Title: Dorsey v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 406, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
QUINTON A. DORSEY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 406, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0404010428 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 27, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    April 4, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 4th day of April 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Quinton A. Dorsey, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s August 19, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In March 2002, Dorsey was charged with Possession with 
Intent to Deliver Drugs, Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled 
Substances, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia.  In September 2002, Dorsey was charged with several 
 
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additional drug and weapon offenses as well as a violation of probation 
(“VOP”).  When Dorsey failed to appear for a contested VOP hearing, a 
capias was issued for his arrest.  When the police found Dorsey in April 
2004, they found drugs and drug paraphernalia in his clothing and in his 
apartment.  He was charged with yet another set of drug and weapon 
offenses, and was also charged with resisting arrest in connection with his 
attempt to escape from the police.   
 
(3) 
In June 2004, Dorsey pleaded guilty to Maintaining a Dwelling 
for Keeping Controlled Substances, Resisting Arrest, Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Receiving a Stolen Firearm, 
and Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a Person Prohibited.  He also 
admitted to a VOP.  Dorsey was sentenced to a total of 7 years incarceration 
at Level V, to be followed by probation.   
 
(4) 
On this appeal, Dorsey claims that:  (a) his guilty plea was 
involuntary as a result of the ineffective assistance of his counsel, in that 
counsel failed to investigate the facts of the case and to file a motion to 
suppress the drug evidence; and (b) the Superior Court committed legal error 
by not expanding the record when considering his postconviction motion. 
 
(5) 
The transcript of Dorsey’s plea colloquy reflects the following:   
The Superior Court had granted Dorsey an extension of one week to 
 
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consider the plea offer extended by the State.  At the time of the plea 
hearing, Dorsey’s attorney requested an additional week in order to consult 
with a Philadelphia attorney.  Because the State would not agree to keep its 
plea offer open for an additional week, Dorsey’s counsel requested an 
opportunity to confer with Dorsey, which the Superior Court granted.  After 
conferring at length with Dorsey, Dorsey’s counsel reported that his client 
would accept the plea the State had offered.1   
 
(6) 
While Dorsey argues that his guilty plea was involuntary, the 
transcript of his plea colloquy belies that claim.  At the hearing, Dorsey 
stated that no one made him any promises in exchange for his guilty plea, no 
one threatened him or forced him to plead guilty, and no one promised him 
what his sentence would be.  He also admitted that he committed the 
offenses to which he was pleading guilty and confirmed that he was satisfied 
with his counsel’s representation.  In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, Dorsey is bound by the representations he made 
during his plea colloquy.2 
(8)    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his 
                                                 
1 While Dorsey admitted to habitual offender status, he was not sentenced as a habitual 
offender.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214. 
2 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631-32 (Del. 1997). 
 
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counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would 
have insisted on proceeding to trial.3  There is no evidence in the record that 
any error on the part of Dorsey’s counsel caused him to plead guilty.  To the 
contrary, the record reflects that Dorsey’s plea agreement provided him a 
significant benefit.  Moreover, given the circumstances of his arrest, the 
evidence against him, and his criminal history, there is no reason to believe 
that Dorsey would have received a lesser sentence had he not pleaded guilty 
and had proceeded to trial.  For all of the above reasons, we find Dorsey’s 
first claim to be without merit. 
 
(9) 
Dorsey’s second claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
failed to expand the record in order to address the arguments he made in his 
postconviction motion.  Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(g) (3), “in 
any case in which an expanded record is directed,” certain documents, 
including exhibits and affidavits, must be submitted to the opposing party.  
However, under Rule 61(g) (1), it is within the discretion of the Superior 
Court in the first instance to determine if an expanded record is needed.  The 
Superior Court found no need to expand the record in connection with its 
consideration of Dorsey’s postconviction motion.  We conclude that there 
                                                 
3 MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 2001). 
 
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was no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in so 
deciding.  We, therefore, find Dorsey’s second claim to be without merit.    
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice