Title: Still v. Cunningham
Citation: 94 P.3d 1104
Docket Number: S-10680, S-10719
State: Alaska
Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2004

94 P.3d 1104 (2004) Vern T. STILL and Wanda Still, Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. Lloyd CUNNINGHAM, as Assignee of Northrim Bank, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Nos. S-10680, S-10719. Supreme Court of Alaska. July 9, 2004. *1105 Thomas V. Van Flein, Clapp, Peterson &amp; Stowers, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellants and Cross-Appellees. Gregory L. Youngmun, John D. Harjehausen, Delisio Moran Geraghty &amp; Zobel, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Before: BRYNER, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, FABE, and CARPENETI, Justices. MATTHEWS, Justice. Vern Still was held liable on a personal guaranty, but his wife Wanda was exonerated on the grounds that the obligee violated the Stills' civil rights by requiring Wanda to sign a guaranty. She was awarded partial rather than full attorney's fees for her successful defense. These appeals present four main contentions. First, Vern contends that the guaranty did not cover the debt in question. Second, Lloyd Cunningham, assignee of the obligee, contends that Wanda should not have been exonerated from liability. Third, Vern contends that he should have been exonerated from liability because his civil rights were also violated. Fourth, Wanda contends that she was entitled to full rather than partial attorney's fees. We conclude that the first three contentions lack merit, but that the fourth is correct. Premier Homes is an Alaska corporation, founded by Vern Still, Lute Cunningham, and Hank Bartos, to import and sell modular homes in the North Pole area. As of 1996, Bartos's shares were in the process of being reacquired and there were four stockholders: Vern Still owned twenty-five percent of the shares, his son Mark also owned twenty-five percent, and Lute Cunningham and his wife Marilyn together owned the remaining fifty percent of the shares. Lute was the president. On June 5, 1996, Vern and Wanda signed separate but identical guaranties, guarantying the payment of all present and future indebtedness of Premier Homes to Northrim Bank. Although the guaranties referred to a specific loan in a shaded area Loan 103 they expressly covered all of Premier's present and future indebtedness to Northrim. Language directly below the shaded area stated that "[r]eferences in the shaded area are for Lender's use only and do not limit the applicability of this document to any particular loan or item." The guaranties contained a clause authorizing the lender, either before or after revocation, to extend the time for payment of an indebtedness without reducing the guarantor's liability.[1] In 1996 Northrim made ten separate loans to Premier, each financing separate modular units. All but one had been sold as of March 12, 1997. On that date Premier borrowed $203,022 from Northrim in a transaction referred to as Loan 200. The note for Loan 200 was signed by Lute as president. The Northrim loan authorization for Loan 200 lists as guarantors the Cunninghams and the Stills.[2] Specific collateral for Loan 200 included a deed of trust covering a modular housing unit owned by Premier, a deed of trust covering real property owned by Lute and Marilyn, and a real estate contract payable to the Cunninghams under which $125,000 was receivable. The purposes of the loan were (1) to provide season start-up costs for Premier; (2) to pay off the $132,000 balance on an earlier loan from Key Bank; and (3) to pay original shareholder Frank Bartos a sum to complete the reacquisition of his shares. On March 20, 1997, eight days after Loan 200 was made, Northrim issued a line of credit to Premier not to exceed $750,000. The proceeds were to be used for the purchase and transportation of modular units. Each loan was to be secured by a first deed of trust on a modular unit placed on a lot and by the guaranties of all of the stockholders in Premier. In 1997 some twelve units were financed by Northrim under this line of credit. All of them were placed in Stillmeyer Estates, a subdivision owned by Vern. Five of the units were purchased by Lute and Marilyn as rentals or for resale. It is not clear if these purchases were made from Premier or directly from the manufacturer. On October 1, 1997, Vern wrote Northrim, revoking the guaranty. The letter stated: "I am writing concerning the guarantee I have signed for Premier Homes of North Pole, *1107 Inc. Effective immediately, I am revoking my guarantee. I will not be responsible for any new loans made through the company, unless I personally appear to sign any documents." Although Northrim had financed approximately twenty units as of Vern's October 1, 1997 revocation, apparently only Loan 200 ultimately proved troublesome. On March 24, 1998, the note was extended to May 25, 1998. On June 26, 1998, the note was extended to October 20, 1998. This extension was accomplished by a document entitled "Change in Terms Agreement," which was signed by Lute as president and Vern as vice-president. Meanwhile, on May 5, June 11, and August 19, 1998, Vern executed new guaranties identical in terms to the June 5, 1996 guaranty that he had revoked, except for references in the shaded areas. A third extension extended repayment to June 30, 1999. On January 18, 2000, Northrim notified Premier, the Cunninghams, and the Stills that Loan 200 was in default. Eventually the note was purchased by Lute's brother Lloyd. Lloyd paid the balance of the loan, $90,039.26, and took an assignment of Northrim's rights as to collateral and the guaranties. Lloyd, as Northrim's assignee, brought this action against the Stills under the guaranties of June 5, 1996, to collect the outstanding balance of Loan 200. Lloyd also made a claim against Vern under the guaranties that Vern executed in 1998. Vern and Wanda answered, denying liability. They interposed a third-party complaint against Lute and Marilyn for fraudulently diverting funds from Premier for their own uses, and for breach of their fiduciary duties as officers and shareholders of Premier. The Stills also counterclaimed against Lloyd for civil conspiracy "to set up a sham proceeding in order to bilk Vern and Wanda Still." Lloyd's complaint was alleged to be "in furtherance of this conspiracy." In an amended answer Vern pled another counterclaim against Lloyd, alleging that Vern had done construction work for Lloyd and had not been fully paid. After some discovery was conducted, Lloyd moved for summary judgment against the Stills based on the June 5, 1996 guaranties and against Vern based on the three guaranties given in 1998. Vern and Wanda opposed the motion on two grounds. They claimed, first, that the guaranties did not cover Loan 200, and second, that Northrim violated federal and state law by refusing to extend credit to Vern, who was independently creditworthy, without first requiring Wanda's guaranty. The Stills also contended that the three extensions of Loan 200 voided their obligation as guarantors. In reply, Lloyd argued that the guaranties explicitly covered all the indebtedness, including extensions or modifications of the indebtedness. Lloyd also contended that Northrim had a legitimate basis for requesting a guaranty from Wanda. The Stills cross-moved for summary judgment, claiming that Northrim had discriminated against them based on their marital status. The superior court first considered Lloyd's motion for summary judgment. The court ruled from the bench that the 1996 guaranties were continuous in nature and that their terms were not ambiguous.[3] The court declined *1108 to find that extrinsic evidence of conversations between Vern and Gary Roderick of Northrim changed the meaning of the guaranties. The court concluded that Vern's revocation was not effective as to Loan 200 because the revocation was made after the loan. The court also ruled that the extensions did not void the guaranties because the guaranties provided that extensions would not terminate them. But the court reserved decision on the Stills' civil rights claims. Subsequently, the superior court ruled on the Stills' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that the Stills' state and federal discrimination claims were time barred, but that discrimination could be raised as an affirmative defense to the enforcement of the guaranties or as a counterclaim for recoupment. The court ruled that Wanda's guaranty was void, but that Vern's guaranty was enforceable. The parties settled the Stills' third-party claims against Lute and Marilyn. These were dismissed with prejudice in April 2001. A year later the court ruled that Vern could not assert a claim against Lloyd as a constructive co-guarantor standing in the shoes of his brother Lute. The case then proceeded to a bench trial on Vern's counterclaim for unpaid construction work against Lloyd. The court found in favor of Lloyd and dismissed the counterclaim. The court entered a final judgment in favor of Lloyd against Vern for the full principal amount paid by Lloyd to Northrim for the note plus interest.[4] Both Lloyd and Wanda moved for attorney's fees. The court awarded Lloyd reasonable actual attorney's fees, as provided in the guaranty, of $28,912.50. Wanda argued that she was also entitled to an award of reasonable actual attorney's fees as a prevailing civil rights litigant. The court determined that Wanda was not entitled to actual fees as a prevailing civil rights claimant, and awarded her partial attorney's fees pursuant to Civil Rule 82. Vern and Wanda appeal and Lloyd cross-appeals. This court reviews an order of summary judgment de novo.[5] Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no dispute as to material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[6] "Once the moving party has established a prima facie case, the non-movant is required, in order to prevent the entry of summary judgment, to set forth specific facts showing that he could produce admissible evidence reasonably tending to dispute or contradict the movant's evidence, and thus demonstrate that a material issue of fact exists."[7] On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this court will construe factual evidence in favor of the opposing party.[8] Vern's first argument is that the superior court erred when it decided that his June 1996 guaranty was applicable to Loan 200. He claims that the court should have considered the evidence of the parties' intent and practice rather than ruling that there must be an ambiguity before extrinsic evidence can be considered: "the trial court refused to consider the substantial extrinsic evidence showing the parties' intent, at the time of the June 5, 1996 guaranty, that the guaranty was applicable only to Loan No. 103 and not Loan No. 200." He contends that "the Court should have ruled that the guaranty was not applicable to Loan 200, or that at the very least the guaranty, when viewed in context with the extrinsic evidence, was reasonably susceptible to both asserted meanings, requiring a jury trial." Vern also argues that if this court determines that the guaranty was continuing in nature, "a genuine issue of fact exists regarding unilateral mistake and fraud." He contends *1109 that Roderick of Northrim told him that his June 5, 1996 guaranty would only apply to the particular loan identified in the shaded area of the guaranty and contends that he would not have signed any of the guaranties if he had been told that they were continuing in nature. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Vern filed an affidavit. The allegations critical to his claim that extrinsic evidence affected the meaning of the guaranties and his claims of mistake and misrepresentation are contained in the following paragraph of the affidavit: Under the terms of the parol evidence rule an integrated written contract cannot be varied or contradicted by prior negotiations or agreements. We explained the operation of this rule in Alaska Diversified Contractors, Inc. v. Lower Kuskokwim School District as follows: In the present case there is no question but that the guaranty was integrated. Further, although Vern's affidavit concerning his conversations with Gary Roderick can be consulted on the question of the meaning of the guaranty, ultimately the language of the guaranty is such that it is not reasonably susceptible to the meaning advocated by Vern. It clearly was not limited to a particular loan, rather it was continuous and applied to all indebtedness incurred by Premier before it was revoked. The superior court correctly decided that the extrinsic evidence referred to by Vern was ineffective to change the meaning of the guaranty. Vern argues that Gary Roderick told him that the guaranty would only apply to the particular loan identified in the shaded area of the guaranty. He now claims that this was a misrepresentation rendering the guaranty void and that it gave rise to a material mistake on his part that also rendered the guaranty void. A guaranty is voidable if it is induced by a fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the obligee.[10] Similarly, a contract may be voidable because of a mistake of one party as to a basic assumption when the mistake is known to the other party or is due to the fault of the other party.[11] Here Vern's mistake and misrepresentation claims are both based on Roderick's alleged misrepresentation. The parol evidence rule does not apply when the remedy of rescission or reformation is sought as a result of misrepresentation, or mistake.[12] Thus these defenses are not precluded by the parol evidence rule. But there are two questions that must be resolved in connection with these defenses. First, is Vern's affidavit sufficiently specific to support a claim that Roderick misrepresented the nature of the guaranty? Second, assuming that the affidavit is sufficiently specific to show factual misrepresentation, did Vern nonetheless fail to raise, and preserve for purposes of appeal, the defenses of mistake or misrepresentation? We turn to a discussion of these points. In reviewing grants of summary judgment, we view the evidence submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion in the light most favorable to the opponent, "resolving all reasonable implications that can be drawn from such evidence in favor of the opponent."[13] But we are also justified in disregarding parties' statements made during litigation as to their subjective impressions or intent at the time of a transaction "unless the party in some way expressed or manifested his understanding at the time of contract formation."[14] Vern's affidavit, quoted supra page 9, contains several statements that are properly considered as nonprobative expressions of his subjective impressions and intent. His statement that he was "led to understand" that only some loans needed a guaranty and his *1111 statement that he would not have agreed to a continuing guaranty, fall in this category. Also, his reference to the guaranties subsequent to the June 5, 1996 guaranty are of doubtful probative effect as to what took place at the signing of the first guaranty, because the subsequent guaranties were signed after he had revoked the first guaranty. But the statement in the penultimate sentence "this is how Gary explained it to me" may be an averment of a communication made during the 1996 transaction. It can be interpreted as saying, when considered most favorably to Vern, that Roderick actually told Vern that the guaranty only applied to the loan number listed on the guaranty. As so construed, the affidavit makes a specific claim that Roderick misrepresented the nature of the guaranty. Even though Vern's affidavit could have supported defenses that the 1996 guaranty should be rescinded or reformed based on mistake or misrepresentation, these defenses were not asserted in Vern's memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Instead, he relied on his civil rights defense and on his claim that the guaranties "do not cover the one loan that was in default Loan No. 200." His memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment extensively develops, for some thirty-seven pages, what appears to be all of his defenses to the motion. Yet at no point does it claim that the guaranty is unenforceable because of misrepresentation or mistake. Indeed, "misrepresentation" or "mistake" are not even mentioned in the memorandum. Issues that are not raised in the superior court are waived and cannot be asserted on appeal as grounds for overturning a judgment.[15] Here Vern's affidavit was relevant to a defense to the motion for summary judgment that was raised the coverage of the guaranty and to two that were not raised mistake and misrepresentation. The fact that the affidavit could have supported defenses that were not raised is not, in our view, sufficient to raise them. Alaska Civil Rule 56(c) sets out the obligations of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. It states in relevant part: Vern did not file a document entitled "Statement of Genuine Issues," but his memorandum stated his defenses in detail. Civil Rule 77, referred to in Civil Rule 56(c), requires an opponent to a motion to file "a brief, complete written statement of the reasons in opposition to the motion, which shall include an answering brief of points and authorities."[16] An opposing memorandum thus must include all of a party's defenses to a motion. Neither the trial court nor the movants should be required to guess whether factual evidence might support defenses that are not identified or relied on. Here, since Vern did not assert as reasons in opposition to the motion for summary judgment the defenses of mistake or misrepresentation, these defenses are waived and cannot be asserted on appeal. Vern argues that his revocation in October 1997 of the June 1996 guaranty discharged him from liability for Loan 200. This claim is without merit for Loan 200 was made some eight months before the revocation. The guaranty states that it will "continue to bind Guarantor for all Indebtedness incurred by Borrower or committed by Lender prior to receipt of Guarantor's written *1112 notice of revocation, including any extensions, renewals or modifications of the Indebtedness." Even without such language, it is established that "upon termination of a continuing guaranty, the continuing guarantor remains a secondary obligor with respect to obligations of the principal obligor incurred prior to termination."[17] Vern also argues that the three extensions without his written consent, as guarantor,[18] voided any obligation that he had under the guaranty. This argument is also without merit. The guaranty explicitly included extensions.[19] A guarantor's consent to future extensions expressed in a guaranty is binding.[20] Citing the general rule that co-sureties between themselves should share the cost of performance of their obligations according to their respective contributive shares, Vern claims that Lloyd should be able to recover from him only twenty-five percent of the amount Lloyd paid in satisfaction of Loan 200. His theory is that Lloyd was the agent of Lute and that if Lute had paid off the entire obligation he would only be entitled to a contribution of twenty-five percent from Vern. The primary difficulty with this argument is that Vern did not establish that Lloyd was acting as an agent for Lute when he acquired the note. As the trial court ruled, "Lloyd Cunningham stands in the shoes of Northrim, the principal," and the applicable rule is that "the principal's entitled to recover the entire amount of the guaranty from [Vern]. After [Vern] paid that, he would have a right of contribution from co-guarantors. That's his suit. That's not this suit." Thus while Vern may have claims against Lute and Marilyn for their contributive shares,[21] he did not establish a factual basis for asserting such claims against Lloyd. The superior court granted the Stills' civil-rights-based motion for summary judgment. It held that Northrim violated the Stills' rights by requiring Wanda to sign a guaranty without a legitimate justification. The court voided Wanda's guaranty because of this violation, but not Vern's. These decisions are challenged in the current appeal and cross-appeal. In the process of ruling on the Stills' summary judgment motion the court wrote a thorough opinion. We set out portions of it here in order to establish the legal context for the claims presented: (Citation footnotes omitted.) Vern argues that since the trial court held that his right to obtain credit individually was violated when Northrim required Wanda to act as a guarantor the court should have invalidated his guaranty along with Wanda's. He argues that as a general proposition contracts made in violation of law should be considered void and that this remedy is appropriate in this case in order to vindicate the violation of his civil rights. Although he cites general authority holding that a contractual provision may be invalidated if it is illegal or in violation of public policy, he cites no authority that has invalidated a guaranty that was permissibly required under equal rights lending laws. A number of cases decided under Regulation B of ECOA have held that while a guaranty that was impermissibly required should be voided, it is not appropriate to void a guaranty that was permissibly required in the same transaction. In general, the reasons for this result are that the civil rights violation caused the impermissibly required guaranty to be signed. But even if the lender had complied with the civil rights law, the permissibly required guaranty still would have been executed. Even though the permissibly bound guarantor must honor his guaranty, he may rely on statutory damage remedies for vindication, assuming the statute of limitations has not run, and assuming that he has suffered damages. A leading case expressing this reasoning is Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman.[22] There the court stated: Other cases employing similar reasoning include Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund[24] and FDIC v. Medmark, Inc.[25] We agree with these authorities both as interpretations of ECOA and as analogous authority concerning how state law should be applied. If Northrim Bank had fully complied with ECOA and its state law counterparts, Vern would still be liable under the 1996 guaranty. Ordering the forfeiture of a permissibly required guaranty that was obtained along with an impermissibly required one does not seem necessary to deter lending institutions from illegal conduct. The array of other potential sanctions, including compensatory damages,[26] punitive damages in egregious cases,[27] injunctive relief,[28] criminal sanctions,[29] and the voiding of the impermissibly required guaranty along with actual attorney's fees to the party whose guaranty was impermissibly required,[30] all serve to deter forbidden conduct. On cross-appeal Lloyd argues that the superior court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of Wanda. He argues that Wanda had the burden of establishing that Premier, rather than Vern, was independently creditworthy. He also contends that there was no evidence that Northrim required Wanda to sign a guaranty for the impermissible reason that she was Vern's spouse and that there were questions of fact as to whether the bank required her guaranty because it was relying on joint property owned by the Stills or on Wanda's annual wages of some $54,000. Lloyd's first point that the relevant inquiry was whether Premier Homes rather than Vern was independently creditworthy is without merit. The applicable regulation is 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (2004). It provides: Under the regulations, both Premier and Vern were applicants.[31] But since Wanda is the spouse of Vern, not Premier, the "applicant" whose standard of creditworthiness is at issue in the present context is Vern. Concerning Lloyd's argument that Wanda failed to produce evidence that Northrim discriminated against her based on marital status, the actual legal question that must be addressed need not be stated in those broad terms. The applicable regulation is 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1), set forth above. Under this regulation, requiring the signature of an applicant's spouse is prohibited if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit requested. As to this question the evidence presented by the Stills showed that Vern was independently creditworthy, that his creditworthiness did not depend on jointly owned property, and that Northrim did not require Wanda to sign a guaranty because of her income. The superior court discussed these points as follows: (Citation footnotes omitted.) We agree with the court's analysis and with its conclusion that "Vern Still was independently creditworthy without Wanda Still's salary or her interest in jointly owned property. No jury could reasonably find otherwise." The superior court ruled that Wanda was the prevailing party and awarded her attorney's fees of $1,992.15. This award was made under Civil Rule 82(b)(2), which provides for a partial award of attorney's fees of twenty percent of reasonable and actual fees to a prevailing party who does not recover a money judgment in a case that is resolved short of trial. The trial court found that Wanda's reasonable actual fees were $9,960.75 and awarded her twenty percent of this sum. Section 1691e(d) of ECOA provides for the recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee "in the case of any successful action under subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section...." Subsection (c) provides for a grant of "such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under this subchapter."[32] "A reasonable *1117 fee" in section 1691e(d) means a reasonable actual fee rather than a reasonable partial fee as would be awarded under Civil Rule 82.[33] Wanda argues that the court should have applied section 1691e(d) and awarded her actual fees. In reply, Lloyd contends that a prerequisite to an award of fees under section 1691e(d) is that the litigant requesting such fees must have filed an action. Lloyd relies on North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc.,[34] where the United States Supreme Court held that an independent action seeking attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988[35] could not be maintained. Instead, such fees may only be sought in litigation in which a party seeks to enforce the civil rights laws listed in section 1988.[36] We do not regard the North Carolina case as closely analogous authority. The Supreme Court did not rule that attorney's fees under section 1988 would not be available in an action in which the prevailing party sought to enforce one of the applicable civil rights laws as an affirmative defense or a setoff. Whether section 1691e(d) authorizes an award of attorney's fees to a litigant who is not a plaintiff is a question of federal law. But so far as we can tell, no federal or state court has held that section 1691e(d) either permits or precludes fee awards to prevailing defendants. The parties have brought no authoritative decisions on the issue to our attention and we have found none.[37] Our case of Hayer v. National Bank of Alaska presents a close analogy.[38] The Hayer case arose when the bank sued the Hayers for a debt. They defended claiming that the bank had violated the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-65. They claimed that they were entitled to a partial offset for statutory penalties because of the bank's violations. The trial court found that the debt was owed and that the Hayers were entitled to a partial offset because the bank had violated the federal act. The court made no award of costs or fees to the Hayers. They appealed claiming, in part, that they were entitled to an award of attorney's fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3), which "provides that a creditor violating the Truth-in-Lending Act is liable `in the case of any successful action to enforce [rights under the act for] the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.'"[39] We held that the Hayers were entitled to attorney's fees under this provision, even though their claim was asserted as a setoff: We believe that this rationale applies as strongly to ECOA violations as to Truth-in-Lending Act violations. We conclude therefore that the court should have awarded Wanda reasonable actual attorney's fees. On remand the superior court should award Wanda a fee of $9,960.75 for her successful assertion of her entitlement to equitable relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c). The award of attorney's fees to Wanda Still is REVERSED. On remand the court should award her $9,960.75. In all other respects, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. [1] Lute and Marilyn Cunningham also signed identical guaranties in favor of Northrim on June 5, 1996. [2] Back-up documentation indicates that this is a reference to Vern and Wanda, not Vern and Mark. [3] The court stated, in part: the language is as clear as any that one sees in any of the case law about what the meaning of the guaranty was. And the Stills signed them without question in 1996. The times that other guaranties were required was after ... Mr. Still revoked that guaranty. And so the conduct is in a different kind of context. And I don't think it ... can be used to raise an ambiguity about what the document said. ... the course of conduct that is actually relevant is the fact that there were no guaranties that were required until Mr. Still revoked his guaranty. That course of conduct says that it was a continuing guaranty and everybody knew it. ... I also find that Mr. Still's letter ... terminating his guaranty wasn't effective with respect to loan number 200.... .... ... the other issue that was raised had to do with the extensions. And certainly there are some ... times that extensions can void a guaranty. But in these particular guaranties, there were provisions specifically in the guaranties themselves that ... cover[ ] extensions. So the language is sufficient to take it out of that ... kind of case where there's a voiding by the fact of extensions. [4] The Stills' conspiracy counterclaim was evidently considered resolved favorably to Lloyd, although the briefs do not describe the procedural mechanism by which this occurred. [5] West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135, 1137 (Alaska 2000). [6] Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c). [7] Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 991 P.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Alaska 1999) (quotations omitted). [8] West, 8 P.3d at 1137. [9] 778 P.2d 581, 583-84 (Alaska 1989) (footnotes omitted). [10] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 12(1) (1996). [11] RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY Y § 12(3). [12] Diagnostic Imaging Ctr. Assocs. v. H &amp; P, 815 P.2d 865, 867 (Alaska 1991). [13] Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996, 1003 (Alaska 2004). [14] Id.; see also Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 870 (Alaska 1981): Differences of opinion among the parties as to their subjective intent, expressed during the litigation, do not establish an issue of fact regarding the parties' reasonable expectations at the time they entered into the contract, since such self-serving statements are not considered to be probative. Rather, the court must look to the express manifestations of each party's understanding of the contract in attempting to give effect to the intent behind the agreement. (Footnotes omitted.) [15] Hagans, Brown &amp; Gibbs v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1164, 1166 n. 2 (Alaska 1989) ("Issues not properly raised or briefed at trial are not properly before this court on appeal."). [16] Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(c)(1)(ii). [17] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 16 (1996). [18] He consented to the second extension in his capacity of vice president of Premier. See supra page 4. [19] The guaranty provided in relevant part: DURATION OF GUARANTY. This Guaranty ... will continue in full force until all Indebtedness incurred or contracted before receipt by Lender of any notice of revocation shall have been fully and finally paid and satisfied and all other obligations of Guarantor under this Guaranty shall have been performed in full. If Guarantor elects to revoke this Guaranty, Guarantor may only do so in writing.... Written revocation of this Guaranty will apply only to advances or new Indebtedness created after actual receipt by Lender of Guarantor's written revocation... This Guaranty will continue to bind Guarantor for all Indebtedness incurred by Borrower or committed by Lender prior to receipt of Guarantor's written notice of revocation, including any extensions, renewals, substitutions or modifications of the Indebtedness. All renewals, extensions, substitutions, and modifications of the Indebtedness granted after Guarantor's revocation, are contemplated under this Guaranty and, specifically will not be considered to be new Indebtedness.... Release of any other guarantor or termination of any other guaranty of the Indebtedness shall not affect the liability of Guarantor under this Guaranty. [20] See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 48(1). [21] See id. §§ 55, 57. [22] 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.Pa.1993). [23] Id. at 329-30 (citation omitted). [24] 51 F.3d 28 (3d Cir.1995). [25] 897 F. Supp. 511 (D.Kan.1995); see also, Southwestern Pennsylvania Reg'l Council, Inc. v. Gentile, 776 A.2d 276, 282 (Pa.Super.2001); Eure v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 248 Va. 245, 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994). [26] See AS 22.10.020(i); Loomis v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Alaska 1976). [27] Id. [28] Id. [29] AS 18.80.270. [30] See infra pages 26-29. [31] 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (2004). [32] 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) provides as follows: Recovery of costs and attorney's fees In the case of any successful action under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court, shall be added to any damages awarded by the court under such subsection. [33] See Hayer v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 663 P.2d 547 (Alaska 1983). [34] 479 U.S. 6, 107 S. Ct. 336, 93 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1986). [35] 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of ... Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 ..., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." [36] North Carolina, 479 U.S. at 11, 107 S. Ct. 336. [37] Courts in two cases, in dicta, have stated or implied that a prevailing defendant may not rely on that statute for an award of attorney's fees. Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.Pa.1993) (implying in dictum that attorney's fees would not be available under statute to defendant seeking recoupment); Durdin v. Cheyenne Mountain Bank, 98 P.3d 899, at ___, 2004 WL 352089, at 6 (Colo.App., Feb.26, 2004) (stating in dictum that fees are not available under this statute to defendants). [38] 619 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1980). [39] Id. at 476. [40] Id.