Title: Trevarton v. Trevarton
Citation: 378 P.2d 640
Docket Number: 20089
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 1963

378 P.2d 640 (1963) David Leroy TREVARTON, by his Mother and Next Friend, Betty Hazel, Plaintiff In Error, v. Lloyd TREVARTON, Defendant In Error. No. 20089. Supreme Court of Colorado. In Department. February 4, 1963. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing February 25, 1963. Spiro A. Fotopulos, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Wood, Ris &amp; Hames, Stephen E. Connor, Denver, for defendant in error. HALL, Justice. The parties are here in the same order they appeared in the trial court. *641 The sole question presented for review is whether an unemancipated minor son can recover damages from his father for personal injuries suffered as a result of the alleged negligence of the father, who, it is charged, was at the time of the injuries: The trial court concluded as a matter of law there could be no recovery under the facts set forth above, the father being immune from suit by a minor child, and granted the motion of the father for summary judgment. Plaintiff is here by writ of error seeking reversal. The question presented is of first impression in this court, and no judicial precedents exist in this state for resolving the problem, nor do we have a statute granting or denying relief in such circumstances. Many decisions of sister states deal not only with the precise problem before us, but many variations thereof. The results reached by these authorities and the reasons assigned are at wide variance. In 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 61b(2), p. 787, we find the following rule: The three earliest decisions of appellate courts in this country dealt with injuries intentionally inflicted on the child by the parent, and each held that there could be no recovery. In these cases no distinction is made between ordinary negligence and intentional wrong, and the courts adopted a rule granting to parents absolute immunity from liability to their minor unemancipated children. The three cases referred to are: Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891), a case in which the father was charged with maliciously causing his minor daughter to be imprisoned in an insane asylum; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991 (1903), in which there were intentional physical injuries, and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 68 L.R.A. 893 (1905), where it was held that a minor unemancipated daughter could not maintain an action against her father for rape. The principal reason urged for the rule of absolute immunity is stated in Hewlett v. George, supra, as follows: More recent decisions involving intentional torts generally reject the holdings of these cases and abound in exceptions and variations of the rule of "absolute immunity." To justify any rule of immunity courts have been wont to grasp desperately for reasons, but many, if not all, fail to withstand attack when subjected to the light of logic and reason. Reasons advanced for the rule are dealt with in a painstaking and exhaustive opinion, authored by Justice Hamley of the Supreme Court of Washington, in the case of Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). He there enumerates the *642 following reasons, advanced by various courts to support the rule: He then deals extensively with each reason and convincingly demonstrates that: Many courts in dealing with the rights of minors to recover from parents for torts, distinguish between claims arising out of the negligence of the parent in the discharge of parental duties and the negligence of the parent in connection with the conduct of his business or employment. In the case before us it appears that the parent was engaged in his business or employment and that his alleged negligent acts had nothing to do with the discharge of parental duties. Courts that continue to subscribe to the immunity doctrine recognize that the parent owes to the child the duty of due or reasonable care, their denial of recovery being based solely on public policy. In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055, it is stated: And in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147, it is stated: In Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 174 N.E.2d 718, Judge Fuld, in a dissenting opinion, stated: "A rule which so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing bears a heavy burden of justification. For me, the burden is not met either by the early rationale or by other arguments more recently advanced. A parent who by negligence injuries his minor child surely commits a civil `wrong' in the sense that there is neither lawful right nor privilege to inflict the injury. And, conversely, the law does not, as I understand it, deliberately carve an exception in favor of parents out of *643 the right of a minor child to be secure from negligent harm to his person." Many courts deny the parent's claim to immunity where the injuries are inflicted by the parent in the performance of duties relating to business as distinguished from parental duties. We concur in the views of such courts. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, where the son was assisting the father in construction work; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538, where a sixteen year old daughter, a passenger in a school bus driven by her father, was injured due to his negligence; Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343, where a twenty year old daughter was a passenger on a bus owned by the father and used in his common carrier business; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, where a seven year old child was burned while playing around a gasoline pump operated as a part of the business of the parent and his partner. Under the circumstances alleged here we find no sufficient reason for denying to the child the remedy sought. Upon the record before us the granting of the motion for summary judgment was error, hence the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. MOORE and McWILLIAMS, JJ., concur.