Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MARK JOHN VASQUEZ JR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116660
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2001

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 27, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 116660  
MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to consider whether defendant’s alleged  
conduct of lying to a police officer about his name and age,  
constituted 
an 
“obstruction”  within the meaning of Michigan’s  
“resisting 
and 
obstructing” statute.  MCL 750.479. Michigan’s  
“resisting and obstructing” statute does not proscribe any  
manner of interference with a police officer, and it also does  
  
not proscribe only conduct that poses a threat to the safety  
of police officers; rather, it proscribes threatened, either  
expressly or impliedly, physical interference and actual  
physical interference with a police officer.  Therefore, we  
would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and  
reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing the charge  
against defendant.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
While investigating a complaint about a loud party, a  
police officer found defendant urinating on the front lawn of  
a private residence.  The officer approached defendant and  
asked him whether he had been drinking alcohol.  Defendant  
responded, “Yes, but not very much.”  The officer suspected  
that defendant was an intoxicated minor.  When the officer  
asked defendant his name and age, defendant said that his name  
was “John Wesley Chippeway” and that he was sixteen years old.  
In fact, defendant’s name was Mark John Vasquez, Jr., and he  
was seventeen years old.  
The officer arrested defendant for being a minor in  
possession of alcohol. MCL 436.1703(1). During the booking  
process, the officer learned from another officer, who  
recognized defendant, that he was actually Mark John Vasquez,  
Jr. When confronted about the officer’s knowledge of who he  
actually was, he admitted his true name and age.  
2  
 
  
The prosecutor charged defendant with being a minor in  
possession—second offense and “resisting and obstructing” a  
police officer.  The trial court quashed the “resisting and  
obstructing” charge, relying on People v Philabaun, 234 Mich  
App 471; 595 NW2d 502 (1999)(Philabaun I), which this Court  
subsequently reversed, 461 Mich 255; 602 NW2d 371 (1999)  
(Philabaun II).  The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed and  
remanded, 240 Mich App 239; 612 NW2d 162 (2000), relying on  
our decision in Philabaun II, that a defendant’s mere refusal  
to obey an order for a blood sample could constitute resisting  
or opposing.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This case requires us to construe Michigan’s “resisting  
and 
obstructing” 
statute. 
 
Questions 
of 
statutory 
construction  
are reviewed de novo.  Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich  
243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTE  
“The primary goal of judicial interpretation is to  
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”  
McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp, 461 Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d  
57 (2000).  “The first step in that determination is to review  
the 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
itself.” 
In 
re 
MCI  
3  
  
Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
The “resisting and obstructing” statute states in relevant  
part:  
Any person who shall knowingly and willfully .  
. . obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or 
wound . . . any person or persons authorized by law 
to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful 
acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve 
and keep the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
. . . . [MCL 750.479.]  
This statute proscribes conduct that “obstruct[s]” a police  
officer while the officer is attempting to “keep the peace.”  
A. “KEEP THE PEACE”  
The “resisting and obstructing” statute proscribes  
certain 
conduct 
encountered by a law enforcement officer while  
the officer is attempting to “keep the peace.”  Therefore, the  
first issue is whether the police officer, in this case, was  
attempting to “keep the peace” when defendant lied to him.  
“[A]n officer’s efforts to ‘keep the peace’ include ordinary  
police functions that do not directly involve placing a person  
under arrest.” People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 759; 456 NW2d  
237 (1990). “[T]he broad statutory clause ‘maintain, preserve  
and keep the peace’ includes all of the duties legally  
executed by a police officer.”  People v Weatherspoon, 6 Mich  
App 229, 232; 148 NW2d 889 (1967).  
In this case, the officer was responding to a complaint  
about a loud party when he found defendant urinating on the  
4  
 
  
front lawn of a private residence.  Because the officer  
suspected 
that 
defendant was an intoxicated minor, the officer  
asked defendant for his name and age.  Defendant told the  
officer that his name was “John Wesley Chippeway” and that he  
was sixteen years old.  In fact, defendant’s name was Mark  
John Vasquez, Jr. and he was seventeen years old. Defendant  
was arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol.  MCL  
436.1703(1).  It is clear that, at the time defendant lied to  
the officer, the latter was responding to suspected criminal  
activity, which constitutes an ordinary police function.  
Because the officer was performing such a lawfully assigned  
function when he questioned defendant, the officer was  
attempting to “keep the peace” within the meaning of the  
“resisting and obstructing” statute, when defendant lied to  
him.  
B. “OBSTRUCT”  
The next issue is whether defendant “obstructed,” within  
the meaning of the “resisting and obstructing” statute, the  
police officer when he lied to him.  “[T]he meaning of  
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.” King  
v St Vincent’s Hosp, 502 US 215, 221; 112 S Ct 570; 116 L Ed  
2d 578 (1991).  “Contextual understanding of statutes is  
generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: ‘[i]t  
is known from its associates,’ see Black’s Law Dictionary (6th  
5  
 
ed), at 1060. This doctrine stands for the principle that a  
word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.”  
Tyler v Livonia Pub Schs, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560  
(1999).  “[I]n seeking meaning, words and clauses will not be  
divorced from those which precede and those which follow.”  
Sanchick v Michigan State Bd of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559;  
70 NW2d 757 (1955).  “It is a familiar principle of statutory  
construction that words grouped in a list should be given  
related meaning.”  Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd,  
Inc, 432 US 312, 322; 97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).  
In the present case, the statute uses the word “obstruct”  
as part of a list containing five other words, namely,  
“resist, oppose, assault, beat [and] wound.” The meaning of  
the word “obstruct” should be determined in this particular  
context, and be given a meaning logically related to the five  
surrounding words of the statute.  “Resist” is defined as “to  
withstand, 
strive 
against, or oppose.”  Random House Webster’s  
College Dictionary (1991) at 1146. 
“Resistance” is  
additionally defined as “the opposition offered by one thing,  
force, etc.” Id. “Oppose” is defined as “to act against or  
furnish resistance to; combat”  Id. at 949. 
“Assault” is  
defined as “a sudden violent attack; onslaught.” Id. at 82.  
“Beat” is defined as “to strike forcefully and repeatedly;  
. . . to hit repeatedly as to cause painful injury.” Id. at  
6  
 
 
  
  
  
120.  “Wound” is defined as “to inflict a wound upon; injure;  
hurt.” Id. at 1537. Each of these words, when read together,  
clearly implies an element of threatened or actual physical  
interference.  
The accompanying term “obstruct” is susceptible to  
several potential meanings.  “Obstruct” is defined as: “1. to  
block or close up with an obstacle. 2. to hinder, interrupt,  
or delay the passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block  
from sight; be in the way of (a view, passage, etc.).” Id. at  
935. Accordingly, we understand the dissent’s definition of  
“obstruct,” which defines it as including both physical and  
nonphysical conduct. Although we understand that “obstruct”  
can be defined in such a manner, when read in context, we  
believe that the more reasonable interpretation is one that  
communicates 
an 
actual, 
or 
a 
threat 
of, 
physical  
interference.1  
1 An Iowa statute, very similar to Michigan’s “resisting 
and obstructing” statute, provides:  
A person who knowingly resists or obstructs 
anyone known by the person to be a peace officer 
. . . in the performance of any act which is within 
the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that 
officer . . . commits a simple misdemeanor. [Iowa 
Code § 719.1.]  
The Iowa Supreme Court has said “[t]he language of 
section 719.1 was chosen because it conveys the idea of active  
interference, with the drafting committee rejecting more 
passive language such as ‘object’ or ‘fail to cooperate.’” 
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
 
 
The words “assault, beat, or wound” necessarily contain  
an element of violence; whereas, the words “obstruct, resist  
[or] oppose” may, but do not necessarily, contain an element  
of violence.  For example, one cannot “assault, beat, or  
wound” an officer without being violent; however, one can  
“obstruct, 
resist, 
[or] 
oppose” 
an 
officer 
without 
necessarily  
being violent.  What this leads us to believe is that when the  
Legislature used these six words together, it intended to  
proscribe both violent and nonviolent physical interference;  
physical interference being the only element common to all six  
words. Therefore, by grouping these six words together as a  
part of a single type of prohibited conduct, the Legislature  
has 
demonstrated 
a 
purpose of proscribing conduct amounting to  
actual or threatened physical interference.2  In this case,  
1(...continued) 
Iowa v Smithson, 594 NW2d 1, 2 (Iowa, 1999), quoting Yeager &  
Carlson, Criminal Law & Procedure, § 422 (Supp 1998)(emphasis  
added).
 Therefore, the mere act of providing false  
information to a police officer does not amount to a violation 
of this statute.  Iowa v Henley, 2001 WL 57994 (Iowa App,  
2001).  
2  The dissent asserts that “the fact that the word  
‘obstruct’ later appears with the words ‘assault, beat, or 
wound’ should not be given any special significance,” post at  
8, because “[a]t the beginning of the statute, regarding the 
service of process, the words ‘obstruct, resist, or oppose’ 
are specifically set apart from the words ‘assault, beat, or 
wound.’” Id. at 7. We respectfully disagree. Rather, that 
the Legislature initially separated the six terms into two 
groups in the statute does suggest that the two groups of 
(continued...)  
8  
 
 
 
defendant’s conduct did not constitute threatened or actual  
physical interference.  Defendant instead lied to the officer  
about his name and age.  While certainly not laudatory,  
defendant’s conduct did not physically interfere with or  
threaten to physically interfere with the officer.3  
2(...continued) 
words have a distinct meaning. This distinction is that the  
words “obstruct, resist, [and] oppose,” refer to nonviolent 
physical interference; while, the words “assault, beat, [and] 
wound” refer to violent physical interference. However, the 
fact that the Legislature then combined the two sets of words, 
in the portion of the statute that we are interpreting here, 
suggests that it is referring to both violent and nonviolent 
physical interference, with physical interference being the 
only element common to both sets of words.  
Further, in our judgment, the Legislature used six verbs 
in the “resisting and obstructing” statute, not to prohibit 
six discrete forms of conduct, but rather to prohibit one 
general category of conduct in as thorough a manner as 
possible, by ensuring that there were no obvious gaps that 
could be exploited in the statute.  Therefore, we must 
interpret each of the six words by looking at them together in 
order to determine the general category of conduct that the 
Legislature intended to prohibit.  
3 The dissent asserts “[w]hen asked to provide his name 
and age, defendant had two lawful choices: he could have 
answered truthfully or exercised his constitutional right not 
to answer at all.  Instead, defendant chose to lie. By doing 
so, he impeded the officer’s investigation by creating a 
nonphysical obstacle to the officer’s attempt to gather 
accurate information.”  Post at 6.  Under the dissent’s  
reasoning, if defendant had refused to answer at all, he could 
also have been charged under the “resisting and obstructing” 
statute.  If defendant had refused to answer, this would have 
also “impeded the officer’s investigation by creating a  
nonphysical obstacle to the officer’s attempt to gather 
accurate information.”  However, one cannot be compelled to  
answer questions posed by a police officer.  Davis v  
Mississippi, 394 US 721, 727, n 6; 89 S Ct 1394; 22 L Ed 2d 
(continued...)  
9  
 
  
  
Moreover, the principal “purpose of [the “resisting and  
obstructing” statute] is to protect officers from physical  
harm.” Philabaun II, supra, at 262, n 17. “The purpose of  
the resisting arrest statute is to protect persons (the  
officers) from physical violence and harm.”  People v  
Kretchmer, 404 Mich 59, 64; 272 NW2d 558 (1978).  The statute  
“attempts to punish an assault upon an officer while in the  
discharge of his duty by a penalty more severe than that  
imposed for other assaults,” i.e., assaults on private  
citizens.4 
People v Tompkins, 121 Mich 431, 432; 80 NW 126  
3(...continued) 
676 (1969); Risbridger v Connelly, 122 F Supp 2d 857, 866 (WD 
Mich, 2000)(holding that a police officer cannot compel one to 
disclose one’s identity); People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 458; 
339 NW2d 403 (1983).  Therefore, one cannot be prosecuted for 
“obstructing” a police officer on the basis of one’s refusal 
to answer questions.  City of Pontiac v Baldwin, 163 Mich App  
147, 152; 413 NW2d 689 (1987).  The dissent asserts that a  
defendant does not “obstruct” a police officer by refusing to 
answer questions posed by an officer. 
However, the dissent 
concludes that when one hinders or impedes an investigation, 
one 
violates 
the 
“resisting and obstructing” statute.  Perhaps 
the dissent is willing to make an exception where one merely 
refuses to speak, but that does not change the fact that under 
the dissent’s reasoning, one who merely refuses to speak 
violates the “resisting and obstructing” statute because such 
conduct may obviously hinder or impede an investigation and 
that is exactly the type of conduct that the dissent argues is 
proscribed by this statute.  In our judgment, a reasoning that 
leads to the conclusion that one may violate a statute by 
exercising a constitutional right is problematic, even though 
one is prepared to make an exception for constitutionally 
protected conduct.  
4  Not only is the purpose of this statute to punish 
assaults upon officers more severely than assaults upon 
(continued...)  
10  
(1899).
 In our judgment, defendant’s conduct, i.e., the  
4(...continued) 
private citizens, but it is also to punish physical 
interferences with officers more severely than nonphysical 
interferences with officers.  This is evidenced by the 
differences in punishments in the law placed upon physical and 
nonphysical interferences with officers. The punishment for 
violation 
of 
MCL 
750.479 
(proscription 
of 
physical 
interferences) is “imprisonment in the state prison not more 
than 2 years, or by a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars.” 
MCL 257.324(1), in contrast, provides in relevant part:  
A person shall not do any of the following:  
(h) Furnish to a peace officer false, forged, 
fictitious, 
or 
misleading 
verbal 
or 
written  
information identifying the person as another  
person, if the person is detained for a violation 
of [the motor vehicle code] . . . .  
The punishment for violation of this statute (proscription of 
nonphysical interferences) is suspension of driver’s license 
for ninety days. Similarly, MCL 750.217 provides:  
Any person who shall in any manner disguise 
himself, with intent to obstruct the due execution 
of the law, or with intent to intimidate, hinder or 
interrupt any officer or any other person, in the 
legal performance of his duty, or the exercise of 
his rights under the constitution and laws of this 
state, whether such intent be effected or not,  
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .  
The punishment for violation of MCL 750.217 (proscription of 
nonphysical 
interferences) 
is 
“imprisonment 
in 
the 
county 
jail 
not more than 1 year or by fine of not more than 500 dollars.” 
Thus, the punishment for “resisting and obstructing” an 
officer is far more severe than the punishment for lying to an 
officer while detained for a violation of the motor vehicle  
code or the punishment for disguising one’s self to an 
officer.  When MCL 750.479 is read in the context of these two  
statutes, specifically the types of punishments attached to 
each, it is increasingly evident that the purpose of MCL 
750.479 is to punish physical interferences with police 
officers.  
11  
giving of a false name and age to an officer, does not fit  
within the range of conduct that MCL 750.479 was meant to  
prohibit.  
It is clear that the principal purpose of this statute is  
to protect police officers from harm.  However, from its  
language, we do not believe that this is the only purpose.  
Because one may threaten to or actually physically interfere  
with a police officer without threatening to or actually  
hurting a police officer, we believe that one may physically  
“obstruct” an officer without necessarily posing a threat to  
the officer’s safety.  For example, one may “obstruct” an  
officer by placing an object in the way of the officer with  
the intent of making it less accessible to the officer. This  
may pose no real threat to the officer’s safety, but it may  
nevertheless “obstruct” because of the physical barrier  
interposed to the officer’s performance of his duties.  
Therefore, both physical interference that poses a threat to  
the safety of police officers (“assault, beat, or wound”) and  
physical 
interference 
that 
does 
not 
necessarily, 
but  
nevertheless may, pose a threat to the safety of police  
officers (“obstruct, resist, [or] oppose”) are proscribed.  
If the Legislature had intended to proscribe any manner  
of interference with a police officer, as the dissent asserts,  
12  
 
 
why did the Legislature not clearly express this intent?5  If  
the Legislature intended to proscribe nonphysical forms of  
“obstruction,” it could have used such terms as “lies,”  
“falsifies,” “refuses to cooperate,” “interferes with” or  
“objects to.”  It did not.6  Instead, the Legislature chose  
5 
For example, the federal statute, 18 USC 1001, 
provides, in relevant part:  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, 
whoever, 
in 
any 
matter 
within 
the  
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or 
judicial branch of the Government of the United 
States, knowingly and willfully—  
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any 
trick, scheme, or device a material fact;  
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or representation; or  
(3) makes or uses any false writing or  
document knowing the same to contain any materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or  
entry;  
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 5 years, or both.  
This statutory language clearly proscribes the giving of a 
false statement to a police officer.  Brogan v United States, 
522 US 398, 400; 118 S Ct 805; 139 L Ed 2d 830 (1998).  If  
Michigan had a similar statute, clearly defendant could be 
charged under such a statute.  However, for whatever reasons, 
Michigan has no such statute, and MCL 750.479 cannot  
reasonably be interpreted by this Court to fill that void. 
Rather, if giving false information to the police is to become 
an offense, it is for our Legislature to say so.  
6 The dissent contends that “our job is to interpret the 
meaning of the plain language of the words actually used by 
the Legislature.”  Post at 10 (emphasis added). We agree, and 
(continued...)  
13  
 
 
 
 
six words that, when read together, evidence an intent to  
proscribe only threatened or actual physical interference.  
Indeed, the fact that the Legislature used six separate  
terms to describe the types of conduct that it sought to  
proscribe, makes it even more probable that, had the  
Legislature truly intended to proscribe “lying” to a police  
officer, it would have expressly included such a term in its  
litany.7  That is, to the extent that the Legislature sought  
to proscribe the types of conduct that the dissent attributes  
to the statute, what more obvious starting point could there  
have been than to prohibit “lying?”  Why, in light of its  
laundry list of proscribed activities, its literal thesaurus  
of forms of misconduct, would the Legislature have been so  
cryptic in setting forth such an obvious form of wrongdoing as  
“lying”?  After all, “lying” is something more than an obscure  
verb describing an abstruse form of misconduct; rather, it  
6(...continued) 
that is exactly what we are doing here.  We are merely 
attempting to interpret reasonably the meaning of the words 
“obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat, or wound” as used in 
the statute. In this process, we are simply not prepared to 
insert the word “lies” into the statute.  
7 Although we fully concur with the dissent that “lying 
to a police officer during an investigation could have grave 
consequences,” post at 6, n 3, MCL 750.479 simply does not 
proscribe 
such 
conduct. 
Just 
as 
it 
is 
Congress’ 
responsibility to address this issue in the context of federal 
law, see note 5, it is the responsibility of the Legislature 
to insert “lying” into MCL 750.479.  
14  
 
 
 
 
describes a form of misconduct that, by itself, has been made  
the subject of numerous significant criminal statutes,  
including, for example, those described in notes 4 and 5.8  
Our opinion is consistent with Philabaun II, where we  
concluded that the defendant’s refusal to comply with a search  
warrant for a blood sample constituted an obstruction under  
Michigan’s 
“resisting 
and 
obstructing” 
statute.  
“[D]efendant’s conduct, although indisputably passive in  
nature, 
was 
nevertheless 
sufficient 
to 
constitute 
obstruction,  
resistance, or opposition to the deputy’s execution of the  
search warrant for the extraction of defendant’s blood.”  
Philabaun II, supra at 264, quoting Philabaun I, supra, at  
488-489(Murphy, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
In 
reaching 
this 
conclusion,  
we stated:  
Although the classic example of resisting or 
obstructing involves a defendant who physically 
interferes with the officer, actual physical 
interference is not necessary because case law 
instructs that an expressed threat of physical 
interference, absent actual physical interference, 
is sufficient to support a charge under the  
statute.  And while an expressed threat of physical 
interference with an officer is sufficient to  
8 The dissent misunderstands our point here.  We are not  
implying that the prosecutor could have charged defendant 
under these other statutes.  We agree that these other 
statutes are inapplicable in this case. Our point is merely 
that, because the Legislature has specifically proscribed 
“lying” in various other significant statutes, it is even more 
likely that, had it truly intended to proscribe “lying” in 
this statute, it would have specifically done this as it has 
done in these other statutes.  
15  
 
 
support a charge under the statute, such a threat 
is not necessary because this Court has held that a 
constant barrage of obscene and abusive remarks to 
an officer, taken together with the refusal to 
comply with the officer’s orders, is sufficient to 
warrant a charge under the statute. [Philabaun II,  
supra at 263, quoting Philabaun I, supra at 488  
(Murphy, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).]  
We agree with Philabaun II that passive conduct may  
sometimes be sufficient to constitute obstruction under the  
“resisting and obstructing” statute. Passive conduct, if it  
rises to the level of threatened physical interference,  
constitutes “obstruction” within the meaning of the statute.  
For example, in Philabaun II, the defendant’s refusal to  
comply 
with 
the 
search warrant, although passive conduct, rose  
to the level of threatened physical interference because the  
officers were placed in a situation in which, in order to get  
a sample of the defendant’s blood, they would have had to  
physically constrain him and take his blood against his will.  
When the defendant refused to cooperate, the next likely  
sequence of events very well could have been the possible  
injury of a police officer attempting to enforce the search  
warrant.  
We also agree with Philabaun II that actual physical  
interference is unnecessary to support a charge under the  
“resisting and obstructing” statute.  Rather, conduct that  
rises to the level of threatened physical interference is  
16  
 
 
sufficient 
to 
support 
a 
charge 
under 
the 
statute.  
Additionally, we agree that an expressed threat of physical  
interference is unnecessary to support a charge under the  
statute.
 Rather, any conduct that rises to the level of  
threatened physical interference, whether it is expressed or  
not, is sufficient to support a charge under the statute. For  
example, in Philabaun II, the defendant’s refusal to comply  
with the search warrant, although not an express threat of  
physical interference, was sufficient to support a charge  
under the statute because by refusing to cooperate, defendant  
was, in effect, physically interfering with the police  
officers; his refusal left the officers with no other choice  
than to use physical force to execute the search warrant.  
In the present case, unlike Philabaun II, the police  
officer was not faced with a situation in which his next act  
would, more likely than not, involve physical confrontation.  
Defendant did not physically obstruct or resist the officer in  
any way.  He instead lied to the officer about his name and  
age.9  This is not the type of conduct that Michigan’s  
9 The following cases are illustrative of cases in which 
defendants supplied false information to police officers and 
courts subsequently held that there was insufficient evidence 
to find the defendants guilty of violating statutes that 
proscribe obstructing an officer: Louisiana v Daigle, 701 So 
2d 685 (La App, 1997)(the defendant falsely told the police 
that a woman was not present, when, in fact, she was); 
Pennsylvania v Shelly, 703 A2d 499 (Pa Super, 1997)(the 
(continued...)  
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
“resisting 
and 
obstructing” 
statute 
was 
intended 
to  
proscribe.10  
9(...continued) 
defendant gave a false name to a police officer); Steele v  
Florida, 537 So 2d 711 (Fla App, 1989)(the defendant gave a 
false name to a police officer); Louisiana v Smith, 352 So 2d 
216 (La, 1977)(the defendant falsely told a police officer 
that her son, who was wanted for armed robbery, was not in the 
house, when, in fact, he was); Ohio v Stephens, 57 Ohio App 2d 
229; 387 NE2d 252 (1978)(the defendant falsely told police 
officers that she did not know a person, who subsequently was 
found in defendant’s basement); Wilbourn v Mississippi, 249 
Miss 835; 164 So 2d 424 (1964)(the defendant gave a false 
description of the man who shot her husband, when, in fact, 
her son shot her husband).  
10 Even if one were to accept the dissent’s proposition, 
that the statute proscribes any interference with a police 
officer while he is attempting to “keep the peace,” one may 
still reasonably question whether defendant’s lies, in fact, 
“obstructed” the officer in “keeping the peace” in this case. 
Although, for example, defendant gave the officer a false age, 
defendant nevertheless gave him an age that still made  
defendant a minor.  Therefore, even though the information was 
false, it could hardly have prevented the officer from 
arresting defendant for being a minor in possession. 
Additionally, the majority does not identify any actual 
“obstruction” that occurred in this case as a result of  
defendant supplying the officer with a false name.  It did not  
cause any apparent delay in processing the charge against 
defendant, nor did it lead to any charge being wrongfully 
pursued against any innocent persons. 
While such an  
“obstruction” is, of course, conceivable, it simply did not 
occur here.  
Michigan’s “resisting and obstructing” statute provides 
that “[a]ny person who shall . . . obstruct . . . shall be  
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, one may commit obstruction of a police officer 
only by actually obstructing a police officer, rather than by  
merely attempting to obstruct an officer. See id. at 274; see  
also In re McConnell, 370 US 230, 233-234; 82 S Ct 1288; 8 L 
Ed 2d 434 (1962)(holding that a statute authorizing federal 
courts to punish “misbehavior of any person in its presence or 
(continued...)  
18  
 
 
 
  
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
An 
officer’s 
attempts to “maintain, preserve and keep the  
peace” under MCL 750.479 encompass the execution of all  
lawfully assigned duties of a law enforcement officer.  In the  
present case, the police officer was attempting to “keep the  
peace” when defendant lied to him, because the officer was  
legally executing one of his duties when he questioned  
defendant.  Under the plain meaning of MCL 750.479, conduct  
that rises to the level of threatened or actual physical  
interference is proscribed. 
Michigan’s “resisting and  
obstructing” statute does not proscribe any manner of  
interference with a police officer, and it also does not  
proscribe only conduct that poses a threat to the safety of  
police officers; rather, it proscribes threatened, either  
expressly or impliedly, physical interference and actual  
physical interference with a police officer.  Defendant’s  
conduct did not constitute threatened or actual physical  
10(...continued) 
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice” 
requires an actual obstruction of the administration of  
justice) (emphasis added); Ohio v Wilson, 101 Ohio Misc 2d 43; 
721 NE2d 521 (1999)(holding that a false statement made to a 
police officer does not violate a statute prohibiting the 
obstruction of official business unless the officer is  
actually hampered in some substantial way)(citing Ohio v  
Stephens, supra at 230) (emphasis added).  Therefore, even if  
one were to accept the dissent’s proposition, that the statute  
proscribes any interference with a police officer, defendant,  
at the most, attempted to “obstruct” the officer.  
19  
 
 
interference.  Therefore, defendant did not “obstruct” the  
police officer, within the meaning of MCL 750.479, when he  
lied to him. Accordingly, we would reverse the decision of  
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order  
dismissing the charges against defendant.11  
CAVANAGH and TAYLOR, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
11 In Justice Kelly’s separate opinion, she agrees with 
the conclusion set forth here that defendant’s conduct did not  
“obstruct” the officer within the meaning of MCL 750.479.  She  
further agrees that this statute does not proscribe any manner  
of interference with police officers; rather, it only 
proscribes threatened or actual physical interference with 
police officers.  
20  
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116660  
MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
Mark John Vasquez, Jr., lied about his age and identity  
to a policeman and, as a consequence, was charged with  
resisting and obstructing a police officer.  MCL 750.479. The  
trial court quashed the charge on the ground that the lies did  
not constitute an "obstruction" within the meaning of the  
statute.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 
240  
Mich App 239; 612 NW2d 162 (2000).  
We granted leave to interpret the meaning of "obstruct"  
and "keep the peace" as those terms were used by the  
Legislature in § 479.  Our primary task is to interpret the  
term "obstruct" to determine the scope of actions the statute  
was intended to penalize.  We would hold that the statute  
proscribes acts of interference that physically hinder a  
police officer's efforts to keep the peace or that threaten to  
hinder them.  Defendant's lies did not violate the statute.  
Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be  
reversed.1  
BACKGROUND  
In the early morning hours of May 1, 1999, Michigan State  
Police Trooper Stephen Spinner investigated a complaint about  
a loud party in Union Township, Isabella County.  Arriving at  
the residence where the party was being held, the trooper  
encountered defendant urinating on the front lawn.  He  
approached and asked defendant whether he had been drinking.  
Defendant responded, "Yes, but not very much."  Spinner  
observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and noticed  
a strong odor of intoxicants on defendant's breath.  
Spinner requested identification.  Defendant said that  
his name was "John Wesley Chippeway" and that he was sixteen  
years old. Spinner took defendant into custody and started  
booking him on charges of minor in possession. MCL  
1Defendant raised an alternative argument in the Court of 
Appeals that § 479 was impermissibly vague and therefore 
unconstitutional.
 
He 
has 
not 
pursued 
that 
issue.  
Accordingly, we do not treat it here.  
2  
 
436.1703(1).  During the booking process, other officers  
recognized defendant as Mark John Vasquez, Jr. 
When  
confronted with the apparent false identification, defendant  
admitted his true identity and age.  
Authorities then fingerprinted him and administered a  
preliminary Breathalyzer test that showed legal intoxication.  
The Isabella County prosecutor charged defendant with being a  
minor in possession-second offense, and with resisting and  
obstructing a police officer in violation of § 479.  
Section 479 provides:  
Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully 
obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff, coroner, 
township treasurer, constable or other officer or 
person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting 
to serve or execute any process, rule or order made 
or issued by lawful authority, or who shall resist 
any officer in the execution of any ordinance, by 
law, or any rule, order or resolution made, issued, 
or passed by the common council of any city board 
of trustees, or common council or village council 
of any incorporated village, or township board of 
any township or who shall assault, beat or wound 
any sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, constable 
or other officer duly authorized, while serving, or 
attempting to serve or execute any such process, 
rule or order, or for having served, or attempted 
to serve or execute the same, or who shall so  
obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound  
any of the above named officers, or any other 
person or persons authorized by law to maintain and 
preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts  
and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the  
peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2 
years, or by a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars. 
[Emphasis added.]  
3  
 
 
 
 
Defendant moved to quash the resisting and obstructing  
charge.  In addressing the motion, the trial court analyzed  
the statute and reasoned that Vasquez' lies did not create the  
kind of "obstruction" that the statute contemplated.  
The court gave the terms of the statute their "ordinary  
usage." It noted that the statute required the obstruction to  
occur while the officer was "maintaining or preserving the  
peace."  Thus, since defendant's lies did not hinder the  
progress of determining whether defendant had been drinking,  
they "did not obstruct the actions required of the officer to  
maintain the peace under a totality of the circumstances in  
this case."2  
Before the Court of Appeals decided Vasquez, we reversed  
the decision in Philabaun I. See People v Philabaun, 461 Mich  
255; 602 NW2d 371 (1999) (Philabaun II). In Philabaun II, we  
held that the defendant had violated § 479 by resisting the  
officer's attempt to execute a search warrant. Moreover, we  
2The court relied on the Court of Appeals opinion in 
People v Philabaun, 234 Mich App 471; 595 NW2d 502 (1999) 
(Philabaun I). 
At issue in Philabaun was whether the  
defendant's  refusal to permit the police to execute a search 
warrant by obtaining a blood sample was resisting and 
obstructing under the statute. 
The defendant did not  
"physically resist" the police officer.  The Court of Appeals  
majority in Philabaun I found that the defendant's passive 
refusal to submit to a blood test did not constitute an  
offense under the statute. The trial court likened Vasquez' 
conduct to that operating in Philabaun, noting the absence of 
"affirmative 
action 
taken against the trooper which would have 
been threatening to public safety."  
4  
 
observed that a defendant could violate the statute without  
engaging in a physical altercation with the officer.  
We concluded that the purpose of the statute is to  
protect officers from physical harm.  See Philabaun II, supra  
at 262, n 17, citing People v Kretchmer, 404 Mich 59, 64; 272  
NW2d 558 (1978).  We also concluded that determinations  
whether specific conduct falls within the statute should be  
made on a case-by-case basis. See Philabaun II, supra at 263­
264.  
The Court of Appeals relied on Philabaun II to support  
its finding that Vasquez' verbal acts were violations of the  
statute, despite the absence of physical obstruction or  
resistance on his part.  From the language and holding of  
Philabaun II, the Court of Appeals discerned and applied the  
following test:  
[A] prosecutor must support a [charge under § 
479] with competent evidence showing that there is 
probable cause to believe that (1) the conduct 
alleged, whether active or passive, obstructed, 
resisted, or opposed (2) any of the listed  
officials (3) in their described duties and (4) the 
alleged conduct was done knowingly and wilfully. 
[240 Mich App 244.]  
It concluded that the evidence tended to show that  
Vasquez knowingly lied to Spinner about his name and age.  
Vasquez' conduct, while passive, "suggested that [he] wished  
to prevent the State Police from instituting any legal action  
against him as an individual and would actually hinder law  
5  
 
  
enforcement agents from taking action against him, which fits  
under the broad definitions of restricting, obstructing, or  
opposing."  240 Mich App 245.  The Court of Appeals continued:  
We see a marked similarity between the effect 
of saying "no" to a police request, as in  
Philabaun, 
and 
giving 
false 
and 
misleading 
information in response to a similar request by a 
State Police trooper; both responses presented an 
obstacle to the investigating law enforcement  
agent's attempt to discharge his legal duties. [Id.  
at 245.]  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, Vasquez' act of  
lying to Spinner fell within the coverage of § 479.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This 
case 
involves 
a 
question 
of 
statutory  
interpretation, which we review de novo. Genesee Co Friend of  
the Court v General Motors Corp, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___  
(2001); Brown v Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374;  
617 NW2d 301 (2000).  
DISCUSSION  
The question presented is whether the lies that Vasquez  
told constitute conduct that the statute was intended to  
penalize.  The primary goal of judicial interpretation of  
statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the  
Legislature. Frankenmuth Mutual Ins v Marlette Homes, Inc,  
456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998); People v Morey, 461  
Mich 325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). The first criterion  
in determining intent is the specific language of the statute.  
6  
 
In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596  
NW2d 164 (1999); People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284;  
597 NW2d 1 (1999).  
The language is sometimes given meaning by context or  
setting. Consumers Power Co v Pub Serv Comm, 460 Mich 148,  
163, n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999); Tyler v Livonia Pub Schs, 459  
Mich 382, 391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999).  As we interpret it, we  
keep in mind the subject matter and purpose of the act.  In re  
Wirsing, 456 Mich 467, 474; 573 NW2d 51 (1998); People v  
Seeburger, 225 Mich App 385, 391; 571 NW2d 724 (1997).  
"Keep the Peace"  
The wording of § 479 indicates that it applies to  
conduct encountered by a law enforcement officer while  
attempting to "maintain, preserve and keep the peace." Thus,  
to apply the statute, we must gain an understanding of what it  
means to "keep the peace."  
The phrase originated under the common laws of England  
and referred to the "king's peace."  It related to the general  
duties assigned to justices of the peace, first instituted in  
England by King Edward III in 1326.  People v McLean, 68 Mich  
480, 482; 36 NW 231 (1888), citing 1 Steph Crim Law, 190.  The  
justices were "assigned to keep the peace" and, by order of  
the king, empowered "to take and arrest all those they may  
find by indictment or suspicion, and put them in prison." Id.  
7  
 
 
Thus, the common-law duties of English justices of the peace  
resemble those associated with modern-day law enforcement  
officers.  
Black's Law Dictionary defines "keeping the peace" as  
"[a]voiding a breach of the peace; dissuading or preventing  
others from breaking the peace."  Black's Law Dictionary, 6th  
ed (1991).  Breach of the Peace, in turn, was a criminal  
offense at common law. In 1884, in Davis v Burgess,3 this  
Court set forth a commonly accepted definition for "breach of  
the peace":  
Now, what is understood by "a breach of the 
peace?" By "peace," as used in the law in this 
connection, is meant the tranquillity enjoyed by 
citizens of a municipality or community where good 
order reigns among its members. It is the natural 
right of all persons in a political society, and 
any intentional  violation of that right is "a 
breach of the peace." It is the offense of  
disturbing the public peace, or violation of public 
order or public decorum.  
Similarly, in People v Johnson,4 
this Court described  
"breaking the peace" as "any act or conduct inciting to  
violence, or tending to provoke or excite others to break the  
peace."  
Absent statutory provisions or internal definitions to  
the contrary, we must interpret the language of a statute in  
354 Mich 514, 517; 20 NW 540 (1884).  
486 Mich 175, 177; 48 NW 870 (1891).  
8  
 
 
light of previously established rules of common law.  We give  
those words that acquired unique meaning at common law the  
same meaning when used in a statute dealing with the same  
subject. Nummer v Dep't of Treasury, 448 Mich 534, 544; 533  
NW2d 250 (1995); Pulver v Dundee Cement Co, 445 Mich 68, 75;  
515 NW2d 728 (1994); People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 13; 340 NW2d  
805 (1983). 
Therefore, we read the statutory phrase  
"maintain, preserve and keep the peace" to refer to conduct by  
law enforcement officers. 
It is conduct intended to  
discourage and prevent acts that violate the tranquility and  
good order of a peaceful community or incite others to do so.  
The phrase, as used in § 479, evokes a setting in which  
a law enforcement officer is performing official duties. We  
note that such a setting extends beyond the location where an  
arrest occurs.  There is ample authority to suggest that an  
officer's efforts to "keep the peace" include ordinary police  
functions not directly involved in placing a person under  
arrest.  See, e.g., People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 759; 456  
NW2d 237 (1990); People v Krum, 374 Mich 356, 362; 132 NW2d 69  
(1965); People v Weatherspoon, 6 Mich App 229, 232; 148 NW2d  
889 (1967).  
As we observed in Little, supra at 756, n 6, "[a] police  
officer is expected to be, and should be, in a constant state  
of readiness to quell any disturbance."  Thus, activities  
9  
encompassed by the phrase "maintain, preserve and keep the  
peace" are patrolling, surveilling, responding to suspected  
criminal 
activity, 
quelling 
actual 
disturbances, 
and 
executing  
many other duties legally assigned to a police officer.  
In this case, Trooper Spinner was responding to a  
complaint about a loud party complaint when he encountered  
defendant urinating on a lawn.  He questioned defendant and  
observed signs of drunkenness.  It was in that setting that he  
requested identification from him and encountered the lies at  
the center of this dispute.  Since Trooper Spinner was  
executing his duties as a police officer when the encounter  
took place, we find that he was engaged in "efforts to  
maintain, preserve and keep the peace" within the meaning of  
§ 479.  
"Obstruct"  
The 
question 
becomes 
whether 
Vasquez 
"obstructed" 
Trooper  
Spinner's performance of those efforts.  The portion of the  
statute at issue proscribes knowing and wilful acts that  
"obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound" a police  
officer engaged in keeping the peace.  
As we proceed, we are mindful of the well-settled purpose  
of the statute, recognized by virtually every court that has  
addressed § 479 since the Legislature enacted it in 1931. The  
purpose is to "punish an assault upon a public officer in the  
10  
 
  
discharge of his duty by a penalty more severe than that  
imposed for assaults on private citizens . . . ." Little,  
supra at 757, citing People v Tompkins, 121 Mich 431; 80 NW  
126 (1899); United States v Feola, 420 US 671; 95 S Ct 1255;  
43 L Ed 2d 541 (1975).  Moreover, the statute is a tool for  
protecting officers from physical violence and harm.  See,  
e.g., Kretchmer, supra at 64; Philabaun II, supra at 262,  
n 17.  
The prosecution and our dissenting colleagues argue that  
the term "obstruct" should be construed broadly.  They view it  
as encompassing any physical or oral act that causes delay or  
presents an obstacle to an officer's efforts to gather  
information.
 While such an expansive meaning may be  
consistent with a literal reading of the word, it does not  
comport with the legislative intent underlying § 479.  
This Court often consults dictionary definitions to  
ascertain the generally accepted meaning of a term that is not  
expressly defined by statute.  See Consumers Power Co, supra,  
at 163, n 10; Oakland Co Rd Comm'rs v Michigan Property &  
Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751  
(1998). 
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1984)  
defines "obstruct" as:  
1. to block or close up with an obstacle or 
obstacles, as a road. 2. to interrupt, hinder or 
oppose the passage, progress, course, etc., of. 3. 
to block from sight.  
11  
 
 
However, as with the word "obstruct," dictionaries often  
contain multiple definitions and define a term using multiple  
terms that, themselves, have multiple definitions.
 Thus,  
exclusive 
reliance 
on dictionary definitions can blur, as much  
as clarify, the meaning of a word. Dictionaries are therefore  
properly regarded as mere interpretive aids for the court.  
See Consumers Power Co, supra, at 163, n 10; note, Looking it  
up: Dictionaries and statutory interpretation, 107 Harv L Rev  
1437 (1994).  
Keeping the lay definition in mind, along with the  
purpose of the statute, we next examine the statutory context  
in which the word "obstruct" appears.  Our consideration of  
context involves an examination of the family of words or  
phrases associated with the word "obstruct" in § 479.  This  
analytical concept is known in law by the Latin phrase  
noscitur a sociis ("It is known from its associates").  
Livonia Pub Schs, supra at 390. It stands for the proposition  
that, when we seek the meaning of words and clauses, we do not  
divorce them from those that precede and those that follow.  
Sanchick v State Bd of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d  
757 (1955). Words grouped in a list should be given related  
meaning.  Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432  
US 312, 322; 97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).  
12  
 
  
In a similar vein, it is appropriate to consider the  
doctrine "ejusdem generis."  Again from the Latin, it means  
"[o]f the same kind, class, or nature." 
Black's Law  
Dictionary (6th ed). If general words follow an enumeration  
of specific subjects, the general words are presumed to  
express only things of the same kind, class, character, or  
nature as the enumerated subjects. Sands Appliance Services,  
Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). 
Of  
course, 
interpreting 
a statute, we must examine its objective,  
the harm it is designed to remedy, and we must apply a  
reasonable construction that best accomplishes its purpose.  
People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 479-480; 550 NW2d 505 (1996).  
Here, the statute uses the word "obstruct" in a six-term  
list that contains "resist," "oppose," "assault," beat" and  
"wound."  Defendant contends that each, when read in context,  
implies some action by a person that either causes or  
threatens physical harm or interference to a police officer.  
This is consistent with our interpretations of the statute in  
Little and Philabaun II.  
Defendant urges that the word "obstruct" be read to  
describe a physical obstruction, such as a person physically  
blocking an officer from pursuing his duties. It can also mean  
a passive act of obstruction, defendant asserts, one that  
exposes an officer to harm or physically blocks his ability to  
13  
carry out his duties. Within the meaning of § 479, mere words,  
even lies, cannot "obstruct" unless they create an enhanced  
risk of physical interference or harm to an officer's personal  
safety, defendant contends.5  
We find merit in defendant's interpretation.  The six  
words, presented as they are in the statute, create a  
continuum.  The first, "obstruct," is the mildest manner of  
violating the statute, and the final, "wound," the most  
severe.
 The dissent opines that the first three words  
preclude a finding that § 479 was intended to address only  
actual or threatened harm to police officers.  This is so,  
surmises the dissent, because the word "assault" would be  
rendered nugatory if the "obstruct," "resist" and "oppose"  
were narrowed to the physical realm.  
We cannot agree. Where broadly defined words are grouped  
with terms of specificity, the general words are interpreted  
as belonging to the same class as the narrowest in the list.  
Sands Appliance Service, supra at 242. Here, none will deny  
the terms "assault," "beat," and "wound" necessarily involve  
a physical component of actual or threatened harm. Therefore,  
for purposes of applying § 479, the doctrine of ejusdem  
5I note that defendant's observation about limits on the  
way "words" can violate the statute says nothing about whether 
acts that actually or threaten to physically interfere with a 
police officer violate § 479. Indeed, as we would hold today, 
such acts do constitute obstruction under the statute.  
14  
 
  
generis supports restricting the first three terms in the list  
to behavior involving actual or threatened physical harm or  
physical interference.  
Indeed, the only common thread that reasonably can be  
woven through the entire list is the element of actual or  
threatened physical interference or action. 
Such an  
interpretation provides the most effective way of addressing  
the mischief the statute was designed to remedy.  On this  
basis, we find that the Legislature drafted the list of six  
verbs to describe a fluid string of behavior that constitutes  
a violation of the statute.  And, it follows, the words and  
the concepts covered are interrelated.  
"Obstruct," "resist," "oppose," and "assault" address  
actions or words that threaten physical harm to an officer or  
impose a physical barrier to the officer's performance of  
official duties.  The final two, "beat" and "wound," proscribe  
actual physical harm to an officer.  When viewed together, in  
proper context, the words depict the range of conduct.  The  
behavior runs from verbal utterances and physical acts that  
threaten to physically interfere with an officer to the  
erection of physical barriers, physical interference, and the  
perpetration of physical harm.6  
6Section 479 exists today in its original form. The 
Legislature has never amended it.  
15  
 
 
 
Moreover, 
one 
can infer that, in elevating these offenses  
to high misdemeanors, the Legislature intended to reserve  
harsher punishment for assaulting police officers than for  
committing ordinary assault. This Court drew that inference  
in Little, supra, when making a plain language analysis of the  
statute.7  
There 
are 
other 
reasons 
to 
interpret 
"obstruct" 
narrowly.  
Today's holding, requiring more than mere lies to offend §  
479, avoids the creation of an unduly harsh penal scheme.8  It  
7The prosecution also argues that defendant's lies should 
be included in conduct proscribed by § 479 because they could 
have led to a criminal charge being made against an innocent 
person. Indeed, the prosecutor contends that suspects who 
provide false identification to police officers typically do 
so for one of two reasons. First, they wish to avoid being 
treated as habitual offenders by concealing their true 
identity and the nature of their past record. Second, they 
intend to abscond from justice by avoiding future court 
hearings in connection with the criminal charge. Authorities 
then encounter difficulties locating a fugitive because they 
do not know his true name.  
In this case, had Vasquez successfully lied, then 
absconded from justice, a warrant would have been issued for 
the arrest of a different person.  The prosecutor contends 
that § 479 should be interpreted broadly enough to encompass 
Vasquez' 
actions, 
because 
it 
will 
discourage 
similar 
deceptive 
behavior. Certainly, some criminals engage in the dishonest 
activities 
described 
by the prosecutor.  Had Vasquez absconded 
from justice, he could have implicated an innocent person in 
a criminal proceeding. While this is a good reason for the 
Legislature to consider revising the statute, it does not 
advance us in ascertaining legislative intent.  That is  
because it is not pertinent to ascertaining the meaning to the 
words used in § 479.  
8This point is made clear by careful consideration of the 
(continued...)  
16  
 
 
rejects the scenario embraced by the prosecutor and our  
dissenting 
colleagues 
that 
would 
contravene 
legislative 
intent  
and create a statutory meaning ripe for misuse and injustice.  
Here, as defense counsel aptly reminds, Vasquez was caught and  
charged with being a minor in possession, a crime not  
punishable by incarceration.  Under the reading sanctioned by  
the prosecutor and the dissent, a lie about his name and age  
could bring him a two-year jail sentence.  
Moreover, if mere lies violated the statute, virtually  
any misstatement of fact given to a police officer by any  
witness or bystander could lead to a resisting and obstructing  
conviction.  Such harshness could chill citizens' willingness  
to cooperate with police investigations.  Although the  
prosecution contends that this weapon would be used  
8(...continued) 
broad application endorsed by the dissent. The dissent would 
interpret "obstruct" to proscribe any oral utterance that 
creates a synapse of delay for an officer carrying out 
official duties. The absurdity of such a rule is apparent when 
the following hypothetical example is considered:  
Suppose a man witnesses a pickpocketing crime on the 
street. Suspecting that the man saw the crime, an officer 
approaches and queries, "Which way did he go?" The man does 
not respond for a full ten seconds. Then, he says, "He went 
that way," and points in the direction the pickpocket fled. 
In such a case, under the dissent's rule, the man's honest 
answer would constitute an obstruction. The manner in which  
the man answered the officer's question created a delay in the 
officer's 
gathering 
of 
information 
pursuant 
to 
an  
investigation. Contrary to the dissent's argument, this 
certainly is not conduct that the Legislature intended to 
penalize.  
17  
 
"sparingly" 
by 
law 
enforcement officers, we are concerned that  
it would open wide a door for the unscrupulous.  Thus, we  
reject the request to read it into § 479.  
For the reasons previously set forth, we would hold that  
the Legislature enacted the resisting and obstructing arrest  
statute to penalize actual or threatened acts of physical  
interference or violence against police officers.  Lies,  
alone, do not violate the statute.  Vasquez' use of a false  
name and age, in this case, did not rise to an obstruction  
within the meaning of § 479 and therefore did not offend it.  
CONCLUSION  
We conclude that an officer's attempts to "maintain,  
preserve and keep the peace" under MCL 750.470 encompasses the  
execution of all lawfully assigned duties of a law enforcement  
officer. In this case, Trooper Spinner was actively engaged  
in efforts to keep the peace when he encountered Vasquez.  
We would hold, also, that the Legislature intended § 479  
to operate against actual or threatened physical harm to or  
interference 
with 
a 
law enforcement officer engaged in keeping  
the peace. It is intended to make unlawful the placement of  
physical 
barriers 
before an officer engaged in the performance  
of official duties.  Therefore, the word "obstruct" as used in  
the statute means interference that physically hinders the  
progress of an official action or creates actual or threatened  
18  
harm to the police. The statute contemplates both expressed  
and implied threats of such harm.  Mere lies are insufficient  
to trigger a violation.  
Thus, Vasquez' conduct was not of the kind that the  
statute was designed to prevent. The decision of the Court of  
Appeals retaining the § 479 charges against Vasquez should be  
reversed.  
19  
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
  
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116660  
MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CORRIGAN, C.J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  While I agree with the lead  
opinion’s conclusion that the police officer in this case was  
attempting to “keep the peace,” I reject its unnecessarily  
narrow reading of the word “obstruct.”1  In effect, the lead  
opinion inserts a new element-
-
-actual or threatened physical  
interference—into the resisting and obstructing statute. In  
my view, defendant’s alleged conduct—lying to the officer  
about his name and age—clearly falls within a common  
1 For the reasons set forth in this dissent, I also 
disagree with Justice Kelly’s separate opinion, which reaches 
essentially the same conclusion as the lead opinion.  
1  
 
  
 
 
 
understanding of the word “obstruct.”  Accordingly, I would  
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
I. THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  
Resolution of this case requires an examination of the  
text of the resisting and obstructing statute.2  As set forth  
in Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119  
(1999), the principles guiding our interpretation of statutes  
are well established:  
The foremost rule, and our primary task in 
construing a statute, is to discern and give effect 
to the intent of the Legislature. 
Murphy v  
Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 447 Mich 93, 98; 523 
NW2d 310 (1994). See also Nation v W D E Electric  
Co, 454 Mich 489, 494; 563 NW2d 233 (1997).  This  
task begins by examining the language of the 
statute itself.  The words of a statute provide 
“the most reliable evidence of its intent.” United  
States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 
69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981).  If the language of the 
statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have 
intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the 
statute must be enforced as written.  No further  
judicial construction is required or permitted. 
Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 
135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).  
The Legislature has provided that “[a]ll words or phrases  
shall be construed and understood according to the common and  
approved usage of the language.” MCL 8.3a. We thus consult  
a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that  
lack a unique legal meaning.  See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich  
2  This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory 
interpretation. Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243,  
248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
2  
 
 
 
439, 456; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).  
II. ANALYSIS  
The resisting and obstructing statute states:  
Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully 
obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff, coroner, 
township treasurer, constable or other officer or 
person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting 
to serve or execute any process, rule or order made 
or issued by lawful authority, or who shall resist 
any officer in the execution of any ordinance, by 
law, or any rule, order or resolution made, issued, 
or passed by the common council of any city board 
of trustees, or common council or village council 
of any incorporated village, or township board of 
any township or who shall assault, beat or wound 
any sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, constable 
or other officer duly authorized, while serving, or 
attempting to serve or execute any such process, 
rule or order, or for having served, or attempted 
to serve or execute the same, or who shall so  
obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound 
any of the above named officers, or any other 
person or persons authorized by law to maintain and 
preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts 
and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the 
peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2 
years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand 
dollars. [MCL 750.479 (emphasis added).]  
Resolution of this case turns on our interpretation of  
the word “obstruct” as it refers to police attempts to keep  
the peace.  Consistent with the principles of statutory  
interpretation set forth above, we must examine the “common  
and approved usage” of the word. MCL 8.3a. As noted in the  
lead 
opinion, 
Random 
House 
Webster’s 
College 
Dictionary 
(1991)  
defines “obstruct” as:  “1. to block or close up with an  
obstacle . . . . 2. to hinder, interrupt, or delay the  
3  
  
 
passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block from sight; be  
in the way of (a view, passage, etc.).”  Although this  
definition 
of 
“obstruct” 
clearly 
encompasses 
physical  
interference, it is not limited to physical interference.  
Certainly, it is possible to hinder, interrupt, or delay an  
officer’s attempts to keep the peace without resorting to  
actual or threatened physical interference, as the lead  
opinion would require.  
This Court recognized as much in People v Philabaun, 461  
Mich 255, 264; 602 NW2d 371 (1999), when we held that the  
defendant’s polite refusal to comply with a search warrant for  
the extraction of blood, “although indisputably passive in  
nature, 
was 
nevertheless 
sufficient 
to 
constitute 
obstruction,  
resistance, or opposition.”  We explained that “[p]hysical  
resistance, threats, and abusive speech can be relevant facts  
in a prosecution under this statute, but none is a necessary  
element.” Id. at 262. Today, the lead opinion attempts to  
revise 
Philabaun 
by 
explaining 
that 
the 
defendant’s  
nonphysical conduct in that case actually “rose to the level  
of threatened physical interference.”  Ante, p 17. 
Thus,  
under the lead opinion’s curious logic, although neither  
physical resistance nor threats are necessary elements of the  
statute, prosecutors must still prove the existence of either  
an actual or threatened physical interference.  
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The lead opinion reasons that the defendant’s conduct in  
Philabaun 
rose 
to 
the 
level 
of 
threatened 
physical  
interference because, when he refused to cooperate, “the next  
likely sequence of events very well could have been the  
possible injury of a police officer attempting to enforce the  
search warrant.” Ante, p 17 (emphasis added). Accordingly,  
rather than focusing on a defendant’s actual oral or  
nonphysical act of obstruction, the lead opinion demands a  
difficult 
inquiry 
into 
“likely” 
and 
“possible” 
consequences 
of  
such an act.  It would have courts ask whether the defendant’s  
act would place the police officer in a “situation in which  
his next act would, more likely than not, involve physical  
confrontation.” 
Ante, p 18 (emphasis added). 
I do not  
believe that such inquiry is practicable or required by the  
plain statutory language. 
Consistent with the most  
straightforward reading of our decision in Philabaun, I would  
hold that oral, nonphysical acts that hinder, interrupt, or  
delay an officer’s attempts to keep the peace constitute  
obstruction under the resisting and obstructing statute.  
Applying the statute to these facts, defendant’s alleged  
conduct falls within the plain meaning of the word “obstruct.”  
A state trooper tried to gather information to investigate his  
suspicion that defendant was an intoxicated minor.  When asked  
to provide his name and age, defendant had two lawful choices:  
he 
could 
have 
answered 
truthfully 
or 
exercised 
his  
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constitutional right not to answer at all.  Instead, defendant  
chose to lie. 
By doing so, he impeded the officer’s  
investigation by creating a nonphysical obstacle to the  
officer’s attempt to gather accurate information.3  
The lead opinion, relying on the doctrine of noscitur a  
sociis, concludes that the word “obstruct” refers only to  
physical obstruction despite the fact that the common  
understanding of the word clearly encompasses both physical  
and nonphysical obstruction. The noscitur a sociis doctrine  
stands for the simple proposition that the words of a statute  
should be understood in context.  See Tyler v Livonia Schs,  
459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). While I have no  
objection to interpreting the word “obstruct” in the context  
of its placement in the statute, I disagree with the lead  
opinion’s conclusion that the Legislature’s placement of the  
word “obstruct” in a list of words also including “resist,  
oppose, assault, beat or wound,” indicates an intent to limit  
the common meaning of the word to include only physical  
obstruction.
 The lead opinion’s conclusion that physical  
interference is the only element common to all six words  
overlooks the fact that the simple notion of interference also  
3 
 While the facts of this case indicate a de minimis  
violation of the statute, I caution my colleagues that hard 
facts make bad law.  It is certainly conceivable that under 
different factual circumstances, lying to a police officer 
during an investigation could have grave consequences.  
6  
 
 
connects all six words.  While all six words are verbs that  
could be used to describe acts of physical interference, only  
two of them, “beat” and “wound,” definitely require a physical  
act; the other four may also be used to describe nonphysical  
acts.  Thus, read in context, it is at least equally likely  
that the Legislature meant to criminalize all types of  
interference, both physical and nonphysical.  
More fundamentally, the unique structure of the statute  
at issue demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend that  
its grouping of the six words together give special meaning to  
any of the words.  At the beginning of the statute, regarding  
service of process, the words “obstruct, resist, or oppose”  
are specifically set apart from the words “assault, beat, or  
wound.”  Later, however, when the statute refers to keeping  
the peace, all six words are listed together.  Notably, in the  
second instance the list is preceded by the word “so,” which  
refers readers directly back to the statute’s earlier use of  
the same words.  Because the meaning of each word contained in  
the list of six is established by reference to the first part  
of the statute, where “obstruct, resist, or oppose” are set  
apart from “assault, beat, or wound,” the fact that the word  
“obstruct” later appears with the words “assault, beat or  
wound” should not be given any special significance.  
To the extent that the meaning of the word “obstruct” can  
be 
determined 
from 
context, the only relevant comparable words  
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are “resist” and “oppose.” Because resistance and opposition  
can be oral or nonphysical just as easily as they can be  
physical, proper application of the doctrine of noscitur a  
sociis does not support the conclusion that the Legislature  
intended the word “obstruct” to have a limited meaning.  If  
anything, 
the 
Legislature’s 
decision 
to 
initially 
separate 
the  
words “obstruct, resist, or oppose” from the words “assault,  
beat, 
or 
wound” 
suggests 
an 
intention 
to 
avoid 
an  
interpretation that would require a physical component.  
III. THE LEAD OPINION’S OTHER ARGUMENTS  
Perhaps not entirely satisfied with the force of its  
statutory construction argument, the lead opinion includes a  
number of additional arguments in support of its position.  
First, the lead opinion suggests that my interpretation of the  
statute would criminalize a defendant’s assertion of the  
constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.  
See ante, p 9, n 3. I disagree. The silence of a person with  
no independent legal duty to speak simply cannot be  
characterized as an obstacle to a police investigation in the  
same manner as an affirmative untruthful statement.  Unlike a  
false statement, which by its nature is misleading, lawful  
silence merely requires police officers to perform the full  
extent 
of 
their 
investigative 
duties—unaided 
and  
unimpeded—within the boundaries of the law. In other words,  
a legally justified refusal to offer assistance is not the  
8  
  
equivalent of a positive decision to interfere.  
Second, the lead opinion relies heavily on the notion  
that the Legislature could have written the resisting and  
obstructing statute to more clearly criminalize lying to the  
police by simply including “lying” in the list of prohibited  
actions. Ante, pp 13-15, n 8 at 16.  This argument is not  
persuasive. Generally speaking, our job is to interpret the  
meaning of the plain language of the words actually used by  
the Legislature.  Rather than making assumptions based on what  
the Legislature could have done, we should strive to determine  
what it actually did. Certainly, our job would be easier in  
this case if the Legislature had specifically listed “lying”  
among 
the 
prohibited 
actions. 
 
Nevertheless, 
the 
Legislature’s  
failure to use the word “lying” does not alter the conclusion  
that lying can “obstruct” a police investigation.  
Finally, the lead opinion suggests that its position is  
bolstered because the Legislature has specifically addressed  
the problem of lying to police officers in other statutes.  
Ante, p 11, n 4.  The first statute identified in the lead  
opinion, 
MCL 
257.324(1)(h), 
is 
clearly 
inapplicable 
because 
it  
relates only to persons detained for violations of the motor  
vehicle code.  The second statute identified in the lead  
opinion, 
MCL 
750.217, is also arguably inapplicable because it  
has been construed to apply only to situations involving  
physical concealment. See People v Jones, 142 Mich App 819,  
9  
 
 
 
823; 371 NW2d 459 (1985) (holding that lying to the police  
does not constitute a “disguise”). 
Accordingly, the  
prosecutor’s only alternative in this situation was to charge  
defendant under MCL 750.479.4  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The 
lead 
opinion’s conclusion that the crime of resisting  
and obstructing requires actual or threatened physical  
interference has no basis in the text of the statute. 
Our  
recent decision in Philabaun established that oral or  
nonphysical conduct may fall within the plain meaning of the  
statute. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
WEAVER and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.  
4 Even if MCL 750.217 or MCL 257.324(1)(h) were available 
under these facts, nothing in either statute reflects a  
legislative intent to limit the prosecutor’s charging  
discretion. The enactment of a statutory provision covering 
a factual scenario does not automatically preclude a  
prosecutor from proceeding under a different statutory 
provision that also encompasses the same factual scenario. 
E.g., People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 760; 456 NW2d 237 (1990).  
10