Title: State v. Robert W. Morton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-44-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The Supreme Court affirmed Morton's murder conviction and death sentence in 1998. This appeal addresses Morton's request for proportionality review of his death sentence. Morton and his co-defendant, Alonzo Bryant, left a go-go bar to commit robberies on the night of February 23, 1993. In the parking lot, they encountered Toby Chrostowski and tried to block his path. Chrostowski walked past them, but was stabbed once in the chest. He survived. Approximately two hours later, Morton and Bryant drove into the Delran Amoco station and attacked Michael Eck, the gas-station attendant. Eck was stabbed twenty-four times in the chest, shoulder, forearm, and groin. A stab wound to Eck's heart was fatal, and the two wounds to Eck's liver could also have been fatal. Eck was able to call 9-1-1 to summon help, but died later that night at the hospital from massive bleeding. Later that evening, Morton went to the hospital to treat a knife wound to his left index finger sustained while stabbing Eck. The nurse who had treated Chrostowski's stab wound earlier that evening suspected that Morton's injury, which looked like a knife wound, was related to the Chrostowski stabbing. She called the police. The ensuing investigation by police led to the arrest of Morton and Bryant as the perpetrators of both stabbings. In the initial custodial interrogation of Morton, he denied any involvement in the gas-station robbery murder. In a later statement, he confessed to the crimes. Morton also admitted that he intended to kill Eck, not to facilitate the robbery, but to eliminate him as a witness. A Burlington County jury convicted Morton of murder, felony murder, first-degree robbery, and assault charges. Morton absented himself from the ensuing penalty phase. Defense counsel presented a 200-page mitigation book, which included documentation of Morton's troubled childhood, his mother's deficient parenting, and his borderline intellectual functioning. Morton refused, however, to meet with a psychiatrist or psychologist. The jury unanimously found the existence of two aggravating factors: c(4)(f) (escape detection) and c(4)(g) (felony murder). Ten of the twelve jurors also concluded that the State had proven the c(4)(c) (torture or depravity) aggravating factor. Some jurors found various different mitigating factors. They unanimously concluded, however, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and the death sentence was imposed. HELD: Morton's death sentence is not disproportionate. 1. There are two facets of individual proportionality review: (1) frequency analysis, which measures the relative frequency of death sentences in factually similar cases, and (2) precedent-seeking review, which is a traditional judicial way of comparing similar cases to determine whether a death sentence is aberrational. The defendant bears the burden of proving that his death sentence is disproportionate. (Pp. 6-9) 2. Frequency analysis involves the salient-factors test, which compares a defendant's case to those sharing the same, predominate identifying factor. The AOC placed Morton in the F-2 subcategory, which encompasses murders committed during the course of a robbery of a business. The Court agrees with that designation. Application of the salient-factors test does not indicate that Morton's death sentence is disproportionate. (Pp. 9-13) 3. Precedent-seeking review involves the comparison of a defendant's sentence with other cases based on the level of culpability. The Court uses a three-part model to determine criminal culpability, considering (1) the defendant's moral blameworthiness; (2) the degree of victimization; and (3) the defendant's character. Morton's moral blameworthiness is very high. He admitted that he killed Eck to prevent his identification; his premeditation likely lasted several hours; he repeatedly stabbed Eck despite Eck's defenselessness; and he presented no evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or disturbance. The degree of victimization in this case was exceptional, as well, despite the absence of living victims. Eck must have suffered tremendous pain from the twenty-four stab wounds, including three in the groin area. Morton and Bryant continued to brutally stab Eck even though he offered no resistance and begged for his life. Morton's character has both aggravating and mitigating aspects. He had never been arrested as an adult prior to these offenses, but he showed little remorse for the killing and exhibited violent tendencies. Based on the three-part model of criminal culpability, Morton exhibits a high level of culpability. (Pp. 23-24) 4. Comparing Morton's case to other defendants in the F-2 sub-category, the Court is satisfied that his death sentence is not disproportionate. And, considering some of the cases not in his sub-category that Morton requests be included for comparison purposes, there is no disproportionality. Even if the Court's precedent-seeking review does not reveal differences in deathworthiness to explain why Morton, but not the defendants in two other cases, Roger Hoyte and Charles Williams, received the death sentence, that disparity alone does not demonstrate disproportionality.(Pp. 24-42) 5. The fact that Morton's co-defendant, Alonzo Bryant, received a life sentence is not probative evidence of disproportionality. The jury in Bryant's case could not agree whether Bryant had committed the murder by his own conduct, making Bryant ineligible for the death penalty. (Pp. 42-43) 6. The Court rejects Morton's contentions of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty in Burlington County. The number of death-eligible defendants is far too small to permit meaningful inferences from such data. For the reasons expressed in In re: Proportionality Review II, also decided today, the Court also rejects Morton's claims of statewide, systemic racial discrimination. (Pp. 43-47) Morton's death sentence is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE LONG, dissenting, is of the view that Morton's death sentence is disproportionate to the life sentence of his co-defendant, Alonzo Bryant, and to the life sentences of other defendants with similar characteristics who committed factually similar murders. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROBERT W. MORTON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 14, 2000-- Decided August 2, 2000 On proportionality review of a death sentence imposed in the Superior Court, Law Division, Burlington County. Bernadette N. DeCastro, Assistant Deputy Public Defender and Claudia Van Wyk, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Deputy Attorney General argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. [Proportionality Review I, supra, 161 N.J. at 84 (quoting David S. Baime, Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court: Proportionality Review Project at 10 (Apr. 28, 1999) (Baime Report I) (citation omitted))]. We will therefore consider all death-eligible cases, whether or not they were capitally prosecuted, because the State's decision not to prosecute the defendant capitally does not necessarily reflect on the defendant's lack of deathworthiness. Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 291-92. F-2 Incl. D 28" (5/18) 15" (5/33) 55" (18/33) F-2 Excl. D 24" (4/17) 13" (4/32) 53" (17/32) All Ds 30" (52/176) 11" (52/455) 39" (176/455) All Ds Excl. D 29" (51/175) 11" (51/454) 39" (175/454) The salient-factors test reveals that the death-sentencing rates in defendant's subcategory do not appreciably differ from the overall death-sentencing rates. In the F-2 death-eligible universe, the death-sentencing rate for business-robbery-murders is fifteen percent, which is greater than the eleven-percent death-sentencing rate of the 455 cases in the full universe, inclusive of defendant. When defendant's case is excluded from the F-2 death eligible universe, the thirteen-percent death sentencing rate slightly exceeds the rate at which all death eligible cases result in a death sentence. Among the cases that proceeded to a penalty trial, juries sentenced people in defendant's subcategory to death at a twenty-eight percent rate, which is a bit lower than the overall thirty percent death sentencing rate in the penalty-trial universe. The disparity increases when excluding defendant's case: twenty-four percent for business-robbery-murders versus twenty-nine percent for all cases excluding defendants that advanced to a penalty phase. On the other hand, business-robbery-murders are more likely to proceed to a penalty phase than other death-eligible murders. The fifty-five percent penalty-trial-advancement rate exceeds the overall thirty-nine percent rate. Even when defendant's case is excluded, fifty-three percent of business-robbery-murders proceed to a penalty phase. Those results are comparable to those obtained in other proportionality review cases, in which this Court found no disproportionality. See Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 302 (reporting death-sentencing rate at penalty trial for E-1 defendants, excluding Harvey, as 33%, and death-sentencing rate for all E defendants, excluding Harvey, as 24"); State v. Cooper, 159 N.J. 55, 78 (1999) (Cooper II), cert. denied, S Ct. (2000) (noting death-sentencing rate at penalty trial for C-1 defendants, excluding Cooper, as 39%, and death-sentencing rate for all defendants, excluding Cooper, as 30"); DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 173-74 (reporting death-sentencing rate for I 1 defendants, excluding DiFrisco, as 25%, and death-sentencing rate for all I defendants, excluding DiFrisco, as 29"); Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 168-69 (reporting the death-sentencing rate at penalty trial of contract-murder principals, excluding Marshall, as 0%, and death-sentencing rate for entire contract murder pool, excluding Marshall, as 33"). Thus, the salient-factors test does not indicate that defendant's death sentence is disproportionate. The statistics suggest that prosecutors consider capital murders in the F-2 subcategory to be more deathworthy than other death-eligible homicides but that juries do not consider business-robbery murders to be more deathworthy than other capital murders. [Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210-11 (citing Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 155) (citations omitted)]. [Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 313 (quoting State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 46 (1996))]. Therefore, we conclude that defendant was imbued with knowledge of the effect that this brutal stabbing would have on Eck's survivors. Defendant was twenty-five years old when he murdered Eck. The jury unanimously rejected the c(5)(c) (age) mitigating factor and, thus, his age does not diminish his blameworthiness. Bryant's involvement in planning the robbery and murder mitigates defendant's moral blameworthiness to an extent. Bryant was the apparent mastermind behind the plan to commit multiple robberies and murder. Ten jurors found that defendant would not have committed or participated in the robbery-murder of Eck had it not been for Bryant. Defendant's proportionality counsel goes further and contends that Bryant, a career criminal, took advantage of Mr. Morton's mental deficiencies to instigate defendant's participation in the crimes. However, defense counsel overstates the case. At the penalty phase, the jury rejected the following proposed c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factor: Due to his intellectual abilities, Robert Morton was drawn into the criminal acts by Alonzo Bryant who had previously been convicted of aggravated assault and served eight years in a federal prison, only having been released sixty days prior to the offense. The jury appears to have been persuaded that, despite defendant's borderline intellectual functioning, he was able to make independent decisions. Although Bryant primarily planned the robbery and murder, defendant willingly participated in the crimes. Therefore, his culpability in planning the murder should not be diminished because of the presence of a co-defendant. Overall, defendant's moral blameworthiness is very high. He murdered Eck to escape apprehension for, not merely to commit, the robbery of the Delran Amoco. Defendant and Bryant repeatedly stabbed Eck despite his defenselessness. Defendant presented no evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or emotional disturbance. Although Bryant principally planned the robbery murder, defendant readily collaborated in committing the crimes. (2) RICHARD FEASTER 1 Armed with a sawed-off shotgun he had purchased two weeks earlier, Feaster and Michael Mills one evening drove to the Family Texaco in Deptford. Feaster placed the sawed-off shotgun against the face of Keith Donaghy, the only attendant working at the time. Feaster then fired the fatal shot, which literally blew out Donaghy's teeth and destroyed his brain. He subsequently stole $191.32 from Donaghy's pants pocket. No physical evidence linked Feaster to the crime; however, he made inculpatory statements to several people. Feaster told a jailhouse informant that he shot a man in the head at point-blank range in order to see what it felt like to kill before enlisting in the Marines. Feaster was twenty-two years old and had a high-school diploma. He was unemployed but he had worked in construction jobs. He had suffered brain injuries that hindered his impulse control. He also had borderline intelligence. His alcoholic father abused him and his mother. Feaster had prior convictions for marijuana possession and simple assault. The same month he killed Donaghy, Feaster committed another robbery-murder at a different gas station in Deptford. Despite the defense's vigorous attacks on the State's witnesses' credibility, the jury convicted Feaster of purposeful or-knowing murder by his own conduct, felony murder, robbery, and weapons offenses. At the penalty phase, the jury found the c(4)(g) (felony murder) and c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors present and rejected the c(5)(c) (age) mitigating factor. The jury sentenced Feaster to death. The court sentenced him to a consecutive twenty-year prison sentence with a ten-year parole disqualifier for the robbery conviction. (3) TIM HARRIS Harris and co-defendant Laquam Lassiter followed Robert Lee Rose and Audrey Williamson into a store in Newark. Pointing a revolver at Rose's head, Harris demanded money. Rose handed Harris a ten-dollar bill, but Harris ordered him to relinquish additional cash. Rose gave Harris another $140. Harris then pointed his gun at Williamson and said: Give it up, bitch. She gave him forty dollars but resisted his demands for more money. Frightened, Williamson began to run behind the store counter. Harris lethally shot her in the head. Lassiter took $230 from Williamson. Harris told Lassiter that he shot Williamson because she did not give him all of her money. Harris, who turned nineteen the month he murdered Williamson, had no prior adult record but an extensive juvenile record. He had no psychiatric problems and claimed to have no history of substance abuse. He dropped out of high school after tenth grade and did not work afterward. Harris confessed to the murder, but repudiated the confession at trial. The prosecutor tried Harris non-capitally. The jury convicted him of murder, robbery, aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit robbery, and weapons offenses. The court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of life imprisonment plus twenty years with a forty-year parole disqualifier. The AOC coded as present the c(4)(g) (felony murder) aggravating factor and the c(5)(c) (age), c(5)(f) (no prior record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factors. (4) CRAIG HART Craig Hart, who was twenty-five years old, got into a taxicab at 5:30 in the morning. He told the driver that he was going to rob him and ordered the driver to lie face-down in the front seat of the taxi. Hart shot the driver twice in the back of the head. After firing the fatal gunshots, Hart stole the driver's cash, credit card, wallet, and watch. Four weeks later, Hart confessed to the robbery-murder after he was arrested for committing another robbery. Hart was an unemployed high-school graduate who had worked as a mailroom clerk and cabinet maker. He had no prior criminal history. He abused cocaine and marijuana but appeared to have no psychological problems. Although Hart pled guilty to purposeful-or-knowing murder and armed robbery, the State prosecuted him capitally. The jury, believing that Hart was intoxicated when he committed the robbery-murder, found the c(4)(g) (felony murder) aggravating factor and the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance), c(5)(c) (age), c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), c(5)(f) (no prior record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factors. The court sentenced Hart to life imprisonment for the murder and a consecutive twenty-year prison term for the robbery. Hart's aggregate parole ineligibility equaled forty years. (5) JACINTO HIGHTOWER 1A &amp; 1B In the early afternoon, Hightower walked into the Cumberland Farms convenience store in Willingboro. Hightower put Pampers on the store counter and asked Cynthia Barlieb, the store clerk, for a carton of cigarettes. While she was retrieving the cigarettes, Hightower changed the sign on the store's front door from open to closed. He returned to the counter, pulled out a gun, and ordered Barlieb to open the cash register. She declined, and he shot her in the chest. She continued to refuse to open the register, and he shot her in the neck. Hightower tried to open the register himself and became frustrated by his inability to do so. When he felt Barlieb grab his leg, he shot her in the head. Hightower dragged her lifeless body into the freezer, turned off the lights, and left the store. When he committed the murder, Hightower was twenty-one years old and on leave from the United States Army. Disciplinary problems induced him to drop out of high school in tenth grade, but he later earned a GED. Various psychiatric experts had diagnosed him with dysthymic disorder (depressive neurosis), episodic drug and alcohol abuse, borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. A brain defect caused the antisocial personality disorder. His mother had mild affective disorder, experienced mood swings, and had difficulty with impulse control. When Hightower was young, other boys sodomized him; nonetheless, his mother did not seek medical attention for him. Hightower's mother was often absent for long periods of time, frequently immersed in extramarital affairs, and told her children that she hated them because they deprived her of freedom. He was raised in an abusive and dysfunctional environment. A jury convicted Hightower of murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and weapons offenses. He asked to be sentenced to death, and the jury obliged. The jury found the c(4)(c) (torture or depravity), c(4)(f) (escape detection), and c(4)(g) (felony murder) aggravating factors and the c(5)(f) (no prior record) and c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factors. This Court affirmed the convictions but reversed the death sentence because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that unanimity was required for mitigating factors. State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378 (1990). The State retried Hightower, and the second jury also sentenced him to death. The jury found the c(4)(f) (escape detection) and c(4)(g) (felony murder) aggravating factors and the c(5)(c) (age), c(5)(f) (no prior record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factors. Because the trial court improperly removed a juror during deliberations, this Court again reversed Hightower's death sentence. State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239 (1996). The State has not yet retried him. (7) ANTHONY INMAN Inman, who was twenty-two years old, and his co-defendant Wayne Harvey were looking to rob drug dealers when they discovered an apparently less dangerous target. They saw a grocery store open and decided to rob it. They went inside after a customer left the store. Inman pulled out a .45-caliber handgun and ordered that the victim, a co-owner of the store, give money to Harvey, who was aiming his nine-millimeter handgun at the victim. The victim reached for his gun, and Inman shot him twice in the chest. The victim yelled to the other co-owner: They're killing me! Run! The co-owner did not take the victim's advice. He ran into the front of the store and shot Inman twice. Inman and Harvey fled. Inman was under the influence of drugs and alcohol when he committed the robbery and homicide. Except for being a heroin addict, Inman had no physical or psychological problems. He was unemployed. He had prior convictions for theft as well as drug and weapons offenses. Inman pleaded guilty to aggravated manslaughter, conspiracy, robbery, and weapons offenses. The court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment with a fifteen-year parole bar for the aggravated manslaughter conviction and a consecutive ten-year prison term and a five-year parole disqualifier for the robbery conviction. His aggregate sentence was forty years imprisonment, twenty years of which he would be ineligible for parole. The AOC coded as present the c(4)(g) (felony murder), c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors. (8) DAVID RUSSO After his car broke down on the New Jersey Turnpike, Russo went to a gas station in Swedesboro. He returned a week or two later. Both times he went to the gas station, he was friendly and engaged the gas-station attendants and auto mechanics in conversation. Thus, they were surprised when Russo suddenly brandished a nine-millimeter handgun and announced a stick-up the evening of his second visit to the station. He ordered Joseph Iovanisci, Dino Rossi, and Ann Kiley to walk from the office to the parts room, where he made them lie on the floor. Then, Russo shot all of them from point-blank range. Iovanisci died from a gunshot wound to the head, and Kiley was seriously brain damaged. Russo did not seriously injure Rossi despite shooting him twice. Russo confessed after police officers apprehended him. He was intoxicated when he committed the crime and had a history of heroin and cocaine addiction and alcoholism. He also has suffered from depression. He enlisted in the Air Force while in eleventh grade and remained in the Air Force until his apprehension. Russo, who was twenty-nine years old, had a GED. His prior record consisted of a weapons offense and getting court martialed for a drug offense. After his arrest, Russo behaved exemplarily in jail. A jury convicted Russo of capital murder, felony murder, two counts of attempted murder, four counts of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. At the ensuing penalty phase, the jury found present the c(4)(b) (grave risk of death to others) and c(4)(g) (felony murder) aggravating factors but rejected the c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factor. The jury found the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance), c(5)(c) (age), c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), c(5)(f) (no prior record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factor. The jury unanimously concluded that the aggravating factors failed to outweigh the mitigating factors. The court sentenced Russo to an aggregate term of life imprisonment plus forty years with a fifty-year parole disqualifier. (9) ABDEL JABER SALEH Saleh agreed to buy 5000 videocassettes for $7500 from Michael Rehani. Saleh drove a rented U-Haul to Rehani's place of business in Hackensack. Saleh strangled Rehani and hit him over the head with a crowbar. Saleh dragged Rehani, who was unconscious, into his own office, bound and gagged him, doused him with charcoal fluid, and set him afire. Rehani was still alive when Saleh began burning him. While the fire burned, Saleh loaded the U-Haul with the 5000 videocassettes he was supposed to have purchased. Saleh drove to Old Bridge, where he placed the 5000 tapes in a storage area he had rented in his wife's name. Rehani's friends found Rehani burning. They put out the fire, but Rehani had died by the time firefighters arrived at the scene. The medical examiner concluded that the strangulation, head blows, and burns were each capable of causing death by themselves. Saleh drove to Youngstown, Ohio, where he caught a flight to Los Angeles. One week after committing the murder, Saleh walked into a police station in Los Angeles. Saleh said that he had witnessed 2 Latino men commit the murder and the men forced Saleh at gunpoint to drive away. The subsequent investigation revealed that Saleh was the perpetrator. Saleh was twenty-two years old. He was married and had a two-year-old daughter. He worked as a machine operator for his father-in-law's company. He had no mental health or substance abuse problems. He had no prior criminal record. A jury convicted Saleh of capital murder, felony murder, aggravated arson, and robbery. The jury could not agree on whether to sentence Saleh to death. The jury found the c(4)(f) (escape detection), c(4)(g) (felony murder), c(5)(f) (no prior record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors and rejected the c(4)(c) (torture or depravity) and c(5)(c) (age) factors. The court sentenced Saleh to life imprisonment plus thirty years with a forty-five year parole bar. (10) FREDERICK SIMMONS At approximately 2:10 a.m., Simmons and co-defendant John Poteat walked into the Firehouse Tavern, a bar in Wildwood, and intended to rob it. When Poteat ordered a case of beer, the bartender, Michael James, thought something was strange and tried to flee. Poteat struck James over the head with a club. James implored Poteat to take money and leave him alone, but Poteat threatened to kill James. Poteat continued beating him, and James attempted to defend himself. Robert Conners, the only customer in the bar, attempted to intervene in the altercation. Simmons interceded before Conners could help James. Simmons grabbed Conners and threw him into a wall and then into the bathroom, where Simmons slammed Conners's head into the sink. The blow broke the sink in half and knocked it of its mooring. Simmons then threw Conners into the ground, stomped on his neck, stabbed him five times, and stomped on his head. As Conners was dying from the stab wounds, Simmons rinsed off his knife with hot water and a paper towel. Simmons left the hot water running and left the bathroom. Simmons, careful not to leave fingerprints, went outside where Poteat and James were fighting. Simmons kicked James in the head while Poteat beat him. Simmons and Poteat subsequently fled. Simmons discarded the knife as he ran away from the Firehouse Tavern. James survived but had a fractured skull and other injuries. After his arrest, Simmons initially proclaimed his innocence but ultimately confessed. Simmons admitted that he killed Conners because Conners could identify him. Simmons was a thirty-five-year-old homeless and unemployed widower. He had previously worked as a short-order cook. He had a prior shoplifting conviction. He was an alcoholic and cocaine addict and had ingested large quantities of beer and cocaine prior to committing the crimes. Simmons functioned at an intellectual level slightly above mental retardation. He suffered from depression and several personality disorders. Poteat had approached him with the suggestion that they commit robberies. (11) RAFAEL SLAUGHTER One night at 11 p.m., Slaughter, who was twenty-two years old, went into a fast-food restaurant. He walked up to the counter, but before he ordered food he went to each side of the restaurant and looked out the window. An employee found this behavior suspicious. Slaughter left the restaurant after ordering his food. He returned three hours later, when the restaurant employees were preparing to close for the evening. Slaughter approached an eighteen-year-old male employee, who was taking out the trash behind the restaurant. Slaughter put a gun to his back and ordered him to walk inside the restaurant. Slaughter asked him for the combination to the safe, but the employee told Slaughter that he did not know the combination. Slaughter then shot him twice in the back from point-blank range. The victim bled profusely, lost consciousness twelve minutes after the shooting, and died shortly thereafter. Slaughter had also ordered two female employees to the ground, but he did not shoot them. After the shooting, Slaughter left the restaurant without any money. Slaughter's parents were young and not ready for marriage when he was born. They did not have enough time for him, and they gave his brother preferential treatment. He did not have any substance abuse or emotional problems. He was helpful to his relatives when they needed a hand with chores, babysitting, or other matters. In connection with the murder, a jury convicted Slaughter of capital murder, felony murder, and weapons offenses. In the penalty phase, the jury found the c(4)(g) (felony murder), c(5)(c) (age), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors present and decided not to sentence Slaughter to death. On the murder conviction, the court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment during which he would be ineligible for parole. The court also sentenced him to two consecutive ten-year prison terms for two auto thefts Slaughter committed the day of the murder. (14) CHARLES WILLIAMS After eating a meal at McDonald's, Williams walked up to the counter and pulled out a .38 caliber handgun. Williams demanded money from the restaurant manager and ordered two other employees to lie down on top of each other. Williams accompanied the manager as he emptied out the cash registers in the front counter and drive-through area. Williams then ordered the three employees into the back of the restaurant. He ordered the manager to remove money from the safe and the other employees to lie face down. He then made the manager lie down next to them. Williams shot the manager and one other employee in the head. The third employee escaped from the store although Williams fired shots at him as he ran away. The manager died. The other employee whom Williams shot survived but sustained severe brain damage that permanently disabled him. Williams was twenty-eight years old when he committed the offenses. With several prior convictions for robbery, burglary, theft, assault, and resisting arrest, Williams has spent all but ninety-three days of his adult life imprisoned. School authorities placed him in a Special Service School because he was classified as emotionally disturbed. He abused cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, but he never received substance abuse treatment. When he was a child, Williams's parents, who were both drug addicts and alcoholics, abused and neglected him. From the time Williams turned ten years old, his father would order him drinks at neighborhood bars. His father, who was described as a womanizer and a pimp, forced Williams and his father's paramour to engage in various sex acts. Williams's father sexually abused Williams's sister and once sexually abused Williams. His father also was violently abusive toward Williams's mother, who had numerous black eyes, once had fractured ribs, and once needed treatment at a hospital. Williams's father broke Williams's ribs when Williams was nine because he had accidentally spilled his father's cocaine. Williams's mother was a prostitute and often left her children home alone while cavorting with other men. During these periods of abandonment, Williams would provide food for himself and his siblings by stealing from a local supermarket. Williams's mother suffered several emotional breakdowns, and she often called her children little fuckers. A jury convicted Williams of capital murder, felony murder, two counts of attempted murder, three counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and four counts of weapons offenses. The jury could not agree on the appropriate penalty. The jury found the c(4)(f) (escape detection) and c(4)(g) (felony murder) aggravating factors but rejected the c(4)(b) (grave risk of death to others) aggravating factor. The jury also found the c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factor. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus ninety-five years with a seventy-eight-and-one-half year parole disqualifier. (2) KHALIF JAMES James and co-defendants Lawrence McGriff and Jason Means were intoxicated and driving around when James and McGriff decided to rob a gas station. After getting out of the car, James asked McGriff if he wanted to go through with the robbery. McGriff answered affirmatively and they walked to the station. James pistol whipped the gas-station attendant. A guard dog bit McGriff, and James drew his gun purportedly to shoot the dog. Then, the attendant attacked McGriff, and James and McGriff shot the attendant, who died from four gunshot wounds, including one to his head. James was a nineteen-year-old high-school graduate who had worked at a fast-food restaurant. He occasionally used alcohol or marijuana. He had no prior adult convictions. James confessed to shooting the gas-station attendant; however, he claimed that he had tried to shoot the attendant in the leg and had thought he shot him in the back. The State did not prosecute James capitally. A jury convicted him of purposeful-or-knowing murder, felony murder, robbery, and weapons offenses. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life imprisonment with thirty years of parole ineligibility. The AOC coded as present the c(4)(g) (felony murder), c(5)(c) (age), c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), c(5)(f) (no prior record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors. (3) HAROLD RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez and co-defendant Marceliano Guetierrez attempted to rob a gas station. Rodriguez shot and killed a customer. He also shot the gas-station owner six times. The owner survived but was hospitalized for two and one-half weeks. Rodriguez and Guetierrez's involvement in another robbery, in which they shot a woman in the leg, led to their apprehension for the murder. Rodriguez was a thirty-seven-year-old father of three children. He was an illegitimate child who had been raised by his father. When Rodriguez was fourteen years old, he ran away from home. He was unemployed when he committed the murder, but he had previously worked as a machine operator. He used heroin and cocaine daily for twenty years and had a prior conviction for marijuana possession. There is no indication that he had emotional problems in addition to substance abuse. However, he had AIDS. Rodriguez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, murder, attempted murder, robbery (two counts), and weapons offenses. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. The AOC coded as present the c(4)(b) (grave risk of death to others), c(4)(g) (felony murder), c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), and c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROBERT MORTON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________ LONG, J., dissenting. Robert Morton, a 25 year old man with no prior criminal record, emotional problems and an extremely limited intellectual capacity, was befriended by a sophisticated career criminal named Alonzo Bryant. In Bryant's thrall, Morton agreed to participate in a gas station robbery in which Michael Eck was stabbed to death. The jury, nearly unanimously, concluded that but for Bryant, Morton would never have been involved in the crime. Despite that, Morton was sentenced to death and Bryant to life. Because of my abiding belief that the sentence imposed on Morton was not only disproportionate to that of Bryant, the mastermind of the crime, but also to the sentences imposed on other defendants with similar characteristics who committed factually similar murders, I dissent. I. In State v. Feaster, decided today, I expressed my general reservations about our system of proportionality review. ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2000) (Long, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 4). Rather than repeat those points, I incorporate them here and add an additional concern about the Court's handling of the problem of intra-case disproportionality. The Court holds that this case presents no such disproportionality although Bryant, the career criminal who devised the robbery-murder, was sentenced to life and Morton, a follower with no prior criminal involvement, was sentenced to die. Ten jurors in Morton's case determined that he would not have committed, or participated in, the murder but for Bryant's lead. The jury apparently concluded that Bryant was more culpable than Morton. However, Bryant's jury was deadlocked regarding whether he committed the murder by his own conduct; accordingly, he was not death-eligible. Despite that ineligibility, the court that presided over both trials specifically concluded that Bryant had indeed stabbed the victim. In my view, Bryant's life sentence renders Morton's death sentence disproportionate. Where a more culpable co-defendant receives a life sentence, a sentence of death should not be imposed on the less culpable defendant. Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, ___; 2 000 WL 123997, *6 (Fla. 2000) (reversing death sentence because more culpable co-defendant received life sentence); accord Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207, 1214 (Fla. 1997) (same); see also State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Idaho 1985) (holding less culpable co-defendant's death sentence disproportionate even though more culpable co defendant also received death sentence); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 250-52 (1995) (DiFrisco III) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (arguing death sentence disproportionate because State did not prosecute co-defendant). Upholding Morton's death sentence in the face of Bryant's life sentence violates our principle that we treat like cases alike. State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 220 (1992) (Marshall II) (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 155 (1961)). Indeed, sentencing Morton to death while sentencing Bryant, the substantially more culpable co-defendant, to life in prison is arbitrary and cannot be upheld. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883 (1976) (noting death penalty cannot be imposed arbitrarily); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 190 (1987) (holding New Jersey Constitution provides heightened protection from arbitrariness and inconsistency in capital sentencing). Unless justified by substantial differences in mitigating evidence, which is not the case here, if a co-defendant who instigated and planned a murder receives a life sentence, the defendant who followed the co defendant's lead cannot be sentenced to death consonant with the notion of proportionality. The Court has omitted consideration of those very basic principles in rejecting Morton's intra-case disproportionality claim. II. A. Salient Factors Robert Morton's own case is included in the salient factor statistics. For the reasons discussed in Feaster, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (Long, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 26), Morton's death sentence should not confirm its own propriety. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 263 (Handler, J., dissenting). Equally troubling is the fact that one of the death sentenced F-2 cases included in Morton's category is that of Richard Feaster whose case the Court decided today. It is incomprehensible to me that the Court can use Feaster's sentence to justify Morton's and Morton's to justify Feaster's. Excluding Morton's own case under the salient-factors test, thirteen percent of death-eligible cases in the F-2 category resulted in the death penalty, compared to eleven percent overall. Excluding both Feaster and Morton, as I believe we should, the death sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases in the F-2 subcategory is only about ten percent, and the death sentencing rate for those proceeding to the penalty phase is only nineteen percent. Given that no death sentence other than Morton's has been fully upheld (except Feaster's which the Court upholds today), we cannot conclude from the salient-factors test that there is a societal consensus that the death penalty is an appropriate penalty for F-2 defendants. See State v. Cooper, 159 N.J. 55, 72 (1999) (Cooper II). III. Comparative Culpability A. Defendant's Culpability 1. As I indicated in Feaster, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (Long, J. dissenting) (slip op. at 10-11), we should not engage in an abstract discussion of a defendant's deathworthiness based on subjective moral reasoning rather than comparative analysis. That said, I believe certain aspects of the Court's discussion of Morton's culpability are misleading and inappropriate. Throughout its discussion, the Court emphasizes that Morton committed murder to escape detection for the robbery. That emphasis is misplaced. I understand the aggravating nature of the escape detection factor in a case in which an eyewitness to a crime is killed to silence him, or in a case where the defendant returns, on a separate occasion, to eliminate the victim as a witness against him. However, a defendant who kills a victim because she resists is no less culpable than a defendant who kills the same victim to escape detection. Furthermore, the escape detection aggravating factor is so commonplace in robbery-murder capital cases that placing substantial weight on the presence of the factor as indicative of high culpability cannot be justified. Although this aggravating factor (c(4)(f)) is considered to increase defendant's moral blameworthiness, its widespread, almost universal application, regardless of the lack of evidence presented to establish it in various cases, destroys its efficacy as an appropriate aggravating factor. Its unbounded, amoebic application is inherently expansive, making it impossible to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants adequately to allow for meaningful distinctions regarding defendants' blameworthiness. [State v. Harvey, 159 N.J. 277, 386 (1999) (Harvey III) (Handler, J., dissenting).] Accord State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 427-28 (1999) (Loftin II) (Handler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 229, 145 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1999). Indeed, the Court acknowledges that the escape detection motive is typical in felony-murder cases. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 15-16). In view of its prevalence in robbery-murder cases, the Court's emphasis on defendant's motive is distracting and troubling. 4. One of the recurring problems we face in proportionality review is that of inconsistent coding of factors from case to case. In re Proportionality Review Project, __ N.J. __ (2000) (slip op. at ___) (Proportionality Review II). Sometimes it is caused by statutory changes or AOC policy, and sometimes by our own missteps. Such a misstep occurred in Harvey III, where we expanded the non-decedent victim factor and made it applicable to every case in which the victim was a unique person with a web of familial relations -- in other words, to every single murder case. 159 N.J. at 313 (cited at ante at ___ (slip op. at 19)). What murder case does not involve a victim who was a unique person ? How many decedents do not have a web of familial relations ? A comparison factor that covers every conceivable comparison case without distinguishing the culpability of any defendant has no utility and mars the integrity of precedent seeking review. Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 386. The Court has cited that factor in this case. Given our significant responsibility in this endeavor, that was wrong. The universal non-decedent factor should be eliminated from future cases. B. Comparison Cases Our duty in this portion of proportionality review is to ensure that Morton has not been singled out unfairly for capital punishment. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 88 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 47); accord Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210. Considering both Morton's crime and his character, it is our responsibility to determine whether the comparison cases in which a life sentence was imposed render his death sentence disproportionate. It is not our responsibility, and not even within our power, to determine whether Morton's death sentence was deserved on a moral level. Our inquiry should avoid that question at all costs, because it is all too tempting to determine proportionality based on the ugly facts of a particular crime. Neither of the cases in Morton's comparison group that resulted in a death sentence is a good bench mark against which his sentence can be measured for disproportion. Hightower, who asked to be put to death, has had his death sentences reversed because of constitutional flaws. Feaster's sentence is clearly disproportionate and cannot be used to justify Morton's. Feaster, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (Long, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 40). Of the comparison cases that proceeded to a penalty trial, the majority resulted in life sentences; there is nothing obvious about Morton's case that explains why he was sentenced to death. Roger Hoyte's culpability was extraordinary. In three separate incidents over a period of two and one half weeks, Hoyte murdered three taxicab drivers, each of whom he and his co defendants robbed. One of the victims who survived the initial gunshot inflicted on him died after Hoyte shot him two more times and then stabbed him. The Court concedes that those crimes were heinous, but strains to conclude that Hoyte's life sentences do not support Morton's disproportionality claim. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 30). I disagree. Surely, a jury could find that a defendant who murdered three victims is highly culpable, indeed more so than a defendant who murders one victim. See Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 408 (Handler, J., dissenting); Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 272 (Handler, J., dissenting); Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 100 (Handler, J., dissenting). The mitigating evidence in Hoyte's case cannot overcome the presumption that he, as a multiple murderer, is more culpable than Morton. As noted, Hoyte's motive of completing the robberies is not less culpable than Morton's motive of escaping detection. Hoyte's clean criminal record mirrors Morton's lack of a prior criminal history. Although Hoyte abused heroin, cocaine, or marijuana, he never alleged that he was intoxicated while he committed the crimes. Mere drug addiction does not substantially diminish deathworthiness. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 204 (finding defendant highly blameworthy despite drug abuse). Indeed, drug abuse does not reduce a defendant's culpability at all unless a connection between the addiction and the crime can be shown. See Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 93 (noting connection between drug addiction and homicide in comparison cases). Hoyte's cooperation with the police, his remorse, and his age may reduce his culpability, but those mitigating factors do not offset the fact that he killed three people. David Russo also is extremely culpable in comparison with Morton. In a gas station, he announced a stick-up, ordered three victims to lie on the floor, put a gun to their heads, and shot them. He killed one victim and caused another severe brain damage. Not surprisingly, the jury found the (4)(b) (grave risk of death to others) aggravating factor. The victimization in Russo's case greatly exceeds the victimization in Morton's case. Russo's depression, intoxication, and good jailhouse behavior do not render him less culpable than Morton, yet Russo received a life sentence. Charles Williams, another defendant who shot multiple victims, is substantially more culpable than Morton. He forced three McDonald's employees to lie down at gunpoint while he stole money. He shot two of them in the head and shot at the third employee, who escaped unharmed. One of the victims died from the head wound while another sustained severe brain damage that permanently disabled him. The tremendous victimization in that case is matched by Williams's extraordinarily culpable character. He committed a plethora of prior offenses and was in prison for all but ninety-three days of his adult life. In other proportionality reviews, the Court has placed tremendous weight on a defendant's extensive prior record when deeming him highly deathworthy. See Harris II, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 30); Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 314, 318; Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 213. Likewise, the Court has found a defendant's lack of a prior record to be a meaningful distinction justifying disparate sentences. See, e.g., Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 318. Williams's long criminal record, when contrasted against Morton's law-abiding history, magnifies Williams's relative culpability. Undoubtedly, the abuse Williams suffered in his childhood is horrendous. However, in previous proportionality reviews, the Court has shown little sympathy for defendants who suffered similar abuse. See, e.g., Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 90. Viewed side by side, there is no objective way to rationalize the life sentence in Williams's case and the death sentence in Morton's. Abdel Jaber Saleh was plainly more culpable than Morton and his life sentence provides powerful evidence of the disproportionality of Morton's death sentence. Saleh strangled his victim, hit him over the head with a crowbar, bound and gagged him with a metal chain, and set him on fire while he was still alive. Saleh subsequently stole 5000 videocassettes he had agreed to purchase from the victim. After fleeing to Los Angeles, Saleh told police that he had seen two Latino men burn somebody to death. The Court acknowledges that the degree of victimization in Saleh's case was formidable. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 31). Although Saleh was three years younger than Morton at the time of their respective murders, and Saleh's jury found that his family would suffer emotional and psychological harm if he were executed, the victimization in Saleh's case exceeds that in any other case by a large degree. Rafael Slaughter's life sentence suggests the disproportionality of Morton's death sentence because of the remarkable similarity between the cases. Slaughter confronted a fast-food restaurant employee behind the restaurant, put a gun to his head, forced him to go inside the restaurant to the safe, and shot him twice in the back after he was unable to give Slaughter the combination to the safe. The victim remained conscious for twelve minutes before bleeding to death. While toting his gun, Slaughter also ordered two other restaurant employees to lie on the ground. The Court concludes that because Slaughter was three years younger than Morton, was not motivated by a desire to avoid apprehension, and because his victim died more quickly than Eck, his life sentence is justifiable. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). I disagree. Slaughter's victim and Eck both suffered tremendously before dying; the fact that Eck survived for an additional hour cannot rationally support disparate sentences. As discussed above, Slaughter's motive (completing the robbery) is not less culpable than Morton's motive of escaping detection. Last, although Slaughter's relative youth mitigates his culpability, it does not offset the increased victimization in his case. Accordingly, Slaughter's life sentence suggests that Morton's death sentence is disproportionate. Three cases that never even made it to a jury also illustrate the disproportionality of Morton's sentence. Ronald Wheeler pled guilty to felony murder for assaulting the office manager where he worked, stabbing her to death after she refused to give him his Christmas bonus, then stealing her pocketbook and some petty cash. Because of the nature of the stabbing, the AOC narrative concludes that Wheeler intended to torture the victim in addition to killing her. I agree with the Court's conclusion that the victimization in Wheeler's case is similar to the victimization in Morton's case. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 34). However, I disagree that Wheeler's motive was benign when he barged into the victim's office. Wheeler's possession of a knife and his violent reaction to the victim's refusal to give him the bonus suggests that the robbery was premeditated. Even if Morton's crime was more premeditated than Wheeler's, Wheeler's role in planning his crime renders him as culpable as Morton. In either case, Wheeler's sentence of forty years in prison, with a possibility of parole after thirty years, is indicative of the disproportionality of Morton's death sentence. When robbing a gas station, Harold Rodriguez shot the owner and a customer. The owner recovered from his injuries after two and a half weeks of hospitalization, but the customer died. While that murder was under investigation, Rodriguez shot a woman in another robbery. Although Rodriguez said he used heroin and cocaine on a daily basis, he did not claim to be intoxicated at the time of the crime. Accordingly, the Court's reliance on the presence of the (5)(d) factor, see ante at ___ (slip op. at 41), is flawed. I concur with the Court's finding that Rodriguez's bout with AIDS is mitigating. Ibid. However, the aggravation in Rodriguez's case nevertheless renders him more culpable than Morton. Rodriguez was able to enter into a plea bargain for a term of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after thirty years, in exchange for pleading guilty to murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, two counts of robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The Court acknowledges that Corey Washington, another similarly situated defendant who was permitted to enter a plea to avoid the death penalty, appears as culpable as Morton. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). Although Washington was six years younger than Morton at the time of his offense, he had at least as significant a role in planning the crime as his co-defendants. Washington and his co-defendants made the victim and his sixty eight-year-old co-worker lie on the floor while the perpetrators removed money from a safe. Presumably, the victim and his co worker feared for their lives during that period. Their fears were realized when Washington fatally shot the victim and a co defendant shot the co-worker. Thus, I agree with the Court that Morton is not more culpable than Washington. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 35). Morton's death sentence, as contrasted with Washington's sentence of thirty years imprisonment, suggests disproportionality. In sum, I find that Roger Hoyte, David Russo, Abdel Jaber Saleh, Rafael Slaughter, Ronald Wheeler, Charles Williams, Harold Rodriguez, and Corey Washington are all at least as culpable or more culpable than Morton. Yet, those eight comparison perpetrators have received sentences of life imprisonment or less, while Morton was singled out for the death penalty. I recognize that [d]isparity alone does not demonstrate disproportionality, State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 386 (1994) (Bey IV), and that proportionality review is not intended to ensure that one killer's sentence is identical to all other similarly categorized killers, Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 319. Rather, [p]roportionality review seeks to determine whether a particular death sentence is aberrational. In re Proportionality Review, 161 N.J. 71, 76 (1999) (Proportionality Review I) (quoting Bey IV, supra, 139 N.J. at 352). Although, like Justice Handler, I disagree with the meaning the Court has ascribed to the notion of aberration (i.e., extreme disproportion), id. at 104-05 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), even accepting its vision of that term in this case, in which Morton is as culpable or less culpable than eight life-sentenced defendants in his comparison group, I believe he has demonstrated that his death sentence is disproportionate. The other cases in defendant's comparison group neither support nor detract from Morton's showing of disproportionality. Some present less victimization than Morton's but involve a defendant who acted alone or as the dominant participant with other co-defendants. It is, of course, difficult to compare the mitigating evidence in the comparison cases with Morton because of how little we know about Morton's background and character. He was uncooperative with the lawyers who, in turn, failed to present a single witness to pursuade the jury to spare Morton's life. Nonetheless, what we do know about Morton mitigates his culpability relative to other defendants with more sophisticated intellects and more opportunity to direct the actions around them. Carl Culley, for example, was younger and caused less suffering than Morton; he was an alleged victim of sexual abuse. However, Culley planned a robbery alone and had committed two prior offenses and therefore does not detract from Morton's disproportionality claim. Despite Tim Harris's youth and the lower victimization in the murder he committed, his lengthy juvenile record, failure to finish high school, inability to hold a steady job, and role as at least an equal planner of a robbery-murder make him as culpable as Morton. The same may be said about Donald Loftin, whose murder of a chambermaid involved less victimization than Morton's, but who planned his entire offense alone. NO. A-44 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROBERT W. MORTON, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED