Title: Virginia Surety Co. v. Schlegel
Citation: 200 Kan. 64, 434 P.2d 722
Docket Number: 44,841
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1967

200 Kan. 64 (1967)
434 P.2d 722
VIRGINIA SURETY COMPANY, INC. and STANLEY DILLEY, Appellants,
v.
BEN SCHLEGEL d/b/a SCHLEGEL'S GARAGE, and WICHITA INSULATION CO., INC., Appellees.
No. 44,841

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 9, 1967.
Rodney H. Busey, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Lester C. Arvin and Kay K. Arvin, both of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Darrell D. Kellogg, of Wichita, argued the cause, and W.A. Kahrs, Robert H. Nelson, H.W. Fanning, Richard C. Hite, Roger M. Sherwood, Richard L. Honeyman, Thedore H. Hill and Mearle D. Mason, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee, Ben Schlegel d/b/a Schlegel's Garage.
Donald R. Newkirk, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Wayne Coulson, Paul R. Kitch, Dale M. Stucky, Gerrit H. Wormhoudt, Philip Kassebaum, John E. Rees, Robert T. Cornwell, Willard B. Thompson and David W. Buxton, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee, Wichita Insulation Co., Inc.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This appeal stems from a controversy over a bailment destroyed by fire. The bailor proceeded against the bailee and a third party, operating on the bailee's premises, in the alternative as permitted by K.S.A. 60-220 (a).
The petition insofar as material here alleged:
Schlegel, the bailee, answered admitting that the trailer was located in his garage and that a fire occurred therein but that he was without information with which to affirm or deny the remaining allegations of the petition.
The Wichita Insulation Company, the third party, answered admitting that its employees worked at the Schlegel Garage at the *66 date alleged and that a fire occurred but denied that it or its employees were guilty of negligence which caused the fire.
A pretrial conference resulted in a comprehensive order which provided in part:
..............
"a. What caused the fire?
"b. Who caused the fire?
At the trial the plaintiff presented testimony which we summarize at some length, as the issues present mixed questions of fact and law.
The owner and operator of the Schlegel Garage testified that he was in the garage during the day of the fire until about 7:30 P.M. Two employees of the Wichita Insulation Company were there when he left. He stated:
Donny Cook's testimony covered the smoking of cigarettes over the parts area:
The City Fire Marshal testified:
Stanley J. Spingler, investigator for the City of Wichita Fire Department, testified:
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence each of the two defendants moved the court for a directed verdict. The trial court, in ruling on the motions, appears to have concluded that "it was more probable true than not true that careless smoking was the causative factor of this fire" and it can be stated from the evidence that one of the two defendants, through agents, could have been guilty of negligence. "But since these are not joint tort feasors a verdict by the jury at this point would, I believe, be pure conjecture." Both motions were sustained and plaintiff has appealed.
The appellant contends that his proof was sufficient to go to the jury as to the negligent cause of the fire by each appellee. As there is a difference in the approach, at least as to procedure, the sufficiency of the proof against each appellee will be considered separately.
The appellee, Wichita Insulation Company, suggests that plaintiff's claim is based upon negligence which is never presumed but must be established by competent evidence. Likewise, mere proof of negligent conduct does not establish a cause of action but the *69 negligence must be the proximate cause. It is further suggested evidence that a casualty occurred and a loss was sustained does not, when standing alone, create liability and does not justify submission of a case to a jury  citing Smith v. Mr. D's, Inc., 197 Kan. 83, 415 P.2d 251; Fredrickson v. Mackey, 196 Kan. 542, 413 P.2d 86; Holt v. Bills, 189 Kan. 14, 366 P.2d 1009; Blackmore v. Auer, 187 Kan. 434, 357 P.2d 765; Little v. Butner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P.2d 1022; Mills v. State Automobile Insurance Association, 183 Kan. 268, 326 P.2d 254.
The veracity of the above generalities cannot be questioned and appellant does not do so. Appellant counters with the suggestion that the court weighed the evidence and did not give him the benefit of the inferences which should have been drawn from his evidence. The appellee responds with the contention that appellant relies upon a pyramid of inferences capped by a pure guess and that a presumption or inference based upon a presumption or inference is insufficient to establish negligence  citing Smith v. Mr. D's, Inc., supra; Kitchen v. Smith, 184 Kan. 188, 334 P.2d 413; Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., 163 Kan. 611, 185 P.2d 158.
Here we reach the crux of the case between these two parties  is it necessary to pyramid inference upon inference to support appellant's case on the facts presented? We think not.
We will not concern ourselves with just what constitutes an inference on an inference, but rather we will examine the evidence to determine if the jury can reach a conclusion on the vital issues without indulging in mere speculation or conjecture. We are impressed with the statement in Duncan v. Railway Co., 82 Kan. 230, 108 Pac. 101, which reads:
We are also impressed with the statement in 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 166, p. 205, as follows:
We do not find the evidence to be so uncertain or speculative in this case. Briefly reviewing we find that the damage to the trailer in the garage by fire was a positive fact. The fact that the fire started in the parts department is quite positive. Eliminating all other possible causes it would appear that the fire was started by the careless smoking of a cigarette. This may be an inference but it is rather a definite one. It is also supported by the opinion of an expert. An inference which is drawn by a witness with special technical experience is to be weighed with positive or factual testimony. We find the general rule thus stated:
This court has held that an expert may give his opinion as to the origin of a fire in an arson case. In State v. Smith, 173 Kan. 807, 252 P.2d 917, it is stated:
State v. Gore, supra, dealing with an arson case, states the rule:
The weight to be given the testimony of an expert is a matter for the consideration of the jury but the testimony of a qualified expert is sufficient to make a prima facie case.
The question remains  who was carelessly smoking the cigarette? The employees of the appellee, The Wichita Insulation Company, were working above the parts department. They were on a balcony flicking ashes onto one by six inch boards with 1/4 and 1/2 inch cracks in between. It may require an inference or an assumption to find that an employee of the insulation company was the party guilty of carelessly or negligently handling the cigarette. However, there are rather substantial facts to support the inference.
It might further be suggested that the fact that there are several inferences to be drawn in a single case is not objectionable as long as each has a factual foundation. In Broyles v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 155 Kan. 74, 122 P.2d 763, we held:
Applying the rule that as against a motion for a directed verdict all evidence must be considered in favor of the opposing party and all inferences must be considered in favor of the party adducing the evidence (Baker v. Western Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 196 Kan. 345, 411 P.2d 711; Gardner v. Pereboom, 197 Kan. 188, 416 P.2d 67) we are forced to conclude that the motion for a directed verdict on behalf of the Wichita Insulation Company should not have been sustained.
As we approach the controversy between the appellant (bailor) and the appellee (bailee), we find ourselves confronted with procedural rather than substantive questions of law, i.e., presumptions and burden of proof.
It appears to be the very general rule that when the bailor shows that the property was delivered to the bailee for hire and the bailee has failed to return the thing bailed, a prima facie case is made out against the bailee and he must come forward with proof of loss free from negligence on his part. (43 A.L.R.2d 412.)
From this point on the authorities are not in accord. Many authorities hold that the bailee need only show destruction of the bailed property by fire to overcome the bailor's prima facie case. *72 Other modern authorities hold that the bailor makes out a prima facie case when he proves loss of the property by fire while in the possession of the bailee  this on the theory that the bailee still has the obligation to establish due care. (8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailments, §§ 315 and 316, p. 1202.)
This court appears to follow the latter theory. In Wiley v. Locke, 81 Kan. 143, 105 Pac. 11, we state at page 147:
The appellee calls our attention to the rule that when proof of lack of negligence affirmatively appears from plaintiff's (bailor's) testimony, the necessity for that proof by the defendant (bailee) is obviated. It would be difficult to quarrel with the rule so announced. However, we do not see where it has any application here. The plaintiff introduced expert testimony, based on adequate data, that the fire was caused by careless smoking. There has been no evidence that the bailee exercised due care. The best that can be said for the bailee is, there was an inference that the employees of the insulation company were the careless smokers. Evidence of some other possible cause of the fire does not refute the presumption of lack of due care or negligence on the part of the bailee. In Jones v. Warner, 57 Wash. 2d 647, 359 P.2d 160, 92 A.L.R.2d 1404, where the court had under consideration an action by a bailor for damages to an automobile, we find the following statement:
*73 We must also give consideration to K.S.A. 60-220 (a) which provides:
Where parties have been joined in the alternative the court has discretion not to require the plaintiff to elect among them that he is entitled to have the cause submitted as to all defendants. A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict only if as a matter of law plaintiff's evidence prevents a verdict against him. In Metrakos v. New York Cent. R. Co., 12 F.R.D. 177, the federal court, in dealing with a similar rule, stated at page 178 of the opinion:
We cannot say at this juncture of the case that a showing has been made which would absolve the bailee of all charges of lack of due care as a matter of law. At this juncture no showing has been made which would foreclose plaintiff from maintaining the action against both defendants.
The judgment is reversed with instructions to grant a new trial.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.