Title: Vasquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S258191
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
GERARDO VAZQUEZ et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S258191 
 
Ninth Circuit 
17-16096 
 
Northern District of California 
3:16-cv-05961-WHA  
 
 
January 14, 2021 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, Groban and 
Humes* concurred. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
First Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
1 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING 
INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
S258191 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
At the request of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, we agreed to decide the following question of 
California law (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548):  Does this 
court’s decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 (Dynamex) apply retroactively? 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Dynamex 
does apply retroactively.  In Dynamex, this court was faced with 
a question of first impression:  What standard applies under 
California law in determining whether workers should be 
classified as employees or independent contractors for purposes 
of the obligations imposed by California’s wage orders?  In 
addressing that question, we concluded that under one of the 
definitions of “employ” set forth in all California wage orders — 
namely, to “suffer or permit to work” — any worker who 
performs work for a business is presumed to be an employee who 
falls within the protections afforded by a wage order.  (Dynamex, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 916.)  We further held that such a worker 
can properly be found to be “an independent contractor to whom 
a wage order does not apply only if the hiring entity establishes:  
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the 
hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both 
under the contract for the performance of such work and in fact; 
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual 
course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
2 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, or business of the same nature as the work 
performed for the hiring entity.”  (Id. at pp. 916–917.)  This 
standard, also used in other jurisdictions to distinguish 
employees from independent contractors, is commonly referred 
to as the “ABC test.”  (Id. at p. 916.) 
In concluding that the standard set forth in Dynamex 
applies retroactively — that is, to all cases not yet final as of the 
date our decision in Dynamex became final — we rely primarily 
on the fact that Dynamex addressed an issue of first impression.  
It did not change a settled rule on which the parties below had 
relied.  No decision of this court prior to Dynamex had 
determined how the “suffer or permit to work” definition in 
California’s wage orders should be applied in distinguishing 
employees from independent contractors.  Particularly because 
we had not previously issued a definitive ruling on the issue 
addressed in Dynamex, we see no reason to depart from the 
general rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect. 
Defendant Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. asserts 
that an exception to the general rule of retroactivity should be 
recognized here.  Defendant maintains that, prior to the 
issuance of our decision in Dynamex, it reasonably believed that 
the question of whether a worker should be classified as an 
employee or independent contractor would be resolved under the 
standard set forth in this court’s decision in S.G. Borello & Sons 
v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 
(Borello).  Borello addressed whether farmworkers hired by a 
grower under a written “sharefarmer agreement” were 
independent contractors or employees for purposes of the 
workers’ compensation statutes.  (Id. at p. 345.)  The Borello 
decision, however, did not address whether a worker should be 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
3 
considered an employee or an independent contractor for 
purposes of the obligations imposed by a wage order.  Indeed, 
twice in the last decade, we signaled that the test for 
determining whether a worker should be classified as an 
employee or independent contractor in the wage order context 
remained an open question.  (Ayala v. Antelope Valley 
Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522 (Ayala); Martinez v. 
Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 57–58 (Martinez).)   
Defendant additionally contends that it could not have 
anticipated that the distinction between employees and 
independent contractors for purposes of the obligations imposed 
by a wage order would be governed by the ABC test that we 
adopted in Dynamex.  But defendant’s argument carries little 
weight when, as here, the underlying decision changes no 
settled rule.  Moreover, public policy and fairness concerns, such 
as protecting workers and benefitting businesses that comply 
with the wage order obligations, favor retroactive application of 
Dynamex.  Thus, we do not view the retroactive application of 
the ABC test to cases pending at the time Dynamex became final 
as improper or unfair.   
Accordingly, in response to the question posed by the 
Ninth Circuit, we answer that this court’s decision in Dynamex 
applies retroactively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
4 
I.  DYNAMEX’S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SUFFER OR PERMIT TO WORK DEFINITION 
IN WAGE ORDERS APPLIES RETROACTIVELY 
TO ALL NONFINAL CASES GOVERNED BY 
SIMILARLY WORDED WAGE ORDERS 
As noted, the sole issue before this court is whether our 
decision 
in 
Dynamex, 
supra, 
4 Cal.5th 
903, 
applies 
retroactively.1 
We begin with a brief summary of the Dynamex decision.  
In Dynamex, we faced the question regarding what standard 
applies in determining whether, for purposes of the obligations 
imposed by California’s wage orders, a worker should be 
considered an employee who is covered and protected by the 
applicable wage order or, instead, an independent contractor to 
whom the wage order’s obligations and protections do not 
apply.2  As we explained in Dynamex, all currently applicable 
California wage orders, in defining the terms as used in the 
wage orders, define the term “ ‘employ’ ” in part to mean “ ‘suffer 
 
1  
Although the particular facts of the underlying federal 
litigation in this case arise from a franchising arrangement, the 
question of California law posed by the Ninth Circuit that we 
agreed to answer does not involve any inquiry into the general 
relationship or applicability of the Dynamex decision to 
franchise agreements or arrangements, and we do not address 
that subject. 
2  
California’s wage orders were promulgated by the 
Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC), the state agency charged 
with fixing minimum wages, maximum hours of work, and 
conditions of labor for various industries.  (Brinker Restaurant 
Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1026.)  Although 
the Legislature defunded the IWC in 2004, its wage orders 
remain in full force and effect.  (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole 
Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1102, fn. 4.)      
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
5 
or permit to work’ ” and define the term “ ‘ “employee” ’ ” to 
mean “ ‘any person employed by an employer.’ ”  (Dynamex, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 926; see id. at p. 926 fn. 9.)  At the same 
time, we noted that the wage orders do not contain a definition 
of the term “ ‘independent contractor’ ” nor any “other provision 
that otherwise specifically addresses the potential distinction 
between workers who are employees covered by the terms of the 
wage order and workers who are independent contractors who 
are not entitled to the protections afforded by the wage order.”  
(Id. at p. 926.) 
After a lengthy review of prior relevant California 
decisions (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 927–942), we 
described the variety of standards that “have been adopted in 
legislative enactments, administrative regulations, and court 
decisions as the means for distinguishing between those 
workers who should be considered employees and those who 
should be considered independent contractors.”  (Id. at p. 950 & 
fn. 20.)  We explained that as early as 1937, the suffer or permit 
to work standard embodied in California’s wage orders had been 
described “as ‘the broadest definition’ that has been devised for 
extending the coverage of a statute or regulation to the widest 
class of workers that reasonably fall within the reach of a social 
welfare statute.”  (Id. at p. 951.)  We took note of a number of 
criticisms that had been advanced regarding several tests that 
rely upon a “multifactor, ‘all the circumstances’ standard” for 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors.  
(Id. at p. 954; see id. at pp. 954–956.)  Thus, in part to avoid 
these criticisms, we concluded in Dynamex that it is “most 
consistent with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit 
to work standard in California’s wage orders . . . to interpret 
that standard as:  (1) placing the burden on the hiring entity to 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
6 
establish that the worker is an independent contractor who was 
not intended to be included within the wage order’s coverage; 
and (2) requiring the hiring entity, in order to meet this burden, 
to establish each of the three factors embodied in the ABC test 
— namely  (A) that the worker is free from the control and 
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance 
of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the 
work and in fact; and (B) that the worker performs work that is 
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) 
that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as 
the work performed.”  (Id. at pp. 956–957, fn. omitted.) 
Accordingly, this court’s decision in Dynamex was based 
upon a determination concerning how the term “suffer or permit 
to work” in California wage orders should be interpreted for 
purposes of distinguishing between employees who are covered 
by the wage orders and independent contractors who are not 
protected by such orders. 
