Title: State ex rel. William A. Stinson, Relator vs. The Honorable Ted House, Respondent.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90364
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2010

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE ex rel. WIILIAM A. STINSON,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relator,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90364 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
The HONORABLE TED HOUSE,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
 
Opinion issued July 16, 2010 
 
Introduction 
 
William Stinson was ordered by the trial court to execute a medical records 
authorization to release his healthcare records in a wrongful death action filed against 
him and his parents.  This Court granted Mr. Stinson’s request for a preliminary writ of 
prohibition preventing the trial court from compelling execution of the authorization.    
Because the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Mr. Stinson to sign a medical 
records authorization permitting disclosure of his medical records that are protected by 
the physician-patient privilege, the preliminary writ is made permanent. 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
On August 14, 2004, William A. Stinson was involved in a high-speed automobile 
collision that resulted in the death of Ricky J. Young.  Mr. Young’s daughter, Shauna 
Young, is the plaintiff in the present wrongful death suit.  Her amended petition for 
wrongful death contains two counts.  The first count seeks damages against Mr. Stinson 
for negligently operating the motor vehicle that caused her father’s death.  The 
allegations in the petition state that, at the time of the collision, Mr. Young was 
attempting to turn off of the interstate when Mr. Stinson, who was approaching from 
behind, moved into the left lane to pass and struck Mr. Young’s vehicle.  The petition 
further alleges that Mr. Stinson was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the 
crash and was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. 
 
The second count in Ms. Young’s petition seeks damages against Mr. Stinson’s 
parents and their automobile dealership1 for negligently entrusting Mr. Stinson with the 
vehicle involved in the collision.  The petition alleges that Mr. Stinson’s parents knew or 
should have known that Mr. Stinson was addicted to alcohol and drugs that impaired his 
driving ability, that he had received medical treatment for such addictions, and that he 
had been charged and convicted of numerous alcohol-related driving offenses prior to the 
August 14 collision. 
 
In the course of discovery, Ms. Young served Mr. Stinson with a request for 
production asking him to execute a medical records authorization permitting the 
                                             
 
1 Mr. Stinson’s parents are officers and agents of William B. Stinson & Sons, Co. d/b/a 
W.B. Select Auto Center.  
disclosure of all medical and psychological records pertaining to treatment he had 
received for alcohol, drug, or substance abuse problems dating back to 1990.  Mr. Stinson 
objected to the request on the ground that the records sought were protected by physician-
patient privilege, which had not been waived.  The trial court overruled Mr. Stinson’s 
objection and ordered him to execute the medical records authorization. 
 
Thereafter, Mr. Stinson filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of 
appeals to prevent the trial judge from compelling Mr. Stinson to sign the medical 
records authorization.  After granting a preliminary order in prohibition, the court of 
appeals quashed its order and denied Mr. Stinson’s writ petition.  Mr. Stinson then 
petitioned this Court for a preliminary writ of prohibition, which the Court issued.  Mo. 
Const. art. V sec. 4. 
Discussion 
 
In his sole point relied on, Mr. Stinson argues that he is entitled to a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its order requiring execution of the 
medical records authorization because his medical records are protected by the physician-
patient privilege, which has not been waived.  Mr. Stinson contends that by ordering the 
execution of the medical records authorization form, the trial court acted in excess of its 
authority, thereby entitling him to a writ of prohibition. 
Prohibition is an appropriate remedy when a party is ordered to produce material that 
is protected from discovery by some privilege.  State ex rel. Rogers v. Cohen, 262 
S.W.3d 648, 650 (Mo. banc 2008).  Otherwise, if privileged material were produced, the 
damage to the disclosing party would be irreparable and could not be repaired on appeal.  
 
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Id. (citing State ex rel. Boone Ret. Ctr., Inc. v. Hamilton, 946 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Mo. banc 
1997)).   
 
The physician-patient privilege is established by section 491.060.2  The statute 
provides that a licensed physician or psychologist is “incompetent to testify . . . 
concerning any information which he or she may have acquired from any patient while 
attending the patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to 
enable him or her to prescribe and provide treatment for such patient as a physician. . . .”  
Section 491.060(5).  The physician-patient privilege “applies to medical records and all 
aspects of discovery.”  State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Mo. 
banc 2006).  See also Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 62 (Mo. banc 
1999); State ex rel. Benoit v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Mo. banc 1968). 
In the present case, the medical records sought by Ms. Young fall within the 
protective scope of the physician-patient privilege.  The medical records authorization 
form submitted with Ms. Young’s request for production sought disclosure of “all 
personal health information pertaining to any care, treatment, evaluation, diagnosis 
and/or observation for medical, psychiatric or psychological services arising out of, or in 
any way relating to, alcohol, drug or substance abuse problems and any medical, 
psychiatric or psychological conditions relating thereto from January 1, 1990 to the 
present.”  By its terms, the request seeks access to records containing information used to 
evaluate, diagnose, and treat Mr. Stinson.  Such records assuredly would include 
                                             
 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
 
 
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information acquired from Mr. Stinson by a physician or psychologist to prescribe and 
provide treatment and, therefore, fall within the scope of the physician-patient privilege. 
 
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Stinson placed any of his 
medical conditions in issue or took any other steps to affirmatively waive the privilege.  
The mere fact that Mr. Stinson has denied liability and is defending against the present 
suit does not constitute a waiver of the privilege.  Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 63.  
Therefore, because the requested documents fall within the scope of the physician-patient 
privilege and there is no evidence that Mr. Stinson waived the privilege, the privilege 
bars the discovery of the medical records Ms. Young requested. 
 
Despite the applicability of the physician-patient privilege, Ms. Young argues that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Stinson to execute the medical 
records authorization because the requested records are relevant to her claim against Mr. 
Stinson’s parents for negligent entrustment.  Ms. Young claims the records are relevant 
because they help prove that Mr. Stinson’s parents knew or should have known that he 
was incompetent to drive a motor vehicle.3   
The mere fact that the privileged medical records may be relevant to Ms. Young’s 
claim for negligent entrustment does not mean that the medical records are discoverable.  
The very nature of an evidentiary privilege is that it removes evidence that is otherwise 
relevant and discoverable from the scope of discovery.  See Rule 56.01(b)(1).  Therefore, 
                                             
 
3 One of the elements for negligent entrustment is that the entrustor knew or had reason to 
know of the entrustee’s incompetence.  McHaffie By and Through McHaffie v. Bunch, 
891 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. banc 1995). 
 
 
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the fact that the medical records might be relevant to Ms. Young’s claim for negligent 
entrustment does not alter the conclusion that the records are undiscoverable. 
 
Ms. Young also argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. 
Stinson to execute the medical records authorization because the disclosure of the 
requested medical records does not violate the public policy underlying the physician-
patient privilege.  She argues the privilege only is intended to protect patients from 
having the information they provide to their doctors used against them personally in a 
subsequent suit.  Consequently, Ms. Young claims that because the medical records in 
this case will be used only to prove the liability of Mr. Stinson’s parents, the public 
policy underlying the privilege is not implicated.  Ms. Young’s public policy argument 
ignores the language in section 491.060. 
  
As noted previously, section 491.060 states that a licensed physician or psychologist 
“shall be incompetent to testify . . . concerning any information which he or she may 
have acquired from any patient. . . .”  The language of the statute does not limit the 
application of the privilege only to situations in which the confidential medical 
information will be used against the physician’s patient.  This Court must give effect to 
statutes as they are written.  Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Mo. banc 
1998).  Because the legislature did not limit the scope of the privilege only to situations 
in which the confidential medical information will be used against the patient, the 
privilege applies to all circumstances in which a physician or psychologist is called on to 
give testimony or produce records concerning information that was acquired from a 
patient, regardless of whether the information will be used against the patient.  
 
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Moreover, contrary to Ms. Young’s argument, the public policy underlying the 
physician-patient privilege is implicated when confidential information is disclosed, even 
if it will not be used against the patient.  “The purpose of the physician-patient privilege 
is to enable the patient to secure complete and appropriate medical treatment by 
encouraging candid communication between patient and physician, free from fear of the 
possible embarrassment and invasion of privacy engendered by an unauthorized 
disclosure of information.”  State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. banc 
1989).  The public policy of encouraging candid communication between patient and 
physician would be undermined if patients feared that their physicians or psychologists 
could disclose their confidential communications in any lawsuit, regardless of whether 
the information would be used against the patient or a third party.  Information contained 
in a patient’s medical file becomes no less private or potentially embarrassing to the 
patient merely because the information will be utilized against someone other than the 
patient.  Not surprisingly, therefore, this Court previously found that the physician-patient 
privilege bars the disclosure of medical records belonging to patients who were not 
parties to the suit.  See, e.g., Benoit, 431 S.W.2d 107. 
 
Here, Mr. Stinson faces the same possibility of embarrassment and invasion of 
privacy that he would face if his medical records were released to prove claims against 
him personally, rather than his parents.  Consequently, the requested disclosure fits 
squarely within the policy rationale underlying the physician-patient privilege.  Ms. 
Young’s argument to the contrary is without merit. 
 Conclusion 
 
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The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Mr. Stinson to sign a medical records 
authorization to disclose medical records that were protected by the physician-patient 
privilege.  If the privileged medical documents were required to be produced, Mr. Stinson 
would suffer irreparable injury that could not be repaired on appeal.  Therefore, the 
preliminary writ of prohibition is made permanent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
All concur. 
 
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