Title: John G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89665
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2001

Docket No. 89665-Agenda 20-May 2001.
JOHN G. PHILLIPS &amp; ASSOCIATES, Appellant, v. JEFFREY 
 								M. BROWN, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, the law firm of John G. Phillips &amp; Associates
(Phillips), filed suit against defendant Jeffrey Brown for
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The
circuit court of Cook County dismissed the complaint with
prejudice as a sanction for discovery violations. Phillips appealed;
the appellate court dismissed the appeal because the notice of
appeal was untimely (No. 1-99-4078 (unpublished order)). We
granted Phillips' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	Because of the posture of this case and the question we are
called upon to decide, the allegations in the complaint are of only
passing importance. In short, defendant Brown was once an
associate at Phillips. He left to go to another firm, and when he did
so, two clients with whom he had been working transferred their
cases to the new firm, allegedly at Brown's behest.
	The complaint was originally filed in 1995. On November 2,
1999, the court dismissed the entire complaint, with prejudice, as
a discovery sanction. The dismissal did not contain Rule 304(a)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) language. On November 19, 1999, Phillips
filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal. On December 1, 1999,
Brown filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R.
137). The trial court denied Brown's motion for sanctions on
December 13, 1999, in an order which did contain Rule 304(a)
language. Brown did not appeal from the denial of sanctions, and
Phillips never filed a new notice of appeal.
	In the appellate court Brown moved to dismiss Phillips's
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that the November 19
notice of appeal was premature because of the subsequent motion
for sanctions. The appellate court granted the motion, dismissing
the appeal.
ANALYSIS
	Before this court, the sole issue is whether the appellate court
acted correctly in dismissing the appeal. The resolution of this
question turns on interpretation of the rules promulgated by this
court. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. People v.
Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000) ("[t]he interpretation of a
supreme court rule, like a statute, is a question of law that we
review de novo"); In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 401
(1998).
	The appellate court was correct in dismissing the appeal.
	First, there can be no dispute that according to the rules of this
court (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304(a)), appeals may ordinarily only be
taken from final orders which dispose of every "claim"-i.e., "any
right, liability or matter raised in an action." Marsh v. Evangelical
Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). Unless an order
resolves all claims, "it must contain an express finding that there
is no just reason for delaying an appeal. Otherwise, the order is not
appealable." Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d  at 465. See also 155 Ill. 2d R.
304(a) ("an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial
court has made an express written finding that there is no just
reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both").
	Further, it is clear that motions for sanctions under our Rule
137 are "claims" in the cause of action with which they are
connected. Rule 137, which permits parties to request sanctions
for improper filings, explicitly provides that "[a]ll proceedings
under this rule shall be brought within the civil action in which the
pleading, motion or other paper referred to has been filed, and no
violation or alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to a
separate civil suit, but shall be considered a claim within the same
civil action." (Emphases added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. In this regard,
filing a Rule 137 motion is the functional equivalent of adding an
additional count to a complaint, or counter-claim, depending on
which party files the motion.
	Thus, since a motion for sanctions under Rule 137 is a
"claim," and a notice of appeal cannot be filed before the trial
court has disposed of all claims, a notice of appeal cannot be filed
before the trial court has ruled on all Rule 137 motions. This court
has already so held, in Marsh. There, we stated that "no appeal
may be taken from an otherwise final judgment entered on a claim
when a section 2-611 claim remains to be resolved, absent a
finding pursuant to Rule 304(a) that there is no just reason to delay
enforcement or appeal." Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d  at 468. Section 2-611
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par.
2-611), which was at issue in Marsh, was preempted by and
incorporated into Rule 137. See Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d  at 467.
	Had Marsh not been clear enough, we were subsequently
faced with a situation nearly identical to the case at hand in
Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo &amp; Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6 (1998). There, as here, the trial court dismissed a complaint
with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and the
defendant subsequently filed a Rule 137 motion for sanctions. We
recognized that as a general rule "[a] final order is appealable as
of right, and filing a notice of appeal is the jurisdictional step
which initiates appellate review." But we immediately noted that
"[t]he filing of a timely motion for sanctions in the trial court,
however, renders a notice of appeal from such an order premature
and precludes appellate jurisdiction." Niccum, 182 Ill. 2d  at 7. See
also Gaynor v. Walsh, 219 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1002 (1991)
(dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction where defendant filed
a Rule 137 motion after plaintiff had filed notice of appeal
following denial of motion for reconsideration of summary
judgment); P. Esposito, Timing the Notice of Appeal in Light of
Requests for Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Illinois Approach, 4
App. L. Rev. 55, 61-62 (1992) ("a notice of appeal filed either
before or during the pendency of a timely filed Rule 137 motion
is worthless in the absence of a Rule 304(a) finding"). Although
in Niccum we ultimately held that the appellate court had
jurisdiction over the appeal, this was only because the trial court
had included Rule 304(a) language in the final order, which
rendered it appealable despite the subsequently filed sanctions
claim. Niccum, 182 Ill. 2d  at 9.
