Title: PEOPLE OF MI V TIFFANY F LIVELY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123145
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2004

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 16, 2004  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123145 
TIFFANY FREE LIVELY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.   
We granted leave to appeal1 to consider whether the 
materiality of a false statement is an element of the 
statutory offense of perjury, MCL 750.422 and 750.423. The 
Court of Appeals held that materiality is an element that 
must be submitted to the jury,2 but the plain language of 
MCL 750.423 sets forth a definition of perjury that does 
not require proof of materiality. 
Because the Legislature 
has decided that materiality is not an element, the trial 
1 468 Mich 942 (2003). 
2 254 Mich App 249; 656 NW2d 850 (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
court did not err in refusing to submit that issue to the 
jury. We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and reinstate defendant’s perjury conviction. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case arises from an underlying divorce action. 
Defendant’s husband sued her for divorce. 
A default 
judgment was entered. Defendant moved to set it aside. At 
the hearing on that motion, defendant testified that she 
was unaware of the divorce proceeding until after the 
judgment had entered and that the complaint for divorce had 
never been served on her. 
She also submitted an affidavit 
to that effect in support of her motion. 
The trial court 
set aside the default judgment. 
The prosecutor charged defendant with one count of 
committing perjury in a court proceeding, MCL 750.422. The 
prosecutor alleged that defendant had falsely testified 
both that she had not been served with the complaint for 
divorce and that she had lacked knowledge of the divorce 
proceeding. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the 
ground that the allegedly false testimony was not material. 
The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the 
testimony was material. 
The 
case 
proceeded 
to 
trial. 
The 
prosecution 
presented 
testimony 
from 
the 
divorce 
attorney 
for 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
defendant’s husband, an officer who served the complaint on 
defendant, and a caseworker for the friend of the court. 
Defendant did not object to the court’s use of a standard 
criminal jury instruction, CJI2d 14.1, which, at the time, 
did not include materiality as an element for the jury to 
consider. 
Defendant did, however, request an instruction 
on specific intent that referred to a false statement on a 
material matter. 
The court denied defendant’s request to 
include 
the 
phrase 
“on 
a 
material 
matter” 
in 
the 
instruction. The jury found defendant guilty. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. 
It 
concluded that the materiality of a false statement is an 
element of perjury. 
The Court noted that in United States 
v Gaudin, 515 US 506; 115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444 
(1995), the Supreme Court had concluded that materiality is 
an element in a federal prosecution for making false 
statements on federal loan documents, and had rejected the 
contention 
that 
materiality 
in 
perjury 
cases 
is 
a 
traditional exception to the rule that all the elements of 
an offense must be submitted to a jury. 
The Court of 
Appeals rejected case law suggesting that materiality is an 
issue for the court, rather than the jury, to decide. 
See 
People v Noble, 152 Mich App 319; 393 NW2d 619 (1986); 
People v Hoag, 113 Mich App 789; 318 NW2d 579 (1982). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court 
erred in precluding the jury from considering materiality, 
and it determined that this error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to 
appeal.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case requires us to determine whether the 
materiality of the false statement is an element of the 
statutory offense of perjury. 
We review de novo this 
question of law. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 531; 664 
NW2d 685 (2003). 
III. ANALYSIS 
To provide the proper context for our interpretation 
of 
Michigan’s 
perjury 
statute, 
we 
must 
discuss 
the 
constitutional principle set forth in Gaudin, supra. 
The 
Supreme Court explained in Gaudin that every essential 
element of an offense, including—where it is an element— 
materiality, must be submitted to the jury. 
Gaudin 
involved a federal statutory offense and the government had 
3 468 Mich 942 (2003). 
4  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
conceded that materiality was an element.4 
Gaudin thus 
provides that if materiality is an element of a perjury­
related 
offense, 
then 
it, 
like 
all 
other 
essential 
elements, must be submitted to the jury as a matter of 
federal constitutional law. 
The holding in Gaudin offers no guidance on the 
interpretive question before us, i.e., whether materiality 
is an element of perjury under our state perjury statute. 
See Gaudin, supra at 525 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 
(“Nothing in the Court’s decision stands as a barrier to 
legislatures that wish to define—or that have defined—the 
elements of their criminal laws in such a way as to remove 
issues 
such 
as 
materiality 
from 
the 
jury’s 
consideration.”). 
In other words, Gaudin simply makes 
4 The federal statute at issue in Gaudin provides: 
Whoever, 
in 
any 
matter 
within 
the 
jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and wilfully
falsifies, conceals or covers up by any 
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be 
fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. [Gaudin,
supra at 509, quoting 18 USCS 1001 (emphasis
added).] 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
clear that if materiality is an essential element under our 
state statute, then it must be submitted to the jury. 
If, 
however, we conclude that materiality is not an element, 
then the holding in 
Gaudin has no bearing on our 
determination. 
The central question we must resolve, then, is whether 
our Legislature has defined the offense of perjury to 
include materiality as an element. 
This Court has 
previously indicated that, at common law, materiality was 
an element of perjury. 
See, e.g., People v Fox, 25 Mich 
492, 496-497 (1872). 
Our Legislature, however, has 
constitutional authority to change the common law. 
Const 
1963, art 3, § 7; Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 
243, 256; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). 
It appears that this Court 
has never expressly decided whether MCL 750.423 or its 
predecessors altered the common-law definition of perjury. 
To discern the meaning of our perjury statute, we 
apply the interpretive principles recently set forth in 
Mendoza, supra: 
Relying 
on 
established 
doctrines 
of 
interpretation, one cannot disagree that the 
first 
step 
in 
discerning 
legislative 
intent 
requires review of the statutory text adopted by
the 
Legislature. 
House 
Speaker 
v 
State 
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d
539 (1993). 
See also MCL 8.3a (“All words and
phrases 
shall 
be 
construed 
and 
understood 
according to the common and approved usage of the 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
language . . . .”). 
If unambiguous, the 
Legislature will be presumed to have intended the
meaning expressed. 
Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439
Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). 
[Mendoza, 
supra 
at 
550 
(Cavanagh, 
J., 
concurring 
in 
result).] 
MCL 750.423 provides: 
Any person authorized by any statute of this
state to take an oath, or any person of whom an
oath shall be required by law, who shall wilfully
swear falsely, in regard to any matter or thing,
respecting which such oath is authorized or 
required, shall be guilty of perjury, a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not more than 15 years. [Emphasis added.] 
Our 
Legislature 
has 
thus 
defined 
perjury 
as 
a 
willfully false statement regarding any matter or thing, if 
an oath is authorized or required. 
Noticeably absent from 
this definition is any reference to materiality. 
The 
Legislature could easily have used a phrase such as “in 
regard to any material matter or thing,” or “in regard to 
any matter or thing material to the issue or cause before 
the court,” but the Legislature did not use such language. 
The phrase “any matter or thing” is a broad one. 
The 
commonly understood word “any” generally casts a wide net 
and encompasses a wide range of things. 
“Any” has been 
defined as: 
1. one, a, an, or some; one or more without
specification or identification. 
2. whatever or 
whichever it may be. 
3. in whatever quantity or
number, great or small; some.  4. every; all . . 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
. . 
[Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(2d ed, 1997).] 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature 
intended for perjury to consist of a willfully false 
statement concerning every matter or thing for which an 
oath is authorized or required, because it did not limit 
the matters or things in question on the basis of their 
materiality. 
Reinforcing our conclusion that the Legislature’s 
failure to include a materiality requirement in MCL 750.423 
is dispositive is the fact that several perjury-related 
statutes not at issue here do require that the false matter 
or statement be material. 
See MCL 28.422a, 32.1131, 
168.729, 
257.254, 
324.5531(2), 
380.1003, 
500.2014, 
500.4509, 600.8813, 764.1e(2), and 765.25.5  These statutes 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
Legislature 
knows 
how 
to 
make 
materiality an element of a perjury-related offense. Thus, 
the failure to make materiality a requirement in the 
perjury statutes at issue here must be given meaning. 
In light of the broad scope of the statutory phrase 
“any matter or thing,” we conclude that the Legislature 
5 We also note that the federal perjury statute 
expressly requires that the false statement be material. 
See 18 USC 1623. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
intended that a willfully false statement about any matter 
or thing concerning which an oath was authorized or 
required falls within the statutory definition of perjury 
and thus may be charged as perjury if a prosecutor so 
chooses.6 
We note that many prior decisions of this Court have 
not 
analyzed 
the 
statutory 
language 
or 
adequately 
differentiated the statutory offense from its common-law 
6 The dissent opines that our decision will allow a 
prosecutor “unfettered discretion to charge a party or
witness with perjury for any discrepancy made under oath,
no matter how trivial.” 
Post at 1. In responding to this
argument, we find it useful to quote our response to a
similar argument by the dissent in People v Chavis, 468
Mich 84, 94, n 6; 658 NW2d 469 (2003): 
The dissent also criticizes our opinion as
allowing the prosecutor “unfettered discretion,”
post at 99, in determining when to bring charges
under the statute. 
It is invariably the case
that the prosecutor always has great discretion
in deciding whether to file charges. 
Such 
executive branch power is an established part of
our constitutional structure. 
Any apprehension
that the prosecutor may abuse this power should
be tempered, in part, by the knowledge that there
are significant systemic protections afforded 
defendants, including the defendant’s right to a
preliminary examination and right to a jury
trial. 
Moreover, there are other protections
against the misuse of power that spring from
daily scrutiny by the media as well as from
periodic elections, which call all office holders
to account to their constituents. 
9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
counterpart.7 See, e.g., People v Collier, 1 Mich 137, 138 
(1848); Hoch v People, 3 Mich 552, 554 (1855); Flint v 
People, 35 Mich 491 (1877); Beecher v Anderson, 45 Mich 
543, 552; 8 NW 539 (1881); People v McCaffrey, 75 Mich 115, 
123-124; 42 NW 681 (1889) (quoting the predecessor to MCL 
750.423, yet still assuming that materiality is required); 
People v Almashy, 229 Mich 227, 230; 201 NW 231 (1924); 
People v Kert, 304 Mich 148; 7 NW2d 251 (1943).  These 
cases 
are 
overruled 
to 
the 
extent 
that 
they 
are 
inconsistent with our opinion today.8 
7 The dissent is therefore quite right to observe that
for well over a century and a half Michigan courts have
assumed that materiality is an element of perjury. 
This 
long history might be a reason to apply stare decisis and
acquiesce in the judiciary’s redefinition of perjury, if 
not for the fact that we are compelled by Gaudin to revisit 
our perjury jurisprudence. 
As noted, Gaudin holds that 
materiality, like any element of a crime, must be submitted
to and decided by the jury. 
Therefore, despite our 
precedent 
to 
the 
contrary, 
we 
are 
constitutionally
compelled 
to 
reject 
the 
dissent’s 
assertion 
that 
“materiality is a question of law for the trial court to
determine . . . .” 
Post at 4. 
Once we jettison one
fundamental tenet of our 150-year jurisprudence on perjury,
we have no reason to shy away from the other question posed
by this appeal—whether materiality is truly an element of
perjury as defined by our Legislature. 
8 The Court of Appeals has treated materiality as an
element, but has also construed prior decisions of this
Court to require that this element be decided by the trial
court rather than a jury. See People v Hoag, supra; People
v Jeske, 128 Mich App 596; 341 NW2d 778 (1983); People v
Noble, supra. 
Obviously, the holdings in those cases are
Footnotes continued on following page. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Although the prior case law in this area has not been 
a model of clarity, the statutory definition of perjury is 
clear. 
We are bound to follow the Legislature’s directive 
that materiality is not an element of this offense. 
Our 
Legislature is responsible for defining the elements of 
criminal offenses, and we therefore adhere to those 
definitions.9 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Gaudin 
expressly recognized that legislatures are free to define 
“the elements of their criminal laws in such a way as to 
remove 
issues 
such 
as 
materiality 
from 
the 
jury’s 
consideration.” 
Gaudin, supra at 525. 
That is precisely 
inconsistent with Gaudin, which requires that a jury decide
essential elements of an offense. We make clear that these 
cases should no longer be followed. 
9 The dissent’s analysis of stare decisis is incomplete
because it fails to consider reliance interests. 
In 
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000),
we explained that this Court “must ask whether the previous
decision 
has 
become 
so 
embedded, 
so 
accepted, 
so 
fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it
would produce not just readjustments, but practical real­
world dislocations.” 
Here, the dissent fails to explain
how our overruling of earlier case law that (1) improperly
read an element into a perjury statute and (2) required the
court rather than the jury to decide that element, will
produce any real-world dislocations. 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
10 
what our Legislature has done. 
We must respect that 
legislative choice and apply the plain statutory language.10 
While it is not necessary to our decision, we note
that other state legislatures have made a similar choice to
alter the common law by eliminating the element of 
materiality from their perjury statutes. 
For example, in
Beckley v State, 443 P2d 51 (Alas, 1968), the Alaska
Supreme Court construed a statute similar to our own and
concluded that it did not require proof of materiality.
The Alaska statute provided: “‘A person authorized by law
to take an oath or affirmation, or a person whose oath or
affirmation is required by law, who willfully and falsely
swears or affirms in regard to a matter concerning which an
oath or affirmation is authorized or required, is guilty of
perjury.’” Id. at 54. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded: 
The statute is unambiguous. 
It clearly
indicates the intent of a legislative body to
enlarge the scope of the crime of perjury as it
existed at common law so as to make it a crime 
for one to willfully and falsely swear in regard
to any matter in respect to which an oath is
authorized 
or 
required, 
regardless 
of 
the 
question of materiality of such matter to an
issue before the court. 
Materiality is not mentioned in the Alaska
perjury statute; therefore it is unnecessary, in
order to prove the crime of perjury, to establish
that the matter concerning which willfully false
testimony under oath was given was material to an
issue before the court. The crime is complete if
one shall willfully swear falsely in regard to 
any matter respecting which an oath is authorized
or required. [Id. at 54-55.] 
The court further noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had reached the same conclusion regarding a similarly
worded statute in that state. 
See State v Miller, 26 RI
282; 58 A 882 (1904). 
We 
find 
the 
Alaska 
Supreme 
Court’s 
reasoning
persuasive. Like the Alaska law, our statute unambiguously
Footnotes continued on following page. 
12  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The dissent would follow earlier decisions of this 
Court treating materiality as an issue to be decided by the 
trial court, rather than the jury. The dissent’s position, 
however, is inconsistent with the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gaudin. 
As a matter of federal 
constitutional law, all essential elements of an offense 
must be submitted to a jury. 
We are no longer free, in 
light of Gaudin, to follow earlier case law treating 
materiality as an element for the trial court to decide as 
a matter of law. 
We must conclude either that materiality 
is an element that must be submitted to the jury, or that 
it is not an element at all.11  As discussed above, we have 
defines perjury to exclude the common-law element of 
materiality. 
11 The dissent purports to follow Gaudin by insisting
that materiality is not really an element, but simply a
question of law to be decided by the trial court. But if,
as the dissent contends, a defendant may not legally be
convicted of perjury without proof of materiality, then
materiality would, by definition, be an essential element
of the offense. 
See Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed)
(defining “elements of crime” as “[t]he constituent parts
of a crime . . . that the prosecution must prove to sustain
a conviction”). 
The dissent cannot have it both ways. 
Either 
materiality is an essential element that must be submitted
to the jury under the federal constitution or it is not an
element at all. 
The dissent would essentially create out
of whole cloth a special “sub-element” category that is
immune from the strictures of the federal constitution. In 
light of Gaudin, this Court’s obligation under the federal
Footnotes continued on following page. 
13  
 
 
                                                 
read the statutory language as it is clearly written. 
The 
statutory text simply does not require proof that the false 
statement was material. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The plain language of our perjury statute alters the 
common law and does not require proof of materiality. 
We 
thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate defendant’s perjury conviction. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
constitution is to require all essential elements of an
offense to be submitted to a jury. We adhere to that duty
and conclude that materiality simply is not an element
under the language of our perjury statute. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 123145 
TIFFANY FREE LIVELY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
MARKMAN, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority and would reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant's 
perjury conviction, but I would do so for different 
reasons. 
Further, I agree with the thoughtful analysis of 
the majority concluding that the plain language of the 
perjury statutes, MCL 750.422 and 750.423, clearly does not 
require as an element of perjury that a false statement be 
material. 
Indeed, it does not appear that the dissent 
itself disagrees with this conclusion.1
 Finally, I agree 
1 Although the dissent observes that it "disagree[s]
with the majority’s assertion that in all prior cases
dealing with perjury, our courts did not properly analyze
the statutory language," post at 3, the dissent neither
invokes any particular past statutory analysis in support
of this observation, nor sets forth any contrary statutory
analysis of its own. 
The dissent's argument is predicated
Footnotes continued on following page. 
 
 
                                                 
with the majority that United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 
510; 115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995), requires that 
the issue of materiality, if it is indeed an element of 
perjury, 
must 
be 
submitted 
to 
the 
jury 
for 
its 
determination. 
I write separately because, in my judgment, it is 
unnecessary to address the most difficult question in this 
case—whether, under the standards of Robinson v Detroit, 
462 Mich 439, 466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), longstanding 
precedents in Michigan, holding that the materiality of a 
false statement constitutes an element under MCL 750.422 
and 750.423, should be overruled. As the dissent correctly 
observes, post at 4, and the majority does not dispute, 
ante at 9 n 7, it has been the law of Michigan for more 
than 150 years that materiality constitutes an element of 
perjury. 
It is unnecessary to address the application of 
Robinson to the instant question because defendant's 
statement here was clearly "materially" false. 
Therefore, 
whether Michigan's prior case law is maintained or not, 
defendant here was properly convicted of perjury. 
exclusively upon the authority of precedent. 
While I do 
not find the dissent unreasonable and, indeed, do not
reject its principal argument, there is nonetheless nothing
in the dissent that purports to repudiate the majority's
thorough statutory analysis. 
2  
 
 
Defendant's false statement was made in support of her 
motion to set aside a default judgment, and pertained to 
whether she was aware that a divorce action had been filed 
and whether she had been served with the complaint. 
In 
granting her motion, the trial court stated that with the 
divorce "only ten days old," and with "[s]ome question" in 
his mind regarding defendant's lack of notice, it seemed 
desirable to set aside the default. 
The trial judge 
remarked, "Listening to it all, it sounds to me like the 
mother ought to have known there was a divorce going on, 
but I'm not convinced. 
So at any rate, we'll set it 
aside." I agree with the prosecutor that the gist of these 
remarks was that the trial judge was unsure whether 
defendant was lying, but that he chose to give her the 
benefit of the doubt and vacate the default. 
Contrary to 
the Court of Appeals, I do not believe that the trial judge 
was asserting that defendant's false statements were 
immaterial to his decision on her motion. However, even if 
the Court of Appeals is correct in its estimation of the 
judge's remarks, the test for materiality is not whether 
false testimony actually affected the outcome of court 
proceedings, but merely whether it could have affected such 
proceedings. 
People v Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 432; 556 
3  
 
 
NW2d 512 (1996); People v Jeske, 128 Mich App 596, 603; 341 
NW2d 778 (1983). 
In the context of a motion to set aside a default 
judgment—a proceeding in which matters of actual notice and 
service will often prove determinative, see MCR 2.603(D)— 
statements pertaining to whether notice has been served or 
received will almost always carry with them the potential 
to influence the court. 
Because such statements will 
typically go to the heart of the rationale for default 
placed in question by a motion to set aside a judgment, it 
will almost always be true that such statements could have 
affected the proceedings. 
Therefore, they will almost 
always constitute "material" statements and, where false, 
will 
almost 
always 
constitute 
"materially" 
false 
statements. 
In the instant case, defendant's statements 
carried with them the potential to influence the outcome of 
her motion to set aside the default judgment, and the trial 
court’s statement that “I’m not convinced” that defendant 
is lying, “so . . . we’ll set it aside,” indicates that her 
statements, in fact, did influence the outcome. 
Thus, even if "materiality" is an element of perjury, 
and even if the trial court's failure to send this issue to 
the jury constituted error, Gaudin, supra at 510, the error 
was harmless under the present circumstances because no 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant's 
false statements in their context were not "materially" 
false.2  For the reasons set forth, I respectfully disagree 
with the Court of Appeals that a contrary result could have 
obtained on the part of a reasonable juror. 
Thus, I 
conclude that the prosecutor has shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury 
on materiality was, at most, harmless error. 
I concur with the majority in reinstating defendant's 
conviction, but I would avoid reaching the question whether 
longstanding Michigan precedents concerning the meaning of 
MCL 750.422 and 750.423 should now be reversed.3 
Stephen J. Markman 
2 Viewing the error here—one depriving the jury of an
instruction concerning an element of the crime—as of 
constitutional dimension, see People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47,
51; 610 NW2d 551 (2000), and assuming arguendo that this
question was preserved, I agree with the Court of Appeals
that this error does not constitute a structural defect 
incompatible 
with 
harmless 
error 
analysis, 
People 
v 
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 765 n 11; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), but
is subject instead to the preserved constitutional error 
standard of People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392;
521 NW2d 538 (1994). 
Under this standard, the burden is
upon the prosecutor to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error is harmless. 
3 The Legislature, of course, might well choose the
occasion of this opinion to make clear its present
intentions on "materiality" as an element of Michigan's
perjury statutes. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 123145 
TIFFANY FREE LIVELY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Today, the majority determines that MCL 750.423, which 
sets forth the definition of perjury, does not require 
proof of materiality. 
The majority’s decision allows a 
prosecutor unfettered discretion to charge a party or 
witness with perjury for any discrepancy made under oath, 
no matter how trivial. 
While I concur with the majority 
that materiality is not an element for the jury to decide, 
I believe that the issue of materiality is a question of 
law, which is a threshold requirement for the trial court 
to determine. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
A person accused of perjury in a court proceeding is 
charged under MCL 750.422. 
MCL 750.422 states the 
following: 
 
 
Any person who, being lawfully required to
depose the truth in any proceeding in a court of
justice, shall commit perjury shall be guilty of
a 
felony, 
punishable, 
if 
such 
perjury 
was 
committed on the trial of an indictment for a 
capital crime, by imprisonment in the state 
prison for life, or any term of years, and if
committed in any other case, by imprisonment in
the state prison for not more than 15 years. 
MCL 750.423 defines perjury and became effective on 
September 18, 1931. MCL 750.423 states the following: 
Any person authorized by any statute of this
state to take an oath, or any person of whom an
oath shall be required by law, who shall wilfully
swear falsely, in regard to any matter or thing,
respecting which such oath is authorized or 
required, shall be guilty of perjury, a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not more than 15 years. 
From May 18, 1846, to the time MCL 750.423 was enacted 
in 1931, perjury was defined as follows: 
If any person authorized by any statute of
this state to take an oath, or if any person of
whom an oath shall be required by law, shall
willfully swear falsely, in regard to any matter
or 
thing, 
respecting 
which 
such 
oath 
is 
authorized or required, such person shall be 
deemed guilty of perjury . . . . 
[RS 1846, ch
156, § 2.] 
Since 1846, our Legislature has defined perjury as 
falsely swearing “to any matter or thing.” Also since that 
time, this Court has repeatedly held that alleged perjured 
statements must have been material to an issue or cause in 
the prior proceeding. 
In People v Almashy, 229 Mich 227, 230; 201 NW 231 
(1924), this Court stated, “It is fundamental that both the 
2  
 
 
 
oath and the facts sworn to must be material in order to 
justify conviction of perjury.” In People v Kert, 304 Mich 
148, 154-155; 7 NW2d 251 (1943), this Court stated, “While 
perjury . . . is defined as a wilful false swearing in 
regard to any matter or in respect to which such oath is 
authorized or required, it is always necessary to show that 
the perjury was in regard to a material fact.” 
Numerous 
other cases have also stated that claims of perjury must 
allege materiality. 
See People v Cash, 388 Mich 153, 159; 
200 NW2d 83 (1972); People v Vogt, 156 Mich 594, 595; 121 
NW 293 (1909); People v Ostrander, 110 Mich 60, 61; 67 NW 
1079 (1896); People v McCaffrey, 75 Mich 115, 120, 124, 
126; 42 NW 681 (1889); Flint v The People, 35 Mich 491, 493 
(1877); People v Fox, 25 Mich 492, 496 (1872) (majority 
opinion by Cooley, J.); People v Gaige, 26 Mich 30, 33 
(1872); People v Collier, 1 Mich 137, 138 (1848) (“It is a 
well-settled rule, that it must appear on the face of the 
indictment that the false allegation was material to the 
matter in question; for if it be of no importance, though 
false, it will not be perjury . . . .”); see also Model 
Penal Code, § 241.1; ULA Penal Code 241.1. 
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that in all 
prior cases dealing with perjury, our courts did not 
properly analyze the statutory language. 
Even Chief 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Justice Corrigan, the author of the majority opinion in 
this case, wrote an opinion when she was at the Court of 
Appeals stating that materiality is an essential element of 
statutory perjury. People v Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 428­
429, 432; 556 NW2d 512 (1996). 
In Kozyra, supra at 432, 
the Court of Appeals stated, “One of the essential elements 
of perjury is that the issue or cause to which the 
defendant swears is material. . . . 
For purposes of a 
perjury prosecution, a statement is material if it could 
have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding.”1 
The idea that materiality is a question of law for the 
trial court to determine is not a novel one. For over 150 
years, this Court has recognized this proposition. 
Today, 
the current majority states that for over a century and a 
half, justices who have come before them have been wrong. 
I do not agree with such a notion.2 
1 While I disagree that materiality is an element of 
perjury for the jury to determine, the necessity that the
allegedly perjured statement be material to the proceedings
has been consistently held in our jurisprudence.
2 I also do not agree that this issue is controlled by 
federal constitutional law. I agree with the majority that
all essential elements of an offense must be submitted to a 
jury, as stated in United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 523;
115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995); however, I believe
that the issue of materiality is not an element. 
Rather,
consistently with our past jurisprudence, materiality is a
Footnotes continued on following page. 
4  
 
 
                                                 
 
“The application of stare decisis is generally the 
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent 
development 
of 
legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.” 
People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 633; 648 
NW2d 193 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Even if this Court determines an error was made, 
“‘[b]efore this court overrules a decision deliberately 
made, it should be convinced not merely that the case was 
wrongly decided, but also that less injury will result from 
overruling than from following it.’” 
Id. at 634, quoting 
McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006 
(1904). 
Even if past Courts erred, I find it hard to 
fathom that the majority believes that less injury will 
result to our citizens when they can be charged with 
perjury over immaterial discrepancies. 
The majority states that I have not considered 
reliance interests and have not explained how overruling 
earlier 
case 
law 
“will 
produce 
any 
real-world 
dislocations.” 
Ante at 11 n 9. 
I note that there are 
likely no superficial reliance interests to consider when a 
question of law. As such, it is well within the purview of
the courts to determine. 
5  
 
 
 
case involves a matter of criminal justice. 
How unlikely 
it would be for this Court to decide not to overrule a past 
case because criminals have been relying on it to further 
their criminal conduct. 
Notably, the majority’s argument 
can be made any time a case involves a matter of criminal 
justice. 
However, I do not believe that, merely because a 
case involves a criminal matter, the edicts of stare 
decisis are discarded. 
This Court’s 150-year history of 
recognizing that materiality is a question of law and our 
citizens’ reliance on this Court’s consistent application 
of the law must not be discarded merely because of a 
perceived lack of reliance interests. 
Further, the majority quotes from People v Chavis, 468 
Mich 84, 94 n 6; 658 NW2d 469 (2003), and states that 
prosecutors have always had great discretion in whether to 
file charges. 
The majority also notes, “'Any apprehension 
that the prosecutor may abuse this power should be 
tempered, in part, by the knowledge that there are 
significant 
systemic 
protections 
afforded 
defendants, 
including 
the 
defendant’s 
right 
to 
a 
preliminary 
examination and right to a jury trial.'” 
Ante at 9 n 6, 
quoting id. 
However, by eliminating any determination of 
materiality by the court, a preliminary examination and 
jury trial will offer little protection to those charged 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for trivial matters. 
The majority certainly does not mean 
to advocate jury nullification, yet that is what it is 
doing when it mentions the protections of a jury trial. 
While 
the 
prosecutor 
must 
prove 
his 
case 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt, the problem is in the nature of the 
charge. 
The perjury charge may be related to an 
inconsequential discrepancy, yet if it is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the jury has no choice but to convict. 
Finally, while the majority is comforted by the 
prosecutor’s daily scrutiny by the media and periodic 
elections, I am certain this provides little comfort to the 
witness, undoubtedly a witness who testified in a manner 
that was contrary to that sought by the prosecutor, who 
sits in prison. 
Accordingly, 
I 
concur 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
materiality is not an element of perjury for the jury to 
determine. 
However, I would hold, consistently with this 
Court’s decisions for over 150 years, that the issue of 
materiality in a perjury prosecution is a question of law 
for 
the 
trial 
court 
to 
determine. 
Therefore, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
7