Title: In the Matter of E. Lorraine Harris, an Attorney at Law
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: d-52-02
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 2005

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). This is an attorney disciplinary case. Respondent, E. Lorraine Harris, was admitted to practice in New Jersey in 1994. Since that time, she has amassed an extensive ethics history, consisting of two temporary suspensions, an admonition, a reprimand, and two term suspensions for misconduct that has included potential misappropriation; misrepresentation; false statements of material facts to a tribunal; failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities; lack of diligence; gross neglect; failure to safeguard client property; and charging an unreasonable fee, among other things. Although her most recent suspension expired in March 2002, she has not sought reinstatement to practice and remains suspended to date. The current matters before the Court comprise five separate Disciplinary Review Board (DRB or Board) decisions, arising from respondent s derelictions in representing eleven clients and from her failure to comply with the obligations placed on suspended attorneys pursuant to R. 1:20-20. In the first decision, the Board determined that respondent should be suspended for one year for her violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) arising out of five separate client matters. Respondent s conduct in those matters consisted of multiple instances of gross neglect; misrepresentation; failure to communicate; lack of diligence; and gross neglect, among other things. In two instances, respondent s derelictions led to the issuance of warrants for her clients arrest. Her conduct in these matters further led to a finding of a pattern of neglect. In the second decision, the Board determined that respondent should be suspended for six months for her misconduct in two client matters. In one of those matters, respondent solicited and accepted from her client an unearned fee that she was prohibited by statute from taking without court approval. She later refused to return that fee, even when ordered to do so by a fee arbitration committee. In the other matter, despite multiple warnings and opportunities to correct her own deficiencies, respondent s derelictions resulted in the dismissal of her client s municipal court appeal on two separate occasions. In the third decision, the DRB determined that respondent should be suspended for three months for her violation of multiple RPCs in two other client matters. Those matters were brought before the Board on a certification of default filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), based on respondent s failure to file an answer to the OAE s complaint. Thus, the allegations of the complaint were deemed admitted under R. 1:20-4(f). The Complaint alleged that respondent had failed to return to her client an unearned retainer, despite having been ordered to do so by a fee arbitration committee, and that she had failed to comply with the requirements of R. 1:20-20 (Future Activities of Attorney Who Has Been Disciplined . . . ) in several respects following her 2001 suspensions. In the fourth decision, the DRB determined that respondent should be reprimanded for filing a frivolous lawsuit. In the fifth and final decision, four members of the DRB recommended that respondent be suspended for one year for her misconduct in one client matter. One other member favored an indeterminate suspension, while the three public members of the Board voted for respondent s disbarment. In that client matter, the Board found that respondent did not act diligently in her representation of her client. The Board further found that respondent forged her client s name to a certification that she then filed with the court, and later lied to ethics authorities about signing the document. The Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause why Harris should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. HELD : The pattern of respondent s conduct over a course of years makes clear that she does not possess the essential qualifications to practice law in this State, and her persistent and multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct do not allow a finding that she is professionally salvageable; protection of the public and preservation of the integrity of the legal profession require her disbarment. 1. The Supreme Court is charged with the responsibility of determining whether lawyers are fit to practice law in this State, whether an attorney has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, and if so, the proper measure of discipline. The purpose of discipline is to protect the public from unfit lawyers and promote public confidence in our legal system. The proper measure of discipline will depend on several factors, including the nature and number of professional transgressions, the harm caused by those transgressions, the attorney s ethics history, and whether the attorney is capable of meeting the standards that must guide all members of the profession. (pp. 16-18) 2. Although misconduct, such as knowing misappropriation of client funds, that breaches a fundamental and solemn trust is itself sufficient to trigger automatic disbarment, a string of lesser, yet serious, professional improprieties within a fixed time period compounded by a long, unrepentant ethical history will also demand severe discipline. (pp. 18-19) 3. Respondent has crossed a line. Nothing in the record inspires confidence that if respondent were to return to practice her conduct would improve. Her tenure as an attorney has been marked by incompetence, deceit, and disloyalty to clients, a number of whom have been victimized. The record does not allow a finding that respondent is professionally salvageable. Protection of the public and preservation of the integrity of the legal profession require her disbarment. (pp. 19-21) So Ordered. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE did not participate. IN THE MATTER OF E. LORRAINE HARRIS, An Attorney at Law Argued November 9, 2004 Decided March 16, 2005 On an Order to show cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. Walton W. Kingsbery, III, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Angelo J. Falciani argued the cause for respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent is a persistent violator of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Since becoming a lawyer, the number and nature of her transgressions have struck at the core values that define a lawyer s responsibility to clients, the court, and the profession. Basic honesty and a minimal level of competence are indispensable qualifications to practice law in this State. The pattern of respondent s conduct over a course of years makes clear that she does not possess those essential qualifications. When a lawyer s derelictions are so many and so grave, our paramount concern must be to protect the public and maintain the public s confidence in the integrity of the profession. Based on the record before us, we are constrained to enter an Order disbarring respondent. The proper measure of discipline will depend on a number of factors, including the nature and number of professional transgressions, the harm caused by those transgressions, the attorney s ethical history, and whether the attorney is capable of meeting the standards that must guide all members of the profession. See In re Nigohosian, 88 N.J. 308, 315 (1982) (per curiam) ( The severity of discipline to be imposed must comport with the seriousness of the ethical infractions in light of all the relevant circumstances. ). Misconduct that breaches a fundamental and solemn trust, such as the knowing misappropriation of a client s funds, is itself sufficient to trigger automatic disbarment. See In re Cavuto, 160 N.J. 185, 195 (1999) (holding that mere act of taking client s money without authority to do so requires disbarment and that lawyer s prior unblemished character will not excuse misappropriation that was knowing and volitional (citing In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 159-60 (1986))). However, a string of lesser, yet serious, professional improprieties within a fixed time period compounded by a long, unrepentant ethical history will also demand severe discipline. See, e.g., In re Zeitler, 182 N.J. 389, 392-94, 400 (2005) (holding that disbarment was warranted based on misconduct in three separate disciplinary matters evidencing pattern of neglect when combined with lengthy history of ethical violations dating back almost thirty years); In re Harris, 131 N.J. 117, 117-18 (1993) (ordering disbarment of attorney for conduct in ten matters involving lack of diligence, gross neglect, failure to communicate, conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation, failure to safeguard client or third party property, abandonment of clients, and failure to cooperate with ethics authorities); In re Spagnoli, 115 N.J. 504, 505, 520 (1989) (disbarring attorney for ethical violations spree that included pattern of neglect, gross negligence, lack of due diligence, failure to communicate with clients, failure to cooperate in disciplinary hearings, and failure to return files). In the five groupings of cases before us, the DRB has recommended a one-year suspension, a six-month suspension, a three-month suspension, a reprimand, and a one-year suspension. We agree with the three dissenting members of the DRB who believe that respondent has crossed a line. In their dissent, they summarized the sad and hapless professional life of respondent, who in a relatively short, ten-year career, has proven to be a completely dysfunctional attorney who has no regard for the truth. Every aspect of respondent s law practice suffers from her delinquent conduct. Innumerable clients have complained to the ethics authorities about her actions: she has repeatedly taken retainers and performed little or no work, grossly neglected legitimate claims, and lied to the clients about their cases. . . . . . . . . . . [J]udges from municipal, state, and federal courts have complained about this attorney s incompetence and deceitful behavior in their courtrooms and in cases under their review. They have done so, almost universally, after having given respondent ample opportunity to correct deficiencies in her work or to bring a matter into compliance. Yet, respondent has been either unable or unwilling to do so. . . . . . . . Truth has little meaning to this respondent it is a pliable thing for her, to be worked until it fits her immediate needs. That view is unacceptable in an attorney, who is sworn to be truthful . . . . . . . . Over the years that we have endured this respondent s excesses, no meaningful mitigation has ever been offered to explain or modify her bizarre behavior. How many times must we see her repetitive acts before we can say enough is enough? The dissenting DRB members concluded that respondent was beyond redemption and recommended that she be disbarred. We also conclude that [n]othing in the record inspires confidence that if respondent were to return to practice [her] conduct would improve. In re Vincenti, 152 N.J. 253, 254 (1998) (per curiam). Respondent s tenure as an attorney has been marked by incompetence, deceit, and disloyalty to clients, a number of whom have been victimized by respondent. Although we take note that she has made contributions to her community and church, we cannot chance another run by respondent as an attorney. The risk to the public is too great. The record does not allow us to find that respondent is professionally salvageable. Ultimately, we are invested with the duty of protecting the public and preserving the integrity of the legal profession. For those reasons, we must disbar respondent. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE did not participate. /S/ Stephen W. Townsend CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT APPLICATION FOR DISPOSITION Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not be Disbarred or Otherwise Disciplined IN THE MATTER OF E. LORRAINE HARRIS, An Attorney at Law. DECIDED March 16, 2005 OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY