Title: Chesapeake Utilities Corporation v. Hopkins
Citation: 340 A.2d 154
Docket Number: 
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 1975

Decided April 2, 1975. Rehearing Denied June 4, 1975. John J. Schmittinger of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Dover, for defendant and third-party plaintiff below, appellant. Howard M. Berg of Berg, Komissaroff & Sawyer, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee. *155 Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, DUFFY, Associate Justice, and QUILLEN, Chancellor. HERRMANN, Chief Justice: In this negligence action, the defendant Chesapeake Utilities Corporation (hereinafter "Chesapeake") appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff John W. Hopkins (hereinafter "Hopkins") which was based upon the doctrine of civil death. Hopkins is a convicted felon, presently imprisoned. In denying Chesapeake's motion, the Superior Court rejected its contentions and held that the doctrine of civil death is not a part of the law of Delaware; that Hopkins has the capacity to maintain his personal injury action despite his felony convictions; and that it is not against the law or public policy of this State to allow a prisoner to appear in court in the prosecution of his claims for civil damages. We agree. I. Defendant argues that under the common law doctrine of civil death, a convicted and imprisoned felon is barred from maintaining a civil action;[1] that the common law doctrine remains the law of Delaware in the absence of any statute or constitutional provision abrogating it. See Shellhorn and Hill, Inc. v. State, Del.Supr., 187 A.2d 71 (1962); 21 Am.Jur.2d., Criminal Law, §§ 621, 626. Although the applicability of the civil death doctrine in this State is a question of first impression in this Court,[2] we resist the temptation "to explore the ancient and in many respects obsolete learning connected with [it]."[3] The determinative issue presented by this appeal is resolved by the mandate of Art. 1, Sec. 9 of the Delaware Constitution which provides in pertinent part: "All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land, without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense * * *." By virtue of that constitutional provision, the common law doctrine of civil death, including its concomitant rule denying a sentenced felon the right to bring any legal or equitable action, is not the law of Delaware. A chose in action, such as Hopkins' claim for personal injuries, is a property *156 right. Hopkins may not be deprived of that property right without "remedy by the due course of law" guaranteed to him by the Delaware Constitution. We find unacceptable Chesapeake's argument that the existence of other specific constitutional[4] and statutory[5] disability provisions compel the conclusion that the common law doctrine of civil death prevails in this State. Statutes suspending the civil rights of imprisoned felons are penal and may not be extended by implication. 18 C.J.S. Convicts § 4. The express constitutional guaranty of "remedy by the due course of law" protecting property rights bars any such implication. II. The method by which Hopkins will be permitted to pursue his personal injury claim, whether by attending the trial in custody or by deposition, is for the Superior Court's decision in the exercise of its judicial discretion. We note, in passing, that 11 Del. C. § 6537[6] is not exclusive and that the provisions of 11 Del.C. Ch. 65, providing for treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of offenders as useful, law-abiding citizens within the community, are to be liberally construed. See 11 Del.C. § 6501. Affirmed. UPON PETITION FOR REARGUMENT In seeking reargument, Chesapeake points out that we failed to mention its arguments based upon Art. 1, Sec. 15 of the Delaware Constitution.[*] Chesapeake now contends that the conclusion we have reached herein renders Sec. 15 meaningless, and that the language of that Section "should be given precedence over the general language of Art. 1, Section 9". These contentions deserve comment. Chesapeake argues that Art. 1, Sec. 15 allows for limited forfeiture of estate, and, therefore, "the way is clear in this State for the common law doctrine of civil death to apply to convicted felons, at least, during the life of the offender." The argument is without merit. Admittedly, the provisions of Sec. 15 can be read to permit a forfeiture of estate during the life of an offender who is placed in a state of "attainder". But even if so read, the provision does not require the sweeping conclusion that the common law doctrine of civil death is established as the law of Delaware. See Colton v. Wade, 32 Del.Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951); and Cannon v. Windsor, 1 Houston 143 (1855). "Cardinal are the rules that the Constitution and each part thereof must be harmonized and construed as a whole; that it *157 cannot be presumed that any clause of the Constitution is intended to be without full force and effect." State v. Roberts, Del. Supr., 282 A.2d 603 , 606 (1971). To hold that the doctrine of civil death is the law of this State by reason of the limited forfeiture exception permitted by Sec. 15 would substantially impair the express protection given certain property rights by Sec. 9. The two Sections must be harmonized; one will not be given precedence over the other. The express constitutional guaranty of "remedy by the due course of law" contained in Sec. 9 bars the implication that the doctrine of civil death prevails in this State by virtue of Sec. 15. The petition for reargument is denied.