Title: Commonwealth v. Magadini
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11874
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2016

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SJC-11874 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID MAGADINI. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     December 7, 2015. - June 23, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Trespass.  Necessity.  Practice, Criminal, Request for jury 
instructions.  Evidence, Cross-examination, Relevancy and 
materiality, Bias of government witness. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Southern Berkshire 
Division of the District Court Department on April 8, April 9, 
and July 8, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Fredric D. Rutberg, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for the defendant. 
 
Jessie J. Rossman (Matthew Segal with her) for American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others. 
 
John Bossé, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendant, David Magadini, was convicted by 
jury on seven counts of criminal trespass, each based on the 
2 
 
defendant's presence, in 2014, in privately-owned buildings 
where he was the subject of no trespass orders.1  Five incidents 
occurred between February and March, the sixth occurred on April 
8, and the seventh occurred on June 10.  Before trial and during 
the charge conference, the defendant requested a jury 
instruction on the defense of necessity, asserting that his 
conduct was justified as the only lawful alternative for a 
homeless person facing the "clear and imminent danger" of 
exposure to the elements during periods of extreme outdoor 
temperatures.  The judge denied the request, concluding that the 
defendant had legal alternatives to trespassing available.  As 
to each conviction, the judge imposed concurrent sentences of 
thirty days in a house of correction.  A single justice of the 
Appeals Court stayed the sentences pending resolution of this 
appeal.  We granted the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
On appeal, the defendant asserts the following errors at 
trial:  (1) denial of his request for an instruction on the 
defense of necessity; (2) limitation of his cross-examination of 
witnesses; (3) misstatements made by the prosecutor during 
closing argument; and (4) denial of his motion for a required 
                     
 
1 The judge allowed the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on an eighth charge, which was based on 
the defendant's presence at the site of the former St. James 
Church, located in Great Barrington, on April 19, 2014. 
3 
 
finding of not guilty on the charge stemming from the April 8 
incident.2  We conclude that the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's request for an instruction on the defense of 
necessity as to the six trespassing charges related to the 
incidents from February through April, 2014,3 and that the error 
was prejudicial.  Accordingly, we vacate the first six 
convictions and remand for a new trial.4  The defendant did not, 
however, meet his burden to demonstrate the foundational 
requirements for a necessity defense instruction as to the 
seventh conviction, stemming from the June 10 trespass.  
Therefore, we affirm that conviction as well as the denial of 
his motion for a required finding of not guilty for the April 8 
incident.  We address the defendant's remaining claims, which 
relate to issues that may arise at retrial. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for our discussion of the specific 
                     
 
2 The defendant, in multiple briefs that he contends are 
filed in accordance with Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201 
(1981), raises several new claims and expands on claims made in 
his appellate brief. 
 
 
3 These six charges related to the trespasses by the 
defendant on February 20, February 21, March 4, March 6, March 
28, and April 8. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, and Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers in support of the defendant. 
4 
 
issues raised.  In 2014, the defendant was charged with 
trespassing on three properties in Great Barrington -- 
Barrington House, Castle Street, and SoCo Creamery.  Barrington 
House is a mixed-use building with several different 
restaurants, an enclosed atrium, and apartments above the 
businesses.  Castle Street is a three-story building with retail 
establishments, offices, and apartments.  SoCo Creamery is an 
ice cream shop.  The defendant was barred from each property by 
no trespass orders.  The owner of the Castle Street building had 
the defendant served with a no trespass order in July, 2008; the 
manager of Barrington House had the defendant served in June, 
2012; and the owner of SoCo Creamery had the defendant served in 
January, 2014.   All of the no trespass orders were in effect at 
the time the charges were brought against the defendant. 
 
Four charges related to the defendant's presence at 
Barrington House.  On February 21, March 4, and March 6, police 
found the defendant lying in a hallway by a heater during the 
evening, nighttime, or early morning hours of days described as 
"cold" or "very cold."  At approximately noon on April 8, a day 
described as "cool," police responded to a report and observed 
the defendant walking through a common area in the Barrington 
House toward the front door.  Two charges stemmed from the 
defendant's presence at Castle Street, where police had found 
the defendant lying on the floor in the lobby next to a heater 
5 
 
during periods of cold weather.  The first incident occurred 
between 8 A.M. and 10 A.M. on February 20, 2014; the defendant 
was awake.  The second incident occurred at approximately 6:30 
A.M. on March 28; the defendant was sleeping.  The seventh 
charge was based on conduct that occurred on June 10, 2014, when 
the defendant entered SoCo Creamery, ignored requests by the 
clerk to leave the premises, and used the bathroom for ten to 
fifteen minutes.  The defendant did not dispute that he violated 
all of the trespass orders, focusing his case instead on the 
necessity defense in cross-examination and his direct testimony. 
 
The defendant, a lifelong resident of Great Barrington, 
became homeless after he moved out of his parents' home in 2004.  
His purpose in moving out was to "reorganize."  He planned to 
return to his parents' home, but he was unable to do so because 
the "landlord," who "wanted [the defendant] out" refused to 
allow it.  After leaving his parents' home, he generally lived 
outside year-round, but during the winter months, he tried to 
"find a more sheltered area" from the "ice and a snow storm."  
During the cold weather, the defendant used blankets, gloves, 
and scarves to try to stay warm, but when the weather was "so 
severe . . . that [it was] not possible," he would seek shelter 
in private buildings. 
 
For a two- to three-month period in the winter of 2007, the 
defendant stayed at the local homeless shelter, called the 
6 
 
Construct.5  Three days before he began staying there, he had 
gone to that shelter at approximately 3 A.M. following a 
blizzard.  He was refused entry, and he stayed on the porch for 
about an hour before being asked to leave.  A few days later, he 
spoke with someone from the shelter, and he was allowed to stay 
for a few months before he was told to leave because of "certain 
issues."  Therefore, the defendant had no other place to stay in 
Great Barrington.6  For a period of "three to four years," he 
lived outdoors, first at Stanley Park and later at the outdoor 
gazebo behind the Great Barrington Town Hall, where he had been 
living at the time of the trespass incidents.  He considered the 
gazebo his home and registered to vote from that address.7 
                     
 
5 As pointed out in the amicus brief, on its Web site, 
Construct advertises "permanent" and "transitional" housing, see 
http://constructinc.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/5A85-7G9K], 
and asserts that persons who "lost" housing "may be eligible for 
temporary room and board and support services while . . . 
mak[ing] the transition from homelessness to permanent housing," 
see http://constructinc.org/housing-options/ 
[https://perma.cc/X858-8Z5W]. 
 
 
6 The defendant testified that he had had one friend who 
would take him in occasionally, but he learned the day before 
his testimony that the friend had "recently" passed away.  
During follow-up questioning, the defendant testified that there 
was no other "private apartment" where he could stay during the 
applicable time period.  He also responded, "No," to the 
question whether there was any "private residence other than the 
public parks" where he could stay. 
 
7 The defendant testified that he registered to vote using 
the address of the gazebo, 334 Main Street, as his "official 
residency." 
7 
 
 
At the time of the trial, the defendant was a sixty-seven 
year old unemployed college graduate.  He had worked in the 
past, but he was not employed at the time he was charged with 
the trespassing offenses.  The defendant had attempted to obtain 
an apartment almost "every week for about seven years."  
Although he had money to pay for an apartment depending on the 
day, he explained that it was very difficult to find an 
apartment in Great Barrington because of the upfront fees.  
Accordingly, he was unable to obtain an apartment.  He was aware 
of a homeless shelter in Pittsfield, but he did not consider 
renting lodging or staying at a homeless shelter outside of 
Great Barrington.  He testified, "I was born here and I intend 
to stay here."  He does not have a driver's license. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Necessity defense.  The defendant claims 
that the judge erroneously denied his request for a jury 
instruction on the defense of necessity and that he improperly 
excluded evidence relevant to the defense.  The common-law 
defense of necessity "exonerates one who commits a crime under 
the 'pressure of circumstances' if the harm that would have 
resulted from compliance with the law . . . exceeds the harm 
actually resulting from the defendant's violation of the law."  
Commonwealth v. Kendall, 451 Mass. 10, 13 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 590 (1983).  As such, the 
necessity defense may excuse unlawful conduct "where the value 
8 
 
protected by the law is, as a matter of public policy, eclipsed 
by a superseding value . . . ."  Kendall, supra, quoting Hood, 
supra. 
 
For a defendant to be entitled to a necessity defense 
instruction, he or she must present "some evidence on each of 
the four underlying conditions of the defense," Kendall, 451 
Mass. at 14:  "(1) a clear and imminent danger, not one which is 
debatable or speculative"; (2) [a reasonable expectation that 
his or her action] will be effective as the direct cause of 
abating the danger; (3) there is [no] legal alternative which 
will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the Legislature 
has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate 
choice regarding the values at issue."  Id. at 13-14, quoting 
Hood, 389 Mass. at 591.  If the defendant satisfies these 
foundational conditions, "the burden is on the Commonwealth to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of necessity."  
Commonwealth v. Iglesia, 403 Mass. 132, 134 (1988). 
 
The judge focused only on the third element in his denial 
of the defendant's request for a necessity defense instruction 
at the close of all the evidence.  The judge ruled that the 
defendant had other available legal alternatives, "motels, and 
hotels, the police station," and that the evidence was lacking 
on the defendant's inability to "rent a hotel room on these 
isolated evenings."  We conclude that the judge erred in ruling 
9 
 
that the defendant failed to meet his burden to provide some 
evidence that showed the lack of an available legal alternative 
to the trespasses. 
 
a.  Clear and imminent danger.  Before we address the third 
element, we review the first element, "clear and imminent 
danger," because the Commonwealth contends that the defendant 
failed to meet the foundational requirement for this element as 
to the seventh offense, which occurred on June 10, 2014.8   
 
There appears to be little question that the weather 
conditions on the dates of the offenses in February and March 
presented a "clear and imminent danger" to a homeless person.9  
The temperatures on the dates of the offenses were not admitted 
at trial, but the weather on the February and March dates was 
described as "cold," "really cold," and "very cold."  Moreover, 
the timing of each of those incidents, in the early morning or 
late evening hours when the defendant was either sleeping or 
lying down, suggests the dangerousness of the circumstances 
                     
 
8 The second and fourth elements of the necessity defense 
are not contested. 
 
 
9 Citing a report of the National Coalition for the 
Homeless, Winter Homelessness Services: Bringing our Neighbors 
in from the Cold, at 15 (Jan. 2010), the amici assert that 
homeless people routinely face life-threatening conditions in 
the winter, noting that "life-threatening cases of hypothermia 
do not require extreme temperatures; indeed, they often occur 
when the ambient temperature is between [thirty-two] degrees 
Fahrenheit and [forty] degrees Fahrenheit." 
10 
 
where sleeping may place one in the same position for an 
extended period and, thus, increases the potential harm from the 
weather.  See Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2006) ("involuntary sitting, lying, or sleeping on public 
sidewalks . . . is an unavoidable consequence of being human and 
homeless without shelter").  See also In re Eichorn, 69 Cal. 
App. 4th 382, 389 (1998) ("Sleep is a physiological need, not an 
option for humans").  Moreover, the Commonwealth concedes that 
the defendant met his burden of demonstrating a "clear and 
imminent danger" for these six incidents.10 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth that the defendant did not 
meet his burden to show a "clear and imminent danger" for the 
incident on June 10, where the evidence showed only that he had 
to use the bathroom.11  Accordingly, we do not include the 
incident on June 10 in our analysis requirements of the 
availability of "legal alternatives" to trespass. 
                     
 
10 The Commonwealth does not contest the "clear and imminent 
danger" element as to the April 8 trespass, therefore, we leave 
for another day whether, as a matter of law, the reported 
temperature, described as "cool," would create a clear and 
imminent danger to a homeless person at noon when he was 
charged. 
 
11 Trial counsel asked the clerk present at the time the 
defendant entered the store whether the defendant said that his 
entry was "an emergency and that he really needed . . . to use 
the bathroom"; she responded, "No, . . . he didn't say anything 
to me."  Moreover, the defendant did not request a necessity 
defense instruction on this charge, instead requesting the 
instruction for the charges that occurred "between February and 
let's say April, due to the weather." 
11 
 
 
b.  Availability of lawful alternatives.  We have explained 
previously that satisfaction of the third element requires a 
defendant to demonstrate that he "ma[d]e himself aware of any 
available lawful alternatives, 'or show[ed] them to be futile in 
the circumstances.'"  Kendall, 451 Mass. at 15, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 401 (1998).  On that point, 
the defendant must present "some evidence," enough that 
"supports at least a reasonable doubt" whether the unlawful 
conduct was justified by necessity.  Kendall, 451 Mass. at 14.  
In other words, the defendant must present enough evidence to 
demonstrate at least a reasonable doubt that there were no 
effective legal alternatives available before being entitled to 
an instruction on the necessity defense.  This does not require 
a showing that the defendant has exhausted or shown to be futile 
all conceivable alternatives, only that a jury could reasonably 
find that no alternatives were available.  See Kendall, supra at 
19 (Cowin, J., dissenting), citing Iglesia, 403 Mass. at 135. 
 
The parties agree that this issue is governed by the 
Kendall case, but disagree as to its application.  In Kendall, 
the defendant had driven while intoxicated to the hospital so 
that he could take his girl friend for medical treatment of a 
serious head wound.  Id. at 11-12.  He was charged with 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor 
and requested an instruction on the defense of necessity because 
12 
 
he and his girl friend did not have telephones from which they 
could call 911.  Id. at 12.  A majority of this court affirmed 
the judge's decision to deny the defendant's request because the 
record was "devoid of evidence that the defendant made any 
effort to seek assistance from anyone prior to driving a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated."  Id. at 15.  Further, the evidence 
demonstrated that at least one neighbor, who lived about forty 
feet from the defendant's residence, was home at the time of the 
incident, that there was a fire station approximately one 
hundred yards from that neighbor's home, and that the defendant 
and his girl friend had just left a Chinese restaurant within 
walking distance from the defendant's home.  Id. at 11-12.  
Accordingly, the defendant had not met his burden to "present at 
least some evidence at trial that there were no effective legal 
alternatives."  Id. at 15.  Three dissenting justices disagreed, 
concluding that the defendant had met his burden because his 
conduct was not unreasonable in light of the "risk of failure" 
from the available alternatives; and therefore, weighing the 
propriety of defendant's choice should have been given to the 
jury.  Kendall, 451 Mass. at 16, 18, 19 (Cowin, J., dissenting). 
 
Here, the defendant's evidence was sufficient to meet his 
burden under the majority holding of Kendall.  In determining 
whether there has been sufficient evidence of the foundational 
conditions to the necessity defense, "all reasonable inferences 
13 
 
should be resolved in favor of the defendant, and, no matter how 
incredible his testimony, that testimony must be treated as 
true."  Pike, 428 Mass. at 395.  Taken in this light, there is 
at least "some evidence" that the defendant lacked effective 
legal alternatives to trespass during cold days and nights.  
Kendall, 451 Mass. at 15.  The defendant testified that he 
stayed at an outdoor gazebo "[p]retty much" year round, that in 
2007 he was told to leave the only local homeless shelter and 
had previously been denied entry to the shelter in the middle of 
the night following a blizzard, that no other places "want [him] 
in . . . their facility," that he was unable to rent an 
apartment despite repeated attempts, and that there was nowhere 
besides public parks where he could stay.  Additionally, the 
officer who asked the defendant to leave the Barrington House at 
approximately 9:30 P.M. on February 21 testified that the 
defendant had to go back outside, and the judge sustained an 
objection to defense counsel's question about whether the 
officer offered to transport him to any other shelter or 
facility.  The manager of Castle Street corroborated the 
defendant's attempt to rent an apartment by his testimony that 
he called police to have the defendant removed from the building 
after the defendant "forced his way onto the third floor of the 
building, flashing money in hand, demanding I rent him an 
apartment." 
14 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant failed to meet 
his burden because he presented no evidence that he was unable 
to rent an apartment outside of Great Barrington, that he was 
unable to gain entry to the Pittsfield shelter, and that he 
would still be excluded from the local homeless shelter in 2014.  
The Commonwealth's argument is unavailing.  We do not require an 
actor facing a "clear and imminent danger" to conceptualize all 
possible alternatives.  Kendall, 451 Mass.at 16 n.5.  So long as 
the defendant's evidence, taken as true, creates a reasonable 
doubt as to the availability of such lawful alternatives, the 
defendant satisfies the third element.  Contrast Kendall, supra; 
Pike, 428 Mass. at 401.  The defendant has done so here.12 
 
Additionally, we note that the options proposed by the 
Commonwealth do not appear to be effective alternatives on the 
record before us.  Where the only local homeless shelter had 
previously denied the defendant entry at 3 A.M. following a 
blizzard and had later told him he had to leave, the law does 
not require the defendant to continue to seek shelter there in 
order to demonstrate that doing so is futile.  Moreover, the 
                     
 
12 Whether a jury would believe that the defendant had no 
lawful alternative where he could obtain shelter is not an 
appropriate consideration for our analysis.  See Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 200 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 352 Mass. 387, 398 (1967) ("[t]he fact that the 
evidence may not be of a character to inspire belief does not 
authorize the refusal of an instruction based thereon"). 
15 
 
defendant's conduct is viewed at the time of the danger, and 
actions that the defendant could have taken to find shelter 
before the dangerous condition arose do not negate the 
conclusion that there were no lawful alternatives available at 
the time of his unlawful conduct.  See United States v. 
Kpomassie, 323 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(alternatives not available at time of crime when their 
availability was "sufficiently far in the past"). 
 
We do not view the requirement that a defendant consider 
lawful alternatives as broadly as suggested by the Commonwealth.  
Our cases do not require a defendant to rebut every alternative 
that is conceivable; rather, a defendant is required to rebut 
alternatives that likely would have been considered by a 
reasonable person in a similar situation.13  Moreover, we are not 
                     
 
13 As the level of harm that could arise from the unlawful 
conduct increases, so does the requirement for considering 
lawful alternatives.  See Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 410 Mass. 
726, 731-732 (1991) (discussing weighing of "competing harms").  
We recognize that the defendant's conduct may not have been 
appreciated by owners, managers, and residents of the private 
buildings in which the defendant sought cover, but there was no 
evidence that the defendant's presence did, or had the potential 
to, cause physical harm to any persons.  Accordingly, the 
requirement to consider alternatives may be viewed more 
leniently where the potential harm was only property-related 
than it would be viewed where the unlawful conduct, as in 
Kendall, 451 Mass. at 15, had the potential to harm both persons 
and property.  The doctrine of necessity has its roots in the 
notion that "[t]he law deems the lives of all persons far more 
valuable than any property."  United States v. Ashton, 24 F. 
Cas. 873, 874 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470). 
 
16 
 
prepared to say as a matter of law that a homeless defendant 
must seek shelter outside of his or her home town in order to 
demonstrate a lack of lawful alternatives.14  Our law does not 
permit punishment of the homeless simply for being homeless.15  
See Commonwealth v. Canadyan, 458 Mass. 574, 579 (2010) (setting 
aside finding that defendant violated condition of probation 
where homeless shelters did not have technology required for 
compliance).  Once the foundational requirements are met, the 
necessity defense allows a jury to consider the plight of a 
homeless person against any harms caused by a trespass before 
determining criminal responsibility.16 
                                                                  
 
 
14 The viability of this option proposed by the Commonwealth 
is hampered for the additional reason that the defendant had no 
driver's license or any other apparent method to make the 
twenty-mile trek to Pittsfield. 
 
 
15 As of 2014, Massachusetts had the fifth highest number of 
homeless people in the United States.  2014 Annual Homeless 
Assessment Report to Congress, Office of Community Planning and 
Development, U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Part 1, at 8 
(Oct. 2014).  A single male, such as the defendant in this case, 
is without emergency shelter options granted by law to other 
residents of Massachusetts.  See G. L. c. 23B, § 30 ("the 
[Department of Housing and Community Development] shall 
administer a program of emergency housing assistance to needy 
families with children and pregnant wom[e]n with no other 
children"). 
 
16 Allowing a defendant to defend his trespassing charges by 
claiming necessity will not, of course, condone all illegal 
trespass by homeless persons.  It simply allows a jury of peers 
to weigh the "competing harms" to determine criminal 
responsibility.  See Hutchins, 410 Mass. at 730.  In Hutchins, 
this court reviewed different circumstances where the balance of 
 
17 
 
 
Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, we conclude 
that the judge erred in denying the defendant's request for an 
instruction on the defense of necessity.  As the defendant 
satisfied the foundational elements entitling him to the 
defense, the judge's failure to instruct the jury about the 
defendant's principal defense requires a new trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lapage, 435 Mass. 480, 486 (2001) (ordering new 
trial after judge erred in omitting instruction on principal 
defense).  We therefore vacate the defendant's convictions of 
the charges occurring in February, March, and April, 2014. 
 
c.  Exclusion of evidence relevant to necessity defense.  
Because it is likely to arise at a retrial, we address the 
defendant's argument that the judge infringed on his ability to 
demonstrate the foundational elements of the necessity defense 
where the judge limited the scope of his questioning on 
                                                                  
harms was considered.  Id. at 731-732, discussing Commonwealth 
v. Thurber, 383 Mass. 328 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Iglesia, 
403 Mass. 132 (1988).  Specifically, the court noted that a 
prison escape would likely be justified where a prisoner was in 
imminent danger at the prison and submitted himself directly to 
authorities after escape or where an individual who was 
unlawfully carrying a firearm would likely be justified where 
the carrier "wrested the gun" from an attacker and immediately 
went to the police station.  Id.  Here, whether a homeless 
person's trespass in a privately-owned building where he 
previously had been barred from entry is a greater or lesser 
harm than the intrusion suffered by the owner and occupiers of 
the building is a question properly decided by a jury where the 
defendant met the foundational elements for the necessity 
defense.  Iglesia, supra at 135 (jury instructed on whether 
defendant made "better choice" by acting illegally). 
18 
 
relevancy grounds.  Specifically, the judge ruled as 
"irrelevant" questions by defense counsel during cross-
examination that related to whether the defendant was asleep or 
intoxicated when trespassing.17  Additionally, the judge 
prohibited counsel from asking officers who responded to the 
trespass calls whether they offered the defendant transportation 
to a shelter.  "Evidence is relevant if it renders the desired 
inference more probable than it would be without the evidence."  
Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 210 (1978), citing Green v. 
Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 59 (1975).  Relevant evidence may be 
admissible if it "tends to establish the issue" or "constitutes 
a link in the chain of proof."  Poirier, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472, 473 (1881).  Here, that 
evidence would be anything that tends to establish any of the 
four elements of the necessity defense.  We conclude that the 
questions set forth above speak to the presence of a clear and 
                     
 
17 The defendant contested, on this same ground, several 
other evidentiary rulings where the judge limited inquiry.  For 
example, the judge concluded that the defendant's attempt to 
introduce evidence that one of the tenants may have given him 
permission to stay in the common areas of the building was 
irrelevant, but that finding also was predicated on the 
defendant's failure to establish that anyone had authority to do 
so.  Several objections to the defendant's testimony also were 
sustained where the defendant was nonresponsive and testifying 
in a narrative.  Additionally, the judge found questions about 
how the defendant arrived at court that day to be irrelevant, 
but did allow testimony that he did not have a driver's license.  
We do not discern any error in these rulings on the record 
before us. 
19 
 
imminent danger, the effectiveness of the defendant's conduct in 
abating that danger, or the availability of alternatives, and 
are therefore relevant. 
 
2.  Bias.  The defendant argues that the judge improperly 
excluded evidence relevant to bias, depriving him of his right 
to present a full defense under art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  Specifically, the defendant argues that 
the judge erred in limiting his cross-examination of the 
property manager for the Barrington House and the owner of SoCo 
Creamery where trial counsel's questions were designed to show 
bias against him and a potentially illegitimate ground on which 
the no trespass orders were based.  We address the issues 
relating to the witness for Barrington House because they are 
likely to arise at retrial, and to the witness for SoCo Creamery 
because we have not vacated the defendant's conviction of the 
June 10 charge. 
 
As to the property manager for the Barrington House, the 
defendant claims error in the judge's rulings sustaining the 
Commonwealth's objections to the following questions:  whether 
the defendant was a "disruption with . . . tenants," whether his 
presence was "annoying to [her] as a property manager," and 
whether he was "trespassed . . . basically because he's on the 
property itself."  As to the owner of SoCo Creamery, the 
defendant argues that the judge erroneously prohibited counsel 
20 
 
from asking the owner whether he had "expressed a strong opinion 
that [he] fe[lt] that [the defendant] has no respect for any 
businesses in town" and whether the defendant had "become a 
nuisance in your eyes to your business."  The prosecutor did not 
object on any stated ground, the judge did not express his 
reasons for sustaining the objections, and defense counsel did 
not directly respond to the objections. 
 
"The right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine a 
prosecution witness to show the witness's bias, and hence to 
challenge the witness's credibility, is well established in the 
common law, in the United States Constitution," and in art. 12 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Commonwealth v. Tam 
Bui, 419 Mass. 392, 400, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861 (1995).  A 
judge has "no discretion to bar all inquiry into the subject" of 
bias where the defendant demonstrates there is such a 
possibility.  Id. at 400.  The defendant must, however, "make a 
'plausible showing' of alleged bias, with a factual basis for 
support."  Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 624 (2014), 
quoting Tam Bui, supra at 401.  If the defendant fails to do so, 
the judge has discretion to exclude the evidence.  Sealy, supra. 
 
The defendant made no showing at trial of the alleged bias 
and argues on appeal that a per se bias exists against homeless 
persons, which calls into question the legitimacy of the no 
trespass orders.  Neither witness testified to the grounds for 
21 
 
obtaining the no trespass orders for Barrington House and SoCo 
Creamery or about any details surrounding the charged conduct.18  
Weighed against the actual testimony provided by these two 
witnesses, there was no error in excluding this line of 
questioning.  Where the witnesses did not provide details about 
the basis for the no trespass orders, the legitimacy of the 
orders was not a subject of their testimony and would not have 
been affected by any claimed bias. 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The prosecutor stated 
in his closing argument that the defendant "testified that he 
was at the Construct up until the first week of March before 
these incidents occur, before then on his own testimony he was 
at the Construct."  The defendant, however, testified that he 
stayed at the Construct in 2007, not 2014.  The defendant argues 
on appeal that this misstatement was prejudicial to his argument 
that he sought shelter during the cold out of necessity.  
Because we assume that this misstatement will not occur at 
retrial and only affects the convictions that we have vacated, 
we do not discuss the claim further. 
 
4.  April 8 incident.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty 
                     
 
18 The no trespass orders for the Barrington House and SoCo 
Creamery were authenticated and introduced during the testimony 
of the two witnesses. 
22 
 
on the charge stemming from his presence at Barrington House on 
April 8.  Specifically, he argues that his presence in the 
publicly accessible common areas of the building during business 
hours is an insufficient basis on which he could be convicted of 
trespassing. 
 
The criminal trespass statute, G. L. c. 266, § 120, 
provides in relevant part, "Whoever, without right enters or 
remains in or upon the dwelling house, [or] buildings . . . of 
another . . . after having been forbidden so to do by the person 
who has lawful control of said premises . . .  shall be 
punished."  The defendant argues that a guilty verdict requires 
loitering or lingering, and because the record fails to 
establish either, he must be acquitted of the charge.  We 
disagree.  The criminal trespass statute does not require this 
extra element that the defendant seeks to include. 
 
The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 
Mass. 632 (1943), is unavailing.  In Richardson, the defendants, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, were charged with trespass based on their 
presence in the common area of an apartment building, right 
after they had been directly told that they were prohibited from 
doing so.  We concluded that the defendants had an implied 
license to use the common areas of the building to contact 
tenants even without "any proof of direct authority"; and 
23 
 
therefore, the defendant's "entry" was lawful.19  Id. at 639-640.  
The facts of this case are significantly different than those in 
Richardson.  Here, it is uncontested that persons with authority 
had banned the defendant from the Barrington House prior to any 
of the charged entries.  Accordingly, any license to enter the 
common areas that may have been implied was revoked by the no 
trespass order.  See Hood, 389 Mass. at 590 ("Even if 
[defendants] had an implied license to enter based on 
Richardson, they had no right to remain after those with lawful 
control of the property asked them to leave"). 
 
The judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion for 
a required finding of not guilty. 
 
5.  The defendant's Moffett briefs.  The defendant, in what 
he characterizes as briefs filed pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
Moffett, 383 Mass. 201 (1981), raises several claims for our 
review.  We have reviewed these issues and conclude that they do 
not merit relief. 
 
6.  Conclusion.  Because we conclude that the judge erred 
in denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction on the 
defense of necessity for the trespassing charges that occurred 
in February, March, and April, 2014, we vacate those six 
                     
 
19 In Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 634-635 
(1943), we noted that G. L. c. 266, § 120 (Ter. Ed.), prohibits 
entry and remaining on a property without right, but the 
defendant had been charged only with unlawful entry. 
24 
 
convictions and remand for a new trial.  We affirm the 
conviction stemming from conduct that occurred on June 10, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.