Title: New Jersey v. Vincenty
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 2019

New Jersey v. Vincenty Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Adrian Vincenty argued two detectives failed to inform him of the criminal charges filed against him when they interrogated him and asked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. Relying on New Jersey v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68 (2003), Vincenty filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the detectives. The trial court denied his motion in part and granted it in part. The trial court held that the detectives did not violate A.G.D., but the court suppressed the statements Vincenty made to the detectives after he invoked his right to counsel. Vincenty pleaded guilty to first-degree attempted murder and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier. Vincenty appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of Vincenty’s motion to suppress. According to the Appellate Division, the record showed that Vincenty was informed of the charges pending against him before he waived his right against self-incrimination. Thus, the Appellate Division held, the detectives did not contravene A.G.D. After its review, the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, finding the record revealed the detectives failed to inform Vincenty of the charges filed against him when they read him his rights and asked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. "That failure deprived Vincenty of the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination. Pursuant to A.G.D., Vincenty’s motion to suppress should have been granted." The Court thus reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Adrian A. Vincenty (A-40-17) (079978)Argued October 23, 2018 -- Decided March 11, 2019FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In State v. A.G.D., the Court held that “[t]he government’s failure to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.” 178 N.J. 56, 68 (2003). Defendant Adrian Vincenty argues that two detectives failed to inform him of the criminal charges filed against him when they interrogated him and asked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. Relying on A.G.D., Vincenty filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the detectives. The Court considers that motion. Detectives Thomas Glackin and Brian Mera questioned Vincenty about the attempted robbery and attempted murder of Jerry Castellano. Castellano was attacked by two men on March 20, 2011. One of the assailants wore a mask and dropped or threw it away after the attack. Castellano ultimately survived the attack. Police officers recovered the mask on the night in question. The mask was tested for DNA -- and Vincenty’s DNA was found on it. The detectives also identified Vincenty from the video recording of the attack. Detective Mera read Vincenty his rights -- and Vincenty was given and read a form detailing his rights. At the bottom of the form, it read: “I acknowledge that I have been advised of the constitutional rights as stated above.” Vincenty signed the form. Detective Mera explained that the police identified Vincenty from the video recording of the attack and sought his assistance to identify the second assailant on the video recording. Detective Mera told Vincenty that “the judge already charged [him],” explained that they obtained Vincenty’s DNA from the mask, and informed him that they “have the charges.” Vincenty indicated that he was confused and denied any involvement in the attack. Detective Mera said, “We have you with the DNA and we have you . . . with gun charges, right?” Vincenty responded, “Ah huh.” Vincenty nonetheless continued to deny any involvement in the robbery. Detective Mera then told Vincenty that they “presented the evidence to the judge,” who “put the charges in.” Vincenty still indicated that he was “surprise[d] that [the detectives] ha[d] . . . evidence against [him].” The detectives showed Vincenty a picture of the assailants. Vincenty told the detectives one of the assailants “looks like [him]” and that he has a coat similar to one worn 1 by one of the assailants. Detective Mera explained that they had shown a judge all of the evidence because in order for them to speak with Vincenty, “[they] needed the charges.” The detectives attempted to elicit information about the other assailant. Vincenty said, “I don’t know him very well like that,” and “I met him thru [sic] another friend of mine.” A few moments later, Detective Mera mentioned that they had charges against Vincenty. Vincenty then stated that he did not get a letter from a judge about the charges and asked the detectives what the charges were. The officers showed Vincenty a list of the charges and explained to Vincenty that he had been charged with attempted homicide, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Shortly thereafter, Vincenty told the detectives he wanted to talk to a lawyer and expressed concern that there were charges pending against him. The detectives continued questioning Vincenty, who again asked to speak with a lawyer and indicated that he was both surprised and confused. The detectives then acknowledged Vincenty’s desire to speak with a lawyer and stopped questioning him. A grand jury indicted Vincenty, who then filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Detectives Glackin and Mera. The State indicated that it would not seek to admit any statements Vincenty made after he first requested to speak with a lawyer, and the trial court found that, until Vincenty requested to speak with a lawyer, his statements were the result of a “knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.” Vincenty entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he pleaded guilty to first-degree attempted murder and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of Vincenty’s motion to suppress. The Court granted Vincenty’s petition for certification. 232 N.J. 278 (2018).HELD: The record reveals that the detectives failed to inform Vincenty of the charges filed against him when they read him his rights and asked him to waive his right against self- incrimination. That failure deprived Vincenty of the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination. Pursuant to A.G.D., Vincenty’s motion to suppress should have been granted.1. The right against self-incrimination is one of the most important protections of the criminal law. Individuals, as holders of the right, may waive the right against self- incrimination. Law enforcement officers must first advise a suspect of the right against self- incrimination before attempting to obtain a waiver of the right. The State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances. (pp. 11-12)2. In A.G.D., detectives questioned the defendant at his home about allegations of sexual abuse. 178 N.J. at 59. The detectives did not tell the defendant that a warrant for his arrest had been issued. Ibid. The defendant confessed to the alleged sexual abuse and was subsequently convicted of related offenses. Id. at 60-61. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress his confession. Id. at 61. The Court held that the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed, id. at 69, because the “government’s failure to inform a suspect that a 2 criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights,” id. at 68. If suspects are not informed that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed against them, they necessarily lack “critically important information” and thus “the State cannot sustain its burden” of proving a suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the right against self-incrimination. Ibid. (pp. 13-14)3. A.G.D. thus calls for law enforcement officials to make a simple declaratory statement at the outset of an interrogation that informs a defendant of the essence of the charges filed against him. That information should not be woven into accusatory questions posed during the interview. The State may choose to notify defendants immediately before or after administering Miranda warnings, so long as defendants are aware of the charges pending against them before they are asked to waive the right to self-incrimination. (p. 14)4. Vincenty’s interrogation is precisely what A.G.D. prohibits, and it substantiates A.G.D.’s holding. Unaware that charges had been filed against him, Vincenty appeared willing and ready to waive his right against self-incrimination. However, when Vincenty was informed of the criminal charges filed against him, everything changed. His willingness to speak with the detectives dissipated. As that chain of events demonstrates, Vincenty’s ability to knowingly and intelligently decide whether to waive his right against self-incrimination was fundamentally altered when he was informed of the criminal charges filed against him. Withholding that critically important information deprived Vincenty of the ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right against self-incrimination. (pp. 14-16)5. The trial court and Appellate Division erred in holding Vincenty knowingly and intelligently waived his right against self-incrimination. Consideration of harmless error would not change matters here because some of Vincenty’s statements could be fairly characterized as inculpatory, and Vincenty’s conduct reveals that his decision to plead guilty was influenced by the trial court’s suppression ruling. (pp. 16-17) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’S opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 40 September Term 2017 079978 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Adrian A. Vincenty, a/k/a Adrian A. Vicente and Adrian A. Vicenty, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided October 23, 2018 March 11, 2019Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, of counsel and on the briefs).Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Frank Muroski, of counsel and on the brief, and Erica Bertuzzi, Assistant Hudson County Prosecutor, on the brief). 1 JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In State v. A.G.D., this Court held that “[t]he government’s failure toinform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed orissued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing andintelligent waiver of rights.” 178 N.J. 56, 68 (2003). Defendant AdrianVincenty argues that two detectives failed to inform him of the criminalcharges filed against him when they interrogated him and asked him to waivehis right against self-incrimination. Relying on A.G.D., Vincenty filed amotion to suppress statements he made to the detectives. The trial court denied his motion in part and granted it in part. The trialcourt held that the detectives did not violate A.G.D., but the court suppressedthe statements Vincenty made to the detectives after he invoked his right tocounsel. Vincenty pleaded guilty to first-degree attempted murder and wassentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with an eighty-five percent paroledisqualifier. Vincenty appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of Vincenty’smotion to suppress. According to the Appellate Division, the record showedthat Vincenty was informed of the charges pending against him before he 2 waived his right against self-incrimination. Thus, the Appellate Division held,the detectives did not contravene A.G.D. We disagree. The record reveals that the detectives failed to informVincenty of the charges filed against him when they read him his rights andasked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. That failure deprivedVincenty of the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right againstself-incrimination. Pursuant to A.G.D., Vincenty’s motion to suppress shouldhave been granted. We thus reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment andremand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. Adrian Vincenty was incarcerated at the Garden State CorrectionalFacility when Detectives Thomas Glackin and Brian Mera visited him toquestion him about the attempted robbery and attempted murder of JerryCastellano. Castellano was attacked on March 20, 2011 in Weehawken.Video surveillance of the attack showed two men approach Castellano. Theassailants attempted to rob Castellano but were unable to execute the robbery.One of the assailants shot Castellano in the back of the head. One of theassailants wore a mask and dropped or threw it away after the attack.Castellano ultimately survived the attack. 3 Police officers recovered the mask on the night in question. The maskwas tested for DNA -- and Vincenty’s DNA was found on it. The detectivesalso identified Vincenty from the video recording of the attack. The detectivessought to question Vincenty to identify the second assailant on the videorecording. Detective Glackin asked Detective Mera to accompany him to questionVincenty because Vincenty speaks only Spanish and Mera is fluent in Spanish.The detectives recorded the interview. Detective Mera spoke with Vincenty inSpanish. Detective Mera read Vincenty his Miranda1 rights -- and Vincenty wasgiven and read a form detailing his rights. The form was written in bothEnglish and Spanish. At the bottom of the form, it read: “I acknowledge that Ihave been advised of the constitutional rights as stated above.” Underneaththis acknowledgment, Vincenty signed the form. Detective Mera explained that the police identified Vincenty from thevideo recording of the attack and sought his assistance to identify the secondassailant on the video recording. Detective Mera told Vincenty that “the judgealready charged [him].” Detective Mera explained that they obtainedVincenty’s DNA from the mask recovered at the scene of the attack. Detective1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 4 Mera then explained “how DNA works” -- that each individual has distinctDNA -- and informed Vincenty that because Vincenty’s DNA was discoveredat the scene, the detectives “have the charges.” Vincenty indicated that he was confused and denied any involvement inthe attack. Shortly thereafter, the following exchange occurred: Detective Mera: We have you with the DNA and we have you . . . with gun charges, right? Vincenty: Ah huh. Detective Mera: Okay. Vincenty: Correct. Vincenty nonetheless continued to deny any involvement in the robbery.Detective Mera then told Vincenty that they “presented the evidence to thejudge,” who “put the charges in.” Vincenty still indicated that he was“surprise[d] that [the detectives] ha[d] . . . evidence against [him].” Vincentywas then asked whether he knew the second man in the video: Detective Mera: [W]e would like to know who you were with that night. Vincenty: Ah, I don’t know about him. Detective Mera: Okay. You don’t know him? Vincenty: Do you understand me? I was walking, but I did not shoot any one [sic]. 5 The detectives showed Vincenty a picture of the assailants. Vincentytold the detectives one of the assailants “looks like [him]” and that he has acoat similar to one worn by one of the assailants. Detective Mera explainedthat they had shown a judge all of the evidence because in order for them tospeak with Vincenty, “[they] needed the charges.” The detectives againattempted to elicit information about the other assailant: Detective Mera: Who were you with that night? Vincenty: That was a person from, but I don’t know him very well like that. You understand? Detective Mera: What’s his name? Vincenty: Honestly, I don’t know. I met him thru [sic] another friend of mine. Do you understand me? A few moments later, Detective Mera mentioned that they had chargesagainst Vincenty. Vincenty then stated that he did not get a letter from a judgeabout the charges and asked the detectives what the charges were. The officersshowed Vincenty a list of the charges and explained to Vincenty that he hadbeen charged with attempted homicide, robbery, and conspiracy to commitrobbery. The detectives then asked Vincenty additional questions, attemptingto elicit further information about the attack. Vincenty denied anyinvolvement in the robbery but did tell the detectives he lived near the scene ofthe crime and “went to the store to buy cigarettes.” Shortly thereafter, 6 Vincenty told the detectives he wanted to talk to a lawyer and expressedconcern that there were charges pending against him. The detectives continued questioning Vincenty. After the detectivesagain showed Vincenty a list of the charges against him and continued to askhim to provide information about the attack, Vincenty again asked to speakwith a lawyer and indicated that he was both surprised and confused. “I needto see a lawyer,” Vincenty explained, “because I am confused right now.” Thedetectives then acknowledged Vincenty’s desire to speak with a lawyer andstopped questioning him. B. A grand jury indicted Vincenty for first-degree attempted murder,contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; first-degree armed robbery,contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree conspiracy to commit armedrobbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degreepossession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A.2C:39-5(b). Vincenty filed a motion to suppress the statements he made toDetectives Glackin and Mera. Vincenty argued his statements should besuppressed because, in his view, the detectives failed to comply with A.G.D.and failed to cease questioning him when he first asked to speak with a lawyer. 7 The trial court conducted a hearing where both Vincenty and DetectiveMera testified. Vincenty testified that he told the detectives he wanted tospeak with a lawyer before they began recording the interview. DetectiveMera, however, testified that Vincenty requested to speak with a lawyer at theend of the interrogation only. The State indicated that it would not seek toadmit any statements Vincenty made to the detectives after he first requestedto speak with a lawyer, as the State conceded that any statements made afterthat point should be suppressed. The trial court found that Vincenty’s reliance on A.G.D. was“misplaced.” In the trial court’s view, Vincenty was informed of the chargespending against him “immediately after he signed the waiver and before hemade any statements with reference to the incident.” The trial court foundDetective Mera’s testimony -- but not Vincenty’s -- credible and found thatVincenty did not ask to speak with a lawyer before the detectives beganrecording the interview. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial courtfound that, until Vincenty requested to speak with a lawyer, his statementswere the result of a “knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his Mirandarights.” The trial court held that any statements Vincenty made after he firstrequested to speak with a lawyer would not be admissible during the State’scase-in-chief. 8 Vincenty entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby hepleaded guilty to first-degree attempted murder and reserved his right to appealthe denial of his suppression motion. Under the agreement, the Staterecommended a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment with an eighty-fivepercent parole disqualifier. The trial court sentenced Vincenty in accordancewith the State’s recommendation. C. Vincenty appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.Vincenty argued he was not informed of the charges filed against him when hewas read his Miranda rights and, thus, the detectives failed to comply withA.G.D. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial ofVincenty’s motion to suppress. The panel held that the detectives did notviolate A.G.D. because, in its view, the record supported the trial court’sfinding that Vincenty “was apprised of the charges pending against him beforehe decided to cooperate with the investigation and provide self-incriminatinginformation.” We granted Vincenty’s petition for certification. 232 N.J. 278 (2018). 9 II. A. Vincenty argues his motion to suppress should have been granted.Vincenty claims the detectives failed to inform him of the charges pendingagainst him when he was read his Miranda rights. That failure, Vincentyclaims, requires the suppression of his statements pursuant to A.G.D.According to Vincenty, the Appellate Division erroneously interpreted hisargument as raising a factual dispute when the detectives’ compliance withA.G.D. is strictly a question of law. B. As a threshold matter, the State argues that the trial court’s denial ofVincenty’s motion to suppress, even if erroneous, was harmless. In the State’sview, Vincenty did not offer any inculpatory statements to the detectives , andthe denial of his motion to suppress therefore could not have influencedVincenty’s decision to plead guilty. Thus, according to the State, we shouldsummarily affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment or dismiss Vincenty’sappeal as improvidently granted. As to the error alleged by Vincenty, the State argues Vincentyknowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights when he agreed tospeak with the detectives because the detectives informed him of the pending 10 charges. The State argues we should apply a totality-of-the-circumstancesanalysis, rather than the bright-line, “rigid and inflexible constitutional rule” itclaims Vincenty is advancing. III. A. When we review a trial court’s denial or grant of a motion to suppress,we “defer to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings aresupported by sufficient evidence in the record.” State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015). We disregard, however, findings of fact that are clearlymistaken. Ibid. We review de novo any legal conclusions reached by the trialcourt. Id. at 263. B. The common law has granted individuals the “right against self-incrimination since colonial times.” A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 66. The Legislaturehas since codified the right “in our statutes and rules.” State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101 (1997) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503). The importance ofthe common law right “is not diminished by the lack of specific constitutionalarticulation.” Ibid. Rather, the “common law privilege against self-incrimination affords greater protection to an individual than that accorded 11 under the federal privilege.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Guarino, 104 N.J. 218, 229 (1986). We have provided that protection because the right against self-incrimination is “an integral thread in the fabric of [the] common law,” State v.Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 286 (1986), and “one of the most important protectionsof the criminal law,” State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000). Accordingly,we maintain “an unyielding commitment to ensure the proper admissibility ofconfessions.” State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 252 (1993) (quoting Hartley, 103 N.J. at 301 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Individuals, as holders of the right, may waive the right against self-incrimination. Presha, 163 N.J. at 313. Law enforcement officers must firstadvise a suspect of the right against self-incrimination before attempting toobtain a waiver of the right. State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 382 (2014) (citingMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 444 (1966)). A waiver of the right againstself-incrimination must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Reed, 133 N.J.at 250-51. The State carries the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubtthat the suspect’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of allthe circumstances.” Presha, 163 N.J. at 313. 12 IV. A. In A.G.D., detectives questioned the defendant at his home aboutallegations of sexual abuse. 178 N.J. at 59. The detectives did not tell thedefendant that a warrant for his arrest had been issued. Ibid. The defendantagreed to accompany the detectives to the prosecutor’s office for furtherquestioning. Ibid. The defendant confessed to the alleged sexual abuse andwas subsequently convicted of related offenses. Id. at 60-61. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress his confession, and thetrial court denied the motion. Id. at 61. On appeal, the Appellate Divisionfound that the defendant’s right to counsel was not triggered because anindictment had not been issued. Ibid. The panel remanded for a new Mirandahearing because, on the record presented, the Appellate Division could notaddress the defendant’s claim that his confession was coerced. Id. at 61-62.On remand, the trial court again denied the defendant’s suppression motion ,and this Court granted his petition for certification. Id. at 62. This Court held that the defendant’s confession should have beensuppressed, id. at 69, because the “government’s failure to inform a suspectthat a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprivesthat person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of 13 rights,” id. at 68. If suspects are not informed that a criminal complaint orarrest warrant has been filed against them, they necessarily lack “criticallyimportant information” and thus “the State cannot sustain its burden” ofproving a suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the right againstself-incrimination. Ibid. Because the detectives failed to inform the defendantthat an arrest warrant had been issued, the defendant in A.G.D. was simplyunable to execute a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right against self-incrimination. Ibid. A.G.D. thus calls for law enforcement officials to make a simpledeclaratory statement at the outset of an interrogation that informs a defendantof the essence of the charges filed against him. That information should not bewoven into accusatory questions posed during the interview. The State maychoose to notify defendants immediately before or after administering Mirandawarnings, so long as defendants are aware of the charges pending against thembefore they are asked to waive the right to self-incrimination. B. Vincenty’s interrogation is precisely what A.G.D. prohibits, and itsubstantiates A.G.D.’s holding. That is to say, Vincenty’s interrogationillustrates that suspects cannot knowingly and intelligently determine whether 14 to waive their right against self-incrimination if, when making thatdetermination, they have not been informed of the charges filed against them. Unaware that charges had been filed against him, Vincenty appearedwilling and ready to waive his right against self-incrimination. He signed aform acknowledging that he understood his rights, spoke with the detectives,and did not request to speak with a lawyer. However, when Vincenty wasinformed of the criminal charges filed against him, everything changed. Heappeared shocked and surprised. He seemed to understand for the first timethe heightened magnitude of the interrogation. He instructed the detectivesthat he wanted to speak with a lawyer. His willingness to speak with thedetectives dissipated. He was no longer willing to waive his right against self-incrimination. As that chain of events demonstrates, Vincenty’s ability to knowinglyand intelligently decide whether to waive his right against self-incriminationwas fundamentally altered when he was informed of the criminal charges filedagainst him. Rather than inform Vincenty fully of the charges at the outset,the detectives told him at various points during the interrogation that sometype of charges were filed against him. It was not until late in theinterrogation -- well after the detectives read Vincenty his rights and askedhim to waive his right against self-incrimination -- that the detectives detailed 15 the actual charges Vincenty was facing. At the point when the detectivesasked Vincenty to waive his right against self-incrimination, they failed toinform him of the specific criminal charges filed against him. Withholdingthat “critically important information” deprived Vincenty of the ability toknowingly and voluntarily waive the right against self-incrimination. Stated simply, the State failed to carry its burden of proving beyond areasonable doubt that Vincenty knowingly and intelligently waived his rightagainst self-incrimination. C. The trial court and Appellate Division erred in holding Vincentyknowingly and intelligently waived his right against self-incrimination. TheState, however, argues this Court should find the error harmless because, in itsview, Vincenty’s statements to the detectives were not inculpatory and thuscould not have influenced his decision to plead guilty. We decline the State’sinvitation to find the error harmless. Vincenty expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of hissuppression motion in the plea agreement. On appeal, the State opposedVincenty’s legal arguments on the merits and did not argue harmless error.We find that the State has waived the harmless error argument -- and wedecline to exercise our discretion to reach an issue not raised before the 16 Appellate Division. See State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 467 n.1 (2017)(declining to consider an argument raised “for the first time on appeal”). Nor would consideration of harmless error change matters here becausethe State’s arguments are not persuasive. Some of Vincenty’s statementscould be fairly characterized as inculpatory. When speaking with thedetectives, Vincenty indicated that he knew the other assailant andacknowledged that he looked like one of the assailants. Those statementsalone could be viewed as inculpatory and militate against a finding of harmlesserror. The State’s contention that the denial of Vincenty’s suppression motioncould not have influenced his decision to plead guilty, moreover, is directlyrefuted by Vincenty’s actions. Vincenty reserved the right to appeal the denialof his suppression motion in the plea agreement. He exercised that right and,when the trial court’s decision was affirmed, filed a petition for certificationwith this Court. Vincenty’s very conduct reveals that his decision to pleadguilty was influenced by the trial court’s suppression ruling. V. Because Vincenty’s motion to suppress should have been granted, wereverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ- VINA’S opinion. 18