Title: Coleman v. Martinez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2021

Coleman v. Martinez Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether, under the facts of this case, plaintiff Leah Coleman, the victim of a violent assault by social worker Sonia Martinez’s patient, could bring a negligence claim against Martinez. Martinez’s patient, T.E., suffered two violent episodes prior to her treatment with Martinez. Coleman worked for the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) and was tasked with ensuring the welfare of T.E.’s children when the children were removed from T.E.'s care after her hospitalization following her second violent incident. In a letter to Coleman dated October 1, 2014, Martinez stated that T.E. had been compliant during her sessions and with her medication and was ready and able to begin having unsupervised visits with her children with the goal of reunification. At her deposition, Martinez acknowledged the inaccuracy of representing that T.E. did not exhibit psychotic symptoms in light of what she and the group counselor had seen. During a November 7 appointment, Martinez disclosed to T.E. Coleman’s report of T.E.’s hallucinations. T.E. “became upset” and “tearful,” denied any psychotic symptoms, and reiterated her goal of regaining custody of her children. Later that day, T.E. called DCPP and spoke with Coleman. During their conversation, T.E. referenced her session with Martinez, denied that she was experiencing auditory hallucinations, and stated she did not understand why such a claim would be fabricated. Coleman advised T.E. to seek advice from an attorney as DCPP would “maintain that she [was] not capable of parenting independently due to her mental health issues.” Six days later, T.E. made an unscheduled visit to DCPP offices, where she stabbed Coleman twenty-two times in the face, chest, arms, shoulders, and back. Coleman filed a complaint against Martinez, alleging that Martinez was negligent in identifying her to T.E. as the source of information about T.E.’s hallucinations, and that T.E.’s attack was a direct and proximate result of Martinez’s negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Martinez, finding no legal duty owed to Coleman under the particularized foreseeability standard set forth in J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330 (1998). The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Martinez had a duty to Coleman under the circumstances here. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Leah Coleman v. Sonia Martinez (A-3-20) (084489)Argued February 2, 2021-- Decided July 15, 2021SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether, under the facts of this case, plaintiff Leah Coleman, the victim of a violent assault by social worker Sonia Martinez’s patient, may bring a negligence claim against Martinez. Martinez’s patient T.E. suffered two violent episodes prior to her treatment with Martinez. In 2007, T.E. attacked her or her mother’s landlord -- punching, biting, and stabbing him before chasing him with a knife. In 2011, T.E. attacked a friend, throwing hot oil, stabbing her, and hitting her with a frying pan. Just over a year after the second incident, officers responded to reports of T.E. standing in the middle of the street, screaming and clutching one of her children. According to police, T.E. claimed that aliens were after her. She also reported auditory hallucinations commanding self-harm. Officers transported T.E. to the hospital, at which point the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) removed her five children. DCPP’s contract with Hispanic Family Center (HFC) occasioned T.E.’s referral to Martinez, a mental-health therapist at HFC. Martinez conducted a risk assessment of T.E. in October 2013, finding her to be low risk, with “[n]o history of violence.” Martinez acknowledged at deposition that this designation was inappropriate. In November 2013, a psychiatrist at HFC instructed that T.E. be immediately scheduled with him upon “decompensation.” In a separate assessment later in November 2013, T.E. stated that her goal was to regain custody of her children, an objective she repeated throughout her treatment at HFC. As is reflected in Martinez’s progress notes, she met with T.E. regularly over the next year. Three notes from April, July, and August 2014, respectively, are of particular relevance: (1) T.E. was observed talking to herself during a counseling group, and she got up and yelled, “I just saw Jesus”; (2) Martinez observed T.E. “appear[ing] to be responding to outside stimuli,” but T.E. “[v]ehemently denied 'hearing voices,’” became upset that “others [were] 'lying’ about her (regarding 'hearing voices’),” and was concerned that those alleged lies could prevent her from regaining custody of her children; (3) Martinez observed that T.E. seemed “distracted and was engaged [i]n discussion [and] that she appeared to be 'hearing or trying to listen to something.’” 1 Coleman worked for DCPP and was tasked with ensuring the welfare of T.E.’s children. In a letter to Coleman dated October 1, 2014, Martinez stated that T.E. had been compliant during her sessions and with her medication and was ready and able to begin having unsupervised visits with her children with the goal of reunification. At her deposition, Martinez acknowledged the inaccuracy of representing that T.E. did not exhibit psychotic symptoms in light of what she and the group counselor had seen. On October 28, 2014, Coleman emailed Martinez that T.E. “ha[d] shared with a family member that she hear[d] commanding voices, to which she fe[lt] an obligation to act on their commands.” Coleman further wrote that T.E. told the family member that she had withheld that information from Martinez and her psychiatrist. Martinez responded to the email the following day, informing Coleman that T.E. had a November 7, 2014 appointment and that she would address the issue with her. Martinez later acknowledged that Coleman’s email suggested psychosis necessitating immediate attention and evidenced that T.E. had not been honest with Martinez. During T.E.’s appointment with Martinez on November 7, Martinez disclosed to T.E. Coleman’s report of T.E.’s hallucinations. T.E. “became upset” and “tearful,” denied any psychotic symptoms, and reiterated her goal of regaining custody of her children. Martinez later conceded that, as of the November 7 appointment, she was aware that (1) T.E. had a history of violence, (2) clients with children were often upset with DCPP, (3) T.E. had not met with her psychiatrist since July 2014, (4) T.E. needed to refill her Prozac prescription, which itself did not treat hallucinations, and (5) it was advisable that T.E. be seen by a psychiatrist. Instead of taking any action to ensure that T.E. received treatment, despite instructions to refer T.E. to the HFC psychiatrist immediately upon decompensation, Martinez encouraged T.E. to “follow up with medications” and attend her next psychiatric appointment. Later that day, T.E. called DCPP and spoke with Coleman. During their conversation, T.E. referenced her session with Martinez, denied that she was experiencing auditory hallucinations, and stated she did not understand why such a claim would be fabricated. Coleman advised T.E. to seek advice from an attorney as DCPP would “maintain that she [was] not capable of parenting independently due to her mental health issues.” Six days later, T.E. made an unscheduled visit to DCPP offices, where she stabbed Coleman twenty-two times in the face, chest, arms, shoulders, and back. Coleman filed a complaint against Martinez, alleging that Martinez was negligent in identifying her to T.E. as the source of information about T.E.’s auditory hallucinations, and that T.E.’s attack was a direct and proximate result of Martinez’s negligence. During discovery, Dr. Charles A. Dackis, M.D., provided an expert report on behalf of Coleman concluding to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Martinez deviated from acceptable standards of treatment-team therapists by failing to report evidence of T.E.’s psychosis to her psychiatrist. The “most egregious” example of 2 Martinez’s negligence, according to Dr. Dackis, was her failure to immediately contact T.E.’s psychiatrist after receiving direct evidence in Coleman’s email that T.E. was experiencing hallucinations. Instead, Martinez waited more than a week to meet with T.E. and “needlessly identified [Coleman] as the source of information to her psychotic patient.” Dr. Dackis opined that, had Martinez reported T.E. to her treating psychiatrist, T.E. would have been placed on anti-psychotic medication, would have been carefully monitored, and would not have assaulted Coleman. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Martinez, finding no legal duty owed to Coleman under the particularized foreseeability standard set forth in J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330 (1998). Important to the court were the facts that no direct threat was ever communicated and that no evidence of violent behavior preceded the attack. The Appellate Division reversed, stressing Martinez’s long-term relationship with T.E. and her awareness of T.E.’s prior aggravated assaults and psychotic episodes. The Court granted certification, 244 N.J. 163 (2020), to determine whether the record, viewed in a light most favorable to Coleman, could establish that Martinez owed a duty to Coleman.HELD: The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that Martinez had a duty to Coleman under the circumstances presented here.1. To determine whether a duty of care exists, a court first considers the foreseeability of harm to a potential plaintiff. Foreseeability of injury, as it affects the existence of a duty, refers to the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. In J.S., the Court synthesized reasoning from previous cases about the foreseeability inquiry and how it can be tailored to address when the proposed duty of care pertains to third-party harm. The Court noted that, “where the nature of the risk or the extent of harm is difficult to ascertain, foreseeability may require that the defendant have a special reason to know that a particular plaintiff . . . would likely suffer a particular type of injury.” 155 N.J. at 338. When the risk of harm has been unreasonably enhanced, however, foreseeability does not require an identifiable victim or harm, but rather extends to persons who fall normally and generally within a zone of risk created by the particular tortious conduct. (pp. 16-23)2. Whereas the foreseeability inquiry is thus rooted in the specific facts of a particular case, the fairness and policy inquiry focuses on the ability to derive from those facts a general rule that can sensibly, predictably, and fairly govern future conduct. To evaluate the relevant fairness and policy considerations at issue, this Court has adopted a test that requires “identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors -- the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993). Here, both components of the duty-of-care analysis must include the fact that Martinez is a mental-health professional and that her alleged negligence (a) occurred in the course of providing mental-health services to T.E., and (b) included her own revelation of the eventual victim’s identity to T.E. (pp. 23-25) 3 3. In McIntosh v. Milano, the court held “that a psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect an intended or potential victim of his patient when” the psychiatrist “determines, or should determine, in the appropriate factual setting and in accordance with the standards of his profession established at trial, that the patient is or may present a probability of danger to that person.” 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489 (Law Div. 1979). Reasoning that the duty could be premised on either the existing relationship between practitioner and patient or on a practitioner’s broader obligation to protect the community, akin to the duty to warn others of an infectious disease, the court determined that a jury could have found in that case that the psychiatrist knew or should have known that his patient posed a threat to the victim, or that there was a duty to “look into” whether the patient was a danger. Id. at 489-90. (pp. 25-27)4. Enacted in part to codify McIntosh, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 immunizes licensed medical professionals in the fields of “psychology, psychiatry, medicine, nursing, clinical social work, or marriage and family therapy” from civil liability for patients’ violent acts “unless the practitioner has incurred a duty to warn and protect the potential victim” in accordance with the test set forth in the statute. Reviewing the text and legislative history of the statute and applying traditional principles of construction, the Court finds Martinez does not fall within N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 but notes that, “even if a practitioner does not incur a duty to warn and protect under the statute, he or she may still be liable for a breach of his or her duty to treat a patient in accordance with applicable professional standards.” See Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 39 (2006). The Court finds that to be the case here and that the duty-of-care analysis developed through case law -- the particularized foreseeability inquiry adopted for third-person harm, followed by the four- prong fairness and public policy analysis -- therefore governs. (pp. 27-31)5. Applying that test, Martinez was aware of T.E.’s prior acts of violence and suspected auditory hallucinations; she did not follow the express instruction that T.E. should be referred immediately to a psychiatrist upon decompensation; and she inexplicably identified Coleman as the source of information adverse to T.E.’s regaining custody of her children, despite her awareness (1) of T.E.’s goal of reunification with her children, (2) that patients “who were trying to get custody of their kids back were often upset with [D]CPP,” and (3) that T.E. had paranoid thoughts. Considering the facts in a light most favorable to Coleman, Martinez made Coleman an antagonist to T.E. in her pursuit to regain custody of her children. Even though T.E. did not communicate a specific threat directed at Coleman, Martinez’s identification of Coleman and failure to immediately refer T.E. to a psychiatrist, combined with the information she had at the time, made it particularly foreseeable that T.E. would lash out violently against Coleman. (pp. 32-38)6. Having found foreseeability, the Court next considers whether imposition of a duty here would be fair by applying the Hopkins factors. An important consideration in assessing the relationship between the parties is the responsibility for conditions creating the risk of harm; here, Martinez’s failure to refer T.E. for immediate psychiatric 4 assistance allowed the ultimate harm realized. What’s more, Martinez increased the risk by identifying Coleman as the source of adverse information. Second, the Court notes the considerable nature of the risk. The failure of a mental-health practitioner to exercise reasonable care may lead to serious physical harm to patients and others. Third, Martinez had ample opportunity and ability to avoid the harm realized. Dr. Dackis’s report concluded that, had Martinez referred T.E. to her psychiatrist, she would have been placed on medication and monitored, and the assault would have been avoided. When, as here, the burden on a defendant is low in relation to the potential harm posed, imposition of duty is fair and appropriate. In sum, fairness and policy favor the imposition of a duty when a patient’s threat of harm to identifiable third parties is particularly foreseeable. The Court provides guidance as to how the duty it recognizes here may be tailored by factors related to the patient and to the practitioner in future settings. (p. 38-42)7. Going forward, a jury will determine whether Martinez breached the duty of care she has been found to have owed in this case by not referring T.E. for psychiatric evaluation as she had been instructed to do and by disclosing Coleman’s identity as the person who reported T.E.’s hallucinations; whether that breach was the proximate cause of the harm Coleman suffered; and, if so, whether Coleman has proven damages and the quantum of such damages. The Court adds guidance concerning proximate cause, leaving the issue to the jury and explaining that, should a jury conclude that Martinez breached the duty of care identified in this opinion, the jury could also conclude that that breach was the proximate cause of Coleman’s injuries. (pp. 42-45) AFFIRMED and REMANDED for further proceedings. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, writes that the common law should be harmonized with the standards of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 so that the public policies enunciated by the Legislature through its statutory enactment and by the Court through the common law are not in conflict. Noting that a mental health professional listed in the statute would have had no duty to warn or protect Coleman here, Justice Albin finds it discordant that Martinez, a licensed social worker, is exposed to liability, whereas a licensed clinical social worker or even a licensed psychiatrist with much greater knowledge and expertise in the field of human behavior would not. Justice Albin asserts that basic fairness and an enlightened public policy strongly indicate that the duty-to-warn-or-protect standard governing licensed social workers and clinical social workers should not be different. In Justice Albin’s view, conforming - - standard of “particularized foreseeability,” in the J.S.’s case of a licensed social worker, to the guideline in N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 would maintain a consistent standard for similarly situated mental health professionals. Under that standard, Justice Albin submits, Martinez did not have a duty to warn or protect Coleman.JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA join. 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 3 September Term 2020 084489 Leah Coleman, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sonia Martinez, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided February 2, 2021 July 15, 2021 Mark A. Lockett argued the cause for appellant (Kiernan Trebach, attorneys; Mark A. Lockett, on the briefs). Gary D. Ginsberg argued the cause for respondent (Ginsberg & O’Connor, attorneys; Gary D. Ginsberg, on the briefs). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. After T.E.1 suffered a psychotic episode that included auditoryhallucinations, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency1 As did the Appellate Division, we refer to T.E. by her initials. 1 (DCPP) removed her five children and, in October 2013, referred T.E. forcounseling to defendant Sonia Martinez, a licensed social worker. Over thefollowing thirteen months, Martinez learned of or was present for at least fourepisodes of T.E.’s auditory hallucinations. Martinez did not refer T.E. forpsychiatric intervention, despite having been instructed to do so. And shecontacted DCPP in October 2014 to facilitate unsupervised visits between T.E.and her children. When plaintiff Leah Coleman, a DCPP employee, wrote to Martinezseveral weeks later explaining that T.E. had confided to a member of herfamily that T.E. continued to experience and conceal hallucinations, Martinezresponded that she would be meeting with T.E. about a week later. At thatmeeting, Martinez told T.E. that Martinez had been informed of T.E.’shallucinations and identified Coleman to T.E. as the source of that information.Believing the disclosure to be detrimental to her goal of regaining custody ofher children, T.E. brutally stabbed Coleman at DCPP’s offices ten days later,resulting in significant physical and psychological injuries. Coleman filed a negligence action for personal injuries against Martinez.The trial court granted Martinez’s motion for summary judgment, finding thatshe owed no legal duty to Coleman under the particularized foreseeabilitystandard set forth by this Court in J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330 (1998). The 2 Appellate Division reversed, concluding that there was adequate evidence tomeet the J.S. standard and that, if Coleman could prove that the standard ofcare required alerting T.E.’s psychiatrist of her hallucinations, it would be fairto impose a duty on Martinez to mitigate that threat. The Court considers whether, under the facts of this case, the victim of aviolent assault by a social worker’s patient may bring a negligence claimagainst the social worker. Because we agree with the Appellate Division thatMartinez had a duty to Coleman under the circumstances presented here, weaffirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court forfurther proceedings. I. The factual recitation that follows is derived from the parties’ appellateappendices, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Coleman, thenonmovant. See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523(1995). A. Two violent episodes preceded T.E.’s treatment with Martinez. Duringthe first, in July 2007, T.E. attacked her or her mother’s landlord -- punching,biting, and stabbing him before chasing him with a knife -- for “beingdisrespectful.” T.E. was thereafter charged with and convicted of aggravated 3 assault and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. In the secondepisode, in December 2011, T.E. attacked a friend, throwing hot oil, stabbingher, and hitting her with a frying pan. T.E. was, again, convicted ofaggravated assault. Just over a year after the second incident, officers responded to reportsof T.E. standing in the middle of the street, screaming and clutching one of herchildren. According to police, T.E. claimed that aliens were after her. Shealso reported auditory hallucinations commanding self-harm. Officerstransported T.E. to Cooper University Hospital where she remained for a weekbefore being transferred to the Camden County Health Services Center. After a three-week stay, T.E.’s discharge summary from the CamdenCounty Health Services Center referenced T.E.’s prior violent acts and notedthat she was required to wear an ankle bracelet.2 The summary stated that T.E.acknowledged that she had experienced a psychotic episode and attributed theepisode to her trying phencyclidine (PCP) for the first time. T.E. wasreportedly calm and cooperative during her stay at the Camden County HealthServices Center and displayed no major psychiatric symptoms, aggression,violence, impulsiveness, or suicidal or homicidal ideations. T.E. was2 The record does not include the sentences received by T.E. for her two aggravated assault convictions but does disclose that T.E.’s sentence for a probation violation included electronic monitoring. 4 diagnosed with “PCP induced psychotic disorder with delusions, andhal[l]ucinations, onset during intoxication.” The report noted that T.E. wassomewhat defensive and may have downplayed her symptoms, and had beeninstructed to participate in drug counseling. Upon her transport to Cooper University Hospital, DCPP removed T.E.’schildren; three were placed with T.E.’s mother and two were placed with theirpaternal grandmother. DCPP referred T.E. to Dr. John O’Reardon, M.D., apsychiatrist, whose August 2013 report noted T.E.’s prior assaults, that shewas at one point placed in restraints while at Cooper University Hospital , andthat she had cocaine in her system when admitted. T.E. claimed that she usedcocaine once and that her statements to hospital staff about drug use were ameans of ensuring discharge. Dr. O’Reardon found this claim to be of“doubtful veracity.” T.E. also reported to Dr. O’Reardon auditoryhallucinations of male voices that were “scary” and threatened to “dissolveher,” beginning in the spring of 2012 and increasing in frequency thereafter. 3T.E. further reported believing that individuals could hear each other’sthoughts and that she received messages from television and music.3 We note that the record is inconsistent as to when exactly T.E. began experiencing auditory hallucinations. Though T.E. reported to Dr. O’Reardon that her hallucinations began in spring 2012, Coleman’s expert report -- relying on excerpts of T.E.’s deposition not included in the record before us -- indicates that T.E. began having hallucinations in 2010. 5 Dr. O’Reardon concluded that T.E.’s reported symptoms satisfied the“criteria for bipolar disorder initially with a manic psychotic episode that lateron progressed to a mixed episode with criteria for both a major depressiveepisode & mania being met at the same time.” Dr. O’Reardon noted that T.E.exhibited continued psychotic symptoms in the form of “paranoid ideas”including “[d]elusions that people [were] after her,” and recommendedsupervised visits with her children, completion of substance-abuse treatment,continued individual therapy, referral for psychotropic medication, and, inlight of her prior assaults, anger-management classes. B. DCPP’s contract with Hispanic Family Center (HFC) occasioned T.E.’sreferral to Martinez, a mental-health therapist at HFC. Martinez conducted arisk assessment of T.E. in October 2013, finding her to be low risk, with “[n]ohistory of violence.” Martinez later acknowledged at deposition that thisdesignation was inappropriate. In November 2013, a psychiatrist at HFCevaluated T.E. and instructed that she be immediately scheduled with himupon “decompensation.” 4 In a separate assessment later in November 2013,4 Decompensation refers to the “failure of defense mechanisms resulting in progressive personality disintegration.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 349 (26th ed. 1981). 6 T.E. stated that her goal was to regain custody of her children, an objective sherepeated throughout her treatment at HFC. As is reflected in Martinez’s progress notes, she met with T.E. regularlyover the next year. At her deposition, Martinez described an objective of hersessions with T.E. to be determining whether T.E. continued to experiencehallucinations and, if so, to have her treated with medication. Three progressnotes are of particular relevance. The first progress note, made on April 1, 2014, stated that T.E.’s groupcounselor “observed [T.E.] in group 'talking to herself’ and [t]hat during group[T.E.] got up and yelled that 'I just saw Jesus.’” The second note, made onJuly 2, 2014, recounted that Martinez observed T.E. in the HFC waiting area“appear[ing] to be responding to outside stimuli.” When confronted, T.E. toldMartinez that she was on her cell phone; T.E. was not holding a cell phone orwearing earphones and, when challenged, T.E. claimed to have been wearingsmall earpieces. Martinez noted that T.E. “[v]ehemently denied 'hearingvoices,’” became upset that “others [were] 'lying’ about her (regarding'hearing voices’),” and was concerned that those alleged lies could prevent herfrom regaining custody of her children. Martinez advised T.E. thathallucinations could be managed and did not necessarily prevent her fromregaining custody. In the third progress note, made on August 15, 2014, 7 Martinez observed that T.E. seemed “distracted and was engaged [i]ndiscussion [and] that she appeared to be 'hearing or trying to listen tosomething.’” T.E. claimed that she was thinking and denied auditoryhallucinations. C. Coleman worked for DCPP as a family services specialist tasked withensuring the welfare of T.E.’s children. In a letter to Coleman dated October1, 2014, Martinez stated that T.E. had been compliant during her sessions andwith her medication and was ready and able to begin having unsupervisedvisits with her children with the goal of reunification. According to Martinez,“[a]s sessions ha[d] progressed there ha[d] not been symptoms of psychosis orindications that she [was a] harm to herself or others.” At her deposition,Martinez acknowledged the inaccuracy of representing that T.E. did notexhibit psychotic symptoms in light of what she and the group counselor hadseen. On October 28, 2014, Coleman emailed Martinez that T.E. “ha[d] sharedwith a family member that she hear[d] commanding voices, to which she fe[lt]an obligation to act on their commands.” Coleman further wrote that T.E. toldthe family member that she had withheld that information from Martinez andher psychiatrist. Coleman testified at deposition that she emailed Martinez 8 because, as T.E.’s therapist, it was Martinez’s responsibility to handle thoseissues. She “assumed it was understood” that the contents of the email wouldnot be shared with T.E. because Martinez knew of the severity of T.E.’smental-health issues and “it [was] just not professional to do . . . . To repeatthat kind of information that could 'poke the bear,’ so to speak.” Martinez responded to the email the following day, informing Colemanthat T.E. had a November 7, 2014 appointment and that she would address theissue with her. Martinez later acknowledged that Coleman’s email suggestedpsychosis necessitating immediate attention and evidenced that T.E. had notbeen honest with Martinez. Four days before her scheduled meeting withMartinez, T.E. visited DCPP offices to pick up a bus pass. According to areport by Coleman, she approached T.E., who asked whether Coleman hadbeen “sending her telepathic waves.” When Coleman asked T.E. to repeat thestatement, T.E. scolded herself. During T.E.’s appointment with Martinez on November 7, 2014,Martinez disclosed to T.E. Coleman’s report of T.E.’s hallucinations. T.E.“became upset” and “tearful,” denied any psychotic symptoms, and reiteratedher goal of regaining custody of her children. Martinez later conceded that , asof the November 7 appointment, she was aware that (1) T.E. had a history ofviolence, (2) clients with children were often upset with DCPP, (3) T.E. had 9 not met with her psychiatrist since July 2014, (4) T.E. needed to refill herProzac prescription, which itself did not treat hallucinations, and (5) it wasadvisable that T.E. be seen by a psychiatrist. Instead of taking any action toensure that T.E. received treatment, despite instructions to refer T.E. to theHFC psychiatrist immediately upon decompensation, Martinez encouragedT.E. to “follow up with medications” and attend her next psychiatricappointment. Later that day, T.E. called DCPP and spoke with Coleman. During theirconversation, T.E. referenced her session with Martinez, denied that she wasexperiencing auditory hallucinations, and stated that she did not understandwhy such a claim would be fabricated. She also said that she did not recallmaking the “telepathic waves” comment to Coleman days earlier and askedwhat “she [could] do about people lying on her.” Coleman advised T.E. toseek advice from an attorney as DCPP would “maintain that she [was] notcapable of parenting independently due to her mental health issues.” Six days later, T.E. made an unscheduled visit to DCPP offices to speakwith Coleman and her supervisor, Donna Johnson. During the meeting, T.E.appeared “disheveled,” “really agitated,” and “really upset,” and she wanted toknow what DCPP would report to the court about her behavior. T.E. disputedColeman’s email to Martinez and report about “telepathic waves” and 10 disclosed that she had run out of medication. Johnson reported that T.E.appeared to disassociate at times during the conversation. T.E. testified at her deposition that, on November 17, 2014, she awokehearing voices. In the early afternoon, with Coleman and Johnson “in [her]head . . . . like a vision” telling her that they were going to remove her childrenfrom her mother’s house, T.E. grabbed a steak knife and went to DCPP offices.Coleman was about to meet with a client, saw T.E. at the elevator, and greetedher, assuming that she was making an unscheduled visit. T.E. turned andremarked “oh, just the person I was looking for.” Coleman held the elevatordoor for T.E., who pulled the steak knife out of her sleeve and stabbedColeman twenty-two times in the face, chest, arms, shoulders, and back.Coleman suffered, among other injuries, severed veins and arteries, a collapsedlung, and blood clots in her legs. T.E. testified that she went to DCPP officeswith the specific purpose of stabbing Coleman or Johnson. Details of T.E.’s subsequent criminal proceedings are not provided in therecord, though Martinez’s third-party complaint indicates that T.E. wasconvicted of attempted murder and sentenced to a term of eleven to thirteenyears in state prison. 11 D. Coleman filed a complaint against Martinez, alleging that Martinez wasnegligent in identifying her to T.E. as the source of information about T.E.’sauditory hallucinations, and that T.E.’s attack was a direct and proximateresult of Martinez’s negligence. In her answer, Martinez denied that any dutyowed to Coleman was unmet, asserted that Coleman’s injuries were the resultof her own negligence and the negligence of others, and claimed protectionunder the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11.5 During discovery, Dr. Charles A. Dackis, M.D., emeritus associateprofessor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perelman School ofMedicine, provided an expert report on behalf of Coleman concluding to areasonable degree of medical probability that Martinez deviated fromacceptable standards of treatment-team therapists by failing to report evidenceof T.E.’s psychosis to her psychiatrist. The “most egregious” example ofMartinez’s negligence, according to Dr. Dackis, was her failure to immediatelycontact T.E.’s psychiatrist after receiving direct evidence in Coleman’s email5 Separately, Martinez filed a third-party complaint against T.E., then incarcerated, claiming that T.E. was responsible for Coleman’s injuries and damages; a default was entered against T.E. for failure to answer the third - party complaint. 12 that T.E. was experiencing hallucinations. Instead, Martinez waited more thana week to meet with T.E. and “needlessly identified [Coleman] as the source ofinformation to her psychotic patient.” Dr. Dackis opined that, had Martinezreported T.E. to her treating psychiatrist, T.E. would have been placed on anti-psychotic medication, would have been carefully monitored, and would nothave assaulted Coleman. Martinez filed a motion for summary judgment based on the followingassertions: she was immune from liability under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16; theharm to Coleman was unforeseeable as a matter of law; Coleman failed toestablish proximate cause; T.E.’s hallucinations and subsequent criminal attackacted as superseding intervening causes; there were deficiencies in Dr.Dackis’s expert report; and Coleman’s claims were barred by the CIA. Inopposition, Coleman argued that N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 and the CIA wereinapplicable; that, even if N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 applied, the professionalnegligence alleged was separate and apart from a duty to warn; and thatforeseeability, proximate cause, and superseding and intervening causationwere questions for the jury. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Martinez, findingno legal duty owed to Coleman under the particularized foreseeability standardset forth in --- Important to the court were the facts that no direct threat was J.S. 13 ever communicated and that no evidence of violent behavior preceded theattack. The Appellate Division reversed,6 concluding that if [Coleman] proves the standard of care required [Martinez] to immediately alert T.E.’s psychiatrist about her command hallucinations, it was foreseeable that T.E. posed a danger to [Coleman] and [Johnson], and it is fair to hold that [Martinez] had a duty to take reasonable steps to avoid exposing them to danger posed by T.E.Important to the Appellate Division were Martinez’s long-term relationshipwith T.E. and her awareness of both T.E.’s prior aggravated assaults andpsychotic episodes, the latter of which Martinez personally witnessed.Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light mostfavorable to Coleman, the Appellate Division determined that a jury couldreasonably conclude that T.E. experienced psychotic symptoms on the date ofColeman’s email to Martinez, that Martinez should have immediately reportedthese symptoms to T.E.’s psychiatrist, and that Martinez instead confrontedT.E. and disclosed the source of her information -- endangering Coleman andJohnson in the process.6 We granted certification following an earlier opinion of the Appellate Division and summarily remanded for reconsideration in light of the parties’ agreement about a stated fact. 241 N.J. 100 (2020). We refer here to the second Appellate Division opinion. 14 We granted certification, 244 N.J. 163 (2020), to determine whether theevidence of record, viewed in a light most favorable to Coleman, couldestablish that Martinez owed a duty to Coleman.7 II. A. Coleman claims that T.E.’s history of auditory hallucinations andviolence, Martinez’s knowledge of T.E.’s ongoing hallucinations and failure toimmediately refer T.E. to a psychiatrist, and Martinez’s identification ofColeman as the source of information about T.E.’s ongoing hallucinations aresufficient to establish foreseeability under J.S. Coleman agrees with theAppellate Division’s J.S. analysis and offers Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 459 N.J.Super. 554 (App. Div. 2019), and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liabilityfor Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (Section 41) as additional support basedon Martinez’s relationship with T.E. Coleman reads Vizzoni as relying onSection 41 to conclude that liability for the car accident in that case was aquestion of proximate cause to be determined by a jury. B. Martinez asserts that the trial court was correct in finding no duty toColeman “due to the lack of any direct threat communicated to [Coleman] -- or7 Applicability of the CIA is not at issue in this appeal. 15 to [Martinez] regarding [Coleman].” According to Martinez, the AppellateDivision misapplied the particularized foreseeability standard of J.S. becauseMartinez “had no 'particular knowledge’ or special reason to know that a'particular plaintiff,’ [Coleman], would suffer a 'particular type’ of injury.” Martinez challenges consideration of Vizzoni as factually inapposite andbecause it was decided on proximate cause not duty of care. Most importantly,Martinez does not read Vizzoni, or any other published appellate decision, asadopting Section 41’s standard for the duty owed by mental-healthpractitioners, positing that particularized foreseeability -- which she arguesColeman fails to meet -- remains the standard for the duty of care owed in NewJersey. III. A. “The fundamental elements of a negligence claim are a duty of careowed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant,injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach, and damages.”Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014). It is the obligation of theplaintiff to prove each element. Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584(2008). The core issue in the present matter is whether Martinez owed a dutyto Coleman and, if so, the scope of that duty. 16 “A duty is an obligation imposed by law requiring one party 'to conformto a particular standard of conduct toward another.’” Acuna v. Turkish, 192 N.J. 399, 413 (2007) (quoting Prosser & Keeton on Torts: Lawyer’s Edition §53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984)). Whether, in a given context, “a duty to exercisereasonable care to avoid the risk of harm to another exists is [a question] offairness and policy that implicates many factors.” Carvalho v. Toll Bros. &Devs., 143 N.J. 565, 572 (1996). “[A]s a background principle, the law of torts declines to impose a dutyof care upon '[a]n actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical oremotional harm to another.’” See G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019)(second alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liabilityfor Physical and Emotional Harm § 37 (Am. Law Inst. 2012)). However,“duty of care 'is a malleable concept that “must of necessity adjust to thechanging social relations and exigencies and man’s relation to his fellows ,”’”id. at 414 (quoting J.S., 155 N.J. at 339), and a duty has been found to existwith respect to third-party actions in a number of situations, see, e.g., Kelly v.Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548 (1984) (holding that a social host “is liable forinjuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of amotor vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by theintoxication,” a duty now codified in the Social Host Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 17 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 284 (1982)(finding that a supermarket owed a duty to its customer, who was attacked inthe store’s parking lot). Determination of whether a duty of care should befound with respect to harm caused by a third party is a particularly “uncertain. . . area of tort law.” See Mckesson v. Doe, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 48, 51(2020). To make that determination, as in all duty-of-care determinations, a“court must first consider the foreseeability of harm to a potential plaintiff andthen analyze whether accepted fairness and policy considerations support theimposition of a duty.” Jerkins v. Anderson, 191 N.J. 285, 294 (2007) (citationomitted). “Foreseeability of injury, as it affects the existence of a duty, refersto 'the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended.’” Ibid. (quotingClohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997)). And,to evaluate “under all of the circumstances” the relevant fairness and policyconsiderations at issue, this Court has adopted a test that requires “identifying,weighing, and balancing several factors -- the relationship of the parties, thenature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, andthe public interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993). 18 “The determination of the foreseeability of harm and considerations offairness and policy are connected,” with some overlap among theconsiderations relevant to each. Carvalho, 143 N.J. at 573. Ultimately, allconsiderations must be balanced “in a 'principled’ fashion, leading to adecision that both resolves the current case and allows the public to anticipatewhen liability will attach to certain conduct.” G.A.-H., 238 N.J. at 414(quoting Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439); accord Estate of Desir v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 322-23 (2013). 1. In J.S., a wife and her husband moved next door to a family with twodaughters and, over the course of a year, the husband sexually assaulted bothchildren. 155 N.J. at 335. The wife claimed that, even though she knew orshould have known of her husband’s proclivities, id. at 337, she owed no dutyto the children and they sustained harm at the hands of a third party, id. at 335.The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment, id. at 336, and thisCourt affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, id. at 354. In doing so, wesynthesized reasoning from previous cases about the foreseeability inquiry andhow it can be tailored to address when the proposed duty of care pertains tothird-party harm: Foreseeability as a component of a duty to exercise due care is based on the defendant’s knowledge of the risk 19 of injury and is susceptible to objective analysis. Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 484-85 (1987). That knowledge may be an actual awareness of risk. [Carvalho, 143 N.J. at 576-77]. Such knowledge may also be constructive; the defendant may be charged with knowledge if she is “in a position” to “discover the risk of harm.” Id. at 578. In some cases where the nature of the risk or the extent of harm is difficult to ascertain, foreseeability may require that the defendant have a “special reason to know” that a “particular plaintiff” or “identifiable class of plaintiffs” would likely suffer a “particular type” of injury. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 262, 263 (1985). Further, when the risk of harm is that posed by third persons, a plaintiff may be required to prove that defendant was in a position to “know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there [was] a likelihood of conduct on the part of [a] third person[]” that was “likely to endanger the safety” of another. [Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 507] (internal quotation and citation omitted). [Id. at 338 (text alterations in original).] Foreseeability in the context of third-party criminal acts does not requireprior similar offenses, Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 508, but rather can be found in anawareness of prior acts of violence and threats thereof, see Broach-Butts v.Therapeutic Alts., Inc., 456 N.J. Super. 25, 36-37 (App. Div. 2018). It istherefore a fact-sensitive inquiry. The “identifiable” or “particular” plaintiffrequirement is likewise tied to the factual specifics of a case. As J.S. notes,when it would be difficult for a person to ascertain the risk of harm of the 20 actions by another, particularity is required. See 155 N.J. at 338. In thatsituation, potential victims must, as a general rule, be “particularlyforeseeable” in type, number, likelihood of presence, and harm to beanticipated. See People Express, 100 N.J. at 263-64. When the risk of harm has been “unreasonably 'enhanced,’” however,foreseeability does not require an identifiable victim or harm, but ratherextends “to persons who fall normally and generally within a zone of riskcreated by the particular tortious conduct.” Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 175(1982) (quoting Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 144-45 (1977)). A fact-basedinquiry into whether the defendant enhanced the risk of third-party harm istherefore needed. Even in premises-liability cases, in which the defendant property owneror manager, by virtue of that status, may have certain responsibilities underlongstanding legal principles to people who enter the property, theforeseeability inquiry requires close scrutiny of the factual circumstances.See, e.g., Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 500-01, 516-17 (holding that a supermarketcould be liable for the death of a customer after an attack in the parking lot);Kuehn v. Pub Zone, 364 N.J. Super. 301, 310-15 (App. Div. 2003)(distinguishing Ivins v. Town Tavern, 335 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2000), 21 and finding a duty of care owed to a bar patron in light of factualcircumstances indicating knowledge of the risk). And careful consideration of the factual circumstances is even more vitalwhen the duty arises in a novel context. In J.S. itself, for example, the Courtheld “that when a spouse has actual knowledge or special reason to know ofthe likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in sexually abusive behavioragainst a particular person or persons, a spouse has a duty of care to takereasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm.” 155 N.J. at 352. Althoughthat holding acknowledges the spousal relationship present, it rests on theawareness gained through that relationship. Among the factors the Courtfound relevant in determining whether the husband’s assaults were sufficientlyforeseeable to support the imposition of a duty on his wife included prioroffenses; the number, recency, and nature of those offenses; the extent towhich the non-assaulting spouse encouraged or facilitated unsupervised deedswith the potential victims, and physical evidence and behaviors in the home.Id. at 340. Indeed, “particularized foreseeability” was tailored in J.S. to“conform the standard of foreseeability to the empirical evidence and commonexperience that indicate a wife may often have actual knowledge or specialreason to know that her husband is abusing or is likely to abuse an identifiable 22 victim,” avoiding an overly broad duty to every potential victim of a spouse.Id. at 342-43. In G.A.-H., this Court distinguished the wife’s knowledge in J.S. fromthe alleged knowledge of an emergency medical technician (EMT) whosecoworker had “an illicit sexual relationship” with a minor. See 238 N.J. at 407-08, 417. The victim brought suit against the EMT, alleging that, becausethe coworker had shown him pictures of the victim on his phone, had boastedof being in a relationship with someone, and had once taken an ambulance todrop the victim at school and several times parked near her bus stop, id. at408-10, “there was a reasonable basis for [the EMT] to believe [his colleague]was engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor and that [the EMT] shouldtherefore have a duty to report that relationship,” id. at 412. This Courtrejected that argument and declined to “decide whether [the] duty [imposed inJ.S.] should apply to co-workers because no reasonable trier of fact could findthat [the EMT] knew or had special reason to know [of the] illegal sexualrelationship with a minor.” Id. at 417. Thus, again based on the facts of thecase, the Court found the lack of foreseeability to resolve the issue of whethera duty of care should apply. 23 2. Although the absence of foreseeability can defeat the imposition of aduty of care, foreseeability “does not in itself establish the existence of aduty.” Jerkins, 191 N.J. at 295 (quoting Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v.EMAR Grp., Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 194 (1994)). “Once the foreseeability of aninjured party is established, . . . considerations of fairness and policy governwhether the imposition of a duty is warranted.” Carvalho, 143 N.J. at 573(omission in original) (quoting Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 135 N.J. at 194-95). Again, to balance those considerations, New Jersey courts employ a four-prong analysis, weighing the (1) relationship of the parties, (2) nature of therisk, (3) opportunity and ability to exercise care, and (4) public interest. Ibid. Pertinent to that four-prong analysis are whether: statutes protectagainst the harm ultimately realized, J.S., 155 N.J. at 343-45; the defendantmay have avoided the harm with “relative ease” as compared to the gravity ofthe harm, Podias v. Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 351 (App. Div. 2007); thedefendant was responsible for creating the risk of harm, Carvalho, 143 N.J. at 574-75; and the defendant had an opportunity to fix or “dismiss” the ultimatecause of harm, Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 157 N.J. 221, 233 (1999). Also,“[t]he imposition of liability should discourage negligent conduct by fosteringreasonable conduct and creating incentives to minimize risks of harm.” 24 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 448. Ultimately, the “most cogent explanation,” Desir, 214 N.J. at 322, for whether a duty is recognized “turns on whether theimposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under allof the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy,” ibid. (quotingHopkins, 132 N.J. at 439). Thus, whereas the foreseeability inquiry is rooted in the specific facts ofa particular case, the fairness and policy inquiry focuses on the ability toderive from those facts a general rule that can “sensibly, predictably, and fairlygovern future conduct.” See id. at 330. Here, both components of the duty-of-care analysis must include the fact that Martinez is a mental-healthprofessional and that her alleged negligence (a) occurred in the course ofproviding mental-health services to T.E., and (b) included her own revelationof the eventual victim’s identity to T.E. B. New Jersey courts have recognized the “uniquely personal” relationshipbetween mental-health practitioners and their patients. See, e.g.,Comprehensive Psych. Sys., P.C. v. Prince, 375 N.J. Super. 273, 277 (App.Div. 2005). This includes recognition that a mental-health patient “exposes tothe therapist, not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entireself, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.” In re Rules Regarding 25 Inmate-Therapist Confidentiality, 224 N.J. Super. 252, 262 (App. Div. 1988)(quoting Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955)). Ourcourts have also considered the duty of mental-health providers to third partiesat risk of harm by the provider’s patients. In McIntosh v. Milano, the defendant psychiatrist treated a teenagepatient who confided a number of delusions and behaviors, including strikingfear in others, involvement with and possessiveness toward a neighbor fiveyears his elder, hoping the neighbor would “suffer” as he suffered, andshooting a BB gun at the car of the neighbor or her boyfriend. 168 N.J. Super. 466, 472-73 (Law Div. 1979). The patient ultimately shot and killed theneighbor. Id. at 474. The plaintiff premised the wrongful-death action thatfollowed on expert testimony that there was a duty to warn the victim, herparents, or law enforcement of the risk of harm to the neighbor. Id. at 476-78.The defendant psychiatrist moved for summary judgment. Id. at 470. The court determined that a therapist’s duty to warn third parties of thelikely criminal or tortious acts of a patient “depends . . . ultimately onquestions of fairness involving a weighing of the relationship of the parties,the nature of the risk involved, and the public interest in imposing the dutyunder the circumstances,” id. at 482-83, principles that mirror our general dutyanalysis, see Carvalho, 143 N.J. at 573. It further held 26 that a psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect an intended or potential victim of his patient when he determines, or should determine, in the appropriate factual setting and in accordance with the standards of his profession established at trial, that the patient is or may present a probability of danger to that person. [McIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 489.]Reasoning that the duty could be premised on either the existing relationshipbetween mental-health practitioner and patient or on a practitioner’s broaderobligation to protect the community, akin to the duty to warn others of aninfectious or contagious disease, the court determined that a jury could havefound that the psychiatrist knew or should have known that his patient posed athreat to the victim, or that there was a duty to “look into” whether the patientwas a danger to himself or others. Id. at 489-90. The Law Division in McIntosh noted that imposing a duty to warn onmental-health practitioners raises patient-confidentiality concerns, see id. at490-93, but found that those considerations had “no over-riding influence”under the facts presented because there is “a duty to disclose when compelledby law or if an imminent danger to the patient or to society exists,” id. at 493. In 1991, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 “to codifyMcIntosh and to clarify the ways in which a mental health practitioner candischarge the duty to warn and protect potential victims of violence without 27 incurring liability for disclosure of confidential information,” Marshall v.Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 35-36, 38 (2006); see also S. Judiciary Comm.Statement to S. Comm. Substitute for S. 3063 (Mar. 11, 1991) (explaining that,in the wake of decisions such as McIntosh, the bill would provide licensedpractitioners with immunities from civil liability for patients’ violent actsabsent a duty to warn, and for disclosure of privileged information where thereis a duty to warn). N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(a) immunizes licensed medical professionals in thefields of “psychology, psychiatry, medicine, nursing, clinical social work, ormarriage and family therapy” from civil liability for patients’ violent actsagainst themselves or third parties “unless the practitioner has incurred a dutyto warn and protect the potential victim.” Martinez appears to no longer dispute that, as a licensed social worker,rather than a licensed clinical social worker, she does not fit within N.J.S.A.2A:62A-16’s list of immunized practitioners. See N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(a). Weagree. If the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(a) left any room for doubt,the Social Workers’ Licensing Act of 1991 differentiates requirements forclinical and non-clinical social workers, see N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-3, -6, -8, andcements that the two fields are distinct. 28 The dissent asserts that we should veer from what the Legislatureunambiguously provided in passing N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16, ignoring the clearlychosen words of the Legislature and the facts of this case along the way. Theimpetus for including licensed clinical social workers within the statute’sprotections appears to have been provided by Governor James J. Florio, whowrote to the General Assembly that “th[e] bill does not refer to clinical socialworkers. References should be added, since clinical social workers arebecoming subject to state licensure and they function in a similar therapeuticmanner to the practitioners listed.” See Letter to Gen. Assemb. RegardingSen. Comm. Substitute for S. 3063 3 (June 11, 1991). The Social Workers’ Licensing Act of 1991, distinguishing the licensingrequirements for licensed clinical social workers and licensed social workers,see N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-3, -6, -8, was drafted during the same session as N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16, see L. 1991, c. 134, § 1, and we assume that theLegislature knew precisely what it was doing when it extended immunity tolicensed clinical social workers and not licensed social workers. Indeed,“[s]tatutes that deal with the same matter or subject should be read in parimateria and construed together as a 'unitary and harmonious whole.’ Thismaxim of statutory construction is especially pertinent when . . . the statutes inquestion were passed in the same session.” Saint Peter’s Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy, 29 185 N.J. 1, 14-15 (2005) (omission in original) (quoting In re Adoption of aChild by W.P. & M.P., 163 N.J. 158, 182-83 (2000) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting)). We “tradition[ally] giv[e] 'narrow range’ to statutes granting immunityfrom tort liability because they leave 'unredressed injury and loss resultingfrom wrongful conduct.’” Velazquez v. Jiminez, 172 N.J. 240, 257 (2002)(quoting Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401 (1979)). “Had theLegislature intended to confer immunity” on licensed social workers, it wouldhave stated so, Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 593 (2012),and “[i]f the failure to provide immunity to [licensed social workers] was anoversight, any corrective measure must be taken by the Legislature,” id. at 596.It is “[o]ur common law [that] evolves consonant with changes in statutorypolicy,” Dunn v. Praiss, 139 N.J. 564, 578 (1995), not the reverse. 88 The dissent’s attempt to expand those immunized by N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 in order to harmonize it with the common law it altered is inconsistent with our practice of constraining the breadth of statutes, see Velazquez, 172 N.J. at 257 (“Where a statute alters the common law, the most circumscribed reading of it that achieves its purpose is the one that should be adopted. Doubt about its meaning should be resolved in favor of 'the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in the common law.’” (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 310 (1992))), and does not respect the Legislature’s constitutional role, see Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 12 (1960) (“The judicial branch of the government has imposed upon it the obligation of interpreting the Constitution and of safeguarding the basic rights granted thereby to the people. In this sphere of activity the courts recognize that they have no power to overturn a law adopted by the Legislature within its constitutional limitations, even though the law may be unwise, impolitic or unjust.”); LaFage 30 Further, to fit this case under the umbrella of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16, thedissent mischaracterizes the duty found here as one to warn as opposed to oneto properly treat and not disclose. In Marshall, we distinguished a duty towarn under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 from alleged patient abandonment analogousto the failure to refer here and found “[n]otably absent” from the statute any“legislative intent to immunize mental health practitioners from liability fordeviations from accepted standards of care.” 188 N.J. at 38. Instead, weconcluded that “[a] practitioner’s common-law duty to exercise [a] degree ofcare . . . exist[ed] separate and apart from any duty to warn and protectpursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16,” ibid., and that “even if a practitioner doesnot incur a duty to warn and protect under the statute, he or she may still beliable for a breach of his or her duty to treat a patient in accordance withapplicable professional standards,” id. at 39. We so find here. Therefore, it is not the statutory test described above that controls here,but rather the duty-of-care analysis that has developed through case law -- theparticularized foreseeability inquiry adopted for harm caused by another tothird persons, followed by the four-prong fairness and public policy analysis.v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 460 (2001) (LaVecchia, J., concurring) (“The Legislature is free to expand, modify, or abrogate common law as it may reasonably determine.”). 31 IV. We now apply that test to the facts of this case. As we do so, our reviewis guided by the procedural posture of this case, which was decided onsummary judgment. We review “a summary judgment decision by the samestandard that governs the motion judge’s determination.” Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 539 (2019). That standard dictates that summary judgment shallbe granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories andadmissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party isentitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.” R. 4:46-2(c). Theevidence considered is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.Brill, 142 N.J. at 523. Consistent with this standard of review, “[t]he trial court’s conclusionsof law and application of the law to the facts warrant no deference from areviewing court.” W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 238 (2012). Ultimately,“whether a defendant owes a legal duty to another and the scope of that dutyare generally questions of law for the court to decide.” Robinson, 217 N.J. at 208. 32 A. Informed by the principles set forth above, we first consider whether, inlight of what was known at the time of the attack, it was particularlyforeseeable that T.E. would assault Coleman. We believe that it was. Indeed,J.S. instructs that “a plaintiff may be required to prove that defendant was in aposition to 'know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there[was] a likelihood of conduct on the part of [a] third person[]’ that was 'likelyto endanger the safety’ of another.” 155 N.J. at 338 (alterations in original)(quoting Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 507). Further guidance is found in decisionsregarding liability for the criminal acts of third parties. For example, in Butler, we affirmed reversal of the trial court’sjudgment notwithstanding the verdict after a supermarket customer was injuredin a parking-lot assault and sued for failure to warn and provide a safe place toshop and park. 89 N.J. at 274, 284. Importantly, seven similar attacks hadtaken place on the premises within the year and the lone security guard on thepremises worked inside the store. Id. at 274-75. Recognizing that negligenceis based on what a reasonably prudent person would foresee under thecircumstances, we reasoned that “[i]f the reasonably prudent person wouldforesee danger resulting from another’s voluntary criminal acts, the fact thatanother’s actions are beyond defendant’s control does not preclude liability.” 33 Id. at 276. Fifteen years later, we reversed entry of summary judgment for thedefendant in Clohesy, where a customer died of asphyxiation after beingassaulted while attempting to enter her car, even though no prior similar actshad taken place on the premises. Id. at 500-01. We found that prior lessercrimes such as shoplifting and theft on or near the premises, the size andlayout of the premises, increasing crime rates in the general neighborhood,absence of security, and the nature of nearby businesses -- which attractedloiterers -- all lent to a finding of foreseeability. Id. at 516-17. The Appellate Division considered a similar issue in Kuehn, where a barhad become a hangout for motorcycle gangs. 364 N.J. Super. at 306.Incidents of violence decreased after a policy was established prohibiting gangmembers from “wearing their colors.” Id. at 306-07. One night, three gangmembers wearing their colors pushed past a doorman and were permitted bythe co-owner to stay for a drink; after which they assaulted the plaintiff in thebathroom. Id. at 307-08. The trial court entered judgement notwithstandingthe verdict in favor of the bar, finding that the attack was random andunforeseeable without the presence of members of rival gangs. Id. at 308-09.The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the jury’s verdict in theplaintiff’s favor. Id. at 322. The court noted that the co-owner had actualknowledge of the risk of injury because of her familiarity with the gang and its 34 history of random assaults, id. at 311, and concluded that imposition of a dutywas appropriate under J.S. and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344pertaining to premises liability, id. at 313. Observing that the co-owner “hadknowledge . . . that there was 'a likelihood of conduct on the part of thirdpersons in general’ that was 'likely to endanger the safety’ of a patron at someunspecified future time,” the court found that “[a] 'duty to take precautions’against the endangering conduct thus arose.” Ibid. (quoting Restatement(Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). In contrast, in Ivins, thecourt found that a bar did not owe a duty of care to a patron injured in a fightbased on the existence of few prior incidents, the bar’s placement in an areanot susceptible to crime, and a lack of events placing bar staff on notice of apotential fight. See 335 N.J. Super. at 197. Butler, Clohesy, and Kuehn reinforce that the particularizedforeseeability standard of J.S. -- which the parties agree is applicable to thisappeal -- requires review of the circumstances surrounding the occurrencecomplained of in deciding whether to impose a duty. See J.S., 155 N.J. at 353(discussing the wife’s knowledge of the children’s frequent visits to her home,their time spent alone with her husband, her failure to confront her husband,and her actual or constructive knowledge of his proclivities and propensities). 35 B. Applying the principles of Butler, Clohesy, Kuehn, and J.S. to the factshere, Martinez was aware of T.E.’s prior acts of violence -- both involvingstabbing -- the most recent of which had taken place just fourteen months priorto T.E.’s hospitalization. Martinez authored or received at least four accountsof T.E. experiencing hallucinations as reflected in the progress notes of April1, July 2, and August 15 as well as Coleman’s October 28 email. She hadpersonally witnessed two of T.E.’s suspected auditory hallucinations. Shefurther knew that T.E.’s last appointment with her psychiatrist predated boththe August 15 incident and October 28 email. T.E. needed to refill hermedication as of her final appointment with Martinez on November 7. These facts are like those found relevant to foreseeability in J.S., see id.at 340 (finding relevant a spouse’s prior offenses, therapeutic history andregimen, and physical evidence discoverable in the marital home), and a farcry from the absence of either knowledge or a reason to know in G.A.-H., 238 N.J. at 417. T.E.’s initial psychiatric evaluation expressly instructed that T.E.should be referred immediately to a psychiatrist upon decompensation, whichwas not done here. Cf. Kuehn, 364 N.J. Super. at 314-15 (finding that theadoption of a bar policy against allowing patrons to enter wearing gang colors 36 -- a policy that was not followed on the day of the assault at issue -- wasrelevant in a duty analysis). In addition, Martinez inexplicably identified Coleman as the source ofinformation adverse to T.E.’s regaining custody of her children. Thatidentification was made despite Martinez’s awareness of T.E.’s repeatedlystated goal of reunification with her children, that patients “who were trying toget custody of their kids back were often upset with [D]CPP,” and that T.E.had paranoid thoughts as reflected in Dr. O’Reardon’s report and her owninteractions with T.E. -- including T.E.’s statement that people were “lying”about her hallucinations during her July 2 session with Martinez. Consideringthe facts in a light most favorable to Coleman, Martinez made Coleman anantagonist to T.E. in her nearly two-year pursuit to regain custody of herchildren. As Martinez’s petition notes, “foreseeability may require that thedefendant have a 'special reason to know’ that a 'particular plaintiff’ or'identifiable class of plaintiffs’ would likely suffer a 'particular type’ ofinjury.” J.S., 155 N.J. at 338 (emphasis added) (quoting People Express, 100 N.J. at 262-63). We need not determine whether any single factor or group offactors referenced above is determinative. 37 We reiterate “that an identifiable class of plaintiffs is not simply aforeseeable class of plaintiffs.” People Express, 100 N.J. at 263. Rather, “[a]nidentifiable class of plaintiffs must be particularly foreseeable in terms of thetype of persons or entities comprising the class,” and “the certainty orpredictability of their presence.” Id. at 264. We find that, here, such a classwould include Coleman. Even though T.E. did not communicate a specificthreat directed at Coleman, unlike the patient in McIntosh, Martinez’sidentification of Coleman and failure to immediately refer T.E. to apsychiatrist, combined with the information Martinez had at the time,collectively made it particularly foreseeable that T.E. would lash out violentlyagainst Coleman. Accordingly, “'[p]articularized foreseeability’ in this kindof case will conform [to] the standard of foreseeability” in which a mental-health practitioner “may often have actual knowledge or special reason toknow” of the risk of harm posed by a patient. See J.S., 155 N.J. at 342; seealso Rules Regarding Inmate-Therapist Confidentiality, 224 N.J. Super. at 262. C. Our finding of foreseeability does not complete our analysis, however.As we found in Desir, “[f]airness, not foreseeability alone, is the test.” 214 N.J. at 325 (quoting Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, 147 N.J. 510, 515(1997)). In considering whether the imposition of a duty is fair, we must “bear 38 in mind the broader implications that will flow from the imposition of a duty .”Id. at 326. As we have in prior cases, we walk through whether imposition ofa duty is fair based on the relationship of the parties, nature of the risk,opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest. See, e.g.,Jerkins, 191 N.J. at 296-99; Alloway, 157 N.J. at 232-33. First, we note the contractual relationship of Martinez and Coleman’semployers, see Alloway, 157 N.J. at 232-33 (finding a paving contract relevantin the imposition of duty), and the fact that the two shared T.E. as aclient/patient. Further, an “important consideration in assessing therelationship between the parties is the responsibility for conditions creating therisk of harm.” Carvalho, 143 N.J. at 574; accord J.S., 155 N.J. at 338-39.Here, Martinez’s failure to refer T.E. for immediate psychiatric assistanceallowed the ultimate harm realized. What’s more, Martinez increased the risk,see Di Cosala, 91 N.J. at 175, by identifying Coleman as the source of adverseinformation, creating an antagonistic relationship -- in T.E.’s view -- betweenher and Coleman. Second, we note the considerable nature of the risk. The failure of amental-health practitioner to exercise reasonable care may lead to seriousphysical harm to patients, see Marshall, 188 N.J. at 34, and others, seeMcIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 489. Indeed, Martinez acknowledged both that 39 she personally observed signs that T.E. experienced auditory hallucinationsand that T.E.’s designation as “low risk” was an error because of T.E.’s priorviolent assaults. Therefore, by virtue of her practitioner-patient relationship,Martinez was in a unique position to know, see Podias, 394 N.J. Super. at 351,and, indeed, had actual awareness, see Alloway, 157 N.J. at 233, of the gravenature of the risk associated with failing to properly treat T.E. and identifyingColeman. Third, we find that Martinez had ample opportunity and ability to avoidthe harm realized. Martinez became aware that T.E. experiencedhallucinations on April 1 -- more than seven months before the assault onColeman. Thereafter, she witnessed suspected hallucinations on July 2 andAugust 15, and Coleman notified Martinez on October 28 that T.E. confided ina family member that she concealed her hallucinations. It would have beenappropriate at any time during those nearly four months, per the initialpsychiatrist’s instruction, to immediately refer T.E. to her psychiatrist.Martinez did not. In his expert report, Dr. Dackis opined that Martinez deviated fromacceptable standards of treatment-team therapists by repeatedly failing toreport evidence of T.E.’s decompensation to her psychiatrist, the “mostegregious” example of which followed Coleman’s email. Instead, Martinez 40 “needlessly identified [Coleman] as the source of information to her psychoticpatient.” Even after identifying Coleman to T.E., Martinez had ten days toseek immediate psychiatric intervention. She did not. Martinez’s ability toidentify and avoid the harm realized was squarely within her duties. SeeCarvalho, 143 N.J. at 577-78 (finding that a duty could fairly be imposed on anengineering firm in part because the harm at issue arose from a situation thatfell within the engineer’s “explicit responsibilities”). Martinez may well havebeen able to discharge her duty of care in this instance by simply following thedirectives set out by the psychiatrist who first saw T.E. Finally, Dr. Dackis’s report concluded that, had Martinez referred T.E.to her psychiatrist, she would have been placed on anti-psychotic medicationand monitored, and the assault would have been avoided. When, as here, theburden on a defendant is low in relation to the potential harm posed,imposition of duty is fair and appropriate. Furthermore, imposition of a dutyhere will encourage the exercise of greater discretion and care, see Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 448, and will not suffer from the scope issues that may counselagainst imposing a duty, see Desir, 214 N.J. at 328-29. We thus find that fairness and policy favor the imposition of a dutywhen a patient’s threat of harm to identifiable third parties is particularlyforeseeable. Of course, “the discharge of this duty of due care will necessarily 41 vary with the facts of each case.” See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976). The duty imposed here may be tailored byfactors including the patient’s diagnosis, progress or deterioration, andfrequency and nature of interactions with identifiable third parties. Also,relevant to this duty at law are the practitioner’s obligations in practice,including professional standards, institutional policies, and directives withinindividual treatment plans.9 D. Going forward, a jury will determine whether Martinez breached theduty of care we find she owed in this case by not referring T.E. for psychiatricevaluation as she had been instructed to do and by disclosing Coleman’s9 In light of our finding that Martinez owed Coleman a duty of care based on the particularized foreseeability standard, we do not explore at length Coleman’s asserted alternate basis for liability, grounded in the Appellate Division’s decision in Vizzoni and Section 41 of the Third Restatement. By way of guidance, however, we add the following. First, we agree with Martinez that the Appellate Division did not adopt Section 41 in Vizzoni, but rather invoked that section merely to support the distinction drawn in that case between affirmative acts and failures to act. See 459 N.J. Super. at 572-73. Second, we decline to adopt Section 41. We “typically give[] considerable weight to Restatement views,” predicated on whether “they speak to an issue our courts have not yet considered.” See Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 530 (App. Div. 1996). But we conclude that the particularized foreseeability test established in our jurisprudence readily covers whether a mental-health practitioner could be found to owe a duty of care for harm caused by a patient under a particular set of factual circumstances. 42 identity as the person who reported T.E.’s hallucinations; whether that breachwas the proximate cause of the harm Coleman suffered; and, if so, whetherColeman has proven damages and the quantum of such damages. We add the following guidance concerning proximate cause, which askswhether the actual harm suffered was a reasonable consequence of thedefendant’s actual act or omission. Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 503. Althoughproximate cause requires consideration of foreseeability, the inquiry isdistinguishable from the foreseeability inquiry in the context of determiningwhether a duty of care applies -- “[f]oreseeability in the proximate causecontext relates to remoteness rather than the existence of a duty,” ibid., andgenerally, “[i]t suffices if [the cause] is a substantial contributing factor to theharm suffered,” Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 27 (1999). Limitationis appropriate to prevent sweeping liability when “[a] single overturned lantern. . . burn[s] Chicago,” see People Express, 100 N.J. at 253, but that does notmean that Mrs. O’Leary’s neighbor does not have a claim. Proximate cause is generally a question for the jury, but courts may“reject[] the imposition of liability for highly extraordinary consequences.”J.S., 155 N.J. at 351-52. Based on the facts before us, we see no reason to takethe question of proximate cause from a jury’s capable hands. We note that“[t]he standard of particular foreseeability may be successfully employed to 43 determine whether [an] injury was proximately caused.” People Express, 100 N.J. at 264-65. Here, should a jury conclude that Martinez breached the dutyof care we have identified, it could also conclude that that breach was theproximate cause of Coleman’s injuries. Significantly, a third party’s criminal actions do not serve as anintervening cause when “the reasonably prudent person would foresee dangerresulting from another’s voluntary criminal acts.” Broach-Butts, 456 N.J.Super. at 42-43 (quoting Butler, 89 N.J. at 276) (leaving for a jury the questionof whether the defendant social service agency’s placement of a foster childwithout adequate warning of his history of dangerous behavior proximately ledto a fatal stabbing); see also Hill, 75 N.J. at 147 (finding that, after recognizingthe defendant’s duty related to her leaving her car parked in a high-crime areawith the keys inside after the lot’s closing time, “it should then become thejury’s task to determine whether under the facts of th[e] case that duty wasviolated by defendant . . . and her conduct was a substantial causative factor inthe plaintiff’s injury”). As we explained above, the foreseeable danger of T.E. acting outviolently is precisely why Martinez had a duty not to identify Coleman as thesource of adverse information, and to make sure that T.E. received propertreatment. Breach of either of those duties, premised upon the testimony to be 44 elicited -- including that of Dr. Dackis, who opined that the assault would havebeen completely avoided had Martinez reported T.E. to a psychiatrist asinstructed -- could be found by a jury to be “a substantial contributing factor tothe harm suffered.” Perez, 161 N.J. at 27. In sum, Martinez treated a patient convicted of two violent assaults at adire time in her life and proceeded to watch her decompensate. Further, oncethat decompensation became a barrier to T.E.’s reunification with her children,Martinez identified Coleman as an antagonist and personification of thatbarrier. “It does not seem highly extraordinary” that those actions would resultin a violent assault against Coleman. See J.S., 155 N.J. at 352. V. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Appellate Division’sdecision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA join. 45 Leah Coleman, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sonia Martinez, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. Mental health professionals owe a duty of confidentiality to theirpatients as part of their therapeutic mission but also, in clearly definedcircumstances, owe a duty to warn or protect if their patients pose a clear andpresent danger of causing harm to an identifiable person or class of people. Inweighing those conflicting duties, the Legislature -- the ultimate expositor ofpublic policy -- has by statute articulated the duty-to-warn-or-protect standardin the case of licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, clinical socialworkers, marriage and family therapists, and practitioners of medicine. See N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16. Licensed social workers, whose professionalresponsibilities mirror in many ways those of licensed clinical social workers,are not included within the protection of the statute. 1 The implication of the majority’s holding is that a licensed socialworker’s common law duty to warn or protect is greater than that of any of thenamed mental health professionals in N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16. In other words, themajority evidently maintains that a licensed social worker -- who has lesstraining, experience, and expertise than a psychiatrist or licensed clinicalsocial worker in predicting the potential for a client’s violence -- has a duty towarn or protect when a psychiatrist or licensed clinical social worker does not. Imposing a common law duty on a licensed social worker that is so atodds with the Legislature’s defined duty for similarly situated mental healthprofessionals is not consonant with sound public policy or basic notions offairness -- the guiding principles for the establishment of a duty. SoniaMartinez, a licensed social worker, may have known that her client, T.E., wasexperiencing auditory hallucinations -- but none that indicated that T.E. wouldact violently or homicidally against Leah Coleman. A similarly situatedpsychiatrist would have had no duty to warn or protect Coleman under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16. But the majority holds that Martinez had a duty to warnor protect under this Court’s common law principle of particularizedforeseeability articulated in J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 342-43 (1998). To avoid the misguided result reached today, the common law should beharmonized with the standards of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 so that the public 2 policies enunciated by the Legislature through its statutory enactment and bythis Court through the common law are not in conflict. Because the outcomeof the summary judgment motion would have been different had the Courtaligned the common law with legislative policy, I respectfully dissent. I. A. The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme that directlyrelates to the issue before us. N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(a) provides that any personlicensed “to practice psychology, psychiatry, medicine, nursing, clinical socialwork, or marriage and family therapy . . . is immune from any civil liability fora patient’s violent act against another person or against himself unless thepractitioner has incurred a duty to warn and protect the potential victim.”(emphasis added). The “duty to warn and protect” is not triggered unless: (1) The patient has communicated to that practitioner a threat of imminent, serious physical violence against a readily identifiable individual or against himself and the circumstances are such that a reasonable professional in the practitioner’s area of expertise would believe the patient intended to carry out the threat; or (2) The circumstances are such that a reasonable professional in the practitioner’s area of expertise would believe the patient intended to carry out an act of 3 imminent, serious physical violence against a readily identifiable individual or against himself. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(b) (emphases added).] Under the statute, the duty to warn and protect can be fulfilled by takingsuch steps as “[a]rranging for the patient to be admitted voluntarily to apsychiatric unit of a general hospital,” “[a]dvising a local law enforcementauthority of the patient’s threat and the identity of the intended victim,” or“[w]arning the intended victim of the threat.” N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(c)(1), (3),(4). In addition, a mental health practitioner is protected from civil liabilityfor the disclosure of confidential information in discharging a duty under thestatute. N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(d). The purpose of the statute is to give mental health practitioners “aspecific guideline” when facing the dual “quandary” of civil liability -- either“for failing to warn a potential victim of the patient’s capability for violence,or . . . for disclosing confidential communications between the therapist andthe patient.” Sponsor’s Statement to S. 3063 2 (Nov. 19, 1990). In short, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 balances two important values: protecting a patient’sinterest in the confidentiality of a therapeutic relationship and protecting thesafety of an “identifiable individual” whom the practitioner reasonablybelieves will be the target of “imminent, serious physical violence.” N.J.S.A.2A:62A-16(b); see Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 38 (2006). 4 The competing values facing the mental health practitioners named inthe statute are the very same facing licensed social workers. The question iswhether licensed social workers should be singled out to navigate anamorphous common law standard rather than be held to the “specificguideline” that governs similarly situated mental health practitioners. B. Determining whether to impose a duty under the common law turns onconsiderations of basic fairness and public policy. Hopkins v. Fox & LazoRealtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993); accord J.S., 155 N.J. at 339. Those whomust conform their conduct to the duty must be provided sufficient guidance todo so. G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 414 (2019) (citing Hopkins, 132 N.J.at 439). We do not construe the common law in a vacuum. Oftentimes, whenimposing a duty, we do so in light of the State’s overall public policy asevidenced by legislative enactments. See, e.g., Estate of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199, 216-18 (2020) (reviewing civil and penal statutes expressing theState’s strong public policy against not only underage drinking, but also theservice of alcohol to visibly intoxicated social guests); J.S., 155 N.J. at 347(“In defining the appropriate standard of care, we are enjoined again toconsider the comprehensive legislative treatment of the issue of sexual abuseof children.”). 5 In J.S., we held that a spouse could be held civilly liable for the sexualabuse her husband inflicted on two adolescent girls visiting her home based ona standard of “particularized foreseeability” and the spouse’s failure to preventor warn of the anticipated danger. 155 N.J. at 342, 352-53. We found thatsexual abuse was particularly foreseeable to the spouse because, as sheconceded for argument purposes, “'at all relevant times’ she 'knew or shouldhave known of her husband’s proclivities/propensities’” and because she knewthat the girls “spent considerable amounts of time [in her home] alone with herhusband.” Id. at 353. The difference in assessing “particularized foreseeability” in J.S. and thepremises-liability cases cited by the majority and in this case is that a licensedsocial worker, like a psychiatrist or a licensed clinical social worker, mustbalance the duty of confidentiality against the duty to warn or protect anidentifiable individual -- and must do so in the murky field of mental health,where predictions about human behavior are exceedingly difficult to make.Indeed, the Legislature has decreed that a licensed social worker, like alicensed clinical social worker, is not required to disclose confidentialinformation about a patient unless, for example, the patient “presents a clearand present danger to the health or safety of an individual.” N.J.S.A.45:15BB-13(b); see also N.J.A.C. 13:44G-12.3(a)(4). The majority’s approach 6 -- imposing a duty to warn or protect in the absence of a clear and presentdanger to an identifiable individual -- is arguably in conflict with theLegislature’s confidentiality requirement in N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-13(b). Conforming the common law standard of “particularized foreseeability”in J.S., in the case of a licensed social worker, to the legislative guideline in N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 would maintain a consistent standard for similarlysituated mental health professionals. The majority is not advancing notions ofbasic fairness or public policy by suggesting that a licensed social worker musthave a greater degree of discernment for predicting a patient’s future violentact against an identifiable individual, pursuant to the common law, than a morethoroughly trained licensed clinical social worker, pursuant to statute. 1 Basicfairness and an enlightened public policy strongly indicate that the duty-to-warn-or-protect standard governing licensed social workers and clinical socialworkers should not be different. 21 To be licensed, clinical social workers must meet several additional eligibility requirements not required of social workers, including two years of full-time experience in the practice of clinical social work, twelve semester hours of graduate-level course work in methods of clinical social work practice, and a clinical examination administered by the Association of Social Work Boards. See N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-6; N.J.A.C. 13:44G-4.1 to -4.2. 2 Both social workers and clinical social workers are licensed by the State Board of Social Work Examiners, pursuant to the Social Workers’ Licensing Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-1 to -13; both must hold at least a master’s 7 II. A. At the time of the relevant events, plaintiff Leah Coleman was a caseworker in the Department of Children and Families, Division of ChildProtection and Permanency (DCPP) responsible for T.E.’s case. The DCPPhad removed T.E.’s five children from her custody after she experiencedauditory hallucinations that resulted in her temporary commitment. T.E. wasseeking the reunification of her family while receiving treatment for hersignificant mental health issues. Martinez, a licensed social worker, wasT.E.’s therapist. Coleman, T.E.’s case worker at DCPP, communicated withMartinez. On October 28, 2014, Coleman sent an email to Martinez informing herthat T.E. had “shared with a family member that she hears commanding voices,to which she feels an obligation to act on their commands,” and “that she hasfailed to report [the voices] to her therapists and psychiatrist.” Martinezdegree in social work, N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-6(a)(1), (b)(1); and both are bound by a duty of confidentiality to their patients, N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-13. Both provide similar mental health services, and licensed social workers may even perform clinical social work, such as psychotherapy, so long as they are supervised by a licensed clinical social worker. See N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-3, -4(d). 8 responded to the email, stating that she would “address this with [T.E.] andkeep [Coleman] posted.” On November 7, 2014, Martinez met with T.E. and questioned her aboutthe report of hearing voices referred to in the email and identified Coleman asthe source of the information. T.E. denied hearing voices or having anypsychotic symptoms, although she was upset. Martinez assured T.E. thatexperiencing audio-visual hallucinations would not preclude her regainingcustody of her children. On earlier occasions, Martinez had observed T.E.appearing to respond to hearing voices. Martinez noted in her session report,as she had in previous reports, that T.E. displayed no suicidal or homicidalideation. The same day as her meeting with Martinez, T.E. called Colemanand was told that DCPP “will maintain that she is not capable of parentingindependently due to her mental health issues.” T.E. was scheduled to meetwith her psychiatrist eleven days later. A psychiatrist who had evaluated T.E. a year earlier indicated that T.E.should be referred to him for an immediate appointment “[i]f signs ofdecompensation [were] observed.” In retrospect, that Martinez should havereferred T.E. for an immediate appointment with a psychiatrist rather thankeeping to the appointment scheduled eleven days later seems obvious. But 9 none of the auditory hallucinations of which Martinez was aware indicated thatT.E. would act out violently. 3 Martinez testified in her deposition that the fact that a person isexperiencing auditory hallucinations, or even command hallucinations, doesnot necessarily “mean that [person is] dangerous.” That observation issupported by scientific literature. See, e.g., Keith Hersh & Randy Borum,Command Hallucinations, Compliance, and Risk Assessment, 26 J. Am. Acad.Psychiatry & L. 353, 353, 357 (1998) (noting that command hallucinations canrange “from innocuous to life threatening” and that “not everyone whoexperiences a command hallucination will comply, nor is everyone whoexperiences such symptoms considered dangerous”). B. The violent knife-wielding attack on Coleman by T.E. is a terribletragedy, and the horrific injuries suffered by Coleman are lamentable. But thefailure of Martinez to prophesize the assault against Coleman, based on theinformation available to her, does not render her liable under a standard of3 Although Martinez was aware that T.E. had a prior history of assaultive conduct, nothing in the record before us suggests that Martinez had a reason to believe that those assaults were in any way related to command hallucinations. 10 “particularized foreseeability” when viewed in light of the legislative“guideline” provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16. Martinez knew that T.E. wasscheduled to meet with her psychiatrist eleven days after their last session.Under the majority’s approach, Martinez had a duty to immediately refer T.E.to the psychiatrist for treatment. Yet, under that analytical paradigm, theremust be a finding of particularized foreseeability -- that Martinez had“particular knowledge or special reason to know that [Coleman] would suffer a[violent life-threatening assault from T.E.]” See J.S., 155 N.J. at 342(quotation marks omitted). The question still remains, under the common law,did Martinez have the knowledge or special reason to foresee in aparticularized way the attack on Coleman, and therefore the ability to preventor warn of the attack? N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 sets forth an articulable standardfor determining when a mental health professional must act and set aside theprivilege of confidentiality. The common law does not betray its special rolewhen it emulates a sensible statute that advances a sound public policy. As it presently stands, the Legislature has decreed that a licensed socialworker is not required to disclose confidential information about a patient inthe absence of “a clear and present danger to the health or safety of anindividual.” N.J.S.A. 45:15BB-13(b); see also N.J.A.C. 13:44G-12.3(a)(4). 11 Our common law must give meaningful instruction to licensed socialworkers concerning when the duty of confidentiality must give way to the dutyto warn or protect and when they will face liability to an identifiable individualwho is injured by a patient. Our common law should be harmonized -- not beput in conflict -- with the legislative goals articulated in N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16. Viewed through the prism of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16, the common lawstandard of particularized foreseeability should impose on a licensed socialworker, such as Martinez, a duty to warn or protect when (1) “[t]he patient hascommunicated . . . a threat of imminent, serious physical violence against areadily identifiable individual” and a reasonable licensed social worker “wouldbelieve the patient intend[s] to carry out the threat” or (2) when, based on thecircumstances, a reasonable licensed social worker “would believe the patientintend[s] to carry out an act of imminent, serious physical violence against areadily identifiable individual.” --- N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(b)(1) to (2). See The summary judgment record before us does not provide support for theconclusion that T.E. communicated to Martinez “a threat of imminent, seriousphysical violence” against Coleman or that the circumstances known toMartinez should have given rise to a reasonable belief that T.E. “intended t ocarry out an act of imminent, serious physical violence against” Coleman. In 12 the absence of such a record, Martinez did not have a duty to warn or protectColeman, and therefore she should not be subject to civil liability. III. The common law should not be at odds with a related legislative schemethat defines with precision the contours of a duty to warn or protect in the caseof mental health professionals. The discordant result reached here means thatMartinez, a licensed social worker, is exposed to liability, whereas a licensedclinical social worker or even a licensed psychiatrist with much greaterknowledge and expertise in the field of human behavior would not. The common law persists in any field until occupied by the Legislature.It is for the Legislature to determine whether, for duty-to-warn-or-protectpurposes, licensed social workers are to be disfavored among mental healthprofessionals. For today, the inequitable distinction between licensed socialworkers and other mental health professionals remains. Because I believe that Martinez is entitled to a grant of summaryjudgment, I respectfully dissent. 13