Title: John D. Hess v. Juan Fernandez III, M.D.
Citation: 2005 WI 19
Docket Number: 2003AP000327
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2005

2005 WI 19 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0327 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
John D. Hess, Joan M. Hess, Adrienne V.  
Hess, and Emily M. Hess, a minor, by  
William Smoler, her Guardian ad Litem, 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, 
Wausau Insurance Companies,  
 
Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Juan Fernandez III, M.D.,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 25, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas S. Williams   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs (in the court of appeals) by Christopher R. Bandt and 
Nash, Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken, Manitowoc, and oral 
argument by Christopher R. Bandt. 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs by Jon G. Furlow, Mary C. Turke and Michael Best & 
Friedrich, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Jon G. Furlow. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross-appellants there were 
briefs by William Smoler and Smoler Law Office, LLC, Monona, and 
oral argument by William Smoler. 
 
 
2005 WI 19 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0327  
(L.C. No. 
95 CV 138) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John D. Hess, Joan M. Hess, Adrienne V.  
Hess, and Emily M. Hess, a minor, by  
William Smoler, her Guardian ad Litem,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants, 
 
Wausau Insurance Companies,  
 
          Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Juan Fernandez III, M.D.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 25, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Marathon 
County, Thomas S. Williams, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.    
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before us on 
certification 
from 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
No. 
03-0327   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2001-02).1  Juan Fernandez, M.D. 
(Fernandez) and the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund (Fund) 
appeal2 from an order of the Marathon County Circuit Court, 
Thomas S. Williams, Judge, which granted Joan, John, Adrienne, 
and Emily Hess's (Hess) post-verdict motion to amend the 
pleadings to allow an award of costs and reasonable actual 
attorney fees pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a).  The circuit 
court, relying on Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2),3 held that Fernandez 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.   
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 states, in relevant part: 
"The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or other 
proceeding in the court of appeals upon certification by the 
court of appeals or upon the supreme court's own motion." 
2 For the purposes of argument before this court, Fernandez 
joined the response combined brief of the Fund.   
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09(2) states:  
Amendments to conform to the evidence.  If issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings.  Such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and 
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any 
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to 
so amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues.  If evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by 
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice 
such party in maintaining the action or defense upon 
the merits.  The court may grant a continuance to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.   
No. 
03-0327   
 
3 
 
and the Fund had impliedly consented to the trial of § 51.61 
issues and that they were not prejudiced as a result of the 
amendment. 
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion by granting the motion to amend the 
pleadings to include Hess's new claim.  In doing so, we 
determine that there was no express or implied consent by 
Fernandez or the Fund to try the issues raised by the 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61 claim, and that the circuit court did not 
properly apply the balancing test when it allowed the amendment 
of the pleadings.       
¶3 
Additionally, we 
hold that, 
irrespective of the 
amendment, the Fund cannot be liable for costs and reasonable 
actual attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a).  The Fund 
is not a "person," and therefore is incapable of violating any 
rights of a patient under the statute.     
I 
¶4 
Joan Hess began counseling sessions with therapist 
Carolyn Decker (Decker) in August 1990.  Decker employed 
hypnosis to regress her in order to learn more about her 
childhood.  Her condition deteriorated, however, and she was 
hospitalized in May 1991.  Fernandez was her admitting physician 
at the hospital.  He had participated in her treatment since 
March 1991, and increased his role during her hospitalization.  
Fernandez authorized her continued treatment with hypnotherapy, 
and began personal sessions with her in November 1991.  At some 
point during those treatments, Joan Hess began to recover 
No. 
03-0327   
 
4 
 
memories of sexual abuse and other unusual scenarios, such as 
images of her father and other relatives participating in cult 
activities, like killing and eating babies, bestiality, and 
group sex.  Eventually, she came to believe that her father had 
molested her as a child, and subsequently filed a lawsuit 
against him for sexual abuse.   
¶5 
Joan 
Hess's 
condition 
continued 
to 
deteriorate 
throughout 1992, forcing her to be hospitalized on five separate 
occasions.  In May 1992, Fernandez diagnosed her with multiple 
personality disorder.  In addition, Fernandez agreed that she 
should undergo a hysterectomy because she suffered anxiety at 
the sight of blood.   
¶6 
In July 1994, Joan Hess ended her care with Fernandez.  
Over the next couple of years, she came to realize that her 
memories, and the diagnosis of multiple personality, were false 
and caused by Fernandez.  In March 1995, Hess filed a claim 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 655 against Decker4 and Fernandez, alleging 
negligence and failure to obtain informed consent before 
providing Joan Hess’s psychiatric treatment.  They named the 
Fund as a defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.27(5)(a)2.   
¶7 
Hess retained an attorney for the malpractice claim, 
but did not contract with him on an hourly basis.   Instead, 
they agreed to pay him on a contingent fee basis, which would 
amount to thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%) of any 
                                                 
4  Decker settled the claim filed against her and was 
dismissed from the case with prejudice.   
No. 
03-0327   
 
5 
 
"lump sum amount" recovered after the commencement of trial.  
Fernandez and Decker each obtained separate representation.  
However, nearly 18 months into the lawsuit, Fernandez’s counsel 
assumed additional representation for the Fund.   
¶8 
On September 2, 1999, a jury returned a verdict for 
Hess on the medical malpractice claims, finding that Fernandez 
had negligently treated Joan Hess and failed to obtain informed 
consent for her treatment.  The jury awarded plaintiffs 
$861,538.46 in damages, including $450,000 for Joan Hess.  The 
remainder was awarded to her husband and children for derivative 
claims. 
¶9 
After the verdict, Hess moved to amend the pleadings 
to recover costs and reasonable actual attorney fees under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a).5  Hess alleged that because Fernandez 
denied her “prompt and adequate treatment,” as guaranteed under 
§ 51.61(1)(f),6 
they 
qualified 
to 
receive 
payment 
under 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.61(7)(a) states, in relevant part:  
Any patient whose rights are protected under this 
section who suffers damage as the result of the 
unlawful denial or violation of any of these rights 
may bring an action against the person. . . . The 
individual may recover any damages as may be proved, 
together with exemplary damages of not less than $100 
for each violation and such costs and reasonable 
actual attorney fees as may be incurred.  
6  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.61(1)(f) states that each patient 
shall:  
[h]ave 
a 
right 
to 
receive 
prompt 
and 
adequate 
treatment, rehabilitation and educational services 
appropriate for his or her condition, under programs, 
services and resources that the county board of 
No. 
03-0327   
 
6 
 
§ 51.61(7)(a).  Although their original pleadings did not 
include a claim under § 51.61, the circuit court granted the 
motion,7 concluding that Fernandez had violated Joan Hess’s right 
to adequate treatment based on the jury’s finding of negligence.  
However, the amount of costs and fees was to be determined at a 
later date.   
¶10 After the circuit court granted the post-verdict 
motion, it awarded Hess $911,409.81 in reasonable actual 
attorney 
fees 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a), 
reducing 
the 
request by the time Hess's attorneys spent on derivative claims 
and other matters.  The court also awarded Hess costs in the 
amount of $295,567.43, minus statutory costs that had already 
been paid.  The court instructed the parties either to determine 
the actual amounts based on the decision or to mediate.  
Ultimately, the court entered a judgment on the § 51.61(7)(a) 
claim for Hess in the amount of $1,250,576.73, which included 
                                                                                                                                                             
supervisors is reasonably able to provide within the 
limits of available state and federal funds and of 
county funds required to be appropriated to match 
state funds.  
7 The motion for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a) never directly asked the court to 
amend 
the 
pleadings 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2).  
However, the circuit court treated the motion as one for an 
amendment in its decision to award costs and reasonable actual 
attorney fees. 
No. 
03-0327   
 
7 
 
the costs and reasonable actual attorney fees in pursuing the 
post-verdict motion to amend.8    
¶11 Fernandez and the Fund were unsuccessful in motions 
for reconsideration.  The court of appeals certified the issues 
to this court.  We accepted certification of all issues raised 
in the certification from the court of appeals, and we now 
reverse for the reasons set forth herein. 
II 
¶12 The first issue that we address is whether the circuit 
court erred in allowing Hess to amend the original pleadings to 
include a claim for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a).  Such a decision by the circuit 
court to grant leave to amend a complaint is discretionary.  
Finley v. Culligan, 201 Wis. 2d 611, 626, 548 N.W.2d 854 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  A court misused its discretion if the court failed 
to exercise its discretion, the facts do not support the court's 
decision, or the court applied the wrong legal standard.  Id.  
On review, we will not upset a discretionary decision unless 
such discretion was erroneously exercised.  Stanhope v. Brown 
County, 
90 
Wis. 2d  
823, 
834, 
280 
N.W.2d 
711 
(1979).  A circuit court has properly exercised its discretion 
when it has "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper legal 
standard, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 
                                                 
8 On October 7, 2002, Hess filed a motion for an award of 
interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  The circuit court denied 
their motion on December 12, 2002.  On July 29, 2004, Hess filed 
a cross-appeal of that ruling.   
No. 
03-0327   
 
8 
 
reasonable conclusion."  Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 
246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698 (citations omitted).   
¶13 When reviewing the legal standard in this case, we 
look first to Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2).  This subsection, along 
with § 802.09(1),9 sets forth the applicable standards for the 
circuit court to apply in deciding if an amendment conforms to 
the evidence:    
If issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings.  Such amendment of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure to so amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues.  If evidence is objected to 
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice such party in maintaining the action 
or defense upon the merits.  The court may grant a 
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such 
evidence.   
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2).  For our review, we interpret each of 
the 
parts 
of 
the 
statute 
as 
governing 
separate 
factual 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09(1) states, in relevant part:  
Amendments.  A party may amend the party's pleading 
once as a matter of course at any time within 6 months 
after the summons and complaint are filed or within 
the time set in a scheduling order under s. 802.10.  
Otherwise a party may amend the pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given at any stage of the 
action when justice so requires.   
No. 
03-0327   
 
9 
 
scenarios.  State v. Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d 616, 629, 312 
N.W.2d 784 (1981).   
 
¶14 The first part of subsection (2) addresses a scenario 
where the unpleaded issues are tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties.  Zobel v. Fenendael, 127 Wis. 2d 382, 
387, 379 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985).  We have interpreted this 
first section of the subsection to be mandatory.  Peterson, 104 
Wis. 2d at 629.  If there is a determination that the issue was 
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, the 
court must amend the pleadings to conform with the proof 
presented at trial.  Id.   To determine implied consent, the 
court must use the test of actual notice, and if it finds no 
actual notice, it should find no implied consent to try the 
unpleaded issue.  Id. at 634.  If, on the other hand, the 
circuit court finds that there was no consent to the trial of 
the unpleaded issue, it must apply a balancing test and make an 
"interests of justice" determination.  Zobel, 127 Wis. 2d at 
390.   
 
¶15 The second part of the statute addresses a scenario 
where the evidence presented at trial was objected to for 
failing to be included in the original pleadings.  Id. at 388.  
This section of the statute grants the circuit court discretion 
to allow amendments.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2).  In fact, the 
statute encourages the circuit court to amend liberally when 
presentation of the merits of the action is at stake, and if the 
objecting party fails to show that the amendment would be 
prejudicial to its continued maintenance of the case.  Id.   
No. 
03-0327   
 
10 
 
 
¶16 The second part of Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2) does not 
appear to apply here.10  Because there is nothing in the record 
which demonstrates that Fernandez and the Fund objected to any 
evidence presented under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a), it seems 
clear that this case must be resolved under the first part of 
the subsection, as well as under § 802.09(1).   
¶17 Hess makes three arguments as to why the circuit court 
correctly granted its motion for costs and reasonable actual 
attorney fees.  First, Hess argues that the complaint was 
sufficient as drafted.  Because Wisconsin is a notice pleading 
state, Hess argues that there was no requirement to set forth 
specifically each claim in the original complaint, but rather 
that a complaint requires only one cause of action.11  Second, 
Hess relies on the circuit court's decision that Fernandez and 
the Fund had given implied consent, as the elements of the 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61 claim were "fully aired" during the trial.  
Finally, Hess argues that Fernandez and the Fund failed in their 
burden of proving prejudice, as they did not sufficiently 
identify any hardship resulting from the amended § 51.61(7)(a) 
claim.  Hess also argues that Fernandez and the Fund had 
                                                 
10  Hess argues that the Fund could not have shown prejudice 
under either the first or second part of Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2), 
and that, regardless of which part is selected, the amendment 
should stand.    
11 Although we recognize that Wisconsin does not require 
heightened specificity in pleadings, we do not accept Hess's 
argument that a party never needs to plead a claim for attorney 
fees, which requires the proof of different elements, in a claim 
for medical malpractice.   
No. 
03-0327   
 
11 
 
opportunities to respond to the motion for costs and reasonable 
actual attorney fees, and that the failure to make such a 
response cannot now equate to prejudice.   
 
¶18 Fernandez and the Fund, on the other hand, urge us to 
follow the interpretation of both Peterson and Zobel, and hold 
that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard in 
allowing the amendment of the complaint.  They first argue that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
finding 
implied 
consent.  
Specifically, they argue that because they did not receive 
actual notice that evidence was being presented on the unpleaded 
issue, there could not have been implied consent.  Next, 
Fernandez and the Fund argue that the circuit court focused on 
whether they met their burden on prejudice, and neglected to 
consider, among other matters, why Hess delayed bringing a claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a) for four years.  Additionally, 
Fernandez and the Fund claim that the circuit court was wrong 
and that they were in fact prejudiced.    
 
¶19 In our analysis of Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2), we first 
address the issue of consent.  Here, the record is quite clear 
that Fernandez and the Fund did not provide Hess with any 
express consent to try the unpleaded issues contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a).  We have identified express consent to 
be that which "may be given by stipulation, or may be 
incorporated in a pre-trial order and rarely raises any serious 
fact question."  Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 630, n. 17 (citation 
omitted).  We, along with the parties, agree that no such 
consent was given here.  Therefore, if Fernandez and the Fund 
No. 
03-0327   
 
12 
 
consented to the trial of costs and reasonable actual attorney 
fees, the consent must be implied.  See Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 
630.    
 
¶20 As stated above, the determination of whether a case 
was tried by implied consent is to be made by the circuit court.  
In this case, the circuit court held that there was implied 
consent, because the elements of the Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a) 
claim, at least as to violation of the standard of care, were 
fully addressed at trial.  The court articulated that the 
elements of a § 51.61(7)(a) claim would require proof that Joan 
Hess was a "patient" receiving services for mental illness, that 
her rights under § 51.61 were unlawfully denied or violated, and 
that she suffered damages as a result of such denial or 
violation.  It concluded, therefore, that Joan Hess's right to 
adequate 
treatment 
was 
violated, 
because 
the 
jury 
found 
negligence based on Fernandez's failure to exercise reasonable 
care.   Thus, the court was satisfied that the elements, at 
least as to the violation of the standard of care, were "fully 
aired" 
during 
the 
trial, 
and 
the 
amendment 
satisfied 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2).   
 
¶21 From our review of the record, we disagree with the 
circuit court and conclude as a matter of law that there was no 
implied consent, since Fernandez and the Fund did not have 
actual notice of the unpleaded issue.  For support on this 
conclusion, we look to Peterson.  In that case, we held that 
implied consent exists where there is no objection to the 
introduction of evidence on the unpleaded issue and where the 
No. 
03-0327   
 
13 
 
party not objecting is aware that the evidence goes to the 
unpleaded issue.  Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 630.  Thus, actual 
notice to the parties is the key factor in determining if there 
was implied consent.  Id.  Because we assume that relevant 
evidence was admitted here without timely objection, we must 
review the record to determine if Fernandez and the Fund had 
actual notice that the claim by Hess for costs and reasonable 
actual attorney fees was being raised during trial.  See id.    
¶22 We cannot conclude that, because the jury found 
negligence as to the standard of care, Fernandez and the Fund 
were fully aware that Hess was also trying a claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(f), and that they could be liable for over 
$1 million in costs and reasonable actual attorney fees under 
§ 51.61(7)(a).  The circuit court erred when it failed to 
analyze the implied consent issue in terms of actual notice.  It 
found that the issue was "fully aired," at least as to the 
violation of the standard of care, simply because it concluded a 
commonality of proof between the pleaded and unpleaded claims.   
The circuit court, despite finding implied consent without 
considering actual notice, pointed out matters that clearly lead 
to a determination of no actual notice:  "[T]here was no 
specific prayer for relief under sec. 51.61(7), no discussion of 
which the court was aware of an award under that section until 
the filing of plaintiff's motion Number 1, and no request for 
instruction or inclusion of a specific verdict question as to 
sec. 51.61(7)."  We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that 
under the circumstances presented here, there was not a valid 
No. 
03-0327   
 
14 
 
determination that there was implied consent, since Fernandez 
and the Fund did not have actual notice.  "The reasoning behind 
this view is sound since if evidence is introduced to support 
basic issues that already have been pleaded, the opposing party 
may not be conscious of its relevance to issues not raised by 
the pleadings unless that fact is made clear."  6 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1493 at 32-35 (1990).       
 
¶23 Although we conclude that Fernandez and the Fund did 
not give any consent to trial of the unpleaded issue, our 
analysis of Wis. Stat. § 802.09 is not complete.  In Peterson, 
we decided to utilize a balancing approach in regard to the 
interests of the party benefiting from, and those of the party 
objecting to, the amendment, separate from the analysis of 
implied consent.12  Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 632; see also Zobel, 
127 Wis. 2d at 891.  Therefore, the circuit court has to 
determine if such an amendment is in the "interests of justice."  
Such analysis of the "interests of justice" often involves 
consideration of prejudice.  Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 635.  
However, the United States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 
                                                 
12 In Peterson, this court noted that some federal courts 
had chosen to use a different test, in place of actual notice, 
to determine if there was implied consent.  This alternative 
test, applied to amendments arising under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b), 
was invoked to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced.  
Ultimately, 
we 
held 
that 
the 
best 
approach 
for 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2) would be to treat the concepts of implied 
consent and prejudice separately.  Thus, if the court determines 
that there was no implied consent, it may sua sponte under sec. 
802.09(1)(2) amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence if 
it is in the "interests of justice."  State v. Peterson, 104 
Wis. 2d 616, 634, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981).   
No. 
03-0327   
 
15 
 
U.S. 178 (1962), held that the balancing test also can take into 
account a variety of factors including undue delay, motive, and 
prejudice.  Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.   
¶24 When determining the "interests of justice," we agree 
with the court of appeals' decision in Zobel that such a review 
presents a question of law.13  Zobel, 127 Wis. 2d at 391.  We 
therefore review the decision of the circuit court de novo, 
although benefiting from its analysis.  Meriter Hosp., Inc. v. 
Dane County, 2004 WI 145, ¶12, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 689 N.W.2d 627.  
¶25 Here, the circuit court concluded that Fernandez and 
the Fund did not meet the burden of proof as to prejudice.  The 
court denied the argument that there was prejudice because of 
the lack of notice of the remedy sought.  It reiterated that 
because the claim was "fully aired" during trial, Fernandez and 
the Fund could not prove prejudice as to the lack of notice.  On 
appeal, Hess seeks to uphold this ruling.   
¶26 Fernandez and the Fund, on the other hand, make 
multiple arguments in opposition to the circuit court's holding 
that the pleadings could be amended in the "interests of 
justice."  They argue that the circuit court erred by focusing 
almost exclusively on prejudice.  While prejudice is clearly a 
factor to be considered in applying this standard, they claim 
                                                 
13 The court in Zobel correctly acknowledges that the issue 
can, in other contexts, present a mixed question of law and 
fact.  However, in cases such as this, where our review is 
limited to the undisputed facts of the record, the only question 
remaining is decided as a matter of law.  Zobel v. Fenendael, 
127 Wis. 2d 382, 391, 379 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985).     
No. 
03-0327   
 
16 
 
that the court should also look to other factors, such as undue 
delay and improper motive, and "balance the interests of the 
party benefiting by the amendment and those of the party 
objecting to the amendment."  Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 634.  
They conclude that while no one factor is dispositive in this 
balancing test, the circuit court erred in failing to apply the 
"interests of justice" standard properly.   
¶27 In Peterson and Zobel, the courts held that the party 
objecting to the amendment could not claim prejudice if the 
circuit court offered an opportunity to offer additional 
evidence.  Id. at 639; Zobel, 127 Wis. 2d at 391 n.8.  In regard 
to the motion for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a) in this case, Fernandez and the 
Fund never had the opportunity to present their positions on 
these matters at trial and have them heard by the jury.  The 
parties apparently had an opportunity to brief the issue, take 
depositions, and retain experts, but this occurred in a post-
verdict motion hearing.  Being unable to present its position at 
trial and, thus, heard by the trier of fact may be prejudicial 
to the party objecting to the motion.   
¶28 Furthermore, we are not blind to the unfairness 
inherent in permitting an amendment at such a late hour.  See 
DRR, L.L.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 171 F.R.D. 162, 168 (Del. 
1997).  We agree with Fernandez and the Fund that in order to 
determine the "interests of justice," we must consider in the 
balance several more factors.  In Peterson, we were able to make 
our 
"interests 
of 
justice" 
determination 
without 
much 
No. 
03-0327   
 
17 
 
difficulty, because the court amended the complaint sua sponte, 
and did not give the objecting party any time to respond.14  
However, we did not hold that this was the only situation in 
which a court can find that an amendment is not within the 
"interests of justice."  Thus, when we balance the interests of 
both parties, as Peterson requires, we agree with Fernandez and 
the Fund that the circuit court should have considered such 
factors as undue delay and the motive of the moving party, as 
well as whether prejudice resulted for the Fund and Fernandez.   
 
¶29 We find support for this approach from federal cases.  
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a),15 the federal 
counterpart to Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1), federal courts have leave 
                                                 
14 Although Peterson applied to an amendment made by the 
court sua sponte, the court of appeals in Zobel, 127 Wis. 2d at 
390-91 n.7, correctly held that there is no reason why the 
rationale of Peterson could not apply to cases where a party has 
moved to amend the complaint.  See Wheeler v. Gen. Tire & Rubber 
Co., 142 Wis. 2d 798, 817, 419 N.W.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1987).  This 
is a logical extension, especially because our analysis in 
Peterson was also based on Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2), which governs 
a motion made by parties, not by the court.  Zobel, 127 Wis. 2d 
at 390 n.7.        
15 Rule 15(a) states, in relevant part:  
(a) Amendments.  A party may amend the party's 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before 
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and 
the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 
20 days after it is served.  Otherwise a party may 
amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires.  
No. 
03-0327   
 
18 
 
to amend a pleading "when justice so requires."16   Courts have 
expanded the interpretation of "interests of justice" beyond 
prejudice, however, and held that among the adequate reasons for 
denying leave to amend under such circumstances are "undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 
movant. . . ."  Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Viernow v. Euripides 
Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 799 (10th Cir. 1998) ("we 'have often 
found untimeliness alone a sufficient reason to deny leave to 
amend'") (citation omitted); DRR, L.L.C., 171 F.R.D. at 167 ("a 
movant who offers no adequate explanation for its delay will 
ordinarily be denied leave to amend"); Zahra v. Town of 
Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 686 (2d. Cir. 1995) ("It was entirely 
reasonable for the district court to deny a request to amend a 
complaint that was filed two and one-half years after the 
commencement of the action"); Perrian v. O'Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 
194 (7th Cir. 1992) ("'the longer the delay, the greater the 
presumption against 
granting 
leave 
to 
amend'") 
(citations 
omitted).  We see no reason not to extend this rationale to 
cases requiring "interests of justice" determinations under 
                                                 
16 When 
we 
formulated 
the 
"interests 
of 
justice" 
determination in Peterson, we used language from Rule 15(a), as 
well as Rule 15(b).  We held that the circuit court may "under 
sec. 802.09(1)(2) amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
if the circuit court concludes that justice so requires."  
Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 634.  This court in Peterson denied the 
amendment because we specifically determined that the objecting 
party was unfairly deprived of his opportunity to meet the issue 
and, therefore, prejudiced.  As a result, we had no need to 
consider other factors upon which a court could deny leave to 
amend in the "interests of justice."          
 
No. 
03-0327   
 
19 
 
§ 802.09(1).  Accordingly, we hold that in situations such as 
this, where the amendment was not brought until after the jury 
verdict, and four years after the original pleadings were filed, 
the delay is a significant factor in applying the balancing 
test.   
 
¶30 It is also argued that Hess had a dilatory motive in 
moving for amendment of the complaint.  Hess did not move to 
amend the claim for costs and actual attorneys fees until after 
the jurors determined their award.  Hess's motion requested 
$1,052,426.17, which is considerably more than the sum of 
$149,985, which was the amount that Hess's attorney had agreed 
to accept based on the contingent fee agreement.     
¶31 Although Hess attempts to refute any allegation of 
improper motive, the argument seems to be of questionable merit.  
Hess contends that because a post-verdict motion for attorney 
fees was allowed in Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 
Wis. 2d 203, 232, 533 N.W.2d 746 (1995), that the motion here 
should not be considered untimely and, thus, improper.  In that 
case, we allowed a post-verdict motion for attorney fees under 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18.  There were allegations that the defendant 
engaged in false and misleading advertising that resulted in 
pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs. Id. at 232.  We held that 
these allegations were exactly the type of allegations that fall 
within 
the 
purview 
of 
§ 100.18. 
 
Id. 
 
That 
case 
is 
distinguishable, however, because there was clear evidence of 
implied consent during trial from the party objecting to the 
amendment.  The reason that this court allowed the post-verdict 
No. 
03-0327   
 
20 
 
motion for attorney fees in Gorton was because the claim was 
"fully aired" at trial, the party objecting had actual notice.    
¶32 Fernandez and the Fund argue that the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a) limits fee recovery to "actual 
attorney fees . . . incurred."  Yet, as noted, Hess now claims 
fees and costs much greater than those permitted by the 
contingent fee agreement between Hess and counsel, and thus 
greater than the reasonable actual attorney fees incurred.      
¶33 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion in granting Hess's motion to amend the 
pleadings under either the theory of implied consent or the 
balancing test related to the "interests of justice."  The 
circuit court should have considered factors other than just 
prejudice and should have given much more weight, in applying 
the balancing test, to the delay in bringing the motion to 
amend, the motive of the moving party, as well as the prejudice 
to Fernandez and the Fund, resulting from the hourly fee claim, 
and the lack of opportunity to present their positions at trial.  
It appears obvious that Fernandez and the Fund had relied on the 
fact that there was a contingent fee agreement involved here.       
III 
 
¶34 In light of our holding above, there is no need to 
address the remaining issues certified by the court of appeals, 
except the question of the Fund's liability in regard to future 
claims for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a).   
 
No. 
03-0327   
 
21 
 
¶35 The legislature established the Fund when it enacted 
Wis. Stat. ch. 655 in 1975, in response to medical malpractice 
concerns.  Wis. Patients Comp. Fund v. WHCLIP, 200 Wis. 2d 599, 
606-07, 547 N.W.2d 578 (1996).  The legislature created a new 
system for processing medical malpractice claims and created the 
Fund in order to "finance a portion of the liability incurred by 
health care providers in medical malpractice actions."  Id. at 
607.   
 
¶36 In order to determine if the Fund's financing applies 
to claims brought under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 for violation of 
patients rights, we must examine Wis. Stat. § 51.61.  Again, we 
hold that the interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  Meriter, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶12-13; 
see also State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 
(1996).  Although we consider this question independent of the 
decision of the circuit court, we nevertheless benefit from its 
analysis.  Meriter, ___ Wis. 2d at ___, ¶12-13; Meyer v. Sch. 
Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999).      
¶37 Our main objective in statutory interpretation "is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
As a result, the court's analysis should begin with the plain 
language of the statutory text.  Id., ¶45.  If the language of 
the statute is clear on its face, then we should apply the 
statute using the common and generally accepted meanings of the 
terms.  
Meriter, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, 
¶13.  
Thus, with an 
No. 
03-0327   
 
22 
 
unambiguous statute, we need not consult any extrinsic sources.  
Id. (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  
¶38 In addressing Wis. Stat. § 51.61, the circuit court 
held that claims for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees 
can apply to the Fund.  For support, it looked to the court of 
appeals' decision in Wright v. Mercy Hospital, 206 Wis. 2d 449, 
557 N.W.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1996).  There, a patient brought suit 
against a nurse, hospital, and the hospital's insurer, after a 
nurse at the hospital developed a sexual relationship with the 
patient.  The nurse and the insurer settled, but the court of 
appeals determined that the patient was entitled to costs and 
reasonable actual attorney fees from the hospital under § 51.61.  
The court of appeals allowed an award under a § 51.61 claim, 
even though the hospital was a corporation.  The circuit court 
here held that the result in the Wright case gave tacit support 
to the statute's applicability to the Fund in this case.    
¶39 We disagree with the circuit court's interpretation 
and its application of Wis. Stat. § 51.61 to the Fund.  The Fund 
is clearly not a person "who violates the right in question," as 
§ 51.61 requires.  The Fund does not provide any treatment and 
could never violate any of the rights proscribed in § 51.61.  As 
a result, there is no basis to conclude that it is subject to 
costs and reasonable actual attorney fees.   
¶40 In so holding, we must clarify the court of appeals' 
decision in Wright, even though the chief holding in that case 
can be distinguished.  While the hospital implied that no 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61 claims could apply to it or its insurer 
No. 
03-0327   
 
23 
 
because they were corporations, that issue was not addressed by 
the court because the argument was not developed.  Wright, 206 
Wis. 2d at 449.  The court of appeals also did not consider, in 
Wright, the issue of Wis. Stat. ch. 655 exclusivity.  The court 
of appeals should have put much greater emphasis on the 
relationship between the contingent fee agreement and the claim 
for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees.  When applying 
the 
balancing 
test, 
such 
a 
factor 
should 
be 
carefully 
considered.      
¶41 As previously noted, the liability of the Fund does 
not extend to  Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7)(a), since the Fund is not a 
person under the plain language of that statutory section.  
Since we have determined that the Fund does not come within the 
plain language of § 51.61(7)(a), we need not determine whether 
the Fund's arguments concerning "damages" and the exclusivity of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 655 to the Fund are correct.  It is enough for 
our purposes here that we find that the Fund is not a person 
within the meaning of § 51.61(7)(a) and, therefore, not subject 
to the provisions relating to costs and reasonable actual 
attorney fees.   
¶42 Because we determine that the motion to amend was 
erroneously granted and that Fernandez and the Fund are not 
subject to an award of costs and reasonable actual attorney 
fees, we need not address the question of interest on such an 
award.         
IV 
No. 
03-0327   
 
24 
 
¶43 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by granting the motion to amend the 
pleadings to include Hess's new claim.  In doing so, we 
determine that there was no express or implied consent by 
Fernandez or the Fund to try the issues raised by the 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61 claim, and that the circuit court did not 
properly apply the balancing test when it allowed the amendment 
of the pleadings.  Additionally, we hold that, irrespective of 
the amendment, the Fund cannot be liable for costs and 
reasonable actual attorney fees under § 51.61(7)(a).  The Fund 
is not a "person," and therefore is incapable of violating any 
rights of a patient under the statute.     
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.    
 
¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
No.  03-0327.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I would 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  The plaintiffs' 
complaint requested an award of costs and fees and such further 
relief as the court may find proper.  The complaint did not set 
forth a specific prayer for relief under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(7). 
¶46 I conclude that the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion in granting the post-trial motion to amend the 
pleadings to include a claim for fees and costs.  The burden of 
proof was on the defendants to show prejudice.  They have not 
carried their burden.  
¶47 We held in State v. Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d 616, 634, 
312 N.W.2d 784 (1981), that the circuit court has "wide 
discretion regarding amendment of the pleadings to ensure that 
the entire controversy is presented and to ensure that the party 
opposing 
the 
amendment 
is 
not 
unfairly 
deprived 
of 
the 
opportunity to meet the issue created by the amendment."   
¶48 The majority opinion fails to allow the circuit court 
any discretion, let alone wide discretion, regarding the post-
trial amendment of the pleadings.  Furthermore, the majority 
opinion does not determine prejudice but rather decides the case 
in "the interests of justice," thus looking far afield for 
indicia of prejudice.  The most important factor in deciding 
when leave to amend may be denied in both pre- and post-trial 
motions to amend is whether the opposing party will be 
prejudiced.17   
                                                 
17 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1487 at 612-13 (1990).          
No.  03-0327.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶49 As the Peterson court explained, prejudice does not 
mean that the party suffers a substantive harm but rather means 
that the party "was deprived of an opportunity to defend against 
the amended charge."18  The majority opinion ignores the facts 
and the circuit court's decision that the defendant had a full 
opportunity to defend against the amended charge, which had the 
same elements and proof as the original charge.  Instead, the 
majority opinion stresses that here the defendants did not know 
they could be liable for over $1 million in costs and reasonable 
actual attorney fees.19  
¶50 The majority opinion despairs that attorney fees and 
costs were not presented to the jury.20  Yet attorney fees are 
determined only after a successful termination of the underlying 
claim.21  And here the parties had the opportunity to brief the 
issue of fees and costs, take depositions, and retain experts.22  
¶51 The circuit court carefully explored the facts and law 
applicable to the issue.  The circuit court concluded that the 
standard of care applicable to both the allegations in the 
complaint and the amended pleadings was fully aired and that the 
defendants made no offer of proof that additional evidence could 
                                                 
18 Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d at 635. 
19 Majority op., ¶22. 
20 Id., ¶27. 
21 See Gorton v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 230, 533 
N.W.2d 746 (1995). 
22 Majority op., ¶27. 
No.  03-0327.ssa 
 
3 
 
have been presented had they been aware of the amended 
pleadings.   Accordingly, the defendants were not prejudiced. 
¶52 Try as the majority might,23 the majority opinion 
cannot distinguish Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co. from the 
present case.  Gorton was a negligent misrepresentation case 
tried before a jury.  The court permitted the pleadings to be 
amended post-verdict to add a statutory misrepresentation claim 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18 that permitted recovery of 
attorneys' fees.  The Gorton court allowed the amendment because 
the allegations underlying both claims were fully aired at 
trial, the defendant was not prejudiced, and no other evidence 
could have been presented during trial to rebut the amended 
claim that was already at issue based on the complaint.24  The 
Gorton court allowed attorneys fees and costs to be determined 
post-verdict. I view Gorton as on all fours with the present 
case. 
¶53 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the circuit 
court judgment should be affirmed.  The circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.   
¶54 I do not join the majority opinion regarding the 
Fund's liability for costs and reasonable actual attorney fees 
because the majority has delivered an unnecessary advisory 
opinion. 
                                                 
23 Majority op., ¶31. 
24 Gorton, 194 Wis. 2d at 232-33. 
No.  03-0327.ssa 
 
4 
 
 
No.  03-0327.ssa 
 
 
 
1