Title: BERRY v ROMAIN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-058
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 1981

No. 81-58 IN THE SUPREME: COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 GEORGE W . BERRY, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. CLAYTON M. ROMAIN and RAYMOND C. ROMAIN, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: Distrist Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead. Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Keller and Gilmer, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Datsopoulos, MacDonald and Lind, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: July 2, 1981 ~ecided: AU G ? 1 7981 Filed: AUG ' - 798 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s a c t i o n was brought i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, County of F l a t h e a d , t o r e s c i n d a c o n t r a c t f o r t h e purchase of r e a l p r o p e r t y i n F l a t h e a d C o u n t y . The d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t s counterclaimed f o r a breach of c o n t r a c t f o r nonpayment by t h e p l a i n t i f f-respondent . The m a t t e r was t r i e d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , and f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment were e n t e r e d f o r p l a i n t i f f-respondent i n t h e amount of $49,385.36. T h e r e a f t e r , a p p e l l a n t s ' motions f o r amend- ment of t h e f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s and judgment and f o r a new t r i a l were f i l e d . The c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r amending v a r i o u s f i n d i n g s and making a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s and an amended judgment i n f a v o r of respondent f o r r e s c i s s i o n along w i t h a judgment f o r $46,218.10 p l u s i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e of t h e o r i g i n a l judgment. The i s s u e s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , a s set f o r t h i n t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' b r i e f , were s i x i n number b u t can be p r o p e r l y handled and d i s c u s s e d by t h i s Court a s follows: 1. Whether t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r r e s c i s s i o n is supported by s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence. 2. Whether t h e r e s c i s s i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t by reason of mutual m i s t a k e was a proper remedy t o be a p p l i e d by t h e c o u r t . 3. Whether t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y awarded damages under t h e circumstances of t h i s c a s e . A p p e l l a n t s , t h e Romains, purchased a t r a c t of l a n d l o c a t e d i n Flathead County near B i g f o r k , Montana, from Wesley House. The i r r e g u l a r l y - s h a p e d t r a c t is bounded on t h e west by Montana Highway 35 and on t h e s o u t h and e a s t by a county road. I n t h e s p r i n g of 1978, t h e y c o n t r a c t e d w i t h House t o b u i l d a two-story commercial b u i l d i n g on t h e s o u t h p a r t of t h e p r o p e r t y , i n t e n d i n g t o r e n t t h e space a s o f f i c e s . They h i r e d House, from whom t h e y were purchasing t h e l a n d , t o c o n s t r u c t t h e b u i l d i n g . When c o n s t r u c t i o n began, t h e b u i l d i n g was intended f o r a p p e l l a n t s ' use and, a s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , f o r r e n t a l p r o p e r t y . During t h e l a t t e r p a r t of June or e a r l y p a r t of J u l y 1978, respondent Berry, t h e owner of t h e Bigfork Convales- cence C e n t e r , a n u r s i n g home, along w i t h t h e l o c a l d e n t i s t and a d o c t o r who was c o n s i d e r i n g moving i n t o t h e a r e a , met w i t h a p p e l l a n t s t o see i f t h e y could purchase t h e b u i l d i n g . They contemplated c r e a t i n g a medical c e n t e r , w i t h t h e d o c t o r and d e n t i s t u p s t a i r s and respondent occupying t h e d o w n s t a i r s a r e a . Following t h e meeting respondent met w i t h a l o c a l a t - t o r n e y , L e e Simmons, and d i s c u s s e d w i t h him t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s u b j e c t i n g t h e b u i l d i n g t o a condominium ownership. A t t h e time respondent c o n t a c t e d Clay Romain, one of t h e a p p e l l a n t s h e r e i n , t h e b u i l d i n g was approximately 50 p e r c e n t completed. Respondent and a p p e l l a n t s m e t s e v e r a l times r e g a r d i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a s a l e . A f t e r essen- t i a l l y a g r e e i n g t o t h e terms of t h e s a l e , i f one were t o o c c u r , a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t t h e y met w i t h a t t o r n e y Simmons. Simmons, i n t h e c o n f e r e n c e w i t h a p p e l l a n t s and respondent, noted t h a t a p p e l l a n t s had n o t h e l d t h e p r o p e r t y long enough t o q u a l i f y f o r a long-term c a p i t a l g a i n . H e suggested t h a t , a s a b u s i n e s s t a x m a t t e r , an o p t i o n be used w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t down payment followed by a c o n t r a c t f o r deed a s a method f o r t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e p r o p e r t y . A t t h a t t i m e t h e s t a g e of c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e b u i l d i n g was such t h a t e i t h e r a p p e l l a n t s would c o n t i n u e w i t h t h e i r p l a n s t o f i n i s h and l e a s e it a s o f f i c e s p a c e , o r respondent, who had d i f f e r e n t p l a n s , would have t o make changes c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s p l a n s . The p a r t i e s agreed t o proceed w i t h t h e o p t i o n f o l - lowed by a c o n t r a c t f o r deed, t o be prepared by Simmons, w i t h $40,000 a s c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e o p t i o n , and a t o t a l purchase p r i c e of $300,000. I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t a t t h e t i m e t h e r e was no survey of t h e p r o p e r t y and t h a t t h e s a l e was f o r less than t h e e n t i r e p a r c e l , Simmons advised t h e p a r t i e s t h a t a survey would be r e q u i r e d f o r r e c o r d i n g pur- poses, and t h e b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r , a t a p p e l l a n t s 1 r e q u e s t , c o n t r a c t e d w i t h a l o c a l surveyor t o do t h e job. There is a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e about what d e s c r i p t i o n was annexed t o t h e o p t i o n which was e x e r c i s e d August 23, 1978. The o p t i o n provided f o r its e x e r c i s e by October 1 5 , 1978, and a c o n t r a c t f o r deed was signed by t h e p a r t i e s a t approximately t h a t time. While t h e c o n t r a c t was prepared and signed t o convey t h e p r o p e r t y p u r s u a n t t o t h e p a r t i e s 1 agreement, t h e o p t i o n t o purchase, t h e deeds and t h e n o t i c e s o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s p u r c h a s e i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t were n o t completed because no l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n was a v a i l a b l e t o a t t a c h a s an e x h i b i t t o t h o s e documents. Consequently, t h e c o n t r a c t was held by a t t o r n e y Simmons u n t i l t h e t r a n s a c t i o n could be completed by o b t a i n i n g t h e proper survey. I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t problems a r o s e i n t h e survey, t h e documents remained i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y u n t i l t h e y were r e l e a s e d t o t h e p a r t i e s f o r t h e f i l i n g of t h i s a c t i o n . No escrow was ever f o r m a l l y con- cluded and no documents were ever f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k and r e c o r d e r of Flathead County. The c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e d f o r q u a r t e r l y p a y m e n t s o f $6,827.60, f i r s t due on November 15, 1978. The c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e d t h e s e l l e r s t o f u r n i s h t h e p u r c h a s e r s a t i t l e p o l i c y i n t h e amount of t h e c o n t r a c t showing good merchant- a b l e t i t l e t o be v e s t e d i n t h e s e l l e r s i n f e e simple. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e land was t o be t r a n s f e r r e d by a warranty deed upon payment of t h e purchase p r i c e i n f u l l . The c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n e d s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u b m i t t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y t o a condominium ownership and f o r t h e s e l l e r s ' agreement t o remove o r r e f a c e an e x i s t i n g b u i l d i n g on t h e remaining p r o p e r t y w i t h i n two y e a r s . The c o n t r a c t a l s o provided t h e f o l l o w i n g a s t o paving and parking: "The s e l l e r s hereby covenant t o pave t h e parking a r e a on t h e s o u t h and n o r t h s i d e s of t h e b u i l d i n g on t h e s e premises a t no a d d i t i o n a l c o s t t o t h e purchaser by August 1, 1979." Although t h e survey had n o t been r e c e i v e d by November 15, 1978, respondent made t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r l y payment of $6,827.60 t o h i s a t t o r n e y . I n accordance w i t h t h e c l o s i n g s t a t e m e n t prepared by him, t h e a t t o r n e y p a i d $5,911.60 of t h a t amount t o a p p e l l a n t s . Sometime i n December 1978 o r e a r l y January 1979, respondent c o n t a c t e d t h e surveyor a t h i s home r e q u e s t i n g t o s e e t h e survey and a t t h a t time was t o l d t h e r e were encroachments upon t h e S t a t e of Montana and F l a t h e a d County right-of-ways. The survey showed t h a t a p a r t of t h e e a v e s on t h e s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of t h e b u i l d i n g and a b r i c k f a c i n g on t h e e a s t corner of t h e f r o n t s o u t h e r n e n t r a n c e encroached upon county right-of-way. I t a l s o showed an encroachment of a p o r t i o n of t h e eaves of t h e b u i l d i n g o n t o t h e s t a t e high- way right-of-way on t h e northwest c o r n e r of t h e b u i l d i n g . A f t e r speaking w i t h t h e s u r v e y o r , respondent con- t a c t e d h i s a t t o r n e y and m e t w i t h him t o d i s c u s s t h e survey. Within t h e n e x t few w e e k s t h e s i t u a t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s d e t e r i o r a t e d . On January 24, 1979, respondent, w i t h a new a t t o r n e y , s e n t a p p e l l a n t s a n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o r e s c i n d t h e c o n t r a c t , demanding a c o r r e c t i o n of t h e v a r i o u s b r e a c h e s of t h e c o n t r a c t w i t h i n t e n d a y s and demanding payment of $50,126.86. On J a n u a r y 25, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s o b t a i n e d an easement f o r t h e encroachments i n t h e p a r k i n g involved i n t h e County o f F l a t h e a d ' s r i g h t - o f - w a y . I n a d d i t i o n , a p p e l l a n t s ' counsel responded t o t h e n o t i c e of t h e i n t e n t i o n t o r e s c i n d , r e q u e s t i n g a d e t a i l e d s t a t e m e n t of t h e i t e m s of concern. On February 11, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s gave respondent a n o t i c e of d e f a u l t under t h e c o n t r a c t f o r f a i l u r e t o make t h e second q u a r t e r l y payment. On February 21, 1979, r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l gave w r i t t e n n o t i c e of r e s c i s s i o n , t e n d e r i n g r e s t o - r a t i o n of t h e t i t l e documents p r e v i o u s l y r e c e i v e d by him on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t s repay a l l monies expended to- g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t . T h i s a c t i o n was t h e r e a f t e r commenced on March 30, 1979. The f i r s t i s s u e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n is whether t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r t h e r e s c i s s i o n is supported by s u b s t a n t i a l , c r e d i b l e evidence. The s t a t u t o r y grounds f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a c a s e i n r e s c i s s i o n a r e set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n s 28-2-1701 e t s e q . , MCA. A p a r t y t o a c o n t r a c t may r e s c i n d t h e same o n l y under t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s : " ( 1 ) i f t h e consent of t h e p a r t y r e s c i n d i n g . . . was g i v e n by m i s t a k e o r o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h d u r e s s , menace, f r a u d , o r undue i n f l u e n c e . . .; " ( 2 ) i f , through t h e f a u l t of t h e p a r t y a s t o whom he r e s c i n d s , t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r h i s o b l i g a t i o n f a i l s i n whole o r i n p a r t ; " ( 3 ) i f such c o n s i d e r a t i o n becomes e n t i r e l y void from any cause; " ( 4 ) i f such c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b e f o r e it is rendered t o him, f a i l s i n a m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t from any cause; o r " ( 5 ) i f a l l t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s c o n s e n t . " Sec- t i o n 28-2-1711, MCA. S e c t i o n 28-2-1713, MCA, s e t s f o r t h t h e s p e c i f i c requirements t o be followed i n r e s c i s s i o n c a s e s . The r e s c i n d i n g p a r t y must use r e a s o n a b l e d i l igence and t a k e a c t i o n w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e upon d i s c o v e r i n g t h e f a c t s which e n t i t l e him t o r e s c i n d . Here, a p p e l l a n t s do n o t q u e s t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t respondent took prompt and speedy a c t i o n i n f i l i n g h i s c a s e . The s o l e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s i s s u e is whether it is a proper c a s e f o r r e s c i s s i o n . The t r i a l c o u r t was urged t o r e s c i n d t h e c o n t r a c t f o r mutual m i s t a k e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e p a r c e l of p r o p e r t y t o be conveyed, f o r f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i n whole or i n p a r t , because of a p p e l l a n t s ' breach i n f a i l i n g t o f u r n i s h t i t l e i n s u r a n c e t o respondent showing good and merchantable t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y , f r e e and c l e a r of a l l l i e n s and encumbrances; f o r f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i n whole or i n p a r t and i n a m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t , f o r a p p e l l a n t s ' f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e deeded p r o p e r t y on t h e s o u t h s i d e of t h e b u i l d i n g e n a b l i n g respondent t o own a p a r k i n g l o t ; and l a s t , f o r a c t u a l and c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d i n a p p e l l a n t s ' f a i l u r e t o a d v i s e respondent of known encumbrances on t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y . The t r i a l c o u r t i n its f i n d i n g s of f a c t b e a r i n g on r e s p o n d e n t ' s r i g h t t o r e s c i s s i o n found: "7. P r i o r t o t h e purchase of t h e p r o p e r t y by p l a i n t i f f , p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t s had viewed t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e b u i l d i n g , and agreed a s p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t t h a t p a r k i n g would be provided on t h e s o u t h and n o r t h s i d e s of t h e b u i l d i n g and p a i d by d e f e n d a n t s . "8. . . . [The surveyor] d i s c o v e r e d t h a t county right-of-way r u n s immediately t o t h e s o u t h of t h e b u i l d i n g and a p o r t i o n of t h e b u i l d i n g e n c r o a c h e s on s u c h r i g h t - o f - w a y . The survey f u r t h e r d i s c l o s e d t h a t a p o r t i o n of t h e e a v e s of t h e b u i l d i n g encroached on s t a t e highway right-of-way on t h e west s i d e of t h e p r o p e r t y . N e i t h e r p a r t y was aware of t h e encroachments of t h e county right-of-way and s t a t e easement p r i o r t o t h e completion of t h e survey. "9. [ A s amended] An easement had been ob- t a i n e d i n regard t o t h e county right-of-way a t a l l times. The Montana Highway Department w i l l n o t make any agreements i n any way a f f e c t i n g encroachment i n t h e west s i d e of t h e b u i l d i n g . " Following t h e s e f i n d i n g s t h e c o u r t made its conclu- s i o n s of law which bear d i r e c t l y on t h e i s s u e of r e s c i s s i o n : "1. The agreement a s t o p a r k i n g on t h e s o u t h and west s i d e s of t h e b u i l d i n g was p a r t and p a r c e l of t h e c o n t r a c t and agreement of t h e p a r t i e s . "2. Both p a r t i e s were a t a l l t i m e s a c t i n g i n good f a i t h and by reason of m i s t a k e and n o t by f r a u d . " T h u s , t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was e n t i t l e d t o r e s c i s s i o n , and t h e c o u r t , c o n t r a r y t o t h e arguments of a p p e l l a n t s , addressed t h e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l i t y of mutual m i s t a k e of t h e p a r t i e s . W e f i n d i m p l i c i t i n t h e t r i a l cour t' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n its c o n c l u s i o n s of law t h e r u l i n g t h a t a mutual m i s t a k e of f a c t o c c u r r e d i n t h i s c a s e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e parking. Both p a r t i e s agreed t h a t a p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t w a s t h a t parking would be a v a i l a b l e . I t was u n c o n t r a d i c t e d t h a t respondent, as p u r c h a s e r , r e q u i r e d a deeded p a r k i n g l o t t o go w i t h t h e b u i l d i n g , whether i t was t o be l e a s e d or developed i n t o condominium u n i t s . Parking was a major c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a s shown by t h e o r i g i n a l l e t t e r of r e s c i s s i o n on January 4 , 1979. W e f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t a c t e d w e l l w i t h i n its d i s c r e t i o n a s a c o u r t of e q u i t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t p a r k i n g was a m a t e r i a l p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t ; t h a t a mistake w i t h regard t o p a r k i n g was an adequate b a s i s f o r r e s c i s s i o n under s e c t i o n 28-2-1711, MCA; and t h a t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o n t r a c t had f a i l e d i n a m a t e r i a l a s p e c t a s w e l l . Regardless of a p p e l l a n t s ' argument t h a t a s u b s t i t u t e parking easement had been o b t a i n e d f o r t h e s o u t h e n t r a n c e , which is a c r u c i a l i s s u e t o a commercial developer and t o a proposed t e n a n t , w e f i n d t h e c o u r t was w e l l w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n determining t h a t t h e m i s t a k e and f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p a r k i n g p r o b l e m was s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d s f o r r e s c i s s i o n o f t h e c o n t r a c t . A p p e l l a n t s argue t h a t t h e easement t h e y have o b t a i n e d f o r t h e parking was a s u f f i c i e n t s u b s t i t u t e h e r e t o p r e v e n t a r e s c i s s i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t . However, such an easement d i d n o t comply s u f f i c i e n t l y w i t h t h e p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of commercial p r o p e r t y owner s h i p t o s a t i s f y t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e p a r k i n g i s s u e was n o t m a t e r i a l . A t t h e t r i a l a p p e l l a n t s advanced t h i s p o s i t i o n , and it was r e j e c t e d by t h e court--a g r a n t of easement is simply n o t ownership. A p p e l l a n t s had c o n t r a c t e d t o p r o v i d e a f e e simple t i t l e f r e e and c l e a r of a l l l i e n s and encumbrances and were unable t o perform t h i s c o n t r a c t . The t r i a l c o u r t was i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o determine t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e r i g h t t o t h e remedy of r e s c i s s i o n , and adequate l e g a l a u t h o r i t y s u p p o r t s its d e c i s i o n . See Bolinger v. C i t y of Bozeman ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 158 Mont. 507, 511, 493 P.2d 1062, 1064; Ryan v. Board of County Commissioners ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 620 P.2d 1203, 1209, 37 St.Rep. 1965, 1972. The n e x t i s s u e is whether t h e r e s c i s s i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t by reason of mutual m i s t a k e was a proper remedy. A p p e l l a n t s argue t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of law made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h its f i n d i n g s of f a c t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , a p p e l l a n t s urge t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t "found t h a t t h e encroachment problems on t h e s o u t h s i d e of t h e b u i l d i n g were remedied by [ a p p e l l a n t s ] o b t a i n i n g an easement from t h e county . . . " However, a s we i n d i c a t e d above, a l t h o u g h it is t r u e t h a t a p p e l l a n t s o b t a i n e d an easement, t h e c o u r t a t no time found or determined t h a t such an easement "remedied" t h e parking s i t u a t i o n . I n f a c t , t h e c o u r t found e x a c t l y t h e o p p o s i t e . S i n c e no deeded p a r k i n g could be o b t a i n e d on t h e s o u t h s i d e of t h e b u i l d i n g , t h e r e was a m a t e r i a l mutual m i s t a k e of f a c t and a m a t e r i a l f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n j u s t i f y i n g t h e r e s c i s s i o n . Respondent does n o t have t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e proof of t h e f a c t s because t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s a l r e a d y f o u n d them, and t h i s C o u r t c a n draw e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Rule 52, M.R.Civ.P.; Poulsen v. T r e a s u r e S t a t e I n d u s t r i e s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 626 P.2d 822, 827, 38 St.Rep. 218, 223. W e adhere t o t h e d o c t r i n e of implied f i n d i n g s where, a s h e r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a r e g e n e r a l i n terms. Any f i n d i n g s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y made b u t n e c e s s a r y t o t h e judgment a r e deemed t o have been implied i f supported by t h e evidence. See Poulsen, s u p r a . A s long a s t h e implied f i n d i n g s a r e n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e x p r e s s f i n d i n g s , t h i s Court w i l l n o t o v e r t u r n t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e s u l t . Here, t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e m i s t a k e r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n s was a m a t e r i a l mistake and t h e f u r t h e r f i n d i n g t h a t a l a c k of deeded parking space s u p p o r t s a m a t e r i a l f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n a r e s u f f i c i e n t implied f i n d i n g s t o s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a r e s c i s s i o n should be g r a n t e d under s e c t i o n 28-2-1711, MCA. The t h i r d i s s u e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n is whether t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y awarded damages under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e . A p p e l l a n t s r a i s e t h e i s s u e of damages a s c r e d i t f o r f a i r r e n t a l v a l u e p a i d f o r t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g respon- d e n t ' s p e r i o d of c o n t r o l of t h e premises. T h i s i s s u e is one which was addressed a t t r i a l and c o n s i d e r e d by t h e c o u r t i n a motion t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law. A f t e r h e a r i n g arguments and reviewing t h e b r i e f s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d i n f a c t p a r t i a l l y amend t h o s e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . The c o u r t added f i n d i n g s concerning a t t o r n e y f e e s , f i r e i n s u r a n c e , u t i l i t i e s and c a r p e t i n g damages b u t d e c l i n e d t o make any f u r t h e r a d d i t i o n s . The t r i a l c o u r t i m p l i e d l y h e l d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 28-2-1715, MCA, were m e t when it adjudged t h e r e s c i s s i o n , allowing an o f f s e t i n t h e o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s and f u r t h e r o f f s e t s i n t h e amendments i n its October 22, 1980, o r d e r . However, i n view o f t h e f a c t t h a t respondent never o b t a i n e d a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y because c o n s t r u c t i o n was n o t completed, a r e n t a l o f f s e t was n o t found t o be proper and was r e f u s e d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p r o p e r t y could n o t have been occupied or r e n t e d , n o t o n l y because of t h e l a c k of parking b u t a l s o because it was n o t hooked up t o t h e Bigfork sewer system. Affirmed. I J u s t i c e W e concur: %&$% c h i e m u t i c e