Title: Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S274191
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
CORBY KUCIEMBA et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S274191 
 
Ninth Circuit 
21-15963 
 
Northern District of California 
3:20-cv-09355-MMC 
 
 
July 6, 2023 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
S274191 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
Here we answer two questions of California law certified 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
concerning the scope of an employer’s liability when an 
employee’s spouse is injured by transmission of the virus1 that 
causes the disease known as COVID-19.  The questions are:  
(1) If an employee contracts COVID-19 at the workplace and 
brings the virus home to a spouse, does the California Workers’ 
Compensation Act (WCA; Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.) bar the 
spouse’s negligence claim against the employer?  (2) Does an 
employer owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members?2 
 
The answer to the first question is no.  Exclusivity 
provisions of the WCA do not bar a nonemployee’s recovery for 
injuries that are not legally dependent upon an injury suffered 
by the employee.  The answer to the second question, however, 
is also no.  Although it is foreseeable that an employer’s 
 
1  
The virus in question is formally designated as SARS-
CoV-2. 
2  
When the district court rendered its decision in the 
underlying case, the first question was one of first impression.  
Subsequently, the Second District Court of Appeal squarely 
addressed the question in See’s Candies, Inc. v. Superior Court 
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 66, review denied Apr, 13, 2022, S272923 
(See’s Candies).  The Court of Appeal did not have occasion to 
answer the second question.   
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
negligence in permitting workplace spread of COVID-19 will 
cause members of employees’ households to contract the disease, 
recognizing a duty of care to nonemployees in this context would 
impose an intolerable burden on employers and society in 
contravention of public policy.  These and other policy 
considerations lead us to conclude that employers do not owe a 
tort-based duty to nonemployees to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Because this matter is presently on appeal from a 
dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6) 
(28 U.S.C.), we recite the facts as alleged in the operative 
complaint.  (See Papasan v. Allain (1986) 478 U.S. 265, 286.)  
The question at this stage of the litigation is the legal sufficiency 
of the pleadings.  We treat the factual allegations as true for 
purposes of addressing the certified questions.  (See Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 555–556.)  
 
COVID-19 is a highly contagious and potentially fatal 
respiratory illness spread through airborne droplets, like those 
produced from coughs or sneezes.  The complaint alleges the 
disease can also be spread by contact with virus particles left on 
the surface of objects.  The disease was recognized in early 2020 
and spread rapidly across the globe.  In March 2020, the World 
Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and Bay 
Area counties issued shelter-in-place orders prohibiting 
nonessential travel.  Eventually, these orders were relaxed and 
replaced with orders tailored to specific industries.  As relevant 
here, the City and County of San Francisco’s health officer 
issued an order on April 29, 2020 prescribing health and safety 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
guidelines to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at construction 
jobsites.  
 
On May 6, 2020, Robert Kuciemba began working for 
defendant Victory Woodworks, Inc. (Victory) at a construction 
site in San Francisco.  About two months later, without taking 
precautions required by the county’s health order, Victory 
transferred a group of workers to the San Francisco site from 
another location where they may have been exposed to the virus.  
After being required to work in close contact with these new 
workers, Robert became infected.3  He carried the virus home 
and transmitted it to his wife, Corby, either directly or through 
her contact with his clothing and personal effects.  Corby was 
hospitalized for several weeks and, at one point, was kept alive 
on a respirator.4   
 
On October 23, 2020, the Kuciembas sued Victory in 
superior court.  Corby asserted claims for negligence, negligence 
per se, premises liability, and public nuisance.  Robert asserted 
a claim for loss of consortium.  Victory removed the case to 
federal court and moved to dismiss.  The district court granted 
the motion with leave to amend.  Plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint reasserting the same causes of action except the 
public nuisance claim.  The district court granted a renewed 
motion to dismiss, this time without leave to amend, concluding:  
(1) claims that Corby contracted COVID-19 through direct 
 
3  
Because they share a last name, we refer to plaintiffs by 
their first names to avoid confusion. 
4  
According to the original complaint, Robert was also 
hospitalized for his COVID-19 infection.  Robert filed a workers’ 
compensation claim for this injury, however, and does not allege 
a direct negligence claim.  
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
contact with Robert were barred by the WCA’s exclusive remedy 
provisions; (2) claims that Corby contracted COVID-19 through 
indirect contact with infected surfaces were subject to dismissal 
for failure to plead a plausible claim; and (3) to the extent the 
claims were not barred by statute or insufficiently pleaded, they 
failed because Victory’s duty to provide a safe workplace did not 
extend to nonemployees, like Corby, who contract a virus away 
from the jobsite.  
 
Plaintiffs appealed, and on June 22, 2022, we agreed to 
answer the certified questions.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity 
 
The California’s workers’ compensation system is a 
comprehensive statutory scheme through which employees may 
receive prompt compensation for costs related to injuries 
incurred in the course and scope of their employment.  (Lab. 
Code, § 3200 et seq.; see Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State 
Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810 (Vacanti).)  The 
system is premised on a theoretical exchange we have called the 
“ ‘compensation bargain.’ ”  (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 
Cal.3d 1, 16.)  Under this bargain, “the employer assumes 
liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard 
to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that 
liability.  The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain 
payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial 
injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up 
the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.”  (Ibid.) 
 
To effectuate this exchange, the WCA limits an employee’s 
remedies for covered injuries.  When the statutory conditions for 
recovery are met, an employer’s liability to pay compensation 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
under the WCA is “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to 
any person.”  (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a).)  Similarly, with 
limited exceptions not relevant here, “the right to recover 
compensation is . . . the sole and exclusive remedy of the 
employee or his or her dependents against the employer.”  (Lab. 
Code, § 3602, subd. (a).)  A basic prerequisite to the payment of 
compensation, and triggering of these exclusivity provisions, “is 
that the compensation sought is for an injury to an employee.  
In some circumstances, however, the bar on civil actions based 
on injuries to employees extends beyond actions brought by the 
employees themselves.”  (Snyder v. Michael’s Stores, Inc. (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 991, 996 (Snyder).)  As noted, the relevant statutes 
provide that an employer’s compensation obligation is “in lieu of 
any other liability whatsoever to any person” (Lab. Code, § 3600, 
subd. (a), italics added), and such compensation is “the sole and 
exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents 
against the employer” (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a), italics 
added).  “This statutory language conveys the legislative intent 
that ‘the work-connected injury engender[] a single remedy 
against 
the 
employer, 
exclusively 
cognizable 
by 
the 
compensation agency.’ ”  (Snyder, at p. 997.) 
 
Because the workers’ compensation system has its 
theoretical basis in the compensation bargain between employer 
and employee, a nuanced analysis is required when third parties 
seek to sue the employer after an employee’s work-related 
injury.  In general, workers’ compensation benefits provide the 
exclusive remedy for third party claims if the asserted claims 
are “collateral to or derivative of” the employee’s workplace 
injury.  (Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 997; see King v. 
CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1051 (King); Vacanti, 
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 811.)  This aspect of workers’ 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
compensation law is sometimes called the derivative injury 
doctrine.  (See, e.g., Snyder, at p. 1000.)  Examples of third party 
claims deemed “collateral” or “derivative” include heirs’ claims 
for an employee’s wrongful death (Horwich v. Superior Court 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 286), a spouse’s claim for loss of 
consortium (LeFiell Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 275, 284–285 (LeFiell)), and a spouse’s claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by witnessing 
an employee’s injuries (Williams v. Schwartz (1976) 61 
Cal.App.3d 628, 634).  In general, a family member’s claim for 
an injury derived from an employee’s workplace injury is barred 
by workers’ compensation exclusivity.  However, a family 
member’s claim for her own independent injury, not legally 
dependent on the employee’s injury, is not barred, even if both 
injuries were caused by the same negligent conduct of the 
employer.  (Snyder, at p. 998.) 
 
Determining 
the 
scope 
of 
workers’ 
compensation 
exclusivity can be analytically challenging.  (See Vacanti, supra, 
24 Cal.4th at p. 811.)  After all, a spouse’s complaint for loss of 
consortium or negligent infliction of emotional distress seeks 
damages for injuries that the nonemployee plaintiff personally 
suffers.  Yet, the spouse’s claims would not arise but for the fact 
that the employee was injured.  It is the fact of the employee’s 
workplace injury that results in the spouse’s loss of consortium 
or emotional distress.  If the employee had not been injured, the 
spouse’s injury would not have occurred.  However, we have held 
that something more than factual, or “but for,” causation is 
necessary to give rise to the exclusivity bar imposed by the 
derivative injury doctrine.  A plaintiff’s claim is barred as 
derivative only if the plaintiff is required to prove injury to the 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
employee as at least part of a legal element of the plaintiff’s own 
cause of action.   
 
For example, a common law loss of consortium claim 
requires proof of “four elements:  ‘(1) a valid and lawful marriage 
between the plaintiff and the person injured at the time of the 
injury; [¶] (2) a tortious injury to the plaintiff’s spouse; [¶] 
(3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff; and [¶] (4) the 
loss was proximately caused by the defendant’s act.’ ”  (LeFiell, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 284–285.)  Because the plaintiff is 
required to prove that her spouse suffered tortious injury, the 
claim is “ ‘by its nature, dependent on the existence of a cause of 
action for tortious injury to a spouse.’ ”  (Id. at p. 285.)  A wife 
may suffer her own loss of consortium injury, but that claim 
legally derives from the tortious injury to her husband.  
Similarly, a bystander’s recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is permitted only if the “plaintiff:  (1) is 
closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of 
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then 
aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result 
suffers serious emotional distress.”  (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 644, 667–668, fns. omitted.)  As with loss of 
consortium, to be legally sufficient the emotional distress claim 
requires the occurrence of a separate injury to the plaintiff’s 
close relation. 
 
We explored this requirement of legal dependence in 
Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th 991.  There, the plaintiff alleged she 
was injured in utero when her mother inhaled toxic fumes in the 
workplace.  (Id. at p. 994.)  The mother was hospitalized with 
symptoms from the exposure, and the plaintiff suffered 
permanent neurological damage.  The trial court had sustained 
a demurrer to the child’s negligence action based on Bell v. 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
Macy’s California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1442 (Bell), which held 
that fetal injuries are derivative of injuries to the pregnant 
mother as a matter of law.  (Snyder, at p. 994.)  Snyder rejected 
this approach and concluded the child’s claim was not barred as 
derivative because the plaintiff’s action sought compensation for 
her own injuries, not her mother’s.  (Id. at p. 995.)  The mother’s 
inhalation of fumes was a “but for” fact in the causal chain of 
injury, but it was not legally required to be proven as an element 
of the daughter’s own cause of action.   
 
Snyder’s analysis began with a close examination of the 
Bell case, which it then disapproved.  The pregnant employee in 
Bell had complained of severe abdominal pain, which turned out 
to be caused by a ruptured uterus.  An on-site nurse employed 
by Macy’s misdiagnosed the condition and delayed calling for an 
ambulance.  The complaint alleged that the delay caused fetal 
brain damage.  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1446–1447.)  
The trial court granted summary judgment to Macy’s on the 
ground that the child’s claims were barred by the derivative 
injury doctrine.  The Bell court affirmed, concluding workers’ 
compensation exclusivity barred the child’s tort claims against 
the employer because a fetus in utero is inseparable from its 
mother.  Therefore, the prenatal injuries were “a collateral 
consequence” and a “direct result” of the employer’s negligence 
toward the mother.  (Id. at p. 1453.)  Bell reasoned that injury 
to a fetus “can only occur as the result of some condition 
affecting its mother,” and if that condition arises in the course 
of employment the derivative injury doctrine applies.  (Id. at 
p. 1453, fn. 6.) 
 
Snyder rejected Bell’s focus on the relationship of fetal 
injuries to a maternal “condition” as overbroad:  “Neither the 
statutes nor the decisions enunciating the [derivative injury] 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
rule suggest workers’ compensation exclusivity extends to all 
third party claims deriving from some ‘condition affecting’ the 
employee.  Nor is a nonemployee’s injury collateral to or 
derivative of an employee injury merely because they both 
resulted from the same negligent conduct by the employer.  The 
employer’s civil immunity is not for all liability resulting from 
negligence toward employees, but only for all liability, to any 
person, deriving from an employee’s work-related injuries.  
([Lab. Code,] § 3600.)”  (Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 998.)  In 
Bell, the suit rested on the direct injury to the child caused by 
the employer’s delay in summoning aid.  It neither alleged, nor 
was required to allege as an element of proof, any workplace 
injury to the mother herself.   
 
Our opinion in Snyder then mentioned two aspects of the 
analysis for determining whether a third party’s injury is 
derivative.  First, we quoted Bell’s dissenting justice, who opined 
that the derivative injury rule applies when the third party 
claim is “ ‘derivative . . . in the purest sense’ ” in that “ ‘[i]t 
simply would not have existed in the absence of injury to the 
employee.’  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 1456 (conc. and 
dis. opn. of White, P. J.).)”  (Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 998.)  
Second, we related an advocate’s view that the derivative injury 
rule “applies when the plaintiff, in order to state a cause of 
action, must allege injury to another person — the employee.”  
(Ibid.)  From this discussion, Victory and its supporting amici 
curiae derive a rule for derivative injuries that is based on 
factual causation.  They assert that if a third party’s injury 
would not have occurred but for an injury to the employee, it is 
derivative of the employee’s injury for workers’ compensation 
purposes.  Here, because Corby would not have become ill with 
COVID-19 but for her husband Robert’s infection at work, they 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
argue Corby’s injury is derivative of Robert’s and her claims are 
therefore barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. 
 
The argument misinterprets Snyder.  We explained there 
that the derivative injury rule governs when “ ‘the third party 
cause of action [is] derivative of the employee injury.’ ”  (Snyder, 
supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 998, italics added.)  Snyder thus tethered 
the derivative injury analysis to the plaintiff’s cause of action, 
not to a factual relationship between injuries to the plaintiff and 
the employee.  That focus is confirmed by Snyder’s next 
sentence, which explains that the derivative injury rule comes 
into play when the plaintiff must allege injury to an employee 
“in order to state a cause of action.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Snyder 
did not hold that the exclusivity bar arises any time an employee 
injury is a “but for” cause of injury to a third party.  Read 
carefully, the case holds that exclusivity provisions bar a third 
party claim only when proof of an employee’s injury is required 
as an element of the cause of action.  
 
Snyder took pains to note that a third party’s claim must 
be legally dependent on an employee’s injury for the derivative 
injury rule to apply.  For example, we observed that the Bell 
court erred in examining whether the fetal injuries resulted 
from negligent treatment of the mother or a “condition” affecting 
the mother.  (Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 999.)  Instead, we 
explained, the court should have asked “whether [the child’s] 
claim was legally dependent on [the mother’s] work-related 
injuries.”  (Ibid., first italics added.)  We faulted Bell’s assertion 
that fetus and mother were “ ‘inseparable,’ ” noting that fetal 
and maternal injuries are not necessarily related.  (Id. at 
p. 1000.)  Then, of critical importance here, we held that “[e]ven 
when the mother is injured, . . . the derivative injury rule does 
not apply unless the child’s claim can be considered merely 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
collateral to the mother’s work-related injury, a conclusion that 
rests on the legal or logical basis of the claim rather than on the 
biological cause of the fetal injury.”  (Ibid., second italics added.) 
 
Accordingly, Victory’s sole focus on viral transmission as a 
factual “but for” cause is misplaced.  For the derivative injury 
rule to apply, Robert’s infection must not only be the factual 
cause of Corby’s illness; Corby’s claim must also be “legally 
dependent on injuries suffered by” Robert.  (Snyder, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at p. 1000, italics added.)  Robert’s infection may have 
been a necessary factual step in the causal chain that led to 
Corby’s illness.  But it is not necessary for Corby to allege or 
prove injury to Robert to support her own negligence claim.  The 
difference becomes clear when her claim is compared to a 
derivative claim like loss of consortium.  If Corby had sought 
recovery for loss of consortium, she would have been required to 
prove that an injury to her spouse, Robert, in turn injured her 
by affecting their marital relationship.  (See LeFiell, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 285.)  To support her negligence claim here against 
Victory, however, she need only show that Robert was exposed 
to the virus at the workplace and carried it home to her.  As 
plaintiffs point out, it does not matter for purposes of Corby’s 
claim whether Robert himself developed COVID-19 or suffered 
any cognizable injury from his exposure to the virus.  Corby’s 
negligence claim is not legally dependent on any actual injury to 
Robert.   
 
The recent decision in See’s Candies, supra, 73 
Cal.App.5th 66 properly applied Snyder in addressing 
essentially the same facts presented here.  The See’s Candies 
complaint alleged that a wife had contracted COVID-19 at work 
due to the company’s poor safety practices.  She infected her 
husband, who died from the illness.  (Id. at p. 72.)  The trial 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
court rejected the company’s argument that the wife’s wrongful 
death claims were barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity 
because the husband’s death would not have occurred but for 
her own workplace injury.  (Id. at pp. 72–73.)  Ruling on the 
company’s petition for writ relief, the Court of Appeal affirmed, 
concluding the company’s sole reliance on biological causation 
was inconsistent with our discussion in Snyder.  The court 
observed that Snyder repeatedly described “collateral or 
derivative claims as those that are ‘legally’ or ‘logically’ 
dependent on an employee’s injuries.”  (Id. at p. 85, quoting 
Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 999, 1000, 1005.)  After 
discussing some unifying features of derivative claims, the court 
correctly concluded the derivative injury rule applies when it is 
“legally impossible to state a cause of action . . . without alleging 
a disabling or lethal injury to another person.”  (See’s Candies, 
at p. 86.)  Moreover, the court noted, “a construction of the 
derivative injury rule premised solely on causation would bar 
civil claims by any person injured as a result of the employee’s 
injury,” not just claims from family members.  (Id. at p. 89.) 
 
The See’s Candies decision made a further observation 
about derivative injury claims that is relevant here:  These 
claims generally seek recovery for economic or intangible losses 
sustained as a result of a loved one’s disability or death, rather 
than for the plaintiff’s own physical injuries or death.  (See’s 
Candies, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 88; see Snyder, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at pp. 1001–1002.)  Unless a plaintiff’s physical injury 
or death claim were somehow legally dependent upon an 
employee’s workplace injury, it would not be barred as 
derivative.  (See Snyder, at p. 1000.)  Indeed, it appears only one 
appellate decision has applied the derivative injury rule to a 
third party’s separate physical injuries.  
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
 
Salin v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 
185 (Salin) involved unusual facts.  Salin’s highly stressful job 
allegedly caused him to become increasingly mentally deranged.  
(Id. at pp. 187–188.)  One day, as a result of the extreme 
pressure exerted by his employer, Salin attempted to kill 
himself but instead shot and killed his two young daughters.  
(Id. at p. 189.)  He then sued his employer for his daughters’ 
wrongful deaths.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal was skeptical of 
this claim.  It correctly concluded workers’ compensation 
provided the sole remedy for Salin’s own injuries because, as the 
complaint alleged, the psychotic episode was proximately caused 
by his own employment.  (Id. at pp. 190–191; see Lab. Code, 
§§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a).)  However, the court went 
astray when it held workers’ compensation exclusivity also 
barred a claim for the daughters’ wrongful death.  Accepting 
that Salin stood in the shoes of his nonemployee daughters in 
asserting the claim, the court reasoned that any claim by the 
daughters against the employer would have been barred 
because the daughters’ injuries, like Salin’s own, were factually 
caused by an employment-related mental condition.  (Salin, at 
pp. 191–193.) 
 
Salin’s analysis on this point was thin.  Quoted in full, it 
reads:  “We have considered plaintiff’s argument, as we 
understand it, that in respect of his daughters’ wrongful death, 
he stands in the position of a nonemployee third party who has 
suffered injury and damages as a result of the tortious act of an 
employer.  [¶] The point is answered by Labor Code section 3600 
stating that: ‘Liability for compensation [by an employer to a 
worker is] in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any 
person. . . .”  (Italics added.)  [¶] Moreover, we observe judicial 
holdings that where, following a work-related injury or death, 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
conditions of compensation exist, third parties who have 
suffered prejudice or damages by virtue of such injury or death[] 
are barred from recovery in actions at law against the employer.  
[¶] California, as do most, if not all of the states of the union, 
follows the ‘ “broader view of the exclusion of liability on the part 
of the employer to any person whatsoever by reason of the injury 
accruing to the employee whether such person be a dependent 
or nondependent.” ’  [Citations.]  Recognizing this rule, plaintiff 
concedes, as he must, that:  ‘A series of cases apply the exclusive 
remedy rule where the alleged injury stems directly from the 
employee’s injury.’ ”  (Salin, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at pp. 191–
192.)  Citing loss of consortium, emotional distress and wrongful 
death claims, Salin concluded:  “It follows that had plaintiff’s 
daughters survived the injuries he had inflicted upon them, or 
had otherwise been damaged due to his employment-related 
mental condition, they would have had no cause of action against 
[the employer].”  (Id. at p. 192.) 
 
As is apparent from the foregoing, the Salin court relied 
solely on the statutory provision limiting employers’ liability for 
injuries “sustained by . . . employees” (Lab. Code, § 3600, 
subd. (a), italics added) and on derivative injury cases involving 
intangible or economic losses.  At no point did the court explain 
what authorities or rationale supported extending the 
derivative injury rule to encompass independent third party 
claims for personal injury or death resulting from the employer’s 
negligent conduct.  It simply assumed that a “but for” link to the 
employee’s injury was sufficient to make a third party’s claim 
derivative.  
 
Our opinion in Snyder cast some doubt on this analysis.  If 
this court had agreed that “but for” causation alone is sufficient 
to render a third party’s personal injury claim derivative, 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Snyder would have discussed Salin with approval.  But it did 
not.  Instead, after explaining that claims for wrongful death, 
loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
are derivative because the alleged injuries are “legally as well 
as causally” dependent on an employee’s injury (Snyder, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at p. 999), Snyder mentioned Salin in a footnote, 
observing that “[o]ne Court of Appeal has gone farther” (id. at 
p. 999, fn. 2).  Without deciding the correctness of Salin’s 
holding, we observed that Labor Code “sections 3600 through 
3602 do not directly support the Salin court’s extension of the 
derivative injury rule to third party injuries allegedly caused by 
an injured employee’s postinjury acts.”  (Ibid.)  We now clarify 
that, without more, a mere causal link between a third party’s 
personal injury and an employee’s injury is not sufficient to 
bring the third party’s claim within the scope of the derivative 
injury rule.5  Salin v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 136 
 
5  
Our holdings in Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th 800 and King, 
supra, 5 Cal.5th 1039 are consistent with this analysis.  In 
Vacanti, lien holders sought to recover compensation for medical 
services they provided to employees for workplace injuries 
(Vacanti, at p. 815), and, in King, an employee sought to recover 
for separate injuries that arose from the treatment of his 
workplace injury (King, at pp. 1052–1053).  Although the 
opinions stated that “injuries arising out of and in the course of 
the workers’ compensation claims process fall within the scope 
of the exclusive remedy provisions because this process is 
tethered to a compensable injury” (Vacanti, at p. 815; see King, 
at p. 1052), their holdings were not based on factual causation.  
Instead, they rely on the principle that the WCA provides only 
a single remedy for an employee’s workplace injury.  (See Lab. 
Code, § 3600; Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 996.)  Because both 
cases involved attempts to recover additional amounts for an 
employee’s compensable workplace injury, the claims in those 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Cal.App.3d 185 is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with the 
views expressed herein. 
 
Victory posits a number of grounds for distinguishing or 
limiting Snyder.  Although we agree there are some significant 
factual differences between that case and this one, Snyder’s 
guidance on the derivative injury rule remains compelling. 
 
As Victory points out, the unborn child in Snyder “did not 
‘catch’ birth defects from the employee.”  Although the fetus was 
exposed to toxic fumes only because her mother inhaled them, 
she alleged she was injured by the fumes themselves and not as 
a result of an injury her mother suffered.  (Snyder, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at p. 1000.)  According to Victory, this means the fetal 
injuries were entirely separate and independent from those of 
her employee-mother, just as if the fetus had instead been a 
child visiting the workplace in a stroller at the time of the carbon 
monoxide release.  Victory contrasts these independent injuries 
with the situation here, in which Corby contracted COVID-19 
only after breathing viral particles expelled by Robert or left on 
surfaces after he became a carrier of the disease. 
 
It is not clear that the factual predicate for this distinction 
is accurate.  One might also say that Corby was exposed to the 
virus through Robert, just as the fetus in Snyder was exposed to 
a toxin through her mother.  In other words, the passage of a 
harmful 
substance 
through an intermediary does 
not 
necessarily render the resulting injury derivative of or collateral 
to an injury sustained by the intermediary.  In any event, 
Snyder took pains to clarify that a causal “but for” link between 
 
cases were barred by the WCA’s exclusivity provisions.  (See 
King, at pp. 1052–1053; Vacanti, at pp. 815–816.) 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
the injuries is not what matters for purposes of the derivative 
injury rule.  The pertinent question is not whether an 
employee’s work-related injury was a “but for” link leading to 
the third party injury.  Instead, the pertinent question is 
whether the plaintiff’s claim is logically or “legally dependent” 
on that employee injury.  (Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 999, 
see id. at pp. 1000, 1005.)  Because Corby’s negligence claim 
does not require that she allege or prove that Robert suffered 
any injury, it is not barred by the derivative injury rule.6 
 
Victory’s additional attempts to cabin Snyder fare no 
better.  First, Victory asserts Snyder intended to create nothing 
more than “an in utero rule” because all of the out-of-state cases 
the opinion discussed concerned fetal injuries.  These 
authorities were most relevant to the facts in question, but that 
does not mean the legal principles Snyder announced do not 
apply in other contexts.  We did not limit Snyder’s holding to in 
utero injuries.  On the contrary, we observed that our discussion 
of Bell had “clarified the scope of the derivative injury doctrine.”  
(Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)  Second, Victory insists 
that the “key” to Snyder’s holding “was not the manner of the 
harm, but the situs of the harm — the fact that the fetus was 
independently injured on the employer’s property.”  This 
 
6  
An amicus curiae brief supporting Victory asserts that the 
derivative injury rule should bar recovery whenever an 
employee’s injury is part of the causal chain leading to the 
nonemployee’s injury, because “[c]ausation is an essential 
element of every negligence claim.”  (Amicus Curiae Brf. of 
United States Chamber of Commerce, et al., at p. 24.)  The 
argument sweeps too broadly and would expand the derivative 
injury rule well beyond its currently recognized bounds.  It also 
repackages the same focus on biological causation we rejected in 
Snyder.  
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
assertion misreads our opinion.  Snyder’s holding was not 
premised on the fact that the fetus was injured at the mother’s 
workplace.  The location where injury occurs is not a dispositive 
consideration for determining whether the derivative injury rule 
bars a nonemployee’s recovery.  Snyder did not suggest 
otherwise. 
 
As we noted in Snyder, care must be taken when 
considering extensions of the derivative injury rule because the 
WCA’s “ ‘compensation bargain’ . . . is between businesses and 
their employees and generally does not include third party 
injuries.”  (Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1004.)  Although it 
makes sense to consider purely collateral or derivative losses as 
part of the employee’s exchange, nothing in the language of the 
WCA nor the case law construing it “remotely suggests that 
third parties who, because of a business’s negligence, suffer 
injuries — logically and legally independent of any employee’s 
injuries — have conceded their common law rights of action as 
part of the societal ‘compensation bargain.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1005.)  
Instead, those losses are properly subject to compensation under 
a conventional tort analysis.  (Ibid.; see Civ. Code, § 1714, 
subd. (a).) 
 
Finally, although the issue is still novel, we note that one 
other court has also concluded derivative injury principles do 
not bar “take-home” COVID-19 claims.  In Estate of de Ruiz v. 
ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC (E.D.Wis. 2022) 601 
F.Supp.3d 368 (Ruiz I), a federal district court considered 
whether exclusivity provisions of the Wisconsin’s Worker’s 
Compensation Act barred recovery for the death of a spouse from 
COVID-19 following her husband’s workplace infection with the 
virus.  Construing statutes similar to Labor Code sections 3600 
and 3602 (see Ruiz I, at p. 375), the court concluded claims for 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
the wife’s death were not barred.  It distinguished Wisconsin 
case law finding loss of consortium claims to be derivative 
injuries, noting that it made “sense to apply the exclusive-
remedy provision in that situation because the nonemployee-
spouse cannot legally state a cause of action without alleging a 
disabling or lethal injury to her spouse.”  (Id. at p. 376.)  In the 
case before it, however, the wife was not merely a bystander but 
had “suffered an independent injury by contracting and dying of 
COVID-19.”  (Ibid.)  The court stressed that claims for her death 
were “not legally dependent on” the husband’s workplace injury, 
and the mere existence of a causal link between the injuries, 
through transmission of the virus, was not enough to trigger 
exclusivity provisions.  (Ibid.) 
 
The district court in Ruiz I, supra, 601 F.Supp.3d 368 also 
relied on Woerth v. U. S. (6th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 648, a decision 
under the Federal Employee’s Compensation Act.  In that case, 
a nurse contracted hepatitis while working at a veteran’s 
administration hospital and passed the disease to her husband.  
The court concluded the husband’s tort claims were not barred 
by workers’ compensation exclusivity because he sought 
recovery not for losses ancillary to his wife’s illness but for his 
own entirely independent medical expenses and lost wages.  
(Woerth, at pp. 649–650.)  The court explained:  “While [the 
husband’s] hepatitis may derive from his wife as a matter of 
proximate cause, his cause of action does not.  His right to 
recover for the negligence of the United States is based upon his 
own personal injury, not a right of ‘husband and wife.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 650.)  Of course, Ruiz I and Woerth are not binding precedent 
in California.  Their logic, however, is persuasive.   
 
Accordingly, we conclude exclusivity provisions of the 
WCA do not bar Corby’s tort claims against Victory.  Corby’s 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
negligence claims are not legally or logically dependent on any 
workplace injury sustained by Robert, and the “but for” causal 
link between Corby’s injury and Robert’s exposure to COVID-19 
is insufficient, on its own, to render the claims derivative.  (See 
Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 999–1000.) 
B. 
Duty of Care 
 
The second certified question asks whether California law 
imposes a duty of care on employers to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19 to their employees’ household members.  Before we 
address this substantive question, the parties’ briefing requires 
us to clarify once again the appropriate framework for analyzing 
duty in this context. 
1. 
No Special Relationship Required 
 
Victory argues plaintiffs’ assertion of duty here fails for 
lack of a special relationship.  It contends no duty of care was 
owed because it was not in a special relationship with Corby, 
and its employer-employee relationship with Robert cannot be 
the basis of a duty to prevent harm away from the worksite or 
to third parties.  The assertion that a special relationship is 
required misapprehends our case law and ignores the 
allegations in the operative complaint.7 
 
7  
Amicus curiae See’s Candies, Inc. and See’s Candy Shops, 
Inc. (See’s Candies) observes that courts in other states have 
declined to impose a duty of care to prevent COVID-19 
transmission based on employers’ lack of a special relationship 
with nonemployees.  (See Iniguez v. Aurora Packing Co., Inc. 
(Ill.Cir.Ct. Mar. 31, 2021) 2021 WL 7185157 at p. *2 (Iniguez); 
Estate of Madden v. Southwest Airlines, Co. (D.Md. Jun. 23, 
2021, Civ. A. No. 1:21-CV-00672-SAG) 2021 WL 2580119 at p. 4, 
fn. 1 (Madden).)  The short answer to this argument is that the 
law in other states is different, and there is no indication in 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
 
Duty, under the common law, is essentially an expression 
of policy that “ ‘the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal 
protection against the defendant’s conduct.’ ”  (Dillon v. Legg 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734; see Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 
3 Cal.4th 370, 397 (Bily).)  The requirement of a legal duty is 
frequently invoked “ ‘to limit generally “the otherwise 
potentially infinite liability which would follow from every 
negligent act.” ’ ”  (Bily, at p. 397; see Kesner v. Superior Court 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1143 (Kesner).) 
 
The “general rule” of duty in California is established by 
statute.  (Cabral v. Ralph’s Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 
771 (Cabral).)  Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) states in 
relevant part:  “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result 
of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to 
another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the 
management of his or her property or person, except so far as 
the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the 
injury upon himself or herself.”  “This statute establishes the 
 
these cases that either Illinois or Maryland has a statute 
equivalent to Civil Code section 1714 imposing a duty of care on 
all persons by default. 
 
Similarly, Victory relies on Elsheref v. Applied Materials, 
Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 451 to argue the employer-employee 
relationship “does not translate to a special relationship outside 
the workplace.”  In that case, a child born with birth defects sued 
his father’s employer, claiming his injuries were caused by the 
father’s exposure to workplace toxins.  The court first concluded 
duty should not be imposed based on an analysis of policy factors 
(id. at pp. 460–461; see post, at pp. 29–46), then separately 
rejected the child’s argument for duty based on lack of a special 
relationship (Elsheref, at pp. 461–462).  Because we hold that a 
special relationship is not required given the nature of plaintiffs’ 
allegations here, Elsheref is inapposite. 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
default rule that each person has a duty ‘to exercise, in his or 
her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’  (Cabral, 
at p. 768.)”  (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 
214 (Brown).) 
 
As we recently explained, the rule of Civil Code 
section 1714, though broad, “has limits.”  (Brown, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 214.)  It “imposes a general duty of care on a 
defendant only when it is the defendant who has ‘ “created a 
risk” ’ of harm to the plaintiff, including when ‘ “the defendant 
is responsible for making the plaintiff’s position worse.” ’ ”  
(Ibid., quoting Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 703, 716 (Lugtu).)  “The law does not impose the same 
duty on a defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the 
plaintiff would suffer the harm alleged.  Generally, the ‘person 
who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure 
to take affirmative action to assist or protect another’ from that 
peril.”  (Brown, at p. 214, quoting Williams v. State of California 
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23; see Regents of University of California 
v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 (Regents).) 
 
The situations we confronted in Brown and Regents fell 
within this exception to Civil Code section 1714’s default rule of 
duty.  In both cases, the plaintiffs’ injuries were inflicted by a 
third party, not the defendant.  The Brown plaintiffs were 
sexually abused by their athletic coach (Brown, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 210), and the Regents plaintiff was stabbed by a 
fellow college student during class (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 617).  The claims we considered in those cases were not 
against the individuals whose negligent or intentional conduct 
caused the plaintiffs harm, but against organizations the 
plaintiffs asserted were negligent in failing to protect them from 
the harm.  (See Brown, at p. 210; Regents, at p. 617.)  These 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
defendants, a sport’s governing body and a university, did not 
create or contribute to the risk of sexual abuse or stabbing.  For 
that reason, the default duty rule of Civil Code section 1714 did 
not apply, and the starting point for our analysis was instead 
the alternate rule that generally “ ‘one owes no duty to control 
the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such 
conduct.’  (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 
203.)”  (Regents, at p. 619; see Brown, at p. 214.)  Under those 
circumstances, we explained, the law does not impose a duty to 
control, warn, or protect unless there is a special relationship 
between the parties that “ ‘gives rise to a duty to act.’ ”  (Regents, 
at p. 619; see Brown, at p. 220.) 
 
The complaint here alleges that, in violation of a City and 
County of San Francisco health order issued two months earlier, 
Victory transferred a group of previously off-site workers when 
there was reason to believe they had been exposed to the SARS-
CoV-2 virus.  According to the complaint, Robert’s work placed 
him in close contact with these newly arrived workers.  As a 
result, he was infected with the virus and passed it to his wife 
Corby.  The complaint does not allege that Victory was negligent 
in failing to protect Corby from harm caused by the negligent or 
intentional misconduct of a third party.  Rather, it alleges Corby 
was harmed by Victory’s own misconduct in transferring 
potentially infected workers to Robert’s jobsite and forcing 
Robert to work in close proximity to them. 
 
It is true that Robert was the conduit for Corby’s infection, 
and thus he was the immediate cause of her illness.  But an 
exclusive focus on causation in this context is inconsistent with 
our case law.  The proper question, we have explained, is instead 
whether the defendant’s “ ‘entire conduct created a risk of 
harm’ ” to the plaintiff.  (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 215, 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
fn. 6, quoting Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm (2012) § 37, com. c, p. 3; see Brown, at p. 214.)  
“Although we have held that the existence of a relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant is one basis for finding 
liability premised on the conduct of a third party [citations], we 
have never held that such a relationship is a prerequisite to 
finding that a defendant had a duty to prevent injuries due to 
its own conduct or possessory control.”  (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at p. 1163, italics added.)  Likewise, Brown explained that “the 
no-duty-to-protect rule will not relieve the defendant of an 
otherwise applicable duty to exercise reasonable care when, by 
its own conduct, the defendant has increased the risk of harm to 
the plaintiff.”  (Brown, at p. 215, fn. 7.)  Here, plaintiffs have 
alleged that Victory created a risk of harm by violating a county 
health order designed to limit the spread of COVID-19.  These 
allegations raise a claim that Victory violated its obligation “to 
exercise due care in [its] own actions so as not to create an 
unreasonable risk of injury to others.”  (Lugtu, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 716; see Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)  The fact that the 
alleged violation resulted in injury beyond the workplace, when 
the contagion was spread by an innocent third party, does not 
change the analysis. 
 
Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th 1132 is consistent with this 
conclusion, because Civil Code section 1714 was the starting 
point of our duty analysis under analogous facts.  There, 
plaintiffs contracted mesothelioma as a result of their family 
members’ work with asbestos.  They argued that defendant 
companies owed them a duty of care, as employers or 
landowners, to prevent “take-home” exposure to asbestos.  
(Kesner, at p. 1140.)  The mechanism of injury was different in 
Kesner, because in that case the toxin itself was carried home on 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
the clothing or person of the workers, whereas here the virus 
generally passes to household members by indirect means, 
through a worker whose coughing or sneezing spreads airborne 
viral particles.8  But in both cases the employee is a vector, 
bringing home a harmful substance that causes the plaintiff’s 
injury.  We began our analysis in Kesner with the default rule of 
Civil Code section 1714 and then considered whether policy 
considerations justified limiting or recognizing an exception to 
that duty.  (See Kesner, at pp. 1142–1143.)  Even though 
causation of the plaintiffs’ injuries was indirect, as alleged here, 
our opinion never suggested that a special relationship was a 
required prerequisite for finding a duty of care. 
 
Several additional arguments have been advanced for why 
the default duty of Civil Code section 1714 should not apply, but 
none is persuasive.  Amicus curiae Construction Employers’ 
Association (CEA) argues an employer cannot “create” a risk of 
COVID-19 because the virus is preexisting and does not derive 
from an employer’s property or operations.  Nor can an employer 
make a “plaintiff’s position worse” (Lugtu, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 716) with respect to COVID-19, CEA asserts, because the 
virus is now ubiquitous.  However, we have previously 
considered Civil Code section 1714 to be the source of a duty to 
prevent the negligent transmission of infectious disease.  (See 
John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1188–1189 
[HIV].)  Moreover, CEA’s arguments once again ignore the 
allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true at this 
 
8  
We do not address plaintiffs’ theory of transmission from 
surfaces because the plausibility of those allegations remains 
the subject of dispute in the Ninth Circuit.  We note, however, 
that the precise method of viral transmission makes no 
difference in our duty analysis. 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
stage in the litigation.  (See Papasan v. Allain, supra, 478 U.S. 
at p. 286.)  Victory need not have created the virus itself to owe 
a duty of care.  What is important is that Victory allegedly 
created a risk of infection by transferring exposed workers to 
Robert’s jobsite in violation of the county health order.  By doing 
so, it also made Corby’s situation worse by increasing the 
chances she would become infected with the virus through 
contact with her husband.  Relatedly, CEA contends any 
increased risk was not “unreasonable” (see Civ. Code § 1714, 
subd. (a)) because the Governor’s “ ‘Stay-Home Order’ ” 
permitted the continuation of essential work, including by 
construction contractors such as Victory.  (See Governor’s Exec. 
Order No. N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020).)  To the extent this 
argument concerns duty as opposed to breach, plaintiffs do not 
assert Victory increased the risk of harm merely by continuing 
its business operations; they allege Victory engaged in 
affirmative misconduct by violating a county health order.  
These allegations are sufficient to support an assertion of duty 
under Civil Code section 1714. 
 
CEA also argues cases applying Civil Code section 1714 
“consistently involve defendants that created a risk through 
their own ‘property or person’ by introducing a dangerous 
product or activity into society.”  Unlike the asbestos that 
produced injury in Kesner, for example, Victory did not use the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus in its business or obtain any commercial 
benefit from it, although it presumably did benefit from the 
exemption that allowed it to continue operating during the 
pandemic.  But this distinction from Kesner and similar cases 
does not exempt Victory from the default duty to use due care in 
its operations to avoid foreseeable injuries.  Civil Code 
section 1714’s duty is not premised on the defendant’s use of 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
hazardous materials; indeed, several cases considering whether 
the duty applies have involved entirely different facts.  (See, e.g., 
Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 768 [tractor-trailer parked 
alongside freeway]; Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 456, 462–463 [garbage truck operating near bridle 
path].)  Nor does case law support limiting an employer’s duty 
of care to “business-specific activities.”  For example, Weirum v. 
RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 45–47, concluded a radio 
station owed a duty to a driver killed in a car accident by 
listeners who were participating in a radio-sponsored contest.  
And Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 49, 55–58, held that a telephone company’s duty of due 
care extended to a phone booth user who was struck by a drunk 
driver.  We decline CEA’s invitation to read new limitations into 
the statute. 
 
Finally, amicus curiae See’s Candies urges us to adopt the 
reasoning of a recent Court of Appeal decision declining to 
impose a duty on a public employer to prevent the spread of 
typhus.  In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 62 
Cal.App.5th 129, 132, the plaintiff alleged her husband 
contracted typhus from unsanitary conditions at the police 
station where he worked and passed the disease to her.  
Although the case is similar in that it involved transmission of 
a contagious disease to a spouse, it is different in significant 
respects.  Because the defendant in City of Los Angeles was a 
public entity, its liability had to be based on statute rather than 
the common law.  (Id. at p. 138; Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire 
Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.)  To support her claim 
for a dangerous condition of public property under Government 
Code section 835, the plaintiff analogized the city’s conduct to 
that of the negligent premises owners in Kesner who failed to 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
prevent the escape of asbestos from their properties.  (City of Los 
Angeles, at pp. 141–142.)  The Court of Appeal rejected this 
comparison, primarily because “Kesner involved private 
companies rather than public entities,” and this court has held 
that public entity liability under Government Code section 835 
is not coextensive with private liability.  (City of Los Angeles, at 
p. 143; see Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1077, 1093 (Vasilenko).)  For that reason, Civil Code 
section 1714 was inapplicable.  (City of Los Angeles, at p. 143.)  
The court further observed that Kesner was distinguishable 
because the plaintiffs there were injured from contact with the 
hazardous workplace condition itself, carried home on the 
workers’ clothing, whereas the plaintiff before it had contracted 
typhus from her husband months after he first became ill.  (Id. 
at pp. 143–144.)  The court therefore concluded the basis for 
premises liability in Kesner, “hazardous substances that have 
escaped the property and caused harm offsite,” was not 
applicable to the facts alleged.  (Id. at p. 144.)  Because its 
holding was premised on the limited scope of liability under 
Government Code section 835, City of Los Angeles does not 
support a categorial rule against employer liability in other 
negligence contexts involving the transmission of infectious 
diseases. 
 
As noted, we agree that the mechanism of harm to third 
parties is frequently different for a contagious disease than for 
those injured outside the workplace by a toxin like asbestos.  
Kesner’s holding might well be distinguished for this reason in 
addressing premises liability, a question we do not reach here.  
But the different mechanism of harm is not significant to the 
question that is before us:  whether Civil Code section 1714 
imposes a duty of care on employers to prevent the spread of 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
COVID-19 to employees and their household members.  Nothing 
in Kesner suggested its reliance on the default rule of Civil Code 
section 1714 had anything to do with the specific mechanism of 
injury alleged.  We conclude the default rule of duty applies in 
the COVID-19 context as well where plaintiffs have alleged that 
the defendant, through its own actions, created an unreasonable 
risk of the disease’s transmission.  That conclusion does not end 
the matter, however.  
 
2. 
Rowland Analysis 
Civil Code section 1714 articulates a general duty of care.  
But exceptions can be recognized when supported by compelling 
policy considerations.  (See Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217; 
Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628; Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 771.)  That is the case here. 
 
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland) 
identified several considerations that may, on balance, justify a 
departure from Civil Code section 1714’s default rule of duty.  
(Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 771.)  They are:  “the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the 
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.”  (Rowland, at p. 113.)  Rowland’s multifactor test 
“was not designed as a freestanding means of establishing duty, 
but instead as a means for deciding whether to limit a duty 
derived from other sources,” like Civil Code section 1714.  
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217, italics added.)  “As we have 
also explained, however, in the absence of a statutory provision 
establishing an exception to the general rule of Civil Code 
section 1714, courts should create one only where ‘clearly 
supported by public policy.’ ”  (Cabral, at p. 771, quoting 
Rowland, at p. 112.) 
 
This analysis is conducted “at a relatively broad level of 
factual generality.”  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772.)  We 
analyze the Rowland factors to determine “not whether they 
support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on 
the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving 
out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is 
justified by clear considerations of policy.”  (Ibid.; see Kesner, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1143–1144.)  “In other words, the duty 
analysis is categorical, not case specific.”  (Regents, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 629.)   
 
“The Rowland factors fall into two categories.  The first 
group involves foreseeability and the related concepts of 
certainty and the connection between plaintiff and defendant.  
The second embraces the public policy concerns of moral blame, 
preventing future harm, burden, and insurance availability.  
The policy analysis evaluates whether certain kinds of plaintiffs 
or injuries should be excluded from relief.”  (Regents, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 629; see Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1145.)  It 
bears noting that different timeframes are relevant to different 
aspects of the analysis.  Whereas foreseeability issues are 
assessed based on information available during the time of the 
alleged negligence (see Kesner, at pp. 1145–1146), “our duty 
analysis is forward-looking” in regard to policy issues 
surrounding burdens that would be placed on defendants (id. at 
p. 1152).  We conclude that, although the transmission of 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
COVID-19 to household members is a foreseeable consequence 
of an employer’s failure to take adequate precautions against 
the virus in the workplace, policy considerations ultimately 
require an exception to the general duty of care in this context. 
 
 
a. 
Foreseeability Factors 
 
“The most important factor to consider in determining 
whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise 
ordinary care articulated by [Civil Code] section 1714 is whether 
the injury in question was foreseeable.”  (Kesner, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 1145.)  In making this assessment, the court must 
focus not on particularities of the defendant’s conduct and the 
plaintiff’s injury, but on “whether the category of negligent 
conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of 
harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed 
. . . .” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772.) 
 
The first question here, then, is whether it was foreseeable 
that an employer’s negligent failure to adhere to promulgated 
workplace precautions against the spread of COVID-19 could 
result in transmission of the virus to employees’ households.  
Victory does not dispute that the foreseeability factor weighs in 
favor of recognizing a duty of care.  The highly contagious and 
potentially deadly nature of COVID-19 had been widely 
publicized by the late spring of 2020.  In addition to general 
public knowledge, employers allowed to continue operations 
during this time were subject to strict regulations designed to 
limit transmission of the virus.  As relevant here, the City and 
County of San Francisco’s April 29, 2020 health order mandated 
specific health and safety precautions to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19 at construction jobsites.  Among other things, 
employers like Victory were required to:  screen workers for 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
symptoms daily upon arrival at the jobsite; maintain social 
distancing between workers except as strictly necessary for the 
work; remove any infected worker from the jobsite immediately 
and sanitize their work area; stagger trades to reduce worker 
density; provide workers with personal protective equipment 
appropriate for use in construction; and provide ventilation in 
the work area to the extent possible.9   
 
In Kesner, we found industry guidance relevant in 
concluding it was reasonably foreseeable that asbestos fibers 
carried home on workers’ clothing could cause injury to 
household members.  (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1145–
1146.)  Standards published by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration and other industrial hygiene regulations 
required that employers minimize employees’ exposure to 
airborne asbestos.  We concluded these sources put employers 
on notice of the risks of take-home exposure.  (See id. at 
pp. 1146–1148.)  Similarly here, government health orders 
notified employers of the reasonable foreseeability that COVID-
19 could be transmitted not only within the workplace but also 
to individuals who came into contact with infected employees.  
The analogy is not perfect.  Companies that used asbestos likely 
had access to a deeper well of scientific knowledge about the 
dangers of asbestos and methods for preventing its transfer 
 
9  
Plaintiffs contend the county’s health order provides the 
appropriate standard of care, yet some amici curiae have raised 
arguments concerning whether the health order created a 
freestanding duty.  Whether a local measure enacted on an 
emergency basis could appropriately impose a tort duty 
extending to employees’ household members is an issue not 
encompassed in the certified questions.  Accordingly, we express 
no opinion on it. 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
offsite than was available in the early months of the pandemic.  
Nevertheless, we conclude sufficient information was provided 
to employers like Victory that it was reasonably foreseeable 
their failure to take adequate precautions against spread of the 
virus could result in its transmission to employees’ households. 
 
The second foreseeability factor in a Rowland analysis, 
“the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury” 
(Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113), is relevant “primarily, if 
not exclusively, when the only claimed injury is an intangible 
harm, such as emotional distress” (Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 
p. 421).  In contrast, the personal injury claims we address here 
are both tangible and amenable to compensation.  (See Regents, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 630; Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1148.) 
 
The third Rowland factor, closeness of the connection 
between conduct and injury (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 
p. 113), “is strongly related to the question of foreseeability 
itself” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 779).  Generally, when the 
injury is connected to the defendant’s negligent act only 
distantly or indirectly, the risk of that type of injury from the 
category of negligent conduct at issue is “likely to be deemed 
unforeseeable.  Conversely, a closely connected type of injury is 
likely to be deemed foreseeable.”  (Ibid.)  This factor is distinct, 
however, because it “accounts for third party or other 
intervening conduct.”  (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1086.)  
“Where the third party’s intervening conduct is foreseeable or 
derivative of the defendant’s, then that conduct does not 
‘ “diminish the closeness of the connection between defendant[’s] 
conduct and plaintiff’s injury.” ’ ”  (Ibid.; see Kesner, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 1148.) 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
 
Similar to Kesner, the relevant intervening conduct 
alleged here is that an employee, having been exposed to the 
virus at work, would contract COVID-19 and spread it to people 
in his household.  (See Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1148.)  
Given the high transmissibility of the virus, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that an employee negligently exposed at work would 
transmit the virus to household members.  “An employee’s 
return home at the end of the workday” is a predictable and 
expected occurrence.  (Id. at p. 1149.)  When, in doing so, the 
employee serves as a vector in spreading a highly contagious 
disease to household members, the transmission can be 
attributed to the employer’s negligence in failing to take 
reasonable precautions to prevent workplace exposure.  (See id. 
at pp. 1148–1149.) 
 
Victory protests that the highly contagious nature of 
COVID-19 instead weighs against finding a close connection 
between the misconduct and the injury.  It notes that employees 
may encounter numerous potential sources of exposure to the 
virus every day.  As a result, it argues, the origin of an 
employee’s infection is ultimately impossible to trace.  Because 
the virus is highly contagious, an employee could have 
contracted COVID-19 from an exposure while commuting to 
work, stopping at the grocery store on the way home, or even at 
work but without fault of the employer.  Moreover, as amicus 
curiae CEA points out, tracing the source of an infection would 
be even more difficult at a construction jobsite than at most 
workplaces because construction sites typically involve multiple 
contractors and subcontractors working side by side, along with 
other professionals.  The situation here is thus distinguishable 
from that in Kesner, where the only plausible source of asbestos 
fibers brought home was the employee’s workplace.  The nature 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
of the intervening conduct is also more complicated here than in 
Kesner, where the conduct consisted only of the employee’s 
return home at the end of the workday.  Here, many factors 
could affect the likelihood that an employee would contract and 
transmit COVID-19.  Employees may exercise varying levels of 
diligence in properly wearing a mask, avoiding crowds, or 
employing other precautions to prevent illness.  The line 
between an employer’s negligence and transmission of the virus 
to household members is thus not as direct as in the asbestos 
context. 
 
Plaintiffs dismiss these arguments as attacks on 
causation, stressing that the allegations of their complaint must 
be accepted as true at this stage of the litigation.  Yet the 
examination of causal connections, which is what this factor 
requires, is an inquiry akin to analyzing proximate causation.  
Victory is correct in observing that the connection between 
wrongful conduct and injury is somewhat attenuated here, and 
we conclude that, overall, this factor weighs only slightly in 
favor of recognizing a duty of care.  “In determining whether one 
has a duty to prevent injury that is the result of third party 
conduct, the touchstone of the analysis is the foreseeability of 
that intervening conduct.”  (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1148.)  
Regardless of alternative sources of exposure, or variations in 
the personal precautions employees undertake, it is plainly 
foreseeable that an employee who is exposed to the virus 
through his employer’s negligence will pass the virus to a 
household member. 
 
 
b. 
Policy Factors 
 
Although Rowland’s foreseeability factors generally weigh 
in favor of recognizing a duty here, “foreseeability alone is not 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
sufficient to create an independent tort duty.”  (Erlich v. 
Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552.)  “A duty of care will not be 
held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries . . . where the social 
utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the 
injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the 
compensatory and cost-internalization values of negligence 
liability.”  (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 502.)  
Accordingly, we examine Rowland’s policy factors to determine 
whether they support an exception to Civil Code section 1714’s 
duty of care for this class of negligent conduct.  (See Cabral, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 772–773.)  In doing so, we are mindful 
that social conditions surrounding COVID-19, much like the 
virus itself, have evolved a great deal since the start of the 
pandemic, and these changes are likely to continue.  We 
acknowledge that the calculus might well be different in the 
future. 
 
The first policy factor concerns “the moral blame attached 
to the defendant’s conduct.”  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 
p. 113.)  “We have said that if there were reasonable 
ameliorative steps the defendant could have taken, there can be 
moral blame ‘attached to the defendants’ failure to take steps to 
avert the foreseeable harm.’ ”  (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 1091.)  The failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent 
harm is, of course, the essence of any negligence claim, and this 
one is no exception.  Plaintiffs argue Victory’s failure to follow 
all precautions outlined in the county health order carries 
significant moral blame because this conduct increased the risk 
of COVID-19 infections.  But Victory and its supporting amici 
curiae observe that moral blame is typically found when the 
defendant reaps a financial benefit from the risks it has created.  
For example, in Kesner, we observed that commercial entities 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
“benefitted financially from their use of asbestos and had 
greater information and control over the hazard than employees’ 
households.”  (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1151; see Beacon 
Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 
LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 586.)  While Victory and other 
companies certainly did not profit from the spread of COVID-19, 
it is less clear whether such companies may have benefitted 
from ignoring health and safety protocols.  During the early 
months of the pandemic, essential businesses like Victory were 
permitted to operate, presumably at a profit, but only if they 
strictly adhered to precautions in government health orders.  
Some of these precautions, such as quarantining workers 
potentially exposed to the virus, acquiring and distributing 
protective gear, and rearranging work schedules, may have 
posed significant implementation costs.  Disregarding those 
standards would potentially result in related cost savings.  
 
Relative inequality between the parties may also bear 
upon moral blame.  “We have previously assigned moral blame, 
and we have relied in part on that blame in finding a duty, in 
instances where the plaintiffs are particularly powerless or 
unsophisticated compared to the defendants or where the 
defendants exercised greater control over the risks at issue.”  
(Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1151.)  Even if few initially knew 
much about COVID-19 or its transmissibility, companies are 
likely to have, or have access to, superior knowledge about 
infection 
outbreaks 
in 
their 
workforce, 
an 
important 
consideration given the highly contagious nature of the virus.  
They also have a superior ability to control the overall workplace 
environment to prevent infections, although individual 
employees also bear some responsibility in this regard.  On 
balance, considering their greater access to knowledge and 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
control, we conclude the moral blame factor weighs in favor of 
establishing a duty.  (See Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 631–
632.) 
 
The next Rowland factor, the “policy of preventing future 
harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of 
negligent conduct upon those responsible.”  (Cabral, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 781.)  Placing the cost of negligence on responsible 
parties is generally thought to induce behavioral changes that 
will make the activity in question safer.  (See Kesner, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 1150.)  However, “[t]he policy question is whether 
that consideration is outweighed, for a category of negligent 
conduct, by laws or mores indicating approval of the conduct or 
by the undesirable consequences of allowing potential liability.”  
(Cabral, at pp. 781–782.)  This factor thus examines both the 
positive and the negative societal consequences of recognizing a 
tort duty.  (See Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1089–1090 
[discussing harmful consequences that could result from a 
finding of duty].) 
 
Public policy strongly favors compliance with health 
orders to prevent the spread of COVID-19.  Recognizing a duty 
of care beyond the workplace could enhance employer vigilance 
in this regard.  However, there is only so much an employer can 
do.  Employers cannot fully control the risk of infection because 
many precautions, such as mask wearing and social distancing, 
depend upon the compliance of individual employees.  
Employers have little to no control over the safety precautions 
taken by employees or their household members outside the 
workplace.  Nor can they control whether a given employee will 
be aware of, or report, disease exposure.  There is also a 
possibility that imposing a tort duty not covered by workers’ 
compensation could lead some employers to close down, or to 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
impose stringent workplace restrictions that significantly slow 
the pace of work.  The economic impact of such changes could be 
substantial and is difficult to forecast.  For businesses regarded 
as essential and projects that serve the social welfare, slowed 
operations or shutdowns could be particularly detrimental.  On 
balance, this factor is mixed or weighs slightly against imposing 
a duty to nonemployees. 
 
The next Rowland factor, and the one emphasized by 
Victory and its supporting amici curiae, examines “the extent of 
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community 
of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for 
breach.”  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)  Victory’s core 
concern here is that recognizing a tort duty to employees’ 
household 
members10 
would 
impose 
enormous 
and 
unprecedented financial burdens on employers, both in 
 
10  
Victory’s burden argument initially appears to rest on a 
broader framing.  It asserts:  “There is simply no limit to how 
wide the net will be cast:  the wife who claims her husband 
caught COVID-19 from the supermarket checker, the husband 
who claims his wife caught it while visiting an elder care home, 
the member of a sorority who claims a sister . . . serving on jury 
duty caught it from the court bailiff . . . .”  While we agree that 
a duty to prevent secondary COVID-19 infections could 
potentially encompass all these scenarios, plaintiffs have 
proposed limiting the duty to household members of employees.  
Consistent with that limitation, the certified question we have 
been asked to answer is whether, under California law, “an 
employer owe[s] a duty to the households of its employees to 
exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19.”  
(Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 31 F.4th 
1268, 1270 [order certifying questions to the Supreme Court of 
California].)  Accordingly, we express no view on the propriety 
of recognizing a duty beyond this limited context, nor any 
burdens that would result from doing so. 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
potential damages awards and litigation costs.  We encountered 
similar arguments in Kesner.  Plaintiffs rely heavily on Kesner’s 
analysis, but there are some significant differences that counsel 
for a different result here.   
 
As discussed, Kesner considered whether commercial 
users of asbestos owe a duty of care, as employers or landowners, 
to prevent secondary asbestos exposure by individuals offsite.  
(Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)  The plaintiffs’ decedents 
had developed mesothelioma, a deadly cancer, through contact 
with asbestos fibers carried home from work on a family 
member’s clothing.  (Id. at p. 1141.)  In the Rowland analysis to 
determine whether a duty was owed to such persons, the 
defendants maintained that “[a]llowing tort liability for take-
home asbestos exposure would dramatically increase the volume 
of asbestos litigation, undermine its integrity, and create 
enormous costs for the courts and community.”  (Id. at p. 1152.)  
They also argued the cases would be difficult to prove due to the 
passage of time, given the long latency period between exposure 
and development of the disease.  (Ibid.)  We responded to these 
arguments “by observing that the relevant burden in the 
analysis of duty is not the cost to the defendants of 
compensating individuals for past negligence.  To the extent 
defendants argue that the costs of paying compensation for 
injuries that a jury finds they have actually caused would be so 
great that we should find no duty to prevent those injuries, the 
answer is that shielding tortfeasors from the full magnitude of 
their liability for past wrongs is not a proper consideration in 
determining the existence of a duty.  Rather, our duty analysis 
is forward-looking, and the most relevant burden is the cost to 
the defendants of upholding, not violating, the duty of ordinary 
care.”  (Ibid.) 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
 
While employers may already be required to implement 
health and safety protocols to protect their employees from 
COVID-19 infections, concluding they owe a duty to the 
household members of employees has the potential to alter 
employers’ behavior in ways that are harmful to society.  
Because it is impossible to eliminate the risk of infection, even 
with perfect implementation of best practices, the prospect of 
liability for infections outside the workplace could encourage 
employers to adopt precautions that unduly slow the delivery of 
essential services to the public.  Even San Francisco’s health 
order, imposed early in the pandemic, acknowledged that 
compliance cannot always be total and may give way “to the 
limited extent necessary . . . to carry out the work of Essential 
Businesses.”  Moreover, if a precedent for duty is set in regard 
to COVID-19, the anticipated costs of prevention, and liability, 
might cause some essential service providers to shut down if a 
new pandemic hits.  This negative “consequence[] to the 
community” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113), while 
hypothetical, cannot be ignored.  A finding of duty may be 
inappropriate if its recognition would deter socially beneficial 
behavior.  (See Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 391, 402.) 
 
Although Kesner cautioned that “the most relevant 
burden” in a Rowland analysis is the cost of upholding a tort 
duty (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1152), we did not completely 
ignore the financial consequences that could result from 
increased litigation.  Indeed, Rowland’s formulation of this 
factor incorporates such considerations, because it requires 
analysis of the burden of “imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach.”  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 
p. 113, italics added.)  We observed in Kesner that the 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
defendants had raised a “forceful contention” in pointing out 
that a finding of duty “would open the door to an ‘enormous pool 
of potential plaintiffs.’ ”  (Kesner, at p. 1153.)  Conceding that 
there were legitimate concerns about the potential breadth and 
unmanageability of claims, we nevertheless concluded these 
problems did not require a categorical rule against tort liability 
for take-home asbestos exposure.  Instead, these concerns were 
addressed by limiting the scope of the duty.  (Id. at p. 1154.)  We 
determined it was sensible, in that context, to limit the duty to 
prevent take-home asbestos exposure to household members 
only.  (Id. at pp. 1154–1156.) 
 
Plaintiffs here contend the burdens resulting from liability 
for secondary COVID-19 infections can be adequately addressed 
by imposing a similar limit.  For this reason, they ask us to 
recognize a duty of care extending only to individuals who share 
a household with the employee.  Kesner’s approach cannot be 
translated so seamlessly into the present context, however.  For 
one thing, the “household members” limit made sense in Kesner 
because the mechanism of injury there required frequent and 
sustained contact with asbestos fibers on workers’ clothing and 
effects.  (See Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1154–1155.)  Yet 
transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus can occur in as little as 
15 minutes of contact with an infected person or even after the 
infected person has left the space.  (See Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Scientific Brief:  SARS-CoV-2 
Transmission 
<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/science/science-briefs/sars-cov-2-transmission.html> [as of 
July 6, 2023].  All internet citations in this opinion are archived 
by 
year, 
docket 
number 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.)  Drawing a limit at 
household members would be more arbitrary in the COVID-19 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
context because it would exclude a higher percentage of injured 
people. 
 
The broader reach of the proposed duty is another 
difference, and the most important one, between this case and 
Kesner.  The duty we considered in Kesner involved a relatively 
small pool of defendants:  companies that used asbestos in the 
workplace.  There was also a much smaller pool of potential 
plaintiffs:  household members who were exposed to asbestos 
from an employee’s clothing and then went on to develop 
mesothelioma.  Here, by contrast, a duty to prevent secondary 
COVID-19 infections would extend to all workplaces, making 
every employer in California a potential defendant.  And unlike 
mesothelioma, which is known to be “a very rare cancer, even 
among persons exposed to asbestos” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1135−1136), the virus that causes 
COVID-19 is extremely contagious, making infection possible 
after even a relatively brief exposure.  Even limiting a duty of 
care to employees’ household members, the pool of potential 
plaintiffs would be enormous, numbering not thousands but 
millions 
of 
Californians. 
 
“Ultimately, 
the 
limited 
transmissibility of asbestos provides a natural curb on the pool 
of potential plaintiffs.  With COVID-19, by contrast, the pool of 
potential plaintiffs isn’t a pool at all — it’s an ocean.”  (Ruiz v. 
ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods LLC (E.D.Wis. 2022) 606 
F.Supp.3d 881, 888 (Ruiz II).)  In the past, “[e]ven when 
foreseeability was present, we have . . . declined to allow 
recovery on a negligence theory when damage awards 
threatened to impose liability out of proportion to fault . . . .”  
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
(Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 398.)  That prospect is certainly 
presented by the duty rule proposed here.11 
 
In addition to dire financial consequences for employers, 
and a possibly broader social impact, the potential litigation 
explosion facilitated by a duty to prevent COVID-19 infections 
in household members would place significant burdens on the 
judicial system and, ultimately, the community.  As amicus 
curiae CEA aptly put it, “If there was ever a ‘floodgates’ 
situation, this is it.”  Courts would have to manage a very large 
number of suits, and variations in individual exposure history 
and precautions against the virus would likely make it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the cases to be grouped into collective or 
class actions.  Fact-specific disputes could also make these cases 
complex and time-consuming to litigate.  For example, a motion 
challenging proximate causation based on alternative sources of 
exposure could not be brought, or resolved, until after the case 
had proceeded through discovery.  Expert testimony on 
causation might be required, making resolution on summary 
judgment difficult or impossible.  Similarly, whether an 
employer breached a duty of care would likely present highly 
 
11  
Plaintiffs counter that last year the Legislature failed to 
pass an industry-supported bill that would have shielded 
businesses from liability for direct or indirect transmission of 
COVID-19.  (Assem. Bill No. 1313 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) § 2.)  
We decline their invitation to draw significance from this fact.  
“Legislative silence is an unreliable indicator of legislative 
intent in the absence of other indicia.  We can rarely determine 
from the failure of the Legislature to pass a particular bill what 
the intent of the Legislature is with respect to existing law.  ‘As 
evidences of legislative intent they [unpassed bills] have little 
value.’ ”  (Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1349, fn. 
omitted.) 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
fact-specific issues that could not be resolved without extensive 
discovery or witness testimony.  The burden on the courts posed 
by a flood of complex cases that cannot be resolved in the early 
stages of litigation would be daunting.  
 
Given these considerations, we conclude “the burden to 
the defendant and consequences to the community” weigh 
against imposing a duty of care and thereby authorizing liability 
for its breach.  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113)  
 
The final Rowland factor considers the availability and 
cost of insurance.  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)  
Although the parties do not discuss this factor directly, some 
amici curiae represent that commercial insurers have been 
reluctant to provide coverage for losses related to COVID-19.  
Published decisions in this area concern first party claims for 
property damage and lost income due to COVID-19 (see, e.g., 
Marina Pacific Hotel & Suites, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96) and may not give a reliable indication 
of whether third party liability claims would be covered.  Given 
the dearth of information available at this time, we are unable 
to draw any firm conclusions as to whether this factor supports 
imposing a duty. 
 
In sum, while the foreseeability factors and the policy 
factor of moral blame largely tilt in favor of finding a duty of 
care, the policy factors of preventing future harm and the 
anticipated burdens on defendants and the community weigh 
against imposing such a duty.  “In assessing duty, however, we 
do not merely count up the factors on either side.”  (Vasilenko, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1092.)  Some factors may be so weighty as 
to tip the balance one way or the other.  Here, the significant 
and unpredictable burden that recognizing a duty of care would 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
impose on California businesses, the court system, and the 
community at large counsels in favor of an exception to the 
general rule of Civil Code section 1714.  Imposing on employers 
a tort duty to each employee’s household members to prevent 
the spread of this highly transmissible virus would throw open 
the courthouse doors to a deluge of lawsuits that would be both 
hard to prove and difficult to cull early in the proceedings.  
Although it is foreseeable that employees infected at work will 
carry the virus home and infect their loved ones, the dramatic 
expansion of liability plaintiffs’ suit envisions has the potential 
to destroy businesses and curtail, if not outright end, the 
provision of essential public services.  These are the type of 
“policy considerations [that] dictate a cause of action should not 
be sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk.”  (Elden v. 
Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 274.)  In some cases, “the 
consequences of a negligent act must be limited in order to avoid 
an intolerable burden on society.”  (Ibid.)  This is such a case. 
 
3. 
Out-of-State Cases 
 
The parties have alerted us to three decisions from other 
states considering the issue now before us.  All have declined to 
recognize a duty for employers to prevent the spread of COVID-
19 outside the workplace.  
 
In Madden, supra, 2021 WL 2580119, a flight attendant 
contracted COVID-19 after she was required to attend in-person 
training.  She passed it to her husband, who died a month later 
of complications from the virus.  (Id. at p. *1.)  The federal 
district court, applying Maryland law, analyzed whether the 
airlines owed a duty of care to the employee’s spouse using the 
same seven-factor test California courts apply under Rowland.  
(Id. at p. *4; see Kiriakos v. Phillips (Md. 2016) 139 A.3d 1006, 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
1033.)  Although foreseeability and most other factors weighed 
in favor of duty, the court found the societal consequences 
“harder to justify” because imposing a duty “would significantly 
expand the field of potential liability.”  (Madden, at p. *6.)  In 
particular, “finding a duty . . . would leave employers litigating 
countless COVID-19 third-party exposures simply by virtue of 
contact with their employees during the pandemic.  All that 
would functionally be required for duty to attach would be 
potential exposure at work and subsequent contact with a 
foreseeable third party, which represents a relatively common 
set of circumstances.”  (Ibid.)  After weighing all the factors, the 
court concluded concerns in Maryland case law over “limiting 
the class of prospective future plaintiffs” were dispositive and 
precluded a finding of duty.  (Id. at p. *8.) 
 
Similar concerns led to the same result in another case 
alleging a spouse’s wrongful death from COVID-19, Ruiz II, 
supra, 606 F.Supp.3d 881.  The federal district court applied a 
six-factor test under Wisconsin law to determine whether public 
policy considerations precluded an employer’s liability for 
transmission of COVID-19 to third parties.  (Id. at p. 1, citing 
Alvarado v. Sersch (2003) 262 Wis.2d 74, 84 [662 N.W.2d 350, 
354].)  Consistent with Madden, which it discussed at length, 
the court held that Wisconsin public policy did not support 
recognizing a duty of care.  (Ruiz II, at pp. 882, 890.)  
Considering the ubiquity and high transmissibility of the virus, 
the court concluded, “allowing recovery . . . would create too 
unreasonable a burden on the defendant, and . . . would enter a 
field that has no sensible stopping point.”  (Id. at p. 883.) 
 
An Illinois trial court reached the same conclusion in 
Iniguez, supra, 2021 WL 7185157, another third party wrongful 
death case.  In ruling on the employer’s motion to dismiss, the 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
court applied a four-factor test balancing foreseeability and 
likelihood of injury against the burden of preventing injury and 
the consequences of placing this burden on the defendant.  (Id. 
at p. *2.)  It concluded public policy did not support finding a 
duty of care, observing “both the magnitude of guarding against 
the burden of employees spreading Covid to third parties and, 
perhaps more importantly, the consequences of placing that 
burden on Defendant mitigate against the imposition of a duty 
herein.”  (Id. at p. *4.) 
 
As noted, these cases are not binding on us, and they can 
be distinguished based on particular aspects of the different 
states’ laws.  For example, Maryland law is especially focused 
on limiting duty in the third party context.  (See Madden, supra, 
2021 WL 2580119, at p. *8.)  And, a day after the Ruiz II 
plaintiffs filed suit, Wisconsin legislators passed a law shielding 
businesses from civil liability related to COVID-19, a 
development that made the state’s policy position on duty quite 
clear.  (See Ruiz II, supra, 606 F.Supp.3d at p. 889; Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.476.)  We have not relied on these out-of-state cases as 
authority for our analysis.  We discuss them merely to note that 
their holdings are consistent with our conclusion that 
California’s policy considerations, as articulated in Rowland, do 
not support recognizing a duty of care to prevent third party 
COVID-19 infections.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we answer the Ninth Circuit’s questions as 
follows: 
 
(1)  If an employee contracts COVID-19 at the workplace 
and brings the virus home to a spouse, the derivative injury rule 
KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
of California’s workers’ compensation law does not bar a 
spouse’s negligence claim against the employer. 
 
(2)  An employer does not owe a duty of care under 
California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ 
household members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548) 
Review Granted (published) 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S274191 
Date Filed:  July 6, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   
County:   
Judge:   
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Venardi Zurada, Mark L. Venardi, Martin Zurada and Mark Freeman 
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.  
 
Alan Charles Dell'Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Hinshaw & Culbertson and William Bogdan for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
O’Connor Thompson McDonough Klotsche and John W. Klotsche for 
Construction Employers’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent.  
 
Eimer Stahl and Robert E. Dunn for the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America, National Federation of Independent 
Business, National Association of Manufacturers, the California 
Workers’ Compensation Institute, the California Chamber of 
 
 
Commerce, the Restaurant Law Center and the National Retail 
Federation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Malcolm A. Heinicke, Benjamin J. Horwich, 
Joseph Lee and Donald B. Verrilli for See’s Candies, Inc., and See’s 
Candy Shops, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for the Civil Justice Association of California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.  
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Martin Zurada 
Venardi Zurada LLP 
101 Ygnacio Valley Road, Suite 100 
Walnut Creek, CA 94596 
(925) 937-3900 
 
Allan Charles Dell’Ario 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 359 
Napa, CA 94559 
(707) 666-5351 
 
William Bogdan 
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 
50 California Street, Suite 2900 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 263-8127 
 
Robert E. Dunn 
Eimer Stahl LLP 
99 South Almaden Boulevard, Suite 642 
San Jose, CA 95113 
(408) 889-1690 
 
Benjamin J. Horwich 
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP 
560 Mission Street, 27th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 512-4066