Title: Barry Hoffman v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-072
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 5, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC94072
____________
BARRY HOFFMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 5, 2001]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Barry Hoffman, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the trial court’s
denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of postconviction relief.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Because the State failed to disclose evidence that
was favorable to the defense, we reverse the order denying Hoffman’s motion for
postconviction relief and remand with directions that the conviction be vacated and
a new trial granted.   See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 7, 1980, Frank Ihlenfeld and Linda Parrish were murdered in a
Jacksonville Beach motel room.  Barry Hoffman (Hoffman) was arrested in
Michigan for the murders in October 1981.  Testimony developed at trial revealed
that Hoffman had murdered the victims for Lenny Mazzara (Mazzara), a high-level
drug dealer in Jacksonville who worked for James Provost (Provost), a local
gangster.  Hoffman and his codefendant, James White (White), 20, were procured
to commit this murder by George “Rocco” Marshall (Marshall), one of Mazzara’s
employees.  Marshall’s wife owed Provost a $10,000 drug debt which would be
partially or wholly forgiven if Marshall found someone to kill Ihlenfeld.  Apparently,
Ihlenfeld was also involved in the drug trade with Mazzara and Provost, but had
stolen from Provost and owed him money.  At Marshall’s request,  Hoffman
agreed to commit the murders in exchange for $5,000.  White assisted in the
murders in exchange for $500.  
Evidence presented at trial implicating Hoffman in the crimes included a
package of cigarettes found in the hotel room with Hoffman’s fingerprint and
confessions by Hoffman to FBI agents and Jacksonville Beach Police officers. 
Hoffman was indicted by a grand jury for two counts of first-degree murder on
October 28, 1981.  On March 25, 1982, Hoffman was charged by information with
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conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree.  The two cases were consolidated
on June 25, 1982.  Mazzara and White were tried separately for their involvement in
the crimes.  
On June 28, 1982, Hoffman pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder,
and the court agreed to sentence him to two concurrent life sentences with the
conspiracy charge nolle prossed in exchange for truthful testimony against
Mazzara, the man who allegedly ordered Ihlenfeld’s murder.  When Hoffman
denied killing anyone at Mazzara’s trial, the prosecution withdrew from the plea
agreement and announced its intention to try Hoffman for both counts of first-
degree murder.
Hoffman testified at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  Judgments
of conviction were entered against him on January 14, 1983, on one count of first-
degree murder for the murder of Frank Ihlenfeld, one count of second-degree
murder for the death of Linda Parrish, and one count of conspiracy to commit
murder in the first degree.  On January 20, 1983, the jury recommended a sentence
of death for the first-degree murder conviction by a nine-to-three vote.  The trial
court agreed, finding that the four aggravators found (prior conviction of violent
felony; heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC); cold, calculated and premeditated
(CCP); and pecuniary gain) outweighed the mitigators found (no significant criminal
1  Hoffman raised the following issues on appeal:  (1) the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress his confession; (2) the trial court erred in excusing for
cause certain veniremen because of their views on capital punishment; (3) the
prosecuting attorney made improper arguments to the jury; (4) the trial court
erroneously found the previous conviction of a felony and CCP aggravators without
any pretense of moral or legal justification; (5) the trial court erred in considering the
manner of Ms. Parrish’s death to support the finding of the previous felony
aggravator; (6) the HAC aggravator was not supported by the circumstances of the
murder; (7) the State improperly sought the death penalty to punish Hoffman for not
giving testimony against a codefendant; (8) defendant’s sentence of death was unfair
since his codefendants each received life sentences.
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history and the co-conspirator’s sentence of life imprisonment).  The trial court
sentenced Hoffman to death for the first-degree murder on February 11, 1983.  
Hoffman appealed and his convictions and sentences were affirmed by this
Court.  See Hoffman v. State, 474 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1985).1   This Court made the
following findings:  Hoffman’s second-degree murder conviction was enough to
substantiate a prior conviction for a violent felony; the State’s withdrawal from the
plea bargain and continued prosecution of Hoffman after he had reneged on his
part of the agreement did not show the State purposely sought capital punishment
as retribution; and life imprisonment for Hoffman’s codefendants did not require
finding that Hoffman’s equal protection rights were violated because the death
sentence was imposed. 
On October 2, 1987, Hoffman filed a motion to vacate pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 raising, inter alia, claims under Brady v.
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Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The motion was summarily denied by the trial court
on October 7, 1987.  On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded, finding a
remand for a full hearing was required where the trial court stated no reasons for its
rejection of Hoffman’s petition and failed to attach specific parts of the record in
support of its summary denial.  See Hoffman v. State, 571 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1990). 
This Court also ordered the State to honor Hoffman’s chapter 119 request for
access to state attorney records and required the trial court give Hoffman up to
thirty days to amend his 3.850 motion after receipt of any public records.
On June 17, 1991, Hoffman filed an amended motion to vacate, which was
summarily denied on August 26, 1991.  In response to an appeal to this Court, the
State claimed that some of Hoffman’s requests sought records from agencies that
had nothing to do with the judgment and sentence and were agencies over which
the state attorney had no control.  While agreeing with the State in principle on this
matter, we also determined that the state attorney should make every effort to
disclose materials within its possession even if they originated in other agencies. 
See Hoffman v. State, 613 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 1992).  We again remanded to the
trial court for resolution of the public records issue in December 1992 and directed
that our 1990 mandate be followed.  
Several years of public records litigation ensued, and on January 1, 1997,
2   Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
3   The procedurally barred issues included: claim I–Hoffman was denied the
right to counsel and to effective assistance of counsel at critical stages of the
proceeding; claim III (raised on direct appeal)–Hoffman could not give a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights because of a mental impairment that prevented
him from comprehending instructions; claim VI (raised on direct appeal and found to
lack merit)–the prosecutor’s arguments so infected the proceedings with unfairness
as to render the resulting death sentence unreliable; claim VII (should have been raised
on direct appeal)–CCP was applied to this case in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments; claim VIII (should have been raised on direct appeal)–(a) the
judge showed bias regarding the mitigating factors by belittling their significance; (b)
the prosecutor failed to honor two stipulations; claim IX (should have been raised on
direct appeal)–the jury was misled by statements that diluted their responsibility for
sentencing (Caldwell claim); claim X–continued suppression of public records (the
circuit court has ruled on all public record requests filed by the defendant;  this issue
has been resolved);  claim XI (should have been raised on direct appeal)–penalty phase
jury instruction improperly shifted the burden to defendant to prove death penalty was
inappropriate;  claim XII (raised on direct appeal and found to lack merit)–the trial
judge’s application of HAC in post-penalty phase denied Hoffman a fair trial. 
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Hoffman filed his second amended motion for postconviction relief.  After an April
11, 1997 Huff2 hearing, the trial court issued an order outlining the issues that would
be heard at the evidentiary hearing and those that were barred.3 The trial court
found three issues required an evidentiary hearing:  (1) the State withheld
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland; (2) ineffective assistance of
counsel in the guilt/innocence phase; and (3) ineffective assistance in the penalty
phase.  The evidentiary hearing was held on July 15, 1997.  On June 29, 1998, the
4   Hoffman also claims the trial court erred in denying (1) his ineffective
assistance of counsel at penalty phase claims; (2) his ineffective assistance of counsel
at the guilt phase claim; (3) further disclosure of public records pursuant to chapter
119; (4) an evidentiary hearing on these claims: (a) whether there was a knowing,
intelligent waiver of Miranda rights; (b) denial of right to counsel and effective
assistance at critical stages of the proceedings; (c) prosecutor’s closing arguments
infected proceedings with unfairness rendering the sentence fundamentally unreliable
and unfair; (d) CCP was incorrectly applied; (e) trial counsel was ineffective at penalty
phase for failing to object to judge’s improper instruction on pretrial stipulations and
judicial bias in determining mitigators; (f) the jury was misled by instructions and
arguments diluting their sense of responsibility for sentencing in violation of Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), and Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.
1988); (g) penalty phase instructions improperly shifted burden to Hoffman to prove
death was inappropriate; (h) judge’s post-penalty application of HAC denied Hoffman
right to fair trial.  These issues are not discussed because they have been rendered
moot by our disposition based on the Brady claim.   
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trial court issued an order denying relief on the three claims. 
Hoffman appeals the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief.  He raises
five issues; we find merit in the Brady claim, and reverse his conviction on this
basis.4  
BRADY VIOLATION 
Hoffman claims he was entitled to a new trial because the evidence presented
at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates the State withheld exculpatory evidence and
there is a reasonable probability that had the defense known this information the
result of the trial would have been different.  We agree and remand this case to the
trial court for a new trial.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
5   The hair was also excluded as belonging to the female victim.
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When a Brady violation is alleged, the defendant must establish a prima facie
case that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  To meet this test, the defendant must prove:
(1) the State possessed favorable evidence, including impeachment evidence; (2)
the evidence was suppressed; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed, the outcome would have been different.  See Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Way v. State,
760 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2000).
Hair Evidence   
First, Hoffman argues that the trial court erred in denying his claim that the
State violated Brady by withholding the results of an exculpatory hair analysis, an
analysis which excluded Hoffman, codefendant White and the male victim,
Ihlenfeld, as the sources of the hairs found in the female victim’s hands.5  The State
contends that in its response to a discovery request, it disclosed the existence of a
hair analysis to defense counsel.  This disclosure, the State asserts, should have
placed Hoffman’s attorney on notice of any other evidence flowing therefrom. 
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Evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing indicates a long brown hair was found
in the right hand of Ms. Parrish, and hairs were found in the clutch of her left hand. 
Evaluation by the FDLE showed these hairs were Caucasian male head and pubic
hairs that did not match that of the defendant.  Additionally, the head hair did not
match that of the male victim. 
Hoffman argues this evidence was not available to defense counsel at trial
because the report was not disclosed.  The record indicates the defense filed a
demand for discovery on November 5, 1981.  The State answered the demand on
November 6, 1981, and indicated there were scientific reports available concerning
the autopsy, fingerprinting, blood analysis, and hair analysis.  However, the report
which indicated the Caucasian hair found in the female victim’s hand did not match
Hoffman’s hair was not done until February 11, 1982.  There is no indication that
the State ever disclosed this report to the defense, and the State does not argue that
this report was disclosed.  Instead, the State essentially argues that defense counsel
should have inquired further once told of the existence of other hair analyses. 
The State’s additional argument is that defense counsel Harris elicited
information at trial from a serologist about the hairs.  The information solicited,
however, was merely the fact that hairs were gathered at the scene.  The State
asserts this testimony sufficiently apprised the defense of the existence of this
6   None of the blood found at the scene or on the victims’ clothing matched
Hoffman’s blood type.
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evidence.  This argument is flawed in light of Strickler and Kyles, which squarely
place the burden on the State to disclose to the defendant all information in its
possession that is exculpatory.  In failing to do so, the State committed a Brady
violation when it did not disclose the results of the hair analysis pertaining to the
defendant.   
However, in order to be entitled to relief based on this nondisclosure,
Hoffman must demonstrate that the defense was prejudiced by the State’s
suppression of evidence.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-82.  To make this
determination, the suppressed evidence must be viewed in context with the other
evidence that was presented at trial.  The evidence at trial which tended to inculpate
the defendant was a fingerprint lifted from a cigarette pack found at the scene
matching Hoffman’s fingerprint.  The jury could have believed Hoffman was
present at the scene of the crime based on this evidence.  However, of saliva
samples taken from cigarette butts found at the scene, none matched Hoffman’s
type AB blood.6  The jury could also have believed, based on this evidence, that
Hoffman was not in that motel room, but that one of his acquaintances who was
present had Hoffman’s cigarette pack or a cigarette pack Hoffman had touched at
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some point.  Since Merrill, Mazzara, Hoffman and White all worked for the Provost
organization, such a scenario is not an impossibility.
The other evidence linking Hoffman to the crime was his confessions to FBI
agents and Jacksonville Beach Police officers.  Hoffman argued at trial that he never
made the Jackson, Michigan confession.  Additionally, he argued the unrecorded
statements given to the Jacksonville Beach police officers resulted from his drug
addiction and did not contain any information that had not been published in the
papers and known to everyone.  Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, Hoffman
presented evidence that another suspect also confessed to the crimes.  
Whether Hoffman was in fact in that motel room was an important issue that
the jury had to resolve.  Therefore, any evidence tending to either prove or disprove
this fact would be highly probative.  Hair evidence found in the victim’s clutched
hand could tend to prove recent contact between the victim and a person present in
that room at the time of her death.  With the evidence excluding Hoffman as the
source of the clutched hair, defense counsel could have strenuously argued that the
victim was clutching the hair of her assailant, but that assailant was not Hoffman.
Given the circumstances of this case, there is a reasonable probability, had
the evidence been disclosed, that the outcome would have been different.  See
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).   Therefore, the defendant is
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entitled to a new trial based on this Brady violation. 
Nondisclosure of Deal with George (Rocco) Marshall 
Hoffman also argues that the nondisclosure of certain aspects of Marshall’s
deal with the State served to bolster his testimony against Hoffman.  It does not
appear from the record that any evidence about Marshall’s deal was in fact
withheld.  Former defense counsel Harris testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
could not say if the State had disclosed evidence regarding Marshall, his deal with
the police, or his connection to the Provost organization.  When asked if he would
have presented evidence of Marshall and the victim being involved in the same drug
organization, Mr. Harris responded, “Possibly, yes. I don’t know.”  At trial, Harris
was able to elicit unfavorable testimony from Marshall about himself, including his
drug use and dealing and his initial denial when asked by the police if he knew
anything about these murders.  Once offered a deal, he implicated Hoffman.  This
negative character information was used to diminish Marshall’s credibility in the
eyes of the jurors.  However, despite this information, the jurors convicted the
defendant of these crimes and recommended a sentence of death for Hoffman.
In denying relief on this claim, the trial judge said:
The identity of Rocco Marshall and the extent of his
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knowledge about this case were well known to the
defense throughout the discovery and pretrial stages of
the case.  The defendant’s trial counsel vigorously cross-
examined Mr. Marshall at trial and established a number
of effective points which might damage his credibility
with a jury.  These facts could only have been known to
defense counsel at trial as the result of adequate, and
indeed thorough, pretrial discovery.  The specific
circumstances of his incentives to testify were well known
to the defense, and were talked about at trial.
These findings are supported by the record and demonstrate that Hoffman is not
entitled to relief on this issue.  Hoffman has failed to demonstrate that any material
evidence concerning Marshall was withheld.
Evidence Regarding Other Suspects
Third, Hoffman argues that the State withheld, to his detriment, evidence
about the existence of other suspects.  Hoffman contends that information
concerning Bubba Jackson, Bones Merrill, Clarence Robinson and Meade Haskins
was withheld.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel answered in the negative
when asked if the State had disclosed Bubba Jackson’s confession to the murders. 
Counsel also replied he was unaware that Jackson had told a friend, David Jack,
that he had broken off a knife in Mr. Ihlenfeld’s back.  Counsel explained that in
light of the fact that the blade of a knife had been found in Ihlenfeld’s back, he
would have presented that evidence to the jury.  Counsel was not questioned about
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the other individuals named above.   
As the State points out, the prosecution is not required to give the defendant
all information regarding its investigatory work on a particular case.   In fact, as
stated in Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1249 (Fla. 1997), “Brady does not
require disclosure of all information concerning preliminary, discontinued
investigations of all possible suspects in a crime.”  The State argues that trial
counsel was aware that there were other suspects in the case based upon testimony
at trial.  Detective Dorn testified at the evidentiary hearing that only after the
investigation of other suspects were the police led to Hoffman and codefendant
White.
The State does not argue that the reports concerning the investigation of
other suspects were disclosed.  Instead the State relies on the general proposition
that the State is not required to give the defense all of its investigative information in
order to satisfy the requirements of Brady.  See Medina; Spaziano v. State, 570 So.
2d  289 (Fla. 1990); and Swafford v. Dugger, 569 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1990). 
Although this is generally true, under the circumstances of this case, where another
person has also confessed to the crime, the State should have disclosed that
information to the defense.  There is a reasonable probability that the result of the
trial would have been different had the jury heard that another suspect had
7   The record indicates that Hoffman has type AB blood, James White has type
A blood, Bubba Jackson has type A blood, Linda Parrish had type A blood, and
Ihlenfeld had type B blood.  The blood type retrieved from the cigarette butt and
Ihlenfeld’s jeans was type O.
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confessed and the hair in the victim’s hand did not belong to Hoffman.
Blood Analysis
Hoffman complains that the blood types of the other suspects were not
revealed by the State.  However, during the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel
admitted to being aware that there was blood found at the scene of the crime that
was inconsistent with Hoffman’s and White’s.  The testimony of the serologist at
trial, including defense counsel’s cross-examination, all revealed that the blood
found at the scene did not match others who were involved or suspected of
involvement in these murders.7   Hoffman did not show at the evidentiary hearing
that the State did in fact withhold any information regarding this blood or that the
information was exculpatory.  Thus, Hoffman has not demonstrated a violation of 
Brady.  
Hoffman’s Post-Plea Statements
Lastly, Hoffman contends that trial counsel was denied access to records of
Hoffman’s post-plea statements.  During a hearing on December 21, 1982, defense
counsel moved for rehearing of a motion to suppress Hoffman’s statements that
8   Moreover, the prosecutor testified at the evidentiary hearing that his
conversations with Hoffman were not recorded and no notes were taken.  He also
indicated he discussed the substance of those conversations with defense counsel, and
he said defense counsel had copies of depositions given by Hoffman to the attorneys
for White and Mazzara in which Hoffman confessed to his involvement in both
murders.  
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had initially been argued and denied on June 25, 1982.  A rehearing was held on
January 10, 1983, where defense counsel argued that any incriminating statements
made by Hoffman to the prosecutor should be suppressed because they were made
without the assistance of counsel and while Hoffman was under the influence of
drugs.  The prosecutor agreed not to use those statements at trial and, in fact,
refrained from doing so during the trial.  The record reflects that these statements
were not only known to defense counsel but were not used in any manner that
would have prejudiced Hoffman.8  For these reasons, relief on this claim is denied. 
Conclusion
We find that the Brady violation pertaining to the nondisclosure of hair
evidence and the confession of another person to these crimes severely
compromised Hoffman’s right to a fair trial and requires reversal of the trial court’s
ruling and Hoffman’s convictions.  Hoffman’s remaining claims are rendered moot
by our decision on the Brady issue and do not require further discussion here.  We
reverse the trial court’s denial of Hoffman’s motion for post-conviction relief and
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direct that his conviction be set aside.  We also remand this case for a new trial.
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
L. Page Haddock, Judge - Case Nos.  81-9299 CF & 82-2527 CF 
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Linda McDermott, Assistant CCC-NR,
and John A. Tomasino, Assistant CCC-NR, Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel -
Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee