Title: People v. Casillas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83911
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 16, 2000

Docket No. 83911-Agenda 26-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ROBERT CASILLAS, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 16, 2000.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Robert Casillas, was convicted of two counts of first
degree murder. Defendant waived his right to a jury for purposes
of sentencing, and the trial court found him eligible for the death
penalty on the basis of having committed two or more murders.
After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial
court sentenced defendant to death. Defendant's sentence has been
stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.(1)

BACKGROUND
	The following evidence was adduced at trial. At
approximately 5:15 p.m. on February 24, 1989, police responded
to a holdup alarm at Key Jewelers, 6903 North Clark Street, in
Chicago. Upon their arrival, police found the back screen door of
the store ripped and the back door open. Snow on the ground near
the back door was trampled on and police found several pieces of
gold jewelry on the ground near the rear of the store and in the
alley behind the building.
	Inside the store, police discovered the bodies of the owners,
Myung Choi and her husband, Chang Choi, each dead from a
gunshot wound to the head. Jewelry was on the floor and several
cases had been opened and emptied out. Police investigators
recovered several spent shell casings and a right-hand black
leather glove from the scene. Additionally, one live round was
found laying on top of Mrs. Choi's leg and another bullet was
recovered from a ceiling panel. A firearms examiner determined
that all of the bullets, including those recovered from the bodies of
Mr. and Mrs. Choi, were fired from the same .32 caliber
semiautomatic weapon. Police also recovered 28 fingerprint
impressions from the scene, but no murder weapon was found and
the crimes remained unsolved for several years.
	In May 1995, acting on a tip from a confidential informant,
police contacted Patty Farias, at whose apartment defendant stayed
during early 1989. The apartment was located on West Farwell,
around the corner from Key Jewelers. According to Farias, as she
arrived home from work and parked her car the evening of
February 24, 1989, she noticed several police cars and officers
going in and out of the jewelry store. When she got to her
apartment, Farias found the door deadbolted from the inside,
which was unusual. She knocked on the door and codefendant
Guadelupe Aguilar, whom Farias knew by the nickname "Stilleto,"
let her inside. Farias went to her bedroom, which was also locked.
Defendant, whom Farias also knew by his nickname "Rush,"
opened the door, and Farias saw two large green trash bags,
several black jewelry trays and pieces of gold jewelry strewn
across the bed.
	Farias became angry and demanded defendant leave her
apartment. Defendant gathered up the trash bags and jewelry and,
at defendant's request, Farias drove defendant and Aguilar to the
home of defendant's sister, Alvina Hernandez. Once there, the two
men removed the bags from the trunk of Farias' car and took them
into the house. Farias did not see either man again, and spoke to
defendant on only one other occasion approximately one month
later, when defendant called Farias to ask how her children were.
Farias stated that she never went to police because she was afraid.
	Police then interviewed defendant at Area 3 headquarters.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant spoke
privately with Chicago Police Detective Richard Zuley, eventually
admitting to his involvement in the crimes committed at Key
Jewelers on February 24, 1989. Assistant State's Attorney Joseph
Alesia subsequently arrived to speak with defendant, and, after
again being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant agreed to
give a handwritten statement. In his statement, defendant said that
both he and Aguilar stayed at Farias' apartment the night of
February 23, 1989. Farias left for work the next morning and her
two children went to school, leaving defendant and Aguilar alone
in the apartment all day. Defendant stated that, at approximately
4 o'clock on the afternoon of February 24, he and Aguilar walked
around the corner to Key Jewelers to "case it," meaning to look for
security and see if the store would be easy to rob. After looking
around the store and looking at some of the jewelry, the two men
left.
	Defendant and Aguilar walked back to Farias' apartment,
where they were still the only ones home. The two men snorted
some cocaine, and then went back to Key Jewelers at
approximately 5:10 p.m., in defendant's words, "to rob it." Mr.
and Mrs. Choi were the only persons present in the store. After
entering the store, defendant stated, Aguilar told him to keep his
eyes open, meaning that "something was going to happen." While
Aguilar looked at a gold medallion, defendant stated that he stood
by the display cases near the front of the store to watch for anyone
approaching.
	According to defendant's statement, he then heard a pop, at
which time he turned around and saw Aguilar's arm extended and
either a .25- or .32-caliber gun in his hand pointed at Mr. Choi's
head. Mr. Choi slumped down, at which time Mrs. Choi ran to the
back of the store and pressed an alarm buzzer. Aguilar chased the
woman to the back of the store, grabbing her by the neck. Aguilar
tried to shoot Mrs. Choi, but the gun jammed, and a live bullet
popped out of the gun. Aguilar then shot Mrs. Choi once in the
head and she fell to the ground.
	Defendant stated that Aguilar then began emptying trays of
jewelry into a box, handing defendant approximately seven or
eight jewelry trays. The two men removed a board from the back
door and escaped through the back, cutting through an alley and a
gangway to Farias' apartment. Shortly after they arrived back at
the apartment, Farias came home and found defendant on her bed
with the trays of jewelry. According to defendant, Farias "started
looking for answers from him," at which time he and Aguilar put
the jewelry in plastic garbage bags. Defendant then pulled Farias'
car up to the apartment. Aguilar came out of the apartment
carrying the trash bags of jewelry. Farias also came out and drove
the two men to defendant's sister's home, where defendant and
Aguilar stayed overnight. Defendant further stated that the next
day, Aguilar gave him a handful of gold chains, rings and
medallions which he gave away the following week.
	The cause proceeded to trial in April 1997. Defendant and
Guadelupe Aguilar were tried in simultaneous, severed trials
before two separate juries. The State's theory at trial was that
defendant and Aguilar planned and carried out the robbery
together, but that it was defendant who actually shot and killed Mr.
and Mrs. Choi. In addition to testimony by several other police
personnel who responded to the initial alarm and who worked on
the case, latent fingerprint examiner Officer William Kovacs
testified for the State as to two fingerprint impressions and one
palmprint impression taken from a counter at the store which
matched those of Aguilar. Detective Zuley testified as to his
conversation with defendant prior to defendant's giving his
handwritten statement in which defendant stated that he was
wearing a pair of dark-colored gloves, either dark green or black,
the day of the murders.
	Patty Farias also testified on behalf of the State, repeating her
account of the events February 24, 1989, as previously told to
police in 1995. Additionally, Farias stated that defendant had told
her a month prior to the murders that he wanted to get a gun
because he always had one. Farias added, however, that she had
never seen defendant carrying a gun, nor did she ever see a gun in
her apartment.
	Paul Hernandez, defendant's brother-in-law, also testified for
the State. He and his wife, Alvina, defendant's sister, were home
with several other family members the evening of February 24,
1989, when defendant and Aguilar arrived. Hernandez testified
that Aguilar was carrying about three bags of jewelry, which he
placed on the kitchen table. Aguilar told Hernandez that they had
robbed a jewelry store, and then gave Hernandez's brother a gold
bracelet and offered to sell some of the jewelry to Hernandez.
Hernandez further stated that he thought Aguilar had a gun
because he had his shirt untucked on one side and was constantly
adjusting his pants, although he did not actually see either Aguilar
or defendant with a gun. The next morning, Hernandez asked both
men to leave his house.
	Additionally, the jury heard testimony regarding defendant's
August 1995 escape from the Cook County jail, where he was
being held pending trial. Victor Cervantes, whom defendant did
not know, but who was attending a party near the Cook County jail
the night defendant escaped, testified that he invited defendant
inside and later arranged a ride for defendant. William Prybell of
the fugitive warrant unit of the Cook County sheriff's police
apprehended defendant approximately one month later in
Pasadena, Texas, and transported him back to the custody of the
Cook County department of corrections. The trial court instructed
the jury to consider defendant's escape only as evidence of his
consciousness of guilt.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf, providing a different
account from that in his earlier statement to police. Defendant
stated that he and Aguilar stopped by the jewelry store initially,
not to case it, but to look at jewelry on their way to find Patty
Farias' car, which they believed was parked nearby on the street.
Defendant further stated that, after they went back to Farias'
apartment, Aguilar told him he wanted to purchase a ring he had
seen earlier in the store. They went back to Key Jewelers and
Aguilar spoke with Mr. Choi while defendant looked at jewelry.
According to defendant, he was scared and shocked when he heard
the first shot. He saw Aguilar chase Mrs. Choi to the back of the
store and shoot her, at which time, defendant stated, he fell to his
knees and felt sick and scared. Defendant further testified that he
only helped Aguilar carry jewelry out of the store out of fear, and
initially refused to accept any of the proceeds of the robbery, but
kept some of jewelry after Aguilar gave him a "crazy look."
Defendant said he only signed the handwritten statement admitting
to participation in the robbery after Assistant State's Attorney
Alesia promised him he would not be charged with murder. He
also stated that he escaped from the Cook County jail because he
feared for his safety when the business card Alesia gave to him
was taken away, although defendant did not know who took the
card.
	At the close of all the evidence, the jury was instructed on
intentional, knowing and felony murder as well as on the law of
accountability. The trial court, however, failed to give Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.02, instructing the jury
that an indictment is not evidence of guilt, and Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.03, instructing the jury as to the
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The jury
returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of both
murders.
	Defendant waived his right to a jury for his death penalty
sentencing hearing, and, after admitting the jury verdicts into
evidence, the court found him eligible for the death penalty on the
basis of having committed two or more murders. 720 ILCS
6/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996).
	At the aggravation-mitigation phase of defendant's death
penalty hearing, the prosecution introduced evidence of
defendant's extensive criminal history, which included evidence
linking defendant to the September 1991 shooting of Artemio
Garcia and the October 1991 murder of Gerardo Gonzalez. The
prosecution also introduced evidence of defendant's numerous
disciplinary infractions while in the custody of the Department of
Corrections, as well as his 1995 escape and previous escape
attempts in 1983 and 1984.
	In mitigation, defendant presented testimonial evidence of his
good behavior while in custody at Stateville Prison. Defendant's
brother and sister offered evidence of defendant's abusive
childhood. Defendant's childhood foster father also testified on his
behalf.
	At the close of all the evidence, the trial court ruled that there
was no mitigation sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty, whereupon defendant was sentenced to death.
Defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial, sentencing hearing,
and reconsideration of sentence was denied.
ANALYSIS
	Defendant raises 11 issues on appeal, challenging both his
conviction and death sentence. We address each in turn.
Trial Errors
Jury Instructions
	Defendant first contends that his right to due process and a
fair trial was violated when the trial court failed to give Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.02 and No. 2.03 (3d ed.
1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d). IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.02
states:
			"The [(information)(indictment)(complaint)] in this
case is the formal method of accusing the defendant[s] of
an offense and placing [(him)(them)] on trial. It is not any
evidence against the defendant[s] and does not create any
inference of guilt."
	IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.03 states:
			"[(The) (Each)] defendant is presumed to be innocent
of the charge[s] against him. This presumption remains
with him each defendant throughout every stage of the
trial and during your deliberations on the verdict and is
not overcome unless from all the evidence in the case you
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty.
			The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden
remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant
is not required to prove his innocence."
	At trial, neither the State nor defense tendered either
instruction to the court. Defendant did not object to the omission
of these instructions at trial or in his post-trial motion. Ordinarily,
the failure of a defendant to tender an instruction or to otherwise
object at trial waives the issue for appellate review. People v.
Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d 476, 485 (1990). Defendant, however, argues
that trial counsel's failure to do so constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel. Additionally, defendant claims that, in
keeping with the constitutional requirement that he be provided a
fair trial, principles of waiver or procedural default do not apply.
	In Layhew, we noted that a written instruction informing the
jury of the presumption of defendant's innocence and the State's
burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is
a time-honored and effective method of protecting a defendant's
right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d  at 486, citing
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468, 478, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1937 (1978). Thus, despite defendant's failure to
object, this court will notice this error and endeavor to determine
whether defendant was denied a fair trial by the court's failure to
sua sponte give IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.03.
	The court bears the burden of seeing that the jury is instructed
as to the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.
Although error, the trial court's failure to give this written
instruction does not automatically result in a finding that
defendant's constitutionally protected right to a fair trial has been
violated. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 60 L. Ed. 2d 640, 643, 99 S. Ct. 2088, 2090 (1979). In Layhew, this court
adopted the totality of the circumstances analysis used by the
United States Supreme Court in Whorton. Under this test, to
determine whether defendant received a fair trial, we must look to
all the circumstances including all the instructions to the jury, the
arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was
overwhelming and any other relevant factors. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d 
at 486, quoting Whorton, 441 U.S.  at 789, 60 L. Ed. 2d  at 643, 99 S. Ct.  at 2090.
	Applying this test to the facts of the instant case, we find the
jury was adequately informed about the burden of proof and the
presumption of innocence. Under the first factor enunciated in
Whorton, the reviewing court looks to the instructions that the trial
court actually did give the jury. Here, at the start of voir dire, the
trial court discussed at length, repeatedly and in the presence of all
the jurors, the State's burden of proof and defendant's
presumption of innocence. Specifically, the trial judge stated to all
potential jurors:
			"One of the significant characteristics in a criminal case
is that the State bears the burden of proof in a criminal
case. The standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In
a criminal case the State bears the burden to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden
never shifts. It remains with the State throughout the trial.
			Kind of on the other side of that coin is a constitutional
principle that has to do with our system of law, and that is
called the presumption of innocence. Under our system of
law, every criminal defendant, meaning one who has been
accused of committing a crime, every criminal defendant,
not just this defendant, but any criminal defendant is in
the law presumed innocent. Sometimes that is described
as saying a defendant is cloaked with the presumption of
innocence.
			That presumption of innocence remains with the
defendant throughout the trial and never goes away. That
presumption of innocence remains with the defendant
even while the jury is deliberating. That presumption of
innocence is not removed or rebutted until and unless the
jury, having been instructed and having heard all the
evidence and deliberating, removes that presumption with
a finding of guilty. Those are two very basic premises
under our system of law, and one has to keep in mind
throughout jury service on a criminal case.
