Title: Commonwealth v. Gamboa
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13063
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2022

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SJC-13063 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DARIUS GAMBOA. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 8, 2022. - July 20, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Identification.  Evidence, Identification, Relevancy 
and materiality, Polygraph test.  Practice, Criminal, 
Mistrial, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Renee P. Dupuis, J. 
 
 
 
Jennifer H. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following a jury trial, the defendant, Darius 
Gamboa, was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory 
of deliberate premeditation.1  He appeals, arguing that (1) the 
 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm while not at home or work, unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm, and two counts of intimidation of a witness. 
2 
 
judge improperly denied his motion for a mistrial, (2) the judge 
improperly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce testimony 
relating to polygraph evidence, (3) the judge improperly denied 
the defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction, and (4) 
this court should exercise its powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to grant the defendant relief.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence presented at trial, 
reserving certain details for later discussion. 
On the evening of July 6, 2012, Julio Barbosa (victim) was 
killed by a single gunshot outside a convenience store in New 
Bedford.  Shortly before he was killed, the defendant had driven 
to the convenience store with his father, Ryan Gamboa; after the 
two parked, they encountered the defendant's cousin Tyrell 
Gamboa nearby on the street, and Tyrell waited by the car while 
the defendant and Ryan walked toward the store.2,3 
Manuel Pina, a friend of Ryan's, "bumped into" Ryan on the 
way to the store, went toward the store with Ryan, and then 
stayed outside while Ryan entered the store alone.  At around 
 
 
2 Because the defendant, the defendant's father, and the 
defendant's cousin share the same surname, we refer to each by 
his first name. 
 
 
3 Tyrell was given a grant of immunity prior to testifying.  
At trial, Tyrell claimed to have trouble remembering the events 
surrounding the shooting.  The judge found that Tyrell was 
feigning memory loss and permitted much of Tyrell's grand jury 
testimony to be admitted substantively. 
3 
 
that same time, Pina saw the victim in front of the store.  The 
victim entered the store soon thereafter.  Pina also described 
passing another man standing by the convenience store, whom Pina 
described as "tall" with "brown skin, curly hair," and "a wider 
nose."4 
Meanwhile, inside the store, a store clerk witnessed Ryan 
and the victim get into an "aggressive" verbal argument.  
Moments later, the clerk saw the victim punch Ryan, and Ryan 
attempted to punch back.  The clerk watched as the two men ran 
out of the store, with Ryan following the victim.  What happened 
next was out of the clerk's vision, but he heard a loud crack. 
Pina, who was still outside the store, saw the victim and 
Ryan run out of the store at nearly the same time.  The two men 
ran past Pina, and Pina saw the victim fall and get back up.  
While watching the victim, Pina heard "fireworks or something" 
or a "pop" come from "behind the store" or "from like right 
around the corner."  Pina saw the victim "grab[] himself" and 
heard him say that he had been shot as he fell back to the 
ground. 
Another patron of the convenience store was sitting right 
outside when he saw two male figures near the store's entrance.  
 
 
4 Pina also testified that he recognized this man as the 
defendant.  As discussed infra, this statement should not have 
been admitted, and the trial judge forcefully instructed the 
jury to disregard it. 
4 
 
This witness saw Ryan "flip something," resembling a 
pocketknife, and then watched as the victim ran toward the 
street.5  Moments later, the witness saw a "flash" from the 
corner of the store, heard a "really loud noise," and then saw 
the victim "drop[]."  This witness testified that he saw a hand 
and something that "resembled a gun" "on the corner [outside] of 
the [convenience store]," the same place he saw the flash and 
heard the noise.  He also placed a man resembling the defendant 
outside of the store at the time of the shooting, describing a 
"tall, dark" man who was "a little bit on the heavyset side."  
He was able to point out the man in a still image from a 
surveillance video recording. 
Another eyewitness likewise reported seeing a man 
resembling the defendant walking back and forth outside the 
store.  This witness described the man as having a "big nose" 
 
 
5 At trial, the store clerk likewise testified that Ryan was 
wielding a knife when he chased after the victim.  However, on 
cross-examination, the store clerk confirmed that he originally 
had told the police that it was the victim who had carried a 
knife.  Even if the clerk's prior statement to the police were 
admissible for the truth of the matter -- there having been no 
objection to the admission of that statement by the Commonwealth 
-- the clerk's conflicting testimony would not change the 
outcome here. 
 
 
Although the defendant sought a manslaughter instruction 
and now challenges the trial judge's denial of his request, see 
infra, he did not request an instruction on defense of another, 
and the evidence -- even with the clerk's statement to the 
police -- would not have supported such an instruction. 
5 
 
and "carrying a white towel."  The surveillance video also 
depicted a man with a white towel outside the store.  When the 
police interviewed the defendant weeks later, he was carrying a 
towel or rag and told police that "he sweats a lot," "[s]o he 
uses a rag to wipe his face." 
Tyrell testified that he still was waiting by the car when 
he heard a "bang" come from the vicinity of the store.  A few 
minutes after the "bang," Tyrell saw the defendant and Ryan 
walking toward him.  Tyrell, Ryan, and the defendant then left 
the scene. 
 
Karissa Oliveira, the defendant's girlfriend, testified 
that she talked to the defendant the morning after the murder.  
The defendant told Oliveira that he was at the convenience store 
with Ryan the previous night.  According to Oliveira's grand 
jury testimony, which was admitted substantively,6 the defendant 
 
 
6 At trial, Oliveira's testimony was inconsistent with her 
sworn grand jury testimony.  Instead, she claimed that she 
testified falsely before the grand jury.  The trial judge 
allowed the grand jury testimony to be admitted substantively 
and as impeachment evidence under Mass. G. Evid. § 801 (d) (1) 
(2022). 
 
 
Evidence at trial showed that when Oliveira first testified 
before the grand jury, she provided the defendant with a false 
alibi.  After the defendant was arrested, Oliveira again was 
called before the grand jury, and prosecutors asked her to 
correct her prior testimony.  She refused to do so.  
Consequently, she was arrested for misleading the police.  A few 
days later, with her attorney present, Oliveira told law 
enforcement that she wanted to amend her grand jury testimony 
and then testified before the grand jury as recounted supra. 
6 
 
told Oliveira that he saw Ryan chase the victim, and that when 
the victim crossed the defendant's path, the defendant shot him 
one time. 
Police and firefighters responded to the scene after 
multiple 911 calls from bystanders and a "shots fired" dispatch.  
An ambulance arrived and transported the victim to St. Luke’s 
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. 
 
About a month after the shooting, the defendant voluntarily 
spoke to the New Bedford police.  The defendant was indicted the 
following month, and after a jury trial, he was convicted of 
murder in the first degree, among other charges.  See note 1, 
supra. 
Discussion.  1.  Motion for a mistrial.  The defendant 
first contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion 
for a mistrial.  We disagree.  The defendant had sought a 
mistrial after a witness, Pina, improperly testified about 
recognizing the defendant at the scene of the shooting, after 
 
 
 
As discussed in more detail infra, defense counsel's 
primary trial strategy was to cast doubt on the credibility of 
the Commonwealth's witnesses by suggesting that the witnesses 
had been coerced into making certain statements.  As part of 
this strategy, defense counsel emphasized this series of events, 
especially the fact that Oliveira was in custody during her 
interviews with police, to suggest that Oliveira's amended grand 
jury testimony was untrue and the result of police pressure. 
7 
 
the defendant's motion to suppress Pina's identification of the 
defendant previously had been allowed. 
"We review the decision to deny a motion for a mistrial for 
an abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 
739 (2019).  "Where a party seeks a mistrial in response to the 
jury's exposure to inadmissible evidence, the judge may 
correctly rely on curative instructions as an adequate means to 
correct any error and to remedy any prejudice to the defendant" 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Id. at 740.  Accordingly, 
although Pina's testimony constituted inadmissible evidence, 
given the judge's extensive and emphatic curative measures, we 
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
 
There is no question that Pina's testimony positively 
identifying the defendant was inadmissible.  Pina previously had 
told investigators that he saw a man, whom he did not know, 
outside the convenience store at the time of the shooting.  Pina 
had then identified this man as the defendant in a photographic 
array prepared by police.  Prior to trial, the defendant 
successfully had moved to suppress this identification based on 
infirmities in the process by which police prepared the array 
and obtained the identification.  However, at trial, when the 
Commonwealth sought to elicit a description of the man Pina had 
seen outside the store, Pina testified that the man's name was 
8 
 
"Darius" (i.e., the defendant's first name).7  The defense 
objected immediately and moved for a mistrial. 
 
Despite the clearly improper testimony, the judge did not 
abuse her discretion in denying the mistrial motion.  First, the 
judge provided timely and forceful curative instructions to the 
jury.  After a brief sidebar conversation, and before any other 
evidence was presented, the judge told the jury: 
"Jurors, with respect to the last statement made by this 
witness, you are to completely strike that.  It's stricken 
from the testimony.  If you wrote any notes along those 
lines, cross it out.  It is to be stricken from your minds 
as best as you are able. 
 
"I cannot emphasize that instruction to you enough.  The 
statement just made by this witness is completely contrary 
to any other statement he gave prior to coming into this 
courtroom, so completely strike it from your minds." 
 
