Title: International Association of Firefighters Local S-20, et al. v. State of Florida - Corrected Opinion
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-1434
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1434 
____________ 
 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL S-20, et 
al., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
November 8, 2018 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in 
International Association of Firefighters Local S-20 v. State, 221 So. 3d 736 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2017).  After further consideration, we conclude that jurisdiction was 
improvidently granted.  Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss 
this review proceeding. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
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NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.  
 
LEWIS, J., dissenting.  
 
 
I dissent from the majority’s decision to discharge jurisdiction in this case.   
The right to bargain collectively is a fundamental right.  See art. I, § 6, Fla. Const.; 
Hillsborough Cty. Governmental Emps. Ass’n v. Hillsborough Cty. Aviation Auth. 
(Hillsborough), 522 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. 1988).  The government of Florida 
belongs to the people.  See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 1992) 
(explaining that “[e]ach right” in the Declaration of Rights is “a distinct freedom 
guaranteed to each Floridian against government intrusion” and “operates in favor 
of the individual, against [the] government”).  The people of Florida have voted 
and voiced their desire with regard to how they want their government operated.   
An amendment to the Constitution, duly adopted, is the last 
expression of the will and intent of the law-making power and prior 
provisions inconsistent therewith or repugnant to the amendment are 
modified or superseded to the extent of inconsistency or repugnancy.   
 
State v. Div. of Bond Fin. of Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 278 So. 2d 614, 617-18 (Fla. 
1973) (citing Advisory Op. to Governor, 12 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1943); Sylvester v. 
Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1944); Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Polk Cty. v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs of Polk Cty., 50 So. 574 (Fla. 1909); Jackson v. Consol. Gov’t of City of 
Jacksonville, 225 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1969)).  Article I, section 6 of the Florida 
Constitution should be considered the last expression of the will of the people.  See 
id. at 617 (“It is a fundamental rule of construction that, if possible, amendments to 
 
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the Constitution should be construed so as to harmonize with other constitutional 
provisions, but if this cannot be done, the amendment being the last expression of 
the will of the people will prevail.”).  The Governor’s constitutional veto authority 
is the earlier of the two conflicting provisions, having existed as early as the 
Florida Constitution of 1838.  Art. III, § 16, Fla. Const. (1838).  Article III, section 
16 of the 1838 Constitution provided that any bill which the Governor objected to 
was to be returned to the house in which the bill originated, and that house would 
reconsider the bill.  Id.  By contrast, the Florida Constitution did not provide public 
employees the right to bargain collectively until the 1968 constitutional revision.  
Art. I, § 6, Fla. Const. (1968). 
 
After the 1968 constitutional revision, the Legislature had an obligation to 
effectuate the fundamental right to collectively bargain.  In Dade County 
Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1969), the Court 
held that it is essential that the Legislature “enact appropriate legislation setting out 
standards and guidelines and otherwise regulate the subject within the limits of 
said Section 6.”  This Court has also held that if the Legislature failed to 
implement the rights in question the “Court [would], in an appropriate case, have 
no choice but to fashion such guidelines by judicial decree in such manner as may 
seem to the Court best adapted to meet the requirements of the constitution.”  Dade 
 
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Cty. Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Legislature of Fla., 269 So. 2d 684, 688 (Fla. 
1972).   
There can be no doubt that when any party, including a Governor, is 
involved in a direct dispute and at the same time maintains the power to act as final 
arbiter of the dispute through the power of veto—the impasse resolution process is 
subverted.  See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).  The old maxim remains true: 
“[N]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would 
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”  Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting The Federalist No. 10, 
at 59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).  In this context, the use of veto authority, 
after the impasse has been resolved by the Legislature, allows the Governor to act 
as a judge in his own cause, thereby obstructing due process.  See id. (recognizing 
that no individual should be allowed to judge his or her own case given the 
inherent risk of bias in doing so).  With the Governor holding the power to veto the 
Legislature’s decision resolving the impasse, the fundamental right of public 
employees to collectively bargain is rendered hollow.  See Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters Local S-20 v. State (Local S-20), 221 So. 3d 736, 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  In acting as the third-party decision maker, the 
 
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Legislature’s decision should be implemented in a process that does not include 
executive branch veto.   
The Legislature has an obligation to the people of Florida to create a system 
that shields fundamental rights against due process violations.  The Legislature 
cannot dodge the issue of a flawed system as merely “subject to politics.”  
Fundamental rights must be balanced to exist and be protected within a 
constitutional framework.  It is the responsibility of the Legislature to create a 
constitutional structure that would not leave any party that was a participant in the 
dispute as the final decider.  This may not be an easy task; however, it is a 
necessary task nonetheless to protect fundamental rights as presently contemplated.   
 
Within these narrow circumstances the Legislature may consider a number 
of alternatives including the implementation of a state compelling interest test in 
which the Governor would be required to demonstrate a compelling state interest 
to sustain a veto of a legislative resolution of an impasse.  See Local S-20, 221 So. 
3d at 740-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce the Legislature has ruled in the 
public employees’ favor and against the Governor, it cannot be reconciled with 
Article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution to allow the Governor to render the 
Legislature’s decision a nullity through the veto authority.”).  In recognizing that 
public employees have the right to collectively bargain as a fundamental right, the 
Legislature may decide that this fundamental right should be subject to official 
 
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abridgment only upon a showing of a compelling state interest.  Hillsborough, 522 
So. 2d 358.  Nevertheless, members of the Legislature cannot throw up their hands 
and simply say “oh well.”  Democracy can be dangerous and full of complexities; 
and, while the overall structure remains in concept, the moving parts move as 
directed by the people.   
 
For the reasons set forth above, I dissent. 
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D16-618  
 
Tobe M. Lev and Richard Siwica of Egan, Lev & Siwica, P.A., Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
Mark A. Touby and Richard A. Sicking of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral 
Gables, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc., International 
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO 
 
Thomas W. Brooks of Meyer, Brooks, Demma & Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida; and G. "Hal" Johnson, Florida Police Benevolent Association, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc.