Title: WEBER v WEBER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13925
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 1978

No. 13925 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1978 B E U L A H MAY WEBER, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- JACK L. WEBER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Boyd, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman H. Bennett, I11 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Maurice Maffei argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: January 31, 1978 W R * ,. - I . - F i l e d : M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the District Court, Deer Lodge County, entered June 8, 1977, finding defendant Jack Weber delinquent i n payment of child support and determining he was not entitled t o modification of the decree of custody entered on November 15, 1972, with respect t o the two minor children of the parties t o t h i s action. The period of time relevant to t h i s appeal commenced i n the l a t e spring and early summer of 1976, when plaintiff mother contacted defendant father for the purpose of requesting him t o care for the minor children for the summer months of 1976. Following the conversation defendant traveled t o the home of p l a i n t i f f , acquired the children and returned t o h i s home i n Belgrade f o r the purpose of caring for the children during the summer months. In the f a l l 1976, defendant returned the children t o p l a i n t i f f . A discussion between the parties took place as t o whether defendant could maintain the temporary custody of the children for the purpose of allowing the children to attend school i n Belgrade. Following t h i s discussion, plaintiff agreed t o allow defendant t o maintain the custody of the minor son, John, t o allow him t o attend school i n Belgrade. Defendant thereafter returned t o h i s home and enrolled h i s son i n the Belgrade school system. Subsequently defendant was advised by h i s sister-in-law, Dorothy Weber, that p l a i n t i f f was bringing the minor daughter Brenda eo Gallatin Gateway for the purpose of residing with defendant' s sister-in-law and brother. Thereupon defendant went t o the home of h i s sister-in-law and brother and took h i s daughter with him t o Belgrade and enrolled her i n the Belgrade school system, without the permission of h i s ex-wife. O n September 26, 1976, plaintiff returned t o Gallatin Gateway t o v i s i t with her minor daughter a t which time she was advised the child was residing with defendant. She then went to defendant's home i n Belgrade t o get her daughter. Following an altercation which occurred on September 26 a t the residence of defendant, a motion for temporary restraining order, supported by affidavit, was f i l e d by plaintiff and was followed by a temporary order and order to show cause issued by the District Court. After the issuance of the order t o show cause defendant surrendered the children t o p l a i n t i f f . These issues a r e presented for review: 1) Whether the District Court erred i n failing t o modify the custody degree entered i n November 1972, with respect t o the two minor children of the parties? 2) Whether the District Court erred i n determining delinquencies i n child support without allowing credit t o defendant for house repairs, groceries purchased, and clothing purchased for the children? It is the position of defendant that the court erred i n failing t o modify the custody with respect t o both children. The basis for the modification i s different for each child. Section 48-339, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n part: "(2) The court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree o r that were un- known t o the court a t the time of entry of the prior decree, that a change has occurred i n the circumstances of the child or h i s custodian, and that the modification is necessary t o serve the best interest of the child. J I n applying these standards the court s h a l l retain the custodian appointed pursuant t o the prior de- cree unless: "(b) The child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with consent of the custodian * * *." Defendant argues that i n the case of h i s minor son, John, integration took place with the consent of p l a i n t i f f . The record i s not clear a s t o the arrangement concerning how long the son was t o stay with the father, but the father did enter the son i n the Belgrade school system for the year 1976-1977. It is apparent from the record that when defendant was allowed t o take the minor son for the school year 1976-1977, that John was not integrated into defendant father's family because a temporary restraining order was f i l e d on October 1, 1976 and the custody of the son returned t o the plaintiff. The son was only i n the custody of the defendant from early summer 1976 to October 1, 1976. There i s no evidence from which the court could determine, a s required by section 48-339(2), R.C.M. 1947, that a change has occurred i n the circumstances of the child John, o r h i s custodian, which requires a modification t o serve h i s best interests. This Court has long relied upon the discretion of the District Court in custody matters. I n Brooks v. Brooks, Mont . , 556 P.2d 901, 33 St. Rep. 1114, 1116, the Court stated: "This Court has long followed the rule that unless there is a clear abuse of discretion by the t r i a l court, a decision on custody w i l l not be overruled on appeal. Love v. Love, 106 Mont. 303, 533 P.2d 280; Gilmore v. Gilmore, 166 Mont.47, 530 P.2d 480; Anderson v. Anderson, 145 Mont. 244, 400 P.2d 632. In these cases t h i s Court has committed i t s e l f t o the view that the welfare of the child i s the paramount consideration i n awarding custody and that it must of necessity, be l e f t largely t o the discretion of the t r i a l judge. H e hears the testimony, sees the witnesses' demeanor and has a superior advantage i n determining those d i f f i c u l t problems .'' W e can find no abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court regarding the custody of John, the minor son. I n regard to the minor daughter Brenda, defendant asks t h i s Court t o look t o section 48-339(2)(c), R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s that i n applying i t s standards the court s h a l l retain the custodian appointed pursuant t o the prior decree unless: " (c) the child ' s present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental,moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely t o be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its advan- tages t o him." It is the position of defendant that the record preponderates i n favor of modification of custody based upon section 48-339(2)(c). From the record it is clear Brenda was .placed i n the custody of defendant for the summer 1976. After plaintiff returned from receiving medical treatment i n California, she took Brenda with her t o her home i n Anaconda. Thereafter, she, as the custodian of the child, placed her temporarily in the home of her former brother-in-law, Sam Weber. Defendant without the consent of plaintiff took Brenda t o h i s own home and would not return her custody t o p l a i n t i f f , u n t i l the court order required him t o do so. W e find no change i n the circumstances of p l a i n t i f f mother which would justify a modification of the decree as it pertains t o the custody of the minor daughter Brenda. The welfare and best interests of the child are the primary concern of the court and even though there have been substantial changes i n the mother's health, t h i s Court w i l l not modify the order unless the welfare of the child w i l l be promoted. Plaintiff t e s t i f i e d she has no present health problems which would interfere with her duties i n caring for the children. Defendant has failed t o produce any evidence upon which a modification of custody could be based. The District Court as t r i e r of the facts, had the opportunity t o observe the parties, had the benefit of the reports of the welfare departments and found insufficient evidence for modifi- cation of the decree as it pertains t o the custody of the two minor children. This Court w i l l not disturb that ruling. Also, it i s defendant's position t h a t the District Court failed t o recognize other contributions made by him toward the support of h i s children i n determining that defendant was delinquent in payment of child support. Haaby v. Haaby, (1974), 165 Mont. 475, 478, 529 P.2d 1387. Here, defendant father has contributed t o the support of h i s minor children i n ways other than the payment of child sup- port. It i s uncontradicted that he (1) bought groceries for the children; (2) bought clothes for the children; ( 3 ) repaired the motor i n the furnace a t the mother's home; and (4) skirted the t r a i l e r home of the mother. A l l of these contributions enhance the welfare of the children, but are things customarily performed by a father i n addition t o support payments. Further, the problem of giving the defendant father credit for doing these things is that nowhere i n the record does defendant offer testimony as t o the amount he spent for groceries, clothing and repairs. The D i s t r i c t Court had no way of knowing whether he contributed, i n kind, an amount equal t o the delinquency i n the support payments. Therefore, the D i s t r i c t Court was not i n error i n holding that defendant was delinquent i n h i s child'support payments. The judgment of the District Court i s affirmed. f F Justice W e Concur: - - Chief stic ice