Title: P. v. Lawrence
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 186
Docket Number: S160736
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2009

Filed 4/30/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S160736 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B193831 
RINGO LAWRENCE, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA284590 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
When a criminal defendant who has waived his right to counsel and elected 
to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) 
seeks, during trial, to revoke that waiver and have counsel appointed, the trial 
court must exercise its discretion under the totality of the circumstances, 
considering factors including the defendant’s reasons for seeking to revoke the 
waiver, and the delay or disruption revocation is likely to cause the court, the jury, 
and other parties.  (People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163-164.)  Here, the 
revocation request by defendant, who was being tried jointly with a codefendant, 
was not heard until after the jury had been selected and sworn and the 
prosecution’s first witness had begun to testify.  We hold that considering all the 
circumstances, especially defendant’s failure to articulate a compelling reason for 
revoking his Faretta waiver and the likely delay and disruption that continuing a 
joint trial after the jury was empanelled would cause, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the revocation request.  We reverse the judgment of the 
1 
Court of Appeal, which held the denial was an abuse of discretion and was 
prejudicial per se because it resulted in the complete denial of defendant’s right to 
be represented by counsel. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of the offenses are not important to the issues we address here.  In 
brief, a paid police informant testified at trial that he bought two rocks of cocaine 
from defendant for $20 at a Los Angeles house.  A police officer observed the 
transaction through binoculars, but was unable to see the actual exchange of 
money or drugs.  When the police searched the house and its occupants shortly 
afterward, they found the $20 bill used to buy the cocaine in codefendant Patricia 
Broomfield’s sock and found more rocks of cocaine in the house.   
Defendant was charged with one count each of sale of a controlled 
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and possession of a controlled 
substance for sale (id., § 11351.5).  Similar charges were brought against 
Broomfield and John Evans. 
Defendant was initially represented by court-appointed counsel, but during 
pretrial proceedings he substituted retained attorney Paul Cohen.  When the case 
was called before Judge Wesley on the morning of Wednesday, September 28, 
2005, the People and the two codefendants announced they were ready for trial, 
but Cohen, who had filed for a continuance, explained he was selecting a jury in 
“a six count attempt[ed] murder case” and would therefore not be ready for “about 
two weeks.”  Cohen informed the court defendant wished to represent himself, and 
defendant confirmed that desire.   
The court told defendant it would expect him to be ready in two weeks, as 
Cohen would have been, but counsel for codefendant Broomfield, Joseph Walsh, 
observed that a two-week continuance “runs into my calendar.  I have another case 
right after this.  I am available for this two weeks.”  After a series of written and 
2 
oral admonishments, defendant reaffirmed his desire to represent himself.1  On his 
further statement that he was ready for trial, the court sent the case out for trial 
before Judge Mooney. 
When the parties appeared before Judge Mooney later that morning, they 
discussed possible plea agreements.  The court suggested defendant might wish to 
offer to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of five years in prison, a deal the 
prosecutor (who had previously offered six years) said he would be willing to 
propose to his supervisors.  Defendant, however, indicated he thought he should 
get diversion or probation, despite several charged prior convictions and despite 
his having been on conditional release at the time of his arrest.  He also facetiously 
suggested that if he went to trial and won the court should give him $5 million “for 
wasting my time.”  In the afternoon, codefendant Evans made a negotiated plea 
and the court began jury selection for the joint trial of defendant and codefendant 
Broomfield. 
During jury selection on the afternoon of September 28, Broomfield’s 
attorney, Walsh, brought to the court’s attention that defendant had been asking 
him questions.  Walsh added that on the basis of “informal” discussions with 
defendant, “I think he wants to withdraw his pro per status.”  Defendant 
responded:  “The only reason is cross-examination.  People are saying something 
and I am not for sure able to, you know.”  Addressing defendant, the court noted 
he had been “advised of all of these problems” before waiving his right to counsel, 
                                              
1 
One of the advisements defendant initialed as part of his written Faretta 
waiver read:  “I understand that depending on the stage of my case, if I ask to give 
up my pro per status and request counsel to handle my case, the Court may deny 
this request and I may have to proceed with trial without an attorney.” 
3 
but continued, “We will see if we can contact your counsel.”2  Walsh pointed out 
that defendant’s former attorney “is engaged in I believe an attempted murder trial 
and he will be for two weeks.”  The court admonished defendant not to “bother[]” 
Walsh with questions during the trial.  Defendant said nothing more about 
revoking his in propria persona status, and jury selection continued with defendant 
representing himself. 
On Thursday, September 29, jury selection was completed and the jurors 
and alternate jurors were sworn.  There was no additional discussion on the record 
regarding appointment of counsel for defendant.  Defendant neither raised the 
issue nor sought a ruling.  Proceedings were adjourned until Monday, October 3. 
On the morning of October 3, just after the court called for the jurors to 
enter, defendant told the court:  “I talked to my wife and I need a state appointed 
lawyer or public defender.  I am going to have to request a public defender and I 
am retiring my pro per on the record.”  The court responded that it would address 
that request at the next break.  The court gave opening jury instructions, the 
prosecutor and both defendants presented opening statements, and the 
prosecution’s first witness began his testimony. 
At the first break in trial, the following discussion occurred:   
                                              
