Title: Gates v. State
Citation: 484 So. 2d 1002
Docket Number: 55362
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1986

484 So. 2d 1002 (1986) Nazareth GATES v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 55362 Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 26, 1986. *1004 Roy Pitts, Meridian, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen., by Anita Mathews Stamps, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: In the late afternoon of June 23, 1983, Gates shot and killed Willie Hughes with a 30-30 rifle in Starkville, Mississippi. Gates turned himself in and confessed to the shooting. He was indicted for murder. His trial was continued until the October, 1983, term. On the first day of the trial, Gates requested another continuance on the ground that a material witness was absent. This motion was overruled and the case proceeded to trial. When the prosecution rested, Gates moved for a directed verdict but was overruled. When the trial ended, Gates renewed his motion for a directed verdict and requested a peremptory instruction of not guilty. This motion was overruled and the instruction was refused. Upon the verdict of guilty, Gates was sentenced to life imprisonment and perfects this appeal. As the trial judge found no elements of manslaughter in the evidence, he refused instruction D-8. However, he did grant a self-defense instruction. Harper v. State, 478 So. 2d 1017 (Miss. 1985), sets out the test to be applied to determine when an instruction on a lesser included offense should be submitted to the jury: Id. at 1021. Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-35 (1972) provides as follows: By his own statement given shortly after the incident, Gates and Jamie Humphries were in her car when Gates saw his wife, Shirley Gates, in a truck with Hughes. According to Gates, Hughes cursed Gates so Gates followed him until they arrived at the Texaco service station. At this point, Gates got out of his vehicle with the rifle. He intended to whip Hughes, but when Hughes got smart and cursed him Gates lost his head and shot Hughes. Scott Jones saw the shooting. According to Jones, Hughes was unarmed and appeared calm. He made no movement toward Gates. Gates appeared upset. Gates shot Hughes in the chest and waived the gun at Shirley Gates and yelled at her. Paul Hendrick corroborated the testimony of Scott Jones. Douglas Brownlee was in the truck with Hughes and Shirley Gates. Brownlee's testimony was that Gates told Hughes in strong language to pull the truck over. When Hughes pulled into the Texaco lot, Brownlee jumped out because of the language Gates had used. He did not know if Gates was going to shoot Hughes or not. Brownlee went to the rear of the truck. Hughes got out and then Gates got out with the rifle. Hughes was unarmed and had no weapon in the truck. Hughes said nothing to Gates and made no move toward him. Gates told Hughes to get on his knees, and when Hughes did not do so Gates shot him. Finding discretion to be the better part of valor, Brownlee then fled. Shirley Gates testified. She was not living with Hughes but was separated from Gates. Up to their arrival at the Texaco station, her testimony is the same as Brownlee's. She testified that at the station Hughes got out, unarmed, and Gates got out with the rifle. Gates accused Hughes of talking about him, which Hughes denied. Gates then told Hughes to get on his knees, which Hughes refused to do. Gates then shot Hughes. Gates told Shirley he ought to kill her too, and started hitting her with the rifle. By stipulation, the defense was able to get before the jury an affidavit and the statement given to the police by Jamie Humphries, the unavailable witness. In the Humphries version, Hughes cursed Gates and they argued. When this argument was resumed at the Texaco lot, Gates shot Hughes. Gates claimed that Hughes cursed him and made a move like he was going for something in the truck, so he shot him. Yet, Gates says that the two men were not arguing when the shooting took place, and his own statement made to the police after the incident made no mention of the move. There was no evidence of a physical assault by Hughes upon Gates. Mere words, no matter how provocative, are insufficient to reduce an intentional and unjustifiable homicide from murder to manslaughter. Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 731 (Miss. 1984); Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 383, 387-88 (Miss. 1982). Nor is this a case where the accused was entitled to a manslaughter instruction because the killing occurred after he caught his spouse in the act of adultery. Denham v. State, 218 Miss. 423, 67 So. 2d 445 (1953). When the Harper test is applied to this evidence, it cannot be said that Gates was entitled to a manslaughter instruction. The trial judge properly refused it. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-15-29 (1972) provides as follows: Of course, the granting or not granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. In King v. State, 251 Miss. 161, 168 So. 2d 637 (1964), the Court said the following: 251 Miss. at 171-72, 168 So. 2d at 641. See also, Denton v. State, 348 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (Miss. 1977) (there must be an offer to show on appellant's motion for a new trial that prejudice to appellant resulted.) Both sides issued subpoenas for Humphries on October 13, 1983, and both subpoenas were served and returned. On the day of the trial, Gates filed for a continuance on the grounds that Humphries was in the hospital due to complications in a pregnancy. The motion set forth what *1007 Humphries would testify to and said further that it was not filed for the purpose of delay but for good cause. Attached to the motion was a letter from Dr. Leroy Howell stating that Humphries was in the hospital and could not testify on October 20. Also attached to the motion was the affidavit of Gates which set out, inter alia, what Humphries would testify to. At the motion hearing, the prosecution offered to stipulate that if called Humphries would testify as set out in the motion and part four of the affidavit, and as set out in a statement given to the police by Humphries on June 23, 1983. The prosecution of course did not stipulate as to the truth of that testimony. The trial court overruled the motion because there was no proof that Humphries was actually in the hospital, only the letter from the purported physician. He also gave as a supporting reason the stipulation. Defense counsel announced ready, subject to the motion for continuance. Gates had set forth what he expected to prove by Humphries in his affidavit. He arguably made an attempt to preserve the motion throughout the trial as required by King, supra; however, he made no attempt to introduce more evidence about her absence, such as substituting an affidavit of the doctor for the letter, even though the judge told him that he was not satisfied with the proof about her absence. Also, when the evidence at trial indicated that Humphries was in the hospital, Gates failed to renew his motion. The motion was not renewed at trial's end, nor was any further action taken concerning the absent witness. More important, on both motions for a new trial, Gates made no attempt to present Humphries to the court for examination nor present her affidavit, so the court could consider it and "review the whole case and correct any error prejudicial to the defendant which may appear in any part of the proceeding." King, supra. Gates never indicated at any time that the witness would have testified in any way other than what was contained in the affidavit and statement which was stipulated to. Gates cites several cases in support of this assignment, which are readily distinguishable. Ivy v. State, 229 Miss. 491, 91 So. 2d 521 (1956), comes closest to being authority for reversal. In Ivy, the witness, defendant's wife, would have testified that the victim was the aggressor. She was the only witness who would verify the defendant's version. We held that the denial of a continuance under these circumstances was error. In so doing, it was noted that not only did the application for continuance conform with the statute but the motion for a new trial conformed with the procedure governing continuances as set out in Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265, 271 (1885). This procedure was followed in King, supra. Also, the Ivy motion was supported by the affidavit of the attending physician, and when this occurs a strong prima facie case for a continuance is made out. Gates never produced the affidavit of the attending physician. The comfort offered to Gates by Ivy is cold indeed. There was no abuse of sound judicial discretion in denying the continuance. Gates offered the witness Lena Hopper to testify that Hughes had bragged to her about being the father of a child by the wife of Gates and that Hughes had told her that if Gates said anything to him about it he would kill him. The testimony was excluded. Gates admits that the statements were not communicated to him before he shot Hughes; therefore, they clearly were not relevant to the manslaughter issue. Out of court statements offered "for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted" are hearsay and inadmissible. *1008 Fuselier v. State, 468 So. 2d 45, 52 (Miss. 1985). Uncommunicated threats made by the victim may be admissible, if otherwise