Title: Thomas Overton v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-404
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95404
____________
THOMAS OVERTON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[September 13, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Thomas Overton.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1),
Fla. Const.  For the reasons detailed below, we affirm Overton’s  convictions and
death sentences.
I.  FACTS
On August 22, 1991, Susan Michelle MacIvor, age 29, and her husband,
Michael MacIvor, age 30, were found murdered in their home in Tavernier Key. 
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Susan was eight months pregnant at the time with the couple’s first child.
Susan and Michael were last seen alive at their childbirth class, which ended
at approximately 9 p.m. on August 21, 1991.  Concerned co-workers and a
neighbor found their bodies the next morning inside the victims’ two-story stilt-
house located in a gated community adjacent to a private airstrip.  
Once law enforcement officers arrived, a thorough examination of the house
was undertaken.  In the living room, where Michael’s body was found,
investigators noted that his entire head had been taped with masking tape, with the
exception of his nose which was partially exposed.  He was found wearing only a
T-shirt and underwear.  There was a blood spot on the shoulder area of the tee-
shirt.  When police removed the masking tape, they discovered that a sock had
been placed over his eyes, and that there was slight bleeding from the nostril area. 
Bruising on the neck area was also visible.  The investigators surmised that a
struggle had taken place because personal papers were scattered on the floor near a
desk, and the couch and coffee table had been moved.  A small plastic drinking
cup was also found beside Michael’s body.
Continuing the search toward the master bedroom, a piece of clothesline
rope was found just outside the bedroom doorway.  Susan’s completely naked
body was found on top of a white comforter.  Her ankles were tied together with a
-3-
belt, several layers of masking tape and clothesline rope.  Her wrists were also
bound together with a belt.  Two belts secured her bound wrists to her ankles.
Around her neck was a garrote formed by using a necktie and a black sash, which
was wrapped around her neck several times.  Her hair was tangled in the knot. 
Noticing that a dresser drawer containing belts and neckties had been pulled open,
officers believed that the items used to bind and strangle Susan came from inside
the home.  Her eyes were covered with masking tape that appeared to have been
placed over her eyes in a frantic hurry.  Under the comforter upon which the body
rested were several items which appeared to have been emptied from her purse. 
Also under the comforter was her night shirt; the buttons had been torn off with
such force that the button shanks had been separated from the buttons themselves. 
Near the night shirt were her panties which had been cut along each side in the hip
area with a sharp instrument.
Within the master bedroom, the investigators also found a .22 caliber shell
casing, and somewhat later a hole in a bedroom curtain was noticed.  Also in that
bedroom, the officers found an address book with some pages partially torn out.  
The sliding glass door in the bedroom was open and a box fan was
operating.  There had been a heavy rain storm the night before and the heat and
humidity were quickly rising.  As a result of these conditions, Susan’s body was
-4-
covered with moisture.  The investigators used a luma light to uncover what
presumptively appeared to be seminal stains on Susan’s pubic area, her buttocks,
and the inside of her thighs.  The serologist later testified that he collected what
appeared to be semen from Susan’s body with swab applicators.  Three
presumptive seminal stains also appeared on the fitted sheet.  Within close
proximity to one of the seminal stains on the fitted sheet, a stain which appeared to
be dried feces was located.  It was also noticed that Susan had fecal matter in her
buttocks area.  Ultimately, the officers took the comforter, fitted sheet, and
mattress pad into evidence.  
The investigation next proceeded to a spare bedroom, which was then being
renovated for use as a nursery for the baby.  The sliding glass door in that room
was also open.  A ladder was found propped up against the balcony outside the
nursery.  Cut clothesline rope was hanging from the balcony ceiling, and outside the
home, the phone wires had been recently cut with a sharp instrument. 
The medical examiner’s testimony at trial established multiple factors.  As to
Michael, the autopsy revealed that he suffered a severe blow to the back of  the
head.  The external examination of Michael’s neck revealed several bruises
particularly around the larynx, along with ligature marks which indicated that the
1.  The doctor testified that the ligature marks were indicative of “a rope
wrapped around four times or wrapped around twice and reapplied once or
wrapped around once and reapplied four times.”
-5-
device used to strangle Michael had been wrapped around his neck several times,1
and that pressure was applied from behind.  The internal examination of Michael’s
neck confirmed that his larynx, as well as the hyoid bone and epiglottis, had been
fractured.  There was also bruising and an internal contusion indicative of a heavy
blow to the back of the neck.  The internal examination of the neck area revealed
that the neck was unstable and dislocated at the fifth cervical vertebrae. There was
also internal bleeding in the left shoulder, indicative of a severe blow to the area. 
Additionally, Michael had significant bruising in his abdominal area causing a
contusion fairly deep within the abdomen.  The doctor testified that the injury could
have been inflicted by a strong kick to the area. Based on his observations, the
doctor opined that the cause of death was asphyxiation by ligature strangulation
(rope).  He added that Michael could have been rendered unconscious ten to fifteen
seconds after the ligature was applied, or that it could have taken longer depending
on the pressure applied. 
With respect to Susan, the external examination of her face revealed that she
had received several slight abrasions.  The ligature marks around her neck indicated
that she was moving against the ligature, thereby causing friction.  Also, the
-6-
discoloration in her face indicated that blood was not exiting the head area as fast
as it was entering.  According to the medical examiner, this is indicative of an
incomplete application of the ligature, which demonstrated that, more likely than
not, a longer period of time passed before Susan lost consciousness once the
ligature was applied.  Her wrists also exhibited ligature marks and her hands were
clenched.  Moving down to her lower body, an abrasion to her vulva and several
abrasions to her legs indicative of a struggle were found.  The medical examiner
concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that she had been sexually
battered.  When interrogated for an explanation of the presence of feces in the
rectal area, the doctor determined that it could have happened either at the time of
death or it could have been caused by her fear.
The medical examiner determined that Susan was approximately eight
months pregnant at the time and proceeded to examine the fetus.  The doctor
determined that the baby would have been viable had he been born, and that he
lived approximately thirty minutes after his mother died.  The doctor testified that
there was evidence that he tried to breath on his own.
Dr. Pope, the serologist, examined the bedding and made cuttings in
accordance with the markings he had made at the scene.  One of the stains from the
fitted sheet and another stain from the mattress pad tested positive for sperm. The
2.  Cuttings were not sent to the FDLE immediately after Dr. Pope detected
the presence of sperm cells because at that time (i.e., 1991-92), the FDLE had
recently begun the process of DNA testing and their protocol did not allow for
testing in cases where there was not a suspect.  
3.  The doctor provided the following explanation as to why the luma light
indicated the presence of presumptive seminal fluid and why no sperm cells were
found on the swabs: “The body is forever degrading and the most important thing
that we’re looking for in seminal fluid itself is the sperm cells, and remember, I told
- - I mentioned that the body itself was moist and it already was exuding a liquid. 
You’re in a hot, hot environment.  You’re in a very humid environment.  It had
been raining off and on all that day.  With those factors, those things cause the
seminal fluid to basically decompose or degrade rapidly and so it was really not a
big surprise when I got to this stage that there was no sperm.”  A similar
explanation was provided by the forensic serologist from the FDLE.  
4.  Overton was never arrested in connection with the Surrett murder.
-7-
cuttings were later sent to FDLE for DNA testing.2  Examination of the swabs from
Susan’s body failed to reveal the presence of sperm cells.3
The discovery of this death scene produced a large-scale investigation, and
comparable media coverage focused on the murders.  Over the years following the
murders, law enforcement agencies investigated several potential suspects. 
Through this investigatory process, Thomas Overton’s name was brought up
during a brain-storming session in May 1992.  The reason he was considered a
suspect was because he was a known “cat burglar,” whom police suspected in the
murder of 20-year-old Rachelle Surrett.4  At the time of the MacIvor murders,
Overton worked at the Amoco gas station which was only a couple of minutes
-8-
away from the MacIvor home.  Janet Kerns, Susan’s friend and fellow teacher, had
been with Susan on several occasions when Susan pumped gas at that Amoco
station.  No further investigation was undertaken with respect to Overton at that
time.
In June of 1993, the cuttings from the bedding were sent to the FDLE lab in
Jacksonville where James Pollock, an expert in forensic serology and DNA
identification, proceeded to examine the cuttings.  Through a  process known as
restriction fragment length polymorphism (“RFLP”), Dr. Pollock was able to
develop a DNA profile from two of the cuttings (i.e., one cutting from the fitted
sheet and another from the mattress pad).  Specifically, the profile was developed
by examining the DNA at five different locations, known as loci, within the
chromosomes.  Dr. Pollock compared the profile to samples from several potential
suspects.  No match was made at that time.
In late 1996, Overton, then under surveillance, was arrested during a burglary
in progress.  Once in custody, officers asked him to provide a blood sample,
which Overton refused.  Days later, Overton asked correction officers for a razor,
and one was provided.  Overton removed the blade from the plastic razor using a
5.  Police were not sure whether Overton was attempting to commit suicide,
or whether this was a ploy to attempt an escape–something he had tried  previously
several years earlier while at another institution.  
6.  Dr. Pollock testified that since he had initially conducted the DNA
extraction process in 1993 (when lab only had capabilities to examine five loci), the
FDLE lab had been able to examine one additional locus by 1996.
-9-
wire from a ceiling vent, and made two cuts into his throat.5 The towel that was
pressed against his throat to stop the bleeding was turned over to investigators by
corrections officers.  Based on preliminary testing conducted on the blood from
the towels,  police obtained a court order to withdraw the defendant’s blood for
testing.
In November of 1996, over five years after the murders, Dr. Pollock was
able to compare the profile extracted from the stains in the bedding to a profile
developed after extracting DNA from Overton’s blood.  After comparing both
profiles at six different loci, 6 there was an exact match at each locus.  Dr. Pollock
testified that the probability of finding an unrelated individual having the same
profile was, conservatively, in excess of one in six billion Caucasians, African-
Americans and Hispanics.  
In 1998, the cuttings from the bedding were submitted to yet another lab, the
Bode Technology Group (“Bode”).  Dr. Robert Bever, the director at the Bode
lab, testified as to the tests which were conducted on the bedding and the resulting
-10-
conclusions.  The Bode lab conducted a different DNA test, known as short
tandem repeat testing (“STR”), from that performed by the FDLE.  Overton’s
DNA and that extracted from a stain at the scene matched at all twelve loci.  These
results were confirmed by a second analyst and a computer comparison analysis. 
Asked to describe the significance of the Bode lab findings, Dr. Bever testified that
the likelihood of finding another individual whose DNA profile would match at
twelve loci was 1 in 4 trillion Caucasians, 1 in 26 quadrillion African Americans and
1 in 15 trillion Hispanics.
In addition to the presentation of the DNA evidence, the State presented the
testimony of two witnesses formerly incarcerated in the same facility with Overton. 
The first was William Guy Green, who testified that Overton had admitted to him
that Overton had “done a burglary at a real exclusive, wealthy, wealthy area down in
the Keys.  The guy had his own airplane and a private airway and he could land his
plane in his front yard.”  Overton further told Green that when he went into the
house, he “started fighting with the lady,” whom he later described as a “fat bitch,”
and that “she jumped on his back and he had to waste -- waste somebody in the
Keys.”  Green also testified that Overton stated that he had struggled with another
person inside the house.  Green further testified that Overton spoke to him about
specific action he would take when he committed burglaries.  Among these
-11-
precautions were the cutting of phone lines before going into the house to stop
victims from calling out or to stop automatic alarm systems; he would always wear
gloves, and he would bring with him a “kit,” consisting in part of a gun, knife,
gloves and disguises.  Green also testified that Overton told him that the “best
time” to commit a burglary would be during a power outage or severe storm. 
The second informant to testify was James Zientek, who met Overton at the
Monroe County Jail in May 1997.  Overton, who believed that Zientek was a
hardened criminal from New York, sought Zientek’s assistance to carry out a plan
that would relieve Overton from the pending charges.  Specifically, Overton
planned to give Zientek significant details of the MacIvor murders, and then have
Zientek contact authorities and inform them that another inmate by the name of Ace
had provided such details.  Using Overton’s logic, this would create reasonable
doubt and he would be found not guilty.  Therefore, during the course of several
months, according to Zientek, Overton gave Zientek precise details of what
occurred in the MacIvor home on the night the couple was murdered.  Overton also
showed Zientek pictures related to the crimes, which Overton had obtained to
assist his attorneys in preparing his defense.  Specifically, Overton told Zientek that
he had met Susan at the Amoco gas station where he worked.  Overton believed
that he had a “hot and cold type relationship” with Susan; some days she was
-12-
polite to him and others she was “cold and bitchy.”  There came a point when
Susan stopped coming to the gas station.  However, according to Zientek, Overton
retrieved Susan’s address from either a check or a credit card receipt.  Zientek
testified that Overton informed him that he had surveilled the house on several
occasions.  On one occasion, Overton had observed Michael doing construction
work at the lower level of the house.  Another time, he said he had intended to enter
the home, but did not because he realized that the MacIvors had company.  
Turning to the events on the night of August 21, 1991, Overton told Zientek
that he went to the home carrying a bag, which contained, among other things, a
police scanner.  He described his attire as being a Ninja-type suit, consisting of a
mask, black military-style fatigues and gloves.  One of the first things Overton
completed when he arrived was the cutting of phone wires.  He then positioned a
ladder against the balcony that surrounded the house, but in the process of moving
the ladder, he made a noise.  A light in the house came on which caused him to wait
outside for approximately twenty minutes before ascending the ladder. Once he
reached the balcony, Overton cut some clothesline, “popped” the sliding glass
door to the spare bedroom and gained entry into the home.  He walked around the
house and saw the MacIvors sleeping in their bedroom.  He proceeded to walk
throughout the house, but suddenly he heard a noise and observed Michael walking
-13-
over to the kitchen and opening the refrigerator.  Overton said he panicked and that
his adrenaline started rushing.  Michael started looking around as if he sensed that
something was wrong.  Michael walked out of the kitchen and through the area
where Overton was then standing.  Overton then approached Michael from behind
and “slammed him in the back of the head” with a pipe he had found at the house.
Zientek testified that “the blow to the head with the pipe didn’t immediately knock
him out.  There was a struggle and Mr. Overton knocked him out with his fist.” 
While Overton was attempting to restrain Michael, Susan ran out of the bedroom
screaming.  He chased her back into the bedroom and temporarily restrained her,
using articles he found inside the bedroom to bind her.  Overton tried to calm
Susan by stating that as long as everyone cooperated no one would get hurt. 
However, Susan began to plead with him, inquiring “Why are you doing this to
me?”  She told him that she was married, and began to plead with Overton for her
husband’s and baby’s life. Overton also admitted to Zientek that Susan had stated:
“I know who you are.” 
At that point, Overton became “concerned about the male just being
temporarily knocked out.  He knew that he wasn’t dead.”  He then proceeded to
place a sock over Michael’s eyes and covered his face with masking tape.
According to Zientek’s testimony, Overton did not strangle Michael at that point. 
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Instead, he went back into the master bedroom and raped Susan.  When he had
completed his attack, Overton said he strangled her because he “doesn’t leave any
witnesses.”  He also stated that either in the process, or after completing the
strangulation, Overton noticed motion in her stomach, placed his hand over it, and
felt the fetus move. 
Overton then returned to the living room area “where the male was apparently
just becoming conscious.”  Overton then kicked Michael in the abdominal area and
proceeded to strangle him with “some kind of cord.”  Overton “made it very clear
that he doesn’t leave witnesses.”  Overton also explained to Zientek that the reason
why he placed a sock over Michael’s eyes and tape around his head was because
he thought that as he strangled Michael, his eyes would bulge out and he would
bleed through his nose.  
Appellant continued to show Zientek photographs from the scene.  When
Zientek saw a picture of a shell casing and a bullet hole in the curtain, he asked
Overton, “Why would they take a picture of that?”  Overton replied that the casing
and the bullet hole had nothing to do with the crime.  Overton further stated that he
“confuse[d] the crime scene” and ripped pages from the address book in the
bedroom because he believed it would lead the police to think that the attacker
wanted to remove the assailant’s name from the phone book.  Overton also told
7.  The defense argued that Detective Visco’s alleged motivation to plant the
evidence was based on an internal affairs complaint which Overton at one point
filed against Visco, but from which Visco was eventually cleared. 
-15-
Zientek that he took things “nobody would realize were gone.” The only item which
neither law enforcement officers nor the families were able to account for were
several pictures that Susan had taken that weekend of her pregnant stomach.  
Overton essentially concluded by informing Zientek that he entered the house with
the intent to rape Susan.
Zientek also testified that while looking at autopsy photos of one of the
victims, he began to vomit.  Overton started to laugh and cautioned Zientek to not
get the pictures wet.  Overton also showed Zientek a picture of a small chalkboard
in the kitchen where one of the victims had written “renew life insurance.”  Overton
laughed and said something to the effect that, “You don’t think they knew what
time it was?”
The primary thrust of the defense in the case was centered upon a theme that
law enforcement officers, Detective Visco in particular, had planted Overton’s
semen in the bedding, which was essential to the prosecution.7  The defense
theorized that Detective Visco obtained the defendant’s sperm from Overton’s
one-time girlfriend, Lorna Swaybe, transported the sample in a condom, and placed
8.  Detective Visco had spoken on several occasions with Lorna Swaybe,
Overton’s girlfriend.  The testimony was not clear as to when these conversations
occurred or what the nature of the conversations had been.  Ms. Swaybe died in
1994, and Detective Visco testified that he never received any seminal fluids from
Ms. Swaybe. 
9.  The testimony indicates that these new cuttings came from sections in the
sheet which were not alleged to contain any seminal fluids.  The State was
attempting to prove that the Nonoxynol-9 found was present as residue from
laundry detergent (which also contains Nonoxynol-9). 
-16-
it on the bedding.8
In an attempt to substantiate this fabrication of evidence theory, the defense
consulted Dr. Donald Wright, a forensic pathologist.  The doctor suggested that
the defense examine the samples from the bedding for Nonoxynol-9, a compound
contained in spermicidal condoms.  Relying on this advice, the defense caused the
samples to be sent to the lab at the Consumer Products Testing Company in New
Jersey.  
In the sample labeled as originating from the bottom sheet, the lab director,
Mr. Trager, found 53 micrograms of Nonoxynol-9.  The state attorney’s office
requested a confirmatory test and submitted two new cuttings from the bedding
sheet.9  In the first sample, Trager found 50 micrograms of Nonoxynol-9.  In the
10.  Trager’s testimony indicates that some amount of Nonoxynol-9 was
found in this second sample, but that the amount was not sufficiently significant so
as to be recognized by the lab’s equipment.  
11.  The trial testimony leads to the conclusion that no seminal stains were
found on the comforter.
12. The only condoms found at the scene were thought to belong to the
victims because the package was located inside a small basket in their bedroom
along with a tube of K-Y Jelly, Vaseline, and body lotion.  These condoms were
not spermicidal; therefore, they did not contain Nonoxynol-9.  
-17-
second sample, Trager also found an undetermined amount of Nonoxynol-9.10  
Also, 11 micrograms of Nonoxynol-9 were found in a sample from the comforter.11
On cross-examination by the State, Trager testified that there are various forms of
Nonoxynol and that the tests he performed did not provide a basis to distinguish
whether the Nonoxynol-9 found on the bed sheet was of a spermicidal nature, or
whether it was a commercial grade of Nonoxynol-9 commonly used in household
detergents.  Although he acknowledged that the perpetrator could have been
wearing a condom which might have torn during the course of the struggle with
Susan, Dr. Wright continued to opine that the seminal fluid forming the stain on the
fitted sheet had been planted through the use of a condom. 12  
Several factors were elicited during cross-examination.  A spermicidal
condom contains 25 to 35 milligrams of Nonoxynol-9.  It may be concluded that
there are usually 25,000 to 35,000 micrograms of Nonoxynol-9 in one spermicidal
-18-
condom.  In this case, 53 micrograms were found from the first test sample and 50
micrograms from the second test sample.  Dr. Wright further noted that the initial
report he received from Mr. Trager (i.e., the report that led Wright to believe that
the seminal fluid had been planted) indicated that the amount found was 53
milligrams (there are 1000 micrograms in 1 milligram), but that a revised report
indicated that there had been a typographical mistake and that the actual amount of
Nonoxynol-9 present was only 53 micrograms.  Dr. Wright candidly admitted that
he did not know the amount of Nonoxynol-9 normally contained in a condom when
he initially suggested that the seminal fluid had been planted; nor did he know that
not all condoms contain Nonoxynol-9 or that Nonoxynol-9 was used in detergents. 
In response to this defense expert’s testimony presented to support the
fabrication theory, the State presented one rebuttal witness, Mr. Richard Oliver, a
chemist from the Home Personal Care Industrial Ingredients Division of a national
laboratory, the company which is the sole manufacturer in the United States of
Nonoxynol-9 as a spermicide.  Oliver testified that Nonoxynol-9 is not only used as
a spermicide (i.e., spermicidal Nonoxynol-9), but it is also commonly incorporated
as an ingredient in household detergents (i.e., commercial grade Nonoxynol-9).  Mr
Oliver testified that as a manufacturer, his company could possibly tell the
difference between the two types,  given a “significantly large sample.”  He added,
-19-
however, that after either type of the chemical has been “put out into the
environment and say, placed on other objects,” there is no test to distinguish
between the two types of Nonoxynol-9.  After reviewing the results of the tests
performed by Mr. Trager, Oliver concluded that the correct methodology had been
used, but based upon sample quantities extracted from the fitted sheet, there was
absolutely no way to determine whether the Nonoxynol-9 found was spermicidal
(from a condom) or commercial grade (from detergent).  Oliver further opined that
it is “most likely” that residue amounts of the commercial grade Nonoxynol-9
remain after the rinse cycle in a standard washing machine.  Ultimately, during
closing arguments, the State argued both that the perpetrator might have been
wearing a spermicidal condom, or that any amount of Nonoxynol-9 found in the
fitted sheet was residue which remained after the sheet had been washed.  
At the conclusion of the guilt phase proceedings, the jury found Overton
guilty of the first-degree murders of Susan and Michael MacIvor.  The jury also
returned guilty verdicts as to the charges of killing an unborn child, burglary, and
sexual battery.  
At the penalty phase, the State presented only victim-impact evidence, and
relied on the testimony from the guilt phase proceedings in support of the
aggravating factors it sought to establish.  The defendant declined to present any
-20-
evidence in mitigation of the death penalty and unequivocally stated on several
occasions that he did not want his attorneys to present any mitigating evidence, nor
would he permit them to make any arguments on his behalf.  After concluding the
penalty phase deliberations, the jury recommended imposition of the death penalty
by a vote of nine to three as related to the death of Susan, and as to Michael
MacIvor, the jury recommendation favored the death penalty by a vote of eight to
four.
The trial court found the following aggravators as to both victims: (1) the
crimes were heinous, atrocious and cruel (“HAC”); (2) the murders were
committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner (“CCP”); (3) the
defendant has been previously convicted of another offense involving the use of
violence (contemporaneous murder); (4) the murders occurred during the
commission of a sexual battery and burglary; and (5) the murders were committed
in an attempt to avoid arrest.
With regard to mitigation, the court considered, pursuant to section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (1999), the defendant’s family background, military
record, employment record, possible history of substance abuse and possible
mental health problems.  The judge concluded that nothing in the defendant’s
background could be classified as a statutory mitigating circumstance. As to
-21-
nonstatutory mitigators, the court found that the defendant would be incarcerated
for the rest of his life with no danger of committing any other violent acts, but gave
this factor little weight.  The court also recognized the defendant’s courtroom
demeanor and behavior as a nonstatutory mitigating factor, and accorded it some
weight. 
The trial court ultimately determined that “in weighing the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, the scales of life and death tilt
unquestionably to the side of death.”  Accordingly, the judge imposed the death
penalty upon Overton for the murders of Susan and Michael MacIvor.  As to the
other offenses, Overton was sentenced to 15 years for the killing of an unborn child
and to two terms of life imprisonment for the burglary and sexual battery. This
direct appeal followed.
II.  Analysis
A.  Cause Challenges
As his first issue on appeal, Overton asserts that the trial court erred in
denying defense challenges for cause as to prospective jurors Russell and Heuslein. 
Overton claims that Mr. Russell should have been excused for cause based on his
stated views regarding the defendant’s right to remain silent, the prospective juror’s
awareness of security measures, and his prior knowledge of facts concerning
-22-
events which were not the subject of the trial.  Overton further maintains that Mr.
Heuslein should have been dismissed for cause because he also was aware of the
security measures being employed, and because of his views on the death penalty.  
First, we agree with the appellant that this issue was properly preserved by
trial counsel.  See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990).  Second, we
note that to prevail with this argument, Overton must establish that the trial court
erred in denying the challenges for cause as to both Russell and Heuslein because
the trial court did award the defense one additional peremptory challenge, thereby
replacing one of the peremptory challenges expended on either Russell or Heuslein. 
This issue could only constitute reversible error if we conclude that the trial court
erred in denying the challenges as to both of these potential jurors.  See, e.g.,
Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 1994) (“Since the trial judge gave
Watson one additional peremptory challenge, he is not entitled to reversal unless
both jurors were improperly excused.”);  Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964, 969 (Fla.
1989) (“Because the trial judge granted the appellant’s motion for one additional
challenge, appellant is entitled to have his conviction reversed only if he can show
that the judge abused his discretion in refusing to excuse both jurors Sergio and
Boan for cause.”).  
-23-
Turning to the question of whether it was error to deny the cause challenges
as to Russell and Heuslein, recently, in Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1128 (Fla.
2000), we detailed the law with respect to this issue.  Initially, it is clear that the test
to determine a juror’s competency is whether that juror can set aside any bias or
prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions
on the law given by the court.  See also Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.
1984).  We added that “[a] juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable
doubt exists as to whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind.”  Kearse,
770 So. 2d at 1128 (citing Bryant v. State, 656 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1995)).  It is
also well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to
grant or deny a challenge for cause based on juror incompetency, and the decision
will not be overturned on appeal absent manifest error.  See Van Poyck v.
Singletary, 715 So. 2d 930, 931 (Fla. 1998); Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 670, 674
(Fla. 1997).
1.  Prospective Juror Russell
With these standards in mind, we must determine whether the trial court erred
in denying the challenge for cause as to prospective juror Russell.  When
questioned as to his thoughts on the presumption of innocence and a defendant’s
right to remain silent during the trial, Russell responded: “I understand what Judge
-24-
Jones said, but I kind of believe like, I’d want to get up there if I was innocent, you
know, and say what I had to say to explain myself.”  Shortly thereafter, he added: 
MR. RUSSELL:  I always think if a person’s innocent they should get
up on that stand and speak for themselves.  That’s the way I believe. 
But also, I understand what the Judge said, too.  It’s like confusing to
me.. . . But in all honesty, that’s what I really believe.  I believe a
person should get up there and say, I didn’t do this.
MR. SMITH [Defense Counsel]: That’s what you want someone to
do?
MR. RUSSELL: Yes.  
(Emphasis supplied.)  Immediately thereafter, the judge explained that the defendant
did not have to testify and that a failure to testify could not be held against him. 
Russell responded:
MR. RUSSELL:   I could follow the law, what you’re telling me.  
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. RUSSELL: But I’m giving you my honest opinion. 
THE COURT: That’s all we want.
MR. SMITH: Was there anything that you would have to overcome
then in your mind for whatever reason, whether it’s my advice or--
MR. RUSSELL: If it’s your advice to him not to--
MR. SMITH: Or for whatever reason, you think that you would tend
to kind of hold that against him or want to hear from him?
MR. RUSSELL: It’s like I said, I could follow the Judge’s rules, but I
still feel the person should get up there if they’re innocent.
MR. SMITH: Okay.
MR. RUSSELL: I can’t--I can’t see myself sitting there and being
accused of a crime and not getting up there and trying to clear myself,
you know.
MR. SMITH: Uh-huh.
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(Emphasis supplied.)
Each juror was then individually questioned with respect to the responses
they had given during generalized voir dire.  The following colloquy ensued: 
THE COURT: When we were out there in the open group there, you
had some reservations about the Defendant’s right to remain silent.
MR. RUSSELL: Yeah.
THE COURT: What if, as part of the evidence, you were not
presented with testimony from the Defendant?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, I will--I will be able to follow your instruction
without--
THE COURT: meaning if I sit here and say he doesn’t, the Defendant
--
MR. RUSSELL: If he doesn’t testify and you say that he doesn’t have
to, then I respect that.
THE COURT: Not only doesn’t he have to, but it can’t be considered
as evidence of guilt.
MR. RUSSELL: Right, I would--right.
THE COURT: It cannot be used in any adverse way against him.
MR. RUSSELL: Right.
THE COURT: It cannot come into your deliberations whatsoever.
MR. RUSSELL: Right.
THE COURT: Yesterday you had reservations about that.
MR. RUSSELL: Well, that’s--right, that’s the way I always feel about
it when someone doesn’t take the stand, I figure they’ve got
something to hide.  That’s the way I’ve always believed.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. RUSSELL: But I can shut that out.  If you tell me to shut it out, I
still shut it out. . . .
SMITH: You said that you would expect and you’ve always believed
that someone should testify, isn’t that what you just stated?
MR. RUSSELL: You mean the--
MR. SMITH: The person charged should always testify.
MR. RUSSELL: Yeah.  I don’t know, I just, to me I feel like if I was
charged with a crime that I’d want to get up there knowing that I’m
-26-
innocent and tell it to the jury myself.  That’s the way I believe.
MR. SMITH: And you think that that’s what people should do if
they’re charged with a crime?
MR. RUSSELL: That’s what I feel I should do.
MR. SMITH: Well, what about other people?  You wouldn’t tend to
hold that against someone who wouldn’t take the stand?
MR. RUSSELL: No, that’s--it’s--
MR. SMITH: You wouldn’t think, well, why didn’t he?
MR. RUSSELL: I would think that, but I would close that out of my
mind, because the Judge said to close it out of your mind.
MR. SMITH: Well, I mean,--
MR. RUSSELL: I wouldn’t consider that if that’s what you’re asking
me.  I wouldn’t hold it against him.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We begin our analysis with the premise that the presumption of innocence is
defeated if “a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the
accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction.”  Singer v.
State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959) (quoting Powell v. State, 175 So. 213, 216 (Fla.
1937)).  The record in this case clearly demonstrates that Mr. Russell admitted
during voir dire that he has “always believed” that “when someone doesn’t take the
stand . . . they’ve got something to hide.”  As the record also reveals, he reiterated
this same sentiment on more than one occasion.  He also stated, however, that he
could “shut that out” and that he was able to “follow [the court’s] instructions.” 
The obvious question is whether Russell’s assurances that he would be able to
follow instructions sufficiently negate his prior stated beliefs that it was his “honest
-27-
opinion” that a defendant who does not testify must have something to hide.  See
generally Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Johnson v.
Reynolds, 121 So. 793, 796 (Fla. 1929) (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of
bias of prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in
his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from
its influence.  By what sort of principle is it to be determined that the last statement
of the man is better and more worthy of belief than the former?”)).  
Based on the totality of his responses, we conclude that Russell’s assurance
that he would be able to follow the law did not sufficiently negate his prior abiding
adherence to the notion that he had “always believed” that defendants should testify
if they have nothing to hide.  In reaching our conclusion, we rely on our decision in
Hamilton v. State, 547 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1989), which involved a juror who
indicated that she had extreme difficulty with the presumption of innocence and a
defendant’s right to remain silent.  See 547 So. 2d at 632.  In Hamilton, defense
counsel’s challenge for cause was denied, as was his request for additional
peremptory challenges. See id.  In reversing and ordering a new trial, this Court
noted that “[a]lthough the juror in this case stated in response to questions from the
bench that she could hear the case with an open mind, her other responses raised
-28-
doubt as to whether she could be unbiased.”  Id. at 633.
Our conclusion in this case is similarly guided by the reasoning of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Lowe v. State, 718 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  In
that case, a prospective juror’s statements indicated that he possessed what the
court termed as an “undeniable misunderstanding of the presumption of
innocence.”  Id. at 921.  The court found error in the trial court’s decision to not
remove the person for cause, noting that “[t]his juror’s single statement that he
would acquit if the state presented insufficient evidence was tortuously teased from
him only by the most pointed of leading questions.  Even if it had been
spontaneous, after his repeated assertions imposing on the defendant some burden
to erase any idea of guilt, this single statement could not possibly evidence the
correction or elimination of a view so resolutely held and repeatedly stated.”  Id. at
922-23; see also Huber v. State, 669 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
(“Even though [the] prospective juror . . . eventually said he would be able to
follow the law and require the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
his original expression of doubt about his ability to presume the defendant innocent
because he believes that police don’t arrest innocent people is a basis for
reasonable doubt that he might not be able to render an impartial verdict.  This was
not overcome by his subsequent capitulation and agreement that he would follow
13.  Because we determine that Russell should have been dismissed for
cause based on his views on the presumption of innocence and right to remain
silent, we decline to address whether the trial court erred in not dismissing Russell
for cause on alternative bases (i.e., his awareness of security measures and his prior
knowledge of facts not introduced at trial). 
-29-
the law as given to him by the trial court, and it was error to not dismiss [him] for
cause.”)
The Third District reached a similar conclusion in Gibson v. State, 534 So.
2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), in which it remanded for a new trial after one of the
potential jurors stated during voir dire, “I feel if they are innocent, they can tell their
side of the story to the judge.”  Id. at 1232.  Although the juror ultimately indicated
that if she had a reasonable doubt she would find the defendant not guilty, the
appellate court concluded that her answers gave reasonable doubt as to whether
she could render an impartial verdict.  See id.   
In the present case, after thorough consideration and analysis of the totality
of Mr. Russell’s voir dire statements with respect to the presumption of innocence
and a defendant’s right to not testify at trial, we conclude that his responses
sufficiently placed in doubt his ability to be an impartial juror, notwithstanding the
tortured attempt at rehabilitation.  Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Russell
should have been excused for cause.13
2.  Prospective Juror Heuslein
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We next address whether the cause challenge as to prospective juror
Heuslein was properly denied.  As previously noted, Heuslein was challenged for
cause based on his views on the death penalty and awareness of the security
restraints to be placed on the defendant, including a stun belt.
a.  Views on the Death Penalty
The standard for determining whether a potential juror should be excused for
cause based on his view with respect to the imposition of the death penalty is
“whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38, 45 (1980).  In resolving this particular issue in this case, we find guidance in our
opinion in Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994).  There, Castro claimed error
in the trial court’s failure to excuse for cause several jurors who possessed a strong
presumption in favor of the death penalty.  See id. at 990.  After examining the
record, we found no error in the trial court’s refusal to strike the prospective jurors
based on their views on the death penalty.  See id.  Our conclusion in that case was
premised on the record evidence indicating that once these jurors were advised that
they were responsible for weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, they all
indicated that they would be able to follow the law.  See id.  In doing so, we noted:
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Not surprisingly, the prospective jurors had no grounding in the
intricacies of capital sentencing.  Some of these jurors came to court
with the reasonable misunderstanding that the presumed sentence for
first-degree murder was death.
Id.
Our reasoning in Castro was based on an observation we find ever present in
many death penalty cases.  That is, the average juror summoned for prospective
service in a case where the State is seeking the death penalty enters the courtroom
without any true insight whatsoever into the elements or factors involved in  capital
sentencing proceedings.  They are overwhelmingly unaware of the existence of the
bifurcated process by which defendants may be tried and ultimately sentenced to
the death penalty. They similarly do not possess the requisite familiarity with the
necessary balancing scheme whereby aggravating and mitigating factors are
weighed against each other in an effort to produce a proportionate sentence. 
We made similar observations in Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637 (Fla.
1995), a case which, like the present case, involved the trial court’s failure to
excuse a juror who seemed to strongly favor the death penalty, but who later noted
that she thought she could follow the court’s instruction with respect to sentencing. 
After concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the
cause challenge, we noted:
-32-
[J]urors brought into court face a confusing array of procedures and
terminology they may little understand at the point of voir dire.  It may
be quite easy for either the State or the defense to elicit strong
responses that jurors would genuinely reconsider once they are
instructed on their legal duties and the niceties of the law.
Id. at 644.  
The same conclusion reached in Castro and Johnson can be found in Reaves
v. State, 639 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1994).  There, Reaves challenged the trial judge’s
rulings regarding two jurors who indicated that they would automatically
recommend the death penalty if a defendant were found guilty of murder.  Upon
our examination of the record, we determined that the trial court had not abused its
discretion because both jurors, after hearing an explanation as to the process of
weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, acknowledged that they were
capable of reviewing all of the evidence and following the court’s instructions in
considering a proper punishment.  See id. at 4 n.6.
Turning to the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Overton’s cause challenge as to Mr. Heuslein on the
basis of his views towards the death penalty. When voir dire examination began,
Mr. Heuslein did note that he favored the death penalty in cases where the
defendant is found guilty of first-degree murder.  As the questioning proceeded,
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however, defense counsel, the State, and the trial court all explained the capital
sentencing scheme and its balancing process to Mr. Heuslein.  Ultimately, as noted
by the trial court,  Mr. Heuslein expressed a “great deference” to the trial court’s
instructions, and noted, on several occasions, that he would “start from a clean
slate,” follow the law,  and abide by the sentencing scheme which required him to
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  In fact, in response to the
court’s questioning, Heuslein indicated that he had no doubt that he could entertain
the possibility of a life recommendation should the jury find Overton guilty of first-
degree murder.  Based on this record, we hold that no abuse of discretion
occurred.  See Bryant v. State, 656 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1995) (concluding that
the trial court did not err in denying cause challenges where five jurors who
expressed a predisposition to impose the death penalty if the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder later stated that they would follow the court’s
instructions and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether
death was the appropriate sentence).
b.  Knowledge of Security Restraints
Overton also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the cause
challenge as to Heuslein based on the fact that he had learned through the media
14.  To be sure, the record indicates that the stun belt remained concealed
underneath Overton’s shirt throughout all of the proceedings, and that great efforts
were undertaken to ensure that the prospective venire members would not see the
defendant in shackles.
-34-
that the defendant was wearing a concealed “stun belt” and leg shackles.14 
Specifically, Heuslein stated: “Well, the only reason I even brought that up
yesterday is everybody is saying you’re innocent when you come into court. Well,
if he’s innocent, why is he in all of these heavy restraints?  Why can’t he just sit
there the way we sit there?  That was all that I meant by that.”  When asked if he
thought that such indicated that the defendant was not innocent, he responded:
“No.  I just . . . think it’s rather weird.  You’re not expecting us to instantly believe
a person’s innocent.  Why are you restraining him?”  The prosecutor then
explained to this juror that the standard used to determine whether someone should
be arrested or which security measures to utilize is different from the standard that
jurors apply in determining guilt.  The juror agreed and said that he understood
what the prosecutor explained and that, in any event, he “would listen to the case to
really find out what really happened” because he thought “there’s a lot more than
the paper’s putting in.”
We conclude that Mr. Heuslein’s responses do not indicate that he thought
that the presence of the security restraints was indicative of guilt.  Instead, the
-35-
statements to the prosecutor regarding the restraints may be properly characterized
as Heuslein’s personal assessment of the paradox that although all defendants enter
the courtroom clothed with the presumption of innocence, some are restrained
during the guilt phase.  In essence, Mr. Heuslein was expressing his personal
opinion that it was inconsistent for the criminal justice system, as a whole, to
emphasize that defendants are innocent until proven guilty, while simultaneously
restraining some defendants during trial.  Morever, this prospective juror indicated
that he understood that different standards were used to determine the necessity for
restraints versus the finding of guilt, and he explicitly indicated that he would listen
to, and base any decision on, the evidence presented at the trial.  As a result, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defense
counsel’s challenge as to Heuslein based on the prospective juror’s prior
knowledge of courtroom security measures.
3.  Conclusion on Cause Challenges
 As previously noted, because the trial court granted an extra peremptory in
this case, it was necessary for Overton to establish that the trial court erred as to
both Russell and Heuslein to establish reversible error.  See, e.g., Watson, 651 So.
2d at 1162;  Cook, 542 So. 2d at 969.  Although we conclude that the trial court
should have excused Mr. Russell for cause, we do not reach the same conclusion
-36-
as to Mr. Heuslein.  Accordingly, appellant has failed to demonstrate that any error
as to this issue warrants reversal for a new trial.
B.  STR Discovery
Overton’s second issue on appeal concerns the discovery of certain
documents from the Bode lab relating to the STR/DNA tests conducted in this
case, namely, the lab’s validation studies, the protocol manuals, and proficiency
tests.  According to Overton, these documents were essential to the defense DNA
expert’s independent assessment of the reliability of the State’s test.  His specific
argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in not compelling discovery of these
materials and in not granting a continuance so that defense counsel could review
them.
We review the trial court’s decision that no discovery violation occurred 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  See State v. Evans, 770 So. 2d 1174, 1183
(Fla. 2000); Pender v. State, 700 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1997).  The trial judge’s
decision to deny the defense’s motion for continuance is likewise reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.  See Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla.
1998); Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544, 546 (1994).  Under this standard, the trial
court’s ruling should be sustained unless no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court.  See Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1990). 
15.  This case had been originally set for trial in October 1997, but was
continued on three occasions (two joint and one defense continuance), and did not
begin until January 11, 1999.
-37-
Based on the record below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not finding a discovery violation or by denying the motions for
continuance.  Primarily, the defense was aware, as early as June of 1998, that Bode
would be conducting independent testing.  When the final report was submitted on
October 14, 1998, the trial was still approximately three months away.  The defense
was notified by the State at the December status conference and by Bode that the
requested manuals, tests and studies were much too voluminous to copy and ship. 
Because of this, defense counsel and experts were invited to review the materials at
the Bode lab in Virginia.  The defense declined to visit the lab, phone its director
(Dr. Bever), set a deposition, or even question Dr. Bever at the Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) hearing with respect to the information
defense counsel sought.  Moreover, and to be sure, the record does not indicate
that defense counsel requested the continuances so that he or the defense expert
could consult with the lab in Virginia.  Rather, defense counsel sought the
continuances in the event that the court were to grant the defense’s accompanying
motions to compel. 15  In sum, we determine that no abuse of discretion occurred.
C.  Additional Defense Expert
-38-
As his third issue on appeal, Overton asserts that the trial court erred in not
appointing an additional defense expert to rebut the State’s evidence relating to the
presence of Nonoxynol-9 in the bedding found at the MacIvor home.  In Bates v.
State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999), this Court reiterated the applicable standard when a
defendant alleges error in the trial court’s decision to not appoint an expert:
In evaluating whether there was an abuse of discretion courts have
applied a two-part test: (1) whether the defendant made a particularized
showing of need; and (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the
Court’s denial of the motion requesting the expert assistance.  
Id. at 16 (quoting San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1346 (Fla. 1997)).
Overton’s particular point on appeal is that the defense needed an expert
chemist to (1) conduct further testing on the bed sheet to determine whether the
Nonoxynol at issue was the spermicidal form or commercial grade (i.e., the kind
used in detergents), and (2) confront the state’s expert’s assertion that the
Nonoxynol came from a detergent.  
Mr. Oliver, a chemist employed by the company that is the single
manufacturer of spermicidal Nonoxynol-9, testified that, as a manufacturer, his lab
could possibly tell the difference, given a “significantly large sample,” between
spermicidal Nonoxynol-9 and commercial grade Nonoxynol-9.  Oliver added,
however,  that once the chemical has been “put out into the environment and say,
-39-
placed on other objects,” there is no test which can distinguish between the two
types of Nonoxynol-9.  After reviewing the results of the tests performed by Mr.
Trager, Mr. Oliver concluded that the correct methodology was used, but that
given the sample quantities extracted from the fitted sheet, there was no way to
determine whether the Nonoxynol-9 found was spermicidal or commercial grade.  
Although Appellant mentions in his initial brief an FBI bulletin which
apparently has some information indicating that “forensic chemists do use tests to
identify trace particles, lubricant ingredients, and/or spermicidal Nonoxynol from
condoms,” neither this bulletin, nor anything remotely similar, was brought to the
trial court’s attention.  The only information the court had before it was both Mr.
Trager’s and Mr. Oliver’s testimony that it was not possible to distinguish between
spermicidal Nonoxynol and commercial grade Nonoxynol. This leads to the
conclusion that the defendant failed to make a particularized showing of need
because it was not possible to make the determination Overton sought to establish
(i.e., that the Nonoxynol-9 found on the bed sheets was spermicidal in nature).
However, even if we were to assume that defense counsel did establish a
particularized need for the expert to conduct a test to differentiate between these
two forms of Nonoxynol-9, and further assumed that such test did exist, and that
when conducted the test would indicate that the Nonoxynol-9 found on the bed
-40-
sheet was spermicidal, Overton cannot establish the requisite prejudice. That is,
even if the Nonoxynol-9 came from a spermicidal condom, the State argued below
that Overton, in his plan to not leave behind any evidence or witnesses, could have
easily used a condom, the contents of which either spilled during the forcible sexual
assault or when he attempted to remove the condom.  Thus, as the State contends
on appeal, and as was argued at the trial, it would not have mattered whether the
Nonoxynol-9 was spermicidal or commercial grade.  That factor, coupled with the
correct characterization that the defense failed to produce a scintilla of evidence
that Detective Visco planted the seminal fluids, precludes any showing of prejudice
by Overton.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
D.  Motion for Mistrial
Next, Overton suggests that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
mistrial after the prosecutor made statements during the State’s rebuttal closing
argument that the defense had requested only one Nonoxynol test, while the
prosecution sought additional testing.  According to Overton, this “misleading”
argument suggested that the defense was hiding unfavorable evidence, and thus a
mistrial was warranted.
A motion for a mistrial should be granted “only where the error is so
-41-
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.”  Hamilton v. State, 703 So. 2d 1038, 1041
(Fla. 1997);  see also Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 546 (Fla. 1999); Cole v.
State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997).  A trial court’s ruling granting or denying a
mistrial motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g.,
Goodwin, 751 So. 2d at 546; Hamilton, 703 So. 2d at 1041; Cole, 701 So. 2d at
853.  With respect to improper arguments made by prosecutors, this Court has
held that there is no abuse of discretion in denying a motion for mistrial where the
prosecutor’s argument constitutes a fair comment on the evidence.  See, e.g.,
Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1997) (finding prosecutor’s comment that
the defendant “would have done [the victim] a big favor if he had shot him. It
would certainly have been a less painful death” to be proper comment on the
evidence where defendant beat victim to death with a shotgun). 
Here, during defense counsel’s direct examination of Mr. Trager, the chemist
from Consumer Products Testing Company, defense counsel inquired whether the
tests conducted by Trager supported the State’s theory that the Nonoxynol-9
present in the bed sheet was simply residue after the sheet had been washed with a
household detergent.  Trager testified that to make such a determination would
require the distribution of Nonoxynol-9 to be fairly uniform and that he would
probably recommend more testing in this case because he could not conclude one
16.  To reiterate, Trager found 53 micrograms in the sample submitted by the
defense and 50 micrograms in one of the samples submitted by the State, and he
was unable to tell the exact amount in the second sample submitted by the State
because it was below that lab’s reporting level.
-42-
way or the other.16  During cross-examination, Trager testified that the defense had
asked him to test only one spot, and that when Trager informed defense counsel
that the State had submitted two additional cuttings for confirmatory testing, the
defense attempted to prohibit Trager from performing the additional tests
(presumably because defense counsel considered Trager a defense expert).
During the defense’s closing argument, counsel stated:
You have semen plus Nonoxynol raises the specter of planting
significantly.  Those were his direct words.  And that has not been
dispelled by any expert, by any testing because, as all of these experts
said, well, we need more testing, more testing, more testing.
The State, during its rebuttal, stated:
We talked about the condom and that more testing is needed.  The
State didn’t do enough testing.  Who asked for only one test.  The
State did more testing--
At that point, defense counsel objected and requested a mistrial, arguing that the
prosecutor’s statement was a mischaracterization of the evidence which would
mislead the jury.  The trial court disagreed and denied the motion for a mistrial.  
Based on the evidence introduced at trial (i.e., that the defense submitted one
sample for testing and attempted to prevent Trager from performing the additional
-43-
confirmatory tests (for whatever reason)), we conclude that the prosecutor’s
statement during rebuttal that the defense only requested one test and that the State
sought confirmatory testing was a proper comment on the evidence introduced at
trial.  Moreover, because defense counsel argued during closing that more testing
was needed, we conclude that the State should have been able to rebut that
argument by noting that the defense only submitted one sample for testing and that
the State sought to have more confirmatory tests performed.   Accordingly, we do
not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
mistrial because the prosecutor’s statements were a proper comment on the
evidence and any potential error was not “so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.”
E.  Testimony of Prison Chaplain
We next consider whether the trial court allowed the State to improperly
bolster testimony of Zientek through the alleged hearsay testimony of the prison
chaplain.  As is further detailed in the facts, Zientek testified as to conversations he
had with Overton relating to the crimes.  Apparently, at some point during his direct
examination, Zientek became emotional and his eyes teared up while describing
some of the materials he reviewed.  He indicated during direct examination that
when he saw one of the autopsy pictures he vomited and that he was “pretty
freaked out about the whole thing. . . .  It was bothering me.  I wanted to get a hold
-44-
of the chaplain . . . .”  During cross-examination, defense counsel asked:  “And in
fact, you, before when you were looking disturbed and shedding tears, that was an
act, wasn’t it?”  Defense counsel further attacked Zientek’s testimony that he had
“vomited” when he saw some of the pictures shown to him by Overton and that
instead he  “thanked” Overton for showing him the pictures and other materials.
The State then presented the jail chaplain, Judith Remley.  Defense counsel
objected on the basis that this witness’s testimony was “improper vouching and . .
. not relevant.”  The prosecutor argued that Chaplain Remley’s testimony would
solely relate to Mr. Zientek’s demeanor when he spoke to her, and the record
reveals that this is exactly what occurred.  Specifically, during Ms. Remley’s brief
direct examination, she was asked: “What was his [Zientek’s] demeanor when he
came to talk to you about that conservation?”  She replied, “He was very upset. 
He was crying.  He was devastated.”  
First, we conclude that the issue is properly preserved because we believe
the trial court was “fairly apprized” of the relief sought and the grounds for the
objection.  See Filan v. State, 768 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting
section 924.051(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999)).  Turning to the merits, we decline
to address whether the chaplain’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay introduced
for purposes of bolstering Zientek’s credibility because we conclude that any error
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which may have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Chandler
v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 198 (Fla. 1997) (holding that improper admission of prior
consistent statement is subject to harmless error analysis); Anderson v. State, 574
So. 2d 87, 93 (Fla. 1991).  In this case, Zientek’s testimony that Overton admitted
committing the crimes, which was presumably bolstered by the chaplain’s hearsay
statement, was not the sole evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. 
The DNA evidence, consisting of the results from two separate tests,  identified
Overton as the person who committed these crimes.  Overton’s involvement in
these murders was further corroborated by the other cellmate to whom Overton
confessed the crimes, Guy William Green.  Moreover, the jury had the benefit of
seeing Zientek testify and,  therefore, with or without the chaplain’s testimony, they
were able to assess his credibility.  In sum, we find no harmful error in the trial
court’s admission of the chaplain’s testimony.
F.  Internal Affairs Complaint Against Detective Visco
As already noted, the defense’s hypothesis of innocence at trial was that the
seminal fluid found on the bedding at the crime scene had been planted.  The
defense suggested that Detective Chuck Visco, from the Monroe County Sheriff’s
Office, planted the evidence. According to the defense, Visco’s motive generated
from an internal affairs complaint that Overton filed against Detective Visco for
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“stealing” Overton’s vehicle.  Detective Visco was ultimately cleared of the charges
in that complaint. 
