Title: Garcia v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12749
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12749 
 
ALBA GARCIA  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.      March 2, 2020. - December 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ.1 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Execution of sentence, Stay of 
proceedings, New trial.  Global Positioning System 
Device.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  Search 
and Seizure, Bodily intrusion. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 17, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Lenk, J. 
 
 
 
Luke Rosseel for the defendant. 
 
Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  Following her conviction of trafficking in 
narcotics, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.  She 
also sought to stay the execution of her sentence while her 
motion for a new trial was pending.  The trial judge granted 
the stay and imposed conditions of release, including home 
                                                 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
confinement with various exceptions, and monitoring with a 
global positioning system (GPS) device.  The defendant filed a 
petition in the county court seeking relief from the 
conditions on the ground that GPS monitoring and home 
confinement were an unconstitutional search and seizure.  
After the single justice denied relief, the defendant appealed 
to the full court.  We conclude that the condition of home 
confinement was not a seizure because it was imposed pursuant 
to a valid conviction and lawful sentence.  And, although the 
imposition of GPS monitoring was a search, it was reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Thus, we affirm.2 
 
Background.  In 2014, a grand jury indicted the defendant 
on charges of trafficking in between thirty-six and one 
hundred grams of heroin, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32E (c), and possession of cocaine with intent to 
                                                 
 
2 After oral argument in this case, the underlying case in 
the Superior Court was resolved.  Thus, the stay of the 
execution of the defendant's sentence is no longer in effect, 
and this appeal is moot.  Nonetheless, we exercise our 
discretion to reach the merits of the defendant's claims 
because "the issue [is] one of public importance, . . . it was 
fully argued on both sides, [and] the question [is] certain, 
or at least very likely, to arise again in similar factual 
circumstances."  See Commonwealth v. Yameen, 401 Mass. 331, 
333 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988), quoting 
Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 783 (1984).  
Additionally, due to the limited duration of any stay of 
execution, and because many defendants may be reticent to 
challenge conditions imposed pursuant to stays they sought and 
successfully obtained, the issues addressed are "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review."  See Department of Revenue 
Child Support Enforcement v. Grullon, 485 Mass. 129, 130 
(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 486 
(2008). 
3 
 
 
distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).  After 
arraignment, the defendant was released on personal 
recognizance.  A Superior Court jury later convicted her of 
both charges.  The judge sentenced her to a term of from five 
years to five years and one day in State prison on the 
trafficking conviction, and two years of probation for the 
conviction of possession, to be served concurrently. 
 
After appealing from her convictions, the defendant was 
granted leave by the Appeals Court to file a motion for a new 
trial in the Superior Court.  She sought to stay her sentence 
while her motion for a new trial was pending.  Accompanying 
her motion to stay, the defendant submitted an affidavit 
stating that all of her close family members lived in 
Massachusetts, including multiple children and siblings in 
Worcester County, the county in which she was convicted and 
lives.  She also averred that she had been released on bail or 
personal recognizance during multiple years of the pendency of 
this case, and that she had not missed any court appearances. 
 
The trial judge granted the stay after concluding that 
"the defendant has presented a meritorious issue regarding 
sentence that could possibly lead to a new trial."  The judge 
set bail at $2,500 and imposed conditions of release, 
including home confinement, GPS monitoring, and weekly 
reporting to the probation department.  The defendant was 
permitted to leave her home only for medical and legal 
appointments. 
4 
 
 
 
In a subsequent motion for reconsideration, the defendant 
argued that the conditions of GPS monitoring and home 
confinement were an unreasonable search and seizure, 
respectively, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  The judge denied the motion but granted the 
defendant's alternative request to modify the conditions in 
order to permit her to leave her home for employment in 
addition to medical and legal appointments.  The defendant 
then filed a petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, seeking to remove the conditions.  The single 
justice denied relief, and the defendant appealed to the full 
court. 
 
Discussion.  "[T]he extraordinary remedy of general 
superintendence [under G. L. c. 211, § 3,] is meant for 
situations where a litigant has no adequate alternative 
remedy."  Vaccari, petitioner, 460 Mass. 756, 758 (2011), 
quoting McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 185 (2008).  
We "review interlocutory matters in criminal cases only when 
substantial claims of irremediable error are presented . . . 
and only in exceptional circumstances, . . . where it becomes 
necessary to protect substantive rights" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Snow, 456 Mass. 1019, 
1019 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 320 
(1980).  "We will not disturb the single justice's denial of 
relief absent an abuse of discretion or other clear error of 
5 
 
 
law."  Care & Protection of Isabelle, 459 Mass. 1006, 1006 
(2011), citing Matthews v. Appeals Court, 444 Mass. 1007, 1008 
(2005). 
 
1.  Home confinement.  The defendant argues that the 
condition of home confinement is an unreasonable seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment and art. 14.3  We conclude that the 
seizure doctrine is inapplicable here.  Moreover, under the 
applicable law, i.e., the common law and existing rules of 
criminal procedure, the imposition of home confinement was not 
an abuse of discretion.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a), as 
appearing in 454 Mass. 1501 (2009). 
 
a.  Seizure.  To prevail in her claim that home 
confinement as a condition of release during a stay of 
sentence pending resolution of a motion for a new trial is a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, the defendant 
first must establish that the constitutional prohibitions 
against unreasonable seizures apply during a postconviction 
stay of sentence. 
 
i.  Pretrial seizures.  Seizure jurisprudence 
historically has focused on arrests, investigatory stops, and 
other street-level interactions.  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 
                                                 
 
3 Indeed, several United States Courts of Appeals have 
held that pretrial conditions of release restricting 
interstate travel are seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  
See, e.g., Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 1999), 
abrogated on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 
939 (5th Cir. 2003), and cases cited.  But see Bielanski v. 
County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2008). 
6 
 
 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Commonwealth v. Baldassini, 357 Mass. 
670, 672-675 (1970).  Nonetheless, the reach of the doctrine 
since has expanded.  In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 
125 (1975), for example, the United States Supreme Court held 
that, under the Fourth Amendment, the government cannot detain 
a suspect following a warrantless arrest without "promptly" 
obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause.  See 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) 
("judicial determinations of probable cause within [forty-
eight] hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with 
the promptness requirement").  Such holdings made clear that a 
seizure can exist not only as a momentary occurrence, but also 
as a circumstance that persists from the moment of arrest at 
least until the determination of probable cause.  See Bryant 
v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2005), citing 
McLaughlin, supra, and Gerstein, supra at 125 ("it is well 
established that the Fourth Amendment governs the procedures 
applied during some period following an arrest"). 
 
In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) 
(plurality opinion), the United States Supreme Court signaled 
that the doctrine had an even greater temporal scope when it 
stated that "[t]he Framers considered the matter of pretrial 
deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to 
address it."  The Court cemented this doctrine in Manuel v. 
Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 918 (2017), where it proclaimed that 
"pretrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment not only 
7 
 
 
when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal 
process in a criminal case."  Thus, the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures remains in effect 
throughout the pretrial period.  See id.; Hernandez-Cuevas v. 
Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2013).  The reach of art. 14 
must extend at least as far.  See Commonwealth v. Lyles, 453 
Mass. 811, 812 n.1 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 
Mass. 782, 786-789 (1996). 
 
ii.  Postconviction deprivations of liberty.  
Notwithstanding the extension of the definition of a seizure, 
the doctrine is not limitless.  "[O]nce a trial has occurred, 
the Fourth Amendment drops out:  A person challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and 
any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 n.8.  
For the following reasons, we conclude that the seizure 
protections of art. 14 also come to an end at the point of 
conviction. 
 
There are two conceptual avenues by which a seizure could 
take place after trial.  First, a single seizure could begin 
during the pretrial period and continue past the moment of 
conviction.  The word "seizure," however, typically describes 
an event that is momentary or brief.  See Manuel, 137 S. Ct. 
at 926-927 (Alito, J., dissenting); California v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991).  The word plausibly can be expanded 
to encompass the entire pretrial period, which theoretically 
8 
 
 
is a short-lived prelude to the main event of trial.  But no 
purported brevity exists after trial.  To say that a seizure 
can last throughout the pretrial period and then continue 
throughout any postconviction deprivation of liberty would 
stretch the concept to the point of snapping. 
 
The second possibility is that a sentence of 
incarceration or other postconviction deprivation of liberty 
could constitute a new seizure, independent of any pretrial 
seizures.  But the "constitutional division of labor" inherent 
in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights weighs against this 
possibility.  See Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 n.8.  The seizure 
doctrine primarily protects against two types of government 
action:  deprivations that are unreasonable because the 
government did not have justification to seize, see, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 531 (2016), and 
circumstances in which some type of seizure was permissible, 
but the manner in which the deprivation of liberty was 
effected was excessive or otherwise unreasonable, see, e.g., 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–396 (1989), citing 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). 
 
In the pretrial stage, the various procedural protections 
offered at trial have not been made available.  Once trial 
commences, however, many protections spring to life.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 456 (2019) 
(vacating conviction due to errors at trial).  See also 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27 ("probable cause determination 
9 
 
 
is . . . the first stage of an elaborate system . . . designed 
to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal 
conduct").  At that point, the two primary areas of concern 
under the seizure doctrine, discussed supra, are covered by 
other provisions.  If a defendant believes that there is no 
justification for any deprivation of liberty, he or she can 
challenge the validity of the conviction or the underlying 
criminal statute.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Squires, 476 
Mass. 703, 710–711 (2017) (reversing convictions based on 
insufficient evidence); Commonwealth v. Williams, 395 Mass. 
302, 303 (1985) (reversing conviction where criminal ordinance 
was unconstitutionally vague).  If a defendant wishes to 
redress the manner in which a postconviction liberty 
deprivation is administered, the defendant has many potential 
claims, including that the sentence is illegal or that the 
punishment is cruel or unusual.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 428 (2015) (revising illegal sentence 
that exceeded length permitted by statute); Michaud v. Sheriff 
of Essex County, 390 Mass. 523, 533-534 (1983) (holding 
unsanitary jail conditions were cruel and unusual punishment 
under Federal and State Constitutions). 
 
Simply put, if a postconviction deprivation of liberty 
does not violate one of the many applicable constitutional 
provisions, the deprivation cannot be unreasonable.  
Therefore, it is logical that the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights would cabin the seizure doctrine, as implied by the 
10 
 
 
natural meaning of the word, to the pretrial process.  We thus 
conclude that art. 14's prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures does not apply to a deprivation of liberty based on a 
lawful conviction or sentence.4 
 
Here, the defendant challenges conditions imposed while 
her sentence is stayed.  As discussed infra, the Superior 
Court judge derived her authority to impose such conditions of 
release from the defendant's conviction and sentence, both of 
which remain lawful judgments at this point.  Accordingly, the 
seizure doctrine does not apply. 
 
b.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a).  Although the seizure 
doctrine is inapposite, our court rules and jurisprudence 
regarding stays of sentences do apply in the postconviction 
context. 
 
Here, the defendant moved to stay the execution of her 
sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a), which provides, 
in relevant part: 
"If a sentence of imprisonment is imposed upon conviction 
of a crime, the entry of an appeal shall not stay the 
execution of the sentence unless the judge imposing it or 
[a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court or the 
Appeals Court] determines in [his or her] discretion that 
execution of said sentence shall be stayed pending the 
[final] determination of the appeal." 
 
                                                 
 
4 A deprivation of liberty that occurs postconviction, but 
that is not based on the conviction or sentence, presents a 
different question.  See, e.g., Jones vs. District of 
Columbia, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 16-CV-2405 (D.D.C. June 13, 
2019) (postconviction seizure occurred where judge sentenced 
defendant to time served and ordered him released, but 
department of corrections held him at jail for several hours). 
11 
 
 
 
The two considerations relevant to a determination 
whether to grant a stay of execution of a sentence pending the 
disposition of a motion for a new trial "are the same as those 
relating to a stay of execution of sentence pending appeal."5  
See Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 77 (2013).  The 
first is "whether the defendant's motion for a new trial 
presents an issue that 'offers some reasonable possibility of 
a successful decision.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 
378 Mass. 489, 498 (1979).  Embodied within this inquiry is 
the primary motivation for granting stays:  if the motion is 
successful, absent a stay, a fundamental injustice could have 
occurred.  "The conviction may be reversible, but the time 
spent in prison is not."  Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 1), 380 
Mass. 851, 856 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. 
App. Ct. 501, 513 (1979). 
 
The second consideration is whether a defendant would 
pose a security risk if released.  See Commonwealth v. Dame, 
473 Mass. 524, 539, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 132 (2016), 
citing Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 2), 456 Mass. 128, 132 
(2010).  This inquiry takes into account whether the defendant 
will return to court, whether the defendant poses a danger to 
any individual or the community, and the likelihood that the 
defendant will commit other crimes while a resolution of the 
                                                 
 
5 Although the defendant requested that the execution of 
her sentence be stayed during the pendency of a decision on 
her motion for a new trial, her direct appeal also then was, 
and remains, pending. 
12 
 
 
motion for a new trial is pending.  See Charles, 466 Mass. 
at 77, citing Polk v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 251, 253 (2012).  
In making this determination, a judge may weigh factors such 
as the defendant's "familial status, roots in the community, 
employment, prior criminal record, and general attitude and 
demeanor."  Charles, supra, citing Hodge, 380 Mass. at 855, 
and Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 505. 
 
If a judge grants a stay despite some perceived security 
risk, the judge may impose conditions of release to address 
that risk.  See Charles, 466 Mass. at 78–79 ("judge evaluated 
the possible security risk posed by [defendant] and addressed 
any uncertainties by imposing conditions that effectively 
would confine [him] to his home"); Commonwealth v. Senior, 429 
Mass. 1021, 1022 (1999) (conditions of release during stay 
"provide[d] some further assurance that the defendant [would] 
not endanger the community or commit additional criminal 
acts"). 
 
We review a denial of a stay of execution based on 
security concerns for an abuse of discretion because such a 
denial "involve[s] determinations of fact and the exercise of 
sound, practical judgment, and common sense" (citations 
omitted).  See Hodge, 380 Mass. at 855.  See also Christie v. 
Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 400 (2020), citing Cohen, 456 
Mass. at 132 ("[a] decision whether to grant a stay is within 
the sound discretion of the judge").  An abuse of discretion 
exists where a judge makes "a clear error of judgment in 
13 
 
 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that 
the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  The imposition 
of conditions of release during a stay implicates the same 
determinations, and thus must be reviewed under the same 
standard.  See Polk, 461 Mass. at 255 (applying abuse of 
discretion standard to single justice's decision to impose 
conditions of release during stay of execution of sentence). 
 
In this case, the judge granted the requested stay after 
having concluded that the defendant had presented a 
potentially meritorious issue in her motion for a new trial.  
Implicit in that decision was a determination that the 
defendant did not pose a security risk sufficient to require 
incarceration.  Those conclusions are not at issue before us.  
Although the judge determined that continued incarceration was 
not necessary, she did decide that bail, home confinement, and 
GPS monitoring were necessary to ensure public safety and the 
defendant's future appearance in court. 
 
These implicit determinations were not an abuse of 
discretion.  During her pretrial release in this case, a new 
criminal complaint was brought against the defendant alleging 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, to which she 
later pleaded guilty.  Based on the defendant's history of 
repeat offenses, the judge could have concluded there was a 
significant risk that the defendant would continue to 
14 
 
 
participate in drug distribution if she were to be released 
without conditions.  Additionally, the serious charges in this 
case, if the defendant again were to pursue such actions, 
would pose a danger to the public.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A 
(trafficking in more than thirty-six grams of heroin is among 
crimes that can lead to pretrial detention based on 
dangerousness).  Lastly, the judge's explicit conclusion that 
the conditions were necessary to ensure the defendant's future 
appearances in court could have been based on the implicit 
conclusion that the defendant had three years of her prison 
sentence remaining to serve, potentially providing her with a 
significant incentive to flee.  Cf. Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 
481 Mass. 747, 755 (2019), quoting Querubin v. Commonwealth, 
440 Mass. 108, 116 (2003) ("potential penalty . . . and the 
related 'possibility of a defendant's flight to avoid 
punishment' . . . are significant considerations" in bail 
context).  The judge reduced the hardship imposed on the 
defendant by ultimately allowing exceptions to the condition 
of home confinement for work, legal appointments, and medical 
appointments.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion by requiring partial home confinement during the 
pendency of a decision on the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
 
2.  GPS monitoring.  The defendant also argues that the 
imposition of GPS monitoring as a condition of the stay of 
sentence was an unconstitutional search.  We review this claim 
15 
 
 
as well under "the more stringent standards of art. 14, with 
the understanding that, if these standards are met, so too are 
those of the Fourth Amendment" (quotation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 729 n.16 (2012).  We 
agree that it was a search, but we conclude that the search 
was reasonable because the legitimate governmental interests 
advanced by the search outweighed the level of intrusion on 
the defendant. 
 
a.  Whether GPS monitoring of the defendant was a search.  
A governmental action can constitute a search in either of two 
ways.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 715, cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019).  The most frequently referenced 
test derives from Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  Under this test, the 
government performs a search when it intrudes on a "subjective 
expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable."  Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 
41, 58 (2019), citing Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 
Mass. 685, 688 (2009).  See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 
Mass. 230, 241 (2014). 
 
Regardless of whether there is an intrusion on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, a search also occurs when 
the government violates the "degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted."  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 
(2012), quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
16 
 
 
(2001).  See also Johnson, 481 Mass. at 715.  Thus, "[w]hen 
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on 
persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the 
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has undoubtedly 
occurred" (quotations omitted).  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
1, 5 (2013).  Privacy rights under art. 14 are at least as 
extensive as those under the Fourth Amendment.  See Lyles, 453 
Mass. at 812 n.1. 
 
In Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 309 (2015) (per 
curiam), the United States Supreme Court examined a statute 
that required recidivist sex offenders to be tracked by a GPS 
device attached to their persons.  The Court held that "in 
light of [Jones and Jardines], a State also conducts a search 
when it attaches a device to a person's body, without consent, 
for the purpose of tracking that individual's movements."  
Grady, supra at 307-309.  We subsequently concluded that the 
imposition of GPS monitoring as a condition of probation is a 
search under art. 14.6  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 718, citing 
Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 691 (2019).  We held 
similarly that "GPS monitoring as a condition of pretrial 
                                                 
 
6 Thus, unlike the seizure doctrine discussed supra, the 
search doctrine under art. 14 is applicable postconviction.  
The reasons for this distinction are readily apparent.  While 
a search is forward-looking and potentially can generate 
evidence for a future criminal prosecution or probation 
revocation proceeding, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 
Mass. 710, 720-721, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019), 
incarceration and other postconviction seizure-like 
deprivations of liberty are primarily backward-looking and 
address criminal offense that previously have occurred. 
17 
 
 
release is a search under art. 14."  See Commonwealth v. 
Norman, 484 Mass. 330, 335 (2020). 
 
We have not yet examined whether GPS monitoring as a 
condition of release during a stay of sentence is also a 
search.  Here, government authorities attached a GPS device to 
the defendant's body, without her consent, in order to track 
her movement.7  Under the plain language of Grady, 575 U.S. 
at 309, the imposition of GPS monitoring was a search.  Her 
status as a convicted criminal released during a stay of 
execution does not alter this obvious conclusion. 
 
First, the fact that the defendant's liberty is 
conditional does not preclude GPS monitoring from constituting 
a search.  Parolees and probationers, whose circumstances are 
in some ways similar to the defendant's, have diminished 
expectations of privacy.  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 722, 
citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 473 Mass. 481, 485 (2016).  See also 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (probationers 
and parolees "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which 
every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty 
properly dependent on observance of special . . . 
                                                 
 
7 There is no evidence of consent in this record.  Even if 
the defendant had signed a form acknowledging and consenting 
to her conditions of release, a form not contained in this 
record, such a form would not constitute consent sufficient to 
exempt the GPS monitoring imposed from the reach of art. 14.  
See Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 702 (2019), citing 
Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 791 n.3 (1988). 
18 
 
 
restrictions'").  This diminishment is justified by a variety 
of related reasons. 
 
One such justification is based on the fact that 
"probationers [and] parolees are on the 'continuum of [S]tate-
imposed punishments.'"  See Moore, 473 Mass. at 485, quoting 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).  "Just as 
other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an 
offender's freedoms, a court granting probation may impose 
reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some 
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens."  Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 119.  Here, the government lawfully could punish the 
defendant, but it has decided in the interests of justice 
temporarily to forgo that option.  Because the defendant is 
not currently serving a sentence, the government cannot 
justify a search on the ground of punishment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morasse, 446 Mass. 113, 121 (2006) (defendant 
does not receive credit towards sentence of incarceration for 
time spent in home confinement). 
 
The reduction in privacy interests also is justified by 
the "assumption . . . that the probationer 'is more likely 
than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.'"  See Knights, 
534 U.S. at 120, quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880.  This 
consideration applies to defendants released during a stay of 
sentence; their convictions and sentences remain valid 
judgments.  See Charles, 466 Mass. at 77.  Cf. G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 57, 58 (criminal record is relevant factor in bail 
19 
 
 
decisions).  We therefore conclude that the defendant's 
privacy interests, like those of a probationer or parolee, are 
diminished as compared with other individuals.  See United 
States v. Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1138 (1994) ("As with the parole and 
probation cases, there is a heightened need for close 
supervision" if defendant has been released while awaiting 
sentencing); State v. Lucas, 56 Wash. App. 236, 240–241 (1989) 
("convicted criminal defendant . . . released pending appeal 
but subject to conditions of probation . . . should expect 
close scrutiny"). 
 
Nonetheless, "[t]he fact of 'diminished privacy interests 
does not mean that [art. 14] falls out of the picture 
entirely.'"  Feliz, 481 Mass. at 701, quoting Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).  Art. 14 still 
provides substantial protections to parolees and probationers.  
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("liberty of 
a parolee enables him [or her] to do a wide range of things 
open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime").  
See, e.g., Moore, 473 Mass. at 487–488 (reasonable suspicion 
required for search of parolee's home); Commonwealth v. 
LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 792-793 (1988) (warrant requirement 
and reasonable suspicion standard apply to probation 
searches). 
 
At a minimum, these diminished interests must safeguard 
the most basic aspects of freedom and privacy in our society.  
20 
 
 
The protection against physical intrusions of persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, is an "irreducible constitutional 
minimum."  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  Therefore, the fact that the defendant's release 
is conditioned on compliance with certain rules does not bring 
the imposition of GPS monitoring outside the ambit of art. 14.  
See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 718. 
 
The existence of the defendant's incomplete prison 
sentence also does not change our analysis.  We have held that 
a governmental action within a prison does not constitute a 
search when two conditions are present:  the prison policy at 
issue furthers legitimate penological security interests, and 
prisoners are warned of the policy.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 206–207 (2011), citing Matter of a Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. at 687-689 & n.6.  See also Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (no Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights in prison cell).  Neither of these factors apply here. 
 
First, the defendant lives at home, so the security 
interests of correctional facilities are irrelevant.  Second, 
that the defendant was aware of the imposition of the GPS 
device is not relevant.  In some circumstances, the government 
0may be able to reduce individuals' reasonable expectations of 
privacy by warning them of the forthcoming surveillance.  See 
Johnson, 481 Mass. at 722, citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.  
But see Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. at 698–699 
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting), quoting 5 W.R. LaFave, Search 
21 
 
 
and Seizure § 10.9(d), at 427–428 (4th ed. 2004) ("Katz surely 
does not mean that Fourth Amendment protections evaporate upon 
advance notice of any intended surveillance").  Our analysis 
here, however, is centered on the physical intrusion test, not 
reasonable expectations of privacy.8  Thus, our jurisprudence 
regarding searches within correctional facilities is 
inapposite. 
 
