Title: Secura Supreme Insurance Co. v. Estate of Huck
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001078-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2023

2023 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1078-FT 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Secura Supreme Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Estate of Daniel Keith Huck, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 542, 966 N.W.2d 124 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 69 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 22, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Eugene A. Gasiorkiewicz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶¶1-2, 4-16, and 29, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Barbara A. O’Brien, Erik M. Gustafson, and Borgelt, 
Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral 
argument by Patryk Silver.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Susan R. Tyndall, Tony M. Dunn, Angela Komp, and Habush, Habush 
 
 
2 
& Rottier, S.C., Racine. There was an oral argument by Tony M. 
Dunn.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Edward E. Robinson and 
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, for the Wisconsin Association 
for Justice. There was an oral argument by Edward E. Robinson.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Daniel C.W. Narvey, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, for the 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, the American Property Casualty 
Insurance Association, and the Wisconsin Defense Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 21 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1078-FT 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV1847) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Secura Supreme Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Estate of Daniel Keith Huck, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAR 22, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶¶1-2, 4-16, and 29, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   Petitioner 
Secura 
Supreme Insurance Company (Secura), which insured Daniel Keith 
Huck, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision1 that 
                                                 
1 Secura Supreme Ins. Co. v. Est. of Huck, 2021 WI App 69, 
399 Wis. 2d 542, 966 N.W.2d 124. 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
2 
 
affirmed an order granting judgment to the Estate of Daniel 
Keith Huck (Estate).2  We affirm the court of appeals.   
¶2 
We interpret Secura's policy as precluding Secura from 
reducing its liability to the Estate by the total amount of 
payments the Estate initially received.  The Estate first 
received worker's compensation from Huck's employer's worker's 
compensation insurer (WC insurer), and then a settlement from 
the tortfeasor's insurer.  Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29(1)(b)(2021-
22)3 obligated the Estate to reimburse the WC insurer with a 
portion of the settlement it received from the tortfeasor.  
Secura's 
underinsured 
motorist 
(UIM) 
policy 
contemplated 
payments made in accordance with worker's compensation law in 
its reducing clause, and obligated the Estate to reimburse the 
WC insurer.  The policy also required the Estate to exhaust any 
other bodily injury liability bonds or policies and to receive 
payment from them before Secura would pay UIM benefits.  
Accordingly, we conclude the policy's plain language required 
its payment of UIM benefits based on the Estate's recovery after 
reimbursements 
to 
the 
WC 
insurer 
and 
collection 
of 
the 
tortfeasor's liability payment had occurred.   
¶3 
However, 
Secura 
argues 
its 
policy 
"substantially 
incorporates" 
the 
statutory 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(i), which permits it to reduce payment by the amount 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Eugene A. Gasiorkiewicz of Racine County 
presided.  
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
3 
 
the Estate initially received.  We conclude the plain language 
of § 632.32(5)(i) establishes that an insurer may reduce its 
liability by the recovery of the insured at the time the insurer 
enforces 
its 
reducing 
clause. 
 
The 
Estate's 
obligatory 
reimbursement was made pursuant to "worker's compensation law," 
which § 632.32(5)(i)2. recognizes.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that Secura is not statutorily authorized to reduce its 
liability 
limits 
by 
the 
total 
worker's 
compensation 
and 
tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but 
was obligated to reimburse in part.  Accordingly, Secura's 
policy 
and 
§ 632.32(5)(i) 
require 
Secura 
to 
provide 
an 
additional $9,718.73 to the Estate.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The facts are undisputed.  Mr. Huck was struck and 
killed by a motorist while he performed his job duties for the 
Village of Mount Pleasant.  Since the fatal accident occurred in 
the course of Mr. Huck's employment, the Village's WC insurer 
initially provided $35,798.04 to the Estate.   
¶5 
The motorist that struck Mr. Huck was insured for 
$25,000 in liability coverage, which also was provided to 
Mr. Huck's Estate.  However, by receiving the $25,000 settlement 
from the tortfeasor, the Estate was obligated to reimburse the 
WC 
insurer 
from 
the 
settlement 
based 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1)(b).  As required, the Estate reimbursed the WC 
insurer $9,718.73 so that the Estate ultimately retained 
$26,079.31 from worker's compensation.  This dispute centers on 
the importance of the $9,718.73 reimbursement (the "Disputed 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
4 
 
Amount") that the Estate was required to return to the WC 
insurer.  
¶6 
Mr. Huck had purchased an automobile insurance policy 
from Secura that included UIM coverage with a liability limit of 
$250,000 for "each person."  The Estate's recovery from worker's 
compensation and the tortfeasor were insufficient to cover 
Mr. Huck's damages, which exceeded $250,000.  The Estate 
submitted a claim under the Secura UIM policy.  The policy's 
reducing clause allowed Secura to reduce its UIM liability 
limits by the amounts paid by a tortfeasor, and by "amounts paid 
or payable under any worker's compensation law."4  Therefore, 
Secura reduced its liability limit to the Estate by the $25,000 
settlement with the tortfeasor.  Secura also reduced its 
liability limit by the total worker's compensation benefit of 
$35,798.04, "even [though] some of that money (the Disputed 
Amount) return[ed] to the [worker's compensation] Payor."  Based 
on these reductions, Secura tendered $189,201.96 to the Estate.5  
¶7 
Secura filed a declaratory judgment complaint and 
moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.06(3).  Secura sought a declaration that its UIM reducing 
                                                 
4 A reducing clause "permits a setoff from the insured's UIM 
coverage the amount paid to the insured by the underinsured 
tortfeasor," or by other enumerated sources.  Dowhower ex rel. 
Rosenberg v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶1, 236 Wis. 2d 
113, 613 N.W.2d 557.   
5 Secura explained in its declaratory judgment complaint 
that:  ($250,000)-($25,000 tortfeasor settlement)-($35,798.04 in 
worker's compensation) = $189,201.96.  
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
5 
 
clause applies to the total "amount paid" pursuant to the 
worker's compensation payment, notwithstanding any reimbursement 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.29.  The circuit court denied Secura's 
motion and granted the Estate judgment on its counterclaim, 
ordering Secura to tender the Disputed Amount to the Estate.  
Secura appealed.   
¶8 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed, 
relying 
on 
our 
statutory analysis of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) in Teschendorf 
v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 
258.  In Teschendorf, we held that § 632.32(5)(i) "does not 
allow an insurer to reduce uninsured motorist [UM] policy limits 
by worker's compensation payments that are not made to or on the 
behalf of the insured, the insured's heirs, or the insured's 
estate."  Id., ¶2.  The court of appeals reviewed our statutory 
analysis and public policy rationales in Teschendorf before 
concluding that Secura is "permitted to reduce its [UIM] 
coverage limits . . . [only] by the total amount of worker's 
compensation actually received by the Estate."  Secura Supreme 
Ins. Co. v. Est. of Huck, 2021 WI App 69, ¶20, 399 Wis. 2d 542, 
966 N.W.2d 124.  Accordingly, the court of appeals determined 
Secura must provide the Estate the Disputed Amount.   
¶9 
Secura petitioned us for review, which we granted.  
Secura renews its argument that the plain language of "amounts 
paid" and "payment" settles this matter.  Secura argues it may 
reduce its liability by the "amounts paid" to the Estate 
regardless of what happened after those amounts were provided 
because the Estate was paid those amounts, notwithstanding its 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
6 
 
obligation to reimburse the WC insurer.6  The Estate contends the 
Disputed Amount cannot be considered an "amount paid" because 
the Estate did not retain possession of it.  It argues that 
Secura impermissibly reduced its UIM liability limits by the 
Disputed Amount, and that Secura owes it the Disputed Amount for 
a total recovery of $198,920.69 under the policy.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 Our task is to interpret an insurance policy and Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(i) 
based 
on 
undisputed 
facts. 
 
The 
interpretation of an insurance policy presents a question of law 
that we review independently.  Smith v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 155 
Wis. 2d 
808, 
810, 
456 
N.W.2d 
597 
(1990). 
 
Statutory 
interpretation also presents a question of law that we review 
independently.  Mau v. N.D. Ins. Rsrv. Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶28, 
248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45.  
B.  Secura's Policy 
¶11 We first review the UIM policy Mr. Huck purchased from 
Secura.  The Declarations page provides that Mr. Huck purchased 
UIM coverage with a liability limit of $250,000 for "each 
                                                 
6 The policy allows Secura to reduce its liability by "all 
sums:  paid" (by or on behalf of persons who are legally 
responsible) and by "all sums:  paid or payable" (worker's 
compensation law).  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) allows 
insurers to reduce their liability by "[a]mounts paid" (by or on 
behalf of persons who are legally responsible) and "[a]mounts 
paid or payable" (worker's compensation law).  Despite the minor 
differences between the policy language and statute, Secura 
relies on its interpretation of "paid."  
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
7 
 
person." 
 
The 
policy 
includes 
an 
"Underinsured 
Motorist 
Coverage" endorsement.  The UIM endorsement establishes that 
Secura "will pay under this coverage only after the limits of 
liability under any bodily injury liability bonds or policies 
have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements."  
The policy also includes a reducing clause, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums: 
(1) 
Paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf 
of persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible . . . . 
(2) 
Paid or payable because of the bodily injury 
under any of the following or similar law: 
a.  Worker['s] compensation law; 
. . . .  
This coverage, when combined with any amounts paid by 
liability policies or bonds applicable to the owner or 
driver of an underinsured motor vehicle, will provide 
coverage up to the amount stated in the Declarations.  
This is the contract language we interpret to determine whether 
Secura's policy permits the insurer to reduce its UIM liability 
limit to the Estate by the total payments it initially received, 
rather than by the Estate's recovery after reimbursement to the 
WC insurer had occurred.  
¶12 We begin by revisiting the rules that guide our 
analysis.  Our interpretation of an insurance policy is 
controlled by the same rules of construction that we apply to 
interpret a contract.  Kremers-Urb. Co. v. Am. Emps. Ins. Co., 
119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).  Our goal is to 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
8 
 
"give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the 
language of the policy."  Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶12, 
264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.  Language in an insurance 
contract "is to be given the common and ordinary meaning it 
would have in the mind of a lay person."  Kremers-Urb., 119 
Wis. 2d at 735.  "If possible, a court should interpret a 
contract so that all parts are given meaning."  Whirlpool Corp. 
v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 154, 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995).  When 
the "terms of an insurance policy are plain on their face, the 
policy must not be rewritten by construction."  Smith, 155 
Wis. 2d at 811.   
¶13 The policy does not define the term "paid."  Secura 
argues 
that 
"paid" 
simply 
means 
an 
obligation 
has 
been 
discharged, "no matter the ultimate destination."  Secura argues 
that the WC insurer and the tortfeasor's insurer "paid" the 
Estate, consequently discharging their obligations.  Therefore, 
Secura argues it may reduce its liability limit by the Disputed 
Amount despite the Estate's statutory obligation to repay a 
portion of its recovery to the WC insurer.   
¶14 The plain language in the policy's reducing clause 
allows Secura to reduce its liability by "sums" "[p]aid or 
payable . . . under any . . . [w]orker['s] compensation law."  
Accordingly, the policy contemplates payments made consistent 
with worker's compensation laws (because of bodily injury).  See 
State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d 704, 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
9 
 
710, 456 N.W.2d 359 (1990) (express reference to a law by a 
contract reflects the parties' clear intent to address it).7   
¶15 Located in Wis. Stat. ch. 120 "Worker's Compensation," 
Wis. Stat. § 102.29, the statute by which the Estate was 
obligated 
to 
reimburse 
the 
WC 
insurer, 
is 
a 
worker's 
compensation law.  Although the policy does not specifically 
identify the worker's compensation law to which it refers, there 
is no dispute that § 102.29 comes within that general provision 
in the policy.  See id. at 712 ("[W]e give full meaning to the 
intent of the parties, as ascertained from the express language 
of the contract.").   
¶16 Accordingly, Secura may not alter its liability limit 
based on the outcome of some, and not all, "sums" paid "because 
of" a payment under worker's compensation law.  It follows that 
the "sums" by which Secura may reduce its liability because of 
"worker's 
compensation 
law" 
account 
for 
the 
Estate's 
reimbursement pursuant to the Wis. Stat. § 102.29 requirements.  
Lastly, because the policy's plain language does not except 
reimbursements made under ch. 102, we will not read in an 
exception that is not there.  To do so would rewrite the policy, 
which we cannot do.  Smith, 155 Wis. 2d at 811.  Since the 
                                                 
7 See also Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 
107, ¶60, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 ("[T]he laws which 
subsist 
at 
the 
time 
and 
place 
of 
the 
making 
of 
a 
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they were 
expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.  This 
principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, 
construction, discharge, and enforcement." (quoting Von Hoffman 
v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1866)). 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
10 
 
policy contemplates payments made in accordance with worker's 
compensation law, including § 102.29, Secura may not ignore the 
law's effects on the Estate's recovery.  Accordingly, Secura may 
not reduce its liability limit by the Disputed Amount. 
¶17 Furthermore, even if we were to accept Secura's 
argument that the word "paid" completely resolved the dispute, 
we would have to reject its interpretation of the policy's terms 
because it impermissibly interprets the reducing clause in a 
manner that renders a portion of the contract meaningless.  Md. 
Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶45, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 
786 N.W.2d 15 ("[C]ontract language should be construed to give 
meaning to every word, 'avoiding constructions which render 
portions of a contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere 
surplusage.'" (internal citations omitted)).   
¶18 The policy directs, "We will pay under this coverage 
only after the limits of liability under any bodily injury 
liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of 
judgments or settlements."  The policy amount that is "paid or 
payable" under worker's compensation law is a timed payment as 
the policy directs that Secura "will pay" UIM coverage "only 
after" other sources of payment "have been exhausted."  Because 
we must give meaning to a policy's provisions by reviewing the 
policy as a whole, we do not review the reducing clause in 
isolation.  Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶24.  Stated otherwise, 
the policy's plain language conditions Secura's UIM payment on 
the final resolution of "amounts paid" by other sources; 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
11 
 
accordingly, we conclude that the policy addresses an insured's 
recovery after required reimbursements have been made.8  
C.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 632.32(5)(i) and 102.29 
¶19 Secura argues its policy "substantially incorporates" 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), which it argues 
"provides" that Secura need not pay the Disputed Amount to the 
Estate.  Accordingly, we turn next to interpret the statute to 
determine whether it permits Secura to reduce its payment to the 
Estate as Secura contends.9  Secura argues that the statute 
                                                 
8 We note Wis. Stat. § 893.43(2) supports our interpretation 
of the policy.  There, the legislature has provided that "A 
cause 
of 
action 
involving 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage . . . accrues on the date there is final resolution of 
the underlying cause of action by the injured party against the 
tortfeasor."  This is important because final resolution of the 
claim against the tortfeasor is what causes the injured party, 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(2), to reimburse the WC insurer for a 
portion of its initial payment to the injured workman.   
9 We have interpreted this statute previously, but never in 
light of the novel issue now facing us:  "[w]hether the 
statutorily approved phrase 'all sums . . . [p]aid or payable 
because of the bodily injury under [w]orker's compensation law' 
in an underinsured motorist ('UIM') insurance policy's reducing 
clause necessarily permits the reduction for all amounts paid, 
including those amounts that the employer/worker's compensation 
insurer initially paid, but then recovered through a third-party 
action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29."  Pet. Br. at 7.  See 
Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 293 Wis. 2d 
123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) to 
determine whether an insurance company may reduce its liability 
by the amount of worker's compensation paid to the State Fund 
rather than to an estate); Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶23, 
302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411 (interpreting whether payments 
to an insured from non-UIM tortfeasors are ones "that apply" 
under 
§ 632.32(5)(i)); 
Dowhower, 
236 
Wis. 2d 
113, 
¶2 
(interpreting whether § 632.32(5)(i) violates substantive due 
process).  See also Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 
2001 WI 86, ¶15, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893 ("Depending on 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
12 
 
allows an insurer to reduce its liability by "amounts paid" by 
worker's compensation and the tortfeasor, and therefore it is 
"not relevant" that the Estate had to repay a portion of the 
worker's compensation recovery.   
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) states in relevant 
part: 
(i)  A policy may provide that the limits under 
the policy for . . . underinsured motorist coverage 
for bodily injury or death resulting from any one 
accident shall be reduced by any of the following that 
apply: 
1.  Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person or 
organization that may be legally responsible for the 
bodily injury or death for which the payment is made. 
2.  Amounts paid or payable under any worker's 
compensation law. 
¶21 We 
first 
review 
the 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, as set forth in Kalal.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  We "assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in 
the statutory language."  Id., ¶44.  Accordingly, we begin with 
the language of the statute, and "[i]f the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Id., ¶45.  
"A dictionary may be utilized to guide the common, ordinary 
meaning of words."  Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 
¶10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.  We also strive to give 
"reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
                                                                                                                                                             
the facts of a case, the same statute may be ambiguous in one 
setting and unambiguous in another."). 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
13 
 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  We note that "[s]tatutory 
interpretation centers on the 'ascertainment of meaning,' not 
the recitation of words in isolation."  Brey v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 
(quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47). 
¶22 With these principles in mind, we conclude that the 
plain language of the statute grants permission to an insurer to 
reduce its liability limit when the final amount of an insured's 
worker's compensation recovery has been determined.  The parties 
agree that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) serves as legislative 
permission to insurers to reduce their limit of liability by 
enumerated means.  Subdivisions (i)1. and (i)2. are at issue in 
the instant case.   
¶23 Both subdivisions contain the phrase "amounts paid," 
so we begin there.  In this context, "paid" is a past participle 
of pay that the legislature uses to modify "amounts."  Secura 
argues the word, "paid," simply communicates past action, but it 
overlooks 
that 
past 
participles 
are 
"routinely 
used 
as 
adjectives to describe the present state of a thing."  Henson v. 
Santander 
Consumer 
USA 
Inc., 
582 
U.S. 
79, 
84 
(2017) 
(interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).  For 
example, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
explained 
in 
its 
statutory 
interpretation of "a debt owed" that an ordinary person would 
understand "collect[ing] a debt owed to Steve," as "a debt 
currently owed to Steve," rather than "a debt Steve used to own" 
and now does not.  Id. (emphases in original). 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
14 
 
¶24 Similarly, "amounts paid" uses the past participle of 
"pay" as an adjective to describe a present state.  An ordinary 
person would understand "amount paid" to mean "amount currently 
paid" rather than "amount once paid and then given back."  See 
id.  
¶25 To ensure our interpretation gives meaning to all 
words in the statute, we next interpret the word, "payable," 
that appears only in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  "Payable" is defined as "requiring to be 
paid, specifying payment to a particular payee at a specified 
time or occasion, or in a specified manner."  Webster's Third 
New Int'l Dictionary 1659 (1986).  The plain meaning of 
"payable," therefore, is that payment is due, but the manner and 
the timing of payment may involve future payments.  For 
instance, a settlement may be "payable in installments," or 
"payable monthly."  Regardless, it would still be an "amount 
payable" under our interpretation of the statute.  
¶26 Lastly, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. allows for the 
reduction of "[a]mounts paid or payable under any worker's 
compensation law."  As we stated earlier, Wis. Stat. § 102.29 is 
a worker's compensation law that establishes reimbursement of 
amounts initially received as worker's compensation due to 
subsequent settlements.  By including "worker's compensation 
law" 
in 
§ 632.32(5)(i)2., 
the 
legislature 
contemplated 
proceedings such as those subject to § 102.29.  See Union 
Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 64, 68-69, 108 N.W.2d 
180 (1961) ("A general reference refers generally to the law on 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
15 
 
a subject and incorporates the entire subject matter.").  
Because § 102.29 obligated the Estate to reimburse the Disputed 
Amount, the reimbursement was made pursuant to a worker's 
compensation law.  We interpret § 632.32(5)(i)2. to account for 
the reimbursement into the "amount paid" to the Estate so that 
the statute contemplates the Estate's final recovery.  
¶27 Accordingly, we conclude, that "amounts paid" under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. and "amounts paid or payable" in 
subd. 2., both reference the present tense.  "Amounts paid" is 
interpreted as the current "amounts paid" or outstanding such as 
by an installment agreement,10 at the time an insurer seeks to 
reduce its liability under § 632.32(5)(i).  Stated otherwise, 
"amounts paid" refers to an insured's final recovery at the time 
an insurer reduces its liability, which we recognize may occur 
when a UIM claim accrues.11  See Wis. Stat. § 893.43(2).   
¶28 At the time Secura sought to reduce its liability, the 
Estate had already reimbursed the Disputed Amount pursuant to a 
worker's compensation law.  The final "amounts paid" to the 
Estate pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) was $51,079.31 from 
the combined tortfeasor and worker's compensation settlements.  
                                                 
10 We provide just one example of a situation that gives 
meaning to the term "payable."  Our decision today does not 
limit 
"payable" 
to 
just 
installment 
payments 
or 
other 
circumstances that have not been briefed before us.  
11 Our conclusion is consistent with that reached in other 
jurisdictions.  See Wildman v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 703 
N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ind. App. 1998); Cherry v. Coregis Ins. Co., 
204 P.3d 522, 525-26 (Idaho 2009).   
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
16 
 
Secura seeks to reduce its UIM liability to the Estate by both 
the "amounts paid" and also by the Disputed Amount; in other 
words, Secura seeks to reduce its liability by the amount the 
Estate initially received before required reimbursements were 
made.  Section 632.32(5)(i) does not support this.  Secura must 
tender the Disputed Amount to the Estate in accordance with the 
statute. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We interpret Secura's policy as precluding Secura from 
reducing its liability to the Estate by the total amount of 
payments the Estate initially received.  The Estate first 
received 
worker's 
compensation 
from 
Huck's 
employer's 
WC 
insurer, and then a settlement from the tortfeasor's insurer.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1)(b)2. 
obligated 
the 
Estate 
to 
reimburse the WC insurer with a portion of the settlement it 
received from the tortfeasor.  Secura's UIM policy contemplated 
payments made in accordance with worker's compensation law in 
its reducing clause, and obligated the Estate to reimburse the 
WC insurer.  The policy also required the Estate to exhaust any 
other bodily injury liability bonds or policies and to receive 
payment from them before Secura would pay UIM benefits.  We 
therefore conclude that the policy's plain language required its 
payment of UIM benefits based on the Estate's recovery after 
reimbursements 
to 
the 
WC 
insurer 
and 
collection 
of 
the 
tortfeasor's liability payment had occurred.   
¶30 However, 
Secura 
argues 
its 
policy 
"substantially 
incorporates" 
the 
statutory 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
2020AP1078-FT   
 
17 
 
§ 632.32(5)(i), which permits it to reduce payment by the amount 
the Estate initially received.  We conclude the plain language 
of § 632.32(5)(i) establishes that an insurer may reduce its 
liability by the recovery of the insured at the time the insurer 
enforces 
its 
reducing 
clause. 
 
The 
Estate's 
obligatory 
reimbursement was made pursuant to a "worker's compensation 
law," which § 632.32(5)(i)2. recognizes.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that Secura is not statutorily authorized to reduce its 
liability 
limits 
by 
the 
gross 
worker's 
compensation 
and 
tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but 
was obligated to reimburse in part.  Accordingly, Secura's 
policy 
and 
§ 632.32(5)(i) 
require 
Secura 
to 
provide 
an 
additional $9,718.73 to the Estate.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶31 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  If I buy an 
$8 sandwich, hand the cashier a $10 bill, and she hands me my 
sandwich and $2 in change, how much was she "paid" for the 
sandwich?  Eight dollars, of course.  But according to Secura, 
that isn't so clear.  It contends that the Estate of Daniel Huck 
was "paid" $250,000 in connection with the accident that caused 
Huck's death, even though the Estate ended up with just 
$240,281.27 after it was required by statute to pay the 
$9,718.73 difference back to a workers' compensation insurer.  
See generally Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).   By that same logic, the 
cashier in my sandwich example was paid $10, even though she 
kept only $8.  I agree with the majority/lead opinion that this 
nonsensical result is contrary to the plain meaning of the word 
"paid" 
and, 
therefore, 
the 
policy's 
language. 
 
I 
write 
separately, however, because I reach that conclusion for 
different——and in my view, simpler——reasons.   
¶32 The language of Secura's policy is clear.  It 
guaranteed 
the 
Estate 
a 
"predetermined, 
fixed 
level 
of 
[underinsured motorist coverage]," $250,000, "that is arrived at 
by combining payments from all sources."  Welin v. Am. Fam. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2006 WI 81, ¶49, 292 Wis. 2d 73, 717 N.W.2d 690.  The 
initial grant of coverage states that Secura will pay damages 
the Estate "is legally entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injury."  The emphasized terms are defined in the policy, and 
one of them——"underinsured motor vehicle"——is relevant here.  An 
underinsured 
motor 
vehicle 
is 
one 
"to 
which 
a 
bodily 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rfd 
 
2 
 
injury . . . policy applies at the time of the accident but its 
limit for bodily injury liability is . . . [l]ess than the limit 
of liability for this [underinsured motor vehicle] coverage."  
The limit of liability for Secura's coverage is $250,000, which 
Secura "will pay . . . only after the limits of liability under 
any bodily injury liability . . . policies have been exhausted 
by payments of judgments or settlements."  In other words, 
Secura promised to pay last, after the Estate recovered any 
money it was owed for the accident by the tortfeasor or others, 
and only if the limits of the tortfeasor's insurance coverage 
were less than $250,000.  And all Secura promised to pay was the 
difference between the money the Estate recovered from those 
other sources and $250,000.  That is spelled out clearly in the 
policy's reducing clause, which decreases Secura's limit of 
liability by "all sums" paid by those legally responsible for 
the accident or "[p]aid or payable because of the bodily injury 
under . . . [w]orkers' compensation law."   
¶33 The upshot of these provisions is simple.  Every 
dollar the Estate is paid either by those legally responsible 
for the accident or by workers' compensation reduces Secura's 
$250,000 limit of liability by that same amount.  If the Estate 
is paid $250,000 or more by those legally responsible or by 
workers' compensation, then Secura owes nothing.  If not, Secura 
makes up the difference up to $250,000.  In any case, the Estate 
is guaranteed to end up with at least the predetermined, fixed 
amount of coverage it bargained for, $250,000.  See Welin, 282 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rfd 
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 73, ¶49.  Or at least that's what the policy says should 
happen. 
¶34 Secura argues, however, based on a hyper-literal 
interpretation of the word "paid," that the Estate should 
receive just $240,281.27.  That is because the Estate initially 
received $35,798.04 in workers' compensation payments, even 
though it later had to pay $9,718.73 back to the workers' 
compensation insurer according to a statutory formula.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1), (giving the workers' compensation insurer a 
right to a portion of the proceeds the Estate recovered from the 
tortfeasor).  In Secura's view, the Estate was therefore "paid" 
the full $35,798.04, even though it netted only $26,079.31 in 
the end. 
¶35 The problem with Secura's interpretation is that when 
the policy is read as a whole, the Estate is only "paid" the 
money it retains after resolving both its claims against the 
tortfeasor and any resulting obligations to the workers' 
compensation insurer.  See Liebovich v. Minn. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 
75, ¶27, 310 Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764 (explaining that we 
must read insurance policies "as a whole").  Simply put, it is 
not enough if, at one point in time or another, the Estate had 
$250,000.  Rather, the policy requires that the Estate end up 
with the predetermined, fixed, final recovery of at least 
$250,000 it bargained for.  And because Secura's argument would 
leave the Estate with less than that amount, it must be 
rejected.   
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rfd 
 
4 
 
¶36 This conclusion is confirmed both by the policy's 
language regarding workers' compensation recoveries and by a 
statute governing underinsured motorist claims.  First, the 
policy's reducing clause lowers Secura's limits of liability by 
"all sums . . . [p]aid or payable . . . under . . . [w]orkers' 
compensation law."  And as mentioned previously, § 102.29(1)——a 
provision of workers' compensation law——mandates that the 
workers' compensation insurer receive a portion of the money the 
Estate recovered from the tortfeasor.  Thus, the amount "[p]aid 
or payable" under workers' compensation must be determined by 
taking into account money the Estate had to pay back to the 
workers' compensation insurer under § 102.29(1).  Only after 
that repayment is made can we know "all sums" the Estate was 
"[p]aid."  See also majority/lead op., ¶16 (reaching a similar 
conclusion).  Second, Wis. Stat. § 893.43(2) states that an 
underinsured motorist claim accrues for statute-of-limitations 
purposes only after the "final resolution of the underlying 
cause of action by the injured party against the tortfeasor."  
The final resolution of the underlying cause of action against 
the tortfeasor is also what triggers the injured party's 
obligation under § 102.29(1) to repay a portion of that final 
recovery against the tortfeasor to the workers' compensation 
insurer.  For that reason, it makes no sense to calculate the 
amounts "paid" to the Estate under Secura's policy before that 
point in time, as Secura does.  We only know what the Estate was 
"paid," and therefore what Secura owes, once the Estate has 
resolved its claim against the tortfeasor and made any necessary 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rfd 
 
5 
 
reimbursement 
to 
the 
workers' 
compensation 
insurer 
under 
§ 102.29(1).   
¶37 In my view, that's all we need to say to resolve this 
case.  Despite that, the majority/lead opinion goes further, 
unnecessarily analyzing a provision of the policy that the 
parties did not meaningfully discuss in their briefs, see 
majority/lead op., ¶¶17-18, and the omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(i), which regulates reducing clauses.  See id., 
¶¶19-28.  Even though I agree with the majority/lead opinion's 
bottom line, I would not reach these issues.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.1   
¶38 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, BRIAN HAGEDORN, and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion. 
 
 
                                                 
1 I join ¶¶1-2, 4-16, and 29 of the majority/lead opinion.   
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶39 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
I remember once I was with [Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.]; it was Saturday when the Court was to 
confer.  It was before we had a motor car, and we 
jogged along in an old coupé.  When we got down to the 
Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as he 
walked off, I said to him:  "Well, sir, goodbye.  Do 
justice!"  He turned quite sharply and he said:  "Come 
here.  Come here."  I answered:  "Oh, I know, I know."  
He replied:  "That is not my job.  My job is to play 
the game according to the rules." 
Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of Liberty 
302, 306–07 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
¶40 This court should resolve this case by considering the 
parties' arguments and neutrally applying well-established rules 
for interpretating insurance policies.  Instead, the majority 
rejects the parties' contractual agreement in favor of doing 
justice in a case involving tragic facts.  While the results 
achieved by the majority's decision may be more palatable, the 
resulting injury to the rule of law is anything but just.   
¶41 Daniel Keith Huck died from a bodily injury he 
sustained while working for the Village of Mt. Pleasant.  The 
Estate of Huck received about $36,000 in worker's compensation 
benefits.  Later, the Estate became statutorily required to 
reimburse a portion of this payout.  Huck had an insurance 
policy with underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage through Secura 
Supreme Insurance Company.  The Estate filed a claim.  Secura 
and the Estate dispute the amount owed under the policy.  Secura 
relies on the policy's reducing clause, which provides that the 
policy's 
limits 
"shall 
be 
reduced 
by 
all 
sums . . . 
[p]aid . . . because of the bodily injury under . . . [w]orkers' 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
2 
 
compensation law[.]"  Secura argues the Estate was "paid" 
$36,000 because Mt. Pleasant's $36,000 financial obligation to 
the Estate was discharged when the Estate was provided with the 
money.  The Estate does not respond by referencing definitions 
of "paid" or relying on grammatical principles.  Instead, the 
Estate primarily argues that siding with Secura would produce an 
"absurd result."  That argument is grounded not in law but in 
subjective perceptions of justice. 
¶42 The majority/lead opinion sides with the Estate, but 
conspicuously absent from the opinion is any discussion of the 
Estate's principal argument.1  Instead, the opinion attempts to 
develop a textual analysis that was——at best——underdeveloped by 
the Estate.  This court need not address an underdeveloped 
argument, and it should not do so in this case.  See, e.g., Papa 
v. Wis. Dep't of Health Servs., 2020 WI 66, ¶42 n.15, 393 
Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17 (declining to address an underdeveloped 
argument).  Although suffering from its own analytical flaws, 
Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet's concurrence correctly notes the 
majority/lead opinion goes too far by "analyzing a provision of 
the policy that the parties did not meaningfully discuss in 
their briefs[.]"  Concurrence, ¶37.  While this court has near-
absolute discretion to deviate from the parties' arguments and 
often does given its law-development function, the majority/lead 
                                                 
1 This court's internal operating procedures explain, "[i]f 
. . . the opinion originally circulated as the majority opinion 
does not garner the vote of a majority of the court, it shall be 
referred to in separate writings as the 'lead opinion[.]'"  Wis. 
Sup. Ct. IOP III.G.4 (Feb. 28, 2023). 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
3 
 
opinion does not exercise discretion because it does not explain 
its departure from the party presentation principle.  See Town 
of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16, ¶73, 390 
Wis. 2d 266, 
938 
N.W.2d 493 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
The 
majority/lead 
opinion 
does 
not 
even 
acknowledge——let alone explain——why it leaves the Estate's 
primary argument unaddressed.   
¶43 In this case, a persuasive explanation would be 
difficult to provide.  This court granted the petition for 
review to address the Estate's primary argument, which the court 
of appeals, in a published opinion, held it was compelled by 
this court's precedent to adopt.  See Secura Supreme Ins. v. 
Estate of Huck, 2021 WI App 69, ¶7, 399 Wis. 2d 542, 966 
N.W.2d 124.  Specifically, the court of appeals held it was 
bound by Teschendorf v. State Farm Insurance Cos., 2006 WI 89, 
293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258, in which this court disregarded 
the plain meaning of the law in favor of what the court deemed a 
more just result.  While a majority of the court could not 
coalesce on a rationale, six justices agreed that a "literal" 
reading of the law favored the insurer and accordingly deemed it 
either absurd or ambiguous in order to decide the case in favor 
of a sympathetic plaintiff.  Id., ¶¶18, 22, 32 (majority/lead 
op.).  Notably, in this case court of appeals judge Shelley A. 
Grogan wrote a concurrence signaling concern that Teschendorf 
required the court of appeals to disregard the plain language of 
the insurance policy and Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. (2019–20).2  
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019–20 version. 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
4 
 
See Secura Supreme Ins., 399 Wis. 2d 542, ¶21 (Grogan, J., 
concurring).  As the majority/lead opinion notes, this court 
granted review of the court of appeals decision, but the 
majority 
leaves 
that 
decision 
largely 
unreviewed 
in 
its 
opinions.  Majority/lead op., ¶¶1, 9. 
¶44 Justice Dallet's concurrence, with its references to 
allegedly "nonsensical" results, aligns more closely with the 
Estate's actual argument, but her concurrence is problematic for 
a different reason.  See Concurrence, ¶¶31, 36.  Justice Dallet 
endorses 
a 
case-deciding 
approach 
grounded 
in 
subjective 
perceptions of justice at the expense of the rule of law. 
¶45 Applying the law to the parties' arguments, I conclude 
the policy's limits should be reduced by the total amount of 
worker's compensation paid, not by the amount ultimately netted 
by the Estate.  I further conclude Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2., 
which also uses the word "paid," permits such a reduction.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Tragic Facts 
 
¶46 The parties have stipulated to the tragic facts of 
this case.  Huck was struck by a negligently driven motor 
vehicle while employed as a utility worker for Mt. Pleasant.  
Huck died as a result.  The Estate received about $36,000 in 
worker's compensation benefits.  After that, the Estate settled 
with the negligent driver's insurance company for the policy 
limits of $25,000.  Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 102.49(5) 
required Mt. Pleasant to pay $20,000 to the state treasury for 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
5 
 
the benefit of the Work Injury Supplemental Benefits Fund.  
Under § 102.29, the Estate was obligated to reimburse about 
$10,000 of the worker's compensation benefits to the worker's 
compensation 
carrier 
using 
the 
settlement 
proceeds.  
Accordingly, 
the 
Estate 
received 
$36,000 
in 
worker's 
compensation benefits, but the Estate netted only about $26,000.  
Huck's insurance policy with Secura provided UIM coverage with 
limits of $250,000; the damages exceed those limits.  The Estate 
made a claim under the policy. 
B.  The Reducing Clause 
 
¶47 The 
parties 
calculate 
the 
amount 
Secura 
owes 
differently, based on different readings of the reducing clause, 
which provides: 
B.  Reducing Clause:  The limit of liability shall be 
reduced by all sums: 
1. 
Paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf 
of persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible. . . .  
2. 
Paid or payable because of the bodily injury 
under any of the following or similar laws: 
a. 
Workers' compensation law[.] 
The parties dispute only the amount of reduction for worker's 
compensation benefits.  Secura argues for a $36,000 reduction——
the amount the Estate received under worker's compensation law—— 
while the Estate argues the reduction should be only $26,000 
because the Estate had to reimburse the worker's compensation 
carrier approximately $10,000.  The parties agree the $25,000 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
6 
 
settlement reduces the limits.3  They also agree the $20,000 
payment by Mt. Pleasant to the Fund does not trigger the 
reducing clause.  Accordingly, the parties calculate the amount 
owed under the policy as follows: 
 
Secura 
 
The Estate 
 
$250,000 (the limit of 
liability) 
$250,000 (the limit of 
liability) 
 
−$36,000 (the amount of 
worker's compensation received) 
 
−$26,000 (the amount of 
worker's compensation netted) 
−$25,000 (from the settlement) 
−$25,000 (from the settlement) 
 
 
= $189,000 
 
= $199,000 
 
¶48 Notably, the language of the reducing clause is 
materially similar to the language of Wis. Stat. § 632.32, also 
known as the "Omnibus Statute" because, as this court has 
explained, "it sets the minimum requirements all motor vehicle 
insurance policies in Wisconsin must satisfy."  Brey v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2022 WI 7, ¶5, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 
N.W.2d 1.  Subsection (5)(i)2. provides: 
(i) 
A policy may provide that the limits under the 
policy 
for 
uninsured 
motorist 
coverage 
or 
underinsured motorist coverage for bodily injury or 
death resulting from any one accident shall be 
reduced by any of the following that apply: 
. . . . 
                                                 
3 The Estate notes the parties agree that "[t]he UIM 
reducing clause permitted reduction of the $250,000 UIM limits 
by the $25,000 recovered from the tortfeasor and the $26,079.31 
net benefits paid by the worker's compensation carrier."  The 
parties "part[] ways" over the $10,000 of worker's compensation 
benefits that was "repaid[.]"  
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
7 
 
2. Amounts paid or payable under any worker's 
compensation law. 
The operative effect of the reducing clause must be permissible 
under § 632.32(5)(i)2. 
C.  The Procedural History 
 
¶49 This 
case's 
procedural 
history 
demonstrates 
the 
parties focused on the applicability of Teschendorf.  Secura 
sought from the circuit court a declaration stating it owed only 
$189,000, and the Estate counterclaimed.  The circuit court 
sided with the Estate. 
 
¶50 Secura appealed, and the Estate's argument in response 
focused mainly on this court's decision in Teschendorf.  It 
framed the sole issue on appeal as follows: 
In Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 2006 WI 
89, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258, a statutorily-
permitted reducing clause was declared impermissible 
when used to reduce underinsured motorists . . . 
limits by sums paid not to the insured, but to a state 
fund . . . .  Does a reducing clause permitted by Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), reducing UIM limits by "all sums 
. . . [p]aid or payable because of the bodily injury 
under 
. . . 
[w]orker's 
compensation 
law," 
become 
impermissible where the worker's compensation insurer 
has been reimbursed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29, 
precluding double recovery by the insured?[4] 
Answered by the Circuit Court:  Yes. 
(Third and fourth ellipsis and modifications in the original.) 
 
¶51 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision in a published opinion.  Secura Supreme Ins., 399 
Wis. 2d 542 (majority op.).  The court of appeals accepted the 
                                                 
4 Although this issue statement claims Teschendorf was about 
UIM coverage, the case was actually about uninsured motorist 
coverage.  See infra Section III.B. 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
8 
 
Estate's framing, concluding, "[t]he court in 
Teschendorf 
squarely rejected the literal reading of the reducing clause 
Secura proposes here."  Id., ¶10 (citing Teschendorf, 293 
Wis. 2d 542, ¶¶22, 24, 44).  The majority opinion of the court 
of appeals cites Teschendorf more than 30 times, demonstrating 
its centrality in the reasoning of the court below.  In 
concurrence, Judge Grogan wrote, "[o]n a clean slate, Secura's 
textual argument may not have been so swiftly dismissed, but our 
supreme court foreclosed it in Teschendorf."  Id., ¶21 (Grogan, 
J., concurring). 
 
¶52 Secura filed a petition for review.  It explicitly 
argued "Teschendorf is ripe for reexamination to——at least——
clarify the proper analysis [to] the lower courts[.]"  In 
response, the Estate professed this case does not present a 
novel question of law given Teschendorf.  The Estate framed the 
issue in much the same way that it had framed the issue before 
the court of appeals: 
Words in statutes and insurance policies are given a 
meaning which avoids absurd or unreasonable results, 
or results clearly at odds with the legislature's 
purpose. . . .  Can an insurer reduce its [UIM] 
coverage limits by sums neither its insured nor his 
workers compensation insurer recovered because its 
policy contains a reducing clause deducting "all 
sums . . . [p]aid or payable because of the bodily 
injury under . . . [w]orker's compensation law"? 
(Second and third ellipsis and second and third modifications in 
the original.)  The Estate argued Teschendorf should not be 
reexamined because the absurd results canon has been "repeatedly 
applied" in various contexts——not just in Teschendorf.  It 
claimed this case would be a mere "rehash[ing]" of the "same 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
9 
 
principles" applied in Teschendorf and several other cases.  
This court granted Secura's petition. 
D.  The Parties' Briefing 
¶53 The focus on Teschendorf continued in the briefing.  
Secura argues the case does not need to be overruled but should 
be limited to its extreme facts (discussed more in Part III).  
The Estate argues the court of appeals was correct to "center" 
its analysis on Teschendorf, declaring the analysis "spot on."  
Similarly, the Estate claims this case does not raise an issue 
of "first impression" because, in its view, "the issue raised is 
very similar to that addressed in Teschendorf[.]"  The Estate 
continues, "Teschendorf . . . require[s] that the appellate 
court's decision be affirmed."  The Estate opens its brief by 
noting, "Wisconsin courts reject interpretations of statutes 
that produce results contrary to the statute's purpose and 
common sense."  (Citation omitted.)  The Estate also makes 
passing reference to the principle that statutes should be 
construed 
in 
harmony, 
grounding 
this 
argument 
in 
consequentialism.  The Estate argues, "[a]s the court of appeals 
correctly 
explained, 
Secura's 
argument——that 
the 
workers 
compensation was 'paid' to the insured but ignoring that that 
sum had been reimbursed to the workers compensation insurer——
'defies common sense and the fundamental purpose of [UIM] 
insurance coverage[.]'"  Quoting Secura Supreme Ins., 399 
Wis. 2d 542, ¶17 (majority op.).  Claiming a purported ambiguity 
in the policy, the Estate argues this court must affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals because "[t]o hold otherwise 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
10 
 
would create an absurd result[.]"  Regardless of how the Estate 
frames its arguments, every contention advanced by the Estate 
rests on the absurd results canon. 
¶54 In contrast, Secura offers a fully-developed plain 
language argument in response to the Estate's emphasis on the 
purported absurdity of the results Secura's plain language 
interpretation 
may 
yield. 
 
Secura 
references 
dictionary 
definitions to support its interpretation of "paid," some of 
which have been adopted by Wisconsin courts in other contexts.  
See, e.g., Danbeck v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins., 2000 WI App 26, ¶9, 
232 Wis. 2d 417, 605 N.W.2d 925 (noting "payment" is defined as 
"1:  the act of paying or giving compensation : the discharge of 
a debt or an obligation . . . 2:  something that is paid : 
something given to discharge a debt or obligation or to fulfill 
a promise" (quoting Payment, Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (1993)) (ellipsis in the original)). 
¶55 In 
contrast, 
the 
Estate 
references 
dictionary 
definitions 
once——for 
the 
word 
"reimburse"——which 
appears 
nowhere in the relevant language of the policy or the Omnibus 
Statute.5  Apparently, the Estate means to suggest that money 
reimbursed has not been "paid," but even the language the Estate 
uses to describe the facts of this case presupposes the Estate 
was, in fact, paid.  For example, the Estate writes, "[t]he 
parties 
parted 
ways . . . as 
to 
Secura's 
denial 
of 
the 
[E]state's claim to the extent of the . . . [disputed amount] 
                                                 
5 The brief also contains a reference to Black's Law 
Dictionary, within a block quote of another source, but the 
definition is for the word "insurance."   
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
11 
 
repaid to the workers compensation carrier."  (Emphasis added.)  
An amount can be "repaid" only if it in fact has been "paid." 
 
¶56 In attempting to illustrate the meaning of this 
utterly plain word, Justice Dallet's sandwich shop analogy 
suffers from a basic mathematical error.  She begins her 
concurrence with the following scenario:  "If I buy an $8 
sandwich, hand the cashier a $10 bill, and she hands me my 
sandwich and $2 in change, how much was she 'paid' for the 
sandwich?  Eight dollars, of course.  But according to Secura, 
this isn't so clear."  Concurrence, ¶31.  This simple analogy 
fails because Justice Dallet did not incur a $10 financial 
obligation——only an $8 one.  The moment she handed $10 to the 
cashier, she satisfied her obligation to pay for the sandwich, 
but the cashier immediately incurred an obligation to give back 
$2.  In this case, the worker's compensation carrier incurred a 
$36,000 financial obligation, which was satisfied when that 
amount was paid to the Estate.  Had the carrier incurred a mere 
$26,000 obligation but inadvertently sent the Estate a check for 
$36,000, perhaps Justice Dallet's analogy would be relevant.  In 
this case, however, the carrier used exact change.  Even though 
the law later compelled a reimbursement, had the carrier paid 
only $26,000 initially, it would not have fulfilled its 
obligation. 
 
Perhaps 
textual 
arguments 
may 
exist 
for 
a 
definition of "paid" favoring the Estate, but Justice Dallet 
offers none. 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
12 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶57 This 
case 
requires 
this 
court 
to 
interpret 
an 
insurance policy.  The interpretation of a policy is a question 
of law, subject to independent review.  Talley v. Mustafa 
Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, ¶13, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55 (citing 
Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins., 2016 WI 54, 
¶12, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285). 
 
¶58 Contrary to the majority, the policy language compels 
a reduction by the total amount of worker's compensation paid to 
the Estate.  Accordingly, I must determine whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(i)2. 
permits 
such 
a 
reduction. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation, like policy interpretation, presents a question 
of law subject to this court's independent review.  Water Well 
Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc., 369 Wis. 2d 607, ¶12 (citing Estate of 
Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2008 WI 87, ¶18, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Consequence of the Majority/Lead Opinion not Reviewing 
the Court of Appeals Decision 
 
¶59 The majority/lead opinion correctly notes this court 
granted review of a court of appeals decision; however, it does 
not review it.  In a published opinion, the court of appeals 
decided it was bound by Teschendorf.  By affirming the court of 
appeals without reviewing its decision, the majority preserves 
the court of appeals opinion as binding precedent.  Although the 
majority affirms the decision on a different basis, it does not 
expressly——or even impliedly——signal that the opinion below does 
not retain its precedential value.  Consequently, the court of 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
13 
 
appeals will understand itself to be bound by that opinion.  See 
State v. Schmidt, 2016 WI App 45, ¶48 n.11, 370 Wis. 2d 139, 884 
N.W.2d 510 (citing Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins., 2010 WI 78, 
¶44, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78).  See generally Wis. Mfrs. 
& Com. v. Evers, 2023 WI 5, ¶2, 405 Wis. 2d 478, 984 N.W.2d 402 
(per curiam) (noting that while this court has not addressed the 
issue directly, when this court affirms a published opinion of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
on 
different 
grounds 
but 
without 
suggesting its rationale was incorrect, the court of appeals 
opinion remains binding precedent).  At a minimum, the majority 
should withdraw the precedential status of the opinion below. 
B.  This Court's Decision in Teschendorf 
¶60 If the majority had reviewed the decision of the court 
of appeals, it would need to revisit Teschendorf, on which the 
Estate's argument continues to heavily rely.  Although no less 
tragic, the facts of Teschendorf are quite different than the 
facts of this case.  A man died while acting in the scope of his 
employment after an uninsured motor vehicle struck a car in 
which the man was riding.  293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶3 (majority op.).  
In accordance with Wis. Stat. § 102.49(5)(b) (2001–02), a 
portion of worker's compensation benefits were paid to the Fund, 
but none were paid to the man's estate because he was single and 
had no dependents.  Id.  Of the approximately $174,000 paid in 
worker's compensation benefits, $159,000 went to the Fund, and 
the rest went to recipients other than the man's estate.  Id.  
The man had a policy providing uninsured motorist coverage, with 
limits of $150,000.  Id., ¶4.  The insurer argued the reducing 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
14 
 
clause operated to change the limits to $0 because more than 
$150,000 had been paid in worker's compensation benefits.  Id., 
¶5. 
¶61 The issue in Teschendorf was whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(i)2. (2001–02) prohibited reducing the limits by the 
$159,000 paid to the Fund.  Although this court resolved the 
issue, it was divided on the rationale.  Public policy pervaded 
each member's reasoning. 
¶62 This court held Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. prohibited 
the reduction; however, it was split into two factions.  The 
first faction, which has been subsequently called the "absurdity 
faction," 
consisted 
of 
three 
justices 
who 
concluded 
the 
statutory language unambiguously did not prohibit the reduction 
but determined the result of applying the unambiguous language 
would be absurd.  Id., ¶18 & n.8.  They first recognized the 
plain meaning of the reducing clause: 
There is no ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.  
The statute says that policy limits may be reduced by 
"amounts 
paid 
or 
payable 
under 
any 
worker's 
compensation law."  The clause "amounts paid or 
payable" is not qualified and unambiguously brings 
within its scope payments made to the insured or to 
any other person or entity, provided that the payment 
was made under any worker's compensation law. 
Id., ¶30 (lead op.); see also id., ¶18 n.8 (majority op.) 
(explaining the absurdity faction "believe[d] that the meaning 
of the statute is plain, but the results produced by the plain 
meaning are absurd").  These justices declined to apply the 
plain meaning, however, because in their view "the results that 
follow are so unreasonable . . . that they require the plain 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
15 
 
meaning to be rejected."  Id., ¶18 (majority op.).  Accordingly, 
these justices "construe[d] the statute to avoid that result."  
Id., ¶32 (lead op.) (citing State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶15, 
259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416).  Defying a fundamental canon of 
construction, they opted to read the words "to the insured" into 
the statute after the words "amounts paid or payable[.]"  Id., 
¶31.  These justices expressly acknowledged the qualifier "to 
the insured" "is not present in the text of the statute" and its 
plain meaning "allows policy limits to be reduced regardless of 
to 
whom 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits 
are 
made." 
 
Id.  
Nevertheless, to protect "injured persons," they opted to 
rewrite the statute, openly discarding what they (correctly) 
understood to be the plain meaning of the words chosen by the 
legislature.  Id., ¶38. 
 
¶63 The second group, known as the "ambiguity faction," 
consisted of three justices who agreed the statute was ambiguous 
and who resolved the ambiguity in favor of the insured.  Id., 
¶18 (majority op.).  Like the absurdity faction, they conceded 
the plain meaning of the statute: 
The literal reading of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. 
favored by [the insurer] permits the conclusion that 
an insurer may reduce uninsured motorist limits by the 
amount of worker's compensation payments made to 
anyone.  Subsection (5)(i)2. contains no qualifying 
language specifying to whom the payments must be made; 
payments could be made to the insured, to the Fund, or 
to anyone. 
Id., ¶22 (lead op.).  This faction noted the insurer's "literal 
interpretation" could reduce the limits to $0.  Id., ¶28.  
Finding that result unpalatable, these justices read into the 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
16 
 
statute "an implicit condition that the insurer may reduce 
uninsured motorist benefits only by the amount of worker's 
compensation payments made to or on behalf of the insured."  
Id., ¶23.  This implicit condition was supported, the three 
claimed, by § 632.32(4) (2001–02), which required that every 
motor vehicle insurance policy include uninsured motorist 
coverage.  Id., ¶24.  Under the ambiguity faction's extra-
textual reasoning, "[t]he consistent leading purpose of this 
statutory scheme is to require that insurers provide uninsured 
motorist coverage for the protection of their insureds," while 
"the subordinate purpose is to minimize the insurers' exposure 
by allowing insurers to limit the protection offered by 
uninsured motorist coverage to a fixed, predetermined amount 
that takes into account payments from specified sources[.]"  
Id., ¶27.  According to the ambiguity faction, the purported 
"leading purpose" would be defeated if not for the read-in 
implicit condition. 
 
¶64 The two factions achieved their desired result——
defeating the contractual reduction——after joining together in a 
lengthy discussion of legislative history and public policy, 
rather than text.  Id., ¶¶44–62 (majority op.).  Then-Chief 
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson concurred with the mandate but 
joined neither the absurdity faction nor the ambiguity faction.  
Id., ¶66 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
C.  Evaluating the Parties' Arguments:  Teschendorf's Limited 
Reach 
¶65 In this case, the parties' arguments primarily address 
the reach of Teschendorf and, more generally, the absurd results 
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17 
 
canon.  Secura does not ask this court to overturn Teschendorf.  
In fact, it concedes the reducing clause may not be read to 
cause a subtraction from the limits for the $20,000 paid to the 
Fund——because of Teschendorf.  Instead, Secura simply argues 
that Teschendorf does not apply to the $10,000 in worker's 
compensation benefits, which were paid to the Estate and later 
repaid.  Secura asserts the court of appeals erred in extending 
Teschendorf too far.  In contrast, the Estate argues Teschendorf 
should be the focal point of this court's analysis and prohibits 
the reduction at issue. 
 
¶66 As a preliminary matter, Secura argues Teschendorf is 
largely "non-binding" because no majority agreed on a rationale, 
citing State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 685, 538 N.W.2d 249 
(1995) (per curiam).  In Elam, this court explained that "[a] 
general principle of appellate practice is that a majority of 
the participating judges must have agreed on a particular point 
for it to be considered the opinion of the court."  Id. (citing 
State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194–95, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984) 
(per curiam)).  Critically, no majority in Teschendorf held the 
particular result absurd, and no majority held the statute 
ambiguous——a majority formed almost exclusively on a discussion 
of legislative history and public policy.  As this court has 
explained, a dearth of overlap between rationales on which a 
mandate was based is "troublesome."  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 
76, ¶8 n.5, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600.  Teschendorf's 
application to this case is a prime example:  In applying 
Teschendorf, how much weight should this court place on its 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
18 
 
specific facts and the purported absurdity of the insurer's 
proffered interpretation?  The lack of a majority rationale in 
Teschendorf provides sufficient justification to limit the 
decision's application to its extreme facts because determining 
how Teschendorf applies to even a slightly different fact-
pattern is difficult.  See Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of 
Judicial Precedent 198–99 (2016).  See generally Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶243, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 
N.W.2d 402 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting), summarily 
rev'd sub. nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 
U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (per curiam) (explaining this court 
does not follow the so-called "Marks rule," pursuant to which a 
legal rule may be precedential even if its rationale was not 
adopted by a majority). 
¶67 Although noting this divide, Secura restricts its 
argument to attacking the rationale advanced by the ambiguity 
faction in Teschendorf, because the absurdity faction's analysis 
would not extend to the significantly less extreme facts of this 
case.  In contrast to Teschendorf, the Estate in fact receives 
insurance proceeds approaching the policy limit, and the 
variance between the parties' positions approximates $10,000.  
Secura asserts "the only way the [a]mbiguity [f]action could 
find an alternative to the 'literal' meaning [wa]s by adding a 
qualification into the statute . . . that is simply not there."  
(Citation omitted.)  Judges may not, however, either add words 
to or subtract words from the text of the law.  See State v. 
Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶24, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271 ("It is a 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
19 
 
cardinal 'maxim[] of statutory construction . . . that courts 
should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 
meaning.'"  (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 
Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 129) (modification in the original)).  
As Judge Grogan explained in her concurrence, the text of the 
law does not state "the 'payment' must be made to the insured" 
even though this court in Teschendorf so held.  Secura Supreme 
Ins., 399 Wis. 2d 542, ¶21 (Grogan, J., concurring) (quoting 
Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins., 2005 WI App 10, ¶¶19-20, 278 
Wis. 2d 354, 691 N.W.2d 882 (2004) (Fine, J., dissenting), 
aff'd, 293 Wis. 2d 123).  Nor, as Judge Grogan also noted, does 
the text "address what happens after a worker's compensation 
payment is made but is subsequently partially paid back, which 
is the factual scenario presented in this case."  Id.  Secura is 
correct to argue the ambiguity faction's rationale should be 
rejected; it is antithetical to fundamental rules of textual 
interpretation.   
¶68 In 
effect, 
the 
ambiguity 
faction 
searched 
for 
ambiguity, 
which 
this 
court 
has 
repeatedly 
rejected 
as 
inappropriate.  See, e.g., Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. Div. of 
Hearings & Appeals, 2019 WI 109, ¶18, 389 Wis. 2d 486, 936 
N.W.2d 573 ("We do not, however, look for ambiguity because 
'[s]tatutory 
interpretation 
involves 
the 
ascertainment 
of 
meaning, not a search for ambiguity.'"  (quoting State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110) (modification in the original)).  A 
good lawyer can render a sentence as straightforward as "the sky 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
20 
 
is blue" ambiguous if he stares at it long enough; perhaps the 
sky is just sad.  Merely because the argument can be made that 
the sky is sad does not mean a reasonable person would actually 
ascribe that meaning to the sentence "the sky is blue."  
Ambiguity must be facially present in a statute, and it 
certainly does not come into existence merely because three 
justices are troubled by a result dictated by plain meaning.  
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) ("A provision that 
seems to the court unjust or unfortunate . . . must nonetheless 
be given effect."). 
¶69 While the court in Teschendorf agreed on very little, 
it should disturb this court that six justices acknowledged a 
"literal" reading of the statute supported the insurer.  293 
Wis. 2d 123, ¶¶24, 32 (lead op.).  A literal reading is not 
necessarily the same as a plain reading, but the absurdity 
faction noted the insurer's reading was not only "literal" but 
"plain[.]"  Id., ¶32.  See generally Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶11 
(explaining "the plain-meaning approach is not 'literalistic'" 
(quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52)).  Self-evidently, a plain 
meaning cannot be ignored by merely labelling it literal, as the 
ambiguity faction did in discarding it. 
¶70 The ambiguity faction's addition of what it deemed an 
"implied condition" is reminiscent of a time when "the monarch 
. . . [was considered by some] a one-man legislator."  Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, at 349.  Centuries ago, one treatise 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
21 
 
embraced judicial law-making in an early exposition of the 
usefulness of divining legislative intent: 
[I]n order to form a right judgment when the letter of 
a statute is restrained, and when enlarged, by equity, 
it is a good way, when you peruse a statute, to 
suppose that the lawmaker is present, and that you 
have asked him the question you want to know touching 
the equity; then you must give yourself such an answer 
as you imagine he would have done, if he had been 
present . . . .  And if the lawmaker would have 
followed the equity, notwithstanding the words of the 
law . . . , you may safely do the like. 
Edmund Plowden, Note to Eyston v. Studd, (1574) 2 Plow. 459a, 
467, as reprinted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 349 
(ellipses in the original).  Centuries later, the people of 
Wisconsin 
vested 
the 
law-making 
power 
exclusively 
in 
a 
representative body of the people.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 1.  To ask what the king would want may yield an answer, but 
to divine what hundreds of legislators would want is impossible.  
See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 349.  Collective intent is 
nothing more than a "fiction" because each legislator has his 
own "subjective views[.]"  Id. at 392; see also Town of Wilson, 
390 Wis. 2d 266, ¶68 ("Crafting judicial doctrines based on the 
collective intent of a large body relies on the false premise 
that a deliberative body acts with a single purpose."  (citing 
John W. MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in 
Present Day Law Practice, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1950))).  
Additionally, to ask the latter has the potential to invite 
"judicial mischief," Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 350, 
because "judicial predictions of how the legislature would have 
decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
22 
 
more than wild guesses, and thus lack the legitimacy that might 
be accorded to astute guesses."  Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' 
Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 548 (1983).   
 
¶71 While members of the judiciary may have valid and good 
ideas for improving the law, the people deny us the authority to 
make such policy decisions, having vested the law-making power 
exclusively in the legislature.  The desirability of such 
"improvements" undoubtedly depends on how one may be affected by 
the 
rewritten 
law. 
 
"Although 
judges 
may 
profess 
well-
intentioned 
justification 
for 
'improving' 
the 
law, 
'interpretative approaches can be used for all kinds of 
purposes, not just beneficent ones.'"  Friends of Frame Park, 
U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶96, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 
N.W.2d 263 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Old-Fashioned 
Textualism 
Is 
All 
About 
Interpretation, Not Legislating from the Bench, ABA J., Apr. 
2019).  "The people of Wisconsin elect judges to interpret the 
law, not make it."  Id.  
¶72 The ambiguity faction's rationale was nothing more 
than 
a 
dangerous 
"venture" 
down 
the 
"path 
of 
judicial 
legislation" to reach a result deemed "desirable[.]"  See State 
ex rel. Crow v. West Side St. Ry. Co., 47 S.W. 959, 961 (1898).  
Such an action aggregates law-making power to the judiciary, 
thereby consolidating in one branch governmental powers the 
people deliberately kept separate to avoid tyranny.  See League 
of Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶35, 387 
Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209. 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
23 
 
¶73 After attacking its rationale, Secura suggests the 
absurdity faction may have framed the case correctly, but would 
limit the reach of the absurdity doctrine to a "truly anomalous" 
situation identified after an "exacting analysis."  Secura 
points out, "[h]ad the insurer prevailed in Teschendorf, the 
insured's estate would have received nothing because the 
employer's payments exceeded the . . . limits."  In contrast, 
the Estate would receive just about five percent less if this 
court adopted Secura's argument.  The Estate counters that Huck 
bargained for a "predetermined, fixed level of coverage"——
$250,000——and Secura's interpretation of the policy would deny 
the Estate the benefit of Huck's bargain, a result it declares 
"absurd." 
¶74 A historical analysis of the absurdity doctrine 
supports Secura's argument that even if the absurdity faction in 
Teschendorf was correct (it wasn't), that faction's rationale 
does 
not 
extend 
to 
this 
case. 
 
Defining 
absurdity 
is 
challenging, but two "archetypal" examples of an absurd result 
exist in common law.  Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the 
Limits of Literalism:  Defining the Absurd Result Principle in 
Statutory Interpretation, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 127, 139 (1994).  
One scholar wrote that these two examples are "the nearest thing 
we have to a legal definition of absurdity."  Id.  Both examples 
developed in the context of statutory interpretation, but the 
absurd results canon is materially the same as applied in 
contract interpretation.  The examples were summarized and the 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
24 
 
absurd results canon applied long ago by the United States 
Supreme Court in the following oft-quoted passage: 
The 
common 
sense 
of 
man 
approves 
the 
judgment 
mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which 
enacted, 'that whoever drew blood in the streets 
should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not 
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person 
that fell down in the street in a fit.  The same 
common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, 
that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a 
prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, 
does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the 
prison is on fire——'for he is not to be hanged because 
he would not stay to be burnt.'  And we think that a 
like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, 
that 
the 
act 
of 
Congress 
which 
punishes 
the 
obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, 
or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of 
temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest 
of the carrier upon an indictment for murder. 
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868). 
 
¶75 To equate the Estate receiving $189,000 instead of 
$199,000 with the two archetypal examples of absurdity would be, 
well, absurd.  The two examples are qualitatively different than 
the Estate's received insurance proceeds.  History tells us 
punishing a person for trying to preserve life would work a 
grievous moral injustice.  Punishing a doctor who provides life-
saving care or a prisoner who escapes a burning prison would not 
violate only common sense——it would violate natural law.  See 1 
William Blackstone, Commentaries *129 ("THE right of personal 
security 
consists 
in 
a 
person's 
legal 
and 
uninterrupted 
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his 
reputation."); see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All people are 
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
25 
 
happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").  
Punishing a mail carrier for temporarily detaining mail while 
the carrier was detained by the State would be Kafkaesque and 
contrary to the common law tradition of prohibiting punishment 
for involuntary acts.  See actus reus, Black's Law Dictionary 
(11 ed. 2019). 
¶76 The two archetypal examples demonstrate "the absurd 
. . . results canon applies only rarely and in rather narrow 
circumstances[.]"  Container Life Cycle Mgmt., LLC v. Wis. Dep't 
of Nat. Res., 2022 WI 45, ¶79, 402 Wis. 2d 337, 975 N.W.2d 621 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  "Just because a court 
dislikes the outcome does not mean it is absurd."  Id. (quoting 
Schwab v. Schwab, 2021 WI 67, ¶44 n.1, 397 Wis. 2d 820, 961 
N.W.2d 56 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)).  Properly 
understood, absurdity is not about "practical[ity]" or "fit" 
because "people differ over what is sensible and what is 
desirable," which is why "we elect those who write our laws——and 
expect courts to observe what has been written."  Backus v. 
Waukesha 
County, 
2022 
WI 
55, 
¶26, 
402 
Wis. 2d 764, 
976 
N.W.2d 492 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(modification in the original) (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading 
Law, at 22).  An absurd result "consists of a disposition that 
no reasonable person could intend."  Scalia & Garner, Reading 
Law, at 237. 
¶77 Justice Joseph Story described the extraordinary facts 
necessary to disregard plain language to avoid absurdity: 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
26 
 
[I]f, 
in 
any 
case, 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
a 
provision . . . is 
to 
be 
disregarded, 
because 
we 
believe the framers of that instrument could not 
intend what they say, it must be one, where the 
absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to 
the case would be so monstrous, that all mankind 
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the 
application. 
1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States § 427 (1833).  The Estate's primary argument would have 
this court lower the threshold for application of the absurdity 
doctrine from "monstrous" to merely unfavorable.  In ruling for 
the Estate, the majority implicitly endorses a new rule 
declaring that when happenstance——i.e., an event outside the 
control of the insured——reduces the "predetermined, fixed level 
of coverage," the result is legally absurd, justifying judicial 
revision of the insurance contract.   
¶78 If results are to drive interpretation of insurance 
policies, the majority should consider the consequent increase 
in insurance premiums, which alone demonstrates that the effect 
of Secura's proffered interpretation is not "so monstrous, that 
all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the 
application."  Id.  In its discussion of the absurd results 
canon, a leading treatise on Wisconsin insurance law repeats the 
maxim, "an insurance company should not be bound to risks it did 
not contemplate and for which it did not receive a premium."  1 
Sheila M. Sullivan, Anderson on Wisconsin Insurance Law § 1.34 
(8th ed. 2022).  "[W]hen the terms of a policy are plain on 
their face, the policy should not be rewritten . . . to bind the 
insurer to a risk it was unwilling to cover, and for which it 
was not paid."  Olguin v. Allstate Ins., 71 Wis. 2d 160, 164–65, 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
27 
 
237 N.W.2d 694 (1976).  Happenstance often plays a role in 
determining how a policy applies.  Ambiguity in a policy is 
almost always resolved against an insurer, but if unambiguous 
policy provisions can also be interpreted against an insurer 
whenever judges think the language would produce unfair results, 
insurers are left with increased risk uncertainty and will price 
their policies accordingly.6   
¶79 As amicus Wisconsin Insurance Alliance et al. (WIA) 
explains:  "Insurers underwrite and issue policies in belief 
that policies – and the statutes with which the policies must 
comply – will be interpreted and enforced as written.  Deviating 
from this precept injects uncertainty and additional costs into 
an already heavily-regulated industry."  Reducing clauses, 
especially, "are valued by insurers because they serve to reduce 
the cost of premiums to policyholders."  Therefore, "[t]he 
decision below fosters confusion and undue complexity and will 
                                                 
6 Usually, this court has interpreted ambiguity against an 
insurer.  See, e.g., Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 2016, WI 53, 
¶42, 369 Wis. 2d 547, 881 N.W.2d 309 (citing Estate of Sustache 
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2008 WI 87, ¶21, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 
N.W.2d 845).  In at least one case, however, this court used the 
absurd results canon to side with the insurer's interpretation 
of an ambiguous policy provision.  Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins., 6 
Wis. 2d 53, 57–58, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959) ("Even though the policy 
provision is ambiguous and must be construed against the 
insurer, the unreasonable result should be avoided of so 
construing the medical payments clause of defendant's policy as 
to permit the injured person to recover for medical or hospital 
services supplied to him by some third party volunteer without 
cost or personal liability to pay therefor on the part of such 
injured 
person."). 
 
That 
case 
demonstrates 
the 
possible 
"absurdity"——if that word will be used so loosely——of holding 
insurers liable for risks never contemplated and for which no 
premium has been paid. 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
28 
 
harm insurers and consumers by placing upward pressure on the 
cost of insurance."   
¶80 Lowering the threshold for absurdity would effect a 
substantial change in the law.  The purpose of UIM coverage is 
to "substitute[] for insurance that the tortfeasor should have 
had." 
 
Teschendorf, 
293 
Wis. 2d 542, 
¶24 
(quoted 
source 
omitted).  Had Huck been hit by a negligently-driven motor 
vehicle that was not underinsured (i.e., by a vehicle covered 
under a policy with $250,000 limits), the Estate would have 
received about $10,000 less than it would receive in this case 
under Secura's proffered reading.  But for the negligently 
driven motor vehicle being underinsured, the reducing clause 
would have no relevance.  The Estate would have received 
$250,000 in settlement, plus a $36,000 payment of worker's 
compensation benefits, for a total of $286,000.  Wisconsin 
Statute § 102.29(1), however, would have required the Estate to 
refund the $36,000 in total.  Additionally, the worker's 
compensation carrier would have been entitled to $20,000 of the 
settlement 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(2). 
 
After 
these 
statutorily-required deductions, the Estate would have received 
only $230,000.  Accordingly, Secura accurately notes, "Huck 
purchased UIM insurance to protect against being injured by a 
tortfeasor with liability limits less than $250,000. . . .  [The 
Estate] received exactly that——and more——since the Estate 
recovered more than if the tortfeasor had been insured to 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
29 
 
$250,000."7  The Estate has no response to this fact.  As Secura 
accurately observes, under a plain language interpretation of 
the policy, "the Estate's recovery is greater than zero——already 
distinguishing this case from Teschendorf——and more than if the 
tortfeasor had liability limits of $250,000." 
 
¶81 Expanding the absurd results canon to override the 
text whenever judges deem the results "nonsensical," as the 
Estate would have it, would unsettle the reasonable expectations 
of contracting parties, not to mention leave the law vulnerable 
to judicial revision.  The language of the reducing clause 
plainly contemplates reducing the limits by all sums paid in 
worker's compensation benefits.  $36,000 was a sum paid.  
Nothing in the policy language gives the reimbursement any 
relevance.  Reimbursement of money paid does not change the 
simple fact that money was, in fact, paid.  While this result 
may seem "unfair," nothing gives this court the authority to 
disregard 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
an 
insurance 
policy.  
Teschendorf was wrongly decided but may be distinguished based 
on its materially different facts.  Either way, Teschendorf has 
no bearing on a textual interpretation of the policy in this 
case. 
D.  The Analysis of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. 
 
¶82 The majority/lead opinion (in a part joined only by 
the author and one other justice) concludes Secura's proffered 
                                                 
7 WIA similarly observes, "the outcome advanced by SECURA is 
not absurd at all because it results in the insured recovering a 
greater amount than if the tortfeasor had liability coverage 
equivalent to the insured's UIM limits." 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
30 
 
interpretation of the reducing clause is not authorized by Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.  Majority/lead op., ¶¶19–28.  This non-
precedential 
analysis 
is 
unnecessary 
given 
the 
opinion's 
conclusion that Secura's interpretation of the reducing clause 
is incorrect.  Regardless, that analysis is wrong. 
 
¶83 The majority/lead opinion's analysis works only by 
improperly adding a word to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.  Section 
632.32(5)(i)2. authorizes a reduction by "[a]mounts paid or 
payable 
under 
any 
worker's 
compensation 
law[.]" 
 
The 
majority/lead opinion inserts the word "current" before "amounts 
paid," so the statute becomes:  "Current amounts paid or payable 
under any worker's compensation law[.]"  Id., ¶27 ("'Amounts 
paid' 
is 
interpreted 
as 
the 
current 
'amounts 
paid' 
or 
outstanding such as by an installment agreement, at the time an 
insurer seeks to reduce its liability under § 632.32(5)(i).").  
Problematically for the majority/lead opinion, the text does not 
use the phrase "current amounts paid."  It does not include any 
temporal limitation on how the amount paid is to be calculated.  
Without rewriting the statute, the majority/lead opinion's 
analysis fails.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶84 This case demonstrates that "the law is such an Ass."  
George Chapman, Revenge for Honour, A Tragedie 37 (1654).  If, 
however, we are to be a "government of laws, and not of men," 
that is the price we must occasionally pay.  John Adams, 
Novanglus: A History of the Dispute with America, from Its 
Origin, in 1754, to the Present Time, in Revolutionary Writings 
No.  2020AP1078-FT.rgb 
 
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of John Adams (C. Bradley Thompson ed. 2000).  Because I would 
leave the revision of our laws with the legislature where that 
work belongs, I respectfully dissent. 
 
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