Title: Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001028
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1028 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Harvey F. Jacque and Lois C. Jacque, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc 
 
JUDGE: 
Allan J. Deehr 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs 
by Patrick A. Dewane, Jr. And Dewane, Dewane, Kummer, Lambert & 
Fox, Manitowoc and oral argument by Patrick A. Dewane, Jr. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by 
Mark J. Mingo, Daniel L. Zitzer and Mingo & Yankala, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Mark Mingo. 
 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1028 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Harvey F. Jacque and Lois C. Jacque, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded with directions. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  Steenberg Homes had a mobile 
home to deliver.  Unfortunately for Harvey and Lois Jacque (the 
Jacques), the easiest route of delivery was across their land.  
Despite adamant protests by the Jacques, Steenberg plowed a path 
through the Jacques’ snow-covered field and via that path, 
delivered the mobile home.  Consequently, the Jacques sued 
Steenberg Homes for intentional trespass.  At trial, Steenberg 
Homes conceded the intentional trespass, but argued that no 
compensatory damages had been proved, and that punitive damages 
could not be awarded without compensatory damages.  Although the 
jury awarded the Jacques $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in 
punitive damages, the circuit court set aside the jury’s award 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
2 
of $100,000.  The court of appeals affirmed, reluctantly 
concluding that it could not reinstate the punitive damages 
because it was bound by precedent establishing that an award of 
nominal damages will not sustain a punitive damage award.  We 
conclude 
that 
when 
nominal 
damages 
are 
awarded 
for 
an 
intentional trespass to land, punitive damages may, in the 
discretion of the jury, be awarded.  We further conclude that 
the $100,000 awarded by the jury is not excessive.  Accordingly, 
we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the punitive damage 
award. 
I. 
¶2 
The relevant facts follow.  Plaintiffs, Lois and 
Harvey Jacques, are an elderly couple, now retired from farming, 
who own roughly 170 acres near Wilke’s Lake in the town of 
Schleswig.  The defendant, Steenberg Homes, Inc. (Steenberg), is 
in the business of selling mobile homes.  In the fall of 1993, a 
neighbor of the Jacques purchased a mobile home from Steenberg. 
 Delivery of the mobile home was included in the sales price.   
¶3 
Steenberg determined that the easiest route to deliver 
the mobile home was across the Jacques’ land.  Steenberg 
preferred transporting the home across the Jacques’ land because 
the only alternative was a private road which was covered in up 
to seven feet of snow and contained a sharp curve which would 
require sets of “rollers” to be used when maneuvering the home 
around the curve.  Steenberg asked the Jacques on several 
separate occasions whether it could move the home across the 
Jacques’ farm field.  The Jacques refused.  The Jacques were 
sensitive about allowing others on their land because they had 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
3 
lost property valued at over $10,000 to other neighbors in an 
adverse possession action in the mid-1980’s.  Despite repeated 
refusals from the Jacques, Steenberg decided to sell the mobile 
home, which was to be used as a summer cottage, and delivered it 
on February 15, 1994. 
¶4 
On the morning of delivery, Mr. Jacque observed the 
mobile home parked on the corner of the town road adjacent to 
his property.  He decided to find out where the movers planned 
to take the home.  The movers, who were Steenberg employees, 
showed Mr. Jacque the path they planned to take with the mobile 
home to reach the neighbor’s lot.  The path cut across the 
Jacques’ land.  Mr. Jacque informed the movers that it was the 
Jacques’ land they were planning to cross and that Steenberg did 
not have permission to cross their land.  He told them that 
Steenberg had been refused permission to cross the Jacques’ 
land. 
¶5 
One of Steenberg’s employees called the assistant 
manager, who then came out to the Jacques’ home.  In the 
meantime, the Jacques called and asked some of their neighbors 
and the town chairman to come over immediately.  Once everyone 
was present, the Jacques showed the assistant manager an aerial 
map and plat book of the township to prove their ownership of 
the land, and reiterated their demand that the home not be moved 
across their land.   
¶6 
At that point, the assistant manager asked Mr. Jacque 
how much money it would take to get permission.  Mr. Jacque 
responded that it was not a question of money; the Jacques just 
did not want Steenberg to cross their land.  Mr. Jacque 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
4 
testified that he told Steenberg to “[F]ollow the road, that is 
what the road is for.”  Steenberg employees left the meeting 
without permission to cross the land. 
¶7 
At trial, one of Steenberg’s employees testified that, 
upon coming out of the Jacques’ home, the assistant manager 
stated:  “I don’t give a ---- what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get 
the home in there any way you can.”  The other Steenberg 
employee confirmed this testimony and further testified that the 
assistant manager told him to park the company truck in such a 
way that no one could get down the town road to see the route 
the employees were taking with the home.  The assistant manager 
denied giving these instructions, and Steenberg argued that the 
road was blocked for safety reasons. 
¶8 
The employees, after beginning down the private road, 
ultimately used a “bobcat” to cut a path through the Jacques’ 
snow-covered field and hauled the home across the Jacques’ land 
to the neighbor’s lot.  One employee testified that upon 
returning to the office and informing the assistant manager that 
they had gone across the field, the assistant manager reacted by 
giggling and laughing.  The other employee confirmed this 
testimony.  The assistant manager disputed this testimony. 
¶9 
When a neighbor informed the Jacques that Steenberg 
had, in fact, moved the mobile home across the Jacques’ land, 
Mr. Jacque called the Manitowoc County Sheriff’s Department.  
After interviewing the parties and observing the scene, an 
officer from the sheriff’s department issued a $30 citation to 
Steenberg’s assistant manager. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
5 
¶10 The Jacques commenced an intentional tort action in 
Manitowoc County Circuit Court, Judge Allan J. Deehr presiding, 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages from Steenberg.  The 
case was tried before a jury on December 1, 1994.  At the 
completion of the Jacques’ case, Steenberg moved for a directed 
verdict under Wis. Stat. § 805.14(3)(1993-94).
1  For purposes of 
the motion, Steenberg admitted to an intentional trespass to 
land, but asked the circuit court to find that the Jacques were 
not entitled to compensatory damages or punitive damages based 
on insufficiency of the evidence.  The circuit court denied 
Steenberg’s 
motion 
and 
the 
questions 
of 
punitive 
and 
compensatory damages were submitted to the jury.  The jury 
awarded the Jacques $1 nominal damages and $100,000 punitive 
damages.  Steenberg filed post-verdict motions claiming that the 
punitive damage award must be set aside because Wisconsin law 
did not allow a punitive damage award unless the jury also 
awarded compensatory damages.  Alternatively, Steenberg asked 
the circuit court to remit the punitive damage award.  The 
circuit court granted Steenberg’s motion to set aside the award. 
 Consequently, 
it 
did 
not 
reach 
Steenberg’s 
motion 
for 
remittitur. 
¶11 This case presents three issues: (1) whether an award 
of nominal damages for intentional trespass to land may support 
a punitive damage award and, if so; (2) whether the law should 
apply to Steenberg or should only be applied prospectively and, 
                     
1 All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
6 
if we apply the law to Steenberg; (3) whether the $100,000 in 
punitive damages awarded by the jury is excessive. 
¶12 The first issue is a question of law which we review 
de novo.  The second issue involves the prospective application 
of a judicial holding which is a question of policy to be 
determined by this court.  Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 
378, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986).  The court allows prospective 
application for the purpose of mitigating hardships that may 
occur with the retroactive application of new rules.  Colby v. 
Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 364, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996).  
Finally, where, as here, the circuit court did not provide a 
reasoned analysis supporting or rejecting remittitur, in order 
to determine whether to remit the punitive damages awarded, a 
reviewing court must review the entire record as a matter of 
first impression and determine whether, in its judgment, the 
damage award is excessive.  Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis. 2d 
211, 230, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980). 
II. 
¶13 Before the question of punitive damages in a tort 
action can properly be submitted to the jury, the circuit court 
must determine, as a matter of law, that the evidence will 
support an award of punitive damages.  Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 
Wis. 2d 332, 344, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1990).  To determine 
whether, as a matter of law, the question of punitive damages 
should have been submitted to the jury, this court reviews the 
record de novo.  Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 155 Wis. 2d 724, 
736, 456 N.W.2d 585 (1990); Lievrou, 157 Wis. 2d at 344. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
7 
¶14 Steenberg argues that, as a matter of law, punitive 
damages could not be awarded by the jury because punitive 
damages must be supported by an award of compensatory damages 
and here the jury awarded only nominal and punitive damages.  
The 
Jacques 
contend 
that 
the 
rationale 
supporting 
the 
compensatory damage award requirement is inapposite when the 
wrongful act is an intentional trespass to land.  We agree with 
the Jacques.   
¶15 Our analysis begins with a statement of the rule and 
the rationale supporting the rule.  First, we consider the 
individual and societal interests implicated when an intentional 
trespass to land occurs.  Then, we analyze the rationale 
supporting the rule in light of these interests. 
¶16 The general rule was stated in Barnard v. Cohen, 165 
Wis. 417, 162 N.W.2d 480 (1917), where the question presented 
was: “In an action for libel, can there be a recovery of 
punitory damages if only nominal compensatory damages are 
found?”  With the bare assertion that authority and better 
reason supported its conclusion, the Barnard court said no.  Id. 
at. 418.  Barnard continues to state the general rule of 
punitive damages in Wisconsin.  See Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 
2d 425, 438-40, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).  The rationale for the 
compensatory damage requirement is that if the individual cannot 
show actual harm, he or she has but a nominal interest, hence, 
society has little interest in having the unlawful, but 
otherwise 
harmless, 
conduct 
deterred, 
therefore, 
punitive 
damages are inappropriate.  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 201 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
8 
Wis. 2d 22, 548 N.W.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1996); Maxwell v. Kennedy, 
50 Wis. 645, 649, 7 N.W. 657 (1880). 
¶17 However, 
whether 
nominal 
damages 
can 
support 
a 
punitive damage award in the case of an intentional trespass to 
land 
has 
never 
been 
squarely 
addressed 
by 
this 
court.
2  
Nonetheless, Wisconsin law is not without reference to this 
situation.  In 1854 the court established punitive damages, 
allowing the assessment of “damages as a punishment to the 
defendant for the purpose of making an example.”  McWilliams v. 
Bragg, 3 Wis. 377, 378 (1854).
3  The McWilliams court related the 
facts and an illustrative tale from the English case of Merest 
v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814), to explain the 
rationale underlying punitive damages. 
¶18 In Merest, a landowner was shooting birds in his field 
when he was approached by the local magistrate who wanted to 
hunt with him.  Although the landowner refused, the magistrate 
proceeded to hunt.  When the landowner continued to object, the 
magistrate threatened to have him jailed and dared him to file 
                     
2 Although Steenberg cites Sunderman v. Warnken, 251 Wis. 
471, 29 N.W.2d 496 (1947), for the proposition that the Barnard 
rule applies to a trespass case, we disagree.  Barnard, 165 Wis. 
417.  In Sunderman, the court affirmed the order dismissing the 
tenants action against the landlord for wrongful and illegal 
entry.  The court held that “a landlord who entered the leased 
premises in order to make necessary repairs, as required by 
public officials” had not violated the lease, i.e., the court 
found that there had not been a wrongful entry.  In light of 
this holding, any discussion of the Barnard rule was dicta.  
Sunderman, 251 Wis. at 477. 
3 Because McWilliams was an action of trespass for assault 
and battery, we cite it not for its precedential value, but for 
its reasoning. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
9 
suit.  Although little actual harm had been caused, the English 
court upheld damages of 500 pounds, explaining “in a case where 
a man disregards every principle which actuates the conduct of 
gentlemen, what is to restrain him except large damages?”  
McWilliams, 3 Wis. 377 at 380.   
¶19 To explain the need for punitive damages, even where 
actual harm is slight, McWilliams related the hypothetical tale 
from Merest of an intentional trespasser: 
 
Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, 
before his window, and that a man intrudes and walks 
up and down before the window of his house, and looks 
in while the owner is at dinner, is the trespasser 
permitted to say “here is a halfpenny for you which is 
the full extent of the mischief I have done.”  Would 
that be a compensation?  I cannot say that it would 
be. . . . 
McWilliams, 3 Wis. At 380-81.  Thus, in the case establishing 
punitive damages in this state, this court recognized that in 
certain situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the 
damage done to the land, which may be minimal, but in the loss 
of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her 
property and, the court implied that this right may be punished 
by a large damage award despite the lack of measurable harm. 
¶20 Steenberg 
contends 
that the 
rule 
established in 
Barnard prohibits a punitive damage award, as a matter of law, 
unless 
the 
plaintiff 
also 
receives 
compensatory 
damages.  
Because the Jacques did not receive a compensatory damage award, 
Steenberg contends that the punitive damage award must be set 
aside.  The Jacques argue that the rationale for not allowing 
nominal damages to support a punitive damage award is inapposite 
when the wrongful act involved is an intentional trespass to 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
10
land.  The Jacques argue that both the individual and society 
have significant interests in deterring intentional trespass to 
land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm that results.  
We agree with the Jacques.  An examination of the individual 
interests invaded by an intentional trespass to land, and 
society’s interests in preventing intentional trespass to land, 
leads us to the conclusion that the Barnard rule should not 
apply when the tort supporting the award is intentional trespass 
to land. 
¶21 We turn first to the individual landowner’s interest 
in protecting his or her land from trespass.  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that the private landowner’s right 
to exclude others from his or her land is “one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.”  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 384 (1994); (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).  Accord Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)(quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
4  This court has 
long recognized “[e]very person[’s] constitutional right to the 
exclusive enjoyment of his own property for any purpose which 
does not invade the rights of another person.”  Diana Shooting 
Club v. Lamoreux, 114 Wis. 44, 59 (1902)(holding that the victim 
of an intentional trespass should have been allowed to take 
judgment for nominal damages and costs).  Thus, both this court 
                     
4 We refer to these cases only to emphasize the nature of 
the 
Jacques’ 
interest 
and, 
correspondingly, 
Steenberg’s 
violation. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
11
and the Supreme Court recognize the individual’s legal right to 
exclude others from private property. 
¶22 Yet a right is hollow if the legal system provides 
insufficient means to protect it.  Felix Cohen offers the 
following analysis summarizing the relationship between the 
individual and the state regarding property rights:   
 
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be 
attached: 
 
To the world: 
 
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I 
may grant or withhold. 
 
Signed: 
 
Private Citizen 
Endorsed: The state 
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, IX Rutgers Law 
Review 357, 374 (1954).  Harvey and Lois Jacque have the right 
to tell Steenberg Homes and any other trespasser, “No, you 
cannot cross our land.”  But that right has no practical meaning 
unless protected by the State.  And, as this court recognized as 
early as 1854, a “halfpenny” award does not constitute state 
protection. 
¶23 The 
nature 
of 
the 
nominal 
damage 
award 
in 
an 
intentional trespass to land case further supports an exception 
to Barnard.  Because a legal right is involved, the law 
recognizes that actual harm occurs in every trespass.  The 
action 
for 
intentional 
trespass 
to 
land 
is 
directed 
at 
vindication of the legal right.  W. Page Keeton, Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts, § 13 (5th  ed. 1984).  The law infers some 
damage from every direct entry upon the land of another.  Id.  
The law recognizes actual harm in every trespass to land whether 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
12
or not compensatory damages are awarded.  Id.  Thus, in the case 
of intentional trespass to land, the nominal damage award 
represents the recognition that, although immeasurable in mere 
dollars, actual harm has occurred. 
¶24 The potential for harm resulting from intentional 
trespass also supports an exception to Barnard.  A series of 
intentional trespasses, as the Jacques had the misfortune to 
discover in an unrelated action, can threaten the individual’s 
very ownership of the land.  The conduct of an intentional 
trespasser, if repeated, might ripen into prescription or 
adverse possession and, as a consequence, the individual 
landowner can lose his or her property rights to the trespasser. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 893.28. 
¶25 In sum, the individual has a strong interest in 
excluding trespassers from his or her land.  Although only 
nominal damages were awarded to the Jacques, Steenberg’s 
intentional trespass caused actual harm.  We turn next to 
society’s interest in protecting private property from the 
intentional trespasser. 
¶26 Society has an interest in punishing and deterring 
intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests 
of the individual landowner.  Society has an interest in 
preserving 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
legal 
system. 
 
Private 
landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who trespass 
upon their land will be appropriately punished.  When landowners 
have confidence in the legal system, they are less likely to 
resort to “self-help” remedies.  In McWilliams, the court 
recognized the importance of “’prevent[ing] the practice of 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
13
dueling, [by permitting] juries [ ] to punish insult by 
exemplary damages.’”  McWilliams, 3 Wis. at 381.  Although 
dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help, one can easily 
imagine a frustrated landowner taking the law into his or her 
own hands when faced with a brazen trespasser, like Steenberg, 
who refuses to heed no trespass warnings. 
¶27 People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished. 
Punitive damages have the effect of bringing to punishment types 
of 
conduct 
that, 
though 
oppressive 
and 
hurtful 
to 
the 
individual, almost invariably go unpunished by the public 
prosecutor.  Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 
(1965).  The $30 forfeiture was certainly not an appropriate 
punishment for Steenberg’s egregious trespass in the eyes of the 
Jacques.  It was more akin to Merest’s “halfpenny.”  If punitive 
damages are not allowed in a situation like this, what 
punishment will prohibit the intentional trespass to land?  
Moreover, what is to stop Steenberg Homes from concluding, in 
the future, that delivering its mobile homes via an intentional 
trespass and paying the resulting Class B forfeiture, is not 
more profitable than obeying the law?  Steenberg Homes plowed a 
path across the Jacques’ land and dragged the mobile home across 
that path, in the face of the Jacques’ adamant refusal.  A $30 
forfeiture and a $1 nominal damage award are unlikely to 
restrain Steenberg Homes from similar conduct in the future.  An 
appropriate punitive damage award probably will. 
¶28 In sum, as the court of appeals noted, the Barnard 
rule sends the wrong message to Steenberg Homes and any others 
who contemplate trespassing on the land of another.  It 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
14
implicitly tells them that they are free to go where they 
please, regardless of the landowner’s wishes.  As long as they 
cause no compensable harm, the only deterrent intentional 
trespassers face is the nominal damage award of $1, the modern 
equivalent of Merest’s halfpenny, and the possibility of a Class 
B forfeiture under Wis. Stat. § 943.13.  We conclude that both 
the private landowner and society have much more than a nominal 
interest in excluding others from private land.  Intentional 
trespass 
to 
land 
causes 
actual 
harm 
to 
the 
individual, 
regardless of whether that harm can be measured in mere dollars. 
 Consequently, the Barnard rationale will not support a refusal 
to allow punitive damages when the tort involved is an 
intentional trespass to land.  Accordingly, assuming that the 
other requirements for punitive damages have been met, we hold 
that nominal damages may support a punitive damage award in an 
action for intentional trespass to land. 
¶29 Our 
holding 
is 
supported 
by 
respected 
legal 
commentary.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the 
proposition that an award of nominal damages will support an 
award of punitive damages in a trespass to land action: 
 
The fact that the actor knows that his entry is 
without the consent of the possessor and without any 
other privilege to do so, while not necessary to make 
him 
liable, 
may 
affect 
the 
amount 
of 
damages 
recoverable against him, by showing such a complete 
disregard 
of 
the 
possessor’s 
legally 
protected 
interest in the exclusive possession of his land as to 
justify the imposition of punitive in addition to 
nominal damages for even a harmless trespass, or in 
addition to compensatory damages for one which is 
harmful. 
 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
15
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 cmt. e (1979).  The 
Restatement reiterates this position under the punitive damages 
section:  nominal damages support an award of punitive damages 
“when a tort, such as trespass to land, is committed for an 
outrageous purpose, but no significant harm has resulted.”  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. c (1979). 
¶30 Prosser 
also 
finds 
the 
compensatory 
damages 
prerequisite unsupportable: 
 
Since it is precisely in the cases of nominal damages 
that 
the 
policy 
of 
providing 
an 
incentive 
for 
plaintiffs to bring petty outrages into court comes 
into play, the view very much to be preferred appears 
to be that of the minority which have held that there 
is sufficient support for punitive damages. 
W. Page Keeton, et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
§ 2, at 14 (5th  ed. 1984)(citations omitted).  A minority of 
other jurisdictions follow this approach.  See, Annotation, 
Sufficiency of Showing of Actual Damages to Support Award of 
Punitive Damages - Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th  11, 36 (1985). 
III. 
¶31 Next we consider the effect of our holding on the 
parties before us.  Steenberg argues that its reliance at trial 
on the well-established Barnard rule compels this court to 
either apply our holding prospectively, or grant a new trial.   
¶32 Steenberg argues if we should hold, as we do, that 
punitive damages can be awarded with only a nominal damage 
award, our holding should not apply to them.  Steenberg cites 
Colby, 202 Wis. 2d 342, for the proposition that a holding that 
departs 
from 
past 
precedent 
should 
only 
be 
applied 
prospectively.  Steenberg argues that because it relied on the 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
16
well-established Barnard rule at trial, and our holding today 
recognizes an exception to the Barnard rule, today’s holding 
should not apply to this case.  Steenberg misunderstands Colby 
and the doctrine of sunbursting. 
¶33 Sunbursting
5 is an exception to the general rule 
referred to as the “Blackstonian Doctrine.”  Fitzgerald v. 
Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 575, 157 N.W.2d 595 
(1968).  This classic doctrine provides that a decision which 
overrules precedent is accorded retroactive effect.  Thomas E. 
Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective 
Effect Only: “Prospective Overruling” or “Sunbursting”, 51 Marq. 
L. Rev. 254 (1967-68). 
¶34 At times, inequities will occur when a court departs 
from precedent and announces a new rule of law.  In an effort to 
avoid inequity on these rare occasions, the court has recognized 
exceptions to the Blackstonian Doctrine and used the device of 
prospective overruling, known as “sunbursting,” to limit the 
effect of a newly announced rule when retroactive application 
would be inequitable. 
¶35 Prospective application of a judicial holding is a 
question of policy to be determined by this court.  Harmann, 128 
                     
5 Judge Thomas Fairchild has suggested that “[i]f one thinks 
of a judicially pronounced new rule of law as the rosy dawn of a 
new day, ‘sunbursting’ has an appropriate connotation.”  Thomas 
E. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective 
Effect Only: “Prospective Overruling” or “Sunbursting”, 51 Marq. 
L. Rev. 254, 255 (1967-68).  However, the illustrative nature of 
the term is purely coincidental.  Prospective overruling earned 
the nickname “sunbursting” from the name of a party to 
litigation involving prospective application.  Great Northern 
Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 
(1932). 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
17
Wis. 2d at 378.  The court allows sunbursting for the purpose of 
mitigating hardships that may occur with the retroactive 
application of a new rule.  Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 364.  This 
court will not sunburst absent a compelling judicial reason for 
doing so.  Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 379 (citation omitted).  No 
simple rule helps us determine the existence of a judicial 
reason for sunbursting.  Id.  Instead, the equities peculiar to 
a given rule or case determine the rule adopted by the court in 
each case. 
¶36 Steenberg contends that its reliance on Barnard at 
trial 
creates 
a 
compelling 
judicial 
reason 
to 
sunburst.  
Steenberg explains that its trial strategy was dependent on the 
Barnard rule.  Therefore, it contends that a holding in this 
case, recognizing an exception to the Barnard rule should only 
apply prospectively, i.e., not to Steenberg Homes.  We disagree. 
 We find Steenberg’s contention that it relied on the Barnard 
rule misleading.  Steenberg did not concede the intentional 
trespass until after the Jacques rested at trial.  At this 
point, 
when 
overwhelming 
evidence 
clearly 
established 
Steenberg’s intentional trespass on the Jacques’ land, then and 
only then, did Steenberg rely on Barnard and concede intentional 
trespass.  This type of “reliance” does not give rise to the 
inequity that sunbursting is designed to prevent. 
¶37 Steenberg’s reliance on the Barnard rule is not the 
type of reliance that normally forms the basis for sunbursting. 
 The court does not prospectively apply a holding merely because 
of reliance on an old rule.  Rolo v. Goers, 174 Wis. 2d 709, 
723, 497 N.W.2d 724 (1993).  Prospective application of a 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
18
holding based on reliance on an old rule has occured when there 
has been reliance on an overruled decision by a substantial 
number of persons and considerable harm or detriment could 
result to them.  Id.  See also Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 
Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, 107 N.W. 292 (1961)(abrogating 
charitable immunity); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962)(abrogating governmental immunity); Widell v. 
Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249 
(1963)(abrogating immunity of religious entity).  When tort law 
is 
changed, 
the 
court 
is 
concerned 
about 
exposing 
many 
individuals and institutions to liability who would have 
obtained liability insurance had they known they would no longer 
enjoy immunity.  Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 381.  Steenberg does 
not claim that others will be adversely affected by our 
recognition of an exception to the Barnard rule.  Steenberg only 
refers to its own reliance, and to its own punishment. 
¶38 The 
Jacques’ 
interests 
also 
prevent 
us 
from 
sunbursting in this case.  In determining whether hardship or 
injustice will occur, the court must also consider the effect of 
prospective application on the party who sought to change the 
law.  Retroactivity is usually justified as a reward for the 
litigant who has persevered in attacking an unsound rule.  To 
refuse to apply the new rule here would deprive the Jacques of 
any benefit from their effort and expense in challenging the old 
rule which we now declare erroneous.  That, we conclude, would 
be the greater injustice.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
exception to Barnard that we recognize today shall be applied to 
Steenberg. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
19
IV. 
¶39 Finally, we consider whether the jury’s $100,000 
punitive damage award to the Jacques is excessive.  In this 
case, the circuit court, finding that the issue was moot, 
rejected Steenberg’s motion for remittitur without review.  
Because we conclude that the nominal damages awarded to the 
Jacques support the jury’s punitive damage award, and because we 
conclude that our holding today applies to Steenberg, the issue 
is not moot.  Therefore, we review the $100,000 award to 
determine whether it is clearly excessive.  We conclude that it 
is not.  Accordingly, we do not order remittitur. 
¶40 The award of punitive damages in a particular case is 
entirely within the discretion of the jury.  Notwithstanding the 
jury’s broad discretion, the circuit court has the power to 
reduce the amount of punitive damages to an amount that it 
determines is fair and reasonable.  Malco v. Midwest Aluminum 
Sales, 14 Wis. 2d 57, 65, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961).  We are 
reluctant to set aside an award merely because it is large or we 
would have awarded less.  Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis. 2d 211, 
236, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980).  A jury’s punitive damage award will 
not be disturbed unless the verdict is so clearly excessive as 
to indicate passion and prejudice.  Fuchs v. Kupper, 22 Wis. 2d 
107, 125 N.W.2d 360 (1963).  When we review the record to 
determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive, the 
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Fahrenberg, 96 Wis. 2d at 231.  A punitive damage 
award that is the product of a fair process is entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity.  TXO, 509 U.S. at 457.  
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
20
Nonetheless, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes substantive limits on the size of punitive damage 
awards.  Management Comp. Serv. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie, 206 
Wis. 2d 157, 557 N.W. 2d 67 (1996). 
¶41 The Due Process Clause prohibits the court from 
imposing a “’grossly excessive’” punishment on a tortfeasor.  
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1592 
(1996)(quoting TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 
509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993).  The Due Process Clause dictates that 
an individual receive fair notice not only of the conduct that 
will subject him or her to punishment, but also of the severity 
of the penalty that a state may impose.  Gore, 116 S.Ct. at 
1598.  Only when a punitive damage award can be fairly 
categorized as grossly excessive in relation to the State’s 
legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence does it enter 
the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause. 
 Id. at 1595. 
¶42 The Supreme Court has recently clarified the three 
factors a court must consider when determining whether a 
punitive damage award violates the Due Process Clause: (1) the 
degree of reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the disparity 
between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and 
the punitive damage award; and (3) the difference between this 
remedy and the civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed 
in comparable cases.  Gore, 116 S.Ct. at 1598-99, 1603. 
¶43 We turn first to the reprehensibility factor.  The 
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 
damage 
award 
is 
the 
degree 
of 
reprehensibility 
of 
the 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
21
defendant’s conduct.  Punitive damages should reflect the 
egregiousness of the offense.  Id. at 1599.  In other words, 
some wrongs are more blameworthy than others and the punishment 
should fit the crime.  In this case, the “crime” was Steenberg’s 
brazen, intentional trespass on the Jacques’ land. 
¶44 Steenberg’s 
intentional 
trespass 
reveals 
an 
indifference and a reckless disregard for the law, and for the 
rights of others.  At trial, Steenberg took an arrogant stance, 
arguing essentially that yes, we intentionally trespassed on the 
Jacques’ land, but we cannot be punished for that trespass 
because the law protects us.  We reject that position.  We are 
further troubled by Steenberg’s utter disregard for the rights 
of the Jacques.  Despite numerous unambiguous refusals by the 
Jacques to allow Steenberg access to their land, Steenberg 
delivered the mobile home across the Jacques’ land.  
¶45 Furthermore, these deceitful were egregious; Steenberg 
Homes acted deviously.  After the conversation in the Jacques’ 
kitchen, the Jacques, their neighbors, and the town chairman 
were satisfied that the matter was resolved, and Steenberg would 
not trespass on the Jacques’ land.  Nevertheless, the Steenberg 
employees testified that as they walked out of the Jacques’ 
home, the assistant manager told them to use any means to 
deliver the mobile home.  This conduct is reprehensible.  We 
conclude that the degree of reprehensibility of Steenberg’s 
conduct supports the imposition of a substantial punitive award. 
  
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
22
¶46 We now turn to the next factor in the Gore analysis: 
the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the 
Jacques and the punitive damage award.  Gore, 116 S.Ct. at 1601. 
¶47 In Management Computer Services, this court concluded 
that 
a 
reasonable 
relationship 
between 
the 
amount 
of 
compensatory damages, the potential criminal penalties, and the 
punitive damage award is required.  Management Comp. Serv., 206 
Wis. 2d at 193.  This requirement combines the second and third 
Gore factors.  We address them separately.   
¶48 We have expressly rejected the use of a fixed 
multiplier, either a fixed ratio of compensatory to punitive 
damages or of criminal fine to punitive damages, to calculate 
the amount of reasonable punitive damages.  Id.  However, in the 
appropriate case, a comparison of the compensatory damages and 
the punitive award is important.  While a constitutional line 
ought not be marked by a simple mathematical formula, the 
proportionate rule for punitive damages is one factor in 
determining the reasonableness of the punitive damage award.  
Id.  See James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 1977 
Wis. L.Rev. 753, 771. 
¶49 When compensatory damages are awarded, we consider the 
ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.  This is so because 
compensatory damages represent the actual harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff.  However, when nominal damages support a punitive 
damage award, use of a multiplier is of dubious assistance 
because the nominal damage award may not reflect the actual harm 
caused.  If it did, the breathtaking 100,000 to 1 ratio of this 
case could not be upheld.  However, in the proper case, a $1 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
23
nominal damage award may properly support a $100,000 punitive 
damage award where a much larger compensatory award might not.  
This could include situations where egregious acts result in 
injuries that are hard to detect or noneconomic harm that is 
difficult to measure.  In these instances, as in the case before 
us, a mathematical bright line between the constitutional and 
the unconstitutional would turn the concept of punitive damages 
on its head. 
¶50 Finally, we turn to the third factor in the Gore 
analysis: we compare the punitive damage award and the civil or 
criminal 
penalties 
that 
could 
be 
imposed 
for 
comparable 
misconduct.  Gore, 116 S.Ct. at 1603.  Since punitive damages 
are assessed for punishment, it is relevant to compare the 
punitive damage award to the maximum fine in the section of the 
Wisconsin Criminal Code that contains a similar offense.  Meke 
v. Nicol, 56 Wis. 2d 654, 664, 203 N.W.2d 129 (1973).  A 
reviewing court engaged in determining whether a punitive 
damages 
award 
is 
excessive 
should 
accord 
“’substantial 
deference’ 
to 
legislative 
judgments 
concerning 
appropriate 
sanctions for the conduct at issue.”  Gore, 116 S.Ct. at 1603 
(citation omitted). 
¶51 We consider this factor largely irrelevant in the 
present case because the “conduct at issue” here was scarcely 
that contemplated by the legislative action.  Steenberg received 
a citation for trespass to land under Wis. Stat. § 943.13, a 
Class B forfeiture.  Wis. Stat. § 939.52(3)(b).  Section 
943.13(1)(b) provides that “[w]hoever . . . [e]nters or remains 
on any land of another after having been notified by the owner 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
24
or occupant not to enter or remain on the premises” is subject 
to a Class B forfeiture.  The maximum penalty for a Class B 
forfeiture is $1000.  § 939.52(3)(b).  Steenberg’s egregious 
conduct could scarcely have been contemplated by the legislature 
when it enacted this statute which provides a penalty for simply 
“entering or remaining” on the land of another.  Here, not only 
did Steenberg Homes illegally enter and remain on the Jacques’ 
land, first they plowed a path across the Jacques’ field, then 
they transported a mobile home over the path.  Furthermore, the 
statute failed to deter Steenberg’s egregious misconduct.  And 
we see no reason why the legislative penalty for simple trespass 
will deter future conduct by Steenberg.  Without punitive 
damages, Steenberg has a financial incentive to trespass again. 
¶52 Our 
concern 
for 
deterrence 
is 
guided 
by 
our 
recognition of the nature of Steenberg’s business.  Steenberg 
sells and delivers mobile homes.  It is, therefore, likely that 
they will again be faced with what was, apparently for them, a 
dilemma.  Should they trespass and pay the forfeiture, which in 
this case was $30?  Or, should they take the more costly course 
and obey the law?  Today we alleviate the uncertainty for 
Steenberg Homes.  We feel certain that the $100,000 will serve 
to encourage the latter course by removing the profit from the 
intentional trespass. 
¶53 Punitive damages, by removing the profit from illegal 
activity, can help to deter such conduct.  In order to 
effectively do this, punitive damages must be in excess of the 
profit 
created 
by 
the 
misconduct 
so 
that 
the 
defendant 
recognizes a loss.  It can hardly be said that the $30 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
25
forfeiture paid by Steenberg significantly affected its profit 
for delivery of the mobile home.  One hundred thousand dollars 
will. 
¶54 Finally, a substantial punitive damage award serves to 
assure that tort claims involving egregious conduct will be 
prosecuted.  By allowing punitive damages, the self interest of 
the plaintiff might lead to prosecution of a claim that might 
not otherwise be pursued.  A $100,000 punitive damage award will 
not only give potential trespassers reason to pause before 
trespassing, it will also give aggrieved landowners reason to 
pursue a trespass action. 
¶55 In sum, although actual harm and criminal penalties 
have some relevance to the amount of punitive damages and may be 
factors in determining the reasonableness of the punitive damage 
award, we have not been willing in the past, and are not willing 
in this case, to adopt a mathematical formula for awarding such 
damages.  Fahrenberg, 96 Wis. 2d at 235-36.  Our consideration 
of the Gore factors leads us to the conclusion that the $100,000 
punitive damages award does not excessively punish Steenberg 
Homes for its egregious conduct, to deter it from trespassing 
again, and to deter others who might be similarly tempted.  The 
punitive award neither shocks our conscience, nor takes our 
breath away.  On the contrary, it is the brazen conduct of 
Steenberg Homes that we find shocking, not the $100,000 punitive 
damages award. 
¶56 In conclusion, we hold that when nominal damages are 
awarded for an intentional trespass to land, punitive damages 
may, in the discretion of the jury, be awarded.  Our decision 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
26
today shall apply to Steenberg Homes.  Finally, we hold that the 
$100,000 punitive damages awarded by the jury is not excessive. 
 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for 
reinstatement of the punitive damage award. 
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded with directions. 
 
 
No.  95-1028 
 
 
27
 
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