Title: Ex parte A.M.P. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: E.W.H. and S.M.H. v. A.M.P.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061010
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2008

REL:03/14/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061010
_________________________
Ex parte A.M.P.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  E.W.H. and S.M.H.
v.
A.M.P.)
_________________________
1061013
_________________________
A.M.P.
v.
2
E.W.H. and S.M.H.
_________________________
1061170
_________________________
W.P. and P.P.
v.
In the matter of the adoption of S.L.S., a minor child
Appellate Proceedings from Cullman Probate Court
(AC-2005-032)
BOLIN, Justice.
A.M.P., the biological mother of S.L.S. ("the mother"),
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order
setting 
aside 
the 
probate 
court's 
interlocutory 
order 
granting
the petition of the foster parents, E.W.H. and S.M.H., to
adopt S.L.S. ("the child") (case no. 1061010). While the
mother's petition for the writ of mandamus was pending, the
probate court entered a final order granting the adoption
petition 
of 
the foster parents. Subsequently, 
the 
mother filed
an appeal from the probate court's final order (case no.
1061013). W.P. and P.P., the child's maternal great-uncle and
his wife, also appeal from the probate court's final order of
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
3
adoption (case no. 1061170). We dismiss A.M.P.'s petition for
the writ of mandamus, and we affirm the order of adoption.
Facts and Procedural History
The child was born in another state in December 1999.
When the child was born, both the mother and the child tested
positive for opiates.  The mother refused drug treatment and
social services, and a hearing was scheduled on the child's
welfare in that state.  The mother fled with the child to
Alabama.  In April 2000, the Alabama Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") received a report of abuse or neglect from
the social services department of the child's birth state
regarding the child.   
In May 2000, DHR took temporary custody of the child
pursuant to an order of the juvenile court.  The mother was
allowed to maintain physical custody of the child after the
mother agreed to attend 
a drug-treatment 
facility. 
She entered
the facility but after a short time left the facility, taking
the child with her.  The mother returned to the child's birth
state and left the child with an unrelated individual there.
The mother could not be located, and a DHR employee went to
the state and brought the child back to Alabama.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
4
The child was placed in the custody of S.B., a maternal
great-aunt of the child.  The maternal great-aunt could not be
a permanent placement for the child, and DHR allowed the
great-aunt to place the child with friends of hers, E.W.H. and
S.M.H. In July 2000, E.W.H. and S.M.H. became provisionally
licensed as the child's foster parents.  As foster parents,
E.W.H. and S.M.H. signed an agreement with DHR and, as part of
that agreement, agreed as follows:
"That the State Department of Human Resources
has full responsibility and authority for making and
carrying out any and all plans for the children
pertaining to adoption, without interference on our
part, 
and 
that 
said 
Department 
has 
full
responsibility and authority for making and carrying
out any and all plans for children pertaining to
transfer to other homes, return to relatives, etc.,
without interference on our part.   We further agree
to cooperate with the Department of Human Resources
requested by that Department in carrying out plans
for the children.
"....
"That we will not file a petition in the court
to adopt a child in our home, or take steps toward
the adoption of the child, without the WRITTEN
CONSENT of the State Department of Human Resources."
(Capitalization in original.)
In January 2001, DHR developed the first of several
individualized service plans ("ISP") for the child with the
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
5
goal of permanent placement of the child with a relative. DHR
contacted the child's putative father, who was incarcerated,
on several occasions; he did not express an interest in caring
for the child.  The mother by this time was also incarcerated
and unable to care for the child.  Subsequently, both the
maternal grandmother, A.T., and the maternal grandfather,
D.P., who were at that time divorced from one another, filed
separate petitions for custody of the child, alleging that the
child was dependent.  The child has three older siblings: one
sibling lives 
with 
the maternal grandmother; one 
sibling lives
with the maternal grandfather; and the third sibling lives
with another relative. 
In 2003, the juvenile court held a hearing on the
grandmother's 
and 
grandfather's 
petitions. 
 
The 
foster 
parents
obtained 
legal 
counsel, 
and 
counsel 
was allowed 
to 
participate
in 
the juvenile court proceedings, although 
the 
foster parents
had not filed a petition for custody of the child.  Instead,
the foster mother indicated that she did not feel that the
grandfather and grandmother were suitable custodial parents
for the child.  In December 2003, the juvenile court denied
both grandparents' petitions for custody.  Both the
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
6
grandmother and the grandfather filed separate appeals.  On
November 5, 2004, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the juvenile court in each appeal, without an
opinion.  A.T. v. Cullman County Dep't of Human Res., 921 So.
2d 478 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)(table); D.P. v. Cullman County
Dep't of Human Res., 921 So. 2d 478 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004)(table).  The grandfather petitioned this Court for
certiorari review.  On March 11, 2005, this Court denied the
grandfather's 
petition, 
without 
an 
opinion. 
Ex 
parte 
D.P., 
924
So. 2d 805 (Ala. 2005)(table).   
Following the juvenile court's order denying the
grandparents' petitions for custody of the child, DHR
continued to develop an ISP for the child so that she could be
placed with a relative.  We note that since November 2001 the
child has visited with the maternal great-grandmother, B.P.,
every Wednesday. In  October 2004, the child began having
Tuesday afternoon visits with W.P. and P.P., a maternal great-
uncle and his wife, after they came forward as a relative
resource for adoption, and the child began spending the first
full weekend of every month with the great-uncle and great-
aunt. Also in October 2004, one weekend each month, the child
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
Nothing in the Alabama Adoption Code requires a hearing
1
before the entry of an interlocutory order of adoption.
However, there is nothing to prohibit such a hearing.  All
that is required before an interlocutory order is entered is
that the mandates of § 26-10A-18, Ala. Code 1975, are met.  
7
had weekend visitation with the maternal great-grandmother.
While the child was visiting with the great-grandmother, the
child also was able to visit with her sister, who resides with
a relative who lives near the great-grandmother.   
On March 18, 2005, the foster parents filed a petition in
the probate court to adopt the child. On March 22, 2005, DHR
held a meeting with the great-uncle and great-aunt and the
foster parents regarding the child's ISP. On June 30, 2005,
DHR was notified that the foster parents had filed a petition
to adopt the child. On August 1, 2005, the probate court held
a hearing on the petition and entered an interlocutory order
granting the foster parents' petition.   It appears that after
1
the interlocutory order was entered, the foster parents
stopped allowing the child to visit any of the relatives.  
On September 7, 2005,  the great-uncle and great-aunt
filed a petition in the probate court seeking to adopt the
child.  Attached to their petition was a written consent
signed by the mother, consenting to the adoption of the child
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
Section 
26-10A-7(a)(5) provides that the putative
2
father's consent is needed if the putative father has
registered with the Putative Father Registry and responds
within 30 days to the notice he receives under § 26-10A-
17(a)(10).  Nothing in the record indicates that the putative
8
by the great-uncle and great-aunt. On September 8, 2005, the
mother filed a motion to set aside the interlocutory order
granting the foster parents' petition of adoption on the
ground that the foster parents had not obtained her consent to
the adoption;  the probate court denied the mother's motion.
On September 16, 2005, the great-uncle and great-aunt filed a
motion contesting the adoption and a motion to transfer the
case to the juvenile court, pursuant to § 26-10A-3, for the
limited purpose of terminating the parents' rights. They also
moved the probate court, under § 26-10A-21, to stay the
adoption proceeding because the child was the subject of
related proceedings in the juvenile court.    
On October 11, 2005, a hearing was held at which the
foster parents, DHR, and the great-uncle and great-aunt
appeared with counsel and the mother was represented by
counsel.  The putative father did not appear and was not
represented by counsel, even though he was served with notice
of the adoption by publication.   Evidence was presented
2
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
father 
registered 
with 
the 
Putative 
Father 
Registry.
Nevertheless, service was attempted on the father by certified
mail, but the mail was returned as unclaimed.  Notice was then
served by publication in the local newspaper for four
successive weeks as provided for in §§ 26-10A-17(a)(10) and
26-10A-17(c)(1), Ala. Code 1975.  
9
indicating that the mother had been incarcerated on and off
for several years of the child's life, although the evidence
was conflicting as to the total time the mother had been
incarcerated. There was evidence indicating that the mother
had written the child several letters and had occasionally
contacted the foster parents regarding the child until
sometime in 2001. Evidence was presented indicating that the
mother had telephoned the child when the child was visiting
with relatives. The prison ministry where the mother was
incarcerated had sent the child and her siblings gifts from
the mother.  There was evidence indicating that the mother was
released on probation in 2004 and that she was thus free for
a short period but that she did not attempt to see the child
during that time.  
The great-aunt testified that she and her husband did not
come forward sooner seeking to adopt the child because the
grandfather and grandmother had both been seeking custody of
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
10
the child and she thought a competing petition for adoption
would cause discord in the family.  There was ample evidence
presented indicating that both the foster parents and the
great-uncle and great-aunt would provide a loving home for the
child.    
On October 21, 2005, the mother filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus in the Court of Civil Appeals, seeking an
order compelling the probate court to set aside its
interlocutory order of adoption and to transfer the foster
parents' 
petition 
for 
adoption 
to 
the juvenile court, pursuant
to § 26-10A-3.  On October 25, 2005, DHR filed a motion in the
probate court stating that before the foster parents could
proceed with their adoption petition, they needed the consent
of the parents or a termination of parental rights.   
On November 8, 2005, the probate court entered a final
order granting the foster parents' petition to adopt the
child.  On November 18, 2005, the mother filed in the Court of
Civil Appeals a motion to stay the final order of adoption
pending the outcome of the mother's petition for a writ of
mandamus.  On November 22, 2005, the mother appealed the final
order of adoption to the Court of Civil Appeals.  On November
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
The guardian ad litem questioned whether the great-uncle
3
and great-aunt's appeal was timely.  Section 26-10A-26, Ala.
Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Adoption Code, provides that
an appeal shall be filed within 14 days of the final order of
adoption.  Section 26-10A-37 provides that the Alabama Rules
of Civil Procedure apply to the probate court in adoption
proceedings to the extent that they apply under § 12-13-12,
Ala. Code 1975.  Section 12-13-12 provides that in the absence
of express provisions to the contrary, provisions of the Code
relating to pleading, practice, evidence, and judgments and
orders in the circuit court shall apply in the probate court.
The great-uncle and great-aunt timely filed a postjudgment
motion.  That motion was denied by operation of law.  The
notice of appeal was thus timely filed under the Alabama Rules
of Civil Procedure.  The Court of Civil Appeals has addressed
the merits in appeals in adoption cases from the probate court
where a party has filed a postjudgment motion.  See In re
J.C.P., 871 So. 2d 831 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)(the putative
father filed a postjudgment motion, which was denied by
operation of law, and the father subsequently appealed the
final order of adoption); J.B. v. F.B., 929 So. 2d 1023 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005)(following the denial of his postjudgment
motion, the father appealed from the judgment of the probate
court granting the adoption petition).  
11
22, 2005, the great-uncle and great-aunt filed a motion for a
new trial, which the trial court never ruled upon. On December
6, 2005, the Court of Civil Appeals denied the mother's motion
to stay as premature.  On December 16, 2005, the great-uncle
and great-aunt appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals.  In
3
January 2006, the Court of Civil Appeals consolidated the
three cases.  On April 27, 2007, the Court of Civil Appeals
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
Section 12-3-15 provides that "[w]hen it is deemed
4
advisable or necessary for the proper dispatch of the business
of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, with the advice of the Supreme Court, and
the presiding judge of the Court of Civil Appeals, may in
writing designate any case in the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals to be transferred to the Supreme Court for a hearing
and final determination by that court."  No reason was stated
for the transfer of this case to this Court.  The Supreme
Court clerk's office assigned these cases to Justice Bolin on
November 29, 2007.
12
transferred the consolidated cases to this Court, pursuant to
§ 12-3-15, Ala. Code 1975.  
4
The Mother's Petition for the Writ of Mandamus (case no.
1061010)
On October 21, 2005, the mother filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus compelling the probate court to set aside its
interlocutory order of adoption and to transfer the foster
parents' adoption petition to the juvenile court because the
mother had not consented to the adoption of the child by the
foster parents.  The mother contends that § 26-10A-3 supports
a transfer to the juvenile court because it provides that if
any party whose consent is required fails, or is unable, to
consent to the adoption, the proceeding will be transferred to
the juvenile court for a termination of parental rights.  The
mother further contends that because the probate court did not
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
13
obtain her consent to the adoption by the foster parents and
because her parental rights had not been terminated, the
probate court never obtained jurisdiction to enter the
interlocutory order of adoption.  
"'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be
issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Perfection
Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995)). A
petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for
challenging an interlocutory order.  Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.
2d 795 (Ala. 2001); see also Smith v. Jones, 554 So. 2d 1066
(Ala. Civ. App. 1989)(treating natural parents' appeal from
issuance of an interlocutory order granting the adoption as a
petition for a writ of mandamus).  
The probate court entered an interlocutory order of
adoption on August 1, 2005.  On September 8, 2005, the mother
filed a motion to set aside the interlocutory order, which the
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
14
trial court denied.  A final hearing was held on the foster
parent's adoption petition, the contest to the adoption, and
the great-uncle and great-aunt's adoption petition on October
11, 2005.  The probate court entered a final order of adoption
on November 8, 2005, granting the foster parents' petition.
The mother's mandamus petition seeks to have this Court order
the probate court to set aside its interlocutory order and to
transfer this adoption case to the juvenile court because, she
says, the probate court failed to obtain her consent to the
adoption of the child by the foster parents and therefore was
without jurisdiction to enter the order.  The foster parents
argue that the mother has an adequate remedy at law and,
therefore, that she is not entitled to mandamus review.  
Generally, an "adequate remedy" exists if the petitioner
will be able to raise the issue on appeal.  See Ex parte
Daimler Chrysler Corp., 952 So. 2d 1082 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte
Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 2000); Ex parte Inverness
Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 2000).  "'A writ of mandamus
will issue only in situations where other relief is
unavailable or is inadequate, and it cannot be used as a
substitute for appeal.'"  Ex parte Flexible Prods. Corp., 915
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
15
So. 2d 34, 39 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Empire Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998)).  We agree
that a petition for a writ of mandamus cannot be used as a
substitute for an appeal.  However, the petition for a writ of
mandamus in the present case is moot.
Section 26-10A-18 provides:
"Once 
a 
petitioner 
has 
received 
the 
adoptee 
into
his or her home for the purposes of adoption and a
petition 
for 
adoption 
has 
been 
filed, 
an
interlocutory order of adoption shall be entered
delegating to the petitioner (1) custody, except
custody shall be retained by the Department of Human
Resources or the licensed child placing agency which
held custody at the time of the placement until the
entry of the final decree and (2) the responsibility
for the care, maintenance, and support of the
adoptee, including any necessary medical or surgical
treatment, pending further order of the court.  This
interlocutory decree shall not stop the running of
the time periods prescribed in Section 26-10A-9." 
(Emphasis added.)
Section 26-10A-18 has two conditions that must be met
before the court enters an interlocutory order; the
prospective 
adoptive 
parents must receive 
the 
child 
into their
home for the purpose of adoption and a petition for adoption
must be filed.  In the present case, the foster parents did
not receive the child into their home for the purpose of
adoption; instead, they were the foster parents of the child
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
16
and initially received the child into their home for the
purpose of serving as foster parents.  However, the mother did
not file a motion with the Court of Civil Appeals for a stay
of the interlocutory order.  With no stay in place, the
probate court had jurisdiction to continue the adoption
proceedings.  We note that the purpose of an interlocutory
order of adoption is to enable the prospective adoptive
parents to authorize any necessary medical care for the minor
child.  See Comment to § 26-10A-18.  As foster parents
licensed by DHR, the foster parents had authority to authorize
medical treatment for the child.  See Ala. Admin. Code  (Dep't
Human Res.) Reg. 
660-5-29-.04 
("Foster 
parents 
shall
participate in planning to meet the medical and dental needs
of child(ren) in custody.").  Furthermore, we note that "[a]s
provided for in § 26-10A-24, a proper person at any time
before a final decree of adoption is entered may petition the
court for a contested hearing. If the contesting party is
successful, 
the 
court 
shall 
dismiss 
the 
adoption 
proceedings."
Comment to § 26-10A-18.  Once the final order of adoption is
entered, the interlocutory order becomes moot.  A moot case
lacks justiciability.  Accordingly, we dismiss the petition
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
17
for a writ of mandamus because the interlocutory order of
adoption became moot when the final order of adoption was
entered. 
The Mother's Appeal (case no. 1061013)
The mother raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the
probate court had jurisdiction to grant the foster parents'
adoption petition when they failed to obtain the consent of
either parent and when the probate court failed to transfer
the petition to the juvenile court for a termination of the
parents' 
rights; 
(2) 
whether 
the 
probate 
court 
had
jurisdiction to grant the foster parents' petition for
adoption when DHR had not consented to the adoption and there
was no finding that DHR had unreasonably withheld its consent
to the adoption; and (3) whether there was clear and
convincing evidence that the mother abandoned her child,
thereby impliedly consenting to the adoption.
"In Alabama, the right of adoption is purely statutory
and in derogation of the common law, ... and unless the
statute by express provision or necessary implication confers
the right of adoption, such right does not exist."  Evans v.
Rosser, 280 Ala. 163, 164-65, 190 So. 2d 716, 717 (1966)
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
18
(citing Doby v. Carroll, 274 Ala. 273, 147 So. 2d 803 (1962)).
Furthermore, "[w]e have always required strict adherence to
the statutory requirements 
in 
adoption 
proceedings."  
McCoy 
v.
McCoy, 549 So. 2d 53, 57 (Ala. 1989) (citing Ex parte
Sullivan, 407 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1981)).
"'The adoption of a child was a proceeding
unknown to the common law. The transfer of the
natural right of the parents to their children was
against its policy and repugnant to its principles.
It had its origin in the civil law and exists ...
only by virtue of the statute which ... expressly
prescribes the conditions under which adoption may
be legally effected.
"'Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of
adoption, and under our law this consent is made
absolutely essential to confer jurisdiction on the
... court to make an order of adoption, unless the
conditions ... exist specially provided by the
statute itself and which render such consent of the
parents unnecessary. Unless such consent is given,
or, for the exceptional causes expressly enumerated
is dispensed with, the court has no jurisdiction in
the matter. ... The power of the court in adoption
proceedings to deprive a parent of his child being
in derogation of his natural right to it, and being
a special power conferred by the statute, such
statute must be strictly construed, and in order to
warrant the exercise of the special power ... in
opposition to the wishes and against the consent of
the natural parent, on the ground that conditions
prescribed by statute exist which make that consent
unnecessary, the existence of such conditions must
be clearly proven ... if the statute is open to
construction and interpretation, it should be
construed in support of the right of the natural
parent.'"
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
19
McGowen v. Smith, 264 Ala. 303, 305, 87 So. 2d 429, 430-31
(1956) (quoting In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 522-24, 126 P. 161,
164-65 (1912)).
On appeal, the mother argues, as she did in her petition
for the writ of mandamus, that the probate court erred in
granting the foster parents' petition for an interlocutory
order of adoption because the foster parents failed to obtain
the consent of either the mother or the father and the probate
court failed to transfer the adoption petition to the juvenile
court for a termination of the mother's and father's parental
rights pursuant to § 26-10A-3.  However, the transfer
provision of § 26-10A-3 does not apply to interlocutory
orders. The failure of, or the inability to obtain, the
"consent" in § 26-10A-3 means consent generically, i.e., it
can involve the absence of written or implied consent. Whether
all necessary consents of whatever type are present, though,
is to be decided at a later stage of the proceedings, even as
late as at the final, dispositional hearing.  See § 26-10A-
13(c), concerning written consents, which states that "[a]ll
consents or relinquishments required by this act shall be
filed with the court in which the petition for adoption is
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
20
pending before the final decree of adoption is entered," and
§ 26-10A-24(a)(3), which provides that whether an actual or
implied consent is valid shall be determined at a contested
hearing, and § 26-10A-25(b)(2), which requires the court, at
the dispositional hearing, to find on clear and convincing
evidence that "[a]ll necessary consents, relinquishments,
terminations 
or 
waivers 
have 
been 
obtained 
and, 
if
appropriate, have been filed with the court."   Therefore,
whether the proceeding will be transferred to the juvenile
court for the limited purpose of terminating parental rights
is an issue that typically arises after an interlocutory order
has been entered. 
The mother also appears to be arguing that the probate
court erred in entering the final order of adoption because
the foster parents failed to obtain the consent of either the
mother or the father and the probate court failed to transfer
the adoption petition to the juvenile court pursuant to § 26-
10A-3 for a termination of the mother's and father's parental
rights.
We note that § 26-10A-3 vests the probate courts with
original jurisdiction of proceedings brought under the Alabama
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
21
Adoption Code.  Once a petition for adoption is filed in the
probate court, however, there are four statutory provisions
for a transfer to another court of either the entire
proceeding or a specified portion thereof.
First, § 12-12-35, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"(a) Adoption proceedings, primarily cognizable
before the probate court, may be transferred to the
district court on motion of a party to the
proceeding in probate court.
"(b)  When adoption proceedings are transferred
to the district court, a copy of the record of such
proceedings shall be filed in the probate court, and
the probate court offices shall maintain records of
all adoption proceedings within their respective
counties." 
This provision, which predates the Alabama Adoption Code but
which was not affected by it, allows a party to an adoption
proceeding to initiate a transfer, which is discretionary with
the probate court ("may be transferred"), and, once a motion
for transfer is granted, the entire "adoption proceeding[]" is
transferred to the district court.   See Ex parte C.L.C., 897
So. 2d 234 (Ala. 2004)(holding that the primary jurisdiction
over adoptions is in the probate court and that, unless the
juvenile court acquires jurisdiction over a petition to adopt
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
The UCCJA has been repealed and replaced by the Uniform
5
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). See
§ 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
22
by the transfer mechanism of § 12-12-35, the juvenile court is
without authority to grant an adoption).
Second, § 26-10A-21 states:
"If, at any time during the pendency of the
adoption proceeding, it is determined that any other
custody action concerning the adoptee is pending in
the courts of this state or any other state or
country, any party to the adoption proceeding, or
the court on its own motion, may move to stay such
adoption proceeding until a determination has been
made by an appropriate court with jurisdiction
pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)
 or the Parental
[5]
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). The adoption may
be transferred and consolidated with a custody
proceeding in any court in this state."
This statute, which includes a transfer mechanism, provides
that, upon motion made by a party or upon the court's own
motion, the probate court may stay an adoption proceeding
while a custody action is pending in another court, and, in
addition, the probate court may transfer "the adoption" to the
other court to be consolidated with the custody proceeding.
Thus, this section, like § 12-12-35 quoted above, provides for
a discretionary transfer of the entire adoption proceeding.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
23
Third, § 26-10A-24, dealing with hearings on adoption
contests only, provides for a limited transfer in subsection
(e), which states:
"(e) On motion of either party or of the court,
a contested adoption hearing may be transferred to
the 
court 
having 
jurisdiction 
over 
juvenile
matters."
Like the two transfer provisions above, a transfer under this
provision, which may be upon the request of a party or upon
motion of the court, is a discretionary transfer by the
probate court; however, unlike the other two provisions, this
section provides that only the "contested adoption hearing"
may 
be 
transferred, 
rather 
than 
the 
entire 
adoption
proceeding. Therefore, after a juvenile court has conducted a
"contested adoption hearing" transferred to it pursuant to §
26-10A-24(e) and decided the issues presented in the hearing,
the adoption proceeding would be remanded to the probate court
for further action.
The last possible transfer procedure in an adoption
proceeding is contained in § 26-10A-3, Ala. Code 1975, which
states:
"The 
probate 
court 
shall 
have 
original
jurisdiction over proceedings brought under [this]
chapter. If any party whose consent is required
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
24
fails to consent or is unable to consent, the
proceeding will be transferred to the court having
jurisdiction over juvenile matters for the limited
purpose of termination of parental rights. The
provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to
proceedings in the court having jurisdiction over
juvenile matters."
(Emphasis added.)  As the emphasized portions of this section
provide, if a necessary consent is not present, the proceeding
must be transferred to the juvenile court, but only for the
limited purpose of determining whether the parental rights of
the nonconsenting parent should be terminated.
Sections 26-10A-7 and -10 set out the entities from whom
consents or relinquishments are either required or not
required, before an adoption can be granted.  When a consent
or relinquishment is required, §§ 26-10A-11 and -12 prescribe
the requirements necessary for an express, written consent or
relinquishment (and provide a form therefor), while § 26-10A-9
sets out the acts or omissions by which a consent or
relinquishment required by § 26-10A-7 may be implied.  The
contest provision in the Alabama Adoption Code, § 26-10A-24,
provides, among other grounds of contest, for the adjudication
of the validity of either an express or implied consent.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
25
When the probate court has exercised its discretion to
transfer the entire adoption proceeding (by virtue of § 12-12-
35 or § 26-10A-21) to either a district or another court, the
transferee court acquires jurisdiction, and the probate court
thereafter maintains only recordkeeping responsibilities. See
§ 12-12-35(b) quoted above.  When the probate court has
exercised its discretion to transfer only that limited portion
of the proceeding concerning a contested hearing (by virtue of
§ 26-10A-24(e)), it is nevertheless then the province of the
transferee juvenile court, attendant to the transferred
contested hearing, to decide a contested issue of implied
consent.  Put another way, it is the court that hears and
decides the contest that determines "[w]hether an actual or
implied consent or relinquishment to the adoption is valid."
§ 26-10A-24(a)(3).
Accordingly, in the absence of a transfer of the contest,
it is the probate court that hears and determines whether all
necessary consents or relinquishments, either express or
implied, are present.  Where, as here, the probate court did
not transfer the contest filed by the great-uncle and great-
aunt, the probate court properly proceeded to hear and decide
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
26
whether the mother and the putative father gave their implied
consent pursuant to § 26-10A-9.  The probate court found  that
each parent had given implied consent, and there was then no
mother or father who was required to give consent who had not
done so, and therefore no basis for the court to transfer the
proceeding pursuant to § 26-10A-3 "for the limited purpose of
termination of parental rights," as the mother so requested.
It is only when there is no express or implied consent or
relinquishment from a parent of the adoptee that the mandatory
transfer portion of § 26-10A-3 applies, so that "the
proceeding 
will 
be 
transferred 
to 
the 
court 
having
jurisdiction over juvenile matters for the limited purpose of
termination of parental rights."  (Emphasis added.)  When
applicable, this transfer provision is mandatory, both because
of its language and because the probate court cannot grant an
adoption petition in the absence of a necessary parental
consent 
or 
relinquishment, 
and 
it 
is 
the 
exclusive
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, § 26-18-1 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975, to terminate parental rights, which obviates any
further need for consent or relinquishment from the affected
parent.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
27
     In the present case, the great-uncle and great-aunt
sought a transfer of the adoption proceeding to the juvenile
court for a termination of parental rights under § 26-10A-3.
When the legislature adopted the Alabama Adoption Code in
1990, § 26-10A-3 established the probate court as the court
with original jurisdiction over adoptions.  When § 26-10A-3 is
read in para materia with § 26-10A-9, it is clear that if the
probate court finds that the evidence does not prove implied
consent or if the biological parent is unable to consent, then
the probate court must transfer the case to juvenile court for
a determination of whether to terminate parental rights.  A
fair reading of the Alabama Adoption Code is that the court
with original jurisdiction over adoptions should be able to
determine whether a parent whose consent is required has,
through his or her acts or omissions, impliedly consented to
an adoption. 
The mother cites Vice v. May, 441 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1983), in support of her position that the probate court
should have transferred the adoption proceeding to the
juvenile court for a termination of parental rights and that
because the probate court failed to transfer the case for a
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
When Vice was decided, § 26-10-3 provided: "'No adoption
6
of a minor child shall be permitted without the consent of his
parents, but the consent of a parent who has abandoned the
child, or who cannot be found, who is insane or otherwise
incapacitated from giving such consent, or who has lost
guardianship of the child, through divorce proceedings, or by
the order of a juvenile court or court of like jurisdiction,
may be dispensed with, and consent may be given by the
guardian if there is one, or if there is no guardian, by the
state department of pensions and security.'" Vice, 441 So. 2d
at 943.
28
termination of parental rights, the probate court's order is
void.  In Vice v. May, the Court of Civil Appeals held that
under § 26-10-3, the precursor statute to § 26-10A-3, the
consent of the parents, or in circumstances falling under §
26-10-3, the consent of the guardian or the Department of
Pensions and Security, is jurisdictional, so that if the
required consent is missing, the court never obtains
jurisdiction to proceed to the paramount question of the
child's welfare.   As noted, § 26-10-3 was superseded in 1990
6
by § 26-10A-3 when the Alabama Adoption Code was enacted, and,
under § 26-10A-3, a probate court's order of adoption is void
when the probate court did not obtain the consents of parents
as required and the juvenile court had not entered an order
terminating 
the 
parent's 
parental 
rights.  
However, 
consent to
an adoption can be either express and written or implied from
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
29
the conduct of a parent.  Furthermore, the mother's reliance
on Vice is misplaced because the probate court in that case
found that the mother had impliedly consented to the adoption.
That is, the probate court could first determine whether there
was sufficient evidence regarding implied consent and then
proceed.        
The mother argues that the probate court did not have
jurisdiction to grant the foster parents' petition for
adoption because DHR had not consented to the adoption of the
child by the foster parents and there was no finding that DHR
had unreasonably withheld its consent to the adoption as set
out in § 26-10A-7(a)(4).
Section 26-10A-7(a)(4) requires
the consent of "[t]he agency to which the adoptee has been
relinquished or which holds permanent custody and which has
placed the adoptee for adoption, except that the court may
grant the adoption without the consent of the agency if the
adoption is in the best interest of the adoptee and there is
a finding that the agency has unreasonably withheld its
consent ...."  (Emphasis added.) Section 26-10A-2 defines
"relinquishment" as "[g]iving up the physical custody of a
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
30
minor for purpose of placement for adoption to a licensed
child placing agency or the Department of Human Resources." 
In the present case, DHR had temporary, not permanent,
custody of the child.  Also, the child was not "relinquished"
to DHR as that term is defined in the Alabama Adoption Code;
the mother did not give up physical custody of the child for
the purpose of placing the child with DHR for adoption.
Instead, DHR obtained temporary custody of the child after a
child-abuse-and-neglect report had been filed.  It does not
appear that DHR's consent to the adoption under § 26-10A-
7(a)(4) was necessary.  Adoptions are purely statutory
creatures and strict adherence to the statutes is required.
Although it would seem logical to require the consent of the
agency that had either temporary or permanent custody of a
child before an adoption could proceed, we leave it to the
legislature to remedy any defect in that regard.  
Last, the mother contends that the foster parents failed
to present clear and convincing evidence indicating that she
had abandoned the child and thus given her consent to the
adoption.  Section 26-10A-9 sets out instances in which a
parent's consent to an adoption may by implied by his or her
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
31
acts or omissions with respect to the child's care. Those
instances 
include 
"[k]nowingly 
leaving 
the 
adoptee 
with 
others
without provision for support and without communication, or
not otherwise maintaining a significant parental relationship
with the adoptee for a period of six months." 
The mother left a drug-treatment facility with the child
in 2000 without the permission of the court that had ordered
her to undergo treatment at the facility.  She left the child
with an unrelated individual in 2000.  The mother has not
provided any financial support for the child during its life.
It does not appear that she has had any physical contact with
the child since 2000.  The mother made no attempts to have
physical contact with child while she was incarcerated.  The
prison ministry where the mother was incarcerated has sent the
child and the child's siblings gifts from the mother.  The
mother wrote the child several letters while she was
incarcerated 
and 
there 
was 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
the 
mother
had recently telephoned the child when the child was visiting
with relatives.  
The mother states in her brief to this Court that it was
undisputed that she has been in jail or prison for all but a
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
32
few days of the time that the child has been in DHR's custody.
However, the record is disputed as to how much time the mother
has actually been incarcerated during the child's life. The
record indicates that the mother was released from an out-of-
state prison in the summer of 2004 but did not contact DHR
regarding her release or her location, nor did the mother
request a visit with the child following her release.
Subsequently, the mother violated her parole and was arrested
again.  We agree with the mother that incarceration alone is
not a ground for finding that a parent has abandoned a child.
See Gillespie v. Bailey, 397 So. 2d 130 (Ala. Civ. App.
1980)(incarceration per se does not constitute abandonment of
a prisoner's child, but it is a factor to be considered along
with other factors indicating abandonment in determining
whether the 
prisoner 
has 
impliedly 
consented to the adoption).
However, maintaining a significant parental relationship with
a child entails more than a mere sporadic showing of interest
or concern.   Here, there was clear and convincing evidence
indicating that the mother has failed to provide for the child
and that she has not maintained a significant relationship
with the child.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
33
The Great-Uncle and Great-Aunt's Appeal (case no. 1061170)
The great-uncle and great-aunt argue that the probate
court erred in failing to enforce the agreement the foster
parents had entered into with DHR in which the foster parents
agreed that they would not seek to adopt the child without
DHR's permission.  They also argue that the probate court
erred in granting the foster parents' adoption petition when
there was a relative resource available because the
legislature, in § 12-15-1.1, Ala. Code 1975, mandates that the
family unit be preserved.  The great-uncle and great-aunt also
argue that the probate court erred in not staying the petition
for adoption pursuant to § 26-10A-21, because, they say, the
child was under the continued supervision of the juvenile
court.
The great-uncle and great-aunt argue that the probate
court should have honored the agreement the foster parents
signed with DHR.  In that agreement, the foster parents agreed
that they would obtain DHR's permission before they sought to
adopt the child.   The foster parents contend that only DHR
has standing to advance that argument.  We agree.  
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
34
In K.P. v. G.C., 870 So. 2d 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003),
two sets of foster parents sought to adopt the same child.
The second set of foster parents argued that the probate court
erred in finding that DHR had improperly withheld its consent
to the first set out foster parents.   
"To be a proper party, 'a person must have an
interest in the right to be protected.'  Eagerton v.
Williams, 433 So. 2d  436, 447 (Ala. 1983).  Also,
'[a]s a general rule, "a litigant may not claim
standing to assert the rights of a third party."' Ex
parte 
Izundu, 
568 
So. 
2d 
771, 
772 
(Ala.
1990)(quoting Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v.
Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 144, 417 A.2d 1003,
1006 (1980). ...[T]he finding that DHR unreasonably
withheld its consent to the adoption of the children
by [the first set of foster parents] does not create
in [the second set of foster parents] a right that
they have an interest in protecting such as would
entitle them to advance an argument on behalf of
DHR."  
870 So. 2d 755-56.  In the present case, the great-uncle and
great-aunt were not parties to the foster parents' agreement
with DHR.  The foster-parent relationship is a state-created
relationship that is maintained by DHR.  DHR is the proper
party to decide how best to protect its interest in its
foster-care agreement with the foster parents.       
The great-uncle and great-aunt also argue that the
probate court erred in granting the foster parents' adoption
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
35
petition 
when 
there 
was 
an 
available 
relative 
resource 
because
the legislature mandates that the family unit be preserved in
§ 12-15-1.1.  Section 12-15-1.1 applies in juvenile courts and
to those "who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court."  Subsections (1) and (8) of § 12-15-1.1 provide that
the goal of the juvenile court is to preserve and strengthen
the child's family whenever possible and to maintain a
preference at all times for preserving the family unit.
In the present case, the child was currently before the
probate court on a petition for adoption.  Although § 12-15-
1.1 sets out the purposes of the juvenile court, § 12-15-30
establishes the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and
recognizes that adoption proceedings are outside 
the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court unless transferred there.
See § 12-15-30(b)(5).   Unlike the probate court, the juvenile
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings in
which a child is alleged to be delinquent, dependent, or in
need of supervision.  As discussed earlier in this opinion,
there are certain situations in which the probate court may
transfer part or all of an adoption proceeding to the juvenile
court.  This transfer may be to terminate parental rights, to
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
See note 5, supra.
7
36
hear a contested hearing, or to decide the adoption in its
entirety.  The interplay between the probate court and the
juvenile court in adoption proceedings does not mean that the
probate court must follow the strict mandates of the juvenile
court.  Furthermore, although one of the goals of juvenile
court is to preserve the family unit and to maintain a
preference at all times for preserving the family unit, the
juvenile court does have the authority to terminate parental
rights when necessary.      
The great-uncle and great-aunt also argue that the
probate court erred in not staying the petition for adoption
when the child was under the continued supervision of the
juvenile court.
Section 26-10A-21 provides:
"If, at any time during the pendency of the
adoption proceeding, it is determined that any other
custody action concerning the adoptee is pending in
the courts of this state or any other state or
country, any party to the adoption proceeding, or
the court on its own motion, may move to stay such
adoption proceeding until a determination has been
made by an appropriate court with jurisdiction
pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Child
Custody Act (UCCJA)
 or the Parental Kidnapping
[7]
Prevention Act (PKPA).  The adoption may be
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
37
transferred 
and 
consolidated 
with 
a 
custody
proceeding pending in any court in this state."
The great-uncle and great-aunt filed a motion in the
probate court on September 16, 2005, to stay the adoption
proceedings, arguing that the child was the subject of related
proceedings in the juvenile court and that the probate court
should therefore stay any further proceedings.  In R.C.O. v.
J.R.V., 759 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1999), the biological father
appealed from the probate court's order denying the father's
motion to dismiss and his motion to stay the proceedings and
granting the prospective adoptive parents' petition to adopt
the child.  The child was born out-of-wedlock, and the mother
had placed the child with a private adoption agency.  The
agency had then placed the child with the prospective adoptive
parents.  The adoption agency filed a complaint and petition
in the juvenile court stating that the biological mother was
unable to properly care for the child, that the father had
shown no interest in the child, and that it would be in the
best interest of the child to proceed with the adoption.  The
father 
was 
served with 
forms 
entitled 
"Relinquishment of Minor
for Adoption" and "Notification of Right to Counsel" in
Florida where he resided.  Acting pro se, the father filed a
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
38
statement in the juvenile court, stating that he refused to
relinquish the child for adoption and that he wanted custody
of the child.  The juvenile court issued an order requiring a
paternity test.  The adoption agency later moved to dismiss
its complaint because the mother had withdrawn her consent to
the adoption.  The juvenile court granted the motion to
dismiss.  The father appealed, seeking review of his claim for
custody. While the appeal was pending, the prospective
adoptive parents filed a petition to adopt in the probate
court.  The father filed a motion to dismiss the petition
pursuant to § 26-10A-21.   The Court of Civil Appeals held
that the probate court should have stayed the adoption
proceeding because the father's claim for custody was still
pending in the juvenile court. 
While R.C.O. would appear to support the great-uncle and
great-aunt's argument, § 26-10A-21 has 
since 
been 
amended, 
and
R.C.O. addressed the earlier version of § 26-10A-21.  When §
26-10A-21 was amended, the phrase "shall move to stay such
adoption proceeding" was changed to read "may move to stay
such adoption proceeding."  The amended version makes seeking
the stay discretionary.  Also, during the amending process
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
39
what is now the last sentence was added to § 26-10A-21:  "The
adoption may be transferred and consolidated with a custody
proceeding pending in any court in this state."  The amended
version makes the transfer and consolidation of the adoption
with a pending custody proceeding discretionary.  In
accordance with the current version of § 26-10A-21, making
transfer 
of 
the adoption 
proceeding 
and consolidation 
with any
custody proceeding discretionary, we cannot say that the
probate court exceeded its discretion in refusing to grant the
stay under the facts of this case.
Conclusion
The mother's petition for a writ of mandamus has been
rendered moot. Therefore, we dismiss the petition.  The
probate court's order of adoption challenged in both the
mother's appeal and the great-uncle and great-aunt's appeal is
due to be affirmed.  In this case, the child was fortunate to
have foster parents and a great-uncle and great-aunt, all of
whom love this child and want to provide this child with a
safe and stable home life.  However, only one set of parents
may adopt the child. The judgment of the probate court
granting the adoption petition of the foster parents and
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
40
denying the great-uncle and great-aunt's contest and petition
for adoption, based on ore tenus evidence and therefore
presumed correct, Ex parte J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1081 (Ala.
2005), is affirmed.
1061010 -– DISMISSED.
1061013 -- AFFIRMED.
1061170 -- AFFIRMED.
Lyons, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Stuart, and Smith, JJ., concur
specially.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
41
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully with the main opinion.  I write to clarify
what I believe to be this Court's holding in Ex parte T.V.,
971 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2007).
The facts in T.V. are in many ways similar to those in
this case.  T.V., a drug-addicted mother facing jail time,
allowed the Department of Human Resources to take custody of
her son and to place him with another family while she was
attempting to deal with her drug-related problems.  Once she
began to make progress in her recovery, she sought to
reestablish visitation rights with her child.  Before the
court ruled on her motion for visitation, it terminated her
parental rights.  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment, and she petitioned this Court for the
writ of certiorari.  This Court's main opinion in T.V. states
that "[t]he only issue in this case is whether there were
grounds to terminate T.V.'s parental rights and whether there
was a viable alternative to doing so." 971 So. 2d at 8.  When
addressing appeals from a judicial termination of parental
rights, "this Court must review not only whether [the child]
remains 
dependant, 
but 
also 
whether 
the 
trial 
court 
considered
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
42
and rejected, based on clear and convincing evidence, the
possible 
viable 
alternatives 
before 
terminating 
[the 
parent's]
parental rights." 971 So. 2d at 8.  Therefore, as we have
stated, "[t]he need to consider all viable alternatives is
rooted, in part, in the recognition that the termination of
parental rights is a drastic step that once taken cannot be
withdrawn ...." 971 So. 2d at 9.   
Our holding in T.V. was not that the Department of Human
Resources failed to "pursue any viable relative resource"
before terminating the mother's parental rights.  Instead, we
held that "the trial court did not, after full consideration
of all the viable alternatives to terminating T.V.'s parental
rights, 
find 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
none 
existed."
971 So. 2d at 23.  Therefore, whether the Department of Human
Resources bears an absolute burden to pursue every viable
alternative to the termination of parental rights, regardless
of the duration and subjectively beneficial nature of the
child's tenure with his or her foster family, before it may
petition for the termination of a parent's rights was not a
question presented to this Court in T.V.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
43
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion completely.  I also
concur with Justice Smith's special concurrence.  I write to
reemphasize the problem with the court-created "no viable
alternative" second prong of the termination-of-parental-
rights test adopted by this Court in Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.
2d 950 (Ala. 1990).  I have written at length concerning the
origin of this judicial engraftment of a requirement outside
the statutes and its subsequent modification, which made bad
caselaw worse.  See Ex parte F.P., 857 So. 2d 125 (Ala.
2003)(Stuart, J., dissenting).  Although this judicially
created test has become entrenched in our caselaw, it is
nevertheless erroneous and perhaps will one day be overruled.
The subsequent interpretation of "no viable alternative"
by this Court and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has
exacerbated the problem the test creates in child-welfare
practice.  For example, as Justice Smith notes in her special
writing, the rationale relied on by the majority in our recent
decision in Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2007), suggests
that the Department of Human Resources, before filing a
termination-of-parental-rights petition, must pursue any
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
44
viable relative resource, no matter how long a child has been
in foster care and, in my opinion, no matter how beneficial a
child's 
proposed 
permanent 
placement. 
 
With 
such 
an
interpretation of the "no viable alternative" prong of the
test, the Court seems to have overlooked the "best interest of
the child" and mistakenly placed "family reunification" in a
position superior to "permanency for the child" as a
consideration in child-welfare cases.  I assert that "family
reunification" and "permanency for the child" stand on equal
footing as considerations in child-welfare cases and that "the
best interest of the child" must always be paramount in cases
involving child custody.
     Furthermore, even under existing law, relatives of the
child who do not come forward and seek custody of the child in
a timely fashion after a child's removal from his or her home
but who rather belatedly come forward seeking custody only
when the termination of parental rights is imminent are in
almost all cases not a viable alternative to the termination
of parental rights and the placement of the child for
adoption.  This fact is especially true in a case such as this
one, where the result of the effective termination of the
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
45
mother's rights and adoption is a continuation in the custody
of the only people the child has known as parents.   In most
such situations, only the termination of parental rights and
adoption promotes the best interest of the child and provides
the permanence desperately needed by a child who, through no
fault of his or her own, is placed into our foster-care
system.
So long as our child-protection system does not promote
the best interest of our children, concerned parties with the
best interest of the children at heart will continue to turn
to the probate courts of our State in appropriate cases.   
Smith, J., concurs.
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
46
SMITH, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects.  I
write specially to highlight the inexplicably wide legal chasm
between the evidence necessary to sever a parent's rights by
a finding of implied consent in an adoption case filed in the
probate court and the evidence necessary to sever a parent's
rights 
in 
a 
termination-of-parental-rights 
proceeding 
filed 
in
the juvenile court.
This case originated in the juvenile court in a rather
typical fashion.  The Department of Human Resources ("DHR")
initiated the matter in the juvenile court by filing a
dependency petition.  DHR initially placed the child with a
relative and ultimately placed the child with E.W.H. and
S.M.H., friends of the relative and individuals approved by
DHR as foster parents.  DHR's efforts at reunification of the
family unit were apparently to no avail because of the
mother's continued use of drugs and the father's failure to
pursue any relationship with his child.
As the majority opinion notes, the maternal grandparents
each filed a separate appeal.  The appellate process in their
appeals was not finalized until March 11, 2005, when this
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
47
Court denied the grandfather's petition for the writ of
certiorari.  Only when the child was five years old, and at
the point in time when DHR would have presumably filed a
petition to terminate parental rights based on the father's
absence and the mother's continuing drug dependency, did the
maternal great-uncle and his wife, W.P. and P.P., come forward
to offer themselves as a relative resource.  
The foster parents filed an adoption petition in the
probate court within days of the finalization of the appellate
process of the juvenile court proceeding, asserting that the
parents implicitly consented to the child's adoption by virtue
of their abandonment of the child.  Not surprisingly, W.P. and
P.P. attempted to transfer the adoption proceeding to the
juvenile court.  The probate court denied their motion to
transfer the adoption proceeding to the juvenile court, and
the juvenile court postponed its scheduled proceedings pending
outcome of the adoption proceeding.
Although W.P. and P.P. testified in the adoption
proceeding that they did not come forward earlier "due to
pending appeals" and to "preserve family harmony," they
admitted on cross-examination that when the child came into
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
48
DHR's care in 2000 at six months of age they had their own
family obligations that apparently influenced their decision
not to respond to DHR's efforts to locate a family resource.
Specifically, P.P. testified:
"Whenever [the child] first came to Cullman when she
was six months old, at that time it was the year, I
believe, of 2000.  At that time[,] my husband and I
still had two children in college.  My daughter had
announced that she was going to be getting married,
so we were in the middle of children in college and
also planning for weddings.  And at that point in
our life, we had built a house, and we had only been
in that house for one year.  And also at that time,
we felt like we had raised our children.  We weren't
ready to take on a six-month-old."
The rationale advanced by this Court in our recent
decision in Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2007), suggests
that DHR must pursue any viable resource rather than filing a
termination-of-parental-rights petition, regardless of the
length of time the child has been in foster care. In my
dissent in T.V., I observed that had a termination-of-
parental-rights proceeding been filed after the 18-month
permanency hearing, there was ample evidence to suggest that
the mother had, in essence, abandoned her child.  But, because
no termination proceeding had been filed at that juncture, the
mother could rehabilitate herself and later seek to have some
1061010, 1061013, and 1061170
49
place in her child's life, regardless of the child's age and
despite innumerable years of neglect and abandonment.  It is
no wonder that the relatives in the instant case, who have
belatedly 
asserted 
themselves 
as 
a 
viable 
placement
alternative, seek a judicial environment--a termination-of-
parental-rights proceeding--where, under T.V., the existence
of a viable alternative prevails over permanency and the best
interest of the child.  Likewise, it is no wonder that these
foster parents, the only parents this child has known for all
but the first six months of life, seek to place themselves in
a judicial environment--an adoption proceeding in the probate
court--where six months' abandonment constitutes implied
consent, which, once given, cannot be revoked.  
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, J., concur.