Title: State Board of Education v. Fasold
Citation: 445 P.2d 489
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 1968

445 P.2d 489 (1968)
STATE of Oregon, Acting by and through the State BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant,
v.
Jesse V. FASOLD, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted September 5, 1968.
Decided September 25, 1968.
*490 Gerard K. Drummond, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Rives &amp; Schwab and Herbert M. Schwab, Portland.
Peter S. Herman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., Salem.
Before PERRY, C.J., and McALLISTER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE and HOLMAN, JJ.
SLOAN, Justice.
The State Board of Education seeks declaratory determination of its power to adopt rules governing the common schools of the state. The Superintendent denies the board's authority and seeks a declaration that the Constitution of Oregon vests in him alone the full authority to administer the state common school system. The trial court held that Article VIII, § 1 of the Oregon Constitution vested the duty of supervision in the Superintendent of Public Instruction. We reverse.
The following admitted facts and issues presented are taken, substantially, from the Board's brief:
The Superintendent concedes that the legislature has the power to delegate the responsibility of fixing the number of pupils per teacher to an administrative agent. He insists, however, that because he is named in the constitution that he is the only person to whom the legislature can delegate such authority. The Superintendent cites several cases from other states which he claims support his contention. It is our view that the provisions of our constitution and the literally uncontrolled power of the legislature to provide for, regulate and administer the public school system dilutes the authority of decisions from other states.
It is apparent from the proceedings of the Oregon Constitutional Convention that the only reason a Superintendent of Public Instruction is mentioned in that document was for the purpose of saving money by merging the duties of that kind of an office with the office of governor. Carey, A History of the Oregon Constitution; Lewis, Education in the Oregon Constitutional Convention of 1857, 23-24 Oregon Historical Society Quarterly, 1922-23, p. 220. Mr. Lewis reports that there *492 was little dissent in the convention for the need of a state organized system of common school education with full authority and responsibility placed with the legislature. This power is a sovereign, plenary one, its only limitation being that it be uniformly exercised and that no special or local law can be passed respecting support for the common schools and for the preservation of school funds. Article IV, § 23, Oregon Constitution; Harris v. Burr, 1898, 32 Or. 348, 52 P. 17, 39 L.R.A. 768; Campbell et al v. Aldrich et al, 1938, 159 Or. 208, 79 P.2d 257; Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 1957, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797.[2] There is no intimation in the constitutional history or in the many decisions of this court sustaining the legislative authority relative to schools that the legislature is restricted in its choice of placing this delegated authority.
When we remember also that "The Legislature of this state is invested with legislative power to the fullest extent, except so far as limited expressly or by necessary implication in the Constitution of the state and of the United States, and in considering the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, the question is not as to the extent of the power that has been delegated by the people to the legislative assembly, but as to the extent of limitations the people have imposed upon such body."[3], then we find no doubt of the legislature's authority to create and empower the State Board of Education.
We conclude, therefore, that the constitutional creation of the title of Superintendent of Public Instruction is not a limitation or prohibition on the power of the legislature to create the Board of Education and that the Board had the authority to adopt and enforce the challenged rule.
Reversed.
[1]  The full text of Section 1 reads: "The Governor shall be superintendent of public instruction, and his powers and duties in that capacity shall be such as may be prescribed by law; but after the term of five years from the adoption of this constitution, it shall be competent for the legislative assembly to provide by law for the election of a superintendent, to provide for his compensation, and prescribe his powers and duties." 

Of greater significance, however, is Section 3 of Article VIII which provides:
"The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform and general system of common schools."
[2]  The rule expressed is common not only to Oregon but is uniformly followed. It was recently stated in Garber and Reutter, The Yearbook of School Law, 1967, The State and Educational Administration, p. 12:

"The legislature then is a free agent and may enact any law relating to education that it desires unless specifically prohibited from so doing by the constitution. In the exercise of its authority, it may create whatever educational machinery it wishes and delegate to the agencies it creates whatever powers it deems proper, within certain limitations to be noted later."
The limitations mentioned are unimportant to the decision in this case. For similar pronouncements see the Yearbooks of School Law for prior years.
[3]  State v. School District No. 3, 1915, 78 Or. 188, 192, 193, 152 P. 221, 222; The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Becker v. Board of Education of Benton County, 1965, 258 Iowa 277, 283, 138 N.W.2d 909, at 912, has concisely expressed this power of the state legislative assembly and the burden of one who challenges its acts as follows:

"The General Assembly has power to enact any legislation it sees fit provided it is not clearly and plainly prohibited by some constitutional provision. It is appellants' burden to negative every conceivable basis which may support this Act. * * *."