Title: Desetti v. Chester
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 141239
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2015

Present: All the Justices 
 
JUDY GAYLE DESETTI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141239 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                    June 4, 2015 
FRANCIS CHESTER, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal we determine whether a plaintiff 
sufficiently pled a claim for legal malpractice that occurred 
during the course of an attorney's representation of the 
plaintiff in a criminal matter. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal comes to us upon the circuit court sustaining 
a demurrer.  "For purposes of evaluating a demurrer, a court 
assumes that all material facts, implied facts[,] and 
reasonable inferences from those facts that are properly 
alleged in the complaint are true."  Brown v. Jacobs, ___ Va. 
___, ___ n.2, 768 S.E.2d 421, 423 n.2 (2015).  Accordingly, the 
relevant facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. 
Judy Desetti, her husband Joel Desetti, and her son Ryan 
Desetti were involved in a criminal incident with a law 
enforcement officer at the Desetti home.  Arising from that 
incident, Judy was charged with felony assault and battery of a 
law enforcement officer in violation of Code § 18.2-57, and 
misdemeanor obstruction of justice in violation of Code § 18.2-
 
2 
460.  Also arising from that incident, Joel and Ryan were 
charged with misdemeanor obstruction of justice in violation of 
Code § 18.2-460. 
Judy employed Francis Chester of the firm Chester-Cestari 
Law, P.C., to represent her in this criminal matter.  Chester 
was also retained by Joel and Ryan to represent them in their 
own criminal proceedings. 
Joel's and Ryan's charges of misdemeanor obstruction of 
justice went to trial first.  Chester called Judy as a witness.  
During the course of her direct examination, Judy admitted that 
she struck the law enforcement officer who had entered the 
Desetti home.  At the conclusion of trial, both Joel and Ryan 
were found guilty. 
Subsequent to that trial, the Commonwealth conveyed to 
Chester a plea offer on Judy's charges.  The offer allowed Judy 
to plead guilty to a misdemeanor assault and battery, rather 
than to the felony assault and battery that she had been 
charged with.  Chester never conveyed this plea offer to Judy 
or responded to the Commonwealth.  Instead, Chester advised 
Judy that she should plead not guilty and go to a jury trial 
because "she had a 'slam dunk' case."  Chester also failed to 
inform Judy that a guilty verdict on her felony charge would 
entail a mandatory minimum sentence of six months of 
incarceration. 
 
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Based on Chester's advice, Judy pled not guilty and 
requested a jury trial.  Judy asserts that various aspects of 
Chester's representation during the trial constituted legal 
malpractice.  Among these allegations of malpractice is 
Chester's unilateral decision, without consulting with Judy, to 
reject the Commonwealth's jury instruction that incorporated 
the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault and battery 
because Chester was employing a "felony or freedom" strategy.  
At the conclusion of that trial, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on the felony assault and battery charge, and Judy was 
sentenced to the mandatory minimum of six months of 
incarceration.  Judy unsuccessfully exhausted her direct 
appeals. 
One month into her sentence, Judy filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus alleging that Chester's representation 
was so deficient and prejudicial that it deprived her of her 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.  One 
year later, the habeas court granted Judy's habeas petition on 
the basis that Chester's ineffective assistance of counsel 
prejudiced Judy in the criminal matter.  The habeas court held 
that Chester's representation was constitutionally deficient 
because of (1) Chester's concurrent representation of Judy, 
Joel, and Ryan, (2) Chester's failure to convey and explain the 
Commonwealth's plea offer, and (3) Chester's failure to advise 
 
4 
and consult with Judy regarding the inclusion of a lesser-
included misdemeanor offense in the jury instructions. 
The habeas court vacated Judy's felony assault and battery 
conviction.  The Commonwealth elected to retry Judy for her 
actions giving rise to her original charges.  During the course 
of this second criminal matter, Judy pled guilty to misdemeanor 
assault and battery.  Pursuant to this plea, Judy was convicted 
of misdemeanor assault and battery and was sentenced to ten 
days of incarceration, with all ten days suspended. 
Judy subsequently filed a legal malpractice claim against 
Chester and the firm Chester-Cestari Law.  This legal 
malpractice claim alleged multiple bases of Chester's 
malpractice for actions during the original criminal matter. 
Chester and Chester-Cestari Law filed a demurrer to Judy's 
complaint.  The demurrer asserted that Judy failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted because she was not 
actually innocent of the criminal act of assault that gave rise 
to the criminal matter in which the alleged legal malpractice 
occurred.  That is, although Judy's felony assault and battery 
conviction had been vacated, Judy subsequently admitted guilt 
to misdemeanor assault and battery, and it was that guilt of a 
criminal act, rather than a guilty verdict for any given crime, 
which proximately caused injuries Judy suffered from the 
original criminal matter. 
 
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The circuit court agreed with Chester and the firm 
Chester-Cestari Law, and sustained the demurrer without leave 
to amend.  Judy timely appealed to this Court. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Although we granted three assignments of error, we need 
only address the first assignment because our resolution of the 
issue of proximate causation resolves this appeal.1  Jimenez v. 
Corr, 288 Va. 395, 404, 764 S.E.2d 115, 118 (2014). 
Assignment of error 1 reads: 
1. 
The trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' 
Demurrer because it thereby decided, as a matter of 
law, that [Judy] could not prove that Chester's 
negligence was the proximate cause of [Judy]'s harm 
when the trial court had already established by prior 
order granting [Judy]'s Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus that it was reasonably probable that Chester's 
ineffective assistance of counsel caused [Judy] Harm. 
A. 
Standard Of Review 
"A trial court's decision sustaining a demurrer presents a 
question of law which we review de novo."  Harris v. Kreutzer, 
271 Va. 188, 195, 624 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2006).  "A demurrer 
accepts as true all facts properly pled, as well as reasonable 
inferences from those facts."  Steward v. Holland Family 
Props., LLC, 284 Va. 282, 286, 726 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2012). 
                     
 
1 Assignment of error 2 pertains to whether Judy's guilty 
plea to the misdemeanor charge was equivalent to being 
convicted of the felony charge. 
 
Assignment of error 3 pertains to whether Judy was 
required to plead actual innocence of all criminal culpability 
to state a legal malpractice cause of action. 
 
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B. 
The Elements Of A Legal Malpractice Claim 
"A cause of action for legal malpractice requires the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship which gave rise to 
a duty, breach of that duty by the defendant attorney, and that 
the [pecuniary] damages claimed by the plaintiff client must 
have been proximately caused by the defendant attorney's 
breach."  Shevlin Smith v. McLaughlin, ___ Va. ___, ___, 769 
S.E.2d 7, 9 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  This is all that must be pled by a legal malpractice 
plaintiff who alleges that malpractice occurred during the 
course of a civil matter. 
However, a legal malpractice plaintiff who alleges that 
malpractice occurred during the course of a criminal matter has 
additional burdens of pleading.  These additional burdens are 
to ensure that "courts [do] not assist the participant in an 
illegal act who seeks to profit from the act's commission."  
Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 34, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1990).  That 
is, it is the policy throughout the Commonwealth that a 
criminal defendant may not profit from a crime in a subsequent 
legal malpractice action.  See Taylor v. Davis, 265 Va. 187, 
191, 576 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2003); Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 
281-82, 482 S.E.2d 797, 801-02 (1997). 
Consequently, "actual guilt is a material consideration 
[because] courts will not permit a guilty party to profit from 
 
7 
his own crime."  Adkins, 253 Va. at 282, 482 S.E.2d at 802.  
Relevant to this appeal, we have held that this "material 
consideration" requires a legal malpractice plaintiff, who 
alleges that malpractice occurred during the course of a 
criminal matter, to plead that the damages to be recovered were 
proximately caused by the attorney's negligence and were not 
proximately caused by the legal malpractice plaintiff's own 
criminal actions.  Id. (holding that it is proper to sustain a 
demurrer if the legal malpractice plaintiff fails to satisfy 
this "material consideration").  Consequently, a legal 
malpractice plaintiff who alleges that malpractice occurred 
during the course of a criminal matter must plead facts 
establishing this element of the cause of action:  that the 
damages to be recovered were proximately caused by the 
attorney's negligence but were not proximately caused by the 
legal malpractice plaintiff's own criminal actions.  W.S. 
Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 384, 478 
S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996) ("A demurrer will be sustained if the 
pleading, considered in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, fails to state a valid cause of action."). 
C. 
Judy's Legal Malpractice Complaint 
Judy pled that she employed Chester of the firm Chester-
Cestari Law for purposes of representing Judy in a criminal 
matter, and that this employment created an attorney-client 
 
8 
relationship.  Judy pled that Chester breached his duties 
arising out of that attorney-client contractual relationship.  
And Judy pled that Chester's breach proximately caused certain 
pecuniary loss.2  Had the alleged malpractice occurred in a 
civil matter, this would be sufficient for Judy's complaint to 
survive demurrer.  However, Judy's pleading failed to satisfy 
the additional burden that a legal malpractice plaintiff's 
damages cannot be proximately caused by the plaintiff's 
criminal actions. 
The crux of Judy's argument is that her criminal conduct, 
in the absence of legal malpractice, would have resulted in a 
misdemeanor conviction with a ten-day incarceration sentence – 
which is what Judy was actually convicted of and sentenced to 
in the second criminal proceeding.  Judy concedes, as she must, 
that any injury flowing from a misdemeanor conviction and a 
ten-day incarceration sentence for her assault on the law 
enforcement officer was therefore proximately caused by her 
criminal actions, and damages therefor are not recoverable in a 
                     
 
2 In her complaint, Judy pled both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages.  However, Judy's complaint was filed before 
we issued our opinion in Shevlin Smith v. McLaughlin, ___ Va. 
___, 769 S.E.2d 7 (2015).  In that case, we clarified that "[a] 
legal malpractice plaintiff may recover only pecuniary damages 
proximately caused by an attorney's breach of the contractually 
implied duties" arising from the "attorney-client contract" of 
representation.  Id. at ___, ___, 769 S.E.2d at 15, 20.  At 
oral argument, Judy's counsel conceded that Judy could recover 
only those pecuniary damages identified in the complaint. 
 
9 
legal malpractice action.  But Judy contends that any damages 
proximately caused by her felony conviction and her six month 
incarceration sentence were not proximately caused by her 
criminal actions, and instead these damages were proximately 
caused by Chester's malpractice.  According to Judy, absent 
Chester's malpractice, she would not have been convicted of a 
felony and would not have served a six month sentence, which 
led to her pecuniary damages. 
Judy's pleadings fail to support her arguments.  That is, 
Judy failed to adequately plead that her attorney's legal 
malpractice, as opposed to her own commission of a criminal 
act, proximately caused the pecuniary damages alleged in her 
complaint. 
1. 
Wrongful Severity Of Conviction:  Legal Malpractice 
Proximately Causing The Felony Conviction 
The first aspect of Judy's original conviction that she 
alleges was proximately caused by Chester's legal malpractice 
is the fact that Judy was convicted of a felony, rather than of 
a misdemeanor.  Judy's pleading adequately alleges that she 
would have been convicted of a misdemeanor, in the absence of 
Chester's legal malpractice, because she would have accepted 
the original misdemeanor plea offer.  But this only satisfies 
half of Judy's burden.  To adequately plead proximate 
causation, Judy must plead that the damages she seeks to 
 
10 
recover were proximately caused by legal malpractice and not by 
her own criminal conduct.  Adkins, 253 Va. at 282, 482 S.E.2d 
at 802; W.S. Carnes, 252 Va. at 384, 478 S.E.2d at 300.  In the 
context of this allegation and Judy's theory of the case, Judy 
must plead that the damages she seeks to recover were caused by 
her felony conviction, which was entered only because of legal 
malpractice, and would not have been caused by her misdemeanor 
conviction, which was properly entered as punishment for her 
criminal actions. 
The only relevant pecuniary damage, as pled in the 
complaint, was that Judy's "nursing license was suspended . . . 
as a direct result of her felony conviction."  This allegation 
can reasonably be understood to relate to the general averments 
in her complaint that she has "been prevented from working and 
will be so prevented in the future," and having "suffered lost 
wages[ and] damages related to her job and career."  However, 
there is no allegation stating that, but for the felony 
conviction entered pursuant to Chester's negligence, Judy would 
not have lost her nursing license and suffered the 
corresponding pecuniary harm.  Alternatively stated, Judy 
failed to plead that she would not have lost her nursing 
license based upon her conviction of misdemeanor assault and 
battery.  And there is no reasonable basis, from the facts 
pled, to infer that Judy would have kept her nursing license if 
 
11 
she had been convicted of a misdemeanor.  Therefore, Judy 
failed to plead damages flowing from her felony conviction that 
would not have been proximately caused by her misdemeanor 
conviction. 
2. 
Wrongful Duration Of Sentence:  Legal Malpractice 
Proximately Causing The Six Months Incarceration 
The second aspect of Judy's original conviction that she 
alleges was proximately caused by legal malpractice is that she 
was sentenced to six months of incarceration, rather than to 
the later sentence of ten days of incarceration with all ten 
days suspended.  As an initial matter, Judy failed to 
specifically allege that she would have been sentenced to any 
particular length of incarceration absent Chester's 
malpractice.  Instead, Judy's complaint quotes the habeas 
court's determination that "there is a reasonabl[e] probability 
that but for [Chester's] deficient performance, the results of 
the [original criminal] proceeding would have been less severe 
than the judgment and sentence imposed."  By incorporating the 
habeas court's determination as to prejudice affecting 
sentencing, Judy's pleading adequately alleges that she would 
have been sentenced to less than six months of incarceration.  
See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
("[T]he legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel 
in [the criminal defendant/legal malpractice plaintiff's] 
 
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criminal proceedings and for legal malpractice in this action 
are equivalent."); Shaw v. Department of Admin., Pub. Defender 
Agency, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 n.4 (Ala. 1991) ("The burden of 
proof in the two proceedings[, an ineffective assistance 
proceeding and a legal malpractice proceeding,] is similar."); 
Glaze v. Larsen, 83 P.3d 26, 31 (Ariz. 2004) ("Although the 
standard of proof imposed under Strickland arguably does not 
correspond precisely to the burden placed on a plaintiff in a 
legal malpractice action, the inquiry in each case is at the 
very least so similar that post-conviction proceedings often 
will provide definitive guidance as to whether any alleged 
legal malpractice actually occurred and/or was the cause of the 
defendant's conviction."); Barner v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 712 
(Cal. 2000) ("The same standard of care governing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel applies in a civil legal 
malpractice action."); Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 139 
(Colo. 2005) ("[T]he standard for demonstrating prejudice in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the standard for 
establishing causation in a malpractice claim involve 
equivalent analyses."); Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del. 
1998) ("The standards for proving ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal proceeding are equivalent to the 
standards for proving legal malpractice in a civil 
proceeding."); Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) 
 
13 
(concluding that "the standards for determining ineffective 
assistance of counsel in malpractice [are] essentially the 
same"); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Mass. 1991) ("[A]n 
appellate court's ruling that counsel was not ineffective may 
well justify precluding a criminal defendant from maintaining a 
malpractice action against his trial counsel."). 
However, this again only satisfies half of Judy's burden.  
The result of the habeas corpus proceeding does not answer the 
issue before us.  A habeas court's determination on the 
ineffectiveness of a criminal defendant's counsel and 
subsequent prejudice to that defendant establishes that 
constitutionally deficient performance proximately caused the 
outcome in the original criminal proceeding.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  However, we must also 
look to the damages flowing from the outcome of the criminal 
matter.  We must determine whether the pleadings properly 
allege that any of those damages were proximately caused by 
legal malpractice, rather than by the legal malpractice 
plaintiff's own criminal actions.  Adkins, 253 Va. at 282, 482 
S.E.2d at 802; W.S. Carnes, 252 Va. at 384, 478 S.E.2d at 300. 
Judy's complaint, as pled, fails to identify any pecuniary 
damages that were specifically caused by her six months of 
incarceration, and not by a sentence imposed absent Chester's 
malpractice – that is, and not by a sentence imposed because of 
 
14 
Judy's own criminal actions.  And such damages cannot be 
reasonably inferred because there is no basis to determine what 
sentence a circuit court would have imposed in the original 
criminal proceeding had Chester not been negligent. 
This inability to determine such a sentence arises from 
the fact that a defendant convicted of misdemeanor assault and 
battery under Code § 18.2-57 is subject to a sentence of not 
more than twelve months of incarceration and a fine of $2,500, 
either or both.  Code §§ 18.2-11(a); 18.2-57(A).  Although Judy 
was eventually sentenced to only ten days, with all ten days 
suspended, that sentence and suspension occurred after she had 
already served her original six month sentence.  According to 
Judy's complaint, the original misdemeanor plea offer was not 
accompanied by a sentence recommended by the Commonwealth.  
Even if such a recommendation had been made, there are no facts 
pled from which to draw the inference that, absent the legal 
malpractice, the circuit court would have imposed any shorter 
sentence than the six months that was imposed. 
A reviewing court has no basis to infer a particular 
sentence that the circuit court would have imposed had Judy 
been convicted of a misdemeanor, much less a sentence less than 
the six months of incarceration Judy endured pursuant to 
Chester's malpractice.  We cannot reasonably infer, based upon 
the bare allegation that the circuit court imposed a ten day 
 
15 
suspended sentence after Judy had already been incarcerated for 
six months for the now-vacated felony, what compensable injury, 
if any, was caused by the sentence imposed in the first 
proceeding which was subject to the legal malpractice and not 
by Judy's own criminal actions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Judy is a legal malpractice plaintiff who alleged that 
malpractice occurred during the course of a criminal 
proceeding.  However, Judy failed to satisfy her burden of 
pleading that the pecuniary injury she seeks to recover was 
proximately caused by her attorney's legal malpractice, rather 
than being proximately caused by her criminal actions.  We 
therefore will affirm the circuit court's judgment sustaining 
the demurrer. 
Affirmed.