Title: Oxford Finance Companies, Inc. v. Burgess
Citation: 303 S.C. 534, 402 S.E.2d 480
Docket Number: 23329
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 1991

303 S.C. 534 (1991) 402 S.E.2d 480 The OXFORD FINANCE COMPANIES, INC., Respondent v. Robert A. BURGESS d/b/a Statesburg Mobile Home Park, Appellant. 23329 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard November 26, 1990. Decided February 4, 1991. *535 M.M. Weinberg, III of Weinberg, Brown and McDougall, Sumter, for appellant. Brian C. Pitts of Bowen and Smoot, Hilton Head Island, for respondent. Heard Nov. 26, 1990. Decided Feb. 4, 1991. TOAL, Justice: This appeal involves whether a landlord has priority to possession of a mobile home over a purchase money security interest holder. The circuit court held the purchase money interest *536 holder was entitled to possession of the mobile home. We affirm. On November 13, 1986, Lawrence Pruitt and Kelly Pruitt (Tenants) entered into a lease with Robert A. Burgess (Landlord) to rent a lot upon which to place a mobile home. The lease requires a payment of $85.00 per month, is silent as to its term, and requires thirty (30) days notice by the Tenants for its termination. On November 15, 1986, the Tenants purchased a mobile home from Conner Mobile Homes. On the same day, the Tenants executed a Purchase Money Note and Security Agreement which, among other things, granted the seller a security interest in the mobile home. Oxford Finance Companies, Inc. (Oxford), by reason of various transfers, became the holder of the Purchase Money Note and Security Agreement. A certificate of title covering the mobile home was recorded with the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation on March 27, 1987. On March 28, 1989, the Tenants vacated the premises without providing notice to Oxford or to the Landlord. The Tenants defaulted under the Purchase Money Note and Security Agreement by failing to pay installments when due. The Tenants also became delinquent on their rent becoming due on April 1, 1989. After the Tenants' departure, Oxford requested possession of the mobile home from the Landlord, who refused to turn over possession. The Landlord claimed he was entitled to the mobile home by virtue of a landlord's lien for past due rent and late charges with priority over Oxford's security interest. The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled the Landlord had no lien, and even if he did, his lien was subordinate to Oxford's. The trial court also granted judgment for Oxford against the Landlord for claim and delivery and conversion, and transferred the case to the jury roster for a trial as to damages. The Landlord appealed to this Court. We affirm. This Court may affirm a lower court ruling upon any grounds appearing in the record, Sup. Ct. Rule 4, § 8, and we *537 choose to do so here. The Landlord argues he has a lien on the mobile home superior to Oxford's claims pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 27-39-50 (1976), and § 27-39-260 (1976). Section 27-39-50 reads: Section 27-39-260 states: While these statutes may have given the Landlord some rights to the mobile home, both were repealed by Act No. 494 *538 § 9(A), 1988 S.C. Acts 4115, effective January 1, 1989. In Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316, 318-19, 360 S.E. (2d) 314, 316 (1987), this Court held: (citations omitted). The Landlord contends the decision in Cochran v. Darcy, 5 S.C. 125 (1873) advances his cause, and that he had a contractual right that was vested in November of 1986 (when the lease was signed) which may not be affected by repeal of the aforementioned statutes. We disagree and hold Cochran is inapposite. In Cochran, the parties entered into two contracts for sums certain in 1867. Upon default by Darcy in 1872, Cochran obtained judgments for the sums due. Meanwhile, the legislature had passed the homestead exemption, and Darcy sought to claim the exemption against Cochran, thereby reducing Cochran's recoverable judgments by the amount of the exemption. The Cochran Court held that the exemption, if applied to the parties there, would impermissibly impair Cochran's contractual rights to the full sums he deserved. This case is distinguishable. Where Cochran's contractual rights to certain monies arose in 1867, before the passage of the act, the Landlord's rights (if any) to possession of the mobile home arose, not at the time the lease was signed, but at the time the Tenants vacated and became in arrears. See Burnett v. Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 125 S.E. (2d) 10 (1962). Because the repeal of the statutes took place on January 1, 1989, three months before the Tenants became in arrears on April 1, 1989, the Landlord was and is unable to rely upon the statutes for any possessory rights. *539 The Landlord next asserts he is not liable for conversion, even if he was erroneous in refusing to turn over possession of the mobile home to Oxford. We disagree. A claim for conversion can be based on an unauthorized detention of property, after demand. Castell v. Stephenson Finance Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E. (2d) 311 (1964). In order to prevail in a conversion action, the plaintiff must prove either title or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion. Causey v. Blanton, 281 S.C. 163, 314 S.E. (2d) 346 (1984). The Landlord's mistaken view of the law is of no avail to him. Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat.[1] Lastly, the Landlord argues it should not be compelled to respond in this case for punitive damages. Punitive damages are recoverable in conversion cases in the event it is determined the defendant's acts have been willful, reckless, and/or committed with conscious indifference to the rights of others. Hunt v. Jordan, 286 S.C. 340, 333 S.E. (2d) 569 (Ct. App. 1985). The trial judge transferred the case for a jury trial as to appropriate damages. In that proceeding, evidence will be developed regarding the Landlord's motive, knowledge, intent, and proof of damages. We thus deem it wise to refrain from making a determination as to punitive damages before this evidence has been developed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the lower court. GREGORY, C.J., and HARWELL, CHANDLER and FINNEY, JJ., concur. [1] Ignorance of the law [or a] law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no man. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed. 1979).