Title: Karl A. Burg by his legal guardian v. Cincinnati Casualty Insurance Co.
Citation: 2002 WI 76
Docket Number: 2000AP003258
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2002

2002 WI 76 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3258 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Karl A. Burg by his legal guardian,  
Gladys M. Weichert,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Cincinnati Casualty Insurance Co. and  
Robert W. Zimmerman,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 241 
Reported at:  248 Wis. 2d 145, 635 N.W.2d 622 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael G. Malmstadt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and PROSSER, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Gregory J. Cook, Anthony P. Hahn and Kasdorf, Lewis & 
Swietlik, S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by Gregory J. Cook and 
Anthony P. Hahn. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Victor C. 
Harding and Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff, Reinhardt & Bloch, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Victor C. Harding. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John T. Podbielski, Jr. 
and Schelble & Podbielski, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (MADD). 
 
 
 
2
 
2002 WI 76 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3258  
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 8875) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Karl A. Burg by his legal guardian,  
Gladys M. Weichert,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Cincinnati Casualty Insurance Co. and  
Robert W. Zimmerman,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This case involves a serious 
snowmobile accident and requires us to determine the scope of 
the term "operate" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 350.09, (1995-
96)1 a snowmobile safety statute that requires anyone who 
operates a snowmobile at night to illuminate the snowmobile's 
head and tail lamps. 
                                                 
1 All future references will be to the 1995-96 version of 
the Wisconsin Statutes. 
No. 
00-3258   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The plaintiff Karl Burg was severely injured while 
snowmobiling at night.  At the time of the accident, Burg was 
traveling on the graded, unfinished bed of new highway lanes 
under construction, which ran alongside an existing highway.  
The accident occurred when Burg swerved to avoid hitting another 
snowmobiler, who had, five minutes earlier, together with a 
companion, stopped and shut off his snowmobile on the same path 
Burg was using. 
¶3 
Before trial, Burg moved for a determination that the 
driver of the stopped snowmobile was negligent per se for 
violating Wis. Stat. § 350.09, which requires head and tail 
lamps to be illuminated when a snowmobile is operated at night, 
and Wis. Stat. § 346.51, which prohibits the parking, standing, 
or stopping of any vehicle upon a roadway.  The circuit court 
denied the motion, concluding that a snowmobile completely 
stopped with its engine off was not being "operated" within the 
meaning of the head and tail lamp statute.  The court further 
concluded that the statute prohibiting the parking, stopping, or 
standing of any vehicle upon a roadway did not apply, because 
the snowmobile was stopped some distance off the actual highway, 
on the unfinished roadbed of the additional lanes that were 
under construction.  
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
stopped snowmobile was being "operated" within the meaning of 
the head and tail lamp statute, because the act of stopping the 
snowmobile was sufficient to meet the statutory definition of 
"operate."  We disagree.  The snowmobile statutes define 
No. 
00-3258   
 
3 
 
"operate" as "the exercise of physical control over the speed or 
direction of a snowmobile or the physical manipulation or 
activation of any of the controls of a snowmobile necessary to 
put it in motion."  Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r).  This definition 
does not include merely sitting on a stopped snowmobile with the 
engine off.  We also agree with the circuit court's conclusion 
that Wis. Stat. § 346.51 does not apply because a graded roadbed 
under construction does not constitute a "roadway" within the 
meaning of the statute.  Accordingly, we reverse.   
I 
¶5 
On the evening of November 29, 1995, two pairs of 
snowmobilers were traveling on a make-shift snowmobile trail in 
Racine County.  Highway 36 was under re-construction——two lanes 
were being added to expand the existing two-lane highway into 
four lanes.  The two new lanes under construction were graded 
and flat, making it a good place to run a snowmobile.  The 
defendant Robert Zimmerman and his friend, Dean Leighton,2 were 
snowmobiling on the unfinished new lanes.  At approximately 
Highway 36 and Malchine Road, they stopped and shut off their 
snowmobiles, in the middle of the lane of snowmobile travel on 
the unfinished road bed.  
¶6 
Both snowmobiles were configured in such a way that 
when the sleds were turned off, the head lamps and tail lamps 
were extinguished and could not be re-illuminated until the 
                                                 
 
2  Leighton is not a party to this litigation.  He signed a 
Pierringer-type release prior to the filing of this lawsuit.   
  
No. 
00-3258   
 
4 
 
engine was restarted.  To restart the snowmobile, the ignition 
key had to be turned and a cord pulled.3 
¶7 
The plaintiff Karl Burg and his friend Robert Dros 
were also snowmobiling on the unfinished new lanes of Highway 
36.  Burg was in the lead, ahead of Dros by approximately 100 to 
110 feet, and traveling between 35 and 40 m.p.h.  They came to 
the location where Zimmerman and Leighton were sitting on their 
stopped, unilluminated snowmobiles, approximately five minutes 
after Zimmerman and Leighton got there.  Dros saw Burg's brake 
light come on, his sled 
fishtail, 
and his 
brake 
light 
extinguish.   
¶8 
Burg evidently had not seen Zimmerman or Leighton 
until it was too late, swerved in an apparent effort to avoid 
hitting Zimmerman, and instead struck Leighton's sled.  Either 
on impact or sometime thereafter, Burg's helmet came off.  Burg 
was thrown into the air and landed approximately 40 feet from 
the point of impact.  He suffered severe and permanent head 
injuries.  Leighton, who was also thrown from his sled, was 
knocked unconscious.  His helmet, however, remained secure, and 
he regained consciousness at the scene.   
¶9 
Burg sued Zimmerman, alleging that Zimmerman had been 
negligent in the operation and parking of his snowmobile.  Prior 
to trial, Burg moved for an order declaring Zimmerman negligent 
                                                 
3 Testimony showed that although it was possible to do so, 
it was extremely difficult to pull the cord while seated on the 
snowmobile.  Zimmerman testified that it was more practical to 
get off the sled and pull the cord from a standing position. 
No. 
00-3258   
 
5 
 
per se for violating Wis. Stat. § 350.09(1) and (3).  This 
statute generally sets forth the lighting requirements for a 
snowmobile.  Subsection (1) requires that when operated during 
the hours of darkness, a snowmobile must have its head lamp and 
tail lamp illuminated.  Wis. Stat. § 350.09(1).  Subsection (3) 
imposes an additional requirement that the illuminated tail lamp 
be visible for 500 feet.  Wis. Stat. § 350.09(3).   
¶10 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Michael Malmstadt, denied the motion.  The circuit court noted 
that a boating statute requires boaters who are stopped in the 
water to show a light, see Wis. Stat. § 30.61(6), but said there 
was no similar statute for snowmobilers.  Accordingly, the court 
reasoned that "[i]f the legislature had wanted to require people 
who stop and park somewhere with a snowmobile to have a light on 
it when it is stopped, they could have said so.  They have said 
so with other vehicles such as boats . . . I guess there is no 
dispute that Mr. Zimmerman stopped his snowmobile and was 
sitting on it talking to another guy who also had a snowmobile, 
and they were sitting there.  Sitting on it I don't believe 
under the law is operating it."  
¶11 During the second day of the ensuing jury trial, Burg 
renewed his motion to have Zimmerman declared negligent per se 
for violation of Wis. Stat. § 350.09.  In addition, Burg also 
asserted that Zimmerman was negligent per se for violating 
Wis. Stat. § 346.51, which prohibits stopping, standing, or 
parking a vehicle in a business or residential district upon the 
roadway of a highway. 
No. 
00-3258   
 
6 
 
¶12 The circuit court again denied the motion.  "This 
statute, 346.51, is designed to protect people traveling on the 
roadway.  You're trying to get it to say that they are negligent 
vis-à-vis snowmobilers who are traveling off the roadway . . . 
55 feet from the roadway, the negligence of this statute in my 
view relates to people traveling on the roadway . . . [i]t 
doesn't relate to people traveling off the roadway."  Judge 
Malmstadt also stuck to his earlier ruling that "operation" for 
purposes of the snowmobile head and tail lamp statute did not 
include the act of merely sitting on a parked snowmobile with 
its engine off: "Snowmobiles  . . .  in this state can be parked 
without a light, according to the law.  Now that doesn't mean 
that parking it without a light on in the middle of the pathway 
used by other snowmobiles is not negligence.  It's just not 
statutorily prohibited." 
¶13 At the close of evidence, Burg again renewed his 
motion on the negligence per se issues, and the motion was again 
denied.  The jury found Burg negligent and Zimmerman not 
negligent.  Burg moved for a new trial, reiterating his 
negligence per se arguments, and also challenging the jury's 
damages award as perversely low.  The motion was denied, and 
Burg appealed. 
¶14 In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court, concluding that Zimmerman was "operating" his 
snowmobile 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 350.09 
and 
No. 
00-3258   
 
7 
 
350.09(9r), and therefore was negligent per se.4  The court 
concluded that the definition of "operate" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 350.01(9r) 
included 
"a 
person's 
actions 
in 
stopping 
a 
snowmobile and turning off its motor because, literally, such 
actions do 'exercise physical control over the speed and 
direction' of the snowmobile."  Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2001 WI App 241, ¶10, 248 Wis. 2d 145, 635 N.W.2d 622.  The 
court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial.  We accepted 
review. 
II 
¶15 This case concerns the meaning of the term "operate" 
in Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r) for purposes of the head and tail 
lamp illumination requirement of Wis. Stat. § 350.09.  This is a 
question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  
Peterson v. Midwest Security Ins. Co., 2001 WI 131, ¶11, 248 
Wis. 2d 567, 636 N.W.2d 727. 
¶16 "Statutory interpretation begins with——and, absent 
ambiguity, is confined to——the language of the statute," and 
statutory words and phrases, unless technical in nature or 
carrying a peculiar legal meaning, are construed according to 
common and ordinary usage.  Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, 
Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶10, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833; 
Peterson, 2001 WI 131, ¶19.  See also, Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  
                                                 
4 The court of appeals did not address the negligence per se 
argument under Wis. Stat. § 346.51. 
No. 
00-3258   
 
8 
 
¶17 The 
snowmobile 
head 
and 
tail 
lamp 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 350.09, provides: 
Head lamps, tail lamps and brakes, etc. (1) Any 
snowmobile operated during the hours of darkness or 
operated during daylight hours on any highway right–
of–way shall display a lighted head lamp and tail 
lamp. . . .   
(3) After February 12, 1970, the tail lamp on a 
snowmobile must display a red light plainly visible 
during darkness from a distance of 500 feet to the 
rear. 
Wis. Stat. § 350.09(1) and (3). 
¶18 There is no dispute that the accident occurred during 
the "hours of darkness" for purposes of this statute.  Whether 
Zimmerman was required to display a lighted head and tail lamp, 
and therefore was negligent per se for failing to do so, depends 
upon whether the term "operate" within the meaning of the 
statute includes sitting on a snowmobile that is parked and shut 
off. 
¶19  "Operate" is a defined term in Chapter 350, which 
pertains to the regulation of snowmobiles.  "'Operate' means the 
exercise of physical control over the speed or direction of a 
snowmobile or the physical manipulation or activation of any of 
No. 
00-3258   
 
9 
 
the controls of a snowmobile necessary to put it in motion."  
Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r).5  
¶20 The statute is not ambiguous.  Two activities qualify 
under this definition of "operate": 1) the exercise of physical 
control over the speed or direction of a snowmobile; and 2) the 
physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls 
necessary to put the snowmobile into motion.6 
¶21  Sitting on a snowmobile while it is stopped and shut 
off does not involve the exercise of physical control over the 
speed or direction of the snowmobile.  "Speed" means magnitude 
of velocity, and therefore concerns movement.  See The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1731 (3d ed. 1992).  
                                                 
5 The statutory definition of "operate" concludes with this 
sentence: "'Operate' includes the operation of a snowmobile."  
This apparently was intended to make the terms "operate" and 
"operation" 
essentially 
synonymous 
throughout 
Chapter 
350.  
Section 950.01(9r) was created by 1987 Wis. Act 399, § 443qe. 
When originally enacted the subsection read, "'Operation of a 
snowmobile' means controlling the speed or direction of a 
snowmobile."  The definition was then amended in 1991.  The 
amendment deleted the reference to "operation" and changed the 
term to "operate," 1991 Wis. Act. 39, § 3233, making clear, 
however, that the new defined term "operate" includes the old 
defined term "operation." 
6 Similar language appears in the Implied Consent and 
Operating While Intoxicated statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305 and 
346.63.  However, the drunk driving statutory scheme uses the 
phrase "drive or operate," and separately defines those terms.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(3)(a) and (b), 343.305(1)(b) and (c).  
Accordingly, "operate" is defined a bit more narrowly for 
purposes of the OWI and refusal statutes, and refers only to 
"the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
necessary 
to 
put 
it 
in 
motion."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(3)(a) and (b), 343.305(1)(b) and (c).    
No. 
00-3258   
 
10 
 
Similarly, "direction" means the "course along which a person or 
thing moves."  Id. at 527.  A parked snowmobile with its engine 
off is obviously stationary.  Sitting on a parked snowmobile 
with its engine off cannot constitute the exercise of physical 
control over its speed or direction.   
¶22 The second part of the definition——the physical 
manipulation or activation of the controls of a snowmobile to 
put it in motion——does not necessarily require the snowmobile to 
actually be in motion.  See State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 
544, 555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996); Milwaukee County v. 
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 628, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980).  
It does, however, plainly require some affirmative physical act 
of manipulation or activation of the snowmobile's controls 
necessary to put it in motion.  Sitting on a parked snowmobile 
with its engine off is not, without more, the "manipulation or 
activation" of the snowmobile's controls necessary to put it in 
motion. 
¶23 The court of appeals majority relied upon Proegler and 
Modory to support the conclusion that Zimmerman was operating 
his snowmobile within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r).  
As noted by the court of appeals' dissent, however, Proegler and 
Modory actually support the opposite conclusion.  
¶24 Proegler involved the prosecution of a drunk driver who 
had been found asleep and intoxicated at the wheel of his parked 
but still running vehicle. The court of appeals held that 
"restraining the movement of a running vehicle constitutes 
physical 
manipulation 
of 
a 
vehicle's 
controls 
. . . ."  
No. 
00-3258   
 
11 
 
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d at 627-28.  The court concluded that 
"'[o]peration' of a vehicle occurs either when a defendant 
starts the motor and/or leaves it running."  Id. at 628-29.  
Accordingly, Proegler stands for the proposition that "operate" 
for purposes of the drunk driving statutes includes starting the 
engine or restraining the movement of a parked but still running 
vehicle.7 
¶25  Modory also involved a drunk driving prosecution.  
There, the defendant was in the driver's seat at the controls of 
his pickup truck, with the truck's engine running and its wheels 
spinning, but going nowhere, because the truck was stuck on a 
mound of dirt.  Modory, 204 Wis. 2d at 540.  The court of 
appeals held that the immobility of the truck was immaterial, 
because the physical manipulation or activation of the controls 
of the vehicle for purposes of the definition of "operate" did 
not necessarily require that the vehicle be moving.  The court 
concluded that the defendant had "performed the requisite acts" 
under the definition of "operate" for purposes of the drunk 
driving laws, because "[h]e was behind the wheel of a vehicle 
                                                 
7 Burg attempts to bolster his argument by reference to the 
general definition of "operator" contained in the motor vehicle 
code.  Wisconsin Statute § 340.01(41) defines "operator" as "a 
person who drives or is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(41). This is unavailing for two 
reasons.  First, Chapter 350, which governs snowmobiles, has its 
own definition of "operator."  See Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9w).  
Second, Wis. Stat. § 340.01(74) generally excludes snowmobiles 
from the motor vehicle code, except where otherwise specified: 
"[a] snowmobile shall not be considered a vehicle except for 
purposes made specifically applicable by statute."   
No. 
00-3258   
 
12 
 
with the engine running and was attempting to free the vehicle 
from its stuck position."  Id. at 543-44. 
¶26 Here, the court of appeals focused on the act of 
stopping the snowmobile and turning off its motor as the 
requisite "physical manipulation" of the snowmobile's controls.  
But this misreads the evidence in the case.  Zimmerman was not 
in the process of stopping his snowmobile and turning off its 
engine when the accident occurred; he had done that five minutes 
earlier.  Proegler and Modory involved drunk drivers who were 
exercising some form of control over running vehicles——in 
Proegler, restraining it from moving, and in Modory, attempting 
to move it. 
¶27 In contrast, at the time of the accident here, 
Zimmerman was merely sitting on his snowmobile while it was 
parked with its engine off.  This is insufficient to constitute 
"operation" of the snowmobile for purposes of the head and tail 
lamp illumination requirement in Wis. Stat. § 350.09.8  The 
circuit court correctly concluded that Zimmerman was not 
negligent per se for violation of Wis. Stat. § 350.09. 
                                                 
 
8  Mothers Against Drunk Driving filed an amicus curiae 
brief in this case, concerned about any influence it might have 
on the enforcement of drunk driving laws.  We do not perceive 
any potential for negative affect.  This case concerns a safety 
statute that specifies when the driver of a snowmobile must 
illuminate the snowmobile's head and tail lamps.  The definition 
of "operate" in the drunk driving statutes is not at issue.  
Furthermore, "operation" for purposes of the drunk driving laws 
can be proved circumstantially.  A defendant found intoxicated 
behind the wheel of a parked car with its engine off but still 
warm might well be prosecuted on that circumstantial evidence of 
recent "operation." 
  
No. 
00-3258   
 
13 
 
¶28 The 
circuit court 
also 
correctly 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 346.51 does not apply to this case.  This statute 
prohibits the parking, stopping, or standing of any vehicle, 
attended or unattended, upon the roadway of any highway outside 
a 
business 
or 
residence 
district.9 
 
Wisconsin 
Statute 
§ 340.01(54) defines "roadway" as "that portion of a highway 
between the regularly established curb lines or that portion 
which is improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel, excluding the berm or shoulder."  The graded but still 
unfinished bed of highway lanes under construction is clearly 
not a "roadway" under this definition.  Accordingly, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.51 does not provide a basis for finding Zimmerman 
negligent per se. 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Statute § 346.51 
is 
made 
applicable to 
snowmobiles by Wis. Stat. § 346.02(10), and provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(1) No person shall park, stop or leave standing any 
vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the 
roadway of any highway outside a business or residence 
district when it is practical to park, stop or leave 
such vehicle standing off the roadway, but even the 
parking, stopping or standing of a vehicle off the 
roadway of such highway is unlawful unless the 
following requirements are met:  
(a) An unobstructed width of at least 15 feet 
upon the roadway of such highway must be left opposite 
such standing vehicle for the free passage of other 
vehicles. . . .   
(b) Such standing vehicle must be capable of 
being seen by operators of other vehicles from a 
distance of 500 feet in each direction along such 
highway. 
. 
No. 
00-3258   
 
14 
 
¶29 To summarize, Wis. Stat. § 350.09 requires anyone who 
"operates" a snowmobile during the hours of darkness to 
illuminate the snowmobile's head and tail lamps.  Because the 
statutory definition of "operate" does not include the act of 
sitting on a parked snowmobile with its engine off, Zimmerman 
was not negligent per se for failing to have the head and tail 
lamps of his snowmobile illuminated at the time of the accident.  
Furthermore, an unfinished roadbed under construction does not 
constitute a "roadway" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 346.51, 
which prohibits the parking, standing, or stopping of a vehicle 
on a roadway, and therefore does not provide a basis for a 
finding of negligence per se.10  The court of appeals is 
reversed.          
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
10 That Zimmerman was not negligent per se does not mean he 
could not be found negligent for parking his unilluminated 
snowmobile in the path of other snowmobiles.  The jury, however, 
found him not negligent.    
  
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
1 
 
¶30 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I cannot join 
the majority's opinion because I conclude that the driver of the 
snowmobile was indeed "operating" the snowmobile as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 350.01.  I would affirm the court of appeals' 
decision that stopping a snowmobile and turning off its motor is 
"operation," because such actions require the exercise of 
physical control over the speed and direction of the snowmobile.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶31 The majority concludes that the term "operate" in 
Wis. Stat. § 350.09 does not include the actions of a driver 
sitting on a parked snowmobile after having stopped it and shut 
off the motor.  The majority divides the definition of "operate" 
into two qualifying activities, but concludes that here, the 
driver is not exercising physical control over the speed or 
direction of the snowmobile, nor does the driver's conduct 
qualify as the manipulation or activation of the snowmobile's 
controls necessary to put it in motion.  In drawing these 
conclusions, the majority seems to rely largely on one fact:  
the snowmobile's motor was shut off.  Although I agree that the 
facts here indicate that the snowmobile's motor was not running 
at the time of the accident, I respectfully disagree that 
because the motor was turned off, the driver was not, under the 
facts presented, "operating" the snowmobile. 
¶32 The majority interprets "operate" to require acts of a 
positive nature, such as having the motor running, so that the 
snowmobile is prepared for positive movement.  I do not draw 
such a distinction.  Based on the plain language of the 
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
2 
 
definition in Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r), "operate" requires the 
"exercise of physical control" or the "physical manipulation or 
activation of any of the controls."  I agree with the court of 
appeals' conclusion in this case that a person's actions in 
stopping a snowmobile and turning off the motor fall within the 
definition of "operate."  The driver is exercising physical 
control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile by 
bringing it to a stop.  Moreover, the driver is physically 
manipulating the controls by turning off the engine.  "The fact 
that such actions stop the snowmobile certainly renders those 
actions no less controlling of speed and direction than other 
actions that accelerate the snowmobile or change its course."  
Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 241, ¶10, 248 
Wis. 2d 145, 635 N.W.2d 622 (emphasis in original).  Moreover, 
"[t]he fact that the manipulation stopped the snowmobile's 
motion certainly renders that action no less a manipulation of 
the controls necessary to put the snowmobile in motion."  Id. at 
¶11 (emphasis in original). 
¶33 As the court of appeals noted, Milwaukee County v. 
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980), 
supports this interpretation of "operate."  In Proegler, the 
court concluded that a drunk driver, sleeping in a parked car 
with the motor running, was operating the vehicle.  95 
Wis. 2d at 628-629; see also State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 
545, 555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a drunk 
driver sitting in the driver's seat with engine running and 
wheels spinning, but stuck on a mound of dirt, was operating the 
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
3 
 
vehicle).  The majority here relies on Proegler for the 
proposition that "operate" requires that the motor be running.  
I respectfully disagree.  Comparing the facts in Proegler to the 
facts in this case demonstrates how interpreting "operate" in 
terms of whether the motor is running relies on inappropriate 
distinctions.  To me, a wide-awake person still sitting on a 
snowmobile after having stopped it and turned the motor off has 
more physical control over the speed or direction of the 
snowmobile than a drunk driver sleeping in a parked car with the 
motor running.  See Burg, 2001 WI App 241, ¶12. 
¶34 I find further support for this interpretation of 
"operate" by contrasting it with the definition of "drive."  
"'Drive' means the exercise of physical control over the speed 
and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion."  
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(a) (emphasis added).  The majority's 
interpretation of "operate"——which relies largely on the fact 
that the motor is running——seems more akin to this definition of 
"drive," rather than the definition of "operate."  Although the 
majority does not require "motion" in its interpretation of 
"operate," the majority does require that the motor be running, 
and the difference seems minimal to me.  Focusing on "the 
exercise of physical control" and "physical manipulation," in a 
broader sense of action——having either a positive or negative 
effect over the speed or direction of the snowmobile——makes 
sense to me in order to distinguish clearly between "operate" 
and "drive."   
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
4 
 
¶35 Furthermore, I conclude that interpreting "operate" in 
this way makes sense when applied to the facts here.  The 
accident occurred in the middle, as opposed to the beginning or 
the end, of Zimmerman's snowmobiling trip.  Granted, he was not 
driving at the time of the accident because the snowmobile was 
not in motion.  He was, however, operating the snowmobile.  He 
started operating the snowmobile when he left on his trip.  At 
the time of the accident he was still operating his snowmobile 
when he was sitting on it after affirmatively manipulating the 
controls to stop it and turn off the motor.  Moreover, he was 
physically 
controlling, 
albeit 
in 
a 
negative 
way, 
the 
snowmobile's speed or direction. 
¶36 Finally, interpreting the term "operate" to include 
both positive and negative acts of physical control over the 
speed or direction seems logical, especially with respect to 
snowmobiles. 
 
In 
comparison 
to 
other 
motor 
vehicles, 
a 
snowmobile is small; therefore, it seems possible to manipulate 
the controls and have physical control over the speed or 
direction of the snowmobile without having the motor running.  
By requiring that the motor be running to "operate," the 
majority would have to conclude that if a person is pushing a 
snowmobile, with the motor off, the person is not exercising 
physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile; 
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
5 
 
to decide to the contrary, would violate the majority's 
interpretation of "operate."11 
¶37 I conclude that "operate" is appropriately interpreted 
to include the exercise of physical control over the speed or 
direction of a snowmobile in both positive and negative ways.  
Applied here, Zimmerman was operating the snowmobile.  He had 
recently brought the snowmobile to a stop and turned off the 
motor, which required the physical manipulation of the controls.  
Furthermore, 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
accident 
Zimmerman 
was 
physically controlling the snowmobile's speed and direction by 
restricting its movement.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court 
of appeals' decision.  For the reasons stated, therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
11 I also agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the circuit court's——and now the majority's——interpretation of 
"operate" renders an ironic result under the facts of this case.  
Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 241, ¶12 n.8, 248 
Wis. 2d 145, 635 N.W.2d 622.  "[T]he operator of a snowmobile 
that is stopped with its motor off would not be negligent per 
se, while the operator of a snowmobile that is stopped with its 
motor on would be negligent per se, although he or she would be 
better able to quickly respond to a dangerous situation."  Id.  
For this additional reason, therefore, I respectfully disagree 
with the majority's reliance on the fact that the motor must be 
running in order to "operate" a snowmobile. 
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
6 
 
¶38 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  00-3258.npc 
 
1