Title: Armatta v. Kitzhaber
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44995
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 1998

Filed:	  June 25, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JUDITH D. ARMATTA; SHERIFF STAN
ROBSON; SIDNEY I. LEZAK; STEPHEN 
KANTER; JEAN TATE; KATHLEEN
HAGBERG; and LINDA EYERMAN,

								Appellants/Cross-

								Respondents, 

	v.

JOHN KITZHABER, Governor of the 
State of Oregon; PHIL KEISLING, 
Secretary of State; and THE 
STATE OF OREGON,

								Respondents/Cross-

								Appellants.

(CC 96C-14060; CA A96736; SC S44995)

	On certification from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted March 31, 1998. 

	Thomas M. Christ, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Portland,
argued the cause for appellants/cross-respondents.  With him on
the briefs were Carl R. Neil and Katherine A. McDowell, ACLU
Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Portland.

	Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondents/cross-appellants.  On the briefs
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General, and Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.**

	CARSON, C.J.

	The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

	Durham, J., concurred and filed an opinion.

    *Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Pamela L.
Abernethy, Judge.

   **Graber, J., resigned March 31, 1998, and did not participate
in this decision.

		CARSON, C.J.

		This is a certified appeal involving a direct challenge
to the constitutionality of Ballot Measure 40 (1996),(1) a "crime
victims' rights" initiative that was approved by the voters at
the 1996 general election.  The circuit court enjoined defendants
Kitzhaber and the State of Oregon (collectively referred to
herein as "the state") from enforcing section (2) of Measure 40,
after concluding that that section revised, rather than amended,
the Oregon Constitution.  The state appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the appeal to this court. 

		As this case is presented to us, the merits of the
various policy choices represented by Measure 40 are not at
issue.  The only question is whether the measure was adopted
validly.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, although
it purported to be a single amendment to the Oregon Constitution,
Measure 40 contains two or more constitutional amendments that
must be voted upon separately under Article XVII, section 1, of
that document.  We therefore hold that, because the measure does
not comply with the requirements for adopting a constitutional
amendment, it is invalid in its entirety.  We modify the judgment
of the circuit court accordingly.

I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

		Shortly after the 1996 general election, plaintiffs
filed the present action under ORS 28.010 (1995) for declaratory
and injunctive relief, seeking a ruling that Measure 40 was
unconstitutional.  Specifically, plaintiffs contended that
Measure 40 violated the Oregon Constitution in three respects: 
(1) it contained two or more amendments, in violation of Article
XVII, section 1; (2) it embraced more than one subject, in
violation of Article IV, section 1(2)(d); and (3) it revised,
rather than amended, the Oregon Constitution, which, under
Article XVII, section 2, cannot be accomplished by initiative
petition.  Plaintiffs further sought a declaration that defendant
Keisling, Secretary of State, violated the law by placing Measure
40 on the ballot and that defendant Kitzhaber, Governor of
Oregon, violated the law by proclaiming the adoption of the
measure.  Finally, plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting
the State of Oregon from enforcing Measure 40.  The state filed
an answer, and both sides moved for summary judgment.

		In a letter opinion issued on February 5, 1997, the
circuit court concluded that section (2) of Measure 40 revised
the Oregon Constitution, but that the section was severable. 
Accordingly, the court severed section (2) and left the rest of
the measure intact.  On February 19, 1997, the court entered an
order and a judgment consistent with its letter ruling as to the
validity of Measure 40.  The judgment enjoined "[d]efendant
Kitzhaber and his subordinates and the State and its
subdivisions" from "enforcing or attempting to enforce section 2
of Ballot Measure 40."  The judgment concluded, however, that
defendant Kitzhaber did not violate the law when he proclaimed
the adoption of Measure 40.  Finally, the judgment concluded that
plaintiffs' claims against defendant Keisling were time-barred
and, accordingly, dismissed him as a defendant.(2)  In June 1997,
the court entered a supplemental judgment awarding plaintiffs
attorney fees in the amount of $23,677.50.  

		Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the circuit court erred in concluding that section (2) was
severable from the rest of Measure 40 and also erred in rejecting
their other substantive challenges to the measure.  The state
cross-appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in
concluding that section (2) revised the constitution.  The state
further contended that the court erroneously entered an
injunction against defendant Kitzhaber and the State of Oregon,
and that it erroneously awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs. 
Shortly thereafter, the state moved to stay or modify the circuit
court's injunction concerning the enforcement of section (2) of
Measure 40.  The Court of Appeals stayed the injunction in August
1997, pending the outcome on appeal.  Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 149
Or App 498, 943 P2d 634 (1997).

		In early 1998, in response to plaintiffs' motion
pursuant to ORS 19.405(1) (1997), the Court of Appeals certified
the appeal, and this court accepted it.  ORS 19.405(2) (1997).

II.  OVERVIEW OF MEASURE 40

		Measure 40 was submitted to the voters as an initiated
amendment to Article I of the Oregon Constitution.  According to
its preamble, Measure 40 "is designed to preserve and protect
crime victims' rights to justice and due process and to ensure
the prosecution and conviction of persons who have committed
criminal acts."  (Boldface in original.)

		The measure contains nine sections.  Section (1) lists
the following rights to which victims of crime are entitled in
all criminal prosecutions and juvenile delinquency proceedings: 
(1) rights relating to pretrial detention and release of criminal
defendants; (2) the right to be notified of certain stages of
criminal proceedings and the right to be present and heard; (3)
the right to information about the conviction, sentencing,
imprisonment, criminal history, and future release of criminal
defendants; (4) the right to refuse to participate in criminal
defendants' discovery requests; (5) the right to receive prompt
restitution; (6) the right to have all relevant evidence admitted
against criminal defendants; (7) the right to have criminal
defendants tried by a jury composed of jurors who are registered
voters and who have not been convicted of a felony or served a
felony sentence within the last 15 years; (8) the right to have
criminal defendants convicted by a jury vote of 11 to 1 in
aggravated murder and murder cases; (9) the right to receive
prepared copies of court transcripts; (10) the right to have
criminal defendants serve their sentences in full, without such
sentences being set aside, except through the governor's
reprieve, commutation, or pardon power, or pursuant to appellate
or post-conviction relief; (11) the right to have convicted
criminals sentenced consecutively for crimes against different
victims; (12) the right to joinder of charges against criminal
defendants; (13) the right to be consulted during plea
negotiations in certain cases; and (14) the right to notification
of the foregoing rights as soon as reasonably practicable. 
Measure 40, §§ (1)(a) to (n).

		Section (2) of Measure 40 declares that the rights set
out in the measure "shall be limited only to the extent required
by the United States Constitution," that Article I, sections 9 
and 12, of the Oregon Constitution, "shall not be construed more
broadly than the United States Constitution," and that, in cases
involving victims, "the validity of prior convictions shall not
be litigated except to the extent required by the United States
Constitution."  Section (3) provides that the measure "shall not
reduce a criminal defendant's rights under the United States
Constitution, reduce any existing right of the press, or affect
any existing statutory rule relating to privilege or hearsay."

		Section (4) of Measure 40 declares that the decision to
initiate criminal prosecutions or juvenile delinquency
proceedings rests with the district attorney and gives the
district attorney the authority to assert the rights conferred
upon victims in the measure.  Sections (5) to (8) define the
terms "victim" and "relevant evidence" for purposes of Measure
40, and clarify various matters relating to the rights conferred
in the measure.  Finally, section (9) states that Measure 40
creates no new civil liabilities.

III.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO MEASURE 40

		Because it is dispositive, we first address plaintiffs'
contention that Measure 40 contains two or more amendments, which
must be voted upon separately under Article XVII, section 1, of
the Oregon Constitution. 

		The people's power to amend the constitution through
initiative petition arises under Article IV, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution.  In addition, Article XVII, section 1, sets
out procedural requirements that apply if the legislature
proposes constitutional amendments, as well as other requirements
that apply to amendments submitted to the voters by legislative
proposal or initiative petition.  One of those requirements is
that "two or more amendments" must be submitted "separately" to
the voters.(3)

		Plaintiffs contend that, despite the fact that it was
presented to the voters in the form of a single constitutional
amendment, Measure 40 actually contains "two or more amendments"
that the voters must vote upon separately under Article XVII,
section 1.  The state responds that the separate-vote requirement
applies only to legislatively proposed constitutional amendments,
not to amendments proposed by initiative.  Alternatively, the
state contends that Measure 40 contains only one amendment, in
compliance with the separate-vote requirement. 

A.   Application of the Separate-Vote Requirement to

	Initiated Amendments

		We first address the state's contention that the
separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, applies
only to amendments proposed by the legislature.  In doing so, we
must consider the specific wording of Article XVII, section 1,
the historical circumstances that led to its creation, and the
case law surrounding it.  See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 
415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992) (setting out construction methodology).(4)

		Article XVII, section 1, provides, in part:

	"Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution
may be proposed in either branch of the legislative
assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a
majority of all the members elected to each of the two
houses, such proposed amendment or amendments shall   
* * * be * * * referred by the secretary of state to
the people for their approval or rejection * * *.  If a
majority of the electors voting on any such amendment
shall vote in favor thereof, it shall thereby become a
part of this Constitution.  The votes for and against
such amendment, or amendments, severally, whether
proposed by the legislative assembly or by initiative
petition, shall be canvassed by the secretary of state
in the presence of the governor, and if it shall appear
to the governor that the majority of the votes cast at
said election on said amendment, or amendments,
severally, are cast in favor thereof, it shall be his
duty forthwith * * * to declare the said amendment, or
amendments, severally * * * to have been adopted by the 
people of Oregon as part of the Constitution thereof,
and the same shall be in effect as a part of the
Constitution from the date of such proclamation.  When
two or more amendments shall be submitted in the manner
aforesaid to the voters of this state at the same
election, they shall be so submitted that each
amendment shall be voted on separately. * * * This
article shall not be construed to impair the right of
the people to amend this Constitution by vote upon an
initiative petition therefor." (Emphasis added.)

		Article XVII, section 1, prescribes the procedure for
the legislature to propose constitutional amendments, as well as
other requirements relating to amendment of the constitution. 
For purposes of our analysis in this case, the most significant
requirement is that, if "two or more amendments" are submitted at
the same election, they must be "so submitted that each amendment
shall be voted on separately." 

		As noted, the state contends that the separate-vote
requirement applies only to amendments proposed by the
legislature, not to amendments initiated by the people.  In the
state's view, Article XVII, section 1, as relevant here, can be
analyzed as three distinct parts:  (1) the first two sentences,
which set out voting and referral procedures for legislatively
proposed amendments; (2) the third sentence, which sets out the
procedure for canvassing votes on a proposed amendment, "whether
proposed by the legislative assembly or by initiative petition;"
and (3) the fourth sentence, which imposes the separate-vote
requirement "[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted in
the manner aforesaid."  (Emphasis added.)  The state contends
that the words "submitted in the manner aforesaid" refer to only
the first part of Article XVII, section 1, which sets out voting
and referral procedures for legislatively proposed amendments
(i.e., the "manner" in which such amendments are "submitted"). 

		We disagree with that parsing of the text of Article
XVII, section 1.  First, the separate-vote requirement appears
after the reference in the third sentence to amendments "proposed
by the legislative assembly or by initiative petition." 
(Emphasis added.)  That placement of the separate-vote
requirement suggests that the requirement applies both to
amendments proposed by the legislature and those proposed by
initiative.  Additionally, the third sentence of Article XVII,
section 1, which pertains to canvassing of votes, refers to
"[t]he votes for and against such amendment, or amendments,
severally," proposed by either the legislature or initiative
petition.  (Emphasis added.)  That wording is significant for two
reasons.  First, by referring to "such" amendment or amendments
proposed in either manner, immediately after stating the
procedure for referring legislatively proposed amendments, the
third sentence appears to incorporate the procedures for
submitting constitutional amendments by initiative petition, set
out in Article IV, section 1.  Second, by repeatedly using the
word "severally," the third sentence emphasizes that the voters
must vote upon and adopt two or more amendments separately,
regardless of the manner of their proposal. 

		As contextual support for its reading of Article XVII,
section 1, the state points to Article IV, section 1(4)(b), which
provides that "[i]nitiative and referendum measures shall be
submitted to the people as provided in this section and by law
not inconsistent therewith."  The state reads that provision as
clarifying that Article IV, section 1 -- not Article XVII,
section 1 -- governs the method for submitting amendments
proposed by initiative petition.

		However, the text of Article IV, section 1(4)(b), cuts
against the state's argument.  Significantly, that section
provides that initiated amendments must be submitted in
accordance with Article IV, section 1, "and by law not
inconsistent therewith."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, Article IV,
section 1(4)(b), itself acknowledges that certain requirements in
addition to those set out in Article IV, section 1 -- such as the
separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1 -- also
govern the submission of initiated amendments.  Another part of
Article IV -- section 1(4)(d) -- illustrates that point.  That
section specifically provides that initiated laws and amendments
shall become effective 30 days after their approval,
"[n]otwithstanding section 1, Article XVII of this Constitution." 
(Emphasis added.)  That phrase would be surplusage if the
requirements contained in Article XVII, section 1, were
inapplicable to initiated amendments.  Further, it is significant
that nothing in Article IV, section 1, similarly insulates
initiated amendments from the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1.  

		In sum, the specific wording of Article XVII, section
1, as well as the context provided by parts of Article IV,
section 1, suggest that Article XVII, section 1, incorporates the
procedures for submitting amendments proposed by initiative.  The
text and context further suggest that, with the exception of
specific procedures for legislatively proposed amendments,
Article XVII, section 1, applies to amendments "proposed by the
legislative assembly or by initiative petition," unless Article
IV, section 1, specifically provides otherwise.

		The historical development of Article XVII, section 1,
and Article IV, section 1, as relevant here, supports that
conclusion.  When the Oregon Constitution went into effect in
1859, Article XVII provided the only method for changing the
constitution -- by legislative proposal.  The original version of
Article XVII included a separate-vote requirement that is worded
similarly to the current version of that requirement now
contained in Article XVII, section 1.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op
at 20-21) (setting out text of 1859 version of Article XVII).

		In 1902, Article IV, section 1, was amended to grant
the people the initiative and referendum power, including the
ability to propose constitutional amendments by initiative
petition.  At that time, Article IV, section 1, provided that
"[p]etitions and orders for the initiative * * * shall be filed
with the secretary of state, and in submitting the same to the
people he, and all other officers, shall be guided by the general
laws and the act submitting this amendment, until legislation
shall be especially provided therefor."  Or Const, Art IV, § 1
(1902) (emphasis added).  Thus, since the creation of the
initiative and referendum power in 1902, Article IV, section 1,
has provided that submission of such measures shall be guided
both by Article IV, section 1, and other applicable laws,
presumably including Article XVII, section 1.

		In 1906, Article XVII was amended, pursuant to the
people's initiative power, to implement the new initiative and
referendum process.  The amended version is the same as the
current version of Article XVII, section 1.  Or Const, Art XVII,
§ 1 (1906).  The 1906 amendment added what is now the third
sentence of Article XVII, section 1, pertaining to the canvassing
of votes, including the reference to "amendments * * * proposed
by the legislative assembly or by initiative petition."  The new
third sentence contained three references to an "amendment or
amendments, severally." (Emphasis added.)  The 1906 amendment
also reworded the separate-vote requirement, albeit not
materially, and incorporated it into section 1, thereby replacing
sections 1 and 2 with a new version of section 1.

		The 1906 amendment to the text of Article XVII is
instructive for our purposes here in two ways.  First, by
specifically incorporating references to the people's recently
acquired initiative power, it appears that the voters intended
the requirements contained in Article XVII, which originally
pertained only to legislatively proposed amendments, to apply to
initiated amendments as well.  Second, by repeatedly including
the phrase "amendment or amendments, severally," the 1906
amendment emphasized that "two or more amendments" must remain
separate from one another, regardless of the manner of their
proposal.(5)

		Finally, in 1968, the people adopted a new version of
Article IV, section 1, pursuant to legislative proposal.  The new
version included the current wording of Article IV, section
1(4)(b), that initiated measures must be submitted "as provided
in this section and by law not inconsistent therewith."  Or
Const, Art IV, § 1(4)(b) (1968).  That wording is similar to the
earlier requirement in Article IV, section 1, that submission of
initiated amendments must be guided by the "general laws," as
well as by Article IV, section 1.  As noted, that wording
suggests that the provisions of Article XVII, section 1,
including the separate-vote requirement, apply to initiated
amendments, unless Article IV, section 1, dictates otherwise.

		Turning to the applicable case law, we note that only
one case, Baum v. Newbry et al., 200 Or 576, 267 P2d 220 (1954),
has attempted to address whether the separate-vote requirement
applies to amendments proposed by initiative petition.  However,
in Baum, the court assumed, without deciding, that the separate-vote 
requirement applied to initiated constitutional amendments. 
200 Or at 581.  Baum, therefore, is not helpful to our analysis
here.

		In sum, the specific wording and historical development
of Article XVII, section 1, as well as the context provided by
parts of Article IV, section 1, indicate that Article XVII,
section 1, incorporates by implication the procedures for
submitting constitutional amendments by initiative petition. 
Additionally, since 1902, Article IV, section 1, itself has
provided in some form that the submission of initiated amendments
shall be governed by applicable laws not inconsistent with
Article IV, section 1.  Nothing about the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1, is inconsistent with any
provision of Article IV, section 1.  Accordingly, we conclude
that the separate-vote requirement applies to constitutional
amendments proposed by initiative, as well as those proposed by
the legislature.

B.   Interpretation of the Separate-Vote Requirement

		Having concluded that the separate-vote requirement
applies to initiated constitutional amendments, we turn to
plaintiffs' contention that Measure 40 contains two or more
amendments in violation of that requirement.  In response to
plaintiffs' challenge, the state contends that the scope of the
separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, is defined
by Article IV, section 1(2)(d), which requires merely that a
constitutional amendment embrace "one subject only."  If a
proposed amendment embraces a single subject under Article IV,
section 1(2)(d), the state argues, it necessarily constitutes a
single amendment, rather than multiple amendments, under Article
XVII, section 1.  In the state's view, Measure 40 embraces a
single subject -- either crime victims' rights or, more broadly,
crime -- and, therefore, constitutes only a single amendment to
the constitution.

		The parties' respective positions require us to examine
both the meaning of the separate-vote requirement of Article
XVII, section 1, and the relationship, if any, between that
requirement and the single-subject requirement of Article IV,
section 1(2)(d).  In doing so, we emphasize that, when
interpreting the Oregon Constitution, we must assume "that every
word, clause and sentence therein have been inserted for some
useful purpose."  School Dist. 1, Mult. Co. v. Bingham et al, 204
Or 601, 611, 283 P2d 670, modified on rehearing 284 P2d 779
(1955); see also State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or 163,
177, 269 P2d 491 (1954) ("An elementary rule of construction is
that[,] if possible, effect should be given to every part and
every word of a Constitution and that unless there is some clear
reason to the contrary, no portion of the fundamental law should
be treated as superfluous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 
Thus, because we are concerned here with two requirements that
are worded differently and are located in different parts of the
Oregon Constitution, we must assume that they have different
meanings and that neither requirement is superfluous.  In
conducting our inquiry into those meanings, we are guided by the
construction methodologies set out in Priest, 314 Or at 415-16,
and Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or
551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994).  See ___ Or at ___ and n 4 (slip op
at 8 and n 4) (setting out methodologies). 

	1.   The specific wording, historical development, 

		and case law surrounding Article XVII, section 1

		We begin by examining the specific wording of Article
XVII, section 1, which, as noted, prescribes the procedure for
amending the constitution by legislative proposal, as well as
setting out requirements for amendment by legislative proposal or
initiative petition.  The separate-vote requirement of Article
XVII, section 1, provides:

"When two or more amendments shall be submitted in the
manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the
same election, they shall be so submitted that each
amendment shall be voted on separately."

		Although Article XVII, section 1, does not define what
is meant by "two or more amendments," it is important to note
that the text focuses upon the potential change to the existing
constitution, by requiring that two or more constitutional
amendments be voted upon separately.  Additionally, as a textual
matter, the words "shall be submitted in the manner aforesaid to
the voters" (emphasis added) could speak to the form that a
proposed amendment must take as it passes through the legislative
or initiative process, up to the time of its submission to the
people.  That particular text establishes, at a minimum, that the
separate-vote requirement prevents the combining of several
proposed amendments, which have been labeled from their inception
as separate amendments, into one proposed amendment subject to a
single vote.  That is, all proposed amendments must be submitted
to the voters in the same form in which they passed the
legislature or were circulated by initiative petition.(6)  However,
it is not clear from the text that that construction is all that
is meant by the separate-vote requirement.  We now turn to the
historical circumstances surrounding the development of Article
XVII, section 1.  

		As noted earlier, when the Oregon Constitution went
into effect in 1859, Article XVII provided the only method for
amending the constitution:

"SECTION NO. 1

	"Any amendment, or amendments to this Constitution
may be proposed in either branch of the Legislative
Assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a
majority of all the members elected to each of the two
Houses such proposed amendment, or amendments shall
with the ayes, and nays thereon, be entered on their
Journals, and referred to the Legislative Assembly to
be chosen at the next general election; and if, in the
Legislative Assembly so next chosen, such proposed
amendment, or amendments, shall be agreed to, by a
majority of all the members elected to each House, then
it shall be the duty of the Legislative Assembly to
submit such amendment, or amendments to the electors of
the State, and cause the same to be published without
delay, at least four consecutive weeks, in several
newspapers published in this State, and if a majority
of said electors shall ratify the same, such amendment,
or amendments, shall become a part of this
Constitution.

"SECTION NO. 2

	"If two or more amendments shall be submitted in
such manner, that the electors shall vote for, or
against each of such amendments separately; and while
an amendment or amendments, which shall have been
agreed upon by one Legislative Assembly, shall be
awaiting the action of a Legislative Assembly, or of
the electors, no additional amendment, or amendments
shall be proposed." Or Const, Art XVII (1859) (emphasis
added).

		Thus, Article XVII, section 1, originally provided for
amendment only if a majority of the members of both houses of two
successive legislatures voted to submit an amendment to the
people and a majority of the voters then approved it.  Article
XVII, section 2, also contained a separate-vote requirement that
is similar to the wording that now appears in Article XVII,
section 1.  We have found no history concerning the specific
intent of the framers of the Oregon Constitution in respect of
that requirement when they adopted Article XVII.

		The genesis of the provision is instructive, however. 
Article XVII of the Oregon Constitution of 1859 was based upon
Article XVI of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, which was
drafted during a constitutional convention held in that state in
1850.  See Charles Henry Carey, ed., The Oregon Constitution and
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857,
481 (1926) (Article XVII is identical to Article XVI of the
Indiana Constitution of 1851 in all material respects).  We have
found no Indiana decision antedating adoption of the Oregon
Constitution that might have influenced the Oregon framers'
intent regarding the separate-vote requirement.  See Priest, 314
Or at 418 (suggesting that a decision from Indiana courts
interpreting a provision of the Indiana Constitution subsequently
incorporated in the Oregon Constitution would be instructive in
interpreting the Oregon provision).

		Although it is not as helpful as history or case law
revealing the intent of the framers of the Oregon Constitution,
information that demonstrates the intent of the framers of the
Indiana Constitution of 1851 can be instructive when interpreting
a provision of the Oregon Constitution patterned after the
Indiana Constitution.  See Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508,
516, 783 P2d 506 (1989) (so suggesting).  The debates from the
Indiana convention of 1850 thus may assist our analysis here, to
some extent.  We turn to an examination of those debates.

		Before 1851, the only method of changing the Indiana
Constitution in any respect was by calling a constitutional
convention.  Ind Const, Art VIII, § 1 (1816).  A new article was
drafted during the 1850 convention that allowed the legislature
to propose amendments to the people.  In proposing that new
article, its drafter stated:

"[S]uppose such a provision had been contained in the
present Constitution, the State would not have been
under the necessity of expending some eighty thousand
dollars in the calling of this Convention.  There were
but few of its provisions that required amendment, and
those amendments could have been easily made by the
Legislature with the approbation of the people, they
having the opportunity to accept or reject the proposed
amendments. * * * If there should be a change of
popular sentiment in relation to the establishment of a
State bank, or in relation to the negro question, or in
relation to the rights of married women, and a change
should be desired in any provision that we shall make
in reference to any of those subjects, instead of
calling a Convention * * *, the amendments could be
made without burthening the people with any expense
whatever."  H. Fowler, 2 Report of the Debates and
Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the
Constitution of the State of Indiana, 1258-59 (1850)
(hereafter "Debates and Proceedings") (statement of
James G. Read) (emphasis added).

That statement suggests that the new amendment procedure, among
other things, was intended to address particular, specific
changes to the constitution.  That is, a single "amendment," such
as one concerning the establishment of a state bank or the rights
of married women, was intended to encompass a particular
constitutional change.

		The convention eventually adopted Article XVI of the
Indiana Constitution of 1851.  Section 2 of that article
incorporated virtually the same separate-vote requirement as that
contained in the Oregon Constitution of 1859, as well as a
prohibition against proposing new amendments while others were
pending approval.  Ind Const, Art XVI, § 2 (1851).  The
convention debates indicate that the purpose of the prohibition
was to avoid voter confusion.  Fowler, 2 Debates and Proceedings
at 1953.  The debates do not reveal the delegates' intent as to
the separate-vote requirement, however. 

		Thus, although the debates from the Indiana
constitutional convention do not reveal clearly the drafters'
intent when they created the separate-vote requirement, the
debates do indicate that the delegates viewed the amendment
process as a means of adopting particular constitutional changes. 
Having exhausted our review of the Indiana history, we return to
the historical development of Article XVII of the Oregon
Constitution.

		In 1902, a majority of the people voted to amend
Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, in response to
a proposal by the Oregon Legislative Assembly, to reserve to the
people the right to initiate laws and constitutional amendments. 
Or Const, Art IV, § 1 (1902).  In 1906, the people amended
Article XVII, pursuant to their initiative power, making changes
to implement the new initiative process.  The amended version is
the same as the current version of Article XVII, section 1,
described previously.  Or Const, Art XVII, § 1 (1906).  See also
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 14-15) (discussing the 1906 amendment). 
For our purposes here, it is significant that the 1906 amendment
repeatedly inserted the phrase "amendment or amendments,
severally," into Article XVII, section 1, in relation to
amendments proposed by the legislature or by initiative petition. 
Thus, as discussed earlier, the text of the 1906 amendment
emphasized that separate amendments must remain separate and
distinct from one another.  The voters' pamphlet for the 1906
election contained no statements reflecting either supporters' or
opponents' understanding of the amendment to Article XVII,
perhaps because the foregoing proposition did not appear to
require explanation.

		In summary, there is no historical information that
specifically illuminates the intent of the framers of the Oregon
Constitution when they adopted the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1.  However, the debates from the Indiana
convention of 1850 suggest that a constitutional "amendment" was
intended by the framers of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 to
address a particular constitutional change, and we have found
nothing to suggest that the framers of the Oregon Constitution
had a different understanding or intent.

		We turn to the applicable case law interpreting the
separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution.  The first case applying that requirement is
State v. Osbourne, 153 Or 484, 57 P2d 1083 (1936), which involved
a challenge to a legislatively proposed amendment that provided
that 10 members of a circuit court jury could render a guilty or
not-guilty verdict, except in first-degree murder cases.  The
Osbourne court concluded, without analysis, that the separate-vote requirement was
 not implicated "because only one amendment
was submitted at the election."  153 Or at 486.  It is not clear
from Osbourne whether the court thought that two different
amendments labeled as such must be submitted to implicate the
separate-vote requirement, or whether the court merely concluded
that the amendment at issue constituted only one amendment.(7)

		Next, in State of Oregon v. Payne, 195 Or 624, 635, 244
P2d 1025 (1952), the court similarly held that a legislatively
proposed amendment that reinstated the death penalty did not
contravene the separate-vote requirement, "because only one
amendment was submitted to the voters."  Like Osbourne, the
court's reasoning in Payne is not clear.  However, the briefs
submitted in Payne clarify the parties' understanding of the
separate-vote requirement.  The defendant had contended that the
amendment at issue, although it was submitted as one amendment,
actually contained two or three constitutional amendments that
the voters must vote upon separately.  Appellant's Brief, Oregon
Briefs (unbound), No 0-72, 40-43 (1952).  The state responded
that the separate-vote requirement required only that a proposed
amendment could not have different objects and purposes in view. 
Respondent's Brief, Oregon Briefs (unbound), No 0-72 at 39-40. 
Thus, both parties in Payne read the separate-vote requirement as
imposing a substantive limitation upon the ability to propose
constitutional amendments.  The parties differed, however,
concerning the scope of that requirement.

		The court in Payne did note that the amendment at issue
contained two different sections and repealed a constitutional
provision that effectively contained two sections, "although not
separately numbered."  195 Or at 635.  Thus, under Payne, the
fact that a proposed constitutional amendment contains more than
one section does not preclude its submission as a single
amendment.  However, the court's conclusory statement that "only
one amendment was submitted" appears, when read in the context of
the parties' competing contentions, to indicate that the court
was ruling that the constitutional change at issue there was
substantively, rather than numerically, one amendment.

		Finally, in Baum, 200 Or 576, the court addressed the
question whether an initiated amendment to Article IV, section 6,
which concerned reapportionment of the legislative assembly,
constituted a single amendment.  After assuming, without
deciding, that the separate-vote requirement applied to
constitutional amendments submitted by initiative petition, the
court briefly stated:

"[The separate-vote requirement] does not prohibit the
people from adopting an amendment which would affect
more than one article or section by implication. * * *
At most it prohibits the submission of two amendments
on two different subjects in such manner as to make it
impossible for the voters to express their will as to
each.  The fact, if it be one, that the reapportionment
amendment may have amended more than one section of the
constitution, would be immaterial."  Id. at 581
(emphasis added).

		Baum stands for the following principles.  First, it
demonstrates that the purpose of the separate-vote requirement is
to allow the voters to decide upon separate constitutional
changes separately.  Stated differently, Article XVII, section 1,
imposes a requirement aimed at ensuring that the voters are able
to express their will in one vote as to only one constitutional
change.  That is consistent with our textual analysis of the
separate-vote requirement, which noted that the requirement
focused upon the nature of the change to the existing
constitution, as well as the procedural form that an amendment
takes when it is submitted to the people.  Second, Baum
demonstrates that, by implication, a single constitutional
amendment may affect one or more constitutional provisions
without offending the separate-vote requirement.  Finally, Baum
suggests that the separate-vote requirement encompasses, to some
extent, the notion that a single amendment must contain a single
"subject." 

	2.   The specific wording, historical development, and

		case law surrounding Article IV, section 1(2)(d)

		As noted earlier, the state contends in this case that
the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, imposes
the same limitation upon the people's ability to amend the
constitution as the single-subject requirement of Article IV,
section 1(2)(d).  Therefore, we must examine the single-subject
requirement and its relationship, if any, to the separate-vote
requirement.

		Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:

	"(1)  The legislative power of the state, except
for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly,
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

	"(2)(a)  The people reserve to themselves the
initiative power, which is to propose laws and
amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them
at an election independently of the Legislative
Assembly.

	"* * * * *

	"(c) An initiative amendment to the Constitution
may be proposed only by a petition signed by a number
of qualified voters equal to eight percent of the total
number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at
the election at which a Governor was elected for a term
of four years next preceding the filing of the
petition.

	"(d) An initiative petition shall include the full
text of the proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution.  A proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters
properly connected therewith.

	"(e) An initiative petition shall be filed not
less than four months before the election at which the
proposed law or amendment to the Constitution is to be
voted upon."  (Emphasis added.)

		Article IV, section 1(2), reserves to the people the
power to enact laws and adopt amendments to the constitution by
initiative petition.  Like Article XVII, section 1, Article IV,
section 1(2), does not define the word "amendment."  The
principal substantive restriction set out in Article IV, section
1(2), is that a proposed amendment must "embrace one subject only
and matters properly connected therewith."  Unlike the text of
the separate-vote requirement, that requirement focuses upon the
content of the proposed amendment, by requiring that it embrace
only a single subject.  In other words, the single-subject
requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), concerns only the
text of the proposed amendment viewed in isolation, rather than
how a proposed amendment might change the existing constitution.

		In order to fully understand the interplay between the
separate-vote and single-subject requirements, it is helpful to
determine whether the single-subject requirement pertains only to
amendments proposed by initiative, or also to amendments proposed
by the legislature under Article XVII, section 1.  The answer is
not clear from the text of Article IV, section 1(2)(d).  However,
when viewed in context with the first sentence of subsection
(2)(d) and the rest of section 1(2) of Article IV, which pertain
only to the initiative process, it appears that the single-subject requirement 
in Article IV, section 1(2)(d) applies only
to "law[s] or amendment[s]" proposed by initiative.

		Article IV, section 20, offers further support for that
conclusion.  It provides, in part:

	"Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and
matters properly connected therewith, which subject
shall be expressed in the title."  (Emphasis added.)

Because Article IV, section 20, imposes a single-subject
requirement upon legislative enactments, it is logical that, as
to statutory enactments, the single-subject requirement in
Article IV, section 1(2)(d), applies to only laws enacted by
initiative.  It follows, as a textual matter, that the single-subject 
requirement in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), applies to
only constitutional amendments adopted by initiative, rather than
those adopted pursuant to legislative proposal under Article
XVII, section 1.

		We turn to the historical circumstances surrounding the
development of the single-subject requirement of Article IV,
section 1(2)(d).  At the outset, we note that the original Oregon
Constitution contained no single-subject requirement for proposed
amendments.  It did, however, contain the single-subject
requirement for legislation in Article I, section 20.  Or Const,
Art I, § 20 (1859).

		As explained earlier, in 1902, the people adopted a
legislatively proposed amendment to Article IV, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution, thereby reserving to themselves the right to
initiate laws and constitutional amendments.  Or Const, Art IV, 
§ 1 (1902).  The new provision did not define the word
"amendment" and did not contain a single-subject requirement. 
The voters' pamphlet for the 1902 election did not contain any
statements concerning the provision, and we have found no other
sources from that time period that inform us of the voters'
intent concerning the word "amendments" as it was used in the new
provision.  See LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 284 Or 173, 184 n 8,
586 P2d 765 (1978) (demonstrating that proponents' statements can
be indicative of the meaning of the measure when those statements
are circulated to the public at large). 

		In 1968, the voters approved a legislatively proposed
amendment that repealed the extant version of Article IV, section
1, and adopted a new version in its place.  The new version made
changes to the initiative and referendum process, one of which
was the imposition of a single-subject requirement upon proposed
laws and amendments.  Or Const, Art IV, § 1(2)(d) (1968); see
also ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 30) (setting out text of Article
IV, section 1(2)(d)).  As noted earlier, it appears from its text
and context that that single-subject requirement pertains only to
initiated constitutional amendments, as well as to initiated
laws, rather than to legislatively proposed amendments.

		The explanatory statement contained in the 1968 voters'
pamphlet stated that one purpose of the 1968 amendment was to
"clean-up" parts of the constitution, by repealing obsolete
provisions and by combining the various initiative and referendum
powers held by the people into one part of the constitution.  See
Official Voters' Pamphlet, Primary Election, May 28, 1968, 8
(setting out purposes of the 1968 amendment).  A manifest
inference from that history is that one element of the "clean-up"
was to ensure that laws passed by the people pursuant to their
initiative power were subject to essentially the same single-subject requirement as enactments of the legislature.  In so
doing, however, the new version of Article IV, section 1, also
imposed that requirement upon initiated constitutional
amendments.

		In summary, then, the Oregon Constitution originally
contained a single-subject requirement for legislation, but not
for constitutional amendments.  Although the people acquired the
initiative power in 1902, it was not until 1968 that Article IV,
section 1, imposed a single-subject limitation upon the people's
ability to amend the constitution.  However, the Oregon
Constitution never has imposed a single-subject requirement upon
the legislature's ability to propose amendments to the
constitution.

		We now turn to the case law interpreting the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), which is
well-settled for our purposes here.  In OEA v. Phillips, 302 Or
87, 100, 727 P2d 602 (1986), for example, this court concluded
that the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section
1(2)(d), is the same as the single-subject requirement for
legislation contained in Article IV, section 20.  The court noted
that the central purpose of the single-subject requirement was to
prevent the practice of inserting two or more unrelated
provisions into a single bill -- commonly known as "log-rolling"
-- so that legislators favoring one provision would be compelled
to vote for the bill despite their opposition to the other
provisions.  If log-rolling were not prohibited, several
provisions could become law that, standing alone, could not have
succeeded on their own merits.  Id. at 95. 

		More recently, in State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or
83, 89-91, 949 P2d 724 (1997), this court reviewed the case law
interpreting both section 1(2)(d) and section 20 of Article IV. 
In that case, which involved legislation enacted by both the
legislature and initiative petition, the court concluded:

	"This court's one-subject decisions demonstrate
that an enactment that embraces only one subject does
not violate the one-subject provisions of Article IV
merely by including a wide range of connected matters
intended to accomplish the goal of that single
subject."  Id. at 91.

Rather, the court must examine the body of the measure to
determine whether the proposed law or amendment contains "a
unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act
[or amendment], such that it can be said that the measure
embraces one subject only."  Ibid. (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted).  See also McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 
443-44, 909 P2d 846 (1996) (setting out that approach under Article
IV, section 20).  The Caleb court concluded that, because the
provisions of the enactment at issue facilitated a single goal
and were pertinent and germane to one overall subject, the
enactment did not violate Article IV, section 1(2)(d).  326 Or at
92-93.

		Finally, we note that, in this case, the state relies
heavily on the discussion in Baum, 200 Or at 581, concerning the
separate-vote requirement, emphasizing that, under Baum, that
requirement prohibits submitting an amendment or amendments "on
two different subjects."  In the state's view, Baum stands for
the principle that the single-subject and separate-vote
requirements impose the same restriction upon the people's
ability to amend the constitution, and, therefore, if an
amendment embraces a single subject under Article IV, section
1(2)(d), as interpreted in OEA, Caleb, and other cases, then it
must be deemed a single amendment under Article XVII, section 1.

		We disagree that Baum, which was decided 14 years
before the single-subject requirement for initiated amendments
was added to Article IV, section 1, must be read as the state
urges.  Baum instead suggests that the purpose of the separate-vote 
requirement is to allow the people to vote upon separate
proposed constitutional changes separately.  Although the court
in Baum referred to a hypothetical amendment containing multiple
"subjects," the court did not state that, if a proposed amendment
contains a single subject, then it also must be deemed to be a
single amendment.

	3.   Summary

		Our review of the specific wording, historical
development, and case law surrounding Article XVII, section 1,
and Article IV, section 1(2)(d), can be summarized as follows. 
First, as a textual matter, the separate-vote requirement of
Article XVII, section 1, focuses both upon the proposed change to
the constitution, as well as the procedural form of submitted
amendments.  In contrast, the text of the single-subject
requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), focuses upon the
content of a proposed amendment, by requiring that it embrace
only one subject and matters properly connected therewith. 
Additionally, the single-subject requirement of Article IV,
section 1(2)(d), applies only to initiated constitutional
amendments, not to legislatively proposed amendments.

		As to historical development, the Oregon Constitution,
as originally written, contained a single-subject requirement for
legislation and a separate-vote requirement for constitutional
amendments proposed by the legislature.  After the adoption of
the initiative and referendum process in 1902, the constitution
was changed over time to implement that process, including
imposing the separate-vote and single-subject requirements upon
the people's ability to propose constitutional amendments by
initiative petition.  However, there is not, and never has been,
a single-subject requirement for amendments proposed by the
legislature.  Indeed, the separate-vote requirement is the only
limitation upon the legislature's ability to amend the
constitution.  Additionally, the history behind the corresponding
provision of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 suggests that a
constitutional "amendment" was intended by the framers of that
document to address a particular constitutional change, and we
have found nothing to suggest that the framers of the Oregon
Constitution had a different understanding or intent.

		Turning to the case law interpreting the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1, we note first that the
cases are lacking in detailed analysis.  However, as a whole, the
cases demonstrate that the purpose of the separate-vote
requirement is to allow the people to vote upon separate
constitutional changes separately.

		Finally, the case law interpreting the single-subject
requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), demonstrates that
that requirement is intended to prohibit "log-rolling."  However,
when conducting a single-subject inquiry, a court must examine
only the content of the proposed amendment, not the effect that
the amendment might have upon the existing constitution.	

	4.   Legal Principles

		Having examined the specific wording, historical
development, and case law surrounding the separate-vote
requirement of Article XVII, section 1, and the single-subject
requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), we reach the
following conclusions.  First, the purposes behind the two
requirements are similar:  Both serve to ensure that the voters
will not be compelled to vote upon multiple "subjects" or
multiple constitutional changes in a single vote.  

		However, it is significant that, from the beginning of
statehood, the single-subject and separate-vote requirements have
been worded differently.  As we have discussed, the single-subject requirement, 
initially contained only in Article I,
section 20, but now also contained in Article IV, section
1(2)(d), focuses upon the content of a proposed law or amendment,
by requiring that it embrace only one subject and matters
properly connected therewith.  See Caleb, 326 Or at 91 (under
Article IV, section 1(2)(d), the court must examine the measure
at issue to determine whether it embraces a single subject);
McIntire, 322 Or at 443-44 (setting out the same approach under
Article I, section 20).

		The separate-vote requirement, by contrast, focuses
upon the form of submission of an amendment, as well as the
potential change to the existing constitution, by requiring that
two or more constitutional amendments be voted upon separately. 
That is, in addition to speaking to the form of submission, the
separate-vote requirement addresses the extent to which a
proposed amendment would modify the existing constitution.  That
is significantly different from the wording of the single-subject
requirement, which focuses in isolation only upon the text of a
proposed amendment in requiring that it embrace a single subject.

		We also think it significant that the separate-vote
requirement applies only to constitutional amendments, while the
single-subject requirement applies equally to constitutional
amendments and legislation.  It follows, we believe, that the
separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, imposes a
narrower requirement than does the single-subject requirement of
Article IV, section 1(2)(d).  Such a reading of the separate-vote
requirement makes sense, because the act of amending the
constitution is significantly different from enacting or amending
legislation.  See, e.g., McIntire, 322 Or at 437-38 (stating that
the single-subject requirement of Article I, section 20, "should
not be so construed so as to hamper or cripple legislation, or
render it oppressive or impracticable, * * * or to multiply the
number of laws unnecessarily" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  Indeed, because the separate-vote requirement is
concerned only with a change to the fundamental law, the notion
that the people should be able to vote separately upon each
separate amendment should come as no surprise.  In short, the
requirement serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the
concept of a constitution.

		Finally, we acknowledge that, under Baum, 200 Or at
581, the separate-vote requirement encompasses the notion that a
single constitutional amendment must contain what the court there
referred to as a single "subject[]."  Indeed, if a proposed
amendment contained two different subjects, it could not be
considered a single amendment, regardless of the existence of the
single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). 
However, the fact that a proposed amendment containing more than
one subject would violate both the separate-vote and single-subject 
requirements does not compel the conclusion that the
opposite also is true, i.e., that a proposed amendment that
contains only one subject would not violate the separate-vote
requirement.  As we have discussed, the separate-vote requirement
imposes a narrower restriction than the requirement that a
proposed amendment embrace only one subject.  It follows,
therefore, that a proposed amendment that satisfies the broad
standard for embracing a single subject nonetheless may violate
the separate-vote requirement.  The state's contrary argument is
not well-taken.

		The remaining question is how to determine whether a
proposal to amend the Oregon Constitution offends Article XVII,
section 1, because it contains two or more amendments.  We
conclude that the proper inquiry is to determine whether, if
adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to the
constitution that are substantive and that are not closely
related.  If the proposal would effect two or more changes that
are substantive and not closely related, the proposal violates
the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, because
it would prevent the voters from expressing their opinions as to
each proposed change separately.  In some instances, it will be
clear from the text of the proposed initiative whether it runs
afoul of Article XVII, section 1.  In other instances, it will be
necessary to examine the implications of the proposal before
determining whether it contains two or more amendments.  

		We turn to Measure 40, to determine whether it contains
two or more amendments in violation of Article XVII, section 1.

C.   Application of Legal Principles to Measure 40

	1.   Analysis of Measure 40

		As discussed earlier, by its terms, Measure 40 purports
to amend Article I of the Oregon Constitution, by adding a new
section to that article that contains procedural rights to which
crime victims are entitled in the pretrial, trial, and post-trial
phases of a criminal prosecution or juvenile delinquency
proceeding, and by prescribing a construction methodology for
sections 9 and 12.(8)  Measure 40 does not otherwise expressly
repeal or modify any existing constitutional provision.  As
explained below, however, the measure implicitly changes the
existing Oregon Constitution in several respects.

		a.  Article I, section 11.  Two of the victims' rights
set out in section (1) of Measure 40 implicate Article I, section
11, which provides, in part:

	"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in
the county in which the offense shall have been
committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor; provided, however,
that any accused person, in other than capital cases,
and with the consent of the trial judge, may elect to
waive trial by jury and consent to be tried by the
judge of the court alone, such election to be in
writing; provided, however, that in the circuit court
ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty
or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of
first degree murder, which shall be found only by a
unanimous verdict, and not otherwise[.]"  (Emphasis
added.)

Section (1)(h) of Measure 40 permits a guilty vote of 11 to 1 in
aggravated murder and murder cases, "notwithstanding any other
law or provision of [the Oregon] Constitution."  Section (1)(h),
therefore, changes the unanimous verdict requirement in murder
cases, currently set out in Article I, section 11.(9)  Further,
section (1)(g) of Measure 40 grants crime victims the right to
insist upon a jury trial.  That section changes a defendant's
ability to waive trial by jury under Article I, section 11, in
that it specifies a circumstance -- a victim's desire for a jury
trial -- in which a criminal defendant cannot waive a jury
trial.(10)

		b.  Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a).  Section
(1)(g) of Measure 40 also specifies certain requirements for
juror qualification.(11)  Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a),
provides that "[t]he Legislative Assembly shall provide by law
for * * * [s]electing juries and qualifications of jurors." 
Thus, section (1)(g) of Measure 40 changes Article VII (Amended),
section 5(1)(a), because it imposes constitutional limitations
upon the legislature's authority to enact laws pertaining to
juror qualification in criminal cases.

		c.  Article I, section 14.  Section (1)(a) of Measure
40 allows pretrial release in certain cases only upon a proper
evidentiary showing.(12)  Article I, section 14, which requires
that crimes other than murder and treason "shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties," sets out a standard to determine when an
arrested person may be released before trial.  See generally
Priest, 314 Or at 419 (Article I, section 14, applies to those
accused, but not yet convicted, of criminal offenses).  Section
(1)(a) of Measure 40 changes that standard, by adding new
constitutional prerequisites for pretrial release.  In other
words, section (1)(a) changes the circumstances in which certain
criminal defendants otherwise would be entitled to release under
Article I, section 14.

		d.  Article I, sections 9 and 12.  Perhaps most
notably, section (1)(f) of Measure 40 grants crime victims the
right to have "all relevant evidence admissible against the
criminal defendant."  In addition, section (2) provides that
"[t]he rights conferred on victims by this [measure] shall be
limited only to the extent required by the United States
Constitution" (boldface in original) and that "Section 9, Article
I and Section 12, Article I of this Constitution shall not be
construed more broadly than the United States Constitution."(13)

		The parties offer competing interpretations of section
(2) of Measure 40, specifically the phrase that limits possible
constructions of Article I, sections 9 and 12.  Plaintiffs
contend that that phrase effectively repeals Article I, sections
9 and 12, as they currently exist, together with judicial
interpretations of those provisions, and replaces them with the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.(14) 
Plaintiffs further contend that section (2) effectively modifies
Article VII (Amended), section 1,(15) because it limits the
judiciary's inherent power to interpret the Oregon Constitution,
as well as Article III, section 1,(16) because, at the least, it
modifies the separation of powers principles set out in that
section.

		The state responds that section (2) of Measure 40
merely clarifies the scope of a crime victim's right to have all
relevant evidence admissible against a criminal defendant, by
instructing courts that they may suppress evidence obtained in
violation of the Oregon Constitution only if the United States
Constitution would require suppression.  Stated differently, in
the state's view, section (2) changes the remedy to be afforded
for a violation of certain rights embodied in the Oregon
Constitution, but does not change the nature of the state
constitutional rights themselves.

		We need not resolve the parties' competing contentions
concerning the precise intended effect of section (2) of Measure
40.  Even under the state's more limited reading of section (2),
that section, particularly when read in conjunction with section
(1)(f) of Measure 40, would have the following effects.  First,
it would create a constitutional limitation upon the remedy to be
afforded for violations of Article I, sections 9 and 12, by
requiring that evidence be suppressed only if the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require suppression. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, section (2) would change
the nature of the rights currently afforded under Article I,
section 9, because the protections afforded by Article I, section
9, include the right to have evidence excluded if it is obtained
in violation of the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.  See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Rogers, 314 Or 114,
119, 836 P2d 127 (1992) (the exclusion of evidence under Article
I, section 9, is "based on the personal right to be free from an
unlawful search and seizure," in contrast to deterring police
misconduct (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Davis,
313 Or 246, 253-54, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) ("If th[e] constitutional
right [under Article I, section 9] to be secure against
impermissible government conduct is to be effective, it must mean
that the government cannot obtain a criminal conviction through
the use of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's rights
under that provision. * * * Individual rights so protected are
vindicated through the sanction of suppression of evidence."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

		e.  Summary.  Measure 40 adds a number of crime
victims' rights to Article I of the Oregon Constitution and also
changes the constitution in the following respects:  (1) a
criminal defendant's ability to waive a jury trial under Article
I, section 11, is limited by the victim's new and competing right
to a jury trial; (2) a unanimous verdict no longer is required in
aggravated murder and murder cases under Article I, section 11;
(3) the legislature's ability to enact laws pertaining to juror
qualifications in criminal cases under Article VII (Amended),
section 5(1)(a), is limited by new constitutional requirements;
(4) a criminal defendant's right to pretrial release under
Article I, section 14, is limited by new constitutional
requirements; and (5) at the least, the constitutional remedy for
violation of the rights set out in Article I, sections 9 and 12,
is limited to the remedies available under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and, consequently,
evidence obtained in violation of those rights can be suppressed
only if the United States Constitution requires suppression.(17)

	2.   Measure 40 contains two or more amendments to the 		Oregon Constitution

		As can be seen, in addition to adding a number of crime
victims' rights to Article I, Measure 40 changes five existing
sections of the Oregon Constitution (Article I, sections 9, 11,
12, and 14, and Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a)),
encompassing six separate, individual rights (pertaining to
search and seizure, unanimous jury verdicts, waiver of jury
trial, former jeopardy, self-incrimination, and bail), in
addition to limiting the legislature's ability to establish juror
qualifications in criminal cases.  Those multiple constitutional
changes effected by Measure 40 are more than sufficient to meet
that part of the test for "two or more amendments," discussed
earlier, that inquires whether the measure at issue makes "two or
more changes to the constitution."  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
43) (stating test).  It is equally clear, we think, that the
changes effected by Measure 40 are substantive.  The remaining
issue, then, is whether those changes are "not closely related."

		Many of the constitutional provisions affected by
Measure 40 are related in the sense that they pertain to
constitutional rights that might be implicated during a criminal
investigation or prosecution.  However, not all -- such as the
requirement that the jury pool in criminal cases be drawn from
registered voters -- share even that relationship.  Further, even
those provisions that are related in the sense described are not
related closely enough to satisfy the separate-vote requirement
of Article XVII, section 1.  For example, the right of all people
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article
I, section 9, has virtually nothing to do with the right of the
criminally accused to have a unanimous verdict rendered in a
murder case under Article I, section 11.  The two provisions
involve separate constitutional rights, granted to different
groups of persons.  Similarly, the right of the criminally
accused to bail by sufficient sureties under Article I, section
14, bears no relation to legislation concerning the qualification
of jurors in criminal cases under Article VII (Amended), section
5(1)(a).  Those examples alone are sufficient to demonstrate that
Measure 40 contains "two or more amendments" to the Oregon
Constitution.  Accordingly, we conclude that the measure was not
adopted in compliance with Article XVII, section 1.

		We emphasize that we express no view regarding the
merits of the changes proposed by Measure 40.  Indeed, this
court's case law makes clear that Article IV, section 1, grants
the people the power to change the Oregon Constitution as they so
desire, including modifying or repealing a provision of the Bill
of Rights, so long as the proposed change or changes comply with
the constitutional requirements for amending the constitution. 
See Ex Parte Kerby., 103 Or 612, 616-17, 205 P 279 (1922)
(through their initiative power, the people can adopt a
constitutional amendment that expressly or implicitly repeals an
existing constitutional provision, including a provision of the
Bill of Rights); Boyd v. Olcott et al., 102 Or 327, 358-59, 202 P
431 (1921) ("The Constitution prescribes the method by which it
may be amended, and the procedure so prescribed is the measure of
the power to amend.").  Our holding here simply is that Measure
40 contains two or more constitutional amendments that must be
voted upon separately under Article XVII, section 1.(18)

D.  Measure 40 is Invalid in its Entirety

		It is a long-standing principle of law that a proposed
constitutional amendment must be adopted in compliance with the
procedures set forth in the Oregon Constitution:

"The provisions of the constitution for its own
amendment are mandatory, and must be strictly observed. 
A failure in this respect will be fatal to a proposed
amendment, notwithstanding it may have been submitted
to and ratified and approved by the people.  The
constitutional provisions are as binding upon the
people as upon the legislative assembly, and the people
cannot give legal effect to an amendment which was
submitted in disregard of the limitations imposed by
the constitution * * *. * * * If * * * an attempt is
made to amend an existing constitution, its every
requirement regarding its own amendment must be
substantially observed, and the omission of any one
will be fatal to the amendment.  The constitution is
the supreme law of the land, binding upon all, and can
no more be disregarded in the manner of its own
amendment than in any other respect.  As long as it
remains, its provisions must be observed."

Kadderly v. Portland., 44 Or 118, 135-36, 74 P 710 (1903), on
rehearing 75 P 222 (1904) (emphasis added).  See also Boyd, 102
Or at 359 ("The provisions of the Constitution for its own
amendment are mandatory and binding not only upon the legislative
assembly but also upon all the people as well; and, consequently,
a failure to observe the mandates of the Constitution is fatal to
a proposed amendment, even though the electors have with
practical unanimity voted for it.").  Accordingly, because
Measure 40 was not adopted in compliance with Article XVII,
section 1, we hold that it is void in its entirety.(19)

IV.  REMAINING ISSUES

		We turn to the remaining issues in this case, raised on
the state's cross-appeal.

A.   Injunction

		As noted earlier, after concluding that section (2) of
Measure 40 revised the constitution, the circuit court entered an
injunction against "[d]efendant Kitzhaber and his subordinates
and the State and its subdivisions," enjoining them "from
enforcing or attempting to enforce" section (2).  Also as noted,
the Court of Appeals stayed the enforcement of the injunction,
pending the outcome on appeal.  Armatta, 149 Or App 498.

		The state contends that, regardless of our
determination whether Measure 40 is invalid, "permanent
injunctive relief is not appropriate against the state or its
agencies."  Plaintiffs respond that any error that might have
occurred in the issuance of the injunction is moot, either
because the Court of Appeals already "vacated" the injunction or,
if Measure 40 is declared invalid in its entirety, an injunction
no longer is necessary.  

		We agree with plaintiffs' latter point:  An injunction
is not necessary in light of our determination that Measure 40
was not adopted in compliance with Article XVII, section 1, of
the Oregon Constitution.  Consequently, we need not address the
propriety of the circuit court's order enjoining defendants
Kitzhaber and the State of Oregon from enforcing section (2) of
Measure 40.

B.   Attorney Fees

		Finally, the state assigns error to the circuit court's
decision to award plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount of
$23,667.50.(20)  In the state's view, plaintiffs have
individualized interests in the outcome of this case that make
attorney fees inappropriate under Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 65-67, 535 P2d 541 
(1975), and Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514,
548-49, 931 P2d 770 (1997).  The state further disputes whether,
in filing this action, plaintiffs sought to benefit the rights of
all Oregonians.  Plaintiffs respond that they have no
individualized interests at stake in this litigation and that
their goal of having Measure 40 declared unconstitutional serves
to benefit all Oregonians.

		In Deras, the plaintiff, a former candidate for state
representative, sought a declaratory judgment that certain laws
that restricted campaign spending were unconstitutional.  272 Or
at 49-50.(21)  This court agreed, holding that the laws at issue
were invalid.  The court then addressed the trial court's
decision to deny the plaintiff attorney fees, stating:

"[A]s a general rule[,] American courts will not award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party absent
authorization of statute or contract, * * * [however,]
courts of equity have the inherent power to award
attorney's fees.  This power frequently has been
exercised in cases where the plaintiff brings suit in a
representative capacity and succeeds in protecting the
rights of others as much as his own."  Id. at 65-66.

The court concluded that, because the plaintiff's action was in
"the interest of the public in preservation of the individual
liberties guaranteed against governmental infringement of the
constitution," he should be awarded reasonable attorney fees. 
Id. at 66-67.

		Since issuing its decision in Deras, this court has not
allowed another attorney fee award under the principles set out
in that case.  In denying such requests, the court has clarified
that there are a number of prerequisites that must be fulfilled
before such an award is appropriate.  First, the proceeding must
be one in equity.  See, e.g., Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or
423, 428, 781 P2d 346 (1989) (denying attorney fees, in part,
because the action was not one in equity); Cook v. Employment
Division, 293 Or 398, 401, 649 P2d 594 (1982) (same).  Second,
the party requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party. 
See Gugler v. Baker Co. Ed. Serv. Dist. (Gugler III), 305 Or 570,
574, 754 P2d 903 (1988) (denying fees because the plaintiffs had
not prevailed in their action); Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314
Or 600, 604, 841 P2d 633 (1992) (same); see also Lewis v. Dept.
of Rev., 294 Or 139, 143-44, 653 P2d 1265 (1982) (denying fees,
in part, because the court did not grant the relief sought by the
plaintiff).  Finally, in filing the action, the party requesting
attorney fees must have been seeking to "vindicat[e] an important
constitutional right applying to all citizens without any gain
peculiar to himself," Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314 Or at 602,
as opposed to vindicating "individualized and different
interests," Vannatta, 324 Or at 549, or "any pecuniary or other
special interest of his own aside from that shared with the
public at large."  Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or at 427.  See
also Samuel v. Frohnmayer, 308 Or 362, 370, 779 P2d 1028 (1989)
(the plaintiff in Deras was seeking no "monetary or other gain
peculiar to himself"). 

		This case involves a proceeding in equity, and, in
light of our conclusion that Measure 40 is invalid, plaintiffs
are the prevailing parties.  Rather, in challenging the award of
attorney fees, the state first contends that plaintiffs have the
same sort of individualized interests in the outcome of this
litigation that were identified in Vannatta.  Looking to
plaintiffs' statement of standing in their complaint, the state
specifically notes that:  (1) plaintiff Robson, Benton County
Sheriff, alleged that Measure 40 would remove his discretion to
assign inmates to alternative programs; (2) plaintiff Eyerman
alleged her concern that, under Measure 40, law enforcement
officials may trespass upon her property; and (3) all seven
plaintiffs alleged their concerns about the effect that Measure
40 would have on their taxes.

		We conclude that the factors cited by the state
concerning plaintiffs' interests in this case are not the type of
"individualized," "peculiar," or "pecuniary" interests that
preclude an attorney fee award.  Unlike the plaintiffs in other
cases in which this court denied attorney fees for that reason,
none of the plaintiffs in this case stands to gain any particular
benefit from a declaration that Measure 40 is invalid, other than
the benefit that they share with all other citizens in having the
Oregon Constitution correctly construed.  Compare Vannatta, 324
Or at 549 (plaintiffs challenging campaign finance laws, who
included a potential candidate for state office and a political
action committee, had "individualized and different interests" in
the litigation that they sought to vindicate); Dennehy v. City of
Gresham, 314 Or at 604 (taxpayer who challenged a user charge had
a peculiar interest in the litigation).

		The state next emphasizes that, in awarding attorney
fees to plaintiffs, the circuit court found that "the relief
[plaintiffs] sought and obtained benefits all Oregon residents
equally against governmental searches."(22)  In the state's view,
that reasoning cannot provide the basis for awarding attorney
fees to plaintiffs, because the voters, through their initiative
power, are free to change the nature of the state constitutional
protections relating to search and seizure. 

		We agree that the crux of this action is not whether
the Oregon Constitution should contain its own, independent
protections against governmental intrusions in the form of
unreasonable searches and seizures, compelled self-incrimination,
or placement of a person in jeopardy twice for the same offense. 
As we have made clear in this opinion, the people of Oregon have
the power to change their constitution as they so desire,
provided that the proposed change is adopted in compliance with
the requirements for amending the constitution, as set out in
Article XVII, section 1, and Article IV, section 1.

		However, in filing this action, plaintiffs primarily
sought to enforce the provisions of the Oregon Constitution that
relate to amendment and revision of that document, and ultimately
prevailed on their claim that Measure 40 was not passed in
compliance with the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII,
section 1.  Plaintiffs, therefore, sought to benefit all
Oregonians, because they sought to defend the integrity of the
amendment and initiative processes.  That is the type of public
benefit that, in our view, makes an award of attorney fees
appropriate.  See Gilbert v. Hoisting &amp; Port. Engrs., 237 Or 130,
138, 384 P2d 136 (1963), modified 390 P2d 320 (1964) (awarding
attorney fees to union members who sought to correct abuses of
the democratic process in their union, because "[t]he
preservation of the democratic process in the functioning of
unions is a matter of primary concern, not only to union members
but to the public as well").  Accordingly, we hold that the
circuit court's award of attorney fees was proper.

V.  CONCLUSION

		Expressing no view on the merits of the constitutional
changes effected by Measure 40, we conclude that the measure
contains two or more amendments, in violation of Article XVII,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution.  Because Measure 40 was
not passed in compliance with Article XVII, section 1, it is
invalid in its entirety.  We further conclude that injunctive
relief is not necessary in this case.  Finally, we affirm the
award of attorney fees to plaintiffs.

		The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part
and reversed in part.

APPENDIX

Ballot Measure 40 provides:

"AMENDS CONSTITUTION

"PREAMBLE: This initiative is designed to preserve and
protect crime victims' rights to justice and due
process and to ensure the prosecution and conviction of
persons who have committed criminal acts.  It shall be
interpreted to accomplish these ends.

"This section is added to Article I of the Oregon
Constitution:

"(1) To ensure crime victims a meaningful role in the
criminal and juvenile justice system, to accord them
due dignity and respect, and to ensure that persons who
violate laws for the punishment of crime are
apprehended, convicted and punished, the following
rights are hereby granted to victims in all
prosecutions for crimes and juvenile delinquency
proceedings:

	"(a) The right to be reasonably protected from the
criminal defendant or the convicted criminal throughout
the criminal justice process; decisions as to the
pretrial release of the defendant are to be based on
the principle of reasonable protection of the victim
and the public; any person arrested for a crime for
which the People have set a mandatory minimum sentence
shall not be released prior to trial unless a court
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the
person will not commit new criminal offenses while on
release; 

	"(b) The right to be present at, to be heard at,
and, upon specific request, to be informed in advance
of any critical stage of the proceedings where the
criminal defendant is present, including trial;

	"(c) The right, upon request, to information about
the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, criminal
history and future release from physical custody of the
criminal defendant or convicted criminal;

	"(d) The right to refuse an interview, deposition
or other discovery request by the defendant, the
defendant's attorney, or other person acting on behalf
of the defendant;

	"(e) The right to receive prompt restitution from
the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct
that caused the victim's loss or injury.

	"(f) The right to have all relevant evidence
admissible against the criminal defendant;

	"(g) The right, in a criminal prosecution, to a
public trial without delay by a jury selected from
registered voters and composed of persons who have not
been convicted of a felony or served a felony sentence
within the last 15 years, except that no court shall
hold that a jury is required in juvenile court
delinquency proceedings.

	"(h) The right to have eleven members of the jury
render a verdict of guilty of aggravated murder or
murder, notwithstanding any other law or provision of
this Constitution;

	"(i) The right to have a copy of a transcript of
any court proceeding, if one is otherwise prepared;

	"(j) The right that no law shall permit a sentence
imposed by a judge in open court to be set aside or
otherwise not carried out except through the reprieve,
commutation, and pardon power of the governor or
pursuant to appellate or post-conviction relief;

	"(k) The right that no law shall limit the court's
authority to sentence a criminal defendant
consecutively for crimes against different victims;

	"(l) The right to have all charges against a
criminal defendant tried in a single trial; subject to
rules regarding venue;

	"(m) The right to be consulted, upon request,
regarding plea negotiations involving any violent
felony; and

	"(n) The right to be informed of these rights as
soon as reasonably practicable.

"(2) The rights conferred on victims by this section
shall be limited only to the extent required by the
United States Constitution; Section 9, Article I and
Section 12, Article I of this Constitution shall not be
construed more broadly than the United States
Constitution and in criminal cases involving a victim,
the validity of prior convictions shall not be
litigated except to the extent required by the United
States Constitution.

"(3) This section shall not reduce a criminal
defendant's rights under the United States
Constitution, reduce any existing right of the press,
or affect any existing statutory rule relating to
privilege or hearsay.

"(4) As to the decision to initiate criminal or
juvenile proceedings and as to the conduct and
prosection of such proceedings, it is the district
attorney who is authorized to assert the rights
conferred on victims by this section.

"(5) 'Victim' means persons who have suffered
financial, social, psychological or physical harm as a
result of a crime or juvenile offense, and includes, in
the case of a homicide, a member of the immediate
family of the decedent, and, in the case of a minor
victim, the legal guardian of the minor.  In no event
shall the criminal defendant be considered a victim. 
In criminal cases not involving a victim, the people of
the State of Oregon, represented by the State of
Oregon, shall have the same rights conferred by this
section on victims.

"(6) 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to prove the charge against the criminal
defendant or establish the proper sentence for the
criminal defendant.

"(7) In criminal cases prosecuted by a municipality,
'district attorney' as used in this section includes
the city attorney.

"(8) 'Criminal defendant' includes juvenile offenders
in juvenile court delinquency proceedings.

"(9) This section creates no new civil liabilities."
(Boldface in original.)

	DURHAM, J.	Armatta v. Kitzhaber

	I concur in the majority's disposition of the trial court's
judgment, and write separately to explain the basis for my
concurrence with the award of attorney fees.

	In Gilbert v. Hoisting and Port. Engrs., 237 Or 130, 138,
384 P2d 136, 390 P2d 320 (1964) and Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47,
66-67, 535 P2d 541 (1975) this court relied on the inherent power
that courts of equity have used throughout their history to award
attorney fees "in cases where the plaintiff brings suit in a
representative capacity and succeeds in protecting the rights of
others as much as his own."  Deras, 272 Or at 66.  Those cases
support the principle that, if a plaintiff brings an action that
seeks relief from official misconduct or errors that violate the
plaintiff's important legal rights, and the plaintiff's action
succeeds in protecting the rights of others as much as his own,
the court, exercising its inherent equitable power, may award
attorney fees, in addition to other appropriate relief, to the
successful plaintiff.  That equitable principle rests on an
important assumption about litigation of this kind.  That is, if
the plaintiff's action actually results in the protection of the
legal rights of a broader segment of society, and the defendant's
choice to defend an unconstitutional law or official action
brought about the necessity of incurring the expense of legal
services to vindicate the plaintiff's rights in court, it is
consistent with judicial notions of fairness to require the
defendant, not the plaintiff, to pay the reasonable expenses of
bringing the action, including attorney fees.

	Congress has enacted fee-shifting legislation governing
analogous litigation that vindicates federal constitutional and
statutory rights.  42 USC § 1988.  Unlike the rule discussed in
Gilbert and Deras, the federal statute does not depend on a
showing that the action protected the rights of persons other
than the plaintiff or that an award of attorney fees is
consistent with equitable principles.

	The Oregon legislature has not enacted a statute that
addresses the recovery of prevailing party attorney fees in
circumstances similar to those presented in this case.  This is a
potential subject for state legislation.  In the absence of
legislation, Oregon courts will continue to administer judge-made
rules on this subject that reflect the equitable principles that
underlie Gilbert and Deras.

	Some of those judge-made rules bear closer scrutiny to
insure that they, in fact, accomplish equity.  For example, in
Samuel v. Frohnmayer, 308 Or 362, 779 P2d 1028 (1989), the issue
was: 

	"whether an award of attorney fees to the winning party
for expenses incurred in pursuing the declaratory
judgment may be 'proper' further relief under the
statute, when only the statute itself is relied upon as
the source of the court's authority to make the award." 
308 Or at 364.  

The court concluded that a specific statute, ORS 182.090, not a
more general statute, ORS 28.080, or Deras, governed the award of
attorney fees in the circumstances, and that the plaintiff had
not pleaded or proven that he was entitled to an award of
attorney fees under the governing statute.  In discussing why
Deras was not controlling, the court said:

	"The award [in Deras] was based on the inherent power
of a court sitting in equity as well as the fact that
the citizen had vindicated a right applying equally to
all citizens, without any monetary or other gain
peculiar to himself.  [Deras,] 272 Or at 65-66.  See
also Cook v. Employment Division, 293 Or 398, 401, 649
P2d 594 (1982).  Samuel's position is not analogous. 
He is not a volunteer (at least in the Deras sense); he
is vindicating only an interest of his own.  Even if
this case were one in equity, it would not be an
appropriate one in which to make an award based on
Deras v. Myers."  (Emphasis added.)

	That passage in Samuel is noteworthy in several
respects.  First, the details of the court's description of Deras
are entirely dictum.  The court held only that a statute, ORS
182.090, was the sole source of authority to award attorney fees
in the circumstances and that the plaintiff was ineligible under
that statute.  The court had no reason to discuss whether Deras
stated a correct rule of law or to alter the rule stated in
Deras.

	Second, the Samuel court's summary of Deras is not
accurate.  The passage emphasized in the quotation stated above
appears in no form in Deras.  If the Samuel court meant to
suggest that being a "volunteer" under Deras meant that the
plaintiff cannot seek any monetary or other relief peculiar to
himself, that reading of Deras is incorrect.  The passage in
Deras that the Samuel court cited states:

	"[Plaintiff] correctly points out that courts of equity
have the inherent power to award attorney's fees.  This
power frequently has been exercised in cases where the
plaintiff brings suit in a representative capacity and
succeeds in protecting the rights of others as much as
his own. * * *

		"It is beyond dispute that the interest of the
public in preservation of the individual liberties
guaranteed against governmental infringement of the
constitution is even stronger than that present in
Gilbert.  Correspondingly, plaintiff in this case, at
least as much as the plaintiffs in Gilbert, should not
be required to bear the entire cost of this litigation
the benefits of which flow equally to all members of
the public."  272 Or at 66.

That discussion demonstrates that Deras does not support the
statement in Samuel that the plaintiff must seek to vindicate the
rights of all citizens without any monetary or other gain
peculiar to himself.

	Neither is that statement supported by the other case
authority cited in Samuel.  Cook v. Employment Division states
only that, in deciding Deras and Gilbert, the court relied on the
inherent power of a court of equity.  Cook, 293 Or at 401.  Cook
does not mention a requirement that the plaintiff seek no
monetary or other gain peculiar to himself, and does not suggest
that Deras or Gilbert recognized such a requirement.

	Aside from the absence of any legal support for such a
purported requirement, this court has never explained why a court
of equity would impose such a precondition to the recovery of
attorney fees.  The defendants in Gilbert and Deras enforced
unconstitutional or unlawful legal schemes that harmed the
plaintiffs' rights.  If those defendants, acting pursuant to the
same unlawful schemes, had committed even more serious
transgressions against the plaintiffs, such as, for example,
depriving them of their property, that fact would enhance, not
diminish, the plaintiffs' equities in seeking attorney fees under
Gilbert and Deras.  In my view, equitable principles, not the
dictum in Samuel, determines a prevailing party's entitlement to
attorney fees under Gilbert and Deras.  A party never loses the
right to any form of equitable remedy merely by seeking complete
relief in the complaint.  Neither should a request for complete
relief, including relief that is peculiar to the requesting
party, disqualify the party from an award of attorney fees under
Gilbert and Deras.  Such an impediment finds no support in
traditional equitable principles.

	Unfortunately, three later cases have repeated without
analysis the dictum in Samuel suggesting that Deras required the
prevailing plaintiff to seek vindication of important
constitutional rights without any gain peculiar to himself. 
Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 548-49, 931 P2d 770 
(1997);(23)
Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314 Or 600, 602, 841 P2d 633 (1992);
Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or 423, 427-28, 781 P2d 346 (1989). 
That erroneous description of the law derived from Gilbert and
Deras does not acquire legitimacy by reason of its bare
repetition in those cases. 

	The court, at its earliest opportunity, should correct
its erroneous descriptions of criteria for a recovery of attorney
fees under Gilbert and Deras.  The error probably affects the
relief sought in many cases that never reach this court.  For
example, parties may forego requesting relief to which they are
entitled simply to avoid the argument that they are disqualified
from seeking attorney fees because they have sought to vindicate
an individual interest that is different from the public's
potential interest in the litigation.  Parties have no ability to
recast their claims so that they can recover all the relief to
which they are entitled individually and still recover the
attorney fees to which they are entitled under Gilbert and Deras. 
The unfairness of forcing a litigant to make that sort of
election is obvious.  Because that error is rooted in dictum in
an opinion of this court, it is less likely that the legislature
will adopt a statute that corrects it.  Accordingly, the court
must act.

	I join the majority's award of attorney fees here
because, in accordance with the principle of Gilbert and Deras,
we must acknowledge that plaintiffs' litigation has succeeded in
protecting the constitutional rights of other citizens as much as
their own.  The determination of plaintiffs' entitlement to
attorney fees in this context is controlled by the application of
traditional equitable principles.  In describing their standing
to bring this action, plaintiffs identify several diverse legal
interests that they do not share with the general public.  The
majority concludes that those interests are not sufficient to
disqualify plaintiffs from recovering their attorney fees.  

	I would apply a somewhat different analysis.  In my
view, although plaintiffs' interests in bringing this litigation
do not mirror the interests of the general public in a favorable
outcome, plaintiffs do share with the general public an interest
in protecting the Oregon Constitution from unlawful amendment. 
Plaintiffs' litigation has succeeded in protecting the public's
interest as much as their own.  Moreover, none of plaintiffs'
diverse interests cited by defendants invoke any equitable
principle that would render an award of attorney fees unfair or
inequitable.  Accordingly, in reliance on Gilbert and Deras, I
join the majority's award of prevailing party attorney fees to
plaintiffs in this case.

	I concur. 

1.      1	The text of Measure 40 is attached as an appendix to
this opinion.  Measure 40 currently is listed as Article I,
section 42, of the Oregon Constitution (1997).

2.      	Plaintiffs do not challenge the dismissal of defendant
Keisling.

3.      	We refer to that provision as the "separate-vote"
requirement throughout this opinion.  The relevant constitutional
provisions are set out in the text below.

4.      	We note that certain parts of Article XVII, section 1,
themselves were adopted by the people pursuant to their
initiative power.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 14-15)
(discussing the 1906 amendment to Article XVII, section 1).  Our
methodology for interpreting a constitutional provision adopted
by initiative is to examine the text and context of the
provision, in order to discern the voters' intent.  If the
voters' intent is not clear from an analysis of text and context,
we also examine the history of the provision.  Ecumenical
Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871
P2d 106 (1994).

5.      	The voters' pamphlet for the 1906 election did not
contain any statements by supporters or opponents concerning
their understanding of the scope of the amendment to Article
XVII, including the application of the separate-vote requirement
to initiated amendments.  See Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at
560 n 8 (the history of an initiated amendment includes arguments
for and against the amendment printed in the voters' pamphlet).

6.      	To illustrate, suppose that the legislature passed
bills A, B, and C, all purporting to amend the constitution in
some way.  Under Article XVII, section 1, the legislature must
submit the three bills to the voters as three separate proposed
amendments (A, B, and C), subject to separate votes, and may not
combine them as a single proposed amendment (ABC) that is subject
to a single vote.

7.      	The court's opinion and the parties' briefs in Osbourne
reveal that the true dispute was whether the ballot title for the
proposed amendment led the voters to conclude that two or more
amendments were being submitted.  See Osbourne, 153 Or at 486-88
(so demonstrating); Appellant's Brief, 1082 Oregon Briefs 1, 26-43 (1936) (same); Respondent's Brief, 1082 Oregon Briefs at 22-25
(same).

8.      	On its face, Measure 40 appears to identify two primary
purposes.  The preamble of the measure provides:

"This initiative is designed to preserve and protect
crime victims' rights to justice and due process and to
ensure the prosecution and conviction of persons who
have committed criminal acts.  It shall be interpreted
to accomplish these ends."  (Boldface in original;
emphasis added.)

We need not determine the significance of that wording, however,
because our analysis in the text that follows, concerning the
extensive constitutional changes effected by Measure 40 and the
lack of relationship between the affected constitutional
provisions, answers the question whether the measure contains two
or more constitutional amendments.

9.      	The crime of first-degree murder, to which Article I,
section 11, refers, was repealed in 1971 and replaced with the
crime of murder.  Or Laws 1971, ch 743, §§ 88, 432.  The crime of
aggravated murder was created in 1977.  Or Laws 1977, ch 370.

		Plaintiffs contend that, "[t]aken literally, [section
(1)(h) of Measure 40] requires the jurors to convict.  A 

not guilty verdict, or finding of a lesser offense, is simply not
allowed under the measure, according to its plain terms." 
(Emphasis in original.)  We do not read section (1)(h) to reach
that absurd result.  It is apparent, in our view, that the
purpose of that provision is to allow a conviction based upon the
guilty votes of 11 jurors for a verdict of guilty, if one juror
does not agree.

10.      	As noted earlier, Measure 40 also provides that, "as to
the conduct and prosecution of [criminal prosecutions and
juvenile delinquency] proceedings, it is the district attorney
who is authorized to assert the rights conferred on victims by
this [measure]."  Measure 40, § (4) (boldface in original).

11.      	Section (1)(g) of Measure 40 grants crime victims the
right to a public trial "by a jury selected from registered
voters and composed of persons who have not been convicted of a
felony or served a felony sentence within the last 15 years."

12.      	Section (1)(a) of Measure 40 grants crime victims:

"The right to be reasonably protected from the criminal
defendant or the convicted criminal throughout the
criminal justice process; decisions as to the pretrial
release of the defendant are to be based on the
principle of reasonable protection of the victim and
the public; any person arrested for a crime for which
the People have set a mandatory minimum sentence shall
not be released prior to trial unless a court
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the
person will not commit new criminal offenses while on
release[.]"  (Emphasis added.)

13.      	Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:

	"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."

Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:

	"No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the
same offence (sic), nor be compelled in any criminal
prosecution to testify against himself."

14.      	The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

	"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."

		The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:

"No person shall * * * be subject for the same offence
[sic] to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself[.]"

The Fourth and Fifth Amendments are made applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 655, 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081
(1961) (Fourth Amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 US 784, 794,
89 S Ct 2056, 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969) (double jeopardy clause of
Fifth Amendment); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 243, 89 S Ct
1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969) (self-incrimination clause of Fifth
Amendment).

15.      	Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, provides:

	"The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in one supreme court and in such other courts as may
from time to time be created by law."

16.      	Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:

	"The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three seperate (sic) departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, including the administrative, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of
the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided."

17.      	Plaintiffs contend that "[o]ther potentially-affected
sections of the Bill of Rights include [section] 15
(reformation), [section] 19 (imprisonment for debt), [section] 23
(habeas corpus), [section] 40 (penalty for aggravated murder),
and [section] 41 (work for inmates)."  Plaintiffs do not
elaborate on those claims, and we do not address them.

18.      	Because we agree with plaintiffs that Measure 40
contains two or more amendments under Article XVII, section 1, we
do not address plaintiffs' additional contentions that the
measure embraces more than one subject or that it revises, rather
than amends, the Oregon Constitution. 

19.      	Because this case concerns the procedural requirements
for amending or revising the constitution, the question of
severability, which was raised as an issue below in relation to
plaintiffs' "revision" challenge to Measure 40, is not an issue
here.  Severability relates to a substantive challenge, based
upon a superior source of law, to certain provisions of a law or
amendment that has been properly enacted or adopted.  Hart v.
Paulus, 296 Or 352, 361, 676 P2d 1384 (1984); see also Oregon
State Police Officers' Assn. v. State of Oregon, 323 Or 356, 380,
918 P2d 765 (1996) (in concluding that a constitutional
amendment, adopted by initiative petition, violated the Contracts
Clause of the United States Constitution, the court applied
principles of severability and concluded that no section could be
saved).  In contrast, this case concerns "the legality of the
enactment [or adoption] process itself."  Hart, 296 Or at 361. 
See also Lane Transit District v. Lane County, 327 Or 161, 169-70, ___ P2d ___ (1998) (stating that the severability clause in
the measure at issue "is (and would have to be) aimed at judicial
construction of the measure after (and if) * * * it is adopted").

20.      	The state does not dispute the amount of attorney fees
awarded; rather, it challenges only the decision to award
attorney fees.

21.      	The Deras opinion erroneously stated that the plaintiff
was a candidate at the time.  That was inaccurate.  In fact, the
plaintiff in Deras was a former candidate for public office, but
was not a candidate for anything at the time of the opinion.

22.      	On appeal, plaintiffs reiterate that argument to
support the attorney fees award, contending that the judgment
below "saves everyone, not just [plaintiffs], from loss of the
state constitutional protections against self-incrimination,
double jeopardy, and unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures."

23.      	Vannatta may be read to have introduced yet another
erroneous impediment to an attorney fee award in cases controlled
by Gilbert and Deras.  In denying an award of attorney fees, the
court in Vannatta said:  "The overall benefit to the public is
only an ancillary result in this case."  324 Or at 549.  Nothing
in Gilbert or Deras suggests that a prevailing party who
otherwise qualifies for an award of attorney fees will lose that
entitlement if the benefit to the public is merely an "ancillary"
result of the litigation.  The plaintiffs in Gilbert and Deras
sought to vindicate their own legal interests in bringing their
actions.  The benefit to the broader public from their success
was only an ancillary result of the litigation.  Despite its
ancillary character, that public benefit was sufficient to
justify an award of attorney fees to the successful plaintiffs. 
I do not read Vannatta to disqualify an otherwise eligible party
from recovering attorney fees under Gilbert and Deras merely
because that party aims primarily to protect personal, rather
than the public's, rights from disparagement.