Title: PEOPLE OF MI V LORD SHAWN RUSSELL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122998
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 27, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122998 
LORD SHAWN RUSSELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J. 
In this case, we granted leave to appeal to consider 
whether a defendant may, by conduct alone, “unequivocally” 
waive his Sixth Amendment Right to counsel and elect to 
proceed pro se. 
We need not reach that question in this 
case because a review of the record reveals that defendant 
clearly and unequivocally declined self-representation. We 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to 
deliver less than fifty grams of both cocaine and heroin.1 
At the beginning of trial, defendant informed the trial 
court that he wanted his trial counsel, Damian Nunzio, 
removed and new trial counsel appointed.2 
The trial court did not grant defendant’s request, but 
noted that he “would entertain” the request if defendant 
presented “some valid reason” to appoint substitute counsel 
other than “personality difficulties.” 
Defendant offered 
no such explanation. After refusing to grant defendant’s 
request, the trial court offered defendant the following 
four options: 
[O]ur alternatives here are basically these.
You may, if you have made arrangements on your
own, bring in your own lawyer at your own expense
and hire anybody you want, and I will allow that
lawyer to substitute right now and we’ll go from
here. 
Option number two, we can go forward with 
Mr. 
Nunzio, 
the 
second 
lawyer 
that’s 
been 
provided for you at government expense, and try
this case on the merits. 
I would strongly
suggest that, if Mr. Nunzio thinks you have a
valid defense, that you consult with him and work 
1 
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). 
2 
Mr. Nunzio was defendant’s second appointed attorney.
Defendant’s 
first 
appointed 
attorney 
withdrew 
after 
defendant complained about counsel’s representation. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
with him on it because he’s a man that knows how 
to present such a defense. 
Or number three, you may decide to serve as
your own counsel and represent yourself. 
I 
caution you strongly against the third course
because obviously a trial involves issues of 
complicated legal procedure and, unless you are
legally trained, and I don’t know whether you are
or not but I suspect you are not, there are many
pitfalls there for the unwary. 
And that leads us, I suppose, to option
four, which is sort of a variation on option
number three, in which you provide your own 
defense but Mr. Nunzio would be available to 
consult with you and provide you assistance as to
technical legal points when you need counsel.[3] 
After defendant continued to indicate that he did not 
“feel 
comfortable” 
with 
his 
appointed 
attorney’s 
representation, the trial court reminded defendant of his 
other available options—defendant could retain counsel or 
he could represent himself: 
The Court: 
And, while I would not advise
it, I will certainly guard your rights and see to
it that you have the opportunity to present your
own defense, if that’s your wish. 
Defendant: Well, that’s putting words in my
mouth. I— 
The Court: 
Well, then maybe you should put
words in your mouth and tell me what you want. 
Thus, two of the four options presented to defendant
involved forms of self-representation. 
3  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant: 
I told you. I don’t want Mr.
Nunzio as my attorney. 
The Court: 
. . . So, your options are
really kind of limited. 
Defendant: 
The State has the obligation to
give me representation. 
At a later point in the proceedings, the following exchange 
occurred: 
The Court: . . . And if you can’t cooperate
with the man, then you can try the case yourself,
and that’s fine. You have a constitutional right
to do it. I don’t think it’s a good idea, but I’m
here to guarantee your constitutional rights. And
if you want to try your case yourself, by 
goodness, that’s what we’re going to do. 
Defendant: 
Well, that’s what you keep
insisting that I do, and I’m telling you that I
need competent counsel . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
Although the trial court then gave defendant several 
more opportunities to select among the four proffered 
options, defendant continued to reject all of them. 
The 
trial court then empanelled the jury and asked defendant if 
he had any questions for the panel. Defendant stated: 
Yes. 
Ladies 
and 
gentlemen, 
this 
is 
something totally new for me. 
I’m being forced
into this situation . . . . 
I requested the Court appoint new counsel
for me, and they said, for some reason being that
we’re here and they don’t see the difference—any
differences between me and Mr. Nunzio. 
So they 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
   
  
 
forced me to go on with this trial alone by
myself. 
After a four-day trial, defendant was convicted of 
both charges and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 
2½ to 40 years for each conviction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions 
in a published opinion. The panel concluded that defendant 
implicitly “made his unequivocal choice” to proceed in 
propria persona “by his own conduct” when he continued to 
reject appointed counsel’s representation.4
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review for clear error the trial court’s factual 
findings surrounding a defendant’s waiver. However, to the 
extent that a ruling involves an interpretation of the law 
or 
the 
application 
of 
a 
constitutional 
standard 
to 
uncontested facts, our review is de novo.5 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION 
The Sixth Amendment provides that the accused in a 
criminal prosecution "shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
4 
254 Mich App 11, 17; 656 NW2d 817 (2002). 
5 
See People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912
(2001); People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152
(2000). 
5  
 
 
  
                                                 
  
   
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
the Assistance of counsel for his defence." 
US Const, Am 
VI.6 This requirement was made applicable to the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 
The right to counsel is considered fundamental because it 
is essential to a fair trial and attaches at the trial 
stage, 
which 
is 
clearly 
a 
critical 
stage 
of 
the 
proceedings.8
 While a defendant may choose to forgo the 
assistance of counsel at trial, any waiver of the right to 
counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.9
 In 
addition, it is a long-held principle that courts are to 
make every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a 
6 
Likewise, Const 1963, art 1, § 20 provides that the
accused in a criminal prosecution "shall have the right
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his . . . 
defense." 
Our Michigan Constitution is not at issue here
because the federal Supremacy Clause, US Const, art VI, cl
2, requires that we apply the federal constitutional 
analogue to the degree that our Constitution provides less
protection to a criminal defendant. 
California v Ramos,
463 US 992; 103 S Ct 3446; 77 L Ed 2d 1171 (1983). 
This 
case does not present an opportunity to discern whether our
Constitution provides a right of self-representation that
is greater than its federal counterpart. 
7 
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed
2d 799 (1963). 
8 
Id. 
9 
Iowa v Tovar, 541 US ___; 124 S Ct 1379; 158 L Ed 2d
209 (2004); Godinez v Moran, 509 US 389; 113 S Ct 2680; 125
L Ed 2d 321 (1993); Patterson v Illinois, 487 US 285, 292 n
4; 108 S Ct 2389; 101 L Ed 2d 261 (1988). 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
fundamental constitutional right,10 including the waiver of 
the right to the assistance of counsel.11
 
In Faretta v California,12 the United States Supreme 
Court held that a defendant "has a constitutional right to 
proceed 
without 
counsel 
when 
he 
voluntarily 
and 
intelligently elects to do so."13
 While the Faretta 
10 
The principle that every reasonable presumption should
be 
indulged 
against 
the 
waiver 
of 
a 
fundamental 
constitutional right has a long-standing pedigree in 
federal constitutional law. 
See Hodges v Easton, 106 US
(16 Otto) 408, 413; 1 S Ct 307; 27 L Ed 169 (1882) (“It has 
been often said by this court that the trial by jury is a
fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the
people. Consequently, every reasonable presumption should
be indulged against its waiver.”). 
11 
Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed
1461 
(1938) 
(every 
reasonable 
presumption 
should 
be 
indulged against the waiver of counsel); Michigan v 
Jackson, 475 US 625, 633; 106 S Ct 1404; 89 L Ed 2d 631
(1986); Martinez v Court of Appeal of California, 528 US
152, 161; 120 S Ct 684; 145 L Ed 2d 597 (2000)(noting that
there is a “‘strong presumption against’” waiver of 
counsel)(citation omitted); People v Adkins (After Remand),
452 Mich 702; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). 
12 
422 US 806; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975). In
Faretta, the majority identified a “nearly universal 
conviction” 
that 
forcing 
representation 
on 
unwilling
defendant “is contrary to his basic right to defend himself
if he truly wants to do so.” Id. at 817 (emphasis added). 
13 
Id. at 807 (emphasis added). See also Martinez, supra
at 154. In Michigan, the right of self-representation is a
right explicitly conferred in our Constitution. 
See Const 
1963, art 1, § 13. This right has been afforded to the
citizens of Michigan since 1850. See Const 1850, art 6, §
24. 
7  
 
 
  
                                                 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
majority noted that the framers of the Constitution never 
imagined that the right of self-representation “might be 
considered 
inferior 
to 
the 
right 
of 
assistance 
of 
counsel,”14 the United States Supreme Court has also noted 
that the “right to self-representation is not absolute.”15 
Indeed, because a defendant automatically enjoys the right 
to the assistance of counsel,16 and the right of self­
representation and the right to counsel are mutually 
exclusive, a defendant must elect to conduct his own 
defense “‘voluntarily and intelligently,’”17 and must be 
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self­
representation “in order to”18 proceed pro se.19  Therefore, 
14 
Faretta, supra 832. 
15 
Martinez, supra at 161 (emphasis added). 
16 
The right to the assistance of counsel is automatic;
assuming the right is not waived, assistance must be made
available at critical stages of a criminal prosecution,
regardless whether the defendant has requested it. 
United 
States v Wade, 388 US 218, 223-227; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed
2d 1149 (1967); Carnley v Cochran, 369 US 506, 513; 82 S Ct
884; 8 L Ed 2d 70 (1962). 
appointed, over a defendant's objection. Faretta, supra at 
17 
Martinez, supra at 161 (citation omitted). 
18 
Faretta, supra at 835 (emphasis added). 
19 
Moreover,
representation 
even 
once 
properly
may 
be 
terminated 
or 
elected,
standby 
self­
counsel 
834 n 46. 
Standby counsel may participate in the trial
proceedings, without the express consent of the defendant,
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
  
 
while the right of self-representation is a fundamental 
constitutional right, other interests, such as the failure 
to effectively waive the right to counsel or a governmental 
interest in “ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the 
trial” may in some instances outweigh the defendant’s 
constitutional right to act as his own counsel.20  In sum, 
although the right to counsel and the right of self­
representation are both fundamental constitutional rights, 
representation by counsel, as guarantor of a fair trial, 
“is the standard, not the exception,”21 in the absence of a 
proper waiver. 
B. MICHIGAN’S APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD 
In People v Anderson,22 this Court applied the Faretta 
standard 
for 
self-representation 
and 
established 
(…continued)
as 
long 
as 
that 
participation 
does 
not 
"seriously
undermin[e]" the "appearance before the jury" that the
defendant is representing himself. McKaskle v Wiggins, 465
US 168, 187; 104 S Ct 944; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984). 
20 
Martinez, supra at 162. 
21 
Id. at 161. 
See also United States v Martin, 25 F3d
293, 295 (CA 6, 1994) (“While the right to self­
representation is related to the right to counsel, the
right 
to 
self-representation 
is 
grounded 
more 
in 
considerations 
of 
free 
choice 
than 
in 
fair 
trial 
concerns.”). 
22  398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). 
See also People v
Dennany, 445 Mich 412; 519 NW2d 128 (1994). 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
requirements regarding the judicial inquest necessary to 
effectuate a valid waiver and permit a defendant to 
represent himself. 
Upon a defendant's initial request to 
proceed pro se, a court must determine that (1) the 
defendant's request is unequivocal, (2) the defendant is 
asserting 
his 
right 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily through a colloquy advising the defendant of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and 
(3) the defendant's self-representation will not disrupt, 
unduly 
inconvenience, 
and 
burden 
the 
court 
and 
the 
administration of the court's business. 
In 
addition, 
a 
trial 
court 
must 
satisfy 
the 
requirements of MCR 6.005(D), which provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The court may not permit the defendant to 
make an initial waiver of the right to be 
represented by a lawyer without first 
(1) advising the defendant of the charge,
the maximum possible prison sentence for the 
offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required
by 
law, 
and 
the 
risk 
involved 
in 
self­
representation, and 
(2) offering the defendant the opportunity
to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the
defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult
with an appointed lawyer. 
In Adkins, this Court clarified the scope of judicial 
inquiry 
required 
by 
Anderson 
and 
MCR 
6.005(D) 
when 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
confronted with an initial request for self-representation. 
Adkins 
rejected 
a 
“litany 
approach” 
in 
favor 
of 
a 
“substantial compliance” standard: 
We hold, therefore, that trial courts must
substantially 
comply 
with 
the 
aforementioned 
substantive 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
both 
Anderson and MCR 6.005(D). Substantial compliance
requires that the court discuss the substance of
both Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) in a short 
colloquy with the defendant, and make an express
finding that the defendant fully understands, 
recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of
counsel procedures. The nonformalistic nature of
a 
substantial 
compliance 
rule 
affords 
the 
protection of a strict compliance rule with far
less of the problems associated with requiring
courts to engage in a word-for-word litany
approach. 
Further, 
we 
believe 
this 
standard 
protects 
the 
“vital 
constitutional 
rights
involved 
while 
avoiding 
the 
unjustified
manipulation which can otherwise throw a real but
unnecessary 
burden 
on 
the 
criminal 
justice
system.” 
Completion 
of 
these 
judicial 
procedures
allows the court to consider a request to proceed
in propria persona. If a judge is uncertain 
regarding whether any of the waiver procedures
are met, he should deny the defendant's request 
to proceed in propria persona, noting the reasons
for the denial on the record. The defendant 
should 
then 
continue 
to 
be 
represented 
by 
retained or appointed counsel, unless the judge
determines substitute counsel is appropriate.[23]
 
Under 
Adkins, 
if 
the 
trial 
court 
fails 
to 
substantially comply with the requirements in Anderson and 
Adkins, supra at 726-727 (emphasis added; internal
citation omitted). 
11  
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
   
the court rule, then the defendant has not effectively 
waived his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel. 
In addition, the rule articulated in Adkins 
provides a practical, salutary tool to be used to avoid 
rewarding gamesmanship as well as to avoid the creation of 
appellate parachutes: if any irregularities exist in the 
waiver proceeding, the defendant should continue to be 
represented by counsel. 
C. RESOLUTION 
In this case, a review of the record indicates two key 
facts: first, that defendant expressly rejected self­
representation 
and, 
second, 
that 
defendant 
never 
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel at trial.24  Indeed, defendant clearly 
sought appointment of another trial counsel, and defendant 
and the trial court engaged in a lengthy dialogue over 
defendant’s desire to have substitute counsel appointed. 
While defendant was given clear choices, defendant 
consistently 
denied 
that 
his 
choice 
was 
self­
representation. 
Throughout his colloquy with the trial 
Because defendant clearly and unambiguously rejected
self-representation, 
we 
need 
not 
address 
whether 
a 
defendant’s desire to proceed pro se may ever be inferred 
by conduct. 
12  
24 
 
 
  
 
   
                                                 
  
 
  
 
court, 
defendant 
steadfastly 
rejected 
the 
option 
of 
proceeding to trial without the assistance of counsel.25 
Therefore, it cannot be said, as the Court of Appeals and 
dissenting opinions maintain, that defendant unequivocally 
chose self-representation and voluntarily waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.26 
25 
Defendant did not have the right to a third appointed
counselor, 
because 
no 
defendant 
is 
entitled 
to 
the 
appointed counselor of his choice. 
See Wheat v United 
States, 486 US 153; 108 S Ct 1692; 100 L Ed 2d 140 (1988); 
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People
v Portillo, 241 Mich App 540; 616 NW2d 707 (2000). Rather,
the decision to permit substitution of appointed counsel is
within the discretion of the trial court. People v Hooper,
406 Mich 978; 280 NW2d 444 (1979). In this case, defendant
does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to appoint substitute counsel; rather, defendant
argues before this Court that the trial court reversibly
erred because defendant did not unequivocally waive his
right to counsel and did not elect to represent himself. 
26 
As the dissent notes, there are some federal circuit
court cases holding that an unreasonable insistence on the
appointment of a new attorney operates as a waiver of the
right to counsel. This view is in contravention of the
principle articulated in Johnson. Until the United States 
Supreme Court sees fit to distinguish or overrule Johnson,
this Court is required to follow it. Moreover, it does not
logically follow that a defendant affirmatively waives a 
fundamental constitutional right simply because he insists
on a favorable ruling on something to which he is not
entitled. Under the theory advocated by the dissent, if a
defendant were to insist on empanelling only left-handed 
jurors, his insistence would constitute an affirmative 
waiver of his right to a jury trial even if he explicitly
indicates that he desires a jury trial. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
  
 
We believe that defendant’s repudiation of self­
representation was unmistakable in this case. 
However, to 
the degree that defendant’s refusal to explicitly choose 
between continued representation by appointed counsel and 
self-representation 
created 
any 
ambiguity 
regarding 
plaintiff’s desire to unequivocally waive his right to 
trial counsel, any ambiguity should have been resolved in 
favor of representation because, consistently with Adkins 
and United States Supreme Court precedent, courts must 
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
the right to counsel.27 
IV. Conclusion 
Because 
defendant 
unequivocally 
rejected 
self­
representation and did not voluntarily waive his right to 
the assistance of counsel at trial, the trial court erred 
in requiring defendant to proceed in propria persona. 
The 
27 
Because defendant’s waiver of his right to the 
assistance of counsel at trial was not voluntary, we need
not address whether defendant’s waiver was knowing and
intelligent. 
It is worth noting, however, that an 
effective waiver of trial counsel requires a more exacting
waiver than that required to waive counsel at pretrial
stages of the proceedings. 
See Iowa v Tovar, supra, 124 S 
Ct 1387-1388; 158 L Ed 2d 220-221 (requiring that a 
defendant “must be warned specifically of the hazards 
ahead” and that those warnings surrounding waiver of 
counsel at trial be “‘rigorous[ly] conveyed”)(emphasis
added; citation omitted). 
14  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
  
   
clear cut rule articulated by this Court in Adkins requires 
that counsel should have been retained where defendant 
explicitly rejected self-representation.28  Accordingly, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.29 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor 
28 
In this instance, the trial court should have simply
denied defendant’s request to appoint another counsel and
continued with the proceedings. 
Defendant’s acceptance of 
the trial court’s discretionary ruling was not required. 
29 
The complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of
a criminal proceeding is a structural error that renders
the result unreliable, thus requiring automatic reversal.
Gideon v Wainwright, supra; People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47,
51-52; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
  
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 122998 
LORD SHAWN RUSSELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
because I agree with the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals and believe that defendant, by his conduct alone, 
“unequivocally” waived his constitutional and statutory 
right to trial counsel. 
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 
1, § 13; MCL 763.1. 
Because I believe that defendant’s 
waiver also satisfied the requirements set forth by this 
Court in People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 
857 (1976), and MCR 6.005(D), I would affirm defendant’s 
conviction. 
Further, I respectfully urge the United States Supreme 
Court to consider granting certiorari in this case to 
clarify the operation of the presumption against the waiver 
 
 
 
 
 
of trial counsel in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; 58 S Ct 
1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938). 
In this case, defendant 
unreasonably refused to cooperate with his second court­
appointed counsel, but also declined to assert that he 
wished to proceed pro se. 
Some federal courts have 
interpreted such conduct as constituting an effective 
waiver of the right to trial counsel, but the lack of 
clarity regarding the scope of the Johnson presumption 
continues to create constitutional uncertainty. 
Where a 
defendant 
unreasonably 
declines 
appointed 
counsel’s 
services, 
the 
Johnson 
presumption 
should 
not 
remain 
inviolate. 
The right to trial counsel, the right to self­
representation, and the prohibition against forcing trial 
counsel on an unwilling defendant intersect. 
Thus, courts 
must protect a defendant’s rights while also safeguarding 
the integrity of the judicial process from delay tactics 
and gamesmanship, both of which are on display in this 
case. 
If defendant here had been required to retain his 
counsel, as the majority would require, he would now almost 
certainly be arguing that his right to trial counsel had 
been violated and that such counsel had been forced upon 
him against his will. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and 
heroin. 
At the beginning of trial, defendant informed the 
trial court that he wanted his trial counsel, Damian 
Nunzio, removed and new trial counsel appointed.1
 Among 
other allegations, defendant claimed that there had been 
miscommunications between him and Nunzio, that Nunzio had 
been convinced of defendant’s guilt, that Nunzio had failed 
to give defendant certain helpful documents, and that 
Nunzio had failed to call certain witnesses. 
The court found that defendant had failed to present 
“some valid reason why a different lawyer should be 
appointed, other than the fact that [defendant was] seeming 
to have personal difficulties with the leading members of 
the bar.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion to 
appoint new counsel, and informed defendant that his 
options were as follows: 
You may, if you have made arrangements on
your own, bring in your own lawyer at your own
expense and hire anybody you want, and I will
allow that lawyer to substitute right now and
we’ll go from here. 
1 The trial court permitted defendant’s first appointed
trial counsel, Paul Mitchell, to withdraw after defendant
complained about the manner in which he represented
defendant. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option number two, we can go forward with 
Mr. 
Nunzio, 
the 
second 
lawyer 
that’s 
been 
provided for you at government expense, and try
this case on the merits. 
I would strongly
suggest that, if Mr. Nunzio thinks you have a
valid defense, that you consult with him and work
with him on it because he’s a man that knows how 
to present such a defense. 
Or number three, you may decide to serve as
your own counsel and represent yourself. 
I 
caution you strongly against the third course
because obviously a trial involves issues of 
complicated legal procedure and, unless you are
legally trained, and I don’t know whether you are
or not but I suspect you are not, there are many
pitfalls there for the unwary. 
And that leads us, I suppose, to option
four, which is sort of a variation on option
number three, in which you provide your own 
defense but Mr. Nunzio would be available to 
consult with you and provide you assistance as to
technical legal points when you need counsel.
That pretty much exhausts the field, as far as I
can determine at this moment, for what we might
do about proceeding here today. 
Defendant insisted that he did not want Nunzio to 
represent him because, “Mr. Nunzio has stated that he 
doesn’t believe that I’m innocent.” 
Nunzio denied this 
allegation. 
The trial court explained to defendant that: 
[E]ven if we were to assume arguendo that
[Nunzio] did say that, and I don’t believe it for
a minute, it would not be germane. 
A lawyer
represents a client by presenting his defense
under the law. 
* * * 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not necessary that Mr. Nunzio believe
you are innocent in order to represent you and
present the very best defense available to you 
under the law. So, essentially we’re sparring at
shadows here, and this discussion is not getting
us anywhere. 
Defendant continued to insist that he did not want 
Nunzio to represent him. The trial court responded: 
I think I’ve given you the options as I
understand them, and I’m prepared to go with
whichever one you feel is the appropriate one to
follow at this particular time. 
Defendant replied, “Well, I’ve expressed mine. “I don’t 
want Mr. Nunzio to represent me.” (Emphasis added.) 
The court then explained that only three options 
remained for defendant: 
Your options are that you may bring in 
counsel of your own choosing, which you’ve had
many months to do and I don’t see anybody sitting
here, so I don’t assume that [is] going to 
happen; or you may represent yourself in which
case I will allow Mr. Nunzio to be available to 
provide you with legal counsel on technical and
procedural points when you wish to consult with
him. 
The trial court then warned defendant about the dangers of 
self-representation, stating: 
If you wish to do that, I will certainly
proceed in that fashion. 
I would not personally
advise that you do that, but that’s your right. 
* * * 
I should advise you that there is an ancient
adage in the law, for good reason, that a man who
acts as his own counsel has a fool for a client. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The corollary to the rule is that he also has a
fool for a lawyer, but, as a practical matter, it
all winds up in the same place. 
My guess is that you will not fare well in
that approach, but you have the right to take
that approach if you wish to do it. 
Defendant replied, “Well, that’s putting words in my 
mouth.” 
The trial court responded, “Well then maybe you 
should put words in your mouth and tell me what you want.” 
Defendant responded, “Well, I told you. 
I don’t want Mr. 
Nunzio as my attorney.” 
The trial transcript contains four more pages of 
dialogue between defendant and the trial court in which, 
although defendant continues to request that a new attorney 
be appointed for him, the trial court continued to deny 
such request. The court eventually states: 
What I really want to know is how you want
to proceed so we can get started here. 
And I’m 
willing to take a recess and let you speak to Mr.
Nunzio, or if you want don’t want to speak to Mr.
Nunzio, I’m willing to take a recess and let you
contemplate the matter. 
But the fact is that we 
need to know what it is that you wish to do and
within the range of the options, which I think
I’ve pretty clearly delineated for you. 
I’m 
prepared to accommodate you. 
Now, do you wish to consult with Mr. Nunzio
or mull this over for a few minutes, or are you
ready to make an alternative choice at this time? 
Defendant answered, “Your Honor, I thought I made 
myself clear here.” 
The trial court replied, “Well 
6  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
apparently not because I haven’t heard you make any choice 
. . . I just need to know which of those you wish to do.” 
The transcript contains another six pages of dialogue 
between the trial court and defendant in which defendant 
complained about Nunzio’s performance. 
After the trial 
court found all of defendant’s allegations to be completely 
unfounded, the following exchange between the trial court 
and defendant occurred: 
Defendant: I don’t—I don’t want any contact
with Mr. Nunzio, and I expressed that to you. 
I 
don’t want Mr. Nunzio to have anything to do with
anything in my case. . . . There’s no way that I
will let him try to defend me. 
* * * 
All right. 
Well, I just want it noted that
I have stated the conflict between me and 
attorney Nunzio, and the statements that Mr. 
Nunzio has made in regards to me and my case, and
there’s no way that I would feel comfortable with
him having anything to do with the defense on my
behalf. And I’m requesting that you remove him 
from my case. 
Court: 
All right. 
Well, then, I will
inform the jury that you have chosen to represent
yourself and that Mr. Nunzio is available as your
legal advisor. 
Now, are you ready to proceed or
do you wish to take a few moments to get yourself
organized. 
Defendant: (No verbal response) 
Court: Mr. Russell that’s a question to you. 
Defendant:
 I’ve requested to you, Your 
Honor, I said that I don’t want Mr. Nunzio 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
involved in nothing of my defense, and I am
requesting of this court to appoint counsel. 
Court: Well, we have appointed counsel, Mr.
Russell, and he sits next to you at this 
particular moment. Now, you can either work with
Mr. Nunzio or demonstrate some reasonable basis 
why he should be removed, which you have not
done, or else we’re going to start this case and
you can represent yourself. 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
Inasmuch as you apparently have not made
arrangements for alternate counsel, I suggest
that you strongly consider going forward with the
very capable lawyer that you have been provided.
Failing that, I will protect your right to 
represent yourself. But this is the day and time
of proceeding and we’ve run out of time. 
We’ve 
run out of options. 
So I suggest that you
confine 
yourself 
to 
what 
we’ve 
discussed. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Although the trial court then gave defendant several 
additional opportunities to select an option,2 defendant 
continued to refuse to do so, at which time the trial court 
empanelled the jury and asked defendant if he had any 
questions for the panel. Defendant stated: 
Yes. 
Ladies 
and 
gentlemen, 
this 
is 
something totally new for me. 
I’m being forced
into this situation . . . . 
I requested the Court appoint new counsel
for me, and they said, for some reason being that
we’re here and they don’t see the difference—any 
2 In order to accord defendant adequate opportunity to
consult with Nunzio regarding the four options, the trial
court took two recesses, the first for twenty minutes and
the second for one-and-a-half hours. 
8  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
differences between me and Mr. Nunizo. 
So they
forced me to go on with this trial alone by
myself. 
After a four-day trial, defendant was convicted on both 
charges and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of two­
and-a-half to forty years on each count. 
Although the 
Court of Appeals remanded this case for correction of the 
presentence 
investigation 
report 
and 
resentencing, 
it 
affirmed 
defendant’s 
convictions, 
concluding 
that 
defendant, by his conduct alone, had demonstrated his 
choice to represent himself at trial.3 
II. Analysis 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Faretta v 
California, 422 US 806, 819-820; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 
562 (1975), and that a defendant may waive his right to 
counsel, provided he do so “competently and intelligently.” 
Johnson, supra at 468. 
[W]hether there has been an 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in 
each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding 
that 
case, 
including 
the 
background, 
3 254 Mich App 11, 22; 656 NW2d 817 (2002). 
9  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
experience, and conduct of the accused.” 
Id. (emphasis 
added). 
In Michigan, the right to self-representation is 
secured by both the state constitution and statute.4 
However, this Court has stated that a trial court may only 
permit a defendant to represent himself if the following 
requirements have been satisfied: (1) the defendant’s 
request to represent himself has been unequivocal; (2) the 
defendant has asserted his right of self-representation 
“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”; (3) the trial 
court 
has 
been 
satisfied 
that 
the 
defendant, 
in 
representing 
himself, 
“will 
not 
disrupt, 
unduly 
inconvenience and burden the court and the administration 
of the court’s business.” People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 
367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). 
Moreover, the trial court 
4 Const 1963, art 1, § 13 provides: 
A suitor in any court of this state has the
right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in
his own proper person or by an attorney. 
MCL 763.1 provides: 
On the trial of every indictment or other
criminal accusation, the party accused shall be
allowed to be heard by counsel and may defend
himself, and he shall have a right to produce
witnesses and proofs in his favor, and meet the
witnesses who are produced against him face to 
face. 
10  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
must also satisfy MCR 6.005(D).5 
People v Adkins  (After 
Remand), 452 Mich 702, 722; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). 
Taken 
together, the requirements of Michigan law are in accord 
with the waiver requirements of the federal constitution. 
See Iowa v Tovar, 541 US ___, 124 S Ct 1379, 158 L Ed 2d 
209 (2004)(“the [federal] constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the 
nature of the charges against him, of his right to be 
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable 
punishments attendant upon the entry of the guilty plea”); 
Faretta, supra at 835 (holding that, before a defendant may 
waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a defendant 
“should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation”). 
5 MCR 6.005(D) provides, in relevant part: 
The court may not permit the defendant to 
make an initial waiver of the right to be 
represented by a lawyer without first 
(1) advising the defendant of the charge,
the maximum possible prison sentence for the 
offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required
by 
law, 
and 
the 
risk 
involved 
in 
self 
representation, and 
(2) offering the defendant the opportunity
to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the
defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult
with an appointed lawyer. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Compliance with these requirements mandates that the 
trial court “engage, on the record, in a methodical 
assessment of the wisdom of self-representation by the 
defendant.” 
Adkins, supra at 721. 
The defendant must 
exhibit “‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment’” of 
the right to trial counsel, and the trial court should 
“‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’” of 
such right. 
Id., quoting Johnson, supra at 464. 
Further, 
“‘[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. 
The record must show, or there must be an allegation and 
evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel 
but intelligently and understandably rejected the offer.’” 
Adkins, supra at 721 (citations omitted). 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it declined defendant’s request to appoint 
him 
a 
third 
attorney, 
thereby 
forcing 
defendant 
to 
represent himself. 
That is, defendant contends that 
because he did not expressly waive his right to trial 
counsel, such waiver was, at the very least, equivocal and, 
therefore, invalid.6 
6 It was entirely proper for the trial court to require
defendant to choose between proceeding to trial with his
present attorney and representing himself. See United 
States v Grosshans, 821 F2d 1247, 1251 (CA 6, 1987);
Maynard v Meachum, 545 F2d 273, 278 (CA 1, 1976). 
12  
 
 
 
 
I disagree. 
A waiver of a defendant’s right to trial 
counsel must be “unequivocal,” Anderson, supra at 367, 
meaning only that such waiver must be “[c]lear; plain; 
capable of being understood in only one way, or as clearly 
demonstrated.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). 
I do not 
accept the standard proposed by defendant and implied by 
the majority—that only a verbal waiver can sufficiently 
constitute an "unequivocal" waiver of the right to trial 
counsel. 
Neither defendant nor the majority has cited a 
single state or federal court decision that has adopted 
such a standard, and I do not believe this standard to be 
implicit in the requirement of an "unequivocal" waiver. 
Here, defendant was offered four options by the trial 
court in response to his request for a third appointed 
counsel. Having clearly rejected three of these options, I 
believe, as a matter of logic, that it can be fairly 
concluded that defendant "unequivocally" assented to the 
fourth option. 
That defendant made clear his displeasure 
at being limited to these four options does not alter my 
conclusion. 
The fact that defendant desired the fifth 
option of being appointed a third counsel does not 
transform the trial court's decision to reject such an 
appointment into an abuse of discretion. 
See Mowat v 
Walsh, 254 Mich 302, 304; 236 NW 791 (1931); People v 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 556-557; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). 
As 
the majority has correctly noted, “no defendant is entitled 
to the appointed counselor of his choice.” Ante at 12-13 n 
25. Because there was no abuse of discretion, there was no 
fifth option. 
Defendant was properly limited by the trial 
court to four options, and he clearly rejected three of 
these. 
Concerning 
the 
first 
option, 
defendant, 
despite 
repeated invitations and opportunities to hire his own 
counsel, failed to do so and expressed no interest in doing 
so. Concerning the third and fourth options, defendant, as 
noted earlier, unambiguously, repeatedly, and vehemently 
refused to have Nunzio represent him. 
Supra at 4-5, 7. 
The majority would disregard defendant’s clear wishes on 
this point and force defendant to retain Nunzio. 
Ante at 
14. 
In Faretta, supra at 820-821, the United States 
Supreme Court 
asserted that the Sixth Amendment “right to 
counsel,” 
does not permit the trial court to appoint 
counsel that defendant has refused to accept: 
The 
language 
and 
spirit 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the 
other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment,
shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not an
organ 
of 
the 
State 
interposed 
between 
an 
unwilling defendant and his right to defend 
himself personally. 
To thrust counsel upon the
accused, 
against 
his 
considered 
wish, 
thus 
violates the logic of the Amendment. 
In such a 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master;
and the right to make a defense is stripped of
the personal character upon which the Amendment
insists. 
It is true that when a defendant 
chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his
case, law and tradition may allocate to the 
counsel the power to make binding decisions of
trial strategy in many areas. . . . This 
allocation can only be justified, however, by the
defendant’s consent, at the outset, and to accept
counsel as his representative. 
An unwanted 
counsel “represents” the defendant only through a
tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. 
Unless 
the 
accused 
has 
acquiesced 
in 
such 
representation, the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for,
in a very real sense, it is not his defense. 
[Emphasis in original.] 
Faretta continued by stating, “no State or Colony had ever 
forced counsel upon an accused; no spokesman had ever 
suggested that such a practice would be tolerable, much 
less advisable.” Id. at 832. The Court then observed: 
There can be no blinking at the fact that
the right of an accused to conduct his own 
defense seems to cut against the grain of this
Court’s decisions holding that the Constitution
requires that no accused can be convicted and
imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right
to the assistance of counsel. 
See Powell v 
Alabama, 287 US 45 [53 S Ct 55; 77 L Ed 158 
(1932)]; Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 [58 S Ct
1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938)]; Gideon v Wainwright,
372 US 335 [83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963);
Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25 [92 S Ct 2006; 32
L Ed 2d 530 (1972)]. 
For it is surely true that
the basic thesis of those decisions is that the 
help of a lawyer is essential to assure the
defendant a fair trial. 
And a strong argument
can surely be made that the whole thrust of those
decisions must inevitably lead to the conclusion
that a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer
upon even an unwilling defendant. 
15  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But it is one thing to hold that every
defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the
assistance of counsel, and quite another to say
that a State may compel a defendant to accept a
lawyer he does not want. 
The value of state­
appointed counsel was not unappreciated by the
Founders, yet the notion of compulsory counsel
was utterly foreign to them. 
* * * 
To force a lawyer on a defendant can only
lead him to believe that the law contrives 
against him. [Id. at 832-834.] 
Moreover, in his concurrence in Martinez v Court of Appeals 
of California, 528 US 152, 165; 120 S Ct 684; 145 L Ed 2d 
597 (2000), Justice Scalia noted: 
I have no doubt that the Framers of our 
Constitution, 
who 
were 
suspicious 
enough 
of 
governmental power—including judicial power—that
they insisted upon a citizen’s right to be judged
by an independent jury of private citizens, would
not 
have 
found 
acceptable 
the 
compulsory
assignment of counsel by the Government to plead
a criminal defendant’s case. 
That 
asserting 
the 
right 
of 
self­
representation may often, or even usually, work
to the defendant’s disadvantage is no more 
remarkable—and no more a basis for withdrawing
the right—than is the fact that proceeding
without counsel in a custodial interrogation, or
confessing to the crime, usually works to the
defendant’s disadvantage. 
Our system of laws
generally presumes that the criminal defendant,
after being fully informed, knows his own best 
interests and does not need them dictated by the
State. 
Any other approach is unworthy of a free
people. As Justice Frankfurter eloquently put it
for the Court in Adams v United States ex rel. 
McCann, 317 US 269, 280 [63 S Ct 236; 87 L Ed 
268] (1942), to require the acceptance of counsel 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“is to imprison a man in his privileges and call
it the Constitution.” 
Thus, after defendant told the trial court that he no 
longer wanted Nunzio to represent him, the trial court did 
not have the authority to force defendant to be represented 
by Nunzio.7  Accordingly, I question the basis on which the 
majority asserts that “the trial court should have simply 
denied defendant’s request to appoint another counsel and 
continued with the proceedings.” Ante at 14, n 27.8  Under 
Faretta, this type of action by the trial court would 
seemingly have violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
7 In response to the majority’s assertion that,
“[u]nder the theory advocated by the dissent, if a 
defendant were to insist on empanelling only left-handed 
jurors, his insistence would constitute an affirmative 
waiver of his right to a jury trial even if he explicitly
indicates that he desires a jury trial,” ante at 13, I
simply 
note 
that, 
while 
a 
defendant 
does 
have 
a 
constitutional right not to be represented by counsel he
does not want, Faretta, supra at 833, a defendant does not 
have a constitutional right to empanel “only left-handed 
jurors.” 
Accordingly, I find the majority’s example 
unhelpful in resolving the constitutional issue raised in
this case. 
8 It appears to me that the majority’s “practical,
salutary tool” of thrusting unwanted counsel onto a 
defendant is at least arguably in contravention of Faretta. 
Ante at 11. The majority focuses on only a single sentence
in that case, ante at 7, n 12, while ignoring the general
rule repeatedly set forth in Faretta that it is a violation 
of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel to
“compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want.”
Supra at 833. 
17  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
to trial counsel and presumably provided a basis for a new 
trial. 
Thus, in light of Faretta, the only remaining option, 
and this was made abundantly clear to defendant, was the 
second option. 
That defendant did not expressly assent to 
this option is not dispositive of his choice—for such an 
option is all that remained available to him.9
 The 
majority’s 
decision 
to 
require 
a 
defendant 
under 
circumstances such as these to expressly assent to self­
representation is either to ensure that a “no decision” 
impasse develops in the event that a defendant refuses to 
give an express assent, or to unwarrantedly pressure the 
trial court into disregarding its own judgment—appointing 
new trial counsel where it is not viewed as necessary—and 
enduring the necessary trial delays as new counsel orients 
himself. 
9 To further support my assertion that defendant 
unequivocally waived his right to trial counsel, I note
that defendant did not contradict Nunzio, who, after 
meeting with defendant during an hour-and-a-half recess,
told the trial court, “I believe Mr. Russell still contends
he wishes to represent himself.” 
If, as the majority
asserts, defendant “consistently denied that his choice was
self-representation,” ante at 12, I question why defendant,
who was decidedly vocal in expressing any disagreements
that he had during trial proceedings, did not challenge the
truth of this statement by Nunzio. 
From this, I can only
surmise that Nunzio correctly characterized defendant’s 
wishes. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That is, the majority’s decision requires the trial 
court to exercise its discretion in accord with defendant's 
own preferences and to compel the trial court to grant him 
a third appointed counsel. 
But the question of such an 
exercise of discretion is a distinct question from whether 
the trial court has complied with its obligations in 
permitting a defendant to proceed to trial by self­
representation. 
Because I believe that there has been no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting 
defendant's application for a third appointed counsel, 
defendant has no right to such counsel.  He has a right 
only to the four options identified by the trial court. 
The upshot of the majority’s decision, in my judgment, 
is that it undermines the administration of justice by 
encouraging gamesmanship in the courtroom by criminal 
defendants, making more readily available an appellate 
parachute for appellants, and frustrating the orderly 
progress 
of 
trial 
proceedings. 
As 
this 
Court 
has 
previously observed: 
The Court recognizes and sympathizes with
the “Catch 22” judges face in the waiver of
counsel setting. 
On the one hand, defendants
have a right to counsel. 
On the other hand,
defendants have a right to self-representation.
We realize the potential for savvy defendants to
use these competing rights as a means of securing
an appellate parachute. [Adkins, supra at 724.] 
19  
 
 
 
 
Although a defendant’s rights to trial counsel and to self­
representation are intertwined, defendant here would ensure 
that these rights increasingly take on a “zero sum” 
relationship in which either the former or the latter right 
is necessarily violated, and in which one or the other 
becomes a potential basis for appellate reversal. 
This 
becomes more likely when formalisms (such as the majority's 
unfounded requirement that a waiver only be effected by 
verbal statement) come to prevail over an inquiry into the 
totality of circumstances, including both the verbal 
statements and the conduct of the defendant. 
Under the circumstances of this case, I would find 
that defendant, by his conduct alone, unequivocally waived 
his right to trial counsel. 
Given defendant’s knowledge 
that the trial court was unprepared to appoint new counsel 
and defendant's clear rejection of three of the four 
options offered to him by the trial court, I 
believe that 
these 
circumstances, 
which 
do 
not 
include 
a 
verbal 
statement of assent to self-representation, sufficiently 
give rise to an “unequivocal” waiver of his right to trial 
counsel. 
Because of the disadvantages that inure from self­
representation, a defendant must also “knowingly [and] 
intelligently” waive his right to trial counsel. Anderson, 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
supra at 368. To satisfy this requirement, the trial court 
must ensure that a defendant has been “made sufficiently 
aware of his right to have counsel” and “of the possible 
consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel” so 
that his choice “‘is made with eyes open.’” 
Patterson v 
Illinois, 487 US 285, 292-293; 108 S Ct 2389; 101 L Ed 2d 
261 (1988)(citations omitted); see also Anderson, supra at 
368, 370-371. 
“The trial judge is in the best position to 
determine whether the defendant has made the waiver 
knowingly . . . .” 
Adkins, supra at 723 (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, the trial court engaged in a 
lengthy and methodical colloquy, over thirty-five pages 
long, explicitly warning defendant of the dangers of self­
representation. 
Among other warnings, the trial court 
counseled that, “unless you are legally trained,. . . there 
are 
many 
pitfalls 
there 
for 
the 
unwary,” 
and 
“I’m 
suggesting that you don’t know legal procedure.” The trial 
court also advised defendant as follows: 
I should advise you that there is an ancient
adage in the law, for good reason, that a man who
acts as his own counsel has a fool for a client. 
The corollary to the rule is that he also has a
fool for a lawyer, but, as a practical matter, it
all winds up in the same place. 
My guess is that you will not fare well in
that approach, but you have a right to take that
approach if you wish to do it. 
And, while I
would not advise it, I will certainly guard your 
21  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
rights 
and 
see 
to 
it 
that 
you 
have 
the 
opportunity to present your own defense, if 
that’s your wish. 
Further, the trial court repeatedly warned defendant that 
if Nunzio were removed, new trial counsel would not be 
appointed. 
Finally, the trial court gave defendant 
numerous opportunities, including two separate recesses, to 
consult with Nunzio concerning defendant’s four options. 
Accordingly, I am convinced, as was the trial court, that 
under the circumstances of this case, there is no question 
that defendant was provided with sufficient information to 
make a decision with “eyes wide open.” Thus, I would hold 
that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant 
“knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to trial 
counsel when he repeatedly informed the trial court that he 
no longer wanted Nunzio to represent him. 
A defendant’s waiver of his right to trial counsel 
must also be voluntary. 
Anderson, supra at 371. 
“The 
trial judge is in the best position to determine whether 
the defendant has made the waiver . . . voluntary.” 
Adkins, supra at 723 (citation omitted). 
Substitution of 
counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. People v Williams, 386 Mich 565, 578; 194 
NW2d 337 (1972). 
“While a defendant may not be forced to 
proceed to trial with incompetent or unprepared counsel, 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
. . . a refusal without good cause to proceed with able 
counsel is a ‘voluntary’ waiver.” 
Maynard v Meachum, 545 
F2d 273, 278 (CA 1, 1976). 
See also United States v 
Harris, 2 F3d 1452, 1455 (CA 7, 1993)(finding a voluntary 
and 
informed 
waiver 
where 
the 
defendant 
refused 
to 
cooperate with his lawyers and was told that no substitute 
counsel would be appointed for him); United States v 
Kneeland, 148 F3d 6, 12 (CA 1, 1998)(a waiver of the right 
to 
trial 
counsel 
must 
be 
considered 
involuntary 
if 
defendant had a valid reason for requesting the appointment 
of new trial counsel). 
In United States v Moore, 706 F2d 538 (CA 5, 1983), 
the trial court required the defendant to proceed pro se 
after he rejected several court-appointed attorneys. 
Like 
the 
instant 
defendant, 
the 
defendant 
in 
Moore 
made 
statements on the record that he was not waiving his right 
to trial counsel, but that he simply wanted different trial 
counsel. 
Defendant 
was 
convicted 
and 
appealed 
his 
conviction on this basis. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction, stating: 
[Defendant] refers to a statement by the
trial court which indicates that the court knew 
[defendant] was not waiving his right to counsel.
This misperceives the record. Viewed in the 
context of the entire dialogue, the trial court 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
was noting its awareness that [defendant] was not
waiving his demand for dismissal of his current
attorney and appointment of another. That demand
is precisely the issue herein presented: may a 
defendant repeatedly demand that his appointed
counsel be relieved and that new counsel be 
appointed and, if the request is denied, contend
that his sixth amendment right to counsel . . .
has been violated? We answer that inquiry in the
negative. 
We conclude that a persistent, unreasonable
demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment
of new counsel, as herein discussed, is the 
functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary
waiver of counsel. In such an instance the trial 
court may proceed to trial with the defendant
representing himself. [Id. at 540.] 
 
Similarly, in United States v Fazzini, 871 F2d 635 
(CA 7, 1989), the defendant sought to remove his fourth 
court-appointed attorney. In allowing defendant to dismiss 
his latest attorney, the trial court “expressly found that 
defendant, 
through 
his 
actions, 
had 
knowingly 
and 
voluntarily waived the right to counsel.” 
Id. at 642. 
During trial, the defendant claimed that he was being 
“forced” to proceed pro se, and continually expressed a 
desire for new counsel to be appointed. 
Defendant was ultimately convicted. 
The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, stating: 
In this case, the defendant claims that he
did not knowingly and intentionally waive his
right to appointed counsel since he continued to
ask for counsel even after Kling was excused from
the case. Yet it is not necessary that a 
defendant verbally waive his right to counsel; so 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
long 
as 
the 
district 
court 
has 
given 
the 
defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the
assistance 
of 
appointed 
counsel, 
defendant's 
actions which have the effect of depriving
himself of appointed counsel will establish a
knowing and intentional choice. [Id.] 
The instant defendant was essentially given only two 
viable options—continue with court-appointed counsel or 
continue without court-appointed counsel. 
Defendant made 
it abundantly clear that he would not be cooperating with 
his current counsel, and therefore, I believe, that he 
effectively chose to proceed pro se. Like the defendant in 
Fazzini, the instant defendant denied that he was making 
this choice. 
Nevertheless, the vehement negation of one 
choice—to proceed with his current counsel—constituted the 
acceptance of the only remaining option available—to 
proceed pro se. 
I agree with the lower courts and believe that 
defendant consistently failed to assert a valid reason to 
have new court-appointed counsel, and thus voluntarily 
waived his right to trial counsel. 
The trial court 
asserted that “Mr. Nunzio is a man of considerable 
professional ability,” with an extensive history of trial 
work, and is an “extremely capable” and “well-respected” 
defense attorney. 
Further, Nunzio himself apprised the 
trial court: 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Your honor, I am prepared to try the case.
I am not only familiar with all the issues 
surrounding this case, but I have dealt with
these cases numerous times in the last number of 
years. 
And I have communicated all of those 
relevant issues that I have explored. 
The 
discovery is complete. 
I’ve had the opportunity
to look at discovery. I talked to the prosecutor
in this case regarding this case. I am more than 
capable at this point in time trying the case 
* * * 
But counsel is ready to proceed to trial at
this point in time. 
Later, after defendant asserted “that Mr. Nunzio is not 
representing me in a proper[] fashion,” the trial court 
responded, “I don’t see that. I see no indication that Mr. 
Nunzio has done anything wrong at all.” 
I agree with the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals and find no evidence 
in the record to suggest that Nunzio’s representation of 
defendant 
“fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness . . . .” 
People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 
644; 664 NW2d 159 (2003). 
Nor does defendant present any 
evidence to the contrary. 
Because I believe that this 
Court should follow federal precedent, holding that an 
unreasonable insistence on the appointment of a new 
attorney operates as a waiver of the right to counsel, and 
26  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
that defendant’s protests to the contrary do not render 
that waiver ambiguous, I dissent.10 
To constitute a valid waiver of the right to trial 
counsel, the trial court must also be satisfied that in 
representing himself, defendant “will not disrupt, unduly 
inconvenience and burden the court and the administration 
of the court’s business.” Anderson, supra at 368. Because 
the trial court, in fact, allowed defendant to represent 
himself, I would hold that the trial court was persuaded 
that defendant, in representing himself, would not disrupt 
or otherwise inconvenience or burden the court and, thus, 
fulfilled the third requirement of Anderson. 
Further, although the requirements in Anderson have 
been satisfied, the trial court must “substantially comply” 
with MCR 6.005(D) for a valid waiver to occur. 
Adkins, 
supra at 726. 
“A particular court’s method of inquiring 
into and satisfying these concepts is decidedly up to it, 
as long as the concepts in these requirements are covered.” 
10 As the majority correctly notes, the Supreme Court
stated in Martinez that “the right to self-representation
is not absolute” in that the defendant must choose self­
representation voluntarily and intelligently. 
Ante at 8. 
Cf. Caplin & Drysdale v United States, 491 US 617, 651; 109
S Ct 2646; 105 L Ed 2d 528 (1989); Arizona v Roberson, 486
US 675, 686; 108 S Ct 2093; 100 L Ed 2d 704 (1988)(holding
that even the constitutional right to counsel is not 
absolute.) 
27  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Id. at 725. 
I would hold that MCR 6.005(D) was satisfied 
here because defendant was fully advised of the nature of 
the charges against him and the possible punishments in the 
information,11 
and 
of 
the 
risks 
involved 
in 
self­
representation.12 
Finally, the court should “indulge every reasonable 
presumption [de-italicize presumption] against waiver” of a 
defendant’s right to trial counsel. 
Adkins, supra at 721 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
“‘The record must 
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which 
11 At the outset of the trial, the court stated: 
Mr. Russell is here for trial today on 
charges of possession with intent to deliver less
than 50 grams of cocaine, possession with intent
to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin, and he
is also charged as a fourth felony habitual 
offender. 
See Adkins, supra at 730-731 (holding that the trial court
had 
satisfied 
the 
requirement 
of 
MCR 
6.005(D) 
that 
defendant be advised of the maximum and minimum sentences 
because “the judge had already expressed the nature of the
charge and possible punishments to the defendant at his
arraignment”). 
12 “A particular court’s method of inquiring into and
satisfying [MCR 6.005(D)] is decidedly up to it, as long as
[the proper] concepts . . . [are] covered.” 
Adkins, supra
at 725. 
Because the trial court counseled defendant that,
“unless you are legally trained, . . . there are many
pitfalls there for the unwary,” we believe that its warning
satisfied the requirement of MCR 6.005(D) that the trial
court advise defendant of “the risks involved in self 
representation . . . .” 
28  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently 
and understandably rejected the offer. 
Anything less is 
not waiver.’” 
Adkins, supra at 721 (citations omitted). 
As 
previously 
discussed, 
defendant 
here 
intelligently 
waived his right to trial counsel by repeatedly stating 
that he did not want Nunzio to represent him. 13 
"The determination of whether there has been an 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in 
each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including [the] conduct of the 
accused.” Johnson, supra at 464 (emphasis added). 
I would 
conclude that defendant’s conduct, under the circumstances 
of this case—his informed and unequivocal refusal to accept 
any of the other three options offered to him by the trial 
court—constituted an acceptance of the only remaining 
option, 
and 
that 
defendant 
thereby 
“intentional[ly] 
relinquish[ed] or abandon[ed]” his right to trial counsel. 
Id. 
13 Defendant made the following statements concerning
his desire that Nunzio not represent him: (1) “I don’t-- I
don’t want any contact with Mr. Nunzio, and I expressed
that to you. 
I don’t want Mr. Nunzio to have anything to
do with anything in my case”; (2) “There is no way that I
will let him try to defend me . . . [T]here’s no way that I 
would feel comfortable with him having anything to do with
the defense on my behalf”; and (3) “I don’t want Mr. Nunzio
involving in nothing of my defense.” 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
I believe that defendant, by his conduct alone, 
unequivocally waived his constitutional and statutory right 
to trial counsel. 
Further, I believe that defendant’s 
waiver satisfied the requirements of Anderson and MCR 
6.005(D). 
Accordingly, I would hold that defendant waived 
his right to trial counsel and thus affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Stephen J. Markman
Maura D. Corrigan 
30