Title: Velasquez v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 708, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDGAR VELASQUEZ,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 708, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Cr. I.D. No. 0803023797 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  March 31, 2010 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  April 27, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Edward C. Gill, Esquire, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Abby Adams, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Edgar Velasquez (“Velasquez”), appeals 
from the judgment denying his motion for postconviction relief relating to 
his nolo contendre plea in the Superior Court on the charge of Rape in the 
Second Degree.  Velasquez contends that the Superior Court erred by failing 
to grant his motion for postconviction relief because the Truth-in-Sentencing 
(“TIS”) form indicates that he did not understand that there was a minimum 
sentence, or what the minimum sentence was, when he pled nolo contendre.  
 
We have concluded that Velasquez’s claims are without merit.  
Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
 
Velasquez was arrested on March 19, 2008, and charged with Rape in 
the First Degree and Kidnapping in the First Degree.  On September 18, 
2008, Velasquez entered a nolo contendre plea to one count of Rape in the 
Second Degree.  A conviction range of ten to twenty-five years is written on 
the TIS form and the Plea Agreement, both of which bear his signature.  
Because Velasquez is Spanish-speaking, the TIS form was filled out in 
Spanish.   
 
3
There are two relevant questions on the TIS form.  The first question 
asks, “¿Existe pena mínima obligatoria?”1 and has two boxes beside it with 
“Sí” and “No” written beside them.  The second question asks, “De ser éste 
el caso, ¿Cúal es?”2  and has a blank line beside it. On the version submitted 
by Velasquez, it appears that he only checked the “No” box for the first 
question.  On the State’s copy, it appears that he checked “Sí” and “No.”3 
The second question, however, is left blank on both the State’s and 
Velasquez’s copy of the TIS form.  Ultimately, this discrepancy is not 
determinative. 
At the hearing in which Velasquez pled nolo contendre, the following 
exchange occurred: 
The Court: Sir, I am told that you wish to resolve the pending 
case involving rape in the first degree and kidnapping in the 
first degree with a guilty plea, to one count of rape in the 
second degree. 
Defendant:4 Yes. 
The Court: Is this your decision? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: The rape in the second degree carries a penalty of 
ten years.  The sentence has to start at ten years, up to 25 years.  
Do you understand that? 
Defendant: Yes. 
                                          
 
1 Is there a mandatory minimum sentence? 
2 [If] [t]his be the case, what is [it]? 
3 The State’s version of the TIS form contains many stray marks not contained on 
Velasquez’s form.  Both versions are Xerox copies. 
4 Velasquez answered his questions through an interpreter.   
 
4
The Court: I will consider that which has been recommended 
to me, pursuant to the negotiations, but I am not bound to 
accept the recommendation.  Do you understand that? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Has anybody promised you what the judge would 
do today? 
Defendant: No. 
 
 
* 
* 
* 
The Court: All right.  I am holding up a Spanish language 
Guilty Plea Form which the Court uses.  Did you and your 
lawyer, with the assistance of the interpreter, go through this 
document? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Line by line? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Did you understand it? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Is there anything you want to ask me about it? 
Defendant: No. 
The Court: Did you fill in the answers honestly? 
Defendant: Yes. 
 
Velasquez was sentenced to twenty-five years at Level V, with credit 
for time served, to be suspended after ten years for fifteen years of Level III 
probation and was ordered to register as a Tier III sex offender.  
Sentence Modification Denied 
 
On January 20, 2009, Velasquez filed a pro se motion for sentence 
modification.  In that motion, Velasquez claimed his innocence, implied that 
he did not answer honestly during his plea colloquy with the Superior 
 
5
Court,5 and sought to have his sentence reduced or be deported. The 
Superior Court denied the motion.  It held that the Plea Agreement was 
appropriately followed, the court was unable to modify or reduce the 
mandatory sentence and that Velasquez’s motion was untimely.  
Rule 61 Motion Remanded 
 
On May 6, 2009, Velasquez, with the assistance of counsel, filed a 
timely motion for post-conviction relief, claiming that “he was not properly 
advised of the nature of the minimum sentence” and that, because the guilty 
plea form “indicates that there was no minimum mandatory sentence,” the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. On May 19, 2009, the Superior Court 
altered the sentence order, removing the “minimum mandatory” language, 
but retaining the minimum sentence of ten years.  This alteration was 
supported by its finding that the sentence was “not a mandatory sentence, 
but a minimum sentence pursuant to statute.” The Superior Court denied the 
remainder of Velasquez’s motion as moot.  
Velasquez then appealed that denial to this Court.  This Court, by 
order dated October 13, 2009, found that the issue was not moot and 
                                          
 
5 “Although I said ‘no’ when Your Honor asked on the day that I accepted the plea if I 
had been forced to sign the paper, they had me up against the wall at swordpoint with no 
other option. Your Honor asked me questions, yet I remained silent due to the warnings 
[my attorney through the interpreter] had given me before. In the end, the lawyer who 
represented me told me that the State did not have sufficient proof and that the prosecutor 
did not want to see a long prison sentence.”  
 
6
remanded the matter back to the Superior Court to determine whether 
Velasquez understood that he faced a minimum sentence of ten years when 
he pled nolo contendre. 
On remand, the Superior Court reviewed the transcript of the 
proceedings.  It held that the defendant’s plea was knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent. This appeal followed. 
Standard of Review 
We review a Superior Court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction 
relief for an abuse of discretion.6 “An abuse of discretion occurs when ‘a 
court has . . . exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, 
[or] . . . so ignored recognized rules of law or practice’ . . . ‘to produce 
injustice.’”7  Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.8 
Velasquez’s Contentions 
Velasquez contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
failing to grant his motion for post-conviction relief.  According to 
Velasquez, the TIS form and comments made by his trial counsel indicate 
that he was unaware of a minimum sentence of imprisonment when he pled 
                                          
 
6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996) (citing Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 
1121, 1124 (Del. 1991)). 
7 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988)). 
8 Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 
A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985)). 
 
7
nolo contendre.  Velasquez argues that his response of “No” to “¿Existe 
pena mínima obligatoria?”9 and failing to respond to “De ser éste el caso, 
¿Cúal es?” on the TIS form indicate that he was not aware of the minimum 
sentence on the charges.   
Velasquez also argues that his trial counsel’s statement that he went 
with Velasquez through the TIS form, line by line, reinforces the assertion 
that Velasquez was unaware of the minimum sentence because there was a 
blank space for the second question. Velasquez acknowledges that in his 
exchange with the Superior Court during the plea colloquy, he replied “yes” 
when the judge asked if he understood that “the sentence has to start at ten 
years, up to twenty-five years.”  According to Velasquez, the judge’s 
question was erroneous because he “never used language to indicate that 
there was a minimum sentence.” 
Rule 61 Motion Properly Denied 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(c) states: “Before accepting a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendre to a felony . . . the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands . . . (1) . . . the mandatory minimum penalty provided 
                                          
 
9 As noted, however, on the State’s copy of that TIS form, Velasquez checked “Sí” and 
“No.” 
 
8
by law, if any . . . .”10  As noted by Velasquez, the Superior Court informed 
him that, in pleading nolo contendre, he would be facing a sentence that 
“start[s] at ten years.” Although the Superior Court did not use the words 
“minimum sentence,” the court expressly communicated that the sentencing 
range began at ten years.  
Furthermore, the Superior Court asked if Velasquez went through the 
TIS form with his attorney, understood it, and had any questions. Velasquez 
stated that he did go through the TIS form with this attorney, understood it, 
and had no further questions. The Superior Court was entitled to rely upon 
his answers during the hearing.11 In addition, both the Plea Agreement and 
TIS form have a sentencing range of ten to twenty-five years clearly written 
on them.  Velasquez signed both documents. 
In support of his argument, Velasquez relies upon State v. Newton.12 
In that case, the defendant’s counsel and the Superior Court judge both 
informed the defendant that there was a minimum mandatory sentence of 
four years, when, in reality, the minimum mandatory sentence was six 
                                          
 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(c). See also Wells v. State, 396 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1978) 
(holding that it is reversible error when a trial judge, in taking guilty pleas, does not “state 
clearly to the defendants, on the record, the full possible range of the sentences” specified 
by statute). 
11 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
12 State v. Newton, 1998 WL 731570 (Del. Super. May 29, 1998). 
 
9
years.13  The judge ordered that the defendant’s guilty plea be set aside as he 
was not properly informed of the actual minimum mandatory length of the 
punishment.14   
Newton is distinguishable from Velasquez’s case because here, neither 
the judge nor Velasquez’s attorney misinformed Velasquez of the applicable 
minimum sentence.  The TIS form and Plea Agreement show the correct 
sentencing range of ten to twenty-five years. In addition, the Superior Court 
told Velasquez that his sentence would “start at ten years.” 
This Court stated when remanding this matter: “If [Velasquez] knew 
of the minimum sentence, however, the omission in the Truth in Sentencing 
form he filled out would be immaterial, and the motion for postconviction 
relief should be denied.”  The Superior Court determined as a matter of fact 
that Velasquez knew there was a minimum sentence of ten years.  The 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Velasquez’s 
motion for post-conviction relief. 
Conclusion 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
13 There, the sentenced was heightened due to a prior robbery conviction of which the 
State, defense counsel and the Superior Court were unaware.  Id. at *1. 
14 Id. at *2.