Title: Jacqueline Dixson v. Wisconsin Health Organization Insurance Corporation
Citation: 2000 WI 95
Docket Number: 1997AP003816
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2000

2000 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3816 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Jacqueline Dixson, a minor, by her Guardian ad 
Litem, Dale R. Nikolay and Kathryn Dixson,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Health Organization Insurance 
Corporation,  
 
Defendant, 
Becky Mae Carson and Allstate Insurance Co.,  
 
Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs- 
 
Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Oriental Investment Company,  
 
Third-Party Defendant, 
Milwaukee County,  
 
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 185, 603 N.W.2d 748 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Arlene D. Connors 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-third party plaintiffs-
appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Michael A. Mesirow, 
Vicki L. Arrowood and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee, 
 
2 
and oral argument by Michael A. Mesirow. 
 
 
For the third party defendant-respondent there 
was a brief and oral argument by Louis Edward Elder, principal 
assistant corporation counsel, Milwaukee. 
 
2000 WI 95 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3816 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jacqueline Dixson, a minor, by her  
Guardian ad Litem, Dale R. Nikolay and  
Kathryn Dixson,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Health Organization Insurance  
Corporation,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Becky Mae Carson and Allstate Insurance Co., 
 
          Defendants-Third- 
          Party Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Oriental Investment Company,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant, 
 
Milwaukee County,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant- 
          Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
2 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This case raises the question of 
whether Milwaukee County, by virtue of its federally-mandated 
duty to inspect a rent assistance property, had a duty to test 
the property for the presence of lead-based paint.  Two-year-old 
Jacqueline Dixson and her mother, Kathryn, sued their landlord, 
Becky Mae Carson, for injuries Jacqueline suffered as a result 
of ingesting lead-based paint, allegedly in the duplex they 
rented from Carson.  Shortly before Jacqueline's diagnosis, and 
pursuant 
to 
federal 
regulations, 
the 
apartment 
had 
been 
inspected by Milwaukee County's Rent Assistance Program, which 
found that the apartment "appeared to be in compliance" with HUD 
lead-based paint regulations.   
¶2 
Carson and her insurer impleaded Milwaukee County for 
contribution, alleging that the County was negligent in its 
performance of the inspection.  The County moved for summary 
judgment, and the circuit court granted the motion, concluding 
that the County had no duty to inspect or test for lead-based 
paint.  The court of appeals affirmed.  We conclude that the 
County's federally-mandated duty to inspect the rent assistance 
property in this case did not include the duty to test for the 
presence of lead-based paint.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
¶3 
The relevant facts are from the pleadings and the 
affidavit of the County's rent assistance program coordinator.  
They are as follows.  Sometime in 1989, Kathryn Dixson and her 
two-year-old daughter, Jacqueline, moved into a duplex owned by 
Becky Mae Carson located at 3414 North 23rd Street in Milwaukee. 
 At the time, Dixson participated in a federal Department of 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
3 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rent assistance program 
administered by Milwaukee County.   
¶4 
Dixson informed the county rent assistance program 
coordinator of her move in February 1990.  At that time, the 
County required Dixson to read and sign a lead-based paint 
notice.  The notice contained a general warning to participants 
in the program of the dangers of lead-based paint.  It also 
advised tenants living in properties built before 1978 to ask 
their landlords about the presence of lead-based paint. 
¶5 
Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 882.109 (1990),1 Milwaukee 
County conducted an inspection of the Dixsons' unit on June 22, 
1990.  The inspector completed a 26-item inspection form, which 
instructed the inspector to put a check mark next to all items 
that were "okay."  One of the items checked as "okay" stated: 
 
The dwelling unit appears to be in compliance with HUD 
Lead Based Paint regulations, 24 C.F.R., part 35 of 
the title, issued pursuant to the Lead Based Paint 
Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. 4801.  The Owner 
may be required to provide a certification that the 
dwelling is in accordance with such HUD regulations. 
Both the county inspector and Kathryn Dixson signed the 
inspection form.  Next to the inspector's signature, the form 
stated, "I hereby certify that I have inspected this dwelling 
unit and have determined that to the best of my knowledge it 
complies with the requirements of Section 882.109 of 24 C.F.R. 
Part 882 on 6-22-90."   
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the Code 
of Federal Regulations are to the 1990 version.  
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
4 
¶6 
Sometime in the fall of 1990 Jacqueline Dixson was 
diagnosed with lead poisoning.  Kathryn Dixson and Dale Nikolay, 
Jacqueline's Guardian ad Litem, filed suit against Carson and 
her insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (collectively, Carson), 
seeking damages for injuries Jacqueline suffered as a result of 
her ingestion of lead-based paint, allegedly in the duplex.   
¶7 
On August 11, 1995, Carson impleaded Milwaukee County 
for contribution based upon the County's inspection of the 
Dixsons' duplex in connection with the rent assistance program.2 
The plaintiffs then amended their complaint to name the County 
as a defendant. 
¶8 
The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it 
had no legal duty to conduct tests for lead-based paint.  The 
County argued that the duty to test for lead-based paint rested 
with the landlord and could not be shifted to the County by 
virtue of its duty under the rent assistance program to conduct 
quality inspections of participating rental units. 
¶9 
The County relied upon an affidavit from Kim Jines, 
the Rent Assistance Program Coordinator.  The affidavit stated 
that under the program, the County had no duty to test 
participating properties for lead-based paint.  At most, the 
                     
2 Carson also impleaded Oriental Investment Company as a 
third-party defendant.  Oriental owned property rented by 
Jacqueline's aunt where Jacqueline spent time and may have been 
exposed to lead-based paint.  Dixson later amended her complaint 
to name Oriental as a defendant as well.  The claims against 
Oriental are not at issue in this appeal.  
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
5 
County had a "duty to conduct initial and annual quality 
inspections so as to provide decent, safe, and sanitary units." 
¶10 The Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the Honorable 
Arlene D. Connors, granted summary judgment in favor of the 
County, dismissing both Carson's third-party action and the 
Dixsons' direct claim.  The court found that the County's rent 
assistance quality inspection was not a guarantee that no lead-
based paint existed in the apartment, because the inspection 
report only stated that the property "appeared" to comply with 
pertinent HUD regulations regarding lead paint.  Because Carson 
offered 
no 
evidence 
contradicting 
the 
County's 
affidavit 
disclaiming a duty to test for lead-based paint, the court found 
there was "no basis on which to hold the County, as opposed to 
the property owner, liable for any of the plaintiffs' alleged 
injuries."  The court also held that the Dixsons' action against 
the County was barred by their failure to file a notice of claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) and (b) (1993-94).3  The circuit 
court did not address the issue of whether Carson was also 
required to file a notice of claim as a prerequisite to the 
third-party action for contribution. 
¶11 Carson appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in 
an 
unpublished 
decision. 
 
The 
court 
characterized 
the 
dispositive issue as whether the County "voluntarily assume[d] a 
duty to inspect for lead based paint," citing Nischke v. Farmers 
                     
3 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 version. 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
6 
& Merchants Bank & Trust, 187 Wis. 2d 96, 113, 522 N.W.2d 542 
(Ct. App. 1994), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). 
 The court of appeals concluded that there had been no 
assumption of duty, because the inspection report merely advised 
that the apartment "appeared" to comply with HUD regulations 
regarding lead paint. 
¶12 We accepted review on the issue of the County's duty 
to inspect or test for lead-based paint.  However, the case 
presents an initial jurisdictional question of whether Carson 
was required to file a notice of claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80, and after oral argument we asked for additional 
briefing on the notice of claim issue.  We conclude that Carson 
was not required to file a notice of claim under § 893.80 
because a claim for contribution is a contingent claim not 
subject to the 120-day notice of claim requirement in the 
statute.  We also conclude that the requirement that the County 
inspect the rent assistance property did not carry with it a 
duty to test for lead-based paint.  Therefore, summary judgment 
was appropriate, and we affirm. 
¶13 The threshold jurisdictional issue requires us to 
determine whether the notice of claim requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80 
applies 
to 
third-party 
claims 
for 
contribution.  
Section 893.80 provides in pertinent part: 
 
893.80 Claims against governmental bodies or officers, 
agents or employes; notice of injury; limitation of 
damages and suits. (1) Except as provided in subs. 
(1g), (1m), (1p) and (8), no action may be brought or 
maintained against any . . . governmental subdivision 
or agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
7 
agent or employe of the corporation, subdivision or 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action unless: 
 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employe 
under s. 801.11.  Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall 
not 
bar 
action 
on 
the 
claim 
if 
the . . . subdivision or agency had actual notice of 
the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction 
of the court that the delay or failure to give the 
requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the 
defendant . . . subdivision 
or 
agency 
or 
to 
the 
defendant officer, official, agent or employe . . . . 
¶14 Carson's 
claim 
against 
Milwaukee 
County 
is 
for 
contribution.  A cause of action for contribution is separate 
and distinct from the underlying cause of action.  State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 264, 201 N.W.2d 
758 (1972).  It does not accrue with the underlying claim.  It 
is a contingent claim that becomes an enforceable right only 
when 
one 
joint 
tortfeasor 
pays 
more 
than 
his 
or 
her 
proportionate share of the damages.  Id. at 266.   
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 requires a notice of claim to 
be filed within "120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim."  We have previously held the state 
employee notice of claim statute inapplicable to contingent 
claims for contribution, because the event giving rise to a 
contingent claimthe tortfeasor paying more than his or her 
share of the damagestypically occurs long after the event 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
8 
giving rise to the underlying claim.  Coulson v. Larsen, 94 
Wis. 2d 56, 59, 287 N.W.2d 754 (1980). 
¶16 In Coulson we interpreted Wis. Stat. § 895.45 (1975-
76), the notice of claim statute pertaining to claims against 
state officers or employees.4  There, the defendants brought a 
third-party 
claim 
for 
contribution 
against 
certain 
state 
employees without first filing a notice of claim on the attorney 
general as required by the statute.  The state argued lack of 
jurisdiction due to noncompliance with the statute.  We noted 
the statutory language requiring notice of claim "within 90 days 
of the event causing the injury, damage or death" and concluded 
that the legislature did not contemplate the application of the 
statute to claims for contribution because their contingent or 
inchoate 
nature 
made 
compliance 
with 
such 
time 
limits 
impractical.  Id. at 59.  See also State Farm, 56 Wis. 2d at 
262; Geiger v. Calumet County, 18 Wis. 2d 151, 118 N.W.2d 197 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.45 (1975-76) provided: 
(1) No civil action or civil proceeding may be 
brought against any state officer, employe or agent 
for or on account of any act growing out of or 
committed in the course of the discharge of such 
officer's employe's or agent's duties, unless within 
90 days of the event causing the injury, damage or 
death giving rise to the civil action or civil 
proceeding, the claimant in the action or proceeding 
serves upon the attorney general written notice of a 
claim stating the time, date, location and the 
circumstances of the event giving rise to the claim 
for the injury, damage or death and the names of the 
persons involved, including the name of the state 
officer, employe or agent involved (emphasis added).  
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
9 
(1962); Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 790, 35 
N.W.2d 911 (1948). 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.45 (1975-76) was replaced by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82 and later amended in response to Coulson to 
specifically require a notice of claim where contribution or 
indemnification is sought from state employees.  1983 S.B. 83. 
Section 893.82(3) provides that no "civil action or civil 
proceeding may be brought against any state officer, employe or 
agent . . . unless within 120 days of the event causing the 
injury, damage, or death giving rise to the civil action or 
civil proceeding, the claimant in the action or proceeding 
serves 
upon 
the 
attorney 
general 
written 
notice 
of 
a 
claim . . . ." 
 
Section 
893.82(2)(c) 
specifically 
defines 
"damage or injury" as including "any physical or mental damage 
or injury or financial damage or injury resulting from claims 
for contribution or indemnification."  The statute further 
provides that, in the case of a claim for contribution or 
indemnification, the "event" giving rise to the claim is the 
"underlying cause of action."  Wis. Stat. § 893.82(4)(a).  But 
the statute provides an exception: if the tortfeasor making the 
claim for contribution or indemnification "had no actual or 
constructive knowledge of the underlying cause of action at the 
time of the event," the 120-day time period begins when actual 
or 
constructive 
knowledge 
is 
acquired 
or 
the 
claim 
for 
contribution or indemnification accrues, whichever is earlier.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.82(4)(b).    
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
10
¶18 Thus, in Wis. Stat. § 893.82, the legislature clearly 
demonstrated its intention that claims for contribution or 
indemnification against state employees are subject to the 
notice of claim requirement.  Significantly, however, there is 
no reference whatsoever to claims for contribution in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80, which applies to claims against other governmental 
bodies.  Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature did not 
intend § 893.80 to apply to claims for contribution. 
¶19 DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 515 N.W.2d 
888 (1994), and City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Board, 
216 Wis. 2d 616, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998), both cited by the County 
in support of the requirement of a notice of claim here, are 
distinguishable.  Each involved a recognizable, accrued, non-
contingent claim (an action for injunctive relief in City of 
Waukesha and a declaratory judgment action in City of Racine) as 
opposed to a contingent claim such as one for contribution.  
Neither case undermines our conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
was not intended to apply to contingent claims for contribution. 
 Carson was not required to file a notice of claim before 
impleading the County for contribution. 
¶20 The jurisdictional question thus resolved, we reach 
the substantive issue in the case: whether the County, by virtue 
of the federally-mandated inspection of the rent assistance 
property in this case, had a duty to test for lead-based paint. 
 We conclude that it did not.  
¶21 A cause of action for negligence requires: 1) a duty 
of care on the part of the defendant, 2) a breach of that duty, 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
11
3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and 
4) an actual loss or damage as a result of the injury.  Peters 
v. Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 192, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999) 
(quoting Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 
742 (1995)).  The focus here is on the first element: whether 
the County had a duty of care regarding lead paint inspection 
and testing. 
¶22 We start from the general premise that "'the duty of 
any person is the obligation of due care to refrain from any act 
which will cause foreseeable harm to others even though the 
nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed person or 
harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act . . . .'"  
Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419-20 (quoting A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link 
Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483-84, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974)). 
 Carson argues that the County's duty of ordinary care in this 
case included the requirement of inspecting and testing for 
lead-based paint under the "Good Samaritan" rule expressed in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965).5  Essentially, this 
                     
5 Section 
324A.  Liability to Third 
Person for 
Negligent Performance of Undertaking.   
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to 
render 
services 
to 
another 
which 
he 
should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the 
third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases 
the risk of such harm, or 
 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
12
rule requires one who voluntarily assumes a duty that is 
necessary for the protection of another to exercise ordinary 
care in the performance of the duty, if the circumstances are 
such that the failure to do so increases the risk of harm to 
another.  Carson contends that because the County undertook an 
inspection of the duplex, it voluntarily assumed the duty to 
test for, treat and/or eliminate the hazards of lead-based 
paint. 
¶23 Carson 
misconstrues 
the 
federal 
regulations 
that 
require the County, in its role as administrator of the rent 
assistance program, to inspect properties occupied by rent 
assistance recipients.  Although the applicable line item on the 
County's inspection form certified that the Dixsons' unit 
"appeared to comply" with the provisions of 24 C.F.R. Part 35, 
the overall inspection was conducted pursuant to 24 C.F.R. 
§ 882.109.  Each of these sections of the federal code provides 
for slightly different inspections, but neither section requires 
the County to test for, treat or eradicate lead-based paint 
under the circumstances of this case.   
                                                                  
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the 
other to the third person, or 
 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the 
other or the third person upon the undertaking. 
 
The use of the word "protect" in the introduction is 
apparently a typographical error and should instead read 
"perform."  Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 168 Wis. 2d 863, 883 
n.7, 485 N.W.2d 31 (1992).  
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
13
¶24 Two subparts of 24 C.F.R. Part 35 appear to be 
relevant to our inquiry.  Subpart A concerns notification to 
purchasers and tenants of HUD-associated housing constructed 
prior to 1978.  The purpose of the subpart is to establish 
procedures to assure that all purchasers and tenants of HUD-
associated housing are notified of the hazards of lead-based 
paint, the symptoms and treatment of lead paint poisoning, and 
the importance and availability of maintenance and removal 
techniques for eliminating lead paint hazards.  24 C.F.R. 
§ 35.1. 
¶25 To this end, purchasers and tenants of HUD-associated 
housing are required to be notified of the following: 1) whether 
the property was constructed prior to 1978, 2) that the property 
may contain lead-based paint, 3) the hazards associated with 
lead-based paint, 4) the symptoms and treatment of lead-based 
paint poisoning, and 5) the precautions to be taken to avoid 
lead-based paint poisoning.  The provisions of this section 
clearly impose on rent assistance program administrators a 
requirement of notification only, not a duty to inspect or test 
painted surfaces for the presence of lead-based paint.  The 
County complied with these provisions when it gave Kathryn 
Dixson the information on lead-based paint and told her to check 
with her landlord. 
¶26 The other relevant provision in 24 C.F.R. Part 35 is 
subpart C, which is the only provision in Part 35 that 
specifically mentions an inspection.  It provides that "all 
applicable surfaces of HUD-associated housing constructed prior 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
14
to 1978 shall be inspected to determine whether defective paint 
surfaces exist."  24 C.F.R. § 35.24(b)(1).  A defective paint 
surface is defined as "an applicable surface on which the paint 
is cracking, scaling, chipping, peeling or loose."  24 C.F.R. 
§ 35.22.  It is neither stated nor implied that the County or 
other program administrator must inspect or test for lead-based 
paint.  All that is required is a visual inspection of painted 
surfaces to detect any irregularities or defects in the surface 
that might require follow-up testing, treatment or eradication. 
¶27 When an inspection is conducted pursuant to 24 C.F.R. 
§ 882.109, the entire subpart C of Part 35 is superceded and 
replaced by 24 C.F.R. § 889.109(i).  The regulations direct that 
in the case of a unit constructed before 1978, for a family that 
includes a child under the age of seven years, the initial 
inspection and each periodic inspection "shall include an 
inspection 
for 
defective 
paint 
surfaces." 
 
24 
C.F.R. 
§ 882.109(i)(3).  As in 24 C.F.R. Part 35, defective paint 
surfaces are defined as "paint on applicable surfaces that is 
cracking, scaling, chipping, peeling or loose."  24 C.F.R. 
§ 882.109(i)(2).  Therefore, in this provision, as in 24 C.F.R. 
Part 35, the duty imposed on the administrator of the rent 
assistance program is a duty to conduct a visual inspection for 
faulty paint surfaces, not to inspect or test for lead-based 
paint. 
¶28 The federal regulations do contain a provision that 
requires the County to conduct lead-based paint testing, but it 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
15
does not apply to the circumstances presented here. 24 C.F.R. 
§ 882.109(i)(4) provides that:  
 
In the case of a unit constructed prior to 1978, for a 
Family which includes a child under the age of seven 
years with an identified EBL condition [excessive 
absorption of leada confirmed concentration of lead 
in whole blood of 25 ug/dl or greater], the initial 
inspection 
under s 
882.209(h)(1), 
or 
a 
periodic 
inspection under s 882.211(b), shall include a test 
for 
lead-based 
paint 
on 
chewable 
surfaces 
[all 
chewable protruding painted surfaces up to five feet 
from the floor or ground, which are readily accessible 
to children under seven years of age, e.g., protruding 
corners, windowsills and frames, doors and frames, and 
other protruding woodworks].   
24 C.F.R. § 882.109(i)(4).  Thus, the federal regulations only 
impose a duty to test certain surfaces for lead paint if the 
family occupying the unit being inspected has a child under the 
age of seven years who already has elevated levels of lead in 
his or her blood.  Carson has submitted no evidence that 
Jacqueline Dixson had elevated lead levels at the time the 
County conducted the inspection of the duplex.  Therefore, the 
applicable Code provisions requiring the County to inspect the 
property do not include a requirement that the County test for 
the presence of lead paint, only that it visually inspect the 
paint surfaces for cracking, peeling and the like.   
¶29 While a standard of ordinary care may under certain 
circumstances 
be 
defined 
by 
legislation 
or 
government 
regulations, see Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 164 Wis. 2d 
639, 658, 476 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991), and Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 286 (1965), we cannot conclude that the 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
16
regulations in this case required the County to test for lead-
based paint.  The regulations clearly require lead-based paint 
testing only under very specific circumstances not present here. 
 Furthermore, there is no evidence that the County voluntarily 
undertook to test for lead-based paint, and so the "Good 
Samaritan" rule of the Restatement § 324A does not apply. 
¶30 The County never stated or otherwise implied that the 
Dixsons' duplex had been tested and found to be free from lead-
based paint.  Rather, the inspection form signed by the County 
inspector and Kathryn Dixson stated that the premises "appeared" 
to comply with the provisions of 24 C.F.R. Part 35, and that the 
unit complied with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 882.109, 
which did not mandate testing under these circumstances.  By 
this statement on the inspection form, the County was only 
representing that its inspection revealed no "cracking, scaling, 
chipping, peeling or loose" paint in the duplex.  Carson has not 
introduced evidence to the contrary, and the other items on the 
inspection report indicate that the paint surfaces were not 
defective.  As the court of appeals noted, the use of the word 
"appear" on the inspection form indicates that the inspection 
"merely alerts the reader that a visual inspection revealed no 
obvious violation" of the HUD regulations, which were limited to 
a visual inspection for "defective paint surfaces." 
¶31 Furthermore, the inspection form clearly warned that 
the responsibility for any lead-based paint on the property 
rested with the landlord; it stated that the property owner "may 
be required to provide a certification that the dwelling is in 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
17
accordance with such HUD Regulations."  The County also warned 
participants in the rent assistance program that if they lived 
in a rental unit built before 1978, they should ask their 
landlord about the presence of lead-based paint. 
¶32 The law of this state places the responsibility for 
lead paint testing on the property owner.  In Antwaun A. v. 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 62, 596 N.W.2d 
456 (1999), we concluded that a duty to test for lead-based 
paint arises whenever the landlord of a residential property 
constructed before 1978 either knows or should know that there 
is peeling or chipping paint in the property.  We see no 
justification for shifting the duty to test for lead paint from 
the property owner to the County based upon federal regulations 
that impose upon the County a limited duty to inspect for 
deteriorating paint surfaces in properties leased by rent 
assistance recipients.  To impose such a wholesale shift of 
responsibility would create two classes of property ownersone 
that has a duty to test for lead-based paint under Antwaun A., 
and another that is relieved of that duty because it leases to 
tenants who receive federal rent assistance through Milwaukee 
County or any other public housing authority.   
¶33 Therefore, we conclude that when Milwaukee County 
conducted an inspection of the Dixsons' duplex pursuant to the  
federal rent assistance program regulations, it did not assume a 
duty to test for lead-based paint.  The obligation of testing 
for lead-based paint was neither imposed upon the County by the 
regulations, nor required by the standard of ordinary care 
No. 
97-3816 
 
 
18
because of a voluntary assumption of duty.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment was appropriately granted dismissing Carson's claim for 
contribution against the County. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
1 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
The majority opinion unduly narrows the third-party plaintiffs' 
claim against Milwaukee County and, as a result, dismisses the 
claim, concluding that the County had no duty to inspect the 
plaintiffs' apartment for lead-based paint.  Because such a 
conclusion, even if accurate, does not resolve the case, I 
dissent. 
¶35 As the majority opinion properly notes (majority op. 
at ¶ 2), the third-party complaint alleged that the county was 
negligent in its inspection of the plaintiffs' apartment, and 
that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' 
injuries.  The County subsequently made a motion for summary 
judgment, on two separate grounds.  First, the County argued 
that it could not be liable for injuries suffered by the 
plaintiffs since the plaintiffs did not rent an apartment owned 
by the County.  Second, the County asserted that the action 
should be dismissed for failure to prosecute because the 
plaintiffs and the third-party plaintiffs had failed to show up 
at a scheduled deposition at which counsel for the County 
appeared.  The County included as a part of its motion for 
summary judgment an affidavit from Kim Jines, the County Rent 
Assistance Program Coordinator.  The affidavit stated that the 
County had a duty to "conduct initial and annual quality 
inspections so as to provide decent, safe, and sanitary units." 
 However, the affidavit stated that there is "no requirement by 
law that the County conduct lead poisoning tests." 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
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¶36 Both the plaintiffs and the third-party plaintiffs 
responded to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.  The 
plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was not appropriate 
because the County had conceded that it had a duty to inspect 
the apartment and that it was a question for the jury to 
determine whether the inspection was negligent and the cause of 
the plaintiffs' injuries.  The third-party plaintiffs' motion in 
opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
similarly argued that such relief was not appropriate because 
"[t]here clearly exists an issue of fact as to whether Milwaukee 
County was negligent in its inspection of the home . . . ." 
¶37 The 
third-party 
plaintiffs' 
brief 
included 
an 
affidavit from the third-party plaintiffs' attorney.  The 
affidavit included portions of the transcript of the plaintiffs' 
deposition, in which a plaintiff testified that a representative 
from the County had inspected the apartment on two separate 
occasions and had not mentioned anything about lead-based paint. 
 The third-party plaintiffs also included the inspection form 
that the Milwaukee County Department of Public Works had filled 
out and signed, certifying that the plaintiffs' apartment 
complied with the standards listed therein. 
¶38 The 
County subsequently filed a 
motion entitled 
"motion to dismiss."  That motion asserted that the affidavit 
submitted by the attorney for the third-party plaintiffs should 
be disregarded because it was hearsay, and that the inspection 
form included should also be disregarded because it was not 
authenticated pursuant to chapter 909 of the Statutes.  The 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
3 
motion also sought the dismissal of the claim against the County 
based on the statute of limitations and the notice of claims 
statute.  These issues are not relevant for the purpose of this 
dissent. 
¶39 The circuit court dismissed the third-party action 
against Milwaukee County because the inspection report only 
stated that the apartment "appeared" to comply with the 
pertinent HUD regulations regarding lead-based paint.  The 
circuit court held that the third-party plaintiffs had not 
submitted any evidence to refute the contention made in the 
affidavit of the Coordinator that the County did not have a duty 
to test for lead-based paint. 
¶40 The court of appeals affirmed, utilizing a similar 
rationale.  The court of appeals characterized the dispositive 
issue as whether the "county voluntarily assume[d] a duty to 
inspect for lead-based paint."  The court of appeals held that 
no assumption of duty had taken place, since the inspection form 
merely stated that the apartment "appeared" to comply with the 
regulations.  The court of appeals further held that the third-
party plaintiffs had failed to submit any evidence to suggest 
that the inspection report was erroneous in its limited 
assertion that the apartment appeared to comply with the federal 
lead-based paint regulations.   
¶41 This court's majority opinion agrees with the circuit 
court and court of appeals, which held that the federal 
regulations do not create an affirmative duty on the County to 
inspect for lead-based paint.  Rather, according to the 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
4 
majority, the regulations create a duty on the County to conduct 
a "visual inspection for faulty paint surfaces."  Majority op. 
at ¶ 27.6  On the basis of the inspection form and the federal 
regulations, the majority opinion concludes that the County did 
not state or otherwise imply that the apartment was free of 
lead-based paint; the County stated only that the apartment 
appeared to comply with the federal regulations.  The majority 
further states that because the third-party plaintiffs did not 
submit evidence suggesting that the County breached its duty to 
conduct a visual inspection for faulty paint, summary judgment 
for the defendants is appropriate.  Majority op. at ¶ 30. 
¶42 In my view the majority opinion's analysis of the 
claim against the County is faulty.  The majority examined 
whether the County voluntarily undertook an affirmative duty to 
test for lead-based paint or whether such a duty arises from the 
federal regulations.  Majority op. at ¶ 20.  But neither of 
these analyses reflects Wisconsin's well-established negligence 
law.  In Wisconsin, as this court has repeatedly explained, the 
first element of a negligence claim is a duty of care, and that 
duty is established under state law whenever it is foreseeable 
to the defendant that his or her act or omission to act might 
cause harm to some other person.  At the very least, every 
person is subject to a duty to exercise ordinary care in all of 
                     
6 Although the majority opinion continually uses the words 
"visual inspection," the federal regulations refer to "an 
inspection"; it is not specifically limited to a visual 
inspection. 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
5 
his or her activities.  This court has not adopted the 
Restatement's provisions regarding the voluntary assumption of 
duties in evaluating negligence claims.  Instead, the general 
framework governing the duty of care in Wisconsin negligence 
actions is as follows: A person is negligent when he or she 
fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is the care that 
a reasonable person would use in similar circumstances.  A 
person is not using ordinary care and is negligent if the 
person, without intending to do harm, does something (or fails 
to do something) that a reasonable person would recognize as 
creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or 
property.  In Wisconsin, failure to take an affirmative action 
may constitute negligence when that failure is inconsistent with 
the duty to exercise ordinary care.  Gritzner v. Bubner, 2000 WI 
68 at ¶¶ 20-23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d___.7 
¶43 Thus the ultimate question in this case is not whether 
the County voluntarily undertook an affirmative duty to inspect 
but whether, under all the circumstances, the County did not 
exercise with due care when it inspected the apartment and 
represented to both the landlord and prospective tenant that the 
                     
7 As the Gritzner opinion went on to discuss, "even when a 
duty of care exists and the other elements of negligence have 
been established, public policy considerations may preclude 
liability."  Gritzner v. Bubner, 2000 WI 68 at ¶ 24, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  However, there has been no argument of 
such a public policy limitation in this case. 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
6 
unit appeared to comply with HUD regulations related to lead-
based paint.8 
¶44 The third-party complaint against the County was not 
based solely on the County's failure to test for lead-based 
paint; 
the 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
the 
safety 
inspection 
conducted by the County was negligent.  The third-party 
complaint alleged that the inspection was negligent specifically 
in that it failed to disclose or reveal the existence of lead-
based paint.  But that was only one of the ways in which the 
County's inspection could have been negligent.  The County's 
inspection could have been negligent in that it failed to detect 
chipping or faulty paint or other outward signs of lead-based 
paint dangers. 
¶45 The majority opinion concludes that the negligence 
claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment because the 
third-party plaintiffs did not submit evidence suggesting that 
                     
8 The Wisconsin Jury Instructions make clear that: 
A person is negligent when [he or she] fails to 
exercise ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care 
which a reasonable person would use in similar 
circumstances.  A person is not using ordinary care 
and is negligent, if the person, without intending to 
do harm, does something (or fails to do something) 
that a reasonable person would recognize as creating 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person 
or property. 
 
Wis JICivil 1005.  See also Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 
Wis. 2d 409, 419, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) ("Each individual is 
held, at the very least, to a standard of ordinary care in all 
activities."). 
No. 97-3816.ssa 
 
7 
the County breached its duty to conduct a visual inspection for 
faulty paint.  Majority op. at ¶ 30.  This conclusion is in 
error because the County did not move for summary judgment on 
the grounds that its inspection had not been negligent.  Rather, 
the County's summary judgment motion (and subsequent "motion to 
dismiss") was based on the limited premise that the County did 
not have a duty to inspect for lead-based paint because the 
County did not own the apartment.  As the third-party plaintiffs 
argue in their brief to this court, a motion for summary 
judgment based on the lack of a legal duty because of lack of 
ownership does not require the non-movants to present factual 
evidence as to the inadequacies of the inspection.   
¶46 I would remand this cause to the circuit court for a 
determination of whether, under all the circumstances, the 
County exercised due care in its inspection and representation. 
 If the County wishes to file a summary judgment motion based on 
the lack of evidence that it failed to conduct its inspection in 
violation of due care, it may do so.  We should not create such 
a motion for the County and by doing so refuse to give the 
third-party plaintiffs an opportunity to refute it.   
¶47 For the reasons stated, I dissent.