Title: Hamilton Co. Bd. of Education vs. Asbestospray Corp., et. al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: October 16, 1995

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 1 2 AT NASHVILLE 3 4 5 6 7 HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD ) FOR PUBLICATION 8 OF EDUCATION, ) 9 ) Filed: October 23, 1995 10 Plaintiff-Petitioner, ) 11 ) 12 v. ) Certified Questions of Law from 13 ) the United States Court of 14 ) Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 15 ASBESTOSPRAY CORPORATION, ) 16 NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY, ) 17 and W.R. GRACE & CO.-CONN., ) 18 ) 19 Defendants-Respondents. ) No. 01S01-9502-FD-00024 20 21 22 For Plaintiff-Petitioner: For Defendant-Respondent W.R. Grace: 23 24 Jerry H. Summers Robert L. Crossley 25 Summers, McCrea & Wyatt Anthony M. Iannacio 26 Chattanooga, Tennessee Katherine A. Brown 27 Vance L. Broemel 28 W. Ward Crutchfield Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell 29 Crutchfield, Benson & Pope Nashville, Tennessee 30 Chattanooga, Tennessee 31 32 Edward J. Westbrook 33 Frederick J. Jekel 34 Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson 35 & Poole 36 Charleston, South Carolina 37 38 E. Pete Kulmala 39 Lewis, Babcock & Hawkins 40 Columbia, South Carolina 41 42 O P I N I O N 43 44 45 46 47 48 DROWOTA, J. 49 2 QUESTIONS CERTIFIED 1 2 In this suit brought by the Hamilton County Board of Education (the Board) in 3 federal court to recover the cost of asbestos removal from its school buildings, the 4 United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit certifies the following questions, 5 pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, for our 6 determination: 7 (1) Whether the doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi, as codified in 8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-113, renders the Board immune from the 9 expiration of the three year statutory period of limitation otherwise 10 applicable to this case; 11 12 (2) Alternatively, whether Tennessee law provides for the tolling of the 13 statute of limitations for the period during which the Board participated 14 in a class action filed in a federal forum in another state. 15 16 17 18 Because we answer the first question in the affirmative, we decline to answer 19 the second certified question. 20 21 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 22 23 The facts of this case, which we glean from the Sixth Circuit's certification 24 order, are as follows. At some undisclosed time, Hamilton County insulated a 25 number of school buildings that it owned with sprays containing asbestos. In 1980, 26 the Tennessee Department of Education, as part of a statewide "asbestos in schools 27 program," investigated the Hamilton County schools and found asbestos in 21 of 28 those schools. Subsequently, in 1983, Hamilton County hired Law Engineering 29 Corporation to survey its schools and to determine the amount of asbestos therein; 30 3 this survey was undertaken in compliance with regulations pertaining to asbestos 1 promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Law Engineering 2 recommended the removal of asbestos-containing material from a number of 3 schools; and Hamilton County began the removal process in September 1984. 4 5 Meanwhile, a number of school districts across the nation filed a national class 6 action on January 17, 1983, in a federal district court in Pennsylvania, seeking the 7 recovery of asbestos abatement costs for their schools (National Schools Class 8 Action). The Board received notice of this class action and thereafter considered 9 itself part of the class. On September 28, 1984, the district court certified the class, 10 but the certification did not become final until October 20, 1986. However, for 11 reasons that are undisclosed, the Board opted out of this litigation on December 1, 12 1987. 13 14 On December 7, 1987, the Board filed a tort action in the United States District 15 Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, based on diversity jurisdiction, for the 16 recovery of asbestos removal costs against several defendants, including U.S. 17 Gypsum Company, and W.R. Grace & Company. In May 1989, U.S. Gypsum 18 Company filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Tennessee's three-year 19 statutory period of limitations applicable to injuries to personal and real property, 20 Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105, had expired. The Board countered by arguing that 21 Tennessee's nullum tempus doctrine, as codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-113, 22 rendered the three-year limitations period inapplicable. Alternatively, the Board 23 argued that the limitations period had been tolled during the time it participated in the 24 federal class action. 25 4 The district court (Judge R. Allan Edgar) granted the motion in favor of U.S. 1 Gypsum, and later made the ruling applicable to the other defendants. The Board 2 appealed from this ruling to the Sixth Circuit, and that Court certified the above- 3 mentioned questions to us. 4 5 ANALYSIS 6 7 The common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi, which is literally 8 translated as "time does not run against the king," prevents an action brought by the 9 State from being dismissed due to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations 10 normally applicable to the specific type of action. This doctrine has been justified on 11 the ground "that the public should not suffer because of the negligence of its officers 12 and agents ..." State ex rel. Board of University School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 13 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1982). Tennessee's version of this doctrine, found at § 28-1-113, 14 provides as follows: "The provisions of this title [pertaining to statutes of limitation] do 15 not apply to actions brought by the State of Tennessee, unless otherwise expressly 16 provided." This doctrine is not to be lightly regarded, as we have repeatedly stated 17 that statutes of limitation are looked upon with disfavor in actions brought by the 18 State, and will not be enforced in the absence of clear and explicit statutory authority 19 to do so. Dunn v. W.F. Jameson & Sons, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tenn. 1978); 20 Anderson v. Security Mills, 175 Tenn. 197, 133 S.W.2d 478 (1939). 21 22 Moreover, it is settled that the nullum tempus doctrine applies, in certain 23 cases, to subordinate organs of the state, such as counties or municipalities. The 24 basic rule regarding the applicability of nullum tempus to actions brought by 25 5 subordinate bodies is set forth in Wood v. Cannon County, 166 S.W.2d 399 (Tenn. 1 1942), where we stated: 2 3 The statute of limitations does not run against the sovereign or the 4 state, or against a county, when [the county is seeking] to enforce a 5 demand arising out of, or dependent upon, the exercise of its 6 governmental functions as an arm of the state. But the statute does 7 run against a county or municipality in respect of its rights or claims 8 which are of a private or corporate nature and in which only its local 9 citizens are interested, as distinguished from a public or governmental 10 matter in which all the people of the state are interested. 11 12 Wood, 166 S.W.2d at 401 [citations omitted]. See also Jennings v. Davidson County, 13 208 Tenn. 134, 344 S.W.2d 359, 361-362 (1961). 14 15 16 17 Here, in concluding that the doctrine of nullum tempus did not render the 18 Board immune from the expiration of the limitations period, the district court relied 19 exclusively upon Anderson County Bd. of Educ. v. National Gypsum Co., 821 F.2d 20 1230 (6th Cir. 1987), a Sixth Circuit case in which a local Tennessee school board 21 brought an action to recover the costs of replacing an asbestos-laden roof. In 22 Anderson County, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit surveyed the relevant 23 Tennessee cases, and determined that in situations where the subordinate bodies 24 brought the action to discharge obligations or mandates specifically set forth by state 25 statute, nullum tempus was held to apply; but where the action was merely brought 26 to increase the amount of money in the treasury of the subordinate body, nullum 27 tempus was inapplicable. While conceding that "any activity of a subordinate 28 government can be legitimately called a state function," Anderson County, 821 F.2d 29 at 1233, the Anderson County court refused to accept such a broad definition: 30 instead, it concluded that "some state interest recognized by state legislation must 31 be at stake beyond that of simply having more money in the hands of the subordinate 32 6 body." Id. 1 Having gleaned this rule from the cases, the Sixth Circuit proceeded to apply 2 the rule to the facts before it, stating that: 3 4 In our case, there is no broader interest of state government that was 5 substantially promoted. The state did not mandate, prevent or affect 6 the type of roofing to be purchased. Whether the roofing should be 7 replaced or not was not the subject of any state mandate. No state 8 monies are substantially affected, whether the roof was or was not 9 replaced, and whether this suit is successful or not successful. The 10 state formula for allocation of funds to counties does not depend on the 11 financial status of the county as reflected by whether it is successful in 12 this suit or any other suit for money damages. 13 14 Id. 15 16 17 18 The Anderson County court then summarized its holding as follows: 19 20 21 22 Based on our review of Tennessee law ... we hold that the immunity 23 does not extend to every action of a subordinate body such as a 24 county, municipality, or school board, even when it can be 25 characterized as acting 'in furtherance of a state function.' There must 26 be a direct nexus between the action complained of and the state 27 function. Where, as in this case, the subordinate body is primarily 28 involved in normal commercial activity not inextricably connected to the 29 state function, nor to state rules, regulations, or commands pertaining 30 to that function, the subordinate body does not thereby acquire 31 immunity from the statute of limitations in bringing suit. We recognize 32 the matter is not free from doubt, and further recognize that the state 33 of Tennessee may alter or clarify this position. 34 35 Anderson County, 821 S.W.2d at 1232-33. 36 37 38 39 With all due respect, we believe that the analysis employed by the Anderson 40 County court is unduly restrictive. First, it is uncontroverted that the State of 41 Tennessee has accepted, both in its constitution and statutory code, the duty of 42 1Many instances can be cited where the State has delegated its powers to local bodies for the purpose of education. For example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6- 2001 empowers county and city boards of education to exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire property for public school purposes. 7 providing a free public education to its citizens. Tenn. Const. Art. XI, § 12; Tenn. 1 Code Ann. § 49-1-1 et seq. Because of education's inclusion in both the fundamental 2 law and legislation of this state, its provision is a quintessential governmental, not a 3 private, function. Applewhite v. Memphis State University, 495 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 4 1973); Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S.W. 962 (1899). Furthermore, in Dunn 5 v. W.F. Jameson & Sons, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1978), a case in which the 6 Board of Regents of the State University and College System brought an action 7 against numerous defendants to recover the cost of a defective building at Memphis 8 State University, we stated that "there can be no doubt that the State, in entering into 9 these contracts involved in this case through its agency (the plaintiff), was acting in 10 furtherance of education. As education is a governmental function, the State was 11 acting in its sovereign capacity in this instance." Dunn, 569 S.W.2d at 801. 12 Therefore, it is clear that the repair or maintenance of school buildings, when 13 undertaken by the state government, is a governmental function. 14 15 Dunn is of utmost importance here because, as is the case with many other 16 aspects of education, the State has simply delegated its governmental function -- in 17 this instance that of maintaining school property -- to subordinate bodies.1 For 18 example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-101(2)(B)(8) mandates that county legislative 19 bodies "shall [l]evy such taxes or provide funds by bond issues by the voters for the 20 purchase of school grounds, the erection and repair of school buildings, and for 21 equipping the same ..." (emphasis added). Because this mandate to provide funds 22 2Indeed, we have flatly held, in a different context, that the maintenance of school buildings by a county board of education is a governmental function. Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn. 247, 225 S.W.2d 49, 50 (1949). 8 for the repair of school buildings obviously implies a duty to repair on the part of the 1 subordinate body, we disagree with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that an action to 2 recover the costs of repairing a defective school building is a "normal commercial 3 activity not inextricably connected to the state function, nor to state rules, regulations, 4 or commands relating to that function ..." (emphasis added).2 5 6 The erroneous nature of this conclusion is particularly apparent in the context 7 of the specific "repair" at issue here -- asbestos removal. As early as 1982, EPA 8 promulgated a detailed rule concerning asbestos, which it summarized as follows: 9 10 EPA issues this rule to reduce risks to human health from exposure to 11 asbestos-containing material in school buildings. This rule requires 12 public and private elementary and secondary schools in the United 13 States to identify friable asbestos-containing materials, maintain 14 records and notify employees of the location of the friable materials 15 which contain asbestos. 