Title: Sophian Plaza Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, Missouri
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC97626
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 2019

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
SOPHIAN PLAZA ASSOCIATION, 
  ) 
et al.,   
 ) 
  ) 
Respondents, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC97626 
  ) 
CITY OF KANSAS CITY,  
  ) 
MISSOURI,  
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PLATTE COUNTY 
The Honorable James Van Amburg, Judge 
I.
Introduction
The City of Kansas City appeals a judgment in favor of Sophian Plaza Association 
and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs on claims of breach of injunction, breach of 
contract, specific performance and civil contempt in connection with City's termination of 
its trash rebate program.  The breach of contract claim is not viable because the underlying 
contract was merged into the 1976 Modified Judgment at the request of the parties.  Neither 
Sophian Plaza nor the class of similarly situated plaintiffs may bring a contempt action to 
enforce the 1976 Modified Judgment because they were not parties to the litigation nor 
Opinion issued October 15, 2019
 
2 
were the 1976 plaintiffs certified as a class under Rule 52.08.  The circuit court's judgment 
is reversed. 
II. 
Background 
 
 In 1971, City enacted an ordinance, § 16.20(a), providing for trash collection for 
all residences except "trailer parks or buildings containing seven or more dwelling units."  
In 1975, three lawsuits filed by owners of residences excluded from the trash collection 
service were consolidated in one suit challenging the constitutional validity of the 
ordinance.  In its April 1976 judgment, the circuit court held the exclusion of trailer parks 
and buildings with seven or more dwelling units was unconstitutional and entered a 
mandatory injunction requiring City to provide trash collection services to Graham1 "unless 
and until City enacts a valid ordinance which establishes a reasonable and justifiable 
classification for those persons who are not entitled to refuse collection by City."  Both 
Graham and City filed timely notices of appeal of the April 1976 order.   
 
On August 31, 1976, City and Graham filed a Stipulation and Agreement ("the 
Agreement") with the circuit court.  The Agreement was signed by Graham's attorney as 
well as by the assistant city attorney on City's behalf.  The Agreement required City to 
either provide trash services to owners of apartment buildings containing seven or more 
dwelling units and owners of trailer parks within Kansas City, Missouri, or pay each owner 
$1.15 per occupied unit per year in lieu of trash services.  The Agreement provided the 
                                              
1 The three separate actions were styled: Graham, et al., v. City of Kansas City, No. C-75-515; 
Byers & Danneberg, et al., v. City of Kansas City, No. C-74-172; and Frances Max, et al., v. City 
of Kansas City, No. C-74-173.  To promote clarity and avoid confusion, the collective of plaintiffs 
in these three actions will be referred to as "Graham" in this opinion. 
 
3 
cash payment would be increased or decreased each year by "the same percentage as the 
increase or decrease in the average cost of providing services" to those dwelling units 
receiving trash service under the city ordinance.  The Agreement also provided City's 
obligations to provide the trash rebate program would terminate only upon City's 
termination of its entire trash collection service.  Following termination of the trash 
collection service, City's obligation to provide the trash rebate program would renew 
should City ever then restore its city-wide trash collection service. 
 
Before the record on appeal was filed in the court of appeals, and upon the joint 
request of the parties through the Agreement, the circuit court entered a modified judgment 
(the "1976 Modified Judgment") declaring § 16.20(a) unconstitutional, adopting and 
incorporating the Agreement into its judgment at the request of the parties, and entering a 
mandatory injunction directing City to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
Agreement.2  In 1976, City amended its trash collection ordinances in adherence with the 
1976 Modified Judgment by formally adopting the trash rebate program into the city code. 
                                              
2 Though more than 30 days had passed after the circuit court's entry of judgment in 1976, Rule 
75.01 was effectively identical to the rule today:  
After the filing of notice of appeal and before the filing of the record on appeal in 
the appellate court, the trial court, after the expiration of such thirty-day period, 
may still vacate, amend or modify its judgment upon stipulation of the parties 
accompanied by a withdrawal of the appeal. 
(Emphasis added).  The circuit court was within its power to modify its judgment despite both 
parties having filed timely notices of appeal because the record on appeal was not filed in the 
appellate court, the parties stipulated to the modification, and the parties filed a withdrawal of their 
appeals. 
 
4 
 
City continued providing the trash rebate program until the city council approved a 
proposed budget eliminating the program in 2008.  In 2010, City effectively eliminated the 
program by repealing City Code §§ 62-41(a3) and 62-42. 
 
The class plaintiffs, Sophian Plaza Association, Townsend Place Condominium 
Association, Inc., and Stadium View Apartments filed a class action petition in 2015, 
alleging City's elimination of the trash rebate program was a breach of the modified 
judgment and a breach of the Agreement.  The circuit court certified a class consisting of: 
All managers and owners of trailer parks, condominiums, apartments and 
buildings containing seven or more dwelling units located in Kansas City 
Missouri during the class period May 1, 2010 to the present.  Excluded from 
the class are members of the Heartland Apartment Association as of February 
27, 2015. 
 
After trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the class on its claims for breach 
of injunction, breach of contract, specific performance, and civil contempt.3  The circuit 
court assessed $10,274,704 in compensatory damages, required City to "pay $2,846 per 
day until it complies with its trash collection obligations[,]" and ordered City to pay class 
counsel $1,362,562.50 in fees and $59,035.56 in expenses.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the judgment, and this Court granted transfer.4 
 
 
 
                                              
3 "Breach of Injunction" is not a claim separate from civil contempt.  See Contract Enforcement: 
Specific Performance and Injunctions, § 1.2.2. (2d ed. 2019) ("A promisor who refuses to comply 
with … an injunction may be subject to civil or criminal contempt.").   
4 Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
III. 
Analysis 
 
The circuit court determined members of the class fell within the definition of 
"Owners" provided in the Agreement.5  In accord with this determination, the circuit court 
concluded City breached the Agreement and the class could recover for breach of contract 
and could receive specific performance of the Agreement.  A fatal flaw in the circuit court's 
conclusion in this regard is that, at the request of Graham and City, the circuit court merged 
the Agreement into the 1976 Modified Judgment.  "[M]erger is the substitution of rights 
and duties under the judgment or the decree for those under the agreement[.]"  46 Am. Jur. 
2d Judgments § 430 (2017).   
 
The law of merger by judgment is one closely related to res judicata.  See, e.g., 
Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 n.5 (Mo. banc 2002).  
The most common method by which it operates is "[w]hen a claim on a contract is reduced 
to judgment[.]"  46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 438 (2017).  This Court has recognized the 
law of merger by judgment in this context.  See Ballard v. Standard Printing Co., 202 
S.W.2d 780, 782 (Mo. 1947) ("Generally a cause of action merges in the judgment entered 
thereon and any further action must be upon the judgment."); State ex rel. Noe v. Cox, 19 
S.W.2d 695, 699 (Mo. 1929) ("[A] valid judgment upon a promissory note merges the 
cause of action which previously existed upon the note, and, after a valid judgment has 
been rendered upon the note, recovery must be had upon such judgment and not upon the 
                                              
5 The Agreement defines "Owners" as: 
[T]he owners or authorized managing agents of the owners of apartment buildings 
containing seven or more dwelling units and the owners or authorized managing 
agents of trailer parks located within the City of Kansas City, Missouri. 
 
6 
note.").  However, merger by judgment may also occur at the election of the parties to the 
contract, so long as the parties intend the agreement to become decretal through its 
requested merger with the judgment.  School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Mo. Bd. of Fund 
Comm'rs, 384 S.W.3d 238, 261 n.21 (Mo. App. 2012).6   
                                              
6 In School, the court of appeals outlined the law of merger by judgment in this particular context: 
Generally, where the object of the contract does not, by its nature, require court 
approval to render the terms of the contract enforceable, court "approval" of the 
contract does not merge the contract with the decree and the contract remains 
independently enforceable.  Even in such circumstances, the parties can elect to 
have the otherwise enforceable contract incorporated into a decree (as 
distinguished from simply being approved by the court), in which case the contract 
does merge with the decree, and is thereafter only subject to enforcement or 
modification by the court. … [W]hether the agreement is to remain contractual 
or to become decretal depends on the intention of the parties.   
384 S.W. 3d at 261 n.21 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Toth v. Toth, 483 
S.W.2d 417, 422 (Mo. App. 1972); Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. App. 1964). 
The law of merger exists to prevent suits like Sophian Plaza's.  Once parties turn to the 
courts to enforce their previously-entered agreement—be it through a judgment on a breach of 
contract claim, or, as here, a voluntary merger with a binding judicial decree in order to obtain the 
right to bring a contempt action upon the Agreement's breach—a party cannot later seek to 
separately and independently enforce the contract while retaining a right to enforce the court's 
judgment through civil contempt proceedings.   
When a claim on a contract is reduced to judgment, the contract between the parties 
is voluntarily surrendered and canceled by merger in the judgment and ceases to 
exist.  Because all of the prior contractual rights are merged into and extinguished 
by the judgment, thereafter … the contract no longer serves any purpose except as 
evidence supporting the judgment.   
46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 438 (2017). 
This is not a new or novel legal doctrine—its roots trace to the Court of Common Pleas in 
1606.  It was by noted English barrister and Judge Sir Edward Coke's pen that the law of merger 
was first woven into the common law fabric.  Maynard E. Pirsig, Merger by Judgment, 28 Minn. 
L. Rev. 419, 424-25 (1944).  In Higgens's Case, Coke reasoned: 
So when a man has a debt on a bond, and by ordinary course of law has judgment 
thereon, the contract by specialty which is of an inferior nature, is by judgment of 
law changed into a matter of record, which is of a higher nature.  If he who recovers 
may have a new action and a new judgment he may have infinite actions, and 
infinite judgments to the perpetual vexation and charge of the defendant & infinitum 
in jure reprobatur [infinity in law is condemned].  
6 Co. Rep. 44 b. (1606). 
 
7 
 
The parties' intention for the Agreement to become decretal by operation of merger 
is clear from the Agreement's plain language.  In paragraph seven, the Agreement reads: 
"The parties jointly request the Court to incorporate this Stipulation and Agreement in a 
judgment herein and to make compliance with the provisions hereof mandatory."  
(Emphasis added).  The language of the resulting 1976 Modified Judgment equally evinces 
the parties' intent for the Agreement to become decretal.7 
 
When Graham and City jointly requested the 1976 circuit court to merge the 
Agreement "in a judgment herein and to make compliance with the provisions hereof 
mandatory[,]" and the circuit court complied with the request, they voluntarily surrendered 
their future right to make a separate claim on the Agreement itself.  Instead, the rights 
established in the Agreement can only be enforced through a contempt proceeding brought 
pursuant to the 1976 Modified Judgment. 
 
 
                                              
7 In relevant part, the 1976 Modified Judgment provides: 
[T]he parties hereto have filed herein their Stipulation and Agreement, a copy of 
which is appended hereto and made a part hereof, proposing that a system of cash 
payments or refuse services for the properties of plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated, and for dwelling units in trailer parks, mutually agreeable to the parties, 
be adopted by the Court and incorporated into a modification of its judgment 
herein. … [A] Mandatory Injunction is hereby entered directing the City of Kansas 
City to provide refuse collection services, or the cash equivalent thereof, to the 
properties of the plaintiffs and to the properties of others similarly situated, and to 
dwelling units located in trailer parks, under the terms and conditions specified in 
the Stipulation and Agreement filed herein."   
(Emphasis added). 
 
8 
 
The circuit court concluded that since May 1, 2010, "City has failed to meet its 
obligation under the Modified Judgment and Mandatory Injunction[,]" and accordingly 
held City in civil contempt of the Modified Judgment and Mandatory Injunction and 
entered judgment for the class.  However, no members of the class were parties to the 1976 
Modified Judgment. 
 
"Civil contempt is for the protection of a party to the litigation, the party for whose 
benefit the order, judgment or decree was entered.  Its function is to provide a coercive 
means to compel the other party to the litigation to comply with relief granted to his 
adversary."  Teefey v. Teefey, 533 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Mo. banc 1976) (emphasis added).  It 
necessarily follows, then, that to bring a civil contempt action, one must have been a party 
for whose benefit the original judgment was entered.  No one in this class falls into that 
category. 
 
The class argues that, despite no formal class certification in the 1976 proceedings, 
the 1976 Modified Judgment was clearly intended to "afford relief to all owners of relevant 
properties" and "treated all such owners as members of a class for whom the Modified 
Judgment provided a specific pecuniary benefit."  (Emphasis omitted).  Therefore, the class 
argues, it should be entitled to enforce the 1976 Modified Judgment because its members 
qualify as "others similarly situated" under the judgment's terms.  Supra, n.7.  However, 
that argument ignores that the requirements imposed by Rule 52.08 "are not merely 
technical or directory, but mandatory."  Beatty v. Metro. St. Louis City Sewer Dist., 914 
S.W.2d 791, 795 (Mo. banc 1995), overruled on other grounds by Zweig v. Metro. 
 
9 
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W. 3d 223, 248 n.17 (Mo. banc 2013).  The reason, Beatty 
provides, is: 
The impact of certification of a lawsuit as a class action is readily apparent. 
Individuals who did not initiate the litigation and who will have little or no 
practical control over the litigation nonetheless will be bound by its result.  
The potential increase in exposure to the defendant and the additional 
increase in the burden and cost of litigation to all parties may well overwhelm 
the substantive merits of the dispute. 
 
Id. at 794-95 (emphasis added).  The consequence of not certifying a class under Rule 
52.08(b) and thereafter following class action procedures—including ordering individual 
notice be provided to all class members under Rule 52.08(c)—is that the 1976 Modified 
Judgment can be enforced only by the parties to that judgment, even though the judgment 
extends benefits to others.  State ex rel. Niess v. Junkins, 572 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Mo. banc 
1978) (concluding a lawsuit was maintainable only by the individual parties on their own 
behalf, and not as a class action, due to a failure to strictly adhere to Rule 52.08's 
requirements).   
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, this class cannot avail itself of enforcement proceedings brought upon 
the 1976 Modified Judgment.  The circuit court's judgment holding City in civil contempt 
of the 1976 Modified Judgment—to which no one in the class was a party—is reversed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur