Title: Commonwealth v. Dame
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11683, SJC-11937
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2016

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SJC-11683 
SJC-11937 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RONALD C. DAME. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     November 6, 2015. - February 3, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Delay in commencement of 
prosecution, Search and seizure, Probable cause.  Due 
Process of Law, Delay in commencement of prosecution.  
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Probable Cause.  Search and 
Seizure, Motor vehicle, Probable cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Indictment, Delay in commencement 
of prosecution, Motion to suppress, Harmless error, 
Execution of sentence, Sentence.  Error, Harmless. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 20, 2006. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by James R. Lemire, J.; a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter W. 
Agnes, Jr., J.; and the case was tried before Richard T. Tucker, 
J. 
 
A motion for a stay of sentence filed in the Supreme 
Judicial Court was referred to Spina, J., and was considered by 
him. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan with him) for 
the defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  Clara Provost (victim) was brutally murdered in 
the bedroom of her apartment sometime after 10:30 P.M. on 
January 6 or early in the morning hours of January 7, 1974.  The 
subsequent police investigation focused on several potential 
suspects.  A year of investigation produced a circumstantial but 
not very strong case against the defendant, including a brief 
prior dating relationship with the victim that apparently ended 
badly; a flawed alibi; fresh scratches on his face; and a 
handprint on the outside of the door through which the murderer 
forced entry into the apartment.1  No one was indicted for the 
murder, and the investigation became largely dormant.2 
 
During the murder investigation in 1974, however, tissue 
was taken from under the fingernails of both hands of the victim 
and preserved.  More than twenty-five years later, analysis of 
this evidence proved decisive in the decision to prosecute the 
case.  As increasingly advanced methods of deoxyribonucleic acid 
                                                          
 
 
1 The evidence also included the observations of two 
witnesses, one of whom saw a man parked in a truck near the 
victim's apartment when the witness left that apartment at 
approximately 10:30 P.M., and another who observed a man climb 
over a wall next to the victim's apartment building around 
midnight.  Neither could positively identify the defendant as 
the individual they saw that evening. 
 
 
2 There were periods of activity thereafter; for example, a 
number of the witnesses were reinterviewed in 1983 after a 
potential lead developed in the case involving another 
individual.  That lead did not pan out. 
3 
 
(DNA) analysis became more reliable, accurate, and accepted as 
evidence admissible in Massachusetts proceedings, Commonwealth 
v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 789 (1997) (finding reliable and 
approving polymerase chain reaction analysis), a new era of 
investigation commenced.  The samples that had been preserved 
were analyzed and swabs were taken from the previously 
identified potential suspects.  The analysis identified the 
tissue that contained DNA as consistent with the defendant's DNA 
and inconsistent with the DNA of the other suspects.  This 
evidence, combined with the fresh scratches observed (and 
photographed) by the police on the defendant's face when he was 
interviewed the day after the murder in January, 1974, led to 
his indictment on November 20, 2006, and ultimately his 
conviction on February 24, 2012, of murder in the first degree 
on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.3 
 
The defendant raises several claims on appeal.  First, he 
challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the 
murder indictment on the ground that the Commonwealth recklessly 
or negligently delayed indicting him for thirty-two years, 
prejudicing his defense.  Second, he claims error in the denial 
                                                          
 
 
3 The case was submitted to the jury based on three theories 
of murder in the first degree:  premeditated murder, murder by 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder.  The underlying 
felony was armed burglary.  The jury were also instructed on 
theories of murder in the second degree, including felony-murder 
in the second degree, with the underlying felony being assault 
with intent to commit rape. 
4 
 
of his motion to suppress evidence of a paper towel that the 
police seized from his vehicle without probable cause to believe 
that evidence of the crime would be found in there.  Finally, 
the defendant requests relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Just before he filed his appellate brief with this court, 
the defendant filed a motion to stay the execution of his 
sentence.  The motion was referred by the full court to the 
single justice, who denied it.  The defendant's appeal from the 
denial of this motion was consolidated with his direct appeal. 
 
Although we agree that the paper towel should have been 
suppressed,4 we affirm the defendant's conviction, as well as the 
denial of his motion to stay the execution of his sentence.  
After a review of the record, we also decline to grant relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving discussion of other evidence to our 
consideration of the legal issues raised. 
 
The victim was twenty-three years old at the time of her 
death.  She lived with her three and one-half year old son in 
the first-floor apartment of a multifamily residence at 30 
Lunenburg Street in Fitchburg.  The victim's parents, her 
                                                          
 
 
4 Because of this conclusion, we need not reach the 
defendant's challenge to the admission in evidence of the paper 
towel on relevancy grounds. 
5 
 
brother, and three of her sisters lived in the second-floor 
apartment, which had a separate entrance off 13 Highland Avenue. 
 
In late November 1973, the defendant met the victim at a 
country-western club.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant took 
the victim on a date, at which time he engaged in oral sexual 
relations with her.  They may have gone on at least one other 
date.  After Thanksgiving and until the time of her murder, 
however, the victim began a regular dating relationship with 
another man, Gerard Duhaime, a soldier stationed at Fort Devens. 
 
On Saturday, January 5, 1974, the victim and her sister 
Beatrice were walking to a local bar about five minutes from 
their residence when they saw the defendant drive by them very 
slowly.  The victim's demeanor changed after this encounter; she 
had previously been very excited about going out with her 
sister.  After arriving at the bar, the victim realized she had 
forgotten her driver's license and returned home alone to 
retrieve it.  Her sister Sheila, who was at the victim's 
apartment taking care of the victim's son, testified that the 
victim returned to her apartment "in a rush," grabbed her 
driver's license on the table, and left.  Beatrice testified 
that the victim took an unusually long time, more than one-half 
hour, to return to the bar, and when she returned it was as if 
"she was in another world.  She wouldn't even talk." 
6 
 
 
On Sunday, January 6, 1974, the victim spent the day with 
her son and Sheila.  Sheila left the victim's apartment at 
around 6 P.M.  The victim asked Sheila to unlock the door 
downstairs for her boy friend, Duhaime, who was coming later 
that night.  Duhaime was at the victim's apartment from 
approximately 7:30 P.M. to 10:30 P.M.  He made sure the door was 
locked when he left. 
On the way to his vehicle, Duhaime noticed a man sitting in 
a dark pick-up truck with the engine running, staring at him.  
Duhaime made eye contact with the man a few times and the 
encounter made him "very uncomfortable" and "kind of nervous."  
As Duhaime drove away in his vehicle, the truck followed him at 
a close distance with its headlights on, but turned off shortly 
thereafter.  After the victim's murder, the police showed 
Duhaime the defendant's photograph.  Duhaime said that the 
defendant's eyes reminded him of the same eyes, with "that same 
cold, mean look," he saw when he was leaving the victim's 
apartment on January 6. 
 
That same evening, shortly after midnight, Steven Svolis 
was driving his vehicle in the area of Lunenburg Street when he 
saw a man jumping over the wall between the victim's apartment 
building and the building next to it.  Svolis described the man 
as being tall and thin, and having long straight hair on the 
top, which was consistent with Dame's appearance.  The man was 
7 
 
wearing a suede coat with sheepskin lining that was a "car-coat 
length," dark pants, light socks, and dark shoes.5 
 
On January 6, 1974, Colleen Regan, a young woman who had 
been regularly dating the defendant since the prior year, told 
the defendant that she had plans to go on a date with another 
man that night.  The defendant was upset about the date and went 
to her house to see if she would change her mind.  Regan told 
the defendant she was going to go on the date, and he told her 
he would be at the Eastwood Club that evening.  A few days 
later, Regan saw the defendant and observed that he had 
scratches on his face that were not there when she saw him on 
January 6. 
 
On January 7, 1974, the victim was found lying on her bed, 
naked from the waist down.  Blood was pooling on her bed.  Her 
head was wedged between the headboard and the mattress and her 
throat had been severely slashed.  During his examination of the 
crime scene, a State police trooper observed a smeared bloody 
handprint on the victim's left inner thigh.  He also observed 
that the door to the victim's apartment had been forced open, 
with the latch broken.  Other police officers found "some pieces 
of paper towel" on the floor in front of the stove.  No usable 
fingerprints, besides those of the victim, were found in the 
                                                          
 
 
5 After reading about the victim's murder in the newspaper, 
Steven Svolis went to the police and reported what he had seen. 
8 
 
apartment.  On the front door, however, a palm print and three 
latent prints that matched the defendant's fingerprints were 
found slightly above the broken latch.  Scrapings from under the 
victim's fingernails from both hands were preserved because they 
contained human blood and skin tissue. 
 
Later that day, the Fitchburg police interviewed the 
defendant.  There were several scratches on the defendant's left 
cheek, which were then photographed.  During the interview, the 
police went outside to the defendant's vehicle, opened the rear 
door, and retrieved a paper towel from the back seat area.  
Sperm cells were later detected on the paper towel that was 
found in the defendant's vehicle.  The defendant was 
subsequently interviewed by the police multiple times in 
January, 1974.  No one was charged with the victim's murder.6 
 
More than twenty-five years later, on December 1, 1999, a 
chemist at the State police crime laboratory sent samples from 
the paper towel found in the defendant's vehicle and from the 
fingernail scrapings to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
                                                          
 
6 The case file was opened briefly in 1983 based on a police 
interview in Keene, New Hampshire, after a woman accused a man 
with whom she had been in a prior relationship, George Dunton, 
of the victim's murder.  Police determined that he had nothing 
to do with the homicide.  This information was not presented at 
trial, although a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analyst testified 
that she compared the DNA profile derived from the fingernail 
scrapings to Dunton's profile and excluded him as a potential 
source of the DNA present in the scrapings. 
9 
 
(FBI) for DNA testing.  Between 2000 and 2006, the police 
obtained DNA from the defendant, Duhaime, and George Dunton.7 
The DNA samples were further tested by a DNA analyst in the 
State police crime laboratory in 2007 using more sophisticated 
analytical techniques.  A DNA profile was created for each of 
the three men.  The fingernail scrapings from the victim's right 
hand contained a single source male profile which "matched the 
DNA profile" from the defendant such that the defendant could 
not be excluded as a contributor to the sample.  Dunton and 
Duhaime were excluded as potential sources of DNA present in the 
fingernail scrapings.  Based on standard DNA testing, the 
probability of a randomly selected unrelated person having 
contributed DNA to this mixture was approximately one in 5,227 
of the Caucasian population.8  Based on the more advanced short 
tandem repeat of the Y chromosome testing on the fingernail 
scrapings,9,10 the defendant's profile would not have been 
                                                          
 
 
7 The results of the testing by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation were not admitted at trial, but excluded Dunton 
and Gerard Duhaime as possible contributors to the sample.  The 
defendant was not excluded as a contributor.  In 2007, more 
advanced DNA analysis was performed.  The results of this 
analysis were presented at trial. 
 
8 The defendant is Caucasian. 
 
 
9 Short tandem repeat of the Y chromosome (Y-STR) testing 
permits testing on smaller samples of DNA than other forms of 
DNA testing. 
 
10 
 
expected to occur more frequently than one in 2.2 million 
unrelated Caucasian males.11 
As for the paper towel seized from the defendant's vehicle, 
the nonsperm fraction contained a mixture of DNA from more than 
one source, and the defendant matched the major male profile in 
that DNA mixture.  The probability of a randomly selected 
individual unrelated to the defendant having a DNA profile 
matching that obtained from the nonsperm fraction was 
approximately one in 27.8 million of the Caucasian population. 
 
At trial, the defendant denied that he broke into the 
victim's apartment and murdered her.  He testified that during 
the night of the murder he was at the house of his sister, 
Theresa LaPlume, from about 7 P.M. until approximately midnight, 
and then went directly to his home.  The defendant testified 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
10 At trial, the DNA analyst explained that DNA analysis 
involves four steps:  extracting a sample; determining the 
quantity of sample available; amplifying the locations of 
interest within the sample (of which there are fifteen that are 
used because they are "highly discriminating between 
individuals"); and converting the amplified sample into a visual 
product known as the DNA profile.  STR testing involves the 
amplification process by which fifteen locations of interest are 
copied.  Y-STR testing focuses on sequences of DNA found only on 
the Y-chromosome, so although the fifteen sites are shared 
between males and females, the Y-STR sequences are found only in 
males. 
 
11 At trial, defense counsel's legal assistant testified 
that she researched and constructed a family tree of the 
defendant's male relatives and determined that, in 1974, the 
defendant had twenty-four to twenty-five male relatives living 
in the Fitchburg area. 
11 
 
that his niece scratched his face while he was at his sister's 
house.  LaPlume died in 1993.  In rebuttal, the Commonwealth 
called Robert Powers, who testified that he saw the defendant at 
the Eastwood Club on January 6, 1974.  Specifically, Powers 
testified that he, his children, and his wife were at the club 
from approximately 7:30 P.M. to 9 or 9:30 P.M., and that during 
that time the defendant spoke with his wife.  He also testified 
that the defendant was still at the club when he and his family 
left. 
 
2.  Motion to dismiss.  On appeal, the defendant argues 
that the judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of preindictment delay by the Commonwealth.  
The defendant contends that the thirty-two year delay between 
the victim's murder and the return of the indictment against him 
prejudiced his defense to a degree constituting a violation of 
his due process rights.  The crux of the defendant's argument is 
that his alibi witness, his sister, died in 1993 and was 
therefore unable to testify in his defense, and that the 
Commonwealth was "reckless and/or negligent" in failing to 
charge him when she was still alive. 
 
Due process principles intrinsic to the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights protect putative defendants from 
preindictment delays by the government that are intentional and 
12 
 
prejudicial.  Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 458 (2010), 
citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) ("Due 
Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against 
oppressive delay").  A defendant seeking dismissal of an 
indictment due to preindictment delay "must demonstrate that he 
suffered substantial, actual prejudice to his defense, and that 
the delay was intentionally or recklessly caused by the 
government."  Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 281 (1999), 
and cases cited.  "[T]he burden of establishing the 
constitutional violation is a heavy one."  Commonwealth v. Best, 
381 Mass. 472, 484 (1980).  The motion judge denied the motion 
on the ground that the defendant had not established either 
substantial actual prejudice or that the delay was intentionally 
or recklessly caused by the Commonwealth.  We agree with the 
judge's findings. 
 
a.  Prejudice.  "The primary purpose of preindictment due 
process analysis is to assess prejudice to the defendant's 
ability to mount a defense."  King v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 
1043, 1044 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 377 Mass. 
682, 691 (1979).  Although the preindictment delay surely caused 
some prejudice to the defendant's case, the circumstances do not 
give rise to the "severe prejudice" that would require the 
"drastic remedy" of dismissal of the indictment (citation 
13 
 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 87 
(1989). 
 
The defendant claims that LaPlume's testimony would have 
corroborated his alibi that he was at her home from 
approximately 7 P.M. to until shortly after midnight on the 
evening of the murder, and that she would have testified that 
her daughter, the defendant's niece, scratched his face, 
providing an explanation for how the defendant's face was 
scratched that evening.  The defendant claims that LaPlume's 
absence at trial was irremediable because, although he could 
testify himself as to his alibi, his testimony would have been 
bolstered by LaPlume's testimony. 
 
We disagree with the defendant's assertion that the loss of 
LaPlume's testimony caused severe prejudice.  First, LaPlume's 
report to the police that the defendant arrived at her home on 
the night of the murder between 6:30 P.M. and 7 P.M. was 
contradicted by other noninterested witnesses who told the 
police that the defendant was at the Eastwood Club that night.  
One of those witnesses, Powers, told the police in January, 
1974, and testified at trial that he saw the defendant at the 
Eastwood Club on January 6, 1974, from 7:30 P.M. until 
approximately 9 or 9:30 P.M.12,13  In addition, during the 
                                                          
 
 
12 The defendant argues that his alibi remains intact 
despite Robert Powers's testimony because Powers's statements do 
14 
 
investigation, LaPlume's husband contradicted LaPlume's report 
by telling the police that he left his house around 7:30 P.M. on 
the night of the victim's murder and that the defendant was not 
at the home.  Regan, who was dating the defendant at the time of 
the victim's murder, also testified that the defendant had told 
her at 6 P.M. that night that he would be at the Eastwood Club.  
Given these facts, we cannot conclude that LaPlume's testimony 
would have significantly aided the defendant's defense. 
 
In addition to the reports contradicting LaPlume's 
statements about the defendant's whereabouts on the night of the 
murder, "[c]ommon sense and the case law dictate that the 
testimony of a blood relative of the defendant is inherently 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not directly contradict Theresa LaPlume's time line as to where 
the defendant was after 9:15 P.M.  This dispute as to his 
whereabouts on the evening of murder was brought to the 
attention of the jury, as the defendant testified on his own 
behalf, stating that he went to LaPlume's home after leaving the 
Eastwood Club.  The jury were therefore aware of the limitations 
of Powers's testimony and could draw their own conclusions as to 
the defendant's whereabouts on the night of the murder.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 469 n.17 (2007) ("It is 
for the jury to make a determination of credibility").  Powers's 
statements do, however, directly contradict the defendant's 
testimony as to the time the defendant arrived at his sister's 
home.  This discrepancy would have permitted the jury to infer 
the defendant was never there. 
13 In his reply brief, the defendant argues for the first 
time that Powers was not a particularly credible witness because 
he was biased against the defendant, who had flirted with 
Powers's wife at the Eastwood Club.  We need not consider this 
argument, given that credibility determinations are for the jury 
and that defense counsel had an opportunity to elicit testimony 
on this point during his cross-examination of Powers but did not 
do so. 
15 
 
less credible than the testimony of other witnesses."  
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 153 (1999).14  Here, where 
LaPlume's testimony would have been contradicted at trial by 
unrelated parties, we cannot conclude that her testimony would 
have been so powerful as to exculpate the defendant.15  
Additionally, the defendant was able to pursue his alibi defense 
through his own testimony at trial.16 
                                                          
 
 
14 The defendant also claims that, in deciding the motion to 
dismiss, it was improper for the motion judge to balance 
LaPlume's statements to the police against those made by other 
witnesses to the police because such credibility determinations 
are for the jury.  We disagree, as it is implicit in the 
preindictment delay analysis that the judge must assess 
prejudice to the defendant's case by weighing the missing 
evidence against the other evidence to be presented at trial.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patten, 401 Mass. 20, 22 (1987) 
(judge reviews record to determine whether defendant has 
adequately demonstrated through "concrete evidence, and not 
simply by a fertile imagination, a reasonable possibility that 
access to the lost items would have produced evidence favorable 
to his cause").  Here, the judge properly considered the 
likelihood that LaPlume's testimony would have exculpated the 
defendant and concluded that the defendant had not demonstrated 
such a likelihood in light of the other evidence discussed. 
 
15 After interviewing witnesses who placed the defendant at 
the Eastwood Club (and not LaPlume's home) on the evening of 
January 6, 1974, the police confronted LaPlume.  She began to 
shake and tear up and told the police to leave her house.  The 
police also developed information that the defendant went to 
LaPlume's house at 8 A.M. on the morning of January 7, 1974, 
several hours after the murder. 
 
 
16 The defendant also argues that his constitutional right 
not to testify was infringed because, without LaPlume, the 
presentation of his alibi defense required him to testify.  We 
disagree.  See Commonwealth v. Toon, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 651 
n.12 (2002) ("That a defendant may need to testify or present 
evidence in order to raise self-defense does not violate State 
16 
 
 
Finally, "[t]he likelihood that the loss was prejudicial is 
eased by the reliability of the evidence presented by the 
government" (citation omitted).  Imbruglia, 377 Mass. at 689.  
Here, the Commonwealth presented ample evidence from which the 
jury could find that the defendant murdered the victim, 
including the defendant's handprint on the door broken into by 
the killer; a photograph of the scratches on the defendant's 
face that Regan testified were not there when she last saw him 
earlier in the evening of January 6, 1974; and the DNA analysis 
comparing the defendant's DNA with that present in the blood and 
tissue scrapings taken from under the victim's fingernails. 
 
Thus, the defendant has not shown that LaPlume's statements 
would have significantly aided his defense, see Lovasco, 431 
U.S. at 783 ("every delay-caused detriment to a defendant's case 
should [not] abort a criminal prosecution"), and has failed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
or Federal constitutional privileges against self-
incrimination").  See also Commonwealth v. Beauchamp, 49 Mass. 
App. Ct. 591, 606-607 (2000), quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970) (that defendant felt "virtually compelled" 
to testify did not infringe on privilege against self-
incrimination; "The defendant in a criminal trial is frequently 
forced to testify himself . . . in an effort to reduce the risk 
of conviction . . . .  That the defendant faces such a dilemma 
demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a 
defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination"). 
17 
 
meet his burden of showing substantial actual prejudice to his 
defense as a result of preindictment delay.17 
 
b.  Recklessness.  Dismissal of an indictment is only 
required where a defendant makes a persuasive showing of both 
actual prejudice and intentional or reckless conduct by the 
government that caused the delay.  See Imbruglia, 377 Mass. at 
691, citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 ("Proof of prejudice is a 
necessary, but not sufficient element of a due process claim").  
Here, where the defendant concedes that the delay was not 
intentional, we focus our analysis on whether the preindictment 
delay was "incurred in reckless disregard of known risks to the 
                                                          
 
 
17 The defendant also argues that, in addition to granting a 
new trial, this court should rule that LaPlume's statements to 
the police are admissible under Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 
Mass. 23 (2015).  In Drayton, we held that an otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay statement may be admissible if the 
statements were "critical to [the defendant's] defense" and bore 
"persuasive assurances of trustworthiness."  Id. at 36, quoting 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).  We disagree 
with the defendant's assertion that the "narrow" constitutional 
principle governing the facts in Drayton, supra at 32, applies 
in this case.  As discussed, LaPlume's testimony was not 
"critical" to the defendant's defense because he was able to 
testify to the same information.  Additionally, LaPlume's 
statements were contradicted by the statements of other 
witnesses, contrast id. at 27, 37-38 (witness's hearsay 
statements more trustworthy when corroborated by statements by 
other witnesses), and she had a familial relationship with the 
defendant, rendering her testimony inherently less credible than 
statements by the other noninterested witnesses in the case.  
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 153 (1999).  While 
LaPlume consistently told the police that the defendant was at 
her home on the night of the murder, these latter two points 
weigh heavily against finding that LaPlume's statements bore 
"persuasive assurances of trustworthiness."  Drayton, supra at 
36. 
18 
 
putative defendant's ability to mount a defense" such that 
dismissal is warranted.  Imbruglia, supra.  Although this case 
involves a considerable passage of time between the murder and 
the indictment, the defendant points to no facts in the record, 
nor do we discern any, that suggest recklessness by the 
Commonwealth in investigating the murder or bringing the 
indictments.  Instead, the defendant merely states that "[t]he 
delay was reckless."  Such a conclusory statement will not 
suffice to meet the defendant's heavy burden of proving a 
constitutional deprivation.  Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 
307, 332 (2009), quoting Best, 381 Mass. at 484. 
From our review of the record, it is apparent that the 
Commonwealth investigated at least one other potential suspect 
in the 1980s, and followed up on DNA testing as it became more 
widely available and approved as admissible evidence in the late 
1990s.  The defendant contends that the fact that the results of 
the initial DNA testing done by the FBI were returned to the 
State police crime laboratory in 2001 belies the Commonwealth's 
contention that the DNA evidence is what motivated it to seek 
the indictment against the defendant in 2006.  To the contrary, 
after the initial DNA testing by the FBI, the Commonwealth 
reinvestigated the other potential suspects, took additional 
saliva samples, and retested the DNA samples using more advanced 
techniques as they became available.  These facts do not support 
19 
 
a finding of recklessness.  See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791-792 
(declining to adopt rule requiring government to file charges 
once probable cause has been established or once government has 
"assembled sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt").18 
 
The defendant also urges the court to depart from our 
holding in Imbruglia and conclude that a negligent delay may 
constitute a due process violation requiring dismissal of an 
indictment.  We decline to do so.  We recognize that negligent 
preindictment delay may amount to a constitutional violation in 
some cases, see, e.g., Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1016 (1990); however, such 
circumstances are not present here.  Moreover, there is no 
reason to revisit our established rule where the defendant has 
otherwise failed to make the requisite showing of actual 
                                                          
 
 
18 Although much of our inquiry focuses on the defendant's 
due process rights and corresponding ability to mount a defense, 
our analysis also incorporates some deference to the interests 
of prosecutorial discretion.  "[P]rosecutors are under no duty 
to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they 
are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  To impose such a duty 'would have a 
deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon 
the ability of society to protect itself.'"  United States v. 
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1977), quoting United States v. 
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).  To the extent that the 
prosecution is required to make "'a necessarily subjective 
evaluation of the strength of the circumstantial evidence 
available and the credibility of the [defendant's] denial,' some 
delay is normal and justifiable."  Commonwealth v. Best, 381 
Mass. 472, 485 (1980), quoting Lovasco, supra at 793. 
20 
 
prejudice to his defense and is therefore not entitled to a 
dismissal of the murder indictment against him.  We accordingly 
affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
indictment for preindictment delay. 
 
3.  Motion to suppress motor vehicle search.  The defendant 
also appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress paper 
towel evidence seized from his motor vehicle.  The defendant 
concedes that the police had probable cause to believe he 
murdered the victim at the time his motor vehicle was searched.  
He argues, however, that the motion was wrongly denied because 
there was no probable cause to believe there was evidence of the 
crime in his vehicle, noting that the motion judge's ruling 
makes no findings about his vehicle being driven on the night of 
the crime or being otherwise involved in the crime.19 
 
"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error 'but 
conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 
(2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 
(2002).  Credibility determinations are "the province of the 
motion judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses."  
                                                          
 
 
19 The defendant had access to at least two vehicles during 
this time period -- his father's pickup truck and a Chevrolet 
Super Sport vehicle.  The paper towel was seized from the 
interior of the Chevrolet. 
21 
 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 48 (2011).  "Our review 
here is based on the facts as developed at the suppression 
hearing, not at trial."  Id. 
The motion judge found the following facts.  On the evening 
of January 7, 1974, Fitchburg police Detective Joseph Carbone 
came into contact with the defendant, who had voluntarily come 
to the police station and was being interviewed by State police 
Lieutenant John J. Carney and Fitchburg police Detective Paul 
Keating.  At one point, Carbone followed Detective David Caputi 
outside to the defendant's vehicle, which was parked at the 
police station.  Carbone watched as Caputi opened the rear door 
to the defendant's vehicle and retrieved what Carbone perceived 
to be some rags or clothes from the back seat area (the parties 
agree the paper towel evidence was included).  We assume that 
the Commonwealth could not establish that the search had been 
consented to by the defendant.20 
Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable -- subject 
                                                          
 
 
20 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, which took 
place in 2010, although there was testimony that police officers 
had a key to the defendant's vehicle, there was no witness 
available to the Commonwealth who could testify regarding the 
defendant's consent to the search.  A report written by one of 
the police officers stating that the defendant had given 
permission for the warrantless search was excluded by the motion 
judge, and the officer who wrote the report was deceased. 
22 
 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 
891, 901 (1990).  "One of those exceptions, commonly known as 
'the automobile exception,' applies to situations where the 
police have probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle 
parked in a public place and apparently capable of being moved 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624, (2008).  "The existence of probable 
cause depends on whether the facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge at the time of making the search or seizure 
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
defendant had committed, or was committing, an offense."  
Commonwealth v. Miller, 366 Mass. 387, 391 (1974).  In 
determining whether the police had probable cause to search the 
defendant's vehicle without a warrant, we ask whether "the 
information possessed by police, at the time of the proposed 
warrantless search, provide[d] a substantial basis for the 
belief that there [was] a timely nexus or connection between 
criminal activity, a particular person or place to be searched, 
and particular evidence to be seized."  Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 
69 Mass. App. Ct. 465, 470 (2007), quoting Grasso & McEvoy, 
Suppression Matters under Massachusetts Law § 14–1[b], at 14–3 
(2006). 
23 
 
 
We previously have found probable cause to conduct a 
warrantless search of a vehicle where facts indicated that there 
was a connection between the crime and the vehicle.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 573-574 (2002) (probable 
cause existed to believe evidence concerning crime would be 
found in defendant's truck where, when victim was last heard 
from, she had been with defendant in his truck); Commonwealth v. 
Beldotti, 409 Mass. 553, 557 (1991) (probable cause existed to 
believe that evidence concerning crime would be found in 
defendant's home where defendant's motor vehicle was parked 
because defendant was with victim that morning and had driven 
his vehicle on day of murder). 
 
In contrast, here the motion judge found no facts 
connecting the crime and the defendant's vehicle.  There was no 
finding that the defendant had driven the vehicle searched on 
the night of the murder or had otherwise used the vehicle in 
furtherance of the crime, nor were there any other facts found 
that would support an inference that evidence would probably be 
found therein.  We therefore conclude that the motion judge 
erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the paper 
towel evidence. 
 
Given this error, we must determine whether the admission 
of that evidence requires a new trial.  Because the defendant 
properly preserved the issue, we ask whether the admission of 
24 
 
the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 154 (2011).  "[T]o 
establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Commonwealth must show that other properly admitted evidence of 
guilt is 'overwhelming,' in the sense that it is 'so powerful as 
to "nullify any effect"' that the improperly admitted evidence 
'might have had' on the fact finder or the findings."  
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 362 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 704 n.44 (2010).  In 
undertaking this analysis we consider a number of factors, 
including "the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's 
case; the relationship between the evidence and the premise of 
the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the frequency of 
the reference; whether the erroneously admitted evidence was 
merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence; the 
availability or effect of curative instructions; and the weight 
or quantum of evidence of guilt."  Hoyt, supra at 155, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 553 (2006). 
 
We conclude that the paper towel evidence was of marginal 
importance to the prosecution's case and the inferences the jury 
could draw from the evidence were limited.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth called a "fiber analyst" to testify as to his 
examination of paper scraps found in the victim's apartment, and 
the paper towel taken from the defendant's vehicle.  The analyst 
25 
 
opined that the scraps and the towel were consistent with being 
from the same manufacturer and were likely from the same batch 
or run.  The witness was effectively cross-examined by defense 
counsel, admitting that he could not tell what company 
manufactured the towels and that a "batch or run" could be 
70,000 or 80,000 rolls or more, depending on which company 
manufactured them and the size and speed of its manufacturing 
machinery. 
 
At the end of the case, all that the prosecutor, in closing 
argument, said about the paper towel found in the defendant's 
vehicle was that the fact that the paper towel had the 
defendant's DNA on it showed that it was in fact recovered from 
the defendant's vehicle in 1974, and that the pattern on the 
scraps of paper found by the police in the victim's apartment 
was more like patterns found on paper towels than napkins. 21,22 
 
Moreover, to the extent that the paper towel evidence 
permitted an inference that the defendant had been in the 
victim's apartment the night of the murder, there was other 
powerful evidence from which the jury could draw a similar 
inference, including the defendant's palm and fingerprints on 
                                                          
 
 
21 The paper towel was mentioned in just two paragraphs of 
the prosecutor's thirteen-page closing argument. 
 
 
22 Defense counsel had questioned a witness as to whether 
the scraps were actually of napkins brought to the victim's 
apartment that night by Duhaime. 
26 
 
the forced door of the victim's apartment and the DNA found 
under her fingernails.  We conclude that any prejudice to the 
defendant's case caused by the admission of the paper towel 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.23 
 
4.  Denial of motion to stay execution of sentence.  The 
defendant lastly claims that the single justice erred in denying 
his motion to stay the execution of his sentence.  We review the 
denial of the motion for abuse of discretion.  See DiPietro v. 
Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 964, 964 (1976).  Such discretion is 
governed by two considerations:  the defendant's likelihood of 
success on appeal and whether the defendant poses a security 
risk.  Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 2), 456 Mass. 128, 132 (2010).  
As to the second factor, "[s]ignificant considerations include 
the defendant's familial status, roots in the community, 
employment, prior criminal record, and general attitude and 
demeanor" (citation and quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 77 (2013). 
                                                          
 
 
23 In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the 
defendant was the perpetrator of the murder principally based on 
his fingerprints, the DNA evidence, the observations of Duhaime 
on the night of the murder, and the defendant's apparent false 
alibi.  The prosecutor further argued that the defendant was 
guilty of murder in the first degree under all three theories, 
including murder occurring during the course of an armed 
burglary.  The only mention of a possible attempted sexual 
assault came at the beginning of his closing, and was based on 
the position of the victim's body, "legs spread apart and naked 
from the waist down," and not on the paper towel found in the 
defendant's vehicle. 
27 
 
 
The latter consideration alone supports denial of the 
motion.  It is presumed that a defendant charged with murder in 
the first degree is not entitled to bail.  Farley v. 
Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 1004, 1004 (2000).  Moreover, where the 
defendant was convicted of brutally murdering the victim, and 
where he did not submit any evidence of ties to family or the 
community, we are not persuaded that he did not pose a security 
risk.24  Given this, we conclude the single justice did not abuse 
his discretion in denying the defendant's motion. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a review of 
the entire record, we discern no reason to exercise our powers 
to grant a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt.  Although 
the defendant's trial was not error free, we conclude that there 
is no miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial, and 
accordingly, the defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
24 The defendant argued in his motion to stay execution of 
sentence that evidence of his "roots in the community" was 
supported by the testimony of defense counsel's legal assistant, 
who performed genealogical research of the defendant's family 
and found several male relatives living in the area.  Because 
the defendant made no assertion as to his relationship with any 
of his relatives, we cannot conclude he had ties to the 
community.