Title: Menefee v. Veal
Citation: 484 So. 2d 437
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 1986

484 So. 2d 437 (1986)
Naomi MENEFEE, et al.
v.
Russell VEAL, et al.
84-846.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 7, 1986.
Henry L. Penick, Birmingham, for appellants.
Nancye Scott Alley, Birmingham, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b)(1), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to set aside a judgment dismissing the action. We affirm.
On October 17, 1983, the plaintiffs filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County a bill to quiet title to real estate. On June 22, 1984, Judge Thompson entered the following order:
On February 5, 1985, Judge Thompson rendered a final judgment in the case as follows:
The plaintiffs filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion on March 7, 1985, requesting that this judgment be set aside. It read as follows:
A hearing on this motion was set for March 22, 1985; however, the plaintiffs failed to appear at that time. On March 22, 1985, Judge Thompson entered an order denying the motion. Hence, this appeal.
An appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up for review the correctness of the judgment which the movant seeks to set aside, but is limited to deciding the correctness of the order appealed from. Raine v. First Western Bank, 362 So. 2d 846 (Ala.1978). The denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review only upon an abuse thereof. Maddox v. Druid City Hospital Board, 357 So. 2d 974 (Ala.1978). In order for a movant to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(1), he or she must allege and prove one of the grounds set out therein. Rule 60(b)(1), supra; Raine v. First Western Bank, supra.
In the present case, the motion to set aside the judgment sets out grounds of mistake and/or excusable neglect under *439 Rule 60(b)(1). The plaintiffs argue that, notwithstanding their failure to appear at the hearing, under Rule 11, Ala.R.Civ.P., the trial court should have considered their motion as an affidavit by their counsel in support of the requested relief. Even assuming this to be true, we cannot say that Judge Thompson abused his discretion in this case by denying the motion. The record shows that this case was pending on the trial court's docket for approximately nine months prior to the June 22, 1984, submission order. That order is not ambiguous. It required plaintiffs' counsel to request a setting of the case for trial on the merits within 60 days or have it submitted to the court for a disposition order. Plaintiffs' counsel stated in the motion that he "mistakenly surmised that after perfecting service this case would be placed upon the trial docket in its normal course, without further request or action." The reason for this erroneous assumption is not stated in the motion; however, counsel argues in his brief that it is the local practice in Jefferson County for a case to be automatically placed upon the trial docket. He also argues that it was a procedural impossibility for him to request a trial setting within 60 days from the date of the submission order because service was not perfected on two of the named defendants until July 30, 1984. He insisted that because these defendants had 30 days in which to file an answer, he would have been placed in the position of requesting a trial date prior to the filing of their answer.
We need not reach the merits of these arguments, as they should have been directed to Judge Thompson at the March 22, 1985, hearing. We do note that this case was not dismissed until approximately seven months after the June 22, 1984, submission order, and approximately six months after service was perfected. At that time the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to have a hearing on their motion, and they failed to take advantage of it.
Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Thompson, we affirm his order denying the plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.