Title: Layton & Costas v. Layton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87,2018; 100,2018; 125, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
HANNA LAYTON and LINDA 
COSTAS,1 
 
 
Respondents Below, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
JACKSON P. LAYTON, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   Nos. 87, 2018; 100, 2018;  
§   and 125, 2018 
§   Consolidated 
§ 
§   Court Below—Family Court 
§   of the State of Delaware 
§   
§   C.A. No. CN15-04403  
§   Petition Nos. 17-22998 and 
§   17-24587 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 17, 2018 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 23, 2018 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellants, Hanna Layton (“Mother”) and Linda Costas 
(“Grandmother”), filed these consolidated appeals from three Family Court 
orders.  The underlying case involves Jackson Layton (“Father”) and Mother’s 
two daughters (“the Children”) and Father’s efforts to visit and reunify with 
the Children.  At the time these appeals were filed, the Children were under 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
2
the guardianship of Grandmother.2  In the orders on appeal, the Family Court 
found Mother and Grandmother in contempt of its prior orders regarding 
Father’s visitation and reunification therapy with the Children.  The Family 
Court also ordered Mother to pay attorneys’ fees to Father’s counsel3 and 
ordered Grandmother to pay $2000 to secure the services of a new 
reunification therapist.  After careful consideration, we find no merit to these 
consolidated appeals.  Accordingly, we affirm the Family Court’s judgments. 
(2) 
The Children were born on April 28, 2004 and March 25, 2007.  
The family’s history is long and complicated.  It appears that Mother and 
Father became estranged from one another in 2011, and Mother was awarded 
sole custody of the Children in November 2013.  In August 2015, 
Grandmother, through counsel, filed a petition for guardianship of the 
Children.  Mother’s whereabouts were unknown at the time.  Although she 
failed to file an answer to the guardianship petition, she later appeared in 
person to support the petition.  Father, through counsel, objected to the 
                                                 
2 Although the Family Court initially stayed its consideration of Father’s petition to rescind 
Grandmother’s guardianship pending reunification therapy, the Family Court later lifted 
the stay and granted Father’s petition for rescission after these appeals were filed.  Mother 
and Grandmother filed several different appeals from the rescission proceedings, which are 
pending before the Court. 
3 Father’s counsel is representing Father on a pro bono basis by assignment from a group 
providing services to military veterans.  In turn, Father’s counsel was directed to forward 
Mother’s installment payments of $200 per month to the Veteran’s Clinic associated with 
the Delaware Law School. 
 
3
petition.  In March 2016, the parties reached an agreement for a temporary 
guardianship order pending a hearing in July 2016.  The temporary order 
included the parties’ stipulation that Father and the Children would engage in 
reunification therapy with Dr. Samuel Romirowsky in consultation with the 
Children’s therapist, Jennifer Cutrona. 
(3) 
After a two-day trial, the Family Court granted Grandmother’s 
petition for guardianship on August 10, 2016 (“the Guardianship Order”).4  As 
part of the Guardianship Order, the Family Court cautioned Mother and 
Grandmother to cooperate with the previously agreed-to reunification therapy 
between Father and the Children.  The Family Court stated that it would “not 
tolerate interference with Father’s attempts to improve” his relationship with 
the Children.5  The Family Court further warned Mother and Grandmother 
that, while it did not want to uproot the Children and remove them from 
Grandmother’s home at present, “the Court will seriously consider moving 
the children to Ohio [where Father lives] on a permanent basis if the maternal 
family acts as an impediment to Father’s efforts.”6  The Guardianship Order 
awarded Father visitation with the Children “as determined appropriate by Dr. 
Romirowsky,” and stated that, if Dr. Romirowsky believed that the maternal 
                                                 
4 Costas v. Layton, File No. CN15-04403, Pet. No. 15-24413 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 10, 2016). 
5Id. at 22. 
6 Id. 
 
4
family was interfering with Father’s visitation, then the Court would consider 
imposing sanctions that might include granting “additional visitation to 
Father, fines, incarceration, or a change in custody….”7 
(4) 
In December 2016, Father filed a petition for a rule to show 
cause, alleging that Grandmother and Mother were in contempt of the 
Guardianship Order by thwarting the progress of his reunification with the 
Children.  After two days of hearings, the Family Court issued an order dated 
June 5, 2017, finding both Mother and Grandmother in contempt (“the First 
Contempt Order”).8  The Family Court warned them against “continuing to 
display a negative and hateful attitude towards Father to the girls” and stated 
that the Court would “tolerate no contempt of this Order.”9  The Court ordered 
that “Dr. Romirowsky shall schedule reunification therapy/visits between 
Father and the girls at his discretion and shall solely be responsible for setting 
the frequency, date, time and length of the contact.”10  
(5) 
Thereafter, Mother and Grandmother filed a petition for a rule to 
show cause in July 2017, alleging that Father was in contempt of the First 
Contempt Order and requesting, among other things, that the reunification 
                                                 
7 Id. at 23-24. 
8 Layton v. Costas, File No. CN11-03412, Pet. No. 16-38190 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 5, 2017). 
9 Id. at 13. 
10 Id. 
 
5
therapy with Dr. Romirowsky be discontinued.  Father, in turn, filed a petition 
for a rule to show cause, alleging that Mother and Grandmother were in 
contempt of the First Contempt Order.  Among other things, Father asked the 
Family Court to rescind Grandmother’s guardianship as a sanction for her 
ongoing contempt and interference with Father’s attempts to reunify with the 
Children.   
(6) 
The Family Court held three days of hearings in January and 
February 2018 on the parties’ cross-petitions.  Dr. Romirowsky testified that, 
before Mother and Grandmother cut off his contact with the Children, he had 
had more than twenty sessions with the Children and Father.  When they 
started therapy, the Children indicated they had no memories of Father, either 
good or bad, but they were interested in developing their relationship with 
him.  Dr. Romirowsky testified that, on multiple occasions, the therapy 
sessions would be interrupted by members of the maternal family.  On one 
occasion, when Father was participating in the session via Skype, Mother 
walked into the session unannounced and ended it prematurely, stating that 
the Children needed to have their dinner.  Dr. Romirowsky finally told the 
maternal family members that they were not allowed in his office but had to 
wait outside during his sessions with the Children and Father. 
 
6
(7) 
Dr. Romirowsky testified that, while sometimes the sessions 
started with the Children protesting, the sessions quickly dissipated into 
warm, playful and affectionate interaction between Father and the Children. 
Based on his experience with the parties and in light of the Family Court’s 
order giving him the discretion to do so, Dr. Romirowsky testified that he 
approved Father taking the Children for visits in the community on two dates 
in July 2017.  Those visits were to be followed by debriefing with the parties 
in his office, and if Dr. Romirowsky determined those visits had gone well, 
then Father would be permitted to have two overnight visits with the Children 
in August 2017.  Dr. Romirowsky testified that Grandmother refused to 
cooperate with his approved visitation plans, telling him that the Children 
would not attend any of those visits.   
(8) 
In September 2017, Grandmother and Mother appeared at Dr. 
Romirowsky’s office without an appointment while he was in session with 
another patient, demanding that he turn over the Children’s files.  Dr. 
Romirowsky explained that he could not release the files unless a proper 
release was signed by both Grandmother and Father.  One of the women then 
called the police on her cell phone and began yelling into the phone that the 
doctor was a liar.  Dr. Romirowsky testified that one of his patients in the 
waiting room was so disturbed by the ruckus that he left the office.  Dr. 
 
7
Romirowsky also testified that he received a letter from Mother in November 
2017 stating that he was not permitted to have any further contact with the 
Children.   
(9) 
Dr. Romirowsky expressed the opinion that Mother and 
Grandmother had created a toxic environment for the Children’s reunification 
efforts and had placed enormous pressure on the Children not to have a 
relationship with Father.  He believed that the maternal family was planting 
false memories in the Children and, in short, that the Children were being 
“brainwashed.”  Dr. Romirowksy testified that, because Grandmother was 
blocking the reunification process, he would not continue undertaking 
reunification therapy while the Children remained under Grandmother’s 
guardianship. 
(10) In addition to Dr. Romirowsky, the Family Court also heard 
testimony from Father, Mother, Grandmother, Father’s stepfather, Mother’s 
father, the Children’s therapist, and Dr. Romirowsky’s office assistant.  The 
Family Court also spoke briefly with the Children and listened to numerous 
recorded Skype conversations between Father and the Children, which had 
been made without Father’s knowledge and were offered into evidence by 
Mother and Grandmother.   
 
8
(11) On February 8, 2018, the Family Court issued a twenty-six page 
opinion, setting forth all of the testimony and evidence presented during the 
three-day hearing (“the Second Contempt Order”).11  The Court concluded 
that the First Contempt Order gave Dr. Romirowsky sole discretion for 
scheduling therapy and visits between Father and the Children.  Dr. 
Romirowsky had determined that it was appropriate for Father to go straight 
to community visits with the girls rather than engaging in further therapy 
sessions in Dr. Romirowsky’s office.  Thus, Father was not in contempt of the 
First Contempt Order for failing to engage in further counseling with the 
Children before attempting to schedule community visits.  The Family Court 
denied Mother and Grandmother’s petition for a rule to show cause. 
(12)  As to Father’s petition for a rule to show cause against Mother 
and Grandmother, the Family Court concluded that several of Father’s 
allegations were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
Nonetheless, as to Mother, the Family Court found that her letter to Dr. 
Romirowsky, stating that the doctor did not have her permission to engage in 
further therapy sessions with the Children, was a clear violation of the First 
Contempt Order, which provided that Mother and Grandmother were to 
                                                 
11 Costas v. Layton, File No. CN15-04403, Pet. Nos. 17-22998, et al. (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 
8, 2018). 
 
9
follow the schedule set by Dr. Romirowsky and to follow his 
recommendations for treatment.  The Family Court ordered Mother to 
reimburse Father’s counsel’s fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting 
his contempt petition. 
(13) As to Grandmother, the Family Court concluded that there was 
clear and convincing evidence that she had violated the First Contempt Order 
in multiple ways, including refusing to follow Dr. Romirowsky’s schedule for 
visitation by declaring that further visits “were not going to happen,” by 
disrupting what was left of Dr. Romirowsky’s therapeutic relationship with 
the Children when she appeared unannounced in his office and demanded the 
Children’s files in a belligerent and harassing manner, and by making or 
permitting other family members to make disparaging remarks about Father 
within the Children’s hearing.  
(14) The Family Court further found that Grandmother had failed in 
her statutory responsibilities as guardian of the Children to provide for their 
emotional well-being and to comply with all Court orders because she failed 
to support the Children’s reunification efforts and she allowed Mother daily 
access to the Children and participated with Mother in the continued 
poisoning of the Children against Father.  Despite this conclusion, the Family 
Court stayed further consideration of Father’s petition to rescind 
 
10
Grandmother’s guardianship, pending further reunification efforts with a new 
therapist.  To retain a new therapist, Grandmother was ordered to pay $10,000 
to Father’s counsel, who would hold the money in escrow until further order 
of the Court.  The Family Court stated that it would schedule a review hearing 
for each Monday following every appointment with the new therapist. 
(15) On February 20, 2018, the Family Court entered its final order 
on attorney’s fees, requiring Mother to pay Father’s attorney $8900 in fees 
and costs, payable at a rate of $200 per month until paid in full (“the 
Attorney’s Fees Order”).  Thereafter, on February 23, 2018, the Family Court, 
following a review hearing with the parties on the progress of the reunification 
therapy, issued a modification to the Second Contempt Order, reducing 
Grandmother’s obligation from $10,000 to $2,000 to pay for the reunification 
therapy (“the Revised Contempt Order”).  The Family Court gave 
Grandmother until March 14, 2018 to make the payment and noted that the 
first therapy appointment was to be scheduled for March 16, 2018.  
Grandmother never made the payment, and reunification therapy with a new 
therapist never occurred. 
(16) Mother and Grandmother filed these appeals, challenging the 
Second Contempt Order, the Attorney’s Fees Order, and the Revised 
Contempt Order.  Although they raise six issues, only four were properly 
 
11
raised in this appeal.12  First, they contend that the Family Court abused its 
discretion by completely disregarding the testimony of Jennifer Cutrona, the 
Children’s therapist, in favor of Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony.  Second, they 
contend that the Family Court erred in finding them in contempt because the 
First Contempt Order required three additional therapy sessions before Dr. 
Romirowsky could approve community visits between Father and the 
Children.  Third, they contend that the Family Court’s conclusion that the 
three therapy session anticipated by the First Contempt Order were not 
mandatory reflects judicial bias.  And fourth, they contend that the Family 
Court did not conduct a proper interview of the Children. 
(17) In his answering brief, Father raises several points.  First, he 
contends that the appeals should be dismissed for Mother and Grandmother’s 
ongoing contempt of the Guardianship Order, the First Contempt Order, the 
Second Contempt Order, and the Revised Contempt Order.  Second, Father 
                                                 
12 There are six claims raised in the body of the Argument section of the appellants’ opening 
brief on appeal. These six arguments do not correspond to the six arguments contained in 
the opening brief’s Summary of Argument section.  See Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 
1152 (Del. 1993) (noting that, under Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(A)(3), any argument 
that is not raised in the body of the argument section of the opening brief will not be 
considered by the Court on appeal).  The following arguments were not properly raised in 
this appeal - the Family Court abused its discretion in accepting Father’s completion of an 
out-of-state domestic violence course as an adequate substitute for a Domestic Violence 
Coordinating Council course, which was previously addressed but was not part of the 
Second Contempt Order, and the Family Court erred in discharging the guardian ad litem 
who was appointed to represent the Children during the guardianship proceedings in 2016, 
which was not raised in and was irrelevant to the Second Contempt Order.  Supr. Ct. R. 8.  
 
12
contends that any issue about Grandmother’s payment for reunification 
therapy is moot because, after these appeals were filed, the Family Court 
rescinded Grandmother’s guardianship of the Children and awarded Father 
custody.  Finally, Father asserts that, if this Court reaches the merits of the 
appeals, the judgments of the Family Court should be affirmed because: (i) 
the Family Court did not err in denying the petition for contempt against 
Father; (ii) the Family Court did not err in finding both Mother and 
Grandmother in contempt of the First Contempt Order; and (iii) the Family 
Court did not err in ordering Mother to pay $8900 in legal fees as a sanction 
for her contempt. 
(18) Our review of a Family Court order extends to the facts and the 
law as well as to the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.13  If 
the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our standard of review is 
abuse of discretion.14  Although we have a duty to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence and to the test the propriety of the trial court’s factual findings, 
we will not overturn those findings unless they are unsupported by the record 
or are clearly wrong.15  When the determination of facts turns on a question 
of the credibility and the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of witnesses 
                                                 
13 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
14 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
15 Wife (J.F.V.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
 
13
appearing before the trial court, we will not substitute our opinion for that of 
the trier of fact.16 
(19) Father argues that we should dismiss these consolidated appeals 
without reaching the merits because of Mother’s and Grandmother’s ongoing 
contempt of the Family Court’s orders.  Father relies upon this Court’s ruling 
in Schmidt v. Schmidt,17 where we held that a party who displays defiance of 
a trial court’s order by refusing to comply with the order should not be 
permitted to appeal the substance of that ruling while persisting in his 
defiance.18  In Schmidt, the appellant sought review of a property division 
order without also seeking review of the Family Court’s order finding him in 
contempt of the property division order.  Under those circumstances, we 
concluded that the appellant could not use the judicial process to appeal the 
merits of the underlying property division order.  We further noted, however, 
that our dismissal of the appeal was not to be construed as a ruling that one 
held in contempt could not seek review of the contempt determination itself.19 
(20) The circumstances in this case are distinguishable from Schmidt.  
In the present case, the parties are only appealing the Family Court’s orders 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 610 A.2d 1374 (Del. 1992). 
18 Id. at 1377. 
19 Id. 
 
14
finding them in contempt of the court-ordered reunification therapy and 
awarding attorney’s fees and imposing sanctions.  The validity of the 
reunification therapy, which was part of a consent order entered in 2016, was 
never appealed and is not at issue here.  The parties have a right to seek review 
of the Family Court’s orders related to the contempt proceedings. 
(21) Thus, we have considered the substance of Mother’s and 
Grandmother’s fairly-raised issues on appeal, but we find no merit to their 
arguments.  The record reflects, contrary to their assertions, that the Family 
Court carefully considered all of the witnesses’ testimony presented during 
the three-day hearing on the parties’ cross-petitions resulting in the Second 
Contempt Order.  The Family Court’s findings that Mother and Grandmother 
were each in contempt of its prior orders regarding the reunification therapy, 
but that Father was not, are supported by clear and convincing evidence in the 
record and are not clearly wrong.   
(22) The First Contempt Order gave Dr. Romirowsky the sole 
discretion to direct the reunification process and warned Mother and 
Grandmother about the potential consequences of their continued interference 
and contempt of the court-ordered reunification.  Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony 
at the hearing reflected that Mother wrote to him, saying that he was not 
permitted to have further contact with the Children.  Dr. Romirowsky also 
 
15
testified that Grandmother, among other things, refused to make the Children 
available for visits with Father that were approved by Dr. Romirowsky.   
(23) Under these circumstances, we find no error in the Family 
Court’s findings of contempt.  Contrary to the appellants’ argument, the 
Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Romirowsky’s 
testimony to be credible and in giving that testimony more weight than the 
testimony of the witnesses presented by Mother and Grandmother.  Such 
credibility determinations are entirely within the judge’s discretion.20  We also 
find no merit to the appellants’ conclusory argument that the weight afforded 
Dr. Romirowsky’s testimony is evidence of judicial bias or their contention 
that the judge conducted an “improper” interview of the Children.  Instead, 
we find that the record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that Dr. 
Romirowsky testified credibly about Mother’s and Grandmother’s continuing 
interference with Father’s reunification efforts.  The Family Court also 
properly interviewed the Children.  We also find no error in the Family 
Court’s rejection for lack of credibility Mother’s and Grandmother’s 
purported justifications for their contemptuous conduct. 
(24) Moreover, we find no abuse of the Family Court’s discretion in 
ordering Mother to pay Father’s attorney’s fees.  The Family Court has broad 
                                                 
20 Wife (J.F.V.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
 
16
discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees and costs.21  The award 
in this case was to compensate Father’s counsel for the time and effort that 
counsel expended in prosecuting a second contempt petition.  Because 
Father’s counsel is representing Father on a pro bono basis, the Family Court 
ordered that Mother would pay a reduced fee, to be forwarded by Father’s 
counsel to a veterans’ legal clinic.  There is nothing in the record to support 
Mother’s contention that the Family Court abused its discretion in awarding 
reasonable attorney’s fees, payable in $200 monthly installments until paid in 
full.  The award was not arbitrary or unreasonable.22 
(25) We also find no abuse of the Family Court’s discretion in 
sanctioning Grandmother for her contemptuous conduct.23  The Family Court 
found that Grandmother’s ongoing defiance and disruption of the court-
ordered reunification process led Dr. Romirowsky to refuse to provide further 
reunification therapy.  As a result of her contempt, the Family Court required 
Grandmother to pay $10,000 (later reduced by the Revised Contempt Order 
to $2000) in order to retain the services of a new reunification therapist.  
                                                 
21 Thomas v. Thomas, 102 A.3d 1138,1150 (Del. 2014). 
22 Id. at 1150-51. 
23 Father argues that this issue was rendered moot by the Family Court’s subsequent 
rescission of Grandmother’s guardianship, which nullified the need for further 
reunification services.  Because the rescission of Grandmother’s guardianship is still 
pending appeal in this Court, the Family Court’s contempt sanction against Grandmother 
arguably remains a “continuing justiciable controversy,” which we will address on the 
merits. See Family Court v. Alexander, 522 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Del. 1987).   
 
17
Under the circumstances, the compensatory sanction was justified and 
reasonable.  There is no basis in the record to overturn the Family Court’s 
finding that Grandmother could afford to pay $2000. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the 
Family Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice