Title: State of Missouri, Respondent vs. Tyrone C. Bateman, Appellant.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90528
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: August 3, 2010

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90528 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
TYRONE C. BATEMAN, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis 
Honorable Joan L. Moriarty, Judge 
 
Opinion issued August 3, 2010 
 
 
Tyrone Bateman was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of his 
cousin Miles Bateman and sentenced to life in prison without parole.  On appeal, Tyrone1 
argues that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he deliberated before shooting the victim and that the trial court erred in 
overruling his challenge to the state’s peremptory strike of an African-American 
venireperson under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 86 (1987). 
Finding no error, this Court affirms.  Tyrone left the victim’s home after the two 
engaged in a physical altercation.  He drove to his own house to retrieve his shotgun, 
                                             
 
1   To avoid confusion, this Court refers to both the victim and the defendant by their first 
names, as both have the last name of Bateman.  No disrespect is intended. 
drove back to the victim’s house, kicked down the door, shot and killed the victim, and 
then drove from the scene while exclaiming, “I got him.  I got him.”  This evidence, if 
believed, was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find the element of deliberation 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This Court also finds no reversible error in the trial court’s rejection of Tyrone’s 
claim that the state’s strike of an African-American venireperson, B.T., violated Batson. 
In support, Tyrone argues the state’s explanation that it struck B.T. because he showed 
initiative and leniency in sua sponte asking about the degrees of murder was pretextual in 
that the state failed to exercise a peremptory challenge as to a Caucasian venireperson 
who also asked a question about punishment and because the questions were asked only 
after the prosecutor solicited questions from the venire.  The state argues that there was 
no similarly situated Caucasian juror, and, therefore, the strike was not pretextual. 
The focus of some prior cases on the “crucial” nature of the presence of a similarly 
situated juror should be understood to mean that this evidence often is determinative of 
the presence of pretext; the presence of such a juror is not necessary to find pretext, 
however.  Pretext is determined in light of the entirety of the circumstances, not by the 
presence of a single factor.  See, e.g., State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992).  
As discussed below, factors that have been identified as relevant, in addition to the 
presence of a similarly situated Caucasian juror, include, but are not limited to, the 
striking of a disproportionate number of minorities, the number of minorities left on the 
jury, the use of strikes against non-minority jurors, the logical relevance of the 
prosecutor’s proffered explanation, objective factors bearing on the state’s motive to 
discriminate, and the prosecutor’s pattern of practice such as his or her demeanor and 
history of making or not making pretextual strikes.   
Tokenism in leaving some minorities on the jury or in striking some non-
minorities will not prevent a strike from being found to be pretextual where other factors 
support a finding of pretext, and the determination of pretext must be made based on the 
prosecutor’s statement at the time of the Batson challenge; new reasons why a strike 
could have been made may not be offered on appeal.  
Here, however, the challenge was made solely on the bases that there was a 
similarly situated Caucasian juror who was not stricken and that the prosecutor 
mischaracterized the nature of a question asked by the stricken juror.  The record shows 
that the Caucasian venireperson was not similarly situated and that his answers supported 
the prosecutor’s statement that he believed B.B. would be more favorable to the 
prosecution than would the B.T. The other minor misstatements by the prosecutor were 
not significant or dispositive, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the 
strike of B.T. was race-neutral. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. 
Underlying Criminal Action 
The evidence shows that Tyrone and Miles Bateman were cousins living on the 
same street.  After a night out together, Miles slept at Tyrone’s house.  When Miles 
awoke the next morning, he discovered Tyrone had borrowed his van and some amount 
of money.  Tyrone later returned the van without gas.  The money was not returned.  
Tyrone left a pair of shoes or boots in the van, which Miles kept until he could collect the 
 
3
missing money from Tyrone. 
A few days later, on March 21, 2005, Miles was repairing a flat tire in front of his 
mother’s house, where he lived, when Tyrone drove up with a mutual friend to retrieve 
the shoes.  When Miles refused to give back the shoes until Tyrone returned his money, 
an argument ensued and escalated into a physical confrontation.  Tyrone struck or 
grabbed Miles, who then retaliated by hitting Tyrone in the head with the jack handle he 
was holding.  Tyrone’s head began to bleed profusely, and the two wrestled on the 
ground until the fight was broken up by Miles’ mother.  Tyrone told Miles, “… [W]hen 
you get off me, I’m going to hurt you real bad.”  Miles went into his house and then the 
bathroom to wash his face. 
Tyrone returned to his car and drove in reverse down a one-way street.  Upon 
reaching his house, Tyrone retrieved a shotgun.  Tyrone then returned to Miles’ house, 
kicked down the front door and shot Miles once in the area of his left chest.  Tyrone did 
not try to help Miles or seek medical attention for him after the shooting.  Instead, he got 
back into his car and drove away, exclaiming, “I got him.  I got him.” 
During a subsequent search of Tyrone’s house, police recovered a shotgun and 
shell consistent with the gun used to shoot Miles.  Miles died as a result of the injuries 
inflicted by the gunshot.  Police later apprehended Tyrone at an apartment where he was 
partially hidden in the closet of a child’s bedroom.  Tyrone resisted arrest so aggressively 
that police subdued him with a Taser. 
The state charged Tyrone with first-degree murder.  At trial, Tyrone admitted he 
shot Miles but argued he was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter.   
 
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B. 
Jury Selection 
 
At the start of the second day of voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether any of the 
venirepersons, after having the night to think about the previous day’s questions, had a 
“response” or a “rethought:” 
[H]as anyone else had a chance to sleep on anything about what we talked 
about and have a response to anything we may have talked about yesterday 
or you rethought as of last night or today. 
 
B.B., a Caucasian venireperson, replied: 
 
Yesterday we were talking.  And I’m not talking about presumption of 
innocence here or anything like that.  But the State is not asking for the 
death penalty or it’s been ruled out completely.  And I’m trying, in my 
mind, to justify why if we determine that there was guilt in this case that we 
wouldn’t be allowed to consider all possible punishment.  Not that we 
would necessarily go for that, but why would we eliminate some of the 
punishment possibilities from the deliberation? 
 
The prosecutor generally explained why the prosecutor might seek the death penalty in 
only certain types of murder cases and that the jury would not be involved in sentencing.   
 
Later in voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether the venire members could follow 
the “instructions as to one of the elements in the case” even if “it may differ from what 
you thought was the law or what you think the law ought to be ….”  The prosecutor 
continued, “I want to know can you follow the Court’s instructions even if it differs from 
your own?”  After five venirepersons answered in the affirmative, the prosecutor asked 
B.T., an African-American venireperson: 
[Prosecutor]:  Juror 217, can you follow the Court’s instruction even if it 
differs from your own personal thoughts or beliefs on the issue? 
 
[B.T.]:  Juror 217.  I believe I can.  But one question, when you say degree, 
what do you mean by that, First Degree, Second Degree? 
 
5
 
[Prosecutor]:  That will be entailed in the instruction that the Court gives 
you that there are elements that go into making a homicide a Murder in the 
First Degree.  There are certain requirements, certain things that need to be 
sustained before it’s Murder in the First Degree or to make it Murder in the 
First Degree. 
 
[B.T.]:  I mean, is that like more of a harsher sentence? 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Murder in the First Degree is a higher charge, per se, than 
Murder in the Second Degree or even manslaughter.  There’s a kind of 
ranging of them.  Murder in the First Degree in some instances carries the 
death penalty.  It does not in this case.  Any of those questions that you have 
as far as degrees go, the Court will give you an instruction on. 
Let me ask you this:  If your personal belief is one thing but the 
Court’s instructions is another, will you be able to follow the Court’s 
instruction and apply it to the facts of the case? 
 
[B.T.]:  Yes. 
 
[Prosecutor]:  You’d be able to set aside even if you disagree with it? 
 
[B.T.]:  (Juror nods head.) 
 
The Court:  Is that a yes? 
 
[B.T.]:  Yes.  I’m sorry. 
 
The prosecutor did not initially include B.T. in his peremptory strikes, but when a 
Batson challenge was upheld as to one of the prosecutor’s original strikes, he struck B.T.  
After the defense made a Batson challenge, the prosecutor explained: 
You honor, I struck [B.T.] for the sole reason that each – before I asked a 
question about following the Court’s instructions and [alluding] as to 
different degrees of murder or homicide shortly after reading the charge, it 
was a Murder in the First Degree case, [B.T.] beat me to that question and 
asked if there are different degrees of murder charges and are there other 
things than First Degree to consider.  And the reason I strike him … is 
because I take that initiative that he showed as, you know, maybe a sign that 
he has a more lenient bend on his personal disposition in this matter or in 
criminal matters. 
 
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Defense counsel argued this explanation was pretextual in that B.T.’s question 
merely showed that he did not understand the differing degrees of homicide, and it was 
responsive to the prosecutor’s question whether he could follow the court’s instructions.  
Defense counsel also argued venireperson B.B. was similarly situated to B.T. because 
B.B. showed initiative in asking why the jury could not consider capital punishment in 
this case.  The court denied the challenge, finding that the strike was race-neutral.  
Defense counsel later struck B.B.  Another strike by defense counsel was disallowed by 
the Court for not being race-neutral.  Tyrone was found guilty of first-degree murder and 
armed criminal action.  The court sentenced Tyrone to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of probation or parole for first-degree murder and a consecutive term of 10 
years for armed criminal action.   
Tyrone appeals, raising two points: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding of deliberation; and (2) the trial court clearly erred in overruling his objection to 
the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of B.T. under Batson, which violated the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 2 and 
18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.  Following a decision by the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, Eastern District, this Court granted transfer.  MO. CONST. ART. V, § 10.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s “review is limited to 
whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to have 
been convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 
419 (Mo. banc 1993), citing, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, n.13 (1979).  
 
7
“[T]he Court does not act as a super juror with veto powers, but gives great deference to 
the trier of fact.”  State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998) (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted). “On review, the Court accepts as true all of the evidence 
favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and 
disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary.”  Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 404.  
“‘[T]his inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence 
at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’”  Chaney, 967 S.W.2d at 52, quoting, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-319.  
 
“In reviewing a circuit court’s decision concerning a Batson challenge, a circuit 
court is accorded great deference because its findings of fact largely depend on its 
evaluation of credibility and demeanor.”  Kesler-Ferguson v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 
556, 558 (Mo. banc 2008).  Therefore, the “court’s findings on a Batson challenge will 
be set aside [only] if they are clearly erroneous, meaning the reviewing court is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  State v. McFadden, 216 
S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo. banc 2007) (“McFadden II”). 
III. 
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FIRST-DEGREE MURDER 
 
Tyrone challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the first-degree 
murder conviction.  He argues the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Tyrone knowingly caused Miles’ death after deliberation upon the matter.  See § 
565.020.1, RSMo 2000.  “Deliberation” is defined as “cool reflection for any length of 
 
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time no matter how brief ….”  § 565.002(3), RSMo 2000.  “Proof of deliberation does 
not require proof that the defendant contemplated his actions over a long period of time 
….”  State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 747 (Mo. banc 1997).  “Deliberation, like most 
elements of mens rea, must ordinarily be proved through proof of the circumstances 
surrounding the killing.”  State v. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 218-19 (Mo. banc 1993).  
“Without evidence of deliberation, an intentional killing is second-degree murder ….”  
State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Mo. banc 2002). 
 
Tyrone argues that “no other reasonable inference” can be drawn but that he was 
acting under the influence of a violent “anger or passion” when he shot Miles and was not 
acting out of deliberation.  In support, he notes it was undisputed that he had just received 
a head injury and that he recklessly drove the car backward down the street toward his 
house to retrieve his shotgun. 
While this evidence may have permitted the jury to determine that he shot and 
killed his cousin in the heat of anger or passion, it did not require the jury to reach this 
determination.  The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he shot and killed Miles after deliberation, that is, after cool 
reflection, “no matter how brief.”   
In particular, the state presented evidence that the fighting between Tyrone and 
Miles stopped once Miles’ mother separated them and Miles retreated into the house.  
Tyrone, therefore, had ample opportunity to terminate the confrontation.  State v. 
Norman, 243 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Mo. App. 2007) (deliberation may be inferred when a 
perpetrator has ample opportunity to terminate the crime).  Instead, Tyrone threatened 
 
9
Miles, saying, “I’m going to hurt you real bad.”  State v. Overkamp, 646 S.W.2d 733, 
737 (Mo. 1983) (“Previous threats by the accused to kill the deceased are admissible to 
show malice and premeditation or state of mind”).  Tyrone then got in his car and drove 
home.  Rather than staying in this safe location, Tyrone got his gun and drove back to the 
scene of the altercation.  Such a “time lapse between the threat and the shooting would 
have established a period of deliberation.”  Rhodes v. State, 157 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Mo. 
App. 2005).  “Where the defendant commits a murder which, because of the particular 
method of attack, required some time to complete, this Court has permitted an inference 
of deliberation.”  O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d at 219.  
Tyrone’s choice not to return empty-handed but to bring a deadly weapon with 
him as he went back to confront his cousin also supports the jury’s finding of 
deliberation.   State v. Stacy, 913 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo. App. 1996) (bringing a deadly 
weapon to the commission of a crime supports a finding of deliberation).  Tyrone then 
kicked down his cousin’s front door and fired his shotgun directly at Miles from only 3 to 
5 yards away.  The shot caused serious injury to Miles’ left lung and major blood vessels 
of the left shoulder.  It fractured facial bones, causing a disfiguration of Miles’ chin.  
Instead of calling for help when he saw how seriously Miles was injured, Tyrone fled the 
scene while exclaiming, “I got him.  I got him.”  “[F]ailure to seek medical help for a 
victim strengthens the inference that the defendant deliberated.”  State v. Strong, 142 
S.W.3d 702, 717 (Mo. banc 2004). 
There was substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the 
element of deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
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IV.  
BATSON CHALLENGE 
In 1880, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a state statute providing that 
African Americans could not serve as jurors.  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 
(1880).  While Strauder had the effect of forcing states to abandon “statutes that 
expressly restricted jury service to whites,” local officials found ways around its holding.  
For example, “[i]n some jurisdictions, names of black residents were included on the lists 
from which jury panels” were drawn, but were placed on “color paper so they could be 
easily avoided during the supposedly random drawing of the venire.”  EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING 
LEGACY 10 (2010).  Such practices led the Supreme Court to find in Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965), that African Americans continued to be precluded from jury service 
after Strauder, often under the guise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges.  To 
eliminate such conduct, Swain held that a defendant could show his or her equal 
protection rights were violated by showing the prosecutor “consistently and 
systematically exercised their strikes to prevent any and all Negroes on petit jury venires 
from serving on the petit jury itself.”  Id. at 222-23.   
Following the 1965 Swain decision, some state officials “turned to somewhat 
more subtle ways of keeping blacks off jury venires.”  Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., concurring).  “Although the means used to exclude blacks … changed[,] the 
same pernicious consequence” remained.  Id.2  As a result, as this Court noted in State v. 
                                             
 
2 For example, a recent study found that after Swain, but before Batson, “a decades-long 
policy of systematically excluding African Americans from jury service in criminal cases 
 
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Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo. banc 1992), the “Swain burden of proof imposed a 
nearly insurmountable obstacle to the vindication of black persons’ equal protection 
rights as evidenced by the fact that in the twenty-one years after Swain, only two 
defendants were able to establish a case of discrimination.” See also Theodore 
McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, BATSON V. KENTUCKY: A PROMISE 
UNFULFILLED, 58 UMKC L.Rev. 361, 365 (1990) (commenting on the pre-Batson 
effect of the Swain holding). 
Batson removed “the crippling burden of proof imposed upon defendants by 
Swain,” Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 933, and made a significant stand against such patent 
injustice when it held that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to 
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black 
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black 
defendant.”  476 U.S. at 89.  Such “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection of the 
venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection ….”  Id. at 86.  In Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400, 409-11 (1991), the Supreme Court subsequently recognized that criminal 
defendants have standing to assert not only the violation of their own rights but also the 
violation of the equal protection rights of excluded venirepersons.  
Parker set out the procedure to be followed in making a Batson challenge: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
… was [actually] codified in a training manual” in one Texas county.  EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE at 16.  In 1968, a manual containing an article authored by a Texas 
prosecutor under the direction of his superiors in the district attorney’s office outlined the 
reasoning for excluding minorities from jury service.  The manual, titled “Jury Selection 
in a Criminal Case” was distributed to prosecutors and remained in circulation until at 
 
12
First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard to one or 
more specific venirepersons struck by the state and identify the cognizable 
racial group to which the venireperson or persons belong.  The trial court 
will then require the state to come forward with reasonably specific and 
clear race-neutral explanations for the strike.  Assuming the prosecutor is 
able to articulate an acceptable reason for the strike, the defendant will then 
need to show that the state's proffered reasons for the strikes were merely 
pretextual and that the strikes were racially motivated. 
 
836 S.W.2d at 939 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).3  Accord, State v. Edwards, 
116 S.W.3d 511, 526-28 (Mo. banc 2003).   
State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Mo. banc 2006) (“McFadden I”), 
noted that one of the most telling and common means of showing pretext is by showing 
that similarly situated venirepersons are treated differently, stating: 
To show pretext, the defense can present “side-by-side comparisons” of 
venirepersons allegedly struck for racially discriminatory reasons with those 
who were allowed to serve.  Evidence of purposeful discrimination is 
established when the stated reason for striking an African-American 
venireperson applies to an otherwise-similar member of another race who is 
permitted to serve.  
 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted).  
While the presence of a similarly situated Caucasian juror usually is indicative of 
pretext, and for this reason sometimes has been referred to as “crucial,” see, e.g., State v. 
Taylor, 18 S.W.3d 366, at 374-75 (Mo. banc 2000), proof of a similarly situated 
Caucasian juror is not required in order to make a successful Batson challenge.  As the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
least 1976.  Its use was strongly condemned in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 264 
(2005) (finding this manual in use post-Batson).   
3 Even after these decisions, however, a recent study by the Equal Justice Initiative 
reports that peremptory strikes still often are used to remove minorities from jury service.  
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE at 14-18. 
   
 
13
United States Supreme Court noted in Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 247 n.6, “A per se rule that 
a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror 
would leave Batson inoperable ….”  McFadden II similarly noted that the presence of an 
identical white juror is not required.  216 S.W.3d at 676.  
The ultimate issue to be decided under Batson is whether defendant has shown 
pretext, not whether there is a similarly situated Caucasian juror.  This Court, in stating 
that pretext is to be determined by looking at “the plausibility of the prosecutor’s 
explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case,” 
Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939, has made it clear that the trial court may not conclude the 
prosecutor acted without pretext merely because one or more common means of 
establishing the existence of pretext is not borne out by the record.  See also Batson, 476 
U.S. at 98; Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 231-232.  There is rarely a simple litmus test for 
examining pretext.  Rather, the trial court should take “into account a variety of factors” 
“[i]n determining whether the defendant has carried the burden of proof and established 
the existence of purposeful discrimination.”  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.  See also State 
v. Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d 464, 469-70 (Mo. banc 2002).  
This does not mean, however, that the trial or appellate court is permitted to peruse 
the record to find legitimate reasons why the potential juror might have been stricken.  To 
the contrary, the issue of pretext is determined by the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the 
strike at the time of the Batson inquiry.  The trial and appellate courts cannot identify 
additional reasons why the prosecutor could have stricken the venireperson but rather 
must look at whether the reason or reasons given by the prosecutor are race-neutral and, 
 
14
if so, at whether the defendant has shown that the seemingly race-neutral reason or 
reasons are merely pretextual.  Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252. 
It would be error to conclude from the focus of some cases on the presence or 
absence of a similarly situated Caucasian juror that the presence of such a juror is 
necessary to find pretext.  Emphasis (sometimes undue) on this single factor seems to 
have resulted from this Court’s use of the word “crucial” in cases such as Taylor, 18 
S.W.3d at 374-75.   See State v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 595, 597-98 (Mo. App. 1999); State v. 
Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 601-02 (Mo. App. 1997); State v. Carter, 889 S.W.2d 106, 
108-09 (Mo. App. 1994).  While Taylor and other cases have turned on the presence of a 
similarly situated Caucasian juror, see e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 247; Edwards, 116 
S.W.3d at 525; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940; State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. 
banc 1987), they have done so under the facts of each case.  The lack of a similarly 
situated Caucasian juror is not dispositive.  
Prior cases have identified a non-exclusive list of factors that may be relevant in 
any particular case.  For example, a court also should look at “[t]he degree of logical 
relevance between the proffered explanation and the case to be tried in terms of the kind 
of crime charged, the nature of the evidence to be adduced, and the potential punishment 
if the defendant is convicted ….”  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940.  The prosecutor’s 
“patterns of practice,” e.g., questions and explanations and history of pretextual strikes, 
may be relevant, Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 233-34, 253; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940, as may 
both the prosecutor’s “demeanor” while engaging with venirepersons, Antwine, 743 
S.W.2d at 65, and the demeanor of excluded venirepersons.  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 
 
15
940.4  “Objective factors bearing on the state’s motive to discriminate on the basis of 
race, such as the conditions prevailing in the community and the race of the defendant, 
the victim, and the material witnesses, are also worthy of consideration.”  Id.  See also 
Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 65.   
The prosecutor’s disproportionate number of strikes against other minority 
venirepersons and/or the number of minority venirepersons remaining after peremptory 
strikes in the case before the court, is significant.  Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240-41.  Not 
using every strike against African-Americans or other minorities does not necessarily 
demonstrate a lack of racial motivation as to the challenged strike or strikes – it merely 
shows a probability that every strike was not racially motivated.   
Similarly, the fact a prosecutor has left one or more than one African-American or 
other minority on the jury does not insulate the prosecutor from a claim of pretext, nor 
does the fact that some strikes were used against Caucasian venirepersons or that there 
was no substantially similar Caucasian juror who was not stricken.  Parker, 836 S.W.2d 
at 940; see State v. Hunter, 802 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Mo. App. 1991).  Therefore, while 
some prior cases have found no pretext after noting that a prosecutor failed to use all of 
his or her “challenges against blacks” as “relevant to show that race was not the motive 
for the use of peremptory strikes,” State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 456 (Mo. banc 
1993); see also State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Mo. banc 2006), these cases 
should not be understood to mean that tokenism will protect the prosecutor from a finding 
of pretext if the prosecutor’s explanations of the challenged strike or strikes indicates 
                                             
 
4 See note 2. 
 
16
pretext or if the disproportionate nature of the strikes does so.  See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 
240-41.  
Indeed, “to hold that mere tokenism satisfied Batson would fly in the face of its 
purpose.”  Hunter, 802 S.W.2d at 203.  Because equal protection rights extend to 
excluded venirepersons, see Powers, 499 U.S. at 409-11, the racial composition of the 
jury is an ineffective shield against prosecutorial animus if even one venireperson is 
stricken for racially motivated reasons.  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940.  
Turning to the case at hand, the defense raised a Batson challenge arguing that 
B.T. had been stricken because he was African-American.  As required by Parker and 
similar cases, the prosecutor then came forward with a reasonably specific and race-
neutral reason for the strike, stating that he believed that B.T. had shown initiative by 
asking about the degrees of murder and that his concern about the lesser degrees of 
murder caused the prosecutor to think that he might be lenient.  It was then defendant’s 
burden “to show that the state’s proffered reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual 
and that the strikes were racially motivated.”  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.  Accord, 
Taylor, 18 S.W.3d at 371. 
 The only grounds for pretext raised by Tyrone below were that B.T. was stricken 
while a similarly situated Caucasian venireperson who asked a question about the death 
penalty, B.B., was not stricken, and that the prosecutor mistakenly stated that B.T. had 
initiated the conversation about degrees of murder whereas he was in fact prompted to do 
so by the prosecutor.  This Court does not find the trial court’s rejection of these 
allegations of pretext was clearly erroneous. 
 
17
While Tyrone is correct that both B.T. and B.B. asked facially similar questions in 
response to a query from the prosecutor, the content of their statements varied in 
substance.  When the prosecutor asked the venirepersons whether they could follow the 
court’s instructions on the difference between first- and second-degree murder, B.T. 
responded by asking, “… [W]hen you say degree, what do you mean by that, First 
Degree, Second Degree?”  Not quite understanding the prosecutor’s somewhat obscure 
initial response, B.T. asked him to clarify it, saying – “I mean, is that like more of a 
harsher sentence?”  This evoked a more detailed response from the prosecutor.   
Conversely, when asked whether he had any thoughts about the day before’s 
questions, B.B. asked: 
Yesterday we were talking.  And I’m not talking about presumption of 
innocence here or anything like that.  But the State is not asking for the 
death penalty or it’s been ruled out completely.  And I’m trying, in my 
mind, to justify why if we determine that there was guilt in this case that we 
wouldn’t be allowed to consider all possible punishment.  Not that we 
would necessarily go for that, but why would we eliminate some of the 
punishment possibilities from the deliberation? 
 
The prosecutor generally explained why the prosecutor might seek the death penalty in 
only certain types of murder cases and that the jury would not be involved in sentencing.   
As is evident from the nature of B.T.’s and B.B.’s comments, the two are not 
comparable.  While both showed some minor initiative by asking questions regarding 
punishment (albeit in both cases they did so in response to an invitation from the 
prosecutor to ask questions), B.T.’s comments showed confusion as to the difference 
between first-degree murder and lesser degrees of murder.  While it is questionable 
whether this curiosity about the degrees of murder showed a tendency toward leniency as 
 
18
opposed to showing a proper desire to better understand the court’s instructions, it is 
evident that B.B.’s question about the death penalty tended to show that he was interested 
in the higher degrees of murder.  A reasonable prosecutor may have concluded from 
these facts that B.B. would be a more favorable juror for the prosecution than would B.T.  
Apparently, the defense thought so also; it used one of its peremptory strikes to remove 
B.B. from the jury after the prosecutor struck B.T. 
Tyrone did not argue to the trial court that any of the other factors identified in the 
above cases5 were present here, and the record does not demonstrate the existence of any 
of those indicia of pretext.  Therefore, nothing in the record shows the prosecutor used 
inappropriate or subjective grounds such as the excluded venireperson’s demeanor, 
occupation as a postal worker or similar factors to strike B.T. or other venirepersons.  
Neither has any evidence been presented that the prosecutor had an inappropriate 
demeanor, questioned minorities differently than he did Caucasians or had a history of 
pretextual strikes.  While the judge below did find that the prosecutor’s strike of another 
venireperson was pretextual in this case, the judge also found a strike by defense counsel 
to be pretextual, and defense counsel did not argue below, nor does he in this Court, that 
the prosecutor’s strikes constituted a pattern of pretext or a ground for finding pretext as 
to B.T. This further shows that the trial court understood its obligation to disallow 
pretextual strikes but did not find the strike of B.T. to be pretextual.  In addition, the 
                                             
 
5 See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 233-34, 240-41; McFadden I, 191 S.W.3d at 651; 
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 526-28;  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 
65. 
 
 
19
defense did not claim below, and does not claim in this Court, that the prosecutor used a 
disproportionate number of strikes against minorities, engaged in mere tokenism or that 
other objective factors supporting pretext were present.  
In sum, for all of the reasons stated above, and giving appropriate deference to the 
trial judge’s ability to judge the credibility of the prosecutor’s reasons, the trial court did 
not err in finding that the strike was race-neutral in “light of the totality of the facts and 
circumstances.”  Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.  This Court is not “left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  McFadden II, 216 S.W.3d at 675. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION  
For all of the reasons stated above, this Court finds that the evidence supported the 
jury’s finding of deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court did not 
clearly err in finding that B.T. and B.B. were not similarly situated and that the 
prosecutor’s strike of B.T. was race-neutral.  The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Price, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge and Fischer,  
JJ., concur; Teitelman, J., dissents in separate  
opinion filed; Wolff, J., concurs in opinion of  
Teitelman, J. 
 
 
20
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90528 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
TYRONE C. BATEMAN,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Dissenting Opinion 
The principal opinion provides an excellent synopsis of the courts’ 130-year 
struggle to minimize racial bias in jury selection.  During this time, the legal standards 
protecting the right of all jurors to serve gradually have grown more stringent for the 
simple reason that prior standards fell short.  Yet, despite the fact that Batson1 was 
decided nearly a quarter century ago, recent cases demonstrate that the bias still exists.  
Therefore, to this day, prosecutors attempt to justify peremptory strikes of black jurors 
based on inconsequential matters such as “crazy looking” hair or being employed by the 
                                             
 
1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 86 (1987). 
United States Postal Service.2  The persistence of bias in jury selection demands that the 
courts continue to enforce the promise of Batson vigorously.  This is a close case and, as 
a result, I would ensure that Bateman’s trial is conducted free of any taint of racially 
biased jury selection.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion to the 
extent that it finds no Batson violation with respect to the state’s peremptory strike of 
B.T. 
The principal opinion notes, correctly, that while the presence of similarly 
situated white jurors is a crucial factor, it is not necessarily dispositive because the 
proper analysis of a Batson claim requires consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances.  However, after recognizing that Batson requires a multi-factor analysis, 
the principal opinion focuses almost exclusively on a single factor --  the conclusion that 
the black and white jurors at issue are not similarly situated.  By focusing on this single 
factor, the principal opinion overlooks three suspect aspects of this case that, when 
considered together, indicate a strong likelihood that the state’s justifications for striking 
juror B.T. were pretextual.   
First, the state struck B.T. for the “sole reason” that B.T. allegedly asked about 
the different degrees of murder before the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors if they 
could follow the court’s instructions.  According to the state, B.T.’s “initiative” in 
                                             
 
2 State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Mo. banc 2007)(state unsuccessfully justified 
peremptory strike by noting a prospective juror’s “crazy looking red hair”); State v. Edwards, 
116 S.W.3d 511, 525-28 (Mo. banc 2003)(state unsuccessfully justified peremptory strike by 
noting a prospective juror worked for the post office).  
 
 
   
raising the issue demonstrated that B.T. had a “more lenient bend” on matters of crime 
and punishment.  The record conclusively refutes the factual basis for the prosecutor’s 
justification.  B.T. did not raise the issue on his own initiative; he was responding to a 
direct question by the prosecutor.  In common discourse, few people would be persuaded 
by an argument premised on inaccurate facts.  Therefore, when the factual basis 
underlying the prosecutor’s explanation of a strike is demonstrably inaccurate, the 
explanation appears more like an after-the-fact justification.    
 
Second, despite being fully apprised of B.T.’s supposed leniency, the state 
originally did not strike B.T. from the venire panel.  Instead, the state struck B.T. after 
the trial court sustained Bateman’s Batson challenge to another prospective black juror.  
The assertion that B.T. may exhibit leniency because he took initiative in asking about 
degrees of murder was apparently not a concern until the state was unsuccessful in 
attempting to strike a different black venireperson from the jury.  The principal opinion 
notes this fact but does not account for it in considering the totality of the circumstances 
of this case.  These circumstances detract substantially from the credibility of the state’s 
explanation for striking B.T.  
 
Finally, the principal opinion notes that the trial court previously rejected an 
earlier strike as pretextual and that this fact indicates the trial court was not hesitant to 
invoke Batson.   No one is arguing that the trial court was unwilling to follow the law.  
The trial court’s state of mind is not at issue.  What is at issue is the prosecutor’s state of 
mind; specifically, whether B.T. was  stricken because of his race or because of a race-
neutral reason that logically is related to assessing the evidence at trial.  Accordingly, the 
 
3
fact that the trial court previously sustained a Batson challenge is most relevant to 
showing that, in this case, the prosecutor demonstrated a tendency to utilize pretextual 
peremptory strikes.   
When the foregoing facts are considered, this Court is left with a factually 
inaccurate justification for a strike made only after the state unsuccessfully attempted to 
exercise a pretextual strike against another prospective black juror.  Given these 
circumstances, I conclude that the state’s justification for striking B.T. was pretextual.  
The Batson violation requires the judgment to be reversed and the case to be remanded.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
 
 
 
 
4