Title: Commonwealth v. Watt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13279
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2024

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SJC-13279 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NYASANI WATT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 8, 2023. – January 11, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, 
Criminal, Postconviction relief, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 21, 2011. 
 
Following review by this court, 484 Mass. 742 (2020), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on August 10, 2020, was heard by 
Mark D. Mason, J. 
 
A request for leave to appeal was reported by Cypher, J., 
in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
Elizabeth Doherty for the defendant. 
Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Afton M. Templin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  In 2020, this court affirmed Nyasani Watt's 
convictions of murder in the first degree and related offenses, 
2 
 
as well as the denials of his motions for a new trial, after 
plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E).  Commonwealth 
v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 765 (2020).  The defendant subsequently 
filed another motion for a new trial alleging, for the first 
time, that his trial counsel slept during critical portions of 
the trial, constructively depriving him of his constitutional 
right to counsel.  A Superior Court judge (motion judge), who 
was not the trial judge, denied the motion without a hearing, 
and the defendant sought leave to appeal the denial from a 
single justice of this court pursuant to § 33E.  The single 
justice reserved and reported this matter to the full court.  
For the reasons discussed infra, we reverse the order denying 
the defendant's motion and remand this matter to the Superior 
Court for a new trial.1 
Background.  The evidence presented in the defendant's 
trial is summarized in Watt, 484 Mass. at 744-745.  Facts 
concerning the postconviction pleadings and subsequent 
allegations against trial counsel are taken from the record and 
from the undisputed findings of the motion judge. 
In 2013, the defendant and his codefendant, Sheldon Mattis, 
were convicted of murder in the first degree for shootings that 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and Citizens for Juvenile Justice. 
3 
 
killed sixteen year old Jaivon Blake and wounded fourteen year 
old Kimoni Elliott.  Watt, 484 Mass. at 744.  Following trial, 
the defendant's trial counsel withdrew, and new counsel filed an 
appearance as the defendant's appellate counsel (first appellate 
counsel).  The defendant moved for postconviction relief and a 
new trial based on claims of extraneous juror influence.  See 
id. at 757-761.  Although the defendant raised with his first 
appellate counsel that his trial counsel slept during portions 
of the trial, first appellate counsel dismissed the issue as 
unmeritorious and did not investigate it further. 
The defendant's first motion, essentially treated as a 
motion for a new trial, was denied in March 2015, and his 
subsequent motion for a new trial was denied in October 2017.  
At the defendant's request, his first appellate counsel withdrew 
in December 2017.  The defendant obtained a second, and his 
current, appellate counsel (second appellate counsel), who filed 
a supplemental motion in support of a new trial.2  This motion 
was denied in July 2018.  The defendant's appeal from his 
convictions and from the denials of his motions for a new trial 
were consolidated before this court and received plenary review 
pursuant to § 33E.  On December 10, 2019, after this court heard 
 
2 The supplemental motion raised an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to investigate 
a "critical" aspect of a prosecution witness's testimony. 
4 
 
oral argument, second appellate counsel learned for the first 
time from the codefendant's trial counsel that the defendant's 
trial counsel had slept during portions of the trial.3  Almost 
six months after oral argument, this court affirmed the 
defendant's convictions and the orders denying his motions.  
Watt, 484 Mass. 765.  Approximately two months later, the 
defendant filed another motion for a new trial, contending that 
he was deprived of his right to counsel because his attorney was 
sleeping during critical parts of the trial.  In support of this 
motion, the defendant submitted his own affidavit as well as 
affidavits from his second appellate counsel, his codefendant, 
his codefendant's two trial attorneys, the two trial 
prosecutors, and his mother.  Each affidavit described the 
affiant's recollection as to whether trial counsel was observed 
sleeping during the trial and, if so, when and for how long.4 
The defendant's affidavit states that trial counsel "fell 
asleep a number of times during the trial," including during 
jury selection and the questioning of two witnesses, one 
possibly being Jeremiah Rodriguez, a key witness for the 
 
3 On receiving this information, second appellate counsel 
confirmed its veracity with the defendant and others who were 
present at the defendant's trial and filed the motion for a new 
trial that is before this court on appeal. 
 
4 It was not possible to obtain an affidavit from the 
defendant's trial counsel as he passed away in June 2019. 
5 
 
prosecution.  The defendant's affidavit further recounts that 
others in the court room, including the trial judge and 
prosecutor, witnessed trial counsel sleeping during portions of 
the trial, that trial counsel at one point was snoring, and that 
trial counsel tried to conceal his fatigued state. 
One of the codefendant's two trial attorneys attested that 
the defendant's trial counsel slept at least once during 
testimony.  The other attorney stated in his affidavit that the 
defendant's trial counsel closed his eyes several times during 
the trial, but that he was uncertain whether trial counsel was 
sleeping. 
One of the two trial prosecutors stated in his affidavit 
that he had observed the defendant's trial counsel "dozing off" 
on multiple occasions during the trial, and that he recalled one 
specific instance in which he had to rouse trial counsel to show 
him a photograph before showing it to a testifying witness.  The 
other trial prosecutor recalled being informed by another 
attorney at trial that the defendant's trial counsel had nodded 
off during the examination of one witness. 
The codefendant stated in his affidavit that he saw the 
defendant's trial counsel "sleeping or nodding off" a number of 
times during the trial and noted two specific instances:  during 
the testimony of an emergency medical technician and during the 
testimony of the younger brother of one of the victims.  The 
6 
 
defendant's mother stated in her affidavit that trial counsel 
"nodded off to sleep" or "was dozing" at some points during the 
trial.  She further stated that trial counsel appeared to be 
"sick" and "did not seem alert," and that he had informed her 
that he had "recently been hospitalized." 
The defendant's second appellate counsel recounted in her 
affidavit that after becoming aware of the allegation, she 
reached out to the jurors from the trial regarding whether they 
observed the defendant's trial counsel sleeping.  The one juror 
who responded did not recall anything specific about the 
defendant's trial counsel.  Second appellate counsel spoke with 
the defendant's first appellate counsel, who confirmed that the 
defendant did raise "something" about trial counsel "being able 
to stay awake at trial," but that the defendant's first 
appellate counsel did nothing with the information because he 
believed there was no basis to pursue the claim. 
The motion judge indicated that he credited the affidavits, 
all of which corroborated that trial counsel had fallen asleep 
multiple times during the trial.  The motion judge nevertheless 
denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, concluding that 
the defendant had waived the claim by failing to raise it on 
appeal or in a previous motion for a new trial, and that trial 
counsel's slumber neither rose to the level of structural error 
nor prejudiced the defendant's case. 
7 
 
Discussion.  1.  Gatekeeper analysis.  Because the 
defendant raised the issue of his trial counsel sleeping during 
the trial after this court had heard and decided his direct 
appeal, we review the appeal from the denial of the instant 
motion for a new trial only if the defendant presents "a 'new 
and substantial' issue that this court could not have considered 
in the course of plenary review."  Commonwealth v. Gunter, 459 
Mass. 480, 487, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  See G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude that he has done so. 
Section 33E, the mechanism by which this court exercises 
plenary review of all convictions of murder in the first degree, 
provides this court with "extraordinary powers" to "consider the 
whole case, both the law and the evidence, to determine whether 
there has been any miscarriage of justice."  Dickerson v. 
Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 744 (1986).  This unique form of 
review requires our consideration of issues raised by the 
defendant, as well as issues not raised, "but discovered as a 
result of our own independent review of the entire record."  Id.  
Balancing the exercise of our extraordinary powers with the 
interests of judicial economy and finality, § 33E simultaneously 
limits a capital defendant's "ability to appeal subsequent 
postconviction motions" following plenary review.  Id.  Pursuant 
to § 33E, such a defendant must first obtain leave to pursue an 
appeal from a single justice of this court, who acts as 
8 
 
gatekeeper to determine whether the defendant "presents a new 
and substantial question which ought to be determined by the 
full court."  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.5 
"The bar for establishing that an issue is 'substantial' in 
the context of the gatekeeper provision of § 33E is not high."  
Gunter, 459 Mass. at 487.  An issue is "substantial" if it is "a 
meritorious issue in the sense of being worthy of consideration 
by an appellate court."  Id.  Here, the defendant presents us 
with a substantial issue, where he alleges that his trial 
counsel's slumber deprived the defendant of his right to the 
assistance of counsel throughout his trial. 
Whether a defendant presents a "new" issue is a slightly 
more complex question.6  Gunter, 459 Mass. at 487.  "An issue is 
not 'new' within the meaning of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, where 
either it has already been addressed, or where it could have 
been addressed had the defendant properly raised it at trial or 
on direct review."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Ambers, 397 
 
5 This threshold determination may be made by a single 
justice or may be reserved and reported to the full court, as 
occurred in this case.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 
1, 2 (2011). 
 
6 Given the strict finality of gatekeeper determinations, we 
do not often have occasion to analyze whether claims are "new" 
as a full court.  A single justice's determination of a new and 
substantial issue "is final and unreviewable."  Gunter, 459 
Mass. at 485.  Thus, unless the gatekeeper function itself is 
reserved and reported (as it was here), the question would not 
come before us. 
9 
 
Mass. 705, 707 (1986).  In interpreting § 33E, we generally have 
"require[d] that the defendant present all his [or her] claims 
of error at the earliest possible time."  Gunter, supra, quoting 
Ambers, supra.  Accordingly, we have rejected gatekeeper 
petitions where a defendant raises no new facts and only 
presents "subtle shift[s]" in his or her theory of the case, 
Commonwealth v. Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 807 (2021),7 and 
where previously litigated claims are repackaged as claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, see Gunter, supra at 490 
("Reframing an omitted issue as an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim does not necessarily make it 'new'"). 
Here, because no one contemporaneously raised the fact that 
trial counsel was sleeping, the error was not apparent in the 
trial record.  Contrast Trigones v. Attorney Gen., 420 Mass. 
859, 861 n.5 (1995) (defendant's gatekeeper petition properly 
denied where defendant failed to demonstrate that claims were 
not evident from record on direct appeal).  Moreover, first 
appellate counsel rejected the claim as nonviable when the 
defendant brought the matter to his attention and therefore did 
 
7 See also, e.g., Gunter, 459 Mass. at 489 (defendant did 
not raise "new" issue where, although presented as "different 
theory," defendant did not allege change in applicable law or 
any new facts); Commonwealth v. Pisa, 384 Mass. 362, 367 (1981) 
("The legal theories, constitutional or otherwise, underlying 
[the defendant's] three other claims were available at the time 
of [the defendant's] first or second appeal . . ."). 
10 
 
not raise it in the defendant's direct appeal.  As a result of 
first appellate counsel's ineffective assistance, this court was 
not able to consider the claim under its plenary review, despite 
the efforts of the defendant.8  In these unique circumstances, we 
conclude that the defendant has presented a "new" question under 
§ 33E, because this claim was not available to the defendant in 
prior proceedings.  To hold otherwise would undermine the core 
purpose of § 33E's framework guaranteeing capital defendants 
exclusive access to plenary review "to determine whether there 
has been any miscarriage of justice."  Dickerson, 396 Mass. at 
744. 
2.  Merits of appeal.  Having determined that the defendant 
meets the § 33E gatekeeper criteria, we turn to a review of the 
denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.  Where, as 
here, the motion judge was not the trial judge and the evidence 
 
8 We note that the defendant's current motion did not allege 
that his first appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to investigate the claim that trial 
counsel had been sleeping during the trial.  Although the 
question has not been put before us, the failure to investigate 
an alleged error of this magnitude clearly was unreasonable.  
See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 491 Mass. 362, 366 (2023), quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (counsel "has 
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigation unnecessary").  
Accordingly, where the defendant raised the issue with his first 
appellate counsel who refused to pursue it, we do not fault the 
defendant for failing to include this claim on direct appeal.  
In these unique circumstances, it would be unreasonable to 
require the defendant to have done more. 
11 
 
provided was purely documentary, our review is de novo.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008). 
A judge "may grant a new trial at any time if it appears 
that justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The defendant argues 
that he constructively was deprived of his right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because his 
attorney was sleeping during the defendant's trial.9  Assessing 
the merits of the defendant's motion, we determine that a 
defendant constructively is deprived of his or her 
constitutional right to counsel under art. 12 where trial 
counsel sleeps for a significant portion or during an important 
aspect of trial. 
a.  Legal framework.  It is well established in the 
Commonwealth, as in Federal jurisdictions, that a person may be 
deprived of counsel in certain circumstances, even though 
counsel is present physically.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984) (constitutional error found, without 
any showing of prejudice, where counsel was present but was 
 
9 Article 12 states in relevant part that "every subject 
shall have a right . . . to be fully heard in his defense by 
himself, or his coun[sel] at his election."  The Sixth Amendment 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for 
his defen[s]e." 
12 
 
"prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of 
the proceeding").  See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-
59 (1932) ("defendants were not accorded right of counsel in any 
substantial sense" when counsel was appointed on first day of 
trial for capital offense without preparation or sufficient time 
to advise defendants or prepare defense); Commonwealth v. Dew, 
492 Mass. 254, 263-267 (2023) (defendant constructively denied 
counsel where counsel was found to have actual conflict of 
interest).  We have not had occasion to consider the point at 
which an attorney's slumber during trial results in deprivation 
of counsel requiring reversal.  Thus, we look for guidance to 
the Federal circuit courts that have addressed this question 
with respect to the Sixth Amendment.10 
Notably, although those courts agree as a general matter 
that a trial counsel's slumber constructively may deny 
defendants their right to counsel such that a new trial is 
warranted, each sets forth slightly differing conceptions of 
when that occurs.  The United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits focus on whether 
 
10 Although we review and consider the available Federal 
precedents that speak to the meaning of the Sixth Amendment in 
order to interpret art. 12, our decision today neither rests on 
nor is "interwoven with the [F]ederal law."  Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).  See id. at 1041 (Federal cases 
"used only for the purpose of guidance" do not negate "separate, 
adequate, and independent grounds" of State court decision). 
13 
 
counsel slept for a substantial portion of the trial.  See 
United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2016) ("a 
defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of the 
defendant's trial"); Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623-626 (6th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1214 (2012) (recognizing that 
denial of counsel with presumed prejudice where "attorney slept 
through a substantial portion of the trial"); Burdine v. 
Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 
U.S. 1120 (2002) ("a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is violated when that defendant's counsel is repeatedly 
unconscious through not insubstantial portions of the 
defendant's capital murder trial"); Javor v. United States, 724 
F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) ("when an attorney for a criminal 
defendant sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial, 
such conduct is inherently prejudicial and thus no separate 
showing of prejudice is necessary").  Meanwhile, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit focuses on 
whether counsel was unconscious "at critical times," a 
consideration that the Fifth Circuit has also discussed.  
Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (at trial, 
"when counsel [was] unconscious at critical times" or 
"repeatedly unconscious . . . for periods of time in which 
defendant's interests were at stake," prejudice may be 
14 
 
presumed).  See Burdine, supra at 349 (fact that counsel slept 
during "critical stages of trial" significant). 
As discussed infra, based on our review of the Federal 
cases that address sleeping counsel, we conclude that under art. 
12, a deprivation of counsel occurs when counsel sleeps for a 
significant portion of trial or sleeps through an important 
aspect of trial. 
i.  Significant portion of trial.  Whether counsel slept 
for a significant portion of the trial depends on, but is not 
limited to, considerations of the duration and frequency of 
counsel's sleeping.  See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11.  For 
example, in Ragin, the Fourth Circuit held that no separate 
showing of prejudice was necessary where counsel slept 
"[f]requently . . . almost every day . . . morning and evening" 
for "'[thirty] minutes at least' at a time."  Id. at 613, 622-
623.  In Tippins, the Second Circuit held that, even where it 
could not be determined precisely when or for how long counsel 
slept, no showing of prejudice was required where it was well 
supported that counsel slept every day at trial and "was 
repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which 
15 
 
[the] defendant's interests were at stake."11  Tippins, 77 F.3d 
at 687. 
 
Under this standard, a defendant might prevail regardless 
of the demonstrated importance of the particular times at which 
counsel slept, if the duration and frequency of counsel's 
sleeping was significant in and of itself.  Although less 
frequent or shorter periods of unconsciousness at trial may 
support a claim of structural error, mere momentary lapses in 
attention or consciousness are insufficient.12  See Tippins, 77 
 
11 In Tippins, the court's analysis also included that 
counsel slept during critical testimony of a codefendant and at 
least one witness and that, on at least one occasion, the trial 
judge stopped the trial to instruct counsel "not to sleep any 
further, [and] that he should be paying attention."  Tippins, 77 
F.3d at 687. 
 
12 Such claims still may be brought under the traditional 
ineffective assistance of counsel framework.  See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 691-692; Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974).  Similarly, broad claims of a condition or behavior by 
counsel that could cause serious lapses in attentiveness or 
unconsciousness are best suited for review as claims of 
ineffective assistance requiring a defendant to demonstrate 
actual prejudice resulting from demonstrated, deficient 
behavior.  See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 960 (1993) ("given the 
varying effects health problems can have on an individual's 
ability to function, claims of ineffective assistance based on 
attorney illness are best suited to the fact-specific prejudice 
inquiry mandated by Strickland"); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 
875-876 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988) 
(generalized claim of attorney's mental illness evaluated under 
ineffective assistance framework because "mere existence of a 
loosely described mental illness or condition cannot be assumed 
to affect legal proceedings unless the condition manifests 
itself in courtroom behavior"). 
16 
 
F.3d at 688 ("the appearance of 'sleeping' may cover a range of 
behavior.  Lawyers may sometimes affect a drowsy or bored look 
to downplay an adversary's presentation of evidence"); 
Commonwealth v. Keaton, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 87 (1994) 
("Meditation may be mistaken for somnolence").  But see Tippins, 
supra at 689 ("The point is well taken that consciousness and 
sleep form a continuum, and that there are states of drowsiness 
that come over everyone from time to time during a working day, 
or during a trial, for that matter.  The record here 
demonstrates that [trial attorney] was actually unconscious").  
Rather, the core inquiry focuses on noticeable and meaningful 
lapses of attentiveness so significant throughout the trial that 
"the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because 
of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts 
on to produce just results."  Ragin, 820 F.3d at 620, quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
ii.  Important aspect of trial.  Even if a defendant cannot 
demonstrate that counsel slept for a significant portion of the 
entire trial, prejudice may be presumed where a defendant 
demonstrates that counsel slept through an important aspect of 
trial.  In so holding, we again draw support from the Federal 
circuit courts, which have taken into consideration the 
significance of the particular events through which counsel 
slept. 
17 
 
For instance, in Tippins, 77 F.3d at 689-690, the Second 
Circuit presumed prejudice where trial counsel, in addition to 
missing parts of the testimony of other prosecution witnesses, 
was found to have slept through "half" of a codefendant's 
testimony and "two-thirds" of the testimony of a confidential 
informant -– "two witnesses of undeniable importance to the 
prosecution of [the defendant]."  In Burdine, 262 F.3d at 349, 
the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to a 
presumption of prejudice where defense counsel repeatedly slept 
"through not insubstantial portions" of trial during which the 
prosecution introduced evidence and examined witnesses adverse 
to the defendant.  The Fifth Circuit characterized these moments 
as comprising the "critical guilt-innocence phase of [the 
defendant's] capital murder trial."  Id.  By comparison, the 
Sixth Circuit found that no presumption of prejudice was 
warranted where a single juror recalled that defense counsel 
slept through a "brief" period of the defendant's cross-
examination.  Muniz, 647 F.3d at 624. 
In suggesting that courts assess the importance of any 
given aspect of trial, we are mindful of the fact that the 
entire trial itself may be considered to be a "critical stage" 
where a defendant's Sixth Amendment and art. 12 rights attach.  
See Commonwealth v. Neary-French, 475 Mass. 167, 170-172 (2016).  
We emphasize that our ruling today does not augment, reduce, or 
18 
 
even rely on our existing body of caselaw identifying "critical 
stages of the prosecution."  Id. at 170, 173 ("The term 
'critical stage' is a term of art and only refers to [those] 
actions and events postindictment or arraignment" at which 
defendant's right to counsel attaches).13  Rather, the standard 
we adopt today for determining whether a constructive 
deprivation of counsel has occurred at trial affirms that which 
already may be intuitive -- that there is a distinction between 
those portions of trial where unremarkable, ancillary evidence 
is being presented versus when direct evidence of guilt or 
innocence is being presented, and that the line between the two 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  And although those 
distinctions may speak to the "magnitude" of constitutional 
error at play, Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 196 
(2014), quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, acknowledging such a 
distinction for the limited purpose of determining whether a 
trial counsel's sleeping constitutes structural error does not 
diminish the extent to which a defendant's foundational right to 
counsel applies during critical stages of the proceedings, such 
as trial. 
 
13 This separate body of law is useful primarily to decipher 
which moments leading up to, surrounding, and following trial, 
in addition to the trial itself, are "critical" and require 
counsel's presence. 
19 
 
We are convinced that this dual approach to considering 
claims of sleeping counsel provides a proper basis to determine 
whether the defendant constructively was denied counsel under 
art. 12.  Although any slumber by counsel during trial is 
distressing and detrimental, counsel's constructive absence 
during either a significant portion of trial or an important 
aspect of trial so offends the constitutional protections 
surrounding the right to assistance of counsel that it renders 
the entire adversary process "presumptively unreliable" and 
creates an uncurable error, "even if the error was ultimately 
harmless."  Valentin, 470 Mass. at 196, quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 659. 
This approach is appropriate in light of the unique 
evidentiary hurdles facing defendants whose rights to counsel 
have been infringed due to a deprivation of counsel.  Indeed, 
when counsel is absent either for a significant portion or 
during an important stage of trial, "the evil lies in what the 
attorney does not do, and is . . . not readily apparent on the 
record."  Javor, 724 F.2d at 834, quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 
586 F.2d 1325, 1332 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). 
b.  Application.  Here, the affidavits submitted by the 
defendant "provide a sufficient factual basis" to support the 
conclusion that trial counsel slept for a significant portion of 
20 
 
trial, and likely slept through an important aspect of trial.  
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 473 Mass. 832, 839 (2016). 
Based on the affidavits, multiple people had observed trial 
counsel sleeping during trial.  The defendant asserts that trial 
counsel slept recurrently and during significant moments, such 
as jury selection and the testimony of two witnesses, possibly 
including Jeremiah Rodriguez, a central prosecution witness.  
Codefendant Mattis confirmed that the defendant's trial counsel 
slept repeatedly during trial, naming two specific occasions, 
including the testimony of an emergency medical technician and 
the victim's younger brother.  One of the prosecutors at trial 
had contemporaneously discussed with a colleague and one of 
codefendant's counsel that trial counsel slept on several 
distinct occasions, including one where the prosecutor had to 
rouse trial counsel to review a photograph before it was shown 
to the testifying witness.  One attorney for the codefendant 
confirmed that trial counsel slept at least once during 
testimony; the other attorney for the codefendant stated that 
trial counsel's eyes were closed several times throughout the 
trial.  The defendant's mother also confirmed the repetitiveness 
of trial counsel's sleeping during trial.  Notably, none of the 
affiants provided statements to the contrary. 
 
Together, these affidavits not only "cast doubt" on whether 
the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to 
21 
 
counsel, but also demonstrate as much (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 622-623 (2016).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 572 (1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1091 (1995) (no abuse of discretion where judge 
decided motion for new trial on memorandum of law without 
holding evidentiary hearing where only substantial issue raised 
was question of law, not fact).  First, we note that this is not 
a case where we only have a defendant's self-serving affidavit 
in support of the defendant's claim.  See Commonwealth v. 
Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 351 (2004).  To the contrary, the 
defendant submitted affidavits from both sides of the aisle, all 
of which corroborate the defendant's claim that trial counsel 
was sleeping throughout trial.  See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 621 
("every witness who testified stated that [trial counsel for the 
defendant] was asleep, appeared to be asleep, or was 'nodding 
off' at some point" during trial).  Second, as the affiants' 
descriptions of when trial counsel slept varied, with some 
accounts more specific than others, we cannot discount the 
possibility that each account represents a separate occasion 
during which trial counsel was asleep.  See id. at 621-622 
(error to "fail[] to consider the likely possibility that each 
witness saw [trial counsel] asleep or nodding off on different 
occasions").  Moreover, the fact that the trial judge neither 
contemporaneously addressed the issue nor provided an affidavit 
22 
 
as to the defendant's claim on appeal is not dispositive.  See 
id. at 622 (rejecting argument that lack of remediation or 
admonishment by judge on record suggested that trial counsel was 
not asleep during trial).14 
 
Based on the uncontested affidavits provided by the 
defendant, "we find it impossible not to conclude" that trial 
counsel at least slept through a significant portion of the 
trial, and likely through an important part of trial, i.e., 
Jeremiah Rodriguez's testimony.15  Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622.  Thus, 
we conclude that the defendant was deprived of his right to 
counsel under art. 12. 
c.  Structural error and substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice.  Having concluded that the defendant was deprived of 
his right to counsel under art. 12, we next consider whether the 
error entitles the defendant to a new trial. 
 
14 Similarly, we cannot conclude that any sleeping by trial 
counsel could not have been significant if neither the 
Commonwealth nor the trial judge contemporaneously addressed the 
issue on the record.  Cf. Tippins, 77 F.3d at 690 ("we cannot 
count on a trial judge to serve as the defense lawyer's alarm 
clock whenever matters arise that touch the client's interest"). 
 
15 The claim that trial counsel slept through Jeremiah 
Rodriguez's testimony arguably is less conclusive from the 
affidavits than the fact that trial counsel was repeatedly 
asleep for a significant portion of the trial.  However, we note 
that the potential veracity of the claim that a trial counsel 
was asleep during the Commonwealth's presentation of critical 
evidence against a defendant would suffice as a separate basis 
to determine structural error under the disjunctive standard we 
recognize today. 
23 
 
Deprivation of counsel amounts to structural error, i.e., 
error that affects the "framework within which the trial 
proceeds, rather than simply . . . the trial process itself."  
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).  Because 
structural error generally "render[s] a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining 
guilt or innocence," Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 
(2010), quoting Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219 
(2006), preserved claims of structural error, if substantiated, 
result in automatic reversal, Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 
Mass. 443, 454 (2019).  However, unpreserved claims of error -- 
even those that are structural in nature -– are reviewed to 
determine "whether the error created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 
88 n.1, 102-103 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021). 
To avoid waiver, a defendant "must raise a claim of error 
at the first available opportunity" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102-103, cert. denied, 
574 U.S. 933 (2014).16  Here, the motion judge concluded that the 
 
16 Although our analysis of waiver invokes similar 
considerations to our analysis of newness under § 33E, namely, 
whether the defendant could have raised a claim sooner, waiver 
is a matter distinct from the gatekeeper query.  See, e.g., 
Francis, 485 Mass. 94, 104-106 (defendant raised new and 
substantial issues satisfying § 33E but had waived claim of 
error). 
24 
 
defendant waived his claim by failing to investigate and raise 
the claim prior to his direct appeal.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 
(c) (2), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).17  We need not 
determine whether the motion judge is correct on this point 
because, as discussed infra, we conclude that the error created 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
In assessing whether an error poses a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, we consider the nature of the error, the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case against the defendant, and 
"whether the error is 'sufficiently significant in the context 
of the trial to make plausible an inference that the [jury's] 
result might have been otherwise but for the error.'"  
Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 396 (2011).  Additionally, 
the United States Constitution requires reviewing courts, at the 
very least, to vacate where the defendant has shown, despite 
waiver, that the error "led to a fundamentally unfair trial."  
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 304-305 (2017). 
 
17 Rule 30 (c) (2) states: 
 
"All grounds for relief claimed by a defendant under 
subdivisions (a) and (b) of this rule shall be raised by 
the defendant in the original or amended motion.  Any 
grounds not so raised are waived unless the judge in the 
exercise of discretion permits them to be raised in a 
subsequent motion, or unless such grounds could not 
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended 
motion." 
25 
 
In our view, the deprivation of counsel at trial is the 
type of structural error that inherently raises serious concerns 
whether the trial itself was "an unreliable vehicle for 
determining guilt or innocence."  Francis, 485 Mass. at 102, 
quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).18  A 
defendant whose attorney is unconscious and thereby 
constructively absent for significant portions of the 
proceedings or during an important part of the proceedings is 
denied the right to "require the prosecution's case to survive 
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing," Cronic, 466 
U.S. at 656, and the right to "consult with [his or her] 
attorney or receive informed guidance from [his or her attorney] 
during the course of the trial" (citation omitted), Ragin, 820 
F.3d at 620.19  Given the unique nature of absentee counsel, it 
 
18 Not every structural error poses a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., Francis, 485 Mass. at 107 
(no substantial risk despite denial of right to counsel of 
choice); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 154-155 (2018) 
(substantial risk analysis to be used where structural error of 
denial of right to public trial found). 
 
19 In the proceedings below, the motion judge found no 
substantial risk, relying in part on the fact that the 
defendant's theory of defense was aligned with that of his 
codefendant, whose two attorneys were not alleged to have been 
asleep at any time during trial.  This was an erroneous legal 
conclusion.  The right to counsel is a fundamental 
constitutional right "accorded to every defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 389 Mass. 359, 366, cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 941 (1983).  While codefendants can consent to being 
 
26 
 
would make little sense to require further proof of specific 
prejudice beyond the absence itself to demonstrate a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice, where the absence endures for 
a significant portion or through an important aspect of the 
trial.  See Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687 ("Of course, the buried 
assumption in our Strickland cases is that counsel is present 
and conscious to exercise judgment, calculation and instinct, 
for better or worse.  But that is an assumption we cannot make 
when counsel is unconscious at critical times").  See also id. 
("Under these circumstances . . . there is little difference 
between saying that prejudice will be presumed and saying that 
prejudice has been demonstrated"). 
Our judicial authority to order a new trial pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) is predicated on the "fundamental 
principle" that "the valuable finality of judicial proceedings 
must yield to our system's reluctance to countenance significant 
individual injustices."  Commonwealth v. Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 
388 (2015).  Even "meticulous efforts to do justice" can be 
 
represented by the same counsel, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, as 
amended, 490 Mass. 1303 (2022), the alignment of common 
interests or theories of defense is not the harm at issue here.  
Rather, a defendant whose attorney is asleep is deprived of the 
ability to "consult with his attorney during the trial" or 
receive "a lawyer's guidance" during "the trial process."  
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1976).  That is not 
an ill mitigated by the presence of some other attorney, even 
one advancing a similar defense. 
27 
 
frustrated by "extraordinary fact patterns."  Id. at 391.  Here, 
where defense counsel fell asleep repeatedly at trial, and 
potentially during at least one crucial witness's testimony, we 
do not have confidence that justice was done.  Cf. Ragin, 820 
F.3d at 624 ("[The defendant] was thrown unarmed into the arena 
to face the gladiators without benefit of the assistance of 
counsel to which he had an absolute right.  As a result, [the 
defendant's] trial was not a confrontation between adversaries 
in which any reasonable person can have confidence"); Tippins, 
77 F.3d at 690 ("In short, there is simply no basis for the hope 
that [defense attorney] was functioning as a lawyer during 
critical times at trial"); Javor, 724 F.2d at 834 ("Prejudice is 
inherent in this case because unconscious or sleeping counsel is 
equivalent to no counsel at all"). 
Conclusion.  The defendant constructively was denied the 
right to counsel in violation of art. 12, and this denial 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The 
order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial is 
reversed.  The defendant's convictions are vacated, the verdicts 
are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court 
for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.