Title: Davis v. Comerford
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12712
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12712 
 
ALLEN H. DAVIS  vs.  WILLIAM COMERFORD & another.1 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 9, 2019. - September 16, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Summary Process.  Landlord and Tenant, Eviction, Tenancy at 
sufferance, Use of premises, Habitability.  Practice, 
Civil, Counterclaim and cross-claim, Affirmative defense. 
 
 
 
 
Summary process.  Complaint filed in the Southeast Division 
of the Housing Court Department on June 11, 2018.  
 
 
A motion for use and occupancy payments was heard by Irene 
H. Bagdoian, J.  
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Mary T. Sullivan, J., in the Appeals 
Court, and the appeal was reported by her to a panel of that 
court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Arthur D. Hardy-Doubleday for the tenants. 
 
David J. Gormley for the landlord. 
 
Patricia A. Whiting, for Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Peter Vickery, for MassLandlords, Inc., amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
                     
 
1 Gina Comerford. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The question presented in this case is whether 
a judge has authority to issue orders for interim use and 
occupancy payments during the pendency of a summary process 
eviction action, and, if so, the circumstances under which it is 
appropriate to exercise that authority.  We conclude that, 
following motion by a landlord, a court has statutory and 
equitable authority under G. L. c. 111, § 127F; G. L. c. 239, 
§ 8A (§ 8A); G. L. c. 185C, § 3; and G. L. c. 218, § 19C, to 
order a tenant at sufferance to make interim use and occupancy 
payments during the pendency of an eviction action.  To exercise 
that authority, the judge, on motion by the landlord, must hold 
a use and occupancy hearing where the factors and circumstances 
described infra are considered, in particular whether the 
summary process action has been prolonged and whether the tenant 
is entitled to withhold or abate rent payments due to 
habitability issues that reduce the fair value of the rental 
premises or has other counterclaims against the landlord that 
may result in rent offsets.  We further conclude that payment 
into an escrow account maintained by the court or counsel for 
one of the parties typically will provide sufficient protection 
to a landlord, but we clarify that a judge may order payments 
directly to a landlord if certain additional factors are 
present, such as where the landlord demonstrates that use and 
3 
 
 
occupancy payments are necessary for the landlord to pay a 
mortgage on the premises or meet other pressing financial 
obligations.  In the instant case, we vacate the judge's order 
for use and occupancy payments and remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
 
1.  Background.  In December 2014, the defendants, William 
and Gina Comerford (tenants), signed a lease agreement to rent a 
single-family home in Brockton from the plaintiff, Allen H. 
Davis (landlord), for $1,700 per month.3  The lease specified 
that the tenancy would be "AT WILL" and "may be terminated by a 
written notice given by either party to the other before the 
first day of any rental period and shall be effective on the 
last day of the rental period, or thirty days after such notice 
has been given, whichever is longer."4  The tenants also gave the 
landlord two $1,700 checks for use as a security deposit and the 
last month's rent. 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in support of 
Gina and William Comerford (tenants) by the Harvard Legal Aid 
Bureau and the amicus brief in support of Allen H. Davis 
(landlord) by MassLandlords, Inc. 
 
3 The parties shortly thereafter signed a lease addendum 
increasing the monthly rent by fifty dollars for use of a 
garage. 
 
 
4 A tenancy at will "may be terminated at any time by the 
will of the parties."  E. Daher & H. Chopp, Landlord and Tenant 
Law § 3.7 (3d ed. 2000). 
4 
 
 
In June 2017, the landlord decided to sell the house and 
provided the tenants with a handwritten notice to quit stating 
that he was terminating their tenancy and that they would have 
to vacate the premises within thirty days.  The tenants asked 
the landlord if they could remain in the house for a few more 
months and offered to pay a higher rent amount.  The landlord 
agreed to let the tenants stay for a rent of $2,125, and the 
tenants promised to move out within three months.  After 
discussion with the tenants, the landlord applied the last 
month's rent deposit towards the rent for August 2017. 
Although the tenants did not move out in August 2017, the 
landlord took no further action until April 14, 2018, when he 
provided the tenants with a handwritten thirty-day notice to 
quit stating that he was terminating the tenancy and that they 
should vacate the premises by May 31, 2018.  In early May 2018, 
the landlord applied the tenants' $1,700 security deposit 
towards the May rent.  The landlord claimed that this left an 
outstanding balance of $612 for the May rent. 
On May 12, 2018, the tenants' counsel sent the landlord a 
letter requesting all records in connection with the tenancy 
pursuant to G. L. c. 186, § 15B, and making a "formal demand for 
the security deposit and interests."  The landlord did not 
respond to this request. 
5 
 
 
On May 17, 2018, the landlord served the tenants with both 
a fourteen-day notice to quit for nonpayment of $612 in May rent 
and a thirty-day notice to quit terminating the tenancy at will.5  
That same day, the tenants asked the board of health of Brockton 
to conduct an inspection of the premises.  After viewing the 
premises on June 15, the health inspector sent the landlord an 
inspection report stating that he was in violation of a city 
ordinance requiring a "certificate of fitness" that the premises 
complied with the State sanitary code and documenting several 
specific violations of the code's "minimum standards of fitness 
for human habitation."6  The landlord acknowledged receipt of the 
inspection report. 
                     
 
5 As required by G. L. c. 186, § 12, the fourteen-day notice 
to quit explained that the tenants could pay the full amount of 
the claimed rent arrearage within ten days after receiving the 
notice to quit in order to avoid eviction.  However, G. L. 
c. 186, § 12, does not provide a cure period for a thirty-day 
notice of termination of a tenancy at will. 
 
 
6 The inspection report required the landlord to obtain the 
certificate of fitness and perform the following corrective 
actions:  "[e]xterminate entire building for rodents and pests 
infestation;" "[l]ocate and repair source of water leak in the 
foundation" in the basement; and "[r]epair or replace all 
cracked and/or loose floor tiles" and "[l]ocate and repair 
source of water leak from the dishwasher" in the kitchen.  In 
addition, the department of public works of Brockton sent the 
landlord a letter informing him that the premises exceeded the 
allowed number of trash barrels in violation of a city 
ordinance, although the record does not reveal the date of this 
letter. 
6 
 
 
On May 30, 2018, the tenants' counsel sent the landlord a 
"[G. L. c.] 93A demand letter."  The letter again requested the 
records concerning the tenancy and the security deposit pursuant 
to G. L. c. 186, § 15B.  In addition to violations of G. L. 
c. 93A, it also alleged breaches of the warranty of habitability 
and covenant of quiet enjoyment, and retaliatory eviction based 
on the tenants' request of the health inspection.  The letter 
claimed that "financial compensation . . . in the amount of 
$6,375.00 (equal to three months' rent) [was] warranted" in 
light of the "significant difference in price between the fair 
market value of the [p]remises in their defective state and the 
current rent therefor."  This letter also enclosed a $612 check 
purporting to cure the fourteen-day notice to quit, which the 
landlord deposited. 
On June 4, 2018, after the tenants declined to vacate the 
premises, the landlord served the tenants with a summary process 
summons and complaint, alleging "failure to pay rent" and 
itemizing unpaid rent of $612 for May and $2,125 for June.  In 
early June, the tenants sent the landlord a check for the June 
rent, but, according to the landlord, the check twice was 
returned for insufficient funds when he attempted to cash it. 
On June 15, 2018, the tenants filed an answer in which they 
raised affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleging breach of 
the warranty of habitability and the covenant of quiet 
7 
 
 
enjoyment; retaliatory eviction; and violations of the consumer 
protection statute, G. L. c. 93A, § 2, and the security deposit 
statute, G. L. c. 186, § 15B.7  The answer identified a number of 
specific defects at the premises, asserted that the tenants had 
"repeatedly apprised the [l]andlord of the unlawful living 
conditions," and claimed damages in the amount of the difference 
between the fair market value and the defective value of the 
premises.8  In their answer, the tenants also included a jury 
demand on all issues. 
A judge of the Housing Court held a hearing on July 11, 
2018.9  At the hearing, the tenants confirmed their request for a 
jury trial.  The judge scheduled a pretrial conference for 
August 29, 2018, to set a trial date.  He also ordered that the 
tenants "pay July use and occupancy, if not already completed," 
to the landlord and, commencing on August 1, "timely pay into 
                     
 
7 The tenants subsequently amended their answer to include 
the landlord's failure to pay any interest on the security and 
last month's rent deposits and to provide notice of interest on 
those deposits, in violation of G. L. c. 186, § 15B (2) (a). 
 
 
8 The tenants' answer identified the following issues with 
the premises:  an improperly installed drain line from the 
dishwasher that caused a leak in the basement; a rodent 
infestation; holes in the walls and floors; missing portions of 
the floor in the attic; an unsafe water supply; the presence of 
toxic mold; and unworkable outlets and ceiling fans. 
 
 
9 The hearing originally was scheduled for June 27, 2018; 
however, the date was changed to July 11 after the tenants filed 
a request for discovery. 
8 
 
 
their counsel's [Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA 
account)] monthly use and occupancy pending further order of the 
court."  Per the order, the tenants paid the landlord the July 
use and occupancy and thereafter began depositing monthly use 
and occupancy payments of $2,125 (the last previously agreed-
upon rent) into their attorney's IOLTA account. 
 
On August 17, 2018, the tenants filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment with respect to their allegations of the 
landlord's violation of G. L. c. 186, § 15B, and G. L. c. 93A, 
as well as the landlord's claim for eviction.  At a subsequent 
hearing, a different Housing Court judge denied the tenants' 
motion on the ground that there were material issues of disputed 
facts. 
On October 24, 2018, because a trial date had not yet been 
scheduled, the landlord filed a one-page motion requesting that 
the court "tender to the [landlord] the rental payments now in 
[the tenants'] attorney's IOLTA account and [order the tenants] 
to pay reasonable use and occupancy each month while this case 
awaits trial."  The motion recited the procedural history of the 
case and asserted that the landlord "has not been paid any rent 
for the months of June, August, September or October 2018, and 
continues to pay his monthly mortgage from his savings."  The 
tenants filed an opposition to the motion for use and occupancy 
9 
 
 
payments asserting, as is relevant here, that the landlord did 
not meet the standards for injunctive relief.10 
On October 31, 2018, a third judge of the Housing Court 
held a hearing on the landlord's motion.  The judge ordered, 
"Commencing November 1, 2018, the [tenants] shall pay use and 
occupancy of $2,150.00 per month by the [first] -- no later than 
the [fifth] -- day of each month through the [landlord's] 
counsel."11  The judge further ordered, "This matter shall be 
scheduled for a pretrial conference on the next available date 
and jury trial."  The order did not address the landlord's 
request that the judge order payment to the landlord of the use 
and occupancy amounts for August, September, and October that 
were being held in the tenants' attorney's IOLTA account. 
 
On November 30, 2018, the tenants filed a petition for 
interlocutory appeal from the judge's order pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231, § 118.  We transferred the appeal to this court on our 
own motion. 
                     
 
10 The tenants also asserted that the landlord had not 
complied with Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (h), 365 Mass. 737 (1974), by 
seeking a prejudgment security without filing an affidavit and 
that the motion was not timely because the motion hearing was 
scheduled too soon after service. 
 
 
11 It is unclear why the judge set the monthly use and 
occupancy payments at $2,150 rather than $2,125, the amount of 
the last previously agreed-upon rent. 
 
10 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory framework.  i.  Liability of 
tenant at sufferance for use and occupancy.  We begin by setting 
out the statutory authority for the liability of a tenant at 
sufferance for use and occupancy.12  General Laws c. 186, § 3, 
provides that "[t]enants at sufferance in possession of land or 
tenements shall be liable to pay rent therefor for such time as 
they may occupy or detain the same."  Rubin v. Prescott, 362 
Mass. 281, 285 (1972), quoting G. L. c. 186, § 3.  See Ghoti 
Estates, Inc. v. Freda's Capri Restaurant, Inc., 332 Mass. 17, 
26 (1954), citing G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 186, § 3 ("tenant at 
sufferance was liable to pay for use and occupation for such 
time as it occupied the premises").13  The payment for use and 
                     
 
12 "A tenant at sufferance is the term used for a person who 
continues in possession of premises after termination of a 
tenancy . . . ."  G. Warshaw, Massachusetts Landlord-Tenant Law 
§ 6:2, at 207 (2d ed. 2001).  See Margosian v. Markarian, 288 
Mass. 197, 199 (1934) (tenant who remains on premises following 
lease termination becomes tenant at sufferance). 
 
 
13 Although G. L. c. 186, § 3, refers to "rent," the term 
"use and occupation" or "use and occupancy" is typically used 
because a landlord's acceptance of "rent" from a tenant at 
sufferance otherwise might indicate that the parties wished to 
create a tenancy at will.  See Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 
449, 451 (1947) (distinguishing "mere use and occupation for 
which a tenant at sufferance is made liable by G. L. [Ter. Ed.] 
c. 186, § 3, for such time only as he 'may occupy or detain' the 
land" from "payment and acceptance of rent" that may provide 
"prima facie proof of the creation of a tenancy at will").  Cf. 
Rubin v. Prescott, 362 Mass. 281, 285 (1972) (landlord's 
acceptance of "rent payments" that tenants at sufferance were 
"obligated to make" pursuant to G. L. c. 186, § 3, did not 
create tenancy at will). 
11 
 
 
occupancy imposed by this statute was intended to "prevent any 
tenant from occupying premises without making compensation to 
his landlord."  Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Save-Mor Furniture Stores, 
Inc., 346 Mass. 426, 430 (1963), quoting Merrill v. Bullock, 105 
Mass. 486, 491 (1870).14  The tenant owes the landlord the "fair 
rental value of the premises."  Lowell Hous. Auth., supra at 
431.  Accord Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. 
Ct. 492, 502 (1997) ("correct measure for a use and occupancy 
charge" owed by tenant at sufferance following lease termination 
"was the then current fair rental value of the premises").  
However, the "liability of a tenant at sufferance is not to be 
determined arbitrarily by the rent fixed in a lease with the 
former owner, but rather is the sum which the trier of fact 
finds the use and occupation were reasonably worth."  Lowell 
Hous. Auth., supra.15  In particular, conditions-related issues 
such as breaches of the warranty of habitability or covenant of 
                     
 
 
14 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has suggested 
that due process issues might arise if a "tenant remained in 
possession without paying rent."  Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56, 67 n.13 (1972). 
 
 
15 General Laws c. 186, § 13, contains a limited exception 
in the case of a tenant at will whose tenancy is terminated 
without fault:  it provides that the tenant "shall be liable to 
pay rent . . . at the same rate as theretofore payable by him 
while a tenant at will" during the "period, equal to the 
interval between the days on which the rent reserved is payable 
or thirty days, whichever is longer, from the time when the 
tenant receives notice in writing of such termination." 
12 
 
 
quiet enjoyment may reduce the fair value of the premises, as 
discussed infra. 
 
A landlord may recover both rent arrearage and unpaid use 
and occupancy in a summary process action.  General Laws c. 239, 
§ 2, states that a landlord "may bring the action by a writ in 
the form of an original summons to the defendant to answer to 
the claim of the plaintiff that the defendant is in possession 
of the land or tenements in question, describing them, which he 
holds unlawfully against the right of the plaintiff, and, if 
rent and use and occupation is claimed, that the defendant owed 
rent and use and occupation in the amount stated" (emphasis 
added).  In turn, G. L. c. 239, § 3, provides that "if the court 
finds that the plaintiff is entitled to possession, he shall 
have judgment and execution for possession and costs, and, if 
rent is claimed as provided in [§ 2] and found due, the judgment 
and execution shall include the amount of the award" (emphasis 
added).  A landlord also may amend his or her complaint to claim 
use and occupancy damages that accrue during the pendency of a 
summary process action.  33A E.G. Daher & H. Chopp, Landlord and 
Tenant Law § 17:2, at 469 (3d ed. 2000), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 
15 (d), 365 Mass. 761 (1974) ("The action may be amended from 
time to time up to the trial date").  Furthermore, a "court 
should include all rent that has become due up to the time of 
13 
 
 
the hearing if the tenant is still in possession."  Residential 
Landlord-Tenant Benchbook 71 (W.E. Hartwell ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
 
ii.  Tenant's defenses and counterclaims relevant to 
liability for use and occupancy.  We review various statutory or 
common-law defenses and counterclaims that may reduce or 
eliminate a tenant's liability for ongoing use and occupancy.  
In particular, we address provisions in the statutes under 
discussion specifically directed at use and occupancy payments. 
 
Section 8A provides a "tenant or occupant" with a defense 
against a landlord's suit for possession based on nonpayment of 
rent or no-fault termination where the tenant has damages from 
counterclaims that equal or exceed the landlord's damages.  
G. L. c. 239, § 8A, first par.  Furthermore, even where the 
landlord's damages exceed the tenant's, the tenant has a 
mandatory seven-day cure period in which to pay the landlord's 
damages and retain possession.  G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par.  
Section 8A is the so-called rent withholding statute.  It was 
originally enacted to provide a defense against eviction to a 
tenant who was not paying all or part of the rent due to 
uninhabitable premises.  See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 
363 Mass. 184, 193 (1973) (original purpose of § 8A to "grant[] 
the tenant the right to withhold rent in order to aid effective 
enforcement of State Sanitary Code regulations").  The 
Legislature has amended the statute, however, to "increase the 
14 
 
 
availability of counterclaims to tenants."  Meikle v. Nurse, 474 
Mass. 207, 213 (2016).  See id. at 213-214 (tenant had defense 
to possession based on counterclaim that landlord failed to 
comply with provisions of security deposit statute, G. L. 
c. 186, § 15B).  Section 8A now permits a tenant to raise "[a]ny 
and all counterclaims . . . to offset the rent" so long as they 
relate to the rental or tenancy.  Residential Landlord-Tenant 
Benchbook, supra at 75.  See Meikle, supra ("steady progression 
in the availability of tenant defenses, culminating in the 
elimination of conditions-based restrictions, confirms the 
Legislature's intent to provide tenants with a broad set of 
defenses and counterclaims in the summary process action").16  
                     
 
16 General Laws c. 239, § 8A, first par., provides that a 
"tenant or occupant" facing a summary process action for 
nonpayment of rent or no-fault termination "shall be entitled to 
raise, by defense or counterclaim, any claim against the 
plaintiff relating to or arising out of such property, rental, 
tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty, for a breach of 
any material provision of the rental agreement, or for a 
violation of any other law.  The amounts which the tenant or 
occupant may claim hereunder shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, the difference between the agreed upon rent and the 
fair value of the use and occupation of the premises, and any 
amounts reasonably spent by the tenant or occupant pursuant to 
[G. L. c. 111, § 127L,] and such other damages as may be 
authorized by any law having as its objective the regulation of 
residential premises" (emphases added).  Potential counterclaims 
unrelated to the conditions may involve, for example, 
interference with a tenant's quiet enjoyment of the tenancy; a 
breach of the security deposit statute, G. L. c. 186, § 15B; a 
breach of the consumer protection statute, G. L. c. 93A; 
retaliatory eviction; discrimination; or intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  See Residential Landlord-Tenant 
15 
 
 
The tenant must meet certain preconditions to benefit from § 8A.  
See Rubin, 362 Mass. at 287-288.17  The tenant need not place the 
rent in an escrow account, unless he or she voluntarily chooses 
to do so or is so ordered by the court in the manner discussed 
infra.  See Daher & Chopp, supra at § 16:44, at 373. 
 
With respect to interim use and occupancy payments, § 8A is 
less than a model of clarity.  The statute provides:  "The court 
after hearing the case may require the tenant or occupant 
claiming under this section to pay to the clerk of the court the 
fair value of the use and occupation of the premises less the 
amount awarded the tenant or occupant for any claim under this 
                     
Benchbook 63-70 (W.E. Hartwell ed., 3d ed. 2013).  See also 
Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 
830, 853-854 (2019) (Appendix) (listing examples of "[p]otential 
defenses and counterclaims"). 
 
 
17 The tenant must meet the following preconditions:  "(1) 
the owner or his agents, servants, or employees, or the person 
to whom the tenant or occupant customarily paid his rent knew of 
such conditions before the tenant or occupant was in arrears in 
his rent; (2) the plaintiff does not show that such conditions 
were caused by the tenant or occupant or any other person acting 
under his control; except that the defendant shall have the 
burden of proving that any violation appearing solely within 
that portion of the premises under his control and not by its 
nature reasonably attributable to any action or failure to act 
of the plaintiff was not so caused; (3) the premises are not 
situated in a hotel or motel, nor in a lodging house or rooming 
house wherein the occupant has maintained such occupancy for 
less than three consecutive months; and (4) the plaintiff does 
not show that the conditions complained of cannot be remedied 
without the premises being vacated."  G. L. c. 239, § 8A, second 
par. 
 
16 
 
 
section, or to make a deposit with the clerk of such amount or 
such installments thereof from time to time as the court may 
direct, for the occupation of the premises."  G. L. c. 239, 
§ 8A, fourth par.  The application of these provisions before 
trial is discussed infra. 
 
A particularly important counterclaim is one based on 
breach of the warranty of habitability.18  The warranty of 
habitability typically requires that the physical conditions of 
the premises conform to the requirements of the State sanitary 
code.  See Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. at 200-201 & n.16.  The 
"tenant's obligation [to pay full rent] abates as soon as the 
landlord has notice that premises failed to comply with the 
                     
 
18 Even in circumstances in which § 8A does not apply, i.e., 
because the tenant did not comply with the statutory 
preconditions mentioned in note 17, supra, a breach of the 
warranty of habitability may provide the tenant with a defense 
to the landlord's claim for unpaid rent.  As we explained in 
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 202-203 (1973), 
"if the tenant fails to follow [§ 8A's] procedures, he cannot 
use the landlord's breach of the habitability warranty as a 
defence to a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent.  However, 
though the landlord may, in that case, evict the tenant, the 
tenant may raise the landlord's breach of his warranty of 
habitability as a partial or complete defence to the landlord's 
claim for rent owed for the period when the dwelling was in 
uninhabitable condition and the landlord or his agent had 
written or oral notice of the defects.  The tenant's claim or 
counterclaim for damages based on this breach would be the 
difference between the value of the dwelling as warranted (the 
rent agreed on may be evidence of this value) and the value of 
the dwelling as it exists in its defective condition" (emphasis 
added; footnote omitted).  See Warshaw, supra at § 9:3, at 300 
("A breach of the warranty of habitability is not a defense to 
eviction; it is a claim in the nature of abatement or damages"). 
17 
 
 
requirements of the warranty of habitability."  Berman & Sons, 
Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 198 (1979).  However, the 
"tenant remains 'liable for the reasonable value, if any, of his 
use of the premises for the time he remains in possession.'"  
South Boston Elderly Residences, Inc. v. Moynahan, 91 Mass. App. 
Ct. 455, 462 (2017), quoting Boston Hous. Auth., supra at 202.  
Thus, the tenant "may raise the landlord's breach of his 
warranty of habitability as a partial or complete defence to the 
landlord's claim for rent owed for the period when the dwelling 
was in uninhabitable condition and the landlord or his agent had 
written or oral notice of the defects."  Boston Hous. Auth., 
supra at 202–203.  "Damages for breach of the implied warranty 
of habitability are measured by 'the difference between the 
value of the dwelling as warranted (the rent agreed on may be 
evidence of this value) and the value of the dwelling as it 
exists in its defective condition.'"  Cruz Mgt. Co. v. Wideman, 
417 Mass. 771, 775 (1994), quoting Boston Hous. Auth., supra at 
203.19 
                     
 
19 The warranty of habitability overlaps to some extent with 
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, which protects the "tenant's 
right to freedom from serious interferences with his tenancy --
acts or omissions that 'impair the character and value of the 
leased premises.'"  Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 102 (1982), 
quoting Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33, 36 (1929).  
"Damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment" are 
calculated in a manner that is "quite similar" to those for 
breach of the warranty of habitability.  Darmetko v. Boston 
18 
 
 
Certain statutes also entitle a tenant to pay a reduced 
rent because the tenant took affirmative action to correct 
conditions affecting the habitability of the premises.  The so-
called "repair and deduct" statute, G. L. c. 111, § 127L, first 
and second pars., allows a tenant, after written notice to the 
landlord of violations of the State sanitary code or other 
conditions-related defects, to deduct "an amount necessary to 
pay for such repairs . . . from rent due to the owner."20  
Additionally, pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 127C, a tenant may 
file a petition to enforce the provisions of the State sanitary 
                     
Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 761 n.4 (1979).  Additionally, under 
G. L. c. 186, § 14, a landlord of a residential tenant who 
interferes with the tenant's quiet enjoyment is "liable for 
actual and consequential damages or three month's rent, 
whichever is greater, and the costs of the action, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, all of which may be applied in setoff 
to or in recoupment against any claim for rent owed or owing." 
 
 
20 General Laws c. 111, § 127L, third par., provides that 
the "owner may recover from the tenant any excessive amount 
deducted from the rent."  In particular, the statute specifies 
that the amounts the tenant may deduct for repairs must be 
reasonable and may not exceed "four months' rent in any twelve-
month period, or period of occupancy, whichever is shorter."  
G. L. c. 111, § 127L, second par.  The statute specifies, 
however, that the landlord may only recover any excessive 
deductions "in an action in contract . . . not in an action for 
possession of the rental premises."  G. L. c. 111, § 127L, third 
par.  A tenant thus would have a defense to a landlord's claim 
for possession for nonpayment of rent by showing that he or she 
spent rent money on repairs to the premises. 
 
19 
 
 
code.21  As under § 8A, G. L. c. 111, § 127F, first par., 
provides that "[i]f the court finds after hearing that the facts 
are as alleged in said petition, it may by written order 
authorize the petitioner . . . to pay to the clerk of the court 
the fair value of use and occupation of the premises, or such 
installments thereof from time to time as the court may direct."  
The statute also provides:  "The court may direct the clerk by 
written order to disburse all or any portion of the rental 
payments received by him to the [landlord] for the purpose of 
effectuating the removal of the violation.  The court may also 
direct the clerk to make such other disbursements of the rental 
payments to the [landlord] . . . as in the judgment of the court 
will permit the owner to maintain the property."  G. L. c. 111, 
§ 127F, first and second pars. 
 
b.  Authority and procedure for interim use and occupancy 
payment.  We conclude that, in situations where they apply, § 8A 
                     
 
21 The State sanitary code provides that "[n]o person shall 
occupy as owner-occupant or let to another for occupancy any 
dwelling, dwelling unit, mobile dwelling unit, or rooming unit 
for the purpose of living, sleeping, cooking or eating therein, 
which does not comply with the requirements of [105 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 410.000]."  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 410.010 (1997).  
Pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 127C, "[i]f the condition of any 
building or any part thereof used for residential purposes is in 
violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation 
established under the state sanitary code," any affected tenant 
may file a petition in the District Court, Housing Court, or 
Superior Court. 
 
20 
 
 
and G. L. c. 111, § 127F, authorize a court to order use and 
occupancy payments that become due pending trial to be paid into 
the court.  We further conclude that, under its equitable 
authority, a judge may order use and occupancy payments into 
private escrow accounts, and, in certain limited circumstances, 
directly to the landlord.  Such interim use and occupancy 
payments cannot be ordered unless a motion for such payments is 
made by the landlord, a hearing is held, and the judge provides 
reasons for such an award based on the factors discussed infra.22 
 
i.  Court's authority to order ongoing use and occupancy 
payments.  We conclude that § 8A, the rent withholding statute, 
grants a court discretionary authority to order interim use and 
occupancy payments into the court that reflect the "fair value 
of the use and occupation" of the premises.  G. L. c. 239, § 8A, 
fourth par.  The statute is not as clear as it could be:  the 
relevant provision states that the "court after hearing the case 
                     
 
22 Other statutes require the court to order ongoing use and 
occupancy payments if there is a delay in execution following 
entry of a judgment.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e) (requiring court 
to order tenant for whom appeals bond has been waived "to pay in 
installments as the same becomes due, pending appeal, all or any 
portion of any rent which shall become due after the date of the 
waiver"); G. L. c. 239, § 11 (requiring tenant who has received 
stay of execution of judgment to "make a deposit in court of the 
entire amount, or such instalments thereof from time to time, as 
the court may direct, for the occupation of the premises for the 
period of the stay").  These statutes are not at issue in this 
case, which involves prejudgment orders of use and occupancy 
payments. 
 
21 
 
 
may require the tenant or occupant claiming under this section 
to pay to the clerk of the court the fair value of the use and 
occupation of the premises . . . or such installments thereof 
from time to time as the court may direct, for the occupation of 
the premises" (emphasis added).  Id.  This language could be 
read as limited to posttrial awards, see, e.g., G. L. c. 239, 
§ 11, but we conclude that a reading that allows for interim 
payments as well is more consistent with the statutory purposes 
of protecting both landlord and tenant rights during ongoing 
summary process proceedings.  The reference to installment 
payments "from time to time as the court may direct" appears to 
encompass ongoing proceedings and interim payments and not just 
a final, posttrial resolution.  See Anderson v. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh PA, 476 Mass. 377, 381–382 (2017) 
("All the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and 
usual meaning, and each clause or phrase is to be construed with 
reference to every other clause or phrase without giving undue 
emphasis to any one group of words, so that, if reasonably 
possible, all parts shall be construed as consistent with each 
other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to 
accomplish its manifest purpose" [citation omitted]).23 
                     
 
23 The identical phrase "installments thereof from time to 
time as the court may direct" also appears in G. L. c. 111, 
§ 127F, first par., a related statute enacted at the same time 
22 
 
 
 
Moreover, the legislative history of § 8A supports the 
interpretation that these "installments" refer to use and 
occupancy payments that become due while the case is pending.  
In 1967, § 8A was amended to provide that the "court may require 
the person claiming a defense under this section to pay all or 
any portion of the rent due or to become due into court or make 
a deposit in court of the entire amount, or such instalments 
thereof from time to time, as the court may direct, for the 
occupation of the premises" (emphases added).  St. 1967, c. 420, 
§ 1.  In 1975, the passage substantially acquired its current 
form when it was amended to provide that the "court after 
hearing the case may require the person claiming a defense under 
this section to pay to the clerk of the court the fair value of 
the use and occupation of the premises less the amount awarded a 
tenant for any counterclaim or make a deposit of such amount or 
such installments thereof from time to time as the court may 
direct, for the occupation of the premises" (emphases added).  
                     
as § 8A.  Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. at 193 n.7.  
General Laws c. 111, § 127F, provides that the court may order 
the payments "after hearing that the facts are as alleged in 
[the tenant's] petition" to enforce the State sanitary code.  In 
this statute, unlike in § 8A, the hearing requirement does not 
seem to mean that the court must wait until hearing the entire 
case before ordering use and occupancy payments.  Rather, as 
discussed infra, the statute contemplates that the court will 
make a determination whether conditions-related defects are 
present and may order use and occupancy to be paid into the 
court until the defective conditions are corrected, at which 
point any remaining funds will be released to the landlord. 
23 
 
 
St. 1975, c. 467, § 3.  The evolution of the statute supports 
the interpretation that "instalments" originally referred to 
"rent due or to become due," i.e., to use and occupancy payments 
that accrued while the case was ongoing.  We thus conclude that 
§ 8A authorizes a judge, following a hearing, to order interim 
use and occupancy payments to be paid into the court. 
 
