Title: Commonwealth v. Walker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961377
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
 VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
 DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 
 EX REL. JANET MAY 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
v. Record No. 961377 
                                      April 18, 1997 
RAYMOND M. WALKER 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether a circuit court had 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of a judgment of a juvenile 
and domestic relations district court when the appealing party 
failed to post an appeal bond. 
 
In May 1986, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 
Court of Hanover County (the District Court) ordered Raymond M. 
Walker to pay Janet May $100 per week for the support of his two 
children.  In March 1994, the Division of Child Support 
Enforcement (the Division) sought and obtained a show cause 
order, claiming that Walker was in arrears in his support 
payments.  On September 9, 1994, following a hearing on the show 
cause order, the District Court found Walker in contempt of court 
for his failure to pay support in the amount of $2,395.  The 
court sentenced Walker to six months in jail, but suspended the 
sentence on the condition that Walker pay the arrearage and 
continue to pay support.   
 
On September 12, 1994, Walker noted an appeal to the Circuit 
Court of Hanover County (the Circuit Court).  No appeal bond was 
set by the District Court or its clerk, and Walker posted no 
 
 
 
 
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appeal bond. 
 
On April 4, 1995, Walker and the Division appeared before 
the Circuit Court.  The Division claimed that the Circuit Court 
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because Walker had not 
posted the appeal bond required by Code § 16.1-296(H).  The 
Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction, heard the case on 
its merits, and found that Walker was not in arrears. 
 
The Division appealed the jurisdictional issue to the Court 
of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's 
judgment, concluding that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction even 
though Walker had not posted an appeal bond.  Commonwealth Ex 
Rel. May v. Walker, 22 Va. App. 230, 468 S.E.2d 695 (1996).  The 
Court of Appeals held that, "where a [district] court fails to 
require an appeal bond as required by statute, the circuit court 
is not deprived of its jurisdiction."  Id. at 233, 468 S.E.2d at 
697.  We awarded the Division an appeal. 
 
At the time the present case was before both the District 
Court and the Circuit Court, Code § 16.1-296(H) provided, in 
pertinent part, the following: 
 
 
No appeal bond shall be required of a party 
appealing from an order of a juvenile and domestic 
relations district court except for that portion of any 
order or judgment establishing a support arrearage 
. . . .  In cases involving support, no appeal shall be 
allowed unless and until the party applying for the 
same or someone for him shall give bond, in an amount 
and with sufficient surety approved by the judge or by 
his clerk if there is one, to abide by such judgment as 
may be rendered on appeal if the appeal is perfected 
or, if not perfected, then to satisfy the judgment of 
the court in which it was rendered. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Code § 16.1-296(H) could not be more clear:  "no appeal 
shall be allowed" unless and until a bond is given by the party 
applying for the appeal.  The statutory requirements for appeal 
bonds always have been construed as mandatory, and the exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction has been confined to the provisions of 
the written law.  The Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 
543, 29 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1944).  We repeatedly have held that 
"[the] failure to substantially comply with the statutory 
requirements applicable to appeal bonds constitutes a 
jurisdictional defect which cannot be corrected after the 
expiration of the time within which an appeal may be taken."  
Parker v. Prince William County, 198 Va. 231, 235, 93 S.E.2d 136, 
139 (1956); accord Ness v. Manuel, 187 Va. 209, 212, 46 S.E.2d 
331, 332 (1948); Woods, 182 Va. at 548, 29 S.E.2d at 411; 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 182 Va. 788, 795, 30 S.E.2d 575, 578 
(1944); Forrest v. Hawkins, 169 Va. 470, 477, 194 S.E. 721, 723 
(1938); Clinch Valley Lumber Corp. v. Hagan Estates, 167 Va. 1, 
4-5, 187 S.E. 440, 441-42 (1936); Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37, 
43, 178 S.E. 787, 789 (1935).   
 
In the present case, Code § 16.1-296(H) mandated an appeal 
bond, and the posting of such bond was required within 30 days 
from the date of judgment.  Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092, 
1096-97, 277 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1981).
*  However, no bond was 
                     
     
*In 1995, the General Assembly amended Code § 16.1-296(H), 
consistent with Godlewski, by adding the following:  "An appeal 
will not be perfected unless such appeal bond as may be required 
is filed within thirty days from the entry of the final judgment 
 
 
 
 
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posted within the 30-day period.  We hold, therefore, that the 
Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
 
In so holding, we reject the Court of Appeals' ruling that, 
because the District Court failed to require a bond, the Circuit 
Court was not deprived of its jurisdiction.  We conclude that 
Code § 16.1-296(H) places the burden on the party applying for 
the appeal to ask for and to have the district court set the bond 
and approve the surety.  It is fundamental that the appealing 
party has the burden of perfecting his appeal.  See, e.g., White 
v. Morano, 249 Va. 27, 30, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1995) (onus is 
upon appellant to provide reviewing court with sufficient 
record). 
 
We also reject the Court of Appeals' conclusion that, based 
upon Code § 16.1-114.1, "equitable considerations" dictated that, 
 under the facts of the present case, the Circuit Court obtained 
jurisdiction.  22 Va. App. at 235, 468 S.E.2d at 697.  Code 
§ 16.1-114.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o warrant, 
motion or other pleading shall be dismissed by reason of a mere 
defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings in the 
district court."  In the present case, the failure to post an 
appeal bond is not a "mere defect, irregularity or omission in 
the proceedings;" rather, it is a fatal jurisdictional defect 
that cannot be cured.  See Hurst v. Ballard, 230 Va. 365, 367, 
(..continued) 
or order [of a juvenile and domestic relations district court]." 
 1995 Va. Acts ch. 517.  The amendment became effective on July 
1, 1995, after the Circuit Court's ruling in the present case. 
 
 
 
 
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337 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1985) (decided under former Code § 16.1-
114); cf. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322, 323-24, 200 
S.E.2d 521, 522 (1973) (appeal bond in deficient amount held 
curable). 
 
Finally, we also reject the Court of Appeals' ruling that 
Walker's failure to post an appeal bond was harmless error 
because he prevailed on the merits in the Circuit Court.  As 
previously noted, the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction; 
therefore, its purported judgment on the merits is void.  See 
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 787, 793, 284 S.E.2d 824, 827 
(1981). 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstate the District Court's judgment which became 
final when Walker failed to perfect his appeal. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.