Title: Moll v. Moll
Citation: 231 N.W.2d 769
Docket Number: 9095
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1975

231 N.W.2d 769 (1975) Margaret MOLL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joseph P. MOLL, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 9095. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 24, 1975. Nelson &amp; Eastman and Huseby &amp; Backes, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Tom Eastman, Fargo. Nilles, Hansen, Selbo, Magill &amp; Davies, Fargo, for defendant-appellee; argued by Donald Hansen, Fargo. *770 ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. This appeal arises out of proceedings initiated by the plaintiff, appellant, Margaret P. Moll, wherein she sought a decree of absolute divorce from the defendant, appellee, Joseph P. Moll. We shall hereafter refer to the parties as Margaret and Joseph. A counterclaim was filed by Joseph. The matter was brought to trial before the Cass County District Court on March 18, 1974, and tried without a jury. During the first day of trial the direct and cross-examination of Margaret was concluded, and defense counsel conducted his direct examination of Joseph. When the proceedings were resumed on the morning of March 19, 1974, Margaret's counsel, Mr. Huseby, moved for a continuance on the ground that Margaret was ill and therefore unable to attend the trial at that time. The motion was denied and the defendant was allowed to reopen his direct examination of Joseph. This questioning consisted essentially of inquiries related to the value of Joseph's contribution to two homes owned by the parties in Fargo, North Dakota. The examination of witnesses was subsequently accomplished, and the trial was concluded that day. Margaret then made a motion for a new trial. That motion was also denied. She now appeals from the order denying that motion. It is her contention on appeal that because of a temporary incapacity, she was entitled to a continuance during the trial of the action and that the refusal of the district court to grant the requested continuance constituted an abuse of legal discretion in that she was denied the right to confront the witnesses appearing against her and was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. She further contends that the court's actions constituted a denial of the due process of law as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution and the Due Process Clauses of Article V and Article XIV of the Constitution of the United States. The first issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the continuance. In response to that motion, the trial court made the following statement from the bench: We have said, as have many other appellate courts, that trial courts are clothed with a wide discretion in the matter of granting and denying motions for a continuance, and an order denying such a motion will be reversed on appeal only where it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling against the motion. In Re Smith's Estate, 69 N.D. 437, 288 N.W. 235 (1939); Madison Silos, Division of Martin Marietta Corp. v. Wassom, 215 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1974); Elm Creek State Bank v. Department of Banking, 191 Neb. 584, 216 N.W.2d 883 (1974). In this case the basis of the motion was Mrs. Moll's alleged illness. As we said in In Re Smith, supra, the trial court must pass upon the question of whether or not the fact of illness is established and in passing upon this question, it may take into consideration not only the showings made by the parties at the time of the motion, but also such facts and circumstances in connection with the case as may have come to its knowledge during the course of the whole proceeding. The trial judge was in a much better position to properly assess the situation than we are on appeal. As the trial judge indicated, no medical evidence of illness was presented to the court to substantiate the contention of Margaret's counsel that she was unable to attend the trial on March 19, 1974, because of illness. Rule 6(f) of the Rules of Court for the District Courts of the State of North Dakota provides: Neither the oral declarations of illness made by Margaret's attorney nor the statements made by Dr. Patterson comply with this rule. We think what the trial court said on October 15, 1974, at the time of the hearing of the motion for new trial is also significant. It is obvious from this statement that the court carefully considered both the motion for continuance and the motion for new trial and that something less than what the rule required would have been acceptable to the trial court. Margaret insists that her presence was essential and that had she been present, she would have been able to successfully rebut her husband's testimony relative to the value of his contribution in labor and material in the improvement of the houses owned by the parties. The trial court could have considered, however, that at the time her deposition was taken on March 14, 1974, she stated she did not know how much money her husband had contributed in improving the house and that while she stated on cross-examination at the trial that she then knew the amount of that contribution, the same was not pursued by her counsel. Margaret urges that parties have a right to be present at the trial of a civil action, and that the trial of this case in her absence was therefore improper. *773 In Jordan v. Butler, which has been cited by both parties, the Supreme Court of Nebraska said: Applying that rule, we find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for continuance in this case. We also conclude that the denial of the motion did not result in a denial of due process under the Constitution of the State of North Dakota or under the Constitution of the United States. The second issue raised by the appellant is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial. Since this motion was based upon the trial court's failure to grant the motion for the continuance, for the reasons given for affirming the trial court in that matter and for the additional reason that no affidavit was filed with the trial court at the time of the motion for new trial setting forth in detail what Margaret, as movant, would have specifically testified to had she been present in rebuttal (so that the trial court could have weighed the importance of her testimony); we conclude that the record does not disclose that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the order denying the motion for a new trial is affirmed. SAND, PAULSON, PEDERSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur.