Title: Downer v. CSX Transportation Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 972637
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1998

Present: Carrico C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Kinser, 
JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice  
 
MICHAEL J. DOWNER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 972657 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
 
 
NOVEMBER 6, 1998 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This is an appeal of an action under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1981) (FELA). 
 
Michael J. Downer filed this FELA action against Amoco Oil 
Company (Amoco) and his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. 
(CSX),  alleging that he was injured when those parties 
negligently exposed him to noxious chemicals at Amoco's Yorktown 
Refinery. Downer settled his claim against Amoco upon its 
payment of $5,000 in exchange for Downer's covenant not to sue 
and the consequent dismissal of Amoco as a party defendant.1
                     
1 Downer's release of Amoco did not release CSX. Code § 8.01-35.1 
provides in pertinent part: 
A.  When a release or a covenant not to sue is given 
in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in 
tort for the same injury . . . :  
 
1. It shall not discharge any of the other tort-
feasors from liability for the injury . . . ; but any 
amount recovered against the other tort-feasors or any 
one of them shall be reduced by any amount stipulated 
by the covenant or the release, or in the amount of 
the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater. 
Subsequently, a jury rendered a verdict of $5,000 in 
Downer's favor against CSX.  CSX moved to reduce the verdict by 
the amount paid by Amoco in settlement of Downer's claim against 
it in accordance with Code § 8.01-35.1(A)(1).  The trial court 
sustained CSX's motion, reduced the amount of the verdict by 
$5,000, and entered judgment against CSX for costs only.  Downer 
appeals and CSX assigns cross-error. 
Consistent with well-settled appellate principles, we state 
the evidence of liability in the light most favorable to Downer, 
who has received a verdict in his favor.  In the summer and fall 
of 1991, Amoco employees loaded a liquid solution of sodium 
hydroxide into tank cars parked on the railroad tracks at its 
Yorktown refinery. Sodium hydroxide is a noxious chemical that 
can become airborne on hot, windy days.  Amoco placed drip pans 
under the tank cars to contain any sodium hydroxide spills. 
On July 9th, 1991, a hot, windy day, Downer was engaged in 
switching operations at the Yorktown refinery and was required 
to be near the drip pans.  At that time, Downer became short of 
breath, spit up mucus, experienced a burning sensation in his 
eyes, and suffered an injury to his upper respiratory tract by 
inhaling fumes from the nearby sodium hydroxide.  Downer was 
taken to a hospital, treated for two days, and released to his 
home for recuperation.  Three weeks later, complaining of pain 
and breathing problems, Downer was hospitalized for an 
 
2
additional eight days.  Downer testified that during this 
hospitalization, he suffered additional stress when a priest 
administered the last rites to him. 
After returning to work at the end of August, Downer was 
again engaged in switching operations near the drip pans at 
Amoco's Yorktown refinery on September 10th, another hot, windy 
day.  On that date, he again inhaled the fumes from the airborne 
sodium hydroxide and suffered the recurrence of some of his 
earlier symptoms.  He was treated as an outpatient at a hospital 
and did not return to work until November 20, 1991. 
Upon his return to work, Downer, asserting his right to do 
so under CSX's collective bargaining agreement, asked to resume 
his work in the Yorktown area.  However, CSX advised him that he 
could not do so because Amoco did not want him working at its 
refinery.  Downer was shown Amoco's letter stating that: 
[i]t is Amoco Oil Company's desire that Mr. Downer not 
be permitted any further access of Amoco's Yorktown 
Refinery location. Such request is being made as there 
now exists an adversarial relationship between Amoco 
Oil Company and Mr. Downer, with his seeking damages 
against Amoco for the alleged injurious exposure on 
Amoco's property.  Secondly, although Amoco disputes 
Mr. Downer's allegations that he suffered adverse 
reactions to his exposure to a toxic substance at the 
Yorktown Refinery, we certainly do not wish in any way 
to contribute to any illness or injury to Mr. Downer 
as a result of his being hypersensitive to any 
purported elements found on the Amoco property. 
 
Because of CSX's acquiescence in Amoco's decision not 
to allow Downer to enter its Yorktown refinery property and 
 
3
because Downer could not work in the Yorktown area without 
entering Amoco's property, CSX assigned him to work on a 
route beginning and ending in Richmond.  This transfer was 
against Downer's wishes because it required him to commute 
each working day between his assignment in Richmond and his 
home in the Yorktown area.  Additionally, Downer allegedly 
suffered humiliation because junior men were working the 
job he wanted "and it's not like I did anything wrong [at 
Amoco's refinery], but I was being punished for it." 
First, Downer argues that by acquiescing in Amoco's 
decision, CSX increased his damages.  On brief, Downer 
acknowledges that the court permitted an instruction 
regarding Downer's inconvenience and humiliation  
Nevertheless, he complains that the court erroneously 
refused to permit him to argue his claims for damages 
arising from the inconvenience and humiliation he suffered 
as a result of Amoco's refusal to permit him to work at its 
Yorktown refinery. 
The transcript discloses that although the court had 
earlier instructed Downer not to assert these claims in his 
final arguments to the jury, he did so briefly and the court 
overruled CSX's objection thereto.  Under these circumstances, 
we conclude that Downer was not prejudiced by the court's 
 
4
earlier ruling, even if erroneous, a matter we need not decide. 
Hence, we reject this contention. 
Next, Downer argues that the court erred in refusing 
to set aside the $5,000 verdict as inadequate and award a 
new trial on the issue of damages.  Downer suggests that  
[r]easonable people could conclude that $5,000 was not 
reasonable compensation for a person who had $1,400 in 
undisputed lost wages, required two hospitalizations 
for a total of ten days, required two visits to the 
emergency 
room, 
experienced 
intense 
pain 
and 
suffering, was confined to his home for at least a 
month and whose condition was so affected that he was 
out of work for seventeen weeks.   
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Downer postulates a principle contrary to our well 
established precedent.  We have repeatedly held that a jury's 
award of damages may not be set aside by a trial court as 
inadequate or excessive unless the damages are so excessive or 
so small as to shock the conscience and to create the impression 
that the jury has been influenced by passion or prejudice or has 
in some way misconceived or misinterpreted the facts or the law 
which should guide them to a just conclusion.  E.g., Poulston v. 
Rock, 251 Va. 254, 258, 467 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1996) (excessive 
verdict); Johnson v. Smith, 241 Va. 396, 400, 403 S.E.2d 685, 
687 (1991) (inadequate verdict). 
These principles presuppose that a trial court will not set 
aside a verdict either as inadequate or as excessive merely 
 
5
because the court may have awarded a larger or smaller sum had 
it been the trier of fact.  See Reel v. Ramirez, 243 Va. 463, 
467-68, 416 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1992)(allegedly excessive and 
inadequate successive verdicts); Raisovich v. Giddings, 214 Va. 
485, 489, 201 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1974) (allegedly inadequate jury 
award); Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 202, 135 S.E.2d 777, 
780 (l964) (allegedly excessive verdict). 
Hence, in deciding whether the jury's award is inadequate, 
the test is whether reasonable people could not conclude that 
the $5,000 award was reasonable compensation in this case.  See 
Bradner v. Mitchell, 234 Va. 483, 487, 362 S.E.2d 718, 720 
(1987)(stating that if "no rational fact-finder" could disregard 
uncontroverted and complete evidence of special damages, such 
damages must be considered fixed constituent part of verdict in 
determining inadequacy of jury award); Dinwiddie v. Hamilton, 
201 Va. 348, 354, 11 S.E.2d 275, 279 (1959) (reversing order 
setting verdict aside because adequacy of earlier jury award 
"was a question on which reasonable minds could differ"). 
We apply those principles here.  And, since Downer attacks 
the sufficiency of the verdict, we view the evidence of damages 
in the light most favorable to the validity of the verdict.  
Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Hite, 184 Va. 614, 617, 35 
S.E.2d 743, 744 (1945) 
 
6
There are several considerations supporting the quantum of 
the jury's award.  Downer does not claim a permanent injury or 
disability.  Since his doctors considered some of his complaints 
to be out of proportion to what they could find physically wrong 
with him, the complaints were thus characterized by the doctors 
as the result of psychological stress.  Downer recognizes that 
such complaints are subjective.  The weight to be given such 
complaints is dependent on the jury's assessment of the 
plaintiff's credibility.  
 
Additionally, the jury was instructed without objection 
that it could reduce the amount of Downer's recovery "in 
proportion to the relative negligence of the plaintiff and 
defendant."2  Given these considerations, we think that 
reasonable persons could conclude the award was adequate.  
Code § 8.01-383 vests discretion in a trial court in 
deciding whether a verdict should be set aside on the grounds of 
excessiveness or inadequacy.  Johnson, 241 Va. at 400, 403 
S.E.2d at 687.  Thus, the ultimate test on appeal to this Court 
is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on 
motions to set aside verdicts as inadequate or excessive.  Id. 
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to set aside the verdict as inadequate.  
                     
2The instruction was in conformity with the FELA comparative 
negligence rule.  45 U.S.C. § 53. 
 
7
In his final assignment of error, Downer maintains that the 
court's "offset" of Amoco's settlement payment against the 
$5,000 verdict against CSX was void as a violation of the 
following provision of 45 U.S.C. § 55:  
Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, 
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any 
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability 
created by this act shall to that extent be void.  
Provided, that in any action brought against such 
common carrier under or by virtue of any of the 
provisions of this act, such common carrier may set 
off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any 
insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that it may 
have paid to the injured employee . . . on account of 
the injury . . . for which said action was brought. 
 
According to Downer, CSX used the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-35.1(A)(1) as a "device" proscribed by 45 U.S.C. § 55 to 
enable CSX "to exempt itself from any liability."  However, as 
CSX points out, counterclaims in FELA actions have been held not 
to be proscribed "devices" to exempt railroads from liability.  
Nordgren v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 101 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 
(8th Cir. 1996); Sprague v. Boston and Maine Corp., 769 F.2d 26 
(1st Cir. 1985) Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 
289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984).  Nor are the 
assertions of the defense of releases obtained by railroads or 
other joint tortfeasors from FELA plaintiffs considered as such 
proscribed "devices."  See Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 
625, 630-31 (1948)(release obtained by railroad); Panichella v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 268 F.2d 72, 75-76 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. 
 
8
denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960)(tortfeasors other than the 
railroad).  In Panichella, the court noted that "[t]he railroad 
merely brought the fact of the release to the attention of the 
court in order to have the law operate thereon."  Id.  Here, CSX 
merely brought the fact of the release and the relevant 
provisions of the Viriginia Code to the attention of the court 
in order to have § 8.01-35.1(A)(1) operate thereon. 
In deciding whether CSX has used a proscribed "device," we 
see no significant difference between the assertion of a 
counterclaim, a release of another joint tortfeasor, and a 
motion to reduce a verdict.  Instead, we think that, because of 
Downer's release of Amoco, CSX simply invoked a statutory right 
designed to avoid double recoveries in cases of this kind.  
Thus, we find no merit in this argument. 
Downer also contends that 45 U.S.C. § 55 evidences a 
congressional intent to preempt "state action to the contrary" 
as exemplified in Code §8.01-35.1(A)(1).  Courts will not, 
however, find a Congressional intent to preempt state action in 
the absence of "clear and manifest purpose" to do so.  CSX 
Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)(quoting 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  We 
fail to detect any such purpose in the Act.  Instead, we think 
that the application of the Act is limited to devices created by 
railroads to exempt themselves from liability.  Here, CSX's 
 
9
right arose under Code § 8.01-35.1(A)(1) because of Downer's 
settlement with Amoco, not because of something CSX did to 
exempt itself from liability.  Hence we reject this contention. 
In sum, we find no error in the trial court's denial of 
Downer's motion for a new trial. 
CSX asserts assignments of cross-error, which, if 
sustained, would require a reversal of the judgment and entry of 
a final judgment in favor of CSX.  We have considered these 
assignments of cross-error and find no merit in them.3
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be  
Affirmed. 
                     
3 At CSX's request, we have not considered those assignments 
of cross-error which would be material only if we remanded the 
case for a new trial. 
 
10