Title: City of Marina v. Cal. State Trustees
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S117816
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2006

1
Filed 7/31/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CITY OF MARINA et al., 
) 
 
 
)  
S117816 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
)  
Ct.App. 6 H023158 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
)  
Monterey County 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE  
)  
Super. Ct. Nos. 
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, 
)  
M41795 & M41781 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) challenges an environmental impact 
report (EIR) prepared by the Board of Trustees of the California State University 
(Trustees).  The EIR concerns the Trustees’ plan to expand a small campus into a 
major institution that will enroll 25,000 students.  The planned expansion will 
have significant effects on the physical environment throughout Fort Ord, the 
former Army base on which the campus is located.  While the Trustees have 
agreed to mitigate effects occurring on the campus itself, they have disclaimed 
responsibility for mitigating some effects occurring off campus.  In particular, the 
Trustees have refused to share the cost of certain infrastructure improvements 
proposed by FORA, the base’s new civilian governing authority.  FORA 
challenges the Trustees’ decision to certify the EIR despite the remaining, 
unmitigated effects as an abuse of discretion under the California Environmental 
Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) (CEQA).  Like the superior 
 
2
court, we conclude the Trustees have abused their discretion and thus reverse the 
Court of Appeal’s contrary decision.   
I. FACTUAL, LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Fort Ord is a former United States Army base on the Pacific Coast, about five 
miles north of Monterey and 125 miles south of San Francisco.  The base lies on 
the northern end of Monterey Bay, an important tourist destination known for its 
scenic beauty and historic sites.  In 1994, the Department of Defense formally 
closed the base and transferred 27,000 acres (over 42 square miles) to a variety of 
governmental entities and local organizations.  The closure created both problems 
and opportunities for the region.  On one hand, the loss of one of the nation’s 
largest military installations threatened to disrupt the local economy.  On the other 
hand, valuable land that for over 75 years had been exclusively controlled by the 
Army became available for civilian economic development.   
To provide a government for the former base and to manage its transition to 
civilian use, the Legislature enacted the Fort Ord Reuse Authority Act (Gov. 
Code, § 67650 et seq.) (hereafter the FORA Act or the act).  Effective May 9, 
1994, the act authorized FORA’s creation and conferred upon it governmental 
powers and duties within the former base that prevail over those of any other local 
governmental entity.  (Id., § 67657, subd. (c).)  FORA’s general statutory purpose 
is “to plan for, finance, and carry out the transfer and reuse of the base in a 
cooperative, coordinated, balanced, and decisive manner.”  (Gov. Code, § 67652, 
subd. (a).)  The act also charges FORA with the more specific policy goals of 
“facilitat[ing] the transfer and reuse of the real and other property [of the base] . . . 
with all practical speed,” “minimiz[ing] the disruption caused by the base’s 
closure on the civilian economy and the people of the Monterey Bay area,” 
“maintain[ing] and protect[ing] the unique environmental resources of the area,” 
and accomplishing these tasks “in ways that enhance the economy and quality of 
 
3
life of the Monterey Bay community.”  (Id., § 67651, subds. (a)-(d).)  The 13 
members of FORA’s governing board are appointed by local governments 
neighboring the base—Monterey County and the Cities of Carmel, Del Rey Oaks, 
Marina, Monterey, Pacific Grove, Salinas, Sand City and Seaside.  (Id., § 67660.)  
Also on the board are 10 ex officio, nonvoting members, including one appointed 
by the Chancellor of the California State University.  (Id., § 67661.) 
The charter for Fort Ord’s future use and development is the statutorily 
mandated Base Reuse Plan (hereafter Reuse Plan), which FORA adopted on June 
13, 1997.  (See Gov. Code, § 67675 et seq.)  The plan addresses land use, 
transportation, conservation, recreation and capital improvement in Fort Ord until 
the year 2015.  (See id., § 67675, subd. (c).)  Pursuant to the plan, FORA will 
make land available over time for a wide range of civilian uses, including 
residential housing, business, light industry, research and development, visitor 
services, recreation and education.  All such development will require 
improvements to the infrastructure the Army left behind.  Recognizing this, the 
Legislature gave FORA the power and duty to prepare the base’s infrastructure for 
civilian development.  In the words of the act, FORA “shall identify those 
basewide public capital facilities . . . that serve residents or will serve future 
residents of the base territory” (Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (a)(1)) and “shall 
undertake to plan for and arrange the provision of those facilities, including 
arranging for their financing and construction or repair, remodeling, or 
replacement” (ibid.; see also id., § 67675, subd. (c)(5) [Reuse Plan must include 
capital improvement plan]).   
FORA has, as the Legislature directed, prepared a capital improvement plan 
identifying public facilities that need construction or improvement and projecting 
future expenditures for that purpose through the year 2015.  (See Gov. Code, 
§ 67675, subd. (c)(5).)  The facilities FORA has identified include elements of 
 
4
Fort Ord’s infrastructure for transportation (mainly roadways), water supply and 
distribution, wastewater management, drainage, and fire protection, among other 
things.  FORA plans to improve these facilities over the life of the Reuse Plan, as 
increasing land use necessitates the improvements and as funding becomes 
available.  Funding is not expected to come through legislative appropriations.  
Instead, the Legislature has directed FORA to arrange its own financing as it sees 
fit (Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (a)(1)), employing any of several funding methods 
authorized in the FORA Act.  FORA may, for example, “levy assessments, 
reassessments, or special taxes and issue bonds” under existing laws governing 
public finance (id., § 67679, subd. (d)),1 “levy development fees on development 
projects within the area of the base” (id., § 67679, subd. (e)) pursuant to the 
Mitigation Fee Act (id., § 66000 et seq.), sell or lease land (id., § 67678, subd. 
(a)), and “seek state and federal grants and loans or other assistance” (id., § 67679, 
subd. (c)).  FORA and its local-government member agencies (id., § 67660) may 
also provide by contract for the transfer of tax revenues (id., § 67691) and/or adopt 
programs of local revenue sharing (id., § 67692).   
In order to determine the long-term financial viability of the Reuse Plan, 
FORA has prepared a Comprehensive Business Plan setting out assumptions about 
                                              
1  
Specifically the Improvement Act of 1911 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5000 et 
seq.), the Improvement Bond Act of 1915 (id., § 8500 et seq.), the Municipal 
Improvement Act of 1913 (id., § 10000 et seq.), the Benefit Assessment Act of 
1982 (Gov. Code, § 54703 et seq.), the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 
(Sts. & Hy. Code, § 22500 et seq.), the Integrated Financing District Act (Gov. 
Code, § 53175 et seq.), the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 (id., 
§ 53311 et seq.), the Infrastructure Financing District Act (id., § 53395 et seq.), the 
Marks-Roos Local Bond Pooling Act of 1985 (id., § 6584 et seq.), the Revenue 
Bond Law of 1941 (id., § 54300 et seq.), a law permitting fire suppression 
assessments (id., § 50078 et seq.), and the Habitat Maintenance Funding Act (Fish 
& G. Code, § 2900 et seq.).  (See Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (d).)   
 
5
projected revenue and expenditures.  As part of this exercise—one obviously 
subject to numerous contingencies given the long planning horizon—FORA has 
projected that it will spend $249.2 million to improve Fort Ord’s infrastructure 
over the 20-year life of the Reuse Plan, i.e., from 1996 to 2015.  FORA projects 
that the largest part of its operational revenue over the same period will derive 
from the sale of land and from a one-time special tax under the Mello-Roos 
Community Facilities Act of 1982 (Gov. Code, § 53311 et seq.).  Other revenue is 
expected to come through local development fees, water and sewer fees, a grant 
from the federal Economic Development Administration, and the annual dues of 
FORA’s members.     
The California State University (CSU) is the largest university system in the 
United States.  Governed by the Trustees, CSU’s 23 campuses across the state 
collectively enroll 405,000 students and employ 44,000 faculty and staff.  CSU 
Monterey Bay (CSUMB), which occupies 1,370 acres transferred by the Army to 
CSU in 1994, is presently the main user of the base.  CSUMB opened in 1995 with 
633 students, using existing military buildings, and now enrolls approximately 
3,800 students, 2,600 of whom live on campus.  From this modest beginning the 
Trustees plan to expand enrollment at CSUMB greatly over the next few decades, 
eventually reaching the target enrollment of 25,000 full-time equivalent (FTE2) 
students in the year 2030.  On May 13, 1998, the Trustees approved a Campus 
Master Plan (hereafter Master Plan) to guide CSUMB toward this target.  Under 
the Master Plan, CSUMB’s resident population of students, faculty, staff and 
household members would gradually increase to 10,350.  The campus’s average 
                                              
2  
One FTE student, a term used in the Trustees’ planning documents, means 
any number of students collectively enrolled in 15 units, e.g., one student taking a 
full course load of 15 units, or three students taking five units each.   
 
6
daily population, which also includes students who commute, would grow to 
19,000.  
Together with the Master Plan for CSUMB, the Trustees also prepared and 
certified an EIR.  The EIR is the focus of the environmental review process and, as 
we have explained, “the primary means” of achieving the state’s declared policy 
of taking “ ‘all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the 
environmental quality of the state.’ ”  (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. 
Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392, quoting Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21000, subd. (a); see also CEQA Guidelines,3 § 15003, subd. 
(a).)  The EIR’s more specific purposes are “to identify the significant effects on 
the environment of a project, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate 
the manner in which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.”  (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (a).)  CEQA expressly requires that an EIR 
accompany the Master Plan for CSUMB.  “The selection of a location for a 
particular campus and the approval of a long range development plan are subject 
to [CEQA] and require the preparation of an [EIR].”  (Id., § 21080.09, subd. (b).)  
The Trustees necessarily serve as the “lead agency” (id., § 21067) responsible for 
preparing and certifying the EIR (id., § 21100, subd. (a)) because they possess 
“full power and responsibility in the construction and development of any state 
university campus” (Ed. Code, § 66606) and thus final authority to approve or 
disapprove the Master Plan.   
                                              
3  
The term “CEQA Guidelines” refers to the regulations codified in title 14, 
section 15000 et seq. of the California Code of Regulations, which have been 
“prescribed by the Secretary of Resources to be followed by all state and local 
agencies in California in the implementation of [CEQA].”  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15000.)   
 
7
In their EIR for CSUMB, the Trustees have determined that expanding 
CSUMB to accommodate 25,000 students will have many significant effects on 
the physical environment of Fort Ord.  CEQA requires “[e]ach public agency [to] 
mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects that it 
carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so” (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21002.1, subd. (b)) and to discuss feasible methods of mitigation in the EIR (id., 
§ 21100, subd. (b)(3); CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1); see also Pub. 
Res. Code, § 21002.1, subd. (a) [one purpose of the EIR is “to indicate the manner 
in which . . . significant effects can be mitigated or avoided”].)  In fact, the 
Trustees’ EIR does identify and adopt specific measures that the Trustees have 
found will mitigate most of the environmental effects of campus expansion to a 
level that is less than significant.  Full mitigation of five remaining effects, 
however, will require action not just by the Trustees on the CSUMB campus but 
also by FORA on a basewide or regional basis.  These remaining effects have 
become the subject of this litigation.   
The Trustees’ EIR describes the five remaining environmental effects, for 
which the Trustees have not provided full mitigation, as follows:  (1) Drainage:  
“Construction of new buildings and facilities will increase impervious surfaces 
and runoff, and could result in localized drainage problems and/or flows exceeding 
storm drain capacities, if storm drainage facilities are not adequately sized and 
maintained.”  (2) Water supply:  “CSUMB water demand will contribute 
incremental demands on existing deficient facilities and/or non-existent facilities.”  
(3) Traffic:  “Campus-related traffic will result in a decrease in level of service 
 
8
from D to E[4] at the [Light Fighter] Drive/North-South Road intersection[5] 
during the PM peak period in the year 2005, from D to E along Del Monte Blvd. 
between Reindollar [Avenue] and Reservation Road[6] in the years 2005 and 
2015, and will contribute to Highway 1 impacts in the years 2015 and 2030.”  
(4) Wastewater management:  “Campus growth will result in increased wastewater 
generation that can be accommodated by the existing wastewater treatment 
system, but will contribute flows to currently deficient sewer lines.”  (5) Fire 
protection:  “Campus population and facility growth will result in increased 
demand for fire protection services.”  
Before a public agency, such as the Trustees, may approve a project for 
which the EIR has identified significant effects on the environment, such as the 
Master Plan for CSUMB, the agency must make one or more of the findings 
required by section 21081 of the Public Resources Code.  The required findings 
constitute the principal means chosen by the Legislature to enforce the state’s 
declared policy “that public agencies should not approve projects as proposed if 
there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which 
would substantially lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects 
                                              
4  
A decrease in the level of service from D to E means, in the context of the  
EIR, that a road’s capacity to handle the existing traffic is no longer minimally 
acceptable for an urban road.   
5  
The Light Fighter Drive/North-South Road intersection is located, as the 
EIR explains, near [t]he main regional entrance” to the CSUMB campus.  This 
entrance has “the most convenient freeway access from State Highway 1 via Light 
Fighter Drive interchange and is signed as the campus main entrance.  Most trips 
from the Monterey Peninsula, Santa Cruz County, and the San Francisco Bay Area 
use this entrance.  North-South Road is also an important local link to Seaside.”   
6  
This half-mile stretch of Del Monte Boulevard lies within the City of 
Marina and connects State Highway 1 with Reservation Road, which leads to the 
CSUMB campus.   
 
9
. . . .”  (Id., § 21002; see also id., § 21002.1, subd. (a).)  More specifically, the 
agency must find that the project’s significant environmental effects have been 
mitigated or avoided (id., § 21081, subd. (a)(1)), that the measures necessary for 
mitigation “are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency 
and have been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency” (id., subd. 
(a)(2)), and/or that “specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other 
considerations” render mitigation “infeasible” (id., subd. (a)(3)).  When the agency 
finds that mitigation is infeasible, the agency must also find “that specific 
overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the project 
outweigh the significant effects on the environment.”  (Id., subd. (b).)7   
                                              
7  
This important section of CEQA (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081) provides 
in full: 
 
“Pursuant to the policy stated in Sections 21002 and 21002.1, no public 
agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an environmental impact 
report has been certified which identifies one or more significant effects on the 
environment that would occur if the project is approved or carried out unless both 
of the following occur: 
 
“(a) The public agency makes one or more of the following findings with 
respect to each significant effect: 
 
“(1) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated into, the 
project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment. 
 
“(2) Those changes or alterations are within the responsibility and 
jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted 
by that other agency. 
 
“(3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations, 
including considerations for the provision of employment opportunities for highly 
trained workers, make infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified 
in the environmental impact report. 
 
“(b) With respect to significant effects which were subject to a finding 
under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), the public agency finds that specific 
overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the project 
outweigh the significant effects on the environment.” 
 
10
In their EIR, the Trustees have identified and adopted a variety of measures 
they have found will partially mitigate the five remaining environmental effects 
noted above.  Full mitigation of these effects to the level of insignificance will, 
however, as the EIR specifically notes, require FORA to improve Fort Ord’s 
infrastructure.  In fact, FORA’s own planning documents take the Trustees’ plans 
for CSUMB into account and propose specific infrastructure improvements that 
will fully mitigate the expanding campus’s remaining effects on water supply, 
drainage, wastewater management, traffic, and fire protection.  Concerning each of 
these effects, the Trustees have declared in their formal findings certifying the EIR 
and approving the Master Plan (see Pub. Resources Code, § 21081) that the 
implementation of FORA’s proposed improvements constitutes the “specific 
measure to mitigate [each of CSUMB’s corresponding environmental impacts] to 
the level of insignificance . . . .”   
As part of its long-term planning process, FORA adopted the assumption that 
that CSUMB would pay, as its share of the cost of infrastructure improvements, 18 
annual installments of $1.139 million each, beginning in fiscal year 1997/1998 and 
ending in fiscal year 2015/2016, for a total contribution over time of approxi-
mately $20.5 million.  At the present time, however, FORA has not imposed any 
tax, fee or charge on CSUMB or proposed to do so.  Instead, FORA hopes to reach 
agreement with the Trustees on their fair share of the cost of infrastructure 
improvements.  The Trustees, however, have refused to contribute any amount to 
FORA for improvements in roads and fire protection, even while finding that 
FORA’s proposed improvements constitute the specific measures necessary to 
mitigate CSUMB’s effects in these areas.  Accordingly, the Trustees cannot 
logically find and, indeed, have not found that CSUMB’s effects have been fully 
mitigated.  Instead, to justify certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan 
despite the remaining, unmitigated effects, the Trustees rely on the following three 
 
11
alternative findings:  (1) improvements to roads and fire protection are the 
responsibility of FORA rather than of the Trustees; (2) mitigation is infeasible 
because the Trustees may not legally contribute funds toward these improvements; 
and (3) the planned expansion of CSUMB offers overriding benefits that outweigh 
any remaining unmitigated effects on the environment.8  (See Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21081, subds. (a)(2), (3) & (b).) 
While the Trustees have refused to contribute any amount for improvements 
in roads and fire protection, they are willing to contribute for improvements in 
water supply, drainage and wastewater management, albeit not in the amount 
FORA has proposed.  Instead, the Trustees propose to contribute through the 
procedure set out in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (section 54999 et seq.).  
Chapter 13.7 authorizes a public utility that is providing a public utility service to 
a public educational agency to impose a capital facilities fee on the latter “after 
agreement has been reached between the two agencies through negotiations 
entered into by both parties.”  (Gov. Code, § 54999.3, subd. (b).)  The resulting 
dispute over the amount of the Trustees’ contribution creates uncertainty about the 
extent to which CSUMB’s off-campus environmental effects will be mitigated.  
                                              
8  
Here, in their own words, is the Trustees’ finding about CSUMB’s effects 
on traffic:  “The Board of Trustees finds that the specific measure to mitigate this 
impact to a level of insignificance is to implement the planned regional FORA 
transportation improvements, as identified in the FORA Reuse Plan and 
accompanying documents.  Implementation of the planned regional improvements 
are [sic] within the responsibility of FORA (not the university).  FORA can and 
should implement these measures.  Because implementation of the regional 
mitigation is currently disputed among the responsible agencies, mitigation of the 
impact to a less than significant level cannot be assured by CSU.  It is hereby 
determined that any remaining unavoidable impacts are acceptable for the reasons 
specified in the Statement of Overriding Considerations . . . .”   
 
The Trustees’ finding about CSUMB’s effects on fire protection is similar.   
 
12
Accordingly, to justify certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan for 
CSUMB, the Trustees have made alternative findings of the same type used to 
address CSUMB’s effects on roads and fire protection.  Specifically, the Trustees 
have found that (1) the basewide infrastructure improvements proposed by FORA 
constitute the specific measures necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s effects to the 
level of insignificance, (2) the mitigation of CSUMB’s effects on drainage, water 
supply, and wastewater management are FORA’s responsibility, and 
(3) overriding circumstances justify certifying the EIR and approving the Master 
Plan despite any remaining unmitigated effects.9   
In an appendix to the EIR addressing public comments, the Trustees explain 
why they have refused to contribute toward improvements in roads and fire 
protection, and why they have agreed to contribute toward improvements in 
drainage, water supply and wastewater management only through the procedure 
established in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.), even though 
these decisions will leave some environmental effects unmitigated.  Whether the 
Trustees, in view of the unmitigated effects, properly exercised their discretion to 
                                              
9  
Here, in their own words, is the Trustees’ finding about CSUMB’s effects 
on drainage:  “The Board of Trustees finds that the specific measure to mitigate 
this impact to a level of insignificance is to implement the planned regional FORA 
drainage improvements, including ocean discharge improvements, and potential 
offsite percolation areas as identified in the FORA Reuse Plan and accompanying 
documents.  CSUMB will contribute fees as mandated by applicable provisions of 
Government Code Section 54999 to mitigate its share of the impact.  Implementa-
tion of the planned regional improvements is FORA’s responsibility.  It can and 
should implement these measures.  They are, in fact, included in FORA’s Reuse 
Plan.  Drainage is presently adequate for university operations.  As noted, there are 
current disputes regarding implementation of these measures; any remaining 
unavoidable impacts are acceptable as a worst case because of the reasons 
specified in the Statement of Overriding Considerations.”   
 
The Trustees’ findings about water supply and wastewater management are 
similar.   
 
13
certify the EIR and to approve the Master Plan for CSUMB depends in large part 
on whether they have correctly understood the nature and scope of their obligation 
to contribute to FORA.  We thus briefly summarize the relevant portion of the 
appendix, which effectively defined the issues in the lower courts and anticipated 
the Trustees’ arguments in the present proceeding. 
CSUMB’s land, the Trustees observe in the appendix to the EIR, is exempt 
from taxation as “[p]roperty owned by the State” under article XIII, section 3, 
subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.  This constitutional provision has 
been interpreted as implicitly immunizing state-owned property from special 
assessments imposed by local governments, except as authorized by the 
Legislature.  (San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified School Dist. (1986) 
42 Cal.3d 154, 160-161 (San Marcos).)  In reaction to San Marcos, the Legislature 
passed a law (chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, beginning with section 
54999) authorizing any public agency that provides public utility services to a 
public educational agency to impose a “[c]apital facilities fee” on the latter “after 
agreement has been reached between the two agencies through negotiations 
entered into by both parties.”  (Gov. Code, § 54999.3, subd. (b).)  This law, which 
addresses only fees intended to “pay the capital cost of a public utility facility” 
(id., § 54999.1, subd. (b)), defines “ ‘[p]ublic utility facility’ ” for these purposes 
as “a facility for the provision of water, light, heat, communications, power, or 
garbage service, for flood control, drainage or sanitary purposes, or for sewage 
collection, treatment, or disposal” (id., subd. (d)).  The FORA Act, in turn, 
provides that “[t]he applicability of any capital facilities fees imposed under this 
title [i.e., the FORA Act] to public educational agencies shall be subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 13.7 [of the Government Code] (commencing with section 
54999) . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 67685.)   
 
14
Based on these authorities, the Trustees conclude in the appendix that the 
Legislature has in effect authorized FORA to impose fees on CSUMB for the 
purposes mentioned in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (e.g., water, drainage 
and sewage; see id., § 54999.1, subd. (d)) but not for any other purposes not 
mentioned (e.g., roads and fire protection).  Any payment to FORA for a purpose 
not mentioned in the section, the Trustees conclude, even a voluntary payment 
made in order to mitigate CSUMB’s environmental effects, would amount to an 
assessment prohibited by the state Constitution, as interpreted in San Marcos, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, and constitute a gift of public funds.  Having thus concluded 
that any contribution by CSUMB to mitigate the campus’s effects on roads and 
fire protection would be unlawful, the Trustees further conclude that to mitigate 
these effects is “infeasible,” presumably for “legal” reasons (see Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(3)), and thus not required by CEQA because, in the 
Trustees’ view, overriding considerations justify proceeding with the project 
despite the unmitigated effects (see id., § 21081, subd. (b)).   
A lengthy statement of overriding considerations accompanies the Trustees’ 
findings certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan for CSUMB.  In the 
statement, the Trustees reiterate the requirements of CEQA, the content of the 
EIR, the principal features of the Master Plan for CSUMB, and favorable public 
comments on the EIR.  The following excerpts summarize some of the 
considerations underlying the Trustees’ conclusion that campus expansion will 
offer benefits that outweigh any remaining unmitigated effects on the 
environment:  “The CSU has identified the need for a university in the Monterey 
Bay area that addresses the projected demand for postsecondary education in the 
state of California by accommodating 25,000 [FTE students] at buildout.  CSU 
recognizes official projections of future increases in the number of students to be 
served . . . which cannot be accommodated within [the] existing system capacity 
 
15
of the CSU.  The reuse of Fort Ord for this purpose is particularly advantageous to 
the CSU because of the difficulty in acquiring campus-size parcels, the value of 
existing development on the site, and the attractive location of the site in the 
Monterey area.  The master plan has been designed to provide an institution that 
will effectively serve the mission of the CSU system.”  In addition, development 
of the campus will offer higher education to “historically underrepresented 
populations and cultures of the state of California,” “foster economic revitalization 
of a region impacted by closure of the largest residential military training facility 
in the nation” and “create job opportunities for approximately 2,760 faculty and 
staff as well as significant additional employment in university support activities.”   
On May 13, 1998, the Trustees adopted resolutions approving the statement 
of overriding considerations, certifying the EIR, and approving the Master Plan for 
CSUMB.  Thereafter, FORA and the City of Marina filed separate petitions for 
writ of mandate challenging the Trustees’ actions.  The petitions alleged, among 
other things, that the Trustees had (1) failed to identify and adopt existing, feasible 
measures to mitigate significant effects on the environment described in the EIR, 
(2) improperly certified the EIR and approved the Master Plan despite the 
availability of feasible mitigation measures, (3) improperly disclaimed 
responsibility for mitigating CSUMB’s environmental effects, and (4) improperly 
relied on a statement of overriding considerations to justify certifying the EIR and 
approving the Master Plan.   
The superior court granted the petitions, issued its writ of mandate directing 
the Trustees to vacate their actions certifying the EIR and approving the Master 
 
16
Plan, and to set aside the EIR’s statement of overriding considerations.  A divided 
Court of Appeal reversed.  We granted FORA’s petition for review.10     
II. DISCUSSION 
The question before us is whether the Trustees have properly certified the 
EIR for CSUMB and, on that basis, approved the Master Plan.  FORA contends 
the Trustees’ decision must be vacated because three findings critical to their 
decision depend on an erroneous legal assumption, namely, that the California 
Constitution precludes them from contributing to FORA, even for the purpose of 
mitigating the environmental effects identified in the EIR, except as expressly 
permitted by chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.).  The first 
two challenged findings are (1) that the Trustees cannot feasibly mitigate 
CSUMB’s significant environmental effects and (2) that to mitigate CSUMB’s 
effects is not the Trustees’ responsibility.  These two findings have, in turn, 
necessitated the third, which is (3) that overriding considerations justify certifying 
the EIR and approving the Master Plan despite the remaining unmitigated effects.  
(See generally Pub. Resources Code, § 21081.)  We conclude FORA is correct and 
that the Trustees have abused their discretion. 
We review the Trustees’ decision, as CEQA directs, under the abuse of 
discretion standard.  (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5.)  For these purposes, 
                                              
10  
The Court of Appeal left undisturbed the superior court’s additional 
conclusion that the Trustees had improperly failed to determine whether certain 
commercial developments contemplated in the Master Plan for CSUMB, including 
a retail mall, were consistent with FORA’s Reuse Plan.  CSUMB is exempt from 
land use regulation by FORA (including regulation under the Reuse Plan) only 
with respect to property “that is used for educational or research purposes.”  (Gov. 
Code, § 67678, subd. (f).)  Profits from the developments in question are expected 
to generate as much as 30 percent of CSUMB’s budget.   
 
 
17
“[a]buse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner 
required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (Ibid.)  Although this standard would command much deference to 
factual and environmental conclusions in the EIR based on conflicting evidence 
(e.g., Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California, 
supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 393, 409), no such conclusions are here at issue.  At issue, 
rather, are the Trustees’ findings that mitigation is infeasible and that mitigation is 
not their responsibility.  These findings depend on a disputed question of law—a 
type of question we review de novo.  De novo review of legal questions is 
consistent with the abuse of discretion standard.  In the context of review for abuse 
of discretion, an agency’s “use of an erroneous legal standard constitutes a failure 
to proceed in a manner required by law.”  (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 
(1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 88; see also Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey 
County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118 [“questions of 
interpretation or application of the requirements of CEQA are matters of law”].)  
De novo review of legal questions is also consistent with the principle that, in 
CEQA cases, “ ‘[t]he court does not pass upon the correctness of the EIR’s 
environmental conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency as an `informative 
document.’ ”  (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of 
California, supra, at p. 392, quoting County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 
71 Cal.App.3d 185, 189.)  An EIR that incorrectly disclaims the power and duty to 
mitigate identified environmental effects based on erroneous legal assumptions is 
not sufficient as an informative document. 
 
18
A. Is Mitigation Infeasible?   
1. Is mitigation infeasible because the Trustees may not lawfully 
contribute to FORA?   
We consider first the Trustees’ finding that they cannot feasibly mitigate the 
environmental effects of their plan to expand the CSUMB campus.  CEQA defines 
“ ‘[f]easible’ ” for these purposes as “capable of being accomplished in a 
successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account 
economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.”  (Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21061.1.)  To this list, the CEQA Guidelines add “legal” factors.  (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15364; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(3).)  The 
Trustees, by arguing the state Constitution prohibits them from voluntarily 
contributing funds to FORA as a form of mitigation, in effect take the position that 
such contributions are legally infeasible.  We discuss here only the permissibility 
of voluntary payments by the Trustees.  Some of the public financing laws that 
FORA has the power to invoke (see Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (d)) would, as the 
Trustees acknowledge, permit FORA to assess state-owned property such as the 
CSUMB campus.  FORA has not, however, attempted to impose an assessment. 
The plain language of the California Constitution does not support the 
Trustees’ position that voluntary mitigation payments are impermissible.  The 
provision on which the Trustees rely, article XIII, section 3, subdivision (a), 
provides simply that “[p]roperty owned by the State” is “exempt from property 
taxation . . . .”  FORA has not imposed a tax on the Trustees.  We have, however, 
interpreted the same constitutional provision as implicitly exempting publicly 
owned property from special assessments made without legislative authority.  
(Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles (1929) 207 Cal. 697, 703-704; see also 
Regents of University of California v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 
547, 549; County of Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water Dist. (1978) 84 
 
19
Cal.App.3d 655, 659-660; cf. Regents of University of California v. City of Los 
Angeles (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 451, 454, fn. 2 [questioning whether the 
exemption is grounded in policy considerations rather than the Constitution].)11  
We reaffirmed this conclusion in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, 160-161, the 
case on which the Trustees principally rely.  The Trustees, as noted, argue based 
on San Marcos that any payment by themselves to FORA for the purpose of 
improving Fort Ord’s infrastructure would constitute a special assessment 
prohibited in the absence of legislative authority.  The Trustees find in chapter 
13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.) legislative authority for payments 
related to subjects mentioned therein, such as water, drainage and sewage 
collection (id., § 54999.1, subd. (d)), but not for any purpose not mentioned, such 
as roads and fire protection.   
The Trustees have misinterpreted San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154.  The 
decision addresses only compulsory charges imposed by one public entity on 
another.  The case has nothing to say about a discretionary payment made by a 
public agency that voluntarily chooses that method of discharging its duty under 
CEQA to mitigate the environmental effects of its project.  Because the Trustees’ 
interpretation of San Marcos critically underlies their position in this case, we 
examine the decision and its consequences in detail.   
At issue in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, was the validity of a 
“capacity fee” (id., at p. 157) imposed by a public water district on a public school 
                                              
11  
But see California Constitution, article XIII D, section 4:  “Parcels within a 
district that are owned or used by any agency, the State of California or the United 
States shall not be exempt from assessment unless the agency can demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that those publicly owned parcels in fact receive no 
special benefit.”  (Added by initiative measure Prop. 218, § 4, approved by the 
electorate Nov. 5, 1996.) 
 
20
district.  The specific question was whether the capacity fee was a user fee, which 
the school district conceded it would have to pay, or a special assessment, from 
which the school district was exempt under the cases cited above.  The court held 
the school district was exempt.  The purpose of the fee was not to pay for water 
service but to provide a source of funds for capital improvements to the water 
system.  (Id., at p. 159.)  The capacity fee thus fit the definition of a special 
assessment as “ ‘a compulsory charge placed by [the government] upon real 
property within a pre-determined district, made under express legislative authority 
for defraying in whole or in part the expense of a permanent public improvement 
therein . . . .’ ”  (San Marcos, at p. 161, quoting Spring Street Co. v. City of Los 
Angeles (1915) 170 Cal. 24, 29.)  In applying this definition, the court “look[ed] to 
the purpose of the fee being charged, and not simply to the form of the fee, a 
matter which can be easily manipulated.”  (San Marcos, at p. 163.)  Accordingly, 
the court attributed no significance to the fact the water district had calculated the 
charge by reference to the volume of water the school district anticipated using—a 
characteristic typical of user fees.  While the assessment’s form thus caused it to 
resemble a user fee in some respects, the water district was not permitted “ ‘to do 
indirectly that which it could not do directly.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting County of 
Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water Dist., supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 655, 659-660.)   
In summary, the court in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, announced two 
holdings:  the court reiterated the existing rule that publicly owned property was 
exempt from special assessment absent “ ‘positive legislative authority therefor’ ” 
(id., at p. 161, quoting Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 207 Cal. 697, 
704), and the court determined that the particular charge at issue was an 
assessment rather than a user fee (San Marcos, at pp. 163-165).  The court found 
analogous support for its conclusions in prior decisions identifying “[t]he rationale 
behind a public entity’s exemption from property taxes and special assessments 
 
21
[as being] to prevent one tax-supported entity from siphoning tax money from 
another such entity; the end result of such a process [possibly being] unnecessary 
administrative costs and no actual gain in tax revenues.”  (San Marcos, at p. 161, 
citing Eisley v. Mohan (1948) 31 Cal.2d 637, 642.)  The court also acknowledged, 
perhaps bluntly, one of the more significant consequences of its holding:  “Our 
conclusion does not mean,” the court wrote, “that the water district cannot collect 
money for capital improvements from its customers; it simply means that the 
private customers will pay the entire cost of capital improvements.  Public entities, 
such as the school district, will not be required to allocate their limited tax 
revenues to pay for capital improvements built by the sewer district.”  (San 
Marcos, at p. 158.)   
The Legislature promptly reacted to the decision in San Marcos, supra, 42 
Cal.3d 154, by authorizing public utilities to charge public-entity customers their 
fair share of the utilities’ capital costs and by ratifying fees previously imposed for 
that purpose.  Under chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.), 
enacted in response to San Marcos, “[a]ny public agency providing public utility 
service” may impose on any public agency a “capital facilities fee” (id., 
§ 54999.2), meaning “any nondiscriminatory charge to pay the capital cost of a 
public utility facility” (id., § 54999.1, subd. (b)).  A “ ‘[p]ublic utility facility’ ” 
for these purposes is “a facility for the provision of water, light, heat, communica-
tions, power, or garbage service, for flood control, drainage or sanitary purposes, 
or for sewage collection, treatment, or disposal.”  (Id., § 54999.1, subd. (d).)  
Motivating these changes to the law was the Legislature’s perception that public 
utilities and their public-entity customers, on the whole, had not shared the court’s 
understanding of the law.  “[M]any public entities that provide public utility 
service,” the Legislature explained, “have imposed capital facilities fees applicable 
to users of public utility facilities in order to equitably apportion the cost of capital 
 
22
facilities construction or expansion required by all public and private users of the 
facilities.”  As a result of San Marcos, however, “the fiscal stability and service 
capabilities of the affected public utility service agencies which have in good faith 
collected and spent these fees for capital improvements are seriously impaired as 
is the ability to finance essential future facilities.”  (Gov. Code, § 54999, 
subd. (a).)   
Against this background, we may easily reject the Trustees’ argument that 
they may not lawfully contribute to FORA as a way of discharging their obligation 
under CEQA to mitigate the environmental effects of their project to expand 
CSUMB.  The Trustees’ three-part argument may be summarized as follows:  
(1) Any payment by the Trustees to FORA for the purpose of capital improvement 
in Fort Ord is an assessment, regardless of form; (2) public agencies are exempt 
from assessment except as permitted by the Legislature; and (3) the Legislature 
has permitted assessments only for the purposes set out in chapter 13.7 of the 
Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.).   
The Trustees err crucially at the outset.  An assessment connotes, at the 
very least, a compulsory charge imposed by the government on real property.  
(Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132, 141; see also Southern Cal. Rapid 
Transit Dist. v. Bolen (1992) 1 Cal.4th 654, 660; San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 
154, 161; Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 170 Cal. 24, 29.)  FORA 
has imposed no charge on the Trustees, let alone a compulsory one.  As part of its 
planning process, FORA has made a provisional effort to estimate the Trustees’ 
fair share of the cost of infrastructure improvements, but FORA has taken no steps 
to create an enforceable legal obligation to pay.  Indeed, FORA disclaims any 
intention to impose a charge on the Trustees and looks instead exclusively to a 
negotiated payment.  This case is not a collection action or an action to validate an 
assessment.  Instead, FORA claims the Trustees have abused their discretion under 
 
23
CEQA by certifying an EIR that improperly fails to identify voluntary 
contributions to FORA as a feasible method of mitigating the environmental 
effects of their project to expand CSUMB.   
In other words, the question of payment arises not because FORA has 
imposed a charge (it has not), but because CEQA requires the Trustees to avoid or 
mitigate, if feasible, the significant environmental effects of their project (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b)) and because payments to FORA may 
represent a feasible form of mitigation.  To illustrate the point, if campus 
expansion requires that roads or sewers be improved, the Trustees may do the 
work themselves on campus, but they have no authority to build roads or sewers 
off campus on land that belongs to others.  Yet the Trustees are not thereby 
excused from the duty to mitigate or avoid CSUMB’s off-campus effects on traffic 
or wastewater management, because CEQA requires a public agency to mitigate or 
avoid its projects’ significant effects not just on the agency’s own property but “on 
the environment” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b), italics added), with 
“environment” defined for these purposes as “the physical conditions which exist 
within the area which will be affected by a proposed project” (id., § 21060.5, 
italics added).  Thus, if the Trustees cannot adequately mitigate or avoid 
CSUMB’s off-campus environmental effects by performing acts on campus (as by 
reducing sufficiently the use of automobiles or the volume of sewage), then to pay 
a third party such as FORA to perform the necessary acts off campus may well 
represent a feasible alternative.  A payment made under these circumstances can 
properly be described neither as compulsory nor, for that reason, as an assessment.   
Arguing to the contrary, the Trustees emphasize the court’s statement in 
San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, 163, that courts will identify an assessment by 
“look[ing] to the purpose of the fee being charged, and not simply to the form of 
the fee, a matter which can be easily manipulated.”  Based on this statement, the 
 
24
Trustees argue that a voluntary payment made to fund projects that might also be 
funded by an assessment, such as infrastructure projects, must be considered an 
assessment for all purposes.  The San Marcos court announced no such 
conclusion.  Instead, the court made the quoted statement in the context of 
determining whether an admittedly compulsory charge was a user fee or an 
assessment.  Nothing in San Marcos speaks to voluntary payments or purports to 
address or narrow any public agency’s duties under CEQA.   
The Trustees also seek to draw support from the court’s statement in San 
Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, of the reason traditionally thought to underlie the 
rule exempting public property from taxation, i.e., that the exemption “prevent[s] 
one tax-supported entity from siphoning tax money from another such entity; the 
end result of such a process [possibly being] unnecessary administrative costs and 
no actual gain in tax revenues.”  (Id., at p. 161.)  Inviting an analogy, the Trustees 
point out that any payment by CSU to FORA for infrastructure improvements will 
reduce the amount of money available to CSU for its core educational functions.  
The Trustees read too much into San Marcos.  While there does exist a general 
rule to the effect that “[p]roperty owned by the State” is exempt from taxation 
(Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 3, subd. (a)), no rule precludes a public entity from 
sharing with another the cost of improvements benefiting both.  Furthermore, 
while education may be CSU’s core function, to avoid or mitigate the 
environmental effects of its projects is also one of CSU’s functions.  This is the 
plain import of CEQA, in which the Legislature has commanded that “[e]ach 
public agency shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of 
projects that it carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so.”  (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b), italics added; see also id., § 21002 
[declaring the same obligation to be “the policy of the state”].)  Nothing in San 
 
25
Marcos can fairly be read as addressing, much less narrowing, a public agency’s 
obligations under CEQA. 
The Trustees, as noted, are willing to contribute to FORA for the limited 
purpose of mitigating CSUMB’s effects on drainage, water supply, and 
wastewater management under the terms of chapter 13.7 of the Government Code 
(§ 54999 et seq.).  Chapter 13.7, as already explained, contains the law the 
Legislature passed in the wake of San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, authorizing 
public utilities to charge public-entity customers their fair share of the utilities’ 
capital costs.  Under the law, “any public agency proposing to initially impose a 
capital facilities fee . . . may do so after agreement has been reached between the 
two agencies through negotiations entered into by both parties.”  (Gov. Code, 
§ 54999.3, subd. (b).)  In such a case, “[t]he public agency imposing . . . the 
capital facilities fee has the burden of producing evidence to establish that the 
capital facilities fee is nondiscriminatory and that the amount of the capital 
facilities fee does not exceed the amount necessary to provide capital facilities for 
which the fee is charged.”  (Id., subd. (c).)  The FORA Act expressly invokes this 
negotiative process by specifying that “[t]he applicability of any capital facilities 
fees imposed under this title [i.e., the FORA Act] to public educational agencies 
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 13.7 . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 67685.)   
Because FORA has not imposed or sought to impose a capital facilities fee 
on the Trustees, chapter 13.7 does not literally apply.  That having been said, we 
see no reason why an agreement between the Trustees and FORA regarding a 
voluntary payment negotiated according to the procedure set out in chapter 13.7 
for the purpose of mitigating specified environmental effects (i.e., water supply, 
drainage and wastewater management) would not satisfy the Trustees’ CEQA 
obligations as to those effects.  While the amount determined by negotiation may 
not equal the amount FORA originally projected, for its own planning purposes, 
 
26
that the Trustees would pay, nothing in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, 
CEQA or the FORA Act permits FORA unilaterally to determine the amount of 
any voluntary contribution the Trustees may choose to make as a way of satisfying 
their obligation under CEQA to mitigate the environmental effects of their project.   
To the contrary, the Trustees as the lead agency under CEQA have the power and 
duty to assess the adequacy of mitigation measures, subject only to judicial review 
for abuse of discretion.  (See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 393.)  Furthermore, nothing in 
chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, CEQA or the FORA Act obliges the 
Trustees to pay more than is necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s effects.  Certainly 
the Trustees need not pay to mitigate effects caused by other users of the base.  To 
the contrary, CEQA requires that mitigation measures “be ‘roughly proportional’ 
to the impacts of the project.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(4)(B), 
citing Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374; cf. id., at p. 391.)12   
Finally on this point, the Trustees argue that chapter 13.7 of the 
Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.) and the FORA Act (id., § 67650 et seq.), 
which specifically authorize FORA to impose on the Trustees a negotiated fee for 
certain purposes (e.g., water supply, drainage and wastewater management), 
suggest the Legislature must have contemplated the Trustees would have no 
obligation to contribute to FORA for other purposes (e.g., the cost of improving 
roads and fire protection).  We discern in the cited provisions, however, no 
evidence of a legislative intent to bar the Trustees from voluntarily contributing, as 
                                              
12  
Similarly, chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, although not here literally 
applicable, requires that payments by a public agency to a public utility for capital 
facilities be “nondiscriminatory” and that they “not exceed the amount necessary 
to provide capital facilities for which the fee is charged.”  (Gov. Code, § 54999.3, 
subd. (c).)   
 
27
a way of meeting their CEQA obligations, their fair share of the cost of 
improvements to roads and fire protection necessitated by CSUMB’s expansion.  
On this point the FORA Act, as noted, provides simply that “[t]he applicability of 
any capital facilities fee imposed under this title to public educational agencies 
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 13.7 [of the same code].”  (Gov. 
Code, § 67685, italics added.)  Chapter 13.7, in turn, speaks only of fees 
“impose[d]” (id., § 54999.3, subd. (b), italics added) by public utilities.  Because 
FORA has imposed no fee on the Trustees, neither Government Code section 
67685 nor chapter 13.7 has any literal application to the present case.  Moreover, 
neither law purports to limit the Trustees’ independent obligation under CEQA to 
protect the physical environment from the effects of their project to expand the 
CSUMB campus.   
2. Is mitigation infeasible because a contribution by the Trustees to 
FORA would amount to a prohibited gift of public funds? 
The Trustees next argue that any payment to FORA made otherwise than 
under Government Code chapter 13.7 (§ 54999 et seq.) would constitute an illegal 
gift of public funds.  (See Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.) 13  The argument invokes the 
court’s statement in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, that the ability of the 
school district in that case to “agree to pay [the disputed capacity] charge 
depend[ed] upon whether the [water] district ha[d] the power to impose it,” and 
that payment of an invalid charge “would amount to a ‘gift of public funds’ in 
                                              
13  
“[N]or shall [the Legislature] have power to make any gift or authorize the 
making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, 
municipal or other corporation whatever . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.)  We 
have long assumed that this constitutional prohibition, applicable by its terms only 
to the Legislature, also applies to public agencies.  (E.g., Santa Barbara etc. 
Agency v. All Persons (1957) 47 Cal.2d 699, 707.)   
 
28
contravention of article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.”  (San 
Marcos, at p. 167, quoting County of Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water Dist., 
supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 655, 660.)  We have, however, already rejected the central 
premise of this argument, which is that a voluntary payment by the Trustees would 
constitute an assessment.   
In any event, the relevant law makes clear that a payment by the Trustees for 
the purpose of mitigating CSUMB’s environmental effects would not constitute an 
unlawful gift of public funds.  “It is well settled that, in determining whether an 
appropriation of public funds or property is to be considered a gift, the primary 
question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ purpose.  
If they are for a ‘public purpose’, they are not a gift within the meaning of [the 
Constitution].”  (County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 281.)  Such 
a payment by the Trustees would have the public purpose of discharging their duty 
as a public agency, under the express terms of CEQA, to “mitigate or avoid the 
significant effects on the environment of projects that [they] carr[y] out or 
approve[] whenever it is feasible to do so.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, 
subd. (b).)   
3. Is mitigation infeasible because the Trustees cannot guarantee that 
FORA will actually implement the proposed infrastructure 
improvements? 
As a final reason why they cannot feasibly mitigate CSUMB’s environmental 
effects by voluntarily contributing to FORA, the Trustees argue they cannot 
guarantee that FORA will actually implement the infrastructure improvements 
proposed in the Reuse Plan.  The argument is not persuasive.   
In certifying the EIR and approving CSUMB’s Master Plan, the Trustees 
specifically found that the infrastructure improvements proposed by FORA 
constitute the “specific measure[s]” necessary to mitigate each of CSUMB’s 
 
29
corresponding environmental impacts to the level of insignificance.  The Trustees 
did not find that mitigation of these impacts was feasible, however, in part because 
of asserted doubts about FORA’s ability to fund and implement the proposed 
improvements.  CEQA, as noted, defines a “ ‘[f]easible’ ” mitigation measure as 
one that is “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a 
reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, 
and technological factors.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21061.1; see also CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15364.)  Invoking this definition, the Trustees found in the EIR as to 
each remaining environmental impact that “implementation of the regional 
mitigation . . . is currently disputed, [and that] mitigation of the impact to a less 
than significant level cannot be assured by CSU.”  
The Trustees explained their position in more detail in response to public 
comments on their EIR:  “Although all parties to the MOA[14] will agree that the 
determined contributions by CSUMB are intended to mitigate the offsite impacts 
contributed by development of the Master Plan, it is acknowledged that CSUMB’s 
contribution represents only a portion of the funding needed to implement the 
regional improvements.  Similar payments will need to be made by other 
jurisdictions contributing to regional impacts in order for the improvements to be 
implemented.  In addition, ultimate implementation of the improvement program 
is under the responsibility of FORA, and cannot be controlled or assured by the 
University.  For these reasons, . . . the [EIR] determine[s] that the significant 
impacts on drainage, water supply, traffic, wastewater generation, and fire 
                                              
14  
That is, a Memorandum of Agreement proposed by the Trustees to 
implement their proposal to contribute funds pursuant to chapter 13.7 of the 
Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.) for improvements in water supply, drainage 
and wastewater management.   
 
30
protection, identified as caused by the Master Plan, will remain significant and 
unavoidable.  These impacts will therefore require the adoption of a Statement of 
Overriding Conditions by the [Trustees] in compliance with CEQA.”   
The presently identified, unavoidable uncertainties affecting the funding and 
implementation of the infrastructure improvements FORA has proposed in its 
Reuse Plan do not render voluntary contributions to FORA by the Trustees 
infeasible as a method of mitigating CSUMB’s effects.  Both the CEQA 
Guidelines and judicial decisions recognize that a project proponent may satisfy its 
duty to mitigate its own portion of a cumulative environmental impact by 
contributing to a regional mitigation fund.  Under the Guidelines, “a project’s 
contribution to a significant cumulative impact” may properly be considered “less 
than cumulatively considerable and thus . . . not significant” “if the project is 
required to implement or fund its fair share of a mitigation measure or measures 
designed to alleviate the cumulative impact.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15130, subd. 
(a)(3).)  Similarly, courts have found fee-based mitigation programs for 
cumulative impacts, based on fair-share infrastructure contributions by individual 
projects, to constitute adequate mitigation measures under CEQA.  (E.g., 
Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1188; 
Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87 
Cal.App.4th 99, 140.) 15 
                                              
15  
The Trustees assert that courts have not permitted public entities, as 
opposed to private entities, to mitigate their projects’ contributions to cumulative 
impacts by paying into regional mitigation funds.  The single decision on which 
the Trustees rely, however, is not on point.  The court in Goleta Union School 
Dist. v. Regents of University of California (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1025, held that 
the Regents of the University of California had no obligation to propose, in an EIR 
addressing a project to expand the University of California at Santa Barbara, 
methods for alleviating overcrowding in local public schools expected to result 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
31
“Of course a commitment to pay fees without any evidence that mitigation 
will actually occur is inadequate.”  (Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey 
County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 140; see also Kings County 
Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal. App.3d 692, 727-728 [lacking 
evidence water would be available for purchase, an agreement to purchase 
replacement water did not adequately mitigate groundwater depletion].)  There is, 
however, no reason to doubt that FORA will meet its statutory obligation as the 
government of Fort Ord to prepare the base for civilian development by 
constructing whatever public capital facilities are necessary for that purpose.  (See 
Gov. Code, § 67679.)  As noted, FORA plans to implement the improvements 
over a period of several years, as increasing land use necessitates them and as 
funding becomes available.  To enable this task to be accomplished, the 
Legislature has given FORA a broad array of fundraising powers, including the 
power to levy assessments and development fees, to share tax revenue with its 
local-government member agencies, and to sell and lease property.  (See Gov. 
Code, §§ 67678, subd. (a), 67679, subds. (c)-(e), 67691, 67692.)  Furthermore, the 
law specifically directs FORA to use its powers to ensure the success of its 
statutory mission (e.g., Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (a)(1) [FORA must “undertake 
to plan for and arrange the provision of [public capital] facilities, including 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
from the project.  The basis for the court’s holding was that CEQA requires 
consideration only of “physical change[s]” in the environment (Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21065; cf. id., § 21060.5), and that the “[e]conomic or social effects of a 
project shall not be treated as significant effects on the environment” (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15131, subd. (a)).  (See Goleta Union School Dist. v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, at pp. 1030-1033.) 
 
 
32
arranging for their financing and construction”]), and the courts ordinarily 
presume that the government, in this instance FORA, will comply with the law 
(e.g., City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 291, 297; Save 
Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87 
Cal.App.4th 99, 141).   
By way of analogy, the court in Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey 
Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 99, held that a county had adequately 
ensured the mitigation of traffic congestion effects by “provid[ing] for 
improvements to be constructed as the traffic triggering the need for the 
improvements exceeded a projected threshold and the funds to pay for the 
improvements were generated by the new development.”  (Id., at p. 141.)  CEQA, 
the court explained, required not “a time-specific schedule for the County to 
complete specified road improvements” (ibid.) but only “that there be a reasonable 
plan for mitigation” (ibid.).  FORA’s Reuse Plan satisfies that criterion.  The 
Trustees’ assumption that CEQA requires more is an error of law invalidating their 
finding that voluntary mitigation payments to FORA do not represent a feasible 
method of mitigating CSU’s off-campus environmental effects.  (No Oil, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d 68, 88 [an agency’s “use of an erroneous 
legal standard constitutes a failure to proceed in a manner required by law”]; see 
also Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, 
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118 [“questions of interpretation or application of the 
requirements of CEQA are matters of law”].)   
B. Is Mitigation Exclusively the Responsibility of FORA?   
CEQA, as previously noted, does not require a public agency to undertake 
identified mitigation measures, even if those measures are necessary to address the 
project’s significant environmental effects, if the agency finds that the measures 
 
33
“are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have 
been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency.”  (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21081, subd. (a)(2).)  The Trustees have made such a finding with respect to the 
measures necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s projected effects on drainage, water 
supply, wastewater management, traffic, and fire protection.  As to each such 
effect, the Trustees have found that “the specific measure to mitigate [each] 
impact to a level of insignificance is to implement the planned regional FORA 
. . . improvements,” and that “[i]mplementation of the planned regional 
improvements is FORA’s responsibility.”   
Certainly FORA has responsibility for implementing the infrastructure 
improvements it has proposed.  (See Gov. Code, § 67679.)  Just as certainly, 
however, the FORA Act contemplates that the costs of those improvements will be 
borne by those who benefit from them.  (See ibid.)  A finding by a lead agency 
under Public Resources Code section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), disclaiming the 
responsibility to mitigate environmental effects is permissible only when the other 
agency said to have responsibility has exclusive responsibility.  As the CEQA 
Guidelines explain, “[t]he finding in subsection (a)(2) shall not be made if the 
agency making the finding has concurrent jurisdiction with another agency to deal 
with identified feasible mitigation measures or alternatives.”  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§  15091, subd. (c).)  The Guidelines’ logical interpretation of CEQA on this point 
“avoids the problem of agencies deferring to each other, with the result that no 
agency deals with the problem.  This result would be contrary to the strong policy 
[requiring the mitigation or avoidance of significant environmental effects] 
declared in Sections 21002 and 21002.1 of the statute.”  (Discussion of Resources 
Agency following CEQA Guidelines, § 15091; see also 1 Kostka, Practice Under 
the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2005) § 17.19, pp. 821-823.)   
 
34
The Trustees offer two arguments in support of their finding disclaiming 
responsibility for the measures necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s off-campus 
environmental effects.  Neither withstands close scrutiny.  The Trustees’ first 
argument—that they may not lawfully contribute to FORA in view of San Marcos, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, and the constitutional exemption of state property from 
taxation (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 3, subd. (a))—has already been considered and 
rejected.  The Trustees’ second argument—that they lack the power to construct 
infrastructure improvements away from campus on land they do not own and 
control—is beside the point.  Certainly the Trustees may not enter the land of 
others to widen roads and lay sewer pipe; CEQA gives the Trustees no such 
power.  (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21004 [“[i]n mitigating or avoiding a 
significant effect of a project on the environment, a public agency may exercise 
only those express or implied powers provided by law other than this division.”].)  
CEQA does not, however, as we have explained, limit a public agency’s 
obligation to mitigate or avoid significant environmental effects to effects 
occurring on the agency’s own property.  (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21002.1, 
subd. (b), 21060.5.)  CEQA also provides that “[a]ll state agencies . . . shall 
request in their budgets the funds necessary to protect the environment in relation 
to problems caused by their activities.”  (Id., § 21106.)  Thus, as we have also 
explained, if the Trustees cannot adequately mitigate or avoid CSUMB’s off-
campus environmental effects by performing acts on the campus, then to pay a 
third party such as FORA to perform the necessary acts off campus may well 
represent a feasible alternative.   
To be clear, we do not hold that the duty of a public agency to mitigate or 
avoid significant environmental effects (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. 
 
35
(b)), combined with the duty to ask the Legislature for money to do so (id., 
§ 21106),16 will always give a public agency that is undertaking a project with 
environmental effects shared responsibility for mitigation measures another 
agency must implement.  Some mitigation measures cannot be purchased, such as 
permits that another agency has the sole discretion to grant or refuse.  Moreover, a 
state agency’s power to mitigate its project’s effects through voluntary mitigation 
payments is ultimately subject to legislative control; if the Legislature does not 
appropriate the money, the power does not exist.  For the same reason, however, 
for the Trustees to disclaim responsibility for making such payments before they 
have complied with their statutory obligation to ask the Legislature for the 
necessary funds is premature, at the very least.  The superior court found no 
evidence the Trustees had asked the Legislature for the funds.  In their brief to this 
court, the Trustees acknowledge they did not budget for payments they assumed 
would constitute invalid assessments under San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154.  
That assumption, as we have explained, is invalid. 
C. Do Overriding Circumstances Justify Approving the Campus 
Master Plan? 
When a public agency has found that a project’s significant environmental 
effects cannot feasibly be mitigated, the agency may nevertheless proceed with the 
project if it also finds “that specific overriding economic, legal, social, technologi-
cal, or other benefits of the project outweigh the significant effects on the environ-
ment.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (b).)  The Trustees, as noted, have 
made such a finding with respect to each of the remaining, unmitigated environ-
                                              
16  
“All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall request in their budgets 
the funds necessary to protect the environment in relation to problems caused by 
their activities.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21106.) 
 
36
mental impacts on drainage, water supply, wastewater management, traffic and 
fire protection.   
If we agreed with the Trustees that mitigation were infeasible for the reasons 
given in the findings, i.e., that the Trustees may not legally contribute to FORA 
and that the Trustees cannot ensure that FORA will actually construct infrastruc-
ture improvements—we would give much deference to the Trustees’ weighing of 
the project’s benefits against the remaining environmental effects.  Generally 
speaking, “a court’s proper role in reviewing a challenged EIR is not to determine 
whether the EIR’s ultimate conclusions are correct but only whether they are 
supported by substantial evidence and whether the EIR is sufficient as an 
informational document.”  (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 407.)  Moreover, an agency’s 
decision that the specific benefits a project offers outweigh any environmental 
effects that cannot feasibly be mitigated, while subject to review for abuse of 
discretion (Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5), lies at the core of the lead agency’s 
discretionary responsibility under CEQA and is, for that reason, not lightly to be 
overturned.  (Cf. Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of 
California, supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 [court reviews the EIR’s sufficiency as an 
informative document and not the correctness of its environmental conclusions].)   
In this case, however, the Trustee’s statement of overriding considerations is 
invalid for a reason that does not require us to reweigh benefits and detriments, or 
to inquire into the statement’s factual basis.  A statement of overriding considera-
tions is required, and offers a proper basis for approving a project despite the 
existence of unmitigated environmental effects, only when the measures necessary 
to mitigate or avoid those effects have properly been found to be infeasible.  (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (b).)  Given our conclusion the Trustees have 
abused their discretion in determining that CSUMB’s remaining effects cannot 
 
37
feasibly be mitigated, that the Trustees’ statement of overriding circumstances is 
invalid necessarily follows.  CEQA does not authorize an agency to proceed with a 
project that will have significant, unmitigated effects on the environment, based 
simply on a weighing of those effects against the project’s benefits, unless the 
measures necessary to mitigate those effects are truly infeasible.  Such a rule, even 
were it not wholly inconsistent with the relevant statute (id., § 21081, subd. (b)), 
would tend to displace the fundamental obligation of “[e]ach public agency [to] 
mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects that it 
carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so” (id., § 21002.1, subd. (b)).  
This conclusion does not, however, preclude the Trustees from including in a 
revised EIR a statement of overriding considerations regarding environmental 
effects as to which they have properly found mitigation to be infeasible for reasons 
other than those we have rejected.   
III. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing discussion it follows that the Trustees must be directed to 
vacate their actions certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan and set aside 
the EIR’s statement of overriding circumstances.  The superior court’s writ of 
mandate does order such relief.  The writ is, however, incorrect in one respect.  In 
describing the principles that would apply should the Trustees decide to make 
voluntary mitigation payments to FORA, the court wrote that “CSUMB’s 
proportional share of the cumulative impacts on public capital facilities in the 
region necessary to mitigate the significant adverse environmental impacts of the 
CMP shall be determined by [FORA] . . . .”  (Italics added.)  To the contrary, 
having chosen not to assess the campus but instead to rely on the Trustees to 
comply with their CEQA obligation to mitigate or avoid the environmental effects 
of their project, FORA has no power to dictate the manner in which the Trustees 
exercise their discretion.  Neither do the remedial provisions of CEQA “authorize 
 
38
a court to direct any public agency to exercise its discretion in any particular way.”  
(Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.9, subd. (c).)  CEQA requires only that any 
mitigation measures the Trustees adopt be adequate.  If FORA wishes to compel 
the Trustees to contribute a specific amount to infrastructure improvement 
projects, FORA is free to proceed by exercising the powers specifically granted in 
the FORA Act (e.g., Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (d)), and in the public financing 
statutes to which the act refers (ibid.), to impose a formal assessment on the 
CSUMB campus, complying of course with the procedural requirements set out in 
those statutes and in the California Constitution (e.g., art. XIII D, § 1 et seq.).   
IV. DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to 
that court with directions to order the superior court to vacate its writ of mandate 
and to issue a new writ consistent with the views set forth in this opinion. 
  
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment and in most of the majority opinion’s reasoning.  I 
write separately to explain my reasons for agreeing that the Board of Trustees of 
the California State University (Trustees) may not rely on Public Resources Code 
section 21081, subdivision (a)(2),1 and to express concern about the majority’s 
discussion of this issue. 
Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.), 
when a certified environmental impact report identifies significant environmental 
effects of a proposed project, section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), permits a public 
agency to approve or carry out the project if it finds that “changes or alterations” 
in the project that would mitigate or avoid the identified environmental effects 
“are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have 
been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency.”  The Trustees, who 
made such a finding here, argue that this provision applies because, under the Fort 
Ord Reuse Authority Act (Gov. Code, § 67650 et seq.) (FORA Act), the Fort Ord 
Reuse Authority (FORA) has “exclusive authority to plan and construct off-
campus local infrastructure improvements” and “the University lacks 
jurisdiction . . . to build off-site improvements.”  
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Public Resources Code.  
 
2
In my view, the Trustees err by focusing on the wrong question:  Whether 
the Trustees, acting for the California State University (CSU), have any 
responsibility and jurisdiction regarding actual construction of the necessary off-
campus infrastructure improvements.  The particular mitigation measure at issue 
here—i.e., the proposed “change[] or alteration[]” in the project to mitigate or 
avoid the identified environmental effects (§ 21081, subd. (a)(2))—is not actual 
construction of the improvements, but is payment to FORA to help fund the 
improvements FORA intends to construct.  Thus, the relevant question here in 
applying section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), is not, as the Trustees argue, whether 
they have jurisdiction actually “to build off-site improvements,” but is whether 
they have any responsibility and jurisdiction to help fund FORA’s construction of 
those improvements. 
Based on provisions of the FORA Act and the Education Code, I conclude 
that the Trustees have such responsibility and jurisdiction.  Regarding the former, 
the FORA Act declares the “financing . . . of the reuse of Fort Ord” to be “a matter 
of statewide importance.”  (Gov. Code, § 67657, subd. (c).)  It provides that 
FORA’s Fort Ord reuse plan “shall be the official local plan for the reuse of the 
base for all public purposes, including . . . funding by all state agencies.”  (Gov. 
Code, § 67675, subd. (a), italics added.)  It directs FORA to “arrang[e] for the[] 
financing” of—not to finance itself —“basewide public capital facilities” such as 
“roads.”  (Id., § 67679, subd. (a)(1).)  It also authorizes FORA to “seek state and 
federal grants and loans or other assistance to help fund public facilities” (id., § 
67679, subd. (c)), and to “enter into contracts and agreements as necessary to 
mitigate impacts of the reuse of Fort Ord.”  (Id., §67680.5.)  These provisions 
demonstrate the Legislature’s intent that funding of the necessary infrastructure 
improvements not be solely FORA’s responsibility, and that funding be provided, 
at least in part, by other public agencies. 
 
3
Several provisions of the Education Code also are relevant to the Trustees’ 
responsibility and jurisdiction.  The Education Code declares generally that “[t]he 
mission of the public segments of higher education . . . include[s] a broad 
responsibility to the public interest.”  (Ed. Code, § 66010.5.)  Of course, payments 
to FORA to help mitigate significant environmental impacts of the expansion 
project here at issue would serve the public interest.  The Education Code also 
declares “the intent of the Governor and the Legislature, in cooperation with the 
Trustees,” to “[p]lace a major priority on resolving the serious problem of 
impacted and overcrowded classes, not only with respect to the [CSU], but 
throughout public postsecondary education.”  (Id., § 66015, subd. (a).)  Consistent 
with this declared priority, the Education Code imposes on the CSU a duty “to 
plan that adequate spaces are available to accommodate all California resident 
students who are eligible and likely to apply to attend an appropriate place within 
the system.”  (Id., § 66202.5.)  It also grants the Trustees “full power and 
responsibility in the construction and development of any state university campus, 
and any buildings or other facilities or improvements connected with the [CSU].”  
(Id., § 66606.)  Finally, it directs the Trustees to “expend all money appropriated 
for the support and maintenance of the [CSU]” (id., § 89750), and authorizes them 
to “enter into agreements with any public or private agency, officer, person, or 
institution, corporation, association, or foundation for the performance of acts or 
for the furnishing of services, facilities, materials, goods, supplies, or equipment 
by or for the trustees or for the joint performance of an act or function or the joint 
furnishing of services and facilities by the trustees and the other party to the 
agreement.”  (Id., § 89036, subd. (a).)  Based on these provisions, I have no 
trouble concluding that the Trustees have both responsibility and jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), to 
contribute to the cost of off-site infrastructure improvements needed to mitigate 
 
4
significant environmental impacts of an expansion project designed, in part, to 
address the statutorily declared “priority on resolving the serious problem of 
impacted and overcrowded classes, not only with respect to the [CSU], but 
throughout public postsecondary education.”2  (Ed. Code, § 66015, subd. (a).)   
I do not join the majority’s analysis of this issue insofar as it relies on 
several CEQA provisions to find that the Trustees have jurisdiction and 
responsibility within the meaning of section 21081, subdivision (a)(2).  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 34-35.)  The majority cites section 21002.1, subdivision (b), which 
requires “[e]ach public agency [to] mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the 
environment of projects that it carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do 
so,” and section 21106, which  requires “[a]ll state agencies . . . [to] request in 
their budgets the funds necessary to protect the environment in relation to 
problems caused by their activities.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 34-35.)  Because 
these two CEQA statutes apply to every state agency, the majority’s analysis 
substantially limits the circumstances under which a state agency may invoke 
section 21081, subdivision (a)(2).  It is unclear to me the Legislature intended 
section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), to be read so narrowly.  Because my analysis 
depends on non-CEQA provisions, I need not, and do not, address that question. 
I also do not join the majority’s analysis insofar as it appears to suggest that 
a public agency lacks jurisdiction and responsibility within the meaning of section 
21081, subdivision (a)(2), when “the Legislature does not appropriate” money 
requested to pay for mitigation measures.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 34-35.)  To 
begin with, the discussion is dictum.  As the majority notes, there is no evidence 
                                              
2  
As the majority notes, the Trustees cited this problem in a statement of 
overriding considerations to justify their approval of the project despite 
unmitigated environmental effects.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.)  
 
5
here the Trustees have even asked the Legislature for the necessary funds.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 35.)  Thus, it is both unnecessary and premature to express an 
opinion about whether the Legislature’s denial of a funding request would affect 
the Trustees’ jurisdiction and responsibility for purposes of applying section 
21081, subdivision (a)(2).   
The other reason I do not join the majority’s dictum is that I question its 
soundness.  It is not clear to me that, for purposes of applying section 21081, 
subdivision (a)(2), a public agency has no responsibility or jurisdiction for a 
mitigation measure simply because the Legislature denies a specific request for 
money to pay for that mitigation measure.  Here, for example, even were the 
Legislature to reject such a request, arguably, the Trustees would still have 
responsibility and jurisdiction to contribute to FORA with money from the CSU’s 
general operating fund.  Moreover, the Legislature has expressly authorized the 
Trustees, at their discretion and “without the prior approval of any other state 
department or agency,” to “sell improvements located on the land at the . . . 
Monterey Bay campus that was transferred” from the federal government (Ed. 
Code, §  89010, subd. (a)) and to use proceeds from those sales “for the purposes 
of building, maintaining, and funding a campus . . . at Monterey Bay through 
expenditures for improvements to the campus . . . .”  (Id., § 89010, subd. (b).)  
Arguably, by virtue of these provisions, even were the Trustees to make, and the 
Legislature to reject, a specific appropriation request regarding the off-campus 
improvements here at issue, the Trustees would have “the power” to make 
contributions to FORA for those improvements (maj. opn., ante, at p. 35) and 
would have jurisdiction and responsibility within the meaning of Public Resources 
Code section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), to make such contributions.  Because of 
these substantive doubts, because we need not decide the question here, and 
 
6
because we have no briefing on the question, I decline to join the majority’s 
dictum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 109 Cal.App.4th 1179 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S117816 
Date Filed: July 31, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Richard M. Silver 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, John A. Taylor, Jr., Patricia Lofton; Miller, Starr & Regalia, Basil S. Shiber and Christian 
M. Carrigan for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
James E. Holst, Alan C. Waltner and Jeffrey A. Blair for The Regents of the University of California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Miller Brown & Dannis, Marilyn J. Cleveland, Chad J. Graff and Kenneth S. Levy for Coalition for 
Adequate School Housing as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Lombardo & Gilles, Sheri L. Damon; Law Offices of Robert Wellington, Kenneth D. Buchert; Law Offices 
of Mary L. Hudson, and Mary L. Hudson for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Manuela Albuquerque, City Attorney (Berkeley) and Zach Cowan, Assistant City Attorney, for League of 
California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
 
McDonough Holland & Allen, Harriet A. Steiner and Kara K. Ueda for City of Davis as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Law Offices of Donald B. Mooney, Donald B Mooney; Law Offices of Marsha A. Burch and Marsha A. 
Burch for San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, Protect Our Water and Central Valley Safe Environmental 
Network as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Norma Turner, Mary-Alice Coleman and Jeffrey A. Diamond for West Davis Neighbors as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Patricia Lofton 
Horvitz & Levy 
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor 
Encino, CA  91436 
(818) 995-0800 
 
Mary L. Hudson 
Law Offices of Mary L. Hudson 
1505 Bridgeway, Suite 206 
Sausalito, CA 94965 
(415) 331-7712