Title: Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Limited
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19S-PL-37
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2019

I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-PL-37 
Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc., et al., 
Appellants (Defendants), 
–v–
Seventy-Seven Limited, et al., 
Appellees (Plaintiffs). 
Argued: February 14, 2019 | Decided: November 12, 2019 
Interlocutory Appeal from Marion Superior Court, 
No. 49D04-1010-PL-43362 
The Honorable Cynthia Ayers, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 49A02-1710-PL-2502  
Opinion by Justice Goff 
 Chief Justice Rush and Justices David and Massa concur. 
Justice Slaughter concurs in Parts I and II and in the judgment. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Nov 12 2019, 10:37 am
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Goff, Justice. 
This litigation arises from the sale of forty dump trucks—a transaction 
in goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The 
agreement governing this sale contained a warranty and a one-year 
limitations period for filing a breach-of-contract suit. Mechanical problems 
plagued the trucks soon after delivery. Several years later, following 
sellers’ unsuccessful attempts at repair, buyers sued for breach of 
warranty.  
Under the UCC, a party’s cause of action accrues (thus triggering the 
limitations period) upon delivery of goods. However, if a warranty 
explicitly guarantees the quality or performance standards of the goods 
for a specific future time period, the cause of action accrues when the 
aggrieved party discovers (or should have discovered) the breach. This is 
known as the future-performance exception.  
As part of the larger issue of whether buyers’ complaint was untimely, 
this case presents two novel issues for our consideration: (1) whether these 
parties’ bargained-for warranty falls under the future-performance 
exception within Indiana’s version of the UCC; and (2) whether the 
sellers’ conduct—including their efforts at repairing the trucks—could toll 
the one-year limitations period under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  
We hold that, under the express terms of their agreement, the parties 
here contracted for a future-performance warranty and any breach-of-
warranty claims did not accrue until the buyers knew (or should have 
known) of the breach. We also hold that, under the equitable estoppel 
doctrine, a party’s conduct—even relating to the repair of goods—may toll 
a contractually agreed-upon limitations period when that conduct is of a 
sufficient affirmative character to prevent inquiry, elude investigation, or 
mislead the other party into inaction.     
However, because there remain genuine issues of material fact relating 
to both issues, we hold that summary judgment is not appropriate now. 
We, therefore, affirm the trial court order denying summary judgment 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Factual and Procedural History 
Seventy-Seven Limited and six other trucking companies1 (collectively, 
the Buyers) purchased forty customizable Kenworth T800 dump trucks 
manufactured by PACCAR and Kenworth Truck Company and sold by 
Kenworth of Indianapolis (collectively, the Sellers). For each truck sold, 
Buyers and Sellers executed a Warranty Agreement that provided, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Kenworth Truck Company warrants directly to you that the 
Kenworth vehicle . . . will be free from defects in materials and 
workmanship during the time and mileage periods set forth in 
the Warranty Schedule and appearing under normal use and 
service.  
Your sole and exclusive remedy against Kenworth Truck 
Company and the selling Kenworth Dealer arising from your 
purchase and use of the vehicle is limited to the repair and 
replacement of defective materials or workmanship . . . to the 
extent of Kenworth Truck Company’s obligations under the 
Warranty Schedule on the reverse side of this Agreement.  
Ex. A; Appellants’ App. Vol. III, pp. 13, 152–70. Sellers disclaimed all other 
warranties (express or implied) and liability for incidental or 
consequential damages. The Warranty Agreement imposed the following 
limitations period for filing a lawsuit:  
It is agreed that you have one year from the accrual of the 
cause of action to commence any legal action arising from 
the purchase or use of the vehicle, or be barred forever.    
1 Convey All, LLC; Keller Trucking, Inc.; K&K Aggregate, Inc.; Huber Transport, LLC; Triple 
H Trucking, LLC; Custom Hauling, Inc. 
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Ex. A.  
In November 2005, Jeary Smith, of Seventy-Seven Limited, took 
delivery of the first truck. On his drive from Chillicothe, Ohio, to 
Greenfield, Indiana, he noticed the truck vibrating excessively. Smith 
reported the vibration immediately to Sellers, instructing them to remedy 
the problem before delivering the remaining trucks. Smith received 
assurances from Sellers that the vibration problem “would fall under 
warranty, it’ll be fixed and it will all go away.” Appellees’ App. Vol. II, p. 
118.          
With these assurances, Buyers took delivery of the remaining trucks 
from late 2005 through 2006. But these trucks also vibrated excessively at 
idle and at certain RPMs. Buyers again reported the problem to Sellers. 
Unable to identify the source of the vibration, Sellers installed modified 
engine mounts as an alternative fix. But the problem returned in 2007. See 
Kenworth of Indpls, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., No. 49A02-1504-PL-249, 2016 
WL 1158460 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2016). Sellers installed new, different 
engine mounts the following year, but, after a temporary reduction in 
vibration, the problem persisted. Id.     
Having failed to resolve the issue to Buyers’ satisfaction, Sellers agreed, 
in March 2008, to extend the base vehicle warranty to four years/250,000 
miles. Sellers also promised to replace the engine mounts for as long as 
Buyers owned the trucks. Despite these attempts to cure, several Buyers 
returned the trucks and stopped making payments in late 2008.  
By November of that year, Sellers, seeking to limit their liability 
exposure, debated whether to recall the trucks or to simply maintain the 
status quo. The latter option, according to one Kenworth employee, would 
“likely lead to litigation” because continually changing engine mounts 
would “probably not be acceptable to the customer.” Appellees’ App. Vol. 
III, pp. 39, 61. He was right.  
In September 2010, Kenworth of Indianapolis (d/b/a ITC Acceptance 
Company) filed a replevin action against two Buyers based on their loan 
defaults. The following month—on October 4, 2010—Buyers filed this 
action, alleging breach of contract, constructive fraud, and rescission of 
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contract claims. Buyers later amended that complaint, adding claims of 
breach of express and implied warranties, estoppel, and non-conforming 
goods as defined under Indiana Code section 26-1-2-106. Buyers’ second 
amended complaint invoked the UCC’s provision allowing for suit when 
an exclusive, limited remedy fails its essential purpose. See Ind. Code § 26-
1-2-719(2) (1995). The trial court eventually consolidated these actions into 
one case.  
Sellers moved for summary judgment, contending that, because Buyers 
did not file their complaint until October 2010, their claims were time 
barred. “The causes of action for all of these trucks accrued upon tender of 
delivery” in late 2005 and early 2006, Sellers argued, “the same time when 
[Buyers] first discovered the excessive vibration.” Appellees’ App. Vol. II, 
pp. 7–8. Thus, Sellers insisted, the one-year limitation period specified in 
the Warranty Agreement ended in January 2007 “at the latest.” Id. at 9. 
Buyers responded by arguing that the cause of action accrued not upon 
delivery but when the four-year warranty period ends. What’s more, they 
argued, the doctrine of equitable estoppel tolled the limitations period 
here. 
In denying summary judgment, the trial court found that Sellers’ 
“promise to work on a permanent fix to the excessive vibration problem 
throughout the modified warranty period” was an implied promise of 
future performance under the UCC.  Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 63. See 
I.C. § 26-1-2-725(2). Based on this finding, the court concluded that the 
cause of action accrued not on the date of delivery but on the date the 
extended warranty expired—that is, “four years from the date of in-
service for each vehicle.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 64. 
Beyond this conclusion, the trial court—finding “substantial reasons” 
to toll the limitations period—deemed Buyers’ complaints timely. Id. at 
64–65. In particular, the court cited Sellers’ (1) extension and modification 
of the original warranty period, (2) promise to change the engine mounts 
as long as Buyers owned the trucks, (3) assurances of providing a 
permanent repair, (4) failure to include a limitations period in the 
modified warranty, and (5) continued assurances and failures to remedy 
the excessive vibration which prevented Buyers from filing suit.  
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Sellers appealed, arguing that Buyers’ causes of action accrued upon 
delivery. What’s more, they insisted, under Ludwig v. Ford Motor Co., 510 
N.E.2d 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), “Indiana law is clear that promises or 
attempts to repair defects do not toll the limitations period.” Appellants’ 
Br. at 29.  
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with the majority 
rejecting Sellers’ Ludwig argument. Kenworth of Indpls. Inc. v. Seventy-Seven 
Ltd., 112 N.E.3d 1106, 1111–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  We granted Sellers’ 
petition to transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. 
Appellate Rule 58(A).     
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews summary judgments de novo, “applying the same 
standard as the trial court.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 
2014). Under this well-settled standard, “summary judgment is proper if 
the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to any fact 
material to a claim or issue, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d 987, 990 (Ind. 
2018). 
We likewise apply a de novo standard of review to issues of statutory 
construction, which encompasses the meaning and scope of the UCC.2 See 
State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 710 (Ind. 2018).  
Discussion and Decision  
  The parties pose the same two questions on transfer: (1) When did 
Buyers’ causes of action accrue, thus triggering the one-year limitations 
period? And (2) did Sellers’ conduct toll the limitations period once that 
limitations period commenced? In resolving this case, we must consider 
first whether the breach-of-warranty claim accrued on delivery or 
 
2 Indiana adopted and codified the UCC at Indiana Code chapter 26-1-2.  
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sometime afterwards. We then discuss whether the limitations period 
could be tolled once it began.  
I. These parties contracted for a one-year limitation 
period that started when a cause of action accrued.  
