Title: Commonwealth v. Melendez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12889
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2022

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SJC-12889 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FELIX MELENDEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 8, 2022. - September 12, 2022. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Double 
jeopardy.  Cellular Telephone.  Search and Seizure, 
Affidavit, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Evidence, 
Prior misconduct.  Practice, Criminal, Assistance of 
counsel, Double jeopardy, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 26, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Kenneth V. Desmond, Jr., J.; 
following mistrial, the remaining cases were tried before 
Kenneth W. Salinger, J. 
 
 
 
Brett J. Vottero for the defendant. 
 
Andrew Doherty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In 2013, the defendant, Felix Melendez, was 
indicted on charges of murder in the first degree of Hilda 
DeVincenzo (victim), unarmed robbery of a person aged sixty or 
older, and receiving stolen property.  At his first trial, the 
2 
 
jury found the defendant guilty of receiving stolen property but 
were unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges.  The 
defendant was tried for a second time on the murder and robbery 
charges, and the jury again were unable to reach a verdict.  At 
his third trial on these charges, the jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and not guilty of unarmed robbery of a 
person aged sixty or older.  The defendant was sentenced to life 
in prison without the possibility of parole on the murder 
conviction and to a term of from three years to three years and 
one day on the conviction of receiving stolen property.  This 
appeal followed and is before us pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  After the appeal was docketed in this court, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which we consolidated with his direct 
appeal. 
The defendant raises five arguments.  First, he argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress personal information collected from the defendant's 
cell phone on the ground that the warrant to search the cell 
phone was not supported by probable cause.  Second, he argues 
that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that the 
defendant had a history of opiate addiction and used heroin on 
occasions not related to the alleged crimes.  Third, the 
3 
 
defendant argues that the evidence did not suffice to establish 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the murder charge and 
that the judge therefore erred in denying his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty.  The defendant further argues 
that a fourth trial for murder would violate State and Federal 
double jeopardy principles, and that we therefore should dismiss 
the indictment for murder.  Finally, the defendant argues that 
he should not have been tried for a third time and that we 
should dismiss the indictment for that reason and prohibit the 
retrial of any criminal charge after two mistrials due to a hung 
jury have been declared on that charge. 
For the reasons stated infra, we conclude that there exist 
no grounds for reversal.  After conducting a thorough review of 
the record, we also conclude that there is no reason to exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or 
to reduce the verdict.  We therefore affirm the defendant's 
convictions and deny his motion for a new trial. 
Background.  "The jury could have found the following 
facts.  We reserve other details for discussion of particular 
issues."  Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 539 (2011). 
1.  Discovery of the victim's body.  The victim's house, 
which was located in Chelsea, has three units and a basement, 
with common entrances on Washington Avenue and Prospect Avenue.  
Both entrances open to common staircases accessible from each 
4 
 
unit.  The basement is accessible from the staircase on the 
Washington Avenue side of the house and from a half door located 
outside the Washington Avenue entrance.  The victim, who was 
eighty-eight years old at the time of her death, lived on the 
second floor; she rented the first-floor apartment to two 
tenants, and the third-floor apartment to the defendant and his 
girlfriend. 
On July 3, 2013, at approximately 1:30 P.M., one of the 
first-floor tenants was having trouble accessing his apartment.  
He informed the victim, and the victim gave him a spare key.  
The tenant used the spare key to access his apartment, and then 
immediately returned the key to the victim before returning to 
his apartment. 
Later that afternoon, between approximately 3:30 and 4:30 
P.M., the same first-floor tenant was in the living room of his 
apartment, directly below the room in which the victim's body 
later was discovered.  From overhead, he heard the sound of 
someone running and a scream, followed by a bang.  At trial, the 
first-floor tenant identified the scream as having been the 
victim's.  He also testified that, if someone had come down the 
stairs from the second floor, he would have heard them do so 
from anywhere in the first-floor apartment.  He did not hear 
anyone come down the stairs. 
5 
 
On July 7, at approximately 12:45 A.M., Chelsea firefighter 
Paul Doherty responded to a report of an electrical fire in the 
basement of the house.  When he arrived, no smoke or flames were 
apparent from the outside of the house.  The half door to the 
basement was open, and Doherty entered.  There was no smoke in 
the basement, but it smelled as if something had been burning, 
and there was charring on one of the basement walls.  The 
defendant, a thirty-five year old man who was six feet tall and 
220 pounds was in the basement speaking with firefighters.  The 
defendant told Doherty that his girlfriend had smelled smoke and 
that he had gone into the basement, where he discovered the 
fire, which he suspected was an electrical fire, and 
extinguished it. 
As Doherty was about to leave, the deputy chief firefighter 
asked him to check on the occupant of the second-floor 
apartment, who had not been seen in a few days.  The defendant 
unlocked the Washington Avenue entrance to the house and led 
Doherty and another firefighter up the stairway to the second-
floor landing.  The door to the victim's apartment was locked.  
One panel of the door to the apartment appeared to have been 
replaced with a piece of wood.  Without first knocking or 
calling out to anyone in the apartment, the defendant began to 
strike the door around the wood panel.  Doherty asked him to 
stop and searched for another way to enter.  After Doherty and 
6 
 
the other firefighter went out to the rear porch, the defendant 
called out to them that he had been able to open the door.  He 
appeared to have gained entry by reaching through the damaged 
panel. 
The defendant entered the apartment first, and the 
firefighters entered behind him.  Doherty immediately smelled 
the odor of a decomposing body.  The entrance opened into a 
kitchen, which had doorways leading to a bedroom, a hallway, 
and, farthest from the entrance, a dining room.  Upon entering, 
the defendant went directly into the dining room.  The victim 
lay face down on the floor of the dining room dressed only in a 
brassiere and underwear.  Blood was visible on her head and in 
her hair.  The victim's body had not been visible from the 
entrance.  Upon seeing the victim's body, the defendant became 
distraught.  The firefighters asked him to leave the room, and 
he went back into the kitchen. 
The apartment was generally clean and tidy.  The victim's 
bedroom, however, appeared to have been ransacked.  Drawers had 
been pulled out of the bureau and nightstand and emptied onto 
the bed and floor, and the bed covers had been pulled up over 
the pillows, partially exposing the mattress. 
Additional officers were summoned, and Chelsea police 
officer Augustus Casucci arrived at the house soon afterward.  
Casucci and the two firefighters went up to the victim's 
7 
 
apartment.  The defendant attempted to go into the victim's 
apartment as well, but Casucci told him not to do so.  The 
defendant appeared to be excited and nervous.  After Casucci 
entered the victim's apartment, the defendant went up to the 
third-floor apartment, and then came down to the second-floor 
apartment and asked whether he could enter.  He stated that the 
keys to his car might be inside.  He was not allowed to enter.  
Then, while two other officers who had arrived were on the rear 
porch of the second-floor apartment, they heard footsteps 
overhead on the third-floor porch.  The defendant had come out 
onto the porch above and was smoking a cigarette. 
2.  Investigation.  An autopsy of the victim revealed 
injuries to her neck, including fractures to her thyroid 
cartilage, which were consistent with compression or blunt force 
trauma.  Her sternum and all but five of her ribs had been 
broken.  She also had blunt force injuries on all of her 
extremities, and either blunt force or sharp force injuries to 
her head.  Soft tissue hemorrhaging around the bone and 
cartilage fractures indicated that the injuries were inflicted 
prior to her death.  The Commonwealth's expert testified that 
either the injuries to the victim's neck or those to her chest 
could have caused her death. 
The victim's son examined the contents of the apartment to 
determine whether any of the victim's property had been removed 
8 
 
and provided investigators with a list of missing items.  All of 
the victim's jewelry was missing, including, specifically, a 
platinum or white gold ring with a row of diamonds, a gold 
wedding ring, a white gold pinky ring with two stones, a gold 
necklace with a pendant in the shape of the letter "H," and a 
gold necklace with a crucifix pendant.  The victim's son 
described the band of the diamond ring as being thin and worn.  
The victim's credit card, checkbook, and cell phone, as well as 
a strong box and the keys to the other apartments in the house, 
also were missing. 
Detectives checked various pawn shops in the area to 
determine whether any of the victim's missing jewelry had been 
sold there.  On July 8, 2013, detectives learned that, on July 
5, the defendant had sold some items at a jewelry store in 
Everett for $130.  The sale records included a copy of the 
defendant's driver's license.  The records indicate that, 
initially, the person selling the items was identified as "Frank 
A.," although this name was crossed out and the defendant's name 
was written in its place.  Among the items sold on July 5 were a 
gold wedding band and a platinum or white gold ring with a row 
of diamonds.  The band of the diamond ring that the defendant 
sold was bent and worn.  The victim's son identified this 
diamond ring as the one belonging to the victim. 
9 
 
Detectives obtained the defendant's cell phone records from 
his cellular service provider pursuant to a warrant.  These 
records showed that between 6:58 P.M. and 7:42 P.M. on July 3, 
2013, the defendant made seven calls to four different pawn 
shops or jewelry buyers in the Boston area.  He had made no such 
calls in the week preceding July 3.  The defendant also called 
two pawn shops on the morning of July 6. 
On July 9, 2013, detectives searched the defendant's 
apartment pursuant to a search warrant.  A white gold or 
platinum diamond engagement ring was found underneath the 
mattress of the defendant's bed.  The victim's son recognized 
this ring as the victim's engagement ring.  A latent fingerprint 
on a plastic bag on the floor of the victim's bedroom matched 
the fingerprint of the defendant's left ring finger. 
3.  The defendant's statements to police officers.  While 
police officers were at the house on July 7, 2013, the day the 
victim's body was discovered, one officer conducted interviews 
with the occupants of the first-floor and third-floor apartments 
of the house, including the defendant, as part of the 
investigation.  The defendant told the officer that, on July 3, 
he had driven his girlfriend to work in the morning and returned 
to their apartment at around 7:30 or 8 A.M.  At around noon, the 
defendant left to go to a store and to visit a friend, and 
returned at around 3 P.M.  The defendant said that at that time 
10 
 
he saw the first-floor tenant speaking with the victim on the 
second-floor landing about having trouble accessing his 
apartment.  The victim gave the first-floor tenant a spare key.  
A short time later, as the defendant was coming down the stairs, 
the victim told him that the lights in her apartment were not 
working.  The defendant said that he went into her apartment to 
confirm that the lights were not working, and then went into the 
basement and fixed the circuit breakers.  He then returned to 
her apartment, checked that the lights were working, and went up 
to the third-floor apartment. 
The defendant said that, at around 4 P.M., he went to see a 
person named Ricky Crespo at an address in Chelsea for some 
automobile body repairs.  The defendant then picked his 
girlfriend up from work at approximately 4:30 or 5 P.M. and 
returned to his apartment.  When the defendant was asked to 
clarify his whereabouts between 3 and 6 P.M. on July 3, he said 
that he had been at home, painting a vanity at that time.  The 
defendant also stated that, on July 4, he had spent time with a 
friend, Orlando "Oly" Crespo (Oly Crespo or Crespo), and they 
had driven around all day, but he could not remember exactly 
where they had gone.  The defendant further stated that on July 
6, he again had spent most of the day with Crespo and had 
discussed buying a motorcycle from him. 
11 
 
On July 8, two investigators returned to the house and 
asked the defendant to provide a buccal swab.  The defendant 
agreed.  After providing the sample, he said to the 
investigators, "Just to let you guys know, I've been in that 
apartment before."  He said that, on July 3, he had been sitting 
in the victim's apartment, on a chair in the kitchen, when the 
first-floor tenant came upstairs to inform the victim that he 
was locked out of his apartment.  After the first-floor tenant 
took a spare key from the victim, unlocked his apartment door, 
and returned the key to the victim, the defendant went up to his 
apartment for ten to fifteen minutes, then returned to the 
victim's apartment and watched television with her.  The 
defendant told investigators that the victim did not look well 
and was unsteady on her feet.  He said that he may have helped 
her around the apartment while she leaned on his arm.  He also 
stated that he talked to the victim "all the time," and said, 
"Ask anyone.  They'll tell you."  The defendant also stated, "If 
I was that guy -- kind of guy, she was an easy target." 
Further investigation revealed the following facts.  The 
defendant's girlfriend's work records showed that she did not 
arrive at work until 1:15 P.M. on July 3.  In addition, Ricky 
Crespo's automobile body shop is located in Dedham, not Chelsea.  
Oly Crespo, however, lives in Chelsea, at the address that the 
defendant had provided.  Finally, the person who had delivered 
12 
 
the victim's Meals on Wheels lunch in the late morning on July 3 
stated that the victim seemed fine, and the victim's son, who 
had spoken to her on the telephone that afternoon, also 
testified that she had sounded fine. 
4.  Search of the defendant's cell phone.  During the July 
9 search of the defendant's apartment pursuant to a warrant, 
police seized his cell phone.  On August 21, 2013, detectives 
obtained a warrant to search it.  Upon searching it, detectives 
observed the defendant's contact list; Internet search history; 
a Facebook Messenger instant messaging application chat thread 
(messenger chat); and the defendant's sent text messages.  At 
trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that the messenger 
chat contained a photograph of a "notice to quit" for nonpayment 
of rent issued on June 25, 2013, to the defendant and his 
girlfriend.  In addition, the defendant's list of contacts 
contained the contact details of various drug rehabilitation 
centers, pawn shops, and jewelry stores. 
The messenger chat showed that, on June 19, the defendant 
sent a message his girlfriend that he would be "going on [his] 
journey," that he "need[ed] to get all of this poison out of 
[himself]," and that he "ha[d] been down this road before."  His 
girlfriend responded that she hoped that he would "have the 
bed."  The defendant's record of sent text messages showed that, 
13 
 
on July 9, the defendant sent text messages to his girlfriend, 
including the following: 
"My mother said thank you for telling her I'm using 
dope. . . . 
 
"Don't worry . . . .  Chino [the defendant] is gone with 
the wind.  You have a good life and your keys will be 
somewhere.  I don't want nothing to do with this place.  
I'm going to move on. . . ." 
 
The final text message on the cell phone, sent by the defendant 
on July 9, read, "I'm leaving.  Bye, Mom." 
5.  Testimony of Oly Crespo.  Oly Crespo, a friend of the 
defendant, testified1 that he had met the defendant at a drug 
detoxification facility where he was being treated for heroin 
use.  Crespo explained his own history of using heroin and that 
he had been in a drug rehabilitation program as recently as two 
weeks before testifying in September of 2016.  Crespo did not 
remember seeing the defendant in the summer of 2013.  He 
testified that he "might have" gone to a pawn or jewelry shop 
with the defendant "a long time" ago. 
6.  Theory of defense.  At trial, the defendant called no 
witnesses and did not testify.  On cross-examination of several 
witnesses called by the Commonwealth, trial counsel sought to 
 
1 The Commonwealth obtained Crespo's contact information 
from the search of the defendant's cell phone.  Crespo testified 
under a grant of immunity.  Crespo was not questioned about the 
grant of immunity, and the immunity agreement was not admitted 
in evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 261-262 
(1989). 
14 
 
establish that police officers failed adequately to investigate 
the case.  Trial counsel suggested that officers should have 
investigated whether the son of the defendant's girlfriend, who 
was living in the third-floor apartment as well, was the 
perpetrator.  The son was wearing a global positioning system 
monitoring bracelet in July 2013 and admitted to drinking at the 
time.  The son had passed out in the third-floor apartment on 
July 6, was awakened by his mother, and smelled smoke.  Trial 
counsel also emphasized that the police failed to investigate 
discrepancies in the statements of the first-floor tenant; to 
obtain corroborating information about the location of the 
defendant's girlfriend's son at relevant times; and to obtain 
cell phone and text message records of the defendant's 
girlfriend's son. 
Procedural history.  A grand jury indicted the defendant on 
charges of murder, G. L. c. 265, § 1; unarmed robbery of a 
person aged sixty years or greater, G. L. c. 265, § 19 (a); and 
receiving stolen property of a value greater than $250, G. L. 
c. 266, § 60, as amended through St. 1987, c. 468, § 4.2  The 
defendant was tried before a jury beginning on September 10, 
 
 
2 General Laws c. 266, § 60, was substantially revised 
subsequent to the facts giving rise to this case.  See St. 2014, 
c. 451, § 3; St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 146-148.  The defendant is 
liable for the crime as it was defined at the time of its 
commission.  See Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 552-553 
(2013). 
15 
 
2015.  The jury found the defendant guilty of receiving stolen 
property.  The jury were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on 
the murder and robbery charges, and a mistrial was declared as 
to those counts only.  The defendant's second jury trial, on 
only the murder and robbery charges, began on February 22, 2016.  
The second trial ended in a hung jury as to both counts, and a 
mistrial was declared. 
The defendant was tried for a third time, beginning on 
September 19, 2016.  At the close of the Commonwealth's case, 
the defendant filed a motion for a required finding of not 
guilty, and the motion was denied.  The jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and 
not on theories of deliberate premeditation or felony-murder.  
The defendant was acquitted of the robbery charge.  The 
defendant was sentenced to a term of life in State prison 
without the possibility of parole on the murder conviction and 
to three years in State prison on the conviction of receiving 
stolen property, to be served concurrently.  The defendant 
timely filed a notice of appeal, and he subsequently filed a 
motion in this court for a new trial based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which we consolidated with his direct 
appeal. 
Discussion.  1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  a.  
Standard of review.  "Because the defendant was convicted of 
16 
 
murder in the first degree, we do not evaluate his ineffective 
assistance claim under the traditional standard set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)."  
Commonwealth v. Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 150 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 (2018).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 486 Mass. 256, 259-260 (2020), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2534 (2021).  "Instead, we apply the more 
favorable standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and review his claim 
to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Denson, supra at 150-151, quoting 
Ayala, supra.  "Under this review, we first ask whether defense 
counsel committed an error," and then, if so, "whether it was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id. at 151, 
quoting Ayala, supra.  "One such error would be if defense 
counsel failed 'to litigate a viable claim of an illegal search 
and seizure.'"  Gosselin, supra at 260, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 90 (2004).  "Whether trial counsel so 
failed depends on whether the defendant can 'demonstrate a 
likelihood that the motion to suppress would have been 
successful' when filed."  Gosselin, supra, quoting Comita, supra 
at 91.  "We analyze that likelihood objectively . . . and 
without 'the advantage of hindsight.'"  Gosselin, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 729 (1978). 
17 
 
The defendant argues that the affidavit in support of the 
application for a search warrant to extract personal data from 
his cell phone did not establish probable cause that evidence of 
the alleged crimes would be found on the cell phone.  Therefore, 
he argues, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a 
motion to suppress the information derived from the search of 
the cell phone.  We first consider whether the affidavit 
contained sufficient information to establish probable cause and 
conclude that it did not.  For this reason, trial counsel erred 
in failing to file and litigate a motion to suppress.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in part 3, infra, we conclude that 
reversal is not warranted. 
b.  Sufficiency of the affidavit.  "Both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 'require a magistrate to 
determine that probable cause exists before issuing a search 
warrant' (citation omitted)."  Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 
508, 521 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 
626 (2011).  "To establish probable cause, the facts contained 
in the warrant affidavit, and the reasonable inferences drawn 
from them, must be sufficient for the issuing judge to conclude 
that the police seek items related to criminal activity and that 
the items described 'reasonably may be expected to be located in 
the place to be searched at the time the warrant issues'" 
18 
 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 114 
(2021).  "There must be probable cause to conclude not only that 
an individual committed a crime, but also that the particular 
source of evidence has a 'nexus' to the offense (citation 
omitted)."  Holley, supra.  "While 'definitive proof' is not 
necessary to meet this standard, the warrant application may not 
be based on mere speculation" (citation omitted).  Id.  See id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983) ("even 'strong reason to suspect is 
not adequate'"). 
"Our review of whether a search warrant was supported by 
probable cause is limited to review of the four corners of the 
affidavit."  Henley, 488 Mass. at 114.  "In determining whether 
an affidavit justifies a finding of probable cause, the 
affidavit is considered as a whole and in a commonsense and 
realistic fashion."  Cavitt, 460 Mass. at 626.  The affidavit 
should not be "parsed, severed, and subjected to hypercritical 
analysis" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 
Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  "A magistrate's determination of 
probable cause is accorded 'considerable deference'" (citation 
omitted).  Holley, 478 Mass. at 522.  See Henley, supra.  
"Probable cause is a 'fact-intensive inquiry, and must be 
resolved based on the particular facts of each case'" (citation 
omitted).  Holley, supra. 
19 
 
The affidavit accompanying the application for a search 
warrant in this case described how firefighters responded to a 
report of an electrical fire, conducted a wellness check of the 
victim, and discovered her body.  The affidavit also described 
police officers' interview with the first-floor tenant, in which 
he described hearing a bang and a scream from the apartment 
above on July 3.  In addition, the affidavit described the 
officers' interview with the defendant at the house following 
the discovery of the victim's body, in which he stated that he 
had fixed a circuit breaker for the victim on July 3, had been 
inside her apartment, and had put out the supposed electrical 
fire in the basement on the night of July 7.  The affidavit went 
on to describe the findings of the investigation into the cause 
of the fire, which suggested that the fire pattern in the 
basement was inconsistent with an electrical fire and that the 
fire had been intentionally set.  The investigation also 
revealed that the defendant's description of the circuit breaker 
on the day he said he helped the victim with an electrical 
problem was inaccurate.  The affidavit described the officers' 
visit to the pawn shop on July 8, where they learned that the 
defendant had pawned four items on July 5, including a gold 
wedding band that matched a description of the victim's wedding 
band.  The affidavit also described the search of the 
defendant's apartment, in which investigators seized a diamond 
20 
 
ring later identified as the victim's engagement ring, along 
with a cell phone that matched a description of the defendant's 
cell phone. 
In addition to the above, the affidavit stated in general 
terms that the affiant knew that cell phones are capable of 
storing large amounts of information.  The affidavit also 
observed that the cell phone that officers sought to search "may 
reveal" the defendant's "location before, during, and after" the 
victim's murder, as well as "any planning and correspondence" 
between the defendant and "potential accomplices."  The 
affidavit further stated that information contained in the cell 
phone "may also show who [the defendant] contacted after the 
murder" and "may aid in the discovery of any unrecovered 
evidence."  Based on this information, the affidavit asserted 
that probable cause existed to believe that evidence of the 
victim's murder and the robbery of her apartment would be found 
on the cell phone. 
The defendant argues that the foregoing information was 
insufficient to establish the requisite probable cause.  We 
agree.  The information in the affidavit undoubtedly 
demonstrated probable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed the offenses described, but this alone does not 
suffice to justify a search of the cell phone.  See Holley, 478 
Mass. at 521.  The affidavit lacked any information 
21 
 
"demonstrat[ing] a nexus between the alleged crime and the 
device to be searched."  Henley, 488 Mass. at 115.  At most, a 
commonsense reading of the affidavit, see Cavitt, 460 Mass. at 
626, discloses that the defendant owned a cell phone and that 
the cell phone was recovered from the apartment where the 
defendant resided and where one fruit of the defendant's alleged 
crimes, the engagement ring, was discovered.  That both items 
were found in the defendant's residence, standing alone, does 
not reasonably establish a nexus between the cell phone and the 
alleged crimes. 
The officer's general statements that cell phones are 
capable of storing vast amounts of data and that a search of the 
defendant's cell phone "may reveal" or "may show" information 
about the defendant's whereabouts around the time of the murder 
or whom he contacted before or after the murder, including 
"possible accomplices," fails to rise beyond the level of 
speculation.  See Henley, 488 Mass. at 116 ("Search warrants 
'rely[ing] on . . . generalities that friends or coventurers 
often use cellular telephones to communicate,' are insufficient 
. . . .  Instead, there must be 'specific, not speculative,' 
evidence linking the device in question to the criminal conduct" 
[citations omitted]); Holley, 478 Mass. at 521.  The affidavit 
contained no specific information suggesting that the alleged 
crime was premeditated, or that there were accomplices with whom 
22 
 
the defendant may have communicated before or after the alleged 
murder; in fact, the affidavit did not even contain any 
statement that the defendant had used his cell phone at any 
point before, during, or after the events described.  Contrast 
Henley, supra at 116-117 (probable cause where affidavit 
suggested murder coordinated by gang members, with defendant 
having traveled to area of crime, where coventurer had already 
been present, for no apparent reason and with apparent intent to 
murder); Commonwealth v. Louis, 487 Mass. 759, 764 (2021) 
(probable cause where affidavit established that coventurers 
communicated by text message and cell phone calls before and 
during alleged crimes, that coventurer said he called defendant 
on day of crime, and defendant was identified in affidavit as 
person who bought gun and shot victim); Commonwealth v. Chalue, 
486 Mass. 847, 883 (2021) (probable cause where cell phone 
record showed defendant on three-way call with suspect within 
hours after crime); Holley, 478 Mass. at 522 (substantial basis 
to conclude defendant's text messages related to crime where 
defendant called victim's cell phone immediately before 
shooting, just as he was entering victim's apartment building). 
The Commonwealth argues that it is reasonable to infer from 
the fact that certain items reportedly stolen from the victim's 
apartment were not recovered, either from the pawn shop or from 
the defendant's apartment, that the defendant had sold, 
23 
 
attempted to sell, or otherwise disposed of the remaining items 
at various unknown locations and that his cell phone would 
contain information related to this activity.  The argument is 
likewise speculative in the absence of additional facts to 
support such inferences.  There is nothing in the affidavit, for 
example, to suggest that the defendant was not already aware of 
the location of the pawn shop where certain items were recovered 
or any similar establishment, or that he needed to or did 
research such places using his cell phone.  The facts contained 
within the four corners of the affidavit, see Henley, 488 Mass. 
at 114-115, therefore do not give rise to a reasonable inference 
that the defendant used his cell phone in connection with the 
crimes of which he was suspected at the time of the warrant 
application, see Donahue, 430 Mass. at 712. 
Because the affidavit, on its face, contained insufficient 
information to establish probable cause to search the cell 
phone, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of the 
cell phone.  Gosselin, 486 Mass. at 260, quoting Comita, 441 
Mass. at 90 (trial counsel ineffective for "fail[ing] 'to 
litigate a viable claim of an illegal search and seizure'").  
Therefore, the portions of the defendant's list of contacts, his 
Internet browsing history, the messenger chat containing the 
image of the notice to quit, and his text messages with his 
24 
 
girlfriend and his mother should have been suppressed.  
Nevertheless, because the remaining evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, sufficed to support 
the defendant's conviction, see Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 
719, 721 (2002), we conclude that no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice occurred.  See part 3, infra. 
2.  Evidence of addiction.  The defendant argues that the 
judge erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's history of 
opiate addiction.  The Commonwealth responds that the evidence 
was properly admitted because it was relevant to the defendant's 
motive in robbing the victim.  Because the defendant objected to 
the admission of this evidence at trial,3 the issue is preserved, 
and we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Don, 
483 Mass. 697, 713 (2019). 
"Although evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is not 
admissible to show a propensity to commit such acts, it may be 
admissible if relevant for another purpose, 'such as to show a 
common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or 
mistake, identity, intent, motive, or state of mind.'"  
Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 25-26 (2016), quoting 
 
3 The defendant did not request a limiting instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 629 n.7 (2021) ("It was 
not necessary for the judge, without any request from either 
party, specifically to instruct on the limited permissible uses 
of the prior bad act evidence"). 
25 
 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 738 (2014), S.C., 479 
Mass. 52 (2018).  Prior bad act evidence is admissible for such 
a permissible purpose if its probative value is not outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 
470 Mass. 228, 249-250 & n.27 (2014).  "Questions of 
admissibility, probative value, and unfair prejudice are left to 
the sound discretion of the trial judge[] and will not be 
overturned absent clear error."  Philbrook, supra at 26. 
26 
 
The Commonwealth elicited testimony from Oly Crespo4,5 that 
the defendant used heroin immediately after selling the victim's 
 
4 Crespo's testimony is not inadmissible even though police 
learned about the defendant's contacts with Crespo in part 
through an improperly obtained search of the defendant's cell 
phone.  The defendant provided investigators with Crespo's name 
and stated that he had spent time with Crespo on July 4 and 6.  
In addition, the defendant gave investigators Crespo's home 
address under the pretense that it was the address of Ricky 
Crespo's garage, where the defendant stated he had been on the 
day of the murder.  "Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if 
. . . discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a 
practical matter, the evidence may be admissible as long as the 
officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of 
evidence, and the particular constitutional violation is not so 
severe as to require suppression" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Mattier (No. 2), 474 Mass. 261, 271 (2016) 
(discovery of cell phone inevitable where officers were 
authorized to search defendant's person even if they had not 
arrested him for purpose of looking for devices).  Regardless of 
the information obtained from the defendant's cell phone 
indicating that he had called Crespo on July 5, investigators 
had sufficient information in the form of the defendant's own 
statements to locate Crespo during their investigation into the 
defendant's whereabouts in the days before and after the 
killing.  Their basis for wanting to speak with Crespo, to 
verify the defendant's version of events, would have been the 
same, and they would have been able to locate him based on the 
address the defendant provided once they discovered that it was 
not connected with Ricky Crespo's garage.  Thus, it is certain 
as a practical matter that the Commonwealth would inevitably 
have discovered all of the information that it obtained from 
Crespo.  In addition, there is no indication in the record that 
investigators acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery, 
and the constitutional violation, obtaining the warrant based on 
a defective affidavit, is not so serious as to require 
suppression.  Furthermore, as discussed infra, Crespo's 
testimony was brief and suffered from problems of credibility.  
On the other hand, the evidence supporting the defendant's guilt 
-- including his being in possession of the victim's jewelry, 
his having sold some of it at a pawn shop in the days following 
the killing, and his having engaged in extensive behavior and 
made numerous statements that indicated consciousness of guilt -
- was abundant.  Even if Crespo's testimony had been admitted in 
27 
 
jewelry on July 5 and introduced evidence from the defendant's 
cell phone records that, within a week, he called two drug 
rehabilitation centers.6  This evidence supported the 
Commonwealth's theory of motive that the defendant attacked and 
robbed the victim in order to sell the items stolen to fund his 
drug use.  See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 199 
(2006) (jury permissibly could find that defendant had motive to 
rob victim's apartment where evidence that defendant had been 
using drugs, had run out of both drugs and money, had been in 
victim's apartment previously, and had reason to believe that 
 
error, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
would have occurred.  See Commonwealth v. Cutts, 444 Mass. 821, 
835 (2005). 
 
5 As noted, see note 1, supra, Crespo testified under a 
grant of immunity.  Trial counsel did not cross-examine Crespo 
on this point or request a cautionary instruction on the 
credibility of witnesses testifying under a grant of immunity.  
See Commonwealth v. Brousseau, 421 Mass. 647, 654 (1996) (judge 
not required to give cautionary instruction regarding immunity 
sua sponte). 
 
