Title: Swallows v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.
Citation: 543 S.W.2d 581
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1976

543 S.W.2d 581 (1976) C.D. SWALLOWS, Appellant, v. WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. and Pinkerton's, Inc., Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. November 15, 1976. William P. Sutherland, Watkins, McGugin, McNeilly &amp; Rowan, Nashville, for appellant. J.G. Lackey, Jr., Stephenson &amp; Lackey, Don R. Binkley, Gracey, Maddin, Cowan &amp; Bird, Nashville, for appellees. COOPER, Chief Justice. C.D. Swallows filed an action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, against his employer, Western Electric Company, Inc., and a detective agency, Pinkerton's, Inc., charging the defendants were guilty of "outrageous conduct" and "invasion of privacy," which caused the plaintiff to suffer severe physical and emotional harm. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, testing the sufficiency of the complaint, as amended. The trial judge then dismissed the action, holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action on either of the theories advanced by Mr. Swallows. We affirm. The predicate for the action against appellees is set forth in the following paragraphs of the complaint, as amended: The appellant also charged that the appellees had actual knowledge that appellant has suffered from mild emotional difficulties in the past and that they should have known that the conduct described above would have "a most deleterious effect upon [appellant's] emotional stability and well being," and that the actions of appellants, in fact, did cause appellant to suffer "the most grievous mental and emotional pain and suffering...." Liability for the tort of "outrageous conduct" exists only where (1) the conduct of the defendants has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to be beyond the pale of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society, and (2) the conduct results in serious mental injury. Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966).[1] "`The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or *583 other trivialities.'" Restatement of Torts (2d), § 46, comment (d), quoted with approval in Medlin, supra 398 S.W.2d at page 274. In Martin v. Senators, Inc., 220 Tenn. 465, 418 S.W.2d 660 (1967), assuming the existence of the common law right of action for invasion of privacy, this court pointed out a condition engrafted on the action, in that: The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, while simplifying and liberalizing pleading, do not relieve the plaintiff in a tort action of the burden of averring facts sufficient to show the existence of a duty owed by the defendant, a breach of the duty, and damages resulting therefrom. The complaint in this action is replete with conclusions couched in the language of Medlin, supra, but does not undertake to describe the substance and severity of the conduct of appellee's employees which allegedly amounted to harassment, nor the substance and severity of the conduct of Pinkerton in its investigations, nor the actions of Western Electric in attempting to discipline appellant. And, as was pointed out in Medlin, "it is not enough in an action of this kind to allege a legal conclusion; the actionable conduct should be set out in the [complaint]," supra 398 S.W.2d at page 275. This is so because the court has the burden of determining, in the first instance, whether appellees' conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery or whether the conduct is such as to be classed as "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities," for which appellees would not be liable. See comments to § 46 of the Restatement of Torts, Second. The judgment of the trial court dismissing appellant's suit for failure to state a cause of action is affirmed. Costs incident to the appeal are adjudged against the appellant and his surety. FONES, HENRY, BROCK and HARBISON, JJ., concur. [1] See Johnson v. Woman's Hospital, 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. App. 1975), for conduct which meets the test prescribed in Medlin, supra.