Title: State Of Florida v. Warren Stang
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-1409
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1409 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WARREN STANG,  
Respondent. 
 
 
[July 8, 2010] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Stang v. State, 24 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), 
pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.  After further 
consideration, we conclude that jurisdiction was improvidently granted.  
Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss this review proceeding. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs with an opinion. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents 
PERRY, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
- 2 - 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring. 
 
I concur with the decision of the majority to discharge jurisdiction but write 
separately with regard to the dissent’s attempt to improperly expand the 
permissible scope of review of this Court.  It is a well established principle of law 
that appellate review is limited to the record on appeal.  See E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co. v. Native Hammock Nursery, Inc., 698 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 3rd 
DCA 1997); Fine v. Carney Bank of Broward County, 508 So. 2d 558, 559 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1987); Finchum v. Vogel, 194 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966).  The 
dissent candidly disregards this rule by basing its opposition to the discharge of 
jurisdiction on matters not included in the record on appeal.  The matters relied on 
by the dissent were first introduced to these proceedings through an improper 
appendix to an amicus curiae brief (which violated appellate rules by attempting to 
generate new issues) filed with this Court, well after the decision of the Second 
District was final.  In fact, the dissent faults the Second District for failing to 
communicate with the trial court or to seek evidence that was not in the record 
before it.  See dissenting op. at 4.  To the contrary, the Second District followed 
very clear appellate rules and acted within its permissible scope of review and this 
Court must do the same. 
 
- 3 - 
 
For these reasons, I agree with the decision to discharge jurisdiction.  
 
 
PERRY, J., dissenting. 
A seasoned criminal is being wrongly set free from a twenty-seven-year 
prison term because of a mistake.  In brief, the district court below ruled that Stang 
must be immediately released because the trial court sentenced him to only a two-
month term and that period has long since expired.1  This ruling, however, is 
incorrect.  At the sentencing hearing on March 30, 2005, the trial judge addressed 
Stang as follows:    
 
Despite admitting to the violation of probation, I don’t believe 
that you’ve ever taken responsibility for this or that you have shown 
any remorse whatsoever, so while you admitted to it, you continued to 
blame shift and to um—insist that you’ve been framed and it’s some 
grand conspiracy, despite the fact that your criminal history stems 
back all the way to ’74, involving crimes of dishonesty from 
shoplifting, non-sufficient funds, grand theft, and in fact, the history 
indicates that you have been arrested on approximately twenty-five 
separate occasions with crimes involving dishonesty.  And yet you sit 
here today and show absolutely no remorse. . . .  
 
I think you’re a consummate con-man and unfortunately for 
you the time is up.  I hereby sentence you . . . for a total of twenty-
                                          
 
 
1.  See Stang v. State, 24 So. 3d 566, 570-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“Under 
these circumstances, Stang can be legally held pursuant only to the original 
sentence imposed on March 30, 2005 . . . .  Since the sentence imposed on March 
30, 2005, expired years ago, Stang is entitled to immediate release.”); see also id. 
at 567-68 (“The practical effect of this sentencing order was that Stang would 
serve about two months in prison and then be released with no further 
supervision.”). 
 
- 4 - 
seven years in the Department of Corrections with credit for 1,915 
days. 
 
Mr. Stang, I hope you learn your lesson and I wish you luck. 
(Emphasis added.)  Had the district court below reviewed the transcript of this 
hearing,2 the court would have known that the judge most certainly did not 
sentence Stang to two months’ imprisonment.  Not by a long shot. 
Unfortunately, this Court feels powerless to stop this miscarriage of justice 
because this Court lacks jurisdiction.  This Court says that the district court’s 
ruling does not conflict with any other rulings of Florida’s district courts or of this 
Court.  I disagree.  At a minimum, the present decision of the district court 
conflicts with this Court’s well-settled precedent governing the procedural bar that 
applies to habeas corpus petitions, as explained more fully below.  But further, the 
decision of the district court also violates basic notions of fair play and essential 
justice.  The citizens of this state are entitled to receive reasonable protection under 
the law from seasoned criminals who have been duly tried and convicted and 
sentenced to lengthy prison terms.  This Court is duty-bound under the law to 
protect all citizens of this state from injustice.  The decision below surely conflicts 
                                          
 
 
2.  As explained more fully below, the district court did not request adequate 
briefing in this case or request or review the trial court’s sentencing record.  
Instead, the district court based its ruling solely on sentencing documents that 
Stang himself selectively filed along with his petition. 
 
- 5 - 
with this Court’s vast body of case law in many respects, but if it truly does not, I 
respectfully ask, why not? 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On January 14, 2000, Stang pled guilty to twenty-four criminal counts, 
including racketeering, grand theft, loan broker fraud, money laundering, and 
conspiracy to commit racketeering.  He was sentenced on April 12, 2000, in the 
Fifteenth Circuit Court in Palm Beach County to five years’ imprisonment on 
fifteen counts, to run concurrently, and to three years’ probation on the remaining 
nine counts, also to run concurrently.  He served his term of imprisonment and was 
released on probation on September 6, 2002.  Less than a month later, he violated 
probation by committing another grand theft offense and by having in his 
possession a firearm.  He was sentenced to a twenty-one-month term on the new 
charge.  After he completed that sentence, the trial court on March 30, 2005, 
conducted a violation of probation (VOP) hearing on the remaining nine counts of 
the original sentence and resentenced him to twenty-seven years, with credit for 
1915 days. 
 
On April 21, 2005, Stang appealed the VOP judgment and sentence to the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal in West Palm Beach, raising a scoresheet issue and 
several other issues.  While the appeal was pending, he was committed to the 
Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) on May 2, 2005.  Then, on June 6, 2005, 
 
- 6 - 
DOC faxed the trial court an inquiry, asking the trial court to clarify whether the 
1915-day credit was to be applied to the total sentence, in which case Stang’s total 
prison time would be approximately twenty-two years, or whether it was to be 
applied to each of the nine counts, in which case Stang would be entitled to 
immediate release.  The trial court responded on June 7, 2005, with a corrected 
sentencing order indicating that the 1915-day credit was to be applied to the total 
sentence.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed the VOP 
judgment and sentence.  Stang v. State, 937 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). 
 
Stang later filed four proceedings with respect to the 1915-day credit 
provision in the VOP sentence, in four different courts.  First, he filed a motion 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in 2007 in trial court, raising 
various postconviction issues including a claim that the “time served” portion of 
the sentence was incorrect.  The trial court denied the motion as untimely.  Stang 
appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded: 
 
Warren Stang seeks appellate review of an order that denied his 
rule 3.850 motion as untimely.  We reverse and remand in part.  
Within his fifth point, Stang takes issue with the “time served” 
provisions of his March 2005 sentence imposed following a plea to 
violations of probation.  Stang's claim is timely and should be 
considered on the merits to the extent his challenge is that the “jail 
time served” award is incorrect or contrary to the 2005 violation of 
probation plea.  Any challenge to the Department of Corrections' 
interpretation of the sentencing documents or the award of “credit for 
time previously served in prison” shall be presented through an 
administrative grievance. 
 
 
- 7 - 
Stang v. State, 976 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).  On remand, the trial court 
denied the “time served” claim on the merits, adopting the State’s position that 
Stang had submitted no authority to support his claim that the 1915-day credit was 
to be applied to each count, not to the total sentence.  Stang did not appeal the 
decision. 
 
Second, Stang filed a habeas corpus petition in 2007 in the Nineteenth 
Circuit Court in Okeechobee County, where he was detained.  He claimed that he 
had not been properly credited with the “time served” award in the manner 
prescribed by the trial court.  The Nineteenth Circuit Court dismissed the petition 
without prejudice based on Stang’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  
Third, Stang filed another habeas petition in 2008 in the Tenth Circuit Court in 
Hardee County, where he was then detained.  He claimed that the 1915-day credit 
should have been applied to each count, not to the total sentence, and that he was 
entitled to immediate release.  The Tenth Circuit Court denied the petition.  And 
finally, Stang filed a certiorari petition in the Second District Court of Appeal in 
Lakeland seeking review of the order of the Tenth Circuit Court denying his 
habeas petition. 
 
Because Stang was seeking immediate release, the Second District Court of 
Appeal treated the certiorari petition as a habeas petition.  That court then relied on 
this Court’s decisions in Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center v. T.O., 684 
 
- 8 - 
So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996), and Murray v. Regier, 872 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2002),3 and 
concluded that the trial court had erred in three respects in notifying DOC that the 
1915-day credit was to be applied to the total sentence, not to each count: (i) the 
trial court had no jurisdiction to correct the sentence during the pendency of the 
direct appeal of the VOP judgment and sentence; (ii) the corrected sentence was 
entered in violation of Stang’s due process rights because he was given no notice 
of the correction and was not present when the sentence was corrected; and (iii) the 
corrected sentence violated double jeopardy principles because it rescinded jail 
credit that had already been awarded.  Stang v. State, 24 So. 3d 566, 569-70 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2009).  The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that Stang was entitled 
to immediate release.  The State sought review. 
II.  THE VOP SENTENCING HEARING AND ORDER 
 
 
The trial court held a lengthy VOP sentencing hearing on March 30, 2005, 
and addressed Stang directly and frankly as follows: 
 
Despite admitting to the violation of probation, I don’t believe 
that you’ve ever taken responsibility for this or that you have shown 
any remorse whatsoever, so while you admitted to it, you continued to 
blame shift and to um—insist that you’ve been framed and it’s some 
grand conspiracy, despite the fact that your criminal history stems 
                                          
 
 
3.  I note that both Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center v. T.O., 684 
So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996), and Murray v. Regier, 872 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2002), were 
pretrial habeas corpus cases, and to the extent the Second District Court of Appeal 
relied on those cases to resolve this posttrial habeas corpus case, the district court 
decision conflicts with this Court’s precedent. 
 
- 9 - 
back all the way to ’74, involving crimes of dishonesty from 
shoplifting, non-sufficient funds, grand theft, and in fact, the history 
indicates that you have been arrested on approximately twenty-five 
separate occasions with crimes involving dishonesty.  And yet you sit 
here today and show absolutely no remorse.  You continue to insist 
that this is some grand conspiracy that some detective, who entered 
your life in 1990, some decade and a half after you began your 
criminal career of committing dishonest crimes, is responsible for 
your demise.  
 
I think you’re a consummate con-man and unfortunately for 
you the time is up.  I hereby sentence you in case number 95-3736, I 
find you guilty of the violation of probation and I sentence [you] in 
counts 44, and 65, to five years in the Department of Corrections, to 
be served consecutively.  To count 72, to which I sentence you to five 
years in the Department of Corrections.  On counts 78 and 48, I 
sentence you to five years consecutive in the Department of 
Corrections.  On counts 70, 77, and 81, I sentence you to five years 
consecutive and in count 75, I sentence you to two years consecutive 
for a total of twenty-seven years in the Department of Corrections 
with credit for 1,915 days. 
 
Mr. Stang, I hope you learn your lesson and I wish you luck. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
The trial court then took a brief recess and returned and, because the 
individual sentences did not add up to a total of twenty-seven years, clarified the 
sentence as follows: 
 
All right.  For clarification, my intent is to give the top of the 
guidelines without bumping a grid for twenty-seven years.  So, you’re 
hereby sentenced to five years in the Department of Corrections on 
counts 44, and 65.  Five years in the Department of Corrections on 
count 72, consecutive.  Five years in the Department of Corrections 
on counts 78 and 48, consecutive.  Five years on counts 70 and 77, 
consecutive.  Five years on counts 81 consecutive. Two years 
consecutive on count 75, for a total of twenty-seven years in the 
Department of Corrections with 1,915 days credit. 
 
 
- 10 - 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Later that same day, the above oral pronouncement was transcribed onto a 
standardized two-page sentencing form, and the form was signed by the trial judge.  
On the first page of the form, the relevant blank was filled in with “1915” and the 
applicable box was checked off and a written notation was added (denoted below 
in quotations): 
It is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of 1915 
days as credit for time incarcerated prior to imposition of this 
sentence.  It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences 
imposed for the counts specified in the order shall run 
 
[x] consecutive to “each other for a total of 27 years.” 
 
On the second page of the sentencing order, another box was checked off, and one 
blank was filled in with “1915” and another blank was left empty: 
[x] 
it is further ordered that the defendant be allowed 1915 days 
 
time served between day of arrest as a violator following 
 
release from prison to the date of re-sentencing.  The 
 
Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit 
 
and shall compute and apply credit for time served on 
 
case/count ________________.  (Offenses committed on or 
 
after October 1, 1989, but before January 1, 1994.) 
 
 
Because the above two pages were contradictory, DOC on June 6, 2005, 
faxed the trial court the following inquiry:  
 
Inmate Stang was sentenced to the department’s custody March 
30, 2005, upon revocation of probation to consecutive terms of 5 
years and a consecutive 2 year term, for an overall twenty-seven (27) 
years state prison in the aforementioned counts. 
 
Based on the documentation attached in exhibit 1 [which is 
page 1 of the sentencing order], a total of 1,915 days credit was 
 
- 11 - 
ordered on the overall 27 years.  However, in exhibit 2 [which is 
page 2 of the sentencing order], the court is allowing 1,915 days 
“plus” the original county jail time and time served in the 
department’s custody from counts 1 thru 3, 8, 30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 42, 
51, 56, 60, 62 and 64, in accordance with Tripp v. State.  The original 
term of this case was 5 years, or 1,825 days.  To award the credit as 
provided in exhibit 2 would result in a potential immediate release. 
 
The department is requesting the Court to clarify within 3 
working days as to (#1) the Court’s intention of the 1,915 days to be 
applied as reflected in exhibit 1; or (#2) in exhibit 2; and (#3) is it the 
Court’s intention to apply 1,915 days as violation of probation credit, 
original county jail time of 706 days and time served in the 
department’s custody to each count. 
 
It appears the 1,915 days is 729 days violation of probation 
credit, 706 days original county jail time, 317 days time served in the 
department’s custody and an additional 163 days jail credit.  Thus, 
awarding the original county jail time and time served would 
duplicate credit.  
 
Your earliest and immediate attention in this matter is greatly 
appreciated.   
 
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court on June 7, 2005, faxed DOC a corrected copy of 
page two of the sentencing order.  On the corrected copy, the box that had formerly 
been checked off was now left blank, and the line that had formerly contained 
“1915” was also left blank. In light of this corrected page, DOC concluded that 
Stang’s VOP sentence was twenty-seven years’ imprisonment, minus 1915 days 
credit, for a total sentence of approximately twenty-two years. 
III.  JURISDICTION 
 
Stang contends, and the present majority opinion agrees, that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in 
Stang v. State, 24 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).  I disagree.  This Court has held 
 
- 12 - 
in innumerable cases, in both published and unpublished decisions, that a prisoner 
cannot use habeas corpus to litigate or relitigate issues that could have been, should 
have been, or were raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.  
See, e.g., Denson v. State, 775 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 2000) (“[A]n extraordinary 
writ petition cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues that were or could have 
been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.”); Mills v. 
Dugger, 574 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 1990) (“[H]abeas corpus is not to be used for 
obtaining additional appeals of issues which were raised, or should have been 
raised, on direct appeal or which were waived at trial or which could have, should 
have, or have been, raised in prior postconviction filings.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); White v. Dugger, 511 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1987) (“[H]abeas 
corpus is not a vehicle for obtaining additional appeals of issues which were raised, 
or should have been raised, on direct appeal or which were waived at trial or which 
could have, should have, or have been, raised in [prior postconviction] 
proceedings.”). 
 
In the present case, according to the plain language of the decision under 
review, the Second District Court of Appeal violated this principle.  In the opinion 
below, the district court stated that Stang first raised a court-based challenge to the 
corrected sentencing order in the rule 3.850 proceeding, which was denied on the 
merits on April 18, 2008.  At that point, he could have, should have, or did raise all 
 
- 13 - 
justiciable issues with respect to that order.  Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
Stang was given that opportunity, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that 
he was later given another opportunity to challenge the same corrected order anew, 
this time in a different court—the Tenth Circuit Court in Hardee County—in a 
habeas proceeding.  And finally, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that 
Stang was given yet another opportunity to challenge the corrected order in yet 
another court—the Second District Court of Appeal itself—in yet another habeas 
proceeding, this time to review the Tenth Circuit Court’s habeas ruling. Thus, 
according to the plain language of the opinion, Stang, through the use of habeas 
corpus, was given three separate bites at the same corrected sentence “apple” in 
three different courts. 
 
To the extent Stang claims that the corrected sentencing order was void 
because it was entered during the pendency of his direct appeal and the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to enter it and that a claim of lack of jurisdiction can be raised 
at any time, Stang has overlooked the plain language of rule 3.850, which 
addresses such jurisdictional claims:  
 
(a) Grounds for Motion. The following grounds may be claims 
for relief from judgment or release from custody by a person who has 
been tried and found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere before a court established by the laws of Florida: 
 
(1) The judgment was entered or sentence was imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State 
of Florida. 
 
(2) The court did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment. 
 
- 14 - 
 
(3) The court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence. 
 
(4) The sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. 
 
(5) The plea was involuntary. 
 
(6) The judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 (emphasis added).  Rule 3.850 places a two-year time limit 
on the filing of such claims, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b), and this time bar cannot 
be circumvented through the filing of an extraordinary writ.  The decision of the 
Second District Court of Appeal, on its face, conflicts with Denson, Mills, and 
White, and countless other decisions of this Court addressing the procedural bar 
that applies to habeas proceedings.  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
The legal issue presented in this case is a pure question of law, subject to de 
novo review.  See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 n.7 (Fla. 2001) (“If the 
ruling consists of a pure question of law, the ruling is subject to de novo review.”).  
As noted above, because Stang raised the corrected sentencing order as an issue in 
the rule 3.850 proceeding and because he either could have, should have, or did 
raise all justiciable issues related to that order at that time, his subsequent habeas 
claims challenging that same order were procedurally barred.  Stang’s proper 
remedy following the denial of his rule 3.850 motion was to file a timely appeal in 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, not to file multiple extraordinary writ petitions 
in various other courts throughout the state. 
 
- 15 - 
 
To the extent this procedural bar is subject to the “manifest injustice” 
exception, see State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003) (“This Court has 
long recognized that res judicata will not be invoked where it would defeat the 
ends of justice.”), the exception is inapplicable here.  The sentence that is set forth 
in the corrected order is consistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement.  As 
noted above, in both oral pronouncements at the March 30, 2005, sentencing 
hearing, the trial court’s language with respect to the issue of credit was virtually 
identical and unequivocal: “a total of twenty-seven years in the Department of 
Corrections with credit for 1,915 days,” and “a total of twenty-seven years in the 
Department of Corrections with 1,915 days credit.”  This pronouncement matches 
the sentence that was set forth in the trial court’s corrected sentencing order.  And 
even if, as the Second District Court below ruled, the corrected order was invalid 
and the initial sentencing order controlled, to the extent there was any discrepancy 
between that order and the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls in 
such situations, for the written order is merely a record of the oral pronouncement.  
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007); Ashley v. State, 850 So. 
2d 1265 (Fla. 2003); Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996).   No manifest 
injustice exists here—Stang is serving exactly the sentence that he was told he 
would serve. 
 
- 16 - 
 
I reiterate that a trial court, on its own motion, has inherent authority and 
retains continuing limited jurisdiction to correct purely clerical sentencing errors4 
at any point prior to completion of the sentence, with notice to the parties.  See 
Boggs v. Wainwright, 223 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 1969) (“[A] court of record may, 
even after the term has expired, correct clerical mistakes in its own judgments and 
records, nunc pro tunc, and [the fact] that such corrections generally relate back 
and take effect as of the date of the judgment, decree, order, writ, or other record 
so corrected, is well settled.”); D’Alessandro v. Tippins, 124 So. 455, 456 (Fla. 
1929) (“If the first sentence contained clerical . . . errors, the judgment as entered 
may at any time be corrected so as to speak the truth of what was in fact done by 
the court.”); Drumwright v. State, 572 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) 
(“Florida has long recognized a court’s inherent power to correct clerical errors.”); 
Carson v. State, 489 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“A court may correct 
clerical mistakes in its own judgments and records, nunc pro tunc, even after the 
term of court has expired, and such corrections generally relate back and take 
effect as of the date of judgment.”); Perry v. State ex rel. Mills, 357 So. 2d 425, 
427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (“Generally, a court of record may, even after its term has 
expired, correct clerical mistakes in its own judgments and records.”). 
                                          
 
 
4.  Cf. Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 n.3 (Fla. 2003) (addressing 
the meaning of the term “scrivener’s error” in the context of rule 3.800(b) 
motions). 
 
- 17 - 
V.  A FINAL POINT 
 
Contrary to Stang’s assertion, the State did not drop the ball in its 
prosecution of this case at the postconviction level.  First, the State did not 
participate in Stang’s first habeas proceeding, in the Nineteenth Circuit Court in 
Okeechobee County.  Stang filed the petition against DOC, not the State, and the 
circuit court dismissed the petition based on DOC’s response showing that Stang 
had not exhausted his administrative remedies.  Second, the State did not 
participate in Stang’s second habeas proceeding, in the Tenth Circuit Court in 
Hardee County.  Although Stang filed the petition against the State, he served a 
copy of the petition on DOC rather than the State, and the court apparently denied 
the petition on its face, never requesting a response from the State.  The court 
issued a brief order noting that Stang’s administrative claim had been adequately 
addressed by DOC and that his sentencing claim must be raised in a postconviction 
motion filed in the sentencing court in Palm Beach County.  Thus, on this record, it 
appears that the State did not even know that these first two habeas proceedings 
were taking place. 
 
And third, in the subsequent review proceeding before the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Lakeland, although Stang filed the petition against the State, he 
again failed to serve a copy of the petition on the State.  This time, however, the 
district court ordered the State to respond.  At that point in the proceedings, the 
 
- 18 - 
petition was styled as a petition for writ of certiorari, and the district court’s order 
stated: “Respondent shall serve a response to the petition for writ of certiorari 
within 20 days.”  Based on that order, the State framed its response in conformity 
with the standard of review for certiorari proceedings—i.e., the State addressed the 
issue of whether the order under review departed from the essential requirements 
of law.  The State argued that the Tenth Circuit Court’s order was correct, that 
Stang was pursuing the wrong remedy.  Rather than seeking habeas relief, Stang 
should have raised his sentencing claim in a postconviction motion filed in the trial 
court.  The State further pointed out that Stang could not use habeas corpus to raise 
an issue that he could have, should have or did raise in his prior rule 3.850 motion.  
Rather, Stang should have appealed the denial of that motion. 
 
After the State filed its response, the Second District Court of Appeal 
changed the rules of the proceeding.  Instead of reviewing Stang’s petition as a 
certiorari petition, the district court, on its own motion, treated the petition as yet 
another habeas petition and applied an entirely different standard of review.5  
                                          
 
 
5.  I note that, as a general rule, a plenary appeal, not another habeas corpus 
petition, is the proper mechanism for seeking review of an order granting or 
denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See generally Philip J. Padovano, 
Florida Appellate Practice § 29.6 (2009).  That is, unless habeas corpus was 
employed in the circuit court as an appellate remedy to review a quasi-judicial 
decision of an administrative tribunal, in which case review in the district court is 
by certiorari.  Id.  I further note that once a party seeks relief in a particular court 
by means of a petition for an extraordinary writ, the party has picked his or her 
forum and is not entitled to a second or third opportunity for the same relief by the 
 
- 19 - 
Rather than determining whether the order under review departed from the 
essential requirements of law, the district court inquired into whether the trial 
court’s detention order was entered without jurisdiction and whether that order was 
void or illegal.  In other words, rather than reviewing the Tenth Circuit Court’s 
order denying habeas relief, the district court reviewed the Fifteenth Circuit 
Court’s sentencing order.  The district court did this peremptorily, without asking 
for supplemental briefing and without having before it a complete record of the 
sentencing proceeding.  In fact, the district court had before it only the sentencing 
documents that Stang himself had selectively filed in the district court along with 
his petition.  On that basis alone, the Second District Court of Appeal answered the 
inquiry in the affirmative and ruled that Stang was entitled to immediate release. 
 
On rehearing, the State pointed out that the district court had no basis for so 
ruling when the district court had before it an incomplete sentencing record.  The 
State also pointed out that under rule 9.200(e), it was Stang’s duty as petitioner, not 
the State’s, to ensure that all relevant portions of the record from the sentencing 
court were prepared and transmitted to the district court.6  Presumably, the State 
                                                                                                                                        
same writ in a different court.  See Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 
1975).  In this respect, the present district court opinion conflicts with this Court’s 
precedent. 
 
6.  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200 provides as follows in relevant 
part: 
 
- 20 - 
was referring to the key sentencing document that was missing from the record—
the transcript of the March 30, 2005, sentencing hearing.  The district court 
summarily denied rehearing. 
As a postscript, I note that this Court has supplemented the record on review 
with an official copy of the transcript of the sentencing hearing from the Fifteenth 
Circuit Court, and, as discussed above, that transcript shows plainly that it was the 
trial court’s intent that Stang should be imprisoned “for a total of twenty-seven 
years . . . with credit for 1,915 days.”  This resolves the clerical error conclusively 
in the State’s favor.  The inquiry is ended.  Thus, to the extent the Second District 
Court of Appeal ruled as it did without adequate briefing and without having 
before it a complete sentencing record, it was not the State’s fault, but its own.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Because Stang raised the corrected sentencing order as an issue in his prior 
rule 3.850 proceeding and because he either could have, should have, or did raise 
all justiciable issues with respect to that order at that time, his subsequent habeas 
claims challenging the same order were procedurally barred.  The proper remedy 
                                                                                                                                        
 
(e) Duties of Appellant or Petitioner. The burden to ensure that 
the record is prepared and transmitted in accordance with these rules 
shall be on the petitioner or appellant.  Any party may enforce the 
provisions of this rule by motion. 
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(e) (emphasis added). 
 
- 21 - 
following the denial of his rule 3.850 motion was to file a timely appeal in the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal, not to file multiple habeas corpus petitions in 
various other courts throughout the State.  This Court has repeatedly held that the 
great writ is not a redundancy.  Habeas corpus was never intended to serve as a 
means to gain additional appeals of issues that could have been, should have been, 
or were raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.  As noted 
above, the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal directly conflicts with 
innumerable decisions of this Court addressing the procedural bar that applies to 
habeas corpus.  I would not discharge review in this case but rather would retain 
review and quash the district court’s decision. 
 
In conclusion, I note that because there is no showing on this record that the 
trial court in Palm Beach County notified the parties when it issued the corrected 
sentencing order, I would return this case to the trial court for entry of a properly 
noticed order consistent with the oral pronouncement. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D08-3536 and 2008-CA-000401 
 
 
(Hardee County) 
 
 
- 22 - 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, and Sara Macks, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
John R. Blue and David L. Luck of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Carolyn J. Mosley, Office of General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, 
Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Florida Department of Corrections, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae