Title: Dunlap v. Cottman Transmissions Sys., LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131318
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2014

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
JAMES M. DUNLAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131318 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  FEBRUARY 27, 2014 
COTTMAN TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS,  
 
LLC, ET AL. 
 
UPON QUESTIONS OF LAW  
CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
(the Fourth Circuit) entered an order of certification 
requesting this Court to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia and Rule 
5:40, and to answer the following questions of law: 
1. 
May a plaintiff use tortious interference 
with contract or tortious interference with 
business expectancy as the predicate 
unlawful act for a claim under the Virginia 
business conspiracy statute, Va. Code 
§§ 18.2-499, 18.2-500? 
 
2. 
Does a [I] two-year or [II] five-year 
statute of limitations apply to claims of 
tortious interference with contract and 
tortious interference with business 
expectancy under Va. Code § 8.01-243? 
 
(Roman numeral designators added). 
 
With regard to the first question, we hold that causes of 
action for tortious inference with contract and tortious 
interference with business expectancy qualify as the requisite 
unlawful act to proceed on a business conspiracy claim under 
Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500 because both claims are predicated on 
2 
an independent common law duty arising outside of contract.  As 
to the second question, we hold that the five-year statute of 
limitations in Code § 8.01-243(B) applies because both tortious 
interference claims involve injury to property rights. 
I.  RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS1 
 
 
James Dunlap brought an action against Cottman Transmission 
Systems, LLC, and Todd P. Leff (collectively, Cottman), alleging 
claims for tortious interference with contract, tortious 
interference with business expectancy, and business conspiracy 
in violation of Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500.2  The claims arose 
from franchise agreements between Dunlap and AAMCO 
Transmissions, Inc., under which Dunlap had operated two AAMCO 
transmission and repair facilities for more than 30 years.  In 
2006, a company that already owned a controlling interest in 
Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC, a competitor of AAMCO, 
acquired a controlling interest in AAMCO.  According to Dunlap, 
the new owner sought to convert all Cottman Transmission 
franchises into AAMCO franchises.  That decision resulted in 
                     
1 The pertinent facts are undisputed and are taken primarily 
from the certification order in Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission 
Systems, LLC, No. 11-2327 (4th Cir. Aug. 21, 2013). 
2 Dunlap filed the action in the Circuit Court for the City 
of Chesapeake, but Cottman subsequently removed it to the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
Norfolk Division (the District Court), under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 
and 1441(a). 
3 
some existing AAMCO franchises being closed, including those 
owned by Dunlap.  He alleged that the closing of his AAMCO 
transmission and repair facilities was brought about by a 
conspiracy between Cottman and others who stood to benefit from 
his franchises' closure. 
The District Court dismissed the business conspiracy claim 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure 
to allege an unlawful act or an unlawful purpose as required to 
establish such a claim.  Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission Sys. 
LLC, No. 2:11cv272, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2011).  It 
concluded that "[a]ll of the duties involved in this case 
[arose] out of and the damages flow[ed] from contractual 
obligations" between Dunlap and AAMCO and that to allow 
"allegations of . . .  contractual interference . . . to serve 
as the requisite unlawful act for purposes of the business 
conspiracy statute would turn what should be contractual claims 
into a tort."  Id. at 3-4 (citing Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 
Va. 166, 695 S.E.2d 537 (2010)). 
The District Court dismissed Dunlap's remaining two tort 
claims as barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Code 
§ 8.01-248.  Id. at 5.  The District Court concluded that our 
decision in Station #2 abrogated the Court's prior ruling 
in Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956), and thus 
rejected Dunlap's contention that his tortious interference 
4 
claims constituted an injury to his property, which would be 
subject to a five-year statute of limitations under Code § 8.01-
243(B).  Id. at 4-5.  The District Court viewed Dunlap's claimed 
damages as "disappointed economic expectations" and held that 
such do not constitute an injury to property.  Id. at 5 
(citing Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, 262 Va. 473, 551 
S.E.2d 596 (2001)). 
Dunlap appealed to the Fourth Circuit.  In its 
certification order, the Fourth Circuit stated: "the two 
questions together determine the outcome of this case."  Rule 
5:40 requires that a certified question be "determinative" in 
"any proceeding pending before the certifying court."  We agree 
that the questions are determinative.  The viability of the 
business conspiracy claim turns on whether the tortious 
interference claims qualify as the requisite unlawful act.  The 
tortious interference claims are time-barred if subject to a 
two-year statute of limitations.  Accordingly, we accepted the 
certified questions of law by order entered September 10, 2013. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
We will address each certified question separately. 
A. Question #1 
The first certified question asks whether tortious 
interference with contract and tortious interference with 
business expectancy qualify as an unlawful act for purposes of a 
5 
claim under the business conspiracy statutes, Code §§ 18.2-499 
and -500.  The common law has long recognized actions based on a 
conspiracy resulting in business-related damages.  For instance, 
in Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888), we 
stated that "[a] conspiracy or combination to injure a person in 
his trade or occupation is indictable."  Id. at 934, 6 S.E. at 
624; see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 746, 749, 73 S.E. 
561, 562 (1912) (stating that "a conspiracy must be a 
combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action, to 
accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish 
some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or 
unlawful means"); Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox C.C. 592 (1867) ("The 
public had an interest in the way in which a person disposes of 
his industry and his capital; and if two or more persons 
conspired, by threats, intimidation, or molestation to deter or 
influence him in the way he should employ his industry, his 
talents, or his capital, they would be guilty of a criminal 
offence.  This was the common law of the land."). 
Years later, in Werth v. Fire Companies' Adjustment Bureau, 
160 Va. 845, 171 S.E. 255 (1933), we explained that 
[a] conspiracy consists of an unlawful 
combination of two or more persons to do 
that which is contrary to law, or to do that 
which is wrongful and harmful towards 
another person [and] may be punished 
criminally by indictment, or civilly by an 
action on the case in the nature of 
6 
conspiracy if damage has been occasioned to 
the person against whom it is directed. It 
may also consist of an unlawful combination 
to carry out an object not in itself 
unlawful by unlawful means. 
 
Id. at 854, 171 S.E. at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We further elaborated in Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 19 S.E.2d 
84 (1942), that  
[t]he gist of the civil action of conspiracy 
is the damage caused by the acts committed 
in pursuance of the formed conspiracy and 
not the mere combination of two or more 
persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or 
use unlawful means.  In other words, the 
basis of the action is the wrong which is 
done under the conspiracy and which results 
in damage to the plaintiff. No cause of 
action exists without the resulting injury, 
and the damage produced must arise as the 
effective result of the conspiracy. 
 
Id. at 338, 19 S.E.2d at 86; accord CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering 
Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 28, 431 S.E.2d 277, 281-82 (1993). 
In 1964, the General Assembly enacted the predecessors of 
Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500, the statutes at issue in the first 
certified question.3  1964 Acts ch. 623.  The provisions of Code 
§ 18.2-500 provide civil relief, including treble damages, for 
persons "injured in his reputation, trade, business or 
                     
3 The conspiracy statute was originally codified in 1962 as 
part of the Commonwealth's antitrust laws.  See Former Code § 
59.21.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962) (superseded).  The General Assembly 
moved the statute to the criminal code with much greater 
sanctions in 1964.  See Former Code § 18.1-74.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 
1975)(superseded), as enacted by 1964 Acts ch. 623); see also 
Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d. 780, 784 (2003). 
7 
profession by reason of a violation of § 18.2-499."  In turn, 
Code § 18.2-499 imposes criminal liability on 
[a]ny two or more persons who combine, 
associate, agree, mutually undertake or 
concert together for the purpose of (i) 
willfully and maliciously injuring another 
in his reputation, trade, business or 
profession by any means whatever or (ii) 
willfully and maliciously compelling another 
to do or perform any act against his will, 
or preventing or hindering another from 
doing or performing any lawful act. 
 
To recover in an action under these statutes, a plaintiff 
must establish: "(1) a combination of two or more persons for 
the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring plaintiff in 
his business[;] and (2) resulting damage to plaintiff."  Allen 
Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 449, 318 S.E.2d 592, 596 
(1984); accord CaterCorp, 246 Va. at 28, 431 S.E.2d at 282.  It 
is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant 
conspirators acted with actual malice, i.e., ill-will, hatred, 
or spite directed toward the plaintiff.  Commercial Bus. Sys., 
Inc. v. BellSouth Servs., 249 Va. 39, 47, 453 S.E.2d 261, 266-67 
(1995).  Rather, a plaintiff must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence only that the conspirators acted with legal 
malice, i.e., "intentionally, purposely, and without lawful 
justification."  Id. at 47, 453 S.E.2d at 267; accord Northern 
Va. Real Estate v. Martins, 283 Va. 86, 110, 720 S.E.2d 121, 133 
(2012); Williams v. Dominion Tech. Partners, L.L.C., 265 Va. 
8 
280, 290, 576 S.E.2d 752, 757 (2003); Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 
561, 578, 544 S.E.2d 666, 677 (2001). 
Because there can be no conspiracy to do an act that the 
law allows, Werth, 160 Va. at 855, 171 S.E. at 259, we have held 
that "an allegation of conspiracy, whether criminal or civil, 
must at least allege an unlawful act or an unlawful purpose" to 
survive demurrer.  Hechler Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors 
Corp., 230 Va. 396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1985).4  In other 
words, actions for common law civil conspiracy and statutory 
business conspiracy lie only if a plaintiff sustains damages as 
a result of an act that is itself wrongful or 
tortious.  See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 501 
(2000); see also Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 80, 639 S.E.2d 
182, 188 (2007) ("[I]n Virginia, a common law claim of civil 
conspiracy generally requires proof that the underlying tort was 
committed."); Werth, 160 Va. at 855, 171 S.E. at 259 ("'To give 
action there must not only be conspiracy, but conspiracy to do a 
wrongful act.'") (quoting Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil 
Co., 40 S.E. 591,  594 (W.Va. 1902)); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 
741 F.2d 1406, 1413 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[C]onspiracy 
allegations . . . do not set forth an independent cause of 
                     
4 The term "unlawful act" is defined as "[c]onduct that is 
not authorized by law; a violation of a civil or criminal law."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1678 (9th ed. 2009). 
9 
action; instead, such allegations are sustainable only after an 
underlying tort claim has been established."); Halberstam v. 
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Since liability for 
civil conspiracy depends on performance of some underlying 
tortious act, the conspiracy is not independently actionable; 
rather, it is a means for establishing vicarious liability for 
the underlying tort."); Koster v. P&P Enters., 539 N.W.2d 274, 
278 (Neb. 1995) ("[A] claim of civil conspiracy is not 
actionable in itself, but serves to impose vicarious liability 
for the underlying tort of those who are a party to the 
conspiracy."); Selle v. Tozser, 786 N.W.2d 748, 756 (S.D. 2010) 
("[C]ivil conspiracy is merely a method of establishing joint 
liability for the underlying tort."). 
To determine whether tortious interference with contract 
and tortious interference with business expectancy qualify as 
the requisite "unlawful act" for purposes of the business 
conspiracy statutes, we must examine the nature of those causes 
of action.  We recognized a cause of action for tortious 
interference with contract rights in Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 
112, 335 S.E.2d 97 (1985).  The necessary elements to establish 
a prima facie case are: "(1) the existence of a valid 
contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge 
of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; 
(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or 
10 
termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant 
damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted."  Id. at 120, 335 S.E.2d at 102; accord Dunn, 
McCormack & MacPherson v. Connolly, 281 Va. 553, 558-59, 708 
S.E.2d 867, 870 (2011).  However, if a contract is terminable at 
will or involves only a contract or business expectancy, "'a 
plaintiff, in order to present a prima facie case of tortious 
interference, must allege and prove not only an intentional 
interference . . . , but also that the defendant employed 
"improper methods."'"5  Dunn, McCormack & McPherson, 281 Va. at 
559, 708 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 
226-27, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1987)); see also Preferred Sys. 
Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 403-04, 732 
S.E.2d 676, 688 (2012); Maximus, Inc. v. Lockheed Info. Mgmt. 
Sys. Co., 254 Va. 408, 414-15, 493 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1997). 
                     
5 "Methods of interference considered improper are those 
means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law 
rules."  Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 227, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 
(1987).  Improper methods may include "violence, threats or 
intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, 
misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue 
influence, misuse of inside or confidential information, or 
breach of a fiduciary relationship." Dunn, McCormack & 
MacPherson, 281 Va. at 559, 708 S.E.2d at 870 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We have also stated that methods may 
be improper if "they violate an established standard of a trade 
or profession, or involve unethical conduct[, s]harp dealing, 
overreaching, or unfair competition."  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
11 
The tortious interference cause of action is historically 
rooted in the principle that "the common law right of contract 
necessarily brought with it, as a corollary, a right to seek 
recompense against those who interfered with a valid 
contract."  Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 685, 693, 725 S.E.2d 
555, 558 (2012); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. v 
(1979) (stating that a plaintiff who has an action for breach of 
contract against a third person is not precluded "from 
maintaining an action . . . against the person who has induced 
or otherwise caused the breach").  Indeed, Cottman acknowledges 
that "there is a common law duty to refrain from interfering 
with contractual rights."  Relying on this Court's decision 
in Station #2, Cottman, however, asserts that a tortious 
interference claim cannot form the requisite unlawful act 
because it "necessarily depends on, and is not independent of, 
contract obligations." 
In Station #2, we addressed whether a conspiracy merely to 
breach a contract qualifies as the required unlawful act for a 
claim under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500.  280 Va. at 173-74, 695 
S.E.2d at 541.  There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants 
conspired to breach their agreement to allow the plaintiff to 
install soundproofing material in the void space above the 
ceiling of its restaurant.  Id. at 171, 695 S.E.2d at 539-40.  
12 
The unlawful act, according to the plaintiff, was the breach of 
that agreement. 
On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's judgment 
sustaining a demurrer to the statutory business conspiracy 
claim.  Id. at 176, 695 S.E.2d at 543.  We concluded that a 
"conspiracy merely to breach a contract that does not involve an 
independent duty arising outside the contract is insufficient to 
establish a civil claim under § 18.2-500." Id. at 174, 695 
S.E.2d at 541 (emphasis added); see also Richmond Metro. Auth. 
v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 559, 507 S.E.2d 
344, 347 (1998) ("A tort action cannot be based solely on a 
negligent breach of contract."); Dunn Constr. Co. v. Cloney, 278 
Va. 260, 267, 682 S.E.2d 943, 946-47 (2009) ("[T]he 
determination whether a cause of action sounds in contract or 
tort depends on the source of the duty violated.").  We 
explained that mere non-performance of a contract cannot "rise 
to the level of an 'unlawful act' under Code § 18.2-500 
[because] the duty of performance under the contract springs 
solely from the agreement; the duty is not imposed extrinsically 
by statute, whether criminal or civil, or independently by 
common law."  Station #2, 280 Va. at 174, 695 S.E.2d at 541.  We 
therefore concluded that the non-performance of a contract could 
not, without more, qualify as an "unlawful act."  Id. at 174, 
695 S.E.2d at 541. 
13 
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the 
plaintiff's agreement with the defendants did not "implicate 
[any] statutory or independent common law duties" and thus a 
conspiracy merely to breach that agreement was insufficient to 
state a claim under the business conspiracy statutes.  Id. at 
175, 695 S.E.2d at 542.  However, the following cases involving 
statutory business conspiracy claims, we explained, were 
distinguishable from Station #2 because they, unlike Station #2, 
did involve conduct violating independent common law 
duties: Commercial Bus. Sys., 249 Va. at 41, 453 S.E.2d at 263 
(a defendant's employee awarded a contract to the plaintiff's 
employer as a result of a bribe); Advanced Marine Enters. v. 
PRC, 256 Va. 106, 112, 501 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1998) (a defendant 
hired the plaintiff's employees although they were subject to a 
non-compete agreement); CaterCorp, 246 Va. at 26-27, 431 S.E.2d 
at 280-81 (a defendant conspired with a plaintiff's employee to 
breach his common law duty of loyalty); Simmons, 261 Va. at 577-
78, 544 S.E.2d at 676-77 (plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary 
duties); and Feddeman & Co. v. Langan Assocs., P.C., 260 Va. 35, 
46, 530 S.E.2d 668, 675 (2000) (same).  Moreover, in Station #2, 
the plaintiff did not allege claims for tortious interference 
with contract and/or tortious interference with business 
expectancy so we had no occasion to address the issue raised in 
the first certified question. 
14 
As we discussed in Station #2, the only duties at issue in 
a breach of contract claim are those arising solely from the 
contract itself; therefore, a breach of contract "does not, 
without more, create a basis for recovery in tort." 280 Va. at 
174, 695 S.E.2d at 541.  In contrast, both tortious interference 
with contract and tortious interference with business expectancy 
are intentional torts predicated on the common law duty to 
refrain from interfering with another's contractual and business 
relationships.  That duty does not arise from the contract 
itself but is, instead, a common law corollary of the 
contract.  See Wyatt, 283 Va. at 693, 725 S.E.2d at 558.  The 
duty arises outside the contract even though the intentional 
interference must induce or cause a breach or termination of the 
contractual relationship or business expectancy.  See Dunn, 
McCormack & McPherson, 281 Va. at 558, 708 S.E.2d at 870. 
Accordingly, we hold that tortious interference with 
contract and tortious interference with business expectancy each 
constitute the requisite "unlawful act" to proceed on a business 
conspiracy claim under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500.  See Bray & 
Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 527 F.Supp.2d 1355, 
1370 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ("Tortious interference with a business 
relationship can constitute an unlawful act for the purposes of 
pleading a claim for civil conspiracy."); Advanced Power Sys. v. 
Hi-Tech Sys., 801 F.Supp. 1450, 1458 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("To 
15 
establish an underlying unlawful act . . . , plaintiff must 
prove that the parties came together for the express purpose of 
committing either a criminal act or an intentional 
tort."); John's Insulation, Inc. v. Siska Constr. Co., 774 
F.Supp. 156, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that a plaintiff must 
plead "specific wrongful acts which constitute an independent 
tort" to establish the predicate unlawful act in a civil 
conspiracy claim); American Diversified Ins. Servs. v. Union 
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) ("[A]ppellant has stated a cause of action for civil 
conspiracy based on an independent tort, specifically the tort 
of intentional interference with business 
relationships."); Avery v. Rossford Ohio Transp. Dist., 762 
N.E.2d 388, 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he underlying unlawful 
act must be a tort."). 
B. Question #2 
 
The second question asks whether a two-year or five-year 
statute of limitations applies to claims of tortious 
interference with contract and tortious interference with 
business expectancy.  Under Code § 8.01-243(A), an action for 
personal injuries is subject to a two-year statute of 
limitations, while under Code § 8.01-243(B) an action for injury 
to property is subject to a five-year statute of limitations.  
The dispositive issue is whether tortious interference with 
16 
contract and tortious interference with business expectancy 
allege injury to property.  See Willard, 262 Va. at 482, 551 
S.E.2d at 600 (holding that the "applicable statute of 
limitations is determined by the type of injury alleged").  If 
so, they must be brought within five years after the cause of 
action accrues.  Code § 8.01-243(B).  If not, the two-year 
statute of limitations in either Code § 8.01-243(A) or -248 
applies.6 
 
We have held that "the right to performance of a contract 
and the right to reap profits therefrom are property rights 
which are entitled to protection in the courts."  Worrie, 198 
Va. at 536, 95 S.E.2d at 196 (emphasis added); accord Chaves, 
230 Va. at 120, 335 S.E.2d at 102; see also Downey v. United 
Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976, 980 (Mo. 1953) ("The 
right to perform a contract and to reap the profits therefrom, 
and the right to performance by the other party, are property 
rights entitling each party to the fulfillment of the contract 
by performance."); Raymond v. Yarrington, 73 S.W. 800, 803 (Tex. 
                     
6 The second certified question asks only about the two-year 
and five-year statutes of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.  
Cottman, however, argues that the applicable statute of 
limitations is the catchall two-year provision in Code § 8.01-
248.  As the statute's plain language indicates, it applies only 
to "[e]very personal action . . . for which no limitation is 
otherwise prescribed."  In determining whether Code § 8.01-248 
applies, we analyze the nature of the cause of action at issue.  
Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 262 Va. 432, 439, 551 S.E.2d 615, 619 
(2001). 
17 
1903) ("It seems to us that where a party has entered into a 
contract with another to do or not to do a particular act or 
acts, he has as clear a right to its performance as he has to 
his property, either real or personal; and that knowingly to 
induce the other party to violate it is as distinct a wrong as 
it is to injure or destroy his property."); cf. Andrews v. Ring, 
266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 (2003) (holding that Code 
§§ 8.01-499 and -500 "apply to business and property interests, 
not to personal or employment interests"). 
 
As Cottman notes, determination of the applicable statute 
of limitations in Worrie depended on whether the alleged cause 
of action for conspiracy to breach a contract was of the nature 
to survive the death of the plaintiff.  198 Va. at 536, 95 
S.E.2d at 195.  At that time, actions that survived and thus 
subject to a longer statute of limitations were those for 
"'wrong to property, real or personal, or which [grew] out of 
breach of contract.'"  Id. at 536, 95 S.E.2d at 195 
(quoting Winston v. Gordon, 115 Va. 899, 915-16, 80 S.E. 756, 
763 (1914)).  Because of statutory enactments in 1977, 
survivability is no longer germane in deciding which statute of 
limitations applies.  Willard, 262 Va. at 479, 551 S.E.2d at 
598; Pigott v. Moran, 231 Va. 76, 80, 341 S.E.2d 179, 181 
(1986).  Nevertheless, the Court's analysis in Worrie to 
18 
determine whether an alleged injury is to property or to the 
person remains relevant and binding.7 
 
That analysis centered on the plaintiffs' claim that "their 
business or estate, their property" in an employment contract 
with a dancing instructor was destroyed by the defendants' 
conspiracy to induce breach of the employment contract and to 
solicit the plaintiffs' customers, depriving the plaintiffs of 
business.  Worrie, 198 Va. at 536-37, 95 S.E.2d at 196.  We 
concluded that based on those allegations, "the wrong done and 
damage done [was] directed to the estate or property of the 
plaintiffs and not to them personally."  Id. at 537, 95 S.E.2d 
at 196; compare Willard, 262 Va. at 481, 551 S.E.2d at 599 
(holding that a shareholder's rights to dissent to corporate 
action "are property interests and that allegations of loss of 
dissenters' rights constitute an allegation of 'injury to 
property' within the meaning of Code § 8.01-243(B)"), and Lavery 
v. Automation Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 234 Va. 145, 154, 360 
S.E.2d 336, 341-42 (1987) (holding that an action seeking 
damages for the unauthorized use of a person's name, portrait, 
or picture was a claim for injury to property), with Pigott, 231 
Va. at 81, 341 S.E.2d at 182 (holding that alleged fraud by a 
realtor was directed at the plaintiffs personally and not to 
                     
7 Likewise, that portion of the decision in Worrie is not 
affected by the Court's subsequent decision in Station #2. 
19 
their property because the fraud had no impact on the real 
property, which remained in the same condition and was available 
for the same use both before and after the alleged fraud was 
perpetrated). 
 
As already discussed, one of the elements of a claim for 
tortious interference with either a contract or business 
expectancy requires intentional interference inducing or causing 
a breach or termination of the contractual relationship or 
business expectancy.  Chaves, 230 Va. at 120, 335 S.E.2d at 102.  
Such interference is directed at and injures a property right, 
i.e., the right to performance of a contract and to reap profits 
and benefits not only from the contract but also from expected 
future contracts or otherwise advantageous business 
relationships.  See Worrie, 198 Va. at 536, 95 S.E.2d at 
196; see also Pure Milk Ass'n v. Kraft Foods Co., 130 N.E.2d 
765, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) ("'[T]he right to perform a 
contract and to reap the profits resulting from such performance 
. . . are property rights which entitle each party to 
protection, and to seek compensation by action in tort for any 
injuries to such contract.'"); Johnson v. Gustafson, 277 N.W. 
252, 254 (Minn. 1938) ("[T]he interest in a contract being a 
property right, a party thereto has a right of action against 
persons who are by their conduct substantially interfering with 
the performance thereof."); Barr v. Essex Trade Council, 30 A. 
20 
881, 885 (N.J. Ch. 1894) ("A man's business is [his] 
property."); Carolina Overall Corp. v. East Linen Supply, Inc., 
174 S.E.2d 659, 661 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970) ("The theory of the 
doctrine which permits recovery for the tortious interference 
with a contract is that the right to the performance of a 
contract and to reap the profits therefrom are property rights 
which entitle each party to protection and to seek compensation 
by action in court for an injury to such contract.").  Contrary 
to Cottman's argument, tortious interference is not an 
allegation of nothing more than disappointed economic 
expectations, which are redressed by the law of 
contracts.  See Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, 
Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 425, 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1988). 
Therefore, we hold that the five-year statute of 
limitations in Code § 8.01-243(B) applies to both tortious 
interference with contract and tortious interference with 
business expectancy. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we hold that both tortious interference with 
contract and tortious interference with business expectancy 
qualify as an unlawful act for purposes of a business conspiracy 
claim under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500. We also hold that the 
five-year statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243(B) applies 
21 
to causes of action for tortious interference with contract and 
tortious interference with business expectancy. 
Certified question 1 answered in 
the affirmative. 
 
Certified question 2, alternative 
II answered in the affirmative.