Title: Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11434
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11434 
 
STEVEN M. GLOVSKY  vs.  ROCHE BROS. SUPERMARKETS, INC. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     February 3, 2014. - October 10, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.  Elections, Ballot.  
Constitutional Law, Elections.  Civil Rights, Coercion.  
Practice, Civil, Election case, Civil rights, Motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 2, 2012.  
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Renée P. Dupuis, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Steven M. Glovsky, pro se. 
 
Mark W. Batten for the defendant. 
 
John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Adam J. Kessel, Frank L. Gerratana, & Sarah R. Wunsch, for 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
                     
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
 
 
2 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  Steven M. Glovsky sought to solicit signatures 
for his nomination to public office outside the entrance to a 
supermarket owned by the defendant, Roche Bros. Supermarkets, 
Inc. (Roche Bros.), but was informed that Roche Bros. prohibited 
this activity on its property.  Glovsky filed suit in the 
Superior Court claiming that Roche Bros. had violated his right 
to equal ballot access under art. 9 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  He requested relief under the 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I (act), for a 
violation of his rights "by threats, intimidation or coercion."2  
Roche Bros.' motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), was allowed.  Glovsky 
appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
                     
2 General Laws c. 12, § 11I, provides that 
 
"[a]ny person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured 
by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights 
secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has 
been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as 
described in section 11H, may institute and prosecute in his own 
name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and 
other appropriate equitable relief . . . ." 
 
General Laws c. 12, § 11H, applies 
 
"[w]henever any person or persons, whether or not acting 
under color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or 
coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or 
coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or 
persons of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the 
United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws 
of the commonwealth . . . ." 
 
 
3 
review.  We conclude that Glovsky adequately has alleged a right 
under art. 9 to solicit nominating signatures outside Roche 
Bros.' supermarket, but that Roche Bros. did not violate this 
right "by threats, intimidation or coercion."3 
 
Background.  The complaint sets forth the following 
allegations.  In early 2012, Glovsky undertook a bid for 
election to the second district seat on the Governor's Council.  
To place his name on the September 6, 2012, State primary 
ballot, Glovsky needed to submit, by May 29, 2012, nomination 
papers containing at least 1,000 certified names.  On February 
7, 2012, Glovsky obtained nomination papers from the office of 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth and began collecting 
signatures. 
 
On the afternoon of March 14, 2012, Glovsky traveled to a 
location in Westwood, near the geographic center of the 
Governor's Council second district, intending to solicit 
signatures on Roche Bros.' property there.  Roche Bros.' 
Westwood property consists of 4.99 acres and contains a 47,568 
square foot supermarket building.  As alleged in the complaint, 
                     
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts in support of the 
plaintiff, and the amicus brief submitted by New England Legal 
Foundation; Associated Industries of Massachusetts; the Greater 
Boston Real Estate Board; the Massachusetts Food Association, 
NAIOP Massachusetts; the Real Estate Bar Association for 
Massachusetts, Inc.; and the Abstract Club in support of the 
defendants. 
 
 
4 
Roche Bros.' Web site describes its Westwood supermarket as "the 
first to incorporate a 'department' concept of merchandising, 
adding a bakery, florist, and a restaurant to make shopping more 
enjoyable."  The store is the only supermarket in Westwood, 
which, as of July, 2009, reported a population of 14,330.  Roche 
Bros. also leases space inside the building to a banking 
institution, which operates a "full service banking" branch 
there.  The bank has its own separate business logo displayed on 
the building's marquee, and maintains a twenty-four hour deposit 
slot in the building's exterior wall 
 
Upon arriving at the Westwood property, Glovsky notified 
Roche Bros. personnel that he intended to solicit nominating 
signatures from voters on the sidewalk immediately outside the 
entrance to the store.  Jim Visconti, the store manager, 
informed Glovsky that Roche Bros. had adopted a policy that "no 
longer" permitted signature solicitation anywhere on its 
Westwood property.  Glovsky's complaint alleges that he felt 
"intimidated" by this delivery of Roche Bros.' policy and 
"threatened by the inherent consequences he understood could 
result if he acted against such a clearly stated prohibition."  
As a result, Glovsky left the property despite believing that he 
had a right under art. 9 to solicit signatures there. 
 
Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We review the 
allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the 
 
 
5 
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff's favor."  Harrington v. Costello, 
467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014).  To survive a motion to dismiss, 
these allegations must "plausibly suggest" an entitlement to 
relief, raising the right to relief "above the speculative 
level."  Id., quoting Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 
623, 636 (2008). 
 
b.  Article 9.  Glovsky argues that he has a protected 
right under art. 9 to solicit signatures in support of his 
nomination to public office on the property of the Roche Bros. 
supermarket in Westwood.  Article 9 provides that "[a]ll 
elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this 
commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish 
by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect 
officers, and to be elected, for public employments."  This 
provision protects the "fundamental right" of equal access to 
the ballot, a "basic right," Opinion of the Justices, 413 Mass. 
1201, 1210 (1992), that is "of fundamental importance in our 
form of government because through the ballot the people can 
control their government."  Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 
Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 91, 93 (1983) (Batchelder I).  See 
Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 462 
Mass. 538, 560 (2012) (art. 9 protects "fundamental" and 
"intertwine[d]" rights of candidates to participate equally in 
 
 
6 
electoral process and of voters to cast their ballots as they 
see fit).  This right of ballot access encompasses an 
individual's right to solicit signatures in support of a 
candidate's nomination to public office.  See Batchelder I, 
supra at 84, 92.  Significantly, art. 9 does not require State 
action.  See Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, supra at 558; Batchelder I, supra at 88. 
 
In Batchelder I, supra at 84, we held that art. 9 protects 
the right to solicit nominating signatures in the common areas 
of a private shopping mall or shopping center, despite the 
property owner's objection.  The present case requires us to 
consider whether art. 9 extends the right to solicit nominating 
signatures to private property like that of Roche Bros.' 
Westwood supermarket, which is not alleged to be a shopping mall 
or shopping center.  As in Batchelder I, supra at 91, "[w]e are 
concerned with ballot access and not with any claim of a right 
to exercise free speech apart from the question of ballot 
access."  As we noted in that case, "[t]he difference between 
free speech and art. 9 rights to free elections and to be a 
candidate equally with others is not purely theoretical."  Id. 
at 92.4 
                     
4 In addition to practical differences between the exercise 
of these rights, art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, which protects free speech, may contain a State action 
requirement.  See Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 
 
 
7 
 
In determining that the plaintiff in Batchelder I had a 
right to solicit nominating signatures in a shopping mall's 
common areas, we balanced his need to solicit signatures on the 
property in order to effectuate his right to equal ballot access 
against the burden that such conduct would impose on the mall 
owner's property interests.  See id. at 91-93.  First, we 
emphasized that the art. 9 right to solicit signatures, unlike 
the broader right to free speech protected by art. 16, requires 
personal contact with voters and cannot be effectuated through 
other means of communication.  Id. at 91-92.  Because of the 
growing importance of shopping malls in retail merchandising, 
they had begun to function "much as the 'downtown' area of a 
municipality did in earlier years," and the shopping center at 
issue represented the "most favorable" area in the district for 
seeking signatures.  Id. at 92-93.  Accordingly, prohibiting the 
plaintiff's access would have "substantially impaired" his art. 
9 right.  Id. at 93.   
 
Second, the plaintiff sought only to engage in "unobtrusive 
and reasonable solicitations in the common areas of the mall," 
not in the stores themselves, so that his activity would not 
unduly burden the mall owner's property interests; indeed, those 
common areas "ha[d] been dedicated to the public as a practical 
                                                                  
707, 713 (2012) (leaving open whether art. 16 extends to private 
property). 
 
 
8 
matter" based on the mall owner's use of the property to host 
frequent civic, charitable, and other events in order to attract 
customers and generate goodwill.  See id. at 92, 93 n.12.  Nor 
had the mall owner shown that requiring it to permit access by 
those soliciting nominating signatures would infringe its own 
constitutional property or speech rights, either by adversely 
affecting its economic interests or by forcing it to associate 
with the plaintiff's views.  Id. at 93.  The mall owner 
adequately could protect its interests by adopting reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions to minimize the burden that 
signature solicitation placed on it.  Id. at 84, 93.5 
                     
5 We have not had occasion since Batchelder v. Allied Stores 
Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83 (1983) (Batchelder I), to address the 
scope of the ballot access right in art. 9 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  Our subsequent discussion of Batchelder 
I in cases dealing with free speech rights under art. 16, 
however, provides guidance as to the factors that might be 
considered when weighing any limitations on the art. 9 right.  
As these cases suggest, the balance of interests between an 
individual soliciting nominating signatures and the owner of 
private property would come out differently if the property 
owner has not opened the premises to the public for the owner's 
own commercial benefit.  See Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 
581, 585-586 (1983) (Batchelder I distinguished where case 
involved art. 16 rights, and private technology laboratory did 
not open its property for its commercial benefit, although it 
did permit public to pass through property's outdoor area).  
Likewise, the balance would come out differently if the property 
is devoted to activities involving a small or narrow group of 
clientele or a special expectation of privacy.  See Ingram v. 
Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 396 Mass. 720, 722-723 
(1986) (Batchelder I distinguished where case involved art. 16 
rights, and private property at issue consisted of interior 
corridors of office linebuilding that housed reproductive health 
care clinic).  See also Batchelder I, supra at 89 n.8 
 
 
9 
 
Roche Bros. seeks to limit the exercise of the art. 9 right 
to the common areas of a large shopping mall, thereby creating a 
bright-line distinction between such common areas and the area 
immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket.  Pointing to 
our observations in Batchelder I, supra at 92, that shopping 
malls had begun to "function in many parts of this State much as 
the 'downtown' area of a municipality did in earlier years" and 
that the common areas of the mall in question "ha[d] been 
dedicated to the public as a practical matter," Roche Bros. 
argues that art. 9 protects solicitation of nominating 
signatures only on private property that serves as the 
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.  Citing 
cases from California and other jurisdictions, Roche Bros. 
contends that the private property located at the entrance to a 
free-standing retail establishment, such as the supermarket 
here, does not meet this test because the owner of such property 
has invited the public only to pass through the area in entering 
                                                                  
(distinguishing parking lot of private hospital).  Cf. PruneYard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78 (1980), quoting Robins 
v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910 (1979) 
(distinguishing "modest retail establishment").  Here, by 
contrast, the property at issue is a large, private supermarket 
to which members of the general public are invited and which 
offers numerous amenities to attract a significant number of 
people with diverse needs and interests.  Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) ("The more an owner, for his advantage, 
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more 
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it"). 
 
 
10 
or exiting the store, not to congregate there.6 
 
Roche Bros. misreads our opinion in Batchelder I.  
Functional equivalence to a traditional public forum is not the 
test for determining whether art. 9 protects signature 
solicitation on private property.  For example, in Commonwealth 
v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 585-587 (1983), we distinguished 
Batchelder I based on the different right at stake and the 
different property in question, and only separately and for 
purposes of addressing a claimed right under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution did we discuss whether the 
property served "a public function" or had been "dedicated to 
certain types of public use" (citation omitted).  Id. at 587.  
Rather, the extent to which private property serves the role of 
a traditional public forum or effectively has been dedicated to 
the public is relevant in the context of art. 9 only as a factor 
in balancing the interests of the individual soliciting 
signatures against those of the property owner.7 
                     
6 See, e.g., Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 8, 55 Cal. 4th 1083, 1092-1093 (2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2799 (2013); Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. 
App. 4th 1375, 1388-1389 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 
Cal. App. 4th 106, 120-122 (2003); Costco Cos. v. Gallant, 96 
Cal. App. 4th 740, 755 (2002); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive 
Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 433-434 (1999); Waremart, 
Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 623, 636-637 
(1999). 
 
7 Indeed, private property's function as a traditional 
public forum serves as the test for State action in this 
 
 
11 
 
In many rural and suburban communities, the local 
supermarket may serve as one of the few places in which an 
individual soliciting signatures would be able to approach 
members of the public in large numbers.  We disagree with Roche 
Bros.' contention that, for purposes of a claim to ballot access 
under art. 9, the privately owned area immediately outside the 
entrance to such a supermarket differs as a matter of kind from 
the common areas of a shopping mall or shopping center so as to 
warrant dismissal of Glovsky's claim pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (b) (6).8  Applying the balancing test employed in 
Batchelder I to the facts as asserted in Glovksy's complaint, we 
conclude that Glovsky adequately has alleged a right under 
art. 9 to solicit nominating signatures on the private property 
outside the entrance to Roche Bros.' Westwood supermarket. 
                                                                  
context.  See, e.g., Central Hardware Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Bd., 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (for conduct of private 
property owner to qualify as State action, "the privately owned 
property must assume to some significant degree the functional 
attributes of public property devoted to public use").  
Accordingly, the strict functional equivalency test urged by 
Roche Bros. effectively would impose the type of State action 
requirement that Batchelder I, supra at 88, expressly rejected.  
Instead, art. 9 demands a more pragmatic and flexible view of 
the extent to which private property serves the public in the 
manner of a traditional public forum such that excluding 
signature solicitors from that property would undermine the 
right to equal ballot access.  See Batchelder I, supra at 88-89, 
92-93. 
 
