Title: Horen v. Horen
Citation: 438 P.2d 857, 73 Wash. 2d 455
Docket Number: 39701
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 1968

73 Wn.2d 455 (1968) 438 P.2d 857 BARBARA M. HOREN, Appellant, v. DWIGHT JOHN HOREN, Respondent.[*] No. 39701. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. March 28, 1968. Welts &amp; Welts, by David A. Welts, for appellant. Bannister, Bruhn &amp; Luvera, by Stanley K. Bruhn, for respondent. LANGENBACH, J.[] At the end of a tortuous trail of some 1,100 pages of a statement of facts, with 20 exhibits, 350 *456 pages of depositions, and the contradictions of 56 witnesses during 8 trying days of litigious testimony was a simple divorce action. Three primary objectives were involved: the divorce, the custody and support of 4 minor children, and the division of community assets. Plaintiff first sued for separate maintenance, but after defendant moved for a summary judgment, plaintiff amended her claim for a divorce. Defendant counterclaimed for a divorce. From the testimony and attitude of the parties displayed during the proceedings, each was granted a divorce. This is not an issue in the case. The parties were married in 1950, when the husband was a student seeking to become a pharmacist. The wife worked to assist in this endeavor until the birth of their first child. After he graduated they went to Skagit County, where he worked in various drugstores. In 1962, he opened his own pharmacy in Burlington, with some financial aid furnished by plaintiff's mother. In the meantime, his business has flourished. The family consists of three girls, aged 13, 11, and 10, and a boy, aged 7, at the time of trial. But the family life seemed to deteriorate. Defendant devoted much time both days and evenings to his business enterprise to the manifest neglect of plaintiff. Plaintiff attended some classes in religious instruction evenings with women friends, and often departed therefrom to go to a cocktail lounge or other places where liquor was served. The children would be left at home with a baby-sitter until the defendant would return from his place of business. After a rather unpleasant incident in July, 1964, defendant refused further to take his wife out into society or visit friends with her. His complaint was that she drank too much liquor and spent too much time in cocktail lounges to the neglect of the children. Her contention was that he became too indifferent towards her and neglected her for his business and his own pleasures. After the divorce action was commenced, plaintiff sought temporary relief. Testimony was taken, after which the *457 children were awarded the defendant on the basis that liquor seemed more important to plaintiff than the welfare of her children. Three weeks later, the matter of custody was reconsidered, and plaintiff was allowed their custody pendente lite. Soon, because of economic factors, both parties were permitted to reside in the family home in separate quarters pending the outcome of the litigation. At the end of the trial, the court rendered a comprehensive oral opinion. It found that during the past 2 years the wife had indulged in intoxicating liquor to excess rather than take care of her home. It felt that with the restraint of the case removed, she might resume her habit of drinking and frequenting cocktail lounges. Consequently, the court determined that the best interests and welfare of the children would be served by awarding their custody to defendant, with very liberal visitation rights to the plaintiff. The family home, with a very substantial mortgage on it, and the pharmacy were the main community possessions. The plaintiff was granted specified personal assets together with a cash award of $33,000 to be paid in definite installments and secured for her by a charge against the pharmacy. She was also allowed her costs, substantial attorney's fees, and alimony on a sliding scale over a period of 5 years in order that she might rehabilitate herself for business employment. The defendant was ordered to pay all liabilities and to establish a trust fund from the proceeds of $6,000 for the children's education. The remainder of the assets and the pharmacy were awarded the defendant. From a decree carrying out the provisions of the oral decision, plaintiff has appealed. There are 5 assignments of error leveled against 13 findings of fact, which findings are not set forth in her brief. While these findings against which errors are asserted are not set forth in full, nevertheless, so much of each finding as is claimed to be erroneous was set forth in accordance with ROA 43. In this manner this court's attention was directed to these specific parts of these findings towards which particular errors were assigned. Consequently thereby the provisions of ROA 43 have been *458 met after a fashion. However, we would make it clear that we do not "like the fashion," and prefer that findings of fact to which an exception is being taken be set forth in their entirety. They concern two main issues the custody of the children and the division of the community property. The trial court found that appellant had engaged in excessive use of alcohol and had shown greater interest in attending cocktail lounges than she had in staying home and being a mother. It also found that, in 2 1/2 years, she had attended such drinking establishments on 45 occasions, and had been doing quite a bit of drinking with her sister. One finding stated: And another: The evidence did not disclose any occasion when appellant became actually drunk or intoxicated. Its greatest import was that she had gone on these occasions with women friends and had consumed one or more drinks of liquor. There was no proof of any unseemly or unbecoming conduct or actions on her part. There was no evidence whatsoever that, after she had received the temporary custody of the children during the pendency of the litigation, she had partaken of any intoxicating liquor. Apparently, she had learned a hard lesson. [1, 2] There was no finding of unfitness on the part of either parent. The experienced trial judge appeared more concerned over the future possibilities which might arise affecting the lives of these children. The future welfare of children is the paramount consideration of the courts. *459 These considerations have been aptly stated and summarized in the recent case of Silverton v. Silverton, 71 Wn.2d 276, 277, 427 P.2d 1001 (1967): [3] The court has painstakingly read the voluminous statement of facts, the record, and the transcript, including the very comprehensive findings of fact. The record discloses *460 three young girls approaching the dangerous years of entering into the maturity of womanhood. If ever a mother's loving care and maternal counsel was needed, that time is rapidly nearing. One author has stated: [4] One vital fact in appellant's favor was her willingness to have the trial judge interview her children. This did not seem agreeable to the respondent. The wishes and desires of these three young girls, of the age of discretion, may be given consideration by the courts. Nelson v. Nelson, 43 Wn.2d 278, 260 P.2d 886 (1953). This did not occur in this action. The careful scrutiny of the entire record, the absence of any apparent deficiency or unfitness of the appellant, save for her periodic drinking habits in the past, with her complete abstension during the pendency of the litigation, lead to the considered conclusion that there has been a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in depriving appellant of the custody of her children. Inasmuch as the case must be remanded to the trial court for a modification so far as the custody of the children is concerned, further attention must be given to the allowance for the support of the children. It appears from the record *461 that $150 per month per child during minority or until emancipation might be reasonable. In the light of these changes in circumstances, the trial court is further directed and empowered to reassess the rights of the parties in and to the community property so far as making an equitable division between the parties due to the change of custody. Accordingly, the decree so far as the custody of the children is involved is modified as herein expressed. The entire case is remanded to the Superior Court for Skagit County for the modification of the decree in the particulars indicated herein; and to make such further findings and decree not inconsistent with the views herein expressed. It is so ordered. FINLEY, C.J., HAMILTON and NEILL, JJ., concur. HILL, J. (dissenting) I dissent. The basis of my dissent is well stated in an excerpt from Chatwood v. Chatwood, 44 Wn.2d 233, 240, 266 P.2d 782 (1954), quoted in part on page 459 of the majority opinion. I would affirm the trial court. July 25, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 438 P.2d 857. [] Judge Langenbach is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] Quoted and followed in Silverton v. Silverton, 71 Wn.2d 276, 277, 427 P.2d 1001 (1967).