Title: State v. Smith
Citation: 319 Or. 37, 872 P.2d 966
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 1994

872 P.2d 966 (1994)
319 Or. 37
STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
v.
Randal Loyal SMITH, Appellant.
CC C90-1537CR; SC S39030.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted January 3, 1994.
Decided May 12, 1994.
Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, Salem.
Brenda J.P. Rocklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Amy E. Alpaugh, Janet A. Metcalf, and Kaye E. Sunderland, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salem.
Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, UNIS and GRABER, JJ.
UNIS, Justice.
This case is before this court on automatic and direct review of a judgment of conviction for aggravated murder and sentence of death, ORS 163.150(1)(f). Defendant seeks reversal of his convictions for aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder.[1]*967 In the alternative, defendant asks this court to vacate his sentence of death. We affirm defendant's convictions and sentence of death.
On September 20, 1990, defendant entered a bank in Washington County. There were two employees of the bank present, both tellers. Defendant went directly to one teller's area. At gunpoint, he demanded that the teller put money in a paper bag that he had brought with him to the bank. After the teller complied with defendant's demands, defendant stepped forward to within a foot of the teller and said, "Look at me." With the barrel of his gun within an inch or two of the teller's forehead, defendant shot her fatally. Defendant then said to the other teller, "Come here." That teller ducked behind a counter and ran out of the bank. As the surviving teller left the bank, defendant shot at her. The teller fled to a nearby restaurant, where she called the police. Later that day, defendant was arrested.
Defendant pleaded not guilty to charges of aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder. Before trial, at the request of defense counsel, two separate hearings before two different circuit court judges were held to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial.[2] The first hearing, held in December 1990, lasted five days. At the conclusion of that hearing, a circuit court judge found that defendant was able to aid and assist in his defense. That judge said that he was "not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant suffers from a major mental disease or defect as defined * * * in ORS 161.295." In support of his findings, the judge noted that all of the experts who had testified "found the defendant capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him" and that the only evidence that defendant was "unable to assist or cooperate with counsel or to participate in his defense" was that he remained mute. The judge further found that defendant was "electively mute" and that, if he chose to remain mute during trial, his muteness would not interfere with his ability to aid and assist his lawyer. The judge explained:
"Had I found the defendant to suffer from a major mental illness, I nevertheless would have been required to find him fit to proceed because the evidence is quite substantially lacking on the point of inability *968 to communicate sufficiently to assist and to cooperate with counsel.
On January 10, 1992, after the trial judge had denied defense counsel's motion to waive a jury trial, a matter which we discuss infra, defendant's lawyer asked the trial judge to re-examine the question of defendant's competency to stand trial. The trial judge agreed. He reviewed the evidence from the prior competency hearing and heard additional testimony. The trial judge concluded that defendant was able to aid and assist in his defense. In an order dated January 30, 1992, he found:
Defendant does not challenge either judge's competency ruling in this court.
At trial, defendant did not contest that he had engaged in the criminal conduct. Instead, the defense relied on the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, i.e., "guilty except for insanity," ORS 161.295.[3]
A jury found defendant guilty of one count of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. Following the findings by the jury during the penalty phase, the trial judge entered a judgment sentencing defendant to death on the conviction for aggravated murder and to incarceration for a period of 60 months on the conviction for attempted aggravated murder.
Defendant asserts several assignments of error. Defendant first contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow his lawyer to waive defendant's right to trial by a jury and to proceed with a bench trial because defendant was unable to waive that right himself.
Before trial, defendant's lawyer submitted to the trial judge in defendant's presence a written request to waive trial by a jury. The written request was signed by defendant's lawyer, but was not signed by defendant. The trial judge asked defendant, who, as previously stated, had been found by another trial court judge to be capable of aiding and assisting in the presentation of his defense,[4] if defendant had any objection to execution of the written waiver request by his lawyer on defendant's behalf. Defendant did not respond to the trial judge's question. The trial judge then denied the request by defendant's lawyer to waive defendant's right to trial by a jury.
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides in part:
By necessary implication, the emphasized quoted language of Article I, section 11, requires that the defendant in a capital case, such as defendant in this capital case, is to be tried only by a jury.[5] Because trial by a jury *969 is compulsory in a capital case, the trial judge did not have authority to permit defendant to waive trial by jury and to proceed in a bench trial. The trial judge, therefore, did not err in refusing to allow the written request by defendant's lawyer to waive defendant's right to trial by a jury.
Defendant next contends that the trial judge improperly excluded testimony during the guilt phase of the trial concerning the length of time that defendant would likely spend in the state hospital if he were found guilty except for insanity. During the second redirect examination of Dr. Johannsen, a psychologist called to testify on defendant's behalf, defense counsel inquired:
Although defense counsel thereafter made an offer of proof on another issue, he did not make an offer of proof on this issue.[6] OEC 103(1)(b)[7] provides that error may not be predicated on a ruling excluding evidence unless the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which the question was asked. See State v. Busby, 315 Or. 292, 298, 844 P.2d 897 (1993) (discussing principle); State v. Olmstead, 310 Or. 455, 459-60, 800 P.2d 277 (1990) (same).[8] The primary purpose of the offer of proof is to enable an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion was erroneous and, if so, harmful, i.e., whether the error affected a substantial right of the appellant. State v. Busby, supra, 315 Or. at 298, 844 P.2d 897. Other purposes are to permit the trial judge to reconsider his or her ruling in view of the actual evidence to be offered, 1 McCormick on Evidence 195-96, § 51 (4th ed 1992), and to enable opposing counsel to take appropriate action, Christinson v. Big Stone County Co-op., 13 F.3d 1178, 1180 (8th Cir 1994).
Here, the absence of an offer of proof precludes this court from evaluating whether Dr. Johannsen's testimony was properly excluded. From this record, it is not even apparent that Dr. Johannsen would have been able to express any opinion as to how long defendant might be held at the state hospital. During earlier questioning, he acknowledged that the length of time that a patient might spend at the hospital was up to the Psychiatric Security Review Board. Moreover, not knowing what his answer would have been makes it impossible for this court to determine whether exclusion of the testimony, if it was error, was harmful error.[9]*970 As the state points out, had Dr. Johannsen said that defendant would spend significantly less time in the state hospital than he would in prison, the trial judge's exclusion of this testimony presumably would have helped, not hurt, defendant's case.
Defendant next claims that the trial judge "erred in limiting defense counsel's direct examination of psychiatrist Janzer." Specifically, defendant asserts that evidence should have been admitted that he did not respond to defense counsel's attempt to encourage him to waive a jury trial. According to defendant:
During defendant's case-in-chief in the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel advised the trial court that he wanted to present testimony that he had explained to defendant, in Dr. Janzer's presence, defendant's "options for going to trialespecially, but not limited to, the offer that the State had made to waive the death penalty if [defendant] would personally waive a jury trial"[11] and that defendant's silence under those circumstances was not to his advantage. The trial judge expressed concerns about getting into "quasi plea negotiations" and advised defense counsel that the information sought from Dr. Janzer could be obtained "without talking precisely about the fact that there was this, in essence, kind of a `quasi plea offer'" in this case.[12]
The court did not, as defendant asserts, exclude the reference to "jury trial waiver" because such evidence was "irrelevant." Rather, the court directed defense counsel to use the words "[t]rial strategies that require [defendant's] consent which would substantially minimize his potential exposure to the death penalty" in lieu of mentioning "jury trial waiver" because of concerns about getting into "quasi plea negotiations" and because of the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant and the state. The court determined that referring to a "jury trial waiver" might suggest that plea negotiations had occurred in this case. For example, during the offer of proof, Dr. Janzer testified that defense counsel "presented [defendant] with questions and a discussion of the possible legal strategies * * * of the possible advantage to [defendant] of agreeing to a trial without a jury so as to avoid the death penalty." (Emphasis added.) A fair interpretation of the highlighted phrase is that the state had agreed not to seek the death penalty if defendant would give up his right to a jury trial, i.e., a plea bargain.
The trial court also concluded that "quasi plea offer" evidence might unfairly prejudice the state. During voir dire, some of the jurors advised the prosecutors that they *971 thought that it was inappropriate to plea bargain, especially in cases involving serious crimes. The unfair prejudice is especially apparent in this case because, in fact, a plea offer was never extended to defendant.
Our examination of the record reveals that defense counsel questioned Dr. Janzer about the "substance of the discussion" that counsel had with defendant in Dr. Janzer's presence, and that Dr. Janzer was allowed to explain how that evidence supported his conclusion about defendant. The trial court's minimal sanitization of the evidence, to which defense counsel agreed (or at least to which defense counsel did not object), did not prevent defendant from questioning Dr. Janzer fully about his relevant observations. See State v. Harberts, 315 Or. 408, 417-18, 848 P.2d 1187 (1993) (redaction of inadmissible matters from proffered testimony may be permitted if the meaning of the remaining proffered testimony is not significantly altered).
The use by defense counsel of the words "jury trial waiver" during his questioning of Dr. Janzer might have communicated falsely to the jury that a plea offer had been extended to defendant when, in fact, no such plea offer had been made. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not improperly limit psychiatrist Janzer's testimony.
Defendant also claims that the trial judge erred in excluding Dr. Johannsen's testimony concerning whether defendant's behavior in declining to waive a jury trial to avoid the death penalty was self-defeating. Defense counsel proposed to ask Dr. Johannsen the following question:
For many of the reasons stated in our discussion of the previous assignment of error, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding that evidence.
We have considered all of defendant's other assignments of error and every argument in support thereof. Those same assignments of error and arguments either have been addressed previously by this court and rejected or are not well taken. Discussion of them would not benefit the bench or bar. We find no error based on those assignments of error.
The judgment of conviction for aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder is affirmed. The sentence of death is affirmed.
FADELEY, Justice, dissenting.
Defendant in this death penalty case did not receive a fair trial because he was not permitted to prove his defense even though the prosecutor produced similar but contrary evidence. Defendant's main line of defense, of which statutory notice was given through counsel appointed to represent him, was that the jury should return a verdict of guilty except for insanity. Defendant bears the burden of proof on that plea. ORS 161.305, 161.055(2). That verdict, if returned, would not permit a death penalty; in this armed-robbery homicide case, commitment to the custody of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) for defendant's life would result. ORS 161.327(1).[1]
Defendant was prevented from bringing before the jury, in support of his plea, striking evidence supporting a finding of fact of mental illness. He was also prevented from bringing to the jury evidence about the length of mental hospital stay in the case of similar PSRB commitments, if the jury found that defendant was guilty except for insanity.
*972 The homicide occurred while defendant was robbing a bank in his home town during regular daylight banking hours. He wore no disguise and made no attempt to conceal his identity. While driving his van to the bank to rob it, he saw and was seen near the bank by a police officer with whom he was well acquainted. Defendant saw and was seen by two acquaintances who were inside but leaving the bank as defendant entered to do the robbery. Defendant shot a teller who knew him and apparently shot at, but did not pursue, another teller who also knew him. He did not flee from the community after the robbery. Defendant was seen later that day driving his van and was stopped by a police officer who summoned additional police to the scene. After several requests for defendant to get out of the van, he did so, and then leaned against the side of the van standing motionless with his arms folded across his chest for two hours and 45 minutes. When the police finally charged toward defendant and arrested him, he did not struggle or resist being handcuffed. He had to be carried to the police vehicle for transport to jail. He did not communicate with the police in any way.
Because his muteness continued, a hearing was held on the issue of whether defendant was competent to aid and cooperate with his appointed defense counsel and, thus, whether he was competent to stand trial under ORS 161.360(2).[2] Two circuit judges who heard pre-trial matters in the case found defendant able to assist and cooperate in his defense. As an integral part of that finding, they also found as fact that his non-speaking behavior was elective on his part, that is, that defendant could talk and assist or cooperate with his counsel if he wanted to do so, and, therefore, that defendant was in fact malingering when he remained mute. In this case, that fact questionmalingering or mentally ill? is much like the question that the law asks the jury, not the judge, to decide where the defense is guilty except for insanity.
Facts in the record relevant to the insanity defense include the following: Before the robbery, defendant had been admitted to the Oregon State Hospital for the mentally ill at least six times; defendant was admitted in December of 1988 and discharged in March of 1989, during which period psychologist Johannsen was among those who treated defendant; although he personally signed a diagnosis report of schizophrenia at that time, at trial he testified that he made no specific diagnosis at that time but noted that schizophrenia should not be ruled out. Psychiatrist Suckow treated defendant in March of 1989 at the state hospital and diagnosed defendant as a paranoid schizophrenic with a passive-aggressive personality. Psychiatrist McKenna, who treated defendant at the state hospital in 1983, had diagnosed defendant as suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia as did the psychiatrist in charge of defendant's treatment team in 1988-89. However, other treating specialistspsychologist Hulteng, and psychiatrist Wessertbelieved that defendant suffered from a severe personality disorder rather than any category of schizophrenia.
Psychiatrist Janzer examined defendant in relation to the charge in this case near the time of trial. Janzer diagnosed defendant as having "schizophrenic reaction."
The theory of defense at trial to the jury was guilty except for insanity. Such a defense must be and was disclosed before trial. The prosecutor's countervailing theory was that defendant's bizarre conduct was prompted by self interest, not insanity, and was designed specifically to benefit defendant, that is, that defendant was merely putting on an act and, thus, was malingering.
The prosecutor started developing the malingering theory early in the jury trial process, asking questions on voir dire that directed the jurors' attention to that theory of the state. The state adduced evidence to the jury in support of its malingering theory *973 throughout the trial. It was the centerpiece of the state's closing argument to the jury.
Although the state was freely permitted to produce evidence to support its malingering theory, rulings of the trial court repeatedly thwarted defense counsel's efforts to disprove that theory and to prove that the conduct was a product of defendant's psychosis instead. This patternrepeatedly excluding evidence consistent with the insanity defense but repeatedly permitting evidence inconsistent with itresulted in an unfair trial.
(1) Evidence Defendant Could or Would Not Speak to Save His Life.
Defense counsel was prevented from proving that defendant would not or could not speak even to save his own life. Whether it was "could not" or "would not" really doesn't change the impact of the offered but excluded expert testimony. That excluded evidence showed that defendant was not "acting out of self interest," thus strongly tending to disprove the keystone element of the state's malingering theory.
Defendant's first assignment of error on this point states:
His summary argument on that assignment contends:
Defense counsel sought to have defendant waive a jury trial on the basis that, in a trial before a judge, the death penalty would not be an available penalty. Waiving a jury, if agreed to by defendant and the court, assuming the state also agreed, thus would save defendant's life. On one occasion, where counsel pointed out that fact to defendant, an expert psychiatrist was present, but when counsel explained to defendant how waiver of the jury trial would avoid the death penalty, defendant still remained mute. Likewise, when counsel in court tried to waive a jury on behalf of defendant and the court asked whether defendant consented, defendant did not respond to the court's question but, instead, remained mute. Waiver of jury trial, therefore, was not a possibility, i.e., avoiding death by that avenue was not possible because of defendant's muteness. This episode was one of the reasons that psychiatrist Janzer opined that defendant was not malingering, was not feigning muteness in his own self interest, and was, instead, mentally ill in a schizophrenic reaction. But the doctor was not permitted to testify meaningfully about the episode, or the lack of self-interest motivation it demonstrated, or the basis for his diagnosis of mental illness that it provided.
After the court sustained the state's objection to testimony about the incident, defense counsel then made an offer of proof. The court and defense counsel discussed further refinements in the wording of questions to be put to the expert. Defense counsel expressly acknowledged that he was satisfied with sanitizing the evidence in accordance with his offer, which retained direct mention of counsel's request that defendant waive a jury trial as a means of avoiding the death penalty. Colloquy concerning that offer follows:
*974 "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]; I can make it more unilateral in nature so it's merely our decision and the prosecutor's office has nothing to do with it.
The prosecutor nonetheless, then objected to the admission of the evidence and requested a clarification of the court's ruling.
The court then instructed defense counsel to make an offer of proof on the evidence, sanitized in the manner and to the degree that defense counsel intended to present it to the jury. Defendant's offer of proof follows:
"Then [defense counsel] suggested to him the possibility that [defendant] may be viewing this as a way of committing suicide, having the State do it for him. That got no response. [Defense counsel] then exercised his imagination and tried to provoke, I believe, [defendant] into some kind of a reaction by sayingasking him what he would do if he could just walk out of my office a free man; it was a beautiful day out there, things of that order. No response to that either.
"A. Well, the continued muteness. First of all, I was persuaded, based upon that behavior I observed as he entered my office and again after he leftas he was leaving my office, that there is some contact with reality. He does hear. If he opens his eyes, he does see, so that there is at least a basic relationship to reality. So it wasn't that he wasn't hearing or taking in what either myself or [defense counsel] was saying to him. It wasand this would fit in with the schizophrenic state of mindthat the way that he was processing that information just does not make sense from afrom an ordinary, rational point of viewthe idea of being up against the death penaltyand I have had *975 considerable experience with defendants in this positionjustit was like he was incapable of conceiving of what effect this would have upon his life.
"Q. In the case of my interview with [defendant] that you witnessed, [defendant's] either passive refusal or nonresponsiveness to my advice that he proceed to trial without a jury so that he would avoid the potential of the death penalty being imposedhow does that fit into this finding by you of not malingering, ruling out malingering?
After the prosecutor had cross-examined the witness Janzer as part of the defense's offer of proof, defense counsel inquired:
The Court responded negatively as follows:
"THE COURT: Actually, I have got a secretary typing up a more sanitized phrase here.
"In lieu of jury trial waiver, this is the phrase that the Court directs you to use in terms of sanitizing this testimony, and for *976 the record it is: `Trial strategies that require his'meaning the defendant's `consent which would substantially minimize his potential exposure to the death penalty,' and that's it.
Using the trial court's sterilizing redaction question, only the following testimony was heard by the jury:
"A. No response.
"* * * * *
Redaction (sanitizing) of a witness' proposed testimony before it finally is presented to the trier of fact may be permitted where that may be and is done "without significantly altering the meaning of the original statement in the context in which it was made." State v. Harberts, 315 Or. 408, 417, 848 P.2d 1187 (1993). Harberts remanded a witness' statement to the trial court to make specific determinations about whether the statement could be redacted to preserve its meaning while avoiding the potentially offensive material that was part of the statement's context. Here the trial court did nothing on the record to show that it performed the evaluative steps prescribed in Harberts or that he was concerned with preserving the meaningfulness of the statement.
The trial court's exclusion of the context that gave the offered testimony its strong evidentiary valuewithout indicating why that context had to also be excludedalso seems to fly in the face of this court's decision in Fromdahl and Fromdahl, 314 Or. 496, 840 P.2d 683 (1992). In Fromdahl, this court ruled that, where the evidence was offered to show a party's mental state or reaction, it was error to exclude testimony about the fact that a polygraph test was taken and, moreover, about the contents of a report of that test in order to show the witness' mental state or reaction to being advised of such report. Id. at 508-509, 840 P.2d 683. This court remanded "for a reexamination of the [main] issue [in the case] in the light of the whole record, including mother's evidence that the court erroneously excluded." Id. at 510, 840 P.2d 683. This court also held in Fromdahl that evidence offered to show a party's state of mind circumstantially was not excludable on hearsay grounds and that exclusion was error. Id. at 508-509, 840 P.2d 683.
Applying Harberts to this case discloses trial error that requires a remand to the trial court to reconsider its decision concerning redaction, in light of the rule in Harberts. Applying Fromdahl requires remand to the trial court to make its decision concerning exclusion of the unredacted testimony on the speak-to-save-your-life issue pursuant to the law announced in Fromdahl. Applying both *977 Harberts and Fromdahl makes mandatory reversal of this case and remand for a new trial wherein admission of the excluded evidence, evidence that goes to the heart of defendant's theory of defense is, newly and properly considered.
The trial court applied to the offered testimony changes (or redactions) that sterilized the testimony, not sanitized it. In so doing, the court apparently relied on an analogy to the rule, based on policy, that excludes offers of compromise in a civil case, but went far beyond excluding any foundation for an inference that the state had offered defendant less than death. The offer of proof, quoted above under the heading "What The Jury Did Not Hear," does not suggest that the state offered or might offer such a deal. The trial court's policy reason, relied on by the majority (319 Or. at 46, ___ P.2d at 970-71) does not apply to the offer made, as quoted above.[5]
There is a significant difference between "this specific idea will save your life if you consent" and "these trial strategies will substantially minimize your potential exposure to the death penalty, let's talk about them." The impact of meaning of the first is nearly lost in the second version. The trial court had no authority to change the meaning to that extent, nor was there any need to do so. The offer of proof did not imply any plea bargain or "compromise" negotiations.
The trial court erred plainly on the face of the record to defendant's prejudice by sterilizing the testimony. The expert witness apparently was not able to communicate completely or effectively under the trial court's reconstruction of the reality that defendant could not or would not speak to save his life. The sterilized phrasing was not the basis for his diagnosis which he was prevented from telling to the jury.
This of course, also forced the expert into agreement with the trial court's competency ruling, although his actual opinion was to the contrary. Moreover, the sterilized testimony, gave no hint of defendant's inability to speak to save his life. It only disclosed an unwillingness to discuss some abstract "strategy" to "minimize a potential exposure."
The trial court's rulings to exclude evidence also had the effect of forcing the jury into agreementfor lack of information to conclude otherwisewith the court's earlier competency rulings. And, the rulings greatly reduced the impact of the expert's opinion that defendant suffered from mental illness.
The rulings invaded the province of the jury and deprived defendant of his defense. Reversal is appropriate for the erroneous exclusion.
Defense counsel had attempted to question a second mental health professional, one whose testimony generally favored the state, about whether defendant's muteness in the conference relating to the request that he consent to waive jury trial in order to save his life was contrary to the state's malingering theory. The trial court ruled to prevent defense counsel from presenting the won't-talk-to-save-his-life evidence to disprove the malingering theory, and did so after an offer of proof was taken.
Defendant's assignment of error concerning this second mental health professional is:
The summary argument on that assignment of error was:
"The trial court also refused to allow defense counsel to question the psychologist *978 about his opinion of defendant's behavior in declining to accept a jury waiver in exchange for the elimination of the possibility of a death sentence. The jury waiver issue was relevant to the psychologist's conclusions concerning defendant. Defendant should have been allowed to ask questions in the area to rebut the state's implications on cross-examination that defendant was malingering and voluntarily remaining mute." (Emphasis added.)
Before the trial court excluded the offered opinion, the prosecution had already proved in the presence of the jury, by questions of the second professional, as follows:
"Q. That doesn't necessarily mean it was self-defeating for [defendant] from his personal viewpoint?
Excluding that witness' opinion that defendant's conduct was not to his advantage after permitting the prosecutor the foregoing, was prejudicial error.[7]
(2) Evidence of Probable Length of Hospital Commitment If Found Guilty Except For Insanity.
Regarding the excluded evidence of probable length of custody in a mental institution if the jury found defendant guilty except for insanity, defendant assigned as error:
Defendant's summary argument on this assignment was:
The state brought before the jury the following testimony:
Following this testimony, defendant sought to ask the expert witness[8] about the probable length of stay at the hospital if defendant was found guilty of aggravated murder except for insanity. The court sustained the prosecutor's objection based on "speculation." In view of what the prosecutor had just been permitted to ask the witness, in the jury's presence, refusal to permit the defendant's question only increased the degree of speculation about the outcome should the jury find defendant guilty except for insanity.
Since 1984, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards have advocated that juries be given more information in insanity plea cases about the effect of a jury finding of insanity. Rorie Sherman, Insanity Defense: A New Challenge, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at AI, A24. The reason to give a jury more accurate information is that, absent that correct information, the jury fills in the gap (or speculates) by substituting its members own common beliefs on the subject. Research indicates that this common belief is that sustaining the insanity plea means that the miscreant will be free and on the street quite soon, a belief contrary to and not in agreement with the reality of the matter. Eric Silver, et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 J.L. &amp; Hum.Behav. 63, 65 (Feb. 1994). Indeed, this issueof giving accurate information to the jury in insanity plea casesis presently before the United States Supreme Court in Shannon v. United States, 92-8346 (pending for argument at this writing). In that case, the appellant claims that jurors' fears about quick release to the street make them reluctant to vote "not guilty by reason of insanity," even when they think that verdict is warranted. Sherman, supra, at A24.
Of course, that situation is exacerbated in a state like Oregon that has tightened the defense to one of "guilty except for insanity," a change that has not yet permeated our society's understanding of the effect on the defendant's confinement.
Whichever way the Supreme Court decides the federal court case, Shannon v. United States, supra, the issue in Oregon should be whether we permit juries to decide the insanity defense or, instead, wish the trial court to decide both facts and law concerning that defense. The statutes require that the jury decide. The state constitution also commits this plea to the jury. Or Const, Art I, § 11.
The trial court's instructions to the jury exacerbated the effect of its restrictive rulings on evidence, an effect that invited speculation about the effect of an insanity verdict. Those instructions exacerbate the error, and violate the purpose of ORS 161.313. Those instructions in part were that:
*980 "* * * * *
"* * * [On some conditions], the board will order the defendant to be conditionally released.
Telling the jury in the abstract that defendant could be released by the PSRB very shortly after the judge sent him to the mental hospital was highly prejudicial error because there was no testimony relating to the instruction for the jury to use in evaluating it in view of the court's prior exclusionary rulings, and because the abstract instruction implies quick release, complete or conditional. The error was compounded by the fact that, here again, the prosecutor's evidence of a short or uncertain length of stay was admitted but defendant's counter evidence was excluded.
I would reverse and remand so that defendant can be accorded a fair trial on his insanity defense. This society does not execute the insane. Defendant is entitled to a fair trial on that issue.
The majority seek to allay the concerns for executing the insane in this case by relying on the findings of the trial judge (not the jury) that defendant was mentally competent to stand trial. Among the judge's factfindings displayed by the majority are ones about defendant's ability to communicate in writing. In the context in which those findings are quoted, it appears that defendant communicated in writing about his defense of the present charge. That implied context misleads. No such written communication occurred. What the trial judge referred to, for example, were written communications while defendant was in the mental hospital years ago. They only serve to prove the efficacy of psychoactive pharmacologic agents administered at the hospital, not defendant's mental state much later at the time of the homicide in this case.
The majority also rely on the defense counsel's failure to observe all evidentiary rules when attempting to present the excluded evidence that was the heart of his affirmative defense. I don't think the government should execute a defendant for the technical inadequacies of his lawyer, selected and appointed by the same government.
[1]  ORAP 12.10(2) provides:

"If, in addition to a conviction for aggravated murder forming the basis for the death sentence, a defendant is convicted of one or more charges arising from the same charging instrument, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review any such conviction without the filing of a notice of appeal."
[2]  ORS 161.360 provides:

"(1) If, before or during the trial in any criminal case, the court has reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed by reason of incapacity, the court may order an examination in the manner provided in ORS 161.365.
"(2) A defendant may be found incapacitated if, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant is unable:
"(a) To understand the nature of the proceedings against the defendant; or
"(b) To assist and cooperate with the counsel of the defendant; or
"(c) To participate in the defense of the defendant."
[3]  ORS 161.295 provides:

"(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.
"(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the terms `mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder."
[4]  As previously noted, defendant does not challenge the correctness of that ruling.
[5]  Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution originally provided in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury * * *." Or Const, Art I, § 11 (1859). Article I, section 11, was amended by referendum in 1932 to provide explicitly that defendants in non-capital cases could waive a jury trial with the trial court's consent and be tried before the court. Or Laws 1933 (constitutional amendments), p 5.
[6]  Although the trial judge sustained the prosecutor's objection on the ground that defense counsel's question called for speculative evidence, defendant does not address that issue before this court. Instead, he argues before this court that the prosecutor's questioning on recross-examination "opened the door" to Dr. Johannsen's testimony. Because that ground for admission was not clearly argued in the trial court, see State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 188, 766 P.2d 373 (1988) (positions of the parties should be clearly presented to the initial tribunal), we will not consider it.
[7]  OEC 103(1) provides in part:

"Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and:
"* * * * *
"(b) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked."
[8]  See also State v. Affeld, 307 Or. 125, 764 P.2d 220 (1988) (ordinarily, when a trial court excludes testimony during direct examination or cross-examination, an offer of proof is required to preserve any claim of error related to what the evidence would have shown).
[9]  "[A] substantial right of a criminal defendant is not affected if there is * * * little likelihood that the error affected the verdict." State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169, 180, 743 P.2d 157 (1987) (citing State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 220-21, 709 P.2d 225, cert. den. 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S. Ct. 1793, 90 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1985)).
[10]  As discussed infra, that argument is somewhat miscast: the trial judge did not hold that evidence concerning the proposed jury trial was irrelevant.
[11]  As stated infra, no plea offer had been extended to defendant.
[12]  Plea discussions and plea agreements are inadmissible "for or against a defendant in any criminal * * * proceeding." ORS 135.435. That statute provides:

"(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, none of the following shall be received in evidence for or against a defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding:
"(a) The fact that the defendant or the counsel of the defendant and the district attorney engaged in plea discussions.
"(b) The fact that the defendant or the attorney of the defendant made a plea agreement with the district attorney.
"(c) Any statement or admission made by the defendant or the attorney of the defendant to the district attorney and as a part of the plea discussion or agreement.
"(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply if, subsequent to the plea discussions or plea agreement, the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest which is not withdrawn."
Similarly, ORS 135.445 and OEC 410 restrict the admission of evidence concerning guilty pleas that are not accepted or are withdrawn.
[1]  The last sentence of ORS 161.327(1) provides: "The period of jurisdiction of the board shall be equal to the maximum sentence provided by statute for the crime for which the person was found guilty except for insanity." In an aggravated murder case arising in 1990 that maximum sentence is natural or true life. ORS 163.105.
[2]  ORS 161.360(2) in part provides:

"A defendant may be found incapacitated if, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant is unable:
"(a) To understand the nature of the proceedings against the defendant; or
"(b) To assist and cooperate with the counsel of the defendant; or
"(c) To participate in the defense * * *."
[3]  Because the trial court directed the defense to use different and more general and abstract words than those in its offer, the jury never heard one basis for the doctor's diagnosis or the facts that support it. What they did hear will be reproduced later in this opinion.
[4]  Defense counsel had presented defendant with a plan that would have prevented the death penalty, if accepted, not one that would merely "minimize his potential exposure" to it. The difference in jury impact is huge.
[5]  The majority bases its decision on this assignment of error on two grounds. The sanitization of the evidence was "minimal," 319 Or. at 46, 872 P.2d  at 971, and that defendant questioned Dr. Janzer "fully." 319 Or. at 46, 872 P.2d  at 971. Comparing the items quoted above under the heading "What the Jury Heard" with that quoted under "What the Jury Did Not Hear" will, I think, convince most readers that Janzer did not testify "fully" and that the sterilization of his testimony was more than "minimal."
[6]  As can be seen, the jury was made aware, by the prosecutor's comments, of the judge's ruling that defendant was competent to stand trial.
[7]  The Supreme Court of the United States has, on various occasions, prohibited a state from using the technical evidence rules to prevent the defendant from proving his or her theory of defense in a capital case. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987).
[8]  Other testimony had established that defendant had worked at the forensic mental health unit of the hospital for many years and was the unit manager for a substantial time. This was the same hospital that defendant would have been committed to if found insane.
[9]  It is noteworthy that the trial court did not say how long that was potentially, i.e., did not relate the instruction to the jury's case.