Title: Ward v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 74S00-0907-PD-320
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2012

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Stephen T. Owens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Thomas C. Hinesley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James B. Martin 
Laura L. Volk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Deputy Public Defenders  
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 74S00-0907-PD-320 
 
ROY LEE WARD, 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Spencer Circuit Court, No. 74C01-0107-CF-158 
The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Special Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Direct Appeal 
_________________________________ 
 
June 21, 2012 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
Roy Lee Ward appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his sen-
tence of death.  We affirm the post-conviction court’s decision for the reasons set forth in this 
opinion.  
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 21 2012, 1:05 pm
 
 
2 
 
Background 
 
 
This petition for post-conviction relief follows Ward’s second trial during which he pled 
guilty to the 2001 rape and murder of fifteen-year-old Stacy Payne.1  Ward was sentenced to 
death following a penalty-phase jury trial.  We earlier affirmed Ward’s sentence on direct appeal.  
Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, aff’d on reh’g, 908 N.E.2d 595 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 2060-61 (2010).  Ward subsequently sought to have his death sentence set aside by filing a 
petition for post-conviction relief as permitted by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1.  The post-
conviction court denied relief, and Ward now appeals.  
 
Discussion 
 
 
Ward raises a number of issues in his petition for post-conviction relief, and we consider 
each in turn.  This opinion proceeds in seven parts:  Part I reviews the law governing post-
conviction relief and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.  Part II addresses Ward’s claims 
that his trial counsel were ineffective in their mitigation investigation and presentation.  Part III 
addresses Ward’s claims that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge certain as-
pects of the State’s case.  Part IV addresses Ward’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel 
claims.  Part V addresses Ward’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  Part VI addresses Ward’s claims that the Indiana Death Penalty 
Statute violates the Eighth Amendment.  Finally, Part VII addresses Ward’s claim under Napue 
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).   
 
I 
 
 
By and large, completion of Indiana’s direct appellate process closes the door to a crimi-
nal defendant’s claims of error in conviction or sentencing.  However, our law allows individuals 
                                                 
1 His first jury trial resulted in guilty verdicts for murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct, followed by 
a penalty-phase jury trial that resulted in the death sentence.  On direct appeal to this Court, however, his 
convictions and sentence were reversed due to prejudicial pretrial publicity.  Ward v. State, 810 N.E.2d 
1042 (Ind. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 926 (2005). 
 
 
3 
whose appeals have been unsuccessful to raise a narrow set of claims through a collateral review 
procedure called “post-conviction relief.”  See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1).  The scope of the 
relief available is limited to “‘issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or that 
were not available on direct appeal.’”  Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. 2009) (quoting 
Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2001)).  Issues available on direct appeal but not 
raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.  Id. 
 
A court that hears a post-conviction claim must make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on all issues presented in the petition.  See P-C.R. 1(6).  The findings must be supported by 
facts and the conclusions must be supported by the law.  Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905; see also Al-
len, 749 N.E.2d at 1164.  Our review on appeal is limited to these findings and conclusions. 
 
Because the petitioner bears the burden of proof in the post-conviction court, see P-C.R. 
1(5), an unsuccessful petitioner appeals from a negative judgment.  A petitioner appealing from a 
negative judgment must show that the evidence as a whole “‘leads unerringly and unmistakably 
to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the trial court.’”  Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905 (quoting 
Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1164).  This means that “‘[we] will disturb a post-conviction court’s deci-
sion as being contrary to law only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one 
conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion.’”  Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1164).  
 
 
Many of Ward’s claims are grounded in his contention that he did not receive the mini-
mum level of effective assistance from his counsel that the Constitution requires.  We analyze 
such claims under the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Under this test, Ward must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient based on prevail-
ing professional norms; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Id. at 687; 
see also Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905-06; Bivins v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Ind. 2000).   
 
 
As for the first component of an ineffective-assistance claim – counsel’s performance – 
we have observed that “‘[c]ounsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and 
tactics, and we will accord that decision deference.  A strong presumption arises that counsel 
 
 
4 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable pro-
fessional judgment.’”  Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 906 (alteration in original) (quoting Lambert v. State, 
743 N.E.2d 719, 730 (Ind. 2001)). 
 
 
And as for the second prong, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in most circumstanc-
es, deficient performance of counsel will be prejudicial when “‘there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.’”  Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “‘A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”  
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  In assessing 
prejudice in the context of a claim of an inadequate mitigation investigation, we consider “‘the 
totality of the available mitigation evidence – both that adduced at trial, and the evidence ad-
duced in the [post-conviction proceeding] – and ‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggrava-
tion.’”  Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453-54 (2009) (per curiam) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)).    
 
II 
 
 
Ward’s first claim is that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel 
were ineffective in investigating, preparing, and presenting evidence in mitigation of the death 
penalty.  Specifically, he argues that trial counsel (a) failed to conduct an adequate mitigation 
investigation; (b) failed to have him evaluated by appropriate mental health experts in a timely 
and comprehensive manner; (c) failed to present certain mitigation testimony from lay witnesses 
that were called at trial; and (d) failed to inform the jury that his guilty plea was a mitigating cir-
cumstance.  Although his arguments overlap to some degree, we consider each of them separate-
ly.     
 
 
5 
 
II-A 
 
 
Ward claims that trial counsel were ineffective in their mitigation investigation.  He ar-
gues that a “comprehensive investigation would have led to a much fuller and more mitigating 
penalty phase presentation that would have yielded a reasonable probability of a sentence less 
than death,” Appellant’s Br. 11, and cites evidence presented at the PC hearing to support his 
claim.  Related to this, he argues that the mitigation investigator’s “inability to complete the so-
cial history crippled the defense preparation.”  Id. at 13. 
 
II-A-1 
 
The PC court concluded that Ward had failed to establish deficient performance or preju-
dice in this regard, and it made findings of fact to support its conclusion.   
 
First, the PC court found that “trial counsel made the efforts necessary to learn all rele-
vant and probative information about Ward and his background to present a thorough, if not 
winning, mitigation presentation.”  PCR App. 324.  Moreover, it found that based on the evi-
dence offered at the PC hearing and considering that they were successful in appealing his first 
trial, Ward’s trial counsel were “aware of any character or background evidence that could have 
been presented and made reasonable strategic choices about what mitigation to present.”  Id.  It 
found that trial counsel had presented testimony from Ward’s mother, his grandmother, his 
brother, his former brother-in-law, his half-brother by his father, a former employer, a former 
sexual partner, his former probation officer, and a former friend to give the jury lay-witness 
background information about Ward’s life.  Id.  The PC court generally concluded that the evi-
dence presented at the PC hearing was “either cumulative of what was presented at trial or oth-
erwise had no capacity to materially improve the mitigating quality of [Ward’s] case.”  Id. at 
324-25.   
 
With regard to the mitigation investigator’s performance, the PC court found that alt-
hough she was experiencing personal problems while working on Ward’s case, “the defense was 
 
 
6 
able to get what it was looking for.”  Id. at 324.  And although the investigator was unable to 
complete a social history as requested, trial counsel testified that she had given her expert “‘[a]ll 
the police reports that had to do with the public indecency charges as well as all the probation 
records, education records, any sort of record that has anything to do with any prior mental 
health treatment evaluation of whatever.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting PCR Ex. 37, at 
46).   
 
Lastly, the PC court found that there was “no relevant probative evidence of mitigation 
presented in the first trial that was not presented in Ward’s retrial, leaving the Court to conclude 
that the supposed lack of any information gained from the previous mitigation expert was suffi-
ciently remedied by resort to other sources of information.”  Id. at 325. 
 
II-A-2 
 
The record corroborates most of these findings and ultimately supports the PC court’s 
conclusion that Ward did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.   
 
The record shows that Ward’s trial counsel, Lorinda Youngcourt and Steve Ripstra, 
indeed faced some difficulties in their mitigation investigation.  At the PC hearing, trial counsel 
testified that they received everything that had been prepared for mitigation in Ward’s first trial, 
PCR Tr. 49-50, 408-10, but because that mitigation file was rather small, they basically had to 
start from scratch, id. at 410.  They retained a mitigation investigator, Michelle Rushton 
(formerly Michelle Perry or Michelle Delph), in November, 2005, id. at 295, but by mid-August, 
2006, Rushton’s investigation was only a little more than a third complete, see Trial II Tr. 91 
(hearing on motion to continue trial).  No one on the defense team did much mitigation work 
during the fall of 2006 after the original trial judge recused himself.  Thus, by early January, 
2007, when Judge Pigman set the trial date for early May, 2007, the mitigation investigation still 
“wasn’t anywhere near complete.”  PCR Tr. 300-01.  Moreover, because she was struggling both 
professionally and personally during that time, id. at 301-02, the social history Rushton 
submitted to trial counsel was incomplete, id. at 306.  In fact, because of the problems they were 
 
 
7 
having with Rushton,2 Judge Pigman allowed trial counsel to hire another mitigation investigator 
in March, 2007.  Id. at 48-49, 305.  That additional mitigation investigator, however, apparently 
abandoned the case after only one day.  Id. at 456.   
 
Yet despite these difficulties, there is evidence of a thorough mitigation investigation per-
formed in this case.  Although Rushton was slow in getting them information, trial counsel 
Ripstra testified that “[Rushton] was providing us with the information we wanted.”  Id. at 48.  
Rushton testified at a pretrial hearing on August 21, 2006, that most of the records had already 
been gathered, Trial II Tr. 91, although testimony offered at the PC hearing suggests that trial 
counsel were still gathering some records in the spring of 2007.  PCR Tr. 440, 483.3  Moreover, 
trial counsel Youngcourt testified at a post-trial hearing that she had sent one of her mental 
health experts “[a]ll the police reports that had to do with the public indecency charges as well as 
all the probation records, education records, any sort of record that had anything to do with any 
prior mental health treatment evaluation of whatever.”  PCR Ex. 37, at 46.4  And we note that 
according to testimony offered on behalf of Ward at the PC hearing, such records are just as im-
portant to the mitigation investigation as a document called “social history.”  PCR Tr. 510-11.  
Notwithstanding the absence of a completed social history, Youngcourt prepared a three-page 
summary about Ward based on his first trial, Youngcourt’s personal conversations with him, and 
his records; she gave this document to her mental health experts before they met with Ward in 
late-March, 2007.  Id. at 447-48.   
 
Further, the mitigation investigation consisted of interviewing many people.  Rushton tes-
tified that she met with Ward twice and that she had quite a bit of contact with his mother.  Id. at 
302.  For her part, Youngcourt testified that she saw Ward once a month or once every other 
month and that she had been representing Ward since 2003.  Id. at 458-59.  Rushton further testi-
fied that she interviewed approximately a dozen lay witnesses for about an hour or an hour-and-
                                                 
2 Youngcourt testified that her failure to supervise Rushton was one of her “biggest short comings in this 
case.”  PCR Tr. 407-08.   
3 Trial counsel testified that they received the records of Dr. Engum, an expert from Ward’s first trial, 
“fairly late in the day,” PCR Tr. 440, and records from Central State Hospital “[v]ery late in the day,”  id. 
at 483.     
4 And that mental health expert, Dr. Friedman, testified at the post-trial hearing that he had spent 50.5 
hours reviewing the file and records provided to him, PCR Ex. 37, at 32-33, suggesting that the file and 
records were quite extensive.   
 
 
8 
a-half each and wrote a report of what she discovered for each interview.  Id. at 310-11.  Ward’s 
trial counsel then divided up the mitigation witnesses and one or the other saw each of them per-
sonally; they then decided who would be called for trial based on the productivity of their testi-
mony.  Id. at 56.  As a result, they called to testify Ward’s paternal grandmother, Trial II Tr. 
1636-46; his mother, id. at 1646-1710; his brother, id. at 1711-21; his half-brother by his father, 
id. at 1770-79; his former case manager at the Indiana State Prison, id. at 1723-26; his current 
case manager at the Indiana State Prison, id. at 1726-29; his former juvenile probation officer, id. 
at 1989-97; his former girlfriend, id. at 1730-40; a former friend/employer, id. at 1740-48; anoth-
er former employer, id. at 1760-69; his ex-wife, id. at 1748-59; and his ex-brother-in-law, id. at 
1779-88.  Trial counsel also called James Aiken, a prison consultant, who testified that based on 
35 years’ experience in the field, Ward could be “safely managed in a high security setting for 
the remainder of his life without causing an undue risk of harm to staff, inmates, as well as to 
[the] general public.”  Id. at 2011-12.  Three mental health professionals, one of whom treated 
Ward in the late 1980s to early 1990s for exhibitionism, also testified on behalf of the defense.  
Id. at 1789-1832 (Dr. Joseph Edwards); id. at 1832-81 (Dr. George Parker); id. at 1884-1989 (Dr. 
Alan Friedman).   
 
But contrary to the PC court’s finding, our review of the record suggests that trial counsel 
were unaware of some background or character evidence that could have been presented.  Testi-
mony presented at the PC hearing indicates that there was some evidence of Ward possessing 
more redeeming traits, and that Youngcourt would have presented that evidence if she had been 
aware of it.  For example, Ward’s grandmother, who also testified at his second trial,5 testified in 
an affidavit that Ward had helped her with yard work after Ward’s grandfather passed away; that 
“[h]e was always willing to help”; that he would buy her gifts; and that he was a “lovely and 
friendly kid.”  PCR Ex. 25.  Ward’s uncle also testified in an affidavit that Ward would help oth-
ers with yard work and other outdoor manual labor.  PCR Ex. 26.  Finally, the mother of one of 
Ward’s ex-girlfriends, Trena Andrews, testified in an affidavit that Ward was a nice, polite 
                                                 
5 Ward’s grandmother, Margaret Ward, testified at Ward’s second trial mostly about their family’s history 
(marriage, education, health, etc.) and about Ward’s exposing himself to her when he was young.  Trial II 
Tr. 1636-46.   
 
