Title: Morrison v. Burlington Industries
Citation: 271 S.E.2d 364, 301 N.C. 226
Docket Number: 60
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 1980

271 S.E.2d 364 (1980) 301 N.C. 226 Elsie T. MORRISON, Employee, Plaintiff, v. BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants. No. 60. Supreme Court of North Carolina. October 23, 1980. Hassell &amp; Hudson, Raleigh, for employee, plaintiff. Teague, Campbell, Conely &amp; Dennis, Raleigh, for Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell &amp; Hunter, Greensboro, for Burlington Industries. This matter is before us on appeal from a decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals reported in 47 N.C.App. 50, 266 S.E.2d 741 (1980). *365 On 26 August 1976, plaintiff filed notice of accident and claim with the Industrial Commission, alleging that her exposure to cotton dust while working at Burlington Industries prior to 25 April 1974 had caused her to contract an occupational disease, byssinosis, resulting in permanent and total disability. On 18 December 1978, Commissioner Brown entered an Opinion and Award finding that plaintiff was totally disabled for work due to her exposure to cotton dust while in defendant's employ. He entered an award accordingly. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission which modified Commissioner Brown's award. The Full Commission found that plaintiff does suffer from an occupational disease and is entitled to compensation but "that plaintiff is not totally disabled by reason of such occupational disease." (Emphasis added.) It found that, "In addition to her chronic obstructive lung disease, plaintiff suffers and has suffered for some time from phlebitis, varicose veins and diabetes. Such conditions constitute an added factor in causing her disability." The Full Commission also entered the following finding of fact: The Commission thereupon awarded plaintiff 55% partial disability compensation for three hundred weeks pursuant to G.S. 97-30. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the Full Commission. The Court of Appeals held that the employee was totally incapacitated for work due to a compensable occupational disease and was entitled to an award for total incapacity under G.S. 97-29. Chief Judge Morris dissented on the ground that an employee should be compensated only for incapacity "resulting from the injury," and not for "factors totally unrelated to her employment." On 7 July 1980, defendants appealed to this Court pursuant to G.S. 7A-30. We heard oral arguments on 13 October 1980. We do not express any opinion on the merits in this order. For reasons stated below, we remand to the Industrial Commission for further hearing on the medical evidence, direct that a record of the proceedings on remand be forwarded to this Court forthwith and retain jurisdiction for our final determination on the merits. We note herewith a summary of the medical testimony. Dr. Battigelli testified, inter alia, as follows: From the record, we conclude that the medical evidence before the Commission is not sufficiently definite on the cause of plaintiff's disability to permit effective appellate review. As we read the medical testimony, the physicians never addressed the crucial medical question of the interrelations, if any, between the cotton dust exposure and claimant's other infirmities such as her bronchitis, upper respiratory infection, sinusitis, phlebitis, and diabetes. In order for this Court to determine if the Commission's findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence, the record, through medical testimony, must clearly show: (1) what percentage, if any, of plaintiff's disablement, i. e., incapacity to earn wages, results from an occupational disease; (2) what percentage, if any, of plaintiff's disablement results from diseases or infirmities unrelated to plaintiff's occupation which were accelerated or aggravated by plaintiff's occupational disease; and (3) what percentage, if any, of plaintiff's disablement is due to diseases or infirmities unrelated to plaintiff's occupation which were not accelerated or aggravated by plaintiff's occupational disease. For example, it is obvious that the Commission relied on Dr. Sieker's percentages in its finding of fact quoted above. However, Dr. Sieker never testified what he meant by "factors other than cotton dust exposure." Did he mean simply the phlebitis, or did he mean also to refer to claimant's bronchitis, upper respiratory infection, sinusitis, phlebitis, and diabetes? Could her cotton dust exposure have aggravated, contributed to or accelerated any of these other conditions; if so, which ones? If claimant is partly disabled by conditions which are caused, aggravated or accelerated by breathing cotton dust, then what percent of her disability is caused by these conditions? If claimant is partly disabled by conditions which are neither caused, aggravated nor accelerated by breathing cotton dust, then what percentage of her disability is caused by these conditions? This Court does not abandon the well-established rules in this jurisdiction that the Industrial Commission has the exclusive duty and authority to find the facts relative to disputed claims and such findings are conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence. Moreover, where the evidence before the Commission is such as to permit either one of two contrary findings, the determination of the Commission is conclusive on appeal and the mere fact that an appellate court disagrees with the findings of the Commission is not grounds for reversal. Here, however, *368 the medical evidence before the Commission which appears in the record before us is not sufficiently definite to permit appropriate appellate review. We cannot evaluate the testimony quoted above and correctly determine whether the findings made by the Commission are supported by the evidence. For that reason, we direct the Commission to re-examine the three medical witnesses to elicit definite answers to the questions noted above. The Commission will then make findings of fact based thereon. If those findings require legal conclusions and an award at variance with those heretofore made by the Commission, it will then make appropriate legal conclusions and order the issuance of an award based thereon. If the additional findings require no change, the Commission will leave its conclusions and award intact. The additional findings of fact together with amended conclusions and award, if any, and a transcript of the additional medical evidence, will be certified to this Court forthwith and treated as an addendum to the record. Copies shall be forwarded to all parties for such further proceedings in this Court as may then be ordered. It is so ordered. Remanded to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings consistent with this order. Jurisdiction retained by this Court for final determination.