Title: State v. Donald Loftin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-78-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 78 September Term 2005 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DONALD LOFTIN, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 31, 2006 Decided June 5, 2007 On appeal from the denial of Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County. David B. Glazer and Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Dorothy A. Hersh, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph L. Bocchini, Jr., Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Donald Loftin was convicted by a jury of the capital murder of Gary K. Marsh. In the penalty-phase proceeding before a separate jury, he was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed defendant s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 318 (1996) (Loftin I), and upheld his sentence on proportionality review, State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 266 (Loftin II), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 897, 120 S. Ct. 229, 145 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1999). Defendant now appeals to this Court from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), in which he claims that both his trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective. One issue raised in the PCR petition is of grave concern to us. During the early stage of defendant s guilt-phase trial, the court learned that a white juror had told two of his African-American co-workers that he was going to buy a rope to hang defendant. The juror s comments were made in a case involving an interracial killing - an African-American defendant was charged with murdering a white man. Accepting the juror s explanation that he had not predetermined defendant s guilt, the court declined to remove him from the panel and permitted him to sit with his fellow jurors until the conclusion of the trial, at which time he was designated an alternate juror. At no time did the trial court interview the remaining members of the panel to confirm that the juror did not communicate to them any preconceived notions of defendant s guilt. There is no room in a capital trial for a juror who expresses a preconceived opinion of a defendant s guilt. Even more alarming is when the juror s remarks prejudging guilt also suggest racial bias. In either circumstance, the trial court must be vigilant to ensure that other members of the panel have not been tainted irreparably by inappropriate comments made by the errant juror. Because the court made no effort to satisfy itself that the jury s impartiality had not been compromised by the suspect juror, we can have no confidence that the verdict was the product of a fair trial. Accordingly, we have no choice but to vacate defendant s conviction and death sentence and remand for a new trial. [Id. at 86-87.] One case that followed the Bey approach is State v. Phillips, which involved a juror suspected of racial bias. 322 N.J. Super. 429, 434-35 (App. Div. 1999). In Phillips, the Appellate Division reversed a murder conviction because of the inadequate questioning of the panel after one juror claimed that another juror made a disparaging racial remark. Id. at 441-42. The preferred approach, the court added, would have been to question the jurors singly to determine the impact of the objectionable remark. Id. at 441. The court observed that an allegation that a juror is racially biased strikes at the very heart of the defendant s right to a trial by an impartial jury, and public confidence in the fair administration of justice is undermined if such allegations are not thoroughly investigated. Id. at 442. The construct we outlined in Bey has been followed in other non-capital cases as well. See State v. Wormley, 305 N.J. Super. 57, 68-70 (App. Div. 1997) (finding that despite excused juror s denial of having disclosed to other juror that she knew State s witness, there was strong likelihood that, even indirectly or unintentionally, she may well have, and therefore failure of trial court to voir dire jury required reversal of defendant s conviction), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 (1998); Scherzer, supra, 301 N.J. Super. at 487 (recognizing that when juror irregularity is brought to trial court s attention, court must examine whether information is capable of prejudicing defendant, and if so [trial] judge must conduct voir dire, preferably individually in camera, to determine whether any jurors were exposed to the information ). Because Tyler held that the presence of a juror who harbors bias carries the potential to taint the jury, designating the juror in this capital case as an alternate after eleven days of trial did not adequately protect defendant s fair-trial rights. During that eleven-day period, a biased juror freely associated with other members of the entire panel. The presumption of prejudice that attached to Juror No. 4 s participation in the proceedings, even as a non-deliberating juror, required the type of voir dire outlined in Bey, Phillips, Wormley, and Scherzer. In light of the trial court s failure to inquire of the jury whether Juror No. 4 expressed his bias or predisposition and, if so, whether any juror was influenced by him, the presumption of prejudice could not be overcome. See footnote 7 Therefore, defendant did not receive his constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by an impartial jury. Denying an accused the right to an impartial jury is to deprive him of the very essence of a fair trial and therefore is not susceptible to a harmless error analysis. See State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 543-44 (1986) (noting that infraction of right to trial by an impartial jury . . . may not be treated as harmless error ) (quoting Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 60); see also Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001) (impaneling of biased juror is a structural defect defying harmless error analysis); Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) ( The presence of a biased jury is no less a fundamental structural defect than the presence of a biased judge. We find this claim outside the gamut of harmless error analysis. ). No matter how overpowering the State s case may be, a defendant has the right to have his fate decided by twelve impartial jurors. If denied that right, an appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment by finding the evidence sufficient to support a hypothetical verdict rendered by an unbiased jury. We are mindful of the resources expended in trying this case. But we have always been willing to pay a high price for maintaining the sanctity of our jury system. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 409 (1988) (Williams II) ( Even in a case . . . where the evidence of guilt is compelling, the right to a fair trial must be diligently protected to insure that all defendants, regardless of the crime charged or the weight of the evidence produced, are tried by a fair and impartial jury. ); State v. Wagner, 180 N.J. Super. 564, 567 (App. Div. 1981) (finding that at times, courts should not hesitate to reverse, even in the absence of prejudice if jury selection is not wholly free from taint and suspicion ); cf. State v. Roberts, 47 N.J. 286, 290-91 (1966) (reversing defendant s manslaughter conviction because, even though judge was probably misquoted uttering racially derogatory epithet and despite strong evidence of guilt, image of justice would be better served by a new trial ). . . . . provide to the report preparer information favorable to the client. In this regard, counsel should consider whether the client should speak with the person preparing the report; if the determination is made to do so, counsel should discuss the interview in advance with the client and attend it[.] [ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.12(A)(2) (Feb. 2003) (emphasis added).] The approach that we take is equally applicable to a pre-sentence interview for a predicate murder conviction that precedes an impending capital trial. We emphasize that neither the probation officer nor the State has committed any wrong, and therefore exclusion of defendant s interview remarks that he did not suffer from a mental illness is not an appropriate remedy, particularly given that the State will argue that those remarks are inconsistent with the mitigation defense he will present. Cf. State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003) (noting that main purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In this procedural setting where there is no governmental wrongdoing, we will not suppress truthful information offered to rebut the veracity of a mitigation defense. We do note that defendant repeated to the State s psychiatric expert comments about his mental health similar to those he made to the probation officer. Notably, in the previous penalty trial, defendant s psychiatric expert gave a simple and plausible explanation for defendant s inability to self-diagnose a mental defect from which he may be suffering. Of course, the jury is the final arbiter of such questions. Accordingly, the use of the PSI report for the purposes we have discussed will not deny defendant a fair penalty trial, if the case proceeds to that point. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DONALD LOFTIN, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting. Nearly thirteen years after defendant Donald Loftin was convicted by a jury of the murder of Gary K. Marsh and was sentenced to death, the majority now holds that the trial judge erred when it did not remove a non-deliberating juror from the jury mid-trial, and that such error was the result of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by defendant s trial and appellate counsel. In the majority s view, that conclusion warrants the reversal of defendant s conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by this Court, See footnote 11 and a remand for a new trial. Because I cannot agree with either the conclusions reached by the majority or with the remedy it orders, I respectfully dissent. I have asked you to come in because I was contacted and it was reported to the Court that you were heard making remarks, not about the facts of this case, but about the fact that you were on your way to the hardware store to get a rope and you were going to make sure that it was a rope that did not break and these comments were made at [the juror s employment] Friday and possibly Monday, early Monday morning of this week and I thought I will give you an opportunity to come in and, perhaps, you can shed some light on what, if anything, happened. THE JUROR: Nothing did happen. It was just that everybody was harassing me at my job because they found out what I was doing from the letter you gave us to give to our employer. That s all it was, simple harassment from my fellow [employees]. THE COURT: And did you respond? And what we were told specifically is that you did not discuss the case, but you made some - THE JUROR: Right. THE COURT: -- What was viewed as smart remarks where you were on the way to the hardware store. THE JUROR: Yes, just so that they would stop harassing me. THE COURT: Okay. All right. In making that statement, have you formed an opinion with respect to the guilt or innocence of this defendant? THE JUROR: Oh, no. No. THE COURT: Is there any particular reason you chose that language in addressing the harassment from your fellow employees? THE JUROR: Well, you would have to know the people that were harassing me to understand it. THE COURT: Well, I would. I m trying to understand it. If you could shed a little bit of light on it for the record. THE JUROR: The people that were harassing me would not let anything go, they will just keep harassing and harassing and harassing. So to stop the harassment and to tell them what they think I would say, that s merely a statement that I made because they think they know me but they don t. THE COURT: Well, what are you saying they think they know you? What is it they think they know about you[?] THE JUROR: Well, they think that I m prejudiced. THE COURT: Okay. So the people around whom - the people who are harassing you, you re telling me are minorities? THE JUROR: Yes, some of them, yes. THE COURT: Some of them? THE JUROR: Some are white. THE COURT: And they think that you re prejudiced? THE JUROR: Oh, yeah. THE COURT: And so what you re saying is that you said that in an effort to - THE JUROR: Stop them from keep coming at me. [(emphasis supplied).] It was after that colloquy that one of defendant s counsel first asserted that he thought the juror s comments are racist. See footnote 14 The trial judge s comments immediately following the juror s individual voir dire were telling, and merit review in full. After requesting that the juror excuse himself for a few moments and in the presence of counsel alone, she explained that her comments off the record earlier about excusing him one way or the other were precipitous. I m going to explain to you why the Court findings the Court made initially were precipitous. Number one, I have a specific recollection of the colloquy between the Court and most specifically Mr. [Jones] See footnote 15 who is the gentleman that had the conversation with [the juror] on Friday and Saturday. In fact, both Mr. [Jones] indicated that it was he and the other people who were approaching [the juror] to ask about the case and that [the juror] did not initially say anything to him. [The juror] just smiled and then this particular individual quoted another person and . . . he did say [that] this person repeated[] to him the comment about getting the rope and it was then that Mr. [Jones] stated that he then went to [the juror] and questioned [the juror] about it. He also indicated that at the end of [the juror] s tour, he again approached [the juror] and asked him had he gotten the rope, had he been to the hardware store and what I ask[ed] him [was] what did he mean by that, he was saying he went out earlier in the morning and then at the end of the day he comes back in so they checked on the Saturday morning, Mr. [Jones] again indicates that he, in fact, went to [the juror] and approached him again about it. Now, Mr. [Jones] indicates that he took offense to it and I don t recall in any event, colloquy with the Court they at any time said anything to [the juror] about taking offense to what he was saying, but it s clear to the Court that every conversation with [the juror] was initiated by Mr. [Jones], using that as a framework to reach the decision that I have reached, people within the work place often say things that are insensitive, whether they re remarks made by one racial group in the context of another, not every racially insensitive remark is necessarily a racist remark nor did it reflect predisposition. [The juror] does not deny he made the statement. He said he made the statement because he knew that s what he wanted - that s what they wanted to hear, that is he prejudice[d] and is being prejudice[d] by co-workers and co-workers basically go to him and he reacted in kind. As a result, the trial judge concluded that she was going to keep [the juror] on this jury, notwithstanding [defendant s] objections. She explained that there were not enough facts from which this Court could conclude that this individual is predisposed[.] The trial judge noted that she ha[d] made inquiry of [the juror] and [the juror] has indicated that he is not predisposed[.] Asking the juror to return and addressing the juror directly, the trial judge concluded as follows: I appreciate your honesty in coming forward. The Court has made a decision to permit you to continue at this juncture as a juror in this matter. You have indicated quite candidly, in the opinion of the Court, that the circumstances under which this statement was made, you have indicated to the Court that you re not predisposed and the Court is therefore satisfied with your answers at this point and ask[s] you [to] continue to serve as a juror. As that record clearly discloses, the trial judge conducted an exhaustive inquiry of the non-deliberating juror in question, concluding that he was candid and was not predisposed towards guilt. For that reason alone, the majority s holding that the trial judge erred when she failed to interview the remaining members of the panel to confirm that the juror did not communicate to them any preconceived notions of defendant s guilt[,] ante at ___ (slip op. at 2), is unsustainable. Despite that factual error, the majority nonetheless concludes that, [b]ecause the [trial] court made no effort to satisfy itself that the jury s impartiality had not been compromised by the suspect juror, we can have no confidence that the verdict was the product of a fair trial. . . . [Therefore,] we have no choice but to vacate defendant s conviction and death sentence and remand for a new trial. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 3). That conclusion is the product of unsupported speculation founded on a false premise: that the non-deliberating juror questioned had preconceived notions of defendant s guilt that could have been communicated to his fellow jurors and, hence, required exploration. The record shows, in contrast, that the trial judge specifically found the contrary. In that context, we have long held that the trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in determining the qualifications of jurors and that its exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S. Ct. 690, 13 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1965). That deference has a common sense basis: Trial courts conducting voir dire are best able to evaluate the credibility and sincerity of a prospective juror in a way that the record will never allow. State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 629 (2004). We have explained the governing principle thusly: Of necessity, a sound measure of discretion must be reposed in our trial courts to determine whether a given juror can well and truly discharge the grave responsibility entrusted or whether the juror s views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially interfere with the performance of that duty. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 256-57 (1987). Accord State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 104 (2002); State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 595 (2000) (noting that [i]t has also been observed that this Court is perhaps too far removed from the realities of the voir dire to appreciate the nuances concealed by a bloodless record ; therefore deference to the trial court is usually prudent (citation omitted)). Against that backdrop, the majority s lack of confidence in the fairness of defendant s trial simply is not based on the clear findings in the record. The trial judge -- an able, experienced and discerning judge - was in the best position to judge whether the juror was biased or predisposed towards guilt. Having had the opportunity to observe and question the juror, she satisfied herself that in fact the juror was not predisposed. Thus, one of the required logical underpinnings for the majority s analysis is simply missing: the now-challenged juror was not predisposed in respect of defendant s guilt and, thus, he could not have contaminated the remainder of the jury. Any presumption that reaches a different result is in error. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the questioned juror did not deliberate on defendant s guilt. As the majority recognizes, in an abundance of caution and without objection from counsel, the trial judge determined that [the questioned juror] would be designated as an alternate juror, removing any possibility that [the questioned juror] would sit as a deliberating juror. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 11) (footnote omitted). Yet, despite those prophylactic measures, the majority nonetheless presumes both predisposition and taint of his fellow jurors, a presumption that is unwarranted in this record. We are better guided by our long-standing rule: No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict. We say possibility and not certainty, for if it were certain that the error led to an unjust result, the reviewing court would be constrained to order the just result, which, on that hypothesis, would be an acquittal, except in the unusual case in which it could be said the error prevented the trier of facts from even reaching the merits. So, too, a probability that the error resulted in a false verdict should, if it were the standard for intervention, drive the appellate court to order the judgment which the jury probably would have reached but for that error. And since a reviewing court could rarely say an error either certainly or probably induced a false verdict, either test would disadvantage a defendant. Defendants fare better if a new trial may be ordered upon a possibility of injustice. Still, not any possibility can be enough for a rerun of the trial. The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. [State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971).] Because, on this record, it cannot be said that the unsubstantiated and rejected possibility of a non-deliberating juror s predisposition somehow tainted those jurors who did deliberate and convict defendant, I cannot join the majority. Instead, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant s application for post-conviction relief. The logic of that reasoning is overshadowed by its irony. If the passage of time alone renders it somehow unfair to remand the matter for a hearing on whether the questioned juror was predisposed and, if so, whether that predisposition tainted the jury, how can it be any less unfair to require an entirely new death penalty trial, one covering events that are older than those which occurred at the trial, and yet still have confidence in the outcome as sought by the majority? The question, of course, is rhetorical; no answer is expected of it. See footnote 16 A far better procedure -- a remand to voir dire the jury as a whole -- is both available and not revolutionary. We have explained that [w]here the court concludes there is a realistic possibility that information with the capacity to prejudice defendant s right to a fair trial may have reached members of jury, it should conduct a voir dire to determine whether any exposure has occurred. If there is any indication of such exposure or knowledge of extra-judicial information, the court should question those jurors individually in order to determine precisely what was learned, and establish whether they are capable of fulfilling their duty to judge the facts in an impartial and unbiased manner, based strictly on the evidence presented in court. [State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 86-87 (1988) (footnotes omitted).] The procedure to be followed in those instances also is well-settled: The court is obliged to interrogate the juror, in the presence of counsel, to determine if there is a taint; if so, the inquiry must expand to determine whether any other jurors have been tainted thereby. The trial court must then determine whether the trial may proceed after excusing the tainted juror or jurors, or whether a mistrial is necessary. The decision to grant a new trial based on jury taint resides in the discretion of the trial court[.] [State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 558 (2001) (citations omitted).] Standing alone, the passage of time is insufficient to justify jettisoning either a lengthy guilt-phase and penalty-phase trial, extensive appeals or the significant efforts expended on post-conviction relief proceedings. Juxtaposed against the expansive nature of the relief granted by the majority, a limited remand of the type proposed here is neither novel nor outside the heartland of what trial courts do everyday. Specifically, in New Jersey, post-trial limited remands have been ordered and used successfully in the past. See State v. Bisaccia, 319 N.J. Super. 1, 16-20 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that the mere passage of time should not by itself preclude a remand and remanding, six years after guilty verdicts, to determine whether hearing is feasible and, if so, extent of jury taint), appeal after remand sub nom. State v. De Stefano, 339 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Reevey, 159 N.J. Super. 130, 135 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 471 (1978) (remanding for hearing concerning the allegation that juror . . . was sleeping during all or part of the summations and charge ). Similar limited remands have been used in the federal courts. Porter v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 898, 900, 107 S. Ct. 298, 299, 93 L. Ed. 2d 272, 274 (1986) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (stating that [w]hen a substantial question of juror bias is presented to the trial court, as it was in this case, we have held that the defendant is entitled to a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120, 104 S. Ct. 453, 456, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267, 274 (1983) (per curiam) (noting that, in matters concerning juror taint, [p]ost-trial hearings are adequately tailored to this task ); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S. Ct. 940, 948, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 89 (1982) (O Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that, on remand, [a] hearing permits counsel to probe the juror s memory, his reasons for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his actions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror s demeanor under cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of the particular circumstances of the case"); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954); United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1993). In the final analysis, questioning jurors after a trial is an extraordinary procedure that should be invoked only when there is a strong representation that a defendant may have been harmed by juror misconduct. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 154 (1998). It is viewed as an extraordinary procedure because due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer and held in this case. [Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S. Ct. at 946, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 86 (footnote omitted).] We do less harm if we approach defendant s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a measured way. For that reason, if we were to conclude, as the majority does, that defendant s trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective in respect of the retention of the non-deliberating juror, then the better approach would be to remand the cause to the same trial judge to conduct a fuller hearing. See footnote 17 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-24 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON APPEAL FROM Superior Court, Law Division STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DONALD LOFTIN, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 5, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto During the course of the trial, we will have recesses, such as at lunch time, and we ll have weekend recesses. You are directed not to discuss this case with anyone. That includes jurors from other panels, family members, friends. You re not to begin any discussions about this case until all of the evidence has been presented, until the attorneys have given their closing arguments, until you ve heard the final instructions from the Court. . . . If there should at any time be anyone who would attempt to approach you and discuss any aspect of this case, you are to report that fact to one of the Sheriff s Officers who have been assigned to this particular trial. an analysis of the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, the defendant s history of delinquency or criminality, family situation, financial resources, including . . . employment history, personal habits, the disposition of any charge made against any codefendants, the defendant s history of civil commitment, any disposition which arose out of charges suspended pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:4-6 including the records of the disposition of those charges and any acquittal by reason of insanity pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:4-1, and any other matters that the probation officer deems relevant or the court directs to be included. The defendant shall disclose any information concerning any history of civil commitment. The report shall also include a medical history of the defendant and a complete psychological evaluation of the defendant in any case in which the defendant is being sentenced for a first or second degree crime involving violence . . . . [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b.]