We conclude that the imposition of GPS monitoring as a 
condition of release during a stay of the execution of a 
sentence is a search under art. 14.  Thus, if the search of 
the defendant by the imposition of GPS monitoring was 
unreasonable, the condition violated art. 14.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barillas, 484 Mass. 250, 259 (2020). 
 
b.  Reasonableness of the search.  Warrantless searches, 
such as the one here, "are presumptively unreasonable."  See 
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 745 (2015), quoting 
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).  "Because the 
                                                 
 
8 Our discussion of reasonable expectation of privacy in 
Johnson, 481 Mass. at 718, occurred as part of a distinct 
inquiry.  We first determined in that case, without 
consideration of reasonable expectations of privacy, that the 
imposition of GPS monitoring as a condition of probation for 
that defendant was a search.  See id.  We then concluded that 
the search did not violate art. 14 because it was reasonable.  
See id. at 719-720.  Next, we examined whether access by the 
police to the GPS location data, after the probationary period 
had ended, was an additional search.  See id. at 720.  This 
access involved no physical trespass beyond the initial 
imposition of the GPS device, which we already had deemed 
permissible.  Accordingly, the proper inquiry was whether the 
police access violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
See id. at 721-722. 
22 
 
 
'ultimate touchstone' of art. 14 is reasonableness, however, 
'the warrant requirement is subject to certain carefully 
delineated exceptions.'"  Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 
35, 49 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 
205, 213 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).  "[T]he 
burden is on the Commonwealth to show that the search 'falls 
within a narrow class of permissible exceptions' to the 
warrant requirement."  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 
603 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 
51, 57 (1974).  A search as a condition of release falls 
within that narrow class of exceptions only when the 
legitimate governmental interests advanced by the search 
outweigh the level of intrusion inflicted upon the individual.  
See Norman, 484 Mass. at 339, citing Moore, 473 Mass. at 484.  
See also Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–119, citing Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
 
i.  Intrusion.  We repeatedly have observed that GPS 
monitoring intrudes significantly on the lives of the 
monitored individual.  See Feliz, 481 Mass. at 698, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 505 n.5 (2014) (GPS 
monitoring is "singularly punitive"); Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
458 Mass. 11, 22 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 
Mass. 559, 570 (2009) (GPS monitoring is "'dramatically more 
intrusive and burdensome' than being required to register as a 
convicted sex offender"). 
23 
 
 
 
We have described two primary ways in which a GPS device 
burdens its wearer.  First, the device burdens the 
individual's liberty interest by the physical attachment of it 
to the individual's body.  See Cory, 454 Mass. at 570.  
Thereafter, the device can function as a "modern day 'scarlet 
letter,'" alerting others of the individual's involvement in 
the criminal justice system.  See Norman, 484 Mass. at 339, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 815-816 
(2013).  Additionally, the device frequently may lose 
satellite connectivity or the battery may become depleted, 
requiring the individual to contact a probation employee 
immediately or risk arrest.  See Feliz, 481 Mass. at 695.  
Resolving the issue may require the individual to leave any 
setting, e.g., his or her place of employment, a house of 
worship, the individual's home, or a doctor's office, in order 
to seek a new satellite connection.  See id. at 704. 
 
The second form of intrusion perpetrated by GPS 
monitoring is informational.  As discussed, a GPS device 
provides the government with a "detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled" log of the individual's movements.  See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216; Cory, 454 Mass. at 570.  This 
relentless, twenty-four hour per day observation "chills 
associational and expressive freedoms[,]" potentially 
"alter[ing] the relationship between citizen and government in 
a way that is inimical to democratic society."  Augustine, 467 
Mass. at 248 n.33, quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, 
24 
 
 
J., concurring).  These concerns are lessened here, however, 
because the permissible condition of home confinement had 
limited the defendant's travels to predetermined locations and 
times.  Thus, her associational and expressive freedoms 
already had been curtailed significantly.9  Additionally, her 
status as a convicted felon with an incomplete sentence to 
serve reduced her privacy interests, partially offsetting the 
intrusion.  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 722, citing Knights, 534 
U.S. at 119. 
 
Having examined the level of intrusion on the defendant, 
we next consider the scope of the governmental interests 
advanced by the search. 
 
ii.  Legitimate governmental interests.  In this case, 
the judge noted that she imposed conditions of release in 
order to ensure public safety and the defendant's return to 
court.  We understand the term "public safety," as used by the 
judge, to correspond both to the risk that the defendant will 
pose a danger to others, as well as the possibility that the 
defendant will commit other crimes while released.  These are 
legitimate governmental interests in the context of a stay of 
execution of a sentence.  See Charles, 466 Mass. at 77, citing 
Polk, 461 Mass. at 253.  As explained supra, these concerns 
                                                 
 
9 We do not suggest that an underlying condition of home 
confinement automatically justifies the imposition of GPS 
monitoring.  In some situations, even where the underlying 
condition is permissible, the governmental interests served by 
enforcement of that condition may not justify the additional 
burden imposed by attachment of a GPS device. 
25 
 
 
justified the imposition of home confinement.  In turn, the 
judge decided that compliance with home confinement was so 
important that GPS monitoring was needed. 
 
The risk of recidivism was not fanciful.  This case began 
in 2013, when the defendant was arrested, arraigned, and 
released on bail; her bail later was reduced to personal 
recognizance.  Thereafter, she was arrested for and pleaded 
guilty to another charge of possession with intent to 
distribute for an incident that occurred while trial in the 
instant case was pending.  She subsequently was convicted in 
this case of trafficking in between thirty-six and one hundred 
grams of heroin, as well as possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute.  Drug distribution at this scale poses a 
danger, albeit indirectly, to others in the community.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A (charge of which defendant was convicted 
can be basis for pretrial detention based on dangerousness).  
Due to the repetitive, relatively recent, and dangerous nature 
of the defendant's criminal conduct, the government had a 
significant interest in deterring her from recidivating.  See 
Johnson, 481 Mass. at 719 (previous probation violations 
supported government's interest in GPS monitoring of 
probationer). 
 
Additionally, the judge commented that the conditions of 
release were necessary to ensure the defendant's return to 
court.  The defendant's looming prison sentence indeed 
contributed to a risk that she might not appear.  See Vasquez, 
26 
 
 
481 Mass. at 755.  But this factor is tied more closely to 
bail decisions than to GPS monitoring.  In Norman, 484 Mass. 
at 338, we noted that "[a]lthough the general specter of 
government tracking could provide an additional incentive to 
appear in court on specified dates, the causal link [was] too 
attenuated and speculative" to justify GPS monitoring based 
solely on the governmental interest in ensuring a defendant's 
return to court.  Here, the same is true.  Nothing in the 
record indicates specifically that GPS monitoring would ensure 
the defendant's appearance in court.  Moreover, for multiple 
years prior to trial, with the potential of the entirety of a 
minimum five-year sentence looming, the defendant had appeared 
at every court proceeding.  Therefore, this factor weighs in 
favor of the constitutionality of the search minimally, if at 
all. 
 
iii.  Balancing.  Because "GPS monitoring is not a 
minimally invasive search," its imposition must be supported 
by reasons that are particularized to the defendant.  See 
Feliz, 481 Mass. at 691.  If the legitimate, particularized 
governmental interests advanced by GPS monitoring do not 
outweigh the level of intrusion, the search violates art. 14.  
See Moore, 473 Mass. at 484, citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
472 Mass. 767, 776 (2015). 
 
The defendant contends that the reasons supporting 
imposition of the conditions would be applicable to anyone 
seeking a stay of execution of a sentence, and therefore were 
27 
 
 
not particularized to the defendant.  The reasons justifying a 
search, however, need not be entirely unique to an individual 
defendant.  Rather, the reasons must be based on the 
defendant's specific situation, which well may bear similarity 
to those of other defendants.  The defendant's convictions in 
this case, her history of recidivism while released, and the 
length of time remaining on her prison sentence all are 
particularized reasons.  These reasons, especially the 
seriousness of the crime and the repeated nature of her 
offenses, provided the government with weighty, legitimate 
interests in monitoring her location.  Thus, because her 
privacy interests were diminished by her conviction and 
pending sentence, we conclude that the legitimate governmental 
interests advanced by monitoring outweighed the significant 
level of intrusion.  See Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d at 1203 ("search 
condition . . . g[ave] society the extra measure of protection 
necessary when releasing a convicted drug merchant pending 
sentencing"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.