Title: Commonwealth v. Holbrook
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10592
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10592 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD HOLBROOK, JR. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 8, 2019. - July 9, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses.  
Witness, Redirect examination.  Evidence, Redirect 
examination, Third-party culprit, Exculpatory.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Confrontation of witnesses, 
Argument by prosecutor, Discovery, New trial, Conduct of 
prosecutor, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 29, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J.; motions 
for a new trial, for postconviction discovery, and for an 
evidentiary hearing were heard by him; and a second motion for a 
new trial, filed on August 17, 2015, was also heard by him. 
 
 
 
Brian J. Kelly for the defendant. 
 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Richard Holbrook, Jr., was 
convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree on the 
theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder in 
2 
 
 
connection with the death of Michael Auger.1  The defendant 
appeals from his convictions, and from the denials of his 
posttrial motions for discovery, for a new trial, and for an 
evidentiary hearing on his first motion for a new trial.  He 
also asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce his murder conviction or to order a new trial. 
 
After full consideration of the record and the defendant's 
arguments, we affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to 
grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
However, for the reasons discussed infra, we reverse the order 
denying the defendant's motion for third-party discovery, we 
vacate the orders denying the defendant's motions for a new 
trial, and we remand for an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's bid for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts adduced at trial.  We summarize 
the facts presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for discussion of 
specific issues. 
 
On November 27, 2006, the Monday after Thanksgiving, the 
victim was found dead in his home, lying face down in a pool of 
blood.  The autopsy revealed that the victim died from skull 
fractures and a brain laceration caused by three "chop wounds" 
                     
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of armed robbery and 
larceny of a motor vehicle. 
3 
 
 
to his head, likely from a blunt instrument with sharp edges.  
His pockets had been cut open, his home was partially ransacked, 
and his computer and "webcam" were found in the bathtub, where 
they had been submerged in water.2  No murder weapon was 
recovered.  The victim was known to carry large sums of cash on 
his person; no money was recovered from his person or his home 
during the investigation.  In addition to money being missing, 
one of the victim's two motor vehicles, a Ford pickup truck, was 
unaccounted for.  The police recovered fingerprints on the 
doorknob to the room where the victim's body was discovered, 
deoxyribonucleic acid on the victim's wallet, and four palm 
prints in the victim's vehicle.3  A forensic examination of the 
computer's hard drive revealed that the computer had been shut 
down abruptly on November 26 at approximately 12:23 P.M.  As 
discussed in more detail infra, the Commonwealth's computer 
expert testified that there was nothing of evidentiary value 
found on the hard drive. 
                     
2 Although some limited information was accessible, 
including certain electronic mail (e-mail) messages, discussed 
infra, the jury were told that there was nothing of evidentiary 
value on the hard drive. 
 
 
3 Testing of this evidence revealed that the defendant was 
not a contributor to the fingerprint on the doorknob, he was 
excluded as a source of the deoxyribonucleic acid on the wallet, 
and he was eliminated as a contributor on the three palm prints 
that the police were able to analyze. 
4 
 
 
 
The defendant, who was homeless at the time of the 
incident, had been raking leaves at the victim's home the Friday 
prior to the murder.  On Sunday morning, the day before the 
victim was discovered, an acquaintance of the victim who was at 
the victim's home saw a man arrive who generally matched the 
defendant's description.4  This acquaintance subsequently picked 
the defendant out of a photographic array.  The victim's mother, 
whose property abutted that of the victim and who had observed 
the defendant with the victim on the Friday prior to the murder, 
also reported seeing an individual matching the defendant's 
description5 at the victim's home on Sunday morning.  She 
observed the individual, wearing the same clothing combination 
as the defendant had worn on Friday, rummaging about in the 
victim's automobile and going in and out of the victim's home, 
but she saw no sign of the victim. 
That same Sunday, a third witness observed an individual of 
similar description6 put something into the victim's truck, 
                     
 
4 The witness described the individual as a "tall, kinda 
skinny" man who was "unshaved" with "really bad, brown, rotten 
teeth." 
 
 
5 The victim's mother described the individual she saw as 
"tall and thin," and wearing a blue, hooded sweatshirt and a 
tan-colored Carhartt-brand jacket. 
 
 
6 The witness described the individual as having scruff on 
his chin and wearing a tan-colored Carhartt-brand work coat with 
a hood pulled over his head. 
5 
 
 
return to the victim's home, and then depart in the truck.  Soon 
thereafter, a security camera recorded footage of a truck 
matching the description of the victim's truck in the parking 
lot of a nearby grocery store.  The security camera footage 
shows an individual generally matching the defendant's 
description exchange a large number of coins for paper currency 
using a coin exchange kiosk in that store. 
The next day, the victim's truck was found in a parking lot 
approximately three miles from the grocery store.  That same 
day, the defendant was observed purchasing items with a large 
amount of cash, and he later stayed in a motel for several 
nights, which was unusual for him. 
Investigators interviewed the defendant within days of the 
killing; the defendant maintained his innocence and claimed to 
have last seen the victim when he raked leaves at the victim's 
home on the Friday before the murder.  At trial, the defendant 
mounted an unsuccessful third-party culprit defense, implying 
throughout the trial that the victim's alleged former boyfriend, 
Sean Meagher, was the killer. 
b.  Third-party culprit evidence.  Sean Meagher, who lived 
with the victim for approximately two years,7 testified that 
                     
 
7 The jury heard varying testimony about exactly when Sean 
Meagher lived with the victim.  Meagher testified that he 
"maybe" moved in with the victim sometime in 2003.  He then 
testified that at the time he found out about the victim's 
6 
 
 
although the two slept in the same bed, they did not have a 
romantic relationship.  Meagher further testified that he had 
communicated with the victim by electronic mail (e-mail) shortly 
after he had moved out of the victim's home, but that he had not 
seen the victim since October 2006.  Finally, Meagher testified 
that, aside from going grocery shopping, he did not leave his 
home at all during the weekend after Thanksgiving in 2006. 
Not presented to the jury was the fact that, during the 
investigation, two witnesses provided information to police that 
contradicted Meagher's story.  Paul Williams informed 
investigators that he saw Meagher at the victim's home on 
Saturday, two days prior to the victim's body being discovered.  
In addition, Ian Anderson told police that Meagher and the 
victim had been involved romantically and that, on that same 
Saturday, the victim had mentioned to Anderson that Meagher had 
                     
murder, he had not lived with the victim for "probably two 
years, two and a half years maybe."  Meagher's former girlfriend 
testified that she and Meagher started living together in 2005.  
That testimony, in isolation, places Meagher living with the 
victim from sometime in 2003 to sometime in 2005.  However, on 
cross-examination, when asked, "So you stayed [at the victim's 
home] until 2006, fair to say?" Meagher answered in the 
affirmative.  E-mail recovered on the computer's hard drive, 
discussed infra, suggests that Meagher moved out of the victim's 
home sometime before September 2005. 
 
7 
 
 
been sending e-mail messages to the victim "constantly" in an 
attempt to extort money from him.8 
Investigators questioned Meagher on the same day that 
Williams spoke to the police9 but prior to speaking with 
Anderson; no one conducted a follow-up interview with Meagher 
based on the information those two witnesses provided.  Nor did 
investigators seek to obtain and compare Meagher's fingerprints 
to the unknown prints recovered from the victim's wallet and 
from the doorknob to the room where the victim's body was 
discovered. 
With regard to data recovered from the victim's computer, 
the Commonwealth represented to the court, the defendant, and 
the jury that there was nothing of evidentiary value found on 
the hard drive.  However, the defendant subsequently learned 
through posttrial discovery that the hard drive contained 
                     
8 Importantly, the jury did not hear from either Paul 
Williams or Ian Anderson because defense counsel chose not to 
call Williams to testify, and because the judge precluded 
defense counsel from calling Anderson to the stand after the 
Commonwealth objected on relevance and hearsay grounds.  As 
discussed infra, Anderson's testimony would have been admissible 
under a Bowden defense because, rather than having been offered 
for its truth, the statement would have been offered to show 
that the "police knew of the possible suspect and failed to take 
reasonable steps to investigate [that information]."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 802 (2009).  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). 
 
 
9 It is unclear from the record whether police interviewed 
Meagher prior to or after Williams told police that he had seen 
Meagher at the victim's home. 
8 
 
 
outgoing e-mail messages dated between September 2005 and July 
2006 that were sent from the victim to Meagher or that 
referenced Meagher.  In them, the victim wrote that he was 
"going crazy thinking of [Meagher]" and that he "just want[ed] 
the past back."  The victim further wrote, "it[']s about 
forgiveness and forgetting, the past is still with us, if you 
want to face it and come back we can get through it."  These e-
mail messages contradicted Meagher's testimony that he and the 
victim had a "friendly" relationship and that he and the victim 
were not romantically involved. 
c.  Postconviction proceedings.  Following his convictions, 
and after obtaining new counsel, the defendant filed a motion 
for a new trial predicated upon trial counsel's ineffective 
assistance with regard to, among other things, counsel's failure 
to obtain a forensic examination of the data from the hard drive 
of the victim's computer, and failure to request fingerprints 
from Meagher to compare them with unknown fingerprints recovered 
from the crime scene.10 
                     
 
10 The defendant also argued that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to obtain forensic examination of footage from a 
neighboring surveillance camera as well as the grocery store, 
failing to obtain forensic examination of the "suggestive nature 
of the photograph identification process," and failing to obtain 
the victim's autopsy report to determine whether the victim was 
sexually active at or about the time of the murder.  He does not 
renew these arguments on appeal. 
9 
 
 
In support of his motion, the defendant obtained leave to 
have an expert examine the computer's hard drive, resulting in 
the recovery of the outgoing e-mail messages discussed supra.  
The defendant subsequently amended his motion for a new trial to 
reference this newly discovered evidence and to allege 
prosecutorial misconduct based on the Commonwealth's failure to 
provide the e-mail messages to the defense prior to trial as an 
additional ground for relief.  The defendant also sought 
permission to request from third-party e-mail providers any 
additional e-mail messages from the victim's accounts sent in 
2005 and 2006 either that were sent between the victim and 
Meagher or that referenced Meagher.  This motion was denied.  
The judge also denied the defendant's request for an evidentiary 
hearing, as well as the underlying motion for a new trial.  Upon 
obtaining different appellate counsel, the defendant filed a 
second motion for a new trial in which he asserted as grounds 
for relief additional instances of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, including trial counsel's failure to mount a robust 
third-party culprit defense and Bowden defense, among other 
things.11  Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  
This motion also was denied. 
                     
11 Although the Commonwealth opposed this second motion on 
the ground that the arguments were waived, the judge disagreed, 
noting that defendant's trial counsel and his first appellate 
counsel were both employed by the Committee for Public Counsel 
10 
 
 
2.  Issues on direct appeal.  On direct appeal, the 
defendant claims that the Commonwealth committed reversible 
error by violating the defendant's right to confront witnesses 
against him, by improperly leading a witness on redirect 
examination, and by making an improper closing argument.12  Upon 
review, we find no reversible error with regard to any of these 
issues. 
a.  Confrontation clause.  When the victim's body was 
discovered, his home had been partially ransacked and his 
computer and webcam were found in the bathtub, where they had 
been submerged in water.  At trial, Michael Perry, the 
Commonwealth's computer forensic examiner, testified that a 
different expert had analyzed the contents of the computer's 
hard drive.  On redirect examination, when asked, "It's fair to 
say that from the reports nothing of evidentiary value was found 
in the analysis of the hard drive; is that correct?" Perry 
responded, "That's correct."  The defendant argues that Perry's 
testimony violated the defendant's confrontation rights.  We 
agree. 
                     
Services.  See Commonwealth v. Egardo, 426 Mass. 48, 49-50 
(1997). 
12 These issues also were raised in the defendant's second 
motion for a new trial, in which he claimed that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain errors 
at the time of trial. 
11 
 
 
An expert may testify as to his or her opinion if that 
opinion is based on facts the expert personally observed, facts 
admitted in evidence, or facts that would be independently 
admissible.  Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 388 (2008). 
Here, Perry did not present his opinion at all; instead, he 
testified as to the contents of a report by a different expert, 
who did not testify and whose report was not admitted as 
evidence.  Perry's statement was thus inadmissible hearsay.  See 
Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 588-592, cert. denied, 
571 U.S. 865 (2013), citing Nardi, supra at 392 ("expert's 
testimony to the fact of a nontestifying analyst's test results 
is hearsay"); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 393 (1992) 
("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial . . . offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted" [citation omitted]).  Further, 
the defendant was denied an opportunity to cross-examine the 
expert who performed the analysis on the computer's hard drive.  
See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 784 (2010), cert. 
denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011). 
The defendant's trial counsel did not object to Perry's 
testimony; thus, we review the error for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Evans, 
438 Mass. 142, 152-153 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 966 
(2003).  Because contents of the computer's hard drive "had no 
12 
 
 
bearing on the key issue at trial," and because the defendant's 
counsel was able to cross-examine Perry effectively on his 
failure to examine independently the contents of the hard drive 
to support the theory that the police did not perform a thorough 
investigation, we conclude that the improperly admitted 
statement did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 
470, 479-480 (2012) (hearsay testimony had no bearing on key 
issue at trial:  "whether the defendant in fact participated in 
the shooting").  Compare Commonwealth v. Jones, 472 Mass. 707, 
717-719 & n.4 (2015). 
b.  Redirect examination of detective.  The defendant also 
claims on appeal that the Commonwealth improperly led a police 
detective through redirect testimony so as to conceal the fact 
that Williams reported seeing Meagher at the victim's home on 
the Saturday prior to the victim being discovered dead.  This 
argument is without merit because, had the Commonwealth 
attempted to elicit such testimony from the detective, it would 
have been inadmissible hearsay.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 802 
(2019).  In any case, the defendant could have called Williams 
to the stand to testify as to who and what Williams saw that 
day.  That trial counsel chose not to do so is an issue raised 
by the defendant in his second motion for a new trial.  See part 
13 
 
 
3.c.i, infra.  As for the prosecutor's questioning of the 
detective, we see no error. 
c.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant argues 
that the prosecutor erred in two areas during her closing 
argument.  First, she highlighted Perry's inadmissible hearsay 
testimony regarding the contents of the computer hard drive: 
"Ladies and gentlemen, you heard the testimony from Michael 
Perry.  He told you that although the hard drive had been 
submerged in water, everything was still able to be 
retrieved off of that computer.  They were still able to 
browse web sites and to check e-mail, and he told you that 
there was nothing of any evidentiary value on that 
computer."  
 
Because the defendant timely objected, we review this statement 
for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 
336, 350-351 (1998).  Regardless of whether the prosecutor's 
statement was accurate, we conclude that because the contents of 
the computer's hard drive were at best a collateral matter and 
did not go to the heart of the issues at trial, the error was 
not prejudicial.  See id., quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 
Mass. 491, 500 (1997), S.C., 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1003 (1998).  Compare Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 
299, 305-307, S.C., 480 Mass. 1015 (2018) (factually incorrect 
statement in prosecutor's closing argument was prejudicial error 
because statement went to "heart of the case"). 
The defendant also argues that it was improper for the 
prosecutor to reference the fact that the defendant had no money 
14 
 
 
prior to the murder, suggesting a motive to rob and kill the 
victim.13  The defendant did not object to this portion of the 
closing argument; we therefore review to determine whether the 
prosecutor's statements were error and, if so, whether that 
error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 116 
(2018). 
"In closing argument, '[p]rosecutors are entitled to 
marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may 
                     
13 The prosecutor stated: 
 
"We know that while the defendant was raking leaves, he 
bummed some cigarettes off of [the victim's brother].  
Recall what his testimony was.  The defendant essentially 
told [the victim's brother] that he didn't have any money 
of his own to buy cigarettes because his boss owed him 
money. 
 
". . . 
 
"And consider the testimony of [the store clerk] . . . .  
[T]his defendant really stood out to her.  What also stood 
out to her was the wad of cash the defendant pulled from 
his pocket, a wad of cash with hundreds and fifties and 
twenties.  The same person, who three days earlier, didn't 
have any money to buy cigarettes now all of a sudden has a 
lot of cash. 
 
". . . 
 
"[H]e's gonna go to Plymouth and he's gonna rent a room at 
a motel.  And it's not just some hotel, ladies and 
gentlemen.  It's a hotel that costs $109 a night.  This 
person, again, who three days earlier didn't have enough 
money to buy cigarettes, is checking into a hotel at $109 a 
night, racking up the service bills, paying cash." 
15 
 
 
draw from it.'"  Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 829 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 52 (1982), S.C., 
450 Mass. 1028 (2008).  Such inferences need only be reasonable 
and possible based on the evidence before the jury.  Roy, supra.  
The evidence presented included testimony that when the 
defendant was raking leaves at the victim's home on that Friday, 
he asked the victim's brother for a cigarette because "he was 
supposed to get paid that night."  The jury also heard evidence 
that the victim was known to carry large sums of cash on his 
person, that when his body was discovered his pant pockets had 
been slashed open and his wallet had been emptied, and that no 
money was discovered in the home.  In addition, the jury heard 
evidence that the defendant made a convenience store purchase 
with a large sum of cash and thereafter stayed at a motel, which 
was unusual for him.  It was therefore permissible for the 
prosecutor to ask the jury to infer that the defendant did not 
have any money prior to the killing and that money was his 
motive for robbing and killing the victim.  Roy, supra. 
3.  Appeal from denial of posttrial motions.  Consolidated 
with his direct appeal are the defendant's appeals from the 
denials of his posttrial motions for third-party discovery, for 
a new trial, and for an evidentiary hearing on his bid for a new 
trial. 
16 
 
 
a.  Motion for third-party discovery.  After his 
convictions and based on the recovered outgoing e-mail messages 
from the computer's hard drive, the defendant sought third-party 
discovery from certain e-mail service providers for the 
production of additional e-mail messages sent in 2005 and 2006 
that were (1) between the victim and Meagher, (2) between the 
victim and others that mention Meagher, and (3) between Meagher 
and others that mention the victim.  The motion was denied. 
"Posttrial discovery may be authorized where affidavits 
filed by the moving party 'establish a prima facie case for 
relief.'  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4)[, as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001)]."  Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 628-
629 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 407 
(2005).  "To meet the prima facie case standard for discovery 
under a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence, a defendant must make specific, not speculative or 
conclusory, allegations that the newly discovered evidence would 
have 'materially aid[ed] the defense against the pending 
charges,' Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 405 (1992), 
and that this evidence, if explored further through discovery, 
could yield evidence that might have 'played an important role 
in the jury's deliberations and conclusions, even though it is 
not certain that the evidence would have produced a verdict of 
not guilty.'"  Daniels, supra.  In other words, "the defendant 
17 
 
 
must make a sufficient showing that the discovery is reasonably 
likely to uncover evidence that might warrant granting a new 
trial."  Sealy, supra at 629, quoting Daniels, supra. 
The defendant claimed that the e-mail messages he sought 
would have potentially impeached the credibility of Meagher by 
demonstrating that, contrary to Meagher's testimony, Meagher and 
the victim had had a romantic relationship and that Meagher may 
have had a motive to harm the victim.  The judge denied the 
motion, concluding that the requested e-mail messages "would 
likely be duplicative of the messages already in [the 
defendant's] possession," and that those messages do not suggest 
that there was any "active hostility" between Meagher and the 
victim immediately prior to the victim's murder.  We are 
sensitive to a trial judge's broad discretion in deciding 
postconviction discovery requests, Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 409; 
however, we conclude that the defendant's motion for third-party 
discovery should have been allowed.  See Daniels, 445 Mass. at 
393. 
Although the e-mail messages obtained from the computer's 
hard drive do not indicate that hostility existed between 
Meagher and the victim at the time they were sent, we note that 
the e-mail message between the two that was sent closest in time 
to the murder is dated November 18, 2005 -- over one year prior 
18 
 
 
to the murder.14  Thus, the e-mail messages recovered reveal 
nothing about whether additional messages, sent closer in time 
to the murder, exist and whether they demonstrate any antagonism 
between the two men.  Anderson's statement that Meagher was 
attempting to extort the victim by way of e-mail prior to the 
murder provides a "sufficient showing that the discovery is 
reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant 
granting a new trial."  Daniels, 445 Mass. at 407.  We therefore 
reverse the denial of the defendant's motion for postconviction 
discovery. 
b.  Requests for an evidentiary hearing.  A judge may 
decide a motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary 
hearing if "no substantial issue is raised by the motion or 
affidavits."  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  "In determining whether a 'substantial 
issue' meriting an evidentiary hearing under rule 30 has been 
raised, we look not only at the seriousness of the issues 
asserted, but also to the adequacy of the defendant's showing on 
the issue raised."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257-
258 (1981).  The motion judge denied the defendant's motion for 
an evidentiary hearing on his first motion for a new trial and 
his subsequent request for such a hearing within his second 
                     
14 We also note that the e-mail messages were outgoing only, 
that is, from the victim to Meagher and not vice versa. 
19 
 
 
motion for a new trial; however, for the reasons explained 
infra, we conclude that the issues raised in the defendant's 
motions for a new trial called for further exploration by way of 
a hearing. 
As discussed in greater detail in the following section, 
the defendant's motions for a new trial asserted substantial 
claims of both ineffective assistance of counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The former claim centered upon trial 
counsel's failure to investigate, among other things, the 
computer's hard drive and failure to mount a more robust Bowden 
and third-party culprit defense.  The latter claim was a 
response to discovering that the Commonwealth failed to turn 
over the e-mail messages recovered from the victim's computer 
hard drive (and representing to the defendant, the court, and 
the jury that "nothing of evidentiary value" was found on the 
hard drive).  The motions were accompanied by affidavits and 
other documentation that buttressed each of the claims.  For 
example, trial counsel stated by way of affidavit that he never 
retained a forensic computer expert to independently investigate 
the hard drive, and that he made a specific discovery request 
for evidence on the hard drive but never received any such 
evidence from the Commonwealth.  Further, the defendant made a 
showing that there was an inadequate investigation into Meagher 
20 
 
 
as a third-party culprit by way of an affidavit of Williams and 
a police report of the interview with Anderson. 
The defendant's assertions of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct warranted an evidentiary 
hearing, which would have given the motion judge an opportunity 
to gather further information to determine the merits of each of 
the claims.  Thus, although whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing is a discretionary decision that lies with the motion 
judge, Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 628 (2004), we are 
convinced that denying the defendant's motions for a new trial 
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in these 
circumstances was error. 
c.  Motions for a new trial.  As mentioned supra, the 
defendant argued both ineffective assistance of counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct in his motions for a new trial.15  
Although without an evidentiary hearing we are not in a position 
to come to any conclusions with regard to whether the 
defendant's trial counsel was ineffective or whether the 
prosecutor committed misconduct, we comment briefly infra on 
concerns raised in the defendant's motions. 
                     
15 The defendant's second motion for a new trial focused on 
his counsel's missteps during trial as additional grounds for 
relief, including but not limited to the issues raised on direct 
appeal, discussed in part 2, supra. 
 
21 
 
 
i.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim focused on trial counsel's failure 
to investigate Meagher thoroughly as a third-party culprit, and 
to mount a robust Bowden defense with the information that 
counsel did have. 
To his credit, defense counsel made a specific pretrial 
request for data on the computer's hard drive,16 and at trial, he 
questioned Meagher about Meagher's relationship with the victim, 
he elicited from detectives the fact that there was no physical 
evidence linking the defendant to the crime scene, and he 
questioned the Commonwealth's computer expert about the expert's 
failure to check the content of the computer activity just prior 
to its last shutdown. 
However, in his motions, the defendant pointed to a number 
of ways in which his trial counsel fell short with regard to 
pretrial investigation and performance during trial.  For 
example, prior to trial defense counsel failed to seek leave to 
conduct an independent forensic examination of the data from the 
hard drive of the victim's computer, and failed to request 
                     
16 Although trial counsel apparently made a specific request 
for "all analysis of the computer hard drive found at the crime 
scene including but not limited to the content containing the 
emails and internet searches on the hard drive," the 
Commonwealth failed to turn over the outgoing e-mail messages 
recovered from the hard drive.  This failure is discussed infra 
in part 3.c.ii. 
22 
 
 
fingerprints from Meagher to compare them with unknown 
fingerprints recovered from the victim's home. 
The defendant also underscored shortcomings in his 
counsel's performance at trial, including with regard to 
information provided by Williams and Anderson.  Trial counsel 
did not present to the jury Williams's statement to police that 
Williams saw Meagher at the victim's home on the Saturday 
following Thanksgiving, that this information conflicted with 
Meagher's alibi, and that police did not follow up on this or 
other information suggesting that Meagher was not truthful with 
investigators.  Had trial counsel done so, it would have 
bolstered both the defendant's third-party culprit defense and 
his Bowden defense. 
Similarly, with regard to the information that Anderson 
provided to police about the relationship between Meagher and 
the victim and Meagher's alleged attempts to extort the victim, 
trial counsel did not present to the jury the failure of the 
police to conduct any follow-up investigation in light of 
Anderson's statement.  Trial counsel might have highlighted the 
fact that there was no additional interview with Anderson or 
Meagher, no effort to obtain Meagher's fingerprints to compare 
them with the prints found at the crime scene, and no 
investigation into Meagher's potential motive to harm the 
victim, including with respect to e-mail messages sent between 
23 
 
 
the two men to confirm whether Meagher in fact was trying to 
extort the victim or with respect to Meagher's refuted romantic 
relationship with the victim.  And although the court did not 
allow trial counsel to call Anderson to testify based on the 
Commonwealth's objection on hearsay grounds, trial counsel 
failed to argue the admissibility of Anderson's testimony for 
the purpose of mounting a Bowden defense, which would have been 
a proper basis to admit Anderson's testimony.  See Commonwealth 
v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 802 (2009) (statements are 
admissible when offered not for truth but to show "police knew 
of the possible suspect and failed to take reasonable steps to 
investigate [that information]"). 
To be sure, additional investigation may not have resulted 
in the defendant's exoneration -- an argument could be made that 
Meagher's fingerprints in the victim's home would be expected, 
as Meagher formerly resided there.  Further, witnesses testified 
that the individual whom they saw in and around the victim's 
home the day before the victim's body was found was not Meagher.  
Nevertheless, a Bowden defense is raised for the purpose of 
demonstrating to the jury that the police "had learned of 
[third-party culprit information] during the investigation and 
failed reasonably to act on the information."  Id. at 803.  "The 
fact that certain tests were not conducted or certain police 
procedures not followed could raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
24 
 
 
defendant's guilt in the minds of the jurors."  Bowden, 379 
Mass. at 486.  This is especially so here, where the evidence 
against Meagher is similar in weight to the evidence against the 
defendant.  The evidence against both is circumstantial and 
requires discrediting an alibi; the defendant claimed he was not 
at the victim's home after raking leaves on Friday despite 
witnesses identifying him at the home on Sunday, and Meagher 
claimed he was not at the victim's home at all that same weekend 
despite Williams identifying him at the victim's home on 
Saturday. 
We do not opine as to whether trial counsel's performance 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel or whether such 
performance, if ineffective, created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice; rather, on remand the motion judge, 
with information obtained from an evidentiary hearing, will be 
in the best position to make that determination.17 
 
ii.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  After obtaining leave from 
the court to engage an independent computer expert who recovered 
certain outgoing e-mail messages from the victim's hard drive, 
the defendant amended his first motion for a new trial to allege 
misconduct by the prosecutor for representing to defense counsel 
                     
 
17 Trial counsel submitted an affidavit stating that his 
failure to raise a robust Bowden defense "was not purposefully 
done for any strategic reasons."  This can be explored further 
at the evidentiary hearing. 
25 
 
 
that nothing of evidentiary value existed on the victim's 
computer. 
We agree with the defendant that the outgoing e-mail 
messages recovered from the computer's hard drive were 
exculpatory in nature.  As described supra, the e-mail messages 
provide a basis from which to conclude that the victim and 
Meagher had been in an intimate relationship, that Meagher had 
left the victim, and that the victim wanted Meagher to return to 
repair the relationship.  However, when asked on direct 
examination about his relationship with the victim, Meagher 
denied that they had been lovers.  Had the Commonwealth turned 
over the e-mail messages on the hard drive, the defendant could 
have used them to impeach Meagher's testimony that he and the 
victim's relationship was "friendly" and not romantic in nature; 
without them, the defendant had no other means of impeaching 
26 
 
 
Meagher on this fact.18,19  Compare Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 
Mass. 251, 264 (1985), S.C., 419 Mass. 1002 (1994) (where 
evidence is cumulative, "courts generally reject the contention 
that such evidence is material . . . so long as the defense had 
adequate opportunity to impeach the witness by other means" 
[citation omitted]).  The e-mail messages would have placed 
Meagher's credibility at issue, thereby strengthening the 
defendant's third-party culprit theory.  Accordingly, the e-mail 
messages were material and exculpatory.  See Commonwealth v. 
Champagne, 399 Mass. 80, 89 (1987) ("Evidence is exculpatory, 
for the purpose of assessing whether the prosecution should have 
                     
 
18 In determining that the defendant was not prejudiced by 
the Commonwealth's failure to disclose the e-mail messages, the 
motion judge concluded that "use of the emails to impeach 
[Meagher] on the issue of whether he and [the victim] had been 
lovers . . . would have been merely cumulative of the evidence 
heard by the jury that he and [the victim] had an intimate 
relationship and slept in the same bed for two years."  We 
disagree.  The e-mail messages would have provided the defense 
with powerful evidence with which to impeach Meagher regarding 
his relationship with the victim and may have led the jury to 
question the veracity of Meagher's testimony on other matters, 
including his alibi.  Without the e-mail messages, we cannot say 
that the defense was provided with an "adequate opportunity to 
impeach [Meagher] by other means" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 264 (1985). 
 
19 The defendant notes that the Commonwealth's failure to 
disclose the exculpatory e-mail messages on the computer's hard 
drive was exacerbated by the testimony of the Commonwealth's 
computer expert, who told the jury that there was nothing of 
evidentiary value on the hard drive.  The prosecutor emphasized 
this misleading information by stating during closing argument 
that there was nothing of evidentiary value on the hard drive, 
including e-mail messages. 
27 
 
 
disclosed it, if it tends to support the innocence of the 
accused"). 
Whether the defendant was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's 
failure to disclose the e-mail messages is for a motion judge to 
determine following an evidentiary hearing.  We note, however, 
that the record appears to reflect that the defendant made a 
specific pretrial request for data recovered from the hard 
drive.20  If a motion judge finds that, in fact, the Commonwealth 
withheld exculpatory evidence despite a specific request for 
such evidence, he or she will apply the prejudice standard more 
favorable to the defendant, that is, whether the defendant has 
demonstrated "that a substantial basis exists for claiming 
prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 598 (2015), 
quoting Daniels, 445 Mass. at 404-405. 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant asks 
us to exercise our extraordinary power to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  However, the trial record, by itself, does 
not establish that the defendant is entitled to a new trial or a 
reduction of the verdict of murder in the first degree.  As for 
the issues raised in the defendant's motions for a new trial, we 
                     
20 In support of his second motion for a new trial, the 
defendant provided the discovery request that he had filed 
nearly five months prior to trial, specifically requesting "all 
analysis of the computer hard drive found at the crime scene 
including but not limited to the content containing the emails 
and internet searches on the hard drive." 
28 
 
 
refrain from making a § 33E determination until the record is 
fully developed on remand following third-party discovery and an 
evidentiary hearing with subsequent findings.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 851 (2015). 
5.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's 
convictions are affirmed.  However, the order denying the 
defendant's motion for third-party discovery is reversed, as is 
the order denying the defendant's motion for an evidentiary 
hearing, and the orders denying the defendant's motions for a 
new trial are vacated.  The case is hereby remanded to the 
Superior Court to allow the defendant to conduct the requested 
third-party discovery of e-mail service providers to determine 
whether additional e-mail messages shedding light on the 
relationship between Meagher and the victim exist.  The 
defendant shall be given leave to amend his second motion for a 
new trial to include any information obtained as a result of 
said discovery requests.  Further, an evidentiary hearing shall 
be held on the defendant's motions for a new trial in order for 
a motion judge to make factual findings regarding the 
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct as well as conclusions as to whether 
the defendant is entitled to a new trial as a result of one or 
both of these factors, if found.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
29 
 
 
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Rosario, 477 Mass. 69, 77-78 (2017). 
Given the unique posture of this case, if the defendant 
seeks to appeal from a denial of his motions for a new trial, he 
need not first petition for leave pursuant to the gatekeeper 
provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 
851. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.