Title: Flethez v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Ass’n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S226779
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2017

SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 3/2/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
LETICIA FLETHEZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S226779 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D066959 
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY  
) 
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT  
) 
ASSOCIATION, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CIVDS 1212542 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
In this action for a writ of mandamus, the superior court determined that 
San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association (SBCERA) 
wrongfully denied Frank Flethez the correct starting date for his disability 
retirement allowance.1   The court then awarded Flethez prejudgment interest 
under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) (section 3287(a)) as part of his 
damages, to be retroactively calculated from the same starting date.2  On appeal, 
SBCERA challenged only the calculation of the prejudgment interest award.   
                                              
1  
Frank Flethez recently passed away and his wife, as his surviving spouse 
and designated beneficiary, has been substituted in as plaintiff.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 377.31.)  Our references in the opinion to “Flethez” are to Frank Flethez. 
2  
The Civil Code defines “damages” as monetary compensation for one “who 
suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another.”  (Civ. Code, 
§ 3281.)  Under specified conditions, an award of damages may include an award 
of prejudgment interest pursuant to section 3287(a). 
2 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with SBCERA that the superior court had erred 
in its calculation of prejudgment interest and reversed the court‟s judgment to the 
extent it awarded section 3287(a) interest on all of Flethez‟s retroactive disability 
retirement benefits starting from the first date of those benefits — July 15, 2000.  
In doing so, the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the reasoning of Austin 
v. Bd. of Retirement (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1528 (Austin).  We granted review to 
consider how prejudgment interest under section 3287(a) should be calculated 
when a retroactive award of service-connected disability retirement benefits under 
the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 is ordered in an administrative 
mandamus proceeding.   
 
As we will explain, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the superior 
court erred in its award of prejudgment interest.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. County Employee Service Disability Retirements 
 
Public employee retirement boards have plenary authority regarding, and 
fiduciary responsibility for, the administration of their retirement systems.  
(Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17.)  A county‟s retirement system is administered by a 
county retirement board, under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937.  
(Gov. Code, § 31450 et seq. (hereafter the CERL).)   
 
County retirement systems formed under the CERL provide both service 
retirements based on age and years of service (Gov. Code, § 31670 et seq.) and 
disability retirements based on an employee becoming permanently incapacitated 
for the performance of his or her work duties.  (Gov. Code, § 31720 et seq.)   
 
When the statutory requirements are met, an employee member of a county 
retirement system who is permanently incapacitated may separate from county 
service and receive either a service-related disability retirement and allowance, or 
3 
a general disability retirement and allowance.  (Gov. Code, § 31720.)  An 
application for either type of disability retirement must be made “[1] while the 
member is in service, [2] within four months after his or her discontinuance of 
service, [3] within four months after the expiration of any period during which a 
presumption is extended beyond his or her discontinuance of service, or [4] while, 
from the date of discontinuance of service to the time of the application, he or she 
is continuously physically or mentally incapacitated to perform his or her duties.”  
(Gov. Code, § 31722.)   
 
Because a county retirement board is “required to administer the retirement 
system „in a manner to best provide benefits to the participants of the plan,” 
(McIntyre v. Santa Barbara County Employees’ Retirement System (2001) 91 
Cal.App.4th 730, 734 (McIntyre); see also Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17), it must 
“investigate[] applications and pay[] benefits only to those members who are 
eligible for them.”  (McIntyre, at p. 734.)  The board may require such proof as it 
deems necessary to determine the existence of a disability.  (Gov. Code, § 31723.)  
“Permanent incapacity for the performance of duty shall in all cases be determined 
by the board.”  (Gov. Code, § 31725.)  The applicant bears the burden of proving 
his or her disability and that it is service related.  (Masters v. San Bernardino 
County Employees Retirement Assn. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 30, 46; Rau v. 
Sacramento County Retirement Bd. (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 234, 238.)  “ „If the 
proof received, including any medical examination, shows to the satisfaction of 
the board that the member is permanently incapacitated,‟ the board shall retire that 
member.  (Gov. Code, § 31724, italics added.)”  (Masters, at p. 46.)  If the board is 
not satisfied that the member is permanently incapacitated according to the proof 
received, the request for disability retirement must be denied.  (Gov. Code, 
§ 31725.)   
4 
 
Government Code section 31724 governs the timing of disability 
retirements and allowances.  The statute provides that when a county retirement 
board is satisfied that the member is permanently incapacitated and grants the 
member a disability retirement, the retirement is “effective on the expiration date 
of any leave of absence with compensation to which [the member] shall become 
entitled . . . or effective on the occasion of the member‟s consent to retirement 
prior to the expiration of such leave of absence with compensation.”  (Gov. Code, 
§ 31724.)  In the case of a member who has been granted or is entitled to sick 
leave, the statute provides that the retirement is not effective until the expiration of 
such leave with compensation, unless the member consents to an earlier date.  
(Ibid.)3 
 
Government Code section 31724 also states the general rule that the 
member‟s “disability retirement allowance shall be effective as of the date such 
                                              
3  
Government Code section 31724 reads in full:  “If the proof received, 
including any medical examination, shows to the satisfaction of the board that the 
member is permanently incapacitated physically or mentally for the performance 
of his duties in the service, it shall retire him effective on the expiration date of 
any leave of absence with compensation to which he shall become entitled under 
the provisions of Division 4 (commencing with Section 3201) of the Labor Code 
or effective on the occasion of the member‟s consent to retirement prior to the 
expiration of such leave of absence with compensation.  His disability retirement 
allowance shall be effective as of the date such application is filed with the board, 
but not earlier than the day following the last day for which he received regular 
compensation.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the retirement 
of a member who has been granted or is entitled to sick leave shall not become 
effective until the expiration of such sick leave with compensation unless the 
member consents to his retirement at an earlier date.  [¶]  When it has been 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the board that the filing of the member's 
application was delayed by administrative oversight or by inability to ascertain the 
permanency of the member's incapacity until after the date following the day for 
which the member last received regular compensation, such date will be deemed 
to be the date the application was filed.” 
5 
application is filed with the [county retirement] board, but not earlier than the date 
following the last day for which [the member] received regular compensation.”  
(Italics added.)  In other words, a retiree‟s disability retirement allowance will 
typically be effective on the latter of two dates: the actual application date or the 
date following the last day for which regular compensation was received after 
separation.  However, “[w]hen it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
board that the filing of the member‟s application was delayed by administrative 
oversight or by inability to ascertain the permanency of the member‟s incapacity 
until after the date following the day for which the member last received regular 
compensation, such date will be deemed to be the date the application was filed.”  
(Ibid.)  Here we are concerned with the latter provision — delay due to the 
inability to ascertain the permanency of the disability.4 
B. The Flethez Matter5 
 
In 1990, Flethez became an employee of San Bernardino County (County).  
He worked as an equipment operator from 1991 until 2000.  In 1998, he was 
injured while performing his job duties.  His last day of work was on January 28, 
2000.  He underwent spinal surgery for his 1998 injury on February 1, 2000.  His 
last day of regular compensation was July 14, 2000.  Flethez underwent additional 
surgeries in 2001 and 2002 and received physical therapy through 2004. 
                                              
4  
Flethez sometimes refers to this provision as the “deemer clause,” referring 
to the date “deemed” to be the application date under Government Code section 
31724 because of the inability to earlier ascertain the permanency of the disability.  
We will instead adopt the “inability to ascertain permanency clause” as a 
shorthand term for this provision. 
5  
Because the historical facts and events established by the record are 
undisputed, we generally adopt the summary of the factual and procedural 
background from the decision of the Court of Appeal.   
6 
 
More than eight years after he last worked for the County, on June 12, 
2008, Flethez filed an application with SBCERA for a service-related disability 
retirement and allowance.  It was rejected for omission of a signed medical records 
authorization.  A little more than one year later, Flethez filed a complete 
application, including a signed medical records authorization and a supporting 
physician‟s report.  In August 2010, SBCERA granted Flethez‟s application for 
service-related disability retirement benefits, effective as of the date of his initial 
application in 2008.  That is, Flethez‟s retirement allowance was made effective 
under the general rule of Government Code section 31724 granting retroactive 
benefits back to the date of his June 2008 application.   
 
Flethez then filed a request for review and reconsideration limited to the 
question of the starting date for his benefits.  Flethez does not dispute that this was 
the first time he contended that his retirement allowance should be retroactive, 
under the inability to ascertain permanency clause of Government Code 
section 31724, to July 15, 2000, the date following his last day of regular 
compensation.  When SBCERA, in April 2011, maintained its original decision 
setting June 12, 2008 as the commencement date for his benefits, Flethez 
requested a formal administrative hearing on the issue.  An administrative hearing 
was held and the hearing officer subsequently issued proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommended decision denying Flethez‟s request for 
benefits retroactive to July 15, 2000.  On October 4, 2012, SBCERA adopted the 
hearing officer‟s proposed decision and maintained the original June 2008 date as 
the effective date of Flethez‟s disability retirement benefits.   
 
Flethez filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, seeking a writ ordering SBCERA to set 
aside its decision and grant him service-related disability retirement benefits 
7 
effective as of July 15, 2000.  (Gov. Code, § 31724.)  He also sought interest at the 
legal rate on all retroactive amounts.   
 
The superior court found that the evidence submitted in the mandamus 
proceeding showed Flethez had not been able to ascertain the permanency of his 
incapacity by the date he stopped working and when he received his last 
compensation.  It determined that the question of when Flethez thereafter became 
able to ascertain the permanency of his incapacity was irrelevant under 
Government Code section 31724 because under the unambiguous words of the 
statute, it was the “inability to ascertain the permanency” until after the date 
following the day of last regular compensation that triggers retroactive payments 
under the inability to ascertain permanency clause.  The court further determined 
that the CERL sets no deadline for filing an application based on the date 
permanency is eventually ascertained.  (Gov. Code, § 31722 [an application is 
timely if from “the date of discontinuance of service to the time of the 
application,” the member is “continuously” incapacitated].)  The superior court 
issued a peremptory writ commanding SBCERA to grant Flethez a service-
connected disability retirement allowance retroactive to July 15, 2000, the date 
after the last day he received regular compensation, i.e., the date that was deemed 
to be his application date under the inability to ascertain permanency clause of 
Government Code section 31724.  SBCERA complied with the writ.   
 
The superior court also ruled Flethez was entitled to prejudgment interest 
under section 3287(a) at the legal rate from the date that each payment of 
retroactive disability retirements benefits would have been due, starting from 
July 15, 2000.  The interest payments on all retroactive amounts totaled 
$132,865.37.  SBCERA timely filed a notice of appeal “limited to the issue of 
interest.” 
8 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded 
prejudgment interest retroactive to July 15, 2000.  It concluded that “in the context 
of disability retirement benefits, a retiring member is entitled to recover section 
3287(a) prejudgment interest on a court award of disability retirement benefits 
from the day on which his or her right to recover those benefit payments became 
vested,” which was “not until the retiring member establishes his or her 
entitlement” to those benefits.  The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the 
superior court for further proceedings to determine the date that Flethez had 
established his right to receive retroactive disability retirement benefit payments.   
 
As noted earlier, we granted review to consider how prejudgment interest 
under section 3287(a) should be calculated when a retroactive award of service-
connected disability retirement benefits under the CERL is ordered in an 
administrative mandamus proceeding. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
The interpretation of the prejudgment interest provisions of section 3287(a) 
as it relates to the provisions of the CERL is, as the parties acknowledge, a 
question of law subject to our independent review.  (B.H. v. County of San 
Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 189; Weber v. Bd. of Retirement (1998) 62 
Cal.App.4th 1440, 1444 (Weber).)   
 