16 17 40 C.F.R. Part 763 (1982). 18 19 20 21 To determine whether a school building contained friable asbestos, the rule 22 required "each local education agency" to take samples of friable materials and have 23 those samples analyzed. If those samples were found to contain significant amounts 24 of asbestos, ameliorative action was required. Although the rule stated that "[m]any 25 of the friable asbestos-containing materials do not require abatement or removal," it 26 also stated that "[a]batement is often needed whenever the friable asbestos- 27 containing material is visibly damaged and easily accessible or has inherently poor 28 9 cohesive strength." Id. 1 2 This initial rule was followed by the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response 3 Act (AHERA), which Congress passed in 1986. 15 U.S.C. § 2641-2654. In this Act 4 Congress declared that the existing EPA rule regarding asbestos in schools was not 5 adequate to meet the problem, 15 U.S.C. § 2641; and it required the EPA to 6 promulgate more detailed and specific rules for the inspection, identification, 7 evaluation and treatment of asbestos-containing materials in schools. 15 U.S.C. § 8 2643. EPA responded to the Congressional mandate by issuing a new set of rules 9 requiring, inter alia, that schools with substantial amounts of asbestos-containing 10 material address the problem with "response actions" ranging from an approved 11 management plan to outright removal, depending on the severity of the problem. 40 12 C.F.R. § 763.90 (1987). Schools failing to adhere to these regulations faced the 13 possibility of a civil penalty. 40 C.F.R. § 763.97. 14 15 These detailed federal statutes and regulations pertaining to asbestos, which 16 are cast in mandatory language, make it clear that the Board was adhering to the 17 commands of a body greater than itself in having dangerous asbestos-containing 18 material removed from its schools and in seeking to recover the costs of this 19 endeavor. Therefore, it was performing "governmental functions as an arm of the 20 state" under the rule enunciated in Wood and Jennings. Moreover, this conclusion -- 21 that asbestos removal or abatement undertaken by a local body is a governmental 22 function affecting the general public, rather than a purely local economic activity -- is 23 supported by an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have considered this 24 issue. See Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 418 S.E.2d 25 3A different judge in the Eastern District of Tennessee, Judge Thomas Hull, reached this same conclusion in County of Johnson, Tennessee v. United States Gypsum Co., 664 F.Supp. 1127 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), a case decided before Anderson County was released. In so concluding, Judge Hull reversed his earlier ruling in Johnson County, 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), in which he had adopted the federal magistrate's recommendation that nullum tempus did not apply. 10 649, 655 (N.C. 1992); Board of Educ. v. A, C, and S Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 601 (Ill. 1 1989); Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Brazier Const. Co., 691 P.2d 178, 181-82 2 (Wash. 1984)(en banc); Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 607 A.2d 756, 3 762 (Pa. Super. 1992); Livingston Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 592 4 A.2d 653, 656-57 (N.J. Super. 1991); District of Columbia v. Owens-Corning 5 Fiberglas Corp., 572 A.2d 394, 406-410 (D.C. App. 1990); United Sch. Dist. No. 490 6 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196, 203 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). In fact, our research has 7 revealed no case that has either utilized the restrictive rationale employed by the 8 Sixth Circuit or reached the result that it did. 9 10 CONCLUSION 11 12 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a local school board engages in 13 a "governmental function" when it brings an action to recover the cost of asbestos 14 abatement or removal; therefore, the nullum tempus doctrine applies in this case.3 15 Because our answer to the first certified question obviates the need to answer the 16 alternative query, we decline to answer the second certified question. 17 18 The Clerk will transmit this opinion in accordance with Rule 23, Section 8 of 19 the Rules of the Supreme Court. The costs in this cause will be taxed to the 20 11 Respondent, W. R. Grace & Co. - Conn. 1 2 __________________________________ 3 FRANK F. DROWOTA III 4 JUSTICE 5 6 7 Concur: 8 9 Anderson, C. J. 10 Reid, Birch, White, JJ. 11