Title: New Jersey v. Anderson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 11, 2021

New Jersey v. Anderson Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Bennie Anderson was employed by Jersey City in the Tax Assessor’s office. His position gave him the opportunity to alter property tax descriptions without the property owner filing a formal application with the Zoning Board. In December 2012, defendant accepted a $300 bribe in exchange for altering the tax description of a property from a two-unit dwelling to a three-unit dwelling. Defendant retired from his position in March 2017 and was granted an early service retirement pension. In November 2017, defendant pled guilty in federal court to violating 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), interference with commerce by extortion under color of official right. Defendant was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay a fine. Based on defendant’s conviction, the Employees’ Retirement System of Jersey City reduced his pension. The State filed an action in state court to compel the total forfeiture of defendant’s pension pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. The trial court entered summary judgment for the State, finding that the forfeiture of defendant’s pension did not implicate the constitutional prohibitions against excessive fines because the forfeiture of pension benefits did not constitute a fine. The Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the State, but on different grounds, concluding the forfeiture of defendant’s pension was a fine, but that requiring defendant to forfeit his pension was not excessive. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded forfeiture of defendant’s pension under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 did not constitute a fine for purposes of an excessive-fine analysis under the Federal or New Jersey State Constitutions. Because the forfeiture was not a fine, the Court did not reach the constitutional analysis for excessiveness. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Bennie Anderson (A-15/16-20) (084365)Argued March 30, 2021 -- Decided August 11, 2021LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the forfeiture of defendant Bennie Anderson’s right to a public pension violates his constitutional right to be free of excessive fines. Defendant was employed by Jersey City in the Tax Assessor’s office. His position gave him the opportunity to alter property tax descriptions without the property owner filing a formal application with the Zoning Board. In December 2012, defendant engaged in an illicit transaction where he accepted a $300 bribe in exchange for altering the tax description of a property from a two-unit dwelling to a three-unit dwelling. Defendant retired from his position in March 2017 and was granted an early service retirement pension. In November 2017, defendant pled guilty in federal court to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), interference with commerce by extortion under color of official right. Defendant was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay a fine. Based on defendant’s conviction, the Employees’ Retirement System of Jersey City reduced his pension. The State filed an action in state court to compel the total forfeiture of defendant’s pension pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. The trial court entered summary judgment for the State, finding that the forfeiture of defendant’s pension did not implicate the constitutional prohibitions against excessive fines because the forfeiture of pension benefits did not constitute a fine. The Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the State, but on different grounds. 463 N.J. Super. 168, 186 (App. Div. 2020). The Appellate Division concluded that the forfeiture of defendant’s pension was a fine, but that requiring defendant to forfeit his pension was not excessive. Id. at 172-73. The Court granted certification. 244 N.J. 288 (2020).HELD: The forfeiture of defendant’s pension under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 does not constitute a fine for purposes of an excessive-fine analysis under the Federal or State Constitutions. Because the forfeiture is not a fine, the Court does not reach the constitutional analysis for excessiveness. 1 1. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution provide in relevant part that excessive fines shall not be imposed. Before determining whether a “fine” is “excessive,” a court first determines whether the government action at issue is a “fine.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 334 (1998). Forfeitures -- payments in kind -- are “fines” if they constitute punishment for an offense and involve turning over property of some kind that once belonged to the defendant. In cases in which the status of the forfeited asset as “property” is disputed, courts resolve the dispute by examining state law. The analysis in the instant matter therefore begins by asking whether, under New Jersey law, defendant had a property right in his pension such that the forfeiture of that “right” is a “fine” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment or the State Constitution. (pp. 13-17)2. For many years, the seminal case on pension forfeiture was Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, in which the Court determined that an inflexible forfeiture rule was not clearly expressed in the language of the pension statute. See 91 N.J. 62, 77 (1982). The Court identified factors to consider and balance when determining whether to impose a pension forfeiture, in the absence of any perceived legislative intent for mandatory forfeiture. Id. at 77-78. (pp. 17-18)3. In 2007, the Legislature added N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 -- the statute pursuant to which the State seeks forfeiture of defendant’s pension. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a) provides that a public employee “who is convicted of any crime set forth in subsection (b) of this section, or of a substantially similar offense under the laws of another state or the United States . . . shall forfeit all of the pension or retirement benefit earned.” (emphasis added). N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 was in effect in 2012 when defendant’s offense occurred. Also in effect at that time was N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a), which provides that “[t]he receipt of a public pension or retirement benefit is hereby expressly conditioned upon the rendering of honorable service by a public officer or employee.” Subsection (b) of N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 empowers boards of trustees to order full or partial pension forfeiture upon dishonorable service, and subsection (c) lists factors -- similar to the Uricoli factors -- for determining whether misconduct breached the honorable service requirement. (pp. 18-21)4. Section 3 makes honorable service a condition of a right to a pension, and section 3.1 makes forfeiture of any right to a pension the result when honorable service is not provided due to conviction of an enumerated offense. The plain language of section 3.1 expresses an unambiguous legislative intent to make the commission of offenses enumerated in subsection (b) the basis for mandatory and absolute pension forfeiture. The factors for consideration contained in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c), which resemble those set forth in Uricoli, apply to public employee misconduct raising honorable service questions outside of circumstances involving convictions for which section 3.1 requires mandatory and absolute forfeiture. As a result of the adoption of section 3.1, no longer can the Court conclude, as it did in Uricoli, that the Legislature did not, unequivocally and categorically, condition the receipt of a pension on the rendering of uniformly honorable 2 service. Defendant committed his offense after the 2007 amendment to the pension laws was enacted and, thus, by the time he committed his offense, the Legislature had eliminated all doubt as to its intent that there be a certain category of offenses the commission of which precludes receipt of a publicly funded pension in New Jersey. Defendant’s federal conviction is an analogue to the state offenses listed and, as per the statute’s wording, qualifies as the basis for the State’s application. (pp. 22-23)5. Because forfeiture of a pension is automatic and mandatory upon the commission of certain offenses under section 3.1, it is clear that defendant did not possess a property right in his pension protected by the Federal or State Constitutions. The Legislature has established that the pre-condition of honorable service to the statutory right is not met when a conviction for an enumerated offense occurs. In such a case, the conditional quasi-contractual right to receive a public pension has not become the “property” of the employee, so there is no fine for purposes of the Bajakajian analysis. And as the trial court noted, New Jersey’s treatment of public pensions as quasi-contractual rights rooted in statute, and not as property rights, is consistent with the majority of courts to have addressed this issue and have similarly denied excessive-fine claims on the basis of the first prong of the analysis. Family law cases that have, in that setting, treated pensions as property subject to equitable distribution do not and cannot convert a public pension into a nonforfeitable property right. Because the Court concludes that the forfeiture worked by operation of N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 is not a fine, the Court does not reach a constitutional analysis for excessiveness. The Court therefore declines to review and vacates the portion the Appellate Division’s opinion analyzing excessiveness. (pp. 24-26) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, would find that Anderson had a property interest in his pension and that the complete forfeiture of his pension violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Explaining that a contract may create a property right and that pensions are considered property subject to equitable distribution in family law jurisprudence, Justice Albin asserts that a pension should not constitute property for one purpose but not another. Justice Albin stresses that Anderson’s conviction, the condition subsequent that triggered the forfeiture, did not arise until after his pension had vested. Justice Albin concludes that the punitive forfeiture of Anderson’s pension -- deferred compensation accumulated over thirty-eight and a half years of public employment -- is a fine for Eighth Amendment purposes. Justice Albin further submits that the fine was excessive -- that the forfeiture of defendant’s entire pension valued at over one million dollars was “grossly disproportional” to defendant’s isolated crime of accepting a $300 bribe.JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE- LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-15/ 16 September Term 2020 084365 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Bennie Anderson, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 463 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2020). Argued Decided March 30, 2021 August 11, 2021Nirmalan Nagulendran argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Miller, Meyerson & Corbo, attorneys; Nirmalan Nagulendran and Gerald D. Miller, on the briefs).Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Steven K. Cuttonaro, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation and Whipple Azzarello, attorneys; Alexander 1 Shalom, Jeanne LoCicero, and William J. Munoz, on the brief). Anthony F. DellaPelle submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae the Institute for Justice (McKirdy, Riskin, Olson & DellaPelle and Institute for Justice, attorneys; Anthony F. DellaPelle, Allan C. Zhang, Wesley Hottot, of the Washington and Texas bars, admitted pro hac vice, and Jaba Tsitsuashvili, of the California and District of Columbia bars, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Bennie Anderson, a former employee in the tax assessor’soffice in the City of Jersey City (the City or Jersey City), was convicted of afederal offense touching upon his position of public employment. Based onthat conviction, the State of New Jersey filed an action in state court pursuantto N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 to compel the forfeiture of defendant’s public pension.This appeal concerns defendant’s claim that forfeiture of his right to a publicpension violates his constitutional right to be free of excessive fines. The trial court and the Appellate Division brought the appropriatestructure to their analyses of defendant’s excessive-fine claim, addressing firstwhether the penalty imposed was a “fine,” and if so, whether the fine wasexcessive. The trial court’s analysis ended at the first step: the court foundthat no fine was exacted because honorable service is a condition of eligibilityfor the pension benefit, and one could not lose that to which one did not have a 2 right to begin with. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court’sanalysis of the first inquiry but affirmed the grant of summary judgment to theState because it concluded that the fine to which defendant was subjected wasnot excessive. Accordingly, the Appellate Division upheld the pensionforfeiture. We granted defendant’s petition for certification, 244 N.J. 288 (2020), inwhich defendant contends that the Appellate Division applied an inappropriateanalysis for excessiveness, and the State’s cross-petition, 244 N.J. 288, 288-89(2020), in which the State argues that defendant’s forfeiture of his publicpension does not constitute a fine. We now affirm the judgment upholding the forfeiture of defendant’spension, but our reasoning differs from that of the Appellate Division. Weconclude, as did the trial court, that defendant was not subjected to a fine.Accordingly, our conclusion on that first inquiry eliminates the need to assesswhether the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine. As a result, we need notreview or express an opinion on the test for excessiveness employed by theAppellate Division. 3 I. A. Defendant was employed by Jersey City in the Tax Assessor’s office.His position gave defendant the opportunity to alter property tax descriptionswithout the property owner filing a formal application with the Zoning Board.That power of alteration included the significant ability to alter the number ofhousing units permitted on a parcel of property, which is what led to theforfeiture issue before us. During the period from December 9 to December 13, 2012, defendantand an individual cooperating with federal law enforcement engaged in anillicit transaction. The record from defendant’s federal conviction waspresented in this forfeiture action. That record reveals that the individual, “aJersey City property owner whose property was zoned for a two-unitdwelling,” sought to establish and exploit a back channel with defendant tohave property rezoned as a three-unit dwelling. The individual contacteddefendant on December 9, and on December 12, defendant agreed to rezonethe property in exchange for a $300 bribe. On December 13, 2012, defendanttold the individual that he had rezoned the property and accepted $300 in cash. Defendant retired from his position in the first quarter of 2017 havingserved in the government of Jersey City for thirty-eight and one-half years. 4 His public position and years of service allowed him to apply for a publicpension provided and administered locally by the City. On March 1 of thatyear, he was “granted an early service retirement pension of $60,173.67” peryear. Later that year, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District ofNew Jersey charged defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), interferencewith commerce by extortion under color of official right, 1 a charge that carrieda maximum prison sentence of twenty years and a maximum fine that was “thegreatest of: (1) $250,000; (2) twice the gross amount of any pecuniary gainthat any persons derived from the offense; or (3) twice the gross amount of anypecuniary loss sustained by any victims of the offense,” plus interest.Defendant and the federal government entered into a plea agreement on June30, 2017, whereby defendant pled guilty to one count of violating § 1951(a),and he stipulated to the above-recited facts. Defendant entered a formal pleaon November 21, 2017, and on March 5, 2018, the United States District Courtfor the District of New Jersey sentenced defendant to two years of probationwith five months of home detention and imposed a fine in the amount of$3,000 and a special assessment of $100.1 Although the charging document provided by the State in the record is undated, the State represents that this criminal information was filed on November 21, 2017, with defendant’s plea form. 5 B. With respect to defendant’s pension, which he received through thelocally administered pension fund for public employees of Jersey City, thefollowing facts and procedural history are pertinent. Between the conclusion of defendant’s federal prosecution and theinstitution of the litigation that led to the instant appeal, the Board of Trusteesof the Employees’ Retirement System of Jersey City held a hearing ondefendant’s pension status. It resolved, on account of defendant’s federalconviction, to reduce his pension to $47,918.76 per year. The State then took action against defendant based on the prescriptionsin N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. On March 26, 2019, the State commenced the instantaction by way of “verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writ seekingforfeiture of public office and position, permanent disqualification from anyposition of public honor, trust, or profit, and forfeiture of pension or retirementbenefits.” The complaint sought total forfeiture of defendant’s pensionpursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. 22 According to the State, the federal offense of which defendant was convicted was substantially similar to the following offenses listed in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1: theft by extortion ( N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5), commercia1 bribery ( N.J.S.A. 2C:21- 10), bribery in official matters ( N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2), acceptance or receipt of unlawful benefit by public servant for official behavior ( N.J.S.A. 2C:27-10), tampering with public records or information ( N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7), and official 6 The next day, the State applied for an order to show cause to dispose ofthe matter “as a summary proceeding” and to require defendant to show cause“why summary judgment should not be entered.” The trial court granted theapplication to proceed summarily. Defendant filed an answer on May 7, 2019, admitting most of theallegations in the State’s complaint but denying that his federal conviction wasfor a crime substantially similar to an enumerated state offense in N.J.S.A.43:1-3.1. Defendant also protested that “the proposed forfeiture of BennieAnderson’s entire pension under these facts would be an excessive fine” withinthe meaning of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution andArticle I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. 3 The Honorable Mary Jacobson, A.J.S.C., heard argument on the matterand entered judgment for the State. The court focused on the Legislature’s2007 amendment to the pension laws, L. 2007, c. 49, § 2, codified at N.J.S.A.43:1-3.1. The court determined that the 2007 amendment eliminated judicialdiscretion in certain circumstances by calling for mandatory pension forfeituremisconduct ( N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2). Thus, the State considered N.J.S.A. 43:1- 3.1(a)’s forfeiture requirement applicable to defendant. 3 Defendant also argued that “[t]he State of New Jersey is estopped from seeking the forfeiture of Bennie Anderson’s entire pension.” That argument is not part of this appeal. 7 for the commission of identified offenses touching on or involving a publicoffice, position, or employment, “to preclude individuals who have onceviolated the public trust from having a second opportunity to do so,” and toensure “there should be no stigma of conviction of a crime of dishonestyamong public employees.” The court reviewed this Court’s earlier decision inUricoli v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 91 N.J. 62 (1982), which found, under the prior statutory law, that the pension lawsdid not mandate forfeiture and set forth factors for courts to use whenexercising their discretion in determining whether to order forfeiture. However, the trial court found that case law to have been superseded bychanges to the statute. The court reasoned from a review of the 2007amendment and later case law that “the policy in these forfeiture statutes is aharsh response, but . . . it was a harsh response to a problem serious enough tojustify its harshness.” The court noted that “the forfeiture statute itselfcodifies a long-standing policy against retention of offenders in governmentservice,” and stated further that “the statute reflects a legislative determinationgoverning the standards of conduct to be observed by those who serve thepublic as a condition to continued employment.” In applying the forfeiture statute to defendant, the trial court furtheragreed with the State that the federal statute Anderson was convicted of 8 violating was similar enough to the state offenses enumerated in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 to justify entering the order sought by the State. 4 Addressing defendant’s argument that the forfeiture of his pensionviolated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution, the court determined that “pensions are more of acontractual arrangement between a public employee and the employer,” whichare “conditioned on honorable service,” than they are a property right. Notingthat “there was no property right to the pension benefits when there’s a breachof the honorable service” condition, the court concluded that, therefore,“forfeiture of the pension benefits does not constitute a payment to the State”or fine. The court reasoned that without a property right at stake, theExcessive Fines Clause was not implicated. Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the grant ofsummary judgment to the State, but on different grounds. State v. Anderson, 463 N.J. Super. 168, 186 (App. Div. 2020). The Appellate Division waspersuaded that the forfeiture of defendant’s pension was a “fine” within themeaning of the constitutional provisions “because he had a property interest inthe form of a contractual right to receive pension benefits, despite the fact that4 As readily acknowledged by the State, defendant’s individual contributions toward his pension are returned upon forfeiture. 9 this right was conditioned on his performance of honorable service. ” Id. at172. In reaching that decision, the court acknowledged that a majority of otherstates take a contract-right approach to pension forfeiture and concludeotherwise when confronted with an excessive-fine argument. However, thecourt was persuaded to adopt its property right analysis and conclude thatforfeiture constituted a fine. Importantly however, the Appellate Division didnot find that requiring defendant to forfeit his pension was “excessive,” fortwo reasons. Id. at 172-73. The court explained, [f]irst, by enacting N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1, the Legislature expressed its clear intent that such a remedy was appropriate for the precise official misconduct committed by defendant. Second, . . . defendant’s taking of a bribe in exchange for a favorable and unjustified change in a property’s tax description is a profound breach of the public trust such that a total pension forfeiture is not a disproportionate result. [Id. at 173.] II. Defendant does not raise a categorical challenge to the forfeiture statuteitself. Instead, the parties divide their arguments into parts that address (1)whether forfeiture constitutes a fine and, if so, (2) whether the forfeitureapplied here is an excessive fine. We granted leave to appear as friends of theCourt to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and theAssociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL), 10 participating jointly, and to the Institute for Justice. We consider amici’sarguments with those of the parties. A. On the question whether the pension forfeiture in this appeal constitutesa fine, the State maintains in its cross-petition that there is a quasi-contractualright rooted in the statutory benefit of a pension, but that right is conditionaland dependent on honorable service as defined by the statutory pensionscheme. According to the State, receipt of a pension was always conditionedon honorable service, and N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 has merely clarified when theprecondition of honorable service is not satisfied, namely through convictionfor any of the enumerated offenses touching on or involving public positionssuch as defendant’s. The State further maintains that the case law, up to Uricoli, recognizedforfeiture to be absolute. With Uricoli determining that the Legislature had notclearly expressed such an absolute requirement, the State argues that Uricolimerely set forth factors for a court to use when forfeiture is discretionary andsubject to equitable considerations, which is no longer the case sinceenactment of the prescriptions of N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. Defendant advances the property right analysis that the AppellateDivision found persuasive, reasoning largely by analogy to matrimonial cases 11 addressing the distribution of pension benefits following divorces. The ACLUand ACDL support defendant’s position that public employees have propertyrights in their pensions and that pension forfeitures constitute fines. B. Defendant’s petition asserts that the Appellate Division applied anerroneous standard for excessiveness. He maintains that a court must look atfactors other than just the nature and impact of the offense. Asserting that theUnited States Supreme Court “has considered factors other than the offense” in Eighth Amendment cases, he asks this Court to fashion an analysis thatconsiders the impact of the fine on the individual in addition to the offense. Criticizing the Appellate Division’s excessiveness analysis as leaningtoo much on legislative intent and not enough on the historical roots andpurposes of the excessive fines prohibition, amici ACLU and ACDL advancean interpretation that takes into account an individual’s means and ability topay a fine, and argue that even if the Federal Constitution’s protection does nottake those circumstances into account, then the State Constitution may. Amicus curiae the Institute for Justice similarly criticizes the AppellateDivision’s excessiveness analysis. The Institute urges adoption of anindividualized analytical method that focuses on the harm actually caused by 12 the defendant and the harshness of the proposed penalty vis-à-vis thedefendant, in light of his or her ability to pay. In countering the position taken by defendant and amici, the State urgesthat we not reach the issue and, instead, end our analysis by finding thatforfeiture as applied here does not constitute a fine. III. Certain standards of review apply in the analysis of this matter. As anappellate court, we approach the review of the grant of summary judgment “denovo, applying the same standard as the trial court.” Woytas v. GreenwoodTree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019); see also R. 4:46-2(c). We also“review the interpretation of a statute de novo.” State v. Pinkston, 233 N.J. 495, 507 (2018). In doing so, “our overarching duty is 'to construe and applythe statute as enacted.’” Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 565(2007) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). When a courtconstrues a statute “[t]o interpret [its] meaning and scope . . . , we look for theLegislature’s intent.” State v. McCray, 243 N.J. 196, 208 (2020). As we oftenhave said, “the statute’s plain language” is “the best indicator of intent.” In reT.B., 236 N.J. 262, 274 (2019). Before this Court, defendant advances an as-applied constitutional claimthat an order forfeiting the remaining part of his pension violates federal and 13 state constitutional prohibitions against excessive fines. The EighthAmendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bailshall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted.” Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitutionprovides in relevant part that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, excessivefines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments shall not beinflicted.” 5 As defendant, the State, the trial court, and Appellate Division allrecognize, courts apply the test promulgated by United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), to determine whether a forfeiture constitutes anexcessive, and therefore prohibited, fine. See, e.g., United States v. Bikundi, 926 F.3d 761, 794-96 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 282-85 (3d Cir. 2010). The federal Excessive Fines Clause andBajakajian’s analysis bind the states by operation of the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 682,5 As noted by Professor Williams, this first sentence of Paragraph 12 of Article I “was carried over verbatim from Article I, Section 15, of the 1844 Constitution.” Robert J. Williams, The New Jersey State Constitution 76 (2012). The excessive-fine provision has not been the subject of much Supreme Court review, and has to date not veered from federal precedent in application. See Davanne Realty v. Edison Township, 408 N.J. Super. 16, 22 (App. Div. 2009) (applying United States Supreme Court precedent), aff’d o.b., 201 N.J. 280, 281 (2010). 14 686-87 (2019); Davanne Realty, 408 N.J. Super. at 22; see also Comm. toRecall Robert Menendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79,131 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court is, of course, the ultimate arbiter ofthe Federal Constitution.”). The Bajakajian test entails a two-part inquiry. “By its plain language,the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is violated only if thedisputed [forfeiture is] both [a] 'fine[]’ and 'excessive.’” Tillman v. LebanonCnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 , 420 (3d Cir. 2000); cf. Menendez, 204 N.J.at 105 (“Our analysis begins with the plain language of the FederalConstitution.”). Therefore, before determining whether a “fine” is “excessive,” a courtmust first determine whether the government action at issue is a “fine,” such asto implicate the Eighth Amendment. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334(“Because the forfeiture of respondent’s currency constitutes . . . a 'fine’within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, we now turn to the questionwhether it is 'excessive.’”). “[A]t the time the Constitution was adopted, 'the word “fine” wasunderstood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for someoffense.’” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 265 (1989)). “The Excessive Fines 15 Clause thus 'limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether incash or in kind, “as punishment for some offense.”’” Id. at 328 (quotingAustin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 609-10 (1993)). “Forfeitures-- payments in kind -- are thus 'fines’ if they constitute punishment for anoffense.” Ibid. “Implicit in this interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause isthe notion that it applies only when the payment to the government involvesturning over 'property’ of some kind that once belonged to the defendant.”Hopkins v. Okla. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 150 F.3d 1155 , 1162 (10th Cir. 1998);see also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328 (explaining that the Clause “limits thegovernment’s power to extract payments” from an individual) (emphasisadded). In the typical case, the status of the forfeited asset as “property” is notdisputed. E.g., Timbs, 586 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 686 (discussing forfeitureof automobile); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324 (discussing forfeiture of currency);Cheeseman, 600 F.3d at 284 (discussing forfeiture of firearms andammunition). However, in cases in which the status of the asset taken fromthe individual is disputed, courts resolve the dispute by examining state law.E.g., Hopkins, 150 F.3d at 1162 (applying Oklahoma law); Pub. Emp. Ret.Admin. Comm’n v. Bettencourt, 47 N.E.3d 667, 674-76 (Mass. 2016)(applying Massachusetts law). 16 Thus, as both the trial court and Appellate Division properly recognized,in accordance with the Bajakajian inquiry, the analysis in the instant mattermust begin by asking whether, under New Jersey law, defendant had aproperty right in his pension such that the forfeiture of that “right” is a “fine”within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment or the State Constitution. Wewill consider defendant’s claim that the exaction is constitutionally“excessive” only if we determine that, under New Jersey law, defendant hadsuch a protectible right in the first instance. IV. Determination of whether a fine was imposed on defendant requiresreview of the legal principles governing the forfeiture of public pensions inNew Jersey to ascertain the nature of defendant’s interest in his pension. A. For many years, the seminal case on pension forfeiture was Uricoli,which involved a question of pension forfeiture for a Chief of Police caughtfixing a motor vehicle ticket. See 91 N.J. at 65. After he was found guilty ofone count of malfeasance in office, Uricoli applied for a pension and wasdenied based on his failure to render honorable service. Ibid. Whenadministrative appeals brought no relief, our Court granted Uricoli’s petitionfor certification. Id. at 65-66. 17 The Court’s decision in Uricoli “reaffirmed the rule that honorableservice is an implicit requirement of every public pension statute, whether ornot this conditional term appears in the particular statute.” Id. at 66. Contraryto the position being taken by the State, however, the Court determined that aninflexible forfeiture rule was not clearly expressed in the language of thepension statute and concluded that the Legislature meant to leave room forjudicial discretion. Id. at 77. To assist courts and administrative bodies with implementation of aflexible test for pension forfeiture, the Court identified factors to be consideredand balanced when applying that test to determine the reasonableness ofpension forfeiture, in the absence of any perceived legislative intent formandatory forfeiture. Id. at 77-78. The factors were rooted in equitableconsiderations. Id. at 78. It bears noting that there is no suggestion of aconstitutional underpinning to the Court’s analysis. Uricoli remained the key case on the exercise of discretion by pensionboards and courts considering whether to impose a pension forfeiture for manyyears. Then, in 2007, the Legislature added N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 -- the statutepursuant to which the State seeks forfeiture of defendant’s pension. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a) provides that [a] person who holds or has held any public office, position, or employment, elective or appointive, under 18 the government of this State or any agency or political subdivision thereof, who is convicted of any crime set forth in subsection b. of this section, or of a substantially similar offense under the laws of another state or the United States which would have been such a crime under the laws of this State, which crime or offense involves or touches such office, position or employment, shall forfeit all of the pension or retirement benefit earned as a member of any State or locally-administered pension fund or retirement system in which he participated at the time of the commission of the offense and which covered the office, position or employment involved in the offense. As used in this section, a crime or offense that “involves or touches such office, position or employment” means that the crime or offense was related directly to the person’s performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office or employment held by the person. [(emphasis added).] The next subsection lists the state-law offenses that trigger application ofsubsection (a). See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(b)(1) to (23). Critically, subsection(c)(2) mandates that [a] court of this State shall enter an order of pension forfeiture pursuant to this section . . . [u]pon application of the county prosecutor or the Attorney General, when the pension forfeiture is based upon a conviction of an offense under the laws of another state or of the United States. An order of pension forfeiture pursuant to this paragraph shall be deemed to have taken effect on the date the person was found guilty by the trier of fact or pled guilty to the offense. 19 N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 (section 3.1) was in effect in 2012 when defendant’s offenseoccurred. 6 Also in effect at that time was N.J.S.A 43:1-3. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a)provides that “[t]he receipt of a public pension or retirement benefit is herebyexpressly conditioned upon the rendering of honorable service by a publicofficer or employee.” Other subsections of section 3 allow for a flexible,discretionary analysis of whether full or partial forfeiture of a pension is anappropriate response to dishonorable conduct. Subsection (b) provides that The board of trustees of any State or locally- administered pension fund or retirement system created under the laws of this State is authorized to order the forfeiture of all or part of the earned service credit or pension or retirement benefit of any member of the fund or system for misconduct occurring during the member’s public service which renders the member’s service or part thereof dishonorable and to implement any pension forfeiture ordered by a court pursuant to section 2 of L. 2007, c. 49 ([ N.J.S.A.] 43:1-3.1). [N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b).]And N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c) lists factors for a board of trustees to “consider andbalance” “[i]n evaluating a member’s misconduct to determine whether it 6 See L. 2007, c. 49, § 2. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(b) was amended after December 2012 to add two crimes to the list of predicate offenses that trigger mandatory pension forfeiture. Those offenses are not implicated here. 20 constitutes a breach of the condition that public service be honorable andwhether forfeiture or partial forfeiture of earned service credit or earnedpension or retirement benefits is appropriate.” Those factors, which reflect theconsiderations found in case law, see Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 77-78, are: (1) the member’s length of service; (2) the basis for retirement; (3) the extent to which the member’s pension has vested; (4) the duties of the particular member; (5) the member’s public employment history and record covered under the retirement system; (6) any other public employment or service; (7) the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the gravity or substantiality of the offense, whether it was a single or multiple offense and whether it was continuing or isolated; (8) the relationship between the misconduct and the member’s public duties; (9) the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt or culpability, including the member’s motives and reasons, personal gain and similar considerations; (10) the availability and adequacy of other penal sanctions; and (11) other personal circumstances relating to the member which bear upon the justness of forfeiture. 21 [ N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(1) to (11).] The flexible analysis that the Legislature has left in place within section3 does not give rise to ambiguity about the legislative scheme. Section 3makes honorable service a condition of a right to a pension, and section 3.1makes forfeiture of any right to a pension the result when honorable service isnot provided due to conviction of an enumerated offense. The plain language of section 3.1 expresses an unambiguous legislativeintent to make the commission of certain offenses the basis for mandatory andabsolute pension forfeiture. The statutory language in section 3.1 leaves nodiscretion for courts dealing with the entry of a judgment of conviction,whether by trial verdict or plea, for the offenses enumerated in subsection (b). N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a) directs that the convicted individual “shall forfeit all ofthe pension” (emphasis added). See State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 149-50(2006) (explaining that “shall” is typically mandatory). The factors identified in section 3 apply when mandatory absoluteforfeiture is not required by section 3.1. In other words, the factors forconsideration contained in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, which resemble those set forth inUricoli, apply to public employee misconduct raising honorable servicequestions outside of circumstances involving convictions for which section 3.1requires mandatory and absolute forfeiture. 22 Defendant’s reliance on Uricoli and its discussion is thereforeunavailing. The Legislature has spoken, filling the gap in the pre-2007pension statutes on which the Uricoli decision was premised. As a result ofthe adoption of section 3.1, no longer can this Court conclude, as it did inUricoli, see 91 N.J. at 77, that the Legislature did not, unequivocally andcategorically, condition the receipt of a pension on the rendering of uniformlyhonorable service. Defendant committed his offense after the 2007 amendment to thepension laws was enacted and, thus, by the time he committed his offense, theLegislature had eliminated all doubt as to its intent that there be a certaincategory of offenses the commission of which precludes receipt of a publiclyfunded pension in New Jersey. 7 And to the extent that there is any questionthat defendant’s federal conviction is an analogue to the state offenses listedand, as per the statute’s wording, qualifies as the basis for the State’sapplication, we endorse the findings and conclusion of the trial court.7 It is apparent the Legislature has woven a piece that reiterates that honorable service is a condition of eligibility for pension receipt, N.J.S.A. 4 3:1-3, and individual pensions remain forfeitable, see N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(d). N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5 was amended by chapter 78, Laws of 2011, in connection with the Legislature’s discussion of non-forfeitable pension rights. Of particular import is subsection (d), which provides that nothing in that subsection altered the forfeitability of individual pensions. The Legislature took pains to state expressly that individual pensions are still subject to forfeiture. 23 B. Having determined that forfeiture of a pension is automatic andmandatory upon the commission of certain offenses under section 3.1, it isclear that defendant did not possess a property right in his pension protected bythe Federal or State Constitutions. The Legislature has established that the pre-condition of honorableservice to the statutory right is not met when a conviction for an enumeratedoffense occurs. In such a case, the conditional quasi-contractual right toreceive a public pension has not become the “property” of the employee. Asthe trial court said, one cannot lose what one did not have to begin with . And,without loss, there is no fine for purposes of the Bajakajian analysis. In short, this case turns on the legislative decision in 2007 to takediscretion away from courts and administrative agencies when publicemployees commit any of the identified offenses. The trial court correctlynoted that and faithfully applied the law as written. And, as the court’sanalysis noted, New Jersey’s approach to treat public pensions as quasi-contractual rights rooted in statute, and not as property rights, is consistentwith the majority of courts to have addressed this issue. E.g., Hopkins, 150 24 F.3d at 1162; Hames v. City of Miami, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 8Those decisions have similarly denied excessive-fine claims on the basis of thefirst prong of the analysis. The Appellate Division’s reliance on family lawcases that have, in that setting, treated pensions as property subject toequitable distribution was misplaced. So too does the dissent misplacereliance on family law equitable-distribution law. That case law does not andcannot convert a public pension into a nonforfeitable property right. That first prong to an excessive-fine analysis -- whether the forfeiturehere was a “fine” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment -- proves to bean impediment that defendant cannot overcome. We hold that the forfeiture ofdefendant’s pension under section 3.1 does not constitute a fine for purposes ofan excessive-fine analysis under the Federal or State Constitutions. C. As a result of our conclusion that the forfeiture worked here by operationof N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 is not a fine, there is no reason to embark on aconstitutional analysis for excessiveness. The Appellate Division engaged inthat endeavor only because it reached a different conclusion on the issue of8 We note that to the extent that the Appellate Division, and now the dissent, found the reasoning of the Bettencourt decision persuasive, we find that decision to be based on a significantly differently drawn statutory scheme and body of case law. See 47 N.E 3d at 673-77. 25 whether this forfeiture constitutes a fine. Here, however, we need not reachthe question. Accordingly, we decline to review the Appellate Division’sanalysis for excessiveness and we vacate that portion of its opinion. See, e.g.,Menendez, 204 N.J. at 95-96 (noting that courts do not engage inconstitutional rulings when unnecessary to our determination of an appeal). V. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm with modification theAppellate Division judgment. The award of summary judgment to the State isaffirmed. JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER did not participate. 26 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Bennie Anderson, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits astate from imposing an excessive fine on a person convicted of a crime. In thiscase, the complete forfeiture of defendant Bennie Anderson’s pension for anisolated crime for which he received a probationary sentence and modest fineby a federal court violates the Excessive Fines Clause. In my view, themajority has denied Anderson the protections afforded by the FederalConstitution by failing to call a fine by its true name and by characterizingstate law in a way that seemingly evades federal review. I thereforerespectfully dissent. I. Bennie Anderson, a Vietnam War veteran, served in various municipalpositions in Jersey City for thirty-eight and a half years, retiring in March 2017 1 at the age of fifty-nine with an early-service-retirement pension of $60,173.67per year. Based on the estimate that Anderson would live to the age of eighty-three, his pension at retirement was worth $1,462,220.18. 1 On November 21, 2017 -- while Anderson was receiving his pension --he entered a plea of guilty in federal court to the offense of interference withcommerce by extortion under color of official right, which carried a maximumsentence of twenty years of imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000.18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a); 3571(b)(3), (d). In his plea, Anderson tookresponsibility for accepting a $300 bribe in exchange for altering the taxdescription of a property for zoning-classification purposes when he worked inthe Tax Assessor’s Office in December 2012. On March 5, 2018, a federal district court judge sentenced Anderson totwo years of probation and five months of home detention and ordered him topay a $3,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. As a result of his conviction,the Employees’ Retirement System of Jersey City reduced Anderson’s pensionto $47,918.76 per year.1 According to the New Jersey Court Rules’ Table of Life Expectancies for All Races and Both Sexes, a person who is fifty-nine can expect to live between 23.9 and 24.7 more years, or 24.3 years on average. R. app. I-A. Multiplying $60,173.67 per year by 24.3 years (assuming Anderson lives to the age of eighty-three) yields the value of $1,462,220.18. 2 In 2019, two years after Anderson’s retirement, the Attorney General’sOffice filed a verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the SuperiorCourt seeking the forfeiture of Anderson’s entire pension pursuant to N.J.S.A.43:1-3.1. That statute provides that a public employee who is convicted of thetype of crime that Anderson committed, a crime touching his office, “shallforfeit all of the pension or retirement benefit earned as a member of” agovernment retirement system. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1(a). In accordance with thestatute, the court ordered the total forfeiture of Anderson’s pension. 2 The issue before this Court is whether the total forfeiture of Anderson’spension valued at over one million dollars -- in comparison to the probationarysentence and $3,100 financial penalty imposed by the federal court -- violatedthe Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines. II. A. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines applies tothe states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Anderson’s personal contributions into his pension were not forfeited. The parties have not submitted documentation of the value of his contributions or the total value of the forfeiture; however, Anderson’s counsel represented at oral argument before this Court that he calculated the forfeiture value as “over a million” dollars. 3 Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019). “Thetouchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause isthe principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear somerelationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” UnitedStates v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 334 (1998). “[A] punitive forfeitureviolates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to thegravity of a defendant’s offense.” Ibid. (emphasis added). That inquiry isinformed by the history of the Excessive Fines Clause, which “ traces itsvenerable lineage back to at least 1215, when Magna Carta . . . . required thateconomic sanctions 'be proportioned to the wrong’ and 'not be so large as todeprive [an offender] of his livelihood.’” Timbs, 586 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 687-88 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Browning-FerrisIndus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 271 (1989)); accordBajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335-36. The majority asserts, however, that the proportionality review mandatedby the Eighth Amendment is unnecessary because the forfeiture of Anderson’spension is not a fine -- that because of Anderson’s dishonorable service he wasnever entitled to the pension he was receiving and, accordingly, nothing wastaken from him. The meaning of what constitutes a fine for EighthAmendment and state law purposes therefore is critical to the analysis. 4 Under the Eighth Amendment, a fine is any payment extracted by thegovernment “whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.”Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328 (quotation omitted). “Forfeitures -- payments inkind -- are thus 'fines’ if they constitute punishment for an offense.” Ibid.The “threshold question” for whether a payment constitutes a “fine” is whether“the payment to the government involves turning over 'property’ of some kindthat once belonged to the defendant.” Hopkins v. Okla. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 150 F.3d 1155 , 1162 (10th Cir. 1998); accord Pub. Emp. Ret. Admin. Comm’nv. Bettencourt, 47 N.E.3d 667, 672-73 (Mass. 2016). To answer that question,we look to New Jersey law to determine whether Anderson had a cognizableproperty interest in the pension that was forfeited upon his conviction. B. That a pension is a creature of contract does not mean that a publicemployee does not have a property interest in his pension. A contract maycreate a property right. See Saginario v. Att’y Gen., 87 N.J. 480, 492 n.3(1981) (referring to “a statutory or contractual entitlement creating a propertyinterest”); 1 Williston on Contracts § 1:1 (4th ed. 2021) (“Enforceable contractrights are deemed to be property rights.”). Public workers enter into government service with a promise that part oftheir wages will be deferred until their retirement. That deferred compensation 5 -- like the wages they receive weekly -- is earned every day through theirlabor. See, e.g., Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175, 182 (2015) (“The individualmembers of the public pension systems, by their public service, earned thisdelayed part of their compensation.”); Steinmann v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 116 N.J. 564, 572 (1989) (“Pensions for public employees . . . . are in the nature ofcompensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement tocontinued and faithful service.” (quoting Geller v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969))); Spina v. Consol. Police & Firemen’s Pension FundComm’n, 41 N.J. 391, 401 (1964) (recognizing that a government pension“[i]n part . . . compensates for services already rendered”). That public employees have a property interest in their pensions -- theirdeferred wages -- is made clear by our family law jurisprudence. This Courthas stated that “a pension is considered property subject to equitabledistribution . . . . [I]t is additional compensation for services rendered for theemployer and a right acquired during the marriage.” L.M. v. Div. of Med.Assistance & Health Servs., 140 N.J. 480, 496-97 (1995) (quotation omitted);see also Whitfield v. Whitfield, 222 N.J. Super. 36, 45 (App. Div. 1987) (“[A]pension plan [is] a form of deferred compensation for services rendered. As asubstitute for wages such benefits unquestionably constitute property.”). 6 A pension should not constitute property for one purpose but not another-- particularly when the other results in evading the Excessive Fines Clause.The Eighth Amendment is intended “to limit the government’s power topunish.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 609 (1993). Taking from aretired public employee the pension he is collecting is little different fromtaking monies from the savings account where he has banked his wages foryears. C. Anderson had retired and was collecting his pension at the time of hiscriminal conviction. No one disputes that “honorable service” is a conditionfor the receipt of one’s pension. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a) provides that “[t]he receiptof a public pension or retirement benefit is hereby expressly conditioned uponthe rendering of honorable service by a public officer or employee. ”Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 permits the partial or total forfeiture of a publicemployee’s pension for misconduct, depending on a weighing of elevenstatutory factors. See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b), (c) (authorizing a pension board “todetermine whether [an employee’s misconduct] constitutes a breach of thecondition that public service be honorable and whether forfeiture or partialforfeiture of earned service credit or earned pension or retirement benefits is 7 appropriate” (emphasis added)). Under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1, however, forfeitureof a pension is mandated for certain convictions. To be clear, it was Anderson’s conviction -- a condition subsequent tohis retirement on pension -- that permitted the State to subject Anderson’spension to forfeiture. See 13 Williston on Contracts § 38:9 (4th ed. 2021)(defining “condition subsequent” as a condition that divests a duty to performa contract after the duty has accrued). In other words, the conviction, thecondition subsequent that triggered the forfeiture, did not arise until afterAnderson’s pension had vested and he was receiving monthly pension checks. This issue is not whether Anderson’s pension can be forfeited butwhether a pension is a species of property, which, when forfeited, is subject tothe strictures of the Eighth Amendment. See Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 91 N.J. 62, 76 (1982) (“[F]orfeiture -- whether of one’s pension or any otherproperty or benefit to which one is otherwise entitled -- is a penalty or apunishment for wrongful conduct.” (emphasis added)). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has addressed that issue andheld that the forfeiture of a pension resulting from a “ violation of the lawsapplicable to [a public employee’s] office or position” exacted a fine withinthe meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause. Bettencourt, 47 N.E 3d at 670,672, 676-77 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 15(4)). Bettencourt, a police 8 officer, was convicted of twenty-one counts of unauthorized access to acomputer system and, at the time, had been a member of the municipalretirement system for over twenty-five years. Id. at 670-71. The publicemployee retirement administration commission found that his convictionrelated to his office, mandating forfeiture of his entire pension under theapplicable statute. Id. at 671. The Massachusetts high court held that the forfeiture of the entirety ofBettencourt’s pension violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 670, 680-81.The court explained “that a public employee who is a member of a retirementsystem holds an interest in retirement benefits that originates in a 'contract’and in substance amounts to a property right.” Id. at 675. According to thecourt, “it is precisely [that] property interest that the employee is required toforfeit, and the forfeiture effects what is in substance an extraction ofpayments from the employee to the Commonwealth,” rendering it a finesubject to Eighth Amendment review. Id. at 677. Anderson should stand in no different shoes than Bettencourt. Andersonhad a property interest in his pension -- deferred compensation accumulatedover thirty-eight and a half years of public employment. The punitiveforfeiture of Anderson’s pension is a fine for Eighth Amendment purposes.The question remains whether the forfeiture of a pension valued at over one 9 million dollars was so disproportionate to the offense of accepting a $300bribe that it violates the Excessive Fines Clause. III. A. In evaluating whether a forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to thegravity of a defendant’s offense” under the Eighth Amendment, Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, courts may consider the following factors: (1) “the nature ofthe substantive crime”; (2) whether the defendant “fit into the class of personsfor whom the [criminal] statute was principally designed”; (3) the maximumsentence and fine “permitted under the statute” and “recommended by theSentencing Guidelines,” as “compare[d] [to] the amount the governmentsought to forfeit”; and (4) the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct, UnitedStates v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-39); accord United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 110 (2dCir. 2016). At least two federal circuit courts have held that a court may alsoconsider the fine’s effect on a person’s livelihood. See Viloski, 814 F.3d at111 (“[H]ostility to livelihood-destroying fines became 'deeply rooted’ inAnglo-American constitutional thought and played an important role inshaping the Eighth Amendment.”); United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 84(1st Cir. 2008) (“Such ruinous monetary punishments are exactly the sort that 10 motivated the 1689 [English] Bill of Rights and, consequently, the ExcessiveFines Clause.”). B. By the standards governing the Excessive Fines Clause, the completeforfeiture of Anderson’s pension -- deferred compensation earned over a careerof thirty-eight and a half years and intended to sustain him in his retirement --was “grossly disproportional” to his offense. That conclusion does notdiminish the seriousness of the crime committed by Anderson. By accepting a$300 bribe in return for altering a tax description of a property from a two-unitdwelling to a three-unit dwelling, Anderson betrayed a public trust. Thebetrayal of that trust, even once in a long career, must be condemned andpunished. But the grossly disproportionate punishment here -- a forfeiturelikely to cause a ruinous financial hardship in the later years of Anderson’s life-- does not fit the crime. Anderson did not take a series of bribes or engage in financial chicaneryover a course of years. He received a benefit of $300 for accepting a singlebribe in an almost four-decade career. In Anderson’s plea agreement, thegovernment acknowledged that he “clearly demonstrated a recognition andaffirmative acceptance of personal responsibility.” Although the federal crimeto which Anderson pled guilty exposed him to a potential twenty -year 11 maximum prison sentence and a $250,000 maximum fine, and although thesentencing guidelines called for a range of between ten and thirty -sevenmonths of imprisonment, see U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Guidelines Manual420 (Nov. 1, 2016), the court sentenced Anderson to only a probationary termwith five months of home detention and ordered him to pay only $3,100 infinancial penalties. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339 n.14 (“That the maximumfine and Guideline sentence to which respondent was subject were but afraction of the penalties authorized . . . show that respondent’s culpabilityrelative to other potential violators . . . is small indeed.”). “The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravityof the offense that it is designed to punish.” Id. at 334. Measuring thepunishment imposed by the federal court against the forfeiture exacted by theState -- the taking of over one million dollars in pension benefits thatAnderson had already begun receiving -- leads to but one conclusion: Theforfeiture of Anderson’s entire pension was “grossly disproportional” to thecrime and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 33 That is not to say that a lesser forfeiture would not pass constitutional muster. Indeed, the Employees’ Retirement System of Jersey City found a reduction of Anderson’s pension from $60,173.67 to $47,918.76 per year appropriate. That forfeiture, reducing his pension by $297,794.31 over 24.3 years, might well withstand constitutional scrutiny. 12 IV. In my view, a state court’s decision cannot evade Eighth Amendmentreview by calling a fine imposed as punishment by some other name.Anderson had a property interest in his pension, and the State exacted aforfeiture of the entirety of that pension in violation of the Excessive FinesClause. I therefore respectfully dissent. 13