competent, in murder cases where the defense is self-defense and there is an issue as to who was the aggressor, since the threats are relevant to the victim's state of mind. Washington v. State, 307 So. 2d 430 (Miss. 1975); Muse v. State, 158 Miss. 449, 130 So. 693 (1930); Beauchamp v. State, 128 Miss. 523, 91 So. 202, 203, 204 (1922); Mott v. State, 123 Miss. 729, 86 So. 514 (1920); Clark v. State, 123 Miss. 147, 85 So. 188 (1920); Leverett v. State, 112 Miss. 394, 73 So. 273 (1916); Echols v. State, 99 Miss. 683, 55 So. 485 (1911). The question is essentially one of relevancy. If the uncommunicated threat is relevant, the attendant circumstances concerning the threat are also relevant and admissible to show the "nature, cause, and depth of the deceased's enmity toward the appellant". Clark, 123 Miss. at 156, 85 So. at 190. However, when the evidence deals solely with the relationship between deceased and appellant's wife, no previous difficulties between the participants nor threats, the evidence is not relevant to the victim's state of mind concerning the self-defense claim. Pearson v. State, 254 Miss. 275, 179 So. 2d 792 (1965). In Brown v. State, 88 Miss. 166, 40 So. 737 (1920), the Court laid down the following rule concerning the admissibility of uncommunicated threats: 88 Miss. at 171, 40 So. at 737. See also Hendrix v. State, 172 Miss. 589, 161 So. 151 (1935). This is not a case where the excluded testimony concerns previous harassments, threats or assaults personally directed toward Gates by Hughes, nor prior attempts by Gates to get help to stop the difficulties between he and Hughes. Such testimony would be admissible. Jackson v. State, 426 So. 2d 405 (Miss. 1983); Bell v. State, 443 So. 2d 16 (Miss. 1983); Lee v. State, 160 Miss. 618, 134 So. 185 (1931). When testimony is excluded at trial, a record must be made of the proffered testimony in order to preserve the point for appeal. Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1982). Lena Hopper was asked whether Hughes had ever said anything to her about being the father of the baby Nazareth's wife, Shirley, was going to have. The state's objection was sustained. A record was made of this testimony with Hopper testifying that Hughes had bragged about being the father of the baby but she did not know whether Gates knew about the bragging. At this point in the trial, this testimony was clearly inadmissible. Pearson, supra. With the jury back in, Hopper was asked if she had ever heard Hughes make a threat against Nazareth. The state's objection was again sustained. No record was made of this proffered testimony. Even if a record had been made and Hopper had testified as to uncommunicated threats, the testimony would have been inadmissible because, at this point in the trial, there was no doubt as to who was the aggressor and there was no evidence of an "overt act" on the part of Hughes at the time of the shooting. Brown, supra. After Gates testified concerning the alleged move, Hopper was recalled. She was again asked whether Hughes had ever told her that Gates' wife was going to have his baby. The state's objection was sustained. No record was made. Testimony concerning the relationship between Hughes and Gates' wife *1009 would have been admissible had there been testimony of uncommunicated threats made by Hughes toward Gates. The testimony of Hopper concerning the alleged uncommunicated threats was admissible after Gates' testimony since then there was some evidence of an "overt act" on the part of Hughes at the time of the shooting. However, the record is totally void of testimony by Hopper concerning uncommunicated threats. We cannot assume that she would have testified as contended by Gates. The point was not properly preserved. First, no objection was made during this testimony and the point was waived. Norman v. State, 302 So. 2d 254, 259 (Miss. 1974). Second, the prosecutor was properly inquiring as to whether Gates had been previously convicted of a crime. Wells v. State, 288 So. 2d 860, 864 (Miss. 1974). Third, it was Gates himself who voluntarily attempted to explain away the previous conviction while on cross-examination. There was no error. There was no objection to this instruction, and we need not consider it unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 462 (Miss. 1984). Manifest injustice is not present as the complained of instruction does not assume a material fact in issue which is the basis of the complaint. Furthermore, when the instructions are read together, it is clear that the jury was properly instructed. Johnson v. State, 475 So. 2d 1136, 1147 (Miss. 1985). The conviction and sentence of life imprisonment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.