Title: Williams v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-1080
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1080 
____________ 
 
RONALD WILLIAMS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 3, 2016] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Williams v. State, 125 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).  In its 
decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court 
certified to be of great public importance: 
Does section 775.087(2)(d)’s statement that “The court shall impose 
any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection 
consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any 
other felony offense” require consecutive sentences when the 
sentences arise from one criminal episode? 
 
 
 
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Id. at 880.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the 
Fourth District’s decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
 
On February 12, 2008, four men had just arrived home and were walking 
toward their apartment door when they heard Ronald Williams, who was in a 
neighbor’s driveway, calling out offensive words regarding their sexuality, 
including “faggot,” “punk,” and making other “homosexual gestures.”  The men 
exchanged words with Williams, then Williams “pulled a gun, pointed it at the 
men, and then fired the gun into the air multiple times, causing the men to run 
inside their home.”  Williams, 125 So. 3d at 880.  The men reported the incident to 
police, and Williams was arrested a short time later. 
 
“The [S]tate charged [Williams] by information with four counts of 
aggravated assault with a firearm, during the course of which [he] actually 
possessed and discharged a firearm.  The four counts corresponded with each of 
the four victims.”  Id. 
 
Williams admitted in a recorded statement to police that, during the 
exchange, he pulled out a gun and fired it in the air multiple times.  Williams 
explained that this incident was prompted because he was upset with the men and 
felt like the men were “flirting with him” and “giving [him] the eye” and when he 
 
 
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fired the gun he was just trying to “scare them” and let them know that they should 
not “stare at [him] like that.”  Williams also stated that he had been drinking earlier 
that day. 
 
The State initially offered Williams a plea deal of five years’ imprisonment 
with a mandatory minimum of three years.  He rejected this offer and responded 
affirmatively when asked by the trial court whether he understood that, if found 
guilty on all four counts, he would be sentenced to eighty years in prison because 
each count carried a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years.  
 
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Williams guilty on all counts.  
Id. at 881.  The jury specifically found that he had possessed and discharged the 
firearm on each of the aggravated assault counts.  Id.  At sentencing, the trial court 
acknowledged that under the “10-20-Life” statute, section 775.087(2)(a)2., Florida 
Statutes (2008), each count carried a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty 
years.  Id. at 881.  The State argued that the mandatory minimums were required to 
be imposed consecutively pursuant to section 775.087(2)(d), Florida Statutes 
(2008).  Id.  However, Williams argued that the trial court had the discretion to 
impose consecutive or concurrent sentences based on this Court’s decision in State 
v. Christian, 692 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1997), in which this Court stated that “[a]s a 
general rule, for offenses arising from a single episode, stacking is permissible 
where the violations of the mandatory minimum statutes cause injury to multiple 
 
 
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victims, or multiple injuries to one victim.”  Id. at 890-91 (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted).  In response, the State pointed out that section 775.087(2)(d) 
was enacted after this Court’s decision in Christian and expressly requires 
consecutive sentences.  Williams, 125 So. 3d at 881.  The trial court agreed with 
the State, and Williams was sentenced to four consecutive mandatory minimum 
twenty-year sentences.  Id.  Judge Joseph Marx noted that he “thought it was 
required and it’s mandatory to impose four consecutive twenty-year sentences 
pursuant to the statute” and if he “didn’t feel compelled to do it, [he] wouldn’t do 
it.”  Judge Marx also assured that he otherwise would not sentence Williams to 
eighty years on this case because the court has “first-degree murder cases that 
people get less than this.” 
 
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court, concluding that “the 
trial court was required to impose consecutive sentences” under section 
775.087(2)(d).  Id. at 882.  The Fourth District focused on the plain language of the 
statute and this Court’s interpretation of that language in State v. Sousa (Sousa II), 
903 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2005).  Id. at 882-84.  Accordingly, the Fourth District 
affirmed Williams’ sentences and certified the question of great public importance 
at issue here.  Id. at 884.   
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The present question for consideration is whether a trial court is required 
under section 775.087(2)(d) to impose consecutive minimum terms of 
imprisonment for multiple offenses when the offenses arise from a single criminal 
episode.  “Judicial interpretations of statutes are pure questions of law subject to de 
novo review.”  Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1310 (Fla. 2012).  Statutory 
interpretation in any case “begin[s] with the actual language used in the statute 
because legislative intent is determined first and foremost from the statute’s text.”  
Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013) 
(quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007)).  “When 
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious 
meaning.”  Bennett v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So. 3d 828, 837-38 (Fla. 
2011) (quoting Fla. Birth-Related Neuro. Injury Comp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Admin. 
Hearings, 29 So. 3d 992, 997 (Fla. 2010)).   
The 10-20-Life statute or section 775.087, Florida Statutes, is implicated 
when a defendant is convicted of any of the qualifying felonies enumerated in 
subsection (2).  § 775.087(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).  Paragraph (2)(a) sets forth the 
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment a trial court must impose when a 
 
 
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defendant possesses or uses a firearm during the commission of a qualifying 
felony.  In 1999, the Legislature added the following paragraph: 
It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually 
possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms 
or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and 
the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this 
subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for 
which the person is convicted.  The court shall impose any term of 
imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any 
other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. 
 
§ 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).   
 
As we have previously determined, this language is clear and unambiguous.  
See Sousa II, 903 So. 2d at 928 (“[N]or do we find the language of [section 
775.087(2)(d)] to be ambiguous.”).  As written, paragraph (2)(d) contemplates two 
distinct imprisonment terms: a term imposed for a qualifying felony pursuant to 
subsection (2), and a term imposed for a non-qualifying felony.  The last sentence 
of paragraph (2)(d) further delineates the manner in which these distinct 
imprisonment terms are to be served in relation to one another.  Specifically, it 
expressly mandates only that a qualifying felony sentence run “consecutively to” 
any sentence imposed for a non-qualifying felony.  Nothing within paragraph 
(2)(d)’s plain language also requires, as the State posits, a qualifying felony 
sentence to run consecutively to another qualifying felony sentence. 
 
Furthermore, at no point since its inception in the past sixteen years have we 
interpreted paragraph (2)(d) to mandate the imposition of consecutive sentences for 
 
 
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the qualifying felonies.  See Sousa II, 903 So. 2d at 927.  Rather, we have 
repeatedly deferred to the trial judge’s discretion wherever the Legislature has not 
explicitly subjugated it.  See State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1986).  
Before the statute was amended in 1999, this Court expressly addressed the issue 
of whether trial courts were legally permitted to impose consecutive mandatory 
minimum sentences for multiple firearm offenses that occurred during a single 
criminal episode.  Beginning with Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983), we 
opined that it was not the Legislature’s intention for a defendant to serve 
consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentences for possessing a firearm 
while robbing multiple victims at the same time.  Id. at 3.  It was noted, however, 
that “[b]y this holding, we do not prohibit the imposition of multiple concurrent 
three-year minimum mandatory sentences upon conviction of separate offenses 
included under subsection 775.087(2).”  Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
We later refused to extend Palmer’s prohibition against consecutive 
sentencing to cases in which the defendant shoots at multiple victims, based upon 
our belief “that the legislature intended that the trial court have discretion to 
impose consecutively or concurrently the mandatory minimum time to be served.”  
Thomas, 487 So. 2d at 1044.  In Thomas, for example, Thomas shot a woman 
numerous times and also shot at the woman’s son during the same encounter.  
Because the record presented evidence of “two separate and distinct offenses 
 
 
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involving two separate and distinct victims,” we upheld the three-year mandatory 
minimum sentences imposed consecutively against Thomas.  Id.  Similarly, 
Christian involved a defendant who shot two people in the midst of a bar brawl.  
We explained that “[t]he injuries bifurcate the crimes for stacking purposes.  The 
stacking of firearm mandatory minimum terms thus is permissible where the 
defendant shoots at multiple victims, and impermissible where the defendant does 
not fire the weapon.”  Christian, 692 So. 2d at 890-91 (footnotes omitted).  
Accordingly, we upheld the concurrent sentences for Christian’s convictions—
including second-degree murder with a firearm, aggravated battery with a firearm, 
and discharging a firearm in an occupied building—as well as the three-year 
mandatory minimum sentences imposed consecutively for the first two offenses.  
Id. at 891. 
After the 10-20-Life law’s 1999 amendment, this Court assessed what 
impact the addition of paragraph (2)(d) had on trial judges’ sentencing authority 
under the statute.  In Sousa II, 
[t]he Second District Court of Appeal reversed the sentence, holding 
that section 775.087(2)(d) did not “provide the legislative 
authorization necessary to require consecutive sentencing” for the 
mandatory minimum terms of [Sousa’s] sentences.  Sousa[ v. State, 
868 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)].  This Court accepted 
jurisdiction based upon express and direct conflict with State v. 
Christian, 692 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1997), a decision holding that a trial 
court did have the authority to impose consecutive mandatory 
minimum sentences where a gun was fired at and injured multiple 
victims. 
 
 
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Sousa II, 903 So. 2d at 924.  Thus, the only question before this Court was whether 
it was legally permissible for trial judges to impose consecutive sentences under 
the current 10-20-Life law.  In unanimously reviving our previous interpretations 
of the statute, we stated: 
We disagree [with the Third District’s holding in Mondesir v. 
State, 814 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002),] that section 775.087 as 
amended still does not permit consecutive sentences.  To draw that 
conclusion we would have to find that the 1999 amendment to section 
775.087 overrules our decisions in Christian and Thomas.  We do not 
agree.  Rather we conclude that this amendment to the statute is 
consistent with the decisions in Christian and Thomas. 
 
Id. at 927.  Thus, we concluded that paragraph (2)(d) did not attenuate trial judges’ 
authority to impose consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for firearm 
offenses. 
 
This controlling precedent establishes the following points of law for 
purposes of sentencing under the current 10-20-Life statute.  Generally, 
consecutive sentencing of mandatory minimum imprisonment terms for multiple 
firearm offenses is impermissible if the offenses arose from the same criminal 
episode and a firearm was merely possessed but not discharged.  See id. at 925; 
Palmer, 438 So. 2d at 4; see also Perreault v. State, 853 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2003) (“It has long been held that the Legislature did not intend for minimum 
mandatory terms to run consecutive to each other when the firearm offenses all 
occurred during the same criminal episode.  This precedent predates the ‘10-20-
 
 
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Life Law’ in section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002).”) (citing Palmer, 438 
So. 2d 1).  It follows, therefore, that a trial court must impose the mandatory 
minimum sentences concurrently under such circumstances. 
If, however, multiple firearm offenses are committed contemporaneously, 
during which time multiple victims are shot at, then consecutive sentencing is 
permissible but not mandatory.  See Sousa II, 903 So. 2d at 925-26; Christian, 692 
So. 2d at 890-91; Thomas, 487 So. 2d at 1044-45; see also Valentin v. State, 963 
So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“[T]he imposition of consecutive 
minimum mandatory sentences under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1997), 
is improper where the offenses occurred during a single criminal episode unless the 
defendant discharges the firearm and injures multiple victims or causes multiple 
injuries to one victim.”).  In other words, a trial judge has discretion to order the 
mandatory minimum sentences to run consecutively, but may impose the sentences 
concurrently. 
These principles are consistent with our reading of paragraph (2)(d)’s plain 
language as discussed above.  They also dovetail with sentencing judges’ 
traditional discretionary function of determining whether multiple sentences 
arising from the same criminal episode are to be served concurrently or 
consecutively.  See Brooke v. State, 128 So. 814, 816 (Fla. 1930) (“The court fixes 
the penalty and the law fixes the beginning and expiration, unless more than one 
 
 
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imprisonment sentence is passed upon the same defendant, in which case the trial 
court may provide that the period of imprisonment may run concurrently or 
consecutively.”) (citing Wallace v. State, 26 So. 713, 725 (Fla. 1899) (“[U]nder the 
discretion vested in the judges in this state as to the duration of terms of 
imprisonment to be fixed by them upon convictions for felonies, and in accordance 
with common-law principles, and the manifest intention of our criminal laws to 
punish separately each offense committed against them, in all criminal convictions, 
where the sentence is to a term of imprisonment, the court can, in its discretion, fix 
the term so that it will begin at the expiration of a former sentence.”)); McCarthur 
v. State, 766 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“[T]he trial court still has the 
discretion to run the sentence either concurrently or consecutively to any future 
punishment for the [control-release] violation.”) (citing Scantling v. State, 711 So. 
2d 524, 524 (Fla. 1998)); see also § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“Whoever, in 
the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which 
constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and 
adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and 
the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or 
consecutively.”); Borges v. State, 394 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) 
(“[I]t is clear that Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1977), does not alter the 
traditional discretionary function of the trial court in deciding whether to 
 
 
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adjudicate a defendant or, once adjudicated, whether the sentences are to be served 
concurrently or consecutively.”).  As such, we hold that, under the plain language 
of section 775.087(2)(d), consecutive mandatory minimum sentences are not 
required, but are permissible, if the sentences arise from a single criminal episode.   
Both our dissenting colleague Justice Polston and the State maintain that the 
Legislature’s use of the mandatory term “shall” is indicative of its intent to require 
consecutive sentencing.  Dissenting op. at __.  This limited reading of paragraph 
(2)(d)’s plain language improperly disregards other vital words within the 
provision.  Indeed, if this limited reading were correct, the Legislature would have 
omitted the restrictive clause applying to nonqualifying felony sentences.  In other 
words, the Legislature would have only stated, “The court shall impose any term of 
imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively” and would not have 
included the phrase, “to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other 
felony offense.”  The dissent and the State give no effect to this essential and 
unambiguous language.  Following their argument would not give all of the plain 
language full effect and would render part of the 10-20-Life statute meaningless.  
This we cannot and will not do.  See Bennett, 71 So. 3d at 838 (“[W]hen a court 
interprets a statute, ‘it must give full effect to all statutory provisions.  Courts 
should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.’ ” (quoting 
Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 185 (Fla. 2010))). 
 
 
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The dissent and the State also justify a reading of paragraph (2)(d) that 
mandates consecutive sentencing of mandatory minimum imprisonment terms by 
highlighting the Legislature’s expressed intent to punish offenders who possess or 
use firearms to the fullest extent of the law.  Dissenting op. at __.  However, such a 
blanket requirement would yield unconscionably excessive imprisonment terms in 
many cases.  See Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez, 
74 So. 3d 1070, 1079 (Fla. 2011) (“We have held that [s]tatutes, as a rule, will not 
be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.”) (citation omitted); V.K.E. v. State, 
934 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (Fla. 2006) (“We will deviate from a statute’s plain 
language when necessary to avoid an absurd result.  ‘[N]o literal interpretation 
should be given that lends to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.’ ” (quoting 
State v. Sullivan, 116 So. 255, 261 (Fla. 1928))). 
Assume, for example, a first-time offender enters a sold-out movie showing 
at a local theater, fires his pistol towards the ceiling, and exclaims to the audience, 
“Nobody move; this is a stick up!”  Also assume that a gang member with an 
extensive rap sheet engages in a shoving altercation with a gang rival in the theater 
parking lot before firing his pistol at and seriously injuring the rival.  The gang 
member then flees from responding law enforcement officers but is apprehended 
several miles down the road.  If 200 observers were present during the theater 
robbery, then, under the 10-20-Life statute, the trial judge would be required to 
 
 
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sentence the theater shooter to a minimum imprisonment term of twenty years for 
each robbery count.  See §§ 775.087(2)(a), (d), Fla. Stat.  But, the interpretation the 
State asks this Court to adopt in this case would further require the trial judge to 
order those sentences to run consecutively.  As such, the theater shooter would be 
required to serve a minimum of 4,000 years in prison before becoming eligible for 
early release.  However, the shooter who injures the gang rival may serve a 
minimum of only thirty-five years’ imprisonment—twenty-five years for the 
aggravated battery followed by ten years for the escape, or vice versa.  See 
§ 775.087(2)(a), Fla. Stat. 
Such a result defies the plain and obvious meaning of the language of the 
statute.  Nowhere in the statute does the Legislature require such grossly 
disproportionate sentences.  Undeniably, the dissent’s and State’s positions would 
lead to a result that is arbitrary and capricious due to the application of a rule that 
essentially would prohibit a trial court from considering the circumstances unique 
to each defendant’s case.  This is particularly true in situations reminiscent of the 
above hypothetical.  It belies common sense that, applying the statute as the dissent 
and the State request, defendants who commit relatively harmless offenses must 
serve hundreds of years in prison while some of the worst offenders receive 
comparatively de minimus imprisonment terms for crimes that are far more 
heinous in nature—and especially for nearly killing another person.   
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative 
and quash the Fourth District’s decision in Williams.  We remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion.   
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in result. 
I agree with the majority that the decision on review should be quashed and 
the certified question answered in the negative. 
I would conclude that the reference to “any other felony offense” at the end 
of the final sentence of section 775.087(2)(d) is ambiguous.  The reading adopted 
by the dissent is one reasonable understanding of the statute.  Dissenting op. of 
Polston, J., at 16-18.  But it is also reasonable to understand that “any other felony 
offense” refers to a felony offense other than one subject to punishment under 
section 775.087(2).  This reading is reasonable because the final sentence of 
section 775.087(2)(d) suggests a dichotomy between “any term of imprisonment 
provided for in [section 775.087(2)]” and “other term[s] of imprisonment”—that 
is, terms of imprisonment not provided for in section 775.087(2). 
 
 
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The rule of lenity requires that when a statute is reasonably “susceptible of 
different constructions” the statute must “be construed most favorably to the 
accused.”  § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding 
that the statute required the imposition of consecutive sentences for each offense 
subject to sentencing under section 775.087(2). 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal that consecutive sentences 
are mandatory under the plain meaning of the statute and would answer the 
certified question in the affirmative.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
Section 775.087(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes, provides that a person who is 
convicted of committing, or attempting to commit, any of several enumerated 
felonies, including aggravated assault, and who, while committing the offense, 
discharged a firearm, “shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 
20 years.”  Additionally, section 775.087(2)(d) (emphasis added) provides that:  
It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually 
possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms 
or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and 
the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this 
subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for 
which the person is convicted.  The court shall impose any term of 
imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any 
other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. 
 
The plain language of section 775.087(2)(d) mandates consecutive 
sentencing.  The Legislature’s use of the mandatory term “shall,” coupled with the 
 
 
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fact that the provision contains no exceptions, is a clear indication that the 
Legislature intended to require consecutive mandatory minimum sentences even if 
the offenses arise from a single criminal episode.  See Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. 
State, 415 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (“[W]here ‘shall’ refers to some 
required action preceding a possible deprivation of a substantive right, or the 
imposition of a legislatively-intended penalty, or action to be taken for the public 
benefit, it is held to be mandatory.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Dunbar v. 
State, 89 So. 3d 901, 906 n.5 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that, because of the use of the 
word “shall” in section 775.087(2), a trial court has “no discretion . . . in deciding 
whether to impose mandatory minimum terms”). 
Furthermore, when the mandatory language of “shall” is considered along 
with section 775.087(2)(d)’s express statement of legislative intent—“that 
offenders who actually possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to 
use firearms or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law”—it 
clearly demonstrates that the Legislature intended for the mandatory minimums 
provided for in the 10-20-Life statute to be imposed consecutively so that the 
harshest penalty could be imposed on individuals who use firearms during the 
commission of certain crimes.   
Accordingly, I would hold that, under the plain language of section 
775.087(2)(d), consecutive mandatory minimum sentences are required even if the 
 
 
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sentences arise from a single criminal episode.  I would answer the certified 
question in the affirmative and approve the Fourth District’s decision.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D10-4237 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Jonathan Russell Kaplan of Richard G. Lubin, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Consiglia Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Mitchell Alan Egber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent