Title: Patten v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002865
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
THOMAS EDWARD PATTEN, III, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF MAURA K. PATTEN 
 
v.  Record No. 002865   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON 
Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider an issue of sovereign immunity 
arising from the trial court's dismissal of a wrongful death 
action under an exception in the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code 
§§ 8.01-195.1 through -195.9 (the Act). 
 
Thomas E. Patten, III, administrator of the estate of Maura 
K. Patten (the decedent), filed a motion for judgment against 
the Commonwealth and certain of its employees alleging, among 
other things, that based on their negligence, the decedent died 
while she was a patient at Western State Hospital (Western 
State).1  Western State is a residential psychiatric facility 
operated by the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, an agency of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patten alleged that employees of Western State failed to 
provide adequate medical treatment to the decedent, which 
                     
 
1The individual defendants were later dismissed from the 
action without prejudice by an order of nonsuit. 
resulted in her death.  On the date of her death, the decedent 
was being held at Western State pursuant to an April 1997 
"Certification and Order for Involuntary Admission to a Public 
or Licensed Private Facility" (the commitment order).  The 
commitment order, issued by a special justice for the City of 
Staunton, stated in relevant part: 
To the sheriff or other authorized officer of said 
county or city and to the director of Western State 
Hospital . . . [The decedent] [h]as . . . proved to be 
so seriously mentally ill as to be substantially 
unable to care for [her]self. . . . The alternatives 
to involuntary hospitalization and treatment were 
investigated and were deemed unsuitable.  I have found 
that there is no less restrictive alternative to 
involuntary hospitalization and treatment in this 
case.  I therefore, command you, the said sheriff, 
other authorized officer or responsible person, to 
make provision for the suitable and proper care of the 
person named in the foregoing petition and to deliver 
such person to the director of Western State Hospital 
. . . for involuntary hospitalization and treatment 
not to exceed 180 days from this date.  Furthermore, 
if admission is denied pursuant to §§ 37.1-68 or 37.1-
70, you are hereby authorized to return [the decedent] 
to this jurisdiction. 
 
 
According to the motion for judgment, the decedent suffered 
from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and had been 
involuntarily committed to Western State on a continuous basis 
from February 1991 until her death in July 1997.  In addition to 
schizophrenia, the decedent had a known history of obesity and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  As a result of changes 
in the decedent's anti-psychotic medication, she experienced a 
large increase in weight, which adversely affected her 
 
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cardiovascular system.  In November 1996, a medical evaluation 
determined that the decedent had an "above average" risk for 
cardiac disease associated with her use of one of her 
medications. 
 
The decedent's dosage of this drug was later reduced and an 
additional drug was added to her daily medications.  About a 
month later, the decedent informed her physicians at Western 
State that she "did not feel well" when taking her medications. 
 
On July 2, 1997, the decedent called some family members 
and friends and complained that she "felt like" she was dying.  
The next day, Margaret Keller, the decedent's sister, called 
officials at Western State to discuss various concerns regarding 
the decedent's worsening condition.  An employee of Western 
State indicated that she would request a full medical evaluation 
of the decedent after the July 4th holiday weekend.  The 
decedent died on July 7, 1997.  From July 3, 1997 to July 7, 
1997, the only information entered in the decedent's medical 
chart were notations of medications administered to her.  An 
autopsy report stated that the cause of her death was "coronary 
insufficiency due to coronary atherosclerosis and cardiomegaly 
due to hypertension." 
 
In response to Patten's motion for judgment, the 
Commonwealth filed a plea of sovereign immunity.  The 
Commonwealth relied on Code § 8.01-195.3(4), which provides an 
 
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exception to the Commonwealth's limited waiver of immunity for 
tort claims "based upon an act or omission of an officer, agent 
or employee of any agency of government in the execution of a 
lawful order of any court."  The Commonwealth asserted that the 
acts alleged in Patten's motion for judgment were taken in the 
execution of such an order. 
 
The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's plea of 
sovereign immunity and dismissed Patten's motion for judgment 
with prejudice.  Patten appeals from the trial court's judgment. 
 
Patten argues that the employees of Western State were not 
acting pursuant to the execution of a lawful court order when 
they treated the decedent.  Patten contends that the commitment 
order did not require Western State to admit the decedent, and 
that its only mandate was directed to the sheriff of the City of 
Staunton.  According to Patten, the director of Western State 
was not ordered to take any action, but had discretion to decide 
whether to admit the decedent to that facility. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that this appeal is 
controlled by our decision in Baumgardner v. Southwestern 
Virginia Mental Health Institute, 247 Va. 486, 442 S.E.2d 400 
(1994), and contends that the acts and omissions of the Western 
State employees occurred during the execution of a lawful court 
order.  Thus, the Commonwealth asserts that under Code § 8.01-
 
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195.3(4), it is immune from liability for the alleged conduct of 
its employees.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
 
In the absence of express statutory or constitutional 
provisions waiving the Commonwealth's immunity, the Commonwealth 
and its agencies are immune from liability for the tortious acts 
or omissions of their agents and employees.  Melanson v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 178, 181, 539 S.E.2d 433, 434 (2001); 
Baumgardner, 247 Va. at 489, 442 S.E.2d at 401; VEPCO v. Hampton 
Red. Authority, 217 Va. 30, 32, 225 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1976).  In 
1981, the General Assembly stated in the Act an express, limited 
waiver of the Commonwealth's immunity from tort claims.  
Melanson, 261 Va. at 181, 539 S.E.2d at 434; Baumgardner, 247 
Va. at 489, 442 S.E.2d at 402; see Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 237 
Va. 621, 623, 379 S.E.2d 338, 340 (1989).  Because the Act is a 
statute in derogation of the common law, its limited waiver of 
immunity must be strictly construed.  Melanson, 261 Va. at 181, 
539 S.E.2d at 434; Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 250-
51, 467 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1996); Baumgardner, 247 Va. at 489, 442 
S.E.2d at 402. 
 
The present appeal, which requires us to apply the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-195.3(4), is controlled by our 
decision in Baumgardner.  There, we held that the "court order" 
exception of Code § 8.01-195.3(4) applied to a wrongful death 
action against the Commonwealth in which the plaintiff's 
 
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decedent was admitted to a mental health institute operated by 
an agency of the Commonwealth.  She was placed in "isolation" in 
a holding cell in the mental health institute and later died 
from a cardiac arrhythmia.  Id. at 488, 442 S.E.2d at 401.  The 
plaintiff alleged that the decedent's death was caused by the 
negligence of certain employees acting within the scope of their 
employment. 
 
The admission order, issued by a general district court, 
ordered the director of the mental health institute: 
[T]o detain said patient for a maximum of 48 hours 
from time of admission to his/her hearing . . . .  The 
[patient] may also be transported to such other 
facility as may be necessary to obtain emergency 
medical evaluation or treatment prior to placement in 
the hospital.  The institution and examining physician 
may provide (only emergency) medical and psychiatric 
services pursuant to this order.  The patient may not 
be released prior to the expiration of such period 
except by order of court. 
 
Id.
 
We held that the plain language of Code § 8.01-195.3(4) 
barred the plaintiff's tort claim because the alleged acts and 
omissions of the institute's employees occurred in the execution 
of a lawful court order.  Id. at 489, 442 S.E.2d at 402.  Under 
the present facts, we likewise conclude that Patten's motion for 
judgment is barred under Code § 8.01-195.3(4).  The decedent was 
involuntarily admitted to Western State pursuant to the 
commitment order, which authorized "the director of Western 
 
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State" to admit the decedent for the purpose of "involuntary 
hospitalization and treatment" for a period "not to exceed 180 
days." 
 
All the acts or omissions alleged by Patten occurred while 
the employees of Western State were engaged in the execution of 
this order for the involuntary hospitalization and treatment of 
the decedent.2  The term "court order," within the meaning of 
Code § 8.01-195.3(4), includes both mandatory and discretionary 
acts authorized by that order.  As we explained in Baumgardner, 
"Code § 8.01-195.3(4) does not exclude discretionary acts from 
its scope; instead, it specifically encompasses any claim that 
is based upon acts or omissions occurring in the execution of a 
lawful court order."  Id. at 490, 442 S.E.2d at 402.  Thus, to 
the extent that Patten's motion for judgment is based on the 
performance or omission of discretionary acts, those acts are 
not removed from the scope of Code § 8.01-195.3(4). 
 
We also find no merit in Patten's argument that the 
commitment order did not require that the director of Western 
                     
 
2 The commitment order directed this involuntary 
hospitalization and treatment, subject to two exceptions that 
are not relevant here.  The order provided that the director of 
Western State may deny admission pursuant to Code §§ 37.1-68 and 
–70.  However, Patten does not claim that the decedent's 
admission papers did not substantially conform to the law, as 
required by Code § 37.1-68.  Likewise, Patten does not allege 
that the decedent was not mentally ill.  Therefore, the 
director's discretion under Code § 37.1-70 to deny admission to 
such a person has no bearing on our analysis.   
 
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State take any action regarding the decedent.  Such a 
construction would render meaningless the order's language 
directing the "involuntary hospitalization and treatment [of the 
decedent] not to exceed 180 days." 
 
Finally, our conclusion that Code § 8.01-195.3(4) bars the 
present action is not affected by our decision in Whitley v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 538 S.E.2d 296 (2000).  There, we 
considered whether the "court order" exception in Code § 8.01-
195.3(4) barred a wrongful death action against the Commonwealth 
and certain of its employees based on a claim that the decedent 
received inadequate medical treatment while incarcerated at a 
state correctional facility.  Id. at 486, 538 S.E.2d at 297-98.  
The order at issue directed that the decedent be incarcerated, 
and did not provide that he be given medical care.  Id. at 495, 
538 S.E.2d at 303. 
 
We held that the employees giving medical care to the 
decedent were not performing acts "in the execution of a lawful 
order of any court," as contemplated by Code § 8.01-195.3(4), 
but merely were providing medical care to the decedent because 
he was an inmate at the correctional facility.  Id. at 495-96, 
538 S.E.2d at 303.  Thus, unlike the acts alleged by Patten, the 
acts alleged in Whitley were outside the scope of the statutory 
exception. 
 
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For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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