Title: ST. EX REL. HAGEN, ETC. v. Bismarck Tire Ctr.
Citation: 234 N.W.2d 224
Docket Number: 9127
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: October 6, 1975

234 N.W.2d 224 (1975) STATE of North Dakota ex rel. Orville HAGEN, Commissioner of Labor, for the Benefit of Donald HOPFAUF, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BISMARCK TIRE CENTER, INC., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. No. 9127. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 6, 1975. Richard P. Rausch, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. Robert P. Brady, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellee. PEDERSON, Judge. This is an appeal by defendant, Bismarck Tire Center, from a judgment by the Burleigh County Court with Increased Jurisdiction for the plaintiff, State of North Dakota ex rel. Orville Hagen, Commissioner of Labor, for the benefit of Donald Hopfauf. The judgment awarded Hopfauf $132.30 for vacation accrued but unused at the time of his voluntary termination of employment. We affirm the judgment. The parties submitted to the trial court an agreed statement of fact and a copy of defendant's vacation policy effective January 1, 1972. No testimony was taken. The trial court prepared a memorandum decision and made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment. *225 Hopfauf was employed by Bismarck Tire Center from March 22, 1971, to April 14, 1973. He knew of the vacation policy, which provided as follows: Hopfauf did not give thirty days' notice of intent to use his accrued vacation but demanded vacation pay after he terminated his employment. Bismarck Tire Center questions none of the findings of fact but challenges the trial court's conclusion that Hopfauf was entitled to vacation pay in lieu of vacation. Bismarck Tire Center argues that because Hopfauf voluntarily terminated his employment and failed to give the thirty-day notice to his employer, he is not entitled to vacation pay. To the extent that the Bismarck Tire Center's vacation policy became a part of the employment contract when drafted and announced to the employees, without any bargaining, it is in effect a "contract of adhesion."[1] In Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n. v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 497 (N.D.1974), we said: The contract provision on vacations as expressed in the vacation policy is read by Bismarck Tire Center as stating a condition precedent, to wit, requiring continuing employment and further requiring thirty days' advance notice. When we apply the rules from Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n. v. Nelson, supra, we construe this contract provision to mean that (1) vacation is in effect additional wages, (2) a vested right in vacation accrues to the employee as earned, and (3) it would be a forfeiture of vested rights to deprive an employee of accrued vacation. In the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 261, it is said: "Where it is doubtful whether words create a promise or an express condition, they are interpreted as creating a promise; * * *" Although we find no decision where this court has so held, the general rule is stated in 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 320, as follows: We hold that Hopfauf had a vested right in accrued, unused vacation; that he did not forfeit such right; and that the trial court properly awarded judgment in his favor. The judgment is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, SAND and VOGEL, JJ., concur. [1] The term "contract of adhesion" arising from French civil law and similarly used in international law, was suggested as an expressive term worthy of a place in our legal vocabulary in 33 Harvard L.Rev. 222 to describe contract provisions drafted by one party and merely "adhered" to, with little choice, by the other party. This court applied the term to insurance contracts in Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (1940), and to grain purchase contracts in Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n. v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 497 (N.D.1974). See also, 53 Colum.L.Rev. 1072 (1953), and 43 Colum.L. Rev. 629 (1943).