Title: Murray v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 240, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GLEN MURRAY,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 240, 2011 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware  
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 1010000692 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 17, 2012 
Decided:  May 14, 2012  
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
Morgan T. Zurn, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice, for the majority: 
2 
 
 
 
Three officers completed a traffic stop along with the ancillary, permissible 
inquiries.  Then, a probation officer continued to question one of the car’s 
passengers, a probationer, even though the officer testified he had no reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  An officer who pulls a car over for speeding does 
not thereby gain free rein to ask as many questions, for as long a time, as he might 
wish.  Further investigation requires further justification.  Because the officer 
lacked reasonable suspicion, we reverse the trial judge’s denial of a motion to 
suppress the drugs discovered in Murray’s bag.  Murray’s continued detention 
constituted an impermissible seizure, and the questioning itself violated even the 
limited rights possessed by a probationer.  
FACTS 
 
Detective Samuel Smith, driving an unmarked car, approached the 
intersection of 30th Street and Jefferson Street.  Smith saw two men who were 
talking turn their heads quickly toward his car, they “became nervous,” and one of 
them walked away and the other climbed into a car.  Although Smith later testified 
that people in the neighborhood commonly recognized his car and called out to one 
another to announce the presence of a police officer, he noticed no one so call out 
on that day.  Smith did not see any hand-to-hand transaction, nor did he see the 
person who entered the car carry anything.  In short, Smith saw a person look at 
3 
 
him and then get in a car.  Smith rounded the block, and testified that the car had 
sped off.  Because Smith’s car lacked emergency lights, he called on the radio for 
assistance.      
 
On I-95, a car driven by Wilmington Police Officer Matthew Hazzard, and 
also containing Probation Officer Daniel Collins, located a car resembling the one 
described on the radio.  After following the car to verify that it was speeding, 
Hazzard pulled over the car.  Smith soon arrived on the scene. 
 
Smith approached the driver and obtained the identity of the driver, 
Jacqueline Owens, and the backseat passenger, Kenyattia Graham.  Probation 
Officer Collins approached the passenger’s side and obtained Glen Murray’s 
identification.  While testifying, Smith admitted the three were, by that time, 
focused on investigating drug activity: 
Q. And at that point when you compelled them to give information, 
you were investigating what at that time? 
A. Drug-related activity, what I believed to be drug-related activity. 
Q. You were investigating drug-related activity based solely on the 
fact they were in an area you knew to be a high-crime area, 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Despite the fact you had not seen any drug activity, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You are yet still investigating drug activity? 
A. Yes.1 
 
                                                           
1 Violation of Probation Tr. at 22 (Del. Super. Nov. 10, 2010).  
4 
 
This purpose does not surprise; all three officers participated in Operation Safe 
Streets.  Collins ran the three names through DELJIS, and learned that Owens 
owned the car, Murray was on Level II probation, and the backseat passenger, 
Graham, had an outstanding capias.  After the DELJIS search, the officers gave 
Owens a verbal reprimand instead of a ticket.  Although the officers knew Graham 
had an outstanding capias, but they did not ask him to step out, pat him down, or 
arrest him.  Instead, in keeping with the motivation for the stop, Collins continued 
looking for drugs.   
Collins returned to Owens’ car, and “[d]ue to the fact Mr. Murray was on 
Level II probation, [Collins] asked him to step out of the car so [he] could perform 
a pat down” to see if he had anything illegal.2 Collins testified: “[Murray] was on 
probation. We were doing a check, basically, to see if there is anything illegal, 
officer safety. He was leaving a drug area. He is on probation for drugs.”3 But 
Collins admitted he had no reason to think Murray was dangerous.4 Collins did not 
find anything during the pat down, and he did not restrain Murray or put him in 
                                                           
2 Suppression Hearing Tr. at 39 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2011). 
 
3 Id. at 38. 
 
4 A40. 
Q. For officer safety would mean that he is likely to possess, maybe, a weapon or 
something. So you had no idea that there was any issue of officer safety when 
you pulled him out, would you agree with me? 
A. Right. 
Prob. Tr. at  38. 
 
5 
 
handcuffs.  Collins then asked Murray if a bag on the front floor of the car, on 
Murray’s side, belonged to him, even though Collins admitted he had no reason to 
believe the car contained anything illegal: 
Q. Anything in that pat-down that led you to believe that there may be 
drugs in the car? 
A. No. 
Q. Anything you observed from the moment you saw them to the time 
in which you did the pat-down that led you to believe that there 
was any drug activity? 
A. No. 
Q. And after the pat-down, you still had no reason to believe there 
was any drug activity? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you decided, “I’m going to continue searching?” 
A. Correct. 
Q. Searching for what? 
A. Anything illegal. 
. . . . 
Q. When you asked about the bag, did you have any reason to believe 
that drugs would be in the bag? 
A. No. 
Q. And when you asked Ms. Owens for permission to search the bag, 
did you have any reason to believe that drugs would be in the bag? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any reason to believe that there would be illegal 
activity in the car when you asked to search? 
A. No. At the time, no.5 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of 
discretion, but review questions of law de novo.6   
                                                           
5 Suppr. Tr. at 45-47. 
 
6 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
After police officers finish a traffic stop, they cannot continue to detain a car 
for the purpose of asking questions without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
behavior.    
 
The permissible duration of a traffic stop depends on the reason the police 
officer pulls the car over.  “The duration and execution of a traffic stop is 
necessarily limited by the initial purpose of the stop.”7  This rule grows out of the 
United States Supreme Court’s explanation of a broader Fourth Amendment 
principle: “An investigatory detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”8  As this Court said in Caldwell, 
“[A]ny investigation of the vehicle or its occupants beyond that required to 
complete the purpose of the traffic stop constitutes a separate seizure that must be 
supported by independent facts sufficient to justify the additional intrusion.”9 
 
Courts conduct a full inquiry into the facts to determine whether the officer 
conducted his investigation reasonably:     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172 (Del. 2010) (citing Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 828 (Del. 
2008); Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del. 2001)). 
 
7 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del. 2001).   
 
8 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983).   
 
9 Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1047 (collecting cases from Maryland and Colorado supporting this 
rule). 
7 
 
Even where the traffic stop is not formally terminated by the issuance 
of a citation or warning, “the legitimating raison d’etre [of the stop 
may] evaporate if its pursuit is unreasonably attenuated or allowed to 
lapse into a state of suspended animation.”  Whether a given detention 
is “unreasonably attenuated” necessarily involves a fact-intensive 
inquiry in each case.10  
 
 
In this case, the police pulled a car over on the basis that it was speeding.  As 
one of the officers testified, the purpose of the stop was to investigate drug activity, 
but under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the police may 
of course pull over a vehicle for breaking the law, even if the officers harbor a 
different subjective motivation.11  The officer’s power to detain the car evaporated 
after the officers ended the investigation that provided the objective justification 
for the stop.   At that time, the officers had no authority to continue detaining the 
car, and, admittedly, no reason to suspect that Murray possessed contraband.  
Not only did none of the officers have reasonable suspicion that Murray had 
drugs, but they also lacked reasonable suspicion that any person in the car had 
drugs.  We have held a person’s decision to leave an area upon sighting police is 
not, in itself, suspicious.12 In addition, our precedent distinguishes between 
graduated levels of flight evidence. A person’s unprovoked flight from uniformed 
                                                           
10 Id. At 1047. 
 
11 See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996) (“We think these cases 
foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the 
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).   
 
12 See Cummings v. State, 765 A.2d 945, 949 (Del. 2001). 
8 
 
officers may, together with other factors, give police a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.13 But ambiguous furtive gestures, such as the claim that two men 
appeared nervous, do not.14 Ambiguous furtive gestures include “ducking back and 
forth, [while] looking back at [an officer in an unmarked car].”15 
 
This case, then, involves baseless police investigation after the conclusion of 
a traffic stop.  The dissent nevertheless defends this continuing investigation, 
describing it as a de minimis intrusion.  The first problem with this conception is 
that the relevant United States Supreme Court precedent focuses on whether police 
extended the traffic stop’s duration “measurably,” not on whether police extend the 
stop “significantly” or “substantially.” In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court said that 
“[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic 
stop do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so 
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of a traffic stop.”16  
In Johnson, the Court permitted an officer who suspected criminal activity on the 
strength of gang clothing, tattoos, and the presence of a police scanner radio to 
perform a protective patdown at the start of a traffic stop.  That is, the ‘unrelated 
matters,’ in Johnson, were not matters that the officer dealt with after the traffic 
                                                           
13 See Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1262-66 (Del. 2001). 
 
14 See id. 
 
15 Id. at 1215, 1218. 
 
16 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333-34, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (2009). 
9 
 
stop, but measures taken for self-protection at the very start of the traffic stop.  
None of the officers in this case spotted items in the car that provided a reasonable 
basis to think the car’s occupants posed a threat, nor did they conduct protective 
patdowns at the start of the encounter.      
 
Even if Johnson established a broadly applicable test permitting the police to 
investigate as they wish in every traffic stop so long as they do not “measurably 
extend” the stop, police actions here fail that test.  For something to be measurable, 
it need not be large; the Court could have used the terms ‘significantly’ or 
‘substantially’ if they intended to proscribe only an extension of a comparatively 
large period of time.  But the United States Supreme Court attaches importance to 
the question of whether the additional investigation lengthened the stop at all.  In 
Muehler v. Mena, a case relied on by Johnson, the Court took pains to point out 
that the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to continue questioning 
precisely because “the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was 
prolonged by the questioning.”17    
This case resembles a case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, State v. 
Robinette.18  In Robinette I, a drug interdiction officer stopped Robinette for 
speeding, checked his license, asked him to step out of his car, turned on the 
                                                           
17 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 1471 (2005).   
 
18 State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995). 
 
10 
 
cruiser’s video camera, and then gave him a verbal warning.19 The officer returned 
Robinette’s license and told him he was free to go.20 Robinette “felt” he was free to 
go, but the officer asked him if he had contraband in the car.21 Specifically, the 
officer said: “One question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal 
contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?”22 
Robinette denied having anything illegal, but the officer asked to search his car.23 
Robinette nodded his head in consent to the search because he did not believe he 
had liberty to withhold it.24 The officer found a small amount of marijuana and a 
methamphetamine pill.25  The Ohio Supreme Court found Robinette’s consent 
given involuntarily because the officer failed to inform Robinette he could leave 
before the officer requested leave to search.26 
                                                           
19 See id. at 764. 
 
20 Id. at 770. 
 
21 Id. at 764, 770. 
 
22 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
23 Id. 
 
24 Id. at 770; but see id. at 774 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). 
 
25 Id. at 764 (majority opinion). 
 
26 Id. at 697 (“We also use this case to establish a bright-line test, requiring police officers to 
inform motorists that their legal detention has concluded before the police officer may engage in 
any consensual interrogation.”). 
 
11 
 
After the Ohio Supreme Court first ruled on the case, the United States 
Supreme Court considered it.27  Our nation’s Court with final word on the U.S. 
Constitution remanded the case, stating that Ohio went too far by suggesting the 
search could only be voluntary, after a traffic stop, if the police officer first told 
Robinette he was free to go.  Instead, the Supreme Court stated that the 
voluntariness of the search can only be determined by a factual inquiry into all of 
the circumstances, and remanded the case for consideration based on that legal 
standard.28 
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court held the officer illegally seized 
Robinette. The officer’s command to step out of the car was objectively justified 
for officer safety in a routine traffic stop, but the stop’s justification ended when 
the officer returned Robinette’s license.29 Ohio’s Supreme Court did not suggest 
the officer violated Robinette’s rights by asking if Robinette had contraband.30 The 
                                                           
27 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996) (Robinette II). 
 
28  Id. at 40 (“The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be 
voluntary, and “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.  
The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judgment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion”). 
 
29 State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 767 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 
(1977)) (Robinette III). 
 
30 Id. at 767-68 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979)). In Florida v. Royer, the Court held that questioning a person on the street or in a public 
place who was not in custody was not a “seizure” triggering Fourth Amendment protection. Id. 
(discussing Royer). In Brown v. Texas, the Court held a sobriety checkpoint was not an 
12 
 
public policy of suppressing illegal drug traffic justified the minimal intrusion of 
extending Robinette’s seizure.31 But, after asking Robinette whether he had 
contraband, the officer did not gain articulable suspicion to justify further 
extending Robinette’s seizure by asking to search his car.32 The Court summarized 
the rule as follows: 
When a police officer’s objective justification to continue detention of 
a person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the 
person’s vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and 
when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts 
giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an 
extension of the detention, the continued detention to conduct a search 
constitutes an illegal seizure.33 
 
Because the stop’s justification and purpose ended when the officer returned 
Robinette’s license, and the officer did not gain articulable suspicion while 
extending the stop in the public interest, the Court held the officer illegally seized 
Robinette when he asked for consent to search his car.34 
 
Although the officer told Robinette he was “free to go,” and Robinette “felt 
free to leave,” the officer prefaced the first question with “before you get gone,” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unreasonable seizure if the intrusion was minimal and the seizure served the public interest. Id. 
(discussing Brown). 
 
31 Id. at 768. The Robinette III Court cited Royer for the proposition that suppressing illegal drug 
traffic was a public interest. Id. 
 
32 Id. at 768-69 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 
102-04 (1959)). 
 
33 Id. at 763, 768. 
34 Id. at 768. 
 
13 
 
which implied he was not free to leave.35 The officer had a superior position of 
authority and could have arrested Robinette if he did not cooperate.36 In this 
context, Robinette “just automatically said yes” to the search because he did not 
believe he could refuse the officer.37 He “merely submitted to ‘a claim of lawful 
authority’ rather than consenting as a voluntary act of free will.”38 Because 
Robinette’s consent did not validate the illegal seizure, the search was illegal.39 
In this case, Collins began an investigation of Murray because Murray was 
on probation that was separate and apart from the speeding stop.  Murray’s 
statement that the bag contained drugs does not preclude a finding that searching 
him and the car violated Murray’s Fourth Amendment rights.  When a person is 
illegally detained before he purports to give consent, his consent may not be 
sufficient to cleanse the illegal detention’s taint.40  The fact that a different person 
attempted to intervene does not change the analysis; in either case it is the officer’s 
act of asking the question that violates the citizen’s rights.   
                                                           
35 Id. (quoting excerpts from a transcript). 
 
36 Id. at 771. 
 
37 Id. at 770-71 (quoting excerpts from a transcript). 
 
38 Id. at 771 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, for the proposition that submission is not sufficient 
for consent). 
 
39 Id. at 768-69, 771-72. 
 
40 See Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1052 n.40 (citing cases in which a person gave consent, but the 
consent was insufficient to cleanse the illegal detention’s taint). 
 
14 
 
In this case, the record contains absolutely no evidence that Murray 
consented to his detention, pat down, or questioning.41 In fact, it contains no 
evidence that Collins asked for Murray’s consent to pull him out of the car. The 
question of whether Owens’ consent was voluntary is irrelevant, because the 
record clearly indicates Collins questioned her about the bag only after he illegally 
detained Murray, patted him down, and questioned him. The Ohio Supreme Court 
warned, in Robinette III: 
The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so 
seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred. 
The undetectability of that transition may be used by police officers to 
coerce citizens into answering questions that they need not answer, or 
to allow a search of a vehicle that they are not legally obligated to 
allow.42 
 
In this case, however, the transition was blunt: Collins asked Murray to step out of 
the car so Collins could pat him down.  This case should be easier to decide than 
Robinette. In Robinette, the officer told Robinette he was free to go before he 
began questioning him, and Robinette admitted that he felt free to go.43 By 
contrast, Collins ordered Murray to step out of the car and patted him down before 
asking about the bag. 
                                                           
41 See Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1047; see id. at 1052 (citing cases in which a person gave consent, 
but the consent was insufficient to cleanse the illegal detention’s taint). 
 
42 See Robinette III, 685 N.E.2d at 770-71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
43 See id. at 770. 
 
15 
 
A separate, independent argument justifies reversal.  Under Delaware 
Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19, and our precedent in Sierra v. State and 
Culver v. State, probation officers must have a reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity to seize or search a probationer. Therefore, our law does not permit 
suspicionless probationer searches.  The officers here repeatedly admitted they had 
no reason to suspect Murray was involved in illegal activity, admitted they did not 
have an officer safety concern, and explicitly asserted they could conduct a 
suspicionless probationer search.  Therefore, when Collins asked Murray to step 
out of the car, he violated Murray’s Fourth Amendment rights.   
 
A probation officer must have a reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds 
to justify an administrative search of a residence or car.44  Nevertheless, this Court 
considers probation officers to have acted reasonably so long as they substantially 
comply with Delaware Department of Corrections regulations.45   
                                                           
44 See Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419-20 (Del. 2010) (affirming a conviction in the 
context of a residential search); Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 828-29 (Del. 2008) (reversing a 
conviction because a probation officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify an administrative 
search of a residence); Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10-15 (Del. 2008) (reversing; residential 
search); Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318-19 (Del. 2006) (affirming; residential search); Fuller 
v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 292 (Del. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming; car search). 
 
45 Pendleton, 990 A.2d at 420; Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292-93. 
 
16 
 
The DOC regulation applicable to probation officers’ detentions and 
searches is Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19.46 Under Procedure 7.19, 
probation officers may detain any positively identified probationer to determine the 
nature of his activity and whether he is complying with the conditions of probation. 
A “detention” means temporarily depriving a person of his freedom to depart the 
area based on reasonable suspicion.47 But they “may not detain any other 
individual abroad unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is 
committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime.” 
Therefore, Delaware case law and administrative law do not permit 
suspicionless probationer searches, even though probationers sign waivers as a 
condition of probation.48 In Sierra v. State and Culver v. State, we invalidated 
probation officers’ searches when, considering Procedure 7.19, the officers did not 
have reasonable suspicion from informant tips.49 Unlike Culver, in which the 
majority and dissent disputed whether independent grounds existed for reasonable 
                                                           
46 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, BUREAU OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE, PROCEDURE 7.19, Arrests, Searches and Arrest-Search Checklist; see Culver, 956 A.2d 
at 10-11 (listing specific procedures); accord Sierra, 958 A.2d at 828-29 (same). The 
Department wrote Procedure 7.19 under the authority granted by 11 Del. C. § 4321. 
 
47 See 11 Del. C. § 1902. 
 
48 Sierra, 958 A.2d at 829. 
 
49 See Sierra, 958 A.2d at 832; Culver, 956 A.2d at 15. 
 
17 
 
suspicion, as explained supra, the officers in this case did not have any grounds to 
infer a reasonable suspicion against Murray for drug activity.50 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Superior Court’s judgment denying the motion to suppress is reversed.   
                                                           
50 Compare Culver, 956 A.2d at 9, 14-15, with id. at 17-19. 
18 
 
RIDGELY, Justice, dissenting: 
 
The majority holds that the contraband must be suppressed based on the 
officers’ treatment of Murray, a passenger.   The majority sidesteps the fact that the 
officers’ patdown and questioning of Murray did not result in the discovery of the 
evidence Murray sought to suppress.  Rather, Owens, the driver, provided valid 
consent to search a bag she claimed as hers during a lawful detention for a 
speeding violation.  Owens’ consent satisfies the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment and Department of Correction Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19, 
as does Murray’s later, spontaneous admission that the bag was his and that it had 
drugs inside it.  I would affirm the denial of Murray’s motion to suppress. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Detective Smith was on patrol in downtown Wilmington when he observed a 
Chrysler travel eight blocks at approximately forty-five or fifty miles per hour in a 
twenty-five mile-per-hour zone.  Smith called for assisting units to respond 
because his vehicle was not equipped with emergency lights.  Smith testified that, 
during that call, he reported a car leaving 30th Street and Jefferson Street at a high 
rate of speed.  At the time, Officer Collins was driving with Wilmington Police 
Officer Hazzard, also as part of Operation Safe Streets.  Collins testified that he 
and Hazzard received a call from Smith reporting a vehicle leaving a possible drug 
19 
 
activity area at a high rate of speed.  Hazzard testified that Smith reported only a 
speeding violation.  Collins and Hazzard caught up to the vehicle on Interstate 95 
and pulled it over.  The car had been traveling at approximately seventy miles per 
hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone.   
 
Hazzard approached the Chrysler on the driver’s side and Collins 
approached on the passenger’s side.  Murray was in the passenger’s seat, Kenyattia 
Graham was in the back seat, and Owens was in the driver’s seat. Collins asked 
everyone in the car for identification, which they provided.  Collins then returned 
to the police vehicle to conduct a criminal history check on DELJIS, which 
disclosed that Murray was actively on Level II probation and that a capias was out 
on Graham.  Collins estimated that only five to six minutes elapsed between the 
time he received the identification and the time he completed the background 
check.  
 
Collins returned to Owens’ car, and asked Murray to step out.  Hazzard 
testified that Graham was also asked to step out of the vehicle.  Collins then 
conducted a patdown of Murray, which did not produce any contraband or 
weapons.  Collins also observed a bag that had been between Murray’s legs in the 
passenger seat.  Collins asked Murray if the bookbag was his.  Murray denied that 
it was.  Collins then asked Owens if it was her bookbag.  She said that it was.  
Collins testified to the following exchange with Owens: 
20 
 
Q. After she told you it was hers, what did you do? 
A. I asked her if she wouldn’t mind if I took a look inside since 
it was in front of Mr. Murray’s legs in the car. 
Q.  And what did she say? 
A. She said I could. 
Q. Did you go to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did anything happen while you were going to open that 
book bag and take a look inside of it? 
A.  As I was attempting to grab it to check, Mr. Murray, who 
was standing outside the car, said: ‘Hold on.  It’s mine.  I have 
drugs inside.’51  
After Murray’s interjection, Collins searched the bag and found cocaine and heroin 
in it.  Collins then called his supervisor and obtained approval to arrest Murray and 
perform an administrative search of Murray’s residence.     
 
Murray moved to suppress the contraband found during the search.  Viewing 
the testimony in the light most favorable to the State, the Superior Court denied the 
motion.  The Superior Court concluded that the traffic stop was not complete at the 
time that Collins requested Owens’ consent to search, explaining that “[t]his is not 
a situation where at the end of the road I’ve given you your license and registration 
and insurance back, everything is fine, and then I try to continue on the 
                                                           
51 Suppression Hearing Tr. at 41 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2011). 
21 
 
investigation in some manner.”52  The Superior Court then concluded that Owens 
provided valid consent to search.  Thus, the search was proper in light of the 
driver’s consent, and also Murray’s admission. 
Analysis 
 
The majority concludes that the officers finished the traffic stop, and then 
continued to detain the car to investigate Murray and ask questions about the bag 
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  This continued detention, the 
majority holds, was unlawful and provides a basis for suppressing the contraband.  
 
Owens’ consent to search, not the patdown and questioning of Murray, led 
to the discovery of contraband in this case.  The record and the Superior Court’s 
findings, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, indicate that the traffic 
stop was not complete at the time that Owens provided consent.  The record further 
supports that Owens’ consent was voluntary, and was not the product of the 
patdown and questioning of Murray.  Because Owens provided a valid consent to 
search during the scope of a lawful traffic stop, the contraband was admissible at 
Murray’s trial. 
 
We held in Caldwell v. State that a traffic stop must be justified from the 
outset by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the investigation must 
                                                           
52 Id. at 87. 
22 
 
be reasonably related in scope to the stop’s initial justification to comport with the 
Fourth Amendment.53   We further held that a traffic stop may be extended beyond 
the scope of its initial justification if “the driver voluntarily consents to further 
questioning or the officer uncovers facts that independently warrant additional 
investigation.”54  After we decided Caldwell, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued a series of opinions that provide further guidance on when an officer may 
pursue inquiries beyond the traffic stop’s initial purpose.  In Muehler v. Mena, the 
Court held that officers can ask a lawfully detained person for consent to search—
even if the officers have no basis for suspecting that person of criminal activity.55  
In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court applied Muehler in the context of a traffic stop.56  
There, the Court held: “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the 
justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the 
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do 
not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”57  Thus, under Johnson, questions 
unrelated to the initial justification for the stop do not per se require either 
reasonable articulable suspicion or consent to further questioning.58 
                                                           
53 780 A.2d 1037, 1045–46 (Del. 2001). 
54 See id. at 1047–48. 
55 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005). 
56 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333–34, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). 
57 Id. at 333 (emphasis added) (citing Mena, 544 U.S. at 100–01). 
58 Several federal court decisions after Muehler and Johnson also instruct that inquiries unrelated 
to the traffic stop’s initial purpose are not per se unreasonable where the temporal extension of 
23 
 
 
In this case, it is undisputed that the officers had a lawful justification for the 
initial traffic stop of Owens’ vehicle, because they witnessed Owens commit a 
speeding violation.  Collins’ questions about who owned the bag and his request 
for consent to search did not “measurably extend” the stop under Johnson so as to 
require independent reasonable suspicion or a voluntary consent to questioning.   
Collins asked one question each to Murray and Owens—whether he or she owned 
the bag—and then requested consent to search from Owens.  Collins testified that 
it took five to six minutes to check their identification, and the record provides no 
basis to conclude that the patdown of Murray and the inquiries about the bag 
measurably extended the length of the stop beyond this time.  Moreover, the 
Superior Court found that the stop was not complete at the time of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the stop is de minimis.  See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (holding that questioning of driver and passengers about their travel plans did not give 
rise to unlawful detention where stop was initiated for lawful purpose and lasted mere five to six 
minutes); United States v. Taylor, 596 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that officers’ 
request for consent to search vehicle during stop for seatbelt violation did not violate Fourth 
Amendment where there was no evidence that stop was unreasonably prolonged), cert. denied, –
–– U.S. –––, 130 S.Ct. 3485, 177 L.Ed.2d 1076 (2010); see also United States v. Stewart, 473 
F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that, after Muehler, “[t]he correct Fourth Amendment 
inquiry (assuming the detention is legitimate) is whether an officer’s traffic stop questions 
‘extended the time’ that a driver was detained, regardless of the questions’ content”). These 
courts have rejected the kind of bright-line, no-prolongation rule suggested by the majority 
opinion. U.S. v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he overwhelming weight of 
authority militates against a bright-line ‘no prolongation’ rule.”). The majority also suggests that 
there is some meaningful distinction between the term “measurably” and “significantly” or 
“substantially” under Johnson. But, as the Sixth Circuit noted in an application of Johnson, 
another definition of the word “measurable” is “significant.” Id. (citing Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary Unabridged (1981) at 1399). 
24 
 
questioning.59   Owens was lawfully detained as part of the traffic stop when 
Collins asked for her consent.  
 
In response to Collins’ questions, Owens identified the bookbag as hers and 
consented to its search.  The voluntariness of a party’s consent is a question of fact 
that is determined by an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.60  Although 
relevant to the analysis, an officer’s failure to advise a lawfully-seized person that 
she is “free to go” does not, of itself, preclude the officer from obtaining a 
voluntary consent to search.61  Generally, consent obtained during a lawful 
detention with “no signs of coercion or duress” will be deemed voluntary.62  Here, 
the Superior Court credited Collins’ testimony as to his exchange with Owens, the 
driver, and concluded that Owens’ consent to search was voluntary.  The Superior 
Court determined that Owens’ consent was valid after considering the totality of 
the circumstances.   
 
The majority states that “the question of whether Owens’ consent was 
voluntary is irrelevant, because the record clearly indicates Collins questioned her 
about the bag only after he illegally detained Murray, patted him down, and 
                                                           
59 Suppression Hearing Tr. at 87 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2011) (“This is not a situation where at the 
end of the road I’ve given you your license and registration and insurance back, everything is 
fine, and then I try to continue on the investigation in some manner.”) 
60 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United 
States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1081–82 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
61 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). 
62 See United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1432 (10th Cir. 1997); Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 
228. 
25 
 
questioned him.”  But, the mere fact that the officers began their inquiry with 
Murray does not, standing alone, render involuntary—or irrelevant—the consent 
Owens gave to a search of a bag she said was hers.    
 
 
Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, consent to search may be 
invalid if it follows an unlawful seizure of the person giving the consent.63  For the 
doctrine to apply, however, there must first be some causal connection between the 
unlawful search or seizure and the consent to search.64   Where some causal 
connection exists, the attenuation analysis set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Illinois may still render the consent valid.65  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
also made clear that “attenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold 
matter, courts determine that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product 
of illegal governmental activity.”66  
 
Here, it is not necessary to reach the attenuation analysis because there is no 
prior illegality relating to Owens.  She was neither searched nor unlawfully 
detained prior to the request for consent.  Collins’ questioning of Owens about the 
bag was permissible, even though it was unrelated to the purpose of the traffic 
                                                           
63 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507–08, 130 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality 
opinion); United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997). 
64 See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963); Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 
1291–93 (Del. 2008). 
65 Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1293 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 
45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). 
66 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990).  See also United 
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1251, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). 
26 
 
stop, under Johnson.  Even if we were to assume that the patdown and questioning 
of Murray was unreasonable, the record supports the Superior Court’s conclusion 
that Owens consented voluntarily to the search of the bag, in the course of a lawful 
traffic stop for speeding.  
 
There is another reason the officer could proceed with the search.  Before 
Collins opened the bag, which Owens said was hers, Murray interjected that it was 
his bag and contained drugs.  Murray’s admission—which was not in response to 
any question asked of him—provided Collins with probable cause to search the 
bag.67  At this point there were conflicting claims of ownership, which the officer 
was not required to resolve.  Whether the search was based upon Owens’ consent 
or Murray’s admission, the search was reasonable and did not violate Murray’s 
rights under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
The majority also relies on Department of Corrections Probation and Parole 
Procedure 7.19 as an independent basis for reversing the decision of the Superior 
Court.  Under Procedure 7.19, probation officers may not detain an individual 
abroad “unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is 
committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime.”  A traffic stop results in 
                                                           
67 State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993) (stating that probable cause requires only 
facts which suggest, when viewed under totality of the circumstances, “that there is a fair 
probability that the defendant has committed a crime”).  Moreover, a probation officer only 
needs “reasonable suspicion” of illegal conduct to conduct a warrantless search of a known 
probationer.  See Jacklin v. State, 2011 WL 809684, at *2, 16 A.3d 938 (Del. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(TABLE). 
27 
 
a seizure of the passengers as well as the driver,68 and that initial detention was not 
unlawful here because the vehicle was stopped for a speeding violation.  Owens’ 
consent to search and Murray’s spontaneous admission supplied the probable cause 
necessary to search the bag.  Procedure 7.19 does not provide greater protections 
than the Fourth Amendment, and does not provide an independent basis for 
reversal in this case. 
 
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Murray’s motion 
to suppress.  Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
68 See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 256–58, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168  L.Ed.2d 132 (U.S. 
2007); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) 
(holding that, during lawful traffic stop, officer may order passenger to exit car without 
reasonable suspicion of safety risk).