Title: Edward Craig Jones and Donald Chasteen v. Regions Bank and Advanced Realty Company, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060896
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2009

REL:06/12/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1060896
_________________________
Edward Craig Jones and Donald Chasteen
v.
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty Company, Inc.
Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-98-1150)
BOLIN, Justice.
Edward Craig Jones and Donald Chasteen (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "the plaintiffs") appeal from the
trial court's denial of their various motions to alter, amend,
1060896
2
or vacate the court's judgment against them or to clarify the
judgment and seeking an attorney fee and expenses.
Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs extended credit to Scott Sheffield for the
purchase of certain real property and took a mortgage in
return to secure their interests.  Regions Bank also extended
credit to Sheffield for the purchase of the same real property
and also took a mortgage to secure its interest.  The
plaintiffs' mortgage was recorded on February 22, 1995, in
mortgage book 3118, page 252, in the office of the Judge of
Probate of Etowah County.  Regions Bank's mortgage was also
recorded on February 22, 1995, in mortgage book 3118, page
247, in the office of the Judge of Probate of Etowah County.
On 
May 
19, 
1998, 
the 
plaintiffs 
purchased 
at 
a
foreclosure sale instituted by the plaintiffs the real
property secured by the mortgage issued to them by Sheffield.
The plaintiffs purchased the property by crediting Sheffield's
indebtedness secured by the mortgage in the amount of
$58,501.25.  Regions Bank also foreclosed on the mortgage
issued to it by Sheffield.  On August 24, 1998, Advanced
Realty Company, Inc. ("Advanced Realty"), purchased the real
1060896
3
property in question for $58,350 at a foreclosure sale
instituted by Regions Bank.
On October 8, 1998, the plaintiffs sued Regions Bank and
Advanced Realty, among others, alleging that Sheffield had
granted them a purchase-money mortgage; that the real property
had been sold to them at a foreclosure sale because of
Sheffield's default under the mortgage taken on the property
by Regions Bank; and that they had received a foreclosure
deed.  The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the
mortgage executed by Sheffield in favor of them had priority
over the mortgage executed in favor of Regions Bank; that the
foreclosure sale pursuant to which the plaintiffs purchased
the real property eliminated any interest Regions Bank
previously held in the property; and that the foreclosure sale
and deed by which Advanced Realty purportedly purchased the
real property was without legal effect.
On November 16, 1998, Regions Bank answered the complaint
and asserted a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring that
its mortgage had priority over the plaintiffs' mortgage and
that the plaintiffs' mortgage was subordinated to the Regions
Bank mortgage.  On that same date, Advanced Realty answered
1060896
4
the complaint and also asserted a counterclaim seeking a
judgment declaring that the mortgage granted to Regions Bank
had priority over the plaintiffs' mortgage; that the
foreclosure by Regions Bank was valid and enforceable; and
that the purchase of the real property by Advanced Realty at
the foreclosure sale held by Regions Bank had the effect of
transferring full legal title to the real property to Advanced
Realty.
On August 11, 2000, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint to allege that they were the legal and rightful
owners of the real property; that Regions Bank and Advanced
Realty had willfully and wantonly continued to exercise
dominion and control over the real property; that Advanced
Realty had been renting the real property to a third party;
and that any funds obtained by Advanced Realty under its
rental arrangement rightfully belong to the plaintiffs.  The
plaintiffs 
adopted 
and 
incorporated into this amended
complaint the averments and allegations contained in the
declaratory-judgment complaint by which they claimed legal
title to the real property by virtue of the purchase-money
mortgage and the foreclosure deed.  
1060896
5
In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought from
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty both compensatory damages and
punitive damages on their claim alleging a willful and wanton
exercise of dominion over the property.  Additionally, the
plaintiffs sought from Advanced Realty the recovery of any
funds obtained by virtue of its renting the property to a
third party and  further sought the imposition of a
constructive trust on any funds obtained by Advanced Realty by
virtue of its renting the property to a third party.  On
September 5, 2000, Regions Bank and Advanced Realty answered
the plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
On October 25, 2000, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint a second time to again allege that they were the
legal owners of the real property at issue by virtue of the
purchase-money mortgage and the foreclosure deed.  Attached to
this pleading were copies of the purchase-money mortgage and
the foreclosure deed, which contained a legal description of
the real property.  The plaintiffs sought immediate possession
of the property and asserted a claim against Regions Bank and
Advanced Realty for the fair rental value of the property
during the time Regions Bank and Advanced Realty were in
1060896
Mesne profits are defined as "profits of an estate
1
received by a tenant in wrongful possession between two
dates."  Black's Law Dictionary 1246 (8th ed. 2004).
6
possession of the property.  The plaintiffs also alleged that
they were entitled to mesne profits from Regions Bank and
Advanced Realty during the time Regions Bank and Advanced
Realty possessed the property.   
1
On May 31, 2001, Regions Bank and Advanced Realty
answered the plaintiffs' second amended complaint.  On that
same date both Regions Bank and Advanced Realty moved the
trial court for a partial summary judgment as to the counts in
the plaintiffs' amended complaints alleging ownership of the
real property and that Regions Bank and Advanced Realty had
willfully and wantonly exercised dominion and control over the
property.  Both Regions Bank and Advanced Realty treated this
latter claim as one alleging trespass.  Regions Bank and
Advanced Realty argued that a trespass claim does not lie
because, they argued, the plaintiffs have failed to establish
that they had actual possession of the property and that
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty intentionally trespassed upon
the property.
1060896
7
On October 11, 2001, the plaintiffs filed an opposition
to Regions Bank and Advanced Realty's motion for a partial
summary judgment.  The plaintiffs argued that a trespass claim
is actionable under § 6-5-212, Ala. Code 1975, which provides
that "[t]he bare right of possession to lands authorizes their
recovery by the owner of such right and also damages for the
withholding of the right."  The paintiffs argued that they
maintained a claim to the rightful possession  of the property
based on the purchase-money mortgage and the foreclosure deed;
therefore, they contended that they were  entitled to pursue
a cause of action arising out of trespass.
Following an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court, on
June 2, 2004, entered the following judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs ("the final judgment"):
"This case having come before the undersigned
for trial and after considering the evidence and
arguments presented by counsel, hereby ORDERS,
ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
"1.  The foreclosure deed whereby [the
plaintiffs] purchased the real property at
issue, recorded at Book 1998, Page 139
(Doc. # D-1998-1969) in the Probate Court
of Etowah County, is valid and title to the
property 
is 
properly 
vested 
in 
[the
plaintiffs].
1060896
It does not appear from the record whether the trial
2
court expressly ruled on the partial-summary-judgment motion
filed by Regions Bank and Advanced Realty on the plaintiffs'
claim  seeking compensatory and punitive damages and alleging
ownership and a wrongful exercise of dominion and control by
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty over the real property.
However, because the trial court awarded the plaintiffs both
compensatory and punitive damages against Advanced Realty it
must have concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover on the claim alleging a wrongful exercise of dominion
and control over the real property.
8
"2.  The Mortgage given to [Regions Bank]
at Book 3118, Page 247 was and is inferior
to the mortgage granted to [the plaintiffs]
recorded at Book 3118, Page 252 and thus
the foreclosure deed whereby Advanced
[Realty] purportedly purchased the real
estate from Regions [Bank], recorded at
Book 1998, Page 239 (Doc. # D-1998-3500),
is a nullity, is void, and is without legal
effect.
"3. [The plaintiffs] are further entitled
to, and do hereby recover from, the
Defendant, Advanced Realty Co., Inc., the
sum of $52,325.25 in compensatory damages,
based upon the reasonable rental value of
the property at issue, plus $850.00 cash
[per] month plus accrued interest from
March 2003 to June 1, 2004.
 
"4. [The plaintiffs] are further entitled
to and do hereby recover from the Defendant
Advanced Realty Co., Inc., the sum of
$1,000.00 in punitive damages;[2]
"5. [The plaintiffs] are further entitled
to 
and 
do 
hereby 
recover 
from 
the
Defendants, Regions Bank and Advanced
1060896
9
Realty Co., Inc., jointly and severally the
sum of $188.00 in court costs.
"6. 
The 
relief 
requested 
in 
the
C o u n t e r c l a i m s  
f i l e d  
b y  
t h e
Defendants/Counterclaim-plaintiffs, 
Regions
Bank and Advanced Realty Co., Inc. is
hereby denied."
On June 30, 2004, Regions Bank and Advanced Realty moved
the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate the final judgment
and/or for a new trial arguing, among other things, that the
trial court's finding that the plaintiffs' mortgage had
priority over Regions Bank's mortgage was erroneous; that the
trial court's finding that they had exercised willful and
wanton dominion over the property and its award of punitive
damages based on that finding was not supported by the facts
of the case; and that the trial court's judgment did not give
Advanced Realty credit for improvements made to the property.
On September 7, 2004, the trial court entered an order denying
the postjudgment motion.
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty appealed the final
judgment to this Court on October 7, 2004.  On that same date
the trial court stayed execution of the final judgment and
approved a supersedeas bond posted by Regions Bank and
1060896
Rule 8, Ala. R. App. P., requires that the supersedeas
3
bond be executed in amount equal to 125% of the amount of the
judgment when the judgment exceeds $10,000.  
10
Advanced Realty in the amount of $83,891.56.   Regions Bank is
3
designated on the bond as the "Appellant-Principal"; Advanced
Realty is designated on the bond as the "Surety."  On November
9, 2004, this Court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975,
transferred the case to the Court of Civil Appeals.  On July
22, 2005, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the final
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, without an opinion.
Regions Bank v. Chasteen (No. 2040137), 954 So. 2d 3 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005)(table).  The Court of Civil Appeals issued a
certificate of judgment on July 22, 2005.  The costs of the
appeal were taxed against Regions Bank and Advanced Realty
pursuant to Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.  
On August 5, 2005, Regions Bank and Advanced Realty
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which this
Court granted on November 4, 2005.  On July 14, 2006, this
Court issued an order quashing the writ (case no. 1041719).
On July 17, 2006, the certificate of judgment issued by the
Court of Civil Appeals was transmitted to the trial court.
1060896
The amounts $70,765.89 and $4,502.64 are the sums the
4
plaintiffs use in their appellate brief (the brief actually
states the total as being $70,675.89, but this is clearly a
typographical error); those amounts vary slightly from the
actual sums set forth by the plaintiffs in their motion.  The
amount of the "prejudgment" accrued interest sought by the
plaintiffs varies slightly in the record.  This Court will use
the sums of $70,765.89 and $4,502.64 for purposes of this
opinion.  The parties are by no means bound by this Court's
mathematical computations, and, if necessary, the amounts may
be recomputed upon remand.     
11
On July 26, 2006, the plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 8(c),
Ala. R. App. P., filed a motion entitled "Motion to Enforce
Liability and Judgment on Supersedeas Bond," seeking to
enforce the final judgment.
   The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to
$70,765.89, which they claimed represented the full monetary
value of the final judgment (compensatory damages of
$52,325.25 + $12,750 (representing $850 per month of rent from
March 2003 through June 1, 2004) + $1,000 in punitive damages
+ $188 court costs + $4,502.64 of accrued prejudgment interest
from March 1, 2003 through June 1, 2004).   Additionally, the
4
plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to postjudgment
interest of $17,979.96 on the above sum (excluding court
costs) calculated at the statutory rate of 12% from June 2,
2004 –- the date of the final judgment  –-  through July 17,
1060896
12
2006 –- the date the Court of Civil Appeals' certificate of
judgment was transmitted to the trial court.  Thus, the total
amount sought by the plaintiffs in this motion was $88,745.85.
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty surrendered possession of the
real property to the plaintiffs on July 31, 2006.
On October 4, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion
entitled "Motion to Clarify And/Or Augment Final Judgment
Entered June 2, 2004."  The plaintiffs sought additional
damages at the rate of $850 per month plus interest from
October 7, 2004 –- the date execution of the final judgment
was stayed –- until July 17, 2006 –- the date the Court of
Civil Appeals' certificate of judgment was transmitted to the
trial court and the stay of execution of the final judgment
was lifted.  The plaintiffs contended that the posting of the
supersedeas bond stayed the execution of the final judgment,
including their repossession and use of the real property.
The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to damages for
the period they were excluded from their property while the
case was pending on appeal and the execution of the final
judgment was stayed.
1060896
13
On October 17, 2006, Regions Bank moved the trial court
to discharge the supersedeas bond and satisfy the final
judgment against it.  Regions Bank contemporaneously paid into
the trial court registry $83,891.56, the full amount of the
supersedeas bond.  Regions Bank sought in its motion an order
from the trial court (1) discharging the supersedeas bond and
the obligations of all surety under the bond, (2) deeming the
final judgment against Regions Bank to be fully paid and
satisfied, and (3) authorizing the disbursement by the trial
court clerk of the deposited funds.
On November 7, 2006, the plaintiffs moved the trial court
to condemn the funds paid into the trial court by Regions Bank
and filed a motion in opposition to Regions Bank's motion
seeking to discharge the supersedeas bond and to satisfy the
final judgment.  The plaintiffs sought an order from the trial
court immediately releasing to them the funds that had been
paid into the trial court by Regions Bank.  Additionally, the
plaintiffs contended that the total amount of the final
judgment, including the postjudgment interest to which they
were entitled, was $88,745.85, which exceeded the amount of
the supersedeas bond.  Relying upon McBarnett  v. Breed, 6
1060896
14
Ala. 476 (1844), and Windham v. Coats, 8 Ala. 285 (1845), the
plaintiffs argued that because Regions Bank was designated on
the supersedeas bond as the "Appellant-Principal," it was
liable for the total amount of the judgment and costs of the
action even if that sum exceeds the amount of the supersedeas
bond. Additionally, the plaintiffs, relying upon Hudson v.
Hudson, 555 So. 2d 1084 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), contended that
"costs" included the attorney fees they had incurred in
successfully resisting Regions Bank and Advanced Realty's
appeal.  The plaintiffs argued that Regions Bank was not
entitled to a satisfaction of the judgment until it had paid
to them the moneys they claimed in excess of the $83,891.56
supersedeas bond that had been paid into the trial court by
Regions Bank.
On November 8, 2006, the plaintiffs specifically moved
the trial court for an order awarding them an attorney fee and
expenses of $22,931.34, which they claimed to have incurred in
successfully defending Regions Bank and Advanced Realty's
appeal.  The plaintiffs argued that Regions Bank, as the
"Appellant-Principal," was liable for the costs of the action
1060896
15
–- including the attorney fees on appeal –- even if that
amount exceeded the total amount of the supersedeas bond.
On November 22, 2006, the trial court entered an order
granting Regions Bank's motion to discharge the supersedeas
bond and to satisfy the final judgment as to Regions Bank.
The trial court discharged the supersedeas bond and terminated
the liability of all sureties under the bond.  The trial court
also ordered that all Regions Bank's liability to the
plaintiffs under the final judgment had been satisfied. 
On December 19, 2006, the plaintiffs moved the trial
court to alter, amend, or vacate its order of November 22,
2006, discharging the supersedeas bond and noting as satisfied
the final judgment against Regions Bank.  The plaintiffs also
moved the trial court to set for a hearing: (1) their motion
for an attorney fee and expenses incurred in successfully
defending the appeal, and (2) their motion to "Clarify And/Or
Augment the Final Judgment" entered on June 2, 2004.
On December 20, 2006, the trial court entered an order
stating that all Advanced Realty's liability to the plaintiffs
arising under the final judgment had been satisfied.  On
December 28, 2006, the plaintiffs moved the trial court to
1060896
16
alter, amend, or vacate its order of December 20, 2006,
satisfying the final judgment as to Advanced Realty.  The
plaintiffs argued that a motion to satisfy the final judgment
as to Advanced Realty was not made in accordance with Rule
7(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that they were not properly
served with a copy of the motion in accordance with Rule 5,
Ala. R. Civ. P.  Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that
when postjudgment interest is added to the amount of the final
judgment, the total final-judgment liability exceeds the
amount of the supersedeas bond paid into the trial court by
Regions Bank.  The plaintiffs contended that Advanced Realty
may be due a credit on the amount owed under the final
judgment by virtue of the amount of the supersedeas bond paid
into the trial court but that Advanced Realty was not entitled
to a satisfaction on the final judgment until the full amount
of the final judgment had been paid.
On February 1, 2007, the trial court entered an order
setting all pending motions for a hearing.  Following a
hearing, the trial court, on February 20, 2007, entered an
order denying all the plaintiffs' pending motions.
1060896
The plaintiffs originally claimed postjudgment damages
5
for lost rent and interest from October 7, 2004, the date
execution of the final judgment was stayed through July 17,
2006, the date the Court of Civil Appeals transmitted its
certificate of judgment to the trial court and the stay of
execution of the final judgment was lifted.  In this motion
the plaintiffs claimed postjudgment rental damages and
interest from the date the final judgment was entered on June
2, 2004, through July 17, 2006, the date the certificate of
judgment was transmitted.
17
On March 9, 2007, the plaintiffs moved the trial court to
alter, amend, or vacate its order of February 20, 2007, denying
all of their pending motions.  Citing § 6-6-293, Ala. Code
1975, the plaintiffs again argued that they were entitled to
postjudgment damages for lost rent plus interest in the amount
of $24,552.25.   On March 13, 2007, the trial entered an order
5
denying this motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'[W]hen 
a 
trial 
court 
hears 
ore 
tenus
testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those
findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is
palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.'  Philpot v.
State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002).  'However,
where 
the 
facts 
before 
the 
trial 
court 
are
essentially undisputed and the controversy involves
questions of law for the court to consider, the
court's 
judgment 
carries 
no 
presumption 
of
correctness.'  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.
2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996).  Questions of law are
1060896
18
reviewed de novo. BT Sec. Corp. v. W.R. Huff Asset
Mgmt. Co., 891 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 2004)."
Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala.
2004).
I. The November 22, 2006, Order Satisfying the Final
Judgment as to Regions Bank
The plaintiffs argue that the amount of the final judgment
to which they are entitled exceeds the amount of the
supersedeas bond paid into the trial court by Regions Bank and
that, therefore, that the trial court erred in entering its
order satisfying the final judgment as to Regions Bank because,
they say, the final judgment has not been fully satisfied.
They contend that Regions Bank as the "Appellant-Principal"
under the supersedeas bond is liable for the total amount of
the judgment and costs of the action, including attorney fees,
even if that sum exceeds the amount of the supersedeas bond.
The plaintiffs contend that under Alabama law a third-
party surety's liability may properly be limited to the amount
of the supersedeas bond but that an "Appellant-Principal" has
potentially greater liability under the supersedeas bond.  The
plaintiffs specifically rely upon McBarnett v. Breed, 6 Ala.
476 (1844), and Windham v. Coats, 8 Ala. 285 (1845), for their
1060896
19
contention that Regions Bank, as the "Appellant-Principal" on
the supersedeas bond, is liable for the total amount of the
judgment and costs of the action even though that sum may
exceed the amount of the supersedeas bond.
In McBarnett, McBarnett sued Breed in a court presided
over by a justice of the peace, and a judgment was entered in
favor of Breed.  McBarnett executed a bond and appealed the
judgment to the circuit court.  Kerr was designated as the
surety on the appeal bond.  The circuit court also entered a
judgment in favor of Breed.  The judgment provided that Breed
recover from McBarnett and Kerr, as the surety, the costs of
the action.  This Court stated:
"In Quinn v. Adair, 4 Ala. 315 [(1842)], we
held, that the statute, requiring the party appealing
from a justice's judgment to give bond and security
for the appeal, applied as well to the plaintiff as
to the defendant; but as the penalty of the bond is
only to be in double the amount of the judgment
below, it is evidently, in most cases, a very
insufficient security.  The circumstance that it is
so, will not, however, warrant us in saying, that the
surety can be made liable beyond the penalty of the
bond.  Here, the penalty is only for [$5.25]; and
although the judgment does not state the amount of
the costs, we feel obliged judicially to notice, that
they must necessarily exceed that sum.
"The proper judgment, in this case, would have
been, that the defendant recover of the plaintiff and
Kerr, his security in the appeal bond, the costs of
1060896
20
this suit, not exceeding the penalty of the bond; and
if the same shall be found to exceed the said
penalty, 
then 
the 
excess 
beyond 
of 
the 
said
plaintiff."
6 Ala. at 476.
In Windham, Coats filed a counterclaim against the
plaintiff Windham in a court presided over by a justice of the
peace.  A judgment was entered in favor of Coats and against
Windham, including interest and costs.  Windham appealed this
judgment to the circuit court and executed a bond in the amount
of $20 for the "payment of the principal, costs, charges, and
all expenses," 8 Ala. at 287, related to the action.  Windham's
coplaintiffs, Rose and Beard, were designated as the sureties
on the bond.  Subsequently, a judgment was entered against
Windham and the sureties on the bond for $193.35, which
included the "sum of $5.39, debt and interest, eighty cents
damages, and all costs."  8 Ala. at 286.  Windham objected to
the entry of the judgment on the bond, arguing that before the
disposition of the case he had fully paid to the clerk of the
court the $20, the amount of the penalty of the bond. 
This Court stated:
"In McBarnett and Kerr v. Breed, 6 Ala. R. 476
[(1844)], the penalty of the appeal bond was $5.25,
this Court said, that we would judicially know, that
1060896
21
the costs exceeded the penalty, and beyond that sum
the obligors in the bond were not liable.  Here the
amount of the costs are not left to conjecture, but
they are explicitly stated in the bill of exceptions.
If no objection had been made and overruled, to the
rendition of a judgment by the Circuit Court, for an
amount exceeding the bond, we should have regarded
the irregularity as a mere clerical misprision,
amendable at the cost of the plaintiff in error.  But
the sureties there appeared by counsel, and resisted
a recovery against them, for any thing more than the
penalty; and the act of 1824, authorises the revision
of the judgment on error. Clay's Dig. 322, § 55. The
payment of the amount of the bond, to the clerk of
the Court, before judgment, did not, in itself,
absolve the obligors from liability; inasmuch as the
clerk had not authority, under the circumstances, to
receive the money. Murray v. Charles, 5 Ala. 678
[(1843)]. To have made the payment effectual, it
should have been shown, that it was assented to by
the plaintiff, or that the money was paid over.
"The judgment of the Circuit Court must be
reversed, and here rendered, that the plaintiff below
recover of Windham and his sureties in the appeal
bond, the debt, damages and costs, amounting to $20,
and for the residue of the costs, the judgment will
be against Windham alone."
8 Ala. at 285.
We find the authorities relied on by the plaintiffs to be
distinguishable from this case.  In both Breed and Windham, the
principals charged with the payment of the  judgment and costs
of those actions in excess of the face amount of the bond were
parties for whom a money judgment had been entered.  In this
case no money judgment had been entered against Regions Bank.
1060896
22
The only judgment entered against Regions Bank granted
declaratory relief in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the final judgment
and declared Regions Bank jointly and severally liable with
Advanced Realty for the $188 in court costs awarded by the
trial court in paragraph 5 of the final judgment.  The
compensatory damages of $52,325.25 along with the $850 per
month rental value of the real property from March 2003 to June
2004 and the $1,000 in punitive damages were awarded against
only Advanced Realty.  
If Regions Bank had not assumed liability to the
plaintiffs by posting, as principal, the supersedeas bond, its
liability in this case would have been limited to the $188 in
court costs.  Although Regions Bank posted the supersedeas bond
in this case as the principal, staying the operation of the
final judgment and ensuring the payment of the sums awarded to
the plaintiffs, including those awarded from Advanced Realty
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the bond, it had the
responsibility to satisfy only its obligation under the bond
up to its face amount of $83,891.56, which it did by paying
that amount into the circuit court.
1060896
23
The total amount of damages claimed by the plaintiffs in
this case, including those damages awarded in the final
judgment, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, the attorney
fee claimed pursuant to the supersedeas bond, and the
postjudgment rental damages clearly exceed the amount of the
supersedeas bond.  However, because no money judgment was
entered against Regions Bank, and because Regions Bank, as
principal, had assumed liability under the supersedeas bond up
to only $83,891.56, the plaintiffs cannot recover from Regions
Bank any damages in excess of the amount of the bond.
Accordingly, the trial court's order satisfying the final
judgment as to Regions Bank is due to be affirmed.  To the
extent that the plaintiffs are entitled to damages above the
amount of the supersedeas bond, those damages must be collected
from Advanced Realty, the party against whom the money damages
were awarded in the final judgment.
II. The December 20, 2006, Order Satisfying the Final
Judgment as to Advanced Realty
The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
entering its December 20, 2006, order satisfying the final
judgment as to Advanced Realty because, they say, they are
entitled to additional moneys from Advance Realty.
1060896
24
A. Prejudgment Accrued Interest
Paragraph 3 of the final judgment states:
"[The plaintiffs] are further entitled to, and do
hereby recover from, the Defendant, Advanced Realty
Co., Inc., the sum of $52,325.25 in compensatory
damages, based upon the reasonable rental value of
the property at issue, plus $850.00 cash [per] month
plus accrued interest from March 2003 to June 1,
2004."
The plaintiffs concede in their reply brief to this Court that
the trial court's award of $52,325.25 in compensatory damages
against 
Advanced 
Realty 
included 
prejudgment 
interest.
However, they argue that they are entitled to an additional
award of prejudgment interest on that part of the judgment
against Advanced Realty awarding rental value of the property
of $850 per month from March 2003 through June 1, 2004.  We
agree.  The plaintiffs state the following in their reply
brief:
"First, [the trial court] clearly did award
prejudgment interest in both the portion of the final
judgment that actually calculated monetary damages
($52,325.25) as well as that portion of the [final
judgment] that did not calculate the damage[s] figure
('... plus $850 cash [per] month plus accrued
interest from March 2003 to June 1, 2004').
"As argued in the Trial Court, it is clear that
the sum of $52,325.25 included prejudgment interest.
That is clear from plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 which makes
clear [they] sought damages in the amount of $850 per
1060896
The parties stipulated to a $4,000 credit for Advanced
6
Realty 
for 
expenses 
incurred 
by 
Advanced 
Realty 
for
improvements to the property.
25
month from September of 1998 and that they also
sought 
prejudgment 
interest 
on 
that 
sum.
Accordingly, if the [trial court] had somehow
disregarded the interest element set forth in Exhibit
19, the maximum amount of compensatory damages that
could have been awarded in the 'calculated' portion
of its final judgment (i.e., from September 1998
through February 2003) would have been $41,900 ($850
x 54 - $4,000
 = $41,900).
[6]
"The question then becomes, in light of the
Trial Court's award of prejudgment interest for the
period of time from September 1998 through February
2003, would the Court not also award prejudgment on
the 'reasonable rental damages' from March 2003 to
June 2004?  Fortunately, this is not a question we
need to grapple with because the [trial court]
expressly awarded prejudgment interest for that
period of time when it stated in the final judgment
that [the plaintiffs] were due 'plus $850 cash [per]
month plus accrued interest from March 2003 to June
1, 2004.'"
(Plaintiffs' reply brief, at 10-11.)
Rule 53, Ala. R. App. P., which grants this Court and the
Court of Civil Appeals the authority to affirm a judgment or
an order without an opinion, provides as follows in subsection
(d):
"An order of affirmance issued by the Supreme Court
or the Court of Civil Appeals by which a judgment or
order is affirmed without an opinion ... shall have
no precedential value ... and shall not be used by
1060896
26
any court within this state, except for the purpose
of establishing the application of the doctrine of
law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel,
double jeopardy, or procedural bar."
This Court has stated:
"'"Under the doctrine of the 'law of the case,'
whatever is once established between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of that
case, whether or not correct on general principles,
so long as the facts on which the decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case."
Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 924
(Ala. 1987).  See also Titan Indem. Co. v. Riley, 679
So. 2d 701 (Ala. 1996).  "It is well established that
on remand the issues decided by an appellate court
become the 'law of the case,' and that the trial
court 
must 
comply 
with 
the 
appellate 
court's
mandate."  Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala.
1989).'"
Bagley v. Creekside Motors, Inc., 913 So. 2d 441, 445 (Ala.
2005) (quoting Southern United Fire Ins. Co. v. Purma, 792 So.
2d 1092, 1094 (Ala. 2001)).
In the final judgment, the trial court expressly awarded
the plaintiffs "$850.00 cash [per] month plus accrued interest
from March 2003 to June 1, 2004."  Regions Bank and Advanced
Realty appealed this judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals;
that court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, without
an opinion.  Regions Bank and Advanced Realty then petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari contending that the Court
1060896
The compensatory damages based on the reasonable rental
7
value of the real property were awarded only against Advanced
Realty.  Therefore, only Advanced Realty is liable for this
award of interest.  Additionally, as discussed in Part I of
this opinion, Regions Bank's liability is limited to the face
amount of the supersedeas bond; to the extent the addition of
the prejudgment interest to the amount of the judgment would
exceed the amount of the supersedeas bond, that excess is
recoverable only from Advanced Realty. 
27
of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment
based on its finding that they were not bona fide purchasers
of the property in question and that the Court of Civil Appeals
erred in holding that the trial court did not err in admitting
parol evidence concerning the priority of the mortgages that
allegedly contradicted the terms of a purchase and sale
agreement.  Although this Court's action has no bearing on the
law of the case, this Court initially granted the petition for
a writ of certiorari but later quashed it.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court's
award of "$850.00 cash [per] month plus accrued interest from
March 2003 to June 1, 2004," to the plaintiffs has become the
law of the case and that the plaintiffs are entitled to an
interest award from Advanced Realty  on $850 per month from
7
March 1, 2003, through June 1, 2004.  
B. Postjudgment Interest
1060896
28
In their "Motion to Enforce Liability and Judgment on
Supersedeas 
Bond," 
the 
plaintiffs 
sought 
 
postjudgment 
interest
in the amount of $17,979.96 payable at the statutory rate of
12% from June 2, 2004, through July 17, 2006.  Section 8-8-10,
Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
"Judgments for the payment of money, other than
costs, if based upon a contract action, bear interest
from the day of the cause of action, at the same rate
of interest as stated in said contract; all other
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12
percent per annum ...."
Postjudgment interest begins to accrue on the date the trial
court entered its judgment.  Elmore County Comm'n v. Ragona,
561 So. 2d 192 (Ala. 1990).
The plaintiffs' entitlement to postjudgment interest is
largely undisputed; the amount paid by Regions Bank to the
trial court –- $83,891.56, the face amount of the supersedeas
bond -- included postjudgment interest.  We conclude that the
plaintiffs are indeed entitled to an award of postjudgment
interest on the damages awarded them in the final judgment
payable at 12% per annum from June 2, 2004 –- the date the
final judgment was entered –-  through July 17, 2006 –- the
date the Court of Civil Appeals transmitted its certificate of
judgment to the trial court.  To the extent that it is
1060896
29
determined by the trial court on remand that the postjudgment
interest to which the plaintiffs are entitled exceeds the
amount of the supersedeas bond, the excess is recoverable only
from Advanced Realty, as discussed above in Part I of this
opinion.
We conclude that the plaintiffs are entitled to both
additional prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest and,
therefore, that the trial court's order satisfying the final
judgment as to Advanced Realty is due to be reversed.  Because
we are reversing this portion of the trial court's judgment for
the foregoing reasons, we pretermit any discussion of the
plaintiffs' additional argument that the trial court's order
satisfying the final judgment as to Advanced Realty should be
reversed on procedural grounds. 
III. Postjudgment Damages for Lost Rent
On October 4, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion with the
trial court entitled "Motion to Clarify And/Or Augment Final
Judgment" seeking additional damages not awarded by the trial
court in the final judgment.  The plaintiffs sought $850 per
month plus interest initially from October 7, 2004 –- the date
execution of the final judgment was stayed –- until July 17,
1060896
30
2006 –- the date the Court of Civil Appeals' certificate of
judgment was transmitted to the trial court –- as compensation
for the period they were excluded from their property while the
case was pending on appeal and the execution of the final
judgment was stayed.  The plaintiffs subsequently sought
postjudgment damages for lost rent and interest from June 2,
2004, the date the judgment was entered by the trial court
through the date the Court of Civil Appeals' certificate of
judgment was transmitted to the trial court.  
Section 6-6-280, Ala. Code 1975, which is found in Article
7 of Chapter 6 of Title 6 of the Code, states: 
"(a) A plaintiff commencing an action for the
recovery of lands or the possession thereof has an
election to proceed by an action of ejectment or by
an action in the nature of an action of ejectment as
is provided in subsection (b) of this section.
"(b) An action for the recovery of land or the
possession thereof in the nature of an action in
ejectment may be maintained without a statement of
any lease or demise to the plaintiff or ouster by a
casual or nominal ejector, and the complaint is
sufficient if it alleges that the plaintiff was
possessed of the premises or has the legal title
thereto, properly designating or describing them, and
that the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully
withholds and detains the same. This action must be
commenced in the name of the real owner of the land
or in the name of the person entitled to the
possession thereof, though the plaintiff may have
obtained his title thereto by a conveyance made by a
1060896
The parties' treatment of the plaintiffs' claim alleging
8
ownership and wrongful exercise of dominion and control by
Regions Bank and Advanced Realty over the real property as one
31
grantor who was not in possession of the land at the
time of the execution of the conveyance thereof. The
plaintiff may recover in this action mesne profits
and damages for waste or any other injury to the
lands, as the plaintiff's interests in the lands
entitled him to recover, to be computed up to the
time of the verdict."
The plaintiffs' amended complaints satisfied the pleading
criteria for an action in the nature of an ejectment under §
6-6-280(b).  The plaintiffs sought immediate possession of the
real property, claiming rightful ownership and title to the
real property by virtue of the purchase-money mortgage and the
foreclosure deed.  The mortgage and the foreclosure deed, which
set forth a description of the real property being claimed by
the plaintiffs, were both attached to the plaintiffs' second
amended complaint and to the original complaint for a
declaratory judgment, which was incorporated by reference in
the first amended complaint.  Additionally, the amended
complaints also alleged that Regions Bank and Advanced Realty
had willfully and wantonly continued to exercise dominion over
the real property, for which the plaintiffs sought both
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as mesne profits.8
1060896
based on trespass in the motion for a partial summary judgment
and the response to the motion does not affect this Court's
conclusion that the plaintiff had stated a claim in the nature
of ejectment pursuant to § 6-6-280(b), because a trespass
claim and a claim in the nature of ejectment are similar.  An
action in the nature of ejectment is "not only ... an
efficient means for the adjudication of the right to
possession, but also [is] a favored action for the trial of
the legal title to land, that action being similar in nature
to both an action in trespass and an action to quiet title.
Kelley v. Mashburn, 286 Ala. 7, 236 So. 2d 326 (1970);
McCormick v. McCormick, 221 Ala. 606, 130 So. 226 (1930);
Vasko v. Jardine, 346 So. 2d 962 (Ala. 1977); Findlay v.
Hardwick, 230 Ala. 197, 160 So. 336 (1935)."  MacMillan
Bloedell, Inc. v. Ezell, 475 So. 2d 493, 497 (Ala. 1985)
(emphasis added).
32
Finally, although not expressly stated, implicit in the final
judgment 
is the trial court's determination that the plaintiffs
were entitled to immediate possession of the real property in
issue. 
Because the plaintiffs had asserted a claim in the nature
of ejectment pursuant to § 6-6-280(b), they were able to seek
a judgment for postjudgment rents against Regions Bank and
Advanced Realty pursuant to § 6-6-293, Ala. Code 1975, as an
additional remedy under Article 7.  Section 6-6-293, Ala. Code
1975, provides:
"The plaintiff may have judgment against the
defendant for the rent of the premises which accrues
after judgment and before the delivery of possession
1060896
33
by motion in the circuit court where the judgment was
entered, on 10 days' notice in writing, unless the
judgment is stayed by appeal and bond, in which case
the motion may be made after affirmance of the
judgment."
(Emphasis added.)
Here, it is undisputed that Advanced Realty continued to
occupy the real property following the trial court's entry of
the final judgment, which found that title to the real property
was properly vested in the plaintiffs and that Advanced Realty
had wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the real
property.  The execution of the final judgment was stayed by
the posting of a supersedeas bond, and Advanced Realty
continued to occupy the real property while the case was
pending on appeal.  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
final judgment and transmitted its certificate of judgment to
the trial court on July 17, 2006.  Advanced Realty delivered
possession of the real property to the plaintiffs on July 31,
2006.  Following the affirmance of the final judgment on
appeal, the plaintiffs moved the trial court for an award of
postjudgment rental damages at the rate of $850 per month and
interest to compensate them for the period Advanced Realty
continued to occupy the real property following the entry of
1060896
The plaintiffs' original motion was entitled "Motion to
9
Clarify And/Or Augment Final Judgment Entered June 2, 2004."
It is well settled that the substance of a motion, not its
nomenclature, is controlling; the relief sought in a motion
determines how the motion is treated.  Ex parte Lang, 500 So.
2d 3 (Ala. 1986); and Campbell v. Campbell, 718 So. 2d 76
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998).  The trial court originally denied this
motion, and the plaintiffs moved the trial court to alter,
amend, or vacate its order denying the motion.  In their
postjudgment motion, the plaintiffs presented the trial court
with the authority in support of the relief that they had
already argued they were entitled to by citing § 6-6-293, Ala.
Code  1975.  Thus, the issue was properly presented to the
trial court and preserved for appellate review. 
Again, because the trial court awarded compensatory
10
damages based on the reasonable rental value of  the real
property against only Advanced Realty, only Advanced Realty
would 
be liable for the postjudgment rental damages.
Additionally, as discussed in Part I of this opinion, Regions
Bank's liability is limited to the face amount of the
supersedeas bond; to the extent that the addition of the
postjudgment rental damages would exceed the amount of the
supersedeas bond, that excess is recoverable only from
Advanced Realty.   
34
the final judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be the rightful
owners of the property and while the case was pending on
appeal.   Based on the plain language of § 6-6-293, the
9
plaintiffs were entitled to recover from Advanced Realty10
postjudgment rents for the period Advanced Realty continued to
possess the real property after the trial court entered the
final judgment on June 2, 2004, through July 31, 2006, the date
Advanced Realty surrendered possession of the real property to
1060896
35
the plaintiffs.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
judgment to the extent that it denied the plaintiffs' claim for
postjudgment rents and interest.
IV. Attorney Fee for Successfully Defending Appeal
The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in
denying their motion seeking to recover as "costs" their
attorney fees incurred in successfully defending Regions Bank
and Advanced Realty's appeal of the final judgment; such fees,
they say, are damages recoverable in this State as costs under
the supersedeas bond.  It is well settled that "'Alabama
follows the "American rule," whereby attorney fees may be
recovered if they are provided for by statute or by contract
or if they are called for by special equity, such as in
proceedings 
where the attorney's efforts create a "common fund"
out of which fees may be paid.'"  City of Bessemer v. McClain,
957 So. 2d 1061, 1078 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Battle v. City of
Birmingham, 656 So. 2d 344, 347 (Ala. 1995)).  However, relying
on Hudson v. Hudson, 555 So. 2d 1084 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), the
plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to recover as "costs"
under the supersedeas bond the attorney fees they incurred in
successfully defending Regions Bank and Advanced Realty's
1060896
This language is substantially similar to the language
11
of the supersedeas bond in this case.
36
appeal.  Regions Bank asks this Court to overrule Hudson to the
extent it contravenes the "American rule" with regard to the
award of attorney fees.
In Hudson, the wife was found to be in contempt of court
for failing to deed certain real property to the husband
pursuant to a divorce judgment.  The wife posted a supersedeas
bond in the amount of $63,750 and petitioned the Court of Civil
Appeals for a writ of certiorari.  The supersedeas bond stated
that the wife agreed to "satisfy such judgment, penalties,
costs, including costs of appeal as may be rendered in this
case" if the wife was unsuccessful on the petition to the Court
of Civil Appeals.
  Hudson, 555 So. 2d at 1085.  
11
After the wife's petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied, the husband sued on the supersedeas bond to recover,
among other things, an attorney fee, taxes and interest paid
on the mortgage during the time the wife unlawfully retained
title to the property, and expert fees required to prove
depreciation on the land and the interest on the value of the
property.  The trial court awarded the husband the relief he
1060896
37
sought.  The wife argued on appeal that the attorney fee, taxes
and 
interest, and the expert-witness fees were not specifically
designated as damages recoverable under the supersedeas bond
and that the husband could not recover those damages as "costs
of appeal."  Hudson, supra.  In affirming the trial court's
judgment, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"Implicit in its opinion, the trial court
determined that certain costs and damages were 'costs
of appeal' pursuant to Rule 8, Alabama Rules of
Appellate Procedure.  Rule 8, [Ala. R. App. P.],
requires an appellant to execute a supersedeas bond
with sufficient sureties to stay execution of the
judgment.  The purpose for requiring the bond is as
stated:
"'[T]o keep the parties in statu quo
pending the appeal.  This purpose, we now
say, reached not only to possession of the
property, but every other consequence of
the judgment, including costs, and the
evidential status and value of the judgment
pending appeal.'
"Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Torian, 221 Ala. 131, 133,
127 So. 829, 831 (1930).  See also Osborn v. Riley,
331 So. 2d 268, 274 (Ala. 1976).
"The committee comments to Rule 8,[Ala. R. App.
P.], state in part as follows:
"'Subdivision (a) provides for the stay
of execution of a judgment pending appeal
in three situations: ... In so providing,
it supersedes Title 7, §§ 793, 794 and
795....'
1060896
38
"Code 1940, title 7, § 794, which was superseded
by Rule 8, provided in part as follows:
"'If the decree or judgment be for the
payment 
of 
money, 
and 
also 
for 
the
performance of some other act or duty, or
for the recovery of property, real or
personal, or the possession thereof, or for
the sale of property, real or personal, and
the party appealing wishes to supersede the
execution of such judgment or decree, he
must, ... also execute bond with good and
sufficient sureties, payable to the clerk
or register, in such sum as the judge may
in writing prescribe, with condition to pay
all such costs and damages as any party
aggrieved may sustain by reason of the
wrongful appeal and suspension of the
execution of the judgment or decree; ....'
"Whereas title 7, § 794, required that the word
'damages' be included in order for damages to be
recoverable under a supersedeas bond, we find that a
clear reading of Rule 8 reveals that there is no such
requirement under the rule.  Therefore, it is not
required that the specific items the husband sought
to recover as 'damages' be set out in the supersedeas
bond.  Consequently, we reject the wife's contention
that the award of attorney fees, expert fees, taxes,
and interest paid on the mortgage was improper on
this ground."
Hudson,  555 So. 2d at 1085-86.
The holding of the Court of Civil Appeals in Hudson is
premised upon the statement in the opinion that "[i]mplicit in
its opinion, the trial court determined that certain costs and
damages were 'costs of appeal' pursuant to Rule 8, Alabama
1060896
39
Rules of Appellate Procedure."  555 So. 2d at 1085.   We find
no basis in Rule 8 to support this conclusion by the trial
court or the Court of Civil Appeals.  As noted by the Court of
Civil Appeals, the former Title 7, § 794, Ala. Code 1940
(Recomp. 1958), which was superseded by Rule 8, required the
party appealing a judgment entered by the trial court to
"'execute bond ... with condition to pay all such costs and
damages as any party aggrieved may sustain by reason of the
wrongful appeal and suspension of the execution of the judgment
or decree; ...'" (Some emphasis added.)  Rule 8 provides:
"(a) Stay by Supersedeas Bond. The appellant
shall not be entitled to a stay of execution of the
judgment pending appeal (except as provided in Rule
62(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.) unless the appellant executes
bond with good and sufficient sureties, approved by
the clerk of the trial court, payable to the appellee
(or to the clerk or register if the trial court so
directs), with condition, failing the appeal, to
satisfy such judgment as the appellate court may
render, when the judgment is:
"(1) For the payment of money only, in an amount
equal to 150% of the amount of the judgment if the
judgment does not exceed $10,000.00, or 125% if the
judgment exceeds $10,000.00;
"(2) For the payment of money and also for the
performance of some other act or duty, or for the
recovery or sale of property or the possession
thereof, in such sum, in addition to the sum required
for money judgments only in (1) above, as the trial
court may in writing prescribe; or if appellant
1060896
40
wishes to supersede the judgment as to the payment of
money only, the requirements of (1) above shall
apply;
"(3) Only for the performance of some act or
duty, or for the recovery or sale of property or the
possession thereof (or if the judgment includes the
payment of money and the appellant does not wish to
supersede the judgment in that respect), in such sum
as the trial court may in writing prescribe.
"The approval of the supersedeas bond by the
clerk of the trial court, unless contested by the
opposing party, shall constitute a stay of the
judgment when the judgment is for the payment of
money only, or the payment of money and some other
act and the appellant wishes to supersede the
judgment as to the payment of money only. In the
event the clerk declines to approve the bond, or the
clerk's approval is contested, the requirements of
(b) below shall apply."
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 8 does not include the express language from § 794
requiring as a condition of the bond the payment of "costs and
damages as any party aggrieved may sustain by reason of the
wrongful appeal and suspension of the execution of the judgment
or decree."  Rule 8 simply requires, as a condition of the
bond, the satisfaction of "such judgment as the appellate court
may render." Damages are no longer  expressly recoverable under
a supersedeas bond pursuant to Rule 8.  Thus, there was no
basis in Hudson, decided after the adoption of Rule 8, for the
1060896
41
trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals to conclude that the
husband was entitled to damages in the form of an attorney fee
as costs of the appeal under the supersedeas bond.  Therefore,
Hudson provides no authority for the plaintiffs in this case
to recover damages in the form of an attorney fee as costs of
1060896
In Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d
12
934 (Ala. 1998), the defendant insurance company argued on
appeal that the trial court's order incorrectly authorized the
recovery of postjudgment interest under the supersedeas bond.