We begin by recognizing that “ „our fundamental task is to determine the 
Legislature‟s intent so as to effectuate the law‟s purpose.‟ ”  (People v. Cole 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974.)  Because statutory language is generally the most 
reliable indicator of legislative intent, we start with the language of section 
3287(a).  (Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198; Martinez 
v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 51.)   
 
Section 3287(a) provides that “[a] person who is entitled to recover 
damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to 
9 
recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to 
recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, 
or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.  This section is applicable to 
recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any 
county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, 
or any political subdivision of the state.”   
 
We have explained that in order to recover prejudgment interest under this 
language, “the claimant must show:  (1) an underlying monetary obligation, 
(2) damages which are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, and 
(3) a right to recovery that vests on a particular day.”  (American Federation of 
Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017, 1022 (American 
Federation of Labor); Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 682 (Tripp), overruled 
on other grounds in Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 166, 180.)  Prejudgment 
interest may be recovered “from any debtor,” including a public entity.  
(§ 3287(a).)6  This is “an exception to the general rule that interest cannot be 
                                              
6  
Section 3287 was first enacted in 1872 when the Civil Code was adopted.  
In 1955, it was amended to add the second sentence, making the provisions 
applicable to “any debtor, including any political subdivision of the State.”  (Stats. 
1955, ch. 1477, § 1, pp. 2689-2690.)  In 1959, the second sentence was amended 
to further broaden the scope of the statute‟s application to recovery of damages 
from “the State or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public 
district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the State.”  (Stats. 1959, 
ch. 1735, § 1, p. 4186.)  In 1967, the existing provisions were designated as 
subdivision (a) of the section and provisions not pertinent here were added as 
subdivision (b).  (Stats. 1967, ch. 1230, § 1, p. 2997.)  In 2013, subdivision (c) was 
added.  (Stats. 2013, ch. 424, § 1.)  We uniformly use “section 3287(a)” to 
reference the applicable prejudgment interest provisions at issue here, even when 
the provisions at the time were contained simply in section 3287.  We have 
previously observed, “[t]here is scant pertinent legislative history” regarding 
section 3287(a).  (American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1030.) 
10 
recovered against a state or municipality.”  (Sanders v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 
3 Cal.3d 252, 262 (Sanders).) 
 
We have recognized that an employee who brings a successful mandamus 
action to recover wrongfully withheld salary payments may satisfy the 
requirements of section 3287(a).  In Mass v. Bd. of Education (1964) 61 Cal.2d 
612 (Mass), we concluded that a wrongfully suspended teacher was entitled to 
prejudgment interest as an element of his damages when the local board of 
education was ordered to reinstate him with full back pay.  We stated that section 
3287(a) “authorizes prejudgment interest on salary payments from the date of 
accrual to the entry of judgment.”  (Mass, supra, at p. 624.)  We rejected the 
argument of the board that interest accrued only “from the date when the board 
bore the legal duty to reinstate plaintiff because until that time the „right to 
recover‟ did not „vest‟ in him” as required by section 3287(a).  (Mass, supra, at 
p. 625.)  We explained as follows: “The Civil Code requires vesting . . . only in 
order to fix with sufficient certainty the time when the obligation accrues so that 
interest should not be awarded on an amount before it is due.  Each salary payment 
in the instant case accrued on a date certain.  Unless the suspension itself can be 
sustained and the board thus relieved of any obligation whatsoever, the salary 
payments became vested as of the dates they accrued.  If plaintiff had not been 
wrongfully suspended, he would have obtained the benefit of the moneys paid as 
of those dates; he has thus lost the natural growth and productivity of the withheld 
salary in the form of interest.”  (Ibid.)   
 
Subsequent cases have relied on Mass to similarly award section 3287(a) 
prejudgment interest on damage awards of wages wrongfully withheld.  (Sanders, 
supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 262- 263 [prejudgment interest awarded in mandamus 
action on wrongfully withheld salary and wage increases]; Olson v. Cory (1983) 
35 Cal.3d 390, 401-402 (Olson) [prejudgment interest awarded in mandamus 
11 
action on claims for back salary]; Currie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 
24 Cal.4th 1109, 1118 (Currie) [Workers‟ Compensation Appeals Board has 
statutory authority to include prejudgment interest in backpay award when 
employee wrongfully denied reinstatement]; Goldfarb v. Civil Serv. Com. (1990) 
225 Cal.App.3d 633, 635-637 (Goldfarb) [county and civil service commissions 
must include prejudgment interest on backpay award for wrongful demotion]; San 
Diego County Sheriffs Assn. v. San Diego County Civil Serv. Com (1998) 68 
Cal.App.4th 1084, 1086-1087 (San Diego County Sheriffs) [local civil service 
commission must include prejudgment interest in award of backpay for wrongful 
termination].)   
 
Relevant here are the cases that also recognize the applicability of section 
3287(a) “on a trial court judgment following a successful administrative 
mandamus action to recover wrongfully withheld benefits.”  (American Federation 
of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1022, original italics omitted, italics added.)  In 
Tripp, supra, 17 Cal. 3d at pages 681-682, we concluded an award of prejudgment 
interest was properly included in a mandamus action for wrongfully denied 
welfare benefits under the former aid to the needy disabled program (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, former §§ 13500-13801).  In Aguilar v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. 
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 239, 246, it was held that a trial court properly ordered the 
California Employment Development Department (EDD) to pay interest on 
unemployment benefits wrongfully withheld.  In Olson, we concluded that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest on wrongfully withheld judicial 
salary and pension increases.  (Olson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 406; accord, Benson 
v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355, 365-366 [interest on widow‟s pension 
benefits].) 
 
The parties do not dispute that, under settled precedent, prejudgment 
interest was properly awarded in this mandamus action challenging SBCERA‟s 
12 
denial of Flethez‟s request for disability retirement benefits retroactive under the 
inability to ascertain permanency clause of Government Code section 31724.  The 
parties advance, however, very different views as to when the right to such 
retroactive benefits was “certain” and “vested” for purposes of calculating the 
amount of interest due under section 3287(a).   
 
Flethez argues that county employees have a vested property right in a 
disability retirement pension from the inception of their employment.  He contends 
that a later court award of retroactive disability retirements benefits after the 
employee becomes disabled and retires carries with it a vested right to 
prejudgment interest from the date each retirement benefit payment fell due under 
the statutory effective date of the retirement allowance.  In support, Flethez 
principally relies on the statements in Mass, supra, 61 Cal.2d 612, that section 
3287(a) “authorizes prejudgment interest on salary payments from the date of 
accrual to the entry of judgment,” that the statute “requires vesting . . . only in 
order to fix with sufficient certainty the time when the obligation accrues so that 
interest should not be awarded on an amount before it is due,” that “[e]ach salary 
payment accrued on a date certain,” and therefore, “the salary payments became 
vested as of the dates they accrued.”  (Id., at pp. 624, 625; accord Olson, supra, 
35 Cal.3d at p. 402 [prejudgment interest is recoverable “on each . . . pension 
payment from the date it fell due”].)  Flethez also relies on Austin, supra, 209 
Cal.App.3d 1528.  In Austin, the reviewing court applied the reasoning of Mass to 
affirm an award of section 3287(a) prejudgment interest on a retroactive award of 
county disability retirement benefits — the same type of award of benefits ordered 
in this case.  (Austin, at pp. 1533-1534.)  Flethez asserts that absent such an award 
of interest here, he will be denied the benefit of the natural growth and 
productivity of the retroactive benefits withheld by the SBCERA and 
13 
correspondingly, the remainder of the members of the SBCERA retirement system 
will be unjustly enriched by the use of his retirement allowance in the interim.   
 
SBCERA argues that county employees have only an inchoate right to a 
disability retirement pension, which vests only when the last contingency to the 
pension is removed.  Specifically, SBCERA asserts that under the CERL, the right 
to a disability retirement and accompanying allowance is not vested until the 
retirement board to which an application is submitted has reviewed the submitted 
evidence and finally acts on the application, or at least has the opportunity to do 
so.  Until such time, SBCERA contends, the applicant‟s benefits claim is also “not 
certain or capable of being made certain” as required by section 3287(a).  
According to SBCERA, it is only when the board wrongfully denies such an 
application and withholds disability retirement payments that prejudgment interest 
begins to run as damages under section 3287(a).  SBCERA argues that this 
distinguishes the instant case from those cases awarding section 3287(a) interest 
on wrongfully withheld salary, wages, or service pensions — payments that do not 
require conditions precedent or the inherent delay of an administrative process to 
determine the plaintiffs‟ entitlement to them in the first instance.  (Mass, supra, 61 
Cal.2d 612; Sanders, supra, 3 Cal.3d 252; Olson, supra, 35 Cal.3d 390; Currie, 
supra, 24 Cal.4th 1109; San Diego County Sheriffs, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1084; 
Goldfarb, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 633.)  SBCERA relies principally on our 
decision in American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1017 and that of the 
Court of Appeal in Weber, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 1440.  SBCERA emphasizes 
that its “fiduciary duty to safeguard its trust fund for all of its members” requires it 
not pay benefits prior to the time the applicant meets his or her eligibility burden 
of proof.   
 
SBCERA has the better argument.  As SBCERA contends, vesting in the 
context of section 3287(a) must be understood in the framework of allowing 
14 
prejudgment interest as a component of damages.  (§ 3287(a) [“A person who is 
entitled to recover damages . . . , is entitled also to recover interest thereon”].)  
As such, it has long been settled that the primary purpose of section 3287(a) “is to 
provide just compensation to the injured party for loss of use of the [underlying] 
award during the prejudgment period — in other words, to make the plaintiff 
whole as of the date of the injury.”  (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 644, 663; Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 919.)  It 
follows that where salary, wage or pension payments have been withheld because 
of wrongful acts (e.g., Mass — wrongful suspension; Olson — wrongful denial of 
salary and pension increases; Currie — wrongful refusal to reinstate; Goldfarb — 
wrongful demotion; San Diego County Sheriffs — wrongful termination), the 
plaintiff has been damaged by the failure to receive the payments to which he or 
she was entitled and would have otherwise received.  As we explained in Mass, 
unless the underlying decision “can be sustained” and the defendant thus “relieved 
of any obligation,” the payments became “vested as of the dates they accrued.”  
(Mass, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 625.)  In the absence of the wrongful act, the plaintiff 
would have “obtained the benefit of the moneys paid as of those dates.”  (Ibid.)   
 
The factual situation here is different.  Flethez first applied for a service-
related disability retirement in June 2008.  He did not at that time request a starting 
date for his benefits earlier than his actual application date.  In accordance with its 
duties under the CERL, SBCERA evaluated and granted his application for 
benefits retroactive to June 2008.  (McIntyre, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.)  
Only then, did Flethez request an earlier starting date for his benefits pursuant to 
the inability to ascertain permanency clause of Government Code section 31724.  
If SBCERA had thereafter granted him the requested start date, as the trial court 
later determined it should have done, Flethez would have received an additional 
lump-sum payment for benefits calculated retroactively from the new deemed 
15 
application date in July 2000.  But Flethez would not have been entitled to receive 
the benefit payments in 2000 or in any of the years preceding the decision of 
SBCERA.  SBCERA could not by law pay Flethez any benefits before he applied 
for them (Gov. Code, § 31722) and carried his burden (Rau v. Sacramento County 
Retirement Bd., supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p. 238) of demonstrating his eligibility 
to SBCERA‟s satisfaction.  (Gov. Code, § 31724.) 
 
In other words, Flethez was not wrongfully denied the use of the benefit 
moneys in any of the years prior to SBCERA‟s decision on his request.  (Weber, 
supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 [“That the payment is retroactive does not mean 
that the Board wrongfully denied benefits for that period”].)  Flethez was injured 
only when SBCERA erroneously denied his request for a starting date under the 
inability to ascertain permanency clause of Government Code section 31724.  For 
purposes of prejudgment interest as a component of damages under section 
3287(a), until the SBCERA made its eligibility determination on his request, there 
were no damages stemming from an underlying monetary obligation “capable of 
being made certain” and his right to an award of retroactive disability benefits 
under the inability to ascertain permanency clause did not vest.  (§ 3287(a).)  As 
amicus curiae7 contend, county employees do not have a vested right to disability 
retirement benefits before such time.  (Weber, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451 
[until a member makes the necessary showing under the CERL, “his or her right is 
                                              
7  
In addition to the briefs of the parties, we have received an amicus curiae 
brief from the Alameda County Employees‟ Retirement Association, Kern County 
Employees‟ Retirement Association, Los Angeles County Employees‟ Retirement 
Association, Marin County Employees‟ Retirement Association, Sacramento 
County Employees‟ Retirement Association, San Joaquin County Employees‟ 
Retirement Association, Tulare County Employees‟ Retirement Association, and 
Ventura County Employees‟ Retirement Association. 
16 
merely inchoate”].)  Rather, the “vested right” members possess is to have their 
CERL retirement board make an “eligibility-to-benefits determination.”  (County 
of Alameda v. Bd. of Retirement (1988) 46 Cal.3d 902, 908.)   
 
We find the CERL disability retirement framework to be similar in this 
regard to the unemployment insurance administrative process this court discussed 
in American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1017.  In American 
Federation of Labor, we considered the “narrow question” of “whether an 
administrative law judge may award interest on a payment of retroactive 
unemployment insurance benefits.”  (Id., at p. 1021.)  We answered that question 
in the negative, finding no express or implied authority for such an award.  (Id., at 
pp. 1022-1023, 1042-1043.)  Of assistance here is our explanation that “[u]nder 
the administrative scheme of the Unemployment Insurance Code, the EDD has no 
underlying monetary obligation to the claimant until it determines the claimant is 
eligible for the benefits.”  (Id., at p. 1023.)  “[T]he Unemployment Insurance Code 
allows the EDD, and unemployment insurance claimants, a reasonable time to 
process each legitimate claim.  Benefits are not due immediately after a claim is 
filed following employment termination.  Rather, they are due promptly only after 
a claimant has established benefit eligibility.  [Citation.]  The statutory scheme 
thus accounts for the fact that delays are inherent in the entitlement claim review 
process and are necessary to ensure [that] only those claimants who have 
established eligibility will receive benefits. . . .  The delays inherent in this system 
are not, however, tantamount to a ‘wrongful withholding’ of benefits giving rise to 
a right to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest once the Board rules in favor of 
the claimant.”  (Id., at p. 1026, italics added.)  Only if the Board wrongfully denies 
benefits, we explained, would the claimant be entitled to section 3287(a) interest 
as part of a court award of “compensation for the egregious delay in receiving 
benefits caused by the necessity of filing a mandamus action challenging the 
17 
Board‟s denial.”  (American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1022.)  
“[C]laimants may not argue that their benefits have been wrongfully withheld until 
the Board erroneously determines they are ineligible . . . .”  (Id., at p. 1037.)  
“Thus, „[t]he central theme of [American Federation of Labor] … is that interest is 
not available absent an agency decision or action which has resulted in wrongful 
withholding of, and corresponding delay in receiving, benefits to which the 
claimant is entitled.‟ ”  (Currie, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)   
 
Like the unemployment insurance benefits at issue in American Federation 
of Labor, Flethez‟s disability retirement benefits under the CERL were not due 
before SBCERA received his application and made a determination of his 
eligibility.  Flethez experienced a wrongful withholding of his benefits when the 
Board erroneously denied his application for a retroactive disability retirement 
allowance under the inability to ascertain permanency clause, thus necessitating 
this mandamus action.  His entitlement to prejudgment interest under section 
3287(a) commenced on the date of wrongful denial.8  However, because the 
record before us is not entirely clear as to that date, we shall remand the matter for 
such factual determination.9 
                                              
8  
The reviewing court in Austin, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 1528, concluded that 
plaintiff Austin was entitled to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest on the trial 
court‟s award of retroactive disability retirement benefits under the CERL from 
the last day of his service — the date he became entitled to such benefits — up to 
the date upon which he was granted the benefits.  (Austin, at pp. 1530-1534.)  We 
disapprove Austin v. Bd. of Retirement, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 1528 to the extent 
it is inconsistent with this opinion.   
9  
We note that Flethez has argued only that SBCERA‟s erroneous denial of 
benefits entitles him to prejudgment interest calculated from July 15, 2000.  He 
has not submitted any argument supporting an alternate date.  Nor has he claimed 
that SBCERA‟s decision was unreasonably delayed, and therefore we express no 
opinion on whether a demonstrated unreasonable delay in deciding an applicant‟s 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
18 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.  The matter is remanded 
to the Court of Appeal with directions that it remand the matter to the superior 
court for a determination of the date SBCERA wrongfully denied Flethez‟s 
application for a retroactive disability retirement allowance under the inability to 
ascertain permanency clause of Government Code section 31724 and a 
recalculation of the amount of prejudgment interest owed based on such date.   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
eligibility for benefits could result in a superior court finding that benefits were 
wrongfully withheld earlier than the retirement board‟s eligibility decision.   
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion and its conclusion that prejudgment 
interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) begins to run only when a 
county retirement board wrongfully denies a member‟s application for retroactive 
disability retirement benefits.  I concur, too, in the court‟s decision directing the 
Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the superior court for a determination of 
the date on which the San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association 
(SBCERA) wrongfully denied plaintiff‟s application for retroactive disability 
benefits.  It would be helpful to the trial court on remand, though, for us to more 
fully explain when a wrongful denial occurs.  The standard I endorse is the one 
articulated by SBCERA:  A wrongful denial occurs on the date the retirement 
system‟s governing board should have determined that the member was entitled to 
retroactive benefits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J.   
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Flethez v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 236 Cal.App.4th 65 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S226779 
Date Filed: March 2, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: David Cohn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael P. Calabrese; Arias & Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Nossman, Ashley K. Dunning, Michael V. Toumanoff and Catherine F. Ngo for Alameda County 
Employees‟ Retirement Association, Kern County Employees‟ Retirement Association, Los Angeles 
County Employees‟ Retirement Association, Marin County Employees‟ Retirement Association, 
Sacramento County Employees‟ Retirement Association, San Joaquin County Employees‟ Retirement 
Association, Tulare County Employees‟ Retirement Association and Ventura County Employees‟ 
Retirement Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Reed Smith, Harvey L Leiderman and Jeffrey R. Rieger for California Public Employees‟ Retirement 
System as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Faunce, Singer & Oatman, Mark Ellis Singer, Edward L. Faunce and Larry J. Roberts for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of John Michael Jensen and John Michael Jensen as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael P. Calabrese 
San Bernardino County Employees‟ Retirement Association 
348 West Hospitality Lane 
San Bernardino, CA  92414 
(909) 915-2039 
 
Ashley K. Dunning 
Nossman 
50 California Street, 34th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 398-3600 
 
Edward L. Faunce 
Faunce, Singer & Oatman 
315 North Vine Street 
Fallbrook, CA  92028 
(760) 451-7377