Title: FRANK v BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12730
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 1975

No. 12730 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE S T A T E O F M O N T A N A 1975 L E L A N D J. F R A N K , Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs - B U R L I N G T O N N O R T H E R N , INC., Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson & Gallagher, Billings, Montana Jack Ramirez argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Michael J. Whalen argued, Billings, Montana - ' t i c I sys Filed:. ~- - Submitted: May 8, 1975 Decided J ~ L 1 8 '975 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of the court. This is an appeal from a judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f Leland J. Frank entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, on a jury verdict i n the amount of $20,000. P l a i n t i f f brought the action t o recover damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s and property damage sustained when he drove h i s 1964 pickup truck i n t o the s i d e of t h e 24th c a r of a f r e i g h t t r a i n . P l a i n t i f f alleged negligence on the p a r t of the r a i l r o a d and the r a i l r o a d raised the defense of contributory negligence. A t t h e close of p l a i n t i f f 's case, and a t the close of a l l evidence, defendant moved f o r a directed verdict on the grounds t h a t : (a) a s a matter of l a w negligence had not been proven, and (b) a s a matter of law p l a i n t i f f was contributorily negligent. Motions f o r a new t r i a l and judgment notwithstanding t h e verdict, were denied. The accident occurred a t a r a i l r o a d crossing on Railroad Street i n the c i t y of Laurel, Montana. It occurred on a b i t t e r l y cold e a r l y morning of December 9, 1972, sometime between 12:30 and 2:00 a.m. Railroad S t r e e t runs e a s t and west, while t h e r a i l - road track i n t e r s e c t s a t a northeast-southwest angle. The t r a i n was moving northerly; t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s vehicle northeasterly. Railroad Street i n the v i c i n i t y of the crossing has a s l i g h t , gradual i n c l i n e s t a r t i n g approximately 400 f e e t west of the crossing. The speed l i m i t is 25 miles per hour. The s t r e e t a t t h a t time was covered with packed snow and ice. The f i e l d s on e i t h e r side of the s t r e e t were a l s o snow covered. In the last 600 f e e t west of the crossing, two s t r e e t l i g h t s a r e located along t h e north s i d e of Railroad Street. A mercury vapor l i g h t is located a t t h e e a s t end of Railroad Street. Another s t r e e t l i g h t i s located on a telephone pole approximately ten t o f i f t e e n f e e t from the northeast c o m e r of the crossing. That l i g h t was high enough t o be v i s i b l e t o a motorist. It was lighted the night of the accident. A s t o obstructions, p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d there were so many obstacles t h a t he could not see the t r a i n u n t i l he got r i g h t t o it. However, t h i s testimony is t o t a l l y refuted by evidence and the exhibits On the afternoon preceding t h e accident p l a i n t i f f had driven t o Billings with h i s brother-in-law; he t e s t i f i e d he spent two hours i n ~ i n y ' s Tavern and had two glasses of beer. H e returned t o h i s farm near Park City a t about 6:00 p.m. He l e f t h i s farm a t about 7:30 p.m. and went t o h i s father-in-law's tavern where he stayed u n t i l 11:30 p.m.; during which time he admitted drinking seven glasses of beer. He then returned t o the home of h i s brother- in-law i n Laurel, where he remained f o r a period of time before leaving t o drive t o t h e Owl Cafe. P l a i n t i f f turned onto Railroad S t r e e t from Yellowstone Avenue about 600 f e e t west of the crossing and proceeded towards the crossing a t 15 t o 25 miles per hour with h i s headlights on low beam. H e did not observe the t r a i n crossing i n f r o n t of him u n t i l he was 30 f e e t from it. H e applied h i s brakes, but h i t a yellow f r e i g h t car which was the 24th c a r from the f r o n t of the t r a i n . After the accident, p l a i n t i f f walked t o the home of h i s brother-in-law and reported it t o the police a t 2:00 a.m. The Railroad appeals and s e t s f o r t h four issues, but only one combined issue i s necessary f o r disposition of the case. That i s s u e is--- Was there any credible evidence t o sustain the verdict t h a t defendant was negligent and whether, i n any event, p l a i n t i f f was contributorily negligent a s a matter of law? This Court has consistently held t h a t ordinarily a t r a i n moving over a crossing i s e f f e c t i v e and adequate warning of i t s presence, i n and of i t s e l f , without additional warning signals. Jawella v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 101 Mont. 102, 113, 53 P.2d 446; Incret v. Chicago, M.St.P. & P.R.Co., 107 Mont. 394, 86 P.2d 12; Broberg v. Nor.Pac.Ry.Co., 120 Mont. 280, 289, 182 P.2d 851; Dimich v. Northern Pac. Ry., 136 Mont. 485, 348 P.2d 786; Hernandez v. C.B. & Q. RR.Co., 144 Mont. 585, 398 P.2d 953. In Montana t h e only exception t o the general r u l e recognized by these cases is t h a t a t a crossing where, because of peculiar and unusual f a c t s and circumstances and owing t o some peculiar environ- ment rendering the s i t u a t i o n unusually hazardous, the r a i l r o a d company may be negligent i n f a i l i n g t o provide additional safe- guards o r warnings other than the presence of the t r a i n standing on o r passing over the crossing. In Broberg t h e Court described the exception i n t h i s language : ''While it i s the general r u l e t h a t it i s not negligence on the p a r t of a railway company i n f a i l i n g t o blow the locomotive whistle, r i n g t h e b e l l , o r t o place warning l i g h t s along the t r a i n where it has stopped on an ordinary crossing o r where it i s slowly moving thereover, o r t o provide a flagman t o warn the t r a f f i c . such f a i l u r e ky, under peculiar f a c t s and circumsfances o r under e c u l i a r environments rendering the s i t u a t i o n unusually fazardous, render t h e company l i a b l e f o r negligence. * * * 1 1 The question a s t o whether o r not t h e crossing involved i n t h i s action was extrahazardous resolves i t s e l f , under t h e r u l e approved by t h i s court i n the Jarvella case t o t h i s : Were there present f o r the determination of the jury any peculiar o r unusual f a c t s and circumstances o r any peculiar environment rendering the s i t u a t i o n unusually hazardous. I I Here, the question i s r e a l l y whether there was any sub- s t a n t i a l credible evidence of any peculiar environment rendering t h e s i t u a t i o n unusually hazardous. In Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 283, 435 P.2d 263, t h i s Court explained substantial credible evidence i n t h i s language: I I Substantial credible evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant submission of the i s s u e of contributory negligence t o the jury is governed by the same r u l e s t h a t a r e used i n determining the sufficiency of the evidence t o support a verdict on t h a t issue. Substantial credible evidence i n t h a t regard simply means such evidence a s w i l l convince reasonable men and on which such men may not reasonably d i f f e r as t o whether it establishes the verdict on t h a t issue; i f a l l reasonable men must conclude t h a t the evidence does not e s t a b l i s h the verdict on t h a t issue, then i t is not A s u b s t a n t i a l evidence.. . [Citing cases) A coroi story of a witness highly improbable o r incredible, o r A s indicated i n Graham, whenever the surrounding circum- stances make the story of witnesses highly improbable o r incredible, o r whenever t h e i r testimony i s inherently impossible, such evidence i s not "substantial1'. The leading case supporting t h i s principle i s Casey v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 56, 66-69, 198 P. 141, followed and c i t e d i n numerous decisions of t h i s Court. I t s language i s p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate here: "Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f i n s i s t t h a t the evidence i s conflicting, and, since the jury found upon the issues and the lower court denied a new t r i a l , t h i s court i s without authority t o i n t e r f e r e but the 1 principal c o n f l i c t s a r i s e upon the p l a i n t i f f s own testimony, r a t h e r than i n the testimony of opposing witnesses. Of the testimony of the witnesses f o r defendant it i s s u f f i c i e n t t o say t h a t i t i s harmonious, and reasonable and consistent with physical f a c t s , but the jury disregarded it altogether and must have based the verdict solely upon the surmises, the guesses and estimates of t h e p l a i n t i f f . "It i s the general r u l e t h a t an order denying a new t r i a l upon the ground t h a t the evidence i s in- s u f f i c i e n t t o sustain the verdict w i l l not be reversed where the evidence i s conflicting, i f there i s some evidence t o support the verdict; but the r u l e has i t s foundation i n the assumption t h a t the c o n f l i c t i s r e a l and the supporting evidence i s substantial. "1n Driscoll v. Market Street Cable Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 553, 33 Am.St.Rep.2031 32 Pac. 591, the supreme court of California said: When a jury catches a t a semblance o r pretense of evidence f o r the purpose of somewhat equalizing financial conditions by taking money away from one party and giving it t o the other without l e g a l cause, the t r i a l judge should,without hesitation, s e t the verdict aside; and i n the event of h i s not doing so, t h i s court w i l l grant a new t r i a l . 1 11 Primarily, it i s the province of the jury t o pass upon the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses and the weight t o be given t o t h e i r testimony, but the determination of the jury is not conclusive. Insufficiency of the evidence i s a statutory ground f o r a motion f o r a new t r i a l * * * and i n passing upon the motion it i s the duty of the t r i a l court t o weigh the evidence, and, i f it is not s u f f i c i e n t t o sustain the verdict, a new t r i a l should be ordered (Mullen v. City of Butte, 37 Mont. 183, 95 Pac. 597), and, i f it i s n o t , the appellate court must then determine whether there i s substantial evidence t o warrant the verdict and w i l l not abdicate i t s authority i n favor of the jury's findings. Jurors a r e subject t o the ordinary i n f i r m i t i e s of human nature, and cases a r e sometimes presented wherein j u s t i c e would be denied i f the courts f a i l e d t o i n t e r f e r e . " W e a r e not unmindful of the advantageous position occupied by t h e jury and t h e lower court i n having the w,tnesses before them, i n hearing them t e s t i f y , and observing t h e i r demeanor; but, though the appear- ance of a witness is an a i d i n judging h i s c r e d i b i l i t y , it is not an i n f a l l i b l e one. Dissimulation i s often d i f f i c u l t t o detect, and falsehood is often clothed i n the garb of truth. Whenever t h e surrounding circum- stances make t h e story of a witness highly improbable o r incredible, o r whenever the testimony is inherently impossible, a new t r i a l should be ordered. Physical conditions may point so unerringly t o the t r u t h a s t o leave no room f o r a contrary conclusion based on reason o r common sense, and under such circumstances the physical f a c t s a r e not affected by sworn testimony which i n mere words c o n f l i c t s with them. * * * "The corollary of t h e f i r s t r u l e above i s s t a t e d cogently i n McAllister v. McDonald, 40 Mont. 375, 106 Pac. 882. It was there held t h a t the supreme court i s not authorized t o affirm an order denying a new t r i a l : (a) Where the evidence tending t o support the verdict i s an isolated statement of a witness which i s i n c o n f l i c t with h i s other statements; o r (b) when t h e verdict i s contrary t o the great weight of the evidence, and the evidence which tends t o sustain the verdict i s impeached o r rendered i m - probable by conceded f a c t s , o r is against a l l reason- able inferences o r probabilities of the case; or (c) when the verdict, though supported by some evidence, i s so u t t e r l y a t variance with the r e a l and unex- plained f a c t s t h a t the court can say t h a t i t i s c l e a r l y wrong. "The r u l e has been stated repeatedly i n t h i s j u r i s - diction t h a t a court may r e j e c t the most positive testimony, though the witness be not discredited by d i r e c t evidence impeaching him o r contradicting h i s statements. The inherent improbability of h i s story may deny a l l claims t o respect. * * * The credulity of courts i s not t o be deemed commensurate with the f a c i l i t y o r vehemence with which a witness swears. I It i s a wild conceit t h a t any court of j u s t i c e is bound by mere swearing. It i s swearing creditably I t h a t is t o conclude its judgment. [Citations omitted]. I1 In his testimony given upon the trial of this case the plaintiff contradicted himself repeatedly; con- tradicted the allegations of his verified complaint; was contradicted by his previous statements, by the physical facts, by every one of defendant's witnesses, and by his own witness, Marchington. Some of his declarations are toq transparent to be entitled to credence, are improbable upon any supposition short of actual mental imbecility. "Plaintiff contented himself with giving estimates and demonstrated that he was without capacity for judging distances, or deliberately colored his testi- mony to meet the supposed exigencies of his case. I I (Emphasis supplied.) The most recent case concerning the subject of extra- hazardous crossings is Hernandez v . C . B . & Q. RR.Co., 144 Mont. 585, 398 P.2d 953. That case is controlling here. In Hernandez the Court impliedly criticized its previous decisions in Broberg and Dimich, indicating that some of the factors considered in those cases would not necessarily be considered again in deter- mining whether an extrahazardous crossing existed. In Hernandez, the plaintiff's decedent was a passenger in an automobile which struck the side of a moving freight train at a railroad crossing near Hardin. The crossing was a spur line which was used season- ally during the sugar beet harvest. The train was made up of thirty dark colored, rust-red cars; the automobile struck the 11 27th car of the train. The accident occurred on an unusually dark'' night. The train was moving about ten miles per hour, at the time of the accident and the driver of decedent's car observed the train at a distance of about 200 yards but was un- able to stop. At the conclusion of evidence, the district court granted defendant's motion for dismissal and this Court affirmed. In Hernandez, the speed limit for traffic approaching the crossing was 55 miles per hour. Here, the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The distances required for unobstructed view of the tracks can be reduced accordingly. Photographs show, without question, that the view of the crossbuck, the crossing, and the track, was completely unobstructed f o r the l a s t several hundred f e e t f o r eastbound t r a f f i c approaching the crossing. I n addition, Railroad S t r e e t i s p r a c t i c a l l y level, and the s l i g h t i n c l i n e s t a r t s approximately 400 f e e t west of the crossing. Once p l a i n t i f f ' s vehicle was within 400 f e e t of the crossing, h i s vehicle was on the i n c l i n e and h i s l i g h t s would show along the i n c l i n e i n the same manner a s i f the s t r e e t was perfectly level. Furthermore, there i s even more reason i n t h i s case than i n Hernandez f o r a finding a s a matter of law t h a t an extrahazardous crossing did not e x i s t . In Hernandez, the surface of the road w a s blacktop and t h e p l a i n t i f f struck a dark, r u s t colored beet car. I n addition, there was not a s t r e e t l i g h t a t the crossing i n Hernandez, a s i n the i n s t a n t case. Thus, there was not substantial credible evidence t o support t h e jury verdict. Additionally, here the p l a i n t i f f was contributorily neg- l i g e n t a s a matter of law. H e did not observe the t r a i n u n t i l he was 30 f e e t away, although he t e s t i f i e d h i s l i g h t s were i n good condition. H e did not observe the crossbuck, although h i s view was completely unobstructed. H e c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o keep a proper lookout. The condition of t h e s t r e e t , the time of day, and other factors show c l e a r l y t h a t p l a i n t i f f was not driving i n a prudent manner. He was c i t e d f o r driving too f a s t f o r e x i s t i n g conditions. Although he denied having entered a g u i l t y plea t o t h a t charge, the records reveal t h a t a plea of g u i l t y was made. But, even without t h a t , the f a c t s reveal p l a i n t i f f g u i l t y of contributory negligence as a m a t t e r of law. Monforton v. Northern Pacific Ry., 138 Mont. 191, 355 P.2d 501. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s reversed and the cause dismissed. /- -- W e concur: , , Justices. 1