Title: Miles v. Commonwealth (order)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052568
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2007

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 8th day of 
June, 2007. 
 
 
Ellis Lorenzo Miles, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
against   
Record No. 052568 
 
 
Circuit Court No. LS-1979-1 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for Rehearing 
 
 
By order entered on November 28, 2006, this Court awarded 
the Commonwealth a rehearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
5:39(e).  Upon consideration of the record, the briefs 
originally filed by the parties, the petition for rehearing 
filed by the Commonwealth, and the argument of the parties, the 
Court concludes that the judgment of this Court and opinion 
issued on September 15, 2006 should not be set aside and should 
stand as issued.  Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is 
reversed and the Commonwealth’s petition filed pursuant to 
former Code § 37.1-70.6 is dismissed with prejudice. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and 
shall be certified to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
_________________________ 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring. 
 
While I agree with the majority that the Court arrived at 
the proper result in its decision in Miles v. Commonwealth, 272 
 
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Va. 302, 634 S.E.2d 330 (2006), I write separately because, in 
my view, the rationale underlying that opinion is overbroad and 
unnecessary to dispose of the issues presented in this case. 
The Commonwealth’s own witness, Dr. Christine A. Nogues, 
testified that Ellis Lorenzo Miles’ score on the Rapid Risk 
Assessment for Sex Offender Recidivism (RRASOR) was inaccurately 
calculated as four instead of three.  At oral argument before 
this Court, the Commonwealth conceded that, if Miles had 
initially received a score of three on the RRASOR, the 
Commonwealth would not have forwarded his name to the Commitment 
Review Committee pursuant to former Code § 37.2-903(C) and would 
not have initiated any further proceedings under the Sexually 
Violent Predators Act (the Act), against Miles.  
 
Since Miles has a substantial liberty interest at stake, 
see Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 240, 609 S.E.2d 1, 4 
(2005), in my view, the Commonwealth should not be allowed to 
proceed with its petition to have Miles declared a sexually 
violent predator under the Act when its own expert witness 
admitted the initial scoring that caused Miles name to be 
forwarded to the Commitment Review Committee for further 
assessment was inaccurate.  That reason alone requires dismissal 
of the Commonwealth’s petition.  Thus, it is not necessary for 
the majority to decide whether a “correctly computed score” is a 
“condition precedent” to initiating proceedings under the Act to 
have an inmate declared a sexually violent predator.  The 
 
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majority’s rationale will encourage a battle between expert 
witnesses with regard to whether an inmate received “a correctly 
computed score” and in turn, whether proceedings under the Act 
should ever have been commenced against a particular inmate.  
“An appellate court decides cases ‘on the best and narrowest 
ground available.’ ”  Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58, 
64, 628 S.E.2d 74, 77 (2006) (quoting Air Courier Conference v. 
American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 531 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk