Title: Ex Parte Kamilewicz
Citation: 700 So. 2d 340
Docket Number: 1960890
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 1997

700 So. 2d 340 (1997)
Ex parte Dexter J. KAMILEWICZ, et al.
(In re Daniel A. EDELMAN, et al. v. WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN &amp; DIXON, et al.).
1960890.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 18, 1997.
Edward B. McDonough, Jr., Keith S. Miller, and Kevin D. Graham of Edward B. McDonough, Jr., P.C., Mobile, for petitioners.
C. Knox McLaney III and Angela L. Kimbrough of McLaney &amp; Associates, P.C., Montgomery; and James E. Atchison and Mona Vivar of Hess &amp; Atchison, Mobile, for respondents.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Dexter J. Kamilewicz, Gretchen L. Kamilewicz, and Martha E. Preston petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss claims against them alleging malicious prosecution, breach of contract, and abuse of process. We grant the writ.
*341 Daniel Edelman and his law firm, Edelman &amp; Combs ("Edelman"), filed an action in the Mobile Circuit Court against the law firm of Wildman, Harrold, Allen &amp; Dixon ("Wildman"); each of the partners in Wildman, individually; the law firm of Schnader, Harrison, Segal &amp; Lewis ("Schnader"); each of the partners in Schnader, individually; the Kamilewiczes; and Preston, seeking damages against all of the defendants for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The complaint also stated a claim against the Kamilewiczes and Preston for breach of contract; and it stated a claim of tortious interference with a contract against every defendant except the Kamilewiczes and Preston. Edelman's office is in Chicago, Illinois. Wildman has its principal office in Chicago and another office in New York. Schnader has its principal office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and other offices in New York City; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Cherry Hill, New Jersey; and Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Kamilewiczes reside in Maine; Preston resides in Wisconsin.
This action arose out of a class action that Wildman and Schnader filed on behalf of the Kamilewiczes, Preston, and others against Edelman and others in a federal district court in Chicago ("the Kamilewicz action"). The Kamilewicz action was based on allegations that Edelman and others had engaged in wrongdoing in obtaining a substantial attorney fee award in a class action styled Hoffman, et al. v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., et al. ("the Hoffman action"), which had been filed in the Mobile Circuit Court. The complaint in the Kamilewicz action alleged, among other things, that Edelman, who had participated as class counsel in the Hoffman action, had committed a fraud on the trial court in the Hoffman action by failing to apprise the trial court that approval of the settlement in that case would result in an out-of-pocket loss for the plaintiff class (of which the Kamilewiczes and Preston were members.)[1] The federal district court dismissed the Kamilewicz action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Edelman then filed the present action, alleging 1) that the Kamilewicz action had been filed in an improper and malicious attempt to relitigate matters that had been settled in the Hoffman action (the malicious prosecution claim); 2) that improper discovery had been attempted in the Kamilewicz action, in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the abuse of process claim); 3) that the Kamilewiczes and Preston had, by filing the Kamilewicz action, breached an agreement not to challenge the settlement reached in the Hoffman action (the breach of contract claim); and 4) that Wildman and Schnader had improperly induced the Kamilewiczes and Preston to file the Kamilewicz action (the tortious-interference-with-a-contract claim). The Kamilewiczes and Preston moved to dismiss the claims pertaining to them, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and, in the alternative, that dismissal was appropriate under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-430 (which requires the trial courts of this state to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action accruing outside the state). The trial court denied the motion.
The requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant are set out in Rule 4.2(a)(2), Ala.R.Civ.P.:
Service of process under Rule 4.2(a)(2) has been held to be as far-reaching as due process permits. However, the constitutional guaranty of due process precludes a court from asserting jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state. Murray v. Alfab, Inc., 601 So. 2d 878 (Ala.1992). In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-76, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181-84, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"*So long as it creates a `substantial connection' with the forum, even a single act can support jurisdiction. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S., at 223[, 78 S.Ct., at 201]. The Court has noted, however, that `some single or occasional acts' related to the forum may not be sufficient to establish jurisdiction if `their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission' create only an `attenuated' affiliation with the forum. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318[, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159, 90 L. Ed. 95] (1945); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S., at 299[, 100 S.Ct., at 568]. This distinction derives from the belief that, with respect to this category of `isolated' acts, id., at 297[, 100 S.Ct., at 567], the reasonable foreseeability of litigation in the forum is substantially diminished."
(Emphasis in original.)
These due process requirements were recently echoed by this Court in Ex parte United Brotherhood of Carpenters &amp; Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, 688 So. 2d 246, 250-52 (Ala.1997):
After examining the record and the briefs, we conclude that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Kamilewiczes and Preston. It is significant, we think, that neither the malicious prosecution claim nor the breach of contract claim directly arises out of or relates to forum-based activities, i.e., they are not based on or related to activities that occurred in Alabama. The underlying basis for both the malicious prosecution *345 claim and the breach of contract claim was the filing of the Kamilewicz action in Chicago. Any injuries suffered by Edelman as the result of those two claims arose out of its being named as a defendant in the Chicago litigation; Edelman suffered no injury as the result of the participation by the Kamilewiczes and Preston as class members in the Hoffman action. A contrary conclusion would, of course, be absurd, given the fact that Edelman represented the class in the Hoffman action. Thus, the requirements for establishing general jurisdiction must be met with respect to those two claims. As previously noted, while a showing of certain minimum contacts may suffice to support a holding of specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff must go further and establish that the defendant's contacts with the forum have been "continuous and systematic" in order to invoke general jurisdiction. The record indicates that the only contact the Kamilewiczes and Preston have ever had with this state were the result of their inclusion as unnamed members of the plaintiff class in the Hoffman action and by virtue of their status as plaintiffs in the Kamilewicz action, in which summonses and complaints were served in Alabama on three Alabama attorneys and their respective law firms (none of whom are parties in this action) and a subpoena was served in Alabama on an expert witness (a Mobile accountant) who had been used by Edelman in the Hoffman action. These isolated brushes with Alabama's judicial system fall far below the threshold of "continuous and systematic" forum activity necessary to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).[2]
*346 With respect to the abuse of process claim, Edelman alleged:
We note that the abuse of process claim is also based, at least in part, on activity that took place in Chicagothe service of a subpoena on Dr. Madansky for the alleged purpose of "harassing" and "punishing" him. As was the case with respect to the malicious prosecution and breach of contract claims, the requirements for establishing general jurisdiction over this aspect of the abuse of process claim have not been met. The sole remaining question, therefore, is whether there is any basis for the trial court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the only aspect of the abuse of process claim that arguably does arise out of or relate to an occurrence in this statethe service of a subpoena on the Mobile accountant.[3]
As previously noted, the only contact the Kamilewiczes and Preston have ever had with Alabama was the result of their inclusion as unnamed members of the plaintiff class in the Hoffman action, and by virtue of their status as plaintiffs in the Kamilewicz action, where they, through their attorneys, served summonses and complaints in Alabama on three Alabama attorneys and their respective law firms and served the subpoena in Alabama on the Mobile accountant. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, "the constitutional touchstone remains whether *347 the defendant purposefully established `[sufficient] contacts' in the forum state," so that it is foreseeable that that defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, 471 U.S.  at 474, 105 S. Ct.  at 2183. "This `purposeful availment' requirement," according to the Court, "ensures that a defendant will not be [sued in] a jurisdiction solely as a result of [the defendant's] `random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' contacts" with that jurisdiction, 471 U.S.  at 475, 105 S. Ct.  at 2183-84. The issue, then, is whether the Kamilewiczes and Preston could have reasonably foreseen that they could be sued in Alabama, by a law firm that they had sued in Illinois, for an injury that allegedly occurred in Illinois. In this regard, there is little doubt that the Kamilewiczes and Preston's contact with Alabama as class members in the Hoffman action was the result of a unilateral decision on the part of Edelman and others to file the Hoffman action in Alabama. As previously noted, unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. It is essential that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. From the Kamilewiczes and Preston's perspective, their involvement in an Alabama class action was entirely fortuitous. The class would have been the same no matter which of the 50 states the Hoffman action had been filed in. Likewise, the service in Alabama of the summonses and complaints on the Alabama attorneys and their respective law firms and the service of the subpoena on the Mobile accountant in the Kamilewicz action were fortuitous, in the sense that those individuals and firms just happened to be located in Alabama, and created only an attenuated affiliation with this state. We conclude, therefore, that neither the Kamilewiczes and Preston's inclusion in the class in the Hoffman action nor their serving process in Alabama in the Kamilewicz action was a sufficient contact with Alabama to put them on notice that they could be sued here for the injuries that Edelman alleged occurred in Illinois.
Having determined that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Kamilewiczes and Preston, we pretermit any discussion as to whether the claims should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
WRIT GRANTED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, KENNEDY, COOK, and SEE, JJ., concur.
[1]  In the Hoffman action, the central issue was whether BancBoston had overcharged mortgagors whose mortgages it serviced, so that a surplus existed in each mortgagor's escrow account. The Kamilewiczes and Preston had mortgages serviced by BancBoston. The record indicates that the settlement in the Hoffman action resulted in BancBoston's changing its procedure for managing its escrow accounts and in de minimis interest payments (not to exceed $8.76) being made to the individual members of the plaintiff class. However, the settlement also resulted in a net loss to at least some of the members of the class. Pursuant to the settlement, the Kamilewiczes' escrow account was charged $91.33 and Preston's escrow account was charged $80.94 in order to pay the attorneys, including Edelman, who had represented the class.
[2]  In Helicopteros, 466 U.S.  at 415-16, n. 10, 104 S. Ct.  at 1872, n. 10, the United States Supreme Court stated:

"Because the parties have not argued any relationship between the cause of action and Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas, we, contrary to the dissent's implication, post, at 419-420, assert no `view' with respect to that issue.
"The dissent suggests that we have erred in drawing no distinction between controversies that `relate to' a defendant's contacts with a forum and those that `arise out of' such contacts. Post, at 420. This criticism is somewhat puzzling, for the dissent goes on to urge that, for purposes of determining the constitutional validity of an assertion of specific jurisdiction, there really should be no distinction between the two. Post, at 427-428.
"We do not address the validity or consequences of such a distinction because the issue has not been presented in this case. Respondents have made no argument that their cause of action either arose out of or is related to Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas. Absent any briefing on the issue, we decline to reach the questions (1) whether the terms `arising out of,' and `related to' describe different connections between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that either connection exists. Nor do we reach the question whether, if the two types of relationship differ, a forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where the cause of action `relates to,' but does not `arise out of,' the defendant's contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific jurisdiction."
Our research has not revealed another case in which the Supreme Court or a federal circuit court of appeals has clarified whether there is a distinction to be made between the terms "arises out of" and "related to" for purposes of determining whether a sufficient connection exists between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum. We note that Justice Brennan in his dissent in Helicopteros took the view that a distinction should be made and that the Due Process Clause required "significant contacts directly related to the underlying cause of action." 466 U.S.  at 427-28, 104 S. Ct.  at 1879. For purposes of this opinion, we assume that the term "related to" has a meaning separate and apart from the term "arises out of." Black's Law Dictionary 108 (6th ed.1990), defines "arise" in pertinent part as follows: "To spring up, originate, to come into being or notice; to become operative, sensible, visible, or audible; to present itself." Black's, at p. 1288, defines "relate" as follows: "To stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with; with `to.' "We also assume, however, that the Due Process Clause does not permit an unduly broad interpretation of the term "related to," but, instead, that it requires a significant or direct relationship between the underlying cause of action and the defendant's contacts with the forum in order to bypass the more stringent requirements that are necessary to invoke general personal jurisdiction, i.e., a showing of continuous and systematic contacts by the defendant with the forum. Although the malicious prosecution claim and the breach of contract claim may be indirectly linked to the Hoffman action (in the sense that the Hoffman action gave rise to the Kamilewicz action, which, in turn, gave rise to the present action), we do not believe that these two claims are sufficiently "related to" the Hoffman action to obviate the need on Edelman's part to demonstrate continuous and systematic contacts by the Kamilewiczes and Preston with Alabama. In any event, we note that even if the malicious prosecution claim and the breach of contract claim were sufficiently "related to" the Hoffman action to invoke a specific personal jurisdiction analysis, the result would be the same because, as we point out later in this opinion, the Kamilewiczes and Preston's contacts with Alabama are not sufficient to give the trial court specific personal jurisdiction.
[3]  Edelman contends that he and his firm were injured because, they say, the accountant was served with a subpoena "[b]efore the time for commencing discovery prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Edelman argues that the "subpoena was issued in Mobile County, Alabama, to procure records and a witness pertaining to this case" and that this constituted an abuse of process because the subpoena "was not for purposes of discovery, as no discovery was permitted yet." The abuse of process claim is apparently based on allegations that the Mobile accountant was served with a subpoena before a discovery-planning conference had been held, as provided in Rule 26(f), Fed.R.Civ.P. The essential elements of abuse of process are: 1) an ulterior purpose and 2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Reynolds v. McEwen, 416 So. 2d 702 (Ala.1982). Although we express no opinion with respect to the merits of this claim, we do question how the possibly premature service of a subpoena on the accountant could rise to the level of an abuse of process or how the service of the subpoena could have injured Edelman so as to establish the necessary standing to pursue an abuse of process claim against the Kamilewiczes and Preston.