Title: People v. Greco
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89940
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2003

Docket No. 89940-Agenda 34-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								PETER M. GRECO,
Appellee.
Opinion filed May 8, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is the constitutionality of sections 1-191
and 4-103.2(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS
5/1-191, 4-103.2(b) (West 2000)). Defendant was charged with
one count of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2000)), two
counts of aggravated unlawful possession of special mobile
equipment (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(5) (West 2000)), and one
count of unlawful defacing of a manufacturer's identification
number (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2) (West 2000)). In dismissing the
latter three counts, the circuit court of Du Page County found
that the definition of "[s]pecial mobile equipment" within
section 1-191 (625 ILCS 5/1-191 (West 2000)) is
unconstitutionally vague. The court also found that the
permissive inference in section 4-103.2(b) (625 ILCS
5/4-103.2(b) (West 2000)) violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. The State appeals the circuit court's ruling directly to
this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R.
302(a)). For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse
in part the judgment of the circuit court, and hold that section
4-103.2(b) violates due process and that the circuit court
improperly sustained defendant's facial challenge of section
1-191.

I. STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
	Due to the procedural posture of this case, the record below
is severely limited. Because this was a facial challenge of the
disputed provisions of the statute, the facts surrounding
defendant's indictment were not adduced before the trial court.
	Defendant was charged under section 4-103.2 with possession
of stolen special mobile equipment. In relevant part, that section
states:
			"(a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:
* * *
				(5) a person not entitled to the possession of any ***
special mobile equipment *** to *** possess *** the
vehicle or vehicle part described in this paragraph
knowing it is stolen or converted[.]" 625 ILCS
5/4-103.2(a)(5) (West 2000).
	Subsection (b) of section 4-103.2 invokes a permissive
inference contained in section 4-103(a)(1) of the Code. Under that
provision, it may be inferred that a person who exercises the
exclusive unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle has
knowledge that the vehicle is stolen. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1)
(West 2000). Moreover, the provision explains that the permissive
inference may be applied whether the date when the vehicle was
stolen is recent or remote. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2000).
The General Assembly based the permissive inference, in part,
upon the finding that:
			"the acquisition and disposition of vehicles and their
essential parts are strictly controlled by law and that such
acquisitions and dispositions are reflected by documents
of title, uniform invoices, rental contracts, leasing
agreements and bills of sale." 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1)
(West 2000).
	Under the Code, special mobile equipment is defined as
follows:
			"Every vehicle not designed or used primarily for the
transportation of persons or property and only incidentally
operated or moved over a highway, including but not
limited to: street sweepers, ditch digging apparatus, well
boring apparatus and road construction and maintenance
machinery such as asphalt spreaders, bituminous mixers,
bucket loaders, tractors other than truck tractors, ditchers,
levelling graders, finishing machines, motor graders, road
rollers, scarifiers, earth moving carryalls and scrapers,
power shovels and drag lines, and self-propelled cranes
and earth moving equipment. The term does not include
house trailers, dump trucks, truck mounted transit mixers,
cranes or shovels, or other vehicles designed for the
transportation of persons or property to which machinery
has been attached." 625 ILCS 5/1-191 (West 2000).
	The indictment provided that defendant's aggravated unlawful
possession of special mobile equipment charges stemmed from his
possession of one "Case Wheeled Loader Model 1845C." The
machinery referred to by the indictment is commonly known as a
"wheel loader," a "uni-loader," or a "skid-steer loader."
	Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing among
other things that: (1) the permissive inference incorporated into
section 4-103.2(b) violates due process and the separation of
powers doctrine; and (2) the definition of "special mobile
equipment" contained in section 1-191 is unconstitutionally
vague. The court granted defendant's motion, and the State now
appeals under Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)).

II. ANALYSIS
	All statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden
of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the
validity of the statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional
violation. People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). If
reasonably possible, a statute must be construed so as to affirm its
constitutionality and validity. People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 10
(1999). In this case the circuit court declared that sections 1-191
and 4-103.2(b) are facially unconstitutional. Such challenges to
legislative acts are the most difficult challenges to mount. In re
R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (2001), quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987).
" '[T]he challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.' " R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at
297, quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697,
707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). Moreover, that the statute
might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, as we
have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the first amendment. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d  at 210-11, quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697,
707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). We review de novo a circuit
court's holding that a statute is unconstitutional. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 
at 338.

A. Section 4-103.2(b); Permissive Inference in Relation to
Special Mobile Equipment
	An inference or presumption is a legal device that either
permits or requires the fact finder to assume the existence of a
presumed or ultimate fact based on certain predicate or basic facts.
People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 141-42 (1998). While inferences
and presumptions play "a vital role in the expeditious resolution
of factual questions" (People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1989)),
their use to prove an element of a crime may raise due process
concerns. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d  at 143. The due process clause
" 'protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.' " People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 114 (1995), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). Thus, "the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments set limits
upon the power of Congress or that of a state legislature to make
the proof of one fact or group of facts evidence of the existence of
the ultimate fact on which guilt is predicated." Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 87 L. Ed. 1519, 1524, 63 S. Ct. 1241,
1245 (1943).
	A permissive inference is one that simply allows, but does not
require, the finder of fact to infer the existence of the ultimate or
presumed fact upon proof of the predicate fact, without placing
any burden on the defendant. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d  at 142. In
situations where there is some corroborating evidence of a
defendant's guilt, the constitutionality of a permissive inference
should be judged under a "more likely than not" standard. People
v. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d 415, 425 (1981). Under this standard, the
permissive presumption will satisfy due process concerns if the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the predicate
fact. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at 425. Where the permissive presumption
is the lone basis for a finding of guilt, however, the presumed fact
must flow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven, predicate
fact. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at 421.
	As a threshold matter, the State argues that defendant lacks
standing to challenge the permissive inference borrowed by
section 4-103.2(b) from section 4-103(a)(1). The State contends
that defendant lacks standing in that the permissive inference
would not have been applied to him because he was charged with
possession of stolen special mobile equipment and not a stolen
vehicle. According to the State, section 4-103(a)(1) solely applies
to vehicles and the acquisition of vehicles is controlled by law as
reflected by legal documents, including titles, leasing agreements,
and bills of sale. Conversely, special mobile equipment need not
be registered and can be transferred by oral contract. Thus, the
State maintains the permissive inference of section 4-103.2(b) was
not meant to be used in cases involving the possession of stolen
special mobile equipment.
	Defendant counters that the State has waived its standing
argument by not requesting that the trial court make a ruling on the
issue. In the alternative, defendant maintains that he has standing
because he is charged with an offense under a statutory scheme
that places him at risk of being subjected to the inference.
Regardless of the State's announced position not to rely upon the
inference, a trial court or the appellate court could rely upon the
statutory scheme in reaching a finding of guilt.
	The doctrine of standing is intended to insure that issues are
raised and argued only by those parties with a real interest in the
outcome of the controversy. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v.
Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206
(2000). To have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute, a person must have suffered or be in immediate danger of
suffering a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the
challenged statute. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 171
(1993). Standing is an element of justiciability, and it must be
defined on a case-by-case basis. In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 280 (1989).
	We need not address defendant's arguments concerning
waiver because we agree with defendant that the statutory scheme
places him in danger of being subjected to the permissive
inference. The State's arguments are belied by the plain language
of the Code. Section 4-103.2 is a provision of the Code relating to
aggravated offenses that involve the sale, receipt and possession
of motor vehicles and other vehicles. 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2 (West
2000). Defendant was charged pursuant to section 4-103.2(a)(5)
of the Code with possession of "special mobile equipment ***
knowing [that the special mobile equipment] is stolen or
converted." 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(5) (West 2000). Subsection
(b) of section 4-103.2 expressly provides that the section
4-103(a)(1) inference shall apply to the offenses set out in
subsection (a) of section 4-103.2. That inference allows the
unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle to be evidence that the
possessor knows that the vehicle is stolen whether the date when
the vehicle was stolen is recent or remote. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1)
(West 2000). Not only is special mobile equipment not exempted
from this permissive inference, it is also specifically included in
paragraph (5) of subsection (a). Moreover, by its very title, the
entirety of section 4-103.2 involves "vehicles." Thus, contrary to
the State's argument, it appears that the legislature intended to
include special mobile equipment within the meaning of "vehicle"
and intended the inference to be applicable in cases involving the
possession of special mobile equipment.
	This conclusion is supported by the definition of "vehicle"
contained in section 1-217 of the Code that contains no reference
to registration or transfer and sales requirements. In section 1-217,
a vehicle is simply defined as:
			"[e]very device, in, upon or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a
highway, except devices moved by human power, devices
used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and
snowmobiles as defined in the Snowmobile Registration
and Safety Act." 625 ILCS 5/1-217 (West 2000).
Additionally, section 1-191 expressly uses the term "vehicle"
when defining special mobile equipment. 625 ILCS 5/1-191 (West
2000). In accord with this statutory language and the statutory
scheme developed by the legislature, we hold that defendant has
sufficiently shown that he is in immediate danger of being
subjected to the permissive inference of section 4-103.2(b) and
thus has standing to challenge that section's constitutionality.
	Nevertheless, the State cites People v. Rogers, 133 Ill. 2d 1
(1989). In Rogers, the defendant was charged with child
abduction. The indictment alleged that the defendant lured two
children into his car for the purpose of committing the act of
criminal sexual abuse. Defendant moved to dismiss the
indictment, complaining that the section of the child abduction
statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 10-5(b)(10), now 720
ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 2000)) was unconstitutional in that it
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto a defendant by
including a presumption that a person who lures a child into a
motor vehicle without the parent's consent is doing so for "other
than a lawful purpose." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.
10-5(b)(10), now 720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 2000). The
defendant also argued that the phrase "other than a lawful
purpose" was unconstitutionally vague.
	This court held that the defendant in Rogers lacked standing
to challenge the inference because it was apparent that the
inference would not be applied to him. Rogers, 133 Ill. 2d  at 11.
The indictment in that case specifically alleged an unlawful
purpose, namely, criminal sexual abuse. Rogers, 133 Ill. 2d  at 11.
As a result, the State had to prove the elements of criminal sexual
abuse at trial and it could not rely on the presumption. Rogers, 133 Ill. 2d  at 11.
	The instant case is easily distinguished. Quite simply, there is
no indication from the record that the State relinquished its ability
to rely on the permissive inference of section 4-103.2(b). Thus,
unlike the Rogers defendant, this defendant has standing to
challenge the statute because he is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of enforcement of the
statute. See People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d 38, 41 (1983).
	We now turn to the merits of the parties' arguments
concerning section 4-103.2(b). Defendant maintained below that
the disputed provision violates the separation of powers doctrine
and due process because it allows knowledge of the fact a vehicle
was stolen to be inferred from the unexplained possession of that
vehicle, regardless of when the vehicle was actually stolen. The
circuit court held that the section violates separation of powers.
Accordingly, before this court, defendant nominally confines his
argument to the separation of powers doctrine, maintaining that
the permissive inference of section 4- 103.2(b) imposes upon the
court a legal premise that contravenes the law of the state as set
out in People v. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d 415 (1981).
	Under Housby, a defendant's "recent and exclusive
possession of items stolen in a burglary, without reasonable
explanation, gives rise to an inference that the possession was
obtained by burglary." (Emphasis added.) Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at
422. Thus, according to defendant, the legislature's expansion of
this inference to eliminate the recency requirement is a usurpation
of the judicial power.
	The permissive inference at issue in this case, as announced
in Housby, is not of recent vintage. In Comfort v. People, 54 Ill. 404 (1870), this court articulated the inference as follows:
		"[W]hile [possession of property soon after it is stolen] is
prima facie evidence of guilt, when it is explained by
other evidence or the surrounding circumstances, [such
possession] should not control. If the possession is recent
after the theft, and there are no attendant circumstances,
or other evidence to rebut the presumption or to create a
reasonable doubt of guilt, the mere fact of such possession
would warrant a conviction." (Emphasis added.) Comfort,
54 Ill.  at 407.
Accord Smith v. People, 103 Ill. 82, 85 (1882); Miller v. People,
229 Ill. 376, 382-83 (1907).
	In subsequent cases we refined the inference and identified the
rationale behind the recency requirement. For example, in People
v. Bullion, 299 Ill. 208 (1921), we explained that, in order for the
inference to arise, the possession of the stolen property must be
"soon after the crime," and it must be the exclusive possession of
the individual charged. (Emphasis added.) Bullion, 299 Ill.  at 212-13. We went on to clarify that:
		"[t]he possession must be so recent as to indicate that the
possessor must have taken the property, and where it is so
remote in time as to have given fair opportunity to the
thief to dispose of the goods and to the defendant to
acquire them honestly, possession is slight, if any,
evidence of guilt ***." Bullion, 299 Ill.  at 212-13, citing
People v. Kubulis, 298 Ill. 523, 530 (1921).
Stated another way in Housby, the inference of guilt flowing from
the recent and exclusive possession of items stolen in a burglary
is justified by the " 'inherently strong probability' " that the
inference is accurate. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at 422. Whether the
possession is recent is ordinarily a question for the jury, and no
definite time can be fixed when, as a matter of law, possession is
not recent. People v. Pride, 16 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (1959); People v.
Malin, 372 Ill. 422, 428 (1939); Kubulis, 298 Ill.  at 530.
	As stated earlier, generally speaking, in order for a permissive
inference to pass constitutional muster, there must be a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed.
Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at 420, citing Tot, 319 U.S.  at 467, 87 L. Ed.  at
1524, 63 S. Ct.  at 1245. The connection between a proved fact and
a presumed fact in a criminal law context " 'must be regarded as
"irrational" or "arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional, unless it can
at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is
made to depend.' " Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at 420-21, quoting Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57, 82, 89 S. Ct. 1532,
1548 (1969).
	Employing these standards, we cannot hold that the
permissive inference contained within section 4-103.2(b) is
constitutional as applied to special mobile equipment. Plainly put,
there is no substantial assurance that a person with unexplained
possession of a piece of special mobile equipment stolen, for
example 10 years ago, more likely than not has knowledge that the
piece of equipment was stolen. In other words, by removing the
recency requirement of the permissive inference as currently
embodied in section 4-103.2(b), the legislature has dramatically
weakened the probability that the inference will be correct with
regard to special mobile equipment. The State concedes that the
acquisition and transfer of special mobile equipment is not subject
to the strict control and documentation requirements that attends
the conveyance of other vehicles. We, accordingly, express no
opinion with regard to the constitutionality of the permissive
inference in the context of other vehicles as defined under the
Code. See, e.g., People v. Gentry, 192 Ill. App. 3d 774 (1989);
People v. Ferguson, 204 Ill. App. 3d 146 (1990) (the permissive
inference did not violate due process in relation to a motor
vehicle). The Gentry court specifically relied on the legislative
finding that the transfer of motor vehicles is strictly documented
and controlled by law. Gentry, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 778-79.
	While the circuit court appears to have confined its holding to
the separation of powers doctrine, we may affirm its decision on
any basis supported by the record. See Gunthorp v. Golan, 184 Ill. 2d 432, 438 (1998). In this case, defendant argued before the
circuit court that section 4-103.2(b) violates due process and
specifically cited Tot and Leary. Moreover, before this court,
defendant mainly relies on Housby, and we stated unequivocally
in Housby that our decision was "mandated by due process
requirements." Housby, 84 Ill. 2d  at 423. Accordingly, defendant
has implicitly raised due process here. The trial court likewise
based its decision, in part, on due process concerns, finding:
		"[There is] a great deal of difference between the
permissive inference to be drawn from *** possession of
recently stolen property as opposed to possession of
property which may have been stolen at any time. Under
that scenario it would have been reasonable to have
bought a part of a tractor at a flee [sic] market and be
charged with a Class 4 felony. It's absurd, absolutely
absurd that that type of inference would be allowable
under the statute."
We are ever mindful of our duty to construe a statute in a manner
that upholds its validity and constitutionality whenever reasonably
possible. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). In this
case, section 4-103.2(b) cannot be reasonably construed as
constitutional with regard to special mobile equipment because it
violates due process by removing the requirement that a piece of
special mobile equipment be recently stolen in order for
possession of the equipment to give rise to an inference that the
possessor knows that the equipment was stolen.

B. Section 1-191; Definition of Special Mobile Equipment
	The State lastly challenges the trial court's ruling that the
definition of "[s]pecial mobile equipment" contained in section
1-191 is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague. 625 ILCS
5/1-191 (West 2000). The State argues that the definition is
sufficiently clear to give a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity of knowing what devices are covered by it.
The State therefore contends that the statute withstands a
vagueness challenge and that the trial court erred in ruling
otherwise.
	A vagueness challenge is a due process challenge, examining
whether a statute " 'give[s] [a] person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly.' " Russell v. Department of Natural Resources,
183 Ill. 2d 434, 442 (1998), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99
(1972). An act is not, however, unconstitutionally vague simply
because one can conjure up a hypothetical dispute over the
meaning of some of the act's terms. Gem Electronics of
Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 481
(1998).
	When considering a vagueness challenge to a statute, a court
considers not only the language used, but also the legislative
objective and the evil the statute is designed to remedy. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 299. In cases such as the one at bar that do not involve
first amendment freedoms, due process is satisfied if: (1) the
statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by
common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2)
the statute provides sufficiently definite standards for law
enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not
depend merely on their private conceptions. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 640 (2000). Moreover, vagueness assaults on statutes
that do not involve first amendment freedoms are to be analyzed
in light of the particular facts of the case at hand. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 
at 299, quoting Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  at 442. The first amendment is
not implicated in this case. Accordingly, defendant cannot contend
that section 1-191 is vague on its face if the provision clearly
applies to him. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 299.
	Section 1-191 begins by classifying special mobile equipment
as "[e]very vehicle not designed or used primarily for the
transportation of persons or property and only incidentally
operated or moved over a highway." 625 ILCS 5/1-191 (West
2000). The potential difficulty with this classification is that it can
be satisfied either by an individual vehicle's design or by its usage.
Nevertheless, we cannot determine whether section 1-191 is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, as there has been
no fact finding in this case. Nor could have the trial court done so.
As a result, it was inappropriate for the trial court to declare the
statute vague. As this is a case not involving first amendment
freedoms, the vagueness challenge could not properly have been
resolved except by application to the facts of the case. The trial
court's determination that the statute was unconstitutionally vague
was, therefore, premature and must be reversed. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at
299-300. While it is possible that specific future applications
" ' "may engender concrete problems of constitutional dimension,
it will be time enough to consider any such problems when they
arise." ' " R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 299-300, quoting Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504,  71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 375, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1196 (1982), quoting Joseph
E. Seagram &amp; Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 52, 16 L. Ed. 2d 336, 348, 86 S. Ct. 1254, 1265 (1966).

III. CONCLUSION
	For the above-stated reasons, we hold that section 4-103.2(b)
of the Illinois Vehicle Code is constitutionally infirm as it applies
to special mobile equipment because it violates due process. In
addition, we hold that the trial court improperly sustained
defendant's facial challenge of section 1-191 of the Code on
vagueness grounds. Further factual development is necessary to
determine if this section clearly applies to defendant. The
judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is, therefore,
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.



	JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority's conclusion that section 4-103.2(b)
is unconstitutional as applied to special mobile equipment. I also
agree with the majority's decision to reverse the trial court's ruling
that section 1-191 is unconstitutionally vague. However, I
disagree with the majority's assertion that it is too early to decide
this question. I would address the issue and hold that section
1-191 is not unconstitutionally vague.
	The majority asserts that it cannot determine if the statute is
unconstitutionally vague because there has been no fact finding.
The rule that the majority relies on to avoid the issue is the
following statement from In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 299 (2001):
"As this was a civil case, not involving the first amendment, the
vagueness challenge could not properly have been resolved except
by application to the facts of the case." Here, no more facts are
required to decide the issue. We know from the indictment that
defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a "Case
Wheeled Loader Model 1845C with Product Identification
Number JAF 0196424." In its response to defendant's motion to
dismiss, the State noted that in the construction industry the
wheeled loader is commonly referred to as a "uni-loader," a "skid
steer," or a "Bob Cat."
	Thus, when defendant was indicted, he was given notice
exactly what equipment he was charged with possessing
unlawfully. In criminal cases, the most common time for a
defendant to bring a vagueness challenge to a statute is after
indictment but before trial. As in this case, the argument is
generally raised in the form of a motion to dismiss the indictment
or information. See, e.g., People v. Law, 202 Ill. 2d 578 (2002);
People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109 (2001); People v. Russell, 158 Ill. 2d 23 (1994); People v. Capitol News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162 (1990);
People v. Ryan, 117 Ill. 2d 28 (1987). That is exactly what
defendant did here.
	It should be noted that section 1-191 is not the statute
defendant challenged as unconstitutionally vague in his original
motion to dismiss the indictment. Rather, defendant argued that
section 4-103.2(a)(5), the section defining the offense with which
defendant was charged, was unconstitutionally vague. This section
makes it an offense to possess, receive, conceal, dispose of, or
transfer special mobile equipment, if the person doing so knows
it to be stolen or converted. Defendant argued that this section was
unconstitutionally vague because, "There is no definition found in
the Statute which clearly defines 'special mobile equipment.' "
The State immediately responded that there was indeed such a
statute, section 1-191, which gives a detailed and comprehensive
definition of "special mobile equipment." Surprisingly, defendant
did not withdraw his vagueness argument. Rather, he simply
transferred the argument to section 1-191, despite the fact that this
section is a textbook example of a nonvague statute.
	Section 1-191, set out in full in the majority opinion, defines
special mobile equipment as "every vehicle(1) not designed or used
primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only
incidentally operated or moved over a highway." The statute then
lists several examples of vehicles that are special mobile
equipment and several types of vehicles that are not. The vehicles
that are listed are indeed ones that are not designed or used
primarily for the transportation of persons or property and are only
incidentally operated or moved over a highway. Likewise, the
vehicles that are excluded are ones that are used primarily for the
transportation of persons or property. The statute is clear, detailed,
and easy to follow, and no one could seriously contend that this is
a vague statute.
	The majority's position seems to be that we do not yet have
enough facts to determine if a wheeled loader is "special mobile
equipment," and thus it is too early to decide the vagueness
question. Two problems are immediately apparent. First,
defendant had the burden to demonstrate that the statute was
invalid. Law, 202 Ill. 2d  at 582. Defendant argued in his
memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss that "we
have no idea what a 'Bobcat' is or how it relates to the vague
definition of special mobile equipment." If this is true, then
defendant has failed in his burden to demonstrate that the statute
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a wheeled loader.
	Second, the majority's position rests on a subtle fallacy. As
the majority correctly notes, a statute is void for vagueness only if
it fails to (1) "provide the kind of notice that would enable a
person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is
prohibited," or (2) "provide explicit standards for those who apply
it, thus authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Law, 202 Ill. 2d  at 582-83. Here, the
statute that "prohibits conduct" is not section 1-191 but section
4-103.2(a)(5), which makes it an offense to possess, receive,
conceal, dispose of, or transfer special mobile equipment, if the
person doing so knows it to be stolen or converted. Section 1-191
merely provides a comprehensive definition of "special mobile
equipment."
	It is also a crime, however, for a person to exert control over
stolen "property" in general if the person knows it to be stolen or
obtains it under circumstances that would reasonably lead him to
believe the property was stolen. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a) (West
2000). It is also a felony to "receive, possess, conceal, sell,
dispose, or transfer" a "vehicle" if the person knows that the
vehicle is stolen or converted. See 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West
2000). Thus, no matter what a "wheeled loader" is, it was unlawful
of defendant to possess it if he knew that it was stolen. Defendant
has not argued that he thought it would be permissible to possess
a stolen wheeled loader if it was not considered "special mobile
equipment." All that the designation of the property as "special
mobile equipment" does is change the class of the offense.
Unlawful possession of stolen special mobile equipment is a Class
1 felony (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(c) (West 2000)), while unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle is a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS
5/4-103(b) (West 2000)), and theft can be anywhere from a Class
A misdemeanor to a Class X felony, depending on what was stolen
and how it was taken(2) (720 ILCS 5/16-1(b) (West 2000)). Thus,
no matter what a "wheeled loader" is, defendant was on notice that
he was not entitled to possess it if he knew that it was stolen, and
he was thus given fair warning what conduct was prohibited.
	Similarly, the statute does not fail to give explicit standards
for those who apply it, and arbitrary enforcement is neither
authorized nor encouraged. If law enforcement officials believe
that a person is in possession of stolen property, the statutes set
forth above are sufficiently clear for them to determine how to
charge the offense. Likewise, the statutory definitions are
sufficiently clear to be applied by a trier of fact. It would be
extraordinarily difficult and burdensome for the legislature to list
every conceivable type of vehicle that is "special mobile
equipment." Instead, they have provided a clear definition, with
specific examples of the types of vehicles that are included in the
definition and those that are not.
	The majority seems to be implying that if subsequent facts
show that a "wheeled loader" is not included in the definition, then
the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a wheeled
loader. I disagree. If it is determined that a "wheeled loader" is
"not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons
or property" and is "only incidentally operated or moved over a
highway," and defendant is shown to have possessed it, knowing
that it was stolen, then defendant is guilty of the charged offense.
If it turns out that a "wheeled loader" does not meet that definition,
then the State has mischarged these counts of the indictment and
defendant is not guilty of this particular offense. Either way, the
statute is not unconstitutionally vague. We have sufficient
information to decide this issue now, and I would hold that the
statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
1.      1The term "vehicle" is defined in section 1-217 (625 ILCS 5/1-217
(West 2000)).

2.      2Defendant in this case was charged with theft of property worth
more than $10,000 but less than $100,000, which is a Class 2 felony.
See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(5) (West 2000).