Title: State v. Bradford
Citation: 250 So. 2d 375, 259 La. 381
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 1971

250 So. 2d 375 (1971) 259 La. 381 STATE of Louisiana v. Ethel C. BRADFORD. No. 51033. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 28, 1971. John P. Jordan and James D. Sparks, Jr., Monroe, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert W. Kostelka, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. HAMLIN, Justice. Defendant Ethel C. Bradford appeals from her conviction of the crime of manslaughter, LSA-R.S. 14:31, and her sentence to serve ten years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Presented for our consideration are five bills of exceptions reserved during the course of the proceedings. The Department of Welfare assigned foster children to the home of defendant. Among those assigned were the four Vonner children, Pamelia Marie, Michael Ray, Christopher, and Johnny Lee Alto; at the time of the commission of the instant offense, Pamelia and Michael were not living with defendant, having been transferred to homes of other parties. During the early afternoon of January 14, 1970, defendant and Johnny, five years of age, were at home alone, and the child was pronounced dead at approximately 6:22 P.M. *376 Counsel for defendant states in brief, "The testimony of the Ouachita Parish Coroner, Dr. J. W. Cummins, revealed that the child died from sub dural and extra dural hemotomas, and in addition there were abrasions and bruises throughout the child's body." (The testimony of the coroner is not attached to the bills of exceptions submitted for our consideration.) An indictment charging that defendant unlawfully killed Johnny Lee Alto Vonner was filed against her on January 22, 1970; she was tried by jury and found guilty by a verdict of nine to three. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to the testimony of Mrs. Faye Kelly as to events which took place on January 15, 1970. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to the testimony of Dr. Elaine Fichter, Pediatrician, with respect to her examination of Christopher Vonner on January 15, 1970. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to the testimony of Pamelia Marie Vonner with respect to corporal punishment she had received from the defendant. Mrs. Faye Kelly, a case worker for the Department of Welfare, State of Louisiana, testified that on January 15, 1970, she accompanied Christopher Vonner and Mrs. Melba Sandifer, a case worker for the Department of Welfare, to Dr. Fichter's office for the purpose of having Christopher physically examined. Mrs. Kelly stated: When asked what she observed or saw at the doctor's office, Mrs. Kelly testified, "When we got to the doctor's office, of course, the child was undressed for a complete physical and on both shoulders there were bruises about the shoulders which lookedthey were raised looking places and we could not tell from looking if they were done recently or if they were old bruises." She stated that extensive X-rays were made. Dr. Fichter testified that Christopher, a small six year old child, "* * * had a small bruise, tender swelling behind the left ear. He had an old abrasion, a healed injury along the right posterior rib cage. He had a fresh welt like swelling and inflammation across his left shoulder and left scapula and he also had a tender groiny injuration along the posterior aspect of the right arm." When questioned about X-rays, the doctor said: Dr. Fichter said that the child had had no apparent treatment and that, "He would have been put in a cast if he had been treated and he obviously was not put in a cast, not the rib, of course, but the arm." Defense counsel contends in this Court: "* * * Pamelia Vonner testified that she had lived with the defendant for about a year and nine months and had requested to be transferred away from defendant's home because she was being beaten. When asked by whom she was beaten, she said, "By Mrs. Ethel Bradford." In this Court, defense counsel submits: *378 Defense counsel argues: Defense counsel further argues: Defendant stood in a position of being "in loco parentis" to the victim. "The term `in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent, and a `person in loco parentis' may be defined as one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption." 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 71, p. 803. "A parent may inflict reasonable and moderate chastisement on his child for the punishment of faults or disobedience and the enforcement of parental authority." 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 7, p. 630. Defendant was charged with the manslaughter of Johnny Lee Alto Vonner, a child she could reasonably and moderately chastise for faults or disobedience and to whom she owed certain duties and responsibilities. "Manslaughter is: In order to convict in a manslaughter prosecution, the burden is upon the State to prove that the homicide was willful and felonious; evidence offered for this purpose is admissible even though it might indicate that defendant was actuated by malice. The jurisprudence to this effect is settled. State v. Walker, 204 La. 523, 15 So. 2d 874, 876 (1943). Cf. State v. Garner, 241 La. 275, 128 So. 2d 655. "* * * Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his child and confers the right to prescribe a course of reasonable conduct for its development, the parent has a wide discretion in the performance of his parental functions, but that discretion does not include the right wilfully to inflict personal injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline. No sound public policy would be subserved by extending it beyond those limits. * * *" Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955). Cf. *379 State v. Lutz, Ohio Com.Pl., 113 N.E.2d 757; Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648. The testimony, supra, was offered to prove that defendant employed a severe system of chastisement for the foster children entrusted to her care. The system of child beating was offered to show that defendant exceeded ordinary parental authority and rights. The testimony was not offered to prove guilt or innocence, but to prove a system of wrong doing. In State v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So. 2d 417, 421 (1966), a manslaughter prosecution, this Court stated: When the testimony supra was adduced, defense counsel had the right of cross-examination; the case was tried to a jury, and the jury had the right to believe or disbelieve the testimony. We conclude that the procedure resorted to by the State was permissible under our statutory law and jurisprudence. State v. Lawrence, 251 La. 1085, 208 So. 2d 685. We find that the testimony, supra, was admissible in evidence under LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 15:446[1] for the limited purposes, as stated supra, of showing system and intent. See, State v. Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So. 2d 370; State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433; State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640; State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So. 2d 473; State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So. 2d 490. The trial judge neither committed reversible error nor abused his discretion in admitting in evidence the testimony, supra; he followed the settled jurisprudence of this State. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved at the end of the State's presentation when the trial court overruled defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict. In State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969), this Court held that in cases tried to a jury Article 778, LSA-C. Cr.P., insofar as it provided for a directed verdict, was repugnant to the constitutional provision that, "The jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge." Art. XIX, Sec. 9, La.Const. of 1921. This holding was affirmed in State of Louisiana v. Williams, No. 258 La. 801, 248 So. 2d 295, decision handed down May 4, 1971, and the matter was set at rest. See, State of Louisiana v. Millsap, 258 La. 883, 248 So. 2d 324 decision handed down May 4, 1971. Defendant herein was tried by a jury and was therefore not entitled to a directed verdict. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's Motion for a New Trial. The Motion for a New Trial alleges, in part, errors assigned to the rulings of the trial judge which have been determined in the Bills of Exceptions discussed supra; they are without merit and require no further attention. The Motion for a New Trial also alleges the following: A hearing was held on the above quoted portion of the Motion for a New Trial. Counsel for the defendant took the stand and testified with respect to the above allegations. After hearing, the trial judge denied the motion and stated: Defense counsel urges in this Court that prejudicial error occurred, perhaps inadvertently, by allowing the jury to view the purported instrument allegedly used in the beating of the child, Johnny Lee Alto Vonner, and that such error is not harmless. He contends that the error was extremely prejudicial. Defense counsel has offered no definite proof that the jury saw the stick; he, as stated by the trial judge supra, was not aware of the presence of the stick until after verdict. Under such facts and circumstances, we cannot conclude that the jury saw the stick, and we do not find that the defendant suffered prejudice. We conclude that the ruling of the trial judge was correct, and that no reversible error was committed by him. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 is without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. BRAHAM, J., concurs. TATE, J., concurs in result. DIXON, Justice (dissenting). I must respectfully dissent. This court goes too far in admitting evidence of other offenses offered under color of proving "system" and "intent." Such evidence is admissible only when the offense charged is one of a system, or when guilty knowledge and intent is "an essential part of the inquiry." R.S. 15:446. The majority finds that the testimony of other offenses was not offered to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused, but "to prove a system of wrong doing." Evidence of other offenses is not admissible to prove that the defendant was engaged in a system of wrongdoing, and it is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a bad person. In addition, I cannot agree that Code of Criminal Procedure article 778 is unconstitutional in any respect. [1] "In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction." LSA-R.S. 15:445. "When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged." LSA-R.S. 15:446. [2] "The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to have been the case the motion shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is grounded. "The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever: "* * * "(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before the verdict or judgment; or "* * *" LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 851. "A motion for a new trial based on ground (4) of Article 851 shall contain allegations of fact sworn to by the defendant or his counsel, showing: "(1) The specific nature of the error or defect complained of; and "(2) That, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defense, the error or defect was not discovered before or during the trial." LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 855.