Title: Carter v. FLORENTINE CORPORATION, INC.
Citation: 310 S.C. 228, 423 S.E.2d 112
Docket Number: 23716
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 1992

310 S.C. 228 (1992) 423 S.E.2d 112 Dozier J. CARTER, Respondent v. FLORENTINE CORPORATION, INC., Appellant. 23716 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Submitted June 5, 1992. Decided September 21, 1992. *229 Lawrence B. Orr of Bridges, Porter, Orr &amp; McEachin, Florence, for appellant. Reginald C. Brown, Jr. of Hyman Law Firm, Florence, for respondent. Submitted June 5, 1992. Decided Sept. 21, 1992. CHANDLER, Justice: Florentine Corporation (Florentine) appeals a Summary Judgment Order which held that Respondent, Dozier Carter (Carter), was not a statutory employee *230 and, therefore, could maintain a civil negligence action.[1] We reverse. Florentine is a South Carolina corporation owned by a single shareholder. Its sole asset is the land and buildings comprising Magnolia Mall in Florence. The Mall is managed by Equity Property Management Corporation (Equity). The management contract between Equity and Florentine requires that Equity (1) hire and discharge all Magnolia Mall employees, (2) negotiate leases for all stores in the Mall, (3) maintain necessary repairs/upkeep of the Mall and (4) compensate all employees and subcontractors. Carter, employed as a customer service representative for the Mall, was hired and paid by Equity. On June 8, 1990, Carter clocked out from work and, while carrying trash from the customer service area, slipped and fell in a Mall corridor. Thereafter, he instituted this negligence action against Florentine for $250,000 damages.[2] Florentine answered and moved for summary judgment, alleging that Carter was its statutory employee whose exclusive remedy was Workers' Compensation. The motion was denied. Was Carter a statutory employee? Where an employer is covered by Workers' Compensation, the Act is the exclusive remedy of an employee injured in the course and scope of employment. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-540 (1985). This exclusivity provision applies both to "direct" employees, and to those termed "statutory *231 employees" under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400 (1985). That section provides, in part: See Smith v. T.H. Snipes and Sons, ___ S.C. ___, 411 S.E. (2d) 439 (1991); Ost v. Integrated Products, 296 S.C. 241, 371 S.E. (2d) 796 (1988). Here, the Mall is clearly Florentine's sole business, and the work being performed by Equity was essential to its operation. Accordingly, Carter is a statutory employee. The judgment below is Reversed. HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur. [1] Generally, denial of summary judgment is interlocutory. Willis v. Bishop, 276 S.C. 156, 276 S.E. (2d) 310 (1981). However, orders determining questions of subject matter jurisdiction are immediately appealable. Sims v. Phillips, 46 S.C. 149, 24 S.E. 97 (1896). This Court has recognized that a determination of whether a claimant is an employee involves a question of subject matter jurisdiction. McCreery v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, 303 S.C. 271, 400 S.E. (2d) 130 (1990); Bailey v. Owen Electric, 301 S.C. 399, 392 S.E. (2d) 186 (1990). [2] Carter did not seek Workers' Compensation benefits.