Title: Government Micro Resources, Inc. v. Jackson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050943
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2006

Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 
and Compton, S.J. 
 
GOVERNMENT MICRO RESOURCES, 
INC., ET AL. 
 
v.   Record No. 050943 
 
ALAN W. JACKSON 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 13, 2006 
ALAN W. JACKSON 
 
v.  Record No. 050937 
 
GOVERNMENT MICRO RESOURCES, 
INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Alan W. Jackson sued his former employer Government Micro 
Resources, Inc. (GMR) and its Chairman of the Board, Humberto 
Pujals, Jr., for breach of contract and defamation.1  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Jackson awarding him $200,500 
in compensatory damages on his breach of contract claim and 
$5,000,000 and $1,000,000 as compensatory and punitive 
damages, respectively, on his defamation claim.  The trial 
court granted the defendants' post-trial motion for 
remittitur, reducing the breach of contract award to $112,500, 
the defamation compensatory damages to $1,000,000, and the 
punitive damages to the statutory maximum of $350,000.  Code 
§ 8.01-38.1. 
 
2
Jackson, GMR, and Pujals appealed the trial court's 
judgment and we have consolidated the appeals for our 
consideration.  GMR and Pujals ask us to reverse the judgment 
of the trial court.  They assert that the trial court erred in 
failing to strike Jackson's defamation claim and that the 
evidence did not support a finding of actual malice necessary 
for an award of punitive damages or to overcome the qualified 
privilege they contend attached to the alleged defamatory 
statements.  Jackson seeks restoration of the jury's 
compensatory damage award for his defamation claim. 
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Jackson's 
defamation claim was not opinion, was timely and properly pled 
and proven; that actual malice was shown by clear and 
convincing evidence; and that in holding that the compensatory 
damage award was excessive, the trial court did not consider 
factors in evidence relevant to that damage award. 
FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to both appeals and we 
recite them in the light most favorable to Jackson, the party 
prevailing in the trial court.  City of Lynchburg v. Brown, 
270 Va. 166, 168, 613 S.E.2d 407, 408 (2005). 
                                                                
1 Jackson also included counts of actual and constructive 
fraud which the trial court struck. 
 
3
Following his discharge from the army, Jackson served 
eight years with the National Security Agency where he 
qualified for top secret and "specially comparted information" 
security clearances following satisfactory completion of 
multiple "full lifestyle polygraph" examinations.  Upon 
leaving the government, he worked for various technical 
systems companies as senior officer or chief executive officer 
developing a reputation for successfully turning financially 
distressed business units into profitable entities and 
expanding the companies. 
In 2001, GMR, a technology resale and services company, 
sought to increase its services business.  To accomplish this 
goal, GMR recruited Jackson to serve as president and chief 
executive officer because of his connections with the federal 
government, his top secret security clearances, and his 
extensive experience with technology services in both the 
public and private sectors. 
Jackson began work at GMR on July 9, 2001.  Within a 
short period, Jackson realized the company's financial 
situation differed significantly from what he was led to 
believe when he accepted the position.  For example, GMR's 
line of credit was significantly reduced because Pujals caused 
a transfer of properties from the company to himself by using 
the company's line of credit to satisfy the mortgages on the 
 
4
properties.  Jackson also learned of a $1.1 million loss GMR 
sustained in the first six months of 2001, a $400,000 
accounting error reported by the chief financial officer in 
August, and a $1.4 million discrepancy between the company's 
listed inventory and that which it actually held. 
In October 2001, as part of its effort to increase its 
services business, GMR began discussions with Seisint, Inc. 
(Seisint), a technology company with a super computer it 
wished to market to the federal government.  Seisint did not 
have contacts with the federal government, but GMR could 
provide those contacts through Jackson.  The Seisint 
executives, Henry E. Asher and Daniel W. Latham, worked 
directly with Jackson.  Eventually, GMR and Seisint executed a 
memorandum of understanding detailing GMR and Seisint's 
agreement to jointly market Seisint's super computer to the 
federal government. 
The remainder of 2001 and the early months of 2002 did 
not bring a significant change in GMR's financial status.  On 
March 5, 2002, GMR terminated Jackson's employment for cause.   
The termination letter accused Jackson of "gross 
mismanagement" of GMR's finances.  Pujals admitted, however, 
that when he wrote the letter he did not have "a specific 
amount of money in mind" as a basis for that statement. 
 
5
According to Asher, Pujals called Asher either the day 
Jackson was terminated, or the next day, and told Asher that 
Jackson "mismanaged the company and cost him a tremendous 
amount of money."  Latham testified that at a meeting in April 
2002 between GMR and Seisint executives Pujals initiated the 
subject of Jackson's firing and said that "Jackson had been 
removed from his job because he lost $3 million."  Pujals 
testified that at the April meeting he had responded to 
Asher's question regarding the details of Jackson's 
termination by saying the company, and not Jackson, lost $3 
million, which resulted in Pujals having to let Jackson go.  
Pujals admitted that Jackson did not lose $3 million for GMR 
and that "it would be false if someone said that." 
Following his termination, Jackson entered employment 
discussions with Seisint.  Because of the information Asher 
received from Pujals, Seisint, at Asher's direction did not 
hire Jackson for a management position but rather engaged him 
as a sales representative and consultant from March 6, 2002 
until December 31, 2002.  On January 1, 2003, Seisint hired 
Jackson as senior vice-president of government programs, which 
Jackson did not consider a management position. 
Pujals was upset when he heard that Jackson was working 
for Seisint because Jackson would not have known about Seisint 
if not for GMR.  Particularly, Pujals said:  "And to find out 
 
6
– and to find out that after we fired him for cause, that he's 
already employed immediately after and he has already a 
relationship right after was very, very – a very, very mean 
thing for him to do." 
I.  The Defamatory Statements 
 
 
The jury was instructed to return a verdict in favor of 
Jackson if it found that Jackson proved either of the 
following two statements: 
Mr. Pujals called Hank Asher within a few 
days of terminating Mr. Jackson (March 5, 
2002).  Mr. Pujals told Mr. Asher that Mr. 
Jackson had mismanaged GMR, had lost what 
Mr. Asher perceived or recalled as an 
exorbitant amount of money, and that Mr. 
Pujals had to let him go as a result; or 
 
In April 2002, Mr. Pujals told Daniel 
Latham, President of Homeland Defense 
[and] Seisint, Inc., and/or Mr. Asher, 
founder and CEO of Seisint, Inc., that he 
fired Al Jackson because Mr. Jackson lost 
$3 million. 
 
GMR2 contends that the first statement was not contained in 
Jackson's pleadings and was not timely asserted, that both 
statements were opinion and therefore could not be the subject 
                     
2 GMR and Pujals filed a joint appeal.  Therefore, 
throughout our discussion of these appeals, "GMR" will refer 
to Pujals and GMR collectively unless the context requires 
otherwise. 
 
7
of a defamation claim, and that Jackson did not prove that GMR 
uttered either statement in haec verba or with malice.3 
A.  Pleading the Defamation Claim 
Whether Jackson failed to plead and timely assert the 
first statement, as GMR contends, depends on whether that 
statement was included in the description of the alleged 
defamation contained in the motion for judgment and a 
subsequent bill of particulars.  A motion for judgment 
asserting a claim for defamation that does not recite all the 
specifics of the alleged defamatory statement, although not 
good pleading, may nevertheless state a "substantial cause of 
action imperfectly."  Federal Land Bank v. Birchfield, 173 Va. 
200, 217, 3 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1939).  The particulars of the 
allegedly defamatory statement may be supplied in a bill of 
particulars.  Id.  However, if, in supplying such specifics, a 
litigant identifies an allegedly defamatory statement that was 
not reasonably included in the original pleadings, such a 
statement constitutes a separate claim of defamation and must 
comply with Code § 8.01-247.1, the one-year statute of 
limitations for defamation claims.  See id. at 217-19, 3 
S.E.2d at 411-12. 
                     
3 GMR's argument that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of actual malice in this assignment of error 
is based on its assertion that the statements were entitled to 
 
8
In this case, Jackson's motion for judgment recited that 
Humberto ("Tico") Pujals and GMR made false and 
defamatory statements to executives of Seisint, 
Inc., stating that Mr. Jackson lost $3 million 
for GMR and was terminated as a result. 
 
In his bill of particulars, Jackson contended that "[o]n or 
around" April 12, 2002, at a business meeting between certain 
identified and unidentified Seisint executives and certain 
representatives of GMR, Pujals stated that in 2001 Jackson 
lost either "a significant amount" of money for GMR or 
"enormous amounts" of money for GMR.  The bill of particulars 
also recited that "[o]n or around" April 12, Pujals "made the 
statement to a Seisint executive (who has requested not to be 
named) that Mr. Jackson 'lost $3 million for GMR last year.' " 
 
On October 8, 2004, Jackson filed a supplemental answer 
to GMR's first set of interrogatories based on the de bene 
esse depositions of Asher and Latham taken by GMR September 
20, 2004 and July 13, 2004, respectively.4  In that answer, 
Jackson stated that Pujals called Asher "either the day, or 
within a few days of terminating Mr. Jackson" and told Asher 
that Jackson had "mismanaged" GMR, that Jackson lost what 
                                                                
a qualified privilege.  Qualified privilege is addressed 
infra. 
4 Jackson's supplemental answer included five alleged 
defamatory statements.  The trial court excluded three 
statements and they are not at issue on appeal.  Therefore, we 
only address the October 8 interrogatory answer as it relates 
to the two statements made by Pujals.  
 
9
Asher "perceived or recalled" to be an "exorbitant amount of 
money," and that Pujals "had to let" Jackson go.  The answer 
also recited that Pujals told Asher and Latham that he fired 
Jackson because Jackson "lost $3 million." 
 
GMR argues here, as it did in the trial court, that the 
first statement submitted to the jury involved a March phone 
call to Asher, which was not pled in either the motion for 
judgment or bill of particulars but was a new allegation of 
defamation based on statements first identified in the October 
8 interrogatory answer.  Because this statement was not pled 
within the one-year limitations period, GMR asserts that it 
was untimely and should not have been presented to the jury. 
In rejecting GMR's contention, the trial court concluded 
that the information contained in the October 8 interrogatory 
answer was "essentially the same allegation" as the statements 
alleged in the motion for judgment and the bill of particulars 
and did not constitute a new or separate defamation claim.  We 
find no error in the trial court's ruling. 
The defamation claim in the motion for judgment and the 
bill of particulars was that two statements were made to 
Seisint executives at an indeterminate time around April 12, 
2002, attributing the loss of large amounts of money to 
Jackson's management of GMR.  The October 8 interrogatory 
answer named a previously "unidentified" Seisint executive to 
 
10
whom one of the statements was made and identified the 
location and time frame of one of the statements.  The 
information provided in the October 8 interrogatory answer, 
the motion for judgment, and the bill of particulars was 
consistent with the statements provided to the jury as 
Jackson's defamation claim.  Therefore, the first statement 
was pled within the limitations period. 
B.  Opinion 
 
GMR next argues that the statements at issue were matters 
of opinion and thus could not be the basis of a defamation 
claim.  According to GMR, the terms "exorbitant" and 
"mismanaged" contained in the allegedly defamatory statements 
submitted to the jury represented Pujals' subjective judgments 
and were expressions of opinion only.5 
 
Statements that express only the speaker's opinion and 
not matters of fact are not actionable as defamation because 
such statements cannot be shown to be false.  Fuste v. 
Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, Inc., 265 Va. 127, 132, 575 S.E.2d 
858, 861 (2003).  "Statements that are relative in nature and 
depend largely upon the speaker's viewpoint are expressions of 
opinion."  Id.  Whether a statement is a statement of fact or 
                     
5 GMR also complains that the word "tremendous" reflects 
opinion, not fact.  However, although the jury heard testimony 
that GMR's financial losses were "tremendous," that word does 
 
11
opinion is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal.  
Jordan v. Kollman, 269 Va. 569, 576, 612 S.E.2d 203, 206-07 
(2005). 
In American Communications Network, Inc. v. Williams, 264 
Va. 336, 341-42, 568 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2002), we held that in 
considering whether a statement was one of fact or opinion, we 
do not isolate parts of an alleged defamatory statement.  
Rather, the alleged defamatory statement must be considered as 
a whole to determine whether it states a fact or non-
actionable opinion. 
The alleged defamation in this case is that Jackson's 
mismanagement caused GMR to lose money in 2001 which, in turn, 
was the basis for Jackson's termination.  Whether a company's 
financial loss is the result of mismanagement is a fact that 
can be proven.  Indeed, in this case, the parties introduced 
substantial evidence regarding the cause or causes of GMR's 
financial losses.  The evidence also established that 
government contracting was a very competitive business and 
success was often based on contacts with "the appropriate 
people."  The trial court observed that the evidence showed 
that Pujals' statements were made as a matter of fact "with 
the intent to defame Mr. Jackson so that he would not be able 
                                                                
not appear in the statements submitted to the jury and we need 
not include it in our discussion. 
 
12
to go to Seisint and get employment with them and cut GMR out 
of the picture." 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in ruling that the alleged defamatory statements were not 
opinion. 
C.  Proof of Defamation 
 
To prevail on a defamation claim, a "sufficient number" 
of the defamatory words must be proven "to make out a good 
cause of action. . . .  They must be substantially proven as 
alleged."  Birchfield, 173 Va. at 215, 3 S.E.2d at 410.  GMR 
contends that because neither Asher nor Latham could recall 
the exact words of the first or second statement, 
respectively, Jackson failed to carry his burden of proof and 
the trial court should have struck the defamation claim.  
However, Asher and Latham were not the only persons who 
testified as to the content of the defamatory statements. 
Jackson testified, "in the telephone call with Dan 
Latham, he told me that . . . Mr. Pujals said I had lost $3 
million for GMR, and that's why I had been fired."  Jackson 
also testified that Asher told Jackson that he understood 
Jackson "lost $3 million for GMR" and that is why Jackson was 
fired.  Pujals testified that he told Asher and Latham that 
the company lost $3 million dollars and "we had to let Jackson 
go." 
 
13
Latham testified that Asher was present when Pujals told 
Latham that Jackson was fired because Jackson had "lost $3 
million," and that $3 million "was a large sum of money for a 
company the size [of] GMR."  Asher testified that he had one 
and possibly two conversations with Pujals in which Pujals 
told Asher that Jackson had "mismanaged the company" and cost 
the company "tremendous" amounts of money. 
 
This evidence is sufficient to satisfy the standard that 
the defamatory words "must be substantially proven as 
alleged."  Birchfield, 173 Va. at 215, 3 S.E.2d at 410. 
Finally, GMR complains that the evidence was insufficient 
to support a finding of actual malice.6  Actual malice is also 
required as a basis for awarding punitive damages.  GMR has 
assigned error to the trial court's failure to strike the 
punitive damage award and, therefore, we will address GMR's 
arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of actual 
malice in the following discussion which addresses that 
assignment of error. 
II.  Proof of Actual Malice 
 
GMR also assigns error to the trial court's failure to 
strike Jackson's claim for punitive damages asserting Jackson 
                     
6 In conjunction with this assertion, GMR argued on brief 
that the trial court erred in finding that the statements were 
defamatory per se; however, GMR did not assign error to this 
holding and consequently we do not address it.  Rule 5:17(c). 
 
14
failed to provide clear and convincing proof of actual malice.  
GMR contends that the test we have established for such proof 
requires "much more than mere falsity" to sustain a finding of 
actual malice.  Citing Jordan, 269 Va. at 580, 612 S.E.2d at 
209, and The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 50, 325 
S.E.2d 713, 746 (1985), GMR asserts that this Court has 
determined that to establish actual malice, a plaintiff must 
produce clear and convincing proof that there were reasons for 
a defendant to doubt the veracity of the defamatory statement 
or that all judgment and reason were abandoned and no 
objective basis existed for the defamatory charge.  GMR 
misstates the law and misapplies these cases. 
To recover punitive damages in a defamation case, the 
plaintiff must prove actual malice by "clear and convincing 
evidence that [the defendant] either knew the statements he 
made were false at the time he made them, or that he made them 
with a reckless disregard for their truth."  Ingles v. Dively, 
246 Va. 244, 253, 435 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1993) (emphasis added).  
A plaintiff seeking punitive damages can prevail by 
establishing either circumstance by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
 
In both cases cited by GMR, the second circumstance – 
reckless disregard for the truth – was relied upon to show 
actual malice.  In Jordan, the defendant claimed that he did 
 
15
not know that the statements at issue were false; rather, he 
believed the statements to be true.  269 Va. at 580-81, 612 
S.E.2d at 209.  Similarly in The Gazette, the Court assumed 
without deciding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the 
defendant knew the defamatory statements were false.  229 Va. 
at 49, 325 S.E.2d at 746.  These cases are not relevant to the 
instant case because Jackson predicates his case of actual 
malice on Pujal's knowledge that his defamatory statements 
were false. 
 
In considering GMR's assertion that Jackson did not 
provide clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, we 
independently review the record, The Gazette, 229 Va. at 19, 
325 S.E.2d at 727, and we review the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party prevailing below.  Jordan, 269 Va. at 
577, 612 S.E.2d at 207.  The record in this case contains 
clear and convincing evidence that at the time Pujals made the 
statements ascribing GMR's loss of large amounts of money in 
2001 to Jackson, he knew those statements were false. 
Pujals himself testified that he knew Jackson did not 
lose $3 million for GMR and that "it would be false if someone 
said that."  According to Asher, Pujals called Asher either 
the day of or the day after Jackson's termination and told 
Asher that Jackson had mismanaged GMR and lost a tremendous or 
exorbitant amount of money.  Latham testified that at a 
 
16
meeting in April, Pujals also initiated the conversation 
regarding Jackson stating that "Jackson had been removed from 
his job because he lost $3 million."  In neither of these 
conversations did Pujals mention that the company's financial 
situation had been affected by a reduced line of credit, the 
$1.1 million loss in the first half of 2001, the $400,000 
accounting error, or the $1.4 million drop-ship inventory 
problem, none of which could be attributed to Jackson. 
 
In summary, Pujals knew his statements were false.  He 
initiated both conversations in which he defamed Jackson.  Our 
independent review of the record, considering the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Jackson, shows clear and 
convincing proof of actual malice; thus, the trial court did 
not err in refusing to strike Jackson's punitive damage claim. 
III.  Qualified Privilege 
 
The principle of qualified privilege protects a 
communication from allegations of defamation if made in good 
faith, to and by persons who have corresponding duties or 
interests in the subject of the communication.  Smalls v. 
Wright, 241 Va. 52, 54, 399 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1991).  A 
plaintiff can overcome the privilege by providing evidence 
that the statements were made with malice.  Fuste, 265 Va. at 
134, 575 S.E.2d at 863.  In this case, the trial court 
concluded that the privilege did not exist and declined to 
 
17
instruct the jury on the issue.  GMR asserts this holding was 
error. 
We need not resolve whether qualified privilege applied 
to the alleged defamation in this case because, even if it 
did, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury was 
harmless error.  In Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 
230 Va. 142, 154, 334 S.E.2d 846, 854 (1985), we held that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury that a qualified 
privilege could be overcome if actual malice was established 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  We held such error 
harmless, however, because the jury awarded punitive damages 
pursuant to an instruction that required proof of actual 
malice by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at 155, 334 
S.E.2d at 855.  Thus, "the jury necessarily found that the 
plaintiff had carried the heavier burden of proof . . . of 
malice sufficient to defeat the privilege."  Id. 
In this case, even if the alleged defamation was entitled 
to a qualified privilege, the privilege would have been lost 
if the jury found Pujals uttered the statements with actual 
malice.  As discussed above, the jury was required to and did 
find that the statements were made with actual malice when it 
awarded punitive damages.  Because we have already concluded 
that the record supports the award of punitive damages, we 
hold that any failure to instruct the jury on qualified 
 
18
privilege was harmless error because the privilege would have 
been lost upon the jury's finding of actual malice. 
IV.  Remittitur 
 
The trial court set aside the jury's $5 million 
compensatory damage award for defamation and ordered 
remittitur of $4 million leaving a compensatory damage award 
of $1 million.  Jackson accepted the judgment of the trial 
court under protest and filed this appeal pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-383.1. 
 
A trial court may set aside a verdict because it is 
excessive if the amount awarded shocks the conscience of the 
court either because it indicates "the jury has been motivated 
by passion, corruption or prejudice" or "has misconceived or 
misconstrued the facts or the law," or because it is so 
disproportionate "to the injuries suffered as to suggest that 
it is not the product of a fair and impartial decision."  
Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Virginia, Inc., 262 Va. 715, 
720-21, 554 S.E.2d, 72, 75 (2001) (quoting Edmiston v. 
Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 202, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1964)); 
Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254, 258, 467 S.E.2d 479, 481 
(1996). 
The trial court in this case concluded that the $5 
million jury verdict was shockingly excessive, explaining that 
it did not believe the jury was motivated by "bias, passion, 
 
19
or prejudice," but rather "misconceived or misunderstood the 
facts or the law."  The trial court opined that the jury 
confused and commingled elements of contract and defamation 
damages leading to an excessive compensatory defamation award. 
 
In reviewing a trial court's order of remittitur, we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard.  Shepard, 262 Va. at 
721, 554 S.E.2d at 75.  Applying this standard requires a two-
step analysis:  (1) we must find in the record both the trial 
court's conclusion the verdict was excessive and its analysis 
demonstrating that it "considered factors in evidence relevant 
to a reasoned evaluation of the damages" when drawing that 
conclusion, and then (2) we must determine whether the 
remitted award is "reasonab[ly] relat[ed] to the damages 
disclosed by the evidence."  Poulston, 251 Va. at 259, 467 
S.E.2d at 482 (quoting Bassett Furniture Indus. v. McReynolds, 
216 Va. 897, 911-12, 224 S.E.2d 323, 332 (1976)).  "Both of 
these steps require an evaluation of the evidence relevant to 
the issue of damages" and mandate that we consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party awarded the 
jury verdict, in this case Jackson.  Shepard, 262 Va. at 721, 
554 S.E.2d at 75. 
Jackson asserts the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding the $5 million jury verdict was excessive.  The 
record contains the trial court's conclusion the verdict was 
 
20
excessive and its reasons for that conclusion.  However, we do 
not find support for the trial court's conclusion in the 
record because the trial court failed to consider, in the 
light most favorable to Jackson, all the "factors in evidence 
relevant to a reasoned evaluation of the damages."  Poulston, 
251 Va. at 259, 467 S.E.2d at 482.  Thus, we hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the jury 
verdict on compensatory damages for defamation and in ordering 
remittitur. 
The trial court's explanation for its belief that the 
jury misconceived or misunderstood the facts and the law is 
that the jury was confused about which of Jackson's injuries 
could be compensated in the defamation award.  An obvious 
example of the jury's confusion and commingling, according to 
the trial court, was the jury's breach of contract award.  
Neither party disputes that the jury was confused and 
improperly included in the breach of contract award $88,000 
related to defamation.  This confusion and commingling, 
according to the trial court, indicates that the jury was also 
confused and improperly commingled other elements and evidence 
of damages in setting the defamation award. 
The trial court, appropriately, did not rely solely on 
the jury's mistake regarding the breach of contract award as 
sufficient support for its belief that the jury was also 
 
21
confused and included improper elements of damage in the 
defamation award.  The trial court identified other factors 
and evidence which it believed supported the conclusion that 
the defamation award was the product of confusion and 
inclusion of improper elements of damage. 
The trial court first identified as a source of confusion 
the jury instructions disallowing emotional distress damages 
on the breach of contract claim but allowing such damages on 
the defamation claim.  These instructions, in the court's 
view, led the jury to include in the defamation award 
emotional distress damages that arose not from the defamation, 
but from Jackson's termination.  This conclusion, however, is 
not supported by the record. 
The trial court, in response to GMR's motion in limine, 
excluded any evidence of emotional distress damages based on 
Jackson's termination from GMR, and we find no such evidence 
in the record.  Nevertheless, GMR attempts to defend the trial 
court's conclusion by referencing portions of the record out 
of context where Jackson refers to his emotional state at the 
time of his termination from GMR. 
As evidence that Jackson's emotional distress stemmed 
from his termination, GMR cites Jackson's testimony that he 
"was already under quite a bit of pressure as it was, since 
[he] had been terminated with no severance" and that the 
 
22
defamation was "in addition to the shock" Jackson had already 
endured.  However, Jackson made these statements in response 
to counsel's inquiry regarding his reaction upon learning of 
the defamation.  GMR also highlights Jackson's discussion of 
"having to start over" and "build a career again."  This 
testimony did not, as GMR suggests, pertain solely to his 
employment situation upon termination from GMR, but also to 
his career "at the moment" of trial when he was still trying 
to overcome the harm resulting from the defamation.  
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Jackson, we conclude that the record does not contain 
sufficient evidence regarding Jackson's emotional distress 
caused by termination from GMR to conclude that the jury 
included damages based on such emotional distress in its 
defamation award. 
 
Next, the trial court reasoned that the jury improperly 
included in the defamation award economic injuries Jackson had 
identified as flowing from his loss of employment with GMR, 
such as loss of GMR stock options.  The trial court found that 
statements Jackson's counsel made during argument on the 
remittitur motion reinforced its conclusion.  Again, the 
record does not support this conclusion. 
 
Jackson introduced evidence of the potential benefits 
stemming from his employment with GMR as part of his fraud 
 
23
claims.  The trial court struck those claims and so instructed 
the jury.  Nowhere in the record did Jackson claim these 
potential benefits as an element of damages, either for breach 
of contract or for defamation. 
While arguing against remittitur, Jackson's counsel did 
not identify those economic benefits as an element of 
Jackson's damages, but rather discussed them in response to 
the trial court's inquiry regarding why the amount of the 
award, $5 million, was not shocking.  Counsel explained that 
in the context of this case, $5 million was not an extravagant 
amount because chief executive officers and members of 
management in these types of businesses regularly dealt in 
multi-million dollar opportunities such as those Jackson 
identified as having taken place at GMR prior to his 
termination.  And, counsel continued, the jury was entitled to 
consider numbers of such size in making the defamation award 
because corporations were not offering Jackson such 
opportunities following the defamation, although they had 
offered opportunities to him prior to the defamation. 
 
More importantly, in considering reasons which might 
account for the size of the defamation award, the trial court 
ignored other evidence and elements upon which the jury could 
have based the award.  The trial court held that the 
defamatory statements constituted defamation per se and 
 
24
properly instructed the jury that Jackson was entitled to 
compensatory damages for injury to his personal and business 
reputation, humiliation, and embarrassment without proof of 
any actual or pecuniary injury.  The trial court also 
instructed the jury that in determining damages for the 
defamation claim it could 
take into consideration all of the circumstances 
surrounding the statement, the occasion on which it 
was made and the extent of its publication, the 
nature and character of the insult, the probable 
effect on those who heard the statement, and its 
probable and natural effect upon the plaintiff's 
personal feelings and upon his standing in the 
community and in business. 
 
Your verdict should be for an amount that will fully 
and fairly compensate him for: 
 
(1) any loss or injury to his business; 
 
(2) any insult to him including any pains, 
embarrassment, humiliation, or mental 
suffering; 
 
(3) any injury to his reputation; and 
 
(4) any actual, out-of-pocket losses that were 
caused by the statement. 
 
In deciding to order remittitur, the trial court failed to 
address Jackson's evidence regarding injury to his reputation, 
humiliation, and embarrassment.  The trial court also failed 
to acknowledge Jackson's right to recover greater damages 
because he presented evidence of his untarnished reputation 
prior to the defamation and of his fear the defaming remarks 
 
25
reached members of the business community beyond the Seisint 
executives.  See Poulston, 251 Va. at 261-62, 467 S.E.2d at 
483. 
Jackson established that though he immediately began 
working for Seisint after his termination, the defaming 
remarks caused him to lose the chance of obtaining a 
management position and the lucrative opportunities available 
to similarly situated managers.  From March 2002 to January 
2003, Jackson worked in sales and as a consultant to Seisint 
and other companies.  His earnings were largely commission-
based, dependent upon his success in selling Seisint's systems 
to the federal government.  When Seisint eventually hired him, 
Jackson did not hold what he considered a management position 
because he did not report to the chief executive officer, was 
not included in management meetings, and had no ability to 
make management decisions.  Seisint hired approximately six 
managers in the year Jackson served as a consultant and 
employee.  Jackson expressed distress and humiliation due to 
losing his opportunity to manage after 25 years:  "It made me 
feel, frankly, quite humiliated and as though I was underused, 
and it put me in a stressful situation where I didn't have 
much control." 
Jackson established his unblemished reputation by 
testifying to his rise in his field, including obtaining and 
 
26
maintaining coveted top-level security clearances with the 
federal government through multiple extensive "lifestyle 
polygraph" examinations.  He also discussed his fears about 
wider publication of the defaming remarks when he testified to 
receiving no inquiries from potential employers after sending 
resumes to "tens of people literally" compared to 15 months 
earlier, prior to the defamation, when he had three potential 
job opportunities. 
In determining that the defamation award was excessive, 
the trial court did not address the injuries presumed in 
defamation per se or the evidence regarding the impact of the 
defamation on Jackson's emotional state, reputation, and 
employment opportunities, all of which the jury was entitled 
to consider.  Therefore, the record does not support a finding 
that the trial court "considered factors in evidence relevant 
to the reasoned evaluation of the damages."  Poulston, 251 Va. 
at 259, 467 S.E.2d at 482. 
Finally, GMR also contends we should affirm the trial 
court's order because, in comparison with other verdicts for 
defamation upheld in Virginia, the defamation award in this 
case is excessively large.  In the recent case of Rose v. 
Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 597 S.E.2d 64 (2004), we declined to 
compare verdicts as a means to measure a verdict's 
excessiveness, but instead analyzed, as we have today, whether 
 
27
the jury was influenced by passion, corruption, or prejudice, 
or misunderstood the facts or law.  Id. at 159, 597 S.E.2d at 
77 (citing Shepard, 262 Va. at 720-21, 554 S.E.2d at 75).  
Additionally, verdicts for defamation per se are not suitable 
for comparison because each case is factually unique and 
because juries are entitled to presume and award compensatory 
damages even if the plaintiff cannot prove actual injury.  See 
Poulston, 251 Va. at 260-61, 467 S.E.2d at 483.  Thus, we find 
no merit in GMR's argument that Jackson's verdict is excessive 
when compared with other defamation verdicts. 
V.  Summary 
In summary, the alleged defamatory statements were timely 
and properly pled and proven and were not statements of 
opinion.  Assuming without deciding that the statements were 
entitled to qualified privilege, the failure to instruct the 
jury on this issue was harmless error because actual malice 
was established by clear and convincing evidence.  The trial 
court abused its discretion in setting aside the jury award 
for compensatory damages based on defamation and in ordering 
remittitur because the record does not support the trial 
court's conclusion that the award was excessive or was the 
product of jury confusion and commingling.  Further, the trial 
court failed to consider elements of recovery upon which the 
 
28
compensatory damage award could be based and the evidence 
which supported those elements. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court, but will reverse that portion of the judgment setting 
aside the compensatory damage award on Jackson's defamation 
claim and ordering remittitur and enter final judgment 
reinstating the jury verdict on that award. 
Record No. 050943 – Affirmed. 
Record No. 050937 – Reversed and 
final judgment.