Title: Holdredge v. City of Cleveland
Citation: 402 S.W.2d 709
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 1966

402 S.W.2d 709 (1966) Homer F. HOLDREDGE et al, Appellants, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND et al., Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. April 15, 1966. Stuart &amp; Hyberger and James F. Corn, Sr., Cleveland, for appellants. Bell, Whitson, Painter &amp; McMurray and Mayfield &amp; Mayfield, Cleveland, for appellees. *710 CHATTIN, Justice. The appellants, complainants below, filed the bill in this cause under the Declaratory Judgments Act against the appellees and cross-appellants, defendants below; the City of Cleveland; Church of God; and James L. Wolfe and wife, Georgia L. Wolfe; seeking to have an ordinance amending the zoning ordinance of the City of Cleveland declared invalid and unconstitutional; also that the defendants Wolfe be prevented from revoking or rescinding certain building restrictions; that a building permit issued to the Church of God be declared void; and that the Church of God be enjoined from using any property it might acquire from Wolfe for other than residential purposes. The defendants filed demurrers on the grounds that: (1) complainants' sole remedy was by certiorari under T.C.A. Section 27-901, et seq., and their bill could not be sustained under the Declaratory Judgments Act; (2) the bill was multifarious; and (3) complainants had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The record shows the City of Cleveland passed on third and final reading a comprehensive zoning ordinance pursuant to the authority of Chapter 7, Title 13, Section 701, et seq., T.C.A., on April 9, 1962. The bill alleged that the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. James L. Wolfe, had sold or optioned to the Church of God a tract or parcel of land adjoining the Oakland Estates Subdivision upon which the Church plans to erect an office building to be used as the international headquarters of the Church of God. The bill also alleged complainants are residents of the Oakland Estates Subdivision and that the parcel of land upon which the Church plans to erect the office building was by the zoning ordinance enacted on April 9, 1962, restricted to residential purposes. It is then alleged in the bill that on April 23, 1965, over the protests of complainants, the Board of Mayor and Commissioners of the City of Cleveland enacted an ordinance amending the zoning ordinance of April 9, 1962, so as to permit the Church to consummate its plans to erect the office building. The bill charged the amendment was enacted by the Board of Mayor and Commissioners without first submitting the amendment to the Planning Commission of the City of Cleveland for its approval; and that, therefore, the amendment was ineffective and void by virtue of T.C.A. Section 13-704. The bill further alleged the purported amendment was unconstitutional for several reasons which we deem unnecessary to set forth here. The Chancellor dismissed the bill as to the defendants, Wolfe and wife, as multifarious. This ruling of the Chancellor is not challenged here. He sustained the demurrers of the City of Cleveland and the Church of God which challenged the right of the complainants to attack the validity of the ordinance of April 23, 1965, which attempted to amend the zoning ordinance of April 9, 1962, other than by a petition for certiorari. He overruled the demurrers insofar as they challenged the right of complainants to test the constitutionality of the ordinance under the Declaratory Judgments Act. He, accordingly, held the ordinance valid and constitutional insofar as complainants were concerned. Complainants and defendants have each appealed. The complainants insist the Chancellor was in error in holding their sole and exclusive remedy to test the validity of the ordinance was by a petition for certiorari. Specifically, the Chancellor held: (Now T.C.A. Secs. 27-901, et sequa). Evidently, the Chancellor overlooked the fact that in both the Brooks and Sherwood cases the Court was concerned with zoning regulations of the City of Memphis authorized by Private Acts. Here, we are concerned with a Public Act codified as T.C.A. Section 13-701, et seq. Chapter 165 of the Private Acts of 1921 authorized the City of Memphis to enact by ordinance zoning regulations. The Act also provides the method by which the zoning regulations may be amended. We quote from the Act: In the Brooks case, the petitioner, Mrs. Brooks, after the amendment was passed and notice given in compliance with the *712 Act by the City Commission, appeared before the City Commission and protested the making of the amendment on the grounds it was arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory and unconstitutional insofar as it affected her property. The Board of Commissioners, after a full hearing which petitioner attended with her Counsel, overruled her objections and approved the ordinance. Thus, the City Commission made an order or judgment upon evidence introduced before them as authorized by the zoning acts applicable to the City of Memphis. It is clear the City Commission, in this respect, was acting in an administrative or quasi-judicial capacity as authorized by the Private Act of the Legislature. It is apparent from what we have quoted from the Private Act authorizing the City Commission of Memphis to approve any change of zoning regulations and ordinances makes such action of the Commission final and conclusive as stated in the Brooks case. However, in the case at bar we are concerned with a Public Act, codified in T.C.A. Section 13-701, et seq. T.C.A. Section 13-703 provides before enacting an amendment to a zoning ordinance, enacted under authority of this Chapter, the chief legislative body of the municipality shall, upon fifteen days notice, hold a public hearing on the proposed amendment. This provision was evidently complied with since the bill charged the amendatory ordinance was passed over the protests of complainants. Defendants insist the passage of the amendment after the public hearing amounted to a final order or judgment approving the ordinance and was conclusive; and, as held in the Brooks case, complainants' exclusive remedy was by petition for certiorari. We cannot agree. The Section requires a hearing prior to the enactment of an amendment. Under the Private Act applicable to the City of Memphis, the legislative body is authorized to conduct the hearing after the passage of the amendment and to confirm, modify or rescind the amendment. Under T.C.A. Section 13-703, the hearing is a prerequisite to the passage or adoption of an effective amendment. The Section does not empower the legislative body to conduct a public hearing after the adoption of the amendment and confirm, modify or rescind the amendment. The adoption of the amendment was a legislative act. The remedy by certiorari provided in T.C.A. 27-901, et seq., "was intended to have application only in a review of an order or judgment rendered after a hearing before a board or commission." Stockton v. Morris &amp; Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197, 110 S.W.2d 480 (1937). T.C.A. Section 13-704 provides: Thus, it was not only essential for the Board of Mayor and Commissioners to hold the public hearing; but, also, to submit the amendment to the Planning Commission before the Board could enact a valid ordinance, if this Section is mandatory. The bill in the instant case alleges and the demurrers admit this Section was not complied with in enacting the amendment. Zoning laws are enacted in the exercise of police power. The police power belongs to the state, and passes to municipalities only when and as conveyed by legislative enactment. State ex rel. Lightman v. City of Nashville, 166 Tenn. 191, 60 S.W.2d 161 (1933). Furthermore, "whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form * * *. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way, shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when some antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercised, the statute must be regarded as mandatory." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 376, pages 872, 873 and 874; Stiner v. Powells Valley Hardware Co., 168 Tenn. 99, 75 S.W.2d 406 (1934). The language here under consideration is mandatory in form. That is "no amendment shall become effective unless it be first submitted to the Planning Commission" for its approval. For the foregoing reasons, we think the Section is mandatory. T.C.A. Section 23-1103 of our Declaratory Judgments Act provides: In the case of Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. City of Knoxville, 181 Tenn. 622, 184 S.W.2d 4 (1944), it was said: Chancery Court had jurisdiction of suit by holders of beer permits for a declaratory judgment as to validity of city ordinance prohibiting sale of beer. Grubb v. Mayor &amp; Aldermen of Morristown, 185 Tenn. 114, 203 S.W.2d 593 (1947). Municipal ordinances may be declared void when not passed regularly or according to the forms of law. Brumley v. Town of Greeneville, 38 Tenn. App. 322, 274 S.W.2d 12 (1954). We are convinced the validity of the ordinance amending the zoning ordinance *714 may be tested under our Declaratory Judgments Act and that certiorari is not the exclusive remedy. We think the Chancellor was in error in holding to the contrary. What we have heretofore said necessarily disposes of the assignment of error of the City of Cleveland and of the Church of God to the effect certiorari was the only and exclusive remedy available to complainants to test the constitutionality of the amendment. It is our opinion the Chancellor was correct in overruling this ground of the demurrer. Since we must reverse the Chancellor, as indicated, we deem it would be premature for us, at this stage of the proceedings, to pass on the other assignments filed in behalf of the complainants, which challenge the action of the Chancellor in finding the amendment constitutional and that it did not constitute "spot zoning." The decree of the Chancellor is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The appellees will pay the costs of the appeal. The costs below will await the final outcome in the trial court. BURNETT, C. J., and WHITE, DYER and CRESON, JJ., concur.