Title: Cathy R. Yahnke v. Larry V. Carson, M.D.
Citation: 2000 WI 74
Docket Number: 1999AP000056
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2000

2000 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0056 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Cathy R. Yahnke, Bruce E. Yahnke, Melissa 
Yahnke, and Bruce Yahnke, Jr.,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
The Connecticut Indemnity Company,  
 
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Larry V. Carson, M.D., Jovan L. Djokovic, M.D., 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., 
and Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Mercy Hospital of Janesville, Wisconsin 
Development Foundation, Inc., Ohic Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 747, 603 N.W.2d 34 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 25, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard T. Werner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Barrett J. Corneille, David J. Pliner and 
Corneille Law Group, L.L.C., Madison, and oral argument by David 
 
2 
J. Pliner. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief 
by Thomas E. Greenwald and Oliver, Close, Worden, Winkler & 
Greenwald, Rockford, IL, and oral argument by Thomas E. 
Greenwald. 
 
 
2000 WI 74 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0056 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Cathy R. Yahnke, Bruce E. Yahnke, Melissa  
Yahnke, and Bruce Yahnke, Jr.,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
The Connecticut Indemnity Company,  
 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Larry V. Carson, M.D., Jovan L. Djokovic,  
M.D., Physicians Insurance Company of  
Wisconsin, Inc., and Patients  
Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Mercy Hospital of Janesville, Wisconsin  
Development Foundation, Inc., Ohic  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This case raises the question of 
whether Wisconsin should adopt the federal "sham affidavit" rule 
as part of its summary judgment procedure.  The issue arises 
because the plaintiffs in this medical malpractice action 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
2 
responded 
to 
the 
defendants' 
summary 
judgment 
motion 
by 
submitting an expert witness affidavit that contradicted the 
expert's deposition testimony.  The circuit court applied the 
federal 
rule, 
which 
generally 
prohibits 
affidavits 
that 
contradict prior deposition testimony from creating issues of 
fact for trial, and granted summary judgment dismissing the 
action. 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed, deferring to this court 
on whether to adopt the federal "sham affidavit" rule and 
concluding that the affidavit here was sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact under current summary judgment 
procedure.  We accepted review and now adopt the federal "sham 
affidavit" rule as an effective tool for circuit courts to use 
in evaluating the existence of genuine factual issues on motions 
for summary judgment.  Therefore, we reverse. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are as follows.  In July 1993, 
Cathy Yahnke underwent carpal tunnel surgery performed by Dr. 
Larry V. Carson.  Shortly after the surgery, Yahnke developed a 
disfiguring condition in her right hand and arm known as 
"Volkman's Contracture," a forced contracture of the forearm, 
wrist and hand inflection of the fingers.  Yahnke and her family 
sued Carson, Dr. Jovan Djokovic, the anesthesiologist, and Mercy 
Hospital for malpractice.  
¶4 
During discovery, 
the Yahnkes named 
two medical 
experts, Dr. Safwan Jaradeh, a neurologist, and Dr. Hani 
Matloub, a surgeon, both of whom had treated Yahnke after the 
surgery.  After some delay, both were made available for 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
3 
deposition.  In their depositions, neither expert was able to 
state that any of the defendants had breached the standard of 
care owed to Yahnke.  Jaradeh, in fact, admitted that he was not 
qualified to render an opinion on Carson's work (the circuit 
court noted that Jaradeh is a neurologist, not a surgeon).  
Matloub, the surgical expert, was asked numerous questions about 
the cause of Yahnke's condition and was unable to link it to the 
surgery performed by Carson.  At the end of his deposition, 
Matloub 
was 
asked 
a 
summarization 
question: 
"Given 
your 
testimony, is it accurate to say that you do not have any 
criticism of the standard of care utilized by Dr. Carson in his 
care and treatment of the patient?"  Matloub replied, "That's 
correct."   
¶5 
Carson, Djokovic and Mercy Hospital each moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that the Yahnkes' expert witnesses 
failed to establish negligence in connection with Yahnke's 
surgery.  The Yahnkes responded to the motion by first asking 
leave of the court to name new experts.  The circuit court 
denied the motion.   
¶6 
The 
Yahnkes 
then 
changed 
counsel 
and 
produced 
affidavits from Jaradeh and Matloub that stated that Yahnke's 
contracture resulted from nerve injury she sustained during the 
surgery; that the most likely cause of this injury was 
inadequate blood flow to her arm; and that the lack of blood 
flow was caused by excessive pressure on her upper arm most 
likely caused by a tourniquet or perhaps a tightly inflated 
blood pressure cuff.  Matloub's affidavit stated that Volkman's 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
4 
Contracture would not normally occur if the surgeon performed 
his work within the ordinary standard of care.   
¶7 
The affidavits obviously contradicted the earlier 
deposition testimony.  Matloub's affidavit attempted to explain 
the contradiction: 
 
The testimony I gave at my deposition held on May 
15, 1998 . . . was based upon my considering only the 
quoted testimony of Dr. Jaradeh or quoted portions of 
certain identified EMG reports and not any other 
records or my examinations of Cathy Yahnke, my 
treatment of Cathy Yahnke, my discussions with Dr. 
Brad Grunert and Dr. Jaradeh or other information 
which I have acquired regarding Cathy Yahnke.  The 
opinions that I have expressed in the preceding 
portions of this affidavit are based upon much more 
information than the limited information which I was 
asked to consider and which I was asked to assume was 
correct by the attorneys asking me those questions. 
¶8 
The Circuit Court for Rock County, the Honorable 
Richard T. Werner, granted summary judgment in favor of Djokovic 
(the 
anesthesiologist) 
and 
Mercy 
Hospital, 
because 
the 
plaintiffs' experts were not qualified to express opinions about 
the standard of care for anesthesiologists and had not even 
mentioned any problems with the care provided by the hospital's 
employees.  The circuit court also granted Carson's motion, 
noting that: 1) Jaradeh had no opinion about the surgeon's 
standard of care and was unqualified to testify about it in any 
event, and 2) Matloub's affidavit directly contradicted his 
deposition testimony.  As to the contradictory affidavit, the 
court found the explanation for the contradiction to be 
"unconvincing and, more importantly, not supported by the 
record."  The court explained: 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
5 
 
This affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony.  
He explains this by stating that his opinions at 
deposition were strictly limited to a review of the 
Mercy Hospital surgery records.  This is simply not 
true.  A review of Dr. Matloub's deposition reveals 
that he reviewed the Mercy Hospital operative records, 
subsequent EMG results, and Mayo Clinic analysis of 
Mrs. Yahnke's muscle tissue.  He had reviewed Mrs. 
Yahnke's 
medical chart 
and records at 
Froedtert 
Memorial Lutheran Hospital.  He consulted with Dr. 
Grunert and co-authored a letter concerning Mrs. 
Yahnke in March, 1998.  He also spoke with Dr. Jaradeh 
about Mrs. Yahnke.  In short, before expressing his 
opinion at his deposition, Dr. Matloub had reviewed a 
considerable amount of medical information concerning 
Mrs. Yahnke and her condition. 
Referring to federal case law on the effect of affidavits that 
conflict with deposition testimony, the court concluded that 
Matloub's affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine factual 
issue for trial, and entered summary judgment dismissing the 
case in its entirety.   
¶9 
The Yahnkes appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed in part, concluding that the Matloub affidavit created 
a genuine factual issue about whether Carson had breached the 
standard of care required of a surgeon.1  The court noted the 
federal rule prohibiting parties from creating a factual dispute 
on summary judgment by submitting an affidavit that conflicts 
with earlier deposition testimony, but deferred to this court to 
adopt or reject the rule for Wisconsin.  We accepted review. 
                     
1 The court of appeals' unpublished decision affirmed the 
circuit court's order of summary judgment in favor of Djokovic 
and Mercy Hospital, as well as its rejection of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine, and those issues are not before us for 
review. 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
6 
¶10 We review an order for summary judgment de novo, using 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  Nierengarten v. 
Lutheran Soc. Servs., 219 Wis. 2d 686, 694, 580 N.W.2d 320 
(1998).  Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)(1995-96).2  The well-established purpose of summary 
judgment procedure is to determine the existence of genuine 
factual disputes in order to "avoid trials where there is 
nothing to try."  Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 752 (1981); Caulfield 
v. Caulfield, 183 Wis. 2d 83, 91, 515 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 
1994).  Although our review is de novo, we benefit from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Nierengarten, 219 Wis. 2d at 694. 
¶11 Under Wisconsin law as it now stands, an affidavit 
submitted in response to a summary judgment motion can suffice 
to create an issue of fact for trial and defeat summary judgment 
even if it flatly contradicts the witness's earlier deposition 
testimony.  An affidavit that conflicts with prior testimony is 
generally thought to create a credibility question, and a 
circuit court does not decide issues of credibility on summary 
                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version. 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
7 
judgment.  Pomplun v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 203 Wis. 2d 303, 
306-07, 552 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1996)(citing Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980)).  However, the 
ability to create trial issues by submitting affidavits in 
direct 
contradiction 
of 
deposition 
testimony 
reduces 
the 
effectiveness of summary judgment as a tool for separating the 
genuine factual disputes from the ones that are not, and 
undermines summary judgment's purpose of avoiding unnecessary 
trials.  The federal courts have responded to this phenomenon by 
developing the so-called "sham affidavit" rule, but to date, 
Wisconsin has not followed suit.   
¶12 The court of appeals has split on this issue.  In 
Wolski v. Wilson, 174 Wis. 2d 533, 539-41, 497 N.W.2d 794 (Ct. 
App. 1993), the court of appeals held that an affidavit 
submitted by the plaintiff in contradiction of his earlier 
deposition testimony was sufficient to create a material issue 
of fact, precluding summary judgment.  The court specifically 
concluded that any changes in summary judgment procedure must 
come either from the legislature or this court.  Id. at 541. 
¶13 However, in Helland v. Froedert Memorial Lutheran 
Hospital., 229 Wis. 2d 751, 601 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
court 
of 
appeals 
essentially 
applied 
the 
federal 
"sham 
affidavit" rule without expressly adopting it.  In Helland, a 
wrongful 
discharge 
case, 
the 
plaintiff 
testified 
in 
her 
deposition that she had received a particular employee manual 
from her employer which established that her employment was at-
will and not contractual.  Id. at 760.  The employer then moved 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
8 
for summary judgment on the basis of the manual, the plaintiff's 
deposition 
testimony, 
and 
the 
law 
applicable 
to 
at-will 
employees.  Id.  The plaintiff responded to the motion by 
submitting an affidavit claiming that she had not, in fact, 
received the manual.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the contradictory affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact.  Id. 
¶14 We were presented with the opportunity to address this 
question in Morris v. Juneau County, 219 Wis. 2d 543, 579 N.W.2d 
690 (1998), but declined to do so.  In Morris, as in Wolski and 
Helland, the plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to 
summary 
judgment 
that 
contradicted 
her 
prior 
deposition 
testimony.  Although we acknowledged that this court is the 
proper forum for the adoption of a "sham affidavit" rule, we 
decided Morris on other grounds and declined to reach the issue. 
 Id. at 563. 
¶15 Most federal appellate circuits have adopted the "sham 
affidavit" rule precluding the creation of genuine issues of 
fact on summary judgment by the submission of an affidavit that 
directly 
contradicts 
earlier 
deposition 
testimony. 
 
See 
Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 
572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969); Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 851 
F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1988); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 
946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984); S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 
72 F.3d 489, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1996); Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986); Babrocky v. Jewel Food 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
9 
Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1985); Camfield Tires, Inc. 
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 
1975); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 1986); 
Van T. Junkins & Assoc., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 
656, 657-59 (11th Cir. 1984); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  The rule is based in 
part on the proposition that testimony given in depositions, in 
which witnesses speak for themselves, subject to the give and 
take of examination and the opportunity for cross-examination, 
is more trustworthy than testimony by affidavit, which is almost 
always prepared by attorneys.  Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 
F.3d 64, 67 (7th Cir. 1995). 
¶16 The rule is also rooted in the very mission of the 
summary judgment procedure: 
 
When confronted with the question of whether a party 
should be allowed to create his own issue of fact by 
an 
affidavit 
contradicting 
his 
prior 
deposition 
testimony, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that no genuine issue of fact was raised.  Perma 
Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F. 2d 
572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969).  Therein the Court noted: 
 
"[i]f a party who has been examined at length on 
deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by 
submitting an affidavit contradicting his own 
prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the 
utility of summary judgment as a procedure for 
screening out sham issues of fact."  410 F. 2d at 
578. 
 
 
The very object of summary judgment is to 
separate real and genuine issues from those that are 
formal or pretended, so that only the former may 
subject the moving party to the burden of trial. 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
10
Radobenko, 520 F. 2d at 544.  Thus, although it is called the 
"sham" affidavit rule, an affidavit that is disregarded because 
it contradicts prior deposition testimony is not necessarily 
"sham" in the sense that it is fraudulent or offered for 
improper 
purposes. 
 
Rather, 
the 
rule 
recognizes 
that 
contradictory affidavits tend to create sham, rather than 
genuine, issues. 
¶17 The federal rule has also been extended to non-party 
affidavits.  In a case remarkably similar to this one, involving 
an expert witness affidavit that contradicted the expert's 
deposition testimony, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit stated: 
 
We can think of no reason . . . not to apply this rule 
to the present case involving the testimony and 
affidavit of the plaintiff's sole expert witness.  The 
purpose of summary judgment motions"to weed out 
unfounded 
claims, 
specious 
denials, 
and 
sham 
defenses,"is served by a rule that prevents a party 
from creating issues of credibility by allowing one of 
its witnesses to contradict his own prior testimony. 
Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th 
Cir. 1988)(citations omitted);  see also Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 
1543, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1995). 
¶18 The federal rule, however, is not absolute, and is 
subject to certain important exceptions.  If the witness can 
establish a reasonable explanation for the contradiction between 
his or her affidavit and his or her depositionthat the 
affidavit clarifies ambiguous or confusing deposition testimony, 
for example, or that the witness's later statements are based on 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
11
newly discovered evidencethen the conflicting affidavit may be 
considered in the summary judgment equation.  Adelman-Tremblay, 
859 F.2d at 520-21; Rios, 67 F. 3d at 1551.  The Tenth Circuit 
describes the "sham affidavit" rule and its exceptions in this 
way: 
 
To determine whether a contrary affidavit seeks to 
create a sham fact issue, we determine whether: (1) 
"the affiant was cross-examined during his earlier 
testimony;" (2) "the affiant had access to the 
pertinent 
evidence 
at 
the 
time 
of 
his 
earlier 
testimony or whether the affidavit was based on newly 
discovered evidence;" and (3) "the earlier testimony 
reflects confusion which the affidavit attempts to 
explain." 
Id. (quoting Franks, 796 F.2d at 1237).  
¶19 The federal and state rules of civil procedure 
governing motions for summary judgment are virtually identical. 
 See Judicial Council Committee Note,  1974, Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 802.08 
(West 
1994); 
Fed. 
R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); 
see 
also 
Transportation Ins. Co. v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 
281, 291, 507 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1993); Fortier v. Flambeau 
Plastics Co., 164 Wis. 2d 639, 664, 476 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 
1991).  The function of summary judgment procedure in federal 
and state courts is the same.  "[W]here a Wisconsin rule of 
Civil Procedure is based on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 
decisions of the federal courts, to the extent they show a 
pattern of construction, are considered persuasive authority."  
Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 99, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985). 
¶20 Wisconsin courts have previously brought this state's 
summary judgment methodology into alignment with federal law in 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
12
certain important respects.  In Transportation Insurance and 
Fortier, the court of appeals adopted the United States Supreme 
Court's Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574 (1986), analyses regarding burden of proof in summary 
judgment motions.  Transportation Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d at 292; 
Fortier, 164 Wis. 2d at 664-66.   This is a similar situation.  
We conclude that the federal "sham affidavit" rule furthers the 
purposes of summary judgment procedure in this state by helping 
circuit courts determine the existence of genuine factual 
disputes, thereby avoiding unnecessary trials and conserving the 
resources of the courts and litigants alike.  Accordingly, we 
adopt the rule for Wisconsin. 
¶21 More specifically, we hold that for purposes of 
evaluating motions for summary judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08, 
an 
affidavit 
that 
directly 
contradicts 
prior 
deposition testimony is generally insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of fact for trial, unless the contradiction is 
adequately explained.  To determine whether the witness's 
explanation for the contradictory affidavit is adequate, the 
circuit court should examine:  (1) Whether the deposition 
afforded the opportunity for direct and cross-examination of the 
witness; (2) whether the witness had access to pertinent 
evidence or information prior to or at the time of his or her 
deposition, or whether the affidavit was based upon newly 
discovered evidence not known or available at the time of the 
deposition; and (3) whether the earlier deposition testimony 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
13
reflects confusion, lack of recollection or other legitimate 
lack of clarity that the affidavit justifiably attempts to 
explain. 
¶22 Applying the rule here, we conclude that summary 
judgment was appropriate in this case.  The record reflects that 
Matloub's deposition afforded the opportunity for both direct 
and cross-examination.  Furthermore, the circuit court found, 
and Matloub's deposition testimony confirms, that Matloub had 
access to and indeed reviewed substantial medical information 
prior to his deposition, and conducted a wide-ranging evaluation 
of Yahnke's condition in order to determine its cause.  He was, 
after all, one of her treating physicians and not merely an 
expert hired for purposes of litigation.  His explanation for 
the contradictions between his deposition testimony and his 
affidavitthat his deposition testimony was based upon "limited 
information"is itself a contradiction, inasmuch as he testified 
in deposition to having reviewed a great deal of medical 
information in an attempt to diagnose and treat Yahnke's 
condition.  His affidavit identifies no newly discovered 
evidence that would explain the change in testimony.  Finally, 
Matloub's deposition testimony does not reveal any confusion 
that would require clarification or explanation in a subsequent 
affidavit.  He was quite unequivocal in his inability to link 
her condition to the surgery. 
¶23 Accordingly, we adopt the federal "sham affidavit" 
rule 
for 
use 
in 
Wisconsin's 
summary 
judgment 
procedure.  
Further, we apply it here to conclude that, because the 
No. 
99-0056 
 
 
14
plaintiffs' expert witness affidavit directly contradicted the 
expert's deposition testimony without adequate explanation, the 
circuit court properly granted Carson's motion for summary 
judgment dismissing the case.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-0056.wab 
 
1 
¶24 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (dissenting).  I conclude that 
the 
adoption 
of 
the 
so-called 
"sham 
affidavit" 
rule 
is 
unwarranted.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶25 We have stated on several past occasions that no other 
statutory provision has been litigated as frequently as Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08, the summary judgment statute.  Kraemer Bros. v. 
United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 565, 278 N.W.2d 857 
(1979) (citing Leszczynski v. Surges, 30 Wis. 2d 534, 537, 141 
N.W.2d 261 (1966)).  Although frequent experience with summary 
judgment has turned it into a familiar motion, we must remember 
that it is a drastic remedy.  Nelson v. Albrechtson, 93 Wis. 2d 
552, 555, 287 N.W.2d 811 (1980).  "There is no absolute right to 
summary judgment."  Zimmer v. Daun, 40 Wis. 2d 627, 630, 162 
N.W.2d 626 (1968).  It is simply a procedural devise to provide 
prompt relief when the pending action presents no triable issue. 
¶26 The methodology employed by the court on motion for 
summary judgment is well established.  Adding the sham affidavit 
rule to this procedure is unwise and unnecessary.   
¶27 The rule is unwise because it puts the court into the 
position of weighing the evidence and choosing between competing 
reasonable inferences, a task heretofore prohibited on summary 
judgment.  Pomplun v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 203 Wis. 2d 303, 
306-07, 552 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1996); Fischer v. Doylestown 
Fire Dep't, 199 Wis. 2d Wis. 2d 83, 87-88, 543 N.W.2d 575 
(1995).  As a result, the "sham affidavit" rule, in my opinion, 
improperly usurps the role of the jury.   
No. 99-0056.wab 
 
2 
¶28 This distortion of the division of labor between judge 
and jury by adopting the "sham affidavit" rule is unnecessary.  
Summary judgment is a procedural tool available to a litigant 
seeking to flush out the fatal defect in an opponent's case.  It 
is not the only tool in the procedural box and should not be 
viewed in isolation from other statutes and rules.  For example, 
if a court decides, at any time, that affidavits presented for 
or against a motion for summary judgment were made in bad faith, 
the judge may order the party who submitted the affidavits to 
pay to the other party the costs, including attorney fees, which 
the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur.  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(5).  
¶29 In addition, if the summary judgment motion is denied, 
a witness may be impeached at trial with prior inconsistent 
statements.  Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a)1.  A defendant may move 
for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of the 
plaintiff's evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 805.14(3).  An attorney who 
files papers with the court for any improper purpose may face 
sanctions under Wis. Stat. § 802.05.  And, as the bar is well 
aware, there is significant bite to a determination that a suit 
has been continued frivolously.  See Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, 
Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 531, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999), reconsideration 
denied, 230 Wis. 2d 246, 601 N.W.2d 650 (1999).   
¶30 I conclude that the "sham affidavit" rule adds nothing 
to our summary judgment process.  Even its unfortunate name, 
"sham affidavit," reflects negatively upon the work of the bench 
No. 99-0056.wab 
 
3 
and bar.  As a result, I cannot join the majority's decision to 
adopt this rule. 
¶31 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join in this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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