The events leading to the complaint occurred when Overton’s car was
impounded and towed to the police station based on a traffic violation.  Once there,
the contents were inventoried, and Detective Visco, who was then the lead
investigator in the murder of Rachelle Surrett, was called because there were
apparently some suspicious items inside the vehicle.  Based on these items,
Detective Visco obtained a search warrant for the vehicle.  Inside the vehicle,
Detective Visco found a “kit” similar to that which Green testified that Overton
confessed to using when committing burglaries.  The vehicle was held for an
unspecified period of time in conjunction with the Surrett murder investigation. 
Overton was never arrested in connection with the Surrett murder.  
At trial, the defense suggested to the court that it would not object to
Detective Visco explaining that the complaint was unfounded or that he was cleared
of any charges.  However, defense counsel sought a ruling from the court  that
although the defense could question Detective Visco as to the filing of the
complaint, the State could not inquire as to the circumstances surrounding the
complaint.  Particularly, the defense sought to eliminate any reference in this case to
17.  The defense’s argument below never sought to exclude mention of the
burglary kit.
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the Surrett murder investigation.17  The State, on the other hand, asserted that to not
allow an explanation of the surrounding circumstances would leave the false
implication that, although he was cleared by the agency, there might have been
some truth to the complaint filed by Overton. The prosecutor added: “To imply
that he [Detective Visco] had some sinister motive to fabricate evidence against the
defendant in this case without him being able to talk about that . . . valid, genuine
investigation . . .tells half.”  The trial judge ruled that defense counsel was free to
question Detective Visco as to the internal affairs complaint, but that he would
permit Visco to explain the context within which it arose.  
First, we determine that the issue was properly preserved.  Addressing the
merits, the trial court’s decision to allow the State to question Detective Visco as to
the circumstances giving rise to the complaint if defense counsel questioned the
detective about the complaint, does not constitute an abuse of discretion. To be
sure, the trial court did not prevent defense counsel from questioning Detective
Visco about the complaint.  The judge simply ruled that if defense counsel “opened
the door” by asking questions relating to the complaint, the State would be allowed
to question the detective, during its cross-examination, about the circumstances
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surrounding the complaint.  
“As an evidentiary principle, the concept of ‘opening the door’ allows the
admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony to ‘qualify, explain, or limit’
testimony or evidence previously admitted.”  Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 579
(Fla. 1999) (quoting Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986)); see also
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 42 (Fla. 2000) (holding that where defendant
sought to establish that witness disliked him and was biased against him, the State
was allowed to ask questions which would shed light on the reasons for the
possible bias or dislike, which included question relating to the witness’s
knowledge that the defendant had engaged in random acts of violence and
blackmail).  The notion of “opening the door” is premised on “considerations of
fairness and the truth-seeking function of a trial.”  Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 579
(quoting Bozeman v. State, 698 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)); see also
McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla. 1980) (holding that prosecutor was
entitled to inquire into exact nature of a prior felony conviction where defense
counsel sought to establish that that prior conviction was inconsequential);
Washington v. State, 758 So. 2d 1148, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“[F]alse
impression permitted the state to fill in the gaps in the truth so tactfully omitted
during cross-examination.”).  
-49-
In this case, defense counsel’s reason for questioning the detective about the
internal affairs complaint was to bolster the defense’s position that the detective
was biased against the defendant and therefore had a motive to plant the evidence.
The facts indicate that the car was detained by Detective Visco during an
unspecified period of time for a traffic violation.  To have prevented the detective
from explaining why the vehicle continued to be impounded for a mere traffic-
related transgression would have given rise to a false implication (i.e., that the
detective continued to hold the vehicle because of some of bias or improper motive
against Mr. Overton and not because it was part of an ongoing criminal
investigation).  As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling as it did.
G.  HAC  as to Michael MacIvor 
Michael MacIvor’s death was caused by ligature strangulation.  This Court
has held on numerous occasions that “it is permissible to infer that strangulation
when perpetrated upon a conscious victim, involves the foreknowledge of death,
extreme anxiety and fear, and that this method of killing is one to which the factor
of heinousness is applicable.”  DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1993)
(quoting Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 421 (Fla. 1986)).  In fact, we have
noted that “[o]ur case law establishes . . . that strangulation creates a prima facie
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case for [HAC].”  Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla. 1996); see also
Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1990) (“[S]trangulations are nearly
per se heinous.”).  Because the evidence in this case clearly establishes that Michael
was strangled to death, the question which remains is whether he was conscious at
the time of the strangulation.  The record evidence leads us to the conclusion that
he was. 
It is clear from the testimony at trial that Michael MacIvor struggled with
Overton prior to his death.  Particularly, the evidence demonstrates that Michael
was first struck in the back of the head, the neck, and the left shoulder area.  It was
at this point that Susan came out of the bedroom screaming.  Overton chased her
back into the bedroom where he restrained, raped and strangled her.  Throughout
this time, he was “concerned about the male just being temporarily knocked out.” 
As a result, he returned to the living room “where the male was apparently just
becoming conscious.”  Overton then kicked Michael in the abdominal area “to
disable him” and “strangled [him].”  We find Overton’s last act of violence prior to
the strangulation particularly instructive in reaching our conclusion that Michael was
conscious at the time the strangulation began.  After all, why would Overton find it
necessary to “disable” Michael by kicking him in the abdominal area if he was
already unconscious?  See, e.g., Scott v. State, 494 So. 2d 1134, 1137(Fla. 1986)
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(upholding HAC, concluding that where victim was “beaten a second time,”
evidence “clearly supports the . . . conclusion that at some point the victim
regained consciousness”).  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s HAC finding.
H.  Jury Instructions
Next, Overton claims that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that it
should use great caution in relying on the informants’ testimony.  Issues pertaining
to jury instructions are not preserved for appellate review unless a specific
objection has been voiced at trial.  See, e.g., Archer v. State, 673 So. 2d 17, 20
(Fla. 1996); Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994).  Overton candidly
admits that no such request for a limiting instruction relating to the credibility of
“snitch” testimony was requested.  Nevertheless, he suggests to this Court that the
failure to give such instruction was fundamental error. 
Fundamental error is defined as the type of error which “reaches down into
the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Urbin v State, 714 So. 2d
411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla.
1996)).  In this case, the State relied on the evidence presented during the guilt
phase to establish the specific aggravating factors it submitted for consideration
during the penalty phase.  During the guilt phase, jurors heard the standard jury
-52-
instruction with respect to the credibility of witnesses, which, among other things,
informed the jurors that they could consider whether the witness had been
previously convicted of a crime and whether he had received some form of
preferential treatment in exchange for his testimony.  Thus, the jury was free to
consider the informants’ criminal records and any possible benefit derived in
evaluating whether their responses were truthful.  Accordingly, no error, much less
that of a fundamental nature, occurred.
I.  Consideration of Mitigating Evidence
As his last issue on appeal, Overton maintains that the trial court erred in not
considering certain available mitigation.  Because Overton declined the opportunity
to present mitigating evidence, our opinions in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246
(Fla. 1993), and Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1993), are instructive.  In
Koon, we detailed the procedures to be followed when a defendant elects to not
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase:
[1] [C]ounsel must inform the court on the record of the defendant’s
decision. [2] Counsel must indicate whether, based on his
investigation, he reasonably believes there to be mitigating evidence
that could be presented and what that evidence would be. [3] The
court should then require the defendant to confirm on the record that
his counsel has discussed these matters with him, and despite
counsel’s recommendation, he wishes to waive presentation of penalty
phase evidence.
-53-
619 So. 2d at 250.  Moreover, we added in Farr:  
We repeatedly have stated that mitigating evidence must be considered
and weighed when contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is
believable and uncontroverted.  That requirement applies with no less
force when a defendant argues in favor of the death penalty, and even
if the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence. 
 621 So. 2d at 1369.
Turning to the record before us, we note at the outset that the procedures
required by Koon were satisfied.  First, defense counsel informed the trial court
that Overton did not wish to present any mitigating evidence.  Counsel specifically
advised the trial court that “over the past two years” Overton had been steadfast in
his position that if he were convicted, he “did not want any mitigation being
presented on his behalf in any manner whatsoever.”  Defense counsel added that
the defense had prepared a memo for the court outlining “things that we could have
brought out in mitigation.”  The judge then inquired what type of mitigation was
“ferreted out or pursued.”  Defense counsel responded, “Well, the family
background, any type of mental defense or mental mitigation, we attempted to
pursue that.  Mr. Overton didn’t want any of that on.  There were some allegations
of drug abuse that may have been able to be presented if that was pursued.” 
Defense counsel added that “from the very beginning Mr. Overton had advised
family and friends not to cooperate with any investigations as far as the penalty
18.  Defense counsel submitted an affidavit from an investigator who spoke
to the defendant’s mother who indicated that, at her son’s request, she would not
speak with them.