Thus, not only did the judge instruct the jury to disregard 
Pina's improper testimony, but she also made clear that this 
testimony was inconsistent with all Pina's prior statements.  
Second, we presume that jurors follow curative instructions, see 
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 392 (2015), and here 
the trial judge noted for the record that she saw several jurors 
crossing out writing in their notebooks during her instructions.  
Third, the judge spoke to Pina after Pina's testimony 
identifying the defendant, with the Commonwealth and defense 
 
 
7 The judge accepted the Commonwealth's representation that 
Pina's improper testimony "was a complete surprise." 
9 
 
counsel present, instructing Pina not to identify the defendant 
again.  While speaking with Pina, the judge determined that Pina 
had learned the name "Darius" from the court paperwork.  Fourth, 
based on this information, the judge encouraged defense counsel 
to elicit testimony from Pina that he did not recognize the man 
at the time of the shooting and had called him "Darius" at trial 
based only on subsequent court paperwork.  Defense counsel did 
so.  Fifth, defense counsel read to the jury a stipulation that 
stated:  "Manuel Pina was shown a photo array and did not make 
an identification of Darius Gamboa when the photo array 
contained a photograph of Darius Gamboa."  Given these timely, 
thoughtful, and extensive curative measures, the judge did not 
abuse her discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a 
mistrial. 
 
2.  Testimony relating to polygraph testing.  The defendant 
next contends that there were three instances at trial in which 
admitted polygraph evidence constituted reversible error.  In 
particular, the defendant takes issue with (1) testimony from 
Oliveira about the fact that, when she was interviewed by the 
police, she was willing to undergo polygraph testing and was, in 
fact, connected to a polygraph; (2) testimony from Lieutenant 
David Domingos, a former police polygraph examiner, about 
polygraph testing generally and specifically as it was used in 
the instant case; and (3) a video recording of the interview 
10 
 
between Oliveira and Domingos, during which Oliveira was 
connected to a polygraph.  We disagree and conclude that in no 
instance did the admission of the contested evidence constitute 
reversible error.8 
 
Based on our existing case law, we reason that evidence 
that relies solely on the supposition that polygraph tests are 
reliable for its relevance or significance is inadmissible 
polygraph evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 
88 (2002); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 201 (1989); 
Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 267-270 (1963).  Evidence 
that refers to polygraph testing but is admitted for a purpose 
that does not depend on the reliability of polygraph tests is 
not inadmissible polygraph evidence but rather evidence that 
merely refers to polygraph testing.  See Commonwealth v. 
Corcione, 364 Mass. 611, 620 (1974) ("this court has not held 
that otherwise admissible evidence must necessarily be excluded 
because it contains mention of lie detector test results").  
 
 
8 Defense counsel objected to some but not all of the 
evidence at issue here.  Thus, the defendant's argument involves 
preserved and unpreserved claims of error.  Where the claims are 
preserved, "we review for prejudicial error."  Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 580 n.14 (2019).  "An error is not 
prejudicial if it did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect" (quotation omitted).  Id., quoting Commonwealth 
v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 545 (2013).  Where the claims are 
unpreserved, "we review any error for a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Moffat, 486 Mass. 
193, 201 (2020).  The former standard of review is more 
favorable to the defendant than the latter. 
11 
 
Such evidence may, in certain circumstances, be admissible, 
assuming its probative value is not substantially outweighed by 
any risk of unfair prejudice.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2022).  
"The effectiveness of limiting instructions in minimizing the 
risk of unfair prejudice should be considered in balancing 
[unfair] prejudice and probative value."  Bryant, 482 Mass. at 
735 (judge did not abuse discretion in admitting evidence of 
defendant's prior bad acts where, among other things, judge 
instructed jury on limited purpose of evidence during jury 
charge).  Compare Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 781-
784 (2021) (despite graphic content, photographs properly were 
admitted where they were probative of "highly contested issue," 
and where judge twice instructed jury to consider photographs 
"dispassionately"); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 807 
(1990) ("Because the evidence admitted was highly probative on 
the issue of motive, and the chance of prejudice was minimized 
by a specific limiting instruction," evidence of victim's 
pregnancy was not admitted in error), with Commonwealth v. 
Denton, 477 Mass. 248, 252 (2017) ("the limiting instruction to 
the jury was insufficient to mitigate the error given the 
inherent dangers in admitting evidence of predisposition"); 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 59 n.3 (1993) (judge's 
limiting instruction "to consider each confession only against 
its maker" was clearly insufficient to protect codefendant's 
12 
 
rights, as held in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 
[1968]). 
 
This court first considered "[t]he question of the 
admissibility of the results of a 'lie-detector' test" in 
Fatalo, 346 Mass. at 267-270.  Based on the doubtful reliability 
of polygraph testing, given the scientific consensus at the 
time, we determined in that case that polygraph results were 
inadmissible.  Id. at 270.  Twenty-six years later, in Mendes, 
406 Mass. at 201, we reexamined "the admissibility of 
polygraphic evidence in criminal trials in this Commonwealth," 
"conclud[ing] that polygraphic evidence is inadmissible in 
criminal trials in this Commonwealth either as substantive proof 
of guilt or innocence or as corroboration or impeachment of 
testimony."  This holding was likewise based upon the lack of 
reliability of polygraph tests.  Id. at 208 ("there remains no 
consensus among experts as to the accuracy of polygraph testing 
to detect deceit"). 
Relying and expanding on Mendes, in Martinez, 437 Mass. at 
88, we held that "a defendant's offer to submit to a polygraph 
examination as evidence of consciousness of innocence is [also] 
not admissible."  Specifically, we determined that the trial 
judge correctly had excluded evidence of the defendant's 
willingness to undergo a polygraph examination when "[t]he 
defendant [had] sought to have the evidence admitted in order to 
13 
 
show his state of mind, a consciousness of innocence."  Id.  We 
reasoned that the defendant's offer to undergo a polygraph 
examination was "a self-serving act undertaken with no 
possibility of any risk," since the polygraph results themselves 
could not be "used in evidence whether favorable or 
unfavorable," so "any inference of innocence [based on the 
defendant's offer was] wholly unreliable."  Id.  As in Mendes, 
we determined that evidence was inadmissible polygraph evidence 
when the purpose for which the evidence was admitted depended on 
the supposition that polygraph tests were reliable.  
Specifically, our reasoning can be rearticulated as follows:  
the defendant's offer to undergo a polygraph test tended to show 
the defendant's consciousness of innocence only insofar as such 
an offer was meaningful; the offer was meaningful only insofar 
as the defendant would face consequences for making the offer 
under false pretenses; and the defendant would face such 
consequences only insofar as the results of the polygraph test 
itself were meaningful and admissible -- that is, reliable. 
 
The instant case differs importantly from Martinez.  During 
trial, defense counsel's primary strategy was to cast doubt on 
the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses by suggesting 
that the police had improperly coerced information from them.  
In his opening statement, for example, defense counsel stated:  
"I submit what you are going to hear is that information was 
14 
 
extracted from witnesses and that in that extraction process can 
you believe the finished product, can you believe what you are 
now being told is supposed to be the truth."  The circumstances 
in which witnesses, including Oliveira and Tyrell, had been 
interviewed by police was an area of focus for both the 
Commonwealth and defense counsel.9  As a result, the contested 
evidence here could have been offered for one or both of two 
different, relevant purposes:  either to show something about 
the internal experience of a witness (e.g., state of mind or 
truthfulness) or to show something about an external experience 
of a witness (e.g., conditions under which the witness was 
interviewed by police).  Although evidence that could be used 
solely for the former purpose would constitute per se 
inadmissible polygraph evidence, evidence that could be used at 
least for the latter purpose would not.  Where evidence can be 
 
 
9 In his brief, the defendant argues that Oliveira claimed 
that her mistreatment by law enforcement occurred exclusively 
during an interview with an assistant district attorney and 
that, consequently, "how one polygraph examiner subsequently 
treated Oliveira during a single interview was irrelevant to her 
claims of intimidation."  This argument misrepresents the trial 
record:  while Oliveira did testify specifically about purported 
mistreatment by an assistant district attorney, she also agreed 
with defense counsel that she had been misled by the polygraph 
examiner, and more broadly, defense counsel repeatedly argued 
that law enforcement coerced prosecution witnesses, such as 
Oliveira, throughout the entire investigation.  Thus, we 
consider the conditions under which Oliveira was "hooked up" to 
a polygraph machine to be extremely relevant to the claims made 
by defense counsel during trial. 
15 
 
for both purposes, such evidence would be admissible unless any 
risk of unfair prejudice -- arising from the fact that the 
evidence could be used for an impermissible purpose -- 
substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence -- 
arising from the use of the evidence for a relevant and 
permissible purpose.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403. 
 
After reviewing the three instances in which allegedly 
inadmissible polygraph evidence was admitted here, we determine 
that there was no reversible error.  Some of the contested 
evidence was relevant only as it related to a permissible 
purpose and was therefore properly admitted.  Some of the 
evidence was relevant as it related to both purposes -- only one 
of which was permissible -- but the probative value of that 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair 
prejudice, and so the evidence was likewise properly admitted.  
Finally, one piece of evidence was admitted in error, as the 
risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative 
value of the evidence, but we determine that this error was not 
prejudicial.  Accordingly, none of the instances to which the 
defendant takes issue merits granting a new trial. 
 
i.  Oliveira's testimony.  During the Commonwealth's direct 
examination, Oliveira stated that she had known at the time that 
she was to be administered a "lie detector test" and that she 
had been "hooked up" to a machine through "little circle things" 
16 
 
with wires.  She also testified that she had not been in pain as 
a result of being "hooked up" to the polygraph.10  During cross-
examination, defense counsel repeatedly emphasized that Oliveira 
had been "hooked up" to a polygraph and elicited from Oliveira 
the fact that although she believed she was being administered a 
polygraph test, no test had in fact been administered.  In 
response to this testimony, defense counsel asked Oliveira:  "So 
somebody once again was misleading somebody, right?"  Finally, 
on the Commonwealth's redirect examination, Oliveira testified 
that during her interview with Domingos, she had told him that 
she would tell the truth and had said to him, "[j]ust hook me up 
to the thing"; "I wouldn't be here if I didn't plan on being 
truthful to get myself out of trouble"; and "[h]ook me up to the 
thing if you think I'm lying." 
 
Oliveira's testimony during the Commonwealth's direct 
examination and the defense's cross-examination did not 
fundamentally rely on the supposition that polygraph tests are 
reliable and therefore was admissible.  The relevance of this 
testimony did not depend on whether Oliveira passed or failed 
 
 
10 Although the Commonwealth was the first party to refer 
explicitly to a "lie detector" or "polygraph" at trial, the 
Commonwealth did so with an innocuous question about Oliveira's 
comfort.  This question was clearly in response to defense 
counsel's repeated suggestions, including in his opening 
statement, that the police had improperly "extracted" 
information from witnesses. 
17 
 
the polygraph test, or whether the test itself was reliable or 
not; rather, Oliveira's testimony was relevant and meaningful 
because it described the circumstances of her police interview.  
This testimony provided the jury with insight into how she was 
treated by police, and on cross-examination, defense counsel 
utilized the fact that Oliveira was misled about the polygraph 
as a vivid example of her mistreatment at the hands of the 
police.  Consequently, we conclude that it properly was 
admitted. 
 
Even testimony referencing the use of a polygraph carries 
with it the risk of unfair prejudice.  Although we acknowledge 
that such testimony may be vital -- as it likely was here, given 
defense counsel's trial strategy -- we nevertheless caution 
against it generally.  Oliveira's testimony during her redirect 
examination -- which included the fact that Oliveira had told 
Domingos, "[j]ust hook me up to the thing"; "I wouldn't be here 
if I didn't plan on being truthful to get myself out of 
trouble"; and "[h]ook me up to the thing if you think I'm lying" 
-- exemplifies the problems inherent in testimony referencing 
polygraph testing:  Oliveira's testimony regarding her 
willingness to be "hooked up" to the machine could tend to show 
both the voluntariness of her encounter with police (i.e., a 
proper use of the testimony) and the truthfulness of her remarks 
to the police (i.e., an improper use of the testimony).  Here, 
18 
 
we must weigh the probative value related to the former against 
the risk of unfair prejudice stemming from the latter.  We 
determine that the risk of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh the significant probative value of the 
testimony and thus that the admission of the testimony was not 
in error. 
 
The probative value of the testimony indeed was 
significant.  The Commonwealth reasonably chose to rebut defense 
counsel's suggestion that the police had coerced witnesses.  
Defense counsel already had deployed the investigatory use of 
polygraph testing as part of a trial strategy to undermine 
prosecution witnesses by suggesting that witnesses had been 
coerced, rendering Oliveira's willingness -- even eagerness -- 
to undergo a polygraph examination relevant to a key contested 
issue at trial.  Defense counsel had also forcefully argued that 
Oliveira had been made to lie on behalf of law enforcement, 
rendering her contemporaneous declarations of truthfulness vital 
rebuttal evidence for the Commonwealth.  For example, during 
opening statement, defense counsel declared, "This case is going 
to hinge on credibility," and told the jury, "Ask yourselves 
after you have heard all of [Oliveira's] testimony whether or 
not you can put any stock in what it is that she has told you."  
During cross-examination of Oliveira, defense counsel insinuated 
that the police had coerced her into telling them not what she 
19 
 
believed to be true but rather what she believed they wanted to 
hear.  And during his closing statement, defense counsel said, 
"This whole case hinges on one person:  Karissa Oliveira.  You 
decide, folks, do you believe her or do you not believe 
her. . . .  [The police] were pressuring and manipulating and 
guiding her." 
 
Although Oliveira's redirect testimony presented a risk of 
unfair prejudice, as noted supra, we do not think this risk 
substantially outweighed the significant probative value of the 
testimony in the face of defense counsel's trial strategy.  The 
risk of unfair prejudice was mitigated by the fact that the jury 
already were aware, due to properly admitted evidence, that 
Oliveira had been connected to a polygraph machine during a 
voluntary encounter with the police.  However, the trial judge 
provided relevant limiting instructions multiple times as the 
trial progressed.  Although it would have been best had the 
trial judge given a contemporaneous instruction, we note that 
defense counsel did not ask for a limiting instruction at the 
time of Oliveira's testimony.  Later during the trial, the judge 
repeatedly provided the jury with cogent and compelling 
instructions limiting the usage of the evidence related to 
Oliveira's interview with Domingos and cautioning the jury about 
the unreliability of polygraph testing.  In addition to the 
limiting instructions given both during Domingos's testimony and 
20 
 
prior to the playing of the video recording, as discussed infra, 
the trial judge addressed Oliveira's testimony during her jury 
charge, telling the jury: 
"[T]he prosecution did not know whether Ms. Oliveira was 
telling the truth. . . .  Prosecutors, like the police, 
have no special methods of determining who is truthful or 
not.  The credibility of this witness, as with all 
witnesses, is a matter for you alone to decide.  The jury 
decides whether or not a witness is telling the truth in 
whole, in part, or not at all." 
 
We may consider all these subsequent instructions when weighing 
the risk of unfair prejudice stemming from Oliveira's testimony.  
See Bryant, 482 Mass. at 737 (considering judge's final jury 
charge when weighing probative value against risk of unfair 
prejudice).  Consequently, we conclude that, although it would 
have been better had the Commonwealth refrained from eliciting 
the testimony in a way that simultaneously could have bolstered 
Oliveira's credibility and had the trial judge provided 
contemporaneous limiting instructions, the admission of 
Oliveira's redirect testimony was not in error. 
 
ii.  Domingos's testimony.  Domingos's testimony, elicited 
by the Commonwealth on direct examination, contained (1) 
information about his training in polygraphy, (2) an explanation 
of the process involved in administering polygraph tests, (3) 
statements that Oliveira had been willing to undergo a polygraph 
test and had believed she would do well, and (4) a statement 
that Tyrell had been willing to undergo a polygraph test.  Of 
21 
 
note, after Domingos had testified as to his training and 
general process, but before he offered the relevant testimony 
about Oliveira, the judge provided the following limiting 
instruction to the jury: 
"Jurors, before the witness goes any further with the 
testimony, I would like to make it very clear to you that 
the question that [the Commonwealth] is now going to put 
the witness about the conversation between this witness and 
Ms. Oliveira, you're not to consider that conversation 
between Ms. Oliveira and Lieutenant Domingos for the truth 
of anything that was contained in the conversation.  You're 
only to consider the evidence that will be elicited by [the 
Commonwealth] from Lieutenant Domingos about the 
conversation as it bears on how the statement of Ms. 
Oliveira was made." 
 
Defense counsel did not cross-examine Domingos. 
 
 
Domingos's testimony about polygraphy generally, as well as 
the limited testimony about his background, did not constitute 
inadmissible polygraph evidence.  He never testified as to 
whether he considered Oliveira to be telling the truth.  
Accordingly, his testimony regarding his expertise could not 
have been used to bolster the credibility of his assessment of 
Oliveira's truthfulness -- he never offered such an assessment 
or an assessment of the accuracy of polygraph testing.  Instead, 
Domingos's training in and knowledge of polygraphy was relevant 
only as it related to the circumstances in which he interviewed 
Oliveira.11  For example, he testified as to the importance of 
 
 
11 We note that some subset of Domingos's general testimony 
about polygraphy was not relevant; therefore, it was admitted in 
22 
 
maintaining a "calm" environment when administering a polygraph 
test, offering some rebuttal to defense counsel's assertion that 
Oliveira had been coerced or threatened in her interactions with 
the police.  The purpose of this part of Domingos's testimony 
did not require any supposition about the reliability of 
polygraph testing, and so it was not inadmissible polygraph 
evidence. 
 
Likewise, the admission of Domingos's testimony about 
Oliveira's willingness to undergo a polygraph test and her 
assertions of truthfulness did not constitute error.  For the 
reasons discussed in relation to Oliveira's own testimony, this 
testimony had significant probative value, and any risk of 
unfair prejudice was mitigated by the instructions offered by 
the trial judge immediately prior to this testimony and repeated 
throughout the trial, limiting the use of this testimony to 
showing the context in which Oliveira's statements were made and 
the conduct of the police. 
 
error.  For example, he testified as to how polygraph machines 
work at a mechanical and physiological level.  This testimony 
was not "of consequence in determining the action" and should 
not have been admitted.  Mass. G. Evid. § 401.  However, as 
discussed supra, this piece of Domingos's testimony had no 
bearing on his or Oliveira's credibility and was in no way 
premised on the supposition that polygraph tests are reliable.  
Consequently, although it was admitted in error, the error was 
harmless. 
23 
 
 
Finally, the admission of Domingos's testimony about 
Tyrell's willingness to undergo a polygraph test did not 
constitute prejudicial error.12  The Commonwealth concedes that 
this testimony should not have been admitted at trial under 
Martinez, 437 Mass. at 88.  However, we conclude that no 
prejudice inured to the defendant, as this admission would not 
have influenced the jury or would have had but very slight 
effect.  Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 580 n.14 (2019).  
The Commonwealth did not refer to Tyrell's willingness to 
undergo a polygraph test in its closing argument, and the trial 
judge later instructed the jury on the unreliability of 
polygraph tests.  Moreover, Tyrell's testimony, which could have 
been bolstered by his willingness to undergo a polygraph test, 
was already corroborated by multiple other witnesses.  Tyrell's 
testimony served to place the defendant at the scene; this 
testimony was cumulative of the testimony of at least two 
eyewitnesses who described a man resembling the defendant 
outside the convenience store, and of Oliveira, who testified 
that the defendant told her that he had been there. 
 
iii.  Video recording of Oliveira's interview.  Finally, 
the jury were shown a video recording of Oliveira's interview, 
during which she was "hooked up" to a polygraph and interviewed 
 
 
12 Defense counsel timely objected to this testimony from 
Domingos. 
24 
 
by Domingos.  As it relates to polygraph testing, the video 
recording was largely cumulative of Oliveira's and Domingos's 
testimony about the circumstances surrounding Oliveira's 
interview with the police.  For example, Oliveira could be heard 
making statements indicating her willingness to undergo a 
polygraph and asserting that she would be truthful.  For the 
reasons discussed supra, we determine that this recording had 
significant permissible probative value, as it tended to show 
the manner in which Oliveira was treated by the police.  
Mitigating the risk of unfair prejudice, the trial judge 
provided a strong limiting instruction to the jury immediately 
prior to playing the video, telling the jury: 
"The Commonwealth at this point is offering the recording 
of the interview between Lieutenant Domingos and Karissa 
Oliveira for a limited purpose.  I have very particular and 
very important instructions regarding how you may use this 
evidence. 
 
"As an initial matter, polygraph examinations are not 
admissible at trial in the courts of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.  Our Supreme Judicial Court has deemed the 
science underlying polygraph procedures is too unreliable 
to be admissible in court. . . .  The Commonwealth is now 
offering the recording of the interview on the limited 
issue of the manner in which the interview was conducted 
and the interactions between Lieutenant Domingos and Ms. 
Oliveira. 
 
"You are not to consider the statements that are made 
during the course of this interview either by Ms. Oliveira 
or by Lieutenant Domingos for the truth contained in those 
statements.  You may only consider the recording as it 
bears on your determination of the circumstances under 
which the statements by Ms. Oliveira were made and on 
whether the police used coercive or bullying tactics to 
25 
 
obtain that statement.  Your consideration must be limited 
to that one issue and that one issue, alone, and nothing 
else. . . ." 
 
In addition, the judge reminded the jury of these instructions 
during her jury charge.  Given the forceful limiting 
instructions from the trial judge, as well as the fact that the 
jury were already properly made aware of Oliveira's willingness 
to undergo polygraph testing, we conclude that the admission of 
the video was not in error on the grounds that the video was 
inadmissible polygraph evidence. 
 
The defendant offers a second argument regarding the 
video's inadmissibility, contending that the admission of the 
video constituted error because it contained inadmissible 
hearsay and statements revealing prior bad acts by the 
defendant.  We note, first and foremost, that the video was not 
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the jury was 
instructed as such.  By definition, no improper hearsay was 
introduced through the admission of the video.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801 (2022) (hearsay is out-of-court statement that "a 
party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement").  Furthermore, we reason that the 
probative value of the video was not outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice related to the defendant's prior bad acts.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 404 (b) (2).  See also Commonwealth v. Crayton, 
470 Mass. 228, 249 & n.27 (2014) (where admitted substantively, 
26 
 
"'other bad acts' evidence is inadmissible where its probative 
value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant, even if not substantially outweighed by that risk").  
As discussed supra, the video allowed the jury to assess the 
conditions under which Oliveira spoke to police -- a contested 
issue that went to the heart of defense counsel's primary trial 
strategy.  The video's probative value was significant.  The 
risk of unfair prejudice from the defendant's prior bad acts, 
however, was not.  The defendant takes issue with recorded 
statements that the defendant illegally possessed marijuana, 
that the defendant asked Oliveira to lie for him about the 
marijuana, and that Oliveira's parents disliked the defendant.  
Defense counsel had already elicited testimony from Oliveira 
about her arrest for possession of marijuana and the fact that 
she was with the defendant at the time; likewise, Oliveira had 
already testified that the defendant had asked her to provide 
him a false alibi and that her parents became upset with her 
continued involvement with him. 
 
The defendant lastly argues that the video contained 
prejudicial remarks from the police to Oliveira.  The defendant 
objects to remarks from Domingos to Oliveira that she "seem[ed] 
like a nice girl," "seem[ed] like a normal kid growing up," that 
he knew what kind of person she was, and that she was "very 
brave."  Although these remarks would constitute inadmissible 
27 
 
opinion testimony if offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, they were not so offered here, and the judge gave 
limiting instructions to that effect.  Given these instructions, 
we again reason that any risk of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh the probative value of these remarks:  
the police's treatment of Oliveira -- which includes the manner 
in which the police spoke to her -- was a significant and 
contested issue at trial, and the video was admitted precisely 
because it showed the conditions under which Oliveira interacted 
with the police. 
 
3.  Manslaughter instruction.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that the trial judge erred in denying his request for a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction.  We disagree. 
 
"A manslaughter instruction is required if the evidence, 
considered in the light most favorable to a defendant, would 
permit a verdict of manslaughter and not murder."  Commonwealth 
v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 422 (2019).  "Voluntary manslaughter is 
an unlawful killing arising not from malice, but from . . . 
sudden passion induced by reasonable provocation, sudden combat, 
or excessive force in self-defense."  Commonwealth v. Yat Fung 
Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 257 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 
446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006). 
 
The defendant's argument focuses on the first of these 
theories of voluntary manslaughter:  reasonable provocation.  
28 
 
"Reasonable provocation is provocation by the person killed 
. . . that would be likely to produce such a state of passion, 
anger, fear, fright, or nervous excitement in a reasonable 
person as would overwhelm his capacity for reflection or 
restraint and did actually produce such a state of mind in the 
defendant."  Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 156 (2021).  
That is, "[a] jury instruction on reasonable provocation is 
warranted only if there is sufficient evidence 'to create a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of a rational jury that a 
defendant's actions were both objectively and subjectively 
reasonable.'"  Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. at 257, quoting Brea, 
supra. 
 
"[I]t is well established that the provocation must 'come 
from the victim' and [crucially, in the instant case] be 
directed at the defendant."  Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. at 258, 
quoting Commonwealth v. LeClair, 445 Mass. 734, 741-743 (2006).   
We have held, for example, that there can be no reasonable 
provocation as a matter of law where "[n]o threatening action 
was directed toward the defendant," and "[a]t most, [the 
defendant] witnessed a casual acquaintance being punched before 
[the defendant] joined in and fired."  Brea, 488 Mass. at 156-
157.  Likewise, we have concluded that there was no reasonable 
provocation -- although the defendant had witnessed the victim 
assault a third party and had himself been attacked by the 
29 
 
victim's associates -- because "there was no evidence that the 
victim had directly threatened or assaulted the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 809-810 (2000). 
 
Here, too, there is no evidence that any of the victim's 
actions were directed at the defendant.  Indeed, even the 
defendant's argument about the existence of reasonable 
provocation centers on the altercation between Ryan and the 
victim; the defendant makes no claim that he himself was engaged 
with the victim at all.  Although we acknowledge the unique 
circumstance of witnessing an altercation involving one's own 
father, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
victim's conduct, even secondarily, was directed at the 
defendant.  Moreover, at the time the victim was shot, he was 
fleeing Ryan, who was chasing after him.  Where no threatening 
action had been directed at the defendant, and the defendant's 
father was in the process of chasing or even assaulting the 
victim, "no rational jury, considering the situation 
objectively, could have believed on this record that a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would be provoked 
to act as he did."  Brea, 488 Mass. at 156.  Consequently, the 
trial judge did not err in denying the defendant's request for 
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having conducted a 
careful review of the record, we decline to exercise our 
30 
 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or 
reduce the degree of guilt.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
13 The defendant has asked us to reduce the verdict in 
consideration of the fact that he was twenty years old at the 
time of the shooting, arguing that "the ever evolving science 
. . . supports that the [twenty] year old brain is still 
immature."  However, we have never held that a defendant over 
the age of eighteen could not be convicted of murder in the 
first degree, and the defendant has provided nothing on the 
record to support his scientific contentions.  See Commonwealth 
v. Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 154 (2022) (rejecting similar 
argument).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 756 (2020) 
("We . . . remand this case to the Superior Court for 
development of the record with regard to research on brain 
development after the age of seventeen.  This will allow us to 
come to an informed decision as to the constitutionality of 
sentencing young adults to life without the possibility of 
parole").