Title: In re J.D.C.H.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 401A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 401A19  
Filed 25 September 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.D.C.H., J.L.C.H. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 
27 June 2019 by Judge Wayne S. Boyette in District Court, Nash County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 29 July 2020 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the 
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
No brief for petitioner-appellee mother. 
 
No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice.  
 
Respondent appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights 
to J.D.C.H. (Jed) and J.L.C.H. (Joel)1 on the ground of willful abandonment. We 
affirm.  
I. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
Petitioner and respondent were involved in an on-again, off-again relationship 
from 2010 through 2014 but never married. Joel was born in July 2011, and Jed was 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juveniles and for ease of reading.  
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born in May 2015. The parents ended their romantic involvement in 2014, shortly 
after petitioner found out she was pregnant with Jed. Respondent is also the father 
of three other children with different women.  
Respondent was initially involved in helping provide care for Joel after his 
birth. He regularly called to check on Joel and was a “good dad” when he was around. 
After Jed was born, however, respondent’s involvement became more sporadic. In the 
year after Jed’s birth, respondent saw the children on only a few occasions. He 
continued to call to check on the children, but his contact became progressively less 
frequent, and he last spoke with the children in September 2016. Jed never had an 
overnight visit with respondent.  
In July 2016, respondent had a four-hour unsupervised visit with the children 
at their paternal grandmother’s home. At that visit, petitioner and respondent agreed 
that respondent could see the children every other weekend if he would pay petitioner 
$200.00 per month in child support. However, respondent never paid any child 
support and did not ask to see the children after that visit. At the time of the 
termination hearing on 30 May 2019, respondent had not seen the children since the 
July 2016 visit.  
Petitioner met her now husband, Mr. H., and they married in December 2016. 
In March 2017, petitioner contacted respondent about changing the children’s last 
names to also include that of Mr. H., and respondent consented to the name change. 
Respondent signed the paperwork but did not show up at the courthouse to bring his 
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identification card, despite petitioner telling respondent that she would bring Joel to 
the courthouse with her so that petitioner could visit with him. Petitioner nonetheless 
was able to effectuate the name changes despite respondent’s absence.  
Respondent was incarcerated from October 2018 to 14 December 2018. The day 
he was released, respondent called petitioner and asked to see the children and stated 
that he wanted to resume his relationship with them. Petitioner denied respondent’s 
request to see the children.  
On 31 December 2018, petitioner filed petitions to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights in both children, alleging the grounds of willful failure to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of the children’s care and willful abandonment. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3), (7) (2019). Respondent filed a pro se, handwritten response 
to the petitions on 27 February 2019, and his attorney filed an answer to the petitions 
on 16 April 2019. At the 30 May 2019 termination hearing, the cases were 
consolidated for hearing and petitioner voluntarily dismissed the ground of willful 
failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children’s care. On 27 June 2019, 
the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights based on willful abandonment and that termination was 
in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent’s 
parental rights. Respondent appealed.  
II. 
Analysis 
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Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for terminating parental 
rights. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 
bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence 
of one or more grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1109(f). “If [the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed in section 7B-
1111 are present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court 
must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental 
rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing 
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110). 
“We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 ‘to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 
692, 695 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 
253 (1984)). “Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the evidence and 
are ‘binding on appeal.’ ” In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53, 839 S.E.2d 735, 738 (2020) 
(quoting In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2019)). “Moreover, we 
review only those [challenged] findings necessary to support the trial court’s 
determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” 
In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58–59 (2019) (citation omitted). “The 
trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 
373 N.C. at 19, 832 S.E.2d at 695 (citation omitted). 
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Respondent contends that the trial court erred by terminating his parental 
rights on the ground of willful abandonment. Specifically, he challenges several of the 
trial court’s findings of fact and argues that the findings and record evidence do not 
support the conclusion that he willfully abandoned the children. We disagree.  
A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights when “[t]he parent has 
willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition or motion.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 
“Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful 
determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the 
child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617 (citation omitted). “[I]f a parent 
withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, 
and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes 
all parental claims and abandons the child.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 
126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962) (citation omitted). “The willfulness of a parent’s actions is 
a question of fact for the trial court.” In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. at 53, 839 S.E.2d at 738 
(citing Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608). “[A]lthough the trial court may 
consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s 
credibility and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful 
abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition.” 
In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2019) (citation omitted).  
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Here, the determinative six-month period is from 30 June 2018 to 31 December 
2018. In support of its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights based on willful abandonment, the trial court made the following 
relevant findings of fact: 
22. 
The last face to face contact and visit the Respondent 
had with either Juvenile was on July 23, 2016, and lasted 
approximately four (4) hours. The Respondent has not been 
in the presence of either Juvenile for over two and one-half 
(2½) years and has not made any serious or sincere effort 
to participate in either Juvenile’s life during those two and 
one-half (2½) years. 
 
23. 
The last communication of any kind the Respondent 
had with the Petitioner to inquire about the welfare of the 
Juveniles was on September 22, 2016, with the exception 
of one text, Facebook message, or email request to visit in 
December of 2018, which was rebuffed by the Petitioner.  
 
24. 
Since September 22, 2016, the Respondent has 
failed to communicate with the Juveniles, with the 
exception of the abovesaid request to visit in December of 
2018, has not sent any letters to the Juveniles, has failed 
to call the Juveniles, has failed to provide any emotional, 
material or financial support to the Juveniles and has 
failed in any manner to perform his duties as a parent to 
the Juveniles. The Court does not consider any attempts by 
the Respondent’s mother inquiring as to the welfare of the 
Juveniles as attributable to the Respondent himself for the 
purposes of this action. 
 
25. 
The Respondent has failed to provide any consistent 
financial or material support for the use and benefit of the 
Juveniles since their birth. 
 
26. 
The Respondent, as a natural father of both 
Juveniles, has willfully abandoned the Juveniles for at 
least six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the 
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filing of these Petitions for Termination of Parental Rights 
pursuant to the provisions of [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-1111(7). 
 
27. 
The Respondent contends that his failure to visit 
with both Juveniles, to have any contact with them, or to 
attempt to have any contact with them was due to his lack 
of finances, lack of transportation, lack of his maturity 
level, and resistance of the Petitioner. The [trial c]ourt 
finds, however, by clear, cogent and convincing evidence 
that the actions and omissions of the Respondent 
constitute conduct by him manifesting a willful intent to 
forego all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish 
all his parental claims to both Juveniles.  
 
28. 
The Respondent has not been prohibited from 
contacting the Juveniles due to sickness, incarceration, or 
any other valid reason.  
 
29. 
The Respondent’s actions and/or omissions and 
failures to act for the two and one-half (2½) years prior to 
the filing of the Petitions, are wholly inconsistent with his 
stated desire to maintain custody or a relationship with the 
Juveniles. 
 
30. 
The Respondent’s actions and/or omissions and 
failures to act for the two and one-half (2½) years prior to 
the filing of the Petitions, constitute willful neglect and a 
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of 
parental care and support.  
  
31. 
For the two and one-half (2½) years prior to the 
filing of the Petitions, the Respondent withheld from the 
Juveniles his presence, his love, and his care; and further, 
willfully neglected to provide support and maintenance to 
the Petitioner for the use and benefit of the Juveniles.  
 
32. 
The Respondent testified he loved both Juveniles. 
While the [trial c]ourt does not doubt the Respondent’s love 
for the Juveniles, the [trial c]ourt finds that the welfare 
and best interest of the Juveniles are paramount to the 
parental love felt by the Respondent and that because of 
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the Respondent’s demonstrated neglect of his parental 
duties and obligations the Respondents’ feelings of 
parental love must yield to the welfare and best interest of 
the Juveniles. 
 
33. 
The [trial c]ourt specifically finds that from July of 
2016 until the filing o[f] the Petition the Respondent 
willfully abandoned both Juveniles and withdrew and 
withheld from them his support and love, and failed to take 
reasonable efforts to force contact with the Juveniles. 
 
34. 
The Respondent failed to take legal action, whether 
with an attorney or on his own, to force contact with the 
Juveniles. The Respondent never attempted to force 
contact with the Juveniles in any manner, even though the 
Respondent earned a decent wage working at various 
places of employment where he was paid between $300.00 
and $450.00 per week “in cash” and supported other 
children by other women. Further, the Respondent 
testified that he opened a checking account and purchased 
a camper for the mother of another of his biological children 
during a time when he contributed no financial support to 
the Petitioner for the use and benefit of the Juveniles. 
 
35. 
The 
Respondent 
demonstrated 
through 
his 
testimony that, although he had the ability and 
intelligence to understand his parental obligations to the 
Juveniles, he willfully failed to fulfill those parental 
obligations, stating “I wasn’t being responsible.” 
 
36. 
Even after he was served with the Petitions in these 
cases, the Respondent failed to demonstrate through his 
actions, other than filing the pro se response, a desire to 
support the Juveniles financially and emotionally, and 
failed to take any action to force contact with them. 
 
37. 
The Petitioner testified that the main reason for 
initiating the Termination of Parental Rights was that the 
Petitioner did not want the Respondent to obtain custody 
of the minor children in the event of her death. 
 
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38. 
The paternal grandmother testified that she 
attempted to contact the Petitioner regarding the welfare 
of the children in the 2 ½ years prior to filing the Petition 
and the paternal grandmother further testified that she 
had a contact telephone number during this time and that 
she was certain that the Respondent Father also had 
access and knowledge of the Petitioner’s telephone number 
during this time period. 
 
39. 
Termination of the Respondent’s parental rights is 
in the best interest and welfare of both Juveniles. 
 
40. 
The best interests of the Juveniles will be served by 
granting the Petitioner the relief requested in her Petitions 
to Terminate Parental Rights filed in 18 JT 64 and 18 JT 
65. 
 
41. 
In making its decision, the [trial c]ourt has 
considered both the conduct of the Respondent in the six 
(6) months immediately preceding the filing of the 
Petitions in this matter and the conduct of the Respondent 
from the date of the filing of the Petitions to the date of the 
hearing.  
 
A. Challenged Findings of Fact 
On appeal, respondent challenges several of the trial court’s findings of fact as 
unsupported or irrelevant. He first challenges as unsupported by the evidence the 
last sentence of finding of fact 22, which states that he “has not made any serious or 
sincere effort to participate in either Juvenile’s life” over the past two and one-half 
years. Respondent argues that his December 2018 phone call to petitioner asking to 
visit with the children was “a sincere effort at reestablishing his relationship with his 
children[,]” which was made during the relevant period Although respondent’s 
request to see the children when he phoned petitioner may have been sincere, we find 
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no error in the trial court’s finding that this one unsuccessful attempt to set up 
visitation in over two years did not demonstrate a “serious or sincere effort” by 
respondent to reestablish his relationship with the children.  
Respondent next challenges finding of fact 23. First, he contends that the 
finding mischaracterizes the nature of his contact with petitioner in December 2018. 
Respondent argues that both he and petitioner testified that the contact was made 
by telephone. We agree that the evidence showed respondent’s contact with petitioner 
in December 2018 was by telephone. Therefore, to the extent the finding of fact 
indicates that the contact was through text, email, or social media, that portion of the 
finding is unsupported by the evidence, and we will disregard that portion. See In re 
B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32, 35, 839 S.E.2d 748, 751 (2020) (stating that the findings of fact 
must be supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence). However, any 
inaccuracy as to the means of contact has no bearing on the substance of this 
finding—that is, that respondent contacted petitioner only once during the 
determinative period. Respondent also argues that finding of fact 23 fails to 
acknowledge his second attempt to contact petitioner through social media in 
January 2019. However, because this contact fell outside the relevant period for 
adjudicating the ground of willful abandonment, any possible error in the trial court’s 
failure to address this point in its findings is harmless. See In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. at 
56, 839 S.E.2d at 740 (“[A]ny error in these findings is harmless and had no impact 
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on the court’s adjudication because they occurred . . . after the petition was filed and 
well outside the determinative time period.”). 
Respondent next contends finding of fact 26, which states that respondent 
willfully abandoned the children within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), is 
actually a conclusion of law because it requires the application of legal principles and 
“decides ultimate issues in the case.” We agree that finding of fact 26 is not an 
evidentiary finding of fact, but we determine that it is an ultimate finding. “[A]n 
‘ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed question 
of law and fact’ and should ‘be distinguished from the findings of primary, 
evidentiary, or circumstantial facts.’ ” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 76, 833 S.E.2d at 772–
73 (quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491, 81 L. Ed. 755, 762 
(1937)); see also In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) 
(“Ultimate facts are the final resulting effect reached by processes of logical reasoning 
from the evidentiary facts.” (citation omitted)). Regardless of how this finding is 
classified, “that classification decision does not alter the fact that the trial court’s 
determination concerning the extent to which a parent’s parental rights in a child are 
subject to termination on the basis of a particular ground must have sufficient 
support in the trial court’s factual findings.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 76–77, 833 
S.E.2d at 773. As a result, we address respondent’s challenge in our discussion 
regarding whether the trial court erred by concluding that respondent’s parental 
rights were subject to termination based on willful abandonment.  
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Respondent next “denies” findings of fact 27, 30, 31, and 33. His challenge to 
these findings rests solely on his one phone call to petitioner two weeks before the 
petitions were filed. Respondent concedes that had petitioner “filed her TPR petitions 
before that telephone call, [he] would have no argument here.” He argues, however, 
that because that one telephone call “came first,” was “unprompted,” and showed his 
“attempt to reestablish his relationship with his children,” he did not “abandon[ ] all 
parental duties and claims to his children” nor “willfully neglect[ ] to provide support 
and maintenance to Petitioner.” (Emphasis in original.) We are not persuaded by this 
argument. One attempted contact during the six-month determinative period does 
not preclude a finding that respondent withheld his love and affection from the 
children and willfully abandoned them. See Pratt, 257 N.C. at 502–03, 126 S.E.2d at 
609 (rejecting the respondent-father’s argument that his one visit during the 
determinative six-month period refuted a finding of willful abandonment); see also In 
re B.S.O., 234 N.C. App. 706, 713, 760 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2014) (affirming a termination 
order based on willful abandonment where the father made only one phone call to the 
children and their mother during the determinative six-month period).  
Respondent next “denies as irrelevant” finding of fact 36 on the basis that it 
refers to his conduct outside of the determinative six-month period. Respondent 
argues that a “trial court has no authority to consider a parent’s post-TPR petition 
actions when determining whether to terminate parental rights under [N.C.G.S.] 
§ 7B-1111(a)(7).” We do not agree. The trial court’s finding regarding respondent’s 
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actions after the termination petition was filed is not “irrelevant” because the trial 
court “may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a 
parent’s credibility and intentions.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 22–23, 832 S.E.2d at 697 
(emphasis in original) (quoting In re D.M.O., 250 N.C. App. 570, 573, 794 S.E.2d 858, 
861 (2016)). Thus, the trial court could consider respondent’s conduct after the filing 
of the termination petition to determine the sincerity and intent of his conduct during 
the relevant six-month period. Respondent has not challenged the evidentiary 
support for this finding and it is thus binding on appeal.  
Respondent similarly “denies as irrelevant” the portion of finding of fact 41 
that indicates the trial court considered both his conduct during the determinative 
six-month period and his conduct after the filing of the termination petition in 
reaching its decision. For the reasons we rejected respondent’s challenge to finding of 
fact 36, we also reject this argument.  
Finally, respondent challenges findings of fact 32, 39, and 40. Finding of fact 
32 states that “[w]hile the [trial c]ourt does not doubt the Respondent’s love for the 
Juveniles, . . . [Respondent’s] feelings of parental love must yield to the welfare and 
best interest of the Juveniles.” In findings of fact 39 and 40, the trial court found that 
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 
Respondent argues that the “trial court cannot consider best interests until Petitioner 
first establishes at least one . . . ground [for termination], which she failed to do.” 
However, because the trial court found that petitioner proved by clear, cogent, and 
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convincing evidence that at least one ground to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights existed—that respondent willfully abandoned the children—the trial court was 
therefore required to make dispositional findings about whether termination was in 
the children’s best interests. In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 842, 788 S.E.2d at 167; 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110. In any event, these findings were not necessary to support the 
trial court’s adjudication of the ground of willful abandonment, and since respondent 
does not challenge the trial court’s dispositional determination, we need not address 
them. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (stating that in reviewing 
a trial court’s adjudication of grounds for termination, we review only those findings 
necessary to support the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed). 
B. Grounds to Terminate Parental Rights 
Respondent next contends that the evidence and the trial court’s findings of 
fact do not support its conclusion that he willfully abandoned the children. 
Respondent acknowledges his admission at the hearing “that he had not been a good 
father before [the] 14 December 2018 telephone call to Petitioner” but argues that his 
actions did not amount to willful abandonment as defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 
We disagree. 
The trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that except for respondent’s one 
unsuccessful phone call requesting to see the children, he made no other attempt to 
contact petitioner or to reestablish a relationship with the children during the six-
month determinative period or for nearly two years preceding that period. The trial 
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court found that respondent did not send any letters to the children, did not call the 
children, and did not provide any emotional, material, or financial support to the 
children. The trial court also found that respondent “demonstrated through his 
testimony that, although he had the ability and intelligence to understand his 
parental obligations to the [children], he willfully failed to fulfill those parental 
obligations, stating ‘I wasn’t being responsible.’ ”  
Respondent acknowledges that he had no other contact with petitioner during 
the relevant six-month period but claims that his single phone call is sufficient to 
demonstrate that he did not intend to forgo all parental duties and did not willfully 
abandon the children. For a parent’s actions to constitute willful abandonment, 
however, “it is not necessary that a parent absent himself continuously from the child 
for the specified six months, nor even that he cease to feel any concern for its interest.” 
Pratt, 257 N.C. at 503, 126 S.E.2d at 609. “[I]f a parent withholds his presence, his 
love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to 
lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and 
abandons the child.” Id. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608 (citation omitted).  
The trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that respondent willfully 
withheld his love, care, and affection from the children and that his conduct during 
the determinative six-month period constituted willful abandonment. Respondent’s 
one unsuccessful request to visit the children during the six-months immediately 
preceding the filing of the termination petition does not undermine the trial court’s 
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ultimate finding and conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned the children. 
See Pratt, 257 N.C. at 502, 126 S.E.2d at 609; see also In re B.S.O., 234 N.C. App. 
at 713, 760 S.E.2d at 65 (“In light of respondent-father’s single phone call to 
respondent-mother and his children during the six months immediately preceding 
[the filing of the termination petition], the [trial] court did not err in finding that he 
willfully abandoned the children.”); In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 324, 296 S.E.2d 811, 
813 (1982) (affirming termination where “except for an abandoned attempt to 
negotiate visitation and support, [the respondent-father] ‘made no other significant 
attempts to establish a relationship with [the child] or obtain rights of visitation with 
[the child]’ ”). Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err by terminating 
respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).  
III. Conclusion 
Respondent challenges several of the trial court’s findings of fact and its 
conclusion of law that respondent willfully abandoned Joel and Jed. Except for a 
portion of finding of fact 23, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact are 
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and we further hold that the 
findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that respondent willfully 
abandoned the children. Respondent did not challenge the trial court’s dispositional 
determination that termination was in the children’s best interests. Therefore, we 
affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights.  
AFFIRMED.