Title: Plummer v. State
Citation: 472 So. 2d 358
Docket Number: 54743
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1985

472 So. 2d 358 (1985) Johnny L. PLUMMER v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 54743. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 22, 1985. Rehearing Denied July 24, 1985. *359 Charles R. Holladay, Picayune, Thomas J. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Catherine Walker Underwood, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Jack Lacy, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, HAWKINS and PRATHER, JJ. HAWKINS, Justice, for the Court: Johnny L. Plummer appeals from his conviction of rape in the Circuit Court of Pearl River County and sentence to twenty-five (25) years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The refusal of the circuit judge to grant a continuance is the only error assigned. Finding Plummer has shown no prejudice from this refusal, we affirm. On November 11, 1981, the grand jury of Pearl River County indicted Plummer of the forcible rape of one Brenda Sue Waddell on July 2, 1981. On November 16, 1981, an order was entered appointing the local public defender, Terrell Simpson, as his attorney. The case was later set for trial on April 19, 1982, a Monday. On the Thursday preceding, April 15, Simpson filed a motion with the court for permission to withdraw as counsel, which the court granted. That same day the circuit judge telephoned Charles R. Holladay, an attorney in Picayune, and asked him if he could represent Plummer, and he agreed to take the employment, with the court informing counsel the case was set for trial Monday. On the next day Holladay interviewed Plummer. No subpoenas for witnesses were requested. On Monday morning, the day of the trial, Holladay filed a motion for continuance, which stated in pertinent part: The record reveals the following proceedings in chambers before empaneling the jury: In the ensuing trial Plummer was convicted. On April 29, 1982, Plummer filed a motion for a new trial, one of the grounds being the refusal of the trial court to continue the trial for one week in order to give his attorney time to prepare for trial and interview all witnesses. No proof was offered in support of the motion, and it was overruled. The public defender was appointed to defend Plummer on November 16, 1981, about six months prior to trial. The case was later set for trial; he said nothing. Then, on April 15, 1982, just before the actual trial, he first notified the court of a possible conflict and asked to be excused. This was wrong. Counsel had a duty to notify the court about a conflict long before this. Apparently someone had requested a special venire. It had not been drawn. Instead of continuing the case, and appointing other counsel and giving them ample opportunity to prepare for trial, the circuit judge called Holladay, an attorney in another city, and asked him if he could represent Plummer. Holladay graciously agreed to do so. The circuit judge should have known, however, there was no possible way in which Holladay, completely unfamiliar with the case, could announce ready in that telephone call. Yet, the circuit judge held the defense to this standard, that Holladay had in effect on Thursday announced ready for trial. The circuit judge should not have permitted Simpson, an attorney with a conflict, to be present at the drawing of the special venire, with Holladay absent. Holladay had a professional duty to be present when the special venire was drawn. Holladay had a duty to request the clerk to issue subpoenas for witnesses he needed. He was derelict in failing to do so. Under the circumstances of this case, the circuit judge should have granted the motion for continuance. All Holladay asked was a week's delay. Of course, Holladay should have notified the court on Friday he could not be ready for trial. It was a serious discourtesy for him to wait until Monday morning to notify the court. This still does not remove the responsibility of the trial judge on Monday in a case of this serious nature, to at least grant a few days to prepare for trial. Having said all this, and expressing our disapproval of this manner of conducting trial proceedings in this case, which in most cases would lead to a reversal, the record contains no hint of how Plummer was injured. Presumably every witness he needed did in fact appear and testify. His defense was consent. Well, not quite. His defense was that he had upon previous occasions had a mutually voluntary sexual intercourse with her, but no intercourse at all this particular night. The prosecuting witness was thoroughly cross-examined, as was her boyfriend (later husband). Plummer testified; his friends and family testified. *362 A rather simple issue of whether or not Plummer raped this woman that night was extensively explored by the testimony of witnesses. There was ample testimony by the victim, and corroboration by her boyfriend, a policewoman and a physician that she had been raped. Indeed, Plummer makes no assignment the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence. Plummer made no showing, offered no testimony in support of his motion for a new trial as to how he would have been better prepared if the trial had been delayed. Contrary to the notion of some members of the public, a lawyer is not some performing magician: he cannot pull a fact out of the air like some rabbit out of a hat. In summary, from this record, it does not appear Plummer would have been the least bit better on the evidence or that his lawyer could have served him any better if the trial had been delayed a month. See: Oates v. State, 421 So. 2d 1025 (Miss. 1982); McFadden v. State, 408 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1981); Boyington v. State, 389 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 1980); Martin v. State, 312 So. 2d 5 (Miss. 1975); Brown v. State, 252 So. 2d 885 (Miss. 1971); Sessum v. State, 221 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1969). Finding no prejudicial error on this assignment, we affirm. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P. JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.