Title: Burlile v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002003
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN BURLILE 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002003 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 20, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding the trial court, the Circuit Court for the City 
of Richmond, properly refused to instruct the jury that in order 
to convict a defendant of capital murder in “[t]he willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person 
within a three-year period” in violation of Code § 18.2-31(8), 
it is necessary that the jury find the defendant was a principal 
in the first degree, or “triggerman,” in each killing at issue. 
BACKGROUND 
Because our review is limited to a single, narrow issue, a 
succinct statement of the facts surrounding the charged crimes 
in this case, presented in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth as the party prevailing below, will suffice.  
Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 108, 532 S.E.2d 629, 630 
(2000).  For reasons that will become apparent, the procedural 
background will be related in some detail. 
On December 1, 1997, Christopher Allen Burlile was indicted 
on two capital murder charges for the killing of Richard Harris, 
Jr. and Chakeisha Carter.  The indictments, F-97-3771 and F-97-
3772, charged that the killings of Harris and Carter were part 
of the same act or transaction in violation of Code § 18.2-
31(7).  On July 6, 1998, the Commonwealth obtained two 
additional indictments charging Burlile with capital murder 
arising from the same killings in violation of Code § 18.2-
31(8): 
 
F-98-2676 . . . On or about October 15, 1997, in 
the City of Richmond, CHRISTOPHER ALLEN BURLILE did 
feloniously, unlawfully, willfully, deliberately and 
with premeditation kill and murder one Chakeisha 
Carter and within a three (3) year period, did kill 
and murder another, namely: Richard Harris Jr. 
 
 
F-98-2677 . . . On or about October 14, 1997, in 
the City of Richmond, CHRISTOPHER ALLEN BURLILE did 
feloniously, unlawfully, willfully, deliberately and 
with premeditation kill and murder one Richard Harris 
[Jr.] and within a three (3) year period, did kill and 
murder another, namely: Chakeisha Carter. 
 
At trial, the evidence established that Dawn Harper, 
Harris’s girlfriend, saw Burlile shoot Harris with a shotgun on 
the evening of October 14, 1997.  Harris died as a result of his 
wounds.  Harper testified that Burlile was accompanied by 
another man at the time of the shooting. 
Later that night, Burlile and an accomplice broke into the 
Carter home.  Chakeisha Carter was shot with a shotgun and died 
as a result of her wounds.  Shotgun shells recovered at the 
scene matched the shells recovered at the Harris murder scene. 
 
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Chakeisha’s mother, Charlene Carter, and Chakeisha’s 
brother, Shea Carter, were also wounded by shotgun blasts during 
the break-in at the Carter home.  Charlene Carter testified that 
she did not know who shot her daughter, but identified Burlile 
as the assailant who fired the shots that wounded her and Shea.  
Shea did not see who fired the shots that injured him and his 
mother or the shot that killed his sister, but testified that he 
heard two unfamiliar voices in the home prior to the shootings. 
At the conclusion of the evidence in the guilt-
determination phase of a bifurcated trial, Burlile requested 
that the trial court give his instruction A, which directed the 
jury that “[t]o find the defendant guilty of capital murder, you 
must find that he was the triggerman in two murders.”  Although 
the instruction failed to identify the theory of capital murder 
to which Burlile intended it to apply, the context of the 
colloquy between the trial court, counsel for Burlile, and 
counsel for the Commonwealth makes clear that the instruction 
was addressed to the charges of capital murder in violation of 
Code § 18.2-31(8) only. 
The Commonwealth objected to instruction A, asserting that 
Code § 18.2-31(8) required only that the defendant have 
committed a murder within three years of the killing for which a 
conviction for capital murder was sought.  Burlile’s counsel 
responded, “Judge, it’s our position that the reasoning or logic 
 
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of the case law requires another instance of capital murder, 
only the triggerman can be guilty of capital murder.” 
The trial court refused Burlile’s instruction A and instead 
gave Commonwealth’s instruction 28, which provides that: 
To find the defendant guilty of capital murder, 
you must find that he was the triggerman in at least 
one of the murders.  In the second murder, you may 
find that he was the triggerman or a princip[al] in 
the second degree. 
 
Burlile objected to this instruction “[i]n view of the 
instruction earlier that we offered that was refused.” 
Prior to jury deliberation and upon the joint motion of the 
Commonwealth and Burlile’s counsel, the trial court “combined 
for one transaction” indictments F-98-2676 and F-98-2677 to 
charge Burlile with “the capital murder of Chakeisha Carter and 
Richard Harris, Jr.” in violation of Code § 18.2-31(8).  
Indictments F-97-3771 and F-97-3772 similarly were “combined for 
one transaction” to charge Burlile with “the capital murder of 
Chakeisha Carter and Richard Harris, Jr.” in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(7).  The jury found Burlile guilty of each combined 
capital murder charge and, in the subsequent penalty-
determination phase of the trial, recommended a sentence of life 
imprisonment for each combined capital murder charge.  On 
January 7, 1999, the trial court sentenced Burlile in accord 
with the jury’s recommendation. 
 
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Burlile filed a petition for appeal in the Court of 
Appeals, presenting three questions for review.  Two of the 
issues raised related to the admission of evidence concerning 
Burlile’s activities as a drug dealer and the trial court’s 
refusal to require the Commonwealth to present for an in camera 
review elements of the police investigation file that Burlile 
contended might contain exculpatory evidence.  The remaining 
issue addressed the trial court’s failure to give instruction A.  
Burlile did not directly appeal his conviction for capital 
murder in violation of Code § 18.2-31(7). 
By order entered September 28, 1999, a panel of the Court 
of Appeals awarded Burlile an appeal, framing the sole issue to 
be addressed as follows: 
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury “[t]o find the defendant guilty of capital 
murder, you must find that he was the triggerman in at 
least one of the murders.  In the second murder, you 
may find that he was the triggerman or a princip[al] 
in the second degree.” 
 
In his opening brief in the Court of Appeals, Burlile 
asserted that the language of Code § 18.2-31(8) was ambiguous 
and should be construed strictly against the Commonwealth.  
Asserting the rationale of Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 
367, 330 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1985), Burlile contended that “[t]he 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one 
person within a three-year period” defining capital murder under 
 
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Code § 18.2-31(8) should be interpreted as requiring that each 
killing qualify individually as a capital murder.  Applying that 
interpretation, Burlile, citing Harrison v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 188, 191, 257 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1979), argued that since 
“only the triggerman can be convicted for capital murder . . . 
[Burlile] must be the triggerman for both murders” in order to 
be found guilty under Code § 18.2-31(8). 
Stating that it was addressing “the narrow issue raised in 
this appeal . . . whether Code § 18.2-31(8) requires proof that 
the defendant was the triggerman in the two killings alleged,” 
the Court of Appeals rejected Burlile’s assertion and affirmed 
his conviction.  Burlile v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 796, 800, 
531 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2000).  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court of Appeals relied upon Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 
487, 492, 464 S.E.2d 128, 130, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 
(1995), and held, in a construction similar to our construction 
of Code § 18.2-31(7) in that case, that Code § 18.2-31(8) should 
be construed as requiring “proof that the defendant was the 
triggerman ‘in the principal murder charged’ and at least an 
accomplice in another killing within a three-year period.”  
Burlile, 32 Va. App. at 802, 531 S.E.2d at 29. 
Although Burlile had not presented argument addressing the 
issue, the Court of Appeals then went on to note that 
“[a]lthough the jury instruction [28], as given, failed to 
 
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include the exact language from Graham [that the defendant must 
be the triggerman in the principal murder charged], any error 
would be harmless.”  The Court reasoned that this was so because 
“[t]he jury’s verdict form clearly identified the principal 
murder charged to be that of Richard Harris and the second 
murder within three-years to be that of Chakeisha Carter,” and 
credible evidence in the record supported a finding that Burlile 
“was the triggerman in the killing of Harris.”  Id.  In a 
footnote, the Court quoted the “verdict form” as stating that 
Burlile “did kill Richard Harris, Jr., and, within a three-year 
period, did kill Chakeisha Carter.”  Id. at 802 n.3, 531 S.E.2d 
at 29 n.3. 
Burlile filed a petition for appeal in this Court for 
review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reasserting the 
evidentiary and discovery issues for which an appeal had been 
denied in the Court of Appeals, and making the following 
assignment of error with respect to the issue for which an 
appeal had been granted below: 
 
The Circuit Court erred in not granting a jury 
instruction requiring the defendant to be a principal 
in the first degree in both homicides in order for the 
murder of two or more persons in a three-year period 
to be capital murder. 
 
By order dated December 1, 2000, we awarded Burlile an appeal 
limited to the issue raised in this assignment of error. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
Before addressing the issue raised by Burlile’s assignment 
of error, we are compelled by the particular circumstances of 
this case to clarify the procedural posture that limits our 
review to that issue.  This is necessary in order to avoid the 
appearance that our resolution of this appeal has a broader 
scope than is intended. 
Rule 5:17(c), in relevant part, states that “[w]here appeal 
is taken from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, only 
assignments of error relating to questions presented in, or to 
actions taken by, the Court of Appeals may be included in the 
petition for appeal to this Court.”  Moreover, Rule 5:25 permits 
us to consider as reversible error only a ruling of the trial 
court for which an “objection was stated with reasonable 
certainty at the time of the ruling.” 
In awarding an appeal to Burlile, the Court of Appeals 
chose to depart from the question presented by Burlile regarding 
the refusal of instruction A, and to consider instead the 
efficacy of instruction 28.  As a result, the Court of Appeals, 
without argument on the issue by Burlile, necessarily also 
considered the issue whether it was error that instruction 28 
did not require the jury to find that Burlile was the triggerman 
in the “principal murder charged” while identifying that murder 
as the killing of Harris.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that 
 
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any error resulting from this deficiency was harmless because 
the “verdict form” clearly identified Harris as the principal 
murder victim with language that Burlile “did kill Richard 
Harris, Jr., and, within a three year period, did kill Chakeisha 
Carter . . . .”  However, the form the Court of Appeals 
references in its opinion is not the verdict form used by the 
jury in the guilt-determination phase of the trial, but, rather, 
the form used by the jury in the sentencing phase to render its 
recommendation on punishment.  The verdict form used in the 
guilt-determination phase simply stated: “We, the jury, find 
[Burlile] guilty of the capital murder of Chakeisha Carter and 
Richard Harris, Jr.” 
In the opening brief filed in this Court, apparently 
drawing on the willingness of the Court of Appeals to examine 
the issue, for the first time Burlile asserts error based upon 
the contention that “[u]nder the instructions given in this 
case, Burlile could be convicted of capital murder if some 
jurors believed he shot Harris but not Carter and other jurors 
believed he shot Carter but not Harris.”  During oral argument 
in this Court, however, appellate counsel for Burlile properly 
conceded that no objection to the failure of instruction 28 to 
require the jury to find that Burlile was the triggerman in the 
“principal murder charged” or to identify Harris as the victim 
 
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of that murder was raised in the trial court, nor did Burlile 
proffer an instruction that would have addressed this issue. 
By addressing his assignment of error to the denial of 
instruction A, which was the “question [originally] presented in 
. . . the Court of Appeals,” Burlile has limited his appeal to 
that issue and has not brought before this Court the “actions 
taken by[] the Court of Appeals” in addressing the alleged 
deficiency of instruction 28.  Accordingly, we express no 
opinion on the view taken by the Court of Appeals that any error 
regarding instruction 28 would have been harmless. 
Moreover, as he did at trial and in the Court of Appeals, 
Burlile limits his argument in this appeal to the application of 
instruction A to the charges under Code § 18.2-31(8).  
Accordingly, Burlile’s conviction for the “combined” capital 
murder under the provisions of Code § 18.2-31(7) and how the 
instructions given or refused might relate to that offense are 
also not at issue in this appeal. 
Similarly, by joining in the motion to “combine” the 
indictments under each theory of capital murder into a single 
charge, Burlile has waived any objection that might arise from 
that unorthodox procedure and any resulting confusion as to 
which victim’s death was the “principal murder charged.”  Nor 
are we concerned with the question whether the legislature would 
have intended for subsections (7) and (8) of Code § 18.2-31 to 
 
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be mutually exclusive theories of capital murder, although it is 
self-evident that the killing of more than one person as part of 
the same act or transaction would of necessity also constitute 
the killing of more than one person within a three-year period. 
The foregoing discussion explains why our review is limited 
to a narrow issue in this case.  We now turn to that issue which 
is whether when a defendant is charged with capital murder in 
“[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more 
than one person within a three-year period” in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(8), the jury should be instructed that it must find 
the defendant was a principal in the first degree, or 
“triggerman,” in each killing at issue.  That issue was fairly 
raised by Burlile’s instruction A and the assignment of error 
with respect to it. 
Code § 18.2-31 defines the offenses involving the willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person that may be 
punished as capital murder.  In some instances, the legislature 
has determined that the status of a defendant will elevate a 
first-degree murder to capital murder.  See, e.g., Code § 18.2-
31(3) (murder by a “prisoner confined in a state or local 
correctional facility” is capital murder).  Similarly, the 
legislature has determined that the status of the victim may 
warrant elevating a first-degree murder to capital murder.  See, 
 
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e.g., Code § 18.2-31(6) (murder of a law-enforcement officer is 
capital murder). 
In contrast to the “status” focus of those offenses of 
capital murder, the legislature has also defined other capital 
murder offenses where the language of the particular subsection 
“evidences a legislative determination that the described 
offense is qualitatively more egregious than an isolated act of 
premeditated murder.”  Graham, 250 Va. at 491, 464 S.E.2d at 
130.  “This result is accomplished by the addition of a 
gradation crime to the single act of premeditated murder.”  Id.; 
see, e.g., Code § 18.2-31(1) (murder during the commission of 
abduction for pecuniary gain or with intent to defile is capital 
murder). 
Burlile contends, as he did in the Court of Appeals, that 
the language of Code § 18.2-31(8) is ambiguous because the 
phrase “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” appears to relate 
to both the principal murder charged and the gradation crime on 
which the elevation to capital murder is based.  Accordingly, 
Burlile asserts that this statute must be construed against the 
Commonwealth as requiring the defendant to be a principal in the 
first degree, or the triggerman, in both the principal murder 
charged and the killing that constitutes the gradation crime. 
Burlile further asserts that this construction is also 
supported by consideration of a distinction that may be drawn 
 
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between the nature of the offense defined under Code § 18.2-
31(8) and other capital murder offenses defined by gradation 
crimes.  Burlile concedes that when there is a transactional 
nexus between the murder charged and the gradation crime, such 
as multiple murders as part of the same act or transaction or 
where the gradation crime is abduction, robbery, or rape, the 
defendant need not be a principal in the first degree with 
respect to the gradation crime.  He asserts, however, that in 
the absence of an unambiguous expression of legislative intent 
to the contrary, the gradation crime under Code § 18.2-31(8) 
should be one involving the defendant as a principal in the 
first degree because there is no requirement that there be a 
transactional nexus between the principal murder charged and the 
gradation crime.  In effect, Burlile’s position is that Code 
§ 18.2-31(8) should be viewed as a “status” offense where the 
defendant’s status is that of being the principal in the first 
degree, or the triggerman, in more than one murder within a 
three-year period.  We disagree. 
In Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 573, 273 S.E.2d 57, 
63 (1980), we held that with respect to capital murder offenses 
that included a gradation crime, Code § 18.2-31 does not require 
proof that a defendant charged with the capital murder was also 
a principal in the first degree to the gradation crime.  
Applying the rationale of Briley to Code § 18.2-31(7), we 
 
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subsequently held that the defendant’s culpability for the 
gradation crime of that subsection need only be that of “an 
accomplice in the murder of an additional person or persons as 
part of the same act or transaction.”  Graham, 250 Va. at 492, 
464 S.E.2d at 130. 
With respect to Code § 18.2-31(7), the gradation crime is 
the defendant’s killing of more than one person as part of the 
same act or transaction.  With respect to Code § 18.2-31(8), the 
gradation crime is the defendant’s killing of more than one 
person within a three-year period.  There is nothing ambiguous 
in the wording of either of these subsections and in neither 
instance does the language suggest a legislative intent that the 
defendant must be a principal in the first degree to both the 
principal murder charged and the gradation crime that supports 
the elevation of that murder to capital murder.  To the 
contrary, to support the construction given to Code § 18.2-31(8) 
by Burlile, we would have to insert language to the effect that 
the gradation crime is the defendant’s killing of more than one 
person within a three-year period as a principal in the first 
degree.  Courts are not permitted to add language to a statute 
nor are they “permitted to accomplish the same result by 
judicial interpretation.”  Harbor Cruises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
217 Va. 458, 461, 230 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1976). 
 
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We hold that Code § 18.2-31(8) does not require proof that 
a defendant charged with capital murder, in the premeditated 
killing of more than one person within a three-year period, was 
a principal in the first degree in each murder referenced in the 
indictment.  Accordingly, we further hold that the jury need be 
instructed only that they must find the defendant was a 
principal in the first degree, or triggerman, in the principal 
murder charged and that he was at least an accomplice in the 
murder of one or more persons other than the victim within a 
three-year period.  Thus, the trial court did not err in 
refusing Burlile’s instruction A. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, and limiting our review to the issue 
preserved below and raised by assignment of error in this 
appeal, we will affirm Burlile’s conviction for capital murder 
under Code § 18.2-31(8). 
Affirmed. 
 
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