Title: STATE EX REL MUIRHEAD v DISTRICT C
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13315
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1976

No. 1.3315 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1976 STATE OF MONTANA, ex r e l . K A R O L A MUIRHEAD, Rela t o r , THE DISrIRICT C O U R T OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , I N AND FOR T H E COUNTY OF LEWIS AND CLARK, AND T H E HON. PETER G. MELOY, JUDGE PRESIDING, Respondents. O K l G l N A L PKOCEEDING : Counsel of Record : For Rela t o r : T d . William Leaphart argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Smith, Smith and Sewell, Helena, Montana Robert J. Sewell argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: April 8, 1976 Decided : y ~ a y 6 1 9 7 6 F i l e d : '- ' - b %I. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of ;:he Court. Relator petitioned t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of prohibition gr orher appropriate w r i t , t o recover the custody of t h r e e minor children. Adversary hearing t o determine the i s s u e of j u r i s - d i c t i o n was s e t by the Court t o be heard April 8, 1976. Briefs were f i l e d , the matter heard, and taken under advisement by t h e Court. A n action i n the d i s t r i c t court was brought by Robert Xuirhead t o modify a decree of divorce between Karola Virginia Yiuirhead and Robert Jack Muirhead, granted by t h e Superior Court o f the s t a t e of Washington, Kitsap County, November 3, 1972. Karola was granted custody of t h e t h r e e minor children of t h e n a r t i e s and Robert was ordered t o pay $300 per month f o r t h e support of the children. Robert was given reasonable r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n a t proper times and places. Robert l e f t t h e s t a t e of 'dashington, and established a home i n Helena, Montana. Robert, while v i s i t i n g t h e minor children on o r about iugust 28, 1975, a t ~ a r o l a ' s home i n Bremerton, Washington, dlleged he observed (1) t h e physical and emotional s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e minor children were located had s e r i o u s l y d e t e r i o r a t e d , ,2) t h e only clean c l o t h e s they had were those they were wearing 2t the time, (3) t h a t t h e children were physically unclean, i4j the household environment was f i l t h y , (5) t h a t Karola had given b i r t h t o another c h i l d out of wedlock and the nine year ~ l d Nicki Lori, was i n charge of a l l the children while Karola dorked a s a c o c k t a i l waitress from 5:00 p.m. t o 2:00 a.m., (6) none , i the children were properly fed, and (7) the family was apparently i-11 desperate f i s c a l need, indicating a f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of varola t o properly u t i l i z e the support money furnished by him. Yubert alleged t h a t a f t e r seeing t h i s s i t u a t i o n , he took the children dild brought them t o Helena, Montana, t o h i s new home. 3n Sctober 5 , 1-975, 3obert petitioned the d i s t r i c t court o f Lewis and Clark County t h a t he be granted t h e c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of the minor children. A copy of t h a t p e t i t i o n was sent t o Karola by r e g i s t e r e d mail and she appeared s p e c i a l l y , challenging the j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e subject matter of t h e p e t i t i o n . Temporary custody was granted by t h e Montana court t o Robert on October 2, 1975; on January 12, 1976, Judge Robert W. Winsor of the Superior Court of the S t a t e of Washington, King County, held a hearing and issued an order t o show cause, found Robert i n contempt of court f o r f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e custody provisions of t h e decree of divorce and ordered Robert t o take immediate s t e p s t o r e t u r n the children t o Karola. Thereafter, on March 3 , 1976, Judge Meloy of t h e d i s t r i c t ~ o u r t , Lewis and Clark County, s t a t e of Montana, denied ~ a r o l a ' s notion t o dismiss f o r lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n and held t h a t h i s court had " j u r i s d i c t i o n over both t h e person of the defendant and of t h e subject matter. I I Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d by the p e t i t i o n : 1. Whether o r not t h e Montana d i s t r i c t court must have i-n Dersonam j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e mother and t h e l e g a l custodian 2 f the minor children before t h a t court can order t h e mother's r i g h t t o custody terminated and t r a n s f e r r e d t o the f a t h e r ? 2. Whether o r not r e l a t o r has s u f f i c i e n t "minimum contacts" with zhe s t a t e of Montana t o come within t h e provisions of ~ o n t a n a ' s long arm s t a t u t e , Rule 4 , M.R.Civ.P.? Where, a s here, the claim i s t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n i s conferred by p h y s i c a l presence of the c h i l d , we must avoid accepting those I l Ldses where custody was obtained by s e i z e and run". This Court i n C a r r o l l v. White, 151 Mont. 332, 335, 443 P.2d ' - 3 , similar t o the i n s t a n t case, a f t e r f i r s t discussing several 3 d r l i . e ~ c u s ~ o d y cases, held: ' I f The mother, who was awarded the custody of the children, had the r i g h t t o f i x t h e i r residence. * 9: ; k And t h e mother's residence determines t h a t of t h e children. ik 9~ Certainly they were r e s i d e n t s of t h e S t a t e of Oregon, when the Oregon court awarded t h e custody t o t h e i r mother. 9 : 9 : * The Oregon court had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o decree t h e custody of the children i n the divorce a c t i o n . That decree i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l f a i t h and c r e d i t here. * ; k tb Any question of t h e f i t n e s s of t h e mother t o have t h e c a r e and custody of the children and her claimed abandonment of them should have been brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of the Oregon court before t h e award of custody was made. 1 1 1 ?iontanals long-arm s t a t u t e , Rule 4, M.R.Civ.P., s e t s f o r t h I I chose persons and corporations who a r e subject" t o the j u r i s - d i c t i o n of Montana courts. The r u l e reads: JURISDICTION PERSONS. (1) Subject t o J u r i s d i c t i o n . A 1 1 persons within 'he s t a t e of Montana a r e subject t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n LJ£ the courts of t h i s s t a t e . I n a d d i t i o n , any person Is subject t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of t h i s s t a t e a s t o any claim f o r r e l i e f a r i s i n g from t h e doing $ersonally, through an employee, o r through an agent, .3f any of t h e following a c t s : (a) t h e transaction of any business within t h i s s t a t e ; j b ) t h e commission of any a c t which r e s u l t s i n accrual within t h e s t a t e of a t o r t a c t i o n ; ,c) t h e ownership, use o r possession of any property, dr of any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n , s i t u a t e d within t h i s s t a t e ; ) contracting t o i n s u r e any person, property o r r i s k located within t h i s s t a t e a t t h e t i m e of contracting; ;e; entering i n t o a contract f o r services t o be rendered o r f o r materials t o be furnished i n t h i s s t a t e by such person; o r , f ) a c ~ i n g a s d i r e c t o r , manager, t r u s t e e , o r other o f f i c e r of any corporation organized under the laws o f , o r having i t s p r i n c i p a l place of business within t h i s s t a t e , o r a s executor o r administrator d f any e s t a t e within t h i s s t a t e . I I R e l a L u r ~ O C S not f i t within any of t h e enumerated I 1 : r i t e r i a . She has no contacts" with t h e s t a t e of Hontana which . ~ u u l d warrani subjecting her t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e liontana courts. Any attempt by Montana t o exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n over :<arola Muirhead would be i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e due process clause of ,:he Fourteenth Amendment t o the United S t a t e s Constitution. Relator i s not subject t o the long-arm s t a t u t e of the s t a t e of Montana and thus the Montana court cannot obtain i n personam jurisdiction over her. Any custody decree rendered by t h e Montana court would not be e n t i t l e d t o f u l l f a i t h and c r e d i t and thus the i n t e r s t a t e custody b a t t l e would continue and what- ever chance the children have f o r s t a b i l i t y and happiness would be l o s t amidst the din of warring parents. It i s the s t a t e of Washington which has the contacts with the p a r t i e s justifying an exercise of jurisdiction. Washing- ton i s the s i t u s of the marriage a s well a s the divorce and i s t h e l e g a l domicile of r e l a t o r and thus the children of which she has l e g a l custody. There i s presently a contempt proceeding i n progress i n the s t a t e of Washington concerning the custody of the Muirhead children. A show cause hearing was held i n S e a t t l e on January 12, 1976 a t which Robert .Mu'irZiead was held i n contempt of court f o r r e f u s a l t o return custody of the children t o r e l a t o r and he was further ordered t o take immediate steps t o so return custody of the children. The matter of appropriate sanctions f o r Robert Muirhead's contempt was continued u n t i l such time a s Robert Pfuirhead i s brought before the Washington Court. It was further ordered t h a t a copy of t h e Washington order be sent t o the Hon. Judge Meloy of the Montana d i s t r i c t court. Equity demands the Montana d i s t r i c t court defer t o the Washington court f o r the reason t h a t Robert Muirhead does not have "clean hands", i . e . , he has petitioned i n Montana f o r a modification of a CJashington decree, which decree he i s presently violating. Brown v. Brown, 105 Ariz. 273, 463 P.2d 71'; State ex r e l . Glasier v. Glasier, 272 Minn. 62, 137 N.W.2d 549. I n h i s chapter on Marriage, Divorce, and Custody, p. 198, i n h i s "Commentary on the Conflict of Laws!' (1971), Professor Russell J. Weintraub of the University of Texas, poses t h i s question and answer: I t H o w can we end the disgraceful i n t e r s t a t e custody b a t t l e s t h a t rage about us with children a s the weapons? JC J i JC What i s needed i s t h a t courts voluntarily d e s i s t from entertaining a p e t i t i o n t o modify a s i s t e r - s t a t e custody decree when t h a t decree was rendered by a court t h a t had s u f f i c i e n t contacts with t h e p a r t i e s t o reach an i n t e l l i g e n t decision, when t h a t other court s t i l l has these contacts so t h a t it could make an informed determination of the request f o r modification, and when there i s no compelling reason, such a s imminent t h r e a t of irreparable harm t o the c h i l d , why the p a r t i e s should not be remitted t o t h a t other s t a t e f o r decision on the p e t i t i o n t o amend the outstanding decree. I I Relator submits t h a t the d i s t r i c t court dismiss ~ o b e r t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r lack of i n personam jurisdiction over r e l a t o r and/or defer t o the jurisdiction of t h e Washington court, because: 1. ~ o n t a n a ' s long-arm s t a t u t e does not encompass a person i n r e l a t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n ; 2. The s t a t e of Washington i s the s i t u s of t h e marriage and the divorce between t h e p a r t i e s and i s the domicile of r e l a t o r a s well a s the children; 3. Robert i s before the Montana court with "unclean hands", i . e . , he is petitioning t o modify a decree which he i n turn i s violating; and 4. Robert Muirhead has s u f f i c i e n t "contacts" with the s t a t e of Washington t o be subject t o t h a t s t a t e ' s jurisdiction. Further there i s presently pending i n the s t a t e of Washington a contempt proceeding i n which he has been personally served and ordered t o return custody of the children t o r e l a t o r . I n view of the f a c t the children here involved a r e now i n school and have but a month t o go t o complete the f u l l year, t h i s Court d i r e c t s the father Robert Muirhead, t o return t h e children t o t h e i r mother i n Washington immediately a f t e r the school year ends. I f there be any question of p e t i t i o n e r Karola's f i t n e s s , t h a t i s f o r the court i n the s t a t e of Washington t o decide, f o r there i s where jurisdiction l i e s . The d i s t r i c t court i s reversed. // Chief Justice - - Justices. Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell specially concurring: I concur in the result based. on lack of subjec~ macter jurisdiction. In my view, the Washington custody award was controlling U r i i l L aodified or superseded by the Washington court. Carroll v. White, 151 Mont. 332, 443 P.2d 13. In Carroll, as here, the Washington court made a valid custody award involving children and parents who were Washington domiciliaries. The custody award in both cases was entitled to full faith and credit in 14ontana. United States Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 1; Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 947. In this case the Washington custody award was violated by the father, then a Montana domiciliary, when he removed the children from their mother's custody in Washington and brought them to Montana. Such unauthorized removal in violation of an existing valid custody award did not vest jurisdiction in the Montana courts to readjudicate custody based on changed circumstances. State ex rel. Nipp v. District Court, 46 Mont. 425, 128 P. 590. As I see it, neither ~ontana's "long arm statute1' (Rule 4 ( 8 ) ( I ) , M. R. Civ. P. ) nor the 'minimum contactsr' test is germane to determining the jurisdiction of Montana courts in interstate custody I I cases involving seize & run" violations of valid custody orders of sister states. Justice. I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA STATE O F MONTANA ex r e l . K A R O L A MUIRHEAD , Relator, V S . THE DISTRICT COURT O F T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA, I N AND F O R T H E COUNTY O F LEWIS AND CLARK, AND T H E H O N O R A B L E PETER G. M E L O Y , JUDGE PRESIDING, Respondents. CLERK OF S ~ P R E M E COURT - STATE OF rdCSJT6lrtlA O R D E R ON PETITION F O R REHEARING O n p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h e opinion f a i l e d t o consider t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce A c t , s e c t i o n s 48-301 through 48-341, R.C.M. 1947, which became e f f e c - t i v e January 1, 1976, and t h a t s a i d Act applied t o a l l proceed- i n g s pending on t h a t d a t e . Appellant f u r t h e r argues t h a t s e c t i o n 48-331, R.C.M. 1947, r e l a t i n g t o j u r i s d i c t i o n was not applied o r distinguished by t h e Court i n its d e c i s i o n and t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o do so could cause considerable confusion i n t h e l a w . Section 48-331, R.C.M. 1947 provides: "48-331. Jurisdiction--commencement of proceedings. (1) A c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e competent t o decide d h i l d custody matters has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make a c h i l d custody determination by i n i t i a l o r modifi- c a t i o n decree i f : " ( a ) t h i s s t a t e "(i) i s t h e home s t a t e of t h e c h i l d a t t h e t i m e of commencement of t h e proceedings, o r " ( i i ) had been t h e c h i l d ' s home state within s i x ( 6 ) months before commencement of t h e proceeding and t h e c h i l d is absent from t h i s state because of h i s removal o r r e t e n t i o n by a person claiming h i s custody or f o r o t h e r reason, and a parent or person a c t i n g a s parent continues t o l i v e i n t h i s s t a t e ; o r " ( b ) it is i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n because " (i) t h e c h i l d and h i s parents, o r t h e c h i l d and a t l e a s t one c o n t e s t a n t , have a s i g n i f i c a n t connection with t h i s s t a t e , and " ( i i ) t h e r e is a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s s t a t e substan- t i a l evidence concerning t h e c h i l d ' s present o r f u t u r e c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; o r " ( c ) t h e c h i l d is physically p r e s e n t i n t h i s s t a t e and " (i) has been abandoned o r "(ii) it i s necessary i n an emergency t o p r o t e c t him because he has been subjected t o o r threatened with mistreatment o r abuse o r is neglected o r dependent; o r " (d) (i) no o t h e r s t a t e has j u r i s d i c t i o n under p r e r e q u i s i t e s s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n accordance with paragraphs ( a ) , ( b ) , o r ( c ) , o r another s t a t e has declined t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e ground t h a t t h i s s t a t e is t h e more a p p r o p r i a t e forum t o determine custody of t h e c h i l d , and "(ii) it i s i n h i s b e s t i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e c o u r t assume j u r i s d i c t i o n . " ( 2 ) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of sub- s e c t i o n ( l ) , physical presence i n t h i s state of t h e c h i l d , o r of t h e c h i l d and one of t h e contes- t a n t s , is n o t alone s u f f i c i e n t t o confer j u r i s - d i c t i o n on a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e t o make a c h i l d custody determination. " ( 3 ) Physical presence of t h e c h i l d , while d e s i r - a b l e , i s not p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n t o determine h i s custody. " ( 4 ) A c h i l d custody proceeding is commenced i n t h e d i s t r i c t court: " ( a ) by a p a r e n t , by f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n " ( i ) f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o r l e g a l separation; o r permanently r e s i d e n t o r found; o r "(b) by a person o t h e r than a p a r e n t , by f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n f o r custody of t h e c h i l d i n t h e county i n which he is permanently r e s i d e n t o r found, b u t only i f he is n o t i n t h e physical custody of one of h i s parents. " ( 5 ) Notice of a c h i l d custody proceeding s h a l l be given to the child's parent, guardian, and custodian, who may appear, be heard, and file a responsive pleading. The court, upon a showing of good cause, may permit intervention of other interested parties. " We find no conflict in our opinion with the above set forth law. Our opinion requires the service of process as provided for by Rule 41, M.R.Civ.P. of the notice provided for in subse~tion(5~. This requirement of "notice" under section 48-331, R.C.M. 1947, is consistent with the requirement of service of process under Rule 4(b) since the purpose of serving a summons is to give notice. The purpose of serving a summons is to give notice to the defendant and thereby afford him an opportunity to defend himself or his property--an essential of due process. This section has been interpreted by this Court con- sistently with Rule 4(b) just as any other statute which requires due process of law, i.e., notice and a hearing. To argue as appellant does here that such service of process is only within the State of Montana, is error. Rule 4 is a "long-arm statute" authorizing service on all persons subject to jurisdiction re- gardless of whether or not those persons are within the State of Montana. Such a holding is consistent with the United States Supreme Court holding in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 97 L.ed 1221, 73 S.Ct. 840, and WiLliams v. Williams, 44 Ohio St.2d 28, 336 N.E.2d 426, that a court may not terminate a parent's custody without having in personum jurisdiction over the parent. DATED this 2 ~ " ' d a y of June, 1976. Justice J u s t i c e s I M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell: I n view of t h e foregoing I hereby withdraw t h e f i n a l paragraph of my s p e c i a l concurring opinion. J u s t i c e