Title: State v. Boleyn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 105483
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,483 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DEAN J. BOLEYN, JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When reviewing a district court's decision concerning the admission of evidence, 
an appellate court first determines whether the evidence is relevant. All relevant evidence 
is admissible unless statutorily prohibited. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in 
reason to prove any material fact. Accordingly, there are two elements of relevancy:  a 
materiality element and a probative element. Materiality addresses whether a fact has a 
legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and is in dispute. Evidence is 
probative if it has any tendency in reason to prove a fact. An appellate court reviews a 
district court's determination that evidence is probative for abuse of discretion whereas 
the district court's decision regarding materiality is reviewed de novo. 
 
2. 
It is no more reasonable to assume that a preference for same-gender, adult sexual 
partners establishes a proclivity for sexual gratification with same-gender children than it 
is to assume that preference for opposite-gender, adult sexual partners establishes a 
proclivity for sexual gratification with opposite-gender children. Accordingly, evidence 
2 
 
 
 
of homosexuality is generally irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible at a trial involving the 
sexual molestation of a child.  
 
3. 
 
When a defendant opens an otherwise inadmissible area of evidence during the 
examination of witnesses, the prosecution may then present evidence in that formerly 
forbidden sphere. 
 
4. 
 
Rebuttal evidence is that which contradicts evidence introduced by an opposing 
party. It may tend to corroborate evidence of a party who first presented evidence on the 
particular issue, or it may refute or deny some affirmative fact that an opposing party has 
attempted to prove. It may be used to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove testimony or 
facts introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party. 
 
5. 
A district judge has broad discretion in determining the use and extent of relevant 
evidence in rebuttal, and such a ruling will not be ground for reversal absent abuse of that 
discretion that unduly prejudices the defendant. Generally, admission of rebuttal evidence 
intended to contradict facts put into evidence during the defense case is not error. 
 
6. 
The three-part test found in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 
(1978), applies to constitutional challenges to sentences under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. In Freeman, this court recognized that "[p]unishment may be 
constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so 
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity." 
3 
 
 
 
 
7. 
In determining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights, a district court must make both legal and factual inquiries. 
These inquiries invoke a bifurcated standard of review:  without reweighing the evidence, 
the appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the district court's findings under 
a substantial competent evidence standard, and the district court's ultimate legal 
conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. 
 
8. 
No one factor of the three-part Freeman test for determining whether a sentence is 
cruel or unusual controls. Ultimately, one consideration may weigh so heavily that it 
directs the final conclusion. Before that conclusion is reached, however, consideration 
should be given to each prong of the test. The first Freeman factor (i.e., the nature of the 
offense and the character of the offender) is inherently factual, requiring examination of 
the facts of the crime and the particular characteristics of the defendant. The second and 
third Freeman factors (i.e., a comparison of the punishment with the punishment imposed 
in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses; a comparison of the penalty with 
punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense) are legal determinations. 
 
9. 
The legislative intent underlying Jessica's Law is to protect children by removing 
perpetrators of sexual crimes against children from society. The United States Supreme 
Court has observed that sex offenders represent a particularly serious threat in this 
country and that they are more likely than any other type of offender to commit violent 
crimes following their release. The State therefore has a particularly compelling interest 
in using incarceration as a means of protecting its youth from sexual offenders. 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
10. 
 
An issue not briefed by an appellant is deemed waived and abandoned. 
 
11. 
 
An appellant's failure to brief each of the three parts of the Freeman test results in 
the issue not being presented in a posture to be effectively decided on appeal.   
 
Appeal from Reno District Court; RICHARD J. ROME, judge. Opinion filed June 14, 2013. 
Affirmed. 
 
Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.   
 
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was 
with him on the brief for appellee.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Dean J. Boleyn, Jr., was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child and sentenced to a hard 25 life sentence pursuant to Jessica's Law. On 
appeal, he argues that the district court erred when it admitted evidence at his jury trial 
establishing that he possessed pornography depicting homosexual acts. Boleyn also 
argues that the district court erred when it determined that his life sentence was 
constitutional.   
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
FACTS 
 
Boleyn began a romantic relationship with Angela Valentine around Christmas 
2005. Valentine had two sons from a previous relationship, T.V. (born May 3, 1999) and 
A.V., who was younger than T.V. She shared custody of the two boys with their father, 
Nick Valentine.   
 
In May 2006, Boleyn and Valentine moved into an apartment in Wichita. Then, 
sometime between late January and early February 2007, they moved into a house outside 
of Haven near Cheney Reservoir. T.V. and A.V. would stay at the house on days and 
weekends that Valentine had custody of the boys.  
 
Boleyn developed a seemingly appropriate relationship with the boys. While he 
was living in the house, Valentine never observed anything to raise any concerns about 
Boleyn's relationship with either boy. But Valentine believed Boleyn spent a lot of time 
with T.V., leading to arguments between the couple. Valentine said that Boleyn "was just 
more interested in spending time with [T.V.] than he was with spending time with me" 
and felt that Boleyn had a better relationship with T.V. than with her. With regard to 
A.V., Valentine said that although Boleyn interacted with A.V. and "wasn't bad" to him, 
she believed that Boleyn favored T.V. and that Boleyn's relationship with A.V. was not 
nearly as close as his relationship with T.V. Valentine said that Boleyn and T.V. "were 
inseparable."  
 
Boleyn and Valentine's relationship deteriorated because, according to Valentine, 
the sexual aspect of their relationship was "nonexistent." This led Valentine to ask 
Boleyn sometime in January 2009 whether he was gay. According to Valentine, Boleyn 
answered by saying, "[N]o, I don't think so." Three to four days after Valentine 
6 
 
 
 
questioned Boleyn about his sexuality, he moved out of the couple's home and into his 
parents' home in Wichita.   
 
Because of the boys' close relationship with Boleyn, Valentine decided that it was 
in their best interest for them to continue seeing Boleyn. Accordingly, Valentine made 
arrangements for Boleyn to spend time with the boys. Valentine said that usually on 
Sundays Boleyn would come to the house and pick up both boys and take them out for a 
few hours.   
 
Several months after Boleyn moved out, Valentine began to feel discomfort 
regarding Boleyn's relationship with T.V. According to Valentine, Boleyn called T.V.'s 
cell phone a lot and sent text messages to him late at night. Valentine read some of these 
text messages. She recalled one text message which caused her some concern:  Boleyn 
texted T.V. that he was going to take a nap and asked T.V. to take a nap with him. 
 
Sometime in the summer 2009, Valentine asked Boleyn to fill out some paper-
work so she could file a claim with his mortgage insurance (Valentine was having trouble 
paying the mortgage, and Boleyn had been unemployed for 2 months.). Boleyn did so, 
and Valentine filed a claim with the insurance company. Eventually, the insurance 
company mailed a check to Valentine for $2,696.83, but the check was made out to 
Boleyn. In July 2009, Valentine contacted Boleyn and asked him to meet her at her 
bank—located inside Walmart—so he could sign the check over to her, enabling her to 
receive the proceeds. Boleyn agreed to do so, but on his way to Walmart, he called 
Valentine and told her that he wanted $1,000 from the check. Valentine told him she 
would not give him any money from the check.   
 
When Boleyn arrived at the bank in Walmart, he and Valentine got into an 
argument. Valentine told Boleyn that unless he endorsed the check, he was not going to 
7 
 
 
 
see the boys anymore. Boleyn got up to leave, apparently taking the check with him. 
Valentine and Boleyn started struggling with each other over the check. Valentine finally 
told Boleyn that she would give him $500 and allow him to see the boys if he signed the 
check. Boleyn agreed and eventually signed the check over to Valentine. Instead of 
giving Boleyn $500, however, Valentine ultimately deposited the entire amount in her 
account. According to Valentine, Boleyn walked away from the bank very angry. 
 
On July 26, 2009, shortly after the incident at Walmart, Valentine—based on a 
feeling she was having that something was wrong with T.V.—asked T.V. if anyone had 
ever done or said anything to him that made him feel uncomfortable. T.V. answered yes. 
Valentine then asked T.V. who had made him feel uncomfortable. T.V. was not 
immediately forthcoming with an answer but eventually said, "Dean." At that point, 
Valentine did not question T.V. anymore but called Nick, T.V.'s father, to come over to 
the house to speak with T.V.  
 
Nick arrived at the house about 20 to 25 minutes later, and he and T.V. spoke by 
themselves outside. After the conversation, Nick told Valentine what T.V. had told him 
(Nick did not testify at trial, so the contents of this conversation were not admitted at 
trial.). After speaking about the conversation, Valentine and Nick agreed to contact the 
police.  
 
Because Valentine believed that the Haven Police Department lacked the 
capabilities to investigate the alleged crime, she decided to contact the Wichita Police 
Department. They went to Nick's parents' house in Wichita, and a Wichita police officer 
came to the home and took a report. Valentine was eventually told to make a criminal 
report in Reno County. On July 27, 2009, she made a report to the Reno County Sheriff's 
Department. 
 
8 
 
 
 
On August 12, 2009, a police detective came to Valentine's home to record a 
phone conversation between T.V. and Boleyn. T.V. placed a phone call to Boleyn using 
the home phone while the detective recorded the conversation and wrote statements for 
T.V. to say to Boleyn over the phone.    
 
The phone conversation lasted a little over 23 minutes. After initial pleasantries 
and telling Boleyn about accidentally shooting his younger brother with a BB gun, T.V. 
told Boleyn that he thought Valentine knew "what happened" between them. Boleyn said, 
"I don't think so," and asked T.V. if he had said anything. T.V. said no. Boleyn said that 
Valentine was probably mad at him for what happened at Walmart. T.V. told Boleyn that 
Valentine had been asking questions about "what's been going on between you and me." 
Boleyn said, "She has?" Boleyn then asked T.V. if he knew what would happen if he said 
anything. Boleyn said he would "be going to jail for the rest of his life." T.V. asked why, 
and Boleyn said because "it was not right" because he was an adult and T.V. was a kid.   
 
T.V. then asked Boleyn why he did "those things" to him. Boleyn said he did not 
know and that "it just kind of happened." Boleyn promised T.V. that it would never 
happen again and told T.V. that he was sorry. Boleyn said that what he did was wrong 
and that he should have never done it. T.V. then asked Boleyn, "[W]hy me?" Boleyn said, 
"I don't know, it just kind of happened." 
 
Boleyn asked T.V. if it was going to be okay, and T.V. said yes. Boleyn promised 
it would never happen again and told T.V. that he loved him. He also told T.V. that he 
would always be there for him. T.V. said that he was having bad dreams about "it." 
Boleyn said that he was having some pretty bad dreams too and that he had been having 
trouble sleeping for the last 3 weeks. Boleyn said that he prayed to God every night to 
forgive him for what he had done.  
 
9 
 
 
 
T.V. asked Boleyn whether, if they got together in the future, he would touch him 
again like he had done before. Boleyn said, "[N]o, never again." Boleyn said that he was 
really sorry for what had happened and promised it would never happen again.  
 
T.V. then told Boleyn that Valentine had been asking him questions and asked 
Boleyn what he should tell her. Boleyn told T.V. that it was up to him to decide what to 
tell Valentine, but reminded T.V. that he knew the "consequences" if he told Valentine. 
Boleyn told T.V. that if he wanted that to happen, so be it. Boleyn said that he would be 
gone forever and that his life would be over. Boleyn then told T.V. that he would like it if 
T.V. did not say anything. Boleyn promised not to do "it" again and acknowledged what 
he did was wrong and said that he apologized for it. Boleyn then said he would really like 
it if he did not have to go to jail for the rest of his life. He said that "they would probably 
kill" him for "one mistake." He then told T.V. that he would always be there for him.  
 
T.V. then told Boleyn that what he did made him feel weird. Boleyn said that he 
felt weird too. T.V. said that he had "never been touched like that." There was a long 
silence before T.V. finally said, "Hello?" Boleyn responded by telling T.V. that if he 
needed something, he could just call him. Boleyn then asked T.V. if he was mad at him. 
T.V. said no. 
 
After talking about various things, T.V. eventually told Boleyn that Valentine was 
considering taking him to a counselor. T.V. suggested that he was going to tell the 
counselor what happened. In response, Boleyn told T.V. that he knew what would happen 
if he did that. Boleyn asked T.V. if he was "really that upset" and then asked T.V. why he 
did not say something to him about being upset. T.V. responded by saying that he never 
had a chance. Boleyn told T.V. that he always had a chance to tell him. Boleyn then said 
that he was really sorry for what had happened and that he hated himself "more for doing 
10 
 
 
 
it." He also said that he would have to live "with that" for the rest of his life. He said that 
if he could "take it all back," he would do so in a heartbeat.  
 
Boleyn told T.V. the worst part about "it" was that he hurt T.V.'s feelings and he 
never meant to do that. T.V. asked Boleyn why he did it. Boleyn answered by saying he 
didn't know and that "it just kind of happened." He said he did not understand "why it 
happened, it just happened." Boleyn said that he hoped T.V. would forgive him. Boleyn 
told T.V. that he cared about him too much to ever do it again. T.V. asked Boleyn if he 
did it because he thought it would make T.V. feel good. Boleyn said, "I don't know, I 
don't know what I was thinking." Boleyn said that it had never happened before and that 
it would not happen again. T.V. eventually told Boleyn that his mom was coming home 
and quickly ended the phone call.   
 
The next day, August 13, 2009, police arrested Boleyn. He was charged with five 
counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3504(a)(3)(A). The State alleged that these crimes occurred between July 27, 2007, and 
February 2009, when T.V. was between the ages of 8 and 10 years old.   
 
Boleyn's case proceeded to trial. During opening statements, defense counsel 
stated that the evidence presented at trial would show that Boleyn did not sexually abuse 
T.V. and that Boleyn was not gay. Notably, during the State's opening statement, the 
prosecutor did not mention anything about Boleyn's sexual preference.   
 
The State's evidence at trial consisted of the testimonies of Valentine and T.V., 
and the recording of the phone conversation between T.V. and Boleyn. T.V., who was 11 
years old and in fifth grade at the time of trial, said that he had had a good relationship 
with Boleyn. He said that the two of them would play video games and watch television. 
T.V. said that Boleyn gave him a lot of attention.  
11 
 
 
 
 
Despite testifying about having a good relationship with Boleyn, T.V. said that 
Boleyn had touched his privates (i.e., his penis) in a "bad way." T.V. said that Boleyn 
would use his finger to "poke" T.V.'s penis and that Boleyn would also touch T.V.'s penis 
with his mouth. T.V. also said that Boleyn made him put his mouth on Boleyn's penis. 
T.V. said that he would tell Boleyn to stop but that Boleyn would say no and keep going.   
 
T.V. said that the touching occurred while Boleyn was living with Valentine in the 
apartment in Wichita and while Boleyn was living in the house near Haven. T.V. said that 
when Boleyn was living in the apartment in Wichita, Boleyn would touch him once a 
week. T.V. said that the frequency of the touching increased to two to three times a week 
once Boleyn moved into the house. When asked to state how many times Boleyn had 
touched him, T.V. said that he did not know, but that it happened "[a] bunch." T.V. said 
that the touching ended once Boleyn moved out of the house. 
 
T.V. said that the reason he did not tell anyone sooner about Boleyn touching him 
was because Boleyn told him that they would both get into trouble.  
 
Finally, T.V. said that the "it" he and Boleyn discussed during their phone 
conversation referred to Boleyn touching him "in the private parts."  
 
Boleyn testified at trial, stating that between May and June 2009, after he had 
moved out of the house, his relationship with Valentine deteriorated. Boleyn said that 
Nick informed him that Valentine was spreading rumors that he was gay, which made 
Boleyn angry. Defense counsel asked Boleyn if he was gay, and Boleyn said no.  
  
With regard to the recorded phone conversation between Boleyn and T.V., Boleyn 
explained that a couple of months prior to the August 12 phone call he was having 
12 
 
 
 
visitation with the boys at his parents' house in Wichita. Boleyn and the boys were 
playing video games when the boys decided they wanted to wrestle. While wrestling, 
Boleyn said that T.V. kneed him in the groin area. Boleyn said that he reacted by hitting 
T.V. in the groin, causing the boy to fall on the ground and begin crying. Boleyn tried 
consoling T.V., but T.V. told him he hated him and that he was going to tell his mom. 
Boleyn was eventually able to console T.V. and asked T.V. not to tell Valentine. 
Accordingly, Boleyn said that this incident was what he and T.V. were discussing during 
the August 12 phone call. Boleyn explained that during the conversation, he told T.V. he 
would go to jail for the rest of his life because he did not know the consequences of 
hitting a child of T.V.'s age in the groin. Boleyn specifically denied ever sexually 
molesting T.V.  
 
Prior to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Boleyn, the prosecutor asked the 
court if the parties could address a matter outside of the presence of the jury. Once the 
jury exited the courtroom, the prosecutor stated: 
 
"Judge, I tried very hard in this case to avoid any reference to the fact a search 
warrant was executed on the defendant's residence where he was living in Wichita on 
August 14, 2009. In his bedroom or adjoining bedroom in his property we found large 
amounts of child pornography involving young males. I did not bring that in, but when 
the defendant stands on the stand under oath and tells the jury he's not gay and he's in 
possession of pornography showing with young boys, Judge, I think that opens the door 
for rebuttal. Before I go there, I want to address the issue with the Court. He specifically 
testified under oath he wasn't gay, and we have child pornography involving young boys. 
So I think he's opened it up for questioning on that issue.  
"[Defense Counsel]:  Judge, Counsel can't open his own door. He brought that up 
in his case in chief when he asked Angela Valentine the circumstances under which they 
separated. He cannot open his own door, and certainly since he opened the door, Mr. 
Boleyn is entitle [sic] to respond to it. If there's something that [the prosecutor] wants to 
submit in rebuttal, I haven't seen it, Judge. If this is something that was taken as a result 
of a search warrant, I haven't seen it, and I would object on those grounds, and [the 
13 
 
 
 
prosecutor] cannot open his own door. Mr. Boleyn was simply responding to an 
allegation that [the prosecutor] brought up on in his case in chief by Angela Valentine.    
. . . . 
"[The Prosecutor]:  Judge, the first time anything was mentioned about gay was 
in opening statements with [defense counsel] mentioned something about; that was 
something she could say. She discussed that with the jury, Judge. I figured that's where 
we were going with the case, but I never asked whether he was gay. I never brought that 
issue. I never tried. I never tried to use that as springboard to get it into my case in chief. 
But when the defendant says under oath he's not gay, we have evidence that would be to 
the contrary, Judge, I think it's admissible. With regard to her not having the child 
pornography in her possession, that's correct. I can't copy it for her. There was a report. I 
discussed it with her earlier and I think I sent her reports or faxed the reports about the 
discovery of that on the computer and I told her I'm not going to bring it in. In fact we 
were going to meet on Friday and go over it. And I said, no, I'm not going to bring that in 
because when I reviewed the case law, making a link between fondling a boy and 
possessing child pornography of young boys is something by the Supreme Court we 
cannot put in the same case because they are different types of conduct and they are not 
permissible. I decided not to bring it in. I told her I would not bring it in. We're talking 
about rebuttal now. We're not talking about case in chief.  
"[Defense Counsel]:  Judge, I did not voir dire on the issue of gay, or Mr. Boleyn 
being gay, or how the jury felt about people who are gay. Did not open that on voir dire. I 
did not address it in opening statements, and [the prosecutor] opened his own door when 
he asked Angela Valentine the circumstances under which they separated and he knew 
that would [elicit] that answer. Mr. Boleyn is entitled to respond to that without [the 
prosecutor] saying that he's opened the door to something that's not admissible in the 
courtroom.  
"The Court:  You're saying that [defense counsel] opened it up in opening 
statements and in voir dire? 
"[The Prosecutor]:  Judge, I'm saying that the first mention of this issue about the 
gay thing came up, my recollection, was opening statements by [defense counsel]. I had 
never mentioned that issue. In fact I wasn't really sure how to approach it until that point. 
But I guess the bottom line is this, there were allegations she confronted him and said, 'I 
think you're gay.' He got mad. That's not a problem. I don't think we opened the door yet. 
14 
 
 
 
It's not until he then later says he got really mad because she was going around telling 
people he was gay and he got really upset about this and then this; the question was 
asked, are you gay? And he said, no, under oath. I mean that's completely different than 
what was presented on the State's case. . . .  
"[Defense Counsel]:  Judge, [the prosecutor] is splitting hairs. Is splitting hairs in 
order to get evidence admitted into this courtroom that is not admissible. We did not open 
the door, Judge.  
"The Court:  Well, you're—you want to put it on rebuttal? 
"[The Prosecutor]: I want to ask questions of the defendant on the stand about 
whether he possessed images of young boys that were naked when he said he wasn't gay. 
"[Defense Counsel]: Then I need to see the evidence, Judge. I asked [the 
prosecutor] to see this evidence. And he said, it's not necessary. I'm not [e]ven going to 
touch it. I need to see the evidence before we go into this for once and for all. I need to 
see the evidence."  
 
The Court agreed to recess for the evening in order to allow defense counsel to 
view the evidence at issue.  
 
The next morning, outside the presence of the jury, the district court held another 
hearing with the parties to discuss the evidence at issue. The prosecutor informed the 
court that the parties had agreed on an initial resolution of the issue. The parties would 
enter into a stipulation stating that the police found pornography in Boleyn's room 
depicting homosexual and heterosexual conduct. They agreed to do this instead of 
mentioning that Boleyn possessed child pornography.   
 
The parties' stipulation stated the following: 
 
 
"1. On August 14, 2009, Dean J. Boleyn, Jr., was residing at his parents' home 
[in] Wichita, Kansas; 
15 
 
 
 
 
"2. On August 14, 2009, a search warrant was served by the Reno County 
Sheriff's Department and Wichita Police Department on the residence [in] Wichita, 
Kansas; 
 
"3. Dean Boleyn, Jr. cooperated with law enforcement in the execution of the 
search warrant and provided them entry into the residence; 
 
"4. Dean Boleyn, Jr. was living in a basement bedroom and had personal 
possessions in the residence; 
 
"5. During the execution of the search warrant, law enforcement officers found 
five Memorex CD-R's that were unmarked in Dean Boleyn, Jr.'s personal property. Two 
of the CD-R's were found in a non-pornographic movie case entitled 'Lord of the Flies.' 
Two of the CD-R's were found in a black CD case that contained music CD's. The other 
CD-R was found in a folder on top of Dean Boleyn, Jr.'s high school diploma; 
 
"6. The CD-R's were seized by law enforcement and examined by a forensic 
computer specialist with the Reno County Sheriff's Office; 
 
"7. One of the CD-R's contained two electronic folders with several files of 
personal information relating to Dean Boleyn, Jr., such as pictures and videos of 
construction sites, family members including [T.V.] and [A.V.] and a car. This CD-R also 
contained files of a pornographic nature depicting photographs of a homosexual nature; 
 
"8. In addition to the two electronic folders that contained personal information, 
the five CD-R's contained forty-three separate electronic files. Thirty-six of the electronic 
files contained photographs and videos showing pornographic homosexual images. Four 
of the electronic files contained three photographs and one video showing pornographic 
heterosexual images. Three of the electronic files depicted non-pornographic and non-
sexual images."  
 
Though she entered into a stipulation with the State concerning the manner in 
which the evidence would be presented to the jury, defense counsel maintained her 
objection to the evidence being admitted at trial, arguing that the evidence was 
inadmissible as impeachment evidence. The district court admitted the evidence for 
impeachment purposes but noted defense counsel's objection to the evidence contained in 
the stipulation and granted her a continuing objection. 
 
16 
 
 
 
When trial resumed, the stipulation was admitted into evidence. The prosecutor 
proceeded to read the stipulation to the jury. After reading the stipulation, the prosecutor 
conducted his cross-examination of Boleyn, focusing on Boleyn's explanation for the 
content of the recorded phone conversation.  
 
The jury ultimately found Boleyn guilty of one count of aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child but acquitted him of the other four counts. The district court, 
pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C), sentenced Boleyn to a hard 25 life sentence. Boleyn 
filed a timely notice of appeal.    
 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE 
 
Boleyn argues that the district court erred when it allowed the State, through the 
parties' stipulation, to present evidence to the jury stating that he possessed homosexual 
pornography. He argues that such evidence constituted improper impeachment evidence 
because the State introduced the evidence for the purpose of suggesting to the jury that 
because Bolyen is gay (as evidenced by his possession of homosexual pornography), he 
has a propensity to molest young boys and, therefore, likely molested T.V. Accordingly, 
Boleyn argues that the evidence was unduly prejudicial and violated his right to a fair 
trial. 
 
When reviewing a district court's decision concerning the admission of evidence, 
an appellate court first determines whether the evidence is relevant. All relevant evidence 
is admissible unless statutorily prohibited. State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, 382, 204 P.3d 
578 (2009). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency in reason to prove any material 
fact." K.S.A. 60-401(b). Accordingly, there are two elements of relevancy:  a materiality 
element and a probative element. State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 261-62, 213 P.3d 728 
(2009). Materiality addresses whether "'a fact . . . has a legitimate and effective bearing 
17 
 
 
 
on the decision of the case and is in dispute.'" State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d 
713 (2008) (quoting State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 14, 169 P.3d 1069 [2007] ). Evidence is 
probative if it has "'any tendency in reason to prove'" a fact. Reid, 286 Kan. at 505 
(quoting K.S.A. 60-401[b]). We review a district court's determination that evidence is 
probative for abuse of discretion, whereas the district court's decision regarding 
materiality is reviewed de novo. State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 586, 243 P.3d 352 
(2010). 
 
In making his argument regarding the admissibility of the stipulation, Boleyn fails 
to acknowledge that during trial the defense, not the State, was the party that made his 
sexual orientation an issue at trial. During opening statements, the State did not explicitly 
claim or suggest that Boleyn is gay, nor did it even mention that Valentine had 
questioned Boleyn about his sexuality prior to the couple breaking up. But during defense 
counsel's opening statement, defense counsel stated that Valentine had accused Boleyn of 
being gay, which caused him to move out of the couple's home. Later in the opening 
statement, defense counsel explicitly stated that "Dean Boleyn is not gay." 
 
During the State's direct examination of Valentine, the prosecutor asked Valentine 
about the end of her relationship with Boleyn: 
 
"Q. Tell us about the demise of your relationship. What happened? 
"A. He and I's relationship between the two of us, our sexual relationship, was 
nonexistent and when I asked him why he wasn't interested in having sex with me; I 
asked him if he was gay, because I didn't know what was going on, or what was wrong.  
"Q. How did he react to that? 
"A. His exact words were, no, I don't think so. 
"Q. Did he get angry at you? 
"A. No, not really. 
"Q. Is that what caused the demise of your relationship? 
18 
 
 
 
"A. He left three days after that, or three or four days after that."   
 
Similarly, on cross-examination defense counsel questioned Valentine about 
asking Boleyn whether he was gay: 
 
 
"Q. You asked [Boleyn] because of the lack of sexual relationship between you 
and he, you asked him if he was gay, right? 
 
"A. Yes, ma'am. 
 
"Q. Because in your mind if he wasn't having sex with you he must be gay? 
 
"A. That wasn't the only reason. When I would try to initiate sex he would not be 
interested and/or there were several occasions he was not able to participate in sex and I 
just didn't feel that was a normal reaction of a 30-year-old male. 
 
"Q. Did you tell him that? 
 
"A. Did I? 
 
"Q. Yeah. 
 
"A. Early, early on [in] the relationship, yes, ma'am.  
 
"Q. So you're saying the lack of sex between you and [Boleyn] was [Boleyn's] 
fault, and that's what led you to believe he must be gay? 
 
"A. At the end of the relationship, yes, ma'am. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Q. Well, and you had done some research on the computer about it, too; is that 
true? 
 
"A. About what? 
 
"Q. Whether or not [Boleyn] was gay? 
 
"A. No, ma'am, that's not true. 
 
"Q. Did you—do [sic] tell him you had? 
 
"A. No, ma'am, not that I recall.  
 
"Q. The basis for your believing [Boleyn] was gay was because he wasn't having 
sex with you? 
 
"A. Not only the not having sex but the fact that he, when I tried to initiate sex, or 
tried to get him interested, he still wouldn't. When I figured out that he wasn't going to 
initiate, I decided I would initiate and that still didn't work."    
19 
 
 
 
 
As these portions of Valentine's trial testimony indicate, the State did not 
introduce evidence during its case-in-chief to establish that Boleyn was gay for the 
purpose of damaging his credibility in front of the jury or to insinuate that Boleyn, 
because he is gay, was likely to have sexually abused T.V. If anything, Valentine's 
testimony established that Boleyn may have lacked sexual interest in Valentine, leading 
her to ask Boleyn whether he was gay. Essentially, the testimony offered an explanation 
of the tension that existed in the couple's relationship during that period of time.   
 
We note that evidence of homosexuality is generally irrelevant and, thus, 
inadmissible at a trial involving the sexual molestation of a child. As a panel of our Court 
of Appeals aptly stated: 
 
"It is no more reasonable to assume that a preference for same gender adult sexual 
partners establishes a proclivity for sexual gratification with same gender children than it 
is to assume that preference for opposite gender adult sexual partners establishes a 
proclivity for sexual gratification with opposite gender children." State v. Blomquist, 39 
Kan. App. 2d 101, Syl. ¶ 2, 178 P.3d 42 (2008) 
 
But when defense counsel specifically asked Boleyn during his direct examination 
whether he was gay and Boleyn answered no, the State was allowed to present evidence 
impeaching Boleyn's claim that he was not gay. See State v. Johnson, 258 Kan. 475, 481, 
905 P.2d 94 (1995) ("We have recognized that when a defendant opens an otherwise 
inadmissible area of evidence during the examination of witnesses, the prosecution may 
then present evidence in that formerly forbidden sphere. [Citations omitted.]"). 
 
The State's purpose for introducing evidence establishing that Boleyn possessed 
homosexual pornography was not for the purpose of impeaching his credibility in general 
but for the purpose of showing that he had been untruthful when he stated at trial, under 
20 
 
 
 
oath, that he was not gay. Accordingly, we construe the stipulation as evidence designed 
to impeach or rebut a claim Boleyn made during his direct examination testimony. See 
State v. Sitlington, 291 Kan. 458, Syl. ¶ 5, 241 P.3d 1003 (2010) ("Rebuttal evidence is 
that which contradicts evidence introduced by an opposing party. It may tend to 
corroborate evidence of a party who first presented the evidence on the particular issue, 
or it may refute or deny some affirmative fact which an opposing party has attempted to 
prove. It may be used to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove testimony or facts 
introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party."). 
 
K.S.A. 60-420 states: 
 
"Subject to K.S.A. 60-421 and 60-422, for the purpose of impairing or supporting 
the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine 
the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him or her and 
any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility." 
 
Applying this provision in State v. Blue, 221 Kan. 185, 558 P.2d 136 (1976), we 
upheld the admission of such evidence, though it was collateral in nature and ordinarily 
not admissible. The case was an appeal from a conviction for forgery wherein defendant 
Blue had presented a forged drug prescription to a pharmacy in Wichita. This occurred 
during the afternoon of July 7, 1975. Defendant and a corroborating witness testified they 
had been at home all morning on July 7, 1975. The State offered evidence in rebuttal that 
the two of them had, in fact, visited another pharmacy during the morning hours and had 
obtained a quantity of drugs with a valid prescription. The trial court ruled the evidence, 
though collateral in nature and ordinarily not admissible, was admissible as rebuttal 
evidence going to credibility. We stated:  "The rebuttal evidence was competent to show 
that the testimony of [the defendant and his witness] that they did not visit any other 
21 
 
 
 
pharmacy that day was false; it was thus admissible to attack their credibility under 
K.S.A. 60-420." Blue, 221 Kan. at 188. 
 
In State v. Nixon, 223 Kan. 788, 576 P.2d 691 (1978), the defendant appealed his 
convictions for rape and aggravated sodomy. At trial, the defendant attempted to admit 
evidence that the alleged victim had sold marijuana in order to show that she was not 
being truthful when she testified to the contrary at trial. Because the defendant did not 
deny having sex with the victim, the main issue at trial was whether the victim had 
consented to the sexual conduct; thus, the victim's veracity was at issue. The district court 
ruled that the sale of drugs was not a crime of dishonesty and, thus, the evidence could 
not be admitted. The defendant argued that the evidence was not intended to establish 
traits of the complaining witness or specific instances of her conduct in order to impeach 
her character in general (see K.S.A. 60-422) but to establish that she was not being 
truthful in her testimony at trial. We reviewed K.S.A. 60-420 and related evidentiary 
rules and prior caselaw, including some cases holding that once inadmissible facts had 
been elicited, similar inadmissible evidence could be elicited to rebut the evidence. For 
example, we quoted from Dewey v. Funk, 211 Kan. 54, 56, 505 P.2d 722 (1973), where 
we stated that "the opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is needed for 
removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original 
evidence." After performing this review of the applicable law, we concluded in Nixon 
that "under the peculiar facts and circumstances in this case, . . . it was error to preclude 
the defendant from presenting evidence in an attempt to prove that the prosecuting 
witness had been untruthful in her testimony." Nixon, 223 Kan. at 794. 
 
Like the defendant and his corroborating witness in Blue and the alleged victim in 
Nixon, Boleyn's credibility was placed at issue in this case after he decided to testify in 
his own defense. Consequently, evidence showing that he had lied during his direct 
examination would have a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and 
22 
 
 
 
would therefore be material. Because Boleyn denied being gay during his direct 
examination, we conclude that evidence establishing that Boleyn is gay would be 
material to the issue of judging the credibility of his testimony.  
 
But we hold that evidence of Boleyn merely possessing homosexual pornography 
would not be probative to rebutting or impeaching his claim of not being gay. Here, there 
is nothing in the record to suggest that mere possession of homosexual pornography 
establishes that the possessor of the pornography is gay. Furthermore, we question 
whether this proposed conclusion can even be drawn from the evidence at issue. The 
stipulation stated that in addition to possessing gay pornography, Boleyn also possessed 
heterosexual pornography. Thus, at the most, the evidence establishes that Boleyn may 
have had an interest in viewing both homosexual and heterosexual pornography, but this 
conclusion is a far cry from the inference that Boleyn is exclusively attracted to or 
sexually active with men. See, e.g., Weinberg, Williams, Kleiner & Irizarry, 
Pornography, Normalization, and Empowerment, 39 Arch. of Sex. Behav. 1389, 1391 
(2012) ("We believe it is unassailable that the central function of pornography is the 
creation or enhancement of sexual fantasy and/or arousal. That is, it presents bodies, 
behaviors, and situations in a way that is intended to sexually inspire or excite the viewer, 
regardless of whether such bodies, behaviors, and situations would be available or even 
desirable for the viewer to experience in real life." [Emphasis added.]).  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in admitting the stipulation 
into evidence for the purpose of rebutting Boleyn's claim that he was not gay. This 
determination, however, does not automatically entitle Boleyn to a new trial. We must 
also determine whether the district court's erroneous admission of this evidence was 
harmless. The applicable harmless error standard is defined in K.S.A. 60-261. See State 
v. Huffmier, 297 Kan. ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2013); State v. Longstaff, 296 Kan. 884, 
895, 299 P.3d 268 (2013). That statute states:  
23 
 
 
 
 
 
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, 
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." K.S.A. 60-261. 
 
This statutory nonconstitutional harmless error analysis requires us to determine 
whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial in 
light of the entire record. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569-70, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) 
(comparing the more stringent test when the error infringes on rights protected by the 
United States Constitution), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). In this analysis, we are 
concerned only with undue or unfair prejudice. See State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 736, 
200 P.3d 1 (2009). The burden of demonstrating harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261 is on 
the State in this instance as the party benefiting from the error. State v. McCullough, 293 
Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 9, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). 
 
 
At oral argument, the court specifically addressed both parties regarding harmless 
error. The State maintained that even if we find error in the admission of the parties' 
stipulation, the error had little impact on the ultimate outcome of the trial. We agree. The 
most damaging evidence presented at trial was the audio recording of the phone 
conversation between Boleyn and T.V. During this conversation, Boleyn clearly 
expressed an awareness of the seriousness and the heinous nature of his conduct with 
T.V. Though the incidents were never described during the conversation, T.V.'s trial 
testimony and Boleyn's statements during the conversation expressing fear of going to 
jail for the rest of his life if Valentine ever found out about the activities clearly 
established that Boleyn engaged in the charged acts. Finally, we note that the jury's 
24 
 
 
 
verdict—acquitting Boleyn of four of the five counts of aggravated indecent liberties with 
a child charged against him—shows that the jury carefully considered the evidence of 
each count and was not unduly swayed by the improperly admitted evidence. Therefore, 
we are convinced that there is not a reasonable probability that the improperly admitted 
evidence affected the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BOLEYN'S HARD 25 LIFE SENTENCE 
 
Finally, Boleyn argues that the district court erred when it concluded that his hard 
25 life sentence was constitutional. Before the district court, Boleyn argued that his 
sentence was unconstitutional based on the three factors found in State v. Freeman, 223 
Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978):  
 
"(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be 
examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this 
inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the 
extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the 
prescribed punishment; 
"(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this 
jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes 
punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent 
suspect; and 
"(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the 
same offense." 
 
Boleyn raises two arguments for why the district court's decision regarding the 
constitutionality of his sentence should be reversed. First, he argues that the district 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the Freeman factors are 
insufficient for this court to properly review the district court's ultimate conclusion 
regarding the constitutionality of his sentence under Freeman. Accordingly, he argues 
25 
 
 
 
that based on State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 719-21, 217 P.3d 443 (2009), this court 
should vacate his sentence and remand the case to the district court so it can make 
sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law regarding each of the three Freeman 
factors. If this court determines that remanding the case for additional findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is unwarranted, then Boleyn argues in the alternative that application 
of the Freeman factors to the record presently before this court should lead to the 
conclusion that his sentence is disproportionate to his crime and, thus, unconstitutional. 
 
As this court recently noted in State v. Britt, 295 Kan. 1018, 1032, 287 P.3d 905 
(2012), the three-part Freeman test applies to constitutional challenges to sentences under 
§ 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. In Freeman, this court recognized:  
"Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual in its 
method, if it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." Freeman, 223 Kan. at 
367.  
 
"In determining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights, a district court must make both legal and factual inquiries. 
These inquiries invoke a bifurcated standard of review:  without reweighing the evidence, 
the appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the district court's findings under 
a substantial competent evidence standard, and the district court's ultimate legal 
conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo." Britt, 295 Kan. 1018, Syl. ¶ 12.  
 
No one factor of the Freeman test controls. "Ultimately, one consideration may 
weigh so heavily that it directs the final conclusion. Before that conclusion is reached, 
however, consideration should be given to each prong of the test." State v. Ortega-
Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). This court also noted in Ortega-
Cadelan that the first Freeman factor (i.e., the nature of the offense and the character of 
the offender) is "inherently factual, requiring examination of the facts of the crime and 
26 
 
 
 
the particular characteristics of the defendant" and that the second and third Freeman 
factors (i.e., a comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this 
jurisdiction for more serious offenses; a comparison of the penalty with punishments in 
other jurisdictions for the same offense) are legal determinations. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 
Kan. at 161.  
 
Boleyn argues that the district court's findings and conclusions regarding the 
Freeman factors are deficient because the district court merely adopted as its ruling the 
State's response to Boleyn's motion seeking to have his hard 25 life sentence declared 
unconstitutional. As a result of the alleged deficiencies in the district court's ruling, 
Boleyn suggests that this court remand the case for further findings pursuant to Seward.    
 
In Seward, the defendant raised state and federal cruel and/or unusual punishment 
challenges during plea negotiations, in his motion for downward departure, and during 
his sentencing hearing, but the district court failed to make any findings regarding the 
Freeman factors. This court noted that appellate courts do not make factual findings but 
review those made by district courts. This court also noted, however, that there had been 
confusion in Kansas caselaw regarding whether the burden of assuring that findings were 
adequate for appeal fell on a party or on the district court. After discussion, this court 
concluded: 
 
"Supreme Court Rule 165 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 235) places the primary duty 
for arriving at adequate findings and conclusions on the district judge. A defendant who 
wishes to appeal on the basis of a constitutional challenge to a sentencing statute must, 
however, ensure that the findings and conclusions by the district judge are sufficient to 
support appellate argument by the filing of a motion invoking the judge's duty under Rule 
165, if necessary." Seward, 289 Kan. 715, Syl. ¶ 3. 
 
27 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that the defendant in Seward had not taken steps to assure that 
adequate findings had been made, this court remanded the case for further proceedings, 
but cautioned: 
 
"We emphasize that we believe this case to be exceptional. In the future, a 
defendant who wishes to appeal on the basis of a constitutional challenge to a sentencing 
statute must ensure the findings and conclusions by the district judge are sufficient to 
support appellate argument, by filing of a motion invoking the judge's duty under Rule 
165, if necessary." (Emphasis added.) Seward, 289 Kan. at 721. 
 
The outcome reached in Seward (i.e., remand for factual findings and legal 
conclusions regarding the Freeman factors) is unavailable here because Seward was filed 
on October 2, 2009, more than a year prior to Boleyn's sentencing on December 17, 2010, 
and the filing of the journal entry of judgment on December 28, 2010. Accordingly, by 
the time of sentencing and the filing of the journal entry of judgment, Boleyn should have 
been aware that Seward's holding made him responsible for ensuring that the district 
court's factual findings and conclusions of law regarding the Freeman factors were 
adequate to support appellate review of his constitutional challenge to his sentence. Thus, 
even if we assume without deciding that the district court's factual findings are 
inadequate, Boleyn would bear the responsibility for the deficient findings and, 
consequently, would not be entitled to the same relief as given to the defendant in 
Seward. Cf. State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 592, 243 P.3d 352 (2010) (though district 
court failed to make specific findings regarding defendant's Freeman argument, district 
court's journal entry was filed prior to Seward; accordingly, defendant's case, pursuant to 
Seward, was remanded for entry of sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law 
regarding the Freeman factors). Thus, Boleyn's argument for remand pursuant to Seward 
is without merit.  
 
28 
 
 
 
Application of the Freeman factors to the record currently before this court 
indicates that Boleyn's sentence is constitutional. Regarding the first factor (the nature of 
the offense and the character of the offender), Boleyn argued before the district court that 
he was 31 years old and had no prior criminal history. He also noted that evidence was 
presented at trial establishing that the allegations of sexual abuse arose after he had been 
in a public altercation with Valentine. Finally, he noted that the jury acquitted him of four 
counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, indicating that the jury did not 
believe T.V.'s testimony that the abuse occurred multiple times.  
 
Regardless of the jury's reasons for acquitting Boleyn on four of the five counts, 
the jury rejected his denial of ever sexually molesting T.V., a child who was between the 
ages of 8 and 10 when the charged conduct occurred. As noted above, T.V. testified at 
trial that Boleyn used his finger to "poke" T.V.'s penis and that Boleyn would also touch 
T.V.'s penis with his mouth. T.V. also said Boleyn made him put his mouth on Boleyn's 
penis. T.V. said he would tell Boleyn to stop but Boleyn would say no and keep going. 
Finally, the transcript of Boleyn's trial establishes that he entered into a stipulation with 
the State in order to prevent evidence from being admitted at trial showing he possessed 
child pornography depicting young male children. 
 
As this court recently stated in State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717, 722, 280 P.3d 203 
(2012): 
 
"The legislative intent underlying Jessica's Law is to protect children by 
removing perpetrators of sexual crimes against children from society. [Citation omitted.] 
The United States Supreme Court has observed that sex offenders represent a particularly 
serious threat in this country and that they are more likely than any other type of offender 
to commit violent crimes following their release. [Citation omitted.] The State therefore 
has a particularly compelling interest in using incarceration as a means of protecting its 
youth from sexual offenders."  
29 
 
 
 
 
Moving on to the second Freeman factor (a comparison of the punishment with 
punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses), Boleyn raises the 
same argument on appeal that he raised before the district court:  aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child is less serious than homicide but is punished more severely. Even 
though the district court failed to address this legal question at sentencing, this court can 
still address the merits of Boleyn's argument on appeal. See Britt, 295 Kan. at 1032. 
 
In Woodard, this court rejected the same argument that Boleyn raises here: 
 
"This argument suffers from several flaws. In the first place, it assumes that 
murderers necessarily receive more lenient sentences in Kansas than violators of Jessica's 
Law. This is not the case. In fact, the Kansas Criminal Code sets out a list of 
transgressions that constitute capital murder, which is an off-grid offense. K.S.A. 21-
3439. Capital murder is subject to punishment by death. K.S.A. 21-4624. The penalty for 
homicide in Kansas may thus be much more severe than the penalties under Jessica's 
Law. See K.S.A. 21-4638; K.S.A. 21-4643. The fact that the penalty for certain 
categories of homicide may be less severe than the penalties for other, nonhomicide 
crimes does not automatically render the penalties for the nonhomicide crimes 
unconstitutional. There is no strict linear order of criminal activity that ranks all 
homicides as the most serious crimes and all nonhomicide crimes as less serious, with the 
corresponding penalties necessarily ranking in diminishing durations of imprisonment. 
"Furthermore, as the State points out, Jessica's Law is not the only Kansas statute 
that provides for more severe penalties for nonhomicide crimes than for certain categories 
of homicide. Compare, e.g., rape, K.S.A. 21-3502, and aggravated kidnapping, K.S.A. 
21-3420, which are severity level 1 offenses, with reckless second-degree murder, K.S.A. 
21-3402(b), which is a severity level 2 offense." Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723-24. 
 
30 
 
 
 
For the same reasons, we conclude that the penalty under K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C) 
is not disproportionately harsh when compared with the punishments imposed for 
homicide in Kansas. 
 
Finally, in his brief on appeal, Boleyn fails to address the third Freeman factor 
(i.e., a comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same 
offense). An issue not briefed by an appellant is deemed waived and abandoned. State v. 
McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 709, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). Additionally, in State v. Easterling, 
289 Kan. 470, 487, 213 P.3d 418 (2009), this court concluded that an appellant's failure 
to brief all of the Freeman factors resulted in the issue not being presented "in a posture 
to be effectively decided" on appeal.  
 
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that Boleyn has failed to show that his 
sentence is unconstitutional under Freeman. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
decision to impose a hard 25 life sentence upon Boleyn pursuant to K.S.A. 21-
4643(a)(1)(C).      
 
Affirmed.