Title: Commonwealth v. Boger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12878
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 2020

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SJC-12878 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  INDIAH BOGER. 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 10, 2020. - December 10, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Parks and Parkways.  Municipal 
Corporations, Parks.  Words, "Public." 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Salem Division of 
the District Court Department on August 10, 2016. 
 
 
The case was tried before Randy S. Chapman, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Nicholas Matteson for the defendant. 
 
Emily R. Mello, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Indiah Boger, was convicted of 
distribution of cocaine in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a), 
and of committing the crime within one hundred feet of a public 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
park in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J (§ 32J), in connection 
with a sale of the controlled substance to an undercover 
officer.  The defendant appeals from the latter conviction, 
arguing that the Commonwealth provided insufficient evidence 
that the park at issue was "public" within the meaning of § 32J.  
We allowed the defendant's application for direct appellate 
review and conclude that, because the Commonwealth did not 
demonstrate that the area in question was either owned or 
maintained by a governmental entity, it failed to prove that the 
area in question is a "public park" for the purposes of the 
statute.  We therefore vacate the conviction of a violation of 
§ 32J. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving some details for later discussion.  As part of 
a "sting" operation, a Manchester-by-the-Sea police detective 
posted a listing on Craigslist2 stating that he was "[l]ooking to 
SKI . . . in the woods up school st."  The detective testified 
at trial that "ski" is a slang term for cocaine.  Thereafter, 
the detective received an e-mail response asking if he was 
"looking for ski."  The detective responded that he was 
interested, and the communication continued by way of text 
messaging, through which the parties settled on a price and 
quantity of cocaine for purchase. 
                     
 
2 Craigslist is a classified advertisements website. 
3 
 
 
 
The detective asked the seller to meet him in a parking lot 
close to the highway in Manchester-by-the-Sea and provided 
directions.  Sometime later, the defendant arrived in a vehicle 
at the predetermined location with two other individuals.  The 
detective approached the passenger side of the vehicle and 
handed money to the front seat passenger.  The defendant, who 
was sitting behind the front seat passenger, then handed the 
detective a plastic bag containing white powder, later 
determined to be cocaine.  After leaving the parking lot, the 
vehicle was stopped by police officers working with the 
detective, and all three individuals were arrested.3 
 
The location of the drug transaction was a parking lot for 
the Cathedral of the Pines, a recreation area, consisting of 
several thousand acres, that is open to the public.  Although 
there was testimony that some of the land within the Cathedral 
of the Pines was owned by the towns of Manchester-by-the-Sea and 
Essex, no evidence was presented as to where the government-
owned tracts were located. 
 
The defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 
one day of imprisonment for the distribution offense and two 
                     
 
3 The other two individuals were charged and tried as 
codefendants.  One codefendant was found guilty of cocaine 
distribution and of violating G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, and the other 
was acquitted on both charges. 
4 
 
 
years of imprisonment for the § 32J offense, to be served 
consecutively. 
 
Discussion.  Section 32J provides in relevant part:  "Any 
person who violates the provisions of [G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32, 32A, 
32B, 32C, 32D, 32E, 32F, or 32I,] . . . within [one hundred] 
feet of a public park or playground . . . shall be punished by a 
term of imprisonment . . . ."  G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.  Although 
the defendant does not contest the jury's finding that she was 
involved in a drug transaction adjacent to a park, she argues 
that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Cathedral of the 
Pines is a public park as required by the statute.  More 
specifically, the defendant contends that to be a "public park" 
within the meaning of § 32J, the property must not only be open 
to the public, but also be either owned or maintained by a 
governmental entity.  We agree. 
 
1.  The meaning of "public" within the context of § 32J.  
In Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357 (2019), we considered 
the meaning of "park" under § 32J.  There we cited with approval 
the dictionary definition, which described a "park" as "a tract 
of land maintained by a city or town as a place of beauty or of 
public recreation" (emphasis added).  Id. at 372, quoting 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1642 (1993).  We 
further stated that it "is for the jury to decide whether a 
tract of land is publicly owned or maintained and dedicated for 
5 
 
 
enjoyment and recreational use by the public."  Matta, supra at 
373.  Although these descriptions of a "park" included aspects 
that would also make the area "public," in that case there was 
no dispute whether the area in question was "public."  Thus, our 
inquiry was focused on, and was limited to, the meaning of 
"park" under the statute.  Id. at 372.  We now turn to the 
question of the Legislature's intent in placing the adjective 
"public" before the word "park."  See Casseus v. Eastern Bus 
Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018) ("Our primary goal in 
interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature" [citation omitted]). 
 
Just as § 32J does not define the term "park," it similarly 
does not define its modifier, "public."  We thus begin with the 
ordinary meaning of the word.  See Matta, 483 Mass. at 372, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 
(1977).  The definition of "public" includes the concept of 
"relating to, or affecting the people as an organized 
community," as well as that of being "authorized or administered 
by or acting for the people as a political entity."  See 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1836.  However, 
where "public" is used as a modifier, it typically denotes 
governmental ownership or control.  See, e.g., id. (defining 
"public corporation" as one that is "government-owned"); id. 
(defining "public housing" as "low-rent housing owned, 
6 
 
 
sponsored, or administered by a government"); id. (defining 
"public land" as "land owned by a government"). 
 
Interpreting the word "public" when used as an adjective as 
government-owned or controlled is consistent with our use of the 
term "public park" in other legal contexts.  See, e.g., Codex 
Corp. v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 392 Mass. 245, 250 (1984) 
("The Legislature first provided for municipal public parks by 
St. 1882, c. 154, 'An Act authorizing towns and cities to lay 
out public parks within their limits' . . ."); Salem v. Attorney 
Gen., 344 Mass. 626, 627 (1962) ("public park" at issue in 
city's "custody and control"); Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 
735, appeal dismissed sub nom. Pierce v. Boston, 335 U.S. 849 
(1948) ("It is settled that the ownership in and the management 
by the city of a public park . . . is subject to the paramount 
control of the [Legislature]"); Catanzarite v. Springfield, 32 
Mass. App. Ct. 967, 967 (1992) (describing Forest Park as "a 
free public park and recreational area maintained by the city of 
Springfield").  See also Smith v. Westfield, 478 Mass. 49, 50 
(2017) ("A city or town dedicates land as a public park where 
there is a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the land 
permanently as a public park and where the public accepts such 
use by actually using the land as a public park"). 
 
The Commonwealth contends, however, that a park need not be 
owned or maintained by a governmental entity to be deemed a 
7 
 
 
public park under § 32J.  Rather, in its view, government 
ownership and maintenance are merely factors that a jury may 
consider in determining whether a tract of land is a public park 
pursuant to the statute.  In essence, the Commonwealth's 
position is that a jury could find that privately owned land 
that is accessible to the public for recreation or enjoyment may 
qualify as a "public park" under § 32J.  We are not persuaded. 
 
First, "[i]t is a well-established proposition that 
criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly."  Commonwealth 
v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 167 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Kerr, 409 Mass. 284, 286 (1991).  The Commonwealth's broad 
interpretation of what constitutes a public park under § 32J 
would make the statute applicable to a greater number of spaces 
than if the area in question were required to be owned or 
maintained by the government, thereby exposing a greater number 
of defendants to enhanced penalties. 
 
Limiting the meaning of "public park" under § 32J to land 
owned or maintained by a governmental entity is consistent with 
legislative intent.  Although there is no question that the 
purpose of the statute is "to protect children from the harmful 
impact of drug dealing," Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 
163, 168 (2017), in 2012, twenty-three years after the statute 
was first enacted, the Legislature amended the statute to reduce 
the disparate impact it had on minority communities in urban 
8 
 
 
areas in its original form, id. at 168-169.  See St. 2012, 
c. 192, §§ 30, 31 (amending § 32J to reduce school zone radius 
from 1,000 feet to 300 feet and limiting time period for offense 
to between 5 A.M. and midnight).  Reading the statute broadly to 
include privately owned public spaces likely would lead to a 
similar unintended impact on those who live in urban areas.  See 
Schindler, The "Publicization" of Private Space, 103 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1093, 1114-1115 (2018) (proliferation of privately owned 
spaces such as plazas, patios, and parks that are required to be 
publicly accessible by municipal ordinances and planning codes). 
 
Further, the meaning that the Commonwealth seeks to 
attribute to "public park" under § 32J is, in essence, the same 
meaning that we previously attributed to "park" unmodified by 
"public"; i.e., a tract of land that is both set apart for, and 
open to, the public for recreational use.  Matta, 483 Mass. at 
373.  As the Commonwealth's interpretation renders the word 
"public" superfluous, we are unpersuaded that it is the correct 
one.  See Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 227 (2008), 
quoting Matter of a Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to 
Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. 353, 358 (1977) ("'every word in a 
statute should be given meaning,' . . . and no word is 
considered superfluous"). 
 
We conclude instead that, by placing the modifier "public" 
before the term "park" in § 32J, the Legislature intended that a 
9 
 
 
public park under the statute is a tract of land that is (1) set 
apart or dedicated for public enjoyment or recreational use, and 
(2) owned or maintained by a governmental entity.  See Matta, 
483 Mass. at 373. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
the judge erred by denying her motion for a required finding of 
not guilty on the § 32J charge because the Commonwealth failed 
to demonstrate that she committed a drug crime within one 
hundred feet of a public park.  To determine whether the 
Commonwealth met its burden of proof to establish each element 
of the offense charged, we ask "whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 
Here, the detective involved in the undercover operation 
testified that the drug transaction in which the defendant took 
part occurred within one hundred feet of the recreation area; 
however, there was no evidence that the defendant was within one 
hundred feet of an area owned or maintained by a governmental 
entity.4  The § 32J conviction therefore cannot stand. 
                     
 
4 Although there was testimony that some of the land 
comprising the area was "town-owned land," no evidence was 
presented as to which tracts within the several thousand acres 
10 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction on the count 
charging the defendant with the § 32J violation is vacated, the 
jury verdict on that charge is set aside, and judgment shall 
enter for the defendant.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
of land were owned or maintained by governmental entities.  
Nothing in the record demonstrated that the area within one 
hundred feet of the drug transaction was owned or maintained by 
a governmental entity, and the Commonwealth did not call as a 
witness any government official involved in the maintenance of 
the surrounding area. 
 
 
5 Given the result we reach, we need not address the 
defendant's argument that she was entitled to present an 
entrapment defense where the undercover officer chose the 
location for the transaction.