Title: Mayfield v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 602, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID L. MAYFIELD, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 602, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 30209462DI 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: February 26, 2003 
  Decided: March 28, 2003 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of March 2003, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, David Mayfield, was found guilty of 
violating a previously imposed probationary sentence.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Mayfield on October 1, 2002 to six years at Level V incarceration, 
suspended after serving three years for three years at decreasing levels of 
supervision.  This is Mayfield’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Mayfield's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Mayfield's counsel asserts that, based 
 
 
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upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Mayfield's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Mayfield with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Mayfield also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Mayfield has raised several 
issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Mayfield’s 
arguments, as well as the position taken by Mayfield's counsel, and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court's decision. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record in this case reflects that Mayfield pled guilty to one 
count of third degree unlawful sexual intercourse and one count of sexual 
harassment in January 1996.  The Superior Court sentenced Mayfield to a 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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total of eight years at Level V imprisonment, suspended entirely for eight 
years at Level IV home confinement, suspended after serving nine months 
for seven years and three months at Level III probation.  The Superior Court 
found Mayfield guilty of violating his probation in 1999 and 2001.  In 
October 2002, the Superior Court held a third VOP hearing.  Mayfield 
appeared at the hearing represented by counsel.  Mayfield acknowledged 
that he had given his probation officer several “dirty urines,” i.e. had tested 
positive for cocaine use.  He also acknowledged that he stopped reporting to 
his probation officer.  He asserted that he had to stop going to the probation 
office and to the Crest Aftercare Program because they were located in a 
drug-infested area, and he “started getting the urges to use.”  Mayfield asked 
the court to permit him to continue his probation and his follow-up treatment 
program with SODAT instead of Crest Aftercare.   
(5) 
Mayfield’s counsel on appeal has represented that there are no 
arguable issues to support Mayfield’s appeal.  In response, Mayfield wrote 
several letters to his counsel contending: (a) his probation officer was 
prejudiced against him and testified falsely against him at the VOP hearing; 
(b) a different judge should have presided at the VOP hearing; and (c) his 
VOP sentence was too harsh.  We find no merit to any of these contentions. 
 
 
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(6) 
The gist of Mayfield’s complaints is that his probation officer 
gave inconsistent testimony and that the Superior Court’s finding of a 
probation violation was the result of this untrustworthy testimony.  Even 
assuming without deciding that the probation officer’s testimony contained 
inconsistencies, those inconsistencies were for the Superior Court, as the fact 
finder, to resolve in its discretion.2  We find no abuse of the Superior Court’s 
discretion. The Superior Court’s finding of a probation violation is amply 
supported by the record given Mayfield’s own admissions regarding his 
“dirty” urine samples and his failure to report as required. 
(7) 
Mayfield next complains that his third VOP hearing should 
have been heard by the same judge who presided over his first two VOP 
hearings.  There is no merit to this contention.  A probationer is entitled to a 
“prompt hearing before a judge of the Superior Court on the charge of 
violation.”3  A probationer is not entitled to a hearing before a specific 
judge. 
(8) 
Finally, Mayfield complains about the length of his sentence.  
After finding Mayfield in violation of his probation, the Superior Court was 
authorized to reimpose any portion of his previously suspended prison term, 
                                                 
2 See Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982). 
3 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 32.1(a) (2003). 
 
 
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giving credit for all time previously served on the sentence at Level V 
incarceration.4  Mayfield does not contend that his VOP sentence exceeded 
either the statutory limits or his original sentence.  Accordingly, we find no 
merit to Mayfield’s contention that the Superior Court sentenced him too 
harshly.5   
(9) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Mayfield’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Mayfield's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Mayfield could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
Justice 
                                                 
4 Gamble v. State, 728 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Del. 1999). 
5 See Williams v. State, 560 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Del.1989) (holding that trial court 
has “wide latitude in probationary matters”).