Title: Hale v. Maersk Line Ltd.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111389
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2012

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CHRISTOPHER T. HALE 
 
v.     Record No. 111389 
 
MAERSK LINE LIMITED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
      
 
 
   
 
    September 14, 2012 
MAERSK LINE LIMITED 
 
v.     Record No. 111390 
 
CHRISTOPHER T. HALE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
James C. Hawks, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in remitting a jury verdict awarding compensatory and 
punitive damages to a seaman injured while on authorized shore 
leave in a foreign port. 
Background 
 
Christopher T. Hale filed this action in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Portsmouth in March 2009 to recover maintenance 
and cure and compensatory and punitive damages from his former 
employer, Maersk Line Limited (Maersk).  Hale claims that he 
suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and depression as a 
result of being "gang-raped," on or about July 14, 2008, by 
uniformed Korean police officers while he was on authorized 
shore leave from a Maersk ship docked in Yosu, Republic of 
Korea.  In his first amended complaint, Hale alleged five 
 
2 
counts against Maersk: (1) negligence and unseaworthiness; (2) 
failure to provide maintenance and cure; (3) wrongful 
termination; (4) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 41 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and (5) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Hale sought $50,000,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages.  
 
Prior to trial, Hale's wrongful termination, Title VII and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were 
struck.  Also, the circuit court ruled that Maersk did not owe 
Hale a duty of care under either the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 30101 et seq., or the general maritime law, including the 
duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel, at any time on the relevant 
dates when Hale was ashore on authorized leave in Yosu.  It 
ruled that, to the extent Maersk owed Hale a duty of care 
during the relevant time period under either the Jones Act or 
the general maritime law, such duty did not arise until Hale 
returned from authorized shore leave to the vessel on which he 
was working. 
 
Hale proceeded to trial on three remaining claims:  a 
claim for maintenance and cure, plus actual and punitive 
damages for unreasonable, willful and wanton refusal to provide 
maintenance and cure; a Jones Act claim for negligence after 
Hale’s return to the ship; and a claim based on the 
 
3 
unseaworthiness of the vessel due to the crew’s incompetence 
after Hale’s return to the ship. 
 
During trial, after the defense rested, Hale moved to 
strike Maersk's defense of willful misconduct.  The circuit 
court overruled the motion.   
 
Maersk then moved for summary judgment as to the 
maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive 
damages on the ground that a plaintiff seeking maintenance and 
cure needed medical evidence.  Maersk asserted that Hale failed 
to provide evidence that he was unfit for duty, and there was 
no evidence of a willful and callous disregard to pay Hale 
maintenance and cure.  The circuit court overruled the motion. 
 
Maersk proffered an instruction concerning the Jones Act 
and seaworthiness claims that quoted the circuit court’s pre-
trial ruling: 
Maersk owed no duty of care to Hale under either 
the Jones Act or the general maritime law, including 
the duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel, at any time on 
July 13th and July 14th, 2008 while Hale was ashore on 
authorized shore leave from the MAERSK RHODE ISLAND. 
 
The circuit court refused the instruction but stated that 
Maersk could argue the point of the instruction to the jury 
during its closing.  Maersk did not object to Hale’s 
instructions concerning the award of compensatory and punitive 
damages on the maintenance and cure claim. 
 
4 
 
The jury returned a general verdict awarding Hale 
$20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive 
damages.  Maersk moved to set aside the verdict and for a new 
trial, asserting that the award of compensatory damages was 
excessive and that several erroneous rulings undermined the 
fairness of the trial. 
Maersk also requested that the circuit court reconsider 
and grant its summary judgment motion made at the close of the 
evidence.  Maersk asserted that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on Hale's maintenance and cure claim for compensatory 
and punitive damages because Maersk had a reasonable defense as 
a matter of law:  Hale's willful misconduct and failure to 
provide medical information to substantiate his entitlement to 
maintenance and cure.  Hale responded, asserting that Maersk 
had waived its argument regarding its motion and that the 
jury's verdict was not contrary to the law or evidence. 
 
During a post-trial hearing, the circuit court stated that 
it found the jury verdict "shocking" and "appallingly excessive 
in comparison to the injury that was actually proven."  The 
circuit court also ruled "that compensatory damages, and 
especially punitive damages, for denial of maintenance and cure 
 
5 
were not warranted by the evidence and the defendant's Motion 
to Strike should have been granted."1 
The circuit court opined that submitting evidence of 
Maersk's net worth to the jury may have "unfairly enlarge[d] 
the amount of the damages."  However, it concluded that a 
retrial on damages offered "no better recourse since it . . . 
assumes the jury's determination of liability was unaffected by 
the evidence and arguments as to denial of maintenance and cure 
. . . ."  Thereafter, the circuit court granted Maersk’s motion 
for partial summary judgment precluding Hale’s recovery of 
compensatory and punitive damages associated with Maersk’s 
denial of maintenance and cure, set aside the punitive damages 
award, and remitted the compensatory damages award to 
$2,000,000.  Hale accepted the remittitur under protest and the 
circuit court entered judgment against Maersk for $2,000,000.  
Both parties appeal. 
Facts 
 
Maersk is an American shipping company headquartered in 
Norfolk, Virginia that operates a fleet of merchant ships, 
which are deployed world-wide.  In July 2008, the tanker MAERSK 
RHODE ISLAND was under contract with the United States Military 
                     
1 Maersk characterized its motion as a motion for summary 
judgment during trial and in its post-trial motions, and the 
circuit court refers to it as such in its final order. 
 
6 
Sealift Command, primarily delivering jet fuel to United States 
military installations in the Far East.  Hale was a 
steward/baker aboard the MAERSK RHODE ISLAND when it made a 
port call at Yosu, Republic of Korea on July 13, 2008. 
 
Maersk granted permission to members of the crew of the 
MAERSK RHODE ISLAND to take authorized shore leave while the 
vessel was in the port of Yosu.  Maersk made arrangements for 
its crew members to be transported between the vessel and 
certain drop-off and pick-up locations.  Maersk coordinated 
this transportation with its local agents.  
 
Hale, along with other crewmembers of the MAERSK RHODE 
ISLAND, was transported to a drop-off location in Yosu.  Hale 
traveled with First Assistant Engineer, Henry Matuszynski; 
Third Assistant Engineer, Darrin Heard; Deck Cadet, Gina 
Gottschalk; and Engine Cadet, Margaret Edwards.  After arriving 
in town, Hale, Matuszynski, Heard, Gottschalk, and Edwards went 
together to a restaurant where they consumed food and drinks, 
including beer and a local alcohol known as Soju.2 
Hale believes that at some time before he departed the 
restaurant, he ingested, without his knowledge or consent, a 
drug or other substance that caused him to become disoriented, 
fearful for his personal safety, and incapacitated.  Hale 
                     
2 Soju is a diluted grain alcohol with an 18-20% alcohol 
content. 
 
7 
testified that he informed Matuszynski that he was not feeling 
well and Matuszynski responded with a wink and patted Hale on 
the shoulder, stating that everything would be okay.  Hale 
testified that "for whatever reason," Matuszynski's response 
made Hale feel "threatened" and "very afraid."  Hale "ran off" 
and hid behind a dumpster down the street.  He eventually ran 
across the street to hide under a car parked in a parking lot. 
 
Hale's next memory is being in a police car, with the 
police "punching," "smothering," and "suffocat[ing]" him.  Hale 
testified that the Korean police officers then dragged him out 
of the car and hit his face fifteen times or more, kicked him, 
exposed themselves to him and raped him.  Hale also stated that 
the Korean police officers forced him to drink alcohol.  At 
some point during the ordeal, Hale recalls someone, who Hale 
believes was a tall Korean who was possibly the ship's agent, 
said "I know you" and kicked Hale between the eyes, rendering 
him unconscious. 
 
Hale next remembers waking up lying on the floor of a van.  
Hale asked the driver to return him to the ship, but instead, 
the driver offered to take him to a hotel.  Hale refused to go 
anywhere with the agent and insisted on being taken to the 
ship.  The driver returned Hale to the ship around 2:30 a.m. on 
July 14, 2008.  
 
8 
 
Chris Townsend, the chief mate, was awakened by a 
telephone call from the duty officer informing him that a 
member of the crew had a problem.  Townsend went to the main 
deck and came upon Hale in the mess hall.  Townsend testified 
that it was apparent that Hale had been drinking. Townsend 
observed the smell of alcohol on his breath, his lack of motor 
skills, and rambling conversation.  Hale informed Townsend that 
Hale had been assaulted by four military personnel and the 
ship's agent, who together held him down and poured Soju down 
his throat. 
 
Captain James Walker, who had also been contacted by the 
duty officer, arrived at the mess hall later.  Walker observed 
that Hale's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he 
smelled of alcohol.  Hale informed Walker that he had been 
drinking and that he had a "scuffle" with the police.  Later, 
according to Walker, Hale elaborated that four Korean soldiers 
attacked him and that the Koreans remembered him from when he 
was in the Army and they were out to get him.  Walker testified 
that Hale told him that after that attack, as Hale was on his 
knees crawling toward what he thought was a sentry post for a 
 
9 
U.S. military base,3 four Korean police officers grabbed him and 
assaulted him. 
Walker began to administer a breathalyzer test to Hale.  
Maersk has a zero tolerance policy for drugs and alcohol and 
the captain is authorized to fire a seaman for being 
intoxicated on board.  At that point, according to Walker, Hale 
said, "[W]hat if I told you that they held me down and poured 
liquor down my throat?  Would you still breathalyze me?"  
Walker claims he asked Hale whether this happened but Hale did 
not respond.  Hale then asked, "[W]ould you still breathalyze 
me if they pulled my pants down and stuck a bottle up my butt?"  
Again, according to Walker, Hale did not respond when Walker 
asked him whether that happened.  Walker testified that he 
believed Hale was "trying to talk himself out of getting 
fired."  Walker administered the breathalyzer test. 
Before leaving the mess hall, Hale contacted Daniel 
Laitinen, the ship's union representative, and asked him to 
come to speak with him.  Laitinen observed that Hale had a 
black eye.  Laitinen testified that Hale told him that four or 
five people, including the ship's agent, sat on top of him and 
poured whiskey and Soju down his throat until he was drunk and 
                     
3 There is no U.S. military base in Yosu.  Walker testified 
that the closest base was about a two and a half hour car ride 
away.  
 
10 
then raped Hale with Coke bottles.  Hale said that his 
assailants remembered him from when he was in the Army.  
Hale testified that he told Walker what had happened and 
that he wanted medical care.  Walker told him he would get him  
to a hospital.  Hale refused to go anywhere with the ship’s 
agent due to his belief of a Korean conspiracy.  Hale wanted a 
marshal or crew member to take him to a hospital.  Hale was 
escorted to his stateroom and fell asleep.   
 
Walker testified that he contacted the ship's agent, 
Young-Min Ga, to discuss what happened and arrange 
transportation for Hale to see a doctor.  Walker then called 
Catherine O'Connell, Maersk's claims manager.  Upon advice from 
O'Connell, Walker called Marine Medical Access and spoke with 
Dr. Neal Sikka at George Washington Hospital.  Dr. Sikka 
advised Walker to get Hale to a doctor "fairly quickly."  
Walker testified that because of Hale’s adamant refusal 
concerning being sent ashore with the ship’s agent for medical 
treatment, and because Hale’s only apparent injury was a black 
eye, Walker decided to let Hale "sleep it off," then "get him 
to a hospital when he was sobered up a little bit." 
Around 6 a.m., Hale woke up and went to speak to Walker 
about receiving medical care.  Around 7 a.m. on July 14, 2008, 
Hale met with Walker again in Walker's cabin.  Walker attempted 
to complete a breathalyzer exam but Hale refused because he saw 
 
11 
termination papers on Walker’s desk.  Walker informed Hale that 
Hale was terminated.  Hale testified that Walker stated "there 
were too many jobs at stake and that people could lose their 
jobs because the MSC [Military Sealift Command] contract was 
getting ready to expire and he [Walker] just didn't believe my 
[Hale's] story."  An agent arrived around 9:40 a.m. to take 
Hale ashore. 
 
After leaving the ship, Hale was transported to the St. 
Paul Surgical Center in Yosu, where he met with a Korean doctor 
who did not speak fluent English.  Hale testified that he asked 
the doctor to examine him for sexual assault, but once Hale 
indicated that he believed the Korean police had raped him, the 
doctor refused to perform the sexual assault exam.  The doctor 
reported that the test results for five types of drugs, 
including alcohol, were negative and that Hale had contusions 
on his head and back. 
 
Maersk arranged for Hale to be flown to Seoul and then 
eventually to the United States.  Upon his arrival in the 
United States, Hale's wife took him to a hospital in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, where Hale checked into the emergency 
room at 8:27 p.m. on July 15, 2008.  He reported that he had 
been attacked and possibly sexually assaulted.  Dr. Kimberly 
Kaminer examined him at 11:30 p.m. and determined that he had 
pain with a bruise around his left eye and "some internal 
 
12 
tenderness on rectal exam."  Other than the black eye, Hale did 
not have objective signs of trauma. 
 
In August 2008, Hale contacted Georg Kenny, his union 
representative, and informed him that he had been "kidnapped, 
raped and tortured ashore in Korea."  Kenny explained the 
grievance process concerning termination of employment and Hale 
attended a meeting with a Maersk representative on August 27, 
2008.  Hale gave the Maersk representative a written statement 
concerning the assault.  
 
On October 9, 2008, Kenny contacted O'Connell to inform 
her that he had discussed maintenance and cure with Hale.  
O'Connell spoke with Hale and he informed her of what he 
alleged happened to him in Yosu.  O'Connell indicated that she 
would review the file and requested that Hale send her any 
medical documentation to support his claim for maintenance and 
cure.  Hale did not send her any medical documentation.  
O'Connell reviewed the file, including a statement from Walker, 
and attempted to contact the other officers that were involved.  
O'Connell later reviewed statements from the agent and the 
Korean doctor as well as a report from the Williamsburg 
hospital, received from Kenny, concerning Hale’s injuries and 
treatment.  She relied on those statements and reports in 
determining whether to provide Hale maintenance and cure.   
 
13 
As a result of her investigation, O'Connell stated that 
she "only had information that Mr. Hale had a black eye."  She 
testified that she had no information that indicated "he would 
not be fit for duty for any other reason," and denied his 
request for maintenance and cure.  In December 2008, Hale 
became employed with Sealift, Incorporated, earning more money 
than he had while on the MAERSK RHODE ISLAND or in any of his 
previous positions.  Hale filed this action in March 2009. 
 
As a result of this experience, Hale testified that he 
feels "humiliated, worthless, hopeless, [and] disgusted" and 
has tried on multiple occasions to kill himself.  His 
psychologist, Dr. K. Jeffrey Schlichter, who started to treat 
Hale on August 23, 2010, testified that an important aspect of 
recovering from a brutal sexual assault is being treated 
immediately.  The longer one goes without appropriate rape 
counseling, the worse the trauma tends to become.  Dr. 
Schlichter testified that his prognosis of Hale and his 
prospects for recovery were "[g]ood with continued treatment 
over an undefined long period of time."  He testified that he 
does not believe Hale has reached a level of maximum 
improvement from what he suffered on July 14, 2008.  Dr. 
Schlichter could not separate Hale's damages between the actual 
assault as opposed to Maersk's alleged refusal to provide 
appropriate medical care.  Although Hale became employed in 
 
14 
December 2008, returning to sea interferes with Hale's 
psychological treatment schedule. 
Analysis 
 
Hale asserts that the circuit court erroneously set aside 
the verdict for compensatory damages and ordered remittitur, 
erroneously set aside the punitive damages he was awarded, and 
erroneously granted Maersk’s post-trial motion for summary 
judgment on his maintenance and cure claims. 
Maintenance and Cure 
 
In support of his contention that the circuit court erred 
in granting Maersk’s post-trial motion for summary judgment, 
Hale argues that Maersk waived its motion to strike made at the 
close of the evidence by not objecting to related jury 
instructions.  Hale also claims that ample evidence existed to 
support a finding that Maersk's decision not to provide 
maintenance and cure caused him devastating emotional damage, 
and Maersk conducted no medical investigation before summarily 
firing Hale and persistently denying him maintenance and cure.   
 
Maersk argues that it was properly entitled to judgment on 
Hale's maintenance and cure claim for both compensatory and 
punitive damages because Maersk had a reasonable defense as a 
matter of law.  Maersk claims it had substantial evidence that 
Hale suffered only minor injuries as a result of his drunken 
assault of police officers, and Hale provided no medical 
 
15 
evidence that he was unfit for duty or needed more curative 
care. 
 
Hale asserts that by not objecting to jury instructions 
concerning the award of compensatory and punitive damages on 
the maintenance and cure claim, Maersk waived its prior 
contention that those damage claims should have been struck.  
We disagree. 
In WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 Va. 140, 564 S.E.2d 383 (2002), 
this Court stated: 
 
Normally, when a party proffers or agrees to an 
instruction which is contrary to a position previously 
argued during trial, the agreed instruction becomes 
the law of the case, and the party is deemed to have 
waived its previous objection.  However, when the 
record is clear that the party is not waiving its 
objection to the prior ruling, but merely proffering 
or agreeing to an instruction consistent with the 
trial court’s prior ruling, the previous objection 
will not be waived. 
 
Id. at 159, 264 S.E.2d at 395 (citations omitted). 
 
As with the defendant in the WJLA case, it is clear from 
the post-verdict record that Maersk merely agreed to 
instructions consistent with the circuit court’s prior ruling, 
and in its motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, Maersk 
continued to assert that the claim should have been struck.  We 
hold that Maersk did not waive its objection to the circuit 
court’s ruling denying its motion for summary judgment.  The 
 
16 
merits of the circuit court’s ruling on Maersk’s motion for 
summary judgment therefore must be addressed. 
The circuit court's post-trial decision to grant summary 
judgment on the maintenance and cure claims4 is a question of 
law.  Consequently, this Court reviews that determination de 
novo.  St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 283 
Va. 403, 407, 722 S.E.2d 622, 625 (2012) ("In an appeal from a 
circuit court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment, 
this Court reviews the application of law to undisputed facts 
de novo."). 
 
Under the general maritime law, "[w]hen a seaman becomes 
ill or injured while in the service of his ship, the shipowner 
must pay him maintenance and cure, whether or not the shipowner 
was at fault or the ship unseaworthy."  Morales v. Garijak, 
Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987).  The obligation to 
pay maintenance and cure extends to a seaman disabled in the 
service of the ship, no matter what the cause, and liability 
extends for a fair and reasonable time after the voyage to 
effect improvement in the seaman's condition.  Calmar S.S. 
Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529 (1938).  "This obligation 
includes paying a subsistence allowance, reimbursing medical 
                     
4 Both parties seem to agree that the circuit court granted 
Maersk post-trial summary judgment on the seaworthiness claim 
as well.  However, the circuit court’s final order does not 
 
17 
expenses actually incurred, and taking all reasonable steps to 
ensure that the seaman receives proper care and treatment."  
Morales, 829 F.2d at 1358.  "The maintenance exacted is 
comparable to that to which the seaman is entitled while at 
sea, and 'cure' is care, including nursing and medical 
attention during such period as the duty continues."  Taylor, 
303 U.S. at 528 (internal citations omitted). 
 
In Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 736-37 
(1943), the Supreme Court of the United States extended 
maintenance and cure to encompass injuries suffered by a seaman 
on authorized shore leave who was struck by a motor vehicle 
driven by a third party.  The Supreme Court considered shore 
leave integral to a seaman's life and to his service to his 
ship.  Id. at 732, 734.  In Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 
511, 516 (1949), the Supreme Court held that a seaman must be 
"in the service of the ship" while ashore to qualify for 
maintenance and cure; "he must be generally answerable to its 
call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine 
tasks or specific orders."  In the instant case, Maersk is not 
disputing that Hale was "in the service of the ship" while on 
authorized shore leave in Yosu. 
                                                                 
reflect any  post-trial summary judgment ruling regarding the 
seaworthiness claim and, therefore, we will not address it. 
 
18 
 
"Upon receiving a claim for maintenance and cure, the 
shipowner need not immediately commence payments; he is 
entitled to investigate and require corroboration of the 
claim."  Morales, 829 F.2d at 1358.  After conducting an 
investigation, a shipowner is "allowed to rely on certain legal 
defenses to deny these claims."  Brown v. Parker Drilling 
Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 2005).  "A failure 
to pay maintenance and cure due an injured seaman is reasonable 
if a diligent investigation indicates that the seaman's claim 
is not legitimate or if the seaman does not submit medical 
reports to document his claim."  Morales, 829 F.2d at 1360.  
 
"If, after investigating, the shipowner unreasonably 
rejects the claim, when in fact the seaman is due maintenance 
and cure, the owner becomes liable not only for the maintenance 
and cure payments, but also for compensatory damages."  Id. at 
1358.  A seaman may recover punitive damages only if the 
shipowner lacked a reasonable defense and "exhibited 
callousness and indifference."  Id.; see also Atlantic Sounding 
Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009) (allowing recovery of 
punitive damages in maintenance and cure actions).  Because the 
shipowner's failure to pay maintenance and cure is not only 
unreasonable but the shipowner was egregiously at fault, the 
shipowner will be liable for attorney's fees in addition to 
punitive damages.  Morales, 829 F.2d at 1358. 
 
19 
 
Thus, to determine maintenance and cure liability, there 
is a well-established escalating scale of liability: 
[A] shipowner who is in fact liable for maintenance 
and cure, but who has been reasonable in denying 
liability, may be held liable only for the amount of 
maintenance and cure.  If the shipowner has refused to 
pay without a reasonable defense, he becomes liable in 
addition for compensatory damages.  If the owner not 
only lacks a reasonable defense but has exhibited 
callousness and indifference to the seaman's plight, 
he becomes liable for punitive damages and attorney's 
fees as well. 
 
Brown, 410 F.3d at 177 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Morales, 829 
F.2d at 1358). 
 
In the instant case, Maersk asserts that it had a 
reasonable defense for denying liability because the medical 
evidence from two medical exams after the incident both 
indicated Hale suffered only contusions, a black eye and some 
internal rectal tenderness.  Hale never presented medical 
evidence to support his claim for maintenance and cure.  Maersk 
also relied on evidence that Hale's injuries were a result of 
his drunken assault of police officers. 
 
When first speaking with Hale about the incident, 
O'Connell asked him to provide a doctor's report indicating he 
was unfit for duty.  Hale responded that he had a doctor's note 
from Korea and that he saw a doctor when he got back to 
Virginia.  O’Connell obtained the doctors’ reports from the 
physicians Hale saw in Korea and Virginia.  O'Connell never 
 
20 
received documentation that Hale was unfit for duty other than 
the report from the Korean doctor indicating Hale had 
contusions and was prescribed medication for seven days.  When 
O'Connell spoke with Hale on October 9, 2008, she already had 
information in her file, including an e-mail from Walker 
summarizing the incident.  In November 2008, O'Connell 
interviewed Walker and attempted to contact other Maersk 
employees who were involved.  O'Connell did not have evidence 
of injuries other than Hale's contusions and black eye; nothing 
indicated he needed further medical care.  O'Connell determined 
and informed Hale that Maersk did not owe Hale maintenance and 
cure.  
An employer may be exempt from penalties, if "the employer 
deliberately relies on a reasonable, but ultimately wrong, 
legal argument to withhold payment."  Williams v. Wilmington 
Trust Co., 345 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2003) (addressing 
plaintiff's claim for penalties under the seaman's wage 
statutes and finding that "negligent failures to pay are not 
comparable to this intentional, good-faith refusal to tender 
wages"); see Brown, 410 F.3d at 171 (stating that a Jones Act 
employer is entitled to investigate a seaman's claim for 
maintenance and cure and rely on certain defenses); Rose v. 
Miss Pacific, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2997 at *25 (D. Or. 
Jan. 10, 2012) ("Because defendants reasonably asserted the 
 
21 
. . . defense, even if they ultimately fail to sustain that 
defense at trial, all other actions allegedly taken by them in 
bad faith are irrelevant."). 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hale, 
Hale proved that his injuries did not result from his voluntary 
intoxication or other misconduct.  However, he provided no 
evidence to Maersk and Maersk’s investigation revealed no 
medical evidence prior to denial of the claim that was 
sufficient to support Hale’s claim for maintenance and cure.  
Hale did not prove at trial or even allege that any such 
medical evidence existed at that time.  Hale testified that 
Maersk was governed by corporate greed rather than a concern 
for the health of its crew, but he did not otherwise present 
any evidence suggesting Maersk's denial of his claim was 
unreasonable, given its investigation.  In this instance, 
although its determination may ultimately have been wrong, 
Maersk still had an unrefuted reasonable defense underlying its 
refusal to provide maintenance and cure. 
The circuit court correctly concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to support Hale's assertion that Maersk 
was unreasonable in denying his maintenance and cure claim.  
Having determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove 
that Maersk's reliance on its defense was unreasonable, Hale’s 
damages on the maintenance and cure claim were limited to 
 
22 
recovery of maintenance and cure benefits.  The circuit court 
properly granted Maersk’s motion for partial summary judgment 
and properly set aside the jury verdict for compensatory and 
punitive damages on the maintenance and cure claim.  See Brown, 
410 F.3d at 178 ("The jury could not rationally have determined 
that [the defendant] was unreasonable in relying on this 
defense, so their finding constitutes clear error."). 
Remittitur 
 
Having found that the circuit court properly struck Hale's 
maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive 
damages, this Court must next consider whether the circuit 
court erred in remitting the verdict. 
 
Hale argues that the circuit court erroneously remitted 
the verdict because credible evidence supports the jury's 
finding that the vessel was unseaworthy and that Maersk 
unreasonably denied Hale maintenance and cure.  Hale asserts 
that the record supports the verdict and does not warrant a new 
trial.  He asks this Court to reinstate the jury verdict. 
 
Maersk argues that the circuit court abused its discretion 
when, after finding that the jury's verdict resulted from an 
unfair trial, it ordered remittitur instead of a new trial on 
the merits.  Maersk claims that the jury was improperly 
instructed on a legally invalid theory of liability because the 
evidence did not warrant compensatory and punitive damages for 
 
23 
denial of maintenance and cure, and that it was also prejudiced 
by the evidence and argument regarding its net worth admitted 
in support of Hale’s punitive damages claim.  We agree that the 
circuit court erred by not ordering a new trial. 
 
Code § 8.01-383.1(A) provides authority for a circuit 
court to remit a jury verdict: 
 
In any action at law in which the trial court shall 
require a plaintiff to remit a part of his recovery, 
as ascertained by the verdict of a jury,   or else 
submit to a new trial, such plaintiff may remit and 
accept judgment of the court thereon for the reduced 
sum under protest, but, notwithstanding such 
remittitur and acceptance, if under protest, the 
judgment of the court in requiring him to remit may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . . 
 
 
Alternatively, a circuit court may order a new trial.  
Code § 8.01-383 provides:  "In any civil case or proceeding, 
the court before which a trial by jury is had, may grant a new 
trial . . . .  A new trial may be granted as well where the 
damages awarded are too small as where they are excessive."  
"In determining whether an excessive damage award requires a 
new trial on all issues, a new trial limited to damages, an 
order of remittitur, or a judgment confirming the award, a 
trial judge is vested with broad discretion, and we will not 
reverse his ruling unless the record plainly shows an abuse of 
discretion."  Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 434, 
297 S.E.2d 675, 682 (1982).  A new trial is not mandatory when: 
 
24 
 
the monetary award, though out of proportion to the 
injuries suffered, is not so excessive as to compel 
the conclusion that the liability verdict was the 
product of sympathy for the plaintiff or bias against 
the defendant.  In such case, if the evidence before 
the jury clearly supports its finding of liability, a 
trial judge has two options.  He may put the plaintiff 
on terms to accept a remittitur in lieu of a new 
trial, Code § 8.01-383.1, or he may grant the 
defendant a new trial limited to damages, Code § 8.01-
383. 
 
Id.  
 
Although a circuit court may order remittitur to remedy an 
excessive verdict, it may not use remittitur to remedy an 
unfair trial of liability issues.  See Agelasto v. Frank 
Atkinson Real Estate, 229 Va. 59, 65, 327 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) 
(observing that a new trial on all issues is necessary when 
erroneous admission of evidence, which may have "tipped the 
scales," is not harmless); Hope Windows, Inc. v. Snyder, 208 
Va. 489, 493, 158 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1968) ("The remittitur 
required by the trial judge did not, however, cure the 
prejudice on the issue of liability" and therefore "a new trial 
on all issues" was necessary.). 
 
When remitting the verdict, the circuit court acknowledged 
that the evidence did not support Hale's maintenance and cure 
claim for compensatory and punitive damages and the circuit 
court should have granted Maersk's motion to strike on that 
issue.  The circuit court was correct in that regard.  Thus, 
the jury was erroneously instructed on the maintenance and cure 
 
25 
claim and imposed liability for unreasonably failing to pay 
maintenance and cure, as evidenced by its award of punitive 
damages. 
 
" 'If an issue is erroneously submitted to a jury, [this 
Court will] presume that the jury decided the case upon that 
issue.' "  Herr v. Wheeler, 272 Va. 310, 318, 634 S.E.2d 317, 
322 (2006) (quoting Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 254, 462 
S.E.2d 94, 97 (1995)).  "[A] substantial error such as this one 
'is presumed to be prejudicial unless it plainly appears that 
it could not have affected the result.' "  Clohessy, 250 Va. at 
253-54, 462 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Spence v. Miller, 197 Va. 
477, 482, 90 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1955)).  In the instant case, 
instructing the jury on compensatory and punitive damages for 
Maersk’s unreasonable failure to pay Hale maintenance and cure 
clearly affected the result, as the jury awarded punitive 
damages on that claim. 
 
Additionally, when a court erroneously allows a party to 
try a punitive damages claim to a jury, a new trial on all 
remaining contested issues is the appropriate remedy.  See 
Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1039, 154 S.E.2d 124, 129 
(1967) (ordering new trial where trial court improperly allowed 
recovery of punitive damages and admitted irrelevant evidence); 
PTS Corp. v. Buckman, 263 Va. 613, 621-23, 561 S.E.2d 718, 723-
24 (2002) (error allowing proof relating to punitive damages 
 
26 
“influenced the jury’s award of both compensatory and punitive 
damages” and a new trial on all issues was ordered).  In the 
instant case, the circuit court observed that it was error to 
allow evidence of Maersk's net worth to be submitted to the 
jury, as it "served only to unfairly enlarge the amount of the 
damages."  In closing argument, Hale's counsel argued that 
Maersk's 2009 annual revenue of $1.5 billion justified a 
significant award of punitive damages.  If the maintenance and 
cure claim for punitive damages should not have been before the 
jury, this evidence of Maersk's net worth also should not have 
been before the jury.  "Yet the irrelevant evidence was before 
the jury without the court's instructing them that it should 
not be considered in fixing the amount of damages."  Eubank v. 
Spencer, 203 Va. 923, 927, 128 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1962) 
(reversing and remanding for new trial because of error noted). 
 
It cannot be said that instructing the jury on 
compensatory and punitive damages regarding maintenance and 
cure was harmless error.  The order of remittitur did not 
correct the fact that the circuit court erred by instructing 
the jury on Hale's maintenance and cure claim for compensatory 
and punitive damages.  Thus, the circuit court erred by not 
ordering a new trial on all issues after concluding that the 
maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive 
damages should not have been submitted to the jury. 
 
27 
 
Our conclusion requires that we reverse the judgment of 
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.  However, 
because additional issues raised by the parties in this appeal 
may arise on retrial, we will address them here. 
Scope of Maersk's Liability 
 
Prior to the trial, the circuit court granted a motion for 
partial summary judgment filed by Maersk, ruling that 
"Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiff under either the 
Jones Act, or the general maritime law, including the duty to 
furnish a seaworthy vessel, at any time on July 13-14, 2008 
when Plaintiff was ashore on authorized shore leave from the 
Tank Vessel MAERSK RHODE ISLAND."  The circuit court held that 
to the extent Maersk owed Hale a duty of care under either the 
Jones Act or the general maritime law, such duty did not arise 
until Hale returned from authorized shore leave.   
 
Hale argues that the circuit court erred in its pre-trial 
ruling on that issue because Maersk is liable under the Jones 
Act for its negligence in violating its duty owed to Hale while 
he was on shore leave, enabling Hale’s attack by Korean police 
officers.   
Maersk argues that the circuit court correctly granted its 
pre-trial motion for partial summary judgment because, as a 
matter of law, Hale was not in the course of his employment 
when injured and Maersk did not breach any duty to Hale.  Also, 
 
28 
it argues that Maersk had no duty to foresee the criminal acts 
of third parties.  We agree that the circuit court correctly 
limited Maersk's liability to its actions once Hale returned to 
the ship. 
 
This Court reviews de novo the circuit court's pre-trial 
ruling that Maersk breached no duties owed to Hale while he was 
on shore leave.  See, e.g., Volpe v. City of Lexington, 281 Va. 
630, 636, 708 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2011) ("We review the trial 
court's ruling de novo, as [t]he issue whether a legal duty in 
tort exists is a pure question of law.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  "The employer's duty under the Jones Act 'is 
to provide seamen with a safe place to work.' "  Martin v. 
Harris, 560 F.3d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estate of 
Larkins v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 806 F.2d 510, 514 (4th Cir. 
1986)).  "[T]his duty extends from the vessel to the shore, 
provided the seaman is acting 'in the course of his 
employment.' "  Id. (quoting O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39, 43 (1943)).  "To prevail on a Jones 
Act negligence claim against his employer, a seaman must show 
(1) that he is a seaman under the Act; (2) that he suffered 
injury in the course of his employment; (3) that his employer 
was negligent; and (4) that his employer's negligence caused 
his injury at least in part."  Id. 
 
29 
 
The Jones Act is not to be interpreted as a workers' 
compensation statute and remains "grounded in negligence and 
not merely on the fact that injuries occur."  Hernandez v. 
Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, 187 F.3d 432, 436-37 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  An employer is liable if 
his "negligence played any part, even the slightest, in 
producing the injury or death for which damages are sought."  
Id. at 436.  Negligence is "conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm."  Id. at 437 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  "And the risk included in this 
definition is one that is reasonably foreseeable."  Id. 
 
Hale argues that Maersk is liable under the Jones Act 
because its employees abandoned Hale on shore, knowing that he 
was in an intoxicated state.  However, courts have indicated 
that a shipowner will not be liable when a crew member fails to 
escort an intoxicated shipmate from shore leave back to the 
vessel.  "[I]n cases arising under the Jones Act, it is settled 
that it is not within the scope of his employment for a seaman 
to aid an intoxicated member of the same crew in returning to 
their ship."  McClure v. United States Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197, 
199 (4th Cir. 1966); see In re Atlass, 350 F.2d 592, 596 (7th 
Cir. 1965) ("Whatever the parental duty of a ship's captain may 
be, it surely does not require him to forcibly detain every 
 
30 
crew member who has had a few drinks or who wishes to go ashore 
to do a bit of drinking for relaxation.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  If a seaman voluntarily assumes the duty of 
escorting an intoxicated shipmate back to the vessel and 
performs this duty unsuccessfully, the seaman's negligence 
cannot be imputed to the shipowner.  See Robinson v. 
Northeastern S.S. Corp., 228 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1956) 
("Without such authorization [the seaman] was not acting within 
the scope of his employment, and his negligence, if any, in 
performing his voluntary undertaking could not be imputed to 
defendant even if successful performance would further the 
interests of the shipowner."). 
 
Similarly, shipowners have no duty to supervise crew 
members' leisure activities.  In re Atlass, 350 F.2d at 596; 
Howard v. M/V Bristol Monarch, 652 F. Supp. 677, 683 (W.D. Wa. 
1987) ("[T]he crew members have a duty to use good sense.  
Supervision of the leisure time activities of the crew was not 
within the scope of the duties" of the captain.). 
 
Applying these principles to the instant case, Maersk had 
no duty to either supervise Hale's leisure activities while on 
shore leave or to escort the intoxicated Hale back to the 
vessel.  Assuming the accompanying crew members' search for 
Hale was inadequate, this cannot be imputed to Maersk, as they 
 
31 
undertook any search voluntarily and were not acting within the 
scope of their employment.  See Robinson, 228 F.2d at 681. 
 
The circuit court correctly concluded as a matter of law 
that Maersk did not have a duty to ensure Hale's safety while 
on shore leave pursuing his own private interests.  If no duty 
existed, Maersk could not breach that duty and there was no 
question for the jury on this issue.  Although Jones Act 
liability may extend to seamen on authorized shore leave, such 
liability does not apply in the instant case.  Cf. Daughenbaugh 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 891 F.2d 1199, 1206, 1208-09 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (seaman's injury was related to his duty to return 
to the ship at a particular time and occurred while seaman was 
en route to vessel from shore leave).   
 
Furthermore, to establish shipowner negligence and recover 
for an assault, a seaman must establish either that (1) the 
assault was committed by the plaintiff's superior for the 
benefit of the ship's business or (2) the master or ship's 
officers failed to prevent the assault when it was foreseeable.  
Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1989); Colon 
v. Apex Marine Corp., 832 F. Supp. 508, 511 (D.R.I. 1993).  In 
the instant case, the evidence failed to establish the 
foreseeability of the assault upon Hale.  See Hernandez, 187 
F.3d at 437.  Assuming arguendo that Maersk violated some duty 
by failing to have Hale escorted back to the ship, Maersk would 
 
32 
not be liable for the criminal acts of Hale’s assailants.  See 
Howard, 652 F. Supp. at 682 (shipowners "cannot possibly be 
required to anticipate, assess, and warn seamen of all the 
possible dangers awaiting them at anchorages around the 
world."). 
 
In that the instruction proffered by Maersk quoting the 
circuit court’s pre-trial ruling on the Jones Act and 
seaworthiness claims accurately stated the circuit court’s 
correct ruling on the law, the circuit court erred in refusing 
that instruction.  The refusal of the proffered instruction was 
not harmless, and it was reversible error for the circuit court 
to refuse the instruction.  See Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 
277 Va. 127, 130-31, 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009). 
Conclusion 
 
Pursuant to the holdings above, we will reverse the 
circuit court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial on 
all issues relating to the seaworthiness and Jones Act claims 
regarding Maersk's actions after Hale returned to the ship, and 
Hale’s claim for maintenance and cure benefits.5 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
5 Given this disposition, the remaining assignments of 
error raised in these appeals are rendered moot and we need not 
address them.