Title: Clark v. PORTLAND TRUST BANK
Citation: 221 Or. 339, 351 P.2d 51
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 1960

Affirmed April 20, 1960.
*340 H.H. Phillips, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Phillips, Coughlin, Buell &amp; Phillips; Clarence D. Phillips, Jarvis B. *341 Black; Seitz, Easley &amp; Whipple and Norman L. Easley, Portland.
Ferris F. Boothe, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Black, Kendall &amp; Tremaine, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and WARNER, SLOAN and HOLMAN, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, J.
This is a suit for specific performance of an alleged oral contract to make a will with provisions for a monthly payment of $250 in favor of plaintiff, Helen Clark, a stepdaughter of Harrie E. McCraney, deceased. The defendant Portland Trust Bank is the executor of the decedent's will, dated November 17, 1954, and hereinafter referred to as the second will. The other defendants, except the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, are legatees under the second will who were not named as beneficiaries under the first will, executed on the fourth day of February, 1953. From a decree in favor of plaintiff and impressing upon the property of the estate of McCraney a trust to enforce the same, the defendants appeal.
Plaintiff was about two years old when her mother married McCraney in 1910. No children were born to that marriage, nor as far as this record reveals, did McCraney have any children by any previous union. As a result, there was an exceptionally strong and affectionate father-daughter relationship subsisting between plaintiff and her father which continued uninterrupted except for occasional outbursts of Mr. McCraney's temper. Some such incidents will be hereinafter referred to, but all, so far as we are informed, *342 were eventually followed by amicable reconcilations and expressions of regret or apology on the part of Mr. McCraney. One of these occurred in 1929 when plaintiff married Mr. Clark, a man not approved by her father. The estrangement thus caused apparently continued until the birth of Mrs. Clark's first son, in February, 1932. Mr. and Mrs. Clark were divorced in 1949. From thence on plaintiff and decedent saw each other more frequently, increasingly so after her mother's death, in November, 1952.
In February or March, 1953, plaintiff had a conversation with Mr. McCraney in which he volunteered that he had made certain provisions in his will for the benefit of herself and two sons. This she testified to as follows:
*343 This is confirmed by a copy of decedent's first will. It provided for payments of $5,000 each to plaintiff's two sons, whom he regarded and treated as his grandsons. It also contained a further provision for an income of $250 per month for plaintiff as long as she remained unmarried.
While visiting the decedent in his home sometime in July, 1953, there was an occurrence which temporarily alienated plaintiff and her father. It seems that an innocent remark of hers addressed at that time to a feminine guest and friend of her father's was misunderstood both by him and the guest. It caused him to imagine that plaintiff was improperly concerned about his personal affairs and prompted him to advise plaintiff the next day to no longer call him father and to inform her that he was going to revoke the provisions made for her in the will of February 4, 1953. As reported and demonstrated by subsequent circumstances, Mr. McCraney was in error and his punishment of his daughter not justified.
Mr. McCraney carried out his threat to revoke the provisions made for Mrs. Clark in his first will. This elimination is reflected in the second will of November 17, 1954.
Plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to conciliate the decedent and convince him that his attitude resulting from that incident was not warranted. Failing in her attempt to restore their erstwhile relationship, she left Portland on June 29, 1955, and moved to Sacramento, California, where she undertook steady employment with a local hospital, intending to remain there.
Sometime in April, 1956, her father went to Sacramento for the purpose of visiting plaintiff. Shortly after his arrival, he expressed his regret at his actions concerning the incident in his apartment in July, 1953. *344 At the same time he proposed that if she would agree to give up her employment and residence in Sacramento and return to Portland and live with him in his apartment for the rest of his life, he would in consideration change his will by reestablishing the testamentary provisions formerly made in her behalf.
The plaintiff, not immediately accepting his proposition, deliberated upon it for several days. Before she announced her final acceptance, her father again called her and added four conditions of which we will take notice. These were agreeable to her and on May 15, 1956, she terminated all of her Sacramento connections and the following day established herself in the home of her father, where she remained as his daughter and companion to and until his sudden death from a heart attack on October 8, 1956.
In the intervening five months between Mrs. Clark's return to Portland and his death, decedent failed to make the testamentary changes which the plaintiff claims he agreed to make.
The defendants present for our attention three assignments of error: first, the representation that there was an insufficiency of proof of a contract; second, that even if an agreement was proved, there was not adequate evidence of performance on the part of Mrs. Clark to take it out from under the statute of frauds; and, lastly, that Mrs. Clark had so breached the agreement that she was not entitled to specific performance.
Consequently, the appeal turns primarly on fact, posing two questions for our consideration: (1) was there an enforceable contract as alleged by plaintiff, and, if so, (2) did she breach it as claimed by defendants.
We first address ourselves to the question concerning the proof of the contract.
*345 As is more usual than unusual when a testamentary agreement is made between two close members of a family, the only evidence regarding the offer and acceptance which ripened into the contract comes solely from the plaintiff. Because of its importance to the solution of the questions presented, we set out in substantial entirety Mrs. Clark's account of the conversation had by and between her and her father in Sacramento in April, 1956:
We pause here to note several principles of law governing our conclusions.
1. It is settled in this state that when a contract is wholly in parol, and the alleged promisor is dead, clear and satisfactory proof of the terms of the agreement and its strict performance by the promisee is required before specific performance of such contract will be granted. Hawkins v. Doe (1912), 60 Or 437, 441, 119 P 754; Leadbetter v. Price (1922), 103 Or 222, 228, 202 P 104; Losey v. O'Hair (1938), 160 Or 63, 73, 83 P2d 493; Tiggelbeck v. Russell (1949) 187 Or 554, 567, 213 P2d 156; Hawkins v. Toombs (1952), 194 Or 478, 483, 242 P2d 194.
2. An examination of the great number of cases which have heretofore been before this court involving specific performance of oral contracts to bequeath or *350 devise property of a decedent-promisor readily discloses that each case depends upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. Vandiver v. Stone (1935), 149 Or 426, 429, 41 P2d 247; Brennen v. Derby (1928), 124 Or 574, 579, 265 P 425.
We have held that in a matter of this kind it is necessary to take into consideration the background of the relationship of the parties and the circumstances under which the contract was made. Tiggelbeck v. Russell, supra (187 Or at 574). We have called contracts of the instant kind "a natural agreement in the nature of a family settlement, and [which] should be carried out by the courts, if possible, because such arrangements are favored in equity." Kelley v. Devin, 65 Or 211, 218, 132 P 535.
3. The defendants argue that the agreement, as testified to by plaintiff, is wanting in the degree of clarity and certainty necessary to sustain the relief she seeks. We do not find it so.
Her recitals do not reveal contractual terminology of the kind that strangers might employ when dealing at arms length on matters to be reduced to writing. But here we have a father and daughter who had been close in terms of affection and mutual respect for most of Mrs. Clark's then 48 years. They had just repaired the wounds made by an old hurt which had separated them for the past three years. It was an occasion when resort is not made to language satisfying to a lawyer who places a premium on the selection of words expressing contractual engagements with meticulous nicety. Instead, Mr. McCraney and Mrs. Clark naturally resorted to phrases common to the family vernacular and so understood by them. Defendants attempt to depreciate its legal effect by referring to it as a "friendly conversation," words initially employed by Mrs. Clark *351 describing her conference with her father in Sacramento. We think her phrase was apt. It accords with the experience of normal conduct in families. Instead of subtracting anything from the legal significance of their negotiations, it gives to them the human element and usual character of conferences between close relatives who understand each other, have confidence in each others integrity and, therefore, feel they do not have to depend upon written instruments to reflect the terms of their every agreement.
We find it difficult to accept the defendants' argument that Mrs. Clark during the last five months of their life together should have taken steps to have urged her aggressive and opinionated father to change his will. Considering the state of his health, such a suggestion seems out of character for one of Mrs. Clark's temperament. That there were no after-discussions between them concerning Mr. McCraney's promise made in Sacramento finds satisfactory explanation in their respective personalities and their close relationship. We submit that in such a background adult children are not given to questioning parents about their earlier promises, nor are the parents given to repeated assurances of their ultimate fulfillment.
Speaking to the subject of the certainty of contracts to make wills, we find in 57 Am Jur 175, Wills § 197, the following statement:
See, also, Anno 106 ALR 749 re Agreement to Leave Property to Another:
Before closing our discussion of the defendants' first assignment of error, we call attention to three matters warranting special comment and as having weight in the formulation of our own conclusions. They relate to Mrs. Clark's attitude on the stand, Mr. McCraney's health and the interest he manifested in having his will changed.
We have often said, and repeat, that in a matter of this kind, the trial judge sits in position of greatest advantage. This attains more importance when the credibility or character of a witness is involved. One cannot read the carefully analytical opinion of the experienced judge in this case and avoid the complimentary impression which he gathered respecting Mrs. Clark. Our own reading of her testimony and his opinion, even without his superior advantage, incline *353 us to adopt one estimate made by her counsel; that is, she was a passive and self-effacing person. These qualities we find are emphasized by the candor and frankness which characterized her testimony throughout the trial and endow it with attributes of persuasiveness.
We do not know precisely when Mr. McCraney's health became a matter of concern to him. Mr. Seitz, his attorney and very good friend, testified that the decedent was suffering from and treating a condition of hypertension when they both were on a pleasure trip in Hawaii in January, 1955. The plaintiff knew her father's health was not good and that he had had heart trouble for sometime; likewise, the fact that "the man was fearful because of his health" and she knew "he didn't like to be alone at night" and added, "He liked somebody in the apartment." Whether this knowledge had been acquired before April, 1956, on the occasion of their California conference, or after is not exactly clear. There was apparent foundation for these morbid apprehensions, for he died of a heart attack on October 8, 1956. This occurred on the steps of St. Vincent's Hospital as he was entering to make a call on a friend who was a patient there.
Although Mrs. Clark made no representation that her father's health was a factor prompting him to go to Sacramento in the spring of 1956, we have no doubt it was an impelling circumstance on his part and was nonetheless a potent influence hastening her final acceptance of his proposition.
From the voices of all who testified we gather that Mrs. Clark's father was a man of integrity. He is also described by one of his intimate friends of many years as "close-mouthed" and not given to confiding "his family troubles or his financial situation." The testimony *354 of Mrs. Clark and others who knew him is substantially to the same effect. It is not surprising, therefore, that he had little to say about the agreement he had made with his daughter. Once he made reference to it by telling Mrs. Doran about the four conditions he had stipulated. It is evident the matter was very much in mind because we learn from Mr. Seitz, his attorney, that "sometime in the summer of 1956" Mr. McCraney said to him, "I'm thinking about making some changes in my will." More than once during the same summer he told Mrs. Doran that he had tried to see his attorney on several occasions for the purpose of changing his will. A fair inference is that delay in making a change was not a want of diligence on Mr. McCraney's part, but was apparently a matter of his attorney's convenience. As late as October 7, 1956, the day before he died, while visiting Mrs. Doran in the hospital, he again expressed his intention to change his will, saying: "I am going to try to see Maurice Seitz."
We hold that the instant contract is sufficiently precise in its terms that neither party could have reasonably misunderstood them, likewise sufficiently certain as to the testamentary obligations of the decedent, and supported by a valuable consideration.
4. Defendants' second assignment, as we have noticed, advances the proposition that the contract must fail because not in writing as required by the statute of frauds and if it is claimed that it is removed from the operation of that law by performance on the part of the plaintiff-promisee, then the acts upon which she relies are not referable to the agreement.
5, 6. In Meads v. Stott (1952), 193 Or 509, 537-8, 238 P2d 256, 239 P2d 594, we cited with approval the following *355 sections from 49 Am Jur, which we deem particularly applicable here:
See, also, Tiggelbeck v. Russell, supra (187 Or 554); Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or 261, 278, 147 P2d 213, 148 P2d 936; Losey v. O'Hair, supra (160 Or at 73).
Even if the statute of frauds, upon which defendants rely, affected the case, the record here is replete with testimony of a part performance which is referable to and induced by the contract relied upon, thus taking the matter out of the statute. The contract is established and its performance on the part of Mrs. Clark is thoroughly proven and without substantial dispute.
We find that Mrs. Clark was happy in Sacramento when her father called upon her there. She had her *356 own apartment, her own car, and a position in a local hospital which was most satisfying to her. She had reached a point and place in her life where, as she expressed herself, she enjoyed her independence. Nearby were friends of earlier years. It was a community where as a small child she had lived and where she had gone to school for awhile. Behind her were the unhappy years which had preceded her divorce in 1949 and the incident which occurred in 1953, when her father, in what appears an unjustifiable outburst of temperament, disinherited her. Her contentment in her California home was attested by her father in conversation with friends after his return to Portland to whom he expressed himself as agreeably surprised and happy over her circumstances.
There was, in fact, nothing whatsoever to tempt her to forego the satisfying life she then enjoyed short of an agreement which offered a sound prospect for future economic security. She was then 48 years old and had only herself to look to insure her future well being in a material sense.
But it was only after several weeks' reflection that she was moved to accept her father's offer and whereby he became the beneficiary of her decision. To meet the terms of the agreement, she had to sell her car at a substantial loss (a sale made at her father's earnest suggestion), forego the friends and pleasant freedom she had created for herself in Sacramento, give up her satisfying position there with the hospital without certainty of obtaining a like or better one in Portland. These things she had to abandon in exchange for a way of life in Portland which she knew would be restrained in large part by the conditions imposed by her aging and ill father and a man of strong will and irascible temperament.
*357 We find no merit in defendants' second assignment of error.
7. The last assignment of defendants advances the proposition that specific performance of the contract should be denied because, as they allege, plaintiff breached the conditions of the agreement.
It will be remembered these conditions were four in number. Her complete performance of three stands unchallenged. Defendants direct their attention to the fourth, relating to the subject of drinking, and rely on a single instance occurring in July, 1956, which offended Mr. McCraney. We decline to dignify the occasion by fuller statement, feeling as we do that defendants overemphasize its significance and that the degree of Mr. McCraney's expressions at the time were not merited by Mrs. Clark's conduct. Indeed, if conceded that his umbrage was justified, it is noteworthy that no one imputes to him any statement that he viewed it as a breach of their agreement or that he remotely suggested or threatened its rescission because of it. It is evident to us, and apparently to Mrs. Clark's father, that plaintiff's substantial performance of her part of the agreement remained unimpaired by her conduct of that one day, which at its worst could only be classified as neither wilful nor intentional, but only as inadvertent and without bad faith. Whatever disturbed the decedent at the time was condoned, for their arrangement continued thereafter without interruption to the day of his death.
8. If Mrs. Clark had, in fact, violated the contract and furnished her father ground for its rescission, it was his duty to exercise that right and give notice of the same. Failing to do so, so far as lack of performance or inadequacy of performance on her part was concerned, Mr. McCraney must be held to have waived *358 the matter. We so held in Kelley v. Devin, supra (65 Or at 218), a case where decedent's son sought specific performance of a parol agreement made with his father to leave an undivided half interest in all of the father's property to the son in consideration for services to be rendered and wherein the defendants, as here, charged the son with default because of his alleged inebriety. The court, in the Kelley case, speaking through Mr. Justice BURNETT, in reaching those conclusions also observed: "The answering defendants have no rights on their own behalf to rescind the contract for him [the deceased father], and it must stand and be executed." (65 Or at 218) See, also, Woods v. Dunn, 81 Or 457, 471, 159 P 1158.
The plaintiff has filed a motion requesting this court to supplement the decree appealed from by a provision insuring to plaintiff the payment of the monthly allowance of $250, accruing prior and subsequent to the entry of the decree from which the appeal was taken. The defendants have not resisted the motion. It appearing to us that a provision of that kind is just and equitable under the circumstances prevailing here and was inadvertently omitted and not discovered until the circuit court lost jurisdiction, we, therefore, direct that the decree be supplemented to provide that the monthly payments of $250 to Mrs. Clark shall be deemed to have accrued as of June 15, 1957, and shall be deemed to have continued to accrue thereafter until such time as the testamentary trustee shall receive the residuary portion of the estate of Harrie E. McCraney, deceased, and commence payments as provided in the decree.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed without costs to either party.