Title: Com. v. Franklin
Citation: 301 Pa. Super. 17, 446 A.2d 1313
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 1982

301 Pa. Superior Ct. 17 (1982) 446 A.2d 1313 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald A. FRANKLIN, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted June 1, 1981. Filed June 18, 1982. *20 Thomas A. Natishyn, Stroudsburg, for appellant. James P. Gregor, Assistant District Attorney, Stroudsburg, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and MONTEMURO, JJ. McEWEN, Judge: We here review an appeal from a judgment of sentence in which the sole contention of appellant is that the sentence of the court to a term of imprisonment of two and one half years to five years upon a charge of aggravated assault was excessive. We do not agree and, accordingly, affirm. The criminal justice system has received in recent years abundant attention from the society it is designed to serve and that attention, often displayed by distress, is ever so frequently directed to the subject of sentencing. There has even been a simultaneous, although unrelated, mandated revision more of the practices than of the principles of Pennsylvania law upon sentencing by not only the legislature but also by the Supreme Court. The eminent Pennsylvania *21 Supreme Court Justice Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., quite aptly noted in Commonwealth v. Cottle, 493 Pa. 377, 382-83, 426 A.2d 598, 600 (1981): The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected as improper sentences imposed in accordance with a pre-established policy or standard for a particular offense since Pennsylvania has long been committed to the philosophy of sentencing aimed to promote rehabilitation as well as to provide punishment. Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976). These dual aims may be achieved when a sentencing judge has broad discretion to "determine, among the sentencing alternatives and the range of permissible penalties, the proper sentence to be imposed." Id., 466 Pa. at 130, 351 A.2d at 656. The Supreme Court in Martin made clear that the nature of the criminal act was not to be the sole basis for the determination of the length of sentence but that, in addition, inquiry was to be made into the character of the convicted individual and into any extenuating or mitigating circumstances, so as to enable the sentencing court to exercise its broad discretion in accordance with the applicable statutory requirements. *22 In the Martin opinion, the Supreme Court stated that it had earlier held in Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973), that when the trial court orders a presentence investigation report, defense counsel has a right to examine its contents before sentencing and, if he contests any portion, to offer evidence in rebuttal.[1] The Sentencing Code[2] delineates the sentencing alternatives[3] as (1) an order of probation; (2) a determination of *23 guilt without further penalty; (3) partial confinement; (4) total confinement; and (5) a fine; and, while allowing a mingling of those alternatives, does by clear mandate declare that when selecting the alternative(s) to be imposed, "The court shall follow the general principle that the sentence to be imposed should cause confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant."[4] Our Supreme Court observed in Martin, supra 466 Pa. at 130 n. 20, 351 A.2d at 656 n. 20, that this legislative mandate was a codification of the philosophy that had long been implicit in Pennsylvania law. The Sentencing Code also directs: The distinguished Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Samuel J. Roberts provides in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977) a most comprehensive treatise upon the reasons for and the benefits of such a requirement. The Sentencing Code also provides specific grounds[5] which are to be accorded weight in favor of an order of *24 probation, while it commands that the court, as a condition precedent to a sentence of total confinement, reach quite specific conclusions[6] after reflection upon the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant. The Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Kostka, 475 Pa. 85, 379 A.2d 884 (1977) that the record of the sentencing proceedings must reveal that the trial court concluded that probation and partial confinement were not appropriate. See also Commonwealth v. Wicks, 265 Pa.Super. 305, 401 A.2d 1223 (1979). The Sentencing Code has since its enactment been extensively discussed in appellate decisions. Those decisions make clear that the specific factors which the sentencing code has enumerated provide the sentencing court with guidelines for articulation of the reasons for the sentence and that, absent a statement of reasons, the record will not reveal whether the legislatively mandated factors had been *25 considered. Commonwealth v. Kostka, supra, 475 Pa. at 92, 379 A.2d at 888; Commonwealth v. Riggins, supra 474 Pa. at 135, 377 A.2d at 151; Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 282 Pa.Super. 193, 197, 422 A.2d 894, 896 (1980). And, while the statement of the court at the sentencing proceedings need not specifically cite or include the language of the sentencing code, the statement of reasons provided by the court must demonstrate that the court has considered the factors specified in the code: See also Commonwealth v. Doyle, 275 Pa.Super. 373, 389, 418 A.2d 1336, 1344 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bachert, 271 Pa.Super. 72, 82, 412 A.2d 580, 586 (1979); Commonwealth v. Wicks, supra, 265 Pa.Super. at 314, 401 A.2d at 1227. While the flurry of both legislative enactment and judicial expression reflects, in the view of most scholars and authorities, a more enlightened approach to a most troublesome social subject, that activity might also be considered in some ways to have been simply a reexpression of traditional precepts: See also Commonwealth v. Doyle, supra, 275 Pa.Super. at 380, 418 A.2d at 1340; Commonwealth v. Wicks, supra 265 Pa.Super. at 310, 401 A.2d at 1225; Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496, 500, 393 A.2d 935, 937 (1978). A review of both the traditional principles and of the recent legislative and judicial edicts provides the following summary of precepts for the sentencing court: Certain of these precepts are quite specific while others, of course, are somewhat abstract, resembling more notion than regulation. It might be said that certain of the precepts *28 simply call for the judge to impress upon the record the conscious factors that compose the basis for the sentence, some of which, in the past, while certainly present, many times went unexpressed; it has already been said that none of the precepts alter the traditional duty of the sentencing judge. And yet, for whatever structure, balance, standardization and clarity of perspective may have been achieved in recent years through the emanation provided by both legislative and judicial effort, it would seem that acceptance by the legislature of the guidelines for sentencing recently adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing finds us at the threshold of the transformation sought by the General Assembly when it established in 1978 the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing to effect "a standard statewide framework for sentencing." Comment to 204 Pa.Code, Ch. 303, Pa.Bull.Vol. 11, No. 42; Saturday, October 17, 1981 at p. 3597. We here review the proceedings of the sentence imposed by the learned and distinguished Forty-Third Judicial District Common Pleas Court Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr., as a result of the guilty pleas by appellant to a charge of aggravated assault. Counsel for appellant agreed at the time the plea was entered that the following statement by the District Attorney to the court was an acceptable summary of the crime: The guilty plea proceedings were concluded on January 7, 1980 and the imposition of sentence was deferred by the court pending presentence investigation. The sentencing hearing was held on February 25, 1980 and a hearing upon the petition of appellant to reconsider the sentence was held on June 9, 1980. A review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects the compliance of the judge with all of the requirements. After counsel for the defendant had addressed the court on behalf of appellant including the expression by counsel of his disagreement with the position of the probation officer that appellant was not amenable to any kind of rehabilitation, and after appellant had declined to make any statement to the court, the court stated: While the court did not make specific reference to the statutory guidelines, the court provided a clear indication of its conclusions that probation or partial confinement were not appropriate as well as that appellant presented an undue risk and was in need of institutional commitment for commission of so serious an offense. While at the hearing upon the petition for reconsideration, counsel for the defendant referred to an auditory-perceptual problem suffered by appellant so that the judgment and character development of appellant was not commensurate with his age, the court responded directly to that contention. It may be noted that the transcript of the hearing upon the petition for reconsideration seems to indicate the application for reconsideration was provoked every bit as much by the distress of appellant *31 at the fact of imprisonment as much as the prescribed length of it. The prevailing principle may be stated: We have earlier catalogued the current "certain procedural" limits that restrict the discretion of the sentencing court. Our review of the record compels the conclusions that the court observed all of those procedural limits and requirements and that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. We, therefore, will not disturb the sentence imposed. Judgment of sentence affirmed. [1] Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1404(a)(2) provides that counsel for the defendant may inspect and copy the pre-sentence report. That same subsection was amended on December 14, 1979, effective April 1, 1980, by deletion of the following provision: ". . . but counsel shall be given the opportunity to comment thereon before the imposition of sentence." The comment upon the 1979 amendment notes that the deleted language "was viewed as unnecessary in light of the similar provision in Pa.R.C.P. 1405(a)" which provides: Rule 1405. Sentencing Proceeding. At the time of sentencing, the judge shall: (a) afford the defendant the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and afford counsel for both parties an opportunity to present argument and information relative to sentencing; The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973), clearly expresses the right of defense counsel to examine the contents of the presentence investigation report; while the Court in Phelps did not specifically express the right of defense counsel to offer rebuttal evidence to any portion of that report, the Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976), states that Phelps expressed not only the right to examine the contents of a pre-sentence investigation report but also the right to offer rebuttal evidence to any portion of that report. It should be noted that Justice Samuel J. Roberts is the author of the Phelps opinion as well as the majority opinion in Martin in which the holding of Phelps is interpreted as providing defense counsel with the right to offer rebuttal evidence to the contents of a pre-sentence report. The right to offer such rebuttal evidence is quite a natural inferential right from the right to examine the pre-sentence investigation report since the right to examine the report is not only hollow but empty, if defense counsel, upon examining the report and finding contested information, were unable to offer rebuttal evidence. Rule of Criminal Procedure 1405 seems to confer the right to offer such rebuttal evidence since it directs the sentencing court to "afford counsel . . . an opportunity to present. . . information relative to sentencing. . . ." [2] Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334 § 1301, added December 30, 1974, P.L. 1052, No. 345, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701 et seq. [3] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). [4] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). [5] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9722. Order of probation. The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court shall be accorded weight in favor of an order of probation: (1) The criminal conduct of the defendant neither caused nor threatened serious harm. (2) The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm. (3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation. (4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the criminal conduct of the defendant, though failing to establish a defense. (5) The victim of the criminal conduct of the defendant induced or facilitated its commission. (6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained. (7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime. (8) The criminal conduct of the defendant was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur. (9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime. (10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. (11) The confinement of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents. (12) Such other grounds as indicate the desirability of probation. [6] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725. Total confinement. The court shall impose a sentence of total confinement if, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary because: (1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or partial confinement the defendant will commit another crime; (2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or (3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the crime of the defendant. [7] Rule 1403. Aids in Imposing Sentence. A. Pre-sentence Investigation Report. (1) The sentencing judge may, in his discretion, order a pre-sentence investigation report in any case. (2) The sentencing judge shall place on the record his reasons for dispensing with the pre-sentence investigation report if the court fails to order a pre-sentence report in any of the following instances: (a) where incarceration for one year or more is a possible disposition under the applicable sentencing statutes; or (b) where the defendant is less than twenty-one years old at the time of conviction or entry of a plea of guilty; or (c) where a defendant is a first offender in that he has not heretofore been sentenced as an adult. (3) The pre-sentence investigation report shall include information regarding the circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant sufficient to assist the court in determining sentence. B. Psychiatric or Diagnostic Examination. After a finding of guilt and before the imposition of sentence and after notice to counsel for both parties, the sentencing judge may order the defendant to (a) submit to psychiatric observation and examination, and for this purpose the defendant may be remanded to any available clinic, hospital or institution for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, or (b) submit to diagnostic observation and examination, and for this purpose the defendant may be committed to a state correctional diagnostic and classification center for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days. The report of such examination may be considered the equivalent of a pre-sentence investigation report.