Title: HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13191
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13191 
 
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., trustee,1  vs.  TOMMY L. MORRIS & another.2 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 4, 2022. - July 22, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Summary Process.  Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices 
Act.  Mortgage, Foreclosure, Assignment.  Practice, Civil, 
Summary process, Counterclaim and cross-claim.  Statute, 
Construction.  Consumer Protection Act, Unfair act or 
practice. 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Southeast Division 
of the Housing Court Department on October 9, 2017. 
 
 
After transfer to the Metro South Division of the Housing 
Court Department, the case was heard by Diana H. Horan, J., on a 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Tommy L. Morris, pro se. 
 
David F. Kiah for Mary L. Morris. 
 
Christopher J. Williamson for the plaintiff. 
 
1 Of the Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E, Mortgage Backed 
Certificates, Series 2005-E. 
 
2 Mary L. Morris. 
2 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Susan Ann Silverstein & Elizabeth A. Aniskevich, of the 
District of Columbia, & Joshua M. Daniels for AARP & others. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Matthew Lashof-Sullivan & 
Jane A. Sugarman, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney 
General. 
 
Grace C. Ross, pro se. 
 
Paul R. Collier, III, for Joseph Cavaliere & another. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case requires us to determine whether, 
in connection with a summary process action brought by the 
assignee of a home mortgage loan to obtain possession following 
a nonjudicial foreclosure, a borrower may bring a counterclaim 
under § 15 (b) (2) of the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act 
(PHLPA), G. L. c. 183C.  We conclude that such a counterclaim 
may be asserted following a nonjudicial foreclosure but is 
limited to the extent of "amounts required to reduce or 
extinguish the borrower's liability under the high-cost home 
mortgage loan" plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees.  Id.  
Further concluding that the borrowers' counterclaim under G. L. 
c. 93A is barred because it exceeds the extent of the claim of 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as trustee of the Fremont Home Loan Trust 
2005-E, Mortgage Backed Certificate, Series 2005-E (HSBC), we 
reverse in part the Housing Court judge's grant of summary 
3 
 
judgment in favor of HSBC and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts are either 
undisputed "or viewed in the light most favorable to . . . the 
party against [whom] summary judgment entered."  Berry v. 
Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 634 (2021), citing Attorney 
Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 371, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 
(1982). 
The defendants, Tommy L. and Mary L. Morris (Morrises), 
purchased their Brockton home (property) in October 2005 with 
the proceeds from two loans obtained from the lender, Fremont 
Investment & Loan, Inc. (Fremont); each loan was secured by a 
mortgage on the property.  The primary loan, which is at issue 
in this litigation, was structured as an interest-only, fixed 
rate loan for the first two years, turning into an adjustable 
rate loan that included principal and interest, with the 
interest adjusted every six months after the initial two-year 
period expired.4  Both loans had a maturity date of November 1, 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the AARP, 
AARP Foundation, and the National Consumer Law Center; the 
Attorney General; Grace C. Ross; and Joseph Cavaliere and 
Blondine Etienne. 
 
4 The initial interest rate on the primary loan was 5.99 
percent.  After the first two years, the interest was adjusted 
to the London Interbank Offered Rate plus 4.2331 percent.  The 
 
4 
 
2035.  Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), 
was the mortgagee on the mortgage that secured the loans.5 
In 2007, the Attorney General initiated a lawsuit against 
Fremont for engaging in unfair and deceptive practices in 
originating and servicing home mortgage loans between 2004 and 
2007 in violation of G. L. c. 93A, including home mortgage loans 
like the Morrises' home mortgage loan, with a fixed interest 
rate for the first few years that then increased considerably 
for the remaining period.  See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & 
Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 737 (2008). 
 
In December 2007, following the expiration of the initial 
two-year period on the primary home mortgage loan, the Morrises' 
monthly payment increased to an amount they could not afford.  
In 2008, the Morrises retained an attorney to assist them to 
obtain a modification of the home mortgage loans; the attorney 
advised them to stop making payments, ostensibly so that he 
could attempt to negotiate a more affordable monthly rate.6  
Acting on this advice, the Morrises made their last payment in 
September 2008 and subsequently defaulted by failing to make 
 
mortgage agreement stated that the interest could be no less 
than 5.99 percent and no greater than 11.99 percent. 
 
5 For a discussion of MERS, see Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. 
Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 572 n.5 (2012). 
 
6 The attorney's bar license was later suspended for two 
years for unrelated instances of misconduct. 
5 
 
monthly payments.  It does not appear that their attorney 
negotiated a loan modification. 
In 2009, Fremont agreed to pay $10 million to settle the 
Attorney General's lawsuit, and the Morrises received 
approximately $2,000 as part of the settlement.7 
In February 2012, the assignment of the mortgage from MERS 
to HSBC was recorded.8  In February 2016, HSBC sent the Morrises 
a right to cure letter, informing them that if they did not pay 
the past due amount on their home mortgage loan, they "may be 
evicted from [their] home after a foreclosure sale."  See G. L. 
c. 244, § 35A.  In April 2016, HSBC sent the Morrises a letter 
regarding their right to request a modified mortgage loan, 
informing them that HSBC's "records indicate[d] that [the 
Morrises were] eligible to request a modification of [their] 
mortgage," and encouraged them to apply for the Home Affordable 
Modification Program and the Home Affordable Foreclosure 
Alternative Program.  The Morrises did not respond, and it does 
not appear that they applied to modify their mortgage loan. 
 
7 HSBC does not contend that the settlement extinguished the 
Morrises' home mortgage loan or that the settlement precluded 
any remedies they might have under the PHLPA or otherwise. 
 
8 HSBC was also assigned the promissory note.  See Eaton, 
462 Mass. at 586 (mortgagee must have possession of note or 
authorization of note holder to foreclose). 
6 
 
In July 2016, HSBC sent to the Morrises an acceleration 
notice in compliance with G. L. c. 244, § 35A, informing them 
that their home mortgage loan had been accelerated and that they 
"may have the right to reinstate the [m]ortgage [l]oan by 
paying" the amount due.  The Morrises did not respond. 
In November 2016, HSBC filed a complaint in the Land Court 
to determine the Morrises' military status pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 3901 et seq.  The Morrises did not respond. 
In June 2017, HSBC sent to the Morrises a notice of 
foreclosure sale.  See G. L. c. 244, § 14.  The notice of sale 
was published on June 30, July 7, and July 14, 2017.  The 
Morrises did not respond or otherwise reach out to HSBC. 
In July 2017, HSBC held a foreclosure sale and sold the 
Morrises' home to itself as the highest bidder.  See G. L. 
c. 244, § 14.  The proceeds from the sale did not suffice to 
extinguish the amount of the Morrises' indebtedness. 
In September 2017, the Morrises were served with a seventy-
two hour notice to quit.  The Morrises did not vacate the 
property.  As discussed supra, the Morrises have made no loan 
payments since 2008. 
b.  Procedural history.  HSBC initiated the present summary 
process action in the Housing Court in October 2017, seeking to 
obtain possession of the property.  The Morrises filed an answer 
asserting, inter alia, that HSBC had no superior right to 
7 
 
possession, that HSBC violated the PHLPA, and that they were 
entitled to damages and injunctive relief under G. L. c. 93A.9  
HSBC moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had 
acquired title through proper compliance with its statutory 
obligations for a nonjudicial foreclosure.  HSBC also contended 
that the Morrises' counterclaims were untimely.  The Morrises 
filed a cross motion for summary judgment.  The judge granted 
summary judgment in favor of HSBC, concluding that the Morrises' 
PHLPA and c. 93A counterclaims were barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations.  The Morrises' subsequent motion for 
reconsideration or to alter the judgment was denied. 
The Morrises appealed, and a divided panel of the Appeals 
Court affirmed, holding first that the Morrises' counterclaim 
pursuant to G. L. c. 183C, § 15 (b) (2), was untimely because it 
could only be raised prior to foreclosure, and second that the 
c. 93A counterclaim was time barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations because the acts giving rise to the c. 93A claim 
were known to the Morrises no later than 2008, when they stopped 
making payments on their home mortgage loan on the advice of 
 
9 The Morrises asserted other counterclaims and defenses 
that they do not press on appeal.  These included that the 
foreclosure sale was void because HSBC was without power to 
convey the property, that HSBC's predecessor committed a breach 
of the mortgage contract, that HSBC violated the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and that they are entitled to damages for the 
reduced value of their home. 
8 
 
counsel.  See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 
417, 421-423 & n.9 (2021).  Following the denial of their motion 
for reconsideration, the Morrises applied for further appellate 
review, which we granted. 
2.  Discussion.10  a.  Standard of review.  Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in 
dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 
706, 716 (1991); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 
1404 (2002).  "Our review of a decision on a motion for summary 
judgment is de novo."  Berry, 488 Mass. at 636.  We review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
summary judgment entered.  See Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 
Mass. 629, 636-637 (2007). 
b.  PHLPA.  The PHLPA, enacted in 2004, aims to protect 
borrowers from predatory lending by creating a "broad scheme of 
liability" against lenders that make "high-cost home mortgage 
 
10 After filing their initial brief, the Morrises terminated 
their relationship with their attorney and requested leave to 
file a revised brief, citing a "profound divergence in 
strategy."  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (n), as appearing in 481 Mass. 
1628 (2019).  They filed a revised brief pro se, and filed a 
supplemental brief following oral argument.  We acknowledge that 
the Morrises no longer advance some of the arguments made in 
their initial brief, but in the interest of completeness, we 
address all arguments made to the extent they are not waived. 
 
9 
 
loans"11 without satisfying the statutory criteria.  Drakopoulos 
v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. 775, 782-783 & n.11, n.13 
(2013).  See Lambiaso, Comprehensive Bill Targeting Predatory 
Lending Gains Momentum, State House News Service, Mar. 15, 2004 
(Lambiaso, State House News Service) ("These measures will help 
working families from being victimized and give them new clout 
by increasing penalties"). 
i.  Claims against lenders that make predatory loans.  The 
statute provides that 
"[a] lender shall not make a high-cost home mortgage loan 
unless the lender reasonably believes at the time the loan 
is consummated that . . . the obligors . . . will be able 
to make the scheduled payments to repay the home loan based 
upon a consideration of the obligor's current and expected 
income, current and expected obligations, employment 
status, and other financial resources other than the 
borrower's equity in the dwelling which secures repayment 
of the loan." 
 
 
11 The statute defines a "high cost home mortgage loan" as 
"a consumer credit transaction that is secured by the borrower's 
principal dwelling, other than a reverse mortgage transaction, a 
home mortgage loan" that has an annual percentage rate or total 
points and fees exceeding certain specified limits.  G. L. 
c. 183C, § 2.  In the Fremont decision, we stated that 
"Fremont's mortgage loans were not 'high cost home mortgage 
loans' governed by G. L. c. 183C," but concluded that "the 
conduct the [PHLPA] prohibits . . . is similar to the central 
element of unfairness . . . in Fremont's lending practices:  the 
origination of a home mortgage loan that the lender should 
recognize at the outset the borrower is not likely to be able to 
repay."  Fremont Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. at 748-749.  On appeal, 
HSBC contends that the Morrises' home mortgage loan was not a 
high-cost mortgage loan subject to the PHLPA, an argument it did 
not press before the Housing Court and which we do not reach on 
appeal. 
10 
 
G. L. c. 183C, § 4. 
The broad remedial purpose of the PHLPA is reflected in the 
array of remedies available to a borrower when a lender makes a 
high-cost home mortgage loan in violation of the PHLPA.  When a 
lender has violated the PHLPA,12 a borrower may seek under the 
statute "injunctive relief or damages," "an order or injunction 
rescinding a home mortgage loan contract . . . or barring the 
 
12 A lender violates the PHLPA by originating a high-cost 
home mortgage loan "without first receiving certification from a 
counselor . . . that the borrower has received counseling on the 
advisability of the loan transaction," G. L. c. 183C, § 3; by 
making a high-cost home mortgage loan without reasonable belief 
"at the time the loan is consummated that [one] or more of the 
obligors, will be able to make the scheduled payments to repay 
the home loan based upon" the borrowers' financial resources, 
G. L. c. 183C, § 4; by originating a high-cost home mortgage 
loan that contains "any provision for prepayment fees or 
penalties," G. L. c. 183C, § 5, "the financing of points and 
fees greater than [five] per cent of the total loan amount or 
$800, whichever is greater," G. L. c. 183C, § 6, "a provision 
that increases the interest rate after default," G. L. c. 183C, 
§ 7, "a scheduled payment that is more than twice as large as 
the average of earlier scheduled payments," G. L. c. 183C, § 8, 
"a demand feature that permits the lender to terminate the loan 
in advance of the original maturity date and to demand repayment 
of the entire outstanding balance," except in some 
circumstances, G. L. c. 183C, § 9, or "a payment schedule with 
regular periodic payments such that the result is an increase in 
the principal amount," G. L. c. 183C, § 10; by "charg[ing] a 
borrower a fee or other charge to modify, renew, extend or amend 
a high-cost home mortgage loan or to defer a payment due," G. L. 
c. 183C, § 11; by "includ[ing] terms pursuant to which more than 
[two] periodic payments required under the loan are consolidated 
and paid in advance from the loan proceeds provided to the 
borrower," G. L. c. 183C, § 12; or by "pay[ing] a contractor 
under a home improvement contract from the proceeds of a high 
cost home mortgage loan" except in certain circumstances, G. L. 
c. 183C, § 14. 
11 
 
lender from collecting" under the home mortgage loan, 
"reform[ation of] the terms of the home mortgage loan," "an 
order or injunction enjoining a lender from engaging in any 
prohibited conduct," or "other relief, including injunctive 
relief, as the court may consider just and equitable."  G. L. 
c. 183C, § 18.13 
ii.  Claims against assignees.  In addition to claims 
against the lender, G. L. c. 183C, § 15, sets forth claims and 
defenses a borrower may assert against a subsequent holder or 
assignee of the home mortgage loan;14 these claims are in 
addition to any other rights available to the borrower under any 
other law.15  See G. L. c. 183C, § 15 (c) ("This section shall be 
effective notwithstanding any other provision of law; provided, 
that nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
substantive rights, remedies or procedural rights available to a 
 
13 As set forth supra, Fremont was the lender of the 
Morrises' home mortgage loan.  Nothing in this opinion affects 
the claims and remedies available against lenders that make 
predatory loans in violation of the PHLPA. 
 
14 We use the term "assignee" to refer to any subsequent 
holder or assignee of a home mortgage loan. 
 
15 Other laws designed to protect borrowers against 
predatory loans include, for example, G. L. c. 244, § 35A, 
passed in 2008, which provides borrowers the right to cure 
defaults within ninety days, and G. L. c. 244, § 35B, passed in 
2012, which requires creditors of certain mortgage loans to make 
good faith efforts to help borrowers avoid foreclosure.  The 
Morrises did not assert claims under these statutes. 
12 
 
borrower against any lender, assignee or holder under any other 
law").  Although the Morrises do not raise claims under 
§§ 15 (a) and 15 (b) (1), these provisions provide context for 
our analysis of the arguments raised by the Morrises, 
demonstrating that the PHLPA provides additional remedies 
against successors that were not pursued here. 
A.  Section 15 (a) claims against assignees that do not 
comply with diligence.  Section 15 (a) sets forth that assignees 
"shall be subject to all affirmative claims and any defenses 
with respect to the loan that the borrower could assert against 
the original lender . . . ; provided that [§ 15 (a)] shall not 
apply if [the assignee] demonstrates by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it" has certain policies prohibiting the purchase 
or acceptance of an assignment of any high-cost home mortgage 
loan, requires the assignor to represent and warrant that it is 
not selling a high-cost home mortgage loan, and exercises due 
diligence to prevent its purchase or acceptance of a high-cost 
home mortgage loan.  G. L. c. 183C, § 15 (a).  Thus, where an 
assignee fails to make the requisite showing of its diligent 
efforts, the full panoply of claims and remedies set forth in 
§ 18 are available to the borrower against the assignee.  See 
discussion and note 12, supra. 
Indeed, we have previously stated that § 15 (a) 
"demonstrates that the Legislature intended a broad scheme of 
13 
 
liability for assignees of high-cost mortgage loans," noting 
that, under § 15 (a), an assignee is subject to "all affirmative 
claims and any defenses" with respect to the loan, not just 
those under the PHLPA (emphasis added).  Drakopoulos, 465 Mass. 
at 781, 782 n.11, quoting Cooper v. First Gov't Mtge. & 
Investors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting 
breadth of § 15 [a] of PHLPA "is in harmony with the analogous 
provision of the Federal Truth in Lending Act [TILA], 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1641[d][1] [2006], which has been read to make 'assignees [of 
high-cost mortgage loans] subject to all claims and defenses, 
whether under [TILA] or other law, that could be raised against 
the original lender'").  The Morrises do not contend that HSBC 
is liable under § 15 (a). 
B.  Section 15 (b) claims against assignees.  In addition 
to the broad claims and remedies pursuant to § 15 (a), two types 
of claims that the borrower could have asserted against the 
original lender are available to borrowers against assignees 
under § 15 (b).  See G. L. c. 183C, § 15 (c) ("The rights 
conferred on borrowers by subsections [a] and [b] are 
independent of each other and do not limit each other").  The 
claims under § 15 (b), however, are not as broad as those under 
§ 15 (a).  Each of the claims available under § 15 (b) is 
"[l]imited to amounts required to reduce or extinguish the 
borrower's liability under the high-cost home mortgage loan" 
14 
 
plus costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.  G. L. 
c. 183C, § 15 (b).  In other words, the remedies under § 15 (b), 
unlike those available under § 15 (a), do not include the full 
panoply of remedies available against lenders and instead are 
limited to monetary damages capped at the borrower's liability 
under the high-cost home mortgage loan (plus costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees). 
I.  Section 15 (b) (1) claims brought in first five years.  
First, under § 15 (b) (1), a borrower may bring an "original 
action" against an assignee for violation of the PHLPA that the 
borrower could have brought against the original lender if the 
action is brought within five years of closing.  Thus, unlike 
the claims under § 15 (a), regardless of the assignee's diligent 
efforts to avoid purchase or assignment of a high-cost home 
mortgage loan, under § 15 (b) (1), an assignee is subject to any 
claims that the borrower could have brought against the original 
lender under the PHLPA for the first five years after the 
closing.16  The Morrises did not bring an action within five 
years of closing of their home mortgage loan, and do not contend 
that § 15 (b) (1) applies to their case. 
 
16 Unlike § 15 (a), which preserves "all" affirmative claims 
and defenses against assignees that the borrower has against the 
original lender whether under the PHLPA or otherwise, the claims 
under § 15 (b) (1) are limited to those under the PHLPA.  See 
G. L. c. 183C, § 15 (b) (1) ("A borrower may bring an original 
action for violation of this chapter . . . " [emphasis added]). 
15 
 
II.  Section 15 (b) (2) claims brought "during the term" of 
home mortgage loan.  Second, under § 15 (b) (2), a borrower may, 
"at any time during the term of a high-cost home mortgage loan, 
employ any defense, claim, [or] counterclaim,[17] including a 
claim for a violation of [the PHLPA]" against the assignee that 
the borrower could have asserted against the original lender in 
any one of three circumstances:  (1) "after an action to collect 
on the home loan or foreclose on the collateral securing the 
home loan has been initiated," (2) after "the debt arising from 
the home loan has been accelerated or the home loan has become 
[sixty] days in default," or (3) "in any action to enjoin 
foreclosure or preserve or obtain possession of the home that 
secures the loan."  As is the case under § 15 (b) (1), and 
 
17 A counterclaim "may or may not diminish or defeat the 
recovery sought by the opposing party" and "may claim relief 
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the 
pleading of the opposing party."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 13 (c), 365 
Mass. 758 (1974).  A defense, however, can only defeat the 
plaintiff's claim and cannot provide affirmative recovery.  See 
Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. VisionAid, Inc., 477 Mass. 343, 
348 (2017), quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
591 (1993) ("In common usage, to 'defend' means to 'deny or 
oppose the right of a plaintiff in . . . a suit or wrong 
charged.' . . .  As the plain meaning of the word 'defend' is 
clear, we do not deviate from it").  See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 
8 (b), 365 Mass. 749 (1974) ("Denials shall fairly meet the 
substance of the averments denied").  Thus, a counterclaim 
asserted under § 15 (b) (2) could result in affirmative recovery 
for the defendant, limited to monetary damages capped at the 
borrower's outstanding liability plus costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, whereas a defense would serve only 
to extinguish the plaintiff's claim related to any deficiency on 
the loan. 
16 
 
unlike under § 15 (a), the defenses, claims, and counterclaims 
set forth in § 15 (b) (2) exist regardless of the assignee's 
diligent efforts to avoid purchase or assignment of a high-cost 
home mortgage loan.  While the defenses, claims, and 
counterclaims under § 15 (b) (2), unlike § 15 (b) (1), are not 
subject to a five-year statute of limitations,18 they must be 
brought "during the term of [the] high-cost mortgage loan."  
Furthermore, § 15 (b) (2) also limits the availability of the 
defenses, claims, and counterclaims to the three aforementioned 
scenarios.19 
 
18 HSBC wisely no longer presses the argument it raised 
before the Housing Court and the Appeals Court that the five-
year statute of limitations applicable to original actions under 
§ 15 (b) (1) applies to § 15 (b) (2).  See Anderson St. Assocs. 
v. Boston, 442 Mass. 812, 817 (2004) (declining to read words 
into statute that are not there). 
 
19 The first scenario is inapplicable in the present case 
because no action was initiated to collect on the loan and the 
foreclosure on the collateral was nonjudicial.  See G. L. 
c. 244, §§ 14, 35A.  The Morrises do not contend that HSBC 
failed to comply with the statutory nonjudicial foreclosure 
requirements.  See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 
637, 646 (2011) (Ibanez), quoting Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 
211 (1905) (Massachusetts "adhere[s] to the familiar rule that 
'one who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its 
terms.  If he fails to do so there is no valid execution of the 
power, and the sale is wholly void'"); Ibanez, supra at 647 n.16 
(mortgagee must also act in good faith and use reasonable 
diligence to protect interests of mortgagor, especially when 
mortgagee becomes buyer at foreclosure sale). 
 
Similarly, while the second scenario was available to the 
Morrises after they were at least sixty days in default or once 
HSBC accelerated the loan, the Morrises did not avail themselves 
 
17 
 
The Morrises assert only that the third scenario applies 
because HSBC's summary process action is one to "obtain 
possession" and that they are therefore entitled to raise a 
counterclaim under § 15 (b) (2).20  HSBC contends that the 
counterclaim is untimely because the foreclosure sale concluded 
the term of the home mortgage loan and thus the Morrises did not 
bring the counterclaim "during the term of [the] high-cost home 
mortgage loan," as required by § 15 (b) (2). 
c.  Statutory construction.  Whether the counterclaim 
asserted by the Morrises is available under § 15 (b) (2) is a 
 
of this option, and they do not contend that this second 
scenario applies in the circumstances of this case.  The 
Morrises defaulted on the home mortgage loan in 2008 and 
received $2,000 from the Fremont settlement in 2009.  They 
received a notice of default and a notice of acceleration in 
2016. 
 
20 Citing no specific provision, the Morrises contend that 
their home mortgage loan is "void" under the PHLPA and that the 
Morrises' PHLPA challenge to the home mortgage loan thus did 
occur during the term of the loan because no legal foreclosure 
had occurred.  It is not clear whether, in making this argument, 
they seek to challenge the foreclosure itself or to seek other 
relief.  To the extent that the Morrises rely on G. L. c. 183C, 
§ 3, which requires consultation with a counsellor as to the 
advisability of a loan and further that "[a] high cost home 
mortgage loan originated by a lender in violation of this 
section shall not be enforceable," such a claim might be 
available if there were record support for the claim and, as 
against a successor, might fall within the scope of § 15 (a), 
if, in addition, the successor failed to make the requisite 
showing under that section.  Here, however, the Morrises' sole 
claim in connection with the PHLPA arises under § 15 (b) (2), 
which is limited to monetary damages required to extinguish any 
liability on the home mortgage loan. 
18 
 
question of the statutory construction of the phrase "during the 
term of a high-cost home mortgage loan."  "Accordingly, our 
analysis begins with 'the "principal source of insight into 
legislative intent"' -- the plain language of the statute."  
Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 362 (2022), quoting Tze-
Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 712 (2018). 
"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is 
that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent 
of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed 
by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main 
object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of 
its framers may be effectuated" (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. Presidents & Fellows of Harvard 
College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  Clear and unambiguous 
statutory language is "conclusive as to legislative intent."  
Patel, supra, quoting Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 
575 (2015).  Where the statutory language is not conclusive, we 
may "turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative 
history and other statutes, for assistance in our 
interpretation."  Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket 
County, 437 Mass. 430, 435 (2002). 
Here, the statutory language is inconclusive.  On the one 
hand, the phrase "during the term of a high-cost home mortgage 
loan" suggests a construction that does not include the period 
following a foreclosure sale.  This is because when a property 
19 
 
is sold at a foreclosure sale, the mortgage is extinguished.  
See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 775 (2011), quoting 
Santiago v. Alba Mgt., Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 50 (2010) 
(upon foreclosure, "the former mortgagee owns the legal and 
equitable interest in the property and the mortgage no longer 
exists"); 4 M.A. Wolf, Powell on Real Property § 37.12[2] (2022) 
(Powell) (upon foreclosure, "there is no longer a mortgage").  
Thus, in a purely technical sense, following foreclosure there 
is no longer a "mortgage loan," as the mortgage ceases to exist.  
It would follow, therefore, that the "term of a high-cost home 
mortgage loan" has ended. 
On the other hand, § 15 (b) (2) refers to the "term of a 
high-cost home mortgage loan" (emphasis added), rather than the 
term of the mortgage itself.  See generally Eaton v. Federal 
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 575-577 (2012) (discussing 
distinction between promissory note evincing underlying 
indebtedness, or loan, and mortgage); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 
Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 649 (2011) (Massachusetts is "title 
theory" State in which "a mortgage is a transfer of legal title 
in a property [to the mortgagee] to secure a debt"); id. at 652 
(discussing difference between mortgage note and mortgage 
underlying note).  While the mortgage is extinguished upon 
foreclosure, if the proceeds of the sale do not satisfy the 
borrower's entire remaining debt, the borrower may continue to 
20 
 
carry liability under the loan.  Powell, supra at § 37.12[2] (if 
"the foreclosure sale [does] not bring in enough money to 
satisfy the full mortgage obligation . . . the mortgagor may 
remain liable for a judgment for the deficiency").  Any 
remaining deficiency may be collected through a deficiency 
action pursuant to the requirements of G. L. c. 244, § 17B.  
Indeed, the underlying promise to repay the amounts borrowed 
often is evidenced by a promissory note –– an instrument 
separate from the mortgage instrument –– that itself is 
enforceable against the borrower.  See Powell, supra at 
§ 37.12[1] ("The debt to repay a sum of money may be evidenced 
by an instrument separate and distinct from the mortgage 
instrument, . . . [which] commonly takes the form of a 
promissory note"); id. at § 37.12[2] ("The note evidences the 
borrower's personal obligation to repay a debt").  Thus, the 
loan –– that is, the underlying indebtedness and promise to 
repay –– may not have ended at foreclosure even if, by virtue of 
the foreclosure, the mortgage instrument no longer secures that 
promise.  See Eaton, supra at 575 (mortgage "serves as security 
for an underlying note"); Powell, supra at § 37.12[1] ("A 
mortgage is given to secure the repayment of an underlying 
debt").  Accordingly, the "term of a high-cost home mortgage 
loan" may refer to the period of time from the origination date 
of the loan to the date when the underlying indebtedness is 
21 
 
extinguished or to the maturity date of the original loan, 
whichever occurs earlier,21 a period that may well continue past 
the extinguishment of the mortgage.22 
Unfortunately, looking at § 15 (b) (2) as a whole does not 
resolve this ambiguity.  See Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, 
 
21 Construing the "term of a high-cost home mortgage loan" 
as the period between the origination date of the loan and the 
loan's original maturity date corresponds to the anticipated 
term of the loan; nonetheless, we acknowledge that this 
construction is imperfect, because as evidenced by other 
provisions in the PHLPA, when the Legislature sought to refer to 
the original maturity date, it did so expressly.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 183C, § 9 ("A high-cost home mortgage loan shall not 
contain a demand feature that permits the lender to terminate 
the loan in advance of the original maturity date . . ." 
[emphasis added]). 
 
22 Of course, the equity of redemption –– the right of the 
debtor to redeem the mortgage obligation after its due date, and 
ultimately to insist on foreclosure as the means of terminating 
his or her equitable title in the mortgaged real estate –– does 
not continue past the foreclosure.  Restatement (Third) of 
Property:  Mortgages c. 3, Introductory Note, at 97 (1996).  The 
equity of redemption is inseparable from the mortgage:  "When 
the right of redemption is foreclosed, the mortgage has done its 
work and the property is no longer mortgaged land.  Instead, the 
former mortgagee owns the legal and equitable interests in the 
property and the mortgage no longer exists."  Bevilacqua, 460 
Mass. at 775, quoting Santiago, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 50.  See 
G. L. c. 244, § 18 (mortgagor holds equity of redemption until 
mortgagee forecloses). 
 
By contrast, in a preforeclosure claim brought under 
§ 15 (b) (2), the equity of redemption has not yet been 
extinguished, so the limitation in § 15 (b) that restricts the 
borrowers' recovery "to amounts required to reduce or extinguish 
the borrower's liability under the high-cost home mortgage loan" 
plus costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, would not 
prevent the borrower from paying off the indebtedness and 
avoiding foreclosure. 
22 
 
Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618 
(1967) ("It is a well established principle of statutory 
interpretation that none of the words of a statute is to be 
regarded as superfluous, but each is to be given its ordinary 
meaning without overemphasizing its effect upon the other terms 
appearing in the statute, so that the enactment considered as a 
whole shall constitute a consistent and harmonious statutory 
provision . . ." [quotation, citation, and alteration omitted]).  
Applying one canon of statutory construction, see Awuah v. 
Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484, 496 (2011) ("When a 
statute lists elements in a series, the rules of statutory 
construction guide us to construe general phrases as restricted 
to elements similar to specific elements listed"), the Appeals 
Court posited that each of the three circumstances set forth in 
§ 15 (b) (2) arguably occurs prior to foreclosure, lending 
support to a construction of the phrase "during the term" as 
limited to preforeclosure actions.  HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 99 
Mass. App. Ct. at 422-423.  The first scenario involves an 
action to collect on the home loan or to foreclose on the 
collateral that has been initiated; thus, it occurs prior to 
foreclosure.  The second scenario occurs after the loan has been 
accelerated or has become sixty days in default; again, this 
occurs prior to foreclosure.  The third scenario occurs in an 
23 
 
action to enjoin foreclosure; perforce, this occurs prior to 
foreclosure. 
However, the third scenario also extends the availability 
of § 15 (b) (2) claims and defenses "in any action to . . . 
obtain possession of the home that secures the loan."  G. L. 
c. 183C, § 15 (b) (2).  As the Appeals Court acknowledged, the 
phrase seems to include postforeclosure summary process actions.  
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 423.  Consistent with 
the aforementioned canon of statutory construction, however, the 
Appeals Court construed the phrase "in any action to . . . 
obtain possession" to exclude postforeclosure summary process 
actions, relying on the additional limitation "of the home that 
secures the loan" because, after foreclosure, the home no longer 
"secures" the loan (emphasis added).  Id.  Under this 
construction, the third scenario largely would be circumscribed 
to the circumstances where the assignee takes preforeclosure 
possession by "open and peaceable entry," which the borrower may 
then oppose.  G. L. c. 244, § 1.  See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 458 
Mass. at 646 n.15 (describing foreclosure by peaceable entry as 
alternative to foreclosure through right of statutory sale). 
As the dissenting justice of the Appeals Court noted, 
however, the phrase "home that secures the loan" could merely 
describe the home as the collateral that secured the loan prior 
to the foreclosure.  See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 
24 
 
at 429 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).  Under this view, the third 
scenario would be available in postforeclosure summary process 
actions, more broadly protecting aggrieved borrowers against 
successors to the original lender.  We conclude that either view 
is reasonable, and thus neither resolves dispositively whether 
the phrase "during the term of a high-cost mortgage loan" is 
limited to preforeclosure actions. 
Accordingly, to resolve the question whether "during the 
term of a high-cost mortgage loan" includes the period following 
foreclosure, we must turn to "extrinsic sources, including the 
legislative history . . . , for assistance in our 
interpretation."  Chandler, 437 Mass. at 435.  As discussed 
supra, the Legislature intended for the PHLPA to provide a 
"broad scheme of liability," Drakopoulos, 465 Mass. at 782 n.11, 
to "help working families from being victimized and give them 
new clout by increasing penalties" for lenders and successors, 
Lambiaso, State House News Service.  In addition, because 
Massachusetts is a nonjudicial foreclosure State, see generally 
G. L. c. 183, § 21; G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C, and thus "does not 
require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to 
foreclose on a mortgaged property,"23  U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 458 
 
23 Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Rhode 
Island each have a similar statute, allowing borrowers to raise 
defenses and counterclaims "during the term" of the home 
 
25 
 
Mass. at 645-646, postforeclosure actions in a very real sense 
often may be the first time a borrower will raise the PHLPA as a 
defense or counterclaim.  See Endeavor Capital N. LLC vs. Smith, 
Mass. Land Ct., No. 18 MISC 000118 (RBF) (Nov. 15, 2018) 
("Nearly all the foreclosures of mortgages in the Commonwealth 
are made by [foreclosure] sale . . ."); MassLegalHelp, What 
Happens When the Bank Forecloses? (July 2013), 
http://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing/foreclosures/process 
[https://perma.cc/LRH3-THXM] (describing normal foreclosure 
process through foreclosure sale).  As the Attorney General 
states in her amicus brief, construing § 15 (b) (2) as 
unavailable postforeclosure would, in effect, make the claims, 
counterclaims, and defenses set forth therein meaningless, 
ignoring the "practical realities of how foreclosures work in 
Massachusetts."  See Massachusetts Access to Justice Commission, 
 
mortgage loan.  See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 137/135(d)(2)(B); Ind. 
Code § 24-9-5-1(b)(3); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-27(c)(2); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 58-21A-11(B)(2); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-25.2-7(b)(2).  
Of these, only the New Jersey statute has been addressed by a 
court.  The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey held that the borrower's defense raised after foreclosure 
was untimely because "the loan was terminated with the 
foreclosure judgment."  Lutzky vs. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust 
Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 09-03886 (JAP) (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2009).  
New Jersey, however, is a judicial foreclosure State, meaning 
that a New Jersey borrower would have the opportunity to raise 
the statute as a defense in a foreclosure action, unlike in 
Massachusetts, where a borrower may not have the same 
opportunity because foreclosure is permitted to be accomplished 
through a nonjudicial process.  Thus, the Lutzky analysis is 
unhelpful to our construction of the PHLPA. 
26 
 
Annual Report on Activities 5 n.5 (Aug. 2021), 
https://massa2j.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/MA-Access-to-
Justice-Commission-Annual-Report-August-2021.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RV34-RFDV] (up to two-thirds of litigants 
appear without lawyers in important legal matters, including 
postforeclosure evictions). 
Based on this history and underlying legislative intent to 
enact a broadly remedial statute, see Jinks v. Credico (USA) 
LLC, 488 Mass. 691, 700 (2021) (remedial statutes should be 
interpreted "with some imagination of the purposes which lie 
behind them" [citation omitted]), we conclude that the "term of 
the high-cost mortgage loan" refers to the period from the 
origination date to the date when the underlying indebtedness is 
repaid, or to the original maturity date, whichever is earlier, 
so that borrowers may avail themselves of the PHLPA's expansive 
protections in a postforeclosure "action to . . . preserve or 
obtain possession of the home that secures the loan."  G. L. 
c. 183C, § 15 (b) (2).  Therefore, the Morrises' counterclaim 
under § 15 (b) (2) may be asserted after foreclosure.  As set 
forth supra, however, the § 15 (b) (2) counterclaim is limited 
to monetary damages capped at the "amounts required to reduce or 
extinguish the borrower's liability under the high-cost home 
27 
 
mortgage loan" plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees.24  
G. L. c. 183C, § 15 (b). 
d.  G. L. c. 93A claim.  The Morrises contend that summary 
judgment should not have entered on their G. L. c. 93A 
counterclaim for HSBC's "unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in the conduct of any trade or commerce."  G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 2 (a).25  Originating a loan "that the lender should recognize 
at the outset the borrower is not likely to be able to repay," 
is an "unfair" practice prohibited by G. L. c. 93A.  Fremont 
Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. at 749.  See Drakopoulos, 465 Mass. at 
 
24 HSBC argues that the fact that a third party could have 
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and thus would be 
the party bringing the postforeclosure summary process action 
against the borrowers requires us to conclude that a defense 
under § 15 (b) (2) is not available in a postforeclosure summary 
process action.  We disagree.  Section 15 of the PHLPA provides 
for circumstances where an assignee of the home mortgage loan, 
like HSBC, is subject to claims, defenses, and counterclaims by 
the borrower.  The fact that it does not also affect a third-
party bona fide purchaser for value is not material to our 
analysis. 
 
25 To the extent that the Morrises base their c. 93A claim 
on the PHLPA violation, it is limited to monetary damages 
required to extinguish the claim as set forth in G. L. c. 183C, 
§ 15 (b) (2).  See Drakopoulos, 465 Mass. at 787 n.16, citing 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Morgan, 404 Mass. 537, 545 (1989) 
(common-law principle that assignee stands in assignor's shoes 
"has never been interpreted to mean that the assignee will be 
liable for all the assignor's wrongs," but borrower may have 
c. 93A counterclaim "to be used only defensively to extinguish 
assignee creditors' claim for remaining debt"). 
 
28 
 
786.26  Under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), consumers who are affected 
by an unfair practice made unlawful by § 2 (a) can bring suit 
"by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party action, for damages and such equitable relief, 
including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and 
proper." 
HSBC argues that the Morrises' c. 93A counterclaim was time 
barred because such claims are subject to a four-year statute of 
limitations.  See G. L. c. 260, § 5A ("Actions arising on 
account of violations of any law intended for the protection of 
consumers, including . . . [G. L. c. 93A], . . . shall be 
commenced only within four years next after the cause of action 
accrues").  While an affirmative claim under G. L. c. 93A would 
be barred under this statute of limitations, the four-year 
limitations period does not apply to preclude a party from 
raising a defensive counterclaim alleging a violation of G. L. 
c. 93A; such a defensive counterclaim "arising out of the same 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
 
26 As an assignee of the mortgage, HSBC could be liable 
under G. L. c. 93A for violations by the original lender, but 
would only be subject to equitable defenses to extinguish the 
remaining debt.  See Drakopoulos, 465 Mass. at 777 & 787 n.16 
(reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of bank on 
plaintiffs' c. 93A claim because bank, as assignee, "[was] not 
shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its 
status as an assignee" but could be liable for equitable 
remedies to extinguish any claim for borrower's remaining debt). 
 
29 
 
plaintiff's claim,[27] to the extent of the plaintiff's claim, may 
be asserted without regard to the provisions of the law relative 
to limitations of actions."  G. L. c. 260, § 36.  See Beach v. 
Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 415-416 (1998) ("[T]he object of 
a statute of limitation in keeping stale litigation out of the 
courts would be distorted if the statute were applied to bar an 
otherwise legitimate defense to a timely lawsuit, for limitation 
statutes are aimed at lawsuits, not at the consideration of 
particular issues in lawsuits" [quotations and citations 
omitted]); Shaw's Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 
345 (2021) ("A statute of limitations does not refer to the date 
on which the cause of action expires, but, rather, to the period 
during which a legal proceeding may be initiated"). 
To fall within G. L. c. 260, § 36, the counterclaim must be 
limited "to the extent of the plaintiff's claim."  This 
 
27 The Morrises' counterclaim arguably arises out of the 
same transaction or occurrence as HSBC's claim, namely, the home 
mortgage loan.  See Potier v. A.W. Perry, Inc., 286 Mass. 602, 
608 (1934) ("The word 'transaction' . . . should not be 
construed narrowly or technically, but should be construed in a 
sense to effectuate the settlement in one proceeding of 
controversies so closely connected as appropriately to be 
combined in one trial . . ."); Keystone Freight Corp. v. 
Bartlett Consol., Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 309-310 (2010) 
(for purposes of compulsory counterclaim, which must "arise[] 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the opposing party's claim," counterclaim "need not rest on 
precisely identical facts or pose identical allegations," but 
rather must be "so closely connected as appropriately to be 
combined in one trial" [citation omitted]). 
30 
 
restriction derives from the common-law concept of recoupment.  
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 367 Mass. 424, 427 
(1975).  See Bernstein v. Gramercy Mills, Inc., 16 Mass. App. 
Ct. 403, 409 (1983), quoting Bose Corp., supra at 427-431 ("as a 
§ 36 counterclaim can go only 'to the extent of the plaintiff's 
claim,' it corresponds to 'recoupment'").  See also Developments 
in the Law Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1245-
1246 (1950) (counterclaim must arise out of transaction forming 
basis of plaintiff's claim "and may be used only to reduce or 
extinguish the plaintiff's recovery").  A successful recoupment 
claim by a defendant may "reduce or extinguish the plaintiff's 
claim, but it could not result in an affirmative recovery for 
the defendant."  Bose Corp., supra at 427-428.  See Restatement 
(First) of Judgments § 55 comment a (1942). 
Here, "[t]he present counterclaim . . . bears no 
resemblance to a recoupment" (quotation omitted).  Bernstein, 16 
Mass. App. Ct. at 409.  In its summary process action, HSBC 
asserted that it had the title to the property by virtue of its 
compliance with the statutory framework permitting a nonjudicial 
foreclosure.28  See Wayne Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 350 Mass. 775, 
 
28 Contrary to the Morrises' suggestion, neither Kattar v. 
Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 13, 17 (2000), nor Ford Motor Credit Co., 
404 Mass. at 540, 545, permits a borrower to assert a c. 93A 
counterclaim for the reconveyance of property that is otherwise 
 
31 
 
775 (1966) ("Legal title is established in summary process by 
proof that the title was acquired strictly according to the 
power of sale provided in the mortgage; and that alone is 
subject to challenge").  There is no claim by HSBC for any 
outstanding liability under the loan; the Morrises' c. 93A 
counterclaim is not for recoupment or "reduc[ing] or 
extinguish[ing]" any remaining debt, as there is none asserted.29  
Bose Corp., 367 Mass. at 427-428.  Therefore, the Morrises 
cannot assert this c. 93A counterclaim as a defense to HSBC's 
summary process eviction action.30 
 
barred by G. L. c. 260, § 36, because it exceeds the extent of 
the plaintiff's claim. 
 
Similarly, the Morrises rely on Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 
466 Mass. 613, 615 (2013), and Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. 
Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016), to suggest that equitable 
claims are available generally in postforeclosure actions.  
Neither case suggests that an affirmative claim that is 
otherwise untimely under G. L. c. 260, § 5A, is revivable, or 
that a counterclaim under G. L. c. 260, § 36, may exceed the 
scope of the plaintiff's claim. 
 
29 Thus, in contrast to a counterclaim under G. L. c. 183C, 
§ 15 (b) (2), which allows the Morrises to pursue damages 
sufficient to extinguish their deficiency on the loan even 
though there is not presently a claim by HSBC for the 
deficiency, see supra, a counterclaim under G. L. c. 93A would 
allow the Morrises to extinguish their deficiency only if HSBC 
brought a deficiency claim against them. 
 
30 The Morrises argue that HSBC lacked standing because the 
foreclosure was invalid.  See Rental Property Mgt. Servs. v. 
Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 547 (2018) (dismissal of action for lack 
of standing proper even if not raised previously).  Here, HSBC 
had standing to assert a claim for summary process by virtue of 
 
32 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The Housing Court judge's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of HSBC is reversed insofar as it concerns the 
Morrises' PHLPA counterclaim and reversed in part and affirmed 
in part insofar as it concerns the c. 93A claim.  The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
the properly executed foreclosure sale.  To the extent the 
Morrises' argument concerns subject matter jurisdiction, it also 
fails.  See G. L. c. 185C, § 1 (jurisdiction proper in Metro 
South Housing Court over matters arising in Brockton); G. L. 
c. 185C, § 3 (Housing Court has jurisdiction over summary 
process actions); G. L. c. 239, § 2 (same).  See also Federal 
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 474 Mass. at 338 ("The Housing Court also has 
jurisdiction to hear summary process complaints, in which the 
owner of a housing unit seeks to evict the occupant of that unit 
and recover possession"). 
 
In addition, in their amended brief, the Morrises summarily 
raise the claim that their due process rights were violated, and 
claims under various Massachusetts statutes, including G. L. 
c. 260, § 21, which provides for a twenty-year statute of 
limitations on actions for the recovery of land; G. L. c. 93, 
§§ 102 and 103, for equal rights violations based on race and 
age; and G. L. c. 183, § 64, for discrimination in residential 
mortgage loans on the basis of location of property.  In 
addition, they raise claims related to the predatory nature of 
the home mortgage loan, including unconscionability and fraud.  
These arguments were not raised before the Housing Court and 
therefore are waived.  See Porter v. Treasurer & Collector of 
Taxes of Worcester, 385 Mass. 335, 338 n.5 (1982) ("We will 
refuse to consider as a basis for reviewing the trial judge's 
rulings, arguments inspired by the loss in the trial court and 
urged for the first time on appeal" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).