Title: Downs v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 220, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PIERRE DOWNS, 
§ 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  No. 220, 2018 
 
 
Appellant, 
§  
 
 
 
§ Court Below—Superior Court  
 
v. 
 
§ of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
§  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§  
 
 
 
§ Cr. ID. K1610003784A&B 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 9, 2018 
Decided: 
March 4, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of March 2019, after careful consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Pierre Downs appeals his convictions of first-degree robbery, third-
degree assault, theft of a firearm, second-degree conspiracy, and possession of a 
firearm by a person prohibited.  The charges stemmed from an assault and robbery 
of Jose Acobe outside the Golden Fleece Tavern on Loockerman Street in Dover. 
(2) 
Downs raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the Superior 
Court erred by admitting a hearsay statement relating to whether the SUV that 
Downs raided after the assault of Acobe contained a gun—the alleged theft of which 
formed the basis of the firearm-theft and person-prohibited charges—and that such 
2 
error was not harmless.  Second, Downs argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to support four of his convictions. 
(3) 
We reject Downs’ insufficient evidence claims, but we agree that the 
Superior Court erred by admitting the hearsay statement, and we conclude that the 
error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we affirm Downs’ convictions of first-degree 
robbery, third-degree assault, and second-degree conspiracy and vacate in part 
Downs’ convictions of theft of a firearm and possession of a firearm by a person 
prohibited. 
* * * 
(4) 
On the evening of September 23, 2016, Acobe went to the Golden 
Fleece Tavern.  Acobe drove a white Chevrolet Blazer (“SUV”) that he had borrowed 
from his aunt and parked it across the street from the bar.  After ordering a beer, 
Acobe left the bar and returned to the SUV to apply cologne. While outside, Acobe 
noticed a group of men looking at him strangely.  After this encounter, Acobe 
returned to the bar to pay for his beer. Several of the men from outside then entered 
the Golden Fleece and stared at Acobe. The men from outside then left the Golden 
Fleece.  
(5) 
Feeling uncomfortable and scared, Acobe also decided to leave the 
Golden Fleece. But as soon as Acobe walked into the street, a man punched him in 
the head, knocking him unconscious.  When Acobe regained consciousness, he saw 
3 
a crowd of people standing around him and discovered that his cell phone and wallet 
were missing. 
(6) 
Emergency medical technicians and Corporal Brian Wood of the Dover 
Police Department responded to the scene.  While emergency medical personnel 
attended Acobe, a Golden Fleece employee told Corporal Wood that something had 
been taken from the SUV.  Upon approaching the SUV, Corporal Wood noticed that 
the driver’s side rear door was open a couple of inches.  Corporal Wood inspected 
the SUV and found a box of shotgun shells on the driver’s seat. 
(7) 
Meanwhile, Acobe was taken to Kent General Hospital.  After 
inspecting the SUV, Corporal Wood went to the hospital to interview Acobe.  Acobe 
told Corporal Wood that “unknown black males had struck him and taken his 
phone.”1 
(8) 
Upon his return to police headquarters, Wood reviewed footage from 
surveillance cameras near the Golden Fleece.  The footage showed men walking 
from the front of the tavern to Acobe’s SUV, entering Acobe’s SUV, removing an 
object, and leaving.  The footage then showed the men split up and enter two 
vehicles: a silver Mercedes-Benz and an orange Dodge Charger.  After reviewing the 
footage, Corporal Wood turned the investigation over to Detective Christopher 
Bumgarner. 
                                         
1 App. to Am. Op. Br. at A291 (“A__” hereafter). 
4 
(9) 
Detective Bumgarner examined more surveillance footage that had 
been captured earlier that night.  In the footage, he saw a group of people, one of 
whom he identified to be Downs, walk to Irish Mike’s, another bar.  When the group 
left Irish Mike’s, they headed toward the tavern. As they were walking, one of the 
members of the group peered inside Acobe’s SUV. 
(10) In the footage, Detective Bumgarner saw a few members of the group 
entered the Golden Fleece while Downs and other members of the group waited 
outside.  As mentioned, Acobe then walked out of the Golden Fleece only to be 
punched in the head by an assailant.  Detective Bumgarner identified that assailant 
as Downs.  After Acobe fell, Detective Bumgarner could not see whether Downs and 
the group were kicking Acobe or taking his belongings due to a light pole obscuring 
the camera’s view. 
(11) Following the assault, Downs and two others from the group 
approached Acobe’s SUV.  Based on his training and experience, Detective 
Bumgarner thought that the two others were acting as lookouts for Downs.  One of 
these lookouts opened the front door of the SUV while Downs opened the back door 
and removed “a large, long object.”2  Detective Bumgarner believed the object was 
either a rifle or a shotgun based on the butt, barrel protrusion, and shape of the object, 
but also acknowledged that it could have been a BB gun or other air rifle.  Downs 
                                         
2 A72. 
5 
then walked away from the SUV at a brisk pace, directly passing under a camera at 
Bradford and Loockerman Streets which allowed Detective Bumgarner to identify 
him. 
(12) Other cameras showed the orange Charger and the silver Mercedes-
Benz drive away.  The Mercedes-Benz followed the Charger until the Mercedes-
Benz stopped at a townhouse on Reed Street.  There, a person got out of the 
Mercedes-Benz, took out a long object,3 walked to the townhouse, and left the 
townhouse without the object.  The Charger stopped at Downs’ home. 
(13) After reviewing the surveillance footage, Detective Bumgarner 
interviewed Acobe at his home and photographed his injuries.  Acobe told Detective 
Bumgarner that after his assault, he “discovered that his cousin, Fruto Cantres, that 
his [Cantres’] shotgun had been removed from the vehicle.”4 Additionally, Acobe 
told Detective Bumgarner that Cantres “had left [a shotgun] in the vehicle and 
described it as a 12-gauge shotgun.”5 
(14) While at Acobe’s home, Detective Bumgarner collected approximately 
fifteen 12-gauge shotgun shells and a shotgun magazine.  After further investigation, 
                                         
3 Although Detective Bumgarner testified that the object appeared to be a rifle or a shotgun, having 
reviewed the video, we believe that a reasonable juror could reject that characterization. 
4 A266. 
5 A273. 
6 
Detective Bumgarner discovered that Cantres had purchased a Marlin Model 55, 12-
gauge shotgun in Newark, Delaware, about two years before Acobe’s assault. 
(15) A week after the robbery, Corporal Wood found the orange Charger 
parked outside of Downs’ home and the silver Mercedes-Benz parked down the 
street. 
(16) The police searched Downs’ home pursuant to a warrant but they did 
not find Acobe’s cell phone, wallet, or Cantres’ shotgun. 
(17) On January 1, 2018, Cantres died of a chronic illness.  He was 
accordingly unable to testify at Downs’ subsequent trial. 
* * * 
(18) On appeal, Downs first argues that the Superior Court erred by 
admitting the following testimony by Detective Bumgarner regarding what Acobe 
had told him during the investigation: “[Acobe] then later discovered that his cousin, 
Fruto Cantres, that his shotgun had been removed from the vehicle.”6   
(19) At trial, before Detective Bumgarner testified, Acobe took the stand. 
Acobe testified that he learned that Cantres never recovered his shotgun, even 
though Acobe also testified that he “never” got the SUV back after the assault.  And 
Acobe testified that “I don’t remember” in response to the question “In the car that 
evening was there a firearm?”  These statements gave Downs reason to believe that 
                                         
6 Am. Op. Br. 4; A266. 
7 
Detective Bumgarner would offer inadmissible double hearsay when testifying 
about his interview of Acobe. 
(20) According to Downs, Detective Bumgarner’s testimony was 
inadmissible double hearsay because Acobe’s statement to Detective Bumgarner was 
not based on Acobe’s personal knowledge, but rather on a later out-of-court 
statement made by Cantres to Acobe that Cantres’ shotgun had been in the SUV.7  
Downs’ contention regarding the basis of Acobe’s knowledge of this fact was borne 
out by Acobe’s later testimony that he had no personal knowledge that there was a 
shotgun in the SUV and that he only later learned from Cantres that Cantres’ shotgun 
was in the SUV that night.8 
(21) The Superior Court nevertheless admitted Detective Bumgarner’s 
testimony because it thought that the testimony was admissible via 11 Del. C. 
§ 3507, which provides that “the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness 
who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence 
with substantive independent testimonial value.” 
                                         
7 We note that the State initially offered Bumgarner—not Acobe—to testify as to Acobe’s prior 
statement.  A263.  By the time Acobe testified as to the contents of his prior statement, the Superior 
Court had already admitted the prior statement.  
8 A322.  In fairness to the Superior Court, Acobe gave that testimony after the Superior Court had 
already ruled on the hearsay objection.  Still, we think that given the testimony that had been 
presented, Acobe’s comments to Detective Bumgarner were more likely than not to have been 
hearsay, and if there were questions as to the admissibility of the testimony in question, the 
Superior Court could have held a hearing outside of the presence of the jury to determine if that 
was the case. 
8 
(22) Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion.  But we review de novo rulings where the alleged error infringes upon a 
constitutionally protected right—here, the right to confrontation.  If we find error, 
we next examine whether the error was harmless.9  A constitutional error is harmless 
only if the State has proven “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”10  We must reverse if we find that the 
error was not harmless.11 
(23)  “If double hearsay is being offered into evidence, each aspect must 
qualify independently as an exception to the hearsay rule.”12 Section 3507 acts as 
such an exception, permitting the admission of out-of-court statements of a present 
witness available for cross-examination.  
                                         
9 We automatically reverse where a constitutional error is structural, Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 
324 (Del. 2003) (discussing the six types of structural error, each inapplicable here), overruled on 
other grounds by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016), but otherwise, we conduct a harmless 
error analysis. 
10 Dawson v. State, 608 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Del. 1992). 
11 Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 11 (Del. 1987) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967)); Williams v. State, 141 A.3d 1019, 1035 (Del. 2016). 
12 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1152, 1162 (Del. 1997). 
9 
(24) Although § 3507 creates an exception to one layer of hearsay, it does 
not permit a court to admit otherwise-inadmissible embedded hearsay within the 
§ 3507 statement13—in this case, a statement from a deceased declarant, Cantres. 
(25) With respect to Detective Bumgarner’s testimony, § 3507 provided an 
exception for the first layer of hearsay—Acobe’s out-of-court statement to Detective 
Bumgarner—because Acobe was present and available for cross-examination.  But 
§ 3507 does not cover the second layer of hearsay—Cantres’ presumed out-of-court 
statement to Acobe.  Neither would Cantres’ presumed statement to Acobe have 
satisfied any other hearsay exception, such as the exception for statements made 
under the belief of imminent death.  Accordingly, Detective Bumgarner’s testimony 
regarding what Acobe presumably learned from Cantres about the shotgun is 
inadmissible hearsay, and its admission deprived Downs of his constitutional right 
to confrontation. 
(26) The State argues on appeal that the Superior Court did not err in 
admitting Detective Bumgarner’s testimony because § 3507(b) does not require that 
the witness offer consistent trial testimony.  But § 3507(b) does not render double 
                                         
13 For example, in Demby, the Superior Court, applying § 3507, admitted the victim’s out-of-court 
statement to a police officer that a third party had told the victim that the third party saw the 
defendant shoot the victim. We reversed, holding that “any hearsay within [the victim’s] section 
3507 statement was inadmissible unless it was permitted by an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. 
at 1161. Because the victim herself had not seen who shot her, the victim’s out-of-court statement 
telling the officer what the third party told her constituted hearsay within hearsay. Therefore, “the 
statement attributed to [the third party was] inadmissible hearsay included within hearsay.” Id. 
(quoting D.R.E. 805).  
 
10 
hearsay admissible, which is the issue in this case.  Furthermore, the testimony in 
this case is not fundamentally inconsistent.  Therefore, § 3507(b) is irrelevant. 
(27) When conducting harmless-error analyses after finding error in the 
admission of evidence, we distinguish between garden-variety evidentiary missteps 
and “evidentiary errors of constitutional magnitude.”  Where the error did not 
implicate constitutional rights, “[t]he well-established rule is that where the evidence 
exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, 
error in admitting the evidence is harmless.”14  But where, as here, the error violated 
protected constitutional rights, an error is harmless only if the State proves “beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.”15 
(28) We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict 
would have been the same without Detective Bumgarner’s testimony.  Although the 
jurors viewed the videos themselves,16 it is reasonable to think that their viewing 
was influenced by Detective Bumgarner’s testimony on whether there was in fact a 
shotgun in the SUV.  That fact was critical and testimony regarding that fact likely 
affected the jury’s determination that the item Downs removed was a shotgun.  
                                         
14 Johnson v. State, 587 A.2d 444, 451 (Del. 1991). 
15 Dawson v. State, 608 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Del. 1992); Johnson, 587 A.2d at 451; Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
16 To be sure, the footage from the Bradford and Loockerman intersection camera depicted Downs 
walking away from the SUV with an object that reasonable jurors might conclude was a long gun. 
11 
(29) There was a substantial gap in the State’s proof of whether there was a 
shotgun in the SUV.  At trial, Detectives Bumgarner and Michael Wilson, another 
investigating officer, acknowledged that they could not say whether the object taken 
from the SUV might have been—besides a shotgun—a BB gun, pellet rifle, or air 
rifle.17  None of those latter weapons are firearms within the meaning of the firearms 
charges that Downs faces.18 
(30) During its closing statement, the State itself highlighted that this gap in 
its case was filled with the challenged hearsay statement: “How do you know it’s 
really a gun? . . . What is the evidence to support that?  First, Mr. Acobe told the 
officers initially, yes, my cousin’s shotgun was in the car and it was stolen.”19 
(31) Absent Detective Bumgarner’s testimony as to what Cantres told 
Acobe, we think a reasonable juror could very well have entertained reasonable 
doubt as to whether Downs took a firearm from the SUV or instead a non-firearm 
object and therefore could have voted to acquit Downs on the firearms charges.  
(32) Because a reasonable juror might have voted to acquit and thus changed 
the outcome of the trial, we cannot find that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We accordingly vacate Downs’ convictions for theft of a firearm 
and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. 
                                         
17 See A134, A190. 
18 See 22 Del. C. § 222(12) (“‘Firearm’ . . . does not include a BB gun.”). 
19 A437. 
12 
* * * 
(33) Downs also raises insufficient evidence challenges as to his convictions 
of first degree robbery and second degree conspiracy.20 
(34) This Court reviews “claims of insufficient evidence de novo[] to 
determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”21 
We note that this is a substantially different standard of review than what we applied 
in the harmless-error analysis above. 
(35) As recited above, there were substantial facts, each well-established by 
admissible and admitted evidence, that support Downs’ convictions of the robbery, 
assault, and conspiracy charges. 
(36) We also note that Downs’ argument that the State failed to prove 
conspiracy because “there was no evidence that [he] intended to aid or abet anyone 
in committing a theft of personal property from [Acobe]”22 is misplaced.  It appears 
that Downs has conflated the requirements of conspiracy with those of accomplice 
liability; intent to aid or abet someone else is not a required element of conspiracy.23  
                                         
20 Downs also raises insufficient evidence challenges as to his convictions of theft of a firearm 
possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, but because we vacate those convictions due to the 
hearsay issue, we need not reach whether they were supported by sufficient evidence. 
21 Neal v. State, 3 A.3d 222, 223 (Del. 2010). 
22 Am. Op. Br. 26. 
23 11 Del. C. § 511–13 (conspiracy defined; conspiracy only requires “intent to promote or 
facilitate” the commission of a crime). 
13 
That said, the evidence produced at trial readily permitted a rational trier of fact to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had proven the elements of 
conspiracy, and Downs was not prejudiced by this slight misstatement. 
* * * 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED as to Downs’ convictions of first-degree robbery, third-degree 
assault, and second-degree conspiracy and VACATED as to Downs’ convictions of 
theft of a firearm and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
Justice