Title: State v. Johnny L. Green
Citation: 2002 WI 68
Docket Number: 2000AP001392-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2002

2002 WI 68 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1392-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Johnny L. Green,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 669, 630 N.W.2d 275 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce Schmidt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Nicolas G. Griswold, Muskego, and oral argument by Nicolas G. 
Griswold. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 68 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1392-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 430) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Johnny L. Green,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner Johnny Green 
(Green) seeks review of a decision from the court of appeals 
that upheld his conviction for first-degree sexual assault as a 
repeat offender.  Green argues that the circuit court erred in 
two respects:  (1) by failing to conduct an in camera review of 
the victim's counseling records and (2) by concluding that the 
prosecutor did not violate a sequestration order.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in either 
respect.  We agree.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Green was charged in Winnebago County Circuit Court 
with one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child as a 
repeat offender, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1) and 
939.62(1)(c)(1997-98).1  The State of Wisconsin (State) alleged 
that Green had sexual contact with N.W., a child under the age 
of 13 years, on or about November 1996.  Green and his 
girlfriend, Lisa Russell, lived with N.W. and N.W.'s mother for 
a short period during this time.   
¶3 
N.W. did not inform anyone of the sexual assault until 
March 28, 1997, at which time she informed Russell.  That same 
day, N.W. informed her mother.  The police were contacted. 
¶4 
On April 10, 1997, Detective Robert Quant of the City 
of Oshkosh Police Department and Rod Schraufnagel of the 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services interviewed N.W. 
and her mother about the sexual assault.  N.W. told them that, 
while she was lying on her bed, Green laid down beside her and 
proceeded to touch her breasts and vagina outside of her 
pajamas.  N.W. alleged that this contact occurred around the 
time she was taken to the hospital because of vaginal bleeding.  
This hospital visit occurred on or about November 22, 1996, at 
which time N.W. was diagnosed with a urinary tract infection.  
During the interview with Quant and Schraufnagel, N.W. also 
reported that Green told her that he would kill her if she told 
anyone.  N.W.'s mother told Quant and Schraufnagel that N.W. had 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
3 
 
not told her of many details surrounding the alleged assault and 
that N.W. was seeing a counselor, Jeanie Roberts, for the 
purpose of discussing the assault.   
¶5 
More than a year later, on October 20, 1998, Detective 
Quant again interviewed N.W.  During this interview, N.W. 
alleged the following.  On the day of the assault, she was home 
alone with Green, and Green called her into her bedroom to watch 
television with him.  When N.W. entered the room, Green was 
lying on the bed.  N.W. sat on the bed, and Green pulled her to 
him.  Green then climbed on top of her and pulled her pajama 
bottoms down.  Green then allegedly penetrated her vagina with 
his penis.  Green did not stop until she told him that she had 
to go to the bathroom.  Then, instead of going to the bathroom, 
she tried to run outside, but Green stopped her and told her 
that if she told anyone, he would kill her and her mom.  Green 
then took her to a gas station to buy candy and a beanie baby.  
Soon after they arrived home, N.W.'s mother arrived home.  A 
short time later, N.W. told her mother that she was urinating 
blood.  Her mother then took her to the hospital. 
¶6 
About two months later, on December 14, 1998, Green 
was charged for having sexual intercourse with N.W.  The 
complaint included the details, as discussed above, of N.W.'s 
April 10, 1997 and October 20, 1998 statements to the police.  
The complaint did not contain any information about N.W. seeing 
a counselor.   
¶7 
The complaint also included details from an interview 
that Quant conducted with Russell.  Russell told Quant that she 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
4 
 
remembered when Green had purchased the beanie baby for N.W.  
Russell stated that at that time she sensed N.W. was upset about 
something, but N.W. did not say anything.  Russell also alleged 
that on one occasion Green admitted to her that he had "fondled" 
or "fiddled" N.W.  Russell stated that, after telling Green that 
he was a "sick bastard," Green told her he was "only kidding to 
see how you would act."  
¶8 
On January 5, 1999, the circuit court, the Honorable 
Bruce K. Schmidt presiding, held a preliminary hearing on the 
charges against Green.  N.W. testified during this hearing.  She 
alleged that Green did not touch her breasts or her vagina 
through her clothes.  She maintained that he had sexual 
intercourse with her.  During her testimony, she stated that she 
went over to a friend's house immediately after the assault and 
that Green went over to get her.  She stated that she did not go 
anywhere else that evening and that she did not go to the 
hospital until the following day.  After hearing testimony from 
N.W. and N.W.'s mother, the court found probable cause and bound 
the matter over for further proceedings.   
¶9 
On February 10, 1999, the court held a pretrial 
hearing, addressing in part a motion for discovery filed by 
Green.  Green's trial counsel informed the court that he had 
recently received a document from the State summarizing the 
April 10, 1997 interview.  This document——a three-page interview 
summary 
written 
by 
Schraufnagel——made 
reference 
to 
N.W. 
attending counseling with Roberts.  Based on this discovery, 
Green's trial counsel made an oral motion requesting the court 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
5 
 
to issue a subpoena duces tecum to obtain N.W.'s counseling 
records.  He alleged that the counseling records were important 
in light of the fact that N.W. did not tell anyone that sexual 
penetration had occurred until October 1998, almost two years 
after the alleged assault occurred.  Green therefore wanted to 
know what N.W. told Roberts.  He argued that the counseling 
records "may contain inconsistent statements."  The State 
responded that it did not have any records from these counseling 
sessions and that it did not intend to introduce any testimony 
concerning these sessions at trial.  Based on these arguments, 
the court denied the motion.   
¶10 Green was tried before a jury over a three-day period 
on the sexual assault charge.  Prior to trial, the court issued 
a sequestration order, which applied to "all prosecution and 
defense witnesses during the trial, apart from Det. Quant of the 
Oshkosh Police Department, who by virtue of being the lead 
investigator in the case should remain at the prosecution 
table."   
¶11 On the second day of trial, the prosecutor called 
Cheryl Haack, one of Green's friends, as a witness.  Haack 
testified on direct examination that, on November 13, 1996, 
Green told her that he sexually assaulted N.W.  Haack reiterated 
this statement on cross-examination.  Haack's testimony was 
inconsistent with a prior statement that she had provided to the 
police, which alleged that her conversation with Green occurred 
in January or February 1997.  Haack admitted at trial that after 
giving this statement she later learned that Green had been in 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
6 
 
jail during January and February 1997.  She testified that she 
later realized that the correct date was November 13, 1996, 
after reviewing a calendar that she had kept during that time.  
Following cross-examination and redirect examination, Haack was 
excused as a witness. 
¶12 The State then called another witness to testify.  
After this witness, the prosecutor recalled Haack to clarify the 
date on which Green confessed to her that he assaulted N.W.  
Green objected to Haack being recalled by the State, but the 
court allowed her to testify.  During her testimony, Haack 
modified her previous testimony, asserting that Green confessed 
to her on November 19, 1996, not on November 13, 1996.  Haack 
admitted that she had discussed the discrepancy of the date with 
the prosecutor in the hall during a break in trial proceedings 
after her testimony.  The prosecutor admitted to a conversation 
with Haack, but stated that it occurred during a break in 
Green's cross-examination of Haack. 
¶13 After the State rested its case, Green brought a 
motion to dismiss, alleging that the prosecutor had committed 
misconduct by violating the sequestration order by communicating 
with Haack during a break in trial and then recalling Haack as a 
witness to clarify her previous testimony.  The court denied 
this motion. 
¶14 The jury found Green guilty of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child as a repeat offender.  He was sentenced to 42 
years in prison.   
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
7 
 
¶15 In a post-conviction motion, Green requested a new 
trial asserting that the circuit court should have conducted an 
in camera review of N.W.'s counseling records pursuant to State 
v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993).  He 
also argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the 
State had violated the sequestration order by communicating 
trial information to its witness during the course of the trial.   
¶16 After a hearing, the court denied the post-conviction 
motion.  The court ruled that Green never met his burden under 
Shiffra to compel the court to conduct an in camera review of 
N.W.'s counseling records.  The court also determined that a 
violation of the sequestration order had not occurred.  Green 
appealed. 
¶17 The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, also 
held that Green failed to make a sufficient pretrial showing to 
entitle him to an in camera review of N.W.'s counseling records.  
The court, citing Shiffra, stated that Green was required to 
make a preliminary showing that the evidence sought was 
"relevant and necessary to a fair determination of guilt or 
innocence."  More specifically, Green was required to show 
"specific facts which would bear upon the witness's ability to 
accurately perceive events, remember or testify."  The court 
concluded that Green had failed to offer any factual showing 
that the counseling records could contain information that would 
show N.W.'s inability to perceive events, remember or testify.   
¶18 The court also rejected Green's claim that the State 
had violated the sequestration order by conversing with its 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
8 
 
witness in the hallway during a break in the trial proceedings.  
The court stated that the purpose of such an order was to 
prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of 
other witnesses.  Green, however, failed to cite any authority 
that a general sequestration order requires witnesses to also be 
sequestered from the prosecutor.  Green's appropriate remedy, 
the court noted, would have been to move to strike the witness's 
testimony or request a mistrial.  Regardless, the court held 
that, even assuming that there had been a violation of the 
sequestration order, Green did not suffer any prejudice because 
Haack was a terrible witness for the State and because her lack 
of credibility had been amply demonstrated. 
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
¶19 We address two issues.  First, we examine whether 
Green met his burden at the pretrial hearing to compel the 
circuit court to conduct an in camera review of N.W.'s 
counseling records.  This question necessarily involves a 
determination of the standard to be applied when a defendant 
seeks an in camera review.  We conclude that the standard to 
obtain an in camera review requires a defendant to set forth, in 
good faith, a specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence and is not 
merely cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant.  
Applying a de novo standard of review, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in failing to conduct such a review in 
this case because Green failed to meet his burden to compel 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
9 
 
review.  Second, we examine whether the sequestration order 
issued by the circuit court was violated when the prosecutor 
consulted with a witness during a break in trial and later 
recalled 
that 
witness 
to 
clarify 
the 
witness's 
previous 
testimony.  We conclude that the consultation between the 
prosecutor and the witness in this case was not a violation of 
the sequestration order, and that, even if it was, Green has not 
shown any prejudice that resulted from this violation.  The 
circuit court and the court of appeals both properly denied 
finding error.  We affirm the court of appeals' ruling. 
III.  IN CAMERA REVIEW 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶20 Green first alleges that the circuit court erred by 
failing to conduct an in camera review of N.W.'s counseling 
records.2  The defendant bears the burden of making a preliminary 
evidentiary showing before an in camera review is conducted by 
                                                 
2 Green argues that N.W. waived her privilege to her 
counseling records because her mother signed releases to these 
records.  In the interview summary written by Schraufnagel, it 
stated that N.W.'s mother "signed releases of information so 
Mercy Medical Center and the counselor in Appleton could share 
the information that they have regarding [N.W.]."  The record 
does not contain any other information on these releases. 
Green failed to raise any waiver of privilege argument on 
appeal prior to his reply brief to this court.  For this reason, 
we conclude that Green effectively waived review of this issue.  
Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 417, 405 N.W.2d 354 
(Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he failure to include alleged errors in the 
motions after verdict constitutes a waiver of the errors.").  In 
seeking post-conviction relief, Green has proceeded with the 
understanding that these records are privileged.  We proceed 
similarly.  
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
10 
 
the court.  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605.  Factual findings made 
by the court in its determination are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Id.  Whether the defendant submitted a 
preliminary evidentiary showing sufficient for an in camera 
review implicates a defendant's constitutional right to a fair 
trial and raises a question of law that we review de novo.  
State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 500, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 
1999); State v. Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d 391, 395, 546 N.W.2d 570 (Ct. 
App. 1996).3  If we determine the requisite showing was made, the 
defendant is not automatically entitled to a remand for an in 
camera review.  The defendant still must show the error was not 
harmless.  Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d at 501.   
B.  Shiffra 
¶21 To determine whether Green met his burden, we first 
examine Shiffra, the case in which the court of appeals 
                                                 
3 We granted review in this case in part to determine this 
question on standard of review.  The parties, however, no longer 
dispute that this preliminary showing is a question of law that 
we review de novo.   
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
11 
 
established that a defendant may obtain an in camera review of 
such privileged records upon a showing of materiality.4 
¶22 Shiffra was charged with second-degree sexual assault, 
and one day before trial, he received evidence from the state 
showing that the victim had a history of psychiatric problems.  
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 603.  He therefore moved for an 
adjournment arguing that he had recently received information 
from the state "'which indicate[d] that . . . the complaining 
witness has a history of psychiatric problems which may affect 
her ability to perceive and relate truthful information.'"  Id.  
The court granted the adjournment, and subsequently, Shiffra 
moved for an order requiring the state and the victim to provide 
him with the victim's psychiatric records and medical records.  
Id.  At the hearing on the motion to compel, Shiffra argued that 
his theory of defense was that the sexual contact was consensual 
and that he sought review of the records only to obtain evidence 
                                                 
4 The State contends that the holding in State v. Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993) was in error 
because it relied on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 
(1987).  The State argues that Ritchie was distinguishable and 
therefore inapplicable because it involved a situation, unlike 
here, where the records were in the government's possession.  
The Shiffra court, however, specifically rejected this argument, 
concluding that it was bound by Wisconsin precedent, which 
clearly made Ritchie applicable in cases where the information 
sought by the defense is not in the possession of the state.  
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 606-07 (citing State v. S.H., 159 
Wis. 2d 730, 736, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1990), and In re 
K.K.C., 143 Wis. 2d 508, 511, 422 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1988)).  
This court recognized the validity of Shiffra in State v. 
Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 386-87, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997), and in 
State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶53, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 N.W.2d 93.  
We will not depart from this precedent.   
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
12 
 
concerning whether the complainant may have suffered from "'some 
type of psychiatric disorder which causes her an inability to 
truthfully relate facts as she perceives them'" or from "'some 
disorder which causes her to have flashbacks to previous 
instances in her life and then they become sexual assaults of 
her because of her disorders.'"  Id.  The circuit court found an 
adequate showing and ordered an in camera review of the 
complainant's records.  Id. at 604.  The state appealed. 
¶23 On review, the court of appeals affirmed.  In its 
analysis, the court began by noting the competing rights and 
interests involved when a defendant seeks an in camera review of 
privileged records.  On the one hand, a criminal defendant's 
right to due process, in particular the right to a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense, is implicated.  Id. 
at 605 and n.1.  On the other hand, the state has an interest in 
protecting 
a 
patients' 
privileged 
records, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04(2),5 
from 
being 
disclosed. 
 
In 
balancing 
these 
                                                 
5 This statute provides: 
(2)  General rule of privilege.  A patient has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other 
person 
from 
disclosing 
confidential 
communications 
made 
or 
information 
obtained 
or 
disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition, 
among 
the 
patient, 
the 
patient's 
physician, the 
patient's 
registered 
nurse, 
the 
patient's 
chiropractor, 
the 
patient's 
psychologist, 
the 
patient's social worker, the patient's marriage and 
family therapist, the patient's professional counselor 
or persons, including members of the patient's family, 
who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment 
under the direction of the physician, registered 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
13 
 
interests, the Shiffra court concluded that an in camera review 
was 
appropriate. 
 
Id. 
 
A 
defendant, 
however, 
is 
not 
automatically entitled to such an in camera review upon request.  
Instead, "[t]o be entitled to an in camera inspection, the 
defendant must make a preliminary showing that the sought-after 
evidence is material to his or her defense."  Id. (citing State 
v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 738, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1990)).   
¶24 In establishing 
the 
burden 
for this 
preliminary 
showing, the Shiffra court analogized to cases where a defendant 
seeks disclosure of a government informant's identity, which is 
also protected by privilege pursuant to statute.6  The court 
noted that, as in cases involving privileged psychiatric 
records, similar competing rights and interests are implicated 
in government informant cases.  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 609.  In 
government informant cases, a defendant may obtain an in camera 
review if he or she provides sufficient evidence to show "that 
an informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal 
                                                                                                                                                             
nurse, 
chiropractor, 
psychologist, 
social 
worker, 
marriage 
and 
family 
therapist 
or 
professional 
counselor.   
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10(1) states in relevant part: 
Identity of informer.  (1) Rule of privilege.  The 
federal government or a state or subdivision thereof 
has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of 
a person who has furnished information relating to or 
assisting in an investigation of a possible violation 
of law to a law enforcement officer  . . . . 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
14 
 
case . . . ."  Id. at 609 n.3.  This burden is reflected in 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).7 
¶25 The court adopted a similar standard for defendants 
seeking to compel an in camera review of a victim's privileged 
psychiatric records.  The Shiffra opinion, however, contained 
some internal inconsistencies in setting forth the specific 
test.  At one point in the opinion, the Shiffra court concluded 
"that the defendant's burden should be to make a preliminary 
showing that the sought-after evidence is relevant and may be 
helpful to the defense or is necessary to a fair determination 
of guilt or innocence."  Id. at 608 (emphasis added).  However, 
in a later part of the opinion the court enumerated the test as 
"may 
be 
necessary 
to 
a 
fair determination 
of 
guilt or 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) states: 
(3)  Exceptions. 
. . . . 
(b) Testimony on merits.  If it appears from the 
evidence in the case or from other showing by a party 
that an informer may be able to give testimony 
necessary to a fair determination of the issue of 
guilt 
or 
innocence 
in 
a 
criminal 
case . . . and . . . a 
state . . . invokes 
the 
privilege, 
the 
judge 
shall 
give 
the . . . state . . . an opportunity to show in camera 
facts relevant to determining whether the informer 
can, in fact, supply that testimony. 
We have stated that this burden "does not place a significant 
burden upon the party seeking disclosure."  State v. Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d 112, 125, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982).  "The showing need only 
be one of a possibility that the informer could supply testimony 
necessary to a fair determination."  Id. at 126. 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
15 
 
innocence."  Id. at 610 (emphasis added).  The Munoz court noted 
this inconsistency, but embraced the "may be necessary" language 
as the appropriate test, stating: 
The broad language of Shiffra--"that the sought-after 
evidence is relevant and may be helpful to the 
defense,"--certainly would seem to suggest a very low 
threshold for a defendant to establish the basis for 
an in camera inspection.  A closer reading of Shiffra, 
however, reveals that a defendant must establish more 
than "the mere possibility" that psychiatric records 
"may be helpful" in order to justify disclosure for an 
in camera inspection. 
[A]lthough Shiffra's reference to information that "is 
relevant and may be helpful to the defense" could 
cover almost anything the defense sought to discover, 
Shiffra did not repeat the "may be helpful" language 
elsewhere in the opinion but, instead, reiterated the 
standard:  "may be necessary to a fair determination 
of guilt or innocence." 
Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d at 397-98 (citations omitted).8  In cases 
subsequent to Munoz, the court of appeals has followed the Munoz 
court's interpretation of Shiffra and applied the "may be 
necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence" 
standard.  See State v. Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶11, 248 
                                                 
8 The "relevant and helpful" standard tracked language, 
which was quoted in Shiffra, from Roviario v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 
60-61 (1957), a seminal case on a defendant's right to discover 
the identify of a government informant.  See Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d at 608.  The "may be necessary" language tracked the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  Because the Shiffra 
court appeared to rely more heavily on the statutory language 
than on Roviario in establishing its standard, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the court intended to adopt and apply the 
standard 
established 
in 
the 
statute. 
 
See 
Shiffra, 
175 
Wis. 2d at 609-10.  Thus, the court of appeals was correct in 
relying on the "may be necessary" language.   
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 396, 636 N.W.2d 481; State v. Walther, 2001 WI App 23, 
¶10, 240 Wis. 2d 619, 623 N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 2000).   
¶26 In the end, the Shiffra court concluded that Shiffra 
had met 
his 
burden in 
making a 
preliminary 
showing of 
materiality.  The court noted that Shiffra had "presented ample 
evidence during the hearing on his discovery motion that [the 
victim's] psychiatric difficulties might affect both her ability 
to accurately perceive events and her ability to relate the 
truth."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612.  These difficulties, the 
court 
reasoned, 
were 
relevant 
because 
they 
affected 
the 
complainant's credibility and bore directly on Shiffra's defense 
of consensual sex.  Id.   
¶27 Before concluding, the Shiffra court considered the 
state's argument that the victim's psychiatric records may 
contain information that was "merely cumulative" to information 
that was already available to him.  Id. at 610.  The state 
described the significant amount of information that Shiffra had 
available to him on the victim's mental health history that was 
contained outside the records.  Id. at 610-11.  This evidence 
showed the extensive history of the victim's mental health 
problems and strongly suggested that Shiffra's specific concerns 
about the victim experiencing flashbacks and about her ability 
to relay truthful information were valid.  The court recognized 
that some of the information contained in the records may be 
cumulative, but it nevertheless allowed for an in camera review, 
stating: 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
17 
 
We disagree with the state.  It may well be that 
the evidence contained in the psychiatric records will 
yield no information different from that available 
elsewhere.  However, the probability is equally as 
great that the records contain independently probative 
information.  It is also quite probable that the 
quality and the probative value of the information in 
the reports may be better than anything that can be 
gleaned from other sources.  Finally, the information 
might well serve as a confirmation of Pamela's [the 
victim's] problems in sexual matters.  It is the duty 
of the trial court to determine whether the records 
have any independent probative value after an in 
camera inspection of the records. 
Id. at 611.  See also Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶18 (concluding 
that an in camera review of confidential prison records was 
still warranted despite concerns that the information may be 
cumulative).   
C.  Standard for a Preliminary Showing 
¶28 Both parties seek to clarify and further define the 
standard for a preliminary showing for an in camera review 
established in Shiffra.  Green argues that it is sufficient for 
a defendant to show, as Shiffra contemplated, that the evidence 
contained in the records "may be helpful to his or her defense."  
This showing is sufficient, he asserts, because the request is 
often made without the defendant's knowledge as to what 
information 
is 
specifically 
contained 
in 
the 
records.  
Therefore, a defendant should not be required to identify the 
exact information contained in the records that is material to 
his or her defense.  In addition, the request is often made at 
the pretrial stage, when discovery is for the most part not yet 
completed and it is often impossible for the defendant to state 
that the information contained in the records will be necessary 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
18 
 
to the outcome of the case.  It is a preliminary request to have 
the court simply look at the documents.  Green also argues that 
there is no real difference between a requirement that the 
counseling records "may be helpful" and one that the records 
"may be necessary" because they both require a mere possibility 
that the records will assist the defendant.  Green also points 
to State v. Hoag, 749 A.2d 331 (N.H. 2000) as setting forth an 
appropriate standard.  Hoag states in relevant part: 
The threshold showing necessary to trigger an in 
camera review is not unduly high.  The defendant must 
meaningfully articulate how the information sought is 
relevant and material to his defense.  To do so, he 
must present a plausible theory of relevance and 
materiality sufficient 
to 
justify 
review 
of the 
protected documents, but he is not required to prove 
that his theory is true.  At a minimum, a defendant 
must present some specific concern, based on more than 
bare conjecture, that, in reasonable probability, will 
be explained by the information sought.   
Id. at 333 (emphasis added to show relevant language relied on 
by Green).  This "plausible theory" standard, Green contends, 
provides 
the 
appropriate 
balance 
between 
maintaining 
the 
privileged nature of these records and affording a defendant his 
or her right to present a complete defense.   
 
¶29 The State argues that it is clear from Shiffra and 
subsequent cases interpreting Shiffra that the court of appeals 
intended to adopt the "relevant and may be necessary to a fair 
determination of guilt or innocence" standard, similar to the 
standard required for cases involving government informants.  
The State argues that, under this standard, the defendant is 
required to clearly articulate what information he or she is 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
19 
 
seeking and how this information ties in to his or her 
particular defense.  A vague proffer of need by the defendant is 
insufficient.  Further, the State contends that the mere 
assertion that information might be helpful or useful to the 
defendant's case is insufficient.  The records must contain 
information that is likely exculpatory for the defendant.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the State relies on Goldsmith v. 
State, 651 A.2d 866 (Md. 1995).  It states in relevant part:   
We agree with the Supreme Court of Michigan that in 
assessing a defendant's right to privileged records, 
the required showing must be more than the fact that 
the 
records 
"may 
contain 
evidence 
useful 
for 
impeachment on cross-examination.  This need might 
exist in every case involving an accusation of 
criminal sexual conduct."  People v. Stanaway, 446 
Mich. 643, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (1994) (footnotes 
omitted). . . .   
 
We therefore hold that in order to abrogate a 
privilege such as to require disclosure at trial of 
privileged records, a defendant must establish a 
reasonable likelihood that the privileged records 
contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper 
defense.   
Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added to show relevant language relied 
on by the State).  Based on this standard in Goldsmith, the 
State urges us to require a defendant to "make a specific 
preliminary showing that the counseling records will produce 
evidence that is relevant to material issues in dispute and 
likely exculpatory of the defendant."   
¶30 Before we set forth our standard, we note two things.  
First, we conclude that it is clear that the court of appeals 
has adopted the "may be necessary" standard as enumerated in 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
20 
 
Shiffra.  See Walther, 2001 WI App 23, ¶10 (rejecting the 
argument that other court of appeals' cases imposed a heightened 
standard).  We conclude that this is a correct interpretation of 
Shiffra and was certainly the standard that was in place, 
pursuant to Munoz, at the time of the motion hearing in Green's 
case.   
¶31 Second, we emphasize that the defendant in this case 
is trying to make a preliminary showing to compel an in camera 
review by the circuit court.  As such, a defendant is not 
required to carry the same burden as that required of the 
circuit court when it conducts its in camera inspection to 
determine whether to disclose the records.  We discussed the 
circuit court's role during its in camera review in State v. 
Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997).  In particular, 
we stated that, "[i]n conducting an in camera inspection of an 
alleged victim's privileged records, the circuit court must 
determine whether the records contain any relevant information 
that is '"material" to the defense of the accused.'"  Id. at 
386-87 (emphasis added) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 
U.S. 39, 58, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001-02, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987)).  The 
preliminary burden for seeking an in camera review must be less 
stringent than the standard applied by the court during its in 
camera inspection.   
 
¶32 The 
Shiffra 
court 
appropriately 
rejected 
the 
materiality standard set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 
U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (asking whether the evidence would have had 
an effect on the proceeding), as difficult to apply before 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
21 
 
trial.  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 607; see also State v. Richard 
A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 785, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1999).  
Instead, the court appropriately looked to the standard for a 
defendant seeking to overcome the informant privilege.  This 
standard requires that the defendant show that the informant's 
testimony "may be necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence."  A mere possibility ("may be") is enough in 
informant cases.  In light of the strong public policy favoring 
protection of the counseling records, however, we conclude that 
a slightly higher standard is required before the court must 
conduct an in camera review of privileged counseling records.  
For this reason, we conclude, consistent with other state 
standards, that a defendant must show a "reasonable likelihood" 
that the records will be necessary to a determination of guilt 
or innocence.  See Goldsmith, 651 A.2d at 133-34 ("a defendant 
must establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged 
records contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper 
defense"); People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994) 
(a defendant must show "a good-faith belief, grounded in some 
demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probability that 
the records are likely to contain material information necessary 
to the defense"); State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("a defendant must first establish a 
reasonable probability that the privileged matters contain 
information necessary to his defense"); compare Commonwealth v. 
Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1997) (a defendant must show 
"a good faith, specific, and reasonable basis for believing that 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
22 
 
the records will contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant 
and material to the issue of the defendant's guilt").   
¶33 Although we change this threshold showing requirement 
from Shiffra, we conclude that other requirements adopted by the 
court of appeals in similar cases remain applicable.  In 
particular, 
a 
defendant 
must 
set 
forth 
a 
fact-specific 
evidentiary showing, describing as precisely as possible the 
information sought from the records and how it is relevant to 
and supports his or her particular defense.  See, e.g., Navarro, 
2001 WI App 225, ¶¶12, 17; Walther, 2001 WI App 23, ¶11.  The 
mere contention that the victim has been involved in counseling 
related to prior sexual assaults or the current sexual assault 
is insufficient.  Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d at 399.  Further, a 
defendant must undertake a reasonable investigation into the 
victim's background and counseling through other means first 
before the records 
will 
be 
made 
available. 
 
From 
this 
investigation, the defendant, when seeking an in camera review, 
must then make a sufficient evidentiary showing that is not 
based on mere speculation or conjecture as to what information 
is in the records.  See State v. Darcy N.K., 218 Wis. 2d 640, 
645, 656, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998).  In addition, the 
evidence sought from the records must not be merely cumulative 
to evidence already available to the defendant.  A defendant 
must show more than a mere possibility that the records will 
contain evidence that may be helpful or useful to the defense.  
Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d at 397-98.   
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
23 
 
¶34 Based on the above considerations, we set forth the 
following standard:  the preliminary showing for an in camera 
review requires a defendant to set forth, in good faith, a 
specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood 
that the records contain relevant information necessary to a 
determination of guilt or innocence and is not merely cumulative 
to other evidence available to the defendant.  We conclude that 
the information will be "necessary to a determination of guilt 
or innocence" if it "tends to create a reasonable doubt that 
might not otherwise exist."  See Fuller, 667 N.E.2d at 855.  
This test essentially requires the court to look at the existing 
evidence in light of the request and determine, as the Shiffra 
court did, whether the records will likely contain evidence that 
is independently probative to the defense.   
¶35 In creating this standard, we intend to place the 
burden on the defendant to reasonably investigate information 
related to the victim before setting forth an offer of proof and 
to clearly articulate how the information sought corresponds to 
his or her theory of defense.  A good faith request will often 
require support through motion and affidavit from the defendant.  
Our standard is not intended, however, to be unduly high for the 
defendant before an in camera review is ordered by the circuit 
court.  The defendant, of course, will most often be unable to 
determine the specific information in the records.  Therefore, 
in cases where it is a close call, the circuit court should 
generally provide an in camera review.  See Walther, 2001 WI App 
at ¶14.  We have confidence in the circuit courts to then make a 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
24 
 
proper determination as to whether disclosure of the information 
is necessary based on the competing interests involved in such 
cases.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611.  A circuit court may 
always defer ruling on such a request or require a defendant to 
bring a subsequent motion if the record has not had time to 
develop.  A motion for seeking discovery for such privileged 
documents should be the last step in a defendant's pretrial 
discovery.   
D.  Green's Preliminary Showing 
¶36 We conclude that, under either the Shiffra standard or 
the slightly heightened standard set forth in this opinion, any 
showing by Green at the circuit court was insufficient to compel 
the court to conduct an in camera review of N.W.'s records.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals' conclusion.   
¶37 At the pretrial hearing, Green merely argued that 
N.W.'s counseling records could contain statements from N.W. 
that were inconsistent with her statements provided to the 
police and to social services.  The mere assertion, however, 
that the sexual assault was discussed during counseling and that 
the 
counseling 
records 
may 
contain 
statements 
that 
are 
inconsistent with other reports is insufficient to compel an in 
camera review.  Green was required to show that the evidence was 
independently probative, that is not cumulative, and to show 
that the evidence was material to his particular defense.  Green 
established neither.  Further, he failed to show any evidence to 
even remotely suggest that N.W. suffered from any psychological 
disorder 
that 
hindered 
her 
ability 
to 
relay 
truthful 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
25 
 
information.  See Jessica J.L. v. State, 223 Wis. 2d 622, 635, 
589 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1998) (in seeking such records based on 
inconsistent statements, a defendant must show, through other 
evidence, that the records will "tend to prove that [the child] 
has a psychological disorder that would make her a poor reporter 
of events relating to sexual conduct or draw her credibility 
into question in any way").  Certainly, Green had access to 
other reports from the police and social services which showed 
that N.W. had changed her story over time; he could have 
attacked (and did attack at trial) her credibility with these 
inconsistent statements.  We therefore conclude that Green did 
not meet his burden under any applicable standard for an in 
camera inspection by the court.  This is, as the court of 
appeals noted, not even a close call.9 
IV.  SEQUESTRATION ORDER 
¶38 Green also argues that the prosecutor violated the 
circuit court's sequestration order when she communicated with 
                                                 
9 Several assertions made by Green to this court to support 
a remand for an in camera review were never presented in his 
evidentiary showing to the circuit court.  For example, Green 
argues that the evidence shows that N.W. may have started 
counseling earlier than the date on which she reported the 
assault to authorities.  We find no evidence to support this 
assertion.  Nevertheless, Green argues that, if this were true, 
it shows that N.W. delayed reporting for an even longer time, 
making the records an even greater source for inconsistent 
statements or otherwise exculpatory evidence.  Green cannot now 
bolster his evidentiary showing for N.W.'s records by adding 
additional factors that may have been relevant at the circuit 
court to grant an in camera review but were never presented to 
the court.   
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
26 
 
Haack during a break in trial testimony about an alleged date on 
which Green confessed the assault to her.  This violation of the 
order, Green contends, resulted in prejudice to him because 
Haack effectively altered her testimony to more closely match 
other evidence presented against Green at trial.  Green argues 
that he is now entitled to a new trial based on this prejudicial 
testimony.   
¶39 If the circuit court finds that a witness has violated 
the court's sequestration order, the court may still permit the 
witness to testify.  The court should not allow such testimony, 
however, when the defendant has been prejudiced by the violation 
and the party calling the witness was a guilty participant in 
the violation.  State v. Bembenek, 111 Wis. 2d 617, 637, 331 
N.W.2d 616 (Ct. App. 1983).   
¶40 Green contends that the prosecutor, not the witness, 
violated the sequestration order by conversing with the witness 
during trial.  Green fails to clearly indicate, however, how any 
alleged 
conversation 
constituted 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
sequestration order.  The only applicable order issued by the 
court limited the sequestration to "all prosecution and defense 
witnesses during the trial, apart from Det. Quant of the Oshkosh 
Police Department, who by virtue of being the lead investigator 
in the case should remain at the prosecution counsel table."  
Such orders are issued to keep witnesses from hearing other 
witnesses testimony, which may lead to prejudice to the 
defendant.  See Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 407, 249 
N.W.2d 524 (1977); see also Wis. Stat. § 906.15(1).  Green has 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
27 
 
not provided any support for the contention that a prosecutor 
violates a sequestration order by merely talking to his or her 
witnesses.  There are no allegations that Haack heard testimony 
of other witnesses in the courtroom, that Haack discussed her 
testimony with other witnesses, or that the prosecutor discussed 
the testimony of other witnesses with Haack.  We find no 
violation of the order in this case.   
¶41 Further, even if this discussion did constitute a 
violation, 
Green 
has 
not 
shown 
any 
prejudice 
from 
this 
violation.  This conversation between Haack and the prosecutor 
allegedly resulted in testimony from Haack where she corrected 
the date on which Green had confessed the assault to her.  
According to Green, Haack corrected this date (to November 19, 
1996) to more closely align her testimony with the date of the 
alleged assault (November 22, 1996).  We cannot conclude that 
this conversation and subsequent mere clarification testimony 
from Haack had any significant effect on the overall trial or 
resulted in prejudice to Green——particularly considering that 
this was the third date that Haack had given for the alleged 
confession and Green's defense counsel showed the inconsistency 
in Haack's statements on cross-examination.  As a result, we 
affirm the court of appeals' ruling on this issue, which upheld 
the circuit court's finding of no error.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 In sum, we conclude that Green's conviction should be 
upheld.  Under any applicable standard, Green failed to show 
that he was entitled to an in camera review of N.W.'s counseling 
No. 
00-1392-CR   
 
28 
 
records.  Further, he failed to show any error of the 
sequestration order by the State in consulting with its witness 
during 
trial 
or 
prejudice 
from 
any 
alleged 
violation.  
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals must be 
affirmed.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
No.  00-1392-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
In the present case, the defendant argues that the State 
violated the circuit court's witness "sequestration" order when 
the prosecutor communicated with a State's witness during a 
break in that witness's trial testimony.10  If the attorney 
violated the court order, the error was harmless.  
¶44 I 
write 
separately 
to 
urge 
that 
exclusion 
and 
separation 
orders 
be 
stated 
with 
particularity 
to 
avoid 
misunderstandings.11  Although the practice of limiting a 
witness's access to other witnesses can be traced to English and 
Germanic law,12 many open questions remain about the limitations 
a court may prescribe.    
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.15 governs both the exclusion 
and the separation of witnesses.  Although the statute uses the 
words "exclusion" and "separation" to mean different procedures, 
the two words are often used interchangeably in the cases.  
                                                 
10 The State moved the court for "[a]n Order sequestering 
all prosecution and defense witnesses during the trial, apart 
from Det. Quant of the Oshkosh Police Department, who by virtue 
of being the lead investigator in the case should remain at the 
prosecution counsel table."  The circuit court stated "the Court 
will grant [the sequestration] motion.  All witnesses will be 
sequestered.  Detective Quant, who's the lead investigator, 
we'll allow him to remain at counsel table." 
11 For discussions of exclusion and separation orders, see 6 
Wigmore, Evidence ch. 63 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); Daniel Blinka, 7 
Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 615.1 at 456 (2d ed. 
2001); John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 50 at 206-11 
(1999). 
12 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976). 
No.  00-1392-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
Sequestration is also used to refer to exclusion or separation 
or both.13   
¶46 "Exclusion" means to remove witnesses from a courtroom 
and, according to § 906.15(1), is mandatory upon request.  
Section 906.15(1) provides that upon the request of a party, the 
judge or the court commissioner "shall order witnesses excluded 
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses."  A 
judge or court commissioner may also make the order on his or 
her own motion.14  Section 906.15(1), however, does not authorize 
excluding certain individuals, such as a party or a victim, 
among others.15   
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 409, 249 
N.W.2d 524 (1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998).   
14 Wis. Stat. § 906.15(1). 
15 According to Wis. Stat. § 906.15(2), subsection (1) does 
not authorize exclusion of any of the following:  
(a) A party who is a natural person.   
(b) An officer or employee of a party which is not a 
natural person designated as its representative 
by its attorney.   
(c) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be 
essential to the presentation of the party's 
cause. 
(d) A victim, as defined in s. 950.02(4) in a 
criminal case or a victim, as defined in s. 
938.02(20m) in a delinquency proceeding under ch. 
938, 
unless 
the 
judge 
or 
circuit 
court 
commissioner finds that exclusion of the victim 
is necessary to provide a fair trial for the 
defendant or a fair fact-finding hearing for the 
juvenile.  The presence of a victim during the 
testimony of other witnesses may not by itself be 
a basis for a finding that exclusion of the 
No.  00-1392-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶47 "Separation" 
means 
to 
remove 
witnesses 
from 
a 
courtroom 
to 
separate 
areas. 
 
According 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 906.15(3), the judge or court commissioner "may 
direct that all excluded and non-excluded witnesses be kept 
separate until called and may prevent them from communicating 
with one another until they have been examined or the hearing is 
ended."  The decision to separate witnesses is within the 
discretion of a court.16  
¶48 The aim of exclusion and separation orders is to 
exercise restraint on witnesses tailoring their testimony to 
that of earlier witnesses; to detect testimony that is less than 
candid; and, when a witness's testimony is interrupted by a 
recess, to prevent improper attempts to influence the testimony 
in light of the testimony already given.17  
¶49 Courts imposing a separation or exclusion order and 
parties seeking such an order should specify the scope of the 
order so as to prevent potential misunderstandings, including 
whether the order limits communications between witnesses and 
attorneys.  Thus, a circuit court might state, for example, 
which witnesses the order applies to, how long the order applies 
                                                                                                                                                             
victim is necessary to provide a fair trial for 
the defendant or a fair fact-finding hearing for 
the juvenile. 
16 Fletcher v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 381, 388, 228 N.W.2d 708 
(1975); Abraham v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 44, 54, 176 N.W.2d 349 
(1970); Ramer v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 79, 82-83, 161 N.W.2d 209 
(1968).   
17 Geders, 425 U.S. at 87; United States v. Strauss, 473 
F.2d 1262, 1263 (3d Cir. 1973); Capital Cab Corp. v. Anderson, 
85 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. 1949); Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d at 409.   
No.  00-1392-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
with respect to each witness, whether the witnesses should 
remain physically separate, whether the witnesses should not 
discuss the case or their testimony with another witness, 
whether the witnesses should not be told directly or indirectly 
what other witnesses have said, whether the witnesses should not 
read a transcript of another witness's trial testimony, and 
whether a witness should not confer with counsel during the 
witness's testimony, including during a recess.18  Whether an 
order should limit or prohibit counsel in a criminal case from 
conferring with the defendant raises special issues.19 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of cases involving some of these orders, 
see, for example, John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 50, 
at 209, n.15 (1999). 
19 Geders, 425 U.S. at 91 (preventing defendant from 
consulting his counsel about anything during a 17-hour overnight 
recess in the trial between his direct and cross-examination 
deprived defendant of his right to the assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment); State v. James County, 41 
So. 702, 704 (La. 1906) (order keeping witnesses where they 
could not hear testimony given at trial did not prevent district 
attorney from communicating with state witnesses); State v. 
Scott, 56 So.2d 839, 840 (Miss. 1952) (defense counsel allowed 
to conference with all defendant's witnesses, but not all 
together as a group); L. Williams v. State, 35 Tex. 355 (Tex. 
1871) (placing the state's witnesses under a separation or 
exclusion order does "not deprive the district attorney of the 
right to confer with them in a proper manner; this is his 
privilege, and, moreover, may be regarded as his duty").  See 
also 6 Wigmore, Evidence ch. 63, § 1840 at 472 (Chadbourn rev. 
1976) ("whether an attorney in the cause may consult with a 
sequestered witness has been the subject of some difference of 
opinion; 
the 
possibilities 
of 
abuse 
by 
unscrupulous 
persons . . . are 
certainly 
great") 
(reference 
to 
footnote 
omitted). 
No.  00-1392-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶50 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.   
¶51 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
For cases stating that orders preventing defendants from 
consulting their attorneys during an overnight recess infringe 
upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see United States v. 
Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950); People v. Nobble, 248 
N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1969); Commonwealth v. Werner, 214 A.2d 276 (Pa. 
1965).  But see People v. Prevost, 189 N.W. 92 (Mich. 1922).   
For cases discussing orders preventing defendants from 
consulting their attorneys during a brief routine recess during 
the trial day, see United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).   
No.  00-1392-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1