Title: Weddington v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 428, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ROBERT WEDDINGTON, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 428, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0602003142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  February 12, 2007 
Decided:  March 14, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 14th day of March, 2007 it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
Appellant Robert Weddington appeals a Superior Court judge’s denial 
of his motion to suppress heroin the State sought to introduce at trial. The police 
found the heroin in Weddington’s back pocket on February 6, 2006.  Weddington 
argues that the Superior Court judge erred during a pretrial suppression hearing 
when he foreclosed Weddington from fully exploring an inconsistency between the 
arresting officer’s sworn testimony at the Superior Court suppression hearing and 
facts that same police officer swore to in an affidavit in support of an application 
for an arrest warrant prepared immediately after the police detained Weddington. 
 
2
 
(2) 
Given proper latitude, Weddington argues, he would have established 
that the police did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him and 
that absent a legal detention, the police seized heroin from Weddington illegally.   
 
(3) 
After consideration of the record, it appears that defense counsel ably 
cross examined the arresting officer and highlighted an inconsistency between the 
police officer’s testimony and his sworn affidavit in support of an application for 
an arrest warrant.  Defense counsel presented the trial judge with sufficient 
information to assess the officer’s credibility and the extent to which the alleged 
inconsistency had a bearing on whether police had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to detain Weddington.  The Superior Court judge’s ruling limiting cross 
examination simply prevented defense counsel from presenting needless 
cumulative evidence, consistent with D.R.E. 403.  Therefore, we find that the 
Superior Court judge neither abused his discretion when he limited defense 
counsel’s cross examination nor when he denied Weddington’s Motion to 
Suppress.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(4) 
On February 4, 2006, as a result of reports of drug sales in the area, 
Detective Taylor of the Wilmington Police Department surveilled the 900 block of 
North Pine Street.  Taylor testified at Weddington’s suppression hearing that while 
conducting the surveillance, he saw Weddington engage in several “hand-to-hand” 
transactions.  During those transactions, Wedding would talk on his cell phone, and 
 
3
then go into a residence at 906 Pine Street.  When Weddington came out of the 
house, he would meet a person who would hand something to Weddington and 
receive something from him in return.  These observations led Taylor to conclude 
that Weddington was selling drugs.   
 
(5) 
After the “hand-to-hand” transactions, a Ford Escort arrived at 906 
Pine Street.  Weddington got into the car briefly, went back into the house, came 
out of the house, and got back into the car.  The car then drove off.  By police 
radio, Taylor requested that officers stop the Ford Escort.  Wilmington Police 
Officer Paul Ciber, Jr. pulled the car over at the Adams Four Shopping Center.  
Ciber removed Weddington from the car and asked him “if he was carrying 
anything.”  Weddington admitted that he had three bags of heroin.  Ciber then 
removed the bags from Weddington’s back pocket.  After the police took 
Weddington into custody, Taylor swore to facts surrounding Weddington’s arrest 
in an affidavit offered in support of an application for a warrant to arrest 
Weddington.1     
                                                 
1  
The affidavit in support of an arrest warrant did not include a statement that Taylor 
observed Weddington’s alleged “hand-to-hand” transactions; however, the affidavit included the 
other details described above about Weddington’s behavior and the fact that police obtained 3 
bags of heroin from his pockets after they had stopped him.  Justice of the Peace Court issued an 
arrest warrant based on Taylor’s affidavit.  Weddington neither raised an issue about lack of 
probable cause to issue the arrest warrant in his motion to suppress nor did he allege that the 
police officers’ failed to follow 10 Del.C. § 1902.   
 
 
4
 
(6) 
The Justice of the Peace Court issued a warrant authorizing 
Weddington’s arrest for possession of heroin in violation of 16 Del. C. § 47532 and 
a grand jury indicted him on that charge on March 20, 2006.  On June 23, 2006, the 
Superior Court held a suppression hearing.  Both Taylor and Ciber testified.  After 
the hearing, the Superior Court judge denied Weddington’s Motion to suppress, 
finding that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain 
Weddington and that the police properly seized evidence from his person.  On July 
27, 2006, a Superior Court judge presided over a bench trial and found 
Weddington guilty of possession of heroin. 
 
(7) 
The record clearly shows that the police seized the heroin Weddington 
sought to suppress from his person after they removed him from the car and after 
he had admitted that he had heroin on his person.  Weddington argues that the 
“hand-to-hand” transactions about which Taylor testified at the hearing never 
occurred.  He maintains that the Superior Court judge erroneously relied on those 
transactions for his conclusion that the police had a reasonable articulable 
                                                 
2  
16 Del. C. § 4753 states:  
 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess, use or 
consume a controlled substance or a counterfeit substance which is a narcotic 
drug unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of the 
practitioner's professional practice or except as otherwise authorized by this 
chapter. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
 
 
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suspicion that he was engaging in criminal activity at the time he was detained.  
Weddington contends that the trial judge’s improper limitation on counsel’s cross 
examination of Taylor prevented Weddington’s counsel from exploring fully the 
inconsistency between Taylor’s testimony at the suppression hearing and the facts 
Taylor swore to in the affidavit he had prepared in support of the application for 
the arrest warrant.  Weddington claims that had he been allowed to explore that 
inconsistency more expansively, the Superior Court judge would necessarily 
conclude that Taylor did not see any “hand-to-hand” transactions and, therefore, 
would not be able to rely on that fact to find that the police had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Weddington possessed drugs at the time they detained 
him.3 
 
(8) 
In order to establish probable cause for the issuance of an arrest 
warrant, Taylor swore to facts in an affidavit he prepared supporting an application 
for an arrest warrant after police detained Weddington and after they seized heroin 
from his person; however, the affidavit did not mention the “hand-to-hand 
transactions” that Taylor had allegedly observed before the detention.  Defense 
counsel sought to highlight this omission in an effort to cast doubt on the 
truthfulness of Taylor’s suppression hearing testimony.  If Taylor never observed 
                                                 
3 
Neither in the Superior Court nor in this appeal did Weddington claim that he was 
improperly questioned under the Delaware Constitution, 10 Del.C. 1902 or the federal 
constitution. 
 
6
“hand-to-hand transactions,” Weddington asserts, then the police lacked a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity before 
detaining him and asking him “if he was carrying anything.”  Defense counsel 
cross examined both Ciber and Taylor about this omission in the affidavit.  In 
response to counsel’s questions, Taylor testified that he did not include the 
information regarding the “hand-to-hand transactions” in the affidavit because he 
did not want to compromise a joint State and federal drug investigation.  
Weddington’s counsel continued to question Taylor about the omissions4 until the 
trial judge interrupted and stated: 
                                                 
4  
Specifically, the transcript reads as follows: 
 
Defense counsel: What you put in your report was that you were conducting 
surveillance, you had received numerous complaints about drug sales taking place 
in this block; is that right? 
 
Taylor: Yes 
 
Defense counsel: Now, that information, that sentence it did not compromise your 
federal investigation to put that information in this affidavit; is that right? 
 
Taylor: That’s correct. 
 
Defense counsel: But somehow putting in this affidavit that – you put more 
information in this affidavit about Robert Weddington, didn’t you? 
 
Taylor: As far as? 
 
Defense counsel: Well, you got his name all throughout this affidavit and what 
you saw him do as far as being on his cell phone, go inside a house, go inside a 
car, and things like that; is that right? 
 
Taylor: Correct. 
 
 
7
                                                                                                                                                             
Defense counsel: But to say that he [Weddington] was observed doing a hand-to-
hand, what you believed to be a drug transaction, that would compromise a 
federal investigation to put that fact in this affidavit, you’re saying? 
 
Taylor: 
 Specifically, possibly, yes.   
 
Defense counsel: In what regard – I don’t follow that all logically, so tell me, fill 
it out for me.   
 
Taylor: Well, any of those individuals that he may have dealt with that day could 
have possibly [been] relevant to a federal investigation. 
 
* * * 
Defense counsel: And you didn’t include any fact about him being observed doing 
drug sales in the affidavit? 
 
Taylor: No, I didn’t 
 
Defense counsel: You made no account in here on the number of transfers you 
saw him do, allegedly, right? 
 
Taylor: No. 
 
* * * 
 
Defense counsel: Him talking on his cell phone in front of his house, there’s 
nothing illegal about that, is there? 
 
Taylor: It depends. 
 
Defense counsel: If you talk on your cell phone in front of your house, is that 
legal or illegal when you do that? 
 
Taylor: Typically I don’t stand in front of my house and talk on the cell phone. 
 
Defense counsel: Folks—if I were to do that in front of my house, is that legal or 
illegal? 
 
Taylor: It depends on where you live. 
 
Defense counsel: And you’re going to suspect me of doing something illegal by 
standing in front of my house and talking on the cell phone? 
 
Taylor: It depends on what I’ve seen prior to you talking on the cell phone.  It’s 
all one unit here.  What I see him do prior to him talking on the cell phone, and 
 
8
 
Wait.  Stop.  Stop.  Can we try – let me try to focus this.  I 
mean, this is a great discovery tool, and you can let this guy talk, he’s 
going to talk.  The only thing that’s really critical that I can see is 
what he told the officers that required them to make the stop.   
Now you can ask him what he observed, and all of that, but it’s 
not relevant to anything, because it’s only relevant to what he told that 
[sic] officers that can justify the stop.  Right?  That [sic] the 
reasonable articulable suspicion.   
 
Defense counsel resumed Taylor’s cross examination and the State objected.  
The trial judge sustained the State’s objection by stating: 
 
[Taylor] didn’t put it in the affidavit, he says, because of a federal 
investigation, I think [defense counsel has] explored how credible that 
is. . . . I’m not sure there’s benefit to keep going over it.  So I’ll 
sustain the State’s objection.  I obviously have a picture of that.   
 
 
(9) 
We review the trial judge’s denial of Weddington’s motion to 
suppress for abuse of discretion.5  At the suppression hearing “both the State 
and the defendant should be afforded the opportunity to present evidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
then once he talks on the cell phone an individual pulls up, the 900 block of Pine 
Street is probably one of the highest blocks in the City of Wilmington for heroin 
sales, as well as crack cocaine sales.  It’s common practice for individuals now, 
who have gotten smarter, to instead of just pulling up on the block and doing a 
sale, to call somebody on the phone and have them meet at a certain location. 
Whether it’s, you know, the corner of 9th and Pine, down the street, it’s very 
typical for individuals who are engaging in spreading the poison in the City of 
Wilmington to use cell phones as a means of distribution.   
 
Defense counsel: So you’re acting as [though] people in that neighborhood have 
less rights than – [The trial judge then intervened as indicated above]. 
 
5  
Henderson v. State, 892 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Del. 2006); see Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 
546, 549 (Del. 1985); see Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. V. Norman Gershman’s Things to Wear, 
Inc., 596 A.2d 1358 (Del. 1991) (Determination of relevancy under D.R.E. 401 and unfair 
prejudice under D.R.E. 403 are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not 
be reversed in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.). 
 
 
9
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.”6  Suppression motions often 
require the trial judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.7  Trial judges, 
however, may exercise broad discretion in the course of regulating the 
presentation of evidence in a suppression hearing.8  They may exclude 
relevant evidence if the admission of the otherwise relevant evidence would 
result in “undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”9 
 
(10) The record here shows that defense counsel ably highlighted the 
inconsistency between Taylor’s suppression hearing testimony and the facts 
sworn to in his affidavit offered in support of the application for an arrest 
                                                 
6  
State v. Ehtesham, 309 S. E. 2d 82, 84 (W. Va. 1983).   
 
7  
See Younger, 496 A.2d at 549.  Weddington argues that Younger supports his argument 
that the trial judge did not properly assess the credibility of the witness.  This argument is not 
persuasive.  In Younger, two police officers testified at the suppression hearing.  The defendant 
argued that the police coerced his confession, and the officers denied it.  The trial judge refused 
to suppress the statement.  This Court acknowledged that a trial judge has broad discretion in 
assessing witness credibility and in Younger, this Court found no abuse of discretion.  Here, the 
trial judge implicitly made a finding of witness credibility.  This trial judge was satisfied that the 
police officers’ testimony was sufficiently credible to support a finding of reasonable suspicion 
and did not abuse his discretion in so finding.   
 
8  
Young, 431 A.2d at 1254.  
 
9  
D.R.E. 403.  See also Smith v. State, 2006 WL 3931082 (Del.) (A trial judge’s decision to 
prohibit defendant from cross-examining a State witness about the witness’s statements 
regarding the witness’s gun ownership was supported by an orderly and logical deductive 
process, was not clearly erroneous, and was well within the judge’s discretion to admit or 
exclude evidence; the judge reasoned that the evidence that defendant wanted to introduce 
simply did not contradict the witness’s statement, and the trial judge did  not want to conduct a 
trial within a trial.). 
 
 
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warrant.  Defense counsel presented the Superior Court judge with sufficient 
facts to allow him to assess Taylor’s credibility.  The judge’s evidentiary 
ruling did not prevent defense counsel from fully exploring the 
inconsistency between the facts Taylor presented at the suppression hearing 
and the facts Taylor swore to in the affidavit he prepared to establish 
probable cause for an arrest warrant.  The Superior Court judge correctly 
concluded that defense counsel put the inconsistency squarely in issue, the 
judge fairly resolved the inconsistency and the limitation placed on further 
cross examination was well within the scope of the judge’s broad discretion 
under D.R.E. 403.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice