Title: Del Gallo v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12837
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 2021

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SJC-12837 
 
RINALDO DEL GALLO, THIRD  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE SUFFOLK 
DISTRICT & others.1 
 
 
October 7, 2021. 
 
 
District Attorney.  Practice, Criminal, District attorney, Nolle 
prosequi.  Words, "Victim." 
 
 
 
The plaintiff, Rinaldo Del Gallo, commenced this action in 
the county court by filing a prolix document entitled "emergency 
averred complaint," in which he alleged, among other things, 
that the district attorney for the Suffolk district failed to 
comply with the requirements of G. L. c. 258B, § 3, the so-
called victims' bill of rights, when she nol prossed certain 
criminal complaints.  Del Gallo sought a broad range of 
declaratory and injunctive relief, relief in the nature of 
mandamus, and the exercise of this court's extraordinary power 
of general superintendence pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A 
single justice denied all forms of relief without a hearing, and 
Del Gallo appeals.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  The complaint stems from the district 
attorney's decision to nol pros several cases against 
individuals who were arrested at a "Straight Pride Parade" in 
Boston on August 31, 2019, and at a rally that followed the 
parade.  Those who were arrested apparently were at the parade 
and rally to object to those events.  They were charged with an 
assortment of crimes, mostly disorderly conduct and assault and 
battery on police officers.  Del Gallo alleges that, as a 
marcher in the parade and a speaker at the rally, he was a 
 
1 The Boston Municipal Court Department and one of its 
judges. 
2 
 
victim of the disorderly conduct2 because the conduct interfered 
with his right under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to participate in the events, although it is 
difficult to find any specific allegation in his lengthy 
complaint suggesting that any of the charged individuals or 
their conduct actually prevented him from marching or speaking 
or even interfered in any way with his doing so.3 
 
 
Discussion.  We begin with the elemental proposition that 
"it is the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth alone, that has 
the prerogative and the responsibility to prosecute defendants 
for criminal offenses."  Matter of Chapman, 482 Mass. 1012, 1014 
(2019).  Private individuals, including crime victims, "have no 
standing in our system of justice to prosecute cases and no 
authority to compel district attorneys or the Attorney General 
to do so."  Id., and cases cited.  The prosecutor, whether it is 
the Attorney General or a district attorney in a given case, has 
"wide discretion in determining whether to prosecute an 
individual, just as he [or she] has wide discretion in 
determining whether to discontinue a prosecution once 
commenced."  Manning v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 
372 Mass. 315, 318 (1977), and cases cited.4 
 
2 He does not claim to have been the victim of any act of 
violence committed by any of the individuals charged with crimes 
against the person. 
 
3 Del Gallo does not identify a specific criminal defendant 
whose alleged conduct he claims directly affected him (if indeed 
he was affected at all).  Nor does he identify which specific 
acts of alleged disorderly conduct he was even aware of, or in 
the vicinity of, at the time they occurred.  Instead, as best we 
can tell, he appears to take the sweeping position that all of 
the disorderly charges against all of the defendants at the 
parade and rally that day must be vacated because of an alleged 
violation of his rights as a victim of one or more of them, 
although he cannot say which ones. 
 
4 Conceivably, there may be some extremely rare circumstance 
in which a prosecutor's authority to decide to discontinue a 
prosecution is not unfettered.  See Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 
246 Mass. 12, 18 (1923) (describing prosecutor's authority as 
"extensive" and "absolute," "except possibly in instances of 
scandalous abuse of the authority").  The district attorney in 
this case made a garden-variety decision not to prosecute.  This 
is far from any kind of "scandalous" situation where we might 
3 
 
 
 
Del Gallo accepts these well-settled principles and 
purports to disclaim any interest in controlling the district 
attorney's decision to nol pros the disorderly conduct charges 
in this case.  He contends, however, that the district attorney 
could not validly exercise her prerogative to nol pros until she 
first met her statutory obligations under G. L. c. 258, § 3, 
which, he alleges, included an obligation to confer with him 
before she made her decision.  Del Gallo's argument rests on the 
premise that he was a victim of the nol prossed charges for 
purposes of the statute.  As explained infra, however, his 
premise is mistaken. 
 
 
a.  Purpose and effect of the statute.  General Laws 
c. 258B, which was enacted in 1983, gave crime victims "the 
right to be kept informed about and to participate in a limited 
way in" criminal cases.  Matter of Chapman, 482 Mass. at 1015.  
The statute "was intended to change the 'traditional view' of 
victims as virtually silent observers to active participants in 
the criminal justice process."  Hagen v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 
374, 380-381 (2002).  But while the statute confers important 
rights on victims vis-à-vis criminal prosecutions, "it does not 
confer on them the status of a party or grant them the rights 
that belong to parties."  Matter of Chapman, supra, and cases 
cited.  Put another way, the victim of a crime has no 
"judicially cognizable interest" in the prosecution of the 
offender, and the statute does not change that.  Id. 
 
 
The district attorneys of the Commonwealth and the Attorney 
General, as criminal prosecutors, are chiefly responsible for 
ensuring that the rights that the statute confers on victims are 
met.  Hagen, 437 Mass. at 377-378, citing Commonwealth v. Bing 
Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131, 134-135 (2001).  They are charged 
with doing so "to the greatest extent possible and subject to 
appropriation and available resources, with priority for 
services to be provided to victims of crimes against the person 
and crimes where physical injury to a person results."  G. L. 
c. 258B, § 3.  Judges, as well, have a role to play in assuring 
that victims are afforded their rights under the statute.  See 
G. L. c. 258B, § 12.  The Hagen case is a good example of how 
this court, in particular, has attempted to strike an 
appropriate balance between protecting the statutory rights of 
victims and respecting the Commonwealth's exclusive prerogative 
to control prosecutions.  See Hagen, supra at 380-381 (holding 
 
question, let alone consider the possibility of restricting in 
some way, the decision to nol pros. 
4 
 
that crime victim has no standing to file motions in criminal 
case, but should be permitted opportunity to address trial court 
directly when fundamental right under G. L. c. 258B is 
jeopardized; otherwise, "the right afforded by the statute is 
essentially meaningless"). 
 
 
b.  Application of statute to Del Gallo.  The statute 
defines "victim" as "any natural person who suffers direct or 
threatened physical, emotional, or financial harm as the result 
of the commission or attempted commission of a crime."  G. L. 
c. 258B, § 1.  Del Gallo fails to state a claim in this case 
because he was not a victim of the alleged disorderly conduct 
crimes that were nol prossed. 
 
 
First, disorderly conduct is not a crime against a person 
or against a specific person's property.  It is a crime against 
the public peace; its essence is a criminal public nuisance.  
See G. L. c. 272, § 53 (b).  See also Commonwealth v. Accime, 
476 Mass. 469 (2017); Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721 
(2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001). 
 
 
Second, we reject Del Gallo's claim that he was a victim 
within the meaning of the statute because he suffered 
"threatened . . . emotional . . . harm" as a result of the 
alleged disorderly conduct.  That language might include, for 
example, someone who is victimized by criminally assaultive 
behavior directed at him or her that does not result in physical 
contact.  We cannot imagine, however, that the Legislature 
intended it as broadly as Del Gallo's argument suggests, to 
apply to every person who is upset by an act of disorderly 
conduct.  There could be tens, hundreds, or even thousands of 
people who witness a given incident, or who claim to have been 
emotionally affected by it even though they did not witness it 
firsthand, who may be known or unknown to the prosecutor.  It is 
inconceivable that the Legislature meant for the prosecutor to 
provide all of them with the rights afforded to crime victims 
under G. L. c. 258B.  See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 
163, 168 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Perella, 464 Mass. 274, 
276 (2013) (rejecting interpretation of statute that would 
"yield an absurd or unworkable result"). 
 
 
Third, assuming (without deciding) that an interference 
with one's First Amendment rights by an incident of disorderly 
conduct could render one a "victim" for purposes of G. L. 
c. 258B, there does not, as we have stated above, appear to be 
any allegation that Del Gallo was in fact prevented from 
5 
 
marching or speaking, or that he personally was interfered with 
in any specific way. 
 
 
Finally, as stated in note 3, supra, Del Gallo does not 
point to a specific act of disorderly conduct, or to a specific 
individual so charged whose complaint was nol prossed, that 
allegedly victimized him.  Rather, he appears to be claiming an 
interest as a victim in all of the disorderly conduct cases, 
regardless of whether he witnessed the particular act charged, 
was affected by it, was aware of it at the time it occurred, or 
was even in the vicinity.  Again, we cannot imagine that the 
Legislature intended to confer "victim" status on someone in 
Del Gallo's position simply because he or she was involved in an 
event's planning5 and was disappointed that the event ultimately 
was met with protest and allegedly was marred by disorderly 
conduct.6 
 
 
Conclusion.  The single justice properly denied all relief 
on the complaint that was before her. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, pro se. 
 
 
5 Del Gallo characterizes himself in his brief on appeal as 
the "First Amendment counsel" for the event organizers.  In his 
complaint, however, Del Gallo brings his claims only on behalf 
of himself and not on behalf of the organizers or anyone else. 
 
6 The argument section of Del Gallo's brief on appeal is 
slightly less than three pages.  He purports to "incorporate[] 
by reference" his very lengthy complaint in the county court; 
states that "the arguments and law there should be carefully 
reviewed"; tells us that the argument in his brief "is merely 
. . . supplemental to the material advanced in" his complaint; 
and then proceeds to "highlight[]" a few points without any real 
legal analysis or citation to authority.  This does not comply 
with the rules of appellate procedure.  We have addressed his 
main contentions but decline to consider the myriad other 
statements in his complaint in lieu of a proper brief.