Title: Julie Ann Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc.
Citation: 2005 WI 64
Docket Number: 2003AP002164
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 2005

2005 WI 64 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2164 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Julie Ann Walberg, as Special  
Administrator for the Estate of Lucille  
Genevieve Yox, Deceased,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
St. Francis Home, Inc. and Catholic  
Charities Bureau, Inc.,  
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 120 
Reported at:  274 Wis. 2d 414, 683 N.W.2d 518 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 2, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas   
 
JUDGE: 
George L. Glonek   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Kenneth A. Knudson, Kristin M. Watson and Knudson, Gee 
& Torvinen, S.C., Superior, and oral argument by Kenneth A. 
Knudson. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Keith J. 
Peterson, Superior and David L. Weidt, Duluth, MN, and oral 
argument by David L. Weidt. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert L. Jaskulski and 
Habush, Habush & Rottier, Milwaukee; William C. Gleisner, III, 
and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee; and Jason T. 
Studinksi and Klammer & Studinski, Portage, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, and there was oral argument 
by William C. Gleisner, III. 
2005 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2164  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 276) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Julie Ann Walberg and as Special Administrator 
for the Estate of Lucille Genevieve Yox 
Deceased, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
St. Francis Home, Inc. and Catholic Charities 
Bureau, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 2, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, St. Francis 
Home, Inc. and Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., seek review of a 
decision of the court of appeals reversing a circuit court order 
that had dismissed Julie Ann Walberg's negligence and breach of 
contract claims against them.1  The petitioners contend that the 
                                                 
1 Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2004 WI App 120, 274 
Wis. 2d 414, 683 N.W.2d 518 (reversing an order of the circuit 
court for Douglas County, George L. Glonek, Judge). 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
2 
 
claims were time-barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.22.2  We 
determine, however, that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 is a saving statute 
that is not applicable to the facts of this case.  Because we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 is the relevant statute for 
calculating the limitations at issue and that the claims were 
timely commenced, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
 
¶2 
The essential facts are brief and undisputed.  Between 
March 29, 1994, and December 3, 1996, the decedent, Lucille 
Genevieve Yox, was a resident of St. Francis Home in Douglas 
County, Wisconsin.  At all material times and until her death on 
August 15, 2000, Yox suffered from Alzheimer's disease.  The 
parties agree that Alzheimer's disease constituted a "mental 
illness" for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.16.3   
 
¶3 
On August 12, 2002, Julie Ann Walberg was appointed 
special administrator for Yox's estate.  That same day, Walberg 
commenced an action for negligence and breach of contract 
against St. Francis Home, Inc. and Catholic Charities Bureau, 
Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "St. Francis").  
The claims concerned allegations related to Yox's care at St. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 We also agree with this conclusion.  See Storm v. Legion 
Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶46, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353 
("[A] 'mental illness' [under § 893.16(1)] is a mental condition 
that renders a person functionally unable to understand legal 
rights and appreciate the need to assert them."). 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
3 
 
Francis Home.  The parties agree that such claims would have 
accrued on December 3, 1996. 
 
¶4 
Among other defenses, St. Francis asserted that the 
action was time-barred due to Wis. Stat. § 893.22.  It then 
filed a corresponding motion to dismiss.  The circuit court 
granted the motion, concluding that the relevant statute of 
limitations was not two years from Yox's death under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16, but rather one year from Yox's death under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.22.  Walberg appealed. 
 
¶5 
The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit 
court.  Relying on Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 31 N.W. 705 
(1887), it determined that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 applied only to 
cases where a person dies with an existing claim that has less 
than one year remaining on the period of limitation.  Walberg v. 
St. Francis Home, Inc., 2004 WI App 120, ¶7, 274 Wis. 2d 414, 
683 N.W.2d 518.  Accordingly, it concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16 was the applicable statute for calculating the period 
of limitation and that Walberg's claims were timely commenced.  
St. Francis petitioned this court for review.  
II 
 
¶6 
This case arises in the context of a motion to 
dismiss.  When reviewing such a matter, we accept alleged facts 
and 
reasonable 
inferences 
as 
true, 
but 
draw 
all 
legal 
conclusions independently.  Tri City Nat'l Bank v. Federal Ins. 
Co., 2004 WI App 12, ¶6, 268 Wis. 2d 785, 674 N.W.2d 617 (citing 
Town of Eagle v. Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d 301, 311-12, 529 
N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
4 
 
 
¶7 
The sole issue for our review is how to compute the 
statute of limitations for a disabled person's claim when that 
person dies.  Our inquiry focuses on two statutes:  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.22 and 893.16.  Interpretation of statutes presents 
questions of law subject to independent appellate review.  Vill. 
of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI 150, ¶12, 267 
Wis. 2d 158, 672 N.W.2d 275 (citing Meyer v. School Dist. of 
Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999)).      
III 
¶8 
We begin our discussion by examining Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.22.  It provides in relevant part: 
Limitation in case of death.  If a person entitled to 
bring an action dies before the expiration of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action and the 
cause of action survives, an action may be commenced 
by the person's representatives after the expiration 
of that time and within one year from the person's 
death. 
 
¶9 
St. Francis maintains that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 is a 
statute of limitations that governs actions brought by an estate 
after the injured party's death.  Applying this interpretation 
to the present case, it contends that the statute automatically 
shortened the period of limitation for Yox's existing claims to 
one year, causing Walberg's claims to be time-barred.  Because 
the death occurred on August 15, 2000, St. Francis asserts that 
the action must have been commenced within one year of that 
date. 
 
¶10 Walberg, meanwhile, advances that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 
extends, rather than restricts, the time period for commencing 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
5 
 
an action of a deceased claimant.  She notes that the statute 
grants the claimant's representatives the power to bring an 
action after the time limit for commencement of the action.  
Furthermore, Walberg argues that it is unnecessary to grant the 
power to commence an action during the time limited for 
commencement of the action, for that power is already granted by 
the underlying statute of limitations.4 
 
¶11 In Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, this court examined 
Section 4234 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1878), the 
predecessor of Wis. Stat. § 893.22.5  The matter arose in the 
context of a banking dispute.  James Curran had deposited $540 
with Witter's Bank on October 6, 1869.  Curran died intestate in 
1872, and an administrator was named for his estate in 1885.  
The administrator subsequently brought suit against the bank, 
                                                 
4 In addition, Walberg notes that other states have similar 
statutes modifying the deadlines for filing an action in the 
event of the death of a party.  See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/13-209 (2004); Iowa Code § 614.9 (2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 600.5852 (2004); Minn. Stat. § 541.16 (2005).  According to 
Walberg, these statutes serve the same function of extending, 
not restricting, the time for the representatives of a decedent 
to bring an action should a claimant die within a short time 
before the expiration of the claim. 
5 The text of Section 4234 is virtually identical to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.22.  Section 4234 provides in relevant part: 
If a person to bring an action, die[s] before the 
expiration of the time limited for the commencement 
thereof, and the cause of action survive[s], an action 
may be commenced by his representatives after the 
expiration of that time, and within one year from his 
death.   
Wis. Rev. Stat. § 4234 (1878). 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
6 
 
seeking to recover the $540.  The bank maintained that Curran 
had already withdrawn the $540.  Additionally, it asserted a 
statute of limitations defense. 
 
¶12 Ultimately, the Curran court determined the statute of 
limitations defense to be dispositive, concluding that the claim 
was barred on and after October 7, 1875.  68 Wis. at 22.  In 
doing so, it examined Section 4234 and noted, "[i]t is obvious 
that this provision only reaches a case where the person 
entitled to bring the action dies during the last year of the 
term of limitation."  Id.  Because Curran died more than one 
year before the statute ran against the claim, the court held 
that Section 4234 had no application to the action.  Id. 
 
¶13 This 
court 
reaffirmed 
the 
Curran 
court's 
interpretation of Section 4234 in Palmer v. O'Rourke, 130 Wis. 
507, 
110 
N.W. 389 (1907), 
a case 
involving 
an alleged 
conversion.  The Palmer court drew upon Curran in rejecting the 
application of Section 4234 to its case.  Palmer, 130 Wis. at 
511.  It stated in relevant part: 
The death of the person to whom the right of action 
accrues does not extend such time unless such death 
occurs during the last of the six years.  In such 
circumstances sec. 4234, Stats. 1898, provides that 
"if a person entitled to bring an action die before 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
time 
limited 
for 
the 
commencement thereof and the cause of action survive 
an action may be commenced by his representatives 
after the expiration of that time and within one year 
from his death."  Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 31 
N.W. 705, limited such section to cases where the 
death of a person occurs during the last year of his 
right to commence the action.  So it will be seen it 
does not apply here. 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
7 
 
Id. 
 
¶14 Additional support for the Curran court interpretation 
is found in the annotated text of Wis. Stat. § 4234 (1889).  
That text contains a specific reference to Massachusetts Pub. 
Stats. Ch. 197, Sec. 12, and the case of Converse v. Johnson, 14 
N.E. 925 (Mass. 1888).  The Massachusetts statute is reproduced 
in the note and is very similar to § 4234, except that it 
permits a decedent's representatives two years after the 
granting of testamentary letters to commence an action and also 
contains a 30-day provision not found in § 4234.  The Converse 
case describes the purpose of the Massachusetts statute as 
follows: 
Pub.St. c. 197, § 12 cannot well be construed to mean 
that in every case the executor or administrator of a 
deceased person who was entitled to bring an action 
must bring the action within two years after the grant 
of letters testamentary or of administration.  The 
section was not intended to further limit the bringing 
of actions, but to extend the time within which they 
could be brought, when the person entitled to bring 
them died before the expiration of the time . . . . It 
was not intended by this section that the debtor 
should have a defense to which he was not otherwise 
entitled . . . .  
14 N.E. at 927. 
¶15 Although St. Francis questions the soundness of the 
Curran court's interpretation, we do not.  Examining the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.22, three preconditions are 
specified:  (1) a person dies; (2) before the expiration of the 
time limited for the commencement of an action; and (3) the 
cause of action survives the person's death.  If these are met, 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
8 
 
then the statute allows for commencement of an action by the 
person's representatives only when two further criteria are 
satisfied:  the action is commenced within one year of the 
person's death and whatever time remaining under the applicable 
statute of limitations passes.   
¶16 As the court of appeals cogently explained in its 
decision below, Curran's interpretation lies in the interplay of 
these last two criteria.  The "obvious" conclusion is that the 
statute applies only to those actions where the time remaining 
under the statute of limitations is less than one year:   
[I]f the action must be commenced within one year and 
the remaining time under the action's statute of 
limitations must have passed, then it necessarily 
follows that the remaining time under the action's 
statute of limitations must be less than one year.  
Curran's holding does not add a gloss to what is now § 
893.22, but only clarifies the peculiar wording of the 
statute and, once clarified, the holding is indeed 
obvious. 
Walberg, 274 Wis. 2d 414, ¶7 n. 4. 
 
¶17 A hypothetical example further illustrates why Wis. 
Stat. § 893.22 cannot apply to claims with more than one year 
remaining on their statutes of limitations.  Suppose, for 
instance, a claimholder died with two years remaining on the 
statute of limitations.  If Wis. Stat. § 893.22 applied, it 
would allow a claim to be asserted after the expiration of the 
remaining two years on the statute of limitations and within one 
year from the person's death.  Such a reading, of course, 
renders the statute internally inconsistent.     
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
9 
 
 
¶18 Accordingly, we are satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 
applies only when a person dies with an existing claim that has 
less than one year remaining on the period of limitation.  We 
therefore determine that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 acts as a saving 
statute, not a statute of limitations.  It provides an 
opportunity for the representatives of any deceased person to 
evaluate the potential claims and complete the procedures 
necessary to commence an action within a period of one year 
following the death of the potential claimant.   
¶19 In the present case, Wis. Stat. § 893.22 does not 
apply because Yox's claims could not have had less than one year 
remaining on their periods of limitation.  We reach this 
conclusion by examining the other statute in dispute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16.  It provides in relevant part: 
Person under disability.  (1) If a person entitled to 
bring an action is, at the time the cause of action 
accrues . . . mentally 
ill, 
the 
action 
may 
be 
commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, 
except that where the disability is due to mental 
illness, the period prescribed in this chapter may not 
be extended for more than 5 years. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of 
limitation otherwise prescribed. 
 
¶20 A review of the language of Wis. Stat. § 893.16 makes 
evident that the statute operates differently based upon whether 
the person's mental disability does or does not cease.  If a 
person's mental disability ceases, the action must be commenced 
within two years.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1).  However, if a 
person's mental disability does not cease, the period is 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
10 
 
extended for up to five years.  Id.  In either event, the 
underlying period of limitation is not shortened.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16(2). 
 
¶21 Here, the parties dispute whether Yox's death caused 
her disability to cease for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.16.6  We 
are persuaded that death constitutes a cessation of disability 
for two reasons.  First, to suggest that disability somehow 
survives a person's death would belie common sense.   
¶22 Second, precedent from other jurisdictions supports 
the conclusion that death terminates a legal disability.  In re 
Estate of Hoenig, 298 N.W. 887 (Iowa 1941) (disability on 
account of minority terminated by minor's death); Fletcher v. 
Holcomb, 45 P.2d 1053 (Kan. 1935) (incompetent's disability 
removed by his death); Univ. of New Mexico v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 
428, 430 (N.M. 1985) (citing Roberson v. Teel, 513 P.2d 977 
(Ariz. App. 1973) (tolling of statute of limitations ends upon 
death of incompetent)); Martin v. Goodman, 258 P. 871 (Okla. 
1927) (disability of minor to sue terminates at death of 
minor)).  See also Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 481 N.Y.S.2d 
539, 545 (1984), aff'd, 481 N.E.2d 245 (1985) ("toll of infancy 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, it is St. Francis's contention that Yox's 
disability did not cease when she died.  This position, of 
course, would extend the time in which Walberg had to commence 
the action under Wis. Stat. § 893.16 up to five years.  
Apparently, St. Francis advanced this argument in the hope that 
we would accept its position that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 tolls only 
the statute of limitations for living persons with disabilities, 
while Wis. Stat. § 893.22 applies to the deceased.  We, of 
course, do not.  As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 893.22 is 
inapplicable to the case at hand.  
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
11 
 
would not benefit plaintiff since the infancy disability was 
removed by [infant's] death on the date of the accident"). 
 
¶23 We therefore determine that Yox's disability ceased on 
August 15, 2000, the date of her death.  As indicated above, 
when a person's mental disability ceases, the action must be 
commenced within two years.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1).   However, 
this rule is not without its qualifications.  To begin, the 
underlying period of limitation still cannot be extended more 
than five years.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1).  Moreover, the 
underlying period of limitation cannot be shortened.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16(2). 
 
¶24 In this case, Yox's claims were for negligence and 
breach of contract.  The parties agree that both causes of 
action accrued on December 3, 1996.  Under Wis. Stat. § 893.54, 
she had three years to bring her negligence action.  Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. 893.43, she had six years to bring her contract 
action.  Had Yox not died, her underlying periods of limitation 
would have extended for up to five years pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16(1).  She therefore would have had until December 3, 
2004, to bring the negligence action and until December 3, 2007, 
to bring the contract action.  Under either calculation Wis. 
Stat. § 893.22 cannot apply, for the claims were not in the 
final year of their limitation period as of August 15, 2000, the 
date of Yox's death. 
 
¶25 Because death ceased the disability on August 15, 
2000, pursuant to § 893.16(1), Walberg had until August 15, 
2002, to commence the negligence action on behalf of Yox.  
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
12 
 
However, as to the contract cause of action, she was not 
required to commence the action by August 15, 2002.  This is 
because § 893.16(2) provides that the underlying period of 
limitation cannot be shortened.  Because the cause of action 
accrued on December 3, 1996, the underlying six-year period of 
limitation extended until December 2002.  Thus, because Walberg 
brought suit August 12, 2002, we conclude that both claims were 
timely commenced. 
 
¶26 In sum, we determine that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 is a 
saving statute that is not applicable to the facts of this case.  
Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.16 is the relevant 
statute for calculating the limitations at issue and that the 
claims were timely commenced, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2003AP2164   
 
 
 
1