Title: Powell v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031421
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PAUL WARNER POWELL 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 031421 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
January 16, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and 
sentence of death imposed upon Paul Warner Powell for the murder 
of Stacey Lynn Reed in the commission of, or subsequent to, 
attempted rape.  Code § 18.2-31(5). 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Powell’s First Trial and Appeal 
Powell was originally convicted of the capital murder of 
Stacey Lynn Reed in 2000 and sentenced to death.  See Powell v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 530, 552 S.E.2d 344, 354 (2001).  In 
the same trial, Powell was convicted of the abduction, rape, and 
attempted capital murder of Stacey’s younger sister, Kristie 
Erin Reed, and was sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment 
and fines totaling $200,000 for those crimes.1  Id.
                     
1 The abduction, rape, and attempted capital murder 
convictions, as well as a conviction for grand larceny, were 
affirmed in the prior appeal and are not at issue in this 
appeal.  Powell had also been tried for robbery and attempted 
robbery, Code § 18.2-58, and three counts of use of a firearm, 
Code § 18.2-53.1.  He was acquitted of those crimes. 
Upon review of the capital murder conviction and the death 
sentence imposed upon Powell, this Court reversed the conviction 
on various grounds including a finding that the indictment 
charging Powell with capital murder in the commission of robbery 
and/or attempted robbery had been improperly amended to include 
a charge of capital murder “during the commission of or 
subsequent to rape and/or attempted rape and/or sodomy and/or 
attempted sodomy.”2  Id. at 532, 552 S.E.2d at 355-56.  Upon 
review of the record, we further held that the wording of the 
indictment limited the Commonwealth to proving that the 
“gradation crime was a rape occurring before or during the 
killing,” id. at 538-39, 535 S.E.2d at 359, and there was “no 
evidence upon which the jury could have found that Powell 
committed the rape of Kristie before or during the murder of 
Stacey.”  Id. at 541, 535 S.E.2d at 361. 
We summarized the consequence of these holdings in the 
conclusion of the opinion, stating: 
there is simply no evidence upon which the jury could 
have relied to find that Powell committed or attempted 
to commit any sexual assault against Stacey before or 
during her murder, or that the rape of Kristie did not 
                     
2 Following the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case-in-
chief in Powell’s first trial, the Commonwealth had conceded 
that there was no evidence of forcible sodomy or attempted 
forcible sodomy against Kristie.  Powell, 261 Va. at 525, 552 
S.E.2d at 351.  Thus, that aspect of the amended indictment for 
capital murder from Powell’s first trial is not relevant to any 
issue raised in this appeal. 
 
2
occur after the murder of her sister.  Accordingly, 
under the circumstances of this case, the evidence at 
best would have supported a conviction for first 
degree murder. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse Powell’s 
conviction for capital murder . . . and remand the 
case for a new trial on a charge of no greater than 
first degree murder for the killing of Stacey Reed, if 
the Commonwealth be so advised. 
 
Id. at 545-46, 552 S.E.2d at 363. 
The mandate from this Court to the trial court tracked the 
language of the opinion, and directed that “the case is remanded 
. . . for a new trial on a charge of no greater than first 
degree murder for the killing of Stacey Reed, if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.” 
B. Events and Proceedings Following Remand 
Powell’s Letter 
On October 21, 2001, Powell wrote an obscenity-laced letter 
to the Commonwealth’s Attorney who had prosecuted Powell in his 
first trial.3  Powell stated in the letter that, because he 
believed he could not be retried for capital murder, “I figured 
I would tell you the rest of what happened on Jan. 29, 1999, to 
show you how stupid all y’all . . . are.”  Admitting that he 
“planned to kill the whole family” on that day, Powell further 
stated that “I had other plans for [Stacey] before she died.”  
 
3
Powell described how he had attempted to initiate consensual 
sexual intercourse with Stacey, which he had previously 
admitted.  Powell then revealed that when Stacey resisted his 
advances, he pushed her onto her bed and, while sitting on top 
of her, told Stacey “that we could do it the easy way or the 
hard way.” 
Powell then described how Stacey had “started fighting with 
me and clawed me [sic] face.”  Powell stated that he “slammed 
her to the floor . . . sat on top of her and pinned her hands 
down again.”  Powell claimed that Stacey relented “and I told 
her if she tried fighting with me again I would kill her.” 
Continuing, Powell stated that, at his direction, Stacey 
began to disrobe, but stopped when the telephone rang.  Stacey 
put her clothes back on so that she could answer the telephone.  
Powell refused to allow Stacey to answer the telephone and 
ordered her to resume disrobing.  When she refused, Powell 
“pushed her back and pulled out [his] knife.”  When Stacey 
attempted to leave the bedroom, Powell stabbed her.  Stacey fell 
back and Powell removed the knife.  Stacey then stumbled to 
another bedroom and collapsed.  Powell “saw that she was still 
                                                                  
3 Powell had previously written to the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney on July 4, 2001, proposing a plea agreement for a first 
degree murder charge for the killing of Stacey Reed. 
 
4
breathing” and “started stomping on her throat” until he “didn’t 
see her breathing anymore.” 
The New Indictment 
Armed with this new evidence, the Commonwealth elected to 
nolle prosequi the indictment in the remanded case, under which 
it was limited to trying Powell for first degree murder under 
our mandate, and sought a new indictment against Powell for 
capital murder.  On December 3, 2001, the grand jury returned an 
indictment charging Powell with the capital murder of “Stacey 
Lynn Reed during the commission of or subsequent to the 
attempted rape of Stacey Lynn Reed.” 
C. Powell’s Second Trial 
Motions to Dismiss the Indictment 
On April 24, 2002, Powell filed a motion to dismiss the 
December 3, 2001 indictment.  Powell asserted that “[w]hen the 
Supreme Court of Virginia issues an opinion concerning a case, 
this opinion becomes the law of the case” and, thus, the 
directive of the opinion and mandate from this Court in his 
first appeal limited his retrial to a charge no greater than 
first degree murder, regardless whether that trial was conducted 
under the original indictment or a new indictment.  The 
Commonwealth filed a response to this motion, asserting that the 
judgment of this Court in Powell’s first appeal was not 
applicable to the December 3, 2001 indictment because Powell had 
 
5
“never [previously] been charged with the capital murder of 
Stacey Reed in the commission or attempted commission [of] 
sexual assault against [Stacey Reed] because, at the time of 
[Powell’s first] trial, no such evidence existed.”  Accordingly, 
the Commonwealth contended that the December 3, 2001 indictment 
was “a new charge, one that has never been litigated in trial 
nor considered by the Virginia Supreme Court.”  Following a 
hearing on this and other pre-trial matters, the trial court 
overruled Powell’s motion to dismiss the indictment in an order 
dated May 6, 2002. 
On May 17, 2002, Powell filed a second motion to dismiss 
the December 3, 2001 indictment.  The briefs filed in the trial 
court in support of and in opposition to this motion parallel 
the arguments made on appeal with respect to this issue and, 
accordingly, we will only summarize the essential points of 
those arguments here.  The import of Powell’s argument was that 
his prior trial and the reversal of his conviction by this Court 
acted as an “implied” or “judicial” acquittal of the attempted 
rape of Stacey, thus barring his retrial for her capital murder 
premised on that gradation offense.  The Commonwealth responded 
that the issue whether Stacey had been the victim of a sexual 
assault was not before the jury in his first trial because the 
bill of particulars provided at Powell’s request indicated that 
only Kristie was the victim of the sexual assault gradation 
 
6
offenses charged in the amended indictment.  Similarly, the 
Commonwealth contended that our comments concerning the 
insufficiency of the evidence to prove a sexual assault or 
attempted sexual assault against Stacey were not directed toward 
any finding of the jury, but to the contrary were indicative of 
the fact that the jury did not consider whether Stacey had been 
the victim of such an assault or attempt. 
On June 5, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on Powell’s 
second motion to dismiss the indictment.  After hearing 
argument, the trial court stated that by identifying Kristie as 
the victim of the rape or attempted rape in the bill of 
particulars, the Commonwealth had clearly identified her as the 
victim of those gradation crimes in the amended indictment for 
capital murder.  The trial court also agreed with the 
Commonwealth that this Court’s reference to the lack of evidence 
to prove any sexual assault or attempted sexual assault against 
Stacey was merely a comment on the record, and not an assertion 
that this was a theory of the case presented by the Commonwealth 
in Powell’s first trial.  On July 3, 2002, the trial court 
entered an order overruling Powell’s second motion to dismiss 
the indictment. 
Other Pre-trial Motions 
On April 25, 2002, Powell filed a motion to have Virginia’s 
statutory scheme for charging a capital crime and imposing a 
 
7
death sentence declared unconstitutional on various grounds.  On 
appeal, Powell reasserts only some of these arguments and does 
so only in summary fashion.  Accordingly, we will not summarize 
those arguments in detail here, but will address them within the 
discussion of the relevant assignment of error, infra. 
On April 26, 2002, Powell filed a motion seeking to have 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office disqualified from 
prosecuting his case.  Powell contended that the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney had a conflict of interest because he was a key “chain 
of custody witness” with respect to his receipt of Powell’s 
October 21, 2001 letter “confession” to the attempted rape of 
Stacey.  Powell further contended that the offensive nature of 
that letter and his other conduct toward the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney had created such a level of animosity that the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney would not be able to objectively pursue 
justice, but would instead seek to satisfy a personal vendetta 
against Powell.  Powell further contended that this taint of 
bias extended to every attorney in the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s 
office, and further asserted that these attorneys would be 
potential witnesses called to give testimony concerning the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s personal animus against Powell.4
                     
4 Powell further contended that one of the Assistant 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys while in private practice had 
represented Powell in an unrelated criminal matter and, thus, 
 
8
On May 1, 2002, the Commonwealth filed responses to 
Powell’s motions to have Virginia’s statutory scheme for 
charging a capital crime and imposing a death sentence declared 
unconstitutional and to disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s 
office.  With respect to the former, the Commonwealth asserted 
that all the issues raised therein had previously been 
considered and rejected by this Court, and there was no cause 
for the trial court to revisit them.  As to the latter, the 
Commonwealth asserted that there was no evidence of bias on the 
part of the Commonwealth’s Attorney or other members of his 
office and denied that there was any such bias, that the manner 
of establishing the chain of custody of Powell’s letter was not 
the defense’s concern, and that the questions of an appearance 
of impropriety should be raised through a disciplinary complaint 
proceeding. 
On May 6, 2002, in the same hearing in which the trial 
court heard argument of Powell’s first motion to dismiss the 
indictment, the trial court also heard argument on Powell’s 
motions to have Virginia’s statutory scheme for charging a 
capital crime and imposing a death sentence declared 
unconstitutional and to disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s 
                                                                  
had a conflict of interest.  Powell does not reassert this issue 
on appeal. 
 
 
9
office from prosecuting the case.  Following that hearing, the 
trial court entered an order overruling these motions without 
comment. 
On December 11, 2002, Powell filed a motion to exclude any 
evidence concerning his abduction, rape, and attempted murder of 
Kristie Reed from his trial.  Powell contended that because he 
was charged only with the capital murder of Stacey Reed 
predicated on an attempted rape of her, evidence of his 
subsequent attack on Kristie was irrelevant or that any 
probative value it might have would be overborne by its unduly 
prejudicial effect on the jury.  The Commonwealth did not file a 
response to this motion, but during oral argument in a hearing 
held December 23, 2002, the Commonwealth asserted that evidence 
concerning the attack on Kristie was part of a continuing 
criminal enterprise and was relevant to show Powell’s motive and 
intent in attempting the rape of Stacey. 
Also on December 11, 2002, Powell, alleging that the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002) had called into question prior judgments of this Court 
concerning the issue, filed a motion seeking to have Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(B) declared unconstitutional because it permits a 
jury to consider evidence relating to the future dangerousness 
and vileness aggravating factors without full protection of due 
process to the defendant to confront witnesses.  Powell also 
 
10
asserted that the statutory definitions of the aggravating 
factors are vague and, thus, would likely result in “unreliable” 
jury verdicts.  The Commonwealth filed a brief in response to 
this motion, asserting that the issue of the constitutionality 
of Code § 19.2-264.4(B) is settled law. 
On December 16, 2002, Powell filed a motion to suppress 
various statements he made to police during the initial 
investigation of the crimes.  Powell alleged that after giving 
an initial statement following waiver of his Miranda rights, he 
advised police that he had nothing more to say.  Thereafter, 
Powell contended, any statement he made to police without a 
readvisement and waiver of his Miranda rights should be 
suppressed.  The Commonwealth responded that the suppression 
issue had been decided in Powell’s first trial and, thus, the 
doctrine of res judicata barred consideration of the issue in 
his second trial.5  Powell filed a supplemental motion on 
December 17, 2002 asserting that a statement taken by an 
investigator on November 2, 2001, while Powell was in prison 
following his first trial, should be suppressed because his 
counsel was not present.  The Commonwealth responded that Powell 
had been advised of and waived his Miranda rights prior to 
                     
5 Powell did not contest the trial court’s failure to 
suppress his statements in the appeal of his first conviction. 
 
 
11
giving this statement and that he was not entitled to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment at that time because he had not yet 
been indicted for the offense for which he was then on trial, 
and the formal proceedings on the prior indictments had 
concluded. 
In summarizing its rulings on these motions during the 
December 23, 2002 hearing, the trial court stated that it found 
Powell had waived his Miranda rights with respect to the 
statement made after his first trial but prior to the bringing 
of the second indictment and, thus, the statement was not barred 
by either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.  The trial court also 
indicated that it would deny the motion to suppress the 
statements from the initial investigation of the crimes, 
incorporating by reference the finding made during the first 
trial with respect to those statements.  The trial court further 
found that evidence of Powell’s attack on Kristie was admissible 
as being part of a common scheme and to show consciousness of 
guilt.  The trial court entered an omnibus order denying all 
these motions as well as the motion challenging the 
constitutionality of Code § 19.2-264.4(B). 
Jury Voir Dire 
Powell’s second trial commenced on January 13, 2003.  The 
trial court conducted voir dire of the venire in panels of five 
potential jurors.  In questioning the first panel, the trial 
 
12
court inquired whether “any of you have acquired any information 
about the alleged offense, or of the accused from the news 
media, or other sources in this particular matter?”  The five 
panel members indicated that they had not.  The Commonwealth 
further inquired whether “[i]f during the course of trial you 
should hear something which would jog your memory about the 
publicity, would you be able to set that aside and render your 
verdict based solely on what you hear in the courtroom?”  The 
five panel members each indicated that they could do so. 
During his voir dire of the first panel, Powell’s counsel 
attempted to ask the following question: 
 
You’re going to hear in this case that the 
Defendant has already been tried and convicted of 
capital murder at one point, and he’s serving life 
sentences for other crimes.  You’re also going to hear 
that the Supreme Court of Virginia overturned the − 
 
At this point, the Commonwealth objected and during a bench 
conference, referencing Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 
375, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985), asserted that, as the panel had 
already indicated that they had not heard of the case 
previously, Powell’s counsel’s question concerning the prior 
trial and appeal “may, in fact, taint” the members of the panel 
and disqualify them from serving on the jury.  Powell’s counsel 
responded that because the evidence would disclose the fact of 
his prior convictions and the reversal of his capital murder 
conviction and death sentence on appeal, the prohibition of 
 
13
Barker did not apply.  He further contended that because a 
jury’s knowledge of a prior conviction was potentially 
prejudicial to the defendant, it was a “tactical decision that 
we’ve made . . . and we wish this evidence to come forward.”  
Thus, he contended that it was proper to explore the potential 
jurors’ bias that would result from hearing that evidence. 
The trial court ruled, even though it agreed that this was 
a “unique case” because the evidence would establish the fact of 
the prior conviction and appellate reversal, “the Barker case is 
still good law.”  Accordingly, the trial court concluded that 
“we have to start off with a jury that does not have” knowledge 
of the prior trial, conviction, and appeal.  Accordingly, the 
trial court ruled that Powell could not question the jurors 
about their potential bias based upon such evidence being likely 
to be presented during the trial. 
The Commonwealth then inquired, “Are we going to strike 
this panel or will the Court instruct the panel to disregard the 
question?”  When the trial court indicated that it would 
instruct the panel to disregard the question, Powell’s counsel 
objected that he was “not sure that instructing them is 
sufficient . . . if they’ve already been told −.”  The trial 
court cut off the objection, stating that the members of the 
panel had already indicated they were unaware of the case and 
that “all I can do is tell them to disregard the question.” 
 
14
Guilt-Determination Phase 
Apart from the new evidence of Powell’s October 21, 2001 
letter to the Commonwealth’s Attorney in which Powell confessed 
to the attempted rape of Stacey, the evidence presented during 
the guilt-determination phase of Powell’s second trial was not 
markedly different from that received during the first trial.  
Because we have thoroughly recounted that evidence in reviewing 
his first trial, see Powell, 261 Va. at 518-520, 552 S.E.2d at 
347-348, and Powell does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence except with respect to proof of the attempted rape of 
Stacey, we need not reiterate the full extent of the evidence, 
but will suffice with a summary of the essential details. 
Powell, who was twenty years old at the time of the crimes, 
had been acquainted with Stacey and her family for approximately 
two-and-a-half years.  Powell, a self-avowed racist and white 
supremacist, objected to Stacey dating Sean Wilkerson, a black 
classmate of Stacey’s.  Id. at 518, 552 S.E.2d at 347. 
Stacey arrived home just before noon on January 29, 1999 to 
find Powell waiting for her.  When Powell learned that Robert 
Culver, a friend of the girls’ mother, would be home shortly for 
lunch, Powell left, but returned at about 12:45 p.m., after 
Culver had left.  When Powell returned, he was armed with a 
survival knife, a butterfly knife, a box cutter, and a 9-
millimeter pistol.  Id.
 
15
During the initial investigation, Powell claimed that he 
and Stacey had argued about her relationship with Wilkerson and 
in an ensuing struggle, Powell drew the survival knife from his 
belt and Stacey “got stuck.”  Id.  Although Powell denied 
stabbing Stacey deliberately or otherwise injuring her, an 
autopsy revealed that she had suffered multiple blunt force 
injuries to her head, neck, and upper body not consistent with 
her merely having fallen during a struggle, but consistent with 
a deliberate stomping.  The autopsy also showed that the wound 
to Stacey’s chest was consistent with the knife having been 
twisted and partially withdrawn and reinserted.  Id. at 520, 552 
S.E.2d at 348. 
Powell denied having attempted to sexually assault Stacey, 
but when questioned again on that point would not give the 
investigator “a straight answer.”  Powell later told police that 
he “probably” raped Kristie because he “didn’t get any with 
Stacey.” 
Leaving Stacey for dead, Powell smoked a cigarette and 
drank a glass of iced tea in the living room of the home, 
waiting for Kristie to return home from school.  When she 
arrived, Powell met her at the door.  Shortly thereafter, 
Kristie discovered her sister’s body.  Powell then forced her to 
go to the basement of the home where he brutally raped her and 
 
16
attempted to kill her by strangulation and by cutting her wrists 
and throat.  Id. at 519, 552 S.E.2d at 347. 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, 
Powell moved to strike the evidence on the ground that the 
Commonwealth had not presented sufficient evidence to 
corroborate Powell’s confession in the October 21, 2001 letter 
that he had attempted to rape Stacey.  The Commonwealth pointed 
to the physical circumstances, such as the disheveled condition 
of Stacey’s bedroom, Stacey’s defensive wounds, and the fact 
that when her body was discovered her pants’ zipper was slightly 
undone, as corroborating Powell’s confession.  The trial court 
denied the motion to strike.  Thereafter, Powell elected not to 
offer any evidence. 
The jury was instructed, heard closing arguments, and 
retired to consider its verdict.  After two hours of 
deliberation, the jury found Powell guilty of capital murder.  
Powell requested a poll of the jury, which confirmed that the 
verdict was unanimous. 
Penalty Determination Phase 
During the penalty determination phase, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence of Powell’s criminal record, including three 
convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, two 
larceny convictions, and his convictions for the abduction, 
rape, and attempted capital murder of Kristie.  The Commonwealth 
 
17
further presented evidence concerning Powell’s extreme racist 
views.  Additional evidence showed that Powell had tortured cats 
when he was younger and that he told an investigator that he 
wanted to purchase a gun to “[k]ill somebody.  Kill a lot of 
somebodies. . . .  Just for something to do.”  Powell also told 
the investigator that he admired Charles Manson and Adolf 
Hitler, saying that “[t]hey were cool.”  The Commonwealth also 
presented evidence that Powell wrote an abusive letter to 
Stacey’s mother in which he included a pornographic picture of a 
woman who resembled Stacey. 
Powell presented evidence from his parents and younger 
brother, a social worker, a psychologist, and a probation 
officer.  This evidence dealt primarily with Powell’s upbringing 
and transfer of custody from his mother to the Department of 
Youth and Family Services following his juvenile offenses.  The 
psychologist described Powell’s home environment as “toxic.”  
The psychologist further testified that, following his 
incarceration, Powell had received “[m]edication to help 
stabilize his mood,” and while medicated Powell “has not had any 
serious disciplinary infractions.”  The psychologist did not 
offer a specific diagnosis for Powell’s “mental-health 
problems,” but testified that Powell’s clinical history 
suggested an “anti-social personality disorder” and that his 
behavior as a child suggested Powell had “an under controlled 
 
18
temperament.”  The psychologist further testified that the 
medication Powell had received in the past was “used for manic 
depressive illness which is now called bi-polar disorder and for 
certain forms of serious depression.” 
After ninety minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a 
unanimous verdict sentencing Powell to death.  The jury 
indicated that the sentence was predicated on both the future 
dangerousness and vileness aggravating factors. 
Sentencing 
On May 8, 2003, the trial court held a sentencing hearing 
and received a pre-sentence report and victim impact evidence 
from Stacey’s mother.  Powell’s counsel argued that imposition 
of the death sentence was not appropriate, asserting that so 
long as Powell were confined and properly medicated, he did not 
present a continuing danger to society and that a life sentence 
without possibility of parole was adequate punishment.  The 
Commonwealth responded that Powell had shown no remorse 
following his conviction in the first trial.  The trial court 
then confirmed the jury’s sentence of death.  We consolidated 
the automatic review of Powell’s death sentence with his appeal 
of the capital murder conviction and expedited the appeal on our 
docket.  Code § 17.1-313(F). 
 
19
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Powell raises twelve assignments of error, the first two of 
which merely restate the elements of the statutory review of any 
death sentence mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C).  We will review 
Powell’s arguments in the order in which the trial court 
considered the issues below. 
A. Failure to Dismiss the Capital Murder Indictment 
 
In his sixth and seventh assignments of error, Powell 
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to 
dismiss the capital murder indictment against him.  This was the 
principal issue addressed by the parties during oral argument 
before this Court.  The various positions under which Powell 
asserts that he was not subject to trial under the capital 
murder indictment can be generally summarized as follows: 
(1) The opinion and mandate of this Court from 
Powell’s first trial limited his retrial for the 
killing of Stacey Reed to a charge no greater than 
first degree murder on any indictment. 
 
(2) Even if retrial on a charge of capital murder was 
not barred under a new indictment, Powell had been 
acquitted, either actually or by implication, of the 
attempted rape of Stacey Reed in his first trial and, 
thus, the law of the case doctrine barred his being 
tried for capital murder based upon the attempted rape 
of Stacey as the gradation offense. 
 
(3) Principles of double jeopardy bar his retrial for 
a violation of Code § 18.2-31(5) because the 
indictment in his first trial did not specify the 
victim of the gradation offense. 
 
 
20
Effect of Prior Opinion and Mandate 
We recognize the principle of the “mandate rule,” stated by 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia in a different context, that: 
A trial judge is bound by a decision and mandate 
from [an appellate court], unless [the court] acted 
outside [its] jurisdiction.  A trial court has no 
discretion to disregard [a] lawful mandate.  When a 
case is remanded to a trial court from an appellate 
court, the refusal of the trial court to follow the 
appellate court mandate constitutes reversible error. 
 
Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 257-258, 532 S.E.2d 908, 912 
(2000); see also Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum 
Corp., 264 Va. 1, 6, 564 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2002) (holding that “a 
trial court cannot permit what this Court . . . [has] said is 
unlawful” in a mandate reversing the trial court’s prior 
judgment and remanding the case). 
Relying on this principle, Powell contends that the trial 
court was without authority to retry him on a new indictment 
charging him with the capital murder of Stacey Reed.  Powell’s 
reliance, however, is misplaced. 
It is self-evident that while the opinion of an appellate 
court, under the doctrine of stare decisis, applies to all 
future cases in the trial courts, the mandate, which is the 
directive of the appellate court certifying a judgment in a 
particular case to the court from which it was appealed, speaks 
only to that case.  Moreover, the mandate is controlling only 
“as to matters within its compass.”  Sprague v. Ticonic National 
 
21
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939).  Thus, while the directive of 
this Court’s mandate binds the circuit court, that court is not 
thereby prohibited from acting on matters not constrained by the 
language of the mandate, construed in light of the appellate 
court’s opinion.  The mandate rule “is merely a ‘specific 
application of the law of the case doctrine,’ [and] in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, it compels compliance on 
remand with the dictates of a superior court and forecloses 
relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the 
appellate court.”  United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 
(1st Cir. 1993)). 
Undoubtedly, had the trial court permitted the Commonwealth 
to retry Powell for capital murder on the original amended 
indictment invalidated by our decision in reviewing his first 
conviction, this would have been violative of our mandate and 
reversible error.  Similarly, had the Commonwealth dismissed 
that indictment and sought a new indictment charging Powell with 
the capital murder of Stacey Reed prior to the rape of Kristie 
Reed, it would have been error for the trial court to permit 
that indictment to stand. 
However, nothing in our opinion or mandate from Powell’s 
first appeal required the Commonwealth to retry Powell on the 
original indictment, abridged to cure the defects found by this 
 
22
Court to charge only first-degree murder.  To the contrary, the 
directive of the mandate expressly stated that Powell was to be 
retried on that indictment based on the record that was before 
this Court at that time, only “if the Commonwealth be so 
advised.” 
Nor did our opinion or mandate expressly preclude the 
possibility of trying Powell on a new indictment charging 
capital murder premised on a different gradation offense after 
dismissal of the former, defective indictment.  Powell’s October 
21, 2001 letter to the Commonwealth’s Attorney in which he 
revealed that he had attempted to rape Stacey before he killed 
her is an exceptional circumstance that merits a narrow 
application of the mandate rule. 
We recognize that, generally, serial prosecutions are not 
permitted where the Commonwealth deliberately refrains from 
bringing criminal charges arising out of the same act or 
transaction while prosecuting others in order to gain the 
advantage of having multiple trials.  See, e.g., Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).  Such was not the case here, 
however, given the unexpected and possibly unique circumstance 
of evidence of an uncharged offense that was not previously 
known or available coming to light after the conclusion of the 
first trial in the form of the defendant’s voluntary confession. 
 
23
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled 
that the opinion and mandate of this Court from Powell’s prior 
appeal did not bar the Commonwealth from dismissing the 
indictment against him and bringing a new indictment charging 
him with capital murder premised upon a gradation offense not 
previously charged by the Commonwealth and based upon evidence 
that was not previously known or available to the Commonwealth 
at the time of his first trial. 
Acquittal under the “Law of the Case” 
Powell contends that although he was not charged in a 
separate indictment with the attempted rape of Stacey in his 
first trial, the Commonwealth nonetheless presented evidence 
tending to show that he attempted to rape Stacey to bolster its 
claim that her murder was related to a sexual assault.  To 
support this claim, Powell relies upon statements made by the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney during his first trial that the evidence 
would show that Powell “wanted something more from [Stacey] and 
she wasn’t going to give it to him and for that she lost her 
life.”  Powell further notes that during his first trial the 
Commonwealth had argued against his motion to strike the 
evidence on capital murder by stating, in part, that “we have 
evidence . . . [that Powell] was having sex or attempting to 
have sex with [Stacey].” 
 
24
Powell contends that as neither the amended indictment for 
capital murder nor the instructions given to the jury specified 
the victim of the sexual assault gradation crimes, the 
Commonwealth intended for the jury in his first trial to 
consider the possibility that Powell attempted to rape Stacey.  
Powell notes that because the jury in his first trial sent a 
question to the trial court “seeking clarification whether the 
rape of Kristie could satisfy the gradation crime requirement 
for the capital murder of Stacey,” Powell, 261 Va. at 526, 552 
S.E.2d at 352, this indicated that the jury had considered and 
rejected the theory that he had attempted to rape Stacey.  
Relying on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1957), 
Powell asserts that because the jury in his first trial rejected 
that theory of the crime, it impliedly acquitted him of the 
gradation offense and, thus, he contends that the law of the 
case prohibits the Commonwealth from retrying that issue under a 
new indictment.6  Powell further points to statements in the 
opinion from his first appeal concerning the insufficiency of 
the evidence to prove an attempted sexual assault of Stacey as 
                     
6 On brief, Powell also used the term “res judicata” in 
describing the effect of his alleged “acquittal” of the 
attempted rape of Stacey.  During oral argument of this appeal, 
he conceded that he was relying only on the “law of the case” 
doctrine in asserting the preclusive effect of his prior trial 
and appeal. 
 
 
25
confirming that he was charged with capital murder based on that 
gradation offense. 
The Commonwealth contends that by identifying Kristie as 
the victim of the rape or attempted rape in responding to 
Powell’s motion for a bill of particulars, it had clearly 
indicated that Powell was not charged or on trial for the 
capital murder of Stacey in the commission of the attempted rape 
of Stacey.  Therefore, the Commonwealth asserts that Powell was 
never placed in jeopardy for the commission of that crime and, 
thus, cannot have been “acquitted” of that crime or of its 
gradation offense. 
Powell contends that “the bill of particulars is irrelevant 
to the issue of whether the [Supreme] Court previously decided 
that Powell was charged with capital murder in the commission of 
the attempted rape of Stacey Reed in his first trial.”  Powell 
bases this contention on the statements in the opinion reversing 
his first conviction for capital murder that “[t]he record as a 
whole is devoid of any evidence that Powell attempted to rape 
. . . Stacey,” Powell, 261 Va. at 534, 552 S.E.2d at 357, and 
that “there is simply no evidence upon which the jury could have 
relied to find that Powell committed or attempted to commit any 
sexual assault against Stacey,” id. at 545, 552 S.E.2d at 363.  
Powell contends that by these statements we indicated that the 
 
26
question whether he had raped or attempted to rape Stacey had 
been at issue in his first trial.  We disagree. 
The question, simply put, is whether the jury in Powell’s 
first trial considered whether Powell attempted to rape Stacey 
Reed and concluded that he did not.  Our guide in resolving that 
question is Ashe, supra, wherein the United States Supreme Court 
held that an issue will be precluded from being retried in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution by the law of the case doctrine 
if, in light of the entire record, the previous jury necessarily 
decided that issue against the prosecution.  But if “a rational 
jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than 
that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration,” 
the prior judgment will not be taken as deciding that particular 
issue.  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.  “The inquiry ‘must be set in a 
practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances 
of the proceedings.’ ”  Id. (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 
332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)). 
Powell’s view of the record of his first trial, and of this 
Court’s observation that the evidence therein was insufficient 
for the jury to have found that he attempted to rape Stacey, as 
showing that the previous jury necessarily decided that issue 
against the prosecution fails to take into account the effect of 
the bill of particulars.  “It is true the bill of particulars is 
not for the purpose of charging the offense.  The indictment 
 
27
must do that.”  Livingston v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 830, 837, 36 
S.E.2d 561, 565 (1946).  “However, the bill of particulars and 
the indictment must be read together.  The function of the bill 
of particulars is to supply additional information concerning an 
accusation.”  Id.  A bill of particulars not only informs the 
accused of the charges against him with sufficient precision to 
enable him to prepare his defense and avoid surprise, it also 
enables him to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of any 
further prosecution for the same offense.  See Wade v. 
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 359, 363, 388 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1990); 
see also United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
The bill of particulars in Powell’s first trial clearly 
limited the prosecution of the capital murder of Stacey under 
Code § 18.2-31(5) to proof of the rape or attempted rape of 
Kristie.  Nevertheless, Powell asserts that the various 
statements of the Commonwealth during his first trial with 
respect to Powell’s effort to initiate consensual intercourse 
with Stacey, and his frustration at being rebuffed by her, 
suggested a motive for his subsequent attack on her sister and 
attempted to influence the jury into believing that Stacey was 
also the victim of an attempted sexual assault.  The fact 
remains that Powell was not charged with having attempted to 
rape Stacey, either as a separate offense or as the gradation 
 
28
offense of the capital murder charge.  Thus, it is not possible 
to conclude that the jury necessarily decided that issue against 
the prosecution. 
Powell is also mistaken in his interpretation of our 
statements regarding his first trial that the record contained 
insufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Powell 
attempted to rape Stacey.  A careful reading of our opinion 
shows that these statements were not intended to convey that 
this issue was before the jury.  To the contrary, these 
statements were observations made to clarify that the amended 
indictment must have been intended to charge Powell with the 
capital murder of Stacey premised upon the gradation offense of 
the rape of Kristie, but was insufficient to do so because of a 
drafting error.7
Powell also contends that even if the jury had not 
impliedly acquitted him of the capital murder of Stacey premised 
on the gradation offense of her rape or attempted rape, the 
effect of this Court’s decision in the appeal of his first 
conviction nonetheless was to expressly acquit him of that crime 
because we found the evidence in that trial insufficient to 
                     
7 We also held that the amendment of the indictment, even if 
properly drafted, would not have been permitted because the 
grand jury “was never called upon to consider [the rape of 
Kristie] as the gradation crime for the capital murder of 
Stacey.”  Powell, 261 Va. at 534, 552 S.E.2d at 357. 
 
29
support a finding of rape or attempted rape of Stacey.  Relying 
on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1978), Powell 
asserts that, because we held that the evidence at his first 
trial at best would have supported a conviction for first degree 
murder, the trial court was bound by that determination in any 
subsequent retrial.  Powell contends that Burks stands for the 
proposition that the determination of an appellate court that 
the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider a 
charge not supported by the evidence acts as an acquittal on 
that charge and that a retrial for the same offense is barred by 
the prohibition against double jeopardy. 
Our conclusion that, lacking evidence of a sexual assault 
on Stacey or the attempt to commit one, Powell could be retried 
only for first degree murder was based upon “the circumstances 
of this case.”  Powell, 261 Va. at 545-46, 552 S.E.2d at 363.  
Nothing in that statement implies that Powell had been acquitted 
of capital murder premised on any possible gradation offense, 
nor, as we have already demonstrated, did it preclude the 
Commonwealth from seeking to indict Powell for the capital 
murder of Stacey with the attempted rape of Stacey as the 
gradation offense under the exceptional circumstances occasioned 
by Powell’s voluntary confession. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
denying Powell’s motions to dismiss the indictment for capital 
 
30
murder on the ground that the Commonwealth was prohibited from 
proving Powell attempted to rape Stacey by the law of the case 
of his former trial and appeal. 
Double Jeopardy 
Powell also contends that the trial court should have 
dismissed the indictment against him because his prosecution 
under that indictment violated the guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States against being 
twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.  Specifically, he 
asserts that having been indicted once for a violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(5) for the murder of Stacey Reed, his constitutional 
guarantee of protection against being placed in double jeopardy 
prohibited the Commonwealth from indicting him a second time for 
that murder under the same subsection of the capital murder 
statute. 
During oral argument of this appeal, Powell acknowledged 
that the Commonwealth may indict and convict an accused for 
multiple counts of capital murder of a single victim under 
different subsections of Code § 18.2-31 without violating the 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.  See Bailey 
v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 747, 529 S.E.2d 570, 584, cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000) (a single indictment may charge two 
counts of capital murder of the same victim under Code 
§§ 18.2-31(7) and 18.2-31(12)).  Moreover, we have held that 
 
31
where a particular subsection of Code § 18.2-31 lists multiple 
gradation offenses, the Commonwealth may indict the accused for 
separate offenses of capital murder of a single victim premised 
on each specific gradation offense.  Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. 216, 228, 509 S.E.2d 293, 301 (1999) (indictments properly 
charged separate violations of Code § 18.2-31(5) premised on 
rape and object sexual penetration of the same victim).  In 
Payne, we said that “it is clear, as well as logical, that the 
General Assembly intended for each statutory offense [in Code 
§ 18.2-31] to be punished separately ‘as a Class 1 felony.’ ”  
Id. 
By statutory definition, capital murder is limited to the 
“willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person” 
under specific circumstances or in the commission or attempted 
commission of certain crimes enumerated in Code § 18.2-31.  We 
have frequently referred to these crimes as gradation offenses 
because, when committed as part of the same transaction as a 
murder, they elevate what would otherwise constitute murder of 
the first degree pursuant to Code § 18.2-32 to capital murder.  
Pertinent to the present case, Code § 18.2-31(5) specifies 
gradation offenses of “rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy 
or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual penetration.”  In 
Payne, we concluded that the rape and object sexual penetration 
of the same victim are separate and distinct gradation offenses 
 
32
and, therefore, support two capital murder convictions 
consistent with double jeopardy protections.  Id.  While Payne 
is instructive insofar as it establishes that separate and 
distinct gradation offenses are enumerated in Code § 18.2-31(5), 
it does not resolve Powell’s case. 
Powell’s contention that he was charged with the same crime 
rather than with two separate crimes under the amended 
indictment and the 2001 indictment is principally premised upon 
the fact that the former failed to identify the victim of the 
rape or attempted rape.  Because the amended indictment in his 
first trial, while identifying Stacey as the victim of the 
murder, did not specify a victim of the gradation offenses of 
rape or attempted rape, Powell contends that proof of the 
identity of the victim was not an element of those offenses.  
Thus, he argues that he was placed in jeopardy regardless of 
whether Stacey or Kristie were proven to be the victim of the 
gradation offenses of rape or attempted rape, and the subsequent 
indictment that expressly identified Stacey as the victim of 
attempted rape violated his constitutional guarantee against 
double jeopardy. 
We agree with Powell that when an indictment does not 
specify the identity of the victim of a gradation offense to the 
crime of capital murder, the identity of the victim of the 
gradation offense is not an element of the crime.  Powell, 
 
33
however, has again overlooked the significance of the bill of 
particulars provided by the Commonwealth in his first trial.  As 
we have already explained, the Commonwealth expressly identified 
Kristie as the victim of the gradation offenses for the capital 
murder of Stacey under Code § 18.2-31(5).  The bill of 
particulars was filed well in advance of the trial and before 
jeopardy had attached.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 
298, 307, 559 S.E.2d 636, 641 (2002) (“The right not to be 
subjected to double jeopardy attaches in a criminal case when 
the jury is impaneled and sworn”). 
During oral argument of this appeal, Powell contended that 
the bill of particulars only limits the Commonwealth’s ability 
to argue a specific theory of the crime, does not amend the 
indictment, and jeopardy attaches as to the indictment as worded 
regardless of whether a bill of particulars has been filed.  We 
disagree. 
As noted above, while “[i]t is true the bill of particulars 
is not for the purpose of charging the offense . . . the bill of 
particulars and the indictment must be read together.”  
Livingston, 184 Va. at 837, 36 S.E.2d at 565.  Thus, we hold 
that where, prior to the attachment of jeopardy, the 
Commonwealth limits the prosecution of a capital murder, 
undifferentiated in the indictment by the identity of the victim 
of the gradation offense, by naming a specific victim of the 
 
34
gradation offense in a bill of particulars, jeopardy will attach 
only to the capital murder charge as made specific by the bill 
of particulars. 
For these reasons, we further hold that the trial court did 
not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment for capital murder 
as violative of Powell’s double jeopardy protection. 
B. Constitutionality of Virginia’s Capital Murder Statutes
 
In his third and eleventh assignments of error, Powell 
attacks the trial court’s order overruling his motions to have 
the Virginia capital murder statutes declared unconstitutional.  
With respect to the motion filed April 25, 2002 and overruled by 
the trial court on May 6, 2002, Powell has restated, in summary 
fashion, five of his arguments advanced in the trial court, 
without citation to authority.8  The failure to adequately brief 
an assignment of error constitutes a waiver of the argument.  
See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 318, 541 S.E.2d 
872, 880, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001) (assignments of 
                     
8 At trial, Powell further contended that the expedited 
review of death sentence cases required by Code § 17.1-313 
violated a defendant’s constitutional right to equal protection.  
Powell contended that by eliminating an intermediate review by 
the Court of Appeals, a defendant is denied the opportunity to 
perfect the issues and arguments he wishes to make on appeal.  
He further contended that expediting death sentence appeals on 
our docket “disadvantaged death-sentence defendants by providing 
them with substantially less time than other criminal defendants 
to protect their legal rights.”  Powell does not reassert these 
issues on appeal. 
 
35
error not briefed are waived even where trial record contains 
written argument addressing same issue). 
Moreover, the arguments raised by Powell have been 
previously considered and rejected by this Court.  The arguments 
raised by Powell and recent decisions rejecting those arguments 
are: 
That the statutes fail to provide meaningful guidance with 
respect to the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating 
factors and that the jury is not provided adequate guidance with 
respect to the application of aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  Rejected in Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 
397, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ 
S.Ct. ___, 72 U.S.L.W. 3392 (2003). 
That permitting evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct 
to be used to establish the defendant’s future dangerousness 
fails to meet the “heightened reliability requirement” of the 
8th and 14th Amendments.  Rejected in Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 
Va. 172, 203, 563 S.E.2d 695, 716 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1123 (2003). 
That the trial court is improperly vested with discretion 
whether to set aside the death sentence for good cause shown and 
is permitted to consider hearsay evidence in the pre-sentence 
report.  Rejected in Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 459, 544 
S.E.2d 299, 303-04, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001). 
 
36
That the mandatory proportionality review procedures 
employed by this Court fail to meet constitutional standards.  
Rejected in Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 509, 537 S.E.2d 
866, 874 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001); Bailey, 259 
Va. at 740-42, 529 S.E.2d at 580-81, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995 
(2000). 
With respect to the December 11, 2002 motion, overruled by 
the trial court on December 23, 2002, Powell asserts, as he did 
in the trial court, that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), requires that 
“many of the procedural safeguards that heretofore have only 
been required during the guilt/innocence phase of trial must now 
be extended to the sentencing phase.”  Powell reasons that 
because Ring held that it was impermissible in a jury trial to 
allow the trial judge to determine whether there were 
aggravating factors sufficient to warrant the imposition of the 
death penalty, id. at 609, the aggravating factors required to 
be found by Code § 19.2-264.4(B) before a sentence of death may 
be imposed are “to be treated as elements of the offense of a 
death-eligible capital murder.”  Powell contends that the 
standards of proof and rules of evidence applicable to the 
determination of guilt must also be applied to the determination 
of sentence, and that, contrary to decisions of this Court made 
prior to Ring, this precludes the Commonwealth from presenting 
 
37
under a “relaxed evidentiary standard” evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal conduct or hearsay evidence when the declarant is not 
available for cross-examination as required by the confrontation 
clause. 
The Commonwealth responds that Ring does not alter the 
analysis of the constitutionality of the procedures applied 
during the penalty determination phase of a capital murder trial 
in Virginia.  Rather, the Commonwealth contends that the 
procedures for the admission of relevant evidence during the 
penalty determination phase under Code § 19.2-264.4(B) continue 
to be fully in accord with the Sixth Amendment due process 
concerns underpinning the decision in Ring.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth. 
First, we note that Powell’s expansive reading of Ring is 
unwarranted for the obvious reason that the statutory scheme at 
issue in that case, which permitted the judge in a capital 
murder jury trial to assume the role of the jury in determining 
whether aggravating factors permitting the imposition of the 
death penalty were present, is markedly different from that of 
Virginia’s death penalty sentencing statute.  See Ring, 536 U.S. 
at 588.  Moreover, nothing in the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Ring suggests that the Court intended to revisit 
broader issues of due process protections afforded in the 
penalty determination phase of all capital murder trials. 
 
38
We further reject Powell’s contention that there is a 
“relaxed evidentiary standard” applicable to the penalty 
determination phase of a capital murder trial in Virginia.  To 
the contrary, Code § 19.2-264.4(B) expressly provides, and we 
have consistently held, that the Commonwealth must prove the 
existence of one or both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 
S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).  
Powell’s contention that the introduction of evidence of 
unadjudicated criminal acts is not admissible because Ring 
somehow refines the need for “heightened reliability” in capital 
sentencing is, as the Commonwealth notes, nothing more than a 
reassertion of the same argument raised in his prior motion and 
consistently rejected by this Court.  Jackson, Jerry v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 189, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2004) 
(today decided).  Powell’s assertion that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) 
permits the introduction of hearsay evidence not otherwise 
subject to an exception is simply wrong.9  See, e.g., Lovitt v. 
                     
9 On brief, the Commonwealth suggests that Powell has 
confused the evidentiary standard applicable to the penalty 
determination phase with that applicable to the trial court’s 
consideration of the presentence report.  Powell did not respond 
to this assertion in his reply brief and does not otherwise 
assert that Ring has any implication to the post-verdict 
sentencing procedure.  Accordingly, we express no opinion on 
that issue. 
 
 
39
Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826 (2003); Jackson, 
267 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.  For these reasons, we hold 
that the trial court did not err in overruling Powell’s motion 
to have the Virginia capital murder statutes declared 
unconstitutional. 
C. Failure to Disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
In his tenth assignment of error, Powell contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to disqualify 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney and his office from prosecuting 
Powell on the new indictment.  Powell asserts the “grossly 
offensive personal attacks” on the Commonwealth’s Attorney in 
Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter, created a direct conflict of 
interest because the Commonwealth’s Attorney “had a personal 
stake in the outcome of this case.”  This is so, Powell 
contends, because the personal attacks in his letter 
“undoubtedly led [the Commonwealth’s Attorney] to have feelings 
of animosity towards Powell.”  The Commonwealth responds that 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney represented to the trial court that 
he could impartially prosecute the case and that it was a matter 
within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether to 
disqualify him.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
The due process rights of a criminal defendant under both 
the Virginia and United States Constitutions are violated when a 
Commonwealth’s Attorney who has a conflict of interest relevant 
 
40
to the defendant’s case prosecutes the defendant.  See Cantrell 
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (1985); 
Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).  However, 
the question whether there is a conflict of interest is 
dependent upon the circumstances of the individual case, and the 
burden is on the party seeking disqualification of the 
prosecutor to present evidence establishing the existence of 
disqualifying bias or prejudice.  The determination whether the 
evidence supports a finding of a conflict of interest is a 
matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  
See Lux v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 561, 569, 484 S.E.2d 145, 
149 (1997). 
The issue may arise where the prosecutor has had an 
attorney-client relationship with the parties involved whereby 
he obtained privileged information that may be adverse to the 
defendant’s interest in regard to the pending criminal charges.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 15 Va. App. 684, 694, 426 
S.E.2d 837, 842 (1993).  A second situation is where the 
prosecutor has some direct personal interest arising from a 
financial interest, kinship, or close friendship such that his 
objectivity and impartiality are called into question.  See, 
e.g., Cantrell, 229 Va. at 391-94, 329 S.E.2d at 24-27.  Neither 
of these circumstances applies to the present case. 
 
41
Beyond these categories of clear and direct conflicts of 
interest and ethical bars to a particular attorney prosecuting a 
particular defendant, there is the broader consideration of 
whether, on the facts of a particular case, the adversarial 
nature of the judicial process has resulted in such enmity 
toward the defendant on the part of the prosecutor that it will 
overbear his professional judgment in seeking fairly and 
impartially to see justice done.  See Lux, 24 Va. App. at 569, 
484 S.E.2d at 149.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
observed in a related context, “ ‘[i]mpartiality is not 
gullibility.  Disinterestedness does not mean child-like 
innocence.’ ”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) 
(quoting In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2nd Cir. 
1943).  We are of opinion that the same can be said of the 
prosecutor’s role. 
The adversarial nature of criminal prosecutions 
unsurprisingly tends to engender some level of friction between 
the prosecutor and the defendant in difficult cases, especially 
where, as here, the defendant seems intent on showing his 
contempt and disrespect for the prosecutor.  However, merely 
demonstrating a history of one-sided acrimony between the 
defendant and the prosecutor is insufficient to establish a 
conflict of interest or prosecutorial misconduct with respect to 
an otherwise proper prosecution.  See, e.g., Phelps v. Hamilton, 
 
42
59 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 1995).  If such were not the case, 
a defendant would have an incentive to deliberately incite such 
enmity.  The evidence must reflect that the prosecutor is acting 
not within the dictates of the law, but has strayed outside 
those parameters in furtherance of a personal animus against the 
defendant. 
Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter undoubtedly was intended 
to insult, if not incense, the Commonwealth’s Attorney.  But, 
the trial court was within its discretion to accept the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s assurance that it had not had an 
effect on his professional judgment in seeking fairly and 
impartially to see justice done.  Moreover, nothing in the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s conduct of the trial evinces any lack 
of such professional judgment on his part.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling 
Powell’s motion to disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney. 
D. Failure to Exclude Testimony of Kristie Reed
In his ninth assignment of error, Powell contends that the 
trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to call Kristie 
as a witness and to give testimony concerning Powell’s rape and 
attempted murder of her during the guilt determination phase of 
 
43
his trial.10  He asserts that evidence of the events following 
the murder of Stacey was not relevant to prove his culpability 
for that crime and that such evidence was, in any case, unduly 
prejudicial.11
The Commonwealth responds that evidence of the rape and 
attempted murder of Kristie, including her testimony and its 
supporting exhibits, was admissible because those acts were 
interrelated parts of a common criminal plan and, thus, were 
relevant to prove Powell’s identity, motive, and intent as the 
perpetrator of all the crimes committed in the course of 
carrying out that plan.  In addition, the Commonwealth contends 
that evidence of the subsequent attack on Kristie was probative 
of Powell’s state of mind during the entire criminal enterprise 
and, thus, admissible to show premeditation in the killing of 
Stacey to rebut Powell’s claim that the killing was accidental.  
We agree with the Commonwealth. 
                     
10 In his pre-trial motion, Powell sought to exclude all 
evidence of his rape and attempted murder of Kristie.  On 
appeal, he has limited his argument to the exclusion of her 
testimony and the exhibits introduced in its course. 
 
11 Powell also asserts that Kristie’s testimony was 
unnecessary because it was cumulative of other evidence and 
should more properly have been received as “victim impact 
testimony” during sentencing.  These arguments were not made at 
trial and, thus, are barred from consideration in this appeal.  
Rule 5:25. 
 
44
Generally, evidence of other offenses is inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution, but it is a well-established exception 
that such evidence is admissible to show a common criminal 
scheme when the various acts are naturally explained as the 
constituent parts of the defendant’s general plan.  See Satcher 
v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 230, 421 S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 
211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970); McWhorter v. 
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 857, 870-71, 63 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1951).  In 
Kirkpatrick we explained that:  
[e]vidence of other offenses is admitted if it shows 
the conduct and feeling of the accused toward his 
victim . . . or if it tends to prove any relevant 
element of the offense charged.  Such evidence is 
permissible in cases where the motive, intent or 
knowledge of the accused is involved, or where the 
evidence is connected with . . . the offense for which 
the accused is on trial. 
 
