Title: Atkins v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052348
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2006

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DARYL RENARD ATKINS 
 
v.  Record No. 052348  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     June 8, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
On prior occasions, we have addressed various issues 
regarding Daryl Renard Atkins’ conviction for capital 
murder and the imposition of the death penalty.  Today, we 
review a jury verdict finding that Atkins is not mentally 
retarded and the circuit court’s reinstatement of Atkins’ 
death sentence in light of that verdict.  Although Atkins 
raises numerous assignments of error, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in two respects: (1) by admitting 
testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses; 
and (2) by informing the venire that another jury had 
already sentenced Atkins to death.  Thus, we will reverse 
the circuit court’s judgment and remand this case for a new 
proceeding to determine whether Atkins is mentally 
retarded. 
I. Procedural History 
 
In February 1998, a jury convicted Atkins of the 
November 1996 capital murder of Eric Michael Nesbitt during 
 
2
the commission of robbery.1  See Code § 18.2-31(4).  During 
the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury fixed 
Atkins’ sentence at death.  Upon review by this Court 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-313, we affirmed his conviction for 
capital murder, but vacated the imposition of the death 
sentence, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of 
York County for a new sentencing hearing.  Atkins v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 180, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999) 
(Atkins I). 
 
At the re-sentencing, a different jury again fixed 
Atkins’ punishment at death on the capital murder 
conviction.  The Circuit Court of York County imposed the 
death penalty in accordance with the jury verdict.  In the 
subsequent review by this Court, we upheld “the imposition 
of the death penalty.”  Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 
375, 379, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2000) (Atkins II). 
The United States Supreme Court then granted Atkins a 
writ of certiorari on the sole issue “[w]hether the 
execution of mentally retarded individuals convicted of 
capital crimes violates the Eighth Amendment?”  Atkins v. 
Virginia, 534 U.S. 809, 809 (2001).  Establishing a 
categorical rule that execution of mentally retarded 
                     
1 Atkins was also convicted of abduction, robbery, and 
related firearm charges.  See Code §§ 18.2-48, -58, and -
53.1, respectively. 
 
3
individuals is excessive punishment, and therefore violates 
the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed our judgment and remanded the case to this Court 
for further proceedings.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
320-21 (2002) (Atkins III). 
 
In response to the United State Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Atkins III, the General Assembly enacted emergency 
legislation defining the term “[m]entally retarded” and 
establishing procedures for determining whether a defendant 
convicted of capital murder is mentally retarded.  Code 
§§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1, -264.3:1.2, -264.3:3.  Part 
of that legislation specifically addressed the procedure to 
be followed in cases when defendants, such as Atkins, had 
been sentenced to death prior to the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Atkins III and the enactment of the 
emergency mental retardation legislation.  Code § 8.01-
654.2.  Following the enactment of the legislation, and 
pursuant to the mandate of the United States Supreme Court 
in Atkins III, this Court remanded Atkins’ case to the 
Circuit Court of York County for the “‘sole purpose of 
making a determination of mental retardation.’”  Atkins v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 73, 79, 581 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2003) 
(quoting Code § 8.01-654.2) (Atkins IV). 
 
4
 
Upon remand, a third jury found that Atkins did not 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 
mentally retarded under Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A).2  Based on 
that verdict, the Circuit Court of York County reinstated 
Atkins’ death sentence.  We awarded Atkins an appeal from 
the circuit court’s judgment pursuant to Rules 5:17 and/or 
5:22. 
II. Analysis 
 
Atkins assigns 38 errors to the judgment of the 
circuit court.  Although he did not brief some of the 
assignments of error, see Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
451, 478, 619 S.E.2d 16, 31 (2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___ (2006) (“[f]ailure to adequately brief an assignment of 
error is considered a waiver”), and others are waived for 
various reasons, we will specifically consider only three 
assignments of error: 
                     
2 The term “[m]entally retarded” is defined as  
 
a disability, originating before the age of 18 
years, characterized concurrently by (i) 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning 
as demonstrated by performance on a standardized 
measure of intellectual functioning administered 
in conformity with accepted professional 
practice, that is at least two standard 
deviations below the mean and (ii) significant 
limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in 
conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A). 
 
5
No. 3 – the circuit court erred “by informing 
[the] jurors that, after a prior valid juror 
determination of sentence was made, the Supreme 
Court of the United States intervened by ruling 
that the execution of persons with mental 
retardation is cruel and unusual punishment, and 
that their decision regarding mental retardation 
would determine whether the prior valid juror 
determination of sentence would actually be 
imposed;” 
 
No. 13 – the circuit court erred “by sustaining 
the Commonwealth’s objection to the 
qualifications and expert testimony of Dr. 
Richard Kelley;” and 
 
No. 15 – the circuit court erred “by overruling 
[Atkins’] objection to the expert qualification 
and subsequent testimony of Dr. Stanton E. 
Samenow as a Commonwealth witness.” 
 
We will first address No. 15, then No. 3, and conclude with 
No. 13. 
A. Dr. Samenow 
On the motion of the Commonwealth, pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.2(F)(1), the circuit court appointed Stanton 
E. Samenow, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to evaluate 
Atkins “concerning the existence or absence of [Atkins’] 
mental retardation.”  The qualifications of an expert 
appointed at the request of the Commonwealth are governed 
by subsection A of Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2.  That subsection 
requires that 
[t]he mental health expert appointed pursuant to 
this section shall be (a) a psychiatrist, a 
clinical psychologist or an individual with a 
doctorate degree in clinical psychology, (b) 
 
6
skilled in the administration, scoring and 
interpretation of intelligence tests and measures 
of adaptive behavior and (c) qualified by 
experience and specialized training, approved by 
the Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, to 
perform forensic evaluations. 
 
At Atkins’ mental retardation hearing, the 
Commonwealth moved to admit Dr. Samenow as an expert in 
“clinical psychology with a specialty in forensic 
psychology.”  On voir dire, Atkins asked Dr. Samenow the 
following questions regarding his qualifications and the 
timing of an intellectual functioning test he administered 
to Atkins: 
Q.  Can you tell me [Dr. Samenow], do you know 
what a standardized measure for assessing 
adaptive behavior is, what that phrase means? 
 
A.  Adaptive behavior? 
 
Q.  A standardized measure. 
 
A.  Yes, it would be giving a test, if such a 
test were appropriate, to try to assess the 
person’s functioning in life, conceptually, 
practically, socially. 
 
Q.  Could you name a few? 
 
A.  The ABS,[3] the test that has been given, I do 
not give it. 
 
Q.  Okay, any others that you know of? 
 
A.  No. 
 
                     
3 The correct name of the test is the Adaptive Behavior 
Assessment System-II (ABAS-II). 
 
7
Q.  And have you ever given it? 
 
A.  No, I have not. 
 
Q.  You’ve never used one, you say? 
 
A.  I have not used the test of adaptive 
functioning. 
 
Q.  Any test of adaptive functioning? 
 
A.  That is correct. 
 
Q.  Okay.  And you administered in 2004 an IQ 
test; is that correct? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  What’s the name of that test? 
 
A.  The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale. 
 
Q.  And you know that two days before you 
administered it, it had already been 
administered? 
 
A.  Oh, I absolutely do.[4] 
 
Q.  Is it accepted professional practice to 
administer that test two days after someone else 
has administered it? 
 
                     
4 During voir dire, Dr. Samenow testified that he 
administered a Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) 
to Atkins two days after a clinical psychologist, who 
testified for Atkins, had given Atkins the test.  After 
Atkins’ clinical psychologist administered the WAIS-III, he 
allegedly advised Atkins not to take the test again.  When 
Dr. Samenow arrived at the prison where Atkins was 
incarcerated, Atkins informed Dr. Samenow that he had 
already taken the WAIS-III and did not feel he should take 
it again.  Dr. Samenow was not previously aware of the 
recent administration of the WAIS-III and elected to repeat 
it because he did not have another test for intellectual 
functioning with him. 
 
8
A.  One knows one’s going to get a practice 
effect and ordinarily one would not. 
 
Q.  Let’s stay with the question, please.  Is it 
accepted professional practice to administer the 
WAIS two days after someone else has? 
 
A.  Generally not. 
 
After this exchange, Atkins moved to disallow Dr. 
Samenow’s testimony on the grounds that Dr. Samenow had not 
conducted the evaluation of Atkins in accordance with the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) and (2) because 
he had not assessed Atkins’ intellectual functioning in 
accordance with accepted professional practice and had not 
administered any standardized measure for assessing 
adaptive behavior.  In response to a question from the 
Commonwealth during additional voir dire, Dr. Samenow 
explained why he did not give a standardized measure of 
adaptive behavior to Atkins, “I don’t think it would have 
been a valid or reliable measure because the individual, 
Daryl Atkins, had been incarcerated for quite some time.  
It would have had to have been retroactive.  I think there 
are many ways to assess adaptive functioning that would be 
more informative.” 
During further cross-examination, Atkins asked Dr. 
Samenow how many assessments for mental retardation he had 
performed during his career.  Dr. Samenow responded that 
 
9
Atkins was the “[f]irst and last.”  Atkins continued with 
these questions: 
Q.  So you have no experience whatsoever 
administering assessments that are standard – I’m 
sorry, standardized measures generally accepted 
in the field for adaptive behavior, you’ve never 
done one? 
 
A.  No, I’m constantly assessing adaptive 
behavior, but I have not given these tests of 
adaptive behavior. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q.  All right.  So having never administered one 
of these tests, you have no clinical experience 
or judgment with respect to when, where or how it 
ought to be administered? 
 
A.  Well, if I have never administered the test, 
then I’m not an expert as to the use of those 
tests. 
 
The circuit court then asked Dr. Samenow whether he “really 
[felt] comfortable” rendering an opinion regarding Atkins’ 
mental retardation.  Dr. Samenow answered, “[A]bsolutely I 
do, because I have spent a career assessing the functioning 
of individuals.” 
 
After the voir dire of Dr. Samenow concluded, Atkins 
re-iterated his objection to Dr. Samenow’s testifying on 
the subject of Atkins’ mental retardation for the reasons 
previously stated and on the additional ground that Dr. 
Samenow did not have the qualifications set forth in Code 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.2(A).  The circuit court overruled Atkins’ 
 
10
motion and determined that Dr. Samenow was qualified to 
render an opinion on mental retardation. 
 
Atkins now argues, as he did before the circuit court, 
that Dr. Samenow was not qualified to testify as an expert 
because he did not meet the requirements of Code § 19.2-
264.3:1.2(A), and because he did not conduct his evaluation 
of Atkins in accordance with the provisions of Code § 19.2-
264.3:1.1(B)(1) and (2).  In response, the Commonwealth 
asserts that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing Dr. Samenow to testify as an expert on the 
issue whether Atkins is mentally retarded.  According to 
the Commonwealth, Dr. Samenow is a licensed clinical 
psychologist with a specialty in forensic psychology; he 
has performed hundreds of forensic evaluations; and he 
explained why he administered an intellectual functioning 
test to Atkins two days after another clinical psychologist 
had done so and why he did not use a standardized measure 
to assess Atkins’ adaptive behavior. 
 
As the Commonwealth argues, “ ‘[t]he admission of 
expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge, and [this Court] will reverse a trial 
court’s decision only where that court has abused its 
discretion.’ ”  Tarmac Mid-Atl., Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 
250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995) (citation 
 
11
omitted).  But, “[w]here a statute designates express 
qualifications for an expert witness, the witness must 
satisfy the statutory criteria in order to testify as an 
expert.”  Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 273, 609 
S.E.2d 4, 11 (2005).  In passing the emergency mental 
retardation legislation, the General Assembly required, 
among other things, that a mental health expert appointed 
under Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2(A) must be “skilled in the 
administration, scoring and interpretation of . . . 
measures of adaptive behavior.”  (Emphasis added.)  We are 
bound by the plain meaning of the unambiguous language used 
by the General Assembly.  Britt Constr., Inc. v. Magazzine 
Clean, LLC, 271 Va. 58, 62, 623 S.E.2d 886, 888 (2006). 
 
During voir dire, Dr. Samenow acknowledged that he had 
never administered a standardized measure of adaptive 
behavior.  Although Dr. Samenow explained that he 
constantly assesses individuals’ adaptive behavior, he 
admitted that, since he has never administered such tests, 
he is not an expert as to the use of them.  In other words, 
Dr. Samenow is not “skilled” in the administration of 
measures of adaptive behavior.  Accordingly, he would also 
lack the requisite expertise in scoring and interpreting 
such tests.  Thus, on the record before us, we conclude 
that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Dr. Samenow 
 
12
possessed the necessary qualifications set forth in Code 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.2(A) and therefore, the circuit court abused 
its discretion by allowing Dr. Samenow to testify and 
express an expert opinion with regard to whether Atkins is 
mentally retarded. 
The Commonwealth argues, however, that any such error 
was harmless because of the overwhelming proof that Atkins 
is not mentally retarded.  In Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
253, 546 S.E.2d 728 (2001), this Court adopted the 
following test for non-constitutional harmless error: 
“If, when all is said and done, the conviction is 
sure that the error did not influence the jury, 
or had but slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand . . . .  But if one cannot 
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all 
that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error, it is 
impossible to conclude that substantial rights 
were not affected . . . .  If so, or if one is 
left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot 
stand.” 
 
Id. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731-32 (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). 
Whether Atkins is mentally retarded was a factual 
issue for the jury to determine.  The Commonwealth 
presented testimony from Dr. Samenow and one other forensic 
clinical psychologist, both of whom opined that Atkins is 
not mentally retarded.  In contrast, two clinical 
 
13
psychologists testified on behalf of Atkins and opined that 
he does meet the statutory requirements for mental 
retardation.5  This evidence presented the jury with the 
classic “battle of the experts.”  It was therefore the 
jury’s task to resolve the conflicts in the expert 
testimony and to decide which expert or experts were worthy 
of belief.  See Todd v. Edwin L. Williams, II, M.D., LTD., 
242 Va. 178, 181, 409 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991).  Since the 
jury decided that Atkins is not mentally retarded, it 
appears that the jury placed more weight on the testimony 
of at least one of the Commonwealth’s two expert witnesses.  
As there is no way for this Court to determine whose 
testimony the jury actually accepted in reaching its 
verdict, we cannot say that the circuit court’s error in 
allowing Dr. Samenow to testify did not influence the jury.  
Therefore, the error was not harmless. 
Our conclusion, however, does not mean that a mental 
health expert appointed to assess a defendant’s mental 
retardation must administer a standardized measure of 
adaptive behavior to the defendant in to order to testify 
as an expert on the issue of the defendant’s mental 
retardation.  To the contrary, such expert needs only to be 
                     
5 Another clinical psychologist testifying for Atkins 
opined that Atkins has substandard intellectual 
functioning. 
 
14
“skilled in the administration, scoring and interpretation 
of intelligence tests and measures of adaptive behavior.”  
Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2(A).  The requirements for assessing a 
defendant’s mental retardation are different and are set 
forth in Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1.  One requirement is that 
“[t]he assessment shall include at least one standardized 
measure generally accepted by the field of psychological 
testing for assessing adaptive behavior and appropriate for 
administration to the particular defendant being assessed, 
unless not feasible.”  Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(2). 
Therefore, if an expert, skilled in administering, 
scoring and interpreting standardized measures of adaptive 
behavior, determines in his or her opinion that such a test 
is not appropriate for a particular defendant or that 
administering a standardized measure of adaptive behavior 
is not feasible, the expert can still testify as to the 
defendant’s mental retardation and explain why a measure of 
adaptive behavior was not administered to the defendant.  
The decision about which tests to administer to a defendant 
and the manner in which they are given goes to the weight 
to be accorded an expert’s opinion regarding mental 
retardation, not to the admissibility of the opinion.6  See 
                     
6 The same conclusion applies to Dr. Samenow’s decision 
to administer the WAIS-III two days after another clinical 
 
15
Hetmeyer v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 103, 108-09, 448 
S.E.2d 894, 898 (1994) (“A challenge to an ‘experts . . . 
methods and determinations . . ., even by other experts, 
does not render inadmissible expert opinion based on those 
. . . methods and computations’ but goes to the ‘weight of 
the evidence,’ raising ‘factual questions to be determined 
by the jury.’ " (citations omitted)).  Cf. Bitar v. Rahman, 
272 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2006) (this day 
decided) (certain objections challenged “the admissibility 
of evidence rather than the sufficiency of evidence”). 
B. Juror Information 
During pretrial proceedings, Atkins moved the circuit 
court to refrain from informing the jury about any of his 
prior offenses, including the underlying capital murder 
conviction and death sentence, and the fact that he is on 
“death row.”  He also requested that the jurors not be told 
the consequences of their verdict, i.e., that finding 
Atkins mentally retarded means his death sentence would not 
be carried out. 
 
The circuit court overruled Atkins’ motion on the 
premise that it was in the best interest of the parties if 
                                                             
psychologist had given the test to Atkins.  Contrary to 
Atkins’ argument, the mere fact that Dr. Samenow did not 
administer the WAIS-III to Atkins in accordance with 
accepted professional practice would not render his opinion 
inadmissible. 
 
16
the jury knew the truth surrounding the proceeding.7  The 
circuit court reasoned that the jury needed to be aware of 
the consequences of its actions.  In accordance with its 
ruling, the circuit court gave the following information to 
the venire: 
This case is a case that is going to be 
unique in the annals of judicial history.  Daryl 
Atkins, in 1996, was charged with committing the 
offense of capital murder, abduction, and robbery 
and use of firearms in those related offenses. 
 
In 1998 he pled not guilty, was found guilty 
and ultimately sentenced to the ultimate penalty 
of death and several other lengthy prison terms. 
 
His case was appealed throughout our 
judicial system ultimately reaching the United 
States Supreme Court.  The United States Supreme 
Court determined that by a consensus of states 
the law now would be that it would be cruel and 
unusual punishment, pursuant to the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, to 
execute someone who may be mentally retarded.  
May be mentally retarded.  They remanded the 
issue of mental retardation to the Virginia 
Supreme Court who ultimately remanded it to this 
Court to make a factual determination as to 
whether Mr. Atkins is mentally retarded.  If he 
is mentally retarded, and that is the fact issue 
that you will determine, another jury has already 
made the determination as to what would happen to 
him.  If he is mentally retarded, by law, his 
sentence would now be commuted to life in prison.  
If you find that he is not mentally retarded then 
another jury has determined what would happen to 
him; that is, that he would be executed. 
 
                     
7 The circuit court did direct the parties not to 
inform the jury that Atkins is on “death row.”  The court 
also granted the Commonwealth’s motion to “death qualify” 
prospective jurors. 
 
17
 
On appeal, Atkins argues that the information provided 
to the jury was prejudicial and distracted it from the sole 
purpose of the proceeding.  The Commonwealth responds that 
it was imperative that the jurors be questioned about any 
bias with regard to the death penalty and that, with such 
questioning, the circuit court also had to inform them as 
it did about Atkins’ capital murder conviction and death 
sentence, the change in the law, and the consequences of 
their verdict.  The Commonwealth also points out that much 
of the information given to the jurors was the same 
information that a jury would know in a case where a 
defendant, unlike Atkins, raises the question of mental 
retardation before trial in accordance with Code § 19.2-
264.3:1.2(E). 
Under the procedures established by the General 
Assembly, the issue of mental retardation “shall be 
determined by the jury as part of the sentencing 
proceeding.”  Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (emphasis added).  
Thus, as the Commonwealth argues, a jury deciding the 
question of a defendant’s mental retardation normally would 
have already found the defendant guilty of capital murder.  
Furthermore, when a defendant charged with capital murder 
raises the issue of mental retardation, the verdict forms 
provided to the jury must include not only the forms 
 
18
specified in Code § 19.2-264.4 but also the forms set out 
in Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(D).  One of the latter verdict 
forms states: 
 
“We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the 
defendant guilty of (here set out the statutory 
language of the offense charged), and that the 
defendant has proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is mentally retarded, fix his 
punishment at (i) imprisonment for life or (ii) 
imprisonment for life and a fine of $_______.” 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(D)(1).  It is evident from this 
verdict form that a jury would also know that a finding of 
mental retardation means the defendant would not be subject 
to the death penalty.  Thus, to the extent the circuit 
court told the jurors in this case that Atkins had been 
convicted of capital murder and that he would not be 
subject to the death penalty if he is mentally retarded, 
the circuit court did not err. 
 
The circuit court, however, went beyond the scope of 
information that a jury would normally know when deciding 
whether a defendant convicted of capital murder is mentally 
retarded.  The circuit court also informed the jury that 
another jury had already decided that Atkins should receive 
the death penalty.  In other words, the jury knew that, if 
it found Atkins mentally retarded, it would in effect be 
nullifying another jury’s verdict to sentence Atkins to 
death.  In a normal context, a jury deciding the question 
 
19
of a defendant’s mental retardation, however, would not 
have already decided that the defendant should receive the 
death penalty.  In accordance with the procedures 
established by the General Assembly, such a jury would 
simultaneously consider issues regarding mental retardation 
and imposition of the death penalty in the same sentencing 
proceeding.  Thus, the jury in this case was not entitled 
to know the sentencing decision of another jury just as a 
jury in a re-sentencing hearing, such as occurred in Atkins 
II, is not entitled to know a prior jury’s sentencing 
verdict. 
Thus, we agree with Atkins.  The fact that the jury 
knew a prior jury had sentenced Atkins to death prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial on the issue of his mental 
retardation.  See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 209, 215, 
608 S.E.2d 907, 910-11 (2005) (defendant was denied a fair 
trial where Commonwealth repeatedly made unfounded, 
prejudicial remarks).  “Retrospective mental retardation 
proceedings in a capital case are unlike any other jury 
proceedings, and require great care in order to avoid over-
whelming prejudice to the defendant.”  Lambert v. State, 
126 P.3d 646, 653 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). 
 
In light of the circuit court’s error in giving this 
information to the jury and in admitting Dr. Samenow’s 
 
20
testimony, it is necessary to remand this case to the 
circuit court for a new proceeding to determine whether 
Atkins is mentally retarded.  On remand, the circuit court 
shall inform the new venire as follows: 
Daryl Atkins has been convicted of the 
offense of capital murder during the commission 
of robbery.  The United States Supreme Court and 
the General Assembly of Virginia have determined 
that a defendant convicted of capital murder, but 
who is mentally retarded, is not subject to the 
imposition of the death penalty.  It is your duty 
to determine whether Atkins is mentally retarded.8 
 
C. Dr. Kelley 
 
Because this case must be remanded, we will address 
one additional issue that could arise during the new 
proceeding in the circuit court, i.e., whether the circuit 
court erred by refusing to allow Dr. Kelley to testify.  
See Holley v. Pambianco, 270 Va. 180, 185, 613 S.E.2d 425, 
428 (2005).  Atkins sought to introduce testimony from Dr. 
Kelley as an expert in the field of pediatrics and 
genetics.  Upon objection by the Commonwealth, the circuit 
                     
8 Since prospective jurors will be told that a mentally 
retarded defendant is not subject to the imposition of the 
death penalty, the circuit court, as it did previously, 
must ask the venire about any bias regarding the death 
penalty. 
 
If the jury determines that Atkins is mentally 
retarded, the circuit court must then direct the jury to 
fix Atkins’ punishment at (i) imprisonment for life or (ii) 
imprisonment for life and a fine of $________.  See Code 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(D). 
 
21
court held that Dr. Kelley’s testimony was not relevant to 
the determination of mental retardation.  We agree. 
During a proffer of his testimony, Dr. Kelley 
explained that Atkins was born with a number of physical 
abnormalities that could predispose him to have cognitive 
or developmental disabilities.  Because of the physical 
abnormalities, Dr. Kelley opined that Atkins suffers from a 
genetic syndrome.  The syndrome, which Dr. Kelley called 
“Atkins Syndrome,” is a “private syndrome,” meaning that he 
“could not find a syndrome that had been described as a 
genetic disorder with exactly the same combination of 
abnormalities.” 
 
Dr. Kelley nevertheless testified that Atkins’ 
physical abnormalities are significant because “more than 
half of the children who have multiple physical 
abnormalities will also have some developmental 
abnormalities.”  Dr. Kelley noted that it is necessary, 
however, to probe further to ensure that “this is a genetic 
abnormality as opposed to just an extreme abnormal [sic].”  
Consequently, Dr. Kelley performed genetic testing on 
Atkins to see if he had any chromosomal abnormalities that 
would confirm a genetic syndrome.  Dr. Kelley was unable to 
find any.  But, he stated the lack of chromosomal evidence 
was not uncommon and did not rule out a genetic syndrome. 
 
22
Finally, Dr. Kelley opined about whether Atkins 
suffers from a genetic syndrome and was at risk for 
developing a cognitive disability: 
Q.  Now, were you able to determine to a 
medical certainty whether . . . Daryl Atkins 
suffers from a genetic syndrome? 
 
A.  I could not identify a specific genetic 
syndrome.  Given the findings, I think any 
geneticist would pursue further by trying to 
identify – doing other genetic studies on the 
family with the assumption that there is a 
genetic lesion explaining the family’s – the 
constellation of the abnormalities.  So we 
stopped at a certain point, but certainly it 
would be indicated to pursue this further with 
modern techniques to try to identify what gene or 
group of genes is abnormal. 
 
Q.  Again, taking into account the physical 
findings and the finding about the difficulty in 
retaining bike riding skills – 
 
 
A.  Right. 
 
Q.  – do you have an opinion to a medical 
certainty about whether this constellation of 
information created a risk factor in Daryl 
Atkins’ life for the development of a cognitive 
disability? 
 
A.  Yes, indeed.  That the association of 
risk factors – the physical findings being a risk 
factor for brain involvement and the history of a 
very unusual type of learning disability. 
 
It is evident from this testimony that Dr. Kelley 
assumed that, because Atkins has certain physical 
abnormalities, he suffers from a genetic syndrome causing 
cognitive disabilities.  But, Dr. Kelley did not confirm 
 
23
this assumption through genetic testing or any other 
accepted method of scientific proof.  As Atkins admitted 
during a colloquy with the circuit court, the most that Dr. 
Kelley could opine within a reasonable degree of medical 
probability was that Atkins’ physical abnormalities are 
risk factors that could lead to developmental and cognitive 
disabilities.  Such an opinion was speculative and without 
an adequate factual foundation.  Expert testimony is 
inadmissible if it is “speculative or founded on 
assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis.”  
Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va. 151, 154, 475 S.E.2d 261, 
263 (1996).  Dr. Kelley also attempted to compare Atkins 
with individuals having both physical abnormalities and 
developmental abnormalities without foundation evidence 
that actually placed Atkins in that category of 
individuals.  See Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 162, 524 
S.E.2d 645, 648 (2000) (expert testimony about principles 
relating to an average driver was inadmissible in the 
absence of evidence placing the defendant in the category 
of the average driver).  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow 
Dr. Kelley to testify. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand this case for a new proceeding, 
consistent with this opinion, to determine whether Atkins 
is mentally retarded. 
Reversed and remanded.