Title: Kenneth Allen Stewart v. James V. Crosby, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2716
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC02-2716
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KENNETH ALLEN STEWART,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,
Respondent.
[May 13, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
Kenneth Stewart petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  Stewart was convicted of first-degree
felony murder, attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, robbery with a
firearm, and arson.  The trial court imposed a death sentence, which this Court
affirmed on direct appeal.  Stewart v. State, 588 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1991).  The facts
and procedural history of this case are set out fully in Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d
59 (Fla. 2001), where this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Stewart's motion
for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 
Stewart has now filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which
1.  In this petition, Stewart alleges: (1) Florida's death penalty statute is
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise
on direct appeal four meritorious issues relating to trial counsel's ineffectiveness
and other errors at trial; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
on direct appeal the issue of trial counsel's concession of Stewart's guilt.
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raises three claims.1  We deny Stewart's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Stewart first argues that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the
United States Constitution under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  This Court has previously
addressed and rejected this claim.  See Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2003);
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002);
King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).  Further,
one of the aggravating circumstances in this case was that Stewart had been
convicted of a prior violent felony.  The prior violent felony aggravator alone
satisfies the mandates of the United States Constitution; therefore, imposition of the
death penalty was constitutional.  See Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 119 n.79
(Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 320 (2003).  Stewart is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
Stewart's remaining claims present issues that lack merit or are procedurally
barred because they were raised or properly could have been raised in a Florida
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion.  In his first two subclaims, Stewart
asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal trial
counsel's ineffectiveness with respect to possible mitigation and a voluntary
intoxication defense.  In these claims, Stewart presents a procedural variant of
claims which this Court addressed and rejected in Stewart’s rule 3.850 motion.  It
is improper to argue in a habeas petition a variant to a claim previously decided. 
Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2003).  Stewart is not entitled to relief
on these claims.  
Stewart's third subclaim, challenging the competency hearing, presents no
argument or factual grounds to support the claim; therefore, it is dismissed as
insufficiently pled.  See Shere v. State, 742 So.2d 215, 218 n.6 (Fla. 1999). 
Stewart's subclaim regarding his incompetence to proceed at all material
stages during trial lacks support in the record on direct appeal.  Appellate counsel
may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel only where the
ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record.  Gore v. State, 784 So. 2d
418, 437-38 (Fla. 2001).  Stewart is not entitled to relief on this subclaim.  
In his final claim, Stewart asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise on direct appeal the issue of trial counsel's concession of guilt. 
Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective
2. Indeed, Stewart raised twenty-six claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial in his Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion.   Each claim was denied by the trial court.  We
affirmed this denial in Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2001).  
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assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal because such claims are more effectively
raised in a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850.  See Grubbs v.
Singletary, 120 F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Blanco v. Wainwright, 507
So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1987)).2  The claim is procedurally barred.
Because all of Stewart's claims are either without merit or procedurally
barred, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
CANTERO, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion and write only to expand on the reasoning
contained therein.  With regard to Issue 1, because of the presence of the prior
violent felony aggravator, I agree that in accordance with our precedent Stewart is
3.  With respect to Stewart's claim that trial counsel failed to investigate
evidence of Stewart's alleged childhood abuse as possible mitigation, this Court
concluded that "the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in this
case was well within the realm of constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel." 
Stewart, 801 So. 2d at 68.  With respect to Stewart's claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to employ a voluntary intoxication defense, this Court
concluded that "counsel made an informed and reasoned decision not to pursue a
voluntary intoxication defense."  Id. at 65.
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not entitled to relief under Ring.  See Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla.
2003).
With regard to Issue 2, in three of the four subclaims Stewart argues that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising trial counsel's ineffectiveness on
direct appeal.  I agree that these claims are meritless.  Ineffective assistance of
counsel claims generally are not cognizable on direct appeal unless trial counsel's
ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record.  See Gore v. State, 784 So. 2d
418, 437-38 (Fla. 2001).  As to subclaims one and two, trial counsel's failure to
present mitigation and trial counsel's failure to pursue a voluntary mitigation
defense, we have already expressly rejected these exact claims in Stewart's appeal
from the denial of 3.850 relief.  See Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2001).3 
Thus, trial counsel's ineffectiveness could not have been apparent from the face of
the record because, simply put, trial counsel was not ineffective.  As to the fourth
subclaim, in which Stewart asserts that appellate counsel should have argued trial
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counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to raise Stewart's competency to proceed,
similarly, no showing of incompetency affirmatively appears in the trial record. 
Thus, because claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness would have been
unsuccessful on direct appeal, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to
raise these meritless issues.  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).
Finally, as to Issue 3, whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise on direct appeal that trial counsel's concession of Stewart's guilt to second-
degree murder or manslaughter violated his constitutional rights, in this case there
was no concession of guilt to first-degree murder.  Thus, this case is
distinguishable from Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 630 (Fla. 2000), in which
counsel conceded guilt to all charges and merely argued for leniency at the penalty
phase.  Thus, trial counsel's concession of Griffin's guilt to the lesser offenses was
proper trial strategy here.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 2003)
(concluding that conceding guilt to a lesser offense is counsel's strategy that may
bind a client even when done without consultation); Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d
223, 231 (Fla. 2001) (even if defendant did not consent to defense counsel's
strategy to concede guilt to a lesser crime such concession was legitimate trial
strategy in attempt to save defendant's life, and was necessary in light of
overwhelming evidence of guilt).  
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Moreover, any concession of guilt to any offense would not have violated
Stewart's Sixth Amendment rights unless Stewart did not consent to counsel's
strategy.  See Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 625; Nixon v. State, 857 172, 176 (Fla. 2003)
(Nixon III) ("[T]he record must contain substantial evidence . . . . that affirmatively
shows that [the defendant] affirmatively, explicitly agreed to counsel's strategy."). 
Because the determination whether competent, substantial evidence exists to
establish that Nixon expressly and affirmatively consented to counsel's strategy
requires an evidentiary hearing, this issue should have been raised as an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim in Stewart's 3.850 motion. Accordingly, it is now
procedurally barred.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion in this case.
CANTERO, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion except that, regarding Stewart’s claim that
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
I would simply hold, in accordance with my specially concurring opinion in
Windom v. State, Nos. SC01-2706 & SC02-2142 (Fla. May 6, 2004), that under
both federal and Florida law, Ring does not apply to convictions that had become
final before that opinion was rendered.
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WELLS, J., concurs.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Daphney E. Gaylord, Assistant CCRC and Robert T. Strain, Assistant CCRC,
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent