Title: People v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91392
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2003

Docket No. 91392-Agenda 5-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ANDRE TIMOTHY HARRIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In October 1999, a jury convicted defendant of four counts of
attempt (first degree murder), two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, and obstruction of justice. The circuit court of Piatt
County sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 45 years for
the counts of attempt and aggravated assault, and six years for
obstruction of justice. The appellate court vacated the sentences
for attempted murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault and
remanded with directions to the trial court to impose consecutive
sentences pursuant to section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)). No.
4-99-1040 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We
allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant lived with his girlfriend, Brandie Ann King, her
son, and her mother at her mother's house. King testified that on
February 15, 1999, she and defendant argued about defendant's
leaving the bathroom dirty after taking a bath. The next morning,
defendant pushed King onto her bed and straddled her, restraining
her ability to move. He then ripped her shirt open and slapped her
face. Defendant ordered her to remove her clothes. While
brandishing a utility knife, defendant sexually assaulted her.
Following forced intercourse, defendant continued to physically
and verbally assault her. Defendant placed the blade of a utility
knife against her throat, stabbed her in the chest with a utility
knife, stabbed her in the abdomen with a steak knife, choked her
repeatedly, beat her with an aluminum baseball bat, placed a
pillow over her face, placed a shirt over her face and attempted to
slit her throat, and used a syringe to inject household cleaning
products into her leg and neck.
	Defendant was found guilty of four counts of attempt (first
degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 1998)), two
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/12-14(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)), and one count of obstructing
justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 1998)). Attempt (first degree
murder) and aggravated criminal sexual assault are Class X
felonies. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c), 12-14(d)(1) (West 1998). The trial
court found that defendant had inflicted serious harm on King and
sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 45 years on each
attempt and aggravated criminal sexual assault count, and a
concurrent 6-year term of imprisonment for obstruction of justice.
	The appellate court reversed the trial court's sentencing order
because defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder
and aggravated criminal sexual assault trigger the consecutive
sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)). The appellate court remanded with
instructions to impose consecutive sentences pursuant to section
5-8-4(a). Because the appellate court found the concurrent
sentences imposed by the trial court in violation of section
5-8-4(a) of the Code, the court did not reach defendant's due
process arguments under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Defendant now appeals
to this court, arguing the appellate court erred in vacating the
concurrent sentences and ordering the imposition of consecutive
sentencing. The appellate court's modification of defendant's
sentence for obstruction of justice to a nonextended term is not at
issue in this appeal.
ANALYSIS
	We are asked to determine whether the appellate court erred
by vacating the concurrent sentences imposed by the trial court
and in ordering that defendant receive consecutive sentences
pursuant to section 5-8-4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)
(West 1998)).
	Section 5-8-4(a) of the Code provides in pertinent part:
		"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for
offenses which were committed as part of a single course
of conduct during which there was no substantial change
in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the
offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class
X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe
bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a
violation of Section *** 12-14 *** of the Criminal Code
of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to
run consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998).
	Section 5-8-4(a) of the Code provides two distinct exceptions
to the general prohibition against consecutive sentences for
offenses arising out of a single course of conduct. People v.
Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 99 (1999). Section 5-8-4(a) establishes
that consecutive sentences are mandatory when the offenses were
committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there
was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective,
and either (1) one of the offenses was a Class X or Class 1 felony
and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or (2) one of the
offenses was a violation of section 12-13 (720 ILCS 5/12-13
(West 1998)), 12-14 (720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West 1998)), or 12-14.1
(720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)) of the Code. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998); see also People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107,
112 (1995). Once the initial determination of course of conduct is
completed, the trial court's exercise of discretion is completed
under subsection (a) (People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 401 (2001)) and consecutive sentencing is mandatory if the
offenses are among the listed triggering offenses. 
	Likewise, section 5-8-4(b) of the Code establishes specific
requirements with respect to the mandatory consecutive
sentencing, and the trial court is responsible under the statute for
enforcement of these sentencing requirements and imposing the
appropriate sentence. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d  at 400-01. Section
5-8-4(b) of the Code provides in pertinent part:
			"The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence
except as provided for in subsection (a) unless ***
multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a
defendant for offenses that were not committed as part of
a single course of conduct during which there was no
substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective,
and one of the offenses for which the defendant was
convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the
defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or when the
defendant was convicted of a violation of Section ***
12-14 *** of the Criminal Code of 1961 ***." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998).
	The trial court is not required to find that the offenses were
part of a single course of conduct for section 5-8-4(b) to apply.
Subsection (b) provides that consecutive sentences must be
imposed when the offense arose from separate courses of conduct
and either (1) one of the offenses was a Class X or Class 1 felony
and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or (2) one of the
offenses was a violation of section 12-13 (720 ILCS 5/12-13
(West 1998)), 12-14 (720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West 1998)), or 12-14.1
(720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)) of the Code.
	While the determination of whether a defendant's actions
constituted a single course of conduct is ordinarily a question of
fact (see People v. Daniel, 311 Ill. App. 3d 276, 287 (2000)), we
must first determine whether the trial court correctly applied
section 5-8-4 of the Code to the facts of this case. It is well
established that a sentencing judge "cannot impose a penalty not
otherwise allowed by the sentencing statute in question." People
v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 506 n.1 (1999); People ex rel. Daley
v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1988). Because the construction
of a statute is a question of law, the standard of review is de novo.
People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996).
	The appellate court found the imposition of concurrent
sentences violates section 5-8-4(a). Implicit in the appellate
court's decision is a factual finding that defendant's actions arose
from a single course of conduct. The appellate court does not
discuss the record as it relates to course of conduct or make an
express finding regarding the course of conduct question, other
than to state that section 5-8-4(a) mandates consecutive
sentences.
	It is not necessary that we determine whether or not the trial
court made a finding with respect to course of conduct or whether
that finding was appropriate. Consecutive sentencing is mandatory
in this case under section 5-8-4 of the Code whether the actions
arose from separate courses of conduct or a single course of
conduct. Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree
murder, a Class X felony, and aggravated criminal sexual assault
in violation of section 12-14(a)(1) of the Code. Defendant's
convictions are among the triggering offenses listed in both
subsections (a) and (b) of section 5-8-4.
	We encountered a somewhat similar situation in McKoski. In
that case, the record revealed that the trial court erred in imposing
concurrent sentences under section 5-8-4. The defendant was
convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of
a child. 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998). The trial court found
the actions of defendant to be separate courses of conduct, because
they involved three separate victims and three separate days over
a nine-month span. The trial court sentenced the defendant to
concurrent terms under section 5-8-4(a). The State brought an
original action in mandamus to require the trial court to impose
consecutive sentences. We found that consecutive sentences were
required because two factors necessitated the application of
section 5-8-4(b) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998)). First,
multiple sentences were imposed for offenses that were not part of
a single course of conduct. Second, defendant was found guilty of
three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under
section 12-14.1 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)),
one of the enumerated offenses that trigger consecutive sentencing
under section 5-8-4(b). McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d  at 400.
	 In Arna, defendant was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment
for attempted murder. He was also found eligible for an extended
term of 30 to 60 years' imprisonment for the attempted murder of
the victim's daughter and was sentenced to 45 years'
imprisonment on that count. The sentencing judge specifically
stated that the sentences were to run concurrently. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 
at 111. On appeal, the defendant challenged his convictions, but
neither the defendant nor the State objected to the imposition of
concurrent sentences. The appellate court rejected defendant's
claims and affirmed his convictions. In addition, the appellate
court held that consecutive sentences were mandatory under
section 5-8-4(a) and ordered that the concurrent sentences be
vacated and the cause remanded to the trial court for the
imposition of consecutive sentencing. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 111-12.
We agreed that the order imposing concurrent sentences violated
the statute's mandate and affirmed the appellate court. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 115.
	The defendant argued that once the trial court decided that
consecutive terms were not mandatory, the appellate court had no
authority to review this determination. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 112.
The defendant relied on two supreme court rules: Rule 615(b)
(setting forth the powers of a reviewing court), which does not
grant expressly to the appellate court the authority to increase a
sentence on review, and Rule 604(a) (setting forth conditions
under which the State may appeal), which does not grant expressly
to the State the right to appeal sentencing issues. 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
604(a), 615(b). The State argued that each of the requirements for
mandatory consecutive sentencing had been met and that the
appellate court had acted pursuant to its inherent authority to
correct the order of the trial court. We agreed with the State that
the order imposing concurrent terms was invalid because the
sentence did not conform to the statutory requirement. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 113. The appellate court had the authority to correct the
sentence at any time. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 113, citing People v.
Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1 (1987). The actions of the appellate court were
not barred by our rules limiting the State's right to appeal and
prohibiting the appellate court from increasing a defendant's
sentence on review. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 113. See also People v.
Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346 (1982); People v. Scott, 69 Ill. 2d 85 (1977).
	As was the case in Arna, the sentence imposed by the trial
court in this case fails to follow the mandate of section 5-8-4. The
facts of this case clearly fall into the narrow category of cases
where a reviewing court on direct appeal has the inherent authority
to correct a trial court order that is in error because of its failure to
conform to a statutory requirement. The appellate court acted
within its authority in vacating the order of concurrent sentences
and remanding for the imposition of consecutive sentences
pursuant to section 5-8-4 of the Code.
	Having determined that defendant should have received
consecutive sentences regardless of whether his actions arose from
a single course of conduct or separate courses of conduct, we must
determine whether the appellate court erred in reaching sua sponte
the question of consecutive or concurrent sentencing.
	Defendant argues that the appellate court was barred from
reexamining the issue and enforcing the consecutive sentencing
provisions because no one objected at trial to the court's supposed
finding that the actions were not part of a single course of conduct.
In support of this position, defendant relies on People v. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d 343 (2001). In Bell, the defendant was convicted of armed
robbery, robbery, and aggravated battery. Pursuant to section
5-8-2(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998)), the
defendant was sentenced to an extended-term sentence for the
lesser-class offense of aggravated battery. The trial court
specifically found that defendant's offenses were part of a single
course of conduct and sentenced him to concurrent sentences
under section 5-8-4(a). Although neither the defendant nor the
State contested the trial court's finding that the actions were part
of a single course of conduct under section 5-8-4(a), defendant
appealed the imposition of an extended-term sentence. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d  at 346-49.
	The question in Bell was what test should apply when
determining whether offenses were part of an "unrelated course of
conduct" as it relates to the imposition of extended-term
sentencing under section 5-8-2(a). Bell, 196 Ill. 2d  at 350. The
appellate court applied the "multiple acts test" to find the
defendant's actions were part of an unrelated course of conduct.
Bell, 196 Ill. 2d  at 348-49. Defendant suggests that we found the
appellate court's holding in Bell to be "absurd" and instead chose
to uphold the trial court's decision that the acts arose from the
same course of conduct, because no one objected to the single
course of conduct ruling at trial. Defendant misconstrues the
holding of Bell. In rejecting the "multiple acts test" for imposition
of sentences under section 5-8-2(a) in favor of adopting the
section 5-8-4(a) test, we found "absurd" the specific result under
the test applied by the appellate court. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d  at 352-53.
We did not find absurd the appellate court's reexamination of
sentencing or the fact that sentencing was appealed at all.
	Defendant asserts that he is entitled to relief in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey
because he was not informed of the potential for mandatory
consecutive sentencing. We have previously held that Apprendi
concerns are not implicated by consecutive sentencing. People v.
Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 286 (2001). Apprendi applies only
where a legislature removes from a jury the assessment of facts
that increase the " 'prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2363, quoting Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 332, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1228-29 (Stevens, J., concurring). It is a settled rule in this
state that sentences which run consecutively to each other are not
transmuted thereby into a single sentence (Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d at
286) and that consecutive sentences, taken together, do not
constitute a "range of penalties" to which Apprendi applies
(People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 534-35 (2001)). Therefore, we
need not reach defendant's due process arguments under Apprendi.

CONCLUSION
	In summary, we hold that the trial court's imposition of
concurrent sentences violates section 5-8-4 of the Code (730
ILCS 5/5-8-4 (West 1998)). We affirm the decision of the
appellate court vacating the sentence and remanding for the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.