Title: State v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 106894
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2014

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 106,894 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
QUARTEZ BROWN, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
In order to facilitate a meaningful appellate review, the district courts are directed 
by Supreme Court Rule 165 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 265) that they must make 
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record.  
 
2. 
 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. But the constitutional right to counsel does not give a criminal defendant for 
whom counsel has been court-appointed, the right to choose which attorney will represent 
the defendant. 
 
3. 
 
If a defendant seeks substitute counsel, the defendant must show justifiable 
dissatisfaction with his or her appointed counsel, which can be demonstrated by showing 
a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or a complete breakdown in 
communication between counsel and the defendant.  
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
A criminal defendant seeking substitute counsel bears the responsibility of 
providing an articulated statement of attorney dissatisfaction. The providing of an 
articulated statement of attorney dissatisfaction by the defendant will trigger the district 
court's duty to inquire into the potential conflict of interest.  
 
5. 
 
A district court's duty to inquire into a potential attorney/client conflict emanates 
from its responsibility to assure that a defendant's constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel is honored. The district court's duty to inquire into a potential 
attorney/client conflict accrues when the court first learns of the potential conflict and 
that duty does not decay or dissipate through any inaction on the part of the defendant. 
 
6. 
 
The district court's failure to fulfill its duty to inquire into a potential 
attorney/client conflict of which it has become aware is an abuse of discretion. 
 
7. 
 
A lack of authority for the defendant to enter the building is an element of the 
crime of aggravated burglary, separate and apart from the element that the entry be 
accompanied with an intent to commit a felony therein. A lack of authority to enter a 
building is not refuted simply because the entry door is always unlocked or because 
persons other than the defendant have been given free access to the building. 
 
8. 
 
In this case, a victim's statement that she felt threatened when the defendant 
pointed a gun at her and demanded that she get down on the floor was sufficient evidence 
to support the apprehension of immediate bodily harm element of aggravated assault.  
3 
 
 
 
 
9. 
 
For jury instruction issues, the progression of analysis and corresponding 
standards of review on appeal are:  (1) First, the appellate court should consider the 
reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising 
an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to 
determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) 
finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error 
was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 
Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).  
 
10. 
 
In order for a defendant to be entitled to a reduced charge because he or she acted 
in the heat of passion, his or her emotional state of mind must exist at the time of the act 
and it must have arisen from circumstances constituting sufficient provocation. 
 
11. 
 
For a defendant to be entitled to lesser included offense instructions on 
unintentional but reckless second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, there 
must be evidence to support a finding that the killing was unintentional. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; ANTHONY J. POWELL and GREGORY L. WALLER, judges. 
Opinion filed August 15, 2014. Reversed and remanded with directions. 
 
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
4 
 
 
 
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Quartez Brown (Quartez) directly appeals from his convictions for 
felony murder, the alternative charge of second-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and 
aggravated assault. The charges arose out of an incident in which Quartez, Kevin Brown 
(Brown), Kiara Williams, and Jalessa Bonner went to the apartment of Otis Bolden, 
where Quartez and Brown entered the apartment, assaulted Ashley Green with a 
handgun, and fatally shot Bolden.  
 
Quartez contends:  (1) The district court abused its discretion in not inquiring into 
the reasons behind his pro se motion for new counsel before allowing its withdrawal 
outside Quartez' presence and without a hearing; (2) insufficient evidence supported his 
aggravated burglary, felony murder, and aggravated assault convictions; (3) the district 
court should have given lesser included offense instructions on voluntary manslaughter, 
reckless second-degree murder, and involuntary manslaughter; (4) the district court erred 
in journalizing his second-degree murder conviction as an off-grid crime; and (5) the 
district court violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 
2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), by considering his prior convictions at sentencing.  
 
Finding that the district court erred in not inquiring before allowing the apparently 
nonconsensual withdrawal of Quartez' pro se motion for new counsel, we remand on this 
issue. We also remand for a nunc pro tunc order correcting the severity level of Quartez' 
second-degree murder conviction. We reject Quartez' remaining claims of error.  
 
5 
 
 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The events leading to this criminal prosecution began to unfold in the early 
morning hours of April 26, 2010, when Williams and Bonner, together with their friend, 
Rika Evans, left a local club and gathered at Bolden's apartment, along with Reader 
Watley. After Bonner accompanied Bolden into his bedroom, she interpreted a comment 
he made as indicating that he had participated with a group of men who had raped her 
some 2 years earlier. That prompted Bonner to ask to leave the apartment.  
 
Bolden drove the three women—Bonner, Williams, and Evans—to the home of 
Bonner and Evans on Glendale, albeit Williams would return to Bolden's apartment to 
stay the night. En route back to his apartment, Bolden picked up Green. Bolden and 
Green spent the night in his bedroom, while Williams and Watley spent the night on the 
couch. There was conflicting testimony as to whether there was any sexual activity 
involving Williams. Watley drove Williams home the next morning. 
 
That same morning, Bonner told her boyfriend, Brown, about Bolden's 
involvement in her prior rape. Additionally, according to Bonner, Williams told Brown 
that Watley and Bolden had sexually assaulted her the night before. Brown then called 
his cousin, Quartez, who came to the Glendale house where the group discussed a course 
of action. Evans noted that Brown was visibly upset but Quartez was not. Quartez, 
Brown, Williams, and Bonner left in Quartez' car to go to Bolden's house. Evans and 
Bonner both testified that they believed the Brown cousins intended to fight Bolden but 
neither believed the men would kill Bolden. But on the way to Bolden's house, the group 
stopped at "Drop's" house, ostensibly to pick up firearms.  
 
The Brown cousins were not friends with Bolden and had never been to Bolden's 
apartment, so Bonner directed them. When the group arrived at the apartment complex, 
6 
 
 
 
Quartez backed into a parking spot. The Brown cousins left the car and opened the 
unlocked door to Bolden's apartment. They first encountered Green in the living room 
and, at gunpoint, directed her to lie on the ground and asked for Bolden's location. 
Initially, Green thought the men were Bolden's friends that were "playing" with him. 
Nevertheless, Green was afraid and felt threatened by the cousins' actions. The cousins 
proceeded to the bedroom indicated by Green, and she heard gunshots, together with the 
inquiry, "[W]hy did you rape my home girl?" Green then heard a window shatter and saw 
one of the assailants exit the apartment through the living room. Apparently, Bolden 
jumped through a bedroom window and attempted to get away, although he would be 
discovered later on the sidewalk at the complex. 
 
When Bonner saw Bolden limping around the apartment building, she moved to 
the driver's seat of the vehicle and retrieved the Brown cousins. The group briefly 
stopped at Drop's house before returning to the Glendale house. Once back at the 
Glendale house, Bonner asked Brown what happened at Bolden's apartment. He 
explained that they were just going to talk to Bolden, but it looked as if Bolden was about 
to reach for something in his side-table drawer, so Brown shot him. Brown said that after 
his gun jammed, Quartez shot.  
 
Passersby discovered Bolden on an apartment complex sidewalk and summoned 
emergency personnel, who transported Bolden to the hospital, where he died from 
multiple gunshot wounds. Bolden had superficial wounds at his genital area and an 
entrance and exit wound on his left thigh, but the majority of Bolden's gunshot wounds 
entered his body from the back side.  
 
A crime scene investigation revealed no signs of forced entry into Bolden's 
apartment. In the bedroom, an investigator found five .25 caliber shell casings, one .45 
caliber shell casing, and a Bluetooth earbud that was still blinking. The deoxyribonucleic 
7 
 
 
 
acid (DNA) profile found on the earbud was a mixture of at least three individuals, but 
the DNA of the major contributor was consistent with Quartez' profile. At trial, the State 
presented three photos from Quartez' cellphone depicting a man presumed to be Quartez 
wearing a Bluetooth earbud.  
 
Based on these events, the State charged Quartez with first-degree premeditated 
murder, or in the alternative, first-degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, and 
aggravated assault. Before his trial began, Quartez filed a pro se motion requesting the 
district court to appoint him new counsel. The motion was set for a hearing, but on the 
day the hearing was scheduled, the record indicates that the motion was withdrawn. The 
record does not indicate who withdrew the motion. The motion is not discussed again on 
the record until Quartez mentioned it during his sentencing hearing.  
 
A jury found Quartez guilty of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder 
as a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated burglary, and 
aggravated assault. The district court did not impose a sentence for the second-degree 
murder conviction, but at the request of the State and with defense counsel's approval, the 
district court did not dismiss the second-degree murder conviction. The district court then 
imposed sentences of 20 years to life imprisonment and postrelease supervision of life for 
the felony-murder conviction, 34 months' imprisonment for aggravated burglary, and 12 
months' imprisonment for aggravated assault, ordering the sentences to run concurrently.  
 
Of the other three participants, Bonner entered a plea, was sentenced, and has not 
appealed. The other two—Brown and Williams—went to trial, were convicted, and have 
appeals pending before this court which were heard on the same docket with Quartez' 
case. However, the three pending appeals raise completely different issues, prompting us 
to treat them as separate cases. 
 
8 
 
 
 
WITHDRAWAL OF PRO SE MOTION FOR NEW COUNSEL WITHOUT INQUIRY 
 
Quartez first argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing 
someone to withdraw his pro se motion for new counsel without making a sufficient 
inquiry into the circumstances prompting the motion. The State does not defend the 
district court's actions on the merits, but rather it counters with a procedural strategy. 
Specifically, the State contends that, pursuant to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3501, Quartez 
only had 14 days to make his claim for a new trial and that his oral motion at sentencing 
was too late, depriving the district court of jurisdiction to consider the claim of error, and, 
thus, precluding our consideration of his complaint.  
 
Standards of Review 
 
Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of 
review is unlimited. State v. Berreth, 294 Kan. 98, 109, 273 P.3d 752 (2012).  
 
If we clear the jurisdictional hurdle, we review the district court's inquiry into a 
potential conflict of interest under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Stovall, 298 
Kan. 362, 370, 312 P.3d 1271 (2013). That standard is stated as follows: 
 
"Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on 
an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is 
based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not support a factual 
finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based." 
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 
(2012).  
 
The defendant bears the burden of showing that the district court abused its 
discretion. State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 312, 319, 263 P.3d 153 (2011).  
9 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Before proceeding further, we pause to observe that this case highlights how a 
cavalier approach to making a record in the district court can impede, if not foreclose, a 
meaningful appellate review and, thus, needlessly consume scarce judicial resources. In a 
case from the same judicial district, where the practice is to memorialize rulings on 
motions with preprinted minute sheets upon which the presiding judge inks a checkmark 
in a box or two and, perhaps, scribbles a few words of cryptic explanation, we set forth 
the following cautionary instruction: 
 
 
"It is true that to facilitate a meaningful appellate review, the district court must 
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. State v. Moncla, 
269 Kan. 61, 65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000); Supreme Court Rule 165 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
239). This obligation is emphasized in Rule 165, which states in part that '[i]n all 
contested matters submitted to a judge without a jury . . . , the judge shall state the 
controlling facts required by K.S.A. 60-252, and the legal principles controlling the 
decision.'" (Emphasis added.) State v. Edwards, 290 Kan. 330, 335, 226 P.3d 1285 
(2010). 
 
Unfortunately, a scant 9 months after the foregoing statement of a district court's 
obligation to explain its ruling, the Eighteenth Judicial District failed to do so in this case. 
There is no record that a judge made an oral ruling on the motion's disposition and the 
written ruling is a checkmark in the box next to the preprinted words, "Withdrawn," on a 
minute sheet.  
 
What we do know from the record is that, before his trial began, Quartez filed a 
pro se motion requesting that the district court appoint him a new defense counsel. The 
motion alleged that there had been a "lack of performance" by current counsel, as well as 
10 
 
 
 
a "complete breakdown of communication," whereby current counsel "refus[ed] to 
communicate 'at any level.'" The motion also alleged that Quartez was filing a complaint 
against his attorney with the office of the Disciplinary Administrator.  
 
The record also tells us that the motion was set for hearing before District Judge 
Warren M. Wilbert, to be heard on January 21, 2011. But there is no record of a hearing 
being held on that date; we only have the minute sheet indicating that the motion was 
withdrawn. Moreover, the appearance docket lists District Judge Gregory L. Waller as 
the presiding judge on the hearing date, and the illegible signature affixed to the minute 
sheet appears to match an earlier order that identified Judge Waller as the signatory. As 
we have suggested, the minute sheet does not reveal who requested the withdrawal or 
whether the movant consented to that disposition.  
 
As the State points out, the record does not reveal whether Quartez repeated his 
complaints about his defense attorney prior to or during his jury trial, which was presided 
over by yet another judge, District Judge Anthony Powell, who also presided over the 
sentencing. But at sentencing, when Quartez was specifically asked by the court whether 
he had anything to say, the following colloquy occurred:   
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I would like to say something. The first thing I 
would like to say—I wrote this down. This is information on the record. December 29th, 
2010, I filed a motion to fire my attorney. I was set a court day for this motion on January 
21st, 2011. My lawyer then came to see me and pleaded with me not to fire him. I told 
him that I did not wish to speak with him until court. When my court date came, I never 
was called to be in the courtroom. My lawyer came in on a later visit and said that the 
judge withdrew my motion, so this whole time I've been trying to fire him and never got 
a chance to hear it in front of a judge. I feel with me not given the appropriate—
opportunity to fire him, I might have had a greater chance at being—beating my case 
because he was not working in my favor. 
 
"MR. [STEVEN] MANK [Defense counsel]:  Well, that's news to me, Judge. 
11 
 
 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, Mr. Brown, that's really something. I find your statement 
to be, with all due respect, outrageous. You have got one of the best lawyers in this 
community. Mr. Mank is one of the most respected, able defense attorneys— 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Well— 
 
"THE COURT:  Don't speak. Do not speak—that I've had the pleasure to work 
with. And I think anyone, and you ask any lawyer, and they would say the same thing 
about Mr. Mank. The fact is, from my observations in court, you got an able defense, I 
think the best under the facts of the case. The facts are what the facts are, and you're 
responsible for those facts.  
 
"I think for you to come into this court now on the date of your sentencing and to 
raise an issue of why—that you wanted to fire your lawyer, I find that to be particularly 
troubling to this Court. But you have the right to file such a motion and you can make 
those proper motions if you wish to do so, but I will tell you right now that my 
observations of defense counsel, that his representation was more than is constitutionally 
adequate. It was superior in every respect. And it's unfortunate that you seek, even today, 
even after what you've heard, seek to blame others for your predicament. The only reason 
that we're here is because of what you did. 
 
"One of the speakers said that you're a follower when leadership was required, 
and here at the opportunity that I give you to make some amens, you choose once again 
to be a follower and not a leader, and I find it to be most despicable, with all due respect, 
sir. What you've done—and the reason I allowed the victims to speak is so you would 
understand the gravity of the acts that you've done, that you would understand that the 
things that you've done can't be undone, and it would appear that all that appears to be 
lost on you and you want to talk about firing your lawyer. I just—I find it incredible. Mr. 
Mank was appointed to this case. He didn't ask to serve. He was asked by the court to 
serve. Mr. Mank can go and do private work and get paid far more money for far less 
hassle, but he agreed to represent you for the minimal amount that the government, that 
the State pays because he knew that you were entitled to a defense. Unbelievable. 
 
"MR. MANK:  Judge, if I may add something for the record. I met with my client 
last Thursday. We went over the presentence investigation report. We discussed 
sentencing. None of this was mentioned to me. 
12 
 
 
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Your Honor, I asked for him to take some of my things 
and to defend me. Because I have things that I did want him to say that he did not say, 
and I asked him to file motions that I would need him to file but also— 
 
"THE COURT:  You're not the lawyer in this case, are you, Mr. Brown? You're 
not the lawyer. You don't have legal training. Right? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  But I also— 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Mank has the right to decide your trial strategy, not you. 
He's the one with the legal knowledge. Why do you think that you want to play lawyer? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  I didn't want to player lawyer, Your Honor. I just wanted 
him to ask these questions. And I also have an apology to the family also, but I just 
wanted to bring this forward.  
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Brown, you have the right to file a motion, an action 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after your appeals are exhausted. Once your 
appeals are exhausted, you have a year from that time to file any ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that you wish to do. So I'll just advise you of your right to do that, and if 
you wish to do it at that time you can do it." 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
The State sets up its jurisdictional argument by characterizing Quartez' statements 
at allocution as a motion for new trial based upon ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Then, it shoots down the "new trial motion" as untimely because it was made more than 
14 days after the trial ended. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3501(1) (new trial motion on any 
other grounds than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days of verdict or 
finding of guilty). Curiously, the State's brief also points out the rather obvious 
circumstance that the timely filed new trial motion, prepared and filed by trial counsel, 
did not claim that the district court erred in not removing trial counsel. That would have 
certainly placed trial counsel in a conflicted posture.  
 
Nevertheless, as we read the defendant's statements at sentencing, he is 
complaining that the district court refused to hear his pro se motion for new counsel, 
13 
 
 
 
which was timely filed, prior to trial. His complaint on appeal is that the district court 
failed to perform its duty to inquire into a potential conflict he had with his attorney, after 
being put on notice of the conflict by defendant's pro se motion. In recent direct appeals, 
this court has considered the issue of a trial court's duty to inquire into a potential 
attorney conflict. See, e.g., State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87, 322 P.3d 325 (2014); Stovall, 
298 Kan. 362; State v. Wells, 297 Kan. 741, 305 P.3d 568 (2013). We see no 
jurisdictional impediment to do so again in this case. 
 
Failure to Inquire 
 
We begin by stating the well-known principle that both our federal and state 
constitutions guarantee the right of criminal defendants to have the assistance of counsel. 
That right to counsel "requires more than the presence of an attorney; it guarantees the 
right to effective assistance from the attorney." (Emphasis added.) State v. Galaviz, 296 
Kan. 168, 174, 291 P.3d 62 (2012).  
 
Yet, our constitutions do not guarantee the defendant the right to choose which 
attorney will be appointed to represent the defendant. If a defendant seeks substitute 
counsel, the defendant "must show 'justifiable dissatisfaction' with his or her appointed 
counsel," which can be "demonstrated by showing a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable 
disagreement, or a complete breakdown in communication between counsel and the 
defendant." Wells, 297 Kan. at 754. The defendant bears the responsibility of providing 
"'an articulated statement of attorney dissatisfaction,'" which will, in turn, "'trigger the 
district court's duty to inquire into a potential conflict'" of interest. (Emphasis added.) 
Wells, 297 Kan. at 755 (quoting State v. Rand, No. 106,774, 2012 WL 6634397, at *5 
[Kan. App. 2012] [unpublished opinion]); see also State v. Taylor, 266 Kan. 967, 979, 
975 P.2d 1196 (1999) (discussing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 
67 L. Ed. 2d 220 [1981], for proposition that district court aware of possible conflict of 
14 
 
 
 
interest between attorney and defendant charged with felony has "a duty to inquire 
further"). 
 
Here, Quartez' motion for new counsel contained sufficient information to trigger 
the district court's duty to make further inquiry. The record does not reflect that the 
district court even attempted to fulfill that duty.  
 
To the contrary, Quartez' in-court statement suggesting that the judge sua sponte 
withdrew the motion without Quartez' consent and without his knowledge is the only 
statement before us as to what occurred. Contrary to the State's argument, we view the 
defense counsel's response—"Well, that's news to me, Judge"—as being ambiguous, at 
best, especially in the context of counsel's later statements. Interestingly, the sentencing 
transcript does not reflect that either the sentencing judge or the prosecutor attempted to 
refute Quartez' description of how his pro se motion for new counsel was handled. That 
description, in addition to raising due process concerns, obviously refutes the notion that 
the district court made the requisite inquiry into whether the alleged problems between 
Quartez and his attorney rose to the level of justifiable dissatisfaction. Moreover, when 
the court was given another opportunity to inquire during defendant's allocution at 
sentencing, the court actually prevented defendant from providing further information on 
the conflict by demanding that he not speak while the judge gratuitously and strenuously 
opined on trial counsel's virtues. We have recently found such a failure to inquire to be an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 98 (district court abused its 
discretion by failing to make appropriate inquiry into potential conflict of interest); 
Stovall, 298 Kan. at 370 (district court abuses its discretion when it makes no inquiry into 
nature of conflict).  
 
Quartez relies heavily on State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 127 P.3d 307 (2006), where 
this court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the 
15 
 
 
 
defendant's pretrial pro se motion to discharge counsel. Vann followed up with a letter to 
the clerk inquiring about the motion and later requested to proceed pro se, but he did not 
mention the motion for new counsel again until the hearing on his motion for new trial. 
The district court told Vann that he should have raised the new counsel issue when the 
court considered his other pro se pretrial motions. Vann complained again at sentencing, 
arguing that he could not have had a fair trial when he and his counsel had a conflict of 
interest. The district court ignored the complaint and proceeded to sentencing. The Court 
of Appeals similarly rejected Vann's arguments, ruling that Vann had multiple 
opportunities after he filed his pro se motion to discharge his counsel to bring the motion 
to the court's attention and failed to do so until posttrial, which the Court of Appeals 
deemed to be too late.  
 
This court disagreed with the lower courts, finding that the district court knew of 
Vann's pretrial motion to discharge his counsel, his follow-up letter to the clerk, and his 
pretrial motion to proceed pro se, and that knowledge, together with the posttrial 
assertions of a conflict, rendered the court's failure to inquire an abuse of discretion 
requiring remand to the district court. Vann, 280 Kan. at 792. The State's attempt to 
distinguish Vann as a case involving the right to proceed pro se is unavailing. But we 
must clarify the portion of Vann that distinguished the prior Court of Appeals decision in 
State v. Boyd, 27 Kan. App. 2d 956, 965, 9 P.3d 1273, rev. denied 270 Kan. 900 (2000). 
 
In Boyd, the Court of Appeals rejected Boyd's argument that the trial court 
violated his constitutional rights by ignoring his pro se pretrial motion to dismiss counsel, 
reasoning as follows:  
 
 
"There is nothing in the record to indicate that Boyd ever objected to the 
appearance of his trial counsel. Boyd appeared with his attorney at the motions hearing, 
the jury trial, the motion for new trial, and at sentencing. He had ample opportunity to 
16 
 
 
 
object to the presence of his attorney. Also, an issue not presented to the trial court, as is 
the case here, will not be considered for the first time on appeal." 27 Kan. App. 2d at 965. 
  
Vann distinguished Boyd by noting that Vann had "raised the issue of his pro se 
motion for new counsel on repeated occasions before the district court." Vann, 280 Kan. 
at 790. While that factual distinction was present, we discern that Boyd's rationale simply 
does not comport with our current decisions. A district court's duty to inquire into a 
potential attorney/client conflict emanates from its responsibility to assure that a 
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is honored. Sharkey, 299 
Kan. at 96 (quoting State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 321, 160 P.3d 457 [2007]). The duty to 
inquire accrues when the court first learns of the potential conflict, and that duty does not 
decay or dissipate just because a pro se defendant fails to give the court multiple 
reminders of its duty throughout the proceedings. As noted in Wells, what a defendant is 
obligated to do to invoke the trial court's duty to inquire is to provide an articulated 
statement of attorney dissatisfaction. 297 Kan. at 754. We decline to add a further 
requirement of repetitive notice. 
 
We pause to clarify that we are not saying that a district court cannot permit a pro 
se movant to withdraw his or her motion for new counsel. But such a withdrawal must be 
the personal, voluntary, and knowing act of the defendant, and the record must reflect 
that circumstance. Otherwise, a district court receiving a motion for new counsel that 
contains an articulated statement of attorney dissatisfaction acquires the duty to make 
reasonable inquiry into the potential conflict of interest and the failure to do so constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. Moreover, after a defendant has triggered the district court's duty 
to inquire into a potential attorney/client conflict, the defendant does not thereafter waive 
his or her right to conflict-free counsel by failing to renew the motion for new counsel 
periodically throughout the proceedings. 
 
17 
 
 
 
Here, the record reflects that Quartez triggered the district court's duty to inquire 
into a potential attorney/client conflict with his pro se motion for new counsel. The 
record does not reflect that Quartez personally, voluntarily, and knowingly withdrew the 
motion, and the record does not reflect that the district court made an inquiry into the 
potential conflict of interest. Consequently, the district court abused its discretion. 
 
On the other hand, as the State points out, this court is not in a position to make 
the factual findings that would be necessary to reverse Quartez' convictions. Without the 
district court's inquiry we do not have a suitable record on appeal to assess the alleged 
conflict of interest or to determine whether any conflict found to exist "'adversely 
affected his counsel's performance.'" Vann, 280 Kan. at 792 (quoting State v. Gleason, 
277 Kan. 624, 653-54, 88 P.3d 218 [2004]). Therefore, we remand with instructions for 
the district court to conduct a hearing on Quartez' claim of attorney dissatisfaction, at 
which the defendant is to be represented by conflict-free counsel. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court shall determine whether Quartez has established justifiable 
dissatisfaction with his counsel and whether that conflict adversely affected the adequacy 
of the attorney's representation.  
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
Quartez also argues that insufficient evidence supported his aggravated burglary, 
felony murder, and aggravated assault convictions. Notwithstanding our remand on the 
first issue, we must analyze the sufficiency issue to determine whether Quartez is entitled 
to an outright reversal. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is well 
established:  
18 
 
 
 
 
 
"When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this court 
reviews all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in determining 
whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374-75, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). In determining 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, this court will not reweigh 
the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 859, 
257 P.3d 272 (2011)." State v. Brown, 298 Kan. 1040, 1054, 318 P.3d 1005 (2014).  
 
Aggravated Burglary  
 
One of Quartez' convictions was for aggravated burglary, which is defined in 
K.S.A. 21-3716 as "knowingly and without authority entering into or remaining within 
any building . . . in which there is a human being, with intent to commit a felony . . . 
therein." In this case, the jury was instructed that the State had to prove the following 
elements:  
 
 
"1. That the defendant knowingly entered a building; 
 
"2. That the defendant did so without authority; 
 
"3. That the defendant did so with the intent to commit aggravated assault 
[against Bolden] a felony therein; 
 
"4. That at the time there was a human being in the building; and  
 
"5. That this act occurred on or about the 26th day of April, 2010, in Sedgwick 
County, Kansas." (Emphasis added.)  
 
Quartez asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his 
entry into Bolden's apartment was without authority. Quartez points to State v. Harper, 
246 Kan. 14, 25-26, 785 P.2d 1341 (1990), where this court found that the legislature 
intended "entry without authority and entry with intent to commit a felony or theft to be 
19 
 
 
 
two separate elements." While Harper's legal holding is applicable here, the factual 
differences in this case do not mandate the same result. 
 
In Harper, the defendant had an "extremely broad grant of authority to enter and 
use" the office at a softball complex where he worked. 246 Kan. at 25. Specifically, 
Harper had a key to the office and authority to enter the office for his duties as the 
complex's groundskeeper, in his role as umpire, for the construction work he was 
contracted to perform for the complex, and when he had too much to drink to drive home. 
The Harper court found that because he had authority to enter the building, he could not 
be convicted of burglary even though he did not have permission to take the records he 
was in the office to obtain. The court reasoned that Harper's authority to enter the office 
was not negated even where his entry was for an unlawful purpose. 246 Kan. at 20.  
 
Quartez argues that his authority to enter the apartment emanated from the fact 
that Bolden did not lock the door to his apartment and did not even have a key to the 
entry door. Apparently, Quartez believes that an unlocked entry door is an invitation for 
anyone to walk into the abode unannounced at any time. One can only imagine the 
euphoria among members of law enforcement upon learning that an unlocked apartment 
door provides them with the authority to enter at will. Of course, such a ludicrous 
proposition does not comport with either common sense or the law. Any rational person 
should know that, without more, a closed door at a residence—whether locked or not—
signals the need to obtain permission to enter. Legally, our legislature "eliminated the 
common-law requirement that a burglary involve a 'breaking.'" State v. Storey, 286 Kan. 
7, 12, 179 P.3d 1137 (2008) (citing Judicial Council Comment, 1968, to K.S.A. 21-3716 
[Weeks]); see also 3 Wharton's Criminal Law §§ 317-318 (15th ed. 1995) ("There is an 
actual break if the defendant makes an opening in the dwelling house, i.e., he removes 
some obstruction in order to enter. . . . It is enough merely that he open a closed but 
20 
 
 
 
unlocked door."). Here, Green testified that Quartez and Brown opened the door to enter 
the apartment unannounced and without permission. 
 
Quartez also argues that he had apparent permission to enter the apartment, based 
upon:  (1) Watley's testimony that people came and went as they pleased from Bolden's 
apartment and people "crashed" there; and (2) Green's testimony that she initially thought 
Quartez and Brown were playing a joke on Bolden. Again, we reject the premise. 
Granting some people permission to enter the apartment at will does not imply that all 
persons have the same authority. See State v. Fondren, 11 Kan. App. 2d 309, 315-16, 721 
P.2d 284 (discussing implied and express authority with respect to school building), rev. 
denied 240 Kan. 805 (1986).  
 
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Brown 
cousins did not have either express or implied authority to enter Bolden's apartment. 
Bonner testified that she did not believe that the cousins had permission to enter the 
apartment and Bolden did not invite them in. Bonner further explained that prior to the 
early morning in question, she had never been to Bolden's apartment and, to her 
knowledge, Brown and Bolden were not friends and the Brown cousins had not 
previously been to Bolden's apartment. The evidence that other people freely entered and 
left Bolden's apartment did not establish an implied authority for strangers to enter the 
apartment uninvited. Consequently, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to 
establish all of the elements of aggravated burglary.  
 
Felony Murder 
 
Quartez next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 
felony-murder conviction because the evidence was insufficient to support the underlying 
felony of aggravated burglary. We can dispose of this issue forthwith. 
21 
 
 
 
 
First, the State was not required to prove that Quartez was convicted of the 
aggravated burglary, just that the killing was done while he was in the commission of the 
underlying felony. See State v. Wise, 237 Kan. 117, 122-23, 697 P.2d 1295 (1985) 
(completion of underlying felony not essential element of felony murder; acquittal of 
underlying felony not inconsistent with felony-murder conviction). Nevertheless, the 
simple answer is that the State did present sufficient evidence of the underlying felony, so 
that the evidence was sufficient for the felony-murder conviction, as well. 
  
Aggravated Assault  
 
Quartez' final sufficiency of the evidence challenge is to his conviction for the 
aggravated assault against Ashley Green. Aggravated assault under K.S.A. 21-3408 and 
K.S.A. 21-3410(a) "is intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of 
immediate bodily harm" committed with a deadly weapon. Quartez argues the State did 
not prove Green was in immediate apprehension of bodily harm. See Spencer v. State, 
264 Kan. 4, 6, 954 P.2d 1088 (1998) ("[T]here can be no crime of assault without 
apprehension by the victim of bodily harm.").  
 
Quartez argues Green's direct examination established that she was not afraid until 
after the threat to her had passed. The following exchange occurred after Green described 
the shooting: 
 
 
"[Prosecution] Q. Okay. What were you doing this whole time? 
 
"A. On the floor, covering my eyes, praying, head down. 
 
"Q. Were you—this may seem like a silly question, but were you afraid? 
 
"A. Yes."  
 
22 
 
 
 
Quartez also argues that Green's cross-examination established that Green thought 
that the Brown cousins were friends of Bolden's, did not threaten her, and did not seem 
interested in her. Quartez' argument is based upon the following exchange:   
 
 
"[Defense counsel] Q. After the two guys came in, it appeared to you that they 
weren't even interested in you, didn't it? 
 
"A. I don't know. 
 
"Q. I mean, they told you to get down and they went into Otis's room? 
 
"A. Yeah. 
 
"Q. They didn't even threaten you, did they? 
 
"A. No. I mean— 
 
"Q. You even told the detective that you thought initially they were his friends, 
didn't you?  
 
"A. (Witness nodding head.) Yeah. 
 
"Q. And why did you think that? 
 
"A. I thought they was playing. I didn't know. 
 
"Q. So— 
 
"A. I didn't know. I didn't know. I thought they was playing. I didn't know that—
I don't know. 
 
"Q. Were those the kind of friends that Otis would have as somebody that would 
come into his house, carrying guns? 
 
"A. I don't know.  
 
"Q. But that's what you thought, they could be his friends? 
 
"A. I don't know."  
 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Green:  "[Defense counsel] asked 
you did they ever threaten you. Did the two people who came in the apartment point their 
guns at you?" Green responded:  "That's considered a threat to me."  
 
Quartez relies on State v. Warbritton, 215 Kan. 534, 527 P.2d 1050 (1974), in 
which the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for pointing a gun at his mother-
23 
 
 
 
in-law, after he had shot his wife. The mother-in-law was holding the defendant's baby 
and testified that she did not fear for her own safety because she thought Warbritton 
would hit the baby first if he shot and would not hurt her. A majority of this court 
reversed the aggravated assault conviction because the victim's testimony negated the 
element that she be placed in immediate apprehension of harm to herself. 215 Kan. at 
538.  
 
Without commenting further on the Warbritton opinion, we find that the facts 
presented here are more akin to those in State v. Lessley, 271 Kan. 780, 26 P.3d 620 
(2001). There, Lessley confronted his ex-girlfriend, Lisa Sears, with a gun in an 
apartment complex parking lot. During the confrontation, Sarah and Darrell Blackman 
drove toward Lessley and Sears. Sears blocked the path of the Blackmans' car and asked 
them to stop. Sarah rolled down the car window, and Sears pleaded with the Blackmans 
not to drive away. Lessley showed Sarah his gun and told the Blackmans to continue 
driving. After the Blackmans drove away, Lessley shot and killed Sears.  
 
On appeal, Lessley argued Warbritton entitled him to relief because the State did 
not present sufficient evidence that Sarah was placed in immediate apprehension of 
bodily harm. Lessley relied upon Sarah's testimony during cross-examination that she did 
not feel threatened as long as she did not get involved. She explained on redirect 
examination that she felt if she and her husband got involved, their lives would be at 
stake and that she felt threatened. On recross-examination, Sarah agreed that Lessley had 
not verbally threatened her life and "'[h]arm was not being immediately threatened 
against' her." 271 Kan. at 788.  
 
After discussing both the majority and dissent in Warbritton, the Lessley majority 
concluded that despite Sarah's testimony that she did not feel threatened as long as she 
complied with Lessley's demands, "Sarah obviously had great fear for her safety and 
24 
 
 
 
well-being." 271 Kan. at 790. The majority focused on the evidence establishing that 
Sarah was less than 3 feet from a man with a gun, panicked when she saw the gun and 
asked her husband to keep driving, and was hysterical while she and her husband looked 
for a telephone to call for help. The dissent focused on the notion that Sarah did not feel 
threatened if she complied with Lessley's demands. 271 Kan. at 800 (Allegrucci, J., 
dissenting).  
 
Similarly, in State v. Hurt, 278 Kan. 676, 688-89, 101 P.3d 1249 (2004), this court 
found sufficient evidence to establish reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm 
notwithstanding some inconsistent testimony from the victim. Pointedly, in Hurt, the 
victim ran away when Hurt pointed a gun at him and then Hurt fired the weapon at the 
victim as he ran away. Certainly, the victim's actions were most consistent with his 
testimony that he was scared when he ran away from the gun and the shots. 
 
Unlike in Warbritton, we are not faced with unequivocal testimony that Green was 
not afraid for herself. See 215 Kan. at 537-38. At most, the defendant can point to some 
inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, as in Lessley and Hurt. Although Green testified 
that she initially thought the men might be playing a joke on Bolden, she clearly said that 
she considered it a threat when they pointed the guns at her. Moreover, if she were not 
afraid, why did she immediately comply with the armed men's demand to get on the 
ground? If a person complies with a demand made at gunpoint, it is logical to infer that 
the compliance was motivated by a fear of bodily harm. If Green truly did not experience 
an apprehension of immediate bodily harm, she would not have hit the ground and given 
up the location of Bolden. See State v. Nelson, 224 Kan. 95, 96, 577 P.2d 1178 (1978) 
(noting that circumstantial evidence can establish victim's fear of bodily harm); see also 
State v. Powell, 266 Kan. 282, 291, 971 P.2d 340 (1998) (noting that because the 
Warbritton opinion did not discuss circumstantial evidence, this court must assume there 
25 
 
 
 
was none). The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conviction for aggravated 
assault. 
  
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Quartez next contends that the district court erred in denying his requested lesser 
included offense instructions on voluntary manslaughter, reckless second-degree murder, 
and involuntary manslaughter. Obviously, if the district court determines, after 
conducting the aforementioned hearing with conflict-free defense counsel, that a conflict 
existed between Quartez and his trial counsel that adversely affected the adequacy of trial 
counsel's representation, the district court will order a new trial and the instruction issues 
presented in this appeal will be moot.  But we proceed to determine whether the 
instruction issues provide an independent basis for ordering a new trial for Quartez as a 
prophylactic measure against the possibility that the district court would determine that 
the conflicted counsel issue did not warrant a new trial, standing alone.  Cf. State v. 
Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87, 101, 322 P.3d 325 (2014) (clarifying that a new trial contingent on 
district court's decision at remand hearing on ineffectiveness of counsel). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
"For jury instruction issues, the progression of analysis and corresponding 
standards of review on appeal are:  (1) First, the appellate court should consider the 
reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising 
an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to 
determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) 
finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error 
was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 
26 
 
 
 
Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012)." State v. Plummer, 
295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 (2012).  
 
Voluntary Manslaughter 
 
There is no dispute that Quartez properly preserved this issue for appellate review 
by requesting a voluntary manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense of second-
degree murder. The requested instruction was also legally appropriate. This court has 
"held on numerous occasions that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of 
both first- and second-degree murder as a 'lesser degree' of those crimes under K.S.A. 21-
3107(2)(a)." State v. Gallegos, 286 Kan. 869, 874, 190 P.3d 226 (2008).  
 
Even if an instruction is legally appropriate, the instruction is only required when 
"'there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of [the lesser 
included offense.]'" Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161 (quoting K.S.A. 22-3414[3]). Where, as 
here, the defendant has requested the instruction, the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant. 295 Kan. at 162. But this court still gives deference to the 
district court, in that this court does not reweigh the evidence or pass on witness 
credibility. 295 Kan. at 162.  
 
Under the theory propounded by Quartez on appeal, voluntary manslaughter 
required the "intentional killing of a human being committed:  (a) Upon a sudden quarrel 
or in the heat of passion." K.S.A. 21-3403. The key elements of voluntary manslaughter 
under K.S.A. 21-3403(a) are (1) an intentional killing, and (2) legally sufficient 
provocation. State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 711, 233 P.3d 265 (2010) (citing Gallegos, 
286 Kan. at 874). Quartez argues that the jury could have concluded the killing was 
intentional, but was a result of heat of passion.  
 
27 
 
 
 
"In order for a defendant to be entitled to a reduced charge because he acted in the 
heat of passion, his emotional state of mind must exist at the time of the act and it must 
have arisen from circumstances constituting sufficient provocation." State v. Guebara, 
236 Kan. 791, 796, 696 P.2d 381 (1985). "Heat of passion" is "any intense or vehement 
emotional excitement of the kind prompting violent and aggressive action, such as rage, 
anger, hatred, furious resentment, fright, or terror. Such emotional state of mind must be 
of such a degree as would cause an ordinary man to act on impulse without reflection." 
236 Kan. at 796; see also State v. Wade, 295 Kan. 916, 925, 287 P.3d 237 (2012) ("The 
hallmark of heat of passion is taking action upon impulse without reflection.").  
 
Quartez relies on the reports of sexual assault by Bonner and Williams as the 
provocation for the Brown cousins' attack on Bolden. We find Quartez' argument to be 
unavailing for at least two reasons:  The evidence did not establish that Quartez' 
emotional state reached the level to be described as a heat of passion; and, even if the 
alleged provocation initially generated a heat of passion, there was a sufficient cooling-
off period to preclude the defense. 
 
First, Quartez cannot point to any evidence that he experienced an intense or 
vehement emotional excitement. To the contrary, Evans testified that although Brown 
was visibly upset, Quartez was not. She testified that she did not see Quartez get mad or 
yell. Bonner testified that at the Glendale house, she told the Brown cousins that they 
should fight Bolden, but neither agreed to do anything. She explained that on the way to 
Bolden's house, the group simply listened to music and did not discuss what was going to 
happen once they arrived.  
 
Additionally, even if Quartez could clear the first hurdle of establishing that he 
was provoked into a state of emotional excitement, he had an adequate opportunity to 
cool down and regain his composure before entering Bolden's apartment. The State points 
28 
 
 
 
to State v. Henson, 287 Kan. 574, 197 P.3d 456 (2008), where we found that a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction was not warranted where 20 to 30 minutes separated the 
provocation of the victim punching the defendant and the act of shooting the victim. The 
defendant had not immediately reacted to being hit, but instead drove home with a friend, 
cleaned himself up, got his gun, talked to his wife, introduced his wife to his friend, and 
drove back to the garage before he shot and killed the victim. Although recognizing that a 
reasonable cooling off period is not set by rule, we found "'[a]n act of violence separated 
from the provocation by sufficient cooling time is the product of malice and cold 
calculation rather than heat of passion.'" 287 Kan. at 583 (quoting State v. Follin, 263 
Kan. 28, 38, 947 P.2d 8 [1997]).  
 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Quartez, we will assume 
Quartez did not learn about the assaults until he arrived at the Glendale house at around 
10:30 a.m. Accordingly, approximately 30 minutes passed before the group left the 
Glendale house to go to Drop's house. The Brown cousins were in Drop's house for 
approximately another 5 minutes. The group then drove to Bolden's house, where 
Quartez backed into a parking spot. Quartez and Brown entered Bolden's apartment and 
interacted with Green shortly after 11 a.m. As in Henson, we find that even if Quartez 
was still angry, he had control of his actions. Therefore, the district court did not err in 
declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.  
 
Reckless Second-Degree Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter  
 
There is no dispute that Quartez properly preserved this issue for appellate review 
by requesting the lesser included offense instructions of reckless second-degree murder 
and involuntary manslaughter. The requested instructions were also legally appropriate. 
See State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 135, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). But, as with voluntary 
manslaughter, Quartez is unable to show that "'there is some evidence which would 
29 
 
 
 
reasonably justify a conviction of [the lesser included offenses.]'" Plummer, 295 Kan. at 
161 (quoting K.S.A. 22-3414[3]).  
 
In order to be entitled to instructions upon unintentional but reckless second-
degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, there must be "evidence to support a 
finding that the killing was unintentional." State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 979, 270 
P.3d 1142 (2012). Unintentional but reckless second-degree murder is "the killing of a 
human being committed:  . . . (b) unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 
21-3402(b). Reckless involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing committed 
recklessly. K.S.A. 21-3404(a). Reckless involuntary manslaughter differs from 
unintentional but reckless second-degree murder "only in the degree of recklessness 
required to prove culpability." Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 135.  
 
In denying the requested instruction, the district court relied on State v. Bailey, 263 
Kan. 685, 690, 952 P.2d 1289 (1998), where this court found that neither Kansas caselaw 
nor legislative history supported the defendant's argument "that an intentional act done 
without regard to the consequences is reckless." Subsequently, however, in State v. Deal, 
293 Kan. 872, 885, 269 P.3d 1282 (2012), this court opined that Bailey's focus "on 
whether the conduct was intentional rather than whether the killing was intended" was 
not the correct interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3402. Rather, "K.S.A. 21-3402 focuses 
culpability on whether a killing is intentional or unintentional, not on whether a deliberate 
and voluntary act leads to death." 293 Kan. at 885.  
 
At the time of Bolden's death, K.S.A. 21-3201(c) defined reckless conduct as 
"conduct done under circumstances that show a realization of the imminence of danger to 
the person of another and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger." In Deal, 
we found "an unintentional but reckless second-degree murder . . . is a killing of a human 
30 
 
 
 
that is not purposeful, willful, or knowing but which results from an act performed with 
knowledge the victim is in imminent danger, although death is not foreseen." (Emphasis 
added.) Deal, 293 Kan. at 884.  
 
Despite the district court's reliance on Bailey, the district court's reasoning 
supports the notion that Quartez intended the result that occurred:   
 
"[T]he acts in this case where defendant pointed the gun, I guess we could differ as to 
what point blank range is, but certainly it wasn't at a distance. It was at close range, six to 
ten feet, and pointed the gun and shot. I don't think those facts show reckless conduct but 
intentional conduct."  
 
Quartez compares his case to State v. Cordray, 277 Kan. 43, 55-56, 82 P.3d 503 
(2004), where the evidence was held sufficient to support a reckless second-degree 
murder conviction. There, Cordray killed a car's occupant when he fired seven "warning 
shots" in the direction of a car he knew was occupied. This court found the evidence 
sufficient to support extreme recklessness even though Cordray did not intend to kill any 
of the car's passengers and presented evidence that his shots did not go where he 
intended. 277 Kan. at 56. Quartez argues his case is similar because he and Brown 
participated in "shooting into Bolden's bedroom, that they knew to be occupied." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
As the State points out, Quartez' argument mischaracterizes the evidence because 
all the bullet casings and Quartez' earbud were found within Bolden's bedroom. The 
evidence established that the Brown cousins entered Bolden's house, immediately asked 
where Bolden was, went into Bolden's room, and shot Bolden multiple times from inside 
the bedroom. The evidence showed that the majority of Bolden's entry bullet wounds 
31 
 
 
 
were on the back side of his body, indicating Bolden was shot as he fled through the 
window.  
 
Even if one could discern some evidence to support recklessness in the shooting of 
the victim in the back, there is no possibility that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict if it had been given the options of reckless second-degree murder or involuntary 
manslaughter. Accordingly, any error in refusing those lesser included offenses would be 
harmless error.  
 
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER TO CORRECT THE JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
 
Quartez points out that the journal entry of judgment incorrectly describes 
Quartez' second-degree murder conviction as an "off-grid" severity level crime, when that 
crime is actually a severity level 1, person felony. K.S.A. 21-3402. The State concedes 
the error. Accordingly, we remand for a nunc pro tunc correction. See K.S.A. 22-3504(2).  
 
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE 
 
Quartez finally argues that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution were violated because the State did not include Quartez' 
prior convictions in the complaint or prove those convictions to the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The State points out that Quartez did not raise this issue to the district 
court. Quartez agreed with his criminal history score and did not protest its use at 
sentencing. Issues not raised to the district court may not be raised on appeal. State v. 
Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 339, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007). Moreover, we decline to reconsider 
our well-settled law that refutes Quartez' argument. See State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 
P.3d 781 (2002). 
 
32 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We remand to the district court with instructions to:  (1) Conduct a hearing on 
Quartez' claim of attorney dissatisfaction, at which the defendant is to be represented by 
conflict-free counsel; and (2) correct the journal entry of judgment to reflect that second-
degree intentional murder is a severity level 1 offense.  
 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
 
MORITZ, J., not participating. 
 
 
DAVID J. KING, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge King was appointed to hear case No. 106,894 
vice Justice Moritz pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) 
of the Kansas Constitution.