Title: State v. Gibson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48323
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2005

FILED:  June 3, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
TRAVIS LEE GIBSON, 
Appellant.
(CC 200005422; SC S48323)
En Banc
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentences of death imposed by the Lane County Circuit Court.
Jack A. Billings, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 9, 2004.
Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for appellant.  With him on the briefs
were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public
Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Kathleen Mary Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With her on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, and Laura Anderson and Janet Klapstein,
Assistant Attorneys General.
BALMER, J.
The judgment of conviction and the sentences, including the
sentences of death, are affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
BALMER, J.
This case is before us on automatic and direct review
of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentences of death. 
Defendant seeks reversal of his convictions for two counts of
aggravated murder and his convictions for felony murder,
attempted murder, first-degree assault, first-degree robbery,
first-degree burglary, and felon in possession of a firearm. 
Defendant challenges trial court rulings in the pretrial, guilt,
and penalty phases of his trial, seeking reversal of his
convictions or, in the alternative, vacation of his sentences and
remand for resentencing.  For the reasons set out below, we
affirm the convictions and the sentences, except that we remand
to the trial court for the limited purpose of merging defendant's
two convictions for aggravated murder and resentencing defendant
to only one sentence of death.
I. FACTS
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999).  
Defendant attended a party at his cousin's house in
Eugene at about 1:00 a.m. on March 12, 2000.  There, defendant
encountered Wendy Gates, James Herlong, and Deon Givens.  Gates
indicated that she knew a man named Joshua Copp who might have
money because he sold marijuana.  Defendant, Gates, Herlong, and
Givens formulated a plan to rob Copp, and defendant agreed to
drive them all to Copp's house.  Defendant had a .45-caliber
pistol with him, and Givens had two handguns, one of which he
gave to Herlong.
When they arrived at Copp's house at about 5:00 a.m.,
defendant and Gates knocked on the door.  Copp let them in
because he knew Gates and then shut and locked the door.  Thirty
seconds later, defendant unlocked the door and flashed the porch
light as a signal.  Givens and Herlong then entered the house,
and Gates went outside to the car.  Givens, Herlong, and
defendant confronted Copp in the hallway and told him to go back
to his room, which he did.  They then asked Copp where his gun
and money were, and Copp told them that his gun was under the
mattress.  Defendant took Copp's gun and wallet, and someone
taped Copp's hands and his eyes.  Copp said that his roommate,
Steve Johnson, was in the next bedroom.  Herlong and Givens
kicked in Johnson's door and asked him where his money was.  They
taped his hands and searched his room but failed to find
anything.  Johnson broke loose and tried to escape through the
window, but defendant and Givens caught and pistol-whipped him.  
After retaping Johnson, defendant, together with Givens
and Herlong, took Johnson and Copp into the living room, laid
them down on the floor, and kicked and hit them.  Someone said,
"Let's just smoke them."  Defendant said, "Fuck it.  Get a
pillow.  I'm going to shoot them both in the head."  When Johnson
broke loose again and ran to the door, defendant and Givens shot
him five or six times at close range.  Johnson fell through the
front door of the house and onto the lawn.  Givens and Herlong
ran outside to the car.  Another shot was fired inside the house,
after which defendant emerged from the house and returned to the
car.  Defendant told the others in the car that he thought that
he had shot one of the victims in the neck or the shoulder. 
From Copp's house, defendant, Givens, and Herlong had
taken some scales, a knife, some marijuana, a gun they found
underneath Johnson's bed, and $200.  Along with Gates, they went
back to defendant's house, where they split up the money.  When
they got there, defendant told his wife, "we just killed two
people."  Later that day, they learned that only Copp had died. 
Defendant, Gates, and Herlong decided to go to Reno, and they
left Eugene by bus the next morning.  In Reno, defendant pawned
the weapon that he had used during the robbery and shootings.  He
subsequently returned to Eugene, where he was arrested.
The state charged defendant with the crimes enumerated
above, and a jury convicted defendant of all counts.  At a
separate penalty-phase proceeding on the two counts of aggravated
murder, the jury affirmatively answered the four questions set
out under ORS 163.150(1)(b).  Pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(f), the
trial court entered a sentence of death on each of the aggravated
murder counts.  
Defendant raises 34 assignments of error.  We have
examined each of those assignments of error, and we discuss five
of them below.  We reject all but the assignment challenging the
trial court's decision to enter two separate convictions for
aggravated murder and two separate sentences of death.
II.  EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S "OTHER BAD ACTS"
In four assignments of error, defendant challenges the
trial court's rulings that allowed evidence of what defendant
describes as his "other bad acts."  Those acts included
defendant's earlier firing of the murder weapon when defendant
and Herlong had considered robbing a sandwich shop and a
conversation on the bus to Reno in which defendant suggested to
Gates that she prostitute herself to make money for the group. 
We discuss in detail the context in which the trial court made
the disputed rulings and the evidence at issue, because that
context helps to explain defendant's arguments and our analysis. 
We then consider defendant's legal arguments.  
A. Context at Trial
1. State's Direct Case
The key issue at trial was whether defendant or Herlong 
shot Copp.  The state sought to prove that defendant was the
shooter by introducing evidence that defendant had been the only
person in the house with Copp when Copp was shot, that defendant
had been armed with the murder weapon during the crime, that
defendant had owned the murder weapon, and that defendant had
been the leader of the group and therefore the one most likely to
have shot Copp.  Although no witness testified to seeing
defendant shoot Copp, several witnesses testified that defendant
had been the only person inside the house with Copp when they had
heard a shot.  No witnesses testified to seeing Copp alive after
they heard the shot.  The state's witnesses also testified that
ballistics tests showed that Copp had been shot with the
.45-caliber pistol that defendant owned, that defendant had
carried that pistol when he and the others had entered Copp's
house, and that defendant had pawned the pistol in Reno following
the murder.  
Herlong testified that he had seen defendant fire the
gun at least once before.  On one such occasion, in the week
preceding the murder, Herlong saw defendant fire the gun through
an open car window and say, "I feel like killing somebody." 
Defendant did not object to that testimony.  The state submitted
an offer of proof in which Herlong testified to the full
circumstances surrounding the incident -- that the incident had
occurred on the same day that Herlong and defendant had gone to a
sandwich shop planning to rob it and that defendant also had
fired the pistol into the back door of the sandwich shop. 
However, that evidence was not presented to the jury at that
time.
Gates testified about the events that had occurred on
the night of the murder and about the subsequent trip to Reno. 
When the state began to question her about whether defendant had
suggested, during the the trip to Reno, that she prostitute
herself to make money for the group, defendant objected that any
testimony regarding that incident was irrelevant and overly
prejudicial.  The trial court ruled that that evidence had "some
limited relevance" but sustained that objection because "[i]t's
taking us too far afield for reasons that aren't going to give us
enough to make that trip worthwhile."
2. Defendant's Direct Case
In defendant's direct testimony, he presented himself
as a passive participant in the crimes.  He stated that his wife
had purchased the murder weapon and that he never had fired it. 
He testified that he just "went along with" the planning and
execution of the Copp robbery and that he had tried to stop
Herlong and Givens from harming the victims.  He claimed that he
had loaned Herlong the murder weapon on the night of the murder,
that he had not been armed at the crime scene, and that Herlong
had carried the murder weapon during the robbery.  He testified
that Herlong, not he, had been the last robber in the house;
that, after the murder, he had tried to give the robbery proceeds
to the others who were involved and to distance himself from
them; and that Herlong and Gates had wanted to go to Reno after
the murder and defendant merely had "help[ed them] out." 
Defendant also repeatedly denied having been the leader of the
group.
On cross-examination, the state sought to question
defendant about whether he ever had fired the murder weapon and
about the prostitution discussion.  First, the state asked
defendant about Herlong's testimony that defendant had fired the
gun before:
"A.  No, that did not happen.  I've never fired that
gun before.
"Q.Never?
"A.No, I have not fired that gun before."
The state then questioned defendant about the events following
the murder, including the trip to Reno.  The state asked
defendant whether he had asked Gates "to do anything in Reno to
make money."  He denied any such conversation, and stated, "I
never asked her to do anything for money for me."
At that point, defendant objected that the state's
questions were "not relevant impeachment."  The state responded
that its questions regarding the prostitution incident were
relevant, in part to rebut defendant's denial of a leadership
role.  The state also sought to ask additional questions
regarding the shooting of the gun at the sandwich shop. 
Defendant objected to both lines of questioning.         
The trial court overruled defendant's objections,
reasoning that 
"[t]he jurors are being asked by virtue of the
defendant's testimony to conclude that he basically was
a more or less accidental and somewhat inconsequential
participant here, at least to the extent that he wants
everybody to believe that the guns were in the hands of
others and that he was not really the leader.
"When asked * * * if he was in charge, he said no. 
When asked if he was in the leadership role, he said
no.  And so in my estimation it would be reasonable for
the [s]tate to be able to prove that on other occasions
involving these same individuals that he was involved
and that he was in a leadership position.  And I think
that the questions put to [defendant] himself and his
answers make that relevant."  
On further cross-examination after the trial court's
ruling, defendant denied that he had fired the gun through the
car window as Herlong had described, again denied ever firing the
gun, and asserted that Herlong had initiated the idea of robbing
the sandwich shop and had fired the gun at the sandwich shop
door:
"Q.  Let's go back to the question I asked you earlier. 
Have you ever fired that .45 before this night?
"A.  No, I have not fired that .45.
"Q.  I thought you said you fired it out the window.
"A.No, I didn't tell you I fired it out the window.
"Q. You never fired it into the door of a restaurant?
"A. No, I didn't.  I was present when that gun was
fired at the door of the restaurant.
"Q. Tell us about that.
"A.  I was given the safe code for a restaurant, and I
was going to go over there and see what was in it. 
I went over there.  James Herlong wanted to come
along with me.  I got there and there was lights
on.  And I said, 'Let's wait.'  It was, I don't
know, it wasn't that late.  I said, 'Let's leave
it alone for now.  It will be there.'  
"* * * * *.  
"* * * He said, 'Come on, * * * I think we can do
this.'  I said, 'All right, come on, let's go. 
Let's just do it.'  I had the gun.  We went back
over there.  He said, 'Let's shoot the door open.' 
I said, 'Man, this is West 11th' * * *.  He said,
'I'll do it.'  I said, 'Come on.' He said, 'All
right, I'll do it.'  And he shot the door a couple
times.  He ran back to my car and --
"Q. So you gave him the gun?
"A. Yeah."
In response to further questions, defendant denied that he ever
had "taken a leadership role" in other "criminal behavior" with
Herlong or Givens.
3. State's Rebuttal Case
The state recalled Herlong and Gates as rebuttal
witnesses to rebut defendant's assertions that he never had fired
the murder weapon; that Herlong, rather than defendant, had
initiated the discussions about robbing the sandwich shop; and
that Herlong and Gates had initiated the discussions about
Gates's possible prostitution.  Defendant objected to the
additional questions on the basis of OEC 404 and because the
testimony "introduce[d] evidence of other wrongful acts."  The
trial court allowed the testimony over defendant's objections.  
Herlong testified that defendant had fired the murder
weapon into the back door of the sandwich shop and that defendant
had been "teaching [him] the ropes" on how to commit robbery. 
Herlong and Gates both testified that defendant had suggested the
plan for Gates to earn money through prostitution in Reno.
B. Defendant's Legal Arguments
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court
rulings allowing the state's questioning of defendant regarding
the sandwich shop incident and the prostitution conversation,
allowing Herlong to testify on rebuttal about the sandwich shop
incident, and allowing Herlong and Gates to testify on rebuttal
about the prostitution conversation. (1)
Defendant's legal arguments on appeal are not
delineated clearly, but he appears to argue that evidence of the
sandwich shop incident and the prostitution conversation was
inadmissible because (1) it was not relevant; (2) it was evidence
of other bad acts that was inadmissible under OEC 404(3); and (3)
even if the evidence was relevant and was admissible under OEC
404(3), it should have been excluded under OEC 403 because the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative
value of that evidence. (2)  We consider defendant's arguments
in that sequence.
