Title: Cunningham v. City of Chesapeake
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 040002
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2004

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
 
v.  Record No. 032974 
 
HELEN CUNNINGHAM 
 
           OPINION BY 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
            November 5, 2004 
HELEN CUNNINGHAM 
 
v.  Record No. 040002 
 
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
Norman Olitsky, Judge 
 
Helen Cunningham filed a thirteen-count motion for judgment 
against the City of Chesapeake (“the City”) alleging that her 
August 30, 1998, miscarriage was caused by toxic water supplied 
by the City.  Counts I through IX of the motion for judgment 
allege breach of contract, breach of warranty, battery, 
negligence, nuisance, trespass and violation of the Virginia 
Consumer Protection Act.  Claims X through XIII allege claims of 
fraud.  Cunningham claimed compensatory damages of $5,000,000 
and punitive damages of $1,000,000. 1  In response, the City 
                     
 
1 Cunningham is lead plaintiff of a combined group of 214 
plaintiffs who allege that their miscarriages were caused by 
exposure to trihalomethanes in the City’s water on various dates 
from 1984 through 2000.  These cases were combined for pretrial 
proceedings under the Virginia Multiple Claimants Litigation 
Act, Code § 8.01-267.1, et seq.  Each plaintiff requested 
compensatory and punitive damages.  The circuit court originally 
 
2
entered special pleas of sovereign immunity and the statute of 
limitations. 
The trial court sustained the plea of the statute of 
limitations as to Counts I through IX and dismissed those claims 
with prejudice.  The trial court overruled the plea as to Counts 
X through XIII, denied the City’s claim of sovereign immunity, 
and refused to dismiss Cunningham’s prayer for punitive damages. 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-267.8(B), the trial court made the 
requisite findings enabling the parties to proceed with an 
interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s judgment. 
 
The City assigned error to the trial court’s denial of its 
special pleas of sovereign immunity and the statute of 
limitations as well as the refusal to strike Cunningham’s prayer 
for punitive damages. Cunningham assigned error to the dismissal 
of her non-fraud claims. We awarded the respective parties 
appeals as to all these issues and consolidated the cases for 
hearing. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Shortly after the City was formed in 1963, it commissioned 
engineering studies to find a reliable water source that would 
sustain future development.  At that time, the City purchased 
most of its municipal water supply from the Cities of Norfolk 
                                                                  
designated Merri Abernethy as the lead plaintiff; however, she 
nonsuited her case, and the court substituted Helen Cunningham 
as lead plaintiff.   
 
3
and Portsmouth, which was expensive and potentially inadequate.  
This study recommended the Northwest River as a source of 
drinking water. 
In May 1975, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers granted the 
City a permit to withdraw water from the Northwest River and 
construct the Northwest River Treatment Plant (“the Plant”).  
The Plant was a conventional water treatment plant employing 
chlorine as a disinfectant, and its design was approved in 1977 
by the Virginia Department of Health.  The Plant supplies most 
of the City’s municipal water. 
While the Plant was typical of its era, the Northwest River 
was an atypical water source, with then undiscovered problems.  
The river has high organic carbon levels.  When chlorine, a 
commonly used water purification chemical, is added it reacts 
with the naturally occurring organic matter in the water to form 
large amounts of trihalomethanes (“THMs”).  At the time the 
Plant was designed, laboratory instrumentation to measure THMs 
was not in use, and THMs were not regulated contaminants. 
 
In 1979, the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300f et seq., required the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to publish a maximum contaminant level (“MCL”) for each 
contaminant which “may have any adverse effect on the health of 
persons.”  42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1976 & Supp. II 
1979).  THMs, the byproducts of water chlorination, were first 
 
4
identified for scientific analysis in 1974.  National Primary 
Drinking Water Regulations; Disinfectants and Disinfection 
Byproducts, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,390, 69,394 (Dec. 16, 1998)(codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142).  In November 1979, the EPA 
set an annual average MCL for total trihalomethanes (“TTHMs”)2 of 
0.10 mg/L or 100 parts per billion (“ppb”).  National Interim 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Control of Trihalomethanes 
In Drinking Water, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,624, 68,624 (Nov. 29, 1979) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141).  These new regulations became 
binding on the City in November of 1983. Id. (providing an 
effective date for the trihalomethane MCL of four years from 
November 29, 1979, for water systems such as the City’s). 
Shortly after the Plant came online in March of 1980, the 
City began sampling for THMs, finding levels that averaged 
between 200 and 350 ppb.  The City retained Malcolm Pirnie, 
Inc., an environmental engineering consulting firm, to evaluate 
viable alternatives to reduce TTHM levels by the November 1983 
regulatory effective date. 
Malcolm Pirnie found that only two methods could 
effectively reduce THMs from the Northwest River water.  The 
                     
 
2 Throughout this opinion, “THMs” will refer to the class of 
chemical compounds formed when chlorine reacts with organic 
material in water.  “TTHMs” will refer to the group of 
compounds, including chloroform, bromodichloromethane, 
dibromochloromethane, and bromoform, as they are regulated by 
the EPA. 
 
5
City adopted both of Malcolm Pirnie’s proposed solutions: 
chlorine dioxide disinfection in the short term and air 
stripping towers in the long term.3 
Chlorine dioxide replaced chlorine as a water treatment 
medium in August of 1983 and had the immediate effect of 
reducing THMM levels within regulatory limits.  The air 
stripping system began operation in May 1985.  Despite constant 
monitoring and adjustment of the disinfectant and air stripping 
process, the Plant still periodically experienced high levels of 
THMs.  In August 1985, the City began adding ammonia after the 
air stripping process.  The ammonia combined with any free 
chlorine in the water supply in order to prevent the chlorine 
from reacting with organic material and forming THMs.  This 
combined treatment process enabled the City to generally meet 
the recognized THM limit of 100 ppb. 
                     
 
3 The air stripping method was 70% of the cost of chlorine 
dioxide disinfection, but testing, designing and installing the 
air stripping towers would take at least a year.  In order to 
meet the deadline for regulatory compliance, the City 
immediately began chlorine dioxide disinfection.  Chlorine 
dioxide, unlike chlorine, combines less readily with the organic 
material in the Northwest River water, forming fewer THMs.  In 
the air stripping system, water was pumped from the bottom of a 
tower through the top and then left to trickle down through a 
packing material.  A high velocity air stream was simultaneously 
run through the water, effectively stripping THM compounds out 
of the water.  The THMs exited the tower through vents.  While 
the chlorine dioxide system sought to limit the formation of 
THMs, the air stripping system allowed them to form, and then 
separated them out of the water supply. 
 
6
In 1997, anticipating stricter regulatory limits on TTHMs 
of 80 ppb, the City determined to replace the air stripping 
towers with a reverse osmosis system. While the air strip system 
could meet the 100 ppb limit, the new limit was “unattainable” 
with that technology. 
The reverse osmosis system could meet the new TTHM limits, 
but the construction to modify the Plant necessitated an interim 
period during which neither the air strip or reverse osmosis 
system would be in operation, but chlorine disinfection would 
continue.  Concerned that high TTHM levels during this period 
would push annual averages over 100 ppb and put the City in 
violation of applicable regulations, the City petitioned the 
State Health Commissioner (“Commissioner”) for a temporary 
exemption from the water quality regulations, particularly the 
TTHM limitations.4 
On June 11, 1998, the Commissioner granted the City’s 
petition for exemption.  In granting the exemption, the 
Commissioner found . . . 
. . . [(1)] a compelling need for construction necessary to 
modify the Northwest River Water Treatment Plant and to 
improve the safety of the drinking water it produces . . . 
[and (2)] the granting of an exemption to the TTHMs 
                     
 
 
4 The Virginia Administrative Code governs a petition for 
temporary exemption in this circumstance.  See 12 VAC 5-590-150. 
 
7
standard will not result in an unreasonable risk to the 
consumers’ health.5 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
In compliance with the exemption requirements, the City 
reported TTHM levels to the Virginia Department of Health 
(“VDH”), installed manganese contactors at the Plant to reduce 
TTHM levels, and posted public notice of the exemption in the 
Virginian-Pilot on July 9, 1998.6 
The City began removing the air stripping towers at the 
Plant in preparation for the construction of the reverse osmosis 
system in February 1998.  That same month, the Los Angeles Times 
reported that an unpublished study by the Reproductive 
Epidemiology Section of the California Department of Health 
Services (“the California study”) found that daily consumption 
of more than five glasses of water with TTHM levels greater than 
75 ppb increased the risk of spontaneous abortion for women in 
                     
5 Additionally, the Virginia Department of Health (“VDH”) 
placed the following conditions on the City: follow a schedule 
of compliance developed by VDH; monitor and report the 
concentration of TTHMs in the water supply as prescribed by VDH; 
operate the Plant in such a manner as to minimize TTHM 
production; and provide public notice as required by the Code. 
 
 
6 The notice explained the origin of THMs in the City’s 
water supply and the known risks associated with consumption of 
THMs: increased risk of cancer from consuming 2 quarts of water 
daily that had THM levels in excess of 100 ppb over 70 years.  
As required, the notice provided an opportunity for a hearing on 
the exemption schedule.  The City’s Director of Public 
Communications also issued a press release on the exemption on 
July 8, 1998, and notice of the exemption was inserted into 
water bills.  VDH terminated the exemption on June 4, 1999. 
 
8
their first trimester of pregnancy.  Within two months of 
receiving a copy of the California study, the City undertook an 
extensive campaign to inform the public of the possible risks to 
women, who might become or were pregnant, of the possible 
effects of consuming City water during the exemption period 
while the air stripping towers were removed and the reverse 
osmosis system was being constructed. 
The City and the Chesapeake Department of Health (“CDH”) 
issued three separate papers publicizing the water warnings: a 
Public Health Bulletin (“the Bulletin”) on March 31, 1998, and a 
news release (“the News Release”) and public notice (“the 
Notice”) on April 1, 1998. 
These warnings summarized the results of the California 
study, explained that the City’s TTHM levels would temporarily 
spike while the air stripping towers were off-line, and gave 
instructions for precautions pregnant women should take in the 
interim period.  These precautions included using primarily 
bottled water or boiling water before drinking.  In addition, 
the City set up recorded messages with health risk information 
and reports of weekly TTHM levels on the City’s Water Quality 
Hotline and Answerline, a CDH phone bank. 
CDH faxed the Bulletin to Chesapeake obstetricians and 
gynecologists, family practitioners, internists, CDH 
Supervisors, City officials, the Chesapeake Public School 
 
9
Administration, newspapers, television and radio station news 
departments, Chesapeake General Hospital officials, Cox 
Communications and VDH officials.  On March 31, 1998, CDH faxed 
a copy of the Bulletin to Cunningham’s obstetrician, Dr. Timothy 
Hardy. 
Media outlets provided extensive coverage of the water 
warnings.  There were 22 television news reports between March 
31, 1998 and May 4, 1998.  The Virginian-Pilot included articles 
about the warning and Chesapeake’s water quality 15 times from 
April 1 though December 21.  The Chesapeake Post ran one article 
on April 17.  Some articles contained listings of fire stations 
where affected residents could pick up free drinking water. 
The City posted the Notice on its cable television bulletin 
board, at Public Utilities Department Offices, and on the City’s 
Internet homepage.  The City distributed copies to City 
libraries and recreation centers, mailed 73,062 copies of the 
Notice to all postal patrons in Chesapeake and sent 13,620 
copies of the Notice home with elementary school students.  
Cunningham was a Chesapeake postal customer in April of 1998 but 
testified that she did not receive the Notice at that time 
“because people stole [her] mail.” 
The City began mailing copies of the Notice to new water 
customers in May of 1998 and continued until June 11, 1999.  On 
September 21, 1998, Cunningham, then known by her maiden name, 
 
10
Helen L. Stringfield, signed up for City water service. Ms. 
Stringfield’s water service was activated on September 30, 1998.  
The New Customers Report run on October 1, 1998, lists 
“Stringfield[,] Helen L[.]” among 31 new customers.  The 
Department of Public Utilities received this report on October 
2, 1998, and mailed a cover letter and Notice to Ms. Stringfield 
that day. 
Cunningham claims that the City’s water supply has 
historically exceeded regulatory limits for THMs, that the City 
knew that high levels of THMs were harmful to her health and 
that of her unborn child, that the City took steps to conceal 
both the high levels of THMs in the water and the deleterious 
effects on water consumers.  She alleges that when the City 
finally undertook a public notice campaign, that effort was 
inadequate because the City failed to inform her individually of 
the consequences of consuming City water. 
The City argues that at the time the Plant was originally 
designed, THMs were not a recognized water contaminant and not 
regulated by the EPA.  The City maintains it thereafter 
consistently planned alternative designs to the Plant and the 
water treatment system in order to meet the required regulatory 
standards.  The City claims that the Plant’s water has met EPA 
specifications since the air stripping towers came online in 
1985.  Further, the City argues that the California Study 
 
11
provided the first concrete evidence of a direct correlation 
between high TTHM levels and a specific health concern and that 
since receiving that study, the City has extensively publicized 
the risks to pregnant women. 
Cunningham admits that she is not alleging that her 
miscarriage was the result of the cumulative effects of THMs or 
the result of any exposure prior to conception.  Cunningham 
learned she was pregnant in July 1998 and miscarried on August 
30, 1998.  Thus, her claim of injury goes only to those acts 
occurring during the exemption period, which encompassed all of 
her pregnancy. 
II. ANALYSIS 
We initially address the issue of sovereign immunity 
because, if it applies, all of Cunningham’s claims are barred. 
A. 
The Law of Sovereign Immunity in Virginia 
“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ 
in Virginia.”  Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 
564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002) (quoting Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 
301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984)).  “Sovereign immunity is a 
rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome 
interference with the performance of its governmental functions 
and preserves its control over state funds, property, and 
instrumentalities.”  City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. 
Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000) (internal 
 
12
quotation marks omitted).  A special plea of sovereign immunity, 
if proven, creates a bar to a plaintiff's claim of recovery.  
Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 
(1996). 
The trial court conducted a hearing on the City’s special 
plea and received pleadings with attached exhibits from the 
parties.  Where no evidence is taken in support of the plea, the 
trial court, and the appellate court upon review, must rely 
solely upon the pleadings (which includes the voluminous 
attachments in this case) in resolving the issue presented. Id.  
The existence of sovereign immunity is a question of law that is 
reviewed de novo. See Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Research Triangle Inst. v. Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 132 F.3d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
In the context of sovereign immunity, Virginia municipal 
corporations exercise two types of functions: governmental and 
proprietary. Gambrell v. City of Norfolk, 267 Va. 353, 357-58, 
593 S.E.2d 246, 249 (2004); Harrell v. City of Norfolk, 265 Va. 
500, 502, 578 S.E.2d 756, 757 (2003); Niese, 264 Va. at 238, 564 
S.E.2d at 132; Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; 
Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 555, 125 S.E.2d 808, 811 
(1962). 
Governmental functions are powers and duties performed 
exclusively for the public welfare. Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 
 
13
527 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 
145, 147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939)).  A function is 
governmental if it entails the exercise of an entity's 
political, discretionary, or legislative authority.  Carter v. 
Chesterfield County Health Comm'n, 259 Va. 588, 590-591, 527 
S.E.2d 783, 785 (2000). 
Proprietary functions are performed primarily for the 
benefit of the municipality.  Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 
S.E.2d at 782 (citing Hoggard, 172 Va. at 147-48, 200 S.E. at 
611).  If the function is a ministerial act and involves no 
discretion, it is proprietary. Carter, 259 Va. at 590-91, 527 
S.E.2d at 785. 
Sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort 
liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions.  
Niese, 264 Va. at 238, 564 S.E.2d at 132 (citing Hoggard, 172 
Va. at 147-48, 200 S.E.2d at 611).  There is no municipal 
immunity, however, in the exercise of proprietary functions. 
Gambrell, 267 Va. at 357-58, 593 S.E.2d at 249; Carmichael, 259 
Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; Carter, 259 Va. at 590-91, 527 
S.E.2d at 785. 
 
This court has consistently held that when a municipality 
plans, designs, regulates or provides a service for the common 
good, it performs a governmental function.  See, e.g., Maddox v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 657, 663, 594 S.E.2d 567, 570 (2004) (plan 
 
14
and design of a sidewalk); Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56, 
59, 405 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1991)(provision of emergency snow 
removal services); Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 
367, 371, 397 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1990) (planning, designing, 
laying out of streets and roads); Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 
237 Va. 167, 172, 375 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1989) (provision of 
ambulance services); Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 60, 
266 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1980) (regulation of traffic through 
traffic signals); Transportation Inc. v. City of Falls Church, 
219 Va. 1004, 1006, 254 S.E.2d 62, 64 (1979) (regulation of 
traffic); Fenon, 203 Va. at 556, 125 S.E.2d at 812 (provision of 
emergency cleanup services); Ashbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 
278, 292, 147 S.E. 223, 227 (1929) (provision of garbage 
collection services). 
In contrast, routine maintenance or operation of a 
municipal service is proprietary.  Gambrell, 267 Va. at 357-58, 
593 S.E.2d at 249; Carter, 259 Va. at 592, 527 S.E.2d at 785.  
See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362 
467 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996) (maintenance of sidewalks); City of 
Richmond v. Branch, 205 Va. 424, 428, 137 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1964) 
(routine maintenance of existing streets); City of Norfolk v. 
Hall, 175 Va. 545, 552, 9 S.E.2d 356, 360 (1940) (faulty 
maintenance or street construction); Chalkley v. City of 
Richmond, 88 Va. 402, 409, 14 S.E. 339, 341 (1891) (failure to 
 
15
keep a sewer drain in repair and free from obstructions). 
B. 
The Application of Sovereign Immunity in this Case 
In response to the City’s plea of sovereign immunity, 
Cunningham contends that “the defense of sovereign immunity is 
unavailable” to a municipality operating a water system.  In 
support of her argument, Cunningham cites our decisions in 
Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 60, 138 
S.E. 503 (1927), and Woods v. Town of Marion, 245 Va. 44, 425 
S.E.2d 487 (1993).7 
The City contends there is no unique rule for sovereign 
immunity claims related to a municipal waterworks, but that the 
principles of law are those applicable to other municipal acts.  
In that context, the City posits three grounds it claims 
establish sovereign immunity in this case. 
Initially, the City argues its action in supplying purified 
water was undertaken for the health, safety and welfare of its 
citizens and is thus an immune governmental function.  Second, 
the City avers it “used its municipal discretion to design, 
construct and upgrade the . . . Plant,” which is a legislative 
function protected from liability.  Finally, the City contends 
supplying purified water was the exercise of a power delegated 
                     
 
7 Cunningham also cites our decision in Leonard v. Town of 
Waynesboro, 169 Va. 376, 193 S.E. 503 (1937), as authority for 
her position.  However, that case involved the liability of a 
municipality under a theory of quantum meruit for the 
construction of a water line. 
 
16
by statute, Code § 15.2-2109, and is thus immune from claims as 
an exercise of the authority of the Commonwealth. 
The distinction between a municipality’s governmental and 
proprietary functions is more readily stated in theory rather 
than applied in actual practice.  “Although the principles for 
differentiating governmental and proprietary functions are 
easily recited, as we have often noted, application of these 
principles has occasioned much difficulty.”  Carter, 259 Va. at 
592, 527 S.E.2d at 785 (citing Ashbury, 152 Va. at 282, 147 S.E. 
at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nonetheless, 
because we conclude the acts complained of by Cunningham were 
within the exercise of the City’s discretionary legislative 
powers and thus a governmental function, we find the trial court 
erred in failing to sustain the City’s plea of sovereign 
immunity. 
Cunningham grounds her argument to bar the application of 
sovereign immunity on language first found in Richmond v. 
Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp. 
[T]he operation of a water department for the purpose 
of supplying water for domestic and commercial 
purposes is a private or proprietary right, and for 
negligence in such operation a municipality is liable 
in like manner as a private individual. 
 
148 Va. at 70-71,138 S.E. at 506. 
 
In Richmond, the plaintiff sought recovery against the City 
of Richmond for damages caused by the malfunction of its 
 
17
sprinkler system when a city employee negligently turned on the 
water supply to the sprinkler system when it was under repair, 
ruining the goods in the warehouse.  148 Va. at 68-69, 138 S.E. 
at 505-06.  We found sovereign immunity did not apply to the 
negligent performance of a clearly ministerial act of routine 
maintenance.  Id. at 72, 138 S.E. at 507.  The planning and 
design of the municipal water system was not an issue in 
Richmond, so the analysis of sovereign immunity based on a 
discretionary legislative function was not before the Court. 
 
Citing Richmond, we later held in Woods v. Town of Marion 
that sovereign immunity did not apply to shield the Town from 
liability.  245 Va. at 47, 425 S.E.2d at 489.  The Town failed 
to maintain its water pipes to prevent water from leaking onto a 
public street and forming ice that the Town subsequently 
neglected to remove for several weeks and by which the plaintiff 
was injured.  Id. at 45, 425 S.E.2d at 488.  Relying on these 
cases, Cunningham contends sovereign immunity cannot apply with 
regard to a municipal water system.  We disagree. 
 
Neither Richmond nor Woods established a special rule 
barring sovereign immunity in any case involving a municipal 
water system.  These cases merely recognize that acts of 
negligence in routine maintenance of municipal water supply 
facilities are nonimmune ministerial acts of a proprietary 
function.  By contrast, in Stansbury v. City of Richmond, 116 
 
18
Va. 205, 207, 81 S.E. 26, 27 (1914), we observed that “[t]he 
adoption of a plan for supplying a city . . . with water 
involves the exercise of a delegated governmental power; and an 
error of judgment with respect to the efficiency and adequacy of 
such systems is not in the first instance reviewable by the 
courts.” 
 
We held in Stansbury that sovereign immunity shielded the 
City from liability for a claim of inadequate water pressure 
from the municipal waterworks.  Id. at 209-10, 81 S.E. at 27-28.  
While the water pressure at the plaintiff’s home was initially 
inadequate, the City was reconfiguring its water system to 
correct the problem.  Id. at 210, 81 S.E. at 28.  In effect, the 
City was in a continuum of planning, designing and implementing 
the planned design of its municipal water service to provide 
appropriate water pressure.  Sovereign immunity applied to 
protect the City because it was exercising its discretionary 
legislative power of designing the means to deliver water 
service.  We quoted with approval the analysis in Johnston v. 
District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19 (1886): 
The duties of the municipal authorities, in adopting a 
general plan of drainage, and determining when and 
where sewers shall be built, of what size and at what 
level, are of a quasi judicial nature, involving the 
exercise of deliberate judgment and large discretion, 
and depending upon considerations affecting the public 
health and general convenience . . . and the exercise 
of such judgment and discretion, in the selection and 
adoption of the general plan or system of drainage, is 
 
19
not subject to revision by a court or jury in a 
private action. 
 
Stansbury, 116 Va. at 209, 81 S.E. at 27 (citing Johnston, 118 
U.S. 19, 20-21 (1886)). 
 
As Stansbury indicates, the planning, design and 
implementation of a municipal water system is no different than 
other municipal acts in the context of a sovereign immunity 
analysis.  By contrast, the municipal actions in the cases cited 
by Cunningham involve routine maintenance or clerical acts 
devoid of any nexus to a discretionary governmental function of 
design or planning.  Other than the fact that the acts in 
Richmond and Woods involved a water system, those claims are no 
different than those for negligent street maintenance or other 
clearly ministerial acts where sovereign immunity does not 
apply. 
 
What we must determine is whether the City’s action to take 
down the air stripping towers and reconstruct the Plant for the 
reverse osmosis system, thereby temporarily creating higher TTHM 
levels during the exemption period covering Cunningham’s 
pregnancy and miscarriage, was a governmental or proprietary 
act.  It is the City’s choice to change the design of its water 
treatment system which Cunningham has pled as the basis for the 
City’s liability.  Specifically, Cunningham pled that the City 
was at fault in choosing the reverse osmosis system because “the 
 
20
City could have, but did not, use other methods that reduce or 
eliminate THM contamination . . . [and] alternate water 
treatment methods could and should have been used.”  For the 
following reasons, we find the City’s action to be a 
governmental function in the exercise of its discretionary 
legislative powers. 
 
The City’s decision to move from the air stripping system 
to the reverse osmosis system was made in the interest of the 
public health.  In February of 1998, the California Study made 
the City aware that high TTHM levels had increased the risk of 
possible miscarriages.  The CDH had informed the City that it 
was “in the best interests of the health of the citizens of 
Chesapeake that the City transition to the new reverse osmosis 
plant” because “the high organics will never dissipate” and if 
the transition were not made, the City would “always be faced 
with the risk of high THMs,”  ultimately concluding that “the 
new plant poses a permanent solution to the problem and removes 
any future risk of spontaneous abortion related to THMs.”  Thus, 
reverse osmosis could meet the new TTHM regulatory levels and 
the air stripping technology could not.  In that context, the 
Commissioner determined in granting the City’s regulatory 
exemption that there was a “compelling need for construction 
necessary to modify the Northwest River Water Treatment 
 
21
Plant. . .to improve the safety of the drinking water it 
produces.”  (Emphasis added). 
The City’s decision to remove the air stripping towers and 
to construct the reverse osmosis system, with the knowledge that 
TTHM levels would rise, was an exercise of the City’s 
legislative discretion and its inherent police power.  “[T]he 
determination of the public improvements to be made by a 
municipality [is] a legislative function.”  Leonard v. Town of 
Waynesboro, 169 Va. 376, 385, 193 S.E. 503, 507 (1937).  
Deciding that the long-term gains to Chesapeake residents 
outweighed the short-term potential dangers to the public 
health, the City undertook the improvements and made an effort 
to alleviate the danger to the public by widely publicizing the 
known hazards to women who were or might become pregnant.  The 
Commissioner verified this decision as he “determined that the 
granting of an exemption to the TTHMs standard will not result 
in an unreasonable risk to the consumer’s health.”  Municipal 
decisions regarding the determination of priorities directly 
related to the general health, safety and welfare of citizens 
are exercises of a governmental function.  See Gambrell, 267 Va. 
at 359, 593 S.E.2d at 250. 
The City’s exercise of its legislative discretion to 
redesign the Plant by replacing the air stripping towers with 
the reverse osmosis facility is no different than a 
 
22
municipality’s design and planning of a roadway, even if other 
design alternatives were available. 
A municipal corporation, in selecting and adopting a 
plan for the construction of a public street, acts in 
a discretionary, governmental capacity and is immune 
from liability for injuries resulting from its errors 
in judgment made in that capacity. 
 
Taylor, 240 Va. at 371, 397 S.E.2d at 835 (citing Hall, 175 Va. 
at 551, 9 S.E.2d at 359). 
 
Cunningham acknowledges on brief that “the City may have 
exercised discretion in establishing the Northwest River Plant,” 
but argues all acts after the initial design decision are per se 
proprietary functions.  We rejected that notion in Stansbury 
where the City of Richmond was not in the initial construction 
of a water system but in a continuum of planning and redesigning 
the existing system just as the City did in the case at bar.  We 
also find no authority for Cunningham’s proposition that 
municipal design and planning as a discretionary legislative 
function is frozen in time, never to be subject to redesign or 
planning at any point. 
The City’s ongoing redesign and planning of its municipal 
water system is no different than the design or redesign of its 
streets and other facilities that may change from time to time.  
Even assuming there could be elements of the operation of a 
water system mixed with the planning and design elements, we 
have noted on many occasions “when governmental and proprietary 
 
23
functions coincide, the governmental function is the overriding 
factor and the doctrine of sovereign immunity will shield the 
locality from liability.”  Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 
S.E.2d at 782 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Cunningham further alleges that the City did not provide 
adequate information of the water supply’s known risks to 
pregnant women.  Like weighing priorities in making public 
improvements, the dissemination of information to the public is 
also a governmental function.  Downs v. City of Southfield, 2001 
Mich. App. LEXIS 2057 at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (non-
precedential decisions).  See also Allen v. United States, 816 
F.2d 1417, 1423 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the government 
was immune from liability for the failure of the Atomic Energy 
Commission administrators and employees to warn the public about 
possible dangers more fully than they had); Loughlin v. United 
States, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D. D.C. 2003) (finding that the 
Army's decision not to issue warnings about munitions burials is 
a protected policy judgment); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 
1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995)(government decision not to bring the 
existence of a natural hazard to the attention of the public is 
discretionary).  Accordingly, sovereign immunity also applies to 
the governmental function of providing notice and bars 
Cunningham’s claim in that regard. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
24
 
Because we find that the City’s redesign and planning of 
the Plant and its public information campaign regarding 
temporary risks associated with consuming City water were 
governmental functions, sovereign immunity applies to bar 
Cunningham’s claims.  The trial court thus erred in denying the 
City’s plea of sovereign immunity.8 
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed in part as 
to the dismissal of counts I to IX of the motion for judgment.  
The judgment of the trial court will be reversed in part as to 
the failure to dismiss the remaining counts of the motion for 
judgment and the claim of punitive damages.  Final judgment will 
be entered for the City. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
          and final judgment. 
                     
 
8 As the application of sovereign immunity bars all of 
Cunningham’s claims, it is unnecessary to address any other 
assignments of error.  Furthermore, having determined the City’s 
acts were of a discretionary legislative function, we do not 
address the City’s other proffered grounds for the application 
of sovereign immunity.