Title: New Jersey v. Urbina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2015

New Jersey v. Urbina Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .(NOTE: The status of this decision is .) SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State of New Jersey v. Edwin Urbina (A-49-13) (073209)Argued November 12, 2014 – Decided June 16, 2015FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether, in pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated manslaughter, defendant’s assertion of facts implying that he acted in self-defense rendered the factual basis for his plea inadequate. On the morning of November 24, 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin A. Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement. He agreed to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State’s recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen-and-one-half years’ incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. At the plea hearing, defendant confirmed that he had sufficient time to speak with his family and counsel. In establishing a factual basis, he stated that he was walking away from Torres when he turned and saw Torres and his cousin “pulling out their firearms.” Defendant then reached for his, which he claimed “just went off.” Defendant asserted: “I ain’t meant to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up.” Defense counsel then explained that they had initially contemplated a self-defense affirmative defense. However, counsel noted that no handgun was found on Torres, meaning that asserting a self-defense argument would require counsel to contend that someone disposed of it. In light of the six bullet wounds in Torres and the absence of a weapon at the scene, defense counsel determined that a self-defense argument was not viable. Defendant confirmed that he understood and agreed with his counsel’s assessment. The prosecutor asked that the plea paperwork be amended to show a waiver of self-defense. Defendant agreed and confirmed that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving any self-defense argument. Subsequently, he was sentenced in accordance with his plea. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. Rather, finding that defendant’s testimony “was merely suggestive of the possibility of invoking self-defense,” the majority determined that the trial court sufficiently explored whether defendant was raising a potential self-defense claim or was waiving it. It concluded that defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived self-defense. The dissent disagreed, noting that self-defense is a complete defense, equivalent to an assertion of innocence. It further noted that when evidence is presented raising a claim of self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving the claim beyond a reasonable doubt, which the dissent believed did not occur here. Moreover, the dissent believed that the trial court did not sufficiently explain to defendant the nature of the defense and the significance of his waiver. Thus, the dissent concluded that defendant’s conviction should be reversed. Defendant appealed to this Court as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division. R. 2:2-1(a)(2).HELD: The trial court’s failure to make further inquiry into defendant’s apparent assertion of self-defense, including ensuring that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense and that the State bears the burden of disproving self-defense once asserted, renders it unclear whether defendant’s plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and requires vacation of his plea of guilty to aggravated manslaughter. 1. Self-defense is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated manslaughter. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a), the use of deadly force against another is justifiable as self-defense “when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” A defendant claiming self-defense must have an actual, honest, and reasonable belief in the necessity of using force. In New Jersey, a guilty plea does not operate as a waiver of all affirmative defenses, including self-defense. This is consistent with the requirement that the trial court elicit a comprehensive factual basis prior to accepting a plea, which allows the court to ascertain the plea’s voluntariness while simultaneously protecting a defendant from pleading guilty to a crime he or she did not commit. (pp. 18-23)2. Challenges to the sufficiency of the factual basis for a plea are generally brought either by way of a motion to withdraw the plea or on post-conviction relief, but may also be brought on direct appeal. A reviewing court owes no deference to the trial court when assessing whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the elements of an offense. Review of the law is plenary. (pp. 23-24)3. The Court notes that if a suggestion of self-defense is raised in a plea colloquy, then the trial court must inquire whether the defendant is factually asserting that defense. If he is not, the plea can be accepted. If, on the other hand, he claims that he used deadly force against the victim in the reasonable belief that his life was in danger, then he is asserting that he did not commit the crime. Before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, the trial court must conduct a thorough and searching inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of that choice. The court must, on the record, ensure that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, requiring both the court and defense counsel to ensure that the defendant has an understanding of self-defense in relation to the facts of the case and that he or she knows that the State bears the burden of disproving the defense if asserted. (pp. 24-26)4. Here, the trial court’s colloquy on aggravated manslaughter would have been appropriate if not for its failure to make further inquiry into defendant’s apparent assertion of self-defense. The Court also is not satisfied that defendant’s waiver of self-defense comported with the requisite standard. Specifically, the trial court did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State bore the burden of disproving self-defense once asserted. Absent such an inquiry, it is unclear whether defendant’s guilty plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, thereby rendering the factual basis insufficient and requiring vacation of the plea. (pp. 26-27) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, defendant’s guilty plea is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings. JUSTICE SOLOMON, DISSENTING, joined by JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and PATTERSON, expresses the view that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to raise a self-defense claim, explaining that defendant’s fleeting suggestion that he acted in self-defense was a product of his natural reluctance to admit to criminally culpable conduct and that any uncertainty about his admission of guilt was sufficiently resolved by the trial court’s questioning and defendant’s own admissions. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICE ALBIN and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and PATTERSON join. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 49 September Term 2013 073209STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.EDWIN URBINA, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 12, 2014 – Decided June 16, 2015 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Robin Kay Lord argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Robin Kay Lord, attorney; Ms. Lord and Richard W. Berg, of counsel and on the brief). Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an appeal from defendant Edwin Urbina’sconviction and sentence for first-degree aggravatedmanslaughter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), following hisentry of a guilty plea for the shooting death of Edwin A.Torres. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred inaccepting his guilty plea because the “factual basis elicitedfor [that] guilty plea indicated that [defendant] was asserting 1 a complete defense to the charge.” That factual basis was laterchallenged on appeal, along with defendant’s seventeen-and-one-half year sentence. In a split decision, a majority of the Appellate Divisionpanel affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. Themajority held that while defendant testified to facts during theplea colloquy that raised the possibility of self-defense, histestimony, when considered in light of all the surroundingcircumstances, did not constitute a contemporaneous claim ofinnocence requiring the court to vacate the plea. Rather, themajority found that defendant, during his plea colloquy,explicitly agreed to waive self-defense after consultation withcounsel and his family. The majority additionally noted thatdefendant signed an amended plea form waiving such defense. Onemember of the appellate panel dissented, concluding thatdefendant’s plea was accompanied by a claim of innocence, andfurther found that the trial judge failed to engage in asufficient colloquy with defendant to confirm that his self-defense waiver was knowing and voluntary. Defendant appealed as of right to this Court. See R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We are now asked to consider whether, in pleadingguilty to the crime of aggravated manslaughter, defendant’sassertion of facts implying that he acted in self-defenserendered the factual basis for that plea inadequate. For the 2 reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Division. I. On the morning of November 24, 2007, emergency dispatchersreceived a report of an injured man in Camden City. Uponarrival at the specified location, Camden police officers foundthe victim, Edwin A. Torres, deceased on the sidewalk withmultiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness tothe incident identified defendant, Edwin Urbina, as the shooter.The witness had known defendant since childhood. Defendant,sixteen years old at the time of the shooting, was thereaftercharged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, wouldconstitute murder contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2). Three days later, on November 27, 2007, defendant,accompanied by counsel, surrendered at the Camden PoliceDepartment, and was thereafter remanded to a youth correctionalfacility. On March 27, 2008, defendant voluntarily elected to havehis case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division,pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27. On that same date, in order to avoid an indictment forfirst-degree murder carrying a potential life sentence with amandatory parole disqualifier of thirty years, defendant enteredinto a negotiated plea agreement with the State. Under the 3 terms of that plea arrangement, defendant agreed to proceed asan adult and to plead guilty to one count of first-degreeaggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), in exchange forthe State’s recommendation of a sentence not to exceedseventeen-and-one-half years’ incarceration subject to aneighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision under the No Early Release Act(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. As a further part of the agreement,defendant agreed to pay the requisite fines and penalties and towaive his right to appeal. Defense counsel expressly reservedthe right to argue for a sentence less than the sentence theState agreed to recommend in accordance with State v. Warren,115 N.J. 433 (1989). At the plea hearing, defendant testified under oath that hehad sufficient time to speak with his family and counsel beforedeciding to plead guilty. Thereafter, counsel for defendantrepresented to the court that he explained to defendant that “bywaiving the Grand Jury he would not be indicted for murder” andthat defendant would instead proceed “on a less serious charge.”Defendant acknowledged his understanding and voluntary agreementto waive indictment. To establish the factual basis fordefendant’s plea, the following colloquy took place, which weset out at length because of its importance: 4 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Edwin, on November 24th you were in the City of Camden, correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You came into contact at that time with Edwin Torres. Do you recall that?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And, Edwin, actually there was another young man with him, is that correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And at the time, you and Edwin Torres, would it be fair to say, got into an argument?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.[DEFENSE COUNEL]: At some point during that argument did you produce a handgun and fire that at Edwin? Did you shoot the handgun?THE DEFENDANT: First he smacked me. When I was walking off, I looked behind me. He said I know you and I turn your back behind me. I looked behind me. Him and his cousin was pulling out their firearms. I went for mines. It was an automatic, so then the gun just went off. When it went off it dropped. When it dropped I picked it up and I just ran.I ain’t mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up.THE COURT: You discharged a firearm in his direction, right?THE DEFENDANT: I shot, like, away from, but it hit and the gun took my hand.THE COURT: Well, you didn’t shoot it in the air and it went in the air and accidentally 5 came down and hit him in the top of the head, right?THE DEFENDANT: No.THE COURT: You pointed it in his direction, right?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: You discharged it multiple times, right?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: You pulled it six times. It wasn’t an automatic, right?THE DEFENDANT: Yes -- no, it was an automatic.THE COURT: You pulled the trigger once and six bullets came out?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: That’s right?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: You knew the pistol was an automatic?THE DEFENDANT: No.THE COURT: But you still shot in his direction six times, correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: And you struck him six times?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, for the record, I also have discovery. The post-mortem indicates six bullet wounds to the victim, so I would just state that also. 6 As far as –- and I don’t disagree at all with Edwin’s recitation of the facts. However, as far as the disposition in this matter, in preparation of this matter, there was no handgun found on the victim at the time the police responded. We would have had to argue that someone disposed of it in order to proffer a viable self-defense argument and I took all that into account when we decided on that and, therefore, although it certainly was contemplated a possible self-defense, based on the lack of a weapon found at the scene and the six bullet wounds, it’s my professional opinion that that would not have been a particularly viable defense. THE COURT: You understand what your lawyer just said? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you agree with that assessment? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [PROSECUTOR]: If I may, Judge, there is an eyewitness and the eyewitness account does not include the victim having a handgun. The facts as the State understood them are different from the defense version. We ask that the plea paperwork be amended to show a waiver of self-defense as part of the plea.1 THE COURT: You understand what [the prosecutor] said? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: You agree with that as well?1 The plea form, initialed and signed by the defendant, included this requested waiver of self-defense as well as the waiver of defendant’s right to appeal. 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.THE COURT: You reviewed everything with your lawyer and you reached this conclusion that this was the best thing to do under the circumstances, right?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: There’s no doubt that you, in fact, discharged a firearm in the direction of Mr. Torres and caused his death, correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: All right. And you do know that, again, by pleading guilty today, you’ve waived any potential utilization of self-defense, correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: You also understand when you weighed everything out that, as [defense counsel] said and as I alluded to, had the matter gone to the Grand Jury you could have been, in fact, indicted for a first degree murder carrying a life sentence, 85 percent without parole, which is essentially 62-and-a- half years without parole?You understand that?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: So, you weighed all that when you reached this decision with your family’s assistance and [defense counsel’s] assistance, correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 8 The court thereafter found that defendant provided anadequate factual basis for aggravated manslaughter, and acceptedthe plea. On May 16, 2008, defendant appeared for sentencing. At thesentencing hearing, the prosecutor briefly set forth the State’sversion of events, as developed during the course of theinvestigation into the victim’s murder: [PROSECUTOR]: There was an eyewitness to this matter of November 24, 2007, at 10:32 A.M., Third and Erie, in the City of Camden, where Edwin Torres was murdered, he was 22 years old. And we had an eyewitness to this murder. In fact, the eyewitness stated the victim and the defendant engaged in conversation, the defendant pulled a gun, the defendant shot the victim. When the victim, Edwin Torres, went to the ground, the defendant stood over top of him, the victim, and at point blank range, repeatedly fired shots into the victim while he was down. In essence, Judge, this was an execution. The victim was executed on the streets of Camden at 10:32 A.M. in broad daylight. Even more troubling is the fact that the juvenile simply walked -- turned away and calmly walked down the street as if nothing ever happened. The investigation revealed between 6 and 10 bullets were fired from one weapon, one firer [sic]. Unfortunately, the victim was hit multiple times. Shot in the leg, torso, neck and face. And he was pronounced dead soon thereafter. 9 Defense counsel then represented to the Court that heagreed with the version of events set forth by the State: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The facts which the State just voiced to the Court were contained in numerous reports which I read and, indeed, is reflective of what [defendant] voiced to your Honor when he pled guilty . . . to this charge[.] Defendant confirmed that he did not have any additions orcorrections to the presentence report and acknowledged that hewas sorry for the crime and apologized to the Torres family.Thereafter, the following exchange occurred between the courtand defendant: THE COURT: I mean, it’s somewhat distressing when you did what you did as if you were killing a bug of some kind where you don’t even think about it, you step on the ant and you end its life and not give it a second thought. That’s what seemed to happen here . . . . THE DEFENDANT: I had a witness. Ain’t happen like that. I ain’t stand over him and shot him two times in the face. THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. How many times did that weapon discharge in his direction? THE DEFENDANT: Ten times. THE COURT: How many? THE DEFENDANT: Ten. THE COURT: I mean, what do you think happens when you shoot at somebody ten times? You think they are going to live? You think there is a likelihood of survival in that situation? 10 THE DEFENDANT: No. After finding two aggravating factors –- N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (risk of re-offense) and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (needfor deterrence) –- and no mitigating factors, the court, inaccordance with the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to aprison term of seventeen-and-one-half years with an eighty-fivepercent parole ineligibility period subject to NERA, withappropriate fines and penalties. On April 11, 2011, nearly three years after his sentencing,defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction reliefalleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After retainingprivate counsel, defendant moved to withdraw his petition infavor of pursuing an untimely direct appeal. The trial courtgranted defendant’s motion without prejudice. The AppellateDivision thereafter granted defendant’s motion to file a Noticeof Appeal as within time. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial courterred in accepting his guilty plea because the “factual basiselicited for defendant’s guilty plea indicated that he wasasserting a complete defense to the charge.” Defendant alsoargued that his sentence was manifestly excessive. In a split decision, the Appellate Division majorityaffirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. At the outset, 11 the majority noted that defendant never moved to withdraw hisplea, and thus the panel was only asked to consider defendant’schallenge to the factual basis for his plea. On that issue, themajority held that while defendant testified to facts during theplea colloquy that raised the possibility of self-defense, histestimony, when considered in light of all the surroundingcircumstances, did not constitute a contemporaneous claim ofinnocence requiring the court to vacate the plea. Explaining its rationale for this conclusion, the majoritybegan by noting that defendant testified as follows: (1) hefired multiple shots from a handgun in the direction of thevictim, and struck the victim six times; (2) the victim died asa consequence of the gunshot wounds; and (3) he did not intendto kill the victim, but “just wanted to have him back up.”According to the majority, this testimony provided a sufficientfactual basis to support a plea to aggravated manslaughter underN.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). Moreover, the majority determined that defendant’sstatement that he saw the victim and another person “pulling outtheir firearms,” prompting defendant to pull his own weapon andfire at the victim “to have him back up,” did not constitute anassertion of innocence. To the contrary, the majority concludedthat defendant’s statement “was merely suggestive of thepossibility of invoking self-defense.” Noting that such a 12 statement required exploration into whether defendant wasraising a potential self-defense claim or was waiving thedefense, the majority found that the trial court sufficientlyprobed defendant about his statement and plea in accordance withState v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 445 (2012) (instructing trialcourts to fully explore factual basis for plea to ascertainwhether defendant “has a potentially valid defense and whetherhe is willing to waive it and enter a guilty plea”). Considering the totality of the record before it, themajority concluded that defendant intelligently, knowingly, andvoluntarily waived self-defense. Specifically, the majoritynoted, defendant acknowledged discussing the case with counseland his family and having sufficient time to consider entering aplea. Moreover, the majority noted that the issue of self-defense was explored on the record before the judge, anddefendant acknowledged that he agreed to waive the defense andconcurred with the judgment of his counsel that the defense maynot have succeeded. Finally, defendant stated that afterweighing all the facts and the charges then pending against him,he wanted to waive self-defense and accept the plea offer. In response to the dissent’s argument that defendantasserted a claim of self-defense, and consequently a claim ofinnocence, the majority noted that defendant never stated that“the victim threatened his life or even tried to point the 13 weapon at him,” nor did he assert that “he had to fire [theweapon] to prevent his own death or serious injury.” Therefore,under the circumstances presented, defendant’s plea statementdid not negate an essential element of his aggravatedmanslaughter charge, and did not, in the majority’s opinion,amount to a contemporaneous claim of innocence. The majority found defendant’s sentence, imposed pursuantto the plea bargain, was not manifestly excessive or undulypunitive. The dissent concluded that defendant’s conviction should bereversed because the defendant asserted a claim of self-defense,and consequently a claim of innocence. The dissent posited thataccepting defendant’s plea despite his assertion that he wasdefending himself runs afoul of this Court’s disapproval ofAlford pleas, wherein a defendant pleads guilty butsimultaneously maintains his or her innocence. See NorthCarolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162(1970). The dissenting judge first noted that self-defense is acomplete defense -- equivalent to an assertion of innocence.The dissent added that when evidence is presented raising aclaim of self-defense, the State bears the burden of disprovingthat claim beyond a reasonable doubt. The dissent stated thatwaiver of self-defense should not be permitted because it 14 constitutes waiver of an essential, but missing element of theoffense at issue, and thus results in a guilty plea despite aclaim of innocence. The dissenting judge further stated that when a courtaccepts a guilty plea on a waiver of self-defense, then underAlford, supra, “we should demand a 'strong factual basis’” forrejecting the self-defense claim and accepting the plea. Thedissent stated that “the State’s showing [here] fell short”because it failed to offer any cognizable evidence, let alone a“strong factual basis,” disproving defendant’s claim of self-defense. Moreover, whether defendant’s waiver was knowing andvoluntary was a “significant question,” because “[t]here was aninsufficient effort [by the court] to explain to defendant onthe record the nature of the defense and the significance of hiswaiver.” In light of these perceived errors and deficiencies,the dissent concluded that it was necessary to reversedefendant’s conviction. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right based on thedissent in the Appellate Division. See R. 2:2-1(a)(2). II. Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in acceptinghis guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for that pleaindicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the chargeof aggravated manslaughter. Defendant argues that accepting a 15 guilty plea despite a claim of self-defense runs afoul of thisCourt’s disapproval of Alford pleas. Therefore, according todefendant, a plea generally should not be accepted unless thereis a retraction or disavowal of a “complete defense, like self-defense, which is an assertion of innocence.” Defendant additionally argues that the trial court failedto sufficiently engage defendant both to determine whether thereexisted an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea and toconfirm that he understood the law of self-defense well enoughto make a truly voluntary and knowing decision to waive thatdefense. Defendant notes that he was only sixteen years old,with a limited education, and no experience with the adultcriminal justice system when he entered his guilty plea.Defendant asserts that the trial court did not give himappropriate advice regarding his rights. In contrast, the State contends that defendant’s guiltyplea was supported by an adequate factual basis. Noting that achallenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis for a plea isgenerally premised upon a failure of a defendant to admit to allof the elements of a crime, the State argues that it is beyonddispute that defendant’s own admissions established all of theelements of aggravated manslaughter. According to the State,defendant’s testimony that the victim pulled out a gun first didnot negate his guilty plea, and did not constitute a 16 contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring that his plea bevacated. Rather, the State maintains that these statements werenothing more than an unsupported, self-serving attempt bydefendant to downplay his criminal culpability. The State also insists that when confronted withdefendant’s testimony regarding this alleged act of the victim,the trial court appropriately explored the issue to ensure thatdefendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, and that it wasbased on facts sufficient to support the charge of aggravatedmanslaughter. Addressing the claim that the trial court failedto adequately explain to defendant on the record the nature ofself-defense and the significance of his waiver, the Stateargues that requiring a more detailed colloquy would place animproper burden on the trial judge to become a second defenseattorney in advising a defendant with respect to his decision toenter a guilty plea. Specifically, the State argues that thedissent “would require the trial judge to explore the merits ofa potential self-defense claim on the record with a defendant.” Moreover, to the extent defendant now claims he is actuallyinnocent because he has a valid defense, the State argues thatdefendant should have moved below to withdraw his guilty plea onthat basis, noting that all of the Slater2 factors weigh heavily2 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009) (prescribing four factors that should be weighed in evaluating motion to withdraw 17 against granting such a motion at this late stage. For support,the State cites to and distinguishes this Court’s recentapplication of the Slater factors in Munroe, supra, arguing thatunlike in Munroe, defendant here specifically acknowledged thathe was not asserting a self-defense claim and that the State’sproofs contradicted his claim. The State concludes by asserting that under the paradigmcreated by the dissent, any defendant who admits guilt at a pleahearing while throwing some blame at his victim can successfullyrepudiate his plea at any time –- a result that would underminethe judicial system’s compelling interest in finality and theplea bargaining system as a whole. III. A. The essential elements of aggravated manslaughter are foundin N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). Under this statute, “[c]riminalhomicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when . . . [t]heactor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifestingextreme indifference to human life.” A defendant acts“recklessly” when heguilty plea: “1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; 2) the nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; 3) the existence of a plea bargain; and 4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused”). 18 consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation. [N.J.S.A. 2C:2–2(b)(3).] B. Self-defense, one of several forms of justificationrecognized by our Code of Criminal Justice, is an affirmativedefense to a charge of aggravated manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-1(a). Under the Code, the use of deadly force against anotheris justifiable as self-defense “when the actor reasonablybelieves that such force is immediately necessary for thepurpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful forceby such other person on the present occasion.” N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a). While it is not imperative that actual necessity exist, adefendant claiming self-defense must have an actual belief inthe necessity of using force, and must also establish that thebelief was honest and reasonable. See State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 161 (1991) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198–99(1984)). However, for a defendant to prevail on a claim ofself-defense, 19 the jury need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s belief was honest and reasonable. Rather, if any evidence raising the issue of self-defense is adduced, either in the State’s or the defendant’s case, then the jury must be instructed that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the self-defense claim does not accord with the facts; acquittal is required if there remains a reasonable doubt whether the defendant acted in self-defense. [Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 200.] At trial, therefore, “[o]nce the issue of self-defense hasbeen raised, the burden to disprove the issue shifts to theState.” Perry, supra, 124 N.J. at 194. ”Self-defense exonerates a person who kills in thereasonable belief that such action was necessary to prevent hisor her death or serious injury . . . .” Kelly, supra, 97 N.J.at 198. C. A defendant who enters a plea of guilty “simultaneouslywaives several constitutional rights, including his privilegeagainst compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial byjury, and his right to confront his accusers.” McCarthy v.United States, 394 U.S. 459 , 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1170–71, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 425 (1969). While in some jurisdictions a guiltyplea operates as a waiver of all affirmative defenses, see,e.g., People v. Bonwit, 219 Cal. Rptr. 297 , 299 (Ct. App. 1985)(“A guilty plea is more than an admission of guilt; it is also a 20 waiver of affirmative defenses”), our courts have been hesitantto go to such extremes. This is in line with our Rules of Court, which instructcourts not to accept a plea of guilty without first questioning the defendant personally, under oath or by affirmation, and determining by inquiry of the defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is made voluntarily, not as a result of any threats or of any promises or inducements not disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. [R. 3:9-2 (emphasis added).] Indeed, “it is essential to elicit from the defendant acomprehensive factual basis, addressing each element of a givenoffense in substantial detail.” State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 236 (2013). The “court must be 'satisfied from the lips ofthe defendant,’” State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 415 (1990)(quoting State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989)), that hecommitted every element of the crime charged, State v. Sainz,107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987). The purpose of this factual foundation is multi-faceted.First, the factual basis enables a judge to “ascertain theplea’s voluntariness.” McCarthy, supra, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1170–71, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 425. “Because a guilty plea isan admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it 21 cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses anunderstanding of the law in relation to the facts.” Ibid.Indeed, Rule 3:9-2 specifies that the court must determine thatthe “plea is made voluntarily . . . with an understanding of thenature of the charge.” It is therefore the duty of the pleajudge to ensure that a defendant pleading guilty “has a fullunderstanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence,”and to thereby “leave[] a record adequate for any review thatmay be later sought.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 280 (1969). Second, the requirement of a factual basis helps “toprotect a defendant who is in the position of pleadingvoluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the chargebut without realizing that his conduct does not actually fallwithin the charge.” Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 421 (internalquotation marks omitted). In fact, in New Jersey, “[e]ven if adefendant wished to plead guilty to a crime he or she did notcommit, he or she may not do so. No court may accept such aplea.” Smullen, supra, 118 N.J. at 415. This is in starkcontrast to the federal standard, which allows an individualaccused of a crime to “voluntarily, knowingly, andunderstandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentenceeven if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation inthe acts constituting the crime,” so long as there is a “strong 22 factual basis for the plea,” Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at 37–38,91 S. Ct. at 167–68, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 171–72. Our rationale fordeparture from the federal rule is clear: We are mindful that our system of justice is not perfect and that, at times, an accused, without the knowledge of the court, may enter a plea of guilty to a crime he did not commit to insulate himself from a potentially greater sentence if found guilty by a jury. That is something over which we have no control. It is another thing, however, for a court to say it is acceptable for a defendant to give a perjured plea. Our court rules and case law require a factual basis for a plea of guilty, that is, a truthful account of what actually occurred to justify the acceptance of a plea. That approach in the long-run is the best means of ensuring that innocent people are not punished for crimes they did not commit. It is an approach that is essential to the very integrity of our criminal justice system. Just because we are powerless to control or eliminate every negative practice in our criminal justice system does not mean that we must condone those practices. Though we recognize that sometimes an accused, unknown to the trial judge, will perjure himself to put through a plea agreement, a court cannot give official license to such a practice. [State v. Taccetta, 200 N.J. 183, 198 (2009).] D. Challenges to the sufficiency of the factual basis for aguilty plea are most commonly brought by way of a motion to thetrial court to withdraw that plea, see, e.g., Slater, supra, 19823 N.J. at 157, or on post-conviction relief, see, e.g., State v.D.D.M., 140 N.J. 83, 95 (1995). Although less common, a defendant may also challenge thesufficiency of the factual basis for his guilty plea on directappeal. See State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 224 (1982). “Thestandard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion tovacate a plea for lack of an adequate factual basis is de novo.”State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015); see also Campfield,supra, 213 N.J. 230-32 (analyzing whether factual basis existedwithout discussing Slater factors). We therefore owe nodeference to the trial court that took this plea. “An appellatecourt is in the same position as the trial court in assessingwhether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfythe elements of an offense.” Tate, supra, 220 N.J. at 404.Review of the law is plenary. Ibid. IV. With the applicable legal principles in mind, we nowexamine whether, in pleading guilty to the crime of aggravatedmanslaughter, defendant’s assertion of facts implying that heacted in self-defense rendered the factual basis for that pleainadequate. We begin by first noting that if a suggestion of self-defense is raised in the plea colloquy, then the trial courtmust inquire whether the defendant is factually asserting self- 24 defense. If the defendant states that he is not claiming self-defense, then the plea can be accepted. On the other hand, ifthe defendant claims that he used deadly force against thevictim in the reasonable belief that his life was in danger,then the defendant is asserting that he did not commit thecrime. So long as the defendant does not factually contend that heacted in self-defense, a defendant may waive a claim of self-defense. As such, before allowing a defendant to waive a claimof self-defense, we require “a thorough and searching inquiry”into “his or her understanding of the nature of the right beingwaived and the implications that flow from that choice.” Statev. Handy3, 215 N.J. 334, 362 (2013); see also McCarthy, supra,394 U.S. at 466, 89 S. Ct. at 1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 425 (notingwaiver cannot be deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary“unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law inrelation to the facts”). To this end, it is the responsibilityof the plea judge to ensure that the waiver is knowing andvoluntary, and to do so on the record. See Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S. Ct. at 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 280. Presumingwaiver from a silent record is impermissible. Accordingly,during the plea colloquy, both the plea judge and defense3 In cases such as this, State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) is not applicable. 25 counsel should ensure that the defendant has an understanding ofself-defense in relation to the facts of his case, and shouldinform the defendant that the State has the burden to disprovethe defense if asserted. Here, the trial court’s colloquy on aggravated manslaughterwould have been appropriate if not for the failure to makefurther inquiry into the apparent assertion of self-defense.Furthermore, we are not satisfied that defendant’s waiver ofself-defense comported with the standard that we require. After defendant stated during the plea colloquy that hepulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled theirguns, and that “I ain’t mean to kill him, your Honor. I justwanted to have him back up[,]” the trial court should haveexplored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. However, the plea judge did not ensure that defendanttruly understood the law of self-defense, including therequirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessityof using force, see Perry, supra, 124 N.J. at 161, or that heunderstood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted, id. at 194. Absent such an inquiry onthe record, it is unclear whether defendant’s plea was trulyknowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See McCarthy, supra, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S. Ct. at 1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 425; State v.Cecil, 260 N.J. Super. 475, 488 (1992). As such, we cannot 26 rightly conclude that a strong factual basis existed to supportdefendant’s guilty plea. Because we find that the factual basis was insufficient, weare constrained to vacate defendant’s plea of guilty toaggravated manslaughter. V. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision and vacate defendant’s guilty plea to aggravatedmanslaughter. Defendant is returned to the position where hestood before he entered his guilty plea, and this matter ishereby remanded for further proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICE ALBIN and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and PATTERSON join. 27 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 49 September Term 2013 073209STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.EDWIN URBINA, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE SOLOMON, dissenting. Defendant admitted under oath that he caused the death ofthe victim, who was standing in close proximity just beforedefendant fired a gun in the victim’s direction, shooting himsix times. The majority acknowledges that these admissions weresufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravatedmanslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). However, the majoritybelieves that defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, andvoluntarily waive the affirmative defense of self-defense.Because, in my view, defendant’s express waivers were adequateto relinquish his self-defense claim, I respectfully dissent.11 Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). After he obtained private counsel, defendant moved to withdraw his PCR application and pursued leave to file an untimely direct appeal, which the Appellate Division granted. 1 I. At the plea hearing, defendant stated that he had a verbaldisagreement with the victim, and that, as defendant was“walking off,” he looked back and saw the victim and his cousin“pulling out their firearms.” Because this statement suggesteddefendant was making a claim of self-defense, the plea judgedirected further inquiry to determine whether defendant’s pleawas factually supported and whether he actually intended toassert or waive self-defense. I agree with the majority that defendants are permitted towaive self-defense pursuant to a plea. See ante at ___ (slipop. at 25. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, as thisCourt recognized in State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 163 (1991), aself-defense claim may severely limit trial strategy because aself-defense theory carries with it the tacit admission that thedefendant was indeed at the scene of the crime. Second, ourCourt has already established that a defendant may waive anaffirmative defense so long as that waiver is “knowing,voluntary, and intelligent.” See State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334,362 (2013) (dealing specifically with insanity defense). Thesetwo principles, taken together, suggest that a criminaldefendant should be permitted to waive self-defense where waiveroffers a strategic benefit to the defendant -- includingentering into a plea agreement -- provided the waiver is 2 knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. As stated by the majority,“[s]o long as the defendant does not factually contend that heacted in self-defense a defendant may waive a claim of self-defense.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 25). Here, defendant did not factually contend that he acted inself-defense. Furthermore, after defendant intimated that hisactions were justified, defense counsel stated that, because“there was no handgun found on the victim at the time the policeresponded,” it was his “professional opinion that [self-defense]would not have been a particularly viable defense.” Defendantagreed with his counsel’s assessment. Additionally, the prosecutor stated that an “eyewitnessaccount” indicated that the victim was unarmed at the time ofthe shooting. Defendant not only agreed with that statement,but also acquiesced to the prosecutor’s request to amend theplea agreement to include a waiver of self-defense, whichdefendant later signed. Defendant also assented when, near the end of the pleacolloquy, the judge asked if defendant “reached this decisionwith your family’s and [defense counsel’s] assistance.”Moreover, the court specifically asked defendant if heunderstood that, “by pleading guilty today, you’ve waived anypotential utilization of self-defense,” to which defendantanswered “Yes.” 3 Any uncertainty about defendant’s admission of guilt wasresolved by the trial court’s questioning and the admissions ofdefendant who unequivocally and emphatically adopted thestatements of his counsel. See Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 348,362 (finding defendant was entitled to waive affirmative defenseafter he informed court of that desire); see also State v.Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 420 (2015) (holding plea courts areentitled to consider direct admissions and statements adopted bydefendant). II. Nevertheless, the majority, relying on Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 362, concluded that “the plea judge did not ensure thatdefendant truly understood the law of self-defense, includingthe requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in thenecessity of using force, or that the State had the burden todisprove self-defense once asserted.” Ante at ___ (slip op at26) (citations omitted). In Handy, this Court was confronted with the issue ofwhether a defendant was competent to waive an insanity defenseand proceed on a claim of self-defense. Id. at 337-39. Defensecounsel in that case disregarded the defendant’s repeatedattempts to assert self-defense, instead relying on “the strongpossibility that [the defendant] might be found not guilty byreason of insanity.” Id. at 357. In a bifurcated proceeding, 4 the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, andthus was deprived of an opportunity to present his self-defenseclaim. Id. at 338. This Court, addressing the tension betweenthe trial court’s finding that defendant was not competent towaive the insanity defense and defendant’s preference to assertonly the substantive claim of self-defense, determined that “thesolution is to apply a procedure akin to that which we utilizein evaluating a competent defendant’s effort to waive othersignificant rights.” Id. at 362. In that context, this Court held that “a thorough andsearching inquiry” should be conducted before determiningwhether “the decision to waive the insanity defense,particularly in the context of a unified trial proceeding, isindeed knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” Ibid. By contrast,competency, which understandably requires a more thorough andsearching analysis, was not at issue here. Rather, the pleacourt was faced only with a vague assertion of facts whichultimately demonstrated that self-defense was not a viableclaim. The second case cited by the majority is State v. Munroe,210 N.J. 429 (2012). In that case, the defendant pled guilty,then later sought to withdraw his guilty plea by asserting thathe had acted in self-defense. Id. at 434. Analyzing thedefendant’s claim under the framework established in State v. 5 Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009), this Court determined thatthe defendant presented a colorable claim of innocence. Munroe,supra, 210 N.J. at 434, 445.2 Importantly, we found “[n]othingin the [the defendant’s] plea colloquy [that] contradicted [his]later assertion that he was acting in self-defense.” Ibid.That is not the case here, where defendant agreed with hiscounsel’s assertion that because no gun was found on the victimand the State had an eyewitness who stated that the victim wasunarmed at the time of the shooting, self-defense was a non-viable claim. Defendant also expressly disclaimed self-defenseboth in the plea colloquy and on the amended plea form. III. The majority also fails to account for considerations firstacknowledged by this Court in State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408,415 (1990), namely, a defendant’s reasonable impulse to avoiddirectly admitting criminal conduct. In Smullen, this Courtaccepted that criminal defendants are often reluctant torecognize “the distasteful reality that makes the chargedconduct criminal” during their plea hearing. Ibid. Thus,2 Noting the majority’s consideration of Munroe, I question why the majority vacates defendant’s guilty plea rather than remand this matter to the trial court for an analysis of “(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused.” Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 150. 6 defendants providing a factual basis often exhibit a “naturalreluctance to elaborate on the details.” State ex rel. T.M.,166 N.J. 319, 334 (2001). This “natural reluctance” on the part of defendants hasinformed our approach to plea colloquies. For example, pleacourts are permitted to elicit from defendants through leadingquestions admissions “necessary to ensure an adequate factualbasis for the guilty plea.” State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218,231 (2013). Furthermore, plea courts may draw rationalinferences from the defendant’s admissions. Id. at 236-37. IV. This record reveals that defendant agreed that no gun wasfound on the victim at the scene, an eyewitness to the crimestated the victim was unarmed, his claim of self-defense was“not viable,” and he was waiving any claim of self-defense bypleading guilty. Based on those facts, I conclude thatdefendant’s fleeting suggestion that he acted in self-defensewas a product of his natural reluctance to admit to criminallyculpable conduct, not a legitimate assertion of a self-defenseclaim. T.M., supra, 166 N.J. at 334; Smullen, supra, 118 N.J.at 415. Thus, in my view, defendant knowingly, intelligently,and voluntarily waived his right to raise a self-defense claimand proffered a sufficient factual basis to support his guiltyplea. 7 Therefore I would affirm the Appellate Division’s judgmentwithout prejudice to defendant’s right to refile a PCR petition. 8 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEYNO. A-49 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior CourtSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.EDWIN URBINA, Defendant-Appellant.DECIDED June 16, 2015 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Fernandez-Vina CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Solomon REVERSE/ CHECKLIST VACATE/ DISSENT REMAND CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X JUSTICE ALBIN X JUSTICE PATTERSON X JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X JUSTICE SOLOMON X JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X TOTALS 4 3