Title: Plank v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC14-414
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-414 
____________ 
 
NOEL PLANK, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[March 17, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The certified conflict issue in this case is whether an individual is entitled to 
counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings before incarceration is imposed as 
punishment.  The First District Court of Appeal rejected that argument in Plank v. 
State, 130 So. 3d 289, 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), but certified that its decision is in 
direct conflict with the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Al-
Hakim v. State, 53 So. 3d 1171, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), and Woods v. State, 
987 So. 3d 669, 674 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), and the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in Hayes v. State, 592 So. 2d 327, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), which all held that a 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
defendant has a right to counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings before 
incarceration is imposed as punishment.1   
We resolve the conflict, holding in accordance with the First District that a 
trial court has the discretion, but is not required, to appoint counsel or give the 
individual an opportunity to seek counsel in a direct criminal contempt proceeding, 
even if incarceration is imposed as punishment, as long as the period of 
incarceration does not exceed six months.  Nevertheless, because the allegedly 
contemptuous conduct for which Petitioner Noel Plank was incarcerated in this 
case did not involve conduct that occurred only in the presence of the court, the 
trial court erred in classifying the conduct as direct criminal contempt.  Plank was 
therefore entitled to the benefit of counsel and to the procedures set forth in the 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 governing indirect criminal contempt.  
Accordingly, while we approve the reasoning of the First District that there is no 
requirement to appoint counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings where a 
defendant is incarcerated for less than six months, we quash the First District’s 
decision upholding the conviction and direct that Plank’s conviction for direct 
criminal contempt be vacated. 
 
 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
FACTS 
On April 15, 2013, Noel Plank, a prospective juror, appeared for jury duty at 
the Leon County Courthouse at 11:30 a.m. and was part of a panel that was seated 
in the courtroom at approximately 1:40 p.m.  In response to general biographical 
questioning, Plank advised the trial judge that he had various issues that would 
make it difficult for him to serve on the jury: 
I work a full day.  I work 13 hours on Thursdays, and I have no 
time or money to sit in court waiting for all of y’all.  First of all, I’m 
going to tell you straight out.  I’m antiwar, Vietnam draft card burner, 
and avoided the Vietnam war.  I’m also 4F.   
When the judge inquired about the meaning of “4F,” Plank responded: 
 
Unqualified for military.  Another thing is I’m antigovernment.  
I have not voted since Ronald Reagan was president.  I’m not even 
registered to vote.  And I’m also, to tell you the truth, I’m a drunk. 
The trial judge did not excuse Plank based on those reasons, and jury selection 
continued.  In response to later general questions pertaining to his background, 
Plank responded as follows: 
My name is Noel Plank.  I’m a driver.  I deliver Homes & 
Land, Tallahassee Woman.  You’ve seen them on magazine racks all 
over Tallahassee.  I have no spouse.  I’m divorced.  I do have a 
daughter, but she lives with my ex.  She’s a writer at FSU.  I’ve lived 
here for 23 years . . . .  
And as far as victim of crime, yes, I have been a victim of 
several crimes, identity theft, theft of over a thousand dollars’ worth 
of professional camera equipment, theft of cell phone, and I’ve been 
burglarized a couple of times, nothing serious taken except a six-pack 
of beer, which I was kind of teed off at, because I was looking 
forward to having a beer after work, when I got home after work.  
 
 
 
- 4 - 
And the police officer says—the sheriff’s asking me, “Did you check 
the fridge?”  I said, “I never thought of that.”  And sure enough, they 
took, they took my six-pack of beer.  Okay.  I found that out.  
And I can listen but my mind goes from about here to here 
(indicating) and I’ll forget.  You can tell me your name.  I will forget 
it as soon as I walk ten feet.  I, I have a bad memory, okay, because I 
also have a plastic plate in this side of my head.  That’s why I’m 4F 
from the military.  I’ve had a bad car accident when I was 17, and 
things have happened and I’m getting older and I’m starting to lose 
my memory.  Okay?  And—okay.  I know no other jurors in here.  
I’ve never served on a jury before. 
 
At some point during jury selection, Plank apparently fell asleep.  The other jurors 
complained that Plank smelled of alcohol and was difficult to awaken at a break in 
jury selection at about 2:55 p.m. as the other jurors tried to pass by Plank.  At the 
trial judge’s direction, a Leon County Probation Officer, Ceressa Haney, then 
administered a breathalyzer test to Plank around 3 p.m., which was performed 
outside the presence of the trial judge. 
 
An hour later, at approximately 4 p.m., the trial judge held a contempt 
hearing regarding Plank’s conduct during jury selection.  At the hearing, Officer 
Haney testified that the results from the breathalyzer test demonstrated Plank had a 
blood-alcohol level of 0.111, and that it is illegal to drive with a blood-alcohol 
level over 0.08.  In addition, Officer Haney testified that she smelled alcohol on 
Plank’s “general person” but could not determine if the smell came from his 
clothes or his breath.  When Plank was given the opportunity to question Officer 
 
 
 
- 5 - 
Haney, he asked only: “What I’d like to know is how I got the smell of beer on my 
clothes when I never spilt one drop on my clothing.”   
 
At that point, the trial judge asked Plank to come to the microphone.  Plank, 
who apparently was handcuffed by that time, replied that he was having a hard 
time getting out of the chair himself, especially with “bracelets.”  The trial judge 
then informed Plank that although he arrived for jury duty at 11:30 a.m., his blood 
alcohol content was still 0.111 more than three hours later, indicating that his 
blood-alcohol level was even higher when he first arrived at the courthouse.  In 
addition, the trial judge stated that she believed that Plank may have driven to the 
courthouse, and Plank confirmed that he had.  The trial judge provided Plank with 
the opportunity to explain why he should not be held in contempt, to which Plank 
stated: 
First of all, I was extremely tired.  I was up at 1:00 this 
morning, and I start work at 5:00 in the morning.  I had to walk in and 
out, in and out, in and out of the vehicle every other door, like, from 
here to your back door there, that distance, and it’s very tiring. 
In response to the trial judge asking if there was anything else he wanted to tell her, 
Plank stated: 
Other than I can’t afford to be—if you got me coming in here to 
court and all this, that’s what I tried telling you before.  I don’t get 
paid for coming to court.  Okay?  I don’t get paid for taking time off.  
Also, I’m about—in the process of losing my house, which I own here 
in Leon County for, let’s see, 13 years.  My mortgage company has 
been giving me a chance to catch up because I missed one month.  
And my hours have been dropped.  I used to make 400 a week.  Now 
 
 
 
- 6 - 
I’m making 200 a week.  I’m barely making it.  That’s, that’s why I 
want to get out of court duty, because Thursday is my busiest day.  
But if you insist, I’ll lose my house and everything.  I’ll be living out 
on the street with everybody else. 
 
The trial judge stated that although she did not want Plank to lose his house, 
she wanted him to come to jury duty without being drunk.  She then found Plank in 
direct criminal contempt: 
All right.  I’m going to find that you’re in direct criminal 
contempt for not only coming to the courthouse drunk but it was 
also—in doing that, you disrupted the jury selection here this 
afternoon and distracted other jurors.  Other jurors obviously noticed 
that you smelled of alcohol, were drunk.  So I am finding you in 
contempt. 
 
Before imposing the sentence, the trial judge provided Plank an opportunity to 
offer any mitigating circumstances, to which Plank responded that he did not know 
what else to say.  The trial judge then sentenced him to thirty days in the Leon 
County Jail, explaining the sentence as follows: 
I can’t ignore this behavior that, that you’re here, you’re over 
the legal limit, you’re acting disruptive during jury selection.  You tell 
me that you’re a drunk and that you’ve refused to follow the law.  I 
mean, that’s what you said during the jury selection.  And then it turns 
out that your blood alcohol level is significantly over the legal limit 
after you’ve been here for three and a half hours.  So certainly your 
blood alcohol level has come down during that past three and a half 
hours.  And you drove here. 
So, I mean, the driving itself, of course, wasn’t in my presence 
and wasn’t part of direct criminal contempt, but I certainly think it’s a 
legitimate factor for me to consider, and I think 30 days is reasonable.  
So that’s my ruling and I’m required to do a written order, so I’ll do 
that, as well. 
 
 
 
 
- 7 - 
The trial judge subsequently entered a written order finding Plank guilty of 
direct criminal contempt for arriving to the courthouse drunk, disrupting jury 
selection, and distracting the other jurors.  In support of this conviction, the order 
relied on the following actions: when Plank was asked to provide background 
information, he responded that he should not have to serve on a jury because he 
was “able to evade the military draft,” worked thirteen-hour days, had a “4F” 
military designation, and was a drunk; he slept during some of the jury selection 
and was difficult to awaken; other jurors indicated that Plank smelled of alcohol; 
and the results of Plank’s breathalyzer test indicated that he had 0.111 grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.  The trial judge found Officer Haney’s testimony 
to be “credible.”  
The order set forth that Plank’s actions were “directed against the authority 
and dignity of the Court” and “interfered with the judicial function.”  The order 
stated that the actions tended to “embarrass, hinder or obstruct the Court in the 
administration of justice and to lessen the Court’s dignity.”   
The trial judge further noted in the order the “mitigating” circumstances of 
Plank having worked late delivering magazines and having “only” a couple of 
beers in the morning.  As to Plank’s testimony of his financial difficulties, the 
order set forth:  
[H]e could have come to the Court without drinking and . . . he drove 
to the Courthouse after drinking and . . . any mitigation presented by 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
[Plank] is lessened by the fact that [his] breath alcohol would have 
been significantly higher when he drove to the Courthouse at 
approximately 11:30 a.m.  
The trial judge sentenced Plank to thirty days in the Leon County Jail and advised 
Plank he had thirty days to file a notice of appeal.  Seventeen days later, the trial 
judge mitigated Plank’s sentence to time served and ordered that he be released 
immediately.   
Plank was declared indigent for purposes of appeal and, through the Public 
Defender’s Office, appealed his conviction and sentence for the contempt of court.  
The First District initially affirmed without a written opinion.  Plank filed a motion 
for rehearing and requested a written opinion and certification of the conflict, 
which the district court granted.  The First District then issued an opinion, which 
stated: 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not appointing him 
counsel or giving him an opportunity to seek counsel for the contempt 
proceeding.  We affirm on the authority of Williams v. State, 698 So. 
2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Saunders v. State, 319 So. 2d 118 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1975), in which this court held that a defendant does 
not have a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment or the Florida 
Rules of Criminal Procedure when charged with direct criminal 
contempt.  Accord Searcy v. State, 971 So. 2d 1008, 1014 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2008); Forbes v. State, 933 So. 2d 706, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2006); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-75 (1948) (explaining 
that the right to counsel and other due process requirements are not 
implicated in contempt cases involving “charges of misconduct, in 
open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court’s 
business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are 
under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and 
where immediate punishment is essential to prevent demoralization of 
 
 
 
- 9 - 
the court’s authority before the public” (internal quotations and 
ellipses omitted)); In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) (explaining 
that a court’s jurisdiction to punish direct contempt vests upon 
commission of the contemptuous act and that it is within the court’s 
discretion to punish the offense immediately or to postpone action 
until the defendant is afforded an opportunity to present a defense). 
We recognize that the Second District held in Woods v. State, 
987 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), and Al-Hakim v. State, 53 So. 3d 
1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), that a defendant has a right to counsel 
under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in direct criminal 
contempt proceedings.  The Fourth District reached a similar 
conclusion in Hayes v. State, 592 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).  
But see Forbes, supra.  Accordingly, we certify conflict with these 
cases. 
 
Plank, 130 So. 3d at 290.  This Court granted review based on the certification of 
interdistrict conflict. 
ANALYSIS 
The district courts of appeal are split regarding whether an individual is 
entitled to counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings before incarceration is 
imposed as punishment.  In order to fully analyze this issue, we first examine the 
right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted that right to 
counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings.  We then review the right to 
counsel under the Florida Constitution and our procedural rules and precedent.  We 
ultimately resolve the conflict by determining that a trial court is not required to 
appoint counsel or give the individual an opportunity to seek counsel in a direct 
criminal contempt proceeding, even if incarceration is imposed as punishment, as 
 
 
 
- 10 - 
long as the period of incarceration does not exceed six months—the point at which 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are triggered.  Finally, we conclude that 
the trial court erred in treating Plank’s conduct in this case as direct criminal 
contempt, rather than indirect criminal contempt.  Accordingly, notwithstanding 
our holding on the conflict issue, the trial court should have followed the 
procedural rules already in existence pertaining to indirect criminal contempt, 
which include entitlement to counsel. 
I.  Right to Counsel in Direct Criminal Contempt Proceedings 
 
Plank asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to 
provide him with appointed counsel or an opportunity to seek counsel before 
convicting him of direct criminal contempt and sentencing him to incarceration.  In 
support, he relies on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; the analogous right to 
counsel under article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution; the state and federal 
due process clauses; section 27.51 of the Florida Statutes; and the Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  But none of these alleged constitutional, statutory, or 
procedural bases provides for the right to counsel in direct criminal contempt 
proceedings. 
First, such a requirement for counsel in direct criminal contempt cases does 
not exist within either the federal or state constitutions.  The Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides generally that “[i]n all criminal 
 
 
 
- 11 - 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  Amend. VI, U.S. 
Const.; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that 
“absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel”).   
In Florida, article I, section 16, of our state constitution specifically 
guarantees the right to counsel, stating, “In all criminal prosecutions the accused 
. . . shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at 
trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and to have a 
speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime was 
committed.”  Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.  As this Court has previously recognized, 
based on the express language of this constitutional provision, its formative 
history, preexisting and developing state law, and the state’s own general history, 
Florida provides an even broader right to counsel than is provided by the Sixth 
Amendment.  State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029, 1041 (Fla. 2008).   
 
 
 
- 12 - 
Despite the constitutional guarantee to the right to counsel, however, courts 
of this nation have long had the inherent authority to impose immediate penalties 
in direct criminal contempt proceedings, where the misconduct occurred within the 
court’s direct view and interfered with the court’s ability to discharge its essential 
functions.  In In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888), the United States Supreme Court 
first recognized a judge’s inherent authority to immediately punish a contemnor by 
fine or imprisonment—without notice or a special hearing.  Specifically, in Terry, 
the Supreme Court denied the claim that the contemnor was unlawfully imprisoned 
after being found in direct criminal contempt of court for assaulting a marshal and 
interrupting an ongoing trial, even though the contemnor was not provided with all 
of the constitutional protections generally afforded to an accused.  Id. at 305-06.  
The Supreme Court explained that this departure from the accepted standards of 
due process was permissible because the direct criminal contempt power is 
essential to protect the courts in the discharge of their functions.  Id. at 313.  The 
Supreme Court emphasized that the power was restricted to suppressing and 
punishing court-disrupting misconduct that occurred within the presence of the 
court.  See id.     
  
In Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275-76, the Supreme Court further recognized that 
while an individual charged with contempt of court generally must be advised of 
the charges against him or her, have a reasonable opportunity to be heard, have the 
 
 
 
- 13 - 
right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to call witnesses, such 
requirements did not apply to direct criminal contempt.  In order to qualify as 
direct criminal contempt, however, the Supreme Court clarified that the 
misconduct must have occurred “in open court, in the presence of the judge, [and] 
disturb[] the court’s business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct 
are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where 
immediate punishment is essential to prevent ‘demoralization of the court’s 
authority . . . before the public.’ ”  Id. at 275.  “If some essential elements of the 
offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that [the judge] must depend 
upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements,” 
the Supreme Court held that “due process requires . . . that the accused be accorded 
notice and a fair hearing.”  Id. at 275-76. 
 
The Supreme Court decided these direct criminal contempt cases prior to 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is made 
obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  While the Supreme Court 
has not spoken directly on Gideon’s impact on the right to counsel in direct 
criminal contempt proceedings, it has not overruled its prior holdings in Terry or 
Oliver.    
 
 
 
- 14 - 
Plank, nevertheless, points to Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02 
(1968), for support that the United States Supreme Court has applied other 
protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to direct criminal contempt.  In 
Bloom, the Supreme Court declared that in direct criminal contempt proceedings, a 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury when a judge is 
considering a sentence of imprisonment in excess of six months.  Id. at 199; see 
also Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974).   
We reject Plank’s argument that Bloom requires courts to appoint counsel in 
all direct criminal contempt proceedings.  Instead, we conclude that Bloom impacts 
only cases in which incarceration is imposed for longer than six months.   
After a review of the relevant precedent, we hold that Plank does not have a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to being incarcerated for direct criminal 
contempt, as long as the period of incarceration does not exceed six months—the 
point at which his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered.  Simply put, 
nothing within the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence requires the result that 
Plank seeks.   
Likewise, in Florida, we have long recognized that courts have the inherent 
authority to take immediate action when the contemnor commits an act of direct 
criminal contempt in the judge’s presence that disturbs the court’s business and 
prevents it from carrying out the court’s essential functions.  This Court has 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
previously explained the public policy reasons behind a court’s inherent authority 
for acting immediately on direct criminal contempt: “The interests of orderly 
government demand that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by 
courts possessed of jurisdiction of persons and subject matter.”  Parisi v. Broward 
Cty., 769 So. 2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2000) (quoting United States v. United Mine 
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947)).   
It is important that courts have the power necessary to require “silence, 
respect, and decorum, in their presence,” but this need must be balanced with the 
recognition that the contempt power “uniquely is ‘liable to abuse’ ” because “the 
offended judge [is] solely responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, 
and sanctioning the contumacious conduct.”  Id. (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994)).  As a result, this Court has 
emphasized that “a balance must be struck between the recognition that courts are 
vested with contempt powers to vindicate their authority and the necessity of 
preventing abuse of these broad contempt powers.”  Id.   
Florida statutory provisions similarly recognize the courts’ authority to act 
on contempt of court.  Specifically, section 38.22, Florida Statutes (2013), 
provides: “Every court may punish contempts against it whether such contempts be 
direct, indirect, or constructive, and in any such proceeding the court shall proceed 
to hear and determine all questions of law and fact.”   
 
 
 
- 16 - 
 
 Plank, however, relies on section 27.51, Florida Statutes (2013), for the 
proposition that he must be afforded counsel when charged with direct criminal 
contempt.  Section 27.51(1) provides that a public defender “shall” represent an 
indigent, and specifically provides that this provision applies to those who are 
charged with criminal contempt.   
We reject Plank’s contention.  Nothing within this statute requires that the 
trial court appoint counsel before acting immediately on direct criminal contempt 
that just occurred within the court’s presence and that requires immediate 
punishment to prevent the demoralization of the court’s authority before the public.  
Again, direct criminal contempt is a narrow exception to the procedural safeguards 
generally required, permitting a court to take immediate action to punish 
contemnors in order to ensure the court’s authority is vindicated and the court can 
conduct its necessary functions.   
Plank’s last contention is that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel 
based on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(b)—a position also taken by 
the Second District in Woods and Al-Hakim.  Rule 3.111(b) requires the 
appointment of counsel for indigent persons “in all prosecutions for offenses 
punishable by incarceration.”  However, this general rule does not trump the 
specific rule governing direct criminal contempt, Florida Rule of Criminal 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
Procedure 3.830, which specifically addresses the procedures that govern direct 
criminal contempt proceedings.  Rule 3.830 states in full: 
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court 
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the 
actual presence of the court.  The judgment of guilt of contempt shall 
include a recital of those facts on which the adjudication of guilt is 
based.  Prior to the adjudication of guilt the judge shall inform the 
defendant of the accusation against the defendant and inquire as to 
whether the defendant has any cause to show why he or she should 
not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the court and sentenced 
therefor.  The defendant shall be given the opportunity to present 
evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances.  The judgment shall 
be signed by the judge and entered of record.  Sentence shall be 
pronounced in open court. 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830.   
 
In contrast, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 governs indirect 
criminal contempt, which involves conduct committed outside the presence of the 
court.  Subsection (d) of rule 3.840 explicitly provides that a defendant is entitled 
to be represented by counsel at the contempt hearing.  In full, rule 3.840 states: 
A criminal contempt, except as provided in rule 3.830 
concerning direct contempts, shall be prosecuted in the following 
manner: 
 
(a)  Order to Show Cause.  The judge, on the judge’s own 
motion or on affidavit of any person having knowledge of the facts, 
may issue and sign an order directed to the defendant, stating the 
essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and 
requiring the defendant to appear before the court to show cause why 
the defendant should not be held in contempt of court.  The order shall 
specify the time and place of the hearing, with a reasonable time 
allowed for preparation of the defense after service of the order on the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
 
(b)  Motions; Answer.  The defendant, personally or by counsel, 
may move to dismiss the order to show cause, move for a statement of 
particulars, or answer the order by way of explanation or defense.  All 
motions and the answer shall be in writing unless specified otherwise 
by the judge.  A defendant’s omission to file motions or answer shall 
not be deemed as an admission of guilt of the contempt charged. 
 
(c)  Order of Arrest; Bail.  The judge may issue an order of 
arrest of the defendant if the judge has reason to believe the defendant 
will not appear in response to the order to show cause.  The defendant 
shall be admitted to bail in the manner provided by law in criminal 
cases. 
 
(d)  Arraignment; Hearing.  The defendant may be arraigned at 
the time of the hearing, or prior thereto at the defendant’s request.  A 
hearing to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall 
follow a plea of not guilty.  The judge may conduct a hearing without 
assistance of counsel or may be assisted by the prosecuting attorney or 
by an attorney appointed for that purpose.  The defendant is entitled to 
be represented by counsel, have compulsory process for the 
attendance of witnesses, and testify in his or her own defense.  All 
issues of law and fact shall be heard and determined by the judge. 
(e)  Disqualification of Judge.  If the contempt charged involves 
disrespect to or criticism of a judge, the judge shall disqualify himself 
or herself from presiding at the hearing.  Another judge shall be 
designated by the chief justice of the supreme court. 
 
(f)  Verdict; Judgment.  At the conclusion of the hearing the 
judge shall sign and enter of record a judgment of guilty or not guilty.  
There should be included in a judgment of guilty a recital of the facts 
constituting the contempt of which the defendant has been found and 
adjudicated guilty. 
 
(g)  Sentence; Indirect Contempt.  Prior to the pronouncement 
of sentence, the judge shall inform the defendant of the accusation and 
judgment against the defendant and inquire as to whether the 
defendant has any cause to show why sentence should not be 
pronounced.  The defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to 
present evidence of mitigating circumstances.  The sentence shall be 
pronounced in open court and in the presence of the defendant. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840 (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
Under our precedent, a specific rule trumps a general rule.  See State v. 
Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1986) (“[T]he specific provision of (b)(1) 
supersedes any general provision of the remainder of the rule.”); M.W. v. Davis, 
756 So. 2d 90, 106 n.31 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] specific statute governing a particular 
subject takes precedence over a conflicting more general statute.”).  Thus, applying 
that principle here, the specific rule governing direct criminal contempt trumps a 
general rule pertaining to the right to counsel.  In addition, the specific procedures 
outlined in the rule governing indirect criminal contempt, which includes 
entitlement to counsel, contrasts with the absence of a specific provision 
establishing the entitlement to counsel in the direct criminal contempt rule.  
Where a court’s ability to undertake its essential functions is jeopardized, the 
court must be able to act swiftly to ensure it can fulfill its obligations and preserve 
the dignity of court proceedings.  Imposing a mandatory requirement that counsel 
be appointed or that the contemnor have the opportunity to obtain counsel could 
interfere with the court’s ability to act swiftly to vindicate its authority.  As the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, the “power to summarily hold an 
individual in direct criminal contempt operates to vindicate the authority of the 
court and stands as a bulwark against disorder and disruption in the courtroom.”  
United States v. Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 1984)).  
 
 
 
- 20 - 
That said, the very absence of the usual constitutional protections for an 
individual charged with direct criminal contempt and the extraordinary power to 
summarily punish an individual found in direct criminal contempt to incarceration 
for a period of up to six months without an attorney highlights what has been 
emphasized in our jurisprudence.  Namely, courts must exercise restraint in using 
this power, especially where incarceration is being considered or imposed.  The 
purpose of permitting a court to act immediately in cases of direct criminal 
contempt is that the misconduct of an individual in front of the court could 
interfere with the court’s inherent authority to carry out its essential 
responsibilities.  As we have previously emphasized, “although the power of 
contempt is an extremely important power for the judiciary, it is also a very 
awesome power and is one that should never be abused.”  In re Inquiry Concerning 
Perry, 641 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 1994).  We have also highlighted the importance 
of protecting due process rights, particularly where incarceration was at issue: 
“because trial judges exercise their power of criminal contempt to punish, it is 
extremely important that they protect an offender’s due process rights, particularly 
when the punishment results in the imprisonment of the offender.”  Id.  
Further, we embrace the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s apt explanation in 
Schenck v. State, 645 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), that the “unique power” 
exercised in direct criminal contempt proceedings “must be used only rarely and 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
with circumspection.”  As the Fourth District stated, “the provocation must never 
be slight, doubtful, or of shifting interpretations.  The occasion should be real and 
necessary, not murky, and not ameliorated in some less formal manner.”  Id.  The 
Fourth District explained in another case how the power to punish direct criminal 
contempt is one of the most unusual powers of a court: “the judge who was the 
object . . . of the allegedly contemptuous conduct becomes the prosecutor and then 
sits in judgment over the very defendant who is said to have just assailed the 
judicial dignity.  That precise circumstance is condoned nowhere else in the law.  
For that reason, the power must be cautiously and sparingly used.”  Emanuel v. 
State, 601 So. 2d 1273, 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (quoting Fabian v. State, 585 
So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Farmer J., dissenting)).    
While we agree that the power must be cautiously and sparingly used, 
nevertheless, when required, we will not mandate that the judge interrupt the direct 
criminal contempt proceeding to either appoint an attorney or allow the contemnor 
to consult with one where the period of incarceration is less than six months.  As 
even the State agrees, however, the trial judge certainly has the discretion to do so, 
particularly if considering incarceration as punishment.  
II.  Direct Versus Indirect Criminal Contempt 
 
Although the First District was correct that Plank was not entitled to counsel 
in a direct criminal contempt proceeding, we conclude that the trial court 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
nonetheless erred in failing to appoint counsel for Plank because the conduct at 
issue did not involve direct criminal contempt.  Contempt of court can assume a 
variety of forms: either civil or criminal in nature, as well as direct or indirect.  See 
Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956).  As this Court has 
long recognized, the rights to which a contemnor is entitled, the quantum of proof 
necessary to convict, and the nature of the punishment that may be administered 
upon a determination of guilt are all dependent on the type of contempt at issue.  
Id.  Thus, courts must first identify the nature of the proceeding “because of the 
drastic nature of punishment oftentimes administered and because of the potentials 
for impinging upon the fundamental rights of a party by the exercise of the power.”  
Id.   
Criminal contempt is considered to be “a crime in the ordinary sense.”  
Parisi, 769 So. 2d at 364.  A criminal contempt proceeding is “instituted solely and 
simply to vindicate the authority of the court [or] otherwise punish for conduct 
offensive to the public in violation of an order of the court.”  Demetree, 89 So. 2d 
at 502.  When imprisonment is ordered, the term is for a set amount of time and is 
administered as punishment for an act that was committed.  Id.   
Criminal contempt proceedings are either direct or indirect.  See, e.g., State 
v. Diaz de la Portilla, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S626 (Fla. 2015).  Conduct committed 
outside the presence of the court is indirect criminal contempt.  Pugliese v. 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1977) (“Where an act is committed out of the 
presence of the court, the proceeding to punish is for indirect (sometimes called 
constructive) contempt.”).   
In order to be considered direct criminal contempt, all of the acts underlying 
the contemptuous conduct must be committed in open court in the presence of the 
judge, “where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of 
the court [and] are actually observed by the court.”  Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275.  If the 
judge needs to rely on statements and testimony from others regarding their 
knowledge about the contemptuous acts, the misconduct is no longer considered 
direct criminal contempt because additional testimony or explanation is necessary.  
Id. at 275-76.  As the Supreme Court has stressed, “the judge must have personal 
knowledge of [the misconduct] acquired by his own observation of the 
contemptuous conduct.”  Id. at 275.  “[K]nowledge acquired from the testimony of 
others, or even from the confession of the accused, would not justify conviction 
without a trial in which there was an opportunity for defense.”  Id.   
The procedural safeguards to which a defendant is entitled vary based on 
whether he or she is charged with direct or indirect criminal contempt.  Rule 3.830, 
governing direct criminal contempt, requires fewer procedural safeguards and 
permits a trial court to summarily punish the contemnor’s misconduct so long as 
the misconduct was committed in the actual presence of the court, whereas the 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
more extensive procedures provided in rule 3.840, governing indirect criminal 
contempt, entitle the contemnor to be represented by counsel.   
III.  This Case 
Applying these principles to the facts presented here, it becomes clear that 
this is not a case of direct criminal contempt.  In determining whether Plank 
committed criminal contempt, the trial judge took testimony from a probation 
officer regarding Plank’s blood-alcohol level after the officer administered a 
breathalyzer test.  In addition, the trial judge relied on off-the-record statements 
from the jurors that Plank smelled of alcohol and Plank’s own admissions that he 
drank before attending jury duty and that he drove to the courthouse.   
While the trial judge may have seen that Plank was asleep or that he had to 
be awakened by the other jurors, the order supporting the contempt conviction fails 
to specify which acts the trial judge personally observed or whether this 
information was presented to the judge from other jurors, who attempted to wake 
Plank during a break so they could pass by his seat.  If the only act personally 
observed by the trial judge was a prospective juror who fell asleep during voir dire, 
this is not the type of willful misconduct that would typically require a court to use 
its “unique power.”  Schenck, 645 So. 2d at 74 (emphasizing that the provocation 
to justify direct criminal contempt “must never be slight, doubtful, or of shifting 
interpretations,” but must be an occasion where the need to act is “real and 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
necessary . . . and not ameliorated in some less formal manner”); Emanuel, 601 So. 
2d at 1274 (stating that the power to exercise direct criminal contempt “must be 
cautiously and sparingly used”).  Whenever a judge must take testimony during a 
criminal contempt proceeding or rely on additional evidence not directly observed 
by the trial judge, the proceeding is no longer direct criminal contempt but 
becomes indirect criminal contempt.  See Oliver, 333 U.S. at 276 (explaining that 
in order to qualify as direct criminal contempt and thus satisfy the “narrow 
exception” to general due process requirements, the misconduct must have 
occurred “in open court, in the presence of the judge . . . where all of the essential 
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court”).     
Because this case involved indirect criminal contempt, the trial court erred in 
failing to either appoint counsel or permit Plank the opportunity to obtain counsel.  
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840, governing indirect criminal contempt, 
requires that the court issue an order to show cause with reasonable time allowed 
for preparation of the defense and further provides that the defendant is “entitled to 
be represented by counsel, have compulsory process for the attendance of 
witnesses, and testify in his or her own defense.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840(d).  These 
necessary procedures for indirect criminal contempt proceedings were not followed 
in this case.   
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
CONCLUSION 
We resolve the conflict regarding whether a defendant has the right to the 
appointment of counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings before 
incarceration is imposed as punishment and hold that a trial court is not required to 
appoint counsel or give the individual an opportunity to seek counsel in a direct 
criminal contempt proceeding, even if incarceration is imposed as punishment, as 
long as the period of incarceration does not exceed six months.  Accordingly, we 
approve the holding of the First District that a trial court does not err by failing to 
provide a contemnor with the opportunity to seek counsel prior to imposing 
incarceration as a punishment in direct criminal contempt proceedings.  We 
disapprove the holdings in Al-Hakim, Woods, and Hayes to the extent that they 
mandate, rather than simply permit, a trial court to either appoint counsel or 
provide a contemnor with the opportunity to seek counsel prior to imposing 
incarceration as a punishment for direct criminal contempt.   
Nevertheless, while we approve the holding of the First District on the 
conflict issue, we quash the affirmance of Plank’s direct criminal contempt 
conviction and direct that his conviction for direct criminal contempt be vacated 
because the conduct at issue involved indirect criminal contempt, rather than direct 
criminal contempt.  We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
Noel Plank, an apparently intoxicated prospective juror, was sentenced to 
thirty days’ incarceration for direct criminal contempt while still intoxicated and 
without the assistance of counsel to offer any mitigating evidence or to clearly 
elicit from the trial court the basis for the allegedly contemptuous conduct.  I agree 
with the majority’s decision to vacate Plank’s contempt conviction because the 
conduct relied on by the trial court was not direct criminal contempt, but I dissent 
from the majority’s holding that a defendant is not entitled to counsel in direct 
criminal contempt proceedings when incarceration of six months or less is imposed 
as punishment.  While I share the majority’s concerns that judges must be able to 
immediately address contemptuous conduct that occurs in their presence and 
disrupts judicial functions, those concerns can be effectuated in a way that still 
preserves a defendant’s right to be represented by an attorney prior to having his or 
her liberty taken away for days, weeks, or even as long as six months.  
 
 
 
- 28 - 
Indeed, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has recognized this right to 
counsel in all direct criminal contempt proceedings since 1992, as has the Second 
District Court of Appeal since 2007.  See Hayes v. State, 592 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1992); Woods v. State, 987 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).  As these courts 
have concluded, requiring the appointment of counsel prior to the imposition of 
incarceration as punishment for direct criminal contempt does not prevent a trial 
judge from threatening to hold a disruptive individual in contempt, nor does it 
prevent the trial judge from removing a disruptive individual from the courtroom 
and taking the individual into custody, pending the contempt hearing.  In fact, from 
the cases I have reviewed, the direct criminal contempt hearing rarely occurs at the 
same time as the disruptive conduct, even when no lawyer is appointed.  I would 
not leave the right to counsel dependent on the discretion of the very trial judge, 
who has already determined that the individual has committed direct criminal 
contempt.  
While this Court holds that the constitutional right to counsel does not apply 
to direct criminal contempt proceedings where incarceration is imposed as 
punishment, I urge the Rules Committee to propose for this Court’s consideration a 
modification of the direct criminal contempt rule of procedure to require 
appointment of counsel if the trial judge imposes or is contemplating a jail 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
sentence in excess of twenty-four hours’ incarceration.2  In this way, the contemnor 
can be immediately taken into custody so that judicial functions are no longer 
impacted, while being given notice of the misconduct underlying the direct 
criminal contempt and the opportunity to consult with an attorney to present a 
defense to the direct criminal contempt and to “present evidence of excusing or 
mitigating circumstances.”  This case is a telling example of how illusory the right 
to present mitigating evidence is when the defendant is not represented by counsel. 
The irony of the majority’s decision is that the failure to require counsel to 
be appointed for indigent defendants will most negatively impact citizens who are 
in the courtroom on their own, unrepresented—and not the defendants cited by the 
State as the most outrageous examples of direct criminal contempt, who are 
already accused of crimes and are represented at trial by an attorney.  The inability 
to consult with an attorney in direct criminal contempt proceedings thus disparately 
affects those unrepresented individuals who have the least ability to conform with 
courtroom expectations in the first place and who are most in need of 
                                          
 
 
2.  In the recent case of In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Juvenile 
Procedure 8.150, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S37 (Fla. Feb. 11, 2016), this Court approved 
a new subdivision to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150, which expressly 
provides that juveniles in direct contempt cases have the right to legal counsel.  
Although I recognize that juveniles are different than adults in many ways, 
nevertheless, many unrepresented individuals may lack the knowledge to 
adequately defend against the pending direct criminal contempt charge without the 
assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
representation, including those with mental health conditions, alcohol or substance 
abuse problems, or limited knowledge of judicial proceedings.  
I recognize the uniqueness of direct criminal contempt proceedings, which 
occur directly before the judge, who also serves as the accuser, the adjudicator, and 
the sentencer.  But there are numerous reasons why the appointment of counsel is 
in the best interests of all parties involved, including the judge who must sentence 
the contemnor.  In this case, for example, an attorney could have more clearly 
elicited, on the record, the basis for the allegedly contemptuous conduct, which 
would have assisted the appellate courts and, perhaps, given the trial judge more 
time to consider whether the conduct truly amounted to contempt of court.  The 
appointment of counsel would also provide the trial court with a better 
understanding of relevant mitigation and permit an attorney to suggest other 
possible forms of punishment, thus fostering the court’s ability to impose the most 
appropriate sentence.  Further, counsel could ensure that the direct criminal 
contempt proceedings remain limited to the situation for which they were intended 
and assist the contemnor in comprehending the misconduct, understanding the 
ramifications of the behavior, and responding appropriately.   
Allowing for the assistance of counsel will neither diminish any respect for 
the judge’s authority, nor interfere with the judge’s unique and awesome power to 
maintain order in the courtroom.  To the contrary, I strongly believe that the 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
Constitution and the dignity of our judicial system are enhanced by allowing an 
individual to have the assistance of an attorney before a sanction of incarceration is 
imposed for direct criminal contempt. 
Two grounds support this conclusion.  First, the broad right to counsel 
provided under the United States Constitution, our Florida Constitution, and the 
applicable Florida statute requires the appointment of counsel for all offenses for 
which incarceration is imposed as punishment.  Second, an individual’s actual need 
for counsel where a sentence of incarceration is at issue remains especially strong, 
and the court’s inherent authority to stop direct contemptuous misconduct is not 
undermined by requiring the court to appoint counsel in cases where the trial judge 
is considering a sentence of incarceration, particularly in light of the many tools 
and resources available to the trial judge to take immediate action to stop such 
misconduct.  I address each of these grounds in detail below.  
I.  Right to Counsel When Incarceration is Possible Punishment 
Under the majority’s holding, incarceration up to six months for direct 
criminal contempt of court is the only exception to the requirement of appointed 
counsel for indigent defendants.  The majority’s rule also precludes an 
unrepresented litigant who can afford counsel the opportunity to hire or consult 
with counsel.      
 
 
 
- 32 - 
Yet, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that incarceration 
is such a different form of punishment that this loss of liberty creates the dividing 
line of when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered.  Specifically, in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned 
for any offense, whether classified as petty, a misdemeanor, or a felony, unless he 
was represented by counsel at his trial.”  Id. (emphasis added).  As the Supreme 
Court later explained in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979), “[W]e believe 
that the central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty 
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently 
sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the 
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”   
The majority relies on In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888), a nineteenth 
century case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the due process 
protections usually required before incarcerating an individual were not applicable 
in direct criminal contempt proceedings, because the direct criminal contempt 
power is essential to protecting the courts in the discharge of their functions.  But, 
even in 1888, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the contempt 
authority is susceptible to abuse and restricted its use to suppressing court-
disrupting misconduct that occurred directly in front of the court by the “disorderly 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
and violent.”  Id.  In Terry, the contemnor—who himself was an attorney—had 
assaulted a marshal and interrupted a trial that was underway.   
Although the United States Supreme Court has never overruled Terry, in the 
subsequent 128 years, the Supreme Court has placed stronger emphasis on the 
necessity of Sixth Amendment protections, specifically the right to counsel, when 
an individual faces incarceration.  While the majority relies on Terry and even In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), those cases predated the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, which held that a defendant’s constitutional 
right to counsel is a prerequisite to ensuring a “fair system of justice.”  372 U.S. 
335, 344 (1963).  An attorney who is knowledgeable as to the law and can speak 
on behalf of his client is “fundamental and essential” to a fair proceeding.  Id. at 
341.  
The United States Supreme Court case of Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 
(1968), recognized the importance of constitutional protections in determining that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to criminal contempt proceedings 
where punishment exceeds six months’ incarceration.  The Supreme Court 
emphasized that, because this particular crime frequently involves a rejection of 
judicial authority, the ability to summarily imprison for contempt is particularly 
“liable to abuse”: 
Given that criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect, 
the question is whether it is a crime to which the jury trial provisions 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
of the Constitution apply.  We hold that it is, primarily because in 
terms of those considerations which make the right to jury trial 
fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference 
between serious contempts and other serious crimes.  Indeed, in 
contempt cases an even more compelling argument can be made for 
providing a right to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary 
exercise of official power.  Contemptuous conduct, though a public 
wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a 
judge’s temperament.  Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to 
the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of judicial 
authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the 
duties of officers of the court.   
The court has long recognized the potential for abuse in 
exercising the summary power to imprison for contempt—it is an 
“arbitrary” power which is “liable to abuse.”  Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 
289, 313 (1888). 
 
Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201-02 (emphasis added).   
More importantly, Florida’s constitutional right to counsel under article I, 
section 16, of the Florida Constitution has been construed even more broadly than 
its federal counterpart.  See State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029, 1041 (Fla. 2008).  
This Court has pronounced that incarceration, as a form of punishment, is such a 
“penalty different in kind and severity from other penalties” that it triggers the 
constitutional right to counsel.  Id. at 1052.  We have further emphasized that the 
right to counsel applies even when there is a possibility of incarceration for a 
misdemeanor—as opposed to the Sixth Amendment, which requires counsel only 
where the defendant is actually imprisoned for the charged offense: 
Under established Florida law, the right of indigents to appointed 
counsel in misdemeanor cases differs from its federal counterpart.  In 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 35-40 (1972), the United States 
 
 
 
- 35 - 
Supreme Court appeared to hold that prospective imprisonment for a 
misdemeanor offense guarantees indigents a right to appointed 
counsel, but the Court clarified in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-
74 (1979), that under the Sixth Amendment this right is limited to 
cases in which the defendant is actually imprisoned for the charged 
offense.  Florida, however, has provided a different standard through 
its Constitution, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Florida 
Statutes.  See art. I, §§ 2, 16, Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111, 
3.160; § 27.51, Fla. Stat. (2003).  In Florida, indigent criminal 
defendants have a right to appointed counsel “for offenses punishable 
by imprisonment.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(b)(1) (1992) (emphasis 
supplied). 
Id. at 1040-41.   
In Parisi v. Broward County, 769 So. 2d 359, 364 (Fla. 2000), this Court 
specifically recognized that Florida’s constitutional rights—including the right to 
counsel—apply to direct criminal contempt proceedings.  While providing an 
overview as to a court’s various contempt powers, this Court held that prior to the 
imposition of criminal contempt sanctions, a contemnor must be afforded certain 
due process, including “the right of criminal defendants to be represented by 
counsel, the right to have the State prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the right not to incriminate oneself.”  This Court then stated that “[i]n addition 
to these constitutional rights, our rules of criminal procedure provide specific 
procedures for both direct and indirect criminal contempt.”  Id. at 365 (emphasis 
added).   
Besides honoring the constitutional rights of the individual, both the Florida 
Statutes and the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise recognize the 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
importance of counsel when incarceration is at issue.  Section 27.51, Florida 
Statutes, provides that a public defender “shall” represent an indigent, and 
specifically provides that this provision applies to those who are charged with 
criminal contempt, unless the court files an order of no imprisonment.  
§ 27.51(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat.  In fact, the addition of “criminal contempt” to the 
crimes for which a court “shall” appoint counsel occurred in 1995 and the 
Legislature made no distinction between “indirect” and “direct” criminal contempt.  
See ch. 95-195, §15, Laws of Fla.   
This statute reflects the Legislature’s clear intent that counsel should be 
appointed where a defendant is facing a possible punishment of incarceration, 
particularly as the statute does not distinguish between direct and indirect criminal 
contempt for purposes of appointing counsel.  Likewise, Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.111(b)(1) broadly provides: “Counsel shall be provided to indigent 
persons in all prosecutions for offenses punishable by incarceration including 
appeals from the conviction thereof.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(b)(1) (emphasis 
added).   
I acknowledge that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830, governing 
direct criminal contempt, unlike rule 3.840 that governs indirect criminal contempt, 
does not address entitlement to counsel.  However, in my view, while rule 3.830 
states that direct criminal contempt “may” be punished “summarily,” the term 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
“summarily” does not mean without a modicum of due process rights.  Moreover, 
nothing in rule 3.830 is inconsistent with rule 3.111(b)(1), which mandates counsel 
in all prosecutions punishable by incarceration.   
Thus, the United States Constitution, our Florida Constitution, the Florida 
Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure uniformly provide that an 
individual should be entitled to counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings 
before incarceration is imposed.  But even if the right to counsel were not 
grounded in any of these authorities, the balance of public policy and practical 
concerns should still demand appointment of counsel before incarceration is 
imposed as punishment for direct criminal contempt. 
II.  The Public Policy Concerns of Direct Criminal Contempt 
I strongly disagree with the State’s premise that “providing the contemnor 
with a lawyer and other procedural safeguards . . . [would] really allow the 
contemnor to disrupt the court system further” and would undermine a court’s 
ability to ensure the administration of justice.  This premise does not withstand 
scrutiny.  In fact, considering the practical requirement of such a rule, especially in 
the context of this case, makes clear that exactly the opposite is true.   
First, although the State claims that the courtroom could become a “circus” 
if the misconduct is not stopped, this is simply a red herring.  In reality, the 
requirement of counsel and the timing of the actual contempt hearing have no 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
impact on a judge’s ability to immediately stop the misconduct and take the 
contemnor into custody.  See, e.g., Al-Hakim v. State, 53 So. 3d 1171, 1172-73 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (after a member of the public disturbed the courtroom in 
response to the public defender’s rejection of adopting a pro se motion, the 
contemnor was handcuffed and taken into custody and the contempt proceeding 
was set for later that day); Forbes v. State, 933 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2006) (after a 19-year-old prospective juror failed to disclose during voir dire that 
he had a pending criminal charge, the court set his contempt proceeding for a time 
after jury selection concluded); Hayes, 592 So. 2d at 327-28 (after a criminal 
defendant left during a break to bring a witness back to court but arrived to court 
late, the trial judge required the defendant to appear at a hearing three weeks later 
and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court).  In most cases, 
including this one, the actual contempt hearing does not occur immediately.   
For example, here, Plank was in the courtroom, sleeping, until a break was 
taken during the voir dire.  The trial judge did not address the contemptuous 
conduct—presumably being drunk and sleeping during voir dire—in front of the 
other prospective jurors.  Only after a break was taken did the trial judge send 
Plank for a breathalyzer test, after which point the judge conducted the contempt 
hearing and ultimately determined to incarcerate Plank for thirty days.  
 
 
 
- 39 - 
I suspect Plank would have remained incarcerated for thirty days if the 
Public Defender’s Office had not filed a motion on his behalf, which prompted the 
trial judge to mitigate the sentence to time served.  At that point, when he finally 
received the assistance of an attorney, Plank, who was already behind on his 
mortgage payments, had lost seventeen days’ worth of income.  It is difficult to see 
how justice was furthered by the events that transpired in this case.   
Second, the practical effect of requiring the defendant to have counsel in 
direct criminal contempt proceedings will not impact a significant number of cases.  
Requiring the opportunity to retain or appoint counsel for direct criminal contempt 
cases is moot if the contemnor already has counsel.  For instance, a contemnor who 
commits misconduct in the courtroom during his or her own trial is likely already 
represented by counsel, so the court does not need to take additional actions to 
appoint counsel for the direct criminal contempt proceedings.  Ironically, then, the 
defendant who is already charged with a crime and is represented by counsel 
receives greater protections if charged with direct criminal contempt.  In contrast, a 
layperson called to jury duty, as here, or a witness to a proceeding who may lack 
knowledge of courtroom procedures or become frustrated with the adversarial 
nature of court proceedings does not enjoy the same protections.   
Third, an immediate sentence of incarceration is not essential in order to 
ensure that courtroom business can be conducted efficiently and promptly without 
 
 
 
- 40 - 
further disruption, particularly because the court, through its bailiffs, can 
immediately take the contemnor into custody and remove him or her from the 
courtroom.  As former Chief Justice Burger observed: “The contempt power . . . is 
of limited utility in dealing with an incorrigible, a cunning psychopath, or an 
accused bent on frustrating the particular trial or undermining the processes of 
justice.  For such as these, summary removal from the courtroom is the really 
effective remedy.”  Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467 (1971) (Burger, 
C.J., concurring).  Other sanctions short of incarceration may be more effective or 
appropriate, especially when dealing with lay people.  Indeed, not all direct 
criminal contempt proceedings even mandate a term of incarceration.  See, e.g., 
Gruss v. State, 869 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (after a prospective juror 
was not excused from jury service despite business commitments and then 
attempted to avoid jury duty by abruptly asserting she could not be fair and 
unbiased, the trial judge held the juror in direct contempt of court and ordered her 
to write a letter of apology and read it the next day in open court). 
Fourth, the appointment of counsel could help ensure that direct criminal 
contempt proceedings remain limited to the situation where the misconduct 
occurred in open court and truly affects the court’s authority, thus justifying the 
use of direct criminal contempt.  A person adjudicated guilty of direct criminal 
contempt has the opportunity to “present evidence of excusing or mitigating 
 
 
 
- 41 - 
circumstances.”  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830.  Yet, most contemnors, without 
knowledge of the law, do not know what to say, much less understand what type of 
evidence constitutes excusing or mitigating circumstances.   
In fact, that is what occurred in this very case.  When the trial judge asked 
Plank for mitigation, he replied that he did not know what to say.  In addition, at 
the time of the contempt hearing, he was still intoxicated, thus further limiting his 
ability to present mitigation.  With the benefit of counsel, Plank could have 
presented relevant mitigation and suggested a less severe sanction than 
incarceration.  Further, counsel could have objected to the trial judge using 
uncharged crimes as a part of the decision in sentencing Plank to thirty days of 
incarceration.  When Plank obtained an attorney weeks later, the judge mitigated 
the sentence to time served—but the defendant had already been incarcerated for 
seventeen days.  
In sum, the policy concerns behind reasons for appointing counsel weigh 
heavily in favor of extending this right to all individuals charged with direct 
criminal contempt who are facing incarceration.  Requiring the appointment of 
counsel would not diminish the power of the trial judge to immediately remove an 
individual from the courtroom to prevent any further disruption, and instead would 
enhance the dignity of the court and increase the chances that justice will be 
served.   
 
 
 
- 42 - 
III.  Conclusion 
As this Court has long held, in matters involving a court’s authority to 
address contempt, “a balance must be struck between the recognition that courts 
are vested with contempt powers to vindicate their authority and the necessity of 
preventing abuse of these broad contempt powers.”  Parisi, 769 So. 2d at 363.  I 
would conclude that prior to imposing incarceration as punishment for direct 
criminal contempt, the court should allow the contemnor to either obtain counsel or 
have counsel appointed.  However, in this case, the trial court erred in treating the 
proceeding as one of direct criminal contempt and therefore I concur with the 
majority’s decision to vacate the conviction.   
QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D13-4458 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Colleen Dierdre Mullen, Assistant 
Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and 
Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent