Title: Wilbourn v. Hardin
Citation: 234 So. 2d 606
Docket Number: 45745
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 1970

234 So. 2d 606 (1970) J.C. WILBOURN v. Mrs. Lorain B. HARDIN. No. 45745. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 20, 1970. Rehearing Denied May 18, 1970. Snow, Covington, Temple &amp; Watts, Meridian, for appellant. Billy R. Covington, Meridian, for appellee. JONES, Justice: Appellant suffered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County when sued by appellee for the destruction of her car by the falling of a brick wall. We are reversing and dismissing. The facts giving rise to the action cover a period of four years. In April 1964, appellant acquired title to a store building at the southwest corner of *607 Front Street and 22nd Avenue in Meridian. Immediately west was a mercantile building which was later destroyed by fire. The corner building was also damaged. Soon after acquisition of the corner building, appellant purchased the property immediately west, which was then vacant, except for debris left from the fire. Each of the two buildings had a separate wall, there being no common wall. Appellant arranged with L.B. Priester &amp; Son to repair the corner building and convert the west property into a parking lot. L.B. Priester, Jr., president of the company, held a degree in engineering, was registered as a practicing civil engineer in Mississippi and North Carolina, and had been in the construction business forty-four years. The conversion of the west property involved removing the rubble and repairing the east wall, which was next to the west wall of the corner building. This work by Priester was completed in June 1964. On April 14, 1965, appellant leased the corner building and parking lot to McRae &amp; Company for ten years, and McRae took possession. Appellee, employed by McRae, used the parking lot to store her car while working. Appellee charged in her declaration, and it was shown by the evidence, that on or about May 13, 1968, there occurred a rain with accompanying winds, and that said wall collapsed. The evidence showed that such winds were violent, and it was testified to, and undisputed, that winds do not have to blow against a wall so as to push it forward; but that in a place, such as the parking lot, with walls on the east and west side, suction created by the wind might pull the wall the other way. The lease to McRae contained this provision: This was a general agreement to repair, rather than an obligation to make specific repairs. In an effort to establish her case, basing same on negligence, appellee traveled backwards for a period of four years (during which the wall had stood) to the time when Priester was removing trash and repairing the wall. Appellee apparently relies upon two items of evidence to establish liability against appellant. The first was that Priester employed one Shumate, also engaged in the construction business, to tear down what was necessary of the wall in question. He was to leave the wall standing about 22 to 24 feet high; and Priester was to tell him when to stop. He said that when he called Priester, to ascertain whether or not he should stop, his men directed his attention to the fact that the wall was loose and would rock when pulled by hand. He said the wall was old and rotten and that "it was not safe to leave standing as it was." He did not examine the foundation. Neither did he check to see if the wall was plumb. When he reported to Priester, he was advised by him that he was going to repair the wall "to make it safe." The witness *608 did not remember that Priester agreed with him, saying, "The only thing he told me is said, `We are going to repair the wall and it will be all right. Just forget it and go on and finish my work.'" It was never reported to any city inspector. He never mentioned the matter to Mr. Priester except that one time. Although the witness claimed he knew some things that Priester did not do in making the wall safe, he could not say what Priester did do. Mr. Priester testified that the uppermost part of the wall was buckled and loose and that he tore it down below any evidence of looseness and five feet below that to get a good solid wall, roof high, for a two-story building to be built later. The original building was three stories high. Priester said that he did not leave an unsafe wall, and told what he did. Appellee argues appellant had economics in mind when deciding not to tear all of the wall down. The proof shows that the reason part of the wall was left was so it might be used, should the parking lot be covered, or another building erected to the height of two stories. The other event relied on was the testimony by appellee that she heard Priester say to Gibson Witherspoon that he had told appellant the whole wall should be razed when she and Witherspoon, who did not testify, were at the scene. Priester said he did say this, but it was after the wall fell and that he was speaking of the wall as it then was, after the collapse. This statement of Priester's was not denied, and it is reasonable to presume that it was made about the portion of the wall remaining after the fall. Presumably, appellee and Mr. Witherspoon were checking for appellee on her loss. There is no proof that appellee was in or near the parking lot while it was being cleared four years prior. Before the lease was executed, appellant went with McRae, representing the lessee, to look at the property. They went on the parking lot and saw the wall and surroundings. No effort was made by appellant to conceal anything. The lessee had the opportunity to check and examine the wall and all the property. The wall actually stood for four years without trouble, and fell only during a violent windstorm. The first Mississippi case where a suit against the landlord for damages for failure to maintain the property was considered was in 1893 and is reported as Jones v. Millsaps, 71 Miss. 10, 14 So. 440 (1893), where it was said: The next case was Rich v. Swalm, 161 Miss. 505, 137 So. 325 (1931), where the Court there wrote: In 1955 there was decided Ford v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Committee, 223 Miss. 630, 78 So. 2d 743 (1955). Ford occupied for business purposes a room rented by his employer. He was injured when a part of the glass in a window fell while he was trying to raise the sash. It was alleged that part of the sash of the window was rotten, causing the glass to fall; that there were hidden defects not known to appellant against whom the jury had found; and that appellees negligently failed to warn appellant. *610 The lease contained these provisions: Appellee denied any privity of contract or any concealment. It was appellant's contention that: This Court refused to adopt such rules and quoted with approval from 32 Am.Jur. Landlord and Tenant section 723, pages 597-598 (1937): It then cited and quoted with approval from Jones v. Millsaps, supra, and Rich v. Swalm, supra, after which it was held: In Ford, supra, it was shown that when the windows were repaired, tin was placed on the sash which concealed the defective condition. The Court stated: This window was repaired after March 1951. The appellant was injured September 4, 1951, a period of six months as compared with four years. The case was affirmed as the law of this State. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So. 2d 451 (Miss. 1966) followed Ford. The heading of this case is: There is no more than a scintilla of evidence, if that, to show any concealment or fraud on the part of appellant; and, therefore, the case is reversed and judgment here for appellant. Reversed and judgment here for appellant. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and RODGERS, PATTERSON, and SMITH, JJ., concur.