Title: Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, Inc.
Citation: 2002 WI 92
Docket Number: 2000AP002493
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2002

2002 WI 92 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2493 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Village Food & Liquor Mart,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
H & S Petroleum, Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation, 
d/b/a Horizon Marathon and Shell,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis J. Barry   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURS/DISSENTS: 
WILCOX, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
CROOKS and SYKES, J.J., join concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by John M. 
Bjelajac and Hartig, Bjelajac, Cabranes & Koenen, S.C., Racine, 
and Robert E. Hankel and Knuteson, Powers & Wheeler, S.C., 
Racine, and oral argument by Robert E. Hankel. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Catherine 
M. Rottier, Sarah A. Zylstra and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, 
LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Catherine M. Rottier. 
 
 
2002 WI 92 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2493  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 907) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village Food & Liquor Mart,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
H & S Petroleum, Inc., a Wisconsin  
Corporation, d/b/a Horizon Marathon and  
Shell,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Dennis J. Barry, Judge.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   In this case, we are asked 
to 
decide 
whether 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
protects 
a 
litigant's right to a jury trial in a civil suit for damages 
under the Unfair Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30 (1999-2000).1  In 
a 
civil 
case 
that 
involved 
allegations 
of 
unfair 
sales 
practices, the defendant, H & S Petroleum (H & S), made a demand 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-2493   
 
2 
 
to the circuit court for a jury trial, which the plaintiff, 
Village Food & Liquor Mart (Village Food), moved to strike. 
¶2 
The Racine County Circuit Court, Dennis J. Barry, 
Judge, held that H & S had no constitutionally protected right 
to a jury trial and granted Village Food's motion.  The court of 
appeals granted H & S leave to appeal the non-final order and 
subsequently certified the question to this court.  We now 
reverse the ruling of the circuit court and hold that the 
Wisconsin Constitution protects the right to a trial by jury for 
a civil suit brought under the Unfair Sales Act. 
I 
¶3 
In 1999, Village Food brought suit against H & S, 
alleging a series of violations of the Unfair Sales Act, 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  Specifically, Village Food claimed that on 
103 different occasions, the Horizon Marathon gas station 
violated 
Wis. Stat. §§ 100.30(2)(am)1m.c 
and 
100.30(3), 
the 
minimum mark-up laws regarding the sale of motor vehicle fuel.  
Horizon Marathon was owned by H & S, and Horizon Marathon 
competed with Village Food in the motor vehicle fuel market. 
¶4 
In its plea for relief, Village Food sought $2000 in 
damages for each violation, and for each day of continued 
violation, pursuant to § 100.30(5m).2  Village Food also sought 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.30(5m) provides: 
Any person who is injured or threatened with 
injury as a result of a sale or purchase of motor 
vehicle fuel in violation of sub. (3) may bring an 
action against the person who violated sub. (3) for 
temporary or permanent injunctive relief or an action 
No. 
00-2493   
 
3 
 
costs and attorney fees, but made no claim for temporary or 
permanent injunctive relief.  H & S demanded a trial by jury in 
the matter. 
¶5 
Village Food moved to strike H & S's jury demand, 
arguing that the Wisconsin Constitution does not guarantee the 
right to a jury trial in a civil suit brought under the Unfair 
Sales Act.  The circuit court agreed with Village Food and 
granted the motion to strike.  Relying on State v. Ameritech 
Corp., 185 Wis. 2d 686, 517 N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994), aff'd 
193 Wis. 2d 150, 532 N.W.2d 449 (1995), the circuit court held 
that, because there was no common law cause of action in 1848 
sufficiently similar to the present one, the right to a jury 
trial was not protected by Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶6 
The court of appeals granted H & S leave to appeal the 
non-final order and certified the appeal to this court.  We 
accepted the certification, and we now reverse the circuit 
court's ruling. 
                                                                                                                                                             
against the person for 3 times the amount of any 
monetary loss sustained or an amount equal to $2,000, 
whichever is greater, multiplied by each day of 
continued violation, together with costs, including 
accounting fees and reasonable attorney fees. . . . 
No. 
00-2493   
 
4 
 
II 
¶7 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
governs a civil litigant's right to a jury trial in a Wisconsin 
court.3  That section states: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law. . . . 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 5.  Here, we are asked if Article I, 
Section 5, guarantees H & S the right to a jury trial.  Whether 
there is a constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial for 
a particular cause of action requires us to interpret a 
provision of the state constitution, which we do independently 
of the lower courts.  State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, 
¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526. 
¶8 
We approach this question in two parts.  We first set 
forth 
the 
test 
by 
which 
we 
determine 
if 
there 
is 
a 
constitutional right to a jury trial for a given cause of 
action.  Second, we apply the test to the cause of action in the 
present case to determine if the constitutional right to a jury 
trial is protected.  In the end, we conclude that H & S is 
                                                 
3 Although H & S does attempt to draw comparisons between 
state court interpretation of Article I, Section 5 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
federal 
Seventh 
Amendment 
jurisprudence, we note that it has been long-decided——and the 
parties 
agree——that 
the 
Seventh 
Amendment 
to 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution does not apply to actions in state court.  Pearson 
v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877); see also Green Spring Farms 
v. Spring Green Farms Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 28, 33 
n.2, 492 Wis. 2d 392 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
00-2493   
 
5 
 
entitled to a jury trial under the test set forth in this 
opinion.   
A 
¶9 
In Ameritech, the court of appeals set forth a two-
part test for assessing statutory causes of action under 
Article I, Section 5.  The court of appeals stated that "[a] 
party has a constitutional right to have a statutory claim tried 
to a jury when: (1) the statute codifies an action known to the 
common law in 1848; and (2) the action was regarded as at law in 
1848."  Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d at 690.  A negative answer to 
either question would mean that the jury trial right is not 
constitutionally guaranteed.4  We agree that a two-part test is 
required; however, we conclude that, in light our prior case law 
interpreting Article I, Section 5, a different test is required 
under the first prong. 
¶10 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees that the right to a trial by jury "shall remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law . . . ."  This 
section clearly indicates that non-statutory causes of action at 
law, where a jury trial was guaranteed before the passage of the 
                                                 
4 This court granted review in State v. Ameritech Corp., 185 
Wis. 2d 686, 517 N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994), but the vote was 
split evenly over whether to affirm or reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.  Justices Steinmetz, Wilcox, and Geske 
would have affirmed the court of appeals, while Chief Justice 
Heffernan, Justice Day, and Justice Bablitch would have reversed 
the 
court 
of 
appeals. 
 
Then-Justice 
Abrahamson 
did 
not 
participate in the decision.  See State v. Ameritech Corp., 193 
Wis. 2d 150, 151, 532 N.W.2d 449 (1995). 
No. 
00-2493   
 
6 
 
state constitution, would continue to have a guaranteed right to 
a 
jury 
trial 
attached 
even 
after 
the 
passage 
of 
the 
constitution.5 
¶11 It certainly follows then that, as the Ameritech court 
concluded, a cause of action created by statute after 1848 will 
have a constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial 
attached if that statute codifies a claim that existed in the 
common law before the adoption of the constitution.  We 
conclude, however, that this requirement from Ameritech——that 
the statute must specifically "codify" a prior common law cause 
of action before the right to a jury trial is warranted——
interprets our prior case law and the state constitution too 
narrowly.  Instead, consistent with our prior case law, we 
conclude that a party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when:  (1) the cause of action 
created by the statute existed, was known, or was recognized at 
common law at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin 
Constitution in 1848 and (2) the action was regarded at law in 
                                                 
5 This court contemplated as much in Gaston v. Babcock, 6 
Wis. 490 [*503], 494 [*506] (1887), stating: 
[T]he constitution provides that the right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate.   
 
We 
suppose 
that 
this 
expression 
must 
have 
reference to the state of the law as it existed at the 
formation of the constitution, and mean that this 
right shall continue as it was at the time of the 
formation and adoption of the constitution by the 
people of this State or to speak, perhaps, with 
greater precision that it shall remain as full and 
perfect as it was at that time.  (Citation omitted). 
No. 
00-2493   
 
7 
 
1848.  See Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 
23 Wis. 2d 494, 503, 128 N.W.2d  73 (1963); Gen. Drivers & 
Helpers Union Local 662 v. WERB, 21 Wis. 2d 242, 251-52, 124 
N.W.2d  123 (1963); Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 
Wis. 2d 623, 635, 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962); Powers v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 89, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960); see also State v. 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 237, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998).   
¶12 As we stated in Bekkedal v. City of Viroqua, 183 
Wis. 176, 192, 196 N.W. 879 (1924), when we were considering the 
jury trial right as it related to a special tax assessment: 
From an early day it was held that the constitutional 
provision, preserving inviolate the right of trial by 
jury preserves that right inviolate as it existed at 
the time of the adoption of the constitution.  The 
matter of special assessments and reassessments is 
purely a statutory proceeding, relates to taxation, 
and there was at common law no right of jury trial.  
Therefore, unless the statute itself makes provision 
for a jury trial, the parties are not entitled thereto 
in a proceeding of the kind now before us.  (Emphasis 
added). 
We have articulated this principle in a number of other cases as 
well.  See N.E. v. DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 361 N.W.2d 693 
(1985); Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 490 [*503], 494 [*506] (1857); 
Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17 [*19], 22 [*29] (1853).   
¶13  Breaking this test down, we first conclude that a 
party has a right to have a statutory claim tried to a jury if 
the cause of action created by the statute existed, was known 
to, or recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of 
the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  Previous decisions of this 
court support this test.  For example, in Bekkedal, we held that 
No. 
00-2493   
 
8 
 
a litigant had no right to a jury trial in an action challenging 
a municipal road construction assessment because the action did 
not exist in 1848 and there was no statutory provision providing 
for such a right.  Bekkedal, 183 Wis. at 192-93.  Similarly, in 
N.E., we held that there was no right to a jury trial in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding, because such proceedings did 
not exist at the time that the Wisconsin Constitution was 
adopted.  N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 203.  In each case, we found that 
the party did not have a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury because the cause of action 
created by the statute did not exist, was not known, and was not 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  See also Gen. Drivers, 21 
Wis. 2d at 252; Bergren v. Staples, 263 Wis. 477, 481-83, 57 
N.W.2d 714 (1953). 
¶14 We emphasize that application of this test will not 
result in affording the right to a jury trial in all statutory 
actions in which the legislature is silent with respect to the 
right of a jury trial.  A party will only have a constitutional 
right to have a statutory claim tried to a jury when the cause 
of action created by the statute existed, was known, or was 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  For new statutory schemes, the 
legislature retains the flexibility to create an appropriate 
fact-finding procedure——including the right to a jury trial——if 
the legislature finds it appropriate.  See Bergren, 263 Wis. at 
483.   
No. 
00-2493   
 
9 
 
¶15 Second, consistent with the second prong in Ameritech, 
we also conclude that the party seeking the jury trial must 
additionally show that the action existed "at law."  Our cases 
support Ameritech's holding in this respect.  In Town of Burke, 
17 Wis. 2d 623, we recognized that the action at issue——a 
contest to a referendum election——may have existed at the time 
the state constitution was enacted, but that the remedies 
available at the time for such a challenge were obtained through 
writs of quo warranto, mandamus, or other equitable actions——not 
legal actions.  Similarly, in 1889, this court analyzed a 
garnishment action in La Crosse National Bank v. Wilson, 74 Wis. 
391, 
399, 
43 
N.W. 153 
(1889), 
where 
we 
recognized 
that 
garnishment cases existed prior to 1848, but noted that the type 
of garnishment in this case——that of non-leviable assets——would 
have been remedied by creditor's bills or other equitable 
proceedings.  In both Town of Burke and La Crosse National Bank 
we held there was no protected right to a trial by jury. 
¶16 Thus, the constitutional language and our previous 
interpretations of this language lead us to the following two-
part test:  a party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when:  (1) the cause of action 
created by the statute existed, was known, or recognized at 
common law at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin 
Constitution in 1848; and (2) the action was regarded as at law 
in 1848.  We now apply that test to the present case. 
No. 
00-2493   
 
10 
 
B 
¶17 To determine if the right to a jury trial is preserved 
in this case, we apply the above test to the statute in 
question——the Unfair Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  Under this 
test, we must determine first if the cause of action created by 
§ 100.30 existed, was known, or was recognized at common law at 
the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848, 
and if so, we must then determine whether the action was one 
that was regarded as at law in 1848.  If both questions can be 
answered 
affirmatively, then 
H & S 
has 
a 
constitutionally 
guaranteed right to a trial by jury.  If either question is 
answered in the negative, the constitutional right is not 
guaranteed. 
¶18 We 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
contours 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  Section 100.30 sets forth a statutory 
scheme which forbids retailers, distributors, and wholesalers of 
certain types of goods (namely alcohol, tobacco products, and 
motor vehicle fuel) from selling their merchandise at an 
artificially low price in order to attract patronage and thereby 
cause harm to competing businesses and to consumers of those 
products.  In enacting the statute, the legislature noted that 
such practices tend to cause commercial dislocations, interfere 
with 
free 
commerce, 
and 
mislead 
consumers.  
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(1). 
¶19 To prevent this commercial practice, the legislature 
created a pricing scheme, whereby wholesalers, retailers and 
distributors of the specified goods are required to mark up the 
No. 
00-2493   
 
11 
 
selling price of those specified goods in accordance with a 
formula.6  This formula varies with respect to the type of entity 
involved (wholesaler, retailer, or distributor), the type of 
product, and where the good is sold (from a retail station or 
otherwise). 
                                                 
6 The formula in question in this case states: 
"[C]ost to retailer" means . . . [i]n the case of the 
retail sale of motor vehicle fuel by a person other 
than a refiner or a wholesaler of motor vehicle fuel 
at a retail station, the invoice cost of the motor 
vehicle fuel to the retailer within 10 days prior to 
the date of sale, or the replacement cost of the motor 
vehicle fuel, whichever is lower, less all trade 
discounts except customary discounts for cash, plus 
any excise, sales or use taxes imposed on the motor 
vehicle fuel or on its sale and any cost incurred for 
transportation and any other charges not otherwise 
included in the invoice cost or the replacement cost 
of the motor vehicle fuel, plus a markup of 6% of that 
amount to cover a proportionate part of the cost of 
doing business; or the average posted terminal price 
at the terminal located closest to the retailer plus a 
markup of 9.18% of the average posted terminal price 
to cover a proportionate part of the cost of doing 
business; whichever is greater. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)1m.c.  The "average posted terminal 
price" is defined as: 
the average posted rack price, as published by a 
petroleum price reporting service, at which motor 
vehicle fuel is offered for sale at the close of 
business on the determination date by all refiners and 
wholesalers of motor vehicle fuel at a terminal plus 
any excise, sales or use taxes imposed on the motor 
vehicle fuel or on its sale, any cost incurred for 
transportation and any other charges that are not 
otherwise included in the average posted rack price. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(a) 
No. 
00-2493   
 
12 
 
¶20 The legislature created several possible remedies for 
a violation of the Unfair Sales Act.  The primary cause of 
action under the Unfair Sales Act is brought by the district 
attorney or the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade, and 
Consumer 
Protection 
(the 
Department) 
as 
a 
quasi-criminal 
forfeiture action.  Wis. Stat. § 100.30(4).  Additionally, the 
Department may issue a cease and desist order, bring an action 
to enforce the cease and desist order, or bring an action for an 
injunction against the offending party.  Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5). 
¶21 The civil action asserted by Village Food in the 
present case was created by the legislature in 1997.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m); 1997 Wis. Act 55, § 24.  This private 
cause of action allows a person7 who is injured by a violation of 
the Unfair Sales Act to bring a civil action against the 
violator for damages or for injunctive relief.  Id.  The private 
cause of action applies only to sales of motor vehicle fuel.  
Id. 
¶22 With the above in mind, we start with the first part 
of our test:  whether H & S had a constitutional right to have 
its Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m) claim tried to a jury because the 
cause of action created by the statute existed, was known, or 
was recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  We conclude that this first 
prong is met.    
                                                 
7 Under the Wisconsin Statutes, "'Person' includes all 
partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate."  
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26). 
No. 
00-2493   
 
13 
 
¶23 H & S contends that the first prong is met because the 
Unfair Sales Act is analogous to causes of action that existed 
at law in 1848.  Specifically, H & S points to several cases 
that were initiated before 1848, which H & S contends are 
comparable to the present case, and where jury trials were 
afforded.  See Getty v. Rountree, 2 Pin. 379 (Wis. 1850); Moore 
v. Kendall, 2 Pin. 99 (Wis. 1849); Rich v. Johnson, 2 Pin. 88 
(Wis. 1849); Wood v. Folmer, 1 Pin. 509 (Wis. Terr. 1845); Vliet 
v. Rowe, 1 Pin. 413 (Wis. Terr. 1844).  H & S suggests the 
present action is closely related to business fraud, and torts 
such as cheating, fraud, deceit, and business slander were 
recognized in the common law at the time of the state 
constitution's adoption.  We are not persuaded by these 
particular comparisons. 
¶24 All of these cases involve causes of action that are 
different than the cause of action at issue under the Unfair 
Sales Act.  Vliet, 1 Pin. 413, was a slander action by one 
person who had given false testimony in a trial before a justice 
of the peace; Wood, 1 Pin. 509, was an action for trespass that 
involved the taking of a wooden raft; Moore, 2 Pin. 99, was a 
replevin action where one party sought recovery of goods that 
had been levied by the sheriff; and Rich, 2 Pin. 88, was a 
breach of covenant of title.   
¶25 The only case cited by H & S that we find somewhat 
similar to the one at bar is Getty, 2 Pin. 379, which involved 
fraud and the breach of an implied warranty in the sale of a 
pump.  However, Getty is similar only because it involves a tort 
No. 
00-2493   
 
14 
 
action between two business entities for monetary damages, but 
the similarity in the cause of action ends there.   
¶26 H & S, however, persuasively points us to the well-
recognized Commentaries on the Law of England wherein Sir 
William Blackstone included a chapter on "Offences Against 
Public Trade."  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, ch. 12, at 154-60 (1778).  H & S suggests that many 
of the offenses listed can be categorized as types of "business 
fraud" and "business torts" and asks that we take a general 
approach in comparing them to the present cause of action.  We 
have reviewed this chapter of Blackstone's Commentaries and find 
that the first prong is met:  H & S had a constitutional right 
to have its statutory claim tried to a jury because the cause of 
action created by the statute existed, was known, and was 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.   
¶27 Most notable among Blackstone's public trade offenses 
are 
the 
common 
law 
crimes 
of 
forestalling 
the 
market,8 
                                                 
8 "Forestalling the market" is defined as: 
buying or contracting for any merchandise or victual 
coming in the way to market, or dissuading persons 
from bringing their goods to market; or dissuading 
persons from bringing their goods or provisions there; 
or persuading them to enhance the price, when there: 
any of which practices make the market dearer to the 
fair trader. 
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 
12, at 158-59 (1778). 
No. 
00-2493   
 
15 
 
regrating,9 and engrossing.10  Although H & S did not cite these 
crimes specifically in argument to this court, we note that 
these causes of action are of the same "nature" as the present 
cause of action under the Unfair Sales Act.  See General 
Drivers, 21 Wis. 2d at 252 (quoting NLRB v. Laughlin, 301 U.S. 
1, 48 (1937)).  These offenses were designed to prevent private 
citizens from trading outside of England's regulated mercantile 
system.11  They were enforced to ensure that revenue was 
generated for the holders of the public market and that dealers 
and speculators were unable to corner the market.  These 
offenses are clearly forerunners of modern unfair trade practice 
statutes, as each involves the prohibition of deliberate 
manipulation of market prices by a market participant in a 
controlled market. 
¶28 The cause of action under the Unfair Sales Act 
involves allegations of a similar unfair trade practice, that 
is, a violation of a minimum price requirement.  Essentially, 
                                                 
9 Blackstone defines "regrating" as "the buying of corn, or 
other dead victual, in any market, and selling it again in the 
same market, or within four miles of the place. . . . For this 
also enhances the price of the provisions, as every successive 
seller must have a successive profit."  Id. at 159. 
10 "Engrossing" is defined by Blackstone as the "buying up 
large quantities of corn or other dead victuals, with the intent 
to sell them again.  This must of course be injurious to the 
public, by putting it in the power of one or two rich men to 
raise the price of provisions at their own discretion."  Id.  
11 Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right To Jury 
Trial Of Antitrust Issues, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 64-65 (1981).   
No. 
00-2493   
 
16 
 
the unfair trade practice involves price cutting in a controlled 
market.   
[S]elling below cost is really an act of unfair 
competition. . . . Sales 
below 
cost, 
it 
has 
been 
stated, are prohibited because "ruinous competition by 
lowering prices has been recognized as an illegal 
medium of eliminating weaker competitors," and because 
"in many lines of industry larger combinations of 
capital through lower costs and through cutting prices 
below costs have driven smaller merchants out of 
business."   
Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and 
Monopolies, § 7.02 (4th ed. 2001) (footnotes omitted).  The fact 
that the type of unfair trade practice prohibited at common law 
differs slightly in its means from the unfair trade practice 
prohibited under the Unfair Sales Act is, we conclude, an 
insufficient distinguishing characteristic to restrict a jury 
trial in this case.  They are essentially "counterpart[s]" in 
combating unfair trade practices.  See Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d at 
697.  The common law offenses discussed by Blackstone therefore 
leads us to the conclusion that H & S has a constitutional right 
to have its Unfair Sales Act claim tried to a jury because the 
cause of action existed, was known, and was recognized at common 
law at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 
1848.   
¶29 We note that engrossing, regrating, and forestalling 
the market were all criminal offenses under the common law, 
rather than private causes of action, as is the claim here.  As 
a result, an aggrieved retailer such as Village Food would not 
have been able to bring a civil cause of action for engrossing, 
No. 
00-2493   
 
17 
 
regrating, or forestalling under the common law.  However, as 
indicated above, the Unfair Sales Act contains a similar 
criminal provision that was part of the original act.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(4).  A civil action for equitable relief was 
contained in the original act under Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5), 
which was later followed by affording private litigants the 
ability to bring a civil action for monetary damages pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m).  The legislative intent was clearly to 
provide an additional means of enforcement.  The fact that one 
is undertaken in the civil context, rather than the criminal 
context, should not deprive the parties of a jury trial in this 
instance.   
¶30 Other causes of action based in tort involving unfair 
competition, including price competition, also lead us to the 
conclusion that H & S has a constitutional right to have its 
statutory claim tried to a jury because the cause of action 
created by the statute existed, was known, and was recognized at 
common law at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin 
Constitution in 1848.  As one commentator has observed: "The 
common law of unfair competition has always recognized that some 
kinds of price competition might be unlawful.  The common law, 
however, lacked a workable definition of what prices were 
unfair."  Peter Carstensen, Predatory Pricing in the Courts:  
Reflection of Two Decisions, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 928, 939 
(1986) (commenting on Mogul Steamship C. v. McGregor, Gow, & 
Co., 23 Q.B. Div. 598 (1889), which reflects that price cutting 
may be unlawful).  Indeed, cases at the turn of the century 
No. 
00-2493   
 
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explicitly recognized that a cause of action may result from 
price 
competition 
if 
a 
defendant 
engaged 
in 
intentional 
malicious conduct against the plaintiff competitor.  See, e.g., 
Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 143 N.W. 482 (Iowa  1913); 
Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N.W. 371 (Iowa  1911); Tuttle 
v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn.  1909); see also Barthlomew County 
Beverage Co. v. Barc Beverage Corp., 524 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1988) ("A valid common law cause of action exists for 
the tort of unfair competition.").  These cases have been cited 
as support for recognizing a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of temporal damage to the business of another.  See 
Martha W. Gerald, Recent Decision, 15 Miss. L.J. 213, 214-17 
(1943) (indicating that the roots of this action is from early 
English cases involving such intentional conduct; see Keeble v. 
Hickeringall, 11 East 574 (1706) (the defendant was held liable 
for intentionally frightening wild foul that the plaintiff was 
attempting to capture for resale)).   
¶31 The above shows that H & S had a constitutional right 
to have its statutory claim tried to a jury because the cause of 
action created by the statute existed, was known, and was 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  The Act prohibits sales below 
cost implemented "with the intent or effect of inducing the 
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade 
from a competitor . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3).  Like the 
torts based in unfair competition enumerated in the cases above, 
this statute limits the ability of one competitor to manipulate 
No. 
00-2493   
 
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the market with the intent to impair the business of a 
competitor.   
C 
¶32 Based on the conclusions reached above, we find that 
the first prong of our test for the right to a jury trial under 
Article I, Section 5, of the Wisconsin Constitution is met.  
Therefore, we also need to address the question of whether such 
an action was legal or equitable in 1848.   
¶33 In short, we conclude that this action was legal in 
nature in 1848.  The plaintiff in this case seeks monetary 
damages for loss sustained as a result of the unfair pricing.  
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m).  An action seeking money damages is one 
at law.  Gavahan v. Village of Shorewood, 200 Wis. 429, 431, 228 
N.W. 497 (1930).  Although the statute also permits the 
plaintiff to seek injunctive relief, the plaintiff has not 
pursued this equitable relief.  As a result, we conclude that 
the second prong of our test is satisfied.   
III 
¶34 In sum, we conclude that H & S has a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to a jury trial in a private cause of action 
under the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act.  We therefore reverse the 
ruling of the circuit court.   
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed. 
 
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1 
 
 
¶35 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the majority's statement of the test by 
which to determine if the right to a jury trial is protected by 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  However, I 
do not agree with the court's conclusion that a private action 
under the Unfair Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30 (1999-2000),12 is 
constitutionally 
guaranteed 
the 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the 
court. 
¶36 The majority's interpretation of the first prong of 
its test is much broader than previous cases of this court have 
held it should be.  In interpreting the first prong, our primary 
focus must be on the pre-1848 actions at law, because those are 
the actions for which the right to a jury trial must, according 
to 
our 
constitution, 
"remain 
inviolate." 
 
The 
logical 
interpretation of this language is that statutory causes of 
action that do not codify common law causes of action in a form 
substantially similar to causes of action as they existed, were 
known, or were recognized at common law before 1848 are not 
afforded such protection according to the plain language of the 
state constitution.  Conversely, for the constitutional right to 
a jury trial to attach to a statutory cause of action, the 
modern statute must codify the pre-1848 cause of action 
substantially as it existed, as it was known, or as it was 
                                                 
12 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
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recognized at common law at the time the constitution was 
adopted. 
¶37 Our 
previous 
decisions 
support 
such 
a 
narrow 
interpretation.  For example, in General Drivers & Helpers Union 
v. WERB, 21 Wis. 2d 242, 124 N.W.2d 123 (1963), a labor union 
alleged that the employer had violated the collective bargaining 
agreement by refusing to make certain payments to employees.  
Id. at 247.  This action could easily have been characterized as 
a contract dispute, and breach of contract actions were 
certainly known at law in 1848.  See, e.g., Baxter v. Payne, 1 
Pin. 501 (Wis. Terr. 1845).  However, this court noted that the 
specific action in General Drivers arose under a claim of unfair 
labor practices, which was not a cause of action that existed at 
the time that the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted.  Gen. 
Drivers, 21 Wis. 2d at 252.  This court's decision rested partly 
on the premise that the relationship between the parties is 
different 
than 
that 
of 
simple 
parties 
to 
a 
contract.  
Id. at 252.  Therefore, we concluded that the litigants did not 
have a constitutionally protected right to a jury trial. 
¶38 In N.E. v. DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 361 N.W.2d 693 
(1985), we found that there was no right to a jury trial in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding, because that type of action 
simply did not exist prior to 1848.  Id. at 203.  Similarly, in 
Bekkedal v. City of Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 196 N.W. 879 (1924), 
we held that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial 
because special tax assessments, like the one at issue there, 
did not exist when the constitution was adopted.  Id. at 192-93. 
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3 
 
¶39 In the Ameritech case itself, the court of appeals 
noted, "there is no dispute that in 1848, the State had no right 
to commence a civil suit to collect forfeitures for deceptive 
advertising or violation of the [Wisconsin Consumer Act]," and 
thus the court found no constitutional right to a jury trial.  
State v. Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d 686, 698, 517 N.W.2d 705 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  These cases make it clear that the first prong of 
our test should be interpreted narrowly, and the majority's 
decision goes against this history. 
¶40 The majority correctly points out that none of the 
pre-1848 cases cited by H & S involves a cause of action that is 
codified in substantially the same form by the Unfair Sales Act.  
Majority op. at ¶¶24-26.  However, unlike the majority, I do not 
find the causes of action listed in Blackstone's chapter on 
offences against public trade persuasive either. 
¶41 The majority highlights three of Blackstone's causes 
of 
action——forestalling, 
regrating, 
and 
engrossing——and 
concludes that their character as examples of unfair trade 
practices makes them sufficiently similar to the Unfair Sales 
Act.  I disagree.  These offenses are certainly forerunners of 
modern antitrust and unfair trade practice statutes in general, 
as each involves the artificial manipulation of market factors 
by a market participant.  However, they are only similar to the 
present cause of action in that general sense. 
¶42 First, engrossing, regrating, and forestalling the 
market were criminal offenses under the common law, rather than 
private causes of action.  As the majority notes, an aggrieved 
No.  00-2493.jpw 
 
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retailer such as Village Food would not have been able to bring 
a 
civil 
cause 
of 
action 
for 
engrossing, 
regrating, 
or 
forestalling under the common law.  Majority op. at ¶28.  This 
makes the old cause of action significantly different than the 
present one. 
¶43 We addressed a similar issue in Bergren v. Staples, 
263 Wis. 477, 57 N.W.2d 714 (1953).  In Bergren, we held that 
there was no constitutional right to a jury trial when an 
employer's compensation insurer brought suit against the third-
party tortfeasor in an attempt to be compensated for a worker's 
compensation claim.  Id. at 482-83.  Despite the various tort 
claims that could be brought in such a case, we recognized that 
the only way the employer's compensation insurer had a cause of 
action 
against 
the 
third-party 
tortfeasor 
was 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  Id.  Because the claim was created 
solely by statute, we held that no constitutional right to a 
jury trial attached. 
¶44 Here, the same reasoning applies.  The sole reason 
that Village Food is able to bring the cause of action in this 
case is because of the existence of the statute.  Therefore, the 
cause of action could not have existed, been known, or been 
recognized at common law prior to 1848.  For that reason alone, 
I would hold that this cause of action does not meet the test 
adopted by the court. 
¶45 Furthermore, the nature of each of the Blackstonian 
offenses cited by the majority is different enough from the 
civil cause of action under the Unfair Sales Act that I cannot 
No.  00-2493.jpw 
 
5 
 
reasonably say that they are substantially codified by the 
statute.  Regrating and engrossing are more akin to modern anti-
monopoly causes of action, as they each involved amassing goods 
in order to artificially raise market prices.  Forestalling the 
market involved preventing goods from getting to market in order 
to artificially raise prices.  Conversely, the present cause of 
action involves the violation of a minimum price requirement, 
statutorily set according to a complex formula, as it applies to 
the sale of a specific type of product.  The Unfair Sales Act as 
a whole provides a detailed scheme for the regulation of 
commercial 
pricing 
practices 
in 
specific 
markets. 
 
The 
significant differences between a cause of action under this 
scheme and under Blackstone's causes of action are obvious. 
¶46 The simple fact that the present cause of action 
involves behavior that affects market prices is, in my opinion, 
simply not sufficient to show that the pre-1848 claims were 
substantially codified in a form as they existed then.  In 
essence, the majority's holding is that the mere classification 
of the cause action as an "unfair trade practice" is enough to 
constitutionally guarantee the right to a jury trial.  This not 
only goes against our precedent, but essentially renders the 
test a nullity, as present causes of action of all sorts 
assessed under this test will only have to be compared generally 
to past causes of action in order to invoke the constitutional 
protection to a trial by jury.  This result comports neither 
with the plain language nor the intent of the constitutional 
provision. 
No.  00-2493.jpw 
 
6 
 
¶47 Because I would find that the Unfair Sales Act does 
not substantially codify a pre-1848 cause of action as it 
existed, was known, or was recognized at common law then, I 
would conclude that the first prong of the test adopted by the 
court has not been met.  Therefore, I would not find it 
necessary to address the question of whether such an action was 
legal or equitable in 1848. 
¶48 In sum, although I agree with the test adopted by the 
majority, 
I would 
conclude 
that 
H & S does 
not have a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial in a private 
cause of action under the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act.  Although 
it has not yet chosen to do so, I would also note that the 
legislature has the ability to amend the act to create a 
statutory right to a jury trial.  See Bergren, 263 Wis. at 483.  
I would affirm the ruling of the circuit court, and find that it 
properly granted Village Food's motion to strike H & S's demand 
for a jury trial in this case. 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DIANE S. SYKES join this opinion.   
 
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