Title: Commonwealth v. Drayton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10667
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 2018

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SJC-10667 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KENJI DRAYTON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 8, 2018. - May 9, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Hearsay, Declaration of deceased 
person.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, 
Affidavit. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 11, 2001. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 473 Mass. 23 (2015), a 
motion for a new trial was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Cathryn A. Neaves for the defendant. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree for the killing of Michael Greene 
and of unlawful possession of a firearm.  The Commonwealth's 
case against the defendant at trial largely depended on the 
testimony of a single percipient witness, James Jackson.  
2 
 
 
Approximately eighteen months after the convictions, another 
individual, Debra Bell, came forward and stated in an affidavit 
that Jackson could not have witnessed the shooting because she 
was in the bathroom with Jackson at the time that it occurred.1  
The affiant died shortly after providing the affidavit.  The 
defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that this affidavit 
was newly discovered evidence, but the trial judge denied the 
motion. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23 (2015) 
(Drayton I), we rejected the defendant's claims of error at 
trial and declined to grant the defendant relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We did, however, remand the case for an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial to 
determine whether "Debra's affidavit falls within a narrow, 
constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule, which 
applies where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is critical to the 
defense and bears persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness."  
Drayton I, supra at 25.  On remand, a different judge determined 
that Debra's affidavit fell within the exception and granted the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  The Commonwealth appealed. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Because Debra Bell shares a last name with her sister who 
is also discussed, Betty Jo Bell, we refer to both by their 
first names. 
3 
 
 
 
We discern no error or abuse of discretion by the motion 
judge in allowing the defendant's motion for a new trial.  In so 
concluding, we give deference to the motion judge's credibility 
findings and conduct our own independent review of the 
documentary evidence and constitutional issues.  The affidavit 
is admissible because it would have been critical to the defense 
and it bears "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness."  
Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 36, quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 302 (1973).  Furthermore, the affidavit is newly 
discovered evidence and casts real doubt on the justice of the 
defendant's convictions.  We therefore affirm the decision of 
the motion judge granting the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
 
1.  Background.  Drayton I presented the facts underlying 
the defendant's convictions.  See Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 25-29.  
We focus here on the specific facts relevant to the issues in 
this appeal. 
 
a.  The shooting.  The Commonwealth's evidence against the 
defendant centered on the testimony of Jackson, the man who 
lived in the apartment where Greene was killed.  Drayton I, 473 
Mass. at 26.  Jackson testified that he let Greene use his 
apartment to sell drugs in exchange for money and free drugs.  
Id. at 25.  Jackson had a similar arrangement in the same 
apartment with the defendant and his codefendant, Levino 
4 
 
 
Williams.2  Id.  One week before the shooting, Jackson told 
Greene that he could no longer use the apartment to sell drugs.  
Id. 
 
On the day of the shooting, the defendant and Williams were 
in the apartment with Jackson, drinking and rolling "oolies," 
which are "cigarettes laced with cocaine and 'reefer.'"  Id.  
Debra and her sister, Betty Jo Bell, were also at the apartment 
during the day, although Jackson testified that both Debra and 
Betty Jo left at some point prior to the shooting.3 
 
Jackson testified that, at some point, he let Greene into 
the apartment.  According to Jackson's testimony, when he let 
Greene into the apartment, it was just Greene, the defendant, 
Williams, and Jackson still in the apartment, with the defendant 
in the living room with Jackson and Williams seated nearby at 
the kitchen table.  Jackson then told Greene that he did not 
want Greene to sell drugs in the apartment anymore, which upset 
Greene.  Id.  According to Jackson, Greene then made a cellular 
telephone call during which he threatened to "kill 'em all" and 
burn down the apartment.  Id.  After Greene made this 
                                                          
 
 
2 Levino Williams, the codefendant at trial, was acquitted. 
 
 
3 According to James Jackson's testimony, there may have 
been several other people in the apartment throughout the day.  
Jackson testified that two tall white males, one named Mark and 
another whose name is unknown, were in the apartment during the 
day.  Statements made to the police also place a woman named 
Sandra in the apartment at various times. 
5 
 
 
threatening telephone call, Jackson left the living room to go 
to the bathroom.  Id.  Jackson heard a gunshot as he was 
preparing to leave the bathroom.  Id.  He walked out and saw the 
defendant shoot Greene five additional times.  Id. at 25-26. 
 
The Commonwealth offered very little physical evidence 
beyond Jackson's testimony that linked the defendant to the 
shooting:  the Commonwealth never located the firearm used to 
shoot Greene, and the only physical evidence that linked the 
defendant to the apartment were a beer bottle that contained a 
latent finger print matching the defendant's right middle finger 
joint and a cellular telephone linked to a person known to both 
the defendant and Williams.4  Id. at 27. 
 
Furthermore, as we noted in Drayton I, "[t]he problems with 
Jackson's credibility were legion."  Id. at 26.  Jackson was a 
heavy drinker and used drugs, including "crack" cocaine, 
extensively throughout his life and in the days leading up to 
the shooting.  Id.  His testimony at trial contradicted some of 
his earlier statements, including his 911 call and his grand 
jury testimony.  Id.  For example, in his 911 call, Jackson 
stated that an unknown assailant pushed through the door and 
shot Greene.  Id.  Jackson also testified during his grand jury 
                                                          
 
 
4 The police traced the cellular telephone to an address in 
the Dorchester section of Boston and a woman named Tamika Ivy.  
The parties stipulated at trial that both the defendant and 
Williams knew Ivy. 
6 
 
 
testimony that Williams was standing behind the defendant as the 
defendant shot Greene but testified at trial that he did not see 
Williams when he saw the defendant shoot Greene.  Id.  Defense 
counsel attempted to impeach him with many of these 
inconsistencies.  Id.  Jackson even stated during his testimony 
that parts of his previous statements were either untrue or 
mistaken.  Id.  Despite these limitations and the "other 
inconsistencies and seeming obfuscations" in Jackson's 
testimony, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree for the shooting of Greene based largely on Jackson's 
testimony.  Id. 
 
b.  Postconviction affidavits.  In October, 2006, eighteen 
months after the convictions, Debra contacted attorney Bernard 
Grossberg, the defendant's trial counsel.  Drayton I, 473 Mass. 
at 24.  In a signed affidavit dated October 17, 2006, Debra 
stated that she was diagnosed with metastatic cancer and was 
undergoing chemotherapy.  She stated that "[b]ecause of the 
uncertainty of [her] medical condition," she did not want the 
fact that she did not disclose what she knew about the shooting 
of Greene on her conscience and decided to come forward.  She 
also stated that her initial statement to police on September 
27, 2001, was "not completely truthful," that she only said 
those things "in order to get out of there as quickly as 
7 
 
 
possible," and that "[t]he officers asked [her] questions, to 
which [she] agreed in order to be able to leave."5 
 
In the affidavit, Debra described the afternoon of the 
shooting very differently from what was presented by Jackson's 
testimony.  She stated that she arrived at the apartment that 
morning at approximately 11 A.M. but left after an argument with 
Jackson.  She stated that she then returned to the apartment "a 
little after 3:00 P.M." and that "there were a number of people 
in the apartment," including Jackson, Greene, a black woman 
named Sandra, an unknown white male, and a black male named Joe.  
According to the affidavit, Debra then brought Jackson into the 
bathroom, where they "were smoking crack cocaine and engaged in 
sexual acts."6  At some point, Debra heard "a series of noises" 
and asked Jackson "if he heard the noises and he said he was not 
sure of what or if he heard anything."  After she waited a few 
                                                          
 
 
5 In her initial statement, Debra told the police that she 
left the apartment before the shooting and did not mention 
anything about being in the bathroom with Jackson.  In her 
affidavit, Debra stated that at the time of her original 
statement to police she was "afraid of the officers," she "did 
not want to get involved in the case," and "the officers told 
[her] that they would take care of arrest warrants that were 
pending against [her] in different courts." 
 
 
6 In the affidavit, Debra stated that she had known Jackson 
"for about three years" and that she "had an off and on intimate 
relationship" with him.  In her statement to police on September 
27, 2001, Debra described her relationship with Jackson as "like 
a brother/sister friendship, concerned about no other guy."  At 
trial, Jackson testified on cross-examination that he had not 
been involved in a relationship with Debra. 
8 
 
 
minutes, Debra "opened the bathroom door and briefly peeked out 
the door."  She saw a person's legs on the floor and "screamed 
to Jackson to look out the door."  Jackson replied, "'[h]ell 
with it' or words to that effect," and slammed the door, saying 
that "he did not care about what was going on."  After a short 
time, Debra opened the door and fled the apartment.  Her 
affidavit concluded with the statement that "there was 
absolutely no way that either [Jackson] or I . . . could have 
seen who shot Michael Greene or who was in the apartment at that 
time." 
 
Grossberg obtained several additional affidavits, including 
one from Betty Jo.  In her affidavit, Betty Jo stated that she 
arrived at the apartment on the day of the shooting at 
approximately 11 A.M. and left approximately one hour later, 
returning at some point in the afternoon to find the building 
sealed off by the police.7  She stated that while she was there, 
the only other people in the apartment were "Jackson, Sandra, 
Mike, Joe, and Debra."  Betty Jo then stated that, "[e]very now 
and then after the shooting on September 20, 2001, [her] sister, 
Debra Bell[,] would tell [her] about what had occurred in the 
apartment" and "would say that she and . . . Jackson were in the 
                                                          
 
 
7 Betty Jo died in February, 2016, which was after the 
release of our decision in Drayton I but prior to the 
evidentiary hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23 
(2015) (Drayton I) (decided October 1, 2015). 
9 
 
 
bathroom getting high on crack cocaine and engaging in sexual 
activity when the shooting occurred."  Betty Jo also stated that 
Debra "would tell [Betty Jo] this more often as she became more 
ill" and that "she wanted the truth to be known" and to "clear 
her conscience."  According to the affidavit, just before she 
died, Debra made Betty Jo promise that Betty Jo would "take care 
of her children and that [Betty Jo] would make the truth known 
about the shooting in . . . Jackson's apartment." 
 
The other two affidavits were from a man identified as 
Joseph Anderson.  In his first affidavit, dated May 15, 2007, 
Anderson stated that he went to the apartment on the day of the 
shooting to purchase crack cocaine from Jackson for a friend.  
Anderson stated that Jackson handed him a small packet of crack 
cocaine and that as Anderson turned to leave, he "saw . . . 
Jackson going into the bathroom with a black woman, who was 
known to [him] as Debra Bell."  In a second affidavit, dated 
July 5, 2007, Anderson added that as he was leaving the 
apartment, he passed two men arguing in the hallway.  He then 
stated that "[b]efore [he] got to the corner, [he] heard what 
sounded like gun shots coming from the area of the apartment." 
 
c.  Procedural history.  While his direct appeal was 
pending, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in 
December, 2006, alleging that Debra's affidavit was newly 
10 
 
 
discovered evidence that warranted a new trial.8  Following a 
nonevidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion in 
November, 2007.  Although the judge stated that she had 
considered holding an evidentiary hearing, she decided not to do 
so because the evidence was inadmissible and impeachment 
evidence alone is ordinarily insufficient to obtain a new trial.  
She accordingly denied the motion on these grounds.  
Specifically, the judge concluded that the affidavit was 
inadmissible because it did not meet the requirements of the 
dying declaration exception.  Because the judge determined that 
the affidavit was inadmissible, she did not reach the other 
issues raised by the defendant's motion for a new trial.  The 
defendant filed a second motion for a new trial in April, 2012, 
this time alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to the 
failure to engage a sleep deprivation or drug use expert and a 
violation of his right to a public trial because of the 
exclusion of the defendant's mother and friend.  The judge 
denied this motion in August, 2012. 
This court then heard the defendant's consolidated appeal 
from the convictions of murder in the first degree and unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and from the denial of the defendant's 
                                                          
 
 
8 Debra died on December 19, 2006, a week after the 
defendant filed his first motion for a new trial.  The defendant 
later filed the affidavits of Betty Jo and Anderson in support 
of the first motion for a new trial. 
11 
 
 
motions for a new trial.  See Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 24-25.  We 
rejected the claims of error at trial that the defendant 
asserted, both on direct appeal and in his second motion for a 
new trial, and declined to grant the defendant relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  Id.  With regard to the defendant's first motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, however, we 
concluded that, under the unusual circumstances of this case, 
there was a substantial issue whether Debra's affidavit falls 
within a narrow, constitutionally based exception to the hearsay 
rule, which applies where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is 
critical to the defense and bears persuasive guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  Id. at 40.  We therefore remanded the matter 
for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.  See id. at 25. 
 
On remand, a different judge in the Superior Court 
conducted the evidentiary hearing.9  At the hearing, the only 
witness who testified was Grossberg.  Grossberg testified that 
he tried to locate Debra prior to trial and hired an 
investigator to find her but was unsuccessful.  Grossberg then 
testified that Debra contacted him "out of the blue" in October, 
2006.  When she came to his office, she "looked very sickly and 
was wearing a scarf to cover her head."  She told Grossberg that 
she knew she was dying.  A few months later, Betty Jo contacted 
                                                          
 
 
9 The case was heard by a different judge on remand because 
the original trial judge had retired. 
12 
 
 
Grossberg and informed him that Debra had died.  Betty Jo spoke 
with Grossberg at his office and signed her affidavit.  Anderson 
also met with Grossberg at his office and signed his two 
affidavits.10 
 
The motion judge concluded that Debra's affidavit was 
admissible because it met the test articulated by this court in 
Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 36.  Specifically, the judge found that 
Debra was motivated to come forward by "her certain impending 
death and her desire to clear her conscience" and that "no 
evidence of any other motivating circumstance was presented."  
The Commonwealth did not produce "any evidence that Debra had 
any prior relationship to the defendant . . . that might have 
motivated her actions."  The judge also found that the other 
affidavits "provide[d] credible corroboration for Debra's 
statements, further demonstrating the statements' 
trustworthiness."  The judge credited Grossberg's testimony on 
the circumstances surrounding the affidavits from Betty Jo and 
Anderson, finding that "the affidavits, particularly Betty Jo's, 
[were] properly viewed as credible."  In concluding that Debra's 
affidavit was trustworthy, the judge noted that there was "no 
                                                          
 
 
10 The motion judge noted that it was not clear how Joseph 
Anderson had come to attorney Bernard Grossberg's attention but 
credited Grossberg's testimony regarding the statements in the 
affidavits.  Grossberg testified that he did not know about 
Anderson until Debra mentioned him in her affidavit. 
13 
 
 
evidence calling into question the authenticity of these 
affidavits or the veracity of their content."  The judge also 
concluded that the affidavit was newly discovered evidence as 
Debra was unavailable and, given Betty Jo's prior statements, 
Grossberg had no reasonable expectation that she had any 
exculpatory information.  As the affidavits were newly 
discovered and cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant's 
convictions, the judge therefore granted the defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Where the Commonwealth appeals from the 
grant of a defendant's motion for a new trial, we consider 
whether the judge committed a significant error of law or abuse 
of discretion in allowing the defendant's motion.  Commonwealth 
v. Kolenevic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 
(2017).  The issue is whether the judge's decision resulted from 
"a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to 
the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id., quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014).  "When, as here, the motion judge did not preside 
at trial, we defer to that judge's assessment of the credibility 
of witnesses at the hearing on the new trial motion, but we 
regard ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to 
assess the trial record."  Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478 Mass. 
14 
 
 
608, 615 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 
307 (1986).  "We review de novo any findings of the motion judge 
that were based entirely on the documentary evidence," which, in 
this case, includes the affidavits.  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 
Mass. 531, 539 (2014).  "We accept other findings that were 
based on testimony at the evidentiary hearing and do not disturb 
them where they are not clearly erroneous."  Id.  "However, we 
'make an independent determination as to the correctness of the 
judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 
205 (2011). 
 
In Drayton I, this court held that Debra's affidavit may be 
admissible if it meets the two-part test set forth in Chambers, 
410 U.S. at 302.11  Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 36.  In Drayton I, we 
also held that the first part of that test, whether the 
affidavit would have been critical to the defense, was clearly 
satisfied in this case.  Id.  We left undecided three distinct 
issues to be addressed at the evidentiary hearing on remand.  
First, the motion judge was to determine whether the affidavit 
met the second part of the test for admissibility, which 
examines whether the affidavit bears "persuasive assurances of 
                                                          
 
 
11 The Commonwealth argues that we should overturn our 
decision in Drayton I insofar as it recognizes a 
constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule.  For the 
reasons stated in Drayton I, we decline to do so. 
15 
 
 
trustworthiness."  See id., quoting Chambers, supra.  Second, if 
the affidavit were determined to be admissible, the motion judge 
then had to determine whether the affidavit was properly viewed 
as newly discovered evidence.  Drayton I, supra at 38-39.  
Third, the judge had to determine whether the affidavit casts 
real doubt on the justice of the defendant's convictions.  Id.  
We address each of these issues in turn. 
 
a.  Whether the affidavit bears persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness.  Because the affidavit "plainly would have been 
critical to the defense," we held in Drayton I that the 
admissibility of the affidavit depended on whether it bears 
"persuasive assurances of trustworthiness."  Drayton I, 473 
Mass. at 36, quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.  We also 
highlighted several elements that seemed to support the 
affidavit's trustworthiness.  See Drayton I, supra at 36-38.  
Following the evidentiary hearing, the motion judge found that 
the affidavit does bear persuasive assurances of trustworthiness 
because of Debra's impending death, the absence of any other 
motive, and the corroboration that exists for the affidavit. 
 
The motion judge found that Debra's statements were 
"motivated by her certain impending death and her desire to 
clear her conscience in the brief time remaining to her."  In 
Drayton I, we drew parallels between the reliability of Debra's 
statements, in light of her impending death, and the reliability 
16 
 
 
of statements that fall within the dying declaration exception.  
Id. at 37 ("while Debra's affidavit fails to satisfy the 
technical requirements for the dying declaration hearsay 
exception, it appears to fall within the rationale for that 
exception").  The motion judge found that "[t]he facts revealed 
by the evidentiary hearing" supported this conclusion because 
Debra appeared sickly and emotional and died soon after signing 
the affidavit.  The motion judge also credited Grossberg's 
testimony about Debra's health and demeanor at the time that she 
signed the affidavit. 
 
The motion judge also found no evidence of any motivation 
for Debra coming forward other than her desire to clear her 
conscience.  See Drayton I, 470 Mass. at 37 (absence of motive 
to lie "tend[s] to support the trustworthiness of Debra's 
statement").  Betty Jo stated in her affidavit that "just 
before" Debra died, Debra told Betty Jo "that she wanted the 
truth to be known about the shooting in . . . Jackson's 
apartment."  The motion judge was further persuaded by the fact 
that Debra contacted Grossberg unprompted and "out of the blue."  
Grossberg testified that he searched for Debra both before and 
after the trial but was unsuccessful.  The motion judge also 
observed that there is no evidence of any connection between 
Debra and the defendant that would have motivated her to come 
17 
 
 
forward and lie on his behalf.12  We highlighted the absence of a 
motive for Debra as potentially persuasive in Drayton I and 
something that could be brought out at the evidentiary hearing.  
See id. at 37 & 38 n.6.  After both sides were given the 
opportunity to develop the record at the hearing, the motion 
judge ultimately found that "no evidence of any other motivating 
circumstance was presented." 
 
Another element that the motion judge found persuasive was 
the corroboration that exists for Debra's statements.  In 
Chambers, the United States Supreme Court found it persuasive 
that the statements at issue in that case were "corroborated by 
some other evidence in the case."  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-
301.  Here, as the motion judge correctly observed, Debra's 
affidavit is corroborated by Betty Jo's affidavit and Anderson's 
                                                          
 
 
12 We also note that the judge concluded that the statements 
Debra gave to Grossberg, rather than those given to the police, 
are more likely to be true.  As Debra explained in her 
affidavit, Debra had various reasons to lie in her initial 
statement to the police.  The affidavit stated that she was 
"afraid" and that she "did not want to get involved in the 
case."  She also stated that the officers "kept coming to [her] 
home and harassed [her] children and family until [she] agreed 
to meet with [them]" and that they "told [her] that they would 
take care of arrest warrants pending against [her]."  Thus, 
while Debra had ample motivation to lie in her original 
statement to the police, there is no evidence of any motivation 
to lie in her affidavit.  We discern no error in the judge's 
analysis. 
18 
 
 
affidavits.  The motion judge found each of these affidavits to 
be credible, particularly the affidavit of Betty Jo.13 
 
We discern no error in the judge's analysis or 
determination that Debra's affidavit bears "persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness."  Our own analysis confirms his 
findings.  We reiterate that this exception is very narrow and 
will be applicable "only in the rarest of cases."  Drayton I, 
473 Mass. at 40.  This case, however, is one in which the 
application of this constitutional exception is appropriate. 
 
b.  Whether the affidavit constitutes newly discovered 
evidence.  "Where the defendant moves for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence, the defendant 'must 
establish both that the evidence is newly discovered and that it 
casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction,' which 
entails a showing that it "'probably would have been a real 
factor in the jury's deliberations.'"  Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 
31, quoting Grace, 397 Mass. at 305–306.  Although "[t]he 
inquiry into whether the defendant has satisfied the new trial 
standard is conceptually distinct from the threshold inquiry 
                                                          
 
 
13 Neither Betty Jo nor Anderson testified at the hearing.  
Betty Jo died prior to the hearing, and Anderson could not be 
located.  The motion judge, however, credited Grossberg's 
testimony concerning the circumstances that prompted Betty Jo 
and Anderson to provide their affidavits.  Our analysis of the 
documentary evidence is consistent with the judge's analysis, 
and we defer to his finding on credibility regarding Grossberg. 
19 
 
 
into whether Debra's affidavit is admissible [evidence], . . . 
many of the same considerations that inform a judge's assessment 
of the affidavit's trustworthiness may well also inform the 
judge's assessment whether it casts real doubt on the justice of 
the conviction."  Drayton I, supra at 39. 
 
"To establish that evidence is 'newly discovered,' the 
defendant must show that the evidence was 'unknown to the 
defendant or his counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them 
at the time of trial."  Drayton I, 473 Mass. at 39, quoting 
Grace, 397 Mass. at 306.  The motion judge correctly concluded 
that the statements in Debra's affidavit were newly discovered 
evidence. 
 
It is undisputed that Debra was unavailable at the time of 
trial.  Additionally, the motion judge found that, even if Betty 
Jo were called as a witness at trial, Grossberg had no reason to 
believe that she had any exculpatory information contradicting 
Jackson's testimony until after the defendant's convictions.  In 
support of this, the judge pointed to her testimony at the 
suppression hearing one month before the trial, in which she 
merely repeated the story she told police and refused to speak 
with Grossberg.  At trial, her attendance had to be secured by a 
capias.  Given Betty Jo's uncooperativeness and her prior 
testimony, there was no reason to believe that had she been 
called as a witness at trial, she would have revealed any of the 
20 
 
 
information contained in Debra's affidavit.  The motion judge 
properly found that, even if she knew of Debra's statements at 
the time of trial, Betty Jo's consistently uncooperative 
behavior prior to trial strongly suggests that she would not 
have revealed these statements if the defense called her to 
testify.  Again, we discern no error in the judge's analysis. 
 
c.  Whether the affidavit casts real doubt on the justice 
of the convictions.  A new trial is warranted "[w]here we 
determine that newly discovered evidence likely would have 
functioned as a real factor in the jury's deliberations."  
Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 623 (2015).  In 
determining whether the newly discovered evidence would have 
been a real factor in the jury's deliberations, we focus on 
"what effect the omission might have had on the jury" rather 
than on whether the verdict would have been different.  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 411 (1992).  
"The over-all strength or weakness of the evidence presented 
against a defendant is significant . . . because it provides the 
context within which to assess whether the newly discovered 
evidence would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations."  Cowels, supra. 
 
While "[n]ewly discovered evidence that tends merely to 
impeach the credibility of a witness will not ordinarily be the 
basis of a new trial," Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 581 
21 
 
 
(1982), a new trial may be warranted where, as here, the 
Commonwealth's case depends on the testimony of a single witness 
and the newly discovered evidence contradicts that testimony.  
See Cowels, 470 Mass. at 621.14 
 
The motion judge found that Debra's affidavit has precisely 
that effect in this case.  We agree.  The Commonwealth's case 
against the defendant depended on the testimony of Jackson, a 
witness with extensive credibility issues.  The motion judge 
properly recognized that, beyond Jackson's testimony, there was 
no evidence that pointed to the defendant as the person who 
killed Greene.  The statements in Debra's affidavit do more than 
just impeach Jackson's testimony; they undermine the 
                                                          
 
 
14 In Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607 (2015), the 
defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree in the 
stabbing death of the victim.  The Commonwealth's main witness 
testified to a timeline that placed the defendants at the 
witness's apartment at various points throughout the night, 
first with the victim and then later without her.  Id. at 609-
610.  The witness testified that when the defendants returned 
without the victim they borrowed some clothes and made various 
threatening statements indicating that they had killed the 
victim.  Id.  The only physical evidence linking the defendants 
to the witness's home were two towels with bloodstains, one of 
which was too small to be tested.  Id. at 610-611.  After the 
defendants were convicted, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing 
revealed that the blood on the towel did not belong to either of 
the defendants or the victim.  Id. at 614.  The defendants 
sought a new trial on the basis of this and other newly 
discovered evidence, but the trial judge denied the motion.  Id. 
at 614-615.  On appeal, we concluded that a new trial was 
warranted because the DNA testing negated key pieces of evidence 
that likely were a real factor in the jury's deliberations.  Id. 
at 623-624. 
22 
 
 
Commonwealth's entire case against the defendant.  Therefore, 
the statements are more than just mere impeachment evidence and 
are a sufficient basis for a new trial. 
 
The motion judge accordingly concluded that Debra's 
affidavit likely would have been a "significant factor" in the 
jury's deliberations in this case.  We also agree with this 
determination.  The Commonwealth's over-all case against the 
defendant was dependent on Jackson's testimony, which Debra 
directly contradicted.  There was also little evidence to 
corroborate Jackson's testimony.  The motion judge therefore 
properly concluded that Debra's affidavit cast real doubt on the 
justice of the convictions. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For these reasons, we hold that the motion 
judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the 
affidavit is admissible and newly discovered evidence that casts 
real doubt on the justice of the defendant's convictions and 
that, therefore, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  The 
judgments of conviction are vacated and set aside, and the 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.