By default, the UCC allows parties four years to bring a lawsuit once a 
cause of action arises from a sales contract. I.C. § 26-1-2-725(1). While the 
parties may not extend this limitations period beyond four years, they 
may reduce the period to one year. Id. It is undisputed that the Warranty 
Agreement amended the limitations period to one year. What’s disputed 
is when Buyers’ breach-of-warranty causes of actions accrued, thus 
triggering the limitations period. 
The UCC instructs that “[a] cause of action accrues when the breach 
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the 
breach.” I.C. § 26-1-2-725(2). Along the same lines, a cause of action for 
breach of warranty accrues “when tender of delivery is made,” 
irrespective of whether the buyer knows of the breach. Id. This default 
delivery rule is subject to the future-performance exception. Under that 
exception, a cause of action for breach of warranty does not accrue on 
delivery if the “warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the 
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such 
performance.” Id. Instead, “the cause of action accrues when the breach is 
or should have been discovered.” Id. In other words, if the express 
warranty guarantees the future performance of the goods, then the 
delivery rule changes to a discovery rule.  
Here, the parties dispute whether the Warranty Agreement invoked the 
future-performance exception and its discovery-of-the-breach rule for 
determining when Buyers’ breach-of-warranty claims accrued.  
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II. Because these parties contracted for an express 
future-performance warranty under the UCC, 
Buyers’ breach-of-warranty cause of action accrued 
when they discovered the breach. 
Because the future-performance exception applies in only narrow 
circumstances, courts interpret and apply the exception strictly. See 
Controlled Env’ts. Const., Inc. v. Key Indus. Refrigeration Co., 670 N.W.2d 771, 
778–79 (Neb. 2003) (citing Joswick v. Chesapeake Mobile Homes, Inc., 362 Md. 
261, 765 A.2d 90 (2001)). For example, since the statute requires that a 
warranty must “explicitly extend[] to future performance of the goods,” 
I.C. § 26-1-2-725(2) (emphasis added), most courts “have held that implied 
warranties by definition cannot explicitly extend to future performance,” 
Stumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1981). See also 2 
William D. Hawkland, Linda J. Rusch & Larry T. Garvin, Uniform 
Commercial Code Series § 2-725:2 (“Almost all courts find that implied 
warranties do not explicitly extend to future performance.”); id. at n.16 
(collecting cases from various jurisdictions). Consequently, courts will 
generally apply the future-performance exception to breach of express 
warranties only. 
A. The parties here bargained for an express warranty.    
The UCC provides that when a seller makes “any affirmation of fact or 
promise . . . to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of 
the basis of the bargain,” then the seller “creates an express warranty that 
the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.” I.C. § 26-1-2-
313(1)(a). Similarly, when a seller provides “any description of the goods 
which is made part of the basis of the bargain,” then the seller “creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.” I.C. § 
26-1-2-313(1)(b). Sellers need not “use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or 
‘guarantee’” or even “have specific intention to make a warranty.” I.C. § 
26-1-2-313(2).     
Here, we find the Warranty Agreement contained a promise relating to 
the goods: “Kenworth Truck Company warrants directly to [Seller] that 
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the Kenworth vehicle . . . will be free from defects.” And that promise 
became a basis of the parties’ bargain. While unnecessary, Sellers even 
used formal language (“warrants”) to evince their intent to create an 
express warranty.  
Having found this Warranty Agreement contains an express warranty, 
we must now consider whether that warranty constitutes a future-
performance warranty. For the reasons below, we conclude that it does. 
B. The UCC case law and commentary specify three 
requirements for a future-performance warranty.  
Courts and commentators generally agree that, “in order to constitute a 
warranty of future performance under [UCC] section 725(2), the terms of 
the warranty must unambiguously indicate that the [seller] is warranting 
the future performance of the goods for a specific period of time.” R.W. 
Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Accord Grand Island Exp. v. Timpte Indus., Inc., 28 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(finding a future-performance warranty in a contract specifying “that the 
trailers would be ‘free from defects in materials and workmanship for a 
period of five years from the date-of-delivery to the First Purchaser’”); 
Stumler, 644 F.2d at 671 (stating that a future-performance warranty must 
“specifically” refer “to future time”); Standard All. Indus., Inc. v. Black 
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820–21 (6th Cir. 1978) (“If a seller expressly 
warrants a product for a specified number of years, it is clear that, by this 
action alone, he is explicitly warranting the future performance of the 
product or goods for that period of time.”); LTL Acres Ltd. P’ship v. Butler 
Mfg. Co., 136 A.3d 682, 687 (Del. 2016) (“The language of the warranty 
must be examined to determine if it explicitly, that is, plainly, warrants 
future performance.”); Controlled Env’ts Const. Inc., 670 N.W.2d at 779 
(stating that courts will not infer a future-performance warranty from 
warranty terms that are not clear); Cosman v. Ford Motor Co., 674 N.E.2d 61, 
66 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (“Illinois courts . . . require an explicit statement that 
the goods, not the warrantor, will perform in a certain way in the 
future.”). See generally 2 Hawkland, Rusch & Garvin, Uniform Commercial 
Code Series § 2-725:2 n.19 (collecting cases).  
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Parsing through these authorities, we understand that a future-
performance warranty is a seller’s explicit promise or guarantee to a buyer 
that the goods will perform (or will be of certain quality) during a specific, 
future period of time.  
1. A good’s quality and performance go hand in hand.   
A promise that the trucks “will be free from defects,” Sellers insist, does 
not explicitly relate to the trucks’ performance, but only their condition or 
quality. Oral Argument at 7:40–9:25. We disagree, and consider it 
imprudent, if not impossible, to separate the two because “the quality of 
the goods . . . underlies an expected performance.” See Joswick, 765 A.2d at 
96. See also id. 96–97 (observing that “the quality of the goods, either by 
positive attribute or by negation of defects, necessarily relates to their 
performance. If the goods do not have the stated quality or develop a 
defect warranted against, they likely will not perform in the manner of 
goods that conform to the promise”); cf. Cosman, 674 N.E.2d at 67 
(rejecting a seller’s promise to repair defects as a future-performance 
warranty because that promise does not “warrant the quality of the 
vehicle or its performance”). What’s more, Sellers’ warranty against future 
defects “under normal use and service” highlights the link between 
quality and performance.   
2. A limited, exclusive repair-and-replacement remedy 
does not constitute a future-performance warranty 
under the UCC because it relates to a seller’s 
performance.  
Buyers, on the other hand, would have us conflate performance of 
goods and performance of Sellers. In other words, Buyers argue that the 
Sellers’ promise to repair and replace a good covered by an express 
warranty is itself a future-performance warranty under the UCC. 
Otherwise, Buyers contend, the warranty would prove illusory. The trial 
court accepted this argument. See Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 64 (tolling 
the statute of limitations based on, among other things, “the future 
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performance exception set out in [section] 725(2)”). But we reject the 
premise that Sellers’ duty to repair and replace defective goods alone 
constitutes a future-performance warranty under the UCC. The promise 
must explicitly extend to the goods’ performance, not the sellers’ 
performance, for a specific future time period. Cosman, 674 N.E.2d at 66 
(noting that Illinois courts have long “required an explicit statement that 
the goods, not the warrantor, will perform in a certain way in the future”). 
Sellers’ obligations to repair and replace defective materials and 
workmanship are better understood as a limited remedy under the 
Warranty Agreement, not as a separate future-performance warranty and 
not as a separate promise. 
3. Under Indiana’s commercial law, an exclusive repair-
and-replace remedy must give the parties the benefit 
of their bargain.   
We are not unsympathetic, however, to Buyers’ argument that their 
repair-and-replace remedy, if unenforceable, could be illusory. The UCC 
permits parties, as part of their arms-length bargain, to limit remedies 
available under a sales contract. I.C. § 26-1-2-719(1)(a) (permitting the 
agreement to “limit the buyer’s remedies to return of the goods and 
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming 
goods or parts”). What’s more, the UCC allows parties to bargain for a 
limited remedy to serve as an exclusive remedy. I.C. § 26-1-2-719(1)(b) 
(instructing that “resort to a remedy is optional unless the remedy is 
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy”). The 
UCC, however, will not leave aggrieved parties without recourse to enjoy 
and to enforce the benefit of their bargains. Indeed, when “circumstances 
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose,” a 
party may seek a remedy under other provisions of the UCC. I.C. § 26-1-2-
719(2). 
Indiana law disfavors “limitations of remedy” and so we strictly 
construe a contract’s limiting provisions “against the seller on the basis of 
public policy.” Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004) (citing Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 
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1078, 1085 (Ind. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. 
v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947 (Ind. 2005)). Because the UCC gives parties 
freedom to shape their own remedies to suit their particular contract, 
Indiana courts will enforce reasonable agreements limiting or modifying 
remedies in a sales contract. Still, Indiana requires at least minimally 
adequate remedies to the contracting parties. I.C. Ann. § 26-1-2-719 UCC 
cmt. (West 2015) (“[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least 
minimum adequate remedies be available.”).3  
C. These parties bargained for a future-performance 
warranty.  
Turning our attention back to the future-performance exception, we 
observe that a warranty must contain three components to qualify as a 
future-performance warranty: (1) it must be an explicit promise or 
guarantee, (2) it must concern the characteristics of the goods themselves, 
and (3) it must identify a specific future time period during which the 
goods will conform to that guarantee. These three components are present 
in this Warranty Agreement:  
Kenworth Truck Company warrants directly to you that the 
Kenworth vehicle identified below . . . will be free from defects 
in materials and workmanship during the time and mileage 
 
3 For example, if a seller limits a buyer’s exclusive remedy to repair or replacement and then 
incompetently repairs or replaces the defective good (effectively resulting in a failure to 
perform), then the UCC gives the buyer a different remedy enforceable at law. See I.C. § 26-1-
1-106(1) (providing that UCC “remedies . . . shall be liberally administered to the end that the 
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed”); 
I.C. § 26-1-1-106(2) (“Any right or obligation declared by I.C. 26-1 is enforceable by action 
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.”). See also Perry, 814 
N.E.2d at 643. Since a buyer in this example should be able to enjoy the benefit of a bargained-
for remedy, we envision the buyer vindicating that right through a breach-of-contract cause of 
action that alleges the remedy failed its essential purpose. Such a cause of action would accrue 
when the breach occurred, that is, when the seller’s repair and replacement remedy failed its 
essential purpose. 
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periods set forth in the Warranty Schedule and appearing 
under normal use and service.    
Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p. 13 (emphases added). A close analysis of this 
contractual language, along with the attached Warranty Schedule, 
reinforces our view that the Warranty Agreement contains the necessary 
criteria for a future-performance warranty. First, the phrase “Kenworth 
Truck Company warrants directly to you” clearly qualifies as an explicit 
promise. See Warrant, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2577–78 (2002) 
(defining the term as “something that serves as a pledge, guarantee, or 
insurance” or “to guarantee (as a fact or a statement of fact) to be at 
present or at a future time as represented” or “to guarantee (as goods 
sold) especially in respect to the quality or quantity specified”); Warrant, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“To guarantee the security of 
(realty or personalty, or a person)” or simply to “promise or guarantee”). 
While there are no magic words for creating a future-performance 
warranty, saying “warrants” in this context plainly connotes a promise or 
guarantee. Second, the promise relates to the quality or performance 
standards of the goods alone—the defect-free Kenworth truck. Third, the 
parties identified a specific future time period for performance by using 
future-tense language (“will be free from defects” for 12-months/100,000-
miles),4 rather than past-tense (“were free from defects”) or present-tense 
language (“are free from defects”).  
We stress that every word and phrase matters in these future-
performance warranties. Adding, omitting, or changing a single word 
potentially alters the warranty’s meaning and breadth. Had Sellers not 
used future-tense language, for example, or had they omitted a specific 
 
4 Notably, other courts have recognized that similarly worded warranties constitute future-
performance warranties under UCC section 2-725(2). See, e.g., Grand Island Exp., 28 F.3d at 74; 
R.W. Murray Co., 697 F.2d at 821–24; LTL Acres Ltd. P’ship, 136 A.3d at 685, 687–88; Joswick, 765 
A.2d at 96–97; Grosse Pointe Law Firm, PC v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 894 N.W.2d 700, 
703–04 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Executone Bus. Sys. Corp. v. IPC Commc’ns, Inc., 442 
N.W.2d 755 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)); Wienberg v. Independence Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 
685, 689–90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Controlled Env’ts. Const., Inc., 670 N.W.2d at 778–781. 
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future time period for the trucks’ quality and performance, or had they 
promised only to repair and replace defects rather than warrant against 
future defects, then this warranty would fall outside the limited future-
performance exception. But as written, this bargained-for warranty 
constitutes a future-performance warranty, and the courts must apply the 
discovery rule to determine when the breach-of-warranty cause of action 
accrued. 
III. Precisely when Buyers discovered or should have 
discovered the breach of warranty remains a 
genuine issue of material fact.  
Determining when a breach-of-future-performance-warranty cause of 
action accrued using the discovery rule requires a court to discern when 
Buyers knew (or should have known) of the breach. Neither the UCC nor 
the Warranty Agreement define the term “breach.” And without statutory 
or contractual guidelines for determining when a party knows or should 
have known of a breach, we turn to the common law.    
Under Indiana’s discovery rule, “a cause of action accrues when a party 
knows or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could discover, that the 
contract has been breached.” Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 
683, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Since even the most basic contracts involve 
at least two parties, each with rights and obligations, it is essential, then, 
under Indiana law for the injured party to know who breached what 
obligation. See generally Horn v. A.O. Smith Corp., 50 F.3d 1365, 1369 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (observing that in the tort context “Indiana’s rule thus has two 
components—the discovery of the injury, as well as its cause.”).  
But knowing or discovering who breached what contractual obligation 
is not a demanding standard. Indeed, Indiana’s discovery rule “does not 
require a smoking gun in order for the [period] of limitations to 
commence.” Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 689. Rather, a cause of action accrues 
and the limitations period begins, when the circumstances involving 
contractual rights and obligations “put a person of common knowledge 
and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that 
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some claim against another party might exist.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. 
Holler, 429 S.E.2d 793, 795 (S.C. 1993)).   
