Title: Doorbal v. Jones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-349
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-349 
____________ 
 
NOEL DOORBAL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[September 20, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This case is before the Court on the petition of Noel Doorbal for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
 
We previously detailed the gruesome and intricate facts surrounding 
Doorbal’s crimes on his direct appeal.  Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 944-52 
(Fla. 2003).  Relevant here, Doorbal was convicted and sentenced to death for the 
first-degree murders of Frank Griga and Krisztina Furton.  Id. at 951.  A jury 
recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court 
sentenced Doorbal to death for both murders.  Id. 
 
 
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In his sentencing order, the trial judge found a total of six aggravators: 
that Doorbal had been convicted of a prior violent felony; that the 
murders were committed to avoid arrest, for pecuniary gain, and in the 
course of a kidnapping; and that they were cold, calculated, and 
premeditated (CCP), and heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  All but 
HAC applied to both murders.  The court found that the HAC 
aggravating factor applied to the Furton murder only.  Each 
aggravator was accorded great weight.  The trial judge did not find 
any statutory mitigators, but did find six nonstatutory mitigators: that 
Doorbal had a difficult childhood, was a hard-working and loyal 
employee, was a loyal friend and positive influence on others, had 
religious devotion and the ability to help others with religious beliefs, 
exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior, and that life imprisonment 
would remove the menace to society.  Each nonstatutory mitigator 
was accorded little weight. 
 
Id. at 951-52.   
On direct appeal, we affirmed Doorbal’s convictions and sentences.  Id. at 
963.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 27, 2003.  
Doorbal v. Florida, 539 U.S. 962 (2003). 
ANALYSIS 
We conclude that the appropriate action is to grant Doorbal’s petition, vacate 
his sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase.  Here, the jury recommended 
death by a vote of eight to four.  Thus, Doorbal’s death sentence violated the 
central holding in Hurst v. State: all critical findings for the imposition of death 
must be found unanimously by the jury.  Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). 
 
 
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In Mosley v. State, we held that Hurst applies retroactively to those 
postconviction defendants whose sentences became final after the United States 
Supreme Court’s June 24, 2002, decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  
Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016).  Doorbal’s convictions became 
final on June 27, 2003.  Doorbal, 539 U.S. 962.  Thus, Doorbal falls within the 
category of defendants to whom Hurst is applicable.  See Hertz v. Jones, 218 So. 
3d 428 (Fla. 2017); Hernandez v. Jones, 217 So. 3d 1032 (Fla. 2017); Card v. 
Jones, 219 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2017). 
Accordingly, the issue is then whether any error that occurred during the 
penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although three 
aggravating factors were necessarily found by a unanimous vote of the jury—(1) 
conviction of a prior violent felony; (2) the capital felony was committed while 
Doorbal was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; and (3) the capital felony 
was committed for pecuniary gain—whether these aggravating circumstances were 
“sufficient” to qualify Doorbal for the death penalty would also be a jury 
determination.  Because the jury vote was eight to four, there is no way of knowing 
if such a finding was unanimous.  Moreover, there is no way of knowing if the jury 
found any of the other aggravating circumstances unanimously,1 or if any 
                                          
 
 
1.  Two of the non-automatic aggravators—HAC and CCP—are among the 
weightiest in Florida.  Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016, 1035 (Fla. 2009). 
 
 
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aggravators that were unanimously found were also unanimously found to 
outweigh the mitigation, which is necessary for imposing the death penalty.  Hurst, 
202 So. 3d at 68; Deviney v. State, 213 So. 3d 794, 800 (Fla. 2017). 
In sum, any attempt to determine what findings were made by the jurors who 
voted for life and the jurors who voted for death would amount to speculation and 
cannot rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, the error 
in this case cannot be considered harmless.  Thus, we grant the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, vacate Doorbal’s death sentence, and remand for a new penalty 
phase proceeding.  See Hertz, 218 So. 3d 428; Hernandez, 217 So. 3d 1032; Card, 
219 So. 3d 47. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
vacate Doorbal’s sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding 
consistent with Hurst. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LAWSON, J., specially concurring. 
 
See Okafor v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S639, S641, 2017 WL 2481266, at 
*6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially). 
Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Maria del Carmen Calzon of Offices of Maria del Carmen Calzon, P.A., Coral 
Gables, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Melissa Roca, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Respondent