Title: STEPANEK v KOBER CONSTRUCTION
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-333
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 1981

N o . 80-333 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 L A R R Y STEPANEK, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, KOBER CONSTRUCTION AND T H E C O U N T Y O F YELLOWSTONE, BY AND T H R O U G H THE COMISSIONERS THEREOF, e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, The Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Stephens and C o l e , B i l l i n g s , Montana Kinnard and Woodward, B i l l i n g s , Montana Dave Kinnard argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondents: Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, B i l l i n g s , Montana Corinne Courtney and Ward Swanser argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: February 2 0 , 1981 Decided: March 11, 1981 F i l e d : MAR 1 1 19@ M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellant, an employee of a subcontractor h i r e d by t h e respondent general c o n t r a c t o r , appeals from summary judgment granted t o the defendants i n the D i s t r i c t Court. However, a p p e l l a n t l i m i t s h i s appeal t o t h e general c o n t r a c t o r , Kober Construction. I n December of 1973, t h e respondent and Yellowstone County entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t f o r the construction of the Metra, a multi-purpose r e c r e a t i o n a l f a c i l i t y i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. I n January of 1974, the respondent entered i n t o a subcontract with A l b e r t D. Wardell Masonry f o r t h e completion of masonry work required i n the Metra p r o j e c t . Appellant was i n j u r e d i n a f a l l from t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s scaffolding on A p r i l 17, 1975. The t r i a l c o u r t granted summary judgment f o r defendants b u t f a i l e d t o s t a t e t h e reasons t h e r e f o r . Disapproval of such f a i l u r e has been r e c e n t l y s t a t e d i n a concurring opinion f i l e d i n Big Man v. S t a t e of Montana and Case (No. 80-265, decided March 1 0 , 1981). I n t h e f u t u r e , we ask t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Courts s t a t e t h e reasons f o r g r a n t i n g summary judgment. Here w e w i l l review a l l i s s u e s argued t o t h i s Court . For purposes of t h i s appeal, a l l f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s must be resolved i n favor of a p p e l l a n t , a g a i n s t whom summary judgment was granted. Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 450, 548 P.2d 613, 615. Defendant and respondent, Kober Construction, w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d t o a s general c o n t r a c t o r . A l b e r t D. Wardell Masonry w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s subcontractor. The primary c o n t r a c t between t h e general c o n t r a c t o r and Yellowstone County required the general c o n t r a c t o r t o be "responsible f o r i n i t i a t i n g , maintaining, and supervising a l l s a f e t y precautions and programs" connected with the construction. Consistent with t h i s provision, the general c o n t r a c t o r ' s job superintendent conducted r e g u l a r s a f e t y meetings with a l l subcontractors on t h e p r o j e c t and i n one i n s t a n c e , t h e subcontractor was ordered t o remove a workman from s c a f f o l d i n g because the general c o n t r a c t o r f e l t t h e workman's negligent conduct would cause i n j u r y . The subcontract provided t h a t t h e subcontractor comply with a l l a p p l i c a b l e s a f e t y and h e a l t h laws and f u r t h e r : ". . . provide a l l safeguards, s a f e t y devices, and p r o t e c t i v e equipment and take any o t h e r needed ac- t i o n s on h i s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; o r a s t h e Contractor may determine reasonably necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e l i f e and h e a l t h of employees on t h e job and t h e s a f e t y of t h e public and t o p r o t e c t property i n connection with t h e performance of t h e work covered herein. " The s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e r a i s e d i n t h i s appeal i s whether t h e general c o n t r a c t o r owed a duty of c a r e t o the a p p e l l a n t and i f so, upon what b a s i s . I f t h e r e was no duty owed, then t h e r e can be no i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t and granting of summary judgment was proper. Rennick v. Hoover (1980), Mont. , 606 P.2d 1079, 1081, 37 St.Rep. 308, 310. Appellant contends t h e general c o n t r a c t o r owed him a duty of c a r e predicated upon (1) c o n t r o l of t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s work reserved i n t h e subcontract and i n f a c t , exercised by t h e general c o n t r a c t o r ; ( 2 ) t h e Scaffolding Act, s e c t i o n 50- 77-101, MCA; ( 3 ) t h e Safe Place s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 50-71-201, MCA; and ( 4 ) t h e primary c o n t r a c t r e q u i r i n g t h e general c o n t r a c t o r t o be responsible f o r s a f e t y on t h e p r o j e c t . The general c o n t r a c t o r contends (1) c o n t r o l of the sub- c o n t r a c t o r was n e i t h e r reserved nor exercised; ( 2 ) a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e s would be improper because t h e r e q u i s i t e element of c o n t r o l was lacking; (3) s a f e t y o b l i g a t i o n s assumed i n t h e primary c o n t r a c t were delegated; and ( 4 ) a p p e l l a n t ' s contributory negligence b a r s recovery. Appellant f u r t h e r contends t h a t i f t h e case i s remanded f o r t r i a l , Occupational Safety and Health Administration (O.S.H.A.) v i o l a t i o n s should be t r e a t e d a s negligence per se. The e f f e c t of those r e g u l a t i o n s i s herein discussed. GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S CONTROL: Montana recognizes t h e general r u l e t h a t "absent some form of c o n t r o l over t h e subcontractor's method of operation, t h e general c o n t r a c t o r and owner of t h e construction p r o j e c t a r e not l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s t o t h e subcontractor's employees." Mont. Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co. (19791, , 593 P.2d 438, 441, 36 St.Rep. 632, 636; 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, s e c t i o n 4 1 4 (1965). Both p a r t i e s r e l y upon Shannon a s t h e c o n t r o l l i n g statement of law. Appellant contends t h a t t h e r e q u i s i t e "control" e x i s t s i f t h e general c o n t r a c t o r had a nondelegable duty t o "control". A review of t h e record before us i n d i c a t e s t h e general c o n t r a c t o r ' s degree of a c t u a l c o n t r o l i s disputed. F i r s t , t h e subcontract c l a u s e purported by respondent t o have delegated a l l s a f e t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e subcontractor, does n o t do so. The general c o n t r a c t o r reserved r i g h t t o c o n t r o l s a f e t y compliance on the p r o j e c t . Second, t h e depositions of t h e subcontractor and t h e job superintendent f o r t h e general c o n t r a c t o r , demonstrate t h e subcontractor's acquiescence i n t h e general c o n t r a c t o r ' s supervision of t h e p r o j e c t ' s s a f e t y . The subcontractors attended weekly s a f e t y meetings conducted by t h e general c o n t r a c t o r . Subcontractor Wardell complied with t h e general c o n t r a c t o r ' s request t h a t an employee be removed from t h e scaffolding and assigned t o work on t h e ground. However, a p p e l l a n t ' s claim i s n o t limited by a showing of a c t u a l c o n t r o l . The general c o n t r a c t o r assumed c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e c o n t r a c t with Yellowstone County. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e general c o n t r a c t o r agreed t o maintain and supervise job s a f e t y . Montana has previously held t h a t s i m i l a r c o n t r a c t u a l arrangements r e s u l t i n c r e a t i o n of a nondelegable duty. Ulmen v. Schwieger (1932), 92 Mont. 331, 1 2 P.2d 856. I n Ulmen t h e duty extended t o a t h i r d person n o t employed by a subcontractor. Here we must decide i f t h a t nondelegable duty extends t o employees. W e hold t h a t it does, and t h e b a s i s f o r our holding i s discussed i n connection with a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Scaffolding Act. APPLICATION OF THE SCAFFOLDING ACT: Section 50-77-101, MCA, s t a t e s : "All s c a f f o l d s e r e c t e d i n t h i s s t a t e f o r use i n t h e e r e c t i o n , r e p a i r , a l t e r a t i o n , o r removal of build- i n g s s h a l l be well and s a f e l y supported, of s u f f i - c i e n t width, and properly secured so a s t o ensure t h e s a f e t y of persons working on them o r passing under them o r by them and t o prevent them from f a l l - ing o r t o prevent any m a t e r i a l t h a t may be used, placed, o r deposited on them from f a l l i n g . " The s t a t u t e does n o t e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e what persons owe t h e duty imposed. I n S t a t e ex rel. Great F a l l s Nat. Bank v. D i s t r i c t Court (1969), 154 Mont. 336, 463 P.2d 326, t h i s Court held a landowner bank, not i n c o n t r o l of t h e work involving t h e s c a f f o l d , was not l i a b l e t o a c o n t r a c t o r ' s employee under t h e s t a t u t e . The Court defined t h e scope of t h e Scaffolding A c t i f i t h e foflawing t e r m s : ". . . i t is c l e a r t o us from t h e language of t h e A c t construed i n t h e l i g h t of i t s purpose t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended only t o make t h e i n j u r e d work- man whole by granting him r e l i e f t o t h e e x t e n t of h i s i n j u r i e s and damages a g a i n s t t h e person, firm o r corporation having d i r e c t and immediate c o n t r o l of t h e work involving t h e use of scaffolding." Great F a l l s Nat. Bank, 154 Mont. 336, 345, 463 P.2d - - 326, 331. The c o u r t reasoned t h a t s e c t i o n 50-77-102, MCA, and s e c t i o n 50-77-104, MCA, then r e f e r r e d t o a s s e c t i o n 69-1402, R.C.M. 1947, and s e c t i o n 69-1404, R.C.M. 1947, showed l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o l i m i t t h e Scaffolding Act t o "one i n immediate c o n t r o l . " The c o u r t noted t h a t these two s t a t u t e s expressly applied only t o "owners, c o n t r a c t o r s , b u i l d e r s , o r persons having t h e d i r e c t and immediate c o n t r o l o r supervision of any buildings." (Emphasis supplied.) However, t h e c o u r t had t o f a c e the i s s u e of nondelegable duty because i f t h e bank owed a duty t o c o n t r o l which it could n o t d e l e g a t e , then it would be s u b j e c t t o t h e provisions of t h e Act. The c o u r t r e f e r r e d t o previous decisions which were based upon nondelegable duty, i.e., Ulmen v. Schwieger, supra, b u t distinguished on t h e b a s i s t h a t they d i d n o t involve employees of a subcontractor. This Court thus began t o c o n s t r u c t a d i s t i n c t i o n between employees of a subcontractor and t h i r d persons such a s t h e one i n j u r e d i n Ulmen. This d i s t i n c t i o n reached i t s climax i n Ashcraft v. Montana Power Co. (1971), 156 Mont. 368, 480 P.2d 812. I t was t h e r e held t h a t , where t h e Montana Power Co. employed an independent c o n t r a c t o r t o c o n s t r u c t l i n e s , an i n j u r e d employee of t h a t subcontractor was precluded from suing Montana Power because of t h e exclusive provisions of t h e wsr3cmarra1 Compensation Act. J u s t i c e Daly dissented. J u s t i c e Haswell d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e . I n response t o Ashcraft, the d e l e g a t e s t o t h e s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention adopted A r t i c l e 11, Section 1 6 , which, a s r a t i f i e d , provides i n p a r t : "The administration of j u s t i c e . Courts of j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o every person, and speedy remedy afforded f o r every i n j u r y of person, property, o r character. N o person s h a l l be deprived of t h i s f u l l --- l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r i n j u r y incurred i n employment f o r which another person m a y be l i a b l e e x c e p t --- a s t o £ e l - low employees -- and h i s immediate employer who h i r e d him i f such immediate employer provides coverage under t h e Workmen's compensation Laws of t h i s s t a t e . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) I n moving passage of t h i s s e c t i o n , delegate Murray s a i d : ". . . Under Montana law, a s announced i n t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n of Ashcraft v. Montana Power Company, t h e employee has no r e d r e s s a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t i e s f o r i n j u r i e s caused by them i f h i s immediate employer i s covered under t h e Workmen's Compensa- t i o n Law." TR. of the Mont. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conven- t i o n , Volume 7 , P a r t 2 a t 5407. ". . . The committee believes t h a t c l a r i f y i n g t h i s remedy would have a s a l u t a r y e f f e c t on t h e conscien- t i o u s n e s s o f p e r s o n s who may c o n t r a c t o u t work t o be done on t h e i r premises." TR. a t 5408. The philosophy behind t h i s s e c t i o n was expressed by delegate Dahood: "We allowed i n our b i l l of r i g h t s an amendment t o a c l e a n and healthy environment. By t h i s provision and t h i s amendment w e a r e going t o provide f o r t h e work- i n g man a s a f e environment. H o w does t h e law stand a t t h e moment? L e t m e t e l l you how it stands. And some of the b i g vested corporate i n t e r e s t s a r e now using independent c o n t r a c t o r s because i t ' s reduced t h e i r c o s t of operation. I f you have some p a r t i c u l a r tough job t h a t you want done on your premises where t h e r e may be some danger connected with it, what do you do, you go o u t and h i r e an independent c o n t r a c t o r . Don't have your employees i n t h a t dangerous a r e a be- cause i f t h e y ' r e h u r t o r i f t h e r e ' s an a c c i d e n t you have t o pay them Workmen's Compensation. So h e r e ' s t h e way you do it now t h a t w e have immunity from t h e Supreme Court----an immunity n e i t h e r intended by t h e people nor intended by the l e g i s l a t u r e . What you do, you h i r e someone on an independent c o n t r a c t o r b a s i s and t h e i r employees a r e i n t h i s dangerous area. You don' t have t o worry about s a f e t y anymore. You don' t have t o do anything t o make your premises safe. You d o n ' t have t o be concerned about a s a f e environment f o r t h e people who a r e working t h e r e t o b e n e f i t your i n t e r e s t . " TR. a t 5417. Since r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Constitution employees on a j o b s i t e a r e afforded t h e f u l l l e g a l r e d r e s s afforded a l l members of s o c i e t y except a s t o fellow employees and t h e i r immediate employer. The general c o n t r a c t o r c i t e s West v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. ( 9 t h C i r . 1971), 451 F.2d 493, f o r t h e proposition t h a t c o n t r a c t u a l d u t i e s assumed by a general c o n t r a c t o r a r e n o t owed t o t h e employees of a subcontractor. I n West, t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d U l m e n and held t h a t , although Montana recognized c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o be nondelegable, t h e b e n e f i t s of t h i s d o c t r i n e applied only t o t h i r d persons and d i d n o t apply t o employees of subcontractors. The holding i n West was made p r i o r t o adoption of Montana's new c o n s t i t u t i o n . Following r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Constitution such d i s t i n c t i o n s no longer e x i s t . The general c o n t r a c t o r , a s a r e s u l t of i t s c o n t r a c t with Yellowstone County, o r i g i n a l l y had c o n t r o l of job s a f e t y . This c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n could n o t be delegated. Ulmen v. Schwieger, supra. Therefore, t h e general c o n t r a c t o r remained i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l and t h e provisions of t h e Scaffolding Act apply. APPLICATION O F SAFE PLACE STATUTE: Appellant contends s e c t i o n 50-71-201, MCA, i s a p p l i c a b l e t o general c o n t r a c t o r s . The Montana Safe Place s t a t u t e s t a t e s : "Every employer s h a l l f u r n i s h a place of employment which i s s a f e f o r employees t h e r e i n and s h a l l f u r n i s h and use and r e q u i r e t h e use of such s a f e t y devices and safeguards and s h a l l adopt and use such p r a c t i c e s , means, methods, operations, and processes a s a r e reasonably adequate t o render t h e place of employment s a f e and s h a l l do every other thing reasonably nec- e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t t h e l i f e and s a f e t y of employees." This s t a t u t e was construed i n Shannon. There we held t h a t t h e term "employer" a s used i n s e c t i o n 50-71-201, MCA, embraces t h e term general c o n t r a c t o r thereby affording p r o t e c t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e t o employees of subcontractors. W e stopped s h o r t of holding the genera,- c o n t r a c t o r owed a nondelegable duty t o those same employees b u t affirmed t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s v e r d i c t on t h e b a s i s of a c t u a l c o n t r o l by t h e general c o n t r a c t o r . W e have here held t h a t the law of nondelegable duty i s a v a i l a b l e t o appellant. W e now r e a f f i r m our holding i n Shannon and hold t h a t t h e provisions of t h e " s a f e place t o work s t a t u t e " cover general c o n t r a c t o r s and t h a t t h e d u t i e s mandated by the s t a t u t e a r e owed t o employees of a subcon- t r a c t o r i f , a s here, t h e r e i s a nondelegable duty a r i s i n g o u t of c o n t r a c t . T H E WEIGHT O F O.S.H.A. REGULATIONS: I n t h i s case t h e subcontractor was c i t e d f o r v i o l a t i o n of O.S.H.A. r e g u l a t i o n s i n connection with t h e s u b j e c t scaffolding. Appellant contends t h a t such v i o l a t i o n s a r e admissible i n evidence and c o n s t i t u t e negligence per se. A v i o l a t i o n of a s t a t u t e o r ordinance intended t o p r o t e c t t h e p l a i n t i f f from t h e i n j u r y incurred is g e n e r a l l y held t o be negligence per s e . W. Prosser, Handbook of t h e Law of Torts, Section 36 a t 200 ( 4 t h ed. 1971). Custer Broadcasting Corporation v. Brewer (1974), 163 Mont. 51-9, 522, 518 P.2d 2571 259. J u r i s d i c t i o n s a r e divided on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a negligence per s e ru1.e f o r t h e v i o l a t i o n of a r e g u l a t i o n . The general r u l e has been t o consider t h e v i o l a t i o n a s merely evidence of negligence. Kell-ey v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co. (1978), 90 Wash.2d 323, 582 P.2d 500, held t h a t v i o l a t i o n of a p p l i c a b l e O.S.H.A. r e g u l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d negligence per se. W e d e c l i n e t o hold such v i o l a t i o n s t o be negligence per s e . Rather such v i o l a t i o n s may be considered by t h e trier of f a c t a s evidence of negligence. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: The general c o n t r a c t o r argues a p p e l l a n t was n e g l i g e n t a s a matter of law. This a c t i o n a r o s e p r i o r t o t h e adoption of comparative negligence. The record i s n o t f u l l y developed on t h e i s s u e of con- t r i b u t o r y negligence. There i s evidence t h a t a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t c o n s t r u c t the f a u l t y scaffolding. Further, a p p e l l a n t e i t h e r performed h i s work o r r i s k e d being terminated. Under these circumstances he i s n o t c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent a s a matter of law. Shannon a t 4 4 0 , 4 4 1 . CONCLUSION: I n summary we hold (1) t h e general c o n t r a c t o r , Kober Construction, had a nondelegable duty t o comply with t h e provisions of i t s c o n t r a c t with Yellowstone County; ( 2 ) t h e provisions of t h e Scaffolding Act, s e c t i o n 50-77-101, MCA, and t h e Safe Place s t a t u t e , 50-71-201, MCA, a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e general c o n t r a c t o r who remained i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l under t h e d o c t r i n e of nondelegable duty; ( 3 ) O.S.H.A. regula- t i o n s , and t h e v i o l a t i o n thereof, a r e only evidence of negligence; and ( 4 ) a p p e l l a n t was n o t g u i l t y of contributory negligence a s a matter of law. The D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n granting summary judgment i n favor of Kober Construction. The case i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t r i a l under t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s enunciated herein. C .f W e concur: w ( 2 ~ a u7 Justices