Title: Allen v. STATE OF IOWA, DEPT. OF PERSONNEL
Citation: 528 N.W.2d 583
Docket Number: 94-02
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 1995

528 N.W.2d 583 (1995) Gary ALLEN and Allen Teepe, Appellants, v. STATE Of IOWA, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL, Personnel Commission, Department of Agriculture, and Iowa Public Employment Relations Board, Appellees. No. 94-02. Supreme Court of Iowa. March 29, 1995. *585 Charles E. Gribble of Whitfield &amp; Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellants. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Linny Emrich, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State. Jan V. Berry, Des Moines, for appellee Public Employment Relations Bd. Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LAVORATO, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ. HARRIS, Justice. This dispute concerns the job classification of two public employees. Using an administrative proceeding designed for the purpose, they challenged their status, asserting their work was essentially the same as that undertaken by specialists in another, better paying, category. The matter is before us on their appeal following an adverse ruling on judicial review. We affirm. Petitioners Gary Allen and Allen Teepe are employees of the Iowa department of agriculture and land stewardship. Both are classified as livestock compliance investigators, a position assigned to the regulatory division of the animal health bureau. That bureau is headed by an executive who supervises three livestock compliance investigators, six livestock inspectors, six veterinarians, and a secretary. Allen and Teepe were livestock inspectors from the 1970s until 1988 when a new, more demanding and complex classificationlivestock compliance investigatorwas created. Allen and Teepe both were then promoted to the new classification. There is similarity between the name of their new classification (livestock compliance investigator) and the classification they seek (compliance officer). Because the classification titles employ the word "compliance," some care must be taken, initially, to avoid confusing the two. Like all state agencies, the Iowa department of agriculture does not exist in a vacuum. Its employees are subject to a merit system of employment organized within the department of personnel under Iowa Code chapter 97A (1995). Prior to 1988 the state authorized what Allen and Teepe describe as "one catch-all series called hearings compliance officer." Many positions were included in this classification. In 1988 those previously so classified, and who presided at administrative hearings, became administrative law judges. Others, those who prosecuted (or assisted in prosecuting) cases before administrative law judges, were placed into either of two classifications: (1) attorney; or, if not a lawyer, (2) compliance officer. At this time the department of agriculture, with permission of the department of personnel, decided to create the position of livestock compliance investigator. Because they perform more difficult and complex investigations than livestock investigators, Allen and Teepe were placed in this new category. This dispute arose because Allen and Teepe think their duties are sufficiently similar to those of compliance officers as to demand they also be so classified. They contend their "special" classification as livestock compliance officers violates Iowa Code section 19A.9(1) and 581 Iowa administrative code section 3.1(1) (similar job responsibilities call for same classification). I. To resolve the dispute over state job classification we enter a relatively new area of administrative law. In common with many, perhaps most, such areas, it is a world of its own. It has a special tribunal, test tools, even its own developing language. The agency's classification review process was well explained in the appellee's brief filed by the attorney general. We quote and adopt that explanation as follows: Allen and Teepe explain that: II. Judicial review of an agency's decision is governed by Iowa Code section 17A.19(8). Review is at law. Hussein v. Tama Meat Packing Corp., 394 N.W.2d 340, 341 (Iowa 1986). It is limited to application of the standards set out in section 17A.19(8). Abel v. Iowa Dep't of Personnel, 472 N.W.2d 281, 282 (Iowa 1991). Under section 17A.19(8), relief may be granted only if agency action was "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious," or is characterized by abuse of discretion. To be arbitrary or capricious, the agency action must be taken without regard to the law or consideration of the facts of the case. Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa Commerce Comm'n, 432 N.W.2d 148, 154 (Iowa 1988). To constitute abuse of discretion, the action must be unreasonable and lack rationality. Frank v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 386 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 1986). If the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence it should be upheld. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f); Mount Pleasant Community Sch. Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 343 N.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Iowa 1984). Evidence is substantial to support an agency's decision if a reasonable person would find it adequate to reach a given conclusion, even if the reviewing court might draw a contrary inference. Mercy Health Ctr. v. State Health Facilities Council, 360 N.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Iowa 1985). III. Allen and Teepe first contend the classification appeal committee's refusal to classify livestock compliance investigators as compliance officers was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and was an abuse of discretion. The classification was created to meet a specific need felt by the department of agriculture. Three livestock inspectors, skilled specialists, were called to serve as troubleshooters, handling more difficult complaints and complex investigations. The committee was convinced that this classification most accurately describes Allen and Teepe's duties. Allen and Teepe point to the committee's concession that there is similarity between their duties and those of compliance officers. But similarities, though necessary to require the requested reclassification, are not sufficient for such a requirement. The record, developed under the process previously described, discloses differences as well as similarities. Allen and Teepe were primarily involved with claimed violations of state and federal regulations on health, sale, release, movement, and listing requirements for livestock. They prepared reports and readied themselves for contested hearings. They also made themselves available to testify in administrative proceedings. Compliance officers were more involved with internal department compliance, reviews, policy-making and with prosecution. Allen and Teepe do not perform the prosecutorial drafting and policy-making functions expected of compliance officers. The extent of internal compliance differs in the two positions, being higher for compliance officers than for livestock compliance investigators such as Allen and Teepe. Allen and Teepe have been unable to carry their burden of showing the committee's rejection of their request to be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. The district court was correct in so holding. IV. For the reasons previously mentioned the court was also correct in finding that the agency decision was supported by substantial evidence. We therefore reject the assignment of error challenging this holding. V. Allen and Teepe also challenge the procedure because the classification appeals committee was appointed by the director of the department of personnel. These appointments were made in accordance with the clear mandate of 581 Iowa Administrative Code 3.5(2). But this administrative provision is, as Allen and Teepe insist, in violation of Iowa Code section 19A.9(1) which clearly mandates that the committee be appointed by the personnel *588 commission. The violation, though, does not help Allen and Teepe. Any violation does not void the actions of the committee because the appointees were clearly acting at least as de facto committee members. The rule in Iowa, as elsewhere, is that actions of de facto members are valid. Board of Directors v. County Bd. (Educ.), 257 Iowa 106, 110, 131 N.W.2d 802, 806 (1964). This rule is consistent with the broader rule that presumes the validity of official agency actions. Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 404 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1987). We see no reason to depart from the general rule under the circumstances here. No committee member was involved as prosecutor or advocate in the case, or even in a similar pending case. The personnel officer who did prosecute the case had no authority over committee members. Although committee members are generally subordinate to the director, the director did not personally advocate this or any related case. The assignment is without merit. VI. In addition to the proceeding we have already described, Allen and Teepe also pursued their classification claim by filing a noncontract grievance with their supervisor, asserting they were being required to work outside their classification of livestock compliance investigators without IDOP authority and without special pay. After the supervisor and the director of the department of agriculture filed denials, the grievance procedure was placed "on hold" until the committee reached the challenged decision we have already discussed. After receiving their adverse decision, Allen and Teepe pursued their grievance before the public employment relations board (PERB). An administrative law judge found that PERB did not have jurisdiction over job classification issues. PERB accordingly dismissed the appeal and Allen and Teepe sought judicial review of the dismissal. The two judicial review proceedings were consolidated and the district court agreed that only the personnel commission, not PERB, has jurisdiction over the matter. Allen and Teepe also challenge this holding in this consolidated appeal. IDOP is the central state agency responsible for personnel management under Iowa Code section 19A.1(2). It is specifically given the responsibility to determine employee position classification under Iowa Code section 19A.9(1). We yield to IDOP's expertise in this field. Abel, 472 N.W.2d at 282 (Iowa 1991). The district court correctly affirmed the holding that IDOP's jurisdiction in the matter is exclusive. AFFIRMED.