Title: In re Albrecht
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45913
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2002

Filed: March 14, 2002 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
NIKOLAUS ALBRECHT,
Accused.
(OSB 95-195; SC S45913)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted March 8, 2000.
	Marc D. Blackman, Ransom Blackman, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for the accused.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Oregon State
Bar, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the
Oregon State Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the date of
the filing of this decision.
	Durham, J., dissents and files an opinion.
	*Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ.,
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged Nikolaus Albrecht (the accused) with four
counts of violating Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(2)
(prohibiting criminal act that reflects adversely on honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, four counts of violating DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), four counts of violating DR 7-102(A)(7) (prohibiting assisting client in conduct that lawyer
knows is illegal), four counts of violating DR 7-102(A)(8)
(prohibiting knowing engagement in illegal conduct), three counts
of violating DR 9-101(A) (requiring deposit of all funds of
client in trust account), two counts of violating former DR 9-101(B)(4) (requiring maintenance of complete records of all
client funds), (1) two counts of violating ORS 9.460(1) (requiring
lawyers to support federal and state law), four counts of
violating ORS 9.527(1) (prohibiting lawyers from committing act
that, if that lawyer were applying for Bar admission, would cause
application to be denied), and four counts of violating ORS
9.527(4) (prohibiting lawyers from engaging in willful deceit or
misconduct in legal profession).
	After a hearing before a three-member trial panel, Bar
Rule of Procedure (BR) 2.4(i)(1), the trial panel ruled that the
Bar had obtained most of its evidence in violation of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (Rule 6(e)), the federal grand
jury secrecy rule (set out below).  The trial panel decided that
the only appropriate remedy for that Rule 6(e) violation was a
dismissal of the Bar's complaint.  Recognizing, however, that
this court might disagree with its decision to dismiss the
complaint, the trial panel also made findings on the merits.  A
two-member majority concluded that the accused had committed
single violations of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(7), and DR 7-102(A)(8).  The majority held that the
accused's misconduct would warrant disbarment.  One trial panel
member dissented, opining that the Bar had failed to prove any
allegation by clear and convincing evidence.
	The Bar sought review.  ORS 9.529. (2)  In this court, the
Bar argues that we should reject the trial panel's decision to
dismiss its complaint as a remedy for violating Rule 6(e).  On
the merits, the Bar seeks review of only two of its four causes
of complaint.  Specifically, the Bar urges this court to find
that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3) (two
counts), DR 7-102(A)(7), DR 7-102(A)(8), DR 9-101(A), ORS
9.460(1), and ORS 9.527(4) (two counts), and to disbar the
accused.  The accused contends that the Bar violated Rule 6(e)
and that the only appropriate remedy to redress that violation is
to dismiss the complaint.  Alternatively, the accused argues that
he did not violate the disciplinary rules in question and that,
even if he did, the appropriate remedy is, at most, a 30-day
suspension.
	This court reviews the trial panel's decision de novo. 
ORS 9.536(3).  The Bar has the burden of proving misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 5.2.  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the complaint should not
have been dismissed, that the accused has committed serious
violations of the disciplinary rules, and that the accused should
be disbarred.
FACTS  
	We find the following facts by clear and convincing
evidence.  In 1978, the accused represented Farber in a real
estate matter.  At that time, Farber was engaged in the business
of buying, selling, and managing real estate.  Over the next two
years, the accused represented Farber on several other real
estate matters, and they became social friends.  
	In 1980, a man named Foss was murdered.  Farber was
charged with the murder.  At his trial, which the accused
attended, (3) the state proceeded on the theory that Farber was a
drug dealer, that Foss was his supplier, and that Farber had
contracted for Foss's murder to avoid paying a drug debt.  During
his testimony at trial, Farber admitted that he was a drug dealer
and testified at length about his illegal drug distribution
activities, but denied involvement in the murder.  A jury
nonetheless convicted Farber of murder, and he was sentenced to
life in prison.  See State v. Farber, 295 Or 199, 666 P2d 821
(1983) (affirming conviction; remanding for resentencing).  
	Farber was released from prison in March 1987, and he
then obtained work in the sales field.  He also began selling
cocaine, which he acquired from Sturgis, whom he had met in
prison.  Sturgis, in turn, acquired the cocaine from
Charlesworth, whom Farber also had met in prison.
	Several months after his release, Farber approached the
accused for legal services in connection with real estate
purchases for investors that Farber had recruited.  The accused
agreed to assist Farber in those transactions.  The accused and
Farber did not have a fee agreement.  
	Pursuant to their arrangement, the accused helped
Farber consummate four real estate purchases between 1987 and
1989.  In the first transaction, Farber found property that was
of interest to his investors and signed an earnest money
agreement under the name SKAMCO, Inc. (on later documents, the
purchaser was identified as "Vernon Baker").  At some point,  
Farber delivered an amount of money not disclosed in the record
to the accused and instructed the accused to deposit that money
into his trust account.  According to the accused, Farber told
him (and he believed) that the money came from legitimate
investors.  Later, the accused drafted a land sale contract for
"Buyer" and wrote a $14,000 check on his trust account as a down
payment for the property.  The accused never met the buyer.      
	The second transaction occurred several months later. 
The accused again assisted Farber in a real estate purchase, this
time in the name of an investor named McGuire.  The accused
received funds from Farber before the purchase and deposited the
money into his trust account.  The funds that the accused
deposited were made up of at least $8,700 in cash and $6,600 in
personal checks, payable to and endorsed by the accused.  The
accused then drafted a land sale contract in McGuire's name and
drew a check on his trust account in the amount of $29,000 for
the down payment.  According to the accused, he was introduced to
McGuire on a single occasion at around that time.
	The accused performed similar services for Farber in
connection with two other real estate purchases in late 1988 and
early 1989.  Before the third purchase, the accused deposited 13
cashier's checks, payable to the accused, totaling over $45,000
into his trust account.  Each of the cashier's checks were in
amounts of less than $10,000. (4)  The accused took $500 cash back
from that deposit.  He also wrote himself a check for $1,000 a
few days after the deposit.  Although the accused does not recall
why he made those withdrawals, he maintains that he would not
have withdrawn any funds for himself unless Farber had authorized
him to do so.  Before the fourth purchase, the accused deposited
nine cashier's checks totaling about $41,000 in his trust
account.  Those checks were payable to and endorsed by the
accused.  All of the checks were in amounts less than $10,000. 
Both purchases were made in the name "Barbara Woodson," an
investor whom the accused never met and from whom he never
received money.   
	On May 1, 1989, the accused opened a new trust account,
designating it the "Farber Ltd." trust account.  The accused
later explained that the growing frequency of Farber's
transactions motivated him to keep Farber's funds separate from
his other clients' funds.  The opening deposit in the Farber Ltd.
trust account, totaling $53,738.82, consisted of cash and 12
cashier's checks from Farber.  All the cashier's checks were
payable to and endorsed by the accused.  Three of those cashier's
checks had been purchased by "Jim Anderson," four by "Jim
Pierson," two by "Jim Robinson," one by "J. Robinson," and one by
"Jim Allen."  The purchaser of the twelfth check was
unidentified.  All the cashier's checks were in amounts less than
$10,000.  Farber then asked the accused to draw a check in
Farber's name for another real estate purchase.  On May 9, 1989,
the accused wrote a check to Farber on the Farber Ltd. trust
account in the amount of $58,200, leaving a balance of $85.20. 
Farber took the check and left the state.  The accused did not
hear from Farber for more than one year and never had significant
contact with Farber again.
	Several weeks after Farber left the state, Farber's
client McGuire (who was, in fact, Charlesworth) contacted the
accused.  McGuire asked the accused to render the same legal
services for him that the accused had rendered for Farber.  The
accused agreed to assist McGuire.  As was true respecting his
relationship with Farber, the accused and McGuire had no written
fee agreement.
	Just as he had done for Farber, the accused deposited
cash and cashier's checks that McGuire gave him into the Farber
Ltd. trust account and drew checks on that account to cover
McGuire's down payments on real estate transactions.  All of the
cashier's checks were in amounts less than $10,000 and all were
payable to and endorsed by the accused.  The accused performed
those services for McGuire in connection with a total of four
real estate transactions.  On six occasions, the accused took
cash back from the deposits, usually a few hundred dollars.  On
18 occasions, the accused wrote checks to himself or to "cash"
from the account; the amounts varied from $150 to $1,600.  The
accused maintains that he would not have taken funds from the
account unless McGuire had instructed him to do so.
	There was a major difference, however, between the
accused's handling of funds that he received from McGuire and his
handling of funds that he had received from Farber.  With Farber,
the accused immediately had deposited all the funds received, no
matter the total amount of the deposit.  With McGuire, the
accused ensured that the total of virtually every deposit made
into the Farber Ltd. trust account was less than $10,000. (5)  
	For example, the record contains a handwritten receipt,
signed by the accused, showing that, on July 18, 1989, the
accused received $76,000 from McGuire.  The accused's trust
account records, however, do not show a $76,000 deposit on July
18 or any day thereafter.  Rather, the trust account records show
that, over the course of two months, the accused made nine
different deposits, each in an amount less than $10,000.  The
nine deposits included seventeen cashier's checks, each dated
July 17, 1989.  Almost all the cashier's checks denoted McGuire
as the purchaser.  One deposit during that two-month period
consisted of $8,750 in cash.  By the end of September 1989, the
accused had deposited $59,625.53 of the $76,000 into the Farber
Ltd. trust account.  The record does not indicate what happened
to the remaining $16,374.87. (6)
	In May 1991, state law enforcement authorities arrested
Sturgis, Farber's former drug supplier, in a drug "sting"
operation.  The record is not entirely clear on the exact chain
of events that followed; however, investigation of Sturgis led
both to his drug supplier, Charlesworth, and to Farber.  Further
investigation revealed that one of Charlesworth's aliases was
McGuire.  More investigation led to the accused.  At some point,
federal authorities became involved.  Eventually, the matter was
presented to a federal grand jury.
	On a date not revealed in the record, an Assistant
United States Attorney served on the accused's bank a grand jury
subpoena for the accused's trust-account records.  The bank
complied with the subpoena. (7)  
  	In May 1993, the Assistant United States Attorney who
was prosecuting the case moved the federal district court for an
order under Rule 6(e) permitting him to disclose grand jury
material to a Multnomah County Deputy District Attorney, an
Assistant Attorney General, and their clerical staff. (8)  The
district court granted the motion. (9)  The accused's trust-account
records were among the documents of which the district court
permitted disclosure.
	In the spring of 1995, the Deputy District Attorney
(DDA) who had received the grand jury materials under the May
1993 court order, and who subsequently had investigated the case,
filed a complaint with the Bar regarding the accused's conduct. 
In his Bar complaint, the DDA outlined the scheme described
above, suggested that the evidence showed that the accused had
been engaged in a money-laundering scheme and, in so doing, had
violated several disciplinary rules.  To support his Bar
complaint, the DDA attached a copy of the accused's trust-account
records. (10)  This proceeding ensued.  	
	On June 17, 1998, the trial panel conducted a hearing
on the Bar's complaint.  At that hearing, the Bar called Haworth,
an IRS special agent, to testify about his investigation of the
accused's trust accounts.  In aid of an objection, the accused's
lawyer asked Haworth if it was his understanding that the records
of the accused's trust accounts had been obtained through a
federal grand jury subpoena.  Haworth responded that that was his
understanding.  The lawyer then asked Haworth if he had an order
under Rule 6(e) authorizing disclosure of the records to the Bar. 
Haworth indicated that he did not, but that it was his
understanding that the United States Attorney's office had one,
because "otherwise I wouldn't be here testifying."  The accused's
lawyer then stated that, until such an order was produced, he
would object to the introduction of the trust-account records and
to evidence derived from those records on the ground that they
were subject to the grand jury secrecy rule, Rule 6(e), and could
not be disclosed without a federal court order. (11) 
	The Bar's lawyer replied:
		"I've never heard of this objection, I'm totally
unprepared to respond to it.  I can say that the bar
got these records from the district attorney's office,
Norman Frink.  The bar didn't get these in response to
a grand jury subpoena.  So how this -- how Mr. Haworth
originally obtained his records, I don't know.  And
what is required there, I don't know.  All I can say
is, we've got these, we've gone through these with [the
accused], they have been exchanged, he's been deposed
on it, this is the first I've heard of any objection."
		The members of the trial panel indicated that they were
unfamiliar with Rule 6(e) and did not know how to proceed.  The
accused's lawyer briefly explained the rule to them and also 
noted that he had a "vague memory" that there had been a motion
to unseal the grand jury records in 1994 or 1995, and that the
motion had been denied.  Haworth interjected that the accused's
lawyer probably was thinking of a motion to unseal that occurred
later in the process, but that there must have been a Rule 6(e)
order early on because the case had been "transferred" from the
United States Attorney's office to the Multnomah County District
Attorney's office and would not have been "transferred" without a
Rule 6(e) order.  The trial panel then asked the Bar's lawyers:
	"Mr. Stroup:	Was there any discussion about the
source of the documents?
	"Mr. Heiling:	Not that I remember.
	"Ms. Hicks:	I can speak to that.  The documents were
received from the complainant in this
case, who happened to be Norm Frink, and
they were sent to [the accused] with the
initial letter that the [B]ar received. 
So all of the documents that we received
* * * have come from the Multnomah
County District Attorney's office.
	"Mr. Stroup:	Did they have anything on them
identifying where they came from, that
they came through this U.S.
investigation?
	"Ms. Hicks:	Are they stamped with grand jury stamp
or something?  No.
	"* * * * * 
	"Mr. Stroup:  	I was trying to find out if there was
any indication on there the source of
the documents so that this issue could
have been raised earlier in some
fashion.  
	"Ms. Hicks:	No."
		The trial panel then asked the Bar's lawyers to make a
telephone call to the Multnomah County District Attorney's Office
regarding the matter.  After a recess, the Bar's lawyer reported:
	"Ms. Hicks:	I called Norm Frink at the Multnomah
County DA's office, I asked him about
whether or not he had a 6-e order.  He
said that he did not have a copy of it
but he is absolutely certain that the
records would not have been released to
him by the U.S. Attorney's office absent
such an order." (12)
		The trial panel ultimately concluded that it was more
likely than not that the United States Attorney's office and the
Multnomah County District Attorney's office had operated in the
matter in accordance with the law (i.e., that the federal
district court had permitted disclosure), and decided to proceed
with the hearing on the basis of that assumption.  However, the
trial panel placed the Bar under an obligation to try to find the
order and suggested that, if no order were found, then the
records might have to be excluded. (13)  The hearing continued, and
the trust account records, Haworth's testimony about the records,
and other derivative evidence were received.  The hearing
concluded on June 24, 1998.  
		Ten weeks passed, and, after considerable effort, the
Bar failed to produce the court order.  During that time, the
United States Attorney's office retrieved the file that was
supposed to the contain the disclosure order, but the order was
not in the file.  When the trial panel learned that the Bar could
not find the order, it issued its decision in the proceeding, in
which it inferred from the Bar's inability to produce a copy of
the Rule 6(e) order that the federal district court had not
permitted disclosure and, thus, that the Bar had received the
trust account records in violation of Rule 6(e).  The trial panel
further concluded that it was required to exclude the trust
account records and all evidence thereby derived.  Because the
excluded evidence was the bulk of the Bar's case against the
accused, the trial panel dismissed the complaint for failure of
proof. (14)  However, the trial panel acknowledged that this court
might disagree with its decision to dismiss and made findings on
the merits in light of that possibility.  In those findings, a
majority of the trial panel found that the accused had violated
the federal money-laundering statute, 18 USC § 1956, and,
therefore, that he had violated DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3),
DR 7-102(A)(7), and DR 7-102(A)(8), as outlined above.  The trial
panel also found that the Bar had failed to prove the other
causes charged in the complaint.  The trial panel concluded that
the appropriate sanction for the proven violations would be
disbarment.
		Shortly after the trial panel had rendered its
decision, the United States Attorney's office located the May
1993 Rule 6(e) order that had permitted disclosure of the
accused's trust-account records and other grand jury materials to
a specified Multnomah County Deputy District Attorney -- the
order had been misfiled.  On September 30, 1998, three weeks
after the trial panel issued its decision, the Bar filed a
request for reconsideration and attached a copy of the disclosure
order.  The trial panel denied the Bar's request for
reconsideration on the ground that it had no further jurisdiction
over the proceeding.  
		The Bar sought review by this court, specifically
challenging both the trial panel's conclusion that the Bar's
complaint should be dismissed as a remedy for the presumed
violation of Rule 6(e) and the trial panel's findings that the
accused had not violated the disciplinary rules alleged in the
fourth cause of complaint.  The Bar asks this court to affirm the
trial panel's alternative findings with respect to the
disciplinary violations charged in the first cause of complaint,
to find the accused to have committed of the violations charged
in the fourth cause, and to disbar the accused as a sanction.
RULE 6(e)
	Although neither party has cited the pertinent Bar Rule
of Procedure, our review of the trial panel's decision to exclude
the evidence as a remedy for a Rule 6(e) violation is governed by
BR 5.1(b), which provides:
	"No error in procedure [or] in admitting or
excluding evidence * * * shall invalidate a
finding or decision unless upon a review of
the record as a whole, a determination is
made that a denial of a fair hearing to
either the Bar or the accused has occurred."
Under BR 5.1(b), we review the trial panel's decision to exclude
the evidence for error and, if there was error, whether the error
denied the Bar a fair hearing.
	In construing Rule 6(e), we first look to the plain
wording of the rule.  See United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481
US 102, 109, 107 S Ct 1656, 95 L Ed 2d 94 (1987) (employing that
methodology); Shaw v. PACC Health Plan, Inc., 322 Or 392, 400,
908 P2d 308 (1995) (following methodology used by United States
Supreme Court when interpreting federal law).  
	Rule 6(e)(2) establishes the general rule of federal
grand jury secrecy.  That rule, set out above, specifically
prohibits certain enumerated persons -- grand jurors,
interpreters, stenographers, operators of a recording device,
typists transcribing recorded testimony, attorneys for the
government, and those attorneys' assistants -- from disclosing
"matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise
provided for in these rules."  Rule 6(e)(2); Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). 
Rule 6(e) further provides that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may
be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule." 
Rule 6(e)(2); see also Worrell Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v.
Westhafer, 739 F2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir 1984), aff'd 469 US 1200,
105 S Ct 1155, 84 L Ed 2d 309 (1985) ("Rule 6(e) applies * * *
only to individuals who are privy to the information contained in
a sealed document by virtue of their positions in the criminal
justice system.").  
	The Bar is not one of the enumerated persons on whom
the rule imposes an obligation of secrecy:  Under the plain
wording of the rule, the Bar has no obligation of secrecy.  Thus,
the Bar is not prohibited from either possessing or using the
accused's trust-account records in this proceeding.  See In re
Charlotte Observer, 921 F2d 47 (4th Cir 1990) (vacating
injunction that prohibited newspapers from publishing name of
target of ongoing grand jury investigation when judge
accidentally mentioned name in open court); In re Polypropylene
Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 181 FRD 680, 693-94 (ND Ga 1998)
(concluding that private party that lawfully, albeit
accidentally, obtained grand jury material and related internal
documents from United States Attorney's Office had no obligation
under Rule 6(e)(2) to return them).  The Bar would have had to
have obtained a federal court order if the Bar had sought to
obtain the trust account records directly from the federal court. 
See In re Barker, 741 F2d 250 (9th Cir 1984) (affirming order
granting disclosure of grand jury material to Bar).  Because the
Bar did not receive the trust-account records directly from
federal court, however, the Bar did not need a disclosure order.
	If Rule 6(e) prevented the Bar from either possessing
or using the trust account records, then we would agree with the
trial panel that excluding the records would be appropriate.  See
In re Langley, 230 Or 319, 323, 370 P2d 228 (1962) (excluding
from disciplinary proceeding evidence obtained in violation of
state wire-tapping law).  But that is not the case.  It is clear
from the above analysis that the Bar did not, and could not,
violate Rule 6(e).  Because the accused does not appear to raise
the argument that exclusion would be an appropriate remedy in a
lawyer disciplinary proceeding for Bar evidence that, at one
point, had been disclosed wrongfully by a person subject to Rule
6(e), we do not consider that argument.
	Under BR 5.1(b), which we again note that neither party
cited, we now must review "the record as a whole" and determine
whether the Bar has been denied a fair hearing.  We have no
trouble concluding that it was.  The evidence that the trial
panel wrongfully excluded was the bulk of the evidence that the
Bar introduced in support of its allegations.  Without the
excluded evidence, it is undisputed that the Bar could not carry
its burden of proof.  We turn to the merits.
	      FIRST CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

	The first cause of complaint charged the accused with
knowingly participating in a criminal money-laundering scheme and
with violating a number of disciplinary rules (DR 1-102(A)(2), DR
1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(7), DR 7-102(A)(8)) and discipline-related statutes (ORS 9.460(1) and ORS 9.527(1)) in the process. 
We find by clear and convincing evidence that the Bar has proved
violations of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(7), and
DR 7-102(A)(8).
		As relevant to the present proceeding, a person commits
the federal crime of money laundering if:  (1) the person
knowingly conducts a financial transaction; (2) the transaction
involves proceeds of a specified kind of unlawful activity; (3)
the person knows that the money involved constituted the proceeds
of the specified unlawful activity; and (4) the person knows that
the transaction was designed to conceal the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of the money.  United States v.
Marbella, 73 F3d 1508, 1514 (9th Cir 1996) (construing 18 USC §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).  Federal courts have indicated that the two
knowledge elements of 18 USC § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) are satisfied
only with evidence of actual subjective knowledge.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Campbell, 977 F2d 854, 857 (4th Cir 1992) (so
holding).
		There appears to be little question that the Bar has
proved two of four of the elements in this case, viz., that the
accused knowingly engaged in financial transactions and that
those transactions in fact involved the proceeds of unlawful
activity.  The accused does not deny that he repeatedly received
and deposited money into his trust accounts and disbursed that
money on behalf of and at the direction of Farber, and later 
Charlesworth, for the purchase of real property.  Neither does
the accused deny that, as it turns out, the money at issue in
fact came from Farber's and Charlesworth's illegal drug
activities.  
		However, the accused does dispute the Bar's contentions
with respect to the remaining two elements of the crime, viz.,
that he actually knew about the illegal source of the money and
that he actually knew that the trust account transactions were
designed to conceal that illegal source.  On our de novo review
of the record, we agree with the Bar that the evidence is clear
and convincing with respect to those elements.  However, our
analysis of those elements requires detailed discussion.       
		In the present proceeding, the record contains some
evidence -- most notably Farber's testimony -- that speaks to the
accused's actual subjective knowledge.  However, the trial panel
expressly found, and we accept, that that evidence is not
credible. (15)  Accordingly, we give no weight to Farber's
testimony. 
		Ignoring Farber's testimony, then, we note the
following facts with respect to the accused's relationship with
Farber that lead to objectively reasonable inferences that the
accused understood the purpose of those trust-account
transactions and the unlawful source of those funds.  
		In his testimony before the trial panel, the accused
testified that he was an unwitting dupe to a talented con man --
that Farber had persuaded him that the money had come from people
who wanted to invest in real estate, that he (the accused) never
really had thought about Farber's purpose in wanting him to
handle the money through his trust account, that Farber had paid
him small amounts to draw up the various real estate contracts
and did not pay him for cycling the money through his trust
accounts, that he (the accused) had agreed to keep the money that
Farber had collected from his "investors" in his trust account as
an "accommodation" to Farber, (16) and that he had never scrutinized
the cashier's checks that Farber had given him and never had
concerned himself with the names or dates or amounts on those
checks.
	The above-described evidence certainly raises our
collective eyebrow.  When all the checks and all the dates are
laid out together, the transactions are suspicious.  This court's
standard of review of clear and convincing evidence, however,
demands more than merely a suspicion that a particular fact is
true.  See In re Johnson, 300 Or 52, 55, 707 P2d 573 (1985)
(defining "clear and convincing evidence" as evidence
establishing "that the truth of facts asserted is highly
probable.").  We conclude that the preceding facts relating to
Farber would not, standing alone, amount to clear and convincing
evidence that the accused actually knew the unlawful source of
the funds and the purpose of his trust account transactions.  
	Against the backdrop of the suspiciousness of the
accused's transactions with Farber, however, are the accused's
transactions with McGuire.  By his own account, the accused had
no real prior relationship with McGuire, and he knew McGuire only
through Farber as the real party in interest in one of Farber's
real estate transactions.  Yet, several weeks after Farber
"cleaned out" the Farber Ltd. trust account and left the state,
the accused was depositing cash and cashier's checks received
from McGuire into the Farber Ltd. trust account and disbursing
money from that account for McGuire's real estate purchases.  The
accused's explanation that he agreed to let Farber use his trust
account as an accommodation does not explain why, after Farber
left town, the accused would undertake a similar "accommodation"
for McGuire, whom he barely knew at the time.  
	Most troubling of all was the manner by which the
accused structured his deposits for McGuire. (17)  The accused's
receipt from McGuire of $76,000 in a single day and his deposit
of those funds over the course two months in bundles that
amounted to less that $10,000 demonstrates that the accused had
become concerned about criminal exposure under 18 USC § 1957,
which makes it a crime to engage in any monetary transaction
involving criminally derived property having a value greater than
$10,000.  There was no reason for the accused to have structured
the deposits as he did, unless he knew that McGuire's money was
criminally derived.  The accused has no explanation for his
structuring of the McGuire deposits.  
	When combined with Farber's history of drug dealing,
the suspicious nature of Farber's transactions with the accused,
the fact that Farber had introduced McGuire to the accused during
one of the suspicious transactions, and the fact that Farber
abruptly left the state, the accused's use of the Farber Ltd.
trust account for McGuire's transactions and his structuring of
the McGuire deposits amount to clear and convincing evidence that
the accused knew that McGuire's money came from unlawful activity
and that it was being cycled through his trust account to
disguise that fact from the authorities.  The objectively
reasonable inferences from the Bar's evidence against the accused
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty of
the crime of money laundering.  The Bar has proved the four
elements needed to establish that crime under 18 USC §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 
	We conclude that, in engaging in the foregoing money-
laundering crime, the accused violated a number of disciplinary
rules.  DR 1-102(A)(2) provides that it is unprofessional conduct
for a lawyer to "[c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice
law."  The fact that the accused committed a criminal act is
established; the connection between that act and the accused's
fitness to practice law is obvious.  See In re White, 311 Or 573,
588-89, 815 P2d 1257 (1991) (explaining that only criminal acts
that have rational connection to lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law implicate DR 1-102(A)(2)).  We find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2).
	We also conclude that, by participating in the conduct
described above, the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), which
prohibits lawyers from engaging "in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  As the Bar notes, the whole
point of the accused's participation in the money-laundering
scheme was to disguise the fact that McGuire's funds were the
proceeds of unlawful activities.  Such conduct involves
dishonesty. 
	In its alternative findings, the trial-panel majority
found that, by violating 18 USC § 1956, the accused also had
violated DR 7-102(A)(7) and (8).  DR 7-102(A)(7) provides that,
"in the lawyer's representation of a client or in representing
the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not * * * counsel or
assist the lawyer's client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent."  DR 7-102(A)(8) provides that, "in the
lawyer's representation of a client or in representing the
lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not * * * knowingly engage
in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary
Rule."
	We agree that the accused's conduct violates both those
disciplinary rules.  The record clearly demonstrates that the
accused not only assisted his client McGuire in a scheme that he
knew to be illegal, but also knowingly engaged in illegal
conduct, i.e., money laundering, himself.       
	In connection with its first cause of complaint, the
Bar asks us to address two statutory provisions that the trial
panel declined to address in its alternative findings.  In
particular, the Bar asks us to find that, in violating 18 USC §
1956, the accused also violated ORS 9.460(1) (requiring lawyers
to "support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of
this state") and ORS 9.527(4) (providing that this court may
disbar, suspend, or reprimand lawyer whenever it appears to court
that lawyer "is guilty of willful deceit or misconduct in the
legal profession").
		In In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 31 P3d 414 (2001),
this court stated that, in lawyer disciplinary proceedings, the
Bar no longer should charge violations of ORS 9.527, at least in
circumstances in which the acts allegedly constituting the
statutory violation also would constitute the violation of a
disciplinary rule.  Accordingly, we will not consider the alleged
violation of ORS 9.527(4).
	We also decline to consider whether the accused's
conduct violated ORS 9.460(1).  Although the Kimmell court's
analysis of ORS 9.527 also may apply to ORS 9.460, we conclude
that, under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to decide that
issue here.  We already have found that the accused violated four
disciplinary rules -- DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(7), and DR 7-102(A)(8) -- by engaging in the conduct at
issue.  As will be seen, the sanction that we impose for those
violations would not be enhanced if such misconduct also were a
violation of ORS 9.460(1).  See In re Recker, 309 Or 633, 638,
789 P2d 663 (1990) (declining to resolve dispute about whether
conduct that had been found to violate DR  1-102(A)(3) also
violation DR 7-102(A)(5), because sanction for first violation
would not be enhanced by second finding).
FOURTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT (18) 

	Finally, the Bar argues that it has proved its fourth
cause of complaint, which the trial panel characterized as
alleging that the accused assisted in Charlesworth's conversion
of funds belonging to Farber's and McGuire's/Charlesworth's
supposed investors.  The trial panel rejected that allegation,
based on its finding that the money at issue belonged to Farber
and McGuire/Charlesworth, and not to third-party investors.    
	The Bar does not contest that finding, as far as it
goes.  However, the Bar argues that the trial panel's decision is
incomplete because it does not address another allegation in the
fourth cause, viz., that the accused converted to his own use
funds that had been entrusted to him by his clients Farber and
McGuire.  See DR 9-101(A) (requiring client funds to be deposited
and maintained in lawyer trust account.)  In that regard, the Bar
notes that there was no fee agreement between the accused and
Farber or McGuire, and that the accused was not authorized to
help himself to the funds that had been entrusted to him.  The
Bar further argues that the accused, in fact, did help himself to
those funds on a regular basis, by:  (1) taking some $3,850 in
cash back from deposits; (2) writing checks to himself or to cash
on the Farber Ltd. trust account to a total of $10,250; and (3)
failing to deposit all the cashier's checks that McGuire had
entrusted to him into the Farber Ltd. trust account.    
	The accused responds, first, that the Bar belatedly and
unfairly is changing its case.  Originally, the Bar had alleged
and argued that the accused converted money belonging to supposed
third-party investors by disbursing that money for Farber's and
McGuire's use without obtaining the investors' consent.  Now, the
Bar is charging that the accused converted money entrusted to him
by Farber and McGuire to his own use.  The accused suggests that
he has not received fair notice of the latter charge and,
therefore, cannot be found guilty on those grounds.  The accused
further urges that the evidence on which the Bar relies is not
persuasive because it attempts to take unfair advantage of his
loss of the records that could show where the money had gone. 
Finally, he argues that there is no evidence in the record to
counter his own general testimony that whatever money was taken
from the trust account was taken pursuant to Farber's or
McGuire's instructions. (19)
	We are not persuaded by the accused's "fair notice"
argument.  Although we would agree with him that the allegations
in the fourth cause are directed primarily at the notion that the
accused assisted or acquiesced in Charlesworth's conversion of
funds belonging to third-party investors, they also clearly
charge that the accused converted at least some of the funds that
were entrusted to him to his own use. (20)  Moreover, the Bar
clearly made an issue of the accused's "cash-back" transactions
and his personal withdrawals from the Farber Ltd. trust account
in its memorandum to the trial panel.
	Still, we are not persuaded by the requisite clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard that those transactions amounted to
conversion.  We first focus on the alleged conversions with
regard to funds belonging to Farber.  The accused took $500 cash
back from a deposit of funds that Farber had given him and wrote
himself a check for $1,000 a few days after that deposit.  The
accused's explanation that those transactions were with Farber's
permission is plausible, as those amounts appear to be reasonable
fees in relation to the legal services that the accused provided
Farber.  Other evidence in the record -- the accused's wife's
testimony and a letter from a computer technician -- corroborate
the accused's testimony that he had lost his own copies of his
trust-account records.  For the above-described reasons, as to
Farber, we conclude that the Bar has failed to sustain its burden
of proof with respect to the DR 9-101(A) charge.
	As to the accused's taking cash back and withdrawals of
funds belonging to McGuire, our reasoning for concluding that the
Bar has failed in its proof differs.  As discussed above, we
conclude that the accused was assisting McGuire in a criminal
enterprise.  In the absence of any clear evidence as to how the
accused was being compensated for that assistance, there is
another equally plausible explanation for the transactions at
issue -- that McGuire had authorized them to compensate the
accused for his money-laundering activities.  Ultimately, then,
the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the charges
in the fourth cause of complaint, i.e., mishandling or conversion
of client funds. 
SANCTION

		We have determined that the accused violated a number
of ethical rules in laundering proceeds from illegal activity. 
In determining the appropriate sanction, this court initially
weighs three considerations:  the duty violated; the accused
lawyer's mental state; and the actual or potential injury caused
by the accused lawyer's misconduct.  In re Devers, 328 Or 230,
241, 974 P2d 191 (1999); ABA Standard 3.0.  We then examine any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances to determine if the
sanction should be adjusted.  Devers, 328 Or at 241; ABA Standard
3.0.  Finally, we compare prior Oregon cases and the sanctions
imposed in them.  Devers, 328 Or at 241.		The accused violated his duty to the public to maintain
the standards of personal integrity upon which the community
relies.  ABA Standard 5.0.  By participating in the money-
laundering scheme as described in this opinion, he engaged in
criminal conduct of a type that reflects adversely on his
honesty, trustworthiness, and general fitness to practice law.
		The accused's money-laundering activities were both
knowing and intentional.  They were performed with conscious
awareness of the attendant circumstances that made the conduct
illegal and also with the conscious intent of concealing from
federal authorities the true nature of the transactions.  See ABA
Standards at 7 (so defining "knowledge" and "intent"). 
		By violating the federal money-laundering statutes, the
accused caused actual injury to the public by helping drug
dealers circumvent laws designed to assist in the detection of
crime. 
		Having considered those factors, we again turn to the
ABA Standards.  The provision that pertains to violations of
duties owed to the public appears most germane.   ABA Standard
5.11.  That standard provides:
	"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
	     "(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct
a necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution
or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
	     "(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice of law."
(Emphasis added.)
		Under that standard, the appropriate sanction in this
instance is disbarment, unless some mitigating circumstance or
prior case law suggests a less drastic sanction.  The trial panel
expressly found that there are no mitigating circumstances, and
the accused does not advance any grounds for mitigation.  Our
case law also supports disbarment in this proceeding:  In the
past, Oregon lawyers who have engaged in serious criminal
misconduct, even without conviction, generally have been
disbarred.  See In re Leonhardt, 324 Or 498, 511, 930 P2d 844
(1997) (noting that history and citing illustrative cases).  We
conclude that the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct is the same.
		The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the
date of the filing of this decision.
	DURHAM, J., dissenting.
	I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
disbar the accused due to the Bar's allegation that the accused
violated the federal money laundering statute, 18 USC § 1956
(1988), with respect to certain funds that he received from a
client, Charlesworth, who used an alias, "David McGuire," among
other aliases.
	I agree with the majority's decision to dismiss all
money-laundering charges against the accused under the first
cause of complaint that arise from his financial transactions
with his client Farber.  The evidence fails to prove those
claims. (21)  I also agree with the majority's decision to dismiss
in their entirety the Bar's charges against the accused under the
fourth cause of complaint.  The trial panel dismissed the Bar's
second and third causes of complaint.  The Bar does not seek
review in this court of those determinations of the trial panel. 
As a result of the foregoing, the only remaining disputed charge
against the accused is the Bar's claim, under the first cause of
complaint, that the accused engaged in money laundering, in
violation of the federal statute, in connection with the manner
in which he dealt with money that he received from Charlesworth.
	In deciding the Bar's claim regarding the accused's
handling of Charlesworth's money, the majority overrules the
accused's objection that the Bar's evidence regarding that claim
largely consists of secret grand jury records that Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6(e) renders inadmissible.  I do not
address the merits of that objection.  Assuming arguendo that the
challenged grand jury records are admissible, the record
evidence, viewed as a whole, is insufficient to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused violated the federal
money-laundering statute in receiving or depositing
Charlesworth's money.
	I will begin by reviewing briefly the pertinent federal
statute, the standard that applies to the knowledge element of
the federal statute, and the Bar's factual allegations regarding
Charlesworth.  In 1986, Congress passed the Money Laundering
Control Act, codified principally at 18 USC sections 1956, 1957. 
The Bar alleged that the accused engaged in criminal acts in
violation of the following pertinent parts of 18 USC § 1956
(1988):
		"(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property
involved in a financial transactions represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which
in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity -- 
		"* * * * *
		"(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in
whole or in part -- 
		"(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
		"* * * * *
		"shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than
$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in
the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or both.
		"* * * * *
		"(c) As used in this section -- 
		"(1) the term 'knowing that the property involved
in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity' means that the person
knew the property involved in the transaction
represented proceeds from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a
felony under State or Federal law, regardless of
whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph
(7)."
	 The element of the actor's knowledge is a key
component of the federal statute and of the Bar's case against
the accused.  According to the Bar: 
	"Whether the Accused committed the crime of money-laundering thus turns on the third and fourth elements
of 18 USC § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i):  whether he knew that he
was assisting Farber and 'McGuire' with transactions
designed to conceal or disguise the 'nature, location,
source, ownership or control' of proceeds derived from
illegal activities.  The Bar claims that he did; the
Accused denies it."
(Emphasis in original.)
	The money laundering statute is federal law.  Thus,
this court is bound to follow federal law in construing the
statute.  All pertinent federal cases that the parties cite
confirm that 18 USC § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) requires proof that the
actor had actual, subjective knowledge that (1) the property in
question represents the proceeds of illegal activity and (2) the
transaction is designed to disguise the nature of those proceeds.
See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 977 F2d 854, 857 (4th Cir
1992) (illustrating principle).  The statutory knowledge
requirement prohibits conviction on the basis of an actor's
negligent failure to learn the pertinent facts, or on what the
actor objectively should have known.  Id. 
	The federal courts have softened the actual knowledge
requirement somewhat by permitting proof of actual knowledge
under the doctrine of willful blindness.  Under that doctrine,
the government can impose criminal liability on a person who,
while recognizing the likelihood that the facts pertinent to
money laundering are present, nonetheless consciously refuses to
take basic investigatory steps to discover what otherwise would
be obvious.  United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F2d
579, 585 (1st Cir 1989).  The willful blindness doctrine requires
the government to establish that the actor had a conscious
purpose to avoid enlightenment.  United States v. Barnhart, 979
F2d 647, 651 (8th Cir 1992).  Additionally, willful blindness
requires proof that the actor took deliberate actions to prevent
the obtaining of actual knowledge of the facts.  Id.  In
explaining that aspect of the willful blindness doctrine, the
court in Barnhart stated:
	"However, the instruction [on willful blindness] should
not be given out in all cases because, despite the
instruction's cautionary disclaimer, there is a
'"possibility that the jury will be led to employ a
negligence standard and convict a defendant on the
impermissible ground that he should have known [an
illegal act] was taking place."' United States v.
White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir.
1984) (per curiam)).  Consequently, if the evidence in
the case demonstrates only that the defendant either
possessed or lacked actual knowledge of the facts in
question -- and did not also demonstrate some
deliberate efforts on his part to avoid obtaining
actual knowledge -- a willful blindness instruction
should not be given. [Citations omitted.] More
succinctly, the instruction should not be given unless
there is evidence to 
		"'support the inference that the defendant was
aware of a high probability of the existence of
the fact in question and purposely contrived to
avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a
defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.' 
[United States v. Rivera, 944 F2d 1563, 1571 (11th
Cir 1991).]  
		"* * * * *
		"In order for a defendant's ignorance to be
deliberate or willful, the defendant must have been
presented with facts that put him on notice that
criminal activity is probably afoot, and then the
defendant must have failed to investigate those facts,
thereby deliberately declining to verify or discover
the criminal activity."
979 F2d at 651-52.
	In Campbell, the Fourth Circuit summarized the
government's burden in attempting to prove actual, subjective
knowledge through the willful blindness doctrine by reciting the
following jury instruction:
		"The element of knowledge may be satisfied by
inferences drawn from proof that a defendant
deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise
have been obvious to her.  A finding beyond a
reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid
enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge. 
Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact
may be inferred upon willful blindness to the existence
of a fact.
		"It is entirely up to you as to whether you find
any deliberate closing of the eyes and inferences to be
drawn from any evidence.  A showing of negligence is
not sufficient to support a finding of willfulness or
knowledge.
		"I caution you that the willful blindness charge
does not authorize you to find that the defendant acted
knowingly because she should have known what was
occurring when the property at 763 Sundown Road was
being sold, or that in the exercise of hindsight she
should have known what was occurring or because she was
negligent in failing to recognize what was occurring or
even because she was reckless or foolish in failing to
recognize what was occurring.  Instead, the Government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
purposely and deliberately contrived to avoid learning
all of the facts."
Id. at 857. (22)
	The Bar's second amended complaint set out separate
factual allegations regarding the accused's dealings with his
clients, Farber and Charlesworth.  The Bar alleged the following
facts to establish that the accused engaged in money laundering
in connection with his dealings with Charlesworth's money:
"5.
		"Beginning in 1989, the Accused represented an
individual, who was using the name 'David McGuire', in
the purchase of several parcels of real property.  The
Accused knew that 'David McGuire' was an alias for a
drug dealer who was associated with Farber and was also
engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.  The true name of
'David McGuire' was Brian Charlesworth (hereinafter
referred to as 'Charlesworth').
"6.
		"On or about May 1, 1989, the Accused established
a separate client trust account for Farber (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Farber account').
"7.
		"Beginning in about July, 1989, Charlesworth,
using the name David McGuire, delivered funds to the
Accused in the form of cash and cashiers' checks
payable to David McGuire, Brian Charlesworth or third
persons.  The Accused knew or had reason to know that
these funds were the proceeds from the sale of illegal
drugs, that the deposit of these funds into the Farber
trust account, and that the real property purchases
were intended to disguise the source of the funds.
"8.
		"At the instruction of both Farber and
Charlesworth, the Accused prepared and later recorded
land sale contracts that named as vendees persons other
than Farber or Charlesworth.  The representations in
the land sale contracts that the vendees were persons
other than Farber or Charlesworth were false and the
Accused knew they were false when he made them."
	In determining whether the accused violated 18 USC §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) in dealing with Charlesworth's money, this court
considers the evidence de novo.  ORS 9.536(3).  The Bar has the
burden to establish the alleged misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  For purposes of a disciplinary
proceeding, evidence is clear and convincing when the truth of
the facts asserted by the Bar is highly probable.  See In re
Blaylock, 328 Or 409, 411, 978 P2d 381 (1999) (stating that
definition). 
	With the foregoing federal statutory scheme and factual
allegations in mind, I turn to the evidence presented in this
case.  The Bar contends that, in 1987, 1988, and 1989, the
accused willingly agreed, first with Farber and later with
Charlesworth, to receive from them and deposit into his trust
account cash and checks that were the proceeds of illegal drug
transactions and to issue trust account checks to pay for real
estate purchases to disguise the true nature of the drug money. 
By contrast, the accused contends that Farber and Charlesworth
were career criminals and accomplished liars who deceived the
accused (and several other persons) about the sources of their
funds, the nature of their businesses, and their purpose in
purchasing various parcels of real property.
	The record contains comparatively little evidence
concerning the accused's relationship with Charlesworth, i.e.,
"David McGuire."  According to the record, the accused first
encountered Charlesworth in about 1988.  Farber introduced
Charlesworth to the accused as "David McGuire" and said that
"McGuire" was one of Farber's wealthy real estate investors. 
Farber also explained that "McGuire" valued his privacy and
wished to leave the details of his property transactions to
others.  Farber later purchased a parcel of real estate in the
name of "McGuire" with the accused's legal assistance, but the
accused did not perform any legal services for "McGuire",
directly, until after May 1989.
	Soon after Farber's May 9, 1989, trust account
withdrawal, "McGuire" contacted the accused.  He indicated that
he was seeking a lawyer to provide legal services of the kind
that the accused had provided to Farber, and asked the accused to
help him.  The accused agreed.  There is no evidence that
"McGuire" discussed any business of an illegal nature with the
accused at that or any other time.  Nothing in the facts known to
the accused indicated that the accused had any good reason not to
represent "McGuire."
	After contacting the accused, "McGuire" left several
trust account deposits of cash or checks with the accused, just
as Farber had done, and the accused disbursed funds from the
trust account, at "McGuire's" request, to pay for real estate
purchases, just as he had done for Farber.
	However, the majority concludes that the accused's
handling of one sum of $76,000, received from "McGuire" on July
18, 1989, indicates that the accused "knew that McGuire's money
was criminally derived."  In re Albrecht, ___ Or ___, ___, ___
P3d ___ (2002) (slip op at 29.)  According to the majority, the
accused "structured" the deposits of that money, as demonstrated 
by what the majority describes as several subsequent deposits to
the trust account over the next two months in sums of less than
$10,000.  On the basis of that conclusion, the majority decides
that the accused engaged in money laundering and orders his
disbarment.
	In my view, clear and convincing evidence does not
support the majority's conclusion.  The record contains a copy of
a sheet of the accused's letterhead, introduced into evidence by
the accused, on which he had written by hand:
		"July 18, 1989
		"Received $76,000 today from David McGuire to hold
in trust for him for investments.
		"Nick Albrecht".
	The record, however, contains virtually no other
evidence about that money.  The Bar did not call Charlesworth
("McGuire") as a witness, perhaps because of his criminal
involvement.   
	The record also contains copies of several cashier's
checks, dated after July 18, 1989, that the accused or his wife
deposited in the accused's trust account.  However, the checks
follow no telltale pattern of the sort that the majority
perceives.  Several checks list the purchaser as "David McGuire,"
"Nick Albrecht," other individuals, or "cash."  Several checks
list no purchaser.  Several of the trust account documents either
are illegible or display a deposit amount with no other
discernible information.  One check deposited "$37,500," thus
undermining at least part of the factual inference on which the
majority seeks to rely.  None of the amounts deposited
corresponds with the $76,000 that the accused received on July
18, 1989.
	The doubts engendered by those significant gaps in the
financial records are magnified by the failure of the Bar to ask
any questions of the accused regarding the deposits to his trust
account after July 18, 1989.  The Bar did not ask the accused any
questions about the $76,000, whether it consisted of a single
check or multiple checks or cash, what it was for, or whether or
how the accused deposited it in trust.  In my view, the answers
to those unasked questions are critical to a clear understanding
of the state of the accused's actual knowledge regarding the
sources of Charlesworth's money.
	Other factors also contribute to the difficulty of
reconstructing "McGuire's" financial transaction with the minimal
records before the court.  The Bar hearing occurred approximately
nine years after the accused's dealings with "McGuire."  The
passage of time affected the memory of several witnesses.
	The accused also suffered a significant loss of his
office records as a result of a computer malfunction in 1995. 
According to uncontradicted evidence, a power surge destroyed the
hard drive in the accused's computer and rendered several
thousand pages of typed text unrecoverable.  The computer
formerly contained entries regarding the accused's trust account
deposits.  All attempts to recover the lost data were
unsuccessful.
	The record evidence falls well short of demonstrating,
as required by the federal law reviewed above, that the accused
had actual subjective knowledge that the $76,000 was the product
of criminal activity.  Contrary to the Bar's allegation, the
accused did not learn, until years later, that "David McGuire"
was an alias and that his client's true name was Charlesworth. 
The record contains no credible evidence that the accused ever
learned, until years later, that Charlesworth was purchasing real
property with the proceeds of drug sales. 
	Moreover, the record contains no evidence that the
accused consciously took steps to avoid acquiring actual
subjective knowledge about Charlesworth's illegal activities. 
From all that appears, the accused's conduct with respect to
Charlesworth was indistinguishable in kind from his conduct with
respect to Farber.  None of that conduct indicates that the
accused intentionally planned his activities to avoid learning
the truth about his clients.
	As noted above, the record justifies at least a degree
of suspicion about the accused's behavior.  The accused's trust
account practices at the pertinent time were far less than ideal,
although his computer back-up system, which he lost in 1995 by
accident, might have supplied much needed organization to his
trust account records.  But all of the accused's clients
experienced the inadequacies of his trust account record keeping,
not only Farber and Charlesworth.  There is no basis for
concluding that the accused employed lax or incomplete record
keeping solely to assist Farber and Charlesworth.
	Ultimately, the evidence about what the accused
subjectively knew about Charlesworth's activities is
inconclusive.  On this record, I cannot conclude that the
evidence proves that it is "highly likely" that the accused knew
that the $76,000 that he received from Charlesworth on July 18,
1989, was the product of criminal activity.  The record contains
no evidence about the accused's knowledge regarding the source of
that money.
	I agree with the trial panel chairperson, who opined in
his dissent below that, although the accused may be guilty of the
Bar's money laundering charge, the record fails to prove that
charge by clear and convincing evidence.  Because the Bar failed
to prove the accused's involvement in laundering Charlesworth's
money by clear and convincing evidence, I would dismiss that
aspect of the Bar's first cause of complaint.
	I respectfully dissent.



1. 	In 1995, former DR 9-101(B)(4) was renumbered as DR 9-101(C)(3).  There was no change to the text of the rule.

2. 	The Bar asserts that it seeks review under ORS
9.536(1).  The accused does not dispute that assertion. 
Nevertheless, we address the issue of the statutory basis for our
review, because the issue is jurisdictional.  ORS 9.536(1)
provides, in part: 
	"* * * If the decision of the disciplinary board
finds the accused attorney has not committed the
alleged wrongdoing or determines that the accused
attorney should be disciplined by way of reprimand or
suspension from the practice of law up to a period of
six months, the Oregon State Bar or the accused, as the
case may be, may seek review by the Supreme Court. 
Such review shall be a matter of right upon the request
of either party.  Otherwise, the decision of the
disciplinary board shall be final. * * *"  
(Emphasis added.)  In this case, however, the trial panel did not
find that the accused had not committed the alleged wrongdoing or
that the accused should be disciplined.  Instead, it dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the Bar had violated Rule 6(e). 
		ORS 9.529 provides this court with jurisdiction over
the present proceeding:
"Bar proceedings relating to discipline, admission
and reinstatement are neither civil nor criminal in
nature.  They are sui generis and within the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to control.  The grounds for
* * * the discipline of attorneys set forth in ORS
9.005 to 9.755 are not intended to limit or alter the
inherent power of the Supreme Court * * * to discipline
a member of the bar."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Balderree v. OSB, 301 Or 155, 159-60,
719 P2d 1300 (1986) (asserting jurisdiction over case in which
federal district court temporarily had stayed lawyer's suspension
for failure to pay Professional Liability Fund assessment on
ground that case involved suspension of lawyer, which "is a
matter for final decision of this court").  Because this
proceeding involves discipline of a member of the Bar, this court
has the inherent power to review the decision of the trial panel.

3. 	The accused did not represent Farber at his criminal
trial.

4. 	The Bar argues that that denomination is significant in
light of several federal money-laundering statutes, which provide
the bases for several of the Bar's allegations.  First, federal
law requires financial institutions to report cash transactions
of more than $10,000 to the federal government.  31 USC § 5313;
31 CFR § 103.22(b)(1).  Second, 18 USC § 1956(a)(1)(B) provides,
in part:
		"Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity -- 
			"* * * * *
			"(B) knowing that the transaction is
designed in whole or in part - 
				"(i) to conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity; or
				"(ii) to avoid a transaction
reporting requirement under state
of Federal law,
	"shall be sentenced to a fine * * * or imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or both."
Additionally, 18 USC § 1957 makes it a crime to:
"knowingly engag[e] * * * in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property of a value greater than
$10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful
activity[.]"

5. 	A $37,500 bank-issued cashier's check, labeled
"redeposit," was deposited into the trust account on October 20,
1989.  It is unclear whether and to what degree 18 USC § 1957
applies to that redeposit.  Regardless, a single deposit in
excess of $10,000 does not lessen the significance of the
accused's  pattern of making deposits less than $10,000.

6. 	The following chart shows the deposit history of the
$76,000 sum that the accused received from McGuire on July 18,
1989.
7. 	Farber had obtained immunity from prosecution under an
agreement with the federal government.  Farber later obtained
immunity from state prosecution under an agreement with the state
government.  Farber testified before the trial panel in this
proceeding under the belief that his immunity agreement with the
state required him to do so.

8. 	Rule 6(e) provides, in part:
"(2) General Rule of Secrecy.  A grand juror, an
interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording
device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom
disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this
subdivision [relating to government personnel assisting
a government attorney] shall not disclose matters
occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise
provided for in these rules.  No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed on any person except in accordance with
this rule.  A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be
punished as a contempt of court.
"(3) Exceptions.
	"* * * * *
"(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by
this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made-
		"* * * * * 
"(iv) when permitted by a
court at the request of an attorney
for the government, upon a showing
that such matters may disclose a
violation of state criminal law, to
an appropriate official of a state
or subdivision of a state for the
purpose of enforcing such law.  
"If the court orders disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury, the
disclosure shall be made in such manner, at
such time, and under such conditions as the
court may direct."
(Emphasis added.)

9. 	The order provided:
		"Based upon the motion of the United States of
America for disclosure of documents, records and data
presented to the federal grand jury in the District of
Oregon, this Court finds the government has made a
showing that disclosure of grand jury material may
disclose a violation of state criminal law; that the
United States has shown a particularized need; that
failure to order the disclosure will work a possible
injustice; the need for disclosure is greater than the
need for continued secrecy; the requested disclosure
covers only materials needed to bring and proceed with
the anticipated state criminal charges; and that state
criminal charges will result in an expeditious and fair
resolution of this matter.
		"It is therefore ordered that the following grand
jury materials in the above-captioned grand jury
investigation be disclosed to Deputy District Attorney
Norman Frink, Assistant Attorney General Kathleen Payne
Pruitt, and to their law clerks and clerical staff, and
law enforcement agents assisting them:
		"All documents, records, data, and testimony,
relating to drug offenses, and money laundering
offenses involved in those violations;
		"All documents, records and data, including
testimony, related to property, income and assets
involved in money laundering offenses or in violation
of drug offenses or any property traceable to such
property;
		"All documents, records and data, including
testimony, related to any and all targets', suspects'
and defendants' conduct and property rights as to any
assets, liabilities, equity or other item of value."

10. 	Although the DDA's complaint is not in the record
before us, the accused's responses to the complaint are.  

11. 	The lawyer also noted that, "until this moment[, I] did
not realize that was the source of [this] information."  

12. 	The accused's lawyer did not object to Bar counsel's
report of her telephone call with the DDA.

13. 	The trial panel admitted a copy of a Rule 6(e) order as
an exhibit of the accused, but that is not the order pertinent to
this proceeding.  That order, dated July 6, 1995, merely
permitted the accused's trust-account records to be disclosed to
several Assistant United States Attorneys and to persons
assisting them in connection with a judicial forfeiture
proceeding.

14. 	We note that it is somewhat unclear whether the trial
panel excluded the evidence as a remedy for the apparent Rule
6(e) violation or whether it dismissed the complaint as a
sanction for the Rule 6(e) violation.  That difference, however,
does not affect our analysis.

15. 	The Bar has asked us to depart from our ordinary
practice of deferring to the trial panel's assessment of a
witness's credibility with respect to the testimony of Farber in
the light of three facts:  (1) that Farber had nothing to gain by
falsely implicating the accused at the time that Farber
testified; (2) that Farber's testimony was consistent with
statements that he made to law enforcement authorities shortly
after his arrest; and (3) that Farber's testimony was consistent
with other evidence showing that the accused understood the
nature of the money that he was accepting and the purpose of his
involvement.  The trial panel, however, also was aware of those
facts, but chose, nonetheless, to disregard Farber's testimony. 
The trial panel was in a superior position to judge Farber's
credibility; we accept the trial panel's finding.    

16. 	Specifically, the accused explained to the trial panel
that Farber did not want the down-payment funds to have his name
on them, fearing that his status as a convicted murderer would
scare off potential buyers.

17. 	See ___ Or at ____ n 5 (slip op at 10, n 5) (setting
out deposit history of $76,000 transaction).

18. 	The Bar included a second cause in its formal
complaint, alleging that the money that the accused deposited 
into his trust accounts was drawn from the funds of third-party
investors and that the accused had paid all that money over to
Farber without the knowledge or consent of those third parties. 
The trial panel rejected the allegations in that second cause on
the ground that the money, in fact, belonged to Farber and
McGuire, and not to third-party investors.  The Bar also included
a third cause alleging that the accused had deposited a retainer
given to him by another client into the Farber Ltd. trust account
and that he had converted some or all that retainer to his own
use.  The trial panel rejected that cause on the grounds that: 
(1) the client who had given the accused the money never had
complained; and (2) the records that would show the accused's
accounting for the money had been discarded or destroyed.  The
Bar does not challenge the trial panel's findings with regard to
the second and third causes, and we do not address those causes
in this decision.       

19. 	The accused testified that he did not remember the
particulars of any cash-back or personal-withdrawal transaction,
but that any money that he would have taken out of the trust
account would have been with Farber's or McGuire's authorization. 

20. 	In that regard, we note that the fourth cause alleges,
among other things:
	     "After January, 1988, the Accused received cash or
cashier's checks that were payable to or drawn on the
funds of Craig Rurey, Jim Anderson, Jim Robinson and
Jim Pierson.  The Accused deposited these funds into
his lawyer trust account.  After May 9, 1989, the
Accused received cash or cashiers' checks that were
payable to or drawn on the funds of Brian Charlesworth,
David McGuire and Brian Lee.  The Accused did not
deposit these funds into his trust account, but
deposited and maintained them in the Farber trust
account.
	     "Between January, 1988, and November, 1990, the
Accused converted to his own use at least $1,250 of the
funds described in paragraph 20. * * *"
(Emphasis added.)

21. 	It is worth noting that the majority's decision to
dismiss the Bar's money-laundering charges involving the
accused's dealings with Farber signifies that the majority
concludes that a significant part of the evidence on which the
trial panel relied in determining that the accused was guilty
does not provide clear and convincing evidence that the accused
violated the money laundering statute. 

22. 	The majority of the trial panel found as a fact that
the facts surrounding the Farber and "McGuire" trust account
deposits "would have caused the accused and any reasonable person
to question the source of funds."  I agree that the accused
either should have known what was occurring or was negligent or
reckless in failing to recognize what was occurring.  But, as the
Barnhart and Campbell decisions demonstrate, those observations
about the accused's behavior are insufficient to satisfy the
actual knowledge or willful blindness requirements of the federal
statute.