Title: In re Marriage of Murphy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93436
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2003

Docket No. 93436-Agenda 14-November 2002.
In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine 								Madonia, Appellant, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal concerns a circuit court's award of attorney fees
for a prior appeal in this dissolution of marriage action. After
remand from an earlier appeal, Catherine Murphy-now known as
Catherine Madonia (Catherine)-petitioned the circuit court to
award her the attorney fees she had incurred in prosecuting that
appeal. The trial court awarded her a portion of the fees she
requested. Michael Murphy appealed that award, contending that
Catherine had not "substantially prevailed" in the earlier appeal
and, alternatively, that the trial court had no evidence to support
the award. The appellate court reversed, with one justice
dissenting. 327 Ill. App. 3d 845. Catherine has brought the instant
appeal from that judgment. We reverse in part and remand.

BACKGROUND
	Catherine filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in July
1990. The circuit court granted Catherine custody of the parties'
child, subject to Michael's reasonable visitation, and ordered
Michael to pay $600 per month in child support, as well as to
maintain medical insurance for the child and pay his tuition and
fees for a parochial school education. The court also divided the
marital assets, the largest of which was a personal injury
settlement resulting from an incident in which Michael was shot
and permanently paralyzed from the chest down. The settlement
consisted of a one-time lump sum payment and guaranteed annual
future payments. The court awarded Catherine the marital
residence and a lump sum of $220,000, but awarded all future
payments under the settlement to Michael as marital property.
Catherine appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the circuit
court's order of dissolution. In re Marriage of Murphy, 259 Ill.
App. 3d 336 (1994).
	In January 1994 Catherine filed a motion to modify child
support, alleging Michael's salary had increased. In November
1998 the court entered an order increasing Michael's child support
obligation to $850 per month, retroactive to January 1998.
Catherine appealed this order, arguing that the trial court had erred
(1) by failing to award her attorney fees, and (2) in its modification
of the child support obligation. The latter contention actually was
comprised of three specific alleged errors in the circuit court's
treatment of the case: (a) the conclusion that the law of the case
doctrine precluded the court from considering the annuity
payments as part of Michael's net income for purposes of setting
child support; (b) the court's downward departure from the
statutory child support guidelines; and (c) the court's decision to
make the modification retroactive only to January 1998. The
appellate court held that the circuit court erred in departing
downward from the statutory guidelines and reversed and
remanded on this issue, but affirmed the circuit court in all other
respects. In re Marriage of Murphy, No. 4-99-0215 (2000)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	In September 2000, Catherine filed a motion requesting that
Michael reimburse her for attorney fees she incurred in
prosecuting her appeal of the November 1998 order. In the motion,
she contended that: she engaged counsel for purposes of the
appeal; she successfully argued that the downward deviation was
erroneous; her income was significantly below Michael's; Michael
was unrepresented on appeal; and the amount her counsel charged
was reasonable and customary for the preparation and argument of
an appeal. The motion also stated that a multipage exhibit attached
to the motion showed the "time expended by counsel and his rate
and expenses for the preparation and argument on the appeal."
That attachment consists of an apparently computer-generated
timesheet, with an anonymous handwritten notation on the first
page which states: "Fees &amp; Expenses Incurred $7199.35."
	Michael argued before the circuit court that Catherine had
prevailed "only in minor part" in her appeal, and further argued
that Catherine was "well able" to pay her own fees, in light of her
net worth of approximately $500,000. He also noted that in the
appeal of the November 1998 order the appellate court had
rejected Catherine's argument that the circuit court had erred in
failing to award her attorney fees for the prior circuit court
litigation. He contended that Catherine had alleged no change in
circumstances since the entry of the appellate court's order which
might impact on the parties' abilities to pay their own attorney
fees.
	In October 2000, the circuit court held a hearing on this
motion as well as Catherine's motion to "implement the mandate"
of the appellate court. The following is the only testimony adduced
regarding the motion for attorney fees:
			"Q. State your name.
			A. Catherine Madonia.
			Q. And now, Miss Madonia, when you prosecuted the
appeal, did you incur attorney's fees?
			A. Yes, I did.
			Q. And have you paid those attorney's fees?
			A. No. I paid some of them, part of them. Not all of
them.
			Q. And you entered into an agreement with me for an
hourly rate as set forth in our motion?
			A. Yes, I did."
	Michael argued again at the hearing and in a post-trial motion
that any award of attorney fees to Catherine would be
inappropriate because (1) Catherine had only prevailed in minor
part in the prior appeal, and (2) she had shown no change in her
financial circumstances since the last hearing on attorney fees,
when the court declined to award fees to Catherine. At the hearing,
counsel for Catherine replied that "This isn't a 1983 or 1988 case
[sic, presumably referring to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C.
§1988] where you have to be the prevailing party. Either party may
seek to have the other party pay based upon the income, not based
upon their assets."
	The circuit court took the motion under advisement, and
ultimately awarded Catherine $1,750 in attorney fees. No written
order appears in the record, but the court's docket entry states with
respect to this issue that "Upon consideration of all relevant
statutory factors, the Court awards [counsel for Catherine] the sum
of $1,750.00 for fees on appeal."
	Michael appealed, and the appellate court reversed, with one
justice dissenting. 327 Ill. App. 3d 845. The court reached only
Michael's first argument, that Catherine had not "substantially
prevailed" in her earlier appeal. The court noted that interpretation
of the phrase was a matter of first impression. After looking to
other Illinois statutes as well as federal law, the court demurred
from issuing a definitive pronouncement as to what it would mean
for a party to "substantially prevail," but stated that "whatever it
means, Catherine did not substantially prevail on her appeal." The
court stated that the issue on which Catherine obtained relief made
only a relatively minor monetary difference, as compared to the
relief potentially available if Catherine had prevailed on the other
issues she had raised. The court averred that its determination was
not based merely on the numerical fact that she had prevailed on
only one of the four issues she raised on appeal. However, the
court went on to state that to "substantially prevail" did "suggest[ ]
that one has to obtain at least 50% of the relief she seeks."
	The dissent noted that section 508(a)(3.1) of the Act was
added in 1997, as part of a "complete overhaul of the fee
provisions of" the Act, intended to achieve " 'substantial parity in
parties' access to funds for litigation costs.' " 327 Ill. App. 3d at
853-55 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting 750 ILCS 5/102(5) (West
1998). The dissent criticized the "majority's requirement that there
be an overwhelming victory before attorney fees can be awarded"
as contrary to the spirit of the 1997 amendments, "which sought
to prevent the situation where an economically disadvantaged
spouse is forced to 'cave in' to a truly unfair settlement." The
dissent contended that the "majority's new rule, that 'one has to
obtain at least 50% of the relief she seeks' before attorney fees
may be awarded" was without support in the statute or case law
and further was objectionable in that
		"If a party has a legitimate basis for appeal we should not
attempt to discourage that party from raising other issues
as well, even though the party thereby risks obtaining less
than 50% of the relief sought. The appellate court should
attempt to provide guidance on troublesome issues, not
penalize parties for raising issues other than sure
winners." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55 (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, the dissent noted that the trial court's determination
regarding fees was entitled to deference and should not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The dissent closed with
the following observation:
		"The argument could be made that this court is as well-qualified as the trial court to determine whether a party
has 'substantially prevailed' on appeal. However, we have
recently ruled that we have no jurisdiction over attorney
fees on appeal. In re Marriage of Baylor, 324 Ill. App. 3d
213, 216 (2001)." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 855 (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
	We granted Catherine leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).



ANALYSIS
	Before this court Catherine contends, relying on the last
sentence of the appellate court dissent, that the appellate court was
without jurisdiction to reverse the circuit court's fee award. She
also argues that the circuit court's fee award was not an abuse of
discretion and should be affirmed.



I. Jurisdiction
	We find the jurisdictional argument to be without merit. It is
important to note that this case does not involve the question
whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to make an initial
award of fees. That was the question the appellate court addressed
in Marriage of Baylor, the case cited by the appellate court
dissent. We express no opinion on this question, because it is not
germane to this case-the appellate court did not purport to make
a fee award. All the appellate court did in this case was review the
circuit court's final order awarding attorney fees. There is no
question that the appellate court has jurisdiction to review an
award of attorney fees in the context of an otherwise valid appeal.



II. Propriety of Award
	The appellate court determined that the circuit court erred in
awarding Catherine attorney fees, because Catherine did not
"substantially prevail" in her prior appeal. Catherine argues that
the circuit court's order is entitled to deference and the appellate
court erred in overturning the fee award in this case.
	In our view, the threshold question in this case is one of
statutory construction, determining the meaning of the statute in
question, section 508(a)(3.1) of the Act. Cf. Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49, 57-63 (1989) (attorney fees under section 11(h) of the
Illinois Freedom of Information Act). Construction of a statute is
a purely legal question, appropriately subject to de novo review.
See, e.g., Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86
(2002). Upon review, we disagree with the appellate court's
construction of section 508(a)(3.1).
	The guiding principles which inform our task of statutory
construction are well settled. Our lodestar is the intent of the
legislature. We may consider the reason and necessity for the law,
the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims. We are
also guided by the presumption that the legislature did not intend
an absurd or unjust result. However, our inquiry always must
begin with the language of the statute, which is the surest and most
reliable indicator of legislative intent. Statutory language must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statute is clear
and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resort to aids of
construction. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Where
possible, we will adopt that construction which will give effect to
every word, clause, and sentence; we strive to read statutes so as
not to render any portion inoperative or superfluous. Kraft, Inc. v.
Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Nor, under the guise of
statutory interpretation, can we "correct" an apparent legislative
oversight by rewriting a statute in a manner inconsistent with its
clear and unambiguous language. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d  at 42.
	Section 508(a) of the Act provides as follows:
			"(a) The court from time to time, after due notice and
hearing, and after considering the financial resources of
the parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable
amount for his own or the other party's costs and
attorney's fees. Interim attorney's fees and costs may be
awarded from the opposing party, in accordance with
subsection (c-1) of Section 501. At the conclusion of the
case, contribution to attorney's fees and costs may be
awarded from the opposing party in accordance with
subsection (j) of Section 503. Fees and costs may be
awarded to counsel from a former client in accordance
with subsection (c) of this Section. Awards may be made
in connection with the following:
				(1) The maintenance or defense of any proceeding
under this Act.
				(2) The enforcement or modification of any order or
judgment under this Act.
				(3) The defense of an appeal of any order or
judgment under this Act, including the defense of
appeals of post-judgment orders.
				(3.1) The prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the
prosecuting party has substantially prevailed).
				(4) The maintenance or defense of a petition brought
under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure
seeking relief from a final order or judgment under this
Act.
				(5) The costs and legal services of an attorney
rendered in preparation of the commencement of the
proceeding brought under this Act.
				(6) Ancillary litigation incident to, or reasonably
connected with, a proceeding under this Act."
(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(1) through (a)(6)
(West 1998).
	The appellate court treated section 508(a)(3.1) as if it referred
to "the prosecution of any appeal" in which the appellant
substantially prevailed. It does not so read. Rather, section
508(a)(3.1) allows the circuit court to award fees for the
"prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the prosecuting party has
substantially prevailed)." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS
5/508(a)(3.1) (West 1998). Inclusion of this claim-specific
language can hardly have been inadvertent, as such language is
found in no other subsection of the statute. To the contrary, all
other subsections speak in general of actions with respect to
"proceedings," "orders," or "judgments." See 750 ILCS
5/508(a)(1) through (a)(6) (West 1998). Only with respect to the
prosecution of an appeal, does the statute specifically tailor
attorney fee awards to individual claims and impose the additional
requirement that the appellant "substantially prevail" in any claim
before the circuit court may consider ordering the opposing party
to reimburse him for his attorney fees expended thereon.
	We believe that the appropriate reading of this section is that,
in the context of a petition for fees for prosecution of an appeal,
the circuit court may only award fees incurred for those individual
claims on which the appellant can be said to have "substantially
prevailed" on appeal. To interpret the statute as requiring that the
appellant prevail on the appeal as a whole would read out the
phrase "claim on," which is contrary to our settled rules of
construction.
	Our interpretation has other virtues in addition to comporting
with the plain language of the statute, giving effect to all of the
words penned by the legislature. First, it eliminates the difficulty
which the appellate court frankly confronted, of determining how
much relief the appellant must obtain in a multiissue appeal so as
to "substantially prevail." This is difficult in any multiissue
appeal; it would be far more difficult in an appeal in which one or
more of the claims involved nonmonetary concerns-as is
frequently the case in dissolution proceedings. It is a discomforting
prospect to require the circuit court to determine whether a party
"substantially prevailed" in an appeal in which he succeeded in
overturning the child support amount but failed in his appellate
claim that he should receive visitation. Although we acknowledge
that it still may at times be more of an art than a science for a court
to determine whether an appellant has substantially prevailed with
respect to an individual issue, the difficulty will be lessened if the
court is not required to weigh the relative import of issues raised.
	Second, our construction neither discourages meritorious
appeals nor encourages frivolous ones. The appellate court dissent
was concerned that a rule should not discourage a party from
raising all possible issues on appeal, for fear of losing possible
reimbursement for fees expended on "sure winners." Although we
note that the general rule in the United States is that parties pay
their own fees (see, e.g., In re Marriage of McGuire, 305 Ill. App.
3d 474, 479 (1999) ("As a general rule, attorney fees are the
primary responsibility of the party for whom the services are
rendered")), we acknowledge the sentiment expressed.
	Our construction of the statute obviates this concern. An
appellant may petition for fees incurred in the prosecution of any
issue on which he substantially prevailed on a prior appeal,
regardless of how many other issues may have been raised.
However, awarding appellate fees on a claim-by-claim basis also
removes any affirmative incentive for a party to add frivolous
issues on appeal along with meritorious issues, in hopes of
increasing the fees which his opponent may be required to pay. By
our construction of the statute a party may raise any claims he
desires on appeal. While the circuit court may award fees for
issues deemed meritorious by the appellate court, no recompense
will be had for preparation of claims on which the appellate court
determined not to grant relief.
	In this case, the determination whether Catherine
"substantially prevailed" on her individual claims is quite simple.
She obtained no relief whatsoever on three of the issues she raised
and obtained all of the relief she sought on the remaining issue.
Clearly, she substantially prevailed on the "departure from the
statutory guidelines" claim and only that claim. Thus the circuit
court could only award her the fees incurred for the prosecution of
that claim. Therefore, the appellate court's conclusion that
Catherine did not "substantially prevail" was correct with respect
to three issues, but was erroneous with respect to the fourth.
	We remand to the appellate court for consideration of
Michael's remaining argument.



CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we reverse in part the appellate
court's holding that Catherine did not "substantially prevail" on
her prior appeal and remand to the appellate court.



	Appellate court reversed in part;
	cause remanded.