 
9 
young man who was always eager to help.6  PCR Ex. 27.  Youngcourt testified that, had she 
known about the information contained in these affidavits, she would have presented it.  PCR Tr. 
466-68.7   
 
 
Our review of the record also indicates that trial counsel intended in their investigation to 
discover certain things but never followed up.  Specifically, they intended to but never contacted 
one witness in particular, Judge Jerome Jacobi, who had represented Ward on a series of public 
indecency charges in the early 1990s while in private practice.  PCR Ex. 23, at 7-10.  In a deposi-
tion admitted at the PC hearing, Judge Jacobi testified that Ward was very polite and cooperative 
and that Ward appeared to be remorseful and ashamed by his acts of public indecency.  Id. at 12-
14, 44.  Trial counsel also wanted to investigate Ward’s grandfather’s military records to add 
credibility to those witnesses who suggested that Ward’s grandfather also suffered from exhibi-
tionism.  PCR Tr. 474.  Thus, the PC court’s finding that trial counsel made reasonable strategic 
decisions about what mitigation evidence to present is not fully supported by the record on these 
matters. 
 
Finally, with regard to the PC court’s final finding on this issue, there was some mitigat-
ing evidence presented at the first trial that was not presented at the second.  In particular, Ward 
points to evidence of certain stress factors that he faced in the days preceding the murder that 
were presented as mitigation in the first trial but not in the second.  Appellant’s Br. 35, 37-38.  
Youngcourt testified that she knew about Ward’s activities preceding the murder and that Ward 
was under certain stressors but that she did not present that evidence to the jury and had no rea-
son not to do so.8  PCR Tr. 477-78.   
                                                 
6 Moreover, Andrews testified that Ward’s father would make inappropriate sexual references in front of 
his children, and this, according to trial counsel Youngcourt, was the most important information in An-
drews’s affidavit.  PCR Tr. 468. 
7 Three other affidavits of Ward’s family’s neighbors were also presented at the PC hearing, but the PC 
court found that they were not admissible.  PCR Tr. 469-73.  These affidavits contain more information 
that Ward was a helpful, thoughtful young man.  See PCR Ex. 28 (Affidavit of Loretta Bodi); PCR Ex. 29 
(Affidavit of Russell Knieriem); PCR Ex. 30 (Affidavit of Juanita Knieriem).  Ward makes no argument 
that these affidavits should have been admitted.    
8 On the other hand, Youngcourt explained at the PC hearing that one of those activities had to do with 
Ward having parked his car in front of some professional business, maybe a stock investment business.  
PCR Tr. 477.  Along with the other activities and stressors, she stated that she had no reason not to pre-
sent that evidence to the jury.  Id. at 478.  But our review of the trial record reveals that Youngcourt ex-
 
 
10 
 
II-A-3 
 
 
Our review of the record does not lead us to an opposite conclusion than that reached by 
the PC court, that Ward’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently in their mitigation investiga-
tion.   
 
“The Constitution requires that the trial counsel in capital cases conduct a reasonable in-
vestigation into potential mitigating factors.”  Wallace v. Davis, No. IP 95-0215-C-B/S, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22353, at *93 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), 
aff’d, 362 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2004).  What is reasonable depends on the circumstances of each 
case, including the facts of the crime, information gleaned from the defendant and others, and 
other readily available sources of information.  Id.  It does not demand a “‘scorch-the-earth strat-
egy.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  Moreover, “Strickland does not require counsel to investigate eve-
ry conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist 
the defendant at sentencing.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003).  
 
Although Ward’s trial counsel failed to discover some arguably mitigating evidence, they 
nevertheless conducted a reasonable investigation, thereby passing constitutional muster.  Trial 
counsel’s conduct here does not rise to anywhere near the level of inadequacy as that in other 
cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has found counsel’s investigation to be deficient.  In Wil-
liams v. Taylor, for example, trial counsel did not begin their investigation until a week before 
trial; failed to uncover records describing Williams’s nightmarish childhood because they incor-
rectly thought that state law barred access; failed to discover or introduce evidence that Williams 
was borderline mentally retarded or that he had received prison commendations; and failed to 
follow up with a CPA who offered to testify that he had visited Williams frequently in prison as 
part of a prison ministry program, that Williams thrived in prison, and that Williams was proud 
of his carpentry degree earned in prison.  529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000).  In Wiggins, trial coun-
sel’s inattention led them to abandon “their investigation of [Wiggins’s] background after having 
                                                                                                                                                             
pressly stated that she had no intention of presenting any evidence that Ward had been parked, just sitting 
in his car, in front of an Edward Jones Investment Firm earlier in the day that Stacy Payne was murdered.  
Trial II Tr. 1431.   
 
 
11 
acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources,” 539 U.S. at 
524 – sources that revealed obvious bases of mitigating evidence that would have led any rea-
sonably competent attorney to investigate further, id. at 524-26.  In Rompilla v. Beard, trial 
counsel failed to examine the court file on Rompilla’s prior convictions despite the fact that they 
knew that the prosecution planned to seek the death penalty by proving Rompilla had a signifi-
cant history of felony convictions.  545 U.S. 374, 383-86 (2005).  In Porter v. McCollum, trial 
counsel did not interview any witnesses or gather any records and thereby failed to uncover any 
evidence of Porter’s mental health or mental impairment, his family background, or his military 
service.  130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (per curiam).  And in Sears v. Upton, trial counsel failed to 
uncover horrific aspects of Sears’s family and social life, that he was learning disabled, and that 
he suffered frontal lobe abnormalities that resulted in substantial cognitive deficits.  130 S. Ct. 
3259, 3262-64 (2010) (per curiam) (5-4). 
 
Unlike these cases, it is clear from the record here that trial counsel conducted a reasona-
ble mitigation investigation.  They interviewed Ward, his family members,9 and others who 
knew him to gain insight into his background and to develop his history; they also gathered rec-
ords related to his education, his time in prison, and his mental health.  Using the ABA standards 
as a guide, we think that the scope of counsel’s investigation was reasonable.  See ABA Guide-
lines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.7 cmt. 
(rev. ed. 2003) (noting that among the topics counsel should explore are medical history, family 
and social history, religious and cultural influences, educational history, military service, em-
ployment and training history, and prior adult and juvenile correctional experience); see also 
Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16-17 (2009) (per curiam) (restatements of professional 
standards can be useful guides as to what is reasonable); cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 
(1986) (cautioning courts not to “constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct”).  
And although they may have wanted to uncover certain mitigating evidence or may have intend-
ed to interview one potential mitigation witness in particular, they were not constitutionally defi-
                                                 
9 Ward does not argue that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to contact his sister, Wanda, who was 
estranged from Ward’s family and possibly living in Germany.  Nevertheless, we note that Ward did in-
terview Wanda’s ex-husband (Ward’s ex-brother-in-law).  Trial II Tr. 1779-88.  Moreover, PC counsel 
did not present testimony from Wanda either, and the one PC expert who talked to Wanda during the 
week of Ward’s PC hearing stated that she had “[l]ittle if any” beneficial information to add.  PCR Tr. 
379.    
 
 
12 
cient for failing to do so on this record.  Cf. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“[E]ven 
if an omission is inadvertent, relief is not automatic.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasona-
ble competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” (citations omitted)).  
Ward’s trial counsel simply did not make “errors so serious that [they were] not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
 
II-B 
 
 
Next, Ward claims that trial counsel were ineffective in selecting and preparing the men-
tal health experts utilized at trial.  He explains that the problem was not that trial counsel made 
no effort to secure expert assistance, but rather that “the mental health experts were ill-suited for 
this case, retained late, and provided necessary background information to inform their opinions 
even later.”  Appellant’s Br. 15.  Like that discussed supra, he claims that “[h]ad there been a 
functioning mitigation specialist capable of providing Ward’s experts with a comprehensive so-
cial history, the jury would have been presented with the totality of Ward’s background and men-
tal illness.”  Id. at 34.  And related to these claims, Ward also argues that trial counsel were inef-
fective for failing to secure rulings on motions for expert assistance and on a certain motion for a 
continuance based on the mitigation investigator having not yet completed a social history.   
 
II-B-1 
 
The PC court concluded that Ward failed to establish either deficient performance or 
prejudice with respect to these claims, and it made findings of fact to support its conclusion.   
 
First, the PC court concluded that “trial counsel thoughtfully selected experts and thor-
oughly and reasonably selected a strategy for presenting mitigation.”  PCR App. 312.  It refer-
enced the transcript of a hearing held to address a post-trial request for additional payment for 
one of the defense’s mental health experts, Dr. Friedman.  At the hearing, Dr. Friedman testified 
that it was trial counsel “Youngcourt’s idea to pursue psychopathy as a theory of mitigation upon 
Dr. Friedman’s advisement that Ward was a primary psychopath.”  Id. at 313 (citing PCR Ex. 37, 
at 17-18).  Dr. Friedman explained that he believed psychopathy to be a mitigating circumstance 
 
 
13 
because of his belief that “‘people do not volunteer to be born, you know, to be constitutionally 
deficient in feeling states.’”  Id. (quoting PCR Ex. 37, at 24).  For her part, Youngcourt testified 
at this hearing that she had provided Dr. Friedman with all the experts’ testimony from Ward’s 
first trial and all the records that had to do with Ward’s prior mental-health-treatment evaluation.  
Id.  The court found that Youngcourt had consulted with her experts to develop collectively the 
mitigation presentation and had explained that the mitigation theory originated in the course of a 
conference call involving Doctors Friedman and Parker as well as Professor Marla Sandys, who 
had been acting as a consultant regarding jury selection.  Id. at 313-14.  As a result, the PC court 
found that trial counsel had performed professionally and competently.  Id. at 314. 
 
Moreover, the PC court did not find significant qualitative differences between the expert 
opinions offered at the PC hearing and those offered at trial.  Id.  At trial, Dr. Parker testified that 
his multi-axial diagnosis of Ward was Axis I: exhibitionism; and Axis II: antisocial personality 
disorder.  Id. at 315.  He explained that Ward suffered from a subset of personality disorder 
called “psychopathy” and that both genetics and environment play a role in psychopathy, but that 
genetics plays a bigger role than people think.  Id. at 315-16.  Ward’s other expert at trial, Dr. 
Friedman, also testified that Ward was a psychopath and explained to the jury that Ward’s “‘psy-
chopathy stops him from conforming his conduct.’”  Id. at 316 (quoting Trial II Tr. 1920-21).  
Ward had been “‘tested out the kazoo,’” and because of that, Dr. Friedman testified that 
“‘[Ward] is what he is.  I don’t need more test data.’”  Id. (quoting Trial II Tr. 1932).   
 
The PC court then summarized the expert opinions offered by Ward at the PC hearing.  It 
explained that Dr. Fabian’s “diagnostic conclusions were that Ward had extreme mental emo-
tional disturbances and cited to:  (1) exhibitionism; (2) depression; (3) ADHD; (4) learning disa-
bility; and (5) mixed personality.”  Id. at 318 (citation omitted).  His primary diagnoses of Ward, 
however, were exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.  Id.  Ward’s other post-
conviction expert, Dr. Ferraro, rendered diagnoses of anxiety disorder not otherwise specified, 
exhibitionism, learning disorder, and antisocial personality disorder.  Id. at 319.  Dr. Ferraro en-
dorsed Dr. Fabian’s observations regarding ADHD and learning disabilities and also pointed to 
disciplinary issues at home that encouraged Ward’s wrongful behavior.  Id. at 320.  Dr. Ferraro 
acknowledged that Ward’s trial experts had observed and described problems with attachment, 
 
 
14 
and he agreed with Dr. Parker’s trial testimony that both genetics and environment play a role in 
personality disorder.  Id. at 320-21.  Of note to the PC court was Dr. Ferraro’s belief that Ward 
murdered Stacy Payne in a fit of rage; it found that “[n]o other expert, in Ward’s first trial, in the 
trial challenged in these proceedings, or other post-conviction experts, has expressed an opinion 
that Ward killed Stacy Payne out of rage.”  Id. at 322.  Both Doctors Fabian and Ferraro 
acknowledged their consensus with the trial experts that Ward suffered from antisocial personali-
ty disorder.  Id. at 319, 321.   
 
After summarizing all the testimony,10 the PC court concluded: 
 
Among all of these experts, those offered at trial and those offered at post-
conviction, a consensus emerges that Ward lacks empathy for others and will hurt 
others to advance his personal well being.  The only discernable distinction noted 
by the Court is that Doctors Fabian and Ferraro would place more responsibility 
for Ward’s personality development in this respect on Ward’s upbringing and en-
vironment, while the experts offered a trial tended to opine that Ward’s antisocial 
personality is more greatly attributable to genetic, biological and immutable psy-
chological makeup.  Given the facts of the murder in this case and the lack of any 
other evidence to suggest that Ward was unable to appreciate the circumstances or 
the wrongfulness of his conduct when [he] raped and murdered Stacy Payne, the 
distinction that comes through the testimony of the trial experts can be seen as 
strategically superior.  The Court finds that testimony like that offered by Dr. Fa-
bian and Dr. Ferraro would not have created a reasonable probability of a differ-
ent outcome.  The dominant features of Ward’s makeup as it relates to this case 
are his antisocial personality and his total lack of remorse.  Ward has failed to 
show prejudice with respect to this claim. 
 
Id. at 323-24. 
 
                                                 
10 The PC court also summarized the testimony of Dr. Edwards who had treated Ward for exhibitionism 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the testimony of the State’s mental health expert presented at the PC 
hearing, Dr. Wood, who had evaluated Ward.  The PC court found that Dr. Wood had also rendered Axis 
I diagnoses of exhibitionism and learning disability and an Axis II diagnosis of antisocial personality dis-
order.  PCR App. 322.  Dr. Wood disagreed that antisocial personality disorder is either biologically or 
genetically inherited, but rather explained that personality disorder is the person’s identity.  Id.  Dr. Wood 
explained that, despite his upbringing, “Ward had the capacity to make choices about his behavior,” and 
that “Ward would make choices in the manner best serving his personal preferences with no regard to any 
expense to others.”  Id. at  323 (citation omitted). 
 
 
15 
Finally, with regard to the mitigation investigator’s failure to complete a social history 
and trial counsel’s failure to secure a ruling on a motion for a continuance based on this, the PC 
court found that “trial counsel well apprised themselves of Ward’s social background, including 
his family, medical, and educational history, as well as his criminal history,” and that “there 
[was] no significant evidence before the Court suggesting that Ward’s mental health experts at 
trial were not made aware of the pertinent information in this regard.”  Id. at 325.  Instead, it 
found that both Doctors Fabian and Ferraro significantly referenced the materials relied upon by 
Doctors Parker and Friedman at Ward’s penalty phase.  Id.  Thus, despite the mitigation investi-
gator’s failure to complete a formal social history, the PC court found that trial counsel were 
thorough in providing extensive information on Ward’s background and social history to the trial 
experts, id., such that they had sufficient information “to render an opinion to a reasonable de-
gree of scientific certainty as to his condition,” id. at 327.  The PC court also found Ward’s claim 
that trial counsel were ineffective by failing to secure rulings on motions for expert assistance to 
be redundant in light of its findings on trial counsel’s selection and use of experts for trial, as 
discussed supra.  Id. at 326. 
 
II-B-2 
 
The record largely corroborates the PC court’s findings of fact and ultimately supports its 
conclusions of law.11   
 
At the outset, we note that the record supports the PC court’s findings with regard to the 
social history and trial counsel’s failure to secure a ruling on a motion for a continuance based on 
this.  As we found in Part II-A, supra, there is evidence that trial counsel conducted a thorough 
mitigation investigation despite the mitigation investigator’s having provided trial counsel with 
an incomplete social history.  Further, the record reveals that both the trial experts and PC ex-
perts substantially relied on the same sources of information, including:  Ward’s family’s history 
and lax discipline at home; his school records; his criminal and DOC records; and his hospitali-
zation and medical records including records developed in the first trial, records from Life 
                                                 
11 We discuss some of the trial experts’ and PC experts’ testimony in Part II-E, infra.  To the extent we do 
not repeat certain aspects of their testimony here, we have considered them together with what is dis-
cussed in this section in reviewing the PC court’s findings.   
 
 
16 
Springs, and records from Central State Hospital.  And while the PC experts also referred specif-
ically to Ward’s Madison State Hospital records, PCR Tr. 236, it is reasonable to conclude that 
trial counsel Youngcourt provided those records to at least Dr. Friedman in light of her testimony 
that she had given him “any sort of record that had anything to do with any prior mental health 
treatment evaluation of whatever.”  PCR Ex. 37, at 46.   
 
Nevertheless, our review does reveal one possible instance where the trial experts may 
have lacked some of Ward’s family’s medical records.  Specifically, when asked whether Ward’s 
mother or father had psychopathy or antisocial personality disorder, Dr. Friedman testified that 
he could not diagnose them because he did not review their medical records.  Trial II Tr. 1965.  
The record reveals that both of the PC experts reviewed Ward’s mother’s mental health rec-
ords.12  It is not entirely clear, however, whether Dr. Friedman had access to records that would 
reveal psychopathy but did not review them or whether he simply did not have access to them.  
And in any event, the PC experts did not review Ward’s father’s mental health records (if any) 
either.  See PCR Ex. 17, at 1-3 (Dr. Fabian’s report listing sources of information); PCR Ex. 21, 
at 1-2 (Dr. Ferraro’s report listing documents reviewed).  Thus, we cannot say that it was clearly 
erroneous for the PC court to find no significant evidence of pertinent information of which 
Ward’s trial experts were unaware.  Moreover, even if Ward’s mother’s records were in fact not 
obtained, we note that PC counsel has not argued that trial counsel performed inadequately in not 
obtaining them. 
 
Moving on, with regard to the PC court’s findings on performance, the record supports 
that it was trial counsel Youngcourt’s idea to pursue psychopathy as a mitigation strategy, PCR 
Ex. 37, at 17-18, although she testified later at the PC hearing that she was always a little con-
cerned about it, PCR Tr. 450.  Specifically, the idea developed during a conference call with Dr. 
Friedman, Dr. Parker, and the defense team’s jury consultant.  PCR Ex. 37, at 51-52.  
Youngcourt explained that their jury consultant, who had done a lot of research on the Indiana 
Death Penalty Statute, had suggested that psychopathy could be a mitigating circumstance, and it 
was one that they hoped could explain the evidence presented by the State in the first trial that 
                                                 
12 As discussed in Part II-E, infra, Ward’s mother testified at the second trial that she was on medication 
for depression, which affected her memory. 
 
 
17 
Ward showed absolutely no emotion on the day of the offenses.  Id. at 51-53.  The record reveals 
extensive efforts in developing psychopathy as a mitigation strategy, including Dr. Friedman’s 
spending 50 hours reviewing articles and other research, synthesizing materials, and contacting 
other professionals about it.  Id. at 13-21.  In defending the reasonableness of the bill that he 
submitted for his services (which was about $58,000, id. at 31), Dr. Friedman explained that he 
knew that this “was going to be an uphill fight” and that he “wanted to be as thorough and dili-
gent as possible to find things in the literature if they existed to help a jury understand [Ward’s] 
condition of primary psychopathy.”  Id. at 24-25.  And when asked whether she thought the bill 
was reasonable, Youngcourt explained:   
 
My honest, honest to God when I first saw it I had a little sticker shock but when I 
sat down and I actually thought about how much time I had spent with him on the 
telephone, I had arranged conference calls with Dr. Parker, Dr. Edwards and Dr. 
Friedman, I had at least two other hour long conference calls with just Dr. Parker 
and Dr. Friedman where they were trying to do exactly what I had hired them to 
do which was help me figure out how to make a defense out of the evidence that I 
had, when I thought about that and then I thought about all of the research articles 
he sent me and even on weekends when he couldn’t get to the library or his data 
base he would e-mail me and I was pulling them off of Lexis Nexus [sic] and var-
ious places I know in my billing there’s some bills for articles that I downloaded 
and I thought about all of that it appeared very reasonable to me because I know 
he was spending as much time on that portion of the case as I did, probably more.   
 
Id. at 49-50.   
 
Ward’s trial counsel presented testimony from Dr. Parker and Dr. Friedman at the penal-
ty-phase jury trial that took place on May 14-18, 2007 (jury selection was held on May 9 and 
May 11, 2007).  Trial counsel filed a motion for funds to retain Dr. Parker on February 5, 2007, 
Trial II App. 463-65, which was granted by the trial court on March 1, 2007, id. at 597.  Trial 
counsel Youngcourt had worked with Dr. Parker on another case where he had identified some-
thing about a defendant that no other expert had, and Youngcourt hoped that Dr. Parker would do 
the same in Ward’s case.  PCR Tr. 425-26.  Dr. Parker conducted two in-person interviews of 
Ward in prison around March 26, 2007, id. at 444, and reviewed a variety of records (including 
Ward’s medical records and records from the first trial).  Trial II Tr. 1839.  Ward freely admitted 
to Dr. Parker to always being a liar, to being very good at lying, and to doing it all the time.  Id. 
 
 
18 
at 1843.  Dr. Parker diagnosed Ward with exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder, and 
specifically, a subset of antisocial personality disorder called psychopathy.  Id. at 1840.  He ex-
plained that, other than keeping Ward away from society, treatment for Ward’s psychopathy was 
not really an option.  Id. at 1873.  According to Dr. Parker, psychopaths do not have a con-
science, id. at 1846; they do not feel guilt or remorse (although they may feel other emotions), id. 
at 1846, 1855; and “[t]hey do what they need and that’s all the justification that they need,” id. at 
1846.  In talking with Ward, Dr. Parker explained that Ward had no emotional connection with 
what they were talking about (either about his exhibitionism or the murder), and in fact, that 
Ward has never really had a connection with other people at all.  Id. at 1846-47, 1878-79.  He 
explained that with antisocial personality disorder, part of it is environmental, but a big part of it 
is genetic,13 and that in this case in particular, Ward was born without a conscience.  Id. at 1847-
49, 1857.  He also explained that the brains of people with antisocial personality disorder are 
structured differently.  Id. at 1849.  Dr. Parker was not surprised that Ward showed no emotion 
on the day of the offenses because Ward has “no sense of other people as real beings.”  Id. at 
1852-53.  Moreover, Dr. Parker explained to the jury that they would not see much emotion from 
Ward during the trial.  Id. at 1860.  With regard to Ward’s exhibitionism, Dr. Parker stated that 
there was a bit of a connection to his psychopathy because if he wanted to expose himself, he 
would.  Id. at 1855.  Finally, Dr. Parker testified that Ward would probably not be a danger to 
others in prison because he would be aware that he is not in control in prison.  Id. at 1873-75.   
 
Trial counsel also sought and was granted funds to retain Dr. Friedman on March 14, 
2007.  Trial II App. 656-62, 681.  Dr. Friedman met with Ward on three occasions while Ward 
was in prison around March 28, 2007, PCR Tr. 451, performed a psychopathic checklist on him, 
and reviewed all the records he was given, Trial II Tr. 1891-92.  Dr. Friedman explained that 
Ward had something “[v]ery much wrong with him,” and he diagnosed Ward with severe psy-
chopathy and exhibitionism.  Id. at 1892, 1894.  Psychopaths, according to Dr. Friedman, “have 
multiple deficits in their capacity to relate to people emotionally because they are so internally 
impoverished,” id. at 1892-93, and therefore, they have a difficult time seeing people the same 
way as normal people see people, id.  Ward even told Dr. Friedman that he does not feel any-
                                                 
13 On cross, Dr. Parker acknowledged that the “question . . . has not been fully answered” whether antiso-
cial personality disorder was genetic or a result of environmental contributions.  Trial II Tr. 1866. 
 
 
19 
thing.  Id. at 1937.  This is why Ward showed no emotion on the day of the offenses.  Id. at 1903.  
Dr. Friedman also explained that psychopaths like Ward do not see themselves as having a future 
so they keep committing crimes.  Id. at 1916.  With regard to the cause of Ward’s psychopathy, 
Dr. Friedman explained that Ward did not volunteer to be the way that he is, but rather that he 
was born with this temperament. Id. at 1911-12, 1966-67.  Because Ward’s psychopathy pre-
vents him from conforming his conduct to the law and because he had psychopathic traits on the 
day of the offense, Dr. Friedman explained that Ward’s psychopathy provides some kind of un-
derstanding as to how he could do something like this.  Id. at 1920, 1931-32, 1956.  Moreover, 
Dr. Friedman explained that, as a psychopath, Ward’s brain functions differently in the way he 
processes and understands information, id. at 1893; that Ward has a need for stimulation, id. at 
1906-08; and that he has poor behavioral controls, id. at 1938-39.  Like Dr. Parker, Dr. Friedman 
explained that there was no real treatment for Ward at this time, other than keeping him in pris-
on.  Id. at 1944-45.  Although he had been given the option of retesting Ward, Dr. Friedman ex-
plained that he did not need more test data and that he would rather spend his time interviewing 
Ward to get his history and to observe his emotional reactions (or lack thereof).  Id. at 1932-33.  
 
At the PC hearing, counsel presented testimony from Dr. Fabian and Dr. Ferraro.  Dr. Fa-
bian stated that his primary diagnoses of Ward were antisocial personality disorder and exhibi-
tionism, PCR Tr. 276, and he acknowledged that there was a consensus among the experts who 
testified at Ward’s second trial and at the PC hearing that Ward suffers from antisocial personali-
ty disorder, id. at 282.  However, Dr. Fabian also concluded that Ward has ADHD, learning dis-
ability, depression, and borderline personality disorder.  Id. at 254.  Dr. Fabian explained that 
Ward was not born with antisocial personality, but rather his ADHD and learning disability put 
him at risk for developing antisocial personality disorder.  Id. at 271-72.  Like Dr. Friedman, Dr. 
Fabian stated that Ward had “been poked and prodded for years,” id. at 221; that Ward knew 
something was wrong with him, id. at 236; and that Ward had problems connecting with other 
people, id. at 235.  But, according to Dr. Fabian, Ward was a psychological challenge that could 
not be described by a simple label – a label like psychopath.  Id. at 289-90.  He also stated that 
Ward could be treated.  Id. at 253.  With regard to Ward’s exhibitionism, Dr. Fabian explained 
that Ward had issues of volitional impairment and that he would flash people to reduce stress.  
Id. at 232.  When asked about Ward’s telling him (Dr. Fabian) that he felt sorry for the victim but 
 
 
20 
telling another expert that he did not, Dr. Fabian explained that Ward’s feeling for Stacy Payne 
“is somewhat . . . conflicted within himself like his emotional makeup to some degree.”  Id. at 
251.   
 
Dr. Ferraro also testified at the PC hearing.  He diagnosed Ward with anxiety disorder not 
otherwise specified; exhibitionism and learning disability by history; and antisocial personality 
disorder, id. at 353-54, and he acknowledged his consensus with other experts, id. at 371-72.  He 
agreed with Dr. Parker and Dr. Friedman that Ward has difficulty relating to and connecting with 
others, id. at 335-36, and that he has “problems with empathy and caring and feeling towards 
people like other people normally do,” id. at 329.  When talking about his father, with whom 
Ward described as his closest relationship, Ward had “a complete lack of depth of relatedness” 
and a “[c]omplete absence of language or words or expressions of emotional presence or contact 
or closeness.”  Id. at 331.  Dr. Ferraro explained that Ward would manipulate others to cope with 
his “intense loathing and feelings of inferiority,” id., and also confirmed that Ward would change 
topics to avoid talking about things that did not serve his best interest, id. at 369-70.  He stated 
that antisocial personality disorders are typically resistant to treatment and suggested that the 
best opportunity to treat Ward was missed when he was young.  Id. at 354-55.  Unlike Dr. 
Friedman, Dr. Ferraro explained that Ward’s personality developed over time and that he was not 
born the way that he is, id. at 346-49, but he later agreed with Dr. Parker that both genetics and 
environment play a role in antisocial personality disorder, id. at 361-62.  And similar to Dr. Fabi-
an, Dr. Ferraro explained that Ward cannot be summed up in a label; that doing so would miss 
more than would be gained.  Id. at 380.14  Finally, with regard to remorse, Dr. Ferraro recounted 
a conversation with Ward where Ward explained that although he feels bad for Stacy’s family, 
he does not feel the way that he should, and that, generally speaking, he does not have the same 
kind of remorse or feelings as other people.  Id. at 357-59. 
 
                                                 
14 With regard to the PC court’s finding that Dr. Ferraro was the only expert who had suggested that Ward 
killed Stacy Payne out of a lifetime of suppressed rage, Ward points to a statement in Dr. Ferraro’s report 
that Dr. Engum (an expert who testified at Ward’s first trial) had also identified the presence and build up 
of intense suppressed anger that combined with other factors to lead to the death of Stacy Payne.  See Ap-
pellant’s Br. 29.  While it is true that Dr. Engum’s report refers to Ward having suppressed his anger for 
most of his life, we do not read Dr. Engum’s testimony or report as expressly stating Dr. Ferraro’s opin-
ion that Ward murdered Stacy out of a fit of rage, and in any event, we do not view this finding to affect 
the outcome of this case, see Part II-E, infra. 
 
 
21 
After reviewing all this testimony, we conclude that, although the evidence is not une-
quivocal as to Ward’s total lack of remorse, there is a substantial amount of evidence to support 
the PC court’s finding of a consensus among the experts that Ward lacks empathy for others and 
is motivated by his own interests.  However, in addition to the one distinction noted by the PC 
court that the trial experts placed more emphasis on biology and the PC experts placed more em-
phasis on environment, we note a few others.  Specifically, the trial experts, while diagnosing 
Ward with antisocial personality disorder, also labeled Ward as a psychopath.  The PC experts, 
although agreeing that Ward has antisocial personality disorder, did not refer to Ward as a psy-
chopath and, in fact, stated that Ward could not be summed up by any sort of label.  Moreover, 
while the trial experts testified that there was no real treatment for Ward at this time, at least one 
of the PC experts testified that Ward could be treated.  Thus, we observe these differences in ad-
dition to the one noted by the PC court, but as discussed infra, we conclude that they do not af-
fect the outcome. 
 
II-B-3 
 
Our review of the record does not lead us to an opposite conclusion than that reached by 
the PC court, that Ward’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently in their selection and prepara-
tion of the mental health experts. 
 
We recognize that Ward’s claim essentially amounts to his view that trial counsel should 
have presented the expert testimony that was presented at the PC hearing and should not have 
pursued psychopathy as a mitigation defense.  But we note that trial counsel made a strategic de-
cision to pursue this defense pursuant to a thorough mitigation investigation, the challenge to 
which we upheld in Part II-A, supra.  “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of 
law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690; see also Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3265 (the reasonableness of the mitigation theory is related to 
the adequacy of the mitigation investigation).  Contra Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666, 675-76 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (decision to seat a biased juror cannot be strategic decision).  We give deference to 
counsel’s choice of strategy and tactics.  Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 906.   
 
 
 
22 
At the PC hearing, trial counsel Youngcourt explained that she hoped “to provide the jury 
a label if nothing else, a diagnosis so that when they went back to deliberate they could say, you 
know, he’s mentally ill,” PCR Tr. 461-62 (emphasis added), and that is exactly what trial counsel 
did.15  Although a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder or, even worse, a finding of psy-
chopathy, may have led some counsel to focus on another mitigation strategy, see Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1405-10 (2011) (finding no ineffectiveness in counsel’s decision to 
evoke a family-sympathy mitigation defense in light of mental health expert’s finding of psycho-
pathic personality traits), even the mental health experts offered at the PC hearing focused on 
Ward’s antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating factor.  Further, we note that psychopathy 
has been viewed as a possible mitigating circumstance in at least one other jurisdiction with a 
death penalty statute that considers as mitigation whether the defendant was under the influence 
of mental or emotional disturbance or was unable to conform his or her conduct to the law.  See 
State v. Caldwell, 388 S.E.2d 816, 823 (S.C. 1990) (evidence of psychopathic personality at time 
of offense supported statutory mitigating instructions pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-
20(C)(b)(2), (6), and (7) under court’s review in favorem vitae in effect at that time).  While evi-
dence of psychopathy might not have made Ward any more likable to the jury, it at least attempt-
ed to assist the jury in understanding him and to explain his horrendous acts and, even more so, 
his documented lack of emotion on the day of the offenses.  See Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3264 (evi-
dence of personality disorder may not have made defendant any more likable, but it might have 
helped the jury understand him and his horrendous acts); Trial II Tr. 1318-19, 1402 (noting lack 
of emotion on day of offenses).  
 
 
Nor was trial counsel deficient in selecting Ward’s mental health experts or providing 
records to them.  As reflected above, Ward’s trial counsel retained their mental health experts 
about two months before the penalty-phase jury trial began.  Even though neither of them was a 
so-called expert in sex-offender treatment, trial counsel did call to testify Dr. Edwards, who had 
actually treated Ward for his exhibitionism, and Dr. Parker offered some connection between 
Ward’s exhibitionism and his psychopathy.16  And while trial counsel Youngcourt suggested that 
                                                 
15 There is evidence in the record that the jury did think that Ward had a mental illness.  See PCR Tr. 475-
77 (Youngcourt recounting encounter with jurors). 
16 Lending further support to our conclusion that trial counsel were not deficient in selecting mental 
health experts is the fact that unlike the experts presented at the PC hearing, the experts presented at trial 
 
 
23 
the trial experts’ opinions of Ward may have been formed before they had all of his relevant in-
formation, PCR Tr. 429-31, and that she continued to send them records even after they had met 
with Ward, id. at 453, the PC record reflects that even PC counsel sent at least one of their men-
tal health experts records after he had evaluated Ward, id. at 219-20.   
 
We agree that trial counsel did not perform deficiently in selecting or preparing their 
mental health experts.   
 
II-C 
 
Ward also contends that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present mitigation 
testimony regarding the impact that Ward’s execution would have on his family.  The PC court 
concluded that Ward failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice in this regard.  
 
The PC court made findings to support this conclusion.  First, it recounted some portions 
of both Ward’s mother’s and brother’s testimony at the PC hearing regarding the effect that 
Ward’s execution would have on them.  It explicitly found to be untrue Ward’s mother’s state-
ment that she would commit suicide if Ward were executed.  PCR App. 336.  Moreover, it found  
 
no evidence supporting any impact on Ward’s family that would not be pertinent 
to the family of any other offender sentenced to be executed.  There is no evi-
dence that Ward played any caretaking or other role of responsibility in any fami-
ly member’s (or any other person’s, for that matter) life.  That said, whether to 
appeal to a jury’s sense of sympathy with regard to the grief or sense of loss that 
the defendant’s family might suffer is a strategic matter.  Regardless, the Court 
finds that had trial counsel elected to present “execution impact” evidence, it 
would not have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
offered some compelling, albeit unsuccessful, reasons for why Ward should spend the rest of his life in 
prison as opposed to being sentenced to death.  Dr. Parker explained that the worst situation for someone 
like Ward would be to spend day after day for the rest of his life in prison because he will have no control 
over what he does; it would be “torment for [Ward] to be in a prison setting for a long time with no atten-
tion other than the usual correctional officers and other inmates.”  Trial II Tr. 1860-61.  And Dr. Friedman 
explained that psychopaths (like Ward) should be locked up and studied so that something like what hap-
pened in this case could be prevented in the future.  Id. at 1943-45.  Not only did trial counsel Youngcourt 
argue these points to the jury in closing, id. at 2091, even the State acknowledged some value in learning 
from people like Ward, id. at 2096. 
 
 
24 
Id. at 340.   
 
 
The record supports these findings.  As for the finding concerning Ward’s mother’s tes-
timony, we note that the PC judge is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses.  Dillon v. 
State, 492 N.E.2d 661, 662 (Ind. 1986).  And our review of the record reveals that Ward did not 
have any responsibility for or any caretaking role in anyone else’s life such that his execution 
would cause some particular impact on another.   
 
Moreover, although trial counsel Youngcourt testified at the PC hearing that she did not 
consider eliciting from Ward’s mother or brother any testimony regarding the impact that Ward’s 
execution would have on them, PCR Tr. 491, the record reveals that she did ask them their opin-
ions as to whether Ward should spend the rest of his life in prison (as opposed to what the jury 
would view as the alternative – being sentenced to death), Trial II Tr. 1696, 1720.  Then, during 
her closing argument, Youngcourt pleaded to the jury, “Don’t do it.  The woman who gave birth 
to him, who shares a birthday with him, she tells you don’t do it, give him life without parole.”  
Id. at 2092. 
 
We do not reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that trial counsel were not deficient 
for failing to elicit “execution impact” testimony, in part because their eliciting Ward’s family’s 
views on whether Ward should spend the rest of his life in prison and arguing that point in clos-
ing substantially served the same end.   
 
II-D 
 
Next, Ward argues that, “[a]lthough trial counsel certainly knew that Ward’s guilty plea 
was a mitigating circumstance under case law, they made no strategic decision not to inform the 
jury accordingly.”  Appellant’s Br. 38 (citation omitted).  The PC court concluded that trial 
counsel’s strategy was reasonable and that Ward was not prejudiced.   
 
The PC court made certain findings to support its conclusion.  Specifically, it found that, 
“[c]onsidering the resources and time Ward insisted upon in demanding a jury trial on the penal-
 
 
25 
ty and the overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is unclear how the jury would have appreciated his 
guilty plea on those charges as particularly mitigating.”  PCR App. 341.  Moreover, it found that 
during her final argument, trial counsel advised and reminded the jury at least three times that 
Ward had admitted to raping and murdering Stacy Payne.  This, according to the PC court, was a 
“strategically effective way to urge some mitigating value from Ward’s guilty plea.”  Id. at 342.   
 
With regard to these findings, we first note that trial counsel Youngcourt testified at the 
PC hearing that she had made no strategic decision not to inform the jury that Ward’s guilty plea 
should be specifically considered as a mitigating circumstance.  PCR Tr. 484.  Nevertheless, she 
stated that she had spent a lot of time during voir dire stating that Ward had admitted to doing 
this.  Id.  And beyond that, the record supports the PC court’s finding that Youngcourt, in mak-
ing her closing argument, reminded the jury at least three times that Ward had admitted to rape 
and murder.  Trial II Tr. 2083, 2086, 2092.  Specifically, she repeated in closing, “We pled 
guilty.  We pled guilty.”  Id. at 2086.  Then, after recounting some of the mitigating evidence, 
she proffered to the jury, “And anything that you think of that I haven’t thought of.  Anything 
you think of that I haven’t thought of.”  Id. at 2090.  Although trial counsel might not have spe-
cifically told the jury that Ward’s guilty plea was a mitigating circumstance, her closing argu-
ment substantially served that end.  Put differently, we find that counsel advanced Ward’s guilty 
plea as a mitigating circumstance even if not formally labeling it as such.  
 
II-E 
 
Any deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance discussed in this Part II did not prejudice 
Ward’s defense, as the totality of the mitigating evidence produced both at trial and at the PC 
hearing are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances.17  We consider first the evidence of 
the aggravating circumstances that the sentencing jury considered.  
                                                 
17 This accords with the U.S. Supreme Court’s methodology in assessing prejudice during habeas corpus 
review of state capital cases.  E.g., Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1408-10 (“‘reweigh[ing] the evidence in aggrava-
tion against the totality of available mitigating evidence’” (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534)); id. at 
1430-33 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (same); Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 19-20 (same). 
 
 
26 
 
II-E-1 
 
The state alleged three aggravating circumstances – that Ward tortured the victim while 
the victim was still alive and/or mutilated the victim while the victim was still alive, Ind. Code § 
35-50-2-9(b)(11) (1998); that Ward committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim 
while committing or attempting to commit rape, id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(F); and that Ward was on 
probation for a felony at the time he committed the murder, id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(C).  See Trial 
II Tr. 1200, 2128-29.  
 
With regard to the first aggravating circumstance, the state presented testimony from 
Melissa Payne, Stacy’s sister, who was in the house when the offenses occurred and who called 
for help.  Both Melissa and the emergency dispatcher who took Melissa’s call testified to Stacy’s 
screaming during the attack.  Id. at 1268, 1271, 1282.  Melissa testified that she heard Stacy say 
“Please stop, please stop,” to which Ward responded, “You better be quiet.”  Id. at 1271.  Matt 
Keller, who was the first officer to arrive on the scene and who apprehended Ward, testified that 
Stacy was alive when he arrived with her arms and legs flailing about and that she was laying in 
a huge pool of blood, nude from the waist down, with her abdominal contents out of her body.  
Id. at 1299.  Keller found twine in Ward’s pocket that was later proven to have Stacy’s blood on 
it.  Id. at 1301-02, 1409, 1411, 1415.  An EMT who responded to the scene also testified that 
Stacy was alive and moaning, id. at 1312; that she grimaced with pain and even cried, id. at 
1313; and that she was conscious the whole time, id. at 1315.  He testified that Stacy tried to 
fight him off and tried to crawl away, as if he were her attacker.  Id. at 1310.  He also described 
her wounds – that her midsection had been cut all the way around with the exception of about 
four inches; that her abdominal contents were spilling outside her body; and that her throat had 
also been cut from one side to the other.  Id. at 1311-12.   
 
In addition, Dr. Rodney Edwards, Jr., an emergency room physician who attempted to 
treat Stacy at a local hospital, elaborated on Stacy’s wounds and state of consciousness.  He de-
scribed that “her small bowel, her small intestines were on top of her abdomen outside of the ab-
dominal cavity . . . [,] the opening of the abdominal cavity appeared to be all the way from one 
 
 
27 
side to the other side,” and that “she had a large gaping wound across the neck that did reveal the 
backside of the trachea” and “a gash across the left hand down to the bone.”  Id. at 1329.  He ex-
plained that Stacy was aware of what was occurring; that there was “a little tearing in the eyes” 
when she was intubated; and that she squeezed a nurse’s hand to show that she could understand.  
Id. at 1333-34.  He explained that she was aware and could feel pain in the hospital and that, in 
fact, she was probably even more aware of what was going on before she arrived at the hospital.  
Id. at 1334-35.  With regard to her abdominal wound, Dr. Edwards testified that it appeared to be 
just one continuous opening, but that at the middle of the lumbar area, there were multiple lines 
down to the bone that indicated “multiple attempts to get through that rigid area” and that it 
“looked like a carving, like an attempt to get through.”  Id. at 1335-36, 1341.  
 
The forensic pathologist, Dr. Hunsaker, who performed Stacy’s autopsy also testified.  
She reported her observation of eighteen blunt-force injuries, id. at 1472, some of which could 
have been caused by a dumbbell, id. at 1481-82.  She explained that the wounds on Stacy’s hand, 
pictures of which were introduced into evidence, were defense wounds, meaning that she “was 
trying to fend for her life.”  Id. at 1487, 1496-97.  She testified that a particular bruise on Stacy’s 
left shin was consistent with a ligature or binding across her leg, id. at 1489, and, similarly, that a 
band-like bruise on her right forearm was also consistent with a ligature, id. at 1523-24.  She also 
described a “large gaping wound to the front of [Stacy’s] neck,” as illustrated by pictures intro-
duced into evidence, and hesitation marks on the left side of Stacy’s neck that suggested she was 
probably moving, or “trying to get away.”  Id. at 1497.  Dr. Hunsaker explained that Stacy’s 
windpipe near her vocal cords had been severed, as well as the right internal jugular vein; these 
injuries prevented Stacy from talking and inhibited her breathing.  Id. at 1498-99.  As for Stacy’s 
abdominal injury, Dr. Hunsaker testified that Stacy “was almost cut in half,” id. at 1496, by a 
wound 24.5 inches in length, id. at 1510, but that there were no “hacking marks” on Stacy’s 
spine, id. at 1534-35.  Finally, the prosecution specifically asked Dr. Hunsaker her professional 
opinion, “[D]o Stacy Payne’s abdominal and back injuries appear consistent with someone at-
tempting to cut her completely in two?” to which Dr. Hunsaker replied, “Yes.”  Id. at 1521.  
 
 
28 
Again, pictures of the injuries Stacy suffered to her abdomen and back were introduced into evi-
dence.18  
 
With regard to the second aggravating circumstance, Ward pled guilty to rape.  But the 
State also called two DNA analysts, one who testified to one of Ward’s penile swabs having Sta-
cy’s DNA on it, id. at 1417-18, and another who testified that Ward could not be excluded as a 
contributor to the sperm fraction on Stacy’s cervical swab, id. at 1456.  The forensic pathologist 
who performed Stacy’s autopsy also described the wounds she observed in examining Stacy’s 
vaginal area – bruising to the left aspect of the vaginal wall and a small petechial hemorrhage.  
Id. at 1491-92.  She testified that these wounds were more likely than not inflicted by some ob-
ject and that the injuries were consistent with sexual assault.  Id. at 1492-93.   
 
And as for the third aggravating circumstance, the State presented testimony from James 
Rice, Ward’s probation officer, that Ward was on probation for a felony burglary conviction out 
of Missouri at the time he committed the murder.  Id. at 1440-41.  
 
II-E-2 
 
Next, we consider the mitigating evidence, starting with what was presented to the sen-
tencing jury.  As mentioned above, Ward’s trial counsel called a number of lay mitigation wit-
nesses.  These witnesses testified to Ward’s family’s history – that they had little education; of-
ten married at an early age; had a history of divorce and infidelity; had a history of mental health 
issues; and frequently changed residence.  Id. at 1638, 1640-41, 1648-59, 1663.  They testified 
that they thought Ward should spend the rest of his life in prison.19  Id. at 1696, 1720.  Their tes-
timony revealed that Ward had learning disabilities; was a hyper child; missed school frequently; 
and was never really self-sufficient.  Id. at 1669-73, 1695, 1708.  At least one witness thought 
that Ward was favored by his parents and, in fact, was encouraged (or at least not discouraged) 
                                                 
18 With regard to the first aggravating circumstance, this Court held in Ward’s direct appeal that a reason-
able jury could find torture and mutilation beyond a reasonable doubt.  To be sure, we found the evidence 
of torture and mutilation to be overwhelming.  Ward, 903 N.E.2d at 962. 
19 We considered whether Ward’s trial counsel were deficient in failing to present execution-impact evi-
dence in mitigation in Part II-C, supra. 
 
 
29 
by his father to behave poorly.  Id. at 1781-83.  Testimony also revealed that Ward’s father had a 
history of exposing himself, id. at 1675, 1786-87, and it was suggested that Ward’s grandfather 
(with whom Ward loved spending time, id. at 1677) may have had a similar history, compare id. 
at 1877 (Dr. Parker testifying that he had been told by the family that Ward’s grandfather had a 
history of exposing himself), with id. at 1717 (Ward’s brother testifying that he had not heard 
about his grandfather’s exposing himself).  Ward was immature and was picked on by others but 
nevertheless was a “likable young man.”  Id. at 1743-1747.  Trial counsel introduced pictures of 
Ward as a child and with his family, id. at 1643, 1663, 1670, although Ward’s mother testified 
that she couldn’t remember certain dates of pictures because she was on medication for, among 
other things, depression, id. at 1663.   
 
Moreover, two of Ward’s case managers at the Indiana State Prison testified on his be-
half, stating that he had only been written up once in prison and that it was for a nonviolent of-
fense.  Id. at 1724-25, 1727-28.  A prison consultant also testified that Ward could be safely 
housed in prison for the rest of his life.  Id. at 2011-12.  And in her closing argument Ward’s trial 
counsel stated several times that Ward had admitted to raping and murdering Stacy Payne, which 
suggested that it was something to be considered in weighing the evidence.20  Id. at 2083, 2086, 
2092. 
 
As discussed in Part II-B, supra, trial counsel also presented three mental health profes-
sionals at the penalty phase.  Dr. Edwards treated Ward for his exhibitionism in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  He testified that Ward had some significant emotional problems that contribut-
ed to his exhibitionism, Trial II Tr. 1803-04; that he did not think that Ward’s family was partic-
ularly supportive, id. at 1818; and that Ward did not make progress in treatment, id. at 1819-20.  
Dr. Edwards had suggested a more long-term sex-offender treatment for Ward because he 
thought that Ward’s exhibitionism could become more severe.21  Id. at 1822.  Next, Dr. Parker, 
testified that Ward suffered from exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder (and a special 
subset of that disorder called sociopathy or psychopathy).  Id. at 1840.  Dr. Parker explained that 
                                                 
20 We considered whether Ward’s trial counsel were deficient in failing to present his guilty plea as evi-
dence in mitigation in Part II-D, supra. 
21 Ward’s former probation officer, Meribeth Adams-Wolf, had also recommended long-term juvenile 
sex-offender treatment for Ward, but that never happened.  Trial II Tr. 1993-97.   
 
 
30 
Ward was never really disciplined at home for his bad behavior; that, in fact, his father sold 
whatever Ward stole; and that Ward had learning disabilities.  Id. at 1858-59, 1870.  Lastly, Dr. 
Friedman, testified that there was something “[v]ery much wrong with [Ward]” in that he was a 
psychopath, id. at 1892, and that his psychopathy prevented him from conforming his conduct to 
the law, id. at 1920.  Specifically, he explained that Ward “is not able to behave in the right or 
wrong way because he doesn’t have the internal mechanisms that allow him to do that.”  Id. at 
1958.  According to Dr. Friedman, Ward did not volunteer to be the way that he is.  Id. at 1910-
15.  Dr. Friedman also testified that Ward knew he was different from other people, id. at 1914, 
and that Ward said he regretted what he did, but Dr. Friedman explained that that is what psy-
chopaths say, id. at 1937.  Dr. Friedman described Ward as having “a manic need for activity.”  
Id. at 1928.  Finally, Dr. Friedman testified that Ward’s father encouraged his antisocial behav-
ior.  Id. at 1963.   
 
As for the evidence presented at the PC hearing, we agree with the PC court that some of 
it was duplicative and what was new added little in the way of mitigating value.  Ward’s counsel 
in his first trial, Barbara Williams, testified to the stressful events occurring in Ward’s life at the 
time of the murder – that he was on probation (a fact proven by the aggravating evidence), that 
he was doing community service, that he was facing new charges of public indecency, and that 
he had been ordered to a treatment program but did not know how he could travel there.  PCR 
Tr. 21-22.  Testimony revealed that Ward had written a letter to the judge after his first trial to 
express his remorse.  Id. at 25.  As discussed supra, affidavits were introduced describing Ward’s 
thoughtfulness and willingness to help others, and one affiant also described Ward’s father’s im-
proper references to sex in front of his children.  Ward’s former girlfriend testified that he had 
treated her with “utmost respect,” PCR Ex. 24, at 15, and explained that she was unhappy with 
the testimony she gave at Ward’s second trial because she felt like she only told the negative 
side, id. at 22.  Ward’s mother testified that she argued with Ward’s father in front of their chil-
dren, PCR Tr. 162-65; and she felt that Ward was embarrassed by his learning disability, id. at 
160, and that he felt like a “nobody” because of exhibitionism, id. at 178.22  She also testified 
that she planned to commit suicide if Ward were executed.  Id. at 185.  Ward’s brother elaborat-
                                                 
22 During the second trial, Ward’s mother testified that Ward never talked to her about his exhibitionism 
and that he never told her why he exposes himself or shared any of his feelings at all.  Trial II Tr. 1687.   
 
 
31 
ed on the discipline imposed on them growing up and explained that his father once shot him 
(Ward’s brother) with a BB-gun.  Id. at 193.  He also testified that Ward’s execution “would tear 
[him] apart.”  Id. at 196.  PC counsel introduced Ward’s grandfather’s military-discharge papers 
into evidence which suggested that he too suffered from exhibitionism.  Ward’s PC counsel also 
introduced the deposition of Judge Jerome Jacobi, who explained that, during the time he repre-
sented Ward in the early 1990s, Ward appeared to be remorseful for his acts of public indecency 
and that Ward was committing these acts as if he wanted to be caught.  PCR Ex. 23, at 14, 16.  
Judge Jacobi explained that Ward’s “problem seemed to be his ability to control his conduct to 
the requirements of law.”  Id. at 22. 
 
Ward’s PC counsel also presented two mental health experts (Dr. Fabian and Dr. Ferra-
ro), as discussed in Part II-B, supra.  Dr. Fabian testified that Ward was a complex, complicated 
individual with many psychiatric diagnoses.  PCR Tr. 221.  He discussed Ward’s lax discipline, 
id. at 224, and his father’s condoning Ward’s antisocial behavior, id. at 225.  He explained that 
Ward probably had some alcohol dependence problems in the past.  Id. at 230.  According to Dr. 
Fabian, Ward started flashing people because he was at a loss interpersonally due to his ADHD, 
learning disabilities, and lack of attractiveness, id. at 235-36; and he also explained that Ward 
would expose himself to others to relieve stress, id. at 232.  Dr. Fabian testified to the following 
mitigating factors:  learning disability; ADHD; chronic mild depression; exhibitionism; history 
of familial mental illness; poor coping skills; self-esteem issues; and extreme mental emotional 
disturbances (including exhibitionism, depression, ADHD, learning disability, and personality 
disorder).  Id. at 251-56.  In his opinion Ward could be treated.  Id. at 253.  The second expert, 
Dr. Ferraro, also recognized certain developmental issues, like Ward’s being hyper; having diffi-
culty processing information; lacking boundaries at home and lax discipline; changing residences 
frequently; and his father encouraging poor behavior.  Id. at 326-29.  Dr. Ferraro diagnosed 
Ward with anxiety disorder, exhibitionism, learning disability, and antisocial personality disor-
der.  Id. at 353-54.  Dr. Ferraro explained that antisocial personality disorders are very resistant 
to treatment and that the best chance to treat Ward would have been when he was young.  Id. at 
355.  And he explained that Ward’s symptoms of mental illness were worsened by the stress he 
faced in the weeks leading up to the murder.  Id. at 355-56.  Finally, when asked why in his opin-
ion Ward attempted literally to cut Stacy Payne in two during the murder, Dr. Ferraro replied that 
 
 
32 
Ward “was out of control and functioning in the midst of extreme rage . . . [triggered by a] life-
time of suppressed rage.”  Id. at 378.   
 
II-E-3 
 
We sum up and weigh all the evidence as follows.  On the mitigation side, we weigh the 
following evidence in the low-to-medium range:  Ward had some issues in his upbringing and 
his family had some mental health problems, but he did not have a particularly nightmarish 
childhood like that in Williams or Sears; and he had some personality disorder (and, according to 
two mental health experts, the most severe type of antisocial personality disorder – psychopathy 
– through no fault of his own).  We weigh the following evidence in the low range:  There may 
have been missed opportunities to help Ward, and his family was not particularly supportive of 
positive behavior.  His family testified that Ward should spend the rest of his life in prison and 
that his execution would impact them.  There was also testimony presented that Ward could safe-
ly be housed in prison and may be treatable.  Ward admitted to raping and murdering Stacy 
Payne and may have felt some remorse for it.  Ward did some thoughtful things and had helped 
others in the past.  Ward had ADHD and learning disabilities; he had a history of exhibitionism 
and some history of alcohol dependence; he had anxiety and depression; and he had poor coping 
skills and was facing certain stress factors around the time of the murder.  All or some of these 
kept Ward from conforming his conduct to the law.   
 
On the other side of the scale are the aggravating circumstances.  We weigh in the low 
range the aggravating circumstance that Ward was on probation for felony burglary out of Mis-
souri at the time he committed the murder.  We weigh in the high range the aggravating circum-
stance that Ward committed the murder by intentionally killing Stacy Payne while committing or 
attempting to commit rape.  We weigh in the highest range the aggravating circumstance that 
Ward tortured and mutilated Stacy Payne while she was alive.  He tied her up.  He hit her repeat-
edly, causing eighteen blunt force injuries to her body.  He cut her hand to the bone.  He cut her 
throat such that her windpipe and internal jugular vein were severed, preventing her from speak-
ing and inhibiting her breathing.  He nearly cut her body in half such that her intestines literally 
spilled out of her abdomen.  She remained alive while he did this, attempting to fight him off:  
 
 
33 
She was alive during the EMT care at her house and during her transport to and care at the local 
hospital, where she was treated for 46 minutes and finally given a sedative, Trial II Tr. 1334, 
1338-39.  And she was pronounced dead after being air-lifted to the University of Louisville 
Hospital, roughly four hours after she was first attacked by Ward.  See id. at 1285, 1350-51.  
 
After weighing the totality of the mitigating evidence against the evidence in aggravation, 
we conclude that Ward was not prejudiced by any inadequacies in his trial counsel’s perfor-
mance discussed in this Part II.  There is no reasonable probability that the additional evidence 
presented at the PC hearing would have changed the jury’s verdict.   
 
III 
 
 
Ward’s second general claim is that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object 
to certain inadmissible evidence and improper arguments by the prosecutor.  Specifically, he ar-
gues that trial counsel (a) failed to challenge the State’s evidence of criminal deviate conduct; (b) 
failed to challenge the State’s use of victim-impact evidence; and (c) failed to challenge the 
State’s testimony regarding a putt-putt golf course at the Indiana State Prison.  According to 
Ward, “[i]f defense counsel had challenged these matters, there is a reasonable probability that 
the result of the penalty phase would have been different.”  Appellant’s Br. 8.  We consider each 
of these arguments in turn.   
 
III-A 
 
 
Ward argues that “[t]rial counsel’s failure to object to the argument and evidence of crim-
inal deviate conduct was deficient performance that prejudiced [him] by introducing evidence of 
a statutory aggravating circumstance dismissed by the plea agreement.”  Id. at 42 (citation omit-
ted).  The PC court concluded that Ward failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice 
with respect to this claim.   
 
 
The PC court made findings of fact from which it reached its conclusion.  It recognized 
that, when Ward pled guilty to rape and murder, the criminal deviate conduct charge and at-
 
 
34 
tendant aggravating circumstance originally charged were dismissed.  It quoted the prosecutor’s 
opening statement discussing the DNA obtained from an anal swab of Stacy Payne and a DNA 
analyst’s testimony regarding the same.  But the PC court found “no evidence in this record of 
objectionable references to criminal [deviate] conduct before the jury.”  PCR App. 334.  It con-
tinued: 
 
The evidence complained of by Ward was to the presence of DNA on anal swabs.  
No evidence of anal penetration was introduced or argued.  The presence of DNA 
on the victim’s body was relevant to the rape aggravator.  Given the position of 
Stacy’s body it is reasonable to infer that the DNA on the anal swabs got there 
when it ran down her body because of gravity.  No one argued [Stacy] had been 
anally violated or penetrated.   
 
Id.  The PC court further found that the jury’s well-supported finding of three statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances was not affected by these references to DNA evidence that might support the 
dismissed charge of criminal deviate conduct.  Rather, “the jury was not charged with considering 
whether Ward had committed criminal [deviate] conduct, as an aggravating circumstance, nor was 
it argued to them.”  Id.   
 
 
The record supports the PC court’s findings.  To be sure, the record reveals some testimo-
ny regarding the presence of Ward’s DNA on Stacy’s anal swab, Trial II Tr. 1456, and the prose-
cutor’s opening argument to that effect, id. at 1221.  And for her part, trial counsel Youngcourt 
testified at the PC hearing that if she did not object to the testimony regarding Ward’s DNA on 
the anal swab, then she must have missed it.  PCR Tr. 491.   
 
But like the PC court, our review reveals no evidence or argument regarding anal penetra-
tion and no reference to criminal deviate conduct.  To the contrary, we observe that Ward’s trial 
counsel elicited testimony refuting that very idea.  Specifically, a nurse who performed a sexual 
assault kit on Stacy testified that there was no documentation of any blunt-force injury to her rec-
tum or anus, Trial II Tr. 1365, and similarly, the forensic pathologist, Dr. Hunsaker, who per-
formed Stacy’s autopsy, testified that there were no injuries to the interior or exterior of Stacy’s 
anus, id. at 1530.  More importantly, our review of the record also reveals that trial counsel 
Youngcourt argued the exact finding that the PC court made regarding the effect of gravity.  In 
 
 
35 
questioning Dr. Hunsaker about the fact that anal swabs were taken, Youngcourt asked:  “And 
based on your experience and training, wouldn’t it be fair to say that if a woman were raped and 
there was semen or sperm in the vaginal area, that it may drip down to the buttocks or the anal 
area?”  Id.  Dr. Hunsaker confirmed this to be the case.  Id.   
 
Moreover, as outlined in Part II-E, supra, the record supports the PC court’s finding that 
the aggravating circumstances that the jury did find were well supported, and there is no indica-
tion in the record that the jury was affected by any reference to this DNA evidence that might 
support a criminal-deviate-conduct charge.  The jury was instructed on only three aggravating cir-
cumstances at both the beginning, Trial II Tr. 1200, and end of the penalty phase, id. at 2053-54, 
and the record supports the PC court’s finding that the jury was presented argument regarding on-
ly those three.  Thus, we do not reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that trial counsel did not 
perform deficiently by failing to object to this testimony and, even if they did, that Ward’s de-
fense was not prejudiced.   
 
III-B 
 
 
Next, Ward argues that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object to certain victim- 
impact evidence.  The PC court concluded that Ward failed to establish deficient performance or 
prejudice in this regard.   
 
 
The PC court made findings of fact to support its conclusion.  It summarized the testimo-
ny offered by Stacy’s parents and sister at trial and identified the photos of Stacy and of her 
family introduced at that time.  PCR App. 327-28.  Stacy’s mother detailed the family’s activities 
in the evening preceding the murder.  Stacy’s sister testified that she was in college now but that 
she was in the eighth grade at the time of the murder.  Stacy’s sister also testified that Stacy was 
a cheerleader, a member of the band, and a member of student council.  In addition, the PC court 
quoted the State’s closing argument that praised Stacy’s sister for her courage and that argued, 
among other things, that Stacy’s life would be diminished if Ward were to receive life without 
parole and that asked the jury, “How can Stacy’s life be somehow less valuable than [Ward’s]?”  
Id. at 328.  
 
 
36 
 
But the PC court found no unconstitutional victim-impact evidence, and found that, even 
if there were, Ward’s defense was not prejudiced by it.  First, it found that the jury instructions 
explicitly directed the jury’s attention to the evidence properly admitted and limited to the aggra-
vating circumstances charged.  Id. at 329.  Second, its “own review of the trial record reveal[ed] 
no instances of the State’s arguing that Ward deserved the death penalty because the suffering it 
caused Stacy’s family.”  Id. at 330.  Rather, the State’s final argument as a whole “asked the jury 
to weigh the aggravating circumstances versus Ward’s mitigating circumstances and interpret the 
evidence that either established the aggravator or diminished Ward’s mitigation.”  Id.  According 
to the PC court, some of the challenged comments were not objectionable because they were rel-
evant to the facts of the crime, and some comments were properly not objected to as part of a 
wise trial strategy: 
 
These comments are not infrequently made during advocacy.  Experienced 
trial counsel on both sides rarely object to them.  Most experienced trial counsel 
feel this is wise trial strategy.  Virtually every final argument the Court has heard 
contains some hyperbole and overstatement.  Not objecting in these circumstances 
is a legitimate trial strategy practiced by lawyers in Indiana Courts every day.  
 
Id.  Finally, the PC court found that these comments did not place Ward in grave peril, and that 
there was no reasonable probability that had these comments been admonished, the jury’s rec-
ommendation would have been different.  Id. at 330-31. 
 
 
Our review of the record supports the PC court’s findings.  First, we note that Ward has 
not presented any evidence that would defeat the presumption that it was part of a wise trial 
strategy not to object to the challenged comments or evidence.  See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 906 (we 
presume that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment).  Moreover, our review of the record reveals no instances of the State arguing that 
Ward deserved the death penalty because of the suffering it caused Stacy’s family or, for that 
matter, because of any impact it had on her family.  Rather, we agree that, as a whole, the State 
discussed the jury’s role in weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence during its closing 
argument.  Trial II Tr. 2070, 2094, 2095, 2108-09.  And even assuming that counsel should have 
objected, we agree that Ward’s defense was not prejudiced by it.  As we outlined above, the jury 
 
 
37 
was instructed on three aggravating circumstances, and the evidence supporting those was over-
whelming.  See Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1196 (Ind. 2001) (assuming counsel should 
have objected to victim impact statement, they were not ineffective in part because evidence 
supporting aggravator was strong).  We do not reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that 
Ward’s trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the challenged comments or 
statements.   
 
III-C 
 
 
Lastly, Ward claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to testimony 
regarding the existence of a putt-putt golf course at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”).  The thrust 
of the claim here is that counsel allowed the prosecutor to suggest that Ward was enjoying life in 
prison playing putt-putt when in fact there was no putt-putt course at the prison at all. 
 
The PC court rejected this claim, and it made certain findings to support this rejection.  It 
recounted the challenged testimony that the ISP has a putt-putt golf area and the prosecutor’s ar-
guments in closing that emphasized this point.  The PC court recognized that by September, 
2006, the putt-putt course was no longer operational and that Ward’s second trial was held in 
May, 2007.  PCR App. 335.  The PC court found, however, that  
 
[t]o the extent that there was not a working miniature golf course on the grounds 
of the [ISP] at the time of Ward’s trial, Ward was not prejudiced by the State’s 
suggestion that [inmates] could participate in activities such as miniature golf.  
Petitioner’s own evidence at post-conviction establishes that ISP had at least fair-
ly recently had [sic] such a facility available for use by inmates.  The evidence al-
so established that life without parole inmates had access to a number of social, 
educational, and recreational activities.  Regardless, the Court finds that had 
Ward’s counsel made an effort to disabuse the jury regarding the availability of 
miniature golf to inmates, such would not have created any probability, let alone a 
reasonable one, of a different outcome. 
 
Id. at 335-36 (internal citation omitted).  We agree.   
 
 
38 
 
IV 
 
Third, Ward claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  Specifical-
ly, he argues that appellate counsel failed to argue that presentation of criminal-deviate-conduct 
argument and evidence was fundamental error; failed to argue that presentation of victim-impact 
argument and evidence was fundamental error; failed to argue that Ward’s guilty plea was a mit-
igating circumstance; and failed to challenge adequately Ward’s sentence of death.23   
 
The standard for gauging appellate counsel’s performance is the same as that for trial 
counsel.  Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 927-28.24  Therefore, “‘[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, [the petitioner] must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.’”  
Id. at 928 (alterations in original) (quoting Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1166); see also Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687 (two-part test for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).  As for the first prong – 
counsel’s performance – we presume that counsel provided adequate representation.  Pruitt, 903 
N.E.2d at 928.  Accordingly, “‘[c]ounsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy 
and tactics, and we will accord that decision deference.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Al-
len, 749 N.E.2d at 1166).  The second prong – the prejudicial effect of counsel’s conduct – re-
quires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a proba-
bility sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citations omitted).  
                                                 
23 This Court has noted that “‘appellate ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally fall into three 
basic categories: (1) denying access to appeal; (2) waiver of issues; (3) failure to present issues well.’”  
Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 927 n.36 (quoting Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1167 n.9).  Ward’s claims fall under the se-
cond and third categories.   
24 Despite these overlapping standards, this Court has noted some unique characteristics in our analysis of 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: 
Appellate counsel’s performance, as to the selection and presentation of issues, will . . . 
be presumed adequate unless found unquestionably unreasonable considering the infor-
mation available in the trial record or otherwise known to appellate counsel.  To prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must therefore show 
from the information available in the trial record or otherwise known to appellate counsel 
that appellate counsel failed to present a significant and obvious issue and that this failure 
cannot be explained by any reasonable strategy. 
Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 928 n.37 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1166 n.8).   
 
 
39 
 
Applying these legal standards, the PC court concluded that appellate counsel “rendered 
competent, constitutionally adequate representation.”  PCR App. 345.  Specifically, it rejected 
the first three of Ward’s claims regarding criminal deviate conduct, victim-impact evidence, and 
his guilty plea as mitigating evidence by referencing its discussion of these claims as they ap-
plied to the effectiveness of trial counsel and concluding that these claims of appellate ineffec-
tiveness of counsel failed for the same reasons.  Id. at 346-47.  As discussed earlier in this opin-
ion, we affirmed the PC court’s finding of no ineffective assistance of trial counsel on Ward’s 
claims regarding criminal deviate conduct, victim-impact evidence, and the guilty plea as miti-
gating evidence, and for essentially the same reasons, we affirm its finding of no ineffective as-
sistance of appellate counsel in these regards.  See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 930 (rejecting appellate 
counsel ineffectiveness claim based on prior finding of no trial counsel ineffectiveness on same 
issue). 
 
With regard to Ward’s fourth claim in this section – that his appellate counsel were inef-
fective for failing to challenge adequately his death sentence – the PC court found that this was 
“a ‘catchall’ that offers no meaningful allegation of deficient performance or prejudice with re-
spect to appellate counsel’s representation.”  PCR App. 347.  We agree.  “A convicted defendant 
making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are 
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690.  In this claim, Ward alleges that his appellate counsel were ineffective, in general, by inade-
quately challenging his death sentence, but he identifies no specific act or omission.  The PC 
court properly rejected this claim. 
 
V  
 
Fourth, Ward raises a claim under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), that the 
trial court’s rulings on certain matters prevented trial counsel from rendering effective assistance.  
Specifically, Ward argues that the set of facts surrounding the trial court’s (a) denial of a contin-
uance; (b) denial of funds for essential experts; and (c) decision to alter the method of jury selec-
tion justify a presumption of ineffectiveness.   
 
 
40 
 
 
In Cronic, the Supreme Court recognized that in certain limited circumstances of extreme 
magnitude, prejudice to a criminal defendant is so likely that an inquiry into counsel’s actual per-
formance is not required.  Id. at 658-62.  Stated differently, a presumption of ineffectiveness 
arises in certain extreme circumstances without resort to the traditional two-prong Strickland 
analysis.  Id.; see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (explaining that Cronic is a 
narrow exception to Strickland).  The Court in Cronic identified three circumstances justifying 
such a presumption:  (1) the complete denial of counsel; (2) situations where counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where 
surrounding circumstances are such that, “although counsel is available to assist the accused dur-
ing trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective as-
sistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual 
conduct of the trial.”  466 U.S. at 659-60. 
 
In Cronic, the district court had appointed a young lawyer with a real estate practice who 
had never conducted a jury trial to represent a defendant who had been indicted for mail fraud.  
Although it had taken the government four-and-one-half years to investigate the case and review 
thousands of documents, this young lawyer had only 25 days for pretrial preparation.  Id. at 649.  
The Tenth Circuit had held that these circumstances, among others, justified a presumption of 
ineffectiveness without inquiry into performance or prejudice.  Id. at 652-53.  The Supreme 
Court disagreed.  While recognizing that certain extreme circumstances justify such a presump-
tion, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances at issue in that case did not make it unlikely 
that the defendant could have received effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 666. 
 
Thus, Ward faces an extremely heavy burden in making his Cronic claims.  Games v. 
State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 481, modified on reh’g on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. 1997).  In 
examining these claims, we look for circumstances that “justif[y] a presumption that no lawyer 
could provide [Ward] with the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution.”  
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 (footnote omitted).  In other words, for us to presume prejudice under 
Cronic, “it must be shown that the circumstances completely deprived [Ward] of any meaningful 
opportunity to subject the State’s evidence to adversarial testing.”  Games, 684 N.E.2d at 479. 
 
 
41 
 
V-A 
 
Ward first argues that trial counsel were rendered ineffective by the trial court’s denial of 
a necessary continuance.  He argues that the trial court was aware that the mitigation investigator 
had not performed certain duties and was struggling in certain ways, but “nevertheless refused to 
provide trial counsel more time to complete the investigation necessary for the presentation of 
complete and accurate evidence supporting a sentence less than death.”  Appellant’s Br. 9.  The 
PC court rejected this claim.   
 
The PC court made certain findings to support its conclusion.  First, it found that Ward 
had more than eighteen months to prepare for his second trial after this Court reversed his con-
viction the first time, and that he did not need more time to prepare given his access to “the entire 
transcript of the first trial, a virtual road map of all the State’s evidence and the extensive social, 
psychological, educational and criminal background information it contained concerning Ward’s 
background.”  PCR App. 349.  The PC court also listed the resources that his trial counsel had 
marshaled in his defense, including:  Joanie Kern, Michelle Rushton, Charles Marks, 
Youngcourt, Ripstra, a retired Sheriff’s Deputy, a professor, and two mental health experts.  Id.  
Moreover, the PC court found that Ward “presented no mitigating evidence in these proceedings 
that was materially different in quantity or character from that his trial attorneys presented on his 
behalf,” id., and therefore, even if the trial court had granted this continuance, “trial counsel 
could presumably have done no better than his post-conviction lawyers over three years later,”  
id. at 349-50.   
 
As we discussed, supra, the record supports the PC court’s finding that Ward has failed to 
show a reasonable probability of a different outcome based on any inadequacies in the mitigation 
investigation.  But we are not concerned here with actual prejudice; rather, we are concerned 
with whether the circumstances justify a presumption of prejudice.  Nevertheless, we do not 
reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that this claim under Cronic fails.   
 
 
 
42 
This Court reversed Ward’s conviction and sentence on June 30, 2004, following his first 
trial.  Ward, 810 N.E.2d 1042 (Youngcourt and Ripstra served as appellate counsel on Ward’s 
first appeal).  In October, 2005, the trial court appointed Ripstra and Youngcourt to represent 
Ward in his retrial.  Trial II App. 307.  Ward’s trial counsel retained their mitigation investigator 
in November, 2005.  PCR Tr. 295.  In January, 2006, the trial court set Ward’s second trial date 
for October 16, 2006.  Trial II App. 307.  That October trial date was then continued pursuant to 
an August, 2006, motion filed by Ward’s trial counsel.  Id. at 307-11; Trial II Tr. 110 (granting 
motion for continuance after hearing).  In January, 2007, after the original trial judge recused 
himself, Judge Pigman set the trial date for early May, 2007, Trial II Tr. 125, roughly eighteen 
months after Ripstra and Youngcourt had been appointed as counsel.  
 
Moreover, the record supports that Ward’s trial counsel had access to everything pre-
pared in Ward’s first trial.  Barbara Williams, Ward’s trial counsel from his first trial, confirmed 
at the PC hearing that she had made sure that all of her files and all of her knowledge regarding 
Ward’s case were available to Youngcourt and Ripstra.  PCR Tr. 26.  And trial counsel Ripstra 
testified at the PC hearing that he had double checked with Williams that they had gotten every-
thing from the first trial.  Id. at 50.  The record also supports that, in addition to Youngcourt, 
Ripstra, Dr. Friedman, and Dr. Parker, all of the people that the PC court identified were in-
volved in Ward’s defense:  Joanie Kern, Youngcourt’s assistant who handled much of the record 
collection, id. at 401; Michelle Rushton, the mitigation investigator, id. at 401-04; Charles 
Marks, an investigator who worked on getting the case moved out of Spencer County, id. at 404; 
Carold Baker, a retired Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy who served subpoenas and assisted in 
finding various people, id. at 405; and Marla Sandys, a professor in the IU-Bloomington Crimi-
nal Justice Department who assisted in developing the jury questionnaires and mitigation theory, 
id. at 405-06. 
 
In this case, Ward’s trial counsel filed motions to continue the May, 2007, trial date on 
January 25, 2007, Trial II App. 396-97, and again on February 28, 2007, id. at 510-15.  Trial 
counsel provided additional support to continue the jury trial on March 12, 2007.  Id. at 644; 
PCR Tr. 441.  The gist of these motions was that trial counsel had some other professional obli-
gations and still had more to do in their mitigation investigation, including their mitigation inves-
 
 
43 
tigator completing a social history.  But as their motions indicate, they were able to handle their 
workloads, Trial II App. 396-97; they had interviewed some people and had collected some rec-
ords and were in the process of interviewing and collecting more, id. at 511-513; and they would 
have a complete social history by the first week of April, 2007, id. at 647.   
 
The circumstances surrounding the trial court’s refusal to continue Ward’s second trial 
fall far far short of justifying a presumption that no lawyer could provide Ward with the effective 
assistance of counsel required by the Constitution or of showing that he was completely deprived 
of a meaningful opportunity to subject the State’s case to adversarial testing.  See Cronic, 466 
U.S. at 661 (not every refusal to continue a trial gives rise to a presumption of prejudice).  As 
discussed above, Ward’s counsel had roughly eighteen months in total to prepare for trial, and 
they had at least four months to prepare from the time Judge Pigman set the May, 2007, trial 
date.  They had access to a variety of resources, including knowledge of everything presented in 
Ward’s first trial, and had obtained or were in the process of obtaining various sources of miti-
gating evidence.  We do not reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that Ward’s trial counsel 
were not rendered ineffective by the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance.   
 
V-B 
 
Next, Ward contends that trial counsel were rendered ineffective by the trial court’s deni-
al of funds for essential expert assistance, specifically experts in special education and sex-
offender treatment.  The PC court rejected this claim, finding that “Ward’s trial attorneys were 
able to, and did, retain substantial and competent expert assistance,” and that Ward had presented 
nothing on post-conviction that, if presented to the jury, would have created a reasonable proba-
bility of a different outcome at trial.  PCR App. 350. 
 
Again, as we discussed, supra, the record supports the PC court’s finding that Ward has 
failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the jury been presented with 
the expert testimony presented at the PC hearing.  However, we are not concerned here with ac-
tual prejudice but with whether the circumstances justify a presumption of prejudice.  Neverthe-
less, we do not reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that this claim under Cronic fails.   
 
 
44 
 
Although trial counsel were not granted funds to retain an expert in sex-offender treat-
ment or in special education, they were granted funds to retain two mental health experts, Dr. 
Friedman and Dr. Parker.  They also had at their disposal all of the expert testimony presented in 
the first trial for both the State and the defense, including one expert who specialized in sexology 
or sexual dysfunction.  Trial I Tr. 2407-09.  And they were in the process of contacting a mental 
health professional who had actually treated Ward for his exhibitionism.  See Trial II App. 513 
(referring to Life Springs health care provider who had treated Ward for a year).  Finally, trial 
counsel also had access to or were in the process of obtaining Ward’s school records, which 
clearly indicated that Ward had a learning disability, and had interviewed or were in the process 
of interviewing people who could testify to Ward’s formative years, including his education. 
 
We do not reach a conclusion opposite the PC court that Ward’s trial counsel were not 
rendered ineffective by the trial court’s refusal to grant funds to obtain certain expert assistance 
(considered individually and together with his argument regarding the continuance). 
 
V-C 
 
Lastly, Ward argues that “the trial court’s sudden change from individual to group voir 
dire did not permit Ward’s counsel the forum needed to reveal potential jurors’ biases about the 
sentence someone charged with a crime like this should receive.”  Appellant’s Br. 9.   
 
The PC court rejected this claim, concluding that although it had been slightly reframed, 
it had been raised and rejected on direct appeal and was therefore barred by res judicata.25  PCR 
App. 350.  We agree.  We rejected Ward’s argument on direct appeal that the trial court commit-
                                                 
25 Alternatively, the PC court concluded that this claim under Cronic (along with the other two discussed 
supra) could have in fact been raised on direct appeal, thereby barring them from post-conviction review.  
PCR App. 350-51.  Although we have affirmed the PC court’s Cronic conclusions for other reasons, we 
do note that these claims would not be barred on the basis that they could have been presented on direct 
appeal.  Cronic claims are ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.  See Hardy v. State, 786 N.E.2d 783, 
787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“Strickland and Cronic are two species of a common genus – ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.”), trans. denied.  Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims may be presented for the first 
time in post-conviction proceedings.  Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ind. 2008).  Thus, Ward’s 
Cronic claims were not barred on grounds that they could have been brought on direct appeal.   
 
 
45 
ted reversible error by modifying the format of voir dire from individual to group questioning of 
prospective jurors.  Ward, 903 N.E.2d at 955-56.  Thus, while framed in a slightly different man-
ner here, we have already decided this issue and therefore, it is barred by res judicata.  See Pruitt, 
903 N.E.2d at 905 (issues litigated adversely to the defendant on direct appeal are res judicata).   
 
VI 
 
 
Fifth, Ward claims that “[t]he death penalty in Indiana, as applied, fails to comport with 
the United States and Indiana constitutions,” Appellant’s Br. 9, and that he has new evidence to 
prove it.  Specifically, he argues that the death penalty has been arbitrarily and capriciously ap-
plied since life without parole (“LWOP”) became an option for sentencing, and moreover, that 
Indiana’s appellate review of death sentences fails to ensure that the death penalty is not being 
arbitrarily imposed.   
 
VI-A 
 
Ward contends that the Indiana capital-sentencing process violates the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 12, 16, and 23, and Article VII, § 
4, of the Indiana Constitution because “Indiana’s death penalty is now rarely imposed upon a few 
random death-eligible defendants.”  Appellant’s Br. 54.  Although Ward cites provisions of the 
Indiana Constitution, his argument is based solely upon federal authority; he makes no separate 
state claim.  Accordingly, we treat his claim as being that the Indiana death penalty scheme vio-
lates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-68 
(1962). 
 
Ward presents no satisfactory explanation as to why this claim could not have been raised 
on direct appeal and, as a consequence, it is not available as a basis for post-conviction relief.  
See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905 (issues available but not raised on direct appeal are waived).  Giv-
en the nature of the claim, however, we elect to address it here as, in all likelihood, were we to 
 
 
46 
reject it on grounds of waiver, it would be presented in exactly the same form in a future capital 
case. 
 
We believe some historical perspective is helpful in analyzing this claim.  In 1972, the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion declaring the death penalty statutes of several states to be 
unconstitutional.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).  However, only two jus-
tices took the view that the death penalty itself violated the Constitution;26 three others were of 
the view that it was only the statutes in question that violated the Constitution.27  (The other four 
justices would have held the statutes to be constitutional.28)  This left open the possibility that a 
state could have the death penalty if only it could write a statute that a majority of the justices 
would find constitutional.  Although the Indiana death penalty statute in effect at the time was 
not part of this litigation, the Legislature rewrote our statute the next year in an effort to meet the 
requirements of Furman.  Pub. L. No. 328-1973, § 1, 1973 Ind. Laws 1806, 1806-08 (repealed 
1976). 
 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue and affirmed the constitutionality of 
two new death penalty statutes, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion), but invalidated one, Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).  Indiana again revised its statute to con-
form to these decisions.  Pub. L. No. 340-1977, § 122, 1977 Ind. Laws 1533, 1595-98 (codified 
as amended at Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (2008)).  The new Indiana statute authorized the death pen-
alty only for a defendant convicted of murder where the state proved the existence of one or 
more statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and the weight of the ag-
gravating circumstance(s) was greater than the combined weight of any mitigating circumstanc-
es.   
 
                                                 
26 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
27 Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concur-
ring). 
28 Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).   
 
 
47 
Under the new statute adopted in Indiana in 1977, a defendant convicted of a single count 
of murder but not sentenced to death faced a maximum term of 60 years’ imprisonment.29  Pub. 
L. No. 340-1977, § 116, 1977 Ind. Laws 1533, 1593 (codified as amended at Ind. Code § 35-50-
2-3(a) (2008)).  In 1993 and 1994, the Legislature revised the death penalty statute to permit a 
sentence of either death or LWOP to be imposed upon a defendant convicted of murder where 
the weight of aggravating circumstance(s) proved beyond a reasonable doubt was greater than 
the combined weight of any mitigating circumstances.  Pub. L. No. 250-1993, § 2, 1993 Ind. 
Acts 4478, 4478 (codified as amended at Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (2008)); Pub. L. No. 158-1994, 
§ 7, 1994 Ind. Acts 1849, 1854 (codified as amended at 35-50-2-9 (2008)).  We think the intent 
of this change is clear: the Legislature wanted there to be an intermediate penalty for aggravated 
murder, one less severe than death but more severe than a term of 60 years.30 
 
Going back to Furman, one of the justices voting to hold the death penalty unconstitu-
tional as applied in that case did so on the basis that the infrequent imposition of the death penal-
ty made it “cruel and unusual.”  In perhaps the most famous sentence of the 233-page Furman 
decision, Justice Stewart said that “death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”  408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).  Only 
“a capriciously . . . random handful” of those who commit equally reprehensible crimes received 
death sentences; the Constitution “cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal 
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”  Id. at 
309-10. 
 
Ward seizes upon Justice Stewart’s language in Furman to argue that, since the Indiana 
death penalty statute was amended in 1993 and 1994 to add LWOP as an alternative sentence to 
death, the imposition of the death penalty itself has become so infrequent as to now be unconsti-
                                                 
29 This was the maximum term of years for one count of murder.  Additional time could be imposed if the 
defendant was guilty of additional crimes.  See, e.g., Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565, 573 (Ind. 1994) 
(consecutive sentences of 50 years each for three murder convictions).  The maximum term of years for 
one count of murder was increased to 65 years in 1995.  Pub. L. No. 148-1995, § 4, 1995 Ind. Acts 3068, 
3069 (codified as amended at Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a) (2008)).   
30 Accepting for hypothetical purposes that the pre-LWOP statute was constitutional but the post-LWOP 
statute is not, Ward’s jury would have not had the option of LWOP but only death or a term of 65 years.  
One might reasonably conclude that Ward was better off being sentenced under a statute that he contends 
is unconstitutional than the one it replaced.  
 
 
48 
tutional in the same way that it was in Furman.  In support of this argument, a team of research-
ers working on Ward’s behalf analyzed Indiana murder cases from 1977 to 2010 where the de-
fendant was what Ward calls “death eligible” – 347 defendants “either charged with or threat-
ened with a charging on information on death.”31  PCR Tr. 123.  Ward’s statistics show that be-
fore LWOP was authorized, 32% of those eligible for death received a death sentence.  Id. at 
128.  After LWOP was authorized, 10% of death-eligible defendants have been sentenced to 
death.  Id. 
 
We hold that Ward has not established a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause for three separate reasons. 
 
First, while it is true that the infrequency of the death penalty was one of the reasons ar-
ticulated by Justice Stewart and other justices in the majority in Furman, the subsequent authori-
zation of death sentencing schemes did not turn on the frequency of the penalty’s use but on the 
structure of the statutes themselves.  As the State points out in its brief on this subject, subse-
quent Supreme Court cases have “clarified that Furman was not necessarily concerned with the 
number of cases in which the death penalty was ultimately imposed, but with the manner in 
which the death penalty was imposed.”  Appellee’s Br. 45 (emphasis in original).  “Furman 
mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the deter-
mination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably di-
rected and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”  Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 189 (opinion of Stewart, J.).  The Indiana statute meets this so-called “guided discre-
tion” requirement with its specification of aggravating circumstances and requirement as to 
weighing them against any mitigating circumstances. 
 
One aspect of the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decisions helps illustrate this point.  
Following Furman, some states (including Indiana) did not adopt “guided discretion” statutes but 
instead adopted mandatory death penalty schemes.  That is, death was required for all murders in 
a certain category (like premeditated murders or murders committed during another felony).  
                                                 
31 We have used some shorthand here to describe Ward’s methodology.  For purposes of our analysis and, 
given our disposition of his claim, we believe this description adequate and accept his data and methodol-
ogy as accurate.  
 
 
49 
These were obviously statutes responding to the concern of infrequently imposed death 
sentences.  But the Supreme Court invalidated these approaches because they barred juries from 
considering mitigating circumstances.  Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.  To repeat, to meet 
constitutional muster, it is the manner in which the death penalty is imposed, not the frequency. 
 
Second, Ward’s analysis deploys in support of his position those cases in which a prose-
cutor exercised discretion not to pursue death.  In calculating the percentages of death sentences 
imposed pre- and post-LWOP, Ward divides the number of death sentences imposed following 
trial (or guilty plea) by the total number of cases in which the law authorized the prosecutor to 
seek a death sentence.  That is, included in his denominator are all those cases in which the de-
fendant was “death eligible” by his definition but where the prosecutor elected not to seek death.  
Neither the data in the record nor the testimony at the PC hearing indicates how many such 
death-never-sought-or-dropped-before-trial cases there were – it is not even clear that any sepa-
rate count was made of such cases. 
 
But we do know that once LWOP was enacted, the prosecutor had a new option in death-
eligible cases.  Given this new option, it only makes sense that there would be a lot more death-
never-sought-or-dropped-before-trial cases post-LWOP than pre-LWOP, thereby reducing the 
percentage of death sentences imposed in initially death-eligible cases.   
 
What Ward’s statistics really prove, then, is the commonsense proposition that once pros-
ecutors had the option to seek LWOP, they sought death less frequently.   
 
This does not make our statute unconstitutional.  In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly held that a death penalty statute need not constrain prosecutorial discretion to be constitu-
tional.  The Court held in Gregg that a “state prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those 
persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense and to plea bargain with them. . . . is 
not determinative of” whether a death penalty statute is constitutional.  428 U.S. at 199 (opinion 
of Stewart, J.).  The decision to seek a death sentence, the Court continued, is one of the stages in 
which 
 
 
 
50 
an actor in the criminal justice system makes a decision which may remove a de-
fendant from consideration as a candidate for the death penalty.  Furman, in con-
trast, dealt with the decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual 
who had been convicted of a capital offense.  Nothing in any of our cases suggests 
that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.  
Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would 
be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose 
it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on 
the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.  
 
Id. (footnote omitted).   
 
Third, while Ward’s data clearly shows a statistically significant difference between the 
rates at which death sentences were imposed for crimes committed pre- and post-1993, adoption 
of LWOP was not the only significant change in Indiana death penalty law that occurred during 
this time period.  Effective January 1, 1990, Indiana Criminal Rule 24 created minimum stand-
ards for experience, specialized training, compensation, and caseload of lawyers appointed in 
capital cases.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys agree that “Rule 24 ha[s] led to improved repre-
sentation by defense lawyers in capital cases.”  Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Represen-
tation in Capital Cases:  The Indiana Experience and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 Ind. L. 
Rev. 495, 509 (1996)).32  In addition to the statutory change that made it more likely that prose-
cutors would exercise their discretion not to seek death, we think that the operation of Criminal 
Rule 24 likely also contributed to the reduction in the rate of death sentences imposed since 
1993.   
 
For the reasons discussed, we do not find the reduction in the rate of death sentences im-
posed since 1993 to result from any constitutional infirmity in our death penalty statute. 
 
VI-B 
 
Ward also contends that death sentences in Indiana are not subjected to meaningful ap-
pellate review, thereby rendering our death penalty process unconstitutional.  Perhaps it is not 
possible for us to be objective in evaluating a claim directed at this Court’s own performance, 
                                                 
32 The Rule was amended on January 1, 1992, and February 1, 1993.  Lefstein, supra, at 495-96  n.3. 
 
 
51 
but we believe that any fair reading of this Court’s death penalty jurisprudence would yield the 
conclusion that each of our decisions comes only after the most careful study and analysis.  In 
addition, as Criminal Rule 24 and other actions reflect, this Court gives a great deal of thought 
and attention to the death penalty process as well as individual cases.  At the time of the PCR 
hearing, Ward reported that 94 individuals had been sentenced to death in Indiana since 1977.  
PCR Tr. 84.  Of those, 22 had been executed, 12 were currently on death row, and 4 had died of 
other causes.  We have reviewed the remaining 56 cases and found that in 44, the individuals re-
ceived relief from their death sentences on direct appeal or in state post-conviction proceed-
ings.33  We believe this record is indicative of a death penalty system that provides the appellate 
review required by the Constitution. 
 
VII 
 
 
Finally, Ward makes a claim under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), regarding the 
prosecutor’s use of false testimony.  Specifically, Ward argues that the prosecutor used testimo-
ny about the existence of a putt-putt golf course at the Indiana State Prison that the prosecutor 
knew or should have known to be false and that the testimony may have had an effect on the out-
come of the trial.  The PC court rejected this claim.   
 
 
Initially, the PC court concluded that this claim was waived because it was available for 
direct appeal but not raised.  PCR App. 362.  It found that trial counsel Youngcourt had “testified 
at post-conviction that she ‘knew more about the Indiana State Prison’ than the prosecutor ever 
could” and that she had been going to the prison for 16-17 years.  Id.  
 
Nevertheless, the PC court concluded that the claim was without merit.  It concluded that 
because “[f]undamental error is not available on post-conviction review,” id. (citing Sanders v. 
State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002)), “the only procedurally available posture in which to lit-
igate these alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct on post-conviction review is to show 
that trial and/or appellate counsel were ineffective in responding to them,” id.  It then analyzed 
                                                 
33 The remaining 12 cases are comprised of 9 in which relief was provided in federal habeas proceedings 
and 3 by gubernatorial clemency.    
 
 
52 
the claim under the traditional prosecutorial misconduct standard that considers whether the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct and whether that misconduct placed Ward in grave peril and 
concluded that the claim failed.   
 
Even if we were to conclude that the testimony elicited by the State concerning the putt-
putt golf course constituted “false testimony” within the meaning of Napue, we agree with the 
PC court that the issue could have been raised on direct appeal and, consequently, is not availa-
ble here.  See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905 (issues available but not raised on direct appeal are 
waived).   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm the PC court’s denial of Ward’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
 
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.