Title: Ex Parte JFC
Citation: 844 So. 2d 604
Docket Number: 1002039
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 15, 2002

844 So. 2d 604 (2002)
Ex parte J.F.C.
(In re J.F.C. v. City of Daphne).
1002039.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 15, 2002.
Daniel P. Mitchell, Bay Minette, for petitioner.
James M. Scroggins of Armstrong, Vaughn &amp; Scroggins, Daphne, for respondent.
LYONS, Justice.
J.F.C. was convicted in the Daphne Municipal Court of criminal surveillance, a violation of Daphne City Ordinance No. 1987-8, adopting § 13A-11-32, Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment; that sentence was split, and J.F.C. was ordered to serve 60 days in the Daphne municipal jail, followed by 2 years of supervised probation. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. J.F.C. v. City of Daphne, 844 So. 2d 597 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain J.F.C.'s conviction for criminal surveillance.
The facts as described in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion are as follows:
J.F.C. argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming his conviction for criminal surveillance. Alabama's criminal surveillance statute, § 13A-11-32, Ala. Code 1975, provides, "A person commits the crime of criminal surveillance if he intentionally engages in surveillance while trespassing in a private place." J.F.C. argues that the City of Daphne ("the City") was required to prove that he actually secretly observed the activities of another person. Because the "courtesy officer" who saw J.F.C. "peering" through the window of the apartment could not testify that he had seen anyone in that apartment or that he had ever talked with the residents of that apartment about the incident, J.F.C. argues that the City failed to prove an essential element of criminal surveillancethat J.F.C. actually observed someone in the apartment.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, recognizing that the State had produced no evidence tending to show that anyone was actually in the apartment J.F.C. was "peering" into, held that the Legislature did not intend that § 13A-11-32 require the City to prove that J.F.C. actually saw another person in order to prove a violation of the statute. Rather, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that "[t]he prohibited act [was] surreptitious observation, coupled with the wrongful purpose of spying upon and thus invading the privacy of another person." 844 So. 2d  at 602. The Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision on caselaw from Georgia and Arizona holding that the "Peeping Tom" statutes in those states do not require proof that anyone is actually in a room into which a perpetrator has looked in order to sustain a conviction under the statutes. See Chance v. State, 154 Ga.App. 543, 268 S.E.2d 737 (1980); State v. Serrano, 145 Ariz. 498, 702 P.2d 1343 (Ariz.App. Div. 2 1985). According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, our "Peeping Tom" statute is "substantially similar" to the Georgia and Arizona statutes.
After considering the record in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, the cases cited in that opinion, and Judge Cobb's dissent to that opinion, we agree with the views expressed by Judge Cobb in her dissent. We quote from Judge Cobb's dissent below:
"J.F.C. was charged with, and adjudicated guilty of, a violation of a city ordinance that adopts § 13A-11-32, Ala. Code 1975, as a municipal offense. He was seen peering into an apartment window, but, without dispute, there was no evidence that anyone was in the apartment when J.F.C. peered inside. Section 13A-11-32(a) states that a person commits the crime of criminal surveillance *606 if he `intentionally engages in surveillance while trespassing in a private place.' Surveillance is defined in § 13A-11-30(3), Ala.Code 1975, as the `[s]ecret observation of the activities of another person for the purpose of spying upon and invading the privacy of the person observed.' ...
"`"The Supreme Court of Alabama has also consistently stated that `[p]enal statutes are to reach no further in meaning than their words.' Clements v. State, 370 So. 2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1979), overruled on other grounds, Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala.1980) (citations omitted). See also State ex rel. Graddick v. Jebsen S. (U.K.) Ltd., 377 So. 2d 940, 942 (Ala.1979) (holding that `penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subjected to their operation').... Furthermore, `[n]o person is to be made subject to penal statutes by implication and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to predominate in favor of the accused.' Clements, 370 So. 2d  at 725."'
"Although the Alabama Legislature might have intended to make criminal the mere spying into another's residence, I firmly believe that this Court is not at liberty to so interpret the statute *607 when the clear language of the statute, which we are obliged to interpret and apply, does not make mere spying criminal. The statute makes criminal the `[s]ecret observation of the activities of another person,' when that observation is accompanied by the requisite criminal intent. Courts are duty bound to strictly construe the terms of legislative mandates; they are not to engage in judicial construction, Ex parte Looney, 797 So. 2d 427 (Ala.2001), even if the outcome of such judicial construction might be more desirable to the courts than the interpretation of a statute's clear meaning. Any change desired in the meaning of the statute is for the Legislature to make."
(Citations to the record omitted; some emphasis added; some emphasis original.) We agree, and we adopt Judge Cobb's dissent. The evidence was insufficient to sustain J.F.C.'s conviction for criminal surveillance.
The City also argues that in the event this Court should find, as we have, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain J.F.C.'s conviction for criminal surveillance, we should, alternatively, enter a judgment against J.F.C. for the lesser offense of attempted criminal surveillance. The City relies upon this Court's decision in Ex parte Edwards, 452 So. 2d 508 (Ala. 1984), in which this Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which had, in an opinion, reversed a conviction for second-degree murder, in accordance with an earlier ruling by this Court in that case, 452 So. 2d 503 (Ala. 1983), and remanded for the trial court to enter a judgment of guilty on the lesser charge of first-degree manslaughter. According to the City, J.F.C.'s presence outside the window of an apartment into which he was peering, constitutes an overt act toward the commission of the offense of criminal surveillance. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals held that J.F.C. was guilty of criminal surveillance and never reached this issue, we remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether J.F.C. should be adjudicated guilty of attempted criminal surveillance.
We hold that the evidence was insufficient to support J.F.C.'s conviction of criminal surveillance. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause to that Court for the entry of an order or for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., concurs in the result.
BROWN, J., dissents.
STUART, J., recuses herself.[*]
BROWN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent, because I agree with Judge Shaw's statement in his special concurrence to the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion that "judicial construction of § 13A-11-30(3), Ala.Code 1975, is necessary because of the ambiguity created by the Legislature's use of the phrases `activities of another person' and `the person observed.'" Like Judge Shaw, I believe the Court of Criminal Appeals' construction of the statute is correct and is consistent with the apparent intent of the Legislature.
[*]  Justice Stuart was the trial judge in this case.