Title: State v. Acosta
Citation: 101 Ariz. 127, 416 P.2d 560
Docket Number: 1553
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 1966

101 Ariz. 127 (1966) 416 P.2d 560 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Bernie Escobar ACOSTA, Appellant. No. 1553. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. July 13, 1966. Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Philip M. Haggerty, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. *128 Lawrence C. Cantor, Phoenix, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Bernie Escobar Acosta, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was tried, convicted and sentenced to serve not less than ten nor more than twelve years in the Arizona state prison for the unlawful sale of narcotics, in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.02, as amended. From the conviction and sentence he appeals. At approximately 9:30 p.m., December 2, 1963, A.F. Barrios, agent of the narcotics division of the state liquor control, was present at the home of Albert Dominguez, special employee of the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control. Barrios searched Dominguez' clothing for evidence of narcotics, then handed him an unmarked ten-dollar bill to be used for the purchase of narcotics. Agent Barrios then followed Dominguez to a tavern located near Third Street and Jefferson in Phoenix. Dominguez entered the tavern in search of two females from whom he felt he could purchase heroin. Dominguez saw defendant in the tavern and inquired if defendant had seen the two women he was seeking. Defendant answered that he had not but inquired why Dominguez wanted them. Dominguez expressed to defendant a desire to purchase "carga" (slang for heroin), and defendant stated he could accommodate him. The two men, observed by agent Barrios who was parked outside the tavern, left and entered Dominguez' car and proceeded to the nearby town of Glendale where defendant, leaving Dominguez in the car, was gone some ten minutes. He then returned and upon starting back to Phoenix, in exchange for the ten-dollar bill, gave Dominguez a "paper" of heroin, later introduced in evidence. Dominguez and defendant returned to the same parking place on Third Street and Jefferson. Defendant stepped out of the car for a moment; the two men then went to defendant's nearby hotel room for a few minutes; Dominguez then returned to his home where agent Barrios, who had followed defendant's car during the entire transaction, took the "paper" from him. Barrios did not see the actual exchange of heroin for money. Defendant first contends the lower court erred in permitting the prosecution, in closing argument, to refer to defendant's failure to testify or present evidence. Defendant refers to the following argument by counsel for the state: A.R.S. § 13-163 provides in part: Any direct or indirect statements amounting to an allusion a defendant failed to testify may well constitute reversible error. State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 294 P.2d 677. Statements by the prosecution that defendant has not acknowledged his actions nor shown remorse during the trial do not constitute comment on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Serna, 69 Ariz. 181, 211 P.2d 455, appeal dismissed, Serna v. Walters, 339 U.S. 973, 70 S. Ct. 1031, 94 L. Ed. 1380. In Tomaris v. State, 71 Ariz. 147, 224 P.2d 209, a statement almost identical to one *129 of those complained of in the instant case, was upheld, the court stating: Udall, in his work on evidence, makes the following observation with reference to A.R.S. § 13-163: In 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence 323 (5th Ed. 1956), the following test is set forth: Based upon this test, and under the interpretations of this court, we find the statements complained of were not comments on defendant's failure to testify, but were merely general comments on the fact that the evidence was uncontradicted. The general context of the argument surrounding the statements complained of was not to allude to defendant's failure to testify, but rather to bring home the point that the evidence was, at least in the view of counsel for the state, uncontroverted, and justified a verdict of guilt. Defendant cites to this court the recent United States Supreme Court case of Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, as persuasive of his position. We do not feel the Griffin case is controlling herein. In Griffin the comments of counsel for the state did not merely allude to, or indirectly refer to, defendant's failure to testify, but were direct comments on his failure to take the stand. The comments complained of included the following: Defendant raises a further point in support of his argument that the state improperly commented upon defendant's failure to testify. He argues that at least one juror indicated after the trial that the fact defendant failed to testify was considered by him in his deliberations, thus it is impossible to tell if more, or perhaps all, the jurors considered this matter. We consider this argument without merit. We have consistently held a juror may not impeach the verdict. State v. Mangrum, 98 Ariz. 279, 403 P.2d 925; State v. Silvas, 91 Ariz. 386, 372 P.2d 718, cert. denied, 371 *130 U.S. 970, 83 S. Ct. 552, 9 L. Ed. 2d 539. The trial court properly instructed the jury as follows: Defendant expressly states in his brief that he is not attempting to impeach the verdict of the jury, but merely that the comments of the deputy county attorney, when viewed in light of the jury's deliberations, require reversal. This matter was considered by the trial court when it denied defendant's motion for new trial. In State v. Byrd, 94 Ariz. 139, 382 P.2d 555, in disposing of a contention that conversation between a juror and the county attorney necessitated granting a new trial, we said: In the instant case the trial judge conducted a hearing into this matter. He ruled on the motion for a new trial, denying said motion on these grounds. We find no abuse of discretion in his handling of the matter. Defendant next contends the lower court erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of defendant based upon insufficiency of evidence. There is no duty on the part of the trial court to direct an acquittal where there is substantial evidence the defendant committed the crime charged. State v. Silvas, supra. This court, on review of the lower court's denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict, must view the facts most strongly in favor of upholding the verdict of the jury. State v. Turner (July 7, 1966), 101 Ariz. 85, 416 P.2d 409; State v. Manis, 95 Ariz. 27, 386 P.2d 77. This motion questions not the competency of the evidence, but its sufficiency. State v. Holliday, 92 Ariz. 168, 375 P.2d 370. In State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400, the same contention was made as in the instant case. In Reyes, supra, in which Dominguez was the informer and Barrios was the agent, we said: As in State v. Reyes, supra, Dominguez testified in the instant case as to the sale. Barrios testified that while he did not see the actual sale, he followed defendant and Dominguez to the place of sale. The evidence was uncontradicted that the "paper" contained heroin. There was no evidence to refute the other evidence of the state. We therefore hold the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty of the unlawful sale of narcotics. Defendant claims the lower court erred in refusing to give an instruction on entrapment. We cannot agree with this position. *131 In State v. Reyes, supra, in dealing with the same argument, we said: In the instant case the facts are no stronger in favor of entrapment than in State v. Reyes, supra. We hold the lower court did not commit error in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction on entrapment. Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with reference to testimony of Dominguez as an accomplice, and that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated. We have repeatedly held the testimony of an informer need not be corroborated for the reason that he is not an accomplice. State v. Arriola, 99 Ariz. 332, 409 P.2d 37; State v. Chavez, 98 Ariz. 236, 403 P.2d 545; State v. Moraga, 98 Ariz. 195, 403 P.2d 289. In all these cases the crime involved was the same as that in the instant case, to wit, illegal sale of narcotics. In all these cases the same argument was made that the informer's testimony had to be corroborated because he was an accomplice. And in all three cases we held such corroboration was not necessary. We therefore hold the trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested instructions on corroboration of testimony of an accomplice. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and UDALL, J., concur.