Defendant first argues that the rebuttal evidence
described above "was not relevant to any material issue in the
case."  OEC 401 provides the standard for determining whether
evidence is relevant.  It states:
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
OEC 401 establishes a "very low threshold" for the admission of
evidence.  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 238, 986 P2d 5 (1999),
cert den, 528 US 1086 (2000).  Evidence is relevant "so long as
it increases or decreases, even slightly, the probability of the
existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action."  Id.  We review the trial court's rulings
regarding the relevance of evidence for errors of law.  State v.
Titus, 328 Or 475, 482, 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (noting that evidence
"either is relevant or it is not").   
Defendant argues that the sandwich shop incident and
the prostitution conversations were "not relevant to any material
issue in the case" and served only "to portray defendant as a
criminal."  The state responds that this evidence was relevant to
rebut defendant's assertions that he was a passive participant in
the crime and that Herlong, rather than defendant, shot Copp. 
According to the state, the evidence instead tended to make more
probable the facts that defendant was the person who shot Copp
and that defendant played a "leadership role" in the killing of
Copp and its aftermath, including the trip to Reno.
As to the sandwich shop incident, we agree with the
state that defendant's and Herlong's testimony was relevant. 
This case turned on the identity of the shooter.  The state's
witnesses testified that defendant had initiated and led the
commission of the charged crimes and that he had shot Copp. 
Defendant's theory of the case was that Herlong was the leader on
the night of the murder, that Herlong had carried the murder
weapon, and that Herlong had shot Copp.  When defendant denied
that he ever had fired the murder weapon, Herlong's testimony
about the facts and circumstances of defendant's earlier
possession and firing of that weapon unquestionably had some
"tendency" to make "more probable" the existence of a fact of
consequence to the case -- namely, that defendant shot Copp. 
Defendant simply is wrong in asserting that that evidence had no
relevance to the central facts of the case other than to portray
defendant as committing "other bad acts."  Herlong's testimony
that he had seen defendant carry and fire the murder weapon
several days before the murder was relevant.  We discuss below
the different question whether that evidence should have been
excluded for some other reason.
We reach a different conclusion regarding the evidence
of the prostitution conversation.  Defendant argues that that
evidence had no purpose other than to show defendant in a bad
light and that it was not relevant to any material issue in the
case.  The state responds that defendant's suggestion to Gates
that she engage in prostitution in Reno to support the group is
additional evidence of his leadership role in committing the
crime and that the jury could infer from that leadership role
that defendant had shot Copp.  
In our view, no such inference reasonably can be drawn. 
In contrast to the evidence of defendant's earlier firing of the
murder weapon, which directly involved the central issue in the
case, the relevance of the prostitution episode depends entirely
upon the state's "leadership" theory.  Indeed, its relevance
depends, first, on the inference that defendant's comment to
Gates about prostituting herself tended to show that defendant
was the leader of the group, and, second, on the inference that
the leader was more likely than one of the followers to be the
shooter.  
Both of those inferences are questionable.  The state
was entitled to -- and did -- introduce evidence tending to show
that defendant played a leadership role in the robbery and
shootings and to rebut defendant's claim that he was only a
passive participant.  However, defendant's prostitution
suggestion came after the charged crimes were committed, while
the group was traveling to Reno.  That brief suggestion bears
only a tenuous connection with the state's leadership theory, and
an even weaker connection with the ultimate issue of whether
defendant shot Copp.  Certainly, some "leaders" of criminal
episodes may be more likely to do the shooting, but other,
perhaps more astute, leaders convince others to do so.  Moreover,
while the state's "leadership" theory regarding Herlong and the
sandwich shop incident showed that defendant had suggested that
he and Herlong commit a violent crime and that defendant had
carried and fired the murder weapon, the prostitution suggestion
bears little resemblance to defendant's leadership role in the
sandwich shop matter.  We disagree with the trial court that
defendant's prostitution conversation with Gates had any tendency
to prove that defendant was more likely than Herlong to have shot
Copp, and we therefore conclude that that evidence was not
relevant and should not have been admitted.  We discuss below the
consequences of that trial court error.
Having concluded that the evidence regarding the
sandwich shop incident was relevant (while the evidence regarding
the prostitution conversation was not), we turn to defendant's
other arguments for the exclusion of the sandwich shop evidence.
