Title: P. v. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S129052
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2006

1 
Filed 5/15/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S129052 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A104219 
SEAN KING, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 186344 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 12020 (section 12020(a)(1)),1 
prohibits the possession of a variety of weapons.  Does it require a culpable mental 
state, or is it a “public welfare offense,” for which proof of a culpable mental state 
is not required?  We conclude that section 12020(a)(1) is not a public welfare 
offense, and that the prosecution must prove the possessor’s knowledge of the 
weapon’s illegal characteristics.   
We also conclude that when, as here, the prohibited weapon is a “short-
barreled rifle” – in this case a rifle that had been altered to reduce its overall length 
to less than 26 inches – the prosecution need only establish the defendant’s 
knowledge of the shortness of the rifle, not its precise dimensions.  The Court of 
Appeal held that the trial court’s failure to instruct on knowledge required reversal 
of defendant’s conviction for illegally possessing the rifle, concluding that the 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise stated, all further citations are to the Penal Code. 
2 
evidence was in conflict as to whether he knew that the rifle was shorter than the 
legally allowed 26 inches in overall length specified in the statute.  Because the 
uncontested evidence established defendant’s knowledge of the rifle’s size, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I 
On December 4, 2001, San Francisco police officers executed a search 
warrant at a house occupied by defendant, his mother, and his brother.  From a 
workbench in the garage they retrieved a loaded rifle, the stock of which had been 
sawed off, so that its overall length was 24 1/8 inches.  In defendant’s bedroom, 
they found methamphetamine and narcotics paraphernalia.   
Defendant was charged with possession of a short-barreled rifle 
(§ 12020(a)(1)), selling or furnishing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11379), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377), 
possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364), and other 
crimes not relevant here.2  
At trial, defendant admitted he knew the rifle was in the workbench drawer, 
and that he “probably picked it up to look at it” while cleaning the workbench, but 
he denied ownership of the rifle, claiming it must have belonged to his brother or 
one of his brother’s friends.  He said he did not know the length of the rifle.   
                                              
2  
Defendant was charged in a 39-count information with kidnapping, 
drugging, robbing, threatening, and repeatedly sexually assaulting a prostitute, 
crimes that collectively carried a maximum sentence of more than 500 years in 
prison.  The jury acquitted defendant on 29 counts.  It deadlocked on six other 
counts, with either 10 or 11 votes for acquittal on each count, and the prosecution 
elected not to retry defendant on those charges.  The jury convicted defendant only 
of the weapon and drug charges previously mentioned. 
3 
With respect to the violation of section 12020(a)(1), the trial court gave this 
standard instruction:  “Every person who possesses a rifle with an overall length of 
less than 26 inches is guilty of [violating section 12020(a)(1)].  [¶]  There are two 
kinds of possession:  actual possession and constructive possession.  [¶]  ‘Actual 
possession’ requires that a person knowingly exercise direct physical control over 
a thing.  [¶]  ‘Constructive possession’ does not require actual possession, but does 
require that a person knowingly exercise control over or the right to control a 
thing, either directly or through another person or persons.  [¶]  One person may 
have possession alone, or two or more persons together may share actual or 
constructive possession.  [¶]  In order to prove this crime . . . each of the following 
elements must be proved:  [¶]  . . . [a] person possessed any rifle with an overall 
length of less than 26 inches.” 
The jury convicted defendant of the crimes previously mentioned, and the 
trial court sentenced him to a term of five years and four months in prison, eight 
months of which were attributable to the violation of section 12020(a)(1). 
The Court of Appeal reversed defendant’s conviction for violating section 
12020(a)(1).  It held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in not 
instructing the jury that to convict defendant, the prosecution was required to 
prove that he knew or reasonably should have known the illegal characteristic of 
the short-barreled rifle he was charged with possessing.  We granted the Attorney 
General’s petition for review. 
II 
Section 12020 prohibits the possession of various “unusual, sophisticated 
weapons, some with mysterious and evil-sounding names . . . .”  (People v. Taylor 
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.)  It includes such exotic items as a fléchette dart, 
4 
a shuriken, and a shobi-zue, as well as more commonplace weapons such as 
blackjacks, billy clubs, and metal knuckles.3  Among the prohibited items is a 
“short-barreled rifle.”  The phrase “short-barreled rifle” is a term of art that 
includes not only rifles with a barrel less than 16 inches long, but also rifles whose 
overall length is less than 26 inches, regardless of the length of the barrel.  
(§ 12020, subd. (c)(2).)4  Here, the rifle seized from the garage was 24 1/8 inches 
long.  
At issue is whether the Legislature intended section 12020(a)(1) to be a 
public welfare offense, or whether the Legislature intended the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant had a culpable mental state, or mens rea, in which case 
we must decide the precise nature of that mental state. 
                                              
3  
Section 12020(a)(1) provides:  “Any person in this state who does any of 
the following is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one 
year or in the state prison:  [¶]  (1) Manufactures or causes to be manufactured, 
imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives, 
lends, or possesses any cane gun or wallet gun, any undetectable firearm, any 
firearm which is not immediately recognizable as a firearm, any camouflaging 
firearm container, any ammunition which contains or consists of any fléchette 
dart, any bullet containing or carrying an explosive agent, any ballistic knife, any 
multiburst trigger activator, any nunchaku, any short-barreled shotgun, any short-
barreled rifle, any metal knuckles, any belt buckle knife, any leaded cane, any zip 
gun, any shuriken, any unconventional pistol, any lipstick case knife, any cane 
sword, any shobi-zue, any air gauge knife, any writing pen knife, any metal 
military practice handgrenade or metal replica handgrenade, or any instrument or 
weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, 
sap, or sandbag.”  (Italics added.) 
4  
A rifle is also defined as “short-barreled” if it may be “readily restored” so 
as to fall within the other definitions of a short-barreled rifle; if it is a part or 
combination of parts designed and intended to be converted into a short-barreled 
rifle; or if it is a combination of parts that could be readily be assembled into a 
short-barreled rifle.  (§ 12020, subd. (c)(2).) 
5 
The basic rules of statutory construction are well established.  “When 
construing a statute, a court seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the 
enacting legislative body.”  (People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 810.)  
“ ‘We first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is 
generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  [Citation.]  The words of 
the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be 
construed in their statutory context.’  [Citation.]  If the plain, commonsense 
meaning of a statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”  (Fitch 
v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818.)  But if the statutory language 
may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, “ ‘ “courts may consider 
various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be 
remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme 
encompassing the statute.” ’ ”  (People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 538; 
People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172.) 
Although the language of section 12020(a)(1) does not specifically mention 
a culpable mental state, this does not mean that the Legislature did not intend to 
require one.  As a general rule, no crime is committed unless there is a union of act 
and either wrongful intent or criminal negligence.  (In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 866, 872; see § 20.)  This rule, which is “firmly embedded” in “ ‘the 
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence’ ” (Staples v. United States 
(1994) 511 U.S. 600, 605) is so basic that wrongful intent or criminal negligence 
“is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary 
implication” (People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. omitted; People 
v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 876), and “penal statutes will often be construed 
to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to state it” (In re Jorge 
M., supra, at p. 872; see also Staples v. United States, supra, at pp. 605-606). 
6 
Proof of a culpable mental state is, however, not required for “public 
welfare offenses.”  These crimes generally involve the violation of statutes that are 
purely regulatory in nature and seek to protect the health and safety of the public.  
(Staples v. United States, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 606-607; In re Jorge M., supra, 
23 Cal.4th at p. 872.)  Examples of such statutes are furnishing alcohol to a minor 
(In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 266), sale of adulterated food (In re 
Casperson (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 441, 443) and driving with a prohibited blood-
alcohol concentration (Ostrow v. Municipal Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 668).  
(See also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 17, 
pp. 220-222.)  In the words of this court:  “ ‘[Public welfare] offenses usually 
involve light penalties and no moral obloquy or damage to reputation.  Although 
criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regulation 
rather than punishment or correction.  The offenses are not crimes in the orthodox 
sense, and wrongful intent is not required in the interest of enforcement.’ ”  
(People v. Coria, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 877.)  
The Attorney General here contends that section 12020(a)(1) is a public 
welfare offense.  Although he acknowledges that a violation of section 
12020(a)(1) requires “proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the 
weapon” the defendant is accused of possessing, he argues that the crime does not 
require proof of the defendant’s “knowledge of the contraband character which 
renders the weapon illegal.”  As explained below, we disagree. 
Section 12020 was enacted in 1953 as part of the Dangerous Weapons’ 
Control Law (§§ 12000-12520).  As originally enacted, the statute stated:  “Any 
person in this State who manufactures or causes to be manufactured, imports into 
the State, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives, lends, or 
possesses any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, 
slung shot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, or metal knuckles, or who carries concealed 
7 
upon his person any explosive substance, other than fixed ammunition, or who 
carries concealed upon his person any dirk or dagger, is guilty of a felony, and 
upon conviction shall be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one year or in a state prison for not less than one year nor more than 
five years.”  (Stats. 1953, ch. 36, § 1, p. 653, italics added.)  The statute was 
derived from a similarly worded uncodified statute enacted three decades earlier.  
(Stats. 1923, ch. 339, § 1, p. 696; see also Stats. 1917, ch. 145, § 1, p. 221.) 
Since 1953, the Legislature has amended section 12020 many times to 
expand the list of prohibited weapons, and to add definitional subdivisions 
describing many of those weapons.  Possession of a short-barreled rifle, at issue 
here, became prohibited in 1988.  (Stats. 1988, ch. 1269, § 2 et seq., p. 4215.)  But 
the statutory language we italicized in the preceding paragraph (any person who 
possesses a weapon listed in the statute is guilty of violating the statute) has 
remained unaltered. 
Two decisions of this court, People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 (Grubb) 
and People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322 (Rubalcava), bear upon the 
requisite mental state for violations of section 12020(a)(1). 
In Grubb, police officers found a small baseball bat, taped and with part of 
the handle broken off, in the trunk of the defendant’s car.  He was convicted of 
possessing a “billy” in violation of section 12020.  He argued that the term “billy” 
was unconstitutionally vague.  We disagreed.  We explained that an item 
commonly used for a nonviolent purpose, such as a baseball bat or a table leg, 
could qualify as a billy, but only “when the attendant circumstances, including the 
time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard 
form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for 
a dangerous, not harmless, purpose.”  (Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 620-621, fn. 
omitted.)  Although “[t]he prosecution need not show the intent of the possessor to 
8 
use the instrument in a violent manner” (id. at p. 621, fn. 9) a defendant “may be 
able to demonstrate an innocent usage of the object” (id. at p. 621).  The burden, 
however, is on the defendant to show that possession of the weapon was for an 
innocent purpose.  (Ibid.)  
Thereafter, in Rubalcava, we held that the crime of carrying a concealed 
dirk or dagger (§ 12020, subd. (a)) “contain[s] a ‘knowledge’ element” 
(Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 332) because it “criminalizes ‘ “traditionally 
lawful conduct” ’ ” (id. at p. 331).  We explained:  “[T]o commit the offense, a 
defendant must still have the requisite guilty mind:  that is, the defendant must 
knowingly and intentionally carry concealed upon his or her person an instrument 
‘that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon.’  (§ 12020, subds. (a), (c)(24).)  
A defendant who does not know that he is carrying the weapon or that the 
concealed instrument may be used as a stabbing weapon is therefore not guilty of 
violating section 12020.”  (Id. at p. 332, fn. omitted.) 
Thus, contrary to the Attorney General’s contention here, a violation of 
section 12020(a)(1) is not a public welfare offense, subjecting the offender to strict 
liability, but instead it requires a culpable mental state, as we made clear in Grubb 
and in Rubalcava.  As Grubb pointed out, the “innocent usage” of a billy, one of 
the items prohibited in section 12020, does not violate that section.  (Grubb, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 621.)  And as Rubalcava noted, the crime of carrying a 
concealed dirk or dagger, also prohibited in section 12020, is “not . . . a strict 
liability offense”; “to commit the offense, a defendant must still have the requisite 
guilty mind . . . .”  (Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 331-332.) 
In an effort to distinguish Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322, the Attorney 
General points out that the crime of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, which 
was involved in Rubalcava, appears in subdivision (a)(4) of section 12020, rather 
than in subdivision (a)(1), which prohibits possession of a short-barreled rifle and 
9 
is at issue here.  Thus, he argues that our holding in Rubalcava that carrying a 
concealed dirk or dagger is not a public welfare offense is not controlling here.  
We disagree.  At the time of the offense in Rubalcava, subdivision (a) of section 
12020 was not divided into subparagraphs, as it is now.  Instead, all the prohibited 
weapons listed in section 12020, including possession of a short-barreled rifle, the 
offense in this case, were listed together in subdivision (a).5  Thus, our conclusion 
in Rubalcava that carrying a concealed dirk or dagger was not a public welfare 
offense also applies to any other weapon that was then listed in subdivision (a) of 
section 12020 and is now specified in subdivision (a)(1) of that statute. 
The Attorney General also relies on two decisions by the Court of Appeal 
holding that section 12020 is a public welfare offense.  They are People 
v. Valencia (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1415, and People v. Azevedo (1984) 161 
Cal.App.3d 235, 240; in accord is a third case, People v. Lanham (1991) 230 
Cal.App.3d 1396.  (But see People v. Prochnau (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 22, 30 
[stating in dictum that to prove a violation of section 12020, the prosecution must 
prove knowledge of the weapon’s “contraband character”].)  The Court of Appeal 
decisions in Valencia, Azevedo, and Lanham have, however, been superseded by 
our later decision in Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322, which reached a contrary 
conclusion.  To the extent they are inconsistent with Rubalcava and this opinion, 
those Court of Appeal decisions are disapproved.  After we decided Rubalcava, 
the Court of Appeal in People v. Taylor, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 941, a 
                                              
5  
After the defendant’s commission of the offense in Rubalcava, supra, 23 
Cal.4th 322, but before our decision in that case, the Legislature divided 
subdivision (a) of section 12020 into parts (1) through (4).  (Stats. 1999, ch. 129, 
§ 3.5.) 
10 
decision authored by Presiding Justice Scotland, correctly held that section 12020 
requires a culpable mental state.    
The Attorney General insists that subdivision (a)(1) of section 12020 sets 
forth a public welfare offense because all the weapons listed in that subdivision 
“share two things in common:  their readily concealable nature and their lack of 
any lawful, utilitarian purpose.”  He contends:  “There is no such thing as the 
‘innocent’ possession” of the weapons listed in section 12020(a)(1) because they 
“simply cannot lawfully be possessed at all.”   
Contrary to the Attorney General’s assertion, many of the weapons listed in 
section 12020(a)(1) do have a lawful, utilitarian purpose.  For instance, as we 
pointed out in Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at page 621, a baseball bat or a table leg, 
each of which unquestionably has lawful, utilitarian purposes, may nevertheless 
constitute a “billy,” possession of which violates section 12020(a)(1).  Indeed, 
many prohibited items in section 12020(a)(1) – a cane gun, a belt buckle knife, an 
air gauge knife, and a writing pen knife, to name but a few –have an obvious 
lawful, utilitarian purpose, but because they are also disguised weapons, their 
possession is illegal.6  Even sawed-off rifles have a lawful purpose, in certain 
limited circumstances that are enumerated in the Penal Code (§§ 12095-12099), 
and are discussed on the Attorney General’s own Web site.  (See 
                                              
6  
A cane gun is a “firearm mounted or enclosed in a stick, staff, rod, crutch, 
or similar device, designed to be . . . used as . . . an aid in walking, if the firearm 
may be fired while mounted or enclosed therein.”  (§ 12020, subd. (c)(5).)  A belt 
buckle knife is “a knife which is made an integral part of a belt buckle . . . .”  (Id., 
subd. (c)(13).)  An air gauge knife is “a device that appears to be an air gauge but 
has concealed within it a pointed, metallic shaft that is designed to be a stabbing 
instrument . . . .”  (Id., subd. (c)(18).)  A writing pen knife is “a device that appears 
to be a writing pen but has concealed within it a pointed, metallic shaft that is 
designed to be a stabbing instrument . . . .”  (Id., subd. (c)(19).) 
11 
http://caag.state.ca.us/firearms/dwcl/12095.htm [as of May 15, 2006].)  It is highly 
unlikely that the Legislature intended that a person possessing an item listed in 
section 12020(a)(1) for its lawful, utilitarian purpose, but unaware of the 
characteristic that makes possession of the item illegal, would nevertheless be 
guilty of violating section 12020(a)(1).  An example would be a person who 
borrows a cane for the legitimate purpose of using it as an aid in walking, unaware 
that a gun is hidden inside it, making its possession illegal under section 
12020(a)(1). 
Having concluded that the Legislature intended a culpable mental state for 
a violation of section 12020(a)(1), we now have to determine what precisely that 
mental state is. 
In In re Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th 866 (Jorge M.), this court examined 
the Legislature’s intent when it enacted the Assault Weapons Control Act 
(§§ 12275-12290), which prohibits the possession of unregistered assault 
weapons.  To determine the Legislature’s intent, Jorge M. looked at factors such 
as the act’s legislative history, other laws discussing the mental state generally 
required for criminal offenses, the severity of the punishment for the crime, and 
the difficulty prosecutors would have in proving a defendant’s mental state.  This 
court then concluded that in enacting the Assault Weapons Control Act, the 
Legislature intended the crime of possessing an unregistered assault weapon 
(§ 12280, subd. (b)) to require proof that the offender knew or reasonably should 
have known that the firearm he or she possessed had characteristics that made it an 
assault weapon.  To require solely a defendant’s actual knowledge, we said, could 
not have been the Legislature’s intent because “[a]n actual knowledge element has 
significant potential to impair effective enforcement” of the Assault Weapons 
Control Act (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 884), and “would predictably 
constitute a heavy burden for the prosecution” (id. at p. 885). 
12 
The holding of Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th 866, requiring the prosecution 
either to prove a defendant’s actual knowledge or to satisfy a lesser “reasonably 
should have known” requirement, does not apply here, however.  At issue in Jorge 
M. was the Assault Weapons Control Act.  Here, we are dealing with section 
12020, a statute that does not involve assault weapons.  As discussed earlier, we 
concluded in Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pages 331-332, that the Legislature 
must have intended section 12020 to require proof of a defendant’s actual 
knowledge.  This would not impose an unduly heavy burden on the prosecution, 
because, as explained below, proving a defendant’s knowledge of a short-barreled 
rifle’s illegal characteristic generally will not be too difficult a task.  
First, the prosecution must prove that the item had the necessary 
characteristic to fall within the statutory description.  It must also prove that the 
defendant knew of the characteristic.  That is, it must prove that a defendant 
charged with possession of a short-barreled rifle knew the rifle was unusually 
short, but the defendant need not know the rifle’s actual dimensions.  Similarly, a 
defendant charged with illegally possessing a cane sword must know that the cane 
contained a sword, and a defendant charged with possessing a writing pen knife 
must know that the pen contained a stabbing instrument.  Knowledge can, of 
course, be proved circumstantially.  Further, the prosecution need not prove that 
the defendant knew there was a law against possessing the item, nor that the 
defendant intended to break or violate the law.  
The prosecution need not prove the defendant’s knowledge of the rifle’s 
precise length.  Short-barreled rifles are illegal simply because they are short, 
which makes them “suitable for unlawful purposes because of their concealability 
and ease of handling.”  (People v. Rooney (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211; see 
also People v. Stinson (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 497, 500.)  A person possessing a 
short-barreled rifle, and having actually observed the weapon, necessarily knows 
13 
of its shortness, and thus knows its illegal characteristic, whether or not the person 
knows how many inches long the weapon is.  That is particularly true of the rifle 
in this case, the stock of which had been crudely sawed off to reduce its overall 
length.  To require the prosecution to prove that a defendant knows the precise 
length of a rifle prohibited by section 12020(a) would make convictions for 
possessing such weapons virtually impossible to obtain, because few criminals 
would take the time to measure their rifles.   
III 
We now apply our construction of section 12020(a)(1) to the facts of this 
case.  Here, when the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of 
illegally possessing a short-barreled rifle, it did not mention that the prosecution 
must prove defendant’s knowledge of the short-barreled rifle’s illegal 
characteristic, namely, its shortness.  The court erred by failing to give this 
instruction because, as we have explained in part II, ante, the prosecution was 
required to prove that defendant knew of the rifle’s illegal shortness. 
The Court of Appeal held that the instructional error described above was 
prejudicial error, requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction for violating section 
12020(a)(1).  It pointed out that the sawed-off rifle that defendant was charged 
with possessing was 24 1/8 inches long, less than two inches shorter than the 
minimum permitted length of 26 inches, and “thus not visibly different in length 
from rifles which may be possessed lawfully.”  It also noted that the rifle was 
found in a common area of the house (the garage) that was not exclusively used by 
defendant, but was shared with his mother and brother.  The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that, based on defendant’s testimony that he did not own the rifle and 
that it “possibly” belonged to his brother or his brother’s friend, the jury could 
have concluded that he was unaware of the rifle’s illegal characteristic.  We 
disagree. 
14 
The undisputed evidence presented at trial showed that defendant was 
aware of the shortness of the rifle he was charged with possessing, because he 
admitted he had seen it in the drawer of a workbench in the garage and “probably 
picked it up to look at it.”  True, he testified that he did not know that the rifle was 
less than 26 inches long, but as we explained earlier, once he saw the rifle, the 
stock of which had been crudely sawn off, he was necessarily aware of the 
weapon’s shortness, which is the characteristic that makes its possession illegal.  
(See p. 12, ante.)  Because the undisputed evidence here showed that defendant 
knew of the rifle’s shortness, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that 
defendant’s knowledge of the rifle’s illegal characteristic was an element of the 
crime charged was harmless under any standard. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to reinstate defendant’s conviction for 
violating section 12020(a)(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. King 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 9/30/04 – 1st Dist., Div. 5 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S129052 
Date Filed: May 15, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Carol Yaggy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Hilda Scheib, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin and Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Hilda Scheib 
P.O. Box 29098 
San Francisco, CA  94129 
(415) 750-9397 
 
Gregg E. Zywicke 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5961