Title: Donie v. Associated Co., Inc.
Citation: 176 Kan. 95, 268 P.2d 927
Docket Number: 39,306
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1954

176 Kan. 95 (1954)
268 P.2d 927
ARTHUR DONIE, Appellee,
v.
ASSOCIATED CO., INC., Appellant.
No. 39,306

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1954.
Ferd E. Evans, Jr., of Wichita, argued the cause, and Lester L. Morris, Verne M. Laing, Ralph R. Brock, L.M. Kagey, Max L. Hamilton and F.W. Prosser, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Robert L. NeSmith, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Justus H. Fugate and Charles D. Anderson, both of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to plaintiff's amended petition, as amended, and the second appearance in this court (See Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., 173 Kan. 753, 252 P.2d 609) of an action involving a contract and an accounting of the profits of the defendant corporation.
Although in a sense the issues now to be reviewed are dependent upon later events and proceedings it is important that readers of this opinion understand the facts, circumstances and conditions governing our decision in the first appeal. They are clearly and succinctly set forth in the opinion of that decision where they can be found by reference if required for informative or other purposes essential to the disposition of this appeal and hence need not be repeated.
After the first appeal, holding that the trial court should have sustained a demurrer to the first amended petition, plaintiff filed a motion in the court below asking that the defendants be required to permit him to inspect, or in lieu thereof give him copies of, the minute books of the corporation disclosing the names and addresses *96 of its directors, the powers delegated to the president and general manager in the matter of hiring employees, and the authority granted Leo B. Bowman in such capacity to employ plaintiff, as well as other employees, and other information of less importance. When this demand was overruled plaintiff filed a second amended petition, whereupon defendants moved to strike that pleading from the files. Plaintiff then filed a second motion asking that defendants be required to furnish him with the information requested in his first motion. This motion was also overruled. Thereupon, after some colloquy between court and counsel, also rulings with respect to the motion to strike the second amended petition which are of little importance, plaintiff asked leave and obtained permission to file a second amended petition, as amended. This pleading, omitting its formal averments and prayer reads:
"SECOND.
"THIRD.
"FOURTH.
"FIFTH.
"SIXTH.
"SEVENTH.
Soon after the filing of the foregoing pleading it was attacked by the defendants with a motion to strike and a motion to make definite and certain. The portion of the motion asking that the letter "s" be stricken from the word defendants as it appears in the Seventh paragraph thereof, although it was sustained, is of little *98 importance and requires no further attention. The portion asking that the petition be made more definite and certain is of more consequence in view of the fact the trial court's overruling thereof is challenged on appeal. It reads:
Following the lower court's refusal to make the second amended petition, as amended, more definite and certain defendants demurred to that pleading on the ground it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Thereafter, and prior to any ruling on such demurrer, plaintiff's motion to dismiss the action as to defendant Leo B. Bowman, without prejudice, was sustained. Subsequently the demurrer of the corporation, the sole remaining defendant, was overruled and it was given 20 days in which to answer. Instead of answering it perfected the instant appeal wherein, under proper specifications of error, it claims the trial court erred (1) in overruling its motion to make the second amended petition, as amended, more definite and certain and (2) in overruling its demurrer to such pleading.
Turning to appellant's first claim of error it is to be remembered that the cause was dismissed as to Bowman prior to the ruling on the demurrer. In view of such action it is certain that from that time on appellant could no longer be heard to say it did not comprehend or understand the claims asserted by appellee, or the party to whom they were intended to have reference, in portions of the pleading challenged by grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the motion to make more definite and certain. Under such circumstances error of the trial court, if any, which we do not concede, in overruling the last three grounds *99 of the motion did not result in prejudice to the substantial rights of the appellant and therefore, under the requirements of our statute (G.S. 1949, 60-3317), would have to be disregarded on appellate review in any event. Even so we are not averse to disposing of contentions advanced by appellant respecting the propriety of the ruling on such motion.
As we read the second amended petition, as amended, and with particular reference to grounds set forth in the motion to make more definite and certain we have little difficulty in concluding that as to: Ground I, the term "net profits" as used therein has a clear and definite meaning, i.e., profits remaining to the corporation after payment of all its legal obligations. Ground 2, the allegations of the Fourth paragraph, when read in connection with the Third paragraph of such pleading disclose and advise appellant that Bowman entered into a contract with appellee as the duly authorized agent of the corporation, whereby appellee, at least so far as his employment was concerned, was employed by, and agreed to work for, the corporation pursuant to and in conformity with the authorization theretofore granted by its board of directors. From the standpoint of the sufficiency of pleadings we believe this conclusion is especially warranted in a case where  as here  the record discloses that the appellant itself, as has been heretofore pointed out, resisted all efforts on the part of appellee to obtain the minute books of the corporation and by that means obtain information which otherwise might have enabled him to plead the authority granted Bowman by the corporation with more definiteness and certainty. Grounds 3, 4, and 5, the allegations of such pleading charging that Bowman, as the corporation's duly authorized agent, employed appellee, followed by allegations in the Fifth paragraph thereof to the effect appellee fully performed all the terms of the contract, that the corporation paid him the sum of $450.00 per month semi-monthly for such services for twelve months, the full term of such contract, and failed, neglected and refused to account to him for one-sixth of its net profits, are to be construed as stating that the corporation was to pay appellee for his services; that the corporation, not Bowman, was the employer of the employees named in the Fourth paragraph; and that the demand for an accounting made upon Bowman was made upon him in his capacity as president and general manager of such corporation. With the petition so construed it necessarily follows the trial court properly overruled *100 the motion to make the second amended petition, as amended, more definite and certain and that appellant's claim of error to the contrary cannot be upheld.
The gist of the primary contention made by appellant in support of its second assignment of error is that in the first appeal this court ruled that the present appellee must, in order to allege a cause of action, plead essential allegations to establish Bowman's agency and authority to bind the corporation and that he has failed to comply with that mandate. Most of its contentions in support of this position are predicated upon the premise that the ruling of the trial court on its motion to make the amended petition, as amended, more definite and certain was erroneous and therefore such pleading must be strictly construed. Heretofore we have demonstrated the motion lacked merit and was properly overruled. It follows the pleading is not subject to any such construction and that all contentions based on that premise are fallacious and must be disregarded. The rule of strict construction on demurrer has no application where a pleading, or such portion thereof as is attacked by a motion to make more definite and certain, is sufficient and the motion is properly overruled. (See Powell v. Powell, 172 Kan. 267, 239 P.2d 974; Lawellin, Admr., v. Eakins, 174 Kan. 319, 255 P.2d 615.) Moreover we have definitely indicated our view that the involved pleading as amended states the contract, at least so far as appellee is concerned, was made and entered into pursuant to the authorization alleged in the Third paragraph of such pleading. We now hold, after an examination and analysis of such paragraph, that its allegations, which we pause to note, are new and were not to be found in the pleading passed upon in Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., supra, comply with the requirements of that decision and contain the allegations essential to establish Bowman's agency and authority to enter into the contract with appellee on behalf of the appellant corporation. Thus construed we have little difficulty in concluding the petition now contains allegations sufficient to state a cause of action and that the many matters appellant seeks to have adjudicated on the basis of the trial court's ruling on the demurrer, which it may be stated we have purposely refrained from mentioning in order to avoid saying anything which might prejudice either of the parties in a trial on the merits of the cause, must be raised by appellant as defenses by way of answer. Whether appellee can sustain the burden of proving the allegations of his petition or appellant establish the defenses with respect thereto, which it now *101 seeks to argue in connection with questions pertaining to the propriety of the ruling on the demurrer, are not matters with which we are presently concerned. All we are now warranted in holding  as we do  is that under the facts, conditions and circumstances set forth and described in the second amended petition, as amended, the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to that pleading.
The judgment is affirmed.