Title: Trawick v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 711, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
CHARLES TRAWICK,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 711, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§  
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Cr.A. Nos. IN02-02-049 thru 0354;  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§     IN02-02-0630 and 0631 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§  
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  March 9, 2004 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  April 7, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
J. Brendan O’Neill, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, J.: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Charles Trawick, was convicted of single 
counts of Robbery in the First Degree and Aggravated Menacing, two counts 
of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, two counts 
of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and other less serious offenses.  
Following the entry of the guilty verdicts, the State filed a motion seeking to 
declare Trawick an habitual offender.1  A sentencing hearing was scheduled 
for November 15, 2002. 
 
The November 15, 2002 hearing was continued at the State’s request 
and over the defendant’s objection.  Based on the evidence presented at the 
subsequent December 6, 2002 hearing, the Superior Court judge concluded 
that Trawick’s 1987 Maryland conviction was for Possession with Intent to 
Distribute Heroin, a felony.  Accordingly, Trawick received a mandatory life 
sentence as an habitual offender, pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
4214(b).    
Trawick has raised three issues on appeal.  First, Trawick argues that 
the Superior Court abused its discretion by continuing the sentencing 
hearing on November 15, 2002.  Second, Trawick argues that the Superior 
Court judge erroneously admitted the Maryland court records into evidence.  
Third, Trawick argues that the Superior Court lacked substantial evidence to 
                                          
 
1 Prior to trial, the State had announced its intention to have Trawick declared an habitual 
offender if he were convicted of Robbery in the First Degree. 
 
3
conclude that he had been convicted of a prior felony in Maryland.  We have 
determined that the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Continuance Properly Granted 
Trawick’s first argument on appeal is that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion by continuing the sentencing hearing, over the objection of 
Trawick’s defense counsel, from November 15, 2002 to December 6, 2002.  
The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is reviewed on appeal for 
abuse of discretion.2  Accordingly, this Court will only reverse a trial judge’s 
decision to grant a continuance if the ruling is based on clearly unreasonable 
or capricious grounds.3     
The record reflects that at the November 15 hearing, the State sought 
to introduce documentary evidence that Trawick had been convicted in 
Maryland of Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin in 1987, a felony.  
The defense challenged the sufficiency of the State’s evidence that the 1987 
conviction was a felony.  Specifically, Trawick’s defense counsel argued 
that the State had produced two conflicting documents to support its position 
that Trawick had been convicted of a felony.  The first document was a 
Criminal Information from Maryland indicating that Trawick had been 
                                          
 
2 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. 1996). 
3 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 744-45 (Del. 2003); Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 
65 (Del. 1993). 
 
4
charged with Possession with Intent to Distribute, a felony.  The second 
document, a microfilmed docket, suggested that Trawick may have entered a 
guilty plea to possession of heroin, a misdemeanor.  In addition to these two 
documents, the State represented to the Superior Court that the Office of the 
State’s Attorney for Baltimore City had confirmed that Trawick’s conviction 
in Maryland was for Possession with Intent to Distribute, a felony. 
After both sides had presented their evidence and arguments, the 
Superior Court stated: 
Well, at the end of the day what the Court’s interest is in 
applying any statute, including the habitual offender statute is 
to get to the truth, not to play evidentiary games, not to decide 
the matter on less than a complete record, and I’m not going to 
do that here.  The Saunders case suggests that when a motion is 
filed it is proper for the Court to receive evidence to resolve the 
issue.  What I have here is at best, I don’t want to say 
conflicting evidence but not complete evidence.  I have 
information that clearly charges Mr. Trawick with an eligible 
felony, and I’m satisfied from having reviewed the statute that 
he was charged under in Maryland that it comports with our 
Delaware possession with intent to deliver statute such that that 
requirement would be met by the State if, in fact, there was a 
finding of guilt as to that charge.  Where I have concerns is that 
I have been supplied with documents from the State that 
suggest that the charge is possession of heroin.  I have a 
presentence investigator with whom I have been unable to 
speak, I have tried to reach, but who upon investigation 
concluded that the charge was possession of heroin, and then I 
have an e-mail which I received today which I think all counsel 
would agree at the end of the day is not the sort of evidence that 
I should be relying upon to make a decision of the gravity that 
this decision implicates. 
 
 
5
So I guess what I’m inclined to do at this point is to take the 
motion under advisement, allow the State to present further 
evidence and, if that be by way of a hearing, to schedule that 
hearing to allow the Court to determine whether or not Mr. 
Trawick, in fact, is eligible for habitual offender status.  As I 
read the statute, it’s a mandatory situation if the State moves 
under this provision and it has the evidence to establish 
eligibility that the Court is obliged to grant the motion and to 
sentence according to the statute. 
 
The Superior Court then continued the hearing until December 6, 
2002.    
The hearing that is at issue in this appeal was to determine whether 
Trawick was an habitual offender.4  Trawick’s sentence under Delaware’s 
habitual offender statute was mandatory.5  The hearing to determine whether 
Trawick qualified for habitual offender status under the statute was an 
integral part of the sentencing process.   
It is well settled that the Superior Court has the authority to correct an 
error in sentencing.6  The State requested, and the Superior Court granted, 
the continuance for the purpose of clarifying an ambiguous record.  In 
Trawick’s case, rather than risk an error in sentencing, the trial judge 
continued the matter in order to ensure the correct result.  The record reflects 
                                          
 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2001). 
5 Id. 
6 Urquhart v. State, 1991 WL 112877, *1 (Del. May, 8 1991) (ORDER) (citing Whalen v. 
State, 492 A.2d 552, 559 (Del. 1985)). 
 
6
that the Superior Court’s decision to continue Trawick’s sentencing hearing 
was a reasonable and proper exercise of discretion.   
Public Records Hearsay Exception 
 
Trawick’s second claim of error is that the Superior Court erroneously 
admitted the Maryland commitment documents into evidence, pursuant to 
the business record exception to the hearsay rule, D.R.E. 803(6), by allowing 
the testimony of an Assistant State’s Attorney from Maryland, who was with 
the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City.  The Assistant State’s 
Attorney from Maryland, Salvatore Fili, testified on behalf of the State at the 
December 6, 2002 sentencing hearing.  Mr. Fili was chief of the felony 
narcotics division in Baltimore City.  Mr. Fili’s testimony was offered by the 
State to provide the foundation for the admission of a Maryland Circuit 
Court commitment order dated March 10, 1987, under the business records 
hearsay exception set forth in Delaware Rule of Evidence 803(6).   
 
The business records exception to the hearsay rule provides for the 
admission of: 
a memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, 
of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or 
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person 
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian 
or other qualified witness, . . ., unless the source of the 
 
7
information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness.7 
 
Pursuant to this rule, the State was required to provide a proper foundation 
for the Maryland Circuit Court commitment order through the testimony of 
“the custodian or other qualified witness.”   
The Superior Court ruled that Fili was not a custodian of the Maryland 
Circuit Court documents.  The issue at the sentencing hearing became 
whether Fili was an “other qualified witness.”  A qualified witness “need not 
be an employee of the [record-keeping] entity so long as he understands the 
system.”8  A qualified witness, in addition to his or her familiarity with the 
record-keeping system, must attest to the following foundational 
requirements of Rule 803(6): 
(1)  [that] the declarant in the records had knowledge to make 
accurate statements; (2) that the declarant recorded statements 
contemporaneously with the actions which were the subject of 
the reports; (3) that the declarant made the record in the regular 
course of business activity; and (4) that such records were 
regularly kept by the business.9 
 
The Superior Court ruled that Mr. Fili had demonstrated “an adequate 
familiarity with the records and record-keeping process such that he would 
                                          
 
7 D.R.E. 803(6). 
8 United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. 
Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 1992)).  See Bruce v. State, 781 A.2d 544, 553-54 
(Del. 2001).   
9 United States v. Console, 13 F.3d at 657 (citing United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 
571 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing F.R.E. 803(6)). 
 
8
be a person qualified to authenticate these records for the purposes of the 
business records exception.”   
We need not decide the issue concerning the admissibility of the 
Maryland prosecutor’s testimony in support of admitting the Maryland 
Circuit Court commitment records pursuant to the business record 
exception.10  Mr. Fili testified as follows: 
Q.  I’m now handing you what’s been identified as State 
Exhibit A for identification.  Would you take a look at that and 
please tell the Court what that is. 
 
A.  This is a true test copy of the commitment order in the case 
of Charles Trawick, 287051, 28705102, and 28705103, which 
was prepared at my request by the clerk of the circuit court for 
Baltimore City, where the convictions were entered.  And it has 
been certified by the clerk of the court, Mr. Frank M. Conaway, 
as a true copy from the record in the court. 
 
Q.  Bringing your attention to Count II of that record, what 
offense does that show? 
 
A.  Count II shows possession with the intent to distribute 
heroin under Maryland Annotated Code, Article 27, Section 
286, which is a felony in the State of Maryland, which carries a 
maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and/or a $25,000 for a 
first offense. 
 
Q.  What was the date of sentence for that charge? 
 
A.  Date of sentencing in this case was March 10th, 1987. 
 
Q.  Okay.  And that is a true copy of a court record? 
 
                                          
 
10 D.R.E. 803(6). 
 
9
A.  Yes, it is . . . . 
 
The certified copy of the Maryland Court’s commitment order was 
properly admissible into evidence at Trawick’s hearing as a public record 
under Delaware Rule of Evidence 803(8).  D.R.E. 803(8) provides a hearsay 
exception for "records, reports, statements, or data compilation in any form" 
of a public agency recording "activities or matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law."  A certified court record of a conviction is a record from a 
public agency.  It is undisputed that sentencing a defendant is a duty 
imposed on the courts by law.   
 
As a general rule, the proponent of admitting public records into 
evidence is not required to establish their admissibility through foundation 
testimony about the way in which the public records were either generated 
or maintained.11  A public record can be admitted into evidence as proof of 
the facts to which it relates without foundation testimony because it will be 
self-authenticating, if it meets the requirements of D.R.E. 902(4).  That rule 
authorizes the court to treat a certified copy of a public record as properly 
authenticated by complying with paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of that rule.   
In Trawick’s case, the copies of the Maryland Circuit Court 
commitment records were certified domestic public documents under seal, 
                                          
 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
911 (1982).   
 
10
as described in D.R.E. 902(1).  The custodian’s signature with a statement 
that he or she has custody of the original, accompanied by a statement that 
the copy is correct, is sufficient to establish the accuracy of the copy as a 
substitute for the original.12  The certified record of Trawick’s conviction 
was properly authenticated under D.R.E. 902(1) and (4).13  Therefore, the 
Maryland commitment records were admissible under D.R.E. 803(8), 
irrespective of any testimony on the subject from the Maryland Assistant 
State Attorney, Mr. Fili.   
Sufficient Evidence Presented 
 
Trawick’s third argument on appeal is that the Superior Court lacked 
sufficient evidence to conclude that his 1987 Maryland conviction was a 
felony.  It is well established that the Superior Court’s determination that a 
defendant is an habitual criminal must be supported by substantial evidence 
in the record.14  Additionally, this determination must be free from legal 
error and any abuse of discretion.15 
 
At the December 6 hearing, the State presented a documentary exhibit 
through the testimony of Salvatore Fili.  Mr. Fili testified that the proffered 
document was a “true test copy” of the commitment order in Trawick’s 1987 
                                          
 
12 See Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 568 (3d Cir. 1989). 
13 Id.   
14 Morales v. State, 696, 390, 394 (Del. 1997). 
15 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 129 (Del. 2001). 
 
11
Maryland case, which had been certified by the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City.  The certified copy of the commitment order that was admitted into 
evidence at the December 6, 2002 habitual offender hearing reflects that 
Trawick was sentenced on March 10, 1987 to fifteen months incarceration 
for the charge of “Poss w/I Dist Heroin.”   
 
We have previously held that “the State has the burden of proof in 
establishing that each predicate offense meets the requirements of Section 
4214 and that the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.”16  
Trawick relies upon our decision in Morales v. State in support of his 
contention that the State did not meet its burden of proof.  In Morales, we 
held that a patent ambiguity in the record created a reasonable doubt.17  In 
that case, the defendant had been charged with Possession with Intent to 
Deliver in 1977 and Trafficking 28 grams or more of cocaine in 1985.  The 
State submitted certified copies of the two indictments in support of its 
habitual offender motion.  The docket sheets, however, did not specify the 
crimes to which Morales had pleaded guilty.  We noted that a defendant may 
plead guilty to a different offense than those listed in the indictment.  
Accordingly, we held that the State had failed to prove that Morales had 
been convicted of the offenses charged. 
                                          
 
16 Id. at 127 (citing Morales v. State, 696 A.2d at 395). 
17 Morales v. State, 696 A.2d at 395. 
 
12
 
In Trawick’s case, however, no ambiguity exists.  The certified copy 
of the commitment order indicates that Trawick was sentenced pursuant to 
Article 27, Section 286 of the Maryland Code.18   In Cunningham v. State,19 
the Maryland Court of Appeals recited the relevant statutory provisions of 
this section: 
Section 286(a)(1) … provides in pertinent part:  
 
Except as authorized by this [Act], it is unlawful for any person 
... to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient 
quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent 
to ... distribute ... a controlled dangerous substance ....  
 
The basic penalty provision for this section, found in subsection 
(b), provide:  
 
Any person who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) 
with respect to:  
 
(1) A substance classified in Schedules I or II which is a 
narcotic drug is guilty of felony and is subject to imprisonment 
for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $25,000, 
or both .…20 
 
In 1987, heroin was classified as a Schedule I narcotic.21 
        The 1987 commitment order established that Trawick had been 
convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin.  This felony drug 
                                          
 
18 This section of the Maryland Code was repealed in 2002, effective October 1, 2002 and 
replaced by a different statute.   See Acts 2002, c. 26, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2002. 
19 Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126  (Md. 1989). 
20 Id. at 128 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 131. 
 
13
conviction, in addition to two other prior felony convictions, rendered 
Trawick eligible to be sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual offender 
pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b).   The Superior Court’s 
decision to sentence Trawick as an habitual offender was supported by 
substantial evidence, free from legal error, and a proper exercise of 
discretion.   
Conclusion 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.  It is further ordered 
that the time within which a motion for reargument may be timely filed 
under Supreme Court Rule 18 is shortened to five days from the date of this 
Opinion. This Order is due to the impending change in the composition of 
the Supreme Court, arising out of the retirement of the Chief Justice in April 
2004.