The Dynamex decision constitutes an authoritative 
judicial interpretation of language — suffer or permit to work — 
that has long been included in California’s wage orders to define 
the scope of the employment relationships governed by the wage 
orders.  Thus, under well-established jurisprudential principles, 
our interpretation of that language in Dynamex applies 
retroactively to all cases not yet final that were governed by 
wage orders containing that definition.  (See Newman v. 
Emerson Radio Corp. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 973, 978 (Newman) [“The 
general rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is 
basic in our legal tradition”]; Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 24 (Waller) [“[T]he general rule [is] that 
judicial decisions are to be applied retroactively”].)  As the 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
7 
United States Supreme Court observed in Rivers v. Roadway 
Express, Inc. (1994) 511 U.S. 298, 312–313:  “A judicial 
construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what 
the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case 
giving rise to that construction.”  In McClung v. Employment 
Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 474, this court, after 
quoting the foregoing passage from Rivers v. Roadway Express, 
Inc., observed:  “This is why a judicial decision [interpreting a 
legislative measure] generally applies retroactively.”  (See 
Woolsey v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 794 (Woolsey) 
[“ ‘Whenever a decision undertakes to vindicate the original 
meaning of an enactment, putting into effect the policy intended 
from its inception, retroactive application is essential to 
accomplish that aim’ ”].) 
As past cases have explained, the rule affirming the 
retroactive 
effect 
of 
an 
authoritative 
judicial 
decision 
interpreting a legislative measure generally applies even when 
the statutory language in question previously had been given a 
different interpretation by a lower appellate court decision.  
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rivers v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., supra, 511 U.S. 298, quoted above, 
involved just such a circumstance.  In that case, the high court 
held that its interpretation of a statutory term contained in the 
1866 Civil Rights Act applied retroactively, notwithstanding the 
fact that a line of prior federal appellate court decisions had set 
forth a contrary interpretation.   
California decisions apply this same rule.  In In re 
Retirement Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 426, 441–454, for 
example, the Court of Appeal held that the California Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of a term in a pension statute in Ventura 
County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
8 
16 Cal.4th 483 applied retroactively, even though the Ventura 
County decision explicitly rejected an earlier contrary 
interpretation of the same statutory term by another appellate 
decision in Guelfi v. Marin County Employees’ Retirement Assn. 
(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 297.  In Woolsey, supra, 3 Cal.4th 758, 
794, we reaffirmed the principle that “[t]he circumstance that 
our decision overrules prior decisions of the Courts of Appeal 
does not in itself justify prospective application.”  We elaborated:  
“An example of a decision which does not establish a new rule of 
law is one in which we give effect ‘to a statutory rule that courts 
had heretofore misconstrued [citation].’ ”  (Ibid.)  Such a decision 
applies retroactively, we concluded, because there is no material 
change in the law.  (Ibid.)   
Dynamex presented a question of first impression 
concerning how a wage order’s suffer or permit to work standard 
should apply in the employee or independent contractor context.  
In resolving that issue, our decision in Dynamex did not overrule 
any prior California Supreme Court decision or disapprove any 
prior California Court of Appeal decision.  Thus, the well-
established 
general 
principle 
affirming 
the 
retroactive 
application 
of 
judicial 
decisions interpreting 
legislative 
measures supports the retroactive application of Dynamex.  
II.  NO EXCEPTION TO THE 
RETROACTIVITY OF DYNAMEX IS 
JUSTIFIED 
Defendant argues that an exception to the general 
retroactivity principle should be applied here because, prior to 
Dynamex, businesses could not reasonably have anticipated that 
the ABC test would govern at the time when they classified 
workers as independent contractors rather than employees.  
Defendant relies on past cases noting that “narrow exceptions 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
9 
to the general rule of retroactivity [have been recognized] when 
considerations of fairness and public policy are so compelling in 
a particular case that, on balance, they outweigh the 
considerations that underlie the basic rule.”  (Newman, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at p. 983; see, e.g., Williams & Fickett v. County of 
Fresno (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1258, 1282; Claxton v. Waters (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 367, 378–379.)  This recognized exception arises 
“ ‘when a judicial decision changes a settled rule on which the 
parties below have relied.’ ”  (Claxton, at p. 378; see also 
Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California (2018) 5 Cal.4th 
542, 572 (Alvarado) [same]; Williams & Fickett, at p. 1282 
[same]; Waller, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 25 [judicial decision 
“clarif[ying]” the law applies retroactively].) 
In support of its position, defendant initially contends that 
prior to Dynamex, it — assertedly like other California 
businesses — reasonably believed that the question of whether 
a worker should be considered an employee or an independent 
contractor would be determined by application of the standard 
set forth and applied in this court’s decision in Borello, supra, 
48 Cal.3d 341.  Under these circumstances, defendant 
maintains that it would be unfair to apply the ABC standard 
adopted in the Dynamex decision, rather than the Borello 
standard, to nonfinal cases that predate the Dynamex decision.  
For the reasons discussed below, we disagree that an exception 
to the general rule of retroactivity is warranted on this theory. 
To begin with, it is important to understand that 
California’s wage orders have included the suffer or permit to 
work standard as one basis for defining who should be treated 
as an employee for purposes of the wage order for more than a 
century. 
 
(Martinez, 
supra, 
49 Cal.4th 
at 
pp. 57–58.)  
Additionally, at least since the 1930s, the suffer or permit to 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
10 
work standard has been understood as embodying “ ‘the 
broadest definition’ ” of employment for extending coverage of a 
social welfare statute.  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 951; see 
id. at pp. 950–951 [citing United States v. Rosenwasser (1945) 
323 U.S. 360, 363, fn. 3, quoting language of then-Senator (later 
United States Supreme Court justice) Hugo L. Black in 
describing the incorporation of the suffer or permit to work 
standard in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act as adopted in 
1937].) 
Defendant contends that prior to Dynamex, a putative 
employer would have reasonably anticipated that the question 
whether a worker should properly be classified as an employee 
or independent contractor for purposes of the obligations 
imposed by an applicable wage order would be governed by the 
Borello decision.  But, as noted above, Borello was not a wage 
order case and that decision did not purport to determine who 
should be interpreted to be an employee for purposes of a wage 
order.  We resolved this question for the first time in Dynamex.  
“Because the relevant portion of [the opinion] did not address an 
area in which this court had previously issued a definitive 
decision, from the outset any reliance on the previous state of 
the law could not and should not have been viewed as firmly 
fixed as would have been the case had we previously spoken.”  
(Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 986–987; see also Alvarado, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 573 [declining to limit holding to 
prospective 
application 
when 
“defendant 
cannot 
claim 
reasonable reliance on settled law”].)  In Newman, we concluded 
that our decision applied retroactively “even if one views [it] as 
breaking new and unexpected ground, . . . [because] it did so in 
an indisputably unsettled area.”  (Newman, at p. 987.)  
Moreover, in two decisions following Borello, we expressly 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
11 
declined to decide the question of what standard applies in 
determining whether workers should be classified as employees 
or independent contractors in the wage order context.  In 
Martinez, decided eight years prior to Dynamex, this court 
addressed the question regarding what standard should be 
utilized in deciding whether an employment relationship existed 
between the plaintiff workers and defendant business entities 
for purposes of a potentially applicable wage order.  Explaining 
that no prior case had directly addressed the proper 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the wage order 
relating to the terms “ ‘employ’ ” and “ ‘employer,’ ” we explicitly 
held that the suffer or permit to work definition was one of three 
alternative bases upon which an employment relationship could 
be established for purposes of the obligations imposed by an 
applicable wage order.  (Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 50, 
64.)   
In Martinez itself, the controversy turned on whether, for 
purposes of the obligations imposed by the wage order, the 
plaintiff workers could properly be considered employees of 
business entities other than the workers’ most direct or 
immediate employer.  Thus, Martinez did not present the 
question of whether the workers were properly considered 
employees or, instead, independent contractors for purposes of 
the wage order.  Yet we expressly signaled that this was an open 
question, emphasizing that we were “not decid[ing]” in Martinez 
whether “the decision in [Borello] has any relevance to wage 
claims.”  (Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 73.)   
In Ayala, supra, 59 Cal.4th 522, a case decided four years 
prior to Dynamex, we explicitly noted that we had solicited 
supplemental briefing from the parties concerning the possible 
relevance of the tests for employee status set forth in the 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
12 
applicable wage order in determining whether a worker was an 
employee or an independent contractor for purposes of the wage 
order.  (Id. at p. 531.)  Ultimately, our decision in Ayala did not 
reach the issue upon which we had solicited supplemental 
briefing, relying instead on the ground that in the trial court the 
plaintiff employees in Ayala had relied solely on the Borello 
standard, and we could resolve that case on that basis without 
considering the wage order definitions of employment.  (Ibid.)  
Nonetheless, at the same time, our decision in Ayala explicitly 
stated that “we leave for another day the question of what 
application, if any, the wage order tests for employee status 
might have to wage and hour claims such as these” (ibid.) — 
namely, claims raising the question of whether workers should 
properly be considered employees or independent contractors for 
purposes of the obligations imposed by a wage order.   
In light of these passages in Martinez and Ayala, 
employers were clearly on notice well before the Dynamex 
decision that, for purposes of the obligations imposed by a wage 
order, a worker’s status as an employee or independent 
contractor might well depend on the suffer or permit to work 
prong of an applicable wage order — and that the law was not 
settled in this area.  (See Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 987 
[explicit statements in previous decisions that this court was 
expressly declining to decide an issue demonstrated that the 
matter was “in flux” and “any reliance on the previous state of 
the law could not and should not have been viewed as firmly 
fixed”].)  By “expressly declin[ing] to decide the issue, thereby 
reserving our ultimate judgment on the question for some later 
date,” we “ ‘highlighted the fact that this question remained to 
be decided by this court.’ ”  (Id. at p. 988, italics omitted.)  Thus, 
defendant’s reasonable reliance argument is unconvincing. 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
13 
Further, although defendant maintains that in classifying 
its workers as independent contractors it reasonably relied on 
the Borello standard, as this court explained in Dynamex, one of 
the principal deficiencies of the Borello standard is its numerous 
factors that must be weighed and balanced — and such a 
standard effectively prevents employers and employees from 
determining in advance how that classification will be resolved.  
(Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 954–955.)  Thus, as a practical 
matter, defendant overstates the degree to which declining to 
extend the Borello test to this context will impinge upon its 
reasonable expectations.  It is worth noting in this regard that 
in Borello itself the agricultural workers were found to be 
employees rather than independent contractors even though the 
workers controlled the manner and details of their work, 
including the hours that they worked.3  (Id. at p. 346.) 
Defendant further argues that even if it should have 
reasonably anticipated that a worker’s designation as an 
employee or independent contractor would depend upon the 
application of a wage order’s suffer or permit to work definition, 
it could not reasonably have anticipated that in Dynamex this 
court would adopt the ABC test as the appropriate standard.  We 
reject the contention that litigants must have foresight of the 
exact rule that a court ultimately adopts in order for it to have 
retroactive effect.  And indeed, the ABC test articulated in 
 
3  
Defendant also asserts that it relied on our decision in 
Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474.  
Patterson addressed the propriety of imposing vicarious liability 
on a franchisor for a franchisee’s wrongdoing, rather than the 
question of what standard applies in determining whether 
workers should be classified as employees or independent 
contractors for purposes of California’s wage orders. 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
14 
Dynamex was within the scope of what employers reasonably 
could have foreseen.  Prior decisions of this court had certainly 
provided putative employers notice concerning the potential 
breadth of the suffer or permit to work language.  In Morillion 
v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 585 (Morillion), this 
court noted that federal cases had interpreted that phrase to 
apply when a putative employer “ ‘knows or should have 
known’ ” that work is being performed on its behalf.  (See id. at 
pp. 584–585.)  And in describing the scope of the suffer or permit 
to work definition in Martinez, we stated that “[a] proprietor 
who knows that persons are working in his or her business 
without having been formally hired, or while being paid less 
than the minimum wage, clearly suffers or permits that work by 
failing to prevent it, while having the power to do so.”  (Martinez, 
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 69.)  Moreover, the three elements of the 
ABC test are prominent factors already listed in Borello, supra, 
36 Cal.3d at page 351.  Last, because Dynamex did not change a 
previously settled rule, any reliance by the parties on the 
previous state of the law is not particularly persuasive in our 
retroactivity determination.  (Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 
p. 986.)  “At a minimum, litigants necessarily were aware that” 
the 
employee/independent 
contractor 
distinction 
in 
the 
applicable wage orders “was uncertain and yet to be definitively 
established.”  (Id. at p. 987.)   
It also bears noting that in Dynamex, this court 
determined that “the suffer or permit to work definition is a 
term of art that cannot be interpreted literally in a manner that 
would encompass within the employee category the type of 
individual workers, like independent plumbers or electricians, 
who have traditionally been viewed as genuine independent 
contractors who are working only in their own independent 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
15 
business.”  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 916.)  This was so, 
we explained, because applying a broad “knows or should have 
known” that work was being performed formulation in the 
employee/independent contractor context would treat true 
independent contractors as employees for purposes of the wage 
order, when they could not reasonably have been intended to be 
so treated.  (Id. at pp. 948–950.)  Accordingly, this court 
harmonized the legislative intent to adopt the broadest 
standard for determining who should be treated as an employee 
for purposes of the wage order with the recognition that there 
was no intention to bring classic independent contractors within 
the reach of the wage orders.  It was in this context that the 
court in Dynamex concluded that it was appropriate to adopt the 
ABC test as the standard for determining whether a worker 
should properly be considered an employee or independent 
contractor.  (Id. at pp. 956–964.)  We did not depart sharply from 
the basic approach of Borello, even though a literal reading of 
the suffer or permit to work definition would have swept far 
more broadly.  Thus, even if we were to give weight to 
defendant’s reliance argument at this juncture, it bears 
repeating that the test we ultimately adopted in Dynamex drew 
on the factors articulated in Borello and was not beyond the 
bounds of what employers could reasonably have expected. 
It is true that “we have long recognized the potential for 
allowing narrow exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity 
when considerations of fairness and public policy are so 
compelling in a particular case that, on balance, they outweigh 
the considerations that underlie the basic rule.”  (Newman, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 983.)  In this case, however, fairness and 
policy considerations underlying our decision in Dynamex favor 
retroactive application.  As we explained in Dynamex, the wage 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
16 
orders’ protections benefit workers by “enabl[ing] them to 
provide at least minimally for themselves and their families and 
to accord them a modicum of dignity and self-respect.”  
(Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 952.)  The wage orders also 
benefit “those law-abiding businesses that comply with the 
obligations imposed by the wage orders, ensuring that such 
responsible companies are not hurt by unfair competition from 
competitor businesses that utilize substandard employment 
practices.”  (Ibid.)  And, “the minimum employment standards 
imposed by wage orders are also for the benefit of the public at 
large, because if the wage orders’ obligations are not fulfilled the 
public will often be left to assume responsibility for the ill effects 
to workers and their families resulting from substandard wages 
or unhealthy and unsafe working conditions.”  (Id. at p. 953.)  
Applying the interpretation of the suffer or permit to work 
definition adopted in Dynamex only prospectively would 
potentially deprive many workers of the intended protections of 
the wage orders to which they may have improperly been 
denied, as well as permit businesses to retain the unwarranted 
advantages of misclassification.4  Last, because we have already 
applied our decision in Dynamex retroactively — to the 
Dynamex parties themselves — it would be unfair to withhold 
the benefit of that decision to other similarly situated litigants.  
In sum, no “compelling and unusual circumstances 
justify[] departure from the general rule” of retroactivity.  
(Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 983; Waller, supra, 11 Cal.4th 
 
4  
Having concluded that our decision in Dynamex applies 
retroactively, and having found no reliance or fairness 
considerations weighing against the general rule that judicial 
decisions apply retroactively, we likewise reject defendant’s 
related due process challenge to retroactive application. 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
17 
at p. 25 [rejecting argument against retroactivity because law in 
question was “but a logical extension” of well-established 
principles].)  As we noted, Borello itself distinguished between 
an employee and an independent contractor “by focusing on the 
intended scope and purposes of the particular statutory 
provision or provisions at issue.”  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 934.)  Given the longstanding definition of “employ” as to 
suffer or permit to work in California’s wage orders, and the 
unsettled nature of its application in the employee/independent 
contractor context, we reject the contention that it is unfair to 
putative employers to apply the ABC standard to work settings 
that predate the Dynamex opinion.  Indeed, we have routinely 
applied our decisions interpreting wage orders retroactively, 
even when the parties did not anticipate the precise 
interpretation of such orders.  (See, e.g., Frlekin v. Apple (2020) 
8 Cal.5th 1038, 1057; Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. 
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 833, 848, fn. 18.)   
Given the constraints imposed by the statute of 
limitations, the retroactive application of Dynamex will in 
practice affect a limited number of cases.  Nonetheless, in light 
of the general rule of retroactivity of judicial decisions and the 
fundamental importance of the protections afforded by the wage 
orders, we find no compelling justification for denying workers 
included in such lawsuits the benefit of the standard set forth in 
Dynamex.   
 
VAZQUEZ v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
18 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In answer to the question posed by the Ninth Circuit, we 
conclude that our decision in Dynamex applies retroactively to 
all nonfinal cases that predate the effective date of the Dynamex 
decision. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR , J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
HUMES, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
First Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court 
Review Granted     
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S258191 
Date Filed: January 14, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:    
County:    
Judge:    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lichten & Liss-Riordan and Shannon Liss-Riordan for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Nayantara Mehta; Cynthia L. Rice, Verónica Meléndez; Jennifer Reisch; Carol Vigne; Ellyn Moscowitz;  
Rocio Alejandra Avila; and Jora Trang for National Employment Law Project, California Rural Legal 
Assistance Foundation, Equal Rights Advocates, Legal Aid at Work, Legal Aid of Marin, National 
Domestic Workers Alliance and Worksafe, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Olivier Schreiber & Chao, Monique Olivier; and Reynaldo Fuentes for California Employment Lawyers 
Association and Partnership for Working Families as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.                       
 
O’Hagan Meyer, Jeffrey M. Rosin; Willenken, Jason H. Wilson, Eileen M. Ahern and Amelia L.B. Sargent 
for Defendant and Respondent.   
 
Marron Lawyers, Paul Marron, Steven C. Rice and Paul B. Arenas for Taxicab Paratransit Association of 
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.    
 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, James F. Speyer and Vanessa C. Adriance for California Chamber of 
Commerce and the International Franchise Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy B. Rosen, Peder K. Batalden and Felix Shafir for Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Paul Hastings, Paul Grossman and Paul W. Cane, Jr., for California Employment Law Council and 
Employers Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Shannon Liss-Riordan 
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. 
729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000 
Boston, MA 02116 
(617) 994-5800 
 
Jason H. Wilson 
Willenken LLP 
707 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 3850 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 955-9240