The defendant contended that the supersedeas bond did not
specifically mention "interest"; therefore, it contended,
there was no obligation under the bond to pay postjudgment
interest.  This Court discussed the holding in Hudson and
stated that postjudgment interest "might be considered to be
included within the 'costs of appeal.'" Johnson, 725 So. 2d at
941 (emphasis added).  The discussion in Johnson relating to
Hudson, however, is dicta.  The basis of this Court's
affirming the award of postjudgment interest in Johnson was
rooted in the language of the supersedeas bond and this
Court's judgment in an earlier appeal in that same case.  This
Court stated:
"[T]he supersedeas bond provided that the sureties
promised to 'satisfy such judgment ... as may be
awarded.'  The 'judgment' of this Court on appeal in
[Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v.] Johnson[, 701 So.
2d 524 (Ala. 1997),] was that Ms. Johnson was
entitled to recover $3 million in punitive damages,
'with interest.'  Thus, the bond obligated the
sureties to 'satisfy' that 'judgment.'"
Johnson, 725 So. 2d at 941.  The language of the bond and this
Court's holding is entirely consistent with Rule 8, Ala. R.
App. P., which requires that the supersedeas bond be executed
"with condition, failing the appeal, to satisfy such judgment
as the appellate court may render." 
42
the appeal under the supersedeas bond.
  To the extent that
12
Hudson provides otherwise, it is overruled.
The plaintiffs also rely heavily on the decision in Osborn
v. Riley, 331 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1976), for their contention that
they are entitled to damages in the form of an attorney fee as
1060896
43
costs of the appeal under the supersedeas bond.  In Osborn, the
plaintiffs sued the defendants seeking to have set aside a deed
by which the plaintiffs had conveyed to the defendants a large
tract of land.  The trial court entered a judgment for the
plaintiffs setting aside the deed based on a finding of undue
influence.  The defendants filed an application with the trial
court to fix the amount of a supersedeas bond.  The trial court
granted 
the application conditioned on the requirement that the
defendants pay any judgment the appellate court might render
as well as "'such costs and damages as any party may sustain
by reason of the wrongful appeal and suspension of the
decrees.'" Osborn, 331 So. 2d at 270.  The defendants obtained
a supersedeas bond from Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
naming Aetna as surety.
This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on appeal.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sued on the supersedeas bond
seeking damages and contending that the defendants' failure to
successfully prosecute their appeal and to pay all costs and
damages constituted a breach of the supersedeas bond.  The
defendants contended that the plaintiffs failed to prove they
were damaged by the unsuccessful appeal or that the appeal was
1060896
44
wrongful.  The trial court entered a judgment for the
plaintiffs and awarded them $20,000 plus costs.  Osborn, supra.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, this Court
stated:
"The third issue presented for our review arises
from 
[the 
defendants'] 
contention 
that 
the
[plaintiffs] suffered no injury as a result of the
appeal and the accompanying suspension of [the]
judgment during the pendency of the appeal.  It is
undisputed that, during the appeal, [the plaintiffs]
were in possession of the land over which the dispute
arose. [The defendants] contend that because the
[plaintiffs] were in possession of the land over
which the dispute arose, it cannot be argued that
they were harmed by the suspension of the court's
decree.
"These arguments are not persuasive in view of
the rule of our cases.  The purpose of a supersedeas
bond is 'to keep the parties in status quo pending
the appeal.  This purpose ... reach[es] not only to
possession 
of 
the 
property, 
but 
every 
other
consequence of the judgment, including costs, and the
evidential status and value of the judgment pending
appeal.  Delay in the settlement of the title in the
plaintiff was consideration enough to support the
bond.'  Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Torian, 221 Ala.
131, 133, 127 So. 829, 831 (1930).  It was there held
that 
there 
could 
be 
recovery 
on 
the 
bond
notwithstanding appellant was not in possession.  In
the instant case, the [plaintiffs] were damaged not
only by a delay in the settlement of title, but also
by the expense of defending their judgment.
"....
"The fourth and final issue raised on appeal
challenges Alabama case law allowing the recovery of
1060896
45
attorney's fees paid for defending the appeal as an
element of damages to be recovered under the
supersedeas bond in a suit of this character. [The
defendants] argue that neither the statute providing
for supersedeas bonds, nor the decree in the instant
case, specifically includes attorneys' fees as an
element of damages.  In the absence of express
statutory or contractual provision to the contrary,
[the defendants] contend that there is no 'inherent
right to have attorney's fees paid by the opposing
side.' 
On 
the 
basis 
of 
case 
law 
from 
other
jurisdictions which is in conflict with the existing
Alabama rule, [the defendants] urge this Court to
hold that damages in suits on supersedeas bonds in a
suit of this character should include only those
damages resulting from the stay of execution of the
judgment. Specifically [the defendants] ask that we
overrule our case of Drake v. Webb, 63 Ala. 596
(1879) and those cases following it.
"[The defendants] refer[] the Court to its
recent opinion in White v. State, 294 Ala. 502, 319
So. 2d 247 (1975), in which this Court held that
attorneys' fees were not recoverable as 'just
compensation' 
in 
eminent 
domain 
proceedings.
However, the issue in White was a matter of first
impression in Alabama.  In contrast, the issue in the
instant case involves the recovery of attorney's fees
as an element of damages under the supersedeas bond,
in a suit of this character, and is the subject of a
long-standing rule in this state.  See, e.g. Dempsey
v. Gay, 227 Ala. 20, 148 So. 438 (1933); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Torian, 221 Ala. 131, 127 So. 829
(1930); Caldwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 205 Ala. 463, 88 So. 574 (1921); Drake v. Webb,
supra; Wheeler v. Fuller, 4 Ala. App. 532, 58 So. 792
(1912). [See Anno: 'Attorneys fees paid by appellee
in resisting unsuccessful appellate review as damages
recoverable on appeal bond' 37 ALR2d 525.]
1060896
46
"In Drake v. Webb, supra, Justice Stone makes
the following statement as the rationale for the
Alabama rule:
"'We find nothing in the condition of
the 
present 
bond 
which 
we 
consider
unreasonable.  The damages imposed are not
a tax, or clog, placed on the appellant's
right of appeal.  That he could have had
without a supersedeas bond, on giving
security 
for 
costs 
of 
appeal. 
 
Such
security for costs would have imposed on
his surety no other liability than to pay
the costs of appeal, if unsuccessful.  This
is a mere regulation of the right of
appeal, for the security of the officers of
court.  But, when an aggrieved suitor
desires to go further, and suspend the
execution of a judgment or decree rendered
against him, this is not simply a question
of the right of appeal.  It goes much
beyond that.  Very great damage may result
from the appeal and the suspension.  The
condition 
of 
a 
bond, 
entailing 
these
consequences, should be so adjusted and
prescribed, as to secure the appellee
against all loss or damage that may result
proximately 
from 
the 
appeal 
and
supersedeas.  Attorney's fees are proximate
damages, cast on the appellee by the
appeal, and are, therefore, within the
condition of the bond. We are not able to
distinguish, in principle, between this
question and the kindred one which arises
in suits on injunction and detinue bonds.'"
Osborn, 331 So. 2d at 273-75. 
Although Osborn was decided after Rule 8, Ala. R. App. P.,
became effective, it addressed a supersedeas bond that was
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47
executed before § 794 was superseded by Rule 8, Ala. R. App.,
see Rule 49, Ala. R. App. P.  Additionally, the supersedeas
bond executed in Osborn obligated the appellants to pay both
costs and damages, but there was no reference to the payment
of damages in the supersedeas bond executed in this case.
Specifically, in Osborn, the supersedeas bond required the
appellants to pay  "'such costs and damages as any party may
sustain by reason of the wrongful appeal and suspension of the
decrees.'" Osborn, 331 So. 2d at 270 (emphasis added).
However, the supersedeas bond in this case case provides only
as follows:
"NOW, therefore, the condition of the foregoing
obligation is such that, if the appellant shall
prosecute this appeal to effect, and satisfy such
judgment, penalties, and costs, including costs of
appeal as may be rendered in this case, then the said
obligation to be null and void, otherwise to remain
in full force and effect."
Therefore, although the supersedeas bond in Osborn expressly
provides for the payment of damages, the supersedeas bond
executed in this case is silent with respect to damages.
Accordingly, Osborn provides no authority for the recovery of
an attorney fee as costs of the appeal under the supersedeas
bond in this case.
1060896
48
Likewise, in Ex parte Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 374
So. 2d 1356 (Ala. 1979), the trial court entered two judgments
against Home Indemnity declaring that it had a duty to defend
and to indemnify Reed Equipment Company in a negligence action
brought by third parties.  Home Indemnity sought to appeal the
judgments, and the trial court required it to file a
supersedeas bond containing the following language:
"'Now, therefore, the condition of the foregoing
obligation is such that, if Appellant fails in the
appeal it will pay such judgment as the Appellate
Court may render in the premises, and all such costs,
and damages as any party aggrieved may sustain by
reason of the execution of the decree, then the said
obligation to be null and void, otherwise to remain
in full force and effect.'"
Ex parte Home Indem. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d at 1357.
Home Indemnity petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus arguing that the trial court could not require it to
post a supersedeas bond containing the above-quoted language
because a supersedeas bond with such conditions would make Home
Indemnity liable for any attorney fees incurred by Reed
Equipment in defending the appeal 
of the declaratory judgments,
should Home Indemnity's appeal be unsuccessful.  In denying
Home Indemnity's petition, this Court explained the holding in
Osborn as follows:
1060896
49
"This argument is totally without merit. In Osborn v.
Riley, 331 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1976), this court
reaffirmed a long line of Alabama decisions which
held 
attorneys' 
fees 
were 
proximate 
damages
recoverable in an action on a supersedeas bond where
an unsuccessful appellant had superseded that portion
of a judgment requiring the performance of some act
or duty other than the payment of money.  Osborn,
therefore, allows trial judges to require supersedeas
bonds conditioned as the one at issue in this case,
where the judgment or decree requires an act or duty
other than the payment of money.
"Home Indemnity implies that Rule 8, [Ala. R.
App. P.], changed the law regarding supersedeas bonds
since Rule 8 supplanted Code 1940, Title 7, §§ 793,
794, and 795.  While it is true the above sections
were replaced by Rule 8, and thus left out of the
1975 Code, they were in fact incorporated into Rule
8.  See Committee Comments to Rule 8, [Ala. R. App.
P.]. Rule 8 still recognizes there are three separate
types of judgments that can be superseded, viz.: (1)
judgments for the payment of money only; (2)
judgments for the payment of money which also require
the performance of, or the staying of the performance
of, acts or duties other than the payment of money;
and (3) judgments requiring the performance of, or
the staying of the performance of, acts other than
the payment of money.
"Rule 
8(a)(2), 
applicable 
to 
this 
case,
definitely allows the trial judge to shape the
supersedeas bond to conform to the facts of the case.
This is demonstrated by the language: '... in such
sum, in addition to the sum required for money
judgments only in (1) above, as the trial court may
in writing prescribe; ....' Furthermore, since the
former statutes governing supersedeas bonds were
incorporated in Rule 8 without substantial change,
former decisions interpreting those statutes govern
interpretation of the rule, there being no intention
1060896
50
to the contrary expressed in the rule.  See Lewis v.
Hitt, 370 So. 2d 1369 (Ala. 1979)."
Ex parte Home Indem. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d at 1357-58.
Ex parte Home Indemnity is not authority for allowing the
plaintiffs to recover as costs an attorney fee in this case
because Home Indemnity relied on Osborn, which addressed a
supersedeas bond executed before the effective date of Rule 8,
Ala. R. App. P.  Additionally, we note that the statement in
Osborn that § 794, Ala. Code 1940 (Recomp. 1958), "[was] in
fact incorporated into Rule 8" is not entirely accurate given
the fact that the language requiring as a condition of the bond
the payment of "costs and damages as any party aggrieved may
sustain by reason of the wrongful appeal and suspension of the
execution of the judgment or decree" is, as discussed above,
absent from Rule 8, Ala. R. App. P.
Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover damages in the form of an attorney fee as
"costs of the appeal" under the supersedeas bond.
Conclusion
In summary, the trial court's order of November 22, 2006,
satisfying the final judgment as to Regions Bank is affirmed;
its order of December 20, 2006, satisfying the final judgment
1060896
51
as to Advanced Realty is reversed.  The December 20, 2006,
order is reversed to the extent it denies the plaintiffs'
motion for prejudgment accrued interest.  Its February 20,
2007, order  is affirmed to the extent it denies the
plaintiffs' motion for an attorney fee incurred in defending
the appeal and is reversed to the extent it denies the
plaintiffs' motion for postjudgment rental damages.  The case
is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Parker, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
1060896
52
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I fully concur in the main opinion with the exception of
the rationale stated in Part IV.  I write to express a
different rationale and, in so doing, make clear that my view
regarding the nonrecoverability of attorney fees under an
appellate supersedeas bond is based on grounds more fundamental
than the differences in the wording of Tit. 7, § 794, Ala. Code
1940 (Recomp. 1958), and Rule 8, Ala. R. App. P., or whether
a trial court has insisted that the bond contain a provision
for the payment of "damages" resulting from an appeal, or only
the "costs" or the "judgment" resulting from the appeal.  
Not only are a party's costs for legal representation on
appeal not properly deemed to be part of the "costs of appeal,"
I believe it improper to consider them, as did the Court in
Osborn v. Riley, 331 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1976), to be "damages"
sustained because the aggrieved suitor not only has appealed,
but has "desire[d] to go further, and suspend the execution of
a judgment or decree rendered against him."  331 So. 2d at 274.
The suspension of a judgment through the posting of a
supersedeas bond has no correlation to the fact that the
appellee must pay for legal representation in the appeal.  It
1060896
53
is in fact the appeal itself, not the suspension of the
judgment during the appeal, that causes the appellee to incur
additional attorney fees to defend against the appeal.  The
holding in Osborn, I submit, therefore, is without the logical
underpinning upon which the opinion itself purports to rely.
Moreover, the holding in Osborn runs contrary to the
essential reasons that we follow the American rule, rather than
the English rule, regarding attorney fees.  Similarly, the
notion, as expressed in Ex parte Home Indemnity Insurance Co.,
374 So. 2d 1356 (Ala. 1979), that trial courts, in certain
types of cases, could require language in a supersedeas bond
that would make the unsuccessful appellant responsible for the
appellee's attorney fees on appeal leaves an "unlevel playing
field" in such cases in two respects:
1.  It gives a potential strategic and negotiating
advantage to appellees in such cases since, unlike appellants,
they can advocate their position on appeal without posting a
supersedeas bond that could make them responsible for the
appellate attorney fees of their opponent; and
2.  It generally allows plaintiffs who have failed to
obtain a judgment in their favor in the trial court access to
1060896
I note that, in addition to the other matters discussed
13
in this writing, the trial court had authority in Hudson to
award attorney fees as part of its judgment in a domestic-
relations action.
54
the appellate courts to vindicate their position without
running the risk of responsibility for their opponent's
appellate attorney fees, while not extending that same right
to defendants who have suffered an adverse trial result.
Consistent with the fundamental nature of my views, I
would overrule not only Hudson v. Hudson, 555 So. 2d 1084 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1989),
 but also Osborn and Home Indemnity insofar
13
as they reflect different views.