Title: State v. Thomas A. Greve
Citation: 2004 WI 69
Docket Number: 2002AP002332-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

2004 WI 69 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2332-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Thomas A. Greve,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by 
Shunette T. Campbell, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Jeffrey 
J. De La Rosa and Seymour, Kremer, Nommensen, Morrissy & Koch, 
L.L. P., Elkhorn, and oral argument by Jeffrey De La Rosa. 
 
 
2004 WI 69 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2332-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 151) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas A. Greve,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County, Michael S. Gibbs, Judge.   Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   This case is before us on 
certification from the court of appeals.  The three certified 
questions arise from an interlocutory appeal filed by the State 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2 and 3 (2001-02),1 due to 
an order of the Walworth County Circuit Court, Michael S. Gibbs 
presiding, denying the State's motion to admit portions of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
2 
 
defendant Thomas A. Greve's sentencing memorandum2 into evidence 
at trial.  The certified questions are: 
(1) Whether State v. Crowell, 149 Wis. 2d 859, 440 
N.W.2d 352 (1989), construing Wis. Stat. § 972.15 as 
limiting 
the 
use 
of 
a 
court-ordered 
presentence 
investigation report (PSI) to postconviction settings, also 
applies to a defendant's sentencing memorandum. 
(2) Whether a defendant's constitutional right to due 
process is violated when his sentencing memorandum is used 
in a subsequent criminal trial. 
(3) Whether 
a 
defendant's 
sentencing 
memorandum 
should be kept confidential, as a matter of public policy. 
¶2 
The majority opinion concludes that neither Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.15 nor our decision in Crowell applies to a defendant's 
sentencing memorandum.  A plurality of the court concludes that 
a defendant's constitutional right to due process will not be 
violated by use of his or her sentencing memorandum in a 
                                                 
2 A defendant's sentencing memorandum has many names (e.g., 
defense presentencing report, defense presentence investigation 
report, defense PSI).  Marcia G. Shein, Sentencing Defense 
Manual:  Advocacy/Practice/Procedure, § 4.1, 4-2 (West Group 
1998).  We will refer to any such document as a "sentencing 
memorandum." 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
3 
 
subsequent criminal trial;3 and the majority concludes that 
public 
policy 
considerations 
do 
not 
support 
extending 
a 
confidentiality 
requirement 
to 
a 
defendant's 
sentencing 
memorandum.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The State, by amended information, charged Thomas A. 
Greve with two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child 
as a persistent repeater.4  Greve later pled guilty to a single 
charge of first-degree sexual assault of a child, but without 
the persistent repeater enhancement.  In preparation for 
sentencing, Greve filed a sentencing memorandum, prepared by a 
clinical social worker, in which he is quoted as making 
incriminating statements about the crime of which he was 
convicted.   
                                                 
3 Justice N. Patrick Crooks, who writes in concurrence, 
would not decide whether there is a constitutional right of 
allocution under either the state or federal constitution.  The 
dissent, written by Justice David T. Prosser and joined by Chief 
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, 
does 
not 
decide 
that 
constitutional 
question 
either.  
Accordingly, this portion of the opinion, ¶¶25–34, is a 
plurality decision, and the concurrence and the dissent refer to 
it as the "lead opinion." 
4 The amended information alleged that Greve violated Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1), which statute criminalizes as a felony sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not yet 
attained 13 years of age.  In addition, the State alleged that 
Greve was a persistent repeater, having been convicted on 
November 10, 1982, of indecent liberties with a child in an 
Illinois case.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m) (defining a 
persistent repeater).      
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
4 
 
¶4 
The 
circuit 
court 
imposed 
a 
40-year 
sentence, 
consisting of a 25-year term of confinement followed by a 15-
year period of extended supervision.  However, the court of 
appeals 
reversed 
Greve's 
conviction, 
based 
on 
improper 
involvement of a substituted judge in the circuit court 
proceeding, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
¶5 
On remand, the State filed a motion in limine, 
requesting 
to 
use 
the 
incriminating 
portions 
of 
Greve's 
sentencing memorandum at a subsequent trial.  The circuit court 
denied the motion, concluding that Wis. Stat. § 972.15 and 
Crowell prohibit use of Greve's sentencing memorandum at a 
subsequent trial.  The State appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the three questions set out above.5  We accepted 
certification. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶6 
This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.15.  The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  State v. T.J. Int'l, Inc., 2001 WI 76, 
¶20, 244 Wis. 2d 481, 628 N.W.2d 774; State ex. rel. Angela M.W. 
v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997); 
Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. 
Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 
(1996). 
                                                 
5 The trial, therefore, has not been rescheduled pending our 
decisions on the certified questions. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
5 
 
¶7 
We 
are 
also 
required 
to 
apply 
constitutional 
principles to a set of facts.  That too presents a question of 
law that we review de novo.  State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶19, 243 
Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712; State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶¶26-
27, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568; State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 
5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.   
B. 
Sentencing Background 
¶8 
In order to explain our answers to the questions 
presented, we first review relevant general principles.  At 
sentencing, the circuit court has a dual responsibility:  to the 
person it is about to sentence and to the public that the 
criminal laws protect.  State v. Heffran, 129 Wis. 2d 156, 163, 
384 N.W.2d 351 (1986); Neely v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 330, 334, 177 
N.W.2d 79 (1970); State v. Perez, 170 Wis. 2d 130, 140, 487 
N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d 380, 
384-85, 330 N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1983).  In order to meet its 
responsibility, the circuit court accepts information about the 
defendant, his or her personality, social circumstances and 
general patterns of behavior to aid it in rendering "an 
intelligent and informed judgment regarding the appropriate 
penalty under the circumstances."  Heffran, 129 Wis. 2d at 163-
64; see also Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d at 385 (noting that "[h]ighly 
relevant, if not essential, to [the court's] selection of an 
appropriate 
sentence 
is 
the 
possession 
of 
the 
fullest 
information 
possible 
concerning 
the 
defendant's 
life 
and 
characteristics"); Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 
N.W.2d 69 (1975) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that all 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
6 
 
information relevant to sentencing should be brought to the 
attention 
of 
the 
trial 
judge"). 
 
Moreover, 
"the 
entire 
sentencing process is to be a search for the truth and an 
evaluation of alternatives."  Farrar v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 651, 
657, 191 N.W.2d 214 (1971); see also State v. McQuay, 154 
Wis. 2d 116, 130, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990).   
¶9 
A PSI is one "means through which the sentencing court 
receives information" about a defendant, Heffran, 129 Wis. 2d at 
163-64, and it is "intended to assist the sentencing court in 
determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed in 
the particular case."  Id. at 163 (citation omitted).  See also 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27 (Mar., 2004) (stating the "primary 
purpose of the presentence investigation report is to provide 
the sentencing court with accurate and relevant information upon 
which to base its sentencing decision"); Crowell, 149 Wis. 2d at 
868 (explaining that a PSI is prepared to provide the sentencing 
court with "a reliable information base" in order to assist it 
in reaching "rational and consistent sentencing"). 
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15 provides that, after a felony 
conviction, the court "may" order a presentence investigation 
prepared by the department of corrections.  Section 972.15(1).  
However, a PSI is not required prior to sentencing.  Bruneau v. 
State, 77 Wis. 2d 166, 174, 252 N.W.2d 347 (1977) (stating that 
a PSI is not constitutionally or statutorily required) (citing 
Weatherall v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 22, 242 N.W.2d 220 (1976) and 
Sprang v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 679, 218 N.W.2d 304 (1974)).  The 
recommendations in a PSI are not binding on the court.  McQuay, 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
7 
 
154 Wis. 2d at 131.  PSIs, ordered pursuant to § 972.15(1), are 
prepared by department of corrections staff.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 328.27(2).  The staff member acts on behalf of an 
independent judiciary, and does not act as an agent of the 
State.  McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d at 133.  In order to be reliable, 
the PSI must be prepared by one who is neutral and independent 
of both the prosecution and the defense.  Perez, 170 Wis. 2d at 
140-41.   
¶11 All court-ordered PSIs contain the same categories of 
information.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27.  They are required 
to review the defendant's present offense, prior criminal 
record, 
prior 
correctional 
institution 
record, 
victim's 
statement, family information and personal history.  Id. at 
(3)(a).  A PSI "shall contain information about the offender's 
present situation," including any pending charges.  Id. at 
(3)(b).  It "shall . . . include[]" the writer's recommendation 
for 
sentencing 
and 
the 
reasoning 
supportive 
of 
that 
recommendation, unless the court has otherwise stated, id. at 
(3)(c), and a tentative corrections plan, unless waived by the 
staff member's supervisor.  Id. at (3)(d).  The defendant has a 
right to challenge any statement in the PSI that he or she 
believes is inaccurate or incomplete.  State v. Watson, 227 
Wis. 2d 167, 194, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999). 
¶12 In recent years, some defense counsel have submitted 
sentencing memoranda prior to sentencing.  Those memoranda are 
similar in content to court-ordered PSIs.  Marcia G. Shein, 
Sentencing Defense Manual:  Advocacy/Practice/Procedure, § 4.2, 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
8 
 
4-7 (West Group 1998).  However, a defendant's sentencing 
memoranda has no prescribed format or requisite inclusions, and 
it is prepared by a person advocating on behalf of the 
defendant.  See John L. Carroll, The Defense Lawyer's Role in 
the Sentencing Process:  You've Got to Accentuate the Positive 
and Eliminate the Negative, 37 Mercer L. Rev. 981, 1000-01 
(1986) [hereinafter The Defense Lawyer's Role in the Sentencing 
Process].   
C. 
Greve's and the State's Positions 
¶13 Greve contends that the contents of his sentencing 
memorandum cannot be used in a subsequent trial.  In order to 
prevail, 
he 
must 
establish 
either 
a 
statutory 
or 
a 
constitutional right that precludes the use of his statements.  
Greve raises both theories.  He contends that Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.15 is the statutory basis because in Crowell we concluded 
that a PSI prepared under § 972.15 could not be used in a trial 
subsequent to Crowell's plea withdrawal.  Greve argues that 
because we concluded in Crowell that § 972.15 prevents the 
subsequent use of a court-ordered PSI, and a defendant's 
sentencing memorandum serves the same purpose as a court-ordered 
PSI, § 972.15 protects his sentencing memorandum too.  The State 
argues that both the statute and Crowell apply only to court-
ordered PSIs. 
¶14 To support his constitutional argument, Greve contends 
that at sentencing, a defendant has a due process right:  (1) to 
be sentenced on the basis of true and correct information; and 
(2) to allocution.  He cites State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
9 
 
772, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992); Bruneau, 77 Wis. 2d at 174-75; and 
Perez, 
170 
Wis. 2d 
at 
138. 
 
He 
contends 
that 
neither 
constitutional right can be fully exercised by a defendant if 
the statements that are made to whomever prepares his sentencing 
memorandum are not suppressed.  The State does not parse whether 
Greve has a due process right to allocution, but it agrees that 
Greve does have a due process right to be sentenced on the basis 
of accurate information.  However, it contends that any 
constitutional right Greve has is not affected by subsequent use 
of his sentencing memorandum, which the State characterizes as 
an advocacy document. 
D. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15 
¶15 In order to decide whether Wis. Stat. § 972.15 and 
Crowell provide support for Greve's position, we begin with an 
examination of the provisions of § 972.15.  Section 972.15 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) After a conviction the court may order a 
presentence investigation, except that the court may 
order an employee of the department [of corrections] 
to conduct a presentence investigation only after a 
conviction for a felony. 
(2) When a presentence investigation report has 
been received the judge shall disclose the contents of 
the report to the defendant's attorney and to the 
district attorney prior to sentencing.  When the 
defendant is not represented by an attorney, the 
contents shall be disclosed to the defendant. 
 . . .  
(3) The judge may conceal the identity of any 
person who provided information in the presentence 
investigation report. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
10 
 
(4) After sentencing, unless otherwise authorized 
under 
sub. 
(5) 
or 
ordered 
by 
the 
court, 
the 
presentence investigation report shall be confidential 
and shall not be made available to any person except 
upon specific authorization of the court. 
(5) 
The 
department 
may 
use 
the 
presentence 
investigation report for correctional programming, 
parole consideration or care and treatment of any 
person sentenced . . . .  
¶16 We turn our attention to the PSI described in Wis. 
Stat. § 972.15 to determine whether that description includes 
all sentencing memoranda or only those that are court-ordered.  
We note that the "purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__ N.W.2d __.  The meaning of the words chosen by the 
legislature is the initial focus of statutory interpretation.  
As we have explained, "We assume that the legislature's intent 
is expressed in the statutory language."  Id., ¶44.  We begin by 
giving that language its plain and ordinary meaning.  Id., ¶45.  
We are aided in ascertaining the meaning by the statutory 
context in which words are placed.  Id., ¶46.  If the statute's 
meaning is clear on its face, we need go no further; we simply 
apply it.  Id., ¶45.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that § 972.15 applies only to court-ordered PSIs. 
¶17 The confidentiality afforded to court-ordered PSIs 
under Wis. Stat. § 972.15 that Greve seeks for his sentencing 
memorandum is contained within subsection (4).  It provides that 
"the 
presentence 
investigation 
report 
shall 
be 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
11 
 
confidential . . . ."  In order to construe how inclusive the 
legislature meant this subsection to be, we examine the 
statutory context in which "presentence investigation" is used.  
Kalal, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶45. 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15(1) begins by suggesting that 
if sentencing for a felony conviction is to occur, "the court 
may order a presentence investigation" to be completed by the 
department of corrections.  However, the court is not required 
to do so.  Therefore, the creation of the PSI referenced in 
subsection (1) is within the control of the court, not the State 
or the defendant.  Furthermore, the PSI of subsection (1) cannot 
include a defendant's sentencing memorandum because a defendant 
would have no authority to "order" the department of corrections 
to make such a report. 
¶19 Additionally, subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. § 972.15 
does not give a defendant the independent right to be provided 
with the PSI unless he or she is unrepresented by counsel, and 
it also requires the court to disclose the PSI to defendant's 
counsel.  Therefore, this subsection could not refer to a 
defendant's sentencing 
memorandum, 
as 
that 
document 
would 
already be available to defendant and his or her counsel.   
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15(3) permits the judge to 
conceal the identity of those who provide information for the 
report.  Therefore, once again, this subsection could not 
include a defendant's sentencing memorandum as the defendant 
would 
know 
who 
had 
provided 
information. 
 
And 
finally, 
subsection (5) permits the department of corrections to use the 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
12 
 
PSI for correctional programming and other functions of the 
department, as an exception to the confidentiality requirements 
of subsection (4).  We conclude that the legislature would not 
have 
intended 
that 
the 
department 
of 
corrections 
use 
a 
sentencing memorandum to carry out its functions when it had no 
basis for knowing whether the information it contained was true 
and correct.  Rather, we conclude the legislature referred only 
to a court-ordered PSI in subsection (5).  Therefore, in order 
to arrive at the conclusion Greve asks that we reach, we would 
have to conclude that subsection (4) refers to documents in 
addition to those described in the other subsections of 
§ 972.15.  However, nothing in the plain wording of subsection 
(4) or of any other subsection of § 972.15 indicates that is 
what the legislature intended.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the plain language of § 972.15 refers only to court-ordered PSIs 
and does not refer to a defendant's sentencing memorandum. 
¶21 Greve also argues that even if the legislature did not 
intend that privately prepared sentencing memoranda should be 
included with the PSIs described in Wis. Stat. § 972.15, our 
decision in Crowell should be extended to defendants' sentencing 
memoranda because they serve the same purpose as court-ordered 
PSIs.  Greve argues that Crowell is broadly written, and 
therefore is elastic enough to be expanded to apply its concepts 
to a defendant's sentencing memorandum.  We conclude that 
Crowell is a statutory interpretation case and cannot be 
expanded to a defendant's sentencing memorandum not described in 
the statute.  
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
13 
 
¶22 Crowell pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault.  A 
second count was dismissed and read in for sentencing purposes.  
The 
court 
accepted 
Crowell's 
guilty 
plea 
and 
ordered 
a 
presentence investigation.  Crowell, 149 Wis. 2d at 862.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the court read a letter from the victim's 
father in which the father demanded that Crowell be tested for 
AIDS and that the family be notified of the results of that 
test.  Id.  The court, over Crowell's objection, ordered a blood 
test.  Id.  Crowell then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and 
the court granted that motion.  Id.  At the subsequent trial, 
the State introduced testimony from the probation and parole 
officer who met with Crowell following his initial conviction as 
part of her preparation of a presentence investigation report.  
The officer testified what Crowell had told her about the sexual 
assault.  Id. at 862-63.  Crowell was convicted of two counts of 
first-degree sexual assault.  Id. at 862.  He appealed his 
conviction, arguing that Wis. Stat. § 972.15 prohibited the 
State's use of the probation and parole officer's testimony at 
trial.  Id. at 866.  Our interpretation of § 972.15 caused us to 
agree with Crowell.  We explained: 
When we look to the purpose of a presentence 
investigation report, however, it becomes clear that 
the legislature did not intend that the information 
collected for the report or the report itself be used 
at trial if the defendant withdraws the guilty plea. 
Id. at 868.   
¶23 One of the reasons we concluded that the legislature 
intended to preclude a later use of the PSI was to ensure the 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
14 
 
continued 
cooperation 
of 
defendants 
in 
the 
presentence 
investigation process.  Id. at 869.  "The quality and accuracy 
of the presentence investigation report, [and therefore its 
helpfulness to the court], depend in large measure on the 
cooperation 
of 
the 
defendant." 
 
Id. 
 
A 
defendant 
who 
communicates openly with the department of corrections staff 
member responsible for the investigation and report will provide 
more information and more honest information.  If a defendant 
realizes that what he or she says during the presentence 
investigation will be used against him or her in some way later, 
the defendant will be reticent to be open and forthcoming.  Id. 
¶24 A second reason we concluded that the legislature 
intended the PSI not be used in establishing guilt involved the 
timing of the PSI.  A presentence investigation cannot be 
ordered, and the report is not prepared or disclosed, until 
after conviction.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.15(1).  By limiting the 
investigation and report to postconviction proceedings, we avoid 
prejudicing the fact finder.  Id. at 870 (citing Rosado, 70 
Wis. 2d at 286); see also Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489 
(1969) (addressing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, a counterpart to Wis. 
Stat. § 972.15). 
¶25 Because neither Wis. Stat. § 972.15 nor Crowell apply 
to a defendant's sentencing memorandum, we answer the first 
certified question in the negative. 
E. 
Constitutional Issues 
¶26 The second certified question requires us to examine 
whether a defendant's constitutional right to due process is 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
15 
 
violated when the State introduces inculpatory statements made 
during the preparation of a sentencing memorandum, at a 
subsequent trial.  Greve's due process arguments are two-fold:  
(1) that he has a constitutional right to be sentenced on true 
and correct information and his sentencing memorandum is 
necessary in order to afford him that right; and (2) that he has 
a constitutional right to allocution that he has exercised 
through 
the 
filing 
of 
a 
sentencing 
memorandum, 
which 
constitutional right will be chilled if his statements can be 
used in a subsequent trial.   
¶27 A defendant has a due process right to be sentenced on 
true and correct information.  See Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 772; 
Bruneau, 77 Wis. 2d at 174-75; Perez, 170 Wis. 2d at 138.  The 
court-ordered PSI is the cornerstone of that information.  See 
The Defense Lawyer's Role in the Sentencing Process, supra, at 
988 (explaining that the presentence investigation report is a 
"primary source of information" about the defendant and his or 
her background).  A defendant has the right to be present at 
sentencing and to object to incorrect or incomplete information 
contained within the PSI.  Watson, 227 Wis. 2d at 193-94.   
¶28 Greve does not explain why the addition of his 
sentencing memorandum will cause the court to more easily 
recognize any inaccuracy in the PSI than his defense counsel's 
questioning at sentencing could achieve.  He seems to contend 
that the court will have more complete information through the 
use of his sentencing memorandum; therefore, that memorandum 
should receive the same protected status as a court-ordered PSI.  
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
16 
 
However, if a defendant's sentencing memorandum were to achieve 
the same status as a court-ordered PSI, a defendant may be less 
likely to be forthcoming with a department of corrections staff 
member over whom he or she has no control.  This could cause the 
sentencing court to have more limited information available to 
it in the PSI.  Therefore, the court may be forced to rely on a 
defense advocacy document for sentencing.  While such a shift in 
court reliance may serve a defendant's purposes, the sentencing 
court must serve the public interest as well.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that confidentiality for statements a defendant makes 
in the course of the preparation of his or her sentencing 
memorandum is not necessary to assure that a defendant will be 
sentenced based on accurate information.  
¶29 Greve also contends that introduction at a subsequent 
trial of inculpatory statements he is quoted as making in his 
sentencing 
memorandum 
violates 
his 
due 
process 
right 
of 
allocution.  He does not identify whether this is a federal 
constitutional right or a state constitutional right.  However, 
he relies on our opinions in Borrell, where we said, "A 
defendant has three due process rights at sentencing:  (1) to be 
present at the hearing and to be afforded the right to 
allocution . . . ," Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 772, and in Bruneau, 
where we said, "The federal cases indicate that a defendant's 
due-process rights at a sentencing hearing are three in number:  
(1) To be present at the hearing and to be afforded the right of 
allocution . . . ."  Bruneau, 77 Wis. 2d at 174.   
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
17 
 
¶30 In Bruneau, we based our assertion of a constitutional 
due process right of allocution on federal law, and we cited 
United States v. Murphy, 530 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1976) and Green v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961) to support our conclusion.  
Bruneau, 77 Wis. 2d at 174 n.2.6  However, the conclusion we drew 
from Murphy and Green was erroneous.  Neither case mentions a 
due process right of allocution that arises under the United 
States Constitution.  Both cases focus solely on the federal 
statutory right found in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.  Additionally, the 
United States Supreme Court decided in Hill v. United States, 
368 U.S. 424 (1962), that the failure to accord a defendant a 
right of allocution before imposing sentence "is neither 
jurisdictional nor constitutional."  Id. at 428.   
¶31 Borrell relied on Bruneau for its assertion that at 
sentencing a defendant has a due process right of allocution.  
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 772.  Therefore, Borrell was referring 
to the same nonexistent federal due process right we cited in 
Bruneau.  Even though those statements were dicta in both 
Borrell and Bruneau, they have caused confusion in other 
Wisconsin courts.  See State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423, 447, 
554 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1996) (explaining the confusion caused 
by the dicta in Bruneau); State v. Turner, 200 Wis. 2d 168, 177, 
546 N.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that the right of 
allocution is purely statutory in Wisconsin and it is contained 
                                                 
6 We also cited Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 as the source of the 
federal statutory right of allocution. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
18 
 
in Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2)).  Therefore, given the clear 
statement by the United States Supreme Court in Hill, we clarify 
our opinions in both Borrell and Bruneau, and all cases7 that 
relied on them for a federal constitutional right of allocution, 
by withdrawing the language that implies there is a due process 
right of allocution under the federal constitution, in all 
circumstances.8 
                                                 
7 See State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 562 n.24, 468 
N.W.2d 676 (1991) (citing Bruneau v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 166, 174-
75, 252 N.W.2d 347 (1977), in dicta, as authority for a due 
process right of allocution at sentencing); State v. Varnell, 
153 Wis. 2d 334, 340, 450 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Bruneau and Currie v. Schwalbach, 139 Wis. 2d 544, 565, 407 
N.W.2d 862 (1987) (a summary contempt case) as authority for a 
due process right of allocution); State v. Peters, 2000 WI App 
154, ¶13 n.13, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655, reversed on 
other grounds, 2001 WI 74, 244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797 
(citing Varnell as authority for a federal due process right of 
allocution); State v. Koopmans, 202 Wis. 2d 385, 397, 550 N.W.2d 
715 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Varnell when it refers to a due 
process right to allocution at sentencing).  There are also 
numerous unpublished cases using the same chain of authority for 
a due process right of allocution assertedly protected by the 
United States Constitution.  
8 A few federal courts have identified a due process right 
of allocution when a defendant requests it; state law does not 
provide for it and the court denies the defendant's request.  
See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1992).  
However, decisions of federal courts other than the Supreme 
Court do not bind this court when interpreting federal law.  
McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 157 Wis. 2d 250, 256-57, 458 
N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 
418, 426 n.4, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983)). 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
19 
 
¶32 We note that there is a line of cases bottomed in 
contempt proceedings where we discuss a right to speak in 
explanation or in mitigation of the act for which contempt was 
sought.  See, e.g., Oliveto v. Circuit Court for Crawford 
County, 194 Wis. 2d 418, 433-34, 533 N.W.2d 819 (1995); Currie 
v. Schwalbach, 139 Wis. 2d 544, 557-68, 407 N.W.2d 862 (1987).  
These cases are grounded in federal law and focus on what 
amount, if any, of procedural process is due in a summary 
contempt proceeding.  Currie, 139 Wis. 2d at 565.  As we 
explained in Oliveto, while relying on Currie: 
[T]he allocution requirement essentially provides a 
check on the heightened potential for abuse posed by 
the summary contempt power by providing an opportunity 
for the contemnor to apologize or to defend or explain 
the contumacious behavior.   
Oliveto, 194 Wis. 2d at 436 (citing Currie,9 139 Wis. 2d at 565). 
¶33 In Currie, we relied heavily on the reasoning in 
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972), for our conclusion that 
summary contempt usually requires a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard at some point in the proceedings.  Currie, 139 Wis. 2d at 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent aptly points out that the defendant in Hill v. 
United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), had not affirmatively 
requested allocution and been denied it.  Therefore, Hill could 
be read as reserving a decision under those facts for another 
day.  Dissent, ¶68.  That position may have merit. However, 
because Greve was asked by the sentencing court if he wished to 
speak and he personally exercised that right in open court 
before sentence was imposed, this case does not raise the issue 
that the dissent suggests the Supreme Court reserved in Hill. 
9 Oliveto v. Circuit Court for Crawford County, 194 Wis. 2d 
418, 533 N.W.2d 819 (1995), cites the Currie case as Contempt in 
State v. Dewerth; however, it is the identical case. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
20 
 
560.  In Groppi, the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
Groppi's conviction for legislative contempt and concluded that 
he had not received due process because he had had no hearing 
and did not get to speak to the charges levied.  The Supreme 
Court explained,  
In exercise of the right to be heard, however 
briefly, . . . the putative contemnor might establish, 
for example, that it was a case of mistaken identity, 
or, also by way of affirmative defense, that he was 
mentally incompetent.  Other matters in explanation or 
mitigation 
might 
lessen 
the 
harshness 
of 
the 
legislative judgment or avoid punishment altogether. 
Groppi, 404 U.S. at 503.  This chain of reasoning shows that the 
right to be heard in the context of summary contempt differs 
from that discussed solely in relationship to sentencing after a 
criminal conviction because decisions such as Groppi and Currie 
combine the right to speak in one's own defense against the 
charges brought, with speech in mitigation of punishment.  See 
also Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498-99 (1974) (concluding 
that a contempt proceeding requires reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to be heard except in the most extraordinary cases).  
Accordingly, discussions of a right to speak in the context of a 
contempt proceeding are a combination of opportunities to speak, 
i.e., the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to be heard 
as a defense against the contempt charges and the potential to 
speak in mitigation of the sentence, as codified by statute.  
Those cases do not support the conclusion that there is a 
federal or state constitutional right of allocution when 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
21 
 
sentencing subsequent to a criminal conviction is all that is 
before the court. 
¶34 Furthermore, we have never concluded that there is a 
due process right of allocution prior to sentencing after a 
criminal trial, that is grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
However, in Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 678, 183 N.W.2d 8 
(1971), we did address the question of whether a defendant is 
"deprived of a constitutional right" when a trial court fails 
"to ask the defendant before imposing sentence whether he had 
anything to say why sentence should not be imposed."  Id. at 
681.  In answering this question, we reviewed the development of 
the right of allocution from its origins in the common law to 
the right that is codified in Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2).  Id. at 
682.  We cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Hill, and we noted that Hill had concluded that any federal 
right of allocution is purely statutory.  Id. at 682-83.  We 
then held that the failure to ask a defendant whether he or she 
had anything to say before sentencing does not constitute 
reversible error, but we requested that trial courts comply with 
the statutory directive of § 972.14(2).  Id.  Therefore, 
although we were presented with the question of whether a 
violation of the right of allocution was a constitutional 
violation, we concluded it was a statutory violation.  No one 
has contended that Nicholas is not good law.  Accordingly, we 
decline to establish a right to allocution under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
22 
 
¶35 We note that the right of allocution at sentencing is 
set out in Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2), which states: 
Before pronouncing sentence, the court shall ask 
the defendant why sentence should not be pronounced 
upon him or her and allow the district attorney, 
defense counsel and defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement with respect to any matter relevant to the 
sentence. 
This statutory right permits a convicted defendant personally to 
make a statement in open court prior to sentencing.10  As we 
explained above, Greve fully exercised his statutory right of 
allocution in open court prior to the imposition of the sentence 
that resulted from his plea.  Possibly because of this, Greve 
does not contend that his statutory right was violated, 
requiring suppression of his statements.  Instead, he attempts 
to bootstrap a claimed "due process right" of allocution onto 
the statutory right, in an effort to protect out-of-court 
statements to a third party.  However, there is nothing in 
§ 972.14(2) that implies statements to third parties or out-of-
court statements were contemplated as part of the right of 
                                                 
10 The Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2) description of allocution as a 
personal statement by a convicted defendant is consistent with a 
common definition of allocution as an in-court statement 
personally made by a convicted defendant.  See, e.g.: 
Allocution: . . . An unsworn statement from a 
convicted defendant to the sentencing judge or jury in 
which the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his or 
her conduct, apologize for the crime, or say anything 
else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence. 
Black's Law Dictionary 75 (7th ed. 1999).  It is also consistent 
with the statutory statement for the federal right of allocution 
set out in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
23 
 
allocution, and the common law history underlying § 972.14(2) 
belies that assertion as well.11  Accordingly, a plurality of the 
court concludes that the right of allocution is that right set 
forth in § 972.14(2), and we answer the second certified 
question in the negative.     
F. 
Public Policy 
¶36 The third question certified by the court of appeals 
is whether a defendant's statements made during the preparation 
of his sentencing memorandum should be kept confidential as a 
matter of public policy.  As support for such a conclusion, 
Greve argues that some defendants are not comfortable talking 
with the department of corrections employees who conduct 
presentence investigations.  He says that court-ordered PSIs 
contain subjective components that are not always reliable.  He 
also 
asserts 
that 
not 
affording 
confidentiality 
to 
the 
statements a defendant makes to the preparer of the sentencing 
memorandum will hinder the flow of information to the sentencing 
court and have a detrimental effect on the sentencing court's 
ability to fashion a reliable and accurate sentence.  Lastly, he 
says 
that 
by 
affording 
confidentiality 
to 
a 
defendant's 
statement in the court-ordered PSI but not to a defendant's 
sentencing memorandum, we are encouraging inconsistent results. 
                                                 
11 See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) 
(explaining that a defendant's right to speak personally to the 
court before sentencing existed at English common law since at 
least 1689). 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
24 
 
¶37 The State counters that we should not afford Greve the 
remedy he seeks on public policy grounds.  It asserts that if 
Greve wants the court to have accurate and complete information, 
he can communicate with the department of corrections staff 
member who is assigned to prepare the report.  If he wants to 
take responsibility for his crime, he already has that avenue 
open to him in a venue that will provide that his statements are 
not used in the event of a subsequent trial, when he speaks with 
the preparer of the court-ordered PSI.  The State also asserts 
that it is only the court-ordered PSI that is objective; Greve's 
sentencing memorandum is an advocacy document prepared by 
someone Greve or his attorney hired.  We agree with the State.   
¶38 Additionally, as we mentioned above in ¶28, affording 
confidentiality to a defendant's statements made during the 
course of the preparation of his sentencing memorandum could 
actually have the effect of limiting the objective information 
available to the circuit court at sentencing.  A holding in 
Greve's favor could permit a defendant to be less forthcoming 
with the preparer of the court-ordered PSI in order to give more 
information and weight to his advocacy document.  Such a result 
is contrary to the public's interest. 
¶39 We conclude we have been presented with no public 
policy grounds sufficient to justify extending confidentiality 
to statements a defendant makes to the preparer of his or her 
sentencing memoranda.  We therefore answer the third certified 
question in the negative. 
No. 
02-2332-CR   
 
25 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 The majority opinion concludes that neither Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.15 nor our decision in Crowell applies to a defendant's 
sentencing memorandum.  A plurality of the court concludes that 
a defendant's constitutional right to due process will not be 
violated by use of his or her sentencing memorandum in a 
subsequent criminal trial; and the majority concludes that 
public 
policy 
considerations 
do 
not 
support 
extending 
a 
confidentiality 
requirement 
to 
a 
defendant's 
sentencing 
memorandum.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed. 
No.  02-2332-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶41 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I conclude that 
whether allocution is required by due process is not a 
dispositive issue in this case, because a private pre-sentence 
investigation and report or sentencing memorandum do not involve 
the right of allocution.  The lead opinion12 reaches the same 
conclusion, yet it goes on to decide, unnecessarily, the due 
process issue.  See lead op., ¶35.  I agree, however, with the 
decision of the lead opinion to reverse the Walworth County 
Circuit Court's decision to deny the State's motion to admit 
portions of the defendant's sentencing memorandum into evidence 
at his retrial on charges of first-degree sexual assault of a 
child.  
¶42 I write separately because I disagree with the lead 
opinion's decision to decide whether there is a constitutional 
right to allocution under either the United States or Wisconsin 
Constitutions.  See lead op., ¶¶25-34.  Such a decision on the 
constitutional issues is unnecessary, since it is clearly not 
material to the holding in this case.  I would wait to analyze 
whether there is a constitutional right to allocution, until a 
case involving the necessity to decide such issue is presented 
to this court. 
¶43 I further disagree with the lead opinion's decision to 
withdraw language from our decisions in State v. Borrell, 167 
                                                 
12 The opinion written by Justice Patience D. Roggensack is 
a lead opinion in regard to the constitutional issue concerning 
the right of allocution.  However, the opinion is a majority 
opinion with respect to the statutory interpretation issue. 
No.  02-2332-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d 749, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992) and Bruneau v. State, 77 
Wis. 2d 166, 252 N.W.2d 347 (1977).  See lead op., ¶31.  The 
decision to withdraw such language is questionable in regard to 
the United States Constitution because of the decisions of 
federal circuit courts, see, Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 
(9th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Murphy, 530 F.2d 1 (4th 
Cir. 1976), and the United States Supreme Court in Hill v. 
United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) and in Green v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961).  See also lead op., ¶31, n.7.  In 
the Wisconsin Constitution the right to due process is contained 
in Article I, § 8.13  Moreover, when read in conjunction with 
this state's recent constitutional amendment with respect to 
victim's rights, Article I, § 9(m),14 the conclusion that, in the 
                                                 
13 Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution states, in 
relevant part:  "No person may be held to answer for a criminal 
offense without due process of law . . . ." 
14 Article I, § 9(m) of the Wisconsin Constitution states, 
in relevant part: 
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by 
law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy.  This state shall ensure that crime victims 
have all of the following privileges and protections 
as provided by law:  timely disposition of the case; 
the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from 
the accused throughout the criminal justice process; 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to 
confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a 
statement to the court at disposition; restitution; 
compensation; and information about the outcome of the 
case and the release of the accused.  The legislature 
shall provide remedies for the violation of this 
section.  Nothing in this section, or in any statute 
enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any 
No.  02-2332-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
future, we may hold that there is such a right to allocution 
under the Wisconsin Constitution becomes, I believe, a strong 
possibility, especially when considered in terms of equal 
protection, as well as due process. 
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
right of the accused which may be provided by law.  
(Emphasis added). 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶45 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  From time to 
time, this court needs to step back from the narrow disputes in 
a particular case to seek a broader perspective on the workings 
of our criminal justice system.  The court did this recently in 
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 678 N.W.2d 197, 
in which it underscored the vital need for sound discretion in 
sentencing in the wake of truth-in-sentencing legislation. 
¶46 Truth-in-sentencing imposes new responsibilities on a 
circuit court.  As a general rule, whenever a court sentences a 
person to imprisonment in a Wisconsin state prison, the court 
must impose a bifurcated sentence consisting of a fixed term of 
confinement followed by a fixed term of extended supervision.  
With few exceptions, these terms, once set, will not be altered.  
A person serving a bifurcated sentence is not eligible for 
parole.  This means that the traditional safety valve for a 
functionally excessive sentence has been removed. 
¶47 Thus, truth-in-sentencing creates added pressure for 
the court to produce a sentence that is reasonable, just, and 
rationally explained.  Such a sentence requires the court to 
have the best information available, delivered in a timely 
manner.  As we observed in Gallion, 
Because we recognize the difficulty in providing 
a reasoned explanation [for a sentence] in isolation, 
we encourage circuit courts to refer to information 
provided 
by 
others. 
 
Courts 
may 
use 
counsels' 
recommendations for the nature and duration of the 
sentence and the recommendations of the presentence 
report as touchstones in their reasoning. 
Id., ¶47. 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
¶48 There are portions of the lead opinion in this case 
that mesh perfectly with the concerns we expressed in Gallion.15  
See Lead op., ¶¶8, 9.  For instance, the lead opinion recognizes 
that the court must possess the "fullest information possible 
concerning 
the 
defendant's 
life 
and 
characteristics" 
to 
facilitate the selection of an appropriate sentence.  Lead op., 
¶8 (quoting State v. Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d 380, 385, 330 N.W.2d 242 
(Ct. App. 1983).16  But the lead opinion's ultimate conclusion is 
inconsistent with this sound policy, and that is the reason I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
 
¶49 Truth-in-sentencing is one of several evolving factors 
that affect contemporary sentencing.  As an example, in 
Wisconsin and throughout the country, there is a new emphasis on 
victims' rights.  Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution affords certain rights to victims of crime, 
including "the opportunity to make a statement to the court at 
disposition."  This constitutional provision is amplified in 
Wis. Stat. § 950.04. 
                                                 
15 The opinion of Justice Patience D. Roggensack is a lead 
opinion, ¶¶26-35, in regard to the constitutional issue of a due 
process right to allocution.  It is, however, the majority 
opinion 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 972.15 and in reversing the determination of the 
circuit court. 
16 See also State v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 146, 560 
N.W.2d 256 (1997) ("We conclude that a circuit court should have 
available to it all information relevant to determining the 
appropriate sentence."). 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
¶50 As a result, in a felony case the circuit court may 
receive a blizzard of information: (1) statements from the 
victim and/or the victim's friends and family; (2) other 
testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the state or 
defense; (3) a presentence investigation conducted by the 
Department of Corrections; (4) an oral presentation from the 
prosecutor; 
(5) 
argument 
and 
recommendation 
from 
defense 
counsel; and (6) allocution by the defendant.  At the conclusion 
of a sometimes emotional, sometimes confrontational sentencing 
hearing, the court faces the challenge of weighing all relevant 
information 
and 
then 
incorporating 
it 
into 
a 
reasoned, 
satisfactorily explained sentence.   
¶51 In 
reality, 
and 
by 
necessity, 
the 
court 
may 
contemplate the essence of both the sentence and its rationale 
before the hearing begins.17  Consequently, defense counsel would 
be 
foolish 
not 
to 
seek 
additional 
ways 
to 
effectively 
communicate the defendant's position to the court, and to 
communicate that position well before sentencing.  A sentencing 
memorandum from the defendant is a logical option. 
II 
¶52 A defendant's sentencing memorandum has no set format, 
but it is intended to serve at least two objectives.  First, it 
corrects any erroneous information or analysis in the court-
                                                 
17 "[A] proper exercise of discretion contemplates that a 
court will give advance thought to the particular crime, the 
criminal and the community."  State v. Varnell, 153 Wis. 2d 334, 
338, 450 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1989). 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
ordered presentence investigation (PSI), when there is a PSI and 
when the PSI is issued first.  Second, it accentuates mitigating 
factors about the defendant and the crime. 
¶53 An informative article about sentencing memoranda 
explains that: 
There 
is . . . neither 
a 
set 
format . . . nor 
a 
prescribed set of arguments that the attorney can 
make.  In some cases, the presentation in the 
[defendant's sentencing memorandum] will focus on the 
hardship of the defendant's life and environmental 
factors such as child abuse.  In others, the emphasis 
will be on the defendant's crime-free life and his 
contributions 
to 
society. 
 
No 
matter 
what 
the 
arguments . . . the defendant's lawyer must include a 
section on the defendant's background and history.  
Most of the mitigating circumstances will appear in 
this section, and, when appropriate, the section 
should include a defendant's version of the offense.  
Given the importance of expressions of remorse in the 
sentencing process, the section also should include 
candid remarks on the subject of remorse, and should 
explain why the defendant committed the criminal act. 
John L. Carroll, The Defense Lawyer's Role in the Sentencing 
Process: You've Got to Accentuate the Positive and Eliminate the 
Negative, 37 Mercer L. Rev. 981, 1000-01 (1986) (emphasis 
added). 
 
¶54 It is hard to dispute the article's advice that a 
defendant who wishes to influence the court at sentencing should 
attempt to explain his motivation, express his remorse, and 
apologize to his victim. 
III 
 
¶55 The issue presented in this case is whether a 
defendant's 
post-conviction 
statements, 
contained 
in 
a 
defendant's sentencing memorandum, relating to the offense of 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
which the defendant was convicted, may be used by the state as 
direct evidence against the defendant in a new trial for the 
same offense after the defendant successfully withdraws his plea 
or after the defendant's conviction of the offense is reversed. 
¶56 To my mind, this is an issue that requires us to step 
back and reflect upon coherent policy in our criminal justice 
system.   
¶57 My first premise is that a circuit court needs and 
benefits from useful, timely information as it prepares to 
sentence a criminal defendant. 
¶58 My second premise is that a defendant's sentencing 
memorandum can and should provide useful, timely information to 
the court.  Ideally, a sentencing memorandum should give the 
court insightful information about what makes a defendant tick, 
so that the court can properly calculate the defendant's 
prognosis for rehabilitation and need for punishment.  If 
defense counsel waits until the sentencing hearing to present 
mitigating evidence, it may be too little and too late. 
¶59 My third premise is that the majority severely 
disadvantages a defendant who wishes to file a sentencing 
memorandum with the court because it precludes the defendant 
from including any inculpatory statement about the offense in 
the 
memorandum 
without 
giving 
up 
use 
immunity 
for 
that 
inculpatory statement if there is a new trial.  Fear of having 
one's own truthful words used against him is bound to chill a 
defendant's candor and substantially nullify the usefulness of 
the memorandum.   
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
¶60 As I read the lead opinion, a defendant cannot repeat 
word-for-word to a person preparing his sentencing memorandum 
what he told the person preparing the PSI, without losing the 
protections of the PSI statement recognized in State v. Crowell, 
149 Wis. 2d 859, 440 N.W.2d 352 (1989).  Correspondingly, a 
defendant cannot (1) expand his discussion of the offense; (2) 
personally clarify error in the PSI's description of the 
offense; (3) explain his motivation for the offense; or (4) 
personally express apology and remorse for the offense without 
putting himself in jeopardy.  The logic of the lead opinion 
strips a defendant of use immunity even if he only quotes from 
his statement in the PSI because, unlike the PSI, the sentencing 
memorandum is not a confidential document.  In short, the 
majority sharply curtails a defendant's right to make his own 
case at sentencing. 
¶61 The State reassures us that the defendant can say 
everything he wants to say in the PSI and receive immunity for 
it.  This does not explain what the defendant should do if there 
is no PSI,18 or if the defendant forgets something until after he 
sees the written PSI, or if the PSI leaves something out or gets 
something wrong.  In State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 595 
N.W.2d 403 (1999), this court acknowledged that "some of the 
information in a PSI may be unverified and some of it may be 
inaccurate."  Id. at 194.  A defendant is entitled to be 
sentenced on the basis of true and correct information.   
                                                 
18 The lead opinion reiterates that "a PSI is not required 
prior to sentencing" (citing cases).  Lead op., ¶10. 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
¶62 In essence, the State contends that the defendant has 
no right to make the case for himself at sentencing in the way 
he wants to make it, unless he is willing to surrender his 
rights 
against 
self-incrimination 
if 
there 
is 
a 
second 
prosecution. 
¶63 The majority forces a defendant to choose between 
preserving the immunity for statements made in the PSI, or 
making the most effective case he can in his own sentencing 
memorandum.  He cannot do both.  If the defendant chooses to 
preserve his immunity, he must restrict the range and candor of 
his sentencing memorandum.  This will limit the defendant's 
right to make his case to the court, and it may deprive the 
court of information.  If the defendant speaks candidly about 
the offense in his sentencing memorandum, he must give up the 
protections 
afforded 
to 
his 
statements 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 972.15.  This severely undermines the Crowell 
decision. 
IV 
¶64 The lead opinion dismisses two potential bases for 
protecting a defendant's inculpatory statements in a sentencing 
memorandum.  First, it concludes that Wis. Stat. § 972.15, by 
its terms, does not cover a defendant's sentencing memorandum.  
Second, it concludes that there is no federal or state 
constitutional due process right of allocution.  The first 
conclusion is reasonable; the second is problematic.   
¶65 The lead opinion explains that allocution is a 
statutory right to speak in open court prior to sentencing, 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2), and that the exercise of that right does 
not require suppression of any statement made by a defendant 
outside the courtroom to the person who prepares a sentencing 
memorandum.  Lead op., ¶¶31, 34, 35. 
¶66 In providing this explanation, the lead opinion dodges 
the obvious question whether a statement made by a defendant 
inside the courtroom at a sentencing hearing is protected from 
use in a new trial.  For the lead opinion to answer this 
question directly would be awkward.  Determining that an in-
court statement is protected would dilute the lead opinion's 
arguments against use immunity for a defendant's statements in a 
sentencing memorandum.  Determining that an in-court statement 
is not protected would render the statutory right of allocution 
meaningless for some defendants 
¶67 I acknowledge that an unconditional due process right 
of allocution would present some disconcerting questions.  For 
instance, does a defendant have a due process right of 
allocution in cases where the court has no discretion to deviate 
from a determinate sentence?19  Does a defendant have a due 
process right of allocution in every misdemeanor case?  Does a 
defendant have a due process right of allocution if his counsel 
speaks but the defendant is never asked?  Does a defendant have 
a due process right of allocution if his statutory right is 
overlooked but the defendant does not object and the court 
imposes a reasonable, satisfactorily explained sentence? 
                                                 
19 See State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423, 554 N.W.2d 215 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
¶68 The last question is similar to the question posed in 
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).  Hill was convicted 
of two felonies after a jury trial.  At sentencing he was not 
asked whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf.  
The district judge, after noting his familiarity with the 
defendant's character and history, imposed sentence and there 
was no appeal.  Five years later Hill commenced litigation under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, claiming he had been 
denied the right of allocution under Rule 32(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.20  The Court decided that "the 
                                                 
20 At the time of the decision in Hill v. United States, 368 
U.S. 424 (1962), Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure read, in part, as follows: 
(a) Sentence. 
 
(1) Imposition of Sentence.  Sentence shall be 
imposed without unreasonable delay.  Before imposing 
sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity 
to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall address 
the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to 
make a statement in his own behalf and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment.   
The equivalent text now appears in Rule 32(i)(4) and reads: 
(i) (4) Opportunity to Speak. 
 
 
(A) By a Party.  Before imposing sentence, 
the court must: 
 
 
 
(i) provide the defendant's attorney 
an opportunity to speak on defendant's behalf; 
 
 
 
(ii) address the defendant personally 
in order to permit the defendant to speak or present 
any information to mitigate the sentence; and 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) is not 
of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack."  
Hill, 368 U.S. at 426.  The Court added: "It is to be noted that 
we are not dealing here with a case where the defendant was 
affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing 
at which his sentence was imposed."  Id. at 429.  This caveat 
puts in context the Court's statement that:  
The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant 
represented by an attorney whether he has anything to 
say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an 
error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a 
writ of habeas corpus.  It is an error that is neither 
jurisdictional nor constitutional.  It is not a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a 
complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission 
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure. 
Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
¶69 The Hill court decided that a defendant does not have 
an unconditional due process right of allocution.  However, 
because the Hill case involved a collateral attack on the 
defendant's sentence, id. at 425, its holding is necessarily 
limited, and it must be cited with caution.  Thus, it would be 
dangerous to rely on Hill for the proposition that a defendant 
has no due process right to allocution, especially when a 
statute grants such a right and the defendant timely seeks to 
assert that right. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
    (iii) provide 
an 
attorney 
for 
the 
government an opportunity to speak equivalent to that 
of the defendant's attorney. 
 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
¶70 In any event, this court has twice stated that due 
process affords a defendant the right of allocution.  State v. 
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 772, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992); Bruneau v. 
State, 77 Wis. 2d 166, 174-75, 252 N.W.2d 347 (1977).  See also 
State v. Perez, 170 Wis. 2d 130, 138, 487 N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Varnell, 153 Wis. 2d 334, 340, 450 N.W.2d 524 
(Ct. App. 1989) ("due process inheres in the right of allocution 
at sentencing").  The lead opinion asserts that this court's 
pronouncement of that right in 1977 was erroneous.  Lead op., 
¶31.  It is bad enough to rescind a recognized constitutional 
right; 
it 
is 
quite 
unacceptable 
to 
rescind 
that 
right 
retroactively. 
¶71 In my view, this case should be analyzed differently.  
Much to its credit, the State quotes from Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976): "The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner'" (emphasis added).  There can be no 
doubt that sentencing is a critical stage in criminal cases,21 
and ordinarily, the defendant has a right to be heard.  This is 
recognized at the federal level in Rule 32(i)(4) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and in Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2). 
¶72 Section 
972.14(2) 
gives 
the 
defendant 
two 
opportunities to speak in a sentencing hearing: (1) "the court 
shall ask the defendant why sentence should not be pronounced 
                                                 
21 State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 635, 135 N.W.2d 295 
(1965), partial abrogation recognized by Ernst v. State, 43 
Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969). 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
upon him or her;" and (2) the court shall "allow . . . defendant 
an opportunity to make a statement with respect to any matter 
relevant to the sentence."  The lead opinion diminishes these 
opportunities by compromising the defendant's ability to tell 
the truth. 
¶73 Section 972.14(2) also gives defendant's counsel the 
opportunity to make a statement.  Sometimes defense counsel's 
presentation will eliminate any actual need for a defendant to 
speak personally.  But sometimes, as Justice Frankfurter wrote 
in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961): "The most 
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as 
the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself."  
In most situations, the defendant must "have the opportunity to 
present to the court his plea in mitigation."  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
¶74 The law is not static.  As noted above, the victim of 
a crime now has a constitutional right to "the opportunity to 
make a statement to the court at disposition."  Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 9m (emphasis added).  Consequently, the defendant should 
have 
an 
equivalent 
right. 
 
This 
right 
may 
not 
be 
an 
unconditional right but it is most assuredly a significant 
right. 
V 
 
¶75 In lieu of any formal holding on due process, I would 
immunize a defendant's inculpatory statements in a sentencing 
memorandum from future use by the state as direct evidence 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
against the defendant on grounds that it furthers sound policy 
in the administration of justice. 
¶76 In our 1999 Watson decision, 227 Wis. 2d at 194, we 
stated: "The defendant is entitled to file his own presentence 
memorandum and to present testimony at the sentencing hearing."  
In the 1992 Perez decision, 170 Wis. 2d at 141-42, the court of 
appeals stated: "[T]he defendant has the opportunity to file his 
own presentence memorandum with the court which can present what 
the defendant believes to be true and correct information the 
court should rely upon in sentencing."  These unremarkable 
passages indicate that sentencing memoranda have become a 
recognized part of criminal sentencing procedure.  As such, 
judicial policy should promote their quality and facilitate 
their value to the court.  
¶77 The lead opinion contends that affording protection to 
a defendant's inculpatory statements in a sentencing memorandum 
could undercut the court-ordered PSI: "[I]f a defendant's 
sentencing memorandum were to achieve the same status as a 
court-ordered PSI, a defendant may be less likely to be 
forthcoming with a department of corrections staff member over 
whom he or she has no control.  This could cause the sentencing 
court to have more limited information available to it in the 
PSI."  Lead op., ¶28. 
¶78 This analysis does not square with the defendant's 
incentives at sentencing, especially when the defendant——for 
either 
strategic 
or 
cathartic 
reasons——opts 
to 
reveal 
information that would normally be harmful to him.  Simply 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
stated, when the defense strategy is candor, it would be unwise 
for a defendant to attempt to game the system by selectively 
withholding factual information from the PSI in order to control 
its spin in a sentencing memorandum.  The court has the 
prerogative not only to consider a defendant's remorse but also 
a defendant's cooperation.  Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶43, n.11.  If 
a defendant deliberately withholds information from the preparer 
of the PSI so that he can pour out inculpatory facts or 
admissions to the preparer of his own sentencing memorandum, the 
court is likely to sense noncooperation and conclude that the 
defendant's remorse is insincere.  In short, a realistic 
defendant has a strong incentive to be as candid in the PSI as 
in his own sentencing memorandum. 
¶79 The lead opinion also suggests that a sentencing 
memorandum is less reliable than an objectively prepared PSI 
because the sentencing memorandum is a tool of advocacy.  This 
overlooks the fact that the very information the state would 
seek to use at a new trial is inculpatory information that tends 
to establish the defendant's guilt.  This damaging information 
is, for the most part, extremely reliable, which is precisely 
why the state seeks to use it and why it is valuable to the 
court. 
¶80 A third reason for opposing use immunity for the 
defendant's statements is that the state should not be deprived 
of reliable evidence in a new trial.  The immediate answer to 
this is that the state either tried the defendant once before or 
was prepared to try him when he entered a plea . . . without his 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
post-conviction 
inculpatory 
statements 
in 
the 
sentencing 
memorandum.   
¶81 In addition, a defendant's inculpatory statements in a 
plea colloquy, Wis. Stat. § 904.10, and in a PSI, § 972.15, may 
not be used in any future proceeding, regardless of how reliable 
and helpful they might be to the state.  Moreover, a defendant's 
statements in a Goodchild22 hearing are inadmissible as direct 
evidence, although they may be used for impeachment.  See State 
v. Schultz, 152 Wis. 2d 408, 426, 448 N.W.2d 424 (1989).  Until 
advised otherwise, I believe a defendant's statements in court 
at sentencing may not be used against him as direct evidence in 
a new trial——in part because a defendant may be forced to answer 
statements made by a victim at sentencing or to correct 
inaccuracies in the PSI.23  A contrary holding would trigger a 
defendant's rights against self-incrimination at sentencing, 
eliminating the presumption that a defendant should come clean 
about any accomplices in his crime.  See State v. Kaczynski, 
2002 WI App 276, 258 Wis. 2d 653, 654 N.W.2d 300.  If a 
defendant's statements at sentencing are not to be protected in 
the future, the court has a duty to say so now. 
                                                 
22 State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965). 
23 A defendant's statements to the court at a sentencing 
hearing 
following 
a 
plea 
are 
arguably 
protected 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 904.10 
("Evidence 
of 
statements 
made 
in 
court . . . in 
connection 
with 
any 
of 
the 
foregoing 
pleas . . . is not admissible").  But statements made to the 
court at sentencing after a trial do not appear to be covered by 
the statute. 
No.  02-2332-CR.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
¶82 To sum up, the circuit court had legitimate reasons 
for excluding the defendant's incriminating statements in the 
defendant's sentencing memorandum.  There was existing precedent 
for a due process right of allocution.  There was concern that 
permitting the statements to be used as direct evidence against 
the defendant would undermine the Crowell decision.  The State 
offered no urgent need for using the evidence.  The use of the 
evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony in a new trial is 
a separate question.  On policy grounds, on these facts, I would 
affirm. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
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