2 
Whether Judge Mooney was referring to Cohen, defendant’s former 
attorney, or to some other attorney appointed as standby counsel is unclear.  In the 
clerk’s minutes for September 28, 2005, after Judge Wesley granted defendant’s 
motion for self-representation, appears the note:  “The Bar panel is notified and 
stand by counsel is to report to Department 134,” which was Judge Mooney’s 
courtroom.  When Walsh referred to defendant’s having been given advisory 
counsel, Judge Mooney corrected him:  “Stand-by counsel, not advisory counsel.  
And counsel did check in if there was a need for him and was on call.  Another 
counsel will be on call, but there is a difference between stand-by counsel and 
advisory counsel.” 
4 
“The Court:  The record should reflect that the jurors have exited the 
courtroom. 
“Just as our jurors were walking in, Mr. Lawrence had made the request to 
have an attorney appointed to represent him in this matter.  And, Mr. Lawrence, 
I will give you a chance to be heard on that request. 
“The Defendant:  Yes, your Honor.  I talked to my wife this weekend and 
she said I shouldn’t be doing something.  And it doesn’t matter to me, but she 
figured I might get a public defender or state appointed attorney or someone. 
“The Court:  Well, Mr. Lawrence, the court — 
“The Defendant:  I haven’t been to the law library or nothing either. 
“The Court:  The court has considered your request and I am going to deny 
your request at this time.  This was something you were warned about when you 
got yourself into this, about you would be at a disadvantage choosing to represent 
yourself in this matter. 
“I also consider the fact that, you know, the jury has been selected in this 
matter, that you also have a codefendant.  And it would be disruptive to her case as 
well to have someone come in.  Your previous attorney, Mr. Cohen, as I 
understand, is still engaged in trial and not available, so for all of those reasons I 
am going to deny your request.   
“And I also note when you filled out this form you were specifically 
advised and you initialed here on paragraph H if you ask to give up your pro per 
status the court may deny the request and have you proceed to trial without an 
attorney and that is where we are now, sir.” 
Trial proceeded with defendant representing himself.  Defendant was 
convicted of both offenses and sentenced to seven years in state prison.  At 
sentencing, defendant was represented by retained attorney Denise McLaughlin-
Bennett. 
5 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  The appellate court held denial of 
defendant’s request to revoke his counsel waiver was an abuse of discretion. 
Inconvenience to the jury, codefendant, and codefendant’s counsel, the court 
reasoned, was an insufficient basis for denial given the early stage of trial, the 
legitimacy of defendant’s reason for seeking appointment of counsel, and 
defendant’s evident inability to represent himself effectively.  The court further 
held the error had deprived defendant of his right to counsel under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, requiring reversal 
without any further showing of prejudice. 
We granted the People’s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, we explained that while a 
timely, unequivocal Faretta motion invoked the nondiscretionary right to 
self-representation, a midtrial motion was “addressed to the sound discretion of 
the court.”  In People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984 (Elliott), the Court of 
Appeal concluded the same was true of a midtrial request to revoke in propria 
persona status and have counsel appointed.  (Id. at p. 993.)  Adapting the 
nonexclusive list of factors to consider mentioned in Windham, the Elliott court 
opined that a trial court should consider, along with any other relevant 
circumstances, “(1) defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in 
the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation, (2) the 
reasons set forth for the request, (3) the length and stage of the trial proceedings, 
(4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the 
granting of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s effectiveness in 
defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney.”  
(Elliott, at pp. 993-994.) 
6 
This court cited Elliott’s discretion framework favorably in People v. 
Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pages 163-164, adding, however, that ultimately the 
trial court’s discretion is to be exercised on the totality of the circumstances, not 
strictly on the listed factors.  Quoting People v. Smith (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 476, 
484, we explained:  “ ‘While the consideration of these criteria [listed in Elliott] is 
obviously relevant and helpful to a trial court in resolving the issue, they are not 
absolutes, and in the final analysis it is the totality of the facts and circumstances 
which the trial court must consider in exercising its discretion as to whether or not 
to permit a defendant to again change his mind regarding representation in 
midtrial.’ ”  (Gallego, at p. 164.)  We found no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court’s denial of the Faretta revocation request, in light of the defendant’s history 
of counsel change requests, the advanced stage of trial (late in the guilt phase of a 
capital trial), and the trial court’s inability to find an attorney who would take over 
at that stage without the need to declare a mistrial.  (Gallego, at pp. 164-165; see 
also People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 148-151 [no abuse of discretion in 
denial of revocation request at the start of the penalty phase:  request appeared to 
be an attempt at delay].)3 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
3  
Courts of Appeal have found no abuse of discretion in People v. Smith, 
supra, 109 Cal.App.3d at pages 483-486 (request made after presentation of 
People’s case, necessary two-week continuance would have inconvenienced 
witnesses, and record suggested the defendant was trying to create an issue for 
appeal), and People v. Smith (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 37, 48-51 (request made on 
third day of trial would have required a substantial delay and would have greatly 
inconvenienced witnesses).  They have found abuses of discretion in Elliott, supra, 
70 Cal.App.3d at pages 994-998 (request made before presentation of evidence 
began, prompted by prosecutor’s offer of proof regarding an uncharged offense, 
and no showing was made that the necessary continuance would disrupt the 
court’s calendar or prejudice the prosecution); People v. Cruz (1978) 83 
Cal.App.3d 308, 319-322 (request made before assignment to trial department; no 
showing of disruption from continuance needed); People v. Hill (1983) 148 
7 
After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s 
revocation request, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the request. 
We note first that defendant’s remark on September 28, that he was having 
trouble with “cross-examination,” did not amount to an unequivocal request to 
revoke his in propria persona status.  (Cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 970, 1002 [“Faretta motions must be both timely and unequivocal.  
Otherwise, defendants could plant reversible error in the record”].)  On that 
occasion, during jury selection, codefendant’s attorney, Walsh, raised the issue by 
telling the court defendant had been asking him questions regarding procedures 
and “just informal conversations with Mr. Lawrence he has a request now that he 
wishes the court — I think he wants to withdraw his pro per status.”  (Italics 
added.)  Defendant responded:  “The only reason is cross-examination.  People are 
saying something and I am not for sure able to, you know.”  As appellate counsel 
acknowledged at oral argument in this court, defendant’s remark was ambiguous.  
It may have meant, “The only reason I am now requesting reappointment of 
counsel is cross-examination,” or it may have meant, “The only reason I was 
asking Mr. Walsh what to do, and am entertaining the idea of having counsel 
reappointed, is cross-examination.”  The record reflects no other comments on the 
topic by defendant until October 3, when he did unequivocally request revocation. 
To the extent the trial court took the September 28 exchange as a request, 
the reporter’s transcript reflects the court intended to accommodate defendant if 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Cal.App.3d 744, 760-761 (request made before jury selection; no showing of 
disruption from the five-day continuance prior counsel needed to be ready); and 
People v. Nguae (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1122-1126 (request made after 
trial, for purposes of sentencing and new trial motion). 
8 
possible, rather than to deny the request, for the court (after taking defendant 
briefly to task for changing his mind) said, “We will see if we can contact your 
counsel.”  Walsh informed the court that defendant’s prior counsel (Cohen) was in 
another trial, but after that the court and parties had no additional discussion of the 
putative request on the record.  There is thus no record of whether the court did try 
to reach prior counsel Cohen or the attorney, alluded to but unnamed in the record, 
who had been appointed as standby counsel, much less whether either attorney 
was actually contacted or what, if anything, either told the court regarding his or 
her availability.   
This record does not establish an abuse of discretion.  The trial court was 
faced with a defendant ambivalent about his in propria persona status, who earlier 
the same morning had executed a valid waiver of counsel, insisting he had “no 
choice” but to dismiss Cohen because he “ain’t doing nothing.”  The court was not 
required, simply because defendant indicated he was having trouble cross-
examining prospective jurors, to suspend jury selection and other trial proceedings 
until it could be determined whether defendant truly wanted to revoke his waiver 
of counsel, whether he was willing to accept Cohen again, or whether another 
attorney could be located, and when either attorney could begin trial.  The court 
did not abuse its discretion in allowing proceedings to continue while the 
availability of counsel was explored.  Defendant, if he did not want to proceed 
without counsel, should have made an express request to revoke his waiver and 
pressed for a final ruling at some point during jury selection.  The record thus 
provides an insufficient basis for us to conclude that defendant made a request to 
9 
revoke his in propria persona status, that the trial court denied it, or that the 
circumstances rendered any denial an abuse of discretion.4 
On October 3, when defendant did make an unequivocal request to revoke 
his Faretta waiver, the jury had been sworn and the court, jury, prosecutor, 
codefendant’s attorney, and witnesses were ready to start the trial.  By the time of 
the first recess, when the court could hear defendant’s request, the court had given 
its opening jury instructions, defendant and the other parties’ attorneys had made 
opening statements, and the prosecution’s first witness had begun his testimony.  
Attorney Cohen, who had previously represented defendant, was in another trial 
and would not be available for about two weeks.  To grant defendant’s request at 
that point would have required a lengthy continuance.  Keeping the jury together 
for that time would have been difficult at best and would likely have resulted in 
significant inconvenience to the jurors.   
                                              
