Title: Crawford v. Div. of Employment Sec.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92208
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2012

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
ARNAZ CRAWFORD,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT 
) 
SECURITY,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission 
 
Opinion issued July 31, 2012 
 
 
Arnaz Crawford appeals from the decision of the labor and industrial relations 
commission finding that he was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and 
ordering him to repay those benefits received while he was ineligible.  The commission’s 
decision is reversed in part and affirmed in part.   
FACTS 
 
Crawford was fired from his job in January 2009.  Shortly thereafter, he was 
admitted voluntarily to a state mental facility for one week.  Crawford’s physician 
advised him to apply for Social Security disability benefits (“SSDI benefits”) because his 
mental condition rendered him unable to work.  In February 2009, Crawford applied for 
SSDI benefits.  The social security administration denied the claim.  Crawford appealed 
and requested a hearing.  
 
While his SSDI appeal was pending, Crawford attempted to find a job 
unsuccessfully.  On July 27, 2009, Crawford applied for state unemployment benefits, 
which require a showing that the claimant is unemployed but is able to work.  The 
Division of Employment Security awarded unemployment benefits to Crawford, and he 
received them until March 20, 2010.   
 
On March 2, 2010, the social security administration determined that Crawford 
had been disabled and eligible for SSDI benefits since January 29, 2009.  It considered 
Crawford’s psychological and vocational evaluations and found that he “is not mentally 
capable of full-time competitive employment.”  The social security administration also 
found that there were no jobs existing in significant numbers that Crawford could 
perform.   
 
Crawford notified the division of employment eecurity that the social security 
administration determined that he was eligible for benefits.  On March 31, 2010, a 
division deputy reconsidered the division’s prior determination that Crawford was 
eligible for unemployment compensation.  The deputy determined that Crawford was 
unable to work from December 20, 2009, to March 20, 2010, and, therefore, was 
ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.  The deputy also determined that 
Crawford had received $3,080 in unemployment compensation benefits that he was 
ineligible to receive.   
 
An appeals tribunal affirmed the deputy’s decisions.  The commission affirmed the 
decision of the appeals tribunal.  The commission recognized Crawford’s willingness to 
work but found that he was not able to work within the meaning of the Missouri 
employment security law and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment benefits.  
Crawford appeals.  
 Standard of Review 
 
The Missouri Constitution, article V, section 18, provides for judicial review of 
the commission’s award to determine whether the award is “supported by competent and 
substantial evidence upon the whole record.”  Similarly, section 288.210(4) provides that 
an appellate court may set aside the commission’s decision regarding an unemployment 
compensation claim if there “was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to 
warrant the making of the award.” 
I.  Eligibility for Benefits 
 
In his first point on appeal, Crawford raises four distinct arguments challenging 
the commission’s decisions finding that he was not able to work and, therefore, was 
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.  First, he asserts that the division’s 
ineligibility determination violates the Supremacy Clause because they were in direct 
conflict with social security administration’s award of disability benefits.  Second, he 
asserts that the commission erred in affirming the decisions that he was ineligible for 
unemployment benefits because the division’s initial determinations were reconsidered 
by the deputy without the showing of “good cause” necessary for a re-determination of 
eligibility for benefits.  Third, he asserts that the decisions violated section 288.215 
 
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because the commission improperly relied on the social security administration’s finding 
that Crawford was disabled.  Finally, Crawford asserts that there was no substantial and 
competent evidence that he was unable to work.  
A. Supremacy Clause 
 
Crawford’s Supremacy Clause argument is premised on the assertion that the 
commission’s ineligibility determinations conflict with regulations that allow the social 
security administration to reduce SSDI benefits by the amount of Crawford’s state 
unemployment compensation benefits.  See 20 C.F.R. 416.1104, 1120-1121.  Crawford 
argues that it would be absurd and improper to allow a state to determine  retroactively 
that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment benefits after the claimant’s SSDI benefits 
already have been reduced because of the receipt of those state unemployment benefits.   
 
Crawford’s argument fails because the SSDI regulations provide that a person can 
receive federal disability benefits even if he is able to engage in part-time work.1  
Theresore, some recipients of SSDI benefits are entitled to Missouri unemployment 
benefits and others are not.  Nothing in the social security regulations prohibits the 
division from finding retroactively that a recipient of SSDI benefits is ineligible for state 
unemployment benefits because, in fact, they are not able to work.  Further, after the 
division found Crawford ineligible and notified him of the overpayment, Crawford had 
                                                 
1 The applicable social security regulations provide that disability benefits will stop if the 
recipient engages in “substantial gainful activity.”  In re Marriage of Lindhorst, 347 
S.W.3d 474, 476 (Mo. banc 2011), citing 20 C.F.R. 404.401a.  A recipient is deemed to 
have engaged in substantial gainful activity if the recipient works more than 80 hours per 
month or earns more than a certain monthly net income.  Lindhorst, 347 S.W3d at 476, 
citing 20 C.F.R 404.1592.   
 
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the option of appealing the SSDI decision to account for the fact that he was no longer 
eligible for state unemployment benefits.   
 
 
Crawford also argues that the division’s actions frustrate the purpose of the Social 
Security Act, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause under Nash v. Florida Industrial 
Comm’n, 388 U.S. 335 (1967).  In Nash, the United States Supreme Court held that 
Florida constitutionally could not refuse to award unemployment benefits to someone 
who had brought federal unfair labor practice charges.  Nash is distinguishable because, 
in this case, there is no indication that Missouri is punishing Crawford for participating in 
the federal social security disability program.  There is no Supremacy Clause violation.  
B.  Good Cause 
 
Crawford asserts that the commission erred in affirming the decisions that he was 
ineligible for unemployment benefits because the division’s initial determinations were 
reconsidered by the deputy without the showing of “good cause” necessary for a re-
determination of eligibility for benefits.  Section 288.070.5 provides, in pertinent part, 
that “[t]he deputy may, however, not later than one year following the end of a benefit 
year, for good cause, reconsider any determination on any claim ….”  Crawford asserts 
that the commission erred in affirming the decision that he was ineligible for benefits 
because the deputy did not have “good cause” to reconsider the eligibility issue.  
 
“An issue appropriate for, but not addressed with the commission, cannot be 
litigated on appeal.”  St. John’s Mercy Health System v. Division of Employment Security, 
273 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Mo. banc 2009).  In his application for review filed with the 
commission, Crawford asserted that the appeals tribunal’s decisions: 
 
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are not supported by competent substantial evidence, are against the 
weight of the evidence, and misstate the law in a number of respects, 
including especially the finding that Mr. Crawford was not able to 
work during the weeks mentioned and the erroneous and unnecessary 
conclusion that to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with a 
subsequent decision of the Social security administration.   
 
 
The issue of the division’s “good cause” to reconsider Crawford’s eligibility was a 
matter that is appropriate for review by the commission.  See, e.g., Roberts v. Labor and 
Indus. Relations Commission, 869 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. App.1993)(the commission 
correctly interpreted and applied section 288.070.5 and was authorized to reconsider the 
claimant’s eligibility for benefits).  The issue of “good cause” to reconsider the initial 
eligibility determination relates to the division’s statutory authority to enter a new 
decision.  Crawford’s application for review does not assert that the division lacked 
statutory authority to reconsider his eligibility for benefits.  Instead, Crawford’s 
application for review asserts that the division’s decision was against the weight of the 
evidence.  Therefore, the issue of “good cause” is not preserved for appeal. 
C.  Section 288.215.2 
 
Crawford asserts that the commission violated section 288.215 by improperly 
relying on the social security administration’s finding that Crawford was disabled.  
Section 288.215.2 provides: 
Any finding of fact, conclusion of law, judgment or order made by an 
arbitrator, commissioner, commission, administrative law judge, 
judge or any other person or body with authority to make findings of 
fact or law in any proceeding not brought under this chapter shall not 
be binding or conclusive on an appeals tribunal or the labor and 
industrial relations commission in any subsequent or separate 
proceeding brought under this chapter, regardless of whether the prior 
 
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action was between the same or related parties or involved the same 
facts. 
 
Section 288.215.2 “reflects a legislative intent to prohibit proceedings outside the 
Missouri Employment Security Law from having a binding effect upon the Commission.”  
Higgins v. Missouri Division of Employment Security, 167 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Mo. App. 
2005).   “However, that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgments, or orders 
entered in such independent proceedings are not binding or conclusive upon the 
Commission or the Division’s Appeals Tribunal does not mean they are to be or must be 
entirely ignored.”   K & D Auto Body, Inc. v. Division of Employment Sec. 171 S.W.3d 
100, 113 (Mo. App. 2005).   The fact that the commission considered the social security 
administration’s disability finding does not amount to a violation of section 288.215.2. 
D.  Substantial and Competent Evidence   
  
Finally, Crawford asserts that there was no substantial and competent evidence 
that he was unable to work.  The record demonstrates that the commission did not 
consider itself bound by the social security administration’s decision.  For instance, in 
exhibits Crawford provided to the commission, he testified that although he wanted to 
work, his physician had told him that he “was real sick” and should not be working.  
Crawford also testified that he would hear voices, talk to himself and pace around and 
that these actions would lead to his discharge from employment.  Therefore, there was 
 
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substantial and competent evidence supporting the commission’s decision.2  Crawford’s 
first point is denied.  
II. Overpayment of Benefits 
 
In his second point, Crawford asserts that the commission erred in affirming the 
determinations that Crawford was overpaid benefits and would be expected to repay 
those benefits.  The resolution of Crawford’s first point disposes of the argument that the 
commission erred in affirming the determination that Crawford was overpaid benefits.  
As such, the sole remaining issue relates to the methods by which the division can 
recover the overpaid benefits.   
A. Ripeness 
 
The division asserts that the issue regarding the methods for recovering the 
overpayments is not ripe because the division has not yet attempted recovery.   
 
 “[T]he ripeness doctrine allows a court ‘to apply a pragmatic test to determine 
whether the agency action is sufficiently binding and sufficiently clear in scope and 
implications to be susceptible to judicial evaluation ....’”  Missouri Ass'n of Nurse 
Anesthetists, Inc. v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 343 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Mo. 
banc 2011) (quoting Missouri Soybean Ass'n v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 
10, 25 (Mo. banc 2003)).  “Determining whether a particular case is ripe for judicial 
resolution requires a two-fold inquiry: a court must evaluate (1) whether the issues tendered 
                                                 
2 This further demonstrates that the commission did not consider itself bound by the 
social security administration disability finding in violation of section 288.215.2.   
 
 
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are appropriate for judicial resolution, and (2) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is 
denied.”  Id. at 27. 
 
Regarding the fitness of the issue for judicial resolution, the division’s notice of 
overpayment states that the overpayment is the result of Crawford’s “error or omission” and 
specifically cites section 288.380 in informing Crawford that he “shall” have the 
overpayments deducted from future benefits and through billing and offsets against state tax 
refunds.  The issue is fit for judicial resolution because it simply requires the application of 
the statutes pertaining to the division’s authority to collect the overpayment.  No further 
factual development is required for judicial resolution. 
 
Crawford also faces hardship if judicial relief is denied.  In its overpayment notices, 
the division has informed Crawford that the division “shall” recover the overpayment 
through a variety of methods, including direct billing.  Crawford’s hardship is obvious and 
imminent; the division has stated that it must, and presumably will, attempt to recover over 
$3,000 from him while he is unemployed and unable to work.   The issue of what methods 
the division can utilize to collect the overpayments is ripe for review.   
B. Collection Methods 
 
   Repayment of unemployment benefits paid to ineligible claimants is addressed by 
sections 288.380.12, 288.380.13 and 288,380.14.  Crawford asserts that the division can 
recover the overpayments only through section 288.380.13 by withholding benefits from 
future unemployment benefit awards.  The division asserts that it can utilize the full range of 
collection methods authorized by section 288.380.14. 
 
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The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as 
reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.   Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of 
America, Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009).  However, “[s]tatutory provisions 
relating to the same subject matter are considered in pari materia and are to be construed 
together.”   Baldwin v. Director of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Mo. banc 2001).  In doing 
so, this Court attempts to read the legislation consistently and harmoniously.  Id.   
 
Section 288.380.12 provides: 
Any person who, by reason of the nondisclosure or misrepresentation by 
such person or by another of a material fact, has received any sum as 
benefits pursuant to this chapter while any conditions for the receipt of 
benefits imposed by this chapter were not fulfilled in such person’s case, or 
while he or she was disqualified from receiving benefits, shall, in the 
discretion of the division, either be liable to have such sums deducted from 
any future benefits payable to such person pursuant to this chapter or shall 
be liable to repay to the division for the unemployment compensation fund a 
sum equal to the amounts so received by him or her. 
 
Section 288.380.13 provides: 
 
Any person who, by reason of any error or omission or because of a lack of 
knowledge of material fact on the part of the division, has received any sum 
of benefits pursuant to this chapter while any conditions for the receipt of 
benefits imposed by this chapter were not fulfilled in such person’s case, or 
while such person was disqualified from receiving benefits, shall after an 
opportunity for a fair hearing pursuant to subsection 2 of section 288.190 
have such sums deducted from any further benefits payable to such person 
pursuant to this chapter, provided that the division may elect not to process 
such possible overpayments where the amount of the same is not over 
twenty percent of the maximum state weekly benefit amount in effect at the 
time the error or omission was discovered. 
 
Finally, section 288.380.14, added in 2006, provides: 
 
Recovering overpaid unemployment compensation benefits shall be pursued 
by the division against any person receiving such overpaid unemployment 
compensation benefits through billing, setoffs against state and federal tax 
 
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refunds to the extent permitted by federal law, intercepts of lottery winnings 
under section 313.321, RSMo, and collection efforts as provided for in 
sections 288.160, 288.170, and 288.175. 
 
 
Subsections 12 and 13 provide for different collection methods depending on whether 
the overpayment was a result of misrepresentation by the claimant or an error or omission by 
the division that is not attributable to the claimant.  If the claimant misrepresented facts to the 
division, then section 288.380.12 authorizes the division to require the claimant to repay the 
overpaid benefits.  In contrast, if the overpayment is the result of an error or omission, then 
section 288.380.13 authorizes less aggressive collection methods, namely, deduction from 
future unemployment benefits.  
 
While subsections 12 and 13 authorize different collection measures depending on 
whether the overpayment was a result of a misrepresentation or a simple mistake, subsection 
14 provides that “any person” to whom unemployment benefits were overpaid is subject to 
billing, income tax setoffs and a number of other collection methods authorized in chapter 
288.   
 
The division contends that the plain language of subsection 14 means that it can 
employ against Crawford the entire range of collection methods authorized by the subsection 
14.  The problem with the division’s interpretation of subsection 14 is that it eliminates the 
hierarchy of collection methods established in subsections 12 and 13. “Repeal by implication 
is disfavored, and if two statutes can be reconciled then both should be given effect.”  St. 
Charles County v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Mo. banc 1998).  Subsections 12, 13, 
and 14 can each be given effect and reconciled by reading subsection 14 as a further 
 
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elaboration of the measures the division may undertake to collect from those who are liable 
to repay under subsection 12.  
  
This interpretation further is supported by the plain language of section 288.381, 
which, like subsection 14, was first enacted in 2006.  In pertinent part, section 288.381 
provides: 
1. The provisions of subsection 6 of section 288.070 notwithstanding, 
benefits paid to a claimant pursuant to subsection 5 of section 288.070 to 
which the claimant was not entitled based on a subsequent determination, 
redetermination or decision which has become final, shall be collectible by 
the division as provided in subsections 12 and 13 of section 288.380. 
 
Section 288.381 unambiguously provides that when the division retroactively determines 
that a claimant has been overpaid, the overpayment shall be collected pursuant to the 
collection methods outlined in subsection 12 and 13.  Section 288.381 further demonstrates 
that subsection 14 was not intended to repeal subsections 12 and 13. 
 
The commission’s decisions are reversed to the extent that they authorize the division 
to collect the overpayment from Crawford pursuant to sections 288.380.12 and 288.380.14.  
In all other respects, the commission’s decision is affirmed.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
________________________________________  
 
  
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice  
 
Russell, Breckenridge, Fischer, Stith and 
Price, JJ., and Byrn, Sp.J., concur. 
Draper, J., not participating.