Title: Campbell v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 247, 2021
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEFFREY CAMPBELL, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 247, 2021 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1906003541A (N) 
§                      1906003541B (N) 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: December 27, 2021 
   Decided: March 8, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court 
Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, the State’s response, and the record 
on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On January 22, 2020, the appellant, Jeffrey Campbell, resolved two 
criminal cases and two violations of probation in an unrelated case (the “Sussex 
case”) by pleading guilty to one count of unlawful sexual contact by a sex offender 
against a child and three counts of dealing in child pornography.  In exchange, the 
State (i) nolle prosequied seven charges of dealing in child pornography and one 
count of sexual solicitation of a child and (ii) agreed to cap its sentencing 
recommendation to fifteen years of unsuspended Level V incarceration.  The 
2 
 
Superior Court ordered a presentence investigation and deferred sentencing.  
Sentencing, initially scheduled for July 10, 2020, was continued several times 
because in-person proceedings were temporarily suspended because of COVID-19 
safety concerns and Campbell preferred to be sentenced in person.  On July 9, 2021, 
the Superior Court sentenced Campbell to a total of sixteen years of unsuspended 
Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision, and discharged 
Campbell as unimproved from probation in the Sussex case.  This is Campbell’s 
direct appeal. 
(2) 
Campbell’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts that he has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law and has concluded that the appeal is wholly 
without merit.  Campbell’s attorney informed Campbell of the provisions of Rule 
26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying 
brief.  Counsel also informed Campbell of his right to supplement his attorney’s 
presentation.  Campbell has submitted points for this Court’s consideration.  The 
State has responded to Campbell’s arguments and has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold.  First, 
the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
3 
 
examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably be raised on 
appeal. 1  Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine 
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 
can be decided without an adversary presentation.2 
(4) 
In his points, Campbell: (i) complains that his sentence exceeds the 
State’s recommendation; (ii) challenges the number of times he had been found in 
violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex case; (ii) alleges that the Superior 
Court unduly emphasized his use of a “secret” phone—the use of which gave rise to 
the convictions at issue in this appeal—because he only possessed it for six weeks; 
(iv) complains that he has been disproportionately punished because he was unable 
to participate in Department of Correction programs and earn good-time credit 
because he agreed to postpone his sentencing until in-person court proceedings 
resumed.   
(5) 
As this Court has held repeatedly, “a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a 
waiver of any alleged errors or defects [that occurred] prior to the entry of the plea.”3  
Campbell complains that certain facts—the number of times he had been found in 
violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex case and the length of time he 
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 442 
(1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81-82. 
3 Benner v. State, 2007 WL 4215005, at *1 (Del. Nov. 30, 2017). 
4 
 
possessed a secret phone—were misrepresented at sentencing hearing.  Notably, 
Campbell does not challenge the voluntariness of his decision to plead guilty or his 
actual guilt.  In any event, the sentencing transcript reflects that (i) counsel clarified 
for the court that Campbell had only been found in violation of the terms of his 
probation in the Sussex case on eight prior occasions and (ii) Campbell, himself, told 
the sentencing judge that he had possessed the hidden phone for somewhere between 
six weeks and two months.   
(6) 
To the extent that Campbell complains that the Superior Court 
sentenced him in excess of the State’s recommendation, our review of a sentence is 
“limited to whether the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the 
General Assembly and whether it is based on factual predicates [that] are false, 
impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed 
mind.”4  As Campbell acknowledged at the plea colloquy, he is guilty of the crimes 
to which he pleaded guilty.  And, as Campbell candidly admits on appeal, his 
sentence falls within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.  Finally, we 
have reviewed the sentencing transcript carefully and find no evidence that the court 
sentenced him with a closed mind. 
(7) 
Campbell’s claims regarding good-time credit also lack merit.  The 
awarding and calculation of good time credit is left to DOC’s discretion, subject to 
 
4 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
5 
 
its rules and regulations.5  “Good time does not exist as a matter of constitutional 
right.”6  To the extent that Campbell argues he was not permitted to participate in 
DOC programs during the time he was incarcerated and awaiting sentencing, this 
inability was Campbell’s own doing: he chose to postpone his sentencing in order to 
appear in court in person.   
(8) 
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Campbell’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Campbell’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Campbell could 
not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
5 Morgan v. State, 2015 WL 4066768, at *1 (Del. July 1, 2015). 
6 Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237, 242 (Del. 1998).