Title: State v. Locklear
Citation: 363 N.C. 438
Docket Number: 578A05
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 2009

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANE LOCKLEAR, JR.
No. 578A05 
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
1.
Evidence–prior crimes or bad acts–murder–similar offense--distinct from
joinder–admissibilty
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution for first-degree murder
by admitting evidence of a prior murder.  The decision about joinder of offenses does not
necessarily determine the presence of a transactional connection between the offenses and does
not determine the admissibility of evidence.  Here, there were similarities between the murders
and the 32 month period between the offenses is not too remote and goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than the admissibility.
2.
Evidence–prior crimes or bad acts–defendant’s admission–convicted felon
and prior murder–explanation of events–motive  
There was no plain error in a first-degree murder prosecution where a statement
was admitted from defendant in which he admitted being a convicted felon and being involved in
a prior murder.  The statements objected to were an integral part of defendant’s explanation of
events and were relevant to motive, and defendant did not show that the jury would have found
him not guilty without the statement or that its admission constituted a fundamental error
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
3.
Evidence–prior crimes or bad acts–drug related–other evidence–no plain
error
In light of the evidence against defendant, there was no plain error in a first-degree
murder prosecution in the admission of a statement from defendant that he had been involved in
drug-related activities.
4.
Constitutional Law–Confrontation Clause–forensic reports–not prejudicial
The admission of forensics reports from a pathologist and dentist who did not
testify violated the Confrontation Clause where the State did not show that either witness was
unavailable or that defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them.  However, the
evidence would not have influenced the verdict in light of the other evidence and because the
defendant was also found guilty under the felony murder rule (where the autopsy played no role). 
5.
Evidence–letter received by inmate–not authenticated–admissibility to show
credibility
An unauthenticated letter in which defendant purportedly asked an incarcerated
witness to change her story was otherwise irrelevant but admissible on redirect examination in
response to defendant’s attack on the inmate’s credibility.  The letter showed her willingness to
come forward and cooperate.  Even assuming error, such error was not prejudicial.
6.
Homicide–second-degree murder--lesser included offense–instruction denied
The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by not giving the
requested instruction on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense where there was clear
evidence supporting each element of first-degree murder, and defendant did not show that rage
rendered him incapable of deliberate thought and the ability to reason.  The only evidence of rage
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was from defendant’s own statements; moreover, the argument concerning premeditation and
deliberation has no bearing on his conviction under the felony murder rule.
7.
Homicide–felony murder–merger with assault–further felony of arson
The trial court did not err by submitting felony murder to the jury where defendant
argued that the killing should have merged with the underlying assault, but there was also the
underlying felony of arson.
8.
Constitutional Law–effective assistance of counsel–conflict of
interest–counsel defending ineffectiveness allegation
Defendant did not show ineffective assistance of counsel due to an alleged
conflict of interest where a pretrial hearing was held concerning the withdrawal of two experts
from the case.  Defendant cannot fault defense counsel for privileged information disclosed by
third parties, protected work product was not revealed, and delays were not solely the result of
deficient performance by counsel.  
9.
Criminal Law–judge’s comments–recusal–denied
There was no error in the denial of a motion to recuse where the judge’s single
reference to his past interaction with defendant did not demonstrate any personal bias or
prejudice against defendant, and there was no evidence of a decision based on emotion rather
than evidence.
10.
Sentencing–capital–instructions–mental retardation
The trial court erred in a capital sentencing proceeding by not giving defendant’s
requested instruction that he would be sentenced to life without parole if the jury found mental
retardation.  The average jury may not understand what a finding of mental retardation will mean
for a defendant.
Justice MARTIN dissenting.
Justice BRADY dissenting.  
Justice NEWBY joins in the dissenting opinion.
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge Robert
F. Floyd, Jr. on 13 June 2005 in Superior Court, Robeson County,
upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree
murder.  On 2 January 2008, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s
motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of
additional judgments.  Heard in the Supreme Court 8 September
2008.
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Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler,
Joan M. Cunningham, and Amy C. Kunstling, Assistant
Attorneys General, for the State.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Constance E.
Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender; and Janet
Moore for defendant-appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Justice.
Defendant Dane Locklear, Jr. was indicted for one count
each of first-degree murder, felonious larceny, burning of
personal property, and first-degree arson.  The case was tried
capitally, and on 1 June 2005, the jury returned verdicts finding
defendant guilty of the first-degree murder of Frances Singh
Persad on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation,
and also under the felony murder rule on the bases of assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and arson.  The
jury also found defendant guilty of misdemeanor larceny, burning
of personal property, and first-degree arson.  Following a mental
retardation hearing, the jury found defendant was not mentally
retarded.  The capital sentencing hearing proceeded, after which
the jury recommended a sentence of death. 
Defendant appealed his capital conviction to this
Court, and we allowed his motion to bypass the Court of Appeals
as to his other convictions.  We find no error in defendant’s
trial, but we vacate his death sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The State presented evidence that in the early morning
hours of 27 February 2000, firefighters responded to reports of a
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fire at the residence of Frances Singh Persad at 52 Beck Street
in Red Springs, North Carolina.  When they arrived at the scene,
firefighters found the home engulfed in flames.  After
extinguishing the fire, firefighters discovered the charred body
of Persad lying on the floor of the front bedroom.  A bloodied
one-by-four board, a bed slat, lay next to her body.  Persad’s
vehicle, a red Ford Mustang, was not at the home.  The shotgun
that Persad normally kept in her bedroom was also missing.  The
subsequent criminal investigation revealed the fire was
intentionally set and that Persad died from carbon monoxide
poisoning.  Persad also sustained blunt-force injuries to her
head and sharp-force injuries to her neck.  Investigators soon
focused their attention on defendant, whom Persad had befriended
while he was a patient at Southeastern Regional Medical Center. 
Persad worked at the medical center as a psychiatric nurse, and
her initial friendship with defendant had developed into a sexual
relationship. 
Several days later, on 1 March 2000, a land surveyor
working in a rural wooded area in Robeson County discovered Ms.
Persad’s red Ford Mustang.  The wooded area was near a canal with
a dirt road beside it, known as “Canal Road.”  The Mustang was
burned down to bare metal and was still smoking.  Defendant’s
extended family resided in the area.  Upon searching the area,
police found defendant hiding in a nearby house. 
Heather Justice testified on behalf of the State.  
Justice stated defendant was an acquaintance of her former
boyfriend, John Campbell.  Justice testified defendant sold
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Campbell a “very large black weapon,” a gun, in exchange for “a
little over 200 pieces of dope” worth “$200.”  Other witnesses
established that this was the same shotgun belonging to Persad. 
Justice further testified that defendant and Campbell arrived at
her residence one Sunday early morning in February of 2000. 
Defendant was driving a red Mustang, and Campbell was sitting in
the passenger seat of the vehicle.  Campbell came into the house
and asked whether defendant could use the bathroom.  As defendant
entered the residence, Justice noticed he appeared to have fresh
blood on his hands and clothes.  After defendant went into the
bathroom, Justice asked Campbell “what was going on, what did he
do--what was he bringing people with blood in my house for.” 
Defendant left approximately ten minutes later. 
The State introduced into evidence several statements
defendant gave to law enforcement officers in which he confessed
to killing Persad.  One statement was audiotaped, while the
second was videotaped.  Defendant told Detective Ricky Britt of
the Robeson County Sheriff’s Office and several other law
enforcement officers that Persad picked him up on the evening of
26 February 2000 after completing a second shift at the hospital. 
Persad drove them in her red Mustang to her home.  Defendant and
Persad were drinking in bed together after sexual intercourse
when they began to argue.  Although defendant could not recall
the exact subject of their disagreement, defendant stated that
Persad was angry with him because he had taken a shotgun from her
house a few days earlier.  The argument “upset” him, and Persad
was “screaming” at him.  Defendant told Detective Britt that “the
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next thing [he knew] is that [he] had grabbed a two by four that
was in her room . . . and [] began beating her with it.” 
According to defendant, Persad attempted to reach the telephone
to call 911, but he beat her down.  She said she “didn’t want to
die.”  Defendant continued to beat Persad in the head with the
board until he believed she was dead.  He checked her heartbeat,
but “knew she was gone.”  She bled profusely, and defendant had
“a lot of blood” on him.  Defendant then set the curtains and
couch on fire and fled the home.  He drove Persad’s Mustang to a
river, where he attempted to wash the blood from his body and
clothes.  Defendant eventually drove to a rural area near Canal
Road and burned the Mustang. 
While confessing to Persad’s murder, defendant
confessed to a second killing that occurred several years
earlier.  Defendant told Detective Britt he killed a young woman
named Cynthia Wheeler, who was a student at the University of
North Carolina at Pembroke at the time of her disappearance in
June of 1997.  At that time, investigators found Wheeler’s
vehicle at the same location near the canal where Persad’s
vehicle was discovered.  Like Persad’s Mustang, Wheeler’s vehicle
was burned down to bare metal.  The skeletal remains of Wheeler’s
body were found several months later along the same canal,
approximately one to two miles away from where Wheeler’s burned
vehicle was located.  Defendant told Detective Britt that he and
Wheeler engaged in sexual intercourse in her vehicle, but that
Wheeler became angry when she discovered defendant was not
wearing a condom.  Wheeler scratched defendant’s face, which
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“upset” him.  Defendant beat Wheeler in the face, then allowed
her to dress.  Wheeler told defendant she intended to tell law
enforcement officers that defendant raped her, then began to run
away.  Defendant caught her, then beat and choked her.  Wheeler
told him, “[p]lease don’t do this.”  At some point, defendant
realized he had “gone too far” and “tried to wake her up.”  He
checked her pulse and heartbeat.  When he realized Wheeler was
dead, he dumped her body in a wooded area along the canal and
burned her vehicle.
The jury found defendant guilty of the first-degree
murder of Frances Persad on the basis of premeditation and
deliberation, as well as under the felony murder rule, with both
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and arson
as underlying felonies.  The case proceeded to sentencing. 
Defendant presented evidence of mental retardation at
the sentencing hearing.  Dr. Timothy Hancock, a clinical
psychologist, testified as an expert in cognitive impairment or
mental retardation.  Dr. Hancock testified he considered
defendant’s case “a slam dunk for retardation” and that it was
one of the few pro bono cases his clinic accepted every year
“based on merit and the strength of the findings.”  Dr. Hancock
testified defendant obtained a full scale IQ score of 68 on the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (“WAIS”) test he administered
to defendant in January 2005.  Dr. Hancock’s testing also showed
defendant’s adaptive functioning was significantly deficient in
social skills, communication skills, self-care, work skills, and
community use.  Dr. Hancock stated that, in his opinion,
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defendant was mentally retarded as defined by the North Carolina
General Statutes. 
Dr. Hancock also testified to earlier testing of
defendant.  In September 2004 defendant obtained a full scale IQ
score of 69 under a WAIS IQ test administered by another clinical
psychologist, Dr. Brad Fisher.  Dr. Fisher determined that
defendant had adaptive deficits in functional academics, self-
care, community use, and work skills.  Dr. Fisher concluded
defendant was mentally retarded.  
According to Dr. Hancock, defendant’s school records
confirmed he had significant impairment in the functional
academics area.  In 1984, when defendant was fourteen years old,
he had an IQ score of 65 on the Slosson IQ test and an IQ score
of 69 on the Stanford-Binet IQ test.  The Slosson test results
showed defendant had a mental age of nine years at the time. 
Defendant was placed in “educably [sic] mentally handicapped”
classes in 1984.  Dr. Hancock stated this was “the educational
version of mentally retarded.”  Defendant dropped out of school
at the age of sixteen when his mother died.
The State presented evidence of defendant’s records
from Southeastern Regional Mental Health, as well as his medical
records from the Department of Correction.  Although defendant
had been previously diagnosed with antisocial personality
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and
cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana dependence, his intellectual
functioning was diagnosed as borderline and not retarded.  The
State also presented evidence that defendant kept several books
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and letters in his prison cell.  Records from the Department of
Correction showed diagnoses of defendant’s “malingering.” 
During the charge conference for the mental retardation
issue, defense counsel requested the trial court to instruct
jurors that, should they find defendant mentally retarded, he
would be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  Defense
counsel argued “not to include that, you know, the jury would
have no way of knowing what would happen to a defendant if he’s
found mentally retarded, whether he’s going to go free or what’s
to happen to him.  So, they need to know that he’s going to--you
know, he is still going to be in prison for life without parole. 
Defense counsel repeated the request:
Where it says the law provides
that no defendant who is mentally
retarded shall be sentenced to
death, and I ask the Court to also
include an additional sentence or
paraphrase after that that upon a
finding that a defendant is
mentally retarded, he will be
sentenced to life without parole. 
As I said, I explained that so the
jury would know that Mr. Locklear
is going to be in jail for life
without parole.  Because otherwise,
they don’t know what’s going to
happen to him if they should find
that he’s mentally retarded.  If
they don’t know what’s going to
happen to him, your Honor, that may
cause a concern if they find him
retarded, you know, what’s to
happen to him, where is he going to
go.
The prosecutor argued the instruction was unnecessary.  The
following colloquy then occurred:
THE COURT:  As we discussed at
the bench, is there anything to
prevent counsel for either the
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State or defendant arguing the law
as it relates to what type of
punishment would be imposed upon a
finding of either mental
retardation or no mental
retardation?
[PROSECUTOR]: I’m not aware of
any restriction.
THE COURT: So, you’re not
arguing that the defendant cannot
argue to the jury--
[PROSECUTOR]: He can argue it.
THE COURT: --if you find him
mentally retarded, then he will be
sentenced in accordance with the
law of the state of North Carolina
to life in prison without parole?
[PROSECUTOR]: That’s
consistent.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I sort of
beg to differ.  To say that he’s
not to be sentenced to death
doesn’t explain to the jury what’s
going to happen to him.  And if I
get in an argument and say, well,
if you find he’s retarded, he gets
a life sentence, here comes the
instruction that says something
different, that doesn’t include
that in there--
THE COURT: There’s two big
different things.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: One is something
different and one doesn’t include
it in--
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, if I
say something that’s not included
in the instructions, then what’s
the jury going to think?  They
listen to the Court’s instructions
of law, and this said, you know,
that’s what the instruction--what’s
going to happen to him, and they
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don’t know, and that’s the big
question.  And that will be the big
question, and that’s a reasonable
question for them to have, well, if
I find him retarded, what’s going
to happen to him.
The trial court denied defendant’s requested instruction.
The jury found defendant was not mentally retarded. 
Following the presentation of evidence on mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the jury recommended a sentence of
death. 
Additional facts will be provided as needed to discuss
specific issues pertaining to defendant’s assignments of error. 
GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
Evidentiary question on the two murders
[10] Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing
the State to introduce evidence that defendant killed Cynthia
Wheeler in 1997.  Although defendant was charged with murdering
both Persad and Wheeler, the offenses were not joined for trial. 
Defendant asserts that the severance of the cases indicates the
underlying factual circumstances surrounding the murders were too
dissimilar to allow joinder of the offenses.  This dissimilarity,
contends defendant, militates against introduction of the
evidence of Wheeler’s murder.  Defendant argues the evidence of
Wheeler’s murder was introduced for no legitimate purpose other
than to demonstrate his propensity to kill Persad, and that
introduction of the evidence unduly prejudiced him, requiring a
new trial.  
Defendant concedes that admission of evidence of a
prior offense under Rule of Evidence 404(b) differs from joinder
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of offenses.  See, e.g., State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 423, 241
S.E.2d 662, 665 (1978) (noting that whether offenses may be
properly joined is a separate question from whether evidence from
one case may be properly admitted at the trial of the other). 
Although the decision to join offenses for trial often involves
considerations similar to those reviewed when determining whether
to admit evidence of a prior offense under Rule 404(b), the
decision to join or not join offenses does not determine
admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b).  State v. Cummings,
326 N.C. 298, 308-11, 389 S.E.2d 66, 72-73 (1990) (holding that,
although the offenses were not joined for trial, the trial court
properly admitted evidence of one murder at the trial of the
other under Rule 404(b)); State v. Corbett, 309 N.C. 382, 388-89,
307 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1983) (determining that joinder of the
offenses, although improper, was not prejudicial in part because
“[e]vidence of each of these offenses would have been admissible
in the separate trials of the others in order to prove the
identity of the assailant”).  Moreover, the decision to join two
or more offenses for trial is discretionary and does not
necessarily indicate the lack of a transactional connection
between the offenses.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-926(a) (2007); State v.
Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 342-43, 464 S.E.2d 661, 668 (1995) (noting
that the decision to consolidate for trial offenses having a
transactional connection is within the discretion of the trial
court), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1023, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1996). 
Thus, although the offenses may be sufficiently connected such
that joinder would be permissible, the trial court may properly
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decline to consolidate them for trial.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
926(a).  Defendant does not contest the trial court’s decision to
try the two murders separately.  We therefore do not agree with
defendant that the failure to consolidate the two offenses
required exclusion of all evidence of Wheeler’s murder.  We now
examine whether the evidence was otherwise properly admitted. 
Rule of Evidence 404 provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.  It may,
however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake, entrapment or
accident.
Id. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2007).  Rule 404(b) is “a clear general
rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its
exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the
defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense
of the nature of the crime charged.”  State v. Coffey, 326 N.C.
268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).  Thus, as long as the
evidence of other crimes or wrongs by the defendant “‘is relevant
for some purpose other than to show [the] defendant[’s] . . .
propensity’” to commit the charged crime, such evidence is
admissible under Rule 404(b).  Id. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 54
(quoting State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 206, 362 S.E.2d 244, 247
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988)). 
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Here, the trial court noted the following similarities
between the murders:
[Both victims are] females; that an
argument arose between the
Defendant and each of the victims
during sexual intercourse, or at or
around the time of sexual
intercourse.  That the Defendant
beat them with both his hands and
at some point--struck them with his
hands during the argument.  I do
note that he further testified and
his statement further indicated--
the oral and video statement, he
further hit Ms. [Persad] with a
two-by-four.  And I think in both
instances he checked the pulse of
the victims, or checked to see if
they were, in fact, deceased or
dead, then he made efforts to
dispose of the bodies.
In Ms. Wheeler’s case he took
the body on the hood of a vehicle
to--off of Canal Road and disposed
of it in the woods.  And in Ms.
[Persad’s] case he set the house
afire.  Both instances, according
to his statement, he indicated he
had just lost control, in effect,
blacked out.  As to both of the
victim’s vehicles, they were burnt
off or near Canal Road within 100
to 200 feet of each other.  That
the death of Cynthia Wheeler
occurred on or about June of 1997. 
That the death of [Frances Persad]
occurred on or about February 27,
the year 2000.  That the proximity
and time between the two--or the
amount of time between the two
alleged deaths and murders is not
so remote as to diminish the
probative value.
The trial court further noted that the arguments between
defendant and the victims arose as a result of alleged misconduct
on the part of defendant.  The trial court ruled the evidence of
Wheeler’s death was admissible for purposes of showing
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defendant’s knowledge, plan, opportunity, intent, modus operandi,
and motive to kill Persad.  The trial court also determined the
evidence was more probative than prejudicial.
Although defendant argues the murders are temporally
and factually distinct from one another, the trial court’s
findings indicate significant similarities between the deaths of
the victim and Wheeler.  As for the thirty-two month time lapse
between the deaths, “remoteness in time is less significant when
the prior conduct is used to show intent, motive, knowledge, or
lack of accident; remoteness in time generally affects only the
weight to be given such evidence, not its admissibility.”  State
v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 307, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991) (citing
State v. Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 93, 195 S.E. 72, 81 (1938)); see
also State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 600-03, 652 S.E.2d 216,
226-27 (2007))(holding that, when there were significant
similarities between the death of the defendant’s wife and the
death of a woman sixteen years earlier with whom the defendant
had a close personal relationship, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting evidence of the prior death, even
though the defendant was never criminally charged with the
earlier death), cert. denied, __ U.S.__, 170 L. Ed. 2d. 377
(2008). 
Defendant argues that, even if admissible, the evidence
was excessively prejudicial, requiring its exclusion under Rule
of Evidence 403.  We review a trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion.  State
v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008) (citing 
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Peterson, 361 N.C. at 602-03, 652 S.E.2d at 227).  We reverse the
trial court only when “‘the court’s ruling is manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision.’”  Id. (quoting Peterson,
361 N.C. at 602-03, 652 S.E.2d at 227 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).  “‘In our review, we consider not
whether we might disagree with the trial court, but whether the
trial court’s actions are fairly supported by the record.’”  Id.
(quoting Peterson, 361 N.C. at 603, 652 S.E.2d at 227 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).  We hold the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the Wheeler
murder.
Defendant assigns error to four other instances in
which he asserts the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of
other prior bad acts.  The objectionable evidence includes:  (1)
defendant’s videotaped statement in which he mentions being a
convicted felon; (2) defendant’s audiotaped statement in which he
identifies a certain mobile home as one where he sold drugs; (3)
testimony by a witness that defendant sold the shotgun he took
from Persad in exchange for illegal drugs; and (4) testimony by a
detective that a visitor attempted to smuggle cocaine and
marijuana to defendant while he was being held at the sheriff’s
office.  Defendant contends the evidence of his criminal record
and drug-related activities was irrelevant to any material issue
at trial and unfairly prejudicial.  Defendant asserts that the
cumulative prejudicial effect of these errors warrants a new
trial.  We disagree.
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To the extent defendant failed to object to 
introduction of much of the evidence he now contends was
inadmissible, or objected on grounds other than those now argued
on appeal, he has waived his right to appellate review other than
for plain error.  We reverse for plain error only in the most
exceptional cases, see State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 35-36, 678
S.E.2d 618, 634 (2009) (quoting State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 16,
653 S.E.2d 126, 136 (2007)), and only when we are convinced that
the error was either a fundamental one resulting in a miscarriage
of justice or one that would have altered the jury’s verdict. 
See id. at 35-36, 678 S.E.2d at 634-35.
We now examine each of the four instances in turn.  The
first instance arises from defendant’s videotaped statement in
which he confesses to killing Wheeler.  In the statement,
defendant describes how Wheeler became angry with him during
sexual intercourse when she discovered he was not wearing a
condom as he had promised to do.  Wheeler scratched his face,
which “upset” him.  He beat her in the face in the back seat of
the car, but then stopped and allowed her to dress.  As she was
leaving the vehicle, Wheeler told defendant she was going to tell
law enforcement that defendant raped her.  She then ran away. 
Wheeler’s threat angered and concerned defendant, because he
believed that, as she was a college student and he was already a
convicted felon, law enforcement “would not believe [him] over
her.” 
[2] Defendant contends the evidence that he was a
convicted felon was improperly admitted because evidence of prior
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convictions is inadmissible when the defendant does not testify. 
See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609 (2007) (permitting admission of
evidence of prior convictions when the defendant testifies);
State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 247, 644 S.E.2d 206, 214 (stating
that “it is error to admit evidence of the defendant’s prior
conviction when the defendant does not testify” (citations
omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 169 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2007). 
At trial, however, defendant only objected to the evidence on the
ground it violated Rule 404(b).  Defendant is therefore limited
to plain error review of this argument.  We conclude defendant
has failed to show that the jury would have found him not guilty
of murdering Persad absent his statement in the videotape that he
was a convicted felon or that admission of this evidence
constituted fundamental error resulting in a miscarriage of
justice.  
Defendant further asserts, as he did at trial, that
admission of the evidence violated Rule of Evidence 404(b).  The
trial court overruled defendant’s objection.  Defendant argues
the evidence only related to the Wheeler case and was irrelevant
to the murder of Persad.  We do not agree.  Defendant’s status as
a convicted felon was an integral part of his explanation
regarding the sequence of events and his motive in killing
Wheeler.  Wheeler threatened to accuse him of rape, and defendant
believed law enforcement would discount his version of events
because of his prior conviction.  Wheeler’s threat angered and
concerned defendant, whereupon he chased her down and killed her. 
This evidence, in turn, was probative of defendant’s murder of
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Persad insofar as it tended to show both defendant’s possible
motive in killing Persad--to prevent her from reporting the theft
of her shotgun to police--and his modus operandi.  We moreover
conclude that, even if erroneously admitted, such admission did
not prejudice defendant. 
[3] The next three instances of admission of evidence
to which defendant has assigned error concern his involvement in
drug-related activities.  As noted above, this evidence included
that defendant once sold drugs, that he sold the shotgun
belonging to Persad for drugs, and that one of his visitors while
he was at the sheriff’s office attempted to smuggle cocaine and
marijuana to him by hiding the drugs in some food.  Defendant,
however, either did not object to admission of the evidence, or
failed to state any grounds for his objection.  He has therefore
failed to preserve these assignments of error for review other
than for plain error.  See Garcell, 363 N.C. at 35, 678 S.E.2d at
634.  In light of the evidence against defendant, we conclude
that admission of the evidence of defendant’s drug-related
activities would not have influenced the jury’s verdict.  We
therefore overrule these assignments of error.  
Crawford issue of admitting opinion evidence
[4] Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting
opinion testimony as to the cause of Wheeler’s death rendered by
a non-testifying pathologist and opinion testimony from a non-
testifying dentist about the identity of Wheeler’s remains. 
Although we agree that admission of the testimony violated the
-20-
dictates of Crawford and was therefore erroneous, we find such
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State tendered John D. Butts, M.D., the Chief
Medical Examiner for North Carolina, as an expert in the field of
forensic pathology.  Dr. Butts testified as to State’s Exhibit
101, which Dr. Butts identified as a copy of an autopsy report
for Cynthia Wheeler.  The autopsy report was prepared by Karen
Chancellor, M.D., a forensic pathologist who performed the
autopsy on Wheeler’s body in 1997.  Dr. Butts testified that,
according to the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Chancellor, the
cause of Wheeler’s death was blunt force injuries to the chest
and head.  Dr. Butts also testified to the results of a forensic
dental analysis performed by Dr. Jeffrey Burkes, a consultant on
the faculty of the University of North Carolina School of
Dentistry.  The forensic dental analysis was included in the
autopsy report.   Dr. Butts stated that, by comparing Wheeler’s
dental records to the skeletal remains, Dr. Burkes positively
identified the body as that of Wheeler.  Neither Dr. Chancellor
nor Dr. Burkes testified.   
Defense counsel objected to Dr. Butts’s testimony
regarding Wheeler’s autopsy, as well as to admission of the
autopsy report, on the grounds that, inter alia, admission of the
evidence violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront
the witnesses against him.  The trial court overruled the
objections.  Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting
opinion testimony by non-testifying witnesses as to the cause of
Wheeler’s death and the identity of her remains.  We agree, but
-21-
determine that admission of the evidence did not prejudice
defendant. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars
admission of testimonial evidence unless the declarant is
unavailable to testify and the accused has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 203 (2004); State
v. Lewis, 361 N.C. 541, 545, 648 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2007).  The
State argues the autopsy report was not “testimonial” and
therefore, is not barred by the Confrontation Clause.  However,
the United States Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument
in the recent case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __,
129 S. Ct. 2527,  __ L. Ed. 2d __ (2009).  There, the defendant
objected on Crawford grounds to the introduction of a forensic
analysis performed by a non-testifying analyst.  The evidence at
issue identified a substance seized by law enforcement officers
and linked to defendant as cocaine.  The Court determined that
forensic analyses qualify as “testimonial” statements, and 
forensic analysts are “witnesses” to which the Confrontation
Clause applies.  See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, __ L. Ed. 2d
at __.  The Court specifically referenced autopsy examinations as
one such kind of forensic analyses.  See id. at __, n.5, 129 S.
Ct. at 2536, n.5, __ L. Ed. 2d at __.  Thus, when the State seeks
to introduce forensic analyses, “[a]bsent a showing that the
analysts [are] unavailable to testify at trial and that
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them” such
evidence is inadmissible under Crawford.  Id. at __, 129 S. Ct.
-22-
at 2532, __ L. Ed. 2d at __; see also State v. Watson, 281 N.C.
221, 229-32, 188 S.E.2d 289, 294-96 (holding the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of the cause of the victim’s death
contained in the victim’s death certificate), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1043, 34 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1972).  
Here, the State sought to introduce evidence of
forensic analyses performed by a forensic pathologist and a
forensic dentist who did not testify.  The State failed to show
that either witness was unavailable to testify or that defendant
had been given a prior opportunity to cross-examine them.  The
admission of such evidence violated defendant’s constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him, and the trial court
therefore erred in overruling defendant’s objections.  We must
now determine whether admission of the evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b) (2007) (“A
violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the
United States is prejudicial unless . . . it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.”); Lewis, 361 N.C. at 549, 648 S.E.2d at 830. 
The evidence erroneously admitted tended to establish
two facts:  (1) positive identification of Wheeler’s body; and
(2) the cause of Wheeler’s death.  Neither fact was critical,
however, to the State’s case against defendant for the murder of
Persad.  The State presented copious evidence that defendant
killed Persad, including defendant’s confessions to the crime. 
The State also presented other evidence of Wheeler’s murder. 
Defendant admitted he killed Wheeler by beating and choking her
to death and that he then burned her vehicle.  We conclude the
-23-
erroneously admitted evidence regarding Wheeler’s cause of death
and the identification of her body would not have influenced the
jury’s verdict.  See Watson, 281 N.C. at 233, 188 S.E.2d at 296
(determining that, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the
victim’s murder by the defendant, “the minds of an average jury
would not have found the evidence less persuasive had the
conclusory evidence contained in the certified copy of the death
certificate [of the victim] been excluded.  The admission of the
evidence contained in the certified copy of the death certificate
was at most harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citations
omitted)).  
