Title: State v. Matthew C. Janssen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001316-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1316-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Matthew C. Janssen,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  213 Wis. 2d 471, 570 N.W.2d 746 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 25, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie County 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Des Jardins 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Vincent R. Biskupic, district attorney for 
Outagamie County, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by 
Eugene A. Bartman and Brian G. Figy, Office of the State Public 
Defender, Appleton, with oral argument by Eugene A. Bartman. 
 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Peter M. Koneazny, 
Carolyn M. Hagner and American Civil Liberties Union, Milwaukee 
for the American Civil Liberties Union. 
 
No.  97-1316 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1316-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew C. Janssen,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   On June 14, 1777, the Continental 
Congress resolved "[t]hat the flag of the thirteen United 
States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white: that the 
union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a 
new constellation."  8 Journal of the Continental Congress 
1774-1789 at 464 (W. Ford ed. 1907).  For the more than 220 
years since that day, our "Stars and Stripes" has endured as 
one symbol that Americans may look to with quiet reflection 
upon who we are as a nation, what our ancestors have done for 
us, and what it is that we wish to accomplish for our future 
generations. 
¶2 
It should come as no surprise that in a country of 
such great pride, honor and tradition, disrespect for the flag 
often leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of even the most 
tolerant among us. 
 
No.  97-1316 
 
2
The American flag . . . has come to be the visible 
symbol embodying our Nation.  It does not represent 
the views of any particular political party, and it 
does 
not 
represent 
any 
particular 
political 
philosophy.  The flag is not simply another "idea" or 
"point of view" competing for recognition in the 
marketplace of ideas.  Millions and millions of 
Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence 
regardless of what sort of social, political, or 
philosophical beliefs they may have. 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 429 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  The flag is a world-wide symbol of freedom; it is 
symbolic of the sacrifices we have made in our lives as 
Americans, and for most of us, it deserves respect and honor. 
¶3 
Although the flag's significance to most Americans 
may be readily apparent, one critical and indispensable fact 
which may exist only in the most distant recesses of our 
internal thought process may not reveal itself so willingly: we 
must also honor and respect the United States Constitution by 
carrying out its commands.  As a court, this is not only our 
primary function in this case, it is our only function. 
¶4 
This is a review of a published decision of the court 
of appeals, State v. Janssen, 213 Wis. 2d 471, 570 N.W.2d 746 
(Ct. App. 1997), which affirmed an order of the circuit court 
for Outagamie County, John A. Des Jardins, Judge.  The circuit 
court dismissed the state of Wisconsin's (State) charge of flag 
desecration against the defendant Matthew C. Janssen (Janssen). 
 The flag desecration statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.05 (1995-96),1 
provides: 
                     
1 All future statutory references are to the 1995-96 volume 
of the statutes unless otherwise noted.  
No.  97-1316 
 
3
 
946.05  Flag desecration. (1) Whoever intentionally 
and publicly mutilates, defiles, or casts contempt 
upon the flag is guilty of a Class E felony. 
 
(2) In this section "flag" means anything which 
is or purports to be the Stars and Stripes, the 
United States shield, the United States coat of arms, 
the Wisconsin state flag, or a copy, picture, or 
representation of any of them. 
¶5 
We are presented with two issues upon review: (1) is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.05(1), 
on 
its 
face, 
unconstitutionally 
overbroad; and (2) if so, can the constitutionality of 
§ 946.05(1) be preserved by a limiting construction of the 
statute or by severing any of its unconstitutional provisions? 
 We hold first that § 946.05(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad 
on its face,2 and second, that its overbreadth may not be cured 
by a limiting construction or by severing any of the statute's 
unconstitutional provisions.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.3 
                     
2 The State presents only one issue for our review: can the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) be preserved by an 
appropriate limiting construction or by severing any of its 
unconstitutional provisions?  In doing so, the State concedes 
that portions of § 946.05(1) are unconstitutional, and instead 
chooses to focus on severability.  Nevertheless, we begin with 
an overbreadth analysis of the statute in order to promote a 
full understanding of our holding. 
3 On January 7, 1998, Janssen filed a motion in this court 
to strike from the State's brief and appendix an affidavit 
which does not appear in the appellate record.  This court held 
the motion in abeyance pending the court's consideration of the 
merits on appeal; we now conclude that the affidavit must be 
stricken.  We have consistently held that we cannot consider 
affidavits which were not part of the record, see, e.g., Howard 
v. Duersten, 81 Wis. 2d 301, 307, 260 N.W.2d 274 (1977) (and 
cases cited therein), and we adhere to that rule today.  
Accordingly, Janssen's motion to strike the affidavit is hereby 
granted. 
No.  97-1316 
 
4
¶6 
The facts relevant to our decision are not in 
dispute.  Beginning in May or June of 1996, Janssen and several 
of his friends began stealing United States flags from 
different locations in the city of Appleton, Wisconsin.  One of 
the first thefts occurred when the group passed through the 
Reid Municipal Golf Course one evening and decided to take the 
flag down from the golf course flag pole.  After stealing the 
flag, Janssen eventually discarded it. 
¶7 
On approximately June 9, 1996, Janssen and his 
friends returned to the golf course and noticed that a new flag 
had been hung on the flag pole.  After lowering and removing 
the flag, Janssen defecated on the flag and left it on the 
steps to the golf course clubhouse.  Janssen and his friends 
did not return until approximately June 26, 1996. 
¶8 
At that time, Janssen and his friends returned to the 
golf course to find that the flag had been cleaned and put back 
on the flag pole.  Once again, Janssen and his friends lowered 
and stole the flag.  This time, however, the group left a 
handwritten note at the golf course, which was eventually 
recovered by the Appleton Police Department. 
¶9 
The note read as follows: 
 
Golf Course Rich Fucks: 
When are you dumb fucks going to learn?  We stole 
you're [sic] first flag and burnt [sic] it, then we 
used your second flag for a shit-rag and left it on 
your doorstep with a peice [sic] of shit.  The 
ANARCHIST PLATOON HAS INVADED Appleton and as long as 
you put flags up were [sic] going to burn them you 
yuppie fucks.  Shove you're [sic] cluB [sic] up your 
ass. 
No.  97-1316 
 
5
¶10 Approximately one month later, Janssen was arrested 
by the Appleton Police Department.  Upon his arrest, Janssen 
confessed to various flag thefts in the city of Appleton, 
including those at the Reid Municipal Golf Course.  Janssen 
also confessed to defecating on the flag.  As a result of his 
confessions, he was charged with two counts of theft, and one 
count of "intentionally and publicly defil[ing] the United 
States flag." 
¶11 On February 5, 1997, the circuit court held a hearing 
to address Janssen's motion to dismiss the flag desecration 
charge on grounds that his act of defecating on the flag was 
constitutionally protected expression.  See U.S. Const. amend. 
I.4  At this hearing, the circuit court concluded that the 
handwritten notethough it "brings into focus an expressive 
communication of protest, dislike, alienation against the 
establishment, 
government, 
and 
other 
institutions 
in 
society"was in this case "not tied to the actual act of 
defecation on the flag" since it was left some 17 days after 
the defecation had occurred.  Record on Appeal, 37:32 (Motion 
Hearing, February 5, 1997).  Accordingly, the circuit court 
held that defecating on the flag, by itself, was not 
constitutionally protected expressive communication within the 
                     
4 The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ."  It applies 
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Schneider v. New Jersey, 
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).  
No.  97-1316 
 
6
meaning of the First Amendment and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397.   
¶12 On March 13, 1997, following an additional hearing to 
address the issues of overbreadth and vagueness, the circuit 
court entered an order dismissing the count of flag desecration 
on grounds that Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad on its face. 
¶13 Upon the State's appeal, Janssen presented three 
arguments in his defense: (1) Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face; (2) § 946.05(1) is 
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; and (3) § 946.05(1) 
is unconstitutional as applied to Janssen, because his conduct 
in this case constituted expression which is protected by the 
First Amendment.  See Janssen, 213 Wis. 2d at 476. 
¶14 The court of appeals first concluded that Janssen 
lacked standing to assert a vagueness challenge against Wis. 
Stat. § 946.05(1) because a reasonable person could not have 
any doubt that defecating on the flag falls within the 
statutory prohibition against defiling the flag.5  See id. at 
477.  After examining the relevant United States Supreme Court 
                     
5 Even if he did have standing, the court of appeals 
concluded that Janssen's vagueness challenge would fail because 
the word "defile" has a specific and well understood meaning.  
See State v. Janssen, 213 Wis. 2d 471, 477, 570 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  Additionally, although Janssen was not charged 
under the portion of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) which makes it 
unlawful to "cast[] contempt upon the flag," the court of 
appeals concluded that the "casts contempt" portion of the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague.  See id. at 477-78. 
No.  97-1316 
 
7
precedent, the court of appeals then concluded that § 946.05(1) 
is overbroad because it makes illegal acts which the Court has 
deemed to be protected expression within the meaning of the 
First Amendment.  See id. at 480.  Finally, the court of 
appeals 
declined 
to 
fashion 
a 
limiting 
construction 
of 
§ 946.05(1)'s language or to sever any of its unconstitutional 
provisions because neither the language of the statute itself, 
nor the legislative history supported the State's suggested 
constructions of the statute.  See id. at 481-82. 
¶15 Having affirmed the circuit court's order on these 
grounds, the court of appeals did not address Janssen's 
argument that his act of defecating on the flag was expression 
protected by the First Amendment.  See id. at 476.  We granted 
the State's petition for review on November 20, 1997, and now 
affirm.6 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 Janssen's challenge to the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 946.05(1), and the State's corresponding attempt to 
preserve § 946.05(1), present questions of law which we review 
de novo, without deference to the conclusions of the circuit 
court or the court of appeals.  See Wisconsin Retired Teachers 
                     
6 Because we affirm on grounds of overbreadth, we need not 
address, and indeed express no opinion on, Janssen's arguments 
that Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) is unconstitutionally vague and 
that Janssen's act of defecating on the United States flag is 
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall 
within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . 
."  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). 
No.  97-1316 
 
8
Ass'n v. Employe Trust Funds Bd., 207 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 558 
N.W.2d 83 (1997). 
¶17 Ordinarily, a statute is presumed constitutional, and 
the party seeking to overcome the presumption must prove the 
statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id. at 
18.  The burden shifts to the proponent of the statute, 
however, where the statute infringes on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.  See State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 522-
523, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994); City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 
Wis. 2d 660, 668-69, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991).  In this case, the 
State concedes that Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1), at least in part, 
infringes upon First Amendment rights.  Therefore, the burden 
is on the State to establish the statute's constitutionality. 
THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE 
¶18 In his overbreadth analysis, Janssen argues that Wis. 
Stat. § 946.05(1) is unconstitutional not because his act of 
defecating on the United States flag is protected expression 
within the meaning of the First Amendment, but because the 
statute may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others 
in situations not before this court.  Courts generally look 
disfavorably upon such challenges, because "constitutional 
rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously."  
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).7 
                     
7 As the Broadrick court explained, "[t]hese principles 
rest on more than the fussiness of judges.  They reflect the 
conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not 
roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of 
the Nation's laws."  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-
11 (1973). 
No.  97-1316 
 
9
¶19 In the First Amendment arena, however, courts have 
altered their traditional rules of standing to permit "attacks 
on overly broad statutes without requiring that the person 
making the attack demonstrate that in fact his specific conduct 
was protected."  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
380 (1977).  See also City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 
11, 19, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980) ("In order to assert a claim of 
constitutional overbreadth, it is not necessary that the 
defendant's own conduct be constitutionally protected.").  This 
overbreadth exception is predicated on the critical importance 
of First Amendment rights in our society.  See, e.g., Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853, 
884 
(1991) 
("As 
philosophers 
and 
legal 
theorists 
have 
demonstrated, the First Amendment protects rights that are 
valued for their relationship both to our concept of autonomous 
personhood 
and 
to 
our 
democratic 
form 
of 
government.") 
(citations omitted). 
¶20 "The 
use 
of 
overbreadth 
analysis 
reflects 
the 
conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowing 
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the 
possibility that protected speech will be muted."  Bates, 433 
U.S. at 380.  Overbroad statutes may undesirably dissuade 
persons from exercising their rights by "chilling" their 
protected speech or expression.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 
No.  97-1316 
 
10 
U.S. 747, 768 (1982); Bates, 433 U.S. at 380; Broadrick, 413 
U.S. at 612.8 
¶21 Thus, 
we 
are 
more 
likely 
to 
review 
the 
constitutionality of a sweeping statute on overbreadth grounds 
than on an "as-applied" theory because "a chill on protected 
activity also means deterrence of the very litigants whose 
complaint is necessary under the as applied method to bring 
about erosion of overbreadth.  The results are delay in 
according 
judicial 
protection 
and 
irretrievable 
loss 
of 
exercise of fundamental rights."  Note, The First Amendment 
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 855 (1970). 
¶22 The overbreadth doctrine does not, however, give a 
court unfettered discretion to invalidate statutes in their 
entirety.  Because application of the doctrine is "strong 
medicine," it is to be "employed by the Court sparingly and 
only as a last resort."  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.  
Particularly where, as here, conduct and not merely speech is 
involved, the overbreadth of a statute must be both "real" and 
"substantial," "judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep."  Id. at 615.  See also Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 
                     
8 The overbreadth doctrine also serves to prevent selective 
enforcement of a statute against unpopular causes, see Spence, 
418 U.S. at 414 n.9; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), 
and to give legislatures more "incentive to stay within 
constitutional bounds in the first place."  Massachusetts v. 
Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 586 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  For a thorough review of the 
overbreadth doctrine, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense 
of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853 (1991); Note, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
No.  97-1316 
 
11 
521.  Stated differently, we will not invalidate the flag 
desecration statute "because in some conceivable, but limited, 
circumstances the regulation might be improperly applied."  
City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 40, 426 N.W.2d 329 
(1988).9 
¶23 We now turn our attention to Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) 
to determine whether it is substantially overbroad, so as to 
render it facially invalid. 
OVERBREADTH OF WIS. STAT. § 946.05(1) 
¶24 "A statute is overbroad when its language, given its 
normal meaning, is so sweeping that its sanctions may be 
applied to constitutionally protected conduct which the state 
is not permitted to regulate."  Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 
Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987).  We have little doubt 
that Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad.  
To explain why, we proceed to define the boundaries of 
constitutionally 
protected 
flag 
desecration, 
knowing 
that 
parties 
making 
overbreadth 
challenges 
may 
hypothesize 
situations in which the challenged legislation would intrude 
upon the First Amendment rights of third parties.  See K.F., 
145 Wis. 2d at 40. 
                     
9 The requirement of substantial overbreadth is tied to the 
"chilling effect" rationale: "While a sweeping statute, or one 
incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill 
the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the 
extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to 
decrease with the declining reach of the regulation."  New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982).   
No.  97-1316 
 
12 
¶25 Because the State asks this court to sever all but 
the term "defiles" from Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1), we first 
illustrate briefly the real and substantial overbreadth of the 
statute's "casts contempt upon" and "mutilates" language.  We 
then consider the constitutionality of a statute that merely 
prohibits "defile[ment]" of the United States flag. 
"CASTS CONTEMPT UPON" 
¶26 In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the 
defendant, Street, was convicted of a New York law which made 
it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or 
defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or 
act [any United States flag]."  Id. at 577-78.  After hearing a 
news report that civil rights leader James Meredith had been 
shot by a sniper in Mississippi, the defendant walked outside 
to a city intersection, stood on the corner and burned the 
flag.  While doing so, he disparaged the flag by shouting "we 
don't need no damn flag," and "if they let that happen to 
Meredith we don't need an American flag."  Id. at 578-79. 
¶27 Reserving the question of whether Street's conviction 
for burning the flag was constitutionally permissible, the 
Court held that the New York law had been unconstitutionally 
applied to Street because it permitted him to be punished 
merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the 
flag.  See id. at 580-81.  In so holding, the Court stated: 
 
We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed 
"freedom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even 
contrary," and the "right to differ as to things that 
touch the heart of the existing order," encompass the 
No.  97-1316 
 
13 
freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our 
flag, including those opinions which are defiant or 
contemptuous. 
Id. at 593 (citations omitted). 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.05(1) expressly prohibits the 
very conduct which was held to be protected by the First 
Amendment in Street.  Its "casts contempt upon" language 
encompasses any speech that is defiant or contemptuous of, or 
which expresses distaste for the flag.  In fact, this portion 
of the statute casts its jaundiced eye with such reprobation as 
to reveal that the only interest being served is the 
proscription of expressive communication.10 
"MUTILATES" 
¶29 Some twenty years after Street, the Supreme Court 
again had occasion to assess the constitutional validity of a 
flag desecration statute.  See Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.  In 
Johnson, the Court was faced with the questions it had 
explicitly left unaddressed in Street: (1) whether the act of 
burning the flag is "sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication," Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974), 
so as to warrant First Amendment protection; and (2) to what 
extent that act could be regulated by the government. 
                     
10 As the State also concedes, the "casts contempt upon" 
language is constitutionally infirm on vagueness grounds.  See 
generally Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (holding 
provision of Massachusetts flag misuse statute that subjects to 
criminal 
liability 
anyone 
who 
"publicly 
. 
. 
. 
treats 
contemptuously the flag of the United States" void for 
vagueness under the due process clause).   
No.  97-1316 
 
14 
¶30 The defendant, Johnson, participated in a political 
demonstration and march to protest, among other things, the 
policies of the Reagan administration.  See Johnson, 491 U.S. 
at 399.  When the protesters arrived at the Dallas City Hall, 
Johnson doused a United States flag with kerosene and set it on 
fire.  See id.  Johnson's acts led to his arrest and conviction 
for desecration of a venerated object pursuant to Texas law, 
which made it a misdemeanor to "deface, damage, or otherwise 
physically mistreat" a national flag "in a way that the actor 
knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to 
observe or discover his action."  Id. at 400 n.1. 
¶31 Under the circumstances presented in Johnson's case, 
the Court concluded that Johnson's burning of the flag 
constituted expressive communication which implicated the First 
Amendment.  See id. at 406.  After rejecting Texas' two 
asserted interests in regulating this expressionpreventing 
breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of 
nationhood and national unitythe Court upheld the reversal of 
Johnson's conviction.  See id. at 420.  In doing so, the Court 
stated, "[w]e do not consecrate the flag by punishing its 
desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this 
cherised emblem represents."  Id. 
¶32 This decision was reaffirmed a year later when the 
Court held that the Flag Protection Act of 1989, an act passed 
in the wake of the Johnson decision, was unconstitutionally 
applied to defendants charged with burning the flag.  See 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).  Similar to the 
No.  97-1316 
 
15 
statute at issue in Johnson, the Flag Protection Act provided 
for fines and imprisonment of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, 
defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or 
ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States."  Id. 
at 314. 
¶33 The Court stated: 
 
Although Congress cast the Flag Protection Act of 
1989 in somewhat broader terms than the Texas statute 
at issue in Johnson, the Act still suffers from the 
same fundamental flaw: It suppresses expression out 
of concern for its likely communicative impact. 
. . . 
Government may create national symbols, promote them, 
and encourage their respectful treatment.  But the 
Flag Protection Act of 1989 goes well beyond this by 
criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of 
its likely communicative impact. 
Id. at 317-18. 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.05(1), as it is written, 
suffers from the same flaws that were present in Johnson and 
Eichman.  Its language barring persons from "mutilating" the 
flag would make criminally punishable flag burning, tearing or 
cutting during a political protest, rally, or any other medium 
in which that person wishes to convey a message by doing 
soexpression which is explicitly protected by the First 
No.  97-1316 
 
16 
Amendment.11  We are confident in our prediction that fear of 
prosecution under this portion of the statute is likely to 
dissuade the citizens of this state from expressing themselves 
in a constitutionally protected manner. 
¶35 The State argues that the real and substantial 
overbreadth of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) that is evidenced by the 
"mutilates" and "casts contempt upon" language may be cured by 
eliminating these two phrases altogether.  According to the 
State, if the word "defiles" alone is left in place, the flag 
desecration statute may be preserved.  We disagree, and proceed 
to explain why § 946.05(1) would remain unconstitutionally 
overbroad on its face if it simply prohibited "defile[ment]" of 
the United States flag. 
SEVERABILITY PRINCIPLES 
¶36 Statutes that are challenged as overbroad may be 
preserved if a limiting and validating construction of the 
statute's language is readily available.  Courts may also sever 
the unconstitutional provisions of the statute, leaving the 
remainder of the legislation intact and in full effect.  See 
                     
11 Of course, certain conditions must be met before one's 
conduct 
becomes 
"sufficiently 
imbued 
with 
elements 
of 
communication," Spence, 418 U.S. at 409, as to fall within the 
First Amendment's protective embrace.  See Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (courts must examine the context in 
which the conduct occurred and ask whether "an intent to convey 
a particularized message was present, and [whether] the 
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it") (quoting Spence, 418 U.S at 410-11).  We 
assume here, as we assume in all hypotheticals in this opinion, 
that these conditions have been met.  
No.  97-1316 
 
17 
Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 521, 522 (citing Fallon, 100 Yale L. Rev. 
at 886); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 ("[A]ny 
enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally 
forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial 
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or 
deterrence to constitutionally protected expression."). 
¶37 "Whether an unconstitutional provision is severable 
from the remainder of the statute in which it appears is 
largely a question of legislative intent, but the presumption 
is in favor of severability."  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 
641, 653 (1984).  "Unless it is evident that the Legislature 
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its 
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may 
be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."  Id. 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)). 
¶38 These 
general 
rules 
of 
construction 
have 
been 
codified in Wisconsin by Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11), which 
provides in relevant part: 
 
990.001  Construction of laws; rules for.  In 
construing Wisconsin laws the following rules shall 
be observed unless construction in accordance with a 
rule would produce a result inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the legislature: 
. . . 
(11) SEVERABILITY.  The provisions of the statutes are 
severable. . . . If any provision of the statutes or 
of a session law is invalid, or if the application of 
either to any person or circumstance is invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
No.  97-1316 
 
18 
¶39 Therefore, in our attempt to sever or find a limiting 
construction of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1), we examine the language 
of the statute as well as its legislative history to determine 
whether the legislature intended the statute to be applied in 
its newly-construed form.  See Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 
207, 227, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991). 
THE LANGUAGE OF WIS. STAT. § 946.05(1) 
¶40 Consistent 
with 
the 
command 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.001(11), we presume that the legislature intended Wis. 
Stat. § 946.05(1) to survive with the term "defiles" on its 
own. 
 
Despite 
our 
construction, 
the 
statute 
remains 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  The word "defile" is defined as 
"to make filthy or dirty; to debase the pureness or excellence 
of; to profane or sully; to make unclean or unfit for 
ceremonial use; desecrate; to violate the chastity of."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 489 (3d 
ed. 1992).12 
                     
12 The Eichman court utilized a similar definition of the 
word "defile" when examining the Flag Protection Act of 1989.  
See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 n.7 (citing 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 592 (1976)). 
No.  97-1316 
 
19 
¶41 This 
accepted 
definition 
of 
the 
term 
"defile" 
illustrates the potential reach of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) even 
after severance of the majority of its substantive provisions. 
 Under this definition, one could be prosecuted for any 
expressive act which makes the flag unclean for ceremonial use 
or which violates the chastity of the flag.  It would 
proscribe, for example, a college student's decision to protest 
our government's foreign policy by affixing a peace symbol to 
both sides of the flag with removable black tape.  The United 
States Supreme Court has held that such activity enjoys First 
Amendment protection.  See Spence, 418 U.S. at 415. 
¶42 One might also defile the flag when conveying a 
message by dyeing, painting or writing upon the flag for 
artistic purposes.  Under the appropriate circumstances, we are 
again confident that Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) could not be 
applied constitutionally to such activity.  Cf. United States 
ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court of New York City, 385 F. Supp. 
165 (1974) (holding that New York statute barring one from 
                                                                
 
Although these accepted definitions of "defile" would 
appear to encompass conduct which also forms the basis for 
liability under Wis. Stat. § 946.06, Wisconsin's "improper use" 
statute, we express no opinion on the constitutionality of that 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 946.06.  Cf. Spence, 418 U.S. 405 
(holding Washington's similarly worded "improper use" statute 
unconstitutional as applied to college student who affixed 
peace symbol to the flag); Koser v. County of Price, 834 F. 
Supp. 305, 309 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (noting that, in light of 
Spence and Johnson, it was unconstitutional for officers to 
arrest individuals under § 946.06(1)(b) who publicly displayed 
a United States flag on which a picture of a Plains Indian was 
superimposed). 
No.  97-1316 
 
20 
"casting contempt" on the flag was unconstitutionally applied 
to defendant who displayed an art exhibit which used the flag 
in an antiwar theme).  In short, any time a person expresses an 
opinion by defiling a flagwhether by attaching a symbol to the 
flag which makes it "unfit for ceremonial use" or renders it 
"filthy or dirty," or by spilling a foreign substance on the 
flag and thereby "debasing its pureness"§ 946.05(1) could be 
used to punish that person unconstitutionally. 
¶43 In our assessment, the Supreme Court's holdings in 
Johnson and Eichman command this conclusion.  Certainly if one 
is protected by the First Amendment when he or she conveys a 
message by burning, tearing or otherwise mutilating the flag 
during a political protest or rally, he or she would also be 
protected for the less destructive act of "defiling" the flag 
under equivalent circumstances.  If one were to splatter the 
flag with oil during a demonstration against the Persian Gulf 
Wara clear act of "defilement" under any interpretation of the 
termwe fail to see how this person could be prosecuted 
constitutionally under Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) when his or her 
fellow protester who chose to burn the flag could not. 
¶44 The State argues that a construction of the word 
"defile" which limits it to purely physical acts which make the 
flag 
physically 
unclean 
or 
dirty 
would 
preserve 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1).  We disagree.  
None of the above-recited examples of protected expression 
would fall outside the scope of § 946.05(1) as the State would 
have us construe the term "defile."  Although such a 
No.  97-1316 
 
21 
construction could save a defilement statute from a potential 
vagueness challenge, see Commonwealth v. Morgan, 331 A.2d 444, 
446 (Pa. 1975), it does little to address the statute's effect 
upon the many conceivable forms of expression which involve 
intentional defilement of the flag.13 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
¶45 Legislative history is of little comfort to the 
State's argument.  Wisconsin Stat. § 946.05 finds its roots in 
a 1901 statute.  See 1901 Wis. Laws, ch. 142; see also Wis. 
Stat. ch. 185, §§ 4575(h)-(k) (Sanborn & Sanborn's Annot. 
                     
13 We note that a construction which by its very language 
limits the statute's application to speech and conduct that is 
not protected by the First Amendment is both impractical and 
constitutionally suspect.  See Laurence H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 12-29, at 1031 (2d ed. 1988).  Tribe notes 
that such a statute "is guaranteed not to be overbroad since, 
by 
its 
terms, 
it 
literally 
forbids 
nothing 
that 
the 
Constitution protects. . . . The problem with that solution is 
that it simply exchanges overbreadth for vagueness."  Id.  
No.  97-1316 
 
22 
Stats. 1899-1906).14  Since then, it has been repealed and 
recreated, see 1919 Wis. Laws, ch. 113,15 and renumbered several 
                     
14 With the first state flag desecration statutes being 
enacted in 1897, Wisconsin's 1901 statute made it one of the 
first to regulate the proper treatment and use of the United 
States flag.  See Note, Flag Burning, Flag Waving and the Law, 
4 Val. U. L. Rev. 345 app. (1970) (compilation of state flag 
desecration statutes).  Currently, every state in the Union, 
with the exception of Alaska, has a statute banning flag 
desecration.  See Ala. Code § 13A-11-12 (1994); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13-3703 (West 1989); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-51-207 
(Michie 1997); Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 614 (West 1988); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-11-204 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-258a 
(West 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1331 (1995); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 256.06, 876.52 (West 1994); Ga. Code Ann. § 50-3-9 
(1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1107 (Michie 1993); Idaho 
Code § 18-3401 (1997); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 620/1 (West 1993); 
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-1-4 (West 1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 718A.1 
(West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4111 (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 525.110 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14:116 (West 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 254 (West 
1989); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 83 (1996); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
264, § 5 (1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.246 (West 1991); 
Minn. Stat. § 609.40 (1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-7-39 (1994); 
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 578.095 (West 1995); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-
215 (1996); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-928 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 201.290 (Michie 1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 646-A:1-2 
(1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-9 (West 1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 30-21-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 136 (McKinney 
1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-381 (1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-
07-02 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.11 (Banks-Baldwin 
1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 372 (Supp. 1998); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 166.075 (1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2102 (1995); R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 11-15-2 (1994); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-220 (Law. 
Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-9-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-311 (1997); Tex. Penal Code Ann. 
§ 42.11 (West 1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-601 (1995); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1903 (1974); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-488 
(Michie 1996); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.86.030 (West 1998); W. 
Va. Code § 61-1-8 (1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-3-110 (Michie 
1997).  Only two reported decisions have addressed the 
constitutionality of a state flag desecration statute since the 
Johnson and Eichman decisions.  See Commonwealth v. Bricker, 
666 
A.2d 
257 
(Pa. 
1995) 
(holding 
Pennsylvania 
statute 
unconstitutional as applied, but constitutional on its face); 
No.  97-1316 
 
23 
times.  See, e.g., 1925 Wis. Laws, ch. 4; 1955 Wis. Laws, ch. 
696.  In 1967, an amendment increased the penalty for flag 
desecration from a misdemeanor to a felony.  See 1967 Wis. 
Laws, ch. 241. 
¶46 The revision of the criminal code in 1955, which 
moved the statute to its present location at Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.05, provides the sole insight into the legislature's 
intent.  In a 1953 Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal 
Code prepared by the Wisconsin Legislative Council, a comment 
is attached to the flag desecration statute.  See 5 Judiciary 
                                                                 
State v. Jimenez, 828 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
Texas statute unconstitutional).  For a historical treatment of 
state flag desecration statutes and their use, see Robert 
Justin Goldstein, The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap: An Historical, 
Political, and Legal Analysis, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 19 (1990); 
Albert M. Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statutes: History and 
Analysis, 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 193, 196-97 (1972). 
The first federal flag legislation appeared in 1917: an 
"improper use" statute which applied only to the District of 
Columbia.  See Michael W. Hoge, Recent Development, 50 Wash. L. 
Rev. 169, 176 n.43 (1974).  See also D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3414 
(repealed 1947).  The first federal legislation to apply 
nationwide did not appear until 1968.  See 18 U.S.C. § 700 
(Supp. IV 1968); Hoge, 50 Wash. L. Rev. at 176 n.43; Note, 4 
Val. U. L. Rev. app. at 362.  It was amended in 1989 following 
the Johnson decision and remains on the books to this day.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 700 (1994). 
15 The statute was undoubtedly recreated to mirror the 
Uniform Flag Law, approved in 1917 by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  See Rosenblatt, 1972 
Wash. L.Q. at 196-97.  Compare Wis. Laws, ch. 113 (1919) with 
Uniform Flag Statute (reprinted in Rosenblatt, 1972 Wash. L.Q. 
at 196-97 n.22).  
No.  97-1316 
 
24 
Committee Report on the Criminal Code 168 (February 1953).  The 
comment reads: 
 
This section penalizes a person who intentionally and 
publicly mutilates, defiles or casts contempt upon 
the flag.  "Intentionally . . . mutilates, defiles or 
casts 
contempt 
upon" 
implies 
something 
grossly 
contemptuous.  It does not include, without more, a 
refusal on religious grounds to salute the flag.  See 
Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 163 S. W. 2d 153 
(1942); Miller v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 428, 133 P. 
2d 223 (1943).  "Publicly" is used in the sense of 
"in public"; it requires more than merely doing the 
prohibited acts in the presence of another person.  
See State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 25 A. 2d 491 
(1942). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶47 This 
comment 
illustrates 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended to prohibit "grossly contemptuous" conduct onlya 
clear attempt to ban speech and conduct based on its expressive 
content.  Such an approach runs contrary to now well-
established principles of First Amendment law.  See, e.g., 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 ("If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society 
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); West 
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein."). 
No.  97-1316 
 
25 
¶48 The legislature's stated intent satisfies us that a 
prolonged search for a constitutionally-rehabilitated version 
of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1)whether by limiting construction or 
severancewould be in vain.  "Although this court will strive 
to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional 
attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of 
perverting the purpose of a statute."  State v. Hall, 207 
Wis. 2d 54, 82, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997).  See also Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961).  No matter what a 
limiting construction or severance of § 946.05(1) may produce, 
the clear intent of the legislature is to proscribe all speech 
or conduct which is grossly offensive and contemptuous of the 
United States flag.  Therefore, any version of the current 
statute would violate fundamental principles of First Amendment 
law both in explicit wording and intent. 
¶49 The State argues that we need not strike the statute 
down in its entirety because there are instances in which a 
person may be prosecuted under Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) in a 
manner that is consistent with the dictates of the First 
Amendment.16  According to the State, this court should focus 
                     
16 Several hypotheticals were discussed at oral argument in 
this case, including the oft-quoted footnote three of the 
Johnson decision, in which the Court noted that the Texas 
statute at issue in that case might apply to conduct that is 
not protected by the First Amendment.  The Court noted: 
A tired person might, for example, drag a flag 
through the mud, knowing that this conduct is likely 
to offend others, and yet have no thought of 
expressing any idea; neither the language nor the 
Texas 
courts' 
interpretations 
of 
the 
statute 
No.  97-1316 
 
26 
more 
on 
"real 
examples" 
of 
overbreadth, 
and 
less 
on 
hypothetical situations in which the statute could not be 
applied constitutionally.  Janssen counters by asserting that 
any physical desecration of the flag constitutes expression 
within the meaning of the First Amendment. 
¶50 In 
our 
assessment, 
the 
real 
and 
substantial 
overbreadth of Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) provides a response to 
both arguments.  As we have shown, the broad language of the 
statute casts an inescapable shadow upon protected expression 
which utilizes the United States flag, even if the extent of 
its proscription were confined to defilement of the flag.  
Although there may be constitutionally permissible applications 
of § 946.05(1), the number of instances in which the law could 
be applied to unprotected behavior is small in comparison to 
the number of instances in which it may be applied to 
expression protected by the First Amendment.  "[J]udged in 
relation to its plainly legitimate sweep," § 946.05(1) is 
sufficiently 
overbroad 
as 
to 
require 
its 
invalidation.  
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. 
                                                                
 
precludes the possibility that such a person would be 
prosecuted 
for 
flag 
desecration. 
 
Because 
the 
prosecution of a person who had not engaged in 
expressive conduct would pose a different case, and 
because this case may be disposed of on narrower 
grounds, we address only Johnson's claim that § 42.09 
as applied to political expression like his violates 
the First Amendment. 
 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 n.3. 
No.  97-1316 
 
27 
¶51 Our approach, however, does not require that we 
endorse 
Janssen's 
"all 
flag 
desecration 
is 
protected 
expression" argument.17  We leave for another day the question 
of whether an appropriately drafted flag desecration statute 
might be applied constitutionally to certain non-expressive 
conduct, recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has 
suggested that such possibilities exist.  See generally 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310; Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. 
¶52 In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 946.05(1) is 
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional on its face.  Because 
the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that a 
limiting construction or severance of the statute's terms can 
preserve the statute in a constitutional form, § 946.05(1) must 
be invalidated in its entirety. 
¶53 Having reached this conclusion, we pause to note the 
extreme difficulty inherent in writing a decision such as this. 
 Ordinarily, the members of this court would call upon that 
core zone of personal restraint we carry deep within us as 
                     
17 Several commentators have advanced different versions of 
this argument.  See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, This is Not a Flag: 
The Aesthetics of Desecration, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1549 (1990) 
(asserting that it will never be possible to formulate a 
"content-neutral" flag desecration law because the flag is a 
pure symbol and any interaction with it is symbolic speech); 
Gregory Herbert, Note, Waiving Rights and Burning Flags: The 
Search for a Valid State Interest in Flag Protection, 25 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 591 (1990) (arguing that no flag protection 
legislation could be constitutional).  Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 111 (1989) 
(concluding that it might be possible to draft legislation that 
prohibits flag burning without running afoul of the First 
Amendment). 
No.  97-1316 
 
28 
justices in order to refrain from such a diversion, but today 
is different.  Today we share in the thoughtful and well-
expressed sentiments of Justice Kennedy: 
 
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make 
decisions we do not like.  We make them because they 
are right, right in the sense that the law and the 
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.  And 
so great is our commitment to the process that, 
except in the rare case, we do not pause to express 
distaste 
for 
the 
result, 
perhaps 
for 
fear 
of 
undermining a valued principle that dictates the 
decision.  This is one of those rare cases.  
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
¶54 Our final assessment of Janssen's behavior is no 
different from our initial, instinctive reaction to the facts 
of this case: we are deeply offended.  Janssen's conduct is 
repugnant and completely devoid of any social value.  To many, 
particularly those who have fought for our country, it is a 
slap in the face. 
¶55 Our own sense of personal anguish does not end with 
the words of this opinion.  Though our disquieted emotions will 
eventually subside, the facts of this case will remain a 
glowing ember of frustration in our hearts and minds.  That an 
individual or individuals might conceivably repeat such conduct 
in the future is a fact which we acknowledge only with deep 
regret. 
¶56 But in the end, to paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, we 
must take solace in the fact that as members of this court we 
are not justified in writing our private notions of policy into 
the Constitution, no matter how deeply we may cherish them or 
No.  97-1316 
 
29 
how mischievous we may deem their disregard.  See Barnette, 319 
U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  If it is the will 
of the people in this country to amend the United States 
Constitution in order to protect our nation's symbol, it must 
be done through normal political channels.18 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                     
18 We note that the Wisconsin legislature recently adopted 
a resolution urging Congress to amend the Constitution so as to 
grant states the authority to prohibit desecration of the flag. 
 See Assem. J. Res. 52, Subst. Amend. 2 (Wis. 1997).  The 
resolution reads in part: 
be 
it 
Resolved 
by 
the 
assembly, 
the 
senate 
concurring, 
That 
the 
members 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature respectfully urge the Congress of the 
United States to begin the process of amending the 
constitution to specify that Congress and the states 
have the power to prohibit the physical desecration 
of the flag of the United States . . . .  
 
 
1