Title: Amalgamated Transit, Local 1756 v. Super. Ct.
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 993
Docket Number: S151615
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2009

1 
Filed 6/29/09  (this opinion should follow the companion case, S155965, also filed 6/29/09) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
) 
LOCAL 1756, AFL-CIO et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioners, 
) 
 
 
) 
S151615 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B191879 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
FIRST TRANSIT, INC., et al., 
)  
Super. Ct. No. KC043962 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
At issue here are two state laws.  One is the unfair competition law, which 
allows a private party to bring an unfair competition action on behalf of others 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203), but only if the person ―has suffered injury in fact 
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.‖  (Id. 
§ 17204.)  The other law is the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 
2004, which provides that an ―aggrieved employee‖ may bring an action to 
recover civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code ―on behalf of himself or 
herself and other current or former employees . . . .‖  (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. 
(a).)   
 
 
2 
This case presents two issues.  First, may a plaintiff labor union that has not 
suffered actual injury under the unfair competition law, and that is not an 
―aggrieved employee‖ under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 
2004, nevertheless bring a representative action under those laws (1) as the 
assignee of employees who have suffered an actual injury and who are aggrieved 
employees, or (2) as an association whose members have suffered actual injury 
and are aggrieved employees?  The answer is ―no.‖  Second, must a representative 
action under the unfair competition law be brought as a class action?  The answer 
is ―yes,‖ for the reasons stated in the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court 
(June 29, 2009, S155965) ___ Cal.4th ___. 
I 
 
Seventeen individual plaintiffs and two labor unions — Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO and Teamsters Joint Council 42, AFL-CIO 
(plaintiff unions) — brought this action against defendants First Transit, Inc., 
Progressive Transportation Services, Inc., and Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.   
 
In the fourth amended complaint plaintiff unions alleged:  (1) they are the 
representatives of defendants‘ employees; (2) this action is brought on behalf of 
themselves and ―all aggrieved transportation industry employees and former 
employees employed by‖ defendants; and (3) over 150 employees and former 
employees of defendants have assigned to plaintiff unions their rights under the 
unfair competition law and the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004, 
―including the right to sue in a representative capacity.‖  With respect to the 
individual plaintiffs, they allege they are bringing this action on behalf of 
themselves as well as on behalf of current and former employees of defendants.   
 
The fourth amended complaint further alleged that defendants have violated 
the unfair competition law, and that defendants are subject to civil penalties under 
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 for failing to provide meal 
 
3 
or rest periods as required by the Labor Code and by an Industrial Welfare 
Commission wage order.  The complaint sought injunctive relief; restitution of 
$10,608,000 in unpaid wages; in lieu of unprovided meal and rest periods, 30 
days‘ wages for each employee who was terminated without being paid; 
$2,626,500 in civil penalties; prejudgment interest; and attorney fees. 
 
The case was assigned to a judge in the complex litigation program of the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court.  The judge held an initial status conference, 
determined that this case was one of five related actions, and designated this action 
as the lead case.  The parties stipulated to a briefing schedule and to a hearing date 
on which the trial judge would decide threshold legal issues, such as whether 
plaintiff unions had standing to sue and whether this representative action must be 
brought as a class action.   
 
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled:  (1) plaintiff unions 
lack standing under the unfair competition law because they have not suffered 
actual injury, and they lack standing under the Labor Code Private Attorneys 
General Act of 2004 because they are not ―aggrieved employees‖; (2) employee 
assignments of rights to plaintiff unions did not confer standing on the unions to 
prosecute the claims in question, as doing so would circumvent the requirements 
of both the unfair competition law and the act and would render meaningless 
recent voter-enacted amendments to the unfair competition law; and (3) the unfair 
competition law claims brought on behalf of others must be brought as a class 
action.   
 
Plaintiff unions petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and a 
stay of the trial court‘s ruling.  After issuing a stay and an order to show cause, a 
divided Court of Appeal panel denied the petition.  We granted plaintiff unions‘ 
petition for review. 
 
4 
II 
 
We begin with a summary of the relevant aspects of both the unfair 
competition law and the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004, the 
two state laws at issue here.   
A.  Unfair Competition Law 
 
The unfair competition law prohibits ―any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 
business act or practice . . . .‖  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)  Before 2004, the 
unfair competition law allowed ―any person acting for the interests of itself, its 
members or the general public‖ to seek restitution or injunctive relief against 
unfair acts or practices.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 17204, added by Stats. 
1977, ch. 299, § 1, p. 1202.)  Thus, under the former law a plaintiff did not have to 
show any actual injury, and a representative action brought under the unfair 
competition law did not have to be brought as a class action.  (Former §§ 17203, 
17204; Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 126, fn. 
10; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 561; 
see Corbett v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 649, 680-681.) 
 
But that changed in 2004, when voters, exercising their constitutionally 
granted power of initiative, enacted Proposition 64.  In the preamble to that 
measure the voters declared that the broad standing permitted by the unfair 
competition law had been abused.  (See Californians for Disability Rights v. 
Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 228.)  Proposition 64 amended the unfair 
competition law to allow private representative claims for relief to be brought only 
by those persons who satisfied the law‘s new standing requirements and who 
complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 382.1  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
                                              
1  
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 states:  ―If the consent of any one who 
should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
5 
§ 17203.)  The law now requires that a representative claim, that is, a claim 
seeking relief on behalf of others (id., § 17203), may be brought only by a ―person 
who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the 
unfair competition‖ (id.,§ 17204).2  This replaced the former standing provision 
which had allowed an unfair competition law action to be brought ―by any person 
acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public.‖  (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, former § 17204.)   
B.  Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 
 
In September 2003, the Legislature enacted the Labor Code Private 
Attorneys General Act of 2004.  (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq., Stats. 2003, ch. 906, 
§ 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.)  The act permits a civil action ―by an aggrieved employee 
on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees‖ to recover 
civil penalties for violations of other provisions of the Labor Code.  (Id., § 2699, 
subd. (a).)  It defines an ― ‗aggrieved employee‘ ‖ as ―any person who was 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
defendant, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question 
is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are 
numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more 
may sue or defend for the benefit of all.‖ 
2  
Business and Professions Code section 17203 states in relevant part:  ―Any 
person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the 
claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with 
Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but these limitations do not apply to 
claims brought under this chapter by [specified government attorneys].‖ 
 
Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides:  ―Actions for relief 
pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of competent 
jurisdiction by [specified government attorneys] . . . or by a person who has 
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 
competition.‖   
 
6 
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged 
violations was [sic] committed.‖  (Id., § 2699, subd. (c).)   
C.  Summary 
 
Both the unfair competition law and the Labor Code Private Attorneys 
General Act of 2004 require a plaintiff to have suffered injury resulting from an 
unlawful action:  under the unfair competition law by unfair acts or practices; 
under the act, by violations of the Labor Code.  Here, plaintiff unions concede that 
they do not satisfy these requirements.  They insist, however, that under either law 
they have standing to sue in a representative capacity as the assignees of 
defendants‘ employees who did sustain injury.  We explore the assignment issue 
below. 
III 
 
The legal concept of assignment refers to the transferability of all types of 
property, including a cause of action.  (Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc. 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1252, 1259.)  A cause of action, sometimes called a ―thing in 
action,‖ ―is a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial 
proceeding.‖  (Civ. Code, § 953.)  ―A thing in action, arising out of the violation 
of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.‖  
(Id., § 954.)  ―An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or 
not to do a certain thing.‖  (Id., § 1427.)   
 
At issue here is whether under the unfair competition law an assignment of 
a cause of action can confer standing on an uninjured assignee, and whether a 
cause of action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 is 
assignable.  In both instances, the answer is ―no,‖ as discussed below. 
A 
 
We noted earlier that through Proposition 64 the California electorate in 
2004 amended the unfair competition law by requiring the plaintiff to be one ―who 
 
7 
has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 
competition.‖  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204; see ante at p. 5, fn. 2; Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) official title and summary, p. 38.)  
As the trial court and the Court of Appeal here pointed out, that requirement 
would be nullified if a person claiming actual injury from some unfair business 
practice were allowed to assign that claim to one who has suffered no injury.  We 
agree.  Below, we explain why. 
 
An assignment requires very little by way of formalities and is essentially 
free from substantive restrictions.  ―[I]n the absence of [a] statute or a contract 
provision to the contrary, there are no prescribed formalities that must be observed 
to make an effective assignment.  It is sufficient if the assignor has, in some 
fashion, manifested an intention to make a present transfer of his rights to the 
assignee.‖  (9 Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed. 2007) § 47.7, pp. 147-148; see Rest.2d 
Contracts, §§ 317, 324.)  Generally, interests may be assigned orally (Civ. Code, 
§ 1052; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 709, p. 795), 
and assignments need not be supported by any consideration (Civ. Code, § 1040; 
National R. Co. v. Metropolitan T. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 827, 831; 9 Corbin on 
Contracts, supra, § 48.1, pp. 159-160; see Rest.2d Contracts, § 332).   
 
To allow a noninjured assignee of an unfair competition claim to stand in 
the shoes of the original, injured claimant would confer standing on the assignee 
in direct violation of the express statutory requirement in the unfair competition 
law, as amended by the voters‘ enactment of Proposition 64, that a private action 
under that law be brought exclusively by a ―person who has suffered injury in fact 
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.‖  (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 17204; see ante at p. 5, fn. 2; Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 2, 2004) official title and summary, p. 38 [Proposition 64 permits one to 
bring unfair competition law action ―only if that individual was actually injured by 
 
8 
. . . an unfair business practice,‖ italics added].)  Accordingly, we conclude that 
under the unfair competition law an injured employee‘s assignment of rights 
cannot confer standing on an uninjured assignee. 
B 
 
With respect to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, an 
action brought under it is also not assignable, as we explain below.   
 
The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 permits an 
― ‗aggrieved employee‘ ‖ — that is, an employee against whom a violation of a 
provision of the Labor Code was committed (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c)) — to 
bring an action ―on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former 
employees‖ to recover civil penalties for violations of other provisions of the 
Labor Code (id., § 2699, subds. (a), (g)).  In bringing such an action, the aggrieved 
employee acts as the proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies, 
representing the same legal right and interest as those agencies, in a proceeding 
that is designed to protect the public, not to benefit private parties.  (Arias v. 
Superior Court, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, ___ [pp. 16-17]; see People v. Pacific 
Land Research Co. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 10, 17.)   
 
A cause of action is transferable, that is, assignable, by its owner if it arises 
out of a legal obligation or a violation of a property right.  (Civ. Code, § 954.)  The 
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 does not create property rights 
or any other substantive rights.  Nor does it impose any legal obligations.  It is 
simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil 
penalties — for Labor Code violations — that otherwise would be sought by state 
labor law enforcement agencies.  As we have held in the past, the right to recover 
a statutory penalty may not be assigned.  (Esposti v. Rivers Brothers, Inc. (1929) 
207 Cal. 570, 573; Peterson v. Ball (1931) 211 Cal. 461, 468-470; Western 
Mortgage etc. Co. v. Gray (1932) 215 Cal. 191, 198; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. 
 
9 
Law, supra, Contracts, § 728, p. 811.)  Therefore, under the Labor Code Private 
Attorneys General Act of 2004 an aggrieved employee cannot assign a claim for 
statutory penalties because the employee does not own an assignable interest. 
 
We turn next to plaintiff unions‘ claim that they may nevertheless maintain 
the actions as entities in their own right based on the legal concept of associational 
standing. 
IV 
 
Under the doctrine of associational standing, an association that does not 
have standing in its own right may nevertheless have standing to bring a lawsuit 
on behalf of its members.  The doctrine was developed in the federal courts under 
the ―case or controversy‖ requirement of Article III of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
―cases‖ or ―controversies.‖  (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; 1 Rotunda & Nowak, 
Treatise on Constitutional Law:  Substance and Procedure (4th ed. 2007) § 2.13, 
p. 246.)  In construing the scope of this constitutional provision, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that an association, such as a labor union, may bring an 
action on behalf of its members when the association itself would not otherwise 
have standing.  Associational standing exists when:  ―(a) [the association‘s] 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests 
[the association] seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s purpose; and 
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit.‖  (Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising 
Comm’n (1977) 432 U.S. 333, 343 (Hunt).)   
 
Here, plaintiff unions argue that the voters‘ enactment of Proposition 64 
incorporated the federal doctrine of associational standing into California‘s unfair 
competition law.  We disagree.  Such incorporation did not occur; indeed, the 
 
10 
amendments that Proposition 64 made to the unfair competition law are 
inconsistent with the doctrine of associational standing, as explained below.   
 
In proposing the amendment to the unfair competition law, section 1 of 
Proposition 64 sets forth its findings and declarations of purpose.  Subdivision (e) 
of section 1 states:  ―It is the intent of California voters in enacting this act to 
prohibit private attorneys from filing lawsuits for unfair competition where they 
have no client who has been injured in fact under the standing requirements of the 
United States Constitution.‖  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) 
text of proposed law, p. 109, italics added.)  That intent is reflected in the amended 
statutory language stating that an unfair competition law action can be brought 
only by a person who has suffered ―injury in fact.‖  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204, 
italics added.)  This standing requirement is inconsistent with the federal doctrine 
of associational standing.  That doctrine applies only when the plaintiff association 
has not itself suffered actual injury but is seeking to act on behalf of its members 
who have sustained such injury.  (See Automobile Workers v. Brock (1986) 477 
U.S. 274, 281; Hunt, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 342; Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law (3d ed. 2000) § 3-20, p. 451.)   
 
Nor do plaintiff unions here have associational standing under the Labor 
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.  The act permits an ―aggrieved 
employee‖ to bring an action on behalf of himself or herself and other current or 
former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.  (Lab. 
Code, § 2699, subd. (a).)  An ― ‗aggrieved employee‘ means any person who was 
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged 
violations was committed.‖  (Id., § 2699, subd. (c).)  Because plaintiff unions were 
not employees of defendants, they cannot satisfy the express standing 
requirements of the act.   
 
11 
 
Insisting that they have standing as associations, plaintiff unions point to 
Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a).  That provision allows the ―aggrieved 
employee or representative‖ (italics added) to give written notice of alleged labor 
violations to both the employer and the Labor and Workforce Development 
Agency, and it describes the range of decisions the agency can make.  There is 
nothing in that provision, however, that relates to standing to bring an action under 
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. 
 
To summarize, a plaintiff has standing to bring an unfair competition law 
action only if the plaintiff has suffered ―injury in fact‖ (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17204), and a plaintiff has standing to bring an action under the Labor Code 
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 only if the plaintiff is an ― ‗aggrieved 
employee‘ ‖ (Lab. Code, § 2699, subds. (a), (c)).  Associations suing under either 
law are not exempt from these express statutory standing requirements. 
V 
 
Plaintiff unions challenge the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that all unfair 
competition law actions seeking relief on behalf of others, including those brought 
by representative or associational plaintiffs, must be brought as class actions.  We 
agree with the Court of Appeal.  In the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court, 
supra, ___ Cal.4th at pp. ___-___ [pp. 5-8], we rejected a similar challenge. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I concur in the judgment.  However, as I explain in my concurring opinion in 
the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court (June 29, 2009, S155965) __ 
Cal.4th __, __ (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.), I do not agree with the majority‘s 
conclusion that the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) 
(UCL), as amended by Proposition 64 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)), literally or 
invariably requires that representative actions be brought as class actions.   
I do agree with the majority that the plaintiff unions in this case may not 
properly bring representative actions under the UCL.  As the majority explains, the 
UCL as amended by Proposition 64 clearly and expressly confers standing to bring 
a representative action only on a ―person who has suffered injury in fact and has 
lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.‖  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17204; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8.)  Plaintiffs‘ concession that they do not 
satisfy these absolute statutory requirements necessarily disposes of any argument 
they might make for standing.   
Because the UCL and plaintiffs‘ concession negate standing in this case, the 
majority‘s discussion of associational standing (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9-11) is 
unnecessary to the decision.  I agree with the majority that Proposition 64 did not 
incorporate wholesale the federal doctrine of associational standing, as set out in 
such cases as Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n (1977) 432 U.S. 
333, but California has its own distinct and well-established law of associational 
 
2 
standing based not on federal law but rather on Code of Civil Procedure section 
382.  (E.g., Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 
Cal.2d 276, 283-285; Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contracting 
Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898, 907-908; Raven’s Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. 
Knuppe Development Co. (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 783, 793-796.)  Because 
plaintiffs do not rely on this body of law, the majority does not address it.  I do not 
understand the majority opinion to hold that an association that has suffered injury 
in fact and lost money or property (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204) may not 
represent its members as the plaintiff in a UCL action.   
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J
 
1 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 148 Cal.App.4th 39 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S151615 
Date Filed: June 29, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Carl J. West 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn & Grosboll, John L. Anderson, Scott M. De Nardo and Benjamin K. Lunch for 
Petitioners. 
 
Davis, Cowell & Bowe, John J. Davis, Jr., and Paul L. More for Heat and Frost Insulators Local 16, 
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 159, Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 393 and Plasterers Local 200 as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, David Pallack, José Tello, Linda Fang; National 
Employment Law Center, Laura Moskowitz; Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Anel Flores; Asian 
Pacific American Legal Center, Yungsuhn Park; Legal Aid Society–Employment Law Center, Matthew 
Goldberg; The Worksafe Law Center, Danielle Lucido; The Watsonville Law Center and Dori Rose Inda 
for Garment Worker Center, Inquilinos Unidos, Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund, Yamin Yan and Yao 
Zhang as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Cynthia L. Rice, Blanca Bañuelos, Michael L. Meuter and Julie 
Montgomery for Jose Arias and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioners. 
 
Altshuler Berzon, Scott A. Kronland and Barbara J. Chisholm for American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Laborers International 
Union of North America, Service Employees International Union, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and Unite Here as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S151616 - counsel continued: 
 
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest: 
 
McMahon Berger, James N. Foster, Jr., Michelle M. Cain; Kampe & Kampe and K. W. Kampe III for Real 
Party in Interest First Transit, Inc. 
 
Gleason & Favarote, Paul M. Gleason, Torey J. Favarote and Richard Y. Chen for Real Party in Interest 
ATC/Vancom, Inc. 
 
Fulbright & Jaworski, Marcus Torrano, Rachel Salvin; Jenkens & Gilchrist, Margaret Rosenthal and 
Sabrina L. Shadi for Real Parties in Interest Progressive Transportation Services, Inc., and Coach USA 
Transit Service. 
 
Littler Mendelson, Theodore R. Scott and Tami Falkenstein-Hennick for Real Party in Interest Laidlaw 
Transit Services, Inc. 
 
O‘Melveny & Myers, Scott H. Dunham, Ryan W. Rutledge; Law Offices of Steven Drapkin, Steven 
Drapkin, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., and Robin S. Conrad for Employers Group, California 
Employment Law Council, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California 
Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra, Timothy Sandefur and Elizabeth A. Yi for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John L. Anderson 
Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn & Grosboll 
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2080 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 677-9440 
 
James N. Foster, Jr. 
McMahon Berger 
2370 N. Ballas Road, Suite 200 
St. Louis, MO  63131 
(314) 567-7350 
 
Marcus Torrano 
Fulbright & Jaworski 
555 South Flower Street, Forty-First Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 892-9200 
 
Scott H. Dunham 
O‘Melveny & Myers 
400 South Hope Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-2899 
(213) 430-6000