Title: Pavulak v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 8, 2005

Sitting by designation pursuant to Art. IV, § 12 of the Delaware Constitution and
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Supreme Court Rule 2 and 4.  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
PAUL E. PAVULAK, 
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§
No. 20, 2005  
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court of
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the State of Delaware in and for
v.
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New Castle County
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STATE OF DELAWARE,
 
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No. 9802015040
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: July 20, 2005
Decided: August 8, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, JACOBS, RIDGELY, Justices,
and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,  constituting the Court en Banc.
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Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED AND
REMANDED.  
Gregory M. Johnson, Esq., of Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esq., of the Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for
Appellee.
RIDGELY, Justice:
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 768 (2005).  
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The defendant-appellant, Paul E. Pavulak, appeals from a sentence
imposed by the Superior Court for a second violation of probation (“VOP”).
The sentence exceeded the sentence imposed after his first VOP that included
a reduction of his original suspended sentence of incarceration.  We find that
the Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in sentencing Pavulak to a prison
term that was longer than the balance of his reduced suspended sentence.
Accordingly, we vacate the second VOP sentence and remand this matter for
resentencing consistent with this opinion.  
I.
On June 30, 1998, Pavulak pled guilty to two counts of unlawful sexual
contact in the second degree, a class G felony.   On September 4, 1998, Pavulak
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was sentenced to four years of incarceration at Level V (two years of
incarceration for each count), which was immediately suspended for four years
of decreasing levels of probation.  
After a hearing on April 11, 2001, the Superior Court found that Pavulak
had violated certain conditions of his probation.  The Superior Court  revoked
Pavulak’s probation and imposed a modified new total sentence of two years
at Level V incarceration, which was suspended after 60 days.  The balance of
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Pavulak’s sentence was to be served at Level III probation.  Pavulak completed
his time at Level V and then resumed serving his probation.  
On July 23, 2001, a second VOP report was filed with the Superior
Court.  Pavulak then fled from Delaware.  He was apprehended in Nevada and
returned to Delaware for a second VOP hearing which was held on December
16, 2004.   The Superior Court found he violated the terms of his probation and
imposed a four-year sentence at Level V incarceration, with credit for the 60
days Pavulak had already served.  This sentence at Level V was suspended after
24 months for Level III probation.  Pavulak then filed this appeal.
II.
Pavulak assigns two errors to his sentence.  First, he argues that the
Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in sentencing him to a prison term in
excess of the suspended sentence imposed on him for his first VOP.  Second,
he argues that the Superior Court failed to set forth its basis on the record with
particularity for imposing a sentence in excess of the sentencing guidelines.
We need not address Pavulak’s second argument because our decision on the
first issue resolves this appeal.
 Pavulak argues that the sentence imposed is unconstitutional.  There are conflicting
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views among federal and state courts about whether an increased sentence following
probation revocation violates the double jeopardy clause.  See Jay M. Zitter, Propriety of
Increased Sentence Following Revocation of Probation, 23 A.L.R.4th 883 (2005) (collecting
federal and state cases).  We need not resolve these conflicting views because the statute
itself is determinative in this case.  
 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1200-01 (Del. 2002) (citing Grand Ventures v.
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Whaley, 632 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 1993)).  
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (2005).  
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 Coleman v. State, 729 A.2d 847, 851 (Del. 1999) (citing Hudson Farms, Inc. v.
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McGrellis, 620 A.2d 215, 217 (Del. 1993)).
 The United States Supreme Court, in a case interpreting the federal Probation Act,
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explained the difference between the statutory authority suspending the imposition of a
sentence and suspending the execution of a sentence already imposed.  See Roberts v. United
States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943).  When a trial court places a defendant on probation and defers
or postpones sentencing, the trial court is said to have suspended the imposition of the
sentence.  Id. at 268.  When the trial court imposes a fixed definite term of imprisonment but
the sentence is suspended for probation, the trial court is said to have suspended the
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Our interpretation of the meaning of Title 11, Section 4334(c) determines
the outcome of this appeal.   Judicial construction of a statute is a determination
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of law, and the appropriate standard of appellate review is de novo.   Section
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4334(c)  provides, “If the violation is established, the court may continue or
revoke the probation or suspension of sentence, and may require the probation
violator to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence, and, if
imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence which might
originally have been imposed.”   
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The language of the statute is not ambiguous.  This Court’s role is,
therefore, “limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words.”   Here,
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the parties agree that the imposition of Pavulak’s sentence was not suspended,
but rather the execution of his sentence was suspended.   Thus, the phrase
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execution of the sentence.  Id.  We cite Roberts only to explain the difference between
suspending the imposition of a sentence and suspending the execution of a sentence.      
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (2005).  
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 Id.  (emphasis added).
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within the statute stating that the trial court “may impose any sentence which
might originally have been imposed” if the imposition of a sentence was
suspended is not applicable.   
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At issue here is what the Superior Court may do when a VOP is found
in a case where the execution of a specific sentence of incarceration has been
suspended.  The statute provides that “the court may continue or revoke the
probation or suspension of sentence, and may require the probation violator to
serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence... .”   The record is clear that
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after Pavulak’s first VOP the Superior Court chose to reduce the Level V time
that had been suspended for decreasing levels of probation.  The Superior Court
imposed a modified new sentence of two years at Level V incarceration instead
of four years, suspended after 60 days.  The balance of the sentence was to be
served at Level III probation.  
This modified sentence had legal consequences.  First, the sentence
incarcerated Pavulak.  Second, it set the parameters for the amount of additional
incarceration Pavulak could be sentenced to serve if he was again found to be
in violation of his probation.  When Pavulak was found in violation of his
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probation for the second time, the Superior Court had the authority to impose
a Level V sentence up to the balance of the suspended sentence then in effect.
 The maximum sentence at Level V, which was available, was one year and ten
months (i.e., the 2 year sentence at Level V minus the 60 days previously
served).  The Superior Court, therefore, erred when it imposed more Level V
time than remained on Pavulak’s suspended Level V sentence.  
III.
The judgement of the Superior Court is reversed and this matter is
remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.