Title: PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120437
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2003

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 20, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 120437  
CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121698  
MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in these cases to consider  
 
whether the lower courts properly applied the exclusionary  
rule to evidence seized pursuant to (1) a search warrant that  
was issued in violation of MCL 780.653 and (2) a bench warrant  
that was issued in violation of MCR 3.606(A).  
Because we conclude that neither the statute nor the  
court rule contemplates application of the exclusionary rule,  
we reverse in both cases. 
In People v Hawkins (see  
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued  
September 28, 2001 [Docket No. 230839]), we hold that evidence  
of firearms and cocaine seized pursuant to a search warrant  
should not have been suppressed on the ground that the warrant  
was issued in violation of the affidavit requirements of MCL  
780.653(b).  In People v Scherf (see 251 Mich App 410; 651  
NW2d 77 [2002]), we hold that evidence of marijuana seized  
from defendant following his arrest should not have been  
suppressed on the ground that the bench warrant pursuant to  
which he was arrested was issued in violation of the affidavit  
requirements of MCR 3.606(A).  
I. FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
A. PEOPLE V HAWKINS  
Detective Todd Butler of the Grand Rapids Police  
1These cases have not yet been tried.  Our statement of  
facts is derived from the preliminary examination and motion 
hearing transcripts and from the documentation contained in 
the lower court records.  
2  
 
 
Department received tips from two informants that illegal  
controlled 
substances were being sold from a residence located  
at 921 Humbolt, S.E., in Grand Rapids.  On the basis of the  
information provided by these sources, Butler sought a search  
warrant to search the residence.  Butler’s affidavit set forth  
the following facts in support of the issuance of the warrant:  
1. Your affiant received information from an  
informant on 10/14/99 that the resident of 921 
Humbolt S.E. was involved in the sale of narcotics.  
The informant stated the residence [sic] is selling 
the controlled substance crack cocaine. 
The  
informant described the resident and seller of the  
controlled substance as “Chris,” B/M, approx. 20, 
5'8", 170 [lbs], medium build/complexion, short 
hair.  
2. Your affiant met with a reliable and  
credible informant on 11/3/99.  Your affiant was  
advised that the informant had observed the  
controlled substance cocaine available for sale  
from the residence within the past 36 hours.  
3. Your affiant was advised by the informant 
the entry door to the suspects [sic] apartment has 
been reinforced to delay a police entry.  
On November 3, 1999, a judge of the 61st District Court  
issued the requested warrant, and the residence was searched  
the same day.  During the search, police seized two stolen  
firearms, approximately 20 grams of cocaine, and other  
contraband.  Defendant, who was not present during the search,  
was stopped by police while driving his vehicle.  Defendant  
was then arrested and later bound over for trial on several  
3  
 
charges.2  
Defendant sought suppression of the evidence seized in  
the execution of the search warrant, arguing that the  
affidavit in support of the warrant was constitutionally  
deficient in that it did not support a finding of probable  
cause, the information it contained was stale, and it did not  
clearly reveal whether one or two informants had supplied the  
information.
 Defendant additionally contended that the  
affidavit did not meet the requirements of MCL 780.653(B)  
because it did not include information concerning the  
credibility of the unnamed informants or the reliability of  
the information they supplied.  
The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to suppress  
the evidence and dismissed the case on the grounds that the  
affidavit 
was 
both 
constitutionally 
deficient 
and 
in 
violation  
of MCL 780.653. 
The court declined the prosecutor’s  
invitation to apply the federal “good-faith exception,” under  
which 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is not applicable  
to evidence seized by officers acting in reasonable reliance  
2Defendant was charged with possession with intent to 
deliver 
less 
than 
50 
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); 
maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d); possession of a 
firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; driving with a suspended 
license, MCL 257.904(3)(b); and two counts of receiving and 
concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535b.  Additionally, 
defendant was charged with being a second-time drug offender, 
MCL 333.7413(2), and a fourth-time felony offender, MCL 
769.12.  
4  
 
      
on a warrant that is subsequently adjudged constitutionally  
deficient.3  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit  
court’s order to suppress evidence on the sole basis that the  
affidavit supporting the search warrant did not meet the  
requirements of MCL 780.653.  Slip op at 3.  The panel  
concluded that People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d 380  
(1995), in which this Court held that evidence obtained under  
a search warrant issued in violation of § 653 must be  
suppressed, was dispositive.  Slip op at 2.  Accordingly, the  
panel 
declined 
to 
address the constitutionality of the warrant  
or the prosecution’s argument that the good-faith exception  
was applicable. Id. at 3.  
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to  
appeal to this Court, limited to the issue whether the  
exclusionary rule applies to a violation of § 653. 466 Mich  
860 (2002).  
B. PEOPLE V SCHERF  
In 
a 
prior 
case, 
defendant 
pleaded 
guilty 
of  
manufacturing with intent to deliver between five and forty­
five 
kilograms 
of 
marijuana 
in 
violation 
of 
MCL  
333.7401(2)(D)(ii) and was sentenced to probation.  Defendant  
3See Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed  
2d 34 (1995); United States v Leon, 468 US 897; 104 S Ct 3405;  
82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984).  
5  
 
allegedly moved out of Michigan without permission and  
thereafter failed to report to his probation officer in  
violation of two of the terms of his probation.  Consequently,  
defendant’s probation officer filed a standard form petition  
requesting that a bench warrant be issued for his arrest.  The  
petition contained the following statements:  
Petitioner requests that a bench warrant be 
issued and Michael Brandon Scherf be arrested and  
held in contempt of court for the following 
reason(s):  
Violation of Rule Number 3: The defendant has  
failed to report as ordered and his whereabouts are 
unknown.  Violation of Rule Number 4: Failure to  
notify agent of change of address.  
The petition contained the statement, “I declare that the  
statements above are true to the best of my information,  
knowledge, and belief,” and was signed by the probation  
officer.  The district court issued the requested bench  
warrant.  
Subsequently, police were interviewing defendant in  
connection with an unrelated larceny complaint when they  
discovered, via the Law Enforcement Information Network  
(LEIN), the outstanding bench warrant for his arrest.  
Defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant.  During a  
search incident to the arrest, police seized several grams of  
marijuana from defendant’s person.  Thereafter, defendant was  
charged with possession of marijuana in violation of MCL  
6  
 
333.7403(2)(d).  
Defendant 
sought 
suppression 
of 
evidence 
of 
the 
marijuana  
on the ground that the bench warrant petition was technically  
deficient in that it was not supported by affidavits as  
required by MCR 3.606(A), which governs contempt offenses  
committed outside the immediate presence of the court.  The  
prosecutor conceded that MCR 3.606(A) was violated because no  
affidavit was submitted in support of the probation officer’s  
petition. The prosecutor argued, however, that the district  
court division of the Isabella County Trial Court should apply  
the federal “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.  
The 
district 
court 
division 
denied 
defendant’s 
motion, 
holding  
that the bench warrant petition was confirmed by oath or  
affirmation and was therefore properly issued.  Additionally,  
the district court division noted that it found Arizona v  
Evans, 514 US 1; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995), which  
reaffirmed and applied the good-faith exception, to be  
persuasive authority.  
Defendant appealed, and the circuit court reversed the  
district 
court 
division’s 
order, 
granted 
defendant’s 
motion 
to  
suppress the marijuana evidence, and dismissed the case.  The  
court held that although the failure to provide an affidavit  
with the bench warrant petition was merely “technical,” it  
rendered the warrant invalid. 
The court rejected the  
7  
 
 
 
prosecutor’s argument that the good-faith exception was  
applicable, stating on the record that the exception was not  
recognized in Michigan.  
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal to the Court of  
Appeals, asserting that the good-faith exception should be  
applied under the circumstances. 
The Court granted the  
prosecutor’s application and affirmed the circuit court  
division’s order.  251 Mich App 410. The majority4 noted that  
the bench warrant petition “was not supported by an affidavit  
as required by MCR 3.606," id. at 411, and that “it is  
undisputed that defendant’s arrest, and the resultant search  
of defendant and seizure of evidence, were based on an invalid  
bench warrant and, therefore, the arrest and consequential  
search were unlawful,” id. at 415.  The majority indicated  
that it would have applied the good-faith exception to the  
exclusionary rule and reversed the circuit court division’s  
decision if it were not obligated under MCR 7.215(I)(1) to  
follow People v Hill, 192 Mich App 54; 480 NW2d 594 (1991), in  
which another panel of the Court specifically declined to  
recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.5  
215 Mich App 415-416.   
4Judge Jessica R. Cooper concurred in the result only.  
5The Court subsequently declined to convene a special 
panel to resolve the potential conflict with Hill, supra.  
People v Scherf, 251 Mich App 805 (2002).  
8  
 
 
This 
Court 
granted 
the 
prosecutor’s 
application 
for 
leave  
to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  467 Mich 856  
(2002).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress  
evidence are reviewed de novo.  People v Hamilton, 465 Mich  
526, 529; 638 NW2d 92 (2002); People v Stevens (After Remand),  
460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999).6  
We must determine in these cases whether suppression of  
evidence is required when MCL 780.653 or MCR 3.606(A) has been  
violated.
 Where a state statute is involved, “whether  
suppression is appropriate is a question of statutory  
interpretation and thus one of legislative intent.”  People v  
Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001),  
quoting Stevens, supra at 644, quoting People v Wood, 450 Mich  
399, 408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (BOYLE, J., concurring).  
Similarly, “[t]he interpretation of a court rule is a question  
of law and is reviewed de novo.”  Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467  
Mich 337, 340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002); see also People v Petit,  
466 Mich 624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).  
6See also People v Hudson, 465 Mich 932 (2001).  
9  
 
 
 
 
   
III. ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
First and foremost, it is important to understand what is  
not before this Court in deciding the issues presented in  
these cases.  We are concerned solely with application of the  
exclusionary rule to a statutory violation (People v Hawkins)  
and to a court rule violation (People v Scherf). The judgment  
of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins was based exclusively on  
the conceded violation of MCL 780.653, and the Court  
specifically declined to address the constitutional validity  
of the search warrant affidavit or the good-faith exception to  
the constitutional exclusionary rule.  Likewise, in Scherf we  
are not concerned with the constitutional validity of the  
bench warrant or of the potential application of the good­
faith exception.  Although the Court of Appeals majority in  
Scherf indicated a willingness to apply the good-faith  
exception in order to avoid suppression of the evidence for  
the conceded violation of MCR 3.606(A), application of that  
exception 
would 
have 
been wholly premature, given that neither  
the circuit court division nor the Court of Appeals panel had  
found a constitutional violation in the first instance.7  
7Moreover, defendant Scherf did not preserve for our 
review any argument that the affidavit in support of the 
issuance of the bench warrant was constitutionally deficient. 
Rather, his sole argument in support of his motion to suppress 
was that the affidavit did not meet the technical requirements 
of MCR 3.606(A).  
10  
 
 
With that in mind, we must determine whether the  
statutory and court rule violations in these cases warrant  
suppression of the evidence.  
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE  
The 
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that  
originated as a means to protect the Fourth Amendment right of  
citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  
See Stevens, supra at 634-635; see also Weeks v United States,  
232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), overruled on  
other grounds in Elkins v United States, 364 US 206; 80 S Ct  
1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Adams v New York, 192 US 585; 24  
S Ct 372; 48 L Ed 575 (1904); Boyd v United States, 116 US  
616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886). The exclusionary rule,  
modified 
by 
several 
exceptions,8 
generally 
bars 
the  
introduction 
into 
evidence 
of 
materials 
seized 
and  
observations 
made 
during 
an 
unconstitutional 
search. 
 
Stevens,  
supra at 634, 636. However, application of the exclusionary  
8For example, the “ good-faith exception,” which has been 
asserted by the prosecutors in the cases at bar, permits 
admission of evidence seized by police officers in reasonable 
reliance on a constitutionally defective search warrant.  See  
Arizona, supra; Leon, supra. 
As noted, because of the 
procedural posture of the instant cases, we do not reach the 
constitutionality of the warrants at issue and, consequently, 
we do not address the applicability of the good-faith 
exception to a violation of Michigan’s counterpart to the 
Fourth Amendment, Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  We note that leave  
has recently been granted in People v Goldston, 467 Mich 938 
(2003), in which this Court will consider whether to adopt and 
apply a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  
11  
 
 
 
rule is not constitutionally mandated, and  
[t]he question whether the exclusionary rule’s 
remedy is appropriate in a particular context [is] 
regarded as an issue separate from the question 
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party 
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police 
conduct. [Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 223; 103 S 
Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).]  
Moreover, the exclusionary rule is not designed to “make  
whole” a citizen who has been subjected to an unconstitutional  
search or seizure.  Rather, the aim of the rule is one of  
police deterrence:  
The wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment 
is “fully accomplished” by the unlawful search or 
seizure itself . . . and the exclusionary rule is 
neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion of  
the defendant’s rights which he has already 
suffered.” . . . The rule thus operates as “a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its  
deterrent 
effect, 
rather 
than 
a 
personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” . . . 
. [United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct 
3407; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984).]  
Irrespective of the application of the exclusionary rule  
in the context of a constitutional violation, the drastic  
remedy of exclusion of evidence does not necessarily apply to  
a statutory violation.9  Whether the exclusionary rule should  
9The exclusionary rule is particularly harsh in that it 
is neither narrowly tailored nor discerning of the magnitude 
of the error it is intended to deter.  By taking no cognizance 
of the effect of a police error upon a particular defendant, 
or of the actual guilt or innocence of a defendant, the 
exclusionary rule lacks proportionality. 
Given these  
characteristics, we decline to expand the use of this rule in 
(continued...)  
12  
 
be applied to evidence seized in violation of a statute is  
purely a matter of legislative intent.  Hamilton, supra at  
534.  
“‘Because our judicial role precludes imposing 
different policy choices from those selected by the 
Legislature, our obligation is, by examining the 
statutory language, to discern the legislative 
intent that may reasonably be inferred from the 
words expressed in the statute. . . . When a 
statute 
is 
clear 
and 
unambiguous, 
judicial 
construction or interpretation is unnecessary and 
therefore, precluded.’” [Sobczak-Obetts, supra at  
694-695 (citations omitted).]  
Likewise, 
whether suppression of evidence on the basis of  
the violation of a court rule is appropriate is controlled by  
the language of the rule. “This Court applies principles of  
statutory 
interpretation 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
court 
rules.  
When the language is unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning  
plainly 
expressed, 
and 
judicial 
construction 
is 
not  
permitted.” Hinkle, supra at 340.  
C. PEOPLE V HAWKINS  
At issue in Hawkins is whether evidence seized from a  
residence 
pursuant 
to a search warrant was properly suppressed  
because the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not  
meet the requirements of MCL 780.653 in Michigan’s search  
warrant act, MCL 780.651 to 780.659.  MCL 780.653 provides, in  
9(...continued) 
the absence of an explicit constitutional or legislative 
requirement.  
13  
 
 
 
pertinent part:  
The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or 
probable cause shall be based upon all the facts 
related within the affidavit made before him or  
her.  The affidavit may be based upon information 
supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed 
person if the affidavit contains 1 of the  
following:  
* * *  
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative 
allegations from which the magistrate may conclude 
that the person spoke with personal knowledge of 
the information and either that the unnamed person 
is credible or that the information is reliable.[10]  
MCL 780.653(b) derives from the defunct “two-pronged test”  
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v  
Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), and  
Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d  
637 (1969), for determining whether an anonymous informant’s  
tip established probable cause for issuance of a search  
warrant. See People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502, 509; 364 NW2d  
658 (1984).  Under the Aguilar-Spinelli formulation as it was  
10Section 1 of the search warrant act, MCL 780.651, 
provides in part:  
(1)  When an affidavit is made on oath to  
a magistrate authorized to issue warrants in 
criminal cases, and the affidavit establishes 
grounds for issuing a warrant pursuant to this 
act, the magistrate, if he or she is satisfied 
that there is probable cause for the search, 
shall issue a warrant to search the house, 
building, or other location or place where the 
property or thing to be searched for and seized 
is situated.  
14  
 
 
  
 
generally understood, a search warrant affidavit based on  
information 
supplied 
by an anonymous informant was required to  
contain both (1) some of the underlying circumstances  
evidencing the informant’s basis of knowledge and (2) facts  
establishing either the veracity or the reliability of the  
information.  See Gates, supra at 228-229; Sherbine, supra at  
509.11  
This Court has previously held that a violation of the  
affidavit 
requirements 
of 
MCL 
780.653 
warranted 
suppression 
of  
evidence. 
Sloan, supra; Sherbine, supra. 
Because we are  
unable to conclude that the Legislature intended application  
of the exclusionary rule where the requirements of § 653 have  
not been met, we overrule Sloan and Sherbine to the extent  
that they so hold, and we conclude that defendant was not  
entitled to suppression of evidence on the basis of the  
statutory violation.  
In Sherbine, 
this Court held that suppression of evidence  
11In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the 
Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test in favor of a “totality of 
the circumstances” approach.  Accordingly, in determining 
whether a search warrant affidavit that is based on hearsay 
information passes Fourth Amendment muster,  
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the  
affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place. [Gates, supra 
at 238.]  
15  
 
 
was required where a search warrant affidavit violated a  
previous version of § 65312 in that it did not make any showing  
that an informant was a credible person and that he supplied  
reliable information.13
 Although this Court specifically  
declined to decide whether satisfaction of the federal  
Aguilar-Spinelli test is required under Const 1963, art 1, §  
11—that is, whether the requirements of § 653 are rooted in  
Michigan’s constitutional search and seizure provision—this  
Court nevertheless applied the exclusionary rule to the  
statutory violation.  In so doing, this Court failed to  
examine the language of § 653 to determine whether the  
Legislature intended that such a drastic remedy be applied to  
a violation of the statutory affidavit requirements.  Rather,  
this Court relied on People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222 NW2d  
12In 1984, § 653 provided:  
The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or 
probable cause shall be based upon all the facts 
related within the affidavit made before him. The  
affidavit may be based upon reliable information 
supplied to the complainant from a credible person, 
named or unnamed, so long as the affidavit contains 
affirmative allegations that the person spoke with 
personal 
knowledge 
of 
the 
matters 
contained  
therein.  
13We concluded in Sherbine that preamendment § 653 
expanded the Aguilar-Spinelli test to require that the 
affidavit set forth facts showing both that a confidential  
informant was credible and that the information was reliable.  
Sherbine, supra at 509-510.  The current version of § 653, as 
amended by 1988 PA 80, makes clear that a showing of either  
credibility or reliability is required.  
16  
 
 
   
 
749 (1974), in which this Court similarly applied the  
exclusionary rule to a statutory violation without performing  
the requisite examination of legislative intent.14
 We  
concluded, “The statutory violation here is clear.  The  
statute requires proof that the informant who supplied the  
information be credible.  The affidavit here failed to satisfy  
this 
requirement. 
 
The evidence must therefore be suppressed.”  
Sherbine, supra at 512.  
Justice Boyle dissented, opining that preamendment § 653  
required a showing of either reliability or credibility, and  
that this Court had misconstrued the statute as an expansion  
of Aguilar. 
Sherbine, 421 Mich 513-514.  Additionally,  
Justice Boyle questioned whether suppression of the evidence  
was required under the circumstances: “I cannot conceive of  
a reason why we should apply the exclusionary rule to the  
supposed violation of a statute where the affidavit would pass  
14In Dixon, this Court held that suppression of evidence 
was required, and reversed the defendant’s conviction on the 
ground that a search of the defendant at a police station was 
in derogation of his right to bail under MCL 780.581.  This  
Court cited decisions from California and Oregon courts 
suppressing evidence for similar statutory violations, but 
noted that in several of those decisions the courts  
specifically found Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 704, 
n 18.  Acknowledging that its decision was not premised on the  
Fourth Amendment, id., this Court nevertheless concluded that  
suppression of evidence obtained in derogation of the  
statutory right to bail was required  because “no other remedy 
[was] as likely to assure its full enforcement,” id. at 705.  
17  
 
 
 
constitutional muster under either Const 1963, art 1, § 11, or  
US Const, Am IV . . . .” Id. at 516.  
In Sloan, this Court held that a violation of a different  
provision in the current version of § 653 required application  
of the exclusionary rule.  A search warrant was issued to  
obtain a blood test from the defendant, who was later charged  
with manslaughter with a motor vehicle,15 operating a motor  
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor  
causing death,16 and felonious driving.17  The portion of § 653  
at issue was the provision that “[t]he magistrate’s finding of  
reasonable or probable cause shall be based on all the facts  
related within the affidavit made before him or her.”  This  
Court held that this provision was violated when the  
magistrate looked beyond the affidavit, to unrecorded oral  
testimony of 
a 
police officer, in issuing the search warrant.18  
Relying on Sherbine, this Court further concluded that the  
blood test evidence had to be excluded because of the  
15MCL 750.321.  
16MCL 257.625(4).  
17MCL 752.191.  
18As 
in 
Sherbine, 
the 
Sloan 
Court 
specifically 
stated 
that 
it 
was 
not 
addressing whether the probable cause determination 
was constitutionally defective.  Sloan, supra at 183 n 17.  
Indeed, this Court noted that the affidavit requirement of § 
653 
was 
not 
constitutionally mandated under either Const 1963, 
art 1, § 11 or the Fourth Amendment. Id.  
18  
 
statutory violation:  
In Sherbine, we held that evidence obtained 
specifically in violation of MCL 780.653 . . . must 
be excluded.  The Legislature appears to have 
acquiesced in this particular construction of MCL 
780.653 . . . .  While the Legislature subsequently 
amended MCL 780.653 . . . because it disagreed with 
portions of our statutory analysis provided in 
Sherbine, it is significant that the Legislature 
when instituting such amendments did not alter our 
holding that evidence obtained in violation of the 
statute must be excluded.  To change the law in 
that regard would have been an easy and convenient 
task for the Legislature. Neither the language in 
the 
amendments, 
nor 
the 
legislative 
history 
pertinent to the amendments provide a basis for 
concluding that a sanction other than exclusion is 
appropriate for the violation of MCL 780.653 . . .  
.  Clearly, the Legislature shares our view that no 
remedy other than exclusion is as likely to assure 
the full enforcement of all of the requirements 
under MCL 780.653 . . .—a statute specifically 
designed by the Legislature to implement the  
constitutional mandate for probable cause under 
Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  [Sloan, supra at 183­
184.]  
Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Riley and Weaver,  
dissented, arguing that the statute was complied with and  
that, in any event, a violation of § 653 did not require  
application of the exclusionary rule:  
Application of the exclusionary rule to any 
technical violation of our search warrant statute  
that may have occurred in the present case is 
unwarranted.  Particularly where the magistrate is a 
sitting judge, as are virtually all magistrates in 
this state, I cannot conclude that the risk of 
relying on after-the-fact allegations are [sic] so 
substantial that we must suppress evidence.  The  
exclusionary rule is intended to serve a deterrent 
purpose, and loses any useful force and effect when 
applied to technical errors that do not rise to the 
level of negligent or wilful conduct, serving then  
19  
 
only to deprive the trier of fact of relevant and 
probative evidence.  As explained by the United 
States Supreme Court in Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 
433, 446-447; 94 S Ct 2357; 41 L Ed 2d 182 (1974):  
* * *  
“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary  
rule necessarily assumes that the police have 
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, 
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some 
right.  By refusing to admit evidence gained as a 
result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill 
in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care 
toward the rights of an accused.  Where the  
official action was pursued in complete good faith, 
however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its 
force.” 
[Sloan, 
supra 
at 
200 
(BOYLE, 
J., 
dissenting).]  
Justice 
Boyle 
additionally 
criticized 
the 
majority’s  
invocation of the “legislative acquiescence” doctrine:  
The 
majority’s 
assertion 
of 
legislative  
acquiescence in the decision in Sherbine . . . to use of  
the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in 
alleged violation of the statute before us is wholly 
mistaken.
 
In 
Sherbine, 
this 
Court’s 
majority 
interpreted the former version of the statute as if it 
imposed a more restrictive standard than the Fourth 
Amendment and suppressed evidence on the basis of that 
consideration.  The swift reaction of the Legislature 
was to amend MCL 780.653 . . . to make it clear that the  
Court was incorrect in concluding that what had occurred 
was a statutory violation.  The Legislature had no need 
to say what should not be excluded; it relied on the 
Court’s word that were it clear that the Legislature had 
authorized the warrant, suppression would not be  
ordered.  
Acting 
on 
our 
representation, 
the 
amended  
legislation tracked the Fourth Amendment.  Because “our  
holding that evidence obtained in violation of the 
statute must be excluded” . . . was wholly derived from 
our narrow reading of MCL 780.653 . . . , the  
legislative amendment of the statute is not an  
20  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
acquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, the view 
in Sherbine that the evidence should be excluded.  
[Sloan, supra at 202-203 (BOYLE, J., dissenting).]  
We agree with Justice Boyle and once again reaffirm that  
where there is no determination that a statutory violation  
constitutes 
an 
error 
of 
constitutional 
dimensions,  
application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate unless  
the plain language of the statute indicates a legislative  
intent that the rule be applied.  Hamilton, supra at 534;  
Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 694. Moreover, we reject the Sloan  
Court’s 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Legislature’s 
silence 
constituted  
agreement with this Court’s application of the exclusionary  
rule in Sherbine. 
As we have repeatedly stated, the  
“legislative 
acquiescence" 
principle 
of 
statutory  
construction has been squarely rejected by this Court because  
it reflects a critical misapprehension of the legislative  
process.  See Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732,  
760 n 15; 641 NW2d 567 (2002); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm,  
463 Mich 143, 177-178 n 33; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).  Rather,  
“Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature’s intent  
from its words, not from its silence.”  Donajkowski v Alpena  
Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
The dissent asserts that “the majority [has] imposed its  
own policy on the Legislature . . . .” 
Post at 10.  
Respectfully, we disagree and believe that it is not this  
21  
  
  
 
 
 
majority but the Sherbine and Sloan majorities that imposed  
their own policy choices on the Legislature with respect to  
the application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of §  
653.  Citing nothing in the text of the statute, the Sherbine  
Court simply declared, without further analysis, that because  
the statute was violated, “[t]he evidence must . . . be  
suppressed.” Sherbine, supra at 512. Similarly, the Sloan  
majority opined that “no remedy other than exclusion is as  
likely to assure the full enforcement of all of the  
requirements under MCL 780.653 . . . .” Sloan, supra at 184.  
The dissent purports to apply a “contextual analysis” of  
§ 653 in reaching the conclusion that the Legislature  
intended the exclusionary rule to apply to a violation of  
that statute.  Yet, as the dissenters readily admit, the text  
of § 653 is entirely silent in this regard.  Post at 2-3,  
generally.  Clearly, there is no principled basis for the  
contention that this Court’s injection of the exclusionary  
rule in Sherbine and Sloan is grounded in the statutory text.  
The dissent attempts to draw a distinction between  
legislative silence and reenactment of a statute following  
judicial interpretation. While we have no reason to contest  
that the “reenactment doctrine” can sometimes be a useful  
tool for determining legislative intent where the statutory  
language is ambiguous, such a tool of construction may not be  
22  
  
utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute.  
This Court’s constitutional charge to interpret the laws does  
not end merely because the Legislature reenacts a statute.19  
In the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature  
intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court’s prior  
construction, there is no reason to subordinate our primary  
principle of construction–to ascertain the Legislature’s  
intent by first examining the statute’s language–to the  
reenactment rule.20  
19Taken to its logical conclusion, application of the 
reenactment 
doctrine 
under 
circumstances 
such 
as 
those 
present 
in the case at bar would undoubtedly lead to results never 
anticipated or intended by the Legislature.  For example, 
suppose that the Legislature amends a statutory code to make 
all pronouns gender-neutral, but otherwise reenacts the code 
as originally written.  It would be neither accurate nor  
reasonable to presume, as the dissent would have us do, that 
the Legislature intended to adopt in toto every appellate 
decision construing or applying the code.  
20Even the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that there has been no stable, consistent formulation of this 
amorphous doctrine. Helvering v Griffiths, 318 US 371, 396; 
63 S Ct 636; 87 L Ed 843 (1943).  Under the broadest  
formulation of the reenactment doctrine, there is no reason 
why only judicial interpretations of statutes should be 
incorporated by implication upon reenactment of a statute. 
Indeed, even administrative interpretations of statutes have  
been recognized as binding.  See United States v Safety Car  
Heating & Lighting Co, 297 US 88, 95; 56 S Ct 353; 80 L Ed 500 
(1936).  
Our point is not that the reenactment doctrine, properly 
limited and applied, is without value as a statutory 
construction 
aid, 
but 
that 
it 
cannot 
be 
employed 
indiscriminately and without recognition of the fact that its 
more expansive versions impose an unreasonable burden on the 
(continued...)  
23  
 
 
 
The Legislature has stated its views on the construction  
of its statutes, in part by providing that all words and  
phrases that are not terms of art21 be given their “common and  
20(...continued) 
Legislature to affirmatively scan our appellate casebooks to 
discern 
judicial 
constructions 
of 
statutes 
that 
the  
Legislature desires for entirely other reasons to amend.  
Applying the reenactment rule here would, in our view, be the 
effective equivalent of imposing an affirmative duty on the  
Legislature to keep abreast of all binding judicial 
pronouncements involving the construction of statutes and to 
revise those statutes to repudiate any judicial construction 
with which it disagrees.  For similar reasons, we have 
rejected precisely such a duty in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Donajkowski, supra at 261-262.  
To 
apply 
the 
reenactment 
doctrine 
under 
these  
circumstances would not only likely fail to give effect to 
legislative intent, but would also presumably violate  
separation of powers principles. See Grabow, Congressional  
silence and the search for legislative intent: A venture into  
“speculative unrealites,” 64 BUL R 737, 759-761 (1984). 
Accordingly, before we ignore the plain meaning of the text of 
a statute, we reject formulations of the reenactment doctrine 
involving 
circumstances 
that 
fail 
to 
demonstrate the  
Legislature's conscious consideration of a judicial decision, 
coupled with some compelling indication that the Legislature 
intended to accept or reject that interpretation.  As is  
illustrated by Justice Boyle’s dissent in Sloan, supra, 
discussed at pp 22-23, it is a perilous exercise to attempt to 
discern legislative intent from the Legislature’s silence, 
even when a statutory amendment responds to some portion of a  
judicial decision. See Sloan, supra at 202-203.  
21We note that in the case of a term of art, application 
of the “reenactment rule” would generally be appropriate  
because such a term by definition carries with it the 
construction accorded it by the courts.  See People v Law, 459 
Mich 419, 425 n 8; 591 NW2d 20 (1999). In contrast, in this  
case we are confronted with the amendment of a statute  
following the imposition of a judicially created remedy that 
is grounded nowhere in the text of the statute. 
Our  
dissenting colleagues opine that “the Legislature could have 
(continued...)  
24  
 
approved” meanings.  MCL 8.3a. Such is consistent with our  
most fundamental principle of construction that there is no  
room for judicial interpretation when the Legislature’s  
intent can be ascertained from the statute’s plain and  
unambiguous language.  See Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich  
611, 615; 647 NW2d 508 (2002).  Accordingly, we decline to  
apply the “reenactment rule” when the Legislature’s intent is  
evidenced by the plain  language of the statute and there is  
no clear indication of any intent to adopt or repudiate this  
Court’s prior construction.  
Nothing in the plain language of § 653 provides us with  
a sound basis for concluding that the Legislature intended  
that noncompliance with its affidavit requirements, standing  
alone, justifies application of the exclusionary rule to  
evidence obtained by police in reliance on a search warrant.22  
21(...continued) 
easily modified the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
when enacting 1988 PA 80,” post at 6-7, and that therefore the 
Legislature must have intended to adopt, sub silentio, the 
exclusionary rule. However, an equally plausible conclusion 
is that, because the Legislature could easily have modified 
the statute to expressly provide for the application of the 
exclusionary rule, it must have intended to reject this 
Court’s decision in Sherbine.  This precisely illustrates one 
of 
the 
reasons 
that 
the “legislative acquiescence” doctrine is 
an untrustworthy indicator of legislative intent, as well as 
why the “reenactment rule” should not be applied as an aid in 
interpreting legislative silence.  
22Any error concerning the search warrant in this case 
rests squarely on the shoulders of the district court judge, 
(continued...)  
25  
 
 
 
Moreover, 
application 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
is  
particularly inappropriate under the circumstances of this  
case, where the objective of the rule—to sanction police  
misconduct as a means of deterrence—would not be served.23  
See Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 712. 
Because we applied the  
exclusionary rule to the statutory violations at issue in  
Sherbine 
and 
Sloan 
without 
performing 
the 
requisite  
examination of legislative intent, we are compelled to  
overrule those decisions to the extent that they conflict  
with today’s holding.24  
22(...continued) 
whose duty it is to ensure that warrants are issued in 
compliance with state and federal law.  There is no indication  
in the record that the officer who applied for the search 
warrant, or the officers who executed the warrant, acted 
improperly.  
23Indeed, we note that the Legislature has specifically 
provided for a sanction in the case of misconduct in the 
execution or procurement of a search warrant.  See MCL 780.657  
(“[a]ny person who in executing a search warrant, wilfully 
exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary 
severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned 
not more than 1 year”); MCL 780.658 (“[a]ny person who 
maliciously and without probable cause procures a search  
warrant to be issued and executed shall be fined not more than  
$1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year”).  That the  
Legislature has elected to deter police misconduct in the 
manner indicated by MCL 780.657 and MCL 780.658 further 
evidences the lack of any legislative intent that the 
exclusionary rule be applied under the circumstances of this 
case.  
24Our dissenting colleagues charge us with ignoring this 
Court’s 
prohibition-era decisions in People v Knopka, 220 Mich 
540; 190 NW 731 (1922), People v Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 
(continued...)  
26  
 
 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred  
in holding that suppression of the evidence was required as  
a remedy for the violation of § 653 in this case.  Because  
the Court of Appeals declined to address the prosecutor’s  
additional arguments on appeal, we remand this matter to that  
Court for further proceedings.  
D. People v Scherf  
The Court of Appeals held in Scherf that a bench warrant  
issued in violation of a court rule was invalid and that  
suppression 
of 
evidence 
obtained 
in 
connection 
with  
defendant’s arrest pursuant to that warrant was therefore  
24(...continued) 
506 (1925), People v Bules, 234 Mich 335; 207 NW 818 (1926), 
and People v Galnt, 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915 (1926), all of 
which involved search warrant requirements as set forth in § 
27 of Michigan’s “liquor law,” 1922 CL 7079(27).  As we  
explained in Sobczak-Obetts, supra, Knopka involved a  
violation of Const 1908, art 2, § 10, not merely a statutory 
violation.
 The Moten and Bules Courts applied, without  
analysis, the Knopka exclusionary rule to purely statutory 
search warrant violations.  The Galnt Court, similarly to the 
Knopka 
Court, 
expressly found a constitutional violation. The  
Moten and Bules decisions, which conclusorily applied the 
exclusionary rule without determining that there was any 
constitutional violation, are distinguishable in any event 
because they did not involve the search warrant statute at 
issue. See Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 700 n 11. Moreover, as  
we noted in Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 707, the statutory  
violations in Moten, Bules, and Galnt pertained to the warrant  
form; in such a case, “the resulting search may be  
constitutionally defective.” (Emphasis in original.) As we  
have taken pains in this opinion to make clear, we are 
reviewing only the Court of Appeals application of the 
exclusionary rule to the alleged violations of a statute and 
a court rule, and we do not address any claims that the 
warrants at issue were constitutionally insufficient.  
27  
     
 
  
 
 
required. We disagree.  
MCR 3.606(A) provides:  
Initiation of Proceeding.  For a contempt 
committed outside the immediate view and presence 
of the court, on a proper showing on ex parte 
motion supported by affidavits, the court shall 
either  
(1) order the accused person to show cause, at 
a reasonable time specified in the order, why that 
person should not be punished for the alleged 
misconduct; or  
(2) issue a bench warrant for the arrest of 
the person.  
Nothing in the wording of MCR 3.606(A) provides any  
indication that the exclusionary rule should be applied to a  
violation of its affidavit requirement.25 
To engraft the  
exclusionary rule—a harsh remedy designed to sanction and  
deter police misconduct where it has resulted in a violation  
of constitutional rights—onto the technical provisions of a  
rule of court in this manner would extend the deterrent well  
beyond its intended application. 
Indeed, the task of  
scrutinizing the police papers submitted in support of a  
warrant for technical compliance with the law falls squarely  
with the judicial officer.  In the absence of language  
25In light of the prosecutor’s concession of error, we 
need not address whether the issuance of the bench warrant was  
actually violative of the affidavit requirement of MCR 
3.606(A).  
28  
 
evincing an intent that suppression of evidence should follow  
from the violation of MCR 3.606(A), we decline to infer one.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The exclusionary rule was improperly applied to the  
violations of the statutory and court rule affidavit  
requirements at issue in these cases.  We cannot conclude, on  
the basis of the plain language of MCL 780.653, that the  
Legislature intended that noncompliance with its terms should  
result in suppression of evidence obtained by police acting  
in reasonable and good-faith reliance on a search warrant.  
Likewise, MCR 3.606(A) does not provide for suppression of  
evidence on the basis of noncompliance with its affidavit  
requirement, and we decline to infer an intent that the  
exclusionary rule should apply under these circumstances.  
In Hawkins, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and remand to that Court for further proceedings.  In  
Scherf, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
remand the matter to the district court division for further  
proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
29  
 
 
____________________________________ 
                                    
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 120437  
CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No.  
121698  
MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the majority’s holding that the violations  
of MCL 780.653(b) and MCR 3.606(A) do not require suppression  
of the evidence seized in these cases.  I write separately to  
note that I do not believe the reenactment rule can be relied  
on in the present cases.  As explained by Justice Boyle in  
her dissent in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 202-203; 538  
NW2d 380 (1995), in which I joined,  
 
 
 
The 
[Sloan] 
majority’s 
assertion 
of  
legislative acquiescence in the decision in  
Sherbine,[1] to use of the exclusionary rule to 
suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation  of  
the statute before us is wholly mistaken.  In  
Sherbine, this Court’s majority interpreted the 
former version of the statute as if it imposed a 
more 
restrictive 
standard 
than 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment  
and suppressed evidence on the basis of that 
consideration.
 
The 
swift 
reaction 
of 
the  
Legislature 
was 
to 
amend 
MCL 
750.653; 
MSA  
28.1259(3), to make it clear that the Court was 
incorrect in concluding that what had occurred was 
a statutory violation.  
The Legislature had no 
need to say what should not be excluded; it relied 
on the Court’s word that were it clear that the  
Legislature 
had 
authorized 
the 
warrant, 
suppression 
would not be ordered.  
Acting on our representation, the amended 
legislation tracked the Fourth Amendment. Because  
“our holding that evidence obtained in violation of 
the statute must be excluded,” ante at 183  
(Cavanagh, J.), was wholly derived from our narrow 
reading of MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3), the  
legislative amendment of the statute is not an 
acquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, the 
view in Sherbine that the evidence should be  
excluded.  
However, while I do not believe the reenactment rule  
should be relied on in the present cases for the reasons  
outlined by Justice Boyle, my opinion should not be construed  
to mean that the rule may not be relied on in other cases  
where it is appropriate.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
1 People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658 (1984).  
2  
 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
v 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 120437 
CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
___________________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 121698 
MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
___________________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today the majority discounts decades of precedent in  
order to adopt its preferred policy of limiting application  
of the exclusionary rule.  Because contextual interpretations  
of the statute and the court rule mandate use of the  
exclusionary rule, and because the task of altering our  
state’s policy concerning statutory remedies belongs to the  
Legislature, I must respectfully dissent.  
MCL 780.653  
  
 
  
Like the majority, I agree that a contextual analysis of  
MCL 780.653 will determine the appropriate remedy for its  
violation. 
However, I depart from the majority’s analysis  
insofar 
as 
it 
neglects 
material 
rules 
of 
statutory  
interpretation. 
 
Since its enactment in 1966, MCL 780.653 has codified  
the requirement that search warrants issue only upon a  
finding of probable cause, giving form to the constitutional  
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The  
provision clarifies that information in support of a warrant  
must be supplied by an individual who has personal knowledge  
of the facts alleged.  MCL 780.653, as amended by 1988 PA 80,  
provides:  
The magistrate's finding of reasonable or  
probable cause shall be based upon all the facts 
related within the affidavit made before him or  
her.  The affidavit may be based upon information 
supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed 
person if the affidavit contains 1 of the  
following:  
(a) If the person is named, affirmative 
allegations from which the magistrate may conclude 
that the person spoke with personal knowledge of 
the information.  
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative 
allegations from which the magistrate may conclude 
that the person spoke with personal knowledge of 
the information and either that the unnamed person 
is credible or that the information is reliable.  
Similarly to the federal and state constitutional  
prohibition against the issuance of a warrant without  
2  
 
  
  
probable cause, the text of this subsection provides no  
specific guidance about the requisite judicial response to  
its violation. 
Statutory construction is, therefore,  
required. 
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
Although the consequence of an infraction is not prescribed,  
1966 PA 189 does authorize a penalty for those who  
intentionally exceed their authority when executing a  
warrant, who exercise such authority with unnecessary  
severity, or who maliciously procure a warrant.  See MCL  
780.657, 780.658.1 
While I agree that these statutory  
provisions must inform our understanding of MCL 780.653, I am  
not persuaded that they mandate the result envisioned by the  
majority.  
As an initial matter, the penalty provisions only  
pertain to a small number of violations.  Most violations of  
1966 PA 189 are not caused by wilful misconduct.  If the  
criminal provisions are deemed the exclusive remedy for any  
1 MCL 780.657 provides:  
Any person who in executing a search warrant, 
wilfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with 
unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than 
$1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year.  
MCL 780.658 provides:  
Any 
person 
who 
maliciously 
and 
without  
probable cause procures a search warrant to be 
issued and executed shall be fined not more than  
$1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year.  
3  
 
  
violation of this act, its directives would have no force.  
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the presence of  
criminal penalties for rare incidents of extreme misconduct  
indicates a legislative intent to displace the exclusionary  
rule.  To so hold would assume the Legislature promulgated an  
impotent (or ineffectual) statute.2  For this reason, I find  
several 
other 
well-respected 
doctrines 
of 
interpretation 
more  
compelling.  
Among them is the strong presumption that a high court’s  
construction of a statute should be given a heightened stare  
decisis effect.  As noted by the United States Supreme Court,  
[the] reluctance to overturn precedents derives in 
part 
from 
institutional 
concerns 
about 
the  
relationship of the Judiciary to Congress.  One  
reason that we give great weight to stare decisis  
in the area of statutory construction is that 
"Congress 
is 
free 
to 
change 
this 
Court's  
interpretation 
of 
its 
legislation.”  
Illinois 
Brick  
Co v Illinois, 431 US 720, 736[; 97 S Ct 2061; 52 
L Ed 2d 707] (1977).  We have overruled our  
precedents when the intervening development of the 
law has "removed or weakened the conceptual 
underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the 
later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable  
with competing legal doctrines or policies." 
Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 173[; 
109 S Ct 2363; 105 L Ed 2d 132] (1989) (citations 
omitted). 
Absent those changes or compelling 
evidence 
bearing 
on 
Congress' 
original 
intent, 
NLRB  
v Longshoremen, 473 US 61, 84[; 105 S Ct 3045; 87 
L Ed 2d 47] (1985), our system demands that we  
2 See People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 713-716; 625 
NW2d 764 (2001) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); People v Stevens  
(After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 648-666; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) 
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting).  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes. 
[Neal v United States, 516 US 284, 295; 116 S Ct 
763; 133 L Ed 2d 709 (1996) (emphasis added).]  
Because this Court shares a similar relationship with  
the Michigan Legislature, I find no reason to reject this  
Court’s precedent in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d  
380 (1995), or People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658  
(1984), which clarify that evidence obtained in violation of  
MCL 780.653 must be suppressed.  
In Sherbine, this Court held that the exclusionary rule  
is the proper remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653.  In  
support, the Court cited People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222  
NW2d 749 (1974), People v Chartrand, 73 Mich App 645; 252  
NW2d 569 (1977), and State v Russell, 293 Or 469; 650 P2d 79  
(1982). Sherbine, supra at 512 and ns 18-21.  
Ten years later, this Court affirmed the application of  
the exclusionary rule for violations of MCL 780.653 (§ 653)  
in Sloan, supra. In Sloan, this Court held that a magistrate  
must base the probable-cause determination on the record  
(i.e., an affidavit is necessary; sworn testimony is  
insufficient), and that a violation of this statute requires  
the exclusion of tainted evidence.  The Court’s rationale was  
based, in part, on the Legislature’s acquiescence to the  
application of the exclusionary rule as expressed in  
Sherbine.  In 1988, the Legislature revised § 653 in response  
5  
 
 
  
 
to Sherbine, overruling by legislative enactment the  
informant- reliability standard.  In doing so, it approved  
the use of the exclusionary rule to redress violations of §  
653.  
Though one might be tempted to dismiss the authoritative  
value of Sloan on the basis of its stated reliance on the now  
disfavored doctrine of legislative acquiescence, a close  
examination reveals the Court utilized a related—but quite  
distinct—rule of interpretation, i.e., the reenactment rule.  
If a legislature reenacts a statute without modifying a high  
court’s practical construction of that statute, that  
construction is implicitly adopted. See Singer, 28 Statutes  
and Statutory Construction (2000 rev), Contemporaneous  
Construction, § 49:09, pp 103-112.  The reenactment rule  
differs from the legislative-acquiescence doctrine in that  
the 
former 
canon provides 
“prima 
facie 
evidence 
of  
legislative intent” by the adoption, without modification, of  
a statutory provision that had already received judicial  
interpretation. Id. at 107.  As articulated by the United  
States Supreme Court, a legislature “is presumed to be aware  
of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute  
and to adopt that interpretation when it [reenacts] a statute  
without change . . . .”  Lorillard, a Div of Loew’s Theatres,  
Inc v Pons, 434 US 575, 580; 98 S Ct 866; 55 L Ed 2d 40  
6  
 
(1978).  As I noted in Sloan, the Legislature could have  
easily modified the applicability of the exclusionary rule  
when enacting 1988 PA 80.  By altering the text to renounce  
the informant rule modified in Sherbine, while reenacting the  
remaining text, the Legislature indicated its detailed  
knowledge of Sherbine and approved the use of the 
exclusionary rule for violations of § 653.3 
Long 
before 
the 
Legislature 
incorporated 
the 
exclusionary rule into MCL 780.653, this Court adopted a  
presumption in favor of utilizing the exclusionary rule for  
statutory violations.  Over eighty years ago, in People v  
Knopka, 220 Mich 540, 545; 190 NW 731 (1922), the Court  
suppressed evidence obtained by warrant issued without  
3The majority’s attempt to diminish the value of the 
reenactment doctrine is misguided. As noted above, the rule 
merely provides prima facie evidence of legislative intent, 
and a bill replacing male pronouns with neutral pronouns 
throughout 
the 
code–as suggested in the majority opinion, ante  
at 23 n 19–would not justify a strong presumption in favor of 
its application because there would be no indication that the 
Legislature 
thoughtfully 
familiarized 
itself 
with 
the  
subsections modified.  Application of the reenactment rule in 
this case, by contrast, does shed light on the scope of the 
Legislature’s familiarity with Sherbine, supra.  
Further, unlike the majority, I have more faith in the 
Legislature’s ability to competently execute its duties. To  
assume the Legislature would not familiarize itself with the 
whole of a particular case when revising one subsection of the 
code in response to that very case does not, as the majority 
suggests, “violate separation of powers principles.”  Ante at  
24 n 20.  Rather, reference to the reenactment rule under such 
circumstances simply acknowledges legislative competency.  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
probable cause:  
It not appearing that the search warrant was 
issued upon the constitutional and statutory 
showing of probable cause, it must be held that the 
evidence procured by it was inadmissible and should 
have been suppressed and that, with such evidence 
out, defendant should have been discharged.  
In 
reaching 
this 
conclusion, 
the 
Court 
focused  
exclusively on the statutes establishing search-warrant  
requirements.  Three years later, in People v Moten, 233 Mich  
169; 206 NW 506 (1925), the Court again applied the  
exclusionary rule to remedy a statutory violation, relying,  
in part, on Knopka. See also People v Bules, 234 Mich 335;  
207 NW 818 (1926) (reversing a conviction on the basis of  
evidence 
obtained 
in 
violation 
of 
statutory 
warrant  
requirements); People v Galnt, 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915  
(1926) (discharging the defendant where evidence obtained in  
violation of statute required suppression).  
Although this Court has recently attempted to narrow the  
import of Moten and its progeny, the distinction is  
particularly inapposite here.  In People v Sobczak-Obetts,  
463 Mich 687; 625 NW2d 764 (2001), the majority distinguished  
the 
Moten-Bules-Galnt 
trilogy 
because 
each 
analyzed  
substantive warrant requirements, i.e., the sufficiency of a  
warrant’s “form,” whereas the statute at issue in Sobczak- 
Obetts concerned procedures relevant to warrant execution.  
8  
 
See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526; 638 NW2d 92  
(2002)(holding that an absence of statutory authority did not  
warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the  
statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local  
governments); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626;  
597 NW2d 53 (1999) (holding that failure to comply with the  
knock-and- announce rule did not warrant application of the  
exclusionary rule).  However, this distinction between  
substantive and procedural interests collapses when applied  
to defendant Hawkins, who challenged the warrant issued for  
his arrest on substantive grounds, maintaining the affidavit  
contained neither credible nor reliable allegations.  The  
trial court agreed: “The affidavit clearly does not conform  
with Michigan statutory authority; namely, MCL 780.653(B).”  
Regrettably, the majority today conflates substantive and  
procedural concerns, ignores decades of precedent, and—in  
spite 
of 
evidence 
to 
the 
contrary—disregards 
the  
Legislature’s unambiguous approval of the application of the  
exclusionary rule for violations of MCL 780.653.  See 1988 PA  
80.  
Until the tide began to shift with Stevens (After  
Remand), the use of the exclusionary rule to remedy statutory  
violations was well settled.  By dismissing the import of  
this Court’s precedent, including Moten, Bules, Sherbine,  
9  
 
 
Sloan, et al., the majority has imposed a policy-based  
doctrine that requires express statements to authorize  
application of the exclusionary rule.  Ante at 21.  This runs  
afoul of the Legislature’s approval of the rule’s application  
to MCL 780.653 as articulated in Sherbine. 1988 PA 80.  
While I can appreciate the majority’s need to balance  
important and competing interests, I take issue with its  
attempt to ground the analysis in the text of MCL 780.653.  
Moreover, shifting the focus to a “clear statement” policy  
works a bait-and-switch on the Legislature.  Not only has the  
majority imposed its own policy on the Legislature, it has  
displaced the controlling interpretive standard—on which our  
Legislature has relied—under the guise of strict textualism.  
MCR 3.606(A)  
The majority concludes that the exclusionary rule is an  
inappropriate remedy because the text of MCR 3.606(A) does  
not specifically demand its application.  Ante at 25. “When  
called on to construe a court rule, this Court applies the  
legal principles that govern the construction and application  
of statutes. . . .  Accordingly, we begin with the plain  
language of the court rule.”  Grievance Administrator v  
Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000).  
Applied here, the doctrine clarifies our rule’s rigorous  
demands. MCR 3.606(A) provides:  
10  
Initiation of Proceeding.  For a contempt 
committed outside the immediate view and presence 
of the court, on a proper showing on ex parte 
motion supported by affidavits, the court shall 
either:  
(1) order the accused person to show cause, at 
a reasonable time specified in the order, why that 
person should not be punished for the alleged 
misconduct; or  
(2) issue a bench warrant for the arrest of 
the person.  
As required by this rule, before contempt proceedings  
may be initiated for any conduct outside of the court’s  
“immediate view,” a party must provide “a proper showing on  
ex parte motion supported by affidavits . . . .”  A motion  
alone is insufficient.  An affidavit, i.e., “a signed  
statement,” must be provided.  Once this requirement is met,  
the court must either order the accused person to prove why  
punishment should not be inflicted or issue a bench warrant.  
In the light of the potential peril, as well as the  
substantive safeguards contained in MCR 3.606(A), I find it  
particularly troublesome that the majority members suggest  
such rules are mere “technical provisions.”  This assertion  
ignores their function as guarantors of procedural rights.  
MCR 3.606(A) threatens punishment solely on the basis of  
exclusive communications between an adversarial party and the  
court.  The procedure authorizes the exercise of police power  
by judicial officers, which—contrary to the majority’s  
11  
 
 
implication—may not be used to detain an individual without  
probable cause.  As an arm of the state, our actions must  
respect the polity’s civil rights, and our court rules are  
drafted to ensure that the exercise of judicial authority is  
not arbitrary or unlawful.  To deem such rules “technical”  
distorts the substance of the rules and the role of the  
judiciary.  
Although the majority holds otherwise, the exclusionary  
rule would be particularly appropriate in this instance.  As  
a tool to prevent the abuse of state power, this Court  
promulgated the court rule to mark the boundaries of  
acceptable judicial conduct.4
 If the exclusionary rule  
applied, magistrates and judges would surely take care to  
4  The majority claims that application of the  
exclusionary rule to MCL 780.653 or MCR 3.606(A) would not 
further the purpose of either because “the aim of the rule is 
one of police deterrence . . . .”  Ante at 12. While I agree 
that we suppress evidence in an attempt to prevent police 
misconduct, the exclusionary rule is also utilized to ensure 
compliance with the law at an institutional level. The ease  
with which we lose sight of this goal is apparent in People  
v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550; 563 NW2d 208 (1997), where we 
equated “good police practice” with violations of the Fourth 
Amendment:  
While conceding that [the officer's] entry 
into the mobile home might have been good police 
practice, 
the 
district 
court 
held 
that, 
nonetheless, it was not a proper search without a 
warrant. [Id. at 554.]  
One wonders how it can be "good police practice" to violate 
the Fourth Amendment.  
12  
 
 
confirm that warrants were issued on a proper showing of  
probable cause.  Such proof is all the court rule requires.  
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE’S UTILITY  
I agree that the exclusionary rule wields significant  
power, but only because it is the sole efficacious method by  
which to protect individuals from state misconduct, as  
defined by our laws.  If any other method of enforcement  
worked so well, it, too, would be deemed disproportionate and  
heavy- handed.  Thus, our debate is not simply about which  
remedy is appropriate, but how sacred we deem the right to be  
free from unlawful state conduct.  Whether codified in  
federal or state constitutions, statutes, or court rules, the  
judicial branch  must enforce the laws that prescribe the  
scope of state power and protect individuals from the  
unreasonable exercise of that authority.  
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, as our nation  
struggles to secure its boundaries while protecting our  
freedoms, the role of the judiciary–charged with maintaining  
the delicate balance between state authority and individual  
liberty–becomes increasingly vital.  Our statutes and court  
rules have been drafted to protect these freedoms.  Because  
both the statute, MCL 780.653, and the court rule, MCR  
3.606(A), would be without force but for the exclusionary  
rule, and because this Court should avoid overruling sound  
13  
precedent and imposing its policy upon the Legislature, I  
must reject the majority’s analysis.  
CONCLUSION  
Though cloaked in a strict Textualism garb, the majority  
attempts to justify its decision on the basis of its own  
policy considerations.  According to the majority, in the  
absence of an express legislative statement indicating an  
intention to invoke the exclusionary rule, the rule will not  
be applied.  However, a more legitimate analysis would  
require an inference in favor of its application.  In so  
doing, it could be guaranteed that the well-settled and  
authoritative interpretation of our statutes could be relied  
upon, and that a statute’s purpose would be effectuated.  
Moreover, without this tool, aggrieved individuals would have  
no opportunity for redress.  For these reasons, I would  
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins.  
With regard to the proper remedy for a violation of MCR  
3.606(A), I would also apply the exclusionary rule.  The text  
of the court rule evinces an intention to impose substantive  
procedural 
safeguards 
into 
the 
warrant-authorization 
process.  
To effectuate this end, the exclusionary rule is required to  
remedy violations of MCR 3.606(A).  Therefore, I would affirm  
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Scherf.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
14  
15