Title: Clark v. State
Citation: 551 So. 2d 1091
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 1989

551 So. 2d 1091 (1989)
Ex parte STATE of Alabama.
(Re Richard E. CLARK
v.
STATE of Alabama).
86-760.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 29, 1989.
*1092 Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
Ken Gibson, Fairhope, for respondent.
KENNEDY, Justice.
This Court issued the writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals in order to clarify the procedural posture of this case. The Court of Criminal Appeals answered this Court's questions, writing in an opinion of February 24, 1989, "this case [referring to Clark v. State, 551 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. Crim.App.1986)] addressed both the appellant's appeal from judgment of conviction and his appeal from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis." Following the return to our remand order, we now consider the merits of the petition.
The issue is whether the defendant, Richard E. Clark, might have been prejudiced by the failure of a juror to make a proper response to a question regarding his/her qualifications to serve as a juror in a criminal case. We conclude that Clark might have been prejudiced, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Clark v. State, 551 So. 2d 1081 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), reversing his conviction.
We adopt in toto the facts of the case as presented in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion of October 28, 1986. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court erred to reversal in not granting Clark's petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was based, inter alia, on an allegation that a prospective juror had given improper responses to questions on voir dire.
The petitioner, the State of Alabama, argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by apparently accepting as true the statements contained in the affidavit of one of the jurors and by reversing Clark's conviction. The juror, Ms. Saundra K. Resmondo, stated in her affidavit:
At the hearing on Clark's motion for new trial, Ms. Resmondo also testified that the other juror stated to her that he had voted to convict the defendant in the prior drug case.
This Court has stated:
Ex parte O'Leary, 417 So. 2d 232, 240 (Ala. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1206, 103 S. Ct. 3536, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1387 (1983) (citations omitted).
We recognize that testimony and affidavits of jurors are not admissible to impeach their verdicts, unless affidavits tend to show extraneous facts that influenced the verdict. Fabianke v. Weaver, 527 So. 2d 1253 (Ala.1988). In this case, however, the issue does not concern the jury's deliberations, but rather whether Clark might have been prejudiced by the failure of a juror to make a proper response to a question regarding his qualifications to serve as a juror. Ms. Resmondo's affidavit raises the issue of whether Clark might have been so prejudiced. Because this is a criminal proceeding, with Clark's substantial liberty interests at stake, we are compelled to find that Clark might have been prejudiced by the juror's failure to disclose his previous jury service in another drug case in which the defendant was convicted.
The State argues that Ms. Resmondo's affidavit is inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. This Court has stated that "[w]here it appears from the face of an affidavit that the affiant had no personal knowledge of the matters to which [she] deposed and that [she] must have secured [her] information concerning those matters from others, then the affidavit is based on hearsay and should not be admitted." Williams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 286 Ala. 703, 708, 246 So. 2d 431, 435 (1971). It appears from the face of Ms. Resmondo's affidavit that she had personal knowledge of the matters contained in the affidavit and that she did not secure her information concerning those matters from others; *1094 therefore, the affidavit was admissible. Furthermore, "[a] statement made out of court is not hearsay if it is given in evidence for the purpose merely of proving that the statement was made, provided that purpose be otherwise relevant in the case at trial." Bryant v. Moss, 295 Ala. 339, 342, 329 So. 2d 538, 541 (1976). Ms. Resmondo's affidavit merely proves that the other juror made the statement about his prior jury service; it does not prove that the juror's statements were true, and the matter was certainly relevant to the matter of whether Clark might have been prejudiced by the other juror's failure to disclose his previous jury service in a drug case in which the defendant was convicted.
We conclude that Clark might have been prejudiced. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.