Title: State v. Phonesavanh Vanmanivong
Citation: 2003 WI 41
Docket Number: 2000AP003257-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 14, 2003

2003 WI 41 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3257-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, a/k/a Sing Chen,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 299 
Reported at:  249 Wis. 2d 350, 638 N.W.2d 348 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 14, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
L. Edward Stengel   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by John J. 
Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha, and oral argument by John J. 
Grau. 
 
 
2003 WI 41 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3257-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 276) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, a/k/a Sing Chen,  
 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 14, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before this court on 
a petition for review filed by the State of Wisconsin.  The 
State seeks review of a published opinion of the court of 
appeals, State v. Vanmanivong, 2001 WI App 299, 249 Wis. 2d 350, 
638 N.W.2d 348, which conditionally reversed five convictions of 
delivering cocaine to undercover officers and remanded the case 
to the circuit court for a hearing on whether the identities of 
two confidential informers should have been disclosed.  A jury 
found the defendant, Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, a/k/a Sing Chen 
(Vanmanivong), guilty of eight counts of delivering cocaine in 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
2 
 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)1 (1999-2000).1  Before 
trial, defense counsel requested disclosure of the identities of 
the State's two confidential informants.  The Sheboygan County 
Circuit Court, L. Edward Stengel, Judge, after receiving 
affidavits from the informers and soliciting an unsworn memo 
from law enforcement, found, in camera, that disclosure of the 
informers' identities was not warranted and denied the motion.  
After Vanmanivong was convicted, he appealed his convictions on 
the basis that the circuit court had erroneously exercised its 
discretion by failing to follow the procedural requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  The court of appeals found the 
circuit court erred by relying upon an unsworn memo with regard 
to the five convictions based on alleged transactions where an 
informant was involved.  It reversed and remanded the case for 
another in camera hearing in which the circuit court would take 
testimony on the identity of the individual who sold drugs to 
the undercover officers and determine if disclosure of the 
informers' identities was warranted.  We reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.   
¶2 
This case presents two issues.  First, we consider 
whether the court of appeals applied the correct legal standards 
in analyzing the circuit court's in camera procedure.  Second, 
if, as both parties now agree, the circuit court erred in 
relying upon an unsworn memo in its decision to deny the defense 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
3 
 
motion to disclose the identities of the confidential informers, 
we consider whether such error was harmless.   
¶3 
We reverse the court of appeals' decision, because we 
find that the court of appeals erred in its statement of 
Wisconsin law regarding disclosure of informers' identities.  
Also, we agree with the court of appeals that the circuit court 
erred in relying upon an unsworn memo as basis for its decision, 
but we reverse the court of appeals' decision because we find 
that error to be harmless in the context of this case.   
I 
¶4 
The following facts are relevant for purposes of this 
review.  Beginning in February 1999, undercover police officers 
began purchasing crack cocaine from a person they knew only as 
"Shorty."  From February 1999 through June 1999, Special Agents 
Neil McGrath and Thomas Sturdivant of the Division of Narcotics 
Enforcement in the Wisconsin Department of Justice participated 
in eight drug buys from Shorty.  Two confidential informants who 
had 
purchased 
cocaine 
from 
Shorty 
on 
previous 
occasions 
introduced the agents to Shorty.  These informants worked 
independently, one working with Agent McGrath and the other with 
Agent Sturdivant.   
¶5 
A confidential informant was present at five of the 
eight drug transactions with Shorty conducted by either Agent 
McGrath or Agent Sturdivant.  Agent McGrath had a confidential 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
4 
 
informer identified as DDI-34442 with him when he bought cocaine 
from Shorty on February 8, 1999 (Count 1), and February 23, 1999 
(Count 3).  Agent Sturdivant handled six cocaine buys from 
Shorty and a different informer, DDI-3432, was present on three 
of those occasions.  DDI-3432 arranged and went along with Agent 
Sturdivant for buys occurring on February 18, 1999 (Count 2), 
February 25, 1999 (Count 4), and March 5, 1999 (Count 5).  On 
March 11, 1999 (Count 6), March 25, 1999 (Count 7), and May 18, 
1999 (Count 8), Agent Sturdivant arranged and completed the last 
three buys from Shorty without the assistance of a confidential 
informant. 
¶6 
Before the buy on February 23, 1999, Agent McGrath 
positively identified a photograph of a Pao Moua as the person 
he knew as Shorty, who sold him cocaine.  McGrath testified at 
trial that the photo was provided after a computer database 
linked the nickname "Shorty" with the name Pao Moua.  Beginning 
with the report dated February 18, 1999, both Agent McGrath and 
Agent Sturdivant referred to Shorty as Moua in their reports and 
used the names interchangeably.3  Sturdivant testified at trial 
                                                 
2 DDI stands for "dangerous drug informant,"  referring to 
confidential informers that law enforcement officials enlist to 
assist them with drug investigations. 
3 Although the first report using Moua as the name for 
Shorty 
is 
dated 
before 
Agent 
McGrath 
made 
the 
photo 
identification and is written by Agent Sturdivant, the document 
reflects that Sturdivant actually signed the report on March 8, 
1999, after the identification by McGrath.  The report by Agent 
McGrath, as brought out at trial, was actually signed on March 
2, 1999. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
5 
 
that he did not come up with Moua's name independently; rather, 
he began using the name Moua in his reports because it was given 
to him by Agent McGrath or other officers.   
¶7 
Sometime before May 18, 1999, the officers realized 
Shorty could not be Pao Moua, because Detective Kirk Bloedorn 
found out Pao Moua had been incarcerated out of state during the 
entire time the drug investigation took place.  Bloedorn later 
testified to that effect at Vanmanivong's trial.  The agents had 
doubts 
about 
Shorty's 
identity 
from 
early 
on 
in 
the 
investigation, so the officers conducted surveillance on several 
occasions between April 1999 and June 1999 to ascertain Shorty's 
true identity.  In April 1999, Detective Bloedorn participated 
in a traffic stop of three Asian individuals.  One of the people 
stopped identified himself as Sing C. Chen, and gave a date of 
birth of June 17, 1968.  Sing Chen gave his address as 912 
Ontario Avenue in Sheboygan, Wisconsin.  Later, photographs of 
this group were taken in the area of 912 Ontario Avenue.  From 
these photographs, Agent McGrath was able to positively identify 
Sing Chen as Shorty.  In his report regarding the final drug buy 
on May 18, 1999, Agent Sturdivant then referred to the person 
who sold him drugs only as Shorty.  He later testified that he 
did so because he recognized Shorty by sight, but was not sure 
of his actual name at the time. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
6 
 
¶8 
In June 1999, Sing Chen4 was charged with eight counts 
of selling cocaine to undercover officers.  Before trial, the 
defendant 
filed a 
motion 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10, 
requesting 
that 
the 
identities 
of 
the 
two 
confidential 
informants be disclosed.  He asserted that the informers might 
be able to provide key testimony important to his defense of 
misidentification.  The defendant, in his offer of proof, 
referenced the police reports in which Pao Moua was identified 
as the person who sold the drugs to the agents and a police 
report in which an informer identified Shorty as a "Hmong male 
in his mid 20's [sic]." Vanmanivong is over thirty years old.  
Vanmanivong argued that identity was a determinative issue and 
that because informants were present at several of the drug 
sales, the informers "may be able to give testimony necessary to 
a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence."  At a 
hearing on the motion, the State conceded that Vanmanivong's 
offer 
of 
proof 
met 
the 
initial 
burden 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) and acknowledged that the next step 
would be an in camera inspection.  The State offered to have the 
informants present to testify and identify Vanmanivong from a 
photo lineup.  The circuit court rejected such an approach and 
requested, instead, that law enforcement conduct a photo lineup 
                                                 
4 According to the record, Sing Chen also identified himself 
as Noy Sang.  At sentencing, the defendant finally provided his 
given name as Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, and stated that Sing Chen 
and Noy Sang were merely nicknames.  Detective Bloedorn 
testified at Vanmanivong's trial that the defendant informed 
him, "Noy and Chen in his country stand for short or small."   
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
7 
 
and submit affidavits to the court.  The court requested a 
procedure be done by which the informants would "identify who 
they are referring to as Shorty." 
¶9 
On July 29, 1999, and August 4, 1999, the two 
informers were interviewed separately and question-and-answer 
style affidavits from these interviews were subsequently signed 
by the informers and submitted to the court.  These affidavits 
state that the informers were shown a photograph.  Both 
informers identified the person in the photograph as the person 
they knew as Shorty.  Unfortunately, the photograph used for the 
photo lineup was not submitted to the court, and no other 
affidavits were provided with the informers' affidavits to 
reflect that the photograph shown to the informers was, in fact, 
a photograph of the defendant.5  Following submission of the 
affidavits, the court, by its own initiative and without 
consulting either of the parties, contacted law enforcement and 
requested additional clarifying information.   
                                                 
5 As noted by the court of appeals, there also appear to be 
inconsistencies with the informers' affidavits.  The case 
activity reports filed by law enforcement in this case identify 
two confidential informers as DDI-3444 and DDI-3432.  However, 
the affidavits have different identification numbers.  In one 
affidavit, Detective Bloedorn states:  "I will be interviewing a 
Confidential Informant and will be putting his CI number at the 
top of the report for reference."  Both affidavits have 
handwritten numbers at the top right corner, CI #1010 and CI 
#1068, different from the numbers used in the case activity 
reports.  No explanation was provided for these inconsistencies.  
Nonetheless, the affidavits do make clear that these informants 
worked with either Agent Sturdivant or Agent McGrath and 
introduced the agent with whom they worked to the person they 
knew as Shorty.  Thus, these discrepancies are immaterial. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
8 
 
¶10 The follow-up communications to the court consisted of 
two typed memos, purportedly from Detective Bloedorn.  These 
memos were not affidavits, but rather unsworn memos from 
Detective Bloedorn to the court.  One of these memos (Exhibit 1) 
discussed information about the cooperation of a confidential 
informant, identified in the memo as Lanh Neauone and CI-3456.  
This document was a forgery.  At trial, the parties stipulated 
that Exhibit 1 was, in fact, created by the defendant.  
Detective Bloedorn testified that he did not create Exhibit 1.  
The other memo (Exhibit 43), however, was submitted by Detective 
Bloedorn to the court and explains the initial misidentification 
of Shorty and the informers' identification of Shorty.   
¶11 On October 22, 1999, the circuit court made an oral 
ruling regarding Vanmanivong's motion for disclosure.  The court 
stated: 
After reviewing the initial affidavits, I gained 
little understanding from what I had originally in 
reviewing all of the reports, and I then requested 
further clarification from the investigative agency as 
to the informant's understanding or knowledge of the 
identity of the defendant, and I received a follow-up 
communication, and I believe you must have my copy. 
I have asked [the deputy district attorney] whether 
there was any objection on behalf of the State of that 
being furnished to [defense counsel].  He says there 
[is] not, and that's been now given to [defense 
counsel]. 
 
My 
review 
of 
this 
affidavit, 
this 
statement, although not under oath, I'm satisfied 
provides the necessary trustworthiness.  With that 
information it appears that the informants do not have 
any additional information as to the identity of the 
defendant. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
9 
 
The 
confusion 
that 
appears 
from 
the 
original 
identification . . . is not activities that involve 
the 
confidential 
informants 
but 
apparently 
are 
activities that centered around the actions of law 
enforcement.  With that clarification and my review of 
the 
documentation, 
I 
do 
not 
believe 
that 
the 
disclosure of the identity of the informants in this 
case would be necessary for a fair or complete 
determination of the issues, and the interests of 
justice does [sic] not require their disclosure at 
this point, so the request for disclosure is denied. 
¶12 As noted by the court at the oral ruling, the unsworn 
memo used in the in camera procedure was turned over to defense 
counsel 
before 
trial. 
 
At 
trial, 
Agent 
McGrath, 
Agent 
Sturdivant, and Detective Bloedorn testified.  They were 
examined and cross-examined regarding the investigation, the 
cocaine transactions, the misidentification of Pao Moua and the 
subsequent 
identification 
of 
the 
defendant. 
 
All 
three 
identified the defendant, Vanmanivong, a/k/a Sing Chen, as the 
person whom they had been investigating.  Agent McGrath and 
Agent Sturdivant testified that the defendant was Shorty and the 
person who had been selling them cocaine.  These agents 
testified that their contacts with Shorty often occurred at 
close range, in vehicles, and that there were opportunities to 
see Shorty with the light on in the vehicle.  Detective Bloedorn 
was cross-examined on information provided in Exhibit 43——the 
unsworn memo used during the in camera procedure.  Defense 
counsel, using Exhibit 43, attempted to raise doubt as to when 
the traffic stop involving Detective Bloedorn actually occurred.  
Defense counsel also used Exhibit 42, Detective Bloedorn's 
report regarding the traffic stop and surrounding investigation, 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
10 
 
for that line of questioning.  Following this cross-examination, 
the defense moved for all the defense exhibits, including 
Exhibit 43, to be moved into evidence.  The circuit court 
granted this motion.  Vanmanivong was subsequently convicted on 
all eight counts of delivering cocaine. 
¶13 Vanmanivong appealed his convictions, claiming that 
the circuit court erred in the exercise of its discretion by 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
mandates 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  The court of appeals affirmed three 
of the convictions, finding that because the confidential 
informers were only present at five of the eight drug buys, the 
identity of those informants related only to those five counts.  
As such, the convictions on Counts 6-8 were affirmed because the 
informers were not present at those transactions. 
¶14 However, finding that the circuit court erred in 
relying upon an unsworn memo in determining that the informers' 
identities 
need 
not 
be 
disclosed, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
conditionally reversed the remaining five counts and remanded 
the case for a retrospective in camera hearing at which the 
circuit court would "take the testimony of the two informants 
regarding the identity of 'Shorty' and the identity of the 
individual 
who 
sold 
drugs 
to 
the 
undercover 
officers."  
Vanmanivong, 249 Wis. 2d 350, ¶19.  We reverse. 
II 
¶15 This case is complex, both legally and factually.  As 
noted, there are two issues presented to this court.  The first 
issue we address is that of the standards used by the court of 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
11 
 
appeals in its conditional reversal of five of Vanmanivong's 
convictions.  In reviewing a circuit court's decision following 
an 
in 
camera 
hearing 
or 
submission 
of 
affidavits 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10, the scope of review is whether the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion.  See State v. Outlaw, 
108 Wis. 2d 112, 128-29, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982); State v. 
Norfleet, 2002 WI App 140, ¶9, 254 Wis. 2d 569, 647 N.W.2d 341; 
State v. Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d 412, 419, 415 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 
1987). "Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making.  
Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning.  This 
process must depend on facts that are of record or that are 
reasonably derived by inference from the record and a conclusion 
based 
on 
a 
logical 
rationale 
founded 
upon 
proper 
legal 
standards." Norfleet, 254 Wis. 2d 569, ¶9 (quoting McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
¶16 In this case, however, we are called upon to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10 to determine what standards are appropriate 
for the determination whether an informant's identity must be 
disclosed.  Such a question of statutory interpretation presents 
a question of law that this court reviews de novo, "benefiting 
from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals."  State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶41, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 
N.W.2d 413 (citing State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 
N.W.2d 904 (1998)). 
¶17 The defendant also asserts that the circuit court's 
error implicates his due process rights, specifically, his right 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
12 
 
to present a defense.  When a defendant's constitutional right 
to a fair trial is implicated, it raises a question of law which 
this court reviews de novo.  See State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 
¶20, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 369, 646 N.W.2d 298; see also State v. 
Littrup, 164 Wis. 2d 120, 126, 473 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(stating "[S]ince this appeal deals with the constitutional 
questions 
of 
whether 
[the 
defendant's] 
rights 
to 
due 
process . . . were protected, the appeal presents questions of 
law.  We review questions of law de novo without deference to 
the trial court") (citations omitted). 
¶18 The statute at issue here, Wis. Stat. § 905.10, is not 
new; 
its 
policies 
have 
been 
long-standing 
and 
we 
have 
interpreted 
its 
language 
on 
previous 
occasions, 
most 
specifically in Outlaw.  Section 905.10(1) of the Wisconsin 
Statutes recognizes the state government's general privilege 
regarding the protection of the identities of confidential 
informants.6  This rule recognizes the privilege, and also "the 
reality 
that 
informers 
are 
an 
important 
aspect 
of 
law 
enforcement and that the anonymity of informers is necessary for 
their effective use."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 121. The seminal 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.10(1) provides: 
Identity of informer.  (1) Rule of Privilege.  
The federal government or a state or subdivision 
thereof has a privilege to refuse to disclose the 
identity of a person who has furnished information 
relating to or assisting in an investigation of a 
possible violation of law to a law enforcement officer 
or member of a legislative committee or its staff 
conducting an investigation. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
13 
 
case on the government’s confidential informant privilege is the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).  In that case, the Supreme Court 
noted the purposes served by such a privilege: 
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and 
protection of the public interest in effective law 
enforcement.  The privilege recognizes the obligation 
of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the 
commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, 
by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to 
perform that obligation. 
Id. at 59. 
¶19 The Court found that the privilege had limitations 
stemming from its purpose and the requirements of fundamental 
fairness.  Id. at 60.  As such, the Court held:  "Where the 
disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his 
communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an 
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the 
privilege must give way."  Id. at 60-61.  However, as noted by 
this court in Outlaw, the Court did not "set up a mechanism for 
determining when an accused’s right to a fair trial was 
infringed by the prosecution’s assertion of the informer 
privilege."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 121-22.  Rather, in Roviaro, 
the Court stated: 
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to 
disclosure is justifiable.  The problem is one that 
calls for balancing the public interest in protecting 
the flow of information against the individual’s right 
to prepare his defense.  Whether a proper balance 
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the 
particular circumstances of each case, taking into 
consideration 
the 
crime 
charged, 
the 
possible 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
14 
 
defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s 
testimony, and other relevant factors. 
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62.  Several years later, in Rugendorf v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1964), the Supreme Court 
confirmed the above balance from Roviaro as the appropriate test 
for determining whether an informant's name must be disclosed.   
¶20 Wisconsin 
codified 
the 
government 
privilege 
for 
informants in Wis. Stat. § 905.10, and recognized the same 
policies as those in Roviaro.  In Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 121, 
this court specifically held that § 905.10(3)(b) is a Wisconsin 
rule and grounded on Wisconsin precedent, but that the rule is 
consistent with Roviaro.  Section 905.10(3)(b) is the provision 
at issue in this case.  It describes an exception to the 
privilege and provides a mechanism through which courts may 
determine whether the privilege stands in a particular case.  
Section 905.10(3)(b) provides: 
Testimony on merits.  If it appears from the evidence 
in the case or from other showing by a party that an 
informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a 
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence 
in a criminal case . . . and the federal government or 
a state or subdivision thereof invokes the privilege, 
the judge shall give the federal government or a state 
or subdivision thereof an opportunity to show in 
camera facts relevant to determining whether the 
informer can, in fact, supply that testimony.  The 
showing will ordinarily be in the form of affidavits 
but the judge may direct that testimony be taken if 
the judge finds that the matter cannot be resolved 
satisfactorily upon affidavit.  If the judge finds 
that there is a reasonable probability that the 
informer can give the testimony, and the federal 
government or a state or subdivision thereof elects 
not to disclose the informer's identity, the judge on 
motion of the defendant in a criminal case shall 
dismiss the charges to which the testimony would 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
15 
 
relate, and the judge may do so on the judge's own 
motion. . . .   Evidence submitted to the judge shall 
be sealed and preserved to be made available to the 
appellate court in the event of an appeal, and the 
contents shall not otherwise be revealed without 
consent 
of 
the 
federal 
government, 
state 
or 
subdivision thereof. All counsel and parties shall be 
permitted to be present at every stage of proceedings 
under this subdivision except a showing in camera at 
which no counsel or party shall be permitted to be 
present. 
¶21 The State in this case argues that the court of 
appeals erred in applying the precedent of this court regarding 
the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  In particular, 
the State argues that ¶14 of the court of appeals' decision 
stated an erroneous standard by relying upon the lead opinion in 
Outlaw, rather than the majority opinion, for the test to be 
applied.  The court of appeals, in that passage, cited the lead 
opinion from this court's decision in Outlaw, stating: 
 . . . a trial court errs in the exercise of its 
discretion when it weighs the evidence revealed by the 
informer or views the case in hindsight.  What is, in 
fact, helpful to a defendant is not a decision that 
should 
be 
made 
by 
the 
trial 
judge 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  The trial court's duty in 
the exercise of discretion is only to determine that 
the testimony the informer could give is relevant and 
admissible in respect to an issue material to the 
accused's defense and hence is reasonably necessary to 
a fair determination of guilt or innocence.  The 
judge's discretionary function under § 905.10(3)(b), 
if it cannot be said that the proffered testimony is 
incredible as a matter of law, is similar to that in 
any jury trial; the judge's duty is merely to 
determine competency, relevancy and admissibility. 
Vanmanivong, 249 Wis. 2d 350, ¶14 (emphasis added)(internal 
citations omitted). 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
16 
 
¶22 As 
noted, 
Outlaw 
was 
a 
split 
decision, 
with 
concurrences by Justice Callow and Justice Steinmetz that 
garnered a majority of the justices for part of the opinion.  
See Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d  at 138-142.  In that case, this court 
was asked to determine what the obligations of the State and the 
defendant were when the informer privilege was invoked by the 
State.  Id. at 113.  The defendant in Outlaw was charged with 
three counts of delivery of cocaine to an undercover agent.  Id. 
at 115.  During trial, the agent admitted five people were 
present just before the transaction took place, a change from 
his prior statements.  Id. at 116.  The defense established that 
the fifth person was an informant and asked the agent the 
informer's name.  Id.  The State invoked the informer’s 
privilege.  Id.  The circuit court denied a motion for 
disclosure without holding an in camera hearing.  Id. at 116-17.  
The defendant was convicted and appealed.  Id. at 118.  The 
court of appeals remanded the case for a hearing.  Id.  Upon 
remand and following an in camera hearing, the court found that 
disclosure was not required because there was not a reasonable 
probability that the informer’s testimony would be helpful to 
the defense.  Id. at 119.  The defense theories were alibi and 
mistaken identity.  Id. at 118.  Although the court found that 
informer could not identify Outlaw, the issue of identity was 
convincingly testified to by the agent, so the testimony, 
reviewed in total, would not be helpful.  Id. at 119.  The court 
of appeals reversed and remanded the convictions.  Id. at 119-
20.  The State then petitioned this court for review, arguing 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
17 
 
that the court of appeals applied an erroneous standard.  Id. at 
120.  Thus, as in this case, the court was left to determine the 
appropriate standards to be applied.   
¶23 In Outlaw, the court split on the determination of an 
appropriate test.  Two years later, this court explained the 
results of Outlaw in State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 352 
N.W.2d 660 (1984).  There, we held that when a majority of a 
multimember court takes a position in a concurrence, the opinion 
of the court and the controlling law on that point is the 
concurrence.  Id. at 194-95.  In Outlaw, the concurrence (and 
majority of justices) specifically rejected some of the language 
of the lead opinion regarding the test to be applied.  Justice 
Callow, writing in concurrence, stated: 
I specifically reject the language in the majority 
opinion stating the proper test for disclosure of an 
informer’s identity to be whether the informer’s 
testimony was relevant and admissible to a material 
issue.  I conclude that an essential condition 
precedent 
to 
disclosure 
is 
that 
the 
informer’s 
testimony be necessary to the defense. 
Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d at 194 (quoting Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 
141)(emphasis omitted).  This court in Dowe then held: 
In Outlaw, the lead opinion represents the majority 
and is controlling on the issues of the state’s burden 
and the existence of abuse of discretion by that 
circuit court.  However, the concurring opinions 
represent the majority on the issue of the test to be 
applied and therefore control on this point. 
Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d at 194-95. 
¶24 We 
now 
reaffirm 
our 
holding 
in 
Dowe 
that 
the 
concurrence in Outlaw states the test to be applied in 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
18 
 
determining whether an informant’s identity must be disclosed.  
Based on the language of the concurrence, a defendant must show 
that an informer’s testimony is necessary to the defense before 
a court may require disclosure.  See Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 139 
(Callow, J., concurring).  "Necessary" in this context means 
that the evidence must support an asserted defense to the degree 
that the evidence could create reasonable doubt.  See id. at 
141-42.  The court of appeals in the instant case relied upon 
the lead opinion for a point of law upon which the concurrence-
majority opinion controls.  As such, the court of appeals erred 
in its statement of the law.   
¶25 The court of appeals appears to acknowledge the 
concurring opinion as controlling to some degree when it states 
a second part to its analysis: 
If the trial court determines that the confidential 
informants' testimony is not relevant and admissible 
with respect to an issue material to Vanmanivong's 
defense, the trial court may reinstate the judgments 
of 
conviction. 
 
If, 
however, 
the 
trial 
court 
determines that the confidential informants' testimony 
is relevant and admissible, the trial court must then 
determine 
if 
the 
disclosure 
is 
necessary 
to 
Vanmanivong's defense. 
Vanmanivong, 249 Wis. 2d 350, ¶20 (citing Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 
141; Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d at 194-95).  However, this statement does 
not eliminate the problems raised by ¶14.  The court of appeals 
mixed and matched what is to be a single test applied as 
described by the concurrence in Outlaw.   
¶26 The court of appeals in ¶14 follows the same errant 
path as the lead opinion in Outlaw by equating relevancy and 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
19 
 
admissibility 
with 
necessity. 
 
As 
the 
majority 
in 
the 
concurrence 
of 
Outlaw 
stated, 
"[T]here 
is 
a 
significant 
difference between these terms; something may be relevant and 
admissible, but not necessary."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 139 
(Callow, J., concurring).  For example, where a defendant claims 
misidentification, this court noted in Outlaw:  "If the in 
camera inquiry results in the judge concluding the informer can 
positively identify the defendant, such testimony meets the test 
enunciated [in the lead opinion]."  Id. at 140-41.  Such 
testimony meets the "relevant and admissible" test, but is not 
necessary to the defense, because it does not support the theory 
of the defense.  Justice Steinmetz pointed out that a similar 
problem arises for evidence that is "merely cumulative."  Id. at 
142 (Steinmetz, J., concurring). 
¶27 The 
interpretation 
of 
§ 905.10 
in 
the 
Outlaw 
concurrence 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
balancing 
principles 
described 
in 
Roviaro.  
The 
standard, 
as 
stated by the 
concurrence, has consistently been upheld by this court and 
other Wisconsin courts.  See State ex rel. Green Bay Newspaper 
Co. v. Circuit Court, Branch 1, Brown County, 113 Wis. 2d 411, 
423, 335 N.W.2d 367 (1983); State v. Lass, 194 Wis. 2d 591, 596, 
535 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the Outlaw 
concurrence is the standard and that Wisconsin's procedure is 
consistent with Roviaro); State v. Hargrove, 159 Wis. 2d 69, 75, 
464 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1990).   Roviaro required a balancing 
test, looking at the defendant's right to present a defense and 
the government's right to protect its informants.  Roviaro, 353 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
20 
 
U.S. at 60-61.  Roviaro explicitly refused to give a specific 
rule, finding that the balance must be done on a case-by-case 
basis.  Id. at 62.  The Court in Roviaro found that to determine 
whether a defendant's right to present a defense requires 
disclosure depends upon a balance of the circumstances of the 
case, including "the crime charged, the possible defenses, the 
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other 
relevant factors."  Id.  We find that the Outlaw definition 
requiring the information to be "necessary" to the defense 
implements an appropriate balance.   
¶28 In 
Rugendorf, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
reaffirmed 
its 
adherence 
to 
the 
Roviaro 
case-by-case 
balancing 
test.  
Rugendorf, 376 U.S. at 534-35.  In that case, the Court reviewed 
its analysis in Roviaro.  Id.  In finding that disclosure of 
informants' identities was not required in the case, the Court 
held that "we cannot say on this record that the name of the 
informant was necessary to his defense."  Id. at 535.  The Court 
also went on to find:  "Never did petitioner's counsel indicate 
how the informants' testimony could help establish petitioner's 
innocence."  Id.  These findings indicate that the standard in 
Outlaw is consistent with Roviaro.  Information that does not 
support the defense's theory is not helpful to the defense and 
cannot be essential to a fair determination of the cause from 
the 
defense 
perspective. 
 
The 
Outlaw 
concurrence 
dealt 
specifically with the defense of misidentification, the defense 
asserted 
in 
the 
present 
case. 
 
It 
stated: 
 
"[W]here 
identification is at issue, I would declare the evidence is not 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
21 
 
necessary to the theory of mistaken identity where the informer 
can identify the defendant with reasonable certainty as the 
participant in criminal activity."  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 141 
(Callow, J., concurring).  
¶29 Vanmanivong has asserted that failure to follow the 
mandatory 
procedures of 
§ 905.10(3)(b) 
implicates his due 
process rights.  This argument fails for several reasons.  As 
noted in both the Outlaw concurrence and lead opinion, the 
informer's privilege is a product of Wisconsin Supreme Court 
rule making.7  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 139.  The rule in Wisconsin 
emerged from Wisconsin precedent.  See Stelloh v. Liban, 21 
Wis. 2d 119, 
126-27, 
129, 
124 
N.W.2d 101 
(1963)(first 
recognizing the balance of interests of the public and the 
person arrested and finding that the informer's identity need 
not always be disclosed).  The privilege is one of public 
policy.  Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d at 421 (citing Stelloh, 21 
Wis. 2d at 125; Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59). 
 ¶30 In 
Larsen, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
analyzed 
the 
contention that failures during the in camera process violate 
due process.  See Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d at 420.  The court of 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that in State v. Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d 112, 120-21, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982), the court found that 
the rules of evidence are generally matters of state law, "to 
the extent that they do not impinge upon United States 
constitutional guarantees."  Wisconsin has interpreted the due 
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions to be 
"substantially equivalent."  State v. Brown, 85 Wis. 2d 341, 
345-46, 270 N.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1978).  Hence, for considering 
alleged due process violations, it is appropriate that the state 
and federal standards applied be consistent. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
22 
 
appeals examined the United States Supreme Court decision in 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), and noted, citing 
Roviaro, that the Supreme Court held that the privilege must 
give way when an informer's identity is essential to a fair 
determination of the cause, but that this was "not a requirement 
of the federal constitution but a court-imposed limitation upon 
the privilege."  Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d at 421.  Based on our 
holding in Outlaw, we agree with this interpretation.  As noted 
in 
Larsen, 
"[s]ince 
Roviaro, 
the 
federal 
courts 
have 
consistently 
held 
that 
the 
defendant 
has 
no 
absolute 
constitutional right to disclosure of the identity of an 
informer."  Id. at 421 (internal citations omitted).  As will be 
made clear later in this opinion, in this case, the balance 
between the defendant's rights and the right of the state to 
protect its informants was adequately provided for by the 
procedures used at this defendant's trial.  As such, we reject 
the defendant's claim that his due process rights were violated.  
As we recently stated in a similar context:  "We have confidence 
in the circuit courts to [] make a proper determination as to 
whether disclosure of the information is necessary based on the 
competing interests involved in such cases."  Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶35. 
¶31 The balancing test laid out in Roviaro has led to a 
variety of interpretations.  Some states have adopted a rule 
providing a privilege such as that in Wisconsin.  See, e.g., 
State v. Opupele, 967 P.2d 265, 269 (Haw. 1998)(interpreting 
Hawaii's rule of privilege).  Other states have simply adopted 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
23 
 
the Roviaro analysis.  See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 687 A.2d 
485, 486-87 (Conn. 1997).  Some jurisdictions, such as the Fifth 
Circuit, have developed a three-part test using the facts of 
Roviaro as basis for differentiating levels of informant 
participation.  See United States v. Orozco, 982 F.2d 152 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that, after analyzing an informant's level 
of participation, the helpfulness of disclosure to the defense, 
and the government interest in nondisclosure, where an informant 
was present but may not have seen the transaction, disclosure 
was not required).  All of the cases, however, perform some type 
of balancing test between the defendant's right to present a 
defense and the government's right to protect its informants.  
See, e.g., United States v. Bender, 5 F.3d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 
1993) (applying the Roviaro balance and finding "[the defendant] 
has failed to demonstrate that he possesses a genuine need of 
informant disclosure that outweighs the public's interest").  
Wisconsin's rule calls for the same type of balance. 
¶32 Based upon the above analysis of the law, the 
following procedures should be used by Wisconsin circuit courts 
when determining whether an informant's identity should be 
disclosed.  Once a defendant has made an initial showing that 
there is a reasonable probability that an informant may be able 
to give testimony necessary to the fair determination of the 
issue of guilt or innocence, the state has the opportunity to 
show, in camera, facts relevant to determining whether or not 
the informant can, in fact, provide such testimony.  If, and 
only if, the court determines that an informer's testimony is 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
24 
 
necessary to the defense in that it could create a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt in jurors' minds, must the 
privilege give way.  Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 141-42 (Callow, J., 
concurring). 
III 
¶33 With the benefit of these above-stated standards, we 
now move to the second issue:  the application of the procedures 
in this case.  The parties here agree, as do we, that it was 
error for the circuit court to rely upon an unsworn memo in 
determining 
whether 
the 
identities 
of 
the 
confidential 
informants 
should 
be 
disclosed. 
 
Section 
905.10(3)(b) 
specifically 
states: 
 
"The 
showing 
[by 
the 
State] 
will 
ordinarily be in the form of affidavits but the judge may direct 
that testimony be taken if the judge finds that the matter 
cannot be resolved satisfactorily upon affidavit."  Under the 
plain language of the statute, affidavits or testimony are the 
two options given the circuit court.  Both of these options 
provide for sworn evidence.  If the judge finds that the 
affidavits provided are inadequate, as in this case, the court 
may then take testimony.  By relying upon an unsworn memo, the 
circuit court here failed to follow the statute.  Additionally, 
we note that the danger of relying upon unsworn evidence played 
out in this very case.  Here, two memos purportedly from 
Detective Bloedorn were submitted to the court.  One of those 
memos was a forgery created by the defendant.  Fortunately, 
here, the forgery was discovered.  We find, however, that 
relying upon unsworn evidence for purposes of the in camera 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
25 
 
process under Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) is error.  This memo, at 
least as used during the in camera procedure, shall not be 
considered as evidence to be relied upon in this review. 
¶34 We 
also 
find 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
by 
independently 
requesting 
additional 
information 
from 
law 
enforcement, a request that led to receipt of the unsworn memo 
from Detective Bloedorn.  The circuit court relied upon that 
independently 
gathered 
information 
to 
make 
a 
ruling 
on 
disclosure.  Again, if the affidavits collected are inadequate, 
the 
judge 
has 
the 
option 
of 
hearing 
testimony.  
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  Judges are generally prohibited from 
independently gathering evidence by the rules of judicial 
ethics.  Supreme Court Rule 60.04(1)(g) prohibits a judge from 
engaging in ex parte communications concerning a pending action, 
with several exceptions not applicable here.8  The Comment to the 
                                                 
8 SCR 60.04 (2000).  A judge shall perform the duties of 
judicial office impartially and diligently. 
 . . . . 
(1)  In the performance of the duties under this 
section, 
the 
following 
apply 
to 
adjudicative 
responsibilities: 
 . . . . 
(g)  A judge shall accord to every person who has 
a legal interest in a proceeding, or to that person’s 
lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.  A 
judge may not initiate, permit, engage in or consider 
ex parte 
communications 
concerning 
a 
pending or 
impending action or proceeding [except as listed 
below]. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
26 
 
rule 
states, 
in 
part, 
"A 
judge 
must 
not 
independently 
investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence 
presented."  Id.  A judge must not go out and gather evidence in 
a pending case.  To do so is error.  The judge here did disclose 
his communication with law enforcement to both parties before 
ruling upon the motion for disclosure.  He also provided the 
unsworn memo 
to the defense before 
trial. 
 
These 
were 
appropriate actions under SCR 60.04.  See Comment to SCR 
60.04(1)(g). 
 
These 
actions, 
though, 
cannot 
balance 
the 
potential harm done by seeking evidence independently and then 
relying upon such evidence in making a ruling. 
IV 
¶35 Although we agree with the court of appeals that error 
occurred in this case, we find that the analysis does not end 
there.  Rather, we move to an examination for harmless error.  
In State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, 
this court adopted the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), which reaffirmed the 
harmless error test stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967).  In Neder, the Supreme Court confirmed the Chapman 
standards:  "That test, we said, is whether it appears 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained.'"  Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (quoting 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).  In this case, the errors at issue are 
procedural.  First, the circuit court erred by independently 
seeking additional evidence during the in camera process.  
Second, the court accepted and relied upon an unsworn memo in 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
27 
 
ruling upon the motion for disclosure.  We now must determine 
whether or not these errors contributed to Vanmanivong's 
convictions.  We examine the nature of the errors complained of 
and their effect, if any, on the trial. 
¶36 Wisconsin courts have accepted that harmless error 
analysis is appropriate for cases such as this.  In our recent 
decision in Green, we compared the situation where a defendant 
seeks privileged psychological records to the situation of 
government informant protection, finding that similar standards 
and 
policy 
balances 
were 
applicable. 
 
See 
Green, 
253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶¶24-25, 29.  In Green, the issue was whether the 
defendant was entitled to an in camera review at all.  Id., ¶20.  
We noted, however, that even if the defendant made the showing 
necessary to get an in camera review, the defendant would not 
automatically be entitled to a remand for such a review, because 
the defendant must still show the error was not harmless.  Id.  
Similarly, in State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 501-02, 602 
N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals found that 
failure to conduct an in camera inspection, even assuming it 
would have led to allowing the defendant to utilize records at 
trial, still constituted harmless error because the information 
came out through testimony at trial.  Thus, we find that 
harmless error analysis is applicable to the type of case we 
have before us.   
¶37 We disagree with the dissent's argument that harmless 
error analysis is inappropriate in this case.  The dissent 
misconstrues the error here to make it fit the mold of State v. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
28 
 
Rizzo.  In Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶¶4-6, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 
N.W.2d 93, this court found that the circuit court had never 
applied the appropriate standards to determine if the defense 
was entitled to a pretrial psychological examination, because 
the State had represented to the court that it was not 
presenting Jensen evidence, obviating the need for such a 
determination.  There, this court had no record upon which to 
determine whether the defense was entitled to the pretrial 
examination or not, because the circuit court had never ruled 
upon the Maday factors.  See id., ¶44.  The court did not apply 
harmless error analysis because the court never exercised its 
discretion to make the determination.  See id., ¶¶44-47.  Here, 
however, as will be discussed, the circuit court did exercise 
its discretion and we do have an appropriate record upon which 
to do a harmless error analysis. 
¶38 We note that the procedural posture in Green is 
different than that found in the case at hand.  In Green, and 
the Ballos case upon which it relied, the issue was whether a 
defendant was entitled to an in camera review at all.  See 
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶20; Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495 at 497.  In 
such cases, the burden falls upon the defendant to show that he 
or she is entitled to an in camera review.  Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶20.  In reviewing that decision for harmless 
error, then, the burden was placed upon the defendant to show 
the error was not harmless.  Id.  In this case, however, there 
is no dispute over the defendant's entitlement to an in camera 
review.  Both sides agree that the prima facie showing was 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
29 
 
satisfied.  Here the problem arises at the next step in the 
analysis——whether the disclosure of the informants' identities 
was necessary.   
¶39 Under Outlaw, the State has the opportunity to present 
evidence that an informant's testimony is unnecessary.  Outlaw, 
108 Wis. 2d at 126; see also Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d at 193-94.  In 
Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 127, this court held that the State did 
not have a burden of proof requiring it to show "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the informer's testimony would not be 
helpful to the defense."  However, if the State does not want 
the case dismissed, the State must reveal what the informants' 
testimony would be.  Id.  Given that the State bears this 
responsibility, and because the State benefited from the errors 
here, we deem it appropriate for the State to bear the burden of 
proving harmless errors that arise at this step in the analysis. 
¶40 In Harvey, this court agreed with prior Wisconsin 
harmless error cases in finding that the beneficiary of the 
error should bear the burden of showing the error to be 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
30 
 
harmless.9  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶40-41 (citing State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985))("[t]he 
burden of proving no prejudice is on the beneficiary of the 
error, here the state").  Here the State benefited from the 
errors that occurred, in that the decision not to disclose the 
identities of the informants was based upon an unsworn affidavit 
received at the request of the circuit court.  Thus, it is 
appropriate for the State to bear the burden of proving harmless 
error. 
¶41 As discussed, harmless error analysis requires, for a 
constitutional error or other error, this court to determine 
whether "'it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'"  
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶44 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-
                                                 
9 The dissent suggests that Harvey is somehow incompatible 
with the Green case.  Dissent, ¶54 n.3.  However, these cases 
are procedurally quite different.  As we have noted, Green deals 
with the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to an in 
camera review in the first place.  See State v. Green, 2002 WI 
68, ¶20, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.  Harvey reviews 
harmless 
error 
analysis 
in 
light 
of 
an 
erroneous 
jury 
instruction.  See State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶35, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  Whatever differences in these 
cases may exist are of no consequence to our present analysis.  
Harvey represents the general rule as it adopted the burden of 
proof used in previous Wisconsin cases.  Id., ¶41.  Further, 
based on Outlaw and Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b), it is appropriate 
for the State to bear the burden in this case.  We also note 
that the Harvey position has been previously accepted as a 
general proposition by this court:  "[T]his court's harmless 
error analysis places upon the beneficiary of the error the 
burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless."  State v. 
Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 241, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996) (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring). 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
31 
 
16).10  This court also has noted that it is the responsibility 
of the court to apply such a test under Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2), 
which provides: 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
¶42 Using this test, we hold that the State met its burden 
and that the procedural errors committed in this case were 
harmless.  Given the circumstances of this case, it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors did not contribute to 
the jury's verdict.  We find that remand for a new in camera 
proceeding in this case would be repetitive, amassing only the 
same evidence already presented to the court and inevitably 
leading to the same result.  
¶43 The dissent acknowledges that the nature of the error 
here is procedural.  See dissent, ¶¶52, 53, 59.  The focus of 
                                                 
10 Following 
the 
Neder 
case, 
this 
court 
in 
Harvey 
reformulated the test for purposes of harmless error analysis in 
the context of jury instructions, stating the test to be whether 
it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error."  
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶46, 49 (citing Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted).  
However, the Neder formulation of the test maintained the 
standards stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.18 (1967).  
See id., ¶44. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
32 
 
our harmless error analysis, as described in both Harvey and 
Neder, must be whether the circuit court's failure to follow the 
statutory procedures contributed to the outcome of the trial.  
We find that the errors here had no effect on the outcome at 
trial.  Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we find that the 
"requisite determination of whether the confidential informants' 
testimony was 'necessary' to the defendant's defense" was made 
by the circuit court in this case.  Dissent, ¶52.  Unlike the 
Rizzo case, the circuit court here made a determination.  The 
court explicitly found that divulgence of the informers' 
identities was not necessary.  The only errors here were 
procedural.  The court erred by using ex parte communications to 
solicit the memo and by then relying upon the unsworn document.  
Because of these procedural missteps, we have thrown out the 
unsworn memo for purposes of consideration in the initial in 
camera review.  It was improperly appropriated and, because it 
was unsworn, it should not have been relied upon in the 
disclosure decision.   
¶44 However, that memo did not disappear following the in 
camera review.  Instead, it was turned over to the defense and 
the trial went forward.  At trial, the defense had an 
opportunity, which it utilized, to cross-examine the agents and 
Detective Bloedorn regarding the misidentification and other 
information in that memo, which became Defense Exhibit 43.  
Defense counsel used the memo to question Detective Bloedorn 
about 
the 
date 
of 
a 
traffic 
stop 
involving 
Sing 
Chen 
(Vanmanivong).  Defense counsel also used Exhibit 42 during that 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
33 
 
examination.  Exhibit 42 is Detective Bloedorn's report on the 
traffic stop and the investigation, and it explained that a 
misidentification occurred and that the past case activity 
reports would have to be changed so they would no longer reflect 
the misidentification of Pao Moua.  The agents and Detective 
Bloedorn withstood questioning regarding why Shorty was first 
identified as Pao Moua.  All three confirmed that, despite the 
initial misidentification, following additional surveillance, 
the officers were able to positively identify the defendant as 
Shorty.   
¶45 The circumstances of this case are different from 
those found in Roviaro.  This case does not have the Roviaro 
situation where the informant was the only participant besides 
the defendant in the criminal event.  In Roviaro, agents were 
not able to see and hear all that occurred between the informant 
and the defendant.  353 U.S. at 63-64.  Here, the agents 
participated in the drug sales and were party to everything that 
occurred relevant to the crimes for which Vanmanivong was 
charged.   
¶46 Following the cross-examination of Detective Bloedorn, 
defense counsel moved for all of his exhibits, including Exhibit 
43, to be moved into evidence.  The trial court granted this 
request.  The defense essentially acknowledged the validity of 
the documents as sworn statements by Detective Bloedorn.  
Although Exhibit 43 was not initially valid for purposes of the 
in camera review, once this document was moved into evidence, it 
became 
valid 
evidence. 
 
Exhibit 
43 
explains 
the 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
34 
 
misidentification 
process 
and 
clearly 
states 
that 
the 
confidential informants identified the defendant as the person 
they knew as Shorty.  The dissent asserts that this memo 
"attests only to the officers' confusion about the identity of 
the defendant" and "does not provide any further insight into 
the confidential informants' 
knowledge 
of 
the 
defendant's 
identity."  Dissent, ¶65 (emphasis omitted).  However, as the 
dissent acknowledges, the memo verifies that Detective Bloedorn 
showed a photo of the defendant to the informants and the 
informants identified the person in the photo as the person they 
knew as Shorty.  See dissent, ¶65.  The memo containing that 
verification came in as evidence when the defense requested its 
admission.   
¶47 Further, it is apparent that the circuit court's main 
point of confusion had little to do with the informants.  As 
noted earlier, the circuit court, in making its oral ruling on 
the defense motion, stated:  "The confusion that appears from 
the original identification . . . is not activities that involve 
the confidential informants but apparently are activities that 
centered around the actions of law enforcement."   
¶48 Given 
that 
the 
very 
same 
memo 
containing 
the 
information the judge relied upon after the in camera proceeding 
was later introduced into evidence at trial, there is no 
possibility that the informants' testimony would have produced a 
reasonable doubt in this case.  The judge's ruling on disclosure 
would not have changed.  Thus, disclosure of the informants' 
identities was not required in this case.  Had the memo been 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
35 
 
appropriately procured and in the form of a sworn affidavit in 
the first place, there was sufficient evidence to uphold the 
discretionary decision of the circuit court not to disclose the 
identities of these informants.  As it is, the same information 
came out through the trial, and the errors during the in camera 
process were rendered harmless.  The information upon which the 
court relied in denying the defense motion for disclosure of the 
informants' identities later came into evidence at trial and, at 
that time, provided sufficient basis for the court's ruling.  
Unlike the Rizzo case, we have a sufficient record upon which to 
determine whether the defendant would have been successful in 
his motion absent the error.  See Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶44 
("Because . . . the circuit court never had the opportunity to 
exercise its discretion in applying the Maday factors, we do not 
know 
whether 
Rizzo 
would 
have 
been 
able 
to 
survive 
a 
determination under Maday."). 
¶49 We find that because the memo introduced into evidence 
by the defense shows the informants identified the defendant, 
the circuit court's ruling was validated.  Remand in this case 
to redo the in camera proceeding and avoid the procedural errors 
would be repetitive, leading to the collection of the same 
evidence and, subsequently, the same ruling by the circuit 
court.   The jury had before it the same information it would 
have had if the procedural errors had not occurred.  As such, 
there is no possibility that these two procedural errors 
contributed to Vanmanivong's convictions. 
No. 
00-3257-CR   
 
36 
 
¶50 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the standards 
applied by the court of appeals were not in accordance with the 
precedent of this court.  We have explained the correct 
procedures to be applied by the circuit court when determining 
if an informant's identity should be disclosed.  Justice 
Callow's concurrence in Outlaw correctly represents the test to 
be applied in Wisconsin on the issue of whether informants' 
identities need to be released to the defendant.  We also hold 
that although we agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court erred in relying upon an unsworn memo and 
gathering evidence independently, we find that such errors were 
harmless in the context of this case.  Because the errors were 
harmless, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that the defendant's convictions on the five counts of 
distributing cocaine be reinstated. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶51 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  I dissent 
for two reasons.  First, I agree with the court of appeals that 
the case should be remanded to the circuit court so that 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) can be properly applied.  Second, I am 
concerned 
that 
the 
majority 
opinion 
leaves 
the 
correct 
interpretation of § 905.10(3)(b) in doubt. 
I 
¶52 It is undisputed that the circuit court failed to 
follow 
the 
in 
camera 
procedure 
mandated 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) and thus did not make the requisite 
determination of whether the confidential informants' testimony 
was "necessary" to the defendant's defense.  I dissent because I 
do not believe that this error is subject to harmless error 
analysis.11   
¶53 The issue in this case is not whether, under harmless 
error analysis, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.12  
Rather, the issue is whether the circuit court's failure to 
follow the procedure in Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) led to the 
exclusion of testimony that might have been "necessary" to the 
defendant's defense. 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶¶35, 41-42 (citing Wisconsin's harmless 
error test as that stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967)). 
12 See majority op., ¶¶35, 41-42. 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶54 Because I believe that the harmfulness of the error 
cannot be assessed without a proper determination as to whether 
the informants' testimony is "necessary" to the defendant, I 
would affirm the remedy detailed by the court of appeals.13  The 
five convictions relating to the drug buys made in the presence 
of the confidential informants should be conditionally reversed 
and the matter should be remanded to the circuit court for a new 
in camera determination conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b).  If the circuit court 
determines that the informants' testimony is not necessary to 
the defense, the convictions may be reinstated.  If, however, 
the circuit court determines that the informants' testimony is 
necessary, then the privilege of confidentiality must give way 
to the defendant's right to present a defense, and the defendant 
is entitled to a new trial on these five counts. 
¶55 The issue presented in this case is similar to one 
faced by this court in State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, 250 
Wis. 2d 407, 640 N.W.2d 93.  Under Wisconsin law, "fundamental 
                                                 
13 The majority opinion brings an inconsistency in our case 
law to light.  The majority cites State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 
253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, for the proposition that a 
defendant bears the burden of proving that a circuit court's 
error in denying him an in camera review of privileged materials 
was not harmless, contrary to the general rule that the 
beneficiary 
of 
the 
error 
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
harmlessness.  Majority op., ¶38.  The majority opinion then 
correctly holds that in this case, pursuant to State v. Harvey, 
2002 WI 93, ¶¶40-41, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, the burden 
of proving that a circuit court's error in conducting an in 
camera review of confidential information is harmless is on the 
beneficiary of that error.  Majority op., ¶40.  I question why 
the burden is placed on different parties in these two 
situations. 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
fairness" requires that a defendant in a sexual assault case be 
entitled to a pretrial psychological examination of the alleged 
victim when the State seeks to put on Jensen evidence——evidence 
that the alleged victim is demonstrating behaviors consistent 
with the behaviors of other such victims.14  Absent this 
opportunity, the defendant is not playing on a level field and 
does not have an adequate chance to counter the State's 
evidence.15   
¶56 This right, however, must be balanced against the 
privacy interests of the victim.  Consequently, circuit courts 
have been directed to consider the seven Maday factors16 to 
determine if the defendant in a given case "has a compelling 
need or reason" for the examination, thereby warranting an 
intrusion into the privacy interests of the victim.17 
¶57 In Rizzo, this court held that the proper remedy for a 
defendant who was convicted at trial after he was erroneously 
denied the opportunity to have a pre-trial determination of his 
right to conduct an independent psychological examination of the 
sexual assault victim was to remand the matter to the circuit 
                                                 
14 State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶14, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 
N.W.2d 93 (citing State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 357, 507 
N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
"Jensen evidence" refers to this court's decision in State 
v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988). 
15 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357. 
16 The "Maday factors" are so named because they were first 
detailed in State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
17 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 360. 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
court with directions to conduct the appropriate pretrial 
determination.   
Only if Rizzo should have been granted his request for 
a pretrial psychological examination did the State's 
introduction of Jensen evidence violate his rights to 
due process and a fair trial.  Because, as we have 
already noted, the circuit court never had the 
opportunity to exercise its discretion in applying the 
Maday factors, we do not know whether Rizzo would have 
been able to survive a determination under Maday.18 
¶58 The remedy in the case at hand should be no different.    
It is true that Rizzo is not on all fours with the case at hand.  
The circuit court in Rizzo made no determination as to whether 
the 
defendant 
was 
entitled 
to 
a 
pretrial 
psychological 
examination and thus there was no record from which an appellate 
court could assess harmlessness.  In the present case, by 
contrast, the circuit court conducted a pretrial hearing and 
created a record.  This distinction, however, is irrelevant 
since the precise issue in this case is the sufficiency of that 
record in determining whether the informants' testimony is 
"necessary" to the defendant.     
¶59 The 
circuit 
court 
never 
properly 
applied 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) to determine whether the defendant was 
entitled to know the identity and thereby present the testimony 
of the confidential informants in this case.  The circuit court 
made its determination to deny the defendant's request based on 
three documents——two affidavits from which it "gained little 
information" 
and 
required 
"further 
clarification" 
and 
an 
inadmissible, unsworn, ex parte memo from a police officer.  We 
                                                 
18 Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶44. 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
simply do not know, therefore, whether the defendant would have 
prevailed if the proper procedure had been followed and adequate 
information had been considered by the circuit court.  
¶60 The majority opinion concludes, "[I]n this case, the 
balance between the defendant's rights and the right of the 
state to protect its informants was adequately provided for by 
the procedures used at this defendant's trial."19  The majority 
points out that the unsworn document submitted by Detective 
Bloedorn was admitted into evidence, and that the defendant 
therefore had an opportunity to cross-examine police officers 
about their confusion concerning the identity of the defendant, 
as evidence of the "procedures" at trial that "adequately" 
balanced the competing interests in this case. 
¶61 I fail to understand how this evidence sufficiently 
compensates for the improper pretrial determination.  In order 
for the procedures used during trial to permit an appellate 
court to determine that the defendant's rights were adequately 
balanced against the state's right to protect its informants, 
and thus that the underlying error was harmless, sufficient 
information must have been elicited at trial to make a 
determination that the testimony of the confidential informants 
was not necessary to the defendant's defense. 
¶62 In State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 602 N.W.2d 117 
(Ct. App. 1999), for example, the defendant in an arson case 
made a pretrial request for an in camera inspection of the 
mental health records of one of the state's witnesses.  The 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶30. 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
witness was an accomplice who had struck a deal with the state 
in exchange for his testimony against the defendant.  The 
defendant argued that the records would demonstrate that the 
witness was obsessed with building bombs and was mentally 
unstable, and that being able to present this evidence was 
necessary to his defense.  The circuit court denied the request.   
¶63 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court's decision was erroneous.  However, it went on to 
hold that the error was harmless because the jury learned during 
the witness's testimony at trial that he had received mental 
health counseling prior to the fire; that he had received 
medication, including anti-depressants; and that he had admitted 
an interest in blowing things up. 
¶64 Here, in contrast, the information elicited during the 
defendant's trial does not provide any similar substitute for 
the information that should have been considered during the 
pretrial in camera investigation.  The confidential informants' 
testimony in this case is "necessary" if it could have "'created 
in the minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt' regarding a 
defendant's guilt,"20 and nothing testified to at trial assists 
in making this determination.   
¶65 The unsworn memo attests only to the officers' 
confusion about the identity of the defendant.  It says very 
little about the knowledge that the confidential informants had 
or the testimony they could offer at trial.  The single 
                                                 
20 State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 140, 321 N.W.2d 145 
(1982) (Callow, J., concurring). 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
paragraph 
in 
Detective 
Bloedorn's 
memo 
discussing 
the 
confidential informants reads as follows: 
Neither of the Confidential Informants were [sic] ever 
aware 
of 
the 
identity 
of 
"Shorty." 
 
The 
CI's 
introduced two different undercover officers and were 
acting independently of each other.  Neither of the 
CI's were aware of each others activities.  When I 
obtained the affidavits for the Court, I at that time 
did show a photo of Sing Chen to both CI's.  Both CI's 
stated that the photo was that of "Shorty." 
In short, it does not provide any further insight into the 
confidential informants' knowledge of the defendant's identity.  
It explains that Detective Bloedorn had shown them a photo of 
the defendant and that both stated that the photo was that of 
Shorty, but this information was already included in the 
original affidavits that the circuit court found unenlightening.   
 
¶66 The factual dispute underlying this case is whether 
the defendant was the person with whom the police officers and 
the confidential informants engaged in drug transactions on five 
separate occasions.  The police officers initially believed that 
the person from whom they bought drugs was a man of Asian 
descent, in his 20s, named Pao Moua.  They later testified that 
the seller was in fact the defendant, a man of Asian descent, in 
his 30s, named Sing Chen.   
¶67 While the defendant had the opportunity at trial to 
cross-examine the police officers about this mistake and 
introduce evidence attesting to their confusion, he never had 
the opportunity to present or test the testimony of the other 
witnesses to the transactions——the confidential informants.   
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶68 While the defendant's right to cross-examine is not 
absolute, it has been denied in the present case without the aid 
of information that illuminates the potential scope or content 
of the confidential informants' testimony and thus without 
adequate consideration of his interests in a fair trial.  
Neither the circuit court, nor the jury, nor this court has had 
a chance to consider evidence of the confidential informants' 
testimony that did not require "further clarification," and yet 
this court stands firm in its conclusion that "there is no 
possibility that the informants' testimony would have produced a 
reasonable doubt in this case."21 
¶69 In addition, if the circuit court were to find on 
remand that the testimony of the confidential informants was 
necessary to the defendant's defense, this court cannot conclude 
that the failure to provide it was nonetheless harmless.  The 
same argument was raised and rejected in Rizzo: 
[A] determination that the psychological examination 
was necessary to level the playing field seems 
inconsistent with a determination that the absence of 
such an examination was harmless error.  A decision by 
the circuit court that a defendant is entitled to a 
pretrial psychological examination of the victim is 
tantamount 
to 
a 
determination 
that 
fundamental 
fairness requires that the defendant be given the 
opportunity to present relevant evidence to counter 
the State's Jensen evidence.  Accordingly, we do not 
apply a harmless error analysis.22 
¶70 The Rizzo analysis of remedy squarely fits the 
situation at hand.  As the majority opinion explains, the 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶48. 
22 Rizzo, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶47 (citation omitted). 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
balancing of interests required under Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) 
also has its roots in the idea of "fundamental fairness."23  The 
statute is specifically designed to incorporate two competing 
interests:  the public’s interest in effective law enforcement, 
embodied in the confidential informant's privilege, and the 
defendant's right to present a defense and have a fair trial.24  
In order to properly balance these interests, the circuit court 
is required to conduct a pretrial in camera examination to 
determine if the requested privileged information is "necessary" 
to the defendant's defense and therefore must be disclosed to 
the defendant. 
¶71 As was true in Rizzo, a determination that the 
informants' testimony is necessary to the defendant in this case 
is inconsistent with a determination that the absence of the 
testimony was harmless error.  A decision by the circuit court 
that the defendant in this case is entitled to the identity and 
thus the testimony of the confidential informants is tantamount 
to a determination that fundamental fairness requires that the 
defendant be given the opportunity to present relevant evidence 
to counter the State's evidence.  Thus, the harmless error 
analysis does not apply. 
II 
¶72 I am concerned that the majority opinion leaves the 
correct interpretation of § 905.10(3)(b) in doubt.  
                                                 
23 Majority op., ¶19. 
24 Majority op., ¶20. 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶73 The majority opinion is correct to point out that 
Wisconsin 
law, 
like 
federal 
law, 
holds 
that 
neither 
a 
confidential informant's privilege nor a defendant's right to 
confront 
a 
confidential 
informant 
is 
absolute, 
and 
that 
determining when the informant's privilege must give way to a 
defendant's right to a fair trial requires a case-by-case 
balancing of the public's interest in effective law enforcement 
against an individual's constitutional rights.25  
¶74 The concurring/majority opinion in Outlaw, however, 
expressly rejected the test established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Roviaro for making this proper balance.  The 
Outlaw concurring/majority opinion stated bluntly that although 
federal case law is relevant and helpful in interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b), 
it 
is 
not 
controlling. 
 
"The 
Wisconsin [informer's privilege] rule is distinctly a product of 
Wisconsin Supreme Court rule making."26 
¶75 More 
specifically, 
the 
Outlaw 
concurring/majority 
opinion 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b) 
clearly 
specifies that a confidential informant's privilege will give 
way only where his testimony is "necessary" to a fair trial.  An 
informer's testimony is necessary if it "could have created in 
the minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt regarding a 
defendant's guilt."27  In contrast, the Roviaro decision holds 
                                                 
25 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957); 
Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 141 (Callow, J., concurring). 
26 Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 139 (Callow, J., concurring) 
(quoting Outlaw majority op.). 
27 Id. at 140 (Callow, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
that "where the disclosure of an informer's identity . . . is 
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is 
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must 
give way."28  As Justice Callow wrote in Outlaw criticizing the 
lead opinion, "I do not believe that relevant and admissible in 
respect to an issue material to the accused's defense is the 
equivalent of reasonably necessary to a fair determination of 
guilt or innocence."29 
¶76 The defendant argues that the test announced in the 
Outlaw concurrence/majority opinion for determining when a 
confidential 
informant's 
privilege 
must 
give 
way 
to 
a 
defendant's right to a fair trial is too strict.  He urges this 
court to adopt the more lenient Roviaro test, citing to 
analogous tests in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), 
State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 
1998), and State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 
(Ct. App. 1993).  The majority opinion's response to the 
defendant is to conflate Roviaro and Outlaw, leaving the reader 
to wonder whether the more lenient federal Roviaro test or the 
stricter Outlaw concurrence/majority test is controlling law in 
Wisconsin. 
¶77 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
                                                 
28 Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61 (emphasis added). 
29 Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d at 139 (Callow, J., concurring). 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶78 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  00-3257-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1