Title: McGlotten v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 634, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 25, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SAMUEL H. MCGLOTTEN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 634, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 0707015477 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 18, 2011 
  Decided: July 25, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of July 2011, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, the 
Superior Court’s order on remand, and the parties’ supplemental memoranda, it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Samuel McGlotten, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s summary dismissal of his first motion for postconviction relief.  After 
considering the parties’ briefs, we remanded the matter to the Superior Court for 
expansion of the record and reconsideration of the merits of McGlotten’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The Superior Court issued its expanded 
decision on remand and the parties have filed supplemental memoranda in 
response.  After careful consideration of all the issues, the Court finds no merit to 
2 
 
McGlotten’s appeal.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court shall be 
affirmed. 
(2) 
The record reflects that McGlotten was arrested in 2007 and charged 
with multiple drug-related crimes.  The evidence at trial established that a police 
informant named William Holloman contacted McGlotten to arrange for a drug 
purchase at a gas station.  The police recorded the phone calls between Holloman 
and McGlotten by holding a tape recorder up to Holloman’s telephone.  These 
recordings were admitted into evidence.  After arranging the drug purchase, the 
police officers then conducted surveillance of the gas station at the appointed time.  
Officers saw McGlotten drive his car into the parking lot, park next to a portable 
toilet and exit the vehicle.  McGlotten stood next to the passenger side of the car 
and called Holloman to let him know where he was.  The front seat passenger in 
McGlotten’s car then exited the vehicle and went into the toilet.  Officers 
approached McGlotten and apprehended him as he was about to enter the driver’s 
side of the vehicle.  On the ground where he had been seen standing, the officers 
found over 40 grams of cocaine packaged in smaller baggies.  The officers arrested 
McGlotten and thereafter conducted a taped interview.  Prior to trial, the State 
provided defense counsel with a summary of McGlotten’s statement but failed to 
provide the tape itself.  Trial counsel objected to admission of the tape.  The 
3 
 
Superior Court took a recess to allow defense counsel to listen to the tape.  
Thereafter, defense counsel withdrew the objection.    
(3) 
The jury convicted McGlotten of one count each of trafficking 
cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, maintaining a vehicle for 
keeping controlled substances, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  The Superior 
Court sentenced McGlotten to a total period of forty-nine years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving twenty-five years in prison for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  This Court affirmed McGlotten’s convictions on 
direct appeal.1   
(4) 
Thereafter, McGlotten filed his first motion for postconviction relief, 
asserting multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Superior Court 
summarily denied McGlotten’s motion.  After the parties filed their briefs on 
appeal, the Court concluded that the matter should be remanded to the Superior 
Court for expansion of the record and reconsideration of the merits of McGlotten’s 
ineffectiveness claims.  On remand, the Superior Court allowed McGlotten to 
amend his postconviction motion to include additional ineffectiveness claims.  The 
Superior Court also obtained responses from McGlotten’s trial counsel and from 
counsel for the State.  In a thoughtful, twenty-seven page opinion, the Superior 
Court denied all of McGlotten’s claims and returned the matter from remand. 
                                                 
1 McGlotten v. State, 2008 WL 5307990 (Del. Dec. 22, 2008). 
4 
 
(5) 
In his opening brief on appeal, McGlotten claims that his trial counsel 
was ineffective because he failed to: (i) pursue an objection to the State’s untimely 
disclosure of the taped police interview of McGlotten; (ii) object to an untimely 
preliminary hearing; (iii) investigate his case and obtain witness statements; (iv) 
file a discovery motion; (v) file a motion to dismiss based on continuances granted 
to the State while waiting for the medical examiner’s report; (vi) object to perjured 
testimony; (vii) file a motion to suppress; (viii) file a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal; (ix) assert his right not to wear prison garb during trial; and (x) request 
an accomplice credibility instruction.   
(6) 
An application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance 
of counsel must establish that: (i) trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different.2  A “reasonable probability” means a probability that is sufficient, 
considering the totality of the evidence, to undermine confidence in the outcome.3  
A defendant must set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of actual 
prejudice4 in order to overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.5   
                                                 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
3 Id. at 694-95. 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
5 
 
(7) 
McGlotten’s first argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to pursue his objection to the State’s untimely disclosure of the taped police 
interview.  McGlotten raised the issue of the State’s untimely disclosure as a 
ground for reversal in his direct appeal.  We held then that the record did not 
reflect “that an earlier disclosure of the recording would have resulted in a different 
outcome at trial.”6  Defense counsel initially objected to the untimely disclosure 
but withdrew the objection after listening to the tape and determining that it did not 
contain any incriminating or prejudicial material.   Also, the written summary of 
the tape, which had been timely disclosed by the prosecutor, accurately 
summarized the contents of the tape and thus McGlotten had not suffered any 
prejudice from the untimely disclosure.  Under the circumstances, McGlotten 
cannot establish that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a 
meritless objection at trial. 
(8) 
McGlotten next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to his untimely preliminary hearing, which was held fourteen days after 
his arrest.7  In this case, the preliminary hearing was scheduled for July 19, 2007, 
seven days after his initial appearance before the committing magistrate, but was 
postponed for another seven days because the testifying officer was not available.  
                                                 
6 McGlotten v. State, 2008 WL 5307990, at *2. 
7 Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(d) provides, among other things, that a defendant is entitled to a preliminary 
hearing within 10 days of the defendant’s initial appearance before the magistrate if the defendant is being held in 
custody.  The ten-day time limit may be extended with the defendant’s consent. 
6 
 
Defense counsel did not object to a continuance.  In reviewing McGlotten’s claim 
below, the Superior Court held that even if counsel had objected to the continuance 
and the court had dismissed McGlotten’s case at the preliminary hearing stage, the 
State still would have been entitled to seek an indictment against McGlotten on the 
same charges.  In fact, the grand jury did indict McGlotten in this case on August 
13, 2007.  Accordingly, McGlotten cannot establish any prejudice from his 
counsel’s failure to object to the brief delay in his preliminary hearing. 
(9) 
McGlotten’s third argument is that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to investigate his case and obtain witness statements.  In his affidavit, however, 
trial counsel disputes McGlotten’s contention and asserts that he received the 
police reports with the witness statements prior to trial and provided copies to 
McGlotten.  Trial counsel discussed the case with detectives and the prosecutor, 
reviewed tapes of the preliminary hearing, and listened to the audio tapes of the 
recorded conversations between McGlotten and Holloman.  Defense counsel 
indicated that he declined to interview the female passengers who were in 
McGlotten’s vehicle because he did not want to learn information that may have 
negatively impacted McGlotten’s defense.  Instead, counsel’s strategy was to use 
the absence of these witnesses to suggest that one of those passengers was 
responsible for the drugs found next to the vehicle thereby creating reasonable 
doubt.  Under these circumstances, we agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion 
7 
 
that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable and that McGlotten failed to establish 
ineffective assistance. 
(10) McGlotten next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
specific request for discovery under Rule 16.  Defense counsel explained in his 
Rule 61 affidavit, however, that he had received automatic discovery from the 
State pursuant to an agreement and that McGlotten received all of the discovery 
materials that counsel otherwise would have requested pursuant to Rule 16.  Again, 
we agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that McGlotten can establish neither 
error nor prejudice with respect to this claim. 
(11) McGlotten next asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to dismiss based on continuances granted to the State while awaiting 
production of the medical examiner’s report.  Defense counsel explained, however, 
that he did not oppose the State’s request for a two-week continuance after the 
State agreed that it would dismiss all charges if the results of the report were not 
received within that period of time.  The Superior Court, in denying McGlotten’s 
ineffectiveness claim, explained that a two-week delay of trial because of the 
missing report would not have been grounds for dismissal of the case.  
Accordingly, McGlotten is unable to establish any prejudice from counsel’s failure 
to file a motion to dismiss because, as the Superior Court explained, there was not 
a sufficient basis for such a motion, and it would have been denied. 
8 
 
(12) Next, McGlotten argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the alleged perjured testimony of two witnesses.  First, McGlotten asserts 
that the officer who testified at his preliminary hearing stated that no specific 
amount of drugs had been mentioned in the conversations between McGlotten and 
Holloman.  At trial, however, a different officer testified that Holloman had 
ordered an ounce of cocaine from McGlotten.  Holloman also testified at trial that 
he had ordered an ounce of cocaine from McGlotten. Defense counsel, in his 
affidavit, stated that the preliminary hearing testimony was technically correct 
because neither McGlotten nor Holloman used the term “an ounce” in their 
discussions.  Nonetheless, there was evidence that, speaking in drug lingo, 
Holloman had ordered an ounce of cocaine when he told McGlotten, “I need to get 
straight for tomorrow.”  Defense counsel stated that he did not focus too much on 
the specific agreement between McGlotten and Holloman in his cross-examination 
of witnesses because he did not want to open the door for the State to introduce 
evidence of prior drug purchases between Holloman and McGlotten.  In fact, 
defense counsel points out, that when he pressed Holloman on cross-examination 
about the differences between his testimony and what was heard on the audio 
tapes, the State objected and argued that if Holloman answered defense counsel’s 
question it would open up the door to prior drug deals between the two men.  
9 
 
Under these circumstances, McGlotten has not overcome the presumption that 
counsel’s approach was “sound trial strategy.”8 
(13) McGlotten also contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to Holloman’s allegedly perjured testimony.  According to McGlotten, 
Holloman lied on cross-examination when he responded, “I’m not sure,” in 
response to defense counsel’s question about whether the outcome of Holloman’s 
pending criminal charges depended on his testifying against McGlotten at trial.  
We find nothing to support McGlotten’s contention, however, that Holloman’s 
statement constituted perjury.  Accordingly, we reject his contention that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing raise such an issue at trial. 
(14) McGlotten’s seventh claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file a motion to suppress: (i) the cocaine seized by police officers in the bag next 
to McGlotten’s car; (ii) the tape of McGlotten’s police interview; and (iii) the 
audio tapes of the phone conversations between McGlotten and Holloman.  In 
response to McGlotten’s contention, defense counsel stated that he did not file a 
suppression motion because there was no legal basis to do so.  The cocaine seized 
by police was found in plain view in a public place and thus was admissible.9  
McGlotten’s taped interview had been conducted after McGlotten was read his 
                                                 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
9 See Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 358-59 (Del. 1998). 
10 
 
Miranda rights and also was admissible.10  The recordings of the phone 
conversations were made by a police officer holding a handheld tape recorder up to 
Holloman’s phone, with Holloman’s consent, while he was engaged in a 
conversation with McGlotten.  Under the circumstances, the recordings were not 
illegal, as McGlotten contends, under 11 Del. C. § 2402(c)(5)(a).11  We agree with 
the Superior Court’s conclusion that, if counsel had filed a motion to suppress on 
any of these grounds, it would have been denied as meritless.  Accordingly, 
McGlotten has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. 
(15) McGlotten next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion for a judgment of acquittal.  On direct appeal, McGlotten raised a similar 
claim, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.12  
We rejected that argument, however, concluding that the State had presented 
sufficient evidence from which any reasonable juror could have found McGlotten 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Under the circumstances, we find that 
McGlotten has failed to establish that the outcome of his trial would have been 
different if defense counsel had filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal.  
Accordingly, we reject this claim of ineffective assistance. 
                                                 
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
11 Section 2402(c)(5)(a) provides that it is lawful for a law enforcement officer in the course of the officer’s regular 
duties to intercept an oral communication if the officer initially detained one of the parties and overhears the 
conversation. 
12 See McGlotten v. State, 2008 WL 5307990, *1. 
11 
 
(16) McGlotten’s ninth argument is that defense counsel was ineffective 
for failing to assert McGlotten’s right not to wear prison garb at his trial.  As 
defense counsel explained in his affidavit, however, McGlotten did not request to 
wear civilian clothing and did not have anyone appear on his behalf before trial to 
provide civilian clothing.  Under the circumstances, we do not find that McGlotten 
was “compelled” to appear at trial in prison garb.13  Although counsel should have 
advised McGlotten to wear civilian clothing if he could obtain it, we do not find 
any reasonable probability that the outcome of McGlotten’s trial would have been 
different if McGlotten had been wearing street clothes.  Accordingly, we reject 
McGlotten’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(17)  Finally, McGlotten claims that defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a instruction cautioning the jury about relying upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of McGlotten’s accomplice, Holloman.14  McGlotten is 
incorrect, however, in his suggestion that Holloman’s testimony was 
uncorroborated.  In fact, a police officer overheard the conversations between 
McGlotten and Holloman and several officers witnessed the arranged drug 
transaction between the two men.  Accordingly, we find no ineffective assistance 
on defense counsel’s part for failing to request an accomplice credibility 
instruction.   
                                                 
13 See Smith v. State, 2009 WL 1659873 (Del. June 15, 2009). 
14 See Bland v. State, 263 A.2d 286 (Del. 1970). 
12 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice