Title: New Jersey v. Mosley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2018

New Jersey v. Mosley Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s consideration was whether defendant Noah Mosley’s due process rights were violated because the State relied on hearsay evidence to prove the violation of probation (VOP) charge filed against him. Defendant’s VOP hearing was “atypical.” He was charged with violating probation because new criminal charges were filed against him; however, the new criminal charges had not yet been adjudicated when the State requested that the court proceed and sentence defendant on the VOP. At the VOP hearing, the State advanced hearsay evidence to substantiate the new criminal charges. The State did not produce the officer who had witnessed the alleged new criminal acts for which defendant was later identified and charged as the perpetrator. Nor did the State provide justification for that failure, relying on the proposition that hearsay is admissible in probation violation hearings. The Appellate Division has previously determined it “fair and practical” for a court to admit “reliable hearsay evidence” in such hearings. Building on the “sound legal foundation” of New Jersey v. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 1986), the Supreme Court held hearsay was generally admissible in a VOP hearing. When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to satisfy its proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s due process rights, a court fundamentally should consider the State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the reliability of the evidence for its proposed purpose. Because here, the hearsay presented was insufficient to prove the new underlying substantive offense that was the premise for defendant’s probation violation and sentence. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division judgment that upheld defendant’s probation violation. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Noah Mosley (A-24-16) (078369)Argued November 29, 2017 -- Decided March 6, 2018LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether defendant Noah Mosley’s due process rights were violated because the State relied on hearsay evidence to prove the violation of probation (VOP) charge filed against him. Defendant was serving a five-year term of probation when he was arrested in September 2014. Based on the circumstances underlying that arrest, the State charged him with a VOP and several new criminal offenses. Before any proceedings on the new criminal charges had taken place, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s VOP. Detective Michael Carullo of the Edison Police Department was the only witness to testify at the hearing. Although he was not present during the events that provide the basis for defendant’s charges, Detective Carullo assisted with the investigation after the events had occurred. He testified based on information that the on- scene officer, Officer Zundel, relayed in police reports about the incident. In addition to Zundel’s reports, Carullo relied on a report that he had prepared concerning the investigation and conversations with other officers. According to Detective Carullo’s testimony, at about noon on September 7, 2014, Officer Zundel of the Edison Police Department parked his unmarked police car in a local store’s parking lot. Sometime later, Zundel observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand exchange of narcotics between a minivan driver and a Mercedes driver. When each vehicle attempted to leave the parking lot, Zundel ordered them to stop. The minivan driver complied, but the Mercedes driver did not. Zundel was unable to stop the Mercedes from speeding out of the parking lot. A consent search of the minivan yielded approximately twenty bags of heroin. The driver of the minivan and a bystander to the episode in the parking lot provided descriptions of the Mercedes driver. Carullo testified that he joined Zundel in working on the case and eventually uncovered evidence that pointed to defendant as the driver of the Mercedes. Zundel was asked to view a photograph of defendant, and based on the photo, Zundel identified defendant as the Mercedes driver that he observed. During the VOP hearing, Detective Carullo was unable to provide details of the encounter between Zundel and defendant that led to defendant’s arrest. Several times during his testimony, Carullo’s recollection had to be refreshed. He read from Zundel’s report. He also refreshed his recollection by reviewing his own report containing information secured from other third parties. At the close of the evidence, defense counsel objected to the State’s use of hearsay and argued that the State had not carried its burden of proof on defendant’s probation violation charge. The State declined to produce more evidence, arguing that hearsay is admissible in VOP hearings and that the standard of proof is lower in such hearings than in a typical criminal trial. The court agreed. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied due process by the admission and use of hearsay in the VOP hearing. The Appellate Division rejected the argument and affirmed. The panel reasoned that a trial court may rely on hearsay evidence so long as it is “demonstrably reliable.” The panel determined that Carullo’s testimony met that standard because he had “actively investigated defendant’s actions” and had extensive experience “interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence against those being investigated.” The Court granted certification “limited to the issue of the trial court’s acceptance of hearsay testimony as proof that defendant committed a new offense in violation of probation.” 228 N.J. 433 (2016).HELD: Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing. When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to satisfy its proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s due process rights, a court fundamentally should consider the State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the reliability of the evidence for its proposed purpose. In this matter, the State failed to provide any justification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose of substantiating the new criminal charges against defendant. 1 1. “The court, if satisfied that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the order or if he has been convicted of another offense, may revoke the . . . probation and sentence or resentence the defendant, as provided in this section.” N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4) (emphasis added). The State bears the burden of proving the charges by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. 126, 137 (App. Div. 1986). At the VOP hearing, a defendant has the specific rights “to hear and controvert the evidence against him, to offer evidence in his defense, and to be represented by counsel.” N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4. A probationer in a VOP proceeding has the overlay of the protections of due process. For VOP hearings, the minimal process required must include “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 489 (1972) . In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 782 n.5 (1973), the Court spoke approvingly of the conventional use, where appropriate, of substitutes for live testimony in VOP hearings but added the reminder that “in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony.” (pp. 14-19)2. Similar to federal law on the issue, New Jersey courts have viewed VOP hearings as “a part of the corrections process” rather than an element of a criminal prosecution. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 134. In Reyes, the Appellate Division explored the State’s use of hearsay evidence to prove a VOP. Id. at 139. The Appellate Division declared “[t]he admission and consideration of reliable hearsay evidence in probation violation proceedings [to be] both fair and practical.” Ibid. The panel recognized that it was unproductive and perhaps unnecessary to insist that the State could not proceed initially with hearsay evidence, and it instructed that the State could supplement its proofs as necessary when the probationer contests the State’s proofs. Ibid. The panel explained its accommodation as a “fair balance of the probationer’s rights with the interest of the public.” Ibid. Reyes allows for flexibility for the State but is ever mindful of the need for sufficient reliable evidence to prove the factual underpinnings to a charged violation. With respect to state courts that consider the question, the overwhelming majority allow the admission of hearsay so long as the hearsay is determined to be reliable. In the federal sphere, a form of balancing test is utilized for determining the admission of hearsay evidence in VOP proceedings. (pp. 19-28)3. The Court adheres to the use of hearsay at VOP hearings but endorses a balancing approach that includes assessment of the reasons for the government’s proceeding through the use of hearsay in addition to testing the evidence’s reliability. The evidence to support the VOP charge must be reliable to meet due process concerns, and the reason for relying on hearsay informs the decision on the evidence’s overall reliability. The Court adopts the factors set forth in United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1997)—(1) the importance of the evidence to the court’s finding; (2) the probationer’s opportunity to refute the evidence; (3) the consequences for the probationer of the court’s finding; (4) the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses; and (5) the traditional indicia of reliability borne by the evidence—which each can assist the trial court in analyzing the reliability of the hearsay being offered by the State and the fairness of its use. And the court should explain its reasons for determining that the hearsay evidence is reliable for its stated purposes. (pp. 28-29)4. The State charged defendant with violating probation by committing another criminal offense. While normally that type of VOP charge is demonstrated through the submission of proof of a criminal conviction, the State here opted to proceed first with the VOP charge. It was incumbent on the State then to prove the new criminal charge. See Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 138. Defendant’s ability to defend against the new criminal charges, which were the premise for the VOP charge, was undermined because the State deprived defendant of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine Zundel, or anyone else, who saw the events transpire. The hearsay evidence that the court accepted from Carullo was not reliable to prove the underlying new criminal charges that were the basis for defendant’s VOP charge. Defendant was denied a hearing that met due process requirements. (pp. 29-31) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. JUSTICE ALBIN, CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT, disagrees as to the evidential standard to be applied going forward. According to Justice Albin, the default position should be the application of the Rules of Evidence. If the State seeks relaxation of the evidence rules for good cause, then the balancing test set forth in Walker would be useful for deciding whether hearsay should be allowed in a probation revocation hearing. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 24 September Term 2016 078369STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.NOAH MOSLEY, a/k/a NUBEE OUTUUQCIO, NUBEE BUCKUOUTUUQCIO, and NOAH MOSELEY, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 29, 2017 – March 6, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on the briefs). David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; David M. Liston, of counsel and on the briefs, and Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, Rebecca J. Livengood, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the briefs). 1 Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion for the Court. In this appeal, we consider whether defendant Noah Mosley’sdue process rights were violated because the State relied onhearsay evidence to prove the violation of probation (VOP)charge filed against him. Defendant’s VOP hearing was atypical. He was charged withviolating probation because new criminal charges were filedagainst him; however, the new criminal charges had not yet beenadjudicated when the State requested that the court proceed andsentence defendant on the VOP. At the VOP hearing, the Stateadvanced hearsay evidence to substantiate the new criminalcharges. The State did not produce the officer who hadwitnessed the alleged new criminal acts for which defendant waslater identified and charged as the perpetrator. Nor did theState provide justification for that failure, relying on theproposition that hearsay is admissible in probation violationhearings. Although we have yet to address the use of hearsay evidencein VOP hearings, several decades ago the Appellate Divisiondetermined it “fair and practical” for a court to admit 2 “reliable hearsay evidence” in such hearings. State v. Reyes,207 N.J. Super. 126, 139 (App. Div. 1986). Reyes establishedtwo important principles for VOP hearings. First, while thereis no bar to the admission and use “of demonstrably reliablehearsay evidence . . . [a] violation may not be bottomed onunreliable evidence.” Id. at 138. Second, the nature of VOPhearings calls for flexibility. Id. at 139. In respect of thelatter, the Reyes panel emphasized that when a defendant ischarged with “inexcusably fail[ing] to comply with a substantialrequirement imposed as a condition of” probation, see N.J.S.A.2C:45-3(a)(4), the State usually does not know whether, or what,factual aspect of a probation violation charge a defendant willcontest at a VOP hearing, Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 139 (notingdifferences between proof of failure to comply and proof oflegitimate excuse for that failure). The decision in Reyeselaborates on ways in which the State may initially produceevidence of a violation and then meet its ultimate burden ofproving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.at 137, 139. Reyes’s approach to the use of hearsay in probationviolation hearings is both practical and protective of the dueprocess rights of a probationer charged with a violation ofprobation. Building on the sound legal foundation of Reyes, wehold that hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing. 3 When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to satisfyits proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s dueprocess rights, a court fundamentally should consider theState’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and thereliability of the evidence for its proposed purpose. Weidentify factors for a court to consider when called on tobalance the respective interests of the parties concerning theState’s use of hearsay in a VOP hearing. In this matter, the State failed to provide anyjustification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidencewas not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose ofsubstantiating the new criminal charges against defendant. Infact, the hearsay was pivotal to defendant’s ability to confrontand test the adequacy of the evidence to support a conclusionthat he committed a VOP by engaging in new criminal conduct.The sole witness at the VOP hearing was an officer who becameinvolved in the investigation of the alleged criminal incidentafter it had occurred, and that witness could not attest topersonal knowledge of the events that provided the basis fordefendant’s new criminal charges. In the unusual circumstances of this case, the hearsaypresented through his testimony was insufficient to prove thenew underlying substantive offense that was the premise fordefendant’s probation violation and sentence. We are 4 constrained to reverse the Appellate Division judgment thatupheld defendant’s probation violation. I. A. Defendant was serving a five-year term of probation when hewas arrested in September 2014. Based on the circumstancesunderlying that arrest, the State charged him with a VOP andseveral new criminal offenses. The new criminal chargesincluded third-degree possession of a controlled dangeroussubstance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), third-degree possession of acontrolled dangerous substance with intent to distribute,N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3), third-degree possession of a controlleddangerous substance with intent to distribute near a schoolzone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, second-degree distribution of acontrolled dangerous substance within 500 feet of publichousing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, and second-degree eluding a policeofficer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b). On December 23, 2014, before any proceedings on the newcriminal charges had taken place, the court conducted anevidentiary hearing on defendant’s VOP. Defendant had admittedthat he had been arrested on the new criminal charges and he wasbeing held in custody for that arrest. See N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(3). However, the State wanted the court to sentencedefendant on the VOP charge. Accordingly, to move forward on 5 the State’s request, the court required an evidentiary hearingon the State’s proofs to substantiate the unadjudicated newcriminal charges that were the premise for the VOP charge. Detective Michael Carullo of the Edison Police Departmentwas the only witness to testify at the VOP hearing. Although hewas not present during the events that provide the basis fordefendant’s charges, Detective Carullo assisted with theinvestigation after the events had occurred. Detective Carullotestified based on information that the on-scene officer,Officer Zundel,1 relayed in police reports about the incident.In addition to relying on Zundel’s reports, Carullo relied on apolice report that he had prepared concerning the investigationand conversations he stated that he had with other officers. B. According to Detective Carullo’s testimony, at about noonon September 7, 2014, Officer Zundel of the Edison PoliceDepartment parked his unmarked police car in a local store’sparking lot. Sometime later, a blue Mercedes parked about twospaces away from his car. The windows of the Mercedes wererolled halfway down, and Zundel observed in the vehicle a blackmale driver and a white male passenger. Shortly thereafter, aminivan entered the lot and parked next to the Mercedes. The1 The record does not disclose Officer Zundel’s first name. 6 minivan’s driver, a white male, got out of the minivan andentered the rear passenger side of the Mercedes. Zundel thenobserved what he believed to be a hand-to-hand exchange ofnarcotics between the minivan driver and the Mercedes driver. When the minivan driver exited the Mercedes and returned tothe minivan, Zundel maneuvered his unmarked police vehicle toblock in the Mercedes and the minivan to prevent both fromleaving. When each vehicle nevertheless attempted to leave theparking lot, Zundel ordered them to stop. The minivan drivercomplied, but the Mercedes driver did not. Zundel drew hisweapon and grabbed the Mercedes’s side door handle, but he wasunable to stop the Mercedes from speeding out of the parkinglot. After securing the scene, Zundel talked with the minivan’sdriver, Anthony Thornton. A consent search of the minivanyielded approximately twenty bags of heroin. Thornton latergave a statement to police revealing that the person whom he metin the parking lot was known as “Black” and that Thornton hadbeen purchasing heroin from him for over a year. Thornton alsoprovided a physical description of the person who sold him thedrugs that day. The police also obtained a statement from a bystander tothe episode in the parking lot. Jimmy An provided an account ofwhat he saw, along with a description of the Mercedes driver. 7 Carullo testified that he joined Zundel in working on thecase and eventually uncovered evidence that pointed to defendantas the driver of the Mercedes when Zundel encountered it in theparking lot. Zundel was asked to view a photograph ofdefendant, and based on the photo, Zundel identified defendantas the Mercedes driver that he observed. C. During the VOP hearing, Detective Carullo was unable toprovide details of the encounter between Zundel and defendantthat led to defendant’s arrest. Carullo was unable to answerquestions designed to test Zundel’s ability to observe what hisreport stated he had witnessed. Carullo admitted that he was“going by [Zundel’s] version of events.” Several times duringhis testimony, Carullo’s recollection had to be refreshed. Heread from Zundel’s report. He also refreshed his recollectionby reviewing his own report containing information secured fromother third parties. Specifically, Carullo could not rememberthe name of the minivan driver; used Zundel’s police report torefresh his recollection concerning the description Thornton hadprovided of his drug seller; used his own report to refresh hisrecollection as to the name of witness Jimmy An; could notremember whether the Mercedes windows were tinted; and could notremember what Zundel observed before the minivan arrived. 8 At the close of the evidence, defense counsel objected tothe State’s use of hearsay, maintaining that the only witness totestify -- Carullo -- had not been present during the allegeddrug transaction and ensuing events in question. Counsel statedthat he was denied the opportunity to confront and question “theperson who was actually trying to effect the arrest” about theevents that led to defendant’s new criminal charges. He arguedthat the State had not produced sufficient evidence to carry itsburden of proof on the substantive aspects of defendant’sprobation violation charge. Following an adjournment, the State declined to producemore evidence, arguing that hearsay is admissible in VOPhearings and that the standard of proof is lower in suchhearings than in a typical criminal trial. The court agreed.Although noting that it “appreciate[d] the desire defense mighthave to have the actual witness present,” the court stated thatit was not required to follow the rules of evidence in a VOPhearing. The court determined that the record containedsufficient evidence to conclude that defendant violatedprobation. For that violation of probation, the court sentenceddefendant to five years in prison with a two-and-a-half-yearparole disqualifier. Defendant appealed, arguing in relevant part that he wasdenied due process by the admission and use of hearsay in the 9 VOP hearing. The Appellate Division rejected the argument andaffirmed in an unpublished opinion. Stating that a defendant’sright to confrontation is not absolute, the panel reasoned thata VOP hearing is not a criminal prosecution and that a trialcourt may rely on hearsay evidence so long as it is“demonstrably reliable.” The panel determined that Carullo’stestimony met that standard because he had “activelyinvestigated defendant’s actions” and had extensive experience“interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence against thosebeing investigated.” We granted defendant’s petition for certification, “limitedto the issue of the trial court’s acceptance of hearsaytestimony as proof that defendant committed a new offense inviolation of probation.” 228 N.J. 433 (2016). We also grantedthe motions of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey(ACLU-NJ) and the Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae. II. A. Defendant argues that his state and federal due processrights were violated by the State’s use of hearsay evidence athis VOP hearing. While acknowledging that such hearings aretechnically not criminal in nature and do not require the sameprocedural demands as a criminal trial, defendant contends thatsuch hearings still place probationers at risk of incarceration 10 and thus require careful procedural protections. Defendantcontends that those procedural protections have not beenadequately elucidated. Defendant maintains that Reyes’s“demonstrably reliable” standard for the use of hearsay evidencein VOP hearings is vague, unclear, and subject to inconsistentapplication. Defendant asks that we adopt a new test,incorporating a variety of factors for determining theadmissibility of hearsay evidence in VOP hearings. Indefendant’s view, any such test should assess the reliability ofthe hearsay evidence and, where necessary, critically analyzethe State’s reasons for calling a witness without personalknowledge of the events in question. Further, defendant contends that the hearsay adduced hereis inadmissible under any standard. Defendant notes that theprosecutor provided no reason for failing to call Zundel as awitness. Defendant asserts that Carullo’s testimony wasunreliable because his recollection had to be refreshed numeroustimes and because his testimony was based, in part, on policereports that he did not prepare. Defendant thus maintains thatthe hearsay relied upon at his VOP hearing was not reliable andshould not have been admitted to substantiate that he committedthe new criminal offenses. B. 11 The State contends that the trial court followed“longstanding principles of due process” in allowing Carullo’shearsay testimony. The State claims widespread support for theproposition that hearsay evidence is permissible in VOP hearingsand that such hearings do not afford defendants the sameprocedural safeguards as a criminal trial. Moreover, the Stateargues that the evidence adduced here was “sufficientlyreliable,” as required by Reyes, and that the demands of dueprocess were satisfied. The State maintains that to holdotherwise would be inconsistent with both state and federal caselaw and would place a heavy and unwarranted burden on the Stateto either produce witnesses at VOP hearings or at the very leastexplain their absence. C. Amicus ACLU-NJ argues that defendants subject to VOPhearings should receive the protections of the confrontationclause because such hearings are criminal in nature and thusentitle defendants to certain procedural safeguards. ACLU-NJemphasizes the grave importance of ensuring that probationersare not imprisoned erroneously and posits that any burdenimposed upon the State by such additional safeguards iswarranted by the fact that those safeguards will aid in thetruth-seeking process. 12 Alternatively, ACLU-NJ maintains that even under the law asit currently stands the prosecution must show good cause forfailing to allow a defendant to confront witnesses. In soarguing, ACLU-NJ states that we should not allow Reyes’s vaguestandard to “eviscerate” a probationer’s right to witnessconfrontation. Turning to the facts at issue here, ACLU-NJargues that the State could not provide a sufficient reason toexplain Officer Zundel’s absence.2 D. The Attorney General, appearing as amicus, argues that VOPhearings are intended to be flexible and informal proceedingsthat provide trial courts with sufficient discretion todetermine the reliability of hearsay evidence. Like the State,the Attorney General argues that VOP hearings are not a stage ofcriminal prosecution and thus do not provide the sameprotections as a criminal trial. Therefore, the AttorneyGeneral maintains, the current reliability standard does notviolate defendant’s due process rights and there is no reason to2 ACLU-NJ also argues that the VOP hearing here resulted in defendant receiving a penalty for the original offense above the statutory maximum, and in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because defendant was not entitled under our law to receive jail credit for time spent serving his probationary sentence. That argument has not been raised by the parties. We decline to consider an argument raised for the first time by an amicus curiae in an appeal. State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 421 (2017). 13 abandon the current rule in favor of a new standard that wouldturn VOP proceedings into “mini-trials” and imbue the processwith unnecessary complications and uncertainty. III. A. We start with some basic concepts governing probation,which is an authorized sentence under the New Jersey CriminalCode. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2). When imposing a sentence of probation, the sentencing courtis empowered to incorporate, among other things, “suchreasonable conditions . . . as [the court] deems necessary toinsure that [the defendant] will lead a law-abiding life or islikely to assist him to do so.” N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(a). Anacknowledged “standard condition” of probation is that theprobationer not commit another offense. State v. Wilkins, 230 N.J. Super. 261, 263 (App. Div. 1989) (recognizing thatcondition as inherent part of any probationary sentenceauthorized under Criminal Code). Defendant was subject to thatstandard condition. A probationer’s commission of a new offensecan support a finding of “failure 'to comply with a substantialrequirement imposed as a condition of probation’” and providegrounds for the revocation of probation. Ibid. (quotingN.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4)); cf. State v. Wasserman, 75 N.J. Super. 480, 484-85 (App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 39 N.J. 516 (1963) 14 (recognizing, pre-Code, that proof of commission of new offenseis basis for revocation of probation). Provisions governing probation violation proceedings areset forth in the Criminal Code. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3 addresses thesummons or arrest of a defendant who is serving a period ofprobation, a defendant’s commitment to custody pending aviolation hearing, and the revocation of probation andresentencing of a defendant. More specifically, the statuteprovides that [a]t any time before the discharge of the defendant or the termination of the period of . . . probation: . . . . (2) A probation officer or peace officer, upon request of the chief probation officer or otherwise having probable cause to believe that the defendant has failed to comply with a requirement imposed as a condition of the order or that he has committed another offense, may arrest him without a warrant. [N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(2).]When a probationer has been apprehended, the court conducts apreliminary hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(3). If the courtfinds “probable cause to believe that the defendant hascommitted another offense or if he has been held to answertherefor,” the court may hold the defendant “without bail 15 pending a determination of the charge by the court havingjurisdiction thereof.” Ibid. In terms of next steps, when a probationer is charged withcommitting a new criminal offense, he can be held pending adisposition on the new criminal charge and thereafter be subjectto a probation violation hearing after a conviction. SeeN.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(3) and (4). Or, the State may proceed witha probation violation hearing based on failure to comply withthe condition requiring that the probationer lead a law-abidinglife, notwithstanding that a conviction on the new criminalcharge has not yet occurred. Wilkins, 230 N.J. Super. at 264.The recognized “'preferable’ procedure” is to delay substantiveaction on the probation violation until after the criminalconviction is secured. Ibid. (quoting 2 The New Jersey PenalCode: Commentary 347 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971). Ultimately, the court has the ability to revoke probation. The court, if satisfied that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the order or if he has been convicted of another offense, may revoke the . . . probation and sentence or resentence the defendant, as provided in this section. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4) (emphasis added).]If the court revokes probation, “it may impose on the defendantany sentence that might have been imposed originally for theoffense of which he was convicted.” N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(b). In 16 addition, the court may add to or modify the conditions ofprobation, even when not revoking probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4. In respect of process, the Code requires that a defendantreceive notice of the nature of the VOP charges and theopportunity for a hearing. Ibid. (requiring, for probationrevocation or modification, “a hearing upon written notice tothe defendant of the grounds on which such action is proposed”).The State bears the burden of proving the charges by apreponderance of the evidence. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 137.Importantly, at the VOP hearing, a defendant has the specificrights “to hear and controvert the evidence against him, tooffer evidence in his defense, and to be represented bycounsel.” N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4. B. 1. In addition to the statutory procedural protectionsconferred by the Code, a probationer in a VOP proceeding has theoverlay of the protections of due process. The United StatesSupreme Court firmly established those protections in Gagnon v.Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 781 (1973). Although the Court notedin Gagnon that the revocation of probation occurs aftersentencing is completed and is not “part of the criminalprosecution,” it recognized that the potential for the loss of 17 liberty represents “a serious deprivation” for the probationer,requiring due process of law. Id. at 781-82. The Supreme Court determined that, for VOP hearings,federal due process concerns are satisfied by informalproceedings that meet basic conditions previously prescribed forparole violation hearings. Id. at 782 (“[A] probationer . . .is entitled to a . . . hearing, under the conditions specifiedin Morrissey v. Brewer” for parole violations); Morrissey v.Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 484 (1972) (“What is needed is an informalhearing structured to assure that the finding of a paroleviolation will be based on verified facts and that the exerciseof discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of theparolee’s behavior.”). Under the Morrissey construct, theminimal process required must include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. [Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added).] 18 Despite listing requirements, Morrissey also allows roomfor accommodation in the proceedings, stating that “the processshould be flexible enough to consider evidence includingletters, affidavits, and other material that would not beadmissible in an adversary criminal trial.” Ibid. Similarly,in Gagnon, the Court spoke approvingly of the conventional use,where appropriate, of substitutes for live testimony in VOPhearings, due to prosecutorial concerns were government to beburdened with an obligation to proceed only through livewitnesses. 411 U.S. at 782 n.5. The Court neverthelessinsisted on reliable evidence, as due process requires, to provea charge, adding the reminder that “in some cases there issimply no adequate alternative to live testimony.” Ibid. 2. Similar to federal law on the issue, New Jersey courts haveviewed VOP hearings as “a part of the corrections process”rather than an element of a criminal prosecution. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 134. Our approach has generally been to followfederal constitutional due process requirements in this area.Id. at 134-35 (noting that stricter state constitutional demandshave not been imposed by our courts, except that New Jersey’sprobation statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4, incorporates additionalright to representation by counsel). 19 In Reyes, the Appellate Division explored the State’s useof hearsay evidence to prove a VOP. Id. at 139. The defendanthad been sentenced to a probationary term with the conditionthat he complete an eighteen-month residential drug program;however, he was discharged after four months and then failed toreport to his probation officer. Id. at 132. At the VOPhearing, the State presented the testimony of a probationofficer, who was not the defendant’s probation officer, becausedefendant’s probation officer was on sick leave at the time ofthe VOP hearing. Id. at 133. The Appellate Division declared “[t]he admission andconsideration of reliable hearsay evidence in probationviolation proceedings [to be] both fair and practical.” Id. at139. The panel reached that conclusion for the sensible reasonthat “[t]he production of witnesses to geographically remote butmaterial events which may not be contested would be inconvenientand wastefully expensive.” Ibid. Thus, the panel recognizedthat it was unproductive and perhaps unnecessary to insist thatthe State could not proceed initially with hearsay evidence, andit instructed that the State could supplement its proofs asnecessary when the probationer contests the State’s proofs.Ibid. The panel explained its accommodation as a “fair balanceof the probationer’s rights with the interest of the public.”Ibid. 20 Substantively, the panel found the State’s evidence inReyes to be reliable in part because the defendant essentiallyoffered no evidence to dispute the State’s proofs that he hadviolated the terms of probation. Id. at 140. Reyes did notraise a factual dispute as to the claim that he had left theresidential drug program prematurely, and the panel refused toimpose on the State the burden of “negativing excusability.”Id. at 139-40. Rather, the Appellate Division determined thatthe State had sufficiently proved, through “reliable hearsayevidence, defendant’s discharge from the program.” Ibid. Thepanel explained in detail why the evidence presented wassufficient: If there was a dispute whether defendant had really been discharged, whether defendant actually behaved as the program staff reported, whether discharge was a reasonable response, or whether defendant’s conduct was excusable, it was up to defendant to create that dispute by eliciting evidence to that effect on cross-examination or by offering such evidence. His failure to do so created the reasonable and lawful inference that no such dispute existed. That inference, coupled with the reliable hearsay proofs, was sufficient basis for [the judge’s] determination that a violation of probation had occurred. [Ibid.]The panel succinctly summed up its holding, stating “[t]here isno constitutional bar to admission and consideration ofdemonstrably reliable hearsay evidence, but a finding of 21 violation may not be bottomed on unreliable evidence.” Id. at138 (citing United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4thCir. 1982) (other citations omitted)). Following that comprehensive analysis of the law andexplication of its application to Reyes’s circumstances, noother published decisions in this State have elaborated on theuse of hearsay in VOP hearings and, as noted earlier, this Courthas not spoken on the issue. IV. A. Defendant presently claims his due process rights under theFederal and State Constitutions were violated by the State’s useof hearsay in his VOP hearing. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J.Const. art. I, ¶ 1. As a broad statement of rights, it isincorrect that the use of hearsay in VOP proceedings is a per seviolation of defendant’s due process rights. To the extent thisCourt has not expressly stated that principle, we do so now. Under Gagnon, federal due process rights permit flexibilityin the use of substitutes for live testimony in probationviolation hearings. 411 U.S. at 782 n.5. And, as the Reyespanel concluded in 1986, state constitutional due processrequirements had not been more strictly construed in the VOPsetting. 207 N.J. Super. at 135. Nor have they since. Indeed,the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, updated since Reyes was 22 decided, are not applicable to VOP hearings. See N.J.R.E.101(a)(2)(C); 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment on N.J.R.E.101 (stating that rules of evidence do not apply in probationproceedings). That said, the decision in Reyes does not suggest, in itsletter or spirit, that hearsay could be used, wholesale, asproof of a VOP under any set of circumstances. Any suchunderstanding of the Reyes opinion does it injustice. Reyesallows for flexibility for the State but is ever mindful of theneed for sufficient reliable evidence to prove the factualunderpinnings to a charged violation. The decision emphasizesthe obligation of a court to be fair and balanced to the rightsof the defendant to have due process, which includes the rightto be proven guilty by reliable evidence and to confront theevidence advanced against him. The decision also strives toavoid placing wasteful, unnecessary obligations on the State ifit can prove its case through hearsay and other non-liveevidence, including the supplementation of the record throughcross-examination or additional witnesses on leave granted.Also, the use of inferences can fill evidential obligationswhere supported by the record, as Reyes explained. Overall, the framework that was established in Reyes wasand remains sound. In the years that have ensued since Reyesissued, appellate courts in numerous other jurisdictions have 23 addressed the use of hearsay in VOP hearings. In their ownways, those courts have sought to offer guidance to trial courtson when hearsay may be relied upon to support a VOP charge whilebalancing the rights of the defendant in such a proceeding. Thestarting premise, however, is that hearsay generally isadmissible in VOP hearings. The devil is in the detail ofavoiding trenching on the due process confrontation rights of adefendant. B. With respect to state courts that consider the question,the overwhelming majority allow the admission of hearsay so longas the hearsay is determined to be reliable. See, e.g., Statev. Stotts, 695 P.2d 1110 , 1119-20 (Ariz. 1985); State v.Giovanni P., 110 A.3d 442, 447-48 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015); Reyesv. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 441-42 (Ind. 2007); State v. Graham,30 P.3d 310, 313 (Kan. 2001); Bailey v. State, 612 A.2d 288,292-93 (Md. 1992); State v. Guthrie, 257 P.3d 904, 914-15 (N.M.2011). The reliability of the evidence to support the VOPcharge satisfies due process concerns in such states. In addition to examining for reliability, a number ofstates also require a specific showing of good cause by theprosecution to explain the failure to call a witness and insteadoffer hearsay evidence. See State v. Marrapese, 409 A.2d 544 ,548-49 (R.I. 1979) (construing State v. DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229 24 (R.I. 1978)); State v. Brown, 600 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (W. Va.2004). In such circumstances, the explanation can beincorporated into the examination for reliability whendetermining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the VOPcharge. In the federal sphere, a form of balancing test is utilizedfor determining the admission of hearsay evidence in VOPproceedings. In the seminal case of United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 642–43 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit establisheda balancing test for reconciling a probationer’s confrontationrights under Morrissey with the government’s reasons for notproviding an opportunity for confrontation: As is true of any balancing test, it is not possible to articulate fixed rules on what the government must show to establish “good cause” in every case. However, there are several factors which should be evaluated in examining the basis cited by the government for dispensing with confrontation. First, the court should assess the explanation the government offers of why confrontation is undesirable or impractical. For example, the government might contend that live testimony would pose a danger of physical harm to a government informant, see Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1244 (2d Cir. 1972), or, as suggested by Gagnon, that procuring live witnesses would be difficult or expensive. A second factor that must be considered, and one that has been focused upon by a number of courts, is the reliability of the evidence which the government offers in place of live testimony. See, e.g., United States v. 25 Burkhalter, 588 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026–27 (4th Cir. [1982]). Thus, where the government demonstrates that the burden of producing live testimony would be inordinate and offers in its place hearsay evidence that is demonstrably reliable, it has made a strong showing of good cause. Where, on the other hand, the government neither shows that presenting live testimony would be unreasonably burdensome nor offers hearsay evidence that bears indicia of reliability, the probationer is entitled to confrontation. [Ibid. (footnote omitted).] Following Bell’s lead, other federal courts began adoptinga balancing-test approach. United States v. Chin, 224 F.3d 121,124 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417, 420(9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 510(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114(11th Cir. 1994). Of particular note is the Ninth Circuit’s enunciation ofthe proper balancing in Walker. Walker instructs trial courtsto consider several factors when balancing interests inconnection with the use of hearsay at a VOP hearing: (1) “theimportance of the evidence to the court’s finding”; (2) “the[probationer’s] opportunity to refute the evidence”; (3) “theconsequences [for the probationer] of the court’s finding”; (4)“the 'difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses’”; and (5)“the 'traditional indicia of reliability borne by theevidence.’” 117 F.3d at 420 (quoting United States v. Martin, 26984 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1993)). We add that Federal Rule ofCriminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) was amended in 2002 to impose abalancing of interests. Under the rule as currentlyconstructed, a federal defendant facing a revocation ofprobation “is entitled to,” among other things, “an opportunityto appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witnessunless the court determines that the interest of justice doesnot require the witness to appear.” That 2002 amendmentincorporated the balancing approach that circuit courts hadbegun to follow. See generally United States v. Jones, 818 F.3d 1091, 1098-1100 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing development of lawand significance of Rule amendment). Presently all circuitcourts of appeals but the Sixth Circuit have expressly adopted abalancing-test approach.3 Several state jurisdictions now follow a balancing approachakin to the one initially expressed in Bell or as otherwiseupdated. See State v. Wibbens, 243 P.3d 790, 792-93 (Or. Ct.App. 2010) (applying balancing test adopted by Ninth Circuit);3 See Jones, 818 F.3d at 1099; United States v. Jordan, 742 F.3d 276, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2004); Chin, 224 F.3d at 124; Walker, 117 F.3d at 420; Grandlund, 71 F.3d at 510; Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. 27 State v. Beck, 619 N.W.2d 247, 250-52 (S.D. 2000); State v.Austin, 685 A.2d 1076 , 1081 (Vt. 1996). C. Although we adhere to the use of hearsay at VOP hearings,we endorse a balancing approach that includes assessment of thereasons for the government’s proceeding through the use ofhearsay in addition to testing the evidence’s reliability.Merely because the rules of evidence are inapplicable to VOPhearings does not control whether due process would be violatedby the court’s acceptance and reliance on unreliable evidence tosustain a VOP charge. The evidence to support the VOP chargemust be reliable to meet due process concerns, and the reasonfor relying on hearsay informs the decision on the evidence’soverall reliability. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 139 (noting thatcourt’s decision as to when to admit hearsay evidence should“represent[] a fair balance of the probationer’s rights with theinterest of the public”). We conclude that the Walker factors provide a helpfulrefinement of the guidance already existing in New Jersey fromthe Reyes decision. See id. at 138 (noting that right toconfrontation is “one element among several to be considered andweighed by the hearing body”). The Walker factors that we adoptto guide trial courts bear repeating: (1) “the importance ofthe evidence to the court’s finding”; (2) “the [probationer’s] 28 opportunity to refute the evidence”; (3) “the consequences [forthe probationer] of the court’s finding”; (4) “the 'difficultyand expense of procuring witnesses’”; and (5) “the 'traditionalindicia of reliability borne by the evidence.’” 117 F.3d at 420(quoting Martin, 984 F.2d at 312). Each factor can assist thetrial court in analyzing the reliability of the hearsay beingoffered by the State and the fairness of its use. And, in thecontext of what is or is not being contested by the defendant,the court should explain its reasons for determining that thehearsay evidence is reliable for its stated purposes. D. Applying those considerations to the case at hand, weconclude that the State deprived defendant of an important dueprocess confrontation right at the VOP hearing. The State charged defendant with violating probation bycommitting another criminal offense. While normally that typeof VOP charge is demonstrated through the submission of proof ofa criminal conviction, the State here opted to proceed firstwith the VOP charge. It was incumbent on the State then toprove the new criminal charge. See Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 138 (“In violation hearings, the circumstances control theadmission and consideration of offered evidence.”). Defendant’s ability to defend against the new criminalcharges, which were the premise for the VOP charge, was 29 undermined because the State deprived defendant of theopportunity to confront and cross-examine Zundel, or anyoneelse, who saw the events transpire. Defendant was preventedfrom questioning the key observer -- Zundel -- on what he couldor could not see, or see well, on the day of the events in theparking lot. See ibid. (“In some situations, there is noadequate alternative to live testimony.”). The State insteadproceeded with Carullo’s hearsay testimony about what Zundelreported he observed on the day of the events in the parking lotinstead of producing Zundel himself. A police report by Zundel,prepared in the context of an investigation and recountingsubjective events in a narrative form, is not a document thatfits into any exception to the hearsay rule. State v.Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 388-89 (2015) (holding that DWI reportscontaining narrative accounts by police officer are inadmissiblehearsay). The hearsay evidence that the court accepted fromCarullo was not reliable to prove the underlying new criminalcharges that were the basis for defendant’s VOP charge. Theconsequences of the court’s determination to treat the evidenceas reliable in this context were substantial for defendant. The State did not even explain why Zundel was not availableon that hearing day, or on an adjourned day, as Reyescontemplates when a factual matter, which is first presentedthrough the production of hearsay, is disputed by a defendant. 30 See Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 139 (noting that State may seekadjournment to supplement its proofs where hearsay evidence iscontested). By declining to call any witness other thanCarullo, the State prevented defendant from being able toconfront the quality of the evidence against him. We hold thatdefendant was denied a hearing that met due processrequirements. In this case, for the reasons expressed, we are constrainedto conclude that the use of hearsay evidence to sustain the VOPcharge against defendant was error. V. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division thataffirmed defendant’s VOP charge. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, AND TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. 31 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 24 September Term 2016 078369STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.NOAH MOSLEY, a/k/a NUBEE OUTUUQCIO, NUBEE BUCKUOUTUUQCIO and NOAH MOSELEY, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I join the majority in concluding that the unadulterateduse of hearsay denied defendant his right to a fair probationrevocation hearing. I also concur in its analysis thatdefendant was denied the opportunity to confront the criticalwitness in this case. The State essentially tried defendant ona newly charged criminal offense as a violation of probation --without the burden of satisfying a higher standard of proof orcomplying with the Rules of Evidence. Defendant had asubstantial liberty interest in a fair probation revocationhearing. Here, the trial court, which found a probationviolation, sentenced defendant to a five-year prison term with atwo-and-a-half year parole disqualifier on the underlyingoffense. 1 Unlike the majority, I believe that the Rules of Evidenceshould apply in probation revocation hearings in the absence ofa good-cause showing for the relaxation of those rules. TheRules of Evidence are an instructional guide -- developed overgenerations -- for the admission of reliable and trustworthyevidence. We apply those rules in garden-variety, slip-and-fallpersonal injury cases in the Civil Part and in minor contractualdispute cases tried in the Special Civil Part because thereliability of the outcome matters to the parties. A defendantfacing a long prison term has as great an interest in thereliability of the fact-findings in a probation revocationhearing. Procedural protections that protect the substantial libertyinterests of the accused should prevail over claims ofefficiency. When the stakes are at their highest, our tolerancefor fact-finding errors should be at its lowest. In thosecircumstances, procedural safeguards, such as those embodied inthe Rules of Evidence, are of the utmost importance. This Courthas not hesitated to impose additional procedural safeguards --above the minimal requirements imposed by due process -- when aperson’s freedom hangs in the balance. See, e.g., State v.Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 63-64 & n.9 (2006) (requiring police tomaintain written records documenting out-of-courtidentifications to ensure reliability of identification 2 procedure); Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 146 (2006) (holdingthat, to ensure integrity of fact-finding hearing, right tocounsel attaches to indigent parents facing incarceration forfailure to pay child support). How our jurisprudence has addressed this subject in thepast should be the beginning, not the end, of the analysis. InGagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court set forththe minimal due process requirements for conducting a probationrevocation hearing. 411 U.S. 778 , 781-82 (1973). The majorityunderstandably turns to Gagnon for guidance. The Supreme Courtin Gagnon, however, presumed that probation officers, notprosecutors, would present the case against a defendant on aprobation violation charge, id. at 783-85, 789, and did not findthat the defendant had an absolute right to counsel at suchhearings, id. at 790. Probation violation hearings are muchdifferent today from when Gagnon was decided more than fourdecades ago. I do not believe that we need a different set of evidencerules for probation violation hearings. Our judges need noinstruction on the application of our Rules of Evidence. Therules adopted by the majority, although an improvement, I fearwill lead to inconsistent results because those rules are morepliable and unfamiliar to our judges. See Pasqua, 186 N.J. at 139-40. 3 I would apply our evidence rules to probation violationhearings, but I would make some common-sense accommodationsgiven the nature of those proceedings. One approach is a noticeand demand procedure. For example, if a non-critical witness isunavailable, the prosecutor could give notice of its intent tocall a substitute witness and demand to know if the defendantintends to challenge the substitute’s testimony. If there is nochallenge, the issue is resolved. See State v. Wilson, 227 N.J. 534, 538-39, 553-54 (2017) (authorizing notice and demandprocedure for admission of map in drug-free-zone case); State v.Simbara, 175 N.J. 37, 43 (2002) (noting statutory notice anddemand procedure for admission of laboratory reports in drugcases). In many cases, a probation officer’s records willsatisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule inthe event the officer is unavailable. See State v. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. 126, 138-39 (App. Div. 1986) (noting that probationreports may be admissible as business reports (citing Prellwitzv. Berg, 578 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1978))). In otherinstances, on a showing of good cause by the State, I wouldallow the relaxation of the Rules of Evidence “to admit relevantand trustworthy evidence in the interest of justice.” SeeN.J.R.E. 101(a)(2). In short, the default position should be the application ofthe Rules of Evidence. If the State seeks relaxation of the 4 evidence rules for good cause, then the balancing test set forthin United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1997),relied on by the majority, ante at ___ (slip op. at 26-29),would be useful for deciding whether hearsay -- otherwiseinadmissible under our Rules of Evidence -- should be allowed ina probation revocation hearing. For the reasons expressed, I concur in the judgment reachedby the majority, but not in the evidential standard to beapplied going forward. 5