Title: Welch v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 292, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LLOYD L. WELCH, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 292, 2002  
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN97-07-1517,  
§  -1519, and -1522 
§  Cr. ID 9707013932  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 16, 2002 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 22, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 22nd day of August 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lloyd Welch, pleaded guilty in 
January 1998 to first degree unlawful sexual intercourse, third degree 
unlawful sexual penetration, and second degree unlawful sexual contact. He 
was sentenced in March 1998 to life imprisonment plus seven years.  He did 
not appeal.  He filed a petition for postconviction relief in June 1999, which 
the Superior Court denied.  This Court affirmed that decision on appeal.1  
Welch filed a second motion for postconviction relief in April 2002, which 
                                                 
1 Welch v. State, 2000 WL 431590 (Del. Supr.). 
 
2
the Superior Court denied on the grounds that it was procedurally barred.  
This appeal ensued.    
(2) 
Having carefully considered the parties= respective contentions 
and the record below, we find it manifest that the judgment of the Superior 
Court should be affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court=s well-reasoned 
decision dated May 15, 2002.  Welch’s motion clearly was untimely.2   
Moreover, the argument raised in Welch’s motion should have been raised 
in his first postconviction motion.3  The Superior Court, therefore, did not 
err in concluding that Welch’s claim was procedurally barred.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
2 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1). 
3 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(2).