Defendant argues that, even if the evidence of the
sandwich shop incident was relevant, it should have been excluded
because it was evidence of a "collateral bad act" that was
inadmissible under OEC 404(3). (3)  That rule provides:
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."
The short answer to defendant's assertion is that the
evidence that defendant fired the murder weapon during the
sandwich shop incident was not introduced to "prove [defendant's]
character * * * in order to show that [defendant] acted in
conformity therewith."  Rather, as discussed above, the evidence
that defendant previously had carried and fired the murder weapon
while he and Herlong planned a violent crime, and the
circumstances in which he did so, were independently relevant to
the issue of whether defendant or Herlong had shot Copp.  
In Barone, 329 Or 210, the defendant argued that OEC
404(3) barred the admission of evidence that, earlier on the
night of the charged murder, he had threatened a woman with a
handgun that resembled the murder weapon.  This court held that
the testimony was admitted properly because it "was helpful to
the jury's consideration of a number of relevant issues,"
including the defendant's possession of the murder weapon on the
night of the murder.  Id. at 236.  Similarly, the evidence here
placed defendant with Herlong in a situation where the two
contemplated committing a violent crime less than a week before
the charged murder occurred; it placed what would later be the
murder weapon -- which sometimes defendant claimed not to own --
in defendant's possession, and it showed defendant firing that
weapon.  Each of those facts was independently relevant to the
issues in the case.  
This court consistently has held that a witness may be
impeached by evidence that contradicts the witness's testimony on
any independently relevant fact, although the witness cannot be
impeached as to merely collateral matters.  State v. Burdge, 295
Or 1, 6 n 3, 664 P2d 1076 (1983).  Defendant testified that
Herlong asked to use defendant's gun on the night of the murder
and that he (defendant) never had fired that gun.  The state was
entitled to introduce Herlong's contradictory testimony on those
matters because it related to the circumstances of the crime and
to whether defendant fired the shot that killed Copp.
Defendant makes the related argument that the state's
introduction of evidence to impeach his testimony, on cross-examination, that he never had fired the murder weapon was
improper because the state was required to "take his answer." 
Defendant agrees that the state was permitted to ask defendant
whether he previously had fired the murder weapon, but that it
could not impeach his testimony by calling Herlong as a rebuttal
witness to contradict defendant's denial.
This court noted in State v. Jones, 279 Or 55, 62, 871
P2d 867 (1977), that, "[w]hen the attempted impeachment is on a
'collateral matter' and the witness denies making the alleged
statement, the party must 'take the answer' and may not then call
another witness to testify that the witness to be impeached made
such a statement."  That common-law rule prevents trial time from
being squandered by additional witnesses testifying about
collateral issues and limits the risk that "jurors will lose
sight of the central historical issues in the case."  1 Edward J.
Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence § 715, 272
(1998).  
However, as noted above, defendant's argument depends
entirely on his assertion that the question of whether he ever
had fired the murder weapon was "collateral."  As this court
pointed out in Jones, the bar on the use of extrinsic evidence to
impeach a witness applies only to impeachment on a "collateral
matter."  Jones, 279 Or at 62.  The test of whether a fact
inquired of during cross-examination is collateral "is whether
the cross-examining party would have been entitled to prove it as
a part of and tending to establish its case."  State v. Johnson,
277 Or 45, 48, 559 P2d 496 (1977); see also Imwinkelried at 273
(fact is not "collateral" if "the fact is logically relevant to
the historical, material facts in issue under [FRE] 401,
[substantially identical to OEC 401]").
As discussed in detail above, however, the facts that
defendant owned the murder weapon and had carried and fired it
several days earlier when he and Herlong contemplated a robbery
were directly relevant to the issue of whether Herlong or
defendant shot Copp.  The state would have been entitled to prove
it as a part of and tending to establish its case.  Defendant's
earlier firing of the murder weapon was not a "collateral
matter."
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the state to introduce impeachment evidence, because his
testimony was "not precise enough to be impeachable."  Defendant
relies on State v. Hayes, 117 Or App 202, 843 P2d 948, rev den,
316 Or 528 (1993), in which the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court erred in permitting the state to introduce evidence
to rebut the defendant's ambiguous testimony.  In Hayes, the
defendant in a sexual abuse case was asked whether he had ever
"[been] mean to" his granddaughter, the victim.  He responded,
"I've never been mean to any of my kids.  My grandkids or my
kids, never, neither one.  No, sir."  Id. at 204.  The state then
impeached the defendant's statement by calling two of the
defendant's daughters and two other granddaughters to testify
that the defendant had abused them sexually.  Id.  The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant's denial that he had
not been "mean" was not precise enough to be impeached by the
testimony proffered by the state.  117 Or App at 206.  Hayes
provides no assistance to defendant.  Defendant stated during
cross-examination that he "never fired that gun before." 
Defendant's statement was precise, and Herlong's testimony that
defendant had fired the gun that was later used to kill Copp into
the back door of the sandwich shop rebutted it.  
Finally, defendant argues that, even if the sandwich
shop evidence was relevant and was not directed at a collateral
matter, it should have been excluded under OEC 403 because its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.  OEC 403 provides:  
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
"In the context of OEC 403, 'unfair prejudice' means an undue
tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly
although not always an emotional one."  State v. Moore, 324 Or
396, 407-08, 927 P2d 1073 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
We review a trial court's decision under OEC 403 for an abuse of
discretion.  Id. at 407.  
Defendant argues that the evidence showing that
defendant and Herlong contemplated robbing the sandwich shop and
that (according to Herlong) defendant fired a shot into the back
door of the sandwich shop was unfairly prejudicial to defendant
because it portrayed him as a criminal.  The state responds that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence because its probative value in showing that defendant
was the leader in a prior incident involving both Herlong and the
murder weapon and that defendant had fired the murder weapon
during that incident outweighed any prejudice to defendant.
We agree that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence.  It is true that the
evidence of the contemplated robbery and defendant's unprovoked
firing of the gun had some potential to cause the jury to view
defendant in a bad light.  However, the potential for unfair
prejudice to defendant from that evidence was limited.  Defendant
already had testified on his own behalf and had admitted to
participation on the night of the murder in criminal activity
that was far more serious than the sandwich shop incident. 
Herlong already had testified, without objection, that during the
week before the murder, defendant had fired the murder weapon
through a car window and said that he felt like killing someone. 
Moreover, the sandwich shop incident demonstrated defendant's
possession and use of the murder weapon itself in a context of
potential criminal activity with Herlong -- evidence probative of
facts that the state was required to prove at trial.  
We have concluded that the trial court properly allowed
cross-examination and rebuttal testimony regarding defendant's
previous firing of the murder weapon but that it should not have
allowed the cross-examination of defendant or the rebuttal
testimony of Gates and Herlong as to the prostitution discussion. 
We now turn to the issue of whether that error was prejudicial.  
OEC 103(1) provides that "[e]rror may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected * * * ."  A criminal
defendant who assigns error to the exclusion or admission of
evidence "must establish that the error was not harmless."  State
v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 487, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US
833 (2001).  Moreover, Article VII (Amended), section 3, requires 
an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any
evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error
affected the verdict.  State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33, 77 P3d 1111
(2003).  The appellate court must focus "on the possible
influence of the error on the verdict rendered, not whether this
court, sitting as a fact-finder, would regard the evidence of
guilt as substantial and compelling."  Id. at 32.  That inquiry
requires us to examine the nature of the error that occurred
below and the context of that error.  Id. at 32-34.  If the
particular issue to which the error pertains has no relationship
to the jury's determination of its verdict, then there is little
likelihood that the error affected the verdict.  Id.
Here, the improperly admitted evidence pertained to
conversations in which defendant suggested to Gates that she
prostitute herself in Reno.  Defendant argues that the evidence
that defendant committed the crime of "compelling prostitution"
was "likely to lead the jury to convict defendant on an improper
basis," viz., his bad character and commission of other crimes.  
We disagree.  First, defendant errs in asserting that
the disputed evidence demonstrated that defendant had committed
the crime of "compelling prostitution."  The comments attributed
to defendant amounted only to a suggestion to Gates that she
engage in prostitution to make money for the group, and she in
fact declined to do so.  Second, any adverse inference that the
jury might have drawn about defendant's character because of that
evidence was undercut by other testimony from multiple witnesses
that Gates previously had worked for an "escort service"
independently of defendant's involvement.  Finally, whether the
prostitution evidence was likely to have affected the jury's
verdict because it cast defendant in an unfavorable light must be
considered in the context of the crimes charged and the trial
court record.  Here, there is little likelihood that the
prostitution evidence had any effect on jury's verdict.  This was
a prosecution for various murder and attempted murder charges,
assault, robbery, burglary, and felon in possession of a firearm. 
Defendant himself testified that he participated in the robbery
of Copp and Johnson, and the testimony of numerous other
witnesses as well as physical evidence supported his admissions. 
Herlong, Gates, and Johnson testified that defendant carried his
.45-caliber handgun during the robbery, and no one disputed that
it was in his possession before and after Copp was murdered and
Johnson was shot.  Ballistics evidence showed that Copp was shot
with defendant's gun.  Johnson testified that defendant said he
was going to kill both him and Copp.  Herlong, Gates, and another
eyewitness, a neighbor, testified that defendant was the only one
of the intruders in the house when they heard the final shot
fired.  Copp was alive when the others left the house; no one saw
Copp alive after that time.  
In the context of that evidence as to defendant's role
in the murder of Copp and the attempted murder of Johnson, we
conclude that there is little likelihood that the trial court's
improper admission of the prostitution testimony had any effect
on the jury's verdict.
III.  AGGRAVATED MURDER CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF DEATH
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it
entered two convictions for aggravated murder and two sentences
of death for the aggravated murder of Copp.  Defendant argues
that, under this court's decision in State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27,
10 P3d 901 (2000), the state properly may charge a defendant with
multiple counts of aggravated murder based on the existence of
multiple aggravating factors, id. at 31, but, in the event of
multiple guilty verdicts on those counts, the trial court should
enter only one judgment of conviction for aggravated murder for
each victim, which judgment should enumerate each of the separate
aggravating factors.  Id. at 37.  Defendant acknowledges that he
did not object at trial to the imposition of two aggravated
murder convictions and two sentences of death, but argues that
this court should review the error because it is apparent on the
face of the record.  The state concedes that the judgment that
the trial court entered is erroneous.
We agree that the trial court erred when it imposed two
convictions and two sentences of death for Copp's murder, and
that that error is apparent on the face of the record.  We remand
the case for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction
reflecting defendant's guilt on the charges of aggravated murder. 
The judgment should merge the two convictions for aggravated
murder into a single conviction and should enumerate separately
the aggravating factors on which the conviction was based.  The
court then should impose a single sentence of death.
IV.  CONCLUSION
We have considered each of defendant's other
assignments of error and each of his supporting arguments.  The
assignments of error and arguments not discussed in this opinion
either have been discussed by this court in previous cases and
resolved against defendant, were not preserved for review, or are
not well taken.  Further discussion of the issues would not
benefit defendant, the public, the bench, or the bar.
The judgment of conviction and the sentences, including
the sentences of death, are affirmed in part and reversed in
part.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. An additional assignment of error concerns the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for a mistrial on the ground that the trial court allowed the state to question defendant about those
incidents.  That assignment fails because, as described below, the underlying objections are not
well taken.
2. Ordinarily, this court considers whether evidence of a
defendant's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is admissible for a
noncharacter purpose under the three-part test set forth in State
v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195, 832 P2d 443 (1992).  Under that
test, evidence of such acts is admissible if (1) it is
independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose; (2) the
proponent of the evidence offers sufficient proof that the
conduct occurred and that the defendant engaged in it; and (3)
the probative value of the conduct is not substantially
outweighed by the dangers of prejudice identified in OEC 403. 
Id. at 195.  Defendant's legal arguments, while not phrased in
terms of the Johnson test, present substantially the same issues
as the first and third parts of that test.  We consider the
arguments in the form that defendant has raised them here, but
the result would not be different if defendant had structured his
arguments more consistently with Johnson.
3. In 1997, the legislature enacted OEC 404(4), which makes admissible in criminal actions
relevant "evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by the defendant."  Or Laws 1997, ch 313, §
29.  Neither party raised or discussed OEC 404(4), and we do not address its applicability here.