6 The defendant's cell phone records were obtained pursuant 
to a warrant that the defendant does not challenge, and the 
defendant did not object to the admission of these records in 
evidence.  In our examination of the record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we find no grounds to conclude that the 
Commonwealth's conduct in obtaining these records failed to 
comply with the requirements of the Federal Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712, and G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 1 and 1B.  Cf. Preventive Med. Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 465 
Mass. 810, 819 (2013).  These records supplied evidence of the 
defendant's calls to drug rehabilitation centers independent 
from the call logs obtained from his cell phone, which should 
have been suppressed.  See part 1, supra. 
28 
 
she might have cash or valuables suggested that "defendant 
needed money and the victim was a nearby and likely source"); 
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464 (2004) (evidence of 
defendant's spending increasing amounts of money on cocaine and 
prostitutes was properly admitted to show motive to murder wife 
and obtain full access to her inheritance). 
Such "[e]vidence of motive is generally admissible" 
(citation omitted).  Mendes, 441 Mass. at 464.  "Without the 
challenged evidence [the murder] could have appeared to the jury 
as an essentially inexplicable act of violence."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982).  "The 
prosecution was entitled to present as full a picture as 
possible of the events surrounding the incident itself."  
Bradshaw, supra at 269-270 (evidence of other crimes properly 
admitted to show motive where Commonwealth "sought to cast the 
defendant's activities on the day of the murder as a desperate 
search for money").  The evidence of the defendant's addiction 
therefore was relevant to show motive. 
Furthermore, "[t]he prejudice likely to be generated by the 
admission of this evidence did not so outweigh its probative 
value that it was error to admit it."  Bradshaw, 385 Mass. at 
270.  As discussed infra, the evidence linking the defendant to 
the killing through his possession and sale of the victim's 
jewelry and the evidence of his conduct and statements 
29 
 
indicating consciousness of guilt was strong and received much 
more attention at trial than the evidence of his addiction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 649 (2017) (prior bad 
act evidence not unduly prejudicial where it "paled in 
comparison" to evidence of defendant's conceded participation in 
victim's death and received minimal attention at trial).  
Crespo's testimony, on the other hand, was brief and equivocal, 
and it suffered from credibility problems due to Crespo's 
inability to remember many details and his own admitted drug 
use.  For example, when asked whether he used drugs with the 
defendant following their visit to the pawn shop, he responded, 
"Probably.  I'm not sure.  I do drugs all the time."  Trial 
counsel pointed out these deficiencies on cross-examination.  
Likewise, the fact that the defendant called drug rehabilitation 
centers disclosed only that he was struggling with addiction and 
did not suggest any violent tendencies resulting from his 
addiction.  Contrast Bradshaw, supra (prior bad act evidence not 
unduly prejudicial even where "some of it . . . resembled the 
crime with which the defendant was charged).  The challenged 
evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and therefore 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting it. 
3.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a 
30 
 
reasonable doubt on the charge of murder in the first degree,7 
and that a required finding of not guilty therefore should 
enter.  Specifically, he contends that, after excluding the 
evidence that was admitted in error, the Commonwealth's case 
lacked evidence identifying the defendant as the person who 
killed the victim, including evidence of motive and 
consciousness of guilt.  The Commonwealth argues that, even if 
evidence from the defendant's cell phone was erroneously 
admitted, this evidence was cumulative of other, stronger 
evidence that was properly admitted, and that therefore the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
"In evaluating a claim of sufficiency, we 'determine 
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, any rational finder of fact could have found each 
of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 543 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 316 (2017).  "A conviction 
may rest exclusively on circumstantial evidence."  Jones, supra.  
While a conviction resting on circumstantial evidence may not 
"be based on conjecture or on inference piled upon inference," 
 
7 The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence with respect to his conviction of receiving stolen 
property. 
31 
 
when evaluating the evidence, "we draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the Commonwealth."  Id. 
At the time of the defendant's trial, to convict a 
defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an 
unlawful killing with malice aforethought, Commonwealth v. West, 
487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021), and with extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
indicated by "indifference to or taking pleasure in the victim's 
suffering, consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim, 
extent of physical injuries, number of blows, manner and force 
with which delivered, instrument employed, [or] disproportion 
between the means needed to cause death and those employed,"8 
Commonwealth v. Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 207 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  Malice is 
"an intent to cause death, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to 
do an act which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a 
 
8 As we noted in Commonwealth v. Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 207 
n.10 (2022), "[t]his court since has refined this standard in 
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 860-866 (2020)."  In 
Castillo, supra at 864-865, we held that a jury must consider 
whether the defendant's conduct was extreme in its brutality or 
its cruelty, and the jury may not base a conviction only on the 
degree of the victim's suffering.  The refinement does not 
affect this case, as we conclude infra that the evidence 
sufficed to show that the defendant's method of killing -- 
inflicting blunt force trauma through numerous blows which 
caused multiple injuries sufficient to cause death -- satisfied 
multiple Cunneen factors. 
32 
 
reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow" (alterations omitted).  Sun, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 164 
(2021). 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove that 
the defendant committed murder in the first degree on a theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See Andrade, 488 Mass. at 543.  
So viewed, the evidence established that the victim was killed, 
her apartment was ransacked, and her valuables were removed .  
The Commonwealth's evidence showed that the defendant lived on 
the third floor of the house and that he was at home on July 3 
at the suspected time of the victim's death.  Although the 
defendant offered differing versions of the events in his two 
statements to investigators, he indicated that he was friendly 
with the victim and that he spent time with the victim within an 
hour of her death.  The first-floor tenant testified that, on 
July 3, after he heard a bang from the room of the second-floor 
apartment where the victim's body was found, he did not hear 
anyone come down the stairs or leave the house.  A fingerprint 
matching that of the defendant's left ring finger was found on a 
plastic bag in the victim's bedroom.  This evidence supported 
the inference that the defendant was able to and did gain entry 
33 
 
to the victim's apartment and kill her, and then returned to the 
third-floor apartment without leaving the house. 
The victim's engagement ring, one of the items missing from 
the apartment, was found in the defendant's apartment, hidden 
under his mattress.  Based on records obtained from a pawn shop 
and the testimony of the pawn shop owner, the jury could have 
found that the defendant sold two other rings belonging to the 
victim and that he attempted to use a false name when doing so.  
This inference was strengthened by records that the Commonwealth 
obtained directly from the defendant's cell service provider 
pursuant to a warrant that showed that the defendant had called 
a number of pawn shops on July 3 and then again on July 6.  This 
evidence provided further support for a finding that the 
defendant was the person who killed the victim and removed her 
valuables from the apartment. 
On the night when the victim's body was discovered, the 
defendant assisted police officers in accessing the victim's 
apartment.  After leading the officers to the victim's apartment 
door, the defendant banged on the door without first knocking or 
calling out to anyone.  After officers had asked him to stop and 
begun looking for an alternative way to enter the apartment, 
without prompting, the defendant reached through a damaged door 
panel and opened the door.  The defendant then entered the 
apartment and proceeded directly to the dining room where the 
34 
 
victim's body was found.  This behavior supported the inference 
that the defendant already knew that the victim was dead and 
where her body was located.  In addition, the jury could have 
found from the evidence that the defendant repeatedly attempted 
to gain access to the victim's apartment while police officers 
were securing the scene, including under the apparent pretense 
of looking for his car keys, because of his guilty state of 
mind.  The jury also could have inferred from the defendant's 
going out onto the third-floor porch to smoke a cigarette while 
investigators were talking on the second-floor porch that the 
defendant was attempting to eavesdrop. 
The defendant's statements to police officers also 
supported an inference of guilt.  He made a number of statements 
about his whereabouts on July 3, including about bringing his 
girlfriend to work and seeing Ricky Crespo, that the jury could 
have found to be false based on information obtained in the 
subsequent investigation.  The jury also could have found that 
his statements about helping the victim with her lights, 
watching television with her, and helping her by the arm because 
she looked ill on July 3 all were part of an attempt to explain 
why his deoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints might be found in 
the victim's apartment. 
This evidence, taken together, was sufficient to support an 
inference that the defendant was the person who killed the 
35 
 
victim and took her belongings.9  In addition, the evidence of 
the victim's extensive injuries, including injuries to her neck 
and chest, either of which independently could have caused her 
death, supported the inference that the defendant inflicted the 
injuries with intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm, or 
that a reasonable person would have recognized a plain and 
strong likelihood that the injuries would cause death to the 
victim, an eighty-eight year old woman.  See West, 487 Mass. at 
800.  The extent of these injuries, the presence of multiple 
injuries sufficient to cause death, and the manner in which they 
were inflicted –- blunt force trauma through numerous blows -- 
also supported a finding that the killing was performed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227. 
Together, all of this evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, provided a sufficient basis for 
 
9 The defendant argues that, if the information obtained 
from the unlawful search of his cell phone had been suppressed, 
the Commonwealth's case would have been devoid of evidence of 
consciousness of guilt and motive.  As discussed supra, the 
defendant's behavior in the presence of police officers and 
statements to them provided evidence of consciousness of guilt 
that supported the inference that the defendant was the 
murderer, and this evidence was entirely independent of the 
search of his cell phone.  While motive is not an essential 
element of murder that the Commonwealth was required to prove, 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 487 Mass. 265, 275 n.11 (2021), the 
call records obtained from the defendant's cell service provider 
and Crepo's testimony provided independent evidence of his drug 
addiction as a motive for the killing notwithstanding the 
suppression of the cell phone evidence.  See notes 4, 6, supra. 
36 
 
the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty of the 
victim's murder. 
4.  Double jeopardy.  Because we affirm the defendant's 
conviction, we need not reach his arguments regarding whether 
subjecting him to further retrial would violate his double 
jeopardy rights.  The defendant also argues that he should not 
have been tried for a third time.  He asks us to dismiss the 
indictment of murder for this reason and to declare a bright-
line rule requiring that an indictment be dismissed after two 
trials have ended in hung juries.  We discern no grounds to 
alter our long-standing rule that a defendant may be retried 
after a mistrial due to a hung jury has been declared.  See 
Perrier v. Commonwealth, 489 Mass. 28, 31 n.3 (2022).  While an 
exception exists where the evidence at trial was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction, that exception is not implicated in this 
case.  See id. 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, after a 
thorough review of the case, we find no basis to exercise our 
discretion under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or 
order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motion for a new trial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  denied.