape or robbery, he would be guilty of
kidnapping also if in committing rape or robbery he
took the victim a 'substantial distance' or held the
victim 'a substantial period of time.'  As finally
enacted the law does not even require that there
actually be a substantial interference with the
victim's personal liberty;  it is only necessary that
the perpetrator have the 'intent to interfere
substantially' with the victim's personal liberty to
make the malefactor guilty of kidnapping if he commits
an act proscribed by ORS 163.225.  We find nothing in
legislative history to indicate the legislature
intended by its adverb 'substantially' anything other
than was intended by the Commission in its use of the
adjective 'substantial.'
"The end result is that the legislature has left
it to the process of adjudication to determine whether
there was an intent to interfere substantially."
Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added; citation and footnote omitted).
As the emphasized part of the quotation from Garcia
makes clear, (10) the legislature used the phrase "intent to
interfere substantially with [the victim's] personal liberty" to
accomplish its goal of distinguishing kidnapping from incidental
conduct that might accompany some other crime.  See State v.
Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 477, 111 P3d 1131 (2005) (quoting
legislative history to that effect). (11)  Nothing in Garcia or
the legislative history suggests that the legislature also
intended to use the act of moving the victim "from one place to
another" to accomplish that purpose.  The majority errs in
relying on that legislative purpose to determine what the phrase
"from one place to another" means.  Reading that purpose into
both the mental element and the physical act amounts to "double
counting" and undercuts rather than advances the legislative
goal.
Interpreting the phrase "from one place to another" in
light of the legislative history and this court's construction of
the kidnapping statutes in Garcia, I would hold that the state
introduced sufficient evidence to submit the crime of second-degree kidnapping to the jury.  Regarding the mental element, a
reasonable juror could find that defendant intended to interfere
substantially with the victim's personal liberty; that is, a
reasonable juror could find that, but for the victim's escape,
defendant intended to drive off with her.  A reasonable juror
also could find that defendant committed the act of taking the
victim "from one place to another."  To be sure, defendant did
not move the victim a "substantial distance" when he moved her
from one seat to another, but the legislative history makes clear
that a defendant need not move the victim a substantial distance
in order to move her from one place to another.  Because a
reasonable juror could find that the state had proved the two
elements necessary to establish second-degree kidnapping, I
respectfully dissent.
Riggs, J., joins in this dissent.
1. That outcome is not surprising.  Defendant is nearly seven feet tall and weighs
nearly three hundred pounds.  The record does not disclose Linderman's size, but the events in this
case occurred just two days before her 83rd birthday.
2. On his appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant did not raise any assignments of
error respecting his conviction on the other three counts of the indictment.  Those convictions
therefore are not before us.
3. The propriety of the Court of Appeals' remand for resentencing is not at issue in
this proceeding.
4. The actual crime involved in Garcia was kidnapping in the first degree under ORS
163.235, but that offense cannot be committed unless the offender "violates ORS 163.225."  ORS
163.235(1).  Thus, the court's comments are relevant to the issue before us.
5. The dissent offers a view of the statutory history that differs from Garcia. 
However, we do not find the materials that the dissent relies on -- most of which were preliminary
discussions -- to be as useful as the Garcia court's summary (with which we agree) of the net
effect of the entire evolution of the kidnapping statute.
6. ORS 163.225 provides in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the second degree if,
with intent to interfere substantially with another's personal liberty, and without
consent or legal authority, the person:
"(a) Takes the person from one place to another[.]"
7. The 1967 Legislative Assembly created the Criminal Law Revision Commission to revise
the state's criminal laws.  State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 416, 605 P2d 671 (1980).  The
Commission divided responsibility for drafting the revised criminal code among three
subcommittees, and this court has looked to the subcommittee and the Commission's drafts, the
minutes of their meetings, and their comments on the drafts to interpret the meaning of the
kidnapping statutes.  See id. (looking to drafters' intent to determine legislative intent).
8. The first draft provided that a person committed the crime of second-degree unlawful
imprisonment if he "restrain[ed] another person."  Criminal Law Revision Commission,
Subcommittee No 2, Preliminary Draft No 1, Art 12, § 4 (Oct 1968).  "Restrain" was defined as
interfering with another's liberty by "moving him from one place to another."  Id., § 1(1).  Second-degree kidnapping was defined as "abduct[ing] another person."  Id., § 2(1).  "Abduct" was
defined as "restrain[ing] a person with intent to prevent his liberation by [one of two means]."  Id.,
§ 1(2).  Proof that a defendant moved a person "from one place to another" was thus necessary to
prove both second-degree kidnapping and the lesser crime of second-degree unlawful interference
-- a fact that, by itself, cautions against reading the phrase as restrictively as the majority does.
9. That much is apparent from Garcia's recognition that incidental movement still would
constitute asportation.
10. In setting out Garcia's discussion of the legislative history, the majority does not quote the
part of the discussion beginning with the sentences emphasized above -- a part of Garcia's
discussion of the legislative history that is, I submit, crucial to understanding both that decision
and the legislature's intent in enacting the second-degree kidnapping statute.
11. Similarly, the court held in Garcia that the mental element -- the intent to interfere
substantially with the victim's personal liberty -- incorporates the concepts of a "substantial
distance" and a "substantial period of time."  See 288 Or at 421 (explaining that those concepts
inform the meaning of the intent to "substantially interfere"); State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 478,
111 P3d 1131 (2005) (same).  It did not hold that the element of a physical act incorporates those
concepts, as the majority now concludes.