Title: Griffin v. Ward
Citation: 148 S.E.2d 133, 267 N.C. 296
Docket Number: 697
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 1966

148 S.E.2d 133 (1966) 267 N.C. 296 Judy Faye GRIFFIN v. Willie D. WARD. No. 697. Supreme Court of North Carolina. May 11, 1966. *135 Sullivan &amp; Horne, by Kirby Sullivan and Thomas E. Horne, Southport, for plaintiff appellee. Stevens, Burgwin, McGhee &amp; Ryals, by Ellis L. Aycock, Wilmington, Herring, Walton, Parker &amp; Powell, by Ray Walton, Southport, for defendant appellant. PLESS, Justice. G.S. § 20-154, which provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall not stop without first seeing that he can do so in safety and that he must give a signal of his intention where the operation of other cars might be affected, is not applicable where the driver has no choice. Here the defendant was confronted with a situation which demanded that he stop because the line of cars in front of him had done so and he could not turn left because of oncoming traffic. It had been raining and the windows of his car were up so he could give no hand signal, so that his negligence, if any, is based upon the statement of the plaintiff that she saw no brake lights burning on the rear of his car. Even so, it may be doubted that this was the proximate cause of the collision. If the plaintiff can survive the motions for nonsuit upon the questionable contention that the defendant was actionably negligent, we have no serious problem in holding that upon the plaintiff's evidence, and upon all the evidence, the plaintiff could not survive the issue of contributory negligence. In Clontz v. Krimminger, 253 N.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 804, this Court said: The following excerpts from Cox v. Lee, 230 N.C. 155, 52 S.E.2d 355, are applicable here: "The plaintiff's negligence, to defeat a recovery in an action like the present, need not be the sole proximate cause of the injury. It is enough if it contribute to the injury as a proximate cause, or one of them." Moore v. Boone, 231 N.C. 494, 57 S.E.2d 783. There is little, if any, conflict in the evidence for the plaintiff and for the defendant, but we have summarized both to give the full picture. The statement of Chief Justice Stacy in Godwin v. Atlantic *136 Coast Line R. R., 220 N.C. 281, 17 S.E.2d 137 is applicable here: Here the plaintiff and defendant had been behind a line of cars for a substantial distance. Under these conditions a driver, in the exercise of reasonable care, is charged with notice that the operation of each car is affected by the one in front of it. He must maintain such distance, keep such a lookout and operate at such speed, under these conditions, that he can control his car under ordinarily foreseeable developments. The defendant did so and was able to stop when it became necessary. No less responsibility was cast upon the plaintiff. Being of the opinion that the cited authorities are controlling here, we hold that the motion to nonsuit the plaintiff's cause of action should have been allowed. Reversed. MOORE, J., not sitting. LAKE, J., dissents. SHARP, J., concurs in result.