Title: Commonwealth v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12502
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12502 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHELLE CARTER. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 4, 2018. - February 6, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Youthful Offender Act.  Due Process of Law, Vagueness 
of statute.  Constitutional Law, Vagueness of statute.  
Wanton or Reckless Conduct.  Evidence, Verbal conduct, 
Expert opinion.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 6, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Lawrence Moniz, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Daniel N. Marx (William W. Fick, Nancy Gertner, Joseph P. 
Cataldo, & Cornelius J. Madera, III, also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney (Maryclare 
Flynn, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Eva G. Jellison, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
Brian Hauss, of New York, Matthew R. Segal, & Ruth A. 
Bourquin, for American Civil Liberties Union & another, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  At age seventeen, Michelle Carter was charged 
with involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender for the 
suicide death of Conrad Roy, age eighteen.  In Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 474 Mass. 624 (2016) (Carter I), we affirmed the 
Juvenile Court judge's denial of the motion to dismiss the 
youthful offender indictment, "conclud[ing] that there was 
probable cause to show that the coercive quality of the 
defendant's verbal conduct overwhelmed whatever willpower the 
eighteen year old victim had to cope with his depression, and 
that but for the defendant's admonishments, pressure, and 
instructions, the victim would not have gotten back into [his] 
truck and poisoned himself to death."  Id. at 635-636.  
Thereafter, the defendant waived her right to a jury trial, and 
the case was tried to a judge in the Juvenile Court over several 
days.  The defendant was convicted as charged and has appealed.  
We now consider whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to 
support the judge's finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed involuntary manslaughter as a 
youthful offender, and whether the other legal issues raised or 
revisited by the defense, including that the defendant's verbal 
conduct was protected by the First Amendment to the United 
3 
 
States Constitution, require reversal of the conviction.  We 
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the judge's 
finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender, and 
that the other legal issues presented by the defendant, 
including her First Amendment claim, lack merit.  We therefore 
affirm.1 
 
Facts.  In Carter I, 474 Mass. at 625-630 & nn.3-8, we 
discussed at length the facts before the grand jury, including 
the numerous text messages exchanged between the defendant and 
the victim in the days leading up the victim's death on July 12, 
2014.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the 
evidence supporting the defendant's conviction was not 
substantially different at trial and revealed the following 
facts. 
 
On July 13, 2014, the victim's body was found in his truck, 
which was parked in a store parking lot in Fairhaven.  He had 
committed suicide by inhaling carbon monoxide that was produced 
by a gasoline powered water pump located in the truck. 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Youth 
Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
and by the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
4 
 
 
The defendant, who lived in Plainville, and the victim, who 
divided his time between his mother's home in Fairhaven and his 
father's home in Mattapoisett, first met in 2012, when they were 
both visiting relatives in Florida.  Thereafter, they rarely saw 
each other in person, but they maintained a long-distance 
relationship by electronic text messaging2 and cellular telephone 
(cell phone) conversations.  A frequent subject of their 
communications was the victim's fragile mental health, including 
his suicidal thoughts.  Between October 2012 and July 2014, the 
victim attempted suicide several times by various means, 
including overdosing on over-the-counter medication, drowning, 
water poisoning, and suffocation.   None of these attempts 
succeeded, as the victim abandoned each attempt or sought 
rescue. 
 
At first, the defendant urged the victim to seek 
professional help for his mental illness.  Indeed, in early June 
2014, the defendant, who was planning to go to McLean Hospital 
for treatment of an eating disorder, asked the victim to join 
her, saying that the professionals there could help him with his 
depression and that they could mutually support each other.  The 
victim rebuffed these efforts, and the tenor of their 
                     
 
2 Voluminous text messages between the defendant and victim 
-- apparently their entire text history -- were admitted in 
evidence. 
5 
 
communications changed.  As the victim continued researching 
suicide methods and sharing his findings with the defendant, the 
defendant helped plan how, where, and when he would do so,3 and 
downplayed his fears about how his suicide would affect his 
family.4  She also repeatedly chastised him for his indecision 
                     
 
3 For example, on July 7, 2014, between 10:57 P.M. and 
11:08 P.M., they exchanged the following text messages: 
 
 
Defendant:  "Well there's more ways to make CO.  Google 
ways to make it. . . ." 
 
 
Victim:  "Omg" 
 
 
Defendant:  "What" 
 
 
Victim:  "portable generator that's it" 
 
 
Defendant:  "That makes CO?" 
 
 
Victim:  "yeah!  It's an internal combustion engine." 
 
 
Defendant:  "Do you have one of those?" 
 
 
Victim:  "There's one at work." 
 
 
Similarly, on July 11, 2014, at 5:13 P.M., the defendant 
sent the victim the following text message:  ". . . Well in my 
opinion, I think u should do the generator because I don't know 
much about the pump and with a generator u can't fail" 
 
See Commonwealth v. Carter, 474 Mass. 624, 626 n.4 (2016) 
(Carter I). 
 
 
4 During the evening of July 11 and morning of July 12, 
2014, the victim and the defendant exchanged the following text 
messages: 
 
 
Victim:  "I have a bad feeling tht this is going to create 
a lot of depression between my parents/sisters" 
 
 
. . . 
6 
 
                     
 
 
Defendant:  "I think your parents know you're in a really 
bad place.  Im not saying they want you to do it, but I honestly 
feel like they can except it.  They know there's nothing they 
can do, they've tried helping, everyone's tried.  But there's a 
point that comes where there isn't anything anyone can do to 
save you, not even yourself, and you've hit that point and I 
think your parents know you've hit that point.  You said you're 
mom saw a suicide thing on your computer and she didn't say 
anything.  I think she knows it's on your mind, and she's 
prepared for it" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Everyone will be sad for a while, but they 
will get over it and move on.  They won't be in depression I 
won't let that happen.  They know how sad you are and they know 
that you're doing this to be happy, and I think they will 
understand and accept it.  They'll always carry u in their 
hearts" 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Victim:  "i don't want anyone hurt in the process though" 
 
 
Victim:  "I meant when they open the door, all the carbon 
monoxide is gonna come out they can't see it or smell it. 
whoever opens the door" 
 
 
Defendant:  "They will see the generator and know that you 
died of CO. . . ." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Victim:  "Idk I'm freaking out again" 
 
 
 . . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "I thought you wanted to do this.  The time is 
right and you're ready, you just need to do it!  You can't keep 
living this way.  You just need to do it like you did last time 
and not think about it and just do it babe.  You can't keep 
doing this every day" 
 
 
Victim:  "I do want to. but like I'm freaking for my 
family.  I guess" 
 
 
Victim:  "idkkk" 
7 
 
and delay, texting, for example, that he "better not be bull 
shiting me and saying you're gonna do this and then purposely 
get caught" and made him "promise" to kill himself.5  The trial 
                     
 
 
Defendant:  "Conrad.  I told you I'll take care of them.  
Everyone will take care of them to make sure they won't be alone 
and people will help them get thru it.  We talked about this, 
they will be okay and accept it.  People who commit suicide 
don't think this much and they just do it" 
 
See Carter I, 474 Mass. at 627 n.5. 
 
 
5 On July 12, 2014, between 4:25 A.M. and 4:34 A.M., they 
exchanged the following text messages: 
 
 
Defendant:  "So I guess you aren't gonna do it then, all 
that for nothing" 
 
 
Defendant:  "I'm just confused like you were so ready and 
determined" 
 
 
Victim:  "I am gonna eventually" 
 
 
Victim:  "I really don't know what I'm waiting for . . but 
I have everything lined up" 
 
 
Defendant:  "No, you're not, Conrad.  Last night was it.  
You keep pushing it off and you say you'll do it but u never do.  
Its always gonna be that way if u don't take action" 
 
 
Defendant:  "You're just making it harder on yourself by 
pushing it off, you just have to do it" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Do u wanna do it now?" 
 
 
Victim:  "Is it too late?" 
 
 
Victim:  "Idkk it's already light outside" 
 
 
Victim:  "I'm gonna go back to sleep, love you I'll text 
you tomorrow" 
 
8 
 
                     
 
Defendant:  "No?  Its probably the best time now because 
everyone's sleeping.  Just go somewhere in your truck.  And no 
one's really out right now because it's an awkward time" 
 
 
Defendant:  "If u don't do it now you're never gonna do it" 
 
 
Defendant:  "And u can say you'll do it tomorrow but you 
probably won't" 
 
See Carter I, 474 Mass. at 626 n.4. 
 
 
At various times between July 4 and July 12, 2014, the 
defendant and the victim exchanged several similar text 
messages: 
 
 
Defendant:  "You're gonna have to prove me wrong because I 
just don't think you really want this.  You just keeps pushing 
it off to another night and say you'll do it but you never do" 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "SEE THAT'S WHAT I MEAN. YOU KEEP PUSHING IT 
OFF!  You just said you were gonna do it tonight and now you're 
saying eventually. . . ." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "But I bet you're gonna be like 'oh, it didn't 
work because I didn't tape the tube right or something like 
that' . . . I bet you're gonna say an excuse like that" 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "Do you have the generator?" 
 
 
Victim:  "not yet lol" 
 
 
Defendant:  "WELL WHEN ARE YOU GETTING IT" 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "You better not be bull shiting me and saying 
you're gonna do this and then purposely get caught" 
 
 
. . . 
 
9 
 
judge found that the defendant's actions from June 30 to July 12 
constituted wanton or reckless conduct in serious disregard of 
the victim's well-being, but that this behavior did not cause 
his death.  This and other evidence, however, informed and 
instructed the judge about the nature of their relationship and 
the defendant's understanding of "the feelings that he has 
exchanged with her -- his ambiguities, his fears, his concerns," 
on the next night. 
 
In the days leading to July 12, 2014, the victim continued 
planning his suicide, including by securing a water pump that he 
would use to generate carbon monoxide in his closed truck.6  On 
                     
 
Defendant:  "You just need to do it Conrad or I'm gonna get 
you help" 
 
 
Defendant:  "You can't keep doing this everyday" 
 
 
Victim:  "Okay I'm gonna do it today" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Do you promise" 
 
 
Victim:  "I promise babe" 
 
 
Victim:  "I have to now" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Like right now?" 
 
 
Victim:  "where do I go? :(" 
 
 
Defendant:  "And u can't break a promise.  And just go in a 
quiet parking lot or something" (emphasis added). 
 
See Carter I, 474 Mass. at 628 n.6. 
 
 
6 During that same time period, the defendant carried out 
what the prosecutor called a "dry run."  On July 10 -- two days 
10 
 
July 12, the victim drove his truck to a local store's parking 
lot and started the pump.  While the pump was operating, filling 
the truck with carbon monoxide, the defendant and victim were in 
contact by cell phone.  Cell phone records showed that one call 
of over forty minutes had been placed by the victim to the 
defendant, and a second call of similar length by the defendant 
to the victim, during the time when police believe the victim 
was in his truck committing suicide.  There is no 
contemporaneous record of what the defendant and victim said to 
each other during those calls. 
The defendant, however, sent a text to a friend at 8:02 
P.M., shortly after the second call:  "he just called me and 
there was a loud noise like a motor and I heard moaning like 
                     
before the victim's suicide -- the defendant sent text messages 
to two friends, stating that the victim was missing, that she 
had not heard from him, and that his family was looking for him.  
She sent similar messages to those friends the following day, 
stating that the victim was still missing and that she was 
losing hope.  In fact, at that time, the defendant was in 
communication with the victim and knew he was not missing.  She 
also asked a friend in a text message, "Is there any way a 
portable generator can kill you somehow?  Because he said he was 
getting that and some other tools at the store, and he said he 
needed to replace the generator at work and fix stuff . . . but 
he didn't go to work today so I don't know why he would have got 
that stuff."  In fact, the defendant and the victim had 
previously discussed the use of a generator to produce carbon 
monoxide.  As the Commonwealth argued at trial, this dry run 
demonstrated the defendant's motive to gain her friends' 
attention and, once she had their attention, not to lose it by 
being exposed as a liar when the victim failed to commit 
suicide.  Arguably, these desires caused her to disregard the 
clear danger to the victim. 
11 
 
someone was in pain, and he wouldn't answer when I said his 
name.  I stayed on the phone for like 20 minutes and that's all 
I heard."  And at 8:25 P.M., she again texted that friend:  "I 
think he just killed himself."  She sent a similar text to 
another friend at 9:24 P.M.:  "He called me, and I heard like 
muffled sounds and some type of motor running, and it was like 
that for 20 minutes, and he wouldn't answer.  I think he killed 
himself."  Weeks later, on September 15, 2014, she texted the 
first friend again, saying in part: 
"I failed [the victim] I wasn't supposed to let that happen 
and now I'm realizing I failed him.  [H]is death is my 
fault like honestly I could have stopped him I was on the 
phone with him and he got out of the car because it was 
working and he got scared and I fucking told him to get 
back in . . . because I knew he would do it all over again 
the next day and I couldn't have him live the way he was 
living anymore I couldn't do it I wouldn't let him." 
 
 
The judge found that the victim got out of the truck, 
seeking fresh air, in a way similar to how he had abandoned his 
prior suicide attempts.  The judge also focused his verdict, as 
we predicted in Carter I, supra at 634, on "those final moments, 
when the victim had gotten out of his truck, expressing doubts 
about killing himself."  The judge found that when the defendant 
realized he had gotten out of the truck, she instructed him to 
get back in, knowing that it had become a toxic environment and 
knowing the victim's fears, doubts, and fragile mental state.  
The victim followed that instruction.  Thereafter, the 
12 
 
defendant, knowing the victim was inside the truck and that the 
water pump was operating -- the judge noted that she could hear 
the sound of the pump and the victim's coughing -- took no steps 
to save him.  She did not call emergency personnel, contact the 
victim's family,7 or instruct him to get out of the truck.  The 
victim remained in the truck and succumbed to the carbon 
monoxide.  The judge concluded that the defendant's actions and 
her failure to act constituted, "each and all," wanton and 
reckless conduct that caused the victim's death. 
 
Discussion.  In Carter I, we considered whether there was 
probable cause for the grand jury to indict the defendant as a 
youthful offender for involuntary manslaughter, whereas here, we 
consider whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support 
her conviction of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt, a much 
higher standard for the Commonwealth to meet.  In Carter I, 
however, we also addressed and resolved several legal principles 
that govern this case.  We rejected the defendant's claim that 
her words to the victim, without any physical act on her part 
and even without her physical presence at the scene, could not 
constitute wanton or reckless conduct sufficient to support a 
                     
 
7 The defendant eventually texted the victim's sister, but 
not until 10:18 P.M., more than two hours after the second 
lengthy phone call with the victim.  In that text, the defendant 
asked, "Do you know where your brother is?", and did not explain 
what she knew about the victim. 
13 
 
charge of manslaughter.  Carter I, 474 Mass. at 632-633.  
Rather, we determined that verbal conduct in appropriate 
circumstances could "overcome a person's willpower to live, and 
therefore . . . be the cause of a suicide."  Id. at 633.  We 
also ruled that "there was ample evidence to establish probable 
cause that the defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless under 
either a subjective or objective standard."  Id. at 635.  See 
id. at 631, quoting Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 483, 496-497 
(2012) (wanton or reckless conduct may be "determined based 
either on the defendant's specific knowledge or on what a 
reasonable person should have known in the circumstances").  As 
we explained, "an ordinary person under the circumstances would 
have realized the gravity of the danger posed by telling the 
victim, who was mentally fragile, predisposed to suicidal 
inclinations, and in the process of killing himself, to get back 
in a truck filling with carbon monoxide."  Carter I, supra at 
635.  We further explained that "the defendant -- the victim's 
girl friend, with whom he was in constant and perpetual contact 
-- on a subjective basis knew that she had some control over his 
actions."  Id.  We also rejected the defendant's claims that the 
involuntary manslaughter statute, G. L. c. 265, § 13, was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to her, Carter I, supra at 
631 n.11; that her reckless or wanton speech having a direct, 
causal link to the specific victim's suicide was protected under 
14 
 
the First Amendment or art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, Carter I, supra at 636 n.17; and that her offense did 
not involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, as 
required by G. L. c. 119, § 54, the youthful offender statute, 
Carter I, supra at 637 n.19.  For the most part, we decline to 
revisit these legal issues today, as we discern no error in our 
earlier analysis.  With these principles in mind, we turn to the 
defendant's arguments on appeal, providing further explication, 
particularly on the First Amendment claim, where we deem 
necessary or appropriate. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
her conviction was unsupported by sufficient evidence.8  In 
particular, she argues that, to the extent her conviction was 
based on the victim's getting out of the truck and her ordering 
him back into it, it was improperly based on her after-the-fact 
statement, in her text message to a friend, that the victim "got 
                     
 
8 The defendant suggests that she was indicted for 
involuntary manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct, 
but wrongly convicted based on a wanton or reckless failure to 
act.  In our view, the indictment charging the defendant with 
manslaughter "by wanton and reckless conduct" subsumed both 
theories.  See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 497 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944) 
("the requirement of 'wanton or reckless conduct' may be 
satisfied by either the commission of an intentional act or an 
intentional 'omission where there is a duty to act'").  
Moreover, it is clear from the judge's findings that the 
conviction was not based solely on a failure to act but also on 
the defendant's affirmative conduct, namely, directing the 
victim to get back in the truck. 
15 
 
out of the [truck] because it was working and he got scared and 
I fucking told him to get back in," a statement she asserts is 
uncorroborated.  It is true that a conviction cannot be based 
solely on the defendant's extrajudicial confession.  
Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984).  The 
defendant's statement, however, was not uncorroborated.  "The 
corroboration rule requires only that there be some evidence, 
besides the confession, that the criminal act was committed by 
someone, that is, that the crime was real and not imaginary."  
Id.  Indeed, "in a homicide case, the corroborating evidence 
need only tend to show that the alleged victim is dead."  Id. 
 
Here, the defendant's statement was more than adequately 
corroborated not only by the victim's death but also by text 
messages exchanged with the victim encouraging him to commit 
suicide, and by the fact that the defendant and the victim were 
in voice contact while the suicide was in progress -- that is, 
despite the physical distance between them, the defendant was 
able to communicate with the victim, hear what was going on in 
the truck, and give him instructions.  The trial judge also 
expressly "looked for independent corroboration of some of the 
statements that [the defendant] made, to make sure that there 
was no undue reliance on any one source of evidence."  The judge 
emphasized that the "photos taken at the scene of the crime, 
where [the victim's] truck was located, clearly illustrate the 
16 
 
location of the water pump immediately adjacent to where he 
would have been sitting in the truck, next to his upper torso 
and his head, thereby giving a good explanation to [the 
defendant's description] that the noise was loud within the 
truck.  [The defendant] at that point, therefore, had reason to 
know that [the victim] had followed her instruction and had 
placed himself in the toxic environment of that truck."  
Clearly, the defendant was not "confessing" to an imaginary 
crime.  In sum, the judge was entitled to credit the defendant's 
statement, and the corroborating details, that the victim had in 
fact gotten out of the truck and that the defendant ordered him 
back into the truck, ultimately causing his death. 
 
The defendant also argues that the judge did not properly 
apply the legal principles set forth in Carter I.  She points 
out that the judge's remarks on the record, explaining the 
guilty verdict, contain no express finding that her words had a 
"coercive quality" that caused the victim to follow through with 
his suicide.  See Carter I, 474 Mass. at 634.  However, those 
remarks were, as the judge stated, not intended as a 
comprehensive statement of all the facts he found or of all his 
legal rulings.  Moreover, "judges in jury-waived trials are 
presumed to know and correctly apply the law."  Commonwealth v. 
Healy, 452 Mass. 510, 514 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Watkins, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 75 (2005). Finally, and perhaps 
17 
 
most importantly, rather than use our formulation, the judge 
expressly tracked the elements of manslaughter.  He found:  "She 
instructs [the victim] to get back into the truck, well knowing 
of all of the feelings that he has exchanged with her -- his 
ambiguities, his fears, his concerns."  This, the judge found, 
constituted "wanton and reckless conduct by [the defendant], 
creating a situation where there is a high degree of likelihood 
that substantial harm would result to [the victim]."9  The judge 
then further found that this conduct caused the victim's death 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  His finding of causation in this 
context, at that precise moment in time, includes the concept of 
coercion, in the sense of overpowering the victim's will. 
This finding is supported by the temporal distinctions 
about causation drawn by the judge.  Until the victim got out of 
the truck, the judge described the victim as the cause of his 
                     
 
9 There is no question in this case that the Commonwealth 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in 
wanton or reckless conduct, that is, "intentional conduct . . . 
involv[ing] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm 
will result to another."  Pugh, 462 Mass. at 496, quoting 
Welansky, 316 Mass. at 399.  Both the objective and subjective 
standards discussed above are satisfied.  Given the victim's 
mental illness, his previous suicide attempts, and his suicide 
plans, there can be no doubt that an ordinary person such as the 
defendant, his girlfriend who constantly communicated with him, 
would understand the grave danger to his life, and yet she 
continued to pressure him to follow through with his plan.  The 
difficult issue before us is not whether the defendant's conduct 
was wanton or reckless, as this is not a close question, but 
whether her conduct was the cause of the victim's death. 
18 
 
own suicidal actions and reactions.  This period of "self-
causation" and "self-help," which is completely consistent with 
his prior behavior, ended when he got out of the truck.  As the 
judge explained: 
"It is apparent to this Court in reviewing the evidence 
that [the victim] was struggling with his issues and seeing 
a way to address them and took significant actions of his 
own toward that end.  His research was extensive.  He spoke 
of it continually.  He secured the generator.  He secured 
the water pump.  He researched how to fix the generator.  
He located his vehicle in an unnoticeable area and 
commenced his attempt by starting the pump. 
"However, he breaks that chain of self-causation by exiting 
the vehicle.  He takes himself out of the toxic environment 
that it has become.  This is completely consistent with his 
earlier attempts at suicide.  In October of 2012, when he 
attempted to drown himself, he literally sought air.  When 
he exited the truck, he literally sought fresh air.  And he 
told a parent of that attempt. 
"Several weeks later, in October of 2012 again, he 
attempts, through the use of pills, to take his life but 
calls a friend and assistance is sought and treatment 
secured.  That [the victim] may have tried and maybe 
succeeded another time, after July 12 or 13 of 2014, is of 
no consequence to this Court's deliberations."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Once the victim left the truck, the judge found that the 
defendant overpowered the victim's will and thus caused his 
death.  As the defendant herself explained, and we repeat due to 
its importance, "[The victim's] death is my fault like honestly 
I could have stopped him I was on the phone with him and he got 
out of the [truck] because it was working and he got scared and 
I fucking told him to get back in . . . because I knew he would 
19 
 
do it all over again the next day and I couldnt have him live 
the way he was living anymore I couldnt do it I wouldnt let 
him." 
 
Although we recognize that legal causation in the context 
of suicide is an incredibly complex inquiry, we conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of proof of 
such causation beyond a reasonable doubt in the instant case.  
The judge could have properly found, based on this evidence, 
that the vulnerable, confused, mentally ill, eighteen year old 
victim had managed to save himself once again in the midst of 
his latest suicide attempt, removing himself from the truck as 
it filled with carbon monoxide.  But then in this weakened state 
he was badgered back into the gas-infused truck by the 
defendant, his girlfriend and closest, if not only, confidant in 
this suicidal planning, the person who had been constantly  
pressuring him to complete their often discussed plan, fulfill 
his promise to her, and finally commit suicide.  And then after 
she convinced him to get back into the carbon monoxide filled 
truck, she did absolutely nothing to help him:  she did not call 
for help or tell him to get out of the truck as she listened to 
him choke and die. 
In sum, the evidence at trial, in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
20 
 
b.  Due process claims.  The defendant argues that she 
lacked fair notice that she could be convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter for her role in the victim's suicide10 and that her 
conviction therefore violated her right to due process.  That 
is, she argues that the law of involuntary manslaughter is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct.  We rejected 
this argument in Carter I, 474 Mass.  at 631 n.11, and we remain 
of the view that the law is not vague.  "A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if [people] of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning. . . .  If a statute has been 
clarified by judicial explanation, however, it will withstand a 
challenge on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness."  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 689 (2000).  
"Manslaughter is a common-law crime that has not been codified 
by statute in Massachusetts."  Carter I, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 106 (2011).  It has 
long been established in our common law that wanton or reckless 
conduct that causes a person's death constitutes involuntary 
manslaughter.  See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 
387, 397 (1967), and cases cited ("Involuntary manslaughter is 
                     
 
10 The defendant characterizes her conduct as merely 
"encouraging" the victim's suicide.  As we have discussed at 
length, however, it is clear from the judge's findings that she 
did not merely encourage the victim, but coerced him to get back 
into the truck, causing his death. 
21 
 
an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused . . . by an act 
which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful 
consequences to another as to constitute wanton or reckless 
conduct").  There is no doubt in this case that the defendant 
wantonly or recklessly instructed the victim to kill himself, 
and that her instructions caused his death. 
Moreover, in the development of our common law, "conduct 
similar to that of the defendant has been deemed unlawful."  
Carter I, 474 Mass. at 631 n.11, citing Persampieri v. 
Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 22-23 (1961).  In Persampieri, 
supra, the defendant was charged with murder, and pleaded guilty 
to manslaughter, after his wife threatened to commit suicide and 
he taunted her, saying she was "chicken -- and wouldn't do it," 
loaded a rifle and handed it to her, and, when she had 
difficulty firing the rifle, told her to take off her shoes and 
reach the trigger that way.  She did so and killed herself.  Id. 
at 23.  We held that these facts would "have warranted a jury in 
returning a verdict of manslaughter."  Id.  Nor is Persampieri 
the only case in which we upheld a defendant's conviction based 
on his participation in a suicide.  See Commonwealth v. Atencio, 
345 Mass. 627, 627-628 (1963) (affirming conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter arising from game of "Russian 
roulette").  Indeed, the principle that a defendant might be 
charged and convicted of a homicide offense merely for 
22 
 
"repeatedly and frequently advis[ing] and urg[ing] [a victim] to 
destroy himself," with no physical assistance, can be found in 
centuries-old Massachusetts common law.  Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
13 Mass. 356, 356 (1816).  In the Bowen case, the defendant was 
in the adjoining jail cell of the victim, whom the defendant 
harangued into hanging himself.11  Id.  It is true, as the 
defendant points out, that the defendant in Bowen, who was 
charged with murder for such alleged conduct, was in fact 
acquitted by the jury.  Id. at 360-361.  But the legal principle 
that procuring a suicide "by advice or otherwise" may constitute 
a homicide is clear from the instructions reported in Bowen.  
Id. at 359.  In sum, our common law provides sufficient notice 
that a person might be charged with involuntary manslaughter for 
reckless or wanton conduct, including verbal conduct, causing a 
victim to commit suicide.  The law is not unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to the defendant's conduct.12 
                     
 
11 The victim committed suicide by hanging hours before he 
was to be hanged publicly for his own killing of his father.  
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 356 (1816). 
 
 
12 The defendant points out that, unlike Massachusetts, 
several other States, rather than relying on the common law, 
have enacted statutes prohibiting aiding or assisting suicide 
and specifying what conduct runs afoul of such statutes.  
However, the fact that some State Legislatures have chosen to 
address this problem by statute in no way prevents us from 
concluding that Massachusetts common law provided the defendant 
with fair notice that her conduct was prohibited. 
 
23 
 
 
c.  Free speech claims.  The defendant argues that her 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter violated her right to 
free speech under the First Amendment and art. 16.13  We disagree 
and thus reaffirm our conclusion in Carter I that no 
constitutional violation results from convicting a defendant of 
involuntary manslaughter for reckless and wanton, pressuring 
text messages and phone calls, preying upon well-known 
weaknesses, fears, anxieties and promises, that finally overcame 
the willpower to live of a mentally ill, vulnerable, young 
person, thereby coercing him to commit suicide.  Carter I, 474 
Mass. at 636 n.17.  We more fully explain our reasoning here. 
 
The crime of involuntary manslaughter proscribes reckless 
or wanton conduct causing the death of another.  The statute 
makes no reference to restricting or regulating speech, let 
alone speech of a particular content or viewpoint:  the crime is 
"directed at a course of conduct, rather than speech, and the 
conduct it proscribes is not necessarily associated with speech" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 
Mass 300, 308 (2014).  The defendant cannot escape liability 
just because she happened to use "words to carry out [her] 
illegal [act]."  Id. at 309, quoting United States v. Barnett, 
                     
 
13 As in Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 690 n.26 
(2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 277 (2018), we apply the same analysis 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
24 
 
667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982).  See Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (upholding 
conviction for speech used as "essential and inseparable part" 
of crime). 
Although numerous crimes can be committed verbally, they 
are "intuitively and correctly" understood not to raise First 
Amendment concerns.  Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265, 279 
(1981).  See K. Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of 
Language 6-7 (1989) (listing twenty-one examples of crimes 
committed using speech).  The same is true under art. 16.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 222, 224-226 (2008) 
(defendant could not assert art. 16 defense to conviction of 
child enticement even though crime could be committed by "words 
[spoken or written] and nothing more"); Commonwealth v. Sholley, 
432 Mass. 721, 727 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001) 
("no violation" of art. 16 where defendant was convicted of 
making threat under G. L. c. 275, § 2).  "It has never been 
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech . . . to make a course 
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, 
either spoken, written, or printed" (citation omitted).  
25 
 
Johnson, 470 Mass. at 309.14  Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that "speech or writing used as an integral part 
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute" is not 
protected by the First Amendment.  Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.  
Accord United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-469 (2010).  
See Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 236 (2001) ("true 
threats" lack First Amendment protection because "purpose is to 
cause injury rather than to add to, or to comment on, the public 
discourse"). 
 
The defendant contends nonetheless that prosecuting and 
convicting her of involuntary manslaughter for encouraging 
suicide effected a content-based restriction on speech that does 
not withstand strict scrutiny.  In particular, she acknowledges 
the Commonwealth's compelling interest in preserving human life 
but argues that we failed to determine in Carter I, 474 Mass. at 
636 n.17, that the restriction on speech was narrowly tailored 
to further that interest.  We disagree.  The only speech made 
punishable in Carter I was "speech integral to [a course of] 
                     
 
14 Crimes committed using text messages or other electronic 
communications are treated no differently.  See Walters, 472 
Mass. at 696 (threat conveyed by "telecommunication device or 
electronic communication device" would not receive First 
Amendment or art. 16 protection [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 312 (2014) (there is no 
First Amendment protection for electronic communications and 
Internet postings used to commit harassment). 
26 
 
criminal conduct," Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468, citing Giboney, 336 
U.S. at 498, that is, a "systematic campaign of coercion on 
which the virtually present defendant embarked -- captured and 
preserved through her text messages -- that targeted the 
equivocating young victim's insecurities and acted to subvert 
his willpower in favor of her own," Carter I, supra at 636.  
Other involuntary manslaughter prosecutions and convictions have 
similarly targeted a course of criminal conduct undertaken 
through manipulative wanton or reckless speech directed at 
overpowering the will to live of vulnerable victims.  See 
Persampieri, 343 Mass. at 22-23; Bowen, 13 Mass. at 359-360. 
As the Supreme Court has explained, "From 1791 to the 
present . . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions 
upon the content of speech in a few limited areas . . . which 
have never been thought to raise any constitutional problems," 
including "speech integral to criminal conduct" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468-469.  We do not 
apply the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny in these 
contexts but rather determine whether the speech at issue falls 
within these "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech" (quotation and citation omitted).  Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 (2011).  Thus, 
there is nothing in the prosecution or conviction of the 
defendant in the instant case, or the prior involuntary 
27 
 
manslaughter cases in the Commonwealth involving verbal criminal 
conduct, to suggest that the First Amendment has been violated 
in any way.  The only verbal conduct punished as involuntary 
manslaughter has been the wanton or reckless pressuring of a 
vulnerable person to commit suicide, overpowering that person's 
will to live and resulting in that person's death.  We are 
therefore not punishing words alone, as the defendant claims, 
but reckless or wanton words causing death.  The speech at issue 
is thus integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus does 
not raise any constitutional problem. 
Regardless, even if we were to apply strict scrutiny to the 
verbal conduct at issue because it might implicate other 
constitutionally protected speech regarding suicide or the end 
of life, we would conclude that the restriction on speech here 
has been narrowly circumscribed to serve a compelling purpose.  
As we explained in Carter I, 474 Mass. at 636, and reemphasize 
today, this case does not involve the prosecution of end-of-life 
discussions between a doctor, family member, or friend and a 
mature, terminally ill adult confronting the difficult personal 
choices that must be made when faced with the certain physical 
and mental suffering brought upon by impending death.15  Nor does 
                     
 
15 In Carter I, 474 Mass. at 636, we stated: "It is 
important to articulate what this case is not about.  It is not 
about a person seeking to ameliorate the anguish of someone 
coping with a terminal illness and questioning the value of 
28 
 
it involve prosecutions of general discussions about euthanasia 
or suicide targeting the ideas themselves.  See Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable").  Nothing in Carter I, our decision today, or our 
earlier involuntary manslaughter cases involving verbal conduct 
suggests that involuntary manslaughter prosecutions could be 
brought in these very different contexts without raising 
important First Amendment concerns.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bigelow, 475 Mass. 554, 562 (2016) ("In considering the First 
Amendment's protective reach, critical to the examination is the 
context and content of the speech at issue" [quotation 
omitted]).  We emphasize again, however, that the verbal conduct 
targeted here and in our past involuntary manslaughter cases is 
different in kind and not degree, and raises no such concerns.  
Only the wanton or reckless pressuring of a person to commit 
                     
life.  Nor is it about a person offering support, comfort, and 
even assistance to a mature adult who, confronted with such 
circumstances, has decided to end his or her life.  These 
situations are easily distinguishable from the present case, in 
which the grand jury heard evidence suggesting a systematic 
campaign of coercion on which the virtually present defendant 
embarked -- captured and preserved through her text messages -- 
that targeted the equivocating young victim's insecurities and 
acted to subvert his willpower in favor of her own." 
29 
 
suicide that overpowers that person's will to live has been 
proscribed.  This restriction is necessary to further the 
Commonwealth's compelling interest in preserving life.  Thus, 
such a prohibition would survive even strict scrutiny. 
 
d.  "Infliction" of serious bodily harm.  The defendant 
argues that her conviction as a youthful offender cannot survive 
under G. L. c. 119, § 54, because she did not inflict serious 
bodily harm on the victim.  She argues that the term 
"infliction" in § 54 requires direct, physical causation of 
harm, not mere proximate causation, and that from her remote 
location, she could not have inflicted serious bodily harm on 
the victim within the meaning of the statute.  We reject this 
unduly narrow interpretation of the statutory language.  The 
youthful offender statute authorizes an indictment against a 
juvenile who is "alleged to have committed an offense  . . . 
involv[ing] the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 119, § 54.  By its terms, the 
statute requires that the offense involve the infliction of 
serious bodily harm, not that the defendant herself be the one 
who directly inflicted it.  If we were to interpret the statute 
to include such a requirement, it is difficult to see how a 
juvenile could be indicted as a youthful offender for, say, 
hiring a third party to carry out an attack on a victim.  It is 
enough, as we said in Carter I, that "involuntary manslaughter 
30 
 
in these circumstances inherently involves the infliction of 
serious bodily harm."  Carter I, 474 Mass. at 637 n.19. 
 
e.  "Reasonable juvenile."  The defendant next argues, as 
she did in Carter I, that her actions should have been evaluated 
under a "reasonable juvenile" standard rather than a "reasonable 
person" standard.16  As we said before, 
"Whether conduct is wanton or reckless is 'determined based 
either on the defendant's specific knowledge or on what a 
reasonable person should have known in the 
circumstances. . . .  If based on the objective measure of 
recklessness, the defendant's actions constitute wanton or 
reckless conduct . . . if an ordinary normal [person] under 
the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of 
the danger. . . .  If based on the subjective measure, 
i.e., the defendant's own knowledge, grave danger to others 
must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen 
to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct so 
as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm' 
(quotations and citation omitted)." 
 
Carter I, 474 Mass. at 631, quoting Pugh, 462 Mass. at 496-497. 
The defendant argues essentially that, when considering a 
juvenile's actions under the objective measure of recklessness, 
                     
 
16 Unlike in Carter I, 474 Mass. at 636 n.18, the defendant 
raised this claim at trial by moving for a required finding of 
not guilty on this ground (among others).  The judge denied the 
motion without stating his reasons, making it unclear to us 
whether he rejected a "reasonable juvenile" standard as a matter 
of law, determined that the evidence would be sufficient to 
establish the defendant's guilt under a "reasonable juvenile" 
standard, or determined that, regardless of whether an objective 
"reasonable juvenile" standard was proper, the evidence was 
sufficient to establish her guilt under a subjective standard.  
The defendant did not press for a "reasonable juvenile" standard 
in her closing argument.  The Commonwealth does not claim that 
the issue was not preserved. 
31 
 
we should consider whether an ordinary juvenile under the same 
circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.  It 
is clear from the judge's findings, however, that he found the 
defendant's actions wanton or reckless under the subjective 
measure, that is, based on her own knowledge of the danger to 
the victim and on her choice to run the risk that he would 
comply with her instruction to get back into the truck.  That 
finding is amply supported by the trial record.  Because the 
defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless when evaluated under 
the subjective standard, there is no need to decide whether a 
different objective standard should apply to juveniles. 
 
Moreover, it is clear from the judge's sentencing 
memorandum that he did in fact consider the defendant's age and 
maturity when evaluating her actions and that he was familiar 
with the relevant case law and "mindful" of the general 
principles regarding juvenile brain development.  He noted that 
on the day of the victim's death, she was seventeen years and 
eleven months of age and at an age-appropriate level of 
maturity.  Her ongoing contact with the victim in the days 
leading to his suicide, texting with him about suicide methods 
and his plans and demanding that he carry out his plan rather 
than continue to delay, as well as the lengthy cell phone 
conversations on the night itself, showed that her actions were 
not spontaneous or impulsive.  And, as the judge specifically 
32 
 
found, "[h]er age or level of maturity does not explain away her 
knowledge of the effects of her telling [the victim] to enter 
and remain in that toxic environment, leading to his death."  
Where the judge found that the defendant ordered the victim back 
into the truck knowing the danger of doing so, he properly found 
that her actions were wanton or reckless, giving sufficient 
consideration to her age and maturity. 
 
f.  Expert witness.  Finally, the defendant argues that the 
judge wrongly denied her motion in limine to admit expert 
testimony by a forensic psychologist.  The witness would have 
testified as to general principles and characteristics of the 
undeveloped adolescent brain, but not as to the defendant 
specifically, as he had never examined her.  It is true, as the 
defendant argues, that we have upheld the admission of similar 
testimony in the past.  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 
66 (2015).  But the fact that one judge properly exercised his 
discretion to admit expert testimony in one case does not mean 
that another judge abused his discretion by excluding similar 
testimony in a different case.  We have reviewed the voir dire 
testimony of the defendant's expert witness and conclude that 
the judge did not abuse his discretion by determining that the 
proffered testimony would not have aided the finder of fact in 
the circumstances of this case.  Moreover, after the judge ruled 
on the motion in limine, the defendant waived her right to a 
33 
 
jury trial and proceeded before the same judge.  Where an 
experienced judge of the Juvenile Court sat as the finder of 
fact in the defendant's case, we cannot perceive any prejudice 
to the defendant in his decision to preclude this expert 
testimony in the circumstances of this case. 
 
Conclusion.  The evidence against the defendant proved 
that, by her wanton or reckless conduct, she caused the victim's 
death by suicide.  Her conviction of involuntary manslaughter as 
a youthful offender is not legally or constitutionally infirm.  
The judgment is therefore affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.