Title: Edward Sarbia Regalado v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR99-413
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2000

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM OCTOBER 12, 2000 EDWARD SARBIA REGALADO APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE CR 99-413 AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHICOT COUNTY, NO. CR-95-33-2 HONORABLE SAMUEL B. POPE, CIRCUIT JUDGE AFFIRMED Appellant, Edward Sarbia Regalado, was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife and was sentenced to life in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence in Regalado v. State, 331 Ark. 326, 961 S.W.2d 739 (1998). Appellant then filed a timely petition for Rule 37 relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied appellant's petition, and this appeal followed. In challenging the trial court's order, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and interview potential witnesses. We affirm. The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of counsel had been enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland provides that when a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel he must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel's errors the result of the trial would have been different. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highlydeferential, and a fair assessment of counsel's performance under Strickland requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. A court hearing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must consider the totality of the evidence before the jury. The decision of whether or not to call a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37. State v. Dillard, 338 Ark. 571, 998 S.W.2d 750 (1999); Helton v. State, 325 Ark. 140, 924 S.W.2d 239 (1996). Trial counsel must use his or her best judgment to determine which witnesses will be beneficial to his client. Johnson v. State, 325 Ark. 44, 924 S.W.2d 233 (1996). When assessing an attorney's decision not to call a particular witness, it must be taken into account that the decision is largely a matter of professional judgment that experienced advocates could endlessly debate, and the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not in itself proof of counsel's ineffectiveness. Id. Nonetheless, such strategic decisions must still be supported by reasonable professional judgment pursuant to the standards set forth in Strickland. State v. Dillard, supra. Appellant submitted three affidavits at the Rule 37 hearing in support of his argument that counsel failed to thoroughly investigate, interview, and subpoena three witnesses that had knowledge of his wife's death; two of the affidavits were from his sons George Garza Regalado and Edward Sarabi Regalado and the other affidavit was from Manuel Garza. Appellant's attorney testified at the Rule 37 hearing that appellant had only asked counselto speak with appellant's sons to convey a personal message. Counsel also testified that there was nothing in the boys' trial statements that was helpful to the defense. When questioned about Manuel Garza, counsel could not remember if appellant had even requested that Mr. Garza be approached. After hearing all the evidence presented at the Rule 37 hearing, the trial court found: However, when these defense witnesses and the alleged undiscovered evidence are compared with the State's case, the Court is compelled to find that even if these additional witnesses had been produced or discovered, it would not have made a difference in this trial. None of the witnesses produced particularly compelling testimony, and the State has always been able to prove that the last time Ms. Regalado was seen alive on the day before her death, she was leaving her home with the Defendant. The State was also able to prove prior threats of the Defendant to Ms. Regalado with the Defendant motioning toward Ms. Regalado and stating that he would kill her and pointing toward her forehead, where the wound which killed her was subsequently inflicted. We affirm the circuit court's denial of this claim as a matter of trial strategy. Appellant has not sustained his burden of proving that his attorney's strategic decision to refrain from calling those witnesses was professionally unreasonable. Furthermore, the witnesses' affidavits supported the fact that appellant was the last person seen with Ms. Regalado before her death and that she was involved in undercover drug activity. These facts had already been established at trial. Based on a thorough review of the record, it appears from the record that the witnesses would not have provided any evidence that would have changed the outcome of the trial. We cannot say that the trial court's decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because the decision by counsel was a matter of trial strategy. Affirmed.