Title: State v. Reid
Citation: 204 Kan. 418, 463 P.2d 1020
Docket Number: 45,493
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 1970

204 Kan. 418 (1970)
463 P.2d 1020
THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
EULYSESS M. REID, Appellant.
No. 45,493

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 24, 1970.
John Matson of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
James Hernandez, Deputy County Attorney, argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Attorney General, Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, and David P. Calvert, Deputy County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FONTRON, J.:
The defendant was charged with second degree burglary and larceny. On January 25, 1968, he appeared before the district court of Sedgwick County, Kansas, with retained counsel, and entered a plea of guilty to both charges. He was thereupon sentenced to the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory for terms of five to ten years for burglary and one to five years on larceny, the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
On appeal the defendant contends the trial court erred in the following particulars: (1) Failing to ascertain adequately whether his plea was entered voluntarily and with understanding of its consequences; (2) failing to ascertain whether there was a factual basis for his plea of guilty; (3) accepting the plea and imposing sentence thereon when the crime was the subject of a controlling federal statute.
We shall consider the first two contentions together pausing first to observe, parenthetically, that Reid does not argue that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily or induced by improper means.
The record reflects that the following proceedings were had at the time of arraignment, plea and sentence:
"THE DEFENDANT: (Standing before the Court.)
"THE COURT: Is that your correct name?
*419 "THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And Mr. Watson is your attorney?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: You waive arraignment?
"THE COURT: How does your client desire to plead?
"How do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
"THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
"THE COURT: Pleading guilty because you are guilty?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: How old are you?
"THE DEFENDANT: Twenty-two.
"THE COURT: Twenty-two?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"MR. WATSON: There is none, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: From where?
"He doesn't want to go to Lansing.
"Is this an institutional parole?
"MR. WATSON: Institutional parole.
"THE COURT: From Hutchinson.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes."
Although the dialogue between the court on one hand, and the accused and his counsel on the other, was not as extended as some we have examined, and may be more cursory than we might commend, still we cannot say the brevity of the proceedings is so extreme as to impugn the validity of the defendant's plea of guilt. There are a number of reasons which compel this conclusion.
It is obvious that Mr. Reid was thoroughly advised as to the offenses with which he was charged and, when queried in detail about them, admitted the crimes. The court had every reason to believe that the defendant's personal plea of guilty was entered because he was, in fact, guilty. In other words there was a factual basis for the court's acceptance of the defendant's plea of guilty. In this respect the circumstances are quite similar to those found in Sharp v. State, 203 Kan. 937, 457 P.2d 14; Mathues v. State, 204 Kan. 204, 460 P.2d 545: and Griffin v. State, 204 Kan. 340, 461 P.2d 550.
While it is true the record reveals no advice by the court as to the effect and meaning of a guilty plea, or as to the defendant's right to trial by jury, the defendant was accompanied throughout the arraignment and sentencing procedures by his retained counsel. It is fair to presume that counsel, whose competency is not questioned, had adequately informed the defendant as to his legal rights and of the effect and consequences of a guilty plea. (Toland v. State, 200 Kan. 184, 186, 434 P.2d 814.)
It is significant, in this connection, that defense counsel expressly waived a jury trial on behalf of and without objection by his client. Moreover, at the time of allocution, when the court inquired if there was any legal reason why sentence should not be pronounced, defendant's counsel replied, with no remonstrance from his client, "There is none, Your Honor." In Walsh v. State, 195 Kan. 527, 407 P.2d 516, this court spoke in words we deem appropriate here:
The defendant was not exactly a novice in the area of criminal procedure when he appeared in court for arraignment. On at least one prior occasion he had pleaded guilty to identical charges and had been sentenced to the reformatory. Thus he must have been fully aware, from bitter personal experience, of the meaning of his guilty plea and of the consequences which would flow therefrom.
We do not suggest that the procedure followed in this case be adopted as a model for future use. Nonetheless we consider it sufficient, under the circumstances shown here, to guard against substantial prejudice to the defendant's legal rights.
The final point raised by the defendant, i.e., that error was committed in accepting his plea because of a controlling federal statute, is strictly without merit. We assume the statute to which the defendant refers is 18 U.S.C. § 659 which makes it a federal offense to steal from any railroad car any goods or chattels which are part of or which constitute an interstate shipment of freight, express or other property. This statute, however, contains the following specific provision:
We find no errors to the prejudice of the defendant's substantial rights and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.