The parties here dispute when Buyers knew (or should have known) 
that a breach of warranty occurred. Sellers argue that Buyers “discovered 
the vibration problem almost simultaneously with the delivery of the 
trucks in late 2005 and early 2006.” Appellants’ Br. at 27. Buyers don’t 
dispute that the trucks vibrated excessively soon after delivery. Rather, 
they contend they did not know (and should not have known) that the 
vibration amounted to a breaching defect because Sellers couldn’t identify 
the cause of the problem and were still testing the trucks in 2008. 
Appellees’ Br. at 7–10, 16–18, 24–26; Oral Argument at 29:30–30:30, 33:50–
35:10.  
Weighing these arguments, we must look to what the parties bargained 
for in the Warranty Agreement. This particular future-performance 
warranty explicitly excluded the truck’s “engine, engine brake, automatic 
transmission, tires, wheels, and/or rims and fifth wheel,” all of which were 
“warranted directly to [Seller] by their respective manufacturers.” 
Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p. 13. Given these exclusions and separate 
warranties, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that—by knowing the 
trucks vibrated excessively on or shortly after delivery—Buyers knew or 
should have known at that time who breached what warranty. What’s 
more, Sellers fail to identify where precisely in the record Buyers knew or 
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should have known that the vibration resulted from parts of the trucks 
subject to this warranty.5    
On the other hand, we cannot endorse Buyers’ view that they could not 
have discovered this breach of warranty while Sellers were testing the 
trucks. Buyers needed no “smoking gun” to discover the breach; they 
needed only to realize that “some claim” against Buyers might have 
existed. See Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 689.  
Based on this particular future-performance warranty and the disputed 
facts before us, we conclude that the point at which Buyers discovered (or 
should have discovered) that Sellers breached the warranty represents a 
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
IV. Indiana law allows for tolling a limitations period 
once it begins.  
Our conclusion on the breach-of-future-performance-warranty claim 
alone supports our decision to affirm the trial court’s denial of summary 
judgment. However, we elect to address the tolling issue here because any 
subsequent determination that Buyers failed to discover Sellers’ breach 
 
5 Sellers stated that Cummins, the truck engine manufacturer, tested the trucks in March and 
April 2006. Appellants’ Br. at 15–16 (citing Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p. 27). But that record 
citation provides no dates for testing. Notably, that citation also indicates that Sellers initially 
believed the engine caused the excessive vibration. Appellants’ App. Vol. III, pp. 27, 34. 
Sellers’ brief likewise says the decision was made in July 2006 to replace the mounts, but it 
provides no record citation for that fact. See Appellants’ Br. at 16. Sellers then claim the engine 
mounts were replaced in September 2006. Id. (citing Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p. 81). But that 
record citation—to an e-mail giving instructions on how to replace the engine mounts—did 
not establish when the engine mounts were replaced (or when Buyers learned of the breach). 
What’s more, neither the e-mail nor Sellers’ brief identifies the parties to the e-mail to show 
what Buyers knew. We echo the Court of Appeals’ admonition to Sellers that their 
designation of two depositions (totaling over 400 pages) is “insufficiently specific for 
purposes of Indiana Trial Rule 56(C).” Kenworth, 112 N.E.3d at 1118 n.17. See Filip v. Block, 879 
N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind. 2008) (noting that “the designation of an entire deposition is 
inadequate” to satisfy the requirements of Trial Rule 56(C), which compels parties to 
specifically “identify the ‘parts’ of any document upon which they rely”). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-37 | November 12, 2019 
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within the limitations period may not be dispositive if Sellers’ actions 
tolled the limitation period. 
The UCC allows for tolling (or pausing) the limitations period once the 
claim has accrued. I.C. § 26-1-2-725(4). Though the UCC imposes uniform 
limitation periods, it does not intrude upon state laws governing when 
that limitations period may be tolled. I.C. Ann. § 26-1-2-725(4) UCC cmt. 
(“Subsection (4) makes it clear that this Article does not purport to alter or 
modify in any respect the law on tolling of the Statute of Limitations as it 
now prevails in the various jurisdictions.”). Indiana law contemplates 
tolling a limitations period governing a sales contract, either by 
contractual agreement or by equity.  
A.  Contracting parties may agree to toll a limitations 
period, but the parties here did not.  
Indiana’s commercial law “favor[s] the parties’ freedom of contract” 
and “enable[es] contracting parties to control their own relationships.” 
Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 
950 (Ind. 2001). That freedom permits parties to curb the UCC’s control 
over their agreements. I.C. § 26-1-1-102(3) (stating that the UCC’s effect 
“may be varied by agreement” unless specified otherwise by the UCC); 
I.C. Ann. § 26-1-1-102(3) UCC cmt. 2 (acknowledging “that freedom of 
contract is a principle of the [UCC]”). As masters of their deal, parties may 
bargain for their respective contractual rights and obligations, and they 
may include in their contracts specific tolling limitations. See generally 
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donohue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 872 N.E.2d 626, 
627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (acknowledging that parties may enter into “pre-
suit agreements tolling the statute of limitations”).6 The parties here, 
however, did not contract for a tolling agreement. See Appellants’ App. 
Vol. III, p. 13; Oral Argument at 5:00–6:00, 16:00–17:40, 35:00–37:00. 
 
6 For example, parties could agree that the limitations period will stop running while a seller 
attempts to repair defective goods and resume when repairs are completed. 
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B. Courts may toll a limitations period under the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel. 
Indiana law allows for tolling a period of limitations under the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 690–91; Ludwig, 
510 N.E.2d at 696–98. This doctrine provides that if a party’s actions 
prevent another party from obtaining the requisite knowledge to pursue a 
claim, then “equity will toll the statute of limitations until the equitable 
grounds cease to operate as a reason for delay.” Perryman, 846 N.E.2d at 
690. Equitable estoppel is typically linked to claims of fraudulent 
concealment, but the doctrine also applies to other conduct that “lull[s] [a 
party] into inaction.” Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind. 1990). 
The Paramo Court, citing a long line of precedent, stated that, to establish 
equitable estoppel, a party’s conduct “must be of a sufficient affirmative 
character to prevent inquiry or to elude investigation or to mislead and 
hinder.” Id. at 599 (emphases added). As we discuss below, a party’s 
efforts at repairing or replacing goods might toll a limitations period 
under the equitable estoppel doctrine, but whether a limitations period is 
tolled will depend on the circumstances of the case, not a bright-line rule.    
1. Ludwig v. Ford Motor Company did not toll the statute 
of limitations based on that seller’s repair efforts.   
In Ludwig, our Court of Appeals rejected application of the estoppel 
doctrine to a seller’s attempts to repair or replace defective goods, holding 
that such efforts “did not toll the statute of limitations.” 510 N.E.2d at 699. 
In denying summary judgment here, the trial court distinguished Ludwig, 
citing factual differences between that case and this one. Appellants’ App. 
Vol. II, p. 62. The Ludwig opinion then divided the Court of Appeals 
below, with the dissent deeming it controlling and the majority rebuffing 
it as non-binding horizontal authority that was wrongly decided. 
Kenworth, 112 N.E.3d at 1112, 1121. In weighing Ludwig’s value here, we 
look to the rationale supporting the decision in that case. We then assess 
how other courts have treated it through the years.      
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In deciding whether a seller’s repair efforts could toll the statute of 
limitations, the Ludwig court first took a broad view, looking to how other 
jurisdictions settled the issue. Noting the split in authority, the court sided 
with those courts holding that a seller’s promises or efforts to repair 
defective goods “do not toll the statute of limitations applicable to an 
action for breach of warranty.” 510 N.E.2d at 698. Like those other courts, 
the Ludwig court based that conclusion in part on its reluctance to “read 
into statutes of limitations an exception which has not been embodied 
therein.” Id. at 699. The court found persuasive the fact that, by adopting 
the UCC, Indiana’s General Assembly provided a four-year statute of 
limitations for a sales contract and the court did not want to allow simple 
performance under the contract to extend that statutory period. Id.  
The Ludwig court then took a narrow view of the tolling issue, focusing 
its attention on the specific facts before it. The court observed that the 
parties “provided explicit, written warranties” that outlined the seller’s 
obligations to repair and replace defective or malfunctioning parts for two 
years. Id. The court also noted the parties were aware of their rights and 
obligations under the warranties when the trucks were delivered. Id. And 
in observing that the sellers completed the repairs “more than 39 months 
before [the buyer] filed suit,” the court concluded that those repairs could 
not have “lulled him into inaction and delayed his filing of this suit.” Id. 
“Given the facts of th[at] case,” the Ludwig court refused to alter the 
parties’ bargained-for warranty to extend the seller’s obligations. Id. 
Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he efforts to repair the engines did not 
toll the statute of limitations.” Id.  
2. Although still good law, Ludwig has limited reach 
since it was tailored to the facts of that case.  
Though thirty years removed from Ludwig, we think the Court of 
Appeals rightly decided that case. Indeed, we are loath to read into a 
contract something that would subvert both the parties’ and the 
legislature’s expressed intentions for their bargain. See WellPoint, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 29 N.E.3d 716, 724 (Ind. 2015). By 
repairing or replacing defective truck engines within the warranty period, 
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Ludwig’s sellers were merely fulfilling their bargained-for contractual 
obligations. Absent evidence of fraud or conduct intended to mislead or 
lull a party to inaction, it would have been inequitable to toll the 
limitations period and thereby lengthen the time exposing the seller to 
legal action for work it was contractually required to perform. 
But while we approve of Ludwig’s resolution for those parties, we 
decline Sellers’ invitation to adopt Ludwig’s holding as a broad rule. 
Ludwig did not speak in comprehensive terms. Rather, the opinion in that 
case couched its conclusion in qualifying phrases like “under the present 
circumstances” and “given the facts of this case.” 510 N.E.2d at 699. Based 
on this language, it does not appear that the Ludwig court intended its rule 
to cast a long, enveloping shadow. In support of this conclusion, we find 
no subsequent Indiana cases (and Sellers point us to none) citing Ludwig 
for the proposition that repair efforts do not toll the limitations period for 
breach of warranty claims.7   
Balancing these Ludwig perspectives, we still see it as good law, only 
limited in scope to the facts of that case. Indeed, for our purposes here, 
Ludwig’s value lies in its instruction that decisions about whether repair 
efforts can provide equitable reasons for tolling depend on the particular 
facts and circumstances in each case. Given the equitable estoppel 
doctrine’s malleable contours, coupled with Ludwig’s limited reach, we 
recognize that when a seller’s repair actions fall outside the bounds of the 
original contract (or are fraudulent), that conduct could be of “sufficient 
affirmative character to prevent inquiry or to elude investigation or to 
mislead and hinder,” thereby lulling a buyer into inaction and tolling the 
limitations period. See Paramo, 563 N.E.2d at 599. But like any other 
decision invoking the equitable estoppel doctrine, deciding whether to toll 
a limitations period based on a seller’s promises or efforts to repair 
defective goods will depend on the facts and circumstances of that case.     
 
7 The cases cited by Seller agree with Ludwig that a breach-of-warranty cause of action accrues 
at delivery but do not hold that repair efforts toll the limitations period. See Pet. to Trans. at 
14; Appellants’ Br. at 23–24. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-37 | November 12, 2019 
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3. Ludwig is distinguishable from this case and does not 
control.   
 Sellers liken their case to Ludwig, urging us to apply it here by 
concluding, as a matter of law, that their repair efforts could not toll the 
limitations period. We disagree and find several distinguishing facts that 
diminish Ludwig’s precedential pull here.     
Unlike in this case, the Ludwig warranty did not warrant against defects 
but served only as a remedial measure if defects arose. 510 N.E.2d at 694 
(“[Seller] warrants to the owner that it will repair any defective or 
malfunctioning parts of each . . . engine . . . in accordance with the 
following schedule.”). In other words, those sellers did not guarantee that 
the truck engines would be defect-free; rather, they promised to repair or 
replace any defective or malfunctioning part. By guaranteeing their 
performance, and not the goods’ performance, those sellers put their 
conduct as the warranty’s centerpiece.  
Ludwig further differs from this case in that, while those trucks were 
defective “[f]rom the start,” there is no indication that those buyers relied 
on the seller’s promises to repair the trucks before accepting them. Id. at 
693. Here, by contrast, Jeary Smith testified that, after noticing the 
excessive vibration in one truck, he informed Sellers that Buyers would 
not take delivery of the remaining trucks. According to Smith, only when 
Sellers assured him that they would fix the vibration did he agree to 
accept the trucks.  
Moreover, unlike the Ludwig sellers, Sellers here extended the warranty 
period, continued repairing the trucks past their original contractual 
obligations, and even promised to continue repairing the trucks as long as 
Buyers owned them. Sellers characterize this as a “goodwill warranty,” 
Appellants’ Br. at 33, but there is designated evidence suggesting that they 
chose this route to buy time in the trade cycle and to limit their financial 
exposure. Appellees’ App. Vol. III, pp. 37–38, 38. No matter Sellers’ 
motives for modifying their contractual obligations, the fact that they did 
modify their obligations (as the trial court noted) removes this case 
beyond Ludwig’s orbit. The Ludwig parties always knew their rights and 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-37 | November 12, 2019 
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obligations under the warranty. On this record, we’re not prepared to say 
the same of the parties here.        
Recall, the trial court found “substantial reasons to toll the statute of 
limitations in this case.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 64. While we need not 
agree with all these reasons, we can affirm the trial court’s order denying 
summary judgment on any basis sustainable in the record. See Markey v. 
Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006–07 (Ind. 2015).  Since we find this 
case distinguishable from Ludwig, we cannot say, on this record, that 
Sellers’ repair efforts did not toll the statute of limitations as a matter of 
law. In the end, whether Sellers’ conduct—related or unrelated to repair 
efforts—tolled the limitations period under the equitable estoppel 
doctrine depends on factual issues best left to the trial court.    
Conclusion  
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying summary 
judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
Rush, C.J., and David and Massa, JJ., concur. 
Slaughter, J., concurs in Parts I and II and in the judgment. 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-37 | November 12, 2019 
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A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L A N T S 
David T. Schaefer 
Anthony M. Zelli 
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 
Louisville, KY 
David J. Jurkiewicz 
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP 
Indianapolis, IN 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E S 
Scott A. Benkie 
Benkie & Crawford 
Indianapolis, IN  
Rodney V. Taylor 
Hilary A. Barnes 
Christopher & Taylor 
Indianapolis, IN