Title: JENKINS v. STATE
Citation: 2002 WY 107, 49 P.3d 1028
Docket Number: 
State: Wyoming
Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2002

JENKINS v. STATE Annotate this Case JENKINS v. STATE 2002 WY 107 49 P.3d 1028 Case Number: 01-182 Decided: 07/12/2002 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002 JOHN JENKINS, Appellant(Defendant) , v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee(Plaintiff) . Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge Representing Appellant: John Jude Jenkins, Pro se, Rawlins, Wyoming. Representing Appellee: Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. *Chief Justice at time of expedited conference. HILL, Chief Justice. [¶1] Appellant, John Jude Jenkins (Jenkins), appeals from an order of the district court that denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence. W.R.Cr.P. 35(a). Jenkins appears pro se, and in forma pauperis, in this Court. Jenkins contends that the district court erred in refusing to give him credit on his sentence(s) for time served in jail while awaiting sentencing. [¶2] We will direct the district court to modify the sentence so as to conform to its oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing, but otherwise affirm. [¶3] Jenkins contends that he should be credited with 169 days of time served in jail while awaiting sentencing. The State contends that the district court properly denied Jenkins's motion to correct his sentence. [¶4] Jenkins was serving time on a two- to four-year sentence, at the Community Alternatives of Casper (CAC), for a felony conviction which resulted in a prison sentence.1 While at CAC, Jenkins was employed at the Radisson Inn in Casper. On March 28, 2000, after being at CAC for over one year, Jenkins left CAC to go to work, but did not return as required. As a result, Jenkins was charged with escape,2 was arrested in Fremont County,3 and was returned to Natrona County. Jenkins entered a plea of guilty to that charge on October 17, 2000. The plea was entered pursuant to a plea agreement wherein, in exchange for the plea of guilty, the State would ask for no more than a 24- to 36-month term of imprisonment. Of particular interest to the district court at sentencing was whether a 24- to 36-month sentence would provide any additional punishment, because the court was concerned with "the number of escapes from CAC." Although the record does not definitively establish how much time remained on Jenkins's original sentence, and neither a copy of the original sentence nor a summary of the amount of time he had served on that sentence are in the record, all participants in the sentencing process were satisfied that there was a "substantial" amount of time left on the original sentence. In addition, the district court was informed that because of the escape, Jenkins would lose his "good time."4 [¶5] After receiving this information, the district court imposed this sentence: THE COURT: Right. That gives me a little better understanding, I think. It seems to me, first of all, the sentence is a little bit awkward, but that I can see that there would be an additional period of time served on this escape charge if it is imposed at 24 to 36 months and if, even if it is concurrent with the other offense out of, I believe, Fremont County. So I'll go ahead and adopt that recommendation. It will be the judgment and sentence of the Court that John Jude Jenkins, Sr., for his conviction of escape in this case be remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Natrona County and by him delivered to the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections to serve a term of not less than 24 nor more than 36 months, either at the Wyoming State Penitentiary or such other facility as designated by the Department of Corrections. I will not grant any credit for time served since the defendant is receiving credit on his underlying accessory to aggravated burglary conviction.5 I will order that this sentence be served concurrent with that conviction out of Fremont County. I'm going to make an intensive treatment unit recommendation and, Mr. Jenkins, you may be familiar with that program. I have a brochure here I'll give to Ms. Johnson so that you can take a look at that. I hope that you take advantage of that recommendation. It's an excellent program. [¶6] The written judgment and sentence does not indicate that Jenkins was to receive credit on his original sentence for the time served in presentence confinement on the escape charge. The genesis of Jenkins's motion in the district court, as well as this appeal, appears to be the result of the silence of the judgment and sentence with respect to what sort of credit Jenkins was to get for his time served in presentence incarceration, coupled with the judgment and sentence's explicit provision that he was to receive no credit for that confinement. [¶7] The following summarizes the basic principles which govern issues relating to credit for time served awaiting imposition of sentence: A sentence which does not include proper credit for presentence incarceration is illegal; a criminal defendant is entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he was incarcerated prior to sentencing, provided that the confinement was due to his inability to post bond on the offense for which he was awaiting disposition; the purpose of this rule is to provide equal protection to defendants who are unable to post bond because of their indigence; a defendant is not, however, entitled to credit for the time that he spent in custody when his confinement would have continued despite his ability to post bond. Smith v. State, 988 P.2d 39 , 40 (Wyo. 1999); and see Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915 , 923 (Wyo. 2000). In this case, none of these principles is dispositive because the district court intended that Jenkins would, in any event, receive credit for his time in jail, and that the credit would go to his original sentence and not the escape sentence. [¶8] In his brief, Jenkins demands that he be given credit for the time served off his sentence for escape. As noted above, the district court did give Jenkins credit on his original sentence for his time served while awaiting sentencing on the escape charge. The district court has no obligation also to give him credit for that time off the escape sentence. While Jenkins does not directly argue that he has not been given credit for time served as set out in the oral imposition of sentence, we opt to be proactive in ensuring that the orally pronounced sentence has been effectuated. Jenkins is entitled to a credit, against his original sentence, for all time he was incarcerated prior to sentencing on the escape charge. He claims that is a period of 169 days and, based on the record extant, that appears to be correct. CONCLUSION [¶9] For this reason, this matter will be remanded to the district court with directions that the written judgment and sentence be modified to clearly reflect that portion of the oral sentence. A copy of the amended judgment and sentence shall be made available to the Department of Corrections to ensure that proper credit has been given. The judgment and sentence of the district court are otherwise affirmed. FOOT