Title: Ex parte Emory L. Terry, as administrator of the estate of Fay Sewell Terry, deceased. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: The estate of Fay Sewell Terry, deceased)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060702
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2007

REL: 11/02/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1060702
____________________
Ex parte Emory L. Terry, as administrator of the estate of
Fay Sewell Terry, deceased
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: The estate of Fay Sewell Terry, deceased)
____________________
1060705
____________________
Emory L. Terry, as administrator of the estate of Fay Sewell
Terry, deceased
v.
Craig G. Terry and Kendrick Terry
2
Appellate Proceedings from Mobile Probate Court (No. 2004-
769) and Mobile Circuit Court (CV-06-2184.51)
SEE, Justice.
Emory L. Terry ("Emory"), as the administrator of the
estate of Fay Sewell Terry, deceased ("the estate"), petitions
this Court for the writ of mandamus directing the Mobile
Circuit Court to vacate its order remanding the administration
of the estate to the Mobile Probate Court.  In the
alternative, Emory appeals the decision of the circuit court
remanding the case to probate court.  We consolidated the two
proceedings for purposes of writing one opinion.  Because
Emory's direct appeal serves as an adequate alternative remedy
to mandamus relief, we deny his petition for the writ of
mandamus; we affirm the decision of the Mobile Circuit Court.
Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from a dispute between Emory and two of
his sons, Craig G. Terry and Kendrick Terry.  Craig and
Kendrick have objected to the final settlement of the estate
because they dispute the inventory and distribution of the
assets of the estate.  Emory first petitioned the probate
court for a final settlement of the estate in May 2005 and
filed an accounting of assets and a statement of heirs at that
1060702, 1060705
Section 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
1
"The administration of any estate may be removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court."
3
time.  The probate court sent a notice to all the heirs listed
by Emory and set the hearing on the petition for September
2005.  Craig and Kendrick answered the petition and objected
to Emory's accounting.  Following the September hearing, the
parties engaged in discovery and a series of motions,
responses, and hearings, none of which resolved the issues
raised at the September 2005 hearing.  In June 2006, Emory
moved the circuit court to remove the administration of the
estate to the circuit court pursuant to § 12-11-41, Ala. Code
1975.   That motion was denied, and Emory petitioned this
1
Court for the writ of mandamus directing the probate court to
transfer the administration of the estate to the circuit
1060702, 1060705
4
court.  In October 2006, this Court noted that "[the] root of
the problem in this case is the failure of the circuit court
to act" and denied Emory's petition, in part "because the
administrator has another available remedy if the circuit
court fails to grant the petition for removal upon its being
filed 
with the 
necessary 
statutory averments." Ex parte Terry,
957 So. 2d 455, 459 (Ala. 2006).  The decision in Terry was
based on an earlier ruling in which this Court held that
"when a party has made a prima facie showing that
the party is entitled to the removal of the
administration of an estate under § 12-11-41, 'the
circuit court must order its removal, subject to
retransfer upon a motion by the opponent of the
transfer, and a finding by the circuit court that
the party effecting removal lacked standing under
the statute.'"
957 So. 2d at 458 (quoting Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700,
704 (Ala. 2001) (hereinafter "McLendon II")).  This Court
further stated in Terry that "if upon denial of this petition
for a writ of mandamus the circuit court denies the
administrator's pending motion to amend or to vacate its order
denying removal, ... the administrator may appeal the order of
the circuit court." 957 So. 2d at 459.  Following this ruling,
the circuit court granted Emory's petition to remove the
administration of the estate.  Kendrick and Craig then moved
1060702, 1060705
5
the circuit court to transfer the case back to the probate
court on the ground that Emory's petition for removal was
untimely.  The circuit court granted Kendrick and Craig's
motion, citing § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, which provides in
relevant part that the "estate may be removed from the probate
court to the circuit court at any time before a final
settlement thereof ...."  The circuit court found that Emory
had properly petitioned the probate court to begin final
settlement proceedings and that the probate court had taken
jurisdiction in the case.  The circuit court concluded that
Emory's petition to remove the administration pursuant to §
12-11-41 
was 
therefore 
untimely 
and 
that 
the 
administration 
of
the estate was due to be remanded to the probate court.  Emory
has sought review of this decision either by the writ of
mandamus or, alternatively, by direct appeal.  As noted
earlier, we deny the petition for the writ of mandamus because
his appeal serves as an adequate alternative remedy, and, as
to the appeal, we affirm.
Analysis
1060702, 1060705
6
Emory petitions this Court for the writ of mandamus
directing the circuit court to reverse its order  remanding
the administration of the estate to the probate court.  
"'"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to
be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court." ...'"
Terry, 957 So. 2d at 457 (quoting Ex parte Williford, 902 So.
2d 658, 661-62 (Ala. 2004)).  This Court has held that the
order of a circuit court "remanding the administration of [an]
estate to the probate court [moves] this branch of the case
out of the circuit court, and [is] such final decree as will
support [an] appeal." Ex parte Kelly, 243 Ala. 184, 187, 8 So.
2d 855, 857 (1942) (citing Bailey v. Southern Ry., 215 Ala.
677, 112 So. 203 (1927)).  As he did when he previously
petitioned this Court for the writ of mandamus, Emory has
another available remedy by direct appeal of the order of the
circuit court. See Terry, 957 So. 2d at 459.  Therefore, we
deny Emory's petition for the writ of mandamus, and we review
the order of the circuit court as a final judgment.
1060702, 1060705
7
Emory's appeal "involves only an issue of law and the
application of the law to undisputed facts; therefore our
review is de novo." Ex parte Hamilton, [Ms. 1041750, December
22, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006)(citing Ex parte
Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 262 (Ala. 2005)).  The sole issue on
appeal 
is 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court, 
to 
which 
the
administration of the estate was removed pursuant to § 12-11-
41, Ala. Code 1975, may remand the administration of the
estate to the probate court on the ground that the probate
court had already begun to exercise jurisdiction over the
final settlement of the estate.
Following this Court's denial of Emory's previous
petition for the writ of mandamus, the circuit court granted
Emory's petition for removal of the administration of the
estate from the probate court pursuant to § 12-11-41, Ala.
Code 1975.  That statute provides that "[the] administration
of any estate may be removed from the probate court to the
circuit court at any time before a final settlement thereof,
by any heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed of any
such estate, without assigning any special equity."  The
1060702, 1060705
8
availability of removal under § 12-11-41 is broad, and "[the]
only limitation on removal occurs once the probate court has
taken steps toward a final settlement, or has, in fact, made
a final settlement." Ex parte Clayton, 514 So. 2d 1013, 1016
(Ala. 1987).  
"The term 'final settlement' signifies that 'nothing
remain[s] to be done by an administrator or by the court in
the settlement of [the] estate.'" Boyd v. Franklin, 919 So. 2d
1166, 1173 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Stevens v. Tucker, 87 Ind.
109, 115 (1882)).  However, this Court has long held that
"[the] words 'at any time before a final settlement,' found in
the removal act, mean before proceedings for settlement begin,
not before they are completed." Ex parte McLendon, 212 Ala.
403, 405, 102 So. 696, 698 (1924)(hereinafter "McLendon I").
"'Furthermore, 
this 
Court 
has 
previously 
held 
that
"[j]urisdiction for final settlement in the probate court
begins upon filing accounts and vouchers with [a] statement of
the heirs invoking the court's jurisdiction for such
settlement and an order entered setting [the] day, directing
notice, etc."'" Boyd, 919 So. 2d at 1172 (quoting McLendon I,
212 Ala. at 405, 102 So. at 698, citing §§ 5901 and 5904, Ala.
1060702, 1060705
9
Code 1923 (now §§ 43-2-501 and -502, Ala. Code 1975)).  When
the probate court has assumed jurisdiction over the final
settlement of an estate, yet a petitioner has successfully
removed the administration to the circuit court, the circuit
court may retransfer the administration to the probate court
upon the motion of the party opposing removal. McLendon II,
824 So. 2d at 704.
In this case, the circuit court's order retransferring
the administration of the estate to the probate court
indicates that Emory had petitioned the probate court for
final settlement proceedings.  The order further indicates
that the probate court had assumed jurisdiction and had taken
steps toward the final settlement.  The record supports these
findings.  Emory petitioned the probate court for a final
settlement in May 2005 and submitted an accounting of assets
and debts and a statement of heirs.  The probate court sent a
notice of the initial hearing on the petition to the heirs
listed in Emory's petition.  Because the initial hearing did
not accomplish a final settlement of the estate, the probate
court issued an order after the hearing directing discovery,
setting a date for trial, and identifying the issues for
1060702, 1060705
10
trial.  Emory then filed  with the probate court an amended
petition for a final settlement.  From these facts, it is
clear that Emory intended to invoke the probate court's
jurisdiction over the final settlement of the estate by
submitting his petitions, amendments, supplements, and
accounts for a final settlement.  It is equally clear by the
notices, orders, and rulings on motions that were issued by
the probate court and the hearings held by that court that the
probate 
court 
had 
accepted 
jurisdiction 
over 
the
administration of the estate and had taken steps toward final
settlement.  Despite the wide latitude afforded under § 12-11-
41, Ala. Code 1975, to interested parties who may petition for
removal of the administration of an estate to the circuit
court, this Court has consistently held that once final
settlement proceedings have been commenced by the probate
court's assumption of jurisdiction, removal is cut off.  See
Boyd, 919 So. 2d at 1172-73; McLendon II, 824 So. 2d at 704-
05; Ex parte Clayton, 514 So. 2d at 1016-18; Mobbs v. Scott,
233 Ala. 70, 169 So. 698 (1936); and McLendon I, 212 Ala. at
405, 102 So. at 698.
1060702, 1060705
11
Emory admits in his petition for the writ of mandamus
that the stress of administering an estate through the
protracted litigation that resulted from his sons' contest of
the assets of the estate led him to seek a more prompt
resolution in the circuit court. Petition at 9.  Although §
12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, exists for the benefit of
petitioners who believe that an "estate can be better
administered in the circuit court than in the probate court,"
a petition for that relief must be made in a timely fashion
before the invocation of the probate court's jurisdiction over
final settlement proceedings.
Conclusion
Because Emory was able to seek review of the circuit
court's order retransferring this case to the probate court
through direct appeal, the petition for the writ of mandamus
is denied.  Emory's petition to remove the administration of
the estate to the circuit court was filed after the probate
court had assumed jurisdiction of the final settlement of the
administration of the estate.  Therefore, the removal was
improvidently granted, and we affirm the circuit court's order
1060702, 1060705
12
remanding the administration of the estate to the probate
court.
PETITION DENIED;  AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.