Title: Johnson v. Raviotta
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 012009
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
OSCAR JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF CYNTHIA Y. BELL, 
DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 012009    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 7, 2002 
JOSEPH JOHN RAVIOTTA, M.D., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 
Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal from an adverse judgment in a medical 
malpractice case, Oscar Johnson, administrator of the estate of 
Cynthia Y. Bell, claims that certain evidence did not meet the 
corroboration requirements of Code § 8.01-397 as a matter of 
law and, therefore, the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury on corroboration and in allowing the jury to consider such 
evidence. 
I.  FACTS 
 
Dr. Joseph John Raviotta provided prenatal care to Cynthia 
Y. Bell in the summer and fall of 1997.  On November 9, 1997, 
Ms. Bell, then 30 weeks pregnant, arrived at the emergency room 
of Community Memorial Healthcenter (the Hospital) complaining 
of gastrointestinal upset, vomiting, and abdominal cramping.  
The emergency room physician diagnosed her condition as a 
urinary tract infection and referred her to Dr. Raviotta for 
further care. 
 
The next day, November 10, Ms. Bell went to Dr. Raviotta's 
office.  The office records reflect that the staff and Dr. 
Raviotta documented a weight gain of four and one-half pounds 
over two weeks, totaling a seven and one-half pound gain in 
less than a month, a three plus proteinuria (protein in the 
blood) reading, a systolic blood pressure of 146, and a 
diastolic pressure of 80.  Dr. Raviotta concluded that Ms. Bell 
had a urinary tract infection, prescribed antibiotics, and 
instructed her to return to his office in two weeks. 
 
On the morning of November 15, Ms. Bell returned to the 
Hospital and was diagnosed with preeclampsia and preterm labor.  
Preeclampsia is a disorder experienced in approximately seven 
to ten percent of pregnancies during the third trimester.  It 
involves a constriction of the blood vessels called "vasospasm" 
that produces unusually high blood pressure and is potentially 
harmful to the kidneys, liver, and the brain.  Preeclampsia is 
treated by delivery of the baby, after which the risks of 
preeclampsia recede in most patients. 
 
Dr. Raviotta performed a Cesarean section and delivered 
Ms. Bell's child at 1:41 p.m.  Ms. Bell was transferred from 
the Post Anesthesia Care Unit to her hospital room at 4:00 p.m.  
Dr. Raviotta ordered that her post-delivery care include a 
Magnesium Sulfate protocol, a treatment which prevents the 
seizures caused by severe preeclampsia.  That protocol required 
 
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administering magnesium sulfate, monitoring the patient's blood 
pressure, pulse, and respiration every thirty minutes, and 
monitoring fluid intake and output every hour.  Dr. Raviotta 
instructed that if the urine output fell below 30 cc per hour, 
he was to be notified immediately, as low urine output 
indicates that the preeclampsia is impeding normal organ 
function. 
 
Jean Lynette Fuller, a staff nurse at the Hospital, was 
assigned to provide nursing care to Ms. Bell.  Nurse Fuller's 
duties included following the Magnesium Sulfate protocol 
prescribed by Dr. Raviotta; however, Ms. Bell's chart contained 
no record, made by Nurse Fuller or anyone else, of any of her 
vital signs from the time she returned to her room at 4:00 p.m. 
until 6:00 p.m. 
 
Shortly after 6:00 p.m., Shaun Bell, Ms. Bell's sister, 
called Nurse Fuller to Ms. Bell's room.  Ms. Bell was 
unresponsive to verbal and tactile stimuli, her eyes were open, 
pupils dilated, and her blood pressure had fallen.  Nurse 
Fuller called Dr. Raviotta, informed him of Ms. Bell's 
condition, and, in response to his questions, told him that Ms. 
Bell's urine output was "fine."  Dr. Raviotta came to the 
Hospital and after checking on Ms. Bell, ordered that she be 
given blood transfusions.  The transfusions began at 8:00 p.m.  
At 11:20 p.m., Ms. Bell suffered seizure activity and went into 
 
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cardiopulmonary arrest.  Ms. Bell was resuscitated, but she 
never regained consciousness.  Ms. Bell died on December 6, 
1997.  Although the expert witnesses did not agree on the exact 
cause of Ms. Bell's death, they did agree that Ms. Bell's 
preeclampsia was a significant factor in her death. 
 
In his motion for judgment, Johnson asserted that Dr. 
Raviotta was negligent in failing to properly diagnose and 
treat Ms. Bell for preeclampsia on November 10 and in failing 
to appropriately monitor her condition on November 15.  He also 
alleged that the Hospital was negligent because its employee, 
Nurse Fuller, failed to monitor Ms. Bell's vital signs and 
urine output as ordered by Dr. Raviotta on November 15.  These 
instances of negligence, Johnson alleged, were direct and 
proximate causes of Ms. Bell's death.  Following a three-day 
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants 
and the trial judge entered judgment on that verdict.  We 
awarded Johnson an appeal. 
II.  ARGUMENT 
Johnson's nine assignments of error relate to the 
application of Code § 8.01-397, often referred to as the "dead 
man's statute," to three items of evidence:  (1) Dr. Raviotta's 
testimony that he checked Ms. Bell's blood pressure at the 
beginning and the end of her November 10 visit to his office; 
(2) Dr. Raviotta's testimony that he checked on Ms. Bell's 
 
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condition between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on November 15; and 
(3) Nurse Fuller's testimony that she monitored Ms. Bell's 
vital signs and urine output between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on 
November 15. 
Code § 8.01-397 provides that, in an action by an executor 
or administrator on behalf of a person who is not able to 
testify, "no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of 
an adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated 
testimony."  Thus, testimony is subject to the corroboration 
requirement if it is offered by an adverse or interested party 
and if it presents an essential element that, if not 
corroborated, would be fatal to the adverse party's case.  Rice 
v. Charles, 260 Va. 157, 165-66, 532 S.E.2d 318, 322-23 (2000); 
Hereford v. Paytes, 226 Va. 604, 608, 311 S.E.2d 790, 792 
(1984).  If corroboration is required, such corroboration must 
be supplied by evidence which tends in some degree to 
independently support the element essential to the adverse or 
interested party's case, but the testimony need not be 
corroborated on all material points.  Rice, 260 Va. at 165-66, 
532 S.E.2d at 323; Brooks v. Worthington, 206 Va. 352, 357, 143 
S.E.2d 841, 845 (1965).  Corroborating evidence may be 
circumstantial evidence or come from another witness.  Id.
Johnson asserts that the contested testimony was subject 
to the corroboration requirements of Code § 8.01-397, and, as a 
 
5
matter of law, no such corroboration existed.  Therefore, 
according to Johnson, the trial court erred in allowing the 
jury to consider this evidence and whether it was corroborated. 
A.  Procedural Issues 
The Hospital and Dr. Raviotta initially assert that Rule 
5:25 precludes our consideration of Johnson's challenges to Dr. 
Raviotta's and Nurse Fuller's testimony regarding Ms. Bell's 
treatment on November 15.  Johnson did not object to this 
testimony when it was offered, but raised his objection during 
the discussion of jury instructions and during his motion to 
set aside the verdict.  Therefore, the Hospital and Dr. 
Raviotta argue that these objections were not timely made and 
consequently were not preserved for appeal under Rule 5:25. 
The purpose of Rule 5:25 is to ensure that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule intelligently on a party's 
objections and avoid unnecessary mistrials or reversals.  
Morgen Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 67, 471 S.E.2d 489, 
493 (1996).  Generally, to satisfy the requirements of the 
rule, an objection must be made contemporaneously with the 
introduction of the objectionable evidence or at a point in the 
proceeding when the trial court is in a position, not only to 
consider the asserted error, but also to rectify the effect of 
the asserted error.  Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 773-74, 
232 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1977). 
 
6
The sufficiency of corroborative evidence under Code 
§ 8.01-397 is usually a question for the jury.  Brooks, 206 Va. 
at 357, 143 S.E.2d at 845; Taylor v. Mobil Corp., 248 Va. 101, 
110, 444 S.E.2d 705, 710 (1994).  The question for the trial 
court is whether, given the entire trial testimony, there is 
more than a scintilla of corroborative evidence upon which the 
jury may determine sufficiency.  Id.  This question may be 
unanswerable until the close of evidence because only at that 
point can all evidence be surveyed to determine if sufficient 
corroboration exists.  Johnson argued that the jury should not 
be allowed to consider the testimony at issue because it was 
uncorroborated as a matter of law.  The record shows that the 
trial court was aware of Johnson's objection before the matter 
was submitted to the jury and, had it agreed with Johnson, the 
trial court could have provided the appropriate instruction to 
the jury regarding the testimony in issue.  Therefore, we 
conclude that Johnson did not waive these assignments of error 
by failing to preserve the issue in the trial court pursuant to 
Rule 5:25. 
B.  Application of Code § 8.01-397 
Citing Paul v. Gomez, 118 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Va. 2000), 
Dr. Raviotta and the Hospital assert that the corroboration 
requirement of Code § 8.01-397 is not applicable to the 
testimony Johnson challenges regarding Ms. Bell's care on 
 
7
November 15.  In Paul, the Federal District Court concluded 
that Virginia's dead man's statute does not require 
corroboration of a party's testimony regarding certain facts if 
another interested party testified to a version of the facts on 
behalf of the decedent.  118 F. Supp. 2d at 696. 
In this case, Shaun Bell testified that she was in her 
sister's room prior to the time she summoned Nurse Fuller at 
6:00 p.m., but that she had not seen a nurse take any of Ms. 
Bell's vital signs prior to that time.  Johnson testified that 
he reached the hospital sometime between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 
p.m. and that he did not see Dr. Raviotta during that time.  
This testimony presented the version of the facts on behalf of 
Ms. Bell, and therefore, the argument goes, the testimony of 
Dr. Raviotta and Nurse Fuller regarding their care of Ms. Bell 
during these time periods was not subject to the corroboration 
requirement of Code § 8.01-397. 
The Federal District Court in Paul relied on Epes' Adm'r 
v. Hardaway, 135 Va. 80, 115 S.E. 712 (1923), which held that 
the corroboration requirement of the dead man's statute applied 
"only to that class of witnesses who were made competent for 
the first time by the Code of 1919, and that, no corroboration 
is required of those witnesses who were competent before the 
Code of 1919 became operative, and who did not then require 
corroboration."  135 Va. at 92-93, 115 S.E. at 716.  As 
 
8
discussed in Epes' Adm'r, prior to 1919, a party could testify 
without corroboration even though an adverse party was unable 
to testify, if another person, who had an interest derived from 
the person unable to testify, testified on behalf of himself or 
the person unable to testify.  Id. at 86, 115 S.E. at 714.  An 
interested party is "one, not a party to the record, who is 
pecuniarily interested in the result of the suit."  Merchants 
Supply Co., Inc. v. Ex'rs of the Estate of John Hughes, 139 Va. 
212, 216, 123 S.E. 355, 356 (1924). 
While the principle relied upon by the Hospital and Dr. 
Raviotta accurately states Virginia law, Johnson asserts that 
the disputed testimony remains subject to the corroboration 
requirement of Code § 8.01-397 because neither he nor Shaun 
Bell are interested parties under the statute.  Relying on 
Coalter's Ex'r v. Bryan, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 18 (1844), Johnson 
asserts that he is not an interested party because his status 
as an administrator "is not a pecuniary interest."  However, 
the holding in Coalter's Ex'r that the executor had no 
pecuniary interest was not a rule of general applicability, but 
a determination made on a specific factual basis. 
At the time Coalter's Ex'r was decided, any person with a 
pecuniary interest in a case was deemed incompetent to testify 
in that case.  Id. at 86-7.  The Court in Coalter's Ex'r 
recited that typically an executor is "identified with [an 
 
9
estate's] interests, and bound to assert and defend them," 
thereby vesting the executor with a pecuniary interest in cases 
involving the estate.  Id. at 87.  However, because Coalter's 
Ex'r involved a dispute between two classes of persons, each 
claiming an interest in the estate, the Court determined that 
the executor did not have a pecuniary interest in the 
litigation: 
The estate which [the executor] represents is in 
nowise interested in such a contest.  Nor has he 
himself any personal interest in it.  The 
question is, not for what or for how much, but to 
whom he shall account, and that in a pecuniary 
point of view must be to him a matter of perfect 
indifference. 
 
Id.  In this case, Johnson is the legal representative of Ms. 
Bell's estate and, as such, bound to assert the interests of 
the estate.  Unlike the executor in Coalter's Ex'r, Johnson, 
as administrator, has a direct pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of this litigation and, therefore, is an interested 
party for purposes of the statute.  Accordingly, the 
corroboration requirement of Code § 8.01-397 does not apply to 
Dr. Raviotta's testimony that he visited Ms. Bell's room 
between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of November 15. 
Shaun Bell, however, is not an interested party for 
purposes of Code § 8.01-397.  Shaun Bell does not have a 
 
10
pecuniary interest in this suit1 and we have never held that 
blood relationship alone makes a witness an "interested party" 
under the statute.  Therefore, Nurse Fuller's testimony 
regarding the care she provided Ms. Bell between 4:00 p.m. and 
6:00 p.m. on November 15 is subject to the corroboration 
requirement. 
We now consider Johnson's challenges to the testimony in 
issue. 
Dr. Raviotta's Testimony 
Johnson's expert witness, Dr. Michael A. Ross, testified 
that elevated blood pressure is a sign of preeclampsia.  He 
opined that Ms. Bell's elevated blood pressure at the November 
10 appointment, along with her excess weight gain and high 
blood protein count, should have alerted Dr. Raviotta to the 
possibility that Ms. Bell was suffering from preeclampsia 
rather than simply a urinary tract infection.  Dr. Ross 
concluded that the failure to consider the data supporting a 
diagnosis of preeclampsia and treatment of only the urinary 
infection was a breach of the standard of care.  
Dr. Raviotta testified that he took a second blood 
pressure reading at the end of the Ms. Bell's November 10, 1997 
appointment, which showed that her blood pressure had returned 
                     
1 Ms. Bell's surviving son is her sole statutory 
beneficiary under Code § 8.01-53. 
 
11
to normal.  Johnson correctly asserts that the dead man's 
statute applies to this testimony because it was given by an 
adverse party and involved an essential element of Dr. 
Raviotta's claim that the care he provided to Ms. Bell on 
November 10 did not breach the standard of care. 
There is no documentation of Dr. Raviotta's second blood 
pressure reading for Ms. Bell on November 10, and no other 
person testified that a second procedure was performed.  Dr. 
Raviotta asserts that his testimony about the second blood 
pressure measurement was corroborated by his own testimony that 
when he had a patient with an elevated blood pressure, he 
"always recheck[ed] the blood pressure at the end of the 
visit." 
Corroboration for purposes of the dead man's statute 
cannot come "from the mouth of the witness sought to be 
corroborated."  Varner's Ex'rs. v. White, 149 Va. 177, 185, 140 
S.E. 128, 130 (1927); see also, Ratliff v. Jewell, 153 Va. 315, 
326, 149 S.E. 409, 412 (1929).  However, Dr. Raviotta asserts 
that when the corroborating evidence is evidence of a habit or 
routine practice, Code § 8.01-397.1 eliminates the 
corroboration requirement of the dead man's statute.  We 
disagree. 
Code § 8.01-397.1 provides in relevant part: 
 
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A.  Admissibility.  Evidence of the habit of a 
person or of the routine practice of an 
organization, whether corroborated or not and 
regardless of the presence of eye witnesses, is 
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
organization on a particular occasion was in 
conformity with the habit or routine practice. 
 
This section does no more than establish that evidence 
showing a certain pattern of conduct is relevant evidence and, 
therefore, a court cannot refuse to admit such evidence on the 
ground that it is collateral, irrelevant evidence.  Cf. Ligon 
v. Southside Cardiology Assocs., 258 Va. 306, 319, 519 S.E.2d 
361, 368 (1999) (testimony by doctors of their normal routines 
inadmissible as irrelevant to show conduct on specific 
occasion).  The phrase "whether corroborated or not" dispensed 
with any perceived need for corroboration of habit evidence as 
a condition of admissibility.  Nothing in Code § 8.01-397.1, 
however, suggests that corroboration is not required when 
otherwise admissible habit evidence is sought to be admitted 
under circumstances that bring such evidence within the ambit 
of the dead man's statute. 
The issue before us is whether the habit evidence in this 
case, consisting only of Dr. Raviotta's testimony, can 
corroborate other testimony from Dr. Raviotta that is subject 
to the dead man's statute.  That conclusion is not affected by 
Code § 8.01-397.1.  Accordingly, because Dr. Raviotta's 
 
13
testimony was not corroborated, we conclude that the trial 
court erred in allowing the jury to consider this evidence. 
Nurse Fuller's Testimony 
Johnson asserts that there was no corroboration of Nurse 
Fuller's testimony that she monitored Ms. Bell's vital signs 
and urine output between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.  According to 
Johnson, this testimony was an essential element of the 
Hospital's defense because, as the Hospital's expert testified, 
the failure to monitor Ms. Bell's vital signs as directed by 
Dr. Raviotta, would have deprived the medical staff of 
information that would have assisted in making a timely 
diagnosis of Ms. Bell's hypovolemic shock and would have 
violated the standard of care.  Johnson asserts that Nurse 
Fuller is an interested party for purposes of the statute 
because, had liability been imposed on the Hospital due to 
Nurse Fuller's negligence, the Hospital would have been 
entitled to indemnification from Nurse Fuller.  Miller v. 
Quarles, 242 Va. 343, 347, 410 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1991). 
 
The Hospital does not dispute Nurse Fuller's status as an 
interested party for purposes of the dead man's statute, but 
argues that her testimony was admissible because it was 
corroborated.  For the reasons that follow, we reject this 
argument. 
 
14
The Hospital maintains that Nurse Fuller's testimony was 
corroborated by documentary evidence and by the testimony of 
Dr. Raviotta and Nurse Virginia Carter Frost.  The documentary 
evidence the Hospital relies upon are two patient care charts 
which indicate that Nurse Fuller administered three "units of 
care" to Ms. Bell between 4:00 p.m. and 4:59 p.m., four "units 
of care" between 5:00 p.m. and 5:59 p.m., and changed Ms. 
Bell's IV fluids at 5:00 p.m.  Nurse Frost testified that a 
"unit of care" is treatment initiated by a nurse independent of 
any physician's orders and that, in order to initiate such 
units of care, the nurse must assess the patient's condition to 
determine the appropriate unit of care.  The Hospital argues 
that this testimony and documentary evidence of Nurse Fuller's 
visits to Ms. Bell confirm Nurse Fuller's testimony that she 
assessed and monitored Ms. Bell's condition between 4:00 p.m. 
and 6:00 p.m. 
This evidence does show that Nurse Fuller had contact with 
Ms. Bell and provided care to her during the time period in 
question, but does not corroborate the specific testimony in 
issue – that she performed the monitoring required by the 
Magnesium Sulfate protocol ordered by Dr. Raviotta.  Although 
Nurse Frost testified that the Hospital practice is to chart 
vital signs when taken whether such signs are normal or not, 
the charts in evidence do not contain such notations.  None of 
 
15
the units of care recorded by Nurse Fuller recited a vital 
sign.  Nurse Frost's testimony that Nurse Fuller had to 
"assess" the patient's condition to initiate units of care does 
not indicate that such assessment included taking vital signs 
or measuring urine output as specified by the Magnesium Sulfate 
protocol ordered by Dr. Raviotta. 
The Hospital also relies on Dr. Raviotta's testimony, that 
he understood from his conversations with Nurse Fuller that she 
was monitoring Ms. Bell's condition and that Nurse Fuller's 
observation of the changes in Ms. Bell's condition led her to 
contact him around 6:00 p.m., as corroboration of Nurse 
Fuller's testimony.  This testimony, however, does not 
corroborate Nurse Fuller's testimony.2  His statement that he 
understood she was monitoring Ms. Bell's vital signs contains 
no information upon which such an assumption was based.  Thus, 
                     
2 Johnson asserts that Dr. Raviotta's testimony cannot 
corroborate Nurse Fuller's testimony because the testimony of 
one adverse witness cannot corroborate the testimony of another 
adverse or interested party.  Ratliff, 153 Va. at 326, 149 S.E. 
at 412.  However, that rule only applies when the corroborating 
witness has a pecuniary interest in common with the person 
whose testimony needs corroboration in the judgment or decree 
sought to be entered based on that testimony.  Arwood v. Hill's 
Adm'r, 135 Va. 235, 242-43, 117 S.E. 603, 606 (1923); Ratliff, 
153 Va. at 325-26, 149 S.E. at 412.  Johnson asserted that Dr. 
Raviotta and the Hospital were jointly and severally liable for 
damages resulting in Ms. Bell's death.  Testimony by Dr. 
Raviotta that formed the basis for a judgment in the Hospital's 
favor would be testimony against his pecuniary interest because 
it would leave him with the sole liability for Ms. Bell's 
 
16
it provides no independent support for the assertion made by 
Nurse Fuller that she checked Ms. Bell's vital signs during the 
time period in question and cannot be corroborative.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing 
the jury to consider Nurse Fuller's testimony that she 
monitored Ms. Bell's condition between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. 
on November 15. 
C.  Harmless Error 
 
Both Dr. Raviotta and the Hospital urge that submission of 
the testimony at issue to the jury and instructing the jury on 
the issue of corroboration were harmless error. 
Dr. Raviotta asserts that any error in the submission of 
his testimony that he rechecked Ms. Bell's blood pressure 
during her November 10 appointment was harmless because none of 
the experts limited their testimony to the second blood 
pressure reading when concluding that Dr. Raviotta did or did 
not breach the standard of care.  Thus, he contends that, even 
without the tainted evidence, there was sufficient evidence in 
the record to support the jury verdict in his favor. 
Similarly, the Hospital argues that Nurse Fuller's 
testimony was not essential to a finding that the Hospital was 
liable because her testimony related solely to the issue of 
                                                                
damages.  Therefore, Dr. Raviotta would not be an "interested" 
party for the purpose of corroborating Nurse Fuller. 
 
17
negligence and did not relate to the issue of causation.  The 
Hospital asserts that the record supports a verdict in favor of 
the Hospital on the issue of causation "separate and apart" 
from Nurse Fuller's testimony. 
Both these arguments overlook the principle recently 
reiterated by this Court in Tashman v. Gibbs, 263 Va. 65, 76, 
556 S.E.2d 772, 779 (2002), that where evidence and an 
instruction have erroneously been submitted to the jury and the 
record does not reflect whether such evidence and instruction 
formed the basis of the jury's verdict, we must presume that 
the jury relied on such evidence and instruction in making its 
decision.  See also, Ponirakis v. Choi, 262 Va. 119, 126, 546 
S.E.2d 707, 711-12 (2001); Rosen v. Greifenberger, 257 Va. 373, 
381, 513 S.E.2d 861, 865 (1999); Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 
249, 254, 462 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1995).  Consequently, we must 
reverse and remand the matter for a new trial 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, for the reasons stated, we conclude that 
Johnson's assignments of error are not precluded by Rule 5:25, 
that Shaun Bell is not an interested party for the purpose of 
Code § 8.01-397, that the corroboration requirements of Code 
§ 8.01-397 are not abrogated by Code § 8.01-397.1, that Code 
§ 8.01-397 applied to the testimony of Dr. Raviotta regarding 
the November 10 office visit and of Nurse Fuller regarding care 
 
18
given Ms. Bell on November 15, that such testimony, as a matter 
of law, was not corroborated as required by that statute, that 
the trial court erred in submitting that testimony and the 
issue of corroboration of such testimony to the jury, and that 
such error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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