In addition, as discussed above, the State presented
evidence of Wheeler’s murder to show defendant’s knowledge, plan,
opportunity, intent, modus operandi, and motive to commit the
premeditated and deliberate murder of Persad.  However, the jury
also found defendant guilty under the felony murder rule, for
which the erroneously admitted autopsy evidence regarding Wheeler
played no role.  Thus, even assuming arguendo that the wrongful
admission of the autopsy evidence influenced the jury to find
that defendant murdered Persad with premeditation and
deliberation, that evidence would not affect the jury’s verdict
of guilt under the felony murder rule.  Defendant has failed to
show prejudice arising from this error.  
 Overruled objections to re-direct examination of a witness
[5] Defendant contends the trial court committed
prejudicial error by overruling his objection to the State’s re-
direct examination of Heather Justice.  Justice testified
-24-
regarding defendant’s exchange of Persad’s shotgun for drugs, and
his appearance at her home at the approximate time of Persad’s
death.  Defendant was driving a red Ford Mustang and was
spattered with fresh blood at the time.  
Defense counsel cross-examined Justice regarding her
previous criminal convictions, her inability to recall dates, and
prior inconsistencies in her statements.  At the time Justice
testified, she was incarcerated for the manslaughter conviction
of her boyfriend Campbell.  Upon re-direct, the State questioned
Justice about a letter she received while serving her sentence. 
Over defendant’s objections, Justice testified she believed the
letter came from defendant and that in his letter, defendant
asked her to “change [her] story.”  Defendant contends the letter
was never authenticated as his, and its contents were therefore
inadmissible.  
However, “[t]he State has the right to introduce
evidence to rebut or explain evidence elicited by defendant
although the evidence would otherwise be incompetent or
irrelevant.”  State v. Johnston, 344 N.C. 596, 605, 476 S.E.2d
289, 294 (1996) (citations omitted).  “Such evidence is
admissible to dispel favorable inferences arising from
defendant’s cross-examination of a witness.”  Id. at 605-06, 476
S.E.2d at 294 (citations omitted).  Here, defense counsel sought
to impeach Justice by cross-examining her regarding her
manslaughter conviction and inability to recall certain dates. 
The State’s re-direct attempted to restore Justice’s credibility
with the jury in part by demonstrating her willingness to come
-25-
forward and cooperate with law enforcement.  Thus, while 
evidence of the letter was otherwise irrelevant, it was
admissible in response to defendant’s attack on Justice’s
character during cross-examination.  See id.  We moreover
conclude that, even assuming error, such error was not
prejudicial.  We overrule these assignments of error.
Denial of instruction on second-degree murder
[6] Defendant asserts there was evidence from which the
jury could have found him guilty of second–degree murder, and the
trial court therefore erred in failing to submit the requested
instruction to the jury.  According to defendant’s statements, he
lost control while arguing with Persad and “the next thing [he
knew]” he “had grabbed a two by four that was in her room . . .
and began [] beating her with it.”  Defendant continued to beat
Persad in the head until he believed she was dead, then set fire
to the residence.  Defendant argues the jury could find from this
evidence that he was provoked to a state of blind rage by his
argument with Persad, that he beat her while in that state of
rage, and that he then set fire to the house believing she was
already dead.  Defendant contends the evidence justified
submission of second-degree murder.  We do not agree.
The well-established rule for submission of second-
degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder
is: “If the evidence is sufficient to fully satisfy the State’s
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of murder
in the first degree, including premeditation and deliberation,
and there is no evidence to negate these elements other than
-26-
defendant’s denial that he committed the offense, the trial judge
should properly exclude from jury consideration the possibility
of a conviction of second degree murder.”  State v. Strickland,
307 N.C. 274, 293, 298 S.E.2d 645, 658 (1983), overruled in part
on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 203-04, 344
S.E.2d 775, 781-82 (1986).  The evidence must be sufficient to
allow a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser
offense and to acquit him of the greater.  State v. Conaway, 339
N.C. 487, 514, 453 S.E.2d 824, 841 (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 635, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392, 401 (1980)), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995).
Here, there was clearly evidence to support each of the
elements of premeditated and deliberate murder.  The
determinative question then becomes whether there was sufficient
evidence to negate these elements such that the jury should have
been allowed to consider second-degree murder.  See Strickland,
307 N.C. at 293, 298 S.E.2d at 658.  “The fact that the defendant
was angry or emotional at the time of the killing will not negate
the element of deliberation unless such anger or emotion was
strong enough to disturb the defendant’s ability to reason.”
State v. Solomon, 340 N.C. 212, 222, 456 S.E.2d 778, 785
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 996, 133 L. Ed. 2d 438
(1995).
Thus, evidence that the defendant
and the victim argued, without
more, is insufficient to show that
the defendant’s anger was strong
enough to disturb his ability to
reason.  Without evidence showing
that the defendant was incapable of
deliberating his actions, the
-27-
evidence could not support the
lesser included offense of second-
degree murder.
Id.; see also State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592,
596 (1992) (indicating that a perpetrator “‘may deliberate, may
premeditate, and may intend to kill after premeditation and
deliberation, although prompted and to a large extent controlled
by passion at the time’” (quoting State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231,
238, 400 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1991))). 
Defendant has failed to show that his rage was of such
magnitude that it rendered him incapable of deliberate thought
and ability to reason.  The evidence showed that defendant struck
Persad numerous times with a board, then set fire to the house. 
Under the “felled victim” theory of premeditation and
deliberation, “when numerous wounds are inflicted, the defendant
has the opportunity to premeditate and deliberate from one shot
[here, a blow] to the next.”  State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 295,
357 S.E.2d 641, 653, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L. Ed. 2d 224
(1987).  Even when a weapon “‘is capable of being fired rapidly,
some amount of time, however brief, for thought and deliberation
must elapse between each pull of the trigger.’”  Id.  As
defendant physically beat Persad with a board, as opposed to
firing a gun, he had even more time for thought and deliberation
between each blow.
We moreover note that the only evidence of defendant’s
“blind rage” comes from his own statements to law enforcement. 
In State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied,
525 U.S. 845, 142 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1998), we concluded the defendant
-28-
was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder when
the State produced evidence that he set fire to an apartment
building to destroy evidence of his earlier mail theft from
residents.  Id. at 463-64, 496 S.E.2d at 363. This Court held
that the defendant’s “self-serving statement that he set the fire
as a prank,” made shortly after the crime, “was not sufficient to
support an instruction on second-degree murder.”  Id. at 464, 496
S.E.2d at 363.  In addition, defendant’s argument goes only to
his conviction of premeditated and deliberate murder, and has no
bearing on his conviction of first-degree murder under the felony
murder rule.  We overrule this assignment of error.   
Submitted first-degree felony murder based on felonious assault
[7] Defendant argues the trial court erred in
submitting first-degree felony murder to the jury based on
felonious assault as the underlying felony.  Defendant asserts
the evidence shows his assault of Persad with a board inflicted
injuries that proximately led to her death.  Defendant contends
the assault should have merged with the murder charge and could
not be used separately as a basis for felony murder.  Assuming
arguendo that defendant’s position is correct, he cannot show
reversible error.  The jury convicted defendant of first-degree
murder based on premeditation and deliberation, as well as under
the felony murder rule, with both felonious assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury and arson as the underlying
felonies.  Defendant’s argument has no bearing on his conviction
of premeditated and deliberate murder or felony murder based on
arson.  We overrule these assignments of error. 
-29-
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[8] Defendant contends he received ineffective
assistance of counsel based on several grounds.  First, defendant
argues an actual conflict of interest caused his counsel to
disclose privileged information to the State, which the State
then used against defendant.  This asserted conflict arose in
September of 2004, when the Capital Defender, Robert Hurley, sent
a facsimile message to Judge Robert F. Floyd, Jr., the Senior
Resident Superior Court Judge for Robeson County, expressing his
concern over the withdrawal of two experts from defendant’s case. 
Mr. Hurley had no prior involvement in defendant’s case, in that
counsel for defendant, William Davis and Donald Bullard, were
appointed in March of 2000, before formation of the Office of
Indigent Defense Services (“IDS”) in July of 2001.  Although both
Mr. Davis and Mr. Bullard were experienced capital defense
attorneys, neither had chosen to be included on the IDS roster. 
Mr. Hurley included in his facsimile to Judge Floyd copies of the
two letters of withdrawal.  The experts, psychiatrist Moira
Artigues, M.D., and psychologist James Hilkey, Ph.D., stated in
their letters that they were withdrawing because of trial
counsel’s failure to communicate and to supply them with
information they had requested to review in order to render an
opinion on defendant’s case.  The letters from Drs. Artigues and
Hilkey were addressed to William Davis, but they were copied to
Mr. Hurley.  In his message to Judge Floyd, Mr. Hurley stated
that the withdrawal of defendant’s experts raised questions as to
-30-
the adequacy of trial counsel’s preparation for the case and the
availability of alternative experts.  
On 28 September 2004, one day after receiving the
facsimile from Mr. Hurley, Judge Floyd held a hearing with
defense counsel Davis and Robeson County district attorney L.
Johnson Britt to determine defense counsel’s preparedness for
trial.  Mr. Davis stated that his decision not to supply Drs.
Artigues and Hilkey with the requested information, including
“discovery and investigative reports,” was deliberate “because
they don’t need the information to do an evaluation, a medical
evaluation” and that the experts had “all the information . . .
that I wanted them to have and I think they were entitled to.” 
Mr. Davis stated that Drs. Artigues and Hilkey had never
previously informed him that they felt unprepared to testify in
defendant’s case, and that, but for the now-absent experts, the
case was ready for trial.  Mr. Davis also complained that the
letter from Mr. Hurley contained “information . . . privileged to
our defense.  He’s got stuff in there about evaluations,
substance abuse.  And that’s privileged information that he
shouldn’t--if he got it, he shouldn’t be disclosing it.” 
Judge Floyd held a second, closed hearing on the matter
to explore Mr. Hurley’s intervention in the case.  Defendant was
present at the hearing, along with defense counsel Davis and 
Bullard, as well as Mr. Hurley, district attorney Britt, Dr.
Artigues, Dr. Hilkey, and several other persons.  Judge Floyd
cautioned all parties that, should they find it necessary to
“disclose information that is pertinent to the defense of Mr.
-31-
Locklear, [to] put the Court on notice prior to that disclosure”
so that such discussions could proceed outside the presence of
Mr. Britt or anyone representing the State.  Mr. Britt was absent
from a portion of the hearing for this reason.  Judge Floyd also
expressed his belief that the resignation letters from Drs.
Artigues and Hilkey contained no “information, in and of itself,
in light of their resignation . . . that was at that point
prohibited to be disclosed.”  At the hearing, Mr. Davis repeated
his position that he had given Drs. Artigues and Hilkey “all the
information that I had and that I intended for them to have as
Mr. Locklear’s attorney, and that I felt they should have.” 
Defendant asserts that, in revealing the letters from
Mr. Hurley, Dr. Artigues, and Dr. Hilkey to district attorney
Britt, and referring to them at the hearings, his counsel
revealed confidential and privileged communications to the
prosecution without authorization.  These communications, argues
defendant, contained “counsel’s mental processes and work product
on sensitive mental health issues.”  Defendant claims the State
later used this information to attack the credibility of
defendant’s expert at the sentencing hearing.  According to
defendant, his attorneys “threw him under the bus” in an effort
to protect themselves from accusations of dilatory performance. 
We are not persuaded. 
First, it is unclear from the record who first
disclosed the facsimile from Mr. Hurley, along with its
accompanying letters from Drs. Artigues and Hilkey, to Mr. Britt. 
Defendant argues it was Mr. Davis, while the State contends it
-32-
was Judge Floyd.  While the transcript shows that Judge Floyd
distributed copies of Mr. Hurley’s facsimile to Mr. Davis and Mr.
Britt at the 28 September hearing, it is silent on whether Mr.
Britt had already obtained the facsimile by then.  It seems
unlikely that Mr. Davis would have given the facsimile to Mr.
Britt, given his complaint to Judge Floyd that Mr. Hurley should
not have included information in the letter Mr. Davis considered
privileged.  Defendant cannot fault defense counsel for
privileged information disclosed by third parties.  
Moreover, we do not conclude that disclosure of the
privileged information prejudiced defendant.  Although the letter
from Mr. Hurley included the statement that “defendant had an IQ
of 65 when he was 14 years of age,” this same information was
disclosed in an affidavit attached to defendant’s motion for a
pretrial mental retardation hearing filed less than a week after
Mr. Hurley sent the facsimile.  References to defendant’s history
of substance abuse would also have worked no prejudice, as the
prosecution was already aware that defendant had significant
substance abuse issues.  Defendant obtained other experts in time
for his trial and did not rely on either Dr. Artigues or Dr.
Hilkey.  Defendant has failed to show that the outcome of his
trial would have been different had the State not known of the
experts’ resignations and their reasons for doing so.  State v.
Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 113, 558 S.E.2d 463, 488 (noting that, under
Strickland, a defendant must show “he was prejudiced by his trial
counsel’s deficient performance to such a degree that ‘but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
-33-
would have been different’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984))), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 896, 154 L. Ed. 2d 165 (2002). 
The letters contained no protected work product
prepared by defense counsel.  Nor do we conclude Mr. Davis
revealed protected work product when he responded to questioning
by Judge Floyd.  Mr. Davis appropriately responded to the trial
court’s questions in general terms.  Although Mr. Davis noted he
had “reasons” for not giving the appointed experts all the
requested information, he did not reveal what his reasons were,
or otherwise disclose trial strategy.  See State v. Prevatte, 356
N.C. 178, 218, 570 S.E.2d 440, 462 (2002) (concluding that,
“[b]ecause the attorneys described in general terms what had been
done, rather than disclosing any of their mental processes, there
was no work product violation” (citation omitted)), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 986, 155 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2003).  Further, to the extent
that the majority of defendant’s argument focuses on prejudice
arising at the sentencing proceeding, our disposition of his case
renders these arguments moot.
Defendant also cites delay in his case as grounds for
ineffective assistance.  However, defendant does not demonstrate
that the delay was due solely to deficient performance on the
part of his counsel, nor that any delay prejudiced his case.
Unfortunately, delay in capital cases is not unusual, 
particularly in Robeson County.  Judge Floyd noted the
“overwhelming number of capital cases to be tried here in Robeson
County.”  While Judge Floyd expressed his concern over defense
-34-
counsel’s lack of communication with Dr. Artigues and Dr. Hilkey,
he found “[t]here has been no showing that any lapse of time and
delay that has occurred has visited any prejudice upon
[defendant] at this time.”  Defendant indicated at the hearing
that he desired continued representation from Mr. Davis and Mr.
Bullard.  Judge Floyd predicted that, with the necessary delay of
obtaining new experts, defendant’s case would not be “tried
[until] probably in the first half of [2005].”  Defendant’s case
was tried in April of 2005.         
Defendant assigns error to a number of further
instances he contends constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.  We have reviewed these contentions carefully and find
them unpersuasive.  We conclude defendant has failed to show he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Recusal
[9] Defendant argues prejudicial error occurred when
his motion to recuse Judge Floyd was denied.  Defendant contends
Judge Floyd displayed “irrefutable bias” against defendant when
he apparently told defense counsel in an unrecorded bench
conference during argument on the defense motion for a pretrial
hearing on mental retardation there was “no way” he would find
defendant mentally retarded, based in part on his previous
interactions with defendant.  Judge Floyd denied the motion for a
pretrial hearing on mental retardation.  Defense counsel moved to
recuse Judge Floyd from presiding over defendant’s motion for a
pretrial mental retardation hearing and the trial of defendant’s
case.  Judge Floyd subsequently withdrew his ruling on the motion
-35-
for a pretrial hearing on mental retardation and reset that
motion, along with the recusal motion, before another judge, who
denied both motions.
Upon motion by the defendant, judges must disqualify
themselves from presiding over a criminal trial if they are
“[p]rejudiced against the moving party or in favor of the adverse
party.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1223 (2007).  The Code of Judicial
Conduct also suggests recusal when the impartiality of a judge
“may reasonably be questioned . . . where [] [t]he judge has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”  Code Jud.
Conduct Canon 3C (1)(a), 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 475, 480.    
Judge James F. Ammons, Jr. considered defendant’s
motions and denied them.  Judge Ammons found as fact that:  Judge
Floyd made his remark “only after . . . reviewing all of the
evidence and arguments” by counsel; after reviewing the same
documents, he agreed with Judge Floyd’s conclusion that defendant
was not entitled to a pretrial hearing based on the evidence;
Judge Floyd never said he would not allow evidence on the issue
of mental retardation to be presented to the jury; Judge Floyd
was “extremely familiar with” the case, having heard many of the
motions, and review of the transcripts of those motions
demonstrated Judge Floyd’s “knowledge of the case,” as well as
“his fairness and impartiality”; recusal of Judge Floyd would
cause needless delay in an already delayed case; and there were
no grounds for recusal. 
We conclude that Judge Floyd’s single reference to his
past interaction with defendant does not demonstrate any personal
-36-
bias or prejudice against defendant.  Nor do we discern any
evidence that Judge Floyd’s decision to deny the motion for a
pretrial mental retardation hearing was based on emotional,
rather than evidentiary, considerations.  Judge Floyd’s denial of
the pretrial hearing on mental retardation did not affect
defendant’s ability to present his mental retardation claim to
the jury.  We overrule this assignment of error.  
Jury Selection
Defendant presents several arguments regarding jury
selection.  Defendant contends the trial court improperly limited
his questioning of prospective jurors about their views on mental
retardation.  The bulk of defendant’s argument addresses the
asserted need for a new sentencing hearing because of these
alleged errors.  In light of our decision to grant defendant a
new sentencing hearing, we do not address these issues.  To the
extent defendant contends the jury selection errors were
structural, requiring a new trial, we have considered these
arguments and find them unpersuasive. 
SENTENCING PROCEEDING
[10] Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s
instructions to the jury on mental retardation.  Specifically,
defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the
jury that a verdict finding him mentally retarded would result in
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  After careful
consideration, we agree with defendant that heightened attention
to procedural safeguards is necessary  in cases of alleged mental
retardation in order to protect against the inadvertent and
-37-
unconstitutional execution of mentally retarded defendants.  We
conclude the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant’s
requested instruction, and that defendant was prejudiced thereby. 
We therefore remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive punishment.  See Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 350 (2002),
cited with approval in State v. Poindexter, 359 N.C. 287, 292,
608 S.E.2d 761, 765 (2005).  Even before the United States
Supreme Court announced its decision in Atkins, the North
Carolina General Assembly amended our capital punishment statutes
to exempt mentally retarded defendants from receiving the death
penalty.  See Act of July 25, 2001, ch. 346, sec. 1, 2001 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1038, 1038 (adopting N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005). 
Accordingly, our General Statutes now provide that “no defendant
who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2005(b) (2007).  North Carolina’s enactment of a
prohibition on executing the mentally retarded was part of a
national consensus, reflected by similar enactments in state
legislatures across the country, that “our society views mentally
retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.”  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, 153 L. Ed. 2d at
347.  The Court in Atkins noted that “[t]o the extent there is
serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded.”  Id. at 317, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 347-48. 
-38-
The task of identifying mentally retarded offenders can
be a challenging one.  See id.  Our General Statutes define
mental retardation as “[s]ignificantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, both of which were
manifested before the age of 18.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(a)
(2007).  “Significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning” is “[a]n intelligent quotient of 70 or below.”  Id.
§ 15A-2005(a)(1)(c) (2007).  “Significant limitations in adaptive
functioning” are defined as “[s]ignificant limitations in two or
more of the following adaptive skill areas:  communication,
self-care, home living, social skills, community use,
self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure
skills and work skills.”  Id. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(b) (2007). 
Procedurally, upon motion by a defendant, the trial
court in its discretion may order a pretrial determination of
mental retardation.  See id. § 15A-2005(c) (2007).  The State
must consent to such a hearing, at which the defendant “has the
burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate mental
retardation by clear and convincing evidence.”  Id.  If the
defendant shows to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is
mentally retarded, the case may only proceed noncapitally.  Id. 
Such procedure sensibly avoids the needless burden of capital
proceedings for those defendants whose mental retardation is
clearly and convincingly evident.  
If the trial court determines that a defendant has
failed to show mental retardation by clear and convincing
-39-
evidence, the defendant may seek a jury determination of mental
retardation during the sentencing hearing.  Subsection 15A-
2005(e) provides:
If the court does not find the
defendant to be mentally retarded
in the pretrial proceeding, upon
the introduction of evidence of the
defendant’s mental retardation
during the sentencing hearing, the
court shall submit a special issue
to the jury as to whether the
defendant is mentally retarded as
defined in this section.  This
special issue shall be considered
and answered by the jury prior to
the consideration of aggravating or
mitigating factors and the
determination of sentence.  If the
jury determines the defendant to be
mentally retarded, the court shall
declare the case noncapital and the
defendant shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) (2007).  Thus, the jury often has the
unenviable task of identifying “gray area” defendants; that is,
those offenders who are not clearly mentally retarded but who may
nevertheless present enough evidence of mental retardation to
render them ineligible for the death penalty.  See Atkins, 536
U.S. at 317, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 348 (noting that “[n]ot all people
who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall
within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there
is a national consensus”).  Notably, the defendant’s burden of
production and persuasion to show mental retardation to the jury
at the sentencing stage is lower than that required at the
pretrial hearing stage.  The defendant must only “demonstrate
mental retardation to the jury by a preponderance of the
evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(f) (2007).  The lesser burden of
-40-
proof indicates legislative awareness of “gray area” defendants
and lawmakers’ intent to protect against the inadvertent
execution of mentally retarded offenders. 
Once evidence of mental retardation is presented to the
jury at the sentencing proceeding, the trial court must “give
appropriate instructions.” Id. § 15A-2000(b) (2007).  The
significance of the requirement for “appropriate instructions” on
the issue of mental retardation is apparent for several reasons. 
As previously noted, a jury finding of mental retardation renders
the case noncapital.  Id. § 15A-2005(e) (“If the jury determines
the defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall declare
the case noncapital and the defendant shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment.”).  Identifying mentally retarded offenders can be
an inherently difficult task requiring particular attention to
procedural safeguards.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 153 L. Ed.
2d at 348 (noting that “some characteristics of mental
retardation undermine the strength of the procedural protections
that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards”).  The
difficulty of this task increases the likelihood that mentally
retarded offenders will be unconstitutionally sentenced to death. 
See id. at 321, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 350 (“Mentally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.”).  Careful instruction by the trial court is
therefore important to “steadfastly guard[]” the procedural
protections to which the defendant is entitled.  Id. at 317, 153
L. Ed. 2d at 348. 
-41-
In the present case, defendant presented substantial
evidence of mental retardation to the jury during the sentencing
proceeding.  Dr. Hancock considered defendant’s case “a slam dunk
for retardation.”  Defense counsel requested that the trial court
“include an additional sentence or paraphrase . . . that upon a
finding that a defendant is mentally retarded, he will be
sentenced to life without parole.”  Counsel argued that absent
such instruction, the jury might mistakenly believe defendant
would “go free” or otherwise misunderstand “what’s to happen to
him.”  The trial court refused defendant’s request and instead
gave the following pattern jury instruction:  “The law provides
that no defendant who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to
death.  The one issue for you to determine at this stage of the
proceedings reads:  Is the defendant, Dane Locklear, Jr.,
mentally retarded?”  1 N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.05 (2001). 
It is well settled that “[i]f a request is made for a
jury instruction which is correct in itself and supported by
evidence, the trial court must give the instruction at least in
substance.”  State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 364, 432 S.E.2d 125,
129 (1993) (citations omitted).  In capital cases, the trial
court is required to “give appropriate instructions in those
cases in which evidence of the defendant’s mental retardation
requires the consideration by the jury of the provisions of G.S.
15A-2005.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b).  Section 15A-2005, in turn,
provides that “[i]f the jury determines the defendant to be
mentally retarded, the court shall declare the case noncapital
and the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.”  Id.
-42-
§ 15A-2005(e).  Defendant’s requested instruction was therefore
correct in itself and supported by evidence.
Given the relatively recent enactment of N.C.G.S. §
15A-2005, this Court has not previously had the opportunity to
examine whether “appropriate instructions” by the trial court
should include an instruction on the consequences of declaring a
defendant mentally retarded.  Our approach to jury instructions
in capital cases involving the insanity defense informs our
present case.  In State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 15, 224 S.E.2d
595, 604 (1976), we held the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the consequences of
finding him not guilty by reason of insanity.  The Court stated
that “the average jury does not know what a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity will mean to the defendant.  This
uncertainty may lead the jury to convict the accused in a
mistaken belief that he will be set free if an insanity verdict
is returned.”  Id. at 14, 224 S.E.2d at 603.  The Court reasoned
that
[t]o allow a jury to speculate on
the fate of an accused if found
insane at the time of the crime
only heightens the possibility that
the jurors will fall prey to their
emotions and thereby return a
verdict of guilty which will insure
that [the] defendant will be
incarcerated for his own safety and
the safety of the community at
large.
Id. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 603.  So persuaded, we adopted the rule
that a defendant who interposes an insanity defense is entitled
-43-
to an instruction on commitment procedures if requested.  Id. at
15, 224 S.E.2d at 604.  
Just as “the average jury does not know what a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity will mean to the defendant,”
id. at 14, 224 S.E.2d at 603, the average jury may not understand
what a finding of mental retardation will mean for a defendant. 
Speculation over the punishment a defendant will receive if found
to be mentally retarded may cause jurors to “fall prey to their
emotions” and render a finding on mental retardation based on “an
overriding fear for the safety of the community,” id. at 15, 224
S.E.2d at 603-04, rather than on the clinical evidence.  See
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 350 (noting that mental
retardation “may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating
factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury”). 
Thus, like a defendant who interposes an insanity defense, a
defendant asserting mental retardation is entitled to an
instruction by the trial court regarding punishment “sufficient
to remove any hesitancy of the jury in returning a [finding of
mental retardation], engendered by a fear that by so doing they
would be releasing the defendant at large in the community.” 
State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 724, 727, 295 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1982). 
We therefore conclude the trial court erred in failing to give
defendant’s requested instruction.
We further conclude that the error prejudiced
defendant.  Notably, although the jury rejected defendant’s
mental retardation claim, the jury found as mitigating
circumstances many facts that would also tend to establish mental
-44-
retardation on the part of defendant.  For example, the jury
found as mitigating circumstances that defendant:  received an IQ
score of sixty-five at age fourteen on the Slosson test, a
scientifically standardized and accepted, individually
administered test of general intelligence; was in the bottom two
percent of the population in global adaptive functioning,
according to testing documented in his school records; attended
special education classes for educable mentally handicapped
children and performed poorly throughout his school career; had
significant adaptive deficits from childhood in the areas of
functional academics; had learning difficulties from his earliest
days; and “obtained a Full Scale IQ score of 68” on the WAIS-III
test given by Dr. Timothy Hancock, which was “consistent with the
score obtained by Dr. Brad Fisher on the prior version of the
same test, the WAIS-R.”  The jury also found that defendant’s
cognitive impairment decreased his ability to control his
impulsivity in stressful situations. 
The State contends defendant cannot show prejudice
because trial counsel told jurors during closing arguments that
defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment if they found
him to be mentally retarded.  We disagree.  “‘[O]n matters of
law, arguments of counsel do not effectively substitute for
statements by the court.’”  State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 654,
452 S.E.2d 279, 302 (1994) (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154, 173, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 148 (1994) (Souter &
Stevens, JJ., concurring) (alteration in original)), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995).  This is because
-45-
arguments of counsel are likely to be viewed as statements of
advocacy, whereas a jury instruction is a definitive and binding
statement of law.  Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 316, 331 (1990).  Further, although the attorneys in their
arguments referenced defendant’s receiving life imprisonment,
counsel for the State also argued that defendant’s mental
retardation claim was “about Dane Locklear avoiding punishment.” 
In light of the jury’s mitigation findings, we conclude there is
a reasonable possibility the jury would have found defendant
mentally retarded absent the omitted instruction.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1443(a) (2007); State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 644, 365 S.E.2d
600, 606 (1988) (concluding it was “not reasonably possible that,
had the trial court given [the] defendant’s [requested]
instruction verbatim, a different result would have occurred at
trial”).  Defendant is therefore entitled to a new sentencing
hearing.  On remand, the trial court should instruct the jury in
compliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) that “[i]f the jury
determines the defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall
declare the case noncapital and the defendant shall be sentenced
to life imprisonment.”  
In light of our decision to remand defendant’s case for
a new sentencing hearing, we do not address defendant’s remaining
arguments regarding sentencing, nor do we engage in
proportionality review. 
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant assigns as error multiple issues he concedes
have been decided unfavorably to him in prior opinions of this
-46-
Court.  Most of defendant’s preservation issues assign error to
the sentencing proceedings.  We need not address such asserted
error in light of our disposition of defendant’s case, but we
nonetheless note that defendant presents no compelling reason to
overrule our precedents on these issues.  Defendant also objects
to the use of a “short-form” murder indictment as
constitutionally deficient.  As he acknowledges, however, this
Court has repeatedly and consistently upheld the legitimacy of
short-form indictments for first-degree murder.  See, e.g., State
v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 292, 677 S.E.2d 796, 816 (2009); State
v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 9-11, 530 S.E.2d 807, 813-14 (2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1083, 148 L. Ed. 2d 684 (2001).  Thus, we
reject these arguments.
We conclude defendant received a fair trial, free from
prejudicial error.  However, we conclude the trial court
committed prejudicial error during the sentencing proceeding.  We
therefore vacate defendant’s death sentence and remand this case
to Superior Court, Robeson County, for a new capital sentencing
proceeding. 
NO ERROR IN GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE; DEATH SENTENCE
VACATED; REMANDED FOR NEW CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING.
Justice MARTIN dissenting.
The trial court instructed the jury that:  (1) only two
sentencing options were available—death and life without parole;
and (2) a finding of mental retardation would eliminate death as
an option.  Having received these instructions, the jury was
-47-
fully aware that a finding of mental retardation would mandate a
sentence of life without parole. 
The execution of mentally retarded defendants violates
the United States Constitution, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002), and state law, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(b) (2007).  For
this reason, the trial court in a capital case must observe
procedural protections designed to meet the challenges associated
with identifying such defendants.  The narrow issue here,
however, is whether the jury in this case understood the
consequences of a finding that defendant was mentally retarded.  
When a defendant claims that an instruction is
ambiguous and subject to erroneous interpretation, “the proper
inquiry . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant
evidence.”  Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).  A
“reasonable likelihood” is more than a “possibility.”  See id. 
“[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the instruction ‘could have’
been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is
a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.”  Victor
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 72 & n.4 (1991)); see also State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341,
347, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (2006) (applying reasonable
likelihood test to challenged jury instruction).  
Moreover, the challenged instruction “‘may not be
judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context
of the overall charge,’” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378 (quoting Cupp v.
-48-
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)), and the proceedings
generally, see id. at 381.  In this regard, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that “[j]urors do not sit in solitary
isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of
meaning” but rather “[d]ifferences among them in interpretation
of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process,
with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light
of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over
technical hairsplitting.”  Id. at 380-81.
This Court recently stated that, in reviewing jury
instructions allegedly subject to erroneous interpretation, “we
inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the
Constitution. . . .  In determining whether the defendant has met
the reasonable likelihood standard this Court must review the
trial court’s instruction to the jury in the context of the
overall charge.”  Smith, 360 N.C. at 347, 626 S.E.2d at 261-62
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The trial court here opened the sentencing proceeding
by instructing the jury that its sole purpose was to determine
which of two sentences, death or life without parole, defendant
would receive:  “Members of the jury, having found the defendant
guilty of murder in the first degree, it is now your duty to
recommend to the Court whether the defendant should be sentenced
to death or to life imprisonment without parole.”  At no time
during the sentencing proceeding was the jury advised of any
potential third form of punishment, nor was the jury advised
-49-
that, the defendant having been found guilty of first-degree
murder, he nevertheless might be released.  
“[J]urors are presumed to pay close attention to the
particular language of the judge’s instructions in a criminal
case . . . and [to] follow the instructions as given.”  State v.
Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 455, 509 S.E.2d 178, 196 (1998) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999).  This presumption is
particularly appropriate here, as the trial court’s instruction
was the first sentence spoken to the jury on the first day of the
sentencing proceeding.  As this Court recently observed:  “The
trial court alluded to only two possible sentences, death or life
imprisonment without parole.  Therefore, if the jury followed
these instructions, they knew of only these two possible
sentences.  We must presume that the jury followed these
instructions.”  State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 219, 607 S.E.2d
607, 622, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 850 (2005). 
Following presentation of mental retardation and other
sentencing evidence, the trial court gave the instruction now
challenged on appeal.  The instruction, which tracked both state
statutory law, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(b), and the pattern jury
instruction, 1 N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.05 (2001), read:  “The law
provides that no defendant who is mentally retarded shall be
sentenced to death.  The one issue for you to determine at this
stage of the proceedings reads:  Is the defendant, Dane Locklear,
Jr., mentally retarded?”  Having been told that its two
sentencing options were death and life without parole and that a
finding of mental retardation would foreclose a death sentence,
-50-
the jury could reach only one reasonable conclusion:  a finding
of mental retardation would result in a sentence of life without
parole.
That the jury understood the consequences of a finding
of mental retardation is supported not only by “the context of
the overall charge,” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378, but also by “all
that [took] place at the trial,” id. at 381.  During closing
arguments on mental retardation, counsel for both parties
specifically informed the jury that a finding of mental
retardation would result in a sentence of life without parole. 
The prosecutor stated, “If Dane Locklear can prove that he is
mentally retarded, then as a matter of law, he cannot be
sentenced to death.  And if you’ve been convicted of first degree
murder, as he has been in this case, he has to be sentenced to
life in prison without parole.”  Similarly, defense counsel
stated, “If we show . . . that he’s retarded, it’s a life
sentence without parole.”  These arguments corroborated the trial
court’s instructions and weigh against a conclusion that the
jury’s verdict was influenced by an erroneous understanding of
the law.  See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 438 (2004) (per
curiam) (explaining that a state court is not precluded “from
assuming that counsel’s arguments clarified an ambiguous jury
charge” and that “[t]his assumption is particularly apt when it
is the prosecutor’s argument that resolves an ambiguity in favor
of the defendant”).
Read in total isolation, the challenged instruction did
not rule out the possibility that a mentally retarded defendant
-51-
might receive punishment other than life without parole.  But the
jurors did not hear the instruction in isolation.  Instead, they
heard the instruction in the context of a capital sentencing
proceeding that the trial court had told them would result in a
recommendation of either death or life without parole.  It would
defy “commonsense understanding,” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381, for the
jury to speculate that the trial court would postpone the
determination of mental retardation to the middle of a proceeding
about death versus life imprisonment if a finding of mental
retardation would make defendant eligible for some third result. 
This is especially true when, as in this case, both parties’
counsel told the jury otherwise.
The majority compares the instant case with this
Court’s decision in State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595
(1976).  The majority concludes that here, as there, the trial
court’s instructions left the jury uninformed about the
consequences of its verdict and prone to speculate that defendant
would be released to the community should it find him mentally
retarded.  See id. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 603-04.  Hammonds is
distinguishable from the instant case in two significant
respects.  First and foremost, the jury in Hammonds was never
told the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity.  Id. at 11, 224 S.E.2d at 601.  Because defendants who
are found not guilty generally go free, the trial court’s failure
to inform the jury of the statutory commitment procedure may well
have left the impression that an acquittal by reason of insanity
would result in the release of a potentially dangerous defendant. 
-52-
Id. at 13, 224 S.E.2d at 602.  Here, on the other hand, the jury
had already found defendant guilty of first-degree murder when it
was asked to determine whether he was mentally retarded.  Because
defendants who are found guilty of murder generally do not go
free, and because the trial court’s instructions as a whole
limited the punishment for a mentally retarded defendant guilty
of first-degree murder to life without parole, there was no
rational basis for the jury to speculate that defendant would
receive anything other than a life sentence.
Additionally, this Court noted in Hammonds that the
jury was further confused by the prosecutor’s misleading
statement in closing argument that “‘if you conclude [the
defendant] is not guilty [by reason of insanity], . . . he walks
out of this courtroom not guilty, returned to this community.’” 
Id. at 11, 224 S.E.2d at 601.  Here, in contrast, counsel for
both parties corroborated the trial court’s instructions by
correctly informing the jury that a finding of mental retardation
would result in a sentence of life without parole.  Put simply,
the concerns raised in Hammonds are not implicated here, and
defendant has not shown a reasonable possibility that his
requested instruction would have led to a different result at his
sentencing proceeding.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2007). 
“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a
fair trial, not a perfect one.”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (citations omitted).  “[N]ot every
ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction
rises to the level of a due process violation,” McNeil, 541 U.S.
-53-
  While the trial court’s instruction does not entitle
1
defendant to a new sentencing proceeding, the Committee on
Pattern Jury Instructions may nevertheless wish to consider
additional language stating that a finding of mental retardation
will result in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 
See State v. Benton, 299 N.C. 16, 22, 260 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1980)
(stating that when a challenged pattern instruction “correctly
declared the law” and, when read in context with the entire
charge to the jury, “was not so confusing as to mislead the jury
or affect the verdict,” the defendant was not entitled to a new
trial, but suggesting that the instruction “might be reviewed by
the Committee . . . for possible clarification”). 
at 437, and resentencing is improper “where the claimed error
amounts to no more than speculation,” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. 
Here, the challenged instruction did not confuse the jury or lead
it to disregard “constitutionally relevant evidence” of mental
retardation.  Id.  Accordingly, the trial court’s instruction on
mental retardation does not entitle defendant to a new sentencing
proceeding.1
I respectfully dissent.
Justice BRADY dissenting.
 
The majority’s assertion that there was a reasonable
likelihood that the jury was able to “speculate” as to
defendant’s fate in the sentencing proceeding ignores the
contents of the record before us.  Because the trial court
informed the jury that a finding of mental retardation would
result in a life sentence without parole, there was no
prejudicial error in denying defendant’s request for special
mental retardation jury instructions.  Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
-54-
At the charge conference, defendant orally requested a
special instruction informing the jury that finding defendant to
be mentally retarded would result in a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  This specific
instruction was denied.  The crux of defendant’s argument, and
the majority opinion, is based upon the illogical reasoning that
the jury was allowed to speculate that defendant could possibly
“go free” and escape punishment if jurors found defendant to be
mentally retarded.  Defendant claims, and the majority agrees,
that by denying defendant’s orally requested instruction, the
trial court permitted the jury to hypothesize about defendant’s
fate and as a result, violated defendant’s due process and Eighth
Amendment rights.  
At the outset, I note that I could find nothing in the
record indicating that defendant ever tendered a written request
to the trial court for alternative or supplemented mental
retardation jury instructions to the trial court.  As a matter of
law, “such requested special instructions ‘should be submitted in
writing to the trial judge at or before the jury instruction
conference.’”  State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 729, 616 S.E.2d
515, 530 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Gen. R. Pract. Super. &
Dist. Cts. 21, para. 1, 2005 Ann. R. N.C. 18), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 925 (2006).  Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly ruled
that a trial court does not err when it denies oral requests for
jury instructions that have not been submitted in writing.  State
v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 240, 485 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1053 (1998); State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 236-
-55-
37, 367 S.E.2d 618, 622-23 (1988); see also  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1231(a) (2007).  Defendant’s request was made orally at the jury
charge conference and it appears that no written request was ever
tendered.  On this basis alone, this Court should conclude that
the trial court committed no error in denying defendant’s
requested instruction.
However, even if I choose the majority’s path and
overlook defendant’s apparent failure to make a written request
for special jury instructions, I still conclude that the trial
court committed no error in denying defendant’s request.  The
appropriate standard under which to review constitutional
challenges to jury instructions is “whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction
in a way that violates the Constitution.”   State v. Smith, 360
N.C. 341, 347, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2006) (citations and internal
quotation omitted).  In demonstrating such a likelihood, the
burden is upon the defendant “to show more than a possibility
that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional
manner.”  Id. at 347, 626 S.E.2d at 261-62 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, “[i]n
determining whether the defendant has met the reasonable
likelihood standard this Court must review the trial court’s
instruction to the jury in the context of the overall charge.” 
Id. at 347, 626 S.E.2d at 262 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
In the instant case, during the sentencing proceeding
the jury heard evidence concerning mental retardation and
-56-
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  After this evidence
was presented, the trial court instructed the jury to deliberate
and reach a verdict solely on the mental retardation issue.  Both
the State and defendant’s counsel presented arguments before the
jury concerning mental retardation.  The trial judge in this case
then recited, verbatim, North Carolina Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction 150.05 when instructing the jury on mental
retardation.  The instruction states: “The law provides that no
defendant who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death. 
The one issue for you to determine at this stage of the
proceedings reads: ‘Is the defendant, Dane Locklear, Jr.,
mentally retarded?’”  See 1 N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.05 (2001)
(footnote call number omitted).
Before these instructions were given, defendant orally
requested during the charge conference additional instructions on
mental retardation specifically stating that upon a finding of
mental retardation, defendant would be sentenced to life without
parole.  The majority is correct that “[i]f a request is made for
a jury instruction which is correct in itself and supported by
evidence, the trial court must give the instruction at least in
substance.”  State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 364, 432 S.E.2d 125,
129 (1993) (citations omitted).  However, the majority
incorrectly concludes that defendant’s requested instruction was
not given “in substance” to the jury.  At the very outset of the
sentencing proceeding, after the guilt phase and before the jury
heard any evidence concerning mental retardation, the trial court
instructed as follows: “Members of the jury, having found the
-57-
  As noted above, even if the Hammonds rule were directly
2
applicable to the instant case, defendant’s instructions were
given to the jury in substance.  
Next, it is important to recognize that the defendant in
Hammonds tendered a written request for supplemental jury
instructions.  See Transcript of Record at 117-24, State v.
Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976) (No. 40).  
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it is now your
duty to recommend to the Court whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without parole.”  The
effect of this charge at the beginning of the sentencing
proceeding was to inform the jury that only two possible
sentences were available for defendant--death or life
imprisonment without parole.  The jurors heard every piece of
evidence regarding mental retardation within the context of this
instruction.  Defendant’s argument that the jury was permitted to
speculate that he would “go free” is contrary to the very first
instruction jurors were given at the sentencing proceeding, which
explicitly eliminated that possibility.
Defendant and the majority rely heavily upon our
decision in State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976),
to argue that the denial of defendant’s requested instructions
was prejudicial error.  Hammonds is noticeably distinguishable
from the case sub judice.  In Hammonds, this Court held that
“upon request, a defendant who interposes a defense of insanity
to a criminal charge is entitled to an instruction by the trial
judge setting out in substance the commitment procedures outlined
[by statute], applicable to acquittal by reason of mental
illness.”   Id. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 604.  First, the jury in
2
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Hammonds was considering the issue of insanity, not mental
retardation.  However, even assuming arguendo that the Hammonds
rule is applicable to defendants who claim mental retardation,
application of the rule in this case is still inappropriate.  In
Hammonds, as this Court specifically noted, during the guilt
determination phase of the trial “the fate of defendant, should
he be acquitted by reason of insanity, became a central and
confusing issue in the arguments of counsel.”  Id. at 13, 224
S.E.2d at 602.  Thus, the purpose of the Hammonds rule is “to
remove any hesitancy of the jury in returning a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity, engendered by a fear that by so
doing [it] would be releasing the defendant at large in the
community.”  State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 724, 727, 295 S.E.2d 391,
393 (1982).  The same fears are not present here.  The jury in
the instant case was not deciding the defendant’s guilt; this had
already been determined in the guilt-innocence phase of the
trial.  Also, unlike the consequences of a verdict finding the
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity in the Hammonds trial,
there is no indication in the record that the question of what
would happen to defendant upon the finding of mental retardation
was confusing or ever in dispute.  Both the State and counsel for
defendant were in agreement and communicated to the jury during
the sentencing proceeding that if defendant was found to be
mentally retarded, he would be sentenced to life in prison
without parole.  Thus, the fears the Hammonds rule was designed
to eliminate were not present in the case sub judice.
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Additionally, when defense counsel orally requested
special mental retardation jury instructions at the charge
conference, the State reminded the trial court that the
instruction had previously been given at the beginning of the
sentencing proceeding.  The trial court then asked, “[i]s there
anything to prevent counsel for either the State or defendant
arguing the law as it relates to what type of punishment would be
imposed upon a finding of either mental retardation or no mental
retardation?”  This prompted a discussion in which the State
confirmed with the trial court that counsel was entitled to argue
before the jury that if it found defendant to be mentally
retarded “he will be sentenced in accordance with the law of the
state of North Carolina to life in prison without parole[.]” 
Therefore, at the time the trial judge denied defendant’s oral
request, he was acutely aware that the jury had already received
the same instruction and that counsel could again explain the
instruction during closing arguments.  “Jurors need adequate
instructions, but they do not need to hear them repeated ad
nauseam.”  State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 60, 678 S.E.2d 618, 649
(2009); see also State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 107, 558 S.E.2d
463, 485, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 896 (2002).  It was reasonable
and within the trial court’s discretion to deny defendant’s
additional request for supplemental jury instructions based on
the consideration that those instructions would be superfluous in
light of the trial court’s initial instructions and arguments of
counsel.
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Counsel for the State and defendant informed the jury
that a finding of mental retardation would result in a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole.  During closing arguments,
counsel for the State asserted:  “If Dane Locklear can prove that
he is mentally retarded, then as a matter of law, he cannot be
sentenced to death.  And if you’ve been convicted of first degree
murder, as he has been in this case, he has to be sentenced to
life in prison without parole.”  (Emphasis added.) Likewise,
defense counsel clearly explained in his closing argument that
defendant would be sentenced to life without parole if the jury
found defendant to be mentally retarded:
[A]s you know and you heard, when a person is
mentally retarded, it doesn’t get any better. 
Doesn’t get any better.  You know, nobody can
make somebody who’s retarded smart.  Can’t do
it.  He’s fixed that way for life.  It’s a
sad thing, but it is, and that’s why we have
this law, 15A-2005.  If we show these things,
that he’s retarded, it’s a life sentence
without parole.  You don’t execute children. 
You don’t execute mentally retarded.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion asserts that under State v.
Spruill, “arguments of counsel do not effectively substitute for
statements by the court.”  338 N.C. 612, 654, 452 S.E.2d 279, 302
(1994) (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 173
(1994) (Souter & Stevens, JJ., concurring)), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 834 (1995).  However, the majority uses this statement out
of context.  In Spruill, this Court referenced the above
statement from Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Simmons v.
South Carolina to support the proposition that a “trial court has
a duty to censor any remarks not warranted by evidence or law.” 
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Id.  This Court cited Justice Souter’s concurring remarks in
relation to a trial court’s responsibility to correct
misstatements of law or fact interjected by counsel during
closing arguments.  Spruill does not speak to whether it is
sufficient for counsel to correctly inform the jury of matters of
evidence and law.  Even if the statement from Spruill is on point
with the instant case, the majority still ignores that here, the
trial court instructed the jury on the two sentencing options--
life imprisonment without parole or the death penalty--at the
outset of the sentencing proceeding.  Thus, the remarks made by
counsel during closing arguments were repetitions of instructions
already given by the trial court and were not “substitutions
for,” but rather elaborations of, “statements by the court.” 
Finally, the majority claims that defendant was
prejudiced because the State “argued that defendant’s mental
retardation claim was ‘about Dane Locklear avoiding punishment.’” 
To suggest that the jury could possibly have misconstrued these
statements to believe that defendant would someday be released
from prison is unconvincing.  When the complete statement is read
in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was insinuating no
such thing:  
So, then, you ask yourselves, well, why
are they saying he’s mentally retarded now? 
For one reason and one reason only.  If Dane
Locklear can prove that he is mentally
retarded, then Dane Locklear cannot face the
ultimate consequences for what he has done. 
If Dane Locklear can prove that he is
mentally retarded, then as a matter of law,
he cannot be sentenced to death.  And if
you’ve been convicted of first degree murder,
as he has been in this case, he has to be
sentenced to life in prison without parole. 
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That’s what this diagnosis is about.  This
diagnosis is not about Dane Locklear being
mentally retarded from the time he was a
child, throughout his life.  This diagnosis
is about Dane Locklear avoiding punishment.
The State plainly tells the jury that if defendant does not
receive the death penalty “he has to be sentenced to life in
prison without parole.”  This remark appears just two sentences
before the statement the majority finds prejudicial.  “Statements
or remarks in closing argument ‘must be viewed in context and in
light of the overall factual circumstances to which they refer.’” 
State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 626, 651 S.E.2d 867, 877 (2007)
(quoting State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 239, 461 S.E.2d 687, 709
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996)), cert. denied, __
U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 59, 172 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2008).   When read in
context, it is clear that the State was not suggesting that if
the jury found defendant to be mentally retarded he would one day
be eligible for parole.  Defendant was not prejudiced by these
statements.
Considering that the jury was instructed at the
beginning of the sentencing proceeding that defendant would
either receive the death penalty or life imprisonment without
parole, and that both the State and defense counsel reiterated
these points during closing arguments, it is inconceivable that
any juror was confused about defendant’s fate should the jury
decide he was mentally retarded.  As such, there is no reasonable
likelihood that the jury could have applied the given
instructions in a way that violated defendant’s constitutional
rights.  The majority has succumbed to engaging in pure
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speculation rather than accepting the reality of the record
before us.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
Justice NEWBY joins in this dissenting opinion.