Title: New Jersey v. Rivera
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2021

New Jersey v. Rivera Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Cynthia Rivera admitted to planning and participating in the armed robbery of Justin Garcia, resulting in serious injuries to Garcia and the murder of his friend, Andrew Torres. At the time of the offenses, defendant was eighteen years old and in a relationship with Martin Martinez. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and assault and to conspiracy to commit robbery. At the time of sentencing, defendant was then nineteen years old with no prior criminal history, no juvenile record, and no arrests. Defendant expressed deep regret for her actions and told the court she had severed her relationship with Martinez, who defendant stated was physically, mentally, and emotionally abusive to her. The sentencing court applied two aggravating factors -- the risk defendant would commit another offense; and the need for deterrence-- and two mitigating factors -- the absence of a prior record, and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. The court did not address mitigating factor nine -- unlikeliness to reoffend -- which the State had conceded. The court weighed aggravating factor three, the risk of reoffense, more heavily than the other factors, relying in large part on defendant’s youth. Thus, the court concluded that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant in accordance with that finding. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review here to consider whether a defendant’s youth could serve as an aggravating factor in sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. "Consistent with both this Court’s precedent and the intent of the Legislature in recently adopting youth as a mitigating statutory factor, we hold that a defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing." Additionally, the Court held that on resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Cynthia Rivera (A-7-20) (084419)Argued October 1, 2021 -- Decided December 29, 2021SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a defendant’s youth can serve as an aggravating factor in sentencing. Defendant Cynthia Rivera admitted to planning and participating in the armed robbery of Justin Garcia, resulting in serious injuries to Garcia and the murder of his friend, Andrew Torres. At the time of the offenses, defendant was eighteen years old and in a relationship with Martin Martinez. Defendant met and went to a motel with a friend, Garcia, and Torres. Once there, defendant texted Martinez the name of the motel so he could “come down . . . to commit the robbery.” Later, Martinez and another man arrived, carrying handguns. Torres was shot and killed upon opening the door; Garcia was also shot and wounded. Jewelry and a phone were taken from Garcia. Defendant’s friend identified defendant, who turned herself in a few weeks later. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and assault and to conspiracy to commit robbery. At the time of sentencing, defendant was nineteen years old with no prior criminal history, no juvenile record, and no arrests. Defendant expressed deep regret for her actions and told the court she had severed her relationship with Martinez, who defendant stated was physically, mentally, and emotionally abusive to her. The sentencing court applied two aggravating factors -- the risk the defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and the need for deterrence, id. at (a)(9) -- and two mitigating factors -- the absence of a prior record, id. at (b)(7), and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement, id. at (b)(12). The court did not address mitigating factor nine -- unlikeliness to reoffend -- which the State had conceded. The court weighed aggravating factor three more heavily than the other factors, relying in large part on defendant’s youth and finding that defendant “hasn’t had enough time to begin . . . a history of criminal activity, which I most certainly think would have been the case.” Concluding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors, the court sentenced defendant accordingly. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted certification. 244 N.J. 183 (2020). 1 HELD: A defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing and cannot support an aggravating factor. On resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). The weight to be given to that factor is within the sentencing court’s discretion.1. Crimes are classified as first, second, third, or fourth degree in descending order of seriousness, and each degree carries its own prescribed sentencing range. In determining the appropriate sentence to impose within the provided range, the sentencing court must first identify any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44- 1(a) and (b) and explain the evidential basis for each. The court must then balance those factors by qualitatively assessing each factor and assigning it appropriate weight given the facts of the case. Findings of any factors must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record to ensure that speculation and suspicion do not infect the sentencing process. Mitigating factors that are suggested in the record or brought to the court’s attention should not be ignored. When the sentencing court fails to provide a qualitative analysis of the relevant sentencing factors on the record or considers an aggravating factor that is inappropriate to a particular defendant or to the offense at issue, the reviewing court may remand for resentencing. Finally, the sentencing court is required to “view a defendant as [that defendant] stands before the court on the day of sentencing.” State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 124 (2014). In Jaffe, the Court held that evidence of post-offense conduct -- cooperative, rehabilitative, or otherwise -- must be fully considered in assessing and weighing the statutory factors. Ibid. (pp. 13-16)2. This appeal turns on the sentencing court’s consideration of defendant’s youth in according great weight to aggravating factor three -- the risk of reoffense -- while giving minimal weight to mitigating factor seven -- the absence of a prior record. In deciding whether a defendant is likely to offend in the future, sentencing courts frequently look to the defendant’s criminal history. The absence of a criminal record will not preclude application of aggravating factor three so long as it is supported by other credible evidence in the record; in exceptional circumstances, courts may find it necessary to apply seemingly contradictory aggravating and mitigating factors. When doing so, the sentencing court must explain how it reconciles those two findings by providing greater detail as to the weight assigned to each aggravating and mitigating factor. (pp. 17-18)3. The Court reviews cases that have noted the importance of considering youth in making sentencing decisions. In response to those court decisions, the Legislature added youth as a statutory mitigating factor. See N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(b)(14). (pp. 18-19)4. To support a finding of aggravating factor three, the record must contain evidence demonstrating a likelihood of re-offense -- be it expert testimony, or the defendant’s criminal history, lack of remorse, premeditation, or other competent evidence. But in making the finding here, the sentencing court engaged in impermissible speculation that 2 defendant would have engaged in other criminal conduct but did not have the opportunity to do so because of her youth. The court reached its conclusion even though defendant had never been arrested or adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile and the State conceded mitigating factor nine -- defendant is unlikely to reoffend. And, as in Jaffe, defendant had taken meaningful post-offense steps towards rehabilitation. The presumption that a defendant’s youth may have prevented the defendant from having a criminal record cannot support a finding of aggravating factor three, and the Court therefore vacates defendant’s sentence. The resentencing court should give due consideration to all credible evidence in the record and all relevant sentencing factors on the day defendant stands before the court. The court is free to apply mitigating factor fourteen. (pp. 19-22) REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 7 September Term 2020 084419 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Cynthia Rivera, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided October 1, 2021 December 29, 2021Morgan A. Birck, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Morgan A. Birck, of counsel and on the briefs).Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of counsel and on the briefs, and Joie D. Piderit, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; William P. Cooper-Daub, of counsel and on the brief). 1 JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a defendant’s youth can serveas an aggravating factor in sentencing. In this case, defendant Cynthia Rivera,nineteen, admitted to planning and participating in the armed robbery of JustinGarcia, resulting in serious injuries to Garcia and the murder of Garcia’sfriend, Andrew Torres. In sentencing defendant pursuant to her plea agreement with the State,the sentencing court applied two aggravating factors -- the risk that thedefendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and the needfor deterrence, id. at (a)(9) -- and two mitigating factors -- the absence of aprior record, id. at (b)(7), and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement,id. at (b)(12). The court weighed aggravating factor three, the risk ofreoffense, more heavily than the other factors, relying in large part ondefendant’s youth. Thus, the court concluded that the aggravating factorssubstantially outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant inaccordance with that finding. The Appellate Division affirmed. We now reverse, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand the matter forresentencing. Consistent with both this Court’s precedent and the intent of theLegislature in recently adopting youth as a mitigating statutory factor, N.J.S.A. 2 2C:44-1(b)(14); L. 2020, c. 110 (effective immediately), we hold that adefendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing.Additionally, we hold that on resentencing, the sentencing court shouldconsider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twentysix] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” Of course, theweight to be given to that factor is within the sentencing court’s discretion. I. We derive the following recitation of the facts from the record before thesentencing court. At the time of the offenses that gave rise to the sentencingquestion before us, defendant was eighteen years old and in a relationship withtwenty-year-old Martin Martinez. It is not clear from the record whether orhow defendant and Martinez knew Garcia, but it appears that they saw picturesof money and jewelry Garcia posted on Instagram and hatched a plan to robhim. Defendant contacted Garcia and then arranged to meet her friend ChelseyMendoza, Garcia, and his friend Torres in the Bronx. Defendant informedMendoza that, although the four would agree to go to the Loop Inn Motel inWoodbridge, New Jersey, the real plan was to rob Garcia at a bodega in theBronx before reaching the motel. At the bodega, defendant and Garcia remained in the car while Mendozaand Torres went into the store. Two unknown men then approached the car 3 with guns, in what defendant believed to be an attempted robbery of Garcia,but Garcia pulled a gun from his glove compartment and drove off. After that,Garcia confronted defendant, accused her of setting him up, and took hercellphone to prevent her from contacting anyone. Defendant, Mendoza, Garcia, and Torres then proceeded to the motel inWoodbridge. 1 On the way to the motel, defendant was able to recover herphone and texted Martinez the message, “he pulled on [sic] gun on me I’mscared NJ.” Once they arrived at the motel, defendant went into the bathroomwith her phone to text Martinez the name of the motel so he could “come downto Woodbridge to commit the robbery.” For the remainder of the evening,Garcia, Torres, Mendoza, and defendant lazed in the hot tub and usedrecreational drugs in their motel room. In the early morning hours, there was a knock on the motel room door.Torres opened the door and was immediately shot and killed. Martinez and aman named John Mingo then entered the room, both carrying handguns. Oneof the men shot and seriously wounded Garcia. Defendant did not see whoshot either victim but did see Martinez “standing over [Garcia] with a gun inhis hand.” Jewelry and a phone were taken from Garcia. After fleeing the1 The record does not reflect where or how the parties reconvened after the attempted robbery. 4 scene, defendant, Martinez, Mingo, and Mendoza returned to the Bronx, wherethey pawned the items taken during the robbery. Detectives identified Martinez from the name provided on the motelfront desk’s sign-in form. The search for Martinez led detectives to Mendoza,who provided a statement recounting the night of the robbery and identifyingdefendant. Arrest warrants were issued for both Martinez and defendant, butinitial attempts to locate them were unsuccessful. A few weeks later,defendant turned herself in to authorities. II. A Middlesex County indictment charged defendant with first-degreemurder, felony murder, and robbery, as well as attempted murder, conspiracyto commit both murder and robbery, and weapons offenses, endangering, andobstruction. Eleven months later, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guiltyto first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), as amendedfrom felony murder; second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), as amended from attempted murder; and second-degree conspiracy tocommit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and :15-1(a)(1). In exchange fordefendant’s guilty plea and her promise to cooperate with the State, theremaining charges were dismissed, and the State recommended an aggregate 5 sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration subject to the No Early Release Act(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. At her sentencing hearing, defendant admitted to planning the robberywith Martinez, contacting Garcia, and arranging for them to meet. She furtheradmitted to traveling to the Loop Inn Motel, keeping Garcia occupied inanticipation of the robbery, and communicating their location to Martinez.Defendant also admitted that she knew Martinez was carrying a gun andbelieved that he would use it in the robbery. Defense counsel opened by noting that defendant was eighteen years oldat the time of the robbery and “t[ook] full responsibility for everything thatoccurred.” He went on to explain that, while defendant did set up the victimwith the intent to rob him, “she had no idea that these horrible, horrific resultswould occur.” Even so, he told the judge that defendant was “looking to bepunished. She’s looking to go to jail.” Counsel emphasized defendant’ssubstantial cooperation with the State and her lack of a criminal history asmitigating factors. Defendant also spoke on her own behalf, expressing deep regret andaccepting “responsibility for [her] actions” by going to prison. Defendant alsomade known to the court that she had made some substantial life changes sinceher arrest. Notably, defendant severed her relationship with co-defendant 6 Martinez, who defendant stated was physically, mentally, and emotionallyabusive to her. Defendant then learned she was pregnant with Martinez’s childand, while incarcerated, gave birth to a son, who is now in the custody ofdefendant’s mother. A high school dropout, defendant stated that she plannedto enroll in a cosmetology certification program upon her transfer to stateprison. In response to defendant’s sentencing arguments, the State submitted tothe court that the fifteen-year sentence detailed in the plea agreement was fair.The prosecutor noted the need to deter others from crossing state lines tocommit “heinous offenses” in New Jersey as a basis for applying aggravatingfactor nine -- the need to deter the defendant and others from violating the law.The State then conceded mitigating factors seven and twelve, noting thatdefendant had no criminal record and had cooperated substantially with theState’s investigation. The State further conceded mitigating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9) (the defendant’s character and attitude “indicate thatthe defendant is unlikely to commit another offense”), remarking that “everydefendant pretty much gets the benefits of mitigating factor nine when theyshow remorse, so she gets that.” At the time of sentencing, defendant was nineteen years old with noprior criminal history, no juvenile record, and no arrests. Her pre-sentence 7 investigation revealed prolonged exposure to alcohol and prescription drugs, aswell as a history of treatment at several mental health facilities. Nevertheless,the sentencing court found “there was a risk that [defendant would] commitanother offense.” The court noted that it gave “great weight to aggravating factor three,”given that this was “a planned event, calculated, thought out and carried out,even when . . . there was a bump in the road” at the bodega. The court furtherexplained, I would find that there is a risk that this defendant will commit another offense, because I attach great weight - - as I indicated with Mr. Martinez, reading the discovery and reading what’s been presented and per the statements provided by each, the way this case lines up is that this never would have happened if Ms. Rivera and Mr. Martinez hadn’t put it together, they hadn’t hatched this scheme. And to ultimately take someone and lure them into this level of victimization is of great concern to the Court and to the [S]tate as well.The court also gave “great weight” to aggravating factor nine because of thenature and circumstances of the offense, stating that the victims were “lured totheir demise by [defendant].” The court expressed concern with “the level ofdepravity associated with [defendant]’s decision making” given that she hadone target, Garcia, but had “no problem” including a second victim, Torres,“who wasn’t even the focus of it.” 8 The court did not address mitigating factor nine -- defendant’s characterand attitude make her unlikely to reoffend -- which the State had conceded.The court discussed and applied mitigating factor twelve for defendant’s“willingness to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in this particularcase.” Finally, the court addressed mitigating factor seven, lack of priorcriminal conduct. The court determined that the factor applied but found thatit should be afforded only minimal weight in light of defendant’s age: Per the state, I would credit her [mitigating factor seven], but give it minimal weight, the fact that she has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense. She is [nineteen]. She’s at the beginning of her adulthood. She has no prior juvenile history, so to speak, but I give it very little weight, because I find that if she had not been captured in this particular instance, her mind frame and the way [of] her thinking and her relationship with Mr. Martinez, could very well have resulted in additional crimes being committed. Though I am most certainly not sentencing her for anything in the future that I think she could have committed, I am just finding that, you know, if any -- if nothing else, she hasn’t had enough time to begin a crime -- begin a history of criminal activity, which I most certainly think would have been the case and that being the reason why I gave great weight to the fact that the risk she’ll commit another offense, aggravating factor three. Finding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed themitigating factors, the court imposed the recommended sentence: fifteen 9 years’ incarceration for aggravated manslaughter; ten years for aggravatedassault; and ten years for conspiracy to commit murder, all subject to NERA,and to run concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of fifteen years’imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed her sentence, arguing that the trial court failed toprovide an adequate explanation for applying both aggravating factor three andmitigating factor seven, which stand in counterpoise. She contended that thesentencing judge should have given more weight to mitigating factor seven andless weight to aggravating factor three. The State countered that the courtprovided an adequate explanation and its findings were well supported by therecord. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s sentence by summaryorder. We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 244 N.J. 183 (2020).We also granted the Attorney General’s motion for leave to appear as amicuscuriae. III. Defendant contends that her sentence is excessive in light of severalerrors made by the sentencing court. First, defendant challenges the greatweight that the sentencing court accorded to aggravating factor three -- her 10 likelihood to reoffend. Although defendant concedes that she helped plan therobbery, she maintains that she did not intend for anyone to be shot, andtherefore her alleged planning was an improper basis for applying aggravatingfactor three to her manslaughter conviction. She further argues that thesentencing court erred by using her youth against her, because there is noevidence that she will go on to develop a record as the sentencing courtsuggested. Defendant also asserts that youth may be considered only as amitigating factor at sentencing, and never as an aggravating factor. Sheemphasizes that this view is supported by prior decisions of both this Courtand the United States Supreme Court, the Legislature’s addition of youth as astatutory mitigating factor by enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), and the widelyaccepted science regarding the age-crime curve and brain development. Defendant also argues that the sentencing court failed to give adequateweight to mitigating factor seven, lack of criminal history, noting that the Stateconceded this mitigating factor. She alleges that the court sentenced her basedon a hypothetical future record, rather than as she stood before the court on theday of sentencing, a first-time offender entitled to the full weight of mitigatingfactor seven. Finally, defendant submits that the sentencing court erred byfailing to consider mitigating factor nine, that she was unlikely to reoffend, afactor also conceded by the State. Defendant notes that she had no prior 11 record, had cooperated with law enforcement, and was remorseful. She furtherstresses that she was a new mother and no longer in a relationship withMartinez, who was abusive and influenced her participation in the crime. The State counters that the sentencing court’s findings regarding theapplicable aggravating and mitigating factors are supported by competent,credible evidence in the record. It contends that the judge appropriatelyapplied and accorded great weight to aggravating factor three based on theplanning involved in the crime and defendant’s dedication to carrying it out.The State further argues that mitigating factor nine did not apply for the samereasons provided by the judge in finding aggravating factor three. Althoughthe State conceded the applicability of mitigating factor nine at sentencing, itnotes that the sentencing court had an independent duty to find each factoronly if supported by the record. The State also contends that the judgeappropriately applied only minimal weight to mitigating factor seven, lack ofcriminal history, as defendant had not “led a law-abiding life for a substantialperiod of time.” The State maintains that any reference to defendant’s age wasmerely a byproduct of the required explanation of the factor and that her youthwas not improperly used against her. Finally, the State argues that the courtwas not required to treat defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor. 12 Amicus curiae the Attorney General largely reiterates and supports theState’s arguments. The Attorney General further contends that the sentencingcourt never linked defendant’s age to a predicted likelihood of re-offense andmerely relied on it to reduce the weight of mitigating factor seven. TheAttorney General ultimately argues that overturning defendant’s sentencewould disrupt the critical discretion afforded to sentencing courts and “upend”current sentencing law. IV. A. We begin our discussion with the standard of review applied to trialcourt sentencing decisions. On review, appellate courts are deferential tosentencing determinations and “must not substitute [their] judgment for that ofthe sentencing court.” State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). The sentencemust therefore be affirmed unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated;(2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were not “based uponcompetent credible evidence in the record;” or (3) “the application of theguidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable soas to shock the judicial conscience.” State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65(1984). Although “[a] sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement ispresumed to be reasonable,” such a sentence may still be vacated if it does not 13 adhere to the sentencing provisions of our Code of Criminal Justice. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70-71. Crimes are classified as first, second, third, or fourth degree indescending order of seriousness, and each degree carries its own prescribedsentencing range. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a). In determining the appropriatesentence to impose within the provided range, the sentencing court must firstidentify any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A.2C:44-1(a) and (b) and explain the evidential basis for each. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014). The court must then balance those relevantaggravating and mitigating factors by qualitatively assessing each factor andassigning it appropriate weight given the facts of the case at hand. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 72-73. By requiring courts to identify and balance the mitigating andaggravating factors, “the Code 'established a consistent framework for guidingsentencing discretion.’” State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420, 437 (2018) (quotingState v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 530-31 (1980)). That framework serves “theCode’s paramount goal of uniformity in sentencing, ensuring 'that similarlysituated defendants receive comparable sentences.’” Ibid. (quoting Case, 220 N.J. at 63). To that end, sentencing courts must provide “a careful and 14 deliberate analysis before a sentence is imposed,” grounded in “a thoroughunderstanding of the defendant and the offense.” Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 71. Findings of any factors “must be supported by competent, credibleevidence in the record” to ensure that “[s]peculation and suspicion [do] notinfect the sentencing process.” Case, 220 N.J. at 64. Mitigating factors thatare suggested in the record or brought to the court’s attention should not beignored. Ibid. Thus, when the sentencing court “fails to provide a qualitativeanalysis of the relevant sentencing factors on the record” or “considers anaggravating factor that is inappropriate to a particular defendant or to theoffense at issue,” the reviewing court “may remand for resentencing.”Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70. Finally, the sentencing court is required to “view a defendant as [thatdefendant] stands before the court on the day of sentencing.” State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 124 (2014). In Jaffe, the defendant was sentenced nearly a yearafter pleading guilty, during which time he had made significant life changes,including getting sober, attending support groups, finding gainful employment,and assuming the role of “de facto” father to his girlfriend’s child. Id. at 116-17. However, the sentencing judge declined to consider evidence of thosepost-offense rehabilitative efforts in assessing mitigating factors, despite 15 acknowledging that defendant’s pre-sentence report had grown “somewhatstale.” Id. at 117-18. We reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that, because “adefendant should be assessed as he stands before the court on the day ofsentencing, . . . the sentencing court must consider a defendant’s relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.” Id. at 116.In so deciding, we remarked that [t]he Code does not . . . require the trial court to ignore a defendant’s individual characteristics and circumstances. To the contrary, the Legislature listed as “general purposes” of the sentencing statute the furtherance of “the correction and rehabilitation of offenders,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(2), and “differentiat[ion] among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1- 2(b)(6). Thus, “the Legislature codified to a certain extent the traditional emphasis on individualized sentencing,” resulting in a “tension between an individualized sentencing approach on the one hand, and the reforms aimed at sentencing uniformity on the other.” [(State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 346 (2012).] [Id. at 120-21.] Accordingly, evidence of post-offense conduct -- cooperative,rehabilitative, or otherwise -- must be fully considered in assessing andweighing the statutory factors. Id. at 124. Remand may be necessary when “asentencing court failed to find mitigating factors that clearly were supported bythe record.” State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010). 16 B. This appeal turns on the sentencing court’s consideration of defendant’syouth in according great weight to aggravating factor three -- “[t]he risk thatthe defendant will commit another offense,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) -- whilegiving minimal weight to mitigating factor seven -- “[t]he defendant has nohistory of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding lifefor a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). In deciding whether a defendant is likely to offend in the future,sentencing courts frequently look to the defendant’s criminal history. See,e.g., State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 502 (2005) (finding “the extent of adefendant’s prior record” supported the sentencing court’s conclusionregarding his risk for re-offense). We acknowledge, however, that the absenceof a criminal record will not preclude application of aggravating factor three solong as it is supported by other credible evidence in the record. Case, 220 N.J.at 67. That assessment “involve[s] determinations that go beyond the simplefinding of a criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about theindividual in light of his or her history.” State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153(2006). For example, a sentencing judge may reasonably find aggravating 17 factor three when presented with evidence of a defendant’s lack of remorse orpride in the crime. State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, courts may find it necessary to applyseemingly contradictory aggravating and mitigating factors. Fuentes, 217 N.J.at 80. When doing so, the sentencing court must “explain how it reconcilesthose two findings” by providing greater detail as to the weight assigned toeach aggravating and mitigating factor and how those factors are balanced withrespect to the defendant. Id. at 81. We have previously requested this type ofdetailed, reasoned explanation when presented with the conflict betweenaggravating factor three, risk of re-offense, and mitigating factor seven, nocriminal history. Case, 220 N.J. at 67. C. Because defendant’s age and youth at sentencing is central to thisappeal, we note the importance of considering youth in making sentencingdecisions. In State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80, 95 (1987), we recognized that a“defendant’s relative youth ordinarily would inure to his benefit” in adetermination of whether to apply an extended sentence. More recently, weextended application of the factors prescribed by the United States SupremeCourt in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), to situations where ajuvenile is facing a term of imprisonment that is the practical equivalent to life 18 without parole. State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 429-30 (2017). In doing so, webuilt upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s “clear message” that “'children aredifferent’ when it comes to sentencing, and 'youth and its attendantcharacteristics’ must be considered at the time a juvenile is sentenced to lifeimprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 429 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 480). We further urged the Legislature to “consider enactinga statute that would provide for later review of juvenile sentences that havelengthy periods of parole ineligibility.” Id. at 430. In response to those court decisions, the Legislature added youth as astatutory mitigating factor. See N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(b)(14) (effective October 19,2020) (“The defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of thecommission of the offense.”). Recommended by “the first annual report of theNew Jersey Criminal Sentencing and Disposition Commission,” the change ismeant to “broaden the court’s consideration of age as a mitigating factor fordetermining sentences.” S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to A. 4373 1 (L. 2020,c. 110). V. Turning to the facts presented in this appeal, by applying and affordinggreat weight to aggravating factor three, risk of re-offense, the sentencingjudge relied on the nature of the offense and defendant’s role in planning the 19 crime and luring the victims into a trap -- facts that were established in therecord and sufficient to support a finding of aggravating factor three. Then, inexplaining his decision to afford minimal weight to the countervailingmitigating factor seven, the judge stated that “[defendant] hasn’t had enoughtime to begin . . . a history of criminal activity, which I most certainly thinkwould have been the case and that being the reason why I gave great weight tothe fact that the risk she’ll commit another offense, aggravating factor three.” This reasoning is based on an impermissible presumption. As notedabove, findings of any aggravating or mitigating “factor must be supported bycompetent, credible evidence in the record” to ensure that a defendant is notsentenced based on “[s]peculation and suspicion.” Case, 220 N.J. at 64. Tosupport a finding of aggravating factor three, the record must contain evidencedemonstrating a likelihood of re-offense -- be it expert testimony, or thedefendant’s criminal history, lack of remorse, premeditation, or othercompetent evidence. But in making the finding here, the sentencing courtengaged in impermissible speculation that defendant would have engaged inother criminal conduct but did not have the opportunity to do so because of heryouth. The court reached its conclusion even though defendant had never beenarrested or adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile and the State conceded 20 mitigating factor nine -- defendant is unlikely to reoffend. In doing so, thecourt failed to provide detail about the weight assigned to each aggravatingand mitigating factor and how those factors were balanced with regard to thedefendant. See Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 81. The sentencing court was obliged to consider defendant as “she [stood]before the court on the day of sentencing.” Jaffe, 220 N.J. at 124. As in Jaffe,defendant had taken meaningful post-offense steps towards rehabilitation,including ending her abusive relationship with co-defendant Martinez andmaking educational plans. Defendant had no prior juvenile adjudications, noarrests, and no criminal record. Defendant cooperated substantially with lawenforcement and expressed sincere remorse for her role in the crime. Shestood before the court as a first-time offender and should have been consideredas one. In conclusion, the presumption that a defendant’s youth may haveprevented the defendant from having a criminal record cannot support afinding of aggravating factor three. We therefore hold that youth may beconsidered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing and cannot support anaggravating factor. Accordingly, we must vacate defendant’s sentence andremand for resentencing. 21 On resentencing, the court should give due consideration to all credibleevidence in the record and all relevant sentencing factors on the day defendantstands before the court. Randolph, 210 N.J. at 354. In other words, bothdefendant and the State are entitled to bring all relevant factors to the court’sattention, so long as they are supported by competent and credible evidence. 2Also, the court on resentencing is free to consider defendant’s youth at thetime of the offense and apply mitigating factor fourteen, which was givenimmediate effect in all sentencing proceedings on or after October 19, 2020.See N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(b)(14); L. 2020, c. 110. VI. For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision and remand for resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.2 Although the State conceded mitigating factor nine, the sentencing judge failed to address this factor in his findings. A sentencing court is, of course, not required to find any factor it concludes is unsupported by the record. However, those factors which are brought to the court’s attention by counsel should not be ignored. Case, 220 N.J. at 64. 22