Title: In re Bettis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S53231
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2006

FILED: December 29, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
WADE P. BETTIS,
Accused.
(OSB 05-31; SC S53231)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 6, 2006.
Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.  With her on the
briefs was Jonel Ricker, Bar Counsel.
Lawrence W. Erwin, Bend, argued the cause and filed the
brief for the accused.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for 30
days, commencing 60 days from the effective date of this
decision. 
*Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating DR 6-101(A)
(failure to provide competent representation). (1)  A trial
panel of the Disciplinary Board determined that the Bar had
failed to prove that allegation and, therefore, concluded that
the accused had not violated DR 6-101(A).  The Bar seeks review
of the trial panel decision.  We review the record de novo.  BR
10.1, BR 10.6.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the
trial panel's conclusion and suspend the accused from the
practice of law for 30 days.
The accused has been a member of the Bar since 1972. 
During the events that led to this proceeding, the accused and
Skinner, a lawyer, both were members of the Umatilla Morrow
Consortium (consortium).  The accused had formed the consortium
for the purpose of assigning indigent defense cases to the
consortium members in Morrow and Umatilla counties; the accused
also was the consortium's administrator.  Skinner and the accused
often assisted each other with court appearances on indigent
defense cases to which the consortium was appointed.
On January 15, 2004, the state charged a defendant,
Gonzalez-Cardona, with first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy,
first-degree kidnapping, first-degree sexual abuse, and fourth-degree assault.  The following day, the state charged another
defendant, Pinto-Roman, with second-degree and fourth-degree
assault.  The two cases were unrelated.  The court appointed the
consortium to represent both defendants.  Skinner was assigned to
represent Pinto-Roman, and the accused was assigned to represent
Gonzalez-Cardona.  Both defendants were in custody in the
Umatilla County Jail.  Skinner and the accused previously had
agreed that the accused would handle all in-custody cases
assigned to either of them due to his proximity to the Umatilla
County Jail.  The accused and Skinner also had agreed that
Skinner would not handle sex crime cases.
On January 20, 2004, Skinner appeared at Pinto-Roman's
arraignment.  At the arraignment, the court scheduled a
preliminary hearing for January 22, 2004.  With the aid of an
interpreter, Pinto-Roman executed a Waiver of Indictment. 
Skinner subsequently informed the accused that she had explained
the Waiver of Indictment to Pinto-Roman with the aid of an
interpreter.  According to the accused, he became Pinto-Roman's
lawyer of record on February 2, 2004. (2)
On February 2, 2004, the accused arranged to meet with
Pinto-Roman at the Umatilla County Jail.  Instead, the staff at
the Umatilla County Jail brought him Gonzalez-Cardona.  During
that meeting, the accused did not realize that he was speaking
with Gonzalez-Cardona, rather than with Pinto-Roman.  Gonzalez-Cardona spoke English and did not require an interpreter. 
Gonzalez-Cardona informed the accused that the state had charged
him with rape and other sexual crimes.  Throughout their meeting,
Gonzalez-Cardona did not correct the accused when the accused
referred to him as Pinto-Roman.  The accused then proceeded to
present to Gonzalez-Cardona an "Election to Waive Trial by Jury"
form.  The caption on the waiver form stated "State of Oregon v.
Benjamin Pinto-Roman."  Gonzalez-Cardona signed the waiver, and
the accused subsequently filed with the court the "Election to
Waive Trial by Jury" form in the Pinto-Roman case.  Prior to the
meeting, the accused had not reviewed the District Attorney's
information and police reports concerning Pinto-Roman.  The
accused did not meet with Pinto-Roman during that visit to the
Umatilla County Jail.  Although Gonzalez-Cardona signed the
"Election to Waive Trial by Jury" form for the Pinto-Roman case,
the court ultimately set the Pinto-Roman case for a jury trial.
The following day, the accused met with Pinto-Roman at
the Umatilla County Jail without the aid of an interpreter. 
After discovering that he could not communicate with Pinto-Roman
without an interpreter, the accused ended the meeting.  A week
later, the accused appeared with Pinto-Roman and an interpreter
for a pretrial conference.  That same day, the accused also
appeared at a hearing with Gonzalez-Cardona and waived the
preliminary hearing in the Gonzalez-Cardona case.  After that
hearing, the accused presented an "Election to Waive Trial by
Jury" form to Gonzalez-Cardona, which Gonzalez-Cardona then
signed.