	Phillips recognizes that Marsh and Niccum are lethal to its
position and requests that this court overrule those decisions.
Plaintiff contends that the decisions are confusing and inherently
contradictory; conflict with the rule that appellate jurisdiction
"attaches instanter upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal";
and permit abuse of the judicial process to deprive a litigant of his
right to appeal. Plaintiff requests that we change the law of this
state so that a timely notice of appeal confers jurisdiction upon the
appellate court regardless of any subsequent motion for sanctions
in the trial court. We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's arguments.
	First, the reasoning of Marsh and Niccum is straightforward.
We have set it out above, but we shall reiterate: (1) absent a Rule
304(a) finding, a notice of appeal may not be filed before the trial
court has disposed of all claims; (2) requests for sanctions under
Rule 137 are claims within the underlying action; therefore (3)
absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a notice of appeal may not be filed
until the trial court has disposed of all requests for sanctions under
Rule 137. We see no ambiguity or basis for confusion here.
	The reason that our rules are so crafted is our often-stated
policy against piecemeal appeals. Rule 137 motions deal with the
propriety of filings in the underlying action. Appellate review of
rulings on such motions will require the reviewing court to
examine not only the particular filing or filings which were the
subject of the motion, but often the entire context of the
surrounding litigation as well. Accordingly, such appeals should
be considered in tandem with any appeal from the litigation from
which it was spawned. This is why Rule 137 provides that motions
thereunder are claims in the underlying litigation-review of such
a motion will almost inevitably require familiarity with the
surrounding case.
	Plaintiff also contends that Marsh is inherently contradictory.
Plaintiff notes that Marsh held that a motion for sanctions is not
a post-trial motion. See Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d  at 461-64. Plaintiff
contends that since only timely post-trial motions toll the time in
which a notice of appeal must be filed, an appellant must file a
notice of appeal within 30 days after the final order, in direct
contrast to the ultimate holding in Marsh that a notice of appeal
cannot be filed until all sanctions motions have been resolved.
	This argument is a red herring. Plaintiff is correct-this court
held in Marsh that a motion for sanctions is not a post-trial
motion. However, as we noted in Marsh, this does not end the
inquiry of when a notice of appeal must be filed. Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d  at 464. The reason that a notice of appeal need not be filed until
after the disposition of a motion for sanctions is not because a
motion for sanctions is a post-trial motion, but because, again, it
is a claim, and a notice of appeal may not be filed until after the
trial court has finally disposed of all claims. See J. Eaton, W.
Quinlan &amp; R. Stern, The Notice of Appeal, in Illinois Civil
Appellate Practice §8.7 (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. 1997) ("A
notice of appeal that is filed before the entry of a final judgment,
or Rule 304(a) certification if necessary, is a nullity").
	Plaintiff protests that Marsh establishes a scheme in which
jurisdiction "bounces" back and forth between the appellate court
and the circuit court. It contends that the circuit court loses all
jurisdiction when a notice of appeal is filed, vesting jurisdiction in
the appellate court, and that it is unseemly for this court to
condone a rule which permits jurisdiction to revert to the circuit
court once it has passed to the appellate court. We are not
persuaded by this argument. Even leaving aside the question of
sanctions, the circuit court does not completely lose jurisdiction
upon the filing of a notice of appeal. It is beyond dispute that the
circuit court has jurisdiction to act on a timely post-judgment
motion. 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2000) ("[t]he court *** may
on motion filed within 30 days after entry thereof set aside any
final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions that shall
be reasonable"). This is true even if that motion is filed after a
notice of appeal, because the filing of the post-judgment motion
renders the prior notice of appeal of no effect. See 155 Ill. 2d R.
303(a); Chand v. Schlimme, 138 Ill. 2d 469, 477-78 (1990).
	Even if plaintiff is technically correct, that our resolution of
this case means that the appellate court becomes vested with
jurisdiction immediately upon the filing of a notice of appeal but
can be divested thereof upon the subsequent filing of a motion for
sanctions, the same minor peculiarity obtains when a post-judgment motion is filed after a notice of appeal. We note that
because the time limit for filing Rule 137 motions is the same as
the limit for filing notices of appeal-30 days from the entry of
final judgment or disposition of the last timely post-judgment
motion-the appellate court will have "temporary" jurisdiction for
only a few days at most. We see neither a conceptual nor a
practical difficulty with such a rule, especially in the case before
us.
	Nor, contrary to plaintiff's argument, does our rule promote
abuse of the judicial process to deprive a litigant of his right to
appeal. Plaintiff suggests that Marsh "facilitates, and arguably
encourages, fraudulent pleadings [i.e. motions for sanctions]
which are filed for no other reason other [sic] than to obliterate the
appellate court's jurisdiction." Plaintiff argues, e.g., that under
Marsh and Niccum the victor in the trial court could preclude
appellate review of the judgment indefinitely by repeatedly filing
Rule 137 motions in the trial court. There are two flaws with this
reasoning. First, of course, fraudulent filings-including improper
motions for sanctions under Rule 137-are sanctionable. If
opposing counsel were filing Rule 137 motions in bad faith, one
could seek sanctions for this conduct by filing one's own Rule 137
motion. Second, and in more direct response to plaintiff's concern
about deprivation of the right to appeal, one may request at any
time that the trial court add Rule 304(a) language to the final order
which disposed of all issues other than sanctions. See 155 Ill. 2d
R. 304(a) ("[s]uch a finding may be made at the time of the entry
of the judgment or thereafter on the court's own motion or on
motion of any party"). The addition of such language would render
the order immediately appealable notwithstanding any Rule 137
claims.
	We see no reason to alter this state's rules of appellate
procedure so as to accommodate this plaintiff's failure to abide
thereby. We acknowledge plaintiff's observation that some
jurisdictions differ regarding the efficacy of a notice of appeal
filed before a motion for sanctions. However, plaintiff has
presented us with no compelling reason for preferring the rule of
these other jurisdictions over our own. As we have previously
stated, our rule is grounded in the public policy against piecemeal
appeals. Sanctions motions for improper filings are, as a general
matter, inextricably interwoven with the case in which they arise.
Thus they should, as a rule, be considered together with any appeal
from the underlying case. Of course, in individual cases a trial
court may believe that the appeal of the underlying judgment
should not have to await its resolution of a sanctions claim. In
such a case, the court may enter a Rule 304(a) finding. However,
the better general rule is that appeals should be unitary.
	As a final attempt to save its appeal, plaintiff contends that the
appellate court had jurisdiction in this case even under Niccum.
Phillips reaches this conclusion by positing that the fact that the
trial court dismissed the complaint "with prejudice" should serve
as the equivalent of Rule 304(a) language. We reject this
argument. On its face Rule 304(a) requires the trial court to make
an "express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying
either enforcement or appeal or both." (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill.
2d R. 304(a). The courts of this state are uniform in strictly
enforcing this requirement. See, e.g., Bank of Matteson v. Brown,
283 Ill. App. 3d 599, 603 (1996) (" '[t]he absence of a Rule 304
finding in a judgment-for whatever reason-leaves the judgment
final but unenforceable and unappealable' "), quoting Hamer v.
Lentz, 155 Ill. App. 3d 692, 695 (1987); Hynes v. Department of
Revenue, 269 Ill. App. 3d 697, 707 (1995) (court lacked
jurisdiction "for the reason that the words of art of Rule 304(a)
that are missing from those orders preclude our exercising
jurisdiction"). Moreover, this court has spoken explicitly on this
topic: "where appeal is sought pursuant to Rule 304(a) from a
judgment which defeats a claim or is in the nature of a dismissal,
the written finding is sufficient only if it refers to appealability."
In re Application of the Du Page County Collector, 152 Ill. 2d 545, 551 (1992). An order which simply dismisses a
complaint-even "with prejudice"-does not invoke Rule 304(a). As
the trial court's order in this case made absolutely no reference to
appealability, or even to Rule 304(a), the dismissal was therefore
not appealable under that rule.


CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.


 
Affirmed.