Title: Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44110
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 1999

Filed:  July 15, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JOHN LAKIN and ANN MARIE LAKIN,
husband and wife,

	Respondents on Review,

	v.

SENCO PRODUCTS, INC., an Ohio
corporation,	Petitioner on Review,

	and	

WESTERN SUPPLY CORPORATION,
an Oregon Corporation, dba 
WESTERN TOOL SUPPLY,

	Defendant.

(CC 9211-07901; CA A83575; SC S44110)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

 	Argued and submitted November 5, 1997; resubmitted June 11,
1998.

	Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., of Green &amp; Markley, P.C., Portland,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
briefs was M. Elizabeth Duncan.

	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for
respondents on review.  With her on the briefs was Maureen
Leonard, Portland.

	Mark A. Bonanno and Thomas E. Cooney, of Cooney &amp; Crew,
P.C., Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon
Medical Association.

	Jeffrey M. Batchelor, of Lane Powell Spears Lubersky LLP,
Portland, filed briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon
Association of Defense Counsel. 

	Thomas W. Brown, of Cosgrave, Vergeer &amp; Kester, LLP,
Portland, Steven J. Goode, Austin, Texas, William Powers, Jr.,
Austin, Texas, and Hugh F. Young, Jr., of the Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, Virginia, filed a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

	Thomas M. Christ, of Mitchell, Lang &amp; Smith, Portland, filed
a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance
Company.

	Jonathan M. Hoffman, of Martin, Bischoff, Templeton,
Langslet &amp; Hoffman, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici
curiae Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,
and Broadway Toyota, Inc.

	Daniel J. Popeo and David M. Young, of Washington Legal
Foundation, Washington, D.C., and R. Daniel Lindahl, of Bullivant
Houser Bailey Pendergrass &amp; Hoffman, P.C., Portland, filed a
brief on behalf of amici curiae Washington Legal Foundation and
Allied Educational Foundation.

	Charles S. Tauman, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of
amici curiae Oregon State Council of Senior Citizens, United
Seniors of Oregon, Salem Gray Panthers, Portland Gray Panthers,
Oregon Consumer League, Consumer Justice Alliance, Oregon Action,
Oregon Advocacy Center, Oregon State Public Interest Research,
Oregon Law Center, and Brain Injury Support Group of Oregon.

	Robert K. Udziela, of Pozzi Wilson Atchison, LLP, Portland,
David F. Sugerman, of Paul &amp; Sugerman, P.C., and Douglas G.
Schaller, of Johnson, Clifton, Larson, &amp; Corson P.C., filed a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.

	Arthur C. Johnson, Eugene, filed a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae Association of Trial Lawyers of America.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

 	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	 Ancer L. Haggerty, Judge.

	 144 Or App 52, 925 P2d 107 (1996).

	**Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Leeson, J., did
not participate in the consideration or the decision of this
case.

		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

		John Lakin and Ann Marie Lakin, (plaintiffs), brought
an action at law against defendant Senco Products, Inc., (Senco)
seeking economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages for personal
injury and loss of consortium arising out of allegations of
negligent failure to warn and strict products liability in the
design and manufacture of the SN325 pneumatic nail gun.  In its
answer, Senco alleged, inter alia, that ORS 18.560(1)
(1) limited
any noneconomic damage award to $500,000.  The jury returned a
special verdict finding Senco liable both in strict liability and
in negligence, and fixing John Lakin's comparative fault at five
percent.  The jury awarded John Lakin $3,323,413 in economic
damages and $2,000,000 in noneconomic damages, and awarded Ann
Marie Lakin $876,000 in noneconomic damages for loss of
consortium.  The jury also found that Senco had acted with
"wanton disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others"
in causing plaintiffs' injuries, and awarded $4,000,000 in
punitive damages.  The trial court applied ORS 18.560(1) and
entered judgment for each plaintiff for $500,000 in noneconomic
damages, reduced by the jury's finding that John Lakin had
contributed five percent to his injuries.  Plaintiffs and Senco
both appealed.  

		On Senco's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  On
plaintiffs' cross-appeal, the court affirmed in part and reversed
in part.  Adhering to its earlier holding in Tenold v.
Weyerhaeuser, 127 Or App 511, 873 P2d 413 (1994), rev dismissed
321 Or 561, 901 P2d 859 (1995), the court held that ORS 18.560(1)
violates Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution,(2) by 
mandating an unconstitutional "re-examination"
of a fact tried by a jury.  Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 144 Or
App 52, 925 P2d 107 (1996).  We allowed Senco's petition for
review.  The primary issue on review is the constitutionality of
ORS 18.560(1).  For the reasons that follow, we hold that ORS
18.560(1) violates Article I, section 17, of the Oregon
Constitution.(3)  We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 

		We summarize the facts from the Court of Appeals'
opinion.  Defendant Senco manufactures and markets pneumatic nail
guns, including the SN325, which discharges 3.25 inch nails.  In
1990, plaintiff John Lakin used an SN325 gun to place a single
nail into a piece of wood.  Standing on his toes on a makeshift
sawhorse platform, Lakin raised the wood and the SN325 over his
head, pressed the firing end of the SN325 against the wood, and
activated the trigger.  Instead of discharging only a single
nail, the SN325 immediately thereafter discharged a second nail,
which struck part of the first nail, causing the firing end of
the SN325 to recoil into Lakin's face.  The SN325 then discharged
a third nail, which penetrated Lakin's brain.  As a result of his
injuries, parts of Lakin's brain had to be surgically removed. 
He now suffers from diminished mental and emotional capacities,
his left arm and leg are paralyzed, he has undergone a radical
personality change, and he cannot live independently.  As noted,
the jury awarded both plaintiffs noneconomic damages in excess of
the limits provided by ORS 18.560(1).  The trial court reduced
the jury's awards according to a formula that the trial court
thought to be required by that statute.  

		As pertinent on appeal, Senco challenged the trial
court's evidentiary rulings, its jury instructions, and its
denial of a directed verdict, all of which pertained to Senco's
compensatory liability.  Senco also challenged the trial court's
rulings pertaining to punitive damages.  Senco renews those
arguments on review.  Plaintiffs' cross-appeal contended that ORS
18.560(1) violates several provisions of the Oregon and United
States constitutions.  On Senco's appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed; on plaintiffs' cross-appeal, the court reversed and
remanded for entry of a judgment modifying John Lakin's recovery
of noneconomic damages and Ann Marie Lakin's recovery for loss of
consortium, and otherwise affirmed.  We allowed Senco's petition
for review primarily to consider the constitutionally of ORS
18.560(1), which caps noneconomic damages in this case.

OREGON CONSTITUTION

		In addressing the constitutionality of ORS 18.560(1)
under the Oregon Constitution, this court's concern is whether
the legislature had the power to enact that statute.  Although,
as noted, the Court of Appeals decided this issue on the basis of
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, we
believe that the answer to whether the challenged statute
violates the right to jury trial expressed in Article I, section
17, of the Oregon Constitution, is dispositive. 

		In analyzing the meaning of a provision of the Oregon
Constitution, this court looks to the specific wording of the
provision, the case law surrounding it, and the historical
circumstances that led to its enactment.  Priest v. Pearce, 314
Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992).  We begin with the text of
Article I, section 17.

	Text

		Article I, section 17, provides:  

		"In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury
shall remain inviolate."  

No party questions that this is a civil case or that plaintiffs
had a right to a jury trial for their claims.  No party argues
that "inviolate" has a different meaning today that it did when
Article I, section 17, was adopted in 1857 as part of the
original Oregon Constitution.  In 1828, the word "inviolate"
meant "unhurt; uninjured; unprofaned, unpolluted; unbroken." 
Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language, Vol 1,
p 113 (1828).  Although it post-dates adoption of Article I,
section 17, in 1889 "inviolate" meant "not violated; free from
violation or hurt of any kind; secure against violation or
impairment."  The Century Dictionary, Vol III, p 3174 (1889).   
Thus, for purposes of this case, whatever the right to a jury
trial in a civil case meant in 1857, it has the same meaning
today.  The plain wording of Article I, section 17, does not
answer the question whether the right to a jury trial then meant,
and, therefore, now means, that the legislature may not adopt a
statute imposing a cap on the amount of noneconomic damages
recoverable in a civil case.  We proceed to examine Oregon cases
that have construed Article I, section 17.

	Case Law

		In Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or 290,
295, 744 P2d 992 (1987), this court stated that Article I,
section 17, guarantees a jury trial "in those classes of cases in
which the right was customary at the time the [Oregon]
constitution was adopted or in cases of like nature."  The court
further stated that the right to jury trial under Article I,
section 17,

	"includes having a jury determine all issues of fact,
not just those issues that remain after the legislature
has narrowed the claims process."

Id. at 297-98.  See also State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car,
120 Or 254, 259, 251 P 701 (1927) ("The right of trial by jury
guaranteed by the Constitution of this state, embraces every case
where it existed before the adoption of the Constitution, and it
is not within the power of the legislature to enact any law which
deprives any litigant of that right."); Tribou v. Strowbridge, 7
Or 157, 159 (1879) (Article I, section 17, "indicates that the
right of trial by jury shall continue to all suitors in courts in
all cases in which it was secured to them by the laws and
practice of the courts at the time of the adoption of the
constitution.").  

	History

		The guarantee of trial by jury was ensured in the Magna
Carta in 1215, although the historical origins of the jury system
predate the Magna Carta by hundreds of years.  Thomas H. Tongue,
In Defense of Juries as Exclusive Judges of the Facts, 35 Or L R
143, 145 (1956) (citing 3 Blackstone Commentaries 349-50)
(hereafter "Tongue").  See also James L. Coke, On Jury Trial, 1
Or L R 177 (1922) (tracing history of jury trial to ancient
Athens).  From the first British expeditions to America, the
common law of England, including jury trial procedures, was made
a part of the law of colonial communities);
(4) State v. Hansen, 304
Or 169, 172, 743 P2d 157 (1987) ("The 'common law of England' was
adopted prior to statehood or official territorial status by
Oregon's provisional government. * * * The common law, in the
sense of an evolving body of law, continues in force insofar as
it is not in conflict with legislation or constitutional
provisions.").

		In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 US 474, 485-86, 55 S Ct 296,
79 L Ed 603 (1934), the United States Supreme Court explained:

		"The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin,
characterized by Blackstone as 'the glory of the
English law' and 'the most transcendent privilege which
any subject can enjoy' (Bk. 3, p 379); and, as Justice
Story said (2 Story, Const. § 1779),' * * * the
Constitution would have been justly obnoxious to the
most conclusive objection it if had not recognized and
confirmed it in the most solemn terms.'  With, perhaps,
some exceptions, trial by jury has always been, and
still is, generally regarded as the normal and
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil
cases at law as well as in criminal cases.  Maintenance
of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history
and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care.  * * *  

		"The controlling distinction between the power of
the court and that of the jury is that the former is
the power to determine the law and the latter to
determine the facts."  

(Citations omitted.)

		By 1783, the majority of state constitutions contained
a catalogue of civil liberties that uniformly guaranteed the
right to trial by jury in a civil case.  Robert F. Williams,
State Constitutional Law, 151-53 (2d ed 1993).  Those provisions
were carried over into the 1802 Ohio Constitution and the 1816
Indiana Constitution.(5)  Article I, 
section 17, was taken verbatim
from Article I, section 20, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851.
(6) 
W. C. Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 Or L Rev
200, 201 (1926).  Thus, Article I, section 17, has its origins in
the early American colonial charters and the first state
constitutions.

  		In 1844, an Oregon legislative act provided in part:

		"All the statute law of Iowa Territory passed at
the first session of the Legislative Assembly of said
Territory, and not of a local character, and not
incompatible with the condition and circumstances of
this country, shall be the law of this government,
unless otherwise modified; and the common law of
England and principles of equity, not modified by the
statutes of Iowa or of this government, and not
incompatible with its principles, shall constitute a
part of the law of this land."

Or Laws, Art. III, § 1, p 100 (1843-49).(7)

		In 1845, the inhabitants of the Oregon Territory
adopted the organic law of the provisional government of Oregon. 
Article I, section 2, of that document provided in part:

		"The inhabitants of said [Oregon] territory shall
always be entitled to the benefits of * * * trial by
jury, * * * and of judicial proceedings according to
the course of the common law. "

Organic Law of the Provisional Government of Oregon (reprinted in
General Laws of Oregon, p 59 (Deady 1845-64)).

		In 1848, Congress extended the rights protected by the
1787 Northwest Ordinance, including the right to jury trial in a
civil case, to the Oregon Territory.  An Act to Establish the
Territorial Government of Oregon, Section 14 (reprinted in
General Laws of Oregon, pp 66, 75 (Deady 1845-65)). 

		The people of the Oregon Territory approved the Oregon
Constitution in 1857; it went into effect February 14, 1859.  

		From the foregoing, we conclude that the framers of the 
Oregon Constitution clearly understood the meaning of the right
to jury trial in a civil case and that they intended that that
right would remain "inviolate," i.e., secure against violation or
impairment, in the new State of Oregon.  It follows, therefore,
that whatever the right to "Trial by Jury" meant in 1857, it
means precisely the same thing today.  The next question is
whether the assessment of damages was a function of a common-law
jury in 1857.  

		In actions for injuries not willfully inflicted,
compensation is the fundamental principle of the law of damages. 
See Oliver v. North Pacific Transportation Co., 3 Or 84, 88 
(1869) (if entitled to anything, plaintiff "is entitled to such a
sum of money as will fully compensate him for all loss and injury
to him, caused by the negligence or wrongful act").  The purpose
of awarding money for pain and suffering caused by another person
is to give "the sufferer a pecuniary satisfaction."  3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries 1112.  Blackstone also wrote that, if a
civil verdict were for the plaintiff, the jurors "assess the
damages also sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the
injury upon which the action is brought."  Id. at 1339.  In his
treatise on damages, McCormick wrote that

		"The amount of damages * * * from the beginning of
trial by jury, was a 'fact' to be found by the jurors."

Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 24 (1935). 
See also Molodyh, 304 Or at 297-98 (the right to jury trial
"includes having a jury determine all issues of fact, not just
those issues that remain after the legislature has narrowed the
claims process"); 1920 Studebaker Touring Car, 120 Or at 259
("[I]t is not within the power of the legislature to enact any
law which deprives any litigant of [the right of jury trial
guaranteed by the Oregon Constitution].").

		In Nelson v. Oregon Railway Etc. Co., 13 Or 141, 143
(1886), this court considered the defendant's argument that the
trial jury's factual findings did not support the damages
awarded.  The court stated:

	"The verdict herein may have been much larger than this
court would have allowed under the evidence in the
case, or in view of the facts found by the jury.  Still
we have no right to set it aside, or reverse or modify
the judgment entered thereon.  The jury are judges of
the facts, and however widely our view might disagree
with theirs matters nothing.  We have no right to
invade their province, however sanguine we may be that
they have committed error."

To the same effect, see generally Locatelli v. Ramsey, 223 Or
238, 242, 354 P2d 317 (1960); Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Or 89,
111, 210 P2d 461 (1955); Hall v. Cornett, 193 Or 634, 644, 240
P2d 231 (1952); Fehely v. Senders, 170 Or 457, 474, 135 P2d 283
(1943); Malpica v. Cannery Supply Co., 95 Or 242, 248, 187 P 596
(1920); Smitson v. Southern Pac. Company, 37 Or 74, 95, 60 P2d
907 (1900).  From the foregoing, we conclude that the assessment
of damages was a function of a common law jury in 1857.(8)

	Judicial control of jury verdicts  

		In ancient common-law trial, judges had no power to
order a new trial solely on the ground that the judge thought
that the verdict was "excessive."  

		The power of a common-law trial judge to set aside a
jury verdict on account of excessive damages and to order a new
trial evolved on account of misbehavior by jurors.  3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries 1347.  It was not until Wood v. Gunston,
82 Eng Rep 864, 867 (1655), that a judge, without any statutory
authority, assumed the power to set aside a jury verdict and
grant a new trial for the reason that, in the opinion of the
trial judge, the amount of the verdict was "excessive."  Before
that case, it  appears that the only ground for a new trial was
actual "misconduct of the jury."  Tongue, 35 Or L R at 145-46
(citing 1 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 225 (3d ed 1922)). 
In Van Lom, 187 Or at 111-12, this court stated:

		"In ancient times, as is recounted in 1
Holdsworth's History of English Law (3d ed.) 337-347,
when a jury brought in what seemed to be a false
verdict the court examined by means of an attaint jury
whether it was correct.  If the original jury was
convicted by the attaint jury they were imprisoned for
a year, forfeited their goods, became infamous, their
wives and children were turned out, and their lands
laid waste.  * * *  The barbarity of this practice
finally led to its abandonment.  But 'It was obvious',
says Holdsworth (p. 346) 'that some regular method of
controlling the verdicts of juries was essential to the
proper working of the jury system.  This regular method
of control was found in the growth of the practice of
granting new trials if the verdict was clearly contrary
to the weight of evidence.'  And, again, he says in
speaking of the value of the jury system as it
developed in England, 'the jury would never have won
this popularity, it would never have attained these
results, if it had not been controlled by the action of
the courts, the legislature and the Council.'  (p.
321)."

		This court's early cases indicate that the court took
seriously the principle that juries were to be the exclusive
judges of a party's damages.  Before 1910, with respect to
motions for non-suit or directed verdict, the sole question was
whether there was "any" evidence in favor of the plaintiff and,
if there was, the jury must receive the case.  Tippin v. Ward, 5
Or 450, 453 (1875) (the case should be submitted to jury, unless
an entire lack of evidence tending to maintain issues on behalf
of the plaintiff or, unless upon the whole case made by the
plaintiff, it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff has no
right to recover); Vanbebber v. Plunkett, 26 Or 562, 564-65, 38 P
707 (1895) (if evidence offered to prove a fact is "competent,
and its tendency, however slight, is to prove such fact, the jury
ought to have it, as they are the exclusive judges of its
sufficiency").  Moreover, this court discouraged the practice of
setting aside a jury's verdict solely on the ground that the
trial judge thought the verdict was "excessive."  See Ore. Cas.
R.R. v. Ore. S. Nav. Co., 3 Or 178, 179 (1869) (a verdict that is
subject to no other objection should not be set aside because the
judge may differ from the jury as to the preponderance of
evidence).

		In Serles v. Serles, 35 Or 289, 57 P 634 (1899),
however, this court interpreted Oregon law to mandate judicial
review that weighed the evidence and could set aside a jury's
verdict and order a new trial, even if the verdict was supported
by sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury and was
rendered after a trial without legal error.  Even after Serles,
however, no Oregon trial court could enter a judgment for an
amount less than the jury's verdict without giving the prevailing
party the option of a new jury trial.  In 1910, Oregon voters
eliminated Oregon trial courts' power to grant new trials for
excessive verdicts by adopting Article VII (Amended), section 3,
(prohibiting any "fact tried by a jury" from being "re-examined
in any court unless no evidence supports the verdict"). 

		In the face of the foregoing line of authority,
punctuated by the adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 3,
in 1910, Senco relies on dicta in Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281,
906 P2d 789 (1995), to support its contention that ORS 18.560(1)
does not violate Article I, section 17.  In Greist, this court
stated:

	"When Article I, section 17, and the [Oregon]
constitution were adopted, a jury's determination of
the amount of damages to be awarded in tort actions was
not protected from judicial alteration.

		"* * * * *

		"Until the adoption of Article VII (Amended),
section 3, in 1910, trial courts were empowered to
reduce jury awards of damages when the courts believed
that those awards were excessive.  That fact, in
itself, disposes of plaintiff's argument that there
existed at common law, at the time Article I, section
17, was adopted in 1857, a right to have a judge enter
judgment on a jury's award of damages -- without
judicial alterations -- in a personal injury action."  

322 Or at 294-95 (emphasis in original).

Based on that dicta, Senco argues:

	"From the beginning, the Oregon legislature also
possessed the power to authorize courts to set aside
excessive verdicts, * * * limit the amount of
recoverable damages in certain actions * * *, and
govern the procedure for awarding damages, * * *
without compromising the right of trial by jury."  

Senco asserts that Greist "should end the inquiry for the present
case."  

		The quoted dicta requires correction.  Oregon trial
courts never have had the power to reduce a jury's verdict or to
enter judgment for a lesser amount of damages over the objection
of the prevailing party, who always could reject a judicial
remittitur and demand a new jury trial.  See Adcock v. Oregon
Railroad Co., 45 Or 173, 181, 77 P 78 (1904) (in an action for
personal injuries, the court may order a remission of part of the
damages awarded by the jury, but only as a condition of
overruling a motion for a new trial). 

		In Greist, this court held that there is no right to a
jury trial in a wrongful death action, because a wrongful death
claim was not one recognized at common law or under the Oregon
Territorial law when Article I, section 17, was adopted.  Greist,
322 Or at 294-95.  However, Greist, did not resolve the
constitutionality of ORS 18.560(1) as applied to a statutory
limit on recovery of noneconomic damages in a common-law action
such as this for which, until recently, no statutory limitation
on noneconomic damages had existed.  We agree with plaintiffs
that these common-law actions carry with them fundamental rights
to a jury determination of the right to receive, and the amount
of, damages.  Thus, because of the common-law origins of
plaintiffs' claims here, Greist is distinguishable.  

	Senco's arguments

		Senco argues that because, at common-law, the trial
judge had authority to ask the plaintiff to accept a remittitur
of damages thought to be excessive or not supported by the
evidence or to face a new trial, the legislature has the right to
do the same thing by imposing a cap on noneconomic damages.  We
disagree.  A statutory cap fundamentally is different from the
doctrine of judicial remittitur.  First, the legislative cap is
mandatory, not discretionary.  The legislature obviously has not
"asked" plaintiffs to accept less than the jury's verdict; it has
mandated a reduction.  Moreover, a trial judge's power before
1857 to grant a new trial differs in several important respects
from the legislature's power to cap damages.  Most important, the
trial judge determined the excessiveness of the damages, if any,
or the insufficiency of the evidence to support the award by
reviewing the facts in a specific case.  Then, if the judge
decided that the jury had rendered an improper damages verdict,
the prevailing party had the right to have a second jury decide
damages.  Under the cap, plaintiffs are denied a second jury
trial.

		Additionally, the statutory cap is not contingent on a
factual finding that the award is excessive as a matter of law. 
The reduction is mandated even though the jury is correctly
instructed, its findings are supported by the evidence as a
matter of law, and no legal error is present in the record.  The
statutory cap involves no review of the facts of a specific case. 
Moreover, the statutory cap also denies a prevailing party an
opportunity to accept a remittitur of the jury's award of
noneconomic damages that is less than the jury's award, but that
exceeds the statutory cap.  

		Senco cites no authority, and we are aware of none, for
the proposition that the drafters of Article I, section 17, would
have tolerated interference with a jury's award of noneconomic
damages in a case such as this as long as the interference
originated in the legislature and not in the court.  Senco's
focus on the legislature's power is misdirected.  The proper
focus under Article I, section 17, is on the rights of the
litigants and the proper role of the jury in a civil case.  Here,
the broad powers of the legislature must yield to a litigant's
specific right to a "Trial by Jury" guaranteed in Article I,
section 17, as that right was understood in 1857.  We conclude
that Article I, section 17, prohibits the legislature from
interfering with the full effect of a jury's assessment of
noneconomic damages, at least as to civil cases in which the
right to jury trial was customary in 1857, or in cases of like
nature. 

		Senco also argues that, because under Article XVIII,
section 7, of the Oregon Constitution,(9) the legislature has the
power to alter or repeal "all laws," it must have the power to
define the legal boundaries of those laws, including the extent
to which a civil defendant may be liable for noneconomic damages.
Again, we disagree.  That provision reserves in the people of
Oregon the right to alter all "laws" in force in the Oregon
Territory in 1857, whether the same were of common-law or
legislative origin.  See Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Or 330, 346, 40
P2d 1009 (1935) (sanctioning legislative limitation on guest
passengers' right to sue for gross and intentional, but not
ordinary, negligence).  However, the legislature's power to alter
"laws" in force in 1857 may be exercised only to the extent that
it does not infringe on constitutionally-protected rights.  If
Article I, section 17, guarantees the right to have a jury assess
noneconomic damages in cases to which it applies, the legislature
may not interfere with that right by capping those damages. 

		Senco next argues that, because ORS 18.560(1) is a law
that is applied only after the jury has performed its 
fact-finding function, it does not violate Article I, section 17. 
Senco argues that the jury's fact-finding function "ends with its
ascertainment of the facts, assessment of the damages, and return
of the verdict."  At that point, Senco asserts, a judicial
function arises, i.e., the duty to apply the law to the facts. 
"Remedies are matters of law, not matters of fact," Senco
insists.  Senco concludes that ORS 18.560(1) "does nothing to
impair that trial or that verdict."  That argument was persuasive
in Etheridge v. Medical Centers Hospitals, 376 SE 2d 525, 528-29
(Va 1989),(10) but was rejected in 
Sofie v. Fiberboard Corp., 771
P2d 711, 724 (Wash 1989).  

		Although it is true that ORS 18.560(1) does not
prohibit a jury from assessing noneconomic damages, to the extent
that the jury's award exceeds the statutory cap, the statute
prevents the jury's award from having its full and intended
effect.  We conclude that to permit the legislature to override 
the effect of the jury's determination of noneconomic damages
would "violate" plaintiffs' right to "Trial by Jury," guaranteed
in Article I, section 17.  Limiting the effect of a jury's
noneconomic damages verdict eviscerates "Trial by Jury" as it was
understood in 1857 and, therefore, does not allow the common-law
right of jury trial to remain "inviolate."  We agree with the
reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Sofie that an
argument like that advanced by Senco here

	"ignores the constitutional magnitude of the jury's
fact-finding province, including its role to determine
damages.  [To argue contra is to assert] that the right
to trial by jury is not invaded if the jury is allowed
to determine facts which go unheeded when the court
issues its judgment.  Such an argument pays lip service
to the form of the jury but robs the institution of its
function.  This court will not construe constitutional
rights in such a manner.  As we once stated:  '"The
constitution deals with substance, not shadows.  Its
inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name.... 
If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the
enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a
vain and futile proceeding.'" 

771 P2d at 721.

		Senco also argues that ORS 18.560(1) is valid because,
even after the cap is applied, plaintiffs "received a large
verdict," including "substantial" noneconomic damages.  In Hale
v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 523, 783 P2d 506 (1989), this
court held that Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution,(11) is not violated 
when the legislature alters, or
even abolishes, a cause of action, so long as the injured party
is not left entirely without a remedy:  

	"[T]he remedy need not be precisely of the same type or
extent; it is enough that the remedy is a substantial
one."  

		The issue in Hale was whether the damage limitations in
the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.260 et. seq., were
constitutional as applied to cities and port districts.  This
court held that those limitations did not deny the plaintiff a
right of action against the City of Portland guaranteed by
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, and that the
damage limitations were permissible under Article I, section
20.(12)  Id. at 517-26.  The 
court further held that the damage
limitations did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses to the United States Constitution.  Id. at 526-27.  We do
not find Hale's Article I, sections 10 and 20, analyses relevant
to our analysis of Article I, section 17.  This court's Article
I, section 17, jurisprudence never has established a
"substantial" remedy test in defining the scope and meaning of
the right of jury trial.  Moreover, we do not assess the
constitutionality of ORS 18.560(1) under Article I, section 17,
based on the amount of the statutory cap; rather, we assess its
constitutionality because it is a cap on the jury's determination
of noneconomic damages. 

		From the foregoing, we conclude that ORS 18.560(1)
interferes with the resolution of a factual issue, i.e.,
noneconomic damages, that Article I, section 17, commits to the
jury.  Thus, the statute's requirement that "the amount awarded *
* * shall not exceed $500,000" violates the injured party's right
to receive an award that reflects the jury's factual
determination of the amount of the damages "as will fully
compensate [plaintiffs] for all loss and injury to [them]." 
Oliver, 3 Or at 87-88.  For the reasons explained above, we hold
that ORS 18.560(1) violates Article I, section 17, of the Oregon
Constitution, and, thus, is void with respect to cases to which
the constitutional provision applies.

		We acknowledge that other courts have upheld statutory
caps on noneconomic damages on various theories under their own
state constitutions.(13)  We have reviewed the extensive decisional
law from other jurisdictions on this subject and we are satisfied
that the conclusion that we reach today is supported by the
better-reasoned authorities.  In addition to the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court in Sofie, quoted above, see Moore v.
Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So 2d 156, 163 (Ala 1991) (damages
assessments of Alabama juries are protected by constitutional
guarantee of right to trial by jury); Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P2d 348, 365-66 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion)
(striking balance in favor of constitutional right of jury
trial); Arneson v. Olson, 270 NW2d 125, 137 (ND 1978) (Medical
Malpractice Act violated jury trial provision of state
constitution).  In contrast, see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
404 NE2d 585, 601-02 (Ind 1980) (medical malpractice cap does not
violate right of trial by jury).

		In summary, Article I, section 17, guarantees a jury
trial in civil actions for which the common law provided a jury
trial when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857 and in
cases of like nature.  Molodyh.  In any such case, the trial of
all issues of fact must be by jury.  The determination of damages
in a personal injury case is a question of fact.  Chase v.
Alexander, 255 Or 136, 138, 465 P2d 226 (1970); Van Lom, 187 Or
at 126-27 (Brand, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The damages available in a personal injury action include
compensation for noneconomic damages resulting from the injury. 
Smitson; Fehely.  The legislature may not interfere with the full
effect of a jury's assessment of noneconomic damages, at least as
to civil cases in which the right to jury trial was customary in
1857, or in cases of like nature.  Molodyh, 304 Or at 297-98;
1902 Studebaker Touring Car, 120 Or at 259.  It follows,
therefore, that, in this context, ORS 18.560(1) violates Article
I, section 17. 

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

		We proceed to consider Senco's arguments relating to
punitive damages.  Senco challenges plaintiffs' entitlement to
punitive damages as well as the alleged "excessiveness" of the
jury's punitive damages award.  Senco argues that the jury's
$4,000,000 million punitive damages award violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides:  

	"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"

Senco argues that "[n]either this Court on independent review,
nor any rational juror, could find, by clear and convincing
evidence or otherwise, that Senco acted with wanton disregard on
the plain record in this case."  Therefore, Senco asserts, the
trial court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to
the jury, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's ruling on that issue.  Senco asserts that the Court of
Appeals "neglected its duty" meaningfully to review the punitive
damages award, as it was required to do by Honda Motor Co., Ltd.
v. Oberg, 512 US 415, 114 S Ct 2331, 129 L Ed 2d 336 (1994), on
remand, Oberg v. Honda Motor  Co., 320 Or 544, 888 P2d 8 (1995),
and BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134
L Ed 2d 809 (1996).  

		In Oberg, 320 Or at 549, this court stated:

	"[T]he standard for post-verdict judicial review of an
award of punitive damages is as follows:  A jury's
award of punitive damages shall not be disturbed when
it is within the range that a rational juror would be
entitled to award in the light of the record as a
whole; the range that a rational juror would be
entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory
and common law factors that allow an award of punitive
damages for the specific kind of claim at issue."(14)  

(Footnote omitted.)

		Following our independent review of the record and for
the reasons cogently explained in the Court of Appeals' opinion,
Lakin, 144 Or App at 67-74, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict and
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of
entitlement to punitive damages.  We hold that on this record as
a whole a rational juror would be entitled to award some amount
of punitive damages.

		We also have considered Senco's challenge to the
alleged excessiveness of the jury's punitive damages award.(15) 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the punitive damages award
was "within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to
award."  Id. at 76 (quoting Oberg, 320 Or at 544).  Following our
independent review of the entire record, and on consideration of
Oberg's directive and the factors enumerated in ORS 30.925(2), we
conclude that a rational juror would be entitled to award the
amount of punitive damages that this jury awarded to plaintiffs. 
The Court of Appeals' summary of the evidence that the jury could
have found to be established by clear and convincing evidence,
Lakin, 144 Or App at 76-77, supports our conclusion.  The award
of punitive damages was not unconstitutionally excessive.  

		We also have considered Senco's challenges to the trial
court's admission of the testimony of Senco's general counsel,
who testified that he was aware that claims were made "four to
eight times per year" involving the unintended actuation of
Senco's nail guns, and to the admission of the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert witness, who testified that he had knowledge
of prior accidents occurring as a result of the use of Senco's
nail guns.  Both witnesses' testimony was offered to show that
Senco had notice of the dangerousness of the SN325.  For the
reasons explained by the Court of Appeals, id. at 61-63, we find
no error and, therefore, affirm the trial court's rulings on
those issues.

		Finally, we have considered each of Senco's other
assignments of error and every argument made thereunder.  As to
any assignment or argument not discussed above, we find no error.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

1. 	ORS 18.560 provides:

		"(1) Except for claims subject to ORS 30.260 to
30.300 [the Oregon Tort Claims Act] and ORS chapter 656
[the Oregon Workers' Compensation Act], in any civil
action seeking damages arising out of bodily injury,
including emotional injury or distress, death or
property damage of any one person including claims for
loss of care, comfort, companionship and society and
loss of consortium, the amount awarded for noneconomic
damages shall not exceed $500,000." 

		"(2) As used in this section:

		"(a) 'Economic damages' means objectively
verifiable monetary losses including but not limited to
reasonable charges necessarily incurred for medical,
hospital, nursing and rehabilitative services and other
health care services, burial and memorial expenses,
loss of income and past and future impairment of
earning capacity, reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred for substitute domestic services, recurring
loss to an estate, damage to reputation that is
economically verifiable, reasonable and necessarily
incurred costs due to loss of use of property and
reasonable costs incurred for repair or replacement of
damaged property, whichever is less.

		"(b) 'Noneconomic damages' means subjective,
nonmonetary losses, including but not limited to pain,
mental suffering, emotional distress, humiliation,
injury to reputation, loss of care, comfort,
companionship and society, loss of consortium,
inconvenience and interference with normal and usual
activities apart from gainful employment.

		"(3) This section does not apply to punitive
damages.

		"(4) The jury shall not be advised of the
limitation set forth in this section." 

2. 	Article VII (Amended), section 3, provides in part:

		"In actions at law, * * * the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this
state, unless the court can affirmatively say that
there is no evidence to support the verdict."

3. 	Article I, section 17, provides:

		"In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury
shall remain inviolate."

4. 	In 1744, the First Continental Congress declared that
the people of America were "entitled to the common law of
England," especially the right to trial by jury, the denial of
which explicitly was incorporated in the Declaration of
Independence as one of the King's acts of tyranny.  In 1787,
Congress passed a law protecting the right of jury trial in the
North-West Territory: 

		"The inhabitants of said territory shall always be
entitled to the benefits of * * * trial by jury; * * *
and of judicial proceedings according to the course of
the common law."  

Article of Compact contained in the Ordinance of 1787 for the
Government of the North-West Territory (reprinted in General Laws
of Oregon, p 81 (Deady 1845-1864)). 

5. 	The early constitutions of Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee all provided that the right to jury trial in a civil
case shall remain "inviolate."  The Pennsylvania constitution of
1776 provided that the right to trial by jury "ought to be held
sacred."  The drafters of Indiana's bill of rights borrowed
freely from the wording of other states' constitutions, most
notably the constitutions of Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Pennsylvania.  Robert Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 Ind
L J 211, 212-13 (1945).

6. 	Article I, section 20, of the 1851 Indiana
constitution, provides:

		"In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate."

7. 	Article I, section 9, of the 1846 Iowa constitution,
provides in part:

	"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate[.]"

8. 	Although the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution does not apply through the Fourteenth Amendment to
the states, Minneapolis &amp; St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 US 211,
217, 36 S Ct 595, 60 L Ed 961 (1916); Walker V. Sauvinet, 92 US
90, 23 L Ed 678 (1875), we read the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court to have reached the same conclusion under
the Seventh Amendment.  See Dimick, 293 US at 480 (the common law
rule as it existed at the time of the adoption of the United
States Constitution was "that in cases where the amount of
damages was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so
peculiarly within the province of the jury that the Court should
not alter it") (citations omitted.); see also Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., 523 US 340, 353, 118 S Ct 1279, 1287,
140 L Ed 2d 438 (1998) ("there is historical evidence that cases
involving discretionary monetary relief were tried before
juries," and "[i]t has long been recognized that 'by the law the
jury are judges of the damages'" (quoting Townsend v. Hughes, 86
Eng Rep 994, 994-95 (C.P. 1677)) and that "there is overwhelming
evidence that the consistent practice at common law was for
juries to award damages"); Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523
US 208, 211, 118 S Ct 1210, 1212, 140 L Ed 2d 336 (1998)
(imposition of a remittitur without the option of a new trial
"cannot be squared with the Seventh Amendment"). 

9. 	Article XVIII, section 7, provides:

		"All laws in force in the Territory of Oregon when
this Constitution takes effect, and consistent
therewith, shall continue in force until altered or
repealed."  

10. 	We note that the relevant provisions of the present
Virginia Constitution, like the Virginia Declaration of Rights
(1776), is written in terms of admonition, not legal command. 
Article I, section 11, of the Virginia Constitution provides in
part:

	"That in * * * suits between man and man, trial by jury
is preferable to any other, and ought to be held
sacred."

11. 	Article I, section 10, provides:

		"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation."

12. 	Article I, section 20, provides:

		"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens."

13. 	The constitutionality of state statutory damage caps
has been attacked in state and federal courts on several grounds. 
It has been asserted, inter alia, that such caps violate
constitutional guarantees of trial by jury, equal privileges and
immunities, separation of powers, substantive and procedural due
process, equal protection, remedy by due course of law, access to
courts, and against special legislation.  The courts that have
considered the constitutionality of state caps are divided on
theory, analysis, and outcome.  It does not appear that the
United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the
validity of state statutory caps on noneconomic damages under the
Seventh Amendment.  See Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional
Law, § 6-3, 354-71 (2d ed) (1992 w/supp 1997) (citing and
discussing cases).

14. 	ORS 30.925(2) defines the statutory factors to be
considered in assessing punitive damages in a product liability
case:  

		"(2) Punitive damages, if any, shall be determined
and awarded based upon the following criteria:

		"(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm
would arise from the defendant's misconduct;

		"(b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of
that likelihood;

		"(c) The profitability of the defendant's
misconduct;

		"(d) The duration of the defendant's misconduct
and any concealment of it;

		"(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant
upon discovery of the misconduct;

		"(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and

		"(g) The total deterrent effect of other
punishment imposed upon the defendant as a result of
the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive
damage awards to persons in situations similar to the
claimant's and the severity of criminal penalties to
which the defendant has been or may be subjected."  

15. 	Senco does not challenge the constitutional sufficiency
of the Oregon's procedures for assessing and reviewing punitive
damage awards.