Title: STATE v SORENSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-026
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 1980

No. 79-26 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- JEAN SORENSON Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and for the County of Silver BOW, The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: M. F. Hennessey and Leonard J. Haxby, Butte, Montana M. F. Hennessey argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris Tweeten and Mike McGrath argued, Assistant Attorney Generals, Helena, Montana John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Michael Wheat argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana Submitted: September 16, 1980 Filed: MQV 2 4 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. Jean Sorenson appeals her conviction of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated a s s a u l t i n the D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of S i l v e r Bow, the Honor- a b l e Arnold Olsen presiding. W e affirm. On December 6 , 1978, t h e S t a t e f i l e d an information charging t h e defendant, Jean Sorenson, with one count of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and one count of aggravated a s s a u l t . O n May 4 , 1979, forty-five days p r i o r t o t r i a l , t h e S t a t e moved t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r leave t o amend the information. The motion was granted. The amended informa- t i o n changed the charge of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide and retained the charge of aggravated a s s a u l t . Defendant was convicted of one count of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and one count of aggravated a s s a u l t following a jury t r i a l . The c o u r t sentenced defendant t o serve twenty- four years' imprisonment on the homicide count and twelve years' imprisonment on t h e aggravated a s s a u l t count, the t e r m s t o run concurrently. Defendant Sorenson owns and operates t h e Stockman Bar i n Butte, Montana. O n November 9, 1978, a t approximately 11:45 p.m., Gerald Lojeski, Sam P e r n e l l and Steven Sims entered and ordered a round of beers. Defendant refused t o serve them and ordered them t o leave the bar. Sims l e f t , b u t Lojeski and P e r n e l l d i d not. An argument ensued, during which defendant procured a handgun from behind t h e bar, pointed it i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of Lojeski and Pernell, and f i r e d t h r e e shots. One b u l l e t struck P e r n e l l i n t h e shoulder. Another struck Lojeski i n t h e face, k i l l i n g him i n s t a n t l y . ~ e f e n d a n t maintained she f i r e d i n self-defense. She claimed she had refused t o serve Lojeski, P e r n e l l and Sims because they were loud and b e l l i g e r e n t . According t o de- fendant, Lojeski became angry and asked i f she had refused them s e r v i c e because P e r n e l l was a black man. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t she threatened t o c a l l the p o l i c e and t h a t Lojeski thereupon threatened t o "kick the s--- o u t of [her]." She then moved down the bar and secured a handgun, and, pointing it a t Lojeski and Pernell, ordered them t o leave. A t t h a t t i m e , Sorenson contended, t h e victims attempted t o s l a p o r s t r i k e her, and P e r n e l l threatened t o "'whup [her] a s s . ' " She t e s t i f i e d she was a f r a i d the victims would "come over t h e bar," so she s t a r t e d shooting. Defendant denied having any i n t e n t t o k i l l o r i n j u r e anyone. The S t a t e presented testimony from t h r e e bartenders and a bar patron, a l l of whom had d e a l t with Lojeski, P e r n e l l , and Sims p r i o r t o t h e i r a r r i v a l a t t h e Stockman B a r , and a l l of whom t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e e men had n o t been loud, b e l l i g e r e n t , o r aggressive. Defendant's testimony a l s o c o n t r a s t s markedly with the testimony of t h r e e eyewitnesses. D a r r e l l Halvorson, a truck d r i v e r and himself a former bartender, w a s seated a t t h e bar within a few f e e t of defendant, Lojeski and Pernell. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t the a l t e r c a t i o n between Sorenson and the victims was not serious, t h a t it w a s a t y p i c a l barroom argument "with a l o t of cussing and swearing on both s i d e s . " Halvorson s t a t e d t h a t Lojeski and P e r n e l l had been drinking b u t d i d not appear t o be overly aggressive u n t i l Sorenson became abusive towards them. According t o Halvorson, Sorenson c a l l e d P e r n e l l a "f- ' nigger c--- s ----- .I1 I t w a s then t h a t the argument heated up. Halvorson t e s t i f i e d t h a t n e i t h e r of t h e two men a t any'time punched o r slapped a t defendant; nor had e i t h e r ever attempted t o "come over t h e bar." A t no t i m e , according t o Halvorson, d i d t h e two men place defendant i n danger of death o r serious bodily injury. I n h i s opinion, it w a s n o t a t a l l necessary t o use a gun t o e j e c t t h e men from the premises. Two Montana Tech students, Greg LaClaire and P a t Rollins, were seated a t t h e opposite end of the bar from Halvorson. Their testimony s u b s t a n t i a l l y corroborated h i s . LaClaire t e s t i f i e d t h a t the victims w e r e "loose" b u t n o t loud when they entered the bar. H e s t a t e d t h a t Sorenson c a l l e d P e r n e l l " a m f and a c--- ----- " and t o l d ----- ----- S him " t o l i c k h i s b ---- ." He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e argu- ment between Sorenson and t h e victims never became physical and t h a t the victims never attempted t o "climb the bar. " Rollins t e s t i f i e d t h a t Sorenson s t a r t e d the argument, t h a t she used profanity a g a i n s t t h e victims the whole t i m e they were i n the bar, and t h a t most of t h e profanity was d i r e c t e d a t Pernell. H e maintained t h a t n e i t h e r man threatened Sorenson, and t h a t n e i t h e r "climbed t h e bar" nor attempted t o s t r i k e Sorenson. Rollins t e s t i f i e d , moreover, t h a t n e i t h e r w a s i n a p o s i t i o n t o s t r i k e her. Neither Lojeski nor P e r n e l l had brandished a weapon of any kind. H e i d e n t i f i e d Sorenson a s t h e aggressor i n the confrontation. According t o Rollins, t h e argument heated up a s the r e s u l t of defendant's profanity. Both LaClaire and Rollins t e s t i f i e d t h a t Sorenson walked from the north end of the bar, where the confronta- t i o n with the victims took place, t o t h e south end of t h e bar, where the two students w e r e seated, t o procure t h e gun. Both LaClaire and Rollins had worked a s bartenders and bouncers. Rollins was 6'2" t a l l and weighed 215 pounds. Instead of remaining a t t h e south end of t h e bar with t h e two students, where she c e r t a i n l y would have been s a f e from any supposed danger posed by Lojeski and P e r n e l l , defendant returned with t h e gun t o t h e north end of the bar. P e r n e l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant then stationed h e r s e l f d i r e c t l y i n f r o n t of him but f a r enough away so t h a t he could not have grabbed o r struck her even i f he had t r i e d . P e r n e l l i n s i s t e d t h a t n e i t h e r he nor Lojeski made the s l i g h t e s t e f f o r t t o harm defendant and t h a t when the s h o t s w e r e f i r e d , defendant was i n no danger of death o r serious bodily injqry. H i s testimony is corroborated by t h e absence of blood on the bar separating defendant from the victims, a s well a s by the testimony of f o r e n s i c expert Donald Reedman. Based on t h e p a t t e r n of powder burns on P e r n e l l ' s clothing, Reedman t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant was probably four and one-half t o f i v e f e e t from the victims when t h e s h o t s w e r e f i r e d . LaClaire t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a f t e r procuring the handgun, Sorenson t o l d the victims t o g e t o u t b u t then "almost instantaneously" s t a r t e d shooting. Rollins t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant f i r e d no warning shots f i r s t . Based on t h e i r personal bartending experiences, Halvorson and the two student witnesses a l l t e s t i f i e d , i n essence, t h a t the bar- room a l t e r c a t i o n posed no t h r e a t of imminent danger t o Sorenson which would make it necessary f o r her t o defend h e r s e l f . Sorenson raises t h e following i s s u e s on appeal: 1. Did the t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n granting the S t a t e ' s motion t o amend t h e information changing t h e charge of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide? 2. Did the t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n granting t h e S t a t e ' s motion i n limine t o exclude reference t o marijuana use by t h e victims and witnesses twelve hours p r i o r t o t h e shooting? 3 . Did the t r i a l c o u r t err i n giving I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and 28 dealing with t h e use of force i n self-defense by an aggressor and an aggressor's duty t o withdraw? 4. Did the t r i a l c o u r t err i n refusing t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury concerning t h e defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e ? 5. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t ? I n her f i r s t assignment of e r r o r defendant e s s e n t i a l l y argues t h a t t h e information w a s v i o l a t i v e of both t h e s t a t u - t o r y mandates of s e c t i o n 46-11-403, MCA, and of t h e consti- t u t i o n a l guarantees of 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, 520, and of t h e due process clauses of the s t a t e and f e d e r a l consti- t u t i o n s . H e r argument has t h r e e p a r t s , each of which w i l l be discussed separately. A. S t a t u t o r y Argument. I n her o r i g i n a l b r i e f , defendant pursues mainly a s t a t u t o r y argument. She relies on t h i s Court's holding i n S t a t e v. Hallam (1978), 175 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55, t h a t amendments subsequent t o pleading a r e allowed only a s t o matters of form and only when no s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant a r e prejudiced. She contends t h a t the lower c o u r t e r r e d i n allowing an amendment of substance a f t e r she pleaded on the o r i g i n a l information. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s r e l i a n c e on Hallam is, however, misplaced. That case construed t h e numerical predecessor t o s e c t i o n 46- 11-403, MCA, p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1977. p r i o r t o 1977, subsection (1) of t h e s t a t u t e permitted amendments of sub- stance only p r i o r t o pleading. The 1977 amendment removed t h a t l i m i t a t i o n , allowing substantive amendments without leave of the court at any time not less than five days before trial. The procedural safeguards governing substan- tive amendments of criminal informations are hereafter declared by this Court's holding in State v. Cardwell (1980), Mont. - - , 609 P.2d 1230, 37 St.Rep. 750, and not by Hallam. B. Burden Shifting. In its brief in support of its motion to amend the information, the State listed, as one justification for increasing the degree of the offense charged, the fact that defendant had failed to supply the State with the names of witnesses who would justify retaining the lesser offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. As a result, defendant contends that the State has attempted to shift its burden of proving that defendant committed mitigated deliberate homi- cide to her. She relies on In Re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375. Defendant's argument that the State unconstitutionally shifted its burden of proving an element of mitigated de- liberate homicide to her is unfounded. The burden-shifting rationale was developed by the United States Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, and In Re Winship, supra. Mullaney invali- dated a rule of Maine law that a defendant must, to reduce a homicide charge to manslaughter, bear the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted "in the heat of passion on sudden provocation." The case held that a necessary element of murder, malice, may not be presumed, thereby relieving the State of the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court applied the same principle in winship to invalidate a New York statute providing that, for a juvenile to be found guilty of an act which would consti- tute a crime if committed by an adult, the State need prove guilt only by a preponderance of the evidence. Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, does not support defendant's position. In 1977 the United States Supreme Court, distin- guishing Mullaney, held that a New York law requiring that the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the offense to manslaughter did not violate the due process clause. Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The Court held that a State is not required to prove the nonexistence of every fact which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. 432 U.S. at 207-209, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The due process clause does not put the states to a choice between abandoning affirmative de- fenses "or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its consti- tutional powers to sanction . . ." 432 U.S. at 208, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The Patterson Court noted that Mullaney was distin- guishable because the Maine law which Mullaney invalidated presumed malice, a requisite element of murder, if the defendant did not prove mitigating circumstances. 432 u.S. at 215-216, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 286. In summary, Patterson stands for the proposition that a state may re- quire a criminal defendant to prove mitigating circumstance when this circumstance constitutes a defense rather than e s s e n t i a l elements of t h e offense. A s t h e Annotator's Note t o s e c t i o n 45-3-115, MCA, provides: " There does n o t seem t o be any f e d e r a l c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l problem i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a burden g r e a t e r than a 'reasonable doubt' s i n c e t h e U.S. Supreme Court has i n d i c a t e d t h a t a s t a t e need n o t allow any a f f i r m a t i v e defenses a t a l l . Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197. And, where it chooses t o allow such defenses, t h e S t a t e may r e g u l a t e t h e burden of producing evidence and t h e burden of persuasion a s long a s it does n o t thereby s h i f t t o t h e defendant i t s own burden of proof a s t o each of t h e e l e - ments of t h e offense beyond a reasonable doubt. I d . The Supreme Court has even held t h a t an - Oregon s t a t u t e , which required t h e defendant t o prove t h e defense of i n s a n i t y beyond a rea- sonable doubt, was n o t v i o l a t i v e of due pro- cess. Leland v. Oregon (1952), 343 U.S. 790." C. Cardwell Argument. A f t e r defendant f i l e d her o r i g i n a l b r i e f , t h i s Court decided S t a t e v. Cardwell (1980), - Mont. , 609 P.2d 1230, 37 St.Rep. 750. I n t h a t c a s e , t h i s Court held t h a t s e c t i o n 46-11-403, MCA, allowing s u b s t a n t i v e amendments without leave of c o u r t , is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, 520. Furthermore, t h e Court held t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s j u d i c i a l supervision of t h e informa- t i o n throughout t h e course of prosecution and t h a t a sub- s t a n t i v e change i n t h e information may only be made i n compliance with c e r t a i n procedural safeguards. Cardwell, 609 P.2d a t 1233. I n her r e p l y b r i e f , defendant contends t h a t t h e Cardwell holding a p p l i e s t o t h i s case. H e r argu- ment i s twofold. I n i t i a l l y , Sorenson contends t h a t t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell r u l e i s n o t a t i s s u e . She argues t h a t Cardwell a p p l i e s d i r e c t l y t o t h e p r e s e n t case f o r e s s e n t i a l l y t h r e e reasons: (1) Cardwell's t r i a l occurred before t h e Sorenson t r i a l ; ( 2 ) t h e defendant has consis- t e n t l y contended t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s amendment of t h e informa- t i o n was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s applied t o her (she contends t h a t t h e S t a t e impermissibly p u t t h e burden on her t o jus- t i f y r e t a i n i n g t h e charge of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide o r see t h e charge increased t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide); and (3) defendant contends t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i - cation, a s announced by S t a t e v. Campbell (1979), Mon t . , 597 P.2d 1146, 1149, 37 St.Rep. 1264, a p p l i e s only t o new, court-created r u l e s , n o t t o s t a t u t e s which have been declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e defendant argues t h a t i f r e t r o - a c t i v i t y i s an i s s u e , then, pursuant t o t h e three-pronged test of S t a t e v. Campbell, supra, t h e e q u i t i e s favor t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell holding i n t h i s case. Cardwell r e p r e s e n t s t h i s Court's view t h a t leave of c o u r t t o amend an information w i l l f u l l y p r o t e c t t h e criminal defendant's r i g h t s under 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, 520. Cardwell i d e n t i f i e s two i n t e r e s t s protected by t h a t c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l provision. The f i r s t i s t h e requirement t h a t t h e information be supported by probable cause a t a l l s t a g e s of t h e proceeding. 609 P.2d a t 1233. The second i n t e r e s t i s t h e requirement, rooted i n t h e due process c l a u s e , t h a t defendant have n o t i c e of t h e charge and an opportunity t o prepare a defense. 609 P.2d a t 1233. To p r o t e c t t h e s e i n t e r e s t s , Cardwell e s t a b l i s h e s t h r e e procedural safeguards t h a t must be complied with before a s u b s t a n t i v e amendment t o an information i s allowed: (1) t h e amended information must be approved by t h e D i s t r i c t Court; ( 2 ) t h e defendant must have adequate n o t i c e of t h e charge and an opportunity t o prepare f o r t r i a l ; and (3) t h e defendant "should" be r e - arraigned on t h e new charge. 609 P.2d a t 1233. The record i n t h e i n s t a n t case shows t h a t t h e s e t h r e e procedural p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o substantive amendments of i n f o r - m a t i o n s have been m e t : (1) Here, although s e c t i o n 46-11-403 ( I ) , MCA, d i d n o t f a c i a l l y r e q u i r e it, t h e prosecution sought and received leave of t h e t r i a l c o u r t before it f i l e d t h e amended i n f o r - mation. On May 4 , 1979, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a motion t o amend t h e information accompanied by a b r i e f i n support of t h e motion. A hearing was held on t h e motion on May 11, 1979, a t which defendant was represented by counsel. By i t s order of May 25, 1979, t h e t r i a l c o u r t granted t h e motion t o amend. ( 2 ) Defendant c l e a r l y had adequate n o t i c e and adequate t i m e t o prepare her defense. The motion t o amend was f i l e d on May 4 , 1979, some f o r t y - f i v e days p r i o r t o the beginning of t r i a l on June 18, 1979. Furthermore, t h e amended i n f o r - mation d i d n o t change t h e substantive elements of t h e charge. The S t a t e has t h e burden of proving t h e s a m e ele- ments under both mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The amended information continued t o a l l e g e t h a t defendant purposely o r knowingly k i l l e d Gerald Lojeski. Defendant has n o t demonstrated how any of her s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s were prejudiced; nor has defendant explained how she was u n f a i r l y s u r p r i s e d o r rendered incapable of preparing a defense by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s leave t o amend t h e information. See S t a t e v. Stewart (1973), 1 6 1 Mont. 501, 505, 507 ~ . 2 d 1050. I f defendant f e l t she had an inadequate opportunity t o prepare an adequate defense, she could have requested a continuance. (3) A minute e n t r y of the District Court dated June 11, 1979, c l e a r l y shows t h a t defendant was rearraigned under t h e amended i n £ orma tion. Because t h e leave of c o u r t w a s granted, the procedural safeguards of Cardwell w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied with and defendant was n o t prejudiced by t h e existence of a proce- d u r a l s t a t u t e which was later ruled unconstitutional. Since she was n o t injured by t h e s t a t u t e , defendant has no stand- i n g t o argue f o r the r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell r u l e . W e f i n d no m e r i t i n defendant's f i r s t assignment of e r r o r . I n her second i s s u e defendant contends t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n prohibiting the defense from r e f e r r i n g t o t h e use of marijuana by P e r n e l l , Sims, and Lojeski while en r o u t e t o Butte by bus a t a rest s t o p i n Idaho, some twelve hours before the shooting. Defendant's arguments a r e l a r g e l y speculative and conclusory. Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e excluded evidence i s "ex- tremely relevant" t o t h e question of t h e fundamental t e s t i - monial c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e ' s two primary witnesses, P e r n e l l and Sims. Defendant argues t h a t much of t h e testi- mony t h a t these men gave a t t r i a l r e l a t e d t o events taking place on t h e bus t o Butte while they were "undeniably" under t h e influence of both alcohol and marijuana, which could have colored t h e i r perception of those events. Defendant i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s i s an "obvious defect" i n t h e i r credi- b i l i t y t h a t should have been brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e jury. Defendant a l s o speculates t h a t t h e witnesses could have again used drugs a f t e r t h e i r a r r i v a l i n Butte and could have been i n a "drug-induced stupor" when they entered t h e Stockman Bar. Defendant also implies that the excluded evidence was relevant to the "central issue" of her case, presumably her theory of self-defense. This contention seems to be premised on an assumption that the smoking of marijuana would be likely to produce aggressive tendencies. The District Court excluded any mention of the use of marijuana by Pernell, Sims and Lojeski twelve hours before the shooting on the grounds of remoteness. In State v. Gleim (1895), 17 Mont. 17, 31, 41 P. 998, this Court stated that the mere use of narcotics is not admissible to impeach witness credibility "unless it is proposed to show that the witness was under the influence of the drugs at the time the events happened about which she testified." Defendant has laid no foundation tending to show that the witnesses were under the influence of drugs at the time of the events in question. She merely assumes that they were and that their behavior was adversely affected. Defendant has, therefore, failed to make the requisite showing under Gleim. Evidence that a witness was intoxicated is admissible on cross-examination to impeach the witness's ability to accurately perceive the events about which he has testified. )a-efzi3 2ss=mq V. Sandberg (1918), 54 Mont. 538, 540, 172 P. 132, 133; State v. Trueman (1906), 34 Mont. 249, 252, 85 P. 1024, 1025. Evolving a satisfactory rule for cases in which the witness uses drugs is considerably more difficult, however. Although the psychological effects of alcohol usage are far from clear, much less is known about the effect of drugs. The multiplicity of drugs and the varying reactions they cause have compounded the difficulties. Only a minority of state courts has adopted a blanket rule of admissibility. Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 742, 743; see also Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957). Those courts allow evidence of drug usage,without requiring proof that the witness's testimentary capacities were impaired, usually on the theory that a user of drugs is a liar. That is, how- ever, a theory of impeachment which seemingly rests more on the witness's character than on his mental capacity. Such a theory would now be governed by Rule 608, Mont.R.Evid. The majority of state courts has adopted the sounder rule that evidence of drug usage is not permitted "unless it can also be proved that the use of narcotics has impaired % * t h e the sensory, zetentive, or communicative f witness." Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 742, 743. The federal courts, operating under the Federal Rules of Evidence upon which Montana's rules are based, have endorsed a variety of approaches. See generally, 3 Wein- stein's Evidence, §607[04] (1978). There does not seem to be a clear consensus in the federal system. State v. Gleim, supra, indicates that Montana has endorsed the majority rule requiring a showing that drug usage has impaired the witness's facilities before evidence of the witness's use of the drug is admissible. Implicit in the formulation of the rule in Gleim (drug use is inadmis- sible unless it is shown that the witness was under the influence of drugs ---- at the time the events about which - he testifies occurred) is a recognition of the concept of remoteness. Here, the trial judge ruled that the smoking of marijuana was too remote in time to be admitted. The ques- tion of remoteness is directed to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Fitzpatrick (1980) , - Mont. 1 606 P.2d 1343, 1355, 37 St.Rep. 194; State v. Satterfield (1943), 114 Mont. 122, 127, 132 P.2d 372. While remoteness is a matter that generally goes to the credibility of the evidence rather than to its admissibility, Satterfield, supra, evidence can be excluded if it is so remote that it has no evidentiary value. Satterfield, supra; State v. Pemberton (1909), 39 Mont. 530, 535, 104 P. 556. Given defendant's failure to lay a proper foundation that the witnesses were under the influence of drugs at the time of the material events in this case, exclusion of the evidence was justified both under the Gleim rule and under the remote- ness doctrine. The District Court did not err in granting the State's motion in limine. Defendant next urges that the trial court erred in giving the following instructions dealing with an aggressor's use of force in self-defense and an aggressor's duty to withdraw. Instruction No. 27, to which defendant objects, reads: "You are instructed that the use of force in defense of a person is not available to a per- son who purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force against himself unless such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the assailant." Defendant also objects to Instruction No. 28: "You are instructed that the use of force in defense of person is not available to a per- son who purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force against himself unless in good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force." Defendant p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y a two-pronged argument. F i r s t , t h e r e is i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o j u s t i f y giving I n s t r u c t i o n Nos, 27 and 28. Defendant p o i n t s s e l e c t i v e l y t o evidence i n t h e record which, standing alone, supports her contention t h a t she was n o t t h e aggressor. She emphasizes t h e f a c t t h a t she i s a 71-year-old woman. She contends t h a t she was suddenly confronted by t h r e e drunk men i n her busi- ness. When she refused t o serve them alcohol, a s she w a s l e g a l l y obligated t o do under s e c t i o n 16-3-301(2), MCA, she contends t h a t t h e men subjected her t o t h r e a t s of physical violence. Second, defendant contends t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a b s t r a c t and incomplete statements of t h e law. Defen- d a n t argues t h a t a person must have t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t of becoming an aggressor before he o r she may be deprived of t h e r i g h t of self-defense on the ground of provocation. Section 45-3-105(2), MCA, provides t h a t self-defense i s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a person who: " ( 2 ) purposely o r knowingly provokes t h e use of f o r c e a g a i n s t himself, unless: " ( a ) such f o r c e i s s o g r e a t t h a t he reasonably b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s i n imminent danger of death o r s e r i o u s bodily harm and t h a t he has exhausted every reasonable means t o escape such danger o t h e r than t h e use of f o r c e which i s l i k e l y t o cause death o r s e r i o u s bodily harm t o t h e as- s a i l a n t ; o r " ( b ) i n good f a i t h , he withdraws from physical c o n t a c t with t h e a s s a i l a n t and i n d i c a t e s c l e a r l y t o t h e a s s a i l a n t t h a t he d e s i r e s t o withdraw and terminate t h e use of force b u t t h e a s s a i l a n t continues o r resumes t h e use of force." I n S t a t e v. Buckley (1976), 171 Mont. 238, 2 4 2 , 557 P.2d 283, t h i s Court held t h a t " t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c - t i o n s must cover every i s s u e o r theory having support i n t h e evidence, and t h e i n q u i r y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t must only be whether o r n o t - any evidence e x i s t s i n t h e record t o warrant an i n s t r u c t i o n . . ." S u f f i c i e n t evidence i s c l e a r l y present i n the record t o support the S t a t e ' s theory t h a t defendant was t h e aggressor i n her confrontation with t h e victims. The evidence j u s t i f i e s giving I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and 28. A person can become an aggressor i f he o r she purposely o r knowingly provokes the victim verbally. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e i n both I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and 28. A s her f o u r t h i s s u e , Sorenson urges t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n refusing her proffered i n s t r u c t i o n s concern- i n g the defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e . Section 45-3-103, MCA, defines t h e j u s t i f i a b l e use of force i n defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e : "A person is j u s t i f i e d i n the use of f o r c e o r t h r e a t t o use f o r c e a g a i n s t another when and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he reasonably believes t h a t such conduct i s necessary t o prevent o r ter- minate such o t h e r ' s unlawful e n t r y i n t o o r a t t a c k upon an occupied s t r u c t u r e . However, he i s j u s t i f i e d i n the use of force l i k e l y t o cause death o r serious bodily harm only i f : " (1) t h e e n t r y i s made o r attempted i n v i o l e n t , r i o t o u s , o r tumultuous manner and he reason- ably believes t h a t such force i s necessary t o prevent an a s s a u l t upon or o f f e r of personal violence t o him o r another then i n t h e occu- pied s t r u c t u r e ; o r " ( 2 ) he reasonably believes t h a t such force i s necessary t o prevent t h e c o m i s s i o n of a f o r c i - b l e felony i n the occupied s t r u c t u r e . " T h i s s e c t i o n is derived from I l l i n o i s which has substan- t i a l l y the same s t a t u t e . Ill. C.C. 1961, T i t l e 38, S7-2. Before the s t a t u t e i s applicable, I l l i n o i s case law r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e e n t r y must be unlawful; hence, the defen- dant may not a s s e r t j u s t i f i c a t i o n where t h e victims e n t e r upon the premises lawfully b u t subsequently engages i n unlawful conduct f o r which t h e occupant of t h e dwelling seeks t o expel the victim. People v. Chapman (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 553, 364 N.E.2d 577; People v. Brown (1974), 19 I l l . ~ p p , 3 d 757, 312 N.E.2d 789; see g e n e r a l l y , Annotator's Note, Montana Criminal Code Annotated 131-132 (rev. 1980). Sorenson's claim i s t h a t once she had ordered these customers o u t of her bar, and they refused t o go, then t h e i r continued presence i n t h e b a r became an unlawful e n t r y i n t o an occupied s t r u c t u r e . Based on t h a t syllogism, she main- t a i n s she was e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s based on s e c t i o n 45- 3-103, MCA. By i t s terms, t h i s s e c t i o n only a p p l i e s t o e f f o r t s of a defendant t o prevent o r terminate an unlawful e n t r y i n t o occupied premises. It has no a p p l i c a t i o n t o a lawful e n t r y i n t o premises. O n t h e evidence here, without doubt, t h e shooting d i d n o t occur while Sorenson was attempting t o prevent o r terminate an e n t r y i n t o her premises. N o e r r o r occurred when t h e D i s t r i c t Court refused i n s t r u c t i o n s based upon t h i s section. N o a u t h o r i t y has been found and none was c i t e d by defendant t h a t a "tumultuous entry" i n t o a tavern makes t h e e n t r y unlawful. The t r i a l c o u r t properly refused defen- d a n t ' s proferred i n s t r u c t i o n s on defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e s i n c e t h e r e w a s no evidence t h a t t h e e n t r y was unlawful o r an a t t a c k upon t h e s t r u c t u r e , F i n a l l y , Sorenson contends t h a t t h e v e r d i c t i s n o t supported by s u f f i c i e n t evidence. The contention i s f r i v o - lous. Defendant merely a s s e r t s i n a conclusory fashion t h a t t h e cause of t h e shooting w a s t h e victims' i n s i s t e n c e on being served l i q u o r , t h a t t h e shooting of t h e victims was e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d even when t h e evidence i s viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e S t a t e , and t h a t she was under extreme s t r e s s which mitigated t h e crime. The jury is not bound to blindly accept defendant's version of the facts. It is free to pick and choose the evidence it wishes to believe. State v . Seitzinger (1979), Mont. , 589 P.2d 655, 658, 36 St.Rep. 122, 125; State v. Fitzpatrick (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d 605. The jury chose to believe the State's witnesses, not Sorenson. The verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. Af f irmed . 1 We concur: 4 A A d @&&&$7 Chief Justice Justices ~igtrict Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Daniel Shea.