Title: Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court of Orange County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S249895
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE ex rel. TONY RACKAUCKAS, as District 
Attorney, etc., 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S249895 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D072577 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
30-201600879117-CU-BT-CXC 
 
 
June 25, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger and Fujisaki* concurred. 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Corrigan concurred. 
 
1 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S249895 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
The Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) 
brought this action against several pharmaceutical companies, 
alleging that the companies had intentionally delayed the sale 
of a generic version of a popular pharmaceutical drug to 
maximize their profits at the expense of consumers throughout 
California.  The companies moved to strike references to 
“California” in the complaint, arguing that the District Attorney 
has no jurisdiction to enforce California’s consumer protection 
laws outside the geographic boundaries of Orange County.  After 
the trial court denied the motion to strike, the companies 
obtained an order from the Court of Appeal directing the trial 
court to grant the motion. 
The People, as real party in interest and represented by 
the District Attorney, have asked this court to determine 
whether the District Attorney’s authority to enforce California’s 
consumer protection laws under the auspices of the unfair 
competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) is 
limited to the county’s borders.  We hold it is not:  The UCL does 
not preclude a district attorney, in a properly pleaded case, from 
including allegations of violations occurring outside as well as 
within the borders of his or her county.   
I. 
The District Attorney initiated this action by filing a 
complaint in the name of the People of the State of California 
against 
Abbott 
Laboratories, 
AbbVie 
Inc., 
Teva 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc; 
Duramed Pharmaceuticals Inc.; and Duramed Pharmaceutical 
Sales Corp. (collectively, Abbott).  The complaint alleged that 
Abbott violated the UCL by entering into agreements to delay 
the market debut of generic versions of Niaspan, a prescription 
drug used to treat high cholesterol.  As a result, the District 
Attorney alleges, users of Niaspan, their insurers, public health 
care providers, and other government entities paid substantially 
higher prices for Niaspan than they would have if the generic 
version had been available without improper delay.  The District 
Attorney sought an injunction prohibiting Abbott from further 
violating the UCL and an order for restitution and civil 
penalties, including treble penalties for violations that injured 
senior citizens or disabled persons.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 17203, 17206, 17206.1; Civ. Code, § 3345; all undesignated 
statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.) 
Abbott, in turn, filed a motion to strike “claims for 
restitution and civil penalties to the extent that those are not 
limited to Orange County.”  Noting that the District Attorney’s 
complaint makes no specific claim to penalties or restitution 
extending beyond the bounds of the county, Abbott asked the 
trial court to strike 16 references to “California” from the 
complaint on the ground that a district attorney’s enforcement 
authority under the UCL is limited to the geographic boundaries 
of his or her county.  According to Abbott, the motion was 
intended to “focus” the case, discovery, and scope of any 
potential settlement. 
The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding 
“premature” Abbott’s concerns about the scope of discovery and 
financial exposure as well as any enforcement concerns that 
might arise if the Attorney General were excluded from a 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
negotiated statewide settlement.  The court explained:  “If 
there’s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General 
. . .  is going to know about [it].  So, we will deal with that if and 
when. . . .  There are going to be more players in any kind of 
settlement unless there’s a carve-out.”  The court did not refer 
specifically to the geographic scope of the District Attorney’s 
authority during the hearing or in its minute order.   
Abbott sought review by means of a writ petition.  A 
divided Court of Appeal overruled the District Attorney’s 
demurrer and granted relief to Abbott, directing the trial court 
to vacate its order denying the motion to strike and to enter a 
new order striking the allegations under which the District 
Attorney 
sought 
statewide 
monetary 
relief. 
 
(Abbott 
Laboratories v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 31 
(Abbott).) 
The Court of Appeal observed that “though district 
attorneys have plenary authority to pursue actions in the 
criminal arena in the State’s name [citation], their ‘authority is 
territorially limited’ to the confines of their county.”  (Abbott, 
supra, 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 19, quoting Pitts v. County of Kern 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 361 (Pitts).)  By contrast, “with respect to 
civil actions, a district attorney has no plenary power.”  (Abbott, 
at p. 19.)  “Rather, it is settled that a ‘district attorney has no 
authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative 
authorization.’ ”  (Id. at p. 20, quoting People v. Superior Court 
(Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 753 (Humberto S.).)  As to 
whether the UCL grants such authority, the court looked to 
People v. Hy-Lond Enterprises, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 734 
(Hy-Lond), which held that a district attorney has no authority 
to limit the powers of the Attorney General or other public 
agencies under the guise of UCL enforcement.  (Hy-Lond, at 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
pp. 752–753.)  The Court of Appeal here explained it had “no 
difficulty applying Hy-Lond’s principles to bar a district 
attorney’s unilateral effort to seek restitution and civil penalties 
for UCL violations occurring outside his or her own county 
jurisdiction.”  (Abbott, at p. 25.) 
Writing in dissent, Justice Dato explained that Abbott had 
failed to “offer anything approaching an ‘extraordinary reason’ 
to justify this court’s decision to intervene at the pleading stage” 
in order to address “a motion to strike that does not challenge 
the plaintiff’s ability to plead a valid claim, but merely seeks to 
edit the language of the complaint in a manner that better suits 
the defendants’ tactical purposes.”  (Abbott, supra, 24 
Cal.App.5th at p. 34 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)  Even if Abbott had 
met this threshold showing, Justice Dato continued, “the 
majority opinion reaches the wrong result.”  (Id. at p. 37 (dis. 
opn. of Dato, J.).)  According to Justice Dato, it is the court, not 
the plaintiff, that awards restitution, and “there is nothing 
inherently problematic about the court awarding restitution to 
statewide victims of defendants’ unlawful business practice.”  
(Ibid.)  “[E]ven absent a request by the District Attorney the 
court is empowered by section 17203 to award restitution ‘to any 
person’ adversely affected by the defendants’ unlawful conduct. 
. . .  This includes, potentially, residents of counties other than 
Orange.”  (Ibid., quoting § 17203, italics added by Dato, J.)  
Similarly, Justice Dato explained, the court could impose civil 
penalties based on any violation proven in the case, within or 
outside of Orange County:  “The penalties are the punishment 
imposed for each violation proved in a law enforcement action 
brought on behalf of the People of the State of California.  If the 
violation is proved, the penalties are appropriately imposed.”  
(Abbott, at p. 38 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)  Finally, Justice Dato 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
rejected Abbott’s argument that a district attorney may not bind 
the Attorney General in settlement, explaining “it is well 
established that the District Attorney’s action will have no res 
judicata effect on a private party’s restitution claim, except to 
the extent that the party signs a release.”  (Id. at p. 37 (dis. opn. 
of Dato, J.).) 
We granted the District Attorney’s petition for review, 
which was limited to the Court of Appeal’s decision to grant writ 
relief.  The District Attorney did not seek review of the portion 
of the Court of Appeal’s opinion overruling the demurrer.  
Accordingly, we express no view on the service requirements of 
section 17209, as all papers filed in this court have been properly 
served upon the Attorney General.  (See § 17209 [requiring 
service of appellate briefs or petitions in UCL matters on the 
Attorney General within three days of filing with the court].) 
II. 
We review the trial court’s denial of the motion to strike 
for abuse of discretion.  (Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. 
Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.)  To the 
extent the decision rested upon a legal determination as to the 
scope of the District Attorney’s authority, it is a question of law 
subject to de novo review.  (Ibid.; see Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 
p. 345.) 
A. 
The UCL prohibits unfair competition, defined as “any 
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.”  
(§ 17200.)  The statute’s “purpose is to protect both consumers 
and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial 
markets for goods and services.”  (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 939, 949.)  “In service of that purpose, the Legislature 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in ‘ “broad, sweeping 
language” ’ ” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
310, 320) to reach “anything that can properly be called a 
business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law” 
(Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 113).  
“By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 
“borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful 
practices’ that the unfair competition law makes independently 
actionable.”  (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles 
Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180, quoting State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 
Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103.)  “ ‘[T]he Legislature . . . intended by 
this sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going 
wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity 
might occur.’ ”  (Cel-Tech, at p. 181, quoting American Philatelic 
Soc. v. Claibourne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 689, 698.) 
To that end, the Legislature has created a scheme of 
overlapping enforcement authority.  Section 17204 provides that 
actions for relief under the UCL may be prosecuted “by the 
Attorney General or a district attorney or by a county counsel 
authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions 
involving violation of a county ordinance, or by a city attorney of 
a city having a population in excess of 750,000, or by a city 
attorney in a city and county or, with the consent of the district 
attorney, by a city prosecutor in a city having a full-time city 
prosecutor in the name of the people of the State of California 
upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of a board, 
officer, person, corporation, or association, or by a person who 
has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a 
result of the unfair competition.” 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
The UCL grants broad equitable authority to courts to 
remedy violations.  Section 17203 provides in relevant part:  
“Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in 
unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.  The court may make such orders or judgments, 
including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to 
prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice 
which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, 
or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any 
money or property, real or personal, which may have been 
acquired by means of such unfair competition.”  Such remedies 
are “cumulative . . . to the remedies or penalties available under 
all other laws of this state.”  (§ 17205.) 
While the UCL provides for both public and private 
enforcement, authorized public prosecutors have an additional 
tool to enforce the state’s consumer protection laws:  civil 
penalties.  “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes 
to engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty 
not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for 
each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil 
action brought in the name of the people of the State of 
California by the Attorney General, by any district attorney, by 
any county counsel authorized by agreement with the district 
attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, by 
any city attorney of a city having a population in excess of 
750,000, by any city attorney of any city and county, or, with the 
consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any city 
having a full-time city prosecutor, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.”  (§ 17206, subd. (a).)  “The court shall impose a civil 
penalty for each violation of [the UCL].  In assessing the amount 
of the civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to 
the case, including, but not limited to, the following:  the nature 
and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the 
persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the 
misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s 
misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net 
worth.”  (§ 17206, subd. (b).)  “If the action is brought by a 
district attorney or county counsel, the penalty collected shall be 
paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was 
entered.”  (§ 17206, subd. (c); see also § 17207 [similar 
provisions for civil penalties against any person who 
intentionally violates any injunction prohibiting unfair 
competition].) 
B. 
Abbott argues that this case is controlled by our statement 
in Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236 (Safer) that 
“the Legislature has manifested its concern that the district 
attorney exercise the power of his office only in such civil 
litigation as that lawmaking body has, after careful 
consideration, found essential.”  According to Abbott, the UCL 
contains no legislative finding that statewide enforcement by 
district attorneys is “essential” to the purpose of the UCL.   
The proceedings at issue in Safer arose when a 
farmworkers’ union set up picket lines around the fields of 
several Ventura County strawberry growers.  (Safer, supra, 15 
Cal.3d at p. 233.)  The growers filed suit to obtain injunctive 
relief against the union and its members, and the trial court 
issued a temporary restraining order limiting the spacing and 
number of pickets.  The next day, the Ventura County Sheriff 
arrested a number of participants in ongoing picketing 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
activities, charging three with willful disobedience of a lawful 
court order, a misdemeanor offense.  Then, when the defendants 
appeared for jury trial, the district attorney dismissed the 
misdemeanor charges and instead served them with orders to 
show cause in contempt proceedings initiated under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1209.  (Safer, at p. 234.)  The net result 
of these maneuvers was “to convert a misdemeanor proceeding, 
in which defendants had the protection of a jury trial and other 
statutory safeguards, into a contempt proceeding, in which 
defendants would be stripped of these protections.”  (Ibid.)  The 
defendants demurred and, alternatively, sought jury trial on the 
civil charges.  The trial court denied relief. 
We held that the trial court acted in excess of its 
jurisdiction when it permitted the district attorney to prosecute 
a contempt proceeding arising from private civil litigation “in 
which the district attorney could rest his participation neither 
upon standing as a party nor upon statutory authorization.”  
(Safer, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 233.)  Our analysis began with a 
survey of instances in which the Legislature empowered a 
district attorney to bring a civil action.  (Id. at pp. 236–237.)  
Observing that none of these authorization statutes “empower a 
district attorney to intervene at will in a civil case involving 
private parties in an economic dispute” (id. at p. 236), we 
discerned a “general mandate” on the part of the Legislature 
“that public officers not use their funds and powers to intervene 
in private litigation” (id. at p. 237).  We held that because the 
district attorney was not authorized to intervene in the 
underlying labor dispute, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction 
by permitting the district attorney to institute the civil contempt 
proceedings.  (Id. at pp. 242–243.) 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
Although Safer specifically concerned “a disturbing 
instance” of intervention by a public prosecutor in private civil 
litigation (Safer, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 242), Abbott notes that 
we have cited Safer for the general proposition that “a district 
attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent 
specific legislative authorization.”  (Humberto S., supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 753 & fn. 12 [citing cases]; see Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 
1155–1156 [citing Safer to explain that if a specific provision of 
the Cartwright Act authorizing the district attorney to bring 
antitrust actions on behalf of the county or its subdivisions did 
not exist, the district attorney would be unable to do so].) 
Even assuming Safer established a general requirement 
that a district attorney may not pursue civil litigation without 
specific legislative authorization, that requirement is satisfied 
with regard to a district attorney’s authority to bring a UCL 
action.  As we explained in People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 
626, a case concerning a district attorney’s authority to 
prosecute violations of the Mobilehome Parks Act (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 18200 et seq.) under the UCL:  “While [Safer] held a 
district attorney may prosecute civil actions only when the 
Legislature has specifically authorized, specific power exists in 
the instant case.  The district attorney is expressly authorized 
to maintain a civil action for either injunctive relief or civil 
penalties for acts of unfair competition.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 17204, 17206.)”  (McKale, at p. 633.)  The question in this case 
is not whether the District Attorney can bring “unlawful” UCL 
claims predicated on violations of the antitrust laws, but 
whether the District Attorney can seek remedies under the UCL 
for conduct occurring outside of his county.  Safer says nothing 
about the scope of remedies that may be sought. 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
As to this question, Abbott concedes that the District 
Attorney may seek and obtain statewide injunctive relief upon 
a sufficient showing before the trial court.  This concession 
follows directly from the text of the UCL’s provision on 
enforcement of injunctive relief.  Section 17207, subdivision (a) 
provides:  “Any person who intentionally violates any injunction 
prohibiting unfair competition issued pursuant to Section 17203 
shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed six thousand 
dollars ($6,000) for each violation.”  Section 17207, subdivision 
(b) then provides that such penalties “shall be assessed and 
recovered in a civil action brought in any county in which the 
violation occurs or where the injunction was issued.”  (Italics 
added.)  In other words, section 17207 explicitly contemplates 
that an injunction issued in one county may operate to prohibit 
future violations in another county.  “The purpose of such relief, 
in the context of a UCL action, is to protect California’s 
consumers against unfair business practices by stopping such 
practices in their tracks.  An injunction would not serve the 
purpose of prevention of future harm if only those who had 
already been injured by the practice were entitled to that relief.”  
(In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 320.) 
There is thus no dispute as to the District Attorney’s 
general authority to bring UCL claims or his specific authority 
to pursue statewide injunctive relief.  The issue here, more 
precisely, is whether a civil enforcement action initiated by a 
district attorney under the UCL may seek civil penalties for 
violations occurring outside of the district attorney’s county as 
well as restitution on behalf of Californians who do not reside in 
the county.  To answer that question, we return to the text and 
purpose of the UCL. 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
C. 
“ ‘ “[O]ur fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the 
lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ 
[Citation.]  As always, we start with the language of the statute, 
‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], 
while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the 
statute’s purpose.’ ”  (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 128, 135.)  As the parties and amici curiae observe, the 
text of the UCL does not explicitly address the geographic scope 
of a district attorney’s authority to seek civil penalties and 
restitution.  But the statute does contain several clues that bear 
on the question presented. 
First, in addition to contemplating statewide injunctions 
(§ 17207), the UCL authorizes courts to “make such orders or 
judgments . . . as may be necessary to restore to any person in 
interest any money or property . . . which may have been 
acquired by means of . . . unfair competition” (§ 17203, italics 
added).  Further, with regard to civil penalties, the statute says:  
“The court shall impose a civil penalty for each violation of [the 
UCL].”  (§ 17206, subd. (b), italics added.)  The broad language 
of these provisions is not qualified by any reference to geography 
or the identity of the plaintiff.  The statute contains no 
geographic limitation on the scope of relief that courts may order 
in an enforcement action brought by a district attorney. 
The purpose of the quoted language of section 17206 was 
to codify the standard set forth in People v. Superior Court 
(Olson) (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 198, for determining the 
number of violations and corresponding civil penalties resulting 
from the publication or broadcast of a media advertisement.  
(See Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, pp. 1707–1708; Sen. Com. on 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1586 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended May 4, 1992, pp. 1–2.)  Although the legislative 
history does not include any specific consideration of the 
question before us, it is notable that the Olson case was brought 
by the Orange County District Attorney seeking injunctive relief 
and civil penalties for false advertisements that ran in multiple 
counties and that targeted homeowners in Orange County and 
Riverside County.  (Olson, at p. 185 & fn. 2.).  Neither Olson nor 
the legislative history of the 1992 amendment to the UCL raised 
any concern about the geographic scope of relief sought in an 
enforcement action by a district attorney. 
Second, section 17206, subdivision (c) provides in part:  “If 
the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the 
penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in 
which the judgment was entered, and one-half to the General 
Fund.”  (See also § 17207, subd. (c) [similarly allocated civil 
penalties recovered for violation of injunction prohibiting unfair 
competition, with one-half to the treasurer of the county in 
which the judgment was entered and one-half to the State 
Treasurer].)  The Legislature’s allocation of one-half of civil 
penalties in a statewide action to the county in which the 
judgment was entered indicates that the Legislature did not 
design the civil penalty scheme to ensure an allocation of civil 
penalties to counties in accordance with the number of 
violations in each county.  Rather, penalties are awarded in 
large part based on the location in which judgment is entered, 
regardless of the number of violations proven or their 
corresponding locations. 
Third, 
in 
making 
injunctions 
prohibiting 
unfair 
competition widely enforceable throughout the state, section 
17207, subdivision (b) distinguishes between “any county in 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
which the violation occurs” and “any county . . . where the 
injunction was issued.”  In other words, the county “where the 
injunction was issued” is not necessarily the county “in which 
the violation [of the injunction] occurs,” and civil penalties to 
punish violation of an injunction may be obtained through a civil 
action filed in either type of county.  (Ibid.)  Thus, for example, 
if an injunction entered in Orange County is violated in 
Riverside County, civil penalties for that violation may be 
recovered in a civil action brought in Orange County.  By its 
terms, section 17207 not only confirms that courts may grant 
statewide injunctive relief, but also contemplates that an action 
brought in the county where an injunction was issued may 
result in an imposition of civil penalties for violations occurring 
in other counties.  Moreover, section 17207 shows that the 
Legislature knows how to write language limiting the award of 
civil penalties to the county “in which the violation occurs.”  But 
it did not enact any such limitation in section 17207 (civil 
penalties for violation of an injunction) or in section 17206 (civil 
penalties for engaging in unfair competition) based on the 
identity of the plaintiff.  As noted, the latter provision states 
without qualification:  “The court shall impose a civil penalty for 
each violation of this chapter.”  (§ 17206, subd. (b).) 
A straightforward reading of the UCL’s broad language is 
consistent with the statute’s purpose and history.  As the parties 
note, there is no specific indication in the voluminous legislative 
record of the UCL that the Legislature intended to grant 
statewide enforcement authority to district attorneys or to 
withhold such authority from them.  But what the record does 
reveal is a clear trajectory toward greater and overlapping 
public enforcement at all levels of government. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
The scope of public UCL enforcement has expanded in the 
decades since the statute’s enactment in 1933.  (See Kraus v. 
Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 129–
130.)  Although the statute originally provided only for 
injunctive relief, the Legislature granted to the Attorney 
General and district attorneys the authority to obtain civil 
penalties for violations of the UCL in 1972.  (Compare Stats. 
1963, ch. 1606, § 1, p. 3184 with Stats. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2, 
p. 2021.)  In 1974, the same authority to seek injunctive relief 
and civil penalties was extended to city attorneys of jurisdictions 
with a population in excess of 750,000, despite objections that 
“prosecution of unfair competition cases should be a county-wide 
function, rather than broken up into cities,” because “harmful 
competition will arise between the two entities.”  (Sen. 
Republican Caucus, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1725 (1973–1974 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 24, 1974, p. 2; see Stats. 1974, ch. 
746, § 1, pp. 1654–1655.)  The law was amended in 1988 to grant 
standing to the San Jose City Attorney (Stats. 1988, ch. 790, § 1, 
pp. 2557–2558), in 1991 to grant standing to all county counsel 
(Stats. 1991, ch. 1195, § 1, p. 5799), and in 1992 to grant 
standing to all city attorneys with the consent of their respective 
district attorneys (Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, p. 1707; see 
generally Fellmeth, California’s Unfair Competition Act: 
Conundrums and Confusions (Jan. 1995) published as part of 
Recommendation on Unfair Competition Litigation (Nov. 1996) 
26 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 227, 234 & fn. 24).  These 
amendments were generally opposed by the California District 
Attorneys Association (CDAA), which argued that the Attorney 
General and district attorneys had the “training and experience” 
to best serve the public interest in the area of consumer 
protection and that “their effectiveness may well be jeopardized 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
or compromised through the expansion of this section.”  (Exec. 
Dir., Cal. District Attorneys Assn., letter to Sen. Ayala re. Sen. 
Bill No. 709 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) May 10, 1991; see also 
Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2440 (1987–
1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 1988, pp. 1–2 [similar]; but 
see Dept. Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 
1586 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) July 23, 1992, p. 3 [noting the 
CDAA’s neutral position to compromise legislation sponsored by 
retailers].) 
The sole exception to this trajectory of expanding UCL 
enforcement was the 2004 enactment of Proposition 64, which 
revised the UCL’s standing provisions for private individuals by 
providing that “a private person has standing to sue only if he 
or she ‘has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property 
as a result of such unfair competition.’ ”  (Californians for 
Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227, 
quoting § 17204, as amended by Prop. 64, § 2.)  Proposition 64 
had no effect on suits brought by the Attorney General, the 
district attorneys, or other public prosecutors. 
In sum, the text of the UCL grants broad civil enforcement 
authority to district attorneys, and this broad grant of authority 
is consistent with the statute’s purpose and history.  We see no 
indication that in an enforcement action brought by a district 
attorney, the Legislature intended to limit civil penalties or 
restitution to the geographic boundaries of the district 
attorney’s county. 
III. 
Abbott contends that we must read a geographic 
limitation into the District Attorney’s UCL enforcement 
authority in order to give effect to the “hierarchical structure of 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
the prosecutorial function within California’s executive branch” 
as set forth in the California Constitution. 
Article V, section 13 of the state Constitution provides:  
“Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney 
General shall be the chief law officer of the State.  It shall be the 
duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State 
are uniformly and adequately enforced.  The Attorney General 
shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and 
sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be 
designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their 
respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make 
reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and 
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the 
Attorney General may seem advisable.  Whenever in the opinion 
of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being 
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the 
Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the 
superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the 
Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney.  
When required by the public interest or directed by the 
Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district 
attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.” 
This provision mentions “the powers of a district attorney” 
but does not define those powers except by reference to “the 
investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime 
in their respective jurisdictions.”  (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)  
Elsewhere, the state Constitution requires the Legislature to 
provide for each county “an elected district attorney” (Cal. 
Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b)) but does not elucidate the district 
attorney’s powers.  Rather, the Legislature has conferred upon 
district attorneys both criminal and civil enforcement authority 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
as a matter of statute, declaring that “the district attorney is the 
public prosecutor, except as otherwise provided by law” (Gov. 
Code, § 26500, 1st par.), and providing for certain secondary 
duties when he or she is “not engaged in criminal proceedings in 
the superior court or in civil cases on behalf of the people” (id., 
§ 26501).  When a district attorney prosecutes criminal 
violations of state law, he or she acts in a state rather than a 
local capacity, and that authority is “territorially limited.”  
(Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 361; see People v. Eubanks (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 580, 589 [district attorney of each county is vested 
with power to conduct prosecutions of criminal offenses “within 
the county”].) 
In reading the language of the constitutional provisions 
concerning the role of the Attorney General and district 
attorneys, we find nothing in those provisions that constrains 
the Legislature’s prerogative to structure UCL enforcement so 
that a district attorney has authority to seek civil penalties and 
restitution for violations outside of his or her county.  The UCL 
does not undermine the Attorney General’s constitutional role 
as California’s chief law enforcement officer.  In particular, the 
public enforcement authority that the UCL grants to district 
attorneys does not constrain the Attorney General’s prerogative 
to intervene or take control of a civil enforcement action that, in 
the Attorney General’s view, does not adequately serve the 
public interest.  (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 [“Whenever in the 
opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being 
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the 
Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the 
superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the 
Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district 
attorney.”]; Gov. Code, § 12550 [Attorney General “has direct 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
supervision over the district attorneys,” and “[w]hen he deems 
it advisable or necessary in the public interest . . . , he shall 
assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and 
may, where he deems it necessary, take full charge of any 
investigation or prosecution of violations of law of which the 
superior court has jurisdiction”].)  In the UCL context, the 
Attorney General’s supervisory role is facilitated by the 
requirement that all appellate briefs or petitions in a UCL 
matter be served upon the Attorney General.  (§ 17209.)  Thus, 
the ultimate locus of control and accountability for UCL actions 
is the office of the Attorney General. 
The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, does not join 
Abbott’s constitutional arguments but offers three practical 
concerns in support of Abbott’s position.  First, the Attorney 
General suggests that the District Attorney’s position would 
present “conflicts of interest” between local prosecutors’ 
responsibility to statewide victims, to whom they are not 
politically accountable, and their own incentives to secure a 
greater share of available remedies for local constituencies.  
“The result,” according to the Attorney General, “could be a 
degradation of UCL enforcement, as local prosecutors compete 
to be the first to settle a case and secure penalties for local use.”  
Second, “granting statewide enforcement authority to local 
prosecutors would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead 
the way in matters of national or international prominence” by 
compromising the Attorney General’s primary role in consumer 
enforcement.  Third, the Attorney General contends, the “widely 
recognized geographic limitations on district and city attorneys’ 
UCL authority have formed the basis for decades of interoffice 
cooperation” between state and local prosecutors, and this 
cooperation, which is crucial to the intensive investigations and 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
litigation necessary to pursue UCL claims, would be jeopardized 
by a rule allowing any district attorney to pursue statewide 
remedies.  The CDAA, as amicus curiae, echoes these concerns, 
adding that an “assertion of statewide jurisdiction and 
preemptive authority . . .  should come . . . only after a careful 
analysis by the State Legislature to resolve competing policy 
objectives.”  (See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 578.) 
These concerns are not without force, and we do not take 
them lightly.  But two caveats are in order.  First, the Attorney 
General’s “conflict of interest” concern appears directed solely at 
civil penalties rather than restitution, as restitution is paid to 
victims, not the county, and thus does not create the same “race 
to file” incentive.  Second, all of these concerns are presented in 
the abstract.  In support of his argument, the Attorney General 
offers a single example of a district attorney unilaterally 
pursuing statewide relief in parallel with a coalition of state and 
local prosecutors.  As the Attorney General recounts, the 
District Attorney of Trinity County, represented by contingency 
fee counsel, sued Volkswagen shortly after the discovery of the 
worldwide diesel emissions cheating scandal, even as the 
Attorney General was investigating the same conduct in what 
eventually resulted in litigation involving all 50 states as well 
as federal and foreign agencies.  Although the Attorney General 
suggests that “granting statewide enforcement authority to local 
prosecutors would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead 
the way in matters of national or international prominence,” he 
reports that the district attorney in that matter dropped his case 
with no apparent negative effects. 
In any event, we note that concerns similar to those raised 
by amici curiae have been conveyed to the Legislature at various 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
junctures when it considered proposals to expand local 
enforcement (ante, at pp. 15–16), and the Legislature 
nevertheless chose to create a decentralized enforcement model 
in which a district attorney has authority to obtain statewide 
relief.  Although arguments in favor of a more centralized model 
are not without merit, the Legislature reasonably could have 
believed that 
an 
overlapping scheme 
of 
decentralized 
enforcement has several potential advantages. 
First, “for a defendant in a state the size of California, a 
law enforcement action alleging a statewide unlawful business 
practice and seeking monetary relief creates, at least 
potentially, a substantial economic exposure.  To the extent law 
enforcement can be Balkanized and monetary relief limited to 
local jurisdictions—especially early in the litigation—a 
defendant’s ‘management’ of the exposure is greatly facilitated.”  
(Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 32 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)  
Second, although it is possible that a district attorney will 
pursue a settlement that undervalues the true scope of 
statewide claims, it is also possible that the alternative would 
be no enforcement or penalty at all for violations outside of the 
district attorney’s county.  Indeed, the limited enforcement 
resources of the Attorney General have been a significant factor 
in the Legislature’s repeated expansion of public enforcement 
authority under the UCL.  Although concerns about conflicts of 
interest or duplicative enforcement have been expressed each 
time the Legislature expanded the scope of UCL enforcement, 
neither the legislative record nor the briefing before us points to 
any concrete or widespread problems.  “Pursuing litigation 
against corporate defendants is expensive, and the Legislature 
was doubtless aware that both financial and political 
considerations may sometimes discourage a public prosecutor 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
from undertaking such a case.  Consistent with the UCL’s broad 
remedial purposes and the perceived need for vigorous 
enforcement, there is nothing unconstitutional about the 
Legislature’s decision to permit and encourage multiple public 
prosecutors with overlapping lines of authority on the theory 
that more enforcement in this context is better than less.”  
(Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) 
Without denying that the UCL scheme may “incentivize 
public prosecutors [to] act[] in their respective county’s financial 
self-interest” at the expense of full redress for violations in other 
counties (Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 31), we are unable 
to conclude that the Legislature necessarily believed this 
concern outweighs the incentive that the scheme provides for 
district attorneys to bring enforcement actions that might 
otherwise not be brought at all.  In the litigation before us, there 
is no indication at this stage that the balance of incentives is 
tipped toward a settlement that is motivated by a conflict of 
interest or is otherwise improper.  In this case, “the concern 
about a local district attorney binding other prosecutors to an 
improper or inadequate settlement is as fanciful as it is 
premature.”  (Id. at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)  In any event, 
concerns about local “windfalls” are tempered by the UCL’s 
mandate that all penalties recovered by local prosecutors be 
used exclusively “for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws.”  (§ 17206, subd. (c).)   
Third, as to the Attorney General’s leadership role and the 
value of interjurisdictional cooperation, the Attorney General 
retains authority to intervene or take over the case (Cal. Const., 
art. V, § 13; Gov. Code, § 12550), and in any event, the Attorney 
General has not identified any specific way in which the District 
Attorney’s conduct of this litigation has compromised such 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
values.  Notably, the trial court here appears quite alert to the 
importance of the Attorney General’s role, explaining that “[i]f 
there’s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General 
. . .  is going to know about [it].  So, we will deal with that if and 
when. . . .  There are going to be more players in any kind of 
settlement unless there’s a carve-out.” 
The Court of Appeal relied on Hy-Lond, supra, 93 
Cal.App.3d 734, in which the Attorney General moved to set 
aside a stipulated judgment between the Napa County District 
Attorney and a nursing home operator with facilities in 12 
counties.  (Id. at pp. 739–742.)  The stipulation provided for 
general injunctive relief and payment of civil penalties (id. at 
pp. 741–742, 748–749) and designated the Napa County District 
Attorney as “ ‘the exclusive governmental agency that may 
enforce the provision of this injunction’ ” (id. at p. 741, fn. 1).  It 
purported to absolve the company of past wrongdoings and 
immunize it from future unfair competition lawsuits brought by 
anyone acting on behalf of the state for alleged violations of any 
acts covered by the injunction.  It also purported to bar the state 
or any of its administrative agencies from taking action to 
suspend or revoke the company’s license based on the alleged 
acts referred to in the complaint.  (Id. at pp. 741, fn. 2, 749.) 
Hy-Lond held that the Attorney General had standing to 
intervene and move to vacate the judgment.  Unlike Abbott, the 
defendants in Hy-Lond argued that the district attorney must 
be able to act on behalf of the state in a civil enforcement action 
because “parties dealing with the state must be able to negotiate 
with confidence with the agent authorized to bring the suit, and 
without the fear that another agency or other state entity might 
overturn any agreement reached.”  (Hy-Lond, supra, 93 
Cal.App.3d at p. 752.)  While acknowledging this concern in the 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
abstract, the court in Hy-Lond reasoned that the parties were 
on notice that the district attorney had no right “to surrender 
the powers of the Attorney General and his fellow district 
attorneys to commence, when appropriate, actions in other 
counties under the provisions of law.”  (Id. at p. 753.)  Moreover, 
the settlement in Hy-Lond ran afoul of the general rule that “an 
injunction cannot be granted to prevent the execution of a public 
statute by officers of the law for a public benefit.”  (Ibid.)  
Finding these principles dispositive, the court noted but did not 
examine the further argument that a contrary rule would result 
in an intolerable conflict of interest by “put[ting] the initiating 
district attorney in the position of bargaining for the recovery of 
civil penalties that would flow into his county’s coffers, at the 
expense of surrendering the rights and duties of the state to 
control the respondent’s activities generally through the powers 
of the Attorney General” and other local and state enforcement 
agencies.  (Ibid.; see id. at p. 754 [“the powers of the district 
attorney are limited by the recognition of a possible conflict of 
interest” and corresponding rules of professional conduct].) 
Hy-Lond is inapposite because it concerned a negotiated 
settlement that specifically sought to limit future enforcement 
authority of the Attorney General and other officials.  The 
parties in this case have not reached any settlement; there is no 
judgment that purports to bind other public prosecutors or limit 
their enforcement authority; and the role of the Attorney 
General has not been compromised or usurped.  Further, the 
trial court said that “if [defendants] reach a settlement with the 
district attorney, unlike the trial court in Hy-Lond — and if the 
[Attorney General] comes in and says I want to be heard about 
this, you bet I’m going to let them be heard on this.”  This is not 
a case where a trial court appears poised to approve a settlement 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
without affording the Attorney General an opportunity to 
participate. 
Ultimately, the pros and cons of centralization or 
decentralization in the enforcement of California’s consumer 
protection laws is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.  
We acknowledge amici curiae’s concern about democratic 
accountability, but it is undisputed that the Legislature has 
authorized local prosecutors to seek a statewide injunction 
under the UCL.  And it is the Legislature, elected by voters 
across the state, that has decided to allow local prosecutors to 
seek civil penalties.  The state Constitution does not preclude 
the Legislature’s choice of an overlapping scheme of public 
enforcement, with no geographic limitations on courts’ authority 
to impose civil penalties and award restitution in actions 
brought by district attorneys.  Of course, nothing prevents the 
voters from petitioning their legislators or placing an initiative 
on the ballot to restrict this authority for local prosecutors if 
they believe it is not sound policy.  But we have no authority to 
impose geographic limits on the broad enforcement authority 
that the text of the UCL grants to district attorneys. 
The Court of Appeal, having reached the contrary result, 
suggested that a district attorney could seek civil penalties 
beyond the boundaries of his or her county if the Attorney 
General were to provide written consent to the litigation.  But 
just as the UCL imposes no geographical limits on a district 
attorney’s enforcement authority, it contains no provision 
requiring the district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s 
consent to enforce the statute.  The Court of Appeal cited 
statutes dealing with intercounty cooperation between district 
attorneys’ and city attorneys’ offices, but those statutes do not 
mention the Attorney General.  Simply put, the UCL does not 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
require a district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s 
consent, written or otherwise, before pursuing an enforcement 
action under the statute. 
Finally, we note that the complaint in this case specifically 
alleges that at least some of the violations occurred in Orange 
County and that venue is therefore proper in the Orange County 
Superior Court.  We have no occasion to address whether a 
district attorney could bring a UCL claim for conduct occurring 
entirely outside the bounds of his or her county.  (Cf. § 17207, 
subd. (b) [public actions to enforce violations of a UCL injunction 
may be brought by specified local and state officers “in any court 
of competent jurisdiction within his or her jurisdiction without 
regard to the county from which the original injunction was 
issued”].)  At the same time, the practical and legal concerns 
raised by the parties and amici curiae, including questions 
regarding the preclusive effect of statewide relief obtained by an 
individual district attorney, may induce the Legislature to 
consider amending the UCL to add procedures to minimize the 
risks of conflicting enforcement efforts.  A basic starting point 
would be the provision of notice to the Attorney General and 
other relevant officials in cases where a district attorney seeks 
a UCL remedy for violations outside the county’s borders. 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeal and remand 
the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
FUJISAKI, J.* 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S249895 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
I agree with the majority opinion that district attorneys 
exercising their authority to enforce the unfair competition law 
(UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) may seek civil 
penalties and restitution for violations occurring outside their 
counties’ borders.  I write separately, however, to call attention 
to a gap in the statutory enforcement scheme that the 
Legislature may wish to fill. 
As the majority opinion explains, the text and history of 
the UCL indicate that when the Legislature empowered district 
attorneys to sue “in the name of the people of the State of 
California” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17206, subd. (a)), it 
intended to authorize district attorneys to pursue the full suite 
of remedies that are available to the state, including civil 
penalties and restitution for violations occurring outside county 
borders.  But absent an effective mechanism for coordinating 
efforts, empowering scores of local officials to sue in the name of 
the State of California will inevitably create some practical 
challenges.  These potential challenges are particularly acute in 
the context of the UCL, which provides that any civil penalties 
recovered by a district attorney “shall be paid to the treasurer of  
the county in which the judgment was entered.”  (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 17206, subd. (c).)  As amici curiae the Attorney General 
and the California District Attorneys Association observe, this 
provision creates an incentive for district attorneys to race each 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
2 
other to the courthouse and to enter settlements that maximize 
their own counties’ recoveries, potentially at the expense of 
consumers elsewhere in the state.  The amici curiae worry that 
the net effect may be to hamper effective statewide enforcement 
of the UCL rather than enhance it. 
The majority correctly notes that the UCL’s system of 
overlapping public enforcement authority generally has not—to 
this point—given rise to such difficulties.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 20.)  But as a consequence of our decision today—which has 
dispelled the cloud of uncertainty that had previously hung over 
statewide enforcement actions brought by district attorneys—
we may well see an increase in attempts to bring such actions, 
and an increased risk that the Attorney General’s and California 
District Attorneys Association’s worries will be realized. 
In other statutes with similar enforcement regimes, the 
Legislature has provided a roadmap for how public officials 
should sort out areas of overlapping responsibility from the 
moment a complaint is filed.  (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 12652 
[spelling out specific procedures for the Attorney General and 
local prosecuting authorities to follow to ensure coordination in 
pursuing False Claims Act violations].)  Such provisions 
implicitly recognize that the Attorney General is “the chief law 
officer of the State,” obligated “to see that the laws of the State 
are uniformly and adequately enforced,” and accorded the 
authority to exercise “direct supervision over every district 
attorney.”  (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)  They also recognize that 
the Attorney General’s ability to carry out these obligations 
depends, in the first instance, on receiving adequate notice of 
relevant claims. 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
3 
The UCL lacks a comparable notification provision for 
trial proceedings.  It does contain one for appellate matters:  On 
appeal, the parties must serve the Attorney General with copies 
of their briefs and petitions.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17209.)  The 
required notice ensures that the Attorney General is aware of 
appellate proceedings that may generate published, binding 
precedent and affect future interpretations of the law.  But for 
the surely far greater number of UCL cases that are resolved in 
the trial courts, the current statutory scheme contains no 
mechanism to ensure notice.  As the majority opinion notes, the 
Attorney General has the authority “to intervene or take control 
of a civil enforcement action that, in the Attorney General’s 
view, does not adequately serve the public interest.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 18, citing Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 and Gov. Code, 
§ 12550.)  But to exercise those constitutional powers—or even, 
at a lesser level, to provide input, direction, or oversight—the 
Attorney General must first be aware of the existence of the 
underlying action. 
The Legislature may wish to fill this gap by requiring that 
district attorneys and other public prosecutors serve the 
Attorney General with a copy of any UCL complaint whose 
prayer for relief seeks monetary relief for violations occurring 
beyond the borders of their respective jurisdictions.  Such a 
requirement—which would parallel the existing statutory 
requirement to serve the Attorney General with copies of each 
appellate brief or petition—would go a significant way toward 
addressing the legitimate concerns the Attorney General and 
other district attorneys have expressed about the powers we 
recognize today, and toward facilitating coordination and 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
4 
collaboration between different enforcing authorities in the 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 24 Cal.App.5th 1 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S249895 
Date Filed:  June 25, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Kim G. Dunning 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel:   
 
Kirkland & Ellis, Michael John Shipley, Jay P. Lefkowitz, Adam T. Humann and Yosef Mahmood for 
Petitioners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Duramed Pharmaceuticals Sales Corp., Inc., and Barr 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey I. Weinberger, Stuart N. Senator and Blanca F. Young for Petitioners 
AbbVie Inc. and Abbott Laboratories. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy Brooks Rosen, Stanley H. Chen; Janet Y. Galeria; and Heather Lynn Wallace for 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California Chamber of Commerce as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Tony Rackauckas and Todd Spitzer, District Attorneys, Joseph D'Agostino, Assistant District Attorney, 
Kelly A. Ernby, Deputy District Attorney; Robinson Calcagnie, Mark P. Robinson, Jr., and Kevin F. 
Calcagnie for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Yvonne R. Meré and Owen J. Clements, Deputy City 
Attorneys; Michael Feuer, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Michael M. Walsh and Monica D. Castillo, 
Deputy City Attorneys; Mara W. Elliot, City Attorney (San Diego), Mark D. Ankcorn, and Kathryn Turner, 
Chief Deputy City Attorney, Kristine Lorenz, Deputy City Attorney; Richard Doyle, City Attorney (San 
Jose), Nora Frimann, Assistant City Attorney; James R. Williams, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Greta S. 
Hansen and Danny Chou, Chief Assistant County Counsel, Laura S. Trice, Deputy County Counsel; 
Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney (Oakland), Maria S. Bee, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Erin B. Bernstein, 
Deputy City Attorney; Alison E. Leary and Jennifer B. Henning for City Attorneys, League of California 
Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.   
 
Law Office of Valerie T. McGinty and Valerie T. McGinty for Consumer Attorneys of California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney General, Michele R. Van 
Gelderen, Daniel A. Olivas, Hunter Landerholm, and David A. Jones, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
 
 
Attorney General as Amicus Curiae. 
 
Mark Louis Zahner; and Thomas A. Papageorge for the California District Attorneys Association as 
Amicus Curiae.  
 
Jeffrey S. Rosell, District Attorney (Santa Cruz), Douglas B. Allen, Assistant District Attorney, for Santa 
Cruz County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kelly A. Ernby 
Deputy District Attorney 
401 Civic Center Drive 
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4575 
(714) 834-3600 
 
Yvonne R. Meré    
Deputy City Attorney 
Fox Plaza 
1390 Market St., 6th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94102-5408 
(415) 554-3874 
 
Jay Lefkowitz 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
601 Lexington Ave. 
New York, NY 10022 
(212) 446-4800