Title: State v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51313
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2007

FILED: April 19, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
JESSE LEE JOHNSON,
Appellant.
(CC 98C46239; SC S51313)
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction and sentence of death imposed by the Marion County Circuit Court.
Jamese L. Rhoades, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 7, 2006.
Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before, De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette, Durham, Balmer, and
Kistler, Justices.*
KISTLER, J.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are affirmed.
* Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.  Carson, J., retired December 31, 2006, and did not participate in
the decision of this case.  Walters and Linder, JJ., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
KISTLER, J.
This case is before us on automatic and direct review of defendant's
judgment of conviction and sentence of death.  See ORS 138.012 (providing for direct
review in the Supreme Court when the jury imposes a death sentence).  On review,
defendant assigns error to 23 of the trial court's rulings.  For the reasons set out below, we
affirm defendant's conviction and sentence of death.
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we state the facts in the light most
favorable to the state.  State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 562, 113 P3d 423, cert den, 126 S Ct
760 (2005).  On March 20, 1998, the victim was found lying on her living room floor,
stabbed to death.  An acquaintance of the victim told the police that defendant had been in
the victim's home the day before she was murdered. (1)

  Another witness reported
seeing a person who matched defendant's appearance walk away from the victim's home
shortly after the murder.  Police officers later found defendant's fingerprints in the
victim's home.
On March 27, seven days after the victim's death, two police officers
arrested defendant for a probation violation.  When the officers arrested him, they seized
his jacket, which was similar to the one that the person walking away from the victim's
home had been wearing.  Before leaving with the officers, defendant put on a pair of
heavy work boots.  One officer noticed that the pattern on the soles of defendant's boots
was consistent with a shoe impression found in blood at the crime scene.
After they arrived at the police station, the officers advised defendant of his
Miranda rights and spoke with him concerning the murder.  During their conversation,
defendant admitted that he had known the victim but maintained that he never had been to
her home even after the officers told him that his fingerprints had been found there.  After
the interview, the officers seized defendant's clothing and boots, placed them in an
evidence locker, and booked defendant into the Yamhill County Jail on the probation
violation charge.
One of the officers interviewed defendant a second time on April 17, 1998. 
By that time, the police had spoken with a number of people who had reported seeing
defendant in possession of the victim's jewelry shortly after her death.  One of those
witnesses told the police that defendant had showed him some of the victim's jewelry and
then said, "I offed the bitch to rob her."  When the officer asked defendant whether the
witness was lying when he reported that defendant had made that statement, defendant
replied, "No, he's not."
The state charged defendant with aggravated murder on June 25, 1998, and
trial was set to begin on September 8, 1999.  Before trial, defendant moved to suppress
some of the state's evidence, including the clothing and boots that the officers had seized
during their first interview with him.  On August 20, 1999, the trial court suppressed that
evidence, reasoning that the officers did not have a warrant to seize defendant's clothing
and that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply.  The state pursued two pretrial
appeals regarding the seized clothing.  Neither appeal was successful.  The case against
defendant went to trial on March 8, 2004, and the jury found him guilty of aggravated
murder and sentenced him to death.
As noted, defendant assigns error to 23 of the trial court's rulings.  Among
other things, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to prevent
the officers from commenting at trial on his invocation of his constitutional right to
silence, in denying his motions to dismiss the charges because the state denied his
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and in ruling that, if defendant
presented expert testimony regarding footprints left at the crime scene, he would open the
door to the introduction of evidence that the trial court had suppressed.  We discuss those
rulings below and affirm without further discussion the remainder of the rulings to which
defendant assigns error. (2)
We begin with defendant's argument that, at trial, the officers impermissibly
commented on the exercise of his right to remain silent.  Defendant filed a pretrial motion
to suppress statements that he had made to police officers on March 27 and April 17,
1998.  He contended that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).  At the hearing
on that motion, the state offered evidence that the officers had advised defendant of his
Miranda rights and that he had spoken with them after receiving that advice.
The evidence at the hearing also revealed that defendant had not answered
all the officers' questions.  Sometimes, defendant had responded, "I don't know what
you're talking about."  Other times, defendant would pause, the officers would repeat or
clarify the question, and then defendant would respond.  Still other times, defendant
would simply remain silent in response to a question.  Ultimately, defendant told the
officers that he did not want to talk to them anymore and, after that point, made no further
statements.
After the hearing on his suppression motion, defendant filed a supplemental
memorandum based on the officers' testimony during the hearing.  In that memorandum,
defendant identified specific instances in which he had remained silent in response to the
officers' questions.  Defendant argued that evidence of his silence was not admissible for
two reasons.  First, he contended that his silence did not qualify as an adoptive admission
under the Oregon Evidence Code.  Alternatively, he argued that introducing evidence of
his silence at trial would be an impermissible comment on the exercise of his
constitutional right to remain silent.
The state argued, in response to the evidentiary issue raised in petitioner's
supplemental memorandum, that it intended to introduce evidence of his silence only for
the purpose of proving that his statements to the officers were voluntary.  On the
constitutional issue, the state argued that defendant's silence, when viewed in context, did
not constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent.  The state reasoned:
"Your honor, I guess what it boils down to on this issue is that the
State is asking you to look at all of the circumstances, to recall that the
defendant was able to and did exercise certain of his rights or at least rights
that he perceived that he had and to, from that, infer that the defendant was
not engaging in an invocation of his right to silence when he was not
responding to certain questions but was rather simply pausing before
answering questions and thinking about them, which is really what I believe
the record reflects * * *."
The trial court accepted the state's argument on the constitutional issue and
"f[ound] that the defendant did not implicitly invoke his right to remain silent."  The court
was concerned, however, that testimony regarding defendant's silence, even if relevant to
prove voluntariness, was more prejudicial than probative.  Applying that standard, the
trial court ruled that two instances of defendant's silence in response to the officers'
questions were admissible but that the other instances of silence that counsel had
identified were not. (3)
At trial, the officer who had interviewed defendant did not testify regarding
the two instances of silence that the trial court had ruled would be admissible, nor did he
testify regarding any other instance of silence that defendant had identified in his
supplemental memorandum.  Rather, the officer testified as follows:
"Well, the first thing that I told [defendant] was -- was that we've continued
to investigate this; we've developed more information.  And I just simply
told him 'I don't have any doubt you were there.  I think you were there at
the time of the homicide.  And -- you know -- the issue with us is that we at
this point need to know what your involvement is.'  While I'm talking with
him saying, 'Hey.  I need to talk to you about a murder,' he is almost casual
in his appearance.  He's got his arms crossed.  He's looking away, down,
kind of off to the side of his lap.  He would be nonresponsive to some
statements and questions, so I'd have to repeat them to get him to respond to
me.  I told him that -- you know -- 'Hey.  I really need to talk to you about
this situation.  And I know you were there when this happened.'  And his
response to that was to say, 'I don't know what you're talking about.'  And I
would follow that up with, 'Well, I'm talking about a murder.  I'm talking
where someone has been stabbed to death.  Someone has stolen her jewelry,
and people are saying you're the one involved in that.'  And he would say, 'I
don't know what you're talking about.'"
The issue that defendant raises on review is narrow.  He does not argue that,
when he remained silent in response to the officers' questions, he invoked his right to
silence and all questioning therefore had to stop.  Cf. State v. Longo, 341 Or 580, 592-93,
148 P3d 892 (2006) (recognizing that selective refusal to talk on some subjects did not
foreclose questioning on other subjects).  Rather, he argues that his intermittent silences
were selective invocations of his constitutional right to remain silent and that, when the
officer testified at trial that he had remained silent in response to the officers' questions,
the officer impermissibly commented on defendant's invocation of his constitutional right
to remain silent.
One difficulty with defendant's argument is the factual premise that
underlies it.  The officer did not testify at trial that defendant remained silent in response
to his questions.  Rather, he testified that defendant hesitated and then answered.  The
officer told the jury that defendant "would be non-responsive to some statements and
questions, so I'd have to repeat them to get him to respond to me."  The officer went on
and set out defendant's responses to his questions -- responses in which defendant denied
any knowledge of the events to which the officer referred.  Far from testifying that
defendant remained silent in the face of questions, the officer testified only that defendant
paused before responding.
At the hearing on defendant's supplemental memorandum, defendant's
counsel explained that he purposefully had omitted from the memorandum "situations of
testimony where the defendant sat, thought, and then gave a response."  Defense counsel
added, "If the State wants to introduce evidence during this trial that defendant sat and
thought about things before he answered, I don't see a problem with that."  It appears
from the limited testimony that the officer gave at trial that the state did precisely what the
defense invited it to do; it offered testimony that, in response to the officer's questions,
defendant sat, thought, and then responded. (4)  In any event, because the officer did not
testify that defendant remained silent in response to his questions, his testimony was not a
comment on defendant's silence, much less a comment on defendant's exercise of his
constitutional right to remain silent. (5)
Defendant's fifth and sixth assignments of error challenge the trial court's
rulings denying his two motions to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial.  As noted,
the state indicted defendant for aggravated murder on June 25, 1998.  On July 13, 1999,
defendant filed a motion to suppress several pieces of evidence, including the clothing
and boots that the officers had seized during their first interview with him.  On August
20, 1999, the trial court suppressed the clothing and boots, finding that "the detectives
seized defendant's clothing without a warrant and without exigent circumstances."  The
court also rejected the state's argument that it inevitably would have obtained the clothing,
ruling that "inevitable discovery [was] inapplicable to the facts and evidence in this case."
On September 30, 1999, the state appealed the trial court's pretrial order. 
The state conceded that the officers had obtained the evidence illegally but argued that the
trial court erred in concluding that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply.  State v. Johnson, 177 Or App 244, 247, 35 P3d 1024 (2001) (Johnson I).  The state contended
that the jail staff would have inventoried (and thus seized) defendant's clothing at the jail
if the officers had not illegally seized the clothing earlier.  Id. at 250.  It followed, the
state reasoned, that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied.  Id.  The Court of Appeals
disagreed, concluding that, even if jail staff would have inventoried defendant's clothes
after his arrest and seized them temporarily for that purpose, the state had failed to show
that the jail staff would have seized that clothing for all the purposes of a criminal
investigation, such as forensic testing.  Id. at 252.  Accordingly, on October 17, 2001, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence.
While the state was pursuing its appeal, it applied to the trial court for a
search warrant authorizing the seizure of the boots and clothes.  That court issued the
warrant, authorizing the police to seize and analyze the clothing "located at the Salem
Police Department."  After the state lost its appeal, it did not petition for review of the
Court of Appeals decision.  It chose instead to rely on the seizure pursuant to the warrant. 
Defendant then moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.  He
argued that the police officers were able to locate the clothing and boots for the purpose
of executing the warrant only because of their earlier, illegal seizure of that evidence. 
The trial court agreed and again suppressed the evidence.  
On October 18, 2002, the state appealed directly to this court from the
second order suppressing evidence. (6)

  On appeal, the state argued that the officers had
an independent source for the information that led to the issuance and execution of the
warrant.  State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 519, 73 P3d 282 (2003) (Johnson II).
On July 24, 2003, this court upheld the trial court's order.  See id. at 511. 
The court began by examining the question, previously unanswered in state law, of how
the burdens of production and persuasion should be allocated when the state claims that a
warranted search or seizure is not the product of an earlier illegality.  Id. at 519-21.  This
court concluded that, if a defendant meets the burden of "establishing a 'factual nexus'
between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence," then the burden of
persuasion shifts to the state to prove that the evidence was not tainted by the unlawful
conduct.  Id. at 520-21.
After this court determined that the trial court correctly had allocated the
burdens of production and persuasion, it considered whether the evidence supported the
trial court's conclusion that the state had failed to meet its burden of persuasion that the
seizure of the evidence pursuant to the warrant was not a product of the earlier illegality. 
Id. at 522-23.  On that issue, the court reviewed the evidence before the trial court and
concluded that, although the trial court could have found that the state had met its burden
of persuasion, it could not say as a matter of law that the trial court erred in finding
otherwise.  Id. at 523-26.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order
suppressing the evidence that the state had seized pursuant to the warrant.  Id. at 526.
Immediately after this court issued its decision in Johnson II, the trial court
offered defendant a trial date of November 10, 2003.  Defendant agreed to postpone the
trial further, pushing it back to February 2004.  In October 2003, defendant filed a pretrial
motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, arguing that the state had violated his rights
under ORS 135.747, Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the
"lion's share" of the pretrial delay had been caused by two unsuccessful and "unduly
lengthy" state's appeals.  The court noted that the first appeal took nearly two years and
found that the state's attorney assigned to the case had failed to give the appeal the
"highest priority," working instead on "a number of less serious cases in lieu of this case." 
The court found that the second appeal "was poorly timed, of questionable value and
added eighteen months to an already unnecessarily long pretrial delay."  Although the
court questioned the value of the state's two pretrial appeals, it denied defendant's motion
to dismiss.  It found that defendant had failed to prove that the delay had prejudiced him. 
The court reasoned:
"Although the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay analysis
suppor[t] Defendant's motion, the Court finds the prejudice prong has not
been met.  Facts supporting a finding of actual prejudice are likely to
become apparent only following trial, when a comprehensive analysis can
be made of the evidence still available following delay."
After the guilt phase but before the penalty phase of his trial, defendant
renewed his motion to dismiss, arguing once again that the state had denied his right to a
speedy trial.  Defendant based his motion in part on what he characterized as "the
testimony contained in the record regarding numerous instances of faded or absent
memories of witnesses."  He also based it on missing evidence regarding cigarette butts
and a photo throw-down.  In support of his motion, defendant filed an affidavit describing
the ways in which the delay had "substantially affected [his] physical and mental well-being."  The affidavit referred, among other things, to trouble sleeping due to the stress of
being in jail, weight loss due to anxiety, the loss of "important family members" and "all
hope," and trouble concentrating on helping his attorney with the case.
The trial court denied defendant's second motion for the same reasons that it
had denied his first motion -- the failure to prove prejudice.  On that point, the court
found that defendant's anxiety was not atypical for someone facing the death penalty, that
defendant was not having trouble sleeping, and that he had not demonstrated that the
evidence that he identified as missing or lost was either material or favorable.  On review,
the parties renew the arguments that they made below. 
When a defendant charged with murder raises statutory and constitutional
speedy trial claims, we reverse our usual order of analysis and consider the constitutional
claims first.  State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 81, 11 P3d 641 (2000).  We do so because a
defendant who prevails on a constitutional speedy trial claim is entitled to dismissal with
prejudice.  Id.  When a defendant who is charged with murder prevails on a statutory
speedy trial claim, he or she is entitled only to dismissal without prejudice and faces the
prospect of another prosecution for the same crime.  Id.  Accordingly, we begin with
defendant's state constitutional claim.
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part, that
"justice shall be administered * * * without delay."  Even though that provision refers
broadly to the administration of justice, this court has held that it is "similar" to the
command contained in the Sixth Amendment that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy * * * trial."  State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 22, 741
P2d 496 (1987); see also Harberts, 331 Or at 81-86 (describing the two provisions as
substantially the same).  The two provisions are not identical, however.  See Haynes v.
Burks, 290 Or 75, 80, 619 P2d 632 (1980) (so noting).  For instance, a defendant's failure
to invoke his or her right to a speedy trial is neutral in the state constitutional analysis
while the failure to invoke the federal right can weigh against a defendant.  Id.
Even though a pretrial appeal is part of the administration of justice, an
undue and "wholly unjustified" delay in prosecuting a pretrial appeal can result in the
denial of a defendant's rights under Article I, section 10.  See Haynes, 290 Or at 90 (so
stating); accord Harberts, 331 Or at 89-91.  In assessing the effect of the delay, the court
considers both the length of the delay and the reasons for it.  When the state pursues a
reasonable pretrial appeal with diligence, the delay will weigh only slightly against the
state.  See Harberts, 331 Or at 90 (stating proposition).  On the other hand, the delay
resulting from a pretrial appeal will weigh more heavily against the state if considerable
delay already has occurred, if the state lacks a "strong justification" for the appeal, and if
the state fails to give the appeal sufficient priority.  See id. at 91-93 (stating those
propositions).
In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial
has been impaired sufficiently to warrant dismissing the charges against him or her, a
court also must consider the prejudice to the defendant.  State v. Tiner, 340 Or 551, 555,
135 P3d 305 (2006).  More specifically, a court
"must assess prejudice to the defendant in light of the interests that the
speedy-trial requirement was designed to protect:  (1) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize the anxiety and concern of the
criminally accused; (3) and to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired."
Id.  When a defendant proves that "the delay caused a 'reasonable possibility of prejudice'
to the ability to prepare a defense," that will weigh in the defendant's favor.  Harberts,
331 Or at 86 (quoting State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 508, 564 P2d 1039 (1977)); see also
Haynes, 290 Or at 82 (indicating that something more "concrete" is called for if trial has
occurred).  However, when the value of unavailable evidence is only speculative, the
unavailability of that evidence will not factor significantly in the analysis.  See Tiner, 340
Or at 557-58 (loss of witness's unknown testimony not sufficient to warrant dismissing
charges); State v. Emery, 318 Or 460, 473-74, 869 P2d 859 (1994) (same).
This court is bound by a trial court's findings of historical fact if there is
evidence in the record to support them.  Johnson II, 335 Or at 523.  Accordingly, the trial
court's findings of fact concerning the length and reasons for the delay, as well as the
type, level, and cause of any anxiety that defendant suffered, are binding if supported by
evidence.  See Harberts, 331 Or at 94 (so indicating).  How those findings of historical
fact factor into the constitutional analysis presents a question of law.  See id. at 91-92 (so
indicating).
In this case, the grand jury indicted defendant on June 25, 1998.  See State v. Vasquez, 336 Or 598, 612-13, 88 P3d 271 (2004) (explaining that the period for
assessing a speedy trial claim begins when the state initiates criminal charges against a
defendant by indictment or its equivalent).  Trial began on March 8, 2004.  The period
between indictment and trial was five years and eight months.  Defendant does not argue
that the state intended to hamper his defense through delay or that the delay was so long
that it is sufficient, without more, to establish a violation of his speedy trial rights.  See
Harberts, 331 Or at 86 (recognizing those bases for proving a speedy trial violation).  The
delay, however, is "substantially greater than the average."  See Mende, 304 Or at 23-24. 
Accordingly, we consider the reasons for the delay and the prejudice to the defendant,
bearing in mind that the length of the delay weighs against the state.   See id. (following
similar course). 
We accept the trial court finding of historical fact that the "lion's share" of
the delay in this case stems from the state's two appeals. (7)  The question of law for
this court, however, is whether the state acted unreasonably and without a sufficient
justification in pursuing the two appeals.  See id. at 92-93 (reviewing those issues as
questions of law).  On that issue, the trial court reasoned that the appeals were "unduly
lengthy" due, in part, to the state's failure to prioritize its first appeal.  It is true that the
state could have pursued the first appeal with greater diligence; however, the state's
attorney moved for only two 28-day extensions of time in which to file the opening brief
in part because of the other cases for which she was responsible.  We cannot say that the
state took an unreasonably long time to brief the case or contributed unduly to the delay. 
Indeed, defense counsel sought more than three months of extensions to file the
answering brief and added to the delay with a cross-appeal that defendant ultimately
abandoned. (8)

  To be sure, part of the delay also derived from the state's motion to
supplement the record and its motion for a limited remand.  The purpose of those
motions, however, was to speed up the process, not slow it down.
With regard to the second appeal, the parties pursued it with exemplary
diligence.  The state moved for one seven-day extension of time in which to file its
opening brief, and defendant did not ask for any extensions of time.  We do not discount
the length of time that the appellate process took; however, we cannot say that the state
took an unreasonable amount of time or acted in a dilatory manner.
We also disagree with the trial court's implicit conclusion that the state
acted unreasonably in pursuing the two appeals.  The second appeal presented unresolved
issues of state law, and its outcome was far from a foregone conclusion.  See Johnson II,
335 Or at 520 (explaining that the allocation of burdens of production and persuasion
presented an unresolved issue of state law).  If the trial court had erred in placing the
burden of persuasion on the state, then the factual finding on which its order depended
would have had no force.  We also conclude that the state acted reasonably in pursuing its
first appeal.  Not only had the trial court based its ruling on a statute that had been
superseded, but the appeal presented a novel issue of state law -- how the inevitable
discovery doctrine applies to unlawful seizures as opposed to unlawful searches. 
Johnson I, 177 Or App at 248-50.  The fact that the state did not prevail on the two
appeals does not mean that it acted unreasonably in pursuing them.
In sum, looking at the length of the delay and the two appeals responsible
for most of it, we conclude that the length of the delay weighs against the state but that
the state did not act unreasonably in taking or pursuing the two appeals.  See Haynes, 290
Or at 86-87, 90-91 (rejecting speedy trial claim in case involving two pretrial appeals); cf.
Tiner, 340 Or at 556-57 (concluding that little justification existed for delay caused by an
unwarranted appeal); Harberts, 331 Or at 92, 98 (finding speedy trial violation where
state pursued an appeal with little likelihood of success, after much delay already had
occurred, and then failed to prioritize that appeal and ultimately abandoned it).
The final factor is prejudice to the defendant.  On that point, defendant
argues that he suffered prejudice to all three interests protected by the speedy trial
requirement in the form of lengthy incarceration, anxiety, and impairment of his defense. 
With regard to the first interest, the length of the pretrial incarceration in this case cuts
against the state.  With regard to the second interest, the trial court found, in ruling on
defendant's speedy trial motion, that he appeared "in good health without visible stress." 
Accordingly, the second interest does not advance defendant's speedy trial claim. See
State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368, 378, 712 P2d 79 (1985) (reaching similar conclusion under
comparable facts).
With regard to the third interest, defendant contends that, by the time of
trial, several witnesses had forgotten critical facts and that their lost memories hampered
his defense in two respects. (9)

  Defendant's claims of trial prejudice arise from a
related series of events.  We first set out the trial testimony regarding those events.  We
then turn to the specific details that some of the witnesses could not remember and
explain why we conclude that, considering the other evidence on the same points, the
witnesses' inability to remember did not prejudice defendant.
At trial, Stacy Satter and Donald Blocker testified regarding defendant's
attempts to trade jewelry and other valuables for methamphetamine shortly after the
victim's death.  Satter testified that, when she met defendant in a park, he had a backpack
containing jewelry and a Citizens Band radio that he was trying to trade for drugs. 
Defendant initially had asked Blocker to make the trade.  According to Satter, Blocker
took the jewelry but not the radio to see if he could trade it for drugs.  When Blocker's
efforts proved unsuccessful, Satter took the jewelry and was able to trade it for a small
amount of methamphetamine, which she brought back to defendant and Blocker.
Blocker testified consistently with Satter.  He did not remember seeing a
radio but testified that he had attempted to trade the jewelry unsuccessfully.  He also
testified that, in talking with defendant about where he had gotten the jewelry, defendant
"said he offed the bitch for what he had" -- i.e., for the jewelry that he was trying to trade
for drugs.  Blocker testified, as Satter had, that she took the jewelry and was able to trade
it for a small amount of methamphetamine, which he and defendant consumed.
Two other witnesses, Vicki Free and Earl Jones, testified regarding
different encounters with defendant.  While defendant was visiting Free's home shortly
after the murder, he gave her two pairs of earrings, which were similar to earrings that the
victim had owned.  Jones was Free's fiancé.  He was not present when defendant gave
Free the earrings.  However, Jones testified that he saw defendant later that same day.  He
noticed that defendant had some rings, an Elgin watch, and cell phones that he was trying
to trade for drugs.  Jones testified that Free had not been present and had not seen the
watch but that he may have told her about it.
Defendant contends that, by the time of trial, Blocker and Free had
forgotten critical details about those incidents that could have aided his defense.  He notes
that Free could not remember whether she had told the police that he had a watch and
Blocker could not remember whether defendant had a Citizens Band radio that he was
trying to trade for drugs.  Defendant argues that, if Free and Blocker had remembered that
he possessed that property in addition to the jewelry, the jury could have inferred that he
trafficked generally in stolen property and that he had received the victim's jewelry in the
course of that enterprise rather than as a result of killing her and stealing the property
from her.
The initial difficulty with defendant's argument is factual.  For example, he
notes that, although Free testified that he had given her earrings shortly after the murder,
she testified that she had not seen defendant with a watch and could not remember
whether she had told the police that defendant had a watch that day.  Even though Free
did not remember telling the police that defendant had a watch, Jones told the jury that he
had seen defendant with an Elgin watch, and his testimony provided the jury with the
information that Free could not remember. (10)

  Similarly, although defendant argues
that Blocker could not remember whether defendant had a Citizens Band radio the day
that he was trying to get Satter and Blocker to trade the jewelry for drugs, Satter
remembered that he had a radio.
Even if some witnesses suffered a loss of memory, other witnesses testified
to the same facts that defendant argues the jury should have heard.  That evidence
permitted defendant to argue that he came into possession of the victim's jewelry as a
result of trafficking in stolen property generally and not as a result of killing the victim. 
Beyond that, the inference that defendant seeks to draw from the fact that he possessed
other stolen property for trade -- i.e., that he came into possession of the victim's jewelry
as a result of trafficking in stolen property -- seems somewhat strained in light of
defendant's statement to Blocker that he came into possession of the jewelry as a result of
"off[ing] the bitch."
Defendant also argues that Blocker's loss of memory barred him from
impeaching Blocker's trial testimony.  Blocker testified on direct examination that, in
explaining the source of the jewelry, defendant had told Blocker that "he offed the bitch
for what she had."  Blocker acknowledged, on direct examination, that he had made
contradictory statements to a defense investigator.  Blocker testified that he had told the
investigator that defendant had not "said these things" and that the police had threatened
to charge him with aggravated murder.  Blocker also explained on direct examination why
he had made those statements to the investigator. (11) 
On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to impeach Blocker's
testimony by asking him whether the investigator had asked certain specific questions and
whether Blocker had replied either that defendant had denied being involved in the
murder or that the detectives had threatened him.  Blocker testified that he remembered
some of the questions and answers, that he did not remember others, and that he might
have made some of the statements but that he could not remember specifically whether he
had done so.  Defendant argues that Blocker's inability to remember all the specific
questions that the investigator had asked and all the answers that he had given prevented
defendant from impeaching Blocker's testimony. (12)

 
Defendant's second argument suffers from the same factual problem as his
first.  Blocker testified on direct examination, in substance, to the same points that
defendant contends he could not elicit, due to Blocker's loss of memory, on cross-examination.  Defendant could have used Blocker's testimony on direct to impeach his
testimony that defendant had admitted "off[ing] the bitch."  Moreover, defendant told the
police that Blocker was not lying when he reported that defendant had said that he had
"offed the bitch" to rob her.  Because defendant's own statements to the police confirmed
that he had made that incriminating statement to Blocker, it is difficult to see how any
inability to impeach Blocker's testimony prejudiced defendant. (13)
Finally, defendant argues that the delay impeded his ability to prepare a
defense because his aunt, who helped raise him and with whom he was close, died during
the pendency of this case.  Defendant contends that her testimony would have helped him
during the penalty phase of the trial.  Aside from the fact that defendant failed to preserve
that argument, it is speculative.  As defendant admits, "[i]t is not possible to know what
she might have said [although] it is highly likely that [she] would have had something
kind to say."  See Tiner, 340 Or at 558 (discounting prejudicial effect of loss of
speculative testimony).  In short, defendant has not shown that the delay caused a
reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defense.
In this case, the state pursued with reasonable diligence two pretrial appeals
that, although unsuccessful, raised new or novel issues.  Moreover, while the appeals
process consumed a considerable amount of time, the resulting delay did not cause a
reasonable possibility of prejudice to defendant's ability to defend against the charges. 
We therefore reject defendant's speedy trial claim under Article I, section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution.
Unlike the Oregon Constitution, the speedy trial analysis required by the
Sixth Amendment contains an additional factor -- when a defendant first raised his or her
speedy trial claim -- that the court must balance along with the length of the delay, the
reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the defendant.  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 US
514, 530, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972) (describing federal four-factor balancing
test).  Although the failure to assert the speedy trial right does not constitute a waiver of
that right, the United States Supreme Court has "emphasize[d] that the failure to assert the
right [in a timely manner] will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial."  Id. at 528-29.  Here, defendant did not make a speedy trial claim
until October 2003, more than five years after the indictment.  That delay in asserting his
speedy trial right cuts against his federal speedy trial claim.  Balancing that delay with the
other three factors discussed above, we conclude that the state did not violate defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
Having resolved defendant's constitutional speedy trial claims, we turn to
his statutory claim.  ORS 135.747 provides:
"If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed
upon the application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is
not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order
the accusatory instrument to be dismissed."
However, even when the state has not brought a defendant to trial within a reasonable
period of time, ORS 135.750 provides that the trial court may continue the case if
"sufficient reason therefor is shown."
A statutory speedy trial claim presents two related but separate inquiries. 
The first question is whether the delay is "reasonable."  In deciding that question, a court
considers both the length of the delay and the reasons for it.  
State v. Johnson, 339 Or 69,
88, 116 P3d 879 (2005). (14)

  When the length of the delay "is greater than would be
expected," a court must examine all the attendant circumstances to determine whether
there was good reason for the delay.  Id. at 88-89.  A defendant need not show prejudice
to prove that the state failed to bring him to trial within a reasonable period of time. 
Emery, 318 Or at 470.
If the state has failed to bring a defendant to trial within a reasonable period
of time, then the remaining question is whether there is "sufficient reason" to continue the
case.  ORS 135.750.  In deciding the sufficiency of the reason, this court has looked to the
purposes for enacting the speedy trial statute -- to clear out cases that "are languishing in
the criminal justice system" and to serve as a "housecleaning" mechanism for trial court
dockets.  Johnson, 339 Or at 90-91.  The question whether the delay is reasonable and the
question whether there is sufficient reason to continue the case present questions of law. 
Id. at 86-87.
In this case, defendant acknowledges that he consented to nearly a year's
worth of delay by agreeing to later trial dates.  Moreover, defendant consented to further
delay by obtaining extensions of time to file briefs on appeal and by filing a cross-appeal
that he ultimately abandoned. (15)  Nonetheless, the remaining delay of more than four
years is enough to trigger an inquiry into its reasonableness.
As noted, the trial court questioned the reasonableness of both the state's
decision to take the two appeals and also the diligence with which it prosecuted them. 
Although we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact, the determination
whether any delay was reasonable presents a question of law for this court.  Johnson, 339
Or at 86-87.  As we explained in the course of deciding defendant's state constitutional
speedy trial claim, we cannot say that the state lacked a sufficient justification for taking
the two appeals or that it took an unreasonable time to brief the issues that the two
appeals raised. 
We also note that defendant's statutory speedy trial claim entails an issue
that his constitutional speedy trial claims did not.  The legislature specifically has
authorized the state to take pretrial appeals from, among other things, adverse rulings on
suppression motions.  See ORS 138.060(1)(c).  Although that legislative decision does
not affect the decision whether the state has honored a defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial, it does bear on the statutory questions whether the state has brought a
defendant to trial within a reasonable period of time and, if not, whether there is a
sufficient reason to continue a case.  To hold otherwise would effectively prevent the
state from reasonably pursuing a procedure that the legislature specifically has authorized. 
It follows that, when, as in this case, the state reasonably has made a decision to take two
pretrial appeals and has prosecuted those appeals with reasonable diligence, either the
resulting period of time is reasonable under ORS 135.747 or a sufficient reason exists for
continuing the case under ORS 135.750.  The trial court did not err in denying defendant's
statutory speedy trial claim.
Defendant finally assigns error to the trial court's ruling regarding his use of
expert testimony.  The court ruled that introducing expert testimony regarding footprints
found at the victim's home would open the door to evidence regarding defendant's boots
that the trial court had suppressed.  The ruling that defendant challenges has a lengthy
history.  We first summarize that history and then set out the ruling to which defendant
assigns error before turning to defendant's arguments.
As noted, the trial court issued two pretrial orders suppressing defendant's
clothing and boots because the state unlawfully had seized them.  The state had tested
defendant's boots after seizing them, and the suppression orders precluded the state from
putting on expert testimony that defendant's boots were consistent with a footprint left in
blood at the crime scene. (16) Although the state recognized that it could not offer that
evidence, it noted at a pretrial hearing that Detective Stoelk had observed the soles of
defendant's boots before seizing them.  Stoelk had noticed that the pattern on defendant's
soles was consistent with a footprint found at the victim's home.  The state contended that
Stoelk could offer that testimony, which the state had obtained independently of any
illegality.
Defense counsel responded that, if the state offered Stoelk's testimony, they
intended to introduce expert testimony to establish that visual observations were not a
reliable way to identify the source of the bloody footprint.  Rather, scientific testing was
required.  The state replied that introducing that evidence would imply inaccurately that it
had not done any scientific testing when, in fact, it had done so.  The state contended that,
if defendant sought to introduce that evidence, he would open the door to the evidence
that the trial court had ordered suppressed.
Faced with those arguments, the trial court concluded that the better course
was to preclude the state from making any reference to Stoelk's observations of
defendant's boots.  It reasoned that the potential prejudice (the inaccurate inference raised
by defendant's rebuttal evidence) outweighed the probative value of the state's
evidence. (17)

  The state accordingly presented its case-in-chief without making any
reference to Stoelk's observations of defendant's boots.
After the state had presented its case-in-chief, defense counsel made an
offer of proof in which they took a different position.  As the initial part of an offer of
proof, they observed that there were two distinct sets of footprints in the victim's house. 
One set of footprints was consistent with the pattern that Stoelk had noticed on the soles
of defendant's boots.  There also was a second, different set of footprints on a broken
knife blade, on some papers lying near the victim's body, and in the mud outside the
victim's home.  Defense counsel reasoned that the second set of footprints was more
immediately connected with the victim's death than the first.
Defense counsel explained that they wanted to introduce a pair of
defendant's tennis shoes to show that his tennis shoes did not match the second set of
footprints.  Defense counsel also wanted to call Detective Stoelk to testify to evidence
that the defense successfully had objected to earlier, that is, they wanted to call Stoelk to
testify that the boots that defendant had been wearing when the officers arrested him were
consistent with the first set of footprints found at the crime scene.
The court and the parties discussed the issue off the record, at which point
defense counsel explained that they also intended to introduce expert testimony to show
that there were two sets of footprints in the victim's house.  The trial court announced a
tentative ruling, which it later put on the record.  The court observed that, by introducing
evidence relating to defendant's boots, defendant ran the risk of opening the door to the
evidence that the court previously had suppressed, and it sought to identify how far
defendant could go without opening the door.  The court stated that defendant could
introduce "lay evidence" that two different sets of footprints were found at the scene of
the crime.  It also recognized that defendant could call Stoelk to testify that defendant had
been wearing boots that were consistent with one set of footprints.  It reasoned that the
introduction of that evidence would not "ope[n] the door to the entire suppressed
evidence or the comparison made by the Oregon State Crime Lab of the defendant's boots
with the latent[ footprints] left at the s[cene]."
The trial court explained that it was concerned that, if the defense went
further and introduced expert testimony regarding the footprints, the jury would draw the
incorrect inference that the state had failed to make comparable scientific tests of
defendant's boots.  The court observed that the only issue on which defendant apparently
wanted to introduce expert testimony -- that there were two sets of footprints in the
victim's house -- did not require an expert.  Rather, the court explained that it was
apparent from the photographs that there were two different sets of prints.
