Title: Plummer v. R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 482, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ELIZABETH PLUMMER, 
§ 
Individually and as Executrix 
§ 
 
of the Estate of EDMOND 
§  
 
PLUMMER, SR. deceased and 
§ 
 
EDMOND PLUMMER, JR., JOHN 
§ 
No. 482, 2011 
PLUMMER, and JAMES PLUMMER 
§ 
 
as Surviving Children of EDMOND 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
PLUMMER, SR., deceased, 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
§  
for New Castle County 
 
Appellants, 
§ 
 
Plaintiffs Below- 
§  
C.A. No. 08C-08-247 
v. 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
R.T. VANDERBILT COMPANY, INC., § 
  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 7, 2012 
Decided:  July 19, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  DISMISSED. 
 
Robert Jacobs, Esquire (argued) of Jacobs & Crumplar P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
Jeffrey M. Weiner, Esquire of the Law Offices of Jeffrey Weiner, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Robert Jacobs, Esquire. 
 
Joseph S. Naylor, Esquire (argued) of Swartz Campbell LLC, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
2 
 
Plaintiffs-Below/Appellants Elizabeth, Edmond, John and James Plummer 
(collectively, the “Plummers”), filed an appeal from a Superior Court order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Below/Appellee R.T. 
Vanderbilt Co., Inc. (“Vanderbilt”).  Vanderbilt has moved to dismiss the 
Plummers’ appeal as untimely.  Vanderbilt takes the position that the Superior 
Court’s June 28, 2011 dismissal order (the “June 28 Order”) was the final order in 
the matter below.  Thus, Vanderbilt contends, the Plummers’ notice of appeal filed 
on September 6, 2011 was untimely under Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i).1  
Vanderbilt argues in the alternative that if the June 28 Order is not the final order, 
the appeal is interlocutory and any appeal must await entry of a final order.  
The Plummers contend that their appeal is timely and not interlocutory 
because the Special Master’s August 9, 2011 order dismissing nine defendants (the 
“August 9 Order”), and not the June 28 Order, constituted the final order.  The 
Plummers contend that under accepted Superior Court practice, the June 28 Order 
was not understood to be final. 
We conclude that the June 28 Order was the only final order in this case and 
that no court error contributed to the Plummers’ delayed filing of this appeal.  
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(i) (requiring appeal “[w]ithin 30 days after entry upon the docket of a 
judgment, order or decree from which the appeal is taken in a civil case”). 
3 
 
Accordingly, we dismiss the Plummers’ appeal as untimely under Supreme Court 
Rule 29(b).2   
Facts and Procedural History 
Edward Plummer, deceased, was an employee at the Avisun / Amoco Plant. 
The Plummers brought suit against Vanderbilt and thirty-six other defendants 
alleging that the decedent had been exposed to asbestos-containing products during 
the course of his employment.   
Vanderbilt moved for summary judgment.  The Superior Court entered an 
order granting the motion on January 20, 2011, immediately following oral 
argument.  On February 4, a judicial action form was issued reflecting the Superior 
Court’s decision.  Vanderbilt’s claims against several other defendants remained 
pending.  The case did not proceed to trial, however, because the Plummers 
notified the Superior Court that a settlement had been reached.  On May 17, 2011, 
the Prothonotary advised the Plummers’ counsel, Thomas Crumplar and Robert 
Jacobs, Esquires (collectively, “Plaintiffs’ Counsel”), that the parties had settled 
and that the case would be dismissed in thirty days if no information was provided 
as to why the case should not be dismissed.  After not hearing from Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel, the Superior Court entered the June 28 Order dismissing the case.  The 
                                          
 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 29(b) (providing for dismissal upon motion for untimely filing of an appeal). 
4 
 
Superior Court also designated the case “closed” on the LexisNexis File & Serve 
system.  
Nine defendants involved in this case and in related cases, not including 
Vanderbilt, also filed an “Omnibus Motion to Dismiss All Claims.”  The omnibus 
motion to dismiss was re-noticed and e-filed the same day as the June 28 Order of 
a Superior Court judge.  On August 9, 2011, the Special Master signed an order 
granting the omnibus motion to dismiss (the “August 9 Order”), apparently without 
knowledge of the earlier June 28 Order.  The Plummers filed a proposed form of 
final order, which the Superior Court did not rule upon.  The Plummers then filed a 
Notice of Appeal with this Court on September 6, 2011, referring to the Special 
Master’s August 9 Order as the final order from which the appeal was being taken. 
Relying on the June 28 Order as the final order, Vanderbilt moved to dismiss 
the Plummers’ appeal as untimely.  This Court remanded the case to the Superior 
Court for clarification of whether a final order had been issued and, if so, when that 
order was issued.  The Superior Court responded that the June 28 Order is the final 
order in this case. 
Following the Superior Court’s return of this matter from remand, the parties 
filed supplemental memoranda.  The Plummers argued that the Superior Court’s 
June 28 Order did not follow longstanding practice: 
If prior practice and custom had been followed, nothing would 
have been entered until all of the stipulations of dismissal were 
5 
 
filed for all Defendants.  As indicated even where summary 
judgment was orally granted it has been a practice to have such 
cases dismissed later on the “omnibus” motion calendar.  
That argument caused this Court to remand the case to the Superior Court for a 
second time.  We requested clarification from the Superior Court on the following 
questions:   
a. Is there a specific procedure currently in place in the 
Superior Court for dismissal of multiple defendants and the 
issuance of final, appealable orders in asbestos litigation; 
b. If so, what is the procedure and when was it instituted; 
c. Does this procedure deviate from prior practice in asbestos 
litigation; 
d. How specifically does it deviate from prior practice; and  
e. Were asbestos counsel notified of the change in practice and 
by what means were they notified. 
In response, the Superior Court informed this Court of the current procedure used 
since January 2007: 
a. Yes, there is a specific procedure in place for the dismissal 
of multiple defendants and the issuance of final, appealable 
Orders in asbestos litigation. 
b. The procedure was instituted in January 2007 and is as just 
described. 
c. The procedure does not deviate from practice as it has been 
conducted since January 2007 and the history and reasons 
for the change are outlined above. 
d. The practice employed here has been the same since January 
2007 and has not been modified since. 
6 
 
e. Asbestos counsel, including Jacobs and Crumplar, were 
notified in 2006 of the change, were invited to participate in 
a hearing before the change was implemented, participated 
at the hearing, and have been operating under this procedure 
for more than five years without objection until the issue of 
the timeliness of this appeal was presented. 
The Superior Court reported that, under the new procedure, when the parties 
notify the Superior Court of a settlement, the Superior Court takes no action until 
thirty days after the date the case was scheduled for trial.  After those thirty days 
elapse, the Prothonotary issues a letter advising the parties that an order dismissing 
the case will be issued in another thirty days.  This process gives the parties a total 
of sixty days during which to act to prevent dismissal.  A party seeking to prevent 
dismissal must show good cause as to why a dismissal is inappropriate.  A standard 
dismissal order includes a provision that the case may be reopened to enforce the 
settlement or to pursue claims after bankruptcy.  
After return of the matter from the second remand, this Court heard oral 
argument.  This is the Court’s decision on Vanderbilt’s motion to dismiss.  
Analysis 
 
 Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i) provides that a civil appeal must be filed within 
thirty days of the entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken.3  Time is a 
jurisdictional requirement.4  Unless the appellant can demonstrate that failure to 
                                          
 
3 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(i); ); 10 Del. C. § 148. 
4 Scott v. Draper, 371 A.2d 1073, 1073–74 (Del. 1977) (“Perfection of the appeal within the 
statutory period is a necessary condition to this Court’s jurisdiction”). 
7 
 
file a timely appeal is attributable to court-related personnel, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the matter.5 
This Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Superior Court in civil 
cases is limited to appeals from final judgments, unless an interlocutory appeal is 
taken and accepted under Supreme Court Rule 42.6  The question of whether an 
opinion embodies a final decision depends on “whether the judge has or has not 
clearly declared his intention in this respect in his opinion.”7  If the language of the 
judgment evidences the judge’s intention that the judgment be final, then the 
judgment is final.8  “When a civil action involves multiple claims and multiple 
parties, a judgment regarding any claim or any party does not become final until 
the entry of the last judgment that resolves all claims as to all parties, unless an 
interlocutory ruling . . . is certified pursuant to Superior Court Rule 54(b).”9   
The June 28 Order is clear on its face that it is a final order.  The caption 
lists Edmond Plummer’s name, and the case number associated with his matter.  It 
states: 
                                          
 
5 Giordano v. Marta, 723 A.2d 833, 834 (Del. 1998); Bey v. State, 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 
1979) (allowing a late appeal on the merits because default was related to court personnel); 10 
Del. C. § 148. 
6 Showell Poultry, Inc. v. Delmarva Poultry Corp., 146 A.2d 794, 795 (Del. 1958); Julian v. 
State, 440 A.2d 990, 991 (Del. 1982); Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42. 
7 J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., 303 A.2d 648, 650 (Del. 1973) 
(quoting United States v. F. & m. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232 (1958)).  
8 Id.  
9 Harrison v. Ramunno, 730 A.2d 653, 653–54 (Del. 1999); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(b). 
8 
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED . . . the above captioned cases are 
hereby DISMISSED; however upon motion and upon a 
showing of good cause, each of the cases may be reopened for 
the limited purpose of pursuing applications to enforce 
settlement agreements or pursuing state law claims upon the 
conclusion of any bankruptcy related matters. 
The May 17 letter preceding the dismissal also clearly notified Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
that the case would be dismissed the following month if no further action was 
taken.  If there was any ambiguity as to the May 17 letter or the June 28 Order, 
Plaintiffs’ Counsel could have requested clarification from the Superior Court.  
Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not do so.10   
The June 28 Order was also the only final order from which the Plummers 
could have appealed in this case.  The August 9 Order entered by the Special 
Master was not a final order by a Superior Court judge.  In Delaware, the exercise 
of judicial authority is limited to persons who have been appointed by the 
Governor and confirmed by the Senate.11  Case-dispositive decisions are inherently 
judicial;12 the dismissal of a matter is thus an exercise of judicial authority.  A 
Superior Court judge did not act on the Plummers’ subsequently-filed proposed 
final order form or otherwise confirm and adopt the dismissal entered by the 
                                          
 
10 Because we hold that the June 28 Order was a final order, we need not consider whether the 
appeal is interlocutory. 
11 State v. Wilson, 545 A.2d 1178, 1184 (Del. 1988) (citing Del. Const. Art. IV, §§ 1, 3). 
12 See Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1178 (Del. Super. 1981) (“Constitutionally, the essence of 
judicial power is the final authority to render and enforce a judgment.”); cf. In re Asbestos 
Litigation, 623 A.2d 546, 549 (Del. Super. 1992) (noting that master’s pre-trial, non-dispositive 
decisions “do not represent the employment of judicial power,” but that “[d]ecisions which are 
case-dispositive are inherently judicial”).  
9 
 
Special Master.13  Absent such judicial action, there was no final order from which 
the Plummers could have appealed, except the June 28 Order.    
Nor have the Plummers shown that their failure to file a timely appeal was 
attributable to court personnel.  The Plummers argue that nine defendants moving 
for dismissal evidenced confusion among the parties as to the effect of the June 28 
Order.  But the Superior Court followed its established procedure in asbestos cases 
by issuing the May 17 letter followed by the June 28 Order.  By the time the 
Special Master acted on August 9, the Plummers’ thirty-day window to file an 
appeal had closed.  Thus, even if the Plummers could show error attributable to 
court personnel in connection with the August 9 Order, that error is irrelevant.  It is 
the appeal of the final order entered on June 28 that matters, and that appeal is out 
of time. 
                                          
 
13 See Wilson, 545 A.2d at 1184 (“[A] master has no independent power of adjudication. In this 
respect a master’s authority is comparable to that of a court-appointed referee whose limited role 
has been authoritatively described: ‘Without confirmation and adoption by the court, the acts of 
the referee have no force or validity whatever, and nothing can terminate with or by his decision, 
the entire proceeding being an exercise of judicial power by the court.’”) (quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d, 
References § 1 (1973)); accord Redden v. McGill, 549 A.2d 695 (Del. 1988) (holding that 
“[f]indings and recommendations of masters which have not been subject to meaningful judicial 
review, including approval or disapproval with the reasons therefore, are not deemed final 
judgments of the Family Court” and thus will not be accepted by Court for review); A.L.W. v. 
J.H.W., 416 A.2d 708, 712 (Del. 1980) (holding Master of the Family Court did not have 
authority to enter a “judgment” and thus did not have authority to enter final decree of divorce). 
10 
 
Conclusion 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the June 28 Order of 
dismissal.  Appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely is GRANTED 
and this appeal is DISMISSED.