Title: City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1999AP000500
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2000

2000 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0500 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
City of Madison, a municipal corporation  
of Dane County, Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of  
the City of Madison,  
 
Intervenor-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations  
Commission, and IAFF Local 311,  
 
Respondents-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 22, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
C. William Foust 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the intervenor-petitioner there were briefs 
by Scott N. Herrick and Herrick, Kasdorf, Dymzarov & Twietmeyer, 
Madison, and oral argument by Scott N. Herrick. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, IAFF Local 311, 
there was a brief by John C. Talis and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, 
Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, Madison, and oral argument by 
2000 WI 39 
 
John C. Talis. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0500 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
City of Madison, a municipal corporation  
of Dane County, Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of  
the City of Madison,  
 
          Intervenor-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations  
Commission, and IAFF Local 311,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner, the Board of 
Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison (PFC), 
seeks review of a court of appeals order that denied the PFC's 
petition to intervene in an appeal.  City of Madison, Wisconsin 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n and IAFF Local 311, No. 
99-0500 (Ct. App. May 11, 1999)(order denying motion to 
intervene).  The court of appeals denied the PFC's petition to 
intervene, holding it could not grant the petition since the PFC 
failed to file a timely notice of appeal.  We reverse the court 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
 Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
2 
of appeals.  Under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 803.09 (1997-98),1 a non-
party to a circuit court action may intervene in an appeal 
brought by another party, even after the time for filing a 
notice of appeal has passed.  We remand this case to the court 
of appeals to determine whether it will grant the PFC's petition 
to intervene. 
I. 
¶2 
This case arises from an action relating to a Madison 
fire department employee who was removed from his position as 
Apparatus Engineer, after he had been promoted to that position 
less than a year before.2  The employee did not receive a hearing 
at the time of his removal by the Chief of the Madison Fire 
Department.   
¶3 
On December 15, 1995, IAFF Local 311 (the union) 
requested a hearing before the PFC.  The PFC is a board 
authorized by statute to hire, promote, and discipline police 
and fire department officers.  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(1)-(5).  The 
PFC refused to conduct a hearing at the union's request because 
in the PFC's opinion, the employee's promotion was not complete 
at the time of his removal, and therefore, the employee was not 
demoted.  Since the employee was not demoted, his removal from 
the position was not subject to a hearing under § 62.13, 
according to the PFC. 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 text unless otherwise noted.  
2 The employee was subject to a one-year probation period 
before the promotion became permanent.    
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
3 
¶4 
The union then filed a grievance with the city 
pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement.  The collective 
bargaining agreement states that grievances are subject to final 
and binding arbitration.3  When the grievance was not resolved, 
the union attempted to arbitrate.  The city would not arbitrate, 
however, and the union filed a complaint with the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission (WERC).  The complaint alleged 
that the city violated Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a)5 in refusing to 
arbitrate the grievance.  A WERC examiner determined that the 
grievance was arbitrable.  The city appealed WERC's decision to 
both the full Commission and the circuit court, but in both 
instances, the WERC decision was affirmed.4 
¶5 
On February 19, 1999, the city filed a notice of 
appeal with the court of appeals.  The PFC moved to intervene in 
the appeal on April 29, 1999, according to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.13.5  The court of appeals denied the petition to intervene, 
holding that 
 
                     
3 The PFC is not a party to the collective bargaining 
agreement.  
4 The PFC was not involved as a party in this litigation.  
5 While the PFC petitioned to intervene under Wis. Stat. § 
(Rule) 809.13, it recognized that the appellate intervention 
statute incorporates by reference Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 803.09, 
the general intervention statute.  The PFC argued that it could 
intervene as a matter of right under § (Rule) 803.09(1), but it 
also stated that its "analysis of WS 803.09(2) [permissive 
intervention] demonstrates that the factors identified in the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure to guide the Court's discretion 
would fully support intervention if they were to be applied."    
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
4 
[t]he time for filing a notice of appeal has expired. 
 In Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 341, 
347, 501 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993), this court held 
that it could not grant intervention to one aggrieved 
by the trial court's final order, who failed to file a 
timely notice of appeal. 
City of Madison, No. 99-0500 (Ct. App. May 11, 1999)(order 
denying motion to intervene). 
 