19. “ THE DEFENDANT: Any mitigation factors that come up, there’s my
back history, my drug abuse and everything, that’s an excuse that somebody
who’s guilty would use.  They say, well, I shouldn’t be punished because I didn’t -
- because all this is my background.  That doesn’t apply to me.”
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phase.”18  At that point, the trial court inquired of Overton whether he in fact
wished to not present any mitigating evidence.  The defendant replied: “No, I don’t
want any mitigation.”  The trial court explained to Overton the procedures that
would take place during the penalty phase.  The defendant stated on the record that
his reasons for not wanting the presentation of mitigating evidence were: (1) “I
didn’t commit the crime”;19 (2) “I trust the appellate system.  I figure I’m going to
have a chance to have it reversed”; and (3) “I’m not going to put my family and
friends though this stuff.”  The judge assured the defendant that: “[I]f you have any
misconception that mitigation would somehow undermine your position on appeal,
that’s not so” and “[y]ou don’t have to expose those people you choose to
insulate from the stresses and pressures of this sort of proceeding.  You can still
insulate them and present mitigation through other forms of evidence.”  The
defendant responded: “But if this had happened to some member of my family or
some friends, I wouldn’t care if the guy drank too much sugar or salt or what they
20. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
-55-
said when he was a kid, there’s no excuse for what happened . . . .”  Overton
further affirmed that his attorneys had tried to convince him to present mitigating
evidence, but that he had instructed his family and friends to not cooperate. 
Overton laughed when the judge asked whether someone had promised him
anything to entice him to give up “this important right.”  He simply added: “I’ll just
take it to the appellate court.”  The judge again advised the defendant: “I just can’t
help but point out to you what I believe to be some of the fundamental flaws in
your reasoning process, because you do not necessarily, again, compromise any
appellate issues [by presenting mitigating evidence].”  Overton added that he was
“fully aware of what’s going on” and that he “know[s] a lot about the process in
the courts and what [he] didn’t know, Mr. Smith and Mr. Garcia has [sic] explained
it to me.  They’re not real happy with my decision, but it is my decision.”  
The court handled other related matters and again questioned the defendant
as to his decision to not present mitigating evidence, and the defendant, once again,
stated on the record that he did not wish to present any evidence in mitigation.  The
court ultimately concluded that the defendant had “made a knowing, voluntary
decision even in the face of advice from competent counsel to the contrary.”  
At the Spencer hearing,20 the trial court inquired about a “memorandum
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regarding mitigation.”  Defense counsel stated: “Judge, after conferring with Mr.
Overton he didn’t want us to do that . . . at least until after the sentencing is
completely over.  He didn’t want anything in the record that would tend to sway the
Court.”  The judge once again engaged the defendant in a lengthy discussion
regarding his decision to not present mitigating evidence.  The judge explained to
him that although he had declined to present any evidence during the penalty phase,
he was still able to present any matter he wanted the judge to consider at the
Spencer hearing.  The defendant again declined to do so, and firmly stated that he
did not wish to present any evidence at that time.  The trial judge thought it would
be best to again place on the record what information had been pursued by defense
counsel, at which point Overton’s attorney stated: “We have had our investigator
attempt to contact Mr. Overton’s family members, in order to go into his
background and also his friends, his prior military school, history and there was
some indications from the discovery that we received from the State that there were
areas of inquiry regarding his past military background, school background, and his
past health, medical record issues, and that’s what we basically pursued and
attempted to pursue.”  The Court again questioned Overton about his decision and
asked: “So do you understand that there is apparently some relevant information
out there that you yourself are precluding the Court from having evidence about? 
21.  Although our recent decision in Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343
(Fla. 2001) (requiring preparation of a PSI in every case where the defendant is not
challenging the imposition of the death penalty or refuses to present mitigating
evidence) was prospective, and thus not applicable to Overton’s case, we note that
the trial court’s decision to order the preparation of a PSI in this case is consistent
with our decision in Muhammad. 
-57-
Do you understand that?”  Overton responded affirmatively.  The court concluded
that Overton had made a knowing and voluntary waiver at that time.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had “considered the
presentence investigation [report] [“PSI”] solely for the purpose of uncovering
possible mitigating factors.”21  The trial court further noted: 
This Court did not let the matter rest after the [Koon] inquiry in
chambers prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, rather,
repeatedly, at various times during the penalty phase, outside the jury’s
presence, the Court conducted an additional inquiry of the defendant
regarding his rights to present mitigation.  The Court also repeated the
process during the [Spencer hearing].  The Court also requested a
presentence investigation [report], but the defendant refused to
cooperate with the Department of Corrections.
Despite this choice by the defendant, this Court has endeavored
to uncover whatever mitigation may exist.  Accordingly, the Court will
now address, and has addressed in its order, the statutory mitigating
factors that may exist.  
As noted above, the defendant did not request that the
 jury be instructed on any statutory mitigating factors, nor did he
present any evidence or argument before this Court at the separate
sentencing hearing to suggest any statutory mitigating factor.  This
Court has reviewed each statutory mitigating factor and now finds that
no evidence has been presented to support any statutory mitigating
factors and none exist.
Nevertheless, the Court has carefully considered the possibility
-58-
that other factors exist in the defendant’s background that would
mitigate against imposition of the death penalty pursuant specifically to
Section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes, and discusses these
possibilities in its sentencing order specifically.  And once again the
analysis of these possible mitigating factors is embodied in the order,
but I will recite those that I considered in conjunction with 921.141
(6)(h), specifically family background, military record, employment
record, history of substance abuse, mental health.  And the Court,
after thoroughly analyzing the possibility that some mitigation may
exist in these areas, has found none to exist.
Nonstatutory mitigating factors also must be considered when
weighing the sentence to be imposed in this case, and despite the
defendant’s refusal to present evidence of any nonstatutory mitigating
factor, the Court has identified the following nonstatutory mitigating
factors:
The defendant will be incarcerated for the rest of his life with no
danger of committing any other violent act . . . . [H]owever, the Court
gives that little weight.
Defendant’s courtroom demeanor and behavior are also a
nonstatutory mitigating factor that the Court can consider, and the
Court has considered that and does find that that nonstatutory
mitigating factor does exist and does accord it some weight.  
(Emphasis supplied.)
The trial court sentencing order, which mirrors the trial court’s oral
pronouncements during the sentencing hearing, indicates that the trial judge in fact
considered whatever mitigation was present in the record, including the limited
information contained in the PSI report.  The post-guilt phase record in this case is
indicative of a judge who conscientiously and deliberately examined the information
available to him, while at the same time respecting the wishes of the defendant. 
-59-
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court committed no error with
respect to its consideration and evaluation of the available mitigating evidence.
J.  Sufficiency of the Evidence and Proportionality
Overton did not raise either of these two issues on appeal.  However, based
on our independent obligation to review the record, we find the evidence sufficient
to support each conviction.  We further conclude that, although not raised by the
defendant, the death penalty is proportionate as to both victims.  See, e.g., Reese v.
State, 768 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2000) (upholding death sentence where victim was
strangled to death; court found following aggravators: HAC, CCP and during the
course of a sexual battery; trial court did not find any statutory mitigators and gave
minimal weight to nonstatutory mitigator (no significant criminal history)); Mansfield
v. State, 758 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2000) (affirming death sentence where victim was
strangled to death; trial court found following aggravators: HAC and during the
course of a sexual battery; trial court found no statutory mitigation and several
nonstatutory mitigators (good conduct during trial, defendant was an alcoholic,
defendant’s mother was alcoholic during childhood, poor upbringing,
dysfunctional family, and brain injury due to head trauma and alcoholism); James v.
State, 695 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1997) (affirming death sentence where victim was
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strangled to death; court found HAC, prior violent felony conviction (based on
contemporaneous murder), and during the course of a felony; trial court also found
significantly more mitigation than that found in this case (ability to appreciate
criminality of conduct was substantially impaired, under the influence of moderate
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of offense, full cooperation with
authorities, genuine shame and remorse, good conduct while incarcerated);
Jennings v State, 718 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1998) (affirming death penalty where trial
court found following aggravators: CCP, avoid arrest, and during the commission
of a felony; one statutory mitigator (no significant history of prior criminal activity);
and nonstatutory mitigation included cooperation with police, deprived childhood,
good employment history, exemplary courtroom behavior); Consalvo v. State, 697
So. 2d 805 (1997) (upholding death penalty where trial court found murder was
committed during the course of a burglary and to avoid arrest; no statutory
mitigation; and slight nonstatutory mitigation (employment history and abusive
childhood)).
III.  CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we affirm Overton’s first-degree murder convictions and
death sentences.  We also affirm his convictions and sentences for sexual battery,
burglary, and the unlawful killing of an unborn child. 
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It is so ordered. 
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Monroe County,
Mark H. Jones, Judge - Case No. PK96-30167-CF
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee