Title: Matter of Estate of Dedeaux
Citation: 584 So. 2d 419
Docket Number: 90-CA-0216
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 1991

584 So. 2d 419 (1991) In the MATTER OF the ESTATE of H. Howard DEDEAUX, Deceased. Gary DEDEAUX, Mike Dedeaux, Vaughn Dedeaux, Laveda Camp and Ruth Dedeaux Oswalt v. Kay Dedeaux. No. 90-CA-0216. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 31, 1991. Hunter M. Gholson, Aubrey E. Nichols, Gholson Hicks &amp; Nichols; Columbus, for appellant. Thomas B. Storey, Jr., A.M. Edwards, Edwards Storey Marshall &amp; Helveston, West Point, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PITTMAN and McRAE, JJ. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Michael, Gary and Vaughn Dedeaux, the sons of H. Howard Dedeaux, joined by their mother, Mrs. Ruth Dedeaux Oswalt and Laveda Camp, have appealed the decree of the chancery court of Clay County construing a holographic will of Dedeaux's to leave his entire estate to Kay Dedeaux, the stepmother of the sons. We find the chancellor followed well-settled principles in construing the will and affirm. Dedeaux, a chiropractor in West Point and father of three grown sons, Michael, Gary and Vaughn, married Kay Dedeaux on October 23, 1983. Dedeaux and his first wife, the mother of the sons, were divorced. Dedeaux had a combination secretary/receptionist/office manager named Laveda Camp, with whom he had a very *420 good relationship. Dedeaux also enjoyed a good family relationship with his three sons. He had owned an interest in their businesses at one time or another, and they owned some West Point realty as tenants in common. On July 3, 1984, Dedeaux prepared a holographic will. He died on September 21, 1989. Upon the petition of Kay Dedeaux, the will was admitted to probate. She then filed a petition to construe the will, naming as defendants the three sons. They in turn filed an answer and counterclaim (later joined by their mother and Laveda Camp) asking the court to set aside the will because of being "contrary, inconsistent and inexplicable," and if not, to construe its provisions so that the items of personalty and realty therein would go to the sons. A photostated copy of the instrument is attached as an appendix. It reads as follows: Following hearing, the chancellor found the instrument to be the genuine will of Dedeaux's, and that by its terms it left all his property in fee simple to his widow Kay Dedeaux. He further decreed Kay Dedeaux "is now the owner of assets owned by H. Howard Dedeaux, deceased, whether the same be real, personal or mixed." The sons have appealed. Upon appeal there is no claim of error in the chancellor's holding that the instrument admitted to probate was in truth and in fact the will of Dedeaux's. The appellants do claim that the document was so ambiguous that it should be set aside, citing two Kentucky cases, Whitehead v. Donnelly, 368 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963), and Smith v. White, 378 S.W.2d 622 (1964). We find no merit to this assignment. The remaining assignments are all focused on the single contention that the will was erroneously construed. It was not the function of the chancellor nor is it of this Court to determine a just and fair disposition of Dr. Dedeaux's estate, but instead to respect his intent. Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 609, 22 So. 2d 411, 413 (1945), Stovall v. Stovall, 360 So. 2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1978), Matter of Estate of Vick, 557 So. 2d 760, 765 (Miss. 1989). And in determining his intent in this case, we are restricted to the four corners of the will itself. Rice v. McMullen, 207 Miss. 706, 731, 43 So. 2d 195, 202 (1949); Lanham v. Howell, 210 Miss. 383, 386, 49 So. 2d 701, 702, cert. denied, Lanham v. Howell, 342 U.S. 834, 72 S. Ct. 57, 96 L. Ed. 631 (1951). The first paragraph of the document headed "Last Will and Testament of H. Howard Dedeaux" reads as follows: There can be but little doubt that if this is all the instrument stated, his widow Kay would have been deemed the sole legatee and devisee under his will, and would have taken all. When Dr. Dedeaux wrote "all of my earthly possessions" we cannot avoid concluding he meant everything he owned. Others might write it differently yet with no clearer meaning. And just as clear is that by "received" Dr. Dedeaux meant for Kay to get "all my earthly possessions." Kay and no one else was to be the recipient of all his property. Moreover, that Dr. Dedeaux meant "received" to connote more than mere naked possession is shown by his just having used the word "possessions" in the sense of whatever he owned, not simply possessed. In interpreting this ordinary language, there is nothing to suggest but that Dr. Dedeaux meant for all he owned ("possessions") be owned ("received") by his widow. Unless there is some clearly defined exception, the ordinary layman thinks of "possessions" as being what is owned. See, Webster's Third International Dictionary, "Possessions: the aggregate of things owned." Brand v. Faries, 20 Del. Ch. 401, 178 A. 583 (1935). Moreover, from the remainder of the will, it is clear that Dr. Dedeaux equated "possessions" and "receive" with ownership. In giving legal effect to an instrument prepared by a layman, a court should endeavor to ascertain what the words contained in it meant to the author, not simply what they could connote to a lawyer. Unless instructed in legal niceties, by the ordinary words "possessions" and "receive" with no further qualification or restriction, Dr. Dedeaux must surely have meant for Mrs. Kay Dedeaux to receive and own everything he possessed and owned. The remaining part of the will has the following preface: We gather no intent from this preface to diminish the estate and ownership he left Mrs. Dedeaux by the first paragraph. The first two clauses make clear that what is to follow is only to occur in event Kay either precedes him in death or they die at the same time. The clause "or at her death I would like to leave the following possessions as listed," at most is precatory. The appellants' primary argument is that, considering the remaining portions, the will at most gave Mrs. Dedeaux a life estate. In reaching his decision, the chancellor relied upon Cockrell v. Jones, 275 So.2d *422 105 (Miss. 1973), a case in which a daughter appealed a construction of her father's joint will as leaving the stepmother the estate in fee simple. We quote from that decision: The two items of the will in question were: 275 So. 2d at 105-107. The appellants tell us Cockrell is distinguishable because in that case it was clear by Item II, the first paragraph, that the testator intended to devise absolute ownership in fee simple. The will in Cockrell was obviously drafted by an attorney, in this case by a layman. As above noted, we find that Dr. Dedeaux in the first paragraph clearly intended absolute ownership, although in lay language, and it is this Court's obligation to honor his intent. Paine v. Sanders, 242 Miss. 392, 401, 135 So. 2d 188, 192 (1961): *423 Nor do we find Brown v. Franklin, 157 Miss. 38, 127 So. 561 (1930), persuasive. The testator, Franklin, had the following two paragraphs of his will: Brown, 157 Miss. at 42, 127 So. at 561. The distinction between Brown and this case is that in Brown, while this Court recognized that the first paragraph standing alone would have given Miss Brown absolute ownership, we further noted, "the next sentence of the will proceeds to expressly define and limit the estate to be left to her." Brown, 157 Miss. at 46, 127 So. at 563. No such unequivocal limitation appears in Dr. Dedeaux's will. Instead, the paragraph following the devise to Mrs. Dedeaux envisions contingencies under which Mrs. Dedeaux could not take under the will in any event, because she would be dead. That the clause "or at her death I would like to leave the following possessions as listed," is precatory is demonstrated by the fact that the will immediately following addresses property owned by Mrs. Dedeaux: "Kay's house on Eshman be left to her son... ." etc. In Wheeler v. Williams, 235 Miss. 142, 146, 108 So. 2d 578, 579 (1959), the will stated: We held: Wheeler, 235 Miss. at 156, 108 So. 2d at 581. Of course, no one can ever know with absolute certainty what Dr. Dedeaux meant because he cannot now instruct us. The Court can be confident that having carefully studied Dr. Dedeaux's will, we cannot hold the chancellor was manifestly wrong, In re Powell's Will, 239 Miss. 10, 17, 121 So. 2d 1, 3 (1960), and under our appellate scope of review, we must therefore affirm. The decree of the chancery court adjudicating that Mrs. Kay Dedeaux was the sole devisee and legatee under Dr. Dedeaux's will is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and DAN M. LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. PRATHER, J., not participating. *424 *425