Title: Glasco v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980909
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TODD M. GLASCO 
 
v. Record No. 980909  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 February 26, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
After a bench trial on December 5, 1996, Todd M. 
Glasco was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Newport News of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and possession 
of a firearm while in possession of cocaine, in violation 
of Code § 18.2-308.4.1  We granted Glasco this appeal on a 
single issue regarding the legality of a search of the 
passenger compartment of his vehicle incident to his 
arrest.  Because we conclude that he was a recent occupant 
of the vehicle prior to his arrest, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals finding that the search 
was lawful. 
I. 
                     
1 The trial court sentenced Glasco to 12 years 
imprisonment, 9 years suspended, on the conviction for 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; and five 
years imprisonment, 4 and one-half years suspended, on the 
conviction for possession of a firearm. 
 
 
On May 4, 1996, around 11:00 o’clock p.m., Wesley T. 
Filer, a uniformed police officer for the City of Newport 
News, was on duty and patrolling in a marked police vehicle 
when he observed a vehicle that he suspected was being 
operated by Glasco.  Filer was familiar with both the 
vehicle and Glasco because of a recent encounter with 
Glasco.  Filer had arrested Glasco on an outstanding capias 
for failure to pay traffic fines approximately two weeks 
prior to this particular evening.  Based on his knowledge 
that a driver’s failure to pay fines normally resulted in 
suspension of that person’s operator’s license and given 
his previous arrest of Glasco, Filer suspected that 
Glasco’s license to operate a motor vehicle had been 
suspended.  However, Filer decided not to stop the vehicle 
at that time.  Instead, he chose to follow the car so that 
he could determine whether Glasco was, in fact, the driver. 
While following the vehicle, Filer contacted his 
dispatcher and requested that a check be made with the 
Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in order to determine the 
status of Glasco’s operator’s license.  Before Filer 
received a response to his request, Glasco pulled his 
vehicle over to the right-hand side of the street and 
legally parked it there.  Glasco then got out of the 
vehicle and began to walk toward a house on the other side 
 
2
of the street.  At that point, Filer stopped his police 
cruiser approximately 20 to 30 feet behind Glasco’s 
vehicle.  After activating his rear strobe light and 
exiting his police car, Filer called out, “Mr. Glasco, you 
don’t have a valid license, do you?”  According to Filer, 
Glasco then turned around and began walking toward Filer, 
at which time Glasco answered, “Come on, Filer, can’t you 
just give me a break?”  Filer requested Glasco to show some 
form of identification.  Glasco produced a Virginia 
identification card but no operator’s license.  In the 
meantime, Filer learned, based on the check with DMV, that 
Glasco’s operator’s license was, in fact, suspended.  Thus, 
he charged Glasco with “driving under suspension” and 
placed him under arrest. 
 
Incident to the arrest, Filer searched Glasco’s person 
and found two small bags containing marijuana in the right, 
front pocket of Glasco’s shorts.  He also found $650 in 
cash and a pager on Glasco’s person.  Filer then put Glasco 
in the backseat of his police vehicle and asked a backup 
police officer, John V. Polak, to search Glasco’s car.  
During this search, Polak found a .38 caliber handgun in 
the pocket of the driver’s door and a clear, plastic bag 
containing, what he thought was and later, when analyzed, 
 
3
proved to be, crack cocaine under the floor mat on the 
driver’s side of the vehicle. 
At a hearing before the trial court on a motion to 
suppress the evidence found during the search of the 
vehicle, Filer admitted that he “had no probable cause to 
believe” that there was any contraband or narcotics in the 
vehicle when he asked Polak to search it.  He did, however, 
assert that he had a “hunch there might be some narcotics 
located in the vehicle” based on information that he had 
received in the past regarding Glasco’s involvement with 
narcotics, and because he had recovered narcotics from his 
person.  The trial court concluded that, once Filer found 
drugs in Glasco’s pocket, there was “probable cause to 
believe possibly there [were] narcotics in the vehicle.”  
Accordingly, the court overruled Glasco’s motion to 
suppress the evidence recovered during the search of the 
vehicle. 
Before the Court of Appeals, Glasco challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and 
the legality of both the initial encounter with the police 
officer and the subsequent search of his vehicle incident 
to his arrest.  With regard to the issue before this Court, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the search of Glasco’s 
automobile incident to arrest was lawful because it was 
 
4
“contemporaneous with the arrest and the arrestee’s recent 
occupancy of the vehicle.”  Glasco v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 
App. 763, 773, 497 S.E.2d 150, 154 (1998).2  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Id. 
at 776, 497 S.E.2d at 156. 
II. 
 
We begin our analysis of a search incident to arrest 
with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).  In that case, 
the Court defined the parameters of a lawful search 
incident to arrest: 
 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the person arrested in 
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek 
to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. 
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In 
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment 
or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee 
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A 
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is 
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer 
as one concealed in the clothing of the person 
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for 
a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within 
his immediate control” — construing that phrase to 
mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 
                     
2 The Court of Appeals also upheld the initial stop of 
Glasco and found sufficient evidence to support Glasco’s 
convictions. 
 
5
 
Id. at 762-63. 
 
Several years after the Chimel decision, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the extent of the area that is 
within an arrestee’s control and thus subject to being 
searched had been construed in different ways.  United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).  With regard 
to the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, the Supreme 
Court later stated that the “courts have found no workable 
definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of the 
arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of 
an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.”  
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).  Thus, the 
Court established a “bright-line” rule to govern such 
searches:  “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial 
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id.
Using this rule, the Court upheld the legality of the 
automobile search at issue in Belton.  The police officer 
in that case had stopped a vehicle, in which Belton was a 
passenger, for travelling at an excessive rate of speed.  
Id. at 455.  After directing Belton and the other occupants 
to get out of the automobile, the officer arrested them for 
 
6
unlawful possession of marijuana.  Incident to the arrest, 
he searched the interior passenger compartment of the 
vehicle.  Id. at 456.  During the search, the police 
officer found cocaine in the pocket of Belton’s jacket that 
had been lying on the back seat of the car.  Id.
Belton established a two-part inquiry for determining 
the legality of a search of a vehicle incident to arrest:  
(1) whether the defendant was the subject of a lawful 
custodial arrest; and (2) whether the arrestee was the 
occupant of the vehicle that was searched.  People v. 
Savedra, 907 P.2d 596, 598-99 (Colo. 1995).  The present 
appeal involves the second part of the inquiry and requires 
that we address the scope of the terms “occupant” and 
“recent occupant” as used by the Supreme Court in Belton. 
Glasco contends that the search of his vehicle 
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures because he was not a recent occupant 
of the vehicle at the time of his arrest.  He had parked 
his vehicle and was walking across the street when Filer 
first initiated contact with him.  Further, argues Glasco, 
he was sitting in the back seat of Filer’s police cruiser, 
parked 20 to 30 feet behind Glasco’s vehicle, when Polak 
actually searched the vehicle.  Thus, according to Glasco, 
 
7
he was not in a position to seize a weapon out of the 
vehicle or to destroy evidence in it. 
Initially, we conclude that certain facts in this case 
do not render the search of Glasco’s vehicle outside the 
parameters of a lawful search incident to arrest.  The fact 
that Glasco was not physically in the vehicle when he was 
arrested or when Polak searched the vehicle does not mean 
that Glasco was not a recent occupant of the vehicle.  The 
defendant in Belton likewise was outside the vehicle when 
the police officer arrested him and conducted the vehicle 
search.  453 U.S. at 457.  “A police officer may search the 
passenger compartment of an automobile incident to the 
lawful custodial arrest . . . even if the arrestee has been 
separated from his car prior to the search.”  United States 
v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 968-69 (6th Cir. 1993); accord United 
States v. Snook, 88 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Similarly, the fact that Glasco was sitting in the 
back seat of Filer’s police cruiser when Polak searched the 
vehicle, thus arguably not in a position to seize a weapon 
or destroy evidence, does not change the result.  
“[O]fficers may conduct valid searches incident to arrest 
 
8
even when the officers have secured the suspects in a squad 
car and rendered them unable to reach any weapon or destroy 
evidence.”  United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 317 (7th 
Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Patterson, 993 F.2d 
121, 123 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 
1146, 1149 (10th Cir. 1985); Gundrum v. State, 563 So.2d 27, 
28-29 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Weathers, 506 S.E.2d 
698, 699 (Ga. App. 1998); but see United States v. Vasey, 
834 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1987). 
The pivotal fact in this case is that Glasco had 
voluntarily exited the vehicle before Filer initiated any 
contact with him, either by confronting Glasco directly or 
by signaling confrontation with the lights or siren on the 
police cruiser.  Other courts that have considered the 
question whether an arrestee in this situation is still a 
recent occupant of a vehicle have reached differing 
conclusions. 
A number of jurisdictions have held that an arrestee 
is an occupant of a vehicle only when the police officer 
arrests or at least initiates contact with the defendant 
while the defendant is inside the automobile.  See United 
States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 891 (1995) (“[W]here the defendant has 
voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away 
 
9
from the automobile before the officer has initiated 
contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton’s 
bright-line rule.”); State v. Vanderhorst, 419 So.2d 762, 
763-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding Belton not 
applicable where defendant was attaching tow rope to 
vehicle when police approached and arrested him for DUI); 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 575 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Mass. 1991) 
(holding search of vehicle did not qualify as search 
incident to arrest because defendant had already exited 
automobile when officers apprehended him); People v. 
Fernengel, 549 N.W.2d 361, 362-63 (Mich. App. 1996) 
(finding Belton not applicable when defendant voluntarily 
left vehicle before police initiated contact). 
Other courts have reached contrary results.  See 
Snook, 88 F.3d at 608 (holding that arrestee was occupant 
of vehicle even though he had voluntarily stepped out of 
car as police officer arrived); Willis, 37 F.3d at 317 
(ruling that Belton applied where police officer saw 
arrestee sitting in vehicle and then sneaking out of it 
before officer initiated any contact with arrestee); United 
States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990) (finding that defendant, 
who was first detained by police while walking away from 
vehicle, then fled, was arrested one block from vehicle, 
 
10
and was then returned to vicinity of vehicle by police, was 
recent occupant under Belton); State v. McLendon, 490 So.2d 
1308, 1309-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (extending Belton 
to justify vehicle search where driver voluntarily got out 
of vehicle and was arrested inside service station twenty 
to thirty feet away from vehicle); Savedra, 907 P.2d at 599 
(“Belton can include situations where the occupant of a 
vehicle anticipates police contact and exits the vehicle 
immediately before that contact occurs.”); People v. 
Bosnak, 633 N.E.2d 1322, 1326 (Ill. App. 1994) (holding 
that arrestee was recent occupant of vehicle under Belton 
rule where police officer followed vehicle but did not 
initiate contact until arrestee parked vehicle and walked 
ten yards away).3
As previously stated, the justification for a search 
incident to arrest is to confiscate weapons that could 
                     
3 Additionally, we infer from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), that 
initial contact by a police officer before an arrestee 
exits a vehicle is not required.  In that case, the 
defendant met the police officers at the rear of his 
vehicle after he had swerved off into a ditch.  Id. at 
1035.  Although the court upheld the legality of the 
officer’s subsequent search of the defendant’s vehicle 
based on the principles enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), the Court also stated that “[i]t is clear . 
. . that if the officers had arrested Long for speeding or 
for driving while intoxicated, they could have searched the 
 
 
11
endanger the safety of the arresting police officer and to 
prevent the destruction of evidence.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
763; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).  The 
Supreme Court’s purpose for enunciating the Belton “bright-
line” rule was twofold.  The Court wanted to create a 
straightforward definition of the area that is within the 
immediate control of the arrestee, thus providing “‘[a] 
single familiar standard . . . to guide police officers, 
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront.’”  Belton, 453 U.S. 
at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 
(1979)).  The Court also sought to eliminate the need for 
litigation in every case to determine whether the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle is within the scope of a search 
incident to arrest.  McLendon, 490 So.2d at 1309-10. 
Given these reasons, we are not persuaded by the 
authorities that have decided that an arrestee is an 
occupant or recent occupant of an automobile only if the 
police officer initiates contact with the arrestee before 
that person exits the vehicle.  That kind of limitation 
assumes that an individual, who voluntarily gets out of an 
__________________ 
passenger compartment under [Belton].”  463 U.S. at 1035 
 
 
12
automobile, is not aware of the presence of a police 
officer, or having such knowledge, it did not prompt the 
person to exit the vehicle.  We do not believe that those 
assumptions are always warranted.  Moreover, a 
knowledgeable suspect has the same motive and opportunity 
to destroy evidence or obtain a weapon as the arrestee with 
whom a police officer has initiated contact.  That suspect 
could also conceal evidence in the vehicle and effectively 
prevent an officer from discovering it by getting out of 
his or her automobile. 
Thus, as in the present case, when a police officer 
observes an automobile, follows it because of his or her 
prior knowledge regarding the vehicle and its suspected 
driver, and arrests the driver in close proximity to the 
vehicle immediately after the driver exits the automobile, 
we conclude that the arrestee is a recent occupant of the 
vehicle within the limits of the Belton rule.  Accordingly, 
the search of the passenger compartment of Glasco’s vehicle 
was a lawful search incident to arrest. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
__________________ 
n.1. 
 
13
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, concurring. 
In this case the trial court denied Glasco's motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of 
Glasco's car because it found that the police officer had 
probable cause to conduct the search.  The trial court 
specifically held that the search was not justified as a 
search incident to arrest.  As I explain in this opinion, I 
believe the trial court was correct on both rulings.  
Therefore, although I disagree with the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals and the opinion of the majority of this 
Court regarding the validity of the search, I concur in the 
result reached by the majority affirming the conviction of 
the defendant.  
I.  Search Incident to Arrest 
The majority concludes that the search of the vehicle 
in this case was a valid search incident to arrest because 
it came within the rule announced in New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454 (1981).  That rule, as stated by the Supreme 
Court is:  "[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial 
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile."  Id. at 460 
(footnotes omitted). 
 
14
To reach its conclusion in this case, the majority 
applies the rule in Belton to facts different from those 
recited in that case in that the arrestee here was not an 
occupant of the vehicle when arrested.  This nonconforming 
fact, standing alone, is not fatal, however, because in 
Belton itself the defendant was not an occupant of the 
vehicle when arrested; he had gotten out of the vehicle at 
the direction of the arresting officer just prior to the 
arrest.  Due to this discrepancy between the rule as stated 
in Belton and the facts of Belton, references in that 
opinion to a "recent occupant" of a vehicle, see id., have 
been incorporated into the rule itself.  However, nothing 
in Belton specifically defined what circumstances qualified 
an arrestee as a "recent occupant."  
Consequently, from its inception, application of the 
so-called "bright line" Belton rule has not provided clear 
resolution of search issues in cases with facts that do not 
mirror the facts in Belton or the precise words of the 
rule.  To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether arrestees with these varying types of connections 
to the vehicle searched are "recent occupants" of the 
 
15
vehicles under Belton.4  However, other federal and state 
jurisdictions have considered a variety of factual 
circumstances. 
As indicated by the majority, the analysis and results 
reached in those jurisdictions are far from uniform.  Some 
jurisdictions have applied the Belton rule to validate a 
search of a vehicle only when the officer arrests or 
initiates contact with the arrestee while he or she is 
still in the automobile.  Other jurisdictions have extended 
the Belton rule through a broader interpretation of "recent 
occupant," thus validating searches of vehicles where the 
arrestee voluntarily left the vehicle and proceeded some 
distance from the vehicle before arrest.  We have not 
previously considered this issue. 
The majority resolves this case by simply reviewing 
the two lines of cases from other jurisdictions, rejecting 
the more restrictive approach, and, without further 
consideration of the specific facts of this case in light 
of the rationales used by those jurisdictions adopting a 
more expansive application of the Belton rule, concluding 
                     
4 In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the 
defendant had crashed the car in a ditch and was standing 
near the opened driver's side door when the police made the 
arrest.  As the majority recognizes, the statements in that 
 
 
16
that the defendant here was a "recent occupant of the 
vehicle" under Belton, thus validating the search of his 
vehicle as a search incident to arrest.  In my opinion, 
determining whether, under the facts of this case, Glasco 
is a "recent" occupant of the vehicle and thus subject to 
the Belton rule, requires an examination of Fourth 
Amendment principles in general and those involved in 
Belton in particular. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects persons from unreasonable searches by the 
government.  The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean 
that before the police may search any area in which a 
suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), the police must 
have probable cause to believe that the area to be searched 
contains evidence of criminal activity by the suspect and 
must obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate.  
See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that citizens have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy while in their vehicles.  
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 667 (1979).  
__________________ 
opinion regarding the application of Belton to the facts of 
that case were dicta. 
 
17
Certain exceptions to the warrant requirement have 
been recognized, such as the right of the police to search 
the person of the arrestee incident to arrest, see Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), and the area 
within his control.  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 158 (1925).  The justifications for this exception to 
the warrant requirement are the need to insure the safety 
of the arresting officer by allowing him to disarm the 
suspect to take him into custody and the need to preserve 
evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 414 U.S. 
218, 234 (1973). 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the 
Supreme Court reversed the trend of a series of cases that 
had broadened the scope of a warrantless search incident to 
arrest.  395 U.S. at 768 (overruling United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) and Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145 (1947)).  In Chimel, the Court limited the 
permissible scope of searches incident to arrest to the 
area "'within [the arrestee's] immediate control' — 
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which 
[the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence."  Id. at 763.  Only when the search 
is thus limited is it reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, according to the Court, in light of the 
 
18
rationale for the exception to the warrant requirement 
recognized in prior cases — safety of the police and 
preservation of evidence.  Id. at 763-64.  
Following Chimel, determining whether a particular 
area in which incriminating evidence was found was within 
an arrestee's "immediate control" required an examination 
of the facts and circumstances surrounding each arrest.  
Such a case-by-case analysis, particularly in the area of 
vehicle searches, presented a significant burden to courts 
and police. 
The Belton "bright line" rule was created by the 
Supreme Court to relieve this burden.  Belton, 453 U.S. at 
459-60.  The Court created the rule following a survey of 
federal circuit court cases decided after Chimel in which 
the police arrested a vehicle occupant and searched the 
vehicle.  The survey revealed to the Court that whenever a 
vehicle occupant was arrested, "articles inside the 
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of 
an automobile are in fact generally, even if not 
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might 
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].'"  
Id. at 460, citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.  Based on this 
recurring fact pattern, the Supreme Court adopted a factual 
presumption that, if the arrestee is an occupant of the 
 
19
vehicle, the arrestee can reach in the vehicle and get a 
weapon or destroy evidence.  Following Belton, a showing of 
the actual fact of occupancy would automatically provide 
the presumed fact of access to the passenger compartment 
which is required by Chimel as a prerequisite for a 
warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest.  The 
Supreme Court made it clear that its holding was "in no way 
alter[ing] the fundamental principles established in the 
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident 
to lawful custodial arrests."  453 U.S. at 460 n. 3. 
Turning to the task at hand, although the cases from 
other jurisdictions addressing this issue are informative, 
our task is to independently consider and apply the 
principles of Chimel and Belton to determine whether, under 
the facts of this case, Glasco was a "recent occupant" of a 
vehicle for purposes of the Belton rule.  A review of the 
cases surveyed and cited by the Supreme Court in Belton as 
supporting the  factual presumption of access to the 
vehicle created in that case reveals that in all but one 
case, the arrestee was arrested while in the vehicle, and 
in all the cases the search of the vehicle occurred after 
the arrestees exited the vehicles at the direction of the 
police and while they were still within close proximity of 
the vehicles.  United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364, 366 
 
20
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336, 
1337 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); United 
States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977); 
United Stated v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1973).  
These fact patterns along with the facts in Belton suggest 
that in using the phrase "recent occupant" in Belton, the 
Supreme Court was referring to persons arrested under these 
or similar circumstances.  
For purposes of this case, however, we need not engage 
in speculation as to whether the fact patterns surveyed in 
Belton would be the only circumstances under which the 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the Belton 
rule could pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  To resolve this 
case, we need only look to one of the "fundamental 
principles" of Chimel cited in and unaltered by Belton:  
The scope of a warrantless search must be "'strictly tied 
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible."  Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 
(citations omitted).  If there is no connection shown 
between a person's occupancy of a vehicle and his arrest, 
then extending the scope of the search incident to arrest 
to the vehicle is neither "tied to" nor "justified by" 
circumstances of the arrest.  Thus, to qualify as a valid 
 
21
warrantless search incident to arrest, at a minimum, some 
connection must exist between occupancy of the vehicle and 
the circumstances of the arrest.5  Whether such a connection 
exists will depend on the facts of each case. 
At the time of the arrest in this case, Glasco had 
lawfully parked his vehicle, crossed the street, and was 
thirty feet away from the vehicle, heading toward the home 
of a friend.  The police had not initiated any contact with 
Glasco prior to that time.  The record contains no 
indication that Glasco was aware of the police when he 
parked and exited his vehicle.   
This case is not a case in which the police have 
officially engaged and are following a suspect and in which 
the suspect stops his vehicle, gets out of it, runs away 
from the police, and is arrested at some point away from 
the vehicle.  See, e.g., White v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 
446, 482 S.E.2d 876 (1997).  Those circumstances may 
suggest some connection between the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest and the arrestee's occupancy of the 
                     
5 By "circumstances of the arrest," I do not mean the 
grounds for arrest.  The "'danger to the police officer 
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant 
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the 
grounds for arrest.'"  Knowles v. Iowa, __ U.S. __, No. 97-
7597, Dec. 8, 1998, 67 U.S.L.W. 4027, 4028, citing United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973). 
 
22
vehicle.  In this case, there is no evidence that Glasco 
was aware of the police presence or took any action as a 
result of the police presence while he was in his vehicle 
or when he stopped, parked, and exited the vehicle.  He was 
neither approached nor arrested by the police until he had 
completely left the area of the vehicle, crossed the street 
and was proceeding toward the house of a friend.  When 
approached by the police, Glasco did reverse his course and 
take steps toward the police, but there is nothing in the 
record that indicates Glasco was heading back to the 
vehicle.  On these facts, there is simply no connection 
between Glasco's occupancy of his vehicle and his arrest.  
Therefore, in the absence of such a connection, there is no 
basis to deem Glasco a "recent occupant" for purposes of 
the Belton rule. 
The majority expresses a concern for adopting a 
rationale that might give a suspect the opportunity "to 
conceal evidence in the vehicle and effectively prevent an 
officer from discovering it by getting out of his or her 
automobile."  While the concealment of evidence is a valid 
concern of law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment 
nevertheless reflects the belief held in our system of 
government that the right to be free from unreasonable 
governmental searches supersedes the interest of the police 
 
23
in unfettered access to one's home, person, or automobile, 
even to recover evidence concealed therein.  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Chimel: 
 
We are not dealing with formalities.  
The presence of a search warrant serves a 
high function.  Absent some grave emergency, 
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a 
magistrate between the citizen and the 
police.  This was done not to shield 
criminals nor to make the home a safe haven 
for illegal activities.  It was done so that 
an objective mind might weigh the need to 
invade that privacy in order to enforce the 
law . . . .  We cannot be true to that 
constitutional requirement and excuse the 
absence of a search warrant without a 
showing by those who seek exemption from the 
constitutional mandate that the exigencies 
of the situation made that course 
imperative. 
 
395 U.S. at 761, citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451, 455-56(1948). 
Therefore, the mere ability of a citizen to put 
evidence out of the reach of law enforcement by placing it 
within an area protected by the right to privacy is not 
sufficient to justify a warrantless search.6
Furthermore, as I have previously indicted, we do not 
need to draw a "bright line rule" to apply in circumstances 
where an arrestee is a "recent occupant" of a vehicle for 
                     
 
6 Of course, under the analysis I suggest here, action 
by a vehicle's occupant shown to be taken in response to 
 
24
purposes of the Belton presumption.  Our responsibility is 
to look at the facts of this case and to determine whether 
the arrestee's occupancy of the vehicle was sufficiently 
connected with the circumstances of his arrest to justify 
application of the Belton rule.  For the reasons stated 
above, it is my opinion that the rule set out in the Belton 
case is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
II.  Probable Cause 
The trial court held that the search of Glasco's 
vehicle did not violate Glasco's Fourth Amendment rights 
because the police officer had probable cause to conduct the 
search.  Glasco appealed this holding to the Court of 
Appeals and argued before that court that probable cause to 
search the vehicle did not exist.  He made the same 
arguments in this Court.7  
Whether probable cause exists is a question of law and 
fact and is reviewed de novo on appeal.  Ornelas v. United 
__________________ 
police presence may subject the actor to search of the 
vehicle under Belton. 
7 Neither the majority opinion nor the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals addresses this issue.  The Commonwealth 
did not address the issue in its brief in this Court, but 
at oral argument, counsel for the Commonwealth "conceded" 
that  probable cause to search Glasco's vehicle did not 
exist.  However, concessions in respect to conclusions of 
law are not binding upon the parties or the court.  Tuggle 
v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 111 n.5, 334 S.E.2d 838, 846 
n.5 (1985).  
 
25
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).  The evidence at trial 
established that, upon searching Glasco incident to his 
arrest for driving under a suspended license, the officer 
found two small bags of marijuana, a pager, and $650 in 
cash.  Six hundred dollars of the $650 was in six separate 
folds.  The currency in each fold amounted to $100.  The 
police officer testified that "I had no probable cause to 
believe [contraband or narcotics were in the vehicle], but I 
did have a hunch there might be some narcotics located in 
the vehicle."  The officer had received information in the 
past that Glasco was involved in narcotics and his "hunch" 
was based on finding the marijuana when he searched Glasco. 
The officer's statement that he did not have probable 
cause is not dispositive.  Subjective motivations of the 
officer do not affect the probable cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996).  The probable cause determination is whether the 
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively 
reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.  Id.  
Applying that standard, the items found as a result of the 
search of Glasco, including the manner in which the 
currency was packaged, along with the officer's knowledge 
of Glasco's involvement with narcotics, were sufficient to 
provide the officer with probable cause to believe Glasco 
 
26
was selling or trafficking narcotics and that additional 
narcotics would be found in the vehicle. 
For these reasons I concur in the result reached by 
the majority. 
 
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