Sometime in March 2004, Gonzalez-Cardona retained
private counsel, and the accused was permitted to withdraw as
counsel for Gonzalez-Cardona.  On March 15, 2004, Pinto-Roman,
with the accused's assistance, entered a guilty plea to fourth-degree assault.  The court sentenced Pinto-Roman to probation and
80 hours of community service and dismissed the second-degree
assault charge.  Thereafter, Pinto-Roman complained to the Bar
about the accused's representation.  According to Pinto-Roman,
the accused did not communicate with him sufficiently.
In an amended formal complaint, the Bar alleged that
the accused had violated DR 6-101(A) in failing to exercise the
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
Pinto-Roman's representation. (3)  DR 6-101(A) provides:
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client.  Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation."
As noted, a trial panel found the accused not guilty of the
charge.
On review, the Bar argues that the trial panel
incorrectly concluded that the accused did not violate DR 6-101(A).  According to the Bar "[t]he panel's findings and
conclusion are contrary to the evidence, which include, but [are]
not limited to, the accused's admissions and other evidence in
this case."  The Bar contends that the evidence before the trial
panel required that it conclude that the accused had failed to
provide competent representation in violation of DR 6-101(A). The Bar has the burden of establishing misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  "Clear and convincing
evidence" means evidence establishing that the truth of the facts
asserted is highly probable.  In re Johnson, 300 Or 52, 55, 707
P2d 573 (1985).  Our standard of review is de novo; however, we
give weight to any credibility findings made by a trial panel. 
See In re Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 470, 41 P3d 1063 (2002) (so
stating).
Whether a lawyer has failed to provide competent
representation in violation of DR 6-101(A) "is a fact specific
inquiry."  In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 60, 36 P3d 468 (2001). 
Furthermore, the "standard for assessing competence and diligence
is an objective one" and, thus, is not focused on a lawyer's
mental state.  See In re Magar, 335 Or 306, 319, 66 P3d 1014
(2003) (stating principle).  Moreover, in assessing whether a
lawyer failed to provide competent representation, we assign no
weight to the outcome of the underlying matter.  See In re
Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 555, 857 P2d 136 (1993) ("If a lawyer does
a poor job, but the client fortuitously or through the efforts of
others obtains a good result, that does not excuse the lawyer
from providing competent representation or justify neglecting the
case.").
This court has stated that the "best measure for
determining lawyer competency is 'the standard stated in DR 6-101(A) itself.'"  Magar, 335 Or at 320.  That standard requires a
lawyer to employ the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."  DR 6-101(A).  In Magar, this court recognized an important distinction
between a lack of competence and negligence:
"A lawyer -- otherwise knowledgeable, skillful,
thorough, and prepared -- might commit a misstep for
which he or she might have to respond in damages.  That
lawyer, although negligent, has not violated DR 6-101(A).  Conversely, but less likely, a lawyer might
act without the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness,
or preparation necessary for the representation, but
commit no misstep that gives rise to an actionable
negligence claim."
Id. at 320.
With that distinction in mind, we turn to the Bar's
argument.  According to the Bar, the general manner in which the
accused prepared for and handled his representation of Pinto-Roman established its allegations of misconduct.  The Bar claims
that the accused "did not review the charging instruments and did
not even know the charges and evidence against [Pinto-Roman] or
[Gonzalez-Cardona] before seeking a waiver of jury trial." 
Additionally, the Bar points to the accused's failure to review
any police or investigation reports and the accused's failure to
conduct his own investigation.  As a result, the Bar contends
that "[t]here is no way that the accused was or could have been
adequately prepared to advise a client about anything or for the
client to understand and make knowing and voluntary decisions
concerning his case."
In particular, the Bar identifies the accused's
February 2, 2004, meeting with Gonzalez-Cardona at the Umatilla
County Jail as revealing three examples of the accused's
incompetence.  First, the accused did not immediately comprehend
that he was meeting with Gonzales-Cardona as opposed to Pinto-Roman.  Second, if the accused had been properly prepared, he
would have noticed the identity mistake during that meeting or at
some point during the subsequent proceedings.  Third, the accused
advised Gonzalez-Cardona, who the accused believed to be Pinto-Roman, to sign the "Election to Waive Trial by Jury" form without
first conducting discovery, further research, or factual
investigation.  
In response, the accused argues that, because the jail
presented Gonzalez-Cardona for the meeting with the accused
instead of Pinto-Roman whom the accused had requested, the jail
was responsible for the subsequent confusion and that neither
Gonzalez-Cardona nor Pinto-Roman had suffered any prejudice due
to the mistaken identity. 
The problem here is not, however, that the accused
spoke to the wrong person.  The problem, instead, lies with the
accused's failure to devote the minimal amount of effort to the
case that must be associated with advice to a client to waive a
fundamental constitutional right.  Thus, we would view the case
no differently if the accused never had been involved in the
identity mistake.  
The record and the testimony before the trial panel
corroborate the Bar's version of events.  Even the accused's
testimony evidences complete ignorance of the factual or legal
issues that might have been germane to either the Gonzalez-Cardona or the Pinto-Roman case at the time that he mistakenly
had Gonzalez-Cardona sign the jury waiver in the Pinto-Roman
case.  
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that,
under the circumstances, the accused's omissions demonstrate that
the accused's representation of Pinto-Roman fell below the
competence standard required by DR 6-101(A).  Pinto-Roman was
charged with serious crimes, for which he could have received a
lengthy prison term. (4)  Other than the death penalty, a
prison sentence is the most serious deprivation of liberty that a
human being in our society can suffer.  Accordingly, a lawyer
defending a client in that circumstance ethically is obligated to
fully acquaint himself or herself with the legal and factual
issues of the case as soon as possible.  
At the time that the accused sought Pinto-Roman's jury
trial waiver, he had not reviewed any discovery from the
prosecutor, and he had conducted no factual or legal
investigation on his own.  In other words, the accused sought his
client's waiver of a fundamental constitutional right without any
basis to conclude that such a waiver was in the client's best
interest.
We agree that, as the accused asserts here, a lawyer, 
over time, may conclude that certain cases (such as those
involving allegations of sex abuse) are better tried before a
judge than a jury.  However, no manner of experience or intuition
permits a lawyer to seek his or her client's waiver of a
fundamental right without first understanding the legal and
factual issues in a case.  Only then is a lawyer prepared to
exercise the professional skill and judgment necessary to advise
and assist a client in making an important tactical choice such
as the waiver of a constitutional right.
The accused's failure to gain any understanding of the
legal or factual issues in the case before seeking Pinto-Roman's
jury trial waiver reflects an absence or suspension of
professional skill and judgment.  Under the circumstances in this
case, we conclude that the accused's representation fell below
the standard of competence mandated by DR 6-101(A).
Having found that the accused violated a disciplinary
rule, we turn to the issue of the appropriate sanction. 
Following our well-established methodology, we first refer to the
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), to make a
preliminary determination of the appropriate sanction, by
considering the duty or duties that the accused violated, his
mental state at the time of his misconduct, and the injury that
his misconduct caused.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then consider the
existence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and
consider this court's relevant case law.  See In re Kluge, 335 Or
326, 348, 66 P3d 492 (2003) (setting out methodology).
In this case, we conclude that the accused knowingly
violated his duties to his client, Pinto-Roman, and to the
profession when he failed to prepare properly in his
representation of Pinto-Roman.  That violation -- seeking the
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right without first
determining whether it was in his client's best interest to do so
-- was, without doubt, harmful to the client and the legal
system. 
Taking into account the duties violated, the accused's
mental state, and the actual and potential harm, we are persuaded
that ABA Standard 7.2, which suggests that a suspension is
appropriate, is applicable here. (5)  Additionally, the accused
has a prior disciplinary record and has substantial experience in
the practice of law, which are aggravating factors to be
considered in determining the appropriate sanction.  ABA Standard
9.22(a).  In 1994, the State Professional Responsibility Board
(board) admonished the accused for violation of DR 5-101(A)
(lawyer self-interest conflict).  In 1997, the board admonished
the accused for violation of DR 6-101(B) (neglect of a legal
matter) for failing to adequately communicate with his client. 
Finally, in 1998, the accused was reprimanded for violation of DR
9-101(C)(3) (failure to account for client funds).  
It is inaccurate to characterize a letter of admonition
"as a form of 'sanction' or as part of a 'prior record' of
discipline imposed upon an accused lawyer."  In re Cohen, 330 Or
489, 500, 8 P3d 953 (2000).  Nonetheless, a letter of admonition
"can be relevant to the determination of the appropriate sanction
in a subsequent proceeding for other misconduct, because it
demonstrates that the accused lawyer has engaged in misconduct in
the past."  Id.  Finally, we will take particular note of a
letter of admonition if it involved the same or similar type of
misconduct.  See id. ("[W]e conclude that a letter of admonition
should be considered under ABA Standard 9.22(a), as evidence of
past misconduct, if the misconduct that gave rise to that letter
was of the same or similar type as the misconduct at issue in the
case at bar.").  Accordingly, we will consider the accused's
substantial experience in the practice of law, as well as the
entirety of the accused's disciplinary record, with the exception
of the 1994 letter of admonition, as aggravating circumstances.
We now turn to a consideration of this court's case
law.  Although no cases are precisely on point, two cases provide
some guidance in our determination of the appropriate sanction.  
In In re Roberts, 335 Or 476, 71 P3d 71 (2003), this
court suspended an accused lawyer for 60 days after concluding
that he had violated both DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 6-101(A).  That
case involved a lawyer who, in the course of representing the
conservator of an estate, failed to comply with applicable
procedural and substantive rules, failed to handle substantive
issues, and failed to give the requisite attention to the case. 
That lawyer also had substantial experience in the practice of
law and had no prior record of discipline. 
In In re Gresham, 318 Or 162, 864 P2d 360 (1993), the
accused lawyer had lacked the knowledge and skill necessary to
undertake a probate case but proceeded to attempt the
representation of such a case.  He also was inexperienced in the
practice of law and had no prior record of discipline.  Several
aggravating factors were also present.  This court suspended that
lawyer for 91 days after concluding that he had violated DR 6-101(A) and (B) and DR 1-102(A)(4). 
In this case, as in Roberts and Gresham, the applicable
aggravating factors and the accused's failure to exercise 
professional skill and judgment in seeking the client's waiver of
a fundamental constitutional right justify a suspension from the
practice of law.  We conclude that the appropriate sanction under
the circumstances present here is 30 days.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
30 days, commencing 60 days from the effective date of this
decision. 
1. The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became effective January 1, 2005.  Because
the conduct at issue here occurred before that date, the Oregon Code of Professional
Responsibility applies. 
2. In a letter to the Bar, the accused stated:
"The Umatilla-Morrow consortium was appointed to
represent Mr. Pinto-Roman on January 22, 2004, and
attorney Toni Skinner was the initial designated
attorney for the Consortium.  I became Mr. Pinto-Roman's attorney of record on or about February 2,
2004."
3. Specifically, the Bar alleged that the accused:
"(a) Failed to confirm the identify of his client
when he met with Gonzalez-Cardona on February 2, 2004;
"(b) Obtained the signature of Gonzalez-Cardona on
the Election to Waive Trial by Jury form concerning the
Pinto-Roman case;
"(c) Failed to review the District Attorney's
information and police reports before he advised or
requested an Election to Waive Trial by Jury [form]
from a client;
"(d) Failed to conduct reasonable investigation
and evaluation of the Pinto-Roman case before he
presented and obtained an Election to Waive Trial by
Jury [form] from a client he assumed was Pinto-Roman;
"(e) Failed to recognize that the circumstances
and crimes identified by Gonzalez-Cardona on February
2, 2004, were not the circumstances and crimes with
which Pinto-Roman was charged;
"(f) Failed to recognize that Gonzalez-Cardona had
signed the Election to Waive Trial by Jury [form] in
the Pinto-Roman case;
"(g) Failed to recognize that he had not obtained
Pinto-Roman's signature on the Election to Waive Trial
by Jury [form] concerning Pinto-Roman's case;
"(h) Failed to meet with and explain the Election
to Waive Trial by Jury [form] to Pinto-Roman;
"(i) Failed to recognize that he had not met with
and had not explained the Election to Waive Trial by
Jury [form] to Pinto-Roman;
"(j) Filed the Election to Waive Trial by Jury
[form] in the Pinto-Roman case that was signed by
Gonzalez-Cardona; and
"(k) Failed to notify the court that Pinto-Roman
had not signed and had not agreed to waive trial by
jury on February 2, 2004."
4. Assault in the second degree, ORS 163.175, is a Class B
felony.
5. ABA Standard 7.2 provides:
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed
to the profession, and causes injury or potential
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system."