Title: State v. Chaussee
Citation: 138 N.W.2d 788
Docket Number: 331
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 1965

138 N.W.2d 788 (1965) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Merle CHAUSSEE, Defendant and Appellant. No. Cr. 331. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 17, 1965. *789 George E. Duis, Fargo, for appellant. Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., Bismarck, and Eugene A. Kruger, State's Atty., Fargo, for respondent. *790 TEIGEN, Judge. This is an appeal by the defendant, Merle Lyle Chaussee, from a final judgment upon conviction of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Section 62-03-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The State's first witness, Lloyd Hanson, testified that the was a patron in the Brass Rail Bar on Main Avenue in Fargo, North Dakota, on December 18, 1964, at approximately 4:15 in the afternoon when the defendant, who had on a hat, topcoat, sport coat, and tie, "staggered" into the bar, sat down by him, and ordered a beer. In the process of paying for this beer, the defendant dropped some change on the floor, which Mr. Hanson helped him recover. Thereafter the defendant played the jukebox and, upon returning to the bar, he dropped something. Mr. Hanson testified that he did not see that the object was at that time; however, he observed the defendant bend over, retrieve it, stick it "in his pants," and then retire to the men's room. After his return from the men's room, the defendant stood in front of the bar, opened his coats, and adjusted an object in his belt, which Mr. Hanson then identified as a gun. A short time later Mr. Hanson left the bar and proceeded down the street to a drug store where he telephoned the police, identified himself, and related what he had seen. Charles Hovden, a detective with the Fargo Police Department, testified that he received a telephone call from Mr. Hanson at approximately 5:15 p. m. on December 18, 1964, and, in response to this call, Policewoman Jennie Nelson and he went to the Brass Rail Bar. Detective Hovden testified: The defendant was subsequently disarmed by Officer Wayne Olson who had been summoned by Policewoman Nelson to assist Detective Hovden. There is but one specification of error advanced by the defendant on this appeal, viz., "That the Court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained through unlawful and unreasonable search and seizure." This contention is predicated upon the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 18 of the Constitution of North Dakota, both of which are apparently identical in meaning. Section 18 of the North Dakota Constitution reads as follows: In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883, 11 N.Ed.2d 777, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, observed: The defendant, however, does not argue that a search which is incidental to a lawful arrest is prohibited under the fourth amendment. Rather, he contends that the arrest in this instance was unlawful; and, as such, the search incident to such arrest was also unlawful. Defendant therefore contends the evidence produced by this search should have been suppressed. Section 62-03-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides, in part: * * * * * * Section 62-03-03 of this same chapter makes a violation of this provision a felony. Detective Hovden did not have a warrant for the defendant's arrest when he entered the Brass Rail Bar. The question thus presented is, could Detective Hovden lawfully arrest the defendant under the circumstances of this case? Section 29-06-15, N.D.C.C., provides, in part: * * * * * * * * * * * * We have held that the charge referred to in Subsection 4, supra, need not be written but may be made orally and informally, provided that it conveys to the officer information sufficient to constitute a reasonable cause for the charge. State v. Willms, N.D., 117 N.W.2d 84; Haggard v. First National Bank of Mandan, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5. Furthermore, Section 29-06-24 of this same chapter imposes an affirmative duty upon the arresting officer to "take from the person arrested all offensive weapons which he may have about his person * * *." The telling question for us is whether the information related to Detective Hovden by Mr. Hanson gave him "probable cause" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and "reasonable cause" within the meaning of Section 29-06-15(3), N.D. C.C., to believe that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon in violation of the law. If it did, the arrest, though without a warrant, was lawful and the subsequent search of the defendant's person and the seizure of the gun were validly made incident to a lawful arrest. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327. We think this question must be answered in the affirmative. There is no *792 fixed formula for the determination of what is or is not a reasonable search. Each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374. As the Supreme Court of the United States has aptly observed: This is not a case of a "faceless informer," condemned by Mr. Justice Douglas in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697. Rather, we deal here with a citizen who should be commended for apprising the authorities of a potentially, if not presently, dangerous situation. When he telephoned Detective Hovden, Mr. Hanson identified himself by name, then related what he had seen. He also provided a detailed description of what the defendant was wearing. Under these circumstances, Detective Hovden would have been derelict in the performance of his duties had he not pursued this information expeditiously. Detective Hovden and Policewoman Nelson arrived at the bar approximately five minutes after the telephone call. There were very few patrons in the bar at the time and they had no difficulty identifying the defendant according to the description they had received. Detective Hovden personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hanson, except whether the defendant had a concealed weapon on his person. Surely, under these circumstances, he had "reasonable grounds" to believe he also had a weapon concealed on his person. *793 The defendant contends that when Detective Hovden placed him under arrest he did so as a mere subterfuge for making a search of his person; that an arrest is not valid where the arrest is a mere subterfuge for making a search; and that any search made after such an arrest is unreasonable because it is not an incident to a lawful arrest. Generally, we agree that an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence. State v. Govan, N.D., 123 N.W.2d 110; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877. In State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989, upon which the defendant relies, Michaels was arrested for failing to signal for a left turn by officers who had been alerted to look for the automobile which he was driving. A search of the trunk of the automobile produced suitcases containing dice, magnets, magnetized dice, and other items. Michaels was subsequently prosecuted for illegal possession of gambling devices and convicted. In reversing his conviction, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded: The facts and circumstances involved in this case are readily distinguishable, however. As we have already indicated, Detective Hovden had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon, and this is the charge upon which the arrest and subsequent criminal information were based. Furthermore, a search of the defendant's person did disclose evidence upon which to establish the offense for which he was arrested, and there was adequate reason for Detective Hovden to believe that the defendant might assault him or others in the bar or effect an escape using the weapon. We believe that Detective Hovden had probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon at the time he arrested him. The arrest was therefore lawful and the subsequent search and seizure, having been made incident to that lawful arrest, were likewise valid. It follows that the defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied, and that the seized weapon was competent evidence lawfully received at the trial. Judgment of conviction is affirmed. BURKE, C. J., and STRUTZ, ERICKSTAD and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.