Title: Simon v. Forer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 021627
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2003

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
EDITH SIMON 
v.  Record No. 021627  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 17, 2003 
LESLIE ELLIOT FORER, M.D., ET AL. 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Rossie D. Alston, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether a statute of 
limitations is tolled upon commencement of a nonsuited 
action when the plaintiff does not renew the action within 
six months from the date of the nonsuit order.  The circuit 
court concluded that the recommenced action was barred 
because it was filed outside both the original two-year 
statute of limitations and the six-month period following 
entry of the nonsuit order.  Finding no error, we will 
affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On June 18, 1999, Edith M. Simon filed a motion for 
judgment for medical malpractice against Leslie Elliot 
Forer, M.D., Michael Bruce Robins, M.D., Potomac Hospital 
Corporation of Prince William, and Potomac Radiology and 
Imaging Associates, Inc. (collectively “the defendants”).  
Simon alleged that the defendants did not “comply with the 
applicable standard(s) of care” and were negligent by 
failing to interpret accurately mammogram screenings 
performed in March 1997 and to make a timely diagnosis of 
breast cancer based on those mammograms.  On July 18, 2000, 
the trial court granted Simon’s motion for a nonsuit 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-380. 
 
Approximately nine months after entry of the nonsuit 
order, on April 16, 2001, Simon re-filed her motion for 
judgment against the same defendants.1  In response, the 
defendants filed, among other things, pleas in bar, 
asserting that Simon’s cause of action was barred by the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations.  See Code 
§ 8.01-243(A).  The parties agree, for purposes of this 
appeal, that Simon’s cause of action accrued either on 
September 14, 1998 or on September 28, 1998. 
 
After considering the parties’ memoranda and argument, 
the circuit court rejected Simon’s argument that the two-
year statute of limitations was tolled while the first 
action was pending.  Since the second action was filed 
outside the original two-year limitations period and not 
within six months of entry of the nonsuit order as provided 
in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), the court sustained the pleas in 
                     
1 Simon filed both motions for judgment in the Circuit 
Court of Arlington County.  By order dated February 27, 
2002, the second motion for judgment was transferred to the 
Circuit Court of Prince William County. 
 
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bar and dismissed the renewed action with prejudice.  Simon 
appeals from the circuit court’s judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations was tolled upon commencement of the 
nonsuited action even though Simon did not renew the action 
within six months from the date of the nonsuit order.  
Resolution of this issue turns on the scope of the tolling 
provision in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) and is a question of 
law, there being no material facts in dispute.  Thus, the 
circuit court’s judgment is subject to de novo review.  See 
Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 410, 559 S.E.2d 616, 618 
(2002); Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 262 Va. 473, 
477, 551 S.E.2d 596, 597 (2001). 
In pertinent part, Code § 8.01-229(E) states: 
 
 
E. Dismissal, abatement, or nonsuit. 
 
 
 
1. Except as provided in subdivision 3 of this 
subsection, if any action is commenced within the 
prescribed limitation period and for any cause abates 
or is dismissed without determining the merits, the 
time such action is pending shall not be computed as 
part of the period within which such action may be 
brought, and another action may be brought within the 
remaining period. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
3. If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as 
prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of limitations 
with respect to such action shall be tolled by the 
commencement of the nonsuited action, and the 
 
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plaintiff may recommence his action within six months 
from the date of the order entered by the court, or 
within the original period of limitation, or within 
the limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, 
whichever period is longer.  This tolling provision 
shall apply irrespective of whether the action is 
originally filed in a federal or a state court and 
recommenced in any other court, and shall apply to all 
actions irrespective of whether they arise under 
common law or statute. 
 
 
On appeal, Simon argues that the circuit court erred 
by not applying the plain language of Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3), which provides that, when a plaintiff suffers a 
voluntary nonsuit, the applicable statute of limitations is 
“tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited action.”  
Relying on this language, Simon contends that the two-year 
statute of limitations was tolled while the first motion 
for judgment was pending and that the circuit court’s 
decision negated the tolling provision in Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3). 
 
Continuing, Simon acknowledges that the opening clause 
of Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) makes the provisions of 
subsection(E)(3) controlling in determining the options for 
re-filing a nonsuited action.  However, Simon asserts that 
nothing in subsection (E)(3) states that a plaintiff must 
re-file a nonsuited action within six months of the date of 
the nonsuit order and that subsection (E)(3) does not 
contain a method of calculating the amount of time 
 
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remaining in the “original period of limitation.”  For 
these reasons, Simon contends that “the reader must then go 
back to the language of . . . Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) for 
instructions on what to do with the time remaining on the 
tolled statute of limitations . . . .”  She states that 
“[t]his step is necessary because the computation for 
tolled time remaining in the original statute of 
limitations is not provided for by . . . Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3).” 
 
Applying her interpretation of Code §§ 8.01-229(E)(1) 
and –229(E)(3), Simon contends that the two-year statute of 
limitations was tolled during the 13 months that the first 
motion for judgment was pending before entry of the nonsuit 
order.  Since nine months of the two years had expired when 
Simon first filed her action, she asserts that she had 15 
months remaining on the original statute of limitations in 
which to renew the nonsuited action.  We do not agree with 
Simon’s position. 
Initially, it is important to point out that this case 
does not implicate the tolling provision set forth in Code 
§ 8.01-229(E)(1).  Under that subsection, a statute of 
limitations is tolled when an action, commenced within the 
prescribed limitation period, is later dismissed or abates 
without determining the merits.  The time during which the 
 
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action was pending is not included as part of the period 
within which the action could have been brought, and the 
action may be re-filed “within the remaining period.”  Code 
§ 8.01-229(E)(1).  However, the initial clause of 
subsection (E)(1) specifically precludes the applicability 
of that tolling provision to an action that is nonsuited.  
In the event of a nonsuit, the provisions of subsection 
(E)(3) govern the determination of the time period during 
which a nonsuited action may be recommenced. 
Subsection (E)(3) provides that, when a plaintiff 
suffers a nonsuit, that plaintiff, unlike a plaintiff 
coming within the scope of subsection (E)(1), has three 
possible time periods in which to renew the nonsuited 
action: (1) within six months of the date of the nonsuit 
order; (2) within the “original period of limitation;” or 
(3) within the period provided in subsection (B)(1).2  Code 
§ 8.01-229(E)(3).  A plaintiff may utilize whichever of 
these periods is longest.  Id.  The question we must answer 
is whether an “original period of limitation” is tolled 
upon commencement of a nonsuited action.  We conclude that 
it is not. 
In Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), the General Assembly 
provided that an applicable statute of limitations shall be 
 
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tolled upon commencement of a nonsuited action.  But, the 
General Assembly did not include the language used in 
subsection (E)(1), stating that “the time such action is 
pending shall not be computed as part of the period within 
which such action may be brought.”  Code § 8.01-229(E)(1).  
That particular language delineates the period of time 
during which a statute of limitations is tolled under 
subsection (E)(1), i.e., while an action is pending. 
Since subsection (E)(3) does not contain comparable 
language, Simon contends that we should refer to the 
provisions in subsection (E)(1) to determine the amount of 
time remaining on the two-year “original period of 
limitation” after entry of the nonsuit order.  However, we 
find nothing in subsection (E)(3) indicating that reference 
to subsection (E)(1) is permissible when an action is 
nonsuited.  To the contrary, the opening clause of 
subsection (E)(1) expressly excludes the applicability of 
the tolling provision contained therein to an action that 
is nonsuited.  But if we adopted Simon’s position that the 
“original period of limitation” was tolled upon 
commencement of the nonsuited action even though she did 
not renew that action within six months of the date of the 
nonsuit order, we would necessarily have to refer to 
_______________________ 
2 The third option is not at issue in this case. 
 
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subsection (E)(1) in order to ascertain the duration of the 
tolling.  Otherwise, the “original period of limitation” 
would be tolled for an indefinite period of time under 
subsection (E)(3). 
Obviously, the General Assembly did not intend for 
that scenario to arise.  Consequently, we conclude that the 
subsection (E)(3) tolling provision must be read in 
conjunction only with the option to renew the nonsuited 
action within six months of the date of the nonsuit order.  
By constructing subsection (E)(3) in this manner, the 
General Assembly has provided a window of six months during 
which a nonsuited action can be recommenced even if it was 
originally filed on the last day of the applicable statute 
of limitations.  However, when a plaintiff, such as Simon, 
suffers a nonsuit and does not renew the action within the 
allotted six months, the “original period of limitation” is 
not tolled. 
Our conclusion is consistent with the General 
Assembly’s use of different terms in Code §§ 8.01-229(E)(1) 
and –229(E)(3).  In subsection (E)(1), the General Assembly 
utilized the term “remaining period” to describe the period 
of time during which a plaintiff may recommence an action 
that is dismissed or abates without determining the merits.  
The use of that term is consistent with the fact that a 
 
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statute of limitations is tolled under subsection (E)(1) 
while an action is pending.  However, in subsection (E)(3), 
which specifically applies to an action that has been 
nonsuited, the General Assembly used the term “original 
period of limitation” to describe one of the possible 
periods during which a plaintiff may renew a nonsuited 
action.  We construe the term “original period of 
limitation” to mean the original statute of limitations 
without any tolling of that statute while a nonsuited 
action is pending.  To interpret this term as Simon 
suggests would require us either to give that term and the 
term “remaining period” the same meaning or to re-write 
subsection (E)(3) to say “original period of limitation” as 
computed under subsection (E)(1). 
We have a duty to “construe the law as it is written.”  
Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm’n v. Chesapeake, 218 
Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1978).  In doing so, we 
assume that the “legislature chose, with care, the words it 
used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound 
by those words.”  Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 
240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990).  “When the 
General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, 
it is presumed to mean two different things.”  Forst v. 
Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop., Inc., 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 
 
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S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981).  Our interpretation of Code § 8.01-
229(E) is consistent with these principles. 
We note that our construction of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) 
is consistent also with the Revisers’ Note regarding that 
subsection: 
 
Subsection E 3 qualifies the application of subsection 
E 1, and requires a plaintiff who takes a nonsuit to 
renew his suit within six months or the running of the 
statute of limitations will not be affected by the 
commencement of the original action. 
 
See also Scoggins v. Douglas, 760 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 
1985).  While the Revisers’ Note is not controlling on this 
Court, see Lavery v. Automation Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 
234 Va. 145, 149 n.3, 360 S.E.2d 336, 339 n.3 (1987), we 
have previously referred to it in interpreting Code § 8.01-
229.  See Douglas v. Chesterfield County Police Dep’t, 251 
Va. 363, 367, 467 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1996). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude that, when Simon 
suffered a nonsuit of her first motion for judgment and did 
not recommence the action within six months of the date of 
the nonsuit order, the two-year statute of limitations was 
not tolled during the pendency of the nonsuited action.  
Consequently, the “original period of limitation” expired 
in September 2000.  Since Simon did not re-file the 
nonsuited action until April 2001, the circuit court 
 
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correctly sustained the defendants’ pleas in bar.  We will 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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