Later, defendant completed his offer of proof.  The offer of proof revealed
that the expert would testify that there were two distinct sets of footprints at the crime
scene.  The first had been made by a shoe with a lug type sole; the second had been made
by a shoe with an oval and bar pattern on the sole.  The expert would testify that the
second pattern was visible on the knife blade, on a spot of blood near the knife blade, on
papers surrounding the victim's body, and in the mud outside of the victim's house.  In
each instance, the oval and bar pattern was the same.  In the expert's opinion, the more
complete footprint in the mud made clear what was "fairly convincing" from the other
prints alone -- that the oval and bar pattern had been made by a shoe.
After hearing the completed offer of proof, the court asked defendant to
specify what the expert testimony added to a lay person's observation of the two distinct
sets of footprints.  In answering that question, defendant did not argue that a lay person
could not determine that there were two separate sets of footprints, nor did he contend
that it would not be apparent to a lay person that the oval and bar pattern appeared on the
knife blade and in the mud.  Rather, he argued that, without expert testimony, a juror
could not conclude that the pattern on the spot of blood was similar to the pattern on the
knife blade.  He also argued that, without expert testimony, a juror could not "necessarily
conclude" that the pattern on the documents was the same as the pattern on the knife
blade.
The court, in turn, asked the state why introducing expert, as opposed to lay,
testimony would be prejudicial.  The state explained that, if defendant's witness testified
as an expert, the jury would be aware that the expert had made a series of measured and
scaled comparisons between the footprints.  The jury also would know, given defendant's
offer of proof, that the police had noticed the soles of defendant's boots when they
arrested him and that the soles of his boots appeared to match one set of footprints at the
crime scene.  The state argued that the jury incorrectly would infer from that limited
evidence that the police had failed to make any further examination of defendant's boots
or undertake any scientific tests to determine whether they matched the footprints at the
scene of the crime.
After considering the parties' arguments, the trial court ruled:
"I believe, once again, we get into what will be improper inferences for the
jury to draw if we get into expert testimony, particularly because it is true
that those same kind of measurements were done [by the state] with regard
to defendant's boots.  And if we get scientific, the [jury is] going to
understand that that's something that gets done and that in fact should have
been done in this case, and they're going to conclude that it wasn't.  And so I
think we're on a safe path if we only have lay testimony with regard to the
observations of the latent[ footprints found at the crime scene] and
observations of any footwear.  And as long as the cross-examination of
various witnesses is only lay testimony, then I think that we're still on safe
ground."
The court's ruling did not preclude defendant from offering his expert's testimony. 
However, if defendant chose to offer expert testimony, he would open the door to the
state's expert testimony that defendant's boots were generally consistent with the first set
of prints found at the crime scene.
Defendant chose not to offer expert testimony and open the door to the tests
that the state had done on his boots.  Rather, he offered lay and photographic evidence to
prove that there were two sets of footprints and to show that one set of footprints was
found on the knife blade, on the papers surrounding the body, and in the mud.  Defense
counsel also called Stoelk to show that defendant had been wearing boots that were
consistent with the other set of shoe prints.  Defense counsel asked Stoelk whether he had
seen a "partial shoe impression etched in blood" made by a "full-sized shoe having a
heavy, cleated lug sole type design on the shoe sole" at the crime scene.  When Stoelk
said that he had seen such a shoe impression, defense counsel then asked Stoelk whether
the soles of the work boots that defendant had been wearing "appeared to be similar to the
heavy, cleated lug type work boot impressions which you observed at the crime scene." 
Stoelk testified that they were.
In closing, defendant argued those same points, and the state did not dispute
them.  Rather, the state agreed that there were two sets of footprints at the scene of the
crime and that only one of them was consistent with defendant's boots.  The state
disagreed with the inferences to be drawn from those facts -- i.e., whether defendant or
someone else was personally and intentionally responsible for murdering the victim.  But
the state did not disagree with the underlying facts regarding the two sets of footprints on
which defendant based his argument.
On review, defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that, if he
offered expert testimony regarding the footprints found at the crime scene, he would open
the door to suppressed evidence regarding defendant's boots.  As an initial matter, we
note that defendant's offer of proof consisted of more than the expert's testimony.  It also
consisted of defendant's statement that he intended to introduce his tennis shoes to show
that they did not match the oval and bar pattern on the second set of footprints (18)

 and
that he intended to introduce evidence that the detectives noticed that the soles of the
boots that he was wearing when they arrested him were consistent with first set of the
footprints found at the crime scene.
Defendant does not dispute that a party may open the door to evidence that
has been suppressed.  As this court recognized in State v. Miranda, 309 Or 121, 128-29,
786 P2d 155 (1990), a defendant who selectively testifies regarding some of his
suppressed statements and thus implies that he had "come clean" with the police runs the
risk that the state may inquire about the remainder of his statements on cross-examination. 
Defendant argues, however, that the evidence that he sought to offer in this case was not
sufficient to open the door to the evidence that the trial court had suppressed.
We think that the trial court's ruling in this case is consistent with the
holding in Miranda.  Defendant wanted to present expert testimony regarding the two sets
of footprints; he also wanted to introduce evidence that the soles of his tennis shoes did
not match one set of footprints found at the crime scene and that an officer had noted that
his boots were consistent with another set of footprints found there.  The trial court
correctly recognized that, given only that evidence, the jury would infer (correctly) that
expert testimony was necessary in this area and (incorrectly) that the state had failed to
test critical evidence.  The inference was particularly problematic because one of the
defense theories was that the state had failed to test and preserve critical DNA evidence. 
The partial presentation of evidence regarding his boots that defendant sought to
introduce bled all too easily into the same theme -- that the state had failed to test
defendant's boots even though the officers were aware that they could be linked to the
murder.
Moreover, as the trial court also recognized, any prejudice resulting from
the use of lay rather than expert testimony in this somewhat unique situation appears
slight, if nonexistent.  Defendant was able to make essentially the same factual points,
which the state did not dispute, through lay testimony and photographic evidence.  On
these facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred in offering defendant the option to use
lay testimony and avoid opening the door to the introduction of the suppressed
evidence. (19)

  Having considered all of defendant's arguments, we uphold the
conviction of aggravated murder and the sentence of death.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are affirmed.
1. The police determined that the victim had been killed during the early
morning hours of March 20, 1998, when the victim's neighbors heard screams for help
coming from her apartment.
2. We have considered all of defendant's other assignments of error.  Any
assignment of error or issue not discussed in this opinion either has been discussed by this
court in previous cases and resolved against defendant's position, was not preserved at
trial, or is not well taken.  Further discussion of those issues would not benefit the public,
bench or bar.
3. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the officers could admit evidence
(1) that defendant had remained silent in response to a statement that the officers had
found defendant's fingerprints at the victim's house and (2) that he had remained silent
when asked "w[h]ere he had gotten the [victim's] earrings."  The trial court excluded two
other instances in which the defendant had remained silent.
4. It is telling (and perhaps independently fatal to defendant's assignment of
error) that, when the officer testified at trial, defendant did not object to his sanitized
testimony even though it differed from the testimony to which defendant had objected in
his pretrial supplemental memorandum.
5. Not every act of silence constitutes an invocation of a person's
constitutional right to remain silent.  Given our disposition of defendant's second
assignment of error, we need not decide whether defendant's intermittent silences
constituted selective invocations of his right to remain silent. 
6. Between the state's first and second appeals, the legislature enacted ORS
138.060(2), which provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court when a trial court
enters a pretrial order suppressing evidence in a murder case.
7. The trial court initially scheduled trial for September 1999, 14 months after
the indictment.  Defendant did not file his first motion to suppress the clothing evidence
until July 1999.  Additionally, defendant agreed to more than one year's worth of delayed
trial.  The rest of the time outside of those appeals consisted primarily of setting new trial
dates and of hearings on various motions.
8. Defendant filed his answering brief on October 32, 2000, five days after he
filed his second request for a 42-day extension.  On December 7, 2000, approximately
five weeks later, he filed a motion to dismiss his cross appeal, which the Court of Appeals
dismissed 12 days later.
9. Defendant does not raise on appeal two arguments that he made to the trial
court regarding how the delay impeded his ability to prepare a defense:  first, defendant
does not rely on the loss of certain physical evidence (cigarette butts and a throw-down);
second, defendant does not rely on the death of the victim's landlord, who first reported
finding the victim's body.  Accordingly, we do not address those arguments.  Moreover,
as the state notes, defendant did not raise before the trial court an argument that he makes
here for the first time regarding certain evidence that the state introduced during the
penalty phase of the trial.  Because that argument is unpreserved, we decline to address it.
10. Defendant makes too much of Free's inability to remember in another
respect.  Although Free testified that she had not seen defendant with a watch and could
not remember whether she had told the police that he had a watch, Jones explained that
Free had not seen the watch and that he may have told her about it.  If Jones's testimony is
accurate, then Free could not have testified at trial whether defendant in fact possessed a
watch because she had no personal knowledge of that fact.
11. Blocker testified at trial that he had thought that the investigator was from
the state, that he was mad because the investigator had refused to provide him with a
lawyer during questioning, and that he had made those statements to the investigator
because he was mad at him.
12. Some of defendant's arguments on this point are simply factually wrong. 
He asserts, for example, that Blocker could not remember telling the investigator that the
police had told Blocker that they had the guy in custody who had committed the murder
and wanted to put him away.  Blocker, however, testified at trial that he had made that
statement to the investigator, that he remembered the question and answer, and that
"[t]hat is what I said."
13. Defendant also notes that Blocker could not remember whether he told
Detective Stoelk that defendant had pointed to West Salem, and away from the victim's
house, when defendant told Blocker that he had "offed the bitch."  Defendant, however,
called Stoelk, who testified that Blocker told him that defendant had pointed towards
West Salem when defendant made that statement.  Stoelk's testimony remedied Blocker's
inability to remember which way defendant had pointed.
14. In calculating the length of the delay, the court does not count those delays
that the defendant causes or to which the defendant expressly consents.  Johnson, 339 Or
at 94-95; see also State v. Davids, 339 Or 96, 100-01, 116 P3d 894 (2005) (assuming that
a defendant's "pattern of tactics at odds with demanding dismissal" under ORS 135.747
might constitute an implied waiver of the right to a speedy trial).  
15. The trial court denied defendant's speedy trial motions, which were based
on statutory and constitutional grounds.  Although the trial court did not address
defendant's statutory speedy trial claim explicitly, we assume that its explicit and implicit
findings of fact regarding the constitutional speedy trial claims apply equally to the
statutory claim.
16. During the pretrial hearing, defense counsel described the state's expert
report as stating that the defendant's boots were consistent generally with the footprint left
at the crime scene.  He noted that the report did not identify any unique markings on the
sole that would permit the expert to opine that defendant's boots in fact had left the
footprint.
17. We describe the trial court's initial ruling to put its later rulings in context. 
We do not endorse it.  Cf. State v. Hart, 309 Or 646, 652, 791 P2d 125 (1990) (holding
that a trial court may not preclude the state from offering admissible evidence because the
defendant's anticipated response would open the door to otherwise inadmissible
evidence).
18. In his offer of proof, defendant did not explain whether he would introduce
expert testimony to show that his tennis shoes did not match the second set of footprints
or whether he thought that the jury could make that determination without expert
assistance.
19. We note that the downside of opening the door to the state expert's
testimony, which defendant sought to avoid, does not appear significant in this case. 
Defendant offered evidence that his own boots appeared to match one set of "shoe
impression[s] etched in blood" at the crime scene.  For all that appears from the record,
defendant sought to avoid opening the door to expert testimony that he owned shoes that
were generally consistent with one set of bloody footprints found at the crime scene.  We
fail to see a difference of any substance between the evidence that defendant offered and
the evidence that he sought to avoid.