Title: GUNNELS v HOYT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-106
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 9, 1981

No. 80-106 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 RONALD L. GUNNELS, Plaintiff and Appellant, ROBIN W . HOYT and MICHAEL CHAPPEL BALSAM, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead. Honorable James M . Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Terry N. Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana For Respondents: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: April 22, 1981 Decided: September 9 , 1981 "EP - $ I 1981 Filed: @- IB B Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f appeals from the jury v e r d i c t and judgment entered i n the D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Flathead County. The jury found the defendants "[not] g u i l t y of negligence which was t h e proximate cause of P l a i n t i f f ' s claimed damages," and a l s o returned a s i m i l a r v e r d i c t i n favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f upon defendant Hoyt's counterclaim. The D i s t r i c t Court entered judgment f o r the defendants. Hoyt does n o t cross-appeal. P l a i n t i f f presents two i s s u e s f o r review: 1. W a s t h e r e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support a v e r d i c t f o r the defendants? 2. Were defense counsel's comments on excluded evidence s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o warrant a r e v e r s a l of the v e r d i c t f o r defendants and a new t r i a l f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f ? W e a f f i r m t h e jury v e r d i c t and judgment. This a c t i o n arose o u t of a motor v e h i c l e accident which occurred on September 19, 1977. P l a i n t i f f Ronald Gunnels brought s u i t a g a i n s t Robin Hoyt and Michael B a l s a m , a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e i r negligence had been the cause of the accident t h a t r e s u l t e d i n i n j u r y t o Gunnels. Hoyt counterclaimed a g a i n s t Gunnels, a l l e g i n g t h a t she had sustained bodily i n j u r y as a r e s u l t of Gunnels' negligence. T r i a l w a s held had been i n September 1979. The jury found n e i t h e r defendant/guilty of negligence which w a s t h e proximate cause of the p l a i n t i f f ' s claimed damages. Defendants were awarded c o s t s and disburse- ; ments t o t a l i n g $103.25, P l a i n t i f f Gunnels appeals from the v e r d i c t and judgment a g a i n s t him. P l a i n t i f f Gunnels w a s driving a 1972 Dodge half-ton pickup on September 19, 1977. H e drove i n t o the r e a r of a 1965 Volkswagen sedan i n t h e control of t h e defendants a t approximately 11:30 p.m. The c o l l i s i o n occurred on Montana ~ i g h w a y 40 between Columbia F a l l s and Whitefish, a t a s p o t 2.9 m i l e s w e s t of Columbia F a l l s , i n the westbound lane climbing "Dollar H i l l " . The road was w e t , and t h e r e was a s l i g h t m i s t o r d r i z z l e i n the a i r a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident. The n i g h t was ex- tremely dark due t o the r a i n y conditions and the wet a s p h a l t road. The highway was over 47 f e e t wide a t t h e s i t e , b u t had no white s t r i p e o r "fog l i n e " t o demarcate the shoulder a r e a and t o separate it from the main roadway. Because the p l a i n t i f f questions the sufficiency of t h e evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t , we w i l l review the evidence. According t o Hoyt and Balsam's testimonies, Robin Hoyt was driving w e s t towards Whitefish, with Balsam as a pas- senger, i n a f r i e n d ' s 1965 Volkswagen sedan. Approximately t h r e e m i l e s west of Columbia F a l l s , on "Dollar H i l l n , two c a t s r a n across t h e road i n f r o n t of the car. Hoyt swerved t o t h e r i g h t t o avoid h i t t i n g the c a t s ; she applied her brakes t o s t o p t h e c a r b u t f o r g o t t o depress the c l u t c h pedal, thereby causing t h e c a r t o stall. The c a r stopped o f f and t o t h e r i g h t of the main-traveled portion of t h e westbound lane according t o both defendants, although t h e r e was no shoulder s t r i p e , o r "fog l i n e " , t o separate t h e roadway from t h e shoulder area. The defendants' had had trouble s t a r t i n g the c a r earlier due t o a weak b a t t e r y , and w e r e n o t a b l e t o s t a r t t h e c a r again a f t e r s t a l l i n g . They attempted t o s t a r t it by "popping t h e clutch"; Balsam pushed t h e c a r backwards down the h i l l , while Hoyt remained i n the d r i v e r ' s s e a t i n order t o l e t o u t t h e c l u t c h while turning the i g n i t i o n . They executed t h i s maneuver 12-15 t i m e s over a period of 15-20 minutes, while backing down the h i l l 100-200 yards. Both t e s t i f i e d t h a t they attempted t o keep t h e c a r as c l o s e t o t h e r i g h t "west- bound" edge of t h e highway as possible, b u t t h a t Hoyt had some d i f f i c u l t y i n s t e e r i n g backwards s t r a i g h t down t h e h i l l and would swerve t o e i t h e r s i d e on occasion. The c a r ' s headlights and t a i l l i g h t s were on throughout t h e defendants' attempts t o "pop t h e clutch". During t h e above-described 15-20 minute period, seven o r e i g h t c a r s approached t h e Volkswagen going up t h e h i l l i n t h e westbound l a n e toward Whitefish ( t h e same d i r e c t i o n i n which t h e defendants had been t r a v e l i n g ) . Whenever a c a r came toward them, Balsam would push the Volkswagen t o t h e edge of t h e westbound lane, as f a r o u t of t h e roadway as p o s s i b l e , and then move t o t h e r e a r of t h e Volkswagen and attempt t o warn t h e approaching c a r by means of waving and shining a f l a s h l i g h t a t i t s windshield. The defendants t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l of t h e approaching d r i v e r s slowed per- c e p t i b l y t o pass. One c a r even stopped. A s p l a i n t i f f ' s truck approached t h e Volkswagen from t h e r e a r , Robin saw t h e l i g h t s of t h e truck, and t o l d Balsam of t h e v e h i c l e coming. She placed t h e c a r i n gear and pulled o u t t h e emergency brake. Balsam walked t o t h e r e a r of t h e Volkswagen and s t a r t e d shining t h e f l a s h l i g h t a t t h e windshield of p l a i n t i f f ' s truck. When p l a i n t i f f ' s truck d i d n o t slow down o r show any evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s having seen them, Balsam r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was going t o h i t them. Balsam y e l l e d a t Hoyt t o s t a y i n t h e c a r , and r a n o f f i n t o t h e barrow p i t . P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he never s a w Balsam o r t h e f l a s h - l i g h t o r t h e Volkswagen p r i o r t o t h e c o l l i s i o n . is truck, however, l e f t 26 f e e t of skidmarks i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e down t h e r i g h t , westbound lane, t h e l e f t skidmark being approxi- mately t h r e e f e e t from t h e c e n t e r l i n e . P l a i n t i f f had been t r a v e l i n g 50-60 m i l e s per hour according t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g patrolman. The patrolman a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t a d r i v e r coming from e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n would have an unobstructed l i n e of v i s i o n t o t h e site of t h e a c c i d e n t f o r a d i s t a n c e of 500- 600 f e e t . P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a complaint a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e defendants' negligence had caused t h e c o l l i s i o n and proximately r e s u l t e d i n damages t o p l a i n t i f f i n t h e nature of medical expenses, pain and s u f f e r i n g , l o s s of earning a b i l i t y , and i n property damage t o t h e truck. The answer admitted t h e c o l l i s i o n had occurred b u t denied t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s damages had been caused by any negligence on t h e p a r t of e i t h e r defendant. The answer a l l e g e d t h a t any i n j u r i e s o r damages suffered by t h e p l a i n t i f f had been caused i n whole o r i n p a r t by h i s own negligence. J u r y t r i a l was held i n September 1979. A t t h e c l o s e of t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of evidence, t h e p l a i n t i f f moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t as t o l i a b i l i t y , arguing t h a t t h e defen- d a n t s ' negligence had been proved a s a matter of l a w . The motion was denied. The jury returned t h e following v e r d i c t : "SPECIAL VERDICT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM "We, t h e jury, answer t h e questions submitted t o us i n t h i s Special Verdict as follows: "QUESTION NO. 1: Were t h e following named Defendants, o r e i t h e r o f Them, g u i l t y of negligence which w a s t h e proximate cause of P l a i n t i f f ' s claimed damages? "ANSWER: Robin Hoyt Y e s N o X Michael B a l s a m Y e s N o X I' The jury was then polled, and a l l 12 agreed with t h e v e r d i c t . Judgment upon the complaint was entered i n favor of t h e defendants. I. P l a i n t i f f ' s first i s s u e d i s p u t e s t h e sufficiency of t h e evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t . I n considering the s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence, w e apply a l i m i t e d standard of review. Where a f a c t i s s u e i s presented before a c o u r t s i t t i n g with a jury, and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e jury v e r d i c t , t h e v e r d i c t w i l l stand. Matter of E s t a t e of Holm (1979), - Mont. , 588 P. 2d 531, 533, 36 St-Rep. 11, 13 (and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ) . W e review t h e evidence i n a l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g party. W e w i l l r e v e r s e only where t h e r e i s a lack of s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e judgment. Ground- water v. Wright (1979), - Mont. - , 588 P.2d 1003, 1004, 36 St.Rep. 4 1 , 42; Holm, 588 P.2d 532, 36 St.Rep. 1 4 . Evidence may be i n h e r e n t l y weak and s t i l l be deemed s u b s t a n t i a l , and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence may c o n f l i c t with o t h e r evidence. Matter of E s t a t e of Holm, supra. I f t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g evidence i n t h e record, t h e c r e d i b i l i t y and weight given t o such c o n f l i c t i n g evidence i s t h e province of t h e jury and not t h i s Court. Holm; Cameron; I n Re C a r r o l l ' s E s t a t e (1921), 59 Mont. 403, 41-3, 196 P. 996, 998. I f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e finding of t h e jury, then w e must s u s t a i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a c t i o n i n denying t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d ver- d i c t . Butler Manufacturing Co. v. J & L Implement Co. (1975), 167 Mont. 519, 529, 540 P.2d 962, 968. P l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s Court has held t h a t where an automobile c o l l i s i o n i s caused by t h e v i o l a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e s t a t u t e , a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t should be entered a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y who v i o l a t e d t h e l a w upon t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y , and only t h e i s s u e of damages should be submitted t o t h e trier of f a c t . Such an argument i s one of negligence p e r se. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d upon t h r e e s t a t u t e s a l l e g e d t o have been v i o l a t e d by t h e defendants a t t h e time of t h e accident. Former s e c t i o n 32-2199, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 61-8-353, MCA, a s t h e jury was i n s t r u c t e d , provides i n p a r t : "Upon any highway . . . no person s h a l l stop, park, o r leave standing any vehicle, whether attended o r unattended, upon t h e paved o r main traveled p a r t of t h e highway when it i s p r a c t i c a l t o stop, park, o r so leave such v e h i c l e off of such p a r t of s a i d highway, b u t i n every event, an unobstructed width of t h e highway opposite a standing v e h i c l e s h a l l be l e f t f o r t h e f r e e passage of o t h e r vehicles. N o person s h a l l stop, stand, o r park any v e h i c l e on such highway unless such v e h i c l e can be seen by t h e d r i v e r of any o t h e r v e h i c l e approaching from e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n within f i v e hundred f e e t and unless d r i v e r s approaching from opposite d i r e c t i o n s are v i s i b l e t o each o t h e r when both a r e a t l e a s t f i v e hundred f e e t from t h e v e h i c l e t o be stopped, turned, o r parked, except i n cases of j u s t i f i a b l e emergency." Former s e c t i o n 32-21-118, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 61-9- 204, MCA, a s t h e jury i n s t r u c t e d , provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Every motor vehicle, . . . s h a l l be equipped with a t l e a s t one t a i l lamp mounted on t h e r e a r which, when l i g h t e d a s required, s h a l l e m i t a red l i g h t p l a i n l y v i s i b l e from a d i s t a n c e of f i v e hundred f e e t t o t h e rear . . ." Former s e c t i o n 32-21-104, R.C.M., 1947, now s e c t i o n 61- 8-358, MCA, as t h e jury w h s i n s t r u c t e d , provides t h a t : "The d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t back t h e s a m e unless such movement can be made with reasonable s a f e t y and without i n t e r f e r i n g with o t h e r t r a f f i c . " I n order t o prove negligence per s e , t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s required t o prove t h a t t h e defendants neglected a duty imposed upon them by s t a t u t e . Williams v. Maley (1967), 150 Mont. 261, 267, 434 P.2d 398, 401; Conway v. Monidah Trust CO. (1913), 47 Mont. 269, 278, 132 P. 26, 27. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , s e c t i o n 61-8-353, MCA, provides t h a t no person s h a l l s t o p o r leave standing any v e h i c l e upon t h e main traveled p a r t of t h e highway when it i s p r a c t i c a l t o s t o p o r leave such v e h i c l e o f f of such p a r t of s a i d highway. What i s " p r a c t i c a l " i n any s i t u a t i o n c l e a r l y depends upon a l l of the surrounding f a c t s and circumstances. See Lyndes v. S c o f i e l d (1979), Mont. - - , 589 P.2d 1000, 1 0 0 2 , 36 St.Rep. 185, 188. Questions of f a c t a r e f o r t h e jury t o resolve, and should n o t be taken from t h e jury when reasonable men might draw d i f f e r e n t conclusions from t h e evidence. Heen v. Tiddy' (1968), 151 Mont. 265, 269, 442 P.2d 434, 436. I n looking a t t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e defendant, we f i n d t h a t t h e defendants could have stopped t h e Volkswagen c l o s e r t o t h e r i g h t edge of the pavement and f u r t h e r o f f t h e main traveled a r e a ; b u t w e a l s o f i n d t h a t t h e weather condi- t i o n s , t h e darkness, t h e h i l l , t h e absence of white l i n e s , head l i g h t s and t a i l l i g h t s , and t h e use of t h e f l a s h l i g h t by t h e defendant t o warn approaching d r i v e r s , a l l bear upon t h e question of p r a c t i c a l i t y . This Court w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e j u r y ' s determination i f the evidence f u r n i s h e s rea- sonable grounds f o r d i f f e r e n t conclusions. Payne v. Sorenson Mont. (1979) I - - , 599 P.2d 362, 365, 36 S t . Rep. 1610, 1613. W e do n o t f i n d a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 61-8-353, MCA, a s a matter of law. P l a i n t i f f contends t h a t t h e defendants were negligent p e r se i n v i o l a t i n g s e c t i o n 61-9-204, MCA, t h e t a i l lamp s t a t u t e . The evidence showed t h a t t h e Volkswagen's b a t t e r y was i n a p a r t i a l l y discharged condition p r i o r t o s t a l l i n g , but a l s o showed t h a t t h e t a i l l i g h t s of t h e c a r w e r e on a t t h e t i m e of the accident. W e cannot conclude a s a matter of law t h a t t h e defendants v i o l a t e d t h i s s e c t i o n . There is a question of f a c t f o r t h e jury t o r e s o l v e which should n o t be taken from the jury where reasonable men might draw d i f - f e r e n t conclusions, Heen. Section 61-8-358, MCA, i s the backing s t a t u t e . While t h e defendants had been backing the Volkswagen a t an e a r l i e r time, the Volkswagen was s t a t i o n a r y a t the time of the c o l l i s i o n . A question may be r a i s e d a s t o whether t h e backing s t a t u t e should apply. I n addition, under the s t a t u t e a determination was required a s t o whether o r not t h e move- ment of backing could be made with reasonable s a f e t y and without i n t e r f e r i n g with other t r a f f i c . Again w e conclude t h a t t h e r e was n o t a v i o l a t i o n of the s t a t u t e as a matter of law, and t h a t t h e questions of f a c t are f o r t h e jury t o resolve. W e f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support a determination t h a t the defendants d i d n o t breach any of t h e d u t i e s imposed by t h e above c i t e d s t a t u t e s . 11. P l a i n t i f f contends on common l a w negligence grounds t h a t t h e r e i s no evidence t o support a conclusion t h a t the defendants d i d n o t breach t h e duty of c a r e owed t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . I t was up t o t h e jury t o decide whether the defendant had exercised t h e ordinary c a r e required of a reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances. The jury w a s properly i n s t r u c t e d . P l a i n t i f f assigns no e r r o r t o any i n s t r u c t i o n s . Substantial evidence supports the v e r d i c t i n t h i s regard when viewed i n a l i g h t most favorable t o the defendants: t h e defendants attempted t o keep o u t of t h e roadway a s much a s possible, l e f t t h e Volkswagen's l i g h t s burning, and attempted t o warn approaching cars by waving a f l a s h l i g h t a t them; t h e d r i v e r s of seven o r e i g h t c a r s saw t h e defendants and slowed down t o pass p r i o r t o t h e c o l l i s i o n . The jury could rea- sonably conclude t h a t such actions had f u l f i l l e d t h e duty t o exercise ordinary care. The p l a i n t i f f argued t o the jury t h a t t h e Volkswagen was less v i s i b l e t o the p l a i n t i f f than it had been t o t h e previous approaching c a r s , f o r t h e reasons t h a t , by t h e t i m e t h e p l a i n t i f f approached, t h e Volkswagen was f a r t h e r o u t i n the roadway, was c l o s e r t o t h e curve around which it f i r s t became v i s i b l e , and was less well l i g h t e d due t o f u r t h e r discharge of the b a t t e r y . These were a l l f a c t u a l arguments which t h e jury could accept o r r e j e c t , and where s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e defendants' favor e x i s t s , w e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e judgment. 111. One of t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e pleadings and framed i n t h e p r e t r i a l order was whether the defendants' a c t i o n s had proximately caused p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y . W e f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support a determination t h a t they d i d not. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d about t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s duty t o operate h i s v e h i c l e i n a c a r e f u l and prudent manner and a t a r a t e of speed no g r e a t e r than i s reasonable and proper under t h e e x i s t i n g conditions ( s e c t i o n 61-8-303, MCA, formerly s e c t i o n 32-2144, R.C.M. 1947), and h i s duty t o see t h a t which he could have seen by keeping a proper lookout. P l a i n t i f f a s s i g n s no e r r o r t o the i n s t r u c t i o n s . There i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support a conclusion t h a t t h e plain- t i f f ' s i n j u r y w a s proximately caused by h i s own a c t i o n s , and n o t by any negligence on t h e p a r t of t h e defendants. The i n v e s t i g a t i n g patrolman t e s t i f i e d t h e a c c i d e n t could have had s e v e r a l causes, including t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was t r a v e l i n g too f a s t and not keeping a proper lookout. Testimony by a p l a i n t i f f t h a t he d i d not see another v e h i c l e p r i o r t o h i t t i n g it has previously been recognized a s evidence of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s own negligence s u f f i c i e n t t o support a v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant. Bernhard v. Lincoln County (1968), 150 Mont. 557, 561, 437 P.2d 377, 380. Having reviewed t h e evidence and concluded it i s s u b s t a n t i a l and s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e jury v e r d i c t , our i n q u i r y on t h i s i s s u e i s ended. P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of misconduct by defense counsel, t h e most s e r i o u s being t h a t defense counsel made improper comments upon and references t o excluded evidence, which i n d i c a t e d t o the jury t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was concealing evidence. The defense attempted t o introduce i n t o evidence t h e records of a D r . Kiley, who had been t h e f i r s t physician t o examine t h e p l a i n t i f f a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n . D r . Kiley w a s n o t c a l l e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f although l i s t e d i n the p r e t r i a l order a s a witness t o be c a l l e d a t t r i a l . The defense could n o t l o c a t e D r . Kiley, and attempted t o e s t a b l i s h t h e accuracy of t h e records by c a l l i n g an employee of t h e doctor. The employee w a s n o t f a m i l i a r with t h e records o r the d o c t o r ' s record keeping procedure; t h e records were excluded upon objection by t h e p l a i n t i f f . During t h e argument regarding a d m i s s i b i l i t y , defense counsel spoke a s follows: "THE COURT: I haven't seen t h e records. I d o n ' t know what she i s going t o t e s t i f y t o . A s I in- d i c a t e , I a m concerned t h a t t h e doctor i s n ' t here t o explain things, make s u r e nothing has been l e f t out. "[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, t h a t of course-- I have m y case, t h e claimant has h i s . And i f he wants t o be s u r e t h a t nothing has been l e f t o u t , he could c a l l t h e t r e a t i n g doctor. I would have c a l l e d him. I couldn' t g e t him. But a s it is, I want t h i s portion. P l a i n t i f f had t h e same chance t h a t I did. " [ P l a i n t i f f ' s Counsel]: Your Honor, I d o n ' t have t o c a l l somebody who has no information t o o f f e r , and I d o n ' t have t o s i t here and l e t half of t h e inform- a t i o n go i n because he d i d n ' t ask him ahead of t i m e . "THE COURT: I am concerned about the lack of c r o s s examination, so I w i l l s u s t a i n the objection." ( T r . p. 408) L a t e r , during the closing argument, defense counsel made reference t o t h e records: "Now, what about D r . Kiley? There is an i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i s on a l l f o u r ' s on t h a t . I want t o read it t o you. And it i s Court's i n s t r u c t i o n number 23 and 24. 'Evidence considered n o t only by i t s only in- t r i n s i c weight, b u t according t o the evidence within t h e power of one s i d e t o produce and t h e other t o contradict. And t h a t i f weaker and less s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence i s offered, when it appears t h a t stronger and more s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence could have been pro- duced, the evidence should be viewed with d i s t r u s t . "24, ' I f a p a r t y has f a i l e d t o produce a witness within h i s power t o produce, you may, i f you see f i t , i n f e r from t h a t , t h a t i f you a r e given the testimony of such witness it would not have been favorable t o such party.' And then it goes on t o say t h a t depends on whether he was a v a i l a b l e t o both sides. "Now, you know t h a t I subpoenaed the records of D r . Kiley. Now, l a i d e s [ s i c ] and gentlemen, I d o n ' t think t h a t t h a t i s m y duty. I a m t h e defendant i n t h i s case. I a m n o t the one t h a t should bring i n p l a i n t i f f ' s t r e a t i n g doctors. And I believe t h a t was the p l a i n t i f f ' s duty. And I believe t h a t he should have brought them i n . But I subpoenaed t h e records, and I t r i e d t o g e t the records f o r you. And now the Court has t o l d you t h a t you can believe a s men and women what you would believe a s jurors. Now, as men and women you may believe t h a t those records of D r . Kiley, and D r . Kiley's testimony-- " [ P l a i n t i f f 's Counsel] : I a m going t o object, Your Honor, That is contrary t o t h e Court' s i n s t r u c t i o n , which i s t h a t he i s n o t t o comment on why t h e Court made a r u l i n g , because they don' t know. And he can' t t e l l them. H e i s only misleading t h e jury r i g h t now. "THE COURT: I d o n ' t think your conclusion i s cor- r e c t , M r . Heckathorn. G o ahead. "[Defense Counsel]: . . . [Ylou may conclude, i f you wish, under t h e Court's i n s t r u c t i o n number 25, t h a t t h a t testimony would be unfavorable t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . And I think the p l a i n t i f f had t h e obligation of bringing t h a t witness i n t o you and l e t t i n g D r . Kiley t e l l you about h i s condition." ( T r . p ~ . 519-20) P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s the two statements by defense counsel implied t o the jury t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was attempting t o conceal evidence, and improperly commented upon t h e c o u r t ' s reasons f o r excluding evidence. W e do n o t agree. I n t h e f i r s t c i t e d instance, defense counsel was n o t implying a concealment of evidence; he was responding t o the c o u r t ' s question of concern t h a t the records might n o t be complete. Defense counsel answered t h a t i f t h e p l a i n t i f f believed something was l e f t out, he could c a l l t h e doctor as a witness and f i n d out. There i s no b a s i s t o compare t h a t statement with t h e one made i n Ralph v. MacMarr Stores (1936), 103 Mont. 4 2 1 , 436, 62 P.2d 1285, 1291, where counsel s t a t e d , "If I can prevent it you a r e not going t o hide t h i s l a d y ' s case from t h i s Court and Jury." When read i n context, the second instance shows t h a t defense counsel was commenting upon the p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o c a l l D r . Kiley o r t o provide h i s records, within t h e context of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 24. Counsel was i n t e r r u p t e d by the p l a i n t i f f ' s objection i n midsentence, and a s a r e s u l t , was misunderstood. He was n o t saying the jury could believe the records and D r . Kiley's testimony; obviously, such would have been impossible. He was saying the jury could believe t h a t t h e evidence, i f produced, would have been favorable t o t h e defendants b u t was i n t e r r u p t e d before he could f i n i s h . P l a i n t i f f does not assign any e r r o r t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t s e l f . The only reference i n the second example which might have been improper i s defense counsel's statement t h a t he had subpoenaed t h e records, and t r i e d t o g e t them i n . Perhaps t h a t d i d comment upon the c o u r t ' s exclusionary ruling. But the c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 adequately warned t h e jury not t o draw any inferences from r u l i n g s on evidence, n o t t o consider r e j e c t e d evidence, and n o t t o conjecture o r draw any inferences a s t o what an answer might have been, o r a s t o the reason behind any objection, Improper argument r e q u i r e s r e v e r s a l only when prejudice has r e s u l t e d which prevents a f a i r t r i a l . Vogel v. F e t t e r Livestock Co. (1964), 1 4 4 Mont. 127, 1 3 9 , 394 P.2d 766, The jury w a s properly in- s t r u c t e d . W e cannot say t h a t any prejudice r e s u l t e d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . W e f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t when the record i s viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e defendants. W e a l s o f i n d no misconduct on t h e p a r t of t h e defense counsel t h a t amounts t o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e a f f i r m t h e judgment of t h e District Court. W e concur: % C ~ & J ~ ~ Q & _ D Chief ~ u s t ? c e J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e h i s w r i t t e n d i s s e n t a t a l a t e r t i m e .