Title: Hutchinson v. Des Moines Housing Corporation
Citation: 99 N.W.2d 81
Docket Number: 49765
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 1959

99 N.W.2d 81 (1959) Tom C. HUTCHINSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Margaret Anne Hutchinson, Deceased, Appellant, v. DES MOINES HOUSING CORPORATION, Fort Des Moines Community Services, Incorporated, and Bruno Ceretti, Appellees. No. 49765. Supreme Court of Iowa. October 20, 1959. *82 Jones, Rockwell &amp; Oliver, Des Moines, for appellant. Bannister, Carpenter, Ahlers &amp; Cooney, Des Moines, for appellee, Des Moines Housing Corp. Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor &amp; Fairgrave, Des Moines, for appellee, Fort Des Moines Community Services, Incorporated. Hallaghan, Irish &amp; Burt, Des Moines, for appellee, Bruno Ceretti. PETERSON, Justice. This case was previously before this court on an appeal as to interlocutory order in Hutchinson v. Des Moines Housing Corporation, 248 Iowa 1121, 84 N.W.2d 10. The appeal pertained to pleadings. A similar case was before this court in Tedrow v. Des Moines Housing Corporation, 249 Iowa 766, 87 N.W.2d 463. In this case the trial court directed a verdict in favor of all defendants, which the majority of this court affirmed. The facts were shown in detail in the two previous cases. We will not repeat them at any length. We will sketch a few basic facts as an introduction to this case, and such additional facts as were offered in evidence, and which do not appear in the record in the Tedrow case. Des Moines Housing Corporation secured from the General Services Authority of the United States Government, in about 1946, the possession and use of about 900 houses, and 65 stores including a recreation center. These improvements were erected at Ft. Des Moines for training purposes during World War II. The only property involved in this action was the recreation center known as building 318. Des Moines Housing Corporation turned over to, or it might be called leased to. Fort Des Moines Community Services, Incorporated, Building 318, under oral lease, and without rental. Community Services, Inc., had complete possession and control of the building and all facilities. Up until February 20, 1956, Des Moines Housing Corporation paid all electric bills. It assumed no responsibility for the building except major repairs. Community Services, Inc., rented the tavern to defendant, Bruno Ceretti under written lease for $250 per month. Mr. Lockhart, the mayor, testified: "Mr. Ceretti was leasing the tavern portion of the building under an agreement marked Exhibit 12." * * * "all of the revenue from Building 318 went to Community Services. Community Services was the landlord." (Emphasis ours.) The lease, provided: "All other public utilities (except telephone) are to be furnished for the use and benefit of lessee by lessor without expense to lessee." It also provided: "All repairs to public utilities furnished by lessor shall be made at the expense of the lessor, who shall keep and maintain said utilities, except the telephone, in good operating condition." (Emphasis ours.) On February 16, 1956, Building 318 was completely destroyed by fire. Mrs. Tedrow, three of her four children, and Margaret Anne Hutchinson, a guest, eleven years old, plaintiff's intestate, lost their lives in the fire. Mr. Tedrow was custodian of the *83 building, and lived in an apartment on the second floor, furnished to him as a part of his compensation. This is an action for damages for loss of the life of Margaret Anne. The trial court sustained motions to direct verdict for all three defendants. Plaintiff appeals. A rough sketch of Building 318 will be of assistance in analyzing the facts: Appellant assigns in substance three errors relied on for reversal: 1. The court erred in failing to submit the case to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 2. The court erred in not submitting the case to the jury under the doctrine of specific negligence. 3. The court erred in directing a verdict for defendants, and holding that the gaps in evidence pointed out in the Tedrow case had not been filled in. The last two assignments of error will be considered together. Des Moines Housing Corporation had no possession or control of the building or of any utilities. It did have an obligation as to major improvements. Inspecting, servicing and repairing of the electrical equipment would not be considered a major improvement. Merle Epps, electrician for Des Moines Housing Corporation testified: "I was employed by the Des Moines Housing Corporation for about 10 years. We were not supposed to do any work in the commercial buildings * * *" Since we are going to hold the failure of Fort Des Moines Community *84 Services, Inc., to properly inspect and maintain the electrical wiring system in good operating condition, as the basis for submission to the jury, motion to direct verdict in favor of Des Moines Housing Corporation was properly sustained. The Housing Corporation had nothing to do with maintenance of the electrical wiring. As between Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc., and Bruno Ceretti it clearly appears he had a written provision in his lease, previously quoted, that lessor would keep and maintain the utilities in good operating condition. This was part of the consideration for which he paid $250 per month. It is true the evidence shows he added several electrical appliances in his tavern. Defendant Community Services, Inc., rented the rooms to Ceretti for tavern purposes, and knew or should have known of such a probability in these modern times. The failure of Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc., to comply with its agreement, if the jury so finds, cannot therefor be charged to Ceretti. The exception would be if defendants produced evidence that Ceretti or his employees had placed the pennies in the fuse wells. The record fails to disclose any such evidence. The motion sustaining directed verdict in his favor was properly sustained. We will not present the question again as to alleged error by failing to submit the case to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It was fully presented in Tedrow v. Des Moines Housing Corporation, and we approve and concur in that presentation and conclusion. The remaining question is what evidence was offered in this case, not offered in the Tedrow case, which requires submission of this case to the jury as to Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc.? In the Tedrow case Mr. Stebbins an assistant in the State Fire Marshal's office testified, but he would go no farther in his testimony than to say "placing pennies behind the fuses * * * does create a fire hazard." Mr. Cook, another assistant, testified: "based upon my years of experience and fire investigation, the condition that we found in Exhibit 27 (the fuse box with the pennies) could create a fire hazard, and would create a dangerous condition." Mr. Stith, City Electric Inspector of Des Moines, offered somewhat similar testimony, as to hazards of pennies in fuse wells. The testimony of these three witnesses was inconclusive, without other facts, and constituted no basis for submission to the jury, as the majority decided. In the case at bar we find a completely different situation. The testimony is more detailed and conclusive. Three competent and qualified experts testified, and the evidence offered is sufficient to require submission to the jury as to Community Services, Inc. The additional evidence is the explanation by electrical experts as to conditions found in the fuse box, and their implications. One expert answered a comprehensive hypothetical question, which was worthy of jury consideration. Mr. Epps, electrician, testified: "After the fire, I had an occasion to make a search of the ruins in order to find a fuse box. * * * I found a fuse box practically in the position it was in the building, except it was on the floor covered up with tile. This fuse box that I found was the one that originally was behind the bar in Bruno's Tavern. This Exhibit 3 is the fuse panel that used to be located in Building 318 behind the bar at the tavern. * * At the time I found Exhibit 3 I made an examination of it by unscrewing some of the fuses in the wells and I found two or three of them had pennies behind them." Mr. Lee Bills who worked for Ceretti from 4:30 p. m. until about 1:15 a. m., testified: "I was working in Bruno's Tavern the night of the fire. The last night that I left Bruno's Tavern before the fire I made my general inspection and looked around the tavern a half hour before I left. As far as I know, there were no *85 lighted cigarettes. There weren't any waste paper baskets out in the tavern portion where the customers were seated that you could throw lighted cigarettes in. * * * On the night before the fire, when I closed Bruno's Tavern, there were not any greasy rags in the tavern. * * * there was never any kerosene or gasoline kept in there." Mr. Bills testified about the extra appliances on the electric circuit in the tavern. "There were 2 coolers where we kept our bottled beer. * * * These coolers were cooled by motors run by electricity. These coolers were left running all night so that the next day we would have cold beer to serve. * * * On this particular night the 2 coolers were practically full of beer. * * The ice box at each end of the bar was used for 6-paks. * * * That night just before the fire, the walk-in cooler was in use. * * * That is where we kept the keg beer and the quarts. The walk-in icebox was cooled by electricty." Bruno Ceretti testified as to additional electrical appliances he had installed: "I put in two reach-in coolers, bottle coolers, and I had two small fans * * * Other electrical equipment included my cash register, two electric clocks and the tap box. The tap box has facilities for cooling draft beer. * * * The ice box was plugged in a wall socket." Mr. John Lagerstrom was called as an expert witness for plaintiff. He is an electrical engineer with a Bachelor and a Masters Degree in electrical engineering. He is employed at Iowa State College as Assistant to the Dean of Engineering. One-fourth of his time is spent in teaching electrical subjects in the electrical engineering department, where he has been teaching for twelve years. He is a member of the American Institute of Electrical Engineering and a member of the National Committee on transmission and distribution. He has nearly completed his study for a Doctors Degree in electrical engineering. Mr. Lagerstrom testified: Mr. Floyd Nelson was called as an expert witness for plaintiff. He lives at Ames, Iowa. He is supervisor of part-time instructors in fire department procedures and operations over the state. He has been employed in that work for seven *87 years. Prior to that time he was a member and assistant Chief of the Fire Department of Atlantic for eight years. He has had special training in fire prevention work and the causes of fire. He testified: Under cross-examination Mr. Nelson testified: Mr. Ed J. Herron, State Fire Marshal of Iowa, was called as a witness by plaintiff. He had been State Fire Marshal since December 15, 1955. Before becoming State Fire Marshal he was the City Fire Marshal of Cedar Rapids. He had joined the Cedar Rapids Fire Department in 1938. He testified: "Over the years, I have made many examinations after fires to determine the cause and origin of the fire. I am an executive board member of the Fire Marshal Section of the National Fire Protection Association, and a director of the International Arson Investigators. I have attended a number of short courses or special courses at Iowa State College and Purdue University." *88 "Q. Mr. Herron, in your determining the cause of arson, or the determining of the cause of fire, have you ever had experience where the fire itself was caused by the electrical system of the building? A. Yes. There are many fires that we have come to the conclusion that are in our opinion, after completed investigation, that were caused by faulty equipment or misuse of electricity. * * * Under cross-examination Mr. Herron testified: Briefly, the content of the evidence of the experts was twofold: 1st. Because of the pennies in the fuse-wells, the fuse would not blow out, and in the absence of this safety-valve, and because of the heavy overload on the electric wires, they became overheated. The insulation on the wire was destroyed by this overheating, the hot wire came in contact with the wall, or some other contacting substance, resulting in the fire. 2d. It was also the opinion of the experts, from the appearance of the wires and the melted metal in the fuse box, that the fire started in or near the fuse box. In other words, a fire from some other area in the building reaching the fuse box would not cause the type of damage which appeared evident. This could only happen from fires starting in or near the fuse box. "Arching", (Webster) in electrical language, is the luminous bridge formed by the passage of a current across a gap between two conductors or terminals. Defendants called Kenneth R. Brown as a witness to refute the testimony of Messrs. Lagerstrom, Nelson and Herron. Mr. Brown is an electrical engineer, owner of Brown Engineering Company in Des Moines. He is a graduate of University of Illinois; worked for many years as an engineer for private corporations, but since 1932 has been in private engineering practice. He takes the opposite position from plaintiff's three witnesses. The answer as between the experts is for the jury. 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1206, states: "It is generally recognized that the relative weight and sufficiency of expert and opinion testimony is peculiarly within the province of the jury to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements." Vigorous objections were made by attorneys for all defendants to the lengthy hypothetical question asked Mr. Hilger. The trial court overruled them. The form and content of a hypothetical question, are largely within the discretion of the trial court. We will not reverse the ruling unless this discretion is abused. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 551b (1) states: "The form of hypothetical questions and the facts to be embraced therein are matters resting largely in the sound discretion of the trial court." The ruling of the trial court on this question was correct. We said in the Tedrow case [249 Iowa 766, 87 N.W.2d 767]: "In order to make a jury question upon negligence, when the evidence is circumstantial, it must be such as to make the theory of causation reasonably probable, not merely possible, and more probable than any other hypothesis based upon such evidence." This theory has become well established by many decisions. In the case at bar there is evidence the fire started in the southwest portion of the tavern. Mr. Jack Davis, who was apparently the first man who saw the fire, and drove to the building, testified: "the fire was concentrated in that part of the building that contained the tavern. * * * At that time I could not see any fire upstairs in the building * * * went all the way around the building and looked in the door that contained that part where you go into the *90 dance hall. I went right up to the door so I could look in and when I looked into the building where the dance hall portion was located, that portion was not on fire. It was smoking but no flame was visible. At this time, the north portion of the building had not been broke out into flame. * * there was no fire that I could see in the portion of the building where the apartment was but the fire in the tavern portion of the building was burning strongly. When I first drove down Rogers Road, the fire was coming through the southwest corner of the tavern. When I came back from having the fire department notified, the fire was still contained in the southwest corner of the tavern * * *" There was some conflicting evidence as to the place the fire started, but the evidence contrary to Mr. Davis' testimony was inconclusive. At any rate this would be a question for the jury. When a case is based on circumstantial evidence and the theory advanced by plaintiff is more probable than possible, it reasonably presents an element of negligence on the part of defendant which should be submitted to the jury. Ruth v. O'Neill, 245 Iowa 1158, 66 N.W.2d 44; Carpenter v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 183 Iowa 1226, 168 N.W. 231; Lunde v. Cudahy Packing Co., 139 Iowa 688, 117 N.W. 1063; Roller v. Independent Silo Co., 242 Iowa 1277, 49 N.W.2d 838. In Ruth v. O'Neill, supra [245 Iowa 1158, 66 N.W. 52], this court said: "The rule as to the amount of circumstantial evidence necessary to establish a fact, as recognized by this Court, has always been the same though not always expressly in identical language * * * it was sufficient if `the proven facts and circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable inference that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury. This is all the law requires.'" In Carpenter v. Security Fire Ins. Co., supra [183 Iowa 1226, 168 N.W. 233], we said: "Whenever the evidence presented in support of any contention is such that it may, when fairly and honestly weighed and considered, produce a conviction in the mind that the facts exist as contended for, it becomes a question for the determination of the legal triers of fact. * * * The jury is bound to gather the truth from the evidence. If the theory which includes liability finds support, rational and reasonable support in the evidence, the fact that reasonable minds might differ as to which of the two theories is better supported by the evidence does not justify the court in taking the case from the jury." We quote from Lunde v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra [139 Iowa 688, 117 N.W. 1067]: "Proof of proximate cause is subject to no more burdensome rule than is applied to the proof of any other essential fact in an ordinary law action. It must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, direct or circumstantial. If there be shown any facts bearing upon the question and they afford room for fair-minded men to conclude therefrom that one theory of the case is better supported than the other, the question cannot be properly withdrawn from the jury." In Roller v. Independent Silo Co., supra [242 Iowa 1277, 49 N.W.2d 842], the court said: "We will go to the record and examine whether or not there were sufficient facts to warrant the jury to pass upon such matters. The facts need not necessarily be shown directly or by eyewitnesses. They may be shown by circumstantial evidence. *91 Also, by inferences which may arise from certain facts and circumstances shown. * * *" "There was a suggestion in argument by defendant that the insulation where the wires had been spliced might have been eaten into by rats. There is nothing in the record upon which to base such a claim. It would simply be speculation and conjecture." In the former case of Hutchinson v. Des Moines Housing Corporation, supra, we considered the question of liability of a landlord when utilities are furnished as a part of the rental consideration, and damage arises because of defect. Margaret Anne was not a tenant, but was a guest in the apartment of a tenant. As a part of his salary as a custodian Mr. Tedrow was furnished his apartment and under the circumstances she was entitled to the same protection as a member of the family. We will not repeat our somewhat detailed analysis as contained in the former decision. We will only renew the citations: Glidden v. Goodfellow, 124 Minn. 101, 144 N.W. 428, L.R.A.1916F, 1073; Housing Authority of Birmingham District v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 417 and 418; 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 750. The judgment on the ruling of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of defendants Des Moines Housing Corporation, and Bruno Ceretti is affirmed. Such judgment as to Fort Des Moines Community Services, Incorporated, is reversed, and the case is remanded for new trial as to said defendant. The appeal costs shall be divided one-half to plaintiff and one-half to defendant Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. All Justices concur.