Title: State v. Luedtke
Citation: 2015 WI 42
Docket Number: 2013AP001737-CR, 2013AP000218-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2015

2015 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael R. Luedtke, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
------------------------------------------------ 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jessica M. Weissinger, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 355 Wis. 2d 436, 851 N.W.2d 837) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 79 
----------------------------------------------- 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 355 Wis. 2d 546, 851 N.W.2d 780) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 73 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 24, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit/Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago/Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Karen L. Seifert /Sandy A. Williams 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner Michael R. Luedtke, 
the cause was argued by Donald T. Lang. There were briefs by 
Donald T. Lang, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
 
2
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-petitioner 
Jessica 
M. 
Weissinger, the cause was argued by Gerald P. Boyle.  There were 
briefs by Gerald P. Boyle, and Boyle, Boyle & Boyle, S.C., 
Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent in both cases, the cause was 
argued by Winn S. Collins, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 42
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF871 & 2010CF116) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael R. Luedtke, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 24, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jessica M. Weissinger, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of two 
published decisions of the court of appeals, State v. Luedtke, 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
2 
 
2014 WI App 79, 355 Wis. 2d 436, 851 N.W.2d 837, and State v. 
Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, 355 Wis. 2d 546, 851 N.W.2d 780.  We 
consolidated the cases for the purpose of this opinion because 
both present the same issue on largely similar facts.  Both 
cases require us to examine the constitutional implications of 
blood sample destruction that deprived the defendants of the 
opportunity to independently test their samples. 
¶2 
In Luedtke, the Winnebago County District Attorney's 
Office charged Michael R. Luedtke ("Luedtke") with one count of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a 
controlled substance (diazepam and methadone), seventh, eighth, 
or ninth offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2009-
10),1 and one count of operating a motor vehicle with a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) states:  
No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: 
Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled 
substance, 
a 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
or 
any 
combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance 
and a controlled substance analog, under the influence 
of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined 
influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a 
degree which renders him or her incapable of safely 
driving. 
Diazepam is listed as a Schedule IV controlled 
substance under Wis. Stat. § 961.20(2)(cr).  Methadone is 
listed as a Schedule II controlled substance under Wis. 
Stat. § 961.16(3)(r). 
 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
3 
 
detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance (cocaine 
and its metabolite, benzoylecgonine2) in the blood, seventh, 
eighth, 
or 
ninth 
offense, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(am).3  The jury found Luedtke not guilty of operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled 
substance but found him guilty of operating a motor vehicle with 
a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the 
blood.  The Winnebago County circuit court4 withheld a sentence 
and placed Luedtke on probation for a period of four years, with 
12 months of conditional jail time, imposed and stayed. 
¶3 
Luedtke filed a post-conviction motion arguing that 
the State violated his due process rights when the Wisconsin 
State Laboratory of Hygiene ("Laboratory") destroyed his blood 
sample, in accordance with routine procedures, before he had the 
opportunity to test it.  Luedtke also argued that the charge of 
                                                 
2 See 
Benzoylecgonine, 
http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/benzoylecgonine (last visited Feb. 9, 
2015).  
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) states: "No person may 
drive or operate a motor vehicle while: The person has a 
detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or 
her blood." 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 967.055(1m)(b) 
defines 
restricted 
controlled substance as any of the following: "1. A controlled 
substance included in schedule I under ch. 961 other than a 
tetrahydrocannabinol.  2. A controlled substance analog, as 
defined in s. 961.01 (4m), of a controlled substance described 
in subd. 1.  3. Cocaine or any of its metabolites.  4. 
Methamphetamine.  5. Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol." 
4 The Honorable Karen L. Seifert, presiding. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
4 
 
operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a 
restricted controlled substance in the blood is unconstitutional 
without scienter.5  The Winnebago County circuit court rejected 
both claims, and Luedtke appealed.   
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed and concluded (1) that 
the State did not violate Luedtke's due process rights when the 
Laboratory destroyed his blood sample in accordance with routine 
procedures; and (2) that the statute prohibiting operating a 
motor 
vehicle 
with 
a 
detectable 
amount 
of 
a 
restricted 
controlled substance in the blood is a strict liability offense, 
and thus does not require scienter.  Luedtke, 355 Wis. 2d 436, 
¶1.  Further, the court concluded that the statute was 
constitutional.  Id.   
¶5 
In Weissinger, the Ozaukee County District Attorney's 
Office charged Jessica M. Weissinger ("Weissinger") with one 
count of injury by use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled 
substance in the blood causing great bodily harm, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(am),6 and one count of operating a motor 
vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled 
substance in the blood (Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC")), 
                                                 
5 Scienter is defined as "[a] degree of knowledge that makes 
a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her 
act or omission."  Black's Law Dictionary 1463 (9th ed. 2009). 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.25(1)(am) states: "Any person who 
does any of the following is guilty of a Class F felony: Causes 
great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a 
vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood." 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
5 
 
second offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am).  Prior 
to trial, Weissinger filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
admission of her blood test results into evidence violated her 
due process rights because the Laboratory had destroyed her 
blood sample before she had the opportunity to test it.  The 
Ozaukee County circuit court7 denied the motion, and the jury 
subsequently found her guilty of both counts.  The court 
withheld a sentence on both counts and placed Weissinger on 
probation for a period of five years for count one and two years 
for count two, to be served concurrently.  As a condition of 
probation, the court ordered five months of conditional jail 
time, stayed pending Weissinger's appeal.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding that the State did not violate Weissinger's 
due process rights when the Laboratory destroyed her blood 
sample in accordance with its routine procedures.  Weissinger, 
355 Wis. 2d 546, ¶1. 
¶6 
Two issues are presented for our review.  The first, 
applicable to both parties, is whether the State violated 
Luedtke and Weissinger's due process rights when the Laboratory 
destroyed their blood samples, pursuant to routine procedures, 
before each had the opportunity to test the samples.  The 
second, applicable to only Luedtke, is whether operating a motor 
vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled 
substance in the blood under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) is a 
                                                 
7 The Honorable Sandy W. Williams, presiding. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
6 
 
strict liability offense, and, if so, whether the statute is 
constitutional. 
¶7 
First, based on precedent, we hold that, in the 
context of evidence preservation and destruction, the Wisconsin 
Constitution does not provide greater due process protection 
under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18 than the United States 
Constitution under either the Fifth9 or Fourteenth10 Amendments.  
As a result, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), 
controls.  Accordingly, in order to prevail, Luedtke and 
Weissinger must show that the State (1) failed to preserve 
evidence that was apparently exculpatory, or (2) acted in bad 
faith by failing to preserve evidence that was potentially 
exculpatory.  State v. Greenwold, 189 Wis. 2d 59, 67, 525 
N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold II).  Luedtke and 
Weissinger's blood samples were neither apparently exculpatory 
nor destroyed in bad faith; therefore, the State did not violate 
their due process rights.   
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Const. art 1, § 8, cl. 1 states: "No person may 
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of 
law, and no person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself or herself." 
9 United States Const. amend. V states: "No person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." 
10 United States Const. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "No state 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
7 
 
¶8 
Second, we hold that operating a motor vehicle with a 
detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the 
blood under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability 
offense that does not require scienter, and is constitutional.  
We therefore affirm the court of appeals.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Michael R. Luedtke 
¶9 
On April 27, 2009, at 2:07 PM in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 
Luedtke, driving a Ford Escort belonging to his employer, rear-
ended another vehicle, extensively damaging it and injuring its 
driver.  Luedtke stated that he caused the accident when he took 
his eyes off the road to reach for his cell phone.  Police 
officers arrived at the scene and eyewitnesses told them that 
Luedtke had stuffed a blue bag-like item into the sewer after 
the collision.  Detective Christopher Guiliani ("Detective 
Guiliani") searched the sewer and found a blue shirt wrapped 
around six syringes and a metal spoon.  Luedtke later testified 
that he hid the syringes, but not the spoon, in the sewer in a 
panic because he thought that they were illegal items.  He also 
testified that he did not know that the items were in the car 
before the accident.  
¶10 At the scene, Officer Joseph Framke ("Officer Framke") 
spoke with Luedtke.  Luedtke admitted that he had taken several 
prescription 
medications 
and 
occasionally 
used 
marijuana.  
Luedtke consented to a search of his vehicle and Officer Framke 
found, in the driver's side door pocket, three additional 
syringes and an unlabeled prescription bottle containing powder 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
8 
 
residue.  In his initial interactions with Luedtke, Officer 
Framke did not notice any significant signs of intoxication but 
concluded that Luedtke was impaired after Luedtke failed 
standard field sobriety tests.  Detective Brett Robertson 
("Detective Robertson") administered a 12-step test that helps 
to determine if a person is under the influence of drugs and 
concluded that Luedtke was impaired.  Luedtke claimed that his 
poor performance on the sobriety tests was due to prior 
injuries, his misunderstanding of the directions, and injuries 
that he sustained during the accident.  Detective Robertson also 
observed fresh puncture marks near Luedtke's right thumb.  
Luedtke admitted that while he did inject morphine, the 
particular puncture marks observed by Detective Robertson were 
from work injuries, not drugs.   
¶11 It is undisputed that at 3:28 PM on the day of the 
accident police conducted a legal blood draw.  Prior to the 
blood draw, Detective Guiliani read Luedtke the "informing the 
accused"11 form after which Luedtke consented to the blood draw.  
The informing the accused form told Luedtke that: 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) 
requires 
that 
a 
law 
enforcement officer provide certain information to a person 
after being arrested for operating while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs.  The officer must inform the arrestee that his 
or her blood, breath, or urine sample will be tested for drugs 
or alcohol.  The officer must also inform the arrestee that he 
or she has the right to take an alternative test free of charge 
and to have a test conducted by a qualified person of the 
arrestee's choice and at the arrestee's expense. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
9 
 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system. . . . If you take all the requested 
tests, you may choose to take further tests.  You may 
take the alternative test that this law enforcement 
agency provides free of charge.  You may also have a 
test conducted by a qualified person of your choice at 
your expense.   
Luedtke declined an alternative test.   
¶12 On April 30, 2009, Luedtke's blood sample arrived at 
the Laboratory, a public health laboratory at the University of 
Wisconsin that is accredited by the American Board of Forensic 
Toxicologists and that acts independently from the direction of 
any law enforcement agency.  On May 1, 2009, Advanced Chemist 
Thomas Neuser ("Neuser") tested Luedtke's blood sample for 
alcohol.  The Laboratory generated a report in May 2009 
indicating that Luedtke's blood tested negative for alcohol.  
The report stated that "Specimen(s) will be retained no longer 
than six months unless otherwise requested by agency or 
subject."   
¶13 On November 18, 2009, the sample underwent a more 
comprehensive Gas Chromatograph with Mass Selective Detector 
("GCMSD") drug panel screen.  This test indicated the presence 
of the anti-depressant venlafaxine, the narcotic methadone, and 
the anti-anxiety medication diazepam, all within the therapeutic 
range.  The test results also indicated the presence of cocaine, 
at less than 20 nanograms12 per milliliter, and the cocaine 
                                                 
12 A nanogram is one billionth of a gram. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
10 
 
metabolite benzoylecgonine, at 330 nanograms per milliliter.  
The detection limit for cocaine is ten nanograms, below which it 
is reported as not detected.  In November 2009, the Laboratory 
generated a second report that identified these drugs as present 
in Luedtke's blood.   
¶14 The Laboratory mailed copies of both the May 2009 
report and November 2009 reports to Luedtke, but he claims that 
he never received them. 
¶15 On December 18, 2009, the Winnebago County District 
Attorney's Office charged Luedtke with one count of operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled 
substance (diazepam and methadone), seventh, eighth, or ninth 
offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), and one count of 
operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a 
restricted controlled substance (cocaine and its metabolite, 
benzoylecgonine) in the blood, seventh, eighth, or ninth 
offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am).   
¶16 Luedtke failed to appear at his initial appearance 
scheduled for January 11, 2010, because he was in custody in 
Outagamie County.  On February 4, 2010, the Laboratory destroyed 
Luedtke's blood sample.  Luedtke claims that he first saw the 
blood test results at his initial appearance on May 24, 2010.   
¶17 On December 28, 2010, Luedtke filed a motion to 
dismiss or to suppress the blood test results on the ground that 
the Laboratory had destroyed his blood.  The circuit court 
denied Luedtke's motion, finding no evidence of bad faith on the 
part of the Laboratory.  The court suggested that Luedtke inform 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
11 
 
the jury that he was not given a chance to retest the sample due 
to its destruction.  
¶18 On April 17, 2012, the State tried Luedtke before a 
jury.  Luedtke's counsel cross-examined Neuser, who testified 
that blood testing is not infallible and that the reported value 
does not always match the target value with an unstable molecule 
like cocaine, though this discrepancy does not constitute a 
false positive.  Luedtke also cross-examined Officer Framke, who 
admitted that Luedtke did not display signs of impairment during 
their initial interactions.  Luedtke testified and explained his 
use of venlafaxine, methadone, and diazepam, and denied any 
cocaine use.  Luedtke also testified that he could not retest 
his blood sample because the Laboratory destroyed it before he 
was aware of the results.  Further, Luedtke admitted that he hid 
the syringes, but not the spoon, in the sewer.  During his 
closing 
argument, 
Luedtke 
focused 
on 
the 
Laboratory's 
destruction of the blood sample.  Luedtke did not call an expert 
witness, object to any jury instructions, or request any 
additional information be added to the record.     
¶19 The jury found Luedtke not guilty of count one, 
operating under the influence of a controlled substance.  The 
jury found Luedtke guilty of count two, operating a motor 
vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled 
substance in the blood.  On April 17, 2012, the court entered a 
judgment of conviction, withheld sentence, and placed Luedtke on 
probation for a period of four years, with 12 months of 
conditional jail time, imposed and stayed. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
12 
 
¶20 On May 31, 2013, Luedtke filed a post-conviction 
motion that challenged the admission into evidence of the blood 
test 
result 
and 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(am).  He asserted that, even if the court admitted 
the blood test results into evidence, the jury should have been 
instructed that they could infer that the sample could have been 
exculpatory had it not been destroyed.  Luedtke also contended 
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  The 
circuit court denied the motions, concluding that the State did 
not violate Luedtke's due process rights when the Laboratory 
destroyed his blood sample.  The court also concluded that 
§ 346.63(1)(am) is a constitutional strict liability offense.    
¶21 On June 11, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction and order denying 
postconviction relief.  The court of appeals concluded that 
§ 346.63(1)(am) 
is 
a 
strict 
liability 
offense 
and 
is 
constitutional.  Luedtke, 355 Wis. 2d 436, ¶¶15-19.  The court 
also concluded that Luedtke failed to show that his blood sample 
was apparently exculpatory or that it was destroyed in bad 
faith.  Id., ¶¶22, 24.  Finally, the court concluded that, 
despite the blood sample's destruction, Luedtke received a fair 
trial.  Id., ¶25-26.   
¶22 Luedtke successfully petitioned this court for review. 
B. Jessica M. Weissinger 
¶23 On July 6, 2009, in Mequon, Wisconsin, between 5:00 
and 5:30 PM, Weissinger's vehicle collided with a motorcycle.  
The motorcyclist saw Weissinger's vehicle swerve into his lane 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
13 
 
when Weissinger turned left at an intersection.  Despite 
applying 
his 
brakes, 
the 
motorcyclist 
struck 
Weissinger's 
vehicle and was thrown to the pavement causing a broken back, 
shattered wrists, a head laceration, and a concussion.  Weather 
was not a factor in the crash. 
¶24 Law 
enforcement 
and 
emergency 
medical 
personnel 
arrived 
at 
the 
scene 
and 
administered 
treatment 
to 
the 
motorcyclist. 
 
Investigating 
Officer 
Mark 
Riley 
("Officer 
Riley") spoke with Weissinger for about one minute.  Officer 
Riley noted that Weissinger had bloodshot eyes, but acknowledged 
that this was consistent with her emotional state and not 
necessarily indicative of impairment.  Officer Brent Smith 
("Officer Smith") also examined Weissinger and did not believe 
her to be intoxicated.   
¶25 Officer 
Riley 
did 
not 
initially 
believe 
that 
Weissinger was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  
However, anticipating a fatality investigation, he obtained 
Weissinger's 
consent 
for 
a 
blood 
draw. 
 
Officer 
Riley 
transported Weissinger to the hospital in a Mequon Police 
Department vehicle.  It is undisputed, however, that she was not 
under arrest at the time.  Because the police did not arrest 
Weissinger for an impaired driving offense, Officer Smith was 
not required to provide her with an "informing the accused"13 
                                                 
13 This incident occurred before the 2010 amendment to Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4), in which the legislature amended the statute 
to require that the "informing the accused" information be 
provided after any vehicular collision involving grave injury, 
great bodily harm, or death.   
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
14 
 
warning before her blood draw.  Officer Smith testified that he 
did not inform Weissinger that she could take an alternate test 
but also testified that he would have complied with such a 
request had she made one.  
¶26 At 6:45 PM that same evening, technician Lisa Brandt 
drew Weissinger's blood, with all parties confirming that both 
the draw and the return of the sample to the police were 
acceptable.  On July 10, 2009, Weissinger's blood sample arrived 
at the Laboratory.  On July 13, 2009, the Laboratory tested the 
blood sample for alcohol.  The following day, the Laboratory 
generated a report that stated that the test results did not 
show the presence of alcohol.  The report also stated that: 
"Specimen(s) will be retained no longer than six months unless 
otherwise requested by agency or subject." 
¶27 On August 7, 2009, the Laboratory tested Weissinger's 
blood sample for drugs using the GCMSD drug panel screen.  The 
GCMSD found that Weissinger's blood contained near-therapeutic 
range levels of the anti-depressant fluoxetine and therapeutic 
range levels of the narcotic oxycodone.  On February 24, 2010, 
the final GCMSD analysis revealed that her blood contained THC 
at a level of 5.9 nanograms per milliliter.  On March 7, 2010, 
the Laboratory generated a report identifying the presence of 
THC. 
¶28 The Laboratory mailed the July 2009 report and March 
2010 report to Weissinger, though she claims that she never 
received them.  In late April 2010, the Laboratory discarded her 
blood sample in accordance with its routine practice.   
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
15 
 
¶29 On 
May 
24, 
2010, 
the 
Ozaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney's Office charged Weissinger with one count of injury by 
use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance (THC) in 
the blood causing great bodily harm, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.25(1)(am), and one count of operating a motor vehicle with 
a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance (THC) 
in 
the 
blood, 
second 
offense, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(am).   
¶30 On May 3, 2011, Weissinger made her first request to 
retest the blood sample.  Soon after, she filed a formal motion 
to retest the sample.  In May 2011, the Laboratory informed her 
that it had destroyed her blood sample in late April 2010.  
Weissinger filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the ground 
that her blood sample had been destroyed.  The circuit court 
denied Weissinger's motion, concluding that the State did not 
violate Weissinger's due process rights.   
¶31 From April 23-24, 2012, the case was tried before a 
jury.  The circuit court gave Weissinger wide latitude during 
cross-examination.  Weissinger cross-examined Advanced Chemist 
Amy Miles ("Miles"), the analyst who tested Weissinger's blood 
sample for drugs.  During cross-examination, Miles acknowledged 
that testing is not infallible and that she had no certain 
evidence or direct knowledge of whether Weissinger received the 
Laboratory's reports.  Miles also testified that, based on the 
blood test results, Weissinger was likely a regular user of 
marijuana and probably had consumed the substance within a few 
hours before the accident, certainly within 24 hours.  The 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
16 
 
court, prior to trial, also gave Weissinger additional time to 
hire an expert witness for her defense, though she ultimately 
declined to do so. 
¶32 The circuit court also allowed the jury to hear a 
statement from Weissinger explaining she was unable to retest 
her blood sample because it no longer existed.  The court 
prohibited the State from indicating that Weissinger waited 
until May 2011 to request a retest of the blood. 
¶33 The jury found Weissinger guilty of both counts.  The 
circuit court withheld sentence and placed her on probation for 
a period of five years for count one and a period of two years 
for count two, to be served concurrently.  As a condition of 
probation, the court ordered five months of conditional jail 
time, stayed pending Weissinger's appeal. 
¶34 On June 25, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed.  The 
court rejected Weissinger's argument that the destruction of her 
blood sample violated due process.  Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546, 
¶1.  The court reasoned that pursuant to Youngblood, Weissinger 
failed to show either that the blood sample was apparently 
exculpatory or that it was destroyed in bad faith.  Id., ¶19.   
¶35 Judge Reilly dissented.  Judge Reilly argued that "[a] 
criminal justice system that allows the government to destroy 
the sole evidence of a person's guilt prior to notice, charging, 
or a meaningful opportunity for the accused to inspect the 
State's evidence is fundamentally unfair."  Id., ¶31 (Reilly, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
Judge 
Reilly 
argued 
Youngblood 
was 
inapplicable in the present case because Weissinger's blood 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
17 
 
sample 
had 
inculpatory 
value, 
not 
merely 
"conceivable 
evidentiary significance."  Id., ¶38 (Reilly, J., dissenting).    
¶36 Weissinger successfully petitioned this court for 
review.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 "Whether state action constitutes a violation of due 
process presents a question of law, which this court decides 
independently . . . ."  State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶32, 348 
Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560.  We uphold the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
State 
v. 
Felix, 
2012 
WI 
36, 
¶22, 
339 
Wis. 2d 670, 
811 
N.W.2d 775. 
¶38 "Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo . . . ."  Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. 
Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.  Whether 
a statute is unconstitutional also is a question of law that 
this Court reviews de novo.  Neumann, 348 Wis. 2d 455, ¶32 
(citing State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 
N.W.2d 354).  Statutes are presumed to be constitutional.  State 
v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, ¶10, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810.  
"A party challenging a statute's constitutionality must [] 
demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Youngblood Controls 
¶39 Luedtke and Weissinger's primary argument on appeal is 
that the Wisconsin Constitution provides greater due process 
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2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
18 
 
protections than the United States Constitution in the context 
of evidence preservation and destruction.  We disagree.  Based 
on our precedent we hold that, in the context of evidence 
preservation and destruction, the Wisconsin Constitution does 
not provide greater due process protections under Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 1 than the United States Constitution does 
under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.  As a result, 
Arizona v. Youngblood, controls.  In order to prevail, Luedtke 
and Weissinger would have to show that the State (1) failed to 
preserve evidence that was apparently exculpatory or (2) acted 
in 
bad 
faith 
by 
failing 
to 
preserve 
evidence 
that 
was 
potentially exculpatory.  Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 67.  The 
blood samples were neither apparently exculpatory nor destroyed 
in bad faith; therefore, the State did not violate Luedtke and 
Weissinger's due process rights. 
¶40 "This court follows the doctrine of stare decisis 
scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule of 
law."  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  Adhering to 
precedent  
ensures that existing law will not be abandoned 
lightly.  When existing law is open to revision in 
every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of 
judicial 
will, 
with 
arbitrary 
and 
unpredictable 
results.  Consequently, this court has held that any 
departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
special justification.   
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266 (citations and quotations omitted).   
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2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
19 
 
The rationales for following the doctrine of stare 
decisis . . . include: '[1] the desirability that the 
law furnish a clear guide for conduct of individuals, 
to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance 
against untoward surprise; [2] the importance of 
furthering 
fair 
and 
expeditious 
adjudication 
by 
eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant 
proposition in every case; and [3] the necessity of 
maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source 
of impersonal and reasoned judgments.' 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95 (quoting Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).  "Stare decisis 
is the preferred course [of judicial action] because it promotes 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles . . . and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process."  State v. Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d 481, 504, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998) (quoting Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). 
Five factors typically contribute to a decision to 
overturn prior case law.  This court is more likely to 
overturn a prior decision when one or more of the 
following circumstances is present: (1) Changes or 
developments in the law have undermined the rationale 
behind a decision; (2) there is a need to make a 
decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; (3) 
there is a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency  in the law; 
(4) the prior decision is unsound in principle; or (5) 
the prior decision is unworkable in practice.   
Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health 
Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 
N.W.2d 216 (quotations omitted). 
¶41 Wisconsin has a well-settled and long standing body of 
law on the due process implications of evidence preservation and 
destruction.  See, e.g., State v. Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461, 351 
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2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
20 
 
N.W.2d 492 
(1984); 
State 
v. 
Ehlen, 
119 
Wis. 2d 451, 
351 
N.W.2d 503 (1984); State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 
N.W.2d 469 (1984).  This precedent requires that, to prevail on 
a due process challenge, a defendant must show that that 
evidence was either apparently exculpatory or that the State 
acted in bad faith by destroying evidence that was potentially 
exculpatory.  State v. Pankow, 144 Wis. 2d 23, 42-43, 422 
N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479 (1984)); State v. Greenwold, 181 Wis. 2d 881, 855, 512 
N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold I) (citing Youngblood).  
Our precedent interprets the Wisconsin Constitution as providing 
the same due process protections for evidence preservation and 
destruction as the United States Constitution.  Greenwold II, 
189 Wis. 2d at 71. 
¶42 As early as 1984, we held that "[t]he importance of 
the production of the original breath ampoule or a portion of 
the blood sample as the sine qua non of due process is a myth 
that should not be perpetuated."  Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 453.  We 
held that it was an error "to conclude due process will be 
violated if a blood test is not suppressed merely because a 
portion of the sample—even if it were retestable—could not be 
produced for further tests."  Id. at 457.  We were "convinced 
that the claim that due process could only be preserved for 
defendants by such retests was illusory."  Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 
480.   
¶43 That same year, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that due process did not require the preservation of a 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
21 
 
breath sample in order to introduce breathalyzer results at 
trial.  Trombetta, 67 U.S. at 491.  Even though a re-test could 
lead to exculpatory evidence, the Court nevertheless held there 
was no due process violation because the destruction occurred in 
good faith and in accordance with normal evidence retention 
practice.  Id. at 488. 
¶44 In Youngblood, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
principle.  The Court noted "the importance for constitutional 
purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government when 
the claim is based on loss of evidence attributable to the 
Government."  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.  The Court was 
unwilling to "impos[e] on the police an undifferentiated and 
absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might 
be of conceivable significance in a particular prosecution."  
Id. at 58.   
¶45 Post-Youngblood, Wisconsin courts have adhered to this 
precedent.  In Greenwold II, the court of appeals concluded that 
"the due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution is the 
substantial equivalent of its respective clause in the federal 
constitution."  Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 71 (citing State v. 
McManus, 
152 
Wis. 2d 113, 
130, 
447 
N.W.2d 654 
(1989)).  
Greenwold II continued to hold to precedent in concluding that 
the Youngblood test controlled and, because the Wisconsin 
Constitution did not provide any greater protection, that due 
process did not require the preservation of a breath or blood 
sample.  Id. 
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2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
22 
 
¶46 Therefore, under longstanding Wisconsin precedent, it 
is clear that the routine destruction of a driver's blood or 
breath sample, without more, does not deprive a defendant of due 
process.  To prevail on a due process challenge, the defendant 
must show that the evidence was apparently exculpatory or that 
it was destroyed in bad faith.  Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 67.  
Bad faith can be shown only if "(1) the officers were aware of 
the potentially exculpatory value or usefulness of the evidence 
they failed to preserve; and (2) the officers acted with 
official 
animus 
or 
made 
a 
conscious 
effort 
to 
suppress 
exculpatory evidence."  Id. at 69.  The United States Supreme 
Court, this court, and the court of appeals have all expressly 
rejected the argument that due process requires the preservation 
of blood samples.   
¶47 Though our precedent is clear that destruction alone 
does 
not 
create 
a 
due 
process 
violation 
under 
either 
constitution, Luedtke and Weissinger both argue that changes or 
developments in the law, specifically State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 
126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, have undermined the 
rationale behind our precedent.14   
¶48 In Dubose, we held that Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution contained a broader due process right 
                                                 
14 We restricted briefing to the first Bartholomew factor: 
"Whether changes or developments in the law in State v. Dubose, 
2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, have undermined 
the rationale behind [the] Ehlen, Disch, Walstad, Pankow, and 
Greenwold II decisions." 
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2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
23 
 
than that contained within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 
¶41.  However, we restricted this broader right to the specific 
context of an identification procedure known as a "showup."  
Id., ¶45.  "A showup is an out-of-court pretrial identification 
procedure in which a suspect is presented singly to a witness 
for identification purposes."  Id., ¶1 n.1 (quotations and 
citation omitted).  We explained that the identification of a 
defendant by "a showup will not be admissible unless, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, the showup was necessary" 
because a "lineup or photo array is generally fairer than a 
showup . . . thus reducing the risk of a misidentification."  
Id., ¶¶33, 45.  We held that the Wisconsin Constitution provided 
greater protection in this context because new studies had 
demonstrated 
that 
unreliable 
eyewitness 
identification 
contributed 
to 
wrongful 
convictions, 
thereby 
providing 
a 
compelling justification for overruling precedent.  Id., ¶¶29-
30, 33.  Three justices dissented, and would have held that the 
state and federal constitutions provided identical protections.  
Id., 
¶56 
(Wilcox, 
J., 
dissenting), 
¶68 
(Prosser, 
J., 
dissenting), ¶89 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
¶49 However, post-Dubose, we have held that the decision 
did not create a precedential sea change with respect to the 
recognition of a broader due process protection under the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
than 
under 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  In State v. Drew, 2007 WI App 213, ¶¶2, 17, 305 
Wis. 2d 641, 740 N.W.2d 404, the court of appeals held that 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
24 
 
DuBose did not alter precedent with respect to lineups and photo 
arrays, explaining that Dubose recognized those identification 
procedures are preferable to a showup.  In State v. Hibl, 2006 
WI 52, ¶56, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 714 N.W.2d 194, we held that Dubose 
did 
not 
directly 
control 
spontaneous 
or 
accidental 
identifications of a defendant by a victim lacking police 
involvement.  Finally, in State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶¶81-82, 
342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238, we distinguished a showup from 
an identification made in court through the showing of a single 
mug shot.   
¶50 The State correctly notes, even within the specific 
context of eyewitness identification, post-Dubose jurisprudence 
confirms the limited reach of its actual holding: that due 
process 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides 
greater 
protection in one identification procedure, the showup.  Dubose 
withdrew no language from Ehlen, Disch, Walstad, or Pankow.  
Dubose is therefore not a sea change or even a development 
sufficient to undermine the rationale behind Ehlen, Disch, 
Walstad, Pankow, and Greenwold II.   
¶51 Luedtke questions the precedential value of Ehlen and 
Disch because they were decided before Dubose.  Dubose did not 
involve 
evidence 
destruction. 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides identical protections to the United States Constitution 
in this context.  Luedtke also argues that Ehlen and Disch are 
distinguishable 
because 
"the 
Court 
implicitly 
assumed 
the 
defendants were aware of the specific focus of the testing on 
alcohol."  Luedtke argues that, unlike the defendants in Ehlen 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
25 
 
and Disch, he had no reason to seek an independent test prior to 
the Laboratory's destruction of his blood sample.  That 
distinction is not persuasive.  When the State conducted the 
blood draw, the officer informed Luedtke that his blood would be 
tested for drugs and alcohol and that he could have the blood 
independently tested.  Although Luedtke allegedly had no reason 
to believe that his blood sample would test positive for 
restricted controlled substances before the Laboratory destroyed 
it, he knew that his blood sample would be tested for drugs.  
Thus, he had reason to seek an independent test before the 
Laboratory destroyed his blood sample.  In Ehlen and Disch, we 
found it significant that the defendants knew of their right to 
seek independent tests before the State destroyed their blood 
samples.  Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 457; Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 470.  
We did not focus on whether the defendants had a reason to 
independently test their samples before their destruction.  
¶52 Further, 
Luedtke 
received 
notice 
that 
the 
"law 
enforcement agency now wants to test one or more samples of your 
breath, blood or urine to determine the concentration of alcohol 
or drugs in your system."  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  Luedtke 
thus knew the nature of the investigation when he declined to 
pursue an alternate test.  Luedtke and Weissinger's argument 
that 
discovery 
granted 
them 
a 
post-charge 
right 
to 
the 
preservation of the blood sample is in conflict with our 
longstanding precedent.  We have consistently held that it is 
the test results, not the blood samples, that fall within the 
discovery statute.  Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 452. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
26 
 
¶53 Because, 
under 
our 
precedent, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides no greater due process protections than 
the United States Constitution regarding evidence preservation 
and destruction, we now proceed to the application of the 
Youngblood test.  Again, under Youngblood a defendant's due 
process rights regarding the destruction of evidence are 
violated if the State (1) fails to preserve evidence that is 
apparently exculpatory or (2) acts in bad faith by failing to 
preserve evidence that is potentially exculpatory.  Greenwold 
II, 189 Wis. 2d at 67.   
¶54 Neither Luedtke nor Weissinger argue that their blood 
samples were apparently exculpatory.  The fact that Luedtke's 
blood tested positive for restricted controlled substances, 
cocaine and its metabolite benzoylecgonine, demonstrates that 
his blood was apparently not exculpatory.  See, e.g., Illinois 
v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 548 (2004) ("[P]olice testing indicated 
that the chemical makeup of the substance inculpated, not 
exculpated, [the] respondent.").  Nor has Weissinger shown how 
her blood sample was apparently exculpatory at the time the 
Laboratory destroyed it.  Her sample, which tested positive for 
the restricted controlled substance THC, was inculpatory as 
well.  Id.   
¶55  Luedtke and Weissinger's due process claims also fail 
because the State did not destroy their blood samples in bad 
faith.  Luedtke argues that the State acted in bad faith by 
destroying his blood sample after he was charged and before he 
received notice of the charge.  Weissinger argues the State 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
27 
 
acted in bad faith by destroying her sample before she was 
charged.  However, Luedtke and Weissinger have failed to prove 
bad faith because they have not shown that the State (1) was 
"aware of the potentially exculpatory value or usefulness of the 
evidence [the State] failed to preserve"; and (2) "acted with 
official 
animus 
or 
made 
a 
conscious 
effort 
to 
suppress 
exculpatory evidence."  See Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 69.   
[R]equiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part 
of the police both limits the extent of the police's 
obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds 
and confines it to that class of cases where the 
interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., 
those cases in which the police themselves by their 
conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis 
for exonerating the defendant. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.   
¶56 Requiring bad faith is especially sensible once a 
blood sample has tested positive for a controlled substance, 
because at that point the sample is "much more likely to provide 
inculpatory than exculpatory evidence."  See Trombetta, 467 U.S. 
at 489.  The Laboratory destroyed both Luedtke and Weissinger's 
blood samples according to routine procedures.  Intentional 
destruction, without more, does not establish bad faith.   
¶57 Weissinger's 
reliance 
on 
State 
v. 
Hahn, 
132 
Wis. 2d 351, 392 N.W.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1986), is misplaced.  The 
evidence destroyed by the State in Hahn had apparent exculpatory 
value.  Id. at 360.  By contrast, Weissinger's blood had, at 
most, potential exculpatory value because, as explained above, 
the fact that her blood sample tested positive for THC indicated 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
28 
 
that her blood sample was inculpatory.  See, supra, ¶54.  Absent 
bad faith, destruction of evidence that merely has potential 
exculpatory value does not violate due process.  Greenwold II, 
189 Wis. 2d at 67 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58).   
¶58 Finally, both Luedtke and Weissinger received fair 
trials.  In Ehlen and Disch, we framed the due process issue 
when evidence is destroyed as one of fairness, 119 Wis. 2d at 
456; 119 Wis. 2d at 477, and in Trombetta the Supreme Court 
defined the fairness guarantee as "a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense."  Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485.  When 
potentially exculpatory evidence is destroyed, "courts face the 
treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose 
contents are unknown and, very often, disputed."  Id. at 486.  
However, "the retention of a breath ampoule or of a blood sample 
[is] of miniscule importance in the assurance of a fair trial 
when weighed in the balance against the traditional rights of 
defendants in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings."  Ehlen, 
119 Wis. 2d at 456.  "[A] whole panoply of due process 
safeguards [] protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, 
whether or not at a particular time a sample of blood is 
retestable."  Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 470.  This panoply includes 
"[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses and experts for the 
state, the right to impeach by use of the separate blood or 
breath analysis results, and the right to attack the credibility 
of the state's witnesses."  Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 452.   
¶59 We agree with the State that both Luedtke and 
Weissinger received fair trials.   
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2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
29 
 
¶60 Luedtke cross-examined witnesses and the court gave 
him an opportunity to call his own expert witness, although he 
chose not to do so.  Luedtke also had the opportunity to tell 
the jury that he was unable to test his blood sample because the 
Laboratory destroyed it.  Luedtke received discovery and 
additional time from the circuit court to prepare his defense 
and to seek documents from the Laboratory through an open 
records request.  Although Luedtke was unable to retest the 
blood sample, he was able to analyze the raw data and 
methodology that the Laboratory used to test the sample.  
Further, when Luedtke's blood was drawn the officer informed 
him, in writing, of his right to independently test the sample 
or to have a second test performed by the State.  Due to these 
these safeguards we conclude that Luedtke's claim of an unfair 
trial is unpersuasive.   
¶61 Weissinger also received a fair trial.  The circuit 
court gave Weissinger full rein to cross-examine the State's 
witnesses.  Weissinger also received discovery.  Although she 
did not call an expert witness, the circuit court granted her 
extra time to hire one.  The circuit court instructed the jury 
that Weissinger's motion to retest her blood sample was denied 
because the Laboratory destroyed her sample before the State 
filed charges.  We have held that defendants unable to 
independently test their blood samples have received fair trials 
under similar circumstances.  See Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 471; 
Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 456-57. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
30 
 
¶62 While it is true that the Laboratory destroyed 
Weissinger's sample before the State filed charges, it was under 
no obligation to preserve the sample any longer than its 
internal six month retention policy required.  Further, the 
Laboratory upheld its duty in mailing Weissinger the test 
results.  The test results informed her that, unless she 
requested otherwise, the Laboratory would destroy her blood 
sample six months after its receipt.  Further, Weissinger was 
not under arrest at the time of her blood draw, thus the officer 
was under no obligation to advise her regarding the opportunity 
for 
additional 
tests. 
 
Weissinger 
argues 
that 
Ehlen 
is 
distinguishable because she was not told that she had the right 
to independently test her blood sample before it was destroyed.  
However, Ehlen is still controlling.  Weissinger and Ehlen both 
requested independent tests after the State destroyed their 
samples.  Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 453-54.  In fact, Ehlen, like 
Weissinger, was charged after the State destroyed his blood 
sample.  Id.   
¶63 Consequently, because we hold that the State did not 
violate Luedtke and Weissinger's due process rights, we conclude 
that the circuit court was not required to give a jury 
instruction allowing the jury to infer that the lost evidence 
was 
exculpatory. 
 
Nor 
was 
Luedtke 
denied 
the 
effective 
assistance of counsel.  To demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Luedtke must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Because we 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
31 
 
have 
rejected 
Luedtke's 
arguments, 
Luedtke's 
claim 
of 
ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.  See State v. 
Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶37, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583 
("Counsel does not render deficient performance for failing to 
bring a [] motion that would have been denied.").  Finally, the 
interest of justice does not mandate a new trial because the 
real controversy, whether Luedtke operated a motor vehicle with 
a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his 
blood, was fully tried.  State v. Bannister, 2007 WI 86, ¶43, 
302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892. 
B. Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Restricted Controlled 
Substance in the Blood is a Constitutional Strict Liability 
Offense. 
¶64 Next, we consider whether operating a motor vehicle 
with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in 
the blood under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability 
offense, and, if so, whether the offense is constitutional.  
Only Luedtke presents this as an issue for review, though we 
note that the State charged Weissinger under the same statute.  
We hold that operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount 
of a restricted controlled substance in the blood under Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability offense and is 
constitutional. 
¶65 "An offense is a strict liability offense if it 
punishes a defendant's behavior without regard to the mental 
state of the defendant."  State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶27, 
253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330.  "To convict a defendant of a 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
32 
 
strict liability offense, the State is not required to prove 
that the defendant acted with a culpable state of mind while 
committing the offense."  Id.  "[S]cienter constitutes the rule 
in our criminal jurisprudence and is generally presumed even 
absent express statutory reference."  State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 
52, ¶11, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684.  "However, strict 
liability criminal statutes are not unknown."  Luedtke, 355 
Wis. 2d 436, ¶8.  In determining whether a statute imposes 
strict liability, we have identified six factors for courts to 
examine.  Jadowski, 272 Wis. 2d 418, ¶¶21-30.  These six factors 
are: 1) the language of the statute; 2) the language of related 
statutes; 3) the legislative history; 4) law enforcement 
practicality; 5) protection of the public from harm; and 6) the 
severity of the punishment.  Id. (citations omitted).  These six 
factors are sound, and we see no reason to depart from their 
application. 
¶66 The first factor, the language of the statute, weighs 
in favor of strict liability, as the legislature omitted any 
requirement that the person know that he has a restricted 
controlled substance in his blood.  In 2003, the legislature 
prohibited operating a motor vehicle while a "person has a 
detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or 
her blood."  2003 Wisconsin Act 97, sec. 2.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(am) contains no reference to mental state, and we 
have previously explained that when a statute makes no reference 
to intent, the statute often imposes strict liability.  See 
Polashek, 253 Wis. 2d 527, ¶28 ("Often, when the statute makes 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
33 
 
no reference to intent, we have held that the statute creates a 
strict liability offense.")  Because the language of the statute 
does not contain scienter this factor weighs in favor of strict 
liability. 
¶67 The second factor, the language of related statutes, 
also weighs in favor of strict liability.  Related statutes 
prohibit 1) the operation of a motor vehicle with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration,15 2) the operation of a motor vehicle by a 
driver who has not attained the legal drinking age and who has 
any alcohol in his or her blood,16 and 3) the operation of a 
commercial motor vehicle with any alcohol in the driver's 
blood.17  These statutes do not refer to mental state and thus do 
not require a showing of state of mind.  Had the legislature 
intended operating while under the influence crimes to require a 
knowledge requirement, we would expect to see such a requirement 
in related statutes, but none exists.  Because the legislature 
has not drafted a scienter requirement into the related 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) states: "No person may 
drive or operate a motor vehicle while: The person has a 
prohibited alcohol concentration." 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(2m) states: "If a person has not 
attained the legal drinking age, as defined in s. 125.02 (8m), 
the person may not drive or operate a motor vehicle while he or 
she has an alcohol concentration of more than 0.0 but not more 
than 0.08." 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63 (7)(a)1 states: "No person may 
drive or operate or be on duty time with respect to a commercial 
motor vehicle under any of the following circumstances: While 
having an alcohol concentration above 0.0." 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
34 
 
statutes, we will not read one into this statute.  Jadowski, 272 
Wis. 2d 418, ¶22.18 
¶68 The third factor, the statute's legislative history, 
also weighs in favor of strict liability.  In the past, we have 
explained that "[w]hen the legislature's goal is primarily to 
regulate, to accomplish a social good, or to obtain a high 
standard of care, proof of a criminal state of mind is often 
eliminated to achieve the desired result."  State v. Stoehr, 134 
Wis. 2d 66, 79, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986) (citing State v. Collova, 
79 Wis. 2d 473, 485, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977)).  The legislative 
history of the statute indicates that the legislature was 
attempting to regulate, accomplish a social good, and obtain a 
high standard of care by eliminating the requirement that an 
individual be under the influence of a drug in order to be 
criminally liable.  See Don Dyke, Wis. Legislative Council Act 
Memo: 2003 Wisconsin Act 97, Operating Vehicle or Going Armed 
                                                 
18 Luedtke's reliance on State v. Griffin, 220 Wis. 2d 371, 
584 N.W.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1998), is not persuasive.  The court of 
appeals in Griffin held that "the presence of drugs in Griffin's 
urine and blood stream, without more, is insufficient evidence 
on which to base a possession conviction."  Griffin, 220 
Wis. 2d at 381.  The court reasoned that "to be found guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance in Wisconsin, the defendant 
must have had the substance under his or her control and must 
have knowingly possessed the substance."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Griffin may lend support to Luedtke's argument that a 
person can unknowingly ingest cocaine.  But that assertion has 
little relevance to the ultimate questions of whether the 
statute at issue imposes strict liability and, if so, whether 
the statute is constitutional.  Put simply, Luedtke was charged 
with operating with a restricted controlled substance in his 
blood, not with possession of cocaine. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
35 
 
with a Detectable Amount of a Restricted Controlled Substance 
(Dec. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Legislative Council Memo].  The 
Legislative Council Memo states: "there is no requirement that 
the person [be] 'under the influence' of that restricted 
controlled substance.  Evidence of a detectable amount is 
sufficient.  It is often difficult to prove that a person who 
has used a restricted controlled substance was 'under the 
influence' of that substance."  Id.  In and of itself, this 
history would support a determination that this factor weighs 
neither in favor nor against strict liability, as it does not 
indicate, one way or the other, that the legislature considered 
whether the statute would impose strict liability.  See id.  
However, the Legislative Council Memo goes on to read: 
Two defenses are available if a detectable amount of a 
restricted 
controlled 
substance 
is 
found 
in 
the 
bloodstream: (1) a defense to causing death or injury 
if the defendant can prove the injury or death would 
have 
occurred 
even 
if 
the 
defendant 
had 
been 
exercising due care and did not have a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood (this is an 
extension of defenses available under current law); 
and (2) a defense to having methamphetamine, GHB, or 
the active ingredient of marijuana in the bloodstream 
if the defendant can show he or she had a valid 
prescription for that substance. 
Id. at 2.  Importantly, "unknowing ingestion" is not listed as a 
defense.   
¶69 Further, the legislative history indicates that the 
legislature intended to make prosecutions easier, by removing 
the "under the influence" requirement.  Requiring the State to 
prove 
knowledge 
would 
undoubtedly 
make 
prosecutions 
more 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
36 
 
difficult.  By removing the "under the influence" requirement 
and not providing "unknowing ingestion" as a defense, the 
legislature 
was 
attempting 
to 
regulate 
drugged 
driving, 
accomplish a social good, and impose a high standard of care on 
those who drive after using restricted controlled substances.   
¶70 The fourth factor, law enforcement practicality, also 
weighs in favor of strict liability.  Intent can be difficult to 
prove, and, under Luedtke's argument a defendant could assert 
that he did not knowingly ingest a restricted controlled 
substance and thus escape liability.  For example, a defendant 
could claim that he accidentally inhaled marijuana smoke, or ate 
a piece of candy laced with cocaine.  The legislative history 
indicates that the legislature intended to make prosecutions 
easier.  Id.  Requiring proof of knowledge or intent is contrary 
to the purpose of practical enforcement.   
¶71 The fifth factor, the protection of the public from 
harm, further weighs in favor of strict liability.  The 
legislature enacted the statute because drivers who have 
restricted controlled substances in their blood are a threat to 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
37 
 
public safety.19  See State v. Smet, 2005 WI App 263, ¶16, 288 
Wis. 2d 525, 709 N.W.2d 474.  The legislature created a strict 
standard to facilitate the prosecution of drugged driving and to 
protect those who travel on the roads.  See Jadowski, 272 
Wis. 2d 418, ¶24 (holding that legislative purpose of protecting 
children weighs in favor of strict liability). 
¶72 The sixth factor, the potential penalties imposed, is 
neutral.  This factor is a "significant consideration in 
determining whether a statute should be construed as dispensing 
with mens rea."  Id., ¶27.  "Criminal liability without criminal 
intent almost always has involved statutes that impose fines or 
short jail sentences."  Id.  A first-offense violation of 
§ 346.63(1)(am) 
is 
a 
civil 
forfeiture. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)1.  A second offense can result in up to six 
months in jail, and a third offense can result in up to one year 
in jail.  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2-3.  A fourth offense can 
result in one year in jail, if the individual has a total of 
four convictions in their lifetime, or a Class H felony with six 
or more months of imprisonment, if the individual has a total of 
                                                 
19 The Institute for Behavior and Health estimates that 20 
percent of motor vehicle crashes are caused by drugged driving, 
which "translates into 8,600 deaths, 580,000 injuries, and $33 
billion in property damage each year in the United States."  
Tina Wescott Cafaro, Slipping Through the Cracks: Why Can't We 
Stop Drugged Driving?, 32 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 33, 35 (2010).  
See also Robert L DuPont, M.D., Drugged Driving Research: A 
White 
Paper 
4 
(Mar. 
31, 
2011), 
http://stopdruggeddriving.org/pdfs/DruggedDrivingAWhitePaper.pdf 
(reporting that one-third of fatally injured drivers with known 
test results tested positive for drugs.). 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
38 
 
four convictions in their lifetime, one of which was in the last 
five years.  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)4-4m.  A fifth or 
subsequent offense results in a Class H felony for five or six 
convictions, a Class G felony for seven, eight, or nine 
convictions, and a class F felony for ten or more convictions.  
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5-7.  These severe penalties for 
repeated violations of the statute "support an inference that 
the legislature did not intend to impose strict liability."  See 
Jadowski, 272 Wis. 2d 418, ¶¶27-29.  However, this factor is 
ultimately neutral because, though any convictions after the 
third offense are felonies, the first offense is a civil 
forfeiture, and the second and third offenses mandate only short 
jail sentences.  Nevertheless, "any inference drawn from the 
severe penalties is outweighed by the other factors."  See id., 
¶29; Polashek, 253 Wis. 2d 527, ¶32 (noting that although six 
months of imprisonment indicates a crime of some seriousness, we 
have held that some felony criminal statutes impose strict 
liability). 
¶73 We decline Luedtke's invitation to apply the rule of 
lenity.  The rule of lenity states "that ambiguous penal 
statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant."  
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶67, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  
We apply the rule of lenity only if "(1) the penal statute is 
ambiguous; and (2) [a court is] unable to clarify the intent of 
the legislature by resort to legislative history."  Id.  Here 
the statute is unambiguous and imposes strict liability.  The 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
39 
 
legislature did not include knowledge or intent as an element of 
the crime and thus, the rule of lenity does not apply.   
¶74 Alternatively, Luedtke argues that, without scienter, 
the statute is unconstitutional and violates his substantive due 
process rights.  "The Due Process Clauses of the United States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions 
protect 
both 
substantive 
and 
procedural due process rights."  State ex rel. Greer v. 
Wiedenhoeft, 2014 WI 19, ¶55, 353 Wis. 2d 307, 845 N.W.2d 373 
reconsideration denied sub nom., Greer v. Wiedenhoeft, 2014 WI 
50, 354 Wis. 2d 866, 848 N.W.2d 861 (citation and quotations 
omitted).  "Substantive due process provides protection from 
'certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions.'"  Id., ¶57 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
"Substantive 
due 
process 
forbids 
a 
government 
from 
exercising 
'power 
without 
any 
reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental 
objective.'"  State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, ¶12, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 
657 N.W.2d 66 (citation omitted).  For these reasons, strict 
liability crimes may violate a person's substantive due process 
rights.  Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Due Process, 1 Subst. 
Crim. L § 3.3 (2d ed. 2013).   
¶75 However, we presume that statutes are constitutional.  
Cole, 
264 
Wis. 2d 520, 
¶11. 
 
Thus, 
we 
"indulge[] 
every 
presumption to sustain the law if at all possible, and if any 
doubt exists about a statute's constitutionality, we must 
resolve that doubt in favor of constitutionality."  Id. (quoting 
Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849).  A party asking this court to find 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
40 
 
a statute unconstitutional has the burden to prove the statute's 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Wood, 
2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 (citation 
omitted).   
¶76 We apply rational basis scrutiny to this statute 
because the statute does not implicate a fundamental right or 
suspect class.  See State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶12, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90; Smet, 288 Wis. 2d 525, ¶¶21-26.  
Rational 
basis 
scrutiny 
is 
satisfied 
if 
the 
statute 
is 
rationally 
related 
to 
achieving 
a 
legitimate 
governmental 
interest.  Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶12.  When faced with a 
substantive due process challenge, we examine "whether the 
statute is a reasonable and rational means to the legislative 
end."  Smet, 288 Wis. 2d 525, ¶11.   
¶77 In the present case, rational basis scrutiny is 
satisfied because the statute is rationally related to achieving 
public safety.  Id., ¶17.  We agree with the court of appeals 
that "[i]n addressing the problem of drugged driving, the 
legislature could have reasonably and rationally concluded that 
'proscribed substances range widely in purity and potency and 
thus may be unpredictable in their duration and effect.'"  
Luedtke, 355 Wis. 2d 436, ¶17 (citation omitted).  Though it may 
be more difficult to deter people from driving after unknowingly 
ingesting a restricted controlled substance, such drivers are at 
least as dangerous as those who knowingly ingest a restricted 
controlled substance.  Further, because no "reliable measure" of 
impairment exists for many illicit drugs, the legislature could 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
41 
 
have reasonably concluded that the more sensible approach was to 
ban drivers from having any amount in their systems.  Smet, 288 
Wis. 2d 525, ¶17.  The legislature could rationally conclude 
that a strict liability, zero-tolerance approach is the best way 
to combat drugged driving.  Ultimately, we are "satisfied that 
prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle while having a 
detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in one's 
blood [without proof of scienter] bears a reasonable and 
rational relationship to the purpose or objective of the 
statute, and that the statute is not fundamentally unfair."  
Id., ¶20.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) presents no due 
process violation and is constitutional.20 
¶78 Therefore, because the statute is a strict liability 
offense and is constitutional, Luedtke is not entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice.  Because the jury did not have 
to determine whether or not Luedtke knew he ingested cocaine, 
the 
real 
controversy 
was 
fully 
tried. 
 
Bannister, 
302 
Wis. 2d 158, ¶43. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
20 Luedtke argues that the statute punishes those who 
accidentally ingest cocaine.  He does not argue that he 
accidentally ingested cocaine.  Luedtke merely argues that it 
was possible that it happened because "he does not use cocaine."  
Further, Luedtke cites to studies that show cocaine is present 
on paper currency and in lakes, but does not explain how such 
exposure could result in a positive blood test.  We decline to 
address this undeveloped argument. 
No. 
2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR   
 
42 
 
¶79 First, based on precedent, we hold that, in the 
context of evidence preservation and destruction, the Wisconsin 
Constitution does not provide greater due process protection 
under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 than the United States 
Constitution under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.  
As a result, Youngblood controls.  Accordingly, in order to 
prevail, Luedtke and Weissinger must show that the State 
(1) failed to preserve evidence that was apparently exculpatory, 
or (2) acted in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence that 
was potentially exculpatory.  Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 67.  
Luedtke and Weissinger's blood samples were neither apparently 
exculpatory nor destroyed in bad faith; therefore, the State did 
not violate their due process rights.   
¶80 Second, we hold that operating a motor vehicle with a 
detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the 
blood under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability 
offense that does not require scienter, and is constitutional.  
We therefore affirm the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals in each 
of the two cases is affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶81 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  The issue 
before the court is whether the State violated the defendants' 
due process rights (protected under the Wisconsin Constitution) 
when a laboratory, following routine practice, destroyed the 
defendants' blood samples.  Neither defendant had an opportunity 
to independently test his sample. 
¶82 These cases raise the broader question of the capacity 
of the defendant, as a matter of due process law, to gain access 
to evidence the defendant may use at trial.   
¶83 The court takes two approaches in deciding that the 
defendants lose:   
¶84 The first approach is to deny that the Wisconsin 
constitution offers greater protection than the United States 
Constitution.  Rather, the court holds that the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 
(1988), interpreting the federal constitutional due process 
guaranty, applies to the Wisconsin constitutional guaranty of 
due process.     
¶85 The second approach is to assert that the court is 
bound, under the doctrine of stare decisis, by its prior 
decisions adopting Youngblood.   
¶86 I take a third approach to the present cases.  I do 
not 
rely 
on 
the 
due 
process 
clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  I would require that hereafter a circuit court is 
to instruct the fact finder in cases like the instant cases that 
the fact finder may, but need not, infer that the destroyed 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
evidence would have been favorable to the defense.  If hereafter 
such a jury instruction is not given, the cause should be 
remanded for a new trial.   
I 
¶87 First, 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
court's 
persistent 
antipathy to construing the Wisconsin Constitution's Declaration 
of Rights differently from the way the United States Supreme 
Court 
construes 
an 
analogous 
provision 
in 
the 
federal 
constitution.  Federal jurisprudence is persuasive and helpful, 
but this court must make an independent judgment considering 
competing 
principles 
and 
policies 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
¶88 We should follow our earlier precedent regarding 
interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Ten years ago, 
the court emphasized that the similarity between the language in 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the language in the United States 
Constitution is not conclusive.   
• In State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶60, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899, the court stated:  "While textual 
similarity or identity is important when determining 
when 
to 
depart 
from 
federal 
constitutional 
jurisprudence, it cannot be conclusive, lest this 
court 
forfeit 
its 
power 
to 
interpret 
its 
own 
constitution to the federal judiciary.  The people of 
this state shaped our constitution, and it is our 
solemn 
responsibility 
to 
interpret 
it. 
 
Federal 
jurisprudence is persuasive and helpful, but we must 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
save independent judgment for considering competing 
principles 
and 
policies 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution."1  (Citation omitted.)   
• In State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶41, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 
699 N.W.2d 582, the court stated:  "[W]hile this 
results in a divergence of meaning between words which 
are the same in both federal and state constitutions, 
the system of federalism envisaged by the United 
States Constitution tolerates such divergence where 
the result is greater protection of individual rights 
under 
state 
law 
than 
under 
federal 
law. . . ."  
(Quoted source omitted.) 
¶89 In keeping with my oath of office to support the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States, I adhere to Knapp and Dubose and to State v. Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977), decided more than 35 
years ago:  The court "will not be bound by the minimums which 
are imposed by the Supreme Court of the United States if it is 
the judgment of this court that the Constitution of Wisconsin 
and the laws of this state require that greater protection of 
citizen's liberties ought to be afforded."   
                                                 
1 See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶¶55-81, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899; id., ¶¶84-94 (Crooks, J., concurring, joined by 
Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley, J., & Butler, J.).  Justice Crooks 
relied on Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W. 2d 4, 12 (Tex. 1992), 
declaring:  "When a state court interprets the constitution of 
its state merely as a restatement of the Federal Constitution, 
it both insults the dignity of the state charter and denies 
citizens the fullest protection of their rights."  
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶90 The court must make this judgment in each case.  
¶91 The majority opinion applies Arizona v. Youngblood to 
interpret 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitution. 
 
Youngblood 
is 
a 
troublesome case.  
II 
¶92 Second, the majority opinion relies on Wisconsin 
precedent. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Greenwold 
(Greenwold 
II), 
189 
Wis. 2d 59, 68-69, 525 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶93 Stare decisis, "let the decision stand," is an 
essential bedrock principle in our system of justice.  To 
overrule precedent requires special justification.  "A court 
must keep in mind that it does 'more damage to the rule of law 
by obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating 
injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision.'"2 
¶94 The court has set forth the following factors that 
typically contribute to a decision to overturn prior case law: 
• Changes or developments have undermined the rationale 
behind a decision; 
• There is a need to make a decision correspond to newly 
ascertained facts; 
• There is a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law; 
• The prior decision is "unsound in principle;"  
• The prior decision is "unworkable" in practice; 
• The prior decision was not correctly decided; and 
                                                 
2 Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶34, 
293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.   
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
• The prior decision has not produced a settled body of 
law.3 
¶95 These factors are sufficiently implicated in the 
present case to justify overturning Greennwold, as demonstrated 
by Judge Brown's concurrence and Judge Reilly's dissent in the 
Weissinger decision in the court of appeals.  
¶96 Judge Brown wrote in concurrence:  Youngblood "sets up 
an illusion. . . . The bad faith component devised by the 
Supreme Court sets such a high bar, it is virtually impossible 
to overcome."4  Judge Brown compiled a comprehensive review of 
criticism levied against the Youngblood bad faith requirement by 
state courts and commentators alike.5  The fact that only 7 out 
of 1,500 published cases citing Youngblood found bad faith 
illustrates the inherent unfairness in the Youngblood test. 
¶97 Judge Reilly wrote in dissent:  "A criminal justice 
system that allows the government to destroy the sole evidence 
of a person's guilt prior to notice, charging, or a meaningful 
opportunity for the accused to inspect the State's evidence is 
fundamentally unfair."6 
                                                 
3 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. Of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶¶94, 99, 100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
4 State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 546, 
851 N.W.2d 780 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 
5 See id., ¶30, n.1 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 
6 Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546, ¶31 (Reilly, J., dissenting). 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶98 I share these judges' unease with the federal standard 
set forth in Youngblood (and adopted by Wisconsin case law).7   
¶99 The Youngblood and Greenwold II decisions do not give 
meaningful protection to a defendant.  "Ironically, the rule of 
law established by [Youngblood] was founded upon the conviction 
of an innocent man."8 
¶100 There is an emerging consensus among courts that have 
considered the issue that the bad faith standard does not go far 
enough to protect adequately the rights of a person charged with 
a crime.  I agree with those courts that viewed the bad faith 
requirement as a "potentially bottomless pit for a defendant's 
interest in a fair trial, and stepped back from the brink."9  I 
take a third approach to the instant cases.  
III 
¶101 I conclude that under the circumstances of these cases 
the court should moderate Youngblood and Greenwold.  One way of 
                                                 
7 State v. Greenwold, 189 Wis. 2d 59, 67, 525 N.W.2d 294 
(Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold II); see majority op., ¶53. 
8 Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood:  Due 
Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 Wash. U. 
L. Rev. 241, 243 (2008).  See also 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal 
Procedure § 24.3(e) at 388-89 (3d ed. 2007).  
9 Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 195 (Md. 2010).   
Numerous states have rejected Arizona v. Youngblood, on 
state constitutional grounds.  Cynthia E. Jones, The Right 
Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial Sanctions for 
Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2893 (2009); 
Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due 
Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 Wash. U. 
L. Rev. 279 (2008); Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 n.* 
(2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
helping to alleviate the concern about destroyed evidence and 
ease the fundamental unfairness of the Youngblood bad-faith 
requirement is to require an instruction that states that the 
fact finder may, but need not, infer that evidence destroyed 
would have been favorable to the defense.10   
¶102 This court often governs evidence in the circuit 
courts and requiring a curative instruction is not unusual in 
Wisconsin 
law.11 
 
Indeed, 
this 
court 
relies 
on 
curative 
instructions with frequency.  A curative instruction has been 
adopted by courts in other states in cases like the present 
cases.12 
¶103 If hereafter such a jury instruction is not given in 
cases such as the instant cases, the cause should be remanded 
for a new trial.    
¶104 I 
favor 
this 
approach 
because 
there 
should 
be 
consequences for even innocent or negligent loss or destruction 
                                                 
10 The instruction I propose would not be given when it is 
necessary for the sample to be destroyed to perform the test.  
See State v. Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 351 N.W.2d 503 (1984). 
11 This court has superintending authority over all courts.  
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1). See In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 
105, ¶3, 48, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110; see also id., 
¶¶71-94, (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Arneson v. Jezwinski, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 
226, 
556 
N.W.2d 721 
(1996) 
("'The 
superintending power is as broad and as flexible as necessary to 
insure the due administration of justice in the courts of this 
state.'" (citation omitted)). 
12 See, e.g., People v. Handy, 988 N.E. 2d 879, 882 (N.Y. 
2013) ("An adverse inference charge mitigates the harm done to 
defendant by the  loss of evidence without terminating the 
prosecution."); State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049 (Ariz. 2014) 
(instruction regarding inference is required under state law). 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
of evidence to deter the State from losing or destroying 
evidence and to ensure that defendants do not bear the total 
burden of the State's conduct.13  The inference instruction takes 
into account the State's explanation of the destruction of the 
evidence by permitting the fact finder to draw an adverse 
inference from the destruction when the fact finder determines 
that the State's explanation of the loss or destruction is 
inadequate. 
¶105 Finally, I note that the invocation of a curative 
instruction is especially important in light of recent cases 
developing the law of evidence in this state. It is arguable 
that defendants are being given fewer and fewer opportunities to 
assess evidence against them.   
¶106 For example, in State v. O'Brien, 2014 WI 54, ¶49, 354 
Wis. 2d 753, 850 N.W.2d 8, the court upheld the use of hearsay 
evidence at preliminary hearings, thus reducing a defendant's 
right of cross-examination.  In State v. Griep, 2015 WI ___, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the court concludes that the State 
does 
not 
violate 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional 
confrontation clauses by not calling as a witness the person who 
tested the defendant's blood at the laboratory and filed the 
report.   
                                                 
13 For a discussion of mistakes made in crime laboratories, 
a failing score of the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, 
and the limitations on the defendant in cross-examination, see 
Judge Reilly's dissent in Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546, ¶¶44-45. 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶107 If the defendant's ability to cross-examine witnesses 
is being reduced, there is all the more reason to be sure that a 
defendant has the opportunity to independently test blood and 
challenge the State's evidence of the blood sample. 
¶108 I 
concur 
(rather 
than 
dissent) 
because 
this 
instruction was not required at the time these cases were tried. 
Argument was made by counsel about missing evidence, but an 
instruction has more force and effect because it carries the 
imprimatur of a judge.14   
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
 
                                                 
14 Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196-97 (Md. 2010). 
No.  2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1