Title: Buhrman v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 070954
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2008

Present: All the Justices 
 
FRANCES GRACE BUHRMAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 070954 
 
   JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 April 18, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether a police officer had 
probable cause to arrest an individual for possession of 
marijuana after observing hand-rolled cigarettes in the 
individual’s vehicle. 
BACKGROUND 
On June 8, 2005, Officer C. M. Nelson of the Henrico County 
Police Department entered a convenience store located in a 
“high-drug” area of Henrico County.  While in the store, Officer 
Nelson noticed Frances Grace Buhrman (Buhrman), a customer in 
the store, having some difficulty maintaining her balance while 
walking and appearing to fall asleep while operating a frozen 
drink machine.  When Buhrman left the store and began walking 
toward her car, Officer Nelson became concerned that Buhrman 
might drive while intoxicated.  She then approached Buhrman and 
asked for her identification. 
Buhrman immediately complied with Officer Nelson’s request, 
opening the car door in order to retrieve her identification.  
At this time, Officer Nelson noticed hand-rolled cigarettes in 
 
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the interior door handle.  Based upon her training and 
experience, a “faint odor,” and the “coloration” of the 
cigarettes, Officer Nelson believed these cigarettes to be 
marijuana cigarettes, and immediately arrested Buhrman for 
possession of marijuana. 
A search incident to the arrest yielded cocaine, heroin, 
and marijuana in both Buhrman’s car and purse.  Thereafter, 
Buhrman was indicted by a Henrico County grand jury for 
possession of cocaine, possession of heroin, and possession of 
marijuana, second offense.  Buhrman filed a motion to suppress 
the physical evidence, which was denied by the trial court.  In 
a bench trial, Buhrman subsequently entered a conditional guilty 
plea on all three offenses and was sentenced to a period of 
twenty years and twelve months incarceration, with all but six 
months suspended. 
Buhrman appealed her convictions to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, asserting that the trial court erred in denying her 
motion to suppress the physical evidence because her arrest was 
not based upon probable cause.  One judge of the Court of 
Appeals denied Buhrman’s petition for appeal in a per curiam 
order dated February 21, 2007.  Buhrman v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 2105-06-2 (Feb. 21, 2007).  Buhrman’s petition for appeal 
was again denied by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals.  
 
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Buhrman v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2105-06-2 (April 26, 2007).  
We subsequently awarded Buhrman this appeal.  
DISCUSSION 
 
On appeal, Buhrman contends that Officer Nelson lacked the 
requisite probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution to make an arrest and, thus, that 
evidence of the cocaine, heroin, and marijuana seized by Officer 
Nelson should have been suppressed as the fruit of an 
unconstitutional search.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 485 (1963).  This Court gives deference to the 
historical facts determined by the trial court, but we apply a 
de novo standard of review when considering whether the legal 
standard of probable cause was correctly applied by the trial 
court to the historical facts.  Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 
414, 419, 620 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2005); Ornelas v. United States, 
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).  
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”  What the Fourth Amendment prohibits “is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”  
 
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
A search is considered reasonable when it is either 
supported by a warrant, or when an exception to the warrant 
requirement has been met.  “One of the most frequently utilized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement is the search incident to 
an arrest.”  1 Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the 
Accused § 3:22, at 494 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1995).  See also 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).  Pertinent to the 
present case, under this exception an officer who makes an 
arrest supported by probable cause may search the entire 
passenger compartment of an arrestee’s nearby automobile.  
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004). 
In the present case, Buhrman does not challenge the scope 
of the search conducted by Officer Nelson.  The sole issue 
raised is whether Officer Nelson had probable cause to arrest 
Buhrman and, thus, perform the search incident to arrest.  We 
turn now to determine that issue. 
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 284 S.E.2d 833 
(1981), we held that “probable cause exists when the facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he 
has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an 
offense has been or is being committed.”  Id. at 820, 284 S.E.2d 
 
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at 836 (citations omitted).  Therefore, in determining whether 
an officer had sufficient probable cause to make an arrest, 
courts should focus upon “what the totality of the circumstances 
meant to police officers trained in analyzing the observed 
conduct for purposes of crime control.”  Hollis v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976).  
In Brown, we considered whether an officer had probable 
cause to make an arrest in circumstances factually similar to 
those presented in this case.  In that case, a police officer 
patrolling a high-crime area observed the defendant asleep in 
the passenger seat of a vehicle while holding a partially-
burned, hand-rolled cigarette.  Id. at 417, 620 S.E.2d at 761.  
Based solely upon this observation, the officer woke the 
defendant, asked him to step out of the vehicle, and arrested 
him.  Id.  A subsequent search of the defendant’s person 
produced evidence containing traces of cocaine and heroin.  Id.  
The defendant was ultimately charged with, and convicted of 
possession of both substances.  Id. 
This Court reversed Brown’s convictions, holding that the 
officer did not have probable cause to arrest and search the 
defendant.  Id. at 422, 620 S.E.2d at 764.  In doing so, we 
observed that probable cause cannot be established “solely on 
the observation of material which can be used for legitimate 
purposes, even though the experience of an officer indicates 
 
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that such material is often used for illegitimate purposes.” Id. 
at 420-21, 620 S.E.2d at 763.  Rather, “such observations must 
be combined with some other circumstance indicating [the 
suspected] criminal activity.”  Id. at 421, 620 S.E.2d at 763. 
 
We find no meaningful distinction between the circumstances 
presented by this case and those at issue in Brown.  Officer 
Nelson conceded that her observation of the hand-rolled 
cigarettes was the basis for her belief that she had probable 
cause to arrest Buhrman for possession of marijuana.  To 
distinguish Brown, the Commonwealth notes that Officer Nelson 
also observed Buhrman acting “intoxicated” and “suspicious.”  
Evidence of intoxication and vaguely “suspicious” actions, 
without more, does not suffice to indicate that hand-rolled 
cigarette materials are being used for the illegitimate purpose 
of smoking marijuana, as opposed to the legitimate purpose of 
smoking tobacco.  Furthermore, behaving in an intoxicated and 
suspicious manner is not so overwhelmingly correlated with the 
use of marijuana so as to exclude the reasonable inference that 
such behaviors are the result of the use of a legal substance 
such as alcohol. 
Furthermore, no other circumstances corroborated the 
officer’s belief that the hand-rolled cigarettes were being used 
for an illegitimate purpose.  Officer Nelson did not testify 
that Buhrman tried to hide the hand-rolled cigarettes, acted 
 
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elusively, or appeared nervous – all of which could support a 
reasonable belief of criminal activity.  Cf. Brown, 270 Va. at 
419, 620 S.E.2d at 762 (finding that the “dispersal” at the 
sight of police “could indicate criminal activity under some 
circumstances”); Hollis, 216 Va. at 877, 223 S.E.2d at 889 
(finding probable cause where the defendant took furtive actions 
to hide hand-rolled cigarettes from the police); United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1980) (indicating that 
nervous behavior in the presence of law enforcement officers may 
be a factor in determining probable cause).  Likewise, the 
Commonwealth’s reliance upon Officer Nelson detecting an 
unidentified “faint odor” is similarly insufficient to create 
probable cause to arrest an individual for possession of 
marijuana in this case.  The officer did not testify that the 
odor which she smelled was indicative of marijuana and never 
identified the source of the odor.  Additionally, Officer Nelson 
did not testify to any distinction she may have drawn between 
the “coloration” of the hand-rolled cigarettes here and what she 
would have expected to observe in cigarettes that contain 
tobacco. 
As the Supreme Court remarked in Terry v. Ohio, “[n]o right 
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
 
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interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.”  392 U.S. at 9 (citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).  Yet, “[b]ecause the 
strongest advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are frequently 
criminals, it is easy to forget that our interpretations of such 
rights apply to the innocent and the guilty alike.”  United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Though we understand the daily challenges faced by 
members of the law enforcement community, courts must remain 
vigilant to “not allow our zeal for effective law enforcement to 
blind us to the peril to our free society that lies in [our] 
disregard of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.”  
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 513 (1983) (Brennan, J. 
concurring). 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that Officer Nelson lacked probable cause, under 
the totality of the circumstances, to arrest Buhrman for 
possession of marijuana.  Thus, the trial court erred in denying 
Buhrman’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result 
of the search incident to that arrest.  Because the evidence 
seized from Buhrman should have been suppressed, there would be 
insufficient evidence to sustain Buhrman’s convictions for 
possession of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in any retrial.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
 
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Appeals, vacate Buhrman’s convictions, and dismiss the 
indictments against her. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and JUSTICE GOODWYN 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
The majority states “[w]e find no meaningful distinction 
between the circumstances presented by this case and those at 
issue in Brown.” I do find meaningful distinctions and 
respectfully dissent. 
 
Officer Nelson observed Buhrman in a convenience store and 
reasonably believed that she was intoxicated.  Buhrman was 
having difficulty maintaining her balance and appeared to fall 
asleep while operating a drink machine in the store.  Officer 
Nelson was concerned that Buhrman might drive from the store in 
an intoxicated state and approached her in the parking lot and 
asked for identification.  When Buhrman opened her car door to 
get her identification, Officer Nelson saw hand-rolled 
cigarettes on the interior of the “door handle.” Based upon her 
training and experience, the “coloration” of the cigarettes, the 
hand-rolled nature of the cigarettes, the lack of any smell of 
alcoholic beverages, the “faint odor” detected upon proximity to 
the cigarettes, and Buhrman’s appearance of intoxication, 
Officer Nelson reasonably concluded that the hand-rolled 
cigarettes contained marijuana.  
 
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In this case, it is important to remember that we are not 
dealing with certainties or even a standard requiring proof 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather, we must consider 
probabilities. 
The legal standard of probable cause, as the 
term suggests, relates to probabilities that 
are based upon the factual and practical 
considerations in everyday life as perceived by 
reasonable and prudent persons.  The presence 
or absence of probable cause is not to be 
examined from the perspective of a legal 
technician.  Rather, probable cause exists when 
the facts and circumstances within the 
officer’s knowledge, and of which he has 
reasonably trustworthy information, alone are 
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 
caution to believe that an offense has been or 
is being committed.  Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Schaum v. 
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 500, 211 S.E.2d 73, 
75 (1975).  In order to ascertain whether 
probable cause exists, courts will focus upon 
“what the totality of the circumstances meant 
to police officers trained in analyzing the 
observed conduct for purposes of crime 
control.”  Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 
877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976). 
 
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820-21, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 
(1981). 
 
The error of the majority is vividly illustrated by the 
language used.  The majority states, “behaving in an intoxicated 
and suspicious manner is not so overwhelmingly correlated with 
the use of marijuana so as to exclude the reasonable inference 
that such behaviors are the result of the use of a legal 
substance such as alcohol.” 
 
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On appellate review, we are to consider the totality of the 
circumstances and not substitute our judgment for that of a 
trained police officer.  Here, the officer observed behavior 
reasonably associated with intoxication, the absence of alcohol 
and the presence of hand-rolled cigarettes with peculiar color 
and odor. 
 
The majority employs language that reveals its use of an 
incorrect standard.  Requiring the Commonwealth to “exclude the 
reasonable inference” invokes language we use to measure the 
sufficiency of the evidence for the determination of guilt or 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003).  But the 
standard here is probable cause. 
 
This case has far more evidence to support Officer Nelson’s 
determination of probable cause to arrest Buhrman than was 
present in Brown. I would affirm the Order of the Court of 
Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court.