Title: Kuznicki v. Mason
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060878
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
JOSEPH M. KUZNICKI, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 060878  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 12, 2007 
ROBERT D. MASON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal involving a condominium unit’s limited 
common element, the dispositive issue concerns whether the 
owners of the condominium unit had standing to institute 
this suit seeking injunctive relief and damages against two 
other condominium unit owners for their actions that 
allegedly decreased the size of the limited common element.  
We conclude that, under Code §§ 55-79.53(A) and –79.80(B), 
only a condominium unit owners’ association has standing to 
sue for claims related to common elements and limited 
common elements. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS1 
Joseph M. Kuznicki and Padmaja Polavarapu 
(collectively, the Kuznickis), and Robert D. Mason and 
Sherril Mason (collectively, the Masons) are owners of 
“[c]ondominium units” in a “[c]ondominium” complex, as 
                                                 
1 We recite the facts as presented in a written 
statement of facts made a part of the record pursuant to 
Rule 5:11(c). 
 
2
those terms are defined in Code § 55-79.41.  The Masons’ 
unit is located on the bottom level of a building that 
houses multiple condominium units.  The Kuznickis’ unit is 
situated within the same building, immediately above the 
Masons’ unit. 
The master deed governing the condominium units 
designates “yard areas” as limited common elements and 
states: “The owner of a Family Unit to which the yard area 
attaches shall have the exclusive use of that yard area, 
which use shall be to the exclusion of all other co-owners 
of all other Family Units.”2  The dimensions of the 
Kuznickis’ limited common element are ten feet by ten feet. 
When the condominium complex was constructed, cooling 
units were installed for the parties’ condominium units on 
separate concrete slabs located on the ground adjacent to 
the building.3  The Masons’ cooling unit measured 29 inches 
by 20 inches, and both it and the Kuznickis’ cooling unit 
were situated on the Kuznickis’ limited common element.  
The parties agreed that the Masons have an easement over 
the Kuznickis’ limited common element with regard to the 
placement of and access to their cooling unit. 
                                                 
2 The record in this case contains only two pages of 
the master deed.  Thus, we do not know whether the master 
deed defines the term “Family Unit.” 
3  As originally constructed, the condominium units had 
heating units separate from the cooling units. 
 
3
 
In October 2004, the Masons experienced mechanical 
problems with both their cooling and heating units.  
Consequently, the Masons replaced their cooling unit with a 
“heat pump,” measuring 42 inches by 30 inches.  The heat 
pump is located on the spot where the original cooling unit 
was situated.  In order to accommodate the larger heat 
pump, the workmen who installed the heat pump had to cut 
down shrubbery next to the Masons’ cooling unit.  The 
Masons did not discuss with, or seek the approval of, the 
Kuznickis or the Piedmont Council of Co-Owners (the 
Council),4 before installing the heat pump or removing the 
shrubbery. 
At a November 2004 meeting of the Council, the 
Kuznickis expressed concern about the newly installed heat 
pump and the fact it was larger than the cooling unit it 
replaced.  The Council retroactively approved the Masons’ 
installation of the heat pump unit, noting that the Masons 
had satisfied the Council’s criteria for approval.  The 
Council did, however, require the Masons to reimburse the 
Council for the cost of replacing the shrubbery. 
 
The Kuznickis subsequently filed a bill of complaint 
against the Masons, seeking, among other things, removal of 
                                                 
4 The Council is apparently the condominium unit 
owners’ association although that fact is not clear from 
the record. 
 
4
the heat pump from their limited common element and 
monetary relief.  In defense, the Masons filed a special 
plea, a motion to dismiss, and a demurrer, asserting, in 
part, that the Kuznickis lacked standing to bring the suit.  
After hearing oral argument from both parties, the circuit 
court granted the Masons’ special plea and motion to 
dismiss, basing its decision on the holding in Virginia Hot 
Springs Company v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 430, 101 S.E. 326, 
328 (1919) (new use of an easement is permissible if it 
does not place an additional burden on the servient 
estate). 
The Kuznickis filed a motion for rehearing, arguing 
that an increase in the width of an easement is not 
permissible.  See Willis v. Magette, 254 Va. 198, 204, 491 
S.E.2d 735, 738 (1997).  After hearing additional argument, 
the circuit court, in a letter opinion, concluded “the 
newly installed heat pump is the same nature and character 
as the original cooling unit, serving the same purpose as 
the original, except adding heat.”  The circuit court 
further concluded “the size of the heat pump does not 
require a significant appropriation of additional space and 
has not placed any additional burden upon the limited 
common element.”  The circuit court therefore affirmed its 
dismissal of the Kuznickis’ suit.  The circuit court, 
 
5
however, chose not to rule on the standing issue raised by 
the Masons.  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Kuznickis assign three errors to the 
circuit court’s judgment.  The dispositive issue, however, 
is raised in the Masons’ assignment of cross-error.  They 
assert that the circuit court erred by failing to rule 
“that only the unit owners’ association, and not the 
Kuznickis, had standing to bring the claims asserted in the 
[bill of complaint].”5  Relying primarily on the provisions 
of Code §§ 55-79.53(A) and –79.80(B), the Masons argue that 
the General Assembly granted exclusive control over common 
elements, including limited common elements, to unit 
owners’ associations and that the specific language of Code 
§ 55-79.53(A) confers standing only upon unit owners’ 
associations to sue for claims or actions regarding common 
elements. 
The Kuznickis disagree and assert that, because they 
have the right to the exclusive use of the limited common 
element, i.e., the yard area, they are asserting a claim 
for a violation of an individual right as opposed to a 
right held in common by all unit owners.  Additionally, 
                                                 
5 We find no merit in the Kuznickis’ argument that the 
Masons did not preserve the standing issue presented in the 
assignment of cross-error. 
 
6
they contend the Masons’ installation of the heat pump 
violated their individual right not to have their limited 
common element altered without their consent as required by 
Code § 55-79.57(A).6  Thus, according to the Kuznickis, this 
is a “proper case” which they, as “aggrieved unit owners,” 
may maintain “on their own behalf” under Code § 55-
79.53(A). 
“The point of standing is to ensure that the person 
who asserts a position has a substantial legal right to do 
so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition 
of the case.”  Cupp v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
County, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984).  With 
regard to the standing issue before us, we note that the 
General Assembly, in 1981, amended the Condominium Act, 
Code §§ 55-79.39 through –79.103 (the Act), to give 
condominium unit owners’ associations “the power to act as 
attorney-in-fact for the individual unit owners in 
asserting or defending actions relating to the common 
elements.”  Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Virginia 
Nat’l Bank, 231 Va. 440, 442, 344 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1986) 
(citing Code § 55-79.80(b1) (1981 Acts ch. 146)).  Since 
                                                 
6 Although the Kuznickis assert on appeal that the 
Masons’ installation of the heat pump violated the 
provisions of Code § 55-79.57(A), they alleged in the bill 
of complaint that the Masons’ actions violated Code § 55-
79.68. 
 
7
the statutory scheme before that amendment did not grant 
power to a unit owners’ association to maintain an action 
with regard to common elements, we held in Chesapeake House 
that the unit owners’ association there had no standing to 
bring an action to recover damages for alleged defects in 
the construction of the common elements in a condominium 
project.  Id. at 442, 344 S.E.2d at 915.  In a subsequent 
case, Rotonda Condominium Unit Owners Association v. 
Rotonda Associates, 238 Va. 85, 380 S.E.2d 876 (1989), we 
explained that the effect of the 1981 amendment to the Act 
was “to transfer irrevocably, by operation of law, [to the 
unit owners’ association] whatever rights of action the 
individual unit owners might have had” concerning common 
elements.  Id. at 89, 380 S.E.2d at 879. 
The statute at issue in both cases, Code § 55-79.80, 
addressed the control of common elements by condominium 
unit owners’ associations and, as relevant to the issue of 
standing, currently states: 
Except to the extent prohibited by the 
condominium instruments, and subject to any 
restrictions and limitations specified therein, 
the executive organ of the unit owners’ 
association, if any, and if not, then the unit 
owners’ association itself, shall have the 
irrevocable power as attorney-in-fact on behalf 
of all the unit owners and their successors in 
title with respect to the common elements, 
including without limitation the right, in the 
name of the unit owners’ association, . . . (ii) 
 
8
to assert, through litigation or otherwise, 
defend against, compromise, adjust, and settle 
any claims or actions related to common elements 
. . . . 
 
Code § 55-79.80(B)(emphasis added).7 
The Kuznickis do not dispute that a unit owners’ 
association has broad powers with regard to common 
elements.  They claim, however, that the provisions of Code 
§ 55-79.80(B) divest an individual unit owner only of 
standing to bring an action with regard to rights held in 
common by all unit owners and that a unit owner still has 
standing to maintain an action concerning an individual 
right not held in common by all unit owners.  In support of 
their argument, the Kuznickis rely particularly on the 
provisions of Code § 55-79.53(A), which state: 
The declarant, every unit owner, and all 
those entitled to occupy a unit shall comply with 
all lawful provisions of this chapter and all 
provisions of the condominium instruments.  Any 
lack of such compliance shall be grounds for an 
action or suit to recover sums due, for damages 
or injunctive relief, or for any other remedy 
available at law or in equity, maintainable by 
the unit owners’ association, or by its executive 
organ or any managing agent on behalf of such 
association, or, in any proper case, by one or 
more aggrieved unit owners on their own behalf or 
as a class action.  A unit owners’ association 
shall have standing to sue in its own name for 
any claims or actions related to the common 
                                                 
7 The language presently designated as subsection B of 
Code § 55-79.80 has not substantially changed since it 
became effective on July 1, 1981.  See 1981 Acts ch. 146. 
 
9
elements as provided in subsection B of § 55-
79.80. 
 
Code § 55-79.53(A) (emphasis added).8 
This subsection was the focus of the Court’s decision 
in Frantz v. CBI Fairmac Corporation, 229 Va. 444, 331 
S.E.2d 390 (1985).  The issue in Frantz was whether a 
condominium unit owners’ association had the authority to 
compromise a claim against a condominium developer over the 
objection of individual unit owners.  Id. at 445, 331 
S.E.2d at 392.  Because the right claimed in a particular 
parcel of real estate, if established, would be held in 
common by all the unit owners, we concluded that the unit 
owners’ association, and not the individual unit owners, 
had standing both to assert and compromise the claim.  Id. 
at 449-51, 331 S.E.2d at 394-95.  In reaching that 
conclusion, we explained: 
[T]he phrase, “in any proper case,” limits, rather 
than expands, the instances in which actions or suits 
are maintainable by unit owners pursuant to the 
authority of Code § 55-79.53.  Hence, while a unit 
owner may assert a claim under the provisions of the 
Condominium Act for the violation of some individual 
right, Code § 55-79.53 contemplates that a violation 
of a right held in common by all unit owners shall be 
maintained by a unit owners’ association, unless the 
association fails or refuses to assert the common 
right. 
 
                                                 
8 The General Assembly amended Code § 55-79.53(A) in 
1993 to add the last sentence in the quoted portion of 
subsection (A).  1993 Acts ch. 667. 
 
10
Id. at 450-51, 331 S.E.2d at 395 (footnote omitted). 
 
The Kuznickis use this explanation to argue they have 
standing to bring this suit against the Masons because 
their claim for violation of their limited common element, 
which they characterize as an individual right, falls 
within the meaning of the phrase “in any proper case.”  The 
Kuznickis’ argument assumes that the standing given to a 
condominium unit owners’ association by the General 
Assembly to bring in its own name actions related to common 
elements does not include actions concerning limited common 
elements.  This assumption, which is the foundation of 
their entire argument, is flawed for several reasons. 
First, the Kuznickis’ position is inconsistent with 
the Act’s definitions of certain terms.  The Act defines 
the term “[u]nit” as “a portion of the condominium designed 
and intended for individual ownership and use,” and the 
term “[c]ommon elements” as “all portions of the 
condominium other than the units.” Code § 55-79.41.  More 
importantly, the Act defines the term “[l]imited common 
element” as “a portion of the common elements reserved for 
the exclusive use of those entitled to the use of one or 
more, but less than all, of the units.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 
11
Next, the section of the master deed dealing with 
limited common elements states that “[t]he owner of a 
Family Unit to which the yard area attaches shall have 
exclusive use of that yard area, which shall be to the 
exclusion of all other co-owners of all other Family 
Units.”  (Emphasis added.)  While this language gives the 
Kuznickis exclusive use of the yard area at issue, it is 
apparent from the actions of the parties in this case that 
the Council retained certain control over the area 
designated as the Kuznickis’ limited common element.  The 
Kuznickis first expressed their concerns about the 
installation of the heat pump to the Council.  The Masons 
sought and obtained, albeit retroactively, the Council’s 
approval for installing the heat pump.  Indeed, the Council 
noted that the Masons had satisfied the criteria for 
approval.9  Additionally, the Council required the Masons to 
reimburse it for replacing the shrubbery that was removed 
incident to the installation of the heat pump. 
Finally, our decision in Mozley v. Prestwould Board of 
Directors, 264 Va. 549, 570 S.E.2d 817 (2002), demonstrates 
                                                 
9 As already noted, the record in this case contains 
only part of the master deed.  Therefore, we do not know 
the type or extent of control retained by the Council over 
the limited common elements.  Nor do we know the Council’s 
criteria for installing a heat pump in the place of a 
cooling unit. 
 
12
that the standing afforded a condominium unit owners’ 
association to sue for claims or actions relating to common 
elements does, indeed, pertain to claims or actions 
concerning limited common elements.   Id. at 555, 570 
S.E.2d at 821.  There, we decided a condominium unit 
owners’ association was entitled to an award of attorney 
fees as a prevailing party in a declaratory judgment suit 
brought by an individual unit owner to determine the 
validity of an assessment for replacing certain windows 
that the unit owners’ association contended were limited 
common elements.  Id. at 557, 570 S.E.2d at 822.  To answer 
the unit owner’s argument that the suit was not the type of 
litigation for which Code § 55-79.53(A) allowed an award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party, we discussed the two 
types of litigation authorized by that subsection.  The 
first type pertains to “actions for failure to comply with 
provisions contained in relevant condominium instruments or 
in the Act.”  Id. at 555, 570 S.E.2d at 821.  A unit 
owners’ association, its executive organ or managing agent, 
or “aggrieved unit owners on their own behalf or as a class 
action” may bring such actions for noncompliance.  Id. 
The second type of litigation concerns actions related 
to common elements.  Id.  With regard to the second type of 
litigation, Code § 55-79.53(A) specifically states, “A unit 
 
13
owners’ association shall have standing to sue in its own 
name for any claims or actions related to the common 
elements as provided in subsection B of § 55-79.80.”  
(Emphasis added.)  As already discussed, Code § 55-79.80(B) 
irrevocably gives a unit owners’ association the right to 
“assert, through litigation or otherwise, defend against, 
compromise, adjust, and settle any claims or actions 
related to common elements.”  Rotonda, 238 Va. at 88, 380 
S.E.2d at 878. 
 
We then held in Mozley that the action at issue did 
not fall within the first type of litigation because the 
unit owner did not fail to comply with any provision of 
relevant condominium instruments or the Act.  264 Va. at 
555, 570 S.E.2d at 821.  We concluded, however, that the 
declaratory judgment suit brought by the unit owner and the 
cross-bill filed by the unit owners’ association were 
“representative of [the] second type of litigation 
authorized by Code § 55-79.53(A).”  Id.  We explained: 
The [unit owner’s association] was required to 
defend against [the unit owner’s] bill of 
complaint seeking a declaration that the 
replacement windows were not “limited common 
elements” as defined by the Act.  The . . . 
cross-bill was a separate assertion by the [unit 
owners’ association], through litigation, of its 
claim that those windows were, in fact, “limited 
common elements.” 
 
 
14
Id. at 555-56, 570 S.E.2d at 881.  Implicit in our decision 
was the recognition that the standing given to a 
condominium unit owners’ association to bring actions 
related to common elements necessarily includes actions 
concerning limited common elements.  Otherwise, the unit 
owners’ association in Mozley would not have been entitled 
to an award of attorneys’ fees because the litigation there 
involved limited common elements. 
In light of the language of Code §§ 55-79.53(A) and –
79.80(B) and our decision in Mozley, we emphasize two 
points.  First, the provisions of Code § 55-79.53(A) give 
standing to a unit owner to assert “in any proper case” 
only claims arising from lack of compliance with the Act or 
relevant condominium instruments.  Second, standing to 
institute claims or actions concerning common elements, 
including limited common elements, is restricted to 
condominium unit owners’ associations. 
Thus, we conclude that the Kuznickis did not have 
standing to bring the present suit for injunctive relief 
and damages for the Masons’ installation of their heat pump 
on the spot where their cooling unit was previously 
located.  Any claim the Kuznickis may have lies against the 
Council with regard to its approval of the Masons’ 
installation of the heat pump.  Standing to raise a claim 
 
15
about the limited common element vis-à-vis the installation 
of the heat pump rests with the Council. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court 
erred by failing to address the standing issue asserted by 
the Masons.  We nevertheless conclude the circuit court 
properly dismissed the Kuznickis’ bill of complaint and 
will therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.10  
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seay, 236 Va. 275, 
280 n.3, 373 S.E.2d 910, 913 n.3 (1988). 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
10 Because the issue of standing is dispositive, we 
will not address the Kuznickis’ assignments of error.