Title: Maniaci v. Diroff (Opinion on Application)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 158005
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2019

MANIACI v DIROFF
 
Docket No. 158005.  Argued on application for leave to appeal October 16, 2019.  Decided 
November 21, 2019. 
 
 
In 2014, Jeffrey S. Maniaci filed an action in the Gladwin Circuit Court against Thomas 
and Mandy Diroff, asserting that he had the right to use a piece of property (Parcel B) that separated 
Vonda Lane from the Tittabawassee River, also known at that location as Secord Lake; defendants 
counterclaimed, arguing that they owned Parcel B.  In June 2015, plaintiff and defendants entered 
into a consent judgment in which defendants conveyed to plaintiff and others an easement to 
traverse Parcel B; specifically, the right of ingress and egress access to and from the water’s edge 
of the Tittabawassee River across Parcel B to Vonda Lane.  The easement expressly allowed the 
temporary mooring and launching of watercraft, including by boat trailer, but prohibited use of the 
easement for nontemporary mooring, docks, and/or wharfs.  In April 2016, plaintiff moved to hold 
defendants in contempt for not complying with the consent judgment, asserting that defendants 
had failed to remove certain barriers on Parcel B; plaintiff also requested to regrade the easement 
to allow a trailer to launch a boat from the parcel.  After a hearing on the issue, the court, Thomas 
R. Evans, J., denied the motion.  Plaintiff sought leave to appeal the postjudgment order in the 
Court of Appeals, and in an unpublished order entered November 23, 2016 (Docket No. 333952), 
the Court denied the application.  In the interim, defendants had conveyed Parcel B to Kenneth G. 
Siler and Tonya L. Siler, and in July 2016, the Silers conveyed Parcel B to the Kenneth G. Siler 
and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated April 3, 2013.  Plaintiff filed an application for leave to 
appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for 
consideration as on leave granted.  500 Mich 1057 (2017).  On remand, the Court of Appeals, 
METER, P.J., and GADOLA and TUKEL, JJ., affirmed the circuit court order in an unpublished per 
curiam opinion issued May 15, 2018 (Docket No. 333952), reasoning that just because it was not 
feasible to back a boat trailer fully to the water’s edge did not prevent the easement from being 
used to launch boats, including with the use of a boat trailer.  Plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme 
Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application for leave to appeal or 
take other action.  503 Mich 1024 (2019). 
 
 
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, 
held: 
 
 
An easement holder cannot make improvements to the servient estate if the improvements 
are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably burden the servient 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
tenement.  Relatedly, the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all the rights that are 
incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.  In this case, the 
easement expressly included the right to bring a boat trailer onto Parcel B and to use it to launch 
watercraft into the water.  Given the dictionary definition of the word “launch,”—that is, to set (a 
boat or ship) in the water—the scope of the easement necessarily included the ability to bring a 
boat trailer at least to the water’s edge; in other words, the easement had to include that ability 
because in order to set a watercraft in the water, including by boat trailer, one had to be able to 
bring the trailer at least to the water’s edge.  In addition, because plaintiff had an easement to 
launch boats, including by boat trailer, and the ability to perform that action was necessary to the 
reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, he had the right to regrade the shoreline of 
Parcel B for easier access to the water.   
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed, circuit court order denying plaintiff’s request to adjust 
the slope of Parcel B vacated in part, and case remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2019 State of Michigan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  November 21, 2019 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
JEFFREY S. MANIACI, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 158005 
 
THOMAS DIROFF and MANDY DIROFF, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees, 
 
and 
 
KENNETH G. SILER AND TONYA L. 
SILER REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST 
DATED APRIL 3, 2013, 
 
Appellee.  
 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
PER CURIAM.  
This case involves the scope of an easement to traverse a piece of property (Parcel 
B) that separates a road (Vonda Lane) from the Tittabawassee River, also known at this 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
location as Secord Lake.  Pursuant to a June 18, 2015 consent judgment, the defendants1 
conveyed an easement across Parcel B for ingress and egress access to and from the 
Tittabawassee River to the plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Maniaci, and others.  The consent judgment 
specified that the easement “may also be used for the temporary mooring and launching of 
watercraft, including by boat trailer, but may not be used for non-temporary mooring, 
docks, and/or wharfs.” 
To decide this case, we must answer two questions.  First, does the scope of the 
easement include backing a boat trailer all the way to the water’s edge?  Second, is it 
necessary for effective use of the easement to regrade the shoreline to allow such access 
by boat trailer? 
We answer both of those questions yes.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, vacate in part the July 11, 2016 order of the Gladwin Circuit Court, 
and remand this case to the Gladwin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Michigan law on easements is well established.  In Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village 
of Dexter, 473 Mich 33, 41; 700 NW2d 364 (2005), quoting Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 
701; 664 NW2d 749 (2003), this Court reaffirmed “[a] fundamental principle of easement 
law”: the easement holder cannot “make improvements to the servient estate if such 
improvements are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably 
                                              
1 In June 2016, the defendants-appellees Thomas and Mandy Diroff conveyed Parcel B to 
Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler.  In July 2016, the Silers then conveyed Parcel B by 
quitclaim deed to appellee, the Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated 
April 3, 2013.  This opinion uses “the defendants” to refer to the Diroffs and “the appellee” 
to refer to the Siler Trust.   
 
 
 
3 
 
burden the servient tenement.”  (Quotation marks omitted.)  The Court also quoted 
Unverzagt v Miller, 306 Mich 260, 265; 10 NW2d 849 (1943), for the related proposition 
that “the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all such rights as are incident or 
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.”  (Quotation marks and 
citation omitted.) 
Applying these legal principles, we have little trouble concluding that the 
unambiguous terms of the easement provide an express right to back a boat trailer to the 
water’s edge.  The consent judgment defines the easement as extending from the end of 
Vonda Road to the water’s edge and states that the easement may be used for the 
“launching of watercraft, including by boat trailer . . . .”  See ¶ 1 of the consent judgment 
(defining Parcel B, in part, as “to the water’s edge of the Tittabawassee River”); see also 
¶ 2 (granting the plaintiff “an appurtenant non-recreational easement for ingress and egress 
access to and from the Tittabawassee River (a/k/a Secord Lake) across Parcel B to and 
from Vonda Lane”) (emphasis added).  Thus, the easement expressly includes the right to 
bring a boat trailer onto the property and to use the trailer to “launch” watercraft into the 
water.  A lay dictionary includes as its first definition of the word “launch” “to set (a boat 
or ship) in the water.”  Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2003); see also 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “launch” as “to set (a boat 
or ship) afloat”).  Because in order to “set a watercraft in the water, including by boat 
trailer,” one must be able to bring a boat trailer at least to the water’s edge, the scope of the 
easement must include the ability to do so.2  We therefore disagree with the Court of 
                                              
2 The Court of Appeals erred by going beyond the language of the consent judgment to 
determine the scope of the easement.  The Court concluded that regrading the shoreline 
 
 
 
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Appeals’ contrary conclusion that “just because it is not feasible to back a boat trailer all 
the way to the water’s edge does not prevent the easement from being used to launch boats, 
including with the use of a boat trailer.”  Maniaci v Diroff, unpublished per curiam opinion 
of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2018 (Docket No. 333952), p 5.   
We similarly have little difficulty concluding that the plaintiff’s request to regrade 
the shoreline of Parcel B is “necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the 
easement.”3  Unverzagt, 306 Mich at 265 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
appellee’s counsel conceded at oral argument that it is currently not possible to set a boat 
in the water by boat trailer on Parcel B.  The current slope of Parcel B therefore both 
prevents a boat trailer from being backed to the water’s edge, a permitted use within the 
scope of the easement, and generally inhibits water access by making it difficult to get 
boats of any kind into the water. 
The plaintiff has an easement to launch boats, including by boat trailer, on Parcel B.  
He seeks to do just that by improving the land to facilitate easy access to the water by 
regrading the shoreline.4  This the law gives him the right to do.  We reverse the judgment 
                                              
was outside the scope of the easement, in part, because of evidence that the shoreline 
remained unchanged from the commencement of this litigation and evidence 
demonstrating that the issue of regrading the shoreline did not arise until long after entry 
of the consent judgment.  Reference to extrinsic evidence is not appropriate because the 
language of the easement is unambiguous.  Little, 468 Mich at 700 & n 2. 
3 The appellee makes nothing more than a conclusory statement that the regrading of the 
shoreline will unreasonably burden its estate.  We consider a challenge under that part of 
the Blackhawk test to be abandoned because the appellee failed to present any supporting 
argument.  
4 We reject the appellee’s contention that regrading the shoreline amounts to “damage to 
the surface of the Easement,” thereby implicating ¶ 4 of the consent judgment (placing 
 
 
 
5 
 
of the Court of Appeals, vacate the portion of the Gladwin Circuit Court’s July 11, 2016 
order denying the plaintiff’s request to adjust the grade or slope of Parcel B, and remand 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.5 
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
                                              
responsibility “for restoring the Easement to its pre-damaged state” on those who created 
such damage).  Rather, we agree with the Court of Appeals that “[g]rading the parcel to 
alter the slope sufficiently to launch a boat from a boat trailer” is an improvement.  Maniaci, 
unpub op at 4. 
5 We decide only that the plaintiff is entitled to make some alteration to the shoreline to 
facilitate the launching of boats by boat trailer and leave it for the trial court to address any 
additional issues on remand that are beyond the scope of that narrow holding.