4  
That the clerk’s minutes for September 28 state defendant’s request was 
denied does not alter our conclusion.  “As a general rule, a record that is in conflict 
will be harmonized if possible.  (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599.)  If it 
cannot be harmonized, whether one portion of the record should prevail as against 
contrary statements in another portion of the record will depend on the 
circumstances of each particular case.”  (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
208, 226.)  We could harmonize the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts here only by 
speculating that the trial court instructed the clerk at some point after the reported 
discussion to note defendant’s request was denied.  This is conceivable — the 
court may have investigated counsel’s availability and concluded the request 
should be denied — but it would not support a finding of abuse of discretion, as 
the detailed circumstances that led to the court’s conclusion would be unknown.  
Speculation aside, we do not consider the clerk’s minutes determinative as a 
record of what happened in the reported discussion on September 28.  Neither 
whether defendant’s remarks amounted to a cognizable request for reappointment 
of counsel nor whether the trial court’s actions amounted to a denial is a matter the 
clerk can determine contrary to the reporter’s transcript. 
10 
The trial court, in denying the request, noted the disruption it would cause 
in codefendant Broomfield’s case.  This was indeed significant.  Broomfield’s 
attorney, Walsh, had another trial starting in two weeks; he was unlikely to agree 
to recommend that Broomfield consent to a mistrial and continuance.  But to 
dismiss the jury and declare a mistrial without Broomfield’s consent would have 
precluded a later trial, as she had already been placed in jeopardy.  The third 
alternative, severing the two cases and proceeding immediately with Broomfield’s, 
would have resulted in the wasteful duplication of holding two trials involving 
many of the same events and witnesses.  The Court of Appeal was thus mistaken 
in its belief that no significant disruption or untoward delay would have been 
threatened if defendant’s request had been granted and a continuance or mistrial 
ordered to permit new counsel to prepare a defense. 
Against this potential for serious disruption to the trial and to the 
administration of justice, the court balanced the reason for defendant’s request.  
Notable here was the lack of either definiteness or urgency in defendant’s reasons.  
Although during jury selection defendant had indicated he was unsure how to 
cross-examine the prospective jurors, at the time of his request to revoke he said 
only that his wife had told him he “shouldn’t be doing something” and, while it 
did not “matter” to defendant, his wife thought he should get an attorney.  But as 
the trial court noted, defendant had been extensively warned when he chose to 
represent himself about the difficulties self-representation would entail.  Nothing 
new or unforeseeable had occurred in the interim; rather, over the weekend his 
wife evidently had expressed concern that representing himself would be more 
difficult than he had anticipated and suggested he reverse his decision.  Buyer’s 
remorse may not be an illegitimate reason for wanting to revoke a Faretta waiver, 
but neither is it a compelling one. 
11 
Defendant argues the trial court’s references to the fact he had been fully 
advised before choosing self-representation show the court took an improper 
“assumption of the risk” approach to the revocation request.  We disagree.  That 
defendant was told of — and affirmed his understanding of — the risks and 
disadvantages of self-representation before he waived counsel reflected on his 
reasons for later seeking to revoke the waiver.  The colloquy tended to show not 
that he had suddenly learned he would be at a disadvantage in the trial, but that 
with additional input from his wife he had simply reweighed the pros and cons of 
self-representation and changed his mind as to the best course.  That a defendant’s 
motion to waive counsel was incorrectly handled has been held to weigh in favor 
of allowing revocation of the waiver.  (See People v. Hill, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 
at pp. 761-762 [trial court’s errors in addressing the defendant’s previous motions 
for substitution of counsel and self-representation led to error in denying his 
request to revoke his counsel waiver].)  Here, there was no mishandling.  Because 
defendant had been fully advised before he chose self-representation, his later 
change of mind properly bore less weight in the trial court’s discretionary decision 
on the revocation request. 
The trial court also erred, defendant contends, in failing to consider on the 
record two additional factors mentioned in Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 984:  
defendant’s history regarding assertion of the right to counsel, and the likelihood 
he would effectively represent himself.  The record, defendant further argues, 
shows he was consistent (except for his single Faretta motion) in wanting 
representation, and he was clearly unable to competently represent himself at trial.  
But we do not agree with the argument’s premises that the trial court must review 
on the record each factor mentioned in Elliott or that any one factor is necessarily 
determinative.  The standard is whether the court’s decision was an abuse of its 
discretion under the totality of the circumstances (People v. Gallego, supra, 52 
12 
Cal.3d at p. 164), not whether the court correctly listed factors or whether any one 
factor should have been weighed more heavily in the balance.   
While a defendant’s proclivity to seek changes in counsel status will 
generally weigh against finding an abuse of discretion, for example, “the fact that 
a defendant has no such history does not preclude the court from denying the 
request if other factors [militate] against it.”  (People v. Smith, supra, 109 
Cal.App.3d at p. 484.)  As far as the record shows, defendant was not trying to 
manipulate the system or create an issue for appeal in making his request to revoke 
in propria persona status.  Nevertheless, he had no compelling reason to do so, and 
granting his request would likely have caused serious disruption to the 
administration of justice, considerations strongly supporting denial.   
Similarly, defendant’s asserted ineffectiveness at self-representation does 
not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  Defendant was untrained in the law and 
may not have been especially experienced in court procedures, but the same could 
be said of many, if not most, in propria persona criminal defendants.  That 
defendant’s defense would have been more effectively presented (or a better 
sentence obtained through a negotiated plea) had he been represented is likely.  
But if that fact were determinative, virtually all self-representing defendants would 
have the right to revoke their counsel waivers at any time during trial.  That is not 
the law.  (People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 149; People v. Gallego, supra, 
52 Cal.3d at p. 164.) 
Considering all the circumstances before the trial court, we conclude the 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s midtrial request to revoke 
his Faretta waiver.  Accordingly, we need not decide whether an error in denying 
the request would have deprived defendant of his constitutional right to 
representation by counsel or whether such a deprivation would require reversal 
without consideration of prejudice. 
13 
14 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
While in custody and facing trial on felony drug charges, defendant Ringo 
Lawrence gave up his constitutional right to counsel and began representing 
himself.  (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819.)  That same day, 
during jury selection, defendant sought to withdraw his waiver of counsel after he 
realized he lacked the skills to question prospective jurors.  The trial court denied 
the motion.  Four days later, defendant again made this request, and the trial court 
again denied it, noting that the jury had been sworn and had heard part of the 
testimony of the first prosecution witness.   
Defendant was convicted and sentenced to seven years in state prison.  The 
Court of Appeal reversed defendant’s conviction because in its view the trial court 
had deprived defendant of his constitutional right to counsel.  The majority 
reverses the Court of Appeal.  I disagree and would affirm that court’s judgment.   
I 
 
In mid-May 2005, a paid police informant bought two grams of cocaine 
base at a house in South Central Los Angeles.  Two weeks later, on June 1, a 
second informant made another controlled buy of cocaine base at the same house.  
An undercover officer watching the June 1 transaction saw the informant talk to 
defendant and saw defendant enter and then leave the enclosed front porch of the 
house, but the officer did not see the two men exchange either money or drugs.   
1 
 
After the June 1 transaction, police officers went to the house, where they 
arrested defendant and a woman, Patricia Broomfield, who was found to have 
$227 in cash, including a “marked” $20 bill that the police had given to the second 
informant.  Both defendant and Broomfield were charged with felony narcotics 
offenses.   
 
On Wednesday morning, September 28, 2005, defendant’s attorney, Paul J. 
Cohen, appeared in the master calendar court on defendant’s behalf.  (Defendant 
had previously been represented by a deputy public defender.)  Because Attorney 
Cohen was about to begin trial in another case, he asked the court for a two-week 
continuance.  He mentioned that defendant, who was in custody and not present in 
court, might want to represent himself.  When defendant was brought into court, 
he confirmed his desire to “take over” his case.   
 
The trial court said it would grant the two-week continuance that Attorney 
Cohen had requested, and it told defendant that if he was going to represent 
himself, he too would “be expected to be ready in two weeks.”  Defendant 
protested that he had been in custody on this case for four months and “all you can 
give me” to prepare the case “is two weeks.”   
 
After warning defendant of the pitfalls of self-representation, the trial court 
asked defendant to fill out a “waiver of counsel” form.  When the prosecutor 
mentioned that he would be out of town on October 13 and 14, the court replied 
that it would schedule the trial for October 17.   
 
At that point, Attorney Joseph Walsh, representing codefendant 
Broomfield, interjected that he did not think defendant “was asking for a 
continuance” but was “just asking to represent himself.”  The trial judge 
responded that if defendant wanted to go to trial that day, “I will send it out” for 
trial.   
2 
 
The trial court then looked at the “waiver of counsel” form filled out by 
defendant, and it noted that defendant had not listed the charged crimes.  When the 
court asked defendant whether he knew what the charges were, defendant made no 
response.  The court told defendant that he was charged with the sale of cocaine 
base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and with possession for sale of 
cocaine base (id., § 11351.5), and it asked if defendant understood the charges.  
When defendant replied that he did, the court said that it would “fill in that section 
on here indicating the charges,” and that defendant should initial the boxes 
acknowledging his understanding of the charges.   
 
The following colloquy then took place:   
 
The Court:  “You have had an opportunity to think about this, is it still your 
desire to represent yourself?” 
 
Defendant:  “Yes, Sir.  I have no choice.” 
 
The Court:  “You have a choice; you can wait for Mr. Cohen.”  
 
Defendant:  “I had a lawyer before, they ain’t doing nothing.”  
 
The Court:  “Is it still your desire to represent yourself?” 
 
Defendant:  “Yes, Sir.” 
 
The Court:  “Are you ready for trial?” 
 
Defendant:  “Yes, Sir.” 
 
The trial court relieved Attorney Cohen from further representation, and it 
transferred the matter to department 134 “for trial forthwith.”  That afternoon, 
defendant’s case was called for trial in department 134.  With defendant 
representing himself and Attorney Walsh representing codefendant Broomfield, 
the court began jury selection.  Shortly thereafter, the court excused the jury panel 
for the day.   
 
Attorney Walsh told the trial court that he had a matter to bring to the 
court’s attention:  He mentioned that once the trial started, defendant, who “was 
3 
unfamiliar with the proceedings,” kept asking questions of Attorney Walsh about 
jury selection, and Walsh had been “answering [defendant’s] questions 
essentially.”  Walsh and the trial court then discussed whether the master calendar 
judge had appointed advisory or standby counsel for defendant.  The court noted 
that the minute order reflected the appointment of standby counsel. 
 
Attorney Walsh then said that, based on “informal conversations” with 
defendant, “I think he wants to withdraw his pro per status.”  Defendant replied:  
“The only reason is cross-examination.  People are saying something and I am not 
for sure able to, you know.”   
 
The trial court admonished defendant not to be “bothering Mr. Walsh 
[codefendant Broomfield’s attorney] during the trial.”  After observing that 
defendant had “filled out a pro per waiver form” and that defendant understood 
“what [he] would be up against” in representing himself, the court announced it 
was in recess on this case until the next morning.  The clerk’s transcript for the 
day has this notation:  “Defendant’s request to have counsel appointed is denied.”   
 
The next day, Thursday, September 29, 2005, jury selection was completed, 
and the trial court swore in the jury, after which it put the case over for four days, 
until Monday, October 3.  That Monday, as soon as defendant’s case was called 
for trial, defendant told the trial court:  “I talked to my wife and I need a state 
appointed lawyer or Public Defender.  I am going to have to request a Public 
Defender and I am retiring my Pro Per on the record.  On the record.”  The trial 
court put that matter over until “the next break,” and had the prosecution call its 
first witness.   
 
Just before the noon recess, the trial court took up defendant’s request for 
counsel.  Defendant explained:  “I talked to my wife this weekend and she said I 
shouldn’t be doing something.  And it doesn’t matter to me, but she figured I 
4 
might get a Public Defender or state appointed attorney or someone.”  Defendant 
added that he had not “been to the law library or nothing either.” 
 
The trial court denied the request for counsel, giving these reasons:  
Defendant had been “warned” of the “disadvantage” of choosing to represent 
himself; the jury had already been selected; “it would be disruptive” to 
codefendant Broomfield’s case to now appoint counsel for defendant; and 
defendant’s former counsel, Attorney Cohen, was likely “still engaged in trial and 
not available.”  
 
Defendant, representing himself at trial, was found guilty as charged and 
sentenced to seven years in state prison.  Defendant appealed.  The Court of 
Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s request 
to withdraw his waiver of counsel and to appoint counsel for defendant, and that 
this error required a reversal of the judgment.  This court granted defendant’s 
petition for review.   
II 
 
Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, a 
defendant in a criminal case has a right to representation by counsel as well as the 
right of self-representation.  (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 819.)  But 
once a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to counsel, that right is no longer absolute.  (Menefield. v. Borg 
(9th Cir. 1989) 881 F.2d 696, 700; People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163-
164.) 
 
There are many reasons why a defendant may choose to give up the right to 
counsel in favor of self-representation.  In the words of the federal appeals court in 
Menefield. v. Borg, supra, 881 F.2d at page 700:  “A criminal defendant may 
initially assert his right to self-representation for reasons that later prove unsound.  
[He] may doubt the willingness of an appointed attorney to represent his interests.  
5 
More often, [he] may have a baseless faith in his ability to mount an effective 
defense.  The lure of self-representation may, however, exact a significant price; 
lost at trial, the defendant may miss important opportunities and even create 
gaping holes in his own case.”  (Fn. omitted.) 
 
Here, defendant asked to represent himself because he had already spent 
four months in jail awaiting trial and, as he saw it, his attorneys (first the deputy 
public defender and then Attorney Cohen) had done “nothing” to bring his case to 
trial.  But almost immediately after giving up his right to counsel, defendant 
realized he was not up to the task of representing himself, and he asked to 
withdraw his waiver of counsel.   
 
At least two states allow defendants to withdraw their waivers of the right 
to counsel and to obtain new counsel “at any time.”  (Ex parte King (Ala. 2001) 
797 So.2d 1191, 1193 [discussing Ala. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 6.1(c)]; State v. 
Rickman (Ariz. 1986) 715 P.2d 752, 756 [discussing Ariz. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 
6.1(e)].)  But California has no such rule.  In this state, when a defendant has 
exercised the right to self-representation, a trial court has broad discretion either to 
grant or to deny the defendant’s later request to abandon self-representation and to 
obtain counsel.  (See People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d 115, 164-165; People v. 
Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 994.)  The Court of Appeal in Elliott listed some 
things that a trial court should consider when ruling on such a motion:  (1) whether 
the defendant has a prior history of changing back and forth between 
representation by counsel and self-representation; (2) the reasons for requesting to 
withdraw a waiver of counsel; (3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) the possibility 
of disruption or delay in the proceedings; and (5) whether the defendant is likely to 
be effective in representing himself.  (Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 993-
994.)  This court in Gallego found these considerations helpful, but it ultimately 
concluded that what the trial court should evaluate was the totality of 
6 
circumstances surrounding the motion at issue.  (Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 
pp. 164-165.)  
 
According to the majority, consideration of the “totality of circumstances” 
in this case supports the trial court’s denial of defendant’s requests that he be 
allowed to abandon his self-representation and that he be given appointed counsel.  
The majority notes that when the trial court addressed the matter on Monday, 
October 3, the jury had already been sworn and the prosecution’s first witness had 
started to testify.  The swearing of the jury was particularly significant, the 
majority states, because to reappoint counsel for defendant would have required 
dismissal of the jury, thus preventing the prosecution from trying codefendant 
Broomfield who, having “already been placed in jeopardy,” would be unlikely to 
agree to a mistrial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)   
 
The critical date, however, was not Monday, October 3, after the jury had 
already been sworn and testimony begun.  The critical event occurred four days 
earlier, Wednesday, September 28, when Attorney Walsh (who represented 
codefendant Broomfield) told the trial court that defendant no longer wanted to 
represent himself, a fact that defendant, who was present, confirmed.  At that time, 
the jury had not been sworn.  Thus, the trial court could simply have excused the 
prospective jurors, reappointed Attorney Cohen to represent defendant, and put the 
case over until October 17, the date that just hours earlier the master calendar 
judge had selected as the date on which defendant’s case was to go to trial.  
Moreover, to allow defendant to withdraw his counsel waiver and to reappoint 
counsel on September 28 would have posed no double jeopardy bar to the 
prosecution of codefendant Broomfield, because jeopardy does not attach until the 
jury is sworn.  (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 279, fn. 12; People v. 
Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 600.)  Here, that did not take place until the next day, 
Thursday, September 29.    
7 
 
Also supporting my conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant’s request at issue are these considerations:  Defendant had no 
prior history of alternating between self-representation and representation by 
counsel; the reason he gave for wanting counsel was a valid one—he realized that 
he lacked the necessary skills to represent himself in the proceeding; his request 
was made on the same day the case was sent out for trial, early on in jury 
selection, and before anything of significance had happened in the case; little 
disruption or delay might reasonably be expected to ensue from granting the 
motion, other than the possible need for the two-week continuance the master 
calendar judge had already been ready to grant; and defendant’s inability to 
understand the jury selection process indicated that he was unlikely to be effective 
in defending against the criminal charges.  (See People v. Elliott, supra, 70 
Cal.App.3d at p. 994.)  Surely, these considerations are relevant in determining 
whether under the totality of circumstances the trial court abused its discretion, as 
I conclude it did, in making defendant go to trial without a lawyer. 
 
Even though the clerk’s transcript of the September 28, 2005, afternoon 
proceeding shows that the trial court “denied” defendant’s “request to have 
counsel appointed,” the majority concludes that this record notation cannot be 
“harmonize[d]” with the reporter’s transcript, which includes no express comment 
by the trial court indicating a denial of defendant’s motion, and that therefore, in 
the majority’s view,  no such motion was made that day.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9, 
fn. 4.)   
 
The majority is wrong.  A fair reading of the September 28 transcript shows 
that Attorney Walsh (who represented codefendant Broomfield) advised the trial 
court that defendant wanted to “withdraw his pro per status,” a fact that defendant 
immediately confirmed by explaining that he did not know how to “cross-
examine” prospective jurors.  The trial court’s awareness of defendant’s desire to 
8 
9 
have counsel represent him is clear from its statement in court that defendant had 
chosen self-representation when he “filled out a pro per waiver” and understood 
“what [he’d] be up against.”  It necessarily rejected defendant’s request when, 
without further inquiry, it recessed the case for the day.  I also note that the trial 
court’s denial of defendant’s request for counsel was duly recorded in the court’s 
minutes.  To summarize, unlike the majority, I see no inconsistency between the 
reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts.   
 
A denial of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel affects “the framework 
within which the trial proceeds” and thus it is not “simply an error in the trial 
process itself.”  (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310.)  Accordingly, I 
agree with the Court of Appeal that in this case the trial court’s denial of the right 
to counsel requires automatic reversal.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lawrence 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 158 Cal.App.4th 685 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S160736 
Date Filed: April 30, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Mark V. Mooney 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert S. Gerstein, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Heather J. Manolakas, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels, Lauren E. Dana, Kristofer Jorstad and 
Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert S. Gerstein 
Law Office of Robert S. Gerstein 
12400 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 820-1939 
 
Steven D. Matthews 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2367