8 As Roche Bros. concedes, none of the out-of-State cases on 
which it relies were decided in the context of a motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
12 
 
Glovsky has alleged a substantial interest in soliciting 
signatures in this area for his nomination to public office.  He 
"cannot reasonably obtain" such signatures other than by 
"personal contact with voters," Batchelder I, supra at 92, and 
"[f]rom the standpoint of a signature gatherer . . . there could 
hardly be a more ideal or efficient spot to conduct one's 
business than the single entrance and exit of a [supermarket or 
giant] grocery store."  Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, 
Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 623, 649 (1999) (Madsen, J., concurring).  In 
general, supermarkets offer a variety of groceries, household 
items, and other merchandise that in many communities would be 
dispersed among several shops along a public way.  See, e.g., 
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 221, 223 
(1958) (supermarkets commonly sell "meats, groceries, 
vegetables, toilet articles, household wares, and other 
merchandise").  In addition to such items, the Westwood property 
includes a bakery, a florist, and a restaurant.  It also 
accommodates a "full service banking" branch.  Because the 
property allegedly contains the only supermarket in Westwood, as 
well as these other amenities, it reasonably can be inferred 
that the property draws a significant portion of the town's 
voters.  In some communities, an individual might solicit 
signatures from members of the public as they traverse the 
public way connecting the various shops that offer such 
 
 
13 
amenities; to deprive Glovsky of similar access to the public 
where the assorted products have been consolidated under a 
single roof could "substantially impair[]" the fundamental 
rights protected by art. 9.  See Batchelder I, supra at 93. 
 
Moreover, the allegations in the complaint support the 
reasonable inference that allowing individuals to solicit 
nominating signatures in the area outside the Westwood 
supermarket building would not unduly burden Roche Bros.' 
property interests.  Roche Bros. invites the public at large to 
shop at its property and offers numerous amenities to attract a 
significant number of people with diverse needs and interests.  
Furthermore, as the only supermarket in Westwood and especially 
given the other features it offers, it is likely that the 
property does draw large numbers of people on a daily basis.9  
Like the plaintiff in Batchelder I, supra at 92, Glovsky seeks 
only the right to engage in "unobtrusive and reasonable 
solicitations" outside the store entrance.  Nothing in the 
                     
9 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, see post at    , we 
do not suggest that the art. 9 right to solicit nominating 
signatures extends to small-scale general stores just because 
they offer a variety of goods.  See note 4, supra.  Such small-
scale stores attract fewer customers than does a supermarket of 
the type at issue here, thereby both diminishing an individual's 
need to solicit signatures there and increasing the relative 
burden that such solicitation places on the property owner.  
Furthermore, many of these small-scale stores abut public 
walkways, so that individuals soliciting signatures would have 
access to the store's customers without entering the private 
property. 
 
 
14 
undeveloped record before us suggests that the proposed, 
presumably brief, interactions with shoppers as they enter or 
leave the supermarket would interfere with Roche Bros.' use of 
its property.10 
 
Roche Bros. argues that, as compared to the common areas of 
a shopping mall, requiring it to permit signature solicitation 
outside its entrance would impose an undue burden because the 
close proximity to its free-standing establishment would create 
greater risks both that Roche Bros. will be seen as indorsing 
the potential political candidate in question and that its 
patrons will be unable to avoid the solicitations as they enter 
or leave the supermarket.  Without further evidentiary support, 
however, these hypothetical risks do not outweigh the interest 
of an individual seeking nominating signatures in accessing the 
property.  It cannot be assumed at this stage of the proceeding 
that Roche Bros. would be identified with the views expressed by 
a person soliciting nominating signatures merely because the 
person does so on premises owned by Roche Bros. but open to the 
general public.  See Batchelder I, supra at 93.  See also 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) 
(PruneYard).  For example, Roche Bros. could post signs in the 
                     
10 The statement attributed to Roche Bros.' store manager 
that Roche Bros. "no longer" permits signature solicitation on 
the Westwood property implies that Roche Bros. previously did 
permit such solicitation. 
 
 
15 
area disavowing any association with potential political 
candidates.  See PruneYard, supra.  Additionally, Roche Bros. 
could prevent those soliciting signatures from harassing its 
patrons and impairing its commercial interests by prescribing 
reasonable restrictions on the location, time, and manner in 
which the nominating signatures may be sought.  See Batchelder 
I, supra at 84, 93.  See also PruneYard, supra at 83.11 
 
We are not persuaded by the California cases on which Roche 
Bros. relies for the proposition that a State constitutional 
right to engage in expressive activity in the common areas of a 
shopping mall should not extend to the area outside a 
supermarket.12  See note 6, supra.  California decisional law 
recognizes an expansive right to engage in free speech on 
                     
11 The dissent concludes that Roche Bros.' concerns about 
indorsement and interference outweigh Glovsky's admittedly 
strong interest in soliciting signatures because such 
solicitation "may" negatively impact Roche Bros.  See post 
at    .  At this stage of the proceeding, our obligation under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), is to 
"accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and draw[] 
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."  Harrington 
v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014). 
 
12 Although our decision in Batchelder I favorably cited 
California precedent, California case law at the time apparently 
extended its State constitutional free expression right to the 
area outside a supermarket.  See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping 
Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-909 (1979), citing In re Lane, 71 Cal. 
2d 872, 878 (1969).  See also National Labor Relations Bd. v. 
Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1090-1092 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1098 (2000); Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 
311, 316, 318 (1983); Bank of Stockton v. Church of Soldiers of 
the Cross of Christ of the State of Cal., 44 Cal. App. 4th 1623, 
1630-1631 (1996). 
 
 
16 
certain private property that is broader than the limited art. 9 
right to solicit nominating signatures that we have recognized 
thus far.  See Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor 
Relations Bd., 42 Cal. 4th 850, 869-870 (2007), citing Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 2.  Although the California Supreme Court has 
identified the State's constitutional provision addressing the 
right to petition the government as an additional ground for 
protecting the solicitation of petition signatures on certain 
private property, see Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 
3d 899, 910 (1979), aff'd, PruneYard, supra, citing Cal. Const., 
art. I, §§ 2, 3, the California courts have not interpreted this 
provision as extending the right to solicit signatures beyond 
the protection afforded by California's free speech clause.  See 
Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106, 122 (2003) 
("To establish a right to solicit signatures at the entrance to 
a specific store, it must be shown that the particular location 
is impressed with the character of a traditional public forum 
for purposes of free speech"); Westside Sane/Freeze v. Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 3d 546, 554 (1990) (California's free 
speech clause provides "primary source" for right to solicit 
signatures identified in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 
supra).  Accordingly, recognition by the California courts of an 
individual's right to solicit signatures on private property 
would open the property to a host of "other forms of expressive 
 
 
17 
activity" and thereby impose a greater burden on the property 
owner than we so far have recognized under the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  See Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, supra at 
128-129. 
 
Furthermore, in concluding that the balance of interests 
weighs in favor of the supermarket owner, the California cases 
rely on the fact that such an owner has invited the public only 
to pass through the area outside the store's entrance, not to 
congregate there.  See Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 55 Cal. 4th 1083, 1092-1093 
(2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2799 (2013); Albertson's, Inc. 
v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 120-122; Trader Joe's Co. v. 
Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 433-434 
(1999).  For purposes of art. 9, however, this consideration 
carries little weight in balancing the interests presented.  In 
Batchelder I, supra at 92, when comparing shopping malls to the 
"downtown" area of a municipality, we focused on the malls as an 
attraction for retail shopping, not on whether people congregate 
in particular parts of the malls.  In terms of access to the 
public, it matters little to a signature gatherer whether people 
congregate in an area or merely pass through.  Likewise, 
although signature solicitation might intrude less on a property 
owner's interests if the owner already permits people to 
congregate on the property to engage in political and expressive 
 
 
18 
activities, see id. at 93 n.12, that does not imply that such 
solicitation necessarily would burden the interests of any other 
property owner.  As discussed, nothing in the record suggests 
that unobtrusive signature solicitation, subject to such 
reasonable restrictions as Roche Bros. may prescribe, would 
impair Roche Bros.' commercial interests. 
 
We conclude that Glovsky plausibly has alleged a right 
under art. 9 to solicit nominating signatures on the private 
property outside Roche Bros.' Westwood supermarket.  We now turn 
to whether Glovsky may seek relief under the Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act for Roche Bros.' alleged violation of this right.  
 
c.  Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.  "Not every violation 
of law is a violation of the [Massachusetts Civil Rights Act]."  
Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 433 Mass. 179, 182 (2001), quoting 
Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 404 Mass. 325, 333 
(1989).  To establish a claim under the act, "a plaintiff must 
prove that (1) the exercise or enjoyment of some constitutional 
or statutory right; (2) has been interfered with, or attempted 
to be interfered with; and (3) such interference was by threats, 
intimidation, or coercion."  Currier v. National Bd. of Med. 
Examiners, 462 Mass. 1, 12 (2012).  See G. L. c. 12, § 11I; 
G. L. c. 12, § 11H.  The Legislature "explicitly limited the 
[act's] remedy to situations where the derogation of secured 
rights occurs by threats, intimidation or coercion" in order to 
 
 
19 
prevent it from establishing a "vast constitutional tort."13  
Currier v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, supra, quoting Buster 
v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 645, 646 (2003).  See 
Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 718 (1989). 
 
For purposes of the act, we define "threats, intimidation 
or coercion" as follows:  a "threat" consists of "the 
intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or 
apprehensive of injury or harm"; "intimidation" involves 
"putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring 
conduct"; and "coercion" is "the application to another of such 
force, either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do 
against his will something he would not otherwise have done."  
Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 505 (2006), quoting Planned 
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 474, 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994), and Buster v. George W. 
Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. at 646.  We employ a reasonable person 
standard in determining whether a defendant's conduct 
constitutes such threats, intimidation, or coercion.  Haufler v. 
Zotos, supra.  A claim under the act is properly dismissed where 
the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint fail to satisfy 
this standard.  See, e.g., Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 708 
                     
13 Because she concluded that Glovsky had no right under 
art. 9 to solicit nominating signatures on Roche Bros.' 
property, the judge did not address whether Roche Bros. violated 
this right "by threats, intimidation or coercion."  
Nevertheless, both parties have briefed this issue on appeal. 
 
 
20 
(1999). 
 
Glovsky argues that Roche Bros. interfered with his art. 9 
right "by threats, intimidation or coercion" when Visconti, 
Roche Bros.' store manager, informed him that Roche Bros. had 
adopted a policy against signature solicitation, causing Glovsky 
to feel "intimidated" and "threatened" such that he vacated the 
premises.  Glovsky relies on Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 
393 Mass. 819, 823 (1985) (Batchelder II), where we held that a 
mall security officer's order that the plaintiff stop soliciting 
signatures involved sufficient intimidation or coercion to 
support a claim under the act. 
 
Batchelder II, supra at 823, however, turned on the threat 
of immediate arrest or forcible ejection implicit within an 
"order[]" from a "uniformed security officer."  See Longval v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 404 Mass. at 333; Bally v. 
Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. at 719.  See also Brunelle v. Lynn 
Pub. Sch., 433 Mass. at 184, quoting Reproductive Rights Network 
v. President of Univ. of Mass., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 508 
(1998) (distinguishing Batchelder II based on security officer's 
"heavy-handed use of police power").  Glovsky does not allege 
that Visconti threatened physically to remove him from the 
premises or to have him arrested, contrast Sarvis v. Boston Safe 
Deposit & Trust Co., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 92 (1999), and as a 
private citizen without any apparent police power, Visconti's 
 
 
21 
statement that Roche Bros. prohibits signature solicitation on 
its property does not bear the same coercive force as a similar 
statement from a security officer.  See Kennie v. Natural 
Resource Dep't of Dennis, 451 Mass. 754, 763-765 (2008); 
Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., supra.14 
 
Glovsky contends that Visconti's statement carried an 
implicit threat of arrest pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 120, which 
provides:  "Whoever, without right enters or remains in or upon 
the . . . improved or enclosed land . . . of another . . . after 
having been forbidden so to do by the person who has lawful 
control of said premises . . . may be arrested by a sheriff, 
deputy sheriff, constable or police officer."  Without further 
indication, however, that Visconti would seek Glovsky's arrest, 
or cause him to suffer other serious adverse consequences, his 
mere declaration of Roche Bros.' policy against signature 
solicitation does not rise to the level of threats, 
intimidation, or coercion.  See Kennie v. Natural Resource Dep't 
of Dennis, 451 Mass. at 765, quoting Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 
Mass. App. Ct. 740, 761 (2002) (Rapoza, J., dissenting) (limited 
"verbal 'posturing' and '[h]uffing and puffing'" do not 
                     
14 We need not here decide whether to revisit the conclusion 
in Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 823 (1985), 
that the mere notification from a security officer of the 
property owners' good faith policy against signature 
solicitation qualifies as intimidating or coercive under the 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. 
 
 
22 
constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion where such 
statements are both delivered by private party and unaccompanied 
by further actions); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. 
Blake, 417 Mass. at 476 n.9 (lecturing, counseling, and 
picketing against abortion do not interfere with that right 
through threats, intimidation, or coercion); Rodriques v. 
Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 881, 889 (1991) (hospital agent's 
explanation to doctor of hospital's policies, leading doctor to 
violate plaintiff's rights in accordance with those policies, 
did not establish hospital's interference with plaintiff's 
rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion).  See also Chao v. 
Ballista, 772 F. Supp. 2d 337, 360 (D. Mass. 2011) (knowledge of 
defendant's troublesome policy does not constitute "indirect 
threat" amounting to threats, intimidation, or coercion); Walsh 
v. Lakeville, 431 F. Supp. 2d 134, 150 (D. Mass. 2006) 
("[m]erely recommending" interference with right "doesn't evince 
the requisite threats, intimidation or coercion").  That Glovsky 
subjectively may have felt "threatened" or "intimidated" does 
not suffice.  See Meuser v. Federal Express Corp., 564 F.3d 507, 
520 (1st Cir. 2009); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. 
Blake, supra at 474-475, quoting Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 358 
Mass. 592, 595 (1971).  Accordingly, Glovsky's civil rights 
claim properly was dismissed.15 
                     
15 This conclusion ordinarily would not preclude Glovsky 
 
 
23 
 
Conclusion.  That portion of the judgment dismissing 
Glovsky's request for declaratory relief under art. 9 is vacated 
and set aside.  The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.  The 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment 
dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
                                                                  
from seeking declaratory relief under art. 9.  See Batchelder I, 
supra at 84 n.2.  See also Longval v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 404 Mass. 325, 332-333 (1989).  However, as the 
deadline for collecting nominating signatures and the election 
for which Glovsky sought ballot access have both passed, the 
case is now moot, and we therefore do not remand for further 
proceedings.  See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 817 
(2013); Tsongas v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 708, 
720-721 (1972). 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting).  The court in this case 
significantly expands the scope of the right afforded by art. 9 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights at the expense of the 
rights of countless commercial property owners across the 
Commonwealth.  In so doing, its reasoning departs not only from 
the cautious analysis employed in Batchelder v. Allied Stores 
Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83 (1983) (Batchelder I), but also from 
the overwhelming national consensus on the proper balancing of 
rights where a limited right to solicit signatures on private 
property is recognized.  By failing to recognize the enormous 
differences between large shopping complexes that duplicate 
traditional downtown functions and free-standing stores selling 
multiple products, the court completely undoes the intended 
balance between the rights of property owners and the rights of 
those whom they invite to use their property, and creates 
serious consequences for property owners who miscalculate their 
obligations despite their best intentions.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. (Roche Bros.), advocates for 
a functional equivalence test that is supported by Batchelder I 
and by the decisional law of other jurisdictions that have 
grappled with this issue.  This test would provide clearer 
guidance to property owners and individuals and would achieve an 
 
 
2 
appropriate balancing of interests.1  Under the functional 
equivalence test, where private property intentionally fills 
"the societal role of a town center" such that it is the 
functional equivalent of a traditional downtown district, 
private property rights must yield to an individual's exercise 
of his or her art. 9 right, subject to reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions.  See Albertson's Inc. v. Young, 107 
Cal. App. 4th 106, 115 (2003), citing Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979), aff'd, PruneYard Shopping 
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).  The primary consideration 
in this test is the intended use, design, and character of the 
property and its common areas in relation to the life of the 
community, reflected largely in the nature of the invitation 
extended to the public.  Where a property owner invites the 
public for nearly limitless use, and thereby replicates the 
environment and function of a downtown district in facilitating 
mixed commercial and social endeavors, the balance of rights 
tips in favor of the individual seeking to exercise rights 
                     
1 That some jurisdictions employ this functional equivalence 
test to determine whether the conduct of a private property 
owner constitutes State action for the purposes of a 
constitutional rights analysis is not problematic.  See ante 
at    .  Where we are concerned with private property owners who 
lure the public from downtown areas by providing a full and 
nearly identical spectrum of services and resources without 
providing the individual rights typically afforded in public 
spaces, the analytical framework employed to determine when a 
private actor is behaving like a State actor is particularly 
fitting. 
 
 
3 
guaranteed in such public forums.  See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 
U.S. 501, 506 (1946) ("The more an owner, for his advantage, 
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more 
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it").  The inverse is 
that where a property owner invites the public for a more 
limited use, reflected in a utilitarian design facilitating only 
the specific commercial purpose of the invitation, the balance 
tips in favor of the owner, as the limited invitation results in 
the retention of some of the property's private nature.  See 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) ("property [does 
not] lose its private character merely because the public is 
generally invited to use it for designated purposes").  
 
The functional equivalence test finds support in Batchelder 
I and in the analyses employed by other courts on this issue.  
Batchelder I involved the then largest shopping mall in 
Massachusetts, which included ninety-five separate retail 
stores, a movie theater, a bowling alley, an exercise facility, 
a beauty salon, a religious facility, and common areas that, as 
a practical matter, were dedicated to the public.  See 
Batchelder I, 388 Mass. at 85, 86 & n.4, 92-93 & n.12.  The 
court concluded that where the mall offered such a breadth of 
potential uses of the property to the public, it functioned as 
the equivalent of a downtown area, intentionally recreating the 
 
 
4 
traditional downtown district.  Consequently, the mall owners 
could not deny visitors the right to solicit signatures that 
they would otherwise enjoy in equivalent public spaces.  See id. 
at 92-93. 
 
The United States Supreme Court and the California 
appellate courts, on whose decisions this court relied in 
Batchelder I, 388 Mass. at 87-88, 90-91, have similarly affirmed 
a limited right to engage in signature solicitation or speech-
related rights on private property that holds itself out to the 
public for nearly unlimited use consistent with the function of 
a downtown district.2  See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 78-79, aff'g 
                     
2 The court rejects Roche Bros.' reliance on California 
decisional law as a guidepost for the legal analysis here 
because the right to solicit signatures there is based in the 
right to free speech, which confers along with it a host of 
other rights.  See ante at    .  The court notes that because 
the art. 9 right is less intrusive in its exercise and less 
broad in scope, it should extend to more areas than the free 
speech right.  See ante at    .  I am not convinced that the 
balancing must be conducted any differently, or that the result 
cannot be instructive, where the factual scenarios and the 
ultimate "speech" sought are so similar to those of the case at 
hand.  There is no reason why the basis of the right should 
preclude our comparison where the ultimate right sought, the 
right to solicit signatures, is the same.  Further, Batchelder 
v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 87-88, 90-91 (1983) 
(Batchelder I), and cases cited, clearly relied on California 
and United States Supreme Court precedent in articulating the 
analytical framework for the art. 9 right.  Despite emphasizing 
the unique need for personal contact in soliciting signatures 
and the narrow scope of the right as compared to free speech 
rights more generally, see Batchelder I, supra at 91-92, the 
Batchelder I court indicated no substantive difference based on 
the origin of the right meriting a different analytical 
framework.  Accordingly, I consider the decisional law of 
 
 
5 
Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 910-911 (State constitutional free speech 
right can be extended to large shopping center); Marsh, 326 U.S. 
at 502-503, 509 (business district of town wholly owned by 
private corporation, which contained residences, streets, 
sewers, and business block with shopping center, was so broadly 
open for public use that private property owners' right to limit 
use must yield to right to distribute religious literature that 
would be otherwise available on public property); Ralphs Grocery 
Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 55 Cal. 
4th 1083, 1104 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2799 (2013); 
Albertson's Inc., 107 Cal. App. 4th at 110, 118-119, and cases 
cited.  See also Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Bd., 424 
U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (free speech right under First Amendment to 
United States Constitution does not extend to private property), 
overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968) (large shopping 
center containing roads and sidewalks was functional equivalent 
of downtown business district and therefore certain First 
Amendment rights could not be infringed there). 
 
Other States that use a multifactorial balancing test akin 
to the court's interpretation of Batchelder I also place 
significant emphasis on the nature of the invitation extended to 
                                                                  
California and other States that have similarly rooted their 
right to solicit signatures in their State constitutional free 
speech provisions to be more persuasive than not. 
 
 
6 
the public.  See, e.g., Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 
55, 61, 62 (Colo. 1991) (assessing whether common areas of mall 
"effectively function as a public place" or "equivalent of a 
downtown business district"); New Jersey Coalition Against War 
in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 333, 
362 (1994), cert. denied sub nom. Short Hills Assocs. v. New 
Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 516 U.S. 812 
(1995), citing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563 (1980) 
(assessing "normal use of the property, the extent and nature of 
the public's invitation to use it, and the purpose of the 
expressional activity in relation to both its private and public 
use"); Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 139 Wash. 
2d 623, 629, 631, 636 (1999) (assessing whether store is 
functional equivalent of downtown area and considering, among 
several factors, scope of invitation to public and intent of 
property owner, as well as nature and use of property and of 
right sought to be exercised).  The functional equivalence test 
therefore has support both in our own precedent and that of 
other jurisdictions. 
Applying this test, it is clear that there is a meaningful 
difference between large shopping malls, which consistently have 
been deemed places where a solicitation right may not be 
infringed, and free-standing supermarkets, which consistently 
have been deemed places where such rights are not protected.  
 
 
7 
A large shopping mall like the one at issue in Batchelder I 
can span over eighty acres, typically serving hundreds of 
thousands of visitors a week, and containing a wide variety of 
retail and department stores, commercial establishments, and 
many other services and amenities.  See Batchelder I, 388 Mass. 
at 85.  See also Bock, 819 P.2d at 62; J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 
N.J. at 338, 339.  Connecting these establishments within the 
mall are common areas that contain seating, plazas, amenities, 
and spaces where visitors can gather.  See Van v. Target Corp., 
155 Cal. App. 4th 1375, 1388-1389 (2007); J.M.B. Realty Corp., 
supra at 339.  The common areas "produc[e] a congenial 
environment that encourages passing shoppers to stop and linger, 
[and] to leisurely congregate for purposes of relaxation and 
conversation."  Ralphs Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1092; Bock, 
supra (visitors "engage, no doubt, in conversations on all 
subjects" in common areas of mall).  In these common areas, the 
mall provides regular programming and events, some "charitable 
and civic" and meant to connect the community, others "simply 
entertainment," Batchelder I, supra at 86 & n.4, that draw 
visitors who may or may not plan to shop.  See J.M.B. Realty 
Corp., supra at 334, 358.  See also Waremart, 139 Wash. 2d at 
636-637 (malls often have walking groups, choir meetings, and 
other activities). 
Although its primary purpose, as with any commercial 
 
 
8 
endeavor, is to make a profit, the mall promotes itself as a 
place where all members of the community can engage in any 
number of activities, thereby blurring the line between 
commercial, civic, and expressive endeavors.3  The resulting 
invitation to the public to use the mall is all-inclusive:  to 
shop, to be entertained, to attend to personal or health needs, 
to congregate, to learn, to connect with others, and to do all 
the activities one could do in a downtown area.  See Robins, 23 
Cal. 3d at 910-911; J.M.B. Realty Corp., supra at 333-334, 359.   
In so opening the property to a nearly limitless range of 
uses, the mall situates itself as the functional equivalent of 
and substitute for the downtown district, where historically 
communities have gathered for such mixed purposes.4  See Ralphs 
                     
3 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed, "The hope is 
that once there they will spend.  The certainty is that if they 
are not there they will not."  New Jersey Coalition Against War 
in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 358 
(1994), cert. denied sub nom. Short Hills Assoc. v. New Jersey 
Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 516 U.S. 812 (1995). 
 
4 A mall need not be enclosed to serve this purpose, and 
indeed, current commercial developments employ an outdoor 
shopping concept that even more closely resembles the historic 
Main Street.  As but two examples, the recently developed The 
Street in Chestnut Hill and Legacy Place in Dedham are both 
designed with the clear intention of replicating Main Street.  
The Street blurs the line between commercial and noncommercial 
purposes by offering a wide range of high-end retail stores 
intermixed with restaurants, a medical center, a movie theater, 
a bank, an optician, hair salons, a large supermarket, a fitness 
facility, and common areas for rest and relaxation.  It 
encourages visitors to bring their pets and hosts a variety of 
concerts, yoga classes, and other activities with no purchase 
 
 
9 
Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1091, quoting Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 
907, 910; J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. at 333-334, 357, 359.  
As a result, because the mall intentionally replaces Main 
Street, it is appropriate for community members to enjoy at 
least some of the expressive rights that they otherwise would be 
able to exercise on the traditional Main Street.   
 
Indeed, "every state that has found certain of its 
constitutional free-speech-related provisions effective 
regardless of 'state action' has ruled that shopping center 
owners cannot prohibit that free speech" (emphasis in original).  
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. at 352, 360.  See, e.g., 
Batchelder I, 388 Mass. at 92-93; Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 905-906; 
Bock, 819 P.2d at 62 ("Mall functions as the equivalent of a 
downtown business district" because contains wide variety of 
commercial and retail establishments, permits range of 
activities in common areas, and facilitates public gathering and 
discussion by opening common areas for varied use); Alderwood 
Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 246 
(1981) (large regional shopping center "performs a traditional 
public function by providing the functional equivalent of a town 
center or community business block"). 
In stark contrast, a free-standing supermarket like Roche 
                                                                  
required.  Similarly, Legacy Place offers extensive retail, 
food, and entertainment options, and a wide variety of 
children's workshops and free concerts.   
 
 
10 
Bros., no matter how large, does not replicate a downtown area 
on these measures.  A supermarket occupies significantly less 
acreage, here just under five acres, and may contain a handful 
of ancillary businesses, such as the full-service bank that 
leases a small portion of the space inside the Roche Bros. store 
here.  Although the complaint does not allege additional facts,5 
the store may have a few chairs inside and a few benches along 
the sidewalk near a single entrance and exit.  But there is no 
allegation that the entryway where the plaintiff sought to 
solicit signatures serves any more than the limited purpose of 
facilitating the entrance and exit of shoppers.  Cf. Ralphs 
Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1092 ("areas immediately adjacent to 
the entrances of individual stores typically lack seating and 
are not designed to promote relaxation and socializing," but 
rather "serve utilitarian purposes of facilitating customers' 
entrance to and exit from the stores and also, from the store's 
perspective, advertising the goods and services available 
within").  This limited purpose is meaningfully different from 
the vast invitation of the open spaces intentionally provided in 
large shopping malls.  Absent common areas, advertised 
                     
5 There is no indication on the record before us of how many 
visitors the supermarket receives each week, what its gross 
annual or weekly sales are, whether the supermarket offers any 
programming or social events, or whether there are any common 
areas in the store.  
  
 
 
11 
programming, or a host of unrelated amenities designed to 
encourage visitors to pursue varied needs, the invitation Roche 
Bros. extends to the public for use of its property is a far 
more limited one than that of a large mall:  to purchase the 
goods and services Roche Bros. offers.6  See Costco Cos. v. 
Gallant, 96 Cal. App. 4th 740, 755 (2002).  All of the areas and 
features of the store are designed toward this purpose.  There 
is no general invitation to gather or to come to the store for 
some other purpose; there is only the invitation to shop and to 
utilize the ancillary services provided in furtherance of this 
invitation.  See Albertson's Inc., 107 Cal. App. 4th at 120-121.  
See also Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569.   
I am very troubled by the court's suggestion that the 
variety of the items sold by Roche Bros. is particularly 
relevant to the analysis.  See ante at    .  This is a matter of 
convenience and not of constitutional importance.  The court 
                     
6 Even if Roche Bros. were to provide other amenities not 
specifically identified in the complaint, they most likely would 
be in furtherance of its explicit commercial purpose of inviting 
the public to shop there.  A pharmacy, a movie rental facility, 
photograph printing services, a United States mail box, lottery 
ticket sales, small children's rides outside the entrance, 
public payphones, or any number of other, small-scale services 
are all amenities of convenience, ancillary to the primary 
purpose of shopping for groceries and other household items.  
They render it more likely that a customer will choose to shop 
for groceries at this store instead of another option; they do 
not signal to the public that they should come to the store to 
engage in noncommercial activities.  See Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. 
v. Garrett, 191 Or. App. 582, 585-586 (2004). 
 
 
12 
allows itself to be distracted by the plaintiff's argument that 
because the supermarket offers products that in a bygone era 
would require visits to numerous stores, the supermarket must be 
considered a wholesale replica of a downtown shopping district.  
This argument shifts the inquiry from the design and purposeful 
use of the property to the inventory of the particular store, 
which may change with the seasons, global product availability, 
business priorities, consumer demand, or any number of variables 
irrelevant to the constitutional analysis we are conducting 
here.  It diminishes the weight of other more important 
considerations by focusing on an individual store owner's 
business acumen in determining that a customer might like to buy 
aspirin and tissues along with orange juice.  Were inventory 
determinative, every general store in the Commonwealth that is 
not accessible by a public walkway, from the shoeshine-cum-
sundries shops nestled within the corporate towers of downtown 
Boston to the pharmacies and big-box stores which now dot our 
urban and suburban environment, might be found to have 
surrendered their property rights to those of individual 
citizens, with no further inquiry into whether these stores 
truly function as the equivalent to downtown districts.7   
                     
7 Although the court assures us that its holding does not 
extend to "small-scale general stores," see ante at    , it 
provides no further guidance as to where exactly it would draw 
the line. 
 
 
13 
It cannot be that a single store, designed to invite 
customers for a limited commercial purpose, falls into the same 
class as a large shopping mall simply because it carries a 
varied inventory.8  This convenience factor does not import the 
social and gathering functions that result from the intentional 
design and use of a property's common areas to facilitate 
community congregation, nor does it transform the invitation 
from a specific commercial one (fulfil all of your daily 
shopping needs here) to an all-inclusive one (do whatever you 
would like here).  See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive 
Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 433 (1999).  
Rather, supermarkets that lack common spaces designed to 
facilitate congregation and encourage visitors with varied 
agendas fail to replicate the historic downtown district.  For 
this reason, other States have explicitly rejected the analogy 
of a single store or supermarket, even where situated among a 
few other stores, to a downtown district or to a large shopping 
mall, and accordingly they have declined to extend certain 
individual liberties to such private property.  See Ralphs 
                                                                  
 
8 There is a key distinction between the inventory of a 
single store and the over-all collection assembled within a 
large shopping mall.  A large mall intentionally brings together 
numerous tenants to cater to a range of different types of 
customers.  In so doing, it creates common spaces between these 
stores that then serve as points of congregation and replicate a 
downtown area. 
 
 
14 
Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1093, 1104 (entryway to supermarket 
not public forum because not "designed and furnished in a way 
that induces shoppers to congregate," but rather "to walk to or 
from a parking area"); Van, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1388-1389 
(entrances to Target, Wal-Mart, and Home Depot stores not 
"functional equivalent of a traditional public forum" because 
"designed to encourage shopping as opposed to meeting friends, 
congregating or lingering," and did not contain "courtyards, 
plazas or other places designated to encourage patrons to spend 
time together or be entertained"); Albertson's Inc., 107 Cal. 
App. 4th at 120-121 (supermarket not "functional equivalent of 
traditional public forum" because "does not invite the public to 
meet friends, to eat, to rest, to congregate, or to be 
entertained at its premises," and its entrance is not "place 
where people choose to come and meet and talk"); Costco Cos., 96 
Cal. App. 4th at 755 (Costco stores not "miniature downtowns" 
because customers go to stores "to purchase . . . goods and 
services offered by Costco," not "with the expectation they will 
meet friends, be entertained, dine or congregate"); People v. 
DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 126-127 (1992) (free-standing grocery 
store does not "present[ ] itself as a forum for free 
expression" because does not give "impression that its property 
was public in nature and open to expressive activities"); J.M.B. 
Realty Corp., 138 N.J. at 373 ("No highway strip mall . . . no 
 
 
15 
single huge suburban store, no stand-alone use, and no small to 
medium shopping center sufficiently satisfies the standard . . . 
to warrant the constitutional extension of free speech to those 
premises"); Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. v. Garrett, 191 Or. App. 
582, 585-586 (2004) (no right to solicit petition signatures at 
supermarket marketing itself as one-stop shop and offering 
mailboxes, automated teller machines, public telephones, and 
seating areas because invitation to public not sufficiently 
broad); Waremart, 139 Wash. 2d at 636-637 (no right to petition 
or solicit signatures at retail grocery store that invites 
public for limited commercial purposes and not "for any 
noncommercial purpose," because store does not "promote any 
public services on their locations," does not have "areas for 
citizens to congregate[,] . . . wait or converse," and "bear[s] 
none of the characteristics of a town center" [citations 
omitted]).  See also Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569 ("Few would 
argue that a free-standing store, with abutting parking space 
for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely 
because the public is invited to shop there").  This court, 
however, has chosen to ignore this consensus and the predictable 
reasoning underlying it. 
 
Even under the Batchelder I balancing test as the court 
interprets it, which entails more interest-based rather than 
size, scope, and functional considerations, the balance to be 
 
 
16 
struck for a supermarket like Roche Bros. should not lean in 
favor of art. 9 rights.  I need not discuss the individual 
interests of using a local grocery store as a place for the 
solicitation of signatures -- that much is clear from the 
court's opinion, and I do not dispute the importance of this 
interest.  But the court undervalues Roche Bros.' claims of 
perceived indorsement and interference with its commercial 
enterprise and its own constitutional property and speech 
rights, such that the court miscalculates the interests at 
stake. 
 
Where a retail business stands alone in its physical space, 
unaccompanied by other stores, there is a real risk that it will 
be seen as indorsing a candidate for whom signatures are being 
solicited outside its entrance.  In addition, where there is 
only one entrance, and the supposed "common area" of the 
property consists of the walkway to that entrance, other 
customers will be unable to avoid the solicitations as they 
enter and leave the store.9  As the California Supreme Court has 
observed, "[s]oliciting signatures . . . pose[s] a significantly 
greater risk of interfering with normal business operations when 
those activities are conducted in close proximity to the 
entrances and exits of individual stores rather than in the less 
                     
9 This is indeed what makes the location so appealing to 
those seeking signatures. 
 
 
17 
heavily trafficked and more congenial common areas."10  Ralphs 
Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1092.  Cf. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 
N.J. at 374 (where property stands alone, "exercise of free 
speech will generate greater interference with their normal 
use").  The right to solicit signatures cannot truly be 
exercised "unobtrusive[ly]" when it is done so directly in front 
of the only ingress and egress of a free-standing store.  See 
Batchelder I, 388 Mass. at 92.  Although the art. 9 right, as 
has been noted, is narrower than the right to free speech, a 
single, free-standing store may nonetheless suffer an impact or 
interference from its exercise, particularly if it serves to 
stifle the property owner's exercise of its own property or 
speech rights. 
 
The solutions the court proposes for overcoming perceived 
indorsement and commercial interference do not cure these 
concerns.  See ante at    .  There are numerous reasons why 
                     
 
10 In contrast, perceived indorsement concerns are minimal 
if not nonexistent at large shopping malls with hundreds of 
tenants.  Where many malls carry a name that is localized (e.g., 
Northshore Mall, Natick Mall) or catchy (e.g., Assembly Row, 
Legacy Place), only the most informed visitor would know the 
identity of the mall's owner.  Further, because large malls 
contain "numerous separate business establishments" and numerous 
entrances, it is unlikely that permitting the solicitation of 
signatures would impair the value or use of the property as a 
mall or interfere with normal business operations.  See 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); 
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910-911 
(1979). 
 
 
18 
posting disclaimers would be impracticable or undesirable for 
property owners, and time, place, and manner restrictions can go 
only so far in countering perceived indorsement and interference 
while still being minimal and reasonable limitations on the 
solicitation right.  Cf. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 96 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment) ("Even large 
establishments may be able to [demonstrate] . . . substantial 
annoyance to customers" of exercise of free speech right "that 
could be eliminated only by elaborate, expensive, and possibly 
unenforceable time, place, and manner restrictions").  These 
important considerations as to the burden on the owner of 
property occupied by a stand-alone store have led courts in 
other States employing nearly identical balancing tests to find 
the balance tipped decidedly in favor of the owner's rights. 
 
The consequences of today's decision are significant.  
Aside from swinging the pendulum too far in favor of the 
exercise of individual rights at the expense of those of 
property owners, the court's decision offers an unworkable test 
in several respects.  No retail store except the smallest, most 
highly specialized one can safely determine that it falls 
outside the scope of the art. 9 right.  All other property 
owners must interpret the sweeping strokes and muddied reasoning 
of the court's decision to parse whether they are obligated to 
respect an individual's exercise of the art. 9 right in any 
 
 
19 
common or outdoor areas, even when that exercise interferes with 
their own constitutional rights or with the livelihood of their 
commercial enterprise, and even when, under an appropriate 
analysis, their rights as property owners would rightfully trump 
those of their visitors.  To preserve their independence from 
perceived indorsement and to ensure a safe and easy shopping 
experience for other customers, property owners will need to 
craft careful time, place, and manner restrictions that minimize 
interference.  See Batchelder I, 388 Mass. at 92-93.   
 
In addition, in determining whether they must permit 
solicitation activity and the extent to which they may restrict 
such activity, property owners will be inclined to err on the 
side of caution where the court creates today the likelihood 
that, if the business makes the incorrect calculation, it will 
owe compensatory money damages under the Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act (act) to the aggrieved individual.  See G. L. c. 12, 
§ 11I.  It is worth repeating that we have consistently avoided 
reading the act as creating a "vast constitutional tort" by 
recognizing actionable conduct in only very limited 
circumstances.  Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 718 
(1989), quoting Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 182 (1985).  See 
Freeman v. Planning Bd. of W. Boylston, 419 Mass. 548, 564, 565-
566, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 931 (1995).  But the court's 
 
 
20 
decision opens the door for a host of claims under the act where 
they are unwarranted. 
 
In vastly expanding the realm of private properties on 
which the art. 9 right may be exercised, and in interpreting the 
requirements for a successful claim under the Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act in this way, the court creates a burdensome and 
unnavigable standard for property owners.  This holding goes too 
far in eroding the rights of property owners to use their 
property for commercial endeavors without undue interference.  
Because I believe that the exercise of the art. 9 right on 
private property should be limited to properties that serve as 
the functional equivalent of a traditional downtown area, and 
that the Roche Bros. supermarket at issue here does not so 
serve, I would affirm the grant of Roche Bros.' motion to 
dismiss on all grounds.