Title: State v. Small
Citation: 105 Ariz. 363, 464 P.2d 955
Docket Number: 1941
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 1970

105 Ariz. 363 (1970) 464 P.2d 955 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Waymond SMALL, Appellant. No. 1941. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 10, 1970. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Sam Lazovich, Miami, for appellant. LOCKWOOD, Chief Justice. Defendant appeals only from a sentence imposed after a plea of guilty to a charge of robbery. The sentence was a term of imprisonment of not less than twelve nor more than fifteen years in the Arizona State Penitentiary. Defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court on a charge of robbery on April 1, 1968. At that time the court corrected the record to show his correct name and asked if he had an attorney or had funds with which to employ *364 an attorney. The defendant replied that he did not have an attorney and said, "the court will have to appoint me an attorney." The court, after one or two further questions regarding indigency, thereupon appointed Attorney Sam Lazovich to represent the defendant. Attorney Lazovich requested time in which to consult with the defendant and the matter was set for the following Monday, April 8, 1968. On April 8, 1968, the defendant and his attorney appeared in court and the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. A trial was set for May 28th and the court stood at recess. However, within a few moments the defendant and his counsel asked the court to reconvene at which time the attorney stated: The defendant then spoke to the court as follows: The court then proceeded to question the defendant in a commendably fair and thorough manner, as to his understanding of what he was doing in entering a plea of guilty, and whether he understood the consequences thereof as follows: The court thereupon directed that the plea be taken and the defendant entered a plea of guilty. The court set a time for sentence for the following Monday. However, in the meantime and before the time set for sentence, the following occurred: In some manner the defendant appeared in the main office of the sheriff at the time that certain trusties were removing garbage cans from the jail. Defendant requested permission from the deputy sheriff in charge to help carry out the cans. Defendant and the trusties walked out of the office to the alley with the garbage cans. The trusties returned but the defendant kept on walking. Defendant was apprehended some four days later and returned to the County Jail, at which time an additional charge was filed against him for "escape from the County Jail." On May 6th the defendant was brought before the court presumably for arraignment on the escape charge and the court appointed Attorney Lazovich to represent the defendant on the new charge. The attorney then requested that a Rule 250, 17 A.R.S., hearing be held for determination of whether the defendant was able to understand the proceedings against him or assist in his defense. The defendant was arraigned on the escape charge at this time, but was not required to enter a plea pending the outcome of the Rule 250 hearing. The court appointed Dr. Maier Tuchler, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Walter O'Brien, a medical doctor, to make the examination of the defendant. On May 15th the court held a hearing at which the two doctors testified as to the ability of the defendant to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. Dr. Tuchler testified as follows: Dr. O'Brien testified that he had just had a few brief words with the defendant before the hearing, and upon request of defendant's attorney court was recessed so that Dr. O'Brien could interview the defendant for a greater length of time. He did so for a period of a half hour or more. Court reconvened and Dr. O'Brien was questioned as to his opinion whether the defendant understood the proceedings against him and whether he was capable of assisting in his defense. The doctor answered both questions affirmatively, and also stated that he believed the defendant "knew the difference between right and wrong all along." In the course of the examination of Dr. O'Brien there was testimony that the defendant had had difficulties since the age of nine, and that he had also at one time had electric shock treatments. During the hearing on redirect examination by the County Attorney the following questions and answers were asked and made: On re-cross examination by Attorney Lazovich the following testimony was adduced: On subsequent redirect examination Dr. O'Brien was asked to read from a report prepared by Dr. Tuchler. He related the report as follows: Dr. O'Brien's testimony concluded the state's evidence. The defendant presented no testimony or evidence. The court then entered the following judgment: On May 20, 1968, the court reconvened. The defendant first entered a plea of "not guilty" to the escape charge, and then the court turned to this matter for sentencing. The defendant's attorney made a statement, which was a summary of the pre-sentencing report prepared by the Court's Probation Officer, Jay L. Warner. This report has been appended to Appellant's Opening Brief. Although in may criminal cases before this Court we are totally unable to understand why the defendant has acted in the violent anti-social manner in which he has, such is not the case here. Here, the pre-sentencing report has given us a glimpse into the social and mental background of this young man. It is a thorough case study of the defendant as an individual, prepared by a probation officer who did an excellent job to give the judge an opportunity to exercise his best judgment on the sentence. The report shows that the defendant was born June 9, 1945, in Cedar Bluff, Alabama. He was one of five children. His father abandoned the family when the defendant was very young and his mother subsequently divorced him and remarried. His step-father died and defendant remembers little about him. In 1949, the defendant's mother moved the family from Alabama to Ohio, and they settled in Columbus. In 1954, when the defendant was nine, he had his first recorded experience with a correctional institution. At this time he was sent to the Juvenile Diagnostic Center in Columbus, Ohio, because he tried to hang himself. He remained there for six months. From there he was placed in the Franklin County Village (a home for neglected minors) where he remained for four months before returning to his mother's home. At age twelve (1957) he was sent to the Fairfield School for Boys in Lancaster, Ohio, (an industrial school) because of delinquent behavior and problems in school. During the next two years the defendant was in and out of the Fairfield School for Boys three times before being sent back to the Juvenile Diagnostic Center. He was at the Diagnostic Center for three months and was then returned to the Fairfield School. In 1960 he ran away from Fairfield and went to Cordele, Georgia, where he lived with a family friend. While in Georgia, the defendant became involved in difficulties with the law. He was sent to an institution in Alto, Georgia, where he remained for about a year. In 1962, after leaving Alto, Georgia, he returned to Columbus, Ohio. He learned from an uncle that his father was in Phoenix, Arizona. In December of 1962, the defendant came to Phoenix, Arizona and lived with his father for a few months before the two left for Houston, Texas. In June of 1963 he went back to Columbus, Ohio, and tried to jump into the Scio River. As a result, he was placed in a hospital until August of 1967 when he *368 walked off and went home to live with his mother. He remained with his mother until October of 1967, when he went to Perris, California to stay with his father. He remained in California until February of 1968 when he came to Phoenix, Arizona. From Phoenix he went to Globe and the incidents resulting in this incarceration arose. Under the prevailing theory of penology, once a person has been convicted of a crime, our system of criminal justice then has three basic responsibilities. First, it must exact a penalty from the person; second, it must protect society from this person until he may be returned to society to lead a productive life; and third, while protecting society, it must attempt to rehabilitate the individual so that he can be released as a beneficial member of society. The case of Waymond G. Small is a classic example of the failure of our penal system to accomplish two of these responsibilities. The pattern of criminal involvement has been established, and the mold is set. Defendant asks this Court to review and reduce the length of his prison sentence because, under the circumstances of this case, it is so severe as to shock the moral sense of the community. A.R.S. § 13-1717, subsec. B authorizes us to review and reduce sentences imposed by a trial court. Our attitude on the exercise of this authority is expressed in State v. Maberry, 93 Ariz. 306, 309, 380 P.2d 604, 606 (1963): We cannot say the trial court at this point in time abused its discretion in imposition of the sentence, which is within the statutory minimum and maximum limits. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL, McFARLAND, and HAYS, JJ., concur.