Title: Oyedepo v. Sellers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120531
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2013

REL: 9/27/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
____________________
1120531
____________________
Ex parte George Mason
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Kola Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and
next friend of Joshua Dosunmu, a minor
v.
Janie Pearson Sellers et al.)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-09-900140)
STUART, Justice.
George Mason petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment
1120531
for him on the basis of State-agent immunity in the action
filed against him by Kola Oyedepo, individually and as
grandfather and next friend of Joshua Dosunmu.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.  
Facts
George Mason is a bus driver employed by the Macon County
Board of Education.  On September 28, 2009, Joshua Dosunmu, a
minor child and a fifth-grade student in the Macon County
school system, was a passenger on the school bus Mason was
driving.  Dosunmu got off the school bus at the Windover
Apartments, which are located on Lynn Drive and Martin Luther
King Highway/Highway 80 West.  After the bus had continued on
its route, Dosunmu attempted to cross the highway.  He was
struck and injured by an automobile, driven by Janie Pearson
Sellers.  Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and next
friend of Joshua Dosunmu, sued Mason and others alleging
negligence 
and 
wantonness 
arising 
from 
Mason's 
alleged 
failure
to properly supervise Dosunmu and/or his alleged failure to
ensure that Dosunmu got off the bus at the appropriate school-
bus stopping point.  
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1120531
Mason answered the complaint and subsequently moved for
a summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State-
agent immunity because, he said, as a bus driver employed by
the Macon County Board of Education at the time of the
accident, he was exercising judgment in transporting and
supervising students on the day of the incident.  He further
asserted that he was performing his duties in a manner
consistent with the rules and regulations established by the
State of Alabama and the Macon County Board of Education.  In
support of his motion, he attached a copy of his responses to
Oyedepo's first set of interrogatories and his deposition
testimony.  Oyedepo opposed Mason's summary-judgment motion,
arguing that Mason was not entitled to State-agent immunity
because, he said, a bus driver does not perform a function
that would entitle him or her to State-agent immunity. 
Oyedepo further maintained that, even if Mason is entitled to
State-agent immunity, on the day of the incident Mason acted
beyond his authority when he allowed Dosunmu to exit the bus
at a location that required Dosunmu to cross a four-lane
highway to get to his house and that, therefore, he is not
immune from civil liability.  The trial court denied Mason's
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1120531
motion.
Mason petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment
for him on the basis of State-agent immunity.  
Standard of Review
"'"'While the general rule
is that the denial of a motion
for 
summary 
judgment is 
not
reviewable, the exception is that
the denial of a motion grounded
on 
a 
claim 
of 
immunity 
is
reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis,
689 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1996)....
"'"'Summary 
judgment 
is
appropriate only when "there is
no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving
party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young
v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.
2d 402 (Ala. 1996).  A court
considering a motion for summary
judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama
Power Co., 675 So. 2d 397 (Ala.
1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll–Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991);
will accord the nonmoving party
all 
reasonable 
favorable
inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley
Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d
981 (Ala. 1992); and will resolve
all reasonable doubts against the
moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
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1120531
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185
(Ala. 1998).
"'"'An 
appellate 
court
reviewing a ruling on a motion
for summary judgment will, de
novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court. 
Fuqua, supra, Brislin, supra.
Likewise, the appellate court
will consider only that factual
material available of record to
the 
trial 
court 
for 
its
consideration in deciding the
motion.  Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha
Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278
(Ala. 1991), 
Boland 
v. 
Fort
Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So. 2d 595
(Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599
So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1992).'"
"'Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135
(Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.
2d 911, 912–13 (Ala. 2000)).  A writ of
mandamus 
is 
an 
extraordinary 
remedy
available only when the petitioner can
demonstrate: "'(1) a clear legal right to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon 
the 
respondent 
to 
perform, 
accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly 
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex parte 
BOC Group,
Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).'
"Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299, 303–04 (Ala. 2008)."
Ex parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So. 3d 837, 840-41
(Ala. 2012).
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1120531
Discussion
Mason contends that, as a bus driver employed by the
Macon County Board of Education, he is entitled State-agent
immunity from Oyedepo's claims and that the trial court erred
by failing to enter a summary judgment in his favor on that
ground.
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'....
"'(5) exercising judgment in the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, 
or 
regulation 
in 
releasing 
prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
"'Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the foregoing statement of the
rule, a State agent shall not be immune
from civil liability in his or her personal
capacity
"'(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a 
governmental 
agency 
require 
otherwise; 
or
"'(2) when the State agent acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
6
1120531
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.'
"Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000).
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a
"burden-shifting" process when a party
raises 
the 
defense 
of 
State-agent 
immunity.
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052
(Ala. 2003). In order to claim State-agent
immunity, a State agent bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims
arise from a function that would entitle
the State agent 
to immunity. Giambrone, 874
So. 2d at 1052; Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d
705, 709 (Ala. 2002).  If the State agent
makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
State agent acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his
or her authority.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at
1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte
Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  "A
State agent acts beyond authority and is
therefore not immune when he or she
'fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations, such as
those stated on a checklist.'"  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).'
"Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452
(Ala. 2006).  Additionally, as this Court recently
stated:
"'"State-agent immunity protects agents of
the State in their exercise of discretion
in educating students.  We will not
second-guess their decisions."  Ex parte
Blankenship, 806 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Ala.
2000).  However, "[o]nce it is determined
that 
State-agent 
immunity 
applies,
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1120531
State-agent immunity is withheld upon a
showing 
that 
the 
State 
agent 
acted
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, or beyond his or her authority.
[Ex parte] Cranman, 792 So. 2d [392,] at
405 [(Ala. 2000)]."  Ex parte Bitel, 45 So.
3d 1252, 1257–58 (Ala. 2010).'
"N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561, 566 (Ala. 2011)."
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So. 3d at 842-43 (footnote
omitted).
First, Mason contends that he is entitled to State-agent
immunity because, he says, the claims against him are based on
acts arising from his performance of official duties and
exercise of discretion in supervising students as a bus driver
for the Macon County Board of Education.   In Ex parte
Trottman, 965 So. 2d 780, 783 (Ala. 2007), this Court held
that "educating students" as described in Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)(adopted by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000)),
"includes not only classroom teaching, but also supervising
and educating students in all aspects of the educational
process."  Alabama caselaw establishes that employees who 
work
in 
the 
educational 
system, 
other 
than 
teachers 
and
administrators, are entitled to State-agent immunity because
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1120531
the performance of  jobs in areas other than the classroom
involves the "supervising and educating of students."  See
Louviere v. Mobile Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 670 So. 2d 873 (Ala.
1995)(recognizing that janitors and steamfitters are entitled
to discretionary immunity ); Ex parte Trottman, supra
1
(recognizing that school secretaries and office clerical
assistants are entitled to State-agent immunity); 
 
Bathgate v.
Mobile Cnty. Bd. Sch. Comm'rs, 689 So. 2d 109 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996)(recognizing that maintenance engineers and facilities
managers are entitled to discretionary immunity); and Lennon
v. Petersen, 624 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1993)(recognizing that
athletic trainers are entitled to discretionary immunity). 
Mason reasons that because the conduct underlying the claims
against 
him 
involved 
his 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
supervising Dosunmu's exiting the bus, he is immune from civil
liability in his personal capacity.
Oyedepo maintains that Mason is not entitled to State-
agent immunity because, he says, bus drivers are not protected
"Since [Ex parte] Cranman[, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala.
1
2000)], we analyze immunity issues in terms of 'State-agent'
immunity, rather than 'under the dichotomy of ministerial
versus discretionary functions.'  Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d
1115, 1117 (Ala. 2003)."  Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d
201, 203 (Ala. 2003). 
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1120531
from civil liability by immunity.  He cites Horton v. Briley,
792 So. 2d 432 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).  In Horton, a bus driver
was sued by a student who was injured when the bus on which
she was a passenger collided with another school bus.  The
Court of Civil Appeals held that the bus driver was not
entitled to State-agent immunity, stating: 
"Bus drivers certainly use their own judgment or
discretion in performing their duties, but that
judgment or discretion is not related to the
formulation or application of governmental policy. 
The Cranman court explained, '[C]haracterizing as a
discretionary function conduct remote from the
execution 
of 
governmental 
policy 
... 
would
perpetuate 
an 
erroneous 
construction 
of 
the
Constitution.'  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 404.  Thus,
we conclude that the bus drivers are not entitled to
State-agent immunity." 
We, however, cannot agree with Oyedepo's contention that
Horton precludes Mason from the protection of State-agent
immunity.  The determination as to whether a bus driver is
entitled to State-agent immunity rests 
upon whether 
the 
claims
against the bus driver are based on acts arising from the
performance of official duties and the exercise of discretion
in the supervision of students.  In Horton, the claims arose
from the bus driver's conduct in driving the bus; in this
case, the claims arise from Mason's conduct in supervising a
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1120531
student's getting off the school bus.  Because the conduct at
issue in this case involves the exercise of discretion in
supervising students, Mason has satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that Oyedepo's claims arise from his 
exercise of
discretion while performing his duties as a bus driver in 
supervising students and that he is entitled to State-agent
immunity. 
Mason further contends that the trial court erred in
failing to enter a summary judgment based on State-agent
immunity because, he says, Oyedepo did not satisfy his burden
of demonstrating that Mason acted beyond the scope of his
authority.  Specifically, he argues that Oyedepo did not
establish that he did not abide by the rules and regulations
established by the Macon County Board of Education for loading
and unloading students from a school bus.  According to Mason,
he complied with the established rules and regulations of the
Macon County Board of Education; he observed Dosunmu and other
children get off the school bus at a location designated by
the school board onto a side road away from traffic; he had
loaded and unloaded Dosunmu at that designated location in the
past; on the day of the incident he watched Dosunmu exit the
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1120531
bus in the approved manner; and he did not drive away until
all the students who had gotten off the bus at the designated
location were safely away from the traffic.
Oyedepo maintains that Mason did not follow the rules and
regulations in the Alabama School Bus Driver Handbook and the
Alabama Commercial Driver License Manual, which have been
adopted by the Macon County Board of Education and that,
therefore, he acted outside the scope of his authority and is
not immune from civil liability.  According to Oyedepo, Mason
did not adhere to the following rules:
-- The driver should never change stops;
-- Students should load or unload only at their
school or designated stop;
-- Students should not cross a median or divided
highway;
-- Students should wait on the side of the road on
which they live;
-- Students should cross the street 10 feet in front
of the bus;
-- During the loading and unloading process, the
driver should COUNT the students and move the bus
ONLY after ALL students are safely on the side of
the road on which they live or in their seats.  Be
alert for students' apparel or carry-on items being
caught on the bus handrail, door, door handle, etc.;
and
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1120531
-- All students who live on the left side of the
road should exit first and cross in single file.
Oyedepo maintains that Mason had no discretion in following
these rules and that Mason acted beyond his authority when he
dropped Dosunmu, not at a designated location on the side of
the highway where Dosunmu's house is located, but across a
four-lane highway from the house.  
The evidence submitted to the trial court established
that, although Dosunmu exited the school bus at a designated
location approved by the Board, Dosunmu did not live on the
side of the highway where he exited the bus; that at no time
before the departure of the bus from the designated location
did Mason observe Dosunmu in or near the flow of traffic; and
that Dosunmu was hit by a car while crossing the highway after
the bus had continued on its route.  The evidence further
established that Mason stated that he was unloading Dosunmu in
accordance with the rules and regulations; that he did not
know that Dosunmu lived across the highway from where Dosunmu
got off the bus; and that he did not know Dosunmu would, or
encourage Dosunmu to, cross the highway.  None of the evidence
established that Mason knew or had reason to know that Dosunmu
was not exiting the bus at a designated location on the same
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1120531
side of the highway as his house or that Mason suggested,
forced, or otherwise caused Dosunmu to exit the bus at the
Windover Apartments.  Indeed, Dosunmu in his deposition
testimony admitted that he did not know why he got off the bus
at the designated spot across the highway from his house. 
Therefore, Oyedepo did not satisfy his burden of establishing
that Mason acted beyond the scope of his authority in
supervising Dosunmu, and the trial court erred in failing to
enter a summary judgment in Mason's favor.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, because Mason has demonstrated
that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to the claims
asserted against him in his individual capacity in Oyedepo's
action, he has established a clear legal right to a summary
judgment on those claims.  Therefore, we grant the petition
and issue a writ directing the Macon Circuit Court to enter a
summary judgment in favor of Mason.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
14