Title: State v. Creach
Citation: 461 P.2d 329, 77 Wash. 2d 194
Docket Number: 39740
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1969

77 Wn.2d 194 (1969) 461 P.2d 329 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. BOBBY LEE CREACH, Appellant.[*] No. 39740. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. November 6, 1969. George F. Velikanje, for appellant (appointed counsel for appeal). Lincoln E. Shropshire, Patrick H. Olwell, and F. James Gavin, for respondent. WEAVER, J. Defendant, found guilty by a jury of first degree forgery, appeals from his judgment and sentence. RCW 9.44.020, .060. The alleged forgery was the signature of the named payee, James S. Black, as an endorsement on a check stolen *195 from Mr. Black's automobile on or about August 7, 1966. Other items stolen from the car were a billfold, numerous credit cards, and two suitcases. August 9, 1966, the Yakima Police Department received a report that an individual was exhibiting credit cards that appeared to be stolen. Pursuant to this report, Officer Leavitt went to the Chinook Hotel where defendant was pointed out by the manager as the individual reported. Officer Leavitt approached defendant and asked for identification documents. Defendant produced a billfold containing numerous credit cards and a driver's license for "James S. Black." Defendant stated that he was Mr. Black and complied with the officer's request that he step outside to answer questions, although he protested that he was waiting for a telephone call. Outside, Officer Leavitt met Sergeant Qualley and told him he had some difficulty identifying defendant. Answers by defendant to questions concerning his height, weight, date of birth, and color of eyes and hair did not correspond with the information on the driver's license. He was requested to accompany the officers to the police station. Nothing was said on the ride to the station. While in the elevator, defendant produced a second wallet and volunteered that it contained his correct identification. At the police station, defendant was interrogated by Detective Sergeant May, who testified that he informed defendant of his constitutional rights by reading the following list to him: Defendant stated that he did not want an attorney; but we note, he was not advised that he had the right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Defendant admitted that the "Black" billfold was stolen, and that he was in possession of the other stolen articles. After further questioning, defendant was booked and placed in jail. August 11, 1966, 2 days later, the police received notice that the endorsement on a check, payable to and drawn by James S. Black, had been forged. Defendant was interrogated again; this time by Detective Sergeant Rutz, who testified that he gave defendant the following explanation of his constitutional rights: Sergeant Rutz further testified that defendant told him that he was well aware of his rights and indicated that he did not want an attorney. During interrogation, defendant admitted that he cashed the stolen check using Mr. Black's signature and identification. Pursuant to CrR 101.20W, the trial court determined that defendant had been fully advised of his constitutional *197 rights prior to making any statement to the officers; that his statements admitting the forgery were voluntary; and that the statements were admissible in evidence. Defendant makes two assignments of error: first, that it was reversible error to permit Officers Leavitt, Qualley, and May to testify concerning statements made by defendant between the time he was approached by Officer Leavitt at the Chinook Hotel and interrogated by Officer May. Second, it was reversible error to admit the testimony of Officers May and Rutz concerning defendant's statements that he had forged the endorsement; the defendant had not been properly apprised of his constitutional rights. This appeal brings into sharp focus the applicability of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), to the facts of the instant case. We disagree with defendant's contention that the testimony of Officers Leavitt, Qualley, and May was inadmissible because he had not been given the Miranda pre-interrogation warnings when asked to step outside the Chinook Hotel to answer questions concerning his identity. [1] The same contention was made in United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir.1968). Defendant had been asked by a police officer to step outside a tavern to answer questions concerning an automobile. In rejecting this argument, the court said: It is difficult to set forth an all-inclusive rule covering every possible situation, but once an investigating officer has probable cause to believe that the person confronted has committed an offense, the officer cannot be expected to permit the suspect to leave his presence. At that point, interrogation becomes custodial, and the suspect must be warned of his rights. People v. Ceccone, 260 Cal. App. 2d 886, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968). See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381, 88 S. Ct. 1503 (1968). In a recent decision rendered after oral argument in the instant case, Miranda was deemed applicable to interrogation of a suspect questioned in his bed in his own room by four police officers at 4 a.m. One of the officers testified that the defendant "was under arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning." Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 22 L. Ed. 2d 311, 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969). Orozco does not extend the rules of Miranda. It simply applies the rule to a specific factual situation, completely different from the instant case. Orozco answers the dissenting opinion. The questioning of defendant outside the hotel was non-coercive; it did not have the "potentiality of compulsion inherent in the in-costody interrogations." It was conducted during the course of a routine investigation. It was not a "custodial interrogation," which the United States Supreme Court has defined as There is no evidence of overbearing or overzealous police officers. Until he was asked to enter the police car, defendant had no reasonable basis to believe that he was under restraint. In fact, Sergeant Qualley testified that had defendant refused to cooperate, he would not have been arrested, but merely kept under surveillance until more information could be obtained. Both officers testified that they did not ask any questions of defendant on the ride to the police station, nor did they ask defendant for the second wallet; he produced it voluntarily. We find no merit in defendant's first assignment of error. Arrest, interrogation, and trial of defendant took place subsequent to June 13, 1966, the effective date of Miranda v. Arizona, supra. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966). We must, therefore, consider the impact of Miranda upon the facts of the instant case. [2] In general, Miranda requires that, prior to custodial interrogation of an accused, he must be warned: (1) that he has the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he does make can and will be used as evidence against him in a court of law; (3) that he has the right to consult with counsel before answering any questions; (4) that he has the right to have his counsel present during the interrogation; (5) and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him without cost to him, prior to questioning, if he so desires. The ultimate question for decision is always: Was the confession or statement voluntarily given? State v. Darst, 65 Wn.2d 808, 815, 399 P.2d 618 (1965). Miranda, however, indicates that an affirmative answer cannot be supported unless the five warnings listed are given to the accused prior to interrogation. Defendant contends that the warnings given by Detective May prior to his first interrogation, and the warnings given by Detective Rutz prior to his second interrogation were *200 inadequate because neither officer informed him in clear and unequivocal terms that he had a right to have a lawyer present during interrogation; or that if he could not afford counsel, one would be appointed for him before any questioning. In Miranda the court said at 469-70: The warnings given by the officers do not meet the Miranda test. It was error, therefore, to admit in evidence defendant's statements to Officers May and Rutz that he had forged the endorsement. Our conclusion is fortified by our recent decision in State v. Tetzlaff, 75 Wn.2d 649, 453 P.2d 638 (1969), wherein we said: The judgment and sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. HILL, ROSELLINI, NEILL, and McGOVERN, JJ., concur. HALE, J. (dissenting) The majority expects too much of police officers. It gives their legal craftsmanship in this case as exhaustive a study, I think, as the bar examiners do to *201 bar examinations. But regardless of the standards of practice required of police officers in giving legal counsel to persons under arrest, the evidence, I would say, shows that the police performed their duty well. The record establishes that the officers advised the defendant in such abundant detail as to meet all standards, constitutional as well as judicial. I would require no more of them. In assessing the adequacy of legal advice rendered by police officers to persons under arrest, the courts are obliged to look for some discernible connection between the standards fixed by the courts and the constitutions of the United States and the State of Washington. The United States Constitution says that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. 5. The Constitution of the State of Washington says much the same. Const. art. 1, § 9. If I could find anywhere in the record that the defendant had been compelled to be a witness gainst himself, or even that his confession was otherwise the product of some kind of coercion, I would agree that the conviction should be reversed. My search of the record, however, reveals nothing compulsory or coercive but on the contrary shows affirmatively a voluntary disposition by the defendant to speak out when confronted with damning evidence and admit his guilt. From what appears to me as abundant evidence, the trial court found not only that defendant confessed voluntarily but did so after receiving a detailed explanation of his rights and privileges relating to self-incrimination. Before asking the questions that elicited the confession, the police officers told the defendant that (1) he had a right to remain silent; (2) any statements he made could be used against him in court; (3) he had the right to the advice of an attorney before making any statement; and (4) looking to his future course, added explicitly "if you do not have the funds to hire an attorney the court will appoint an attorney for you free of charge to you." This advice was read to the defendant before he made a confession, but that was not the end of it. He was advised *202 in even greater detail. At a preliminary hearing held under CrR 101.20W to determine the voluntariness of the confession, Stanley May, sergeant of detectives, after saying that he recited to the defendant a list of the defendant's constitutional rights, testified that he "asked him if he knew his constitutional rights, and he stated that he knew most of them." The officer then testified: Detective May said that he was present 2 days later when Detective Rutz questioned the defendant. Describing Officer Rutz's conduct of the interrogation, Detective May said: Detective May testified on cross-examination: Officer Rutz testified: Officer Rutz then said that he showed Creach the check, and Creach told him he had endorsed and cashed that particular check at the National Bank of Commerce in Yakima. This was the check that the state proved to everyone's satisfaction that it was a forgery. Further, concerning advice given to the defendant by the Yakima police, Officer May testified: But again this was not the end of the legal advice as shown by the record. Officer May said that he was present and heard Officer Rutz expounding the law of constitutional and judicial immunities to the defendant as follows: After the court had ruled that the admission and confession were admissible, Officer Rutz testified, again on direct examination: Detective May in his testimony described how, after the defendant had been advised in detail several times, he at first denied cashing the forged check and then admitted cashing it at the bank: Creach did not testify on his own behalf before the jury, but at the hearing under CrR 101.20W, RCW vol. 0, to test the admissibility of his confession, he said: Further, said the defendant: and went on, still in direct examination: *207 The defendant thus admitted that he knew of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him in court, but denied that he was told the court would appoint a lawyer for him if he was without funds. However, when interrogated by the court, he answered as follows: On cross-examination at the pretrial hearing, Creach admitted that he had been convicted and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for grand larceny in 1943; sentenced in 1947 to 5 years' imprisonment for burglary; and, in 1949, convicted of another felony and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment; and, in either 1958 or 1959 he could not be certain of the year sentenced to the Michigan State Penitentiary at Lansing for 5 to 10 years for second-degree burglary and forgery. The court was well within its discretionary power, I think, in not according to Mr. Creach the highest degree of credibility, and it is not for a reviewing court to believe Mr. Creach's testimony and disbelieve the other witnesses. In my opinion, the court had no choice but to admit the defendant's confession and admissions against interest as voluntary, competent, and material under every conceivable constitutional theory or rule of evidence and even under *208 the most expanded and ethereal interpretation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). In a record about one half of which appears to be devoted to a palaver among court, counsel and witnesses concerning advice to the accused to remain silent or to consult an attorney or to speak up if he wished and the remainder devoted to substantive proof of the crime charged, the evidence is overwhelming that the defendant's confession was voluntary and that he knowingly waived his right to remain silent. The incriminating statements and confessions were admissible, I think, both under the Miranda decision and the state and federal constitutions and under what I deem the time-tested, long-held rule of the American common law now codified for the federal judiciary under Witnesses and Evidence 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1969), as follows: I would, therefore, affirm. HUNTER, C.J., FINLEY and HAMILTON, JJ., concur in the result of the dissent. [*] Reported in 461 P.2d 329.