			The defendant in a criminal case under our system of
law, and it doesn't matter whether it is a state court or
federal court, any jurisdiction, a defendant in a criminal
case has no burden. All of the burden in the criminal case
is on the prosecution. There is no burden on the
defendant, and by that I mean the defendant does not have
to present any evidence. A defendant may choose to
present evidence. What is important to understand is that
there is no requirement for a defendant to present
evidence.
			A defendant does not have to prove anything. The
burden of proof is on the prosecution. Least of all, the
defendant does not have to prove his innocence. It is the
State's obligation under our system of law to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the
only burden and it stays with the State throughout the
trial."
	The trial judge then went on to state that the defendant is
under no obligation to testify on his own behalf, explaining:
		"Well, number one, remember that I said to you that it is
the State's burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt with their presumption of evidence. That
has nothing to do with whether the defendant testifies or
does not testify. That is the first reason. The defendant has
no burden  ***."
	The first group of 14 potential jurors was then called to the
front of the courtroom for questioning, at which time the trial
judge again repeated:
			"Do you understand in the trial of a criminal case that
it is the State who has the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden remains
with the State throughout the trial and never goes away.
			Does everybody understand that, and does everybody
understand that the defendant in a criminal trial under our
system of law has no burden. He doesn't have to present
evidence, he doesn't have to testify. He may present
evidence, may testify, but that is a criminal defendant's
decision. There is no burden on the defendant to do
anything. And least of all, prove his innocence.
			Does everybody understand that the defendant in a
criminal trial has no burden."
	As voir dire continued, the trial judge again reminded the
remaining venire of the presumption of innocence and the State's
burden of proof, stating:
			"Because it has been a while, let me briefly go over a
few principles with you. Remember, the burden stays with
the State, and that burden is to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
			Does everybody understand that? Anybody that doesn't
understand that?
			You further understand that the defendant in a criminal
case, any criminal case in any court in this country, has no
burden. There is only one burden, and it is on the State.
Does everybody understand the defendant has no burden.
He doesn't have to present evidence, does not have to
prove anything. He does not have to present evidence.
That is his option.
			What is important to understand is that the defendant in
a criminal case under our system of law does not have to
do anything. Does everybody understand?
			You further understand that under our system of law by
application of the law, every defendant in every case is
cloaked with the presumption of innocence, and that
presumption remains with the defendant throughout the
trial, and never goes away, and is still with the defendant
even during deliberations by the jury on the verdict, and
that presumption is not removed or rebutted until and
unless the jury does so by returning a verdict of guilty.
			Does everybody understand that the defendant is
presumed in law to be innocent?"
	At no time did any member of the venire express any
difficulty in understanding these concepts. Furthermore, after the
jury was empaneled, prior to the start of trial, the trial court again
explained to the jury that the State bears the burden of proof,
stating:
		"Once the State has concluded its evidence, its case in
chief, the defense, if it wants to, will put on their
evidence. *** Remember what I told you last week and
that is the defendant is not required to do anything, not
required to put on evidence. He may if he wishes to. ***
			Once defense has concluded its evidence, the State has
another opportunity to present evidence. It's called
rebuttal evidence. That is simply an opportunity again
based on the fact that the State bears the burden to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ***."
	In addition, the trial court again informed jurors just prior to
closing arguments that the State would have an opportunity to
speak in rebuttal because it bore the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, the written instructions provided and
read to the jury just prior to deliberations on the elements of each
offense additionally stated:
			"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that each one of these propositions has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant
guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the
evidence that any one of these propositions has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant not guilty."
	Thus, even though the trial court did not specifically instruct
the jury in accordance with IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.03, all jurors
were throughly instructed by the court, both at the beginning and
conclusion of trial, as to the presumption of innocence and the
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
	This court in Layhew, following the Supreme Court in
Whorton, also identified the statements of counsel as significant.
In the instant case, defense counsel discussed the State's burden of
proof during his closing argument, repeating three times that the
jury must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
State also reminded the jury that defendant is presumed innocent
in its rebuttal closing argument.
	Another factor identified in Whorton as important under the
totality of the circumstances analysis is whether the evidence
against defendant is overwhelming. In Layhew, this court held that
the omission of IPI Criminal 2d No. 2.03 did not deprive
defendant of a fair trial, despite finding the evidence of
defendant's guilt short of overwhelming. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d  at
490-91. By contrast, in the instant case, the evidence of
defendant's participation in the Key Jewelers robbery and murders
is overwhelming. Defendant admitted to police to having gone to
Key Jewelers at first to "case" the store, and then later to act as a
lookout during the robbery. Despite defendant's testimony at trial
that he was shocked and scared when Aguilar shot and killed Mr.
and Mrs. Choi, at no time did defendant deny helping Aguilar
remove the jewelry from the store afterward. Furthermore, two
witnesses, Patty Farias and Paul Hernandez, testified to seeing
defendant in possession of several bags of jewelry and jewelry
trays. Regardless of whether the jury believed it was Aguilar who
pulled the trigger and killed Mr. and Mrs. Choi, the evidence
presented at trial, at a minimum, overwhelmingly supports
defendant's accountability because of his assistance in planning
and carrying out the crimes.
	Defendant points out that several jurors were selected from a
panel which was not separately asked after being called to the
front of the courtroom for questioning whether they understood the
presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof.
Defendant also argues that the court's reminder to jurors that it
would be instructed on the law to apply during deliberations
eradicates any ameliorative effect the court's earlier statements
regarding the presumption of innocence and burden of proof may
have had. Additionally, defendant argues that the evidence against
defendant was not overwhelming, and that a properly instructed
jury might have believed defendant's testimony, resulting in an
acquittal.
	After a thorough review of the record, however, we conclude
that the jury was adequately informed about the burden of proof
and the presumption of innocence. Although the court in Layhew
relied upon the fact that each juror was questioned about his
understanding of the principle that a defendant is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, such
individual inquiry is not a necessity to reach such a conclusion. In
the instant case, the trial court very clearly impressed upon the jury
the importance of its duties, and asked venire members as a group
whether they had any difficulty in understanding the presumption
of innocence and burden of proof. Not one person indicated he or
she did not understand. Furthermore, these concepts were repeated
during closing arguments and again in the instructions on the
elements of the offenses charged. Lastly, unlike in Layhew, the
evidence of defendant's guilt in the instant case is overwhelming.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we believe the result of
this trial would not have been different had the trial court provided
IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.03 in written form and therefore, that the
court's failure to do so is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
	We also reject defendant's claim that he was denied a fair trial
by the court's failure to sua sponte give IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.02,
instructing the jury that defendant's indictment is not to be
considered as evidence of guilt. Despite defendant's attempt to
argue otherwise, IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.02 does not invoke
constitutional rights as does IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.03. Therefore
its omission is not examined under a plain error analysis. Thus,
any argument regarding the court's failure to give IPI Criminal 3d
No. 2.02 is waived due to defendant's failure to tender the
instruction to the trial court and his failure to object to its omission
at trial and in his post-trial motion.
	We further reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the omitted instructions. To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) that the attorney's deficient
performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. People v.
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320 (1998), citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). First, as explained above, the outcome of
defendant's trial would not have been any different had IPI
Criminal 3d No. 2.03 been given. Thus, defendant suffered no
prejudice from its omission and his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel fails. Similarly, we do not believe defendant was
prejudiced by the trial court's failure to give IPI Criminal 3d No.
2.02. The trial judge read the indictment to the entire venire prior
to voir dire, explaining:
			"Ladies and gentlemen, those are the charges in this
case. Those are the offenses with which the defendant on
trial is accused. I want to make clear to you now that what
I just read to you is not evidence. Those are the formal
charges that are necessary to bring the defendant to trial.
It is important to understand that is the charging
document, called an indictment. That is not evidence.
That formally states the charges."
	In light of the trial court's instructions to the jury and the
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, we do not believe the
outcome of the trial would have been any different had IPI
Criminal 3d No. 2.02 been read to the jury. Thus, we hold
defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to tender the
instruction or to object and trial counsel was therefore not
ineffective.
Irrelevant Gang Evidence
	Defendant next claims that he was denied a fair trial when the
State elicited testimony from him regarding his affiliation with the
Latin Kings, and when it made reference to defendant's nickname
in its closing argument.
	Prior to trial, the court reserved a ruling on defendant's
motion in limine to exclude any evidence relating to defendant's
gang membership and gang involvement. At trial, the State called
Victor Cervantes to testify regarding defendant's August 1995
escape from the Cook County jail, which evidence was admissible
for the limited purpose of showing defendant's consciousness of
guilt. On direct examination, Cervantes stated that he was
attending a party near the jail when he saw defendant standing on
a corner. Cervantes did not know defendant, but approached him
on the corner where they spoke briefly. Cervantes then invited
defendant to the party. Later, defendant asked Cervantes for a ride,
and Cervantes arranged for his brother to drop defendant off at a
house approximately 1½ miles away.
	On cross-examination, defense counsel raised the
unlikelihood that Cervantes would be so helpful to a total stranger.
After a sidebar, the court allowed Cervantes to testify as to the fact
that he and defendant were both members of the Latin Kings for
the purpose of explaining why he would invite defendant inside
and offer him help. Cervantes stated that, during his initial
conversation with defendant, defendant showed Cervantes a tatoo,
proving his membership in the Latin Kings. Cervantes added that
his brother agreed to give defendant a ride because of their mutual
membership in the gang.
	Defendant does not complain of Cervantes' testimony, but
claims that during the State's cross-examination of defendant, it
overstepped the limited purpose for which the trial court had
allowed evidence of his gang affiliation, that limited purpose being
to rebut the insinuation that Cervantes was not testifying
truthfully. Specifically, defendant claims error with regard to the
following, raised by the State during its cross-examination of
defendant: (1) that defendant's nickname "Rush" is an acronym
for Royalty Under Supreme Heritage, a Latin Kings name; (2) that
defendant has a Latin Kings tatoo; (3) that fellow Latin King
members gave defendant a gun and $1,000 to help him flee to
Texas after his escape from jail; and (4) that Latin Kings in Texas
helped defendant hide. Additionally, defendant complains of
several references to his nickname "Rush" during the State's
closing and rebuttal closing arguments.
	Defendant concedes that he "opened the door" to the
introduction of gang evidence through his cross-examination of
Cervantes, but argues that once the State cleared up any false
impression induced by Cervantes' testimony, any further evidence
about gangs was irrelevant and prejudicial. The State responds
that, based on the insinuations which arose during defendant's
cross-examination of Cervantes, the State was properly allowed to
introduce evidence of defendant's gang membership in order to
explain how and why defendant received help when he escaped
and to demonstrate defendant's consciousness of guilt. We agree
with the State.
	Evidence of gang affiliation is admissible as long as the
relevance of the evidence is established. People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 477 (1996). In the instant case, once defense counsel
suggested that Victor Cervantes' testimony was not credible by
remarking on the unlikelihood that he would assist a total stranger,
the trial court found gang evidence rebutting this suggestion
admissible. Evidentiary rulings of this nature will not be
overturned on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489-90 (1991). Here, we do
not believe the trial court abused its discretion. Further evidence
that other total strangers, some as far away as Texas, provided
defendant assistance solely because of his affiliation in the same
gang serves to reinforce Cervantes' testimony that he did the same,
rebutting the implication, raised during defendant's own cross-examination of Cervantes, that he was testifying untruthfully.
	Furthermore, we note that defendant has waived any claim of
error relating to the State's use of his nickname "Rush" during
closing arguments by failing to raise it in his post-trial motion. See
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). Defendant also
waived any claim of error regarding his Latin Kings tatoo by not
objecting to the State's questioning of him on this issue during
cross-examination. Additionally, any statements by defendant
regarding his tatoo were cumulative of the properly admitted
testimony of Victor Cervantes that he identified defendant's gang
membership by his tatoo. Similarly, defendant's statement during
cross-examination that his nickname is Rush, a Latin Kings
acronym for Royalty Under Supreme Heritage, was cumulative of
earlier testimony by Patty Farias and Paul Hernandez that they
both call defendant Rush. While the jury was not aware at this
point what Rush stood for, they were already aware of defendant's
membership in the Latin Kings. Thus, the fact that "Rush" was a
Latin Kings name added nothing new and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence.
Improper Closing Argument
	Defendant next claims that he was denied a fair trial when the
prosecution made closing arguments referring to defendant's
escape for purposes other than for the limited purpose of showing
his consciousness of guilt. Initially, we note, and defendant
concedes, that this issue was not properly preserved for appellate
review because his post-trial motion fails to set forth the specific
remarks allegedly constituting error. Defendant nevertheless
argues that we should consider this issue as plain error. 134 Ill. 2d
R. 615(a). Under the doctrine of plain error, a reviewing court may
consider an error not properly preserved at trial where the evidence
is closely balanced or where the error was so fundamental and of
such magnitude as to deny the defendant a fair trial. People v.
Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 191-92 (1996).
	We decline defendant's invitation to consider this issue under
the plain error rule. Most of the arguments defendant complains of
were made in response to his counsel's own statements during
closing arguments that defendant's escape may have been
motivated, not by consciousness of guilt, but by unfair treatment
or for "sport." Furthermore, the jury was instructed at the close of
all evidence that evidence of escape was received on the issue of
defendant's consciousness of guilt and was to be considered only
for that limited purpose. Defendant's plain error argument consists
of a single sentence in his reply brief asking this court to employ
the plain error rule because his error was preserved, although
imperfectly. Defendant, however, fails to argue that the evidence
in this case was closely balanced nor does he attempt to explain
why the magnitude of the error denied him a fair trial despite his
own provoking of the State's arguments and the trial court's
subsequent instruction to the jury. Accordingly, we find this issue
waived.
Improper Evidence of Prior Convictions
	Defendant next claims that he was denied a fair trial when the
court permitted the prosecution to impeach him with his 1990
conviction of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, which the court
referred to as "felony offense of unlawful use of a weapon," and
with his 1984 conviction for escape. Defendant argues that the
court admitted evidence of both offenses without first balancing
their probative value against their prejudicial impact as required by
this court in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971).
	As the State correctly observes, this issue is waived because
defendant failed to object at trial when the certified copies of his
convictions were discussed and further failed to raise this issue in
his post-trial motion. Moreover, defendant does not ask this court
to review his claims under the doctrine of plain error.
	Defendant, however, argues that defense counsel's failure to
object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The rules
governing the admission of evidence of prior crimes stem from
this court's adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 in People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971). Under Montgomery, a trial
court may allow impeachment of a witness with any felony
conviction, or any conviction involving dishonesty or false
statement, so long as the witness' conviction or release was within
the previous 10 years. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 516. Before any
such evidence will be admitted, however, the trial court must
determine whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 516.
	Defendant claims the court failed to apply the Montgomery
balancing test before admitting evidence of defendant's prior
convictions. The record, however, belies defendant's claims. First,
the trial judge specifically mentioned Montgomery by name when
considering whether defendant's prior convictions were
admissible. While not dispositive, the judge's statements
contradict defendant's contention that the record shows no
consideration by the court of the relevant factors for and against
admission of the evidence.
	More importantly, the judge clearly did take steps to ensure
defendant was not unduly prejudiced by declining defense
counsel's request to introduce only the mere fact of defendant's
prior felony conviction rather than mentioning the offense by
name. The judge refused to do so on the basis that the jury could
infer defendant was convicted of murder or some other more
serious felony than unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The trial
judge also minimized the prejudicial impact of defendant's
conviction by requiring the State refer to it as "felony unlawful use
of a weapon," thus removing the fact that defendant was already
a felon when he committed the crime from the jury's
consideration. Lastly, the judge demonstrated consideration of the
previous convictions' prejudicial impact by insisting the State
provide a limiting instruction telling the jury that it could only
consider evidence of defendant's previous convictions as it may
affect his believability and not as evidence of his guilt of the
instant charges.
	Although the trial judge did not explicitly state on the record
that she was balancing the probative value of defendant's prior
convictions against their prejudicial impact, this court has declined
to find error when the transcript makes clear that the trial judge
was applying the Montgomery standard, even though the judge did
not expressly articulate it (see People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48,
83 (1996); People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 325-26 (1990)). We
therefore reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object at trial or in his post-trial motion because any
such objection would have been unsuccessful. Consequently,
defendant suffered no prejudice from trial counsel's failure to do
so. See Strickland, 466 U.S at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2069.
Barred Testimony
	Defendant argues that the trial court denied him due process
and a fair trial when it refused to allow him to testify as to an
alleged promise made to him by Assistant State's Attorney Alesia
that, if he cooperated as a witness against Guadelupe Aguilar, he
would not be charged with murder. Defendant claims that this
promise induced him to sign the handwritten statement in which
he confessed to participating in the robbery which led to the
murders of Chang and Myung Choi.
	Several months prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress his statement to police on the basis that it was
involuntarily made. After a hearing, the court denied the motion.
Defendant did not appeal from the trial court's ruling. At trial,
defense counsel attempted on direct examination to elicit
testimony from defendant regarding Alesia's alleged promise to
him. The trial court refused to allow this line of questioning to
proceed on the grounds that the matter of whether defendant's
confession was voluntary was a matter properly litigated outside
the presence of the jury, which had already been determined in the
court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress.
	The admissibility of a confession that is challenged on the
ground that it is involuntary is a matter for the trial court to
determine out of the presence of the jury. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484 (1996). In the instant case, the court ruled as a matter
of law that defendant's statement was voluntary. Thus, the trial
court properly prevented this matter from being again litigated in
the presence of the jury.
	Defendant, nevertheless, still has a right to present evidence
to the jury regarding the credibility and weight to be given to the
confession. Defendant claims the trial court improperly limited his
right to present his contention that the circumstances surrounding
his confession rendered it not credible. A review of the record,
however, demonstrates that, contrary to defendant's claims, he was
not prevented from testifying as to the statement's credibility.
	During his direct examination, defendant stated that, before
he signed the handwritten statement, Assistant State's Attorney
Alesia told him he would not be charged with murder, but that he
would be charged with armed robbery. Defendant also read and
showed to the jury the first line of his statement, which said the
statement was taken regarding an "armed robbery and fatal
shooting," which defendant claimed supported his belief that he
was not charged with murder. Defendant further testified on direct
examination that he did not participate in the robbery and that,
before making his statement to police, he told them "the truth"
about what happened. Additionally, defendant stated that he had
been awake since 4:30 a.m. when he signed the statement at 5:15
p.m., and that Alesia told him if he cooperated, he would not be
charged with murder. Defendant further related that he did not
realize he had been charged with murder until his arraignment the
next day. Furthermore, on redirect examination, defendant again
testified that he signed the handwritten statement only after he was
told he would not be charged with murder.
	Given the extensive testimony by defendant as to the
circumstances surrounding his confession to police, we find
defendant's claim that the trial court improperly precluded him
from testifying that prosecutors promised not to charge him with
murder completely without merit.
Sentencing Errors
Eligibility	Defendant next contends that his sentence of death must be
vacated because the evidence was insufficient to find him eligible
for the death penalty. Defendant waived his right to a jury for the
purposes of sentencing. At the eligibility phase of his sentencing
hearing, the court admitted into evidence defendant's birth
certificate and the original jury verdicts finding him guilty of the
first degree murders of Myung Choi and Chang Choi. Defendant
presented no argument or evidence, and the trial court found him
eligible for the death penalty on the basis of having committed two
or more murders. The relevant statute states:
			"(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time
of the commission of the offense has attained the age of
18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree
murder may be sentenced to death if:
* * *
				(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering
two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this
Section *** regardless of whether the deaths occurred
as the result of the same act or of several related or
unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of
either an intent to kill more than one person or of
separate acts which the defendant knew would cause
death or create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to the murdered individual or another[.]"
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3).
	Defendant contends that he is ineligible for the death penalty
because the court made no finding and the State presented no
evidence to support that he had either an intent to kill or that he
performed any act which he knew would cause the death or strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to any person. Initially,
we note defendant has waived this issue by failing to object at the
sentencing hearing or to raise it in his post-trial motion.
Defendant, however, argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to do so. We disagree. Even if defendant had objected, any
such objection would rightfully have been overruled. At the guilt
phase of defendant's trial, the jury was instructed as to the mental
states of intentional, knowing and felony murder. The jury
returned two general verdict forms finding defendant guilty of the
murders of Chang Choi and Myung Choi. The jury's return of
these general verdicts raises a presumption that it found defendant
guilty of intentional murder. People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118,
157 (1992), quoting People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 455-56
(1988).
	Therefore, since the jury's verdict encompassed the necessary
intent to find defendant eligible for the death penalty under the
multiple murder aggravating factor, the trial court was not required
to make additional findings regarding defendant's mental state
when it entered defendant's jury verdict forms into evidence, and
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue
because defendant suffered no prejudice as a result. See
Strickland, 466 U.S at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
Unreliable Evidence in Aggravation
	Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair sentencing
hearing when the trial court admitted allegedly unreliable evidence
in aggravation regarding his involvement in two other, unrelated
shootings. First, defendant complains of testimony by Assistant
State's Attorney Matthew Mahoney as to statements by two
codefendants implicating defendant as the shooter in the 1991
murder and armed robbery of Gerardo Gonzalez. Defendant also
complains of testimony by Detective George Tracy regarding
statements made to him by a witness to the shooting. Lastly,
defendant complains of testimony by Officer William Soraghan
regarding defendant's involvement in the 1991 shooting of
Artemio Garcia, a crime for which defendant was never charged.
	The State argues that defendant has waived each of the above
claims of error by failing to properly object at trial. We agree.
While defendant objected to the testimony of Assistant State's
Attorney Mahoney and Detective Tracy on the grounds of hearsay,
at no time did he object to any of the complained-of testimony on
the grounds of unreliability. It is well settled that a specific
objection to the admission of evidence waives all grounds not
specified. See People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 335-36 (1995).
Furthermore, defendant failed to raise any objection at all at trial
to the testimony of Officer Soraghan, although he did raise this
issue in his post-trial motion. To preserve an issue for review,
however, a defendant must both object at trial and specifically
include the objection in a post-trial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Defendant's failure to do so renders this
issue waived.
	Defendant further claims that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve these issues for review. After a review of the
record, however, we believe that, even had defense counsel
successfully objected to the evidence complained of, the outcome
of defendant's sentencing would not have been different. Twenty-two witnesses testified for the State in aggravation, and a written
statement was admitted into evidence from a twenty-third witness.
In addition to testimony regarding the Gonzalez and Garcia
shootings, the trial court heard extensive evidence of defendant's
criminal history, which dated back to 1982. The court further
heard testimony and accepted evidence regarding defendant's
numerous disciplinary infractions while in prison, including
testimony from a guard at Stateville Prison who stated that
defendant had a reputation as a gang enforcer and hit man and was
one of the "top five" worst inmates in terms of safety problems.
Additionally, the court heard extensive evidence of three different
escape attempts, which earned defendant the prison nickname
"Houdini."
	The record indicates that the trial court considered all of these
factors in addition to defendant's participation in the Gonzalez and
Garcia shootings in rendering its decision. In addition, the judge
placed special emphasis on the facts surrounding the instant
crimes, including that Mr. and Mrs. Choi were shot for apparently
no reason, leaving two small children without parents. Given the
substantial evidence in aggravation, we do not believe defendant
suffered any prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to object or
to preserve these issues in defendant's post-trial motion. See
Strickland, 466 U.S at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
Accordingly, we reject defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
Rebuttal Evidence
	Defendant next claims he was denied his right to a fair
sentencing hearing and to effectively present his defense when the
trial court declined to read a trial transcript of Javier Chavez's
testimony at defendant's 1992 trial for the murder of Gerardo
Gonzalez prior to defense counsel's closing argument at
sentencing. Although the court admitted the transcript into
evidence, the judge stated that she would read its contents after the
close of all the evidence when it was time for her to consider the
evidence and render a sentencing decision. Defendant contends
that the court's refusal to read the transcript on the spot impaired
his ability to present a meaningful closing argument, rendering the
sentencing hearing unconstitutionally unfair.
	A review of the entire record, however, demonstrates that the
trial court did consider the transcript, along with all other evidence
presented in aggravation and mitigation, before rendering its
sentencing decision. At the time defendant introduced the
transcript into evidence and requested the judge to read it, the
judge replied that she would do so, along with the transcripts of all
testimony given during aggravation and mitigation, at the
appropriate time. Prior to closing arguments, the judge went on to
say that, because of the seriousness of her decision, she intended
to take matters home and go through them thoroughly, reviewing
all trial testimony, exhibits and anything else relevant.
	Nothing in the record indicates that the judge's decision to
wait until after the close of evidence to read the transcript hindered
her decisionmaking process or affected the fairness of the
sentencing hearing in any way. The judge took nearly two weeks
to render a sentence and, when the court reconvened, stated that
the reason for the long delay was to allow her time to go back over
all testimony presented in aggravation and mitigation as well as
the exhibits received into evidence during the sentencing hearing.
The court further made pains to explain the bases for its
imposition of the death penalty, including its careful consideration
of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Given the seriousness
with which the trial court weighed these factors and its careful
consideration of all the evidence, we do not believe defendant's
right to a fair trial was violated by the court's decision to read the
transcript of Chavez's testimony later, along with all the evidence
presented, rather than before defendant's closing argument.
	We further disagree with defendant's contention that the
court's decision not to read the transcript at the time it was
admitted into evidence impaired his closing argument. Defendant
claims such reading was necessary because he made reference to
the transcript in his closing argument and because it rebutted
several allegedly inaccurate statements made by several witnesses
who testified in aggravation for the State. In consideration of
defendant's sentencing, however, the judge could easily refer to
Chavez's testimony at the 1992 trial alongside transcripts of
testimony given by the State's witnesses in aggravation and
defendant's closing argument, and could sort out any
inconsistencies in the testimony at that time, which the record
indicates is just what she did.
Consideration of Improper Evidence in Sentencing
	Based on comments made by the trial judge when explaining
the court's sentencing decision, defendant argues that the trial
court improperly took into account the mere fact of his pending
murder charge in the shooting of Gerardo Gonzalez without
considering any evidence of the crime. Defendant also argues that
the trial court's comments reveal that it improperly found
defendant eligible for the death penalty on the additional bases of
felony murder and murder of a witness to a crime. The State
argues that defendant has waived this issue by failing to either
object at trial or to raise it in his post-trial motion. We agree.
Defendant has waived this issue. Moreover, defendant does not
argue for application of the plain error doctrine nor does he claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve this issue for
review. Consequently waiver applies.
Use of Defendant's Prison Disciplinary Reports
	Defendant next argues that the State's use of prison
disciplinary records as evidence in aggravation denied him a fair
sentencing hearing because the records were unreliable hearsay.
Defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review by failing to
raise it in his post-trial motion. Moreover, this court has previously
rejected such a claim, holding that the contents of prison incident
reports are admissible during the penalty phase of a sentencing
hearing so long as they are relevant and reliable. People v.
Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130 (1998); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998). Defendant's claims that the records were unreliable
because based upon hearsay and double hearsay is further without
merit because this court has also previously ruled that hearsay
evidence is admissible at a capital sentencing hearing. See
Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 83. We decline to revisit our decisions in
these earlier cases.
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
	Finally, defendant argues that his death sentence must be
vacated and his case remanded for a sentence other than death
because the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional for a
variety of reasons. In other cases, this court has considered and
rejected the challenges raised by defendant, including his
arguments that the death penalty statute (1) violates due process
because the prosecutor is not required to give pretrial notice that
he will seek the death penalty (see People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50,
99 (1988)); (2) permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death sentence because the prosecutor has complete discretion to
request a death penalty hearing (see People v. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1988)); (3) impermissibly places the burden of proof and
persuasion upon the defendant (see People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 537-38 (1990); People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 408
(1990)); (4) fails to provide sufficient information gathering
procedures to insure adequate appellate review (see People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 203 (1988); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 266 (1983)); (5) fails to provide a means to ensure that all
aggravating factors relied upon by the sentencer are relevant and
permissible (see People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988); People
v. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72, 111-12 (1986)); (6) contains a
constitutionally vague and overbroad mitigating factor of
" 'significant history of prior criminal activity' " (see People v.
Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 144-45 (1981)); (7) does not permit the
sentencer to give meaningful consideration to mitigation evidence
because it mandates death whenever there is no mitigating factor
sufficient to preclude it (see People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283
(1993)); (8) permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty through an unconstitutionally vague sentencing
standard (see People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 46 (1988)); (9)
permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty by
allowing the sentencer to consider non-statutory aggravating
factors (see People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 59 (1989)); (10) results
in arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty from
county to county depending on the predilections of the local
prosecutor (see People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 378-79 (1988));
(11) unconstitutionally places the State at an advantage by
permitting it to argue first and last at the second phase of the
sentencing hearing (see People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 162
(1998); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 282-83 (1993)); and (12)
inevitably results in the execution of innocent persons (see People
v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 211-20 (1998); People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 260-61 (1998); People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 351-52
(1998)). We decline to revisit our earlier decisions, and
accordingly reject defendant's arguments.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting
Wednesday, March 14,  2001, as the date on which the sentence of
death, entered by the circuit court of Cook County, shall be carried
out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law.
725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court shall send
a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of
Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the
warden of the institution where defendant is confined.
Circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I write separately to express my views regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence of defendant's death penalty eligibility.
	Defendant maintains that the State failed to prove him eligible
for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt because there was
no evidence from which one could find that he had either the
intent to kill any person or that he performed any act which he
knew would cause death or strong possibility of death or great
bodily harm to any person, as is statutorily required. According to
defendant, "absent an individualized finding of intent to kill or
alternatively separate acts which he knew would cause death or
strong possibility of death or great bodily harm, his accountability
for the murders does not make him eligible for death as a
punishment."
	The Illinois death penalty statute provides that at the
eligibility phase of a capital sentencing hearing, the State has the
burden to prove that a defendant is eligible for the death penalty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the State must show that
the defendant was at least 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense and that at least one statutory
aggravating factor exists. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418 (1999)
(and cases cited therein). In this case defendant's eligibility for the
death penalty was predicated upon the statutory aggravating factor
set out in section 9-1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3). That section authorizes the
imposition of the death penalty where "the defendant has been
convicted of murdering two or more individuals" and "the deaths
were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or
of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or
create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the
murdered individual or another." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(3). This court has held that section 9-1(b)(3) allows the
death penalty to be imposed where the defendant acted with
knowledge that his acts would result in death or great bodily harm,
or with the intent to kill. People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 31-36
(1983). This means that, at the eligibility phase of the hearing, the
State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only
defendant's conviction for two or more murders, but also a
culpable mental state, i.e., intent or knowledge at the time of those
crimes. People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 224 (1993). This court
has ruled that the " 'conviction' element" of section 9-1(b)(3) is
satisfied where there is proof that a trial judge has entered
judgment on a verdict of guilty of murder. People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1995). However, whether "the defendant acted with the
requisite mental state is a separate issue." Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 37.
	I note that, at the conclusion of the guilt phase of defendant's
trial, the jury was instructed based on theories of intentional,
knowing, and felony murder and on accountability. The jury
returned a general verdict of guilty with respect to first degree
murder. Therefore, we do not know beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury agreed unanimously on the question of defendant's
mens rea. Nevertheless, the jury's verdict, when viewed in
conjunction with all of the evidence adduced at the trial which the
trial judge heard, can form the basis for affirming, on appeal, the
trial judge's specific finding of death eligibility at sentencing. I
reach this conclusion because, in this case, the trial judge, and not
a jury, served as the trier of fact during the sentencing hearing. See
People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 188 (1992); People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175 (1997). The trial judge knew of the specific elements
required under section 9-1(b)(3) for a finding of death eligibility.
Moreover, the judge, as the trier of fact, may infer the intent to
take a life from a defendant's acts and the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense. People v. Garcia, 97 Ill. 2d 58, 85 (1983).
	This court has previously held that the death penalty may be
constitutionally imposed for murder convictions based on
accountability. Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d  at 263. Even though defendant may
not have been the actual shooter, the evidence shows that, at the
very least, he planned and actively participated in the crimes at
issue. Although there was no direct evidence that it was defendant
who shot the victims, I believe that the proof adduced at trial was
sufficient to sustain the sentencing judge's finding of death
eligibility under the principle of accountability. This conclusion is
amply supported by the evidence heard by the trial judge that was
adduced during the guilt phase of the proceedings (see People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 208-09 (1998), citing People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 163-64 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring)),
as I explain in detal below.
	The evidence adduced at trial established that defendant first
met his codefendant, Aguilar, while both were imprisoned at
Stateville several years earlier. They became reacquainted in
January 1989 and met on two occasions between January 1989 and
the time of the murders on February 24, 1989. It was during this
period that defendant informed his girlfriend, Patty, that he wanted
to get a gun. The night before the murders, defendant and Aguilar
met at a lounge, and, afterward, they both went to Patty's
apartment, where defendant had been living. Aguilar spent the
night at the apartment. The next day, Aguilar and defendant
walked to the jewelry store, which was close in proximity to
Patty's apartment. Defendant told police that he and Aguilar had
to be "buzzed" in and out of the store because the door was locked
electronically. Defendant stated that the sole purpose of this visit
was to "case" the store, that is, to look for security and to see
whether it was easy to rob. After examining some jewelry, both
Aguilar and defendant left, but returned a short time later with the
intention to commit a robbery. Defendant told police that as they
entered the store, Aguilar told him to "keep [his] eyes open,"
which meant to defendant that something was going to happen.
Defendant further admitted that while Aguilar was examining a
piece of jewelry, defendant stayed at the front of the store, acting
as a lookout. Defendant stated that he then heard a pop and saw
that Aguilar had shot the male victim and was chasing the female
victim to the back of the store. Defendant was alongside Aguilar
when Aguilar first attempted to shoot the woman, but the gun
jammed. Aguilar cleared the gun and successfully shot the woman
a few moments later. Defendant and Aguilar then took numerous
trays of jewelry and left the store through a rear door, removing
barricades to do so. They returned to Patty's apartment, where they
emptied the trays onto a bed. Soon thereafter, Patty returned to
home and, upon seeing the jewelry, told defendant and Aguilar to
leave the premises. Defendant stated that he then went to Patty's
car, which she had parked in front of the jewelry store. According
to defendant, the area was swarming with police activity, and he
approached a police officer and asked "What's going on?" The
officer replied that a robbery had taken place, and defendant asked
"Was anyone hurt?" The officer replied that he did not know.
Defendant told police that he then drove himself and Aguilar to
the home of defendant's sister, where the men spent the night.
Aguilar gave defendant his share of the jewelry there. Patty
testified that about a month after the crimes, defendant called her
and she asked him if he committed the robbery and murders.
Defendant responded that she should not ask him any questions.
Defendant never told her that he was afraid of Aguilar or that he
had nothing to do with the crimes.
	With respect to the mens rea required for death eligibility
under section 9-1(b)(3), the intent to take a life may be inferred
from a defendant's acts and the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offenses. Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d  at 263. Applying this
rule to the facts of this case, the proof adduced at the guilt phase
of the trial is sufficient to sustain the sentencing judge's finding of
death eligibility under the principle of accountability. The can be
no question that defendant was a principal actor in a common
enterprise bent upon committing acts of violence upon the victims.
After becoming reacquainted with Aguilar, defendant expressed
the desire to get a gun. Defendant and Aguilar planned to rob the
store and, to this end, "cased" the premises to see what type of
security devices were present. It is uncontradicted that the store's
door was electronically locked, and that the only apparent way to
enter or exit the premises was to be "buzzed" in or out by the
store's owners. This fact supports the inference that, once
defendant and Aguilar departed the store after casing the premises,
they intended to use lethal force, or, at the very least, had
knowledge that lethal force would have to be employed to escape
after robbing this particular location. It is difficult to conceive that
the owners of the jewelry store, after having been robbed, would
have freely and voluntarily buzzed defendant and Aguilar out of
their store without threat of lethal force. In addition, defendant
testified that despite being informed by Aguilar to "keep [his] eyes
open" upon entering the store (meaning that something was about
to happen), defendant neither protested nor withdrew from their
common enterprise. To the contrary, defendant went along with
the plan and acted as a lookout.
	Further, defendant testified that after the first victim was shot,
defendant helped Aguilar chase the second victim into the back
room and watched as Aguilar attempted to shoot her. Even though
the gun jammed, providing defendant with an opportunity to
protest Aguilar's actions or withdraw from any further
involvement, defendant chose to remain at Aguilar's side as he
cleared the gun and then shot the victim on his second attempt.
Defendant then helped Aguilar take trays of jewelry from the store
to Patty's apartment. When she told them to leave, defendant
retrieved Patty's car, which was parked in front of the jewelry
store. During this time, defendant engaged a police officer in
conversation. Although the conversation presented defendant with
the opportunity to admit his involvement in the crimes and to seek
protection from Aguilar because of defendant's fear for his own
safety, he did not do so. Rather, the evidence reveals that
defendant, on his own initiative, suggested that both he and
Aguilar seek refuge at the home of defendant's sister. If, as
defendant suggests here on appeal, he was unaware that Aguilar
would use lethal force, it is highly unlikely that defendant would
subject his sister and her family to possible harm by bringing
Aguilar, who was still armed, into their home. Finally, the
evidence reveals that two men split the robbery proceeds as soon
as they had successfully evaded police.
	Under section 9-1(b)(3), the sentencing judge had to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the deaths were "the result of
either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts
which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another." The evidence that I have outlined above, at
the very least, establishes that defendant knew that the acts would
cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm. This conclusion is especially true under the standard of
review here, which requires that the evidence be examined in a
light most favorable to the prosecution.
	I believe the foregoing analysis is more responsive to
defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim than that offered by
the court today. The court rejects defendant's mens rea contention,
noting that, at the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury returned
a general verdict finding defendant guilty of the murders of Chang
and Myung Choi. According to the court, these general verdicts
raise a presumption that the jury found defendant guilty of
intentional murder. Therefore, "since the jury's verdict
encompassed the necessary intent to find defendant eligible for the
death penalty under the multiple murder aggravating factor, the
trial court was not required to make additional findings regarding
defendant's mental state when it entered defendant's jury verdict
forms into evidence, and trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to raise this issue because defendant suffered no prejudice
as a result." Slip op. at 22.
	I find the court's use of the presumption, as described above,
troublesome on many levels. As an initial matter, it now appears
that every general verdict returned by a jury at the conclusion of
the guilt phase is, for purposes of death penalty eligibility,
automatically transmuted into a finding that the defendant is guilty
of intentional murder. This type of practice in cases in which the
death penalty has been imposed is, in my view, unwise. Where the
ultimate penalty is to be imposed, this court should not be satisfied
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by resort to a presumption. In
this case, the most that can be said is that the general verdict
returned by the jury, on its face, fails to reveal whether the jury
found defendant guilty of felony murder or guilty of intentional or
knowing murder based on accountability for the action of Aguilar.
The verdict does not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
existence of the mens rea required under section 9-1(b)(3).
	In my view, by employing the presumption to defeat
defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the court
renders the eligibility phase of a capital sentencing hearing a
relatively meaningless exercise. In enacting the Illinois death
penalty statute, the General Assembly created a two-phase capital
sentencing scheme. At the first, eligibility, stage of the hearing, the
State is required to prove the elements of the aggravating factor,
including, where applicable, the mens rea necessary for death
eligibility. The statute allows for a defendant to present evidence
during this phase of the hearing. Therefore, the fact that a
defendant may present evidence on the question suggests that a
general verdict of guilty, in the context of section 9-1(b)(3), does
not create an irrebuttable presumption of death eligibility. I must
point out that the death penalty statute does not speak in terms of
presumptions. It places a burden of proof upon the State to prove
the elements required for death eligibility beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court today seemingly forgets that the issues to be
decided at the culpability trial differ from those to be decided for
death eligibility. Not all those convicted of murder may be found
eligible for the death penalty. The court, by allowing a
presumption alone to satisfy proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
minimizes the very real fact that the State bears anew the burden
of proving the required mens rea at the first stage of the capital
sentencing hearing.
	I also believe the court's use of the presumption, as set forth
in its discussion, raises constitutional issues that are best avoided.
This court has noted that the United States Supreme Court has
warned against the use of presumptions that absolve the State of
proving the question of intent beyond a reasonable doubt because
of the due process concerns involved. See People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133 (1998) (and federal cases discussed therein). Moreover, as
I mentioned previously, the issues to be decided at the guilt phase
of the trial differ from those to be decided for death eligibility, and
not all those convicted of murder may be found eligible for the
death penalty. A capital sentencing scheme must provide a
" 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.' "
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883, 96 S. Ct. 1909, 2932 (1976), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
313, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 392, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (1972) (White,
J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the eligibility phase of a death sentence hearing plays a
"constitutionally necessary" function by "circumscrib[ing] the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 878, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 250-51, 103 S. Ct. 2733,
2743 (1983). This phase of the hearing safeguards against arbitrary
and capricious sentencing because it reasonably justifies the
narrowing of the class of persons convicted of murder who are
eligible for the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S.  at 874-77, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 248-50, 103 S. Ct.  at 2741-42. In the past this court, too, has
echoed these same concerns by noting that "[a]ggravating factors
serve as necessary prerequisites without which the death sentence
cannot be imposed; they delineate the borderline between those
cases in which death is a possible punishment and those in which
it cannot be considered." People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 145
(1982); see also People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 544 (1992);
People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (1991). The use of
presumptions in the manner endorsed by the court today does
little, in my mind, to "delineate the borderline between those cases
in which death is a possible punishment and those in which it
cannot be considered" and amounts to little more that appellate
"rubberstamping."
	In all other respects, I concur in the opinion of the court.

	JUSTICES McMORROW and RATHJE join in this special
concurrence.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Casillas' murder conviction should not be
disturbed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be
allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Casillas' sentence of
death should therefore be vacated and he should be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1996). Because
Casillas was found guilty of murdering more than one victim, the
term of his imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996).
1.    1A codefendant, Guadelupe Aguilar, was also tried and convicted of
two counts of first degree murder for the instant crimes.