¶6 
This court granted the PFC's petition for review on 
September 28, 1999. 
II. 
¶7 
The issue in this case, whether a non-party can 
intervene in an appeal after the time for filing a notice of 
appeal has ended, requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.13.  We review a question of rule interpretation de novo.  
City of West Allis v. Sheedy, 211 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 564 N.W.2d 708 
(1997).  "The goal of rule interpretation, like that of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
enacting body."  Id.  We first examine the plain language of the 
statute.  Elections Board v. WMC, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 661, 597 
N.W.2d 721 (1999)(citations omitted).  If the language of the 
statute is capable of only one interpretation, we use that 
meaning.  Id. at 662.     
¶8 
We conclude that under the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.13, a non-party may intervene in an appeal 
after the time for filing a notice of appeal has ended.  Section 
809.13Interventionstates: 
 
A person not a party to an appeal may file in the 
court a petition to intervene in the appeal.  A party 
may file a response to the petition within seven (7) 
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
5 
days after service of the petition.  The court may 
grant 
the 
petition 
upon 
a 
showing 
that 
the 
petitioner's interest meets the requirements of s. 
803.09(1) or (2). 
This language clearly indicates that a non-party may intervene 
in an appeal, as long as the non-party meets the requirements of 
the general intervention statute, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 803.09.  
We therefore find guidance in cases interpreting § (Rule) 
803.09. 
¶9 
Citing Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 
341, 347, 501 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals 
held that the PFC failed to file a timely petition for 
intervention.  City of Madison, No. 99-0500 (Ct. App. May 11, 
1999)(order denying motion to intervene).  We disagree.  In 
Weina, the defendant, Lovdahl, and his insurer, Safeco, did not 
file a cross-claim against the other co-defendants in the 
action.  177 Wis. 2d at 344.  The circuit court granted the co-
defendants' motion for summary judgment, but denied Lovdahl and 
Safeco's summary judgment motion.  Id.  When the plaintiffs 
appealed the circuit court's decision, Lovdahl and Safeco 
attempted to intervene in the appeal, or alternatively, to file 
a non-party brief.  Id.  at 343-44.  The court of appeals held 
that either by intervening or by filing a non-party brief, the 
parties could circumvent the jurisdictional time limit for 
filing a notice of appeal.  Id. at 347 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.10(1)(b); La Crosse Trust Co. v. Bluske, 99 Wis. 2d 
427, 428, 299 N.W.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1980)).  As such, the court 
of appeals denied Lovdahl and Safeco's motions.  Id.   
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
6 
¶10 In this case, the PFC moved to intervene in the appeal 
on April 29, 1999, approximately two months after the city filed 
its notice of appeal.  The statutory time period to file a 
notice of appeal is 45 days where notice of the entry of 
judgment is given.  Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1); Weina, 177 Wis. 2d 
at 344-45.  While the PFC failed to intervene within the 
statutory time period to appeal, an intervenor such as the PFC 
does not have to file a motion to intervene within a statutorily 
set time period.  State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 
112 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 334 N.W.2d  252 (1983) (stating that 
"[t]here is no precise formula to determine whether a motion to 
intervene is timely").  Moreover, the movants at issue in Weina 
are distinguishable because they were parties to the circuit 
court action.  Here, the PFC was never a party at the circuit 
court level.  Therefore, we do not find the analysis in Weina 
helpful in this case. 
¶11 While there is little Wisconsin case law interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.13, the contours of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
803.096 are well defined.7  Subsection (1) of the statute relates 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.09 Intervention. 
(1) Upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action when the movant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and the movant 
is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant's ability to protect that interest, unless 
the movant's interest is adequately represented 
by existing parties. 
(2) Upon timely motion anyone may be permitted to 
intervene in an action when a movant's claim or 
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
7 
                                                                  
defense and the main action have a question of 
law or fact in common.  When a party to an action 
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any 
statute or executive order or rule administered 
by a federal or state governmental officer or 
agency or upon any regulation, order, rule, 
requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant 
to the statute or executive order, the officer or 
agency upon timely motion may be permitted to 
intervene in the action.  In exercising its 
discretion the court shall consider whether the 
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of 
the 
rights 
of the 
original 
parties. 
(3) A person desiring to intervene shall serve a 
motion to intervene upon the parties as provided 
in s. 801.14.  The motion shall state the grounds 
therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading 
setting forth the claim or defense for which 
intervention is sought.  The same procedure shall 
be followed when a statute gives a right to 
intervene. 
(4)  
7 Intervention is defined as "[t]he entry into a lawsuit by 
a third party who, despite not being named a party to the 
action, has a personal stake in the outcome."  Black's Law 
Dictionary, 826 (7th ed. 1999).  See also 2 Callaghan's 
Wisconsin Pleading and Practice § 13.39 (4th ed. 1996).  In 
Wisconsin, intervention is a product of statutory creation, not 
the common law.  White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 
247, 81 N.W.2d 725 (1957).  The history of intervention is worth 
noting: 
The word 'intervenor' is derived from the civil law, 
in which it signifies the process by which, when an 
action is pending between two parties, a third person 
is allowed to interpose for the assertion of some 
collateral, implicit or ulterior right adverse to that 
of either or both of the parties.  The intervener 
[sic] thus came in between (inter venire), and 
differed from one who was interpleaded, or brought in 
at the instance of a defendant, and from one who was 
impleaded, or joined at the plaintiff's instance. 
 
Wisconsin Pleading and Practice at § 13.39.   
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
8 
to intervention as a matter of right.8  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
803.09(1).  A movant must meet four requirements to intervene as 
a matter of right:  1)  the motion to intervene must be timely; 
2) the movant must claim an interest9 in the subject of the 
action; 3) "the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that 
interest;" and 4) the existing parties do not adequately 
represent the movant's interest.10  Armada Broad., Inc. v. Stirn, 
                     
8 A person may intervene as a matter of right when he or she 
needs to protect a right that would not otherwise be protected 
in the litigation.  White House Milk, 275 Wis. at 247.  Those 
individuals may intervene as a matter of right because they are 
necessary parties to the action.  Id.  Intervention as a matter 
of right may also be compared to "joinder of persons needed for 
just and complete adjudication" under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
803.03(1)(b)1, which states that a person shall be joined if 
their ability to protect their interests will be impaired in 
their absence from litigation.  See also Wisconsin Pleading and 
Practice at § 13.39 n.17. 
9 "The interest which entitles one to intervene in a suit 
between other parties must be an interest of such direct and 
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose 
by the direct operation of the judgment."  Lodge 78, Int'l Ass'n 
of Machinists v. Nickel, 20 Wis. 2d 42, 46, 121 N.W.2d 297 
(1963).  
10 A court's exercise of discretion is certainly involved in 
its decision on intervention.  While Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
803.09(1) pertains to intervention as a matter of right, we note 
that a court, in making the determination concerning a petition 
or motion to intervene, must necessarily weigh the evidence on 
these factors.  In Armada Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 
2d 463, 471, 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994), for instance, we stated that 
"[t]he question of timeliness is left to the discretion of the 
 . . . court."  Further, when determining whether permissive 
intervention is appropriate under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 803.09(2), 
the requirement concerning undue prejudice is to be determined 
by the court in an exercise of its discretion.  Id. at 471 n.2. 
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
9 
183 Wis. 2d 463, 471, 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994).  Subsection (2) 
relates to permissive intervention,11 and states that "in 
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the 
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of 
the rights of the original parties."  The court of appeals on 
remand must determine whether the PFC has the right to intervene 
in this appeal, or if the PFC may permissively intervene. 
III. 
 
¶12 We conclude that under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 803.09, a 
non-party to a circuit court action may intervene in an appeal 
brought by another party, even after the time for filing a 
notice of appeal has passed.  We therefore remand this case to 
the court of appeals to determine whether the PFC may intervene 
in the city's appeal.  In exercising its discretion based on the 
case law, the court of appeals will ascertain whether the PFC 
may intervene as a matter of right according to § (Rule) 
803.09(1), or permissively intervene according to § (Rule) 
803.09(2). 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
                     
11 While intervention as a matter of right requires a person 
to be necessary to the adjudication of the action, permissive 
intervention requires a person to be merely a proper party.  
White House Milk, 275 Wis. at 247.  It is within a court's 
discretion to decide whether a party may permissively intervene. 
 See id. at 248; Wisconsin Pleading and Practice, § 13.39 at 
n.15.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 803.04Permissive joinder of 
parties.  
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
10
 
No. 
99-0500 
 
 
1