Title: PEOPLE OF MI V NETO ALAN LAYHER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116315
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116315  
NETO ALAN LAYHER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
Defendant appeals the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
affirming his conviction for one count of first-degree  
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii), and two  
counts 
of 
second-degree 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct, 
MCL  
750.520c(1)(b)(ii).1  We granted leave limited to whether the  
1The trial court sentenced defendant to twenty to forty 
years imprisonment for the first-degree CSC conviction and to 
concurrent terms of eight to fifteen years imprisonment for 
each second-degree CSC conviction.  
 
 
trial court erred so as to require reversal in allowing the  
prosecutor to cross-examine a defense witness concerning a  
prior charge for which he was acquitted.  
We conclude that the overly broad holding of People v  
Falkner, 389 Mich 682, 695; 209 NW2d 193 (1973), which states  
“no inquiry may be made regarding prior arrests or charges  
against” a witness that did not result in a conviction, is  
inconsistent with precedent and with the approach to the  
admission of evidence that we have followed since the adoption  
of the Michigan Rules of Evidence.2  We hold, consistent with  
existing precedent and the Michigan Rules of Evidence, that a  
trial court may allow inquiry into prior arrests or charges  
for the purpose of establishing witness bias where, in its  
sound discretion, the trial court determines that the  
admission of evidence is consistent with the safeguards of the  
Michigan Rules of Evidence.  
We conclude that evidence of the witness’ prior arrest  
without conviction to show the witness’ bias was admissible  
under MRE 402 and MRE 403.  The judgment of the Court of  
Appeals is affirmed and the defendant’s conviction is upheld.  
I  
Defendant, Neto Layher, was convicted by jury over his  
general denial of three counts of criminal sexual conduct  
2The Michigan Rules of Evidence were adopted by this 
Court on January 5, 1978. 402 Mich lxxxviii.  
2  
involving his minor niece, the complainant. During trial, all  
witnesses were sequestered.  
In the summer of 1996, complainant was fifteen and  
staying 
with 
her 
grandmother, 
defendant’s 
mother.  
Complainant, who is mentally slow, testified at trial that  
three incidents occurred sometime before July 5, 1996.  During  
the 
first 
incident, 
defendant 
rubbed 
complainant’s 
breasts 
and  
genitals, first over and then under her clothes, while she was  
sleeping in her grandmother’s bedroom. Complainant testified  
that she did not tell anyone because she was scared.  The  
second incident happened when she was sleeping on the floor in  
her 
grandmother’s 
room 
while 
her 
grandmother 
and 
complainant’s  
sibling slept in the bed nearby.  Defendant woke her by  
touching her over her clothes in the same manner as before.  
He left the room and then returned again, this time touching  
her under her clothes as before. Defendant asked her if she  
would tell.  Again, she testified that she said she would not  
because she was scared.  The third incident occurred when  
complainant was lying on her grandmother’s bed. No one else  
was in the room. She testified that defendant gave her five  
dollars because she was not going to tell and then took the  
money back. Defendant again began rubbing complainant under  
her 
clothes. 
 
During 
this incident, complainant testified that  
defendant penetrated her vagina with his finger.  
3  
 
 
Complainant 
and 
her 
siblings 
had, 
throughout 
their 
lives,  
been moved from the home of one family member to the next.  As  
a result, none of the witnesses were able to testify with  
specificity regarding when the children were at one home or  
another.
 For example, complainant’s grandmother testified  
that the children were not with her at the beginning of the  
summer of 1996, but, rather, were with her at the end of the  
summer.  The grandmother’s testimony was inconsistent with  
that of all the other witnesses.  
Sometime 
after 
the 
incidents 
described 
above, 
complainant  
and her two siblings went to live with Karen Byrd, the  
girlfriend of another uncle.  Complainant and Ms. Byrd  
testified that complainant told Ms. Byrd of the incidents.  
Ms. Byrd then contacted the authorities.  Soon after the  
authorities 
became 
involved, 
complainant 
and 
her 
siblings 
were  
moved from Ms. Byrd’s home to the home of Christine (Layher)  
Walton, an aunt.  
While the children were staying with Ms. Walton, Robert  
(Bob) Ganger, who was working for defense counsel, was sent by  
defense counsel to investigate the case.  Mr. Ganger testified  
that he was sent in response to a call defense counsel  
received saying that Ms. Walton and complainant wanted to talk  
to an attorney.  It was not specified who made that call.  
Mr. Ganger first visited with Ms. Walton and then with Ms.  
Walton and complainant on two additional visits. Mr. Ganger  
4  
 
became the lead defense witness as a result of these  
conversations.  
As a result of the conflict in testimony between Mr.  
Ganger and complainant, the prosecution sought to introduce  
the fact that Mr. Ganger had been tried and acquitted on the  
charge of criminal sexual conduct involving a child under the  
age of thirteen. The prosecution reasoned:  
My position is that is certainly relevant in 
this case to show bias.  Bias is very important for 
the 
jury 
to 
hear. 
And 
this 
particular 
charge . . . is necessary for the jury to hear 
about because of this particular case and the fact 
that Neto Layher is charged with a criminal sexual 
conduct.  
I certainly think that that shows bias that 
he’s going to try to assist another person who has 
been charged with the same thing he’s been charged 
with, and obviously I would believe he would think 
wrongly accused of.  
The trial court allowed the cross-examination to proceed.  The  
Court of Appeals affirmed3 the trial court’s ruling on this  
evidentiary matter. We granted leave to appeal, limited to  
whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing  
introduction of this evidence of Mr. Ganger’s prior arrest and  
acquittal.  
II  
A  
We review evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion.  
3238 Mich App 573; 607 NW2d 91 (1999).  
5 
  
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998); People  
v Bahoda; 448 Mich 261, 289; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). The trial  
court’s decision on close evidentiary questions cannot “by  
definition” be an abuse of discretion.  People v Golochowicz,  
413 Mich 298, 322; 319 NW2d 518 (1982).  However, where  
decisions regarding the admission of evidence involve  
preliminary questions of law such as whether a rule of  
evidence or statute precludes admissibility, our review is de  
novo. 
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607  
(1999).  
Logical relevance is the foundation for admissibility.  
People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 60; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).  
Logical relevance is defined by MRE 402 and MRE 401.  MRE 402  
provides:  
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
United States, the Constitution of the State of 
Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant  
is not admissible.  
As defined by MRE 401, “relevant evidence” is evidence that  
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of  
consequence to the determination of the action more probable  
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  
B  
The prosecutor introduced evidence of Mr. Ganger’s past  
arrest and acquittal of criminal sexual conduct involving a  
6  
 
child less than thirteen to create an inference of bias on the  
part of Mr. Ganger in favor of defendant. Bias is a common­
law evidentiary term used “to describe the relationship  
between a party and a witness . . . in favor of or against a  
party.  Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or  
fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.”  United  
States v Abel, 469 US 45, 52; 105 S Ct 465; 83 L Ed 2d 450  
(1984).  
In Abel, the United States Supreme Court addressed the  
issue of bias in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence  
(on which the MRE are modeled). The defendant and a defense  
witness in that case belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood, a  
secret prison gang that encouraged members to commit perjury,  
theft, and murder to protect each other.  The Abel Court  
concluded that evidence showing a witness’ membership in the  
gang was sufficiently probative of bias to warrant its  
admission.  The Court first noted that the FRE govern the  
admissibility of such evidence, but that, while the rules  
address impeachment of a witness by character evidence and  
conduct (FRE 608), by evidence of a criminal conviction (FRE  
609), and by showing of religious beliefs or opinion (FRE  
610), they do not expressly address impeachment for bias.  Id.  
at 49.  The Court concluded that possible bias of a witness is  
a permissible basis of impeachment under the FRE despite the  
omission of any express treatment of impeachment for bias.  
7  
After reiterating the nature and admissibility of relevant  
evidence under FRE 401 and FRE 402, the Court stated at p 51:  
A successful showing of bias on the part of a 
witness would have a tendency to make the facts to 
which he testified less probable in the eyes of the 
jury than it would be without such testimony.  
* * *  
We think the lesson to be drawn from all of  
this is that it is permissible to impeach a witness 
by showing his bias under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence just as it was permissible to do so before 
their adoption. . . .  
The Court explained the meaning of “bias” as follows:  
Bias is a term used in the “common law of  
evidence” to describe the relationship between a 
party and a witness which might lead the witness to 
slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in 
favor of or against a party.  Bias may be induced 
by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or 
by the witness’ self-interest.  Proof of bias is  
almost always relevant because the jury, as finder 
of 
fact 
and 
weigher 
of 
credibility, 
has  
historically been entitled to assess all evidence 
which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a 
witness’ testimony. [Id. at 52.]  
Addressing first the relevance inquiry of FRE 401, the  
Court concluded that evidence of the defendant’s and defense  
witness’ membership in the Aryan Brotherhood “supported the  
inference 
that 
[the 
witness’] testimony was slanted or perhaps  
fabricated in [the defendant’s] favor.  A witness’ and a  
party’s common membership in an organization, even without  
proof that the witness or party has personally adopted its  
tenets, is certainly probative of bias.”  Id.  Having found  
the evidence relevant, the Court then addressed whether the  
8  
prejudicial effect of this evidence substantially outweighed  
its probative value under FRE 403. The Court noted that the  
trial court had taken reasonable precautions (not permitting  
the impeachment witness to mention the gang by name, and  
giving a limiting instruction concerning the use of the  
testimony) and concluded that these precautions ensured that  
“the admission of this highly probative evidence did not  
unduly prejudice the respondent.” 
Id. at 55. 
The Court  
accordingly found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s  
decision to admit the impeaching testimony.  
We agree with the Abel Court that evidence of bias is  
“almost 
always 
relevant.”  We have consistently reaffirmed our  
observation in People v MacCullough, 281 Mich 15, 26; 274 NW  
693 (1937), that  “The interest or bias of a witness has never  
been regarded as irrelevant.” Indeed, as we note below, MRE  
611(b) states that “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any  
matter relevant to any issue in the case, including  
credibility.”  
C  
Regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning Mr.  
Ganger’s 
prior 
arrest and acquittal, the trial court reasoned:  
This is cross-examination. The Prosecutor is  
entitled to elicit information to support any claim 
that she may have that he’s biased. She certainly 
could argue on the one hand that the witness would 
be biased because he is employed, I would assume, 
by you and your client.  She could also and  
apparently seeks to do so, argue that as a result  
9  
  
of him being accused and acquitted of a crime which 
he claims he did not do of a very similar nature, 
that he is therefore biased in the Defendant’s  
favor and presumably would color his testimony to 
help the Defendant, another person who he may 
believe would also be wrongly accused of the same 
crime.  
We agree with the trial court that the evidence of Mr.  
Ganger’s prior arrest and acquittal is logically relevant  
under MRE 401.  As noted in Abel, supra at 52, “[p]roof of  
bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of  
fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been  
entitled to assess all evidence that might bear on the  
accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”  Further, the  
trial court has wide discretion regarding admissibility of  
bias during cross-examination under MRE 611.4 
Wischmeyer v  
Shanz, 449 Mich 469, 475; 536 NW2d 760 (1995). Mr. Ganger’s  
prior arrest for, and acquittal of, a charge involving the  
sexual abuse of a child supports the inference that Mr. Ganger  
would color his testimony in favor of defendant.  
Nevertheless, 
logically 
relevant 
evidence 
may 
be 
excluded  
as “otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United  
States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these  
4MRE 611 provides in pertinent part:  
(b) Scope of cross-examination. A witness may 
be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any 
issue in the case, including credibility.  The  
judge may limit cross-examination with respect to 
matters not testified to on direct examination.  
10  
 
 
 
 
 
rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.”  MRE  
402.5  We must therefore consider whether, despite its logical  
relevance, the evidence of Mr. Ganger’s prior arrest and  
acquittal should have been excluded.  
III  
On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence should be  
excluded pursuant to the “rule” of People v Falkner, as well  
as by analysis under MRE 403 and MRE 609.  
A  
First, Defendant argues that the admission of a witness’  
prior arrest without conviction violates the holding in  
Falkner. In 1973, Falkner held that  
in the examination or cross-examination of any 
witness, no inquiry may be made regarding prior 
arrests or charges against such witness which did 
not result in conviction . . . . [Id. at 695.][6]  
5As to whether Falkner is a “rule adopted by the Supreme 
Court” within the meaning of MRE 402, we need not decide, in 
the context of this case, whether that phrase applies to 
evidentiary “rules” established by decisions of this Court 
that predate the adoption of the MRE.  As the United States  
Supreme Court in Abel assumed that the “rule” concerning 
impeachment for bias existed before the adoption of the FRE 
and continued to exist thereafter, we assume, for the purposes 
of this case, that the Falkner “rule” similarly continued to 
exist after the adoption of the MRE. Abel, supra at 51-52.  
6People v Rappuhn, 390 Mich 266; 212 NW2d 205 (1973), 
relied on Falkner to hold the impeachment of a criminal 
defendant with evidence that he was previously charged with 
the same offense for which he stood trial warranted a new  
trial. Rappuhn stated that Falkner “speaks to the impeachment 
of any witness by use of an arrest record.”  Rappuhn at 271.  
In People v Sanders, 394 Mich 439, 440; 231 NW2d 639 (1975), 
this 
Court 
characterized 
Falkner 
as 
prohibiting 
the  
11  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This Court has not addressed whether Falkner precludes the use  
of evidence of a prior arrest or charge without conviction  
where offered for the purpose of showing witness bias.  
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Falkner’s holding  
was “phrased broadly,” but created an exception that would  
allow evidence of a prior arrest that did not result in a  
conviction where it “is not used to directly impeach the  
witness but to bring out the witness’ bias or interest in the  
outcome of the case.” 238 Mich App at 578, quoting  People v  
Hogan, 105 Mich App 473, 483; 307 NW2d 72 (1981). The panel  
relied on Court of Appeals cases that it characterized as  
limiting Falkner’s prohibition of the use of prior arrests for  
the purpose of impeaching a witness’ credibility generally.  
Hogan, supra, and People v Bostic, 110 Mich App 747; 313 NW2d  
98 (1981).  
Falkner speaks generally about the impeachment and  
discrediting of witnesses by use of prior arrests.7  However,  
as we have observed above, Falkner did not address the well­
impeachment of a witness’ credibility “by reference to an 
arrest which does not result in conviction.”  
7Specifically, Falkner dealt with the impeachment of two  
defense alibi witnesses with evidence of their prior 
convictions for receiving stolen property. In the course of  
conducting this proper impeachment, the prosecutor also 
questioned 
the 
witnesses, 
without 
objection 
from 
the  
defendant, 
regarding 
the 
fact 
that 
these 
convictions  
represented reductions from the charged offense of unarmed 
robbery. 389 Mich 686-687.  
12  
 
 
 
 
established authority holding that cross-examination of a  
witness regarding bias is “always relevant.” 
MacCullough,  
supra.  Because Falkner’s holding did not exclude impeachment  
regarding a witness’ bias, we conclude that an express  
limitation of Falkner is warranted and reasonable. 
As  
explained in Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 316; 94 S Ct 1105; 39  
L Ed 2d 347 (1974), quoting 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn  
rev), § 940, p 775:  
A more particular attack on the witness’ 
credibility 
is 
effected 
by 
means 
of 
cross­
examination directed toward revealing possible 
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the 
witness as they may relate directly to issues or 
personalities in the case at hand. The partiality 
of a witness is “always relevant as discrediting 
the witness and affecting the weight of his  
testimony.”  
Falkner’s 
arguably 
absolute 
prohibition 
of 
the 
introduction 
of  
prior arrests without conviction conflicts with this Court’s  
traditionally liberal view of cross-examination regarding  
witness bias. Wilson v Stilwill, 411 Mich 587, 599; 309 NW2d  
898 (1981)(“There is ‘a general canon that on cross­
examination the range of evidence that may be elicited for any  
purpose of discrediting is to be very liberal,’” quoting 3A  
Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 944, p 778 (emphasis in  
original); Hayes v Coleman, 338 Mich 371, 381; 61 NW2d 634  
(1953)(“It 
is 
always 
permissible 
upon 
the 
cross-examination 
of  
an adverse witness to draw from him any fact or circumstance  
13  
that may tend to show his relations with, feelings toward,  
bias or prejudice for or against, either party, or that may  
disclose a motive to injure the one party or to befriend or  
favor the other”).  
A proponent’s attempt to discredit a witness’ testimony  
by showing that the witness may be biased in favor of, or  
against, a party or witness, is highly relevant, particularly  
in cases like the present, where that witness is effectively  
the sole source of evidence that contradicts the accuser.  
Denying the factfinder this type of evidence undermines the  
truth-seeking process.  
We therefore hold that evidence of bias arising from past  
arrest without conviction is admissible if relevant, as long  
as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the  
danger of unfair prejudice.  MRE 403. 
Because prejudicial  
inferences may also be drawn from evidence of past arrests,  
“we instruct the bench and bar to employ the evidentiary  
safeguards already present” in the Michigan Rules of Evidence  
in determining the admissibility of a past arrest that did not  
result in conviction. VanderVliet, supra at 74.  
B  
We next apply this holding to the case before us.  In  
doing so we address the defendant’s argument that the  
admission of the evidence violated MRE 403.  MRE 403 provides:  
14  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, 
or 
misleading 
the 
jury, 
or 
by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  
Mr. Ganger’s testimony on direct examination about his  
conversations with complainant and her aunt, Ms. Walton,  
contradicted 
the 
complainant’s, and was offered by the defense  
to discredit complainant’s accusations. Most significantly,  
Mr. Ganger testified that the complainant told him that the  
defendant had not sexually assaulted her and that she had been  
threatened by the prosecution with perjury if she refused to  
testify.  
As a result of these and other contradictions, the  
prosecutor offered and was allowed by the trial court to  
pursue the following line of questioning on cross-examination  
of Mr. Ganger to impeach him:  
Q.  Mr. Ganger, isn’t it true that in 1992 you 
were charged with criminal sexual conduct first 
degree against a child under the age of 13?  
A. Yes, I was.  
Q. And you were tried for that, correct?  
A. Yes, I was.  
Q. And you were acquitted, is that correct?  
A. Yes, I was.  
Q. And you were aware when you went to speak 
to Olivia and Christine that Mr. Layher was charged 
with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree?  
15  
The prosecution’s stated purpose for the admission of this  
evidence was to establish bias that may have affected both Mr.  
Ganger’s manner of investigating the case and his testimony at  
trial.  
The defendant contends that evidence of Mr. Granger’s  
prior arrest and acquittal on charges of criminal sexual  
conduct against a child had “nothing to do” with the case  
against defendant.  We disagree. Mr. Ganger, like defendant,  
denied that he was guilty of the charges.  Conceivably, being  
wrongly accused of the same charge pending against defendant,  
Mr. Ganger would perhaps be overly vigilant in researching the  
case and consciously or unconsciously slant his testimony at  
trial.  Furthermore, the fact of Mr. Ganger’s acquittal on the  
charge lessens the prejudicial effect.  We hold that the trial  
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the  
probative value of Mr. Ganger’s past arrest and acquittal on  
the 
same 
charge 
pending 
against 
defendant 
was 
not  
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  
MRE 403.  
C  
Finally, the defense argues that admission of Mr.  
Ganger’s prior arrest and acquittal violated MRE 609.  We  
disagree. MRE 609 provides for the impeachment of witnesses  
by evidence of convictions of crimes containing elements of  
dishonesty or false statement or crimes containing an element  
16  
 
of theft with certain conditions.  MRE 609 only applies to the  
use of past convictions; it does not address the use of past  
arrests that do not result in convictions for the purpose of  
showing a witness’ bias.  We therefore reject and need not  
further address the defense argument that MRE 609 precluded  
admission of past arrests that do not result in conviction.  
IV  
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and the defendant’s conviction are affirmed.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
17  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 116315 
NETO ALAN LAYHER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
___________________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the majority that, in appropriate 
circumstances, trial courts may admit evidence of a prior  
arrest not resulting in conviction for the purpose of  
establishing witness bias. I agree, also, that neither People  
v Falkner1 nor MRE 609 bars this evidence, and that an  
analysis of whether it is admissible is governed by MRE 401  
and MRE 403.  
I write separately because I believe this Court should  
give further guidance about when prior arrests are admissible  
1389 Mich 682; 209 NW2d 193 (1973).  
to show bias. I would require that, before evidence of prior  
arrests is admitted, there must be a showing that a  
particularized bias exists.  Also, there must be a reasonable  
degree of probability that the earlier arrest caused the  
witness to be biased. Such a holding would assist trial judges  
in analyzing whether to admit evidence of prior arrests to  
show bias and protect against abusive use of arrests on cross­
examination.  
Moreover, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that  
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting  
evidence of Mr. Ganger's past arrest. I would conclude that  
the trial judge's failure to weigh the challenged evidence's  
probative 
value 
against its danger of prejudice constitutes an  
abuse of discretion. Because it appears that the error in this  
case resulted in a miscarriage of justice, I would reverse the  
Court of Appeals decision. Accordingly, I respectfully  
dissent.  
I. The Admissibility of Past Arrests 
to Show Witness Bias  
As the majority recites, evidence of a past arrest may be  
admitted, 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances, 
to 
show 
witness' 
bias.  
And, as United States v Abel states,2 proof of bias is often  
relevant because "the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of  
2469 US 45, 52; 105 S Ct 465; 83 L Ed 2d 450 (1984).  
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all  
evidence which may bear on the accuracy and truth of a  
witness' testimony."  
However, the decision to allow evidence of past arrests  
that did not result in convictions is an ominous one.3  First,  
there is a seemingly endless series of circumstances under  
which bias could be inferred. See 3A  Wigmore, Evidence  
(Chadbourn rev), § 949, p 784.  Also, as the majority admits,  
prejudicial inferences may be drawn from this type of  
evidence. See slip op at 16. Thus, the decision to admit past  
arrests should be undertaken with great caution.  
More importantly, admitting evidence of one's past  
arrests 
may 
have 
the 
regrettable effect of deterring witnesses  
from testifying.4 This would represent as significant a  
hindrance to the truth-seeking process as would a rule  
precluding bias evidence altogether.  
For these reasons, I find inadequate the majority's  
simple instruction that the bench and bar should "employ the  
evidentiary safeguards already present" in the Michigan Rules  
3See Carolina v State, 839 P2d 663, 666 (Ok Crim App, 
1992), noting the multiple concerns associated with using 
prior arrests to show bias.  
4See State v Taylor, 498 SW2d 614, 619 (Mo App, 1973) 
(McMillian, J., concurring); cf. State v Cadena, 9 Ariz App 
369, 371-372; 452 P2d 534 (1969), acknowledging that the 
potential effect of introducing a witness' prior bad acts is 
that it may discourage witnesses from testifying.  
3  
 
  
 
 
of Evidence when analyzing the admissibility of past arrests  
to show witness bias. Slip op at 16. Let it be clear that I  
agree that MRE 4015 and MRE 4036 are the guiding principles to  
be used to determine the admissibility of prior arrests to  
show bias. However, considering the significant concerns  
associated 
with 
admitting 
them, 
further 
direction is  
warranted. 
 
I would require that, before trial judges admit evidence  
of earlier arrests to show bias, they find the existence of a  
particularized bias.7  
I would require, also, that trial judges find that a  
reasonable degree of probability exists that the evidence of  
the earlier arrest caused the witness to be biased. As the  
court in Smith observed, "[i]n those cases in which courts  
5"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  
6"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  
7An example of particularized bias arises where, for 
example the accusation against the defense witness "grew out 
of the same episode which led to the charge for which the 
defendant is standing trial." See Commonwealth v Smith, 26 
Mass App 673, 678, n 1; 532 NE2d 57 (1988). See also State v  
Lewis, 328 So 2d 75, 79 (La, 1976), stating that the witness' 
bias is admissible where it is "direct or personal, rather 
than indirect or general in nature."  
4  
 
  
  
 
 
have countenanced examination about prior arrests or pending  
charges to suggest bias on the part of the witness, there has  
generally been a link between the witness's entanglement with  
law enforcement and the main case on trial." Id. at 676.  The  
court in Carolina stated that "there must be a nexus between  
the arrest of the witness and the conclusion of bias . . . ."  
Carolina, supra at 666.8  
These two directives would provide needed assistance to  
trial judges called upon to make the difficult determination  
whether to admit evidence of past arrests. More specifically,  
it would help trial judges determine the probative value of  
the 
proffered 
evidence and whether that value is substantially  
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It would also  
lessen the occurrence of unrelated collateral attacks on  
witnesses, while keeping the focus of trials on the truth­
seeking process.9  
8See, e.g., State v Moynahan, 164 Conn 560, 600-602; 325 
A2d 199 (1973), holding that there was no error where the 
prosecutor inquired about a witness' prior arrest. The arrest  
stemmed from the same investigation and involved the same type 
of criminal behavior and the same informer as that pertaining 
to the defendant's trial.  
9This opinion should not be construed as advocating a 
heightened standard for admitting prior arrests to show bias. 
The directives articulated above are not meant to be  
interpreted as inconsistent with MRE 403. Rather, they are 
given to (1) protect against misuse of this subject of cross­
examination, and (2) provide an enlightened basis for the 
trial court's determination of relevance and its decision  
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
 
 
These directives would be especially helpful where, as  
here, a witness' prior arrest is unrelated to the factual  
circumstances that gave rise to the trial at which he is  
testifying. I do not deny the possibility that evidence of an  
earlier arrest may be properly admitted in this scenario.10  
However, if the evidence creates merely a remote inference of  
bias, it should be excluded.  Compare Dardi, supra at 336,  
with Gaston v State, 451 NE2d 360, 365 (Ind App, 1983).  
9(...continued) 
whether to exclude evidence under MRE 403. In the analogous 
context of MRE 404(b) evidence, this Court has given 
directives for similar reasons. See People v VanderVliet, 444  
Mich 52, 74, 89, n 51; 508 NW2d 114 (1993); People v Crawford, 
458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), stressing that the 
relationship 
between 
the proffered MRE 404(b) evidence and the 
ultimate fact sought to be proven must be "closely 
scrutinized." In Crawford, we gave this directive in  
recognition of the fact that determining the admissibility of 
other acts evidence is often difficult. See also People v  
Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000), 
clarifying the degree of similarity required in order to admit 
evidence based on the theory of common plan, scheme, or 
system, under MRE 404(b).  
10See, e.g., State v Sweeney, 443 So 2d 522, 529-530 (La, 
1983), where the prosecutor properly inquired into the prior 
arrest of the witness.  The witness' prior arrest had been 
made by the same officers who arrested and testified against 
the defendant; United States v Dardi, 330 F2d 316, 336 (CA 2, 
1964), noting that where a prior arrest may have embittered a 
witness so as to motivate her testimony in a particular 
manner, the evidence would be relevant; Waters v State, 360 So 
2d 358, 365-366 (Ala Crim App, 1978), there was no error where 
the prosecutor cross-examined a defense witness about an 
incident where she was arrested together with defendant, even 
though the arrest was for a crime unrelated to that  
prosecution.  
6  
 
 
 
   
In Dardi, 
a 
witness, Brann, testified for the government.  
Thereafter, the defense called McCollom, who testified that  
Brann's reputation for veracity in Switzerland was "just as  
poor as it could possibly be." Id at 336. 
On cross­
examination, the prosecution asked McCollom whether there was  
an outstanding warrant against McCollom in Switzerland for  
embezzling 
$50,000. 
That 
question 
fairly 
probed 
the 
likelihood  
that McCollom harbored a bias against Brann, because Brann had  
revealed information that led to the embezzlement charge. In  
Gaston there was a prosecution for dealing in a controlled  
substance.
 A cross-examination of the defendant's alibi  
witness, Cruse, regarding Cruse's prior arrest for marijuana  
possession was found to be improper. The Court reasoned that  
there was no nexus connecting the fact of the arrest and the  
conclusion of bias.11  
This case is of the type that presents the greatest  
challenge to determining the admissibility of prior arrests.  
I believe that the steps I have articulated would greatly  
assist trial judges.  
11See also Lewis, supra at 79-80, holding that cross­
examination of a defense witness directed at whether his  
brother had been arrested for an unrelated offense was too  
remote and, thus, improper. The Court explained that any bias 
that may have resulted from the witness' arrest was "too 
remote" and involved "too collateral 
issue"
an 
be
to 
admissible on a bias theory. 
7 
 
II. The Trial Court's Abuse Of Discretion  
The majority holds that "the trial court did not abuse  
its discretion in determining that the probative value of Mr.  
Ganger's past arrest and acquittal on the same charge pending  
against defendant was not substantially outweighed by the  
danger of unfair prejudice." Slip op at 18. I disagree.  
This court reviews evidentiary decisions for an abuse of  
discretion. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 289; 531 NW2d 659  
(1995). The term "discretion" involves "'the idea of choice,  
of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between  
competing considerations.'" People v Talley, 410 Mich 378,  
387; 301 NW2d 809 (1981),12 quoting People v Williams, 386 Mich  
565, 573; 194 NW2d 337 (1972).  
Here, the trial court, over defense objection,13 admitted  
evidence of Mr. Ganger's prior arrest. It articulated its  
rationale as follows:  
All right. Well, the Court would rule that the 
evidence is relevant and it's probative and the  
12Partially overruled on other grounds People v Kaufman, 
457 Mich 266, 276; 577 NW2d 466 (1998)  
13In objecting, defense counsel argued that no exception 
to the Michigan Rules of Evidence supported the admission of 
the challenged evidence.  He urged that the evidence served 
merely to suggest to the jury that Mr. Ganger was "a bum." 
Furthermore, defense counsel argued that the evidence should 
not come in until there was a showing that "[Mr. Ganger has] 
actually got some bias . . . ."  Thus, the objection preserved 
the issue whether the prior arrest was admissible under MRE 
403. The prosecutor has not argued otherwise.  
8  
 
 
 
issue is whether or not the witness-
-
-whether a  
witness, as in all witnesses' testimony, is whether 
the witnesses' testimony is credible and should be 
believed.  
This is cross-examination. The Prosecutor is  
entitled to elicit information to support any claim 
that she may have that he's biased. She certainly 
could argue on the one hand that the witness would 
be biased because he is employed, I would assume, 
by you and your client. She could also and  
apparently seeks to do so, argue that as a result 
of him being accused and acquitted of a crime which 
he claims he did not do of a very similar nature, 
that he is therefore biased in the Defendant's  
favor and presumably would color his testimony to 
help the Defendant, another person who he may 
believe would be also wrongly accused of the same 
crime.  
It's not being offered under [MRE] 609. It's  
not being offered to impeach his credibility 
because he was convicted of a crime. It's being 
offered to show bias for a very specific purpose 
which the Court would rule is a legitimate purpose 
and it is relevant and it is material and it is  
probative and I will allow it.  
My review of the record below persuades me that the trial  
judge failed to conduct any type of MRE 403 balancing  
analysis.14 Although the trial judge discussed the challenged  
evidence's probative value and relevance, there is no  
14By 
explicitly 
weighing 
the 
MRE 
403 
factors, 
trial 
courts 
maintain the appearance of justice by showing the parties that 
the dictates of the law were recognized and followed.  It also  
facilitates 
appellate review. See United States v Johnson, 820 
F2d 1065, 1069 (CA 9, 1987); United States v Robinson, 544 F2d  
611, 616 (CA 2, 1976), aff'd en banc on rehearing 560 F2d 507 
(CA 2, 1977), stating that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (after 
which MRE 403 is modeled), was designed principally to promote 
correct factual determinations in individual cases and actual  
and perceived fairness in the judicial process.  
9  
 
 
 
indication that he considered its prejudicial effect.15  
Consequentially, 
there is nothing in the record supporting the  
conclusion that the trial judge weighed the danger of unfair  
prejudice associated with the challenged evidence against its  
probative value.16  
Therefore, I find erroneous the majority's conclusion  
that the probative value of Mr. Ganger's past arrest and  
acquittal was not substantially outweighed by the danger of  
unfair prejudice. The record establishes that the trial court  
never made a determination to that effect.17 Thus, I would hold  
15I do not suggest that trial judges must state magic 
words in order for their MRE 403 analyses to survive appellate 
scrutiny. However, there should be some indication on the 
record that the trial judge conducted the proper inquiry. 
Compare, State v Micko, 393 NW2d 741, 745 (ND, 1986), finding 
error where the record revealed that the trial judge failed to 
make the essential balancing required of him under North 
Dakota 
Rule 
of 
Evidence 
403; 
with 
United 
States 
v  
Merriweather, 78 F3d 1070, 1079, n 1 (CA 6, 1996), reluctantly 
finding 
no 
error 
requiring reversal where the record supported 
the conclusion that the district court implicitly held that 
the balance under FRE 403 favored admission; however, the 
court reiterated that district courts should make an express 
determination under FRE 403.  
16Furthermore, 
there 
is 
no 
indication 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
took any reasonable precautions to lessen the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence. Cf. Abel, supra at 55, where the 
district court admitted evidence that a witness belonged to a 
gang that required its members to commit perjury; however, the 
court prevented testimony regarding the name of the gang to 
minimize potential prejudice.  
17The majority asserts that the fact of Mr. Ganger's 
acquittal on the charge lessens the prejudicial effect. 
However, there is no indication from the record that the trial 
(continued...)  
10  
 
 
 
that the trial court's failure to do so constitutes an abuse  
of discretion. See generally Talley, supra at 387; see also  
United States v Robinson, 174 US App DC 224, 229; 530 F2d 1076  
(1976), stating that it is preferable that district courts  
perform the FRE 403 balancing analysis expressly.  
III. The Error Requires Reversal.  
My determination that the trial court abused its  
discretion would not end the matter. Rather, this Court can  
reverse because of the error only if defendant establishes  
that it is more probable than not that the error resulted in  
a miscarriage of justice. MCL 769.26. In my view, defendant  
has sustained his burden.  
Here, the only evidence of defendant's guilt was the  
testimony of the complainant. Thus, Ganger's credibility was  
key. Had the jury believed Ganger's testimony that the  
complainant stated on two separate occasions that defendant  
did not sexually touch her, defendant would likely have been  
acquitted. The effect of the evidence that defendant's star  
witness had been charged with molesting a young child cannot  
17(...continued) 
court relied on this fact in admitting the challenged 
evidence. Thus, I find this fact inapposite. See also Old  
Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 182, n 6; 117 S Ct 644; 136 
L Ed 2d 574 (1997), stating that, when reviewing trial courts' 
decisions to admit evidence of prior bad acts, "[i]t is 
important that a reviewing court evaluate the trial court's 
decision from its perspective when it had to rule and not 
indulge in review by hindsight."  
11  
 
be underestimated. Hence, it affirmatively appears more  
probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.  
IV. Conclusion  
Evidence of a witness' past arrests may be admitted to  
establish bias if, in its sound discretion, the trial court  
determines 
that 
admission is consistent with the safeguards of  
the Michigan Rules of Evidence. However, to ensure against  
abuse of this rule, I would require a finding that a  
particularized 
bias 
exists, and that it is reasonably probable  
that the past arrest caused witness bias.  
Here, 
the 
trial 
court's failure to analyze the challenged  
evidence's prejudicial effect and to compare that to its  
probative value was an abuse of discretion. Because it  
affirmatively appears that the error in this case resulted in  
a miscarriage of justice, I would reverse the Court of Appeals  
decision to affirm defendant's convictions.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
12