Title: People v. Tacardon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S264219
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LEON WILLIAM TACARDON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S264219 
 
Third Appellate District 
C087681 
 
San Joaquin County Superior Court 
STK-CR-FER-2018-0003729 
 
 
December 29, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Kruger, Jenkins, 
and Guerrero concurred.   
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. 
 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
S264219 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
A sheriff’s deputy patrolling after dark saw three people 
sitting in a legally parked car in a residential neighborhood, 
smoking something.  He pulled up behind the car, illuminated it 
with a spotlight, and approached on foot.  We granted review to 
examine the significance of the deputy’s use of a spotlight in this 
circumstance.  We conclude that shining a spotlight for 
illumination does not ipso facto constitute a detention under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Rather, the proper inquiry requires 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the 
use of a spotlight. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Sheriff’s Deputy Joel Grubb testified to the following facts 
at the preliminary hearing, where defendant Leon William 
Tacardon first moved to suppress evidence. 
On a March evening, around 8:45 p.m., in a residential 
Stockton neighborhood, Grubb was on patrol in a marked car.  
The area was known for narcotics sales and weapons possession.  
While patrolling, Grubb had both his headlights and high beams 
on for “extra visibility.”  He drove past a BMW legally parked in 
front of a residence, in the vicinity of a streetlight.  The car’s 
engine and headlights were off; smoke emanated from slightly 
open windows.  He saw three people inside and made eye contact 
with the occupants as he drove past them.  Grubb made a U-
turn, parked about 15 to 20 feet behind the BMW, and turned 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
on his spotlight.  He did not activate his siren or emergency 
lights or issue any commands to the car’s occupants.  He sat in 
his patrol car for 15 to 20 seconds while he informed dispatch of 
his location.  He then approached the BMW at a walking pace.  
He did not draw a weapon.   
As the deputy approached, a woman sitting in the 
backseat “jumped out” of the BMW, closing the door behind her.  
The deputy testified that “[i]t was very quick and kind of abrupt 
the way that she opened the door and quickly stepped out.  I felt 
it was unusual.”  She walked towards the back of the BMW, and 
Grubb asked her what she was doing.  She responded, “I live 
here.”  Concerned for his safety, the deputy directed the woman 
to stand near the sidewalk behind the BMW where he could see 
her.  He spoke in a calm and moderate voice and did not draw a 
weapon.  The woman complied.   
Grubb continued to walk toward the car.  As he came 
within a few feet of the BMW, he smelled marijuana smoke 
coming from inside.  The car’s rear windows were tinted.  Even 
with the spotlight on, Grubb had to use a flashlight to illuminate 
the car’s interior.  He could see one large and two smaller clear 
plastic bags on the rear passenger floorboard.  They contained a 
green leafy substance.   
Tacardon sat in the driver’s seat.  Upon request, both he 
and the front seat passenger identified themselves.  Only the 
passenger produced identification.  After Grubb saw a partially 
burned, hand-rolled cigarette in the center console, he asked 
Tacardon about that item and the leafy substance in the bags.  
Asked whether he was on probation or parole, Tacardon said he 
was on probation.  The discussion lasted two to three minutes.     
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
Telling Tacardon to remain seated, Grubb returned to his 
patrol car.  A records search confirmed that Tacardon was on 
probation with a search condition.  After additional officers 
arrived, the deputy placed Tacardon in the back of the patrol car 
and searched the BMW.  He seized the three plastic bags in the 
backseat and a vial containing 76 pills.  A search incident to 
arrest revealed that Tacardon carried $1,904 in cash.  
Laboratory analysis confirmed that the bags contained 696 
grams of marijuana, and the pills were hydrocodone.  The 
amount of drugs, their presence in a car, and the accompanying 
cash were factors consistent with possession for sale.   
Tacardon was charged with possession for sale of 
hydrocodone and marijuana.  (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 
11359, subd. (b).)  At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
denied Tacardon’s motion to suppress the evidence (Pen. Code, 
§ 1538.5) and held him to answer.  The magistrate reasoned:  “it 
was a police contact . . . . [I]n other words, he didn’t stop the 
defendant.  There certainly was a point at which the defendant 
wasn’t free to go but that still would not preclude it being 
characterized as a contact.”  The deputy’s observation of a large 
quantity of what appeared to be marijuana in plain view in the 
back of the car justified further investigation.   
Tacardon renewed his motion to suppress in conjunction 
with a motion to dismiss the information.  (Pen. Code, §§ 995, 
subd. (a)(2)(B), 1538.5, subds. (i), (m); People v. Lilienthal (1978) 
22 Cal.3d 891, 896–897; People v. McDonald (2006) 137 
Cal.App.4th 521, 528–529.)  Based on the preliminary hearing 
record, the superior court granted the motion and dismissed the 
charges.  The court held that Deputy Grubb engaged in a 
consensual encounter when he initially pulled behind 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
Tacardon’s car and turned on his spotlight.  But his detention of 
the female passenger effectuated a detention of Tacardon.    
The Court of Appeal reversed.  It agreed with the superior 
court that Grubb’s position behind Tacardon’s car, spotlight 
illumination, and approach on foot did not “manifest a sufficient 
show of police authority to constitute a detention.”  (People v. 
Tacardon (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 89, 99 (Tacardon).)  The court 
noted that the deputy did not block defendant’s car, use his 
emergency lights, or immediately and aggressively question 
Tacardon.  (Id. at pp. 98–99.)  It concluded:  “Simply put, 
although a person whose vehicle is illuminated by police 
spotlights at night may well feel he or she is ‘the object of official 
scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a 
detention.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 99–100, quoting People v. Perez (1989) 
211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496 (Perez).)  However, it rejected the 
superior court’s conclusion that Grubb’s interaction with the 
female passenger transformed the encounter with Tacardon into 
a detention.  It reasoned that there was “no evidence [Tacardon] 
observed the deputy’s interaction with [the passenger], or that 
the deputy conveyed to defendant that he, like [his passenger], 
was required to remain.”  (Tacardon, at p. 100.)   
In analyzing the deputy’s initial approach, the Court of 
Appeal expressly disagreed with People v. Kidd (2019) 36 
Cal.App.5th 12 (Kidd), which found an unlawful detention on 
similar facts.  In Kidd, a patrolling officer saw two men parked 
on a residential street with the car’s fog lights on at 1:30 in the 
morning.  (Id. at p. 15.)  He drove past the car, made a U-turn, 
and parked 10 feet behind the vehicle.  The officer shined two 
spotlights on the parked car and approached on foot.  (Id. at p. 
16.)  The appellate court found that Kidd, who was in the 
driver’s seat, was detained when the officer pulled up behind the 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
parked car and turned on the patrol car’s spotlights.  (Id. at pp. 
21–22.)  The court observed:  “motorists are trained to yield 
immediately when a law enforcement vehicle pulls in behind 
them and turns on its lights.  Regardless of the color of the lights 
the officer turned on, a reasonable person in Kidd’s 
circumstances ‘would expect that if he drove off, the officer 
would respond by following with red light on and siren 
sounding . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 21, quoting People v. Bailey (1985) 176 
Cal.App.3d 402, 406 (Bailey).)  The court further observed that 
“any ambiguity was removed when the officer more or less 
immediately exited his patrol vehicle and began to approach 
Kidd’s car.  Although the officer’s approach was, according to 
record, not made in a particularly aggressive or intimidating 
manner, a reasonable person in Kidd’s circumstances would not 
have felt free to leave.”  (Kidd, at pp. 21–22.) 
We granted review to resolve this conflict in the Courts of 
Appeal.       
II.  DISCUSSION 
The outcome here turns on the distinction between a 
consensual encounter and a detention.  Deputy Grubb did not 
stop the car.  It was already parked on the street when he saw 
it.  Officers can approach people on the street and engage them 
in consensual conversation.  (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
968, 974 (Brown).)  So merely walking up to someone in a parked 
car is not a detention.  The issue presented is whether there are 
additional circumstances, the totality of which transformed the 
encounter into a detention.    
“An officer may approach a person in a public place and 
ask if the person is willing to answer questions.  If the person 
voluntarily answers, those responses, and the officer’s 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
observations, are admissible in a criminal prosecution.  
[Citations.] 
 
Such 
consensual 
encounters 
present 
no 
constitutional concerns and do not require justification.  
[Citation.]  However, ‘when the officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the 
liberty of a citizen,’ the officer effects a seizure of that person, 
which must be justified under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  [Citations.]  In situations involving 
a show of authority, a person is seized ‘if “in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave,” ’ or 
‘ “otherwise terminate the encounter” ’ [citation], and if the 
person actually submits to the show of authority.”  (Brown, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 974.) 
We consider the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether a detention occurred.  (Florida v. Bostick 
(1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437 (Bostick); Michigan v. Chesternut 
(1988) 486 U.S. 567, 572 (Chesternut); Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 
at p. 980.)  Relevant circumstances may include:  the presence 
of multiple officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, the use of 
siren or overhead emergency lights, physically touching the 
person, the use of a patrol car to block movement, or the use of 
language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with 
the officer’s request is compelled.  (Chesternut, at p. 575; In re 
Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)  The facts are reviewed 
objectively.  As People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935 
(Franklin) explained, “The officer’s state of mind is not relevant 
. . . except insofar as his overt actions would communicate that 
state of mind.”  (Id. at p. 940.)  Likewise, “the individual citizen’s 
subjective belief [is] irrelevant . . . .”  (Manuel G., at p. 821.)     
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
Where, as here, a suppression motion is made before a 
magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing and no 
new evidence is presented in superior court, we are “concerned 
solely with the findings of the [magistrate].”  (People v. Gentry 
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1262.)  We defer to the magistrate’s 
express and implied findings of fact if supported by substantial 
evidence.  (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; 
People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941–942; People v. 
Hua (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033; Gentry, at p. 1262.)  We 
independently assess whether the challenged search or seizure 
violates the Fourth Amendment, applying federal constitutional 
standards.  (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 975; People v. Lenart 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1118; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. 
(f)(2).) 
It is clear that Tacardon was detained at some point.  The 
question is when.  The timing is critical to the outcome.  The 
parties agree that Deputy Grubb had no reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity before he smelled marijuana smoke and saw 
what appeared to be bags of marijuana in the backseat.  So if 
Tacardon was detained before that point, the action was 
unjustified and evidence subsequently discovered during the 
deputy’s search was subject to suppression.  (Terry v. Ohio 
(1968) 392 U.S. 1, 12, 15, 21–22.)     
A.  Pulling Behind, Activating Spotlight, and 
Approaching the Parked Car 
In Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 968, the circumstances were 
these.  At 10:37 p.m., a 911 caller reported that more than four 
people were fighting in an alley behind his house, and someone 
said they had a loaded gun.  The dispatcher sent out this 
information and Deputy Geasland responded, using lights and 
siren.  (Id. at pp. 972–973.)  As he drove down the alley, 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
Geasland saw a car driving toward him and away from the 
reported location.  Geasland yelled to the driver, “ ‘Hey.  Did you 
see a fight?’ ”  (Id. at p. 973.)  Brown drove on without 
responding.  Seeing no one else in the alley, Geasland drove 
after Brown.  When he saw Brown’s car parked nearby, he 
stopped behind it and activated the patrol car’s colored 
emergency lights.  He approached and spoke to Brown, whom he 
arrested for driving under the influence.  (Ibid.)  We concluded 
that Brown was detained when the deputy stopped behind his 
parked car and turned on the patrol car’s overhead emergency 
lights.  Observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has long 
recognized that activating sirens or flashing lights can amount 
to a show of authority” (id. at p. 978), we concluded that, under 
the circumstances presented, “a reasonable person in Brown’s 
position would have perceived Geasland’s actions as a show of 
authority, directed at him and requiring that he submit by 
remaining where he was.  As a sister-state court has observed:  
‘We see little difference, from the perspective of the occupants in 
the vehicle, [between] turning on the blue lights behind a 
moving vehicle and turning on the blue lights behind a parked 
vehicle.  The lights still convey the message that the occupants 
are not free to leave.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting State v. Gonzalez 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 2000) 52 S.W.3d 90, 97.)  
Brown did not, however, adopt a bright line rule that “an 
officer’s use of emergency lights in close proximity to a parked 
car will always constitute a detention of the occupants.”  (Brown, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 980.)  Instead, we emphasized such an 
inquiry “ ‘must take into account “ ‘all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident’ ” in each individual case.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We 
gave the following example:  “a motorist whose car had broken 
down on the highway might reasonably perceive an officer’s use 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
of emergency lights as signaling that the officer has stopped to 
render aid or to warn oncoming traffic of a hazard, rather than 
to investigate crime.  Ambiguous circumstances may be clarified 
by whether other cars are nearby or by the officer’s conduct 
when approaching.”  (Ibid.)  We observed, on the facts before us, 
that “no circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable 
person that Deputy Geasland was doing anything other than 
effecting a detention.  Under the totality of these circumstances, 
Brown was detained when Geasland stopped behind the parked 
car and turned on his emergency lights.”  (Ibid.) 
This case involves the use of a spotlight, rather than red 
and blue emergency lights.  Accordingly, we consider how the 
use of a spotlight affects the analysis of whether a detention took 
place.   
 Several Courts of Appeal have found the distinction 
between a spotlight and red and blue emergency lights 
significant.  In Perez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, an officer 
pulled up facing the defendant’s parked car, leaving room for the 
defendant to drive away, and activated the patrol car’s high 
beams and spotlights.  The officer walked up to the car, knocked 
on the window, identified himself, shined a flashlight into the 
car, and asked the defendant to roll the window down.  The 
officer immediately smelled marijuana.  (Id. at pp. 1494–1495.)  
The Court of Appeal found no detention, noting that the officer 
had not blocked the defendant’s car or activated the patrol car’s 
emergency lights.  It further reasoned that, “[w]hile the use of 
high beams and spotlights might cause a reasonable person to 
feel himself the object of official scrutiny, such directed scrutiny 
does not amount to a detention.”  (Id. at p. 1496.)   
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
In People v. Rico (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 124, an officer 
investigating a recent shooting saw a car driving on the freeway 
that matched the description of a suspect vehicle.  The officer 
pulled alongside the car and shined a spotlight on it.  He then 
dropped back and followed the car for approximately five 
minutes without activating his emergency lights.  The driver 
eventually pulled over on his own, and the officer stopped 
several car lengths behind, again turned on his spotlight, and 
engaged the car’s occupants.  He ultimately recovered a rifle, the 
butt of which he saw sticking out from under the driver’s seat.  
(Id. at pp. 128–129.)  The appellate court concluded that the 
officer’s initial “momentary use of the spotlight” to observe the 
suspect vehicle’s occupants as he was driving next to them was 
not a detention “in the absence of flashing lights, sirens or a 
directive over the loudspeaker.”  (Id. at p. 130.)  Indeed, the 
officer “immediately pulled back without any show of authority.”  
(Ibid.)   
In Franklin, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 935, an officer saw the 
defendant walking in a high crime area wearing a full-length 
camouflage jacket on a warm summer evening.  Finding this 
odd, the officer shined a spotlight on the defendant and parked 
the patrol car directly behind him.  The defendant approached 
the officer and asked, “ ‘What’s going on?’ ”  (Id. at p. 938.)  He 
was sweaty and “ ‘jittery.’ ”  (Ibid.)  When the officer asked the 
defendant to remove his hands from his pockets, he saw what 
appeared to be blood on the defendant’s hands and a vial in his 
pocket containing white powder.  The defendant fled and was 
detained.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal concluded that shining a 
spotlight on the defendant and parking behind him was not a 
detention:  “the officer did not block [the defendant’s] way; he 
directed no verbal requests or commands to [the defendant].  
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
Further, the officer did not alight immediately from his car and 
pursue [the defendant].  Coupling the spotlight with the officer’s 
parking the patrol car, [the defendant] rightly might feel himself 
the object of official scrutiny.  However, such directed scrutiny 
does not amount to a detention.”  (Id. at p. 940.) 
A survey of federal and sister-state authorities yields 
similar results.  (U.S. v. Campbell-Martin (8th Cir. 2021) 17 
F.4th 807, 811–812, 814 [no detention where officer parked two 
spots away from the defendant’s car, shined a spotlight on it, 
and approached on foot]; U.S. v. Tafuna (10th Cir. 2021) 5 F.4th 
1197, 1199, 1201–1202 [no detention where officer parked with 
his patrol car at an angle to the defendant’s driver’s side door, 
activated a bar of “takedown” lights, and approached the 
defendant’s car]; see also id. at p. 1201 [citing cases from the 1st, 
7th, 8th, and 9th Cir.]; U.S. v. Tanguay (1st Cir. 2019) 918 F.3d 
1, 2–3, 7–8 (Tanguay) [no detention where officer parked about 
10 feet behind the defendant’s car, activated his floodlights, and 
approached on foot]; People v. Cascio (Colo. 1997) 932 P.2d 1381, 
1382–1383, 1386–1388 (Cascio) [no detention where two 
deputies parked about 10 feet behind defendant’s van, trained a 
spotlight on it, and approached on foot].)  Applying the totality 
of the circumstances test to the record before them, these courts 
held there had been no detention despite the use of a spotlight.  
(But see U.S. v. Delaney (D.C. Cir. 2020) 955 F.3d 1077, 1079–
1080, 1082–1083 [detention occurred where officers parked 
within a few feet of the nose of the defendant’s car in a narrow 
parking lot, significantly restricting the defendant’s movement, 
and activated their “take-down light”].) 
As noted, Kidd, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 12 came to a 
contrary conclusion based on facts similar to those presented 
here.  In that case a patrolling officer saw two men parked on a 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
residential street with the car’s fog lights on at 1:30 in the 
morning.  The officer decided to check and see if the occupants 
were stranded, “ ‘or what exactly they[ were] doing.’ ”  (Id. at p. 
15.)  He drove past the car, made a U-turn and parked 10 feet 
behind the vehicle, shining two spotlights on it.  As he 
approached the car, he smelled marijuana smoke and asked the 
men what they were doing.  Kidd was in the driver’s seat.  The 
passenger was seen attempting to hide bags of suspected 
marijuana.  The officer asked if either man was on probation or 
parole.  When Kidd admitted he was on probation, the officer 
told both men to leave the car and sit in the patrol vehicle.  A 
subsequent probation search revealed packaged marijuana, a 
digital scale, a pistol with a serial number removed, and 142 
alprazolam pills.  (Id. at pp. 15−16.) 
The Kidd court held the defendant was detained without 
reasonable suspicion “as soon as the officer pulled in behind him 
and turned his spotlights on him.”  (Kidd, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 22.)  Kidd began by acknowledging the authority of Rico 
and Franklin that, without more, the mere act of parking behind 
someone “would not reasonably be construed as a detention,” nor 
would shining a spotlight on a person.  (Id. at p. 21.)  It also 
acknowledged that the officer did not block the car, activate 
emergency lights, or approach in an aggressive or intimidating 
manner.  (Id. at pp. 21–22.)  The court nonetheless concluded 
that the defendant was detained under the totality of the 
circumstances.  (Id. at p. 21.)  Quoting People v. Garry (2007) 
156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1111−1112 (Garry) (see discussion, post, 
at pp. 21–22), it concluded the “officer’s ‘show of authority’ was 
so intimidating as to communicate to any reasonable person 
that he or she was ‘ “ ‘not free to decline [his] requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” ’ ”  (Kidd, at p. 21.)  As for 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
the significance of the spotlights, the court reasoned:  “motorists 
are trained to yield immediately when a law enforcement vehicle 
pulls in behind them and turns on its lights.  Regardless of the 
color of the lights the officer turned on, a reasonable person in 
[the defendant’s] circumstances ‘would expect that if he drove 
off, the officer would respond by following with red light on and 
siren sounding.’ ”  (Kidd, at p. 21, quoting Bailey, supra, 176 
Cal.App.3d at p. 406.)   
The Kidd court’s discussion of the spotlight differs from 
the other appellate court decisions.  By concluding that a 
reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer 
pulls in behind the person’s parked car and turns on the patrol 
car’s lights, “[r]egardless of the color of the lights the officer 
turned on” (Kidd, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 21), the court 
described the use of a spotlight in this circumstance as 
essentially indistinguishable from the activation of red and blue 
emergency lights.  We disagree.  As other courts have held, the 
use of a spotlight generally conveys a different meaning to a 
reasonable person than the use of a patrol car’s emergency 
lights.  Red and blue lights are almost exclusively reserved for 
emergency and police vehicles.  (See Veh. Code, §§ 21055, subd. 
(b), 25258, subd. (b)(1), 25269.)  An officer’s use of flashing red 
lights, or combination of red and blue lights, behind a vehicle 
typically conveys a command to stop.  (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 
at p. 978; but see id. at p. 980.)  Indeed, a motorist may not be 
convicted of evading police unless a red light is displayed.  (Veh. 
Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)(1); People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
1002, 1008.)   
By contrast, a reasonable person would understand that 
spotlights can have a practical function that differs from the 
essentially communicative function of emergency lights.  A 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
spotlight can be used to illuminate the surrounding area for 
safety or other purposes unrelated to the projection of authority.  
Proper illumination enhances the officer’s ability to make 
“ ‘swift, on-the-spot decisions’ ” that are appropriate to the 
circumstances.  (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 984, quoting 
United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 11.)1  And, in certain 
circumstances, depending on how the spotlight is used, it might 
help both the officer and the civilian see what the other is doing 
and make decisions accordingly.  Thus, unlike Kidd, we believe 
a reasonable person would distinguish between a spotlight and 
 
1  
The dissent asserts that the police do not have the same 
latitude to conduct an investigation at night as they do during 
the day.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 10–11.)  The authorities 
cited are inapposite.  Penal Code sections 840 and 1533 limit the 
ability to arrest or execute a search warrant at night out of 
concern for the sanctity of the home.  The cited sections do not 
impose general restrictions on an officer’s authority or 
responsibility to investigate crimes at night.  Further, they do 
not at all restrict police investigations in public places.  Instead, 
Penal Code section 840 prohibits an arrest for the commission of 
a misdemeanor or infraction between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 
and specifically excepts arrests “made in a public place.”  (Id., 
subd. (2).)  Penal Code section 1533 requires that a search 
warrant be served only between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. absent 
a finding of good cause.  (See also People v. Watson (1977) 75 
Cal.App.3d 592, 595–596 [Pen. Code, § 1533 is concerned with 
the drastic intrusion upon a person’s residence by execution of a 
search warrant].)   
The nonbinding authority of U.S. v. Wilson (4th Cir. 2000) 
205 F.3d 720, 723–724 and U.S. v. McLemore (8th Cir. 2018) 887 
F.3d 861, 866–867 hold that an officer’s inability to see does not 
justify a suspicionless detention.  They do not address whether 
an officer can investigate darkened areas or whether the use of 
illumination effects a detention. 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
red and blue emergency lights in considering whether the 
person was free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter. 
As in Brown, however, we decline to state a bright-line 
rule.  A court must consider the use of a spotlight together with 
all of the other circumstances.  It is certainly possible that the 
facts of a particular case may show a spotlight was used in an 
authoritative manner.  These may include flashing lights at the 
driver to pull the car over or attempting to blind the driver, 
which would be relevant considerations under the totality of the 
circumstances.  (See, e.g., Cascio, supra, 932 P.2d at p. 1388.) 
But use of a spotlight, standing alone, does not necessarily effect 
a detention.       
Considering the circumstances here, Tacardon was not 
detained when Deputy Grubb parked behind the BMW, shined 
a spotlight on it, and began to approach on foot.  Grubb made 
eye contact with Tacardon as he drove by.  He then made a U-
turn, parked 15 to 20 feet behind Tacardon’s car, and employed 
the spotlight.  After taking about 20 seconds to inform the 
dispatcher, he began walking towards the car.  The deputy’s 
conduct up to this point conveyed none of the coercive hallmarks 
of a detention.  He did not stop Tacardon’s vehicle or block him 
from driving away.  He did not activate a siren or emergency 
lights or give directions by loudspeaker.  He did not approach 
rapidly or aggressively on foot or draw a weapon.  He gave no 
commands and made no demands; in fact, he did not seem to 
communicate at all with Tacardon or his passengers until the 
woman got out of the car and began to walk away.  As we explain 
below (see discussion, post, at p. 26), it was only after she was 
given, and complied with, Grubb’s directive to remain that she 
was detained. 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Until that point, the deputy’s conduct was consistent with 
that in United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194 (Drayton).  
There, the high court found no detention where there was “no 
application 
of 
force, 
no 
intimidating 
movement, 
no 
overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no 
blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an 
authoritative tone of voice.”  (Id. at p. 204.)  In this context, a 
reasonable person would view the deputy’s use of a spotlight as 
similarly lacking in coercive force.  The deputy used the 
spotlight as a matter of course.  There was no evidence it was 
unusually bright or flashing, or that Tacardon was blinded or 
overwhelmed by the light.  Certainly, a reasonable person would 
notice the deputy’s use of a spotlight, and depending on how it 
is used, a spotlight may contribute to the coerciveness of a police 
encounter.  But under the totality of the circumstances here, 
Tacardon was not detained.   
The dissent argues that this conclusion “strains credulity.”  
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 4.)  Citing a magazine article and 
a manual by a patrol officer, the dissent asserts that it is a 
matter of common experience for both officers and civilians alike 
that a spotlight has a disorienting effect on a car’s occupants.  
(Id. at p. 6.)  It also relies on cases which noted some evidence of 
that effect.  (Id. at p. 7.)  But no such evidence was elicited here.  
The deputy was not asked whether he had been trained to use 
his spotlight in that fashion, or whether its use in this 
circumstance was disorienting.  Tacardon did not testify that he 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
was blinded by the spotlight.  For this reason, the nonbinding 
cases cited by the dissent are distinguishable.2   
 
2  
In U.S. v. Delaney, supra, 955 F.3d 1077, the officers 
parked their patrol car approximately “ ‘[three] feet away from 
the nose of the [defendant’s] Jeep’ ” and trained their patrol car’s 
“take-down light” on it.  (Id. at pp. 1082, 1083.)  The court noted 
that “[s]uch aptly named lights ‘are designed to illuminate the 
stopped car as well as to provide protection for an officer by 
blinding and disorienting the car’s occupants if they look back 
at the squad car.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1083, quoting U.S. v. Shelby (7th 
Cir. 2000, Oct. 26, 2000, No. 00-1873) 2000 WL 1611120, p. *1, 
fn. 1 [unpublished table decision].)  Notably, the unpublished 
case Delaney quoted for the description of the “take-down light” 
provides no source material for this factual assertion; nor did it 
involve a Fourth Amendment challenge to the defendant’s 
detention in that case.  (See Shelby, supra, 2000 WL 1611120, 
at pp. *1, fn. 1, *2.)   
 
In U.S. v. Sigmond-Ballesteros (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3d 
1117, the officer in that case, having “pulled alongside 
Defendant’s truck” as it traveled in the slow lane of a highway, 
“shined his alley light almost directly into Defendant’s face” 
while the defendant was still driving.  (Id. at pp. 1120, 1124.)  
The defendant put his hand up to shield his eyes from the light.  
(Id. at p. 1120.)  The officer described the defendant’s act of 
covering his face as “ ‘suspicious behavior,’ ” but the court 
disagreed and concluded that this gesture did not supply 
reasonable suspicion to detain.  (Id. at p. 1124.)  It did not 
consider whether use of such illumination effected a detention.  
(Ibid.) 
 
In State v. Garcia-Cantu (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) 253 S.W.3d 
236, the officer trained a spotlight on the defendant’s truck 
“even before he stopped his [patrol] car” (id. at p. 245), blocked 
the defendant’s truck (id. at p. 246), approached the car in an 
authoritative manner (id. at p. 248), asked, “ ‘What are you 
doing here?’ ” (ibid.), shined a flashlight into the defendant’s 
eyes, and requested identification (ibid.).  The defendant 
testified at the suppression hearing that when the officer pulled 
 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
Citing a treatise, the dissent reasons that “[s]ingling out a 
parked car and training a powerful spotlight on it from behind, 
as [Deputy] Grubb did here, is ‘conduct significantly beyond’ any 
sort of ‘nonoffensive contact . . . between two ordinary citizens.’ ”  
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 9, quoting 4 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure (6th ed. 2002) § 9.4(a), pp. 597, 598, fns. omitted.)  But 
LaFave, and the extra-jurisdictional cases cited, do not support 
the conclusion that the circumstances of this case qualified as 
such a “significant[]” departure from ordinary expectations as to 
effect a detention.  (Id. at p. 597.)  Addressing specifically the 
subject of police contact with persons seated in parked vehicles, 
LaFave acknowledges that no seizure occurs when an officer 
“merely walks up [and poses a question] to a person . . . who is 
seated in a vehicle located in a public place.”  (Id. at pp. 591–
592, fn. omitted; see also id. at p. 610.)  Significantly, its list of 
supporting citations includes Tanguay, supra, 918 F.3d 1, which 
held that the officers’ act of parking behind a car, activating 
floodlights, and approaching on foot did not constitute a 
detention (LaFave, at p. 598, fn. 81, citing Tanguay, at p. 7), and 
U.S. v. Mabery (8th Cir. 2012) 686 F.3d 591, which held that the 
officer’s act of shining a spotlight on Mabery’s vehicle from the 
street did not constitute a seizure.  (LaFave, at p. 592, fn. 62; see 
Mabery, at pp. 595–597.)  None of the circumstances LaFave 
cites as likely to elevate the encounter to a seizure are present 
in this case:  an order to “ ‘freeze’ ” or get out of the car, “boxing 
the car in, approaching it on all sides by many officers, pointing 
a gun at the suspect and ordering him to place his hands on the 
 
up behind him, he “couldn’t see anything more except a big 
spotlight, ‘a big white light.’ ”  (Id. at p. 240.)  The court found a 
detention based on the totality of the circumstances.  (Id. at p. 
249.)   
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
steering wheel, or use of flashing lights as a show of authority.”  
(LaFave, at pp. 611, 612–613, italics added, fns. omitted; see 
also id. at pp. 613–614, fn. 130 [citing, among other authorities, 
Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 968 and contrasting cases where only 
use of spotlight was involved].)        
Tacardon reasons that he was clearly the focus of the 
deputy’s “official scrutiny” when the deputy made eye contact, 
turned the patrol car around, parked behind the BMW, 
activated his spotlight, and began walking towards the car.  
According to Tacardon, he “knew he was engaged in an 
encounter with the authorities even before the deputy 
approached the car on foot, and was well aware of the light 
glaring immediately behind his car.”  He cites Kidd’s holding 
that “any ambiguity [as to whether a detention occurred] was 
removed when the officer more or less immediately exited his 
patrol vehicle and began to approach [the defendant’s] car.  
Although the officer’s approach was, according to record, not 
made in a particularly aggressive or intimidating manner, a 
reasonable person in [the defendant’s] circumstances would not 
have felt free to leave.”  (Kidd, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 21–
22.)   
Under Tacardon’s proposed rule, any person who is aware 
of police scrutiny and is then illuminated by a spotlight is 
necessarily detained.  Such a rigid approach fails to properly 
honor the totality of the circumstances test noted in Brown.  A 
person approached by an officer may well consider himself the 
object of official scrutiny.  Indeed he is.  An officer of the law has 
initiated a contact for some reason and is requesting interaction.  
The question is where Fourth Amendment jurisprudence draws 
the line between mere consensual contact, which requires no 
justification, and a detention, which requires articulation of a 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
reasonable suspicion that a crime may be afoot.  But the high 
court has long held an officer’s mere approach does not 
constitute a seizure.  (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 434; 
Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 575–576; INS v. Delgado 
(1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216 (Delgado); Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 
U.S. 491, 497 (plur. opn. of White, J.).)  While a reasonable 
person in Tacardon’s position might “feel himself the object of 
official scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a 
detention.”  (Perez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1496; accord, 
People v. Chamagua (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 925, 927, 929; 
Franklin, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 940.)  A detention occurs, 
not the moment a person knows an officer would like to interact, 
but when a person would reasonably believe he or she “ ‘ “was 
not free to leave” ’ or ‘ “otherwise terminate the encounter,” ’ ” 
and submits to the officer’s show of authority.  (Brown, supra, 
61 Cal.4th at p. 974.) 
Notably, courts ruling a detention occurred have 
emphasized other coercive aspects of the officer’s approach that 
are not present here.  Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
777 is instructive in considering when targeted scrutiny might 
transform a contact into a detention.  There, an undercover 
narcotics officer approached the defendant as he walked off a 
plane in the Los Angeles International Airport.  The officer 
identified himself, displayed his badge, and asked if he “ ‘might 
have a minute of [the defendant’s] time.’ ”  (Id. at p. 781.)  When 
the defendant said, “ ‘Sure,’ ” the officer advised him that he was 
“ ‘conducting a narcotics investigation, and that [he] had 
received information that [the defendant] would be arriving 
today from Florida carrying a lot of drugs.’ ”  (Ibid., italics 
omitted.)  We found that a detention occurred and clarified when 
it took place.  “[I]t is evident that Detective Kaiser did not detain 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
Wilson, for federal constitutional purposes, merely by 
approaching him, identifying himself as a police officer, and 
asking if he might have a minute of his time.  [H]owever, the 
officer did not simply ask Wilson if he would permit a search of 
his luggage.  Instead, he advised Wilson that he was conducting 
a narcotics investigation and that he ‘had received information 
that . . . [Wilson] would be arriving today from Florida carrying 
a lot of drugs.’ ”  (Id. at p. 790, italics omitted.)  At that point 
“the entire complexion of the encounter changed . . . .”  (Id. at p. 
791.)  “Common sense suggests to us that in such a situation, an 
ordinary citizen, confronted by a narcotics agent who has just 
told him that he has information that the citizen is carrying a 
lot of drugs, would not feel at liberty simply to walk away from 
the officer.”  (Id. at p. 790.)          
In Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, an officer on night 
vehicle patrol saw the defendant standing near a parked car.  He 
pulled up about 35 feet away, turned the patrol car’s spotlight 
on the defendant, and walked “ ‘briskly’ ” toward him.  (Id. at p. 
1104.)  When the defendant told the officer, “ ‘ “I live right 
there” ’ ” and pointed to a house, the officer replied, “ ‘Okay, I 
just want to confirm that,’ ” and asked the defendant if he was 
on probation or parole.  (Ibid.)  When the defendant said he was 
on parole, the officer grabbed him and a struggle ensued.  The 
officer handcuffed the defendant and searched him, discovering 
narcotics.  (Ibid.)  The appellate court found a detention, 
emphasizing that the officer had rushed at the defendant, 
disregarded the defendant’s representation that he was merely 
standing outside of his own home, and voiced an intention “ ‘to 
confirm that.’ ”  (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 1111–1112.)  The court 
reasoned:  “any reasonable person who found himself in 
defendant’s circumstances, suddenly illuminated by a police 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
spotlight with a uniformed, armed officer rushing directly at 
him asking about his legal status, would believe themselves to 
be ‘under compulsion of a direct command by the officer.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 1112, quoting People v. McKelvy (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1027, 
1034.)   
In People v. Kasrawi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 751, review 
granted September 1, 2021, S270040, an officer patrolling in a 
residential neighborhood early one morning saw the defendant 
cross the street and begin to enter a car.  The officer turned on 
the patrol car’s spotlight and “pulled up behind and to the side 
of” the defendant’s vehicle.  (Id. at p. 754.)  The defendant turned 
to face the officer, who immediately approached and walked to 
within a few feet of the defendant, asking him where he was 
coming from.  The defendant responded that he was resting 
while on a drive from Los Angeles, which the officer found 
suspicious because the street was several miles from the 
highway.  The officer detained and handcuffed the defendant 
and discovered an outstanding warrant.  A search incident to 
arrest yielded stolen items from nearby cars.  (Id. at pp. 754–
755.)  The appellate court concluded that the defendant was 
detained before he responded to the officer’s inquiry.  (Id. at p. 
756.)  It emphasized that the officer parked within a few feet of 
the defendant’s car; “ ‘bathed’ ” the defendant with light; 
immediately 
approached 
with 
“speed 
and 
surety,” 
as 
memorialized by the officer’s body camera; and asked an 
immediate, pointed question, which demanded an answer.  (Id. 
at pp. 759, 760.)   
The 
facts 
of 
Wilson, 
Garry, 
and 
Kasrawi 
are 
distinguishable from the events here.  Upon initially 
approaching Tacardon’s vehicle, Deputy Grubb did not walk 
rapidly, pose any questions to Tacardon, or accuse him of 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
anything.  The deputy’s nighttime approach, aided by a spotlight 
for illumination, did not, without more, effect a detention.  
People v. Kidd, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 12 is disapproved to the 
extent it is inconsistent with the holding here. 
Citing other dissenting opinions and legal commentators, 
the dissent posits that the “ ‘free to leave’ standard has long been 
criticized for having ‘an air of unreality’ and for lacking ‘common 
. . . understanding’ of how civilians experience encounters with 
the police.”  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 8, quoting Drayton, 
supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 208, 210 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.).)  Our 
dissenting colleague emphasizes that he personally would not 
feel free to simply drive away from the officer in this 
circumstance, and suspects others would not either.  (Dis. opn. 
of Liu, J., post, at p. 2.)  As other courts have noted, however, 
“[t]he ‘free to walk away’ test . . . must be read in conjunction 
with the Court’s frequent admonitions that ‘a seizure does not 
occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual 
and asks a few questions.’  [Citations.]  What emerges between 
the two imperatives, therefore, is the directive that police 
conduct, viewed from the totality of the circumstances, must 
objectively communicate that the officer is exercising his or her 
official authority to restrain the individual’s liberty of 
movement before we can find that a seizure occurred.”  (U.S. v. 
Cardoza (1st Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 6, 16; see also, e.g., Delgado, 
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 216 [“While most citizens will respond to a 
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being 
told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the 
consensual nature of the response”].)  Applying this standard, 
the high court has held, for example, that workers were not 
seized when armed law enforcement agents, displaying badges 
and positioned near the exits, questioned the workers at their 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
job site about their citizenship as part of a “ ‘factory survey[].’ ”  
(Delgado, at p. 212; see id. at pp. 212–213, 215–221.)  It likewise 
determined there was no detention where the defendant, in an 
airport, agreed to speak to law enforcement after knowing he 
had attracted the officer’s attention, and the officer displayed 
his badge and asked to talk.  (Florida v. Rodriguez (1984) 469 
U.S. 1, 4–6 (per curiam).)     
In Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. 194, plain-clothes officers 
boarded a Greyhound bus at a scheduled stop after securing the 
driver’s permission to conduct a routine drug and weapons 
interdiction effort.  Officer Lang displayed his badge and spoke 
to each passenger, positioning himself so that he did not block 
the aisle.  (Id. at pp. 197–198.)  Drayton and his companion 
Brown were seated together.  The officer asked if they were 
traveling with luggage, and the pair pointed to a bag in the 
overhead rack.  (Id. at pp. 198–199.)  Lang asked, “ ‘Do you mind 
if I check [the bag]?’ ” and Brown said, “ ‘Go ahead.’ ”  (Id. at p. 
199.)  The check revealed no contraband.  Brown then consented 
to a pat-down search of his person, which resulted in the 
discovery of contraband.  Brown was arrested.  (Ibid.)  Lang then 
asked Drayton, “ ‘Mind if I check you?’ ”  (Ibid.)  Drayton lifted 
his hands and a pat-down revealed objects similar to drug 
packaging.  Drayton was likewise arrested.  Further 
investigation revealed both men had bundles of cocaine powder 
duct-taped between several pairs of their boxer shorts.  (Ibid.)  
The court held Drayton had not been detained before the pat-
down revealed what appeared to be drug packaging.  (Id. at pp. 
203–206.)  It concluded that “ample” evidence pointed to a 
consensual encounter.  (Id. at p. 204.)   
Here, though Grubb made clear his interest in speaking 
with Tacardon, he did not objectively communicate that he was 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
exercising his official authority to restrain him.  If the high court 
believes the standard should be changed or applied in a different 
way, it may certainly so conclude.  Until then, however, it is the 
standard the court prescribes, and we are bound by the court’s 
application of that standard.   
The dissent also questions whether today’s result creates 
an incentive for citizens to drive away from officer encounters, 
risking escalation and danger for both the officer and the 
civilian.  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 9–12.)  But as the high 
court has recognized in other contexts, individuals frequently 
have alternatives for asserting their Fourth Amendment rights, 
such as refusing to answer the officer’s questions or otherwise 
declining to act in the manner the officer has requested.  
(Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 435–437.)  And while many law-
abiding citizens will choose to cooperate with the police “because 
[they] know that their participation enhances their own safety 
and the safety of those around them,” that fact alone does not 
negate the consensual nature of their response.  (Drayton, 
supra, 536 U.S. at p. 205.)       
B.  Detention of the Passenger 
Tacardon argues that Deputy Grubb’s detention of the 
female passenger who got out of the car effectively 
communicated to Tacardon that he also was not free to leave.  
The Court of Appeal rejected this assertion.  Although the court 
had “no difficulty concluding [the passenger] was detained” 
when Grubb “ordered her to remain on the sidewalk near the 
[car],” it found “no evidence defendant observed the deputy’s 
interaction with [the passenger], or that the deputy conveyed to 
defendant that he, like [the passenger], was required to remain.”  
(Tacardon, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 100.)  It therefore 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
concluded that “the magistrate’s implied finding that defendant 
was not detained at this point is supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (Ibid.)     
It is clear that Grubb detained the female passenger.  As 
the deputy approached Tacardon’s car, the passenger “jumped 
out” of the back seat, closed the door behind her, and walked 
towards the back of the BMW.  When the deputy asked her what 
she was doing, she responded, “I live here.”  He then directed 
her to stand near the sidewalk, and she complied.  At this point, 
the woman was detained.   
The question is what effect, if any, did Grubb’s conduct 
have on Tacardon.  It is well established that an officer’s show 
of authority towards others can communicate that the defendant 
is also not free to leave or terminate the encounter.  In Brendlin 
v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249 (Brendlin), for example, the 
Supreme Court held that a passenger riding in a vehicle is 
detained when an officer pulls a driver over for a traffic 
violation.  The court there emphasized that “an ‘unintended 
person . . . [may be] the object of the detention,’ so long as the 
detention is ‘willful’ and not merely the consequence of ‘an 
unknowing act.’ ”  (Id. at p. 254, quoting Brower v. Inyo County 
(1989) 489 U.S. 593, 596.)  It explained:  when a car containing 
passengers is pulled over, “any reasonable passenger [will 
understand] the police officers to be exercising control to the 
point that no one in the car [is] free to depart without police 
permission.”  (Brendlin, at p. 257.) 
But for this rule to apply, the defendant must be aware of 
the officer’s show of authority directed at another.  In Brendlin, 
for example, the officer used “ ‘flashing lights’ ” to stop the 
vehicle in which Brendlin was riding.  (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
at p. 260.)  Likewise, in Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 968, the 
deputy “pulled behind [the defendant’s] car and activated the 
overhead emergency lights on his patrol car.”  (Id. at p. 973.)  We 
rejected the People’s argument that Brown was not aware of the 
deputy’s presence until the deputy approached the car on foot as 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  “[The deputy] did not 
testify that Brown was unconscious, probing under the seat, or 
otherwise distracted.  The reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the record was that Brown was aware of the deputy’s 
overhead emergency lights flashing in the dark immediately 
behind his car.”  (Id. at p. 980.) 
Here, then, the critical factual question was whether 
Tacardon overheard or otherwise perceived the deputy’s 
interaction with the passenger.  But the record shows the 
magistrate did not consider this question.  At the preliminary 
hearing, the prosecutor argued that the deputy’s directives to 
the passenger were “irrelevant with respect to the defendant.  
Whether or not he stopped her under the Fourth Amendment to 
keep her from going into that house is not something I need to 
argue to the court because she’s not here.”  That argument 
confuses the issue of the passenger’s standing to challenge her 
own detention with the effect her detention may have had on 
Tacardon.  The magistrate appeared to adopt the prosecutor’s 
position, commenting to defense counsel that “[the deputy] said 
to the woman she couldn’t leave.  As said by [the prosecutor], 
that’s not the question.  [T]he question is [whether] the 
defendant [was] told he couldn’t leave.”  This formulation is 
overly narrow.  The question is not whether Tacardon was “told 
he couldn’t leave” but whether the totality of the circumstances 
reasonably conveyed to Tacardon he was compelled to remain.  
The magistrate further observed that “there certainly was a 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
point at which the defendant wasn’t free to go, but that still 
would not preclude it being characterized as a contact.”  The 
observation overlooks the principle that a consensual encounter 
can evolve into a detention, and suggests the magistrate did not 
resolve the critical question of the point at which a detention 
occurred.  The magistrate never made an express factual finding 
as to whether Tacardon was aware of Grubb’s interaction with 
the passenger.  Its endorsement of the prosecutor’s argument 
indicates it did not make an implied finding either. 
Because an individual may be detained as a result of a 
police officer’s directives to another person (Brendlin, supra, 551 
U.S. at p. 260), the magistrate erred by failing to consider 
whether the deputy’s interaction with Tacardon’s passenger, 
together with all the other relevant circumstances, effected a 
detention of Tacardon as well.  Although we independently 
determine whether the defendant was detained as a matter of 
law, we rely on the magistrate’s factual findings.  We normally 
imply in favor of the magistrate’s order every finding that is 
supported by the evidence, but this rule “operates only where it 
can be presumed that the court has performed its function of 
weighing the evidence.  If analysis of the record suggests the 
contrary, the rule should not be invoked.”  (Estate of Larson 
(1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 560, 567.)  Because the record 
affirmatively shows the magistrate did not consider whether 
Tacardon was aware of the deputy’s interaction with his 
passenger, the Court of Appeal was wrong to presume the 
magistrate considered the issue and resolved it against 
Tacardon.  Instead, the record shows the magistrate made no 
finding at all on that question.  (See In re Edgerrin J. (2020) 57 
Cal.App.5th 752, 769.) 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
Under the circumstances here, we cannot resolve this 
factual question in the first instance.  “As the finder of fact in a 
proceeding to suppress evidence [citation], the superior court is 
vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and 
draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is 
constitutionally unreasonable.”  (People v. Woods (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 668, 673.)  We cannot displace the magistrate as the 
trier of fact unless the evidence is susceptible to only one 
reasonable interpretation.  (Cf. Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 
980.)   
Here, unlike Brown, the record supports conflicting 
inferences on the issue of Tacardon’s awareness.  Tacardon did 
not testify at the hearing, so any conclusions to be drawn about 
his awareness of the interaction between Grubb and the female 
passenger were necessarily circumstantial.  On the one hand, 
Tacardon made eye contact with the deputy as the deputy drove 
by in a marked patrol car.  That fact could support an inference 
that Tacardon was also aware of the deputy’s conduct in turning 
around, parking behind Tacardon’s car, shining his spotlight, 
and leaving his patrol car to approach Tacardon on foot.  An 
inference could also be drawn that Tacardon was aware his 
passenger had left the car.  As for Tacardon’s awareness of the 
events transpiring thereafter, Tacardon’s car was parked on a 
residential street at night, the engine was off, there was no 
evidence the street was busy, and the encounter between the 
deputy and the passenger occurred about five feet behind the 
car.   
On the other hand, the car doors were closed and the front 
windows were only “slightly lowered.”  When the deputy 
encountered the passenger, he was far enough away from the 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
car that he could not smell marijuana smoke coming from the 
windows.  He spoke to the passenger in a moderate voice and 
did not draw a weapon.  Tacardon was reclined in the driver’s 
seat and wore a hoodie that covered his head.  There was smoke 
in the car and the car’s rear windows were tinted.  All of these 
things may have affected Tacardon’s ability to see and hear 
what was going on behind the car.  And the occupants were 
using marijuana, which may have affected their degree of 
attention.  There is no evidence Tacardon asked why the deputy 
had detained the passenger or otherwise signaled to the deputy 
that he was aware of that circumstance.   
On this record, we cannot say there is only one reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the facts.  Accordingly, we find it 
appropriate to remand the matter for a new factual finding as to 
whether Tacardon was aware of the woman’s detention and to 
assess whether Tacardon was detained under the totality of the 
circumstances.  (See People v. Jenkins (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 
368, 374; see also Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 437.)3 
 
 
 
3  
Having 
concluded 
that 
Tacardon’s 
detention 
was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, the Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to address the Attorney General’s other argument 
that discovery of Tacardon’s probation search condition was an 
intervening circumstance that removed the taint of an otherwise 
illegal detention.  (Tacardon, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 97, fn. 
5.)  A similar issue is pending before us in People v. McWilliams, 
review granted June 30, 2021, S268320, which involves 
discovery of a parole search condition.  In this case, the Attorney 
General did not raise the issue in an answer to Tacardon’s 
petition for review, and neither party has briefed it.  Moreover, 
the question is premature given our remand for further factual 
findings necessary to determine when Tacardon was detained.   
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
We Concur:   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J.
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
S264219 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
I agree with the majority opinion that we should “remand the 
matter for a new factual finding as to whether Tacardon was aware of 
the [passenger’s] detention and to assess whether Tacardon was 
detained under the totality of the circumstances.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 30.)  However, the opinion further concludes that “Tacardon was 
not detained when Deputy Grubb parked behind the BMW, shined a 
spotlight on it, and began to approach on foot.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 15.)  Conversely, the dissenting opinion concludes defendant Leon 
William Tacardon was detained at this point in the interaction 
without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
(Dis. opn., post, at pp. 1–2.)  As to this issue, I would take a different 
approach from both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion.   
As both the majority and dissent recognize, the shining of a 
police spotlight on a suspect can contribute to the coerciveness of the 
encounter and is a factor that must be considered as part of the 
relevant totality of circumstances inquiry.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 
6, 14–16; dis. opn., post, at pp. 3, 7–8.)  I think it is a close question 
whether Tacardon was detained when Deputy Grubb made a U-turn, 
parked behind his car, shined a spotlight on it, and began to approach 
on foot.  But we do not need to reach this question.  We are already 
remanding for the superior court to determine whether these facts, 
plus Tacardon’s possible awareness of his passenger’s detention, 
constituted a detention of Tacardon.  I would therefore let the superior 
court assess the totality of relevant facts rather than have this court 
make a determination now with respect to only some of them.     
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Groban, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
S264219 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
As today’s opinion recounts, Sheriff’s Deputy Joel Grubb 
was patrolling a residential neighborhood at night in a marked 
car and “had both his headlights and high beams on for ‘extra 
visibility.’  He drove past a BMW legally parked in front of a 
residence, in the vicinity of a streetlight.  The car’s engine and 
headlights were off; smoke emanated from slightly open 
windows.  He saw three people inside and made eye contact with 
the occupants as he drove past them.  Grubb made a U-turn, 
parked about 15 to 20 feet behind the BMW, and turned on his 
spotlight.  He did not activate his siren or emergency lights or 
issue any commands to the car’s occupants.  He sat in his patrol 
car for 15 to 20 seconds while he informed dispatch of his 
location.  He then approached the BMW at a walking pace.  He 
did not draw a weapon.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1–2.)  There is 
more to the encounter (id. at pp. 2–3), but my disagreement with 
the court centers on these facts. 
The court concludes that at this point in the interaction, 
defendant Leon William Tacardon, who was in the driver’s seat 
of the BMW, was not detained within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because a reasonable person in his position would 
have believed he was free to leave or otherwise terminate the 
encounter with Deputy Grubb.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15–16, 
19–20.)  In my view, this conclusion does not accord with 
“[c]ommon sense.”  (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
777, 790.)  An “ordinary citizen” in Tacardon’s position “would 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
2 
not feel at liberty to simply walk [or drive] away from the 
officer.”  (Ibid.)  I certainly wouldn’t, and I suspect readers of 
today’s opinion wouldn’t either.  On the facts above, I would hold 
that Tacardon was detained without reasonable suspicion in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal must be reversed and the information 
dismissed. 
I. 
The resolution of this case is straightforward under the 
reasoning of People v. Kidd (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12 (Kidd), a 
case with similar facts.  In Kidd, an officer in a patrol car saw 
two men parked on a residential street at 1:30 a.m.  (Id. at p. 15.)  
“The officer passed the car, made a U-turn, and parked about 10 
feet behind the car”; he “pointed two spotlights . . . at the 
occupied car, and then exited his patrol vehicle.”  (Ibid.)  As he 
approached the car, he smelled marijuana and, upon reaching 
the driver’s side window, “shined his flashlight in the car and 
asked the occupants what they were doing.  Kidd was in the 
driver’s seat.”  (Ibid.)  The officer observed the passenger 
attempting to hide bags of suspected marijuana and asked if 
either man was on probation or parole.  (Ibid.)  After Kidd said 
he was on probation, the officer ordered the men out of the car 
and found drugs and a gun inside the car.  (Id. at pp. 15–16.) 
“Taking into account the totality of the circumstances,” 
the Court of Appeal explained that “Kidd was detained when the 
officer made a U-turn to pull in behind him and trained 
spotlights on his car.  The officer did not block Kidd’s car in, and 
he did not illuminate his colored emergency lights, so as to 
unambiguously signal a detention.  Nevertheless, motorists are 
trained to yield immediately when a law enforcement vehicle 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
3 
pulls in behind them and turns on its lights.  Regardless of the 
color of the lights the officer turned on, a reasonable person in 
Kidd’s circumstances ‘would expect that if he drove off, the 
officer would respond by following with red light on and siren 
sounding . . . .’  [Citation.]  Moreover, any ambiguity was 
removed when the officer more or less immediately exited his 
patrol vehicle and began to approach Kidd’s car.  Although the 
officer’s approach was . . . not made in a particularly aggressive 
or intimidating manner, a reasonable person in Kidd’s 
circumstances would not have felt free to leave.”  (Kidd, supra, 
36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 21–22.) 
Today’s opinion rejects this commonsense conclusion and 
says that a police officer’s “use of a spotlight, standing alone, 
does not necessarily effect a detention.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 15.)  But Kidd’s reasoning is consistent with that proposition.  
(See Kidd, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 21 [“Without more, a law 
enforcement officer shining a spotlight on a person does not 
constitute a detention.”].)  The disagreement here concerns what 
significance a court should assign to the use of a spotlight in 
considering whether the totality of circumstances of a nighttime 
police encounter amounts to a detention. 
Today’s opinion relies on cases involving spotlights where 
the Courts of Appeal and federal and sister-state courts have 
held that no detention occurred.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–11.)  
But those cases are not binding on us, and the fact that Kidd is 
in the minority does not diminish the soundness of its reasoning.  
(Cf. Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2010) 49 Cal.4th 315, 
331 [adopting minority position even though “[a] greater 
number of cases . . . have taken the opposite view”]; Vandenberg 
v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 834 [adopting Court of 
Appeal position even though “most other courts addressing the 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
4 
issue . . . have taken a contrary approach”]; People v. 
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 & fn. 16 [adhering to “th[e] 
minority view” while “recogniz[ing] that the weight of authority 
is otherwise”].) 
In reaching today’s holding, the court contends that 
although activation of red and blue emergency lights “typically 
conveys a command to stop,” “the use of a spotlight generally 
conveys a different meaning to a reasonable person . . . .”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 13.)  Because “[a] spotlight can be used to 
illuminate the surrounding area for safety or other purposes 
unrelated to the projection of authority” (id. at pp. 13–14), the 
court “believe[s] a reasonable person would distinguish between 
a spotlight and red and blue emergency lights in considering 
whether the person was free to leave” (id. at pp. 14–15; see id. 
at p. 13 [“[A] reasonable person would understand that 
spotlights can have a practical function that differs from the 
essentially communicative function of emergency lights.”]). 
I imagine this conclusion comes as news to anyone who 
has ever had their car illuminated by a police spotlight.  The 
court apparently envisions that a reasonable person in 
Tacardon’s circumstances would think, “Oh, the officer who just 
eyeballed me, made a U-turn, pulled up behind me in his patrol 
car, pointed a bright spotlight at my car, got out of his car, and 
is now walking toward me isn’t trying to stop me.  He just turned 
on his spotlight to see what’s going on.  Good thing he didn’t turn 
on his emergency lights . . . looks like I’m free to leave.”  This 
strains credulity.  The spotlight, whatever its “practical 
function” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 13), contributes to the officer’s 
show of authority.  No reasonable person would feel free to leave 
in such circumstances.  A reasonable person would instead 
submit to the officer’s approach and stay put. 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
5 
In this case, Deputy Grubb may well have “used the 
spotlight as a matter of course” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 16) for 
“purposes unrelated to the projection of authority” (id. at p. 14).  
And it is reasonable to believe that using a spotlight in dark 
conditions “might help both the officer and the civilian see what 
the other is doing and make decisions accordingly.”  (Ibid.)  “The 
ultimate question, however, is not the abstract reasonableness 
of the officer’s actions” or the purposes behind those actions “but 
rather the effect of the cumulative show of authority on a 
reasonable person’s assessment of whether they are free to 
terminate the encounter with law enforcement.”  (People v. 
Kasrawi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 751, 758–759.)  Even if it is 
reasonable for an officer to use a spotlight for illumination 
during a nighttime encounter with a parked motorist, the 
question is what the motorist would reasonably believe when 
confronted with the officer’s actions.  And it is evident from 
ordinary experience that “an officer’s show of authority is 
usually bolstered by a spotlight — even if it is used primarily for 
safety purposes . . . .”  (Id. at p. 760.) 
Here, Deputy Grubb did not use his spotlight to illuminate 
a general area for investigation.  Instead, he pointed the 
spotlight at Tacardon’s parked car after making eye contact with 
its occupants, making a U-turn, and pulling up behind the car.  
A reasonable person would have concluded that the officer 
activated the spotlight and trained it on the car as part of a 
series of targeted actions to detain the car and its occupants.  
The court says that “[w]hile a reasonable person in Tacardon’s 
position might ‘feel himself the object of official scrutiny, such 
directed scrutiny does not amount to a detention.’ ”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 20.)  To be sure, “[p]olice officers are as free as any 
other citizen to knock on someone’s door and ask to talk with 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
6 
them, to approach citizens on the street or in their cars and to 
ask for information or their cooperation.”  (State v. Garcia-
Cantu (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) 253 S.W.3d 236, 243 (Garcia-
Cantu).)  But it is equally true that such scrutiny can amount to 
a detention in certain circumstances.  The question is whether 
a reasonable person would feel free to leave or terminate the 
encounter, and the fact that activation of a spotlight causes a 
person to “ ‘feel himself the object of official scrutiny’ ” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 20) is probative, even if not dispositive. 
Today’s opinion says, “There was no evidence [the 
spotlight] was unusually bright or flashing, or that Tacardon 
was blinded or overwhelmed by the light.  Certainly, a 
reasonable person would notice the deputy’s use of a spotlight, 
and depending on how it is used, a spotlight may contribute to 
the coerciveness of a police encounter.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 16.)  But the fact that a spotlight has a disorienting effect that 
augments a police officer’s show of authority and the 
coerciveness of the encounter is a matter of common experience 
to civilians and officers alike.  (See Santos, Making Nighttime 
Traffic Stops (June 20, 2012) Police Magazine [instructing police 
to “[u]se your high beams, spotlights, and takedowns” to 
“creat[e] a ‘Wall of Light’ that will overwhelm the occupants of 
the subject vehicle with intense light”]; Rayburn, Advanced 
Vehicle Stop Tactics: Skills for Today’s Survival Conscious 
Officer (2010) p. 4 [instructing officers that “[t]he spotlight will 
make it difficult for the operator of the vehicle to see”].) 
Further, it does not matter whether an officer is 
“attempting to blind the driver” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 15) or 
whether, in Deputy Grubb’s view, the spotlight’s “use in this 
circumstance was disorienting” or “whether he had been trained 
to use his spotlight in that fashion” (id. at p. 16).  What matters 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
7 
is the effect, which courts routinely infer from the totality of the 
circumstances.  (See U.S. v. Delaney (D.C. Cir. 2020) 955 F.3d 
1077, 1083 [shining a police “cruiser’s take-down light” into a 
stopped car from behind “ ‘provide[s] protection for an officer by 
blinding and disorienting the car’s occupants if they look back 
at the squad car’ ”]; U.S. v. Sigmond-Ballesteros (9th Cir. 2002) 
285 F.3d 1117, 1123 [“The sudden introduction of a light source 
into the driver’s compartment of a vehicle, while the vehicle is 
operated at night, can be disruptive and can lead to a decrease 
in visibility, if not temporary blindness.”]; Garcia-Cantu, supra, 
253 S.W.3d at p. 240 [occupant of a car illuminated from behind 
may be unable to “see anything more except a big spotlight, ‘a 
big white light’ ”].) 
To be clear, I do not urge a per se rule that “any person 
who is aware of police scrutiny and is then illuminated by a 
spotlight is necessarily detained.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19; see 
Garcia-Cantu, supra, 253 S.W.3d at p. 244 [“per se rules 
generally do not determine whether any specific citizen-police 
encounter amounted to a Fourth Amendment detention”; courts 
must examine the totality of the circumstances].)  And I agree 
that relevant circumstances may include whether the officer 
stopped a moving vehicle, blocked a person from driving away, 
gave instructions by loudspeaker, approached aggressively, 
used a commanding tone of voice, or drew a weapon.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 6, 15–16.)  My objection is to the court’s conclusion 
that Deputy Grubb’s use of a spotlight to illuminate Tacardon’s 
car lacked “coercive force” that informed whether a reasonable 
person would have felt free to terminate the encounter.  (Id. at 
p. 16.)  I would hold that shining a police spotlight to illuminate 
a parked car on a residential street contributes to the 
coerciveness of the encounter in the circumstances here, where 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
8 
it was preceded by an officer on patrol making eye contact with 
the car’s occupants, making a U-turn, and pulling up behind the 
car, and then followed a few seconds later by the officer getting 
out of his patrol vehicle and approaching the car. 
II. 
Although I acknowledge there is case law that supports 
today’s holding (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–11), it must also be 
acknowledged that judicial application of the “free to leave” 
standard has long been criticized for having “an air of unreality” 
and for lacking “common . . . understanding” of how civilians 
experience encounters with the police.  (United States v. Drayton 
(2002) 536 U.S. 194, 208, 210 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.); see State 
v. Fogg (Iowa 2019) 936 N.W.2d 664, 675–677 (dis. opn. of Appel, 
J.) [citing criticism by justices of the United States Supreme 
Court, lower court judges, and scholars]; Sundby, The Rugged 
Individual’s Guide to the Fourth Amendment: How the Court’s 
Idealized Citizen Shapes, Influences, and Excludes the Exercise 
of Constitutional Rights (2018) 65 UCLA L.Rev. 690, 718, 721 
(Sundby) 
[4th 
Amend. 
jurisprudence 
has 
a 
“tone 
of 
obliviousness” 
and 
“does 
not 
accord 
with 
reality”]; 
LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence 
Fourth Amendment “Seizures”? (1991) 1991 U. Ill. L.Rev. 729, 
739–740 [“[T]he Court finds a perceived freedom to depart in 
circumstances when only the most thick-skinned of suspects 
would think such a choice was open to them.”].) 
To say that a person in Tacardon’s position was 
experiencing a “consensual contact” with Deputy Grubb (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 19) is to proffer a rather sanguine and 
empirically 
dubious 
view 
of 
police-citizen 
interactions.  
(Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
9 
Amendment’s Seizure Standard (2009) 99 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 51, 62 [“[T]here is a wealth of evidence from 
psychological studies suggesting that people rarely comply 
freely with requests from police officers.”]; see, e.g., Sommers & 
Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent 
Searches and the Psychology of Compliance (2019) 128 Yale L.J. 
1962; Smith et al., Testing Judicial Assumptions of the 
“Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental Study (2013) 14 Fla. 
Coastal L.Rev. 285; Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects 
of Robinette on the “Voluntary” Waiver of Fourth Amendment 
Rights (2001) 44 How. L.J. 349.) 
Professor LaFave, while recognizing the “ ‘moral and 
instinctive pressures to cooperate’ ” with the police, has said:  
“[T]he confrontation is a seizure only if the officer adds to those 
inherent pressures by engaging in conduct significantly beyond 
that accepted in social intercourse.  The critical factor is whether 
the policeman, even if making inquiries a private citizen would 
not, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner which would 
be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two 
ordinary citizens.”  (4 LaFave,  Search and Seizure (6th ed. 2022) 
§ 9.4(a), fns. omitted.)  Singling out a parked car and training a 
powerful spotlight on it from behind, as Deputy Grubb did here, 
is “conduct significantly beyond” any sort of “nonoffensive 
contact . . . between two ordinary citizens.”  (Ibid.; see Veh. 
Code, § 24409, subd. (b) [prohibiting use of high beams 
“[w]henever the driver of a vehicle follows another vehicle 
within 300 feet to the rear”].) 
As the court suggests, Fourth Amendment doctrine on 
police use of spotlights is significantly animated by safety 
concerns.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–14; see U.S. v. Tanguay 
(1st Cir. 2019) 918 F.3d 1, 7–8.)  Yet one might wonder whether 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
10 
today’s opinion creates new safety issues for both officers and 
civilians.  By holding that Tacardon was not detained at the 
point when Deputy Grubb had activated his spotlight and began 
to approach on foot, the court contemplates that a person in 
Tacardon’s position may simply drive away without warning — 
even if an officer is walking toward the car and even if a 
passenger, desiring to leave the encounter, is exiting the car.  
Such a scenario would not promote the safety of either officers 
or civilians. 
The fact is that notwithstanding today’s decision, 
reasonable persons in Tacardon’s position will not drive away 
because they will not feel free to leave.  A more realistic 
statement of today’s holding is that even though the use of a 
spotlight will often contribute to the coerciveness of a nighttime 
encounter, this circumstance simply does not outweigh safety 
concerns in the Fourth Amendment analysis.  A carveout for 
spotlights would arguably put officers on the same footing, day 
or night, with regard to investigatory activities like approaching 
a parked car. 
Yet there is no policy or principle of which I am aware that 
says the police must have the same latitude for conducting 
investigation during the night as during the day.  To the 
contrary, California law distinguishes between daytime and 
nighttime intrusions by police.  (See Pen. Code, § 840 [“An arrest 
for the commission of a misdemeanor or an infraction cannot be 
made between the hours of 10 o’clock p.m. of any day and 6 
o’clock a.m. of the succeeding day, unless” certain criteria are 
met]; id., § 1533 [requiring showing of good cause before 
magistrate may approve service of search warrant between 
10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.]; Tuttle v. Superior Court (1981) 120 
Cal.App.3d 320, 331 [“By adopting Penal Code section 1533, the 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
11 
Legislature has clearly taken note that there is a special threat 
to privacy presented by nighttime police intrusions.”].)  
Moreover, courts have refused to credit darkness as an excuse 
for police intrusions conducted without reasonable suspicion.  
(See, e.g., U.S. v. Wilson (4th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 720, 723–724 
[vacating conviction stemming from vehicle pullover conducted 
because officer, due in part to darkness, could not read 
expiration date on vehicle’s registration tag]; U.S. v. 
McLemore (8th Cir. 2018) 887 F.3d 861, 866 [rejecting 
government’s argument that inability to read temporary license 
plate due to darkness justified police stop and affirming 
suppression of evidence].) 
Recognizing the coercive effect of spotlights would likely 
limit some nighttime investigations, including ones like Deputy 
Grubb’s that turn up contraband.  However, for every 
suspicionless stop that uncovers criminal activity, there are 
many others that come up empty.  (See Bar-Gill & 
Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously (2012) 106 Nw. U. L.Rev. 
1609, 1655 [“police find evidence in only about 10% to 20% of the 
total traffic searches”].)  And “it is no secret that people of color 
are disproportionate victims of this type of [suspicionless] 
scrutiny.”  (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 254 (dis. opn. of 
Sotomayor, J.); see Ayres & Borowsky, A Study of Racially 
Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department (Oct. 
2008) pp. 5–8 [Black and Hispanic residents of Los Angeles, 
compared to Whites, were more likely to be stopped, frisked, 
searched, and arrested but significantly less likely to be found 
with weapons or drugs]; Gross & Barnes, Road Work: Racial 
Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway (2002) 101 
Mich. L.Rev. 651, 668 [searches of White drivers in Maryland 
reveal drugs 22% more often than searches of Black drivers and 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
12 
over 200% more often than searches of Hispanic drivers]; Note, 
Discrimination During Traffic Stops: How an Economic Account 
Justifying Racial Profiling Falls Short (2012) 87 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 
1025, 1040 [searches of White drivers in Illinois reveal 
contraband over 50% more often than searches of non-White 
drivers]; cf. Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom (2012) 
59 UCLA L.Rev. 1124, 1142 [“the conditions under which 
implicit biases translate most readily into discriminatory 
behavior are when people have wide discretion in making quick 
decisions with little accountability”].) 
Moreover, not all individuals feel the same degree of 
freedom to rebuff police advances, even if the law says they are 
free to leave.  (See Pierson et al., A large-scale analysis of racial 
disparities in police stops across the United States (July 2020) 4 
Nature Human Behaviour 736, 739 [Black and Hispanic drivers 
are twice as likely as White drivers to undergo search when 
stopped by police]; cf. Utah v. Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at p. 254 
(dis. opn. of Sotomayor, J.) [“For generations, black and brown 
parents have given their children ‘the talk’ — instructing them 
never to run down the street; always keep your hands where 
they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a 
stranger — all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react 
to them.”].)  Would a reasonable person in Tacardon’s position 
feel free to drive away from Deputy Grubb or otherwise refuse 
to cooperate?  The court’s holding leaves many citizens “ ‘in a 
“Catch-22.”  Exercise of citizen rights in the face of police rights 
may cause police to escalate the intrusiveness of the encounter 
and place the citizen at risk of both physical harm and formal 
arrest.  Failure to exercise citizen rights by responding to the 
officer, however, may be viewed as consensual conduct removing 
the encounter from Fourth Amendment analysis.’ ”  (State v. 
PEOPLE v. TACARDON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
13 
Fogg, supra, 936 N.W.2d at p. 681 (dis. opn. of Appel, J.); see 
Sundby, supra, 65 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 726 [such deprivation of 
constitutional rights “undermines the trust and legitimacy with 
which the justice system is viewed by minority communities”].) 
In sum, today’s opinion stretches the concepts of a 
“consensual encounter” and being “free to leave” beyond the 
bounds of common understanding and ordinary experience.  I 
fear that the benefits of the court’s decision, which expands the 
investigatory authority of the police, will come at the cost of 
subjecting 
more 
law-abiding 
persons 
to 
unwarranted 
surveillance, creating more police-civilian interactions with the 
potential for misunderstanding or escalation, and deepening the 
distrust that some communities have long had toward law 
enforcement. 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Tacardon 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 53 Cal.App.5th 89 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S264219 
Date Filed:  December 29, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Joaquin 
Judge:  Michael J. Mulvihill, Jr. 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and 
Christopher J. Rench, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Paul Kleven, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Christopher J. Rench 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-7661 
 
Paul Kleven 
Attorney at Law 
1604 Solano Avenue 
Berkeley, CA 94707 
(510) 528-7347