Title: Z.G. v. Dep't of Child Servs.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S04-1101-JT-46
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2011

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Kimberly A. Jackson 
 
 
 
 
 
Shari L. Vanderploeg  
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert J. Henke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S04-1101-JT-46 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY 
TERMINATION OF PARENT-CHILD 
RELATIONSHIP OF C.G., MINOR CHILD AND  
HER MOTHER, Z.G., 
 
Z.G. (MOTHER) 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
MARION COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
CHILD SERVICES, 
Appellee (Petitioner below), 
AND 
 
CHILD ADVOCATES, INC., 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-Appellee (Guardian Ad Litem). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court, 49D09-0903-JT-013906 
The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge 
The Honorable Larry E. Bradley, Magistrate 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-1002-JT-75 
_________________________________ 
 
October 11, 2011 
 
 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Oct 11 2011, 12:15 pm
2 
 
 
David, Justice. 
 
We have granted transfer from the Court of Appeals on this case involving the 
termination of parental rights between the child, C.G., and the child‘s mother, Z.G.  We write to 
discuss important issues of due process that have not previously been before this Court.  In all 
other aspects, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
C.G. (Child) was born on December 22, 2000, to Z.M. (Mother).  In 2004, Mother and 
Child moved to Indianapolis.  In January 2008, Mother requested permission from Child‘s 
school to take Child to Utah, but the school indicated Child could not miss any more school 
days.  Thereafter, Mother left Child with a male friend, F.L., and traveled to Utah to visit family.  
In February 2008, F.L. brought Child to stay with C.O. (Neighbor).  Neighbor knew Child and 
had watched Child after school the previous year.  During the three months that Child was at 
Neighbor‘s house, Neighbor purchased clothes and a bed for Child and included Child in family 
events.  However, Neighbor did not speak to Mother at all during this time period.  F.L. then 
took Child on spring break and brought Child back in April 2008, leaving Child at another 
individual‘s house in the neighborhood.  A few hours later, Neighbor discovered Child was back 
in the neighborhood.  Shortly thereafter, Child began complaining that she ―hurt in her privates.‖  
After consulting with the Healthy Families Program, Neighbor took Child to the hospital on that 
same day.  Child was diagnosed with genital herpes and had scarring around the anus and 
perineum.  Child‘s examining physician concluded Child had likely been sexually abused.  Child 
was hospitalized for two days, during which time Neighbor stayed with Child.  On April 17, 
2008, upon release from the hospital, the Department of Child Services (DCS) took custody of 
Child and placed Child in a foster home, where Child still resides.   
 
As is its practice, the first family case manager (FCM 1) for DCS was assigned to assess 
the case.  FCM 1 spoke to Child and Neighbor in the hospital and transported Child to foster 
care.  During this initial assessment, FCM 1 learned that Mother had been arrested in Utah.  
FCM 1 called the Salt Lake County Jail as well as the state and federal prisons in Utah.  On April 
18, 2008, DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) petition alleging Mother had 
3 
 
―abandoned the child in the care of various individuals who are unable and or unwilling to 
provide the child with appropriate care.‖   
 
Shortly after working on Child‘s case, FCM 1 left DCS.  In May 2008, a second family 
case manager (FCM 2) was assigned to the case.  After taking over the case, FCM 2 did not 
speak to Neighbor.  FCM 2 swore in an Affidavit of Diligent Inquiry (ADI) that he had spoken to 
family acquaintances regarding the whereabouts of Mother, but no such contacts were made.  
Based upon the ADI, Mother was served by publication in the CHINS case.  On August 6, 2008, 
the child was adjudicated a CHINS.   
During the time Mother was incarcerated, she made attempts to inquire about Child.  
Once Mother learned of Child‘s involvement with DCS, she wrote DCS on October 14, 2008.  
The letter was written in Spanish and informed DCS she was incarcerated and asked that an 
investigation be brought against F.L.  The letter also inquired if Child was in DCS custody and if 
she could have a family member pick up Child. In November 2008, DCS learned that Mother 
was incarcerated in Henderson, Kentucky, after receiving her letter.   
On December 15, 2008, FCM 2 responded in writing, informing Mother that Child was 
currently in a foster home; asking Mother when her release date from jail would be; and stating 
that there were ―legal procedures that go along with this case which can lead to termination of 
parental rights.‖    
 
On December 23, 2008, Mother sent a second letter to DCS:  
Thank you for responding back and letting me know how my daughter is.  I have 
been writing and trying to get in contact since the moment I found out [Child] was 
in the custody of the state, which was not to [sic] long ago.   
I have a court date in April, and am not sure yet what the outcome will be, so I 
would like a family member to pick my child up.  I love her so much and do not 
want to lose her.  The person which had her when I came to jail did not inform me 
that my daughter had been taken.  Instead he was writing me letters leading me to 
believe she was in good care and was fine, but since I was writing a member of 
our church we attended I was able to find out the truth.  Hopefully everything will 
get cleared on my end and I will be out soon but until then I would like my 
mother or a family member to care for my daughter.   
4 
 
 
Mother received no response to that letter, and she asked a friend to call DCS on her 
behalf.  DCS refused to give Mother‘s friend any information because she was not a parent.  On 
February 12, 2009, Mother wrote a third letter to DCS, again asking for information about Child.  
The letter also asked for information about the alleged sexual abuse and inquired whether Child 
could go live with Child‘s sister.    
 
Mother never provided DCS with the name of Child‘s father or the family members with 
which she wanted Child placed.  Candy Duran lived with Mother‘s brother, Rosalio Cruz, for 
eleven years, had two children with him, and lived in Salt Lake City.  Duran called DCS in an 
attempt to gain custody of Child but DCS did not consider Duran for possible placement of Child 
because Mother‘s brother was incarcerated and Duran is not a blood relative.   
 
DCS filed the petition to terminate Mother‘s parental rights on March 25, 2009, and 
served Mother by mail at the Henderson County Jail where she was incarcerated on federal 
charges.  Mother filed motions to be transported to the trial or to allow her to participate by 
teleconference, but those motions were denied.  Mother, however, was allowed to participate 
telephonically in the proceedings.  On January 11, 2010, the juvenile court entered an order 
terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child.  Child has since been 
adopted by foster parents.1   
Due Process Analysis 
 
Mother contends that numerous due process violations occurred which culminated in the 
termination of her parental rights.  Mother also alleges that there was a lack of evidence to 
support the trial court‘s determination.  We will address each issue separately.   
 
It is well established that the involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme 
measure that is designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed.  
In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).  Choices about marriage, family life, and 
the upbringing of children are among associational rights the United States Supreme Court has 
                                                 
1 At this time, we do not address the effects of reversing a termination order when a child has already been adopted.  
It might be advisable for prospective adoptive parents and the courts to wait until the expiration of any appeal before 
going forward with an adoption.  Alternatively, if a court proceeds with an adoption while TPR proceedings are still 
on appeal, the court should advise all parties, especially the prospective adoptive parents, of the possibility of 
reversal.     
5 
 
ranked as of basic importance in our society and are rights sheltered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment against the State‘s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.  M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996).  ―If any freedom not specifically mentioned in the Bill of 
Rights enjoys a ‗preferred position‘ in the law it is most certainly the family.‖  Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 511 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).   
 
―The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution  and the Due Course of Law Clause of 
the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property 
without a fair proceeding.‖  In re Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001), trans. denied.  Parental rights constitute an important interest warranting deference and 
protection, and a termination of that interest is a ―unique kind of deprivation.‖  Lassiter v. Dept. 
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).  However, children have an interest in terminating 
parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long–term, 
continuous relationships.  Lehman v. Lycoming County Children‘s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 
513 (1982).  When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a 
manner that meets the requirements of due process.  J.T. v. Marion County Office of Family & 
Children, 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has written on the importance of heightened due process protections whenever the State wishes 
to sever the parental bonds of children: 
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been 
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.  Even 
when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing 
the irretrievable destruction of their family life.  If anything, persons faced with 
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural 
protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.  
When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the 
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.   
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–754 (1982).  Due Process has never been defined, but 
the phrase embodies a requirement of ―fundamental fairness.‖  E.P. v. Marion County O.F.C., 
653 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has written that ―the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.‖  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
6 
 
319, 333 (1976).  The process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding turns on the 
balancing of three factors:  (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of 
error created by the State‘s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest 
supporting use of the challenged procedure.  A.P. v. Porter County Office of Family & Children, 
734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000,) trans. denied (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).  
The balancing of these factors recognizes that although due process is not dependent on the 
underlying facts of the particular case, it is nevertheless ―flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.‖  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.  Finally, we must 
keep in mind the general principle that ―if the State imparts a due process right, then it must give 
that right.‖  A.P. v. Porter County, 734 N.E.2d at 1112.  A parent in a proceeding to terminate the 
parent–child relationship is statutorily entitled to (1) cross-examine witnesses, (2) obtain 
witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process, and (3) introduce evidence on behalf of 
the parent.  Ind. Code § 31-32-2-3(b) (2008).   
 
In balancing the three–prong Mathews test, we first note that the private interest affected 
by the proceeding is substantial—a parent‘s interest in the care, custody, and control of her child.  
In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  We also note the countervailing Mathews 
factor, that the State‘s parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also 
substantial.  Id.  Both the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the 
proceeding.  So, we turn to the third Mathews factor, the risk of error created by DCS‘s actions 
and the trial court‘s actions.  We address each of Mother‘s allegations in order. 
A.  Service on Mother 
 
Mother first contends numerous due process violations including a lack of service from 
DCS and lack of effort by DCS in locating Mother, culminating with Mother not attending the 
termination hearing.  It is of paramount importance in any DCS case for parents of children 
involved with DCS to receive notice of such involvement.  When matters are at the termination 
stage of a case, and a child is already adopted, it is in nobody‘s interest that the case be remanded 
and the adoption potentially be undone due to improper service.    
 
The record reflects FCM 1 discovered Mother had been arrested in Utah and contacted 
two county jails in Utah in search for Mother.  The record further reflects that FCM 1 looked for 
7 
 
Mother through the Marion County Jail and Indiana Department of Corrections.  Further, FCM 1 
searched various DCS databases and looked in the local telephone directory.  FCM 1 was unable 
to locate Mother in her efforts.  FCM 2 then took over the case and initiated his own 
investigation into Mother‘s whereabouts.  He made the same search attempts as FCM 1 and was 
also unable to locate Mother.  During these search attempts, Mother was incarcerated on federal 
charges in Henderson, Kentucky.  Although the technology and ability to locate people has 
advanced, there is no centralized technology whereby DCS can type in a person‘s name and learn 
her whereabouts if incarcerated.  DCS had no reason to suspect Mother would be in federal 
custody and no reason to suspect Mother would be in Kentucky.  DCS cannot be expected to find 
a needle in a haystack, which is what Mother is asking DCS to have done.  We agree with the 
Court of Appeals and conclude that if any error existed in DCS locating Mother at this stage of 
the case, it did not substantially increase the risk of error in her termination proceeding.   
 
Mother next contends that DCS misrepresentations on the ADI, which led to Mother 
being served by publication, substantially increased the risk of error leading to her termination.  
Specifically, FCM 2 stated in the ADI, which led to the service by publication, that he asked 
―family acquaintances regarding the parent‘s whereabouts.‖  However, FCM 2 did not speak to 
any family acquaintances.  FCM 2 did, however, check with the Marion County Jail, Indiana 
Department of Corrections, ICES and ICWIS internal databases, telephone directory, Utah State 
Prison, Utah Federal Prison, and Salt Lake County Jail.  The Affidavit of Diligent Inquiry was 
signed and affirmed ―under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representations are true 
and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.‖  We find it extremely troubling that a 
representative from DCS would make a misrepresentation on such an important document.  FCM 
2 offered the excuse that the Affidavit ―populated‖ automatically and could not be deleted.  If 
this is accurate, DCS should correct its internal system to ensure that these ―populations‖ cease 
immediately so that only accurate information exists on its forms.  Yet, in the present scenario, 
we observe that there were no known family acquaintances for FCM 2 to contact about mother‘s 
whereabouts.  The error would be significantly more egregious if there were family 
acquaintances with whom FCM 2 knew to inquire about mother‘s whereabouts.  We also note 
that Mother was able to cross-examine FCM 2 on this issue during the termination proceeding, 
which allowed the court to assess FCM 2‘s credibility in determining what impact this had on 
Mother‘s due process rights as well as on FCM 2‘s credibility as a witness.  We hold that the 
8 
 
misrepresentation on the affidavit, in this limited instance, did not violate Mother‘s due process 
rights.   
B.  DCS Contact with Mother 
We now turn to Mother‘s due process argument that DCS failed to inform Mother of the 
CHINS proceedings after she initiated contact with DCS.  We note the timeline of Mother‘s 
contact with DCS and the DCS response.  Once Mother learned of C.G.‘s involvement with 
DCS, she wrote DCS on October 14, 2008.  The letter was written in Spanish and informed DCS 
she was incarcerated, inquired if Child was in DCS custody and if a family member could pick 
up Child.  Once FCM 2 received the letter, sometime in November 2008, he learned that Mother 
was incarcerated in Henderson, Kentucky.  FCM 2 responded on December 15 but did not 
explicitly state that Child was currently a CHINS.  Rather, FCM 2 inquired into Mother‘s release 
date and asked what her plans were to parent.  FCM 2 did explain that ―there are legal 
procedures that go along with this case which can lead to termination of parental rights.‖  
Furthermore, he informed Mother that Child was in a pre-adoptive home.  Mother immediately 
responded to FCM 2 with a letter on December 23.  Mother wrote that she had a court date in 
April 2009 which she hoped would work everything out, and in the meantime requested a family 
member come take Child.  After not hearing from DCS, Mother sent another letter on February 
12, 2009.  This letter again inquired into how Child was doing, requested family come and take 
Child, and also included a card for Child.  It was not until after receiving this February letter that 
DCS sent Mother an advisement of rights form and a copy of the CHINS petition.  Mother then 
requested counsel in the CHINS.  Within the month, DCS filed its termination petition, and 
Mother did not receive her counsel in the CHINS action until after DCS filed its termination 
petition.   
The delay in advising mother of her rights and informing her of the CHINS action is 
disturbing and inappropriate.  There was no reason for this delay.  Upon obtaining Mother‘s 
letter dated October 14, 2008, DCS should have contacted Mother immediately.  The initial 
response should have included the advisement of rights form and the CHINS petition form.  
Doing so would have allowed Mother representation in the CHINS proceedings at an earlier 
stage.  However, in this case, we cannot conclude that the dilatory action resulted in fundamental 
9 
 
error or deprived Mother of due process.  Mother was incarcerated at that time and awaiting a 
possible ten-year sentence.  Although it may have been advisable for DCS to have put the brakes 
on the termination petition upon locating Mother, or at least temporarily slowed down the 
proceedings, she was nevertheless in federal custody for transporting drugs.  Furthermore, the 
termination proceeding did not conclude until January 2009.  We find the error would have been 
much more egregious if the court had conducted an expedited termination hearing, sometime 
shortly after the termination petition being filed.  However, the delays in the termination 
proceeding and the continuances granted provided further opportunity for Mother and her 
counsel to attempt to prove Mother‘s fitness to parent and also to prepare for trial.  Finally, we 
note that Mother was fully and diligently represented in the termination proceeding.  Counsel 
was able to question FCM 2 about the lack of communication with Mother, and Mother was able 
to present her argument to the trial court judge about any due process violations from the lack of 
contact.  The delay from DCS in advising Mother of her rights and serving her with the CHINS 
petition upon locating Mother is a very poor practice model in the field of child protection.  But a 
reversal is not warranted in this case. 
C.  Personal Attendance at Termination Hearing 
Finally, Mother argues that her due process rights were violated by denying her the 
opportunity to be present at trial due to the standing order existing in Marion County, which 
prohibited the transportation of incarcerated parents to the Marion County Juvenile court 
proceedings.  On October 1, 2006, the Marion Superior Court issued an ―Order Prohibiting 
Transportation of Incarcerated Adults to the Marion County Juvenile Center.‖  In that order, the 
executive committee of the Marion Superior Court determined it would no longer transport 
incarcerated adults to participate in juvenile court proceedings.  The order stated,  
WHEREAS, incarcerated adults have routinely been transported to the Marion 
County Juvenile Center for participation in juvenile court proceedings; and  
WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of the Marion Superior Court has 
determined that this practice should be discontinued. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that incarcerated adults be prohibited from 
transport to the Marion County Juvenile Center, effective immediately.  This 
Order does not apply to transportation of incarcerated adults to court facilities 
other than the Marion County Juvenile Center. 
10 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Marion County Sheriff‘s Department seek 
clarification for any pending transportation order from the court issuing that order, 
if it would require the transportation of an incarcerated adult to the Marion 
County Juvenile Center. 
The record reflects that some adults had been transported to the Marion County Juvenile 
Center until March 2009, when it became a safety concern due to the ―no sight, no hearing‖ 
policy of holding adults and juveniles in the same facility.2   
The Court of Appeals first addressed this issue in Tillotson v. Clay County Dep‘t of 
Family and Children, 777 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).  The Court of Appeals found that 
parents were not denied due process when they were not transported to their termination hearing.  
Id. at 746.  The Court of Appeals, however, cautioned that alternative procedures should be used 
to allow a parent who could not be present in the courtroom to fully participate.  It wrote such 
alternative procedures could include, ―using a speaker phone at the hearing or continuing the 
hearing after the State has presented its case and allowing the parent time to review a transcript 
or audio tape of the hearing and then respond to allegations raised by the State‘s witnesses.‖  Id. 
at 746 n.7.  We note that Mother participated in both days of the termination hearing 
telephonically, with interpreters in the courtroom translating the proceeding into Spanish.  
However, there are risks when a party in such a delicate proceeding is not transported to the 
hearing. 
We first recognize that trial judges are in the best place to assess witness credibility, and 
by not having a parent present at a termination hearing, a trial judge is not as easily able to 
ascertain the credibility of a witness over the phone.  Credibility of a witness must be ascertained 
from ―circumstantial evidence, including the demeanor of the witness, the plausibility of the 
testimony, and the relative strengths of the evidence supporting and opposing the testimony.‖  
Simpson v. State, 165 Ind. App. 619, 622, 333 N.E.2d 303, 304 (1975).  ―From consideration of 
this evidence, the trier of fact can form an opinion of the ‗probability‘ that a particular witness is 
relating an accurate account of the incident.‖  Id.  Our trial rules shed light on the deference we 
give the trial court judge when she is the trier of fact:   
                                                 
2 This is from testimony of the Chief Baliff of the Marion Superior Court Juvenile Division.  It appears in conflict 
with the order dated October 2006.  Nevertheless, at one time, adults were transported to the Marion County 
Juvenile Center.   
11 
 
On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury or with an advisory jury, at 
law or in equity, the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witness.  
Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) (emphasis added).  We recognize the unique position of the trial court to 
assess the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, and only set aside a judgment 
terminating a parent-child relationship if it is clearly erroneous.  Egly v. Blackford County Dept. 
of Pub. Works, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234–1235 (Ind. 1992).   
In the present case there were several procedural safeguards undertaken by the trial court.  
The courtroom was cleared out to provide Mother an opportunity to privately speak to her 
counsel.  The trial was bifurcated, giving Mother an opportunity to review the testimony 
presented by DCS with her counsel.  Counsel had ample opportunity to confer with Mother, 
having been on the case for over six months.  Finally, we note the potential significant cost of 
transporting Mother from Henderson, Kentucky, to Indianapolis, Indiana, for this hearing.  It is 
possible that our analysis may have been different had Mother been across town in the Marion 
County Jail.   
 
After examining a number of other jurisdictions, we observe that the commonly held 
viewpoint is that there is no absolute right to be present at a termination hearing.   
 
Of the states we have surveyed that have found no absolute right of a parent to be present 
at a termination hearing, they take different paths to arrive at their conclusions.  The first 
jurisdiction to address this issue was North Dakota.  Many courts have taken the lead from North 
Dakota, which found that 
a convict does not have a constitutional right to personally appear in a civil suit 
where he has been permitted to appear through counsel and by deposition, if 
appropriate.  Any right to appear personally would have to rest upon convincing 
reasons and would ultimately be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.   
In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 209 (N.D. 1979).  Many courts have followed the North Dakota 
model, and provided discretion to the trial court judge, while finding that representation by 
counsel and the opportunity to appear via deposition are the two key components required in a 
due process analysis of a parent who is not in attendance at a proceeding in which her parental 
12 
 
rights are terminated.  Pignolet v. State Dept. of Pensions and Security, 489 So.2d 588, 590–591 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986); In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-949, 638 P.2d 1346, 
1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); In re C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 357 (Colo. App. 1994); In re Juvenile 
Appeal, 446 A.2d 808, 813 (Conn. 1982); In re F.L.S., 502 S.E.2d 256, 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); 
In re Baby Doe, 936 P.2d 690, 694–695 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); In re M.R., C.R., D.R., M.R. and 
M.R., 736 N.E.2d 167, 169–170 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); In re J.S., 470 N.W.2d 48, 52, (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1991); In Interest of S.A.D., 481 So.2d 191, 193–194 (La. Ct. App. 1985); In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 748 A.2d 1020, 1022–1024 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); 
In re Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 1981); H.W.S. v. C.T., 827 S.W.2d 237, 
242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Raymond Dean L., 109 A.D.2d 87, 90 (N.Y.  App. Div. 1985)3; 
In re John Henry Rich, IV, 604 P.2d 1248, 1252–1253 (Okla. 1979); In re A.P., 692 A.2d 240, 
243–244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Najar v. Oman, 624 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App. 1981); State ex 
rel. M.A.V. v. Vargas, 736 P.2d 1031, 1033–1034 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Darrow v. State, 649 
P.2d 858, 861 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).   
 
Other courts have found that parents are afforded an even higher due process right than 
merely being represented and the opportunity for testimony via deposition.  Nebraska followed 
the North Dakota model and established criteria to aid its trial courts in determining whether to 
allow a parent‘s attendance at a termination of parental rights hearing.  Nebraska wrote that 
courts should consider trial delay, expense on the State in transporting the parents, potential 
danger or security risk which may occur, the reasonable availability of the parent‘s testimony by 
other means, and the best interest of the child.  In re L.V., 482 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb. 1992).  
Other courts have followed Nebraska‘s lead and found extra protections, such as the right to 
review transcripts, right to appear via telephone, and even bifurcating of the trial to allow 
counsel and parent additional time.   E.J.S. v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Servs., 754 P.2d 
749, 752 (Alaska 1988); In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 32 (Del. 1995); In re Randy Scott B., 511 
A.2d 450, 453–454 (Me. 1986); Adoption of Edmund, 739 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000); In re Vasquez, 501 N.W.2d 231, 234–235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); In re Baby K., 722 A.2d 
470, 472–474  (N.H. 1998); State, ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dept. v. Ruth Anne E., 
                                                 
3 We note that in this matter, the father was unable to attend the termination hearing due to a physical disability.  
However, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division analogized this case with several of the incarcerated 
parents cases that are cited herein. 
13 
 
974 P.2d 164, 168–171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. v. Stevens, 786 P.2d 
1296, 1299 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); State ex rel. Jaenette H. v. Pancake, 529 S.E.2d 865, (W. Va. 
2000); In re Christopher D., 530 N.W.2d 34, 42 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).  We also note that a recent 
Kansas opinion overturned an adoption which resulted in the termination of a father‘s right 
because he was not transported even though he was incarcerated in-state.  In re Adoption of 
B.J.M. 209 P.3d 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).   
 
We believe West Virginia has outlined a very practical test, which we now adopt.  
Whether or not an incarcerated parent is permitted to attend a termination of parental rights 
hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court judge.  In exercising that discretion,  
the trial court judge should balance the following factors:  (1) The delay resulting 
from parental attendance; (2) the need for an early determination of the matter; (3) 
the elapsed time during which the proceeding has been pending; (4) the best 
interests of the child(ren) in reference to the parent‘s physical attendance at the 
termination hearing; (5) the reasonable availability of the parent‘s testimony 
through a means other than his or her attendance at the hearing4; (6) the interests 
of the incarcerated parent in presenting his or her testimony in person rather than 
by alternate means; (7) the affect of the parent‘s presence and personal 
participation in the proceedings upon the probability of his or her ultimate success 
on the merits; (8) the cost and inconvenience of transporting a parent from his or 
her place of incarceration to the courtroom; (9) any potential danger or security 
risk which may accompany the incarcerated parent‘s transportation to or presence 
at the proceedings; (10) the inconvenience or detriment to parties or witnesses; 
and (11) any other relevant factors. 
State of West Virginia ex rel. Jaenette H., 529 S.E.2d at 877 (W.Va. 2000).   
 
A blanket order prohibiting transporting a prisoner to a termination hearing is frought 
with danger.  If the trial courts were allowed to hide behind such a blanket order, on review our 
appellate courts would be left with little to no information, forcing them to surmise why the trial 
court issued the order.  This is not good policy.  However, in the case at bar, the trial court would 
have arrived at the conclusion to not transport the mother, as we have previously discussed.   
                                                 
4 We note in the record that the Marion County Juvenile Center has video equipment allowing for videoconferencing 
of incarcerated parents if the parents are in a facility that also has videoconferencing equipment.  Although the IT 
Manager for the Juvenile Center testified the Indiana Supreme Court did not approve of the Center using this 
equipment, (―I know that video court is not an approved method‖), the use of videoconferencing equipment can be 
used in termination proceedings, subject to the provisions of Indiana Administrative Rule 14.  
14 
 
D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or 
judge witness credibility.  Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 
147 (Ind. 2005).  We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most 
favorable to the judgment.  Id.  We apply a two-tiered standard of review when reviewing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in a termination case.  We first determine whether the 
evidence supports the findings, and second we determine if the findings support the judgment.  
Page v. Greene County Dep‘t of Welfare, 564 N.E.2d 956, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).  We set 
aside the trial court‘s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.  In re B.C., 441 N.E.2d 208, 211 
(Ind. 1982).  A judgment is ―clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court‘s 
conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.‖  In re R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  If the evidence and inferences support the trial court‘s decision, we must 
affirm.  In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).   
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the traditional 
right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.  In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.  A parent‘s interest in the care, custody, and control of their 
children is ―perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.‖  Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  The parent-child relationship is ―one of the most valued relationships in our 
culture.‖  Tillotson v. Clay County Dep‘t of Family & Children, 777 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1002), trans. denied.  However, parental rights are not absolute, and may be terminated 
―when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.‖  In re D.D., 
804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.   
In seeking an involuntary termination of parental rights, the State must prove in relevant 
part the following: 
(B) There is a reasonable probability that: 
i. The conditions that resulted in the child‘s removal or the 
reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not 
be remedied; or 
15 
 
ii. The continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat 
to the well-being of the child; 
(C) Termination is in the best interests of the child; and 
(D) 
 There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. 
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b) (2008).  The State must prove the allegations by ―clear and convincing 
evidence.‖  Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (2008).   
 
Mother challenges the evidence that supports several of the trial court‘s findings of fact.  
Mother first argues that the evidence does not support the finding that ―[a] diligent inquiry to 
find and serve Mother was made to no avail, and service of the CHINS action was made upon 
her by publication.‖  We disagree.  As previously discussed, upon learning Mother had been 
arrested in Utah, FCM 1 contacted jails in Utah and did not find her.  By this time, Mother had 
been transported to Henderson, Kentucky.  FCM 1 had no way of knowing Mother would be 
located there.  FCM 1 further checked with the Marion County Jail, Indiana Department of 
Corrections, two DCS databases, and the local phone directory.  When FCM 2 took over the 
case, he made similar searches as FCM 1 did.  At this time, FCM 2 still had no reason to know 
Mother was located in Henderson, Kentucky.  This evidence is sufficient to support the trial 
court‘s finding.   
 
Mother challenges the evidence does not support the finding that ―Mother sent two more 
letters to [DCS] with names of possible placement for [Child].  By this time, [Child] was in an 
appropriate foster home and relatives who were contacted were not interested in going through 
the process for placement.‖  We agree with the Court of Appeals analysis.  The finding is 
misleading because Child‘s aunt contacted FCM 2.  FCM 2 did not initiate the contact.  
However, we find that misstatement harmless because the crux of the finding is that the aunt was 
not interested in going through the process for placement.  FCM 2 informed the aunt that she 
would need to come to Indianapolis and undergo a background check, and she was unwilling to 
do so.  We find the trial court‘s error to be harmless, and find sufficient evidence to support the 
finding.   
 
Mother challenges the evidence does not support the finding that ―Mother thinks she will 
be sentenced to ten (10) years of incarceration.‖  Again, we agree with the Court of Appeals 
16 
 
analysis.  Mother acknowledged twice that she was told she had a ten–year sentence.  Mother 
first stated, ―[t]hey told me it was ten years for conspiracy.‖  Later, she again said, ―I was told 
that I could be there for ten years for conspiracy.‖  To the best of Mother‘s knowledge, she 
would be serving ten years.  We find sufficient evidence to support the finding.   
 
Mother challenges the trial court‘s findings regarding Child‘s therapy.  Those findings 
are 
 
12.  [Child] is currently in therapy, working on four issues:  1) processing her sexual 
abuse, 2) abandonment by her mother, 3) insecurity and 4) adjustment in her current placement. 
 
13.  [Child] has made much progress on issues with the exception of the sexual abuse, an 
issue that she is not ready to address but needs to be in the future. 
 
14.  [Child] has been placed with foster parents since April 2008, and the foster parents 
are willing to adopt her.  [Child‘s] needs are being met, including most importantly, her need for 
continued therapy. 
 
Mother claims Child‘s therapeutic needs are not being met based on the therapist‘s 
qualifications.  We disagree.  The therapist testified to having limited experience working with 
child sex abuse victims but felt she could address Child‘s current therapeutic needs.  The 
therapist also stated if Child needed therapy beyond her ability, she would refer Child to 
someone else.  Therapist testified she planned on continuing to work with Child.  We find the 
evidence supports the trial court‘s findings that Child‘s therapeutic needs are being met.   
 
Finally, Mother challenges finding 18, which states: 
Termination of the parent-child relationship is in [Child‘s] best interests.  
Reunification is not possible.  Termination, providing the opportunity for a 
subsequent adoption, would accomplish the goal for [Child] to be granted a 
permanent home in a loving and stable environment, where she has integrated and 
bonded, and will have her physical and therapeutic needs met.  It would be 
harmful to [Child] if she were removed from her current placement, and could set 
her back in her therapy.  It is not disputed that Mother loves her daughter.  
However, Mother is unavailable to parent and [Child‘s] interests in moving 
forward toward permanency are tantamount to Mother‘s parental rights being left 
in tact [sic].   
 
The record reflects FCM 2 stated that giving Mother more time to work toward 
reunification would not give Child a sense of permanency and would not be in her best interest.  
17 
 
FCM 2 further stated Child has bonded with her foster family, and it would be in her best interest 
for the termination to be granted.   
 
Child‘s Guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that Child needed permanency and granting 
termination would provide permanency for child.  GAL further testified that Child was very 
bonded with her foster mother.  We find the evidence in this case supported the trial court‘s 
findings that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child‘s best interests.   
Conclusion 
 
In this case, several errors were made by DCS which should not have been made.  
However, none of the errors rose to the level of violating Mother‘s due process rights or 
warranting reversal.  Therefore, we affirm the order of the trial court terminating Mother‘s 
parental rights.  We also set forth the above mentioned factors for our trial courts to determine 
whether an incarcerated parent is permitted to attend a hearing on the termination of his or her 
parental rights.   
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.