Title: Jones Express, Inc. v. Edward E. Jackson, Sr., and Jacqueline F. Jackson, individually and as custodial parents of Joshua L. Jackson, a minor, deceased
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070066
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2010

REL:09/24/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1070066
_________________________
Jones Express, Inc.
v.
Edward E. Jackson, Sr., and Jacqueline F. Jackson,
individually and as custodial parents of Joshua L. Jackson,
a minor, deceased
On Rehearing Ex Mero Motu
_________________________
1090663
_________________________
Edward E. Jackson, Sr., and Jacqueline F. Jackson, 
individually and as custodial parents of Joshua L. Jackson,
a minor, deceased
v.
Jacqueline F. Jackson is sometimes referred to as "Jackie
1
Jackson" in the record below.  
2
Charles Quada and Jones Express, Inc.
Appeals from Morgan Circuit Court
(CV-04-296)
PER CURIAM.
This Court's opinion of June 30, 2010, in case no.
1070066, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted
therefor.  
In case no. 1070066, Jones Express, Inc., a defendant
below, appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs, Edward E. Jackson, Sr., and
Jacqueline F. Jackson ("Jackie"),  both individually and as
1
custodial parents of Joshua L. Jackson, a minor, deceased, on
the Jacksons' claim seeking damages for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision and for wrongful death.  In case
no. 1090663, the Jacksons appeal from a judgment entered in
favor of Charles Quada on their claim seeking damages for
negligence.  We reverse both judgments and remand the case for
a new trial. 
Facts and Procedural History
During the early morning hours of March 30, 2004, Joshua
L. Jackson, a minor, was driving a motor vehicle on County
1070066, 1090663
3
Road 35 in Morgan County.  Edward, his father, was a passenger
in the vehicle.  Quada, an employee of Jones Express, was
driving on Highway 67 in a tractor-trailer truck owned by
Jones Express.  The intersection of Highway 67 and County Road
35 is controlled by a traffic light.  At the intersection,
Quada's truck and Joshua's vehicle collided.
Both Joshua and Edward were injured in the accident.  On
April 7, 2004, Edward and Jackie, both individually and as
custodial parents of Joshua, filed a complaint seeking damages
from Quada and Jones Express stemming from the collision.
Joshua died on May 15, 2004, of injuries he sustained in the
collision.  
The Jacksons amended their complaint several times.  The
last amended complaint alleged that Quada, who at the time of
the accident "was on the job and acting as an agent for Jones
Express," failed to stop at a red traffic light before
entering the intersection of Highway 67 and County Road 35 and
colliding with Joshua's vehicle.  The complaint sought damages
from Quada for negligence and wantonness and sought damages
from Jones Express, under a theory of respondeat superior, for
negligent entrustment and for negligent hiring, retention, and
1070066, 1090663
4
supervision.  Additionally, the Jacksons sought damages
against Quada and Jones Express for wrongful death. Finally,
the Jacksons alleged a claim against their insurer, Alfa
Mutual Insurance Company ("Alfa"), for uninsured- and/or
underinsured-motorist benefits.     
After discovery, the case proceeded to trial. The
defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") at
the close of the Jacksons' case and again at the close of the
evidence.  Both motions were denied.  
The trial court instructed the jury on three claims: (1)
negligence by Quada; (2) negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision on the part of Jones Express; and (3) negligent
entrustment by Jones Express.  As to the negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision claim, the jury was instructed as
follows: 
"Jones Express owed a duty to Edward Jackson and
Joshua Jackson to avoid inflicting injuries upon
them by using reasonable care and diligence in the
hiring, supervision and retention of employees who
would be driving its trucks on the public roadways
of this state. Reasonable care and diligence means
such care and diligence as a reasonably prudent
employer would use under the same or similar
circumstances.
1070066, 1090663
5
"To prevail on this negligence claim, the
plaintiffs 
must 
prove 
to 
your 
reasonable
satisfaction the following elements:
"Number one, that Mr. Quada was an incompetent
driver.
"Number 
two, 
that 
Jones 
Express 
knew 
or
reasonably should have known through the exercise of
due diligence that Mr. Quada was an incompetent
driver.
"And number three, that Jones Express failed to
exercise reasonable care in ... hiring, supervising
or retaining Mr. Quada after being placed on notice
that he was an incompetent driver."
As to causation for all three claims, the trial court
instructed, in pertinent part:
"If, after you consider all of the evidence, you
are reasonably satisfied that [Quada and Jones
Express] were negligent in one or more of the
respects that have been claimed by the [Jacksons] in
this case, then the next thing you must do is to
decide whether or not such negligence on the part of
[Quada and Jones Express] was the legal or proximate
cause of injuries suffered by Edward Jackson and
injuries to and the death of Joshua Jackson."
The trial court also submitted two verdict forms to the
jury: one to be completed if the jury found for the Jacksons,
and one to be completed if it found for Quada and Jones
Express.  The first form, titled "Plaintiff's Verdict,"
stated:
1070066, 1090663
6
"If, after a full and fair consideration of all
the evidence, you find for the plaintiffs on one or
more of their claims, then you should use the
following verdict form:
"CLAIM 1: THAT THE DEFENDANTS, CHARLES
QUADA AND JONES EXPRESS, INC., WERE
NEGLIGENT IN OPERATING THE TRUCK AND
PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED 
THE 
PLAINTIFFS'
INJURIES.
"We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiffs
on this claim and against the defendants, Charles
Quada and Jones Express, Inc.
                       
Foreperson
"CLAIM 2: THAT THE DEFENDANT, JONES
EXPRESS, 
INC., 
WAS NEGLIGENT IN 
THE HIRING,
SUPERVISION OR RETENTION OF CHARLES QUADA
AND PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE PLAINTIFFS'
INJURIES.
"We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiffs
on this claim and against the defendant, Jones
Express, Inc.
                       
Foreperson
"CLAIM 3: THAT THE DEFENDANT, JONES
EXPRESS, INC. NEGLIGENTLY ENTRUSTED ITS
VEHICLE TO CHARLES QUADA AND PROXIMATELY
CAUSED THE PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES.
"We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiffs
on this claim and against the defendant, Jones
Express, Inc.
                       
Foreperson"
1070066, 1090663
7
(Capitalization 
in 
original.) The trial court further
instructed the jury that, as to each claim, if it was
satisfied of the truthfulness of the claim, or if the verdict
form represented its verdict, the foreperson should sign his
or her name under the applicable claim.  The verdict form also
provided a space for the jury to designate an award of
damages.  
As to the second form, titled "Defendants' Verdict," the
trial court instructed:
"Now, ladies and gentlemen, after a full and fair
consideration of all of the evidence, if you find
for the defendants on all claims, then you would use
the separate verdict form that says Defendants'
Verdict and reads: 'We, the jury, find in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiffs on all
claims. And it would be signed by your foreperson,
and you would be ready to report your verdict.'"
Unlike the plaintiff's verdict form, this form did not provide
the jury the opportunity to render a verdict in favor of the
defendants on each individual claim or in favor of an
individual defendant.  
After deliberations, the jury returned the "Plaintiff's
Verdict" form with the foreperson's signature under the
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim, as well as
an award of $600,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in
1070066, 1090663
8
punitive damages.  On April 25, 2007, the trial court entered
a judgment in favor of the Jacksons and against Jones Express
based on that verdict:
"In accordance with the jury's verdict returned
in this action on this date, it is hereby ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED by the Court that a judgment be, and
hereby is, entered in favor of the plaintiffs,
Edward E. Jackson and Jackie Jackson, and against
the defendant, Jones Express, Inc., for compensatory
damages in the amount of $600,000.00 and for
punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00,
awarding total damages in the sum of $700,000.00,
plus the costs of court, for which let execution
issue."
Jones Express filed a renewed motion for a JML; a motion
to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment entered on the jury's
verdict; and a motion for a new trial.  The trial court denied
those motions, and Jones Express appealed (case no. 1070066).
On June 26, 2008, this Court, noting that the trial
court's April 25, 2007, order did not indicate that a judgment
had been entered with respect to the claims against Quada or
Alfa and, thus, that the judgment appealed from appeared to be
nonfinal, remanded the case for the trial court (1) to certify
the judgment in favor of the Jacksons against Jones Express as
a final judgment pursuant Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) to
adjudicate the remaining claims, thus making the judgment
1070066, 1090663
In its brief filed in case no. 1090663, Jones Express
2
contends that the April 25, 2007, order was in fact a final
judgment.  Specifically, Jones Express argues that a jury's
verdict in favor of a plaintiff with respect to some
defendants but silent with regard to other defendants should
be considered as equivalent to a verdict in favor of those
defendants.  However, although the trial court may have
entered a judgment on the jury's verdict against Jones Express
on the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim, the
order does not specify a judgment in favor or against Quada or
Alfa on the other claims in this case.
9
final and appealable; or (3) to do nothing, in which case the
appeal would be dismissed as being from a nonfinal judgment.2
On July 2, 2008, on remand, the trial court entered a
judgment restating its April 25, 2007, judgment in favor of
the Jacksons and against Jones Express on the negligent
hiring, retaining, and supervising claim.  The trial court
also entered a judgment in favor of Quada, Jones Express, and
Alfa on all the Jacksons' remaining claims.
According to the record in case no. 1090663, on August 1,
2008, the Jacksons filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's July 2 order.
They argued, among other things, that the jury had not
rendered a verdict in favor of Quada and that the trial
court's July 2 ruling in favor of Quada was "in conflict" with
the jury's finding against Jones Express.  On August 4, 2008,
1070066, 1090663
In its brief filed in case no. 1090663, Jones Express
3
contends that the August 22 order was not entered in response
to the Jacksons' Rule 59(e) motion but was instead a sua
sponte order that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
issue.  However, it is clear from the trial court's order that
it was in response to the issues raised in the Jacksons'
motion.
Jones Express also contends that the trial court's
actions in vacating its July 2 order and holding a hearing
violated this Court's appellate mandate.  However, this
Court's order of June 28, 2008, gave the trial court the
option of certifying a final judgment, adjudicating the
remaining claims, or allowing its judgment to remain nonfinal.
10
Jones Express filed in this Court a motion to stay the appeal
in case no. 1070066 pending resolution of the Jacksons'
motion, contending that a cross-appeal by the Jacksons may
result or that the issues raised by Jones Express on appeal
may be impacted.  This Court granted the motion to stay.
On August 22, 2008, the trial court issued an order
vacating its July 2, 2008, order.  The court, referencing the
Jacksons' postjudgment motion and its failure to hold a
hearing or to give the parties an opportunity to address this
Court's remand order, held that it "should have allowed the
appeal to be dismissed as from a non-final judgment and then
addressed the remaining issues and claims after receiving
input from all parties."  The trial court therefore vacated
the July 2 order.   After a hearing, the trial court issued an
3
1070066, 1090663
The trial court initially chose to adjudicate the remaining
claims, but, in response to a timely postjudgment motion
challenging the propriety of that selection, the trial court
vacated its decision and chose the third option.  This did not
violate this Court's mandate; in fact, this Court stayed the
appeal –- at Jones Express's request –- to allow the trial
court to exercise its options in response to the postjudgment
motion.
11
order on November 12, 2008, finding, specifically, that Alfa
was not liable to the Jacksons and then stating:
"Under the circumstances as shown by the
disputed evidence presented during the trial of this
case, the question of liability on the part of the
defendant, Charles D. Quada, the driver of the
tractor-trailer, hinged on the jury's answer to
these simple questions: did he run the red light or
did Joshua Jackson run the red light at the
intersection where the collision occurred? Having
considered its instructions to the jurors, the
separate and independent claims they were allowed to
consider 
during 
their deliberations and their
verdict, it is ordered that the Judgment entered in
this case on April [25], 2007, constitute an
adjudication of liability against the defendant,
Charles D. Quada, as well as against his employer,
Jones Express, Inc., with damages assessed only
against the latter. 
"For the reasons stated above, the undersigned
determines that no claims, rights or liabilities
remain to be adjudicated in this case and that a
final judgment be, and hereby is, entered."
This Court again remanded the case, holding that it was
unclear how the trial court's November 12 order disposed of
1070066, 1090663
12
the claim against Quada.  In an order dated January 26, 2010,
the trial court entered the following judgment:
"(1) A judgment is entered in favor of the
defendant, ALFA Mutual Insurance Company ('ALFA'),
and 
against 
the 
plaintiffs, 
separately 
and
severally, on all of their claims against ALFA for
uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits.
"(2) A judgment is entered in favor of the
defendant, Charles D. Quada ('Quada'), and against
the plaintiffs, separately and severally, on their
claim 
of 
damages 
alleged 
against 
Quada,
individually, for negligence.
"(3) A judgment is entered in favor of the
defendant, Jones Express, Inc. ('Jones Express'),
and 
against 
the 
plaintiffs, 
separately 
and
severally, on their claim of damages against Jones
Express under a theory of respondeat superior in
connection with the claim of negligence against
Quada.
"(4) A judgment is entered in favor of the
defendant, 
Jones 
Express, 
and 
against 
the
plaintiffs, separately and severally, on their claim
of damages alleged against Jones Express for
negligent entrustment.
"(5) A judgment is entered in favor of the
plaintiffs, Edward E. Jackson, Sr., and Jackie
Jackson, and against the defendant, Jones Express,
for 
compensatory 
damages 
in 
the 
amount 
of
$600,000.00 and for punitive damages in the amount
of $100,000.00, awarding total damages in the sum of
$700,000.00, plus costs, on the plaintiffs' claim of
damages alleged against Jones Express for negligent
hiring, retention and supervision."
1070066, 1090663
13
Subsequent to this order, the Jacksons filed a separate
appeal that was assigned case no. 1090663.  We will consider
the Jacksons' appeal in case no. 1090663 as a cross-appeal and
consolidate it with case no. 1070066 for purposes of issuing
one opinion.    
Discussion
On appeal, Jones Express contends that the jury's verdict
was inconsistent because it found Jones Express liable for
negligently hiring, retaining, and supervising Quada, despite
the fact that it also entered a verdict "exonerating" Quada of
any wrongdoing.  The Jacksons, on the other hand, argue that
the trial court erred in entering a judgment in favor of Quada
on the negligence count.  In the alternative, they argue that,
if the trial court did not err in entering the judgment for
Quada on the negligence count, the verdict is inconsistent and
a new trial is warranted. 
A verdict has been described as "inconsistent" when the
jury "inconsistently resolved the same issue in two separate
counts,"  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293,
319 (Ala. 1999), when the verdict appears to be "the result of
confusion," City of Bessemer v. Foreman, 678 So. 2d 759, 760
1070066, 1090663
14
(Ala. 1996), or when the record in a case does not reveal a
situation in which the jury's decisions can coexist, Ex parte
Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 799 So. 2d 957, 962 (Ala. 2001).  See also
Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 391, 171 So. 2d 96, 97
(1965) (stating that differing verdicts on separate but
identical claims filed by separate parties were "clearly
inconsistent, having been rendered at the same time by the
same jury, on identical facts, [and having] render[ed]
speculative what the jury intended by its verdicts.  Patently,
the verdicts indicate confusion on the part of the jury.").
When a jury verdict is inconsistent, the proper remedy is a
new trial.  Bessemer, 678 So. 2d at 760.  This is so because
"any attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in a verdict
must be based on mere speculation about the jury's intent."
Id.; see also A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. Williams, 517
So. 2d 596, 598 (Ala. 1987) ("Where the jury verdict is the
result of confusion or is inconsistent in law, the trial court
should grant a new trial. A new trial is necessary, because
once the jury is dismissed any attempt to reconcile the
inconsistencies in a verdict amounts to mere speculation about
the jury's intent." (citation omitted)). 
1070066, 1090663
15
It has been stated generally that, in order for an
employer to be liable for the negligent hiring, training,
retention, and supervision of its employee, the plaintiff must
also prove "wrongful conduct" on the part of the employee.
University Fed. Credit Union v. Grayson, 878 So. 2d 280, 291
(Ala. 2003) ("[A] party alleging negligent supervision and
hiring must prove the underlying wrongful conduct of the
defendant's agents."); Voyager Ins. Cos. v. Whitson, 867 So.
2d 1065, 1073 (Ala. 2003) ("A party alleging negligent or
wanton supervision and hiring must also prove the underlying
wrongful conduct of employees."); see also Stevenson v.
Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 1999) (holding
that a jury verdict against an employer based on negligent
training and supervision of a supervisor who allegedly
sexually harassed a fellow employee could not stand where the
jury also exonerated the supervisor); Smith v. Boyd Bros.
Transp., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 2005)
("Under Alabama law, the finding of underlying tortious
conduct is a precondition to invoking successfully liability
for the negligent or wanton training and supervision of an
employee."); and Thrasher v. Ivan Leonard Chevrolet, Inc., 195
1070066, 1090663
16
F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1320 (N.D. Ala. 2002) ("In order to
establish 
a 
claim 
against 
an 
employer 
for 
negligent
supervision, training, and/or retention, the plaintiff must
establish that the allegedly incompetent employee committed
... [a] tort.").    
Jones Express, citing Stevenson v. Precision Standard,
Inc., supra, alleges that the jury's failure to find Quada
liable for negligence conflicts with the verdict in favor of
the Jacksons on their negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision count against Jones Express.  In Stevenson, the
plaintiff, Stevenson, brought an action against her employer,
Pemco, and her former supervisor at Pemco, Windsor, alleging
invasion of privacy and negligence and/or wantonness based
upon Windsor's alleged sexual harassment.  The jury returned
a verdict against Pemco but exonerated Windsor from any
liability. 
On 
appeal, 
Pemco 
contended 
that 
the 
verdict 
was
inconsistent and due to be set aside.  Stevenson countered
that a verdict for an employee and against an employer is
inconsistent only when the employer's liability is based
solely on the theory of respondeat superior.  In her case,
1070066, 1090663
17
Stevenson argued that she asserted "independent claims"
against 
Pemco 
alleging 
negligence 
and 
wantonness,
specifically, that Pemco had acted negligently or wantonly in
supervising or training its employees, a cause of action that
was recognized in Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So. 2d 999
(Ala. 1993).  This Court distinguished Big B, however, noting
that the cause of action in that case "was predicated on the
underlying tortious conduct of an employee ... who at trial
admitted wrongdoing."  762 So. 2d at 824.  This Court further
noted the holding in Potts v. BE & K Construction Co., 604 So.
2d 398 (Ala. 1992), that an employer could be liable for the
intentional torts of its agent if the employer participated
in, authorized, or ratified the wrongful acts, but that to
prove such liability one must demonstrate, among other things,
"the underlying tortious conduct of an offending employee
...."  762 So. 2d at 824.  We concluded:
"Under this Court's holdings in Big B and Potts,
the only means of attaching liability to Pemco would
be to prove wrongful conduct by Windsor as its
agent. But, Pemco simply cannot be held liable for
authorizing or ratifying conduct that, according to
the jury, did not occur. Accordingly, a verdict
against Pemco based on a finding of negligent
training and supervision would be inconsistent with
a verdict exonerating Windsor."
1070066, 1090663
18
Stevenson, 762 So. 2d at 824-25.
As Stevenson and Big B demonstrate, and as the additional
authorities cited above indicate generally, implicit in the
tort of negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision
is the concept that, as a consequence of the employee's
incompetence, the employee committed some sort of act,
wrongdoing, or tort that caused the plaintiff's injury.
Humana Med. Corp. of Alabama v. Traffanstedt, 597 So. 2d 667,
669 (Ala. 1992) (holding that it was "inherently inconsistent
from a proximate cause standpoint" for a jury to hold that a
physician was not negligent in performing surgery but to also
hold the hospital liable based on its "independent negligence"
in failing to supervise and monitor that physician).  Cf.
Bonds v. Busler, 449 So. 2d 244, 245 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)
("We find it settled law in this state that though an
entrustor may be guilty of negligent entrustment of a vehicle
to an incompetent driver, he may not be held liable for such
negligence unless the injury is proximately caused by the
incompetence of the entrustee."); Lane v. Central Bank of
Alabama, N.A., 425 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Ala. 1983) (noting that,
in a cause of action against a master based upon the
1070066, 1090663
19
incompetence of the servant, the plaintiff must show, among
other things, that he has been damaged by the acts of the
servant and that the damage occurred because of incompetency
on the servant's part); and First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v.
Chandler, 144 Ala. 286, 307, 39 So. 822, 828 (1905) ( "'It is
understood, of course, that the incompetency of the servant in
all cases, in order to charge the master, was the proximate
cause of the injury.'" (quoting Bailey on Master's Liability
for Injuries to Servants, 47, 54, 70)).
The 
Jacksons 
argue 
that 
their 
negligent 
hiring,
retention, and supervision claim is an "independent" tort that
did not depend on a finding of negligence in the underlying
tort claim against Quada.  Further, the Jacksons correctly
note that the jury was presented with substantial evidence for
each element of the 
negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claim as instructed by the trial court: (1) that
Quada was an incompetent driver, (2) that Jones Express knew
or reasonably should have known that Quada was an incompetent
driver, (3) that Jones Express failed to exercise reasonable
care in hiring, retaining, or supervising Quada after being
placed on notice that he was an incompetent driver, and (4)
1070066, 1090663
We express no opinion as to whether the trial court
4
correctly instructed on the elements of a claim of negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision.  
20
that Jones Express's negligence was the legal or proximate
cause of injuries suffered by Edward and Joshua.4
However, the issue presented on appeal is not whether
there was a failure to prove the elements of the negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claim as instructed by the
trial court; instead, the issue is whether the jury's verdict
against Jones Express is inconsistent with its failure to find
Quada liable for negligence in the very same factual situation
that caused Edward's and Joshua's injuries.  In other words,
does the verdict indicate that the jury inconsistently
resolved the same issue in two different counts or that it was
otherwise confused?
The dispositive question presented to the jury in this
case, according to the parties and the trial court, was who
ran the red light at the intersection –- Quada or Joshua.  As
the trial court noted in its order denying Jones Express's
postjudgment motions, "the [Jacksons] and Jones Express
recognize that liability in this case centered on the jury's
factual determination as to whether Quada or Joshua ran the
1070066, 1090663
Jones Express contends: "At issue before the jury was the
5
determination as to which of the vehicles had the right of way
at the traffic light at the time of the collision, and which
of the vehicles did not."  Jones Express's brief, at 9; see
also the Jacksons' brief, at 25 (quoting same).
21
red light."   Further, the trial court instructed the jury
5
that "it is negligence as a matter of law for a motor vehicle
to run a red light that is exhibited by a traffic control
device."    
Thus the inconsistency in this case arises because of the
jury's 
apparently 
unreconcilable 
resolution 
of 
the 
dispositive
issue: whether Quada ran the red light.  This was the sole act
of negligence alleged against Quada and the sole act of
incompetency or wrongdoing on Quada's part as an employee of
Jones Express that allegedly caused the Jacksons' injury under
their negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim.  It
is inconsistent for the jury to conclude, on the one hand,
that Quada ran the red light for purposes of the negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claim against Jones
Express, but then not to render a verdict in favor of the
Jacksons on their negligence claim against Quada.
Both sides attempt to address this inconsistency.  Jones
Express argues that the jury's failure to find that Quada was
1070066, 1090663
The trial court engaged in similar speculation in
6
apparently concluding in its November 12, 2008, order that the
verdict on the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision
claim amounted to a finding by the jury of liability against
both Quada and Jones Express, but that the jury intended to
assess damages against only Jones Express.  
22
negligent indicates that it did not find that he ran the light
(Jones Express's brief, at 28); the Jacksons, on the other
hand, argue that Quada "was necessarily found guilty of
running the red light in this case because the jury rejected
contributory negligence."  Although 
both 
theories 
are
reasonable theories by which to address the inconsistency in
the jury's decision, both theories engage in speculation as to
the jury's intent.   The jury could have found that Quada was
6
negligent but failed to indicate that on the jury form, or the
jury could have found that he acted negligently but attempted
to impose liability only on Jones Express.  As this Court once
stated in a case discussing an inconsistent verdict in which
a jury exonerated an employee's conduct but also attempted to
find the employer liable for that conduct: "Such a verdict on
its face discloses that the jury has misconceived the issues,
or was prompted by bias against the employer or in favor of
the employee."  Carter v. Franklin, 234 Ala. 116, 118, 173 So.
861, 863 (1937).  Instead of engaging in speculation in an
1070066, 1090663
23
attempt to reconcile the jury's decision, we simply hold that
it is inconsistent.  
In its order denying Jones Express's postjudgment
motions, the trial court relied on Luker v. City of Brantley,
520 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala. 1987), and held that the negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claim was an "independent"
tort and that, under Luker, the trial court needed only to
"resolve the question of whether the evidence supported a
claim against [Jones Express] for its independent negligence.
Only if such a claim was not sustained by the evidence could
[it] grant a new trial for the apparent inconsistency."  520
So. 2d at 523.
In Luker, the plaintiff, Luker, sued the City of Brantley
("the City") and two police officers employed by the City,
Ennis and Armstrong, for releasing an automobile to an
intoxicated driver, Patrick, who later caused an accident in
which the plaintiff's decedent was killed.  Luker sued Ennis
and 
Armstrong 
on 
claims 
of 
negligence 
and 
negligent
entrustment and sued the City, alleging that it "had
negligently failed to instruct these officers as to the proper
manner in which to enforce the laws regarding intoxicated
1070066, 1090663
A motion for a JNOV is now designated, under Rule 50(b),
7
Ala. R. Civ. P., as a renewed motion for a JML.  Vaughan v.
Oliver, 822 So. 2d 1163, 1170 (Ala. 2001).
24
individuals."  Luker, 520 So. 2d at 518.  The jury returned a
verdict against the City but in favor of the officers.  The
City moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
("JNOV"),  which the trial court granted, setting aside the
7
verdict against the City.  Luker appealed from the JNOV. 
On appeal, the City argued that the JNOV in its favor
was proper because, it said, the jury's verdict was
inconsistent.  This Court reversed the JNOV in favor of the
City, reasoning that a JNOV was not appropriate because the
City was not entitled to a directed verdict at the conclusion
of the evidence based on jury issues as to vicarious
liability.  Further, despite the jury's verdict in favor of
the officers, this Court appeared to assume that the officers
acted negligently:
"Our 
decision 
that 
the 
actions 
of 
[the
officers,] 
in 
and 
of 
themselves, 
constitute
negligence ...  pretermits discussion of whether, in
a particular case, the actions of the officers'
superiors in failing to enroll them in the required
minimum 
standards 
training 
programs 
could 
be
considered the proximate cause of injury.  Whether
or not [the officers] had this training, it is clear
that they acted negligently in allowing Patrick,
1070066, 1090663
25
under the circumstances of this case, to operate the
automobile in an intoxicated state."
520 So. 2d at 520.
On rehearing, this Court attempted to clarify the scope
of its order remanding the case for a determination as to
whether a new trial was appropriate based on alleged
inconsistent verdicts.  The Court stated:
"We held that there was evidence that the
officers were negligent while acting in the line and
scope of their duty and, thus, that the City could
have been held vicariously liable; therefore, the
City's judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
reversed. The jury verdict for the officers and
against the City could not be reconciled if the only
claim against the City was predicated on the
underlying negligence of the officers. Apparently,
however, the plaintiff also pursued a claim against
the 
City 
for 
its 
independent 
negligence 
in
improperly training the officers.
"Before the trial court can grant a new trial
based upon the apparent inconsistency of the
verdicts, it must resolve the question of whether
the evidence supported a claim against the City for
its independent negligence. Only if such a claim was
not sustained by the evidence could the trial court
grant a new trial for the apparent inconsistency.
...
"If the trial court resolves these two issues
favorably to the plaintiff, the appropriate action
will be the reinstatement of the verdict and the
judgment entered thereon. Otherwise, the trial court
will grant a new trial, specifying the grounds made
the basis of its new trial order."
1070066, 1090663
26
Luker, 520 So. 2d at 523.
Luker appears to hold that a new trial based on the
inconsistency of the verdict was warranted in that case only
if the evidence did not support the improper-training claim.
If such evidence had been presented, then the trial court was
required to enter a judgment against the City alone based on
the jury verdict.  Id. 
This analysis differs from our subsequent holding in
Stevenson, supra.  There, we examined whether the evidence,
under 
the 
employee's "independent" claims 
against the
employer, Pemco, could support the judgment against Pemco
"while simultaneously absolving" the supervisor, Windsor, "of
any wrongdoing."  Stevenson, 762 So. 2d at 824.  We held, as
noted above, that Pemco could not be liable for conduct that,
according to the jury, did not occur.  Further, the evidence
did "not support a judgment against Pemco on any theory other
than respondeat superior."  762 So. 2d at 827.  However, the
judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of Windsor was
not appealed and became final; "therefore, the doctrine of res
judicata bar[red] a new trial on the issue of Windsor's
liability."  Stevenson, 762 So. 2d at 827.  Because Windsor,
1070066, 1090663
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "a principal
8
is liable for the tort of his agent if the agent commits the
tort while acting within the scope of his employment.  If the
agent is not liable for any tort, the principal is also
absolved."  Latham v. Redding, 628 So. 2d 490, 495 (Ala. 1993)
(citation omitted).
27
as the employee, could no longer be held liable for the tort
claims asserted against him, Pemco could not be held liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior  and was thus
8
entitled to a judgment in its favor: 
"[B]ecause Stevenson did not appeal from the
judgment in favor of Windsor, that judgment has
become final; therefore, the doctrine of res
judicata bars a new trial on the issue of Windsor's
liability. Because the judgment against Windsor must
stand, a judgment must be entered in favor of Pemco.
See de Feliciano v. de Jesus, 873 F.2d 447 (1st Cir.
1989)(in light of an inconsistent verdict, corporate
codefendant was held entitled to a judgment, where
plaintiffs did not appeal from judgment in favor of
codefendant president of corporation); see, also,
United 
Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC v.
O'Neal, 437 So. 2d 101, 103 (Ala. 1983) (on a claim
directly against an agent, and against the principal
solely on the theory of respondeat superior, 'a
verdict in favor of the agent works an automatic
acquittal of the principal so that [the] verdict
against [the principal] must be set aside'); and
Perry v. Costa, 97 A.D.2d 655, 469 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1983) (doctrine of res judicata barred new trial on
question of employer's liability, based on final
judgment in favor of employee; judgment against
employer reversed)."
762 So. 2d at 827 (footnote omitted).
1070066, 1090663
28
The plaintiff in Luker did not appeal the judgment
entered on the verdict in favor of the employees/officers;
however, the Luker Court failed to recognize the significance
of this omission.  Had the Court done so it would have been
obliged to affirm the trial court's order entering a JNOV in
favor of the City/employer based on the alternative ground
that the failure of proof on the essential element of
negligence of the employees/officers had become res judicata
on that issue.  Instead, the Luker Court recognized a right to
a jury verdict against the City for improper training in terms
consistent with an independent action against the City,
regardless of the fact that the jury rendered a verdict in
favor of the employees/officers on the negligence claim
against them.  Such a result is erroneous and inconsistent
with Stevenson, which sub silentio overruled Luker.  
Having determined that the jury's verdict here was
inconsistent, we must decide the correct disposition of these
appeals.  Jones Express maintains that the judgment on the
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision count is due to
be reversed and that it is entitled to a judgment in its
favor.  Specifically, in its brief in case no. 1070066, which
1070066, 1090663
29
was filed before this Court remanded the case and before the
trial court entered its January 26, 2010, final judgment,
Jones Express argued that Quada had been "exonerated" by the
jury on the negligence count.  A new trial on this count,
which is an essential element of the negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision claim against Jones Express was not
possible because the judgment in Quada's favor had not been
appealed.  Because the issue of Quada's liability could not be
retried, Jones Express argued, it was entitled, under
Stevenson, to a judgment rendered in its favor.  
However, under the peculiar facts of this case, the
Jacksons could not have maintained an appeal from the trial
court's November 12, 2008, order because it was not final and
because it did not actually evidence a judgment in Quada's
favor.  Instead, the trial court's January 26, 2010, judgment
was the first final judgment in Quada's favor on the
negligence count, and the Jacksons have appealed from that
judgment.  In their brief in case no. 1070066, the Jacksons
maintain that, if the jury's verdict in this case is
considered inconsistent, then the proper remedy is actually a
new trial.  We agree.  
1070066, 1090663
Because of our resolution of this case, we pretermit
9
discussion of the remaining issues raised on appeal.
30
Conclusion
The judgment against Jones Express on the negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claim and the judgment in
favor of Quada on the Jacksons' negligence claim are reversed,
and the case is remanded for a new trial.  Bessemer, 678 So.
2d at 760; A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 517 So. 2d at 598.9
1070066 -- ON REHEARING EX MERO MOTU: OPINION OF JUNE 30,
2010, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090663 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.