Title: State v. Michael L. Veach
Citation: 2002 WI 110
Docket Number: 1998AP002387-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2002

2002 WI 110 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
98-2387-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Michael L. Veach,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 143 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 395, 630 N.W.2d 256 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waushara   
 
JUDGE: 
Lewis Murach   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and SYKES, JJ., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, JJ., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
2002 WI 110 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  98-2387-CR   
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 27) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael L. Veach,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant- 
          Cross Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals that reversed a judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Waushara County, Lewis R. Murach, Judge.  
State v. 
Veach, 2001 WI 
App 143, 
246 Wis. 2d 395, 630 
N.W.2d 256.  The circuit court had entered a judgment of 
conviction against Michael L. Veach on two counts of first-
degree sexual assault of a child.  The court of appeals reversed 
the convictions. 
¶2 
The two counts stemmed from allegations by a ten-year-
old girl, Rebecca L. (Becky), that Veach had sexually assaulted 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
2 
 
her on two separate occasions when she was seven years old.  
Both incidents allegedly occurred when Becky and her family were 
camping with Veach and his girlfriend.  Becky claimed that Veach 
had touched her vagina while the two were lying on a hammock, 
and touched her vagina and buttocks while they were spending the 
night in Veach's van.  Veach pleaded not guilty to each count 
and asserted that he had not touched Becky "inappropriately". 
¶3 
The State filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking 
the admission of other acts evidence of Veach's conviction for 
the 1983 sexual assault of his then nine-year-old daughter.  The 
circuit court granted the State's motion to admit the other acts 
evidence, over Veach's objection. 
¶4 
A jury found Veach guilty of both counts.  Veach then 
filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  He claimed that his trial counsel had failed to inform 
him of the possibility of a Wallerman1 stipulation, in which 
Veach would stipulate to certain elements of the crime of first-
degree sexual assault of a child, thereby preventing the State 
from introducing other acts evidence against him.  The circuit 
court denied Veach's motion. 
¶5 
Veach appealed, alleging that the other acts evidence 
was inadmissible, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  
Id. at ¶1.  The court of appeals reversed his conviction in a 
split-decision.  Id.  It determined that the other acts evidence 
                                                 
1 State v. Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158, 552 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
3 
 
was admissible but also determined that, pursuant to State v. 
DeKeyser, 221 Wis. 2d 435, 585 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), 
Veach's trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by not 
informing 
Veach 
that 
he 
could 
enter 
into 
a 
Wallerman 
stipulation.  Veach, 2001 WI App 143, ¶¶31, 41-42. 
¶6 
The State filed a petition for review, and Veach filed 
a cross-petition for review.  We granted both petitions. 
¶7 
The issues in this case concern the admission of other 
acts evidence, Wisconsin's "greater latitude" rule for admission 
of other acts evidence in cases involving children and sex 
crimes, stipulations to elements of crimes, and the standards 
for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶8 
More specifically, the issues are: (1) Did the circuit 
court erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting other 
acts evidence of Veach's sexual assault of his daughter? (2) May 
a defendant stipulate to certain elements of a crime or defenses 
to the crime, and if so, must the State and the circuit court 
accept the stipulation? (3) Does a defense counsel's failure to 
offer such a stipulation constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel? 
¶9 
We 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the other acts 
evidence 
in this 
case. 
 
Our determination 
is 
based on 
application of the three-part test for admission of other acts 
evidence established in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998), and the greater latitude rule, which was re-
affirmed by this court in State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 236 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
4 
 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606, and State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, 
236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629.  We determine that a defendant 
may offer to stipulate to elements of or defenses to crimes, but 
neither the State nor the circuit court is obligated to accept 
the stipulation offer.  Finally, we determine that a defense 
counsel who fails to offer to stipulate to an element or a 
defense in a criminal case has not necessarily provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In this case, Veach's trial 
counsel did not offer a stipulation, but the circuit judge 
stated at Veach's postconviction hearing that he would not have 
accepted a stipulation even if it had been offered.  We conclude 
that trial counsel's failure to offer such a stipulation, even 
if it constituted deficient performance, did not result in 
prejudice to Veach, and therefore did not render his counsel 
ineffective. 
¶10 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶11 Becky, the victim in this case, told Detective Curtis 
Olson of the Waushara County Sheriff's Department2 on January 27, 
1997 that a man named "Michael," later identified as Michael 
Veach,3 had touched her vagina and buttocks on two occasions a 
                                                 
2 Detective Olson interviewed Becky after he was informed of 
her allegations by the Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Department. 
3 Becky told Detective Olson that she thought the man who 
touched her was named Michel Holt, but clarified that she was 
referring to the boyfriend of her Godmother, Jeannie Holt. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
5 
 
few years earlier.4  Becky told Olson that Veach had touched her 
"butt," under her clothes, while they were in his van and had 
touched her "pee pee," under her clothes, when they were in a 
hammock. 
¶12 Detective Olson contacted Veach on February 2, 1997, 
and told him of the allegations.  That same day, Veach went to 
see Olson and voluntarily gave a statement.5  The exchange 
between Olson and Veach went in part, as follows: 
Olson:  Okay.  What, what's your side?  You know, what 
have you got to tell me about it? 
Veach:  It didn't happen.  I don't know what else to 
tell you, you know. 
Olson:  What about the time in the van?  She claims 
that you touched her in the van. 
Veach:  Oh, that was the night she stayed in the van 
because it was so cold and I told her that, I carried 
her to the bathroom, brought her back, got her wrapped 
back up in a sleeping bag, and she still said she was 
cold and I kinda rubbed her back and her legs and 
everything else through the sleeping bag trying to 
warm her up. 
Olson:  Okay.  So there's no, no other contact with 
her? 
Veach:  No other contact. 
Olson:  Okay.  You were both clothed at the time? 
                                                 
4 When asked 
when the 
touching occurred, 
Becky 
told 
Detective Olson: "Um I don't know cause that's so long ago when 
I was little."  She then stated that it occurred "I think when I 
was seven." 
5 The Waushara County Sheriff's Department recorded the 
statements made by Veach and by Becky.   
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
6 
 
Veach:  Completely. 
Olson:  There's another time that she is alleging that 
you, you touched her inappropriately.  Um, and that 
was the time in the hammock.  Um, what can you tell me 
about that? 
Veach:  I don't know.  They, I was swinging in the 
hammock, she wanted to get in with me.  There's other 
people around.  It just didn't happen. 
¶13 Veach was charged with two counts of sexual assault of 
a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1993-94),6 on May 
16, 1997.  The probable cause portion of the complaint referred 
to the statement Becky gave to Olson, as well as reports made by 
Dr. Marianne Niles of the Fond du Lac County Department of 
Community Programs.  The complaint indicated that Becky had told 
Dr. Niles about the incidents in the hammock and in the van.  
Becky stated that "Michael was lying in the hammock and that she 
had joined him in a reclined position; lying on top of him in a 
manner whereby they were facing the same direction and her back 
was against [his] stomach. . . . Michael had touched her with 
his hand, underneath her clothing in the area where she goes to 
the bathroom and which she refers to as her "bottom" and in 
particular the area on her front."7  Becky stated that "Michael 
rubbed this area with his hand, underneath her clothing in a 
back and forth fashion, but that he did not invade her vagina 
with his hand or fingers." 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1993-94 version unless otherwise indicated. 
7 Dr. Niles' report and Becky's testimony at trial made 
clear that Becky referred to her vaginal area as her "bottom" 
and her buttocks as her "butt." 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
7 
 
¶14 Dr. Niles' report further stated that Becky had told 
of a second incident, occurring when she and Veach were spending 
the night in Veach's van.  Becky said they left the van to go to 
the bathroom, and when they returned, she laid down on her 
stomach, and Veach "began rubbing her on her stomach, back, 
"bottom and butt."  According to the report, Becky asserted that 
Veach "rubbed her upon these areas inside of her clothing," but 
that he did not "invade any part of her body." 
¶15 The State filed a motion in limine seeking the 
admission of other acts evidence; it also filed a notice of 
intent to offer admissions made by Veach.  It sought to present 
evidence relating to Veach's 1988 conviction for first-degree 
sexual assault, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1) (1985-86).  
The 1988 conviction stemmed from allegations by Veach's daughter 
that he had sexually assaulted her in 1983, when she was nine 
years old and Veach was living with her and her mother.  Veach's 
daughter told Detective Christ Tzakais of the Fond du Lac County 
Sheriff's Department about two incidents in great detail.  The 
first incident involved Veach allegedly removing his clothes and 
his daughter's clothes, licking her breasts, laying on top of 
her and attempting to insert his penis into her vagina, rubbing 
her vagina and buttocks, and then ejaculating onto her stomach.  
The other incident involved Veach's asking his daughter to put 
his penis into her mouth.  The daughter said she refused, but 
that he "stuck his penis into [her] mouth" and ejaculated.  She 
alleged that Veach had sexual contact with her on six or seven 
other occasions. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
8 
 
¶16 Veach gave a statement to Detective Tzakais in which 
he admitted virtually all his daughter's allegations regarding 
the first incident.  He did not specifically deny the other 
incidents but told Tzakais that he only remembered the first 
incident.  He acknowledged, however, that the other incidents 
could have occurred.  Veach then pled guilty to one count of 
first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to one year in the 
county jail, along with a five-year term of probation. 
¶17 For the present case, the State wanted to present the 
statement given by Veach's daughter as well as the statement 
subsequently given by Veach.  The circuit court, Judge Lewis B. 
Murach, held a hearing to decide the State's motions.  At the 
hearing, the State argued that the other acts evidence and 
Veach's admission to the 1983 sexual assault would be relevant 
to Veach's intent or motive to touch Becky's vagina and buttocks 
for the purpose of sexual gratification and to whether Veach's 
touching of prohibited body parts was intentional or was a 
mistake. 
¶18 Veach's trial counsel objected to the admission of the 
other acts evidence on the grounds that it had no probative 
value, did not fit within the other acts evidence exceptions, 
and was unfairly prejudicial. 
¶19 The court granted the State's motion, finding that the 
evidence was relevant to show that "this was not an accident, 
this was not a mistake.  That it goes to show that the contact 
that 
occurred 
was 
intentional 
contact, 
not 
unintentional 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
9 
 
contact.  That it was for a particular motive, i.e. sexual 
gratification and not for other matters." 
¶20 The court found that the other acts evidence was 
"extremely prejudicial to the defendant" but also "considerably 
probative."  It concluded that the evidence "bears upon the 
matter to be litigated and decided by the jury" and was not 
unfairly prejudicial.  The court decided to allow admission of 
the evidence. 
¶21 Immediately 
before 
trial, 
the 
district 
attorney 
informed the court, the defendant, and defense counsel that he 
intended to offer a certified copy of the judgment of conviction 
from Fond du Lac County, the testimony of the detective who took 
the statement from Veach in 1987, and the substance of the 
statements from Veach.  He also stated that Veach's daughter was 
unable to testify. 
¶22 Defense counsel objected, arguing that he would not 
have an opportunity to cross-examine Veach's daughter.  The 
court allowed admission of the other acts evidence, restating 
its previous ruling that the evidence was admissible "not just 
for impeachment, but rather to prove motive, plan, intent, and 
all the various matters that go into the elements of the 
offense. 
¶23 At trial, the jury heard testimony from Becky, who 
testified that when she was seven years old, on a night in July, 
1994, Veach had touched her at the campground where her family 
and Veach and his girlfriend often camped.  Becky said that 
Veach was in the hammock on his back, "just laying there 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
10 
 
rocking."  She testified that Veach asked her to get into the 
hammock with him.  She said she laid down on Veach's stomach 
(her back on his front), and then he touched her with his right 
hand.  She claimed that he put his hand inside her shorts and 
underwear and rubbed her vaginal area "back and forth," for 
about "a minute."  Becky testified that Veach did not threaten 
or hurt her, and that he did not try to insert his finger into 
her vagina. 
¶24 Becky further testified that Veach touched her again 
in August of the same year.  With her mother's permission, she 
and Veach were sleeping in Veach's van because of cold weather.  
Veach awoke and asked her if she had to go to the bathroom.  She 
did, so Veach carried her to the bathroom.  When they returned 
to the van, she got into her sleeping bag, zipped it up, and 
laid down on her stomach. 
¶25 Becky claimed that Veach "unzippered" her sleeping bag 
down to her knee, and while lying next to her on the floor on 
his stomach, began to touch her back underneath her shirt.  She 
said that he then rubbed her "butt" for about a minute on both 
cheeks, inside her clothes, and then rubbed her stomach, by 
putting his hand underneath her.  Then he began to rub Becky's 
vaginal area with his fingertips, rubbing back and forth.  She 
again testified that Veach did not threaten or hurt her and did 
not try to insert his finger into her vagina. 
¶26 Detective Olson testified about the interview in which 
Veach told him "he brought [Becky] back to the van from the 
bathroom and wrapped her up in a sleeping bag and then she was 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
11 
 
cold and he rubbed her back and legs and everything else through 
the sleeping bag." 
¶27 Detective Tzakais testified about the other acts 
evidence, Veach's 1983 sexual assault of his daughter.  He 
summarized his report of the incident, stating of Veach that: 
about six months prior to him leaving the household, 
he 
recalls 
his 
first 
sexual 
contact 
with 
[his 
daughter].  He was able to describe that for me in 
great detail.  He took her clothes off.  He laid on 
top of her.  He ejaculated.  He sucked her breasts and 
he felt bad about the matter.  He also indicated——I 
asked him if he could recall another incident where 
[his daughter] described him having her give him a 
blow job and he indicated he did not recall that.  
However, he indicated that it could have happened.  He 
also was confronted and asked if he recalled the other 
six incidents that—— 
¶28 At this point, defense counsel objected.  He stated 
"My objection would go to the fact that we are also going to 
introduce a judgment of conviction which shows one conviction 
and not a series of events."  The court overruled the objection. 
¶29 The district attorney continued questioning Tzakais, 
who eventually stated: 
I asked him if there were six other incidents and he 
indicated that he didn't recall them.  However, they 
in fact could have happened and the fact that the 
incident he described was the first incident and there 
was six months after that incident before he left the 
home because he was having sexual contact with [his 
daughter] was my concern. 
¶30 At the close of Tsakais' testimony, the State rested.  
Veach then testified that Detective Tsakais' testimony regarding 
Veach's admission to the first incident with his daughter was 
correct.  He further said that he had left his wife and family 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
12 
 
"Because of what I had done to my daughter, I was feeling real 
guilty about it."  Veach said that he admitted what he had done 
to his daughter and pled guilty.  Conversely, he denied Becky's 
allegations, "Basically because I didn't do it.  I just didn't 
do it." 
¶31 Defense counsel then specifically asked Veach about 
the alleged incidents in the hammock and the van.  Veach 
acknowledged that Becky had been in the hammock with him "quite 
often," but he denied that he ever used the hammock at night, 
the time of day when the assault purportedly occurred. 
¶32 Veach acknowledged that he remembered the time Becky 
slept in his van, and said:  
I put her in the van and she crawled into her 
sleeping bag and she told me she was cold and wanted 
to know if she could cuddle up next to me.  I told her 
no.  I did offer to rub her arms and back and tried to 
warm her up that way. 
When defense counsel asked if he had rubbed her arms and back 
through the sleeping bag, Veach responded: "Through the sleeping 
bag."  He again denied touching Becky inappropriately in any 
fashion. 
¶33 Veach also acknowledged that he had been convicted of 
one crime, the sexual assault of his daughter, but he asserted 
that he had touched a child inappropriately only that one time.  
When asked directly if he ever touched Becky inappropriately, he 
repeated: "No, I did not." 
¶34 On cross-examination, Veach denied that Becky had ever 
laid on top of him in the hammock, but acknowledged spending the 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
13 
 
night with her in the van.  When the district attorney asked if 
he was treating Becky in a fatherly way when he rubbed her back 
in the van, Veach responded: "Yes."  The district attorney asked 
Veach about the rubbing in the van, inquiring about what Veach 
meant when he said he rubbed Becky's back and legs and 
"everything else."  Veach responded: "Everything else, I meant 
her arms and her back."  When the question was essentially 
repeated, Veach responded: "Her leg or arm or feet, you 
know. . . ."  
¶35 The district attorney then turned the questioning 
towards Veach's sexual assault of his daughter. 
District attorney: Do you recall you told us that you 
told Detective Tzakais about everything you did with 
your daughter[]. 
Veach: Correct. 
District attorney: You admitted that about six months 
before you left the house there was an incident that 
started everything, is that true? 
¶36 In response to direct questioning about "the incident 
that started everything," Veach acknowledged that while in his 
daughter's bedroom, he took off his clothes, and his daughter's 
clothes, and then touched his daughter inappropriately.  The 
district attorney asked: "What do you mean by that.  Did you rub 
her back and rub her legs?"  Veach replied that he had not, that 
he touched his daughter "on her bottom."  He explained that by 
bottom, he meant "both sides," her vagina and her buttocks.  He 
acknowledged that he was aroused by touching his daughter, that 
he got an erection and that he ejaculated on his daughter's 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
14 
 
naked stomach.  He denied, however, that he was thinking about 
the incident with his daughter when he was in the van with 
Becky. 
¶37 The district attorney continued questioning Veach: 
District attorney: Now you told us, Mr. Veach, that 
you think that you admitted all your wrongdoings 
before? 
Veach: I have. 
District 
attorney: Do 
you recall 
when 
Detective 
Tzakais was interviewing you and you told him you only 
remembered one incident? 
Veach: That's all there was. 
District attorney: Do you remember when he asked you 
about the fact your daughter [] said it happened at 
least six or seven times? 
Veach: Yes. 
District attorney: Your response to him was you didn't 
recall but it could have happened, is that correct? 
Veach: It could have been. 
District attorney: And also when he asked about an 
incident where your daughter [] came home when she was 
nine years old and you took her into the bedroom and 
had her take her clothes off and had her suck on your 
penis.  You don't recall that but that could have 
happened? 
Veach: No. 
District attorney: Do you remember telling Detective 
Tzakais it could have happened but you don't remember 
it? 
Veach: I could have. 
 . . . . 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
15 
 
District attorney: Mr. Veach, could you tell us what 
your definition of being in a fatherly way [is], the 
terminology you used when you talked to Detective 
Olson? 
Veach: Very concerned for the child's well being. 
District attorney: Were you acting in a fatherly way 
when you had your nine year old daughter take her 
clothes off? 
Veach: No. 
District attorney: Were you acting in a fatherly way 
when you rubbed her vagina and butt and when you came 
on her chest? 
Veach: No. 
District attorney: And you are telling me you were 
acting in a fatherly way when you were in the van and 
rubbing Becky's back and legs and everything else, is 
that what you are telling us? 
Veach: Through[] the sleeping bag, yes. 
¶38 At this point the State finished questioning Veach, 
and the defense rested. 
¶39 At the close of trial, the jury found Veach guilty of 
two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child.  The court 
later sentenced him to 10 years in prison on the first count, 
for the touching in the hammock, and 20 years in prison on the 
second count, for the touching in the van.  The 20-year sentence 
was imposed and stayed, and Veach was placed on probation for 20 
years. 
¶40 Veach 
filed a 
postconviction motion 
pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h), alleging that his trial counsel had 
provided ineffective assistance by not offering a Wallerman 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
16 
 
stipulation.  The circuit court held a Machner8 hearing, where 
Veach and his trial counsel both testified.  The circuit court 
denied Veach's motion orally at the close of the hearing, and 
issued a written order denying the motion on December 29, 1998. 
¶41 Veach appealed on the grounds that the circuit court 
improperly admitted the other acts evidence, and that his 
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not knowing 
he could exclude the other acts evidence by offering a Wallerman 
stipulation. 
¶42 The court of appeals reversed Veach's conviction, in a 
published decision authored by Judge Vergeront.  Veach, 2001 WI 
App 143.  The court agreed with the State that the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in admitting the other acts 
evidence in this case.  However, the court also noted that 
Veach's trial counsel did not know about Wallerman stipulations 
or propose that Veach enter one.  Therefore, pursuant to 
DeKeyser, the court concluded that Veach's trial counsel had 
provided ineffective assistance. 
¶43 The State petitioned for review on the stipulation and 
ineffective assistance issues, and Veach cross-petitioned for 
review on the issue involving admission of other acts evidence.  
We granted both petitions. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
                                                 
8 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
17 
 
¶44 This case comes to the court on a petition for review 
and a cross-petition for review.  The issues raised in each 
petition are intertwined, so we address them together.  This 
case can be broken down into three issues: (1) Did the circuit 
court erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting other 
acts evidence of Veach's sexual assault of his daughter? (2) May 
a defendant stipulate to certain elements of a crime or defenses 
to the crime, and if so, must the State and the circuit court 
accept the stipulation? (3) Does a defense counsel's failure to 
offer such a stipulation constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel? 
A.  Other Acts Evidence 
¶45 The first issue is the correctness of the circuit 
court's decision to admit other acts evidence.  We begin with an 
overview of the well-established standards for a circuit court's 
discretionary decision whether to admit other acts evidence. 
¶46 The admission of other acts evidence, also known as 
Whitty9 evidence, is governed by Wis. Stat. §§ (Rule) 904.04(2) 
and 904.03.  Section 904.04(2) provides: 
904.04 Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. . . .  
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, 
such as 
proof 
of 
motive, opportunity, 
                                                 
9 Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d  557 (1967). 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
18 
 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
¶47 Section 904.03 provides: 
904.03 Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
¶48 "Other acts evidence should be used sparingly and only 
when reasonably necessary."  See Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 
N.W.2d  557 (1967).  It may not be used to demonstrate that the 
accused has a certain character and acted in conformity with 
that trait.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 782 (citing 7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence § 404.5, at 110). 
¶49 In Whitty, this court offered four reasons justifying 
the rule excluding other acts evidence: 
(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant 
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person 
likely to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn 
not because he is believed guilty of the present 
charge but because he has escaped punishment from 
other offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who 
is not prepared to demonstrate the attacking evidence 
is fabricated; and (4) the confusion of issues which 
might result from bringing in evidence of other 
crimes. 
Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 292; see also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
782-83.  "[T]he exclusion of other acts evidence is based on the 
fear that an invitation to focus on an accused's character 
magnifies the risk that jurors will punish the accused for being 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
19 
 
a bad person regardless of his or her guilt of the crime 
charged."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 783. 
¶50 In Sullivan, we set forth a three-part "analytical 
framework" for the admissibility of other acts evidence: 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
(Rule) 
904.04(2), such as establishing motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident? 
(2) 
Is 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
relevant, 
considering the two facets of relevance set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01?  The first consideration 
in assessing relevance is whether the other acts 
evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.  The 
second consideration in assessing relevance is whether 
the evidence has probative value, that is, whether the 
other acts evidence has a tendency to make the 
consequential fact or proposition more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts 
evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence?  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
Id. at 772-73. 
¶51 In addition to the general standards for admission of 
other acts evidence, we must also consider that this case 
involves allegations of child sexual assault.  In cases 
involving allegations of sexual assault, particularly child 
sexual assault, courts are to permit a "greater latitude of 
proof as to other like occurrences."  This "greater latitude" 
rule was recently explained and reaffirmed in Davidson and 
Hammer. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
20 
 
¶52 The greater latitude rule has existed in Wisconsin 
since at least 1893, when it appeared in Proper v. State, 85 
Wis. 615, 624-25, 55 N.W. 1035 (1893); see Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 
¶37.  As we explained in Davidson, the greater latitude rule is 
necessary because of "the difficulty sexually abused children 
experience in testifying, and the difficulty prosecutors have in 
obtaining admissible evidence in such cases."  Davidson, 2000 WI 
91, ¶42 (citing State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 27-35, 398 
N.W.2d 763 (1987)). 
¶53 Application of the greater latitude rule does not 
displace the Sullivan three-part test; courts are to apply the 
Sullivan test, but in doing so, they must permit greater 
latitude in each step of the test.  Id. at ¶¶46, 51-52. 
¶54 In this case, the circuit court allowed the admission 
of other acts evidence of Veach's sexual assault of his 
daughter.  We must evaluate the circuit court's decision in 
light of the standards set forth above. 
¶55 We review a circuit court's decision to admit evidence 
under a discretionary standard.  The question on review is not 
whether this court would have allowed admission of the evidence 
in question.  Instead, if the circuit court "examined the 
relevant facts; applied a proper standard of law; and using a 
demonstrative rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable 
judge 
could 
reach," 
we 
affirm 
its 
decision.  
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 780-81. 
¶56 We have set forth the other acts evidence introduced 
at trial and put it in context.  We will now review the circuit 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
21 
 
court's decision to admit that evidence.  We begin with the 
first part of the three-part test set forth in Sullivan.   
¶57 The first question is "Was the other acts evidence 
offered for an acceptable purpose?"  In assessing the purpose 
for the offering of other acts evidence, we apply the greater 
latitude rule.  See Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶¶46, 51-52. 
¶58 In this case, there is no dispute that the State 
offered the other acts evidence for an acceptable purpose.  
Veach acknowledges that the State offered the evidence to prove 
intent, motive, and absence of mistake or accident.  The 
transcript of the motion hearing demonstrates that the circuit 
court clearly understood the purposes for which the State 
offered the evidence: 
So, the State is proposing to admit this evidence to 
show that this was not an accident, this was not a 
mistake.  That it goes to show that the contact that 
occurred was intentional contact, not unintentional 
contact.  That it was for a particular motive, i.e. 
sexual gratification and not for other matters.  That 
the circumstances may reflect some of these other 
things as well.  The presence in the van with this 
young child.  Was this a plan, was it not, so forth 
(emphasis added). 
¶59 The second part of the three-part Sullivan test is 
"Was 
the 
evidence 
relevant 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.01?"  
Relevance of other acts evidence has two components: The 
evidence must relate to a fact or proposition of consequence to 
the determination of the action; and it must have probative 
valuea tendency to make a consequential fact more or less 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
22 
 
probable than it would be without the evidence.  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 785-86. 
¶60 Veach 
argues 
that 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
was 
impermissibly admitted to prove matters that he did not dispute.  
He claims that the circuit court erred by admitting the evidence 
"to prove a propositionMr. Veach's mental state when he touched 
Rebecca's intimate partsthat was not of consequence to the 
determination because Mr. Veach denied that the touchings 
occurred."  He further claims that the court erred because it 
"admitted the prior acts because it believed Mr. Veach's defense 
was that he touched the child but innocently."  He contends that 
he "did not claim that he touched the child by accident.  
Rather, his defense, consistent with what he had told police, 
was that it "just didn't happen."  
¶61 Veach takes issue with this court's statement in 
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65, that an element of a crime 
constitutes a consequential fact that the State must prove even 
if the defendant does not dispute the element.  Veach claims 
that only disputed matters constitute facts of consequence which 
the state must prove.  He asserts that in this case, intent to 
touch is not a fact of consequence.  He claims that he disputes 
only that the touching occurred, but does not dispute that any 
touching which did occur was intentional. 
¶62 The State maintains that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in finding the other acts related to a 
fact of consequence.  It points out that this court recently 
affirmed that, "'The state must prove all the elements of a 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
23 
 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the defendant does not 
dispute all of the elements . . . .  Evidence relevant to motive 
is therefore admissible, whether or not defendant disputes 
motive.'"  Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65 (quoting State v. 
Plymesser, 
172 
Wis. 2d 583, 
594-95, 
493 N.W.2d 367 
(1992) 
(citations omitted)).  Further, "If the state must prove an 
element of a crime, then evidence relevant to that element is 
admissible, even if a defendant does not dispute the element."  
Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶25 (citing Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 594-
95. 
¶63 The State contends that in this case, the other acts 
evidence was relevant to prove motive, intent, absence of 
mistake or accident, and plan or scheme.  It asserts that the 
defense Veach claims to have assertedthat he did not touch 
Becky——is inconsistent with his story to police and with 
reality.  It points out that Veach acknowledges touching Becky 
in the van, but claims that he did not touch her intimate parts.  
It further asserts that Veach acknowledges laying in the hammock 
with Becky on many occasions, and he does not assert that two 
people can lay in the hammock without touching.  His claim, 
therefore, is only that he did not touch her private parts. 
¶64 According to the State, regardless of Veach's claim 
that he did not touch Becky's intimate parts, the State must 
prove that he touched her, intentionally, for the purpose of 
sexual gratification or arousal.  The State asserts that Veach's 
acknowledgment of intentionally touching Becky's non-private 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
24 
 
parts in the van and laying with her in the hammock "brought all 
these issues into sharp focus." 
¶65 In determining whether the circuit court properly 
admitted other acts evidence in this case, we turn to the motion 
in limine regarding admission of the evidence, and to the 
hearing on the motion.  We then evaluate the circuit court 
decision in light of the greater latitude rule.  See Davidson, 
2000 WI 91, ¶¶46, 51-52. 
¶66 When the State filed its motion in limine it attached 
17 pages of documents, including the statements made by Veach 
and his daughter to Detective Tsakais in 1987, and the statement 
Veach gave to Deputy Olson regarding Becky's allegations.  It 
also submitted a brief.  Judge Murach stated at the hearing that 
he had read the brief.  There is no reason to think he had not 
read the other documents submitted by the State.  Judge Murach 
therefore knew what Veach had told Deputy Olson about Becky's 
allegations.  He knew that the statement reflected the following 
interview: 
Olson:  Okay.  What, what's your side?  You know, what 
have you got to tell me about it? 
Veach:  It didn't happen.  I don't know what else to 
tell you, you know. 
Olson:  What about the time in the van?  She claims 
that you touched her in the van. 
Veach:  Oh, that was the night she stayed in the van 
because it was so cold and I told her that, I carried 
her to the bathroom, brought her back, got her wrapped 
back up in a sleeping bag, and she still said she was 
cold and I kinda rubbed her back and her legs and 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
25 
 
everything else through the sleeping bag to warm her 
up. 
Olson:  Okay.  So there's no, no other contact with 
her? 
Veach:  No other contact. 
Olson:  Okay.  You were both clothed at the time? 
Veach:  Completely. 
Olson:  There's another time that she is alleging that 
you, you touched her inappropriately.  Um, and that 
was the time in the hammock.  Um, what can you tell me 
about that? 
Veach:  I don't know.  They, I was swinging in the 
hammock, she wanted to get in with me.  There's other 
people around.  It just didn't happen. 
¶67 In this statement, Veach did say that "It didn't 
happen.  I don't know what else to tell you, you know."  He did 
say about the incident in the hammock, "It just didn't happen." 
¶68 Veach did not, however, say that he was misidentified.  
He did not say that he was not in the van with Becky or that he 
was not in the hammock with Becky.  He did not imply that he was 
uncertain or unaware of the incidents to which Becky was 
referring.  He instead made clear that he knew exactly what the 
alleged 
incidents 
were. 
 
He 
said, 
"Oh, 
that 
was 
the 
night . . . I kinda rubbed her back and her legs and everything 
else through the sleeping bag."  He also said, "I was swinging 
in the hammock, she wanted to get in with me."  Before the 
hearing, this is all the information Judge Murach had. 
¶69 At the motion hearing, the State argued that it was 
offering the other acts evidence: 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
26 
 
specifically to establish that Mr. Veach at the time 
that he engaged in the conduct alleged was doing so 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
sexually 
gratifying 
himself. . . . [T]he 
State 
is 
entitled 
to 
offer 
evidence that this type of behavior was something 
which Mr. Veach had been prone to do in the past, not 
to prove he acted in propensity with it, but to 
establish for the jury that people are sexually 
aroused 
by 
seven 
or 
eight 
or 
nine 
year 
old 
children. . . . He 
has 
denied 
that 
any 
wrongful 
touching occurred, but it's clear from his statements 
that he did at leas[t] on one occasion touch the 
victim on her back in what he described as a fatherly 
way . . . . [T]he State clearly can introduce other 
acts evidence, first of all to establish that the 
contact did occur because it established the plan that 
Mr. Veach had in having the young child in a position 
where he could have molested her. . . . Secondly, is 
the fact that the touching which Mr. Veach has 
described was for the purpose of sexual gratification.  
The girl says it was upon her buttocks and upon her 
vaginal area inside the clothes.  Mr. Veach says the 
touching was only in a fatherly way.  It goes to the 
purpose of the touching and it also goes to the issue 
of witness credibility. 
¶70 Veach's counsel argued about the probative value of 
the other acts evidence, about its remoteness and its lack of 
similarity with the current allegations.  He spoke about the 
true use of other acts being to show propensity, and then said: 
The only purpose of raising that . . . in a case like 
this where the only two allegations are that this 
child was touched and I don't know if there was any 
touching even underneath the clothing, as to get a 
conviction for that.  I'm not going to talk about the 
credibility much.  He has denied this.  The child has 
testified.  I'm not sure if there is not a mistake 
here in what she thought he was doing and what he was 
actually doin[g].  I don't know.  It seems to me if he 
had that kind of tendency for sexual gratification and 
if he wanted to tie this into the act that he did 
before, there should have been some further activity 
that night, but there wasn't (emphasis added).   
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
27 
 
¶71 In rebuttal, the State seized on trial counsel's 
reference to mistake.  The State said, "We are also here to 
address another issue which [defense counsel] has introduced 
which is the mistake, that the victim has misinterpreted what 
was occurring.  That, your honor, is one of the very elements of 
904.02(2) to which this type of evidence is admissible.  The 
absence of mistake." 
¶72 Given an opportunity to respond, defense counsel did 
not attempt to clarify that the defense Veach was asserting 
would negate all mental elements and preclude the admission of 
other acts evidence.  Nor did he attempt to characterize the 
facts in some other fashion, to demonstrate that Veach was not 
at least contemplating a defense that included forcing the State 
to prove that any touching was not accidental.10  Instead, 
defense counsel stated, "I'm not sure I can add anything to what 
I said before, your honor." 
¶73 In deciding the motion, Judge Murach demonstrated that 
he understood and considered the alleged facts of the case, the 
arguments that the parties had just made, and the law regarding 
other acts evidence.  He stated, in part: 
So the State is proposing to admit this evidence to 
show that this was not an accident, this was not a 
mistake.  Then it goes to show that the contact that 
occurred was intentional contact, not unintentional 
contact.  That it was for a particular motive, i.e. 
sexual gratification and not for other matters.  That 
the circumstances may reflect some of these other 
                                                 
10 We in no way imply that defense counsel performed 
deficiently or provided ineffective assistance in not making 
this argument. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
28 
 
things as well.  The presence in the van with this 
young child.  Was this a plan, was it not, so 
forth. . . . I haven't heard the actual evidence.  I 
know what the claims are . . . .  The defendant's 
position is that this is all a mistake.  That any 
touching that he had with this child in the van that 
night was accidental as far as any kind of sexual 
purpose was concerned.  That it was not a sexual 
motive.  That this was not for the purpose of 
gratification.  That puts us squarely on the hot seat.  
That's what the proof of motive would bear upon.  
That's what the prior evidence would be used to 
address. . . . These, from the description that I have 
heard are the issues to be decided.  Whether the 
touching was inadvertent, accidental, not for sexual 
purposes or whether it was planned, whether it was for 
a sexual motive and whether there was not mistake at 
all.  That's the key issue (emphasis added). 
¶74 Veach argues that the evidence at trial indicated that 
his real defense was that no touching occurred and that he was 
not disputing mental elements of the crime.  For support, he 
points to comments in the post-conviction motion hearing in 
which defense counsel said: "Basically, the theory of defense 
was that it did not occur.  In other words, Mr. Veach did not do 
that."  Defense counsel clarified that the defense was that 
Veach did not touch Becky's buttocks or vagina.  When asked if 
it was "in any way the theory of defense that Mr. Veach touched 
Becky's vagina or buttocks by mistake," defense counsel said, "I 
don't believe so.  I don't think there was any evidence to that 
effect." 
¶75 Veach concludes in his brief that the circuit court 
"hung on Mr. Veach a defense he never raised and used that 
imaginary defense as grounds for admitting highly prejudicial 
other acts evidence."  
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
29 
 
¶76 We disagree with Veach's conclusion.  We conclude 
after inspecting the record that the circuit court listened to 
and understood the arguments.  The circuit court then determined 
that the evidence was related to many facts of consequence, and 
many issues in the case.  While Veach may not have explicitly 
argued that his touching of Becky was mistaken or accidental, he 
did nothing to alert the circuit court that he wished to 
preclude mistake or accident as a possible defense.  He did 
nothing to alert the circuit court that he wished to prevent the 
jury from having an opportunity to conclude that even if he did 
touch Becky's 
vagina or 
buttocks, 
he 
may 
have done so 
accidentally or mistakenly, or inadvertently and unknowingly 
while he "rubbed her back and legs and everything else," through 
her sleeping bag.  When the court made its decision to admit the 
other acts evidence, it was not and could not have been aware 
that Veach wished to make such concessions. 
¶77 Moreover, we made clear in Davidson and Hammer that 
the State is required to prove all elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt even if an element is not disputed.  
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65; Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶25.  Evidence 
relevant to any element is admissible even if the element is 
undisputed.  Id. 
¶78 We cannot conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in determining that the evidence in 
question related to a fact or proposition of consequence.  The 
circuit court reasonably determined that mistake or accident was 
a fact or proposition of consequence based on remarks by defense 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
30 
 
counsel and on the facts of the case, which indicate that 
accident or mistake would be a logical defense.  The court 
reasonably determined that intent and motive were facts or 
propositions of consequence because as elements of the crime, 
intent 
and 
motive 
are 
always 
facts 
or 
propositions 
of 
consequence.  See Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65; Hammer, 2000 WI 92, 
¶25. 
¶79 The second part of the relevancy test is whether the 
other acts evidence has probative value.  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 772.  The question is whether the evidence tends to 
make a fact of consequence more or less probable.  Id.  The 
circuit court concluded that the other acts evidence was 
"considerably probative."  It specifically addressed the issues 
raised by Veach.  The court noted the similarities between 
Veach's daughter and Becky:  
[T]he similarity of the age in the children in 
question.  The fact that these children had an ongoing 
contact . . . There would appear to me to be a fair 
amount of similarity between the kind of contact that 
is described with regard to the prior incident and the 
kind of conduct that is described in the complaint, 
except perhaps for however it ultimately went.  That 
may have more to do with the reaction of the parties 
and the facts and circumstances being a little bit 
different. 
¶80 At 
the 
close 
of 
the 
motion 
hearing 
the 
court 
concluded: 
So, I don't think it is mildly probative.  It is going 
to be considerably probative and the issue is whether 
it's prejudicial and whether that prejudicial impact 
is unfair.  Since it bears upon the matter to be 
litigated and decided by the jury, that is to say 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
31 
 
whether this was indeed a sexual act or was not.  
Whether it would be a misunderstood touching, not for 
sexual purposes or an attempt at sexual gratification, 
that would appear from the description given to me by 
both counsel, to be a central issue that this jury 
will have to decide.  So, I'm going to admit the 
evidence bearing surprise in the testimony that would 
change the picture when we actually are at trial 
(emphasis added). 
¶81 We agree with the circuit court's conclusion.  The 
probative 
value 
of 
other 
acts 
evidence 
depends 
on 
"the 
similarity between the charged offense and the other act."  
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶67 (quoting State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 
39, 58, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999) (citing Sullivan 216 Wis. 2d at 
786)).  In this case, Veach's daughter and Becky were two young 
girls, one nine years old, the other seven.  One was Veach's 
daughter, the other a long-term family friend whose godmother——
"Aunt Jeannie"——was Veach's long-term live-in girlfriend.  When 
asked at trial if Becky trusted him like a father or a close 
uncle, Veach replied: "She trusted me, yes." 
¶82 The incident with Veach's daughter occurred in her 
bedroom, when her mother was not present.  The incident with 
Becky allegedly occurred in the van, where Becky was spending 
the night, with her parents not present.  Veach admitted that he 
rubbed his daughter's "bottom," meaning her vagina and buttocks.  
Becky alleged that Veach rubbed her "bottom," meaning her vagina 
and buttocks.  Additionally, as the State points out in its 
brief, Veach "directly linked" the incidents with his daughter 
and the alleged incidents with Becky when he told Detective 
Olson, "he couldn't believe it was happening to him again.  That 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
32 
 
was one of the reasons he moved out of the house and away from 
his daughter." 
¶83 We agree with Veach that there are dissimilarities 
between the incidents.  As the court of appeals stated: "The 
incidents 
with 
his 
daughter 
were 
"much 
more 
intrusive, 
aggressive, and egregious that the charged acts."  Veach, 2001 
WI App 143, ¶48.  Veach ejaculated during the incident with his 
daughter; there is no similar evidence he did in the alleged 
incidents with Becky.  We also agree that a long period11 
yearshad passed between the 1983 incidents with Veach's 
daughter and the alleged 1994 incidents with Becky. 
¶84 We conclude, however, that the evidence obviously had 
at least some probative value.  The other acts evidence was 
probative of whether any touching occurred.  See State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987).  It was 
probative of whether any touching that occurred was accidental 
or done by mistake.  See Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 56 ("Other acts 
evidence is properly admitted to show absence of mistake if it 
tends to undermine a defendant's innocent explanation for his or 
her behavior.")  It was probative of the motive for any 
touching, whether any touching was for the purpose of sexual 
gratification.  Davidson, 2001 WI 91, ¶65 (quoting Friedrich, 
135 Wis. 2d at 27-28 ("The average juror could well find it 
incomprehensible that one who stands before the court on trial 
could commit such an act."). 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
33 
 
¶85 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in so finding, particularly in light of the greater 
latitude rule.  See Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶¶46, 51-52. 
¶86 The final step in the three-part test is whether "the 
probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." 
 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03; 
Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 772-73 (emphasis added).  In this case, Veach does 
not argue that the other acts evidence confused the issues, 
misled the jury, was a waste of time, or was cumulative.  He 
claims that the danger of prejudice substantially outweighed the 
probative value of the evidence. 
¶87 The question under the third part of the test is not 
whether the other acts evidence is prejudicial, but whether it 
is unfairly prejudicial.  Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 64. 
Unfair prejudice results when the proffered evidence 
has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper 
means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to 
punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision 
on something other than the established propositions 
in the case. 
Davidson, 2001 WI 91, ¶73 (citations omitted).  
¶88 At the hearing on the State's motion in limine, 
Veach's defense counsel objected to the admission of the other 
acts evidence on the grounds that it was unfairly prejudicial.  
The court disagreed.  It stated: 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
34 
 
Sec[tion] 904.03 says that admissible evidence may be 
kept out even though it is relevant . . . if to 
introduce it would be unfairly prejudicial.  That the 
evidence would be so overwhelming that it would be 
unfair to introduce it . . . Usually this would happen 
in a situation where the evidence is such as to put 
the defendant in very bad standing with the jury and 
that doesn't bear very directly upon the issues to be 
decided.  The problem with this particular situation 
is that these issues are not just supportive.  These, 
from the description I have heard are the issues to be 
decided. 
 
Whether 
the 
touching 
was inadvertent, 
accidental, not for sexual purposes or whether it was 
planned, whether it was for a sexual motive and 
whether there was not mistake at all.  That's the key 
issue.  So, this evidence is extremely prejudicial to 
the defendant but since it is a central part of the 
element 
of 
the 
offense, 
it 
is 
not 
unfairly 
prejudicial. 
¶89 The court concluded by saying of the other acts 
evidence:  
So, I don't think it is mildly probative.  It is going 
to be considerably probative and the issue is whether 
it's prejudicial and whether that prejudicial impact 
is unfair.  Since it bears upon the matter to be 
litigated and decided by the jury, that is to say 
whether this was indeed a sexual act or was not.  
Whether it would be a misunderstood touching, not for 
sexual purposes or an attempt at sexual gratification, 
that would appear from the description given to me by 
both counsel, to be a central issue that this jury 
will have to decide.  So, I'm going to admit the 
evidence bearing surprise in the testimony that would 
change the picture when we actually are at trial. 
¶90 Veach argues that the other acts evidence was unfairly 
prejudicial because the other acts were so egregious and were 
described so graphically.  He bases part of his argument on his 
assertion that the other acts evidence related solely to mistake 
and accident and that his defense was not mistake or accident.  
Therefore, according to Veach, the danger of unfair prejudice 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
35 
 
from 
this 
"extremely 
prejudicial" 
evidence 
obviously 
substantially outweighed the non-existent probative value.  
¶91 We agree that the other acts evidence in this case was 
graphic, disturbing, and extremely prejudicial.  However, as we 
have determined, the evidence also had tremendous probative 
value.  The record in this case conclusively demonstrates that 
the 
circuit 
court 
examined 
Becky's 
allegations 
and 
the 
statements regarding the other acts, understood and weighed the 
probative value of the evidence versus the potential for unfair 
prejudice, and made a reasonable decision.  We cannot determine 
that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the 
probative value, particularly in light of the greater latitude 
rule.  We therefore conclude that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in admitting the other acts evidence in 
this case. 
¶92 Veach also asserts that some of the other acts 
evidence admitted at trial was inadmissible hearsay because it 
was based on statements made by Veach's daughter, who did not 
testify.  He points to mention of the incident involving Veach 
and his daughter and oral sex, and to mention of other incidents 
alleged by Veach's daughter.  He claims that his trial counsel 
made a proper objection at trial and that the circuit court 
improperly denied the objection.  He further asserts that the 
evidence 
to 
which 
he 
refers 
was 
unproven 
and 
therefore 
inadmissible.  Veach raised the same issue to the court of 
appeals, which denied his motion on the grounds that Veach 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
36 
 
failed to properly raise his objections at trial.  Veach, 2000 
WI App 143 ¶¶35-38. 
¶93 The evidence in question was subject to the State's 
motion in limine.  The State sought admission of other acts 
evidence and of Veach's admissions.  The State sought admission 
of "certain acts of prior sexual misconduct with [Veach's] 
daughter."  The State also sought to introduce "evidence of 
[Veach's admissions to . . . Detective Christ Tzakais of the 
Fond 
du 
Lac 
County 
Sheriff's 
Department 
during . . . the 
referenced matter." 
¶94 At the motion hearing, the State asked the court to 
"declare the admissibility of evidence concerning Mr. Veach's 
contact with his daughter at the time she was nine years of 
age."  The court granted the motion.  Immediately prior to 
trial, the State clarified that Veach's daughter would not 
testify, but that it planned to offer testimony from the 
detective 
to 
whom 
Veach 
gave 
a 
statement 
regarding 
his 
daughter's allegations.  Veach's counsel objected on hearsay 
grounds to the admission of the judgment of conviction and to 
the admissions by Veach, as found in his statement to Detective 
Tzakais.  The court made clear that it would allow Detective 
Tzakais to testify as to Veach's statement, but not as to 
Veach's daughter's statement. 
¶95 At trial, 
Veach's 
counsel 
raised 
two 
objections 
relevant to Veach's current claim.  The exchanges were as 
follows: 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
37 
 
Detective Tzakais: On September 16th or 17th [Veach's 
daughter] and her mother came into the sheriff's 
department quite distraught about something that was 
going on—- 
Defense counsel: Objection on hearsay grounds as to 
what other folks have told Detective Tzakais. 
The court: I'll permit some latitude by way of 
preliminary questions.  As we get into it, we need to 
be attentive to the hearsay problem. 
¶96 Then a short time later, Detective Tzakais said, about 
his interview with Veach and Veach's statement to him:  
Detective Tzakais: . . . He also indicated—-I asked 
him if he could recall another incident where [his 
daughter] described him having her give him a blow job 
and he indicated that it could have happened.  He was 
also confronted and asked if he recalled the other six 
incidents that—- 
Defense counsel: Objection.  Maybe we should hear this 
outside the presence of the jury. 
The court: For the present time I would ask the 
officer to respond to questions from the District 
Attorney. 
Defense counsel: My objection would go to the fact 
that we are also going to introduce a judgment of 
conviction which shows one conviction and not a series 
of events. 
The court: I would overrule that objection. 
¶97 We agree with the court of appeals that Veach did not 
sufficiently raise an objection to this testimony at trial.  He 
did properly object to the statement of Detective Tzakais 
regarding his daughter's statements.  The court denied the 
objection, but only because the testimony was "preliminary" and 
it did not refer to any past act.  The second piece of 
challenged testimony did involve past acts, but it entailed 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
38 
 
Detective Tzakais testifying as to what he asked and what Veach 
answered.  This evidence was subject to the State's motion in 
limine, and was specifically deemed admissible.  Moreover, the 
court ruled immediately before trial that Detective Tzakais 
could testify as to Veach's statement to him.  As the State now 
points out, Veach certainly knew what was in his statement to 
Detective Tzakais, and he failed to object to the admission of 
testimony regarding his own statement. 
¶98 When defense counsel did object, he did not make 
sufficiently clear upon what grounds the objection was based.  
See 
Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(a); 
State 
v. 
Agnello, 
226 
Wis. 2d 164, 174, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999).  Veach contends the 
objection was to hearsay.  If so, we conclude that the circuit 
court properly overruled the objection, as the testimony was in 
regards to Veach's statement, not his daughter's. 
¶99 Veach asserts that other inadmissible evidence may 
have been admitted on cross-examination of Veach.  We need not 
address the issue, because Veach's counsel made no objection at 
trial, and the issue is therefore waived.  See Agnello, 226 
Wis. 2d at 172-73. 
B.  Wallerman Stipulations 
¶100 The second issue for our review concerns Veach's 
assertion that his counsel should have stipulated to certain 
elements of the charges against him in order to preclude the 
State from introducing other acts evidence.  In the stipulation, 
Veach would have conceded that: (1) Becky had not reached the 
age of 13; and (2) "The touching of Becky's intimate parts, if 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
39 
 
it occurred, was intentional and for the purpose of sexual 
gratification." 
¶101 This type of stipulation——a Wallerman stipulation——
stems from State v. Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158, 552 N.W.2d 128 
(Ct. App. 1996).  In Wallerman, a defendant charged with 
attempted 
homicide, 
attempted 
sexual 
assault, 
and 
armed 
burglary, for allegedly attacking a woman, raised as a defense 
that he was misidentified——that he was not the perpetrator.  Id. 
at 160. 
¶102 At trial, the state introduced other acts evidence of 
an uncharged incident four years earlier in the form of 
testimony from a woman who testified that Wallerman attacked her 
in much the same way.  The court admitted the evidence on the 
issues of motive and intent.  Id. at 162. 
¶103 On appeal, Wallerman claimed that the court erred in 
admitting the evidence on issues——motive and intent——that he did 
not dispute.  Id.  The state asserted that Wallerman had not 
offered a concession to motive or intent, so the state was 
required to prove both elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
at 162-63. 
¶104 The court of appeals concluded that to concede an 
element a defendant had to express a clear and unequivocal 
intention to stipulate and the stipulation had to completely 
remove the issues from the case.  Id. at 167.  It determined 
that Wallerman had not done so, and affirmed his conviction.  
The court also stated: 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
40 
 
When the defendant is faced with "other acts" evidence 
but wishes to concede an element of the crime for 
which the evidence is being offered, the court needs 
to ensure that the record contains conclusive evidence 
which the jury may rely on to find guilt before it 
relieves the State of the duty to prove that element. 
Id. at 167. 
¶105 The court set forth guidelines for such a stipulation: 
First, the trial court should carefully explore the 
breadth of the defendant's offer.  The court needs to 
determine exactly what the defendant is conceding to. 
Next, the trial court needs to assess the State's 
evidence 
and 
determine 
whether the "other 
acts" 
evidence would still be necessary even with the 
defendant's concession.  For example, the State's 
evidence may no longer be needed to prove those 
elements which the defendant is willing to concede, 
but it may nevertheless be relevant to the other 
elements of the crime that the defendant still 
contests. 
Third, the trial court should personally voir 
dire the lawyers and the defendant to ensure that they 
each understand the effects of the concession.  The 
trial court needs to ensure that the defendant 
understands 
that 
the 
State 
will 
rely 
upon 
the 
concession to prove its case and will use it when 
arguing to the jury, and similarly, that the court 
will instruct the jury about the concession.  As 
important, the defendant must know that he or she has 
waived 
the 
right 
to 
produce 
evidence 
and 
make 
arguments on the element. 
Fourth and finally, just like questions involving 
the admissibility of "other acts" evidence, these 
concessions 
or 
stipulations 
should 
be 
addressed 
pretrial if possible.  Such practice will save 
resources for the State, which otherwise would have to 
seek out the factual details of the "other acts" 
evidence; for the defendant, who would have to prepare 
rebuttal; and for the trial court, which would have to 
gauge whether the evidence is admissible. 
Id. at 167-68 (citations and footnote omitted). 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
41 
 
¶106 Two years later, the court of appeals decided State v. 
DeKeyser, 221 Wis. 2d 435, 585 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998),11 a 
case 
in 
which 
a 
man 
allegedly 
sexually 
assaulted 
his 
granddaughter.  The state introduced other acts evidence in the 
form of testimony from the man's other granddaughter that he had 
sexually assaulted her in a similar fashion.  Id. at 441.  
Defense counsel did not offer a Wallerman stipulation, and the 
court admitted the evidence on the issues of intent, preparation 
or plan, and absence of mistake or accident.  Id. 
¶107 The defendant appealed, asserting that his defense was 
that the sexual assault never occurred, and that his defense 
counsel should have stipulated "that the purpose of the alleged 
contact would have been sexual gratification and that the age of 
the victim was under sixteen."  Id. at 441.  The circuit court 
denied DeKeyser's postconviction motion, determining that: (1) 
DeKeyser would likely not have made a concession due to his 
adamant denial of the charges; (2) the court would not have 
accepted DeKeyser's proposed stipulation because the other acts 
evidence was necessary to prove the touching occurred; and (3) 
there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome.  Id. 
at 441-42. 
¶108 The court of appeals reversed DeKeyser's conviction.  
Id. at 439.  It determined that trial counsel was ineffective in 
not offering a Wallerman stipulation, to "concede elements of a 
crime in order to avoid the introduction of other acts 
                                                 
11 This court denied review in both Wallerman and DeKeyser. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
42 
 
evidence."  Id. at 443.  The court stated explicitly that, 
"While we do not hold that a trial court is without discretion 
to accept a Wallerman stipulation because that issue is not 
before us, a trial court erroneously exercises its discretion if 
it rejects such a stipulation based on an erroneous view of the 
law."12  Id. at 443-44.  The court disagreed with all the circuit 
court's reasons for rejecting a Wallerman stipulation, and 
concluded that trial counsel was deficient in not offering such 
a stipulation.  Id. at 451.  It then concluded that the 
deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant, 
and so constituted ineffective assistance.  Id. at 452.  The 
court cautioned that it did not hold that failure to offer a 
Wallerman 
stipulation 
would 
necessarily 
mean 
ineffective 
assistance: 
Counsel may decline to utilize such a stipulation for 
a variety of strategic reasons.  Such a decision is 
not deficient performance.  Further, the receipt of 
other acts evidence will not always be prejudicial to 
the defendant.  The evidence of guilt may be adequate 
even without the other acts evidence or the other acts 
evidence may be of such a nature that it has little 
impact on the jury.  In such cases the receipt of the 
other acts evidence, even if it could have been 
excluded by a stipulation, would not undermine our 
confidence in the verdict. 
Id. at 453-54. 
                                                 
12 DeKeyser stated that it did not hold that "a trial court 
is without discretion to accept a Wallerman stipulation."  We 
assume that it meant to say that it was not holding that a 
circuit court is without discretion to deny a Wallerman 
stipulation.  State v. DeKeyser, 221 Wis. 2d 435, 443, 585 
N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
43 
 
¶109 In the present case, Veach brought a postconviction 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h), basing his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on DeKeyser, which was decided 
shortly after Veach's trial but before his postconviction motion 
hearing.  At the postconviction motion hearing, Veach's trial 
counsel 
testified 
that 
he 
did 
not 
know 
about 
Wallerman 
stipulations at the time of trial, and asserted that if he had 
known about them, he would have raised the issue with Veach.  
Trial counsel was uncertain whether he would have recommended 
that Veach enter into a stipulation, because of the conceptual 
problem of arguing both that he did not touch Becky, and that if 
he 
did 
touch 
her, 
it 
was 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
sexual 
gratification.   
¶110 Veach testified at the hearing that he did not know 
what a Wallerman stipulation was at the time of trial, but if he 
had known he would have stipulated that Becky was under age 13.  
He said he would not have been willing to stipulate that he 
touched Becky's vagina or buttocks, but would have stipulated 
that if he had touched them it would have been for the purpose 
of sexual gratification. 
¶111 Judge Murach denied Veach's postconviction motion.  He 
termed a Wallerman stipulation a "hypothetical defense where a 
defendant makes both the affirmation and the negation of the 
same facts simultaneously," and deemed it "extraordinarily 
cynical."  The court distinguished this case from a situation 
where identity was not an issue, and determined that this was 
not a case where a stipulation would have been a proper 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
44 
 
resolution of the facts presented.  The court concluded that it 
would not have accepted a Wallerman stipulation and that any 
error by trial counsel in not offering a stipulation was 
harmless. 
¶112 Veach appealed, and the court of appeals reversed his 
conviction.  Veach, 2001 WI App 143.  The court determined that 
Wallerman stipulations are contrary to this court's decision in 
Davidson and Hammer, because those cases state that all elements 
of a crime are of consequence, regardless of whether those 
elements are disputed.  Veach, 2001 WI App 143, ¶27. 
¶113 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that 
pursuant to Davidson, a Wallerman stipulation to an element of 
the crime charged would not make inadmissible evidence that 
related to the stipulated element: 
[F]or purposes of the second step of the Sullivan 
analysis, consequential facts are determined with 
reference to the elements of the crime the State must 
prove and are not limited to the elements the 
defendant is challenging in his or her defense.  We 
conclude this holding conflicts with our reasoning in 
DeKeyser that a defense based on a denial that the 
defendant was present limits the consequential facts 
for purposes of the second step of the Sullivan 
analysis.  We must therefore follow Davidson, not 
DeKeyser, on this point. 
Id. 
¶114 The court of appeals suggested that in this case trial 
counsel could not have precluded the admission of other acts 
evidence by offering a Wallerman stipulation.  It nonetheless 
concluded that it was bound under DeKeyser to find that trial 
counsel's failure to offer a Wallerman stipulation constituted 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
45 
 
deficient performance.  Id. at ¶42.  It then found that Veach 
suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance, and 
reversed his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel.  Id. at ¶¶48-49. 
¶115 Judge Lundsten dissented, agreeing that DeKeyser was 
contrary to Davidson, but asserting that DeKeyser did not compel 
a finding of prejudice to Veach.  Id. at ¶57. 
¶116 Now, on appeal, the State urges this court to overrule 
Wallerman and DeKeyser, and to reject the idea that Wallerman 
stipulations 
operate 
to 
bar 
the 
admission 
of 
otherwise 
admissible other acts evidence.  It argues that Wallerman 
stipulations are contrary to this court's decisions in Davidson, 
and Hammer, contrary to the greater latitude rule, contrary to 
the rule that other acts evidence is admissible to bolster the 
credibility of child sexual assault victims, and contrary to the 
rule that the state can prove its case as it sees fit.  The 
State also asserts that conditional Wallerman stipulations, such 
as the one proposed in this case, are illogical because they 
result in a person claiming both to have done an act and not to 
have done the act. 
¶117 By 
contrast, 
Veach 
contends 
that 
Wallerman 
stipulations are compatible with Davidson and Hammer.  He 
asserts that they serve the purpose of keeping out propensity 
evidence.  He argues that Wallerman stipulations are not 
illogical, that they tend to focus the evidence at trial onto 
the issues truly in question. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
46 
 
¶118 We determine that to the extent Wallerman and DeKeyser 
imply that the state and the circuit court are obligated to 
accept Wallerman stipulations, those cases are incorrect and 
must be overruled.  We conclude that requiring the state or the 
circuit court to accept a Wallerman stipulation is directly 
contrary to Wisconsin law as stated in Davidson and Hammer, and 
in the case of child sexual assaults, is also contrary to the 
greater latitude rule.  While we do not hold that Wallerman 
stipulations are invalid per se, we do hold that, with the 
exception of stipulations to a defendant's status, the state and 
the court are not obligated to accept stipulations to elements 
of a crime even if the stipulations are offered in compliance 
with the four-part test set forth in Wallerman. 
¶119 The first and most important reason for our rejection 
of Wallerman stipulations in cases such as this one is that a 
stipulation like the one offered by Veach supposes that a 
defendant can, by use of a Wallerman stipulation, concede to an 
element and make evidence relevant to that element inadmissible.  
Veach assumes in his argument is that both the state and the 
court must accept a Wallerman stipulation.  The DeKeyser court 
declined to decide whether a court has discretion to refuse a 
Wallerman stipulation.  DeKeyser, 221 Wis. 2d  at 443-44.  We 
address the issue here, and decide that a court may refuse such 
a stipulation. 
¶120 The court of appeals in this case, both the majority 
and the dissent, determined that Veach's proposed stipulation to 
elements of the charge against him brings his proposed Wallerman 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
47 
 
stipulation into direct conflict with Davidson and Hammer.  We 
agree. 
¶121 In Davidson and Hammer, we made clear that the state 
must prove all elements of a crime, even elements the defendant 
does not dispute.  Accordingly, evidence relevant to undisputed 
elements is admissible.  Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65; Hammer, 2000 
WI 92, ¶25.  We stated in Davidson: 
As already discussed, the defendant's motive for 
touching [the victim] was an element of the charged 
crime, and the [previous] assault related to that 
consequential fact.  Under our prior cases, the fact 
that the defendant denied sexually assaulting [the 
victim] does not change this conclusion.  "The state 
must prove all the elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, even if the defendant does not 
dispute all of the elements.  Evidence relevant to 
motive 
is 
therefore 
admissible, 
whether 
or 
not 
defendant 
disputes 
motive." . . . [See] 
State 
v. 
Hammer, 
2000 
WI 
92, 
¶25, 
236 
Wis. 2d 686, 
613 
N.W.2d 629 ("If the state must prove an element of a 
crime, then evidence relevant to that element is 
admissible, even if a defendant does not dispute the 
element.") 
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65 (citations omitted).  We cannot 
reconcile a Wallerman stipulation with the language in Davidson 
and Hammer, if the state and the court are obligated to accept 
the stipulation. 
¶122 We also conclude that a Wallerman stipulation in a 
child sexual assault case is directly contrary to the greater 
latitude rule for the admission of other acts evidence in child 
sexual assault cases.  The purpose of a Wallerman stipulation in 
this case——involving an allegation of child sexual assault——is 
to preclude the admission of other acts evidence.  The purpose 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
48 
 
of the greater latitude rule in cases involving allegations of 
child sexual assault is to "permit 'a more liberal admission of 
other crimes evidence.'"  Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶44 (quoting 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 31) (emphasis added); Hammer, 2000 WI 
92, ¶23. 
¶123 We do not mean to imply that Wallerman stipulations 
are per se invalid, even in child sexual assault cases.  We 
simply conclude that the state and the court do not have to 
agree to Wallerman stipulations.   
¶124 We note that under certain specific circumstances, 
stipulations to elements of crimes are valid, and acceptance of 
a properly offered stipulation is required.  In Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme Court held that 
when evidence of a prior conviction is necessary solely to prove 
the element of prior conviction——a defendant's status——it is an 
abuse of discretion under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to refuse to grant a defendant's offer to concede the 
prior conviction.  Id.  The Court made extremely clear, however, 
that its holding applied only to a defendant's status, not to 
any element of the criminal act forming the basis for the 
current charge.  Id. at 173. 
¶125 The Court restated "the familiar, standard rule that 
the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its 
own choice, or more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not 
stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of 
the case as the Government chooses to present it."  Id. at 186-
87.  The Court concluded that, "This is unquestionably true as a 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
49 
 
general matter."  Id. at 187.  The Court made extremely clear 
that acceptance of the stipulation of a criminal record is 
required only when "the record of conviction would not be 
admissible for any purpose beyond proving status."  Id. at 190.  
It specifically noted that the government is guaranteed the 
opportunity to seek admission of evidence if there is a 
"justification for receiving evidence of the nature of prior 
acts on some issue other than status (i.e., to prove 'motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident . . . .')"  Id. 
¶126 In State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 
(1997), this court similarly found that a circuit court was 
required to accept a stipulation to a status element.  In 
Alexander, a defendant attempted to stipulate that he had a 
certain number of prior convictions, suspensions or revocations 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
counting 
prior 
offenses 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  Id. at 633-34, 639-40.  This court 
concluded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by instead admitting evidence on the element of prior 
offenses.  Id. at 634.  Citing Old Chief, we noted that the 
element of "two or more prior convictions" is a status element 
of the offense, which is "completely 'dependent on some judgment 
rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later 
criminal behavior charged against [the defendant].'"  Id. at 
644-45 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190).  We further said, 
"If evidence is admissible for some other reason, such as 
proving motive or intent, Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) regarding other 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
50 
 
crimes evidence guarantees the State the opportunity to seek its 
admission.  Id. at 645 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190). 
¶127 Fundamental differences exist between the stipulations 
offered in Old Chief and Alexander and the stipulation Veach 
asserts he would have offered.  The stipulations in Old Chief 
and Alexander related solely to the defendant's status, were 
unconditional, and were absolutely dispositive of the stipulated 
element.  The stipulation offered by Veach was to an element of 
the criminal act he allegedly committed, was conditional, and 
was not sufficiently broad and clear to remove the issue from 
the case. 
¶128 In 
Old 
Chief 
and 
Alexander, 
the 
defendants' 
stipulations were essentially "I agree that I have one prior 
felony conviction," and "I agree that I have two prior 
convictions."  In other words, the defendants agreed to admit to 
a status element of the crimes. 
¶129 By contrast, the stipulation that Veach in retrospect 
would have offered was conditional.  Veach did not offer to 
stipulate that "the touching of Becky's vagina and buttocks was 
intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification."  He 
offered only to stipulate that "The touching of Becky's intimate 
parts, if it occurred, was intentional and for the purpose of 
sexual gratification."   
¶130 The stipulation proposed by Veach was also to elements 
of the offense that were directly in issue.  He wished to 
stipulate away evidence relating to whether he committed the 
prohibited acts that made up the crime with which he was 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
51 
 
charged.  This is precisely what Old Chief and Alexander 
prohibit.  Pursuant to Davidson and Hammer, it makes no 
difference that the evidence in question is other acts evidence. 
¶131 Additionally, we think the stipulation proposed by the 
defendant is simply inadequate to inform the jury of what is 
agreed to and what is in dispute, and to remove the issues from 
the case. 
¶132 The stipulation that Veach says he would have offered 
would reference Wis JI——Criminal 162 (1996).  It would have 
said: 
The district attorney and the attorney for the 
defendant have stipulated or agreed to the existence 
of certain facts, and you must accept these facts as 
conclusively proved. 
¶133 Veach asserts that the agreed facts would have been 
that, "the touching of [Becky's] intimate part, if it occurred, 
was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification."  
The stipulation proposed by Veach would not properly inform the 
jury that accident or mistake, two issues which the facts of 
this 
case 
obviously 
touched 
upon, 
were 
subject 
to 
the 
stipulation. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶134 The court of appeals in this case determined that 
trial counsel was deficient in not offering a Wallerman 
stipulation, and that this deficiency was prejudicial.  The 
court therefore reversed Veach's conviction on the grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  For the reasons we have set 
forth, we reverse the court of appeals decision. 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
52 
 
¶135 When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a court may reverse the order of the two tests or avoid 
the deficient performance analysis altogether if the defendant 
has 
failed 
to 
show 
prejudice. 
 
State 
v. 
Johnson, 
133 
Wis. 2d 207, 222, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)).  The circuit court made 
abundantly clear in the postconviction hearing that it would not 
have accepted a stipulation had one been offered.  As we have 
explained, a circuit court need not accept a stipulation even if 
one is offered.  Therefore, we need not grade the performance of 
Veach's trial counsel and determine whether not offering a 
stipulation was deficient performance.  We decide only that 
Veach suffered no prejudice because the court would not have 
accepted the stipulation.  For this reason, we reverse the court 
of appeals decision and reinstate Veach's conviction. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶136 In summary, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting other acts 
evidence in this case.  Although Wallerman stipulations are not 
invalid per se, we hold that the state and the circuit court 
need not accept them.  We conclude that in this case, defense 
counsel's failure to stipulate to the mental elements of the 
charges against Veach did not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel because the court would not have accepted the 
stipulation.  We also overrule Wallerman and DeKeyser to the 
extent that those cases state or imply that the state or the 
court must accept a Wallerman stipulation, or that failure of 
No. 98-2387-CR  
 
53 
 
trial counsel to offer a stipulation is deficient performance 
regardless whether the state or the court would have accepted 
the stipulation.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and reinstate Veach's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  98-2387-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶137 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority's decision.  I write separately, however, because I 
would explicitly overrule State v. Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158, 
552 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1996), and State v. DeKeyser, 221 
Wis. 2d 435, 585 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), and rely on Old 
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), and State v. 
Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  The majority 
implies that it is overruling Wallerman and DeKeyser at 
paragraph 118, but it does not do so explicitly.  In fact, at 
paragraph 123, the majority suggests that it is only modifying 
those cases by stating, "We do not mean to imply that Wallerman 
stipulations are per se invalid, even in child sexual assault 
cases."  I would overrule Wallerman and DeKeyser; thus, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶138 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DIANE S. SYKES join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  98-2387-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶139 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Section 
904.04(2) 
of 
the 
rules 
of 
evidence 
clearly 
and 
explicitly states that, with some limited exceptions, "evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that [the person] acted 
in conformity therewith."   
¶140 The exclusion of other acts evidence is based on the 
fear that, if allowed to focus on an accused's character, the 
trier of fact might punish the accused for being a bad person 
regardless of his or her guilt of the crime charged or might 
infer that the accused has a propensity to commit certain acts 
and acted according to his character in committing the act 
charged.13   
¶141 As Justice Bradley has written, Wisconsin's other acts 
jurisprudence "consistently reveals that courts may freely 
permit prior acts evidence in child sexual assault cases to show 
the defendant's propensity to abuse children."14  This case is 
part of that jurisprudence eroding the evidentiary rule.  I 
disagree with this erosion, and Justice Bradley, Justice 
Bablitch, and I have called for the court to stop pretending to 
adhere to Rule 904.04(2) and to acknowledge forthrightly that it 
sanctions the use of propensity evidence in child sexual assault 
cases.   
                                                 
13 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 781, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998); State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 378 N.W.2d 272 
(1985).  See also Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 291, 149 
N.W.2d 557 (1967). 
14 State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶108, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 
N.W.2d 606 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No.  98-2387-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶142 I urge the court to adhere to Justice Bradley's sound 
counsel: 
¶Rather than endeavoring to stretch beyond repair the 
definitions 
of 
the 
acceptable 
purposes 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), 
the 
majority 
should 
simply lay all its cards on the table and acknowledge 
that it is sanctioning the blanket use of propensity 
evidence in child sexual assault cases.  However, the 
majority maintains its refuge under the cloak of the 
very statute it simultaneously erodes.  
 . . . . 
An honest and forthright approach by the majority 
would serve us all better than perpetrating the 
artifice 
of 
adherence 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2).  Because the majority engages in 
legal 
gymnastics 
to 
justify 
the 
admission 
of 
propensity evidence in contravention of the statute, I 
dissent.15 
¶143 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
15 Id., ¶¶109-110. 
No.  98-2387-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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