Title: State v. C.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002205
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2022

2022 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2205 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the interest of C. G., a person under the age 
of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
C. G., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 396 Wis. 2d 105, 955 N.W.2d 443 
PDC No:2021 WI App 11 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 17, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Shawano   
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Kussel, J.    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to all parts except ¶¶6 and 36–46, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion with respect to ¶¶6 and 36–46, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Cary E. Bloodworth, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Cary E. Bloodworth.  
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
filed by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, with whom 
 
 
2 
on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Abigail Potts, assistant attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Abigail L. Churchill, 
Hayley I. Archer, and Trans Law Help Wisconsin, Madison and 
Hawks Quindel, S.C., Madison, for Trans Law Help Wisconsin and 
Hawks Quindel, S.C.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Matthew S. Pinix, 
Marsha L. Levick, and Pinix Law, LLC, Milwaukee, and Juvenile 
Law Center, Philadelphia, for Juvenile Law Center, national 
Center for Lesbian Rights, Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, and Eric S. Janus.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Matthew E. Kelley John 
A. 
Knight, 
Laurence 
J. 
Dupuis, 
and 
Ballard 
Spahr 
LLP, 
Washington, D.C., American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin 
Foundation, Inc., Milwaukee, and American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation LGBT & HIV Project, Chicago, for the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation and American Civil Liberties Union of 
Wisconsin Foundation.  
  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 60 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2205-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016JV38) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the interest of C. G., a person under the 
age of 18: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
C. G., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to all parts except ¶¶6 and 36–46, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion with respect to ¶¶6 and 36–46, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   When Ella was 15 years 
old, she and another teenager, Mandy, sexually assaulted their 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
2 
 
supposed 
friend, 
14-year-old 
Alan.1 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
adjudicated Ella delinquent.2  Ella moved to stay juvenile sex 
offender registration, arguing she and her offense satisfied the 
four criteria in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m)(a)1m. (2017–18).  The 
court denied her motion, finding the offense was "clearly a 
forceful act"; therefore, it concluded Ella's offense could not 
satisfy one of the criteria.  As a result, the law required Ella 
to register as a sex offender.  Less than a year later, Ella 
filed a postdispositional motion to stay registration.  She 
seeks review of a court of appeals decision3 affirming the 
circuit court's denial of this motion. 
¶2 
Ella's legal arguments are grounded in her gender 
identity.  She entered the juvenile justice system as a male.  
Sometime thereafter, Ella realized she was a transgender girl, 
i.e., a biological male who self-identifies as a girl.  Ella has 
a 
traditionally 
masculine 
legal 
name 
she 
believes 
is 
incompatible with her gender identity.  Ella complains she is 
bound to "out herself" as a male anytime she is required to 
                                                 
1 The facts underlying this case involve three juveniles, 
for whom we use pseudonyms.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.81(8) 
(2019–20). 
2 The Honorable William F. Kussel, Jr., Shawano County 
Circuit Court, presided. 
3 State v. C.G., 2021 WI App 11, 396 Wis. 2d 105, 955 
N.W.2d 443. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
3 
 
produce her legal name.4  If Ella were not a sex offender, she 
could petition the circuit court for a legal name change under 
Wis. Stat. § 786.36 (2019–20);5 however, another statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 301.47(2)(a), prohibits her from filing such a petition 
because she is a sex offender, although the State argues it does 
not prohibit her from using an alias provided she notifies the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) of her intent to do so in 
advance. 
¶3 
Ella raises two legal issues for our consideration.  
She argues requiring her to register as a sex offender:  
(1) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to 
her; and (2) violates her right to free speech under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Both arguments 
rest on Ella's inability to change her legal name to conform to 
her gender identity. 
¶4 
We reject both arguments.  Consistent with well-
established precedent, we hold Ella's placement on the sex 
offender registry is not a "punishment" under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Even if it were, sex offender registration is 
neither cruel nor unusual.  We further hold Ella's right to free 
speech does not encompass the power to compel the State to 
                                                 
4 See out, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 
2014) (defining "out" as "to identify publicly as being such 
secretly" 
and 
"esp 
: 
to 
identify 
as 
being 
a 
closet 
homosexual[.]"). 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
4 
 
facilitate a change of her legal name.  We therefore affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  An Overview of Ella, the Perpetrator 
¶5 
Ella, who is now 22, questioned her gender identity 
throughout her adolescence.  After the State filed a delinquency 
petition against Ella, she began to express "thoughts of 
transitioning."  By the time the court held a hearing on Ella's 
first motion to stay sex offender registration, she had started 
transitioning.  At this point, she thought of herself as a 
transgender girl and began self-identifying and attempting to 
present her appearance in a manner consistent with her newfound 
self-awareness.6  The circuit court found she is now fairly open 
about her status as a member of the "LGBTQ"7 community.   
¶6 
Because Ella entered the juvenile justice system as a 
male, many relevant records——including records prepared at the 
direction of Ella's appellate counsel——refer to her using male 
pronouns.8  When quoting those records, we use those pronouns. 
                                                 
6 Ella has not filed a legal name change petition under Wis. 
Stat. § 786.36.  Before the court of appeals, the State argued 
Ella's First Amendment claim was not ripe because the "claim is 
based on the possibility that she might someday unsuccessfully 
try to change her name."  C.G., 396 Wis. 2d 105, ¶29 n.7.  The 
court rejected this argument because Ella is prohibited by Wis. 
Stat. § 301.47(2)(a) from changing her legal name.  Id.  The 
State has not raised ripeness before us, so we address it no 
further. 
7 LGBTQ stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and 
Queer or Questioning. 
8 See, e.g., R. 95:3 n.1 ("Because [Ella] is still legally 
considered to be male, and it is as a male that he entered the 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
5 
 
Elsewhere in our opinion, however, we use female pronouns out of 
respect for Ella's individual dignity.  All parties and amici 
curiae used her preferred pronouns in their briefing, and the 
court of appeals used them in its published opinion.9   
¶7 
Ella's size is critical to understanding the forceful 
nature of the sexual assault.  The circuit court found Ella was 
"pretty massive."  Although we do not have anything in the 
record giving Ella's exact dimensions at the time of the sexual 
assault, a youth justice case worker testified at a hearing a 
little over a year later that Ella was 6-foot-5-inches tall and 
weighed 345 pounds, taking this information from a face sheet 
                                                                                                                                                             
criminal justice system, he is referred to throughout the 
evaluation report [by his legal name], and as a male."). 
9 We 
recognize 
the 
use 
of 
preferred 
pronouns 
is 
a 
controversial issue.  No law compels our use of Ella's preferred 
pronouns; we use them voluntarily.  Our decision to do so bears 
no legal significance in this case, nor should it be construed 
to support their compulsory use. 
Although cautioning courts to "remain scrupulously neutral" 
with respect to the use of pronouns, Justice Brian Hagedorn does 
not recognize in his concurrence that referring to Ella as C.G. 
will be seen as a partisan choice by many readers.  Concurrence, 
¶101.  The "ontological and moral question[]" over pronouns is 
neither legal in nature nor within the scope of the issues 
presented.  See id., ¶99.  We join the parties and the court of 
appeals in referring to Ella using her preferred pronouns.   In 
addition to showing respect for Ella's individual dignity, using 
the 
same 
convention 
as 
the 
parties 
ensures 
we 
"remain 
scrupulously neutral"——in contrast, Justice Hagedorn uses a 
convention even the State, which is adversarial to Ella, has 
chosen not to use.  Id., ¶101.  The only alternatives to 
choosing between masculine and feminine pronouns in this opinion 
would either offend the rules of grammar (the singular "they") 
or produce a stilted writing (exclusive use of proper nouns). 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
6 
 
prepared by the DOC.  A report submitted by Ella's appellate 
counsel said she was 6-foot-4-inches tall and weighed 300 
pounds. 
B.  An Overview of Alan, the Victim 
¶8 
In contrast to Ella, Alan is a heterosexual male.  He 
had 
minimal 
prior 
sexual 
knowledge 
before 
Ella 
sexually 
assaulted him.  He did not know what the word "ejaculated" meant 
when a law enforcement officer questioned him about the assault.  
The officer had to rephrase his question, asking "if anything 
came out of [Alan's] penis" as a result of Ella's contact with 
it. 
¶9 
Alan was diagnosed with autism between one-and-a-half 
and two years of age.  When he was four months old, a medical 
condition necessitated the surgical removal of the lens of his 
left eye, leaving him blind in that eye.  For nearly all of 
Alan's life, he has needed physical and speech therapy.  His 
mother testified at the dispositional hearing Alan was 5-foot-
10-inches tall and weighed 110 pounds.  Based on this testimony, 
the circuit court inferred Alan was "pretty frail[.]" 
¶10 Alan's 
mother 
further 
testified 
his 
autism 
significantly 
affects 
his 
learning 
and 
social 
abilities.  
Specifically, his mother testified he has done poorly in school, 
has had an Individualized Education Program, and has needed 
special classes.  At the time of the assault, Alan was a ninth-
grader but his mother explained he worked at a sixth-grade level 
and was "nowhere near where he should be with the rest of his 
peers." 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 Alan's mother also explained he has never had much of 
a "social life[.]"  According to her, people often become 
annoyed by Alan because he does not understand social cues, such 
as when to stop a conversation.  As a result, he has "had a hard 
time making friends."  Part of the tragedy of this case is that 
Alan's first "supposed friends," or more accurately, "the first 
group of people" with whom he socialized, unsupervised by 
adults, took advantage of him.  She explained the assault has 
had a profound impact on his life, causing Alan grave 
embarrassment. 
C.  The Sexual Assault 
¶12 Alan appears to have met Ella through Mandy, a female 
classmate.  All three juveniles were in the ninth grade at the 
time of the sexual assault; however, Ella was fifteen and Alan 
was fourteen.  According to the officer's narrative attached to 
the delinquency petition, in early 2016, Mandy's sister picked 
up Mandy, Ella, and Alan and drove them to Mandy's parents' 
house.  The four of them went into Mandy's bedroom where they 
talked and texted.  Eventually, Mandy's sister left to go to 
work.  Whether Mandy's parents were home is unclear, but the 
petition suggests Alan believed they were. 
¶13 As night time approached, Ella began sending sexually-
explicit Facebook messages to Alan.  She first asked Alan "if he 
had ever received 'head' before."  Ella then sent at least two 
messages about giving Alan "head."  Alan repeatedly told Ella he 
did not want her to give him "head."  Alan showed the messages 
to Mandy.  In response, Mandy told Alan he should let Ella "do 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
8 
 
it because it feels great."  Alan told her he "did not want to 
get 'head' from a guy." 
¶14 Despite Alan's explicit rebukes, Ella "pushed" him 
onto the bed.  Ella sat on his legs while Mandy restrained his 
arms.  Ella then pulled his pants and underwear down.  Alan 
tried yelling for help, hoping Mandy's parents were home and 
would hear his cries; however, Mandy placed one of her hands 
over Alan's mouth.  Ella then put her mouth around Alan's penis.  
Ella's 
appellate 
counsel 
characterizes 
the 
assault 
as 
"brief[] . . . oral contact with a male friend's penis against 
his wishes," but this assault was a heinous act that forever 
changed Alan's life. 
¶15 Afterward, Ella and Mandy told Alan not to tell anyone 
what they had done to him.  Alan did not say anything because he 
was embarrassed.  Ella, apparently, was not:  she told at least 
two classmates.  She also taunted Alan via Facebook Messenger: 
Ella: 
Remember that time I gave you head?? 
Alan: 
It was fucking unconfortable. 
Ella: 
Uncomfortable* 
Alan: 
Com 
Ella: 
Cum ?? Well anyways if it wasn't for me being 
 
nice, I was gonna do it to you in the Garage 
 
Just saying 
Alan: 
Yea ik that's y I felt weird 
Ella: 
you know you liked it. 
Alan: 
No 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
9 
 
¶16 The high school rumor mill began to turn, and word got 
back to Alan that his classmates knew he had been sexually 
assaulted by Ella.  Alan had various conversations via Facebook 
Messenger indicating he had been assaulted.  A few months after 
the sexual assault, Alan's parents discovered the Facebook 
messages between Alan and his classmates indicating he had been 
assaulted and notified law enforcement. 
D.  Procedural History 
¶17 The State filed a delinquency petition against Ella, 
alleging one count of sexual assault of a child under the age of 
16 and one count of disorderly conduct (both counts as a party 
to the crime).  The circuit court accepted Ella's no-contest 
plea to the sexual-assault count and dismissed but read in the 
disorderly-conduct count. 
¶18 At 
a 
dispositional 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
committed Ella to the DOC for six to ten months, some of which 
was spent at Lincoln Hills, a secure juvenile correctional 
facility.  The court described the sexual assault as "a violent 
attack" because Alan was "held down by two individuals," and it 
was "clearly done against [his] will[.]"   The court also 
emphasized Ella's physical stature——she's a large person, and 
she 
preyed 
on 
a 
frail 
victim. 
 
It 
also 
noted 
Alan's 
disabilities.  It found placement in the home would be "contrary 
to the welfare of the juvenile and the community" because Ella 
"engaged in a forceful delinquent act to a child.  He 
jeopardized and victimized this child.  [Ella] needs to have 
intensive treatment to help him develop a better thought process 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
10 
 
to where he can improve his decision making skills and reduce 
his impulsive behaviors." 
¶19 Ella filed a motion to stay sex offender registration.  
The circuit court held a hearing, denied the motion, and ordered 
Ella to register as a sex offender for 15 years.  In March 2018, 
Ella filed a postdisposition motion to stay sex offender 
registration.  The circuit court denied the postdisposition 
motion, concluding that sex offender registration is appropriate 
and constitutional.   
¶20 The circuit court concluded sex offender registration 
is not punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  The circuit 
court's discussion of Ella's First Amendment claim is more 
complicated because Ella couched her First Amendment claim in 
terms of a violation of substantive due process.  She argued, 
"[s]ubstantive due process protects against government action 
that is arbitrary and wrong regardless of the fairness of the 
procedure used to implement them.  To prevail on a substantive 
due process claim, the claimant must show the infringement of 
one or more liberty interests."10  She then listed four "liberty 
interests" in the following order, all under the heading 
"Wisconsin's juvenile SOR provisions violate substantive due 
process": 
1.   Reputation. 
2.   Right to travel/freedom of movement. 
3.   Freedom of speech/expression. 
                                                 
10 Quotation marks omitted. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
11 
 
4.   Informational privacy. 
Under the subheading "[f]reedom of speech/expression," Ella 
focused her discussion on substantive due process.  For example, 
she argued: 
Few decisions are as deeply personal and important as 
a person's right to live in a manner consistent with 
their gender identity.  "The Constitution promises 
liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that 
includes 
certain 
specific 
rights 
that 
allow 
persons . . . to define and express their identity."  
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).  
Constitutionally protected liberty interests are those 
that implicate "individual dignity and autonomy"——
i.e., decisions or actions that "shape an individual's 
destiny."  Id. at 2597, 2599.  A person's core 
internal sense of their own gender, and what that 
means for their everyday life, is profoundly central 
to their personal identity in ways the Constitution 
protects.[11] 
This 
discussion, 
which 
included 
multiple 
references 
to 
Obergefell, 
a 
landmark 
substantive 
due 
process 
case, 
demonstrates Ella made a different claim before the circuit 
court than on appeal. 
¶21 The circuit court understood itself to be adjudicating 
a substantive due process claim, not a free speech claim.  It 
provided a thorough, written opinion explaining why the law did 
not "shock the conscience . . . or interfere[] with rights 
implicit to the concept of ordered liberty."12  It concluded, 
"[t]he name change restriction is reasonably related to the 
purpose of the statute; registration by its very nature needs to 
                                                 
11 Ellipsis in the original. 
12 Ellipsis in the original. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
12 
 
keep accurate records of its registrants."  Additionally, it 
noted, "[t]he court understands that it could be emotionally 
difficult for an LGBTQ person to have to reveal their LGBTQ 
status; however, . . . it does not appear that [Ella] has taken 
any action to hide her LGBTQ status."   
¶22 Ella appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.  On 
appeal, Ella did not mention substantive due process at all, 
instead focusing on her cruel and unusual punishment claim and 
converting her substantive due process challenge into a free 
speech claim.  The court of appeals rejected Ella's Eighth 
Amendment 
argument. 
 
First, 
it 
concluded 
sex 
offender 
registration 
is 
not 
punishment 
based 
on 
well-established 
precedent.  State v. C.G., 2021 WI App 11, ¶¶41–47, 396 
Wis. 2d 105, 955 N.W.2d 443.  Second, it concluded Ella cannot 
bring an as-applied challenge to circumvent this precedent.  
Id., ¶¶44–47.  The court of appeals also rejected her First 
Amendment claim, holding Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2)(a) does not 
implicate the freedom of speech.  Id., ¶¶26–32.  Even if free 
speech were at issue, the court of appeals determined the law 
would be at most a content-neutral restriction on speech, and it 
would survive intermediate scrutiny because it "is sufficiently 
tailored 
to 
achieve 
the 
State's 
important 
interest 
in 
efficiently tracking registered sex offenders."  Id., ¶¶33–40.  
Ella filed a petition for review, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 The constitutionality of a statutory scheme is a 
question of law, which we review independently while benefitting 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
13 
 
from the analyses of the lower courts.  T.L.E.-C. v. S.E., 2021 
WI 56, ¶13, 397 Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 391 (citations omitted); 
see also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶44, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 
N.W.2d 451 (citation omitted). 
III.  ELLA'S CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAIM 
¶24 The Eighth Amendment states:  "Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted."  Ella's Eighth Amendment claim 
fails for two reasons.  First, sex offender registration is not 
a "punishment" within the meaning of that word as it is used in 
the Eighth Amendment.  Second, even if it were, sex offender 
registration is neither cruel nor unusual. 
A.  Sex Offender Registration Is Not a Punishment 
¶25 "A deprivation cannot violate the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishment' unless it 
first qualifies as 'punishment.'"  Millard v. Camper, 971 
F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Carney v. Okla. Dep't 
of Public Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1352 (10th Cir. 2017)).  To 
determine whether sex offender registration is a punishment, 
courts look first to the intent of the legislature; if the 
intent is not to punish, only the "clearest proof" of the law's 
punitive effects can establish it constitutes punishment.  Id. 
(quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)).  At the effects 
stage, courts consider various factors.  Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).  These factors include, but 
are 
not 
limited 
to: 
 
(1) 
"whether 
[the 
sanction] 
has 
historically been regarded as a punishment"; (2) "whether its 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
14 
 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment——
retribution and deterrence"; and (3) "whether an alternative 
purpose [i.e., a nonpunitive purpose] to which it may rationally 
be connected is assignable[.]"  Id. at 168–69. 
¶26 Following the lead of almost every other court to have 
addressed the issue, this court in State v. Bollig determined 
the legislative intent of the sex offender registration scheme 
is not punitive, nor are its effects sufficiently punitive to 
constitute punishment.  2000 WI 6, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199.  The case arose in the context of a motion for plea 
withdrawal.  Id., ¶1.  The petitioner contended his no-contest 
plea to attempted sexual assault was defective because the 
circuit court did not inform him that, as a result of his plea, 
he would be required to register as a sex offender.  Id.  
Whether the plea was defective turned on whether sex offender 
registration is a collateral consequence of the criminal 
conviction 
or 
a 
punishment. 
 
Id., 
¶16 
("Courts 
are 
constitutionally required to notify defendants of the 'direct 
consequences' of their pleas. . . .  In contrast, defendants do 
not have a due process right to be informed of the collateral 
consequences 
of 
their 
pleas. . . .  
In 
essence, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
registration 
requirement 
constitutes 
punishment."  (citations omitted)). 
¶27 This court began its analysis by noting, "[o]f the 
states that have addressed whether registration of sex offenders 
is punishment, all but one have answered in the negative."  Id., 
¶18.  The general consensus among the courts of this nation at 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
15 
 
that time continues to prevail:  the intent of sex offender 
registration requirements is to protect the public, not punish 
the offender, and sex offender registration is not, in effect, 
so punitive as to constitute punishment.  Id., ¶20 (citations 
omitted); see Smith, 538 U.S. at 96, 105 (concluding Alaska's 
Sex Offender Registration Act is nonpunitive in intent and 
effect); see also Hope v. Comm'r of Ind. Dep't of Corr., 9 
F.4th 513, 534 (7th Cir. 2021) (concluding Indiana's sex 
offender 
registry 
is 
nonpunitive); 
Belleau 
v. 
Wall, 
811 
F.3d 929, 
937 
(7th 
Cir. 
2016) 
(concluding 
Wisconsin's 
requirement that sex offenders subject to civil commitment wear 
a GPS monitoring device 24/7 is not a punishment, reasoning 
"[t]he monitoring law is not punishment; it is prevention"  
(citations omitted)); Millard, 971 F.3d at 1181 ("This court has 
twice, 
and 
the 
[United 
States] 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
once, 
determined that sex-offender registration requirements were not 
'punishments' 
because 
their 
respective 
legislatures 
lacked 
punitive intent and their application lacked punitive effect."  
(citations omitted)). 
¶28 As this court explained in Bollig, "[c]ourts that have 
determined that sex offender registration is not punitive have 
held that the underlying intent is public protection and 
safety. . . .  Likewise, Wisconsin's registration statute does 
not evince the intent to punish sex offenders[.]"  Bollig, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶¶20–21 (citations omitted)).  The intent of the 
law is "to protect the public and assist law enforcement."  Id., 
¶21.  "Registration statutes assist law enforcement agencies in 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
16 
 
investigating and apprehending offenders in order to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of the local community and members 
of the state."  Id., ¶20 (citing State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147, 
153 (N.D. 1999); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 
1994)).   
¶29 Legislative history, examined in Bollig, confirms this 
common sense construction of sex offender registration.  Id., 
¶22 (examining the drafting file of 1995 Wisconsin Act 440, 
which substantially revised the sex offender registration 
statute and renumbered it to Wis. Stat. § 301.45).  From the 
drafting file, "[t]he Executive Summary of Recommendations 
indicates that the intent underlying the legislation related to 
community protection."  Id. (citing Wis. DOC, Sex Offender 
Community Notification i (1994)).  "In addition, a stated goal 
included 
the 
balancing 
of 
community 
protection 
with 
the 
offender's community re-integration needs."  Id. (citing Sex 
Offender Community Notification, at 1).  This summary also 
reflected a concern that sex offenders not be subject to 
"vigilante-ism."  Id., ¶25 (citing Sex Offender Community 
Notification, at 2). 
¶30 The statute primarily at issue in this case, Wis. 
Stat. § 301.47, which prohibits sex offenders from changing 
their legal name, was enacted post-Bollig, but its legislative 
history confirms it is likewise not intended as a punishment.  
Senator Alberta Darling provided written testimony in support of 
the bill, explaining its purpose was to "close[] a major 
loophole" that had been plaguing the effectiveness of the sex 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
17 
 
offender registry.  Written Testimony of Senator Alberta Darling 
in Favor of AB 59 and AB 60 ((Written Testimony), Senate 
Committee on Education, Ethics & Elections (Mar. 27, 2003).  She 
noted, "[l]ast fall the Department of Corrections reported that 
it is uncertain of the location of nearly 2,900 of the 11,000 
offenders on the registry."  Id.; Press Release, Darling to Push 
for Sex Offender Notification Changes, Office of Senator Alberta 
Darling (Oct. 9, 2002) ("The spirit and the intent of the 
original sexual predator notification law is being usurped by 
those who don't care about the penalties that are currently in 
place[.]").13  She said the legislature had not anticipated the 
extent to which sex offenders would try to outwit the 
registration 
requirements. 
 
See 
Written 
Testimony. 
 
In 
particular, 
she 
noted, 
"[t]he 
Waukesha 
Police 
Department . . . encountered an offender who changed his name to 
avoid the registry."  Id.  Therefore, she thought the bill was 
necessary "because . . . this legislation will help protect 
children from harm and keep our communities safe."  Id.  See 
generally Jim Collar, Strengthening the Offender Registry, 
Oshkosh Northwestern, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1B (explaining "some 
Wisconsin 
officials 
want[ed] 
to 
make 
the 
[sex 
offender 
registration] laws stronger" because "public safety [was] 
hanging in the balance"). 
                                                 
13 Senator Darling did not describe registration as a 
penalty; she did discuss statutory penalties for failing to meet 
registration requirements. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
18 
 
¶31 In Bollig, after concluding the legislative intent was 
regulatory in nature, not punitive, this court examined the 
effect of the law.  The petitioner argued, "registration and the 
subsequent public dissemination of information under [Wis. 
Stat.] § 301.46 constitute punishment, akin to traditional 
shaming punishments used throughout history to degrade those who 
have overstepped the boundaries imposed by law."  Bollig, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, 
¶23 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
Specifically, 
the 
petitioner noted registration often results "in ostracism, 
humiliation, and retaliation[.]"  Id.  This court rejected that 
argument because "§ 301.46 . . . does not automatically grant 
the public carte blanche access to the information."  Id., ¶24.  
"[T]he selective release of information underscores that public 
protection, and not punishment, represents the core concern."  
Id. 
¶32 This 
court 
recognized 
"that 
sex 
offenders 
have 
suffered adverse consequences, including vandalism, loss of 
employment, 
and 
community 
harassment[.]" 
 
Id., 
¶26.  
Nevertheless, these effects "do not obviate the remedial and 
protective intent" of registration.  Id. (citations omitted).  
"Simply because registration can work a punitive effect, we are 
not convinced that such an effect overrides the primary and 
remedial goal underlying Wis. Stat. § 301.45 to protect the 
public."  Id. 
¶33 A few years before Bollig, this court decided State v. 
Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998), amended on 
denial of reconsideration, 220 Wis. 2d 360.  In that case, a 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
19 
 
juvenile argued the Juvenile Justice Code (JJC) violated his 
state and federal constitutional rights.  Id. at 869.  The 
answer to some of the issues he raised turned on whether a 
juvenile proceeding was "a criminal prosecution."  Id. at 871, 
877.  To support his argument that "for all intents and 
purposes" the JJC was a "criminal code," he argued a juvenile 
"is potentially subject to . . . a possible need to register as 
a sex offender[.]"  Id.  This court rejected that argument, 
reasoning, 
"[t]he 
requirements 
of 
[Wis. 
Stat.] 
§ 301.45 . . . are only imposed on a juvenile who is adjudicated 
delinquent where the particular facts of the case and concerns 
for 
public 
safety 
dictate 
it. 
 
This 
is 
not 
criminal 
punishment[.]"  Id. at 881; see also State v. Jeremy P., 2005 WI 
App 13, ¶15, 278 Wis. 2d 366, 692 N.W.2d 311 ("In light of our 
supreme court's conclusions in both Bollig and Hezzie, we cannot 
conclude 
that 
Jeremy 
has 
proven 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.34(15m)(bm) and 301.45(1m) are unconstitutional under the 
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.").  Hezzie R. is consistent with the rule in most 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 511 F. 
App'x 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding Ohio's sex offender 
registration "as applied to juvenile delinquents" is not a 
punishment). 
¶34 Ella acknowledges "[s]ex offender registration has not 
traditionally been viewed as punishment"; however, she seeks to 
circumvent longstanding precedent by arguing, as applied to her, 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
20 
 
sex 
offender 
registration 
constitutes 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment.  The law, however, does not recognize as-applied 
challenges under the Eighth Amendment as to whether a statute is 
punitive.  Whether a statute is punitive is determined in the 
abstract, without reference to "the facts and circumstances of 
an individual defendant."  State v. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ¶30, 
397 Wis. 2d 758, 960 N.W.2d 888 (citing Hudson v. United States, 
522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)); see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 
("Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the 
penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in 
relation to the statute on its face."  (emphasis added)). 
¶35 An "as-applied" analysis of whether sex offender 
registration constitutes punishment "would prove unworkable."  
See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001).  Sex offender 
registration "extends over time under conditions that are 
subject to change."  Id.  Its nature, whether penal or non-
penal, "cannot be altered based merely on vagaries" in the 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
to 
a 
particular 
offender's 
circumstances. 
 
Id. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
do 
not 
"evalut[e] 
the . . . nature of [a law] by reference to the effect [the law] 
has on a single individual."  Id. at 262. 
¶36 Even assuming, however, that Ella could launch an as-
applied challenge, her claim still fails.14  In other words, even 
                                                 
14 Justice Brian Hagedorn deems the analysis of Ella's as-
applied challenged "improper."  Concurrence, ¶96.  It isn't.  
The analysis proves the point the United States Supreme Court 
made in Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001):  an as-
applied challenge in the context of the Eighth Amendment is 
indeed unworkable, both substantively as well as temporally.  
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
21 
 
if we accepted her framework, which we do not, she still cannot 
show she has been subjected to punishment.  Many of her 
complaints are not unique to her: 
 For the next fifteen years, she is required to regularly 
report her legal name, aliases, date of birth, gender, 
race, height, weight, hair color, offense, address, 
internet profiles, email addresses, names and addresses 
of employment, and names and address of schools attended.  
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2). 
 She must notify the DOC each time she moves within 10 
days of moving.  § 301.45(4)(a). 
 Under some circumstances, police may disseminate her 
identity to the public.  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(5)(a). 
 Some municipalities have ordinances that restrict where 
she can live. 
 She 
will 
have 
to 
comply 
with 
specific 
statutory 
requirements to enter the premises of an elementary, 
middle, or high school.  Wis. Stat. § 301.475. 
These consequences of sex offender registration are no more a 
punishment for her than they were for the sex offenders in 
Bollig, Hezzie R., and numerous other cases. 
¶37 Reporting requirements impose a nominal burden on 
liberty that directly serves the public safety purpose of the 
law.  Additionally, this court rejected the argument that 
limited 
public 
dissemination 
of 
a 
sex 
offender's 
vital 
information constitutes "shaming" in Bollig.  232 Wis. 2d 561, 
¶¶23–24.  Ella also hyperbolizes the extent to which her 
information can be disseminated.  Sex offender registration for 
adults is generally "confidential," with certain exceptions.  
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(7)(a).  Under some circumstances (often 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
22 
 
because there is a need to protect the public), Wisconsin law 
allows certain government agencies to share registry information 
about adult offenders with non-law enforcement agencies and the 
public.  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(4) & (5).  However, these 
provisions do not allow the distribution of "[a]ny information 
concerning 
a 
child 
who 
is 
required 
to 
register," 
§ 301.46(4)(ag)1. & (5)(c)1., or "any information concerning a 
juvenile proceeding in which the person was involved" if the 
person is now an adult,15 § 301.46(4)(ag)2. & (5)(c)2. 
¶38 The restrictions on Ella's ability to enter a school 
raise a temporal question.  The statute she cites defines 
"school" as "an educational program for one or more grades 
between grades 1 and 12 and which is commonly known as an 
elementary school, middle school, junior high school, senior 
high school, or high school."  Wis. Stat. § 948.61(1)(b).  Ella 
is now 22 years old and past her high school years.  Whether we 
evaluate the punitive aspects of sex offender registration at 
the time it was imposed or presently, the requirements are 
nonetheless rationally connected to the public safety purpose of 
the law.  Additionally, Ella asks us to consider that she 
"completed sex offender treatment," i.e., she wants us to 
consider her as she exists now, not as she existed at the time 
she committed her offense.  She cannot have it both ways.  
                                                 
15 The State informs us in its brief that Ella's legal name 
does not appear in the online sex offender registry. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
23 
 
¶39 The only atypical effects Ella recites relate to her 
gender identity.  Much of her argument focuses on how Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.47(2), which prohibits her from petitioning the circuit 
court for a legal name change, is particularly consequential for 
her, as a transgender woman.  Specifically, Ella argues she has 
"a fundamental right to express her authentic gender identity."  
Because her legal name is male sounding, she believes it is 
inconsistent with this identity.  At this point, Ella is 22 
years old; however, she nonetheless argues her former status as 
a transgender youth, in combination with her status as a sex 
offender, create a particular hardship.  She says, "[f]ull 
expression of gender identity" would "alleviate . . . day-to-day 
harassment and systemic discrimination." 
¶40 Ella also argues requiring her to register as a sex 
offender lacks a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.  
This argument is largely grounded in social science that 
maintains juveniles who commit sexual offenses are at a low risk 
of reoffending.  Ella also notes, "not a single psychologist who 
assessed Ella thought that requiring her to register would 
promote public safety." 
¶41 As explained more thoroughly below, the law does not 
prohibit Ella from using an alias, only from petitioning the 
circuit court for a legal name change; therefore, nothing 
prevents her from expressing her gender identity.  For example, 
nothing prohibits her from dressing in women's clothing, wearing 
make-up, growing out her hair, or using a feminine alias.  
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
24 
 
Perhaps more importantly, Ella's suggestion that the State has 
no rational basis for keeping track of her is incredible. 
¶42 The circuit court noted many of the reports on which 
Ella relies to establish her low risk lack thoroughness.  
Specifically, the court stated, "[w]hen I looked at some of 
these reports too I also felt that they were –– I was a little 
surprised I thought they'd be a little more detailed, they don't 
seem to be."  So, the court found, "they are not as compelling 
as they could have been."  Effectively, the circuit court 
discounted these reports, noting, "[w]hile [Ella] argues that 
there is no evidence that juvenile sex offenders pose a 
significant risk of reoffending; the fact is that they still 
pose a risk.  That is because low risk does not mean no risk."  
See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 933–34 (7th Cir. 2016) 
("[E]ven if we credit the 8 and 16 percent figures the plaintiff 
can't be thought just a harmless old guy.  Readers of this 
opinion who are parents of young children should ask themselves 
whether they should worry that there are people in their 
community who have 'only' a 16 percent or an 8 percent 
probability of molesting young children——bearing in mind the 
lifelong psychological scars that such molestation frequently 
inflicts."  (citations omitted)).  The court also hypothesized 
that, to some extent, studies regarding juvenile sex offender 
recidivism might demonstrate little more than that registration 
"can help prevent further offenses by making it more difficult 
for an offender to reoffend; that is, they may be prevented from 
residing close to potential victims, and they may not be able to 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
25 
 
commit such crimes with the same anonymity as a non-registrant."  
The court also noted at the hearing on the first motion, "I 
believe from the evaluations, the latest evaluations from 
Lincoln Hills indicates that he's at high risk."   
¶43 The circuit court further found Ella's conduct was 
"impulsive" and "an opportunistic type of action," i.e., she 
took advantage of a victim who was vulnerable, despite the 
victim's repeated pleas for Ella to stop.  Sex offender 
registration is designed to eliminate opportunities for people 
who cannot control their impulses. 
¶44 The facts of the underlying offense are highly 
relevant.  While Ella and Alan were close in age, Alan has 
autism, was significantly behind in school, and is blind in one 
eye.  The sexual assault also involved an element of force; it 
was a very serious offense.  In the words of the circuit court, 
"[t]he serious and forceful nature of this attack should not and 
cannot be glossed over.  The child was physically held down, 
against his will, with the assistance of an accomplice while 
[Ella] sat on the child's legs and pulled his pants and 
underwear down."  Mandy placed her hand over Alan's mouth "to 
prevent him from crying out for help."  Ella was also 
significantly larger than Alan.  Ella knew what she had done was 
wrong; she told Alan not to tell anyone.  Had Ella been an 
adult, she would have been guilty of a Class C Felony carrying a 
maximum penalty of 40 years of imprisonment and a $100,000 fine.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c). 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
26 
 
¶45 Events 
occurring 
after 
the 
sexual 
assault 
also 
demonstrate a need to protect the public.  After Ella sexually 
assaulted Alan, she taunted him via Facebook; she also told 
fellow students at school about the assault, perpetuating Alan's 
victimization and trauma.  The circuit court also found Ella had 
"act[ed] inappropriately" at Lincoln Hills "when she attempted 
to kiss another student without the student's permission."  The 
court was particularly concerned about this event:  "this 
behavior needs to be put in context with the fact that the 
juvenile was at Lincoln Hills for a delinquency resulting from 
[the] underlying act of 2nd degree sexual assault of a minor 
child."  Although Ella admitted this attempted kissing was 
wrong, her acknowledgment "is no guarantee that [she] will not 
sexually act out in an illegal manner in the future.  This act 
is not evidence of a reduced risk to reoffend, but rather 
evidence of an increased risk to reoffend." 
¶46 In 
summary, 
sex 
offender 
registration 
does 
not 
constitute punishment under the law, which does not recognize 
Ella's as-applied challenge.  Requiring sex offenders like Ella 
to register their whereabouts with the State is rationally 
related to the public safety purpose underlying the law.  The 
record in this case amply illustrates the connection between 
tracking sex offenders like Ella and protecting the public.  
 
B.  Sex Offender Registration Is Neither Cruel Nor Unusual 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
27 
 
¶47 Ella's Eighth Amendment claim fails even if sex 
offender registration could be construed as punishment because 
registration is neither cruel nor unusual.  The United States 
Supreme Court considers punishment cruel and unusual only if it 
falls into one of two categories:  (1) "those modes or acts of 
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the 
time that the Bill of Rights was adopted"; or (2) "punishment 
inconsistent with 'evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.'"  Ninham, 333 Wis. 2d 335, ¶46 
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405–06 (1986)).16 
¶48 The founding fathers included the Eighth Amendment in 
the 
Bill 
of 
Rights 
because 
of 
their 
familiarity 
with 
"atrocities" committed under English law.  Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130, 135 (1878).  Sir William Blackstone, who had a 
profound impact on the framers of the Constitution, identified 
"[c]ases . . . where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the 
place of execution, in treason; or where he was embowelled 
                                                 
16 But see John F. Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, 95 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 39, 54 & n.91 (2019) (explaining the 
"'evolving standards of decency' test" "take[s] a snapshot of 
current public opinion.  This is the most democratic means of 
measuring the constitutionality of a punishment.  If the 
sovereign 
people 
approve 
the 
punishment, 
it 
must 
be 
constitutional.  But this approach is inconsistent with the 
premise underlying a written Bill of Rights, which is that the 
Constitution should constrain what is sometimes called the 
'tyranny of the majority.'  When caught in a moral panic——
concerning 
drug 
dealers, 
juvenile 
superpredators, 
or 
sex 
offenders, for example——public opinion is likely to support 
extreme punishments in order to restore a sense of social 
control.  The Constitution is meant to constrain the tendency to 
excess, not facilitate it."). 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
28 
 
alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high treason."  Id.  He also 
mentioned "public dissection in murder, and burning alive in 
treason committed by a female."  Id.  These are classic examples 
of punishments prohibited by the Eighth Amendment under the 
first category, all of which involve the infliction of severe 
and unnecessary physical pain, often carried out as a spectacle 
for onlookers.  In comparison, sex offender registration, 
whatever its impact on Ella, does not come close to a form of 
punishment recognized as cruel and unusual at the founding. 
¶49 Under the second category, an offense may be deemed 
cruel17 if it is "excessive" and "so disproportionate to the 
offense committed[] as to shock public sentiment and violate the 
judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and 
proper under the circumstances."  See Ninham, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 
¶85 (quoting State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 69, 471 N.W.2d 55 
(1991)).  This is a "high" bar.  United States v. Juvenile Male, 
670 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012).  For perspective, "the 
[United States] Supreme Court has upheld a life sentence for 
three theft-based felonies totaling a loss of about $230, a 25-
year sentence for stealing golf clubs, a life sentence for 
                                                 
17 We focus on the meaning of "cruel" because United States 
Supreme Court precedent does so while giving the word "unusual" 
much less attention.  See id. at 48 ("[C]ourts and scholars have 
largely ignored the word or assigned it a weak meaning."). 
"Under its original meaning, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause prohibits cruel innovations——that is, punishments that 
are unjustly harsh in light of long-standing prior practice."  
Id. at 42.  Applying either the Court's precedent or the 
original understanding of the Clause results in the same 
conclusion:  sex offender registration does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
29 
 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine, and a 40-year sentence for 
possessing nine grams of marijuana."  Carney, 875 F.3d at 1352 
(citations omitted).  This court has upheld a life sentence, 
without the possibility of parole, for a person convicted of 
first-degree intentional homicide who committed the crime at the 
age of 14.  Ninham, 333 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶4–5.   
¶50 As the State persuasively argued, Ella's temporary 
inability to change her legal name is unlike anything that has 
ever been recognized as cruel, and no other aspect of sex 
offender registration approaches cruelty either.  There is also 
nothing unusual about registration.  As this court noted in 
Bollig, "[p]resently all 50 states have some type of sex 
offender registration and notification laws in effect."  232 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶19 (citing Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 177 
n.1 (D. Mass. 1998)). 
¶51 Accepting Ella's argument would render Wisconsin an 
outlier, without justification.  See, e.g., People v. Adams, 581 
N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991) (concluding Illinois's child sex 
offender registration scheme is not cruel and unusual); Juvenile 
Male, 
670 
F.3d at 
1010 
(concluding 
"SORNA's 
registration 
requirements do not violate the Eighth Amendment" in light of 
"the high standard that is required to establish cruel and 
unusual punishment"); In the Interest of T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578, 
597 (Iowa 2018) (concluding Iowa's juvenile sex offender 
registration requirement is not cruel and unusual).  We reject 
Ella's Eighth Amendment claim and apply the law as it has been 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
30 
 
understood since the founding and as it has been uniformly 
interpreted for more than two centuries. 
IV.  ELLA'S FREEDOM OF SPEECH CLAIM 
A.  Ella's Argument 
¶52 Ella also argues that requiring her to register as a 
sex offender violates her right to free speech under the First 
Amendment, which provides:  "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
¶53 As far as we can discern, Ella advances two theories:  
(1) "Ella's right to express her gender identity is expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment"; therefore, "[b]y 
preventing Ella from changing her name, registration prevents 
her from fully expressing her identity"; and (2) "registration 
not only prevents Ella from expressing her identity, it compels 
speech by forcing Ella to disclose her transgender status." 
¶54 Ella's claim, as well as her theories in support of 
it, have evolved throughout this litigation.  Before the circuit 
court, Ella did not advance an independent First Amendment 
claim, instead choosing to argue the statute violated her right 
to substantive due process because it purportedly restricted a 
number of her liberties, including her right to free speech.  
Before the court of appeals Ella raised a standalone First 
Amendment claim, but she was very particular in how she defined 
it:  "Ella does not assert that the fundamental right is an 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
31 
 
ability to change her name; she asserts a right to express her 
true identity, which is protected by the First Amendment."  In 
support, Ella continued to cite the same substantive due process 
cases she presented to the circuit court, including Obergefell.  
Ella makes a similar argument to this court.  At times, she 
seems to argue requiring her to register as a sex offender is 
unconstitutional; at other points, she seems to concentrate on 
her inability to legally change her name under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.47(2)(a). 
¶55 Ella's distinction between "an ability to change her 
name" and "a right to express her true identity" appears to be 
semantical in this case because Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2)(a) is the 
only statute she complains infringes her right to expression.  
She does not claim, for example, that any statute prohibits her 
from dressing however she pleases, although she cites a case for 
the proposition that "a transgender woman's dressing in feminine 
clothing 
is 
expressive 
conduct 
protected 
by 
the 
First 
Amendment."18 
¶56 Ella also alters her interpretation of the relevant 
statutes.  The State conceded Ella is allowed to use an alias of 
her choosing in day-to-day affairs.  As the State explained, 
while 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.47(2)(a) 
declares 
registered 
sex 
offenders may not change their legal name, the very next 
                                                 
18 Ella's Br. at 33 (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 
No. 001060A, unpublished slip op., 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. 
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, unpublished slip op., 2000 WL 33342399 
(Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000)). 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
32 
 
paragraph, 
(2)(b), 
provides 
sex 
offenders 
may 
not 
"[i]dentify . . . by a name unless the name is one by which the 
person is identified with the department of corrections."  
Another statute, Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)1., directs the DOC to 
include sex offenders' "aliases" in the registry.  Reading these 
two statutes together, the DOC allows sex offenders to use an 
alias provided they notify the DOC.19  Before the court of 
appeals, Ella acquiesced to this interpretation, although she 
did not think it was particularly relevant.20  She described the 
legal issue as her inability to petition the circuit court, 
under Wis. Stat. § 786.36, for a legal name change, claiming 
"she either continues to suffer harm from maintaining a legal 
name that is discordant with her true identity or commits a 
felony by petitioning for a name change."  The court of appeals 
                                                 
19 Krebs v. Graveley, 2020 WL 1479189 *1 n.1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
26, 2020), aff’d 861 F. App'x 671 (7th Cir. 2021) ("The Name-
Change Statute does prohibit sex offenders from identifying 
themselves by a name not registered with the state.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.47(2)(b).  But Plaintiff long-ago registered Karen as an 
alias for Kenneth, the name that appears on her judgment of 
conviction."). 
20 See, e.g., Ella's Ct. App. Reply Br. at 10 ("Nor does 
Ella's ability to informally go by a female-sounding name cure 
this problem.  There is a meaningful distinction between the 
ability to informally identify as Ella and the ability to 
legally identify as Ella.  As discussed, this creates an 
unconstitutional disconnect between Ella's ability to identify 
as a woman and the requirement to present legal documentation 
that does not match her true identity."); Ella's Ct. App. Suppl. 
Reply Br. at 5 ("The State's assertion that Ella's ability to 
informally identify as female cures any constitutional problem 
misses the point.  There is a meaningful distinction between the 
ability to informally identify as Ella and the ability to 
legally identify as Ella."). 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
33 
 
expressly relied on the reading advanced by the State and to 
which Ella did not object.  C.G., 396 Wis. 2d 105, ¶28 ("She 
further contends that her ability to informally identify with a 
female-sounding name——as long as she notifies the registry that 
she uses such a name——is insufficient to protect her right to 
formally identify in that manner with a name other than her 
current legal name."). 
¶57 Ella now changes her position, arguing for the first 
time, "[t]here are two ways to change ones' [sic] name in 
Wisconsin:  through formal petition under Wis. Stat. § 786.36, 
or through 'continuous and consistent use' under the common 
law."  Ella did not invoke the common law in the courts below.  
Nevertheless, she now suggests she may not continuously and 
consistently use an alias because such use might effectuate a 
common 
law 
name 
change, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.47(2)(a).  Neither her briefing before the court of 
appeals nor her petition for review addressed the nuanced 
implications of the common law with respect to this case.  
Accordingly, the State argued in its response brief that Ella 
forfeited this argument.  In Ella's reply brief, she made no 
attempt to rebut the State's forfeiture argument.  See State v. 
Mercado, 2021 WI 2, ¶38 n.13, 395 Wis. 2d 296, 953 N.W.2d 337 
("The State argues that because Mercado did not dispute the 
State's forfeiture argument on appeal, Mercado conceded the 
argument. . . .  We agree . . . .  When a party does not respond 
to an argument, we may deem that argument conceded."  (citation 
omitted)). 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
34 
 
¶58 Although Ella forfeited this argument, we choose to 
address it.  We reject Ella's statutory interpretation.  The 
common law right to use an alias is distinguishable from the 
common law rule that continuous and consistent use of an alias 
effectuates a legal name change.  The plain text of the statute 
abrogated the latter rule but not the former right. 
¶59 "At common law it was the rule that in the absence of 
statutory restriction, and where it is not done for a fraudulent 
purpose, one could lawfully change his name at will without 
proceedings of any sort, merely by adopting another name, and 
for all purposes the name thus assumed would constitute his 
legal name just as much as if he had borne it from birth."  
State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 247–48, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also 32 Wis. 
Att'y Gen. Op. 203, 204–05 (1943) ("[I]t would seem apparent 
that one does not have any absolute inherent or natural right to 
change his name and do business thereunder.  It is generally 
stated that it is well settled that, in the absence of a 
statutory prohibition, a person may lawfully adopt any name he 
chooses."  (citations omitted)).   
¶60 Ella is prohibited by statute from legally changing 
her name; however, under the plain language of the statute, the 
parties essentially agree she can use an alias but for the 
application of the common law.  Accepting this reading, which 
comports with the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2), we 
conclude Ella can use an alias, but even if her use of that 
alias 
would 
otherwise 
be 
sufficiently 
"continuous 
and 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
35 
 
consistent" to effectuate a legal name change if she were not a 
registered sex offender, by operation of law, her legal name 
would remain unchanged.  Section 301.47(2) unambiguously changes 
the common law rule, but it does not clearly change the common 
law right.  See Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 
WI 81, ¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833 ("A statute does not 
change the common law unless the legislative purpose to do so is 
clearly expressed in the language of the statute."  (citing 
Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 399, 288 
N.W.2d 794 (1980)); see also Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 
99, 
¶111, 
378 
Wis. 2d 358, 
903 
N.W.2d 759 
(Kelly, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting) ("A statute will be construed to alter 
the common law only when that disposition is clear."  (quoting 
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 318 (2012)).  Although Ella's 
common law right to use a name of her choosing in day-to-day 
affairs has not been abrogated, the State will not recognize her 
by that name. 
¶61 We accordingly analyze Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2)(a) as a 
prohibition on petitioning a circuit court for a legal name 
change, not a ban on using an alias.  Under this view, 
§ 301.47(2)(a) is nothing more than an exception to Wis. Stat. 
§ 786.36, Wisconsin's statute governing legal name change 
petitions. 
B.  Analysis 
¶62 Because Ella is free to "use whatever moniker she 
chooses for personal or professional purposes," Matter of 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
36 
 
Miller, 617 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 1026 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1994), her First 
Amendment argument is quite narrow:  it concerns only her 
inability to legally change her name, not her ability to use a 
name of her choosing in the course of ordinary affairs. 
1.  The Novelty of Ella's Claim 
¶63 Few courts have addressed this issue.  Among those 
that have, none have held that a prohibition on changing a 
person's legal name, standing alone, implicates the right to 
free speech.  If a person is free to use a different name in 
day-to-day 
affairs, 
statutory 
restrictions 
on 
changing 
a 
person's legal name have not been understood to restrict speech 
or expression. 
¶64 In Petition of Variable for Change of Name v. Nash, a 
New Mexico trial court rejected the petitioner's request to 
change his legal name to "Fuck Censorship!"  190 P.3d 354, 355 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008).  On appeal, the petitioner agued he had a 
First Amendment right "to call himself whatever he wishes" and 
that the denial constituted "improper government censorship[.]"  
Id. at 356.  The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the 
petitioner's arguments, not only because "Fuck Censorship!" is 
obscene, but because the petitioner could use the name under the 
common law without any need to involve the State.  Id. 
("Petitioner is entitled to assume whatever name he desires, 
absent fraud or misrepresentation, but any statutory name change 
will 
be 
subject 
to 
the 
district 
court's 
scrutiny.  
Here . . . '[s]ince [Petitioner's] common law right to use the 
[]name has not been abrogated . . . , none of his First 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
37 
 
Amendment rights have been prejudiced."  (quoted source omitted) 
(modifications in the original)). 
¶65 The Nash court was persuaded by Lee v. Superior Court, 
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Ct. App. 1992).  In that case, the 
petitioner sought to change his legal name to a racial epithet.  
Id. at 764.  Like the petitioner in Nash, who wanted to make a 
political statement about censorship, the petitioner in Lee also 
wanted to make a political statement:  specifically, he said he 
wanted to "steal the stinging degradation——the thunder, the 
wrath, shame and racial slur" associated with the word.  Id.  
"He theorize[d] that his use of the name, with court approval, 
could be used to conquer racial hatred."  Id. 
¶66 The 
California 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reasoned 
the 
petitioner could not force the judiciary to "lend the Great Seal 
of the State of California" to this cause.  Id.  It reasoned, 
"[a]ppellant has the common law right to use whatever name he 
chooses. . . .  However, he has no statutory right to require 
the State of California to participate therein."  Id.  It 
concluded, "[s]ince appellant's common law right to use the 
surname 
has 
not 
been 
abrogated, . . . none 
of 
his 
First 
Amendment rights have been prejudiced. . . .  The order only 
precludes the filing of the name with the Secretary of 
State. . . .  Nothing more, nothing less."  Id. at 768. 
¶67 In Petition of Dengler, the petitioner sought to 
change his legal name to the number 1069.  246 N.W.2d 758, 759 
(N.D. 1976).  He explained that each numeral represented a 
particular concept of importance to him.  For example, he said 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
38 
 
the numeral 1 "stands for my concept of nature which manifests 
itself as one individual among the various forms of life."  Id.  
He claimed he could not express his true identity in any way 
other than by using the name 1069.  Id. at 760.  The petition 
was denied.   
¶68 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, 
"petitioner relied upon the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution for the name change claiming under the freedom of 
speech provision he had a right to change his name.  Petitioner, 
however, failed to give any convincing reason in support of his 
argument, and we are not aware of any."  Id. at 761.  The court 
upheld the trial court's decision because "to use the court or 
law to impose or force a number in lieu of a name upon society" 
went beyond "bordering on bizarre[.]"  Id. at 764.  The common 
law might have permitted the petitioner to use a number as his 
name, but the court would not "force its acceptance" on society, 
which is an effect, to a degree, of a legal name change when 
ordered by a court.  Id.; see also Leone v. Comm'r, 933 
N.E.2d 1244, 1254 (Ind. 2010) ("While the courts have a unique 
power to certify a name change, Hoosiers still may refer to 
themselves by any name they like.  They may not, however, demand 
that government agencies begin using their new names without a 
court order.  This dual structure recognizes the reality that 
names serve multiple purposes, both private and public."  
(internal citation omitted)). 
¶69 Nash, Lee, and Dengler reflect judicial rejection of 
the notion that a legal name change implicates the freedom of 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
39 
 
speech.21  Inherent in each decision is the view that free speech 
is, generally, a negative right, like most rights secured by the 
Bill of Rights.  Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1247 (3d Cir. 
1994) (explaining "the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of 
the United States are primarily negative in character, standing 
guard as vigilant sentinels at the perimeter of permissible 
state conduct.  It is only at the time that the state seeks to 
invade 
this 
citadel 
of 
individual 
liberty 
that 
these 
constitutional guarantees can be summoned to battle."  (internal 
citations omitted)).  "This position has strong textual support 
in the Bill of Rights.  The right of free speech, the right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to be 
free from double jeopardy, the right to due process under the 
Fifth Amendment, all of these are framed as prohibitions on 
state conduct, rather than as commandments for state action."  
Id.  In other words, the State cannot be compelled to recognize 
a name and change its records.22  See Williams v. Racine Cnty. 
                                                 
21 Although the dissent does not address any of these cases, 
it claims our analysis "goes against the tide of the relevant 
case law."  Dissent, ¶116.  If the dissent's assertion were 
correct, it would not have to cite multiple cases having nothing 
to do with the First Amendment to justify its desired outcome.  
See e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (substantive 
due process); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (cruel and 
unusual 
punishment); 
Hernandez-Montiel 
v. 
Immigr. 
& 
Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(immigration law). 
22 States may have an affirmative duty to make certain 
places available for expressive conduct.  David P. Currie, 
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 864, 879 (1986).  Occasionally, advocates have tried to 
extend forum arguments to things produced by government, like 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
40 
 
Cir. Ct., 197 Wis. 2d 841, 846, 541 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1995) 
("Williams has no positive right to a name change.  The fact 
that others have changed their names, or that one of his stated 
reasons for seeking the name change is religious in nature, does 
not create an affirmative right to the name change."). 
¶70 "Self-expression does not require a court order."  
Miller, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 1026.  "There is no constitutional or 
inherent right to compel legal sanction of a change of name, 
notwithstanding the right at common law to assume a new name so 
long as it is not for a fraudulent or illegal purpose."  Leone, 
933 N.E.2d at 1254 (quoting In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 862 
(Ind. 1974) (Prentice, J., dissenting)).  As even advocates 
seeking to expand First Amendment protections acknowledge, 
"denials of name-change petitions do not directly impose 
restrictions 
on 
the 
petitioners' 
speech. 
 
None 
of 
the 
difficulties faced by denied petitioners restrict[] something to 
which they are entitled based on their free speech rights.  None 
of these difficulties in fact place limits on speech at all."  
                                                                                                                                                             
license plates and driver's licenses.  These arguments have had 
limited success.  See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 214–19 (2015) (rejecting an 
argument that Texas specialty license plates create a forum for 
speech because the plates constitute government speech); Krebs, 
2020 WL 1479189 *2 (refusing to address an underdeveloped 
argument that Wisconsin law had created a "limited public forum" 
for "changing one's name").  Because Ella does not raise this 
argument, which borders on being an entirely different claim, we 
need not address it further. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
41 
 
Julia Shear Kushner, Comment, The Right to Control One's Name, 
57 UCLA L. Rev. 313, 337 (2009).23 
2.  Ella's Burden 
¶71 Ella has a difficult burden, in light of the novelty 
of her claim, to persuade us that the name-change prohibition in 
Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2)(a) implicates her right to free speech by 
infringing her expressive conduct.  Clark v. Comm. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984) ("Although it is 
common to place the burden upon the Government to justify 
impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the obligation 
of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive 
conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies."); 
see also Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(applying the burden discussed in Clark).  If the prohibition 
does not infringe expressive conduct, no further First Amendment 
analysis is necessary.  State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶16, 318 
Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34. 
¶72 Ella has not satisfied her burden.  In a recent, 
analogous case, the Eastern District of Wisconsin explained: 
Plaintiff has failed to establish that Wisconsin's 
regulation 
of 
her 
ability 
to 
change 
her 
name 
implicates her First Amendment rights.  The parties 
provide 
relatively 
scant 
attention 
to 
this 
matter. . . .  
Plaintiff 
chides 
Defendant 
for 
providing 
"no 
authority 
for 
its 
assertion 
that 
                                                 
23 Kushner argued viewpoint discrimination, in the context 
of legal name changes, could implicate the right to free speech.  
We need not examine this issue further because Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.47(2)(a) does not allow sex offenders to petition for some 
legal name changes but not others. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
42 
 
regulating a person's name does not implicate the 
First Amendment." 
Plaintiff forgets who bears the burden of proof and 
persuasion on her claim.  It is she, not Defendant, 
who must establish that regulating a person's name 
implicates the First Amendment. 
Krebs v. Graveley, 2020 WL 1479189 *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2020), 
aff’d 861 F. App'x 671 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal citations 
omitted); see also In re Larson, No. A18-2153, unpublished slip 
op., 2019 WL 7286959 *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2019) 
(affirming a lower court's denial of a sex offender's petition 
to change his legal name to "Better Off Dead" because 
"[a]ppellant failed to provide specific authority regarding the 
free-speech 
right 
to 
change 
one's 
name 
under 
these 
circumstances, and there appears to be none" and therefore "the 
district court did not improperly reject appellant's freedom-of-
speech argument and did not abuse its discretion by denying his 
name-change petition").  Ella's claim suffers from a similar 
defect defeating the claim advanced by the plaintiff in Krebs.  
The First Amendment has been a part of our Constitution since 
1791.  People changed their names even before then.   Ella has 
been unable to cite binding or persuasive authority for the 
proposition that restrictions on legal name changes implicate 
protected speech.24  We agree with the court of appeals, which 
                                                 
24 Ella cites cases that are not on point.  For example, she 
relies on Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1990).  In 
that case, a prisoner used a state court proceeding to legally 
change his name after he converted to Islam.  Id. at 1169.  The 
prison nonetheless refused to recognize his name change because 
of a policy "to use only committed names on prison records and 
clothing, and in the mail room."  Id.  The court held "that the 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
43 
 
concluded that "Ella has therefore failed to meet her burden to 
prove that her First Amendment rights are implicated by the sex 
offender registry statute[.]"  C.G., 396 Wis. 2d 105, ¶32; see 
also id., ¶31 (discussing Krebs). 
3.  Ella's Expressive Conduct Theory 
¶73 Ella's argument rests on a faulty conception of 
expressive conduct.  The act of presenting identification, 
either by vocalizing her legal name, writing it down, or handing 
government documents bearing her legal name to someone else, has 
never been considered a form of expressive conduct in either 
legal precedent or in the historical record.  The act of 
producing identification is conduct unprotected by the First 
Amendment. 
¶74 The United States Supreme Court has noted the Free 
Speech Clause's protection "extend[s] . . . only to conduct that 
is inherently expressive."  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (emphasis 
added).  Notably, conduct does not become expressive simply 
because it is accompanied by speech or involves the use of 
                                                                                                                                                             
state authorities must deliver mail to Salaam addressed to him 
only as Salaam and must allow the addition of Salaam's current 
name to his clothing.  The state, however, need reform its 
record keeping only to the extent necessary to allow Salaam to 
receive services and information in his new name within the 
prison."  Id.  Salaam is not factually analogous to this case 
because 
Ella 
has 
not 
received 
a 
legal 
name 
change.  
Additionally, the State is not interfering with Ella's ability 
to use a name of her choosing, i.e., it is not placing a literal 
badge with a different name on her clothing and ordering her to 
wear it, as prison officials did in Salaam. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
44 
 
words.  Id. at 62.  For example, "Congress . . . can prohibit 
employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race.  
The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign 
reading 'White Applicants Only' hardly means that the law should 
be analyzed as one regulating the employer's speech rather than 
conduct."  Id.  "It rarely has been suggested that the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity 
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute.  We reject the contention 
now."  Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 
(1949). 
¶75 When Ella presents herself to the world as a woman, 
her conduct is expressive, but it becomes no less or more 
expressive depending on her legal name.  "Ella has the right to 
use whatever name she chooses, provided she includes it in the 
sex offender registry."  C.G., 396 Wis. 2d 105, ¶32.  The 
expressive component of her transgender identity is not created 
by the legal name printed on her identification but by the 
various actions she takes to present herself in a specific 
manner, e.g., dressing in women's clothing, wearing make-up, 
growing out her hair, and using a feminine alias. 
¶76 Whether conduct is expressive is partly an objective 
inquiry, which turns on how reasonable people——unfamiliar with 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
actor——would 
understand 
the 
conduct.  
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 ("An observer who sees military 
recruiters interviewing away from the law school has no way of 
knowing whether the law school is expressing its disapproval of 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
45 
 
the military, all the law school's interview rooms are full, or 
the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that 
they would rather interview someplace else."); see also Gul v. 
City of Bloomington, 22 N.E.3d 853, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 
(rejecting a claim that a property owner had a First Amendment 
right not to mow his lawn as a mode of expression because 
"[t]here is nothing inherent to an overgrown yard that would 
lead an average person of ordinary sensibilities to conclude 
that any message at all was being conveyed, much less a specific 
environmental message").   
¶77 A person observing Ella present herself as a woman 
would not understand her to be expressing herself as a man 
because the name printed on her driver's license is masculine; 
perhaps displaying her driver's license might cause the viewer 
to have doubts about whether Ella is biologically female, 
thereby inhibiting the success of her intended goal to be 
perceived as a woman.  That impediment does not render the 
production of identification expressive conduct, however.  See 
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶61, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (explaining the right to freedom of 
speech does not entitle the speaker to a favorable outcome in 
her endeavor).  While those who read her legal documents may 
realize she is transgender, that insight does not stop Ella from 
expressing herself in whatever manner she chooses.  "Romeo 
would, were he not Romeo call'd, Retain that dear perfection 
which he owes Without that title[.]"  Leone, 933 N.E.2d at 1252. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
46 
 
¶78 Taking Ella's argument to its logical conclusion, she 
would also compel the State to print on her driver's license 
that she is female because she self-identifies as a woman.  Ella 
says the problem is not merely her inability to change her legal 
name but the impact the name-change prohibition has on her 
ability to identify as a woman.  Ella quite clearly explained 
she wants the legal name change so she no longer has "to present 
legal documentation that does not match her true identity."  
Notably, Ella blurs any distinction between biological sex and 
gender identity, saying she identifies as "a transgender 
female," while at another point saying she "identifies as a 
woman[.]"  If she cannot print "female" on her license, she will 
be outed as easily as she may be with a traditionally-masculine 
name printed on it. 
¶79 Like biological sex, a legal name is a hallmark of 
identification.  Although a person may use an alias for 
expressive purposes, the point of a legal name is to "tether 
one's name to a fixed identifier."  Leone, 933 N.E.2d at 1254 
(citation omitted); see also name, A Dictionary of the English 
Language (10th ed. 1792) ("The discriminative appellation of an 
individual."  (emphasis added)).  If the right to free speech 
included the prerogative to change one's legal name at will 
absent a compelling state interest prohibiting the name change, 
the very point of printing identifying information on documents 
would be undermined.  Just like a legal name, the sex offender 
registry tracks other "[i]nformation sufficient to identify the 
person, including date of birth, gender, race, height, weight 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
47 
 
and hair and eye color."  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)2.  Ella 
offers 
no 
limiting 
principle 
that 
would 
grant 
her 
the 
constitutional right to change her legal name while other 
hallmarks of identification remain fixed.25 
¶80 The historical record does not support Ella's argument 
for compelling the State to change her legal name.  "[A] common-
law name change carries with it no mandate to those with whom 
one comes in contact to accept at face value the nexus between 
the new name and the individual who assumes it.  Persons who 
change their personal names may not necessarily demand that 
government agencies begin using their new names without a court 
order."  65 C.J.S. Names § 21 (updated Feb. 2022).   
¶81 Around the time of the nation's founding, legal name 
changes were rejected by state governments for various reasons, 
and the historical record contains no suggestion that anyone 
thought the First Amendment was implicated.  "A curious example 
of the quibbles into which the common law sometimes [fell] was 
developed by the use of single letters as names.  It was many 
times held that while a vowel, being a complete sound in itself, 
was sufficient to constitute a name, a consonant, representing 
only part of a compound sound, could not so act."  G.S. Arnold, 
Personal Names, 15 Yale L.J. 227, 228 (1905–06).  These early 
cases, along with the scholarship examining them, lack even a 
hint that the founding generation understood government to be 
regulating expressive conduct, protected by the First Amendment.  
                                                 
25  Ella has not advanced a forum argument.  Supra ¶69 n.22. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
48 
 
Ella has not directed us to any historical sources from the 
founding that would support her argument, nor have we found any. 
¶82 A nineteenth century English solicitor general is 
reported to have said, "[t]here was no law forbidding a man to 
change his name; but there was also no law which compelled his 
neighbour 
to 
acknowledge 
him 
under 
the 
name 
he 
might 
assume. . . .  Everybody was at liberty, if he pleased, to 
change his surname, but no one else was obliged to recongise the 
change unless he pleased."  Herbert, ci-devant Jones, Change of 
Surname, in 1 The Herald & Genealogist, at 454, 463 (1863).  To 
the extent officials were "bound" to recognize a name, he 
suggested the rule derived from "convenience."  Id. at 463–64.  
"There was no law on the subject; but when there appeared to be 
nothing 
arbitrary 
or 
improper, 
and 
when 
there 
was 
no 
encroachment on the feelings and rights of others, then it was 
courteous to accede to the wish of a person who might desire to 
change his name."  Id. at 464. 
¶83 Other nineteenth century commentators took a different 
view, writing that all name changes were wholly the prerogative 
of the crown.  See A. C. F-D. & A.M.R., A Treatise on the Law 
Concerning 
Names 
and 
Changes 
of 
Names 
(continued), 
2 
Genealogical Mag., 537, 542 (1899) ("The gift of a name or a 
change of name is a matter of honour, in the prerogative of the 
Crown, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Honour.  
It is wholly outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, 
which have no power to adjudicate upon the point.").  Contra 
T.E. Morris, The Re-Naming of Welshmen, in The Transactions of 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
49 
 
the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion, at 1, 18–19 (1901–02) 
(critiquing the notion that a name is a "gift" and "prerogative" 
of the crown). 
¶84 The historical practice of applying to the crown for a 
legal name change, which the crown could deny, demonstrates the 
limited extent to which the government is required to effectuate 
a legal name change, regardless of whether other methods of 
accomplishing a legal name change did not require a direct 
appeal to the crown.  See Davies v. Lowndes, 1 Bing. N. Cas. 
597, 618 (1835) ("And there is no necessity for any application 
for a royal sign manual to change the name.  It is a mode which 
persons often have recourse to, because it gives a greater 
sanction to it, and makes it more notorious."). 
¶85 "In the 19th and 20th centuries express statutory 
provisions 
for 
changing 
names 
were 
enacted 
in 
many 
jurisdictions."  Hall v. Hall, 351 A.2d 917, 922 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1976).  In nearly all states, including Wisconsin, the 
decision of whether to grant a statutory petition for a legal 
name change has been committed to the sound discretion of the 
court.  Id.; see also Williams, 197 Wis. 2d at 847.  The fact 
that petitions may be denied under this discretionary standard 
strongly 
suggests 
a 
legal 
name 
change, 
as 
traditionally 
understood, does not implicate the freedom of speech.  Ella 
seeks recognition of a new right, not a remedy to enforce a pre-
existing right.  See Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 
U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1259 (2022) (noting "no one before us 
has 
cited 
any 
evidence 
suggesting 
that 
a 
purely 
verbal 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
50 
 
censure . . . has ever been widely considered offensive to the 
First Amendment").  A "[l]ong settled and established practice 
is a consideration of great weight."  Id. (quoting The Pocket 
Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)) (modification in the 
original). 
 
"Often, 
'a 
regular 
course 
of 
practice' 
can 
illuminate or 'liquidate' our founding document's 'terms & 
phrases.'"  Id. (quoting Letter from J. Madison to S. Roane 
(Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 
1908)).  The lack of historical precedent for Ella's position is 
fatal to her claim, particularly because she has the burden to 
persuade us that her expressive conduct is being infringed. 
¶86 In dismissing our historical analysis, the dissent 
ignores the United States Supreme Court's similar originalist 
approach to First Amendment questions.  Its recent unanimous 
decision in Houston Community College System is a prime 
example.  See, e.g., id. at 1259 ("As early as colonial times, 
the power of assemblies in this country to censure their members 
was 'more or less assumed.' . . .  The parties supply little 
reason to think the First Amendment was designed or commonly 
understood 
to 
upend 
this 
practice." 
 
(quoted 
source 
omitted)).  Our "historical journey" in this opinion represents 
the accepted method for interpreting the First Amendment. 
¶87 The dissent criticizes the court for examining the 
historical record in search of evidence suggesting the original 
meaning of the First Amendment protects legal name changes, 
advocating that "times change.  Societies evolve.  Instead of 
looking backward to esoteric sources to define the contours of 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
51 
 
modern existence, we should instead look, as we do in other 
contexts, to 'evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.'"26  These sentiments reflect the 
philosophy of living constitutionalism, which would rewrite the 
Constitution to reflect the views and values of judges.  
Exploring the historical record is more than "interesting"——it 
is impossible to ascertain the meaning of a constitutional 
provision without undertaking this analysis.  See Thomas M. 
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest 
upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 
59 (1868) ("We cannot understand these provisions unless we 
understand their history.").  This method enables judges to 
discern the original public meaning of the text, which is fixed. 
¶88 The alternative approach, embraced by the dissent, 
undermines democracy.  "When government-adopted texts are given 
a new meaning, the law is changed; and changing written law, 
like adopting written law in the first place, is the function of 
the first two branches of government. . . .  Allowing laws to be 
rewritten by judges is a radical departure from our democratic 
system."  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 82–83 ("[T]he living 
Constitution is genuinely corrosive of the fundamental values of 
our democratic society."  (citing William H. Rehnquist, The 
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 706 
(1976))). 
                                                 
26 Dissent, ¶111. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
52 
 
¶89 In comparison to the objective standards by which 
originalism 
allows 
us 
to 
understand 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
constitutional text, the living constitutionalism espoused by 
the dissent leaves unanswered the question of why it "makes 
sense for us to" change the meaning of the First Amendment, and 
by what authority judges (as opposed to the people) may decide 
to change the law.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 803 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting living 
constitutionalism "empowers judges to eliminate or expand what 
the people have prescribed").  Even if "evolving standards" 
could change the meaning of the Constitution, why should 
"Justices' notions" of what the First Amendment "ought to mean" 
prevail over "the democratically adopted dispositions of our 
current society?"  McCreary County v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 
U.S. 844, 899 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting).  Fundamentally, 
the dissent's proposed "constitutional revision by" the judicial 
branch "accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of 
liberty," would "rob[] the People of the most important liberty 
they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the 
Revolution 
of 
1776: 
the 
freedom 
to 
govern 
themselves."  
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Our job 
is not "to define the contours of modern existence"27 but to 
declare the meaning of the law——in this case, the supreme law of 
the land. 
                                                 
27 Id. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
53 
 
¶90 It is a "caricature of originalism," Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law, at 85, to reject it because, as the dissent argues, 
"[a]t the time of the founding . . . transgender rights were the 
furthest thing from the founders' minds."28  "Drafters of every 
era know that . . . the rules they create will one day apply to 
all sorts of circumstances that they could not possibly 
envision[.]"  Id. at 86.  While transgenderism is a modern 
concept, changing one's name is not. 
¶91 The dissent seems to disparage the Constitution (or at 
least its fixed meaning) because "[a]t the time of the founding 
Black people could be considered property and women had no 
rights[.]"29 
 
More 
than 
150 
years 
ago, 
the 
people 
constitutionally adopted equality under the law.  U.S. Const. 
amends. XIII–XV.  As but one abominable example of judges "who 
reject the meaning of the Constitution as enacted and wish to 
substitute another meaning that they contend is superior," Randy 
E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution:  The Presumption of 
Liberty 96 (2004), the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. 
Ferguson abandoned the constitutional guarantee of equality in 
favor of its own "conception of individual rights and who is 
entitled to those rights."30  Judges are not reliable protectors 
of individual rights or liberty when they seek to replace the 
original meaning of the Constitution with their own notions of 
                                                 
28 Id., ¶110. 
29 Id. 
30 Id., ¶109. 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
54 
 
the way things ought to be.  "Only the Constitution can serve as 
a reliable bulwark of the rights and liberty of the people."  
State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶86, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  For this 
reason, we must apply the Constitution's original meaning, and 
not what we may wish it to mean. 
4.  Ella's Compelled Speech Theory 
¶92 Although in the course of day-to-day affairs Ella may 
have to "present[] legal documentation," she does not explain 
how presenting legal documentation bearing a "male-sounding 
name" constitutes compelled speech.  This theory fails for the 
same reason her first theory does:  identifying one's self is an 
act, not a mode of expression.  "[I]t has never been deemed an 
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of 
conduct 
illegal 
merely 
because 
the 
conduct 
was 
in 
part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, 
either spoken, written, or printed."  Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62 
(quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502).  "[W]ords can in some 
circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but 
against conduct."  Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 
389 
(1992)). 
 
Again, 
Ella 
offers 
no 
limiting 
principle.  When the government requires a person to accurately 
list her hallmarks of identification on a tax form, the 
government does not compel her to speak but merely to produce 
information; Ella's claim is indistinguishable.  United States 
v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining 
the Eighth Circuit had "rejected a claim that compelled 
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
55 
 
disclosure of information on an IRS form [i]s unlawful compelled 
speech" and applying the Eighth Circuit's logic to reject a 
compelled speech challenge to a law requiring sex offenders to 
register their residence (quoting United States v. Sindel, 53 
F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995))). 
¶93 The State did not give Ella her legal name——her 
parents did.  Cf. Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524, 526 
(7th Cir. 2013) ("He insists that Wisconsin's policy violates 
the equal protection clause, even if not the first amendment, 
because he thinks that 'Norman C. Green, Jr.' sounds like a 
white man's name, and he is not white.  Yet it is the name his 
parents gave him; it was not forced on him by the state.").  The 
State has not branded Ella with her legal name, and when Ella 
presents a government-issued identification card, she is free to 
say nothing at all or to say, "I go by Ella." 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 Under well-established precedent, Ella's claims fail.  
Sex offender registration does not violate the Eighth Amendment 
because it is not punishment, nor is it cruel or unusual, 
particularly in light of Ella's offense for which the law 
requires her registration.  Ella's First Amendment right to free 
speech does not encompass the power to compel the State to 
facilitate a change of her legal name.  Producing one's legal 
name is properly understood as conduct, subject to government 
regulation, not speech. 
 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
No. 
2018AP2205-CR   
 
56 
 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP2205.bh 
 
1 
 
¶95 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority/lead opinion that C.G.'s First and Eighth Amendment 
challenges to the name-change prohibition in the sex-offender 
registry fail.1  See Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2).  Accordingly, I join 
the opinion in most respects.2  I write separately to make three 
points. 
¶96 First, the majority/lead opinion's analysis of C.G.'s 
as-applied Eighth Amendment claim is improper.  When analyzing 
an Eighth Amendment claim, we are bound to apply United States 
Supreme Court precedent.  The Court has instructed that the 
intent-effects test must be used to determine if a sanction is 
punitive.  See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-70 
(1963).  This test considers whether a particular statutory 
scheme is punitive on its face, not whether its application to a 
particular person might be unduly harsh.  Seling v. Young, 531 
U.S. 250, 263 (2001).  Looking to a statute's implementation or 
person-specific effects "would prove unworkable" and is flatly 
inconsistent with the test's focus on the face of the statute.  
Id.; see also id. at 272-73 (Thomas, J., concurring).  We said 
as much just last term, explaining that the intent-effects test 
"must be applied on the face of the statute, rather than to the 
facts and circumstances of an individual defendant."  State v. 
Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ¶30, 397 Wis. 2d 758, 960 N.W.2d 888. 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.81(8) requires that in cases 
like this we should "refer to individuals only by one or more 
initials or other appropriate pseudonym or designation."  I 
refer to the defendant as "C.G." following our case caption. 
2 I join the court's opinion except for ¶6 and ¶¶36-46. 
No.  2018AP2205.bh 
 
2 
 
¶97 The majority/lead opinion correctly identifies this 
principle, but then devotes several pages to an analysis of a 
claim 
that 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
called 
unworkable.  
Majority/Lead op., ¶¶35-45.  Analyzing the effects of the 
statutory scheme on C.G. personally is antithetical to the 
intent-effects test we must apply.  This discussion does not add 
clarity 
by 
analyzing 
an 
alternative 
claim; 
it 
increases 
confusion by conducting an analysis that cannot be done for a 
claim that does not exist.  The better approach is simply to 
reaffirm that the statutory scheme at issue here is not 
punitive, and leave it there.  See State v. Hezzie R., 219 
Wis. 2d 848, 881, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998); State v. Bollig, 2000 
WI 6, ¶27, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199. 
¶98 Second, it is important to note the limited nature of 
our resolution of C.G.'s First Amendment challenge.  C.G. has 
failed to prove that the prohibition on name changes for 
individuals on the sex offender registry infringes on C.G.'s 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  In the absence of 
on-point 
case 
law, 
supportive 
historical 
evidence, 
or 
a 
compelling argument, we cannot conclude——for what would appear 
to be the first time in American history——that a person's legal 
name 
contains 
expressive 
content 
subject 
to 
the 
First 
Amendment's free speech protections.  As the majority/lead 
opinion explains, the prohibition on changing a legal name does 
not prohibit a sex offender from saying or communicating a 
preferred name, nor does it mandate the communication of any 
particular content.  It is possible that some name-related 
No.  2018AP2205.bh 
 
3 
 
claims could implicate a person's free speech rights or trigger 
other constitutional protections.  But based on the arguments 
and the precise claims before us, I am unpersuaded that the 
prohibition in Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2) on changing one's name 
while 
subject 
to 
the 
sex-offender 
registry's 
reporting 
requirements involves any expressive conduct triggering the 
First Amendment's free speech protections. 
¶99 Finally, I write separately to address a sensitive 
matter.  The majority/lead opinion explains that it uses "female 
pronouns 
out 
of 
respect 
for 
Ella's 
individual 
dignity," 
acknowledging "[n]o law compels our use of Ella's preferred 
pronouns; we use them voluntarily."  Majority/Lead op., ¶6 & 
n.9.  The dissent and the court of appeals make the same 
editorial decision.  Whether to use an individual's preferred 
pronouns, rather than those consonant with one's biological sex, 
presents ontological and moral questions about our identity as 
human beings.  It is a matter deeply personal to those who wish 
to be called by certain pronouns, and to many who are asked to 
call others by their preferred pronouns.  See, e.g., Meriwether 
v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021). 
¶100 These relatively new cultural debates are, in the 
main, not questions courts are well-equipped to answer.  As a 
court of law, we should do our best to remain agnostic regarding 
debates where the law does not supply an answer.  This is 
motivated in part by the modest nature of the judicial role, and 
in part out of the prudential concern that these contested moral 
matters could soon become contested legal matters.  The court's 
No.  2018AP2205.bh 
 
4 
 
decision to use female pronouns could be misread as suggesting 
that someone who identifies as a female is in fact a female, 
under the law or otherwise.  See also United States v. Varner, 
948 F.3d 250, 254-58 (5th Cir. 2020) (presenting additional 
reasons why the court's use of a party's preferred pronouns 
could prove problematic).  We should aim to avoid any unintended 
legal consequences of our language choices. 
¶101 C.G.'s decision to identify as a woman is grounded in 
a particular way of understanding sex and gender——one rooted in 
a person's individual sense of identity.  This view is a 
departure from what was widely accepted just a few years ago and 
is by no means universally shared today.  Without question, C.G. 
should be treated with the same dignity and respect as any other 
litigant before this court.  But I believe we would do well to 
remain scrupulously neutral rather than assume that pronouns are 
for choosing.  These matters of grammar have downstream 
consequences that counsel caution, particularly as a court of 
law where such decisions could have unknown legal repercussions. 
¶102 For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
1 
 
¶103 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Ella is a 
transgender woman seeking to express herself by changing her1 
name to reflect her gender identity in the face of a statute 
that precludes it.  One aspect of sex offender registration is 
that a person subject to the registry cannot undergo a legal 
name change.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.47(2)(a).  Ella challenges 
that restriction. 
¶104 At birth, Ella was assigned male, and her legal name 
is traditionally masculine.  Ella wishes to legally change her 
name to a traditionally feminine name to correspond to her 
gender identity.  Specifically, Ella challenges the restriction 
as applied to her on the basis of the First and Eighth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
¶105 Although I agree that Ella's Eighth Amendment claim 
fails, I write separately to address the majority's First 
Amendment analysis and conclusions.  It cuts short the First 
Amendment analysis by determining that the First Amendment isn't 
even implicated by the name change ban that accompanies Ella's 
                                                 
1 This dissent refers to Ella using her preferred pronouns.  
The concurrence disagrees with this decision and refers to Ella 
by her former masculine name (albeit with initials), citing the 
avoidance of "unintended legal consequences."  Concurrence, 
¶100. 
 
However, 
its 
generalized 
speculation 
does 
not 
specifically 
identify 
any 
legal 
consequences 
supposedly 
implicated. 
I remain unpersuaded by the specter of unidentified legal 
consequences.  Rather, like the majority/lead opinion, I refer 
to Ella using her preferred pronouns "out of respect for Ella's 
individual dignity."  Majority/lead op., ¶6.   
 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
2 
 
registration as a sex offender.  In making this determination, 
the majority takes an overly restrictive view of expressive 
conduct and denigrates the import of a legal name. 
¶106 Admittedly, the facts of the underlying offense 
indicate a "serious and forceful" attack, but that is not the 
question presented here.  See majority/lead op., ¶44.2  Rather 
the question boils down to whether the State has met its burden 
to show that this statutory restriction is narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest——as applied to Ella.  If 
not, then such a restriction cannot be constitutionally applied 
to Ella's circumstances.  
¶107 The majority fails to answer this question.  It 
arrives at a result that is contrary to First Amendment 
precedent and discounts the burdens Ella faces as a result of 
the restriction.  Under the analysis that the majority should 
have conducted, I conclude that Ella has established a violation 
of her First Amendment rights and that the State has not met its 
burden to demonstrate that Ella should be categorically banned 
from filing a petition for a name change.   
¶108 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
2 I cite Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's opinion as a 
"majority/lead" opinion because the opinion in its entirety has 
not garnered a majority vote of the court.  See concurrence, ¶95 
n.2; Koss Corp. v. Park Bank, 2019 WI 7, ¶76 n.1, 385 
Wis. 2d 261, 922 N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring).  
However, the First Amendment analysis that this dissent takes 
issue with is joined by four members of the court, so I 
therefore refer in the body of this dissent to the "majority" 
when discussing the court's conclusions with regard to the First 
Amendment. 
 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
3 
 
I 
¶109 At the outset I observe that although the majority's 
historical journey back to the 18th and 19th centuries is 
interesting, it is misplaced.  In denying that Ella's choice of 
name implicates the First Amendment, the majority attempts to 
support its determination with reference to a "nineteenth 
century 
English 
solicitor 
general," 
nineteenth 
century 
commentators on English law, and practices prevailing at the 
time of the founding.  See majority/lead op., ¶¶81-84.  With all 
due respect, we are in the 21st century and our conception of 
individual rights and who is entitled to those rights has 
thankfully changed in the two centuries since these sources were 
germane.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 660-63 (2015).   
¶110 It is no wonder the majority finds no protection for 
Ella in these sources.  At the time of the founding Black people 
could 
be 
considered 
property 
and 
women 
had 
no 
rights——
transgender rights were the furthest thing from the founders' 
minds.   
¶111 But times change.  Societies evolve.  Instead of 
looking backward to esoteric sources to define the contours of 
modern existence, we should instead look, as we do in other 
contexts, to "evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society."  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 406 (1986). 
¶112 In this maturing society, it makes sense for us to 
recognize the expressive power of a name.  Just as there is a 
First Amendment interest in a religious name, there is a First 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
4 
 
Amendment interest in a name that aligns with one's gender 
identity.   
¶113 The threshold question for the analysis of Ella's 
First Amendment argument is whether the First Amendment is 
implicated.  It is in answering this question that the majority 
goes astray, and I thus address this question first in this 
dissent.  Subsequently, I conduct the analysis the majority 
should have completed, addressing the appropriate level of 
scrutiny that should guide our analysis and applying that level 
of scrutiny to the statute at issue in Ella's as-applied 
challenge. 
II 
¶114 The majority's First Amendment analysis quickly veers 
down the wrong path with its determination that the First 
Amendment is not even implicated by a ban on name changes.  
Majority/lead op., ¶72. 
¶115 In the majority's view, "Ella's argument rests on a 
faulty conception of expressive conduct."  Id., ¶73.  This is 
so, says the majority, because "[t]he act of presenting 
identification, either by vocalizing her legal name, writing it 
down, or handing government documents bearing her legal name to 
someone else, has never been considered a form of expressive 
conduct in either legal precedent or in the historical record."  
Id.  Thus, the majority takes a narrow view of expressive 
conduct, concluding that "[t]he act of producing identification 
is conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."  Id.  The 
majority further attempts to explain:   
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
5 
 
When Ella presents herself to the world as a woman, 
her conduct is expressive, but it becomes no less or 
more expressive depending on her legal name. . . . The 
expressive component of her transgender identity is 
not 
created 
by 
the 
legal 
name 
printed 
on 
her 
identification but by the various actions she takes to 
present herself in a specific manner, e.g., dressing 
in women's clothing, wearing make-up, growing out her 
hair, and using a feminine alias.   
Id., ¶75.  Accordingly, the majority concludes that "identifying 
one's self is an act, not a mode of expression."  Id., ¶92. 
¶116 The majority's conclusion is erroneous as a matter of 
precedent and discounts the personal burdens the name change ban 
foists on Ella.  Contrary to the majority's view, the 
proposition that a name is not expressive conduct implicating 
the First Amendment goes against the tide of the relevant case 
law.  
¶117 Conduct is expressive if it "possesses sufficient 
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play."  
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).  This inquiry is 
informed by whether conduct has the "intent to convey a 
particularized message."  Id.  Changing one's name to reflect a 
certain personal identity fits the bill.  
¶118 A name can convey a person's family history, cultural 
heritage, or religious devotion.  And a name most certainly can 
convey one's gender identity.  It is a fundamental way a person 
presents themselves to the world and is essential to a person's 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
6 
 
identity.3  Calling a person by that person's chosen name 
indicates respect for that person's dignity and autonomy.   
¶119 One need look no further than the daily news and 
recent history to find a litany of name changes, the purpose of 
which is to express an essential piece of a person's identity.  
Cassius Clay became Muhammad Ali.  Bruce Jenner became Caitlyn 
Jenner. 
¶120 When Cassius Clay changed his name to Muhammad Ali, he 
did so not only to convey a religious identity, but to shed the 
"slave name" he was given at birth.  Similarly, when Bruce 
Jenner became Caitlyn, she did so to express an essential piece 
of her identity——her gender identity.  These "particularized 
messages" are certainly worthy of the label of "expressive 
conduct." 
¶121 "The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the 
polity but also those of the human spirit——a spirit that demands 
self-expression.  Such expression is an integral part of the 
development of ideas and a sense of identity."  Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).  
To deny the applicability of the First Amendment to protect the 
expression of one's personal name in this as-applied challenge 
                                                 
3 See Yofi Tirosh, A Name of One's Own:  Gender and Symbolic 
Legal Personhood in the European Court of Human Rights, 33 Harv. 
J. L. & Gender 247, 255 (2010) ("Names——surnames included——play 
a constitutive role in one's personhood (defining for oneself 
and for one's social world a set of affiliations with past 
generations and with present family) . . . ."); Kif Augustine-
Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom is to Call Things by Their Right 
Names, 7 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 1, 1 (1997) ("Naming 
practices reflect conceptions of individuality, equality, family 
and community that are fundamental to identity."). 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
7 
 
gives short shrift to the expressive nature of a name and the 
dignity that the recognition of it carries.  See id. ("To 
suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for 
recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity."). 
¶122 Courts have previously recognized the right to use a 
religious name, declaring that "[a] personal name is special."  
Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1990).  
Indeed, "It may honor the memory of a loved one, reflect a deep 
personal commitment, show respect or admiration for someone 
famous and worthy, or . . . reflect a reverence for God and 
God's teachings."  Id.  "Like a baptism, bar mitzvah, or 
confirmation, the adoption of a new name may signify a 
conversion and the acceptance of responsibilities of membership 
in a community."  Id.  Accordingly, in the context of a 
religious name, it has been established that "an inmate has a 
First Amendment interest in using his religious name, at least 
in conjunction with his committed name."  Malik v. Brown, 71 
F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1995) see also Salaam, 905 F.2d at 1170 
n.4 (quoting Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam)) ("The adoption of Muslim names by inmates 
practicing that religion is generally recognized to be an 
exercise of both first amendment speech and religious freedom." 
(Emphasis added)).   
¶123 These cases regarding religious names are a useful 
analogue to Ella's claim here.  Both a religious name and a name 
that conforms to one's gender identity involve fundamental 
aspects of a person's identity that are conveyed through the 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
8 
 
medium of a name.  As the Eighth Circuit said in Salaam, a name 
may "honor," "reflect," or "signify" essential elements of a 
person's identity.  Salaam, 905 F.2d at 1170.  In other words, a 
name may "express" such elements so as to implicate the First 
Amendment's protections of expressive conduct.  
¶124 Similarly, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
declared that "[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within 
its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that 
allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express 
their identity."  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 651-52.  Additionally, 
the Ninth Circuit has said:  "Sexual identity is inherent to 
one's very identity as a person."  Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigr. 
and Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).  
It is "so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not 
be required to abandon [it]."  Id. 
¶125 Yet the majority requires Ella to abandon her gender 
identity in any situation involving official documents.  The 
court of appeals' assertion, apparently adopted by the majority, 
that "Ella has the right to use whatever name she chooses," 
rings hollow.  Majority/lead op., ¶75 (citing State v. C.G., 
2021 WI App 11, ¶32, 396 Wis. 2d 105, 955 N.W.2d 443).  Even if 
Ella can use her feminine name in daily life, her driver's 
license, passport, applications for public assistance, and any 
other government document still require her to use her former 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
9 
 
masculine name.4  In other words, the government requires that 
she express her fundamental identity as something she is not.  
See Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 
894, 951 (2019) ("Identity documents such as passports, driver's 
licenses, and birth certificates can also play a meaningful role 
in a person's conception of self."). 
¶126 The majority seeks support for its result in the 
Eastern District's recent determination in Krebs v. Graveley, 
2020 WL 1479189 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2020), and the Seventh 
Circuit's affirmance of that decision.  Krebs v. Graveley, 861 
F. App'x 671 (7th Cir. 2021).  Krebs does not stand for the 
broad proposition the majority asserts.  It is true that Krebs 
involves facts similar to those here:  Krebs is a transgender 
woman, named Kenneth at birth, seeking to legally change her 
name to Karen.  She cannot do so because she is a convicted sex 
offender and is prohibited from legally changing her name.   
¶127 Krebs argued that the name change statute violated her 
First Amendment right in four ways:  (1) it constitutes 
compelled speech, (2) it restricts speech in a limited public 
forum, namely the forum provided by Wisconsin for changing one's 
name, (3) it regulates expressive conduct, and (4) the statute 
                                                 
4 "In the last few decades, and particularly since the 
passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, most everything people do is 
subject 
to 
identification 
and 
subsequent 
recordation——from 
opening a bank account or applying for a credit card to 
receiving healthcare, buying alcohol, or taking an Amtrak 
train."  Adam Candeub, Privacy and Common Law Names:  Sand in 
the Gears of Identification, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 467, 469 (2016) 
(footnote omitted). 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
10 
 
fails rational basis review.  The Krebs opinion is certainly not 
a legal exegesis on these issues.   
¶128 Rather than squarely addressing the merits of Krebs's 
claim, the district court rested its determination on Krebs's 
failure to meet her burden and the rank inadequacy of the 
briefing:  "The Court will not engage in any such analysis in 
this case, owing to the fact that Plaintiff has failed to 
establish that Wisconsin's regulation of her ability to change 
her name implicates her First Amendment rights.  The parties 
provide relatively scant attention to this matter."  2020 WL 
1479189 at *1.  "Plaintiff's only support for her position is a 
decade-old, student-written law review article.  This is not 
legal precedent at all.  It is a wholly insufficient legal basis 
for the Court to agree with Plaintiff's viewpoint."  Id. at *2 
(citation omitted).   
¶129 Notably, the district court went out of its way to say 
that its holding was limited by the parties' arguments:  "The 
Court stresses the limitations of this holding.  It is based 
entirely upon the briefing presented in this case by these 
parties."  Id.  The court expanded in a footnote:   
Plaintiff's claim presents important and evolving 
issues for our society.  To be unable to address the 
matter because of poorly constructed and researched 
arguments seems a waste of time for all involved.  But 
as explained in Kay v. Board of Education of City of 
Chicago, 547 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008), when a 
"[district] judge [acts] sua sponte, the parties [are] 
unable to provide their views and supply legal 
authorities.  The benefit of adversarial presentation 
is a major reason why judges should respond to the 
parties' 
arguments 
rather 
than 
going 
off 
independently."  It is for the parties, not the Court, 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
11 
 
to carefully select and craft the arguments they will 
present to support their positions.   
Id. at *2 n.3.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, 
again making its determination based on the inadequacy of 
briefing.  861 F. App'x at 674.    
¶130 Here, in contrast, the issue has been more than 
adequately briefed.  The parties have been ably represented by 
counsel on both sides and we have heard extensively from amici.  
The arguments are developed and the case cannot be summarily 
dispatched for the same reason the Krebs court dismissed that 
case.  Contrary to the majority's assertion, Ella's arguments do 
not suffer from the "similar defect" as those of Krebs.  See 
majority/lead op., ¶72.  As the district court observed, Krebs's 
arguments were practically nonexistent.  As analyzed above, 
unlike the plaintiff in Krebs, Ella has met her burden to 
demonstrate that her First Amendment rights are implicated by 
the name change ban.  
III 
¶131 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
First 
Amendment 
is 
implicated by the sex offender registry's name change ban, the 
next question, left unaddressed by the majority, is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. 
¶132 In this endeavor, we must examine whether the state 
regulation at issue is content-based or content-neutral.  State 
v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶14, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34.  This 
is important because "[a] content-based statute must survive 
strict scrutiny whereas a content-neutral statute must survive 
only intermediate scrutiny."  Id. 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
12 
 
¶133 Generally, a law is content-based if it distinguishes 
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas 
or views expressed.  Id., ¶32.  On the other hand, "laws that 
confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to 
the ideas or views expressed are generally content neutral."  
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶134 The name change ban does not regulate based on the 
content of the conduct.  Instead, it affects all content 
equally.  Name changes based on religion are treated the same as 
name changes based on gender identity, which are treated the 
same as name changes "just because."  The statute does not favor 
one reason for a name change over another, or one name over 
another, but bans all equally regardless of the motivation or 
content. 
¶135 Accordingly, I conclude that the name change ban is 
content-neutral.  Because it is content-neutral, intermediate 
scrutiny applies.  Id., ¶14. 
IV 
¶136 Having determined that intermediate scrutiny is the 
proper framework for analyzing Ella's challenge, I turn next to 
apply that framework, an analysis that, again, the majority 
failed to conduct. 
¶137 "The intermediate scrutiny test allows the government 
to impose reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on speech 
that are 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest.'"  State v. King, 2020 WI App 66, ¶23, 394 
Wis. 2d 431, 950 N.W.2d 891.  "A condition need not be the least 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
13 
 
restrictive means of advancing the government's interests in 
order 
to 
satisfy 
the 
'narrowly 
tailored' 
requirement 
of 
intermediate scrutiny.  Rather, the standard is met so long as 
the restriction 'promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted).  We must additionally consider the burdens 
of the regulation on free expression: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if 
it 
is 
within 
the 
constitutional 
power 
of 
the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 
if 
the 
incidental 
restriction 
on 
alleged 
First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest. 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  The burden 
is 
on 
the 
State 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
constitutional as applied to Ella.  Baron, 318 Wis. 2d 60, ¶14. 
¶138 Ella asserts that the registration requirement that 
she not legally change her name fails this test as applied to 
her because there is no substantial government interest in 
subjecting her to the restriction and the corresponding burden 
on her is significant.  She contends that she is a low risk to 
reoffend, she has no conduct disorder or personality disorder, 
and law enforcement already has her preferred name listed as an 
alias in its records.  Ella further contends that being required 
to continue to use her former masculine name exposes her to 
discrimination, mistreatment, and even physical violence.  
¶139 The State, on the other hand, asserts that the name 
change ban furthers a significant governmental interest in 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
14 
 
protecting the public and assisting law enforcement.  It 
additionally argues that the regulation is sufficiently tailored 
to achieve this interest.  Specifically, the State contends that 
law enforcement's ability to successfully track sex offenders 
would be hampered absent the name change ban and that without 
the ban those on the registry could create confusion by 
repeatedly changing their names, especially if they used common 
names.  The State additionally argues that Ella's specific 
circumstances do not alter the result.  Despite the fact that 
Ella was a juvenile when she was adjudicated delinquent, the 
State argues that law enforcement has a substantial interest in 
being able to quickly locate and identify Ella while she is on 
the registry. 
¶140 I agree with Ella.  The State completely discounts the 
burdens that Ella specifically faces from being categorically 
unable to change her name (and the majority doesn't even address 
the question).  These severe and acute burdens manifest due to 
both Ella's gender identity and her age.   
¶141  The name change ban that accompanies sex offender 
registration means that every time Ella has to complete an 
official task, she must use a name that is inconsistent with who 
she is.  Any time she has to show a state-issued identification, 
she is forced to identify herself as someone she is not.  If she 
applies for a public benefits program, checks into a hotel, 
boards an airplane, or begins a new job, she must present 
official documents that are inconsistent with her very identity.  
See Clarke, supra ¶125, at 951. 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
15 
 
¶142 Further, requiring Ella to maintain a name that is 
inconsistent with her gender identity and forcing her to out 
herself every time she presents official documents exposes her 
to discrimination and abuse.  Sadly, such a concern is not 
merely theoretical.  "In a recent survey, 82 percent of 
transgender Wisconsinites reported experiencing harassment or 
mistreatment in the workplace.  Significant numbers also 
reported that they were discriminated against based on their 
gender identity:  54 percent were not hired, 34 percent lost a 
job, and 22 percent were denied a promotion."  Joseph S. 
Diedrich, Transgender Rights in Wisconsin, Wis. Law., Mar. 2018, 
at 26;5 see also Lisa R. Miller and Eric Anthony Grollman, The 
Social Costs of Gender Nonconformity for Transgender Adults:  
Implications for Discrimination and Health, 30 Socio. F. 809, 
826 
(2015) 
(indicating 
that 
transgender 
people 
who 
have 
transitioned report prejudice and discrimination "especially if 
their legal documents do not reflect their present gender 
identity").   
¶143 These burdens are exacerbated by Ella's young age.  As 
she is just getting her footing in an independent life (a 
difficult 
endeavor 
for 
any 
person 
regardless 
of 
gender 
                                                 
5 See also Ryan K. Blake, Transgender Rights are Human 
Rights:  A Contemplation of Litigation Strategies in Transgender 
Discrimination Cases, 33 Wis. J. L. Gender & Soc'y 107, 115 
(2018) (citing statistics indicating that unemployment for 
transgender survey respondents was twice the national average). 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
16 
 
identity), she must also face the threat of discrimination every 
time she simply uses a government identification.6 
¶144 With regard to abuse, Ella's fears are similarly well-
founded.  The record reflects that Ella was subjected to 
physical violence due to her gender identity while incarcerated.7  
Underscoring the uphill climb Ella faces in having her dignity 
recognized, the Department of Corrections appallingly blamed 
Ella for her own attack, stating essentially that she made 
herself a target.  
¶145 On the flip side, the benefit to the State in 
requiring Ella to retain her former masculine name is minimal.  
The easy tracking that the name change ban is purported to 
foster would not be affected in the slightest by Ella changing 
her name for the simple reason that law enforcement already has 
                                                 
6 See Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won't See You Now:  Rights of 
Transgender Adolescents to Sex Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. 
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 361, 362 (2007) ("The dangers that 
transgender youth face during their adolescent years are 
numerous, scarring, and often have permanent repercussions."); 
Julia C. Oparah, Feminism and the (Trans)gender Entrapment of 
Gender Nonconforming Prisoners, 18 UCLA Women's L. J. 239, 248 
(2012) (explaining that certain burdens can be "exacerbated for 
transgender youth under 18 years old, and those under criminal 
justice supervision who need permission from a parent/guardian 
or warden or parole officer in order to change either their name 
or gender"). 
7 Ella's 
experience 
is 
tragically 
commonplace. 
 
Data 
indicates that transgender inmates are more likely to suffer 
violence while incarcerated and that almost 40 percent of 
transgender 
inmates 
experience 
sexual 
victimization 
while 
incarcerated compared to four percent of all inmates.  Stephanie 
Saran Rudolph, A Comparative Analysis of the Treatment of 
Transgender Prisoners:  What the United States Can Learn from 
Canada and the United Kingdom, 35 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 95, 109-10 
(2021). 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
17 
 
"Ella" listed as an alias.  All that a name change would 
seemingly require from law enforcement's perspective is to 
switch Ella's current legal name with an alias that is already 
on file.  Law enforcement would still have both names and would 
still tie them to the same person.  The burden is purely 
administrative, which pales in comparison to the burdens placed 
on Ella.   
¶146 The 
State's 
argument 
ultimately 
falters 
in 
its 
consideration of Ella's as-applied challenge by discounting the 
burdens the name change ban places on Ella specifically.  In 
light of the burdens Ella faces due to the name change ban, the 
State's "interest" is insignificant.  Where the government 
already knows Ella's preferred name and ties it to her in any 
database search, I am unpersuaded that the State has met its 
burden that she should be categorically banned from making that 
name her legal name, especially given the severe and acute 
burdens Ella cites. 
¶147 Does my conclusion mean that Ella can legally change 
her name, case closed?  No.  If she wishes to follow through on 
changing her name, she must still petition the circuit court in 
her county of residence to legally change her name.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 786.36.  Before legally changing Ella's name, the circuit 
court must find that "no sufficient cause is shown to the 
contrary."  § 786.36(1).  I do not comment on whether Ella's 
petition, should she file one, be granted or denied.  But under 
the circumstances presented, Ella should not be categorically 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
18 
 
foreclosed from presenting a name change petition to the circuit 
court. 
¶148 As the district court stated in Krebs, this case 
presents "important and evolving issues for our society."  
Krebs, 2020 WL 1479189 at *2 n.3.  I agree.  Yet the majority 
ignores such evolution with an incomplete and faulty legal 
analysis that is contrary to precedent and discounts the burdens 
Ella faces.  
¶149 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶150 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP2205.awb 
 
 
 
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