Title: State v. Carlos Perez
Citation: 2001 WI 79
Docket Number: 1999AP003108-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2001

2001 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3108-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Return of Property in: State of 
Wisconsin v. Carlos Perez: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Carlos Perez,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 115 
Reported at:  235 Wis. 2d 238, 612 N.W.2d 374 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 29, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 1, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Walter J. Swietlik 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
R. Douglas Stansbury and Levy & Levy, S.C., Cedarburg, and oral 
argument by R. Douglas Stansbury. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant F. 
Langley, city attorney, and Christopher J. Cherella, assistant 
city attorney, Milwaukee, on behalf of the City of Milwaukee. 
 
2001 WI 79 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3108-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Return of Property in: State of  
Wisconsin v. Carlos Perez: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Carlos Perez,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Perez, 2000 WI App 
115, 235 Wis. 2d 238, 612 N.W.2d 374, affirming an order of the 
Ozaukee County Circuit Court, Walter J. Swietlik, Judge.  The 
issue presented is whether a person who is convicted of carrying 
a concealed and dangerous weapon under Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
(1997-98)1 has "committed a crime involving the use of the 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
2 
dangerous weapon," as that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b), so that a dangerous weapon seized from the 
person may not be returned.  
¶2 
The circuit court and the court of appeals held that 
the phrase "the use of the dangerous weapon" requires more than 
possession of a dangerous weapon in committing a crime before 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) bars return of the weapon.  We 
disagree with this conclusion for the offense of carrying a 
concealed and dangerous weapon, in which conscious possession of 
a dangerous weapon is an element of the crime.  
¶3 
We hold that a person convicted of going armed with a 
concealed and dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
has "committed a crime involving the use of the dangerous 
weapon," and that the return of the dangerous weapon or weapons 
seized 
from 
the 
person 
is 
prohibited 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b).  Accordingly, we reverse. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
¶4 
The facts central to this case are not in dispute.  
Carlos Perez, a resident of Florida, is a self-employed tile 
artisan who came to Wisconsin to work on the construction of a 
home.  On November 14, 1998, in the City of Mequon, Perez drove 
his van into a ditch while attempting to make a U-turn.  Two 
Mequon police officers were dispatched to the scene to assist 
Perez and his passenger, Alfredo Guerrero.  Upon their arrival, 
the officers examined the vehicle for damage and observed three 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
3 
firearms on the floor of the van.  They saw a Colt .45 caliber 
semi-automatic handgun, a 12 gauge semi-automatic shotgun, and a 
30-06 semi-automatic rifle.  The Colt .45 handgun and the 12 
gauge shotgun were uncased and loaded.  The rifle was cased and 
unloaded.  The loaded handgun was on the floor next to the 
driver.  The other guns were on the floor within the driver's 
reach.  The officers also saw three knives, a foot-long 
wooden/metal club, ammunition for each of the firearms, an 
ammunition belt, two gun cases, a flashlight, and two hunting 
magazines.  
¶5 
Perez informed the officers that he had a permit to 
carry concealed weapons in Florida.  He said he did not realize 
that he could not carry the weapons in Wisconsin.  The officers 
seized the weapons and ammunition.  On December 18, 1998, the 
State filed a criminal complaint charging Perez and Guerrero as 
parties to the crime of carrying a concealed and dangerous 
weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.23 and 939.05.2  
¶6 
A plea and sentencing hearing was held before Judge 
Swietlik on July 30, 1999.  Perez was represented by counsel, 
and he appeared via telephone.  He entered a "no contest" plea 
to the charge.  The State recommended a fine of $200, the 
payment of costs, and the forfeiture of the dangerous weapons 
                     
2 Under Wis. Stat. § 941.23, "Any person except a peace 
officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05 is Wisconsin's "parties to crime" 
statute. 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
4 
seized from Perez's van.3  Perez's attorney agreed to the fine 
and imposition of costs but informed the court that Perez 
intended to seek the return of the seized weapons under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20.  Perez and his attorney told the court that 
Perez was in Wisconsin on business at the time of the incident 
and was licensed to carry concealed weapons in his home state 
for the purpose of hunting.  The court accepted Perez's plea and 
imposed a $200 fine and $130 in costs.  It also instructed 
Perez's attorney to file a motion regarding the return of 
Perez's weapons.  
¶7 
On August 24, 1999, Perez filed a motion pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20 seeking the return of all the items seized 
by the Mequon Police Department incident to his arrest.  The 
court held a hearing on September 7, 1999.  The State asserted 
that the return of the dangerous weapons was prohibited by 
§ 968.20(1m)(b), which provides in part: "If the seized property 
is a dangerous weapon or ammunition, the property shall not be 
returned to any person who committed a crime involving the use 
of the dangerous weapon or the ammunition."  The State 
acknowledged that the firearms were not fired but asserted that 
they were involved in the crime of carrying a concealed and 
dangerous weapon "by their mere presence."  
¶8 
The circuit court granted Perez's motion, stating: 
"[I]f these weapons had been in any way used in the commission 
                     
3 As a Class A misdemeanor, Wis. Stat. § 941.23 carries a 
maximum penalty of "a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment 
not to exceed 9 months, or both."  Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3)(a).   
No. 99-3108 
 
 
5 
of an offense I would certainly not grant the motion."  The 
circuit court noted that Perez was licensed to carry concealed 
weapons in Florida and that the weapons "were in no way used in 
the commission of a crime."  The court also ordered the return 
of Perez's other property, including his knives and club.  
However, it did not allow the return of any of the ammunition 
found in the van.   
¶9 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.  In his 
majority opinion, Judge Richard S. Brown utilized a dictionary 
definition of the verb "use" to ascertain the word's common and 
approved usage, writing: 
 
Webster's defines "use" as "to put into action or 
service," to "apply to advantage" and "to carry out a 
purpose or action by means of."  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2523-24 (1993).  In terms of 
the statute, these meanings show that the mere fact 
that the firearm is with a person is not enough.  The 
firearm had to be part of the crime in some way. 
 
 
Lest our holding be misunderstood, we hasten to 
clarify that the firearm's involvement in the crime 
need not be active. . . . But, if a person simply has 
a gun uncased in a car and the car goes into a ditch, 
that person has neither put the gun into action or 
service, availed himself or herself of it, nor carried 
out any purpose or action by means of the weapon.  In 
Perez's 
case, 
there 
is 
no 
evidence 
that 
Perez . . . "used" the firearms to commit a crime as 
that term is understood in everyday language. 
Perez, 235 Wis. 2d at ¶¶6-7. 
¶10 In a lively dissent, Judge Neal P. Nettesheim wrote: 
"I cannot accept the majority's conclusion that a defendant who 
has admitted arming himself or herself with a dangerous weapon 
and then concealing the weapon has not used the weapon for 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
6 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b)." 
 
Id. 
at 
¶15 
(Nettesheim, J., dissenting).  Judge Nettesheim found the word 
"use" in the statute ambiguous and "so elastic and varied that 
it can carry multiple meanings in a given context."  Id. at ¶16. 
 He concluded that "the legislature intended the statute to 
apply to persons convicted of going armed with a concealed and 
dangerous weapon."  Id. at ¶24.   
¶11 This court granted the State's petition for review.  
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶12 The issue in this case requires us to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) and apply the statute to undisputed facts. 
 It therefore presents a question of law that we review de novo, 
Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709, 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
¶13 When interpreting a statute, this court's goal is to 
discern the intent of the legislature, and to give it effect.  
County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 603 N.W.2d 
541 (1999).  The general rule in statutory interpretation is 
that all words and phrases should be construed according to 
common and approved usage unless otherwise defined in the 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
7 
statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1); State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 
389, 404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999).   
¶14 We first examine the plain language of the statute to 
determine if it clearly and unambiguously sets forth the 
legislative intent.  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 
565 N.W.2d 506 (1997).  If it does, we go no further in 
interpreting the statute.  However, if the statutory language is 
unclear or ambiguous, we may look to the scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statute to determine 
the legislative intent.  Teague, 236 Wis. 2d  at ¶17.  Statutory 
language is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in 
two or more different ways or in two or more different senses by 
reasonably well-informed persons.  Id.; Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 
406. 
 
A. Statutory Language 
 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20 governs the disposition of 
seized property.  It provides in part:  
 
(1) Any person claiming the right to possession 
of property seized pursuant to a search warrant or 
seized without a search warrant may apply for its 
return to the circuit court for the county in which 
the property was seized or where the search warrant 
was returned.  The court shall order such notice as it 
deems adequate to be given the district attorney and 
all persons who have or may have an interest in the 
property and shall hold a hearing to hear all claims 
to its true ownership.  If the right to possession is 
proved to the court's satisfaction, it shall order the 
property, other than contraband or property covered 
under sub. (1m) or (1r) or s. 951.165, returned if: 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
8 
 
(a) The property is not needed as evidence or, 
if needed, satisfactory arrangements can be made for 
its return for subsequent use as evidence; or 
 
(b) All 
proceedings 
in 
which 
it 
might 
be 
required have been completed. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20 (emphasis added).  The State contends that 
Perez's firearms represent property covered under subsection 
(1m) of the statute, which consists of two paragraphs, (a) and 
(b). 
 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1m)(a) defines the terms 
"crime"4 and "dangerous weapon."5 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) then provides: 
 
(1m)(b) If the seized property is a dangerous 
weapon or ammunition, the property shall not be 
returned to any person who committed a crime involving 
the use of the dangerous weapon or the ammunition.  
The property may be returned to the rightful owner 
under this section if the owner had no prior knowledge 
of and gave no consent to the commission of the crime. 
 Property which may not be returned to an owner under 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1m)(a)1. provides that: "'Crime' 
includes an act committed by a juvenile or incompetent adult 
which would have been a crime if the act had been committed by a 
competent adult."  
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(a)2. 
provides 
that: 
"'Dangerous weapon' has the meaning given in s. 939.22(10)." 
Under Wis. Stat. § 939.22(10): 
"Dangerous weapon" means any firearm, whether 
loaded or unloaded; any device designated as a weapon 
and capable of producing death or great bodily harm; 
any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295(4); or 
any other device or instrumentality which, in the 
manner it is used or intended to be used, is 
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily 
harm.  
No. 99-3108 
 
 
9 
this subsection shall be disposed of under subs. (3) 
and (4).  
¶18 There is no dispute that "going armed with a concealed 
and dangerous weapon" fits within the definition of "crime" and 
that the firearms at issue are "dangerous weapons."  Perez owned 
these dangerous weapons and they are no longer needed in any 
criminal action or proceeding.  Hence, Perez is entitled to the 
return of his dangerous weapons unless they are "contraband" or 
"property covered under [Wis. Stat. § 968.20](1m) or (1r) or 
[Wis. Stat. §] 951.165."  Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1). 
¶19 The 
criminal 
complaint 
charged 
that 
Perez 
"did 
unlawfully go armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon."  The 
language in the complaint tracked the language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.23, under which he was charged.  When Perez entered his 
plea of no contest to the charge, he conceded the three elements 
of the offense.  He conceded that he was a person, not a police 
officer, who went armed with a dangerous weapon.  He conceded 
that he was aware of the presence of the dangerous weapon.  He 
conceded that the dangerous weapon was concealed.  State v. 
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 660-61, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999) (citing 
State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 182, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986); Wis 
JI——Criminal 1335; State v. Walls, 190 Wis. 2d 65, 71-72, 526 
N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
¶20 In State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 433-34, 249 N.W.2d 
529 (1977), we explained that "going armed" means that "the 
weapon was on the defendant's person or that the weapon must 
have been within the defendant's reach and that the defendant 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
10
was aware of the presence of the weapon."  We reasoned in Asfoor 
that "[c]oncealing or hiding a weapon precludes inadvertence."  
Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
¶21 Under Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b), neither dangerous 
weapons nor ammunition may be returned to a person who has 
"committed a crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon or 
the ammunition."  Does going armed with a dangerous weapon——one 
element in a § 941.23 offense——involve "the use of the dangerous 
weapon" in the commission of a crime?  We think that it does. 
¶22 We focus first on the words of the statute.  In the 
phrase "a crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon," the 
word "use" is a noun, not a verb.  We know that "the" is a 
"definite article."  H. Ramsey Fowler and Jane E. Aaron, The 
Little, Brown Handbook 173, 768 (5th ed. 1992).  Definite 
articles 
may 
be 
described 
as 
"noun 
markers" 
or 
"noun 
determiners," because they always signal that a noun follows.  
Id.  In the phrase "committed a crime involving the use of the 
dangerous weapon," "use" is the noun immediately following the 
article "the." 
¶23 The noun "use" is not defined in the statute.  Under 
long-standing tradition, the court may examine a recognized 
dictionary to determine the common and ordinary meaning of a 
word.  State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 168, 
580 N.W.2d 203 (1998).  Inasmuch as the word "use" appears as a 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
11
noun, we think it is appropriate to examine its definition as a 
noun.6 
¶24 The word "use" has numerous dictionary definitions 
when employed as a noun.  One definition is "the act of using; 
the application or employment of something for a purpose."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1966 (3d 
ed. 1992).  Another definition is "the power or ability to use 
something."7  Id.  
¶25 The numerous and varied definitions of the noun "use" 
indicate that the term may carry a meaning broader than that of 
                     
6 The circuit court and court of appeals both interpreted 
"use" as a verb.  In their briefs to this court, both Perez and 
the State urged interpretations of "use" that treated the word 
as a verb.  However, at oral argument, both parties acknowledged 
that "use" as it appears in Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) is a 
noun.  
7 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1966 (3d ed. 1992), defines the noun form of "use" as: 
1.a. The act of using; the application or employment 
of something for a purpose: with the use of a 
calculator; skilled in the use of the bow and arrow. 
b. The condition or fact of being used: a chair in 
regular use.  2.  The manner of using; usage: learned 
the proper use of power tools.  3.a.  The permission, 
privilege, or benefit of using something: gave us the 
use of their summerhouse. b.  The power or ability to 
use something: lost the use of one arm.  4.  The need 
or occasion to use or employ: have no use for these 
old clothes.  5.  The quality of being suitable or 
adaptable to an end; usefulness: tried to be of use in 
the kitchen.  6. A purpose for which something is 
used: a tool with several uses; a pretty bowl, but of 
what use is it?  7.  Gain or advantage; good: There's 
no use in discussing it.  What's the use?  8.  
Accustomed or usual procedure or practice.   
  
No. 99-3108 
 
 
12
"active use."  There is no question that some of the approved 
and common definitions of the noun "use" connote active 
utilization, but others do not.  For instance, a person who owns 
a firearm for "use" in self-defense may never actually operate 
the firearm.  The person's "use" may consist of "the power or 
ability to use" the firearm.  In that instance, the person's 
"use" of the firearm is latent, not active. 
¶26 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 939.63 
provides 
a 
perfect 
illustration of how the noun "use" has various meanings, some of 
which do not connote active utilization.  The statute reads in 
part: "Penalties; use of a dangerous weapon. (1)(a) If a person 
commits a crime while possessing, using or threatening to use a 
dangerous weapon, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by 
law for that crime may be increased."  Wis. Stat. § 939.63.  
 
¶27 In the title of the statute, "use" appears as a noun: 
the "use of a dangerous weapon."  By contrast, the text of the 
statute contains verb forms of "use": possessing, using, or 
threatening to use.  The statute implies distinctions among the 
verb forms "possessing," "using" or "threatening to use," but 
all these verb forms fall under the heading "use of a dangerous 
weapon." 
¶28 The exact same principle is shown in Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20, entitled "Endangering Safety by [the] use of dangerous 
weapon."  This section reads in part: 
 
 
(1) Whoever does any of the following is guilty 
of a Class A misdemeanor: 
 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
13
 
(a) Endangers another's safety by the negligent 
operation or handling of a dangerous weapon; or 
 
 
(b) Operates or goes armed with a firearm while 
he or she is under the influence of an intoxicant; or 
 
 
(c) Intentionally points a firearm at or toward 
another. 
Wis. Stat. § 941.20 (emphasis added). 
¶29 Operating, handling, and intentionally pointing imply 
active utilization, but the phrase "goes armed with" is the same 
phrase that appears in the carrying a concealed and dangerous 
weapon statute, and the latter statute requires nothing more 
than conscious possession.  All these words and phrases fall 
under the heading "Endangering safety by use of a dangerous 
weapon."  See also Wis. Stat. § 941.26 ("Machine guns and other 
weapons; use in certain cases; penalty.").  Possession is listed 
in § 941.26 under the heading "use." 
¶30 To sum up, the dictionary definitions of the noun 
"use" include "the power or ability to use something," and that 
meaning of the word is broad enough——"elastic" enough in the 
language of Judge Nettesheim——to include conscious possession 
with an ability to use.  "Going armed with a concealed and 
dangerous weapon" clearly adds up to conscious possession with 
an ability to use.  Thus, going armed with a concealed and 
dangerous weapon is one example of "commit[ting] a crime 
involving the use of the dangerous weapon." 
¶31 The statute yields at least three other clues that our 
interpretation is correct.  First, employment of the word 
"involving" in the phrase "involving the use" in Wis. Stat. 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
14
§ 968.20(1m)(b) is evidence that the statute applies to more 
than the "active use" of a dangerous weapon.  "Involving" is a 
broad term.  "Involve" is defined as: "1. To contain as a part; 
include.  2. To have as a necessary feature or consequence; 
entail."   The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 950 (3d ed. 1992).  The offense of carrying a concealed 
and dangerous weapon certainly involves a dangerous weapon.  It 
involves the use of the dangerous weapon to effect conscious 
possession, including placement of the weapon on the defendant's 
person or within the defendant's reach.  "A firearm may be 
involved in the commission of some crimes by its mere presence." 
 State v. Williams, 148 Wis. 2d 852, 861, 436 N.W.2d 924 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (Dykman, J., concurring). 
¶32 Second, the statute 
also 
contains 
the 
following 
sentence: "The property may be returned to the rightful owner 
under this section if the owner had no prior knowledge of and 
gave no consent to the commission of the crime."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b).  Here, it cannot be denied that Perez had prior 
knowledge of and gave consent to the commission of the crime.  
He committed the crime.  Looking beyond this case, however, the 
statute prevents a rightful owner of a dangerous weapon from 
reobtaining the dangerous weapon if the owner has prior 
knowledge of or gives consent to the commission of a crime by 
another person with the dangerous weapon.  When the owner simply 
allows "the use" of his dangerous weapon in the commission of a 
crime, the owner cannot get the dangerous weapon back.  The 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
15
forfeiture does not require the owner's "active use" of the 
dangerous weapon. 
¶33 Third, Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) prohibits the return 
of ammunition to a person who committed a crime involving the 
use of the ammunition.  In one sense, ammunition is actively 
used when it is fired.  However, used ammunition is not likely 
to be the subject of a motion under § 968.20, because people do 
not go to court to obtain spent shells.  Section 968.20 must 
therefore refer to uses of the ammunition other than firing it. 
 Ammunition can be actively used when it is placed in a firearm; 
but if placing ammunition in a firearm is active use, then 
placing a firearm on the person or within the reach of a person 
also must be active use. 
¶34 Perez contends that this interpretation of "use" is 
incorrect, 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
a 
narrower 
interpretation requiring active use.  In his brief, Perez argued 
that he is not the type of person contemplated by the seizure 
statute, that he was not actively using the dangerous weapons in 
any manner, and that it was the legislature's intent and the 
plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute that only those 
dangerous weapons actually "used" in the commission of a crime 
would be subject to seizure and forfeiture. 
¶35 The State itself acknowledges that "the statute may 
reasonably be read to require that the defendant made a more 
active use of the weapon——by brandishing or firing it, for 
example——during the commission of a crime."  The State contends, 
however, that the statute is ambiguous, so that resort to 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
16
extrinsic evidence to elucidate the legislature's intent is 
warranted. 
¶36 The 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
supports 
our 
interpretation.  Nonetheless, because reasonable minds could 
interpret the phrase "involving the use" in § 968.20(1m)(b) in 
different ways, we find the statute ambiguous.  Therefore, we 
may look to the scope, history, context, subject matter, and 
object of the statute to clarify its meaning and confirm our 
interpretation.  Teague, 236 Wis. 2d  at ¶17.     
 
B. Legislative History 
 
¶37 We begin by examining the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20.  Section 968.20 and its predecessors have 
governed the disposition of property seized in Wisconsin since 
at least 1849.  Section 4, ch. 142, Laws of 1849 provided that 
once seized property was no longer needed as evidence, stolen or 
embezzled property was to be returned to its owner, and all 
other property was to be destroyed.  The statute contained no 
special provision for the disposition of firearms or other 
dangerous weapons.  § 4, ch. 142, Laws of 1849.8 
                     
8 Section 4, ch. 142, Laws of 1849, provided in part: 
 
When any officer, in the execution of a search 
warrant, shall find any stolen or embezzled property, 
or shall seize any other things . . . all the property 
and things, so seized, shall be safely kept . . . so 
long as shall be necessary for the purpose of being 
produced as evidence and . . . afterwards, all such 
stolen and embezzled property shall be restored to the 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
17
¶38 In 1925, the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 363.04 
as part of a new statutory numbering system.  Section 363.04 
(1925) was virtually identical to § 4, ch. 142, Laws of 1849. 
¶39 In 1949, the legislature amended § 363.04 to provide 
for the treatment of firearms and like material.9  § 233, ch. 
631, Laws of 1949.10 
¶40 In 1969, the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 968.20 
when it enacted § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  This newly created 
statute did not contain a special provision for the disposition 
of firearms.11  Williams, 148 Wis. 2d at 856.  An accompanying 
note stated: 
                                                                  
owner thereof, and all other things seized . . . shall 
be destroyed. 
 
9 A new subsection in Wis. Stat. § 363.04 (1949) provided in 
part: "(8) Firearms, Explosives, Etc.  Firearms, ammunition, 
explosives, bombs, infernal machines, and like devices, which 
have been used in the commission of a crime, shall be shipped to 
and become the property of the state crime laboratory." 
10 In 1955, the legislature renumbered § 363.04 as § 963.04, 
but did not substantively amend the statute.  § 13, ch. 660, 
Laws of 1955.  
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20 (1969) provided in part: 
(1) Any person claiming the right to possession 
of property seized . . . may apply for its return to 
the county court for the county in which the property 
was seized or where the search warrant was returned.  
The court shall . . . hold a hearing to hear all 
claims to its true ownership.  If the right to 
possession is proved to the court's satisfaction, it 
shall order the property, other than contraband, 
returned if: 
 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
18
 
This section is a new provision which establishes 
a simplified procedure for obtaining the return of 
property seized with or without a warrant.  Obviously 
if such property is needed for use as evidence, it 
need not be returned unless arrangements can be made 
for its subsequent use as evidence.  Contraband need 
never be returned. 
Judicial Council Criminal Rules Committee Note, § 63, ch. 255, 
Laws of 1969.  
¶41 In 1977, the legislature decided to add a subsection 
for the disposition of firearms, creating subsection 968.20(3).12 
 This new subsection did not distinguish firearms involved in 
the commission of a crime.  Williams, 148 Wis. 2d. at 857. 
¶42 In 1979, the legislature repealed and recreated Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20(3), but again did not specifically account for 
firearms involved in the commission of a crime.13  § 844, ch. 
221, Laws of 1979. 
                                                                  
(a) The property is not needed as evidence or, if 
needed, satisfactory arrangements can be made for its 
return for subsequent use as evidence; or 
 
(b) All proceedings in which it might be required 
have been completed. 
  
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(3) (1977) provided in part: 
(a) The custodian of a seized firearm if the 
firearm is not required for evidence or use in further 
investigation . . . shall make reasonable efforts to 
notify all persons who have or may have an interest in 
the firearm of the provisions of sub. (1).  If . . . 
an application . . . is not made . . . the seized 
firearm shall be shipped to and become property of the 
state crime laboratory.  
 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(3) (1979) provided in part: 
 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
19
¶43 In 1983, the legislature created § 968.20(1m), for the 
first time providing different treatment for firearms involved 
in the commission of a crime.14  The bill that created 
§ 968.20(1m)(b), (1983 A.B. 661), was drafted by Bruce Feustel 
of the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB), at the request of the 
Department of Justice.  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting 
File for 1983 Wis. Act 278, Legislative History of 1983 Assembly 
Bill 661.  
¶44 A memorandum to the LRB from Howard Bjorklund, 
Administrator of the Law Enforcement Services Division, on the 
subject of "Proposed Legislation/Firearms Disposition" stated in 
                                                                  
(a) First class cities shall dispose of firearms 
or ammunition seized 12 months after taking possession 
of them if the owner has not requested their return 
and if the firearm or ammunition is not required for 
evidence or use in further investigation and has not 
been disposed of pursuant to a court order at the 
completion of a criminal action or proceeding. . . .  
If the return of the seized firearm or ammunition is 
not requested by its owner under sub. (1) and is not 
returned by the officer under sub. (2), the seized 
firearm or ammunition shall be shipped to and become 
property of the state crime laboratory. 
 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) (1983) provided: 
 
If 
the 
seized 
property 
is 
a 
firearm 
or 
ammunition, the property shall not be returned to any 
person who committed a crime involving the use of the 
firearm or the ammunition.  The property may be 
returned to the rightful owner under this section if 
the owner had no prior knowledge of and gave no 
consent to the commission of the crime.  Property 
which may not be returned to an owner under this 
subsection shall be disposed of under subs. (3) to 
(5).   
 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
20
part: "You've inquired about the above subject and provided 
memoranda from Mike Zaleski.  I agree with Mike that sec. 
968.20, Wis. Stats., is in need of revision.  There certainly 
should be no opportunity for the return of a firearm to the 
perpetrator of a crime."  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting 
File for 1983 Wis. Act 278, memorandum from Howard Bjorklund to 
the Legislative Reference Bureau (Oct. 25, 1982). 
¶45 The Department of Justice's "drafting request" for 
1983 A.B. 661 stated the subject of the bill as "no return of 
firearm to perpetrator."15  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting 
File for 1983 Wis. Act 278, Drafting Request (Dec. 6, 1982).  
¶46 The LRB's analysis of 1983 A.B. 661 provides in 
relevant part: 
 
This proposal revises the treatment of seized 
firearms or ammunition.  If the person committed a 
crime with a firearm or ammunition, the firearm or 
ammunition may not be returned to him or her.  The 
rightful owner of a seized firearm or ammunition may 
reobtain that property if the owner had no prior 
knowledge of and gave no consent to the commission of 
the crime. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1983 Wis. Act 
278, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau.  The LRB's 
analysis does not refer to committing a crime "involving the use 
of the firearm," but to committing a crime "with" the firearm. 
                     
15 "Perpetrate" means "to be responsible for; commit."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1349 (3d 
ed. 1992).  A "perpetrator" is therefore one who is responsible 
for a crime or one who commits a crime.  Thus, the drafting 
request was for a bill to prohibit the return of firearms to 
persons who commit or are responsible for crimes.  
No. 99-3108 
 
 
21
¶47 "With" is a broad term that carries multiple common 
and 
accepted 
meanings, 
including 
"in 
the 
company 
of; 
accompanying," "having as a possession," and "by the means or 
agency of."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 2050 (3d ed. 1992).  Therefore, the LRB analysis 
indicates that the drafters of 1983 A.B. 661 believed that the 
legislature intended to prohibit the return of a seized firearm 
to a person who committed a crime "in the company of," 
"accompanying," "having as a possession," or "by the means or 
agency of" the firearm. 
¶48 The legislative intent behind Wis. Stat. § 968.20 was 
made abundantly clear in late 1994.  Shortly after the 1994 
elections, Representative John Dobyns wrote to the LRB, asking 
for a bill draft for the coming session.  Dobyns wrote: 
 
Under current law, people convicted of carrying a 
concealed weapon are later allowed to retrieve from 
the police agency the concealed weapon that was 
confiscated.  I would like language drafted that would 
require forfeiture of the weapon upon conviction.  The 
weapon can either be destroyed or used for educational 
purposes by the police department. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 
157, Bill Request Form (Nov. 18, 1994). 
¶49 Bruce Feustel, Senior Legislative Attorney, responded 
to the request, stating: 
 
You asked for a draft to require the forfeiture 
of a weapon after a person has been convicted of the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon.  I mentioned 
that I thought we had a statutory requirement that at 
least covered firearms. . . . The current applicable 
law is contained in s. 968.20(1m)(b) . . . This brings 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
22
up 2 questions.  First, does "going armed" with a 
concealed and dangerous weapon (as required in s. 
941.23) meet the standard of "a crime involving the 
use of a firearm?"  From a common sense reading, 
"going 
armed" 
involves 
a 
type 
of 
use 
of 
a 
weapon. . . . You may want to go over this statute 
with the person who raised this problem.  If this 
existing statute is fine as is, then we don't need to 
make any changes. . . . We could draft a specific 
statute dealing only with the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon.  If the problem involves the word 
"use" in s. 968.20(1m)(b), we could change the wording 
to be "use, carry or possess" instead. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 
157, memo from Bruce Feustel to Representative John Dobyns  
(Dec. 16, 1994). 
 
¶50 Representative Dobyns, in turn, replied that the 
problem he had in mind did not involve firearms.  The "problem 
was occurring where the confiscated weapons were knives, 
throwing stars, etc.items that were weapons but not firearms.  
Revise restriction on firearms in 968.20(1m)(b) broaden to 
weapons."  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1995 
Wis. Act 157, memo from Representative John Dobyns to Bruce 
Feustel, Senior Legislative Attorney (December 20, 1994). 
 
¶51 Hence, the bill ultimately drafted simply expanded the 
scope of § 968.20(1m)(b) from "firearms and ammunition" to all 
"dangerous weapons and ammunition."  The LRB analysis of the 
Dobyns bill reads in part: 
 
Current law also includes a specific provision stating 
that a seized firearm may not be returned to a person 
who committed a crime with the firearm.  This bill 
broadens the restriction to prohibit the return of any 
dangerous weapon that a person used in connection with 
a crime.  Further, all of the current provisions for 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
23
the retention or destruction of seized firearms are 
made applicable to seized dangerous weapons. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1997 Wis. Act 
157. 
¶52 We conclude from this legislative history that 1983 
Wis. Act 278, which prohibited the return of a firearm seized 
from persons who "committed a crime involving the 'use' of the 
firearm," reflected a serious legislative concern with firearms 
involved in the commission of a crime.  The intention then and 
the intention confirmed in 1994-1995 was that a dangerous weapon 
seized in a carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon conviction 
should not be returned. 
 
C. Purpose, Scope, and Context 
 
¶53 We next examine the purpose, scope, and context of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b), and find that they also support a 
determination that the statute prohibits the return of seized 
dangerous weapons to those who have committed the crime of 
carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon.  The court of appeals 
has identified two purposes of § 968.20(1m)(b): 
 
First it operates before the fact to deter persons 
from using firearms in the commission of crimes.  
Second, 
and 
most 
important, 
it 
minimizes 
the 
likelihood that a firearm which has been used in the 
commission of crime will find its way back into the 
hands of the criminal or into the hands of his or her 
associates who may likewise be inclined to criminal 
activity.  
Williams, 148 Wis. 2d at 858. 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
24
¶54 The first purpose of the statute is deterrence, which 
is one of the principal objectives of the criminal law.  The 
criminal code increases the penalty for an offender who commits 
a crime while possessing, using, or threatening to use a 
dangerous weapon.  Wis. Stat. § 939.63.  The increased penalty 
is intended to discourage the use of dangerous weapons in the 
commission of crimes by creating fear of additional punishment. 
 Logically, the loss of dangerous weapons through forfeiture is 
also intended to deter the use of dangerous weapons in the 
commission of crimes.  Conversely, the return of dangerous 
weapons 
to 
persons 
who 
have 
committed 
crimes 
with 
them 
undermines deterrence.  If people understand the risk of 
forfeiture on top of criminal prosecution, they are more likely 
to comply with the law. 
¶55 The second purpose is to minimize the likelihood that 
a dangerous weapon will find its way back into the hands of a 
criminal or the criminal's associates.  The objective not to 
rearm persons who have abused dangerous weapons is sensible, 
because these persons may be inclined to abuse the dangerous 
weapons again.  This premise certainly underlies the statute 
that prohibits a convicted felon from possessing any firearm.  
Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a).  When the State has seized a 
dangerous weapon because of the use of that weapon in a crime, 
the use of that weapon in a subsequent crime inflicts an injury 
and jeopardizes public confidence. 
¶56 Perez's interpretation of the statute has the opposite 
effect.  It would return dangerous weapons to offenders who have 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
25
committed offenses with the dangerous weapons but have not 
"actively" employed them in the commission of the crimes. 
¶57 Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) in 
relation 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.23 
will 
promote 
judicial 
efficiency.  In concluding that § 968.20(1m)(b) prohibits the 
return of a dangerous weapon to a person convicted of carrying a 
concealed and dangerous weapon, we create a bright-line rule in 
the application of the law.  Conscious possession of a concealed 
and dangerous weapon is an element of the offense. 
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) provides that "the 
property shall not be returned to any person who committed a 
crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon or the 
ammunition."  This statute has application to many crimes in 
addition to carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon. 
¶59 It arguably applies to crimes in which "the use of the 
dangerous weapon" may require more than conscious possession of 
the weapon to satisfy the forfeiture statute, especially if 
conscious possession of the weapon is not an element of the 
offense.  This presents a question that is not before us.  In 
this case, we decide only that going armed with a concealed and 
dangerous weapon involves such conscious possession or other use 
of the dangerous weapon that the State will not be required to 
prove some additional factor to prevent the return of the 
dangerous 
weapon 
to 
the 
offender 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b). 
 
Where 
the 
element 
of 
"use" 
has 
been 
established by conviction, we see no point in relitigating the 
issue. 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
26
¶60 Perez argues that he is not the type of person for 
whom Wis. Stat. § 968.20 was intended.  We conclude, however, 
that § 968.20 was intended to prohibit the actions taken by 
Perez, inasmuch as a dangerous criminal could have undertaken 
these same actions.  The forfeiture statute does not distinguish 
between "good" lawbreakers and "bad" ones.  Perez pled "no 
contest" to a charge of carrying a concealed and dangerous 
weapon.  In doing so, he conceded that he had unlawfully gone 
armed with a dangerous weapon.  He was driving a van with a 
loaded handgun on the floor next to the driver’s seat, and a 
rifle and a loaded shotgun within reach.  Returning these 
dangerous weapons to Perez is fundamentally at odds with a 
common sense interpretation of the forfeiture statute. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶61 We conclude that a seized dangerous weapon may not be 
returned to a person convicted of the crime of carrying a 
concealed and dangerous weapon.  A person convicted of carrying 
a concealed and dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
has "committed a crime involving the use of the dangerous 
weapon," because "the use" of the dangerous weapon is an 
indispensable element of a § 941.23 offense.  Moreover, our 
textual and historical analysis of Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b) 
convinces us that the legislature intended forfeiture of 
dangerous weapons in this situation.  We therefore remand to the 
circuit court with instructions to enter an order denying 
No. 99-3108 
 
 
27
Perez's motion for the return of the dangerous weapons that were 
seized from him. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 99-3108.jpw 
 
1 
¶62 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I concur with the 
majority 
opinion 
but 
write 
separately 
to 
emphasize 
the 
importance of prosecutorial discretion in our judicial system, 
particularly in the present context involving the forfeiture of 
hunting gear.  The majority notes that "[t]he forfeiture statute 
does not distinguish between 'good' lawbreakers and 'bad' ones." 
 Majority op. at ¶60.  The failure of our statutes to make such 
distinctions is a 
primary 
justification for 
prosecutorial 
discretion, which is grounded in Wis. Stat. § 968.02(1).  As the 
court of appeals has noted, "[t]he duty of a district attorney 
is to administer justice, not obtain convictions.  As such, 
district attorneys are under no obligation or duty to charge in 
all cases where there appears to be a violation of the law."  
State v. Jones, 217 Wis. 2d 57, 64, 576 N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 
1998).  A prosecutor's discretion in pursuing a violation of the 
law, then, is "'quasi-judicial'".  State v. Karpinski, 92 
Wis. 2d 599, 607, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). 
 
¶63 While I believe that the State might have wielded its 
power more judiciously in the present case, it is not my role to 
question 
the 
exercise 
of 
prosecutorial 
discretion.16  
                     
16 On the accountability of prosecutors, we have explained, 
"the district attorney is answerable to the people of the state 
and not to the courts or the legislature as to the manner in 
which he or she exercises prosecutorial discretion."  State v. 
Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 473, 484 N.W.2d 138 (1992).  "Political 
review through the electoral process is sufficient to ensure the 
proper 
applications 
of 
prosecutorial 
discretion." 
 
Id.  
Therefore, "[w]e will not impair, without authority or reason, 
district 
attorneys' 
discretionary decisions 
of 
whether to 
initiate forfeiture proceedings or not."  Jones v. State, 226 
Wis. 2d 565, 585, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999). 
No. 99-3108.jpw 
 
2 
Nevertheless, 
I 
observe 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20(1m)(b) is to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of 
criminals who may commit future crimes with those weapons.  The 
legislature did not intend to deprive any of the over 500,000 
Wisconsin resident sportsmen and sportswomen of their hunting 
gear.17  If prosecutors injudiciously seek forfeiture of hunting 
gear under § 968.20(1m)(b), they will undermine public support 
for sensible laws governing dangerous weapons. 
¶64 Accordingly, I 
would 
urge 
district 
attorneys to 
exercise their prosecutorial discretion to pursue criminals that 
"use" weapons in commission of crime, as the term is ordinarily 
understood, in accord with the legislature's intent, rather than 
pursuing forfeiture actions against sportswomen and sportsmen.  
By exercising prosecutorial discretion in a judicious manner, 
district attorneys will avoid the danger of overwhelming our 
court system with charges that are contrary to the legislature's 
intent.  Moreover, such judicious use of the forfeiture statute 
                     
17 Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, License and 
Registration Sales Per County, 2000.  The Department of Natural 
Resources issued 483,419 gun deer permits, 171,978 resident 
archery permits, 128,946 small game permits, 8162 resident class 
B bear permits, 55,680 water-fowl stamps, 31,911 pheasant 
stamps, and 63,194 turkey stamps. 
No. 99-3108.jpw 
 
3 
where hunting gear is involved will reinforce the public's 
confidence in the judicial system.  
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence.   
 
No. 99-3108.jpw 
 
1