Title: Com. v. Stufflet
Citation: 322 Pa. Super. 176, 469 A.2d 240
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1983

322 Pa. Superior Ct. 176 (1983) 469 A.2d 240 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Daniel T. STUFFLET, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted October 3, 1983. Filed December 16, 1983. *178 Michael R. Muth, Public Defender, Stroudsburg, for appellant. Elmer D. Christine, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Stroudsburg, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before SPAETH, President Judge, and HESTER and LIPEZ, JJ. SPAETH, President Judge: This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence. Appellant argues that the sentencing judge in imposing the sentence considered information that was irrelevant. We agree, and therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. On December 27, 1978, appellant was sentenced to a term of 3 1/2 to 7 years in prison for robbery. He had also been convicted of burglary and recklessly endangering another person, but sentence was suspended on those convictions. An appeal was filed challenging the sentencing proceedings.[1] Appellant claimed that the trial court had failed to comply with the sentencing guidelines, and had failed to state of record the reasons for the sentence. This court agreed and vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing in accordance with the sentencing guidelines and Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 *179 (1977) (court must articulate of record reasons for sentence imposed). Commonwealth v. Stufflet, 291 Pa.Super. 516, 436 A.2d 235 (1981). On remand, the trial court held a resentencing hearing, and on December 30, 1981, reinstated the previous sentence. On January 6, 1982, appellant filed this appeal, and on January 11th he filed a motion with the trial court for reconsideration of sentence, claiming that the court had considered irrelevant information. The court denied the motion[2], and appellant now makes the same claim on appeal.[3] The events leading to appellant's conviction may be described as follows. Appellant and two other men entered a restaurant in Stroudsburg at approximately 1:30 a.m. on July 27, 1977. The two men with appellant locked the restaurant employees in a walk-in freezer while appellant ordered the manager, Carol Swalm, at gun-point, to open the safe. However, she could not open it. One of the two men then took her to a store room and raped her. The two men then forced her to leave the restaurant with them, but she got free and ran. At about that time, police officers arrived on the scene. They saw appellant leaving the restaurant with a stocking over his head and a gun in his hand, and arrested him. At the resentencing hearing, after remand, the following colloquy occurred: At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of sentence, a similar colloquy occurred: We have been unable to escape the conclusion that these statements are self-contradictory. On the one hand, the Court purported to recognize that appellant had properly not been charged with, much less convicted of, the rape, and that therefore the rape should not be counted against appellant. But on the other hand, the court made plain that it was counting the rape against appellant. Thus, at the resentencing hearing the court said: And at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of sentence, the court said: But then immediately after this, the court said "[I]f it reasonably appears from a review of the entire record that the sentencing court may have relied in whole or in part upon an impermissible consideration," the sentence is invalid and must be vacated. Commonwealth *183 v. Cruz, 265 Pa.Super. 474, 477, 402 A.2d 536, 537 (1979) (citing Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102 (1977). Here, it does appear that the trial court relied in part upon an impermissible consideration, namely, the rape. For one may not expect his statement, that he is not considering a fact, to be accepted when it is followed by a statement that he is considering that fact. One of the principal purposes of the rule of Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977), that the sentencing judge must state of record the reasons for the sentence, is to prevent what occurred here. As the Court explained: While we are therefore obliged to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, we are not to be understood as intimating an opinion that the sentence was excessive. Judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished. [1] Appellant failed to file a motion for reconsideration of sentence as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410, but no waiver resulted, for the trial court had failed to advise appellant of his right to file such a motion. Commonwealth v. Stufflet, 291 Pa.Super. 516, 436 A.2d 235 (1981). [2] Although an appeal had already been filed, the court still had jurisdiction to rule on the timely filed motion for reconsideration of sentence. Pa.R.App.P. 1701(b)(3). [3] Appellant also claims that the trial court "looked solely to the severity of the crime, and not the rehabilitative effect that had already been accomplished on the appellant." Brief for Appellant at 7. This claim is waived, for it was not made in appellant's motion for reconsideration of sentence, nor in his statement of questions involved. Pa.R.App.P. 2116; Pa.R.App.P. 302; Commonwealth v. Walls, 481 Pa. 1, 391 A.2d 1064 (1978); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 265 Pa.Super. 474, 402 A.2d 536 (1979).