Title: Roger Lee Cherry v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2023
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC02-2023 
_____________ 
 
 
ROGER LEE CHERRY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 12, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Roger Lee Cherry appeals an order of the circuit court denying his second 
motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 
and an order concluding that he is not mentally retarded under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.203.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
As explained below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Cherry’s postconviction 
motion and the order on mental retardation. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Cherry was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of 
burglary with assault, and one count of grand theft following the 1986 murders of 
Ester and Leonard Wayne.  Cherry v. State, 544 So. 2d 184, 184-85 (Fla. 1989).  
We affirmed both murder convictions and the death sentence imposed for Ester’s 
murder; however, we reversed the death sentence imposed for Leonard’s murder 
on proportionality grounds.  Id. at 186-88.  The facts of this case are fully set out in 
our prior opinion in Cherry’s direct appeal.  See id. at 185-86. 
The circuit court summarily denied each of the claims in Cherry’s first 
motion for postconviction relief.  On appeal, we affirmed that denial with respect 
to most claims but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Cherry’s ineffective 
assistance of penalty phase counsel claims.  Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1074 
(Fla. 1995).  After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court again denied relief, and 
we affirmed that denial on appeal.  Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1055 (Fla. 
2000). 
On August 7, 1997, Cherry filed a second postconviction motion, raising 
five claims.1  The circuit court held a Huff2 hearing, after which it summarily 
denied all five of Cherry’s claims.  State v. Cherry, No. 1986-04473 (Fla. 7th Cir. 
Ct. order dated Oct. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Postconviction Order I].  Following 
                                          
 
1.  The claims raised by Cherry were: (1) he was denied access to important 
files and records by State agencies and offices; (2) newly discovered evidence 
would have altered the outcome of his trial; (3) inadmissible, inaccurate scientific 
evidence was improperly admitted at his trial; (4) execution by electrocution is 
cruel or unusual punishment or both; and (5) appellate lawyers should not be 
prohibited from interviewing trial jurors. 
 
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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Cherry’s motion for rehearing, the circuit court reversed part of its decision and 
granted Cherry’s motion for an evidentiary hearing to address the claim of newly 
discovered evidence. 
At the hearing on June 10, 2002, Cherry presented the testimony of several 
witnesses regarding his newly discovered evidence claim, including Levester Hill, 
one of his childhood friends, who testified that another man, James Terry, 
confessed to playing a role in the murders.  Terry also testified at the hearing, 
claiming that while he had talked with Hill about Cherry’s case, he never said that 
he played any part in the murder of the Waynes. 
After the hearing, the circuit court denied relief on this claim.  State v. 
Cherry, No. 1986-04473 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. order dated Aug. 12, 2002) [hereinafter 
Postconviction Order II].  Cherry appealed the denial of his postconviction motion, 
raising two issues.3 
While review of the circuit court’s decision was pending before this Court, 
Cherry filed a third motion for postconviction relief, based on the decisions in Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (Fla. 2002).  
The State filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction on the basis of this third motion.  
On November 18, 2004, we relinquished jurisdiction to the circuit court for a 
                                          
 
3.  Cherry raised the following issues on appeal: (1) newly discovered 
evidence existed, which if introduced at his trial, would have altered the outcome 
of the trial; and (2) certain scientific evidence was improperly admitted at his trial. 
 
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determination of mental retardation pursuant to rule 3.203.  The circuit court held a 
hearing on July 25, 2005, at which the defense presented evidence. 
Following this hearing, the circuit court found that Cherry did not meet the 
statutory definition for mental retardation.  Cherry v. State, No. 86-4473 (Fla. 7th 
Cir. Ct. order filed Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Supplemental Order]. 
On November 2, 2005, we granted leave to Cherry and the State to 
supplement their initial briefs to this Court on the basis of the circuit court’s 
determination that Cherry is not mentally retarded.  Following oral argument on 
January 5, 2007, we now affirm the circuit court’s denial of each of Cherry’s 
claims. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A.  Original Postconviction Issues 
1.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
Cherry argues that the circuit court erred in denying his newly discovered 
evidence claim.  Newly discovered evidence must meet two requirements in order 
for a court to set aside a conviction or death sentence.  First, Cherry must show that 
the evidence could not have been discovered with due diligence at the time of trial.  
Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994).  Moreover, 
“any claim of newly discovered evidence in a death penalty case must be brought 
within one year of the date such evidence was discovered or could have been 
 
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discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”  Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 
243, 251 (Fla. 2001).  Second, Cherry must show that the evidence would probably 
produce an acquittal or a lesser sentence on retrial.  Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 
915 (Fla. 1991).  In considering whether this evidence would affect the outcome at 
the guilt or penalty phase of a trial, courts consider whether the evidence would 
have been admissible at trial, the purpose for which the evidence would have been 
admitted, the materiality and relevance of and any inconsistencies in the evidence, 
and the reason for any delays in the production of the evidence.  Jones v. State, 709 
So. 2d 512, 521-22 (Fla. 1998). 
In reviewing a circuit court’s decision on a postconviction motion, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court on questions of fact, questions 
concerning the credibility of the witnesses, or questions of the weight to be given 
to the evidence so long as those judgments are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001). 
The evidence at issue that Cherry claims is newly discovered is a confession 
made by James Terry to Levester Hill that he (Terry) participated in these murders.  
At the hearing, Cherry submitted Hill’s affidavit and called Hill to testify.  
According to the affidavit, Hill and Terry discussed the crimes three separate times 
following Cherry’s conviction.  Hill alleged that immediately after Cherry’s 
conviction and again in 1988, Terry said that Cherry had not committed the crimes 
 
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for which he was found guilty.  Also, in their 1988 conversation, Hill attested that 
Terry stated that he threw out a pair of shoes because they matched shoe prints at a 
crime scene.  The final time that Hill talked about these crimes with Terry, which 
is the basis for the instant claim, was in October of 1994.  According to Hill, Terry 
again stated that Cherry did not murder the Waynes.  Terry then told Hill that he 
was at the crime scene and described the events that took place on the night of the 
murders.  Terry told Hill that Mrs. Wayne woke up when Terry entered the house 
and that she then started screaming.  Mr. Wayne entered the room and clutched his 
chest before falling to the floor. 
Terry also told Hill that he had forced Lorraine Neloms to testify against 
Cherry at trial.  Neloms was a key witness for the State, and she testified that 
Cherry was absent around the time of the murders and that Cherry confessed to her 
that he had entered a residence near the armory, a struggle had ensued between 
himself and the residents, and that he had stolen the wallet and car of the residents.  
Cherry, 544 So. 2d at 185.  Neloms was Cherry’s girlfriend at the time of the 
murders, and she was also Terry’s niece. 
This evidence came to the attention of Cherry’s counsel on August 9, 1996, 
when Monica Conklin, an investigator for Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
began researching potential mitigation evidence on Cherry’s behalf in preparation 
for his postconviction proceedings.  Since Hill had been close friends with Cherry 
 
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growing up, Conklin arranged a meeting with Hill.  While interviewing him, 
Conklin discovered that Hill had this information concerning his conversations 
with Terry about the crime.  At that interview, Hill signed an affidavit as to the 
facts stated above. 
Cherry’s counsel attempted to introduce the affidavit at Cherry’s first 
postconviction hearing, but since it had not been raised in that motion, the circuit 
court did not permit its presentation.  Cherry’s counsel thus filed the second 
postconviction motion, which is the subject of this appeal, on August 7, 1997. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Hill’s testimony was substantially similar to the 
statement in his affidavit.  Two discrepancies did emerge, however.  At the hearing 
Hill testified that Terry never specifically stated that he was in the Waynes’ house, 
but Hill assumed that Terry was at the crime scene given Terry’s knowledge about 
the events that night.  This testimony is slightly different from the statement in 
Hill’s affidavit that Terry admitted to being at the crime scene.  Hill also testified 
at the hearing that Terry did not state that he made Neloms testify against Cherry, 
which contradicts a statement from Hill’s affidavit. 
Terry also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  While he admitted to 
speaking with Hill in 1994 about the murders, he testified that he never said that 
Cherry did not commit the crime, that he never said he threw away a pair of shoes 
because they matched prints from a crime scene, and that he had never told Neloms 
 
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what to testify to at trial.  Terry also testified that he was not present at the 
Waynes’ residence on the night of the murders but was on a trip to Apopka with 
his employers. 
The circuit court denied Cherry’s claims, holding that this newly discovered 
evidence was both procedurally barred and lacking in credibility.  Postconviction 
Order II at 3. 
a.  Due Diligence 
Cherry first argues that Terry’s alleged confession to Hill was discovered 
with due diligence.  The circuit court rejected this claim, stating: 
The actual confession in this case was unknown at the time of trial 
because it was allegedly made, piecemeal, beginning in 1987, after 
Defendant was convicted.  Although the last “piece” of the alleged 
confession was made in 1994, it did not come to defense counsel’s 
attention until August 9, 1996, when defense counsel was preparing 
for the evidentiary hearing to be held in December of 1996, as ordered 
by the Florida Supreme Court.  Defendant has only one (1) year from 
the date the evidence was discovered or could have been discovered to 
file a Rule 3.850 Motion.  Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 
2001); Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915-16.  Therefore, the Court finds that at 
the very least, this “newly discovered evidence” could have been 
discovered, by due diligence, in 1994 and brought to the Court’s 
attention within one year from that date.  Thus, the Court finds that 
Defendant has not successfully demonstrated that the “evidence” is 
newly discovered.  Accordingly, this claim is untimely. 
Postconviction Order II at 2-3. 
In 1996, when Conklin first spoke to Hill, it was only because Hill was a 
childhood friend of Cherry, and the investigator was attempting to gather 
 
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mitigation evidence for Cherry’s first postconviction motion.  While Cherry’s 
counsel had apparently suspected Terry was involved in the killings, they had no 
knowledge that Terry and Hill even knew each other, much less that they had 
spoken about the crimes.  Hill offered the information about his conversations with 
Terry to Conklin on August 9, 1996.  Counsel attempted to introduce the affidavit 
at the first postconviction motion hearing but was not allowed to do so and thus 
filed the present motion on August 7, 1997, within one year of Hill’s interview and 
affidavit signing. 
We have barred evidence under the first prong of the newly discovered 
evidence rule before, but in those cases, the evidence was of such a nature that 
there was no reason the defendant could not have discovered it many years before.  
The evidence in these cases had either been in existence and accessible by the 
defense years before or was evidence of general, public knowledge.  For example, 
in Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 2001), we held that evidence that 
traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike might have been illegal because of the 
discriminatory use of racial and drug profiling in 1983 was procedurally barred 
from being introduced as newly discovered at the postconviction hearing in 2000.  
The circumstances of the defendant’s stop were known by counsel and the use of 
racial and drug-profiling in traffic stops had been well known for many years, so 
the evidence was not newly discovered.  Id. 
 
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Evidence was also procedurally barred in Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 
(Fla. 1991), because the evidence included the testimony of witnesses at the crime 
scene who were listed in the police report, and their testimony concerned 
circumstances that occurred at the time of the murder.  When the defendant 
attempted to resurrect this testimony as newly discovered evidence ten years later, 
we held that it was procedurally barred because it could have been discovered 
earlier with due diligence since these witnesses and their statements were found in 
police records at the time of the crime.  Id.  We also approved the decision of a 
postconviction court holding that the defendant had not exercised due diligence 
because the witness whose testimony was the newly discovered evidence had been 
interviewed by police at the time of the trial and the witness’s name appeared in 
the police reports.  Swafford v. State, 828 So. 2d 966, 977 (Fla. 2002).  Finally, a 
codefendant’s testimony that the defendant was not the ringleader of a gang 
involved in a murder was procedurally barred because the defendant was aware of 
the codefendant and could have deposed him at the time of trial.  Walton v. State, 
847 So. 2d 438, 454 (Fla. 2003). 
We have also found evidence of conversations similar to those in the instant 
case to not be procedurally barred even though they were first introduced years 
later.  For example, we approved a district court’s holding that a claim of newly 
discovered evidence, statements made in 1989 by the State’s key witnesses that 
 
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they had lied at the defendant’s trial, were not procedurally barred in 1996 under 
the first prong of Jones.  Robinson v. State, 770 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 2000).  
We also affirmed a postconviction order holding a 1980 confession by a 
codefendant to his cellmate and not presented until a 2001 postconviction motion 
was not procedurally barred under the first prong of Jones.  State v. Mills, 788 So. 
2d 249, 250 (Fla. 2001).  Also, in Jones, though certain evidence was procedurally 
barred, jailhouse confessions made in 1985 by the alleged actual killer “clearly 
qualif[ied] as newly discovered evidence” in the defendant’s 1991 second 
postconviction claim.  Jones, 591 So. 2d at 916.  In comparing these cases to the 
above situations, where we held that testimony and evidence were procedurally 
barred, our determination as to whether a defendant exercised due diligence tends 
to turn on whether the testimony and evidence are in the possession of persons 
with a personal or an on-the-record connection to a case. 
In the present case, the confession which is the newly discovered evidence 
occurred in 1994, was not discovered until August 9, 1996, and was claimed in a 
motion filed on August 7, 1997.  The evidence was not in existence at trial and so 
could not have been discovered at that time.  There was no evidence presented 
either by the State or Cherry that anyone ever knew of a connection between Hill 
and Terry or that Terry had spoken about this crime with anyone besides Hill.  Hill 
stated at the hearing that the first person he ever told about these conversations was 
 
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Conklin in 1996.  This evidence is not the testimony of a witness who was either at 
the crime scene or was known to have any connection to the crime by either 
defense counsel or the State. 
We conclude that the circuit court erred in holding that this evidence was 
procedurally barred.  There is no support for the conclusion that Hill’s testimony 
should have been discovered in 1994.  Hill was not connected to any of the events 
of the crime.  Thus, we conclude that Hill’s conversations with Terry could not 
have been discovered with due diligence prior to their actual discovery in 1996. 
b.  Effect of Newly Discovered Evidence 
Even though we find that the evidence is not procedurally barred, we must 
still determine whether the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or lesser 
sentence on retrial.  Cherry argues that Terry’s confession to his presence at the 
murder would have resulted in at least a life sentence rather than the death penalty, 
if not an acquittal on the murder charge.  The circuit court held that Terry’s 
testimony was more credible than Hill’s testimony on key points and also denied 
the newly discovered evidence claim on its merits.  The circuit court’s order states: 
Moreover, the Court finds that the claim should otherwise be 
denied on its merits.  Mr. Hill’s live testimony is inconsistent, albeit 
slightly, with his affidavit.  More importantly, after hearing the 
testimony of all the witnesses and observing their demeanor, this 
Court finds that Mr. Hill’s testimony is simply not credible, nor 
worthy of belief.  The testimony of Mr. Terry, on the other hand, is 
more credible on key points. 
 
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Postconviction Order II at 3. 
We find that the circuit court’s conclusion as to the merits of the newly 
discovered evidence is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  In 
evaluating a circuit court’s order, “this Court will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court on . . . the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 
given to the evidence,” provided its order is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  Porter, 788 So. 2d at 923.  We are highly deferential to circuit court 
determinations of credibility.  Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1196 (Fla. 2006).  
After our careful review of the record, we conclude that the circuit court’s 
determination on this issue should be affirmed. 
In addition, in assessing the weight to be accorded to newly discovered 
evidence, we consider the evidence in conjunction with all other admissible 
evidence.  Jones, 709 So. 2d at 522.  Physical evidence introduced at trial confirms 
that Cherry was at the crime scene.  Blood found on window panes at the Waynes’ 
house, on a piece of paper near their cut telephone lines, and on a towel inside the 
Waynes’ stolen car was consistent with Cherry’s blood type.  Cherry, 544 So. 2d at 
185.  Cherry also had a cut on his thumb at the time of his arrest four days later, 
which he told police he had received while he was cutting the head off of a fish.  
Id.  Lorraine Neloms testified that when Cherry had returned home the night that 
the murders took place, Cherry was bleeding from a cut on his thumb and that he 
 
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told her that the injury was the result of having cut a line.  Id.  Cherry’s palm print 
was also found on one of the doors inside the home, and his thumb print was found 
on one of the window panes.  Id.  This physical evidence, along with Neloms’ 
testimony, served as the State’s primary evidence and led to Cherry’s conviction 
and death sentence.  Id.  Thus, it has not been demonstrated that even had Hill’s 
testimony been presented at trial, Cherry probably would have received a different 
conviction or sentence.  Even if Hill’s testimony was wholly credible and believed 
by the jury, at no point in his statement did he indicate that Terry confessed to 
committing the murders or that Cherry did not participate in the events that night. 
2.  Scientific Evidence 
Cherry next argues that the population frequency statistics of blood types 
presented at his trial should have been subject to a Frye4 analysis, in accordance 
with this Court’s decision in Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997).  In Brim, 
we held that the Frye test was to be applied in determining whether to admit 
population frequency statistics of DNA.  Id. at 271.  The circuit court summarily 
denied this claim, holding that it was procedurally barred and should have been 
raised at trial or on direct appeal.  Postconviction Order I at 433-34. 
                                          
 
4.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  The Frye test 
requires a judicial determination that the basic underlying principles of and 
methods used to analyze scientific evidence have been sufficiently tested and 
accepted by the relevant scientific community.  Id. at 1014. 
 
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The relevant trial testimony was that of David Baer, a crime laboratory 
analyst in the serology section of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
Crime Laboratory.  Baer, admitted as an expert on serology, testified that some of  
the blood found at the crime scene matched Cherry’s blood group typing.  Baer 
also calculated while on the stand that Cherry’s blood group factor and the six 
enzymes found in his blood are found in approximately one and nine-tenths 
percent (1.9%) of the population.  While Cherry’s counsel argued prior to Baer’s 
testimony at trial that the expert’s testimony should be confined to his area of 
expertise, Cherry did not object when Baer testified as to this population frequency 
analysis or request a Frye hearing on this testimony.  Additionally, Cherry first 
raised this issue only after his conviction and sentence became final on direct 
appeal. 
Cherry argues that this issue is not procedurally barred because it could not 
have been raised at trial, on direct appeal, or even in his first postconviction motion 
because those proceedings all took place before this Court’s opinion in Brim was 
issued in 1997.  Thus, Cherry argues that Brim should be applied retroactively and 
cites to Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1997), as an example of such 
retroactive application. 
In Murray, the State offered DNA evidence that was objected to at trial by 
the defendant on the basis that both the method of DNA testing and the probability 
 
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calculations used by the State’s expert to report the frequency of a match should 
have been subject to the standards of Frye before they were admitted.  Id. at 160.  
Murray objected to this evidence at the pretrial suppression hearing, but the judge 
allowed the evidence, holding that the methodology used to analyze the evidence 
was a weight issue for the jury to consider.  Id. at 161.  On appeal, we applied 
Brim in reiterating that both parts of DNA testing and analysis, including the 
population frequency analysis, are subject to a Frye analysis and held that it was 
the trial judge’s responsibility to determine whether the methods used were proper 
under Frye.  Id. 
Cherry argues that because the trial in Murray occurred before the decision 
in Brim, we retroactively applied Brim when we relied on it in Murray’s direct 
appeal.  However, in Murray, we addressed a preserved claim on direct appeal, to 
which Brim need not have been retroactively applied.  Murray simply is not an 
example of the retroactive application of Brim. 
Brim has never been held to apply retroactively.  In fact, in Armstrong v. 
State, 862 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2003), an appeal of a postconviction motion, we 
declined to hold trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to population 
frequency analysis in the context of DNA testing because the trial in question 
occurred before Brim was issued.  Specifically, we stated: 
We further note the error in Armstrong’s assertion that his trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge more 
 
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specific elements of DNA testing, such as autoradiograms and 
population substructuring, through a Frye hearing.  This trial occurred 
in 1991, six years prior to this Court’s clarification of the Frye test in 
Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997), that each stage of the DNA 
process, i.e., the methodology for determining DNA profiles, as well 
as the statistical calculations used to report the test results, are subject 
to the Frye test.  Armstrong’s trial counsel cannot be found ineffective 
for not demanding the satisfaction of a more complex test than was 
required by the law at the time of trial. 
Armstrong, 862 So. 2d at 713 n.7.  Our description of Brim as a “clarification of 
the Frye test” suggests that Brim did not issue a new rule of law to be given 
retroactive effect.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied 
Cherry’s claim that the population frequency analysis should have been subject to 
a Frye analysis because that claim is procedurally barred.5 
B.  Mental Retardation Claim 
Finally, Cherry challenges the circuit court’s determination that he is not 
mentally retarded in accordance with the definition set forth in section 921.137(1), 
Florida Statutes (2002), which provides: 
As used in this section, the term “mental retardation” means 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing 
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during 
the period from conception to age 18.  The term “significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this 
section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations 
from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test authorized by 
the Department of Children and Family Services.  The term “adaptive 
                                          
 
5.  We also note that the evidence in the instant case deals with the 
population frequency analysis of blood typing, as opposed to the more novel DNA 
testing at issue in Brim. 
 
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behavior,” for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness 
or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal 
independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, 
cultural group, and community. 
Thus, Cherry must establish that he has significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning.  If significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning is established, Cherry must also establish that this significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning exists with deficits in adaptive 
behavior.  Finally, he must establish that the significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior manifested before the age 
of eighteen. 
The circuit court appointed two expert psychologists to test, examine, and 
evaluate Cherry for the court’s mental retardation determination: Dr. Peter Bursten 
on behalf of the defense; and Dr. Greg Prichard on behalf of the State.  Both Dr. 
Bursten and Dr. Prichard submitted reports on their findings. 
At the July 25, 2005, hearing, the defense first called Dr. Bursten to testify.  
Dr. Bursten stated that he interviewed Cherry, reviewed a large amount of 
background information, administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, third 
edition (WAIS-III), and interviewed three people who knew Cherry before the 
offense.  On the WAIS-III test Dr. Bursten administered, Cherry scored a full scale 
IQ of 72.  On cross-examination, Dr. Bursten agreed that the two standard 
 
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deviations language in the rule would place the mental retardation cutoff score at 
70. 
The defense then also called Dr. Prichard.  Dr. Prichard also administered 
several tests, although he relied on the WAIS-III test administered by Dr. Bursten 
for Cherry’s IQ score.  Both Drs. Bursten and Prichard testified that the standard 
error of measurement (SEM) should be taken into account in every IQ analysis.  
Dr. Bursten stated: 
The concept of mental retardation is considered to be a range or 
band of scores, not just one score or a specific cutoff for mental 
retardation.  The idea behind that is there’s recognition that no one IQ 
score is exact or succinct, that there’s always some variability and 
some error built in. 
And the Diagnostic and Statistical manual which is what we––
meaning the mental health professionals––rely on when arriving at 
diagnostic hypotheses.  That manual guides us to look at IQ scores as 
being a range rather than absolute.  And the manual talks about a 
score from 65, a band, so to speak, from 65 to 75––and of course, 
lower than 65––comprising mental retardation. 
Several exhibits were also submitted by the defense.  Among these exhibits 
were several presentence investigation reports throughout the defendant’s life 
which included various IQ scores.6  The defense rested, and the State produced no 
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.  Following the hearing, the circuit court 
                                          
 
6.  The following IQ scores were reported in the exhibits, in addition to the 
test administered in 2005: 71 on Kent test administered in 1968; 85 on Beta test 
administered in 1972; 79 on Kent test administered in 1976; 86 on Beta test 
administered in 1979; 68 on Beta test administered in 1987; 72 on WAIS-R test 
administered in 1992; and 78 on WAIS-R test administered in 1996. 
 
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denied Cherry’s motion for a determination of mental retardation.  Supplemental 
Order at 15. 
In reviewing mental retardation determinations in previous cases, we have 
employed the standard of whether competent, substantial evidence supported the 
circuit court’s determination.  See Johnston v. State, 930 So. 2d 581, 586 (Fla. 
2006).  To the extent that the circuit court decision concerns any questions of law, 
however, we apply a de novo standard of review. 
The fundamental question considered by the circuit court and raised in this 
appeal is whether the rule and statute provide a strict cutoff of an IQ score of 70 in 
order to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.  Cherry argues 
that the standard error of plus or minus five points should be taken into account so 
that the actual cutoff score is 75, in accordance with provisions and rules from the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the American 
Association on Mental Retardation.  Cherry also argues that because of the SEM, 
the IQ measurement is more appropriately expressed as a range of scores rather 
than just one number.  Thus, his IQ score should actually be described as within 
the range of 67 to 77. 
However, the circuit court denied this argument, holding: 
Neither Rule nor statute reference the standard error measurement or 
use the word “approximately”.  The Florida Department of Children 
and Families, in determining mental retardation for eligibility for 
developmental services, makes the 70 IQ score a bright-line cutoff.  
 
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This Court notes, however, that the DSM-IV-TR recognizes IQ is 
more accurately reported as a range of scores, a position reflected in 
the staff analysis for (what was ultimately) Fla. Stat. § 921.137.  The 
Legislature had mental retardation definitions from various states 
before it, some of which unequivocally provided that certain IQ scores 
created a mere presumption either for or against mental retardation; 
language the Legislature did not include in the Florida law.  Neither 
did they set the cutoff at 75.  This Court declines to perform a blanket 
change of the clearly stated IQ criteria, however, the +/-5 standard of 
error is a universally accepted given fact and, as such, should logically 
be considered, among other evidence, in regard to the factual finding 
of whether an individual is mentally retarded. 
Supplemental Order at 7 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
Both section 921.137 and rule 3.203 provide that significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning means “performance that is two or more standard 
deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.”  One standard 
deviation on the WAIS-III, the IQ test administered in the instant case, is fifteen 
points, so two standard deviations away from the mean of 100 is an IQ score of 70.  
As pointed out by the circuit court, the statute does not use the word approximate, 
nor does it reference the SEM.  Thus, the language of the statute and the 
corresponding rule are clear.  We defer to the plain meaning of statutes: 
When [a] statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look 
behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to 
rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.  See Lee County 
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So. 2d 297, 303 (Fla. 2002).  In such 
instance, the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless 
this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to 
legislative intent.  See State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 
2004).  When the statutory language is clear, “courts have no occasion 
to resort to rules of construction––they must read the statute as 
 
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written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of 
legislative power.”  Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 
1996). 
Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64-5 (Fla. 2005).  Because the 
circuit court applied the plain meaning of the statute, it did not err in its conclusion 
that Cherry failed to meet this first prong. 
In Atkins,7 the Supreme Court recognized that the various sources and 
research differ on who should be classified as mentally retarded.  For this reason, it 
left to the states the task of setting specific rules in their determination statutes.  
The Legislature set the IQ cutoff score at two standard deviations from the mean, 
and this Court has enforced this cutoff: 
The evidence in this case shows [the defendant]’s lowest IQ 
score to be 79.  Pursuant to Atkins, . . . a mentally retarded person 
cannot be executed, and it is up to the states to determine who is 
“mentally retarded.”  Under Florida law, one of the criteria to 
determine if a person is mentally retarded is that he or she has an IQ 
of 70 or below.  See § 916.106 (12), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining 
retardation as a significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the period from conception to age eighteen, 
and explaining that “significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning” means performance which is two or more standard 
                                          
 
7.  In Atkins, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is estimated that between 1 
and 3 percent of the population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is 
typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the 
mental retardation definition.”  536 U.S. at 309 n.5.  However, the Court 
concluded, “As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), 
with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate 
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’ 
Id. at 405, 416-17.”  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (alterations in original). 
 
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deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test 
specified in the rules of the department); Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 
1040, 1041 (Fla. 2000) (accepting expert testimony that in order to be 
found retarded, an individual must score 70 or below on standardized 
intelligence test). 
Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005).8 
Given the language in the statute and our precedent, we conclude that 
competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s determination that 
Cherry does not meet the first prong of the mental retardation determination.  
Cherry’s IQ score of 72 does not fall within the statutory range for mental 
retardation, and thus the circuit court’s determination that Cherry is not mentally 
retarded should be affirmed. 
Because we find that Cherry does not meet this first prong of the section 
921.137(1) criteria, we do not consider the two other prongs of the mental 
retardation determination.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial of Cherry’s motion 
for a determination of mental retardation. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
                                          
 
8.  Indeed, another jurisdiction considering a similar claim noted that 
fourteen of the twenty-six jurisdictions with mental retardation statutes have a 
cutoff of seventy or two standard deviations below the mean.  Bowling v. 
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 373-74 (Ky.) (upholding use of seventy IQ score 
cutoff), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 652 (2005). 
 
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For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of his 
postconviction motion, and the circuit court’s determination that Cherry is not 
mentally retarded. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,  
William A. Parsons, Judge - Case No. 1986-04473 CFAWS 
 
Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney 
General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
 
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