Title: Corey Franklin v. State Of Florida  (order)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-413
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-413 
____________ 
 
COREY FRANKLIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 30, 2004] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PARIENTE, C.J. 
The issue in this case is the constitutionality of chapter 99-188, Laws of 
Florida (the "Act"), designated by the Legislature as the "Three-Strike Violent 
Felony Offender Act."  The specific constitutional question presented is whether 
the fourteen provisions of the Act "embrace but one subject and matter properly 
connected therewith" as mandated by article III, section 6 of the Florida 
Constitution, the single subject clause.1  We have jurisdiction based on certified 
                                        
1.  "Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected 
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."  Art. III, § 6, Fla. 
Const.  
 
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conflict among the district courts of appeal.2  For the reasons expressed in this 
opinion, we conclude that the Act does not violate the single subject clause of the 
Florida Constitution. 
I.  SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 99-188 
Chapter 99-188, enacted during the 1999 legislative session, became 
effective July 1, 1999.  Chapter 99-188 is identified at the beginning of its full title 
as "an act relating to sentencing."  The remainder of the full title sets forth the 
statutory provisions that are enacted or amended in the Act.3  A lengthy preamble, 
consisting of twenty-one "Whereas" clauses, follows the full title.4  The Act 
contains fourteen separate sections, twelve of which are substantive.  Section one 
sets forth the citation name of the Act as the "Three-Strike Violent Felony 
Offender Act"5 and section fourteen provides an effective date of July 1, 1999.  
The remaining twelve sections, which are set forth in forty-one pages, may be 
summarized as follows: 
Section 2: 
expands the definition of "prison release reoffender" in 
section 775.082, a sentencing statute. 
Section 3: 
amends section 775.084 to redefine "habitual felony 
offender," to define "three-time felony offender," and to 
                                        
2.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  
3.  The full title, consisting of two pages and 938 words, is set forth as 
Appendix A.  
4.  The full preamble, consisting of two pages and 701 words, is set forth as 
Appendix B.  
5.  "Section 1. This act may be cited as the 'Three-Strike Violent Felony 
Offender Act.'" 
 
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require the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences 
on persons fitting the definition of "three-time felony 
offender." 
Section 4: 
amends section 784.07 to provide mandatory minimum 
sentences for aggravated assault of a law enforcement 
officer and aggravated battery of a law enforcement 
officer. 
Section 5: 
amends section 784.08 to provide a mandatory minimum 
sentence for aggravated assault on a person 65 years or 
older and for aggravated battery on a person 65 years or 
older. 
Section 6: 
amends references to section 775.084 found in section 
790.235, in conformity with section 3. 
Section 7: 
creates section 794.0115, which defines "repeat sexual 
batterer," provides procedures for determining repeat 
sexual batterer status, and creates a mandatory minimum 
sentence for persons who qualify. 
Section 8: 
amends section 794.011, wherein the crime "sexual 
battery" is defined, to refer to new section 794.0115 in 
punishment provisions. 
Section 9: 
amends section 893.135, which criminalizes trafficking 
in certain drugs, to expand the definitions of certain 
trafficking offenses and provide a minimum mandatory 
sentence for certain trafficking offenses. 
Section 10: amends various statutes to incorporate references to 
section 893.135, as amended by section 9. 
Section 11: amends section 943.0535 to require clerks of court to 
transmit to the appropriate United States immigration 
officer records pertaining to aliens who are convicted or 
who enter a plea to any crime. 
Section 12: requires the Governor to publicize the penalties contained 
in the Act. 
Section 13: amends section 810.011 to expand the definition of 
"conveyance," as used to define burglary, to include a 
"railroad vehicle," the statute previously referencing only 
a "railroad car." 
Thus, only two of the Act's twelve substantive sections relate specifically to the 
"Three-Strike" violent felony provisions: section 3, which amends section 775.084 
 
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to define "three-time felony offender" and provide mandatory minimum terms for 
persons meeting the criteria, and section 6, which amends references to section 
775.084 found in section 790.235 to conform to section 3.  However, three of the 
other sections, sections 2, 4, and 5, establish harsher sentences for violent and 
repeat offenders. 
Four of the remaining sections involve substantive criminal offenses.  
Section 7 creates the new offense of "repeat sexual batterer" and establishes a 
mandatory minimum sentence for offenders meeting the criteria for that crime.  
Section 8 adds references to the new statute defining "repeat sexual batterer" to the 
sexual battery statute, section 794.011, wherein "sexual battery" is defined.  
Section 9 modifies the drug trafficking statute to allow prosecution on the basis of 
the number of cannabis plants that a person possesses, sells, or delivers, and 
modifies the weight benchmarks for prosecution.  Section 9 also establishes 
minimum mandatory sentences for drug offenses corresponding to a certain 
quantity.6  Section 13 amends the definition of conveyance in the burglary statute 
to include a railroad vehicle. 
Finally, the Act contains two administrative provisions.  Section 11 requires 
the clerk of the court to transmit to the appropriate United States immigration 
officer records pertaining to aliens who are convicted of or who enter a plea to any 
                                        
6.  Franklin does not assert to this Court that section 9 violates the single 
subject clause. 
 
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crime.  Section 12 requires the Governor to publish the penalties contained in the 
Act. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Franklin was convicted of armed robbery and resisting arrest based on acts 
that occurred after the effective date of chapter 99-188.  He received a sentence of 
forty years in prison as a habitual felony offender, pursuant to section 775.084, 
Florida Statutes (1999), which had been amended by section 3 of the Act.  
Franklin's prior criminal history consisted of one felony conviction (possession of 
cocaine) and one felony for which adjudication of guilt was withheld (burglary of a 
dwelling).  Prior to the Act's amendment to section 775.084, an offense for which 
adjudication of guilt had been withheld would not have qualified as a predicate for 
habitual offender sentencing unless the subsequent offense pending for sentencing 
was committed while the offender was on probation or community control after the 
withhold of adjudication.  See § 775.084(1)(a), (2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). 
Franklin appealed.  While his appeal was pending, the Second District held 
in Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), that the Act violated the 
single subject requirement of article III, section 6.  Relying on Taylor, Franklin 
filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.800(b).  The trial court granted the motion and the State appealed to 
the Third District.  In State v. Franklin, 836 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), the 
 
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Third District held that the Act did not violate the constitutional requirement of a 
single subject.  The Third District also certified conflict with Taylor on whether the 
Act violates the single subject requirement. 
III.  DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS 
We begin with a review of the different approaches employed by the district 
courts of appeal that have addressed the single subject challenge to chapter 99-188.  
In Taylor, the Second District began its analysis by identifying the topics to which 
the various provisions relate.  See 818 So. 2d at 546.  In attempting to discern the 
single subject, the Taylor court noted that the Act's lengthy preamble "evinces the 
legislators' concern with the crime rate in Florida and the fact that felons, 
particularly violent and repeat offenders, are not being sentenced to the maximum 
terms allowed under Florida law."  Id. at 547-48.  The Second District observed 
that most of the sections of the Act address sentencing and impose minimum 
mandatory terms.  See id. at 548.  According to the district court, of the sections 
that do not address sentencing, one creates an offense involving repeat crimes of 
violence punishable by a mandatory minimum term, and four merely implement 
changes made in other provisions of the Act.  See id. at 549.  The Second District 
then determined that all of the sections but two address a "single subject because 
they are naturally and logically related to each other and to the legislatively stated 
purpose of the act."  Id. 
 
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The Second District concluded that section 13, which amended the 
substantive definition of conveyance in the burglary statute to include a "railroad 
vehicle," is not a sentencing provision, and does not concern violent or repeat 
offenders.  According to the Second District, 
[t]his slight expansion of a substantive criminal offense has only an 
attenuated relationship to sentencing or to the other sections of the act, 
in that it might be argued that under the broader definition of a 
conveyance more felons could be convicted of "armed burglary," one 
of the qualifying crimes for three-strikes sentencing.  But that 
relationship is so tenuous, so dependent on the happenstance of 
individual cases, that it simply cannot be characterized as natural or 
logical. 
Id. at 549 (citation omitted). 
The Second District further concluded that section 11, which concerns a 
purely administrative subject, bears even less relationship than section 13 to the 
Act's other provisions and that it impermissibly combines civil and criminal 
subjects in violation of the single subject rule.  Thus, the court ruled the entire Act 
unconstitutional.  See id. at 549-50.7 
Directly contrary to Taylor, the Third District, sitting en banc, held in 
Franklin that there was no single subject violation.  See Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 
                                        
7.  The Fifth District has agreed with the Second District that the Act 
violates article III, section 6.  See Hersey v. State, 831 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2002) (citing Taylor), receded from in part by Jones v. State, 872 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2004).  
 
- 8 - 
114.8  Rather than specifically define the single subject, the Third District focused 
on the purpose of the Act.  Noting that the statute is designed to "protect the public 
from repeat and serious violent felony offenders," the Third District determined 
that section 11 is "reasonably related" to the Act's purpose because it ensures the 
removal of felons from the country after they have served their sentences.  836 So. 
2d at 1113-14.  The Third District stated that, "although less obviously" than 
section 11, section 13 is related to the Act's purpose because it expands on the 
definition of the crime of armed burglary, one of the offenses included in the 
Habitual Felony Offender Act.  Id. at 1114. 
In dissent, Judge Cope asserted that the single subject analysis should and 
could be very straightforward.9  According to Judge Cope, 
[t]he key to the single subject analysis is that the Legislature must 
state the single subject in the title.  It is the Legislature's responsibility 
to say what the single subject is.  Where a single subject challenge is 
raised, the judiciary's sole role is to find the legislatively-stated single 
subject and determine whether it covers the contents of the act. 
Id. at 1116 (Cope, J., dissenting).  Addressing what he termed "widespread 
confusion" over how to identify an act's title and where to find the legislative 
                                        
8.  The Fourth and First Districts have agreed with the Third District that the 
Act does not violate the single subject rule.  See Hernandez-Molina v. State, 860 
So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (en banc decision with eight judges concurring 
and four concurring in part and dissenting in part);  Watson v. State, 842 So. 2d 
275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (affirmance without opinion citing Franklin).  
9.  Two other members of the court joined a separate dissent in which Judge 
Green expressed her agreement with the reasoning of the Second District in Taylor.  
See Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1115 (Green, J., dissenting). 
 
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statement of the single subject, Judge Cope stated that he would limit the inquiry to 
the words following the phrase, "an act relating to," found at the beginning of 
every title.  See id. at 1117.  Under this view, the single subject of chapter 99-188 
would be sentencing.  See id. at 1119.  Judge Cope concluded that section 11 is 
properly connected to sentencing in that it requires the court clerk to provide the 
charging document, judgment, and sentence of every alien offender to the INS 
after sentence has been imposed.  See id. at 1120.  However, similar to the Second 
District in Taylor, Judge Cope concluded that section 13 is not related to 
sentencing because the section changes the substantive criminal law.  See id.  
Thus, Judge Cope would have invalidated the Act in its entirety because of the 
single subject violation.  See id. 
Most recently, the Fourth District in Hernandez-Molina v. State, 860 So. 2d 
483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), reached the same conclusion as the Franklin majority in 
holding that the Act does not violate article III, section 6.  The Fourth District 
concluded that the subject of the Act was sentencing, and its purpose was 
protection of the public through increased punishments.  See id. at 489.  Applying  
this test, the Fourth District determined that section 11 was related to "both the 
subject and purpose of the Act" because removing alien offenders from the country 
at the end of their sentences promoted the legislation's purpose of protecting the 
public.  Id. at 489. 
 
- 10 - 
Regarding section 13, the Fourth District observed that the provision "was 
proposed so that a serious crime against a person, a railroad conductor, would be 
punished accordingly.  Thus, the statute clearly provides for an increased sentence 
for a person committing a serious crime.  As such, it relates both to the subject and 
purpose of the entire act."  Id. at 490.10  The Fourth District also found it 
significant that all of the provisions of the Act concern criminal law and there is no 
evidence of logrolling in this instance.  See 860 So. 2d at 490.  According to the 
district court, it had a duty to apply the "single subject provision to avoid a 
'construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the 
beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.'"  Id. (quoting State ex rel. Flink 
v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957)). 
In a concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, Judge Hazouri, joined 
by three other judges, dissented from the majority decision on the single subject 
issue.  In his view, the single subject violation was more pervasive than the 
violation identified by the Second District in Taylor.  See id. at 491 (Hazouri, J., 
dissenting).  According to the dissent, single subject analysis involves more than 
an examination of the phrase "an act relating to."  See id.  The dissent noted that 
although the first line of the title suggested that the subject of the bill was 
                                        
10.  Armed burglary is one of the enumerated offenses for which a habitual 
violent felony offender or three-time violent felony offender sentence may be 
imposed.  See § 775.084 (1)(b)(1)(m), Fla. Stat. (2003); § 775.084(1)(c)(1)(m), 
Fla. Stat. (2003). 
 
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sentencing in general, the nearly four-page title went on to significantly restrict the 
subject.  See id. at 491.11  Further, relying on the twenty-one "WHEREAS" clauses 
in the preamble and the purpose declared in the Act's citation name, the "Three-
Strike Violent Felony Offender Act," the dissent found the subject of the Act to be 
"matters related to enhanced sentencing for repeat violent felony offenders."  Id.  
The dissent concluded, similar to the Second District in Taylor, that sections 11 
and 13 failed to "naturally and logically relate" to the single subject.  See id. at 
492.  The dissent further determined that section 9, which changes the quantities of 
drugs used in classifying trafficking offenses and provides mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain drug trafficking offenses, also violates the single subject 
clause because it does not naturally or logically relate to the subject of sentencing 
of violent felony offenders.  See id. 
As the cases from the district courts illustrate, the methods for determining 
both the single subject of an act and those matters that are properly connected to 
that subject vary.12  We take this opportunity to review our jurisprudence in this 
                                        
11.  In fact, the title and preamble together are almost four pages. 
12.  Indeed, in its summary analysis, the Third District suggested that there 
was inconsistency in the single-subject precedent:  
 
The issue of whether a multi-section statute violates the "single 
subject" rule is one of those perplexing legal controversies in which 
general rules and decisions embracing them may be found . . . on each 
side of the controversy, and the result, and the group of cases to be 
cited in support of it, lies ultimately in the eye of the judicial beholder.  
 
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area of the law and clarify the single subject analysis. 
IV.  SINGLE SUBJECT RULE ANALYSIS 
A.  Applicable Law 
1.  The Purpose of the Single Subject Clause 
Currently, forty-three states have some form of single subject clause 
applicable to legislation contained in their state constitutions.13  In Florida, the 
single subject clause has been part of our state constitution since 1868, see Canova, 
94 So. 2d at 182, and is presently set forth in article III, section 6.  This provision 
mandates:
 
Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly 
connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the 
title. 
Art. III, § 6, Fla. Const. 
Thus, the single subject clause contains three requirements.  First, each law 
                                                                                                                              
Since this is true, and since the Supreme Court will necessarily 
resolve the conflict with Taylor anyway, it is necessary only rather 
summarily to announce that we believe that each provision of the 
statute is sufficiently related to the others . . . . 
Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1113 (citations omitted).  
13.  The treatise relied on by Judge Cope in his dissent cites forty-one states.  
See Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1124 (citing 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction?
 17:1 at 2 (6th ed. 2002 rev.)).  In fact, forty-three states 
have some type of single subject clause in their constitutions.  The treatise does not 
include Arkansas or Mississippi, whose constitutions contain a single subject 
requirement solely for appropriations bills.  Most of the constitutional single 
subject clauses of the forty-one states referenced in the treatise are substantially 
similar to article III, section 6.   
 
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shall "embrace" only "one subject."  Second, the law may include any matter that is 
"properly connected" with the subject.  The third requirement, related to the first, is 
that the subject shall be "briefly expressed in the title."  In State v. Thompson, 750 
So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1999), this Court reaffirmed the purposes of the single 
subject provision: 
(1) to prevent hodgepodge or "log rolling" legislation, i.e. putting two 
unrelated matters in one act; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud by means 
of provisions in bills of which the title gave no intimation, and which 
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally 
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people of the subjects of 
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have 
opportunity of being heard thereon. 
Id. (quoting Canova, 94 So. 2d at 184). 
In Colonial Investment Co. v. Nolan, 131 So. 178 (Fla. 1930), this Court 
explained the historical backdrop for the constitutional mandate: 
It had become quite common for legislative bodies to embrace in the 
same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other, or to 
the subject specified in the title, by which means measures were often 
adopted without attracting attention.  And frequently such distinct 
subjects, affecting diverse interests, were combined in order to unite 
members who favored either in support of all.  And the failure to 
indicate in the title the object of the bill often resulted in members 
voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have 
approved.  And not only were the members thus misled, but the public 
also; and legislative provisions were sometimes pushed through which 
would have been made odious by popular discussion and 
remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably demonstrated by 
the title of the bill. 
Id. at 179.  In fact, as we observed in State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 39 So. 929 
(Fla. 1905), 
 
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[n]early all the states having Constitutions of recent adoption have 
incorporated therein provisions in nearly identical language, and their 
courts agree as to the purpose of such provisions.  They also agree that 
the provision refers to the subject-matter of the legislation, and not to 
a single purpose or end sought to be accomplished.  Its purpose was to 
avoid the confusion incident to the evil which had grown out of 
'omnibus' legislation. 
Id. at 961 (quoting Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 299 (1877)). 
Extant in our constitution since 1868, the single subject clause is a direct 
expression of the people's intent to provide a limitation on the Legislature's power 
to enact laws.  The judiciary's obligation is to apply the constitutional limitation to 
legislation that violates the constitution.  See generally Sebring Airport Authority 
v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 244 n.5 (Fla. 2001) ("To the judges belongs the 
power of expounding the laws; and although in the discharge of that duty they may 
render a law inoperative by declaring it unconstitutional, it does not arise from any 
supremacy which the judiciary possesses over the Legislature, but from the 
supremacy of the Constitution over both.") (quoting State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 
17 Fla. 67, 84 (1879)); Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 315 (Fla. 1930) ("To the 
extent . . . that . . . an act violates express or clearly implied mandates of the 
Constitution, the act must fall, not merely because the court so decrees, but 
because of the dominant force of the Constitution, an authority superior to both 
Legislature and judiciary.  Such an act never becomes a law."). 
2.  Standard of Review 
 
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When courts are called upon to assess legislation for compliance with article 
III, section 6, the standard of review is highly deferential.  "[T]he general 
disposition of the courts [is] to construe the constitutional provision liberally, 
rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is 
unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been 
adopted."  Canova, 94 So. 2d at 184.  We stated: 
Should any doubt exist that an act is in violation of art. III, sec. 
16[14] of the Constitution, or of any constitutional provision, the 
presumption is in favor of constitutionality.  To overcome the 
presumption, the invalidity must appear beyond reasonable doubt, for 
it must be assumed the legislature intended to enact a valid law.  
Therefore, the act must be construed, if fairly possible, as to avoid 
unconstitutionality and to remove grave doubts on that score. 
Id. at 184-85.  This standard of review has been applied to single subject 
challenges since our earliest cases addressing this issue.  See Bunnell v. State, 453 
So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1984) (stating in review of single subject challenge that 
"legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional and that courts should resolve 
every reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality"); State ex rel. Shevin v. Metz 
Constr. Co., 285 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1973) ("With respect to the sufficiency of 
the title to an Act, all the usual presumptions of validity apply, and we must 
assume that the Legislature intended to enact a valid law."); Colonial Inv. Co., 131 
                                        
14.  The single subject clause was previously contained in article III, section 
16 of the Florida Constitution.  See art. III, § 16, Fla. Const. (1885).  The provision 
was moved to article III, section 6 in the 1968 constitutional revision. 
 
- 16 - 
So. at 178 (stating that to overcome the presumption in favor of constitutionality, 
the single subject violation must occur beyond a reasonable doubt); Ex parte 
Knight, 41 So. 786, 788 (Fla. 1906) (when analyzing single subject challenges 
"every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be yielded in favor of the 
validity of the legislative enactments"); Holton v. State, 9 So. 716, 717 (Fla. 1891) 
(stating in context of single subject analysis that "the courts . . . should always 
apply a liberal rule, and refuse to declare [the legislature's] action void, except in 
clear cases that are free from every reasonable doubt"). 
3.  Defining the Single Subject 
The key to determining whether a legislative enactment violates the single 
subject clause of the Florida Constitution is the method by which the court defines 
the "single subject" of the legislation and the analysis employed to determine 
matters "properly connected therewith."  An analysis of our prior case law reveals 
that, while maintaining fidelity to the mandate of our citizens expressed in our 
constitution, we have given considerable deference to the Legislature to determine 
the single subject.15 
In determining the single subject, we start with the basic principle that "the 
subject is the one that is expressed in the title of the act."  Knight, 41 So. at 788; 
                                        
15.  Starting with Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877), this Court has 
addressed the single subject clause approximately 135 times.  In approximately 
seventy-five percent of the cases, we have upheld the legislation against attacks 
based on asserted single subject violations.  
 
- 17 - 
see also Colonial Inv. Co., 131 So. at 178.  Indeed, the constitutional provision 
requires that the subject be briefly expressed in the title. 
For purposes of single subject analysis, every law published in the Laws of 
Florida has both a short title, i.e. "An act relating to . . . ," and a full title, which 
begins with the chapter law number and ends with "providing an effective date," 
and encompasses the short title.  Cf. State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 
1983).  "[F]ormerly the title of an act was not considered a part of it and, anciently, 
acts had no title prefixed at all but . . . titles [have] come to possess very great 
importance by reason of" the single subject clause contained in the constitution.  
Canova, 94 So. 2d at 183-84.16  Consistent with our earliest jurisprudence and the 
actual wording of our constitution, we reiterate that a court generally need look no 
further than the title of the act in question when defining the single subject. 
                                        
16.  Titles are also constitutionally important under article III, section 7 of 
the Florida Constitution, which requires that prior to passage every bill shall be 
read by its title "in each house on three separate days."  In Kaufman, this Court 
held that the requirements of article III, section 7 were satisfied by a reading of the 
bill number or short title.  According to the Court,  
 
[t]he obvious purpose of reading a bill's title is to inform the 
legislators and the public as to what bill is being voted on.  Given the 
widespread publication of copies of bills, reading a bill's number or 
short title identifies which bill is being considered. 
430 So. 2d at 907. 
 
- 18 - 
Over the years, full titles have varied in length, some being relatively brief17 
and others spanning pages, such as the full title at issue in this case.  Although 
article III, section 6 imposes the restriction that the subject be "briefly expressed in 
the title," we have remained deferential to the Legislature's choice to craft a title to 
an act with few words or many.  Indeed, we noted as early as 1905 that although a 
lengthy full title may be "unduly drawn out . . . , cumbersome, and awkwardly 
worded," its length alone will not invalidate an act under the single subject clause.  
Bryan, 39 So. at 962 ("[A]mplification of the title to an act . . . does not vitiate 
such title or subject it to the criticism of having dealt with two distinct or 
incongruous subjects."). 18  As noted above, in recent years full titles have 
                                        
17.  Historically, titles tended to be shorter than they are today.  Many titles 
addressed in our earlier single subject cases contained little more than a short 
phrase with either no or few conjunctions following an introductory clause such as 
"an act to be entitled."  See Sawyer v. State, 132 So. 188, 191 (Fla. 1931) (act 
entitled "An Act to Define and Punish Arson, and to Repeal Sections 5106, 5107, 
5109, 5111 and 5114 of the Revised General Statutes of the State of Florida, 
Relating Thereto"); Ex Parte Winn, 130 So. 621 (Fla. 1930) (same); Knight, 41 So. 
at 788 (act entitled "An act to prevent the cutting or removing of any timber from 
lands heretofore or that may hereafter be sold for taxes"); State ex rel. Gonzalez v. 
Palmes, 3 So. 171, 172 (Fla. 1887) (act entitled "An act to fix the license tax of 
stevedores").   
18.  In Bryan, the title contained forty-one separate provisions.  In 
considering that title, the Court specifically noted: 
 
Let it be frankly admitted that the title to the act in question is 
decidedly objectionable for many reasons.  Among others which 
might be stated are that it is very prolix, being unduly drawn out, 
contains much unnecessary matter, is cumbersome, and awkwardly 
worded.  However, no matter how strongly these objections may 
 
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consistently begun with the phrase "an act relating to" and ended with "providing 
an effective date." 
This Court has adhered to the presumption that an act complies with article 
III, section 6, even when the full title of an act is lengthy.  When a single subject 
could not be easily determined and when doubts arose as to whether the various 
provisions were connected to the subject, this Court has consistently analyzed the 
act with every reasonable doubt in favor of validity.  As the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Taylor, Franklin, and Hernandez-Molina illustrate, courts 
have relied on various sources individually or in combination when defining the 
single subject, including the general subject expressed in the short title, i.e., "an act 
relating to . . . ,"19 the citation name for the act,20 the full title,21 and the act's 
preamble.22 
We resolve the uncertainty as to the source of the single subject by relying 
on the precise language of the constitution itself, which mandates that the single 
                                                                                                                              
appeal to us, or however much we may disapprove of the title, that 
does not help us answer the question, which is, has the provision of 
the Constitution been violated. 
39 So. at 960. 
19.  See Hernandez-Molina, 860 So. 2d at 489; Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1117 
(Cope, J., dissenting). 
20.  See Hernandez-Molina, 860 So. 2d at 491 (Hazouri, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1113.  
21.  See Taylor, 818 So. 2d at 548. 
22.  See Hernandez-Molina, 860 So. 2d at 491 (Hazouri, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Taylor, 818 So. 2d at 548. 
 
- 20 - 
subject be "briefly expressed in the title."  Although the full title may be as lengthy 
as the Legislature chooses, the actual expression of the single subject within the 
full title must be briefly stated.  Therefore, we adopt that portion of Judge Cope's 
dissent in Franklin in which he concluded that the single subject of an act is 
derived from the short title, i.e., the language immediately following the customary 
phrase "an act relating to" and preceding the indexing of the act's provisions.  In so 
doing, we specifically note that although many acts may contain a citation name by 
which either the entire act or portions of it may be identified, the citation name is 
not synonymous with the single subject.23 
This relatively simple method for defining the one subject of an act is 
supported by our precedent.  Indeed, we have consistently stated that only the 
subject, not matters connected to the subject, must be expressed in the title.  See, 
e.g., City of Hialeah v. State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 174 So. 843, 846 (Fla. 
1937), and cases cited therein; see also City of Pensacola v. Shevin, 396 So. 2d 
                                        
23.  In Tormey v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 2002), the citation name 
for chapter 89-100, Laws of Florida, was "The Law Enforcement Protection Act."  
In his dissenting opinion in Franklin, Judge Cope criticized Tormey for looking to 
the citation name and preamble of the act in question to determine the act's single 
subject.  See Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1121-22 (Cope J., dissenting).  To eliminate 
any confusion on this issue, we recede from Tormey to the extent that the opinion 
can be interpreted as relying primarily on the citation name to determine the single 
subject.  See Tormey, 824 So. 2d at 140.  Nevertheless, in Tormey the violation 
was one of title defect, i.e., the title did not adequately give notice of all the 
provisions in the body of the act.  Thus, Tormey is distinguishable from the issue 
before us in this case. 
 
- 21 - 
179, 180 (Fla. 1981) ("In order to comply with the requirement that the subject of a 
law be briefly expressed in the title, the title need not be an index of all the features 
of the legislation.").  In other words, it is not constitutionally necessary to index the 
provisions contained in the body of the act in the title.  See State ex rel. 
Lichtenstein v. Coleman, 183 So. 163, 164 (Fla. 1938). 
Although not constitutionally required, indexing the provisions of the act in 
the title does tend to further one of the purposes of the single subject provision—
notice to the public and the Legislature.  As stated in Canova, 
there seems to have been some concern in our courts to prevent the 
evil of matters being inserted in a body of an act whose title does not 
properly put the people on notice of such content.  The evil of "log 
rolling" is of course lesser, in that it is easier to detect, for the title is 
notice, per se, of the evil involved. 
94 So. 2d at 184.  However, the full title nonetheless must be "so worded as not to 
mislead a person of average intelligence as to the scope of the enactment and [be] 
sufficient to put that person on notice and cause him to inquire into the body of the 
statute itself."  Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist. v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach 
County, 515 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1987) (quoting Williams v. State, 370 So. 2d 
1143, 1144 (Fla. 1979)). 
Our determination that the single subject of an act can be found in the short 
title is subject to the following caveat:  the title of an act may be general, "so long 
as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself."  State ex rel. Attorney 
 
- 22 - 
General v. Green, 18 So. 334, 338 (Fla. 1895).  In other words, the short title of the 
legislation cannot be so broad as to purportedly cover unrelated topics, and thus 
provide no real guidance as to what the body of the act contains.  Indeed, allowing 
an overly broad short title to become the single subject runs the risk of permitting 
logrolling and hodgepodge or omnibus legislation. 
An example of an overly broad short title can be found in State v. 
Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999).  In that case, the short title of the act was, 
"An act relating to [the] justice system."  Id. at 648.  The State argued that the 
reference to the "justice system" in the title encompassed provisions that addressed 
both career criminals and domestic violence.  See id.  Because the short title was so 
broad as to encompass the entire justice system, this Court looked beyond the short 
title to determine whether the act encompassed a single subject that was briefly 
stated in the title.  We noted that the act was originally titled more narrowly as "an 
act relating to career criminals" before it was changed to refer to the "justice 
system" when the domestic violence provisions were added shortly before the bill 
passed.  See id.  Noting that nothing in the career criminal provisions addressed 
any facet of domestic violence, we determined that it was "clear" that the "various 
sections of [the chapter law] . . . address two different subjects: career criminals 
and domestic violence."  Id. at 648.  Therefore, we hold here, as we did in 
Thompson, that if the Legislature's short title is suspect for being overly broad, a 
 
- 23 - 
court should look to the remainder of the act and the history of the legislative 
process to determine if the act actually contains a single subject or violates the 
constitution by encompassing more than one subject. 
Ordinarily, determining the single subject of an act by reference to the short 
title will be a straightforward process.  The more difficult analysis is whether the 
various provisions are "properly connected" to the single subject.  We now turn to 
the analysis to be used when evaluating the "properly connected" question. 
4.  Properly Connected 
As stated above, the second requirement of the single subject clause in 
article III, section 6 mandates that all provisions in the body of the act be "properly 
connected" to the single subject.  The use of the phrase "properly connected" in 
article III, section 6 is broader than the phrase "directly connected" required by 
article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which authorizes changes in our 
constitution by citizen initiative petition.24  In Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 
(Fla. 1984), we explained the distinction: 
We find it is proper to distinguish between the two.  First, we find that 
                                        
24.  Article XI, section 3 provides: 
 
The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions 
of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that, any 
such revision or amendment shall. . .embrace but one subject and matter 
directly connected therewith. 
 
Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const.  
 
- 24 - 
the language "shall embrace but one subject and matter properly 
connected therewith" in article III, section 6, regarding statutory 
change by the legislature is broader than the language "shall embrace 
but one subject and matter directly connected therewith," in article XI, 
section 3, regarding constitutional change by initiative. Second, we 
find that we should take a broader view of the legislative provision 
because any proposed law must proceed through legislative debate 
and public hearing.  Such a process allows change in the content of 
any law before its adoption.  This process is, in itself, a restriction on 
the drafting of a proposal which is not applicable to the scheme for 
constitutional revision or amendment by initiative.  Third, and most 
important, we find that we should require strict compliance with the 
single-subject rule in the initiative process for constitutional change 
because our constitution is the basic document that controls our 
governmental functions, including the adoption of any laws by the 
legislature. 
Id. at 988-89 (alterations in original) (third emphasis supplied). 
A review of our jurisprudence reveals that we have defined a "proper" 
connection in various ways.  We have described a proper connection as one that is 
"natural or logical."  See, e.g., Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles 
v. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. 2003) ("[M]atters included in the act 
[must] have a natural or logical connection."); Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 657 
(Fla. 2000) ("Pursuant to [the single subject] requirement, there must be a logical 
or natural connection between the various portions of a legislative enactment.").  
We have stated that whether a connection is proper will depend on "common 
sense."  Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987).  We have also 
stated that if the provision is "necessary" to the subject, "fairly and naturally 
germane" to the subject, or promotes the purposes of the legislation as set forth in 
 
- 25 - 
the subject, the provision may be regarded as properly connected.  As we explained 
in surveying the law to date as of 1957, 
if a matter is germane to or reasonably connected with the expressed 
title of the act, it may be incorporated within the act without being in 
violation of [the single subject provision] of our constitution.  
Provisions which are necessary incidents to, or tend to make effective 
or promote the object and purpose of the legislation included in the 
subject expressed in the title of the act may be regarded as matters 
properly connected with the subject thereof. . . .  In determining if 
matters are properly connected with the subject, the test is whether 
such provisions are fairly and naturally germane to the subject of the 
act, or are such as are necessary incidents to or tend to make effective 
or promote the objects and purposes of legislation included in the 
subject. 
Canova, 94 So. 2d at 184 (citations omitted). 
More recently, we explained that a connection between the subject and the 
provision is proper if a "reasonable explanation" exists as to why the Legislature 
chose to join the provision to the legislative act.  Grant, 770 So. 2d at 657 (citing 
State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1993)).  After reviewing these various 
methods of defining a "proper connection," we take this opportunity to set forth the 
correct test to be applied when determining whether a connection between a 
provision in the act and the act's subject is "proper" within the meaning of the 
single subject clause:  A connection between a provision and the subject is proper 
(1) if the connection is natural or logical, or (2) if there is a reasonable explanation 
for how the provision is (a) necessary to the subject or (b) tends to make effective 
or promote the objects and purposes of legislation included in the subject. 
 
- 26 - 
In setting forth this test, we clarify that there is a difference between the 
subject of the act that is briefly stated in the title and the object of the act.  Simply 
stated, "The subject is the matter to which an act relates; the object, the purpose to 
be accomplished."  Nichols v. Yandre, 9 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1942).  In this 
regard, we caution that the "accomplishment of several 'purposes' may be logically 
embraced in one 'subject' so long as all such purposes are germane to . . . the 
expressed general subject."  State ex rel. Crump v. Sullivan, 128 So. 478, 480 (Fla. 
1930); see also North Ridge General Hosp., Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 
2d 461, 463-64 (Fla. 1979) ("The term 'subject' is broader than the word 'object,' as 
one subject may contain many objects.").  The purposes of an act may be 
instructive in determining whether there is a reasonable explanation for the 
inclusion of a specific provision in the chapter law.  However, the purposes of an 
act cannot be used to either define or expand the single subject.  The single subject 
clause contained in article III, section 6 "refers to the subject-matter of the 
legislation, and not to a single purpose or end sought to be accomplished."  Gibson 
v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 299 (1877). 
A review of the body of our jurisprudence addressing single subject leads us 
to conclude that in determining whether a reasonable explanation exists for the 
connection between a specific provision and the single subject, the court may 
consider the citation name, the full title, the preamble, and the provisions in the 
 
- 27 - 
body of the act.  See generally Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 643 (looking to body of 
act to determine whether substantive provisions dealing with domestic violence 
were properly connected to single subject of career criminals); Burch v. State, 558 
So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1990) (examining preamble to determine if provisions were 
properly connected to a single subject); Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1086 (noting that the 
Legislature explained in the preamble of the act how tort reform provisions and the 
insurance regulatory provisions were "properly connected" to the subject); 
Colonial Inv. Co., 131 So. at 178 (noting that even after looking to the body of the 
act, any connection between a provision and the subject was too tenuous to be 
sustained); Green, 18 So. at 337 (examining "entire act" to determine if provisions 
were properly connected to subject).  However, if, after examining the act in its 
entirety, we cannot discern a "reasonable explanation" for the inclusion of a 
seemingly disparate provision, we will look to the history of the legislative process 
to determine how the challenged provision was added to the act.  In other words, 
this Court has looked to the legislative history of the enactment to buttress our 
conclusion that the provision is not properly connected.  For example, in 
Thompson, we noted that the offending domestic violence provisions were added 
to the bill near the end of the regular session after the provisions had failed to pass 
on their own.  See 750 So. 2d at 648.  We stated that "[i]t is in circumstances such 
as these that problems with the single subject rule are most likely to occur."  Id.; 
 
- 28 - 
see also Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620, 627 (Fla. 2000) (chapter law which 
contained disparate provisions added near the end of the sessions constituted a 
"classic act of logrolling"). 
This Court has also concluded that particular combinations of various 
statutory provisions may not be properly connected.  To date, this Court has 
regarded two such combinations with caution:  substantive changes to the criminal 
law that are contained in acts that do not predominately address the substantive 
criminal law,25 and chapter laws that combine civil and criminal provisions.26  
However, other improperly combined provisions may run afoul of the single 
subject clause as well.  For example, we recently found that a provision concerning 
the assignment of bad check debts to a private debt collector had "no natural or 
logical connection" to an act's subject, which was driver's licenses, operation of 
motor vehicles, and vehicle registrations.  See Critchfield, 842 So. 2d at 784. 
There is no bright line rule this Court can create to determine whether a 
                                        
25.  See, e.g., Bunnell, 453 So. 2d at 809 (determining that a chapter law 
which both created crime of obstruction by false information and amended sections 
dealing with the Florida Council on Criminal Justice violated the single subject 
rule). 
26.  See e.g., Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 649 (invalidating act which combined 
provisions concerning violent career criminal sentencing with provisions 
concerning civil remedies for victims of domestic violence); Heggs, 759 So. 2d at 
630 (invalidating act which combined provisions concerning the sentencing 
guidelines, compensation for crime victims, the definition of substantive crimes, 
and civil remedies for victims of domestic violence); State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 
1, 4 (Fla. 1993) (invalidating act which combined the subject of habitual offenders 
with licensing for private investigators). 
 
- 29 - 
connection is proper—that is, whether the connection is natural or logical, or if a 
reasonable explanation exists for how the provision is necessary to the subject or 
tends to make effective or promote the objects and purposes of legislation included 
in the subject.  Nonetheless, we examine chapter 99-188 against the backdrop of 
this jurisprudence. 
B.  Chapter 99-188. 
Initially, we determine that Franklin has standing to assert a single subject 
challenge to chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, notwithstanding the fact that he was 
not directly affected by either section 11 or 13.  See Heggs, 759 So. 2d at 628 
(holding that anyone adversely affected by any of the amendments to the 
sentencing laws contained in chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, could obtain relief 
based on a single subject violation).27  We begin our analysis by reiterating that our 
                                        
27.  In recognizing Franklin's standing in this Court to assert a single subject 
violation, we specifically reject the Third District's statement in dicta that the 
courts have no role in addressing violations of article III, section 6 of the Florida 
Constitution: 
 
[T]he constitutional facts that Franklin has no right to the passage of 
legislation in any particular way, and that, to the contrary, the single 
subject provision affects only the legislators themselves, leads also to 
consideration of the suggestion that that clause is properly subject 
only to interpretation and enforcement by the legislature (which 
frequently engages in just this sort of self-regulation on the floor) and 
the governor in making his decision on whether to approve a 
particular bill, rather than the courts.  Such a holding would vindicate 
the sound and often discussed but seldom applied principle that every 
 
- 30 - 
resolution of this case flows from our highly deferential standard of review in this 
area of the law—that every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of a law's 
constitutionality.  See Bunnell, 453 So. 2d at 809; Canova, 94 So. 2d at 184-85; 
Colonial Inv. Co., 131 So. at 178; Holton, 9 So. at 717. 
The short title of the Act is "An act relating to sentencing."  The citation 
name is the "Three-Strike Violent Felony Offender Act."  The full title is lengthy, 
running two pages and almost one thousand words.  As we have explained, the 
constitution requires that the subject be briefly expressly in the title and we give 
considerable deference to the Legislature's selection of the title.  Based on our 
determination that ordinarily the subject will be found in the short title, we 
conclude that the subject of chapter 99-188 is sentencing.  In so holding, we agree 
with the majority analysis in Hernandez-Molina that the subject of the Act is not 
defined by either its purpose as expressed in the preamble or its citation name in 
section one—the "Three-Strike Violent Felony Offender Act." 
In adopting this straightforward analysis, we reject the State's argument that 
                                                                                                                              
branch of the government is responsible for the enforcement of 
pertinent provisions of the constitution. 
Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1114 n.4.  A construction of article III, section 6 that 
precludes persons affected by a law from challenging that law on single subject 
grounds would be inconsistent with our precedent.  See Heggs, 759 So. 2d at 627.  
Therefore, we reaffirm that Franklin has standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of chapter 99-188, as someone who was adversely affected by the amendments to 
the sentencing laws contained therein.  See Heggs, 759 So. 2d at 627.   
 
- 31 - 
the subject is broader than sentencing.  The State relies on the preamble to support 
its assertion that the subject of the Act is its general purpose—"protecting the 
public from the class of felons identified in the Act."  The Third District in 
Franklin also identified the general purpose of the Act as its subject.  See 836 So. 
2d at 1113 ("[E]ach provision of the statute is sufficiently related to the others and 
to the general purpose of the act as whole . . . .").  Although we agree that one of 
the stated purposes of the Act is protecting the public, we decline to equate the 
purpose of the Act with its subject.  Based on our holding set forth above, we 
decline to define the single subject of chapter 99-188 by its object or purpose.  As 
explained below, the Act's purpose is relevant to a determination of whether its 
provisions are properly connected to its subject. 
We now turn to the controverted issue of whether sections 11 and 13 are 
properly connected to sentencing.  The Second District in Taylor determined that 
sections 11 and 13 lack a proper connection.  The test we utilize is whether there is 
a natural or logical connection to sentencing, or whether a reasonable explanation 
exists for how these provisions are either necessary to sentencing or tend to make 
effective or promote the purposes of the sentencing legislation.  Cf. Grant, 770 So. 
2d at 657; Canova, 94 So. 2d at 184. 
We first address section 11, which provides that the clerk of the court shall 
furnish to the INS officers the charging document, judgment, and sentence "in 
 
- 32 - 
every case in which an alien is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor or enters a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendre to any felony or misdemeanor charge."  Under the 
language of the provision, this shall be done after the alien offender's sentencing 
proceeding. 
We conclude that there is a natural or logical and thus proper connection 
between the requirements of section 11 that sentences of non-citizen offenders be 
provided to INS and the Act's subject of sentencing, in that section 11 is a post-
sentencing measure.  Our conclusion that the connection is proper is buttressed by 
the fact that in requiring the transmission of sentences to the INS, section 11 also 
promotes the Act's purpose of protecting the public from persons sentenced as 
serious or repeat violent offenders.  As stated by the Third District in Franklin and 
the Fourth District in Hernandez-Molina, section 11 aids in the removal of violent 
alien offenders from the country after sentence completion.  See Franklin, 836 So. 
2d at 1114; Hernandez-Molina, 860 So. 2d at 489.  Thus, there is also a reasonable 
explanation why the Legislature would include a provision that facilitates the 
removal of non-citizens who are serious or repeat violent offenders after sentence 
completion in an Act whose subject is sentencing and whose purposes include the 
use of sentencing to protect the public from this class of criminals. 
In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by Franklin's argument 
that the fact that the section applies to all persons who receive a criminal sentence, 
 
- 33 - 
whether felony or misdemeanor, violent or nonviolent, first offense or fiftieth, 
renders this provision in violation of article III, section 6.  The inquiry is not 
whether the section solely relates to the purpose of protecting the public from 
violent and repeat offenders, but rather whether the section is properly connected 
to the single subject of sentencing.  Accordingly, the inclusion of section 11 does 
not result in a violation of the single subject clause of article III, section 6. 
We next turn to section 13, which expands the substantive crime of burglary 
to specifically add "railroad vehicle" to the definition of conveyance.  The Second 
District found the relationship between the substantive crime of burglary and 
sentencing too "tenuous, so dependent on the happenstance of individual cases, that 
it simply cannot be characterized as natural or logical."  Taylor, 818 So. 2d at 549.  
In contrast, the Third and Fourth Districts determined that including section 13 
does not violate the single subject clause because the section expands the definition 
of the crime of armed burglary, which is an offense included in section 775.084, 
the habitual offender sentencing statute.  See Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1113-1114; 
Hernandez-Molina, 860 So. 2d at 490. 
We agree with the Third and Fourth Districts.  The proper connection 
between the expanded definition of burglary and sentencing is found in the fact 
that armed burglary is one of the qualifying offenses for a harsher sentence in the 
Act.  In broadening the definition of conveyance in section 810.11, Florida 
 
- 34 - 
Statutes, which previously encompassed a "railroad car" but not a "railroad 
vehicle," the Legislature ensured that a serious crime against a person inside a 
railroad vehicle (to wit, a locomotive) will be punished accordingly.  See 
Hernandez-Molina, 860 So. 2d at 490.28  Thus, there is a proper connection to 
sentencing in that section 13 makes effective one of the purposes included within 
the subject—imposing harsher sentences on violent offenders.  Considering that 
the purpose of the Act is to protect the public from serious and repeat violent 
offenders, a reasonable explanation exists for including this substantive section 
within an Act whose subject is sentencing. 
In determining that section 13 did not relate to sentencing and therefore 
violates article III, section 6, the Second District in Taylor and Judge Cope in his 
dissenting opinion in Franklin relied, in part, on the fact that section 13 
substantively amended the criminal law.  See Taylor, 818 So. 2d at 549; Franklin, 
838 So. 2d at 1120 (Cope, J., dissenting).  However, we do not consider this fact to 
be determinative in this case. 
                                        
28.  Burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery is a first-degree 
felony punishable by life.  See § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).  Section 810.011 
previously referenced railroad cars within the definition of conveyance.  As noted 
by the Fourth District in Hernandez-Molina, the legislative history of section 13 
reveals that "vehicle" was added to the definition of conveyance due to a perceived 
ambiguity in the statute.  By previously covering only railroad "cars," the statute 
had apparently prevented some burglary prosecutions of persons entering railroad 
locomotives to commit violent offenses against conductors.  See Hernandez-
Molina, 860 So. 2d at 490.  
 
- 35 - 
In contrast to other acts that we found in violation of the single subject rule 
because they combined the creation of new crimes with other disparate 
provisions,29 in this case, section 13 is one of four sections of the Act that relate to 
and amend the substantive criminal law.  We note that section 7 creates a new 
category of offender, a repeat sexual batterer; section 8 adds references to the new 
statute defining "repeat sexual batterer" to the sexual battery statute, section 
794.011, wherein "sexual battery" is defined; and section 9 modifies the drug 
trafficking statute to allow prosecution on the basis of the number of cannabis 
plants which a person possesses, sells, or delivers, and modifies the weight 
benchmarks for prosecution.  Therefore, similar to section 13, sections 7 and 9 
amend substantive crimes.  We note that both the Taylor court and Judge Cope in 
his dissent determined that section 9 was logically related to sentencing because 
the modified crime was punishable by a mandatory minimum term created by the 
Act.  See Taylor, 818 So. 2d at 549; Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1120 (Cope, J., 
dissenting).  The same is true of the new "repeat sexual batterer" offense 
classification created in section 7. 
This reasoning is equally applicable to section 13.  Although not every 
person charged under the modification to the burglary statute contained in section 
                                        
29.  See, e.g., Bunnell, 453 So. 2d at 809 (determining that chapter law 
which both created crime of obstruction by false information and amended sections 
dealing with the Florida Council on Criminal Justice violated single subject rule). 
 
- 36 - 
13 will be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, the fact remains that armed 
burglary, which is an aggravated form of the crime modified by section 13, is 
subject to an enhanced sentence under this Act.  Therefore, as with sections 7 and 
9, there is a proper connection between section 13 and the single subject of 
sentencing. 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that sections 11 and 13 are 
properly connected to the single subject of sentencing.  Chapter 99-188 does not 
violate the single subject clause of article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution.  
Accordingly, we approve the Third District's decision in Franklin, which is before 
us for review.  We also approve the Fourth District's decision in Hernandez-Molina 
and disapprove the Second District's decision in Taylor. 
It is so ordered. 
 
WELLS, CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
- 37 - 
Appendix A 
An act relating to sentencing; creating the "Three-Strike Violent Felony 
Offender Act"; amending s. 775.082, F.S.; redefining the term "prison releasee 
reoffender"; revising legislative intent; amending s. 775.084, F.S., relating to 
sentencing of habitual felony offenders, habitual violent felony offenders, and 
violent career criminals; redefining the terms "habitual felony offender," "habitual 
violent felony offender" and "violent career criminal"; revising the alternative time 
periods within which the habitual felony offender, habitual violent felony offender, 
or violent career criminal could have committed the felony to be sentenced; 
providing that the felony to be sentenced could have been committed either while 
the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence or supervision, or 
within 5 years of the defendant's release from a prison sentence, probation, 
community control, or supervision or other sentence, under specified 
circumstances when the sentence was imposed as a result of a prior conviction for 
a felony, enumerated felony, or other qualified offense; removing certain 
references to "commitment" and otherwise conforming terminology; providing that 
the placing of a person on probation without an adjudication of guilt shall be 
treated as a prior conviction regardless of when the subsequent offense was 
committed; defining "three-time violent felony offender"; providing a category of 
enumerated felony offenses within the definition; requiring the court to sentence a 
defendant as a three-time violent felony offender and impose certain mandatory 
minimum terms of imprisonment under specified circumstances when the 
defendant is to be sentenced for committing or attempting to commit, any of the 
enumerated felony offenses and the defendant has previously been convicted of 
committing or attempting to commit, any two of the enumerated felony offenses; 
providing penalties; providing procedures and criteria for court determination if the 
defendant is a three-time violent felony offender; providing for sentencing as a 
three-time violent felony offender; providing mandatory term of imprisonment for 
life when the three-time violent felony offense for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced is a felony punishable by life; providing mandatory prison term of 30 
years when the three-time violent felony offense is a first degree felony; providing 
mandatory prison term of 15 years when the three-time violent felony offense is a 
second degree felony; providing mandatory prison term of 5 years when the 
three-time violent felony offense is a third degree felony; providing for 
construction; providing for ineligibility of a three-time violent felony offender for 
parole, control release, or early release; amending ss. 784.07 and 784.08, F.S.; 
providing minimum terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of aggravated 
assault or aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer or a person 65 years of 
age or older; amending s. 790.235, F.S., relating to prohibitions against, and 
 
- 38 - 
penalties for, unlawful possession or other unlawful acts involving firearm, electric 
weapon or device, or concealed weapon by a violent career criminal; conforming 
cross references to changes made by the act; creating s. 794.0115, F.S.; defining 
"repeat sexual batterer"; providing within the definition a category of enumerated 
felony offenses in violation of s. 794.011, F.S., relating to sexual battery; requiring 
the court to sentence a defendant as a repeat sexual batterer and impose a 10-year 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under specified circumstances when 
the defendant is to be sentenced for committing or attempting to commit, any of 
the enumerated felony violations of s. 794.011, F.S., and the defendant has 
previously been convicted of committing or attempting to commit, any one of 
certain enumerated felony offenses involving sexual battery; providing penalties; 
providing procedures and criteria for court determination if the defendant is a 
repeat sexual batterer; providing for sentencing as a repeat sexual batterer; 
providing for construction; amending s. 794.011, F.S., to conform references to 
changes made by the act; amending s. 893.135, F.S.; defining the term "cannabis 
plant"; providing mandatory minimum prison terms and mandatory fine amounts 
for trafficking in cannabis, cocaine, illegal drugs, phencyclidine, methaqualone, 
amphetamine, or flunitrazepam; providing for sentencing pursuant to the Criminal 
Punishment Code of offenders convicted of trafficking in specified quantities of 
cannabis; removing weight caps for various trafficking offenses; providing that an 
offender who is sentenced to a mandatory minimum term upon conviction of 
trafficking in specified quantities of cannabis, cocaine, illegal drugs, 
phencyclidine, methaqualone, amphetamine, or flunitrazepam is not eligible for 
certain discretionary early-release mechanisms prior to serving the mandatory 
minimum sentence; providing exceptions; providing penalties; reenacting s. 
397.451(7), F.S., relating to the prohibition against dissemination of state funds to 
service providers convicted of certain offenses, s. 782.04(4)(a), F.S., relating to 
murder, s. 893.1351(1), F.S., relating to lease or rent for the purpose of trafficking 
in a controlled substance, s. 903.133, F.S., relating to the prohibition against bail 
on appeal for certain felony convictions, s. 907.041(4)(b), F.S., relating to pretrial 
detention and release, s. 921.0022(3)(g), (h), and (i), F.S., relating to the Criminal 
Punishment Code offense severity ranking chart, s. 921.0024(1)(b), F.S., relating to 
the Criminal Punishment Code worksheet computations and scoresheets, s. 
921.142(2), F.S., relating to sentencing for capital drug trafficking felonies, s. 
943.0585, F.S., relating to court-ordered expunction of criminal history records, 
and s. 943.059, F.S., relating to court-ordered sealing of criminal history records, 
to incorporate said amendment in references; amending s. 943.0535, F.S., relating 
to aliens and criminal records; requiring clerk of the courts to furnish criminal 
records to United States immigration officers; requiring state attorney to assist 
clerk of the courts in determining which defendants are aliens; requiring the 
 
- 39 - 
Governor to place public service announcements explaining the provisions of this 
act; amending s. 810, F.S.; redefining the term "conveyance" for purposes of ch. 
810, F.S., to include a railroad vehicle; providing an effective date. 
 
- 40 - 
Appendix B 
WHEREAS, in 1996, Florida had the highest violent crime rate of any state 
in the nation, exceeding the national average by 66 percent, and 
WHEREAS, although this state possessed the highest state violent crime rate 
in 1996 in the nation, the incarceration rate in this state in 1996 was less than the 
incarceration rate in at least eleven other states, all of which had a lower violent 
crime rate than the rate in this state, and 
WHEREAS, since 1988, criminals in this state have committed at least 1.6 
million violent crimes against Floridians and visitors to this state, and 
WHEREAS, the per capita violent crime rate has increased 86 percent in this 
state in the last 25 years, and 
WHEREAS, in fiscal year 1996-1997, over 16,000 violent felons in this 
state were sentenced to probation, community control, and other punishments that 
did not incarcerate the violent felon for the maximum prison term authorized by 
law, and 
WHEREAS, during that same fiscal year, less than 9,900 violent felons were 
sentenced to prison, while during that same period criminals committed 
approximately 150,000 violent felonies, and 
WHEREAS, in this state, as of June 30, 1997, more violent felons were on 
probation, community control, control release, or parole, than were in state prison, 
and 
WHEREAS, in 1997, only 15.6 percent of all persons convicted of a felony 
were sentenced to state prison, the second lowest rate of incarcerated felons since 
1984, and 
WHEREAS, the rate of incarcerated felons has declined seven out of the last 
eight years, and 
WHEREAS, since fiscal year 1993-1994, the per capita prison population 
rate in this state has increased 10 percent and the proportion of violent offenders 
incarcerated in state prison has increased 5 percent, and 
WHEREAS, since 1995, the Florida Legislature has enacted stronger 
criminal punishment laws, including requiring all prisoners to serve 85 percent of 
their court-imposed sentences, and 
WHEREAS, since 1994, the violent crime rate in this state has decreased 9.8 
percent, and 
WHEREAS, the Legislature previously has found that a substantial and 
disproportionate number of serous crimes are committed in this state by a 
relatively small number of repeat and violent felony offenders, that priority should 
be given to the incarceration of career criminals for extended prison terms, and 
that, in the case of violent career criminals, such extended terms must include 
 
- 41 - 
substantial minimum terms of imprisonment, and 
WHEREAS, as of June 30, 1997, only 71 designated "violent career 
criminals" have been sentenced to mandatory prison terms, out of a prison 
population of over 65,000 state inmates; and this number does not approach the 
true number of repeat violent felony offenders in this state, and 
WHEREAS, to be sentenced as a "violent career criminal," a felon must be 
convicted of a least four violent, forcible, or serious felonies and must have served 
a prison term, and 
WHEREAS, current law does not require the courts to impose mandatory 
prison terms on violent felons who commit three violent felonies, and these 
three-time violent felony offenders should be sentenced to mandatary maximum 
prison terms to protect citizens of this state and visitors, and 
WHEREAS, studies such as the recent report issued by the National Center 
for Policy Analysis, "Does punishment deter?", indicate that recent crime rates 
have declined because of the increasing number of incarcerated felons, and 
WHEREAS, since California enacted "three strike" legislation in 1994 that 
requires courts to impose mandatory prison terms on repeat felony offenders 
convicted of three serious crimes, that state has experienced significant reductions 
in violent crime, and overall crime rates, and 
WHEREAS, a study by the RAND Corporation estimates that the 
enforcement of this California legislation will reduce serious crime in California 
committed by adults between 22 and 34 percent, and 
WHEREAS, the enactment and enforcement of legislation in Florida that 
requires courts to impose mandatory prison terms on three-time violent felony 
offenders will improve public safety by incapacitating repeat offenders who are 
most likely to murder, rape, rob, or assault innocent victims in our communities, 
and 
WHEREAS, imposing mandatory prison terms on three-time violent felony 
offenders will prevent such offenders from committing more crimes in our 
communities, and likely accelerate recent declines in the violent crime rate in this 
state, NOW, THEREFORE, 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: . . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
I dissent from the majority's determination that chapter 99-188, Laws of 
Florida, does not violate the single subject rule of article III, section 6, of the 
Florida Constitution because the subject is not accurately reflected in the title and 
because sections 11 and 13 are not properly connected with the subject of the 
chapter.  Therefore, contrary to the majority, I would approve the holding in Taylor 
v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), quash the decision in State v. 
Franklin, 836 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), and disapprove the decision in 
Hernandez-Molina v. State, 860 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
Chapter 99-188 contains several sections, most of which deal with either 
enhanced sentences for repeat criminal offenders or the imposition of minimum 
mandatory sentences for violent felons.  Two sections, section 11 and section 13, 
however, do not involve sentencing issues at all.  As the majority explains, article 
III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution contains three requirements:  (1) each law 
shall embrace only one subject; (2) the law may include any matter properly 
connected with that subject; and (3) the subject must be expressed in the title.  See 
majority op. at 12–13 (citing State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1999)).  
While I agree with the majority that the broad subject of the chapter is sentencing 
and that this broad subject is expressed in the title, that is not the complete or 
specific subject of this chapter.  As pointed out by Judge Hazouri in his concurring 
 
- 43 - 
in part and dissenting in part opinion in Hernandez-Molina v. State, 860 So. 2d 
483, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the more specific subject of chapter 99-188 is 
"enhanced sentencing for repeat violent felony offenders." All but two of the 
sections of the chapter pertain to this subject.  As we have done on other occasions, 
we must look beyond the introductory phrase of the chapter, which in this case 
merely says "an act relating to sentencing," to discern its true subject.  See Tormey 
v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting the State's argument that the 
subject of chapter 89-100, Laws of Florida, was simply "an act relating to criminal 
penalties"); Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000); State v. Thompson, 750 
So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2000).  Because the true subject of the chapter is not expressed in 
the title, I would find that there is a violation of the single subject requirement in 
chapter 99-188. 
Additionally, this chapter does not satisfy the requirement of article III, 
section 6, because sections 11 and 13 are not properly connected to the subject and 
objective of chapter 99-188.  "A connection between a provision and the subject is 
proper if the connection is natural or logical, or if there is a reasonable explanation 
for how the provision is necessary to the subject or tends to make effective or 
promote the objects and purposes of legislation included in the subject."  Majority 
op. at 25 (emphasis added).  Neither section 11 nor section 13 is naturally or 
logically connected to the subject of the Act, which is enhanced sentencing for 
 
- 44 - 
serious offenses.30  Since neither section is naturally or logically connected to the 
subject of enhanced sentencing, or to sentencing in general, it is quite evident that 
neither section is "necessary to the subject" of sentencing.  Furthermore, neither 
section tends to make effective or promote the object and purpose of the chapter, 
i.e., to protect the public from serious and repeat violent offenders.  See majority 
op. at 34 ("[T]he purpose of the Act is to protect the public from serious and repeat 
violent offenders . . . ."). 
Section 11 requires the clerk of the court to furnish to the appropriate United 
States immigration officer any records pertaining to any alien who is convicted of a 
felony or misdemeanor or who pleads guilty or no contest to any felony or 
misdemeanor charge.  Section 11 cannot and does not relate to the chapter's subject 
of enhanced sentencing for serious felons; rather, "section 11 addresses a purely 
administrative subject that is far afield of the act's other provisions."  Taylor, 818 
So. 2d at 549.  The majority states that section 11 is "a provision that facilitates the 
removal of non-citizens who are serious or repeat violent offenders after sentence 
completion."  Majority op. at 32.  However, the language in section 11 does not 
limit the transmission of criminal records for repeat offenders or those convicted of 
serious crimes.  Because section 11 pertains to aliens who are convicted of, or 
                                        
30.  Even assuming the title of the chapter is sentencing, sections 11 and 13 
are not properly connected to this broader topic. 
 
 
- 45 - 
plead guilty or no contest to, misdemeanors as well as all felonies, whether violent 
or nonviolent, it does not make effective or promote the Act's object of protecting 
the public from serious and repeat violent offenders. 
Section 13 is likewise not connected to the purpose of chapter 99-188.  
Section 13 adds "railroad vehicle" to the definition of "conveyance" for purposes 
of the enforcement of Florida's burglary statutes.  This provision does not address a 
minimum or enhanced sentencing requirement for violent or repeat offenders.  In 
fact, the only connection between section 13 and the other provisions in the chapter 
is that both involve criminal law.  Such a connection is insufficient.  See, e.g., State 
v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993) (rejecting the State's argument that chapter 
89-280, Laws of Florida, did not violate the single subject requirement because the 
single subject was controlling crime).  Therefore, I would also find that, like 
section 11, section 13 violates the single subject rule because it is not logically 
connected to the subject of the chapter. 
The majority states that "if, after examining the act in its entirety, we cannot 
discern a 'reasonable explanation' for the inclusion of a seemingly disparate 
provision, we will look to the history of the legislative process to determine how 
the challenged provision was added to the Act."  Majority op. at 27.  The 
legislative history of chapter 99-188 reveals that sections 11 and 13 were not a part 
of the original submissions under this chapter. 
 
- 46 - 
When the original House Bill 121 was prefiled on December 8, 1998, neither 
section 11 nor section 13 was included.31  On February 17, 1999, section 11 was 
added by the House Corrections Committee,32 and the Senate adopted its language 
in Senate Bill 1746.33  The Staff Analysis of Senate Bill 1746 reveals that section 
11 was added based on an understanding between the Department of Corrections 
(DOC) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service34 (INS) that the DOC 
would assist the INS in the identification of criminal aliens35 and alleviate the 
burden that was formerly on the INS to request such information from a clerk of 
the court.36  Therefore, it appears that section 11 was intended to be an 
administrative provision added to the Act in order to shift the burden of 
disseminating criminal information about aliens from the federal government to the 
state government.  Thus, section 11, an administrative provision, is not similar to 
                                        
31.  Fla. HB 121 (1999). 
 
32.  Fla. HB 121, § 11, at 79, lines 26-31; 80, lines 1-13 (1999). 
 
33.  Fla. SB 1746, § 11, at 81, lines 26-31; 82, lines 1-13 (1999). 
 
34.  The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) was 
created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to replace the INS.  While the INS 
was part of the United States Department of Justice, the USCIS is part of the 
United States Department of Homeland Security. 
 
35.  Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Jus., CS for SB 1746 (1999) Staff Analysis 10 
(March 23, 1999) (on file with comm.). 
 
36.  Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Jus., CS for SB 1746 (1999) Staff Analysis 17 
(on file with comm.). 
 
- 47 - 
the other provisions in the Act which are properly connected with the subject of 
enhanced sentencing and the objective of protecting the public from serious and 
repeat violent offenders. 
The legislative history of section 13 also supports the conclusion that the 
section is not connected with and is not similar to the other provisions of the Act.  
The Second District Court of Appeal analyzed the legislative history of section 13 
and explained that section 13 was added only after both the House and Senate 
approved the bill and the bill went to the Committee on Fiscal Policy.  See Taylor 
v. State, 818 So. 2d at 549.  Section 13, which adds “railroad vehicle” to the 
definition of “conveyance” in the burglary statute, is completely unrelated to the 
subject and objective of the chapter.  The legislative history, which demonstrates 
that the provision was added after the bill was referred to the Committee on Fiscal 
Policy, does not provide a "reasonable explanation" for the inclusion of this 
disparate provision. 
Thus, chapter 99-188 should be stricken because the subject is not clearly 
expressed in the title and because sections 11 and 13 are not logically connected to 
the subject or objective of the legislation. 
I would remand this case for resentencing because severance of the 
offending sections of the chapter will not cure the problem with the title.  As this 
Court found in Colonial Investment Co. v. Nolan, 131 So. 178 (Fla. 1930), and 
 
- 48 - 
reaffirmed in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d at 628-629, a chapter law should be 
invalidated in its entirety when both the title and the body of the chapter are in 
violation of the single subject rule.  It is for this reason I would strike chapter 99-
188 in its entirety. 
ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D02-957 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Lisa Walsh and Billie Jan Goldstein, 
Assistant Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley and Kellie A. Nielan, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent