Title: St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. v. Howard
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1141132, 1141212
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2016

rel: 05/13/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1141132
____________________
St. Union Baptist Church, Inc.
v.
James M. Howard, Sr.
____________________
1141212
____________________
James M. Howard, Sr., individually, and as appointed
representative of St. Union Baptist Church
v.
St. Union Baptist Church, Inc., et al.
Appeals from Clarke Circuit Court
(CV-14-900224)
1141132, 1141212
STUART, Justice.
The Clarke Circuit Court dismissed both the claims
asserted 
by 
St. 
Union 
Baptist 
Church, 
Inc. 
("the
corporation"), against Reverend James M. Howard, Sr., and the 
counterclaims asserted by Howard against the corporation and
its directors after concluding that their dispute was
ecclesiastical in nature and outside the jurisdiction of the
court.  We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
corporation's claims, but we reverse its dismissal of 
Howard's
counterclaims.
I.
St. Union Baptist Church ("the church") has existed in
Clarke County for over 100 years.   Traditionally, its
1
temporal affairs were administered through a board 
of 
deacons,
and, in January 1992, five members of that board filed
articles of incorporation with the Clarke County 
Probate 
Court
creating St. Union Baptist Church, Inc., whose purpose was
described as follows in those articles of incorporation:
"The purpose for which the corporation is
organized is to administer the affairs of the
St. Union Baptist Church is at times identified in the
1
record and by the parties as St. Union Missionary Baptist
Church.
2
1141132, 1141212
congregation [and] to construct or cause to be
constructed such buildings and structures that are
necessary for proposed worship and church services,
and the corporation shall have the right to buy,
sell, hold, mortgage, and encumber real and personal
property, to receive property by gift, will, or
devise, holding such property in conformity with all
lawful conditions imposed by the donor and may
exercise such other powers as are incident to
private corporations, exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary and educational
purposes."
The 
articles 
of 
incorporation 
identified 
the 
five
incorporating deacons as the initial members of the
corporation's board of directors; it appears that the deacons
thereafter continued to oversee the temporal affairs of the
church in the same manner as they had before the corporation
was formed.2
Minutes from an April 18, 1995, business meeting of the
church indicate that the deacons had decided at that time to
hire Howard as the church's new pastor.  It appears that the
church thereafter operated with Howard as its pastor for a
The church's board of deacons has at least sometimes
2
consisted of more than five deacons, and it is not always
clear if the entity making administrative decisions is the
entire board of deacons or just those also serving as
directors of the corporation.  For clarity, we will refer to
the board of deacons as "the board of deacons" or simply "the
deacons" and will refer to the corporation only when it is
clear that the deacons serving as directors of the corporation
were acting in their corporate capacity.
3
1141132, 1141212
number of years without conflict; by 2012, however, a rift had
formed between Howard and the deacons.  At a business meeting
on April 28, 2012, Howard purported to "give the deacons back
to the church," which apparently encompassed relieving them of
at least some of their duties.  Nevertheless, the minutes of
that meeting reflect that Howard continued to recognize their
involvement in the financial governance of the 
church, 
because
two deacons presented financial reports and Howard informed
the members present that one of the deacons would continue
handling the paying of bills.  Those minutes also indicate
that 
the 
deacons 
immediately 
expressed 
their 
disagreement 
with
Howard's unilateral decision regarding their roles; the
deacons again expressed their displeasure in a June 27, 2012,
letter sent to Howard in which they requested a private
meeting to "settle this matter in a Godly manner."  No such
meeting was held, however, and the deacons thereafter called
a meeting of church members for August 13, 2012, "so that we
may try to settle the on-going differences that have caused
division."  At that meeting, the deacons decided to terminate
Howard's pastorate, and, on August 19, 2012, six deacons
4
1141132, 1141212
signed a letter to Howard informing him of that decision,
stating:
"The listed deacons called the meeting for the
purpose of informing the body of some of their
concerns regarding the welfare of the church that
need immediate attention.  A few of the things that
were discussed were the falling off of member
attendance, the falling off of tithes and offerings,
the incorporation of the church being ignored, your
lack of spiritual and financial leadership, the
$187,000 [of] steel that is lying in the parking
lot, and your holding a grudge against us that has
not been revealed to us.  Your consistently refusing
to meet with the board of deacons has brought us to
where we are today.
"After 
discussing 
these 
topics 
and 
a 
few 
others,
there was a motion from the floor for your
termination, which was seconded.  After putting this
to a vote, the majority present voted for your
termination.  Regretfully, this is to inform you
that your services to St. Union as pastor are no
longer needed as of Monday, August 13, 2012.  We
hope you will accept the majority vote and move on
pleasantly."
Howard declined to leave his position, however, and, on
October 13, 2012, he held another church meeting at which he
asked those present to vote whether they wanted "the pastor to
stay" or "for the deacons to remain."  The minutes of that
meeting indicate that 37 members voted for Howard and 10
members voted for the deacons.
5
1141132, 1141212
For approximately two years, it appears that this
situation remained at a stalemate, with Howard continuing to
serve as pastor and the deacons continuing to perform at least
some of their traditional duties.  The conflict between them
continued, however, and, although the record does not fully
explain the circumstances, it appears that the deacons, who
continued to administer the church's finances through the
corporation, at some point stopped paying Howard's salary.  On
August 26, 2014, a "charge" was prepared declaring that, on
October 13, 2012, the deacons had been removed from office and
that the church henceforth had no deacons.   The charge
3
further declared that "these brothers" nevertheless were
continuing to come to church and acting as deacons and
disturbing worship services despite the fact that they had
"been excluded."  The charge concluded that, "according to the
body of the church, on October 13, 2012, ... these brothers
were relieved of their office of deacon along with any power
to handle any business for or in the name of [the church]." 
The deacons apparently ignored this charge.
It is not clear from the face of the charge who prepared
3
it.
6
1141132, 1141212
At some point thereafter, Howard told the congregation
that he would resign if he was paid the money he was owed;
presumably, this claimed money consisted of the salary that
had been withheld by the deacons.  Howard and the deacons
subsequently began negotiations, and, on November 30, 2014,
Howard submitted his resignation.  On December 1, 2014, Howard
executed an agreement with the corporation in which he agreed
to resign as pastor of the church in exchange for $16,600. 
Howard thereafter negotiated a check in that amount issued to
him by the corporation. 
On December 21, 2014, Howard rescinded his resignation,
stating that he was doing so at the request of the members of
the church who had, he stated, told him that they would not
accept his resignation.  Howard did not repay the $16,600 the
corporation had paid him to resign, however.  The next day,
the corporation sent Howard a letter reminding him of the
December 1 agreement and advising him that legal action would
be taken if he did not honor the agreement.  On December 23,
2014, the threatened legal action was commenced when the
corporation, acting through the five deacons who were now
serving as its officers and directors, sued Howard, alleging
7
1141132, 1141212
breach of contract and trespass and asking the trial court to
issue an immediate temporary restraining order barring Howard
from the church premises, to be followed by a similar
permanent injunction after appropriate proceedings were
completed.  On December 24, 2014, the trial court entered the
requested temporary restraining order barring Howard from the
church premises.
Howard thereafter moved the trial court to dissolve the
temporary restraining order, asserting that the five deacons
purporting to act on behalf of the church in bringing the
litigation were not currently leaders or even members of the
church, having been expelled in October 2012.  He further
argued that when those deacons and/or their predecessors had
incorporated the corporation through which they continued to
control the finances of the church they had never consulted
with the congregation or sought its approval.   Howard also
4
argued that the temporary restraining order was inappropriate
because the corporation had not alleged that any harm would
Three of the five deacons serving as directors of the
4
corporation at the time this litigation began were also
original incorporators.  We further note that one of those
three deacons subsequently stated in a deposition that the
body of the church did in fact give the deacons authority to
form the corporation. 
8
1141132, 1141212
result from Howard attending church services and that, in any
event, he had never been banished from the church or agreed to
stay away from the church premises.  Howard followed his
motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order with his
own complaint, naming as defendants the corporation and its
five directors –– Jessie J. Robinson, Asberry Diffin, Abraham
Kimbell, Jr., James E. Todd, Tommy R. Briggs –– and asserting
claims of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, breach of contract, replevin, and conspiracy and 
seeking an accounting of church funds from 2005 to the
present, 
a temporary 
restraining 
order enjoining 
the
corporation and its directors from expending any 
church 
funds,
and an order requiring the corporation to turn over all funds
held on the church's behalf to Howard.  The corporation and
its five directors subsequently moved the trial court to
dismiss Howard's counterclaims, and Howard filed a similar
motion asking the trial court to dismiss the complaint that
had initiated this action.
On March 20, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the
pending motions, and, on March 23, 2015, the trial court
entered an interlocutory order providing for the 
management 
of
9
1141132, 1141212
the church until the legal issues were fully resolved.  That
order provided, among other things, that a representative
appointed by the State Baptist Board to which the church
belonged would monitor church services each week and would
supervise the handling of all offerings; that church finances
would "remain under their present structure and control" but
that only normal operating expenditures would be made; that
Howard and a guest preacher selected by the deacons would
preach on alternate weeks; that no party would conduct
meetings on church premises other than the scheduled Sunday
services; and that all parties and church members would
refrain from discussing the litigation, disparaging one
another, or soliciting support while on church premises.  
5
This order effectively dissolved the temporary restraining
order entered against Howard in December 2014 but did not
resolve the pending motions to dismiss.
The corporation and its directors thereafter again moved
the trial court to dismiss Howard's counterclaims, supporting
their motion with documentary evidence; they also separately
No party challenged the trial court's authority to enter
5
the March 23 order, and there is some indication that the
order merely reflects an agreement reached by the parties.
10
1141132, 1141212
moved the trial court to enter an order requiring Howard to
return the $16,600 he had received if it was determined that
he was allowed to remain as pastor.  Howard subsequently also
supplemented his previously filed motion to dismiss with
documentary evidence.  On June 2, 2015, the trial court
entered a final judgment dismissing all the claims asserted by
the parties based either on their lack of standing or the
court's lack of jurisdiction.  The trial court explained its
judgment as follows:
"The heart of the dispute and litigation in the
present case is whether Howard is or is not the
pastor of St. Union Baptist Church.  The choice of
a pastor for a church is based wholly on Biblical
principles for which a court cannot interfere
without violating the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of Alabama.  All cases
adjudicated by the Alabama Supreme Court throughout
its history have respected this principle.  The
congregation of St. Union Baptist Church by majority
vote ('pure democracy' per Blount [v. Sixteenth St.
Baptist Church, 206 Ala. 423, 426, 90 So. 602, 604
(1921)]) must choose or terminate its pastor.  This
court nor the legislature through its business
organization statutes nor any church member or
minority group of members can alter this principle. 
The dispute over whether Howard resigned or not and
if he did whether he may be rehired as pastor is for
the majority of the congregation to decide. 
Regardless of the various causes of actions and
names of the parties, the central, substantive
dispute is whether Howard is or is not the pastor
and such is wholly spiritual and ecclesiastical in
nature and the court cannot interfere."
11
1141132, 1141212
On June 9, 2015, the corporation moved the trial court to
reconsider its judgment, noting that the Sunday services at
the church on June 7, 2015, had been "complete chaos" because
Howard and his attorney had declared to the congregation that
Howard was "back in charge" of the church and, the corporation
asserted, Howard was also attempting to conduct another vote
of the congregation to remove the deacons while resisting any
attempt to have a vote conducted concerning his own position. 
The corporation accordingly requested that the trial court
enter a finding of fact that Howard had resigned as pastor and
appoint a mediator to oversee a fair election to determine the
church's future.  On June 11, 2015, the trial court denied
that motion, again noting that the choice of a pastor was a
spiritual matter beyond the jurisdiction of the court.  
Subsequently, on June 29, 2015, Howard moved the trial
court to modify its judgment.  Howard's motion also described
a chaotic atmosphere at the June 7, 2015, services of the
church and further stated that, on Sunday, June 14, 2015,
church members had arrived at the church to discover that the
deacons had changed the locks and posted notices stating that
there would be no church services until further notice and
12
1141132, 1141212
that any trespassers would be prosecuted.  An altercation had
occurred in which two church members suffered knife wounds,
police were called, and criminal-trespassing warnings were
issued to Howard and his wife.  Howard further informed the
court that the police had taken the position that the
corporation controlled the church premises and could control
access to those premises however it wished to do so;
accordingly, Howard asked the court to clarify that the
corporation had no legal right to bar him from the church
premises.   Howard also asked the trial court to reconsider
6
the dismissal of the counterclaims he had asserted against the
corporation and its directors, arguing that those claims did
not involve ecclesiastical or spiritual matters but concerned
the financial affairs and property rights of the church.  
On July 13, 2015, the corporation filed its notice of
appeal to this Court, docketed as appeal no. 1141132,
challenging the trial court's June 2 order dismissing the
corporation's claims; however, because Howard's postjudgment
motion was still pending in the trial court, that notice of
appeal was held in abeyance pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R.
Howard asserts that the police and local government
6
leaders are biased against him and in favor of the deacons.
13
1141132, 1141212
App. P.  Howard thereafter filed an amended complaint, noting
that he had, on July 11, 2015, presided over a conference of
church members held outside the church building at which, he
claimed, the members had unanimously voted to 
disassociate 
the
church from the corporation, to expel the five directors of
that corporation from the church, to elect three new deacons,
and to empower Howard to take whatever action was necessary
through the court system to restore the church to its members. 
He accordingly moved the trial court to enter an order barring
the five directors of the corporation from church premises and
requiring them to deliver to him all financial records of the
church.  He further asked the trial court to advise the police
and other local government officials that the corporation did
not control the church and that only he was authorized to act
on behalf of the church.
On July 28, 2015, the trial court entered an order
denying Howard's motion to modify the June 2 judgment but
setting forth temporary guidelines to govern the operation of
the church pending the resolution of the 
corporation's 
appeal. 
That order effectively provided that the two factions would
alternate possession of the church on a weekly basis and that
14
1141132, 1141212
neither the deacons nor Howard would enter the church on the
weeks assigned to the other.  On August 10, 2015, Howard filed
his notice of appeal of the trial court's June 2 judgment,
docketed as appeal no. 1141212.  The corporation's and
Howard's appeals have since been consolidated for the purpose
of writing one opinion.
II.
Both the corporation and Howard are asking this Court to
review the trial court's June 2 order dismissing their
respective claims based on either a lack of standing or a lack
of jurisdiction.  We have stated that both the issue of
standing and issues of jurisdiction present pure questions of
law; accordingly, we afford the trial court's ruling no
deference on appeal and consider those issues de novo. 
Lumpkin v. State, 171 So. 3d 599, 600 (Ala. 2014), and Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
953 (Ala. 2004).
III.
We first consider the trial court's dismissal of the
claims asserted by the corporation against Howard stemming
from Howard's decision to continue acting as pastor of the
15
1141132, 1141212
church in spite of the fact that he accepted $16,600 from the
corporation in exchange for his agreement to resign his
pastorate.  In dismissing the corporation's complaint, the
trial court concluded that the question at the heart of the
corporation's claims –– whether Howard could continue as the
pastor of the church –– was a spiritual and ecclesiastical
matter in which the court could not interfere without
violating both federal and state constitutional provisions. 
This conclusion is well founded in light of our prior caselaw
on the topic.
In Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 66-67, 61 So. 2d 101,
107-08 (1952), the trial court was asked to decide a dispute
among members of the Twenty-Second Avenue Baptist Church in
Birmingham 
regarding 
the 
continued 
employment 
of 
their 
pastor. 
Members on both sides of the dispute ultimately agreed that
the trial court should supervise an election to settle that
question; they further requested that the court appoint a
special master to conduct the proceedings.  The trial court
thereafter acted in accordance with that agreement and,
following the election, entered its judgment based on the
report of the special master.  However, after representatives
16
1141132, 1141212
of the losing faction appealed, this Court reversed the
judgment of the trial court, holding that the dispute was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court and further stating that
"[w]e have been unable to find any authority which even
remotely tends to uphold the jurisdiction of the civil courts
in a matter of this kind."  258 Ala. at 67, 61 So. 2d at 109.
Subsequently, in In re Galilee Baptist Church, 279 Ala.
393, 394, 186 So. 2d 102, 103 (1966), this Court was called
upon to "bring order out of a chaotic condition" inside
Galilee Baptist Church in Birmingham as a result of a rift in
the congregation regarding the pastor and claims by those on
one side of the dispute that the pastor refused to leave his
pastorate notwithstanding the fact that he had been properly
relieved of his duties.  After representatives of both
factions petitioned the trial court for an injunction seeking
to exclude the other faction from the church, the trial court
held that the pastor was legally entitled to continue to
"occupy the pulpit," provided he agreed to schedule a meeting
for a congregational vote to decide his future and the future
of other church officers.  279 Ala. at 396, 186 So. 2d at 105. 
17
1141132, 1141212
After both factions appealed, this Court reversed 
the 
judgment
of the trial court, stating:
"[T]he court was without authority to grant to [the
pastor] the right to occupy the pulpit of the church
subject 
to 
the 
condition 
that 
he 
call 
a
congregational meeting on the date specified in the
decree.  Such action would in effect amount to the
court taking over and running the affairs of the
Galilee Baptist Church.  This is beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.  Williams v. Jones, 258
Ala. 59, 61 So. 2d 101 [(1952)].  Spiritualities are
beyond the reach of temporal courts, and a pastor
may be deposed by a majority of the members at a
congregational meeting at any time, so far as the
civil courts are concerned, subject only to inquiry
by the courts as to whether the church, or its
appointed tribunal has proceeded according to the
law of the church.  Barton v. Fitzpatrick, [187 Ala.
273, 65 So. 390 (1914)]."
279 Ala. at 397, 186 So. 2d at 106.  See also Odoms v.
Woodall, 246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So. 2d 849, 851 (1945) ("The
civil courts will not take jurisdiction of a controversy
arising out of the removal of a minister if the right to the
position is merely spiritual or ecclesiastical."), and
McGlathery v. Richardson, 944 So. 2d 968, 977 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006) (Murdock, J., concurring specially) ("[T]he underlying
dispute in the present case arises out of a minority of the
church members' interests in voicing their disapproval of the
pastor to the majority of the church.  Such a dispute is a
18
1141132, 1141212
spiritual or ecclesiastical matter that is beyond the
jurisdiction of a civil court.").
The corporation nevertheless argues that the instant case
is distinguishable from the cited cases inasmuch as Howard
executed a contract formalizing his resignation.  That fact,
the corporation argues, makes this a civil and/or a
contractual dispute as opposed to an ecclesiastical one.  We
disagree.  As the trial court implicitly recognized in its
order dismissing the corporation's claims, even if Howard had
resigned, there is still the question whether he could rescind
his resignation or be rehired as pastor if that was the desire
of the majority of the church's members.  Ultimately, only the
congregation, not this Court, can answer that question.  See,
e.g., Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So. 2d
746, 748 (Ala. 1976) ("This court takes cognizance of the well
established case law of this State pertaining to the Baptist
Church and the limited nature of this State's courts'
jurisdiction over the business transacted within the Baptist
Church.  In a Baptist Church, the congregation rules.  The
majority of the members of the church control the business of
the church, and the minority must submit to the will of the
19
1141132, 1141212
majority.").  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
dismissal of the corporation's complaint.
IV.
We next consider the trial court's dismissal of Howard's
claims asserting conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, breach of contract, replevin, and conspiracy and
seeking an accounting of church funds from 2005 to the
present, 
a temporary 
restraining 
order enjoining 
the
corporation and its directors from expending any 
church 
funds,
and an order requiring the corporation to turn over to Howard
all funds held on behalf of the church.  The gravamen of
Howard's claims is that the corporation and its directors have
wrongfully refused him access to financial records of the
church and to church funds, and he also makes vague
allegations that the corporation and its directors have
misused church funds.  The corporation denies that Howard has
been refused access to any records, denies any misuse of
church funds, and maintains that it is the proper party to
control the church's finances.  Unlike the selection of a
pastor, these are not ecclesiastical issues that a court lacks
jurisdiction to consider.
20
1141132, 1141212
In McClendon v. Pugh, 49 So. 3d 1238, 1239 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2010), the Court of Civil Appeals considered an appeal
stemming from similar facts: A Baptist church's board of
deacons acted to discharge the church's pastor, and, instead
of leaving his pastorate, the pastor then called a meeting at
which he presided over the election of a new board of deacons
amenable to his continued employment.  The original deacons
then sued the pastor, alleging that he had mismanaged church
property and misused church funds and requesting, among other
things, that the trial court enjoin the pastor from using any
other church assets, order an accounting of church bank
accounts from the time the pastor gained access to them, and
compel the pastor to resign.  After the pastor complied with
the trial court's subsequent order to conduct a new election
of deacons –– at which the pastor's favored candidates again
were elected –– the pastor moved for a summary judgment,
arguing that the deacons' remaining claims dealt 
with internal
church matters outside the jurisdiction of the court; the
deacons countered by arguing that the issues they had raised
"related solely to financial and property rights, not
ecclesiastical or religious differences."  49 So. 3d at 1239. 
21
1141132, 1141212
The trial court agreed with the pastor and entered a summary
judgment in his favor; however, on appeal the Court of Civil
Appeals reversed that part of the trial court's judgment,
stating:
"We are limited in our authority to interfere
with the internal matters of a church.  McKinney v.
Twenty-fifth Avenue Baptist Church, 514 So. 2d 837,
839 (Ala. 1987).  'As in the case with all churches,
the courts will not assume jurisdiction, in fact has
none, to resolve disputes regarding their spiritual
or 
ecclesiastical 
affairs. 
However, 
there 
is
jurisdiction to resolve questions of civil or
property rights.'  Abyssinia Missionary Baptist
Church v. Nixon, 340 So. 2d 746, 748 (Ala. 1976)
(citing Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 So. 2d
101 (1952)).  The contestants argue that the trial
court had jurisdiction to consider the relief
requested 
in 
their 
complaint 
because, 
the
contestants argue, the underlying dispute in this
case concerns the financial affairs and property
interests of the Church and does not involve any
spiritual or ecclesiastical concerns.
"The contestants rely on Yates v. El Bethel
Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So. 2d 331 (Ala.
2002), in which the Alabama Supreme Court considered
the question whether the courts had jurisdiction
over a dispute between rival factions of a church. 
In holding that the courts had jurisdiction in that
case, our supreme court noted that '"the civil
courts of this state have taken jurisdiction of
disputes between factions of Baptist churches or of
churches similarly governed on the ground that
property or civil rights were involved."'  Yates,
847 So. 2d at 336 (quoting Williams, 258 Ala. at 62,
61 So. 2d at 104).  Our supreme court went on to
note that that case 'began as one involving the
finances, financial assets, and business of the
22
1141132, 1141212
Church, not any of its purely ecclesiastical or
spiritual features, and those financial and business
aspects of the Church have remained center stage
throughout.'  Id. at 336.  Thus, the question
whether the trial court had jurisdiction in this
case to consider the contestants' claims for relief
is dependent on whether this case involves matters
of spiritual or ecclesiastical concerns or if it
involves matters of financial and property rights.
"In 
this 
case, 
the 
contestants 
alleged 
that [the
pastor] mismanaged the financial assets and the
property 
of 
the 
Church. 
 
The 
contestants'
allegations that [the pastor] had used Church funds
for personal gain, that he had mismanaged Church
property, that he had destroyed church records, and
that he had refused to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum do not involve any ecclesiastical or spiritual
matters.  As in Yates, 'neither side ... seeks to
raise [theological] questions.  They argue no issues
of differences in religious faith or creed, and
argue no spiritual conflicts, or ecclesiastical
doctrine.  Rather, the underlying dispute revolves
around the property of the Church –– control over
its financial assets and affairs –– and not God.' 
Id. at 346.  Because this case does not involve any
ecclesiastical or spiritual issues and is instead
focused solely on issues involving the financial
affairs and property rights of the Church, we hold
that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider
the merits of the contestants' complaint."
49 So. 3d at 1240-41.  The claims asserted by Howard similarly
concern the church's financial assets and affairs, which are
not theological questions or ecclesiastical or spiritual
issues.  Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that
23
1141132, 1141212
it lacked jurisdiction to consider Howard's claims, and its
judgment in that regard is due to be reversed.7
V.
The trial court dismissed both the claims asserted by the
corporation against Howard and the counterclaims asserted by
Howard against the corporation and its directors.  We affirm
the trial court's  dismissal of the corporation's claims in
appeal no. 1141312 because the trial court correctly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the
ecclesiastical issue presented in that appeal.  However, we
reverse the dismissal of Howard's claims in appeal no. 1141212
because the issues underlying that appeal involve only the
financial affairs and property rights of the church, not
The trial court also stated that it was dismissing the
7
claims asserted by Howard because he lacked standing.  On
appeal, the parties have not addressed the issue of Howard's
standing; however, we think it evident that Howard, a member
of the church and the presumed pastor, has standing to pursue
his claims.  See, e.g., Walters v. Stewart, 838 So. 2d 1047,
1051 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) ("Although [the pastor] challenges
the standing of [the appellees] based on what, he says, is
their current nonattendance at church services, our supreme
court has held that even former church members have standing
to sue when the issues are their alleged wrongful expulsion
and the claimed misappropriation of church funds by the
minister.  See Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon,
340 So. 2d 746 (Ala. 1976).").
24
1141132, 1141212
ecclesiastical matters, and we remand the case for 
proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
1141132 –– AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs specially.
Murdock, J., dissents.
1141212 –– REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.
Parker, J., dissents.
25
1141132, 1141212
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially in appeal no. 1141132). 
It does not appear that St. Union Baptist Church, Inc.
("the corporation"), has filed a claim seeking damages based
on a breach of the contract in which James M. Howard, Sr.,
agreed to resign as pastor of St. Union Baptist Church and
accept the sum of $16,600.  Nor has it alleged a claim that it
is currently entitled to recover that sum from Howard.   In my
8
opinion, such claims over those funds would arguably involve
the financial affairs and property rights of the church,
claims over which the trial court would have jurisdiction.  We
are not, however, called upon in either of these appeals to
address whether the trial court can determine the ownership of
those funds.
It appears that the corporation has cited the contract
8
as a defense to Howard's counterclaim and third-party
complaint.  In its responses to the counterclaim and third-
party complaint, the corporation argues that the $16,600 must
be returned if the trial court holds that the contract is
invalid.  However, it does not appear that a claim for the
funds constitutes part of the action over which this Court
holds that the trial court had no jurisdiction.  
26
1141132, 1141212
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially in appeal no. 1141212
and dissenting in appeal no. 1141132).
It appears that the appeal and the cross-appeal are two
sides of the same coin.  I would reverse the trial court's
judgment in both cases. 
As this Court reiterated in Foster v. St. John's Baptist
Church, Inc., 406 So. 2d 389, 391 (Ala. 1981):  "Alabama
follows the general rule expressed in Odoms v. Woodall, 246
Ala. 427, 429, 20 So. 2d 849, 851 (1945):  'The civil courts
will not take jurisdiction of a controversy arising out of the
removal of a minister if the right to the position is merely
spiritual or ecclesiastical. ...'"   And in Odoms v. Woodall,
246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So. 2d 849, 851 (1945), the Court also
said that a man's status as a pastor of a church is left to
the appropriate church tribunal "if there is no violation of
contractual right."  
9
But the claims asserted by St. Union Baptist Church,
Inc., and its directors at issue in appeal no. 1141132 are not
"merely spiritual or ecclesiastical."  Here, there is a civil
As the Court likewise stated in Odoms:  "[I]f [a pastor]
9
has a civil or property right in his position, the civil
courts will protect that right."  246 Ala. at 429, 20 So. 2d
at 851.  The converse -- civil court protection of a contract
right to exclude someone as pastor -- would also be true. 
27
1141132, 1141212
contract and an alleged "violation of contractual right." 
Under the apparent  terms of that contract, one party to the
contract, the corporation, paid the other party, James M.
Howard, Sr., $16,600 in return for that other party's
agreement that he would no longer serve as the pastor of
St. Union Baptist Church.  The corporation now seeks to
enforce that contract.   
10
As the corporation argues, then, this case is about the
enforcement of a civil contract.  That fact, among others
discussed below, distinguishes the corporation's initial
action from other cases in which courts have declined to
involve themselves.  The main opinion disagrees with this
contention on the ground that "there is still the question
whether [Howard] could rescind his resignation or be rehired
as pastor if that was the desire of the majority of the
church's members."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  But it is this very
Applicable principles of law governing available
10
remedies for breach of contract may or may not allow for the
injunctive relief or specific performance sought by the
corporation.  That issue goes to the legal merits of the case,
not what this Court has referred to as "jurisdiction" to
decide those merits.  See generally, e.g., Odoms, 246 Ala. at
429, 20 So. 2d at 851 (referring to the issue as whether the
courts should "take jurisdiction" over a dispute involving
church affairs). 
28
1141132, 1141212
"rescission" that the corporation contends constitutes the
violation of the contract that, by this action, it seeks to
enforce.  As for the possibility of the majority of the church
members voting to rehire Howard as pastor, Howard claims that,
in essence, that already has happened.  But the directors of
the corporation deny the efficacy of any such vote.
At this point, in fact, I believe there are issues common
to both the original action of the deacons of the church and
the counterclaim filed by Howard that go beyond the efficacy
and the remedy, if any, of the contract itself.  Based on the
entirety of the pleadings and the record evidence already
presented, I conclude that there are contract and property
rights at stake that require the courts to address the
following questions:  (a) whether Howard is in fact the
current pastor of the church, (b) if so, whether Howard has
been duly authorized to file this action on behalf of the
church, and (c) whether the deacons are still the deacons of
the church and, if they are, whether they, acting as such or
as the directors of the corporation, have authority over the
church property at issue.
  
 This Court's opinion in Odoms is instructive: 
29
1141132, 1141212
"So that the controversy seems to narrow to one
of whether the officers of the church have the
control of the use of the church house and can
direct its preaching and teaching, especially when
approved by a majority of its members, or whether
Woodall claiming to be its pastor can control the
use of the property with the approval of a minority
not acting as a church congregation.
"....
"If the complainants can sustain by due proof
taken according to equity rules the matter set forth
in the sworn bill and affidavits, relief would be
due them in respect to the right to hold and use the
property of the church.
"If no property rights are involved, there is no
jurisdiction of the court to interfere. 45 Amer.
Jur. 755, section 45; Caples v. Nazareth Church, 245
Ala. 656, 18 So. 2d 383 [(1944)]. ...  The civil
courts will not interfere in its internal affairs,
except to protect property rights. ...
"....
"The complainants in the instant case tender a
justiciable question when they allege that a
tribunal of the church having authority has
withdrawn from Woodall his rights as an elder and to
preach in its house of worship, but that he refuses
to abide by that action and holds properties of the
church, and contends that he has the right to preach
in it and use its properties contrary to the
direction and authority of such church tribunal. 
Woodall's denial of that claim, set out in his
affidavit, shows the propriety of its trial in civil
courts to determine the right to the control and use
of the church property."
246 Ala. at 429-30, 20 So. 2d at 850-51.
30
1141132, 1141212
In Gewin v. Mt. Pilgrim Baptist Church, 166 Ala. 345, 51
So. 947 (1909), this Court concluded that the question before
it was not one of religious doctrine, but which of two
factions stood for the "true Mt. Pilgrim Church" and,
therefore, had title to the church property and the right of
possession of that property:
"It must be conceded that the courts have no power
to revise ordinary acts of church discipline or pass
upon controverted rights of membership.  Hundley v.
Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575, 90 Am. St .Rep.
33 [(1902)].  But such considerations are attended
to when they form the basis upon which civil rights
and rights of property depend.  While the courts
cannot decide who ought to be members, they may
inquire whether any disputed act of the church
affecting property rights was the act of the church,
or of persons having no authority.  Bouldin v.
Alexander, 15 Wall. 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 [(1872)]."
166 Ala. at 349, 51 So. at 948.
In Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340
So. 2d 746 (Ala. 1977), this Court said:
"A more accurate reflection of present Alabama
law on this subject is found in In re Galilee
Baptist Church, 279 Ala. 393, 186 So. 2d 102 (1966);
also involving a dispute between two opposing
factions, and the alleged expulsion of the pastor at
a congregational meeting.  This court demonstrated
it is proper for the courts to inquire whether a
congregational meeting, at which church business is
to be transacted, was preceded by adequate notice to
the full membership, and whether, once called, the
meeting was conducted in an orderly manner and the
31
1141132, 1141212
expulsion was the act of the authority within the
church having the power to order it.
"Once the court is presented with sufficient
evidence regarding the regularity of the meeting, it
will then generally refuse to inquire further as to
the fruits of the meeting.  As was stated in
Galilee:
"'Spiritualities are beyond the reach
of temporal courts, and a pastor may be
deposed by a majority of the members at a
congregational meeting at any time, so far
as the civil courts are concerned, subject
only to inquiry by the courts as to whether
the church, or its appointed tribunal has
proceeded according to the law of the
church.'"
340 So. 2d at 748.  See also Yates v. El Bethel Primitive
Baptist Church, 847 So. 2d 331, 336 (Ala. 2002) (noting that,
"[i]n Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 62, 61 So. 2d 101, 104
(1952), we cited several of our cases in which, 'the civil
courts of this state have taken jurisdiction of disputes
between factions of Baptist churches or of churches similarly
governed on the ground that property or civil rights were
involved'" and that "[t]his case began as one involving the
finances, financial assets, and business of the Church, not
any of its purely ecclesiastical or spiritual features, and
those financial and business aspects of the Church have
remained center stage throughout").
32
1141132, 1141212
Based on the entirety of the pleadings and the evidence
before us, it appears to me that, in the present case, civil
and property rights are at stake that require the courts to
decide a number of issues, including, but not necessarily
limited to, the following: (1) whether the action taken to
remove the deacons over two years ago was taken in accordance
with the law of the church, (2) whether the congregation or
Howard would be estopped or otherwise prevented from relying
on that action as a result of the passage of time and/or
subsequent acts or omissions of the parties, and (3) whether
there have in fact been more recent, efficacious votes by the
congregation to remove the deacons and/or to rehire Howard
following his resignation.
That said, in the event that it is determined that Howard
does not in fact have the capacity (and I submit that the
issue would be one of capacity, not standing) to represent the
interests of the church in this litigation, then the
counterclaims may be due to be dismissed for lack of such
capacity and/or the absence of necessary and indispensable
parties.  At this juncture, however, I believe the trial
court's disposition of the parties' claims was not proper;
33
1141132, 1141212
therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court in
the appeal as well as the cross-appeal.
34