Title: Revel v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 517, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WAYNE O. REVEL, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 517, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0610006478 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 4, 2010 
Decided: November 24, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 24th day of November 2010, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Wayne O. Revel, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s July 28, 2010 order adopting the Commissioner’s 
June 14, 2010 report, which recommended that Revel’s first motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be 
denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
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the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, on January 14, 2008, Revel was found 
guilty by a Superior Court jury of two counts of Robbery in the Second 
Degree and one count of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree in 
connection with two bank robberies, one in Kent County and the other in 
New Castle County, and one attempted bank robbery in New Castle County.  
Revel was sentenced as a habitual offender to a total of 15 years of Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after 12 years for probation.  This Court 
affirmed Revel’s convictions on direct appeal.3 
 
(3) 
In his first motion for postconviction relief filed in the Superior 
Court, Revel asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, among 
other things.  Because this was Revel’s first postconviction motion, his 
attorney’s affidavit was requested.4  In this appeal from the Superior Court’s 
denial of Revel’s first motion for postconviction relief, Revel renews his 
claims of ineffective assistance.  Specifically, he contends that his counsel 
failed to conduct a proper investigation, failed to subpoena alibi witnesses 
and failed to conduct a proper cross-examination of a key witness for the 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23 (Del. 2008). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(2). 
 
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State.  In essence, Revel’s argument is that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different if the jury had known he was test driving a car at the 
time of the robberies, that he was employed at the time he was arrested, 
explaining why he had a large amount of cash in his pocket, that his weight 
did not match the description of the robber given to police, and that a 
witness’s identification of him as the robber was questionable.5  Revel also 
claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not holding an 
evidentiary hearing regarding additional evidence “outside the record” that 
his attorney failed to bring to the jury’s attention.     
 
(4) 
The record reflects that, in each of the robbery incidents, 
surveillance footage revealed the robber to be a white male wearing 
oversized clothing, tan boots, and a white baseball cap with a raised white 
symbol on the front.  After the surveillance footage was aired on television, 
Revel’s probation officer, Kerry Bittenbender, contacted police and told 
them he thought the robber was Revel.  At the time of Revel’s arrest, a white 
hat and tan boots like those in the surveillance videos were found in the car 
he was driving and $1,136 was found in his pants pocket, even though the 
evidence was that he was unemployed at the time.  At trial, the surveillance 
                                                 
5 To the extent that Revel has not argued other grounds to support his appeal that were 
previously raised, those grounds are deemed to be waived and will not be addressed by 
this Court.  Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
 
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videos were played for the jury and they were able to compare the physical 
appearance of the robber with that of Revel.   
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.6  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”7  The 
defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.8  As noted by this Court on 
Revel’s direct appeal, this was not a “close case.”9  The evidence against 
Revel was strong.  Even assuming that Revel’s counsel’s actions constituted 
error, there is no evidence that they resulted in any prejudice to Revel.  We, 
therefore, conclude that Revel’s claims of ineffective assistance are without 
merit.       
 
(6) 
It is within the discretion of the Superior Court to determine 
whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary on a motion for postconviction 
                                                 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
7 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
9 Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 30 (Del. 2008). 
 
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relief.10  In this case, the Superior Court properly determined that an 
evidentiary hearing should not be scheduled for the purpose of adducing 
evidence “outside the record.”  We, therefore, conclude that Revel’s claim of 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court also is without merit.         
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
                                                 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h)(1) and (3).