Title: Pritchett v. New Jersey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2021

Pritchett v. New Jersey Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Shelly Pritchett worked for the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC), which ran the state’s juvenile correctional facilities. She was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. When her second request for unpaid leave was denied, her supervisor refused to explain the denial or put the denial in writing. On November 1, 2011, Pritchett learned that she would be subject to disciplinary proceedings -- which would result in her termination without a pension -- if she did not resign by the end of the week. Pritchett applied for retirement disability benefits on November 4. Weeks later, her union representative informed the JJC that Pritchett believed she was forced into retirement against her will. The JJC’s Equal Opportunity Office expressed its opinion that the JJC “failed to engage in the interactive process,” which “resulted in a violation of the State Anti-Discrimination Policy,” but opined that Pritchett’s “request for reinstatement [was] mooted by [her] approval for disability retirement.” Pritchett filed a complaint alleging the State violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). A jury awarded Pritchett compensatory damages in excess of $1.8 million and punitive damages of $10 million. The State challenged the punitive damages award. The trial court determined that the punitive damages amount was high but that no miscarriage of justice occurred. The Appellate Division affirmed in large part, but remanded for reconsideration of the punitive damages award, calling upon the trial court to consider the factors discussed in Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The State petitioned for certiorari review, arguing that the Appellate Division’s remand instructions were flawed in part because they failed to include direction to the trial court to apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing awards of LAD punitive damages against public entities. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the state, modifying the Appellate Division's order to include instruction that the trial court review the punitive damages award with heightened scrutiny. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Shelley Pritchett v. State (A-5-20) (084451)Argued March 1, 2021 -- Decided August 12, 2021LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers the standards to be applied by a trial court when reviewing a jury award of punitive damages against a public entity. Plaintiff Shelly Pritchett worked for the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC), which runs the state’s juvenile correctional facilities. She was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. When her second request for unpaid leave was denied, her supervisor refused to explain the denial or put the denial in writing. On November 1, 2011, Pritchett learned that she would be subject to disciplinary proceedings -- which would result in her termination without a pension -- if she did not resign by the end of the week. Pritchett applied for retirement disability benefits on November 4. Weeks later, her union representative informed the JJC that Pritchett believed she was forced into retirement against her will. The JJC’s Equal Opportunity Office expressed its opinion that the JJC “failed to engage in the interactive process,” which “resulted in a violation of the State Anti-Discrimination Policy,” but opined that Pritchett’s “request for reinstatement [was] mooted by [her] approval for disability retirement.” Pritchett filed a complaint alleging the State violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The jury awarded Pritchett compensatory damages in excess of $1.8 million and punitive damages of $10 million, and the State challenged the punitive damages award. The trial court determined that the punitive damages amount was high but that no miscarriage of justice occurred. The Appellate Division affirmed in large part but remanded for reconsideration of the punitive damages award, calling upon the trial court to consider the factors discussed in Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The State petitioned for certification, arguing that the Appellate Division’s remand instructions were flawed in part because they failed to include direction to the trial court, consistent with this Court’s holding in Lockley v. Department of Corrections, 177 N.J. 413 (2003), to apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing awards of LAD punitive damages against public entities. The Court granted certification. 244 N.J. 154 (2020). 1 HELD: As the Appellate Division instructed, the trial court on remand must (1) substantially consider the factors advanced in BMW and incorporated into New Jersey law by Baker and (2) must “ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered,” in keeping with the guidance in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 , 425-26 (2003). The Court modifies the Appellate Division’s instructions to add that the trial court -- and all trial courts reviewing a punitive damages award issued by a jury against a public entity defendant -- must also apply the heightened scrutiny called for in Lockley and underscored in the companion case of Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, 177 N.J. 434 (2003).1. The Court reviews the history of punitive damages awards against public entities in LAD actions, from the establishment of requirements for punitive damages awards against private entities in LAD actions, see Lehmann v. Toys 'R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 593, 624-25 (1993); to the Court’s initial three-three split over whether punitive damages may be recovered from a public entity for a claim against a public entity under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, which split resulted in the affirmance in that matter of the Appellate Division’s allowance of such damages against the defendant, see Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 417-19 (1994); to the first precedential holding by a majority of the Court that public entities are “liable for punitive damages under the [LAD],” see Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 113-14 (1999). (pp. 16-23)2. On the same day that Cavuoti issued, in another LAD action not involving a public entity, the Court, in Baker, assessed the effect of the Legislature’s adoption of the Punitive Damages Act (PDA), observing that the Act “requires that a court reviewing an award of punitive damages be satisfied that the award is 'reasonable in its amount’ and is justified in the circumstances of the case 'in light of the wrongful conduct.’” 161 N.J. at 229. Baker noted that “[a]lthough the PDA excludes LAD actions from its cap, its general requirements for procedural and substantive fairness are mandated”; the opinion also stressed that there are “substantive constitutional limits on the amount of punitive damages that a jury may award.” Ibid. Recognizing the three factors articulated in BMW for courts to consider when reviewing punitive damages awards -- “the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that formed the basis of the civil suit; the disparity between the harm . . . suffered . . . and the plaintiff’s punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties . . . imposed,” see 517 U.S. at 575, -- the Baker Court instructed that courts “should apply both the requirements of the PDA (with the exception of the statutory cap) and the substantive standards of BMW v. Gore in order to ensure that any award of punitive damages bears 'some reasonable relation’ to the injury inflicted.” Baker, 161 N.J. at 231. (pp. 23-26)3. The Court singles out two matters of significance to this appeal: Lockley and Green. Lockley instructed “that the standards applied in private sector cases, with the exception 2 of those relating to the financial condition of the defendant, should be used” in assessing and reviewing punitive damages awards. Those standards include the PDA provisions for determining whether punitive damages are warranted in the first instance and for calculating the amount of such an award, as well as the Baker/BMW factors. 177 N.J. at 431-33. Importantly, Lockley cautioned trial courts that “the court’s responsibility to review awards of punitive damages for reasonableness is heightened when such damages are awarded against a public entity.” Id. at 433. In Green, which involved a CEPA claim against a public entity, the Court drew from Lockley and stressed that it “set rigorous standards for the calculation of punitive damages against a public entity, recognizing that 'public monies are the source of the award.’” 177 N.J. at 444. (pp. 27-31)4. There can be no doubt that punitive damages awards under the LAD are available against public defendants. The Court recognizes the continuing vitality of Lockley, as well as that of all the cases that led up to it and compelled its result. Interpreting the Legislature’s inaction following those decisions as acquiescence indicative of legislative intent to subject public entities to punitive damages under the LAD, the Court notes that further debate over that policy belongs in the legislative arena. (pp. 31-32)5. The Court reviews the relevant mandates of the PDA and notes that, with respect to punitive damages assessed by a jury against a public entity defendant, the Court has imposed a unique and special duty. In addition to the PDA’s requirement that the amount calculated by the jury be reasonable, the court must adhere to Lockley’s instruction that the reasonableness assessment be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 177 N.J. at 433. The Court explains that the heightened scrutiny standard’s purpose is not simply to ensure that public entities are not treated worse than private entity defendants because certain PDA ability-to-pay factors are not presented to the jury, but rather because public funds are at stake. Further, the Court explains that the Baker and BMW factors are related to due process considerations and are not a substitute for Lockley’s direction for heightened trial-court review, which goes beyond keeping the award to the amount necessary to avoid transgressing due process and requires a more rigorous application of the factors to be considered when assessing the punitive damages award in the context of the factual circumstances of the wrong involved and the nature of the public entity defendant. Application of the Baker/BMW factors and those mentioned, and applicable, under the PDA are not independent assessments, but rather coalesce for a holistic assessment. See Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433. (pp. 32-36)6. The Court finds the Appellate Division’s discussion of the Baker/BMW factors to be substantially correct. The Due Process Clause imposes outer limits on the allowable size of an award of punitive damages, and the Appellate Division appropriately instructed the trial court, on remand, to substantially consider the factors advanced in BMW and incorporated into New Jersey law by Baker. The first BMW consideration -- the reprehensibility of the conduct -- is “[p]erhaps the most important,” and the mental state or track record of the defendants speaks to the reprehensibility of the conduct. See 3 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-77. The Appellate Division also correctly highlighted State Farm’s point that this analysis entails more than the rote application of bright-line ratios, a point that accords with the Legislature’s exemption of the LAD from the PDA’s cap on punitive damages. In sum, the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s instructions, as modified to correct the omission of the required heightened scrutiny by the trial court necessary in the case of a public sector defendant. (pp. 37-40) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 5 September Term 2020 084451 Shelley Pritchett, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. State of New Jersey, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided March 1, 2021 August 12, 2021Peter G. Verniero argued the cause for appellant (Sills Cummis & Gross, attorneys; Peter G. Verniero, on the briefs).Deborah L. Mains argued the cause for respondent (Costello & Mains, attorneys; Deborah L. Mains, on the brief).Robert F. Renaud argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey State League of Municipalities and New Jersey Institute of Local Government Attorneys (Renaud DeAppolonio, attorneys; Robert F. Renaud, on the brief).Nancy Erika Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Smith Mullin, attorneys; Nancy Erika Smith and Zachary Silverman, of counsel and on the brief). 1 Thaddeus P. Mikulski, Jr. submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Thaddeus P. Mikulski, Jr., on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. Following a trial, a jury awarded plaintiff Shelley Pritchett more than$1.8 million in compensatory damages for her employer’s violations of theNew Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, aswell as $10 million in punitive damages. The defendant State of New Jerseyappealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in large part but remanded thematter for the trial court to reconsider the punitive damages award, callingupon the court to substantially consider the factors discussed by this Court inBaker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and the United StatesSupreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The State argues that the Appellate Division’s remand instructions wereflawed because, among other reasons, they failed to include direction to thetrial court, consistent with this Court’s holding in Lockley v. Department ofCorrections, 177 N.J. 413 (2003), to apply heightened scrutiny when reviewingawards of LAD punitive damages against public entities. Pritchett responds 2 that the remand instructions were adequate and that Lockley did not alter theBaker/BMW analysis. Several amici also appeared before the Court. We agree with the State that the Appellate Division’s remandinstructions require modification. In reviewing the punitive damages award,the trial court failed to apply the heightened scrutiny called for in Lockley andunderscored in the companion case of Green v. Jersey City Board ofEducation, 177 N.J. 434 (2003). The Appellate Division’s instructions did notcorrect that inadequacy. While we commend the Appellate Division forinstructing the trial court to consider the Baker/BMW factors more fully, theAppellate Division’s remand instructions should have also alerted the trialcourt to the principles of Lockley and Green that apply in this matter. We thus affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment with modification tothe remand instructions that must guide this trial court, and others, in thereview of a punitive damages award against a public entity. I. A. The following facts were presented at the trial in this matter. Pritchett was hired by the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC) in 2006. TheJJC runs the state’s juvenile correctional facilities and has approximately 400employees at any given time. Pritchett worked as a corrections officer in a JJC 3 facility, and, by 2011, she held the title of Senior Corrections Officer. Herduties included the responsibility to intervene when violence broke out amonginmates. On June 8, 2011, Pritchett broke up a fight between two inmates. As aresult, she suffered injuries to her back, knee, and neck, went on Workers’Compensation leave, and sought medical assistance. In the fall of that year, Pritchett’s physician noticed that an MRI ofPritchett’s spine revealed abnormalities unrelated to her workplace injuries.Because of those abnormalities and Pritchett’s physical complaints, herphysician suspected that Pritchett was suffering from the early stages ofmultiple sclerosis (MS). In a note dated September 17, 2011, her physicianwrote that Pritchett had recovered from her workplace injuries and couldreturn to work with no restrictions on their account, but the doctorrecommended that Pritchett ask for additional leave time to seek a diagnosisand treatment for her underlying health issues and referred her to a neurologist . Consistent with the physician’s recommendation, Pritchett submitted arequest for unpaid leave from her JJC position. Two days later, humanresources (HR) officers forwarded the request to the Acting Director of theJJC, Captain Kelly Gibson, and to Pritchett’s direct supervisor, Lisa Quinto.An internal email to Gibson indicates that HR had planned to approve the 4 request; however, Captain Gibson was against it. HR then turned for supportto Quinto, who, on September 27, emailed Gibson, telling him that Pritchett’s“diagnosis is rather serious.” She went on, “[y]ou may wish to considerapproving this leave through November 1, 2011. This way we can write to hernow and advise her no further leave will be approved beyond November 1 andif she is not medically cleared to return to work, she must resign.” Quintoexplained to Captain Gibson, If you determine she must return to work now, based on the medical, there will be no way she can return and we really have not given her warning that management will not approve further leave beyond a request to extend. If she cannot return in November and does not resign, you will have a stronger case to take steps to remove her and be more readily able to defend the removal in an appeal setting. Since [it’s] only one plus month, we can give her fair warning she must return and then if she does not, you stand a much better chance of winning an appeal. Nonetheless, Captain Gibson remained committed to denying Pritchett’srequest. HR then sought out the JJC’s Deputy Executive Director forOperations, Felix Mickens, forwarding him Quinto’s exchange with Gibsonand adding that [t]o deny leave at this point will surely result in a removal (she has a very serious diagnosis) which will be appealed and not upheld. She will not be able to return to work (she incurred a work-related injury which resulted in the discovery of an unrelated personal 5 medical condition) and we have not advised her management will not approve further leave. With removals we have established a winning defense. . . . November is right around the corner -- management should approve leave through this date as the medical states -- we will write to her and say no further leave -- if she does not, or cannot return, she can resign [or] we can initiate removal for failure to return from an approved leave of absence. Pritchett’s request was ultimately approved on October 11, granting herunpaid leave through November 1, 2011, but the approval came with thecaveat that no further requests would be granted. She was informed that if shedid not return to work on November 2, she would be expected to resign. On October 19, Pritchett was diagnosed with MS. She requestedadditional leave time through February 29, 2012, with an expected return-to-work date of March 1. Gibson and Quinto both denied the request in internalemails. Upon receiving word of the denial, Pritchett telephoned Quinto, whowould not provide an explanation as to why the JJC denied Pritchett’s request.Instead, she told Pritchett that the JJC was not obligated to give her a reason,and then declined to put the denial in writing. When November 1 came, Pritchett wrote to the JJC’s HR manager,stating that she was not able to return to work, but that she did not want toresign. Mickens answered the letter through Pritchett’s union representative,telling her that Pritchett would be subject to disciplinary proceedings -- which 6 would result in her termination without a pension -- if she did not resign by theend of the week. Pritchett submitted an application for retirement disabilitybenefits on November 4. Thereafter, on November 21, Pritchett’s union representative contactedthe JJC’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator, informing thecoordinator that Pritchett believed she was forced into retirement against herwill. The coordinator answered that since Pritchett had already resigned, itwas too late to engage in the ADA’s interactive process and advised Pritchettto contact the JJC’s Equal Opportunity Office. When it responded toPritchett’s request for reinstatement, that Office expressed its opinion that theJJC “failed to engage in the interactive process . . . . This failure to engage inthe interactive process resulted in a violation of the State Anti -DiscriminationPolicy.” However, the Office agreed with the ADA coordinator that Pritchett’s“request for reinstatement [was] mooted by [her] approval for disabilityretirement.” B. 1. In October, 2013, Pritchett filed a complaint against the State of NewJersey and unnamed John Does, alleging that the State violated the LAD byfailing to accommodate her disability and discriminating based on the 7 perception of disability. Following the State’s unsuccessful attempts to endthe matter through motion practice, the trial court conducted a jury trial in June2017. The trial resulted in the jury’s return of a liability verdict in favor ofPritchett. The jury awarded compensatory damages totaling $1,824,911, whichconsisted of $575,000 for emotional distress; $343,789 in back pay; $472,639in front pay; and $433,483 in future pension benefits. The next day, the court reconvened the jury for a proceeding on punitivedamages, during which the parties presented no new evidence. The jury’sdeliberations were brief, lasting from shortly after 2:00 p.m. until about 3:00p.m. The jury awarded Pritchett $10 million in punitive damages. All totaled,the trial court entered a judgment of $12,015,384.44 for Pritchett. Thatamount encompassed $78,367.65 in pre-judgment interest; $22,235.79 in costs;$11,824,911 in compensatory and punitive damages; and $89,870 in attorneys’fees. 2. On September 29, 2017, the trial court heard argument from the partiesonce more on the punitive damages awarded by the jury. 8 The State urged the court not to approve the jury’s punitive damageaward, contending that the JJC’s conduct “was not especially egregious,” thatthe State was entitled to certain protections under the Punitive Damages Act(PDA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17, including the PDA’s cap onpunitive damages, and that jurisprudence from the United States SupremeCourt addressing a constitutionally acceptable ratio of compensatory-to-punitive damages cautioned against the trial court’s approval of the jury’spunitive damages award. Pritchett countered each of the State’s arguments and urged the court toenter judgment approving the punitive damages awarded by the jury. In an oral decision, the trial court granted that, “looking at the BMWfactors,” the amount of punitive damages was high but concluded that nomiscarriage of justice occurred due to the size of the jury’s award. The courtemphatically stated that the eight jurors that sat on this case, the Court got no indication that they were confused, impassioned, prejudiced, biased, inflamed. Rather, what the Court observed was a jury that was intelligent, was one that asked lots of questions, one that took notes, one that was deliberative, one that was impartial and dispassionate and weighed through the evidence here and it’s not now for this Court to make the decision, they made the decision and their decision was clearly within the realm of what I would consider to be reasonable given their conclusion as to the way the defendant’s conduct was, the way the plaintiff was 9 treated, and also the way this case was defended. . . . It was completely reasonable for the jury to come to the conclusions that they made. C. The State appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, the AppellateDivision affirmed the finding of liability and the compensatory damagesawarded by the jury, “but remand[ed] for further proceedings . . . on theamount of punitive damages.” The Appellate Division, quoting its earlier decision in Kluczyk v.Tropicana Products, Inc., explained that “while the amount of punitivedamages does not depend on the award of a specific amount of compensatorydamages or injury to the plaintiff, 'the award must bear some reasonablerelation to the injury inflicted and the cause of the injury.’” (quoting 368 N.J.Super. 479, 497 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting, in turn, Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 242-43 (1999))). To ensure that requisite relationship, the AppellateDivision stated courts are to apply the factors that were articulated by theUnited States Supreme Court in BMW and imported into our state’sjurisprudence by Baker. In its words, the Appellate Division “remand[ed] forsubstantial consideration of the Baker/BMW factors.” Further, the Appellate Division offered additional guidance. It observedthat the United States Supreme Court has “decline[d] . . . to impose a bright- 10 line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed,” quoting State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 , 425 (2003), but nonethelesscautioned that double-digit multipliers are unlikely to comport with dueprocess. By the Appellate Division’s calculations, the ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages in Pritchett’s case was below 7:1, a figure viewed aslikely not constitutionally suspect. The Appellate Division also commentedthat although courts should take heed of the PDA’s normative ratio of 5:1when considering awards of punitive damages for successful LAD claims, thelegislative exemption of LAD claims from the PDA cap suggests that “at leastin some cases, a higher ratio would be appropriate.” And, noting that themaximum civil penalty for LAD violations is limited to $50,000, the courtinferred from the Legislature’s exemption of LAD actions from the PDA’s capon damages “that the Legislature did not consider civil penalties under theLAD to be related to the appropriate recovery by an aggrieved individual. ” The State petitioned for certification, alleging that the AppellateDivision’s remand instructions were flawed and provided inadequate guidancegiven that a punitive damages award against a public entity is at issue. Wegranted the petition, 244 N.J. 154 (2020), and allowed to participate as amicicuriae the New Jersey State League of Municipalities, the New Jersey Instituteof Local Government Attorneys, the National Employment Lawyers 11 Association of New Jersey (NELA), and the New Jersey Association forJustice (NJAJ). II. A. Before this Court, the State advances five main points. First, the Stateemphasizes that, in Lockley, this Court required trial courts, as part of theirgatekeeping function, to use great care in scrutinizing awards of punitivedamages against public entities. The State asserts that the trial court failed todo that, and the Appellate Division’s remand instructions are silent on thatessential point. Second, the State argues that because in any punitive damagescase there is a significant chance that the jury has been inflamed, it isimportant that courts not rely exclusively on the application of theBaker/BMW factors to ensure that there is a reasonable relation between theactual harm suffered and the damages awarded. Third, the State asserts thatthe Appellate Division’s view on the relevance of LAD statutory penalties isinconsistent with Lockley. Fourth, the State argues that Baker and Lockleymeant to impose limiting standards and the Appellate Division’s interpretativedirections are inconsistent with those opinions in that they essentially providetrial courts and litigants with guidance on how to circumvent those cases’guardrails. Specifically, the State urges this Court to view the absence of any 12 legislative action following the Lockley decision “to mean that lawmakerswere satisfied with all parts of that decision, including the heightened standardof review in public entity cases, coupled with the requirement forproportionality.” Finally, the State argues that the Appellate Division“diminished” this Court’s instruction that even though the 5:1 bright -line ratioof punitive to compensatory damages does not apply in LAD cases, it stillserves as a normative measure. The New Jersey State League of Municipalities and New Jersey Instituteof Local Government Attorneys ask the Court to reconsider the decades-olddetermination that punitive damages are available against public entities. Theyecho the State in emphasizing that it is the taxpayer who pays every suchaward and reason that such damages fail to deter misconduct by defendantswho themselves do not bear the brunt of the punishment. Exacting punitivedamages from public-sector defendants is also problematic, in their view,because not all such defendants are of comparable means, meaning that thesmall municipality is comparatively more severely punished than themetropolitan government by what is, on paper, the same amount of damages. B. The cornerstone of Pritchett’s position is that “Lockley did not alter theBaker/BMW factors.” According to Pritchett, Lockley was ultimately about 13 the proportionality of compensatory and punitive damages, and, to the extentthat Lockley and Baker/BMW overlap, it is because Lockley is part of theBaker/BMW inquiry. All that Lockley did, according to Pritchett, was to hold,first, that a public-entity defendant’s ability to pay a damages award was not arelevant consideration in the review of an award, and second, that public-sector defendants are not to be treated any worse than their private-sectorcounterparts. “Thus, when the Appellate Division remanded the question ofthe amount of punitive damages to the trial court for 'substantial considerationof the Baker/BMW factors’ it did not deviate from any decision by this Court.” NELA points out that the Legislature has not corrected this Court’s priorholdings that punitive damages are recoverable in LAD actions against publicentities. Further, NELA maintains that Lockley did not impose a heightenedstandard of review for such awards, and the Appellate Division’s remandinstructions captured the essence of the applicable law, insofar as they requirethe trial court to engage in a holistic analysis when reviewing and approvingthe jury’s punitive damages award in a LAD action. During argument, NELAasserted that there have been no runaway awards of punitive damages againstpublic entities. 14 The NJAJ similarly maintains that Lockley did not impose a heightenedstandard, and emphasizes that the lack of legislative action in this area shouldbe interpreted as allowing for the uncapped recovery of punitive damages. III. A. This appeal concerns the standards to be applied by a trial court whenreviewing a jury award of punitive damages against a public-sector defendant.The State does not ask this Court to reconsider and overturn our precedentholding that punitive damages are available in LAD actions filed againstpublic entities. To the extent that some amici advance that argument, wedecline the invitation, for several reasons. First, amici “must accept the case before the court as presented by theparties and cannot raise issues not raised by the parties.” State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 25 (2012) (quoting Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp.Educ. Ass’n, 91 N.J. 38, 48-49 (1982)). More fundamentally, the ship hassailed on the question of the availability of punitive damages awards in LADactions against public entities. 1 A review of the history of the issue amply1 We address in this case an LAD action but the law’s development in this area has advanced in tandem for punitive damages awards against public entities in CEPA actions. 15 demonstrates that it is time to accept that such change can only come from theLegislature. B. The lead up to the present matter begins with Lehmann v. Toys 'R’ Us,Inc., in which a female employee brought an LAD action against thedefendants for fostering a hostile work environment. 132 N.J. 587, 593(1993). When the matter reached this Court, because the LAD expresslyprovides for punitive damages but includes no guide on their amount, we tookthe opportunity to announce “standards to apply to assess employer liabilitynot only for equitable remedies but also for compensatory damages andpunitive damages.” Id. at 616. The Court held that a punitive damages awardrequires “a greater threshold than mere negligence,” id. at 624; that suchdamages are appropriate “when the wrongdoer’s conduct is especiallyegregious,” ibid. (quoting Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 454(1977)); and that “the employer should be liable for punitive damages only inthe event of actual participation by upper management or willful indifference ,”id. at 625 (collecting cases). The question of whether such punitive damages were available against apublic entity defendant, however, was not before the Court. That setting posedadditional issues, including whether the common law view of the deterrent 16 policy advanced by punitive damages was furthered by awards against publicentities. Those questions remained unresolved for a period of time, and theyarose first in a separate, but related, statutory claim setting, not in an LADmatter. Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Board of Education initiallyaddressed the availability of punitive damages against a public entity in anaction brought under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. 138 N.J. 405, 410 (1994). In that case, the plaintiff, apublic-school employee had, for several years, “expressed concern about thepoor health and safety conditions of the metal shop.” Id. at 410-12.Eventually, he was not rehired, and he filed a CEPA action claiming retaliationand seeking, among other remedies, punitive damages. Id. at 413. A juryrendered a verdict in his favor, but the trial court granted the defendant’s“motion to dismiss the complaint, upon which it had previously reserveddecision.” Ibid. The Appellate Division reinstated the complaint and theverdict, but could not agree on whether punitive damages under CEPA areavailable against a public sector entity -- two judges ruling in favor of theplaintiff and one in favor of the defendant. Ibid. A six-member composition of this Court could not agree on the issueeither, splitting three-three on that question. Id. at 426, 435-36. 17 The Court was unanimous, however, in agreeing “that the analysis andprinciples of Lehmann” construing the LAD should guide consideration of theelements of a CEPA claim as well as CEPA’s liability standards. Id. at 417.Further, in the contexts of both the LAD and CEPA, “employers are bestsituated to avoid or eliminate impermissible vindictive employment practices,to implement corrective measures, and to adopt and enforce employmentpolicies that will serve to achieve the salutary purposes of the respectivelegislative mandates.” Id. at 418. The Court also cited Lehmann to support the conclusion that “a strict[]standard for imposing liability for punitive damages is appropriate in CEPAactions.” Id. at 419. Therefore, as in LAD actions, “the employer should beliable for punitive damages [under CEPA] only in the event of actualparticipation by upper management or willful indifference.” Ibid. (quotingLehmann, 132 N.J. at 625). And the complained-of conduct must be especiallyegregious. Ibid. Addressing the issue that split the Appellate Division -- whether a partymay recover punitive damages from a public entity for a violation of CEPA-- Justice Handler wrote, A sensible and unconstrained reading of the language of CEPA, a consideration of the provisions of CEPA in light of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:13-5, a review of CEPA’s legislative history, an 18 understanding of the underlying policy concerns in awarding punitive damages against public entities, and an examination of CEPA’s remedial purpose persuade us that CEPA does allow the award of punitive damages against public entities. [Id. at 426.] That portion of Justice Handler’s opinion read the plain language ofCEPA as indicating that the Legislature intended to make punitive damagesavailable against such defendants, highlighting CEPA’s definition in N.J.S.A.34:19-2(a) of “employer,” under which the board neatly fit, and N.J.S.A.34:19-5, which authorized an award of punitive damages to prevailingplaintiffs. Ibid. The Court noted that, in contrast to the Tort Claims Act, “nospecific CEPA provision exists that precludes the awarding of punitivedamages against public employers.” Ibid. Although the three members who agreed with the Appellate Division onthis issue “acknowledge[d] the strength of the considerations militating againstpunitive damages visited upon governmental bodies,” id. at 428-29, theyinferred that the Legislature had those considerations in mind when it did notexempt governmental bodies from liability for punitive damages in CEPAactions, stating that “[w]hen the interest transgressed is significant, punitivedamages may be appropriate even when the underlying wrongful conduct isthat of the government.” Id. at 429. In concluding, Justice Handler wrote that 19 the Court “thus defer[red] to the Legislature in including punitive damages inthe remedial arsenal available against public as well as private employers forespecially virulent retaliatory conduct.” Id. at 429-30. Writing on behalf of himself and two others, Justice Pollock dissentedfrom the part of the Court’s opinion that concluded that the Legislatureintended to allow awards of punitive damages to be entered against publicentities. Id. at 435 (Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).Justice Pollock was concerned that “[u]ltimately, the cost of any punitive-damage award will be borne by the taxpayers of Piscataway Township.” Ibid.The dissenters “doubt[ed] that the Legislature, when enacting CEPA, thoughtthat it was overcoming the [TCA’s ban] on awarding punitive damages againstpublic entities” and, in light of that ban, did not read the portions of CEPA thatmake available to prevailing plaintiffs “'[a]ll remedies available in commonlaw tort actions’” to encompass punitive damages against public entities. Id. at435-36 (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:19-5) (third alteration in original). Further, thedissent described CEPA’s legislative history as “sparse” and “enigmatic,” and“believe[d] that not permitting punitive-damage awards against publicemployers is more consistent with the legislative intent.” Id. at 436. “The bestsolution,” in the dissent’s view, “would be for the Legislature to revisit theissue and resolve it definitively.” Ibid. 20 After the Abbamont decision involving CEPA, a precedential holdingissued from this Court in 1999, when a majority of the Court squarely held thatpublic entities are also “liable for punitive damages under the [LAD]” relyingexplicitly on “the basis of the reasoning of the three-member affirmance inAbbamont.” Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 113-14 (1999). The plaintiff in Cavuoti brought an LAD age discrimination case againsthis public employer, New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT), and won a juryverdict that awarded him $222,323 in compensatory damages and $1 million inpunitive damages. Id. at 115. The Appellate Division affirmed in all respectsexcept the punitive damages award, determining “that the trial court had notinstructed the jury” as to the predicate role that upper management must playto make such awards available. Ibid. The case thus provided a second opportunity to consider the punitivedamages issue concerning public sector defendants, but this time in the LADsetting. The Court’s analysis covered numerous points, beginning with N.J.S.A. 10:5-13, which makes all common law tort remedies “available toprevailing plaintiffs.” Id. at 116 (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:5-13). The Courtfurther noted the legislative direction to give the LAD liberal construction tocombat discrimination and Lehmann’s holding that punitive damages areavailable under the LAD. See id. at 116-17. Importantly, the Cavuoti Court 21 also recounted the extensive analysis of the issue in Abbamont, includingAbbamont’s acknowledgement of “the strength of the considerations militatingagainst punitive damages against governmental bodies.” Id. at 132. In the end, the Court adopted the reasoning in and conclusions of JusticeHandler’s opinion in Abbamont, which recognized the availability of apunitive damages award against public entity defendants and imported it toLAD claims. Ibid. In doing so, the Court explained how Abbamont “reflectedour understanding of the LAD,” and had relied on an LAD case, Fuchilla v.Layman, 109 N.J. 319 (1988), to explain how the LAD and TCA servedifferent purposes, such that the LAD is not, in several notable ways,constrained by the TCA. Id. at 132-33. The Court added that it had “observed that the policy concerns regardingthe imposition of punitive damages against public entities for LAD violationswere addressed, in some measure, by the heightened standard that we adoptedin Lehmann for imposing punitive damages.” Id. at 133. Therefore, a sensible and unconstrained reading of the language of the LAD, a consideration of the provisions of the LAD in light of the TCA, a review of the LAD’s legislative history, an understanding of the underlying policy concerns in awarding punitive damages and an examination of LAD’s remedial purposes persuade us that the LAD allows the award of punitive damages against public entities. [Ibid.] 22 Importantly, the Court found its conclusion to be reinforced by the factthat the Legislature had acquiesced in the ruling for, at that point, five years.Id. at 133-34. But the conclusion was not unanimous. Writing again on his ownbehalf, and joined by two other members of the Court, Justice Pollockdissented from that holding. Id. at 135 (Pollock, J., concurring in part anddissenting in part). Justice Pollock pointed to the TCA’s blanket prohibition ofsuch damages and emphasized that “[n]othing in the LAD expressly orimpliedly repeals” the TCA’s prohibition. Ibid. In Justice Pollock’s opinion,the putative statutory authorization for punitive damages in CEPA actions isclearer than in the LAD, but the Justice doubted the Legislature meant in eithersetting “to saddle taxpayers” with “paying punitive damage awards” exactedfrom public entities, which can often “be substantial.” Ibid. The dissentersrenewed the call for the Legislature to resolve the question. Id. at 136. In Baker, another LAD action involving an award of punitive damagesand released the same day as Cavuoti, the Court elaborated on the trial court’srole in reviewing a jury’s award of punitive damages. In doing so, the Courtfocused not so much on the availability of those damages as such under thestatutory and common law of our state, but primarily upon then-recent UnitedStates Supreme Court case law exploring and explaining the due -process 23 implications of awards of punitive damages, in those cases, against privateentities. Baker involved an action filed by two plaintiffs against their formeremployer for age and gender discrimination. 161 N.J. at 223-24. The juryawarded plaintiffs compensatory damages of $135,740 and $102,241,respectively, and the two shared a punitive damages award of $4 million. Id.at 225. Those verdicts were affirmed by the Appellate Division. Ibid. ThisCourt’s opinion in the matter assessed the effect of the Legislature’s adoptionof the Punitive Damages Act. The Court observed that the Act “requires that acourt reviewing an award of punitive damages be satisfied that the award is'reasonable in its amount’ and is justified in the circumstances of the case 'inlight of the wrongful conduct.’” Id. at 229 (emphasis omitted) (quoting L.1995, c. 142). Pertinent for our purposes, Baker notes that “[a]lthough the PDAexcludes LAD actions from its cap, its general requirements for procedural andsubstantive fairness are mandated.” Ibid. “In addition,” the Court observed,“there are substantive constitutional limits on the amount of punitive damagesthat a jury may award.” Ibid. Those limits are imposed by the Due ProcessClause of the Fourteenth Amendment and serve “to ensure that punitive 24 damages awards are made through a fair process that includes judicial reviewof awards.” Ibid. The Baker Court focused its analysis on BMW, summarizing its holdingto require “that courts must examine the substantive basis of the punitivedamages award to determine whether it is so excessive as to violate dueprocess.” Id. at 230. Baker recognized that the United States Supreme Courthad not promulgated a bright-line rule, but instead articulated three factors forcourts to consider when conducting such review: the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that formed the basis of the civil suit; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the injured party who was the plaintiff in the civil case and the plaintiff’s punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. [Ibid. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).] The Baker opinion noted that BMW was consistent with JusticePollock’s observation in Herman v. Sunshine Chemical Specialties, Inc., thatthere is “a volatile dilemma” “at the core of punitive damages” -- that the sameconduct that justifies an award of such damages “can readily inflame anotherwise-dispassionate jury.” Ibid. (quoting 133 N.J. 329, 337-38 (1993)).To guard against potential injustice, then, this Court in Baker warned that “theaward of punitive damages must bear some reasonable relation to the injury 25 inflicted and the cause of the injury.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Herman, 133 N.J. at 338). Accordingly, the Court’s instructions wereas follows: In future LAD cases, courts reviewing punitive damages awards should apply both the requirements of the PDA (with the exception of the statutory cap) and the substantive standards of BMW v. Gore in order to ensure that any award of punitive damages bears “some reasonable relation” to the injury inflicted. [Id. at 231.] Because the trial court had not addressed BMW’s substantive standards,the Court remanded the matter, saying that it was incumbent on the trial courtto consider the BMW factors and determine whether, thus considered, thepunitive damages award was sustainable “or whether the award reflectsprejudice, passion, or mistake warranting a new trial on the amount of punitivedamages.” Ibid. We advised that the trial “court may consider, but is notbound by, the Legislature’s judgment of five times compensatory damages as anormative measure of the limits of proportion.” Ibid. But “[b]ecause someacts of discrimination cause unquantifiable harm, the assessment of proportionto harm may take into account whether there has been an outrageous affront tohuman dignity that warrants departure from a normative punishment. ” Ibid. 26 C. Since those decisions, the Court has addressed punitive damages awardsinvolving public entity defendants in two matters of significance to this appeal:Lockley and Green, both issued on the same day. Lockley involved an LAD claim by a male prison guard against theDepartment of Corrections that resulted in a jury verdict that included a $3million award for punitive damages. 177 N.J. at 416-20. The AppellateDivision reversed the award, holding that the trial court’s jury instructionswere “fatally flawed,” in part because the State does not have the same kind ofbottom-line considerations as private parties. Id. at 421-23 (quoting Lockleyv. Turner, 344 N.J. Super. 1, 18-19 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d as modified, 177 N.J. 413). We agreed with the Appellate Division and held “that in an assessmentof punitive damages against a public entity the financial condition of thedefendant is not useful.” Id. at 430. In recognition that “public entities do notcreate their own wealth and are not driven by a profit motive,” the Courtreasoned that “consideration of the State’s ability to pay does not further thegoal of deterrence as it does in the private sector.” Id. at 431. The Courtconcluded that “[t]he State cannot be deterred by an award based on its'bottom line’ because it does not have one in the private sector sense.” Ibid. 27 Accordingly, Lockley instructed “that the standards applied in privatesector cases, with the exception of those relating to the financial condition ofthe defendant, should be used to guide the jury in its computation and to assistthe court in its review of a punitive damages award.” Id. at 431-32. Thatincludes “those provisions of the PDA, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(b), that set forththe standards to be used in determining whether punitive damages arewarranted in the first instance”; “those standards that govern the calculation ofthe amount of such an award, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(c)”; and the Baker/BMWfactors. Id. at 432-33. Lockley is significant for cautioning trial courts that the court’s responsibility to review awards of punitive damages for reasonableness is heightened when such damages are awarded against a public entity. The judge in the ordinary case acts as a check on the jury’s calculation of punitive damages; in the case of a governmental entity, when public monies are the source of the award, the judge must scrutinize with great care the amount of the award to determine whether it is proportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. [Id. at 433 (emphasis added).] 28 Equally importantly, in Lockley, there was no question that the entireCourt recognized the judicial debate on the availability of punitive damagesagainst public entity defendants under the LAD to be over. 2 The companion case to Lockley -- the other decision of note forpurposes of this appeal -- concluded similarly. In Green, the Court closed thebook on the question of punitive damages against public entities in CEPAcases. See 177 N.J. at 437. The Court began in Green by recounting the substantive reasons forconcluding that punitive damages were available under CEPA against publicentity defendants. See id. at 441. The decision also relied on the doctrine oflegislative acquiescence. The Court emphasized that earlier opinions hadinvited the Legislature’s correction if the Court was mistaken in allowingawards of punitive damages against public entities in CEPA actions. Id. at444-45. Calculating that nine years had passed from Abbamont to Green --and stressing the repeated “request[s] that the Legislature take up the issue” if2 Lockley drew a concurrence from three members of the Court, but in light of Lockley and its companion decision, Green, the concurrence recognized that “[t]he judicial debate over . . . the availability of punitive damages against public entities has come to an end,” and left to the Legislature any prospect of changing course. Id. at 434 (Verniero, J., concurring). 29 correction was needed -- the Court inferred from the Legislature’s “silence thatit intended to subject public entities to punitive damages under CEPA.” Ibid. Green has significance for this appeal for a second reason. AlthoughGreen involved CEPA, and this appeal involves the LAD, the Court’sdiscussion in Green addressed a common concern: the care to be taken by thecourt when punitive damages are awarded against public entities. The Court in Green drew from Lockley to emphasize “the importance of[the Lehmann] standard when considering whether an award of punitivedamages is warranted in the first instance.” Id. at 444. In Green’s words, theCourt “set rigorous standards for the calculation of punitive damages against apublic entity, recognizing that 'public monies are the source of the award.’”Ibid. (quoting Lockley, 177 N.J. at 432-33). That said, the Court reposed itstrust in the trial courts, which must review punitive damages awarded by juriesbefore approving them, and exhorted the courts to “be vigilant in their reviewof such awards.” Ibid. The concurring Justices in Lockley dissented in Green. The dissentasserted that the PDA did not provide adequate safeguards because “theLegislature did not contemplate the use of the PDA for punitive damageawards against public entities.” Id. at 449-50 (Verniero, J., dissenting). Thedissent voiced concern that “taking away an additional limitation on the size of 30 punitive damage awards [to wit, the State’s ability to pay,] places publicentities at risk of being treated more harshly than private sector entities, oreven individuals.” Id. at 450. That “absence . . . may lead a jury naturally toassume that a public entity has the wherewithal through its power of taxationto pay almost any award.” Ibid. In the dissent’s view, “[t]he problem with punitive damages againstpublic entities is that it is unworkable”; because the upper management of thedefendant do not themselves pay the award, the dissent reasoned, uppermanagement is “unlikely to be deterred by the threat of a punitive damagesaward.” Ibid. However, the dissent concluded with the observation that theLegislature’s “silence or action” on the availability of punitive damages “willbe conclusive on the issue.” Id. at 451. 3 D. There can be no doubt that punitive damages awards under the LAD areavailable against public sector defendants. Cavuoti so held and Lockleyelaborated on that point, giving direction on fine points of implementation, in 3 See 177 N.J. at 449 (Verniero, J., dissenting) (commenting nonetheless that “allowing punitive damages against a public entity is so far contrary to the interests of the public, we would have expected the Legislature to speak clearly and unambiguously if it intended such a declaration against the people’s self-interest,” reiterating what Justice Pollock first said in his separate opinion in Abbamont). 31 recognition that “public monies are the source of the award.” 177 N.J. at 432-33. Green added to the Court’s emphasis that the debate was over, at least injudicial forums. We recognize the continuing vitality of Lockley and its formulation ofthe law to the present day, as well as that of all the cases that led up to it andcompelled its result. Lockley has stood for almost twenty years, and theLegislature has not seen fit to overturn, or fine tune, its holding and guidance.And, almost twenty-two years have now passed since Cavuoti first resolved thepunitive damages issue in an LAD case. The Legislature’s inaction bespeaks acquiescence and provides acontinuing message of legislative intent to subject public entities to punitivedamages under the LAD. Further debate over that policy belongs in thelegislative arena. IV. The chief complaint by the State to the Appellate Division’s remandinstructions goes to the appellate court’s lack of attention to the heightenedstandard of scrutiny imposed by Lockley on trial courts reviewing a jury’spunitive damages award. Pritchett and the amici supportive of her positionassert that there is no heightened standard and that the Court’s discussion inLockley was meant to require courts to ensure that public entity defendants are 32 not worse off because the ability-to-pay considerations identified in the PDAwere held not to apply to public sector defendants. The State has the better ofthe argument. Although the PDA does not establish the right to punitive damages, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.15, the Act, generally, governs how punitive damages maybe awarded, id. at -5.12; sets a generally applicable cap on the size of theaward, id. at -5.14(b); and carves out exceptions to the cap, including “causesof action brought pursuant to” the LAD, id. at -5.14(c). 4 The PDA envisions an active role for the trial court in reviewing thejury’s determinations, calling upon the court, “[b]efore entering judgment foran award of punitive damages,” to “ascertain that the award is reasonable in itsamount and justified in the circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose topunish the defendant and to deter that defendant from repeating such conduct.”Id. at -5.14(a). The same subsection further empowers the court to exercise thepower of remittitur or to “eliminate the award of punitive damages” if thecourt determines that either is “necessary to satisfy the requirements of thissection.” Ibid.4 See also Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 390 N.J. Super. 557, 567 (App. Div. 2007) (“The Legislature’s purpose in enacting the Act was to establish more restrictive standards with regard to the awarding of punitive damages.” (quoting Pavlova v. Mint Mgmt. Corp., 375 N.J. Super. 397, 403 (App. Div. 2005))), aff’d, 194 N.J. 212 (2008). 33 With respect to punitive damages assessed by a jury against a publicentity defendant, this Court imposed a unique and special duty. In addition tothe PDA’s requirement that the trial court be satisfied that the amountcalculated by the jury is reasonable, the court must adhere to Lockley’sinstruction that the reasonableness assessment be subjected to heightenedscrutiny when punitive damages are awarded against a public entity. Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433; see also Green, 177 N.J. at 444. Indeed, in Lockley, weemphasized the heightened standard’s role when considering whether apunitive award is warranted in the first instance. The Court saw a need for that role due to its holding that certain PDAfactors, which ordinarily would inform the jury about a defendant’s ability topay a punitive damages award, and might have a constraining effect on theamount of the award imposed by the jury, would not be presented in the caseof a public entity defendant. See Lockley, 177 N.J. at 430-33. But theheightened standard’s role is not, as amici contend, only to ensure that publicentities are not treated worse than private entity defendants -- that is a crabbedinterpretation of the Court’s discussion about the direction for heightenedscrutiny. The context in which the Court made that statement was itsrecognition that public funds were at stake, and the Court imposed a specialresponsibility on the trial court to review for reasonableness an award of 34 publicly funded monies for punitive purposes. Id. at 433. Green’s discussionreinforces that message contained in Lockley. Green, 177 N.J. at 444. Themajority opinions in Lockley and Green were responsive to concerns of theseparately writing Justices; and, with due knowledge that certain PDA factorswere being eliminated, the Court insisted that the trial judge perform aheightened review role. The Appellate Division’s instructions, which were thoughtfullyconsidered and largely correct, were mistaken in this specific respect. Thecourt did not mention the heightened review role to be played by the trial courtand referred only to the Baker and BMW considerations. That significantomission requires correction because the Baker and BMW factors are relatedto due process considerations, Baker, 161 N.J. at 229-30, and are not asubstitute for Lockley’s direction for heightened trial-court review whenpublic entities are on the giving end of a punitive damages award by a jury. Lockley instructs that the trial court’s review is not merely to ensure thata punitive damages award comports with due process. See 177 N.J. at 432-33.There is an extra review role, one beyond keeping the award to the amountnecessary to avoid transgressing due process. By that, we do not meanadditional steps to the existing analytic framework, but rather a more rigorousapplication of what is already in place as factors to be considered when 35 assessing the punitive damages award in the context of the factualcircumstances of the wrong involved and the nature of the public entitydefendant. 5 To the extent that the Baker/BMW factors assist in thatassessment and add to those mentioned, and applicable, under the PDA, weagree with counsel for the State that the factors overlap. These are notindependent assessments; rather, they coalesce for a holistic assessment. SeeLockley, 177 N.J. at 433. In sum, we instruct the trial court on remand, and all trial courtsreviewing a punitive damages award issued by a jury against a public entitydefendant, to review the award under the heightened scrutiny required inLockley and explicated in Green.5 We do not suggest that the judge’s review should entail additional information beyond that which is presented to the jury, with its restrictions against inclusion of information about the public entity’s finances. See Lockley, 177 N.J. at 430-32. We do not retreat from the judgment expressed in Lockley that presentation of the financial picture of a public entity is fraught with difficulty and should not be presented to the jury or through any expansion of information presented to the trial court reviewing a jury’s punitive damages award. Ibid. That said, although the State did not appeal the jury instructions used in this matter, at argument the prospect of review of the model jury charge on the award of punitive damages against a public entity defendant was raised. We invite that review, if only for the purpose of adding a sentence that simply but explicitly states that the jury should not forget that an award of punitive damages comes from public funds. 36 We turn next to review the remand instructions, which were criticized bythe State as inconsistent with our jurisprudence in this area. V. We begin with the observation that, in large part, we find the AppellateDivision’s discussion of the Baker/BMW factors to be substantially correct. As those cases explain, the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment imposes outer limits on the allowable size of an award of punitivedamages. Baker, 161 N.J. at 229-30 (quoting and discussing BMW). Wecommend the Appellate Division for instructing the trial court, on remand, tosubstantially consider the factors advanced in BMW and incorporated intoNew Jersey law by Baker. The Appellate Division correctly highlighted BMWand State Farm as twin guiding lights lit by the United States Supreme Cou rt inthis otherwise hazy area, where courts are tasked with reviewing a punitivedamages award. We commend the Appellate Division’s identification of the three factorsexplicated in BMW: “the degree of reprehensibility of the [underlying tort];the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [Pritchett] and[her] punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and thecivil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” 517 U.S. at 575.In doing so, we emphasize that the first consideration is “[p]erhaps the most 37 important” and that the mental state or track record of the defendants speaks tothe reprehensibility of the conduct, id. at 575-77. Although the United States Supreme Court in BMW introduced theconsideration of ratios between compensatory and punitive damages in thediscussion of the second factor, see id. at 580-82, the Court cautioned in thatcase and in State Farm that mathematical formulae alone cannot encapsulatethe multiple facets of the Due Process Clause or address all of its concerns,BMW 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that theconstitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one thatcompares actual and potential damages to the punitive award.” (emphasisomitted)); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424 (“[W]e have been reluctant to identifyconcrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, tothe plaintiff and the punitive damages award.”); accord Exxon Shipping Co. v.Baker, 554 U.S. 471 , 501 (2008) (restating the principle in dicta). Thus, “because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damagesaward may not surpass,” “courts must ensure that the measure of punishment isboth reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and tothe general damages recovered.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425-26. Indeed, theSupreme Court has intimated that there might be awards that “exceed[] a 38 single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a signi ficantdegree, [that] will [still] satisfy due process.” Id. at 425. We therefore further approve of how the Appellate Division highlightedState Farm’s point that this analysis entails more than the rote application ofbright-line ratios. Although mathematical expressions can give usefulperspective, simple resort to a calculator cannot and must not supplant thewell-considered judgment of our trial courts. Ibid. (“While these ratios are notbinding, they are instructive.”). Finally, we point out that the Legislature, in the LAD setting, issimilarly reluctant to rely solely on bright-line ratios, exempting the LAD in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(c) from the PDA’s cap on punitive damages providedin -5.14(b). Those authorities, then, serve to convince that sole reliance onsuch ratios and caps is impermissible and that a holistic assessment of theBaker/BMW factors is always required. See Baker, 161 N.J. at 231. 6 In sum, we find no error in the guidance that the Appellate Divisionprovided to the trial court when remanding this matter, other than the omission6 That is not to say, however, that there are no numerical examples to guide the trial court’s review. BMW’s third factor instructs courts to consider “the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” 517 U.S. at 575. Lockley instructed trial courts to look to the LAD’s schedule of civil penalties as further grounding, but not controlling, the court’s analysis. 177 N.J. at 432 (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1a). 39 of heightened scrutiny previously addressed. That omission compels ourmodification of the appellate judgment. See supra Section IV. The heightenedscrutiny that this Court decreed in the review of a jury’s award of punitivedamages against a public sector defendant is essential to our direction on howto assess the availability of punitive damages against such defendants. VI. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 40