The statute authorizing a tenant to bring a petition 
alleging sanitary code violations, G. L. c. 111, § 127F, first 
par., is worded similarly to § 8A.  It provides:  "If the court 
finds after hearing that the facts are as alleged in said 
petition, it may by written order authorize the petitioner . . . 
to pay to the clerk of the court the fair value of the use and 
occupation of the premises, or such installments thereof from 
time to time as the court may direct" (emphasis added).24  This 
statute further provides that the court may order the clerk of 
the court to "disburse all or any portion of the rental payments 
received by him to the respondent for the purpose of 
effectuating the removal of the violation" or to "make such 
                     
 
24 To order the payments under G. L. c. 111, § 127F, first 
par., the statute specifies that the judge must find that the 
violations "may endanger or materially impair the health, 
safety, or well-being of such tenant," "such payments are 
necessary to remedy the condition constituting the violation," 
and the "tenant is not in arrears on his rent."  The statute 
further states that the court must take into account any rent 
abatement or counterclaims when determining whether an arrearage 
exists, as well as the tenant's willingness to pay the arrearage 
into the court.  Id. 
24 
 
 
other disbursements of the rental payments to the respondent or 
to any other person as in the judgment of the court will permit 
the owner to maintain the property."  G. L. c. 111, § 127F, 
second par.  Similar to § 8A, the statute also provides that 
"[w]hen the violation is removed, the court shall direct that 
the balance of funds, if any, remaining with the clerk be paid 
to the [landlord]."  G. L. c. 111, § 127F, third par.  As with 
§ 8A, we conclude that G. L. c. 111, § 127F, encompasses interim 
use and occupancy awards. 
 
We further conclude that, even in situations not covered by 
§ 8A and G. L. c. 111, § 127F, a court's equitable powers 
support its discretionary authority to order interim use and 
occupancy payments.  The Housing Court and District Court both 
have the same equity jurisdiction as the Superior Court with 
respect to matters within their subject matter jurisdiction such 
as summary process actions.  Compare G. L. c. 185C, § 3 ("[i]n 
all matters within their jurisdiction, the divisions of the 
housing court department shall have all the powers of the 
superior court department"), and G. L. c. 218 § 19C (District 
Court has "same equitable powers and jurisdiction as is provided 
for the superior court"), with G. L. c. 214, § 1 (superior court 
has "general equity jurisdiction").  In particular, the Housing 
Court has the "power to grant temporary restraining orders and 
preliminary injunctions as justice and equity may require" and 
25 
 
 
the "power and authority for enforcing orders, sentences and 
judgments made or pronounced in the exercise of any jurisdiction 
vested in them, and for punishing contempts of such orders, 
sentences and judgments and other contempts of their authority."  
G. L. c. 185C, § 3.  Moreover, Rule 9 of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1980) provides that, although the "issuance of 
restraining orders and injunctions shall be governed by 
applicable statutes and by Rule 65 and 66, respectively, of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure . . . , the court may 
modify the time periods and notice requirements of those rules 
and otherwise fashion the relief as it deems appropriate" 
(emphasis added).25 
                     
 
25 "We construe G. L. c. 185C, § 3, in light of the purpose 
for which it was enacted," namely to provide a "specialized, 
expert and remedial judicial procedure . . . to stimulate better 
housing maintenance and better relations between property owners 
and occupants for the well-being of the public at large. " 
LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co., 406 Mass. 888, 896 (1990), 
quoting 1971 House Docs. Nos. 956, 4202.  Furthermore, with 
respect to such matters within its jurisdiction, the Housing 
Court has wide latitude to exercise its equitable authority, as 
is apparent from various decisions of the Housing Court.  See, 
e.g., Hicks vs. Leisure Woods Estates, Inc., Hous. Ct., No. 09-
CV-1769 (Western Div. Mar. 5, 2014), aff'd in part, Clark v. 
Leisure Woods Estates, Inc., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 87 (2016) 
(pursuant to "general equity powers of court," court ordered 
defendants to conduct maintenance work, including marking 
walking trails and hiring arborists to inspect certain trees); 
Boston Hous. Auth. vs. Lyons, Hous. Ct., No. 06-SP-00320 (Boston 
Div. June 16, 2006) (after "balanc[ing] the equities," court 
"fashion[ed] a remedy under the doctrine of prevention of 
forfeiture" and allowed public housing tenant who failed to 
report income as required to retain tenancy subject to paying 
26 
 
 
 
Courts from other jurisdictions have concluded that a 
court's equitable powers include the discretionary authority to 
issue interim orders for use and occupancy payments:  the 
leading authority is Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 
479 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit articulated many of 
the different factors that we discuss infra.26 
ii.  The requirement of a motion and a use and occupancy 
hearing.  Regardless of whether it is acting pursuant to 
specific statutory authorization or under its general equitable 
                     
rent owed due to underreporting); Chang vs. Karibian, Hous. Ct., 
No. 05-SP-03879 (Boston Div. Nov. 30, 2005) (court exercises 
"equitable authority" to grant brief stay of execution after 
tenants violated lease provision regarding pets). 
 
 
26 For other jurisdictions and commentators that emphasize 
the equitable, discretionary nature of the court's decision 
whether to order interim payments, see, e.g., Kohner Props., 
Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Mo. 2018) ("Consistent 
with the prevailing view of a majority of jurisdictions, this 
Court holds circuit courts may exercise discretion on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether an in custodia legis procedure 
[(i.e., payment into court during pending litigation)] is 
appropriate in a particular case").  See also Dameron v. Capitol 
House Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 431 A.2d 580, 583 (D.C. 1981), 
overruled on other grounds by McQueen v. Lustine Realty Co., 547 
A.2d 172, 174 (D.C. 1988) (use and occupancy order "equitable 
tool of the court requiring the exercise of sound discretion on 
a case-by-case basis"); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 292 (1979) 
("the decision whether a tenant should deposit all or some of 
the unpaid rents into escrow should lie in the sound discretion 
of the trial judge or magistrate"); Restatement (Second) of the 
Law of Property:  Landlord and Tenant § 11.3, at 381 (1977) 
("The tenant pays rent into escrow at the discretion of the 
court . . ."). 
27 
 
 
power, a judge should issue an order for interim use and 
occupancy payments "only on motion of the landlord, and only 
after notice and opportunity for a hearing on such a motion." 
Bell, 430 F.2d at 479.  The hearing must provide both parties an 
"adequate opportunity to argue the equities of their case," 
including presenting evidence.  Dameron v. Capitol House Assocs. 
Ltd. Partnership, 431 A.2d 580, 584 (D.C. 1981), overruled on 
other grounds by McQueen v. Lustine Realty Co., 547 A.2d 172, 
174 (D.C. 1988).  See, e.g., G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fourth par. 
("In determining said fair value [of the use and occupation of 
the premises], the court shall consider any evidence relative to 
the effect of any conditions claimed upon the use and occupation 
of residential premises").  At the hearing the judge should 
consider and balance the relevant factors discussed infra in 
order to determine whether an order for use and occupancy 
payments is appropriate, and, if so, what the amount should be 
and where the payments should be directed.  The over-all 
balancing of equities must be left on a "case-by-case basis to 
the discretion of the trial judge."  Bell, supra at 483.  We 
will review such balancing only for an abuse of discretion. 
For the purpose of guiding that exercise of discretion, we 
set out the most relevant factors, albeit recognizing that not 
all the factors may be applicable in a particular case, and that 
a full consideration of the applicable factors, individually and 
28 
 
 
collectively, cannot be made without a trial on the merits.  One 
important set of factors relates to the landlord's statutory 
entitlement to use and occupancy payments from a tenant at 
sufferance and the increasing likelihood of harm to the landlord 
from the prolongation of a summary process.  Accordingly, the 
first factor to be considered from the landlord's perspective is 
that defined by G. L. c. 186, § 3:  "[t]enants at sufferance in 
possession of land or tenements shall be liable to pay rent 
therefor for such time as they may occupy or detain the same."  
The Legislature has recognized that "time lost in regaining 
[real property] from a party in illegal possession can represent 
an irreplaceable loss to the owner."  Commentary to Rule 1 of 
the Uniform Rules of Summary Process (1980).  The judge should 
thus consider the time delay expected before final resolution as 
a factor.  "Because summary process is designed 'to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of eviction 
actions, it progresses rapidly through a series of complex steps 
and deadlines."  Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court 
Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 850 (2019) (Appendix), quoting Rule 1 of 
the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  Jury trials will extend the 
typical timeframe substantially.  See Bell, 430 F.2d at 482 
(taking into consideration that "landlord has lost the advantage 
of the summary proceeding and is instead exposed to a prolonged 
29 
 
 
period of litigation without rental income" in determining 
whether interim use and occupancy payments are appropriate).27 
Other factors to be considered from the landlord's 
perspective include the "amount of rent alleged to be due, the 
number of months the landlord has not received even a partial 
rental payment, . . . the amount of the landlord's monthly 
obligations for the premises, . . . and whether the landlord 
faces a substantial threat of foreclosure."  Bell, 430 F.2d at 
484. 
From the tenant's perspective, the most important factors 
include his or her defenses or counterclaims, including but not 
limited to those asserting a breach of the warranty of 
habitability, and the likelihood of success on those defenses or 
counterclaims.  As discussed supra, any and all counterclaims 
related to the rental premises may justify the withholding of 
rent under § 8A.  Counterclaims asserting a breach of the 
warranty of habitability also may provide a rent abatement in 
whole or in part.  See Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 872-
                     
 
27 Summary process is supposed to proceed rapidly, 
potentially taking "fewer than seven weeks" from notice to quit 
to eviction.  Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 837.  When a jury trial is 
requested, this time frame may be significantly expanded.  In 
theory, the Housing Court must schedule a jury trial within 
ninety days of the original trial date.  Housing Court Standing 
Order 1-04, at part VI (2004).  This requirement was exceeded in 
this case. 
30 
 
 
873 (1991) (discussing warranty of habitability and tenant's 
right to benefit of bargain); Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. at 
198 ("tenant's obligation to pay rent is predicated on the 
landlord's obligation to deliver and maintain the premises in 
habitable condition").28  The judge also should consider whether 
a tenant had to pay out of pocket for repairs or maintenance to 
address habitability issues at the premises.  See Super, The 
Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 Calif. 
L. Rev. 389, 433 (2011) (tenant living in uninhabitable unit may 
have to spend money on repairs that otherwise would go to rent).  
The judge should also consider the requirements set out in § 8A, 
such as the landlord's knowledge of the conditions prior to the 
withholding of rent and whether the tenant caused the complained 
of conditions.  As mentioned, the amount of any use and 
occupancy ordered must not exceed the fair value of the rental 
premises.  Lowell Hous. Auth., 346 Mass. at 431. 
Further relevant considerations regarding defenses or 
counterclaims would be "whether the housing code [or other] 
                     
 
28 Conditions of past disrepair that existed when the tenant 
paid full rent also may entitle the tenant to a rent abatement.  
C.F. Downing & J.M. McCreight, Termination of Residential 
Tenancies, in Residential and Commercial Landlord-Tenant 
Practice in Massachusetts § 11.1, at 11-36 (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Educ. 3d ed. 2016 & Supp. 2018) ("There is no requirement in 
G. L. c. 239, § 8A[,] that there be current conditions of 
disrepair in order to invoke a conditions-related defense"). 
 
31 
 
 
violations alleged are de minimis or substantial" and whether 
documentation such as inspection reports or photographs support 
a preliminary determination regarding such conditions.  Bell, 
430 F.2d at 484.  See Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. at 200 n.15 
("A housing inspection report which certifies that Code 
violations exist which 'may endanger or materially impair the 
health or safety, and the well-being of any tenant therein or 
persons occupying said property' would constitute evidence of a 
material breach and the landlord's notice of that breach"); 
Dameron, 431 A.2d at 582 (photographs relevant to determination 
of interim use and occupancy payments); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 
272, 293 (1979) (in setting amount of use and occupancy payment, 
court should consider "seriousness and duration of the alleged 
defects, and the likelihood that the tenant will be able to 
successfully demonstrate the breach of warranty").  See also 
C.F. Downing & J.M. McCreight, Termination of Residential 
Tenancies, in Residential and Commercial Landlord-Tenant 
Practice in Massachusetts § 11.1, at 11-38 (Mass. Cont. Legal. 
Educ. 3d ed. 2016 & Supp. 2018). ("Not every breach of the State 
Sanitary Code . . . will be deemed sufficient for the court to 
determine that the value of the apartment has been diminished"). 
To avoid creating a "monetary barrier" to an impecunious 
tenant with a potentially meritorious defense who has requested 
a jury, while also keeping in mind financial hardship to a 
32 
 
 
landlord, the judge has discretion to consider factors bearing 
on the financial positions of the parties when deciding on the 
award of interim use and occupancy payments.  Bell, 430 F.2d at 
480.  A relevant factor is whether the "tenant has been allowed 
to proceed in forma pauperis."  Id. at 482.  See CMJ Mgt. Co. v. 
Wilkerson, 91 Mass App Ct. 276, 284 (2017) ("Striking a jury 
demand [for failure to comply with pretrial conference order in 
summary process proceeding] . . . must be approached with 
caution"). 
If a judge decides to order interim use and occupancy 
payments, he or she also must determine whether such payments 
should be made into an escrow account or directly to the 
landlord (or some combination of the two).29  In making this 
                     
 
29 We note that § 8A does not contain a mandatory rent 
escrow requirement, and indeed the Legislature has declined to 
enact legislation proposing to insert one.  See, e.g., 2017 
Senate Bill No. 778, entitled "An act requiring mandatory rent 
escrow."  Furthermore, § 8A does not provide for private escrow 
arrangements, only payment to the clerk of the court.  The only 
circumstances in which § 8A specifies that funds can be released 
from escrow is when the court orders that they "be expended for 
the repair of the premises by such persons as the court after a 
hearing may direct, including if appropriate a receiver 
appointed as provided in [G. L. c. 111, § 127H]."  G. L. c. 239, 
§ 8A, fourth par.  Additionally, "[w]hen all of the conditions 
found by the court have been corrected, the court shall direct 
that the balance of funds, if any, remaining with the clerk be 
paid to the landlord."  Id.  It should be noted that although 
this reference to G. L. c. 111, § 127H, is in the current 
version of § 8A, fourth par., the Legislature repealed G. L. 
c. 111, § 127H, in 1992.  See St. 1992, c. 407, § 9.  The 
portion of § 127H that provided for appointment of a receiver, 
33 
 
 
determination the judge should weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages to both parties of escrow versus direct payment, 
recognizing that escrow creates an incentive for a landlord to 
make repairs but still requires a tenant to make ongoing 
payments that ensure that a landlord temporarily deprived of 
rent will receive any funds to which he or she is entitled upon 
judgment in the summary process action, or even sooner if 
required repairs are made.  See Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. at 
193 n.8 (escrowed rent "does not permanently deprive a landlord 
of the rent but only permits the tenant to withhold it until the 
stated violations are corrected" [citation omitted]); id. at 201 
("If the landlord remedies the defects, he will recover the 
withheld rent. . . .  The landlord's incentive to repair comes 
from the knowledge that such action taken before trial will 
guarantee his full recovery of the withheld rent").  See also 
Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280, 284 (Mo. 2018), 
quoting Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 
n.67 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (describing 
escrow as "excellent protective procedure"); Phillips & Miller, 
The Implied Warranty of Habitability:  Is Rent Escrow the 
Solution or the Obstacle to Tenant's Enforcement?, 25 Cardozo J. 
                     
however, has been effectively incorporated into G. L. c. 111, 
§ 127I.  At least one other statute erroneously refers to G. L. 
c. 111, § 127H.  See G. L. c. 185C, § 3. 
34 
 
 
Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 1, 36 (2018) ("The rent escrow forces a 
tenant to remain current with her rent payments, protects the 
landlord's property rights, and provides an incentive for the 
landlord to expeditiously make repairs"); id. at 39-41 (listing 
more than twenty States that authorize rent escrow).30 
In considering whether direct payments should be ordered, 
the judge should recognize that it may be appropriate to order 
them so as to maintain the physical condition of the premises, 
as the judge is already specifically authorized to do by G. L. 
c. 111, § 127F, second par.  See id. (authorizing court to order 
direct payments to "permit the owner to maintain the property").  
Direct payments also may be appropriate when the landlord 
presents evidence that they are necessary to make mortgage 
payments on the property or otherwise presents evidence 
demonstrating a sufficiently pressing need for immediate receipt 
of the payments.  See Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 61 (1973) 
("The court under its inherent powers may order payment of 
amounts out of [the escrow account] to enable the landlord to 
meet his obligations on the property or for other appropriate 
purposes").  Another factor to consider is whether some of the 
                     
 
30 Where a tenant's rent is paid in full or in part by a 
government agency or other third-party assistance program, the 
logistical hurdles of redirecting these payments to an escrow 
account should be considered when assessing compliance with an 
escrow requirement. 
35 
 
 
payments are indisputably due.  See Dameron, 431 A.2d. at 584-
585 (within court's discretion to "maintain[] only the amount in 
dispute in the registry and pass[] through to the landlord the 
undisputed rent").  Cf. Kargman v. Dustin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 
113-114 (1977) (pending appeal, tenant required to pay into 
escrow, but not directly to landlord, rent due under lease; 
payment into escrow of disputed rental increase, "the ultimate 
legality of which [was] the subject of pending litigation," 
remanded for possible waiver).  This is consistent with § 8A, 
fourth par., which expressly permits a tenant to "voluntarily 
deposit with the clerk any amount for rent or for use and 
occupation which may be in dispute" (emphasis added), and with 
the court's general equitable duty "to maintain the status quo" 
pending adjudication, French v. Vandkjaer, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 
980, 980 (1982). 
Finally, on all these questions we recognize that our 
courts adjudicating summary process cases are confronted with a 
crushing number of decisions every day and thus must make 
determinations regarding interim use and occupancy payments 
expeditiously based on the limited information presented to them 
by the parties, who are often appearing pro se.  In issuing his 
or her ruling, the judge should identify the factors considered 
most relevant and explain the over-all balancing of those 
factors orally on the record or in a written order.  The judge 
36 
 
 
should issue a written order specifying what payments of interim 
use and occupancy, if any, are due and to whom.  Orders 
requiring direct payment to landlords also should expressly 
provide the reasons why such direct payment has been ordered, 
particularly why escrow of such payments does not adequately 
protect the landlord's interests. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the October 31, 
2018, order for use and occupancy payments issued by the Housing 
Court judge was deficient in at least two respects.  The tenants 
raised a number of counterclaims that required the judge to make 
a preliminary assessment of their validity, in particular 
whether the tenants might be entitled to withhold or offset rent 
under § 8A.  Here, the judge set the use and occupancy payment 
in an amount twenty-five dollars higher than the previously 
agreed-upon rent of $2,125; however, she does not appear to have 
considered, or at least addressed, the impact of any defective 
conditions, in particular the sanitary code violations found by 
the health inspector, on the fair value of the premises.  
Indeed, neither order providing for interim use and occupancy 
payments contained any explanations why the payments had been 
ordered.  Although such explanation need not be detailed, it 
must identify the most important factors considered and provide 
an over-all balancing of the different interests at stake. 
37 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order for 
use and occupancy payments is vacated and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.