Title: Deal v. Massachusetts Parole Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12746
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2020

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SJC-12746 
 
TIMOTHY DEAL  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 5, 2019. - April 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole.  Administrative Law, Decision, 
Judicial review. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 14, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by C. William Barrett, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper (Barbara Kaban also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, & Benjamin Niehaus, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
2 
 
BUDD, J.  The plaintiff, Timothy Deal, is serving a life 
sentence for committing murder in the second degree when he was 
seventeen.  He sought review of the parole board's (board's) 
denial of his application for parole in the Superior Court, 
alleging that the board abused its discretion by failing to 
analyze properly the "distinctive attributes of youth" in coming 
to its decision.  See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 675 (2013) (Lenk, J., concurring) 
(Diatchenko I), quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 
(2012).  The judge entered judgment in favor of the board, and 
the plaintiff appealed.  We allowed Deal's application for 
direct appellate review, and for the reasons detailed infra, we 
affirm the judge's order allowing the board's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.1 
 
Background.  1.  Underlying facts.  We recount the facts as 
found by the board, supplemented by uncontested facts presented 
in Deal's parole application and hearing.  The victim and Deal 
were next-door neighbors and close friends.  In September 2001, 
the victim, who was facing drug charges, agreed to become an 
informant for police and purchased marijuana from Deal in a 
"controlled buy."  Based on information provided by the victim, 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in support of 
Deal by the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and the youth advocacy division of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
police secured a warrant to search Deal's home, where Deal 
shared a bedroom with his older brother, and subsequently 
arrested Deal and his brother on drug and firearm charges. 
 
In January 2002, after Deal's release on bail, he and a 
companion went to the victim's home.  A fight ensued between 
Deal and the victim, during which Deal stabbed the victim 
multiple times.  The victim died from his wounds that evening.  
Two days after his arrest on murder charges, Deal telephoned the 
victim's mother; when she asked why he killed her son, Deal 
responded, "[The victim] was a snitch. . . .  [W]e tried to keep 
it from you." 
 
Deal was seventeen years old at the time of the killing.  
He was indicted and tried for murder in the first degree, and a 
jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of murder in 
the second degree.  Deal was sentenced to life with the 
possibility of parole after fifteen years, making him eligible 
for parole in early 2017. 
 
2.  The parole hearing.  Deal applied for parole in 
December of 2016.  In advance of his parole hearing, Deal 
submitted a memorandum describing his childhood, his 
rehabilitation, and his plans for housing and employment if 
paroled.  Deal also submitted a report by a forensic 
psychologist concluding that Deal would be a low risk for 
recidivism if paroled based on risk assessments and an interview 
4 
 
with Deal.  The application included submissions in support of 
parole from more than ten friends and family members, including 
the victim's mother.  The Boston police department and the 
district attorney for the Suffolk district submitted letters in 
opposition, both alleging that Deal killed the victim in 
retaliation for acting as an informant. 
 
At the hearing in December 2016, Deal gave an opening 
statement apologizing to the victim's family and stating his 
responsibility and regret for the murder.  When asked to give 
his account of the killing, Deal stated that he had not planned 
or intended to kill the victim in retaliation for cooperating 
with police; rather, an argument over "something petty" 
escalated into a fight during which Deal grabbed a knife from a 
friend and then stabbed the victim multiple times.  Board 
members noted their concern that Deal may have killed the victim 
in retaliation for acting as a police informant, questioning in 
particular why, two days after Deal's arrest for murder, he 
called the victim's mother and told her the victim was a 
"snitch."  In response, Deal characterized the telephone call as 
an attempt to give context for why he, a close friend of the 
victim's family, ended up fighting and killing the victim. 
 
In its written decision, the board denied parole and 
scheduled Deal's next review for December 2020, determining that 
Deal "[had] not demonstrated a level of rehabilitative progress 
5 
 
that would make his release compatible with the welfare of 
society," and that Deal's "version of the offense . . . [was] 
not plausible."  After exhausting his administrative appeals, 
Deal challenged the board's decision by bringing a complaint in 
the nature of certiorari in the Superior Court.  See Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 30 
(2015) (Diatchenko II).  A judge in the Superior Court granted 
the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied 
Deal's cross motion for the same, concluding that the board's 
decision was not an abuse of discretion.  We allowed Deal's 
application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 127, § 130, sets forth the 
standard the board is to apply when making parole decisions.  
The board may grant parole only where it finds, 
"after consideration of a risk and needs assessment, that 
there is a reasonable probability that, if the prisoner is 
released with appropriate conditions and community 
supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society." 
 
Id. 
The board is afforded significant deference with regard to 
its parole decisions.  As the granting of parole is a 
discretionary function of the executive branch, generally the 
judiciary's role is limited to reviewing the constitutionality 
of the board's decision and proceedings.  Commonwealth v. Cole, 
6 
 
468 Mass. 294, 302-303 (2014).  See, e.g., Crowell v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 477 Mass. 106 (2017) (reviewing claims 
that parole decision violated constitution and statutes, and 
remanding for further development of record); Quegan v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834 (1996) (reviewing 
constitutional claims that board may not consider refusal to 
admit guilt in parole determination); Doucette v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531 (2014) (reviewing alleged due 
process violations in parole revocation proceeding, and 
conducting certiorari review of merits of board's decision to 
revoke parole). 
 
Parole decisions for juvenile homicide offenders like the 
plaintiff are handled differently, however.  Unlike adult 
offenders, juveniles have "diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform, and, therefore, they do not deserve the 
most severe punishments," including sentences of life without 
parole (quotations omitted).  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 659-
660, citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  "[B]ecause the brain of a 
juvenile is not fully developed, either structurally or 
functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with 
confidence that a particular offender, at that point in time, is 
irretrievably depraved."  Diatchenko I, supra at 670.  In 
particular, "[r]elying on science, social science, and common 
sense," the United States Supreme Court has pointed to three 
7 
 
"distinctive characteristics of youth" that make juveniles 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing.  Id. at 660, 663. 
 
These characteristics include what are commonly referred to 
as the Miller factors:  (1) children's "lack of maturity" and 
"underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to 
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking"; (2) their 
"vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including from their family and peers," and relatedly, their 
"limited control over their own environment" and inability to 
"extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings"; 
and (3) their "unique capacity to change as they grow older" 
(alteration and quotations omitted).  Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. 
at 30, citing Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 660.  See Miller, 567 
U.S. at 471. 
 
Thus, we held that juvenile offenders who have been 
convicted of murder in the first degree may not be sentenced to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.  Diatchenko I, 
466 Mass. at 669-671.  We went on to hold that juvenile 
offenders sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison, 
(i.e., those convicted of murder in the first or second degree) 
are entitled to a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release [on 
parole] based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 674.  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 
8 
 
Mass. 51, 62-63 (2015); G. L. c. 119, § 72B.  We further held 
that a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" means that the board 
must consider the "distinctive attributes of youth" in 
determining whether the juvenile is likely to reoffend.  
Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 23. 
In addition, although in the normal course parole decisions 
are not subject to judicial review, Cole, 468 Mass. at 302-303, 
we have determined that to ensure that juvenile homicide 
offenders receive a meaningful opportunity for parole, they are 
entitled to judicial review of board decisions on their parole 
applications under the abuse of discretion standard.2  Diatchenko 
II, 471 Mass. at 14, 31.  "In this context, a denial of a parole 
application by the board will constitute an abuse of discretion 
only if the board essentially failed to take [the Miller] 
factors into account, or did so in a cursory way."3  Id. at 31. 
                     
 
2 Juvenile homicide offenders also must have access to 
counsel and access to funds to retain counsel and experts.  
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 
12, 14 (2015) (Diatchenko II). 
 
 
3 This abuse of discretion standard is grounded in our 
balancing of the two constitutional considerations discussed 
supra:  the fundamental imperative of proportionality in 
sentencing under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, and the "strict separation of judicial and executive 
powers" under art. 30.  See Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 27-28. 
9 
 
 
The plaintiff contends that the board abused its discretion 
by denying him parole without more thoroughly analyzing various 
factors related to his youth.  Deal argues that in order to 
enable effective judicial review, and guarantee juvenile 
homicide offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, 
the parole board's decisions must "expressly address in writing 
the youth-specific considerations present in each case, place 
that evidence in the context of the overall parole standard, and 
explain by reference to that evidence why the [b]oard 
nevertheless denied parole if it did."  The judge determined 
that "[w]hile the better practice may have been for the board to 
more specifically outline its findings and discussion in 
relation to the individual Miller factors, as opposed to its 
general statement that it considered them, such a level of 
detail is not required, particularly given the discretion 
afforded to the board."  Upon review, we conclude that the board 
did not abuse its discretion, as it adequately considered the 
requisite youth-related factors.4 
 
In support of his argument, the plaintiff points to the 
fact that the board simply recites the Miller factors as among 
the considerations relevant to its decision without connecting 
those factors to any of the evidence presented at the hearing.  
                     
 
4 We review the Superior Court judge's ruling de novo.  
Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 90 (2015). 
10 
 
We agree with the plaintiff and the concurrence that merely 
stating that the board considered the Miller factors, without 
more, would constitute a cursory analysis that is incompatible 
with art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See 
Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 31.  However, upon review of the 
board's written decision, it is clear that the board's single 
mention of the Miller factors was not the beginning and end of 
the board's consideration of those factors. 
The decision described various negative influences and 
stressors in Deal's environment leading up to the killing, 
including Deal's adult brother enlisting his aid in dealing 
drugs, his family's mounting financial and legal hardships, and 
his struggle to adapt to a change in schools.  Although the 
board did not explicitly state the connection, these facts 
clearly relate to Deal's "vulnerability to negative influences 
and outside pressures, including from [his] family and peers" 
and his "limited control over [his] own environment" (alteration 
and quotation omitted).  See Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 30, 
citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  Further, although the board 
found that Deal's "version of the offense" was not plausible, 
its written decision acknowledged the "loss of friendship" and 
escalating confrontations between Deal and the victim stemming 
from Deal's arrest on information provided by the victim -- 
facts that illuminate the board's consideration of Deal's "lack 
11 
 
of maturity . . . leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk-taking."  See Diatchenko II, supra.  Finally, the 
board's decision noted Deal's participation in various 
rehabilitative programs, employment, and religious activities 
while incarcerated, each of which pertains to Deal's "unique 
capacity to change as [he] grow[s] older."  See id. 
Although the board's decision did not designate each fact 
to a particular attribute of youth, the decision's inclusion of 
these facts supports the board's certification that it did 
consider the Miller factors in a noncursory way.  Had the board 
expressly connected these facts to the Miller factors, there 
would have been no doubt that it gave thoughtful consideration 
to those factors.  Making these connections explicit, rather 
than implicit, will allow the board to make clear to reviewing 
courts that it gave due consideration to the Miller factors. 
The plaintiff also argues that the board impermissibly 
based its decision on factors that are "irrelevant, or at least 
of diminished significance, to juvenile cases."  In particular, 
Deal contends that the board focused more on the conclusion that 
Deal's version of events was "not plausible" than on the 
attributes of youth.  The plaintiff's argument fundamentally 
misunderstands our holding in Diatchenko II.  Although we held 
that the board must consider the "distinctive attributes of 
youth" in order for a juvenile homicide offender to have a 
12 
 
"meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation," we did not say that the board's 
decision had to rise or fall on those factors.  See Diatchenko 
II, 471 Mass. at 23, 30.  It is apparent from the decision that 
the board was primarily concerned about the plaintiff's failure 
to provide a "plausible" account of why he stabbed the victim 
fourteen years after he committed the crime.  This concern is 
indicative of the plaintiff's incomplete "acknowledgement of his 
wrongdoing or . . . his refusal to acknowledge his guilt" -- 
considerations which may be relevant to rehabilitation, see 
Quegan, 423 Mass. at 836 -- rather than a rigid application of 
the traditional penological justifications (incapacitation, 
retribution, or deterrence), which are "suspect" as applied to 
juvenile sentences, see Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 670-671.5  
Further, the board's concern, noted in its decision, that Deal 
had not gone on record to take responsibility for the killing 
until ten years after the crime reinforces the board's 
legitimate reasoning that a longer period of rehabilitation 
                     
 
5 Importantly, the board's written decision did not adopt 
the district attorney's argument that "[a] positive vote for 
parole . . . may send the wrong message to other criminals."  
Although the board noted its concern that Deal may have killed 
the victim in retaliation for being a "snitch," it did so in the 
context of Deal's rehabilitation, as evidenced by his possible 
lack of acknowledgment of the full severity of his crime. 
13 
 
would be necessary before release is compatible with the welfare 
of society. 
The plaintiff argues as well that the board abused its 
discretion by denying parole without discussing the details of 
the risk assessment and report conducted by a forensic 
psychologist who concluded that Deal would be a low risk for 
recidivism if paroled.  In its decision, the board noted that it 
"considered testimony" from the psychologist and that it 
"considered a risk and needs assessment," without discussing 
what the expert and risk assessment found or explaining why 
those findings were not enough to warrant parole.  By denying 
parole on the grounds that Deal "[had] not demonstrated a level 
of rehabilitative progress that would make his release 
compatible with the welfare of society," the necessary 
implication is that, in the board's view, Deal's incomplete 
rehabilitation contradicted the risk assessment and the forensic 
psychologist's conclusion that Deal would be a low risk to 
recidivate.  "[T]he opinion of a witness testifying on behalf of 
a sex offender need not be accepted by the hearing examiner even 
where the board does not present any contrary expert testimony."  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 112 (2014), quoting Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
459 Mass. 603, 637 (2011).  Nevertheless, the better practice, 
14 
 
as described in the concurrence, would be to articulate the 
reasons and evidence overcoming the contrary expert opinion. 
As discussed supra, ultimately the board must determine 
whether there is "a reasonable probability" that the applicant 
would not recidivate if given the proper support, and that 
"release is not incompatible with the welfare of society."  See 
G. L. c. 127, § 130.  Although our review of parole decisions 
for juvenile homicide offenders is limited, we note that here, 
even taking into consideration youth-related factors, the board 
had reason to conclude that the plaintiff had failed to 
demonstrate a "level of rehabilitative progress that would make 
his release compatible with the welfare of society."  The Miller 
factors, although an important consideration, may or may not 
play a determinative role in the board's decision depending on 
the circumstances of a particular applicant.  In denying Deal's 
parole application, the board determined that Deal's incomplete 
rehabilitation, as evidenced by his failure to give a plausible 
account of his motivations for killing the victim, outweighed 
the favorable Miller evidence.  In future cases where, as here, 
evidence relevant to the Miller factors militates in favor of 
release but the board nevertheless denies parole, the better 
practice would be to specify the reasons and supporting facts 
that overcome the Miller considerations.  Additionally, in light 
of the concerns raised by the concurrence, where the board bases 
15 
 
its denial of parole on a determination that the applicant's 
version of events is not plausible, the board should indicate 
both why that version is not plausible and how that 
implausibility bears on the applicant's likelihood to recidivate 
or the compatibility of release with the welfare of society. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the board's decision denying Deal's parole application was not 
an abuse of discretion.  The board based its decision on the 
statutory standard of rehabilitation and compatibility with the 
welfare of society, and its consideration of the distinctive 
attributes of youth was not merely cursory.  Accordingly, the 
Superior Court judge's order granting the board's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and denying Deal's motion for the same 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  In 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655, 671 (2013) (Diatchenko I), we held that life imprisonment 
for a juvenile, even when convicted of murder, is cruel or 
unusual punishment in violation of art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights unless the juvenile has the possibility of 
being released on parole.  We also held that, when the juvenile 
becomes eligible for parole, the parole board (board) must 
provide the juvenile with a "meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."  Id. 
at 674, quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).  And 
in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 
Mass. 12, 24-29 (2015) (Diatchenko II), we declared that a 
"meaningful opportunity to obtain release" requires not only a 
right to the assistance of counsel and a right to have access to 
the assistance of expert witnesses, but also a right of judicial 
review "to ensure that the board exercises its discretionary 
authority to make a parole decision for a juvenile homicide 
offender in a constitutional manner." 
 
In Diatchenko II, supra at 30, we also articulated what it 
means for the board to exercise its discretionary authority in a 
constitutional manner.  Looking to the reasoning in Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), we stated that the board must 
consider that juveniles have "diminished culpability" for the 
2 
 
murder they committed because of the "distinctive attributes" of 
youth:  a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk-taking; vulnerability to negative influences and 
outside pressures, including from their family and 
peers; . . . limited contro[l] over their own 
environment[;] . . . [and lack of] the ability to extricate 
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings" (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Diatchenko II, supra.  The board must 
also consider that juveniles have the "unique capacity to change 
as they grow older" and therefore "greater prospects for reform" 
(citations omitted).  Id.  Unless the board considers these 
distinctive attributes of youth, as well as the consequences of 
aging into adulthood, the board denies the juvenile "a real 
chance to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation."  Id. 
 
The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that "the board 
has carried out its responsibility to take into account the 
attributes or factors just described in making its decision."  
Id.  Recognizing that "the decision whether to grant parole to a 
particular juvenile homicide offender is a discretionary 
determination by the board," we apply the abuse of discretion 
standard.  Id. at 31.  "[A] denial of a parole application by 
the board will constitute an abuse of discretion only if the 
3 
 
board essentially failed to take these factors into account, or 
did so in a cursory way."  Id. 
 
We have yet to articulate how we can ensure that the board 
acted in a constitutional manner by providing a juvenile 
homicide offender a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release" 
after seriously considering the "distinctive attributes" of 
youth.  I conclude that the only way we can ensure that the 
board did not abuse its discretion is to require the board to 
show through its findings that it gave meaningful individualized 
consideration to these attributes of youth in reaching its 
decision.  I also conclude that the board's findings here fail 
to meet that requirement for three reasons. 
 
First, the board's decision consists of three sections:  a 
statement of the facts of the underlying murder case, a 
statement describing the evidence presented at the parole 
hearing, and the "decision."  As shown by the appendix to the 
amicus brief submitted by the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers and the youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, apart from two sentences 
specific to Deal, the "decision" is boilerplate language used in 
virtually all forty-five of the juvenile homicide offender 
parole decisions it reviewed, with only the name of the juvenile 
4 
 
changed.1  Essentially, the board simply identifies the so-called 
Miller factors and declares in all these cases that it 
                     
 
1 The "decision" section is reprinted below, with the 
boilerplate language highlighted in bold: 
 
"The Board is of the opinion that Mr. Deal has not 
demonstrated a level of rehabilitative progress that would 
make his release compatible with the welfare of society.  
The Board recommends that Mr. Deal partake in more 
programming, such as Criminal Thinking and Restorative 
Justice.  The Board believes that the version of the 
offense given by Mr. Deal is not plausible.  A longer 
period of positive institutional adjustment and programming 
would be beneficial to Mr. Deal's rehabilitation.  The 
Board considered all factors relevant to the Diatchenko 
decision in making this determination. 
 
"The applicable standard used by the Board to assess a 
candidate for parole is:  'Parole Board Members shall only 
grant a parole permit if they are of the opinion that there 
is a reasonable probability that, if such offender is 
released, the offender will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society.'  120 C.M.R. 
300.04.  In the context of an offender convicted of first 
or second degree murder, who was a juvenile at the time the 
offense was committed, the Board takes into consideration 
the attributes of youth that distinguish juvenile homicide 
offenders from similarly situated adult offenders.  
Consideration of these factors ensures that the parole 
candidate, who was a juvenile at the time they committed 
murder, has 'a real chance to demonstrate maturity and 
rehabilitation.'  Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk District, 471 Mass. 12, 30 (2015); See also 
Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51 (2015). 
 
"The factors considered by the Board include the offender's 
'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk taking; vulnerability to negative influences 
and outside pressures, including from their family and 
peers; limited control over their own environment; lack of 
the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-
producing settings; and unique capacity to change as they 
5 
 
considered them, without demonstrating in any way how it 
considered them.  I do not suggest that the board must provide a 
detailed analysis of each Miller factor, but it must do more 
than simply declare in a perfunctory manner that it considered 
them.  There must be some meaningful individualized analysis, 
supported by evidence in the parole record, as to whether the 
Miller factors contributed to cause the parole applicant's 
participation in the murder, and as to whether his or her 
conduct while incarcerated has demonstrated that he or she has 
outgrown these attributes of youth through maturity and 
rehabilitation. 
 
Second, under G. L. c. 127, § 130, a parole permit "shall 
be granted only if the board is of the opinion, after 
consideration of a risk and needs assessment, that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if the prisoner is released with 
appropriate conditions and community supervision, the prisoner 
                     
grow older.'  Id.  The Board has also considered a risk and 
needs assessment, and whether risk reduction programs could 
effectively minimize Mr. Deal's risk of recidivism.  After 
applying this standard to the circumstances of Mr. Deal's 
case, the Board is of the opinion that Mr. Deal is not yet 
rehabilitated, and his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society. Mr. Deal, therefore, does not merit 
parole at this time. 
 
"Mr. Deal's next appearance before the Board will take 
place in four years from the date of this hearing.  During 
the interim, the Board encourages Mr. Deal to continue 
working towards his full rehabilitation." 
6 
 
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and 
that release is not incompatible with the welfare of society."  
Section 130, therefore, requires the board to make two 
determinations:  whether "the prisoner will live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law," and whether "release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society."  Id.  The board 
effectively conflates the two by finding that Deal's 
"rehabilitative progress," which appears to be its proxy term 
for the risk of recidivism, falls short of what would be needed 
to make his release "compatible with the welfare of society."  I 
agree with the board that the prisoner's risk of recidivism is 
the determinative factor.  See, e.g., Crowell v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 477 Mass. 106, 113 (2017) ("the board must be able 
to consider whether the symptoms of a prisoner's disability mean 
that he or she has a heightened propensity to commit crime while 
released on parole"); Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 23 ("The 
question the board must answer for each inmate seeking parole 
[is], namely, whether he or she is likely to reoffend . . ."); 
Jimenez v. Conrad, 678 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2012) (no matter 
how good applicant's prison conduct may have been, parole shall 
be granted "only if" board finds that there is "reasonable 
probability" that prisoner will not violate law if granted 
release). 
7 
 
 
But, as the court notes, ante at    , the board's 
determination regarding Deal's risk of recidivism appears to 
rest primarily on its finding that Deal's description of his 
offense "is not plausible."  The board, however, fails to 
identify what it finds implausible about Deal's description.  
Deal accepted responsibility for the murder, expressed remorse 
for his role in it, and admitted that the victim's cooperation 
with the police, which resulted in Deal's arrest for drug and 
firearms possession, created substantial friction in what had 
once been a close relationship with a neighbor he had thought of 
as an older brother.  He also said that this was not the first 
time that he had visited the victim's house after learning that 
the victim had provided information to the police about him.
 
If the board believed that, despite his denials, Deal 
entered the victim's home on the day of the killing planning to 
kill him because of the victim's cooperation with the police, or 
that he stabbed the victim with the intent to kill, it should 
say so and identify the evidence in the parole record that 
supports such a finding.  It should be noted that Deal was 
charged with murder in the first degree on the theory of 
premeditation but found guilty only of murder in the second 
degree.  As a result, we can infer that the jury, after hearing 
the evidence at trial, had a reasonable doubt whether Deal acted 
with premeditation or with an intent to kill, or both.  Where, 
8 
 
as here, the jury did not convict the parole applicant of the 
crime charged, the board should act with caution and care before 
it concludes that the applicant was nonetheless guilty of the 
crime charged. 
 
Moreover, even if the board had an adequate factual basis 
to conclude that the killing occurred differently from what was 
described by Deal, that alone cannot suffice to establish that 
Deal poses a significant risk of recidivism.  Here, Deal 
accepted his guilt; the board only challenges his version of 
events.  However, even if he had denied his guilt, there is 
little, if any, empirical support for a link between acceptance 
of guilt and a decreased likelihood of recidivism.  See, e.g., 
Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent 
Sexual Offenders:  A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. 
Consulting & Clinical Psych. 1154, 1159 (2005) (meta-analysis of 
sex offender recidivism studies concluding that denial of guilt 
"had little or no relationship with recidivism"); Harkins, 
Howard, Barnett, Wakeling, & Miles, Relationships Between 
Denial, Risk, and Recidivism in Sexual Offenders, 44 Archives 
Sexual Behav. 157, 157 (2015) ("the presumption that denial 
represents increased risk, which is common in much of the 
decision making surrounding sex offenders, should be 
reconsidered"). 
9 
 
 
Even before these studies, we recognized the limited role 
that the failure to acknowledge guilt should play in a parole 
decision:  "The absence of such an acknowledgment [of guilt] 
provides no weight on the scale in favor of parole, and thus, in 
a sense, has a negative effect on a prisoner's parole 
application."  Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 
834, 837 (1996).  And although we did not reach the question, we 
recognized that due process might forbid "denial of parole 
solely because a prisoner, who was otherwise fully qualified for 
release on parole, did not acknowledge his guilt."  Id.  Indeed, 
if a prisoner's failure to acknowledge guilt alone were to 
suffice to support a denial of parole, a prisoner wrongfully 
convicted of murder as a juvenile might never be paroled unless 
he or she falsely accepted responsibility for a crime he or she 
never committed.  See Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma:  
Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 
Iowa L. Rev. 491, 529 (2008) ("Proclaiming innocence at a parole 
hearing typically harms one's chances for release . . . while 
'admitting' guilt can serve as a mitigating factor"). 
 
Third, § 130 requires the board to consider "a risk and 
needs assessment" in evaluating the prisoner's risk of 
recidivism.  G. L. c. 127, § 130.  The parole record reflects 
two risk assessments.  The first is the Department of 
Correction's own objective risk assessment, which assesses 
10 
 
Deal's risk of recidivism as low, and also assesses his criminal 
thinking, his anger, and his substance abuse as low.  The second 
was conducted by Deal's expert witness, Dr. Ira Packer, who 
administered several tests, most importantly, the HCR-20 3d ed. 
(Historical, Clinical, Risk Management) Scale, which Packer 
described as "the most commonly used instrument for assessing 
violence risk" and which placed Deal at "low risk" for violent 
recidivism.  Having conducted these tests, as well as a clinical 
interview, Packer reached the opinion that Deal "would be at low 
risk for recidivism if paroled." 
 
At the parole hearing, parole member Dr. Charlene Bonner 
declared that she was "in forensics," and "in the world I'm 
in . . . [Packer is] regarded as . . . one of the best."  Bonner 
also noted that Packer provided risk assessments that were 
"objective" and were "not an opinion," which were "very 
favorable" to Deal.  She also noted that Packer "did something 
that a lot of evaluators won't do," and provided his opinion 
that Deal "would be at low risk to reoffend." 
 
The board in its decision declared that it had "considered 
a risk and needs assessment," and considered Packer's testimony 
and findings.  Yet, nowhere in its decision did it address why 
it rejected the risk assessment by the Department of Correction 
or the HCR-20 test, or Packer's expert opinion regarding the 
risk of recidivism.  The board is not required to accept the low 
11 
 
recidivism risk determined by a risk assessment or opined by a 
prisoner's expert.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 637 (2011) ("The 
opinion of a witness . . . need not be accepted by the hearing 
examiner . . .").  But where it effectively rejects that 
estimation of risk by denying parole, it should explain why and 
identify the evidence it relied on to find a higher estimation 
of risk.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 136 (2019), quoting Police 
Dep't of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 694 (2012) ("an 
agency must 'explain[] on the record its reasons for rejecting 
portions of [an expert's] testimony'").  See also Langlitz v. 
Board of Registration of Chiropractors, 396 Mass. 374, 381 
(1985), citing Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Med., 383 
Mass. 299, 310 (1981) ("an agency or board may not sit as a 
silent witness where expert testimony is required to establish 
an evidentiary basis for its conclusions"); New Boston Garden 
Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 470 (1981) ("The 
board may not reject [the] testimony without a basis for such 
rejection in the record"); Robinson v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 639 (1985) ("where . . . 
there is uncontradicted testimony concerning a subject which is 
beyond the common knowledge and experience of the finder of 
fact, that testimony may not be rejected without a basis for 
12 
 
such rejection in the record").  Otherwise, without such 
meaningful individualized analysis, a court cannot ensure that 
the board has truly considered risk assessments in reaching a 
parole decision. 
 
I concur in the court's judgment only because, at the time 
of this parole decision, we had yet to articulate what the board 
must do to demonstrate through its findings that it gave 
meaningful individualized consideration to the Miller factors 
and the likelihood that age and maturity will diminish these 
attributes of youth and reduce the risk of recidivism.  In the 
absence of this guidance, where the board declared that it 
considered all that it should consider, I cannot say that it 
abused its discretion in denying parole.  And I recognize that 
Deal is entitled to a new parole hearing in December 2020 where, 
if his parole were denied, we would expect meaningful 
individualized findings that are far less conclusory and 
perfunctory than here.