Title: Pryor v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 071744
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2008

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Agee, and  
 
    Goodwyn, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
WILLIAM A. PRYOR, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 071744   SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
June 6, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in permitting the jury to consider a videotaped recording of a 
drug transaction as evidence pertaining to an earlier 
transaction after the court struck the evidence of the later 
transaction. 
I 
 
William A. Pryor, Jr. was charged with two counts of 
distribution of cocaine.  The offenses allegedly occurred on 
June 16, 2003, and July 24, 2003, and videotaped recordings were 
made of both transactions.  The two offenses were tried 
together, and the recordings of both transactions were displayed 
for the jury and admitted into evidence during the trial without 
objection from Pryor.  At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's 
evidence, the trial court granted Pryor's motion to strike the 
evidence regarding the July transaction.  Pryor did not present 
evidence.  When the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court, 
over Pryor’s objection, allowed the jury to consider the 
videotaped recording of the July transaction "only as it may be 
relevant to the June 16, [20]03 charge."  The jury found Pryor 
guilty of distribution of cocaine on June 16, 2003, and the 
trial court entered judgment on the verdict. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Pryor's conviction.  Pryor v. 
Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 42, 646 S.E.2d 21 (2007).  We awarded 
Pryor this appeal. 
II 
 
Greene County Deputy Sheriff Joseph Hogsten arranged to 
have a confidential informant purchase $100 worth of cocaine 
from Pryor.  On June 16, 2003, the informant called Pryor to 
arrange a transaction and then notified Deputy Hogsten.  Deputy 
Hogsten went to the informant's residence and searched her 
person to confirm that she did not have any narcotics in her 
possession.  Deputy Hogsten then outfitted the informant with an 
audio and video transmitting device and gave her instructions 
and $100 for the purchase of cocaine from Pryor. 
 
Deputy Hogsten waited in his vehicle approximately 75 to 
100 yards away from the informant's residence in order to 
observe the transaction.  Deputy Hogsten saw a white Toyota 
Camry pass within 20 feet of him as it approached the 
informant's residence.  He saw two black individuals inside the 
vehicle, but he could not determine whether they were male or 
female.  Deputy Hogsten viewed the transaction "live" on the 
screen of a video camera and recorder ("camcorder") that 
 
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received the broadcast from the transmitting device attached to 
the informant.  After the Camry left the area, Deputy Hogsten 
went to the informant's residence, searched her, and retrieved 
the cocaine that she had purchased from Pryor.  The informant 
was unable to recall which occupant of the vehicle had actually 
handed her the drugs. 
 
Deputy Hogsten later arranged to have the informant 
purchase another $100 worth of cocaine from Pryor.  On July 24, 
2003, Deputy Hogsten again went to the informant's residence, 
searched her person for narcotics, outfitted her with an audio 
and video transmitting device, and gave her $100 for the 
purchase.  On this occasion, the deputy went to a vacant 
adjacent residence in order to monitor the transaction "live" on 
the camcorder screen.  About two hours later, Deputy Hogsten saw 
the same white Toyota Camry, with someone who "appeared to be" 
Pryor and another black male inside, arrive at the informant's 
residence.  After the transaction was completed, Deputy Hogsten 
recovered the cocaine from the informant.  As before, the 
informant was not able to recall which occupant of the vehicle 
had actually handed her the drugs. 
 
The videotaped recordings of both transactions were played 
for the jury and admitted into evidence without objection at 
that time from Pryor.  As previously noted, at the conclusion of 
the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Pryor moved to strike the July 
 
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24 charge.  Thereupon, the trial court informed the jury that 
"[t]he Court has struck the evidence as to . . . the July 24 
charge."  Pryor elected not to present evidence on his behalf.  
After the trial court had instructed the jury and after closing 
arguments, Pryor objected to the delivery to the jury room of 
the videotaped recording of the July transaction.  He argued 
that the recording of the July transaction was irrelevant to the 
charge of June 16 and that, even if relevant, its prejudicial 
effect outweighed its probative value.  The trial court 
overruled his objection.  During deliberations, the jury 
specifically asked whether it was permitted to view the 
recording of the July transaction, and the court replied, "Yes, 
but only as it may be relevant to the June 16, [20]03 charge.  
It may not be considered for the July 24, [20]03 charge, which 
has been struck and is not before you." 
III 
 
Pryor contends that the trial court erred in permitting the 
jury to consider the videotaped recording of the July 
transaction because the evidence regarding the July 24 charge 
had been stricken.*  The effect of sustaining a motion to strike 
the charge is to eliminate all of the evidence submitted on that 
offense from consideration by a jury.  See Anderson v. 
 
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Clinchfield R. Co., 171 Va. 87, 89, 198 S.E. 478, 479 (1938); 
see also 1 Virginia Model Jury Instructions--Criminal, 
Instruction 2.360 (stricken matter must be disregarded). 
 
In the present case, at the conclusion of the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the trial court granted Pryor's 
motion to strike the evidence regarding the charge of 
distribution of cocaine on July 24, 2003.  However, there had 
been no determination whether the videotaped recording of the 
July transaction was properly in evidence for the offense of 
June 16.  It was only when the recording of the July transaction 
itself was being delivered to the jury for their deliberations 
that Pryor made his objection concerning admissibility.  The 
Commonwealth argued that the recording of the July transaction 
was admissible for the charge relating to the June transaction 
because it tended to prove the identity of the defendant in the 
June transaction.  When asked about the relevancy of the 
recording of the July transaction to the charge of the June 
transaction, the Commonwealth responded: 
Well, the officer testified that he went 
through the same setup and there’s a camera.  
We would submit that it’s corroborative of his 
being at her residence which is an issue, I 
think the way the case was argued.  Whether it 
was actually him or not, the testimony was that 
he was---the evidence from that videotape was 
                                                                  
 
* Pryor has assigned numerous errors, but we find assignment 
of error 1 dispositive.  In light of our holding, we need not 
consider Pryor's other assignments of error. 
 
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that he was there another time in a similar 
circumstance, so we think it corroborates the 
fact that the first incident took place and the 
defendant was a participant in that. 
 
Assuming without deciding that the recording of the July 
transaction was relevant to the June offense, we hold that its 
probative value was greatly outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  As we have repeatedly stated: 
The standard governing the admission of 
evidence of other crimes in the guilt phase of 
a criminal trial is well established.  Evidence 
that shows or tends to show that a defendant 
has committed a prior crime is generally 
inadmissible to prove the crime charged.  Guill 
v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 
489, 491 (1998); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 
211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970).  
There are several exceptions to this general 
rule.  One exception is that evidence of other 
crimes is admissible to prove a perpetrator’s 
identity when certain requirements are met. 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 645, 651, 529 S.E. 2d 787, 790-
91 (2000).  "Additionally, admission of evidence of other crimes 
is subject to the further requirement that the probative value 
of the evidence must outweigh any incidental prejudice to the 
defendant."  Scates v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 757, 761, 553 
S.E.2d 756, 759 (2001); accord Guill, 255 Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d 
at 491-92. 
 
Of significance to the evaluation of the evidence in the 
present case is the Commonwealth’s observation that, "[w]hether 
it was actually him or not, . . . the evidence from that 
 
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videotape was that he was there another time in a similar 
circumstance."  Even the Commonwealth had doubts about the value 
of the recording of the July 24 transaction as it pertained to 
Pryor’s identity regarding the June 16 transaction.  Whatever 
slim reed of corroboration this evidence might provide on the 
disputed issue of the perpetrator’s identity, this claimed 
probative value most certainly was not sufficient to meet the 
requirement for admissibility of other-crimes proof; i.e., that 
its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial impact.  See 
Scates, 262 Va. at 761, 553 S.E.2d at 759. 
IV 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming Pryor's conviction and will remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded to 
the circuit court for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so 
advised. 
Reversed and remanded.