Title: L.W. v. Toms River Regional Schools Board of Education
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-111-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 21, 2007

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). As a fourth-grader at South Toms River Elementary School, L.W. was taunted with homosexual epithets such as gay, homo, and fag. The harassment increased in regularity and severity as L.W. advanced through school. While in seventh grade at Intermediate West Middle School, L.W. was subjected to harassment almost daily, which escalated to physical aggression and molestation. Initially, the school s response to reported incidents was to talk to the students about their inappropriate behavior and to warn them of future consequences if the behavior continued. Eventually, as the harassment continued, discipline ranged from detention to suspension of repeat offenders and counseling for first-time offenders. L.W. was forced to miss school days following several of these incidents, a result of his fear and humiliation from the harassment. Eighth grade was a better year for L.W. Throughout L.W. s time at Intermediate West, a school-wide non-discrimination policy was in effect, one that the Tom s River Regional School Board (District) characterized as a zero-tolerance policy. Students and parents were provided a handbook of rules and policies stating that the District does not discriminate on the basis of numerous characteristics; however, it did not specifically enumerate affectional or sexual orientation. The District did not reinforce its discrimination policy with assemblies, letters to parents, or other widespread communication. The District employed progressive discipline when addressing peer discrimination and harassment. First-time offenders were counseled by school officials; a second transgression earned disciplinary points; and a third offense could result in discipline. By way of comparison, if a student was more than one-minute late for class, the student received three points and a detention. Overall, progressive discipline was student-specific, based on the offender s prior record, not the victim s identity of history. On entering High School South, the epithets resurfaced. The abuse culminated in two physical attacks, prompting L.W. to withdraw from the District to attend another school at the District s expense. L.W. described his time as a student in the District as very upsetting. Prior to the harassment, family members described L.W. as a happy child who had become depressed, fearful and withdrawn since his mistreatment. L.W. s mother filed a complaint against the District with the Division of Civil Rights on her son s and her own behalf, claiming that L.W. was repeatedly subjected to harassment by his peers due to his perceived sexual orientation. The complaint alleged that the District s failure to take corrective action violated the LAD. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and a three-day hearing was held. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that a cause of action against a school district for student-on-student sexual harassment was not cognizable under the LAD. The ALJ opined that L.W. s claim should be governed by Title IX standards. Title IX prohibits sexual discrimination in any federally-funded educational program, permitting liability only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment. The Director of the Division of Civil Rights reviewed and rejected the ALJ s dismissal of the complaint, finding that the LAD recognized hostile environment claims against a school district. The Director adopted standards similar to those established in Lehmann, and concluded that a school district will be liable for such harassment where the school administrator or his agents knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take effective measures to stop it. The Director determined that, based on those principles, L.W. was entitled to recovery. The Director also ordered the District to revamp its policies and procedures regarding the prevention of peer sexual harassment. L.W. was awarded $50,000 in emotional distress damages, and his mother was awarded $10,000. The District was assessed a penalty of $10,000 and was required to pay L.W. s attorney fees. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the matter for further proceedings in conformity with its opinion. The panel found that an affectional or sexual orientation peer harassment claim against a school district can be brought under the LAD if the harassment rises to the level of a denial of the advantages, facilities or privileges of a public school. The panel further held that principles similar to those used to determine hostile work environment harassment under Lehmann govern student-on-student harassment allegations. The Appellate Division affirmed the $50,000 award but reversed the $10,000 awarded to L.W. s mother, finding that she was not an aggrieved person under the LAD. The Appellate Division also reversed the Director s order requiring adoption of remedial measures and remanded for reconsideration, finding that the record did not demonstrate a district-wide problem supporting district-wide remediation. One judge dissented from the majority s finding that the District failed to take effective remedial measures. The District s appeal of the ineffective remedial measures finding is before the Supreme Court as of right, based on the dissent in the Appellate Division. The Supreme Court granted the District s petition for certification concerning whether the LAD provides a cause of action for peer harassment and, if so, what standard of liability applies. Seven child advocacy and civil rights organizations filed a joint friend of the Court brief. HELD: The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination recognizes a cause of action against a school district for student-on-student affectional or sexual orientation harassment. A school district is liable for such harassment when the school district knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take actions reasonably calculated to end the mistreatment and offensive conduct. 1. The overarching goal of the LAD is to eradicate the cancer of discrimination. This Court has liberally construed the LAD to further the Legislature s broad remedial objectives. (Pp. 17-18) 2. Because of the LAD s plain language, its broad remedial goal, and the prevalent nature of peer sexual harassment, the Court concludes that the LAD permits a cause of action against a school district for student-on-student harassment based on an individual s perceived sexual orientation if the school district s failure to reasonably address that harassment has the effect of denying that student any of the school s accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges. A conclusion to the contrary would not square with the LAD s prohibition of discrimination in other settings, including the workplace. In addition, this holding furthers the Legislature s goal or eradicating invidious discrimination faced by students in our public schools. Isolated schoolyard insults or classroom taunts are not necessarily actionable. Rather, the aggrieved student must allege discriminatory conduct that would not have occurred but for the student s protected characteristic, that a reasonable student of the same age, maturity level, and protected characteristic would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive school environment that the school district failed to reasonably address. (Pp. 18-22) 3. The Court will depart from federal precedent if a rigid application of its standards is inappropriate under the circumstances. The Court rejects the Title IX deliberate indifference standard because the Lehmann standard should apply in the workplace and in the school setting. There is no need to impose a separate standard because the discrimination is in a school. Additionally, there are substantial differences in scope between the LAD and Title IX and Title IX standard is more burdensome than the LAD test. It would be unfair to impose a more onerous burden on aggrieved students than on aggrieved employees. (Pp. 22-27) 4. The LAD standard governing hostile work environment sexual harassment, as modified, comports best with the circumstances presented in this appeal. A contrary conclusion would be inapposite to the State s strong policy protecting students. In the school setting, the Lehmann standard requires that a school district may be found liable under the LAD for student-on-student sexual orientation harassment that creates a hostile education environment when the school district knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Because the Court does not create a strict-liability standard, the school district is not compelled to purge its schools of all peer harassment to avoid liability. Rather, schools are required to implement effective preventative and remedial measures to curb severe or pervasive discriminatory mistreatment. (Pp. 27-29) 5. The application of a modified Lehmann standard requires further guidance. Schools are different from workplaces; therefore, factfinders must determine the reasonableness of a school district s response to peer harassment in light of the totality of the circumstances. Only a fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis will suffice to determine whether a school district s conduct was reasonable in its efforts to end harassment. Where applicable, the triers of fact should consult DOE regulations, model policies, and other guidance that the agency provides. Factfinders must consider the cumulative effect of all student harassment and all efforts of the school district to curtail the conduct. Finally, expert evidence may be required to establish the reasonableness of the district s response. (Pp. 30-33) 6. Having established a standard by which a school district may be held liable under the LAD for student-on-student harassment and having provided guidance to future factfinders, this matter must be remanded to the Director of the Division of Civil Rights with the further direction that this matter be referred to the OAL to permit supplementation of the record, if requested by either party. (Pp. 33-36) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED. The matter is REMANDED to the Director of the Division on Civil Rights, with the direction that the case be referred to the Office of Administrative Law for proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI s opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 111 September Term 2005 L.W., A MINOR, BY HIS PARENT AND GUARDIAN, L.G., and L.G., INDIVIDUALLY, Complainants, v. TOMS RIVER REGIONAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent-Appellant. Argued November 13, 2006 Decided February 21, 2007 On appeal from and certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 381 N.J. Super. 465 (2005). Thomas E. Monahan argued the cause for appellant (Gilmore &amp; Monahan, attorneys; Michael J. Gilmore, on the briefs). James R. Michael, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for amici curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Association for Children of New Jersey, Education Law Center, Gay Lesbian and Straight Education Network of Northern New Jersey, National Conference for Community and Justice (NJ), New Jersey Family Voices, Roxbury Parents for Exceptional Children, and Statewide Parents Advocacy Network of New Jersey (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger &amp; Vecchione, attorneys; Emily B. Goldberg, on the letter in lieu of brief). CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we must determine whether a school district may be held liable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD or Act), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, when students harass another student because of his perceived sexual orientation and, if so, what standard of liability governs such a cause of action. In the fourth grade, classmates began taunting plaintiff L.W. with homosexual epithets such as gay, homo, and fag. The harassment increased in regularity and severity as L.W. advanced through school. In seventh grade, the bullying occurred daily and escalated to physical aggression and molestation. Within days of entering high school, the abuse culminated with a pair of physical attacks. Ultimately, L.W. s unease prompted him to withdraw from his local high school and enroll elsewhere, at the expense of his school district. Thereafter, on her son s behalf, L.W. s mother filed a complaint under the LAD, alleging that the Toms River Regional Schools Board of Education (District) failed to take corrective action in response to the harassment L.W. endured because of his perceived sexual orientation. The Director of the Division on Civil Rights (Director) held that the District was liable for the student-on-student harassment that L.W. repeatedly endured. The Appellate Division affirmed the Director s decision. Because the Act s broad statutory language is clear, we hold that the LAD recognizes a cause of action against a school district for student-on-student affectional or sexual orientation harassment. We also hold that a school district is liable for such harassment when the school district knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take actions reasonably calculated to end the mistreatment and offensive conduct. Our conclusion furthers the legislative intent of eradicating the scourge of discrimination not only from society, but also from our schools, thus encouraging school districts to take proactive steps to protect the children in their charge. [N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.] Pursuant to the LAD, it is unlawful [f]or any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation directly or indirectly to refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, or to discriminate against any person in the furnishing thereof on the basis of that person s affectional or sexual orientation. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f). Affectional or sexual orientation is defined by the Act as male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression, having a history thereof or being perceived, presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(hh). Further, place of public accommodation expressly includes any . . . primary and secondary school, . . . high school, . . . or any educational institution under the supervision of the State Board of Education, or the Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l). Application of the LAD to claims filed against school districts for student-on-student affectional or sexual orientation harassment will address a significant problem facing our State s educational system. In fact, our Legislature has confronted the negative impact of harassment, intimidation, and bullying in our schools. See N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 to -18 (enacting procedures to curb acts reasonably perceived as being motivated either by actual or perceived characteristic, such as . . . sexual orientation ). As the Legislature found, [A] safe and civil environment in school is necessary for students to learn and achieve high academic standards; harassment, intimidation or bullying, like other disruptive or violent behaviors, is conduct that disrupts both a student s ability to learn and a school s ability to educate its students in a safe environment. [N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.] Commentators underscore the insidious existence and detrimental effects of peer sexual harassment in our schools. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Oleksy, Comment, Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment: Preventing a National Problem on a Local Level, 32 Seton Hall L. Rev. 230, 230 (2001) ( Student-on-student sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in primary and secondary schools throughout our nation. ). The Legislature underscored the problem s severity when it criminalized bias intimidation. N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1. Although that statute is not implicated in this appeal, one who engages in the purposeful intimidation of another because of the victim s sexual orientation is guilty of, at minimum, a fourth degree offense. Id. (also listing race, color, religion, gender, handicap, or ethnicity as protected characteristics). Because of the Act s plain language, its broad remedial goal, and the prevalent nature of peer sexual harassment, we conclude that the LAD permits a cause of action against a school district for student-on-student harassment based on an individual s perceived sexual orientation if the school district s failure to reasonably address that harassment has the effect of denying to that student any of a school s accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f). A contrary conclusion would be incongruous with the LAD s prohibition of discrimination in other settings, including the workplace, because [t]he right of a student to achieve an education free from sexual harassment is certainly as important as the rights of an employee in a work setting. K.P. v. Corsey, 228 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550 (D.N.J. 2002), rev d on other grounds, 77 Fed. Appx. 611 (3d Cir. 2003). By recognizing a cause of action against school districts for failing to reasonably address peer-based, affectional orientation harassment, we further the Legislature s goal of eradicating the invidious discrimination faced by students in our public schools. We do not suggest, however, that isolated schoolyard insults or classroom taunts are actionable. Rather, in the educational context, to state a claim under the LAD, an aggrieved student must allege discriminatory conduct that would not have occurred but for the student s protected characteristic, that a reasonable student of the same age, maturity level, and protected characteristic would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive school environment, and that the school district failed to reasonably address such conduct. See Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 603-04 (enumerating standard for actionable hostile work environment sexual harassment). [Id. at 623 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).] The District, however, maintains that the applicable standard of liability should mirror the standard applied in Title IX actions -- the deliberate indifference standard. Davis, supra, 526 U.S. at 642-43, 119 S. Ct. at 1671, 143 L. Ed 2d at 853. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C.A. 1681(a). In Davis, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a private action for damages could be brought against a school board under Title IX in cases of student-on-student sexual harassment. 526 U.S. at 632, 119 S. Ct. at 1166, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 847. The Court held that such an action exists only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities . . . that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim s access to an educational opportunity or benefit. Id. at 633, 119 S. Ct. at 1166, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 847 (emphasis added). In rejecting a mere negligence standard and establishing that high bar to recovery, the Supreme Court noted that the claim at issue was an implied private right of action under a statute enacted pursuant to Congress authority under the Spending Clause. Id. at 639-40, 119 S. Ct. at 1669, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 851. Therefore, because legislation grounded in Congress s spending power is contractual in nature, damages are available only when the recipient of federal funds had adequate notice of its potential liability. Id. at 640, 119 S. Ct. at 1670, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 852. [Davis, supra, 526 U.S. at 651-52, 119 S. Ct. at 1675, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 859 (internal citations omitted).] Factfinders, therefore, must determine the reasonableness of a school district s response to peer harassment in light of the totality of the circumstances, that is, the constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a single recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201, 208 (1998) (concerning Title VII violation). Indeed, after the events at issue in this appeal, the Department of Education (DOE) established -- and regularly updates -- a model policy to direct school districts in the establishment and maintenance of policies prohibiting harassment, intimidation, and bullying in the educational arena. See N.J. Dept. of Educ., Model Policy and Guidance for Prohibiting Harassment, Intimidation and Bullying on School Property, at School-Sponsored Functions and on School Buses (revised 2006) http://www.state.nj.us/njded/parents/bully.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Model Policy]; see also N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 to -18 (requiring school districts to adopt policies prohibiting harassment based on actual or perceived characteristics, including sexual orientation). The DOE recognizes that decisions about consequences and actions to be taken in response to violations of policies prohibiting harassment, intimidation and bullying should take into consideration the unique circumstances of the acts and the persons involved, as well as the unique conditions and characteristics in each school district. [Model Policy, supra, at 1.] Illustratively, a reasonable response to name-calling among grade-schoolers may be inadequate to address violence among teenagers. The factfinder, therefore, should consider all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, the students ages, developmental and maturity levels; school culture and atmosphere; rareness or frequency of the conduct; duration of harassment; extent and severity of the conduct; whether violence was involved; history of harassment within the school district, the school, and among individual participants; effectiveness of the school district s response; whether the school district considered alternative responses; and swiftness of the school district s reaction. Only a fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis will suffice to determine whether a school district s conduct was reasonable in its efforts to end the harassment. Furthermore, in analyzing school district responses, where applicable, the triers of fact should consult DOE regulations, model policies, and other guidance that the agency provides. See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 6A:7-1.4(a) &amp; 6A:16-7.9(a)2; Model Policy, supra. With those and other considerations in mind, factfinders must consider the cumulative effect of all student harassment and all efforts of the school district to curtail the maltreatment. Agencies and courts reviewing the adequacy of a school district s response must avoid a cabined perspective that views incidents of harassment and responses to offensive conduct in isolation. Courts must bear[] in mind that each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the . . . environment created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes. Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 607 (quotation omitted). Finally, as conceded at oral argument, expert evidence may be required to establish the reasonableness of a school district s response to student-on-student harassment. Common sense will often signal the unreasonableness of inaction by a school district faced with systemic and persistent peer harassment. However, in the more typical dispute, the reasonableness of a school s response may not be apparent. In those more contentious circumstances, factfinders may be assisted by expert opinion regarding educational theories and principles, as well as the standards, policies, and procedures employed in the profession by similarly situated educators. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-111 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court L.W., A MINOR, BY HIS PARENT AND GUARDIAN, L.G., and L.G., INDIVIDUALLY, Complainants, v. TOMS RIVER REGIONAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent-Appellant. DECIDED February 21, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Zazzali CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY