Title: Yarbrough v. Eversole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150400
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 27, 2017

REL: 01/27/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1150400
____________________
Myron Timothy Yarbrough
v.
Steven D. Eversole et al.
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-15-157)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Myron Timothy Yarbrough appeals from a judgment entered
against him by the Shelby Circuit Court in his action alleging
legal malpractice against Steven D. Eversole, Richard C.
1150400
Perry, Jr., and Eversole Law, LLC ("the firm").  We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.
I.  Facts
In 2006, Yarbrough was convicted of one count of rape in
the first degree and two counts of sodomy in the first degree.
The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for each
conviction and ordered that the sentences were to run
concurrently.  Yarbrough appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeals, which affirmed his convictions and sentences in an
unpublished memorandum on February 16, 2007.
At the time of the events giving rise to Yarbrough's
cause of action, the firm employed both Eversole and Perry. 
In March 2012, Yarbrough retained the firm to explore the
possibility of filing a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition on
Yarbrough's behalf.  In his complaint, Yarbrough alleges that
Eversole and Perry represented to Yarbrough that "there was a
basis in fact and law to file a Rule 32 petition."  Yarbrough
asserts, however, that the two attorneys "knew that there was
no 'newly discovered' evidence as defined by Alabama case law
and that the statute of limitations would be a complete bar to
all claims of newly discovered evidence and for the claim of
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ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate
counsel."  Yarbrough alleges that he believed the attorneys'
representations and that, on that basis, he paid the firm
$10,000 to file a Rule 32 petition on his behalf.  
On December 12, 2012, Eversole and Perry filed a Rule 32
petition on Yarbrough's behalf in the St. Clair Circuit Court
in which they alleged the existence of newly discovered
evidence and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel.  On January 16, 2013, the State filed an answer to
the petition in which it asserted that Yarbrough's claims were
time-barred under Alabama law.  According to Yarbrough, on
March 6, 2013, the St. Clair Circuit Court denied the Rule 32
petition, concluding that the claims were time-barred.
Yarbrough states that on July 2, 2013, more than 42 days
after his petition had been denied, the firm filed a notice of
appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals sent notices to Eversole and Perry informing
them that the appeal was untimely and requesting an
explanation, but, according to Yarbrough, Eversole and Perry
failed to provide one, and the appeal was dismissed on
August 5, 2013.
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Yarbrough alleges that Eversole and Perry never informed
him that the reason his appeal had been dismissed was that it
was not timely filed.  He states in his complaint that they
represented to him that "for an additional $15,000.00 they
could file other legal proceedings in order to have
[Yarbrough's] appeal reinstated."  Yarbrough alleges that
Eversole and Perry knew those representations were false and
knew that, in fact, another appellate filing at that point
would be fruitless.  Yarbrough asserts that he believed the
attorneys' representations and that he paid the firm $15,000
for additional appellate work related to his Rule 32 petition.
Yarbrough states that the firm then filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus with the Court of Criminal Appeals on his
behalf.  The Court of Criminal Appeals summarily denied the
petition without an opinion on November 1, 2013.  Finally, in
November 2013, the firm also filed a motion for an out-of-time
appeal in the St. Clair Circuit Court, which, Yarbrough
asserts, "had no basis in law or fact" because, he said, the
circuit court "had no jurisdiction to grant said motion."
For their part, the two attorneys assert that they told
Yarbrough at the outset that any postjudgment relief from his
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conviction would be "a long shot" but that he told them to
submit filings anyway.  
On January 14, 2015, Yarbrough filed a complaint against
the firm, Eversole, and Perry in the Jefferson Circuit Court,
alleging legal 
malpractice and seeking recovery of 
the 
$25,000
in legal fees he paid "a result of the Defendants' negligent
and/or wanton legal malpractice" and punitive damages for the
alleged fraud perpetrated by Eversole and Perry.  On May 22,
2015, Eversole and the firm filed a motion to transfer the
case to the Shelby Circuit Court and a motion to dismiss the
case, asserting that Yarbrough had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.  The motion to transfer
was unopposed.  On May 26, 2015, the case was transferred to
the Shelby Circuit Court.  On June 1, 2015, Perry filed an
answer to the complaint in which he denied Yarbrough's
substantive allegations.  On June 5, 2015, the circuit court
denied the motion to dismiss filed by the firm and Eversole.
On June 6, 2015, the firm and Eversole filed an answer to the
complaint 
in 
which 
they 
likewise 
denied 
Yarbrough's
substantive allegations.  
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On October 8, 2015, the firm and Eversole filed a motion
for a judgment on the pleadings.  In that motion, they
asserted that Yarbrough's "burden of pleadings and proof in
this civil case for legal malpractice is insurmountable as a
matter of law" because, they said, Yarbrough could not
demonstrate that "the results would have been different or
that he was guaranteed a reversal of his conviction" but for
the alleged legal malpractice. 
On October 12, 2015, Perry filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  In that motion, Perry asserted:
"[Yarbrough] was convicted of a felony in part
based upon [Yarbrough's] confession.  [Yarbrough]
has a life sentence.  [Yarbrough] wanted to try
anything to obtain relief.  Perry knew that a Rule
32 Petition and out of time appeals were filed on
[Yarbrough's] behalf.  Mr. Perry worked on some of
them.  Everything that [Yarbrough] wanted or told
was to be filed based upon what Mr. Perry knows, it
was filed."
The summary-judgment motion also stated:  "Rule 32 Petitions
and out of time appeals are standard requests in such a
situation. They are always long shots." In support of the
motion, Perry filed an affidavit in which he denied being
personally paid $25,000 by Yarbrough for legal work.  He
stated that the money was paid to the firm.  Perry also
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expressly denied that he lied to Yarbrough or that he made any
false representations to Yarbrough. Yarbrough filed no
response to Perry's summary-judgment motion.
On October 13, 2015, Yarbrough filed a response to the
firm and to Eversole's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
In the response, Yarbrough argued, among other things, that 
"[w]hat [the firm and Eversole] simply refuse to
acknowledge and are trying to hide is that their
negligence and fraud has damaged [Yarbrough] in the
amount of payment of legal fees for work that from
the moment [the firm and Eversole] took on their
representation had no basis in fact or law and could
never [have] succeeded."
On December 10, 2015, the circuit court entered an order
granting the firm and Eversole's motion for a judgment on the
pleadings and Perry's motion for a summary judgment.  The
circuit court's reasoning is well summarized in the following
paragraph from its order:
"Two 
underlying 
legal 
premises 
belie
[Yarbrough's] insurmountable burden.  In the first
instance, an attorney does not guarantee the success
of his representations, nor is a lawyer 'expected to
achieve impossible results for a client.'  Pickard
v. Turner, 592 So. 2d 1016, 1029 (Ala. 1992). 
Secondarily and even more fundamentally, the Legal
Services Liability Act[, § 6-5-570 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975,] mandates allegations and proof that,
'but for' the negligence of the legal service
provider, the underlying case would have been
different.  Hall v. Thomas, 564 So. 2d 936 (Ala.
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1990).  In his Complaint, [Yarbrough] pled no[] 'but
for' allegations and in his pleadings filed in
opposition to both dispositive motions, [Yarbrough]
does not dispute the holding of either case.
Instead, he argues that a Rule 32 petition should
never have been filed in the first instance.  This
argument, however, overlooks the underlying premise
for which Defendants were hired by [Yarbrough] in
the first place; namely, to develop some legal basis
to overcome the daunting task of reversing the
jury's guilty verdict.  In the judgment of the
Court, even [Yarbrough's] well pled complaint, which
contains no 'but for' causation allegations, cannot
overcome his burden of proof, regardless of the
evidence that he may develop in discovery."
Yarbrough filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.  Standard of Review
Our standard of review in this case is de novo, even
though the circuit court dismissed Yarbrough's claims against
the defendants in response to two different motions, i.e., a
motion for a judgment on the pleadings and a motion for a
summary judgment.  
"'When a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is made by a party, "the trial
court reviews the pleadings filed in the
case and, if the pleadings show that no
genuine 
issue 
of 
material 
fact 
is
presented, the trial court will enter a
judgment for the party entitled to a
judgment according to the law." B.K.W.
Enters., Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603
So. 2d 989, 991 (Ala. 1992). See also
Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d 840
(Ala. 2000). A judgment on the pleadings is
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subject to a de novo review. Harden v.
Ritter, 710 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997). A court reviewing a judgment on
the pleadings accepts the facts stated in
the complaint as true and views them in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id. at 1255–56. If matters outside
the 
pleadings 
are 
presented 
to 
and
considered by the trial court, then the
motion for a judgment on the pleadings must
be treated as a motion for a summary
judgment. See Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Otherwise, in deciding a motion for a
judgment on the pleadings, the trial court
is bound by the pleadings. See Stockman v.
Echlin, Inc., 604 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala.
1992).'"
Medlock v. Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, 15 So. 3d 501, 507
(Ala. 2009) (quoting Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 82–83 (Ala. 2000)). 
"We review the trial court's grant or denial of
a summary-judgment motion de novo, and we use the
same standard used by the trial court to determine
whether the evidence presented to the trial court
presents a genuine issue of material fact.  Bockman
v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2006).  Once
the summary-judgment movant shows there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must
then present substantial evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact.  Id.  'We review the
evidence 
in 
a 
light 
most 
favorable 
to 
the
nonmovant.' 943 So. 2d at 795.  We review questions
of law de novo. Davis v. Hanson Aggregates
Southeast, Inc., 952 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2006)."
Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 342, 346
(Ala. 2006).
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III.  Analysis
Yarbrough's legal-malpractice claims are subsumed under
the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, § 6-5-570 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975 ("the ALSLA").  "There shall be only one form
and cause of action against legal service providers in courts
in the State of Alabama and it shall be known as the legal
service liability action ...." § 6-5-573, Ala. Code 1975.
"A legal services liability action embraces any form
of action in which a litigant may seek legal redress
for a wrong or an injury and every legal theory of
recovery, whether common law or statutory, available
to a litigant in a court in the State of Alabama now
or in the future."
§ 6-5-572(1), Ala. Code 1975.  This includes Yarbrough's
claims alleging fraud.  See, e.g., Cockrell v. Pruitt, [Ms.
1140849, June 30, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2016)
(stating that "[t]his Court has held that the ALSLA 'applies
to a legal malpractice action based upon fraud").
Despite the fact that we apply the same de novo standard
of review to the circuit court's rulings on both motions, our
disposition of Yarbrough's claims against the firm and
Eversole, on the one hand, and Perry, on the other, diverges
because of the different procedural posture of their
respective motions.  
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Perry filed a motion for a summary judgment that he
supported with an affidavit in which he testified that he did
not make any misrepresentations to Yarbrough.  
Yarbrough filed
nothing in response to Perry's submission.  Because Perry
submitted evidence in support of his motion, Yarbrough could
not simply rely on the averments in his complaint.  See, e.g.,
Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala.
1999).   Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment in favor
1
of Perry.  
The same analysis, however, does not apply to Yarbrough's
claims against the firm and Eversole because the firm and
Eversole filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings and
they did not submit any other documents for the circuit court
to consider.  According to the complaint submitted by
Yarbrough,  Eversole and/or the firm misled Yarbrough into
believing that a Rule 32 petition asserting newly discovered
evidence and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel would
not be precluded by the applicable statute of limitations. 
The firm and Eversole contend, however, that, even if this
We note that Yarbrough at no point sought an extension
1
of time pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which to
seek evidence in opposition to Perry's summary-judgment
motion.  
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allegation is accepted as true, Yarbrough cannot meet his
burden of proving that, but for the alleged tortious actions
of the defendants, Yarbrough's Rule 32 petition would have
succeeded.  
The firm and Eversole note that this Court has stated:
"To prevail in a legal-malpractice action, the
plaintiff must prove that, but for the attorney's
negligence, the legal matter concerning which the
attorney is alleged to have been negligent would
have been resolved more favorably to the plaintiff.
Pickard v. Turner, 592 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Ala.
1992).  To meet this burden, the plaintiff must
prove (1) that, in the absence of the alleged
malpractice, the plaintiff would have been entitled
to a more favorable result in the legal matter
concerning which the attorney is alleged to have
been negligent, and (2) that the attorney's
negligence in fact caused the outcome of the legal
matter to be less favorable to the plaintiff than
the outcome would have been in the absence of the
alleged malpractice.  Pickard, 592 So. 2d at 1020
('"Generally, actionable [legal] malpractice cannot
be established in the absence of a showing that the
attorney's wrongful conduct has deprived the client
of something to which he would otherwise have been
entitled." [7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 255 at
462 (1980).]  A lawyer cannot be expected to achieve
impossible results for a client.'); Hall v. Thomas,
456 So. 2d 67, 68 (Ala. 1984) ('A claim for
malpractice requires a showing that in the absence
of the alleged negligence the outcome of the case
would have been different.' (citing Mylar v.
Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983)))."
Bonner v. Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., 26 So. 3d 1115, 1120
(Ala. 2009) (emphasis added).  They argue that Yarbrough
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clearly cannot meet his burden because, if they had not done
what Yarbrough faults them for -- filing a Rule 32 petition on
his behalf and filing an appeal and a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals following the denial
of the Rule 32 petition -- the result for Yarbrough would have
been no different than the circuit court's denial of his
Rule 32 petition that actually occurred.  
As Yarbrough observes, however, this case is different
than the usual legal-malpractice action alleging a failure of
counsel to exercise due care in the handling of an underlying
action.  As he states:
"It is true that [Yarbrough] cannot prove that
the underlying Rule 32 petition and the subsequent
pleadings would have been different.  They would not
have been different because they should never have
been filed in the first instance because there was
no basis in law or fact to file them let alone
charge legal fees to do so.  [Yarbrough] in great
detail in his complaint described the merits of the
motion filed by the [defendants].  They had no merit
and the [defendants] knew or should have known
such."
In other words, the alleged wrongdoing has nothing to do
with the negligent or omissive provision of legal services;
the alleged wrongdoing is that the firm and Eversole convinced
Yarbrough that something could be done in the first place
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when, in fact, it could not, and they accepted his payments
for what they knew would be futile legal services.  Yarbrough
argues that the Rule 32 petition and the subsequent appellate
filings never should have been filed because, he says, they
lacked any basis in fact or law.  He does not claim that, if
the defendants had presented a different argument in the Rule
32 petition or if they had filed a timely appeal the outcome
would have been different. Under such circumstances, it makes
no sense to require the plaintiff to demonstrate that, but for
counsel's improper conduct, the outcome of the Rule 32
proceeding would have been different.
Yarbrough's claim is analogous to a claim presented in
Bryant v. Robledo, 938 So. 2d 413 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). In
Bryant, an attorney allegedly fraudulently induced the
daughter and son-in-law of the attorney's client to pay for
legal services for the client that could never be performed,
because, at the time the attorney accepted money from the
daughter and son-in-law, the attorney knew that the client was
incompetent and could not contract for legal services; thus,
the attorney knew or should have known that he would be unable
to perform any legal services for the client.  The Court of
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Civil Appeals concluded that the daughter and son-in-law had
a viable claim against the attorney:
"Even if no direct contract between James Bryant
[the attorney] and the Robledos [the daughter and
son-in-law] existed, the Robledos also argued that
James Bryant knew at the time that he requested
payment of the $15,000 by the Robledos that Nave
[the client] was incompetent and could not contract
for legal representation. If the Robledos could
produce evidence to support that contention, then a
claim of fraudulent inducement would be shown and
would preclude dismissal of the Robledos' claim of
fraud."
938 So. 2d at 419.  
As in this case, the allegation against the attorney in
Bryant was not that he failed to meet the applicable standard
of care in the course of his representation but that he never
should have accepted payment for representation in the first
place because the client legally could not contract with the
attorney for legal services.  No allegation that the outcome
of the client's case would have been different with better
legal representation was made because that was not the
gravamen of the legal-malpractice claim, and the Court of
Civil Appeals did not suggest that any such allegation or
evidence in that regard was required.
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Moreover, although there appears to be a dearth of
similar 
legal-malpractice 
cases in 
Alabama, 
they 
are
commonplace throughout the country, even though the "but for"
test applied by the circuit court in this case is also a
mainstay of legal-malpractice actions nationwide.  See, e.g., 
Kunau v. Pillers, Pillers & Pillers, P.C., 404 N.W.2d 573, 574
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Wahl v. Foreman, 398 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975);  Coastal Orthopaedic Inst., P.C. v. Bongiorno, 61
Mass. App. Ct. 55, 807 N.E.2d 187 (2004); Polin v. Wisehart &
Koch, No. 00 CIV. 9624 (DLC), Sept. 2, 2004 (S.D. N.Y. 2004)
(not selected for publication in F. Supp. 2d).
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in concluding that
Yarbrough's legal-malpractice action against the firm and
Eversole failed as a matter of law.  There exists a plain
dispute of fact as to what Eversole told Yarbrough about the
prospects of a Rule 32 petition and the subsequent appellate
filings.  Therefore, a judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the firm and Eversole was not warranted.
IV.  Conclusion
The summary judgment in favor of Perry is affirmed.  The
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the firm and Eversole 
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is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Parker, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., concurs in the result.
17