Title: People v. Parker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S113962
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CALVIN LAMONT PARKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S113962 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD154640 
 
 
May 19, 2022 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Jenkins, and Petrou* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
S113962 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
This automatic appeal follows from defendant Calvin 
Lamont Parker’s 2002 conviction and death sentence for the 
murder of Patricia Gallego.  Defendant was found guilty of first 
degree murder in violation of Penal Code1 section 187, 
subdivision (a), and the jury also found true the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), as well as the 
special circumstance allegations that defendant intentionally 
killed Gallego for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)), while 
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of rape (§ 
190.2, subd. (a)(17)).  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of death.  We affirm the judgment. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. 
Prosecution’s Evidence 
Defendant and Gallego were roommates who met while 
she was dating his former roommate, Charles Ijames, in 1997.  
Gallego was a Brazilian citizen and had moved to the United 
States in 1996.  In 1998, after Gallego had dated Ijames for some 
time, defendant told Ijames that Gallego had offered to pay him 
$5,000 if he would marry her.  Ijames understood the offer to be 
 
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
 
purely transactional, not romantic.  Ijames got the impression 
defendant was uneasy about Gallego’s request and that he 
would turn her down.   
Gallego and Ijames broke up in late 1998, and Gallego 
went back to Brazil.  She returned to the United States in late 
1999.  Ijames and defendant stopped living together in 
November 1999, and about six months after that, defendant told 
his friend Leilani Kaloha that he was moving in with Gallego.  
Defendant told Kaloha that he had known Gallego previously, 
that he planned to marry her in exchange for money, and that 
they were moving in to make their marriage appear plausible.  
A month or two after defendant told Kaloha he planned to marry 
Gallego, Kaloha asked defendant if that was still the case, and 
defendant said it was not.  Marilyn Powell, defendant’s ex-
girlfriend, learned defendant and Gallego no longer planned to 
marry some months after moving in together, and Powell 
thought defendant was upset about the change in plans.   
Gallego held two jobs while living with defendant.  She 
was a server at Yakimono restaurant and a supervisor at Café 
Chloe.  Several days before her disappearance, Gallego told 
Eudes De Crecy, the owner of Café Chloe, that she wanted to 
change her life and move out of the apartment she shared with 
defendant.  De Crecy observed that Gallego was stressed, tired, 
and unhappy in the days immediately preceding her 
disappearance.   
Gallego was last seen after her shift at Café Chloe on 
August 10, 2000; she did not return for her next scheduled shift 
on Monday, August 14 or any time before that shift.  Several 
days after she was last seen, a man who identified himself as 
Gallego’s roommate called both restaurants to tell them Gallego 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
 
returned to Brazil temporarily and asked them not to terminate 
Gallego’s employment.   
In late July 2000, defendant wrote a letter to his 
supervisor at work requesting time off in August.  He explained 
that his mother had terminal cancer, and despite the store’s 
understaffing, his request for nearly a week of leave, from 
August 7–12, was granted.  In fact, pursuant to the parties’ 
stipulation, defendant’s foster mother, Eva Nunn, did not have 
cancer or any other terminal illness, and he had not spoken with 
her in over three years.   
In the months leading up to Gallego’s disappearance, 
defendant began calling Wells Fargo Bank, where Gallego did 
her banking, to check on the status of her accounts.  He called 
on June 20 and 28, 2000, and on July 18, 2000.     
On August 12, 2000, defendant rented a U-Haul truck, 
which he parked overnight outside of his apartment.  Later that 
day, defendant bought a “45-gallon roughneck trash can with 
wheels” and a hand drill at a Home Depot.  He then went to a 
Wells Fargo Bank branch, where he cashed a $300 check written 
from Gallego’s account to him.   
The next morning, defendant purchased bolt cutters from 
a Home Depot store, where he also rented a Rug Doctor carpet 
cleaning machine.  That evening, around 5:00 p.m., a man was 
seen parking a U-Haul next to dumpsters located outside a 
PetSmart.  The U-Haul held garbage bags and a Rug Doctor 
carpet cleaning machine; the man was seen throwing two large 
garbage bags into a dumpster, flicking an object — later 
revealed to be a human fingertip — into the brush nearby, and 
driving away.  That night, Josh Dubois, defendant’s upstairs 
neighbor, heard a great deal of noise coming from defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
 
apartment between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.  He testified he 
heard duct tape being torn off of a roll numerous times, as well 
as car doors opening and closing outside of the apartment’s 
windows.   
Around 11:30 a.m. on August 14, 2000, defendant visited 
a Wells Fargo Bank branch and attempted to cash a $350 check 
written from Gallego’s account to him.  The bank’s computers 
were unable to process the check, and defendant left the bank 
without having completed the transaction.   
That evening, defendant called Anna Ching, Yakimono’s 
owner, to tell her Gallego’s mother had had an accident in 
Brazil, and Gallego flew there temporarily.  Defendant conveyed 
that Gallego needed her job and asked that Ching not terminate 
her employment.  The next day defendant telephoned Loic 
Vacher, a manager at Café Chloe, and told him a similar story:  
that Gallego went to Brazil “because one of her parents was in 
the hospital” and that she planned to return and “didn’t quit or 
something like that.”   
Early in the morning on August 14, 2000, Steve Gomez, a 
maintenance worker for a PetSmart shopping center, was 
looking through the dumpsters behind the PetSmart store, a 
practice he engaged in routinely to search for discarded items he 
could take home to his pet.  That morning, as he looked through 
some discarded trash bags, he saw several fingertips.  Gomez 
contacted his supervisor, Cauhtemoc Topete (“Temo”), who 
called law enforcement.  Temo noted the fingers appeared to be 
burned, and Gomez believed the fingertips were feminine.   
San Diego Police Officer Phillip Franchina responded to 
the PetSmart parking lot and saw “severed fingers” among the 
trash in the dumpsters.  James Francis Hergenroeather, a 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
 
homicide detective with the San Diego Police Department, 
responded to the PetSmart scene, where he removed and 
cataloged items found in and around the dumpsters.  The items 
found included:  eight fingertips found in and around the 
dumpsters;2 cigarettes and lighters; “two yellow rubber gloves 
with red stains”; a razor blade; an empty bottle of “Tile Action” 
cleaner; wet paper towels; duct tape packaging, tape, and bolt 
cutters with a Home Depot sticker attached; and a separate bag 
containing many items, among them a banana peel, a pair of 
jeans, a hand drill, a wet washcloth, and empty perfume bottles 
labeled “Bath and Body Works Splash Freesia” and “Dazzling 
Gold Estee Lauder.”    
Within the bag containing the banana peel, Detective 
Hergenroeather also found two pieces of paper with writing on 
them.  The first paper read, “Please do not disturb.  Sleeping.  
Thanx [sic].”  The second was a handwritten “to-do” list, which 
included the following items and notations:  “2-4am; M-Th; 
shaver cord; dish wash gloves; Adidas jacket; knit cap inside-
out; long black nylon (Nike sweats); digi cam (scanner); 
cucumber; get info → software for moving, altering, or enlarging 
photos; burn palms + face thoroughly; (small hand truck & 
drawer for extraction from apt.); 2 S.A.S.E. letters re: 11 day 
hiatus to visit w/ grieveng [sic] relatives; need these checks; 5-
day hiatus for me; Su → Th & slave screams; Ads in Reader + 
Internet Baby!!; on Aug. 2nd/10th/ & 15th; ensure 7,200.00 
avail…; close all windows + kitchen; lock doors; on her stomach; 
 
2  
Detective Sergeant William Holmes returned to the 
PetSmart parking lot the day after Detective Hergenroeather’s 
search to investigate an allegation that a witness saw an item 
being thrown or flicked away near the dumpsters.  He found a 
human thumb in the planters near the dumpsters.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
 
(shave + plug a virgin pussy & clenching ass cheeks pound ‘em); 
(rub your nuts . . . lubed-up tits & lubed-up asshole!!!); (your 
nuts . . .); (30 & afraid to take a dick — what a fuckin’ joke).”  
The list also had a drawing on it showing two people lying on 
top of each other with the caption, “um you got daddy all big n 
wet, now let’s spank that tight lil asshole.”   
On the morning of August 13, 2000, Dale Kaler noticed a 
mattress left in the roadway along the fence line of his neighbor, 
Scott Carroll’s, house.  Their daughters, who had been running 
a lemonade stand that day, noticed the mattress was 
bloodstained.  Kaler and Carroll notified the San Diego Police 
Department, and officers responded.    
On the evening of August 14, 2000, Debra Desrosiers was 
walking with a friend in her Carlsbad neighborhood when they 
noticed a duct-tape-wrapped trash can in a ditch off the road.  
The trash can was out of place, particularly in the well-
manicured subdivision, so they decided to kick the trash can and 
noted it was heavy.  Desrosiers’s walking partner lifted the trash 
can’s lid, and both women saw what appeared to be flesh and 
dark hair in the can and immediately called the police.  A body 
was found in the trash can, ultimately identified as Gallego.   
 On August 15, 2000, defendant telephonically transferred 
the $4,670.02 balance of Gallego’s savings account to her 
checking account.  Later that day, he was arrested at the 
apartment he shared with Gallego.  
Detectives Hergenroeather, Holmes, and Washington 
searched the home.  The apartment looked clean, the windows 
were closed, and Gallego’s bedroom and bathroom appeared to 
have been cleaned.  In Gallego’s bedroom, a bed frame and 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
 
mattress were propped against a wall, and there was a red stain 
on the carpet.   
A number of items were found in the apartment matching 
what was listed on the note in the dumpster, including:  a shaver 
with its cord (found in defendant’s bathroom under the sink); 
dishwashing gloves; an Adidas jacket (found in defendant’s 
closet); a knit cap (found on defendant’s bed); and Nike pants 
(found in defendant’s closet).  A search of Gallego’s car and the 
U-Haul revealed items listed on the handwritten note found in 
the dumpster or similar to items located in the dumpster, 
including a dust mask and bottle of Chanel perfume and a hand 
cart.  A Nash brand scarf was found in the living room closet.   
Defendant’s apartment contained a number of cleaning 
supplies, including a towel and a wet washcloth found in a 
laundry basket in the living room, black garbage bags with red 
pull tabs like those found in the dumpster, several used mops, 
and assorted cleaning products found in the kitchen and 
beneath the sink in defendant’s bathroom. 
Gallego’s passport photos and other identification 
documents were found in the living room in a manila envelope 
on the living room floor with the letters “CAL” and “P.R.G.” 
written on it.  Check No. 201 from Gallego’s account, made 
payable to “Cal,” was found in the kitchen trash.  Gallego’s car 
keys were located in the dining room, along with a notebook and 
a note with instructions on how to drive a manual car.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
 
Several receipts3 and credit card applications4 were found 
on the kitchen counter, along with a credit card in defendant’s 
name, defendant’s driver’s license, $194.30, and a sheet of paper 
listing names, phone numbers, social security numbers, and a 
driver’s license number.  The check defendant tried to cash at 
the Wells Fargo in Mission Valley, No. 202, was also found on 
the kitchen counter.  More papers were located in defendant’s 
bedroom, including:  a Ralphs receipt for garbage bags and food 
dated August 13, 2000 at 11:41 p.m.; an envelope with the words 
“Patricia G.” on it, along with numbers and place names; a note 
with no intended recipient that said, “I am sorry that I’m not 
able to finish my shifts”; two shorter notes; and a letter.5   
 
3  
The receipts included:  an August 13, 2000 receipt for a 
Rug Doctor rental; an August 14, 2000 receipt for the return of 
the U-Haul truck; a receipt from a Sav-On in Carlsbad dated 
August 14, 2000 at 11:38 p.m.; and a receipt from a Togo’s in 
Carlsbad dated August 15, 2000 at 11:40 a.m.  
4  
The credit card applications included:  a J.C. Penney credit 
card application made under the name “Pat R. Gallego”; a 
Nordstrom FSB credit card application made under the name of 
“Pat Ramos Gallego”; a Mervyn’s credit card application made 
under the name of “Pat R. Gallego”; a Robinsons-May credit card 
application made under the name of “Pat R. Gallego”; and a 
Wells Fargo credit card application made under the name 
“Patricia Ramos Gallego.”   
5  
The letter stated, in full:  “I underline ‘true self,’ because 
if that’s your thinking.  [¶] I didn’t feel much like talking last 
night, because all my life long, I’ve been lousy with any . . . of 
verbal confrontation.  So much so that you’d be left with the 
impression that I’m the fuckin’ foreigner.  [¶] Plus, I was pissed-
off about your agenda — just like a God damn Nazi!!  Are you 
the only men you’ll show your true self to, have to fit some 
fuckin’ media mind controlling criteria of T.V. actor looks or 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
 
Hundreds of pornographic images were recovered, 
including hand-altered images depicting body parts from one 
image pasted to another.  Several of these images were collaged 
photographs of Gallego’s face combined with body parts of 
models 
from 
pornographic 
magazines. 
 
Pornographic 
videotapes, pages from pornographic magazines, and hundreds 
of altered images comprised the concededly large collection, 
which the trial court described as “six to ten cubic feet” of 
materials.    
San 
Diego 
Police Department 
Criminalist 
Shawn 
Montpetit saw drops of blood on the carpet in Gallego’s bedroom 
and applied Luminol to parts of her bedroom and bathroom.  
Luminol testing also revealed blood present on a bed frame that 
was leaning against a wall.  Samples from the carpet in 
Gallego’s bedroom that had fluoresced following Luminol 
application were DNA tested, and the blood in the carpet was 
consistent with Gallego’s.  Blood was seen at the threshold of 
Gallego’s bathroom door along the metal strip and along the 
door frame.  Dirt patterns suggested a rug had been removed 
from Gallego’s bathroom floor.  Swabs were taken from the 
fluoresced areas of Gallego’s bathroom floor underneath the 
towel rack and near the shower door, but no blood could be 
 
money or blond hair and blue eyes.  You’re such a fucking 
puppeted piece of shit at a whimsical society’s mercy.  [¶] With 
all that you’ve ever said I do you do your best and succeed at 
making me feel completely insignificant — about half the 
time — while in the early weeks of our cohabitation, I just 
wanted to confront you.  I call it feeling and acting like a human 
being, by yielding, caring, respect, attention and notes and 
flowers to perpetuate said intentions.  [¶] Your brain can only 
hope to aspire to be my liquid excrement!!”   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
 
confirmed from those tests.  Montpetit testified that cleaning the 
bathroom could have removed all of the blood.   
Deputy Medical Examiner Christopher I. Swalwell 
performed an autopsy on Gallego’s body on August 15, 2000.  
The body arrived in a plastic trash can, wrapped in plastic, and 
without clothing save a Nash brand scarf looped and tied loosely 
around Gallego’s head in a double knot.  Her body emitted both 
a foul odor and a sweet one, the latter smelling of Bath and Body 
Works Freesia Body Splash or Estee Lauder Dazzling Gold 
perfume, bottles of which were found in the PetSmart dumpster 
and believed to have been used to mask the smell of 
decomposition.   
A number of external changes and injuries were visible 
including:  pre- and postmortem discoloration due to 
decomposition; a shaved pubic area with no regrowth of hair; 
missing fingers, eight of which and a thumb were later matched 
to the body; blackened and wrinkled skin around her hands 
suggesting postmortem burning; bruising and marks on her 
arms, wrists, head, neck, back and ankle; and a postmortem 
fracture of her thyroid cartilage, an injury common in asphyxia 
by hanging or strangulation. 
 Swalwell did not definitively determine the time of 
Gallego’s death, but estimated it occurred two or three days 
before his examination.  Gallego suffered blunt force trauma to 
her head resulting in a skull fracture.  Assuming she was not 
already unconscious, Gallego’s contact with the object would 
likely have caused her to lose consciousness.  Her head injury, 
caused by a sharp object like the corner of a desk or a rock, would 
not have been fatal and likely occurred premortem because 
there was bleeding.  Gallego also suffered a cut — or sharp force 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
 
trauma — to her neck, severing her internal jugular vein.  
Gallego’s neck injury occurred premortem, and blood loss 
resulting from her injuries was the cause of her death.  Gallego’s 
body contained no blood, and she had no blood on her body, 
suggesting she lost blood somewhere other than the trash can 
she was found in.  Swalwell testified that submerging a wound 
in water tends to keep it moist and prevents clotting, allowing 
blood to flow.  He testified that if Gallego was submerged in a 
bathtub or if water was run over her neck injury, that could have 
played a role in her total blood loss.  Gallego’s death would not 
have been immediate; it would have occurred between one 
minute and one hour after suffering her injury.   
Sergeant Holmes viewed postmortem photographs of 
Gallego’s wrists and back and believed based on marks he 
observed that handcuffs may have been used during the 
homicide.  Detective Hergenroeather likewise noted Gallego’s 
left wrist was bruised or marked in a pattern similar to someone 
who had been handcuffed for too long.6  Holmes sought the 
assistance of Dr. Norman Sperber, a forensic dentist and expert 
 
6 
Defendant had been known to lock his bicycle using 
handcuffs; he did so during the period he lived with Ijames.  
Powell also testified she was aware of defendant using heavy 
metallic silver handcuffs as a bike lock.  Defendant rode his 
bicycle to Powell’s house several times a week during their 
relationship, and he would either lock it outside with the 
handcuffs or bring the bicycle inside and keep the handcuffs in 
his backpack.  Powell described the handcuffs as similar to the 
type police used, with a metal chain linking the two bracelet 
portions of the cuffs.  Following Gallego’s death, the property 
from the shared apartment was moved to a storage facility, 
including a bike that had been stored in a common area, 
photographed both with and without a lock.   
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
in tool mark identification — that is, marks left by any object on 
a soft or hard material, which includes marks left by teeth.  
Sperber examined Gallego’s body in the medical examiner’s 
office to assess whether a mark on her lower back could have 
resulted from having had her hands cuffed behind her back.  
Sperber compared the marks against several varieties of 
handcuffs kept in the police department’s property room.  To do 
this, Sperber turned Gallego’s body facedown, positioned her 
hands behind her back, and placed handcuffs on her wrists — 
observing that the metal chain connecting the two rings of the 
handcuffs was directly over the marked area on her back.  
Sperber also noted Gallego’s right wrist bore a faint mark 
consistent with having worn handcuffs.   
Gallego’s body was examined for physical evidence of 
sexual assault, and no injuries were seen.  Montpetit found a 
mixture of sperm and epithelial cells on vaginal swabs taken 
from Gallego, of which defendant and Gallego were “possible 
contributors.” The probability that someone other than 
defendant and Gallego contributed to the DNA was “1 in 1200 
for the Caucasian population, 1 in 2400 for the African-
American population, and 1 in 1800 for the Hispanic 
population.”   
Additional DNA evidence was collected from the bolt 
cutters, which matched Gallego’s.  The scarf found tied on 
Gallego’s body was tested for the presence of saliva and blood, 
with inclusive results for the former and positive results for the 
latter.  The mattress was tested for the presence of blood and 
sperm, and Montpetit found DNA from blood consistent with 
Gallego’s and DNA from sperm cells consistent with 
defendant’s.  Gallego’s DNA was also found in bloodstained 
areas of the carpet in Gallego’s bedroom.   
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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Montpetit tested the rubber gloves with red stains, which 
were negative for blood.  A sperm cell was found on the banana 
peel that had been discarded in the same trash bag as the to-do 
list found in the PetSmart dumpster, but Montpetit was unable 
to test it given the sample size.  The U-Haul truck contained 
several bloodstains and droplets, and testing of those suggested 
Gallego was the most likely source.   
Following his arrest, defendant met Edward Lee — who 
had been arrested on drug-related charges — and made several 
statements to him.  Defendant told Lee he had been arrested for 
murder, having initially planned to marry a woman from Brazil 
for $2,000 but later deciding “to do another thing” because he 
learned she had approximately $15,000 in the bank.  Lee 
understood defendant had been roommates with the woman he 
planned to marry and that she intended to put money into a joint 
bank account to make the marriage seem legitimate.   
Defendant told Lee that after he killed the woman, he cut 
off her fingers with bolt cutters, and it was more difficult to 
accomplish that task than he had anticipated.  Defendant “said 
he had to just kind of jerk it around to get it to pop.  The skin, 
you know.  He was cutting the knuckles.”  Lee testified 
defendant believed he would not be caught since the woman he 
killed was from a different country.  Lee testified that defendant 
told him he drove a truck to Carlsbad to dispose of the body and 
that he was startled by a light while in the process of disposal, 
so he drove away.  Defendant told Lee that he bagged up 
Gallego’s fingers and threw away several bags — including the 
one with her fingers — in a dumpster while an older woman 
watched him doing so.  Defendant allegedly told Lee he drained 
the woman’s blood in a bathtub before disposing of her body.     
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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David Oleksow, an expert in handwriting, compared some 
documents 
against 
defendant’s 
handwriting 
exemplars.  
Oleksow concluded defendant was responsible for creating the 
handwritten portions of six credit card applications in Gallego’s 
name and a portion of Rug Doctor receipt.   
2. 
Defense Evidence 
Defendant presented evidence from Gallego’s friends and 
former roommates, their neighbors, law enforcement officials, a 
forensic pathologist, an acoustics expert, and the jailhouse 
informant’s mother.   
Gallego’s former roommate, Stephanie Ortiz, testified that 
Gallego discussed marrying a United States citizen to gain 
citizenship.  Gallego told her former roommate, Kristina 
Stepanof, that she was living with a friend to make it appear 
they were in love.   
San Diego Police Officer James Tomsovic testified that De 
Crecy, the owner of Café Chloe, said Gallego seemed “normal” 
and “upbeat” the last time he saw her and had relayed her plans 
to get married on August 27, 2000.  Defendant presented 
testimony from Café Chloe customer and immigration attorney, 
Giacomo Behar, who recalled speaking to several of the 
Brazilian servers at the café and leaving his business card 
should any of them need his assistance.   
Gallego and defendant’s next door neighbor, Laura Balza, 
heard an argument the week of August 6 that she thought was 
coming from the apartment above her.   
An acoustics expert, Jack Goldberg, testified that the 
sound of a woman screaming in defendant’s apartment would be 
loud enough to wake someone in the adjacent apartment and 
would likely wake someone in the apartment above, particularly 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
 
if their windows were open.  No evidence of a scream being heard 
was presented.  Goldberg measured the decibel level of ripping 
duct tape, determined it to be much lower than a scream, and 
concluded that if a nearby apartment resident was able to hear 
duct tape ripping, that resident would also likely be able to hear 
a scream.   
Powell testified that Gallego and her then boyfriend, 
Ijames, had fights that involved cursing and raised voices.   
Dr. William Brady, a forensic pathologist, testified Gallego 
died as a result of the deep cut to her neck and resultant 
bleeding.  Brady believed Gallego’s head injury was not 
necessarily fatal.  Brady concluded Gallego was not gagged, was 
not handcuffed while alive, and suffered no forcible sexual 
contact.   
Annie Lee, Edward Lee’s mother, provided impeachment 
evidence against Lee.  She testified Lee threatened to kill her 
and her tenant.  Although she was not afraid he would harm 
her, she sought a restraining order against him because he was 
addicted to drugs, and she wanted him to seek treatment.   
B. Penalty Phase 
1. 
Victim Impact Evidence 
Gallego’s mother, father, and former roommate testified.  
Gallego’s mother, Terezinha Ramos da Silva, testified Gallego 
was a happy and hard-working young woman.  Gallego’s mother 
last spoke with her daughter a week or two prior to her death.  
She learned of her daughter’s death after Gallego’s father 
received phone calls he did not understand, and da Silva called 
her daughter’s number and was told by the woman who 
answered that her daughter was dead.  Gallego’s mother 
testified that Gallego was “everything to” her.  Although da 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
 
Silva learned her daughter was dead from the woman who 
answered Gallego’s phone, she did not learn the circumstances 
of her death until later; she testified Gallego died twice — once 
when da Silva heard about her death and again in the courtroom 
while testifying.   
Gallego’s father, Rubens Gallego, also testified that 
Gallego was “an enchanting girl.  She was always happy.  She 
would just play.  And she pleased everybody.”  Her brothers were 
distraught upon hearing the news of her death.  Rubens had 
planned to visit his daughter to celebrate her upcoming 
birthday.  He learned the news of his daughter’s death from his 
family and then the consulate, and attending the trial and 
learning the whole story is “much wors[e] than [he] had 
thought.”   
Gallego’s former roommate, Stepanof, also testified for the 
prosecution, describing how she and Gallego became friendly 
after Gallego temporarily moved in with her.  Stepanof 
described Gallego as warm, friendly, and energetic.  Gallego 
introduced Stepanof to some of her friends from Brazil, and 
Gallego attended church services with Stepanof.  Stepanof 
learned of Gallego’s murder from Detective Keyser and 
described its effect on her as “hard.”   
2. 
Defense Evidence 
Defendant’s mother, father, sister, aunt, foster mother, 
foster brother, and social worker testified about his upbringing.  
A pediatrician testified about the effects of child abuse and 
neglect. 
Defendant’s mother, Brenda Graves, appeared in court 
accompanied by a social worker.  She last saw defendant at one 
of his foster homes and recalled that he was born in July, but 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
 
she did not know which day.  Defendant and his sister, J.G., 
were removed from her care at some point; both were initially 
placed with her mother and then in foster homes.  She visited 
them in both placements.  Graves was incarcerated in a state 
hospital and treated for heroin and alcohol addiction; she denied 
being physically violent toward her children.  Ollie Lee, Graves’s 
sister, testified defendant’s father was physically abusive to 
Graves, and Graves was physically abusive with defendant.   
Defendant’s father, Lawrence Parker, testified he did not 
recall what day in July defendant was born.  He described 
injuries defendant suffered as a child.  When defendant was one 
year old, he swallowed some of Graves’s pills and was taken to 
the hospital where his stomach was pumped; he recuperated 
after a few days.  One year later, Lawrence observed Graves 
running angrily up the stairs, heard furniture moving and 
defendant screaming, and saw a large cut on defendant’s head 
that bled profusely.  Lawrence called the police and defendant 
was treated and removed from the home.  After separating from 
Graves, Lawrence saw defendant just twice more during his 
childhood and once during his adulthood, each time for a period 
of just a few hours.   
Defendant was made a ward of the court.  He and J.G. 
were placed with their grandmother and aunt.  Living 
conditions at the home were found to be “deplorable” due to his 
grandmother’s  ill health and numerous other children living in 
the home.  Katherine Graves, defendant’s grandmother, also 
cared for Ollie, two of her brothers, defendant, J.G., and 11 of 
their cousins.  J.G. testified that there was not always enough 
to eat while living there.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
 
While defendant was living with Katherine and Ollie, 
when he was about six years old, he contracted gonorrhea.  
When doctors asked defendant who was “messing with him,” he 
told Ollie that his uncle’s girlfriend had done so, and his uncle 
responded to that information with pride.  J.G. also suffered 
physical and sexual abuse by her cousins and uncles while living 
with Katherine and Ollie.   
When defendant and J.G. were nine and seven, 
respectively, they were placed with foster parents Eva Nunn 
and her husband.  They arrived at Nunn’s home with matted 
hair and trash bags filled with adult-sized clothing that smelled 
of urine.  J.G. testified that the Nunns treated her well, and she 
came to appreciate as an adult how much effort they expended 
caring for her.  Nunn described defendant as a quiet child who 
liked to draw.  Nunn also cared for an unrelated foster child, 
eight-year-old John Breen.  Breen testified that while he and 
defendant lived with the Nunns, Breen mentally and physically 
abused defendant for years, once slamming a ceramic piggy 
bank against defendant’s head, and sometimes using a butcher 
knife to threaten and scare him.  J.G. testified that Breen was a 
“horrible” brother and “bad kid.” 
Graves wrote letters to defendant and J.G. while they 
lived at the Nunn’s home, and she visited sometimes.  Nunn 
described Graves’s demeanor as childlike during those visits; 
Graves mumbled to herself, spoke like a child, and talked about 
her plans to marry Michael Jackson and other musicians.   
Defendant also presented testimony from Dr. Marilyn 
Kaufhold, a pediatrician expert in child abuse and neglect.  
Kaufhold testified that a child who suffers trauma is often 
“hyperaroused.”  If such a child also suffers neglect, the person  
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
 
experiences difficulty forming relationships in adulthood.  
Kaufhold explained that a parent with a mental illness may not 
be able to provide a safe environment for a child because the 
parent may be unable to discern what would be dangerous for 
the child and because that parent may be unable to provide a 
structured and predictable home.   
Kaufhold reviewed defendant’s medical records, noting 
that when defendant was 12 months old, Graves hit him to stop 
him from crying, causing his lip to split and bleed.  In March 
1971, defendant ingested 118 prenatal iron tablets and was 
admitted to the hospital, where he remained in critical condition 
for five days.  In July 1971, in an effort to stop defendant from 
crying, Graves hit his head into a dresser causing a two-inch 
laceration.  While he was recuperating from his head injury, 
defendant was again admitted to the hospital with abdominal 
pain, and surgery revealed an abdominal abscess and intestinal 
obstruction resulting from corrosion caused by his earlier 
ingestion of iron pills.  Kaufhold characterized these incidents 
as abusive and neglectful.  Defendant had a history of bed-
wetting, which persisted throughout his childhood and 
adolescence.   
3. 
Rebuttal Evidence 
Defendant’s ex-girlfriend, Brenda Chamberlain, provided 
rebuttal evidence.  She testified that she and defendant met 
through a mutual friend, and when he returned from a six-
month long deployment with the Navy, the two began dating.  
They moved in together three months later, and for three years 
enjoyed a normal relationship.  In their third year of dating, they 
broke up a few times; Chamberlain describes the final year of 
their relationship as “on and off quite a bit.”  Chamberlain loved 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
 
defendant and believed he loved her, although once they broke 
up, she did not maintain contact.   
When they were dating, Chamberlain and defendant 
would engage in various social activities and would take 
photographs of one another while doing so.  Chamberlain was 
shown collaged images of her face and nude bodies or body parts 
and testified that those images were not how the photographs 
originally appeared.  Chamberlain testified she never saw 
anything like those images while she dated defendant, and he 
treated her well, aside from their mutual arguments. 
PRETRIAL 
A. Defendant’s Competence To Stand Trial  
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to declare a doubt concerning his competence to stand 
trial, suspend proceedings, and hold a competency trial.  He 
contends that the trial court was obligated to initiate 
competency proceedings based on the evidence before it — 
largely in the form of defendant’s conduct and in propria persona 
filings — suggesting that due to a mental impairment, 
defendant was unable to understand the proceedings and 
rationally assist counsel in his defense.  We disagree. 
On several occasions during the course of pretrial 
proceedings and at trial, defendant asked the trial court to 
relieve counsel, permit him to represent himself, or appoint 
different counsel.   During pretrial proceedings, defendant 
moved to represent himself, and the court held a Faretta7 
hearing.  At that hearing, defendant complained he was not 
 
7  
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
 
being given “100 percent of everything” by his attorneys, and he 
specifically sought autopsy photos to compare against the 
medical examiner’s report.  The trial court asked defense 
counsel whether there were any concerns about defendant’s 
competence.  Counsel replied, “I don’t know of anything, your 
honor, that would cause me to make a declaration under 1368.”  
The court then asked whether counsel was aware of any 
disability that would interfere with defendant’s ability to waive 
his right to counsel, and his attorney responded in the negative.  
The court also asked defendant directly for information related 
to competence:  After advising defendant about the nature of 
self-representation in connection with a Faretta motion, it asked 
defendant about his mental health history.  Defendant denied 
ever taking psychiatric medication or being treated for mental 
illness.  The court asked if defendant wished to convey anything 
further, and defendant reiterated his request for copies of 
autopsy photos.  The court pointed out the significance of 
waiving counsel, and defendant requested more time to consider 
whether he wished to do so.  The court did not suspend 
proceedings then, or at any other time, to conduct a competency 
hearing.   
About six months after the Faretta hearing, defendant 
twice sought the appointment of new counsel pursuant to People 
v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, claiming his attorneys were 
dishonest when communicating with him and failed to give him 
all discovery.  Those motions were denied following in camera 
proceedings.   
At the first Marsden proceeding, conducted to consider his 
request for new counsel, defendant alleged there was a general 
conspiracy among the court and counsel, and that his attorneys 
were lying to him.  Defendant was especially concerned about 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
 
the pathologist’s findings as to whether the victim was alive or 
dead during the sexual assault and the extent to which that 
mattered to substantiate a rape charge or special circumstance 
finding.  The court and counsel expressed concern that 
defendant was wading into discussion of the cause of death, 
which was an area that should remain attorney-client 
privileged.  Ignoring those warnings, defendant continued to 
explain that he disagreed with the pathologist’s findings.   
Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a second Marsden 
motion, and the court again conducted an in camera hearing to 
address it.  At that hearing, counsel informed the court that 
defendant was consistently making demands on counsel 
concerning the investigation and defense strategy, explaining, 
“[T]here isn’t any give-and-take with Mr. Parker.  There’s 
nothing that I can do that will . . . stop the torrent of marginally-
relevant requests and demands on our time that — that keep us 
from preparing issues of unquestioned legal significance and 
magnitude.”  Cocounsel agreed that defendant was very engaged 
in the investigation, asking a number of questions — sometimes 
repetitively — despite having received answers to them during 
previous communications.   
After defense counsel expressed frustration to the court 
concerning defendant’s “constant forays into marginally-
relevant areas; which, frankly, border on delusions sometimes,” 
the court interrupted to ask whether counsel was “expressing 
concerns that would cause a suspension of the proceedings.”  
Counsel responded in the negative, and the court agreed, stating 
it had “seen no[]” “basis on which to” suspend proceedings.  
Counsel also explained to the court that the defense had 
retained the services of a mental health expert to examine 
defendant regarding “threshold issues [of] competency and 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
 
sanity, Axis I diagnoses, mental health issues, to see if there 
were any mental health issues . . . that might impact the guilt 
phase or the penalty phase.”  Counsel stated that although 
defendant was not wholly cooperative with the expert’s 
investigative efforts, the expert conveyed his belief that 
defendant did not “suffer[] from any mental health condition 
that would impact his competency or sanity” or that would rise 
to the level of a potential defense at the guilt phase of this case.  
The court ultimately denied the second Marsden motion.   
Defendant filed no other Marsden motions and did not 
again complain about counsel until the conclusion of the guilt 
phase.   Defendant “deliver[ed] a verbal Marsden” alleging his 
attorneys sometimes provided him conflicting information, 
colluded with opposing counsel, and counseled him against 
testifying on his own behalf.  The court conducted in camera 
proceedings to address defendant’s concerns, after which it 
denied his third Marsden request.  These proceedings focused 
on defendant’s desire to testify on his own behalf, counsel’s 
conduct, and defendant’s relationship with counsel; the court did 
not ask questions going specifically to defendant’s competence.   
Following the penalty phase but before a verdict had been 
reached, defendant submitted a lengthy handwritten motion 
alleging trial counsel had been ineffective and had colluded with 
the court and prosecution.  In response, the trial court appointed 
an attorney with the alternate public defender’s office to 
investigate whether the claim was meritorious.  After the 
attorney concluded the claim lacked merit, the trial court heard 
and denied defendant’s handwritten motion.  At the hearing on 
that motion, the court stated its belief, given the high quality of 
advocacy provided by defense counsel and the alternate public 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
 
defender’s office, that there was no attorney with whom 
defendant would have been satisfied.   
On February 24, 2003, defendant submitted two copies of 
a second, lengthy handwritten document reiterating his 
concerns that a conspiracy between the defense, prosecution, 
and court existed.  Appended to this filing were defendant’s 
notes taken on various copies of pleadings and documents filed 
in his case.  In a few instances, defendant drew sexually graphic 
sketches on these pages, all but one of which he made an effort 
to redact before submitting the document to the court.  That 
document was initially filed under seal, but after defendant 
requested it be publicly filed and began reading it aloud during 
his sentencing hearing — during which he alleged collusion 
between the court and counsel — the document was publicly 
filed.   
 
A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when “as a result 
of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the 
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a 
rational manner.”  (§ 1367, subd. (a); see People v. Wycoff (2021) 
12 Cal.5th 58, 81–82 (Wycoff).)  The trial court’s “duty to assess 
competence is a continuing one.”  (People v. Rodas (2018) 
6 Cal.5th 219, 236, fn. 5.)  The obligation to suspend proceedings 
and hold a competency trial is triggered whenever “ ‘the court is 
presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, 
evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning 
the defendant’s competence to stand trial.’ ”  (People v. Johnson 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 575 (Johnson).)  “The word ‘substantial’ 
does not mean that for a doubt to arise, there must be a large 
quantity of evidence of a defendant’s incompetence; rather, it 
means that there must be some evidence of sufficient substance 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
 
that it cannot be dismissed as being inherently unpersuasive.”  
(Wycoff, supra, at p. 83.)   
The obligation to initiate formal competency proceedings 
arises “even if the evidence . . . is presented by the defense or if 
the sum of the evidence is in conflict.”  (People v. Lightsey (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 668, 691.)  “When faced with conflicting evidence 
regarding competence, the trial court’s role . . . is only to decide 
whether the evidence of incompetence is substantial, not to 
resolve the conflict.  Resolution must await expert examination 
and the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing.”  (People v. 
Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234.)  “In other words, once a trial 
court has before it substantial evidence that a defendant is not 
mentally competent, its own observations of the defendant’s 
competence cannot take the place of the formal competence 
inquiry . . . .”  (Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 83.)   
“The decision whether to order a competency hearing rests 
within the trial court’s discretion, and may be disturbed upon 
appeal ‘only where a doubt as to [mental competence] may be 
said to appear as a matter of law or where there is an abuse of 
discretion.’ ”  (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 195.)  
“[A]bsent a showing of ‘incompetence’ that is ‘substantial’ as a 
matter of law, the trial judge’s decision not to order a 
competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the 
trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during 
trial.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1033 (Mai).)   
Defendant claims the trial court erred by failing to initiate 
competency proceedings based on the evidence the court had 
before it suggesting he may have been unable to rationally assist 
his attorneys in the conduct of his defense, including evidence of 
his “consistent mistrust of his counsel, his belief that there was 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
 
a conspiracy against him . . . [and] his belief that evidence in his 
case was fabricated.”  We disagree.  Defendant asserts that over 
the course of his trial, he came to distrust his own attorneys, the 
prosecution team, and the court, becoming convinced that all 
“were joined in a conspiracy to fabricate evidence and secure a 
death sentence.”  As evidence that this distrust impaired his 
ability to rationally assist his attorneys, he points to the fact 
that he:  submitted various documents to the court over 
counsel’s objection, one of which contained a sexually graphic 
drawing; repeatedly attempted — sometimes successfully — 
against counsel’s wishes, to put evidence before the court that 
could impair his defense; failed to cooperate with the mental 
health expert retained to evaluate his competence and possible 
defenses; and made a lengthy statement at his sentencing 
hearing again alleging collusion and disclosing evidence that 
could impair his defense.  Defendant argues that although he 
was never overtly disruptive, this conduct should have alerted 
the court to the possibility that due to mental illness, he was 
unable to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of his defense.          
Nothing in defendant’s conduct suggests the court abused 
its discretion by failing to suspend proceedings to assess 
defendant’s competence.  (See Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 575.)  An uncooperative defendant is not tantamount to an 
incompetent one.  (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1034 [“We 
have frequently recognized . . . and have made clear that an 
uncooperative attitude is not, in and of itself, substantial 
evidence of incompetence”].)  And here, although defendant was 
distrustful of counsel, at times disagreed with the defense 
strategy, and even publicly filed a document despite counsel’s 
and the court’s attempts to maintain it under seal, he was 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
 
actively engaged in his defense and generally cooperative with 
proceedings, as he concedes.  
We see no substantial evidence compelling us to conclude 
that defendant’s behavior resulted from mental illness as 
opposed to unwillingness to cooperate.  (See Mai, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at p. 1033.)  Recently, in Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th 58, 
84, we concluded the trial court erred in failing to initiate 
competency proceedings when the court had before it a 
psychologist’s report that constituted substantial evidence of the 
defendant’s incompetence to stand trial as a matter of law.  In 
the instant case, no mental health expert ever testified or 
reported defendant was unable to assist counsel, nor was there 
any other evidence before the court that constituted substantial 
evidence of the defendant’s incompetence as a matter of law.   
The court took steps to assure itself that defendant’s 
mistrust of his counsel was not rooted in a mental impairment.  
Indeed, the court twice inquired of counsel whether proceedings 
should be suspended due to concerns about his competence, to 
which counsel responded in the negative.  During the Faretta 
hearing, the court asked defendant’s attorneys whether there 
were any concerns about his competence, to which they replied 
no.  And it separately asked defendant whether he had taken 
psychiatric medications or been treated for mental illness, to 
which he replied he had not.  At a Marsden hearing held several 
months later, when defense counsel noted defendant’s requests 
“border[ed] on delusions sometimes,” the court interrupted to 
ask whether counsel was concerned to a degree necessitating “a 
suspension of the proceedings.”  After defense counsel responded 
in the negative, the court agreed it had “seen no[]” “basis on 
which to” suspend proceedings.  During defendant’s second 
Marsden hearing, counsel told the court that an expert had 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
 
examined defendant and concluded there was no basis to assert 
he lacked competence.  While an expert’s opinion is not required 
to find a defendant incompetent, we have noted that “to discard 
[expert] evidence” when it is available “for mere psychiatric 
speculation” is “clearly outside our province.”  (People v. 
Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 288.)  In the absence of 
evidence of incompetence that is substantial as a matter of law, 
we give great deference to the trial judge’s decision not to 
initiate formal competency proceedings.  (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th 
at p. 1033.)   
Defendant complains that in denying his second Marsden 
motion, the court failed to acknowledge defendant’s paranoia 
and delusions, because the court “viewed the motion only 
through the lens of the conventional Marsden inquiry” rather 
than more broadly assessing defendant’s competence.  That does 
not appear to be the case.  When counsel mentioned defendant’s 
requests seemed at times “delusional,” the court immediately 
inquired after defendant’s competence and was reassured by 
counsel that there were no issues of incompetence. “ ‘Although 
trial counsel’s failure to seek a competency hearing is not 
determinative [citation], it is significant because trial counsel 
interacts with the defendant on a daily basis and is in the best 
position to evaluate whether the defendant is able to participate 
meaningfully in the proceedings.’ ”  (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 250, 273.)  Particularly considering counsel’s 
assurances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to initiate competency proceedings. 
We likewise reject defendant’s assertion that his childhood 
history and the nature of the crimes he stood accused of 
committing constituted evidence of incompetence that would 
have “ ‘raise[d] a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.’ ”  (Johnson, supra, 
6 Cal.5th at p. 575.)  “In resolving the question of whether, as a 
matter of law, the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to 
defendant’s mental competence, we may consider all the 
relevant facts in the record.”  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 
1149, 1217.)  Because they constitute “relevant facts,” we 
certainly may assess the nature of the charges and any evidence 
in the record regarding the defendant’s childhood history.  
(Ibid.)  As we have explained, however, “ ‘[w]hen the trial court’s 
declaration of a doubt is discretionary, it is clear that “more is 
required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or 
bizarre statements [citation] or . . . psychiatric testimony . . . [of 
past] diagnos[e]s with little reference to defendant’s ability to 
assist in his own defense.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1218.)  The facts of 
defendant’s childhood history and the nature of the charges 
against him are not enough alone for us to conclude the court 
abused its discretion in failing to declare a doubt as to 
defendant’s competence. 
On this record, we cannot say as a matter of law that there 
was substantial evidence that defendant was unable to consult 
with his attorneys “with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding.”  (Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402; 
see Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033.)  And for the reasons given 
above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
failing to initiate competency proceedings.  (Mai, at p. 1033.) 
B. Release of Television Production Company’s 
 
Videotapes  
Defendant argues his state and federal constitutional 
rights were violated by the trial court’s pre- and posttrial rulings 
to seal and prohibit disclosure to defendant of videotapes.  The 
videos, which were never broadcast, were prepared by a third 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
 
party television production company filming a reality television 
show and depict the prosecution team discussing defendant’s 
case.  He argues the trial court’s rulings constitute error 
warranting reversal or, at a minimum, disclosure of the video 
footage under seal to defendant to determine whether further 
briefing is warranted.  We conclude the trial court did not err. 
 
Five months before the guilt phase began, defense counsel 
issued a subpoena duces tecum to Trial & Error Productions 
(TEP) seeking disclosure of video footage TEP had created of the 
prosecution team.  TEP had been filming a documentary-style 
reality television show about district attorneys preparing for 
and trying cases, and defendant sought to obtain all “outtakes” 
of production related to his case, although no episode ever aired 
related to his case.  TEP moved to quash the subpoena, arguing 
the footage was protected from disclosure by the California 
reporter’s shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2; Evid. Code, § 1070) 
and the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.   
 
Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court ordered 
TEP to release the footage to the court so it could conduct an in 
camera review.  The trial court reviewed four tapes:  a recording 
of an interview with the victim’s mother, which had previously 
been released to the defense; a recording of a meeting between 
former District Attorney Paul Pfingst and two deputy district 
attorneys discussing whether they would seek the death penalty 
in defendant’s case; a recording of District Attorney Pfingst’s 
announcement that the death penalty would be sought; and, a 
recording of a discussion between Attorneys Daly and Thompson 
concerning defendant’s case.  The trial court evaluated the 
factors outlined in Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 
785 (Delaney) for when a defendant may overcome the shield 
law.  The court ruled that defendant would receive a copy of the 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
 
first recording, but the other three videotapes would be sealed 
and retained with the record.   
 
During 
record 
correction 
proceedings, 
defendant’s 
appellate counsel requested copies of the sealed videotapes, and 
the trial court initially ordered the district attorney to make and 
provide copies to counsel.  The prosecution requested the court 
withdraw its order after realizing the videotapes contained the 
TEP footage, alerting the court that no notice had been provided 
to the third party concerning the material’s dissemination.  The 
prosecution contacted NBC Universal Media, TEP’s parent 
organization, which opposed in writing the dissemination of the 
tapes.  The trial court agreed with the prosecution and vacated 
its earlier order to unseal the three videotapes, ordering the 
videotape containing the interview with Gallego’s mother to be 
copied and provided to counsel, and for the other three 
videotapes to be resealed.  Defendant filed a motion with this 
court seeking limited disclosure of the videotapes for appellate 
review, which we denied in an April 25, 2012 order.   
Defendant argues, perfunctorily, that the trial court erred 
by denying him access to the videotapes during trial but focuses 
his argument before this court on the claim that his state and 
federal constitutional rights were violated by denying appellate 
counsel access to the tapes, asserting the appellate record is 
incomplete.  His arguments are without merit.  The videotapes 
are part of the record on appeal, but because they are sealed, 
defendant lacks access to them.  We review independently any 
“records that remain sealed and to which defendant does not 
have access,” keeping in mind that “ ‘[p]arties who challenge on 
appeal trial court orders withholding information as privileged 
or otherwise nondiscoverable “must do the best they can with 
the information they have, and [we] will fill the gap by 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
 
objectively reviewing the whole record.” ’ ”  (People v. Avila 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 606.)  We have done so, and our 
independent review of the videotapes reveals there was no error.   
 
The trial court’s rulings — that trial counsel was not 
permitted access to the videotapes during trial and that 
appellate counsel was not entitled to them — were proper 
because the recordings are subject to and protected by the state’s 
shield law and by the First Amendment to the federal 
Constitution.  We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s 
application of the shield laws.  (People v. Ramos (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 494, 527.)  As relevant here, the state’s shield laws 
protect journalists from disclosing information acquired in the 
course of making news.  (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); 
Evid. Code, § 1070.)  The state’s shield law provides, in pertinent 
part, that a journalist “shall not be adjudged in contempt by a 
[court] for refusing to disclose the source of any information 
procured while so connected or employed [as a news reporter], 
or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained 
or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information 
for communication to the public.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. 
(b).)  “Unpublished information” includes recorded footage not 
shown to the public.  (Ibid.; see also Evid. Code, § 1070 
[statutory predecessor to Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b)].)  The 
shield law applies whether or not the information was provided 
in confidence.  (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 798.) 
In Delaney, we explained that the shield law may be 
overcome only “on a showing that nondisclosure would deprive 
the defendant of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial.”  
(Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805.)  A defendant must make a 
threshold showing that there is a reasonable possibility the 
information sought will materially assist with the defense.  (Id. 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
 
at p. 808.)  The showing “need not be detailed or specific, but it 
must rest on more than mere speculation.”  (Id. at p. 809.)  If the 
defendant overcomes this threshold showing, the court then 
balances four factors to evaluate disclosure, including:  (1) 
whether the unpublished information is confidential or 
sensitive; (2) whether the interests sought to be protected by the 
shield law will be thwarted by disclosure; (3) the importance of 
the information to the defendant; and (4) whether there is an 
alternative source for the information.  (Id. at pp. 810–811.) 
Defendant presents no argument supporting his assertion 
that the court abused its discretion by failing to unseal the 
records for trial counsel’s review, and we see none.   
With respect to whether there was error in failing to 
provide the videotapes to appellate counsel, as the Attorney 
General argues, defendant cannot make the requisite threshold 
showing because, as defendant concedes before this court, “his 
appellate counsel stated [during record correction proceedings] 
she did not necessarily plan to use the videotapes in her 
pleadings and that she would let the court and prosecution know 
if she decided to do so.”  Defendant’s right to discovery was not 
absolute, and when the court declined to provide the videotapes 
to appellate counsel, it reasonably exercised its “ ‘ “wide 
discretion to protect against the disclosure of information which 
might unduly hamper the prosecution or violate some other 
legitimate governmental interest.”  [Citation.]  This may be 
particularly true when the information sought is not directly 
related to the issue of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.’ ” (People 
v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 606.)   
Defendant also fails to demonstrate any specific, 
nonspeculative reason why the recordings would aid in his 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
 
defense on appeal.  He argues he is not required to demonstrate 
that the information sought would go to the “ ‘heart of the case,’ ” 
and claims the recordings would enable postconviction counsel 
to evaluate whether to raise claims of error, misconduct at the 
trial, or an unconstitutional charging decision.  (Delaney, supra, 
50 Cal.3d at p. 808.)  These broad assertions fail to overcome the 
threshold of demonstrating there was “a reasonable possibility 
that the information sought [would] materially aid the defense.”     
Defendant argues the trial court deprived him of due 
process by basing its ruling on law that was not briefed.  
Defendant claims the court’s pretrial analysis relied upon the 
Delaney standard exclusively.  In its posttrial order, the court 
likewise ruled that “the factors outlined in Delaney are a 
reasonable way to weigh the materiality of materials sought in” 
subpoenas duces tecum to third parties.  The court also 
explained the decision to quash the subpoenas duces tecum was 
discretionary and noted that using such subpoenas to conduct 
fishing expeditions was disfavored.  Defendant claims this non-
Delaney reason — that fishing expeditions are disfavored — 
deprived him of due process because he was not provided an 
opportunity to be heard on that subject.  We disagree.  The trial 
court denied defendant’s request to unseal the recordings by 
relying on Delaney and noted in its analysis that although much 
of the state’s common law on discovery had been statutorily 
superseded, “it appear[ed] that the legal aversion to ‘fishing 
expeditions’ expressed in Pitchess” remained applicable “with 
regard to subpoena’s [sic] duces tecum to third parties.”  This 
passing comment, which did not alter the trial court’s conclusion 
that the Delaney factors constituted “a reasonable way to weigh 
the materiality of materials sought in [third party] subpoenas” 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
 
did not deprive defendant of notice or an opportunity to be 
heard.  
To the extent defendant’s appellate argument can be 
construed as a request to unseal the videotapes, we note 
defendant has presented that request already — and properly, 
by way of separate motion — and we denied it.  Defendant offers 
no reason that decision warrants reconsideration.  
GUILT PHASE 
A. Introduction of Collaged Images  
Defendant argues the trial court erred by permitting the 
prosecution to introduce sexually graphic material at the guilt 
and penalty phases.  Defendant contends most of the material 
introduced lacked relevance and was inflammatory and 
prejudicial.  Defendant’s claim lacks merit. 
At defendant’s preliminary hearing on February 28, 2001, 
Detective Hergenroeather testified that he found pornographic8 
magazines in Gallego’s bedroom and a sexually explicit 
videocassette in her videocassette recorder.  In defendant’s 
bedroom, 
Hergenroeather 
found 
over 
1,000 
pages 
of 
pornographic materials, which included:  images of Gallego with 
cutout images of penises, breasts, and other body parts pasted 
over her, or her head pasted over the naked bodies of other 
people; images of men and women with cut-and-pasted or drawn 
images of penises and vaginas over the underlying images; and 
 
8  
Defendant claims it was error to allow “the prosecution to 
repeatedly refer to those materials as ‘porn’ or ‘pornography,’ ” 
but failed to raise this argument before the trial court, forfeiting 
it on appeal.  (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 194.) 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
 
an image of Gallego with a penis pasted over it and a 
handwritten, sexually explicit statement.  
The prosecution sought to introduce some of this evidence 
at trial, arguing it was admissible to prove motive, intent, and 
state of mind; defendant, in contrast, argued the sexually 
graphic images, videos, and testimonial references were 
irrelevant.  At a hearing on the motions, the trial court noted 
that “six to ten cubic feet of pornographic materials” were 
recovered from defendant’s apartment.  The prosecution 
requested a small fraction of that be presented to the jury, a 
three-to-four-inch stack, which materials would include 
writings and images.  Specifically, the prosecution sought to 
introduce several examples of “morphed pornography,” which 
included pictures of the body parts of multiple models cut and 
pasted over each other, or parts pasted onto images of people 
known to defendant, some of which had handwritten 
descriptions of body parts or functions written over them.  The 
prosecution sought to introduce a subsection of the images that 
included cut-and-pasted images of Gallego, of Marilyn Powell’s 
daughters, of Chamberlain, and an image with a reference to 
rape written on it.   
During the hearing, the court described a few categories 
into which the pornographic images fell:  those depicting young 
girls and women without pubic hair, those with sexually explicit 
handwriting added, and those featuring handcuffs.  The court 
ruled that some of the material was relevant and admissible, 
explaining 
that 
while 
the 
prosecution 
was 
“obviously . . . entitled to show the jury the defendant’s sexual 
content of his thoughts about the victim for intent, motive,” it 
was concerned about “just the suffocating mass of it.”  The 
prosecutor sought to introduce images of Gallego to demonstrate 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
 
defendant’s sexual interest in her and argued the photos 
involving Chamberlain, Powell, and Powell’s children were 
relevant to demonstrate they were unaware of his interest in 
and his creation of such imagery during their relationships with 
him.     
The trial court authorized admission of photographs 
involving or depicting Gallego, a few photographs of Powell and 
Powell’s “adult and adult-looking friends and children,” but 
excluded photographs depicting Powell’s minor children and 
initially excluded those with Chamberlain.  The court offered 
defense counsel the option of admitting just a sample of the 
standard pornographic images — rather than the larger 
collection of images — finding them admissible to demonstrate 
the volume of images found and that the images overwhelmingly 
featured women with shaved pubic hair.  In admitting some 
pornographic images depicting women with shaved pubic 
hair — relevant in light of evidence that the victim was found 
with freshly shaven pubic hair and that the to-do list made 
reference to the shaving of pubic hair and to a “shaver cord” — 
the court explained, “[T]he point would be to show that there’s 
other pornography and a lot of it and that it tends to focus on 
shaved women.  [¶]  And I would also then propose not 
pictorially but testimonially to have the jury aware of the mass, 
the quantity that there was, because I think that the quantity 
and the effort that obviously went into it is relevant to the 
threshold motive and intent issues.”   
The court noted it had excluded most of the sexually 
graphic evidence and had overruled defendant’s objections 
based on Evidence Code section 352, due process, and relevance 
that it was “disposition evidence.”  Counsel argued he was 
continuing to object to the introduction of any other sexually 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
 
graphic images.  The trial court suggested the prosecution 
prepare a photo board of those images and at further hearings, 
the parties continued to discuss the images to be included on the 
prosecution’s photo boards, with defendant renewing objections 
to the introduction of many of the images.  Of the thousands of 
images the trial court considered, a very small fraction was 
introduced.   
In addition to the pornographic images, the court 
permitted the prosecution to introduce images of defendant’s 
apartment, 
particularly 
those 
that 
depicted 
stacks 
of 
pornographic images, so the jury could get a sense of the volume 
of material found.  The court also admitted a photograph of the 
pornographic videocassettes found in defendant’s room.   
At another hearing several weeks later, the parties 
discussed the images of Powell and her children, and of 
Chamberlain.  The court excluded images depicting children, 
concluding that there would be a great deal “of evidence that’s 
going to cause the jury to feel — to have some negative views of 
the defendant.  I think the child porn risks demonizing him 
beyond repair in front of the jury.”  The court reasoned the 
prosecution could elicit the testimony it wanted from Powell — 
including her feelings upon learning defendant took and altered 
images of her children in sexually graphic ways — without 
introducing the images themselves.  The court permitted some 
images of Chamberlain to be introduced for the limited purpose 
of determining whether she was aware of them during her 
relationship with defendant and, if not, whether her opinion of 
him was changed upon learning of the images’ existence.   
In addition to the photos and photo boards introduced at 
trial, and the prosecution’s opening and closing statements, 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
 
Hergenroeather 
testified 
that 
he 
found 
hundreds 
of 
pornographic magazines, photographs, and videocassettes in 
defendant’s home.  Powell testified that defendant was generally 
interested in bondage and in “S&M” pornography, and she was 
unaware defendant had removed photographs of her and her 
family members from her home.   
Defendant argues his state and federal constitutional 
rights9 were violated by the admission of sexually graphic 
images and materials and by the “drumbeat of alleged 
‘pornography.’ ”  He first contends the images were not obscene 
within the meaning of the First Amendment and that even if 
they were obscene, the First Amendment does not prohibit 
possession of such materials within the privacy of one’s home.  
He argues the images constituted protected speech, his creation 
 
9  
“With regard to this claim and virtually every other claim 
raised on appeal, defendant asserts that the error violated his 
rights to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination under 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the 
California Constitution.  In most instances, defendant failed to 
make these constitutional arguments in the trial court. 
Nevertheless, unless otherwise indicated, we consider the 
merits of these newly raised arguments because either (1) the 
appellate claim is of a kind that required no objection to preserve 
it, or (2) the claim invokes no facts or legal standards different 
from those before the trial court, but merely asserts that an 
error had the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution.  [Citation.]  In those circumstances, defendant’s 
new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  
[Citations.]  Where rejection of a claim of error on the merits 
necessarily leads to a rejection of the newly asserted 
constitutional objection, no separate constitutional analysis is 
required and we have provided none.”  (People v. Virgil (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 1210, 1233‒1234, fn. 4.) 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
 
of collaged imagery was protected activity under the First 
Amendment, and “a criminal defendant’s First Amendment 
activity is not admissible as evidence if it is wholly irrelevant to 
the elements of the crimes of which he was charged.”  As the 
Attorney General properly points out, defendant is not being 
punished for his possession of the materials, and he cannot 
shelter under a free speech privilege when the sexually graphic 
material was relevant to the charged offenses.  (See Dawson v. 
Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 160 [holding “the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction in a capital 
sentencing proceeding of the fact that the defendant” engaged in 
protected associative activity if “the evidence has no relevance 
to the issues being decided in the proceeding”]; cf. People v. 
Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 118 [“Because evidence of 
defendant’s associations and statements regarding race was 
relevant to issues in question, it was not made inadmissible 
merely by the fact it was also protected by the First 
Amendment”].) 
Defendant claims the admission of sexually graphic 
images violated his state and federal due process rights because 
the images were used as character evidence and to demonstrate 
conduct on a specific occasion, in violation of Evidence Code 
sections 352 and 1101.  “ ‘In reviewing the ruling of the trial 
court, we reiterate the well-established principle that “the 
admissibility of this evidence has two components:  (1) whether 
the challenged evidence satisfied the ‘relevancy’ requirement set 
forth in Evidence Code section 210, and (2) if the evidence was 
relevant, whether the trial court abused its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352 in finding that the probative value of 
the [evidence] was not substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission would create a substantial danger 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
 
of undue prejudice.” ’ ”  (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 
1166, quoting People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 972, in 
turn quoting People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13.)  As 
defendant notes, evidence of a character trait is not admissible 
to demonstrate conduct on a particular occasion, but such 
evidence is admissible “when relevant to prove some fact (such 
as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant 
in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted 
unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe 
that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to 
commit such an act.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  “We review 
the trial court’s rulings on relevance and the admission of 
evidence under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 for abuse 
of discretion.”  (People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 799.)   
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by admitting the sexually graphic images because they were 
more prejudicial than probative and lessened the state’s burden 
of proof.  We disagree.  The images were relevant to intent and 
motive to commit rape, highlighting defendant’s sexual interest 
in Gallego.  There were numerous images of women without 
pubic hair and of women in handcuffs, which were of particular 
relevance in light of the fact that Gallego’s body was found with 
pubic hair removed and with an injury that could have been 
caused by restraint with handcuffs.  In People v. Memro (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 786, the defendant was charged with the first degree 
felony murder based upon the commission of lewd and lascivious 
acts upon a child under age 14, and we concluded that the 
defendant’s possession of pornographic images of young boys 
“yielded evidence from which the jury could infer that [the 
defendant] had a sexual attraction to young boys and intended 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
 
to act on that attraction.”  (Id. at p. 865.)  Like Memro, a jury 
could infer defendant was sexually attracted to and intended to 
engage in specific sexual acts with Gallego based upon the 
images he possessed.  Indeed, defendant had not simply 
collected pornographic images depicting women similar in 
appearance to his victim.  Instead, he spent significant time 
collaging photographs and magazines to create morphed images 
bearing his victim’s face and the bodies of nude models with 
shaved pubic hair or wearing handcuffs.  The images were 
highly probative of both the degree of defendant’s sexual 
interest in Gallego and his careful plans to fulfill a highly 
specific rape fantasy in which he subdued her, handcuffed her, 
and shaved her.   
We likewise conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting the images of Powell, Powell’s adult 
children, and Chamberlain.  The court noted, as to these third 
party images, that the issue of admissibility was closer, and we 
agree.  But our review is highly deferential, and we “will not 
reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown ‘ “the 
trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage 
of justice.” ’ ”  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74 
(Merriman).)  The trial court’s decision to admit this evidence 
does not meet this high standard.     
As to relevance, some of the third party images depicted 
women with shaved pubic hair, which — in light of the victim’s 
lack of pubic hair — heightened their relevance.  In addition, as 
the Attorney General notes, testimony from Powell and 
Chamberlain that they were unaware of defendant’s creation 
and collection of these images allowed the jury to understand 
how Gallego could have unwittingly continued to live with 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
 
defendant while he created morphed pornographic images 
depicting her.  Powell’s relationship with defendant was close in 
time to the murder, and Powell testified that his sexual interests 
were “boring”; the images of Powell and her children countered 
that testimony and showed defendant in fact harbored violent 
fantasies about her and her children.  Chamberlain’s testimony 
that defendant was not the type of person to have created the 
graphic images of her when the two dated countered defendant’s 
penalty phase mitigation theory that his significant childhood 
hardships were the root cause of defendant’s crimes.  The 
prosecution intended to suggest that defendant’s relatively 
normal relationship with Chamberlain was proof that the 
fantasies and obsessions leading to the murder developed later 
and thus were caused by something other than his childhood 
trauma.   
As to prejudice, the court weighed the images’ prejudicial 
impact carefully, admitting only a few of the many available 
images.  For example, to ensure the prejudicial impact was 
limited, the court excluded images of Powell’s minor children.  
Any prejudice was also limited by the relatively brief nature of 
testimony regarding the images; Powell and Chamberlain 
simply confirmed they recognized the individual depicted in the 
collages and had not seen them previously.   
We note that images of Powell, Chamberlain, and all of the 
sexually graphic images were clearly damaging to defendant but 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
them as the trial court took great care to ensure the prejudice 
was limited.  “ ‘As we have repeatedly explained:  “ ‘In applying 
[Evidence Code] section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous 
with “damaging.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 
29.)  For example, only a small sample of the “six to ten cubic 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
 
feet of pornographic material[]” was admitted.  The jury was 
aware of the volume of material only via Hergenroeather’s 
testimony and images of defendant’s bedroom.  The court 
carefully weighed the prejudicial impact of the images and 
excluded most of them, allowing only a handful of images related 
to Gallego, specifically; related to Powell and Chamberlain; and 
related to defendant’s motive and intent.  The court excluded as 
unduly prejudicial most images — including those depicting 
child pornography.  And while the images that were admitted 
may have been disturbing to jurors, as sexually graphic images 
of young boys would have been to the jurors in People v. Memro, 
we conclude here as we did in that case that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by permitting the introduction of 
upsetting and graphic images because their probative value was 
not substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice.  
(People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 865; see also People v. 
Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480; Evid. Code, § 352.)  
This decision was not patently absurd, nor a miscarriage of 
justice.  (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 74; People v. Miles 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587 (Miles).) 
B. Introduction of Victim and Crime Scene Photos  
Defendant contends the trial court’s admission of “gory, 
gruesome and inflammatory” crime scene and autopsy 
photographs constituted error in violation of his state and 
federal constitutional and statutory rights.  We conclude the 
photographs were properly admitted. 
Defendant sought to exclude certain photographs he 
claimed 
were 
irrelevant 
and 
inflammatory, 
including 
photographs of the area where Gallego’s body was found, the 
PetSmart dumpster where her fingertips were found, the area 
where the bloodstained mattress was found, the apartment 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
 
defendant and Gallego shared, autopsy photographs and X-rays 
of Gallego’s hands and head, slides prepared by Sperber, and 
defendant’s arrest photos.  The motion was addressed at an 
April 3, 2002 and June 13, 2002 hearing and over defense 
objection, a limited selection of the challenged photographs were 
admitted.   
Defendant challenges the admission of these photographs 
arguing they were cumulative and irrelevant.  “ ‘The admission 
of allegedly gruesome photographs is basically a question of 
relevance over which the trial court has broad discretion.  
[Citation.]  “A trial court’s decision to admit photographs under 
Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the 
prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly outweighs their 
probative value.” ’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 54.)  
Where probative value is minimal, photos are “inordinately 
gruesome,” and the evidence is cumulative, admission may 
constitute an abuse its discretion.  (People v. Gurule (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 557, 625.)  Defendant argues that testimony about 
the appearance of the crime scenes and diagrams of the relevant 
areas were adequate, and the images introduced were 
cumulative.  We disagree. 
Images like those depicting the interior of the U-Haul, the 
exterior of defendant’s apartment, and the bloodstained 
mattress, provided jurors with visual information beyond what 
testimony could offer.  The images of defendant’s apartment 
complex bolstered testimony concerning the nature of the 
offense, including what might have been overheard by 
defendant’s neighbors, and images of the bloodstained mattress 
and U-Haul bolstered testimony concerning the method of 
killing and disposition of the victim’s remains.  “[P]rosecutors, it 
must be remembered, are not obliged to prove their case with 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
 
evidence solely from live witnesses; the jury is entitled to see 
details . . . to 
determine 
if 
the 
evidence 
supports 
the 
prosecution’s theory of the case.”  (Ibid.)  These photographs 
were not particularly graphic, nor were they cumulative simply 
because testimony had also been offered addressing the subjects 
they depicted.  Diagrams alone would have been inadequate to 
convey the full measure of information jurors were permitted to 
consider.     
Defendant’s claim largely centers on the admission of 
autopsy photographs, alleging they were inflammatory, 
cumulative, irrelevant, and unnecessary.  Defendant’s claim 
lacks merit.  The images were relevant to show the nature of the 
victim’s injuries, particularly her fatal neck wound, the shape 
and nature of her head wound, and the fact that her fingertips 
had been removed.  Defendant argues that the photographs of 
defendant’s hands and fingers were horrific and added little 
beyond what witnesses had testified to concerning “the victim’s 
appearance and injuries, including post-mortem injuries such as 
removal of her fingertips.”  “The trial court has broad discretion 
over the admission of photographs that are alleged to include 
disturbing details.  [Citations.]  We routinely uphold the 
admission of autopsy photos to establish the placement of a 
victim’s wounds and clarify the testimony of prosecution 
witnesses.  [Citation.]  The prosecution is not limited to proving 
its case ‘solely from live witnesses; the jury is entitled to see 
details of the victims’ bodies to determine if the evidence 
supports the prosecution’s theory of the case.’ ”  (People v. Caro 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 502.)  While the images are upsetting, our 
review of the photographs reveals they “were not so gruesome 
as to have impermissibly swayed the jury.”  (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 974.)  Indeed, any “ ‘revulsion they induce 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
47 
 
is attributable to the acts done, not to the photographs.’ ”  
(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1215–1216.)   
Defendant argues the introduction of the photographs 
constituted error because it permitted the prosecution to argue 
the killing was planned and methodical, undermining his theory 
that the crime occurred in the heat of passion.  This argument 
lacks merit.  The jury is entitled to review the evidence, 
including photographs, to ascertain whether the prosecution’s 
theory is supported.  (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 54.)  
Defendant objects to the “large quantity” of images introduced, 
claiming 
the 
court 
failed 
to 
conduct 
“individualized 
consideration” as Evidence Code section 352 commands.  The 
record does not bear this out.  Of the hundreds of images 
available, very few photographs of those areas were actually 
introduced.  Moreover, the court was careful to clarify that the 
images would only “be visible while there’s testimony about 
them, and then they’re going to be put face to the wall.”  The 
court properly exercised its broad discretion in admitting the 
crime scene and autopsy images. 
C. Introduction of Photo of Victim and Her Dog  
Defendant argues the trial court’s admission of a 
photograph of Gallego with her dog improperly invoked jurors’ 
sympathy and lacked relevance.  He claims the erroneous 
admission violated his state and federal constitutional rights.  
We conclude the trial court did not err.  
 
At a pretrial hearing on the admission of various 
photographs, defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s 
planned use of a photograph of Gallego holding her dog, arguing 
that because the image was never one of the photos used in the 
collaged pornography, its use was not appropriate.  Defense 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
48 
 
counsel conceded an unmodified image of Gallego had relevance 
but argued the jury should view an enlarged version of one of 
the photographs used in the collaged pornography.  The 
prosecutor explained none of the modified images could be 
enlarged without distortion, and after requesting and receiving 
photographs of Gallego from her family, this was among the only 
images that could be enlarged to a useful size.  The trial court 
noted the image was somewhat sympathetic because the victim 
was depicted with “an itty-bitty, cute dog,” but nothing about 
the image seemed overly prejudicial to the court in a manner 
violating Evidence Code section 352.    
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting the photograph because it was unnecessary to 
identify the victim and because its probative value was 
outweighed by the prejudicially sympathetic effect it had on the 
jury.  “We review the trial court’s decision to admit photographs 
under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion.  
[Citation.]  ‘ “ ‘The court’s exercise of that discretion will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the 
photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect.’ ” ’ 
[Citation.]  ‘ “To determine whether there was an abuse of 
discretion, we address two factors:  (1) whether the photographs 
were relevant, and (2) whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding that the probative value of each photograph 
outweighed its prejudicial effect.” ’ ”  (People v. Peoples (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 718, 748.) 
Defendant claims before this court that the photograph 
was not relevant to any contested issue. Were we to write on a 
blank slate, defendant’s argument might be persuasive given 
the absence of any factual dispute over the identity of the victim.  
However, defense counsel conceded before the trial court that an 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
49 
 
unaltered or “before” image of Gallego was “relevant,” 
“admissible,” and “clearly . . . ha[d] an evidentiary value to this 
case” “given other photographs that have been admitted in 
relationship 
to 
morphing,” 
and 
also 
“for, 
primarily, 
identification at the guilt phase.”  Thus, defendant conceded 
relevance of a photo of the victim, and that is not at issue here.  
Instead, defendant’s primary objection before the trial court was 
that the jury not be shown this specific photograph of the victim 
with her dog. 
“We have long advised trial courts to exercise care when 
deciding whether to admit during the guilt phase of trial 
photographs of a capital murder victim while alive because of 
the risk such evidence ‘will merely generate sympathy for the 
victim[].’ ”   (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 56.)  An 
“otherwise relevant” photograph of the victim in life need not be 
excluded despite the possibility it could elicit a sympathetic 
response from the jury.  (Ibid.)  As the prosecution argued and 
defendant conceded at the hearing regarding the exhibit’s 
admission, because there were numerous images of Gallego in 
sexually graphic collages and those images could not be enlarged 
without distortion, use of an unaltered image of Gallego was 
necessary to allow jurors to clearly view the victim.   
Gallego’s father briefly identified the victim in his 
testimony from this photograph, and as defense counsel 
conceded, a clear photograph was “relevant given other 
photographs that have been admitted in relationship to 
morphing.”  Although defendant would have preferred to 
enlarge the victim’s face from an image used in the sexually 
graphic collages, that was not possible without the images 
becoming “distort[ed]” or having “big red spots.”  Gallego’s 
family provided a few images to the prosecution from which this 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
50 
 
image was ultimately selected, and most of those also could not 
be enlarged without distortion. Having conceded certain 
photographs of the victim would have been relevant and 
admissible, we cannot agree with defendant that using this 
particular photograph was “calculated to ‘inflame’ and ‘enrage’ 
the jury.”  The exhibit is a roughly 15-inch square posterboard 
depicting Gallego’s placid face next to her dog, Julie.  Gallego’s 
face takes up approximately an eight by 10 inch portion of the 
poster, with the dog’s face taking up a similar amount of space.  
While an image of the victim with her dog “arguably posed some 
risk it would elicit sympathy from the jury, nothing about the 
manner in which [her] likeness was displayed or the 
photograph’s background suggests it was ‘ “particularly 
calculated” ’ to do so.”  (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
pp. 56–57, quoting People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
p. 975.)  Indeed, the trial court was cognizant of both the general 
principle that certain photographs of a victim could become “so 
prejudicial,” but balanced that concern with the practical 
restraints it faced here.  And this was among the only images 
available of the victim that could be enlarged without distortion.  
The court did not abuse its discretion admitting the photograph.  
(People v. Brooks, at pp. 56–57; see also People v. Tully (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 952, 1020 [upholding trial court’s conclusion that 
image of victim in life wearing her nursing uniform was relevant 
and admissible].) 
D. Introduction of Photo of Victim’s Handcuffed Body  
Powell was shown a photograph of Gallego’s postmortem 
body wearing handcuffs to provide testimony regarding whether 
the handcuffs were similar to the type defendant used to lock 
his bicycle.  Defendant argues it was error to introduce the 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
51 
 
photograph and to have allowed Powell to view it.  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court did not err. 
Powell testified that when she dated defendant, he rode a 
bicycle to her home several times a week and locked that bicycle 
with handcuffs.  She described the handcuffs as “big, heavy, 
strong, silver, heavy ones” with a chain between the bracelet 
portions of the cuffs.  When Sperber examined Gallego’s body 
following 
her 
autopsy, 
he 
placed 
standard-issue 
law 
enforcement handcuffs on her wrists and positioned her arms 
behind her back to determine if a mark left on her back could 
have been made by handcuffs.  Powell agreed the handcuffs in 
that image looked like the type defendant used as a bicycle lock.   
Before she testified, defense counsel objected on relevance 
and Evidence Code section 352 grounds to allowing Powell to 
view the photograph, arguing that the image had no 
relationship to her expected testimony that she had seen 
defendant with handcuffs.  The prosecution replied that Powell 
was expected to testify that defendant used handcuffs to lock his 
bicycle and would describe their appearance and his method of 
storing them.  Defendant argued a courtroom bailiff’s handcuffs 
could be shown to Powell, rather than the photograph.  The 
court rejected that suggestion, allowing the prosecution to show 
the admittedly gruesome image to Powell and noting the jury 
had already seen it.  The court ensured Powell was shown the 
photograph prior to testifying to avoid undue shock.  It reasoned 
that Powell should testify about the image, rather than a 
bailiff’s handcuffs, because there had been extensive argument 
about whether defendant owned handcuffs, what they looked 
like, and the legitimacy of Sperber’s experiment using handcuffs 
to assess whether the mark on Gallego’s back was made by a 
similar pair.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
52 
 
Defendant claims introducing the photograph and 
showing it to Powell constituted error because it was irrelevant, 
inflammatory, and cumulative.  There was no error.  As we 
explained above, “ ‘The admission of allegedly gruesome 
photographs is basically a question of relevance over which the 
trial court has broad discretion.’ ”  (People v. Brooks, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 54.)  We will uphold the trial court’s decision 
unless we conclude “ ‘ “the prejudicial effect of such photographs 
clearly outweighs their probative value.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)      
Although the photograph is upsetting, it was probative of 
a central prosecution theory:  that defendant handcuffed his 
victim in the course of her murder.  Accordingly, its introduction 
generally did not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s 
discretion.  (See, e.g., People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 
170–171 [no error in introduction of numerous autopsy photos 
to demonstrate theory of offense].)  Defendant argues that 
because Powell was not a witness to the murder or Sperber’s 
experiment with the handcuffs, showing the photo to Powell 
constituted error because it did not advance the state’s case.  
Defendant’s argument misapprehends the purpose of Powell’s 
testimony.  She was not providing evidence that the handcuffs 
pictured were used in the murder; her testimony was instead 
that defendant had owned handcuffs similar to the type 
pictured:  heavy, and with a chain connecting the bracelets.  
Although Powell was not a witness to the homicide or 
postmortem experiment, she was among the only witnesses to 
testify she had seen defendant with handcuffs.  The 
prosecution’s theory of the case involved defendant subduing or 
binding the victim with handcuffs, but no handcuffs were ever 
located.  Testimony was presented that marks on the victim’s 
body were consistent with having been handcuffed by an object 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
53 
 
similar to police-issued handcuffs with a chain between the 
bracelets, like the type Powell testified defendant had owned.  
Defendant argues Powell could have been shown similar 
handcuffs, and the only reason the photograph was shown to her 
was to inflame the jurors and horrify the witness.  This 
argument lacks merit; the photograph Powell viewed had 
already been introduced, and the jury had viewed it.  The court 
indicated it had no “basis to believe [Powell was] any less able 
than the jurors to view” the photograph.  Even so, the court took 
care to ensure there would be no “undue shock” to Powell; she 
had confirmed she was comfortable viewing the image and was 
shown the image prior to testifying.  The court committed no 
error in permitting Powell to view the photograph.   
E. Tool Mark Expert  
Defendant argues his rights under the federal and state 
Constitutions were violated by the introduction of tool mark 
expert Sperber’s testimony that the marks on Gallego’s back 
appeared to have been made by handcuffs.10   We see no error. 
 
10  
This court is familiar with Sperber from our decisions in 
In re Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 948 (Richards I) and In re 
Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291 (Richards II). In Richards I, 
“this court rejected [the petitioner’s] claim on habeas corpus that 
his conviction should be overturned because the prosecution’s 
dental expert,” Sperber, “had recanted his expert opinion 
testimony at trial that a lesion on [the victim’s] hand was a 
human bite mark matching petitioner’s unusual teeth.”  
(Richards II, at p. 293.)  After the Legislature amended the 
relevant statute to provide that the definition of false evidence 
included repudiated expert evidence, we concluded it was 
“reasonably probable that the false evidence presented by Dr. 
Sperber at petitioner’s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
54 
 
Defendant moved to exclude Sperber’s expert testimony 
regarding tool markings made on Gallego’s body.  At the 
Evidence 
Code 
section 
40211 hearing, 
the 
trial 
court 
acknowledged that Sperber had testified as a bite and tool mark 
expert in his courtroom on prior occasions, and it was likely 
Sperber would again qualify as an expert.  At that hearing, 
Sperber explained that he served as a testifying tool mark 
expert in roughly 20 previous cases.  He received training in 
dental school regarding the impact of tools and teeth on soft 
tissue, including inflammatory and cellular changes.  The court 
asked him what specific training made him expert in tool mark 
identification, such as handcuffs, as opposed to dental 
identification, and he expanded on his dental and medical 
coursework providing a background in that information.  He 
explained that while attending New York University’s dental 
school, dental students and medical students attended some of 
the same classes in subjects like “histology [and] cytology” — 
i.e., cellular and tissue structure and function — because, “no 
matter the part of the body” to be treated, the training is 
“analogous.”  Sperber told the court that he consulted with law 
enforcement regarding a rectangular mark on Gallego’s back 
and became suspicious that handcuffs caused the mark after 
learning defendant possessed handcuffs at some point.  He 
examined Gallego’s body, applied handcuffs by bending her 
arms behind her back in a natural position, and noted the mark 
 
that proceeding” and granted the habeas corpus petition.  (Id. at 
p. 315.) 
11  
Evidence Code section 402 provides in pertinent part, “The 
court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility 
of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury . . . .”  (Id., 
subd. (b).) 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
55 
 
was close to where the handcuffs fell and was approximately the 
length of the ratchet portion of the handcuffs.  Sperber noted 
that marks on Gallego’s arms, in addition to the mark on her 
back, caused him to think her injuries could have been made by 
handcuffs.   
The trial court ruled Sperber’s opinions could be helpful to 
the jury, and the parties remained free to argue about the 
weight of his opinions.  It reasoned Sperber’s education and 
experience informed his opinion and overruled defendant’s 
objections to Sperber providing testimony about handcuffs 
causing the marks Gallego’s body.  The trial court reasoned 
Sperber possessed “more than ample qualifications” to render 
this opinion, and no specific, formal classroom education in 
toolmark identification, as distinct from dentistry, was required 
to be a qualified as an expert.   
At trial, Sperber testified that he was a dentist and an 
expert on tool markings, which included marks made by teeth 
and other objects on hard and soft surfaces, including tissue.  
Sperber consulted on high-profile matters like making 
identifications at the World Trade Center, and on the Jeffrey 
Dahmer and Ted Bundy cases, working all over the United 
States and internationally.  At the time of defendant’s trial, he 
had over fifteen years of experience in assisting law enforcement 
with identifying marks left by objects, including a watch imprint 
on a victim’s forehead, a canine bite mark, a ligature mark made 
by a telephone cord, and numerous others.  He had experience 
consulting in cases involving handcuff marks on two prior 
occasions.   
Sperber’s consultation in this matter involved him viewing 
photographs and then, on August 24, 2000, examining Gallego’s 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
56 
 
body.  He noted a mark on Gallego’s back, slightly smaller than 
a finger, which he believed may “have been produced by 
handcuffs in between the back of that individual, of the victim, 
and whatever surface she had been on when the handcuffs had 
been applied.”  Sperber looked at Gallego’s back, at photographs, 
and — using handcuffs that had been obtained from the police 
department — manipulated Gallego’s hands behind her back 
with handcuffs secured around them “the way people are 
normally handcuffed when they’re seen on television or in 
newspaper articles, things of that nature.”  He observed that the 
solid portion of the handcuffs, the ratchet, was “almost exactly 
over” the mark on Gallego’s back.   
Defendant argues before this court that the allegedly 
minimal scientific value of bite mark identification rendered 
introduction of Sperber’s testimony improper despite the fact 
that Sperber addressed tool, not bite, marks.  Defendant argues 
the field of bite mark expertise is increasingly discredited and 
contends that exaggerated claims made by forensic experts have 
been a leading cause of wrongful convictions.  He argues “the 
unproven reliability” of bite mark analysis rendered the 
analysis Sperber did perform in this case — tool mark 
analysis — “exponentially worse.”  However, unlike bite mark 
analysis, tool mark analysis more generally identifies what 
implement could have left a mark (i.e., this mark could have 
been made by a handcuff), not what particular implement 
actually did so (i.e., these were the actual handcuffs that were 
used).  In this way, the analysis performed here is very different 
from the bite mark analysis upon which defendant relies, 
whereby experts are asked to use bite marks to identify the 
actual individual who would have left those marks.  Here, the 
aim was not to suggest the mark on Gallego’s back was made by 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
57 
 
defendant, but whether the mark could have been made by 
handcuffs, generally.    
Defendant claims that expertise in bite marks may not 
satisfy the Kelly12 rule’s requirements of expert reliability and 
specialized knowledge, but even if it did, Sperber’s testimony 
should have been excluded because it was more prejudicial than 
probative.  We disagree.  Because Sperber’s methodology in this 
case “ ‘isolate[d] physical evidence whose existence, appearance, 
nature, and meaning [were] obvious to the senses of a layperson, 
the reliability of the process in producing that result is equally 
apparent and need not be debated under’ the Kelly rule.”   
(People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 470.)  Sperber observed 
that marks on Gallego’s body were consistent with a type of 
implement, an observation “jurors essentially [could] see for 
themselves.” (People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 81.) 
Because his testimony involved no “ ‘new scientific technique,’ ” 
it is not subject to the strictures of the Kelly rule.  (Id. at p. 76.)   
We will not disturb a trial court’s discretionary 
determination that a witness qualifies as an expert absent 
manifest abuse of that discretion.  (People v. Morales (2020) 
10 Cal.5th 76, 97.)  Such abuse is found when a witness is clearly 
unqualified to serve as an expert.  (Ibid.)  “ ‘ “ ‘ “Where a witness 
has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his 
opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his 
knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than to its 
admissibility.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  We also evaluate the trial court’s 
decision to admit an expert’s evidence for abuse of discretion and 
 
12  
See People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24.  
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
58 
 
“will not disturb a trial court’s admissibility ruling ‘ “except on 
a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”  (Ibid.; see also People v. 
Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 813.) 
The trial court did not err by concluding Sperber was 
qualified to serve as an expert.  The evidence did not show 
Sperber “ ‘ “ ‘ “clearly lack[ed] qualification as an expert.” ’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97.)  To the contrary, 
the 
trial 
court 
evaluated 
Sperber’s 
qualifications 
and 
experience, reasoning that while there was no formal training 
on tool mark analysis, Sperber would have been the type of 
expert to have received such training if it existed.  The trial 
court noted that experience, rather than formal education, was 
an adequate way to become an expert in certain circumstances, 
that Sperber had more experience than anyone else the trial 
court was aware of in the field of tool mark identification, and 
he had a national reputation for being adept at such analysis. 
Sperber had extensive experience identifying “handcuffs and 
handcuff marks,” as well as years of experience “observing 
postmortem examinations” and “questioning the medical 
examiners.”   
To the extent defendant argues that bite mark analysis is 
an increasingly discredited method to establish identity, we note 
the tool mark analysis performed here served a different 
purpose:  to show a mark on the victim was likely made by a 
particular tool, not a particular person.  We see no evidence to 
support a conclusion that Sperber was “clearly” unqualified to 
perform that analysis, particularly in light of the over 20 cases 
in which he had previously testified as a tool mark expert, and 
we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
59 
 
Sperber’s expert testimony.  (People v. Morales, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 97.)  Indeed, Sperber’s knowledge exceeded the 
common experience of jurors, as he identified that the 
“circumferential” marks on Gallego’s wrists likely came from 
handcuffs, noted the “fairly parallel and straight” marks on the 
victim’s back matched certain parts of handcuffs, and 
determined that a particular type of bruising, as distinct from 
an abrasion, was likely caused by the “type of pressure, force, or 
impact,” resulting from “one person on top of another person.” 
Defendant argues that because Sperber examined 
Gallego’s body days after it was found and autopsied, there was 
postmortem distortion of the skin due to decomposition and 
distortion due to excision and clamping of the relevant area.  
This distortion, argues defendant, rendered Sperber’s opinion 
that the mark on Gallego’s back matched a handcuff ratchet 
incredible.  We see no merit to this argument.  Sperber’s 
testimony was based on photographs as well as physical 
examination, and he made clear that while the passage of time 
may have eroded some evidence of abrasions on Gallego’s skin, 
there was no slippage or extreme decomposition to the extent 
the shape or location of the bruise could have been impacted.  
Sperber’s credibility was a matter for the jury’s consideration, 
and to the extent it was impacted by the timing of his 
examination, the jury was free to consider that.  (See People v. 
Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97.) 
Defendant claims Sperber’s testimony was merely that the 
marks on Gallego’s back were “consistent with” being made by 
handcuffs, which language constitutes “a weak estimate of 
association” that juries typically misinterpret as conveying a 
greater degree of certainty.  Indeed, while the court admitted 
Sperber’s testimony concluding it could be helpful to the jury, it 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
60 
 
also noted that the weight of his opinions were a matter for the 
attorneys to argue.  To the extent defendant claims the language 
Sperber used was not sufficiently exacting, he was free to argue 
before the jury — and did — that it should accord the opinion 
little weight.  Defense counsel elicited on cross-examination that 
Sperber’s use of the equivocal word “could” in his report mean 
Sperber believed it “might be handcuffs or it might not be.”  The 
trial judge noted that this “was probably the most effective, 
destructive” cross-examination he had “ever seen in a 
courtroom.” Defense counsel urged the jury in closing argument 
to discredit Sperber’s testimony.  And as the Attorney General 
points out, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.80, 
explaining that they were not bound by an expert witness’s 
opinion and were free to disregard any opinion they found to be 
unreasonable.   
Defendant’s argument also fails because the portion of the 
record defendant quotes as inexact relates to Sperber’s 
testimony about the circumferential mark on Gallego’s wrist, 
not the mark on her back.  In fact, with regard to the more 
particular marks on Gallego’s back, Sperber testified that the 
solid portion of handcuffs was almost exactly over the mark 
when her hands were bound behind her back, and a bruise 
would be made by the pressure or weight of a body pressing 
down on that area.   
The trial court’s admission of Sperber’s testimony was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, nor did it result in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.  (People v. Morales, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 97.)  Defendant claims that its admission 
nonetheless ran afoul of Evidence Code section 352’s command 
that the probative value of Sperber’s testimony be weighed 
against its prejudicial effect.  We disagree.  Defendant claims 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
61 
 
that because the probative value of Sperber’s testimony was 
“thoroughly unreliable,” its only impact was prejudice.  To 
violate Evidence Code section 352, there must be a substantial 
risk of prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time.  Defendant 
claims that risk arose because Sperber was an expert, and he 
opined about the manner of death.  “A party cannot seek to 
exclude evidence merely because it is helpful to the other side.”  
(People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 102.)  Defendant’s 
allegation amounts to no more than a complaint that the 
evidence was helpful to the prosecution’s theory of the case.  We 
conclude no error resulted from the admission of Sperber’s 
expert testimony. 
Even if we assume the trial court erred in admitting 
Sperber’s expert testimony, the error was clearly harmless 
under any standard.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836 (Watson) [error in violation of state law is harmless if it is 
not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the 
defendant would have occurred in its absence]; Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able 
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt”].)  Photographic evidence showed there were marks 
around the victim’s wrists.  Hergenroeather and Holmes both 
testified those marks resembled handcuff bruising.   
There was also ample evidence of defendant’s guilt of 
murder and rape or intent to commit rape.  Defendant and 
Gallego were not engaged in an intimate, sexual relationship.  
DNA evidence from blood in defendant’s apartment and in the 
U-Haul truck he rented matched Gallego’s, and DNA evidence 
from semen on Gallego’s mattress matched defendant.  
Defendant made a to-do list describing sexual acts, items needed 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
62 
 
(such a shaver cord), and a note to “burn palms + face 
thoroughly.”  The autopsy revealed that Gallego’s hands were 
indeed burned.   On his to-do list, he also indicated that he 
needed a five-day hiatus from work, which aligns with the time 
off he requested.  As indicated on his to-do list, at some point 
after Gallego got home from work on August 10, 2000, defendant 
locked and closed the apartment’s doors and windows, subdued 
and gagged Gallego, sexually assaulted her, hit her over her 
head, and cut her neck so deeply her jugular vein was severed.  
Receipts for the U-Haul, bolt cutters, and trash bags were found 
in defendant’s apartment.  Defendant planned to take Gallego’s 
money after killing her, which was evident from his early review 
of her bank balances and his efforts to withdraw and transfer 
funds from her account.  Defendant told his cellmate in county 
jail, Lee, that he killed his Brazilian roommate after learning he 
could steal more money from her if she died than he would earn 
by marrying her, drained her blood in a bathtub, and tried to 
hide her identity by removing her fingertips with a bolt cutter.  
Even if we were to conclude that the introduction of Sperber’s 
testimony constituted error, we are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error would not have contributed to 
the verdict. 
F. Introduction of Sperm Cell in Banana Peel  
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of a single sperm cell found on a banana peel in a trash 
bag recovered from the PetSmart dumpster.  We find no error. 
A swab taken from a banana peel found in the same trash 
bag as defendant’s to-do list and “do not disturb” sign revealed 
a single sperm cell.  The bag was discarded in the dumpsters 
where Gallego’s fingertips were found.  The prosecution sought 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
63 
 
to introduce the evidence, arguing that because defendant’s to-
do list included a cucumber as well as sexual acts, the sperm cell 
on the banana peel was relevant and admissible.  Defendant 
objected, arguing the cell — which could not be genetically 
linked to defendant — was irrelevant and prejudicial.  He 
contended the evidence invited jurors to speculate defendant 
sexually assaulted the victim with the banana and then ate it.  
In evaluating the admissibility of the sperm cell, the court noted 
that the peel’s location in the same bag as defendant’s to-do list 
suggested the items shared a more “dramatic connection” than 
if the banana peel had been found elsewhere in the dumpster.  
The court admitted the evidence.   
At trial, Montpetit testified he examined the banana peel 
and found a single sperm cell from an unknown donor but found 
no blood or epithelial cells from the victim on it. Had the peel 
come in contact with the victim’s soft tissue, it was possible her 
epithelial cells would have transferred onto the peel.  As to the 
single sperm cell, Montpetit explained that it was too small a 
sample to test for DNA and that male ejaculate typically 
contains approximately three billion sperm cells.  
Defendant now argues the trial court’s admission of the 
sperm cell evidence was erroneous because the evidence lacked 
relevance, and its prejudicial impact “far outweighed” its 
probative value.  “ ‘A trial court has “considerable discretion” in 
determining the relevance of evidence.  [Citation.]  Similarly, 
the court has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 
352 to exclude even relevant evidence if it determines the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
its possible prejudicial effects.’ ”  (Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 587.)  Evidence is relevant when it “ ‘ “tends ‘logically, 
naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
64 
 
facts such as identity, intent, or motive.” ’ ” (People v. Young 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931.)  We review the trial court’s 
evidentiary decision for abuse of discretion, disturbing it only if 
we conclude that the trial “ ‘ “ ‘ “court exercised its discretion in 
an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that 
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Miles, at 
pp. 587–588.)   
We conclude the trial court very thoughtfully evaluated 
the admissibility of the sperm cell evidence.  It reasoned, “That 
there is spermatozoa [sic] in the trash at all established some 
microscopic relevance.  And I use that both in terms of size and 
significance of the issue.  The fact that it’s on a banana peel adds 
somewhat to its weight in an evidentiary way.  In light of all 
this — not just the reference to the cucumber, but all the totality 
of the evidence relevant to intent and planning in this case, the 
fact that there is a sperm on the banana peel is circumstantial 
evidence” of sexual contact.  The trial court acknowledged that 
it may be “weak [evidence, but that] doesn’t make it irrelevant.”  
Defendant argues the evidence lacks relevance because the 
sperm cell’s source is unknown, and it could have transferred to 
the banana peel from other, untested items in the same bag.  
The trial court considered those arguments, concluding the 
evidence was “not particularly” “powerful” and its credibility 
was susceptible to multiple attacks.  But the weakness of the 
evidence does not undermine its relevance.  Defendant was 
given an opportunity to test the strength of the evidence on 
cross-examination, during which Montpetit agreed there was no 
“scientific 
evidence 
that 
the 
sperm 
[was] 
necessarily” 
defendant’s, nor “scientific evidence that the banana peel was 
ever in contact with” the victim.  The trial court’s decision to 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
65 
 
admit it was certainly not arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
absurd; accordingly, we will not disturb it.  
Nor are we persuaded that the evidence was more 
prejudicial than probative.  Defendant argues admission of the 
sperm cell evidence is equivalent to the improper admission of 
character evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion under 
Evidence Code section 1101, and that it improperly reduced the 
prosecution’s burden of proof.  We disagree.  Defendant’s to-do 
list included a cucumber and a list of sexual acts.  As the court 
acknowledged, this evidence did not present a “pretty picture” 
of defendant.  But damaging evidence is not necessarily 
prejudicial.  (See People v. Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 29.)  
“ ‘The “prejudice” which [Evidence Code] section 352 seeks to 
avoid is that which “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias 
against the defendant as an individual and which has very little 
effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)  The sperm cell was found on a 
banana peel, and the peel was discarded in the same trash bag 
as defendant’s to-do list — which included a cucumber and a 
number of sexual acts.  While the image of defendant assaulting 
the victim with a banana before eating and discarding it is 
upsetting and evocative, the location of the discarded peel in the 
same garbage bag as the to-do list and handwritten “do not 
disturb” sign discarded from defendant’s home heightens its 
relevance.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting a banana peel with a sperm cell found on it, recovered 
in close proximity to a to-do list linked to defendant, that 
described a number of sexual and other acts performed in 
connection with Gallego’s murder.  Defendant’s planning for his 
crimes and his intent to sexually assault Gallego were central 
issues in the case.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
66 
 
concluding the sperm cell located on a banana peel was 
admissible as potentially relevant to those issues.   
As the Attorney General notes, the evidence of the sperm 
cell, while relevant, was not nearly as prejudicial as some of the 
other evidence against defendant, including the to-do list found 
in the same trash bag.  The court reasoned that while relevant, 
the evidence was not especially powerful, and its credibility was 
subject to attack.  The trial court weighed the probative value of 
the evidence carefully, as well as its potential to confuse jurors, 
suggesting the jurors need not be “biochemist[s]” to understand 
the “basic concept[s]” at issue.  The court also suggested it would 
not take an “inordinate amount of time” for the prosecution to 
present the evidence but ensured the defense would be given 
“every opportunity” to present the factual basis underpinning 
its interpretation of the evidence.  The court’s ruling was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or absurd, and we conclude there is no 
reason to disturb it.  (Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 587–588.)   
G. Impeachment Testimony of Jailhouse Informant  
Defendant claims the trial court erred by limiting his 
cross-examination and impeachment of Lee in violation of his 
state and federal constitutional and statutory rights.  We 
conclude no error occurred. 
Lee testified for the prosecution regarding defendant’s 
jailhouse confession.  Defendant confided his plans to steal from 
Gallego and described how he killed her, cut off her fingertips, 
and disposed of her body.  Defense counsel sought to impeach 
Lee with his prior criminal convictions, including:  Lee’s 1967 
robbery and burglary convictions; his 1990 conviction for 
possession for sale; his 1993 conviction for willful infliction of 
corporal punishment; his admission of using drugs in August 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
67 
 
2000; his 2002 admission of criminal threat; his admission of 
using rock cocaine from 1975 to 2002; and his 2002 conviction 
for false representation of identification to a peace officer.     
The trial court ruled that the defense could impeach Lee 
with the 2002 false representation conviction if he denied the 
underlying conduct.  The court also ruled defendant could 
impeach Lee with violating his restraining order, the incident 
that gave rise to his restraining order, his conviction for sale of 
narcotics in 1990, and his misdemeanor conviction for willful 
infliction of corporal injury in 1993.  The court ruled that Lee’s 
1967 convictions were too old to be relevant.  Defendant 
objected, contending that the 1967 robbery and burglary 
convictions remained relevant because Lee was facing a life 
sentence under the “Three Strikes” law, and he was hoping to 
receive some relief by testifying.  The court ruled the 1967 
offenses were generally precluded but agreed that if Lee’s status 
under the Three Strikes law was raised, defendant would be 
permitted to address those convictions on cross-examination.   
 
During 
Lee’s 
cross-examination, 
defense 
counsel 
questioned Lee about his prior convictions and admissions.  
Specifically, Lee agreed he pleaded guilty to the possession of 
rock cocaine for sale in 1990, pleaded guilty to violating a 
restraining order in August 2000, lied to police about his name 
in January 2002, and used illegal drugs as recently as the day 
before he was arrested and booked into county jail.  Lee denied 
that he was guilty of spousal abuse in 2000 and testified that he 
might have been convicted of spousal abuse in 1993.  Lee further 
denied threatening his mother or her husband in March or June 
2000.  
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
68 
 
 
Defendant now claims the trial court’s limitation on his 
cross-examination of Lee violated his rights to confrontation and 
counsel, lessened the state’s burden of proof, and undermined 
the heightened reliability requirement of capital trials.  We 
disagree.  Defendant fails to support the bare assertion that his 
right to confrontation was violated by the trial court’s order.  
Although a witness may be impeached with any prior conduct 
involving moral turpitude (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
856, 931), trial courts possess broad latitude to exclude 
examination concerning a witness’s prior conviction if it finds 
the prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative 
value.  (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 407.)  One 
factor a trial court considers when determining whether a prior 
conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes is whether 
that conviction “is near or remote in time.”  (People v. Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 931.)  The 33-year gap between Lee’s 
1967 convictions and defendant’s trial is certainly “remote” in 
time.  (Ibid.; cf. People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 722 
[1994 murder and burglary convictions not remote in time to 
1996 trial].)  Moreover, the court would have permitted 
defendant to question Lee concerning the 1967 convictions had 
Lee’s status as a third strike offender been raised; it was not.  
No error resulted from the lack of cross-examination on Lee’s 
1967 offenses.   
We note that additional considerations apply when the 
impeachment evidence is something other than a prior 
conviction because “ ‘such misconduct generally is less probative 
of immoral character or dishonesty and may involve problems 
involving proof, unfair surprise, and the evaluation of moral 
turpitude.’ ”  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 931–932.)  
Defendant argues he was not permitted to fully explore Lee’s 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
69 
 
drug history and related arrests, arguing the court’s ruling 
prohibiting cross-examination on certain subjects falsely 
inflated Lee’s credibility and reliability undermining the 
heightened requirement of reliability in capital cases.  Although 
Lee was not cross-examined concerning his 33-year-old offenses, 
defendant was able to cross-examine Lee concerning every other 
item on his criminal record:  his 1990 conviction for possession 
of the sale of narcotics; his 1993 conviction for willful infliction 
of corporal injury; his 2000 conviction for violating a restraining 
order and the incident that gave rise to it; and his 2002 
conviction for false representation of identification to a police 
officer.  The jury was fully apprised of Lee’s credibility and 
reliability when determining how much weight it should accord 
his testimony.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by limiting the use of impeachment evidence against 
Lee.   
H. Defense Examination of Police Officer Procedures  
Defendant claims the trial court erred by limiting his 
cross-examination and impeachment of Detective Ott in 
violation of his state and federal constitutional rights.  We 
conclude there was no error. 
Defendant sought to cross-examine Ott regarding alleged 
instances of variation from standard police practices, which the 
trial court denied.  Defendant argued he did not confess his 
crime to Lee.  He alleged that Ott met with Lee prior to 
interviewing him, leading defendant to suspect the detective 
“briefed” Lee prior to conducting the recorded interview.  
Defense counsel confirmed he believed Ott would deny speaking 
with Lee before the interview, that no other witness would 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
70 
 
testify to that conversation, and there was no gap in the 
recording of Ott’s interview with Lee.13   
To undermine Ott’s credibility, defendant sought to 
present evidence that Ott engaged in similar “briefing” behavior 
with witnesses in three unrelated investigations.  The 
prosecution reviewed Ott’s file to determine whether any 
information needed to be produced in discovery and found 
nothing of note.  Nevertheless, defendant claimed Ott once 
urged a fellow officer to sign an affidavit attesting to a witness’s 
positive identification of a suspect, once had been asked to 
testify in a separate case regarding his deviations from 
procedure, and once recorded an interview with a suspect, which 
contained a 45-minute gap.  As to the last allegation, the trial 
court concluded it was irrelevant as the matter settled before 
trial.   
The 
prosecution 
objected 
to 
defendant’s 
proposed 
examination regarding these topics on relevance and Evidence 
Code section 352 grounds as speculative, irrelevant, and 
prejudicial.  The trial court agreed, explaining something more 
than Lee’s uncorroborated “passing statement” that he saw Ott 
before his recorded interview was needed to impugn Ott’s 
character.  The court precluded the proposed cross-examination, 
reasoning it would be tantamount to introducing instances of 
misconduct to prove a crime and the jury should not be invited 
to speculate.     
 
13  
Defense counsel contended there was a gap in the 
videotape of Ott’s interview of defendant, but the prosecution 
did not intend to introduce that video recording into evidence in 
the guilt phase.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
71 
 
Defendant argues the trial court’s decision violated his 
confrontation right and prevented his attorney from properly 
defending him.  We disagree.  “ ‘ “ ‘[A] criminal defendant states 
a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was 
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the 
part of the witness, and thereby, “to expose to the jury the facts 
from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences 
relating to the reliability of the witness.” ’  [Citation.]  However, 
not every restriction on a defendant’s desired method of cross-
examination is a constitutional violation.  Within the confines of 
the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in 
restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, 
confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. . . .  Thus, 
unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-
examination would have produced ‘a significantly different 
impression of [the witnesses’] credibility’ [citation], the trial 
court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment.” ’ ”  (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
166, 217, citations omitted.) 
Defendant argues cross-examining Ott would have 
revealed a pattern of practice outside the norm for police 
officers.  We disagree.  Defendant claimed that because one of 
Ott’s prior interviews with a suspect contained a 45-minute gap 
in the recording and because Ott was alone with Lee and 
controlled the audio recording of his interview, he had a practice 
of manipulating interviews to prepare witnesses.  As the trial 
court concluded, such an argument is little more than rank 
speculation; indeed, as the trial court explained, Lee told the 
prosecution that Ott never provided him with information about 
the case, and there was no gap in the audio recording of Lee’s 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
72 
 
interview.  In the absence of affirmative evidence Ott engaged 
in any misconduct in this or other cases, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by concluding the probative value of the 
evidence was outweighed by the consumption of time and 
potential for confusion.  (See People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
390, 438–439.)   
I. Lying in Wait  
Defendant argues insufficient evidence supported the 
jury’s true finding of the lying-in-wait special circumstance or 
first degree murder theory, and that the special circumstance, 
as applied, is unconstitutional.   
“[O]ur assessment of defendant’s various challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence are well settled.  We ‘ “ ‘must review 
the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment 
below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — 
that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid 
value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  The 
same standard applies when examining the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a special circumstance finding.”  (People v. 
Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 57.)   
The “ ‘lying-in-wait special circumstance requires “ ‘ “an 
intentional murder, committed under circumstances which 
include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of 
watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) . . . a 
surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of 
advantage . . . .” ’ ” ’  (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 
629 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 364 P.3d 359] (Johnson).)  The lying-
in-wait special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) 
includes the elements of first degree lying-in-wait murder (id., § 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
73 
 
189, subd. (a)) but requires the additional element that the 
killing was intentional, not merely committed with implied 
malice.  [Citation.]  Thus, we focus here on whether substantial 
evidence supports the special circumstance, for if it does, it 
necessarily supports the theory of first degree lying-in-wait 
murder.”  (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 748.) 
Defendant unsuccessfully moved, pursuant to section 995, 
to set aside the information charging him with Gallego’s murder 
along with the rape-murder, sodomy-murder, and lying-in-wait 
special circumstances.  Defendant argued that there were 
interruptions between the period of alleged watchful waiting 
and the commission of lethal acts undermining the lying-in-wait 
theory, and any efforts he made to conceal his lethal actions 
after committing them could not support the special 
circumstance.  Defendant now claims insufficient evidence 
supports his conviction, arguing it is based on scant evidence — 
namely, that he and Gallego were roommates who could — and 
did — come and go from their shared living space freely (as, for 
example, when Gallego went to work on August 10); that he 
requested time off of work beginning several days before 
Gallego’s last day of work, but that his vacation request did not 
suggest murderous intent; and that he took steps to conceal the 
crime after its commission, which did not undermine his 
assertion that the killing arose from a sudden heat of passion.   
Our review is not limited to the selection of facts defendant 
presents; rather, we consider the whole record.  Having done so, 
we conclude ample evidence supported the special circumstance 
true finding, and therefore the theory of murder.  (People v. 
Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 57.)  Defendant concealed his 
purpose from Gallego and others, gathering Gallego’s personal 
financial information over a period of time to steal her savings.  
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
74 
 
He watched and waited before acting, as evinced by his taking 
photographs from Gallego and creating “morphed” images of her 
face or body combined with images of other women.  He 
requested time off of work for several days and concealed his 
plans for that time, claiming to be visiting his terminally ill 
relative.  He intended to, and did, plan to mutilate and dispose 
of Gallego’s body, as evinced by the notations on his to-do list to 
“burn palms + face thoroughly” and reference to a “small hand 
truck & drawer for extraction from apt.”  Indeed, the medical 
examiner noted that Gallego’s body showed blackened and 
wrinkled skin around her hands suggesting post-mortem 
burning.  He methodically planned his attack, which began at 
least as early as his creation of a to-do list to effectuate the 
crime, which included steps such as closing the doors and 
windows of the apartment to avoid any sound escaping.   
The crime revealed ample evidence of his concealment of 
purpose, watching and waiting, and surprise.  As to evidence of 
surprise, the head wound Gallego suffered, the marks on her 
wrists and back consistent with handcuffing, and her lack of 
defensive wounds all indicate defendant surprised Gallego 
before inflicting the injury that killed her.  Defendant’s 
concealment of purpose to sexually assault Gallego and his 
watchful waiting for an opportune time to act were evident in 
the lengthy list of the sexual acts he drafted to perpetrate 
against Gallego (which list included items he would need to 
carry out those acts like a shaver cord); the collaged sexually 
graphic images of Gallego; and evidence suggesting he carried 
out his intentions, including the fact that Gallego was found 
with recently shaved pubic hair.       
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we conclude a trier of fact could have concluded 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
75 
 
that defendant intentionally killed Gallego following a period of 
watchful waiting.  We need not credit defendant’s contrary 
claims — that several days passed between his last day of work 
and the last time Gallego was seen, which he alleges 
undermines the notion of watchful waiting, and that his 
activities to conceal the murder after committing it suggests it 
was committed in the heat of passion — because sufficient 
evidence supports the trier of fact’s conclusions.  (People v. Moon 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22–23 [upholding lying-in-wait special 
circumstance finding where the defendant concealed his 
purpose, but not his presence, from the victim before “suddenly 
push[ing] her down the stairs and then strangl[ing] her”]; see 
also People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550 (Nelson) [special 
circumstance does not require a defendant “ ‘ “ ‘be literally 
concealed from view before he attacks the victim’ ” ’ ”].) 
Defendant also claims the special circumstance is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it fails to 
narrow the class of death-eligible offenders or provide a basis to 
meaningfully distinguish between those who are and are not 
eligible for the death penalty.  We have repeatedly rejected this 
claim, as defendant acknowledges, and defendant presents us 
with no reason to reconsider our prior conclusion.  (People v. 
Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 751; People v. Johnson, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 634–637; People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
808, 849 [“Contrary to defendant’s argument, the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance is not coextensive with either theory of 
first degree murder”].) 
Defendant argues the jury was misled by the lying-in-wait 
jury instructions and by the prosecution’s related opening and 
closing arguments.  We disagree.  Before closing arguments, 
defendant unsuccessfully moved for judgment of acquittal 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
76 
 
pursuant to section 1118.1, seeking to dismiss the special 
circumstance allegation or to alternatively dismiss the murder 
charge.  The trial court noted that the motion in essence argued 
the lying-in-wait theory was unconstitutionally vague and 
denied the motion both because it found constitutional infirmity 
was not an appropriate basis for a section 1118.1 challenge, and 
because ample evidence supported the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance allegation and theory of murder.   
The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.2514, that 
murder by means of lying in wait requires watching and 
waiting, taking the victim by surprise whether or not they are 
“aware of the murderer’s presence,” and time enough to 
premeditate and deliberate.  The jury was instructed that the 
special circumstance required a premediated, deliberate killing 
 
14  
The jury was instructed as follows:  “Murder which is 
immediately preceded by lying in wait is murder of the first 
degree.  This is a separate theory of first degree murder.  [¶]  
The term ‘lying in wait’ is defined as awaiting and watching for 
an opportune time to act, together with a concealment by 
ambush or some other discrete design to take the other person 
by surprise even though the victim is aware of the murderer’s 
presence.  [¶]  The lying in wait need not continue for any 
particular period of time provided that its duration is such to 
show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation.  [¶]  The word ‘premeditation,’ as I’ve instructed 
you previously, means considering beforehand, and the word 
‘deliberation’ means formed or arrived at or determined upon as 
a result of careful thought and the weighing of considerations 
for and against the proposed course of action.”  
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
77 
 
“by means of lying in wait.”15  In her opening statement, the 
prosecutor argued, “[D]efendant is not only guilty of murder, but 
he’s guilty of slowly and methodically planning this crime, which 
is to take Patricia Gallego by surprise, which is lying in wait.  
He did this in order to rape her, and he did this in order to get 
all her money.”  In closing argument, she told the jury it could 
find the lying-in-wait special circumstance and theory of murder 
true whether or not Gallego knew defendant was present in 
their apartment and explained that no particular duration of 
waiting needed to have been established.  
Defendant argues the instructions amounted to a 
“constitutionally intolerable” violation of his state and federal 
due process rights because the prosecution was not required to 
prove the requisite mental state for first degree murder.  That 
is, he claims the lying-in-wait special circumstance and theory 
of murder “amount[ed] to strict liability for [his] being present 
prior to the offense, in the apartment that he shared with the 
 
15  
The jury was instructed on the special circumstance as 
follows:  “To find that the special circumstance referred to in 
these instructions as murder by means of lying in wait is true, 
each of the following facts must be proved:  [¶] . . . [¶]  One, the 
defendant intentionally killed the victim; [¶] And, two, the 
murder was committed by means of lying in wait.  [¶]  Murder 
which is immediately preceded by lying in wait is a murder 
committed by means of lying in wait.  [¶]  And the term ‘lying in 
wait’ is defined as awaiting and watching for an opportune time 
to act, together with a concealment by ambush or some other 
secret design to take the other person by surprise, even though 
the victim[ is] aware of the murderer’s presence.  [¶]  The lying 
in wait need not continue for any particular period of time, 
provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind 
equivalent to premeditation and deliberation.  [¶]  The words 
‘premeditation’ and ‘deliberation’ have been defined for you 
previously.”   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
78 
 
victim.”  This contention lacks merit.  “ ‘We have repeatedly held 
that CALJIC No. 8.25 adequately conveys to a jury the elements 
of lying-in-wait murder.’ ”  (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
36, 68, quoting People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1244.)  
One of those elements includes watchful waiting for a period of 
time sufficient “to show a state of mind equivalent to 
premeditation or deliberation.”  (CALJIC No. 8.25.)  We have 
also held that “CALJIC No. 8.81.15 is not by its length or terms 
‘ “impossible to understand and apply.” ’ ” (People v. Cage (2015) 
62 Cal.4th 256, 281.)  “It is not internally inconsistent in its 
treatment of the temporal element of lying in wait, which 
properly references the concepts of premeditation and 
deliberation.”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, “the use of the same language 
in both CALJIC No. 8.81.15 and CALJIC No. 8.25 concerning 
the period of time necessary for lying in wait is appropriate.  The 
difference between lying-in-wait murder and the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance does ‘not touch on th[is] durational 
element of lying in wait.’  [Citations.]  The difference lies in the 
required mental states . . . .”  (Ibid.)  We recently affirmed that 
the difference between the special circumstance of lying in wait 
and “ ‘ “ordinary” premeditated murder’ ” is not simply intent, 
but also the “elements of concealment, watching and waiting, 
and a surprise attack from a position of advantage.”  (People v. 
Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 752; see People v. Sandoval 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 416.)  Accordingly, we conclude 
defendant’s contentions that the prosecution was improperly 
relieved of its burden of proof and the jury was inadequately 
instructed on the requisite mental state are meritless.  To the 
extent defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his section 
1118.1 motion, we conclude defendant’s claim lacks merit.  Such 
denials are reviewed “using the same standard ‘employed in 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
79 
 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction,’ ” and we conclude that ample evidence supported 
the trier of fact’s conclusion.  (People v. Veamatahau (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 16, 35, quoting People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1186, 1215.)   
J. Financial Gain Special Circumstance  
Defendant argues insufficient evidence supported the 
jury’s 
true 
finding 
on 
the 
financial 
gain 
special 
circumstance.  As noted above, we review these challenges for 
“ ‘ “ ‘substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Brooks, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 57.)  Before Gallego’s death, defendant 
told Powell he planned to enter into a deal with Gallego to marry 
her in exchange for money.  Defendant left both Ijames and 
Powell with the impression that the planned marriage was 
transactional in nature.  Two days after Gallego was last seen, 
defendant cashed a $300 check written from Gallego to him.  
Two days after that, on the day Gallego’s body was found, 
defendant attempted to cash a $350 check written from Gallego 
to defendant, but he was unable to do so because of an error at 
the bank.  The next day, defendant successfully transferred the 
entire balance of Gallego’s savings, $4,670.02, into his checking 
account.  Defendant had written down all of Gallego’s personal 
identifying and financial information, which he concedes he 
used to submit credit card applications in her name, or 
variations thereof.  Following his arrest, defendant told Lee, his 
county jail cellmate, that Gallego would have paid him $2,000 to 
marry her for citizenship, but defendant determined he would 
profit to a greater degree by killing her and obtaining her 
savings (which he thought to be between $12,000 and $15,000).   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
80 
 
 The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding 
true the financial gain special circumstance.  “Under section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(1), a defendant is subject to the special 
circumstance if the ‘murder was intentional and carried out for 
financial gain.’ ”  (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 201.)  
The financial gain does not need to be the “ ‘ “dominant,” 
“substantial,” or “significant” motive for the murder.’ ”  (People 
v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 282; see also People v. Michaels 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 519 [financial gain may be “secondary 
purpose” of murder].)  Nor does a defendant need to realize any 
“pecuniary 
benefit 
from 
the 
murder” 
for 
the 
special 
circumstance to apply.  (People v. Sapp, at p. 282.)  “ ‘ “[T]he 
relevant inquiry is whether the defendant committed the 
murder in the expectation that he would thereby obtain the 
desired financial gain.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)    
Here, defendant acknowledged that he believed he would 
receive greater financial benefit from killing Gallego than 
marrying 
her. 
 
In 
the 
immediate 
aftermath 
of 
her 
disappearance, he transferred Gallego’s savings into his bank 
account and deposited checks from her account into his.  This 
conduct suffices to establish defendant’s expectation of financial 
gain.  (See People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 851 [a 
reasonable jury could find that the defendant killed the victim 
with an expectation of financial gain when victim closed out her 
account and defendant deposited a portion into his own 
account].)16   
 
16  
Because defendant was not charged with an overlapping 
financial special circumstance, a “limiting construction of the 
financial-gain special circumstance” is not applicable.  (People v. 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
81 
 
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 
207 is misplaced.  There, we held the financial gain special 
circumstance inapplicable to murder that took place during the 
course of robbery of the victim’s wallet and car.  (Id. at p. 246.)  
Defendant argues the crime he committed was more like robbery 
than murder for hire.  But a jury need not find a defendant 
committed murder for hire to conclude the primary or secondary 
purpose of murder was financial gain.  Here, where defendant 
told his cellmate following his arrest that he intended to kill 
Gallego to steal all her money rather than accept a smaller 
amount as payment in exchange for marrying her, he called her 
bank for several days prior to murdering her to check her bank 
balance, and then he methodically transferred funds from her 
account to his after killing her, we conclude there was sufficient 
evidence to support the finding that the murder was committed 
with the “ ‘ “expectation that he would thereby obtain the 
desired financial gain.” ’ ”  (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 282.) 
K. Alleged Instructional Error 
1. 
Prosecution’s Burden To Prove Charges Beyond a 
 
Reasonable Doubt  
Defendant contends that instructing the jury with 
CALJIC No. 2.90, along with four related instructions, 
undermined the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  He acknowledges we have consistently 
 
Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 850; accord People v. Howard 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409.)  
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
82 
 
concluded CALJIC No. 2.9017 suffers from no constitutional 
defect but urges without elaboration that his claim is distinct 
from those raised in other cases.    
Defendant correctly notes that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is constitutionally required to sustain a criminal 
conviction.  (See In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 361–364 
[holding that the due process clause protects defendants by 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt].)  The federal 
Constitution “ ‘does not require that any particular form of 
words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden 
of proof.’ ”  (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1032.)  Rather, 
it 
requires 
that 
“ ‘ “taken 
as 
a 
whole, 
the 
instructions . . . correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable 
doubt to the jury.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1033.)   
We have held CALJIC No. 2.90 “establishes the 
prosecution’s burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. Ghobrial, supra, 
5 Cal.5th at p. 286.)  The instruction is not confusing or 
misleading, as defendant urges us to conclude.  (People v. 
 
17  
The jury was instructed, “A defendant in a criminal action 
is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in 
a case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.  This presumption 
places upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  [¶]  Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  
It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to 
some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case 
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that 
they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral 
certainty, of the truth of the charge.”  (See CALJIC No. 2.90.) 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
83 
 
Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 296.)  Nor do we find that CALJIC 
Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, or 8.83.1 undermined the requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Dalton, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 263 [rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
those four instructions diluted the constitutional requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt].)  We have repeatedly rejected 
the argument that the phrase, “appears reasonable,” in the 
instructions misleads jurors, and defendant advances no 
persuasive reason to reconsider our prior holdings.  (Ibid.; see 
also Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 553–554 [rejecting similar 
challenges to CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83 and 8.83.1].)  
Accordingly, we conclude CALJIC No. 2.90 and related 
instructions did not undermine the requirement of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
2. 
Modification of CALJIC No. 2.70  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to 
modify CALJIC No. 2.70 to eliminate references to “confession” 
in the instruction.  Specifically, he claims that statements he 
made to a fellow inmate in county jail were admissions and 
refusing to remove the definition of confession from the 
instruction permitted the jury to improperly construe 
defendant’s statements as confessions, rather than mere 
admissions.  This argument lacks merit. 
Lee testified that defendant told him that he was in jail 
for killing a Brazilian woman.  Defendant told Lee details of the 
crime, including that he drained the victim’s blood, tried to 
disguise her identity by cutting off her fingers with bolt cutters, 
and transported her body to Carlsbad in a truck, where he was 
startled by a bright light when dumping the body.  Defendant 
told Lee that he initially planned to marry the victim so she 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
84 
 
could become a citizen in exchange for $2,000, but after learning 
she had around $12,000 or $14,000 in the bank, defendant 
explained to Lee, “he figured why get the 2- when he could do 
another thing and get it all, you know.”  Lee testified that by “do 
another thing,” defendant meant that he planned to “get rid of” 
his victim.     
Defense counsel requested CALJIC No. 2.70 — which 
defined an admission and confession — be modified to remove 
the paragraph defining confession.  Counsel argued that 
determining whether defendant’s statements to Lee constituted 
an admission or confession was an issue to be decided by the 
jury.  The trial court declined to alter the instruction, noting 
that “if [it] had some basis to conclude that this wasn’t a 
confession,” modification would be warranted.  “But,” the court 
went on, “it looks like he pretty much confessed to everything.  
Homicide, planning, motive, intent.”  Accordingly, the jury was 
instructed pursuant to an unmodified CALJIC No. 2.70.18 
 
18  
In full, as given, CALJIC No. 2.70 provides:  “A confession 
is a statement made by a defendant in which he has 
acknowledged his guilt of the crime for which he is on trial.  In 
order to constitute a confession, the statement must 
acknowledge participation in the crime as well as the required 
criminal intent or state of mind.  [¶]  An admission is a 
statement made by a defendant which does not by itself 
acknowledge his guilt of the crime for which the defendant is on 
trial, but which statement tends to prove his guilt when 
considered with the rest of the evidence.  [¶]  You are the 
exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made a confession 
or an admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in 
whole or in part.  [¶]  Evidence of an oral confession or an oral 
admission of the defendant not made in court should be viewed 
with caution.”   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
85 
 
Defendant claims that because his statements to Lee were 
admissions not confessions, the trial court’s refusal to modify 
CALJIC No. 2.70 was error.  “We review a claim of instructional 
error de novo.”  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.)  A 
trial court “is obligated to instruct the jury on all general 
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, 
whether or not the defendant makes a formal request.”  (People 
v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744.)  “ ‘ “On review even if an 
erroneous instruction is included reversal is required only when 
it appears the error was likely to have misled the jury.” ’ ”  
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 546.)      
In Nelson, we held that no error flowed from the trial 
court’s inclusion of the “confession” language when instructing 
the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.70, although the trial court 
acknowledged in that case that no confession was made.  
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 546.)  There, the trial court 
reasoned that instructions on both admissions and confessions 
“would clarify the distinction between them so that the jurors 
would not ‘talk[] about confessions [when] really all they are 
talking about is admissions.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We held there was no 
reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the instruction, 
even assuming it should not have been given.  (Id. at p. 547.)  
Here, there is little ambiguity that defendant confessed.  
Defendant told Lee his financial motive for killing the victim 
and provided unusual details about the crime, including the fact 
that he drained all Gallego’s blood and removed her fingertips 
with bolt cutters.  No opportunity for confusion arose from 
giving an unmodified version of CALJIC No. 2.70.  Even if 
defendant is correct that his statement to Lee was an admission 
and not a confession, the jury was free to make that 
determination.  As we concluded in Nelson, reversal is not 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
86 
 
warranted because any error would have been unlikely to have 
misled the jury.  (Nelson, at p. 547.)   
Defendant also argues that by instructing the jury 
pursuant to an unmodified CALJIC No. 2.70, the court implied 
to the jury that there was a confession, an implication that 
impermissibly relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof on 
a substantive charge.  Jury instructions that create a permissive 
inference, even if erroneous, are unconstitutional only if the 
inference is irrational.  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 
1131–1132.)  Even if we assume that CALJIC No. 2.70 
permitted the jury to infer defendant confessed to Lee, that 
inference is sensible, if not compelled, in light of the detail 
defendant used when describing the murder to Lee, and it did 
not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. 
Finally, relying on Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 
defendant claims the alleged instructional error violated his 
right to a reliable verdict.  We have previously rejected this 
claim, finding “no due process or other federal constitutional 
error,” and defendant presents us with no reason to alter that 
conclusion here.  (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 547.) 
3. 
Denial of Defense Instruction on Evidence 
 
Tampering  
Defendant argues the trial court’s denial of his requested 
instruction that the prosecution bears the burden of proof that 
there was no evidence tampering constituted error.  Defendant 
requested the jury be instructed, “The prosecution has the 
burden of proving to you beyond a reasonable doubt that none of 
the evidence they have presented was tampered with or 
contaminated.  You may consider any breaks in the chain of 
custody of any of the evidence collected, transported and 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
87 
 
thereafter evaluated in determining whether the prosecution 
has met their burden.”   
Defendant claimed there was a break or ambiguity in the 
chain of custody of the banana peel, scarf, and vaginal swab.19  
Defendant argued his proposed instruction was warranted 
because Swalwell (a “non-police department scientist”) found no 
spermatozoa on a smear made from a vaginal swab taken from 
Gallego’s body, and Montpetit (“the police department scientist”) 
tested the swab sometime later, finding enough sperm and 
epithelial cells to conclude defendant and Gallego were 
“possible” contributors.  Defense counsel argued to the trial 
court that this difference was “an interesting note” and was 
“something that the jury should consider.”  The prosecution 
contended these evidentiary questions were matters for 
argument, not instruction.  Defense counsel also conceded, when 
pressed by the trial court, that these differing test results did 
not implicate the chain of custody.  Finally, the trial court noted 
that, contrary to the requested instruction’s language, the 
prosecution’s burden was to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, not to prove a lack of evidence tampering or 
contamination.  Defense counsel agreed, suggesting the 
instruction could be given without the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” language.  The trial court denied the requested 
instruction.   
Defendant now claims, “[I]t was error to refuse the 
instruction that would have informed jurors that they must 
 
19  
Defendant argued there were questions about the chain of 
custody of the banana peel and scarf, but aside from this bare 
assertion, the defense argument and ensuing colloquy were 
limited to the vaginal swab evidence.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
88 
 
determine that the prosecution showed the chain of custody was 
intact.”  “ ‘ “ ‘ “[I]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the 
absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general 
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the 
evidence.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 295.)  
“We are ‘mindful of the general rule that a trial court may 
properly refuse an instruction offered by the defendant if it 
incorrectly states the law, is argumentative, duplicative, or 
potentially confusing [citation], or if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence.’  [Citation.]  We review de novo whether 
instructions correctly state the law.”  (People v. Scully (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 542, 592.)     
Defendant’s claim lacks merit.  As the Attorney General 
argues, the jury was instructed on how to evaluate the scientific 
experts’ testimony pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.80.20  Moreover, 
defendant acknowledged the experts’ differing test results were 
unrelated to the chain of custody of the vaginal swab, rendering 
the requested instruction unsupported by substantial — or 
any — evidence.  Because defendant’s requested instruction was 
 
20  
The jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.80 as 
follows:  “In determining what weight to give to any opinion 
expressed by an expert witness, you should consider 
the . . . believability of the witness as well as the facts or 
materials upon which each opinion is based and the reasons for 
each opinion.  [¶]  An opinion is only as good as the facts and the 
reasons upon which it’s based.  If you find that any fact has not 
been proved or has been disproved, then you must consider that 
in determining the value of the opinion.  Likewise you must 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of the reasons upon 
which the opinion is based.  [¶]  You are not bound by an opinion.  
You should give each opinion the weight you find that it 
deserves.  You may disregard an opinion if you find it to be 
unreasonable.”  
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
89 
 
not related to generally relevant legal principles raised by the 
evidence and because it was duplicative, unsupported by 
substantial evidence, and misstated the law, we conclude the 
trial court did not err by refusing to give it.    
4. 
CALJIC No. 2.15  
Defendant argues his conviction must be reversed because 
the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.15, and it was not 
told the instruction was limited to theft-related charges as the 
use note to the instruction suggested it should be.  (See Use Note 
to CALJIC No. 2.15 (5th ed. 1988) p. 40 [“This instruction will 
serve to cover the effect of possession of recently stolen property 
in robbery, burglary, theft and receiving stolen property”].)   
Without objection, the jury was instructed with a modified 
version of CALJIC No. 2.15 as follows:  “If you find that a 
defendant was in possession of recently stolen property, the fact 
of that possession is not, by itself, sufficient to permit an 
inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder.  [¶]  
Before guilt may be inferred, there must be corroborating 
evidence tending to prove defendant’s guilt.  However, this 
corroborating evidence need only be slight and need not, by 
itself, be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.  [¶]  As 
corroboration, you may consider the attributes of possession, 
time, place and manner, that the defendant had an opportunity 
to commit the crime charged, the defendant’s conduct and his 
false statements, if any, and any other evidence which tends to 
connect the defendant with the crime charged.”   
Defendant argues that the instruction given without 
limitation permitted the jury to find him guilty of murder if it 
found he was in possession of recently stolen property along with 
some slightly corroborating evidence.  As the Attorney General 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
90 
 
concedes, we have found the “application of CALJIC No. 2.15 to 
nontheft offenses like . . . murder . . . erroneous.”  (People v. 
Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 248–249 (Prieto).)  This is so 
because “ ‘[p]roof a defendant was in conscious possession of 
recently stolen property simply does not lead naturally and 
logically to the conclusion the defendant committed’ . . . 
murder.”  (Id. at p. 249.)   
Defendant claims the error deprived him of his federal 
constitutional rights because it lessened the state’s burden of 
proof, made it impossible to know whether the jury relied on an 
incorrect theory of culpability, and permitted the jury to infer 
the elements of first degree murder from proof defendant 
possessed stolen property.  We have expressly rejected each of 
these claims.  (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1131–
1133.)   
The instruction did not alter the theory of culpability or 
affect the propriety of the court’s remaining instructions that 
the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
elements of murder were satisfied.  (People v. Moore, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 1131.)  Rather, “[t]he jury was instructed it 
could draw merely ‘an inference of guilt’ from the fact of 
possession with slight corroboration, which any rational juror 
would understand meant he or she could consider this inference 
in deciding whether the prosecution has established the 
elements of murder (and the other offenses) elsewhere defined 
in the trial court’s instructions.”  (Ibid.)   
The instruction did not “unconstitutionally lower the 
prosecution’s burden of proving each element of the crimes 
beyond a reasonable doubt:  [it] ‘did not directly or indirectly 
address the burden of proof, and nothing in the instruction 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
91 
 
absolved the prosecution of its burden of establishing guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’  (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 248.)   
Other instructions also properly informed the jury of its duty to 
weigh the evidence, what evidence it may consider, how to weigh 
that evidence, and the burden of proof.  We decline defendant’s 
invitation to reconsider this conclusion.”  (People v. Moore, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1133; see also People v. Potts, supra, 
6 Cal.5th at pp. 1042–1043.)   
Applying the Watson standard, we conclude, “[T]here was 
no reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a different 
result if the court had limited the permissive inference described 
in CALJIC No. 2.15 to theft offenses.  (See Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)”  (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 249.)  As 
discussed more fully, ante (see Section III.A.2), in light of the 
overwhelming evidence supporting defendant’s conviction, it is 
not reasonably likely a jury would have reached a different 
conclusion by merely considering defendant’s possession of 
stolen property and slight corroborating evidence.  Accordingly, 
we find the error harmless.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 
5. 
Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction  
Defendant 
argues 
two 
voluntary 
manslaughter 
instructions, CALJIC Nos. 8.40 and 8.42, improperly permitted 
jurors to presume murder was the default offense and could be 
reduced or excused by certain mental states, the presence of 
which were defendant’s burden to prove.  Defendant’s claim 
lacks merit.  The jury was instructed with CALJIC Nos. 8.4021 
 
21  
The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.40 as follows:  
“Defendant is accused in count one of having committed the 
crime of murder.  A lesser-included offense of the crime of 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
92 
 
and 8.42,22 the latter addressing provocation and heat of 
passion.  Before the court agreed to give these instructions, it 
 
murder is involuntary manslaughter.  [¶]  Every person who 
unlawfully kills another human 
being without malice 
aforethought but either with an intent to kill, or in conscious 
disregard for human life, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in 
violation of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (a).  [¶]  
‘Conscious disregard for life,’ as used in this instruction, means 
that a killing results from the doing of an intentional act, the 
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act 
was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his or 
her conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with 
conscious disregard for life.  [¶]  In order to prove this crime, 
each of the following elements must be proved:  [¶]  1. A human 
being was killed;  [¶]  2. The killing was unlawful; and  [¶]  3. 
The perpetrator of the killing either intended to kill the alleged 
victim or acted in conscious disregard for life; and  [¶]  4. The 
perpetrator’s conduct resulted in the unlawful killing.” 
 
22  
The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.42 as follows:  
“To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter 
upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the 
provocation must be of the character and degree as naturally 
would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act 
under the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.  
[¶]  The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to 
manslaughter must be such a passion as naturally would be 
aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the 
same circumstances.  A defendant is not permitted to set up his 
own standard of conduct and to justify or excuse himself because 
his passions were aroused unless the circumstances in which the 
defendant was placed and the facts that confronted him were 
such as also would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily 
reasonable person faced with the same situation. Legally 
adequate provocation may occur in a short, or over a 
considerable, period of time.  [¶]  The question to be answered is 
whether or not, at the time of the killing, the reason of the 
 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
93 
 
had a lengthy colloquy with the parties about whether the 
brewing discord between Gallego and defendant regarding 
defendant’s unreturned affection for Gallego could constitute 
provocation.  The court ultimately concluded it would give all of 
the voluntary manslaughter instructions, including CALJIC 
Nos. 8.37, 8.40, 8.42, 8.43, 8.44, and 8.50.  Defendant never 
objected to any of these instructions on the bases he now asserts:  
that they rendered the crime of murder a default offense or 
altered the burden of proof.  Accordingly, his appellate challenge 
is forfeited.  (See People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 391.)   
Even if it had been preserved, we conclude his claim lacks 
merit.  Defendant cites no authority supporting his assertion 
that instructing the jury with two of the standard voluntary 
manslaughter instructions conflicted with other instructions, 
misled the jury regarding who bore the burden of proof, or 
suggested to the jury that murder was a default offense.  We 
have upheld the propriety of both instructions and are presented 
with no reason to do otherwise here.  (See People v. Gutierrez 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144.)  As the Attorney General aptly 
points out, the jury was instructed that the prosecution bore the 
burden of proof pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.50.  Nothing in 
 
accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent 
as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average 
disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, 
and from passion rather than from judgment.  [¶]  If there was 
provocation, whether of short or long duration, but of a nature 
not normally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time 
elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion 
to subside and reason to return, and if an unlawful killing of a 
human being followed the provocation and had all the elements 
of murder, as I have defined it, the mere fact of slight or remote 
provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter.”   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
94 
 
CALJIC Nos. 8.40 or 8.42 altered this mandate.  Jurors are 
presumed to follow the instructions given.  (See People v. 
Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 309.)  We presume 
the jury did so and conclude the trial court did not err, under 
state or federal constitutional standards, by giving CALJIC Nos. 
8.40 and 8.42 without modification.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 
at p. 836; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)  We 
likewise conclude there was no prosecutorial misconduct.  
Defendant did not object to either instruction on those grounds, 
and it is not clear that an admonition would not have cured any 
alleged harm.  (See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 122 
[“To be cognizable on appeal, a defendant ‘ “must make a timely 
objection at trial and request an admonition; otherwise, the 
[claim of prosecutorial misconduct] is reviewable only if an 
admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the 
misconduct” ’ ”].) 
L. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During the Guilt 
 
Phase  
Defendant argues several instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred during the guilt phase of his trial, violating 
his right to due process and rendering the proceedings 
fundamentally unfair.  We reject these claims. 
“ ‘A defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for 
prosecutorial misconduct . . . unless it is reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been 
reached without the misconduct.’ ”  (People v. Flores (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 371, 403, quoting People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 839.) “ ‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render 
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves 
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
95 
 
trier of fact.’ ”  (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 541, 
quoting People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 711.)  During 
opening and closing arguments, the prosecution is given wide 
latitude to make “ ‘fair comment on the evidence, including 
reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn from it.’ ”   
(People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 213.)  “ ‘As a general 
rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless in a timely fashion — and on the same 
ground — the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and 
requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 
impropriety.’ ”  (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th 
at p. 306; see also People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 403).  
Defendant 
alleges 
numerous 
instances 
of 
prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred throughout the guilt phase of his trial, but 
we find none. 
1. 
Opening Statement  
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during the opening statement by improperly arguing about the 
victim’s blood loss, use of a gag, and torture.  He also claims the 
prosecutor’s argument that defendant was guilty of lying in wait 
was improper.   
Defendant’s claim lacks merit.  “ ‘[R]emarks made in an 
opening statement cannot be charged as misconduct unless the 
evidence referred to by the prosecutor “was ‘so patently 
inadmissible as to charge the prosecutor with knowledge that it 
could never be admitted.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 762.)  Defendant argued the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by urging the jury to conclude that, after reviewing 
all of the evidence, it should find that defendant was not only 
guilty of murder, but also of “slowly and methodically planning 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
96 
 
this crime, which is to take [the victim] by surprise, which is 
lying in wait.”  This remark was drawn from the evidence and 
constituted no more than a preview of the prosecution’s theory 
of the case. 
  None of the prosecution’s relatively few specific 
references to draining blood, gagging, or torture constituted 
misconduct.  The prosecution’s descriptions of Gallego being 
“drained” of her blood were reasonably supported by admissible 
evidence.  No blood was found in or on Gallego’s body, nor was 
there blood in the trash can within which she was found.  The 
medical examiner testified the cause of death was severance of 
her jugular vein, which would have caused Gallego to bleed to 
death.  The medical examiner further opined that since no blood 
was found in Gallego’s body, it was possible that defendant 
submerged Gallego’s body in water to allow the blood to flow out.  
Moreover, defendant confessed to his cellmate that he had killed 
his roommate and drained the woman’s blood in the bathroom. 
There was ample evidence to support the prosecution’s 
argument that Gallego’s blood had been drained from her body, 
and the prosecutor’s references to that argument in her opening 
statement therefore did not constitute misconduct.  (People v. 
Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 404.) 
 
Ample evidence also supported the prosecution’s theory 
that Gallego was gagged.  Gallego’s body was completely naked, 
except for a scarf loosely looped and knotted around her neck.  
The trial court noted that it had never seen that style of knot 
used for fashion and believed that the prosecution could make a 
legitimate 
inference 
that 
Gallego 
had 
been 
gagged. 
Hergenroeather testified the scarf had been wrapped around 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
97 
 
Gallego’s neck several times and covered the cut.23  The 
investigators on the case did not believe that the scarf was used 
to disguise the small wound on Gallego’s neck, particularly 
because the rest of Gallego’s wounds remained visible and 
uncovered on her body.  Just as the evidence supported 
prosecution’s use of the word “drained,” so too did the evidence 
support the use of the word the word “gagged” in the prosecutor’s 
opening statement.  (People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 404.) 
The prosecutor’s single, colloquial use of the word torture 
in her opening statement — “The defendant raped and inflicted 
an enormous amount of pain and torture upon Miss Gallego” — 
did not constitute misconduct.  The trial court ruled such a use 
was permissible, and even if the term was inflammatory, a 
single reference to it was not patently inadmissible, nor would 
it have altered the result of defendant’s trial.  (People v. Foster 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1350 [“in light of our conclusion that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting [the] 
evidence, the prosecutor’s reference to the evidence during his 
opening statement was not misconduct”]; see also People v. 
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 762; People v. Flores, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 403.)  Because the terms defendant objects to 
were “within the ‘broad scope of permissible argument,’ ” they 
did not constitute misconduct.  (People v. Dykes, supra, at 
p. 762.)  
To the extent defendant also alleges his state and federal 
constitutional rights were violated when the trial court did not 
require that the prosecutor generally refrain from using the 
 
23  
As Hergenroeather was about to testify as to his belief 
regarding the use of the scarf, an objection was interposed and 
sustained.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
98 
 
words “drained,” “gagged,” and “tortured” during the opening 
statement as defendant requested, we find no error.  
Information about the manner the crime was committed — 
including that the victim may have been subdued by a gag or 
handcuffs and that her blood was drained — may have been an 
evocative description but was not unduly inflammatory and did 
not alter the burden of proof.  We conclude the trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion to preclude use of certain terms in 
the opening statement was not erroneous. 
2. 
Introduction of Evidence 
Defendant alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by introducing certain photographic, physical, and expert 
evidence.  Specifically, he claims the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by:  introducing sexually graphic images and 
referring to those images as “porn” or “pornography”; relying on 
its expert, a forensic dentist; agreeing to appear and discuss 
defendant’s case on a reality television show; introducing 
allegedly “gruesome” images depicting the victim’s postmortem 
body in “an effort to urge jurors to ignore the defense of heat of 
passion”; introducing evidence of a sperm cell on a banana peel; 
introducing a photograph depicting the victim in life with her 
dog; and showing the jury photographs of the victim’s 
postmortem handcuffed body during Powell’s testimony.   
“When a claim of misconduct is based on remarks to the 
jury, we consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the 
jury construed the remarks in an improper fashion.”  (People v. 
Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 350, citing People v. Gonzales 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275.)  Defendant argues the 
prosecution’s 
introduction 
of 
sexually 
graphic 
evidence 
constituted misconduct and claims referring to those images as 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
99 
 
“porn” or “pornography” was inflammatory.  Defendant’s claim 
lacks merit.  It is not reasonably likely the jury improperly 
construed the prosecution’s use of the word “pornography” to 
describe sexually graphic images, as that word is the generally 
understood term for such images, as is the shortened 
colloquialism, “porn.”  To the extent defendant’s objection is to 
the introduction of this relevant and admissible evidence, we 
conclude no misconduct occurred.  Reliance on evidence to prove 
its case is the function of prosecution and does not constitute the 
prosecution’s use of “ ‘ “deceptive or reprehensible methods to 
persuade the jury.” ’ ”  (People v. Steskal, at p. 350, quoting 
People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.)   
We also reject defendant’s contention that the prosecution 
committed misconduct by relying on Sperber’s testimony, whom 
defendant characterizes as a “thoroughly unqualified ‘expert,’ ” 
because the reliance was not a deceptive or reprehensible tool of 
persuasion but was instead the ordinary introduction of expert 
evidence.  (See People v. Steskal, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 350.)  As 
described above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting the testimony, and no misconduct resulted from 
relying on it.  (See People v. Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97; 
see also People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1350.)   
Similarly, the prosecution’s use of photographs and 
physical evidence was not deceptive, reprehensible, or “ ‘ “so 
egregious that it infect[ed] the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 618.)  In People v. Kennedy, the 
defendant claimed on appeal the introduction of a photograph of 
his tattoos constituted prosecutorial misconduct, which claim 
we rejected in part because defendant introduced the 
photograph.  (Id. at p. 619.)  We also concluded the prosecution’s 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
100 
 
mentioning the photograph in closing argument did not 
constitute misconduct because the evidence was relevant.  
(Ibid.)  We conclude likewise here; the photographic and 
physical evidence — the photo of Gallego in life with her dog, the 
autopsy photos, the photo shown to the jury during Powell’s 
testimony, and the sperm cell evidence — was relevant, and the 
prosecution’s introduction of it and reliance upon it did not 
constitute misconduct.  Because the trial court concluded the 
sexually graphic images were relevant and admissible, the 
prosecutor did not commit misconduct by relying on them.  (See 
People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 98 [“ ‘ “merely 
eliciting evidence is not misconduct” ’ ”].)  
Finally, as defendant acknowledges, he is unable to 
demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the prosecutor’s 
agreement to be depicted in a reality television show about his 
case that never aired; having viewed the sealed footage, we 
conclude no misconduct occurred.  (See People v. Steskal, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at pp. 353–354.) 
Beyond his arguments as to admissibility, which we have 
rejected, defendant fails to explain how an advocate’s use of 
relevant evidence, admitted by the court through a proper 
exercise of its discretion, could constitute misconduct.  
3. 
Facts Not in Evidence 
 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting testimony from Hergenroeather that 
Gallego had been gagged.  Prior to his testimony, the court had 
ruled Hergenroeather’s opinion was inadmissible, cutting off 
Hergenroeather’s testimony before he could finish testifying 
that he believed Gallego had been gagged.  While questioning 
Hergenroeather about his process of gathering evidence and 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
101 
 
presenting it to the district attorney, Hergenroeather testified 
that he “believed [Gallego] was gagged.”  The detective 
explained that during the initial investigation, it was his process 
to report only facts, not impressions, in his notes, but after a 
suspect is identified and the case is presented to the district 
attorney, the detective at that point shares his “thoughts and 
impressions of the case,” which in this instance included his 
belief she was handcuffed and gagged.   
No 
objection 
was 
interposed 
in 
response 
to 
Hergenroeather’s statement, but later during his testimony, 
defendant objected to an unrelated line of questioning.  A 
sidebar discussion followed, and the court reminded the parties 
it had previously ruled that evidence concerning the detective’s 
belief regarding why the scarf was looped around Gallego’s neck 
constituted improper opinion evidence.  The court concluded the 
testimony the detective had just given that he believed Gallego 
had been gagged “came in . . . too fast for” the court and the 
defense to note or interpose an objection.  In light of the speed 
and passing nature of Hergenroeather’s testimony, the court 
allowed the parties to decide whether it should raise the issue 
to “unring the bell” by admonishing the jury to disregard the 
testimony or let it be.  Defense counsel argued the jury was 
attentively listening and writing during the detective’s 
testimony, and the court needed to admonish the jury 
immediately upon resumption of proceedings.  The court agreed 
it would do so by explaining to the jury the question and answer 
came too fast for it to sustain any objection, it had previously 
ruled the detective’s opinion about whether the victim had been 
gagged was not admissible, and it would strike the testimony he 
had just given on that topic.  The court admonished the jury as 
indicated.   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
102 
 
Although defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s 
question or Hergenroeather’s testimony on any grounds, it is not 
clear whether this claim is forfeited because the trial court 
acknowledged the testimony was given too quickly for an 
objection to be interposed.24  (See People v. Flores, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 403.)  In any event, we conclude the prosecution’s 
brief question, “And what were your thoughts and impressions 
as to whether Miss Gallego was gagged?” did not constitute 
misconduct.   
“ ‘[A]lthough it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally 
to elicit inadmissible testimony [citation], merely eliciting 
evidence is not misconduct.’ ”  (People v. Fuiava (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 622, 679.)  During examination by the prosecution, 
just as Hergenroeather was about to complete a sentence 
indicating his belief the scarf tied loosely around the victim’s 
neck may have been used as a gag, the court sustained a defense 
objection as to what the detective was about to say.  The trial 
court merely stated that the objection was sustained “as to what 
[Hergenroeather] was about to say.  I’m not striking anything 
he’s already said.”  The court did not elaborate, on or off the 
record, on its ruling.  The prosecutor explained that she 
remembered, incorrectly, that defense counsel had subsequently 
asked Hergenroeather his opinion about whether Gallego had 
been gagged, but that question was not posed.  The prosecutor 
apologized to the court for mistakenly believing it could elicit 
testimony concerning whether the victim was gagged, 
 
24  
At this juncture, the court urged defense counsel to be 
more attentive and interpose objections more frequently to avoid 
testimony inadvertently being given that the court had 
disallowed previously. 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
103 
 
misremembering 
defense 
counsel’s 
examination, 
and 
misunderstanding the nature of the court’s ruling excluding the 
opinion testimony Hergenroeather had been about to give.  The 
court urged the parties to raise evidentiary arguments outside 
the presence of the jury, and the prosecutor promised to do so.   
The prosecutor’s question to Hergenroeather does not 
appear to be an effort to elicit inadmissible testimony; it seems 
instead a reasonable, if mistaken, effort to elicit admissible 
evidence.  (People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 679.)  In any 
event, 
the 
court 
admonished 
the 
jury 
to 
disregard 
Hergenroeather’s testimony, and defendant fails to demonstrate 
that this remedy was inadequate.  (See People v. Tully, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at pp. 1037–1038 [defendant’s nonspecific objection 
to alleged prosecutorial misconduct sustained].)   
4. 
Jailhouse Informant Evidence 
Defendant claims the prosecution committed misconduct 
by introducing Lee’s testimony because, he claims, there were 
doubts concerning its veracity.  He also alleges, “[T]he 
prosecutor’s insistence on not permitting jurors to consider 
Det[ective] Ott’s pattern and practice of misconduct in other 
cases” constituted misconduct.  The trial court heard extensive 
argument regarding the propriety of introducing evidence of 
Ott’s alleged wrongdoing and ultimately ruled it was irrelevant 
because there was no evidence that Ott acted improperly in the 
instant case.  We conclude the prosecutor committed no 
misconduct either by eliciting Lee’s testimony or by not 
presenting evidence of Ott’s alleged misconduct in other cases, 
in accordance with the court’s ruling.  (See People v. Fuiava, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 679 [merely eliciting testimony does not 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct].)  As described above, the 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
104 
 
trial court admitted much of Lee’s testimony, and no misconduct 
resulted from the prosecutor’s reliance on testimony that the 
trial court had already ruled was properly before the jury.  
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, most of Lee’s criminal history 
was introduced as impeachment evidence, and the trial court’s 
ruling excluding a few dated offenses was not a prosecutorial 
decision that could have constituted misconduct.  Finally, we 
conclude the prosecutor’s failure to elicit testimony of Ott’s prior 
acts in reliance on the court’s express ruling that such 
information was unduly speculative and therefore inadmissible 
was not misconduct.  (See People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
p. 1350.)   
5. 
Closing Argument 
Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by encouraging jurors to conclude the crime was planned, 
referring to the sexually graphic “porn” images defendant 
created and to the sexual fantasies described in defendant’s 
writings.  Defendant failed to object to any of these comments, 
but even if the claim was preserved, we would find no 
misconduct.  We have repeatedly held a prosecutor has “ ‘wide 
latitude to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
presented at trial.’ ”  (People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 1022.)  Defendant’s arguments that it was misconduct for the 
prosecutor to ask jurors to credit Sperber’s expert testimony 
about tool marks as common sense, testimony that defendant 
once used handcuffs to lock his bike, evidence the victim’s body 
was drained of blood, and the prosecution’s rebuttal arguments 
that defendant used a gag and handcuffs lack merit; these 
statements constituted no more than permissible comments on 
evidence presented during the trial.  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
105 
 
Although a prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating 
the law (People v. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 204), defendant’s 
claims that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to argue 
manslaughter means “man’s laughter” because it lessened the 
burden of proof, or to explain the jury need not agree on an 
underlying theory of first degree murder, are unavailing.  The 
prosecutor did not suggest defendant was laughing at the 
victim’s death; rather, she explained that the root words of 
manslaughter remind that a finding of manslaughter involves 
less culpability than first degree murder.  While this analogy 
may have been confusing or inapt, it was not a deceptive or 
reprehensible method used to persuade the trier of fact, nor did 
it infect the trial with unfairness sufficient to render the 
subsequent conviction a denial of due process.  (People v. 
Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 306.)  Defendant 
also argues that jurors need not agree on the theory of first 
degree murder, allowing the prosecutor to press “many pieces of 
unreliable information, and theories that were unsupported by 
reliable facts.”  Both the “man’s laughter” argument and the 
prosecutor’s correct statement that jurors need not agree on the 
theory of first degree murder did not constitute misconduct.  
(See, e.g., People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 593 [jurors 
need not agree on theory of first degree murder].) 
PENALTY PHASE 
A. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During the 
 
Penalty Phase  
Defendant alleges the prosecution engaged in a pervasive 
campaign of misconduct at all phases of his trial.  He claims the 
individual instances and cumulative impact of that misconduct 
warrant reversal of his death sentence.  We conclude no 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred at the penalty phase. 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
106 
 
As addressed previously, a prosecutor enjoys wide latitude 
during closing argument to comment on the evidence or draw 
reasonable inferences from it; misconduct arises when the 
prosecution uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to 
persuade the trier of fact or infects the trial with unfairness 
sufficient to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due 
process.  (See People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
p. 306.)  Defendant argues several comments the prosecutor 
made during closing argument constituted misconduct.  The 
prosecutor told jurors that the nature of the case “makes us feel 
bad” in the course of reminding jurors of their duty to persevere.  
Any claim of misconduct arising from this statement is forfeited 
because defendant did not object (see People v. Dykes, supra, 
46 Cal.4th at p. 770), and it lacks merit.  The prosecution’s 
comments urged the jury to impose the death penalty in light of 
the horrific way in which defendant killed Gallego, despite the 
fact that having to listen to the evidence made them feel “bad” 
and despite the fact that they “didn’t want to be here,” which is 
not outside the realm of proper argument.  (People v. Gamache 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 389.) 
Next, defendant argues the prosecutor told jurors they had 
a duty to impose death by stating they were “called upon to 
deliver that penalty in this case.”  The prosecutor also 
analogized their reaching a verdict to climbing Mount Everest.  
Defendant failed to object to these statements, thus forfeiting 
his claim on appeal.  (People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 773.)  Even so, his claims are without merit.  Taken in 
isolation,  the prosecutor’s analogy might have suggested to the 
jury that they should see the imposition of the death penalty as 
the ultimate achievement or something they ought to take pride 
in.  If so, we are doubtful that this would have been a proper 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
107 
 
characterization of the jury’s solemn duty.  However, when read 
in context, the prosecutor’s use of the Mount Everest analogy 
appears intended as a means of empathizing with the jury over 
the “struggle” of having to “immerse” themselves in the “horrible 
murder” of Gallego even after they had already reached a guilty 
verdict, and reminding the jury that they had a duty to “see this 
case through to the end.”  In effect, asking the jury to render an 
appropriate verdict at the end of a grueling trial is not improper 
argument.  While the Everest statement may have been oblique 
and overly dramatic, it was not misconduct.  (See People v. 
Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 306.)  
Next, defendant argues the prosecution improperly asked 
jurors to imagine themselves in the victim’s experiences and 
“see what she went through in the last moments of her life.”  
Defendant forfeited this challenge by failing to object (People v. 
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 773), and his claims are without 
merit.  (People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 692 [A 
prosecutor does not commit misconduct by asking the jurors to 
put themselves in the victim’s shoes].)  “Although it is 
inappropriate at the guilt phase for a prosecutor to appeal to 
sympathy by inviting the jury to view the case through the 
victim’s eyes [citation], such appeals are entirely appropriate at 
the penalty phase.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 
485.)  An appeal to jurors to place themselves in the victim’s 
position is “ ‘ “appropriate at the penalty phase because there 
‘the jury decides a question the resolution of which turns not 
only on the facts, but on the jury’s moral assessment of those 
facts as they reflect on whether defendant should be put to 
death. . . .  In this process, one of the most significant 
considerations is the nature of the underlying crime.  [Citation.]  
Hence assessment of the offense from the victim’s viewpoint 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
108 
 
would appear germane to the task of sentencing.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 486.)  Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by likening jurors to the citizens who reported the trash can 
containing Gallego’s body and PetSmart dumpster where her 
fingers were found, and to the police officers who investigated, 
because the comparisons improperly reinforced that they had a 
duty to impose the death penalty.  We find no error; the 
prosecutor invited the jury to perform its duty as the “conscience 
of the community” and choose the appropriate penalty but did 
not use this comparison to suggest jurors must impose the death 
penalty.  (People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 389.)  A 
prosecutor is free to present closing argument in “ ‘colorful 
terms’ ” so long as any commentary is brief and does not exceed 
the bounds of propriety.  (People v. Jackson, supra, 45 Cal.4th 
at p. 692.) 
Defendant further claims that the prosecution improperly 
argued facts as aggravating factors including defendant’s 
postcrime actions and references to the victim’s dog.  
Defendant’s failure to object or to request an admonishment 
forfeits review of this claim.  (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
1136, 1181.)  It also lacks merit.  Describing what defendant did 
to the victim’s body after her death constitutes comment on 
evidence that was already before the jury.  Additionally, the 
prosecution referenced defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s 
dog to demonstrate how well he knew her.  Both arguments 
constitute the proper exercise of a prosecutor’s wide latitude to 
comment on the evidence.  (People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 213.) 
 Defendant next contends that the prosecution improperly 
urged jurors to count aggravating factors.  The prosecutor told 
the jury they only need to find one special circumstance true to 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
109 
 
reach a verdict, and “if you have two, that’s twice as many.”  
Defendant objected on the basis that the prosecution was giving 
“arbitrary weight” to the factors.  The court addressed the 
objection, providing a curative instruction that “[t]here is no 
magical weight assigned to any factor, no arbitrary weight.”  It 
encouraged jurors “to look at the factors, decide which ones are 
applicable and decide what weight is to be assigned to any of 
them and all of them.”  To the extent the prosecution erred, the 
court’s instruction cured any prejudice that may have arisen 
from the prosecution’s comments.  (People v. Jackson (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 269, 367.) 
Next, defendant argues that the prosecution improperly 
characterized the evidence in mitigation by referring to it as 
reverse victimization, arguing defendant’s lack of criminal 
record was an aggravating factor, and suggesting that a history 
of child abuse should not be used as an excuse.  Defendant 
claimed the prosecution improperly argued evidence of his 
childhood abuse be discarded, rhetorically asking the jury 
whether any one of the 80,000 annual victims of child abuse in 
San Diego could rely on their abuse report should they later 
commit murder and be subject to the death penalty.  The fact 
that a prosecutor elects to rebut “the defense’s mitigating 
evidence does not mean the prosecutor erred or committed 
misconduct.”  “It is not misconduct to argue that ‘the evidence 
lacked the mitigating force the defendant’ ” hoped it would have.  
(People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1239.)  “The 
prosecution ‘ “has a legitimate interest in counteracting the 
mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put 
in . . . .” ’ ”  (People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 431.)  
Furthermore, the prosecution is permitted to question whether 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
110 
 
a defendant’s mitigating evidence carries much weight.  (People 
v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 390.) 
Defendant contends the prosecution improperly argued 
defendant’s lack of remorse could be considered in aggravation 
by arguing he would not have disposed of Gallego’s body in the 
way he had if he cared for her or her family.  The claim is 
meritless.  “Prosecutors are allowed to focus on a defendant’s 
lack of remorse in two ways.  First, ‘[c]onduct or statements at 
the scene of the crime demonstrating lack of remorse may be 
consider[ed] in aggravation as a circumstance of the capital 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).’  [Citations.]  Second, ‘[a] 
prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant’s lack of 
remorse, as relevant to the question of whether remorse is 
present as a mitigating circumstance, so long as the prosecutor 
does not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor.’ ”  
(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 356; see also People v. 
Pollock (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 1153, 1185.)  The prosecutor’s 
reference to defendant’s conduct at the scene of the crime was a 
permissible argument concerning defendant’s lack of remorse. 
Finally, defendant claims the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by commenting on his exercise of constitutional 
rights while Gallego was unable to do likewise.  Specifically, the 
prosecutor argued:  “There was no jury for her.  There was no 
judge in that apartment on Benicia Street.  There was no bailiff 
to maintain order.  She did not have an attorney go in there and 
argue for her life to [defendant].”  This claim lacks merit.  The 
prosecutor’s comments cannot be understood to improperly 
“urge the jury to return a death verdict because defendant 
exercised his constitutional rights and did not suggest that 
defendant should be given a greater penalty because he had a 
trial.”  (People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1207.)  Had the 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
111 
 
prosecutor made disparaging references to defendant’s exercise 
of his own constitutional rights, such an argument would have 
been improper.  But here, the prosecutor’s statements, though 
evocative and hyperbolic, did not “ ‘infect the trial with such 
unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of 
due process.’ ”  (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th 
at p. 306, quoting People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 711.)  
Defendant claims that any prosecutorial misconduct that 
occurred at other points in his trial cumulated, requiring 
reversal of his penalty.  Because we found no misconduct during 
any proceedings and likewise conclude no misconduct occurred 
during penalty phase closing argument, we reject defendant’s 
claim that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct 
warrants reversal.  
B. CALJIC No. 8.88  
Defendant objected to the use of the word “shall” in 
CALJIC No. 8.88, which — as given — instructed jurors, “If you 
conclude that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial 
in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that they 
warrant death instead of life without parole, you shall return a 
judgment of death.”  He claims use of the instruction violated 
his rights under the federal and state Constitutions because 
jurors could have mistakenly believed imposition of the death 
penalty was mandatory. 
Defendant raised his concern with use of the word “shall” 
during a discussion of the penalty phase instructions, and the 
trial court agreed to ameliorate defendant’s concern by adding 
his requested language that “[t]he death penalty is never 
mandatory.”  The jury was instructed with the modified CALJIC 
No. 8.88.  In closing argument, the prosecution explained that 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
112 
 
the word “shall” in the instruction meant that jurors could not 
decide during deliberation that they believed life in prison 
without the possibility of parole was a sentence worse than 
death.  Defendant argues that use of the word “shall” in the 
instruction might have misled jurors into believing the death 
sentence was mandatory, and the prosecutor’s statements 
during penalty phase closing argument increased that 
possibility. 
In People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, we concluded 
that instructing jurors with “the unadorned language of section 
190.3, that the jury ‘shall’ impose a sentence of death if it 
concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstance[],” “could confuse and mislead the jury 
regarding the manner in which the penalty should be 
determined.”   (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 255, 
256.)  This confusion could arise in one of two ways:  either the 
jury could believe it must mechanically weigh the various 
factors, or it might misunderstand “ ‘that our statutory scheme 
does not require any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, 
as a result of the weighing process, the juror personally 
determines that death is the appropriate penalty under all the 
circumstances.’ ”  (Id. at p. 256.)   
No danger of either sort of confusion could have arisen 
here.  Unlike in Brown, the jury was instructed that “the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not 
mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an 
imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any 
of them.  Each of you are free to assign whatever moral or 
sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the 
various factors you are permitted to consider.”  Unlike the 
concern raised in Brown, the jury was not misled into thinking 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
113 
 
the weighing process was mechanical, and jurors understood 
they possessed discretion.  (People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th 
at p. 256; see also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
419; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 640.)  The jury was 
instructed that if the aggravating factors were “so substantial” 
when compared against those in mitigation “that they 
warrant[ed] death instead of life without parole,” jurors “shall” 
return a death judgment, but — unlike in Brown — the jury was 
also expressly instructed that “[t]he death penalty is never 
mandatory.”  This clarification eliminated the concern we 
addressed in Brown, as the jury was instructed that it could find 
that a death judgment was warranted if it determined the 
aggravating circumstances were so substantial compared to 
mitigating circumstances, and also was instructed that 
imposition of a death sentence was never mandatory.  
Defendant’s argument that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by highlighting the instruction’s language in a 
misleading manner is similarly unavailing.  Although in pre-
Brown cases, i.e., those decided before CALJIC No. 8.88 was 
revised, it was necessary to examine the entirety of the record 
including counsel’s argument to determine whether the jury 
could have been misled, we need not do so here to conclude the 
jury understood imposition of death was not mandatory.  (See 
People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 256.)  The language of 
the instruction was not mandatory, and the addition of 
defendant’s requested sentence, that “[t]he death penalty is 
never mandatory,” ensured that was the case here.  And if we do 
examine the record, the prosecutor’s closing argument 
underscores that the jury could not have been misled:  The 
prosecutor explained that the word “shall” in CALJIC No. 8.88 
functioned to remind jurors that even if they personally believed 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
114 
 
that life without the possibility of parole was a sentence worse 
than death, they took an oath to uphold the law, which provides 
otherwise.  Thus, if they found aggravating factors outweighed 
those in mitigation, CALJIC No. 8.88 foreclosed any “debate 
back in that jury room about which punishment is worse.”  In 
this way, the prosecutor did not argue that the language was 
included in the instruction to render the penalty mandatory.  
Instead, the prosecutor relied on the instruction to argue to 
jurors that they took an oath to uphold the law and that even if 
they personally thought life imprisonment was worse than 
death, the law viewed death to be the worse penalty.    
We conclude no error arose from the jury instruction, and 
we likewise conclude the prosecution committed no misconduct 
by highlighting the word “shall” to clarify that death was the 
harsher penalty.  To the extent the prosecutor’s brief reference 
to the instruction engendered any confusion, the trial court’s 
instructions to the jury cured it.  (People v. Winbush, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 480 [“For a prosecutor’s remarks to constitute 
misconduct, it must appear reasonably likely in the context of 
the whole argument and instructions that ‘ “the jury understood 
or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or 
erroneous manner” ’ ”].)   
C. Issues Arising from Defendant’s Handwritten New 
 
Trial Motion Alleging Ineffective Assistance of 
 
Counsel  
Defendant submitted a handwritten document to the court 
during penalty phase deliberations claiming his attorney was 
ineffective.  The court filed the document, initially under seal 
and later — at defendant’s request — in the public record, along 
with a second, similar document defendant later submitted.  The 
court construed his first filing as a motion for new trial based on 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
115 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel and appointed the alternate 
public defender’s office to investigate whether there was merit 
to his motion.  Defendant now argues the trial court erred by 
appointing the alternate public defender without relieving trial 
counsel and by acceding to his request that his documents be 
publicly filed.  We conclude there was no error.   
On August 12, 2002, during penalty phase deliberations, 
defendant submitted a letter to the court complaining that 
appointed counsel performed inadequately.  The jury returned a 
verdict of death later that day.  Defendant’s letter was construed 
as a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and the court appointed the alternate public defender’s 
office “for the limited purpose of dealing with the . . . new trial 
issue.”  The trial court noted there may have been other grounds 
for a new trial motion but had defendant’s motion claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel “prove[n] successful, then [he 
would] go back to square 1.  If that [was] unsuccessful, then the 
public defender would still be free to deal with any other new 
trial motion issues in due course.”   
Defendant asked to be given certain discovery and 
evidentiary materials, and the court denied that request 
reminding him that the alternate public defender, Mike Dealy, 
had access to any necessary documents.  At one point during 
Dealy’s investigation, defendant complained that it appeared 
Dealy was more interested in protecting the alternate public 
defender’s office than him.  After inquiring whether defendant 
had more specific complaints and hearing he did not, the court 
suggested he cooperate with Dealy to avoid being foreclosed in 
the future from complaining about Dealy’s performance.  To the 
extent defendant sought to be heard in lieu of Dealy, the court 
concluded Dealy was not in a “conflicted situation” as a result of 
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116 
 
his representation and denied defendant’s request to represent 
himself.  The court provided Dealy with additional time to 
review materials related to defendant’s Marsden motions and 
the entirety of the trial transcripts and other materials.   
After doing so, Dealy informed the court he would not be 
filing a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Dealy explained the issues to be raised were more 
appropriately the subjects of appellate or habeas corpus claims, 
and that he did not want to “jeopardize [defendant’s] appeal 
rights . . . [or] miss anything” by filing a new trial motion.  Dealy 
assured the court he was not backing out of his representation.   
Finding Dealy’s refusal unusual, the trial court asked to 
hear from Dealy’s supervisor regarding whether the office could 
not do the work it was appointed to do.  Daniel Mangarin, chief 
trial deputy of the alternate public defender’s office, assured the 
court that Dealy was experienced and capable, and that Dealy’s 
decision not to file a motion for new trial was sound and in his 
client’s best interest.  Mangarin explained that the alternate 
public defender’s office had concluded there were no colorable 
ineffective assistance of counsel issues to raise in such a motion, 
but Dealy had been reluctant to state as much on the record and 
potentially impair defendant’s ability to raise postconviction 
claims.  The court released the alternate public defender’s office 
from the case, commenting:  “What I wanted, and I think what 
I got, is an independent evaluation of any potential [ineffective 
assistance of counsel] issues.  It appears, at this point, that I’ve 
had that not just by one but by two attorneys, two experienced 
defense attorneys, and they have expressed their professional 
view that there are no issues properly to be presented at this 
point.”   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
117 
 
Following 
Dealy’s 
release, 
defendant’s 
sealed, 
handwritten new trial motion was provided to appointed counsel 
and was subsequently unsealed and filed at defendant’s request.    
On February 24, 2003, before the hearing on defendant’s motion 
for modification of judgment, defendant submitted a second, 
lengthy handwritten document, which the court filed under seal 
and ordered served on all parties.  Defendant began reading the 
document into the record and requested that an unsealed copy 
of it be made part of the record, which the court granted.   
Defendant argues that appointing Dealy for the limited 
purpose of determining whether appointed trial counsel was 
ineffective ran afoul of this court’s decision in People v. Sanchez 
(2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 84, in which we explained that if a 
defendant makes a showing during a Marsden hearing that the 
right to counsel was substantially impaired, “substitute counsel 
must be appointed as attorney of record for all purposes.”  People 
v. Sanchez is, as the Attorney General notes, readily 
distinguishable as here there was no request to substitute 
counsel.  Instead, defendant submitted a handwritten note in 
which he merely asserted ineffective assistance as a basis for a 
new trial, and there was no showing that defendant’s right to 
counsel had been substantially impaired.  People v. Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at pages 912–915 is instructive although — 
like Sanchez — factually distinguishable from the instant case.   
There, in response to a defendant’s renewed request to 
substitute counsel, the trial court “grant[ed the] defendant’s 
request for independent counsel to represent him,” even though 
it had previously denied that request, explaining “it had 
reversed its earlier ruling ‘just to make sure every possible point 
will be brought forth that legally can be brought forth’ on 
defendant’s behalf.”  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
118 
 
p. 914.)  Guilt phase proceedings continued unabated over the 
defendant’s objection until independent counsel determined a 
Marsden motion was warranted.  (Id. at pp. 914–915.)   
“[W]e reject[ed] defendant’s assertion that the court erred 
when it allowed trial to continue while” the defendant’s motion 
to substitute counsel, which prompted the court to appoint 
independent counsel “was pending.  It is well settled that a court 
‘must promptly consider a motion for substitution of counsel 
when the right to effective assistance “would be substantially 
impaired” if his request were ignored.’  [Citations.]  Here, 
however, the record shows that . . . defendant did not seek the 
discharge of his attorneys but rather requested appointment of 
independent counsel to assist him in bringing such a motion.  
Because there was no pending Marsden motion, the court did 
not err in proceeding with trial.  (See People v. Majors (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 385, 411–413 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137] 
[the court did not err in failing to conduct a Marsden hearing 
before the penalty phase because no motion was before the court 
at that time].)”  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 916.)  
Similarly here, defendant did not move under Marsden for 
substitution of counsel, and the cessation of proceedings was not 
warranted.   
Defendant argues that the fact that separate counsel was 
appointed demonstrates defendant had an actual conflict of 
interest with his trial counsel.  He claims the appointment of 
separate counsel left him without representation as trial counsel 
continued to bear responsibility for his case while having his 
integrity attacked, defense counsel’s “hands [were] tied in 
respects that could not fully be explored on the record,” and 
defendant was left to act as his own attorney, submitting 
motions he claims Dealy should have prepared.  This claim lacks 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
119 
 
merit.  Separate counsel’s appointment did not signal an 
apparent conflict of interest; indeed, his role was to investigate 
whether there was merit to defendant’s contention that a new 
trial motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel was 
warranted.  Defendant’s right to seek new trial on grounds other 
than ineffective assistance of counsel was not impaired; the 
court took care to explain any new trial issues defendant’s trial 
counsel wished to raise could be addressed after the alternate 
public defender’s office completed its investigation.  And 
defendant did not act as his own attorney — indeed, when he 
sought to be heard instead of Dealy, the trial court reminded 
him that he was represented, and any requests for documents 
he made of the court directly should instead be conducted via 
counsel.   
Finally, defendant claims that the court erred by filing his 
handwritten documents because he was represented by counsel, 
and his pro se statements were written without benefit of his 
attorney, constituting a deprivation of the right to counsel.  
Defendant concedes no authority supports his argument, but 
urges us to conclude the trial court acted unreasonably by 
acceding to his requests to publicly file the documents.  There is 
no basis to do so.  As the Attorney General points out, the trial 
court made every effort to maintain the documents under seal.  
Before sentencing, defense counsel advised the documents 
remain sealed.  At defendant’s sentencing hearing, counsel 
explained it had advised defendant he would have an 
opportunity to address the court and should avail himself of it, 
noting he did not wish to interfere with defendant’s ability to 
raise issues with counsel’s performance.  Eventually, after 
defendant began reading one of his filings aloud — rendering it 
part of the public record — the court acquiesced to his desire 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
120 
 
that the documents be publicly filed.  Defendant fails to explain 
how counsel’s representation in this regard was inadequate, nor 
how the material was covered by the attorney-client privilege.  
Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by acceding to his 
request to publicly file the handwritten documents is 
unavailing.   
D. Motion for New Trial  
Defendant claims the trial court improperly denied his 
motion for a new penalty trial or reduction of his sentence to life 
without the possibility of parole, alleging the cumulative effect 
of several erroneous rulings resulted in his sentence.  
Specifically, defendant claims the trial court erred by allowing 
the prosecution to introduce numerous photographs of the 
victim while alive, autopsy photographs of the victim, testimony 
from one of the victim’s friends, rebuttal testimony from 
Chamberlain, and altered and sexually graphic images shown 
to her and the jury in connection with her testimony.  We find 
no error. 
“ ‘ “ ‘ “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new 
trial 
under 
a 
deferential 
abuse-of-discretion 
standard.”  
[Citations.]  “ ‘A trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is 
so completely within that court’s discretion that a reviewing 
court will not disturb the ruling absent a manifest and 
unmistakable abuse of that discretion.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. 
Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 957.)   
The trial court thoughtfully addressed each of defendant’s 
claims.  As to the photographs of the victim in life introduced 
during the penalty phase, the trial court confirmed it would 
“stand by the rulings” it had made to limit the number of 
photographs that could be introduced but reasoned the victim 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
121 
 
impact evidence was generally “authorized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.”  As to the autopsy photos of the victim and her hands, 
the court had excluded the “particularly upsetting” images 
under Evidence Code section 352 at the guilt phase but 
permitted the images’ introduction at the penalty phase as 
“circumstances of the crime,” confirming its continued view that 
the photos were admissible.   
The trial court disagreed with defendant’s argument that 
victim impact testimony must be limited to family members, 
finding that Gallego’s friend, Stepanof, appropriately testified 
about their relationship and about a thank you note the victim 
had written to her.  Finally, the court confirmed the probative 
value of Chamberlain’s testimony and the introduction of 
altered, sexually graphic photographs, explaining the evidence 
was relevant to demonstrate defendant’s capacity to “maintain 
a relatively normal relationship” while engaging in behavior 
indicative of his “dark side which resulted in his being here in 
this case.”   
After addressing each of defendant’s arguments, the court 
clarified its role to independently reweigh the evidence in ruling 
on a motion to modify the judgment.  It did so, explaining its 
view on each of “the statutory factors, [section 190.3, factors] (A) 
through (K), and outlining what — which of those factors I 
believe are important to this decision.”  It did so at some length, 
concluding that after “weighing all these factors, all of these, 
balances [sic] the horror and the calculated character of the 
crime against [defendant’s] lack of a prior record and the 
undeniable darkness of his childhood. . . . that the weight of the 
evidence supports the jury’s verdict.”  The court did not 
manifestly or unmistakably abuse its discretion in reaching 
these conclusions, and we will not upset the ruling on appeal.  
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
122 
 
(People v. Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 957; see People v. Zamudio 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 365 [video montage of images of victim 
while alive admissible penalty phase evidence]; People v. Caro, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 502 [no error admitting autopsy photo of 
victim]; People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1181 [no error 
admitting victim impact evidence from nonfamily member].) 
E. Death Penalty Is Not Arbitrary or Capriciously 
 
Imposed  
Defendant argues death was arbitrarily and capriciously 
imposed based on the county in which he was capitally charged, 
rendering his sentence and confinement unlawful under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution 
and 
under 
the 
California 
Constitution. 
As 
defendant 
acknowledges, we have previously rejected this contention, 
explaining that “ ‘[a] prosecutor’s discretion to select those 
eligible cases in which the death penalty is sought does not 
offend the federal or state Constitution.’ ”  (People v. Silveria 
and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 327.)  “Nor does such 
discretion ‘create a constitutionally impermissible risk of 
arbitrary outcomes that differ from county to county.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
Defendant unpersuasively argues that unequal charging 
standards among the state’s counties violates Bush v. Gore 
(2000) 531 U.S. 98, but in that case the equal protection 
challenge was expressly limited to the Florida vote recount 
process due to that issue’s complexity.  (Id. at p. 109; see also 
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 645 [rejecting contention 
that Bush v. Gore is violated by prosecutorial discretion to 
determine death-eligible cases.)   
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
123 
 
F. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute  
Defendant raises several challenges to California’s death 
penalty statutory scheme, which, as he concedes, we have 
previously rejected.  We decline his request to reconsider those 
conclusions, and we do not find persuasive his contention that 
the challenges, considered in the aggregate, compel a different 
conclusion. 
 
Section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad.  We have held 
that “California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  [Citation.]  Section 190.2, which 
sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death may 
be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 370; see 
also People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 155 (McDaniel).)  
Defendant next claims that his constitutional rights were 
violated by the arbitrary and capricious nature of section 190.3, 
factor (a).  We also “have repeatedly rejected the claim that 
section 190.3, factor (a), which requires the jury to consider as 
evidence in aggravation the circumstances of the capital crime, 
arbitrarily and capriciously imposes the death penalty under 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.”  (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 
989, 1013; see McDaniel, at p. 155.) 
Defendant argues the death penalty statutory scheme 
violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution because the jury need not find unanimously 
or beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors existed 
or substantially outweighed mitigating factors.  “ ‘[T]his court 
has repeatedly rejected arguments that the federal Constitution 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
124 
 
requires the penalty phase jury to make unanimous written 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors 
exist, that they outweigh the factors in mitigation, and that 
death is the appropriate penalty.’ ”  (People v. Steskal, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 379; see also McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 
p. 155.)  
“Likewise, we have held that the high court’s decision in 
Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92 . . . does not alter our 
conclusion under the federal Constitution or under the Sixth 
Amendment about the burden of proof or unanimity regarding 
aggravating circumstances, the weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating 
circumstances, 
or 
the 
ultimate 
penalty 
determination.  [Citations.]  And we have concluded that Hurst 
does not cause us to reconsider our holdings that imposition of 
the death penalty does not constitute an increased sentence 
within the meaning of Apprendi [v. New Jersey (2000)] 530 U.S. 
466, or that the imposition of the death penalty does not require 
factual findings within the meaning of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed. 2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428].  
[Citation] . . . [N]either Ring nor Hurst decided the standard of 
proof that applies to the ultimate weighing consideration.”  
(McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 155–156.) 
California’s death penalty statutory scheme does not 
categorically forbid intercase proportionality review, nor is such 
review a constitutionally required safeguard.  (People v. Linton 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1215; People v. Winbush, supra, 
2 Cal.5th 
at 
p. 490 
[“Intercase 
proportionality 
review, 
comparing defendant’s case to other murder cases to assess 
relative culpability, is not required by the due process, equal 
protection, fair trial, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses 
of the federal Constitution”].) 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
125 
 
The jury’s consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity 
as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) does not 
violate due process or the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments, or render the death sentence unreliable.  (People 
v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 695.) 
 
The use of adjectives in the list of mitigation factors, 
including “extreme” and “substantial,” does not prevent the 
jury’s consideration of mitigation in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  (People v. Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 
p. 519.) 
State law does not require jurors to be instructed that 
statutory mitigating factors be considered only in mitigation. 
(People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 123; People v. Duff (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 527, 570 [the trial court was not constitutionally 
required to instruct the jury that mitigating factors could be 
considered only as mitigating factors, and the absence of 
evidence supporting any factor should not be viewed as an 
aggravating factor].) 
California’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate the 
equal protection clause of the federal Constitution by providing 
significantly fewer procedural protections for person facing a 
death sentence than one charged with a noncapital crime.  
(People v. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 214.)  Capital defendants 
and noncapital defendants “ ‘are not similarly situated,’ ” and it 
is therefore “permissible for noncapital defendants to have more 
procedural protections than capital defendants.”  (People v. 
Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1017.)   
Finally, defendant contends that California’s “very broad 
death scheme” violates both international law and the federal 
PEOPLE v. PARKER 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
126 
 
Constitution.  We have previously rejected this contention, 
concluding, “ ‘[T]he imposition of the death penalty under 
California’s law does not violate international law or prevailing 
norms of decency.’ ”  (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 
1114, quoting People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 351.) 
DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
PETROU, J. *
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Parker 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S113962 
Date Filed:  May 19, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Michael D. Wellington 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Kathryn K. Andrews, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 
General, Holly D. Wilkens, Theodore Cropley, Quisteen S. Shum and 
Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Kathryn K. Andrews 
Attorney at Law 
3060 El Cerrito Plaza, PMB 356 
El Cerrito, CA 94530 
(510) 501-3756 
 
Kristen Ramirez 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9067