Title: State v. Ransburg
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95629
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC95629 
) 
PHILLIP LAMONT RANSBURG, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 
The Honorable James K. Journey, Judge 
Phillip Lamont Ransburg was found guilty in a court-tried case of second-degree 
assault and armed criminal action.  On appeal, Ransburg argues the circuit court erred in 
overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence and entering 
judgment against him because the State did not present sufficient evidence that he 
attempted to cause physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.  The circuit court's 
judgment is affirmed. 
Standard of Review 
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a court-tried criminal case, the 
appellate court's role is limited to a determination of whether the [S]tate presented 
sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could have reasonably found the defendant 
guilty."  State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005).  "The evidence and all 
Opinion issued December 20, 2016
2 
 
reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict."  State v. Belton, 153 
S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). 
Facts 
 
One evening, Ransburg went to his ex-girlfriend's trailer, which was occupied by 
his ex-girlfriend, another man (the ex-girlfriend's new fiancé), and the ex-girlfriend's 
daughter.  At the time, Ransburg carried a long stick with him that was similar to a broom 
stick.  Finding the trailer locked, he kicked in the door and, once inside, charged at the 
other man "like a football player would to hit another attacker" while holding the stick in 
both hands with his clenched fists facing the other man.  The man, however, escaped by 
running into the bedroom, and Ransburg turned his attention to his ex-girlfriend, grabbing 
her wrist and attempting to pull her out of the trailer.  When she resisted, he punched her 
in the face before running out of the trailer with his stick. 
 
Among other charges, the State charged Ransburg with second-degree assault and 
armed criminal action for his actions taken against the man.1  Ransburg waived his right to 
a jury trial.  After overruling Ransburg's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of 
the State's evidence and again at the close of all evidence, the circuit court found Ransburg 
guilty of all charges.  The court sentenced Ransburg to concurrent terms of seven-years' 
imprisonment for second-degree assault and five-years' imprisonment for armed criminal 
                                              
1 Ransburg was also charged with and found guilty of first-degree burglary, second-degree 
domestic assault, and a violation of an order of protection.  He does not challenge those convictions 
on appeal. 
3 
 
action.  Ransburg appealed, and, after an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court 
transferred the case pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution. 
Analysis 
 
In his first point on appeal, Ransburg argues the circuit court erred in overruling his 
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence and entering judgment against 
him because the State did not present sufficient evidence that he attempted to cause 
physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument for purposes of second-degree assault.  
Predicated on his argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove second-degree 
assault, Ransburg argues in his second point on appeal that there likewise was insufficient 
evidence to find him guilty of the related charge for armed criminal action. 
 
"A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if he . . . [a]ttempts to 
cause or knowingly causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon 
or dangerous instrument[.]"  Section 565.060.1(2).2  "Dangerous instrument" is defined as 
"any instrument, article or substance, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, 
is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury."  Section 556.061(9).  
Additionally, "[s]ection 564.011 governs all attempt crimes . . . including attempt-based 
assault as defined by section 565.060.1(2)."  State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Mo. 
banc 2004).  "Attempt, under sec. 564.011, has only two elements: (1) the defendant has 
the purpose to commit the underlying offense, and (2) the doing of an act which is a 
substantial step toward the commission of that offense."  State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75, 
                                              
2  Statutory citations are to RSMo 2000. 
4 
 
78 (Mo. banc 1999).  "A person 'acts purposely', or with purpose, with respect to his 
conduct or to a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or 
to cause that result."  Section 562.016.2.  
 
 Here, Ransburg was charged with attempt-based second-degree assault based on 
his act of charging at the man while holding the long stick.  On appeal, Ransburg challenges 
the first element of attempt, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence that it 
was his conscious object to use the stick as a dangerous instrument.  He relies on several 
cases where the court of appeals held ordinary household objects to be dangerous 
instruments based on the manner in which they were used on the victim,3 and he points to 
the lack of evidence concerning the manner in which he used the stick because he did not 
swing or jab the stick at the man.  This argument is without merit.   
Because Ransburg never reached the man due to the man's escape, he never had an 
opportunity to use the stick on the man in any particular manner.  But "[i]ntent is rarely 
susceptible to proof by direct evidence and is most often inferred circumstantially."  State 
v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Mo. banc 2016).  "The defendant's mental state may be 
determined from evidence of the defendant's conduct before the act, from the act itself, and 
from the defendant's subsequent conduct."  State v. Hineman, 14 S.W.3d 924, 927–28 (Mo. 
banc 1999).  Here, the evidence established that Ransburg, after forcibly breaking into the 
trailer of his ex-girlfriend, charged at the man "like a football player would to hit another 
                                              
3  See State v. Reese, 436 S.W.3d 738 (Mo. App. 2014) (pencil); State v. Rousselo, 386 S.W.3d 
919 (Mo. App. 2012) (ceramic bowl); State v. Coram, 231 S.W.3d 865 (Mo. App. 2007) 
(telephone); State v. Arnold, 216 S.W.3d 203 (Mo. App. 2007) (ink pen); State v. Eoff, 193 S.W.3d 
366 (Mo. App. 2006) (piece of wood).  
5 
 
attacker" while holding the stick with both hands across his body.  After the man escaped, 
Ransburg attacked his ex-girlfriend.  A reasonable inference drawn from these 
circumstances is that Ransburg's conscious object was, if he reached the man, to cause 
physical injury to the man by using the stick under circumstances in which it was readily 
capable of causing serious physical injury.  Any inference to the contrary is disregarded on 
review.  Belton, 153 S.W.3d at 309.  As such, there was evidence from which a trier of fact 
could have reasonably found Ransburg guilty of second-degree assault.  Ransburg's first 
point on appeal, therefore, is denied.  Because Ransburg's second point on appeal is 
predicated on the success of his first point, it is also denied. 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
 
Breckenridge, C.J., Stith, Draper, Wilson and Russell, JJ., concur.