Title: FRANK S. CAMPBELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2006-SC-000931-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2009

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . FRANK S. CAMPBELL V. ,;VUyrrM:e Courf of 2006-SC-000931-MR RENDERED : MARCH 19, 2009 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ON APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE SAMUEL T. WRIGHT, III, JUDGE NO . 05-CR-00072 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING This is a matter of right appeal from ajudgment in which Appellant was convicted of complicity to second-degree assault, complicity to first-degree sexual abuse, and for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree ("PFO II") in connection with ajailhouse assault of a fellow inmate . Appellant argues that he was erroneously denied an instruction on complicity to fourth- degree assault, the sexual abuse instruction failed to contain the element of intent, the Commonwealth was improperly permitted to impeach its witness on a collateral issue, and photographs of the victim's injuries after surgery were improperly admitted . We reject all four claims of error and thus affirm . On December 2, 2004, Coy McClain was lodged in the Letcher County Jail with Michael Fugate, Robert Fields, David Lucas, and Appellant, Frank Campbell . All five men were assigned to Cell 121, which consisted of a common area surrounded by smaller lockdown cells . While incarcerated, McClain played cards with the other four men . One afternoon, McClain stepped into a lockdown cell to ask about playing cards again when Lucas slammed the door behind him, leaving him locked in a cell with Campbell, Fugate and Lucas . According to McClain, once locked in the cell, the three men began hitting him about the head, face, neck, and chest. At one point, Lucas pulled down McClain's pants and underwear and threatened to "f [him] in the hind end." While this was taking place, Campbell was sitting on a bunk with his penis exposed talking about McClain performing oral sex on him (Campbell) . Fugate and Lucas then shoved McClain's head towards Campbell's penis . McClain testified that the whole time he was screaming and struggling, but Fields was making noise outside the cell and turned the television set to a high volume . McClain also recounted that Fields was looking into the cell through a window, pointing and laughing at McClain . McClain testified that, although he did not actually perform oral sex on Campbell, his face came into contact with Campbell's penis. After more than three hours locked in the cell, McClain was able to leave the cell when control booth opened the door to the cell for an unrelated reason . However, according to McClain, the four men threatened to kill him if he tried to alert anyone about the assault and they prevented McClain from getting the guard's attention . Sometime after the assault, McClain wanted a cigarette and had to go back into the cell to retrieve his cigarettes that he had dropped. Again the door slammed behind him and this time Fields began beating him about the head and neck area. Fields also exposed his penis, rubbed it across McClain's face and tried to force McClain to perform oral sex on him . After four hours in the cell, McClain was able to exit the cell and inform the guards at the jail what had happened . McClain was taken to the hospital where x-rays were taken of his jaw. McClain was told by the hospital that nothing was broken and he was taken back to jail. After he was released from jail later that day, McClain immediately went to the office of the county attorney to report his assault . The next day, McClain went to both a local clinic and the emergency room at Jenkins Community Hospital. A CT scan of his face revealed a fractured mandible . McClain was referred to a specialist at the University of Kentucky . McClain ultimately had to have surgery on his jaw . On April 14, 2005, Campbell was indicted on charges of complicity to second-degree assault, criminal attempt to commit first-degree sodomy, and PFO II . Fields, Fugate and Lucas were likewise indicted for the assault and sexual abuse of McClain. After a jury trial on May 1-8, 2006, wherein all four defendants' cases were consolidated, Campbell was convicted of complicity to second-degree assault, complicity to first-degree sexual abuse, and PFO II, for which he was sentenced to a total of thirty (30) years. This appeal by Campbell followed . COMPLICITY TO FOURTH-DEGREE ASSAULT INSTRUCTION Campbell argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of complicity to fourth-degree assault. It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on every theory of the case deducible from the evidence. Fredline v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007) (citing Manning v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W .3d 610, 614 (Ky. 2000)) ; RCr 9.54(1) . While that duty includes instructions on any lesser included offenses which are supported by the evidence, that duty does not require an instruction on a theory with no evidentiary foundation . Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky.1998) (citing Barbour v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W .2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1992), overruled on other grounds bv McGinnis v. Commonwealth , 875 S.W.2d 518 (1994)) . "An instruction on a lesser- included offense is required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury could have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense." Baker v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Ky. 2003) (citing Clifford v. Commonwealth , 7 S.W.3d 371, 377-78 (Ky. 1999)) . A trial court's rulings on instructions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard . Ratliff v . Commonwealth , 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth , 134 S.W.3d 563, 569-70 (Ky. 2004)) . A person is guilty of second-degree assault if he intentionally causes a serious physical injury to another person . KRS 508.020(1)(a) . A person is guilty of fourth-degree assault if he intentionally or wantonly causes a physical injury to another person . KRS 508 .030(1)(a) . Under KRS 500.080, a "physical injury" is defined as "substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical condition." "Serious physical injury" is defined as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious or prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ ." KRS 500.080(15) . Dr. Richard Pollick, the surgeon who performed McClain's surgery, testified that when he first examined McClain, he could not close his jaws together, he had limiting opening of the mouth, the jaw area was swollen and painful, and his jaw made crunching and popping sounds when he moved it. A CT scan and Panorex x-ray revealed a fracture of the condyle, the hinge-like bone at the upper end of the jaw, and a severely dislocated jaw. On December 15, 2004, Dr. Pollick performed a 2 1/2-hour "open reduction" surgery to repair the jaw which required multiple incisions and a titanium plate and screws to secure the bone . Dr. Pollick testified that, even though he was reasonably pleased with the outcome of the surgery, due to the severity of the fracture and the complexity of the surgery, McClain was nevertheless at high risk for long term effects such as malocclusion, arthritis, facial paralysis, and jaw pain. McClain testified that it took him 14-15 months to recuperate from the surgery and that he may have to have one or two more surgeries . . When asked if he was now the same as before the injury, McClain testified that he was not, that his face is crooked, his jaw did not line up right, he could not eat properly and he was in constant pain . Campbell relies heavily on Rowe v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 216 (Ky.App . 2001), in support of his argument that McClain's injury was not shown to be, as a matter of law, a "serious physical injury." Thus, he was entitled to a complicity to fourth-degree assault instruction so that the jury could decide the seriousness of the injury . In Rowe, as in the present case, the victim was struck by the defendant in the mouth area. Rowe, 50 S.W.3d at 218 . The victim in Rowe suffered a chin fracture and lost four teeth. Id . at 218-19 . As a result, the teeth had to be reset using an arch bar. Id. The victim's treating physician testified that the prognosis was extremely good for the teeth and the healing of the fracture, although the doctor recognized that there was still the risk of losing teeth, infection, and nonunion of the fracture . Id . at 220 . While the victim testified to what he endured during the healing period, he did not testify to any lasting effects from the injury or surgery . Id. at 219 . The Court of Appeals held that because the proof established that the injury was treated successfully and there was no substantial risk of death, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on both second-degree and fourth-degree assault. Id. at 221 . There is no question here that the injury to McClain did not create a substantial risk of death. Thus, the issue is whether the proof was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that the injury caused "serious or prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." We believe that it was and that the case is distinguishable from Rowe. Dr. Pollick testified that the fracture and dislocation of McClain's jaw was so severe that it required a long and complex surgery involving metal plates and screws . Despite the surgery, Dr . Pollick stated that McClain was still at high risk for malocclusion, arthritis, facial paralysis, and jaw pain . Most significant was McClain's own testimony that as a result of the injury, his face is now crooked, he cannot eat properly, his jaw did not line up and he was in constant pain . Unlike the victim in Rowe, there was unrefuted evidence of the prolonged impairment of the function of McClain's jaw. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a complicity to fourth- degree assault instruction. OMISSION OF MENTAL STATE IN THE COMPLICITY TO SEXUAL ABUSE INSTRUCTION Campbell next argues that the trial court erred in submitting a complicity to first-degree sexual abuse instruction that omitted the requisite mental state of intent. Campbell concedes that this argument was not preserved and thus seeks review for palpable error under RCr 10 .26. A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of the party will be grounds for relief under RCr 10 .26 only if manifest injustice has resulted from the error. It has been held that because intent is an essential element to a complicity conviction under KRS 502.020(1), the complicity instructions must include the element of intent . Harper v . Commonwealth , 43 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Ky. 2001) . The complicity to first-degree sexual abuse instruction in the case at bar did not contain the requisite element of intent. However, the instructions contained the following definition of "complicity" : [A] person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other person to commit the offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or committing the offense . (Emphasis added) . In Crawley v. Commonwealth , 107 S.W .3d 197, 200 (Ky. 2003), this Court noted that "[o]ften, this element of intent is satisfied by giving a separate instruction defining complicity ." We went on to suggest a wording of an instruction defining complicity that would properly satisfy the element of intent . Id . The wording of the instruction defining complicity in the present case is identical to the language in our recommended instruction in Crawley. Hence, there was no omission of the element of intent from the instructions. IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS ON COLLATERAL ISSUE The Commonwealth called as a witness Chris Fields, a deputy jailer who was on duty the morning McClain was assaulted. Fields and the other deputy jailers who were called as witnesses testified that during the time that McClain claimed he was assaulted, they were not aware of any altercation in the jail and did not hear anyone screaming. On cross-examination, Fields was asked if the jail staffwould have heard an inmate screaming at the top of his lungs if the television was turned up full volume . Fields replied that the staff would have heard something and reacted . The various defense attorneys proceeded to ask multiple questions about jail policy, the configuration of the jail and the awareness of the jail staff in order to demonstrate that if an inmate was being attacked and making a lot of noise, the jail staff would have to see and/or hear what was going on in the cell . On re-direct, the Commonwealth started off its questioning thusly : Commonwealth : Now things can happen in the jail, would you agree or,disagree, that the people on duty don't always know about, would you agree with me? Fields : I'd disagree . Commonwealth : You disagree . Alright, let me give you a specific example. The prosecutor then asked Fields if he was aware of a recent incident at the Letcher County Jail wherein a group of totally different inmates made shanks out of a ceiling grate, overpowered a guard, stabbed the guard in the hand, and almost got control of the control booth . The defense attorneys objected and a bench conference ensued . The defense argued that the prior incident at the jail was irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that "the door has been opened wide" by the defense. The Commonwealth then proceeded to ask Fields a number of questions about the incident . Fields admitted that the incident had occurred at the jail and that the guards had been unaware of the inmates' actions in the cell. Campbell argues that the questioning about the prior jail incident constituted improper impeachment on a collateral issue . Under the collateral facts doctrine, a witness cannot be impeached on a matter that is irrelevant and collateral to issues in the case in which they are testifying . Simmons v . Small, 986 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Ky.App. 1998) . Relative to criminal cases, it has been held that "[a] prosecutor cannot make improper inquiries about collateral matters on cross-examination and then introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence in rebuttal under the guise of impeachment." Purcell v. Commonwealth , 149 S.W.3d 382, 397 (Ky. 2004) (citing Stansbury v. United States , 219 F.2d 165, 168-71 (5th Cir. 1955)) ; see also Bratcher v. Commonwealth , 151 S.W.3d 332, 354-55 (Ky. 2004) . "A matter is considered collateral if the matter itself is not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness." Simmons , 986 S.W.2d at 455 (quoting United States v. Beauchamp , 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1 st Cir. 1993)) (internal quotations omitted) . The central question here is whether the prior incident at the jail was a collateral matter or whether it was relevant in the case to establish a fact of consequence. We believe it was the latter . The defense theory of the case was that the assault on McClain did not happen . The questioning of Fields by the defense was intended to prove that the assault did not happen by showing that if such an assault had happened the way McClain claimed, the guards at the jail would definitely have heard or seen it. The Commonwealth's questioning of Fields on the prior escape attempt at the jail was relevant to refute this evidence that the jailers are always aware of what is going on in the inmates' cells . With everyone other than McClain testifying that they heard and saw nothing during the time McClain claimed he was assaulted in the jail, this evidence was especially important and relevant . We likewise cannot say that the evidence of the prior incident at the jail was more prejudicial than probative under the KRE 403 balancing test discussed in Purcell. Purcell, 149 S.W.3d at 398 (citing Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Handbook, note 14, § 4.05[3], at 276 (4th ed. LexisNexis 10 2003)) . The questioning by the Commonwealth made it clear that the prior jail incident did not involve any of the defendants in the present case, and it was not presented by the Commonwealth for any obfuscatory purpose . The prior jail incident was clearly brought up to demonstrate that the jailers were not always aware of the inmates' actions . in the jail. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to question Fields on the prior jail incident . PHOTOGRAPHS OF MCCLAIN Campbell's final argument is that photographs of McClain that were admitted at trial did not fairly and accurately represent McClain's injuries . The Commonwealth introduced into evidence eight photographs of McClain that were taken the day McClain was released from the hospital following his jaw surgery on December 15, 2004 . Campbell maintains that the photographs were not relevant under KRE 402 because they show a materially altered appearance of McClain after the surgery . Photos of the victim's injuries are generally admissible unless the condition of the body has been materially altered by an extraneous cause unrelated to the commission of the crime. Garland v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W .3d 529, 544 (Ky. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Lanham v. Commonwealth , 171 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. 2005) . As with the admission of other types of evidence, we shall review the trial court's decision on the admission of photographs only for an abuse of discretion . See Greene v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 76, 86 (Ky. 2006) . The eight photographs at issue show McClain with a swollen left jaw, some bruising around his left eye, and incision lines under his left ear . They are neither gruesome nor inflammatory. Although they do not depict McClain's appearance immediately after the assault, they show his condition after a surgery that was necessitated by the assault and resulting injuries . McClain testified that the photos were taken after the surgery, hence there was no misrepresentation about what they showed. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the post-operative photographs to be admitted into evidence . For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Letcher Circuit Court is affirmed . All sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Samuel N. Potter Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Jack Conway Attorney General Jeffrey Allan Cross Criminal Appellate Division Office of Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601