Title: State v. B. W.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022AP001329
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2024

2024 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP1329 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to    
B. W., a person under the age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
B. W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 19, 2024   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee  
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen R. Brostrom   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and PROTASIEWICZ, 
JJ., joined except ¶¶65-67.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which PROTASIEWICZ, 
J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Christopher D. Sobic, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Christopher D. Sobic, assistant 
state public defender.   
 
 
 
2 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Jenni Spies Karas, assistant district attorney. There was an 
oral argument by Jenni Spies Karas, assistant district attorney. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Courtney L.A. 
Roelandts, and The Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, INC., 
Milwaukee. 
There 
was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Courtney 
L.A. 
Roelandts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2022AP1329 
(L.C. No. 2021TP102) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
B.W., a person under the age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
B.W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and PROTASIEWICZ, 
JJ., joined except ¶¶65-67.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which PROTASIEWICZ, 
J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. B.W., 
No. 2022AP1329, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
2 
 
2023), affirming the circuit court1 orders terminating B.W.'s 
parental rights and denying B.W.'s post-disposition motion to 
withdraw his no-contest plea.  We accepted B.W.'s petition to 
review the court of appeals' decision.  We affirm the court of 
appeals.   
¶2 
This petition concerns the following two issues: 
1) 
When a parent in a termination of parental 
rights case enters a no contest plea to grounds, is 
the circuit court's plea colloquy defective if it 
informs the parent of the best interest[s] standard 
but miscommunicates the burden of proof it is required 
to apply at disposition?  
2) 
Did the circuit court improperly rely on the 
adoptive parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. 
to continue to visit with his son in deciding to 
terminate his parental rights? 
¶3 
B.W. argues that the plea colloquy is defective 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
miscommunicated 
that 
a 
clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing burden of proof applied not only to 
the grounds phase but also to the disposition phase.  He argues 
that the burden of proof is a trial right and when the court 
described 
B.W.'s 
rights 
at 
the 
grounds 
phase 
and 
then 
incorrectly advised B.W. that he would have "all those same 
trial rights" at disposition, the court misinformed him that 
this heightened burden of proof, rather than the "best interests 
of the child" standard, would apply at disposition.  B.W. argues 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom presided over B.W.'s plea 
and dispositional hearing and entered the orders terminating 
B.W.'s parental rights.  The Honorable Joseph R. Wall presided 
over B.W.'s post-disposition motion hearing and issued the 
orders denying the motion.  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
3 
 
that because of this miscommunication, he was not properly 
advised about the potential ramifications of pleading no contest 
to grounds.  In other words, B.W. avers that the court 
misadvised that the State would be held "to the higher burden of 
proof that termination was clearly and convincingly in his son's 
best interest."  B.W. also argues that at disposition, the 
circuit court improperly relied on the proposed adoptive 
parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. to continue to 
visit and "co-parent" Bob.2   
¶4 
We conclude that B.W. failed to make a prima facie 
showing that the plea colloquy was defective.  At the plea 
hearing, the circuit court properly informed B.W. that the 
prevailing 
factor 
at 
disposition 
is 
the 
statutory 
standard:  "The best interests of the child."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2) (2021-22).3   
¶5 
We also conclude that at disposition, the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by relying on 
the proposed adoptive parent's testimony that post-termination, 
she would allow B.W. to continue to visit with Bob and that they 
would "co-parent."  The court did not fail to consider that this 
testimony was an "unenforceable promise," nor did the court 
"hinge" termination on this testimony.  The circuit court 
                                                 
2 "Bob" is a pseudonym which the court of appeals used in 
referring to B.W.'s son, since B.W. and his son share the same 
initials.  For sake of consistency and clarity, we will likewise 
use "Bob" to refer to B.W.'s son in this opinion. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
4 
 
properly exercised its discretion, considering the testimony and 
weighing the statutory dispositional factors of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3). 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.4 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶7 
Termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases, governed 
by the Wisconsin Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48, follow a 
bifurcated procedure.  At the initial stage, the grounds phase, 
it is the State's burden to prove the grounds by clear and 
convincing evidence.5  Wis. Stat. § 48.31; see also Evelyn C.R. 
v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶¶21-22, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 
N.W.2d 768; Waukesha Cnty. Dep't Soc. Servs. v. C.E.W., 124 
Wis. 2d 47, 60, 368 N.W.2d 47 (1985).  If "grounds" are proven, 
then the court proceeds to the dispositional stage.  At the 
dispositional phase, "the best interests of the child" shall be 
the prevailing factor.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2); Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶23; State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶¶33-34, 234 
Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475.  In considering the best interests 
                                                 
4 We decline to address the burden of proof issue in the 
majority opinion.   
5 We recognize that Wis. Stat. § 48.31 uses the language 
"clear and convincing evidence" to describe the State's burden 
of proof at the grounds phase.  We also recognize that the 
circuit 
court 
consistently 
used 
the 
language 
"clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing" when describing that same burden.  
No challenge is being made to the court's use of "satisfactory." 
For purposes of this opinion, we use the "clear and convincing" 
language when referring to the statute, and the language the 
court used when quoting the circuit court.  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
5 
 
of the child, "the court shall consider but not be limited to" 
(emphasis added) the following factors: 
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after 
termination. 
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the 
time of the disposition and, if applicable, at the 
time the child was removed from the home. 
(c) Whether 
the 
child 
has 
substantial 
relationships with the parent or other family members, 
and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever 
these relationships. 
(d) The wishes of the child. 
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent 
from the child. 
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into 
a more stable and permanent family relationship as a 
result of the termination, taking into account the 
conditions of the child's current placement, the 
likelihood of future placements and the results of 
prior placements. 
 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
6 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)6 
¶8 
The State filed a TPR petition seeking to terminate 
B.W.'s parental rights to Bob.  In its petition, the State 
alleged two grounds for termination:  (1) that Bob was a child 
in continuing need of protection or services ("CHIPS"), and (2) 
that B.W. failed to assume parental responsibility.  The State 
alleged that B.W. failed to comply with the conditions of return 
for Bob, including but not limited to, a failure to attend 
mental health appointments, control his substance use disorder, 
obtain stable housing arrangements, and be consistent with 
visitation.  The State also referenced numerous reports to Child 
Protective Services ("CPS"), over a four-year span, which 
alleged that B.W. and Bob's mother were engaged in repeated 
domestic violence incidents and ongoing drug use.  In sum, the 
State alleged that B.W. had "still not addressed the issues that 
resulted in [Bob's] removal."  The State sought to place Bob 
with the proposed adoptive parent, with whom B.W. shared another 
child.  
                                                 
6 See, e.g., State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶15, 234 
Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475 (agreeing with court of appeals' 
decision to remand, notwithstanding its erroneous statutory 
interpretation, because "the record indicates that the circuit 
court failed to consider all of the relevant statutory factors 
enumerated under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)") (emphasis added); 
Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 
WI 95, ¶4, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402 (concluding that the 
court 
"must 
consider . . . the 
six 
factors 
enumerated 
in 
§ 48.426(3) in determining the best interests of the child" but 
"the court may also consider other factors . . . but all factors 
relied upon must be calibrated to the prevailing standard: the 
best interests of the child"). 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
7 
 
¶9 
The circuit court held an adjourned initial appearance 
on the State's TPR petition.  The court explained the bifurcated 
TPR procedure to B.W.: 
In the first half, the court answers the basic 
question, is there a legal reason, or what we call a 
ground, to terminate your parental rights? If that 
question is answered "yes," then we get to the second 
half where the court answers the question, is it in 
[Bob's] 
best 
interest 
that 
the 
court 
actually 
terminate your parental rights?  
And in each of those halves, you can agree or 
disagree, you have a right to a trial. So-- 
[B.W.]:  Okay.  
THE COURT:  --turning back to that first half of 
the case where the court answers the basic question, 
is there a legal reason to terminate your parental 
rights, as I indicated, if you disagree that there is 
a reason to terminate your parental rights, you have a 
right to a trial about that.  
. . .  
[W]hether you choose the trial to me the judge or the 
jury, it's the State that has to prove by clear, 
convincing, and satisfactory evidence to a reasonable 
certainty that there is a reason to terminate your 
parental rights. 
The State would try to do that by calling 
witnesses to the stand. You would have a right to 
cross-examine them.  You would have the right to 
introduce your own evidence. You would have the right 
to use subpoenas to require witnesses to come to court 
and testify on your behalf. And you have the right to 
testify yourself or choose to remain silent. . . .  
So assuming for purposes of this explanation that 
it is found there is a legal reason or a ground to 
terminate your parental rights, as I said, then we 
would move to the second half, where the court would 
have to decide whether that's actually in [Bob's] best 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
8 
 
interest.  Again, you could have a trial about that if 
you disagree.  
Now, there's no right to a jury trial in the 
second half.  It's always just a trial to the judge, 
but all those same trial rights would rise up again. 
So it's the State that would have to prove by clear, 
convincing, and satisfactory evidence that it's in 
[Bob's] best interest that the court terminate your 
parental rights.  
And, 
again, 
it 
would 
be 
[a] 
process 
with 
witnesses on the stand.  You would have the right of 
cross-examination.  You would have the right to 
introduce your own evidence.  You would have the right 
to require witnesses to come to court and testify for 
you.  And you could testify also testify [sic] or, 
again, remain silent, again, knowing silence could be 
used against you.  
(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court then set future court dates 
for the matter.  
¶10 Several months later, B.W. pled no contest to the 
grounds phase of the TPR.  At this plea hearing, the circuit 
court advised B.W.: 
THE COURT:  Now, you understand that nobody can 
force you to plead no contest to the grounds phase in 
this case, right? 
[B.W.]:  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  You have an absolute [right] to a 
trial.  It could be a jury trial which we have set 
next week, or it could be a trial just to the Judge.  
Do you understand that? 
[B.W.]:  Yes, ma'am.  
 . . .  
THE COURT:  But either way, it's the State's 
burden to prove by clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence to a reasonable certainty that the grounds 
exist.  And the State would try to do that by calling 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
9 
 
witnesses to the stand.  They would testify under 
oath.  You would have a right to cross-examine them, 
and the right to introduce your own evidence.  The 
right to use subpoenas to require witnesses to come to 
court and testify for you.  Also the right to testify 
yourself or remain silent knowing silence can be used 
against you.   
Do you understand that by pleading no contest 
you're giving up all those trial rights to the first 
half of the case? 
[B.W.]:  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  Now, that does not mean you're giving 
up your trial rights to the second half of the case.  
And that's what we call disposition.  And at that 
hearing, the Court would have to decide if it's in the 
child's best interest to actually terminate your 
parental rights.  Does that make sense? 
[B.W.]:  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  And at all those same trial rights 
then you would have again in the second half [sic], 
it's just a trial to the Judge in the second half.  
Does that match your understanding? 
[B.W.]:  Yes.  
(Emphasis added.)  
¶11 The court then explained:  
Now, assuming I accept your no contest plea as 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, I will then take 
some brief testimony to make sure there's [a] factual 
basis for it.  And then by statute I will be required 
to find you unfit as a parent as to [Bob].  Do you 
understand I'll have to make that finding? 
[B.W.]:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  However, if I do not terminate your 
parental rights, if I do not find that to be in 
[Bob's] best interest, the termination of parental 
rights petition will be dismissed, and that unfitness 
finding will be reversed or vacated, okay? 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
10 
 
[B.W.]:  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  Now, at that second half of the case, 
the disposition, I basically have two choices.  Either 
I find it's in [Bob's] best interest to terminate your 
parental rights, and I do so.  Or I do not find that, 
and I dismiss the TPR petition.  Does that make sense? 
[B.W.]:  Yes, ma'am.  
¶12 The court verified that B.W. was not threatened or 
coerced into entering his no contest plea.  B.W.'s attorney also 
advised the court that he believed that the plea was being made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The court found that 
B.W. was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleading and 
set a date for the next proceeding.  
¶13 The court then held a "prove-up"7 to grounds hearing, 
at which B.W. and his counsel, the guardian ad litem ("GAL"), 
and Bob's former and current case managers attended.  The court 
heard testimony from Bob's former case manager which supported 
the "grounds" determination.  The case worker testified about 
                                                 
7 When, as in this case, a parent pleads no contest to the 
grounds in the TPR petition, the court "shall hear testimony in 
support of the allegations in the petition."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.422(3).  This hearing is commonly referred to as a "prove-
up."  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
11 
 
previous interactions with B.W. while Bob was in his care, and 
the services that were made available to B.W.8    
¶14 Before the court made its findings for the grounds 
phase, it first addressed B.W. and encouraged B.W. to continue 
to progress dealing with "the really hard circumstances" of the 
death of a child, death of his mom, homelessness, and drug 
addiction, in addition to his service-related PTSD.  The court 
stated:  
So, you know, I just want to let you know, I have 
[to] make my findings that the State has proven the 
grounds, but I just want to express my compassion to 
you and my respect to you for your service to our 
country.  
[B.W.]:  Thank you.  
THE COURT:  You're welcome.  So, I do think that 
the testimony does provide clear, convincing and 
satisfactory evidence of the grounds at issue here.  
¶15 The court concluded that grounds were proven:  "[Bob] 
is a child who has been adjudged to be in need of protection or 
                                                 
8 In her testimony, the case manager testified to the unsafe 
conditions which necessitated Bob's removal from B.W.'s care.  
The case manager also testified to the variety of services they 
provided 
B.W. 
after 
Bob's 
removal, 
including 
parenting 
assessments, AODA assessments, random urinalysis, psychological 
evaluation, home management and case management.  According to 
the case manager's testimony, B.W.'s level of participation in 
the provided services was sporadic.  The case manager also 
testified to B.W.'s ongoing struggles to comply with the 
conditions of return.  The case manager's concerns included, 
among other things, B.W.'s refusal to manage and address his own 
mental health diagnoses; B.W.'s inconsistency in visitation; 
B.W.'s difficulty meeting Bob's diagnosed PTSD-related mental 
health needs; and B.W.'s failure to provide Bob with a safe and 
clean home, given B.W.'s frequent experiences with bouts of 
homelessness and housing instability.    
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
12 
 
services and placed outside the of the home for cumulative 
period of 6 months or longer pursuant to one or more court 
orders containing the termination of parental rights notice 
required by law."  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.  The court also 
found that while B.W. had "made a little bit more progress," CPS 
"made reasonable efforts" to provide the services ordered by the 
court and that B.W. "failed to meet the conditions established 
for Bob's safe return."  § 48.415(2)(a)2.a.-b.  Finally, the 
court found that due to B.W.'s failure to meet the conditions 
established for Bob's safe return, Bob had been placed outside 
of the home for 15 of the past 22 months.  § 48.415(2)3.  The 
court found B.W. unfit to parent.  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the State had proven grounds for TPR by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence."9  
¶16 Later that month, the court began the dispositional 
hearing phase.  Including B.W., six witnesses testified at the 
dispositional hearing.  Three witnesses testified on behalf of 
the State:  the case manager, the former case manager, and the 
proposed adoptive parent for Bob.  Three witnesses testified on 
behalf of B.W.:  the supervised visitation worker, B.W.'s 
grandmother, and B.W.   
¶17 The proposed adoptive parent, D.D., testified first.  
D.D. is Bob's foster parent and he lives with her.  D.D. and 
B.W. are also the biological parents of another child, who lives 
with D.D.  As a result, B.W. and Bob have contact.  D.D. 
                                                 
9 See ¶7 n.5, supra.  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
13 
 
explained that before Bob was placed with her two years prior, 
she frequently saw Bob for holidays and overnight visits.  D.D. 
testified that Bob got along with her two other children, and 
since being placed with her, his behavior patterns had improved.  
D.D. further testified that she would like to adopt Bob.  The 
State asked how D.D. would feel about continuing contact between 
Bob and Bob's sibling and B.W.'s grandmother, if the court 
granted termination of parental rights.  D.D. expressed that the 
continued contact would be "totally fine."   
¶18 D.D. affirmed that since Bob was placed in her care, 
she and B.W. "talk a bit."  She stated that B.W.'s contact with 
Bob had been sporadic, but that B.W. had recently been more 
consistent, "call[ing] almost every day."  D.D. also testified 
that unlike Bob's birth mother, Bob "absolutely" talked a lot 
about B.W.  Counsel for the State asked D.D.:  
If the Court were to grant the termination 
petition today, have you given any thought as to what 
your position would be for further contact between 
[Bob] and [B.W.]? 
[D.D.]  I would still expect him to be in full 
contact.  
[Counsel for State]  At this point do you feel as 
though you have a positive relationship with [B.W.]? 
[D.D.]  I think so.  
[Counsel for State]  Is that something that is 
important to you? 
[D.D.]  It is.   
¶19 When questioned by the GAL, D.D. shared that she 
"absolutely" respected the role B.W. had in Bob's life and their 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
14 
 
relationship of father and son.  D.D. reiterated that the 
relationship between B.W. and Bob could continue "as long as 
it's safe, [it would be] fine."  
¶20 Next, the court heard from Bob's former case manager.  
The case manager testified that she had conversations with D.D. 
"about her willingness to be a long-term adoptive resource for 
[Bob]" and that D.D. "was willing because [Bob] was her 
daughter's half sibling."  The case manager also testified to 
observing Bob in D.D.'s home, that Bob "fits in really well" and 
"has a lot of playmates" with the other children in D.D.'s care, 
including his half-sister, and that Bob "appear[ed] bonded" to 
D.D., referring to D.D. as "mom."  The case manager acknowledged 
that if the court were to terminate B.W.'s parental rights, it 
was "highly likely" that D.D. would adopt Bob.  
¶21 The case manager also testified about Bob's health and 
condition at the time of his removal from B.W.'s care.  She 
stated that he "ha[d] some behavioral concerns when the case 
first came in" including a "preoccupation with death, killing" 
so he was referred for a neuropsychological assessment.  She 
said that Bob's PTSD "was related to past trauma or things he 
had witnessed within his home environment" such as the death of 
his grandmother from a drug overdose, and the death of his baby 
sister.  She said Bob was placed in play therapy after the PTSD 
diagnosis and continued to show improvement.  The case manager 
stated that D.D. "had an understanding of what [Bob's] mental 
health needs were," was "supportive" in providing Bob the 
treatment he needed, and that she had no concerns about D.D.'s 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
15 
 
ability to meet Bob's medical or mental health needs going 
forward.  
¶22 The 
case 
manager 
testified 
that 
severing 
Bob's 
relationship with his great-grandmother would not cause him any 
harm.  She noted that the relationship was not substantial and 
"he would still have contact and be able to see her."  The case 
manager testified that no harm would be caused to Bob by 
severing the relationship to his biological mother, as Bob's 
biological mother informed the case manager that "she didn't 
want to have anything to do with the court and she stopped her 
relationship with Bob."   
¶23 When asked about Bob's relationship with B.W., the 
case manager acknowledged that B.W. struggled to maintain 
consistent contact with Bob, which the case manager attributed 
to B.W.'s "drug and alcohol usage."  B.W.'s inconsistency in 
visitation "really upset [Bob]" who would "become angry if 
[B.W.] wasn't present when [Bob] thought he should be there."  
While the case manager said that Bob's relationship with B.W. 
was "substantial," she "[didn't] believe there would be harm if 
the legal relationship were severed because [she] believes that 
he will see [B.W.] outside of a legal relationship."  She 
observed that B.W. and D.D. "share a child who [B.W.] sees on a 
regular basis as well, and so I know that [D.D.] wants the 
children to see and know their dad.  So I believe that [B.W.] 
would be able to see the kids consistently."  The case manager 
testified that termination would be in Bob's best interests 
because it would allow him to "enter into a more stable and 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
16 
 
permanent family relationship" as Bob "craves stability."  She 
said Bob "talks a lot about wanting to go home and being with 
[B.W.]" but when B.W. failed to keep his promises, Bob would 
"become upset" and "get mad" and "want to stay with D.D."  The 
case manager believed that Bob "truly wanted to be in a family 
where he knows that he's not going to go anywhere."  The case 
manager recognized that B.W. "[was] on the right track and he's 
trying to make changes in his life."  However, he "has a 
longstanding history of substance abuse and drug use so I feel 
that there would be a lot more work that still needs to be 
done."  
¶24 Bob's current case manager then testified regarding 
ongoing 
efforts 
with 
B.W. 
to 
obtain 
stable 
housing, 
to 
facilitate in-home visits, and B.W.'s participation in post-
treatment programs.  She also testified that B.W. would have to 
make significant progress to move to unsupervised visits with 
Bob. 
¶25 B.W. first called the visitation worker to testify.  
The visitation worker testified that B.W. had "been progressing 
over time" in terms of completing his VA program and obtaining 
his own apartment, and that her overall summation was that 
"things were progressing and going as they should be."  On 
cross-examination, however, the visitation worker admitted that 
she had never actually been assigned to supervise a visit 
between B.W. and Bob, and that she had to rely instead on notes 
from another supervised visitation worker.   
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
17 
 
¶26 B.W.'s second witness was B.W.'s grandmother.  B.W.'s 
grandmother testified to letting Bob stay at her house and 
"taking care of him when [B.W.] was at his darkest."  She 
testified that she at one point "no longer had contact" with 
B.W., because "he was on drugs and I wouldn't allow him in my 
home anymore."  She also pointed out that she had "seen a 
change" in B.W. over the last year, that he "realized 
it . . . was time for a change."  B.W.'s grandmother also 
testified to having a "cooperative" relationship with D.D., and 
that she "would be willing to be a guardian, work in a guardian-
type position with [Bob]" or "share placement" if the court 
allowed it.  She also testified that she felt she could work 
with B.W. and D.D. to raise Bob, commending B.W. for his 
progress and D.D. for the "positive relationship" she had with 
her.   
¶27 Finally, B.W. took the stand.  B.W. testified to his 
participation in residential rehabilitation treatment and other 
parenting 
and 
anger 
management 
groups. 
 
He 
stated 
he 
participated in those groups "[b]ecause I needed to get my life 
together."  B.W. also testified that he would "love to get [Bob] 
back, love to be the father for him that I know I can be, just 
be there for him on an emotional level and physical."  B.W. 
would be willing to have his grandmother be Bob's guardian while 
he continued to improve.  On cross-examination however, B.W. 
admitted that he had been "diagnosed with alcohol dependence, 
cocaine dependence, opioid dependence, and cannabis abuse" and 
that he had had "four accidental overdoses."  B.W. likewise 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
18 
 
admitted D.D. "provided a stable, secure home for [Bob]" while 
"helping" Bob work though his struggles.  
¶28 After the testimony was concluded, the State asked the 
court to grant its petition for termination of B.W.'s parental 
rights.  In its closing argument, the State said that it "[took] 
no pleasure in making the request," but the State nonetheless 
acknowledged that it was its obligation "to assess and argue for 
what is in [Bob's] best interests, and [the State thinks] 
termination is."  The State reminded the court that "there is a 
ton of evidence about how chaotic [Bob's] life was prior to his 
removal" from B.W.'s care, including exposure to death, domestic 
violence, drug use, homelessness, and other unsafe conditions.  
Among other things, the State argued that if Bob's relationship 
to B.W. were severed by the court granting termination and D.D. 
adopting, that "when the Court looks in terms of balancing the 
nature of the substantial relationship against the risk of harm, 
[Bob is] not going to be harmed if the Court legally severs that 
relationship."  Finally, the State pointed to the fact that "as 
long as [B.W.] stays sober and healthy and appropriate, I think 
[D.D.'s] testimony that she would continue to facilitate that 
contact was very credible," and that D.D. had "continued to 
facilitate that contact [with Bob] outside of case management's 
direct involvement."  In "looking at the totality of the case 
[and] looking at all the factors," the State argued stability 
and permanency "very strongly weigh[] in favor of TPR and 
adoption in this case."   
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
19 
 
¶29 The court continued the disposition hearing to another 
date, a couple weeks later, for the remaining closing arguments.  
The GAL argued for TPR and adoption as being in Bob's best 
interests.  While the GAL recognized "B.W.'s success in AODA 
treatment," she nonetheless recommended termination of parental 
rights instead of a guardianship.  She reminded the court of the 
"horrific circumstances that existed at the time of [Bob's] 
detention" and Bob's subsequent CHIPS——that Bob's baby sister 
died in Bob's parents' care in a hotel room, a hotel room in 
which responding law enforcement found weapons and drugs, as 
well as Bob and his incapacitated parents.  The GAL argued that 
Bob "needs permanence and stability with the current placement 
where he has been nurtured and has found stability and believes 
to be a safe place."  The GAL also argued that Bob's best 
interests should be paramount even to B.W.'s commendable 
progress with treatment, and that whatever progress was made was 
"too recent to take a chance with Bob's life and mental health."  
Finally, 
in 
addressing 
the 
concerns 
about 
B.W. 
and 
his 
relationship with Bob, the GAL stated: 
[I do not] believe it's going to be harmful to sever 
the relationship because the foster parent does have a 
child with [B.W.] and has a long track record of 
allowing contact with that child and [B.W.].  Then 
[Bob] will be a part of that picture.  That 
relationship will still exist, and there's no evidence 
to indicate she would not allow it as long as it is 
safe and stable.   
Legal severance I don't believe will be harmful 
to [Bob] for that reason.  If TPR is not granted, 
reunification is not imminent.  [Bob] needs permanency 
and stability now . . . .  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
20 
 
¶30 The court then heard closing argument from B.W.'s 
attorney, who argued that her client had "demonstrated the 
complete commitment that [B.W.] has had to changing his life," 
and that the court should recognize that "what we do . . . is to 
give parents opportunities to reunite with their children if 
they're worthy."  She argued that it was "clearly in the best 
interest of the child that [B.W.] be allowed to maintain his 
parenting status," because B.W. took anger management classes 
and participated in mental health and drug addiction treatment 
programs.  Finally, B.W.'s attorney argued for dismissal because 
"there are alternatives to terminating his parental rights."  
She suggested "[p]erhaps a shared guardianship or a temporary 
guardianship" with D.D. and B.W.'s grandmother so that [B.W.] 
"could prove over time to the Court that he can maintain his 
sobriety, that this is not just something that he's done 
temporarily, but rather a permanent change."   
¶31 On rebuttal, the State argued that doing anything 
short of TPR in this case was "concerning": 
[I]n my opinion, [anything short of TPR would not be] 
in [Bob's] best interest because the uncertainty and 
the safety concern that kind of circles around with is 
there going to be another relapse, am I going to have 
to go back to a situation of housing instability or 
drug use, those unanswered questions remain if the 
Court does anything short of termination.   
If the Court chooses to grant the State's 
petition as requested, [Bob] knows where he's going to 
be.  He's going to be in a place that is safe no 
matter what, no matter if people make promises to him 
or don't make promises to him, he's safe and secure in 
a home he's thriving in. 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
21 
 
¶32 The State further expressed concern that "recovery is 
a process," so while the State "[didn't] want to diminish the 
progress [B.W.] made," he was still nonetheless "on a path to 
recovery" and susceptible to relapse.  The State concluded by 
reminding the court that it's "focus today has to be on what is 
in [Bob's] best interest as opposed to [B.W.'s] best interest."  
¶33 After closing arguments, the circuit court recognized 
that this was a case that had "a long history of parental drug 
use and then a parent who is solid in recovery by the time we 
get to disposition are really hard." The court acknowledged 
B.W.'s progress in a variety of areas,10 and stated:   
And so it's hard because I want to affirm that, 
but today's hearing is not about affirming that 
progress solely, it's also about what [Bob] needs, and 
[Bob] needs continued stability.   
Of course, relapse is always a potential.  I'm 
not saying that I think that that what's going to 
happen, but also what [Bob] doesn't need is for 
continued uncertainty about where he's going to be, 
what's his home, who is he going to live with.  
¶34 Reiterating its concern that Bob needed "stability," 
the circuit court stated that it "strongly consider[ed] transfer 
of guardianship to [D.D.]" but that doing so would keep Bob "in 
a position for continued litigation, for continued conversations 
about different configurations of his life."  The court 
concluded that Bob's PTSD diagnosis  
                                                 
10 The court referenced B.W.'s progress, that he had not 
used drugs for over five months, was engaged in recovery support 
and aftercare programs, had a full-time job, and had repaired 
the relationship with his grandmother.   
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
22 
 
is really significant.  And . . . it leaves a long 
destructive wake . . . in its path. Even after one 
gets to the point of recovery that you are, that 
destructive path continues to sort of unfold.  It has 
a momentum. 
 . . .  
[A]nd 
I 
just 
really 
think 
that 
Bob 
needs . . . the stability.  
¶35 The court further recognized: 
[G]iven that you [B.W.] and [D.D.] have a child in 
common, you guys already coparent, I'm trusting that 
you guys will continue to do so.  And as you continue 
with your stability and sobriety, the further you get 
into that the safer you'll be for overnight visits, 
for really meaningful coparenting even if the legal 
relationship 
is 
severed, 
and 
I 
found 
[D.D.'s] 
testimony to be credible that she would do that. 
¶36 The court continued:  
So in terms of my findings . . . Bob is likely to be 
adopted post termination.  [D.D.] is licensed and 
committed.  At the time of removal, [Bob] was not in 
good 
mental 
health, 
given 
the 
really 
difficult 
experiences that he had.  Today he's still working 
through those experiences, but overall he is thriving, 
and that's an important thing that the Court doesn't 
want to disrupt.  He doesn't seem to have any medical 
issues.  
I think he does have a substantial relationship 
with you, [B.W.].  I don't think he has a substantial 
relationship with the mother or any extended family 
members.  He certainly knows his great grandmother, 
but I don't think the contact was extensive . . .  
 . . .  
There's always some harm in severing legal 
relationships, but I think that harm will be mitigated 
by the coparenting circumstances that I've just 
described.  [Bob's] wishes are complex as can be 
understood, but he certainly is bonded with [D.D.].  
He is living with his half-sibling.  He's thriving in 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
23 
 
that home, and he has recognized those benefits.  He 
has been separated from his parents since 2019, so a 
significant chunk of his young life.  And most 
fundamentally, it's the stability and permanency that 
the Court is seeking in makings its decision today.11  
¶37 The court concluded, "I do order the termination of 
the parental rights . . . ."  After ordering the termination, 
the court addressed B.W. and stated: 
I will tell you, [B.W.], I agonized over this 
decision considerably, and this was not an easy 
decision.  This was a close call, but in the end I 
really think that [Bob's] need for stability is 
paramount, and as you continue to do well, I trust 
that you and [D.D.] will do the right thing for [Bob] 
to continue to have a relationship with you. 
 . . .  
I just hope and pray that this adverse decision 
doesn't knock you off your sobriety path.  
¶38 B.W. filed a post-disposition motion to withdraw his 
no contest plea to grounds for termination.  Specifically, B.W. 
asserted that the plea colloquy was deficient and his no contest 
plea "was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the 
court failed to properly explain the statutory standard it would 
apply at disposition during the plea hearing."  In his motion, 
B.W. argued: 
                                                 
11 The court considered each of the statutory factors as 
required under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) in making its requisite 
findings, namely:  Bob's likelihood of adoption by D.D., see 
§ 48.426(3)(a); Bob's age and health at disposition, see 
§ 48.426(3)(b); Bob's substantial relationship with B.W., see 
§ 48.426(3)(c); 
Bob's 
wishes 
to 
live 
with 
B.W. 
or 
D.D. 
see  48.426(3)(d); how long Bob had already been separated from 
his birth parents, see § 48.426(3)(e); and Bob's stability and 
permanency interests, see § 48.426(3)(f). 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
24 
 
[B]ecause the court told [B.W.] that he had the same 
rights at disposition that he had during the grounds 
phase at the []plea hearing in this matter, the court 
informed 
[B.W.] 
that 
the 
State 
would 
have 
to 
demonstrate by "clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence to a reasonable certainty" that termination 
of [B.W.'s] parental rights was appropriate. 
¶39 B.W. argued that "[t]he court's explanation improperly 
described the statutory standard which it was required to rely 
on at disposition, as the statutory standard was what was in 
[Bob's] best interests and not whether there was proof by clear 
and convincing evidence that termination was in [Bob's] best 
interests."  Finally, B.W. claimed the circuit court also 
misadvised him of the statutory standard it would rely on at 
disposition during the adjourned initial appearance, because the 
court told B.W. at that hearing that "it's the State that would 
have to prove by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence 
that it's in [Bob's] best interest that the court terminate your 
parental rights."  B.W. argued that since the circuit court "did 
not explain to B.W. that his son's best interests" were the 
"driving factor," the "most important factor," or even the 
"prevailing" factor at disposition, B.W. did not know that the 
circuit court would base its decision at disposition "primarily 
on what it found was in B.W.'s son's best interest," so B.W. was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his 
no contest plea.   
¶40 A different circuit court judge held a hearing on 
B.W.'s 
post-disposition 
motion. 
 
The 
court 
reviewed 
the 
transcript and permitted both parties to make arguments on the 
sufficiency or deficiency of the plea colloquy.  At the 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
25 
 
conclusion of the arguments, the court noted that the circuit 
court judge who took the plea had repeatedly  
referenc[ed] the correct standard, that being just the 
best interests of the child.  So that's a very -– I 
think that's a very direct reference as to what the 
standard is, despite what might have been in [the 
judge's] head, and we're not going to look into what 
her thought process is or what she actually believed 
was to happen at disposition.  Rather, it's what she 
communicated to [B.W.] here. 
¶41 The court found that the circuit court judge who took 
the plea had affirmatively referenced the best interests of the 
child standard at the plea hearing:   
We have not even a direct statement by the judge to 
[B.W.] that, when we get to disposition, the State 
[will] have to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that termination of your rights is in in your child's 
best interest.  . . . [S]he says it in a more oblique 
way, not directly at all, and then as I've referenced 
here . . . she emphasizes, "we're talking about the 
best interests of the child at the dispositional 
hearing."  And I think, in looking at the standard 
here and what [B.W.] needs to show, and considering 
that the rest of the plea colloquy was appropriate, 
and there was no other error in the plea colloquy, 
other than, again, this oblique reference to what 
[B.W.] may have at the dispositional hearing, I do not 
find that [B.W.] has met his burden to show that there 
was evidence here that he did not understand what was 
being said to him at the plea colloquy.  
¶42 The court concluded that the plea colloquy was 
sufficient and didn't "think there [was] anything here that 
rises to the point of really confusion or mixing up the burdens 
or overlapping the burden from the grounds phase to the best 
interests phase," but that the court's "emphasis here on best 
interests 
at 
disposition 
was 
clear 
enough." 
 
The 
court 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
26 
 
determined that B.W. failed to make a prima facie showing that 
his no contest plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, 
and denied B.W.'s motion. 
¶43 B.W. appealed.12  On appeal, B.W. also raised a second 
issue:  "Did 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion in finding that termination of B.W.'s parental rights 
was in his son's best interests when it inadequately considered 
whether severance of their relationship would be harmful?"  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that 
B.W. failed to meet his prima facie burden and was not entitled 
to 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
nor 
to 
withdraw 
his 
plea.  
Highlighting the circuit court's plea colloquy in the record, 
the court of appeals concluded:  
Thus, the record reflects that the circuit court did 
not advise B.W. during the plea hearing that the State 
would have to demonstrate by clear, convincing, and 
satisfactory 
evidence 
that 
termination 
of 
B.W.'s 
rights was appropriate at the dispositional hearing.  
Rather, the circuit court simply advised B.W. that the 
court would have to decide whether it was in the 
child's best interest to terminate B.W.'s rights. This 
complies with the statutory requirement set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2). 
B.W., No. 2022AP1329, at ¶17.  
¶44 The court of appeals further stated: 
At no point, however, did the circuit court describe 
the State's burden in the grounds phase as a "right."  
                                                 
12 The court of appeals stayed its decision pending this 
court's decision in State v. A.G., 2023 WI 61, 408 Wis. 2d 413, 
992 N.W.2d 75.  After ordering supplemental briefing from the 
parties following the decision's release, the court of appeals 
then issued its ruling affirming the circuit court's decision. 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
27 
 
The court stated that B.W. "would have a right to 
cross-examine [witnesses]," "the right to introduce 
your own evidence," "the right to use subpoenas," and 
"the right to testify yourself or remain silent."  As 
a result, based on the record, I am not persuaded that 
the circuit court misadvised B.W. during the plea 
colloquy regarding the standard that would be applied 
at the dispositional hearing. 
Id., at ¶19.  
¶45 The court of appeals concluded that the record did not 
reflect that the circuit court advised B.W. during the plea 
hearing "that the State would have to demonstrate by clear, 
convincing, and satisfactory evidence that termination of B.W.'s 
rights was appropriate at the dispositional hearing."  Id., at 
¶17.  Instead, the court of appeals determined that the circuit 
court "simply advised B.W. that the court would have to decide 
whether it was in the child's best interest to terminate B.W.'s 
rights" and that this colloquy "complie[d] with the statutory 
requirement set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2)."  Id. 
¶46 Regarding B.W.'s argument that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in relying on the adoptive 
parent's testimony, the court of appeals relied on Margaret H., 
234 Wis. 2d 606.  In Margaret H., this court concluded that 
"[i]n its discretion, the [circuit] court may afford due weight 
to an adoptive parent's stated intent to continue visitation 
with family members."  234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶29.  The court of 
appeals determined that B.W. "does not identify any language in 
the record indicating that the circuit court incorrectly 
believed that D.D.'s promise was legally enforceable."  B.W., 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
28 
 
No. 2022AP1329, at ¶27.  B.W. petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶47 The court generally employs the plea withdrawal 
framework from criminal law cases to plea withdrawals in TPR 
cases.  See Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607 ("In prior cases the analysis set 
forth in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986), relating to a circuit court's acceptance of a 
guilty plea in a criminal case, has been used to evaluate a 
challenge to the proceedings mandated by Wis. Stat. § 48.422.").  
"A plea not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may 
withdraw the plea as a matter of right."  State v. Cross, 2010 
WI 70, ¶14, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64 (quoting State v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906).  
Whether B.W. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered a 
no contest plea presents a question of constitutional fact that 
this court reviews independently.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 
(citing State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶16, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 
644 N.W.2d 891).  Whether B.W. has shown that the plea colloquy 
was deficient such that the circuit court violated its duty 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.426 is a question of law that this court 
reviews independently.  Id., ¶21.  Whether B.W. has presented a 
prima facie case by pointing to deficiencies in the plea 
colloquy and sufficiently alleging that he did not know or 
understand information that should have been provided in the 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
29 
 
colloquy is a question of law we review independently.  Oneida 
Cnty. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Therese S., 2008 WI App 159, ¶7, 
314 
Wis. 2d 493, 
762 
N.W.2d 122. 
 
Generally, 
with 
plea 
withdrawal motions alleging a defect in the plea colloquy, the 
violation "should be apparent from the record."  State v. 
Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶61, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14.  "We 
accept 
the 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical 
and 
evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous but we 
determine independently whether those facts demonstrate that the 
defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19.   
¶48 "We decide any questions of law which may arise during 
our review of an exercise of discretion independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals."  LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 
67, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789 (quoting King v. King, 
224 Wis. 2d 235, 248-49, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999)).  But "the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals benefit 
us in our independent review."  Id.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶49 B.W. argues to this court that because the circuit 
court's plea colloquy was defective, he is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing of his motion to withdraw his no contest 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
30 
 
plea.13  For purposes of making his prima facie showing that the 
circuit court violated its mandatory duties, B.W. asserts that 
                                                 
13 Counsel for B.W. acknowledged at oral argument that, for 
purposes of making a prima facie case, the focus must be on the 
circuit court's alleged mistake in the plea colloquy provided at 
the plea hearing, not the circuit court's statements at the 
initial appearance.  However, counsel for B.W. argues that the 
circuit court's statements from the initial appearance were 
problematic as well, and further bolster B.W.'s "reasonable 
interpretation of the record" which helps make B.W.'s prima 
facie case.  According to B.W.'s counsel at oral argument,  
I think the fact that the court also made this mistake 
at the initial appearance adds to the reasonableness 
of that assessment and the push toward him making a 
prima facie case.  At the end of the day I understand 
that the actual mistake has to happen at the plea 
colloquy, and for the reasons here I do think that 
that mistake did take place.    
Oral argument in State v. B.W., No. 2022AP1329, held Mar. 19, 
2024, available on WisconsinEye  https://wiseye.org/2024/03/19/ 
wisconsin-supreme-court-state-v-b-w/ (argument of Attorney Chris 
Sobic, at 27:40). 
The State "acknowledges that the trial court did misadvise 
B.W. at the initial appearance," but contends that "this same 
error was not repeated during the plea colloquy" and "expansion 
beyond 
the 
actual 
plea 
colloquy . . . would 
cause 
absurd 
results."  
Even assuming the initial appearance language is incorrect, 
the plea colloquy exchange is what we review to determine 
whether the plea colloquy is sufficient and complies with the 
statute.  See, e.g., State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 
389 N.W.2d 12 (1986); Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 
¶¶42-44, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607; State v. Negrete, 2012 
WI 92, ¶19, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749; see also A.G., 408 
Wis. 2d 413, ¶41 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (citing State v. 
Clark, 2022 WI 21, ¶¶13–16, 401 Wis. 2d 344, 972 N.W.2d 533) 
("[A] prima facie showing will generally focus on the plea 
colloquy itself to determine whether certain requirements were 
not followed.").   
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
31 
 
the plea colloquy was defective because the circuit court 
"miscommunicated to B.W. that there was a burden of proof at 
disposition."  B.W. argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing at which the State would have the burden to prove that 
B.W.'s no contest plea was nonetheless entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  B.W. also alleges that the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
at 
disposition because it "improperly relied on the adoptive 
parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. to continue to 
visit with his son in deciding to terminate his parental 
rights." 
¶50 The State contends that the circuit court's plea 
colloquy with B.W. "was not defective because it never mentions 
any burden of proof at disposition," so "B.W. was not 
misadvised" at the plea hearing.  The State asserts that B.W. 
failed to make a prima facie case showing that his plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Finally, the State 
dispenses with B.W.'s argument that the circuit court did not 
properly exercise its discretion, "as the court clearly gave 
adequate consideration of and weight to each of the factors 
found in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)," so "[t]he Court's decision to 
terminate the rights of B.W. is well reasoned and its exercise 
of discretion is proper."  Accordingly, the State asks that the 
court affirm the court of appeals' decision which affirmed the 
circuit court.   
¶51 We conclude that B.W. has not made the prima facie 
showing required to withdraw his no contest plea.  The circuit 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
32 
 
court correctly informed B.W. of the statutory standard at 
disposition:  the best interests of the child. Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2).  We further conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered D.D.'s 
testimony.  In its decision to terminate B.W.'s parental rights, 
the circuit court appropriately weighed the required § 48.426(3) 
factors, including this testimony, and determined termination 
was in Bob's best interests.    
 
A.  Plea Withdrawal 
¶52 "It has long been recognized that under the Due 
Process Clause, a defendant's . . . no contest plea must be 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered."  State v. 
Pegeese, 2019 WI 60, ¶21, 387 Wis. 2d 119, 928 N.W.2d 590 
(citing State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶15, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199 (citing another source)); Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
257; Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  "Wisconsin imposes certain statutory 
and common law duties on circuit courts to ensure that a 
defendant's 
plea 
is 
given 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily."  Pegeese, 387 Wis. 2d 119, ¶21; see also State v. 
Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶30, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482 ("The 
duties established . . . in Bangert, and in subsequent cases are 
designed 
to 
ensure 
that 
a 
defendant's 
plea 
is 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.").  "The circuit court must engage 
the parent in a colloquy to ensure that the plea is knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent."  Brown Cnty. Dep't Human Servs. v. 
Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶35, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730.  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
33 
 
"This colloquy is governed by the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.422(7) and notions of due process."  Id., ¶35; (citing 
Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶¶25, 39. 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422 outlines what a court must 
evaluate when conducting a plea colloquy in a TPR.  Before the 
circuit court can "accept[] an admission of the alleged facts in 
the petition," it must: 
(a)  Address the parties present and determine 
that 
the 
admission 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the acts alleged in the 
petition and the potential dispositions.  
(b)  Establish whether any promises or threats 
were made to elicit an admission and alert all 
unrepresented parties to the possibility that a lawyer 
may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances 
which would not be apparent to them. 
(bm)  Establish 
whether 
a 
proposed 
adoptive 
parent of the child has been identified . . .   
(br)  Establish whether any person has coerced a 
birth parent or any alleged or presumed father of the 
child in violation of s. 48.63(3)(b)5.  Upon a finding 
of coercion, the court shall dismiss the petition.  
(c)  Make such inquiries as satisfactorily establish 
that there is a factual basis for the admission.  
§ 48.422(7); see also Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶39; Therese 
S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶5.  
¶54 In Therese S., the court of appeals concluded:  
[I]n order for the court's explanation of potential 
dispositions to be meaningful to the parent, the 
parent must be informed of the statutory standard the 
court will apply at the second stage.  That is, the 
court 
must 
inform 
the 
parent 
that 
"[t]he 
best 
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
34 
 
considered 
by 
the 
court 
in 
determining 
the 
disposition. . . . ."  
Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶16 (emphasis added). 
¶55 The court is not required to "inform parents in detail 
of all potential outcomes" in order to ensure a plea is entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Id., ¶17.  The court 
of appeals agreed that requiring a circuit court to inform 
parents in detail of all potential outcomes would be "unduly 
burdensome."  Id.  But, "at the very least, a court must inform 
the parent" that "the best interests of the child shall be the 
prevailing factor considered by the court in determining the 
disposition."  Id., ¶16; see also Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, 
¶56.  
¶56 "In addition, the person entering the no contest plea 
must have knowledge of the constitutional rights he or she is 
giving up by making the plea."  Kenosha Cnty. Dep't Human Servs. 
v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845. 
This comports with due process.  As to due process, "whenever a 
parent wishes to plead no contest to grounds for involuntary 
termination, the parent must be provided with sufficient 
information to evaluate the stakes involved."  Brenda B., 331 
Wis. 2d 310, ¶41; see also Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶10.  
"The parent must be given sufficient information to understand 
the rights that could be lost if, during the second phase of the 
proceedings, the court decides to terminate parental rights."  
Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶41. 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
35 
 
¶57 "If the court fails to fulfill one of the duties 
mandated . . . under the Bangert line of cases (a 'Bangert 
violation'), the defendant may move to withdraw his plea."  
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶32 (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
274).  A party filing a Bangert post-disposition motion for a 
TPR plea, "must make a prima facie showing that the circuit 
court violated its mandatory duties and must allege the parent 
did not know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the hearing."  Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶6.   
¶58 As a result, B.W. must (1) "make a prima facie showing 
that the circuit court violated its mandatory duties," and (2) 
"allege [that B.W.] did not know or understand the information 
that should have been provided at the hearing."  Therese S., 314 
Wis. 2d 493, ¶6; see also Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶39; Steven 
H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  "A 
[parent] attempting to make this prima facie showing must point 
to deficiencies in the plea hearing transcript; conclusory 
allegations are not sufficient."  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶32 
(citing Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶19).  "[F]or a motion to be 
sufficient, it must allege "who, what, where, when, why, and 
how."  State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶36, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 
N.W.2d 659 (quoting State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶23, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 
682 
N.W.2d 433). 
 
If 
the 
parent's 
motion 
demonstrates a prima facie violation, "the court must hold a 
post-disposition evidentiary hearing at which the state is given 
an opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
[parent's] plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
36 
 
the identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274). 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.426(2) mandates that, "The best 
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor considered 
by the court in determining the disposition of all proceedings 
under this subchapter."  Courts are required to use this 
standard at disposition when determining whether to terminate 
parental rights.   
¶60 B.W.'s argument before us is that the plea colloquy 
was defective because the court erred when it explained that the 
"same trial rights" that applied at grounds would extend to 
disposition and the burden of proof at grounds was one of those 
rights.  He says that he believed the State's clear and 
convincing burden of proof applicable at grounds, was such a 
"trial right" that would apply at disposition.  B.W. argues that 
"the requirement that the State prove grounds by clear and 
convincing evidence is a trial right, even if the court did not 
specifically call it one," citing to Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, 
¶43 ("It is important that the parent understand that by 
pleading no contest to a ground for termination, the parent is 
waiving the right to make the petitioner prove unfitness by 
clear and convincing evidence.").  He avers this demonstrates a 
prima facie showing that his plea was not knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary so as to warrant an evidentiary hearing.  
¶61 In order to analyze whether B.W. has made a prima 
facie showing, we turn to the language of the plea colloquy.  
See State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶¶19-20, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
37 
 
N.W.2d 749 (outlining the Bangert burden-shifting procedure for 
plea withdrawals "predicated on a defendant making 'a pointed 
showing' of an error in the plea colloquy by reference to the 
plea colloquy transcript") (quoting another source); see also 
State v. A.G., 2023 WI 61, ¶41, 408 Wis. 2d 413, 992 N.W.2d 75 
(Hagedorn, J., concurring) (citing State v. Clark, 2022 WI 21, 
¶¶13–16, 401 Wis. 2d 344, 972 N.W.2d 533 ("[A] prima facie 
showing will generally focus on the plea colloquy itself to 
determine whether certain requirements were not followed.")).  
In so doing, we see that the record does not support B.W.'s 
arguments.  Instead, the record demonstrates that the circuit 
court properly explained the procedure to B.W., first outlining 
the burden of proof applicable at the grounds phase:  
THE COURT:  Now, you understand that nobody can 
force you to plead no contest to the grounds phase in 
this case, right? 
[B.W.]  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  You have an absolute [right] to a 
trial.  It could be a jury trial which we have set 
next week, or it could be a trial just to the judge.  
Do you understand that? 
[B.W.]  Yes, ma'am.  
 . . .  
THE COURT:  But either way, it's the State's 
burden to prove by clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence to a reasonable certainty that the grounds 
exist.  And the State would try to do that by calling 
witnesses to the stand.  They would testify under 
oath.  You would have a right to cross-examine them, 
and the right to introduce your own evidence.  The 
right to use subpoenas to require witnesses to come to 
court and testify for you.  Also the right to testify 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
38 
 
yourself or remain silent knowing silence can be used 
against you.   
Do you understand that by pleading no contest 
you're giving up all those trial rights to the first 
half of the case? 
[B.W.]  Yes, ma'am.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶62 In its plea colloquy, the circuit court said, "[I]t's 
the 
State's 
burden 
to 
prove 
by 
clear, 
convincing, 
and 
satisfactory evidence to a reasonable certainty that the grounds 
exist."  The record reflects that the court was referring to the 
burden of proof at the grounds phase, not the dispositional 
phase.  The court then clearly explained to B.W., three times, 
that the "best interests of the child" standard would apply at 
disposition.  
¶63 Regarding disposition, unlike the grounds phase, no 
burden of proof was ever stated, but rather the statutory 
standard of "best interests of the child" was repeatedly spoken:  
THE COURT:  Now, that does not mean you're giving 
up your trial rights to the second half of the case.  
And that's what we call disposition.  And at that 
hearing, the Court would have to decide if it's in the 
child's best interest to actually terminate your 
parental rights.  Does that make sense? 
[B.W.]  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  And at all those same trial rights 
then you would have again in the second half, it's 
just a trial to the Judge in the second half.  Does 
that match your understanding? 
[B.W.]  Yes. 
¶64 The court further explained the process:  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
39 
 
Now, assuming I accept your no contest plea as 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, I will then take 
some brief testimony to make sure there's a factual 
basis for it.  And then by statute I will be required 
to find you unfit as a parent as to [Bob].  Do you 
understand I'll have to make that finding? 
[B.W.]  Yes.  
THE COURT:  However, if I do not terminate your 
parental rights, if I do not find that to be in 
[Bob's] best interest, the termination of parental 
rights petition will be dismissed, and that unfitness 
finding will be reversed or vacated, okay? 
[B.W.]  Yes, ma'am.  
THE COURT:  Now, at that second half of the case, 
the disposition, I basically have two choices.  Either 
I find it's in [Bob's] best interest to terminate your 
parental rights, and I do so.  Or I do not find that, 
and I dismiss the TPR petition.  Does that make sense? 
[B.W.]  Yes, ma'am.  
¶65 A parent who pleads no contest to the grounds phase, 
still retains the right to contest termination at the separate 
and distinct disposition phase.  In contesting termination, B.W. 
does retain "rights."  A closer look at the record demonstrates 
that, while the court did explain that B.W. would have the "same 
rights" at the dispositional phase, the court never referred to 
the burden of proof at the grounds phase as a "right."  Instead, 
the court used the term "right(s)," precisely and specifically 
referring to B.W.'s procedural and constitutional rights:  the 
right to a trial (to a jury or a judge), the right to call and 
cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses, and 
the right to testify or to remain silent.  In short, the record 
reflects that the circuit court did not characterize the clear 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
40 
 
and convincing burden of proof applicable at grounds, as a trial 
right that would be applicable at disposition.  See A.G., 408 
Wis. 2d 413, ¶38 (lead opinion) (circuit court characterized the 
clear and convincing burden of proof as a right, but our court 
nonetheless determined that the plea was knowing, free, and 
voluntary). 
¶66 In short, B.W.'s arguments are unsupported by the 
record.  The plea colloquy reflects that the court never used 
the term "burden of proof" when discussing the disposition 
phase.  When discussing the standard the court would apply at 
disposition, the court repeatedly stated the statutory standard 
of "best interests of the child."  Separately, the court 
properly used the term "right" when referring to certain 
specific rights, but it did not use that term when referring to 
the burden of proof applicable to the grounds phase.   
¶67 B.W. fails to make a prima facie showing under Bangert 
that the circuit court's reference to "trial rights" meant that 
the 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing 
burden 
of 
proof 
applicable at the grounds phase, also applied at the disposition 
phase.  Instead, the court repeatedly stated the correct 
standard at disposition——the best interests of the child.  The 
circuit court's colloquy complied with the language of the 
statute. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(2) 
states, 
"The 
best 
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor" at 
disposition.  Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶16 ("Additionally, 
we conclude that in order for the court's explanation of 
potential dispositions to be meaningful to the parent, the 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
41 
 
parent must be informed of the statutory standard the court will 
apply at the second stage.  That is, the court must inform the 
parent that '[t]he best interests of the child shall be the 
prevailing factor considered by the court in determining the 
disposition. . . .'").  At the plea hearing, the court said that 
the 
standard 
at 
disposition 
would 
be 
the 
child's 
"best 
interest."  Stating the statutory language, "best interests of 
the child," is sufficient.  By the court stating the applicable 
statutory standard for disposition, "the best interests of the 
child," the court has properly advised the parent of "sufficient 
information to evaluate the stakes involved."  Brenda B., 331 
Wis. 2d 310, ¶41; see also Jodie W., 293 Wis. 2d 530, ¶25. 
¶68 The plea colloquy is sufficient.  B.W.'s motion to 
withdraw his no contest plea is not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing.  
 
B.  Reliance on D.D.'s Testimony. 
¶69 At disposition, the circuit court is required to 
consider the factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).  The 
record demonstrates that the circuit court properly complied 
with that statute and exercised its discretion in considering 
the statutory factors at disposition.  In so doing, it 
referenced the potential future contact between Bob and B.W., 
given the fact that B.W. has another child with D.D., the 
proposed adoptive parent.  B.W. may disagree with the circuit 
court's conclusions about termination, but that does not 
constitute reversible error.  
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
42 
 
¶70 A circuit court's decision to terminate parental 
rights is discretionary.  Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶27; 
Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  "A circuit court properly exercises its discretion 
when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard 
of law, and using a demonstrated rational process reaches a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."  Dane Cnty. 
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶39, 346 
Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198.  "When reviewing a trial court's 
exercise of discretion, we are permitted to search the record 
for reasons to sustain such a determination."  Sulla, 369 
Wis. 2d 225, 
¶23. 
 
Finally, 
"this 
court 
will 
affirm 
a 
discretionary decision by a circuit court as long as the court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion."  Nat'l Auto 
Truckstops, Inc. v. DOT, 2003 WI 95, ¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 
N.W.2d 198.  The record demonstrates that the court properly 
used its discretion and applied each of the statutory factors.  
See Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3); see also ¶36 n.11, supra.  
¶71 The court found:  (1) Bob was "likely to be adopted 
post-termination" by D.D., who was "licensed and committed" to 
adopting Bob, Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(a); (2) "[a]t the time of 
removal, [Bob] was not in good mental health, given the really 
difficult experiences that he had. Today he's still working 
through those experiences, but overall he is thriving, and 
that's an important thing that the Court doesn't want to 
disrupt," § 48.426(3)(b); (3) Bob "does have a substantial 
relationship with [B.W.]" but "I don't think he has a 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
43 
 
substantial relationship with the mother or any extended family 
members."  While [t]here's always some harm in severing legal 
relationships, but I think that harm will be mitigated by the 
coparenting circumstances I've just described," § 48.426(3)(c); 
(4) "[Bob's] wishes are complex as can be understood, but he 
certainly is bonded with [D.D.], . . . is living with his half-
sibling . . . thriving in that home, and he has recognized those 
benefits," § 48.426(3)(d); (5) Bob "has been separated from his 
parents since 2019, so a significant chunk of his young life," 
§ 48.426(3)(e); and (6) "most fundamentally, it's the stability 
and permanency [for Bob] that the Court is seeking in making its 
decision today," § 48.426(3)(f). 
¶72 B.W. nonetheless argues that State v. Margaret H., 234 
Wis. 2d 606, supports his argument that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it "concluded that any 
harm to Bob caused by terminating his legal relationship with 
B.W. was mitigated because the court expected D.D. to continue 
to allow B.W. to visit with Bob."  B.W. argues that in relying 
on the adoptive parent's "promise," "the court failed to 
consider that D.D.'s assurance that she would allow for 
continued contact between B.W. and Bob was unenforceable."  
According to B.W., "the court hinged its entire consideration of 
factor three——whether it would be harmful to Bob to sever his 
relationship with B.W.——on D.D.'s unenforceable promise."  B.W. 
refers to D.D.'s testimony that post-termination, she "would 
still expect [B.W.] to be in full contact" with Bob and that "as 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
44 
 
long as it's safe, [it's] fine" that the relationship between 
B.W. and Bob continue.  But, what the circuit court stated is:   
[G]iven that you and [D.D.] have a child in common, 
you guys already co-parent, I'm trusting that you guys 
will continue to do so.  And as you continue with your 
stability and sobriety, the further you get into that 
the safer you'll be for overnight visits, for really 
meaningful co-parenting even if the legal relationship 
is severed, and I found [D.D.'s] testimony to be 
credible that she would do that.   
¶73 The record does not support B.W.'s argument that 
D.D.'s comments were a "promise."  In fact, in Margaret H., we 
said that while a circuit court "may within its discretion 
consider [an adoptive parent's] good faith promise" regarding 
post-termination visitation arrangements, but a court should not 
"hinge its determination on that legally unenforceable promise."  
Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶30.  D.D.'s comments that she 
"would still expect [B.W.] to be in full contact" with Bob and 
that "as long as it's safe, [it would be] fine" that the 
relationship between B.W. and Bob continue, were referenced by 
the court, but the record does not reflect that the court 
considered this to be a promise, unenforceable or otherwise.   
¶74 B.W.'s reliance on Margaret H. is misplaced.  In 
Margaret H., the circuit court found rights to terminate the 
birth mother's parental rights.  At disposition, the foster 
mother "testified that she intended to foster the twins' 
relationship with their birth family and that she envisioned 
continued visitation even upon adoption."  Id., ¶9.  The circuit 
court 
dismissed 
the 
termination 
petition 
referencing 
the 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
45 
 
"evidence on both sides of the issue on whether or not the 
relationship is substantial" finding it "would be harmful to 
these boys to sever that relationship."  Id., ¶10.  The circuit 
court noted that Margaret H. "has never wavered in her desire or 
her love for her grandchildren" and "she has made every attempt 
to put herself in a position and at this time I just can't take 
that away from her."  Id.   
¶75 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.  Our court 
affirmed and remanded "for a consideration of all the relevant 
factors" and application of the "best interests of the child" 
standard.  Id., ¶¶31-35.  We stated:  
In its discretion, the court may afford due weight to 
an 
adopted 
parent's 
stated 
intent 
to 
continue 
visitation with family members, although we cannot 
mandate the relative weight to be placed on this 
factor.  
In this case, the court may certainly choose to 
examine the probability that [the adoptive parent] 
will be faithful to her promise, at the same time 
bearing in mind that such promises are legally 
unenforceable once the termination and subsequent 
adoption are complete.  The circuit court may within 
its discretion consider her good faith promise, but it 
should not be bound to hinge its determination on that 
legally unenforceable promise. 
Id., ¶¶29-30 (citation omitted).  We concluded that the circuit 
court "failed to consider all of the relevant statutory 
factors."  Id., ¶31.  The best interests of the child is the 
polestar of all determinations under ch. 48, the Children's Code 
[1997-98]." Id., ¶¶33, 36. 
¶76 B.W. interprets Margaret H. as requiring a circuit 
court to consider that promises by an adoptive parent are 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
46 
 
legally unenforceable, and presumably to do so on the record.  
Margaret H. requires that the court not "hinge" its decision on 
one factor but instead consider each statutory factor.  While 
"[t]he circuit court may within its discretion consider her good 
faith promise" to allow contact and visitation with family, it 
should 
not 
"hinge 
its 
determination 
on 
that 
legally 
unenforceable promise."  Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶30 
(emphasis added).  
¶77 Unlike 
in 
Margaret 
H., 
the 
circuit 
court 
here 
considered each statutory factor in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) and 
did not "exclusively focus" on the harm of the legal severance 
of 
the 
relationship 
between 
B.W. 
and 
Bob 
or 
D.D.'s 
"unenforceable promise."  The record "reflect[s] adequate 
consideration of and weight to each factor."  Margaret H., 234 
Wis. 2d 606, ¶35.  The third statutory factor, harm of legal 
severance, was but one factor the circuit court considered.  The 
court also considered and evaluated the other statutory factors.  
The court complied with its mandatory duty and afforded weight 
to each factor, utilizing the statutory standard of "best 
interests of the child."    
¶78 The court's decision to "examine the probability" of 
D.D.'s "good faith promise" lies within its discretionary 
domain.  Requiring circuit courts to say on the record such 
things as, "I know this promise is unenforceable, but," would be 
requiring circuit courts to use "magic words" to exercise 
discretion appropriately.  "This court strongly disfavors magic 
words."  A.G., 408 Wis. 2d 413, ¶29; see also Marathon Cnty. v. 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
47 
 
D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶66, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) ("We do not impose a 'magic 
words' requirement in the law and this court has repeatedly 
rejected them."); State v. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, ¶36, 374 
Wis. 2d 98, 892 N.W.2d 682 (rejecting in context of a circuit 
court inquiring about juror bias); State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 
58, ¶33, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810 (rejecting in context 
of withdrawing consent under the Fourth Amendment); Elections 
Bd. v. Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 654, 669-70, 
597 N.W.2d 721 (1999) (rejecting in context of what is required 
to "express advocacy"); Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. ___, 138 
S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (noting that the United States Supreme 
Court refrains from reading statutes to "incant magic words" 
(quoted source omitted)).   
¶79 B.W. identifies nothing in the record which would 
demonstrate that the circuit court believed this co-parenting 
relationship was enforceable.  The court did not "order" any 
such future co-parenting.  In fact, the words of the court were 
that it "trusted" that the co-parenting may continue:  "I'm 
trusting that you guys will continue to do so."  Using the word 
"trust" surely indicates that the court knew it could not demand 
they continue co-parenting as that would be unenforceable.   
¶80 B.W. argues that "the circuit court's notion of a 'co-
parenting' relationship of Bob between D.D. and B.W. improperly 
characterized what occurs following termination of parental 
rights, erroneously suggesting that a substantive ongoing 
parenting relationship between B.W. and Bob would occur."  But 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
48 
 
nothing precludes a circuit court from considering the facts of 
the case, which here reflect that B.W. and the proposed adoptive 
parent have another child in common, and D.D. would like to see 
contact continue with B.W. for that child and Bob.  The statute 
does not limit a circuit court from considering whether an 
adoptive parent might allow a continuing relationship with the 
child and the child's biological family.  In fact, the statute's 
language, "including but not limited to,"14 recognizes that the 
court may consider matters apart from the factors specifically 
listed.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).  The record reflects that the 
court considered the unique facts present.15  The proposed 
                                                 
14 See Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) ("In considering the best 
interests of the child under this section the court shall 
consider but not be limited to the following" list, including 
"likelihood of adoption," and "whether the child has substantial 
relationships with the parent or other family members, and 
whether it would be harmful to the child to sever those 
relationships" (emphasis added).); Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, 
¶29 ("[W]e note that Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(a) requires only 
that the circuit court examine the impact of a legal severance 
on the broader relationships existing between a child and his or 
her family. In its discretion, the court may afford due weight 
to an adoptive parent's stated intent to continue visitation 
with family members, although we cannot mandate the relative 
weight to be placed on this factor."). 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.426(3)(c) states that the court 
shall 
consider 
"[w]hether 
the 
child 
has 
substantial 
relationships with the parent or other family members, and 
whether it would be harmful to the child to sever those 
relationships," but the court is not limited to following only 
the statutory factors: 
To the extent that the court of appeals' statement may 
be interpreted as insisting that the circuit court at 
least consider [the adoptive parent's] promise to 
continue contact between the twins and their birth 
family, we note that Wis. Stat. 48.426(3)(c) requires 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
49 
 
adoptive parent and B.W. were co-parenting another child they 
had in common.  The court, much like at the grounds phase, was 
encouraging to B.W.16  But encouraging words should not be 
mistaken for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  The court's 
conclusion to terminate B.W.'s parental rights to Bob was based 
on a consideration of each statutory factor.  The court 
considered the best interests of Bob as paramount and although a 
"close call" and "difficult decision," the court ultimately 
concluded that B.W.'s parental rights to Bob must be terminated.   
¶81 The circuit court did not "improperly rely" on D.D.'s 
"promise," as B.W. argues.  Here, the circuit court may have 
referenced the facts from testimony in the hope that there could 
be some continued connection between B.W. and Bob, and that 
recognition is not prohibited.  The record reflects that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
only that the circuit court examine the impact of a 
legal severance on the broader relationships existing 
between a child and his or her family. In its 
discretion, the court may afford due weight to an 
adoptive parent's stated intent to continue visitation 
with family members, although we cannot mandate the 
relative weight to be placed on this factor.  
In this case, the court may certainly choose to 
examine the probability that [the adoptive parent] 
will be faithful to her promise, at the same time 
bearing in mind that such promises are legally 
unenforceable once the termination and subsequent 
adoption are complete. The circuit court may within 
its discretion consider her good faith promise, but it 
should not be bound to hinge its determination on that 
legally unenforceable promise.  
Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶¶29-30. 
16 See ¶14, supra.   
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
50 
 
court reviewed the facts specific to this case, applied the 
statutory factors, and tried to encourage B.W. to continue with 
positive steps, even though it was in Bob's best interests to 
terminate B.W.'s parental rights.  As the court noted, while 
"[t]here's 
always 
some 
harm 
in 
severing 
legal 
relationships . . . that 
harm 
will 
be 
mitigated 
by 
the 
coparenting circumstances."  D.D. and B.W. co-parent one child, 
and unlike most TPR cases, these unique circumstances present 
the opportunity for B.W. to see Bob in the future.  B.W.'s 
argument that the circuit court "did not consider that D.D.'s 
testimony that she would allow B.W. to continue to have contact 
with Bob was an unenforceable promise," thus fails.  
¶82 In short, the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion at the dispositional hearing.  The circuit court 
"examine[d] the relevant facts" of this case, "applie[d] a 
proper standard of law," and "using a demonstrated rational 
process" of applying the statutory factors, "reach[ed] a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."  Mable K., 346 
Wis. 2d 396, ¶39.  The record does not support B.W.'s assertion 
that the circuit court believed D.D.'s promise was enforceable.  
Id.  "The ultimate determination of whether to terminate 
parental rights is discretionary with the circuit court."  
Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶27.  We affirm the circuit 
court's discretionary decision to terminate B.W.'s parental 
rights, as the circuit court properly exercised its discretion. 
¶83 The "polestar" determination for the circuit court at 
disposition, as was explained in the plea colloquy, was the best 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
51 
 
interests of the child.  Repeatedly throughout its colloquy with 
B.W., the circuit court informed B.W. that at disposition "the 
court would have to decide whether [termination was] actually in 
[Bob's] best interest."  The circuit court acknowledged that the 
best interests of Bob were paramount, reminding B.W. at 
disposition that while B.W.'s progress was commendable, the 
court's "focus today has to be on what is in [Bob's] best 
interest as opposed to [B.W.'s] best interest."  The court did 
not erroneously consider D.D.'s testimony.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
¶84 B.W. argues that the plea colloquy is defective 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
miscommunicated 
that 
a 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing 
burden 
of 
proof 
applied 
at 
disposition.  He argues that the burden of proof is a trial 
right and when the court incorrectly advised B.W. that he would 
have "all those same trial rights" at disposition, the court 
misinformed him that this burden of proof, rather than the "best 
interests of the child" standard, would apply at disposition.  
B.W. also argues that at disposition, the circuit court 
improperly relied on the proposed adoptive parent's assurance 
that she would allow B.W. to continue to visit and "co-parent" 
Bob.   
¶85 We conclude that B.W. failed to make a prima facie 
showing that the plea colloquy was defective.  At the plea 
hearing, the circuit court properly informed B.W. that the 
prevailing 
factor 
at 
disposition 
is 
the 
statutory 
No. 
2022AP1329   
 
52 
 
standard:  "The best interests of the child."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2).   
¶86 We also conclude that at disposition, the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by relying on 
the proposed adoptive parent's testimony that post-termination, 
she would allow B.W. to continue to visit with Bob and that they 
would "co-parent."  The court did not fail to consider that this 
testimony was an "unenforceable promise," nor did the court 
"hinge" termination on this testimony.  The circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion, considering the testimony and 
weighing the statutory dispositional factors of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
1 
 
¶87 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  B.W. 
agrees and acknowledges "the statutory standard required in Wis. 
Stat. § 48.426(2) does not set a burden of proof level" and 
"[t]here is no burden of proof placed on the State at 
disposition."  The State agrees with B.W. that "'the polestar at 
a dispositional hearing is simply the best interests of the 
child' and no burden of proof exists."  The court of appeals' 
decision from which B.W. appeals, determined the same:  "[t]he 
plain language of [§ 48.426(2)] does not set a burden of proof."1 
¶88 There 
is 
no 
burden 
of 
proof 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(2) at disposition because the statute does not provide 
for one.  And, considerations of procedural due process do not 
require one.  The legislature has demonstrated that it is quite 
capable of stating a particular burden of proof, when one is 
applicable.  At disposition, the statute mandates the circuit 
court to weigh the statutory factors2 and use its discretion to 
                                                 
1 As noted in the majority, this case comes to us on appeal 
from a decision by the court of appeals, State v. B.W., No. 
2022AP1329, unpublished slip op., ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 
2023).   
2 The statutory factors are: 
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after 
termination. 
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the 
time of the disposition and, if applicable, at the 
time the child was removed from the home. 
(c) Whether 
the 
child 
has 
substantial 
relationships with the parent or other family members, 
and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever 
these relationships. 
 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
2 
 
determine what disposition is in the child's best interests, but 
makes no mention of a burden of proof requirement.  A parent's 
procedural due process concerns are also lessened at this stage 
of the proceedings, because the court has already decided that 
the grounds exist to find the parent unfit.  
¶89 We too should definitively conclude that there is no 
burden of proof, under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2), at disposition.  
I join the majority opinion, but concur and write separately to 
provide clarity to our circuit courts that there is no burden of 
proof required at disposition in termination of parental rights 
proceedings under § 48.426(2).  Rather, the court's decision at 
the disposition phase is one within the sound and sole 
discretion of the court:  what is in the child's best interests. 
I 
¶90 Termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases are 
governed by the Wisconsin Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48.  
TPR 
cases 
follow 
a 
bifurcated 
procedure——grounds 
and 
disposition.  In recognition of the "profound consequences of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) The wishes of the child. 
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent 
from the child. 
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into 
a more stable and permanent family relationship as a 
result of the termination, taking into account the 
conditions of the child's current placement, the 
likelihood of future placements and the results of 
prior placements. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3). 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
3 
 
termination,"3 Wisconsin implemented a robust statutory scheme.  
This statutory scheme protects familial interests through both 
stages of a TPR proceeding.  At grounds, where "the parent's 
rights are paramount," the parent is afforded the "full 
complement of procedural rights" because the burden of proof is 
on the State to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the 
statutory grounds for termination exist.  Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶24, 255 
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402; see also Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 
2001 WI 110, ¶22, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  Procedural due 
process considerations also require this heightened burden of 
proof during the grounds phase.  Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 
47, ¶23, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (citing Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982)). 
¶91 At the grounds phase, the court conducts a fact-
finding hearing to determine whether grounds exist to terminate 
parental rights.  Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1).  For grounds, the 
legislature set forth a statutory burden of proof:  The State 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of 
the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists.  
Id.; see also Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶21-22; Waukesha 
Cnty. Dep't Soc. Servs. v. C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 60, 368 
N.W.2d 47 (1985).  If the court "determines that the facts 
alleged in the petition have not been proven, the court 
dismisses the petition."  Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶26; Wis. 
                                                 
3 Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Julie 
A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶23, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
4 
 
Stat. § 48.424(3).  If instead a parent decides to not contest 
the grounds phase of the TPR proceeding, the circuit court is 
required to undergo a colloquy with the parent to ensure that 
the parent understands the procedural rights that are being 
given up.  Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7).  As part of that plea 
colloquy, the court must explain and inform the parent not only 
of the rights being given up, but also needs to describe the 
potential dispositions that the court can consider in the second 
phase of the hearing.  § 48.422(7)(a).   
¶92 If "grounds" are proven or pled, the court proceeds to 
the second stage, the disposition phase under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2).  Just because the court accepts a no-contest plea 
to the grounds phase of a termination of parental rights hearing 
does not mean that the parent's rights are terminated.  Instead, 
the court proceeds to the second phase which allows for any 
party to present evidence, including through testimony, to the 
circuit court as to what disposition is in the best interest of 
the child.  Unlike the burden of proof required in the statute 
for the grounds phase, the legislature has not provided such 
language in § 48.426(2), which governs the procedures for the 
disposition phase.  Instead, it is within the court's discretion 
to determine, considering the statutory factors and the evidence 
presented, whether termination is in "[t]he best interests of 
the child."  § 48.426(2); Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23; State 
v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶¶33-34, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 
N.W.2d 475.  
II 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
5 
 
¶93 Answering the question whether there is a burden of 
proof at disposition requires us to analyze statutes. In 
conducting our statutory interpretation analysis, we begin with 
the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56-58 (2012) (Supremacy-of-Text 
Principle).4  In doing so, we are not "at liberty to disregard 
the plain, clear words of the statute."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46 (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 
(1967)).  "We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed 
in the statutory language," as "[i]t is the enacted law, not the 
unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."  Id.; see also 
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 (1997) ("It is the 
law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . . Men may 
intend what they will, but it is only the laws that they enact 
which bind us.").  "If this process of analysis yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to the ascertainment of its 
meaning."  Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  
¶94 Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.31(1) imposes a "clear and 
convincing" burden of proof at grounds stating, "In this 
                                                 
4 When 
interpreting 
a 
statute, 
the 
Supremacy-of-Text 
Principle states that "[t]he words of a governing text are of 
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is 
what the term means."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading 
Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012). 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
6 
 
section, 'fact-finding hearing' means a hearing to determine if 
the allegations in a petition under s. 48.13 or 48.133 or a 
petition to terminate parental rights are proved by clear and 
convincing evidence" (emphasis added).  Comparatively, Wis. 
Stat. § 48.426(2) governs disposition and states, "The best 
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor considered 
by the court in determining the disposition of all proceedings 
under this subchapter." 
¶95 Unlike Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1), Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) 
contains no burden of proof.  The language of § 48.426(2) is 
plain and its interpretation straightforward.  Simply, there is 
no stated burden of proof at disposition of a TPR proceeding 
because the plain text of the statute does not provide for one.  
"[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute 
that do not appear on its face."  Bates v. United States, 522 
U.S. 23, 29 (1997). 
¶96 The legislature has aptly demonstrated its ability to 
communicate when a burden of proof applies, as it did so for the 
grounds phase.5  In conducting a "text-based, plain-meaning 
approach to statutory interpretation," the court must "guard 
against" substituting the judiciary's subjective policy choices 
for those of the legislature.  State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶112, 
272 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (Sykes, J., concurring).  "It is 
not up to the courts to rewrite the plain words of statutes."  
State v. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46, ¶13, 370 Wis. 2d 187, 881 
N.W.2d 805.  Nor can courts "add words to a statute to give it a 
                                                 
5 See ¶91, supra.  
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
7 
 
certain meaning."  State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶23, 390 
Wis. 2d 248, 938 N.W.2d 521.  There is no burden of proof at 
disposition in the statute because we "interpret the words the 
legislature actually enacted into law[.]"  State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165.  Instead, 
"[t]he polestar at a dispositional hearing is simply the best 
interests of the child."  State v. A.G., 2023 WI 61, ¶33, 408 
Wis. 2d 413, 992 N.W.2d 75 (citing Brown Cnty. v. Brenda B., 
2011 WI 6, ¶33, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730 (quoting Julie 
A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶30)).  
¶97 Not 
imposing 
a 
burden 
of 
proof 
for 
the 
judge 
determining disposition is consistent with the stated purpose of 
Chapter 48.  At the beginning of Chapter 48, the legislature 
explained the judge's role:  "In construing this chapter, the 
best interests of the child . . . shall always be of paramount 
consideration."  Wis. Stat § 48.01(1).  Section 48.01(1)(ag) 
states that "the court may determine that it is in the best 
interests of the child for the child to be removed from his or 
her parents, consistent with any applicable law relating to the 
rights of parents."   
¶98 The 
text 
of 
various 
statutes 
reveals 
that 
the 
legislature does not always impose a burden of proof in the 
"best interests of the child" standard.  Sometimes, however, the 
legislature does set forth a burden of proof.  
¶99 For example, Wis. Stat. § 48.437 addresses certain 
changes in a child's placement.  Under § 48.437(3), a court is 
prohibited from changing placement in the home of a person who 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
8 
 
has been convicted of a homicide of a parent unless the court 
determines by "clear and convincing evidence" that placement is 
in the child's best interests.  That statute states:  
Except as provided in this subsection, the court may 
not change a child's placement to a placement in the 
home of a person who has been convicted of the 
homicide of a parent of the child under s. 940.01 or 
940.05, if the conviction has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated.  This subsection does not apply if 
the court determines by clear and convincing evidence 
that the placement would be in the best interests of 
the child.  The court shall consider the wishes of the 
child in making that determination. 
§ 48.437(3) (emphasis added). 
¶100 Similarly, under Wis. Stat. § 48.357(4d) (and its 
companion, Wis. Stat. § 938.357(4d)), the court may not change 
placement to the home of a person who has been convicted of 
homicide of a parent of a child or juvenile unless that 
conviction has been reversed, set aside, or vacated.  Section 
§ 48.357(4d) states:  
48.357(4d)  PROHIBITED PLACEMENTS BASED ON HOMICIDE IF 
PARENT.  (a) Prohibition.  Except as provided in par. 
(b), the court may not change a child's placement to a 
placement in the home of a person who has been 
convicted of the homicide of a parent of the child 
under s. 940.01 or 940.05, if the conviction has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(am)  Change in placement required. Except as 
provided in par. (b), if a parent in whose home a 
child  is placed is convicted of the homicide of the 
child's other parent under s. 940.01 or 940.05, and 
the conviction has not been reversed, set aside, or 
vacated, the court shall change the child's  placement 
to a placement outside the home of the parent on 
petition of the child, the child's counsel or guardian 
ad litem, the guardian or legal custodian of the 
child, the person or agency primarily responsible for 
implementing the dispositional order, or the district 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
9 
 
attorney or corporation counsel of the county in which 
the dispositional order was entered, or on the court's 
own motion with notice to the parent. 
(b)  Exception.  Paragraphs (a) and (am) do not 
apply if the court determines by clear and convincing 
evidence that the placement would be in the best 
interests of the child.  The court shall consider the 
wishes of the child in making that determination. 
(Emphasis added.)  This statute sets forth the burden of proof 
of clear and convincing evidence that is required for the court 
to determine that the placement is in the child's best interest. 
¶101 Under Wis. Stat. § 48.355(3) (and its companion, Wis. 
Stat. § 938.355(3)), the court may set rules of visitation for a 
parent, but the court must find that visitation is in the 
child's best interests.  Section 48.355(3) states: 
(3)  PARENTAL VISITATION.  (a) Except as provided in 
par. (b), if, after a hearing on the issue with due 
notice to the parent or guardian, the court finds that 
it would be in the best interest of the child, the 
court may set reasonable rules of parental visitation. 
(b)  1.  Except as provided in subd. 2., the 
court may not grant visitation under par. (a) to a 
parent of a child if the parent has been convicted 
under s. 940.01 of the first−degree intentional 
homicide, or under s. 940.05 of the 2nd−degree 
intentional homicide, of the child's other parent, and 
the conviction has not been reversed, set aside or 
vacated. 
1m.  Except as provided in subd. 2., if a parent 
who is granted visitation rights with a child under 
par. 
(a) 
is 
convicted 
under 
s. 
940.01 
of 
the 
first−degree intentional homicide, or under s. 940.05 
of the 2nd−degree intentional homicide, of the child's 
other 
parent, 
and 
the 
conviction 
has 
not 
been 
reversed, set aside or vacated, the court shall issue 
an order prohibiting the parent from having visitation 
with the child on petition of the child, the guardian 
or legal custodian of the child, a person or agency 
bound by the dispositional order or the district 
attorney or corporation counsel of the county in which 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
10 
 
the dispositional order was entered, or on the court's 
own motion, and on notice to the parent. 
2.  Subdivisions 1. and 1m. do not apply if the 
court determines by clear and convincing evidence that 
the visitation would be in the best interests of the 
child.  The court shall consider the wishes of the 
child in making that determination. 
(Emphases added.) 
¶102 Wisconsin Stat § 48.217(3)(c) (and accompanying Wis. 
Stat. § 938.217(3)(c)), relates to change in placement based on 
homicide of a parent.  Section 48.217(3)(c) notes that if the 
court finds by "clear and convincing evidence" that the 
placement is in the "best interest of the child," the court need 
not apply subs. (3)(a) or (3)(b).6   
¶103 In the criminal statutory context, criminal courts 
have jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to have committed 
certain crimes.  But these statutes impose a burden of proof on 
the juvenile to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that it 
would be in the best interests of the juvenile and the public to 
not waive the juvenile into adult court.7  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 938.183(1m)(c)3. states: 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 48.217(3)(c): "Paragraphs (a) and (b) do 
not apply if the court determines by clear and convincing 
evidence that the placement would be in the best interests of 
the child.  The court shall consider the wishes of the child in 
making that determination." 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6) ("Decision on Waiver"):  
After considering the criteria under sub. (5), 
the court shall state its finding with respect to the 
criteria on the record, and, if the court determines 
on the record that there is clear and convincing 
evidence that is contrary to the best interests of the 
juvenile or of the public to hear the case, the court 
shall 
enter 
an 
order 
waiving 
jurisdiction 
and 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
11 
 
For a juvenile who is alleged to have attempted 
or committed a violation of s. 940.01 or to have 
committed a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05 on or 
after the juvenile's 15th birthday, the court of 
criminal jurisdiction finds that the juvenile has not 
attempted to commit a violation of s. 940.01 or 
committed a violation of s. 940.01, 940.02, or 940.05, 
and 
the 
court 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction, 
after 
considering 
the 
criteria 
under 
s. 
938.18(5), 
determines that the juvenile has proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would be in the best 
interests of the juvenile and of the public to adjudge 
the juvenile to be delinquent and impose a disposition 
under s. 938.34. 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶104 In Wis. Stat. § 48.977(6), which deals with revisions 
of guardianship orders, the legislature chose yet again to 
require both a "clear and convincing burden" of proof and the 
"best interests of the child," even within the same subsection: 
(6)  REVISION OF GUARDIANSHIP ORDER.  (a)  Any person 
authorized to file a petition under sub. (4)(a) may 
request a revision in a guardianship order entered 
under this subsection or sub. (4)(h)2., or the court 
may, on its own motion, propose such a revision.  The 
request or court proposal shall set forth in detail 
the nature of the proposed revision, shall allege 
facts sufficient to show that there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances since the last 
order affecting the guardianship was entered and that 
the proposed revision would be in the best interests 
of the child and shall allege any other information 
that 
affects 
the 
advisability 
of 
the 
court's 
disposition. 
(b)  The court shall hold a hearing on the matter 
prior to any revision of the guardianship order if the 
                                                                                                                                                             
referring the matter to the district attorney for 
appropriate proceedings in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction.  After the order, the court of criminal 
jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction.  
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
12 
 
request 
or 
court 
proposal 
indicates 
that 
new 
information 
is 
available 
which 
affects 
the 
advisability of the court's guardianship order, unless 
written waivers of objections to the revision are 
signed by all parties entitled to receive notice under 
sub. (4)(c) and the court approves the waivers. 
(c)  If a hearing is to be held, the court shall 
notify the persons entitled to receive notice under 
sub. (4)(c) at least 7 days prior to the hearing of 
the date, place and purpose of the hearing.  A copy of 
the request or proposal shall be attached to the 
notice.  The court may order a revision if, at the 
hearing, the court finds that it has been proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances and if the court 
determines that a revision would be in the best 
interests of the child. 
(Emphases added.) 
¶105 As evidenced, the legislature has chosen to implement 
a burden of proof in conjunction with the "best interests of the 
child" considerations in other statutory sections inside Chapter 
48.  However, numerous places in Chapter 48 reference the "best 
interests of the child" standard, but do not require more than 
an accompanying discretionary determination. 
¶106 For example, Wis. Stat. § 48.299 (and its companion, 
Wis. Stat. § 938.299) addresses procedures at hearings.  Section 
48.299(1)(ag) references who may be present at a custody hearing 
and provides that certain individuals may be excluded from a 
hearing which deals with sensitive personal information if it is 
in the child's best interest: 
In a proceeding other than a proceeding under s. 
48.375(7), if a public hearing is not held, only the 
parties and their counsel or guardian ad litem, the 
court−appointed special advocate for the child, the 
child's foster parent or other physical custodian 
described in s. 48.62(2), witnesses, and other persons 
requested by a party and approved by the court may be 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
13 
 
present, except that the court may exclude a foster 
parent or other physical custodian described in s. 
48.62(2) from any portion of the hearing if that 
portion of the hearing deals with sensitive personal 
information of the child or the child's family or if 
the court determines that excluding the foster parent 
or other physical custodian would be in the best 
interests of the child.  Except in a proceeding under 
s. 48.375(7), any other person the court finds to have 
a proper interest in the case or in the work of the 
court, including a member of the bar or a person 
engaged in the bona fide research, monitoring, or 
evaluation of activities conducted under [42 U.S.C. 
§ 629h], as determined by the director of state 
courts, may be admitted by the court. 
§ 48.299(1)(ag) (emphasis added).  Additionally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.299(3) states that a child must be present for hearings 
under Chapter 48 unless the court finds it is in the best 
interests of the child not to be present but does not provide a 
burden of proof for the court to make this decision.8 
¶107 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.358(2) provides for a trial 
reunification, but the agency responsible for implementing the 
dispositional order must provide a statement as to why trial 
reunification is in the "best interests" of the child.  See 
§ 48.358(2)(a) ("The request shall contain . . . a statement 
describing why the trial reunification is in the best interests 
                                                 
8 According to Wis. Stat. § 48.299(3):  
If the court finds that it is in the best 
interest of the child, and if the child's counsel or 
guardian 
ad 
litem 
consents, 
the 
child 
may 
be 
temporarily excluded by the court from a hearing on a 
petition alleging that the child is in need of 
protection or services.  If the court finds that a 
child under 7 years of age is too young to comprehend 
the hearing, and that it is in the best interest of 
the child, the child may be excluded from the entire 
hearing. 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
14 
 
of the child . . . ."); see also § 48.358(2)(d) ("If the court 
finds that the trial reunification is in the best interests of 
the child and that the trial reunification satisfies the 
objectives of the child's permanency plan, the court shall order 
the trial reunification.").  Again, the statutes do not identify 
a burden of proof that the court must apply in making this 
decision.  
¶108 Under Wis. Stat. § 48.365(2g)(b)3. and its companion, 
Wis. Stat. § 938.365(2g)(b)3., when a child is placed outside of 
the home for 15 of the most recent 22 months, a report must be 
submitted with a recommendation which must include why adoption 
is in the "best interests" of the child or juvenile.  And, in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.988(6), a juvenile delinquent may be placed in 
another state's institution, but the court must find that it is 
in the "best interest of the child":  
A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an 
institution in another party jurisdiction pursuant to 
this compact but no such placement shall be made 
unless the child is given a court hearing on notice to 
the parent or guardian with opportunity to be heard, 
prior to being sent to such other party jurisdiction 
for institutional care and the court finds that: 
(a)  Equivalent facilities for the child are not 
available in the sending agency's jurisdiction; and 
(b)  Institutional care in the other jurisdiction 
is in the best interest of the child and will not 
produce undue hardship.  
(Emphases added.)  The differences in the statutes identifying a 
burden of proof imposed on the court versus statutes which omit 
a burden of proof in the Children's Code show that the 
legislature deliberately chose to omit or include a burden of 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
15 
 
proof. 
 
"Under 
the 
omitted-case 
canon 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to what the text 
states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus 
est).  That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not 
covered.'"  State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶52, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 
939 N.W.2d 519 (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra ¶93, at 93).   
¶109 Even looking beyond Chapter 48,9 we see that the "best 
interests of the child" is a standard that the legislature 
imposes in, for example, family law.  In initial determinations 
of legal custody and periods of physical placement between 
parents, the best interests of the child controls.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 767.41(2)(a) ("Subject to pars. (am) to (e), based 
on the best interest of the child . . . the court may give joint 
legal custody or sole legal custody of a minor child."); 
§ 767.41(2)(am) ("Except as provided in par. (d), the court 
shall presume that joint legal custody is in the best interest 
of the child."); § 767.41(2)(b) ("Except as provided in par. (d) 
and subject to par. (e), the court may give sole legal custody 
only if it finds that doing so is in the child's best 
interest . . . ."). 
 
Farther 
in 
the 
same 
section, 
§ 767.41(2)(d), is an example of the legislature imposing a 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Chapter 46 ("Social Services"); Chapter 49 
("Public Assistance and Children and Family Services"); Chapter 
301 ("Corrections"); Chapter 324 ("Deployed Parents Custody and 
Visitation"); 
Chapter 
51 
("State 
Alcohol, 
Drug 
Abuse, 
Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health"); Chapter 54 
("Guardianships and Conservatorships"); Chapter 118 ("General 
School Operations"); Chapter 813 ("Injunctions, Ne Exeat and 
Receivers"); and Chapter 938 ("Juvenile Justice Code").  
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
16 
 
burden of proof and a rebuttable presumption, yet still 
requiring consideration of the best interests of the child: 
1.  Except as provided in subd. 4., if the court 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a party 
has engaged in a pattern or serious incident of 
interspousal battery, as described under s. 940.19 or 
940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as defined in s. 
813.12(1)(am), pars. (am), (b), and (c) do not apply 
and there is a rebuttable presumption that it is 
detrimental to the child and contrary to the best 
interest of the child to award joint or sole legal 
custody to that party.  The presumption under this 
subdivision may be rebutted only by a preponderance of 
evidence of all of the following: . . .  
b.  It is in the best interest of the child for 
the party who committed the battery or abuse to be 
awarded joint or sole legal custody based on a 
consideration of the factors under sub. (5)(am). 
§ 767.41(2)(d)1.b. (emphases added). 
¶110 Much like the provisions in Chapter 48, Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.44(2) similarly states that the court would need to 
determine by "clear and convincing evidence" that visitation or 
periods of physical placement would be in the "best interest of 
the child" when determining whether physical visitation or 
physical placement should be with a parent who kills another 
parent.  In other words, the legislature seems to use the "best 
interests" language and the corresponding burden of proof in 
this unseemly scenario, consistently from chapter to chapter. 
¶111 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.451(1) addresses when and how 
custody 
or 
physical 
placement 
may 
be 
modified. 
 
Under 
§ 767.451(1)(b)1.a., the court "may modify an order of legal 
custody or an order of physical placement" if the court finds, 
among other things, "[t]he modification is in the best interest 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
17 
 
of the child."  This statute sets forth a rebuttable presumption 
that continuing the current allocation of decision making under 
a legal custody order is in the best interest of the child and 
that continuing the child's physical placement with the parent 
with whom the child resides for the greater period of time is in 
the best interests of the child, and if the parents have equal 
periods of placement the rebuttable presumption is that remains.   
¶112 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.451(3) 
considers 
when 
modification will not substantially alter the amount of time a 
parent spends with a child:  The court may modify the order "if 
the court finds that the modification is in the best interest of 
the child."  If a parent relocates, then the court considers 
whether a proposed relocation plan is in the child's best 
interests.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.481(2)(b) ("If the court finds 
at the initial hearing that the parent not filing the motion was 
properly served . . . the court shall approve the proposed 
relocation plan . . . unless the court finds that the proposed 
relocation plan is not in the best interest of the child."); 
Wis. Stat. § 767.481(3) ("[T]he court may issue a temporary 
order . . . to allow the parent proposing the relocation to 
relocate with the child if the court finds that the relocation 
is in the child's immediate best interest."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.225(1)(am) ("If the court grants physical placement to one 
parent for less than 25 percent of the time, . . . the court 
shall enter specific findings of fact as to the reasons that a 
greater allocation of physical placement with that parent is not 
in the best interests of the child."). 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
18 
 
¶113 Regarding a modification of judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.461, parties may stipulate to a modification of an order 
of physical placement or legal custody "unless the court finds 
that the modification is not in the best interest of the child."  
Similarly, under Wis. Stat. § 767.451(2), the court may modify 
equal physical placement if it is in the "best interests of the 
child" and the rebuttable presumption that "having substantially 
equal periods of physical placement is in the best interests of 
the child."10 
¶114 In another example, under Wis. Stat. § 767.511(1m), 
the court may deviate from child support standard shirking but 
must consider the "best interests of the child."  It states both 
                                                 
10 The statute, entitled "Modification of substantially 
equal physical placement orders," states as follows: 
Notwithstanding sub. (1): 
(a)  If the parties have substantially equal 
periods of physical placement pursuant to a court 
order and circumstances make it impractical for the 
parties to continue to have substantially equal 
physical placement, a court, upon petition, motion, or 
order to show cause by a party, may modify the order 
if it is in the best interest of the child. 
(b)  In any case in which par. (a) does not apply 
and in which the parties have substantially equal 
periods of physical placement pursuant to a court 
order, a court, upon petition, motion, or order to 
show cause of a party, may modify the order based on 
the appropriate standard under sub. (1).  However, 
under sub. (1)(b)2., there is a rebuttable presumption 
that having substantially equal periods of physical 
placement is in the best interest of the child. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.451(2) (emphases added). 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
19 
 
a burden of proof and consideration of the best interests of the 
child: 
Upon request by a party, the court may modify the 
amount of child support payments determined under sub. 
(1j) if, after considering the following factors, the 
court finds by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that use of the percentage standard is unfair 
to the child or to any of the parties: . . .  
 
(hm)  The best interests of the child. 
§ 767.511(1m)(hm) (emphases added).  
¶115 Under Wis. Stat. § 767.34, parties may stipulate 
regarding child support, but the best interests of the child are 
paramount.  See also Wis. Stat. § 767.333(2)(a) ("If the judge 
approves the stipulation, the judge shall incorporate and enter 
the terms of a stipulation . . . as an initial order of physical 
placement or legal custody unless the judge finds that the terms 
are not in the best interest of the child."); see also Frisch v. 
Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶75, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85; May v. 
May, 2012 WI 35, ¶¶18-19, 339 Wis. 2d 626, 813 N.W.2d 179.  The 
court 
retains 
equitable 
power 
to 
consider 
circumstances 
unforeseen by the parties when they enter into a stipulation 
that adversely affects the best interests of the child. 
¶116 Under Wis. Stat. § 767.511(2), court may establish a 
separate fund or trust if it promotes the best interests of the 
child:  "The court may protect and promote the best interests of 
the minor children by setting aside a portion of the child 
support which either party is ordered to pay in a separate fund 
or trust for the support, education and welfare of such 
children." 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
20 
 
¶117 Under Wis. Stat. § 767.401(1)(a), a court may order 
parties to attend programming concerning divorce if "the court 
determines that it is appropriate and in the best interest of 
the child . . . ."  Pursuant to § 767.407(1)(e), a court may 
make a temporary order before a GAL recommendation but the court 
must "determine[] that the temporary order is in the best 
interest of the child."  
¶118 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.405 
addresses 
family 
court 
services, including court-appointed mediation.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.405(10), the mediator's powers and duties "shall be guided 
by the best interest of the child."  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.405(12)(a), the GAL must comment on an agreement as a 
result of mediation being in the best interests of the child.  
The court may approve or reject the agreement based on the best 
interest of the child.  
¶119 As we can see by the text of these statutes, the 
legislature is well versed at stating a burden of proof when and 
where it deems one to be applicable.  We should not presume then 
that the legislature has imposed a burden of proof where it has 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
21 
 
not so stated one.11  Where the legislature made a statutory 
distinction, "it is the task of this court to give effect and 
meaning to that distinction."  Est. of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 
99, 
¶42, 
378 
Wis. 2d 358, 
903 
N.W.2d 759; 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word . . . .").  
¶120 Courts function day to day making a whole variety of 
determinations that the legislature requires be made "in the 
best 
interests 
of 
the 
child." 
 
In 
those 
matters, 
the 
determinations are made in the discretion of the court with that 
consideration in mind.  To suggest that the legislature really 
meant to write a burden of proof where none is written,12 and 
                                                 
11 Fundamental 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
require us to determine that where the legislature used the same 
terminology throughout the same statutory section, in this case 
Chapter 48, the legislature meant it to have the same meaning.  
Additional statutory interpretation principles dictate that had 
the legislature wished to mandate a burden of proof at 
disposition in TPR proceedings, it would have clearly done so, 
as it did at the grounds phase, in the same chapter, dealing 
with the same statutory subject: TPR proceedings.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 48.31; Wis. Stat. 48.426(3).  But an analysis of the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) shows that the 
legislature chose not to mandate a burden of proof at the 
disposition phase in a TPR proceeding as it did at grounds.  A 
survey of our statutes shows that the legislature has clearly 
mandated a burden of proof accompany the "best interests of the 
child" standard before.  So, had the legislature wanted to 
mandate a statutory burden of proof at disposition in TPR 
proceedings, the legislature could have clearly done so.  The 
fact that the legislature chose not to do so, is certainly 
instructive.  
12 There is no burden of proof at disposition in the plain 
language of the statute.  The legislature chose not to include 
one.  Instead, the legislature chose, as it did under other 
statutory schemes, simply to utilize the standalone "best 
interests of the child" standard. 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
22 
 
that it "forgot" to write a burden of proof when it does just 
that in other subsections of the Children's Code, is contrary to 
fundamental statutory interpretation principles13 and without 
support in the language of the statute.   
¶121 In 
summary, 
in 
applying 
fundamental 
statutory 
interpretation principles to the statute before us, we determine 
that the there is no statutory burden of proof at the 
dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding.  The plain text of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.426(2) is unambiguous; there is no statutory burden 
listed.  Instead, the statute requires courts to utilize the 
"best interests of the child" standard.  The legislature chose 
not to include a burden of proof in this statutory scheme even 
though the legislature included a burden of proof in other 
statutory schemes which also relied on the "best interests of 
the child" standard.  In considering other statutes, we find 
that this legislative choice is not unique, particularly when 
considering the best interests of the child.  
                                                 
13 Fundamental 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
dictate that the phrase "best interests of the child" is 
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the text.  See 
Scalia & Garner, supra n.4, at 170-73 (Presumption of Consistent 
Usage).  Moreover, we should not assume the legislature meant 
more than it said.  We should give the statute's plain language 
its due.  We are not "at liberty to disregard the plain, clear 
words of the statute" we are analyzing.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 
N.W.2d 18 (1967)).  "We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language."  Id., ¶44.  We should 
respect the choice of the legislature to not place a burden of 
proof on the standard at disposition.  
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
23 
 
III 
¶122 "The 
procedural 
due 
process 
clause 
protects 
individuals from governmental 'denial of fundamental procedural 
fairness.'"  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶53, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59 (quoting County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998)).  Because the statutes 
provide for a discretionary decision based on the evidence and 
testimony at disposition, a lack of burden of proof does not 
suggest the proceedings are so fundamentally unfair as to 
violate a parent's procedural due process guarantees.  Instead, 
the TPR proceedings provide ample statutory and constitutional 
protections to ensure that a parent's rights are not erroneously 
terminated in an unfair and defective proceeding.    
¶123 In the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding, if the 
parent pleads no contest to the grounds alleged in the petition, 
the court cannot just accept the plea.  Instead, "[t]he circuit 
court must engage the parent in a colloquy to ensure that the 
plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."  Brenda B., 331 
Wis. 2d 310, 
¶35. 
 
"This 
colloquy 
is 
governed 
by 
the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7)14 and notions of due 
                                                 
14 Under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7), before the circuit court 
can "accept[] an admission of the alleged facts in the 
petition," it must: 
(a)  Address the parties present and determine 
that 
the 
admission 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the acts alleged in the 
petition and the potential dispositions.  
(b)  Establish whether any promises or threats 
were made to elicit an admission and alert all 
unrepresented parties to the possibility that a lawyer 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
24 
 
process."15  Id., ¶35 (citing Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 
WI 28, ¶¶25, 39, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607) (emphasis 
added).  But due process considerations do not mandate a burden 
of proof at the disposition phase because instead, during this 
phase, "[t]he focus shifts to the interests of the child."  
Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶28; Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  The 
parent's procedural due process rights at the disposition 
                                                                                                                                                             
may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances 
which would not be apparent to them. 
(bm)  Establish 
whether 
a 
proposed 
adoptive 
parent of the child has been identified. . . .   
(br)  Establish whether any person has coerced a 
birth parent or any alleged or presumed father of the 
child in violation of s. 48.63(3)(b)5.  Upon a finding 
of coercion, the court shall dismiss the petition.  
(c)  Make 
such 
inquiries 
as 
satisfactorily 
establish that there is a factual basis for the 
admission.  
See also Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶39, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607; Oneida Cnty. Dep't Soc. Servs. v. 
Therese S., 2008 WI App 159, 
¶5, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 
N.W.2d 122.  
15 To ensure parents' due process rights are protected, the 
court 
must 
ensure 
the 
parent 
"[has] 
knowledge 
of 
the 
constitutional rights he or she is giving up by making the 
plea."  Kenosha Cnty. Dep't Human Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 
93, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845.  This includes 
informing the parents of potential outcomes.  While the court is 
not required to inform parents of all potential outcomes, the 
court is required to inform the parent "of the statutory 
standard the court will apply at the second stage," namely, the 
best interests of the child.  Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶16.  
And, the court must inform parents that "the best interests of 
the child shall be the prevailing factor considered by the court 
in determining the disposition."  Id.; see also Brown Cnty. 
Dep't Human Servs. v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶56, 331 
Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730.  
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
25 
 
therefore are diminished because the parent has already been 
found to be unfit by the factfinder. "The best interests of the 
child do not 'prevail' until the parent has been declared unfit 
after fact-finding by the court or jury at the grounds phase of 
the TPR proceeding."  Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶36, 
271 
Wis. 2d 1, 
678 
N.W.2d 856 
(quoting 
Julie 
A.B., 255 
Wis. 2d 170, ¶22).   
¶124 During this phase, the court hears testimony from any 
interested party as to the disposition of the petition.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.427(1) ("Any party may present evidence relevant to 
the issue of disposition, including expert testimony, and may 
make alternative dispositional recommendations to the court.").  
The court weighs the testimony received against all of the 
statutory factors in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).16  The court may yet 
decide to "dismiss the petition if it finds the evidence does 
not warrant the termination of parental rights."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.427(2).  Or, the court may decide to terminate the parental 
rights of one parent.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(3).  Or, the court 
may decide to terminate the parental rights of both parents.  
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶7 n.6; State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, 
¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475 (agreeing with court of 
appeals' decision to remand, notwithstanding its erroneous 
statutory interpretation, because "the record indicates that the 
circuit court failed to consider all of the relevant statutory 
factors enumerated under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)" (emphasis 
added)); Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶4 (concluding the court 
"must consider . . . the six factors enumerated in § 48.426(3) 
in determining the best interests of the child" but "the court 
may also consider other factors . . . but all factors relied 
upon must be calibrated to the prevailing standard:  the best 
interests of the child"). 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
26 
 
Id.  Whatever the outcome chosen, in exercising its discretion 
at disposition, the court must ensure its decision is in "the 
best interests of the child."  
¶125 This 
procedure 
recognizes 
the 
profound 
interests 
involved in terminating a parent's rights.  On the one hand, the 
parent has a strong interest in the continuation of the family 
unit and child rearing.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 651 
(1972).  This interest though comes into tension with the 
State's interest in the welfare and well-being of the child.  
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).  
Because these two colliding interests are at stake, "[w]hen the 
State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide 
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."  Santosky, 455 
U.S. at 753-54.  In Santosky, the United States Supreme Court 
applied the three-factor analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976),17 to determine that factual findings of a 
parent's unfitness for parental termination decisions required 
a  clear and convincing burden of proof.  See Santosky, 455 U.S. 
at 769.  Like Wisconsin's TPR procedures, the New York statutes 
at issue in Santosky also involved a two-step process with the 
first part being a factual determination of the parent's 
unfitness which, if determined by the factfinder, then proceeds 
                                                 
17 In determining what procedural due process protections 
are owed, the Court considered three factors:  "the private 
interest 
that 
will 
be 
affected 
by 
the 
official 
action[,] . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest 
through 
the 
procedures 
used[,] . . . and 
[] 
the 
Government's interest[.]"  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976). 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
27 
 
to a secondary determination of "what placement would serve the 
child's best interests."  Id. at 748.  The Court's holding 
requiring a higher burden of proof than preponderance of 
evidence was only in relation to the first part of the 
termination proceedings involving factual findings.  Id. at 769.   
¶126 Once the State has met this burden, the private 
interests of the parent are diminished at this stage of the 
proceedings because the factual finding of unfitness has already 
been established.  The government's interest to promote and 
provide for the welfare of the child becomes heightened with the 
factual finding of the parent's unfitness.  Procedural due 
process requirements are thus satisfied when, as here, the 
circuit court considers the non-exhaustive list of statutory 
factors, Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(a)-(f), as required in making 
its determination of what is in the best interests of the child.  
This, combined with the procedural process allowing for an open 
evidentiary hearing, satisfies what procedural due process 
requires.  Additionally, all parties in this stage of the 
proceeding are allowed to produce any relevant testimony and 
evidence to aid the circuit court in its best interests of the 
child determination.  
¶127 Decisions as to the "best interests of the child" lie 
within the discretionary domain of the circuit court.  Julie 
A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶42 ("[T]he wise and compassionate 
discretion of the court will determine whether termination will 
'promote the best interests of the child.'" (citation omitted)).  
Instead, "[i]t is the best interests of the child that is the 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
28 
 
'polestar' at the dispositional hearing."  Brenda B., 331 
Wis. 2d 310, ¶33 (citing Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶30).  
But, the court's discretion as to what is in the child's best 
interest 
is 
tethered 
to 
the 
evidence 
presented 
and 
to 
consideration of the mandatory statutory requirements, while 
complying with procedural due process.   
¶128 While "[t]he ultimate determination of whether to 
terminate parental rights is discretionary with the circuit 
court," Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶27, parents and child 
alike are provided multiple statutory layers of protection 
throughout the TPR procedures.  These statutory layers of 
protection ensure that:   
While, as in all discretionary acts of a court, 
reasonable 
persons 
may 
sometimes 
differ 
in 
the 
outcome, all that this court need find to sustain a 
discretionary act is that the trial court examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, 
using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. 
Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175.  
Procedural 
"due 
process 
is 
flexible 
and 
calls 
for 
such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands."  
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  In this 
situation, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
decision 
at 
disposition does not require a burden of proof.  Instead, the 
child's best interest is paramount.  
IV 
¶129 Consequently, I conclude that for the TPR statutes 
applicable in this case, Wis. Stat. § 48.31 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2), no burden of proof applies at disposition and the 
No.  2022AP1329.akz 
 
29 
 
court correctly stated the "best interests of the child" 
standard applicable at disposition.  We should not shy away from 
determining that which has been agreed to by the parties, 
determined 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
comported 
with 
the 
requirements of procedural due process, and is apparent from the 
plain language of the statutes.  
¶130 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶131 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2022AP1329.awb 
 
1 
 
¶132 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion with the exception of paragraphs 65-67.  I 
write separately to briefly emphasize and clarify two points. 
¶133 First, I emphasize that we do not decide whether there 
is a burden of proof at disposition, and if so, what that burden 
is.  Majority op., ¶6 n.4.  Chief Justice Ziegler's concurrence 
notwithstanding, we have not been presented with either argument 
or adversarial briefing on such questions.1  Thus, under the 
current state of our case law, the circuit court at the plea 
colloquy must state the "statutory standard," i.e., the "best 
interest of the child."  Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Therese S., 2008 WI App 159, ¶16, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 
N.W.2d 122.  
¶134 Second, because we do not decide whether there is a 
burden of proof at disposition, I write to clarify that we need 
not resolve whether any potential burden is a "trial right."  
The majority opinion's discussion on this point may foster 
confusion.  See majority op., ¶¶65-67.  It could be read to 
condition whether something is a "right" on whether the circuit 
court refers to it as such.  This cannot be. 
 
                                                 
1 I observe that the court of appeals, in a recent 
unpublished opinion, determined that there is a burden at the 
disposition stage, and that the burden is a preponderance of the 
evidence.  State v. H.C., No. 2023AP1950, unpublished slip op., 
¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2024).  I cite to an unpublished 
opinion for the singular purpose of illustrating that the issue 
is a live one, which has been percolating below.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.23(3). 
No.  2022AP1329.awb 
 
2 
 
¶135 While muddying the waters, the opinion may also call 
into question this court's decision in Brown Cnty. Dep't of 
Human Servs. v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 
N.W.2d 730.  I clarify that Brenda B. remains good law and that 
in no way is a "right" contingent on how the circuit court 
refers to it in a plea colloquy. 
¶136 The majority states that the circuit court here used 
the term "rights" in the plea colloquy to "precisely and 
specifically" refer to "procedural and constitutional rights:  
the right to a trial (to a jury or a judge), the right to call 
and cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses, 
and the right to testify or to remain silent."  Majority op., 
¶65.  However, this list of procedural and constitutional rights 
is not exhaustive.   
¶137 In Brenda B., the court referred to the importance of 
a parent understanding that the parent gives up the "right to 
make the petitioner prove unfitness by clear and convincing 
evidence" when pleading no contest at the grounds phase of a TPR 
proceeding.  Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶43 (emphasis added).  
Holding the State to its burden is similarly described as a 
"right" in other contexts.  For example, in the seminal United 
States Supreme Court case In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), 
the Court refers to the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable 
doubt as "as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a 
delinquency 
proceeding 
as 
are 
those 
constitutional 
safeguards [of] . . . notice of charges, right to counsel, the 
rights of confrontation and examination, and the privilege 
No.  2022AP1329.awb 
 
3 
 
against self-incrimination."  Id. at 368; see also State v. 
Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶42, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 
(referring to "the defendant's right to make the state prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to support guilt") 
(emphasis added).  Under such an understanding, there would be 
no argument that in a criminal case the right to hold the State 
to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a 
"right." 
¶138 The majority opinion in the present case could be read 
to confuse this understanding.  Its analysis is predicated on 
what the circuit court said, not whether holding the State to a 
particular burden is actually a "right."  The opinion could 
imply that something is not a "right" unless the circuit court 
refers to it as such.  Clearly, a legal "right" is a "right" 
regardless of what the circuit court says or fails to say. 
¶139 For the reasons stated above, I respectfully concur. 
¶140 I am authorized to state that Justice JANET C. 
PROTASIEWICZ joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2022AP1329.awb 
 
1