Title: Ex parte TruckMax, Inc., and Babco Engineering, LLC.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022-0957
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2023

Rel: February 17, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0957 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte TruckMax, Inc., and Babco Engineering, LLC 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re:  Latosha Caster-Harris and Ella Thomas-Harris  
 
v.  
 
TruckMax, Inc., et al.)  
 
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-21-900024) 
 
SELLERS, Justice. 
SC-2022-0957 
2 
 
 
TruckMax, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, Babco 
Engineering, LLC (collectively referred to as "TruckMax"), petitioned this 
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the 
trial court") to allow TruckMax to amend its answer in this workers' 
compensation/wrongful-death action so that TruckMax may assert as a 
defense that one of the plaintiffs, Latosha Caster-Harris, who is the wife 
of the decedent involved in this case, lacks the capacity to pursue claims 
against TruckMax.  The parties agree that TruckMax's lack-of-capacity 
defense is an affirmative defense that will be waived if not pleaded.  See 
Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., 146 So. 3d 1041, 1044 (Ala. 2013) 
("[S]urviving dependents of a deceased employee have the capacity to 
bring an action and … a defendant waives the challenge to capacity by 
not raising it.").  Because we conclude that TruckMax has not established 
that the trial court's ruling denying its motion for leave to amend its 
answer should be reviewed pursuant to a mandamus petition, we deny 
the petition. 
 
In October 2020, Joseph Harris was killed when he was struck by a 
litter truck while cleaning up trash on Interstate 22.  The truck was being 
driven by Nekoile Bolton, who was an employee of Sweeping Corporation 
SC-2022-0957 
3 
 
of America ("SCA").  At the time of the accident, Joseph had been 
assigned to SCA by a temporary-employment agency called StaffZone to 
provide trash-collection services for SCA.  SCA owned the truck that 
Bolton was driving.  TruckMax has been accused of improperly designing 
and manufacturing the truck.  TruckMax, however, claims that it acted 
only as the dealer that sold the truck to SCA and that the truck was 
designed and manufactured by an entity that is not a party to this action.  
That issue has not been resolved. 
 
On January 5, 2021, Joseph's wife Latosha sued TruckMax, 
StaffZone, SCA, Bolton, and Bolton's supervisor, Shellie Waites.  Joseph's 
mother Ella Thomas-Harris was also named as a plaintiff in the action.  
The plaintiffs alleged a workers' compensation claim against StaffZone, 
Joseph's employer; negligence, wantonness, and wrongful-death claims 
against SCA and its employees Bolton and Waites; and negligence, 
wantonness, and wrongful-death claims and a claim under the Alabama 
Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine against TruckMax.  It 
appears that all the defendants except TruckMax eventually settled with 
the plaintiffs and were dismissed from the action. 
SC-2022-0957 
4 
 
 
In March 2021, TruckMax filed a motion to dismiss the claims 
against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., but it did not 
challenge either plaintiff's capacity to sue.  In September 2021, the trial 
court denied the motion to dismiss and gave TruckMax seven days to file 
an answer to the complaint.  TruckMax timely answered but did not 
assert that either plaintiff lacked the capacity to sue.  A little less than a 
year later, on August 15, 2022, TruckMax filed a motion for leave to 
amend its answer to assert that Latosha lacked the capacity to pursue 
her claims against TruckMax.1 
In support of its motion for leave to amend, TruckMax asserted that 
Latosha had recently given deposition testimony indicating that she is 
not Joseph's dependent under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act 
("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  TruckMax claimed that 
Latosha's testimony conflicted with allegations in the complaint and with 
 
1TruckMax's petition for a writ of mandamus does not request any 
relief with respect to the claims asserted by Joseph's mother.  Rather, the 
petition concentrates on evidence of Latosha's alleged lack of capacity to 
pursue the action and states that TruckMax is "seeking to add a single 
affirmative defense based on newly-discovered evidence that Latosha 
lacked capacity to sue." Petition at 2. 
SC-2022-0957 
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Latosha's previous responses to interrogatories indicating that Latosha 
is Joseph's dependent.   
According to TruckMax, if Latosha is not Joseph's dependent under 
the Act, then she does not have the capacity to pursue claims against 
TruckMax.  See § 25-5-11(a), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that, if a death 
that is compensable under the Act is "caused under circumstances also 
creating a legal liability for damages on the part of any party other than 
the employer," the deceased employee's "dependents" may, in addition to 
seeking compensation under the Act, "bring an action against the other 
party to recover damages for the … death"); Alabama Power Co. v. White, 
377 So. 2d 930, 932 (Ala. 1979) (construing § 25-5-11(a) and concluding 
that, if an employee's death is caused by a workplace accident covered by 
the Act, then § 25-5-11(a) gives the employee's dependents capacity to 
seek compensation from the employer and from any culpable third party).  
TruckMax also points to § 25-5-61(1), Ala. Code 1975, which provides 
that, although a wife typically is conclusively presumed to be her 
husband's dependent for workers' compensation purposes, that 
presumption fails if it is shown that 1) "she was voluntarily living apart 
from her husband at the time of his injury or death" or 2) "the husband 
SC-2022-0957 
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was not in any way contributing to her support and had not in any way 
contributed to her support for more than 12 months next preceding the 
occurrence of the injury causing his death."  Latosha testified during her 
deposition that she and Joseph had voluntarily lived apart for the 10 
years preceding the accident, even though her interrogatory responses, 
which were submitted months earlier, indicated that Joseph and Latosha 
had lived together.   
Twelve days after Latosha's deposition, TruckMax moved to amend 
its answer, pointing out that it had only recently learned that Latosha 
allegedly was not Joseph's dependent and therefore lacks the capacity to 
sue.  The trial court denied TruckMax's motion, concluding that 
TruckMax's effort to amend its answer was untimely.  The trial court also 
questioned the merits of TruckMax's proposed lack-of-capacity defense.  
This mandamus petition followed. 
Pursuant to Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., "a party may amend a 
pleading without leave of court, but subject to disallowance on the court's 
own motion or a motion to strike of an adverse party, at any time more 
than forty-two (42) days before the first setting of the case for trial."  The 
first trial date set in this action was September 19, 2022.  TruckMax 
SC-2022-0957 
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sought to amend its answer on August 15, 2022, 12 days after Latosha's 
deposition, but 35 days before the first trial date.  Thus, TruckMax 
missed the deadline to amend without leave by eight days.   
When a party seeks to amend a pleading after the expiration of the 
deadline to amend without leave, the party "may amend … only by leave 
of court, and leave shall be given only upon a showing of good cause."  
Rule 15(a).  This Court has construed this portion of Rule 15(a) as follows: 
"[I]n light of the overarching liberal policy of allowing 
amendments under Rule 15, the appropriate way to view the 
request for leave to amend, if a party demonstrates 'good 
cause,' is as though the request had been brought more than 
42 days before trial, when the trial court does not have 
'unbridled discretion' to deny the leave to amend, but can do 
so only upon the basis of a 'valid ground' as stated above." 
 
Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 858 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. 2003) 
(quoting Ex parte Bailey, 814 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 2001)).  If "good cause" 
is demonstrated, valid grounds nevertheless exist for refusing to allow an 
amendment when there is actual prejudice or undue delay.  Id. at 953.   
Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to allow a party 
to amend a pleading under Rule 15(a).  Burkett v. American Gen. Fin., 
Inc., 607 So. 2d 138, 141 (Ala. 1992).  This Court, however, declines to 
decide whether the trial court in this case exceeded its discretion in 
SC-2022-0957 
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denying TruckMax's motion for leave to amend because TruckMax has 
not demonstrated that the filing of a mandamus petition is a proper 
method of seeking appellate review in this case. 
"'The standard governing our review of an 
issue presented in a petition for the writ of 
mandamus is well established: 
 
"'"[M]andamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and 
extraordinary writ to be issued only 
where there is (1) a clear legal right in 
the petitioner to the order sought; (2) 
an 
imperative 
duty 
upon 
the 
respondent to perform, accompanied by 
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another 
adequate remedy; and (4) properly 
invoked jurisdiction of the court."' 
 
"Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 774-75 (Ala. 2000) (quoting 
Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989))." 
 
Ex parte Webber, 157 So. 3d 887, 891 (Ala. 2014) (emphasis added).   
TruckMax points to Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 
supra, in support of the assertion in its mandamus petition that "[a] party 
lacks another adequate remedy where, as here, a trial court denies a 
motion for leave to amend to assert an affirmative defense to which it is 
entitled."  Petition at 11.  In Liberty National, this Court did indeed issue 
a writ of mandamus directing a trial court to allow the defendant to 
amend its answer to plead a previously omitted affirmative defense.  The 
SC-2022-0957 
9 
 
Court, however, did not explain why a petition for a writ of mandamus, 
and not an appeal, was appropriate.  More recently, in Ex parte Gulf 
Health Hospitals, Inc., 321 So. 3d 629 (Ala. 2020), a defendant sought 
mandamus relief after the trial court in that case had allowed the 
plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege additional facts in support of a 
medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action.  This Court denied the 
mandamus petition, concluding that the defendant had failed to establish 
that an appeal would not be an adequate means of reviewing a trial 
court's alleged error with respect to allowing a party to amend a pleading.  
In doing so, the Court stated as follows regarding the lack-of-another-
adequate-remedy element necessary for mandamus review: 
"Parties often try to satisfy this element by citing caselaw in 
which this Court has determined that the issue being raised 
by the party is recognized for interlocutory appellate review. 
Although that may be sufficient in those cases in which it is 
well established that the issue being raised is appropriate for 
mandamus review (e.g., immunity), it is not sufficient here, 
where [the defendant] is challenging the trial court's ruling 
on a motion to amend a complaint. More is needed." 
 
Gulf Health Hosps., 321 So. 3d at 632.  In its mandamus petition, 
TruckMax simply cites to Liberty National in support of its assertion that 
SC-2022-0957 
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mandamus review is proper in this case.  But, as stated in Gulf Health 
Hospitals, "[m]ore is needed."  Id.2 
In response to TruckMax's mandamus petition, the plaintiffs rely 
substantially on Gulf Health Hospitals, but TruckMax ignores that case 
in its reply brief.  Instead, TruckMax points to Ex parte Yarbrough, 788 
So. 2d 128 (Ala. 2000), decided 20 years before Gulf Health Hospitals.  In 
Yarbrough, this Court considered the filing of a mandamus petition an 
appropriate method of seeking appellate review of a trial court's refusal 
to allow a defendant to amend his counterclaim and third-party claim 
based on information he had learned during last-minute depositions.  The 
Court appears to have based its decision to engage in mandamus review 
on the likelihood that an appeal would have resulted in a holding that 
the trial court had erred and the fact that the remedy would have been 
to order a new trial.  But the same could be said about multiple types of 
trial-court error that are not normally subject to mandamus review.  
 
2By providing a citation to one case in which this Court engaged in 
mandamus review with respect to a trial court's ruling on a motion for 
leave to amend an answer to raise a previously omitted affirmative 
defense, TruckMax has not demonstrated that it is "well established that 
the issue being raised [in this case] is appropriate for mandamus review."  
Gulf Health Hosps., 321 So. 3d at 632. 
SC-2022-0957 
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Moreover, the Court in Yarbrough made sure to note that, "[i]f the 
remedy by way of appeal is adequate, as is usually the case with rulings 
allowing or disallowing amendments, we will decline to grant the writ."  
788 So. 2d at 132 (emphasis added).  See also Gulf Health Hosps., 321 So. 
3d at 633 ("'It is not to be assumed or understood, however, that 
mandamus will be allowed as a method of reviewing all rulings denying 
the right to amend a complaint or other pleading. In accord with the 
weight of authority and sound reasoning, it may well be that review of 
the great majority of rulings allowing or disallowing amendments will be 
only by appeal.'" (quoting Ex parte Miller, 292 Ala. 554, 557-58, 297 So. 
2d 802, 805 (1974))).  In light of the recent admonishment in Gulf Health 
Hospitals, we are not convinced by the citation to Yarbrough that 
mandamus review is appropriate in the present case.3 
 
3TruckMax suggests that the Court in Yarbrough also considered 
mandamus review appropriate in part because the parties opposing the 
defendant's request for leave to amend his counterclaim and third-party 
claim contributed to the delay in the defendant's discovering the 
information underlying his desire to amend his claims.  According to 
TruckMax, the plaintiffs in the present case contributed to TruckMax's 
not learning that Latosha might not be Joseph's dependent until shortly 
before the first trial setting.  Although the Court in Yarbrough 
acknowledged that the delay was not completely the defendant's fault, it 
did not clearly state that that circumstance was a justification for 
reviewing the trial court's actions pursuant to a mandamus petition. 
SC-2022-0957 
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The Court does acknowledge precedent wherein we have reviewed 
by way of a mandamus petition a trial court's refusal to allow a defendant 
to pursue a particular affirmative defense for reasons other than 
tardiness.  For example, the Court in Ex parte Teal, 336 So. 3d 165, 168 
(Ala. 2021), granted a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a 
summary judgment in favor of a shooting victim on the defendant's 
affirmative defenses alleging self-defense and statutory immunity to 
liability.  TruckMax, however, does not discuss that precedent or 
otherwise explain why it might establish that mandamus relief is 
appropriate here.  Moreover, in Ex parte Tahsin Industrial Corp., U.S.A., 
4 So. 3d 1121 (Ala. 2008), this Court concluded that mandamus review 
was not available to challenge a trial court's order striking a particular 
affirmative defense because that defense, if successful, would not have 
completely resolved the action against the defendant; it would have only 
reduced the available damages: 
"By asserting that it is not subject to the statutory claim for 
three times the damages allegedly sustained by [the plaintiff] 
plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs under [a 
statutory scheme dealing with sales commissions], [the 
defendant] only partially avoids judgment because its 
defense, if upheld, would not be determinative of the action. 
See Ex parte Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 845 So. 2d 773, 776 
(Ala. 2002) ('Likewise, governed by the particular concerns of 
SC-2022-0957 
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judicial economy raised by the scenario involved here -- a trial 
court's pretrial decision to strike a potentially determinative 
affirmative defense -- we have previously issued the writ [of 
mandamus] after holding that the trial court's decision was 
erroneous, focusing mainly on the inherent prejudice on the 
petitioner.'). We find no basis for relief by way of mandamus 
stemming from [the defendant's] reliance on authority dealing 
with striking an affirmative defense." 
 
4 So. 3d at 1123-24.  In the present case, although lack of capacity would 
seem to resolve Latosha's claims in favor of TruckMax, it does not appear 
to have a substantial probability of resolving the claims of Joseph's 
mother, which, for all that appears, will still need to be tried.4 
 
Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ.  Ex parte Webber, 
supra.  It is TruckMax's burden to establish that such relief is 
appropriate here.  Id.  Because it has not met that burden under the 
reasoning of Gulf Health Hospitals, we deny the petition.  By doing so, 
however, the Court does not suggest that mandamus relief can never be 
appropriate with respect to a trial court's refusal to allow a defendant to 
amend an answer to raise a previously omitted affirmative defense.  For 
 
4We note that the parties do not provide significant discussion 
regarding how this action would be affected if only Joseph's mother, and 
not Latosha, were allowed to proceed against TruckMax.  For example, 
they do not discuss whether damages, or apportionment thereof, might 
be affected by that circumstance. 
SC-2022-0957 
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example, mandamus review might be appropriate if a defendant 
establishes that a disallowed affirmative defense could completely 
resolve the action and an appeal would most likely result in a new trial 
and the waste of judicial resources. 
 
PETITION DENIED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, 
JJ., concur. 
 
Shaw and Cook, JJ., concur in the result.