211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805; see also Satcher, 244 Va. at 
230, 421 S.E.2d at 828. 
There can be no question that it was the Commonwealth’s 
theory in this trial, and taking the evidence in the light 
favorable to the Commonwealth it is an unassailable fact, that 
Powell went to the Reed home with the intention of raping and 
killing both Stacey and Kristie.  As such, the evidence of 
Powell’s rape and attempted murder of Kristie was directly 
probative of his motive and intent in the attempted rape and 
 
45
murder of Stacey.  Moreover, Kristie’s eyewitness testimony 
placing Powell in the home when she arrived and identifying him 
as her assailant was critical to establishing Powell’s identity 
as the perpetrator of the crimes that preceded the criminal acts 
committed against her. 
Powell’s contention that the graphic and emotional 
testimony of the victim of a brutal rape and attempted murder 
should have been excluded because its probative value was 
outweighed by the prejudice it would cause in the minds of the 
jury is equally without merit.  All evidence tending to prove 
guilt is prejudicial to an accused, but the mere fact that such 
evidence is powerful because it accurately depicts the gravity 
and atrociousness of the crime or the callous nature of the 
defendant does not thereby render it inadmissible.  Moreover, 
direct evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, is rarely subject 
to exclusion on the ground that it would be unduly prejudicial.  
In any case, determination of the issue is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 
240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 
(1990).  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err 
in failing to grant Powell’s pre-trial motion to exclude the 
testimony of Kristie Reed from the guilt determination phase of 
the trial. 
 
46
E. Failure to Suppress Powell’s Statements to Police
In his twelfth assignment of error, Powell contends that 
“[t]he trial court erred in not suppressing Powell’s statements 
to police.”  Although he uses the plural term “statements” in 
the assignment of error and makes references to the ability of 
an accused to revoke a prior waiver of his right to remain 
silent, Powell does not expressly restate the contention made in 
the trial court that statements made during the initial 
investigation prior to his first trial should have been 
suppressed because at the conclusion of his first interview he 
stated that he had nothing more to say.  Because Powell has not 
expressly raised this issue on brief or during oral argument, it 
has been waived and we will not address it.  Burns, 261 Va. at 
318, 541 S.E.2d at 880. 
Powell does assert that the trial court erred in not 
suppressing the statement concerning Powell’s October 21, 2001 
letter that he made on November 2, 2001 while in prison to an 
investigator.  Powell contends that because he was still 
represented by counsel from his first trial, the investigator 
should not have questioned him without his counsel being 
present. 
The Commonwealth responds that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had not attached with respect to the crime for which the 
investigator was gathering evidence and for which Powell would 
 
47
be indicted as a result of the evidence in his October 21, 2001 
letter.  Moreover, as Powell executed a waiver of his Fifth 
Amendment rights immediately prior to giving the November 2, 
2001 statement, the Commonwealth contends that the statement was 
properly admitted.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “arises from the fact 
that the suspect has been formally charged with a particular 
crime and thus is facing a state apparatus that has been geared 
up to prosecute him.”  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685 
(1988); see also Alston v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 433, 437, 570 
S.E.2d 801, 803 (2002).  We have already determined that the 
crime for which Powell was tried and convicted in the present 
case was a separate offense from those for which he had been 
previously convicted.  Powell had not been formally charged with 
that offense when he was interviewed on November 2, 2001 and, 
thus, he was not entitled to have his counsel from his prior 
trial present during that interview.  Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 
Va. 236, 252, 397 S.E.2d 385, 394 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
824 (1991).  As Powell does not dispute that he freely and 
knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel at the 
time of the interview, we hold that the trial court did not err 
in failing to suppress Powell’s statement. 
 
48
F. Limiting Voir Dire and Failure to Strike Jury Panel
 
In his fourth assignment of error, Powell contends that the 
trial court erred in not permitting him to question prospective 
jurors about whether knowledge of Powell’s prior conviction for 
capital murder and its subsequent reversal on appeal would 
influence their opinion as to his guilt.  Powell concedes that a 
prospective juror with knowledge of a defendant’s prior 
conviction is subject to disqualification on that ground.  
Barker, 230 Va. at 375, 337 S.E.2d at 733.  But see Patton v. 
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984) (refusing to grant a new trial 
where several jurors had pretrial knowledge of the defendant’s 
prior conviction for the same crime).  Powell contends, however, 
that in his case the jury would ultimately learn of his prior 
conviction during the trial and, thus, asserts that he should 
have been able to question jurors on the effect this evidence 
would have on them. 
The purpose of voir dire is “to ascertain whether [a 
prospective juror] is related to either party, or has any 
interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, 
or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein.”  Code § 8.01-
358.  To that end, prospective jurors may be asked any question 
relevant to determine whether they may be subject to being 
removed from the venire for cause. 
 
49
The test of relevancy is whether the questions relate 
to any of the four criteria set forth in the statute.  
If an answer to the question would necessarily 
disclose, or clearly lead to the disclosure of the 
statutory factors of relationship, interest, opinion, 
or prejudice, it must be permitted. 
 
LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) 
The question that Powell attempted to ask the first panel 
of the venire was not one that “would necessarily disclose, or 
clearly lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of 
relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice” of the 
prospective jurors.  The panel had already indicated that they 
had no prior knowledge of the case and had not formed an opinion 
as to Powell’s guilt or innocence.  Powell’s question would not 
have revealed any preexisting opinion or bias with respect to 
his case, but would instead have served to test the jurors’ 
potential response to the evidence that he expected the 
Commonwealth to present. 
Whether to permit a party to ask a question that goes 
beyond what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a matter 
entirely within the trial court’s discretion.  Id.  We hold that 
the trial court did not err in refusing to permit Powell to test 
the potential response of the jurors to the evidence that would 
be adduced at trial concerning his prior conviction. 
 
50
In his eighth assignment of error, Powell contends that, 
having denied him the opportunity to question the potential 
jurors on this point, the trial court should have disqualified 
for cause the five members of the first panel because his 
attempt to question them provided them with knowledge that he 
had been previously convicted for the capital murder of Stacey 
Reed.  Thus, he contends that these jurors were subject to 
automatic exclusion under Barker. 
Even if we were to agree that Powell’s curtailed question 
provided the five prospective jurors with sufficient information 
to raise the concern for potential prejudice that the jurors’ 
full knowledge of the defendant’s prior conviction raised in 
Barker, that circumstance arose here through Powell’s own 
conduct during the voir dire.  The record demonstrates that 
Powell’s counsel was fully aware that advising the prospective 
jurors that Powell had been previously convicted of capital 
murder carried with it the potential for creating bias against 
his client, but apparently deemed this risk acceptable in order 
to seek the strategic advantage of being able to test the 
jurors’ potential response to the evidence concerning that 
conviction during the trial.  Counsel further recognized the 
risk that the trial court would not permit him to pursue that 
line of questioning, and, as we have just determined, was within 
its discretion to do so. 
 
51
Under the “invited error” doctrine Powell may not benefit 
from his counsel’s voluntary, strategic choice to place Powell 
at a potential disadvantage in the hope, unproductive though it 
was, of gaining some advantage.  See, e.g., Moore v. Hinkle, 259 
Va. 479, 491, 527 S.E.2d 419, 426 (2000); Saunders v. 
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970); 
Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 787, 791, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273 
(1961).  “No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will 
be permitted to approbate and reprobate – to invite error . . . 
and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own 
wrong.”  Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417, 374 S.E.2d 
46, 54 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989).  Accordingly, 
we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to strike 
the members of the first voir dire panel for cause under the 
particular circumstances created by Powell in this case. 
G. Failure to Strike the Evidence 
In his fifth assignment of error, Powell contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to strike the evidence as to 
capital murder on the ground that the Commonwealth had not 
adequately corroborated his confession in the October 21, 2001 
letter of having attempted to rape Stacey.  Thus, Powell 
contends that the evidence at best would have supported a 
conviction for first degree murder.  We disagree. 
 
52
Although the Commonwealth may not establish an essential 
element of a crime by the uncorroborated confession of the 
accused alone, “‘only slight corroborative evidence’” is 
necessary to show the veracity of the confession.  Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 175, 360 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1987) 
(quoting Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 133, 321 S.E.2d 
273, 279 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985)), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).  What is more, if “[t]his 
corroborating evidence is consistent with a reasonable 
inference” that the accused committed the crime to which he has 
confessed, the Commonwealth need not establish through direct 
evidence those elements of the crime that are proven by the 
confession.  See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 646, 499 
S.E.2d 538, 551 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999). 
Contrary to Powell’s contention that there is not even 
“slight” corroborative evidence to support the reliability of 
his confession, the forensic evidence and direct testimony are 
consistent with and substantiate Powell’s version of “the rest 
of what happened” in every relevant respect.  Powell’s going to 
the home armed when he knew Stacey would be there alone, 
Stacey’s defensive wounds, the evidence that her pants’ zipper 
was slightly undone, the subsequent rape of Kristie, and 
Powell’s later concession that he raped Kristie because he 
“didn’t get any with Stacey” all corroborate his confession to 
 
53
the attempted rape of Stacey in the October 21, 2001 letter.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
overruling Powell’s motion to strike the evidence as to capital 
murder premised on the attempted rape of Stacey. 
H. Mandatory Sentence Review
In his first and second assignments of error, Powell 
contends that the jury imposed the sentence of death under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor 
and that the sentence of death is disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in other cases considering both the crime and 
the defendant.  As noted above, these two assignments of error 
parallel the mandatory review of every death sentence this Court 
conducts pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C).  Accordingly, we will 
combine the mandatory review of Powell’s death sentence with our 
discussion of the issues raised by Powell in his assignments of 
error. 
Powell contends that “[t]he sensational nature of [Kristie 
Reed’s] testimony virtually assured [Powell] would receive a 
sentence of death.”  This is so, he asserts, because “the 
graphic and irrelevant evidence about the attack on Kristie” 
would have enraged the jury and rendered it unable to reach an 
impartial verdict. 
We have already determined that evidence of the rape and 
attempted murder of Kristie was relevant and admissible during 
 
54
the guilt determination phase of the trial.  Similarly, Powell’s 
rape and attempted murder of Kristie was relevant for the jury’s 
consideration of his future dangerousness during the penalty 
determination phase of the trial.  Accordingly, Powell’s 
assertion that the jury was influenced by “irrelevant” evidence 
is without merit.  However, while graphic evidence of a violent 
crime is admissible in the guilt determination phase of a 
capital murder trial, we will also consider the potential impact 
such evidence may have had on the jury’s decision to impose the 
death sentence during the penalty determination phase. 
The brutal rape and attempted murder of a thirteen-year-old 
child are undoubtedly among the most abhorrent crimes that can 
be placed in evidence before a jury contemplating whether to 
impose a sentence of death upon a defendant.  Nonetheless, the 
mere fact that the jury is presented with such evidence does not 
raise a presumption that the jury will be unable to set aside 
its natural emotions and fairly consider all the evidence.  See 
Bailey, 259 Va. at 751, 529 S.E.2d at 586 (evidence of 
infanticide and uxoricide, though abhorrent crimes, did not 
preclude jury from making a rational sentencing determination in 
a capital murder trial). 
Powell further contends that the trial court erred in 
submitting to the jury a verdict form that permitted it to 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine but which did 
 
55
not expressly parallel the trial court’s sentencing instructions 
by stating that this form was to be used if the jury found that 
neither aggravating factor had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  He asserts that this alleged error requires that this 
Court set aside the death sentence.  Powell concedes that he did 
not raise this issue at trial, but nonetheless contends that it 
is proper for this Court to consider his argument as part of the 
mandatory review of his sentence, apparently contending that an 
erroneous verdict form would constitute an “arbitrary factor” 
that would influence the jury’s sentencing decision. 
Our review of the record in this case does not disclose 
that the jury failed to give fair consideration to all the 
evidence both in favor and in mitigation of the death sentence.  
Moreover, the jury was properly instructed upon the sentences 
available and the basis for imposing them and the record 
supports the jury’s determination to impose a sentence of death 
upon a finding that both aggravating factors were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  We find nothing to suggest that the jury, 
or the trial court in reviewing the verdict, imposed the death 
sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 
arbitrary factors.  Accordingly, we hold that the sentence of 
death was not imposed under passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary 
factor. 
 
56
In a separate section of his brief, ostensibly related to 
the assignment of error paralleling the passion, prejudice and 
arbitrary factor aspect of our mandatory review, Powell asserts 
that the alleged error in the wording of the life sentence 
verdict form should result in the reversal of his death sentence 
and a remand for a new sentencing proceeding.  While we consider 
the entire record of a capital murder trial to determine whether 
the sentence of death should be set aside because of improper 
influence on the jury, we have previously rejected the 
contention that the “arbitrary factor” language of Code § 17.1-
313(C)(1) permits a defendant to raise as a separate issue on 
appeal an issue barred by the failure to make a proper objection 
in the trial court by contending that the error influenced the 
jury’s sentencing decision.  See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 
Va. 127, 148 n.6, 152 n.7, 295 S.E.2d 643, 653 n.6, 656 n.7 
(1982) (rejecting assertion in dissenting opinion that mandatory 
review permitted challenge to form of jury verdict to be raised 
for the first time on appeal).  Accordingly, while Powell is not 
precluded from arguing that the alleged error in the life 
sentence verdict form improperly influenced the jury’s 
sentencing decision as a basis for commuting the death sentence, 
we will not consider his separate argument under the same 
 
57
assignment of error as a basis for reversing that sentence and 
ordering a new sentencing proceeding.12
Powell contends that the death sentenced imposed upon him 
is excessive or disproportionate when compared to similar cases 
considering both the crime and the defendant.  Powell’s sole 
contention is that his history of mental health problems and his 
failure to receive adequate treatment when in state custody as a 
juvenile militates against the appropriateness of the death 
penalty in his case.  We disagree. 
Code § 19.2-264.4(B) lists as a mitigating factor the fact 
that “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was significantly impaired.”  The 
psychologist called by Powell did not offer a specific diagnosis 
of Powell’s mental health problems, merely classifying them 
generally as suggesting an anti-social personality disorder and 
“a mood disorder, primarily depressive in nature . . . 
                     
12 Powell also contends that the “ends of justice” exception 
of Rule 5:25 would permit us to consider the alleged error in 
the life sentence verdict form as a basis for reversing his 
death sentence and ordering a new sentencing proceeding.  
However, as Powell cannot argue for reversal of his death 
sentence under the assignment of error paralleling the mandatory 
review of that sentence and failed to make this issue the 
subject of a separate assignment of error, the issue is not 
properly before us.  Rule 5:17.  Accordingly, we will not 
address this issue as a basis for reversing the sentence of 
death and remanding for a new sentencing proceeding. 
 
58
characterized by irritability, short temper and so forth.”  The 
psychologist did not testify that Powell lacked the ability to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or that his condition 
significantly impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. 
The jury heard this testimony concerning Powell’s mental 
health problems, and we must assume that the jury followed the 
trial court’s instruction to consider evidence presented in 
mitigation.  The jury clearly concluded that Powell’s history of 
mental health problems did not mitigate his offense.  See Swann 
v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 238-39, 441 S.E.2d 195, 206-07, 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994) (death sentence imposed 
despite “history of mental health hospitalization and 
treatment”); Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 313, 377 S.E.2d 
595, 601, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989) (death sentence 
imposed despite evidence of defendant’s prior confinement in 
nine or ten mental hospitals); Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 1064, 1076-79, 266 S.E.2d 94, 101-103 (1980) (death sentence 
imposed despite mitigating evidence of defendant’s “schizoid 
personality disturbance” and “extreme mental and emotional 
disturbance”). 
                                                                  
 
 
59
Apart from Powell’s contention that his history of mental 
health problems should preclude the imposition of a death 
sentence in his case, we are required by Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) 
to conduct a comparative review of the death sentence imposed in 
this case with other capital murder cases, including those where 
a life sentence was imposed.  “The purpose of our comparative 
review is to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what cases 
justify the imposition of the death penalty.”  Orbe v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000).  In conducting this 
statutorily mandated review in this case, we have focused on 
cases in which the victim was murdered during the commission of 
rape or attempted rape, and in which the sentence of death was 
imposed based on findings of both future dangerousness and 
vileness.  See, e.g., Patterson v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 301, 
551 S.E.2d 332 (2001); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 506 
S.E.2d 763 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999); Pruett v. 
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 
482 U.S. 931 (1987); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 
S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984); Mason v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 919 (1979); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 
135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).  We have also 
considered cases in which defendants received life sentences, 
 
60
rather than the death penalty, for capital murder during the 
commission of rape or attempted rape.  See, e.g., Horne v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 339 S.E.2d 186 (1986); Keil v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 99, 278 S.E.2d 826 (1981).  Considering 
all the factors revealed by the record, both those favoring 
imposition of the death sentence and those in mitigation against 
it, we hold that the sentence is neither excessive nor 
disproportionate to the penalties imposed by other sentencing 
bodies in the Commonwealth for comparable crimes. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Having found no error below and perceiving no other reason 
to commute or set aside the sentence of death, we will affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
61