Title: Commonwealth v. Arias
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13136
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2021

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SJC-13136 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RANDY ARIAS. 
 
 
September 16, 2021. 
 
 
Estoppel.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, Verdict, 
New trial. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Randy Arias, appeals from the denial of his 
motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 
1502 (1995), to reduce the verdict of murder in the second 
degree to manslaughter or to grant a new trial.  We transferred 
the appeal to this court on our own motion to consider whether 
principles of direct estoppel apply where, as here, the same 
general issues raised by the rule 25 (b) (2) motion were 
previously raised, considered, and rejected in his direct 
appeal.  Concluding that direct estoppel does apply, we affirm 
the order of the Superior Court judge denying the rule 25 (b) 
(2) motion.  Neither Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001), nor rule 25 (b) (2) provides an 
additional or alternative route to revisit an issue that already 
has been finally decided. 
 
 
Background.  The facts established at trial previously have 
been described, and we need not detail them here.  See 
Commonwealth v. Arias, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 455-458 (2013) 
(Arias I).  In short, the defendant was convicted of murder in 
the second degree in the 2008 shooting death of Julio Zuniga and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing 
serious bodily injury to Roberto Francisco Sanchez Rios.  The 
central issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.  Id. at 
454-455.  On direct appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
convictions.  It concluded, insofar as is relevant here, that 
the defendant's claim that the judge failed properly to instruct 
the jury on defense of another had not been preserved for 
2 
 
 
 
 
purposes of appeal, and that the judge's instruction did not 
create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. at 
464.  The Appeals Court explained: 
 
"The judge's defense of another instruction, when 
considered as a whole against the backdrop of the trial, 
would have been interpreted by a reasonable juror to have 
adequately conveyed the nature of the defense and its 
components.  Even if the instruction were infirm, given the 
nature of the defense was that the defendant did not shoot 
anyone and defense of another was not a live issue that was 
contested at trial, there was no substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice." 
 
Id. at 455. 
 
 
Thereafter, the trial judge denied the defendant's motion 
pursuant to rule 30 (b) for a new trial and other postconviction 
relief.  Among other grounds for the motion, the defendant again 
argued that the instruction on defense of another was infirm, 
contending that the instruction failed adequately to explain 
"that the jury could convict him of manslaughter if they found 
he was using excessive force to defend another."  Commonwealth 
v. Arias, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1126 (2015) (Arias II).  The Appeals 
Court panel rejected the argument, reasoning that the claim 
substantially had been decided in the direct appeal, and that 
the defendant could not obtain "'review and reconsider[ation]' 
of questions already 'reviewed by an appellate court.'"  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 229 (1973).  
Although the defendant argued that the instructional issues 
presented were "completely different," the Appeals Court 
determined that the issue, no matter how it was phrased, had 
been waived and, accordingly, was subject to review only for a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  As to that, the 
panel concluded that the defendant's claims were without merit 
and that, "even if there were error in the instructions, the 
court 'could not conclude that the defendant suffered any real 
prejudice or that the error materially influenced the verdict.'"  
Arias II, supra, quoting Arias I, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 467-468. 
 
 
In July 2020, more than nine years after trial, the 
defendant filed a motion pursuant to the second sentence of rule 
25 (b) (2) to reduce the verdict of murder in the second degree 
or to grant a new trial, once again focusing on the instruction 
on defense of another.  In particular, he argued that the trial 
judge had "failed to inform the jury that the use of excessive 
force in defense of another could serve as a mitigating factor 
3 
 
 
 
 
permitting a conviction of manslaughter instead of murder."  In 
addition, he asserted that his relative youth (he was twenty 
years old at the time of the murder) and "its attributes," in 
combination with the claimed errors in the defense of another 
instruction, supported a reduction in the verdict.   
 
 
A second Superior Court judge initially denied the motion, 
but subsequently allowed a motion for reconsideration.  On 
reconsideration, a third Superior Court judge concluded that, 
although the "five-day limit in the first sentence of [r]ule 
25 (b) (2) may not bar Arias' [m]otion brought pursuant to the 
second sentence, see Commonwealth v. Guy G., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 
271, 278 (2001), . . . there are no substantive grounds to 
either reduce the verdict or order a new trial in this case."  
The judge concluded that principles of estoppel precluded 
revisiting issues that substantially had been decided 
previously.  In addition, she rejected as misplaced the 
defendant's argument that his relative "youth and personal 
experiences" warranted a lesser verdict, both because the 
propriety of the instructions had been previously established 
and because "there was no evidence presented at the trial or in 
support of this motion of any 'personal circumstances' or 
'distinctive attributes' . . . to warrant a reduction," citing 
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 471 Mass. 537, 544, cert. denied, 577 
U.S. 1013 (2015).  This appeal followed. 
 
 
Discussion.  The determination whether direct estoppel 
precludes relief on the motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) 
(2) presents a question of law that we review de novo.  See 
Commonwealth v. Aldana, 477 Mass. 790, 801 (2017) (questions of 
law considered de novo). 
 
 
Although motions filed under the first sentence of rule 25 
(b) (2) must be filed within five days of the discharge of a 
jury, motions filed under the second sentence of the rule, like 
motions filed pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, may be filed at 
any time.1  See Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 318 
 
1 Rule 25 (b) (2) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995), states:  "Motion 
After Discharge of Jury.  If the motion [for a required finding 
of not guilty] is denied and the case is submitted to the jury, 
the motion may be renewed within five days after the jury is 
discharged and may include in the alternative a motion for a new 
trial.  If a verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on 
motion set aside the verdict and order a new trial, or order the 
entry of a finding of not guilty, or order the entry of a 
4 
 
 
 
 
(1982), citing Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 552 n.6 
(1981), and Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 537 n.7 
(1981).  The fact that there is no time limit for filing motions 
under the second sentence of the rule, see Keough, supra at 318 
n.3, does not mean that the rule authorizes a duplicative 
determination of claims.  We construe the rules of criminal 
procedure "to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration, and the elimination of expense and delay."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 2 (a), 378 Mass. 844 (1979).  See Commonwealth 
v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161, 166 (2006).  That construction 
includes minimizing duplication of judicial effort, Keough, 
supra, and supports application of principles of direct estoppel 
to preclude review of claims "already litigated and determined," 
regardless of the procedural vehicles selected.  Commonwealth v. 
Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 806 (2021), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 498 (2020).  Justice would not be 
well served by permitting the relitigation of the same or 
similar claims on multiple occasions simply by selecting 
different procedural vehicles. 
 
 
In general, a defendant is directly estopped from obtaining 
review of a claim where the Commonwealth demonstrates that the 
issue was "already litigated and determined . . . , that such 
determination was essential to the . . . conviction, and that 
the defendant had an opportunity to obtain review of the 
determination" (citation omitted).  Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 
at 806.  See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 498, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 710-711 (2005) (where "the 'facts and 
the law are literally the same [as in the direct appeal],' 
direct estoppel prevents a judge from granting relief . . . 
solely 'based on [the] assertion that [the] direct appeal was 
decided wrongly'").  In this case, as the third motion judge 
properly recognized, the defendant's postconviction motions each 
were predicated on the central claim that was rejected on direct 
appeal, i.e., that the "trial judge's . . . instructions [on 
defense of another] were 'errant,' 'confusing,' and 
'nonexistent' because they did not adequately explain that the 
jury could convict him of manslaughter if they found he was 
using excessive force to defend another."  Direct estoppel thus 
precludes further consideration of the issue. 
 
 
We reject the defendant's argument that further 
consideration of the issue is warranted because, even though the 
trial judge's instructions may not have warranted a new trial 
 
finding of guilty of any offense included in the offense charged 
in the indictment or complaint." 
5 
 
 
 
 
(as the Appeals Court twice concluded), they were sufficiently 
flawed as to merit a reduction of the verdict pursuant to rule 
25 (b) (2).  Principles of direct estoppel are not, however, so 
circumscribed as to be limited to cases in which the defendant 
seeks the exact same relief that previously was denied.  In 
Rodriguez, 443 Mass. at 711, for example, we considered a 
defendant's motion for a new trial under rule 30 (b).  We 
concluded that direct estoppel applied because the substantive 
issues underlying the motion previously had been litigated and 
finally adjudicated in the context of a motion to suppress.  We 
held "that principles of direct estoppel operate as a bar to the 
defendant's attempt in her rule 30 (b) motion to relitigate 
issues in her motion to suppress."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Leary, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 345 (2017) (where issues raised in 
connection with rule 25 [b] [2] motion were addressed in 
connection with direct appeal, arguments merged and issues were 
considered moot). 
 
 
We recognize that both Sanchez and Rodriguez involved 
motions that were brought and decided pursuant to rule 30 (b).  
Although a rule 30 (b) motion challenges the validity of a 
verdict, whereas a motion pursuant to rule 25 (b) (2) challenges 
the degree of a verdict, that is a distinction without a 
practical difference for estoppel purposes.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 388 n.7 (2015) (rule 30 [b] vests judge 
with authority "substantially similar to the authority on a 
motion under" rule 25 [b] [2]).  See also Commonwealth v. Pring-
Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 732 n.14 (2007) ("judge has similar broad 
discretion to grant a new trial in the interests of justice 
under both rules"); Gilbert, 447 Mass. at 167 (where "the nature 
and substance of the defendant's motion was that his conviction 
for murder in the first degree could not stand because of errors 
in the instructions given to the jury," such motion "could have 
been filed under either rule 25 [b] [2] or rule 30 [b]").  A 
defendant may not avoid basic concepts of waiver, estoppel, and 
preclusion by the expedient of recasting claims decided 
adversely to him or her into a motion filed under rule 25 (b) 
(2). 
 
 
Finally, we reject the defendant's contention that his 
"youth and immaturity" at the time he committed the murder now 
warrant a reduction in the verdict.  As the motion judge noted, 
the defendant was twenty years old at the time, and he presented 
no evidence of "personal circumstances" or "distinctive 
attributes" that persuaded the judge that the verdict of murder 
in the second degree was unsupported by the evidence, against 
the weight of the evidence, or not consonant with justice.  See 
6 
 
 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 214 (2017).  Viewing the 
claim of youth and immaturity either alone or in combination 
with the alleged instructional error, the defendant has not 
demonstrated any abuse of discretion.  See id.; Commonwealth v. 
Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 802 (2000); Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 557 (in 
reviewing judge's determination that verdict should [or should 
not] be reduced under rule 25 [b] [2], "we should not engage in 
an independent analysis of the question," considering instead 
only "whether the judge abused his [or her] discretion or 
committed an error of law"). 
 
 
Conclusion.  Principles of direct estoppel preclude another 
review, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), of the issues 
the defendant raises.  The issues were previously decided 
against him in his direct appeal and in his collateral appeal 
from the denial of his postconviction motions under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (b). The order denying the motion for reduction of 
the verdict or for a new trial is therefore affirmed. 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Sharon Dehmand for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.