Title: Yazel v. William K. Warren Medical Research Center
Citation: 2014 OK 57
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 2014

Yazel v. William K. Warren Medical Research Center Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The Tulsa County Assessor assessed ad valorem taxes on portions of real property owned by the respondent-appellees (and taxpayers) William Warren Medical Research Center and Montereau, Inc. The taxpayers challenged the assessment and the County Board of Equalization determined that the properties were not taxable. The Assessor appealed to the Tulsa County District Court which found in favor of the taxpayers. The Assessor again appealed but the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Assessor was not represented by the district attorney, nor the State Attorney General. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the Court of Civil Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . YAZEL v. WILLIAM K. WARREN MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER, INC. 2014 OK 57 Case Number: 111,502 Decided: 06/24/2014 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. KEN YAZEL, Tulsa County Assessor, Petitioner/Appellant, v. THE WILLIAM K. WARREN MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER, INC., an Oklahoma not-for-profit corporation; and MONTEREAU, Inc., an Oklahoma not-for-profit corporation; Respondent/Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV HONORABLE E. MARK BARCUS, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 The Tulsa County Assessor assessed ad valorem taxes on portions of real property owned by the respondent/appellees William Warren Medical Research Center and Montereau, Inc. (taxpayers). The taxpayers challenged the assessment and the County Board of Equalization determined that the properties were not taxable. The Assessor appealed to the Tulsa County District Court which found in favor of the taxpayers. The Assessor again appealed but the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Assessor was not represented by the district attorney, nor the State Attorney General. On certiorari, we hold that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the Court of Civil Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Leisa S. Weintraub, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant. Joel L. Wohlgemuth, David R. Ross, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 This cause (Yazel 1) and its companion case No. 111,643 Ken Yazel, Tulsa County Assessor v. The William K. Warren Medical Research Center, Inc., et al (Yazel 2), involve the dispositive issue of whether 68 O.S. 2011 §2880.1(D)1 requires a county assessor to be represented by a district attorney or by the Oklahoma Tax Commission before an appeal from the Board of Equalization may proceed to the Courts. We hold that it does not. FACTS ¶2 The defendants/respondents, The William K. Warren Medical Research Center, Inc. (Warren), and Montereau, Inc. (Montereau), (collectively taxpayers) not-for-profit corporations, owned real property located in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. For the tax year 2012, Ken Yazel, the Tulsa County Assessor (assessor) levied ad valorem taxes on portions of the real property owned by Warren and Montereau. Warren's property was valued for ad valorem tax purposes at $178,990,012.00 and Montereau's was valued at $1,648,042.00. ¶3 On March 2, 2012, Warren filed a written informal protest with the assessor, arguing that the property should be exempt from taxation pursuant to 68 O.S. 2011 2887(8)(b)(1) because it was a "continuum of care retirement community."2 On May 14, 2012, the assessor modified Warren's assessment to $107,394,007.00 based on the ratio of licensed nursing facility, assisted living and Alzheimer beds to the total number of beds in the overall facility.3 On May 27, 2012, Montereau also filed a written informal protest and its assessment was adjusted to $988,825.00 for the same reasons. ¶4 The taxpayers filed a formal appeal on June 8, 2012, with the Tulsa County Board of Equalization (Board). The Board held a hearing on June 20, 2012, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the Board issued a notice of adjustment and cancelled the assessment because it determined that the properties were not taxable. The assessor, represented by its general counsel, appealed the Board's decision on July 9, 2012, to the District Court of Tulsa County.4 ¶5 There, the assessor argued that the Board's cancellation of the tax assessments was not supported by the facts or by the statutes because they pertain to "continuum of care retirement community facilities." The taxpayers answered, contending that the Assessor's actions were arbitrary and unlawful in finding a partial exemption rather than a 100% exemption, and that the properties had been exempt for more than a decade. They also alleged that pursuant to 68 O.S. 2011 §2880.1(D), the appeal could not be brought to the district court unless it was brought by the Tulsa County District Attorney.5 ¶6 On September 7, 2012, Warren and Monereau filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that: 1) their use of the property met the requirements for exemption; 2) the assessor's interpretation was contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of a "Continuation of Care Retirement Community;" and 3) the assessor abruptly reversed 12 years of continuous exemption status. In a footnote of the summary judgment motion, the taxpayers also noted that the appeal to District Court was filed without the participation of the Tulsa County District Attorney, an independent legal flaw that required summary judgment be rendered. ¶7 On January 7, 2013, the trial court granted the taxpayers' motion for summary judgment, and the order was filed on January 28, 2013.6 On February 22, 2013, the assessor appealed raising six issues relating to the exemption status of the taxpayers.7 The taxpayers filed a response reasserting their arguments made in their summary judgment motion. The cause was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals on April 4, 2013. ¶8 Also on April 4, 2013, the assessor appealed case No. 111,643, Yazel 2, from the Tulsa County District Court.8 It was filed on July 9, 2012, and it involved the same parties with the addition of similar taxpayer parties. In Yazel 2, the assessor challenged the constitutionality of 68 O.S. 2011 §2887(8)(b)9 by declaratory judgment action as required by 68 O.S. 2011 §2880.1(A).10 The trial court certified the question of constitutionality to the Oklahoma Attorney General and expressly invited the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the State of Oklahoma on September 12, 2012. The Attorney General neither responded nor participated in the proceedings. ¶9 However, the record does reflect that on July 17, 2012, counsel for the taxpayers sent a letter to the Tulsa County District Attorney, informing the district attorney of the lawsuits, advising him that the Assessor was represented by "inside counsel" and asking for the district attorney's position on this issue. The district attorney responded by letter dated the same day, stating: . . .The Legislature recently amended 19 O.S. § 527 to authorize the county assessor to employ general counsel to advise or represent him in the performance of his official duties. Mr. Yazel advised our office on July 6, 2012, that he intended to exercise his rights under the aforementioned statute to have his general counsel, Leisa Weintraub, represent him in the above-referenced matter. If you have any questions or comments, please contact me. . . .11 Section 527 has not been amended since. Neither the State Attorney General nor the district attorney represented the assessor, and the cause culminated in a final order on March 11, 2013 which granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents and against the assessor. Yazel 2 was made a companion case to this cause on April 8, 2013. ¶10 On June 17, 2013, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an order in both cases directing the assessor to show cause why the appeals should not be dismissed for violation of 68 O.S. 2011 §2880.1(D)12 because the assessor was not represented by either the district attorney or the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Both the assessor and the respondents responded to the show cause order. The assessor argued that he was not required to be represented by the district attorney or the Oklahoma Tax Commission. The respondents argue that the cause must be dismissed because the district attorney or tax commission was not representing the assessor on appeal. On September 26, 2013, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an unpublished opinion in which it dismissed the appeal in this cause because neither the district attorney nor an attorney from the Oklahoma Tax Commission appeared on behalf of the assessor. It also issued an order in Appeal No. 111,643 dismissing that cause for the same reason. ¶11 On October 16, 2013, the assessor filed for certiorari in this Court, arguing that the Court of Civil Appeals had misconstrued the §2880.1(D) and ignored the application of 19 O.S. 2011 §52713 which expressly allows a county assessor to hire counsel to represent the assessor in the official duties of office. On November 18, 2013, the County Assessors Association of Oklahoma and the County Officers and Deputies Association of Oklahoma filed an amicus curiae statement in support of certiorari. We granted leave to file the amicus curiae briefs and certiorari in both companion cases on March 24, 2014, to address the issue of first impression. COUNTY ASSESSORS MAY EMPLOY COUNSEL TO REPRESENT THEM IN COURT PROCEEDINGS INCLUDING APPEALS FROM THE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. ¶12 The taxpayers argue that the district attorney and/or counsel from the Oklahoma Tax Commission have a mandatory duty to represent the assessor. They also insist that use of the word "duty" in 19 O.S. 2011 §527 unambiguously and clearly means that only the district attorney or counsel from the Oklahoma Tax Commission may represent the assessor in a proceeding such as this in the district court.14 ¶13 The assessor does not dispute that when requested, the district attorney or Oklahoma Tax Commission has a duty to represent an assessor. However, the assessor contends that the taxpayers' construction of §527 is inconsistent with the entire statutory scheme regarding the ability of county officials to hire private counsel. The amicus curiae contend that following the taxpayers' construction of the statute would significantly impact the ability of assessors to effectively and efficiently provide revenue to counties across Oklahoma. ¶14 The Oklahoma Constitution grants counties the power of assessment and collection. It provides in art. 10, §20: The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may, by general laws, confer on the proper authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect such taxes. Pursuant to 19 O.S. 2011 §1,15 counties are granted the right to sue and be sued and pursuant to 19 O.S. 2011 §§215.4,16 215.2517 and 215.37M,18 they have the right to obtain private counsel to represent them in any civil actions or proceedings which any county in the district is interested. County officials are also entitled to receive advice and opinions from district attorneys.19 ¶15 The tax collecting authority of the county is critical to the operation of the State.20 The necessity of county collections was discussed by the Court in Webster v. Morris, 1928 OK 84, 264 P. 290, a case involving the enforcement of tax collections and the county excise board's participation. The Court explained: . . .Government is not supported by voluntary donations from its citizenship. County and state governments of Oklahoma, together with the municipalities thereof, are almost wholly dependent for their sustenance upon the enforcement of collecting taxes levied and assessed against real and personal property. If this system breaks down through the want of administrative force, or inaction, the effect will be to impair and paralyze the functions of government in this state. . . . 'What method shall be devised for the collection of a tax, the Legislature must determine, subject only to such rules, limitations, and restraints as the Constitution of the state may have imposed.' Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) 748. . . . In this state the counties are, by statute, made the collecting agencies for taxes levied and assessed against real and personal property. . . . ¶16 The Webster Court, relying on Smartt v. Board of Commissioners, Craig County, 1917 OK 590, 169 P. 1101, noted that there are certain other functions of government which are elementary and indestructible, such, as the administration of justice in the courts and the maintenance of a public school system which depend on the performance of mandatory duties by municipal officers. Without the fulfillment of these duties, the life of the state and the security of the citizen would be precarious indeed. The Court also said: It is obvious that the government itself cannot be long maintained, unless its system of taxation is enforced by its administrative officers charged with this duty. The state of Oklahoma, as heretofore observed, has selected the counties of this state as its agents for the collection of taxes levied and assessed on an ad valorem basis against real and personal property. The state has also provided that, in the event taxes are not paid on real estate, such taxes may be enforced by a resale of said property, and the state has also imposed upon the counties the cost of publishing notices of resale. As heretofore pointed out, the levying and collection of taxes are always necessary for the support and maintenance of government, and the final enforcement of collecting taxes through a mandatory process is as essential to the government as the levy itself; and, moreover, if one citizen pays the taxes levied against his property, while another fails to do so, it creates an unequal burden on the citizen that pays. The obligation of the county to provide a reasonable and necessary estimate to pay the cost of notices for resale of real estate cannot be escaped by the county. It is an obligation placed upon the county by the state, and the operation and discharge of this duty by the county is as necessary to the sustenance of the county as it is to the state; therefore, the only discretion that may be exercised by the county excise boards of the state, as it relates to the estimate for publishing notices of resale, is the amount that will be reasonably necessary for such purpose. ¶17 It is from within this framework which this case must be decided. In 1989, with an effective date of 1992, the Legislature renumbered and overhauled the ad valorem taxation statutes.21 Title 68 O.S. 2011 §2880.1(D) was included in this from a prior version in the tax code, and it was last amended with inconsequential changes in 1998.22 It unambiguously provides a duty for the district attorney to represent the county assessor. However, omitted from the statute is clear direction as to whether this representation is a condition to the assessor proceeding in the courts to fulfil the duties of office, or only if the assessor requests such representation because the assessor has not hired a general counsel pursuant to 19 O.S. 2011 §527.23 ¶18 The right to appeal a tax assessment has long been recognized by the Legislature.24 At the same time as the renumbering and revision in 1989, county officials were allowed to hire private counsels as an alternative to district attorney representation.25 In 1998, the Legislature, pursuant to 19 O.S. Supp. 1998 §527, expanded legal representation by expressly authorizing the sheriff of a county having a certain population to employ a general counsel to advise and represent the sheriff.26 Finally, in 2005, this expansion was extended to tax assessors when the Legislature modified the statute to expressly include assessors.27 ¶19 At least far as an individual goes, the right to the assistance of legal counsel includes the right to be represented by a legal practitioner of one's own choosing.28 Legal practitioners are not interchangeable commodities.29 Personal qualities and professional abilities differ from one attorney to another, making the choice of a lawyer critical both in terms of the quality of the attorney-client relationship and the type and skillfulness of the professional services to be rendered.30 The Legislature recognized this as an important right to be extended to certain state and county office holders such as the Assessor when it amended §527 in 2005.31 ¶20 A similar rationale was noted in State of Oklahoma ex. rel. Gene C. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1980 OK 96, 614 P.2d 45 . Howard involved the question of whether the Attorney General and only the Attorney General could represent the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in court proceedings. By statute, the duty of the Attorney General included appearing on behalf of the state, as well as the right to designate counsel of the Corporation Commission as a legal representative with consultation and advice from the Attorney General. ¶21 The question became whether the Corporation Commission's staff attorneys independently and absent "consultation and advising with the Attorney General" could appear and defend the Commission, especially when the Attorney General had yet to participate in the case. While the Court concluded that the Attorney General could appear on behalf of the state to represent those with like views, the Corporation Commission was also entitled to appear and defend itself. ¶22 The Court noted that: 1) the Oklahoma Constitution did not bar the Commission's attorneys from appearing for it;32 2) implicit in the statutory language was the ability to appoint its own in-house counsel;33 and 3) "the right to be represented by counsel ordinarily should include the right to make a choice, if timely exercised, of attorneys whose views are consonant with one's own or who at least will present the client's interests."34 ¶23 The Legislature amended 19 O.S. 2011 §527 nearly 9 years after it enacted 68 O.S. 2011 §2880.1(D). The Legislature obviously recognized that because county assessors must fulfill their duties of office, allowing the assessor to hire counsel, or be represented by a district attorney, or the Oklahoma Tax Commission would ease an assessor's ability to fulfill statutorily mandated duties. This conclusion is consistent with all of the statutory enactments which allow county officials to hire and be represented by private counsel of their choosing,35 and with other cases which have previously been brought to this Court by lawyers hired by county assessors, rather than district attorneys or tax commission counsel.36 It also tracks the rationale of State of Oklahoma ex. rel. Gene C. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1980 OK 96, 614 P.2d 45 . Accordingly, we hold that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. CONCLUSION ¶24 Statutory intent is ascertained from the whole act considering its general purpose and objective with relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.37 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.38 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them.39 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.40 ¶25 The legislature has expressly recognized in multiple statutes that because county assessors must levy, assess, and collect taxes owed to fulfill their duties of office, allowing the assessor to hire counsel, or be represented by a district attorney or the Oklahoma Tax Commission would ease an assessor's burden in fulfilling statutorily mandated duties. This intent is obvious, considering the purpose and objectives of the plain language in the applicable statutes, as well as the evolution in the law as it relates to county assessors' legal representation. Because the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the cause, rather than address the merits of the appeal, the cause is reversed and remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., concur. WINCHESTER, J., dissents. FOOT