Title: Roberts v. Love
Citation: 333 S.W.2d 897
Docket Number: 5-2072
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 1960

333 S.W.2d 897 (1960) Paul K. ROBERTS, Appellant, v. W. L. LOVE et al., Appellees. No. 5-2072. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 28, 1960. Rehearing Denied May 2, 1960. *898 B. Ball, Warren, for appellant. Philip E. Dixon, Warren, Duval L. Purkins, Lake Village, for appellees. HARRIS, Chief Justice. On March 3, 1959, appellant, a practicing attorney of Warren, Arkansas, was notified by a deputy sheriff of Bradley County that Circuit Judge G. B. Colvin, Jr., had requested Roberts to appear at the courthouse. Upon arriving at the courthouse, appellant found that the Circuit Court was in session, and that A. C. Duncan, a Negro, was charged by information with the crime of assault with intent to rape, the charge relating to the alleged attempt to rape a white high school girl. Judge Colvin appointed appellant to defend the Negro. After talking to the defendant in a private consultation room, appellant returned to the courtroom, and observed that a representative of the local newspaper, "The Eagle Democrat", had obtained permission from the court to take pictures. Appellant objected to the taking of pictures, and the court withdrew its permission. Upon being asked to enter a plea, Roberts moved that the court commit the defendant to the State Hospital for thirty days observation.[1] Following remarks, hereinafter set out, by the prosecuting attorney and judge, the motion was granted. On March 5th, in its regular weekly edition, the following story (one column width) relative to the proceedings in the courtroom, appeared in the Eagle Democrat: On September 12th, appellant instituted suit against appellees for libel, alleging that the story was libelous, being partly false, and the true portions "slanted" to convey the impression that he was insincere in his defense, and had endeavored to defeat justice by trickery; that the publication was maliciously made in an effort to damage appellant's professional standing, and that he had been damaged in his reputation, and had suffered great loss of business by reason of said publication. Compensatory damages were sought in the amount of $250,000, and a like amount was asked for punitive damages Appellees demurred to the complaint, and subsequently moved that certain paragraphs of the complaint be stricken for the reason that said paragraphs were irrelevant, redundant, argumentative, and prejudicial. This motion was granted, the demurrer sustained, and the suit dismissed. From such judgment comes this appeal. Appellant first asserts that the Circuit Judge should have disqualified himself. Ark.Stats.Anno., § 28-604 (1947), provides: We have held that a judge cannot testify for the state in a criminal case pending before him, Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29 S.W. 894, 31 L.R.A. 465, but whether a chancellor is disqualified to hear a case in which he is called to testify, is a matter within his discretion. Fidelity &amp; Deposit Co. v. Cunningham, 181 Ark. 954, 28 S.W.2d 715. Dean Ralph C. Barnhart of the University of Arkansas Law School, in an article, "Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege", 4 Ark.Law Review, 377 (1950), discusses the matter of determining whether a judge should disqualify himself in situations where he will be called to testify. At page 389 of the article, it is stated: In the case before us, such a situation does not actually arise, for here the judge was not called to testify, nor was any jury impaneled; rather, the litigation was disposed of by demurrer, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge passing upon the pleadings. While we think it immaterial in this litigation, we agree with appellant that the court erred in striking paragraphs 4 A, B, C, D, and E. The article, obviously, cannot be classed as libelous per se. Any alleged libel, therefore, required innuendo denoting the libelous sense in which the words were intended. As stated in 53 C. J.S. Libel and Slander § 162b 2 (a), p. 249: We therefore, in reaching our determination of whether the article was libelous, consider each averment in appellant's complaint. Appellant only alleges one statement in the article to be actually false; i. e., the opening phrase, "Through a legal technicality * * *." Appellant alleges as follows: Appellant states that because of the use of the term "legal technicality", which he alleges to be false, the complexion of the entire content of the article was changed. Appellant contends that the motion to send Duncan to the State Hospital for observation was a substantive right rather than a legal technicality. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd edition, defines the word "legal" as "of or pertaining to law; arising out of, or by virtue of, or included in law; based upon or governed by". Technicality is defined as "a particular which is technical, or peculiar to any trade, profession, sect, or the like, especially in terminology or method of procedure; as, medical and legal `technicalities'." It would therefore appear that a dictionary definition of "legal technicality" is simply "legal procedure." Appellant asserts, however, that the actual meaning of the term is not controlling, to which we agree, and that the applicable rule is found in Jackson v. Williams, 92 Ark. 486, 123 S.W. 751, 752, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 840, wherein we said: *901 Under this rule, appellant argues that the term legal technicality denotes to the public mind "chicanery"; implies that one prevails, not because of right, but rather through trickery; in other words, in the matter before us, that justice was thwarted by unfair methods. We do not agree with appellant that these words have that meaning to the general public. We are of the opinion that the term "legal technicality" connotes, to those unfamiliar with legal terms, the impression that the matter, or question passed on, was decided on grounds other than the merits of the case. By no stretch of the imagination can we visualize the words being understood to mean "to prevail by trickery or chicanery." Such a construction would, in our view, be unreasonable, and far removed from the plain and natural meaning of the term. Actually, it would appear that the motion made could properly be considered a legal technicality, inasmuch as the motion arose out of law, was governed by law, was peculiar to the legal profession, and is provided for under our procedure. In 40 Words and Phrases, p. 524, as relating to criminal law, substantive law is defined as "that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes punishment therefor." Procedural law is "that which provides or regulates the steps by which one who violates a criminal statute is punished." Substantive law is "that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion." Here, the two terms rather merge, for the right to an examination is included in substantive law, and the motion to obtain that right is a matter of procedure. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the contention, for even though the term be literally incorrect, we cannot agree that it carried with it the implications set out in appellant's complaint. It is not contended that paragraphs B, C, D, and E are false (in fact, appellant admitted in oral argument that all of the rest of the events reported in the article are correctly stated); it is only contended that the story was slanted and maliciously designed to defame appellant's reputation. Appellant's allegations from paragraph B through E, in full, are as follows: If the allegations in paragraph B constitute a cause of action, then libel is committed any time a newspaper reports that a white attorney represents a Negro in a criminal action. The assertion that the phrase stating that Roberts was appointed as the Negro's lawyer "was an attempt to infer that the attorney's character was similar to the alleged character of the Negro" transcends any reasonable interpretation that could be given the words, and the article plainly stated that Roberts was appointed. In quoting the remark of the prosecuting attorney in open court, the newspaper demonstrated its good faith by stating "Roberts assured the Court that he felt the Negro might be insane." Paragraphs D and E relate to a factual report of the proceedings, and we are unable to ascribe to this report the meaning, impression, or interpretation given it by appellant. Incidentally, photographers are not barred from courtrooms by law in this state; the prohibition arises under the Judicial Code of Ethics promulgated by the American Bar Association.[2] There are several defenses to a suit for libel, among them the conditional privilege accorded to newspaper reports of judicial proceedings. However, since we are of the view that the publication herein involved is not susceptible of a defamatory meaning, it is irrelevant whether the conditional privilege attaches, and we see no reason to discuss this defense. Likewise, though the factual report appearing in the article was admittedly true (except that appellant alleged the term "legal technicality" *903 to be false), our conclusions are not based upon that premise, for we do not say unequivocally or dogmatically that one can never be libeled by a statement, even though true. Rather, we determine this litigation on the basis of the fact that when this article is construed as a whole, considering the words in their plain and natural meaning, according to the sense in which they appear to have been used, and the ideas such words would convey to those who read themthe article is not libelous. In other words, the article is not susceptible of a defamatory meaning. We think the public is generally cognizant of the fact that attorneys are appointed to represent indigent prisoners. The story plainly states in the second paragraph that appellant was appointed as the Negro's lawyer. There is nothing in the article which even remotely indicates that Roberts sought this appointment or desired to represent the defendant. In view of public sentiment and the probable outraged feelings of the community toward a crime of this nature, we can readily understand appellant's sensitivity to the article; we daresay that numerous instances have arisen wherein people have been embarrassed by seeing their name in print, though no wrongful act had been committed, but under our system of government and its democratic processes, a free press is assured. Certainly, this is as it should be. As stated in Article II, Section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas: The article in question is not an abuse of this right. We deem it proper, in view of appellant's sincere feelings, to point out that in representing this defendant, he was only carrying out a duty imposed upon him by virtue of his profession, and as a member of the Bar of Arkansas. Canon IV of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides: We commend this attorney, as indeed any attorney should merit commendation, for his compliance with this Canon, which assures diligent representation to any prisoner, irrespective of the crime charged. The right of representation is fundamental to the American concept of justice. Here, Mr. Roberts, though apparently finding his duty distasteful, did not equivocate, nor seek to escape, from the responsibility assigned to him. No cause of action having been stated by the complaint, the judgment is affirmed. JOHNSON, Justice (dissenting). This case comes up after a demurrer to the complaint was sustained. It is the rule in Arkansas that allegations of a complaint are accepted as true on demurrer. Glenn v. Union Bank &amp; Trust Company, 150 Ark. 38, 233 S.W. 798. This being so, I am convinced the appellant raised a prima facie case and the evidence should have gone to the jury. After all, there is only one basic question here and that is the effect of the article on the plaintiff's reputation in the community. There are two ways to find this effect. One is from the evidence the plaintiff would have produced. The other is by giving certain meaning to words used in context as the majority has here. This second method is inexact, to say the least. I do not agree with the majority statement that this article could obviously not be *904 libelous per se. If the article is false and tends to injure the plaintiff's reputation and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or shame, it is libelous per se. Hall v. Binghampton Press Co., Sup., 29 N.Y.S.2d 760. The question of falsity in this case revolves around the use of the term "legal technicality". In arriving at a conclusion as to whether the defendants' use of the term was true or false under the circumstances I don't believe we should substitute a dictionary definition of the term for a jury finding. The plaintiff should have the benefit of any meaning ascribed to the phrase by his neighbors, and possible clients, in his community. Jackson v. Williams, 92 Ark. 486, 123 S.W. 751, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 840. The cause should be tried on its merits, not by this court as an appellate jury. For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. [1] Under the provisions of Initiated Act No. 3, adopted at the general election of 1936, Acts 1937, p. 1384. [2] The Code of Judicial Ethics was adopted by the State Judicial Council of Arkansas in September, 1958, and Section 35, pertinent hereto, reads as follows: "Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted. * * *" [3] Emphasis supplied.