Title: Ex parte L & D Transportation and George Berry. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Brian Jones v. L & D Transportation and George Berry)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1090467
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2011

This case was previously assigned to another Justice; it
1
was reassigned to Justice Shaw on February 23, 2011.   
REL:03/25/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1090467
_________________________
Ex parte L & D Transportation and George Berry
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Brian Jones
v.
L & D Transportation and George Berry)
(Tallapoosa Circuit Court, CV-05-13)
SHAW, Justice.1
L 
& 
D 
Transportation 
("L&D") 
and 
George 
Berry
(collectively "the petitioners"), the defendants in an action
1090467
2
brought by the plaintiff, Brian Jones, petition this Court for
a writ of mandamus compelling the Tallapoosa Circuit Court to
set this case for a jury trial rather than a bench trial.  We
grant the petition and issue the writ.  
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2003, Jones was driving a motor vehicle on
Highway 280 in Tallapoosa County.  He was involved in a
collision with a motor vehicle being driven by Berry.  
In March 2004, Jones sued Berry and L&D, Berry's
employer, seeking damages for injuries Jones allegedly
received in the accident; he alleged that Berry was acting in
the line and scope of his employment with L&D at the time of
the accident.  Jones's complaint demanded a trial by jury.
The petitioners answered the complaint and also demanded a
trial by jury.
In August 2004, the trial court dismissed the case
pursuant to a motion filed by the petitioners, apparently on
the ground that Jones had failed to obey an order of the trial
court.  The case was reinstated in November 2004.  In November
2006, the petitioners again moved the trial court to dismiss
the action, this time based on an alleged failure to
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prosecute, which motion the trial court granted in March 2007.
Jones moved to reinstate the case, and the trial court held a
hearing on Jones's motion on May 9, 2007.
In an order entered on June 6, 2007, the trial court
granted Jones's motion to reinstate the case.  In its order,
the trial court noted, in part: "At the May 9, 2007 hearing,
[Jones's] new counsel advised the Court that, in an effort to
further expedite this matter, they would voluntarily withdraw
the ... jury demand."  The trial court further stated: "[T]he
plaintiff's case is reinstated and plaintiff's jury demand is
stricken."  (Emphasis and capitalization omitted.)  The
resulting entries on the case-action summary stated:  
"06/06/2007 ... ORDER - REINSTATED AND JURY DEMAND
STRICKEN.
"06/08/2007 ... BENCH/NON-JURY TRIAL REQUESTED."  
(Capitalization in original.)  
In July 2009, Jones filed a motion to set the case for
trial.  On September 17, 2009, an entry appeared in the case-
action summary stating that the case was "SET FOR: TRIAL --
BENCH ON 12/01/2009 ...."  (Capitalization in original.)  On
November 13, 2009, the petitioners filed a motion to reset the
case for a jury trial.  The trial court denied the motion on
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December 1, 2009.  The petitioners now seek mandamus review of
the trial court's denial of their motion.  
Standard of Review
"A petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate
method of challenging a trial court's denial of a demand for
trial by jury."  Ex parte Jackson, 737 So. 2d 452, 453 (Ala.
1999).  
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1)
a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." 
Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).
Discussion
Alabama Const. 1901, Art. I, § 11, provides: "[T]he right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."  See Ex parte
Kurtts, 706 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Ala. 1997) ("Section 11, Ala.
Const. 1901, makes trial by jury a fundamental right.").
Similarly, Rule 38(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "The right
of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution of Alabama or
as given by a statute of this State shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate."  This right, however, is subject to
1090467
Counsel for both sides present affidavit testimony
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outside the record disputing whether the petitioners consented
to the withdrawal of Jones's jury demand.  These materials are
not properly before this Court.  Ex parte Pike Fabrication,
Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala. 2002) ("[T]his Court is
bound by the record, and it cannot consider a statement or
evidence in a party's brief that was not before the trial
court."), but see Ex parte Guaranty Pest Control, Inc., 21 So.
3d 1222, 1228 (Ala. 2009) (considering affidavit testimony
describing what occurred at a hearing, noting that the
assertions in the affidavit were not denied by the opposing
party and purported "to describe proceedings before the trial
court").  
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waiver.  Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Ala.
1982) ("[N]o constitutional or statutory provision prohibits
a person from waiving his or her right to trial by jury.").
A demand for a jury trial may be withdrawn by consent of
the parties.  Rule 38(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("A demand for trial
by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without
the consent of the parties ....").  The materials before us
clearly reflect that, when this case was reinstated in June
2007 on Jones's motion, Jones desired to withdraw his own jury
demand.  Although the parties dispute whether Jones's jury
demand was properly withdrawn under Rule 38(d), Ala. R. Civ.
P.,  the petitioners maintain that their own timely request
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for a jury trial was never withdrawn or stricken.  Nothing in
the materials before us explicitly contradicts that assertion.
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Specifically, the orders of the trial court entered before
September 2009 indicate only that Jones's request for a jury
trial had been stricken and that a bench trial was simply
"requested."  The first indication by the trial court that the
case would not actually be tried by a jury occurred when the
trial court, on September 17, 2009, set the case for a bench
trial. 
In determining whether a party has waived a previous,
timely request for a jury trial, we have noted that "[w]aiver
of a jury demand may arise from 'any conduct or acquiescence
inconsistent with an intent to insist upon jury trial.'"
Holman v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d
107, 108 (Ala. 1985) (quoting Ingram v. Omelet Shoppe, Inc.,
388 So. 2d 190, 195 (Ala. 1980)).  In Holman and Ingram, the
parties who had previously demanded trials by jury, but whose
requests had not been ruled on, did not object to the fact
that there was no jury until after the case had been tried in
a bench trial.  Similarly, in Bullock v. Howard, 717 So. 2d
402, 403 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), the court noted that
"participating in [a] non-jury trial without requesting a
ruling on [a] jury demand, or without objecting to the lack of
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a jury, is inconsistent with an intent to insist upon a jury
trial."  See also Brown Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial
Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 932, 941 (Ala. 1983) (holding that a
party was estopped from seeking a jury trial because it
assented to a nonjury trial in another proceeding that
litigated its claim).  Further, an objection to the lack of
a jury made after trial has commenced comes too late and in
such a case the right to a jury trial is waived.  Raburn v.
Bailes, 565 So. 2d 122, 126 (Ala. 1990).
The petitioners assert that they have taken no action
inconsistent with their request for a jury trial.  We agree.
Jones suggests that the petitioners should have acted in June
2007 to secure a jury trial, but nothing in the materials
before us indicates that the petitioners' separate jury demand
was refused by the trial court until September 2009, when the
trial court scheduled a bench trial.  No other conduct by the
petitioners that could be considered inconsistent with an
intent to insist upon a jury trial (or as a waiver) is
identified.  
When a "demand for a jury trial is made ... the demand is
effective to compel a jury trial on all issues raised in the
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complaint, 
answer, 
compulsory 
counterclaim, 
and 
reply 
thereto.
No judicial discretion is invoked ...."  Baggett v. Sims, 387
So. 2d 792, 795 (Ala.  1980).  The facts of this case show
that the petitioners timely demanded a jury trial under Rule
38(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The petitioners' request for a jury
trial was never stricken and was never waived by consent under
Rule 38(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Further, no waiver, as identified
by prior caselaw, e.g., Holman, Ingram, Bullock, Brown Mech.
Contractors, and Raburn, supra, occurred in this case.
Therefore, the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying
the petitioners' motion to reset the case for a jury trial. 
Conclusion
The petitioners are entitled to a jury trial.  The
petition is granted, and the trial court is instructed to set
the case for a jury trial.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.  
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
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COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  Alabama law is long settled that
the right to a jury trial can be waived.  See, e.g., Ex parte
AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C., 49 So. 3d 1198 (Ala.
2010).  The case-action summary for this case shows a transfer
of the case to the nonjury docket on June 8, 2007.  The
petitioners, in their reply brief to this Court, admit that
"the case had been apparently transferred to the nonjury
docket following the entry of the trial court's June 7, 2007
order as reflected on case action summary sheet printed from
the AlaFile electronic filing system." Petitioners' reply
brief, at 4.  Although this statement attempts to qualify the
admission with an assertion that no explicit notice was ever
sent to the petitioners, it does make clear that the
information regarding the action taken by the trial court was
available to the petitioners immediately after June 7, 2007.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the petitioners do not
explicitly deny being aware of the understanding that the case
had been set for a nonjury trial.  Rather, they simply assert
that they never explicitly withdrew their demand for a jury
trial.
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The critical question before this Court is whether the
trial court exceeded its broad discretion in denying the
petitioners' motion to reset the case for a jury trial in
light of their conduct up to that point in the litigation.  I
believe that a fair reading of the facts in this case show
that the petitioners were aware that the trial court intended
to set the case for a nonjury trial after the hearing in May
2007 when they at least appeared to acquiesce in that result.
That result was further confirmed by the trial court's actions
in moving the case to the nonjury docket. Some two years
later, after the parties had completed discovery and the case
was set for a nonjury trial, the petitioners determined that
the situation was not to their advantage and developed the
argument advanced in this petition -- that they had not
explicitly waived their jury demand.  They presented this
argument to the trial court and were refused.  Under these
facts, I do not believe that the petitioners have shown the
necessary "clear legal right" to afford them mandamus relief.
Ex parte Synovus Trust Co., 41 So. 3d 70 (Ala. 2009); Ex parte
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1998).  I
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believe that the petition is due to be denied. Therefore, I
dissent.