Title: Oneida County Dept. of Social Services v. Nicole W.
Citation: 2007 WI 30
Docket Number: 2005AP002656
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2007

2007 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2656 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Brianca M. W., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
Oneida County Department of Social Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Nicole W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 290 Wis. 2d 513, 712 N.W.2d 88 
(Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 13, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 30, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Kinney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, JR., JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Thomas D. Wiensch, assistant corporation counsel and 
there was oral argument also by Jennifer A. Stuber, guardian ad 
litem. 
 
 
2007 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2656  
(L.C. No. 
2005TP4) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Brianca M. W., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Oneida County Department of Social Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Nicole W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
circuit court's order2 terminating Nicole W.'s (Nicole) parental 
rights to her daughter, Brianca M.W. (Brianca).  The focus of 
                                                 
1 The appeal was decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.31(2) (2003-04).  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 The Honorable Robert E. Kinney, Circuit Court Judge for 
Oneida County, presided. 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
2 
 
Nicole's appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting 
partial summary judgment under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) because 
her parental rights to her other child, Rockey, were terminated 
in a default judgment.  Nicole contends that there was 
insufficient evidence demonstrating the particularized grounds 
for the termination of Nicole's parental rights in regard to 
Rockey, which precludes the use of that termination under 
§ 48.415(10)(b) 
and 
that 
a 
default 
judgment 
is 
not 
a 
"termination on grounds," as she interprets § 48.415(10)(b).  
Consequently, Nicole argues, partial summary judgment should not 
have been granted and her parental rights were unlawfully 
terminated.    
¶2 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not 
require proof of which § 48.415 ground was relied upon for a 
prior termination of parental rights because the phrase, "on one 
or 
more 
of the 
grounds specified in this section," in 
§ 48.415(10)(b) 
refers 
to 
proving 
only 
that 
the 
prior 
termination was an involuntary termination. We also conclude 
that the order terminating Nicole's parental rights to Rockey, 
which arose from her default for failing to comply with a court 
order to personally appear at the fact-finding hearing, cannot 
be collaterally attacked in this proceeding and is sufficient 
evidence to prove that there was a prior involuntary termination 
of Nicole's rights to another child.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals.     
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
 Nicole's daughter, Brianca, was born on October 21, 
2003.  Brianca was placed in foster care shortly after birth and 
has continued in foster care through the time of trial.3  On 
March 11, 2005, the Oneida County Department of Human Services 
(the Department) filed a petition to terminate Nicole's parental 
rights to Brianca.  The petition alleged two grounds for the 
termination 
of 
Nicole's 
parental 
rights: 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(2), Brianca's continuing need of protection or services 
and 
§ 48.415(10), 
the involuntary termination of Nicole's 
parental rights to another child within the previous three 
years.   
¶4 
The Department moved for partial summary judgment on 
the second ground, relying on an order filed in Waukesha County 
on February 3, 2003 that involuntarily terminated Nicole's 
parental rights to her son, Rockey.4  The order states that 
Nicole was in default because she failed to appear at the fact-
finding hearing and that the termination of her rights to Rockey 
was involuntary, but it does not state the precise grounds for 
the involuntary termination.  To explain more fully, section 6 
of the standard order form that the Waukesha County Circuit 
                                                 
3 The circuit court found that Brianca was adjudged to be in 
need of protection or services under Wis. Stat. § 48.13(2),(3), 
or (10) based on a "Child in Need of Protection and/or Services" 
(CHIPS) order dated December 5, 2003.  The CHIPS case was 
identified as Oneida County Juvenile Court Case No. 03-JC-94.    
4 The Honorable Marianne E. Becker, Circuit Court Judge for 
Waukesha County, signed the order on January 24, 2003. 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
4 
 
Court employed contains a list of all of the grounds found in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415 for an involuntary termination.  Opposite 
each ground is a box to check, which when checked would indicate 
that ground was a basis for the termination.  However, the 
circuit court checked none of the boxes in section 6 of the 
form. 
 
The 
petition 
that 
commenced 
the 
Waukesha 
County 
termination of parental rights proceedings alleged that Nicole 
had abandoned Rockey, § 48.415(1), and that Rockey was in 
continuing need of protection or services, § 48.415(2). 
¶5 
In the present Oneida County termination proceedings, 
two hearings were held on the Department's motion for partial 
summary judgment.  At the first hearing, Nicole argued that the 
order terminating her rights to Rockey was not sufficient 
because it was not a "termination on grounds," as she interprets 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b), because the order was based on her 
default at the termination proceedings.  The court reviewed the 
Waukesha order, which stated that Nicole was in default but did 
not state the specific grounds employed for the involuntary 
termination.  The court then continued the hearing to allow the 
Department to produce a copy of the Waukesha petition to 
determine whether grounds sufficient under § 48.415 had been 
alleged.  At the second hearing, the court reviewed the petition 
in combination with the Waukesha County Circuit Court order and 
determined that the order was sufficient to establish an 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
5 
 
involuntary termination of parental rights within the criteria 
set out in § 49.415(10)(b).5   
¶6 
Nicole appealed and repeated her argument that the 
termination of her parental rights to Rockey based on her 
default was not "based on grounds" as she interprets Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(10).  Nicole also argued that the default order did not 
show the circuit court had made findings of fact based on 
evidence presented to show the county had proved the grounds 
alleged 
and 
therefore, 
the 
prior 
termination 
order 
was 
insufficient in that way as well.   
¶7 
The court of appeals rejected Nicole's arguments and 
affirmed the circuit court's decision.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that because the prior termination was involuntary, a 
fact 
that 
Nicole 
does 
not 
contest, 
it 
was 
necessarily 
accomplished on one of the grounds listed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415.  See Oneida County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Nicole W., 
No. 2005AP2656, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. 
February 7, 2006).  The court of appeals also concluded that an 
order demonstrating an involuntary termination of parental 
rights to another child within the previous three years, as 
required in § 48.415(10)(b), was the only proof the Department 
was required to submit.  The court of appeals reasoned that even 
with a default judgment rendered because Nicole failed to comply 
                                                 
5 The circuit court also found that Brianca was adjudged to 
be 
in need of protection or services under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.13(2),(3), or (10) based on a CHIPS order dated December 5, 
2003, as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(a).      
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
6 
 
with a court order to personally appear at the fact-finding 
hearing as the basis for terminating parental rights, the 
Department must have proved the grounds for the termination by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Id., ¶11.  The court stated, 
"[t]o require the type of extensive review suggested by Nicole 
would be tantamount to permitting a collateral attack on the 
prior TPR."  Id., ¶12. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
We review the partial grant of summary judgment 
independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit 
court.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶15, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶9 
To determine whether partial summary judgment was 
properly 
granted 
in 
this 
case, 
we 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(10).  The interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that we also review independently, "but benefiting from the 
analyses of the court of appeals and the circuit court."  Marder 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 
286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
B. 
Termination of Parental Rights  
¶10 Terminations of parental rights "are among the most 
consequential of judicial acts, involving as they do 'the 
awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all legal 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
7 
 
recognition of the parental relationship.'"  Steven V. v. Kelley 
H., 2004 WI 47, ¶21, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (quoting 
Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 
768).  A parent's interest in the parent-child relationship may 
rise to the level of a fundamental liberty interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
Id., ¶22 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).6  
When a fundamental liberty interest is at issue, the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that proof of 
parental unfitness be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  
Id., ¶23.   
¶11 The Wisconsin Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48, 
reflects constitutional safeguards.  Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶22.  As provided in the Children's Code, an involuntary 
termination of parental rights proceeding involves two steps——
grounds and disposition.  Id., ¶¶22-23.  The first step, the 
grounds or unfitness phase, includes a fact-finding hearing "to 
determine whether grounds exist for the termination of parental 
rights."  Id. (quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.424).  
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 sets out 12 grounds for an 
involuntary termination of parental rights, including the 
grounds relied upon here, a prior involuntary termination of 
parental rights to another child within the prior three years.  
                                                 
6 The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution states:  "nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law." 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
8 
 
§ 48.415(10).7  At the fact-finding hearing, "[t]he petitioner 
must prove the allegations [supporting grounds for termination] 
by clear and convincing evidence."  Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶22; Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1).  While the legislative objective of 
the Children's Code is to promote the best interests of the 
child,8 the parent's rights are a court's central focus during 
the 
grounds 
phase 
of 
a 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding.  Id.   
¶13 If grounds are found, the court must find the parent 
unfit.  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶25.  The proceeding then 
moves to step two, the dispositional phase.  Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶23; Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶26 (citing Sheboygan 
County DHHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶28, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 
N.W.2d 402).  At the dispositional phase, the court determines 
whether the best interests of the child are served by the 
termination of the parent's rights.  Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶23; 
Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2)).  While the central focus of the court proceeding 
                                                 
7 The other grounds for involuntary termination include 
abandonment, relinquishment, continuing need of protection or 
services, continuing parental disability, continuing denial of 
periods of physical placement or visitation, child abuse, 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility, 
incestuous 
parenthood, homicide or solicitation to commit homicide of 
parent, parenthood as a result of sexual assault, and commission 
of a serious felony against one of the person's children.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(1)-(9m). 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01 states:  "[i]n construing this 
chapter, the best interests of the child . . . shall always be 
of paramount consideration." 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
9 
 
is now on the best interests of the child, the parent's rights 
are not ignored.  A parent has the right to present evidence and 
to be heard at the dispositional phase too.  Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶23 (citing Wis. Stat. § 48.427(1)-(1m)).   
¶14 We have concluded that summary judgment may be 
employed in the grounds phase of a termination of parental 
rights proceeding when there is no genuine factual dispute that 
would preclude finding one or more of the statutory grounds by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶28-
44 (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)-(3)).  We explained that 
nothing in the statutes prohibits summary judgment in the 
grounds phase and that § 802.08 sets the procedure to be 
followed.  Id., ¶33.  We further explained that "[s]ome 
statutory grounds for unfitness . . . are expressly provable by 
official documentary evidence, such as court orders or judgments 
of conviction."  Id., ¶37.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(10) is one 
of the subsections we listed as provable by court order.  Id., 
¶¶37-38.  We explained:   
The availability of partial summary judgment in the 
grounds phase of a TPR proceeding where the entire 
proof of unfitness under the statute is an undisputed 
court record furthers the legislature's purpose and is 
consistent with the general rule that the provisions 
of the code of civil procedure apply to all civil 
actions and proceedings.   
Id., ¶39.   
¶15 In this case, we address whether partial summary 
judgment was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) when 
the order that terminated Nicole's parental rights to Rockey did 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
10 
 
not state the explicit § 48.415 ground upon which the circuit 
court relied and the prior involuntary termination was based on 
her default for failing to comply with a court order to 
personally appear at the fact-finding hearing of the grounds 
phase of the termination of parental rights proceeding.  With 
these questions in mind, we begin by determining the meaning of 
§ 48.415(10)(b).   
C. 
Statutory Interpretation 
¶16 We interpret Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) to determine what 
is 
required 
to 
satisfy 
the 
proof 
requirements 
of 
§ 48.415(10)(b).  Statutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the words of a 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop our inquiry and apply the 
words chosen by the legislature.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (citing Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Statutes are interpreted in the 
context in which they are used, as part of a whole and in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely related 
statutes.  Id., ¶46.  A statute is ambiguous "if it is capable 
of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two 
or more senses."  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is ambiguous, the 
court may examine extrinsic sources, such as legislative 
history.  Id., ¶48.  However, "[s]tatutory interpretation 
involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a search for 
ambiguity."  Id., ¶47 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 
WI 28, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656). 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
11 
 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(10) provides: 
Prior involuntary termination of parental rights to 
another child, which shall be established by proving 
all of the following: 
(a) That the child who is the subject of the 
petition has been adjudged to be in need of protection 
or services under s. 48.13(2), (3) or (10). 
(b) That, within 3 years prior to the date the 
court adjudged the child who is the subject of the 
petition to be in need of protection or services as 
specified in par. (a), a court has ordered the 
termination of parental rights with respect to another 
child of the person whose parental rights are sought 
to be terminated on one or more of the grounds 
specified in this section. 
¶18 We conclude that the statute is not ambiguous and that 
its plain language requires that:  (1) the child who is the 
subject of the petition has been adjudged to be in need of 
protection or services under Wis. Stat. § 48.13(2), (3) or (10); 
and (2) within the three years prior to that adjudication a 
court has terminated the parent's rights to another child in an 
involuntary termination proceeding.  We come to this second 
conclusion because the words of § 48.415(10)(b), "on one or more 
of the grounds specified in this section," when read in the 
context of the whole statute, plainly refer to the 12 grounds 
listed for an involuntary termination of rights under § 48.415.  
This 
is 
significant 
because 
it 
is 
only 
an 
involuntary 
termination 
of 
rights 
that 
is 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
§ 48.415(10).  Stated otherwise, if Nicole had voluntarily given 
up her rights to Rockey, the order terminating her parental 
rights to him would be insufficient to satisfy § 48.415(10) 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
12 
 
because that order would not have been based "on one or more of 
the grounds specified in this section," i.e., in § 48.415.  
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not require proof 
of which of the available 12 grounds set out in § 48.415 was the 
basis for the involuntary termination because the phrase, "on 
one or more of the grounds specified in this section," is meant 
as only a general directive that assures the termination of 
rights was involuntary.  In regard to the sufficiency of a prior 
order that can be used as grounds under § 48.415(10), there is 
no need for the order to specify which ground was employed, as 
any of the grounds set out in § 48.415 is sufficient to satisfy 
the requirement of paragraph (10)(b).9  Furthermore, there is no 
reason that the legislature would require proof of which ground 
under § 48.415 was used in the prior termination because by 
enacting § 48.415 with multiple grounds for an involuntary 
termination of rights, the legislature established that proving 
any single ground listed therein by clear and convincing 
evidence is sufficient for a court to conclude that a parent was 
unfit.  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶25. 
¶20 Although we do not consult legislative history to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) because we have concluded that 
                                                 
9 Of course the issue may be different if the termination of 
Nicole's parental rights to Rockey were being appealed.  In that 
case, the reviewing court could be asked to ascertain whether 
sufficient proof was admitted by the circuit court to support 
the court's determination that a specific ground was proved by 
clear and convincing evidence.  However, an appeal of the 
termination of Nicole's parental rights to Rockey is not before 
us. 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
13 
 
it is unambiguous, we may do so to confirm our decision.  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  In this case, we note that the joint 
legislative council note analyzing § 48.415(10) is consistent 
with our interpretation of the statute.  See 1995 Wis. Act 275, 
§ 89.  The analysis states: 
Note:  Adds a ground for involuntary TPR based on 
the 
involuntary 
TPR 
of 
another 
child 
when 
the 
following conditions are met: 
1.  The child who is the subject of the petition 
has been adjudicated CHIPS under s. 48.13(2), stats., 
(abandonment), (3), stats., (sexual or physical abuse) 
or (10), stats., (parent, guardian or legal custodian 
neglects, refuses or is unable for reasons other than 
poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, 
medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously 
endanger the physical health of the child); and 
2.  Within the 3 years prior to the date the 
child was adjudicated CHIPS, a juvenile court has 
ordered the involuntary TPR of another of the person's 
children. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The joint legislative council note 
explaining the statute supports our interpretation that the 
language requiring the prior termination to be on grounds 
specified in § 48.415 means only that it must be proved that the 
prior termination was involuntary.     
¶21 As one of her contentions, Nicole asserts that the 
termination of her parental rights to Rockey may not be used to 
satisfy Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) because the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court failed to check any of the boxes in section 6 on 
the form order the court used.  Nicole's argument is not 
persuasive because, as we have explained above, the last clause 
in § 48.415(10)(b) requires only that the prior termination be 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
14 
 
an involuntary termination and does not require proof of which 
grounds were the bases for that termination.  Nicole concedes 
that 
her 
parental 
rights 
to 
Rockey 
were 
involuntarily 
terminated. 
¶22 Furthermore, once a court has entered an order 
terminating a parent's rights, unless it is overturned in a 
further proceeding, it is presumed valid.  See Zrimsek v. Am. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959).  In 
Zrimsek, we explained that a "judgment rendered by a court 
having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, 
unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not 
open to contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its 
validity, verity, or binding effect, by parties or privies, in 
any collateral action or proceeding, except . . . for fraud in 
its procurement."  Id. (quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments, § 401).  We 
so explained in the context of examining the finality of a 
default judgment on a bail bond action against the principal.  
Id. at 3-4.  We concluded that the presumption of validity of 
judgments is no less binding if the judgment was based on a 
default than if it were based on a full trial.10  Id.   
¶23 Based 
on 
Wisconsin's presumption of validity of 
judgments, we must assume the Waukesha County Circuit Court 
                                                 
10 The Waukesha County Circuit Court had the authority to 
render a default judgment in response to Nicole's failure to 
comply with its order that she appear at the fact-finding 
hearing.  See Gaertner v. 880 Corp., 131 Wis. 2d 492, 497, 389 
N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1986).  Nicole does not contest this 
authority. 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
15 
 
found by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the 
grounds listed in Wis. Stat. § 48.415 had been proved before it 
terminated Nicole's parental rights to Rockey.  This is so 
because Nicole does not allege that the Waukesha Circuit Court 
was without jurisdiction, that the order was appealed or 
otherwise set aside or that it was procured by fraud.   
¶24 Furthermore, that an order does not have a written 
statement of which ground was the basis for an involuntary 
termination, but instead lists all possible grounds, is no basis 
for nullifying the effect of the order.  We must assume the 
order is valid.  Therefore, it is logical also to assume the 
missing check mark on the standard form employed by the Waukesha 
County Circuit Court is but a clerical or scrivener's error.  
See Bostwick v. Van Vleck, 106 Wis. 387, 390, 82 N.W. 302 (1900) 
(stating that a clerical mistake is "a mere omission to preserve 
of record, correctly in all respects, the actual decision of the 
court, which in itself was free from error," while an error in a 
judgment is "something that the trial court erroneously omitted 
to pass upon or considered and passed upon erroneously").  
¶25 The Oneida County Circuit Court said it also assumed 
the omission "was probably an inadvertent oversight in the 
filling out of the standard form.  The rest of the form appeared 
to have been filled out fine . . . ."  Mere clerical errors do 
not affect the validity of orders.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Gottschalk v. Miller, 136 Wis. 344, 348, 117 N.W. 809 (1908) 
(affirming an order of the supervisors of the town of Eagle to 
lay out a new highway and discontinue part of an old one because 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
16 
 
the alleged error in the description of the highway was "a mere 
clerical error and does not affect the validity of the order"). 
D. 
Collateral Attack  
¶26 Nicole also contends that the Waukesha County order 
that terminated her parental rights to Rockey cannot be used 
because it was entered after she was found in default for 
failing to comply with a court order to personally appear at the 
fact-finding hearing.  However, a circuit court must take 
sufficient evidence to prove by the clear and convincing 
standard of proof that grounds for the termination exist, and it 
must make such a finding even when the parent is found in 
default for failing to comply with a court order that she 
personally 
appear. 
 
Evelyn 
C.R., 
246 
Wis. 2d 
1, 
¶26.11  
Nevertheless, Nicole requests us to look under the order to the 
proceedings in Waukesha County to assure that this was done. 
¶27 We agree with the court of appeals that to require 
more evidence than a prior involuntary termination order to 
                                                 
11 In Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
629 N.W.2d 768, the parent did not personally appear at the 
fact-finding hearing and the circuit court found that grounds 
existed to terminate the parental rights based on allegations in 
the petition that the parent had abandoned the child.  Id., ¶9.  
We concluded the court had erroneously exercised its discretion 
and reasoned, "by entering a default judgment against Tykila 
[the parent] on the issue of abandonment without first taking 
evidence sufficient to support such a finding, the circuit court 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
requirements for termination of parental rights."  Id., ¶19.  
However, we found a factual basis in the record to support the 
termination and concluded the circuit court's procedural error 
was harmless.  Id., ¶¶32-35. 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
17 
 
satisfy 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(10) 
would 
be 
tantamount 
to 
permitting a collateral attack on the prior order.  A collateral 
attack on a judgment is "an attempt to avoid, evade, or deny the 
force and effect of a judgment in an indirect manner and not in 
a direct proceeding prescribed by law and instituted for the 
purpose of vacating, reviewing, or annulling it."  Zrimsek, 8 
Wis. 2d 1, 3 (citing 5 Callaghan's, Bryant, Wisconsin Pleading 
and Practice (3d ed.), p. 373, § 37.97).12 
¶28 In general, "a judgment is binding on the parties and 
may not be attacked in a collateral action unless it was 
procured by fraud."  State v. Madison, 120 Wis. 2d 150, 154, 353 
N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1984); cf. State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, 
¶¶52-55, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649.  Wisconsin courts have 
recognized 
the 
general 
disfavor 
of 
allowing 
collateral 
challenges on the basis that "they disrupt the finality of prior 
judgments and thereby tend to undermine confidence in the 
integrity of our procedures and inevitably delay and impair the 
orderly administration of justice."  State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI 
App 143, ¶6, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 720 N.W.2d 114 (citing Custis v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) and Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 
889, ¶¶26-28 (following Custis)) (internal quotations omitted).  
The finality of a judgment in a termination of parental rights 
proceeding is even more critical because, as the legislature 
                                                 
12 See State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶¶17, 28, 238 Wis. 2d 
889, 618 N.W.2d 528 (allowing an offender to collaterally attack 
a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding "only when 
the challenge to the prior conviction is based on the denial of 
the offender's constitutional right to a lawyer"). 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
18 
 
recognized, 
"instability 
and 
impermanence 
in 
family 
relationships 
are 
contrary 
to 
the 
welfare 
of 
children."  
Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶32, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 
607 N.W.2d 607.   
¶29 Nicole contends that her attack on the termination of 
rights order that arose in part from her default rendered 
because she failed to comply with a court order to personally 
appear is not a collateral attack on the validity of the order.  
She characterizes it as a failure of proof by the Department 
because it has not shown what actually occurred at the fact-
finding hearing in Waukesha County Circuit Court when her 
parental rights to Rockey were terminated.  For example, in oral 
argument her counsel raised the issue of a possible denial of 
the right to counsel in the prior proceeding.  When counsel was 
asked 
whether 
Nicole 
was 
attacking 
the 
Waukesha 
County 
termination of her parental rights to Rockey because she had not 
been 
represented 
by 
counsel 
in 
that 
proceeding, 
counsel 
responded that it was not possible to tell whether she had been 
represented by counsel, given the record before the court.    
¶30 We have allowed defendants to collaterally attack a 
prior criminal conviction in the very limited circumstance of 
the deprivation of the right to counsel.  In Hahn, we held that 
a defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction that 
serves to enhance a prospective sentence where the defendant 
makes a prima facie showing that his or her constitutional right 
to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
19 
 
Constitution was violated in that prior proceeding.13  Hahn, 238 
Wis. 2d 889, ¶¶17, 28.  We subsequently noted that we were 
"bound as a matter of federal constitutional law" and that "the 
Supreme Court's concerns about ease of administration and 
finality of judgments weighed in favor of a bright-line rule 
against collateral attacks, with the limited exception of right-
to-counsel violations."  State v. Peters, 2001 WI 74, ¶15, 244 
Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797 (citing Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 889, ¶¶28-
29).   
¶31 We note that allowing a collateral attack due to a 
violation of the right to counsel has been applied only in the 
context of criminal proceedings and a termination of parental 
rights proceeding is civil in nature.  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶32 (stating termination of parental rights proceedings under 
Chapter 48 are civil proceedings).  The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach in civil proceedings.  State v. Krause, 
2006 WI App 43, ¶11, 289 Wis. 2d 573, 712 N.W.2d 67 (citing 
Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2001)).   
¶32 However, even though termination of parental rights 
proceedings are civil proceedings, we have determined that they 
"require 
heightened 
legal 
safeguards 
against 
erroneous 
decisions."  Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 (concluding the 
                                                 
13 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence."  This amendment is made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 889, ¶4 n.3 (citing 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).   
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
20 
 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires 
a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the termination 
is appropriate).   
¶33 While the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil 
proceedings, the right to counsel in termination of parental 
rights proceedings is accorded by Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2).14  The 
legislature emphasized the necessity of counsel and "[t]he 
legislative edict is that, in termination proceedings, 'any 
parent . . . shall be represented by counsel.'"  M.W. v. Monroe 
County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 437, 342 N.W.2d 
410 (1984).  We have recently affirmed that the statutory right 
to counsel is necessary to preserve the "fairness and integrity" 
of termination proceedings.  State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, 
¶63, __ Wis. 2d __, 724 N.W.2d 623.  We have further explained 
that 
the 
statutory 
right 
to 
counsel 
includes 
effective 
assistance of counsel.  A.S. v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995, 1004, 
485 N.W.2d 52 (1992).  In examining whether assistance of 
counsel in an involuntary termination of rights proceeding was 
effective, we have applied the Strickland test.  Id. at 1005 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  In 
Strickland, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
adopted 
the 
following two-part test: 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) provides in relevant part:  
"If a proceeding involves . . . the involuntary termination of 
parental rights, any parent 18 years old or older who appears 
before the court shall be represented by counsel; but the parent 
may waive counsel provided the court is satisfied such waiver is 
knowingly and voluntarily made." 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
21 
 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient.  This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant 
by the [S]ixth [A]mendment.  
Second, 
the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. 
Id. (citing State v. Harvey, 139 Wis. 2d 353, 375, 407 N.W.2d 
235 (1987) (emphasis added).  Therefore, we have applied Sixth 
Amendment concepts in the context of termination of parental 
rights proceedings, even though the proceedings are civil in 
nature and the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil 
proceedings.   
¶34 When a claim of denial of the right of counsel is 
made, the claimant has the burden to make a prima facie showing 
of a violation of the right to counsel.  State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 
107, ¶25, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.  In that showing: 
[W]e require the defendant to point to facts that 
demonstrate that he or she did not know or understand 
the information which should have been provided in the 
previous proceeding and, thus, did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her right 
to counsel.  Any claim of a violation on a collateral 
attack that does not detail such facts will fail.   
Id. (concluding there was not a prima facie showing because the 
defendant did not mention specific facts that indicated his 
waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary) 
(citation omitted). 
¶35 However, we need not determine whether the prior 
Waukesha County termination of rights order may be collaterally 
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
22 
 
attacked due to a violation of the right to counsel because 
Nicole made no prima facie showing that she was denied the right 
of counsel in the termination of rights proceeding regarding 
Rockey.  Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 889, ¶¶17, 28; Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 
300, ¶25.  Furthermore, Nicole does not argue that she was not 
actually represented by counsel in the prior termination 
proceedings; she simply argues that the record does not 
demonstrate she was represented by counsel.  However, the 
Department does not have the burden of proof in a collateral 
attack; Nicole does.  See Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶25 (citing 
State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶46, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 
14).  She has not met it here.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not 
require proof of which § 48.415 ground was relied upon for a 
prior termination of parental rights because the phrase, "on one 
or 
more 
of the 
grounds specified in this section," in 
§ 48.415(10)(b) 
refers 
to 
proving 
only 
that 
the 
prior 
termination was an involuntary termination. We also conclude 
that the order terminating Nicole's parental rights to Rockey, 
which arose from her default for failing to comply with a court 
order to personally appear at the fact-finding hearing, cannot 
be collaterally attacked in this proceeding and is sufficient 
evidence to prove that there was a prior involuntary termination 
of Nicole's rights to another child.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals.   
No. 
2005AP2656   
 
23 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Department of Social Services' motion for partial summary 
judgment terminating Nicole W.'s parental rights to Brianca was 
based on a certified copy of a Waukesha County Circuit Court 
order terminating Nicole W.'s parental rights to another child, 
Rockey.  The issue presented in the instant case is whether the 
Department was entitled, as a matter of law, to a partial 
summary judgment on the basis of the Waukesha order.         
¶38 The 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(10) 
clearly, 
explicitly, and plainly requires that the "prior involuntary 
termination of parental rights . . . shall be established by 
proving . . . that a court has ordered the termination of 
parental rights [to the other child] . . . on one or more of the 
grounds specified in this section."1 
¶39 The Waukesha order terminating Nicole W.'s parental 
rights to her other child, Rockey, a copy of which is attached, 
                                                 
1 Section 48.415(10) provides as follows: 
Prior involuntary termination of parental rights to 
another child, which shall be established by proving 
all of the following: 
(a) That the child who is the subject of the petition 
has been adjudged to be in need of protection or 
services under s. 48.13(2), (3) or (10). 
(b) That, within 3 years prior to the date the court 
adjudged the child who is the subject of the petition 
to be in need of protection of services as specified 
in par. (a), a court has ordered the termination of 
parental rights with respect to another child of the 
person 
whose 
parental 
rights 
are 
sought 
to 
be 
terminated on one or more of the grounds specified in 
this section. 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
2 
 
does not satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10).  
Everyone agrees, including, I am sure, the reader, that the 
order fails state the grounds upon which the termination was 
ordered.2    
¶40 The majority opinion plugs the omission in the 
Waukesha order relating to Rockey by rewriting Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(10).  The majority opinion simply reads the statutory 
words "ordered the termination of parental rights . . . on one 
or more of the grounds specified in this section" out of the 
statute book.  
¶41 The 
majority 
opinion 
interprets 
this 
statutory 
language as merely requiring that the prior termination be an 
involuntary termination; the ground of termination need not be 
stated.  According to the majority opinion, "the last clause in 
§ 48.415(10)(b) requires only that the prior termination be an 
involuntary termination and does not require proof of which 
grounds were the bases for that termination."  Majority op., 
¶21; see also ¶¶2, 36.3 
¶42 By rewriting Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b), the majority 
opinion can declare the Waukesha order sufficient even though 
                                                 
2 Observe that the order provides several boxes to be marked 
to indicate on which grounds the termination of parental rights 
was ordered.  None was marked and no other reference to the 
statutory ground for termination appears. 
3 Other paragraphs in the majority opinion repeat that it is 
only necessary that the prior termination be "involuntary," 
majority op., ¶20, and that "there is no need for the [Waukesha] 
order to specify which ground was employed, as any of the 
grounds set out in § 48.415 is sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of paragraph (10)(b)."  Majority op., ¶19.   
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
3 
 
the order does not specify any ground for terminating Nicole 
W.'s parental rights to the child.  I disagree with the majority 
opinion.  If the legislature had concluded that proof of a prior 
involuntary termination of parental rights was all that was 
needed 
it 
could 
have 
simply 
so 
stated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(10).  It did not.   
¶43 I would not rewrite the text of the statute.  I would 
apply the statute as written by the legislature, giving meaning 
to all of the words.  The statute clearly states that a prior 
involuntary termination of parental rights to another child 
shall be established by proving that the prior court ordered 
termination on a ground specified in Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  The 
Waukesha order relied upon by the Department did not satisfy 
this requirement, and therefore the Department's motion for 
partial summary judgment must fail as a matter of law. 
¶44 Even if I were to accept the majority opinion's 
reading of the statute, the Waukesha order does not satisfy the 
statute.  The Waukesha order is based on a default, not on any 
of the statutory grounds, as I explain below.    
¶45 Recognizing the defect in the Waukesha order, the 
circuit court attempted to repair the Waukesha order by 
importing into the Waukesha order the grounds for termination 
stated in the petition for termination filed in Waukesha.  I 
disagree with the circuit court's approach.    
¶46 At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment in 
the present case, Nicole W. asserted, and the circuit court 
agreed, that the Waukesha order was defective and could not 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
4 
 
support the motion for summary judgment as a matter of law 
because the order did not state a statutory ground for 
termination.   
¶47 Accordingly, the circuit court adjourned the hearing 
on 
the 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment 
and 
permitted 
"the 
corporation counsel to obtain the rest of the file . . . ."  The 
circuit court suggested various Waukesha County documents the 
corporation counsel might produce to cure the deficiency, such 
as the petition for termination and a transcript of the Waukesha 
County court hearings, and even proposed that the Department 
have the Waukesha court amend the order to correct it.4 
¶48 When, at the motion hearing, the corporation counsel 
offered an uncertified copy of the termination petition filed in 
                                                 
4 The circuit court stated that the corporation counsel 
should "find out what the petition alleged and, perhaps, obtain 
a transcript of the proceedings at which the default order was 
entered.  Presumably that was transcribed because I think it 
would have been in the ordinary course of things. . . ."   
The circuit court further explained that it could not 
"determine from the current order what the grounds really were.  
What was Nicole W. defaulting to?  What did the petition allege?  
That's really what we have to have. . . . We don't know really 
who the scrivener of the order was. . . ."  
The circuit court suggested that "it may well be that we 
should 
really 
have 
an 
amended 
order 
out 
of 
Waukesha 
County. . . . [I]t would be preferable to let Waukesha County 
correct its apparent inadvertent error."   
The circuit court concluded its instructions to the 
corporation counsel by saying that "what we have to do here is 
come back here and find out at that point whether the basis that 
was stated——or bases stated were those mentioned in the statute.  
So we can't decide it today and we should have that information 
supplied."   
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
5 
 
Waukesha County, the circuit court refused to accept it.  The 
circuit court instructed, "[W]e should get a certified copy and 
we should also compare it with the order and we should give 
Waukesha County the opportunity to amend the order by, you know, 
having one of the boxes checked here."5 
¶49 At the next hearing on the motion for partial summary 
judgment, the corporation counsel produced only a certified copy 
of the petition for termination of parental rights to Rockey 
filed in Waukesha County, which, as might be expected, stated a 
statutory ground for termination.  The circuit court found that 
the petition was good enough to plug the hole in the Waukesha 
order.  I disagree with the circuit court.  There is no proof 
the ground for termination alleged in the petition was ever 
proven.     
¶50 Although the form order provides the circuit court an 
opportunity to state that the matter was tried to a jury or to 
the circuit court and that one or more of the statutory grounds 
for termination was found, the completed Waukesha order in the 
instant case merely states that Nicole W. failed to appear and 
was in default.  The spaces in which to indicate that a hearing 
was held and that fact-finding occurred remain blank on the form 
order.      
¶51 The Waukesha order on its face violates chapter 48 of 
the statutes by relying only on default and not fact-finding.  
                                                 
5 The circuit court was referring to the boxes on the order 
terminating parental rights which could be marked to indicate on 
which statutory grounds the order was granted.  None of the 
boxes was checked here. 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
6 
 
Before entering a default judgment in a termination of parental 
rights case, a circuit court must hold a fact-finding hearing 
and find by clear and convincing evidence, upon the evidence 
presented, that the grounds to terminate the defaulting parent's 
rights to the child have been proven, even when a parent fails 
to appear at all and defaults or fails to appear at a proceeding 
in disobedience to a court order.  Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 
2001 WI 110, ¶¶24-25, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.   
¶52 The Waukesha order and the petition relating to Rockey 
upon which the Department relies do not establish that the 
circuit court held a fact-finding hearing or made the required 
findings.  The only reasonable reading of the Waukesha order 
terminating Nicole W.'s parental rights to Rockey was that the 
order was entered on Nicole W.'s failure to appear and that no 
fact-finding hearing was held and no findings were made.  
Although this court has been clear that the fact-finding hearing 
must occur even if a parent does not appear, it is apparently 
not uncommon for circuit courts to skip an evidentiary hearing 
and fact-finding when a parent fails to appear for it.  See 
Torrance P. v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 724 
N.W.2d 623; Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 
Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  Accordingly, I conclude that the 
circuit court erred in relying on the petition to terminate 
parental rights to Rockey to fill the void in the Waukesha 
order. 
¶53 The sad part of the case is that this dispute could 
have 
been 
resolved 
simply 
and 
swiftly, 
thereby 
bringing 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
7 
 
permanency to Brianca's life.  All the corporation counsel had 
to do to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) in the instant case was 
to produce in the circuit court, as the circuit court suggested, 
a transcript of the Waukesha County proceedings or a corrected 
copy of the Waukesha order.  Either of these methods would have 
clearly demonstrated one way or the other whether the prior 
termination of parental rights was on statutory grounds.   
¶54 Because partial summary judgment was erroneous, I 
would reverse the circuit court order granting partial summary 
judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court to give the 
Department an opportunity to prove that the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court "ordered the termination of parental rights [to 
Nicole W.'s child Rockey] . . . on one or more of the grounds 
specified [in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)]."  If the Department 
cannot offer such proof, then the circuit court must, as Nicole 
W.'s brief requests, hold a trial on Nicole W.'s fitness as a 
parent with respect to Brianca.          
¶55 In any event, the court's rewriting of the statute 
should have ended the majority opinion.  The statute, as 
rewritten by the majority opinion, disposes fully of the case.  
Nevertheless, the majority opinion reaches out to discuss and 
decide other issues.  It tries to bolster its opinion, 
declaring, without any basis, an error in the order (majority 
op., ¶24), and relying on a presumption of the validity of a 
judicial proceeding (majority op., ¶¶22-23).  It seems to me 
that it is just as likely that the order was correct and 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
8 
 
reflected an error at the proceedings as that the order was in 
error and the proceedings correct.     
¶56 The majority opinion then wanders even more broadly 
and addresses collateral attacks on a prior judgment terminating 
parental rights (majority op., ¶¶27-28), although no such 
collateral attack has been made in the present case, and winds 
up with an unnecessary discussion of Nicole's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in the Waukesha court (majority op., ¶¶30-35).   
¶57 Even if I agreed with the mandate, I would not join 
these parts of the majority opinion because they are not 
necessary to a decision in this case; I do not write to them now 
because they are not actually before the court.  A court should 
not reach out and decide matters not before it.  Less is often 
more when deciding cases before the court.  "If an issue——no 
matter how important or interesting——is not squarely presented 
by a case, the court should not reach out to decide it.  The 
court will get another chance——particularly if the court notes 
the issue but does not express any opinion on it."6   
¶58 David M. Borden, Associate Justice of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, offered the following advice on appellate 
decision making: "[W]e ought to decide only what the case fairly 
presents.  Put another way, ordinarily we ought not reach out to 
                                                 
6 See Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DePaul L. 
Rev. 673, 685-86 (Spring 1994) (footnotes omitted).  The Chicago 
Council 
of 
Lawyers 
conducted 
the 
evaluation 
to 
provide 
information to judges on how they are perceived by the Chicago 
bar and to provide information to lawyers and litigants 
practicing in the Seventh Circuit. 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
9 
 
decide what is not reasonably necessary to the decision, even 
though we are convinced that what we have to say in that regard 
is correct."7 
¶59 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., join this opinion. 
 
                                                 
7 Hon. David M. Borden, Some Neutral Principles Revisited, 
27 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 13 (Fall 1994). 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
10 
 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
11 
 
No.  2005AP2656.ssa 
 
1