Title: In re R.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12415
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12415 
 
R.B., petitioner. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     February 5, 2018. - June 11, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Evidence, Sex offender, Medical report.  
Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Superior Court Department on October 
11, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Bonnie H. MacLeod, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Brandon L. Campbell for the petitioner. 
 
Brendan J. Frigault for the Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In February, 2011, the petitioner was committed 
to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) as a 
sexually dangerous person, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12.  The 
following year, he filed a petition for examination and 
2 
 
 
discharge.  G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  A jury found that the 
petitioner continued to be sexually dangerous, and an order 
entered continuing his commitment.  On appeal, the petitioner 
argues for the first time that the order of commitment should be 
reversed because a written report of a psychological examination 
conducted approximately twenty-four years before should not have 
been admitted at trial.  The Commonwealth contends (among other 
things) that because the petitioner did not object to the 
report's admission at trial, the issue is waived and we should 
not review it on appeal.  We are thus asked to decide squarely 
whether an appellate court will consider unpreserved arguments 
on appeals from sexual dangerousness proceedings under G. L. 
c. 123A.  We conclude that, as in criminal cases, such arguments 
are to be reviewed for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  We also conclude that there was no error in the 
admission of the report.  In addition, we reject the 
petitioner's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
conceding during his closing argument that two of the 
Commonwealth's expert witnesses were "very credible."  The order 
of commitment is affirmed.1 
 
Background.  The jury could have found the following facts.  
The petitioner has a lengthy history of sexual violence.  Before 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
 
becoming an aggressor, the petitioner was himself a victim.  He 
had a "horrible childhood" marked by "substantial trauma" 
stemming from neglect, drug use, and physical and sexual abuse.  
He suffered that abuse at the hands of his mother, his sisters, 
his half-sisters, and their friends, until he grew old enough to 
protect himself.  Asked how these experiences were connected 
with his subsequent sexual offending, the petitioner responded, 
"In order to get rid of it, I had to give it away." 
 
The petitioner was committed as a sexually dangerous person 
based on three separate cases.  First, in 1990, when he was 
fourteen years old, the petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on 
two counts of indecent assault and battery on a seven year old 
girl, who claimed that the petitioner had grabbed her crotch and 
kissed her.  Next, in 1994, when the petitioner was eighteen 
years old, he was convicted of two counts of indecent assault 
and battery on a fourteen year old girl.  She alleged that, on 
one occasion, he tried to kiss her and put his hands down her 
pants; the next day, he lifted her shirt and attempted to touch 
her breasts.  For this offense the petitioner received a one-
year suspended sentence. 
 
Third, in 2001, the petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated 
rape, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and armed robbery.  
On this occasion, the petitioner approached a woman outside a 
bar, held a knife to her throat, and led her to the nearby 
4 
 
 
woods, where he violently raped and robbed her.  The petitioner 
was sentenced to ten years in State prison on the aggravated 
rape conviction, and to lesser sentences on the remaining 
convictions, including five years of probation.  At the 
completion of the committed portion of his sentences, the 
petitioner was civilly committed as a sexual dangerous person.2  
During his periods of incarceration and civil commitment, the 
petitioner received over one hundred disciplinary reports; some 
included violent behavior, but none involved sexual misconduct. 
 
In October, 2012, the petitioner filed a petition for 
discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, claiming that he is no 
longer a sexually dangerous person.  The case was tried before a 
jury in the Superior Court in March, 2016.  The Commonwealth 
presented testimony from three expert witnesses, including two 
qualified examiners, Dr. Mark Schaefer and Dr. Robert Joss, and 
                     
 
2 A "sexually dangerous person" is defined, in pertinent 
part, as "any person who has been . . . convicted of or 
adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by 
reason of a sexual offense and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure 
facility," or who was "previously adjudicated as such by a court 
of the commonwealth and whose misconduct in sexual matters 
indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual 
impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive sexual 
misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression 
against any victim under the age of [sixteen] years, and who, as 
a result, is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on 
such victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable 
desires."  G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
5 
 
 
a psychologist who is a member of the community access board 
(CAB), Dr. Niklos Tomich.3  Both qualified examiners diagnosed 
the petitioner with antisocial personality disorder, and 
concluded that the petitioner was sexually dangerous.  Tomich 
testified that he and the CAB unanimously concluded that the 
petitioner remained sexually dangerous; in addition to 
antisocial personality disorder, Tomich diagnosed the petitioner 
with sexual sadism disorder (Schaefer and Joss concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to diagnose the petitioner with 
                     
 
3 General Laws c. 123A, § 9, sets forth the detailed 
procedural requirements for a trial on a petition for release.  
The petitioner must be examined by two "qualified examiners, who 
shall conduct examinations, including personal interviews, of 
the [petitioner] . . . and file with the court written reports 
of their examinations and diagnoses, and their recommendations 
for the disposition of such person.  Said reports shall be 
admissible in a hearing pursuant to this section. . . .  The 
qualified examiners shall have access to all records of the 
person being examined."  G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  "A qualified 
examiner is either (1) a physician who is licensed by the 
Commonwealth and certified or eligible to be certified in 
psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology; or 
(2) a psychologist who is licensed by the Commonwealth.  In all 
cases, a qualified examiner is designated as such by the 
Department of Correction and has at least two years of 
experience with diagnosis or treatment of sexually aggressive 
offenders."  Green, petitioner, 475 Mass. 624, 625 n.3 (2016), 
citing G. L. c. 123A, § 1.  See Green, petitioner, supra at 630 
("qualified examiners are recognized in G. L. c. 123A as 
independent, skilled, and accountable experts who play a unique 
and central role in G. L. c. 123A proceedings").  In addition to 
the requisite qualified examiner testimony, the Commonwealth may 
present additional expert testimony through a representative of 
the CAB, "whose function shall be to consider a person's 
placement within a community access program and conduct an 
annual review of a person's sexual dangerousness."  G. L. 
c. 123A, § 1. 
6 
 
 
sexual sadism).  The petitioner presented no expert testimony on 
his behalf, although an aunt testified that, if released, the 
petitioner could live with her in New Hampshire and she would 
help him find a job and enroll in therapy. 
 
The jury returned a verdict finding that the petitioner is 
a sexually dangerous person, and the petitioner was ordered to 
remain committed to the treatment center for an indeterminate 
period, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9, 14 (d).  The petitioner 
timely appealed, and we transferred his case from the Appeals 
Court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Because the 
petitioner's first argument on appeal is one that he did not 
raise at trial -- an objection to the admission of a report from 
a psychological evaluation conducted while the petitioner was in 
custody for committing his first offense in the 1990s -- our 
threshold question is one on which our appellate courts have 
provided conflicting guidance in recent years:  whether 
appellate courts should consider defendants' unpreserved 
arguments on appeals from sexual dangerousness proceedings under 
G. L. c. 123A, and if so, under what standard. 
 
Relying on one strain of authority, the Commonwealth argues 
that such arguments are waived, and should not be considered at 
all.  See, e.g., McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 157 (2005), 
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1114 (2006) (declining to consider 
7 
 
 
challenges to jury instructions not raised during trial under 
§ 9); Commonwealth v. Mazzarino, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 367 
(2012) (objection to testimony that defendant refused to speak 
with qualified examiner not raised below and therefore waived).  
This position finds support in the general principle, applied 
far more readily in the civil context, that appellate courts do 
not consider issues that were not raised below.  See, e.g., 
Albert v. Municipal Court of Boston, 388 Mass. 491, 493-494 
(1983); see also Commonwealth v. Oakes, 407 Mass. 92, 94 n.4 
(1990), quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941). 
 
The defendant, citing this court's more recent opinions, 
argues that appellate courts should (and already do) review 
unpreserved arguments in sexual dangerousness proceedings for a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. George, 477 Mass. 331, 335 n.3 (2017) (reviewing unpreserved 
objection for substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); 
Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 583 n.9, cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 150 (2014) (same).  This is the same standard that 
applies generally to unpreserved arguments in criminal cases.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  
It requires a court to consider broadly whether it has "a 
serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been 
different had the [alleged] error not been made."  Commonwealth 
8 
 
 
v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. 
LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999). 
 
This split in authority regarding the scope of our review 
stems in part from the quasi civil, quasi criminal nature of 
sexual dangerousness proceedings.  On the one hand, "[w]e have 
repeatedly emphasized the fundamental difference between 
criminal punishment and civil commitment of a sexually dangerous 
person, stating that a 'G. L. c. 123A proceeding is neither 
criminal nor penal in nature, but is a civil proceeding to which 
constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants do not 
necessarily apply.'"  Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 637 
(2018) (Kafker, J., concurring), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 374 (2008).4  At the same time, we have 
recognized that, like criminal punishment, commitment due to 
sexual dangerousness infringes on an individual's protected 
liberty interest.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 
583, 590 (2006), citing G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 14 ("The 
                     
 
4 In Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489 (2000), we 
referenced several components of G. L. c. 123A that render the 
statute remedial, such that it is "nonpunitive and . . . civil," 
not criminal (for purposes of deciding whether c. 123A is an ex 
post facto law).  Id. at 500, quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 
426 Mass. 534, 538 (1998).  These included the statute's "civil" 
designation, its location "among public welfare chapters of the 
General Laws" (rather than the criminal code), and its over-all 
purpose of providing for the "care, custody, treatment and 
rehabilitation," not punishment, of persons committed to the 
treatment center.  Bruno, supra, quoting G. L. c. 123A, § 2. 
9 
 
 
defendant's interest is weighty.  If committed, his loss of 
liberty would be total. . . .  Commitment is for an 
indeterminate period . . . , and he has a strong interest in 
avoiding such commitment"); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 
489, 502 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 238, 
250 (1977) ("While commitment proceedings under c. 123A are 
civil proceedings, the potential deprivation of liberty to those 
persons subjected to these proceedings 'mandates that due 
process protections apply'").  In fact, we have stated that a 
determination of sexual dangerousness "may have far more serious 
consequences for the individual than criminal punishment," given 
that persons are "subject to a one day to life commitment."  
Travis, supra at 246.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).5 
 
"[I]n deciding what safeguards are required, it is 
necessary to look at the nature of the right which the State 
seeks to circumscribe.  The more precious the right, the greater 
the protection, whether the proceedings be labelled civil or 
criminal."  Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 378 Mass. 479, 487 (1979), 
citing Travis, 372 Mass. at 246; Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 
                     
 
5 Among its criminal components, G. L. c. 123A applies the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to the determination of an 
individual's competency to stand trial, id. at § 15, as well as 
to the ultimate determination of sexual dangerousness.  Id. at 
§ 14 (d).  Likewise, the statute "provides a right to counsel to 
individuals who the Commonwealth seeks to commit."  Commonwealth 
v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 581 & n.7 (2007), citing G. L. 
c. 123A, §§ 9, 12, 13, 14. 
10 
 
 
468, 487-488 (1975).  Given the fundamental liberty interest at 
stake in sexual dangerousness proceedings, we consider it 
appropriate to review arguments that are raised for the first 
time on appeal.6  When evaluating such unpreserved arguments, we 
apply the same standard governing criminal cases:  review for a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
2.  Admission of the report.  We now turn to the merits of 
the petitioner's appeal.  During its direct examination of 
Tomich, the Commonwealth introduced, without objection from the 
petitioner's trial counsel, a report from a psychological 
consultation of the petitioner when he was sixteen years old and 
in custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) for his 
first offense (the petitioner was forty years old at the time of 
trial).  The report indicated that during DYS treatment, the 
                     
 
6 Waiver doctrine "serves a dual purpose:  it protects 
society's interest in the finality of its judicial decisions 
. . . and promotes judicial efficiency."  Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 637 (1997), and Commonwealth v. Pisa, 
384 Mass. 362, 366 (1981).  Strict adherence to the doctrine in 
this context, however, would not achieve those dual purposes.  
See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 209081 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 478 Mass. 454, 464-465 (2017) (Gants, 
C.J., dissenting) (discussing manner in which "the interest in 
finality is considerably less weighty in a sexual risk 
classification proceeding than in a criminal case").  Judicial 
economy would not be served by limiting petitioners to arguments 
that were raised below, as a failure to object at trial may 
result in a petitioner's claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel on appeal, based on counsel's failure to make the proper 
objection. 
11 
 
 
petitioner had disclosed additional details about the indecent 
assault and battery, including that he had "repeatedly rape[d] 
the [victim] over an extended period of time.  There was force 
involved in the rapes, and at the time of the last rape, [the 
petitioner] disclosed 'choking her until she passed out.  I left 
her for dead, so I just forgot about her.'"  The petitioner now 
contends that the judge's admission of this report was erroneous 
and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice that 
warrants reversal of the order of commitment, on the grounds 
that the report was unreliable and unfairly prejudicial. 
 
Review for a substantial risk for a miscarriage of justice 
requires considering "the strength of the Commonwealth's case, 
the nature of the error, the significance of the error in the 
context of the trial, and the possibility that the absence of an 
objection was the result of a reasonable tactical decision."  
Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.  Where there is no error, however, there 
can be no risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., 
Randolph, 438 Mass. at 303.  And we discern no error here. 
 
The ordinary rules of evidence do not apply in sexual 
dangerousness proceedings, see McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. at 
147, and psychological records, including juvenile records, are 
expressly admissible under the governing statute.  G. L. 
c. 123A, § 9.  The report was not protected by the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, G. L. c. 233, § 20B, as it 
12 
 
 
was introduced as evidence of the petitioner's mental condition 
(the purpose of the proceeding is to assess whether the 
petitioner is sexually dangerous) and "not as a confession or 
admission of guilt" with respect to the offense; further, the 
report makes clear that the petitioner was advised at the time 
of the evaluation that the conversation would not be 
confidential, as is required under Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 
Mass. 265, 270 (1974).  Contrast Department of Youth Servs. v. 
A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 524-527 (1986) (substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice where testifying psychiatrist failed to 
give juvenile Lamb warning before interview).7 
 
In addition, when considering the significance of the 
psychological report in the context of the Commonwealth's case 
against the petitioner, Azar, 435 Mass. at 687, its admission 
created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Tomich, when asked what significance he attached to the report, 
replied, "not a lot," and said that the CAB "take[s] additional 
                     
 
7 The petitioner argues that the report is unreliable (and 
therefore inadmissible) because it gives "no indication whether 
a parent or interested adult was included" when the petitioner 
was given the Lamb warning and agreed to proceed.  In support, 
the petitioner cites Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 438 Mass. 372, 
380-381 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. MacNeill, 399 Mass. 71, 
78 (1987), which states the principle that a valid waiver of 
Miranda rights by a juvenile age fourteen years or older 
requires a "genuine opportunity" to consult with an "interested 
adult."  We decline to extend this requirement to the giving of 
a Lamb warning to a juvenile. 
13 
 
 
information like this with a grain of salt."  He added further 
that he "saw nothing in the record that indicated that this was 
a consistent account on the part of [the petitioner]."  
Similarly, the report did not figure prominently in the 
testimony or report of either qualified examiner; rather, each 
remarked that the petitioner's most recent offense, the rape, 
was the most concerning (Schaefer noted that the rape "appears 
to be the most serious in terms of [the petitioner's] committing 
harm to [a] victim," and Joss testified that the offense 
involved "a significant escalation in the amount of violence" 
compared to the prior offenses).  And ultimately, all three 
experts testified that the petitioner remains sexually 
dangerous, based on his history of sexual offenses and his 
mental health diagnoses, as well as his lack of progress in 
treatment programs and his disciplinary record while 
incarcerated, which demonstrate the petitioner's continued 
inability to control himself. 
 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  Last, the 
petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
conceding during closing arguments that both qualified 
examiners, who had testified that the petitioner remains 
sexually dangerous, were "very credible."  Generally, the 
preferred method for challenging the effectiveness of trial 
counsel is through a motion for a new trial, see, e.g., 
14 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810 (2006), and cases 
cited, as the "court [then] has the benefit of affidavits and 
other materials from trial counsel" explaining the reason for 
his or her actions, Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 
109, 115 (2006).  Where there is no motion for a new trial we 
are often unable to discern trial counsel's strategy, and 
therefore unequipped to determine whether counsel's actions 
"[fell] measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer."  Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 
89, 96 (1974).  Here, however, it appears from the record that 
trial counsel chose, as a matter of strategy, to focus the jury 
on the testimony of the qualified examiners as credible 
witnesses because they had both diagnosed the petitioner with 
antisocial personality disorder, which does not necessarily lead 
to sexual misbehavior, rather than the testimony of the CAB 
expert, who had diagnosed the petitioner with sexual sadism.  
While conceding the credibility of witnesses who have offered 
adverse testimony cannot always, as a general matter, be 
considered sound strategy -- both qualified examiners concluded 
that the petitioner remains sexually dangerous -- counsel's 
reasoned, strategic concession here was not facially 
ineffective, given the relative strength of the Commonwealth's 
case and weakness of the petitioner's case.  See, e.g., T.A. 
Mauet, Trial Techniques and Trials § 9.11 (10th ed. 2017) ("An 
15 
 
 
important part of closing argument is addressing juror concerns 
and apparent weaknesses. . . .  Good lawyers always deal 
candidly with the jurors' concerns and look for ways to turn 
apparent weaknesses into strengths"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.