Title: Commonwealth v. Rintala
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12310
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12310 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARA L. RINTALA. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     May 3, 2021. - September 27, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Witness, Expert.  Evidence, Expert opinion, 
Qualification of expert witness, Prior misconduct, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Constitutional Law, Double 
jeopardy.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Required 
finding, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 19, 2011. 
 
Following review by this court, 473 Mass. 1018 (2016), the 
case was tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion for a new 
trial, filed on March 1, 2019, was considered by Jane E. 
Mulqueen, J. 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
Steven E. Gagne, Assistant District Attorney (Jennifer 
Handel Suhl, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Peter R. De Forest, Brooke W. Kammrath, Peter A. Pizzola, & 
John A. Reffner, pro se. 
M. Chris Fabricant & Tania Brief, of New York, & Stephanie 
Roberts Hartung for New England Innocence Project & another. 
2 
 
 
Katherine H. Judson, of Wisconsin, Anthony D. Mirenda, Neil 
Austin, & Rachel L. Davidson for Center for Integrity in 
Forensic Science. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 2016, a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree for the murder of her spouse, 
Annamarie Rintala (victim).  On appeal, the defendant challenges 
the admission of expert testimony as to the victim's time of 
death as well as expert testimony related to the time and manner 
in which paint was either poured or spilled on, under, and 
around the victim in the basement where the victim was found.  
The defendant also argues that there were errors requiring 
reversal related to the denial of her motion for a required 
finding of not guilty, the admission of evidence of prior 
misconduct, the judge's sua sponte instruction on consciousness 
of guilt, and the Commonwealth's closing argument.  Finally, she 
argues that the retrial as well as the manner in which the 
Commonwealth presented its evidence at the third trial violated 
her constitutional rights. 
We conclude that the admission of the expert testimony as 
to the timing and manner of application of paint in the basement 
was error.  Because the error was prejudicial, we vacate the 
judgment entered against the defendant.1 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by four 
forensic scientists; by the New England Innocence Project and 
3 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We briefly summarize the facts 
that the jury could have found at the defendant's trial, 
reserving details for our discussion of the legal issues. 
On March 29, 2010, the defendant, a paramedic, returned to 
the home she shared with the victim in Granby at around 7 P.M.  
Shortly after entering the home, she saw the victim at the 
bottom of the stairs to the basement.  The defendant initially 
only saw the victim's feet in the basement.  Before going down 
to check on the victim, the defendant first brought their 
daughter and their dog to a neighbor and asked the neighbor to 
call 911.  When first responders arrived, they found the 
defendant in the basement with the victim.  Paramedics quickly 
determined that the victim was dead, and several members of the 
Granby police department brought the defendant upstairs.  She 
spoke briefly with an officer at the scene before going to the 
Granby police station to speak with a State police detective 
working with the office of the district attorney for the 
northwestern district. 
Various members of the State police responded to the scene 
and initiated an investigation.  They extensively photographed 
the scene and collected physical evidence.  Investigators 
 
the Innocence Project, Inc.; and by the Center for Integrity in 
Forensic Science. 
4 
 
recovered a container of paint from the floor near the body.2  
When first responders had arrived, they observed paint all over 
the defendant, the victim, and the basement floor.  The two 
paramedics and the first two police officers on scene offered 
various descriptions of the paint, each generally describing the 
paint as white, wet, and shiny.  The victim had twenty-three 
distinct bruises all over her body, all of which appeared recent 
or fresh.  These included multiple blunt injuries to the 
victim's head.  The victim also had wounds around her neck, and 
the medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was 
manual strangulation. 
Over the course of two interviews with the State police, 
the defendant provided a timeline of her activity on the date of 
the homicide.  The defendant told detectives that she and the 
victim had been arguing the night before, as the victim had been 
upset about the defendant socializing with a male friend at home 
while the victim was at work.3  The defendant said that she left 
the house sometime around 3 P.M. on the day of the homicide.  
After leaving the house, the defendant went to a number of 
 
2 The paint at issue was Glidden EZ Track ceiling paint.  
The paint was manufactured by Glidden Paint. 
 
3 The victim had worked a night shift on March 28 that began 
at 8 P.M.  She was scheduled to work the same shift on the day 
she was killed. 
5 
 
different locations.4  She eventually went to the Holyoke Mall, 
where she was identified on surveillance video footage just 
before 5 P.M.5  From there, the defendant stopped at a restaurant 
around 5:47 P.M.  The defendant did not enter the restaurant; 
instead, surveillance video footage shows her truck near the 
rear of the parking lot.  From the video recording, it appears 
that the defendant threw several items in a trash can in the 
parking lot before driving away within one to two minutes of 
entering the parking lot.  Three rags were later recovered from 
the trash can, one of which contained a "faint" bloodstain.6  
After leaving the parking lot, the defendant then drove to a 
nearby grocery store, arriving just before 6 P.M.  She purchased 
a few items and left the store at 6:19 P.M.  She then drove to 
another restaurant that was approximately five miles away before 
returning home. 
 
4 The State police traced the defendant's steps at each 
location and, where possible, recovered physical evidence and 
surveillance video footage. 
 
5 In her interviews with the State police, the defendant 
stated that she and the daughter went to several locations 
before going to the Holyoke Mall.  There is no surveillance 
video footage or physical evidence to corroborate these stops. 
 
6 An expert testified for the defense that the bloodstain 
contained "degraded" deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).  He opined 
that the analysis of the DNA indicated that it likely was not 
freshly deposited on the rag. 
6 
 
Throughout the time she was away in the afternoon, the 
defendant sent the victim text messages, attempted to call her 
multiple times, and left her several voicemail messages.  The 
police recovered the victim's cell phone, which included the 
messages from the defendant and a significant number of text 
messages and calls, with the last outgoing communication 
occurring at 12:21 P.M.  During her first interview on the night 
of the homicide, the defendant permitted the detectives to 
perform a brief visual search of most of her body.7  The 
Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant and the 
victim had an acrimonious, at times violent, marriage, 
culminating with the defendant strangling the victim on March 
29.  The Commonwealth argued that the defendant engaged in a 
scheme designed to cover up her involvement in the homicide by 
driving around all afternoon, disposing of evidence, and 
attempting to communicate with the victim to demonstrate that 
she believed the victim was alive at the time of the calls.  The 
defendant then intentionally poured the paint on the body and 
 
7 The only thing that the detective noticed during the 
examination was a small mark on the victim's neck or upper 
chest.  The detective described the mark as an abrasion at 
trial, but the defendant said to her during the interview that 
the mark came from a recent consensual encounter with the 
victim.  The defendant also changed her clothes at the crime 
scene and was near a Granby police detective as she did so.  The 
detective did not notice any marks or abrasions on the defendant 
and agreed that she would have made note of it if she had seen 
anything like that. 
7 
 
lifted the body onto herself before the police arrived to make 
the crime more difficult to investigate. 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted in 
October 2011.  She was tried in early 2013 and again in early 
2014.  Both trials ended in mistrials because of hung juries.  
The Commonwealth tried the defendant a third time in September 
and October of 2016, and the defendant was convicted of murder 
in the first degree.  At the third trial, the Commonwealth 
introduced for the first time the testimony of David 
Guilianelli, a quality engineer at the company that manufactured 
the paint found at the crime scene.  Guilianelli provided expert 
testimony, based on his own experiments, explaining that the 
paint found at the crime scene was poured deliberately and not 
spilled and that the paint was poured no more than four hours 
before photographs were taken of the crime scene just after 9 
P.M.  The defendant filed a motion for a new trial in March 
2019, which was denied.  This appeal followed. 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant brings a number 
of claims related to (1) the admission of expert testimony, (2) 
the denial of her motion for a required finding of not guilty, 
(3) the admission of evidence of prior misconduct, (4) the 
judge's sua sponte instruction on consciousness of guilt, (5) 
the Commonwealth's closing argument, and (6) her due process 
rights.  We address each argument in turn. 
8 
 
a.  Expert testimony.  The defendant contends that the 
trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony of the 
medical examiner, Dr. Joann Richmond, as to the time of death.8  
The defendant also challenges the admission of testimony from 
Guilianelli, the Commonwealth's paint expert.  We address each 
challenge. 
i.  Legal background.  We begin with the legal standards 
governing expert testimony.  "We review a judge's determination 
to admit or exclude expert testimony . . . for an abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 729 
(2015).  The defendant must therefore demonstrate that the judge 
made "a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant 
to the decision, such that the decision falls outside the range 
of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Given 
that the defendant moved to exclude the challenged testimony 
prior to trial and objected to the testimony during trial, she 
need only demonstrate that any error was prejudicial to warrant 
reversal.  See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 239 (2014). 
 
 
8 Prior to the second trial, the defendant filed a motion in 
limine to exclude the testimony, which was denied without a 
hearing.  The defendant renewed her objection at the third 
trial.  The judge overruled the defendant's objection, 
determining that the issues raised by the defendant related to 
the weight and credibility of the testimony, not its 
admissibility. 
9 
 
For expert testimony to be admissible, the proposed witness 
must be qualified as an expert to testify to a specific subject 
matter.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2021).  "'The crucial issue,' 
in determining whether a witness is qualified to give an expert 
opinion, 'is whether the witness has sufficient "education, 
training, experience and familiarity" with the subject matter of 
the testimony.'"  Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 533 
(2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 183 
(1996).  "Testimony 'on matters within the witness's field of 
expertise is admissible' when the testimony concerns matters 
beyond the common knowledge of the jurors and will aid the 
jurors in reaching a decision" (emphasis in original).  
Frangipane, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 
618, 628 (1989).  At the same time, however, "a judge's 
discretion can be abused when an expert witness is permitted to 
testify to matters beyond an area of expertise or competence."  
Frangipane, supra. 
In addition to whether the proposed expert is qualified, 
the judge must also determine that the expert testimony is 
sufficiently reliable to reach the jury.  As the proponent of 
the expert testimony at issue, the Commonwealth "bears the 
burden of establishing . . . that the methodology or theory 
underlying the expert testimony is sufficiently reliable."  
Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 (2010).  See 
10 
 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 453 (2021) ("proponent 
must establish a sufficient foundation for a judge to determine 
whether the expert's opinion satisfies gatekeeper reliability"); 
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass. 212, 220 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 729 (2015) ("Under the 
Daubert-Lanigan standard, 'the touchstone of admissibility is 
reliability'").  See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 585-595 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 
15, 25-26 (1994).  When assessing reliability, a reviewing court 
may, when appropriate, consider material that was not before the 
trial judge "to ensure an accurate decision concerning the 
reliability of scientific evidence."  Commonwealth v. Camblin, 
478 Mass. 469, 479 (2017).9  "Although 'our review under this 
standard is deferential and limited, it is not perfunctory.  A 
judge's findings must apply the correct legal standard to the 
 
9 In this case, we have considered the affidavit of Dr. 
Arghavan Louhghalam, which the defendant submitted with her 
motion for a new trial, as part of our plenary review of the 
record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Commonwealth v. 
Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 617 (2020) (plenary review entails 
review of entire record).  Louhghalam is an assistant professor 
in the civil and environmental engineering department at the 
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth.  Louhghalam's research 
focuses on the behavior and response of construction materials 
(e.g., concrete, ceramics, and steel) under external loading and 
environmental conditions.  She is very familiar with the design 
of experiments and models to predict how materials will respond 
to external and environmental conditions.  Although we recognize 
that Louhghalam has not been subjected to any form of cross-
examination, and take that into account, we have considered her 
opinions and incorporate them where relevant. 
11 
 
facts of the case and must be supported by an examination of the 
record.'"  Hinds, supra at 218, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 639 (2005), overruled on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87 (2013).  Simply stated, 
"[i]f the process or theory underlying [an] . . . expert's 
opinion lacks reliability, that opinion should not reach the 
trier of fact."  Davis, supra, quoting Patterson, supra. 
ii.  Time of death testimony.  A.  Relevant facts.  Four of 
the first responders testified that they touched the victim's 
body in the basement once they arrived on scene.  One paramedic 
stated that the victim's arms were locked in an unnatural 
position and that she "was very, very cold, ice cold."  The 
other testified that the victim's wrist was "cold" and "stiff."  
One of the police officers who moved the body similarly 
testified that the body was "extremely stiff and very cold," 
with the other describing the body as "very, very stiff" and 
observing that her "whole body moved as one unit."  The victim's 
cell phone records from March 29 also shed light on the time of 
her death .  The victim was active on her cell phone throughout 
the morning.  Her last activity on her phone, as referenced 
supra, was a call she placed at 12:21 P.M. 
At trial, Richmond testified to her opinion that the 
victim's time of death was "six to eight to twelve" hours before 
the first responders found her.  She based this opinion on the 
12 
 
reports of first responders regarding the state of the victim's 
body, particularly their descriptions of the body as cold and 
stiff.  The first responders did not thoroughly examine the body 
for rigor mortis or take the body's core temperature; rather, 
they described their impression of the body's temperature and 
stiffness when they briefly touched and moved the body. 
B.  Analysis.  The defendant does not dispute that Richmond 
was qualified to testify as an expert regarding time of death or 
that time of death estimates are generally admissible.  
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 424 Mass. 64, 68–69 (1997) ("There is 
substantial authority establishing the reliability of estimates 
of time of death by medical examiners, and they need not be 
proved infallible to be admissible").  Rather, the defendant 
argues that Richmond's opinion was not based on "sufficient 
facts or data," and was not "the product of reliable principles 
and methods" that were "reliably applied . . . to the facts of 
the case."  Mass. G. Evid. § 702.  The defendant argues that 
because no one properly examined the body for rigor mortis, 
Richmond could not reliably estimate the time of death.10 
 
 
10 The defendant also argues that because the first 
responders' descriptions of the body temperature were based on 
skin contact and not measurement of core temperature, which is 
generally used to assess the cooling of the body after death 
(algor mortis), Richmond's reliance on reports of the body being 
cold was unreasonable, and thus Richmond's opinion was in 
practice only based on reports of stiffness.  For the same 
13 
 
"[G]eneral acceptance in the relevant community of the 
theory and process on which an expert's testimony is based . . . 
continues to be sufficient to establish the requisite 
reliability for admission in Massachusetts courts regardless of 
other Daubert factors."  Patterson, 445 Mass. at 640.  See 
Hinds, 487 Mass. at 217 n.11 (expert testimony may be admitted 
under general acceptance standard).  Four experts testified 
regarding rigor assessments and time of death in this case, each 
to the effect that no time of death estimate is precise, an 
appropriate time of death assessment takes into account all 
available information, and the quantity and quality of the 
information available affects the range of the estimate.  As the 
experts explained, it is common for medical examiners to rely on 
assessments conducted by others, often professional death scene 
investigators.  Richmond's determination that she could place 
significant weight on the consistent descriptions of the 
experienced first responders who testified in the instant cases 
was a decision made within the framework of existing methodology 
to credit certain available information.  As made clear by the 
experts, time of death estimates may be derived from an 
assessment of rigor, and that assessment does not have to be 
completed by the medical examiner herself.  The defendant's 
 
reasons discussed infra, we conclude that this goes to the 
weight, not the admissibility, of Richmond's opinion. 
14 
 
contention in this case that Richmond's opinion was based on 
inadequate information goes to the weight and not the 
admissibility of the testimony.  Given Richmond's undisputed 
qualifications, the data available to her, her reliance on 
generally accepted methods for estimating time of death, and her 
application of those methods to the available data, we conclude 
that the judge did not make "a clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision" to admit 
Richmond's testimony (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L., 
470 Mass. at 185 n.27.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702.11 
 
This was also not, as the defendant contends, an unreliable 
application of an established methodology to a new usage.  For 
this argument, the defendant relies on Patterson, 445 Mass. at 
628, in which we considered an expert opinion that employed a 
particular method of fingerprint examination to identify 
simultaneous impressions, even though that method is usually 
used for individual impressions.  The court concluded that the 
 
 
11 The defendant also contends that Richmond improperly gave 
an initial opinion as to time of death –- which she never 
changed -- entirely based on a telephone call with State police 
Detective Jamie Magarian on the night of the victim's death, in 
which he asked her if it was possible for a body to become "cold 
as ice" and "stiff as a board" in a matter of hours.  This 
mischaracterizes Richmond's conversation with Magarian.  
Richmond was very clear in her testimony that she gave Magarian 
an answer to a specific hypothetical question about rigor mortis 
that night, but not a time of death opinion as to the victim, 
and that her ultimate opinion was based on all of the 
information she later gathered. 
15 
 
judge should not have assumed the method of identification could 
be reliably applied to a new usage (simultaneous impressions), 
but rather the judge should have engaged in a fact-specific 
Lanigan inquiry regarding the reliability of "the particular 
application of that process."  Id. at 645-649.  Here, we are not 
confronted with a new usage or an untested methodology.12 
iii.  Paint testimony.  The defendant claims that 
Guilianelli's testimony should not have been admitted because he 
was not qualified to testify as an expert and because his 
testimony lacked sufficient reliability to reach the jury.  The 
defendant also contends that trial counsel's assistance as it 
related to excluding or countering Guilianelli's testimony was 
ineffective.  As we detail infra, we agree that Guilianelli 
lacked the necessary expertise to perform the paint analysis 
here and that his testimony lacked the requisite reliability and 
therefore should not have been admitted.  Moreover, because 
Guilianelli's testimony was significant and likely swayed the 
 
 
12 We do not agree with the defendant that because the first 
responders lacked professional training in assessing rigor 
mortis, their reports are so unreliable that an opinion based on 
them should not be admissible.  Although they were not 
professional death scene investigators, the first responders –- 
particularly the medical personnel -- were experienced and had 
previously encountered dead bodies, and some did have specific 
training on rigor mortis.  Given their collective medical 
experience and qualifications and the consistency of their 
descriptions, any lack of specific training goes to the weight, 
and not the admissibility, of Richmond's opinion. 
16 
 
jury's verdict, we conclude that the error was prejudicial, and 
we therefore vacate the judgment against the defendant.  We thus 
need not resolve the defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.13 
A.  Relevant facts.  We begin by describing the state of 
the crime scene when first responders arrived shortly after 7 
P.M.  The first officer to arrive testified that he observed the 
victim lying in "what appeared to be a large pool of pink wet 
paint and a couple different areas of large pools of blood."14  
He also stated that "there was no coagulation [of the paint] 
whatsoever" and that he was leaving footprints everywhere as he 
moved around.  The next officer that arrived similarly described 
the paint as "white paint, fresh, still wet."  He explained that 
the paint "didn't appear dry to [him]" and that he did not see a 
film on top of the paint.  The two paramedics provided similar 
descriptions.  One testified that the paint was "wet" and 
"shiny" and that "it was all over the place."  He also did not 
notice any film or coagulation on top of the paint.  The other 
 
13 We do note, however, that the expert identified on appeal 
describes in devastating detail the weaknesses of Guilianelli's 
methodology.  Although these weaknesses are somewhat evident 
without the benefit of this expert, they are clarified with the 
expert's assistance. 
 
14 In his first report, written shortly after the incident, 
this paramedic described the paint as "spilled white paint" 
(emphasis added).  In his second report, written within days of 
the incident, he wrote that the paint was pink. 
17 
 
paramedic testified that the "paint appeared to be very wet, 
fresh-looking."  Three of the first responders testified that 
they did not smell any odor of fresh paint.  A State police 
detective testified that when he went to the basement several 
hours later, after 9 P.M., he observed "wet fresh paint on the 
floor and paint on the body as well." 
The condition of the basement is reflected in the 
photographs taken by investigators at the scene.  The basement 
floor appears to be made of concrete.  The photographs show a 
large pool of paint under the victim, with the paint appearing 
pink in some spots and white in others.  There are also a number 
of footprints and other marks around the paint, as well as 
several bloodstains.  Investigators did not take any 
measurements of the pools of paint, such as the depth or 
thickness of the paint.  The paint container was found next to a 
pool of paint, and the lid was found underneath the container.  
Photographs of a dehumidifier in the basement indicated that the 
temperature was approximately fifty-five degrees with sixty-five 
percent humidity.15 
B.  Background and experiments.  In April 2014, after the 
second trial, the Commonwealth sought to determine whether the 
drying time of the paint could be extrapolated from the change 
 
15 The dehumidifier was not preserved, so it is unclear 
whether the temperature and humidity it recorded were accurate. 
18 
 
of the color of the paint on the basement floor.  The 
Commonwealth contacted the company that manufactured the paint 
and were connected with Guilianelli, a quality engineer at PPG 
Industries.16  Guilianelli has a bachelor's degree in chemistry 
and a minor in physics, and he had worked in the paint industry 
for twenty years.  He described his primary task over the course 
of his career as developing and formulating paints and coatings.  
Guilianelli explained that, as part of his work, he would test 
new paints by looking at how they behave in a can after being 
stirred and then after being brush- or roll-applied to a 
surface.  When Guilianelli tested new paints, all of the testing 
was done at three mils, that is, three one-thousandths of an 
inch.17 
Although he did not design the paint at issue in this case 
-- EZ Track paint -- Guilianelli was "very, very familiar" with 
another paint that was modified to make the EZ Track.  He 
testified that the EZ Track paint is designed for ceilings and 
has a special dye that makes the paint change from pink when it 
is applied to white once it has dried.  The paint is designed to 
be applied at a thickness of three mils.  At that thickness, the 
 
16 PPG Industries is the parent company of Glidden Paint, 
the company that manufactured the paint. 
 
17 Guilianelli explained that most paints are applied at six 
mils wet and dry at three mils. 
19 
 
paint will be dry to the touch and turn white within 
approximately thirty minutes under ideal drying conditions. 
To respond to the Commonwealth's request, Guilianelli 
decided to perform a series of experiments.  He documented each 
experiment with a series of photographs as well as his personal 
notes and observations.  He noted several over-all conclusions 
at the end of the experiments.  Because these experiments are 
central to Guilianelli's testimony, we describe them in detail. 
In his first experiment, Guilianelli tried to determine if 
a timeline could be established based on the rate at which the 
paint cured and the color changed from pink to white.  To do 
this, he (1) poured 127 grams of paint onto a Lanetta chart18 and 
(2) applied the paint in varying thicknesses to a different 
Lanetta chart with a sag bar.19  The thicknesses of the samples 
in the sag bar ranged from eight mils to forty mils.20  He 
performed this experiment at seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit and 
 
18 The chart was a Lanetta CU-1 chart, which is commonly 
used in the paint industry.  It has a sealed surface.  Unless 
otherwise noted, each of the samples was poured onto this type 
of chart. 
 
19 Guilianelli explained that a sag bar is a chart that has 
several parallel "tracks" or "little rivers" allowing for paint 
at various different thicknesses. 
 
20 For reference, forty mils is approximately one tenth of 
one centimeter. 
20 
 
thirty percent humidity.21  He observed the paint over a period 
of time and took photographs with varying lighting conditions at 
varying intervals, ranging from ten minutes to over thirty 
minutes.  From this test, he concluded that (1) poured paint did 
not show any color change for four hours; (2) an edge formed 
around the poured paint after approximately fifty minutes, and 
cracking in the paint began after sixty minutes; and (3) it 
would be better to analyze the drying timeline based on the 
cracking pattern of the paint as opposed to the change in color. 
In the second experiment, Guilianelli's objective was to 
determine if a timeline could be established based on the curing 
properties of EZ Track paint.  He poured seven 150-gram samples 
on a Lanetta chart in a large, walk-in environmental chamber.22  
He also poured an additional sample that he intended to touch to 
determine when a skin formed over the sample.  The chamber was 
set to sixty-two degrees Fahrenheit and forty-three percent 
humidity.  As he did before, Guilianelli observed the samples at 
various intervals and documented the experiment with 
 
21 As set forth supra, the temperature and humidity reading 
on a dehumidifier in the basement was different:  fifty-five 
degrees with sixty-five percent humidity. 
 
22 Guilianelli poured the second sample one hour after he 
poured the first and repeated this sequence for all seven 
samples. 
21 
 
photographs.23  From this experiment, Guilianelli concluded that 
"[d]rying patterns did start to emerge . . . .  The edge of the 
[sample] started to dry around [thirty] minutes.  Cracking 
started around [ninety] minutes and was very prevalent at 120 
minutes.  A dulling of the surface from drying and skinning 
starts about [thirty] minutes." 
In the third experiment, Guilianelli poured a single sample 
of 300 grams of paint onto a Lanetta chart and placed the chart 
into a different environmental chamber set to fifty degrees 
Fahrenheit and seventy percent humidity.24  During the 
experiment, Guilianelli noted that the chart had bowed such that 
the edges were elevated and the paint had pooled towards the 
center of the chart.  Guilianelli concluded that the increased 
humidity resulted in the color of the paint staying pink longer.  
He also concluded, "Edge starts to form around [forty-five] 
minutes.  Cracks along edge start to form at [ninety] minutes. 
. . .  Rapid changes [sic] the appearance of the coating 
 
23 The photographs of the experiments appear to have been 
taken from different heights and angles and under differing 
lighting conditions.  In some photographs, there is a visible 
glare or reflection.  Conversely, some photographs have shadows 
over the samples. 
 
24 The chamber used in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth 
experiments was smaller than the one used in the second 
experiment. 
22 
 
happened between [two] and [five] hours.  These changes can be 
used as markers to determine the dry time in other photos." 
The fourth experiment largely replicated the third 
experiment, with the only apparent change being that Guilianelli 
used clips to prevent the chart from bowing as it had in the 
third experiment.  Guilianelli also noted that in this 
experiment his observations "focus[ed] on the curing that occurs 
along the edge of the coating."  He concluded, "Edge starts to 
form between [thirty] and [sixty] minutes.  Cracks along the 
edge start to form at [ninety] minutes.  Cracks in the center of 
the paint film showing up at 120 minutes.  Cracking throughout 
the film at 150 minutes.  Very noticeable cracking throughout 
the film at 180 minutes.  Severe cracking seen at 240 minutes." 
The fifth experiment involved two separate samples.  The 
first used the same parameters as the fourth experiment.  The 
second sample was an unknown quantity of paint poured into a 
cookie tray of unknown dimensions lined with aluminum foil and 
placed into the chamber with the first sample.  The purpose of 
the second sample was to "show what happens to EZ Track paint if 
it was to pool in a depression."  For the first sample, 
Guilianelli observed the same pattern as he had in the fourth 
experiment, with the edge forming between thirty and sixty 
minutes and cracking progressing from ninety to 240 minutes.  
For the second sample, Guilianelli observed that the sample 
23 
 
"started to crack between [thirty] and [sixty] minutes.  Severe 
cracking by hour [two]." 
In the sixth experiment, Guilianelli poured 500 grams of 
paint onto a chart and placed it into the environmental chamber 
set to fifty-five degrees Fahrenheit and sixty-five percent 
humidity.25  The chart was "taped down on a cement block" to 
"more closely mimic the environment in question."  Guilianelli 
also placed a "panel . . . above the CU-1 chart to minimize the 
airflow coming in contact with the paint."  Guilianelli did not 
record any conclusions from this last experiment. 
Guilianelli drew several over-all conclusions from these 
experiments.  First, he concluded that "[d]ulling of the paints 
[sic] surface happens around [thirty] minutes."  Next, he 
concluded, "The edge of the paint starts to dry first.  This 
causes a ridge of dry paint at the outer most edges of the 
spill.  This starts to form between [thirty] minutes and [sixty] 
minutes.  A defined edge is prevalent at [ninety] minutes."  As 
to cracking, he concluded, "Edge [c]racking starts to show 
between [sixty] and [ninety] minutes.  It becomes prevalent at 
120 minutes."  Finally, he concluded, "Cracking starts to show 
in the middle of the paints [sic] surface around 120 minutes.  
 
25 This was the temperature and humidity displayed on the 
dehumidifier in the basement. 
24 
 
Become [sic] prevalent around 150 minutes and is [e]xtremely 
noticeable at 180 minutes." 
C.  Pretrial procedure.  On June 23, 2014, the Commonwealth 
notified the defendant that it intended to call Guilianelli as 
an expert witness.  It indicated that Guilianelli would testify 
about the chemical composition and properties of the paint and 
"the manner and pace at which it dries in specific atmospheric 
conditions."  It also indicated that Guilianelli may offer an 
opinion as to the quantity of paint and how long before the 
crime scene photographs were taken that the paint had been 
poured or spilled.  On July 15, the Commonwealth sent the 
defendant the photographs and notes that Guilianelli took during 
his experiments. 
On May 2, 2016, the defendant filed a motion in limine to 
exclude Guilianelli's testimony.  The defendant's arguments 
focused on the differences between the conditions at the crime 
scene and the conditions under which Guilianelli conducted his 
experiments.  Drawing on his experiments, Guilianelli then 
produced a report in late May 2016.  In the report, Guilianelli 
offered four opinions, two of which are relevant here.26  First, 
Guilianelli opined that "the paint was intentionally poured 
 
26 Guilianelli's first two opinions -- that the paint in the 
can was homogenous except for the dye, and that there was 
approximately one gallon of paint in the container before it was 
applied to the floor -- are not directly challenged. 
25 
 
rather than being knocked over, dropped, or otherwise spilled."  
Relying on the crime scene photographs, Guilianelli highlighted 
six factors that led to this conclusion:  "the paint flow, the 
position of the container atop the lid, the position of the 
handle, the lack of spatter, the lack of fresh paint on the lid, 
and the paint ending up on top of certain surfaces with evidence 
of a controlled turn."  Additionally, Guilianelli opined that 
"the paint was poured within a half hour of the first responders 
arriving on scene."  In reaching this opinion, he relied on his 
experiments, the observations made by first responders, and his 
review of the crime scene photographs.  In particular, he 
explained that he felt "very strongly" that the paint was poured 
within two and one-half hours before the photographs were taken.  
First responders arrived at the house at approximately 7:15 P.M, 
and the first photograph of the scene appears to have been taken 
at 9:18 P.M.  He also concluded that the paint was applied no 
more than four hours before the photographs were taken, or 
roughly 5 P.M. 
On July 7, after reviewing Guilianelli's report, the 
defendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of 
her motion in limine arguing that Guilianelli's testimony failed 
to satisfy the Daubert-Lanigan reliability standard because his 
testimony was "nothing more than anecdotal observations that 
have not been tested by the scientific method."  In support of 
26 
 
these arguments, the defendant submitted the affidavit of Dr. 
Otto Gregory, a chemical engineer with substantial experience 
with paints.27  Gregory stated that Guilianelli's conclusions 
were "not the result of scientific methodology" but rather were 
"simply anecdotal observations."  Gregory explained that very 
little of Guilianelli's work "was the product of any 
experimentation" and that "those experiments fail to take into 
account many unknowns and . . . are based on false assumptions."  
Gregory spelled out how Guilianelli's conclusion that the paint 
was poured was not "based on scientific study."  For example, 
Gregory pointed out that Guilianelli's reliance on the position 
of the lid under the container was "nothing more than 
speculation and has not been tested by means of a scientific 
method."  Gregory also raised concerns about Guilianelli's 
failure to control for airflow in his experiments and at the 
crime scene as well as the assumptions that Guilianelli made 
about the homogeneity of the paint. 
Shortly before trial, the trial judge denied the 
defendant's motion in limine to exclude the paint testimony 
without first conducting a Daubert-Lanigan hearing.  This was 
done after the Commonwealth and the defendant both agreed that 
the judge could decide the defendant's motion in limine on the 
 
27 Gregory is a personal friend of the defendant's parents. 
27 
 
papers filed and did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  
The trial judge concluded that "Guilianelli's drying-test and 
pour/spill observations and his conclusions are the product of 
his professional experience with paint in general, and with the 
. . . paint at issue, and that they are based on reliable 
principles and methods that he applied to the relevant facts of 
this case."  The trial judge's only further explanation for what 
made Guilianelli's experiments "based on reliable principles and 
methods" was that "[i]t appears that the conditions he utilized 
in his studies were in general sufficiently similar to 
conditions in the basement on the evening of March 29, 2010, so 
as to make his observations and conclusions of value to [the] 
jury."  The judge determined that criticisms of the experiments 
went not to the admissibility of the evidence but to its weight 
and therefore were properly raised on cross-examination. 
D.  Testimony.  At trial, Guilianelli testified in detail 
about the properties of paint generally and this particular 
paint.  He then described his experiments, sharing many of the 
details and findings listed in his notes and his report.  He 
told the jury that the paint was applied to the floor "within 
approximately [thirty] minutes of the time the first responders 
arrived."  He explained that this opinion relied on the 
consistent descriptions of the paint as wet and shiny by various 
first responders.  He also relied on the crime scene photographs 
28 
 
depicting the paint in the basement.  He pointed to the lack of 
any dry edge in multiple photographs as well as limited evidence 
of cracking and wrinkling in the photographs as consistent with 
what he saw in his experiments after approximately two hours.  
Guilianelli also testified that the paint was not spilled but 
was intentionally poured by someone based on the same reasons he 
provided in his report. 
Guilianelli acknowledged that this area was "a new realm" 
for him, as he had never before poured paint and watched it as 
it dried.  On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he also 
had never before testified regarding the use of the dulling, 
cracking, and wrinkling of paint to estimate when the paint was 
applied, nor was he aware of anyone else in the paint industry 
who had done so.  He also acknowledged that he had never read 
any scholarly or industry articles regarding estimating drying 
time based on the edge of a pool of paint or the wrinkling and 
cracking of the paint's surface.28 
E.  Analysis.  As detailed supra, the defendant contends 
both that Guilianelli was not qualified to offer this expert 
testimony and that Guilianelli's testimony was not based on 
sufficiently reliable methods.  Although we have serious doubts 
about whether Guilianelli was qualified to offer this testimony, 
 
28 Guilianelli does not refer to any reference materials in 
his report or testimony. 
29 
 
we need not resolve that issue, as it is clear that his 
experiments here were not based on sufficiently reliable 
methods.29 
As the proponent of the expert testimony at issue, the 
Commonwealth "bears the burden of establishing . . . that the 
methodology or theory underlying the expert testimony is 
sufficiently reliable."  Shanley, 455 Mass. at 761.  Typically, 
reliability is assessed using the familiar Daubert-Lanigan 
 
29 The precise question is whether Guilianelli possessed 
"sufficient 'education, training, experience and familiarity'" 
to determine forensically when and how the paint was applied to 
the basement floor and the victim's body based on the 
information he was provided.  See Frangipane, 433 Mass. at 533, 
quoting Richardson, 423 Mass. at 183.  At the time of trial, 
Guilianelli had worked in the paint industry as a chemist for 
twenty years, developing and testing new paints for their 
ordinary uses.  There is a significant distinction, however, 
between what Guilianelli had done in the paint industry for over 
twenty years and what the Commonwealth asked him to do in this 
case.  What testing Guilianelli had done appears to be at very 
low thicknesses on sealed surfaces.  There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that he had the education, training, or 
experience to develop experiments to test paint in other vastly 
different circumstances.  Designing paints and observing what 
happens when they dry at three one-thousandths of an inch on a 
sealed chart is an entirely different exercise from forensically 
analyzing the drying patterns of large pools of paint found 
below and on top of a dead person and spread about a concrete 
floor.  Guilianelli testified that he had never done an 
experiment like this before, nor had anyone in his company.  He 
had never testified about paint drying in any court proceeding 
and was not aware of any other instance of such testimony.  He 
also did not do any research on the topic or search for any 
academic or industry materials on this topic.  That Guilianelli 
had worked in the paint industry for twenty years and was 
involved with the design and production of the paint at issue 
here does not mean that he was qualified as an expert witness on 
any topic related to paint. 
30 
 
factors or the general acceptance test.30  See Davis, 487 Mass. 
at 454; Hinds, 487 Mass. at 217 & n.11.  We have also recognized 
that "[d]iffering types of methodology may require judges to 
apply differing evaluative criteria to determine whether 
scientific [or technical] methodology is reliable."  Canavan's 
Case, 432 Mass. 304, 314 n.5 (2000).  "A judge has 'broad 
discretion' to weigh [the Daubert-Lanigan] factors and to apply 
varying methods to assess the reliability of the proffered 
testimony, depending upon the circumstances of a particular case 
. . . ."  Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469, 476 (2017), 
quoting Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111 (2006). 
Expert testimony also may be based on or informed by the 
results of experimentation.  "Whether testimony as to 
experiments shall be admitted must be largely left to the 
discretion of the trial judge, and that discretion will not be 
interfered with unless in its exercise [the judge] clearly 
appears to be wrong."  Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 380 
Mass. 362, 365 (1980).  The conditions in the experiments must 
nonetheless be "substantially similar" to those at the crime 
 
30 "The five nonexclusive factors are 'whether the 
scientific theory or process (1) has been generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific community; (2) has been, or can be, 
subjected to testing; (3) has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; (4) has an unacceptably high known or potential 
rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized standards.'"  
Davis, 487 Mass. at 454, quoting Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 
Mass. 229, 238 (2007). 
31 
 
scene for the experiments to be of any value.  Id. at 365-366.  
And "[w]here new hard science is involved, an appellate court 
will always take a hard look at the trial judge's decision to 
admit or exclude the evidence."  Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 
317 (Greaney, J., concurring).  See Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 
Mass. 787, 811 (2016), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017) ("Our case 
law demonstrates that when expert testimony as to a novel or 
developing area of science is offered, the court carefully 
considers whether it is sufficiently reliable to reach the trier 
of fact" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
Our analysis of Guilianelli's approach begins with the 
important principle that judges should closely scrutinize expert 
testimony where the testimony is "prepared solely for purposes 
of litigation, as opposed to testimony flowing naturally from an 
expert's line of scientific research or technical work."  
Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th 
Cir. 2007).  See 2000 Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 
702, quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 
1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995) (courts 
should consider as part of their reliability analysis whether 
experts are "proposing to testify about matters growing 
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted 
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed 
their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying").  
32 
 
Guilianelli's experimentation and trial testimony had little 
relation to his professional work.  As set forth supra, 
Guilianelli testified that he had never done an experiment like 
this before, nor had anyone in his company.  He had never 
testified about paint drying in any court proceeding and was not 
aware of any other instance of such testimony.  He also did not 
do any research on the topic or search for any academic or 
industry materials on this topic.31  Rather than flowing 
naturally from his work, therefore, his experiments greatly 
differed from the work he ordinarily performed and the 
observations he had experience making, and his opinions were 
developed solely to assist the Commonwealth's prosecution of the 
defendant.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 
(1999) (objective of Daubert's gatekeeper requirement "is to 
make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon 
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the 
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field"). 
Relatedly, the Commonwealth has not pointed to any basis in 
existing scientific literature or research for Guilianelli's 
 
31 Because Guilianelli conceived of and designed the 
experiments without any stated basis in existing science or 
literature, and because neither the Commonwealth nor the trial 
judge applied the Daubert-Lanigan factors, it would make little 
sense to attempt to apply them here. 
33 
 
methodology or experiments.  Instead, it appears that 
Guilianelli designed these experiments on his own without any 
guidance.  We are not aware of any case in which expert 
testimony relating to the drying time of paint in this manner 
was admitted.  This further erodes the reliability of his 
testimony.  See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 157 ("We have found 
no indication in the record that other experts in the industry 
use [the method] or that [other experts] normally make the very 
fine distinctions about, say, the symmetry of comparatively 
greater shoulder tread wear that were necessary, on [the 
expert]'s own theory, to support his conclusions.  Nor, despite 
the prevalence of tire testing, does anyone refer to any 
articles or papers that validate [the expert]'s approach"). 
Guilianelli's experiments also do not appear to have been 
performed consistently with basic scientific principles.  See 
Hinds, 487 Mass. at 221 ("experts in the 'hard sciences' 
primarily base their findings on repeatable experiments 
conducted under controlled conditions").  See also National 
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States:  A Path Forward 111 (2009) (NAS Report) ("Adherence to 
scientific principles is important for concrete reasons . . . .  
The reliability of forensic science methods is greatly enhanced 
34 
 
when those principles are followed").32  Critically, he never 
attempted to measure the thickness or depth of the paint at the 
crime scene, which Dr. Arghavan Louhghalam, see note 9, supra, 
submitted was actually the most important variable when 
assessing the drying and curing time of paint.33  Guilianelli's 
experiments also did not take into account the surface upon 
which the paint was found, a dead body and concrete, as opposed 
to a sealed chart.34  He also did not account and control for the 
disturbances in the paint caused by the defendant and first 
responders.  To the extent he considered temperature and 
humidity, he was dependent on the accuracy of the readings at 
the crime scene, which were not verified.  In most of his 
 
32 Both Gregory and Louhghalam identified numerous flaws 
with Guilianelli's experiments and criticized his approach for 
not following the scientific method.  And while not available to 
the trial judge, the Center for Integrity in Forensic Science 
submitted an amicus brief arguing that Guilianelli's testimony 
was flawed forensic science. 
 
33 Guilianelli acknowledged that the thickness of the paint 
affects drying time. 
 
34 In one experiment, Guilianelli taped the Lanetta chart to 
a random "concrete slab" in order to "best mimic the floor at 
the crime scene."  As Louhghalam pointed out, this makes no 
sense.  There were no Lanetta charts taped to concrete found at 
the scene.  Guilianelli himself explained that the charts are 
sealed substrates, so very little water would be absorbed into 
the chart, rendering whatever to which the chart was taped a 
seemingly irrelevant consideration.  If Guilianelli wanted to 
account for the conditions at the crime scene, he should have, 
at the very least, poured the paint onto concrete, not a sealed 
chart taped to concrete. 
35 
 
experiments he did not even use the temperature and humidity 
reflected in these readings.  In sum, Guilianelli's experiments 
did not account or control for many important conditions at the 
crime scene.  Failing to control for, or even attempt to 
measure, potentially significant variables seriously undermines 
the reliability of testimony derived from experimentation.  
Hinds, 487 Mass. at 221 (experts in hard sciences control 
conditions for experiments).  See, e.g., Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 
291, 301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000), citing 
Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasizing significance of expert's failure to control for or 
account for important or explanatory variables). 
Furthermore, given the novelty of his experiments, that 
Guilianelli did not repeat or validate any of his six 
experiments is also significant.  See NAS Report, supra at 112 
("Typically, experiments or observations must be conducted over 
a broad range of conditions before the roles of specific 
factors, patterns, or variables can be understood").  Louhghalam 
explained that the more reliable scientific approach would have 
been for Guilianelli to "repeat the experiment at each 
thickness, temperature and humidity level and report the average 
and standard deviation of the measured times."  Louhghalam noted 
that, without such repetition, it is not possible to know 
whether the measurement is accurate, an outlier, or the product 
36 
 
of some other influence, as "small sample sizes usually lead to 
poor prediction performance."  Guilianelli instead treated the 
outcomes of a series of isolated experiments as conclusive as to 
the drying time of paint.  His failure to control for important 
variables and attempt to repeat or validate his findings further 
undermines the reliability of his opinions. 
Finally, Guilianelli's findings and conclusions were also 
largely subjective.  See NAS Report, supra at 124 ("The goal is 
to make scientific investigations as objective as possible so 
the results do not depend on the investigator").  For example, 
one of Guilianelli's conclusions from his experiments was that 
"[d]ulling of the paints [sic] surface happens around [thirty] 
minutes," and he testified at trial that paint goes from being 
shiny to being more dull and less shiny after approximately 
thirty to forty-five minutes.  But, as Louhghalam attests, how 
shiny or dull paint appears is influenced by the location of the 
person viewing the paint and the lighting conditions, making it 
highly subjective.35  Guilianelli's conclusions also relied 
heavily on the subjective descriptions of the paint provided by 
the first responders as well as his own subjective 
 
35 Louhghalam attempted to illustrate the subjective nature 
of describing a surface as shiny or dull by pointing to a 
photograph of the second experiment.  One photograph showed two 
samples of the same quantity that were poured at the same time, 
but one of the samples appears to be noticeably "shinier" than 
the other. 
37 
 
interpretation of the photographs from the crime scene.  His 
opinion was based essentially on his comparison of their 
subjective observations of the crime scene with his own 
subjective observations of the crime scene photographs.  He then 
compared these subjective observations with his still subjective 
observations of a set of experiments that did not replicate the 
reality of the crime scene.  This is not a reliable methodology 
for expert testimony. 
In sum, Guilianelli's testimony lacked most if not all of 
the features of reliability that are necessary for the expert 
testimony to be admissible at trial.  Guilianelli's testimony 
did not satisfy either the general acceptance test or the 
Daubert-Lanigan standard, and we see no other "evaluative 
criteria" that suggest his methodology is reliable.  See 
Shanley, 455 Mass. at 761; Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at 314 n.5.  
See also Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 154-155.  Therefore, it was 
an abuse of discretion to permit the Commonwealth to introduce 
this testimony. 
We also conclude that it was error for Guilianelli to 
testify to his opinion that the paint was poured and not 
spilled.  None of Guilianelli's experiments attempted to 
distinguish between poured paint and spilled paint.  Rather, his 
testimony was based solely on his interpretation of the crime 
scene photographs and his personal experience with spilled 
38 
 
paint.  He identified six reasons in his report and his 
testimony as the basis for his opinion.  At least two of those 
reasons -- that the handle of the container was in a certain 
position and that the container was resting on the lid on the 
floor of the basement -- have no apparent basis in any 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 702.36 
Although Guilianelli's other four reasons -- that there was 
no wet paint on the lid, that the flow patterns on the basement 
floor suggest a "controlled pour," the patterns of flow visible 
on the container, and the absence of spatter on the basement 
floor -- appear to have some potential scientific basis, 
Guilianelli made no attempt to use experimentation or other 
 
36 The fact that the container was found atop the lid in the 
crime scene photographs does suggest that it was placed there, 
but that is not based on any expert analysis, as this would be 
obvious to lay observers as well as an expert.  The question is  
when and by whom.  Guilianelli testified that if the container 
was knocked over, the lid would have been in front of the 
container, so the paint must have been poured.  Crucial to 
Guilianelli's conclusion is the assumption that the container 
was not moved.  However, there are a number of possible 
explanations, as the container could just as easily have been 
accidentally or deliberately moved at some point before the 
photographs were taken.  At least four first responders walked 
around the victim's body near or through the paint, and the 
defendant told a detective that she moved the victim's body when 
she got to the basement.  This was not a well-controlled crime 
scene, to say the least.  As a result, these observations appear 
to be little more than lay supposition and guesswork by 
Guilianelli.  For the same reasons, the position of the handle 
is also not a proper subject for expert testimony. 
39 
 
methods to determine whether the paint was poured or spilled.  
Instead, he simply relayed his past experiences working with and 
around paint and drew conclusions therefrom.  See Commonwealth 
v. Franceschi, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 610 (2018) ("While 
training and experience, to which [the expert] referred, might 
have taught [the expert] a methodology, it is not itself a 
methodology"). 
For example, regarding the absence of paint on the lid, 
Guilianelli testified that the photographs of the lid indicated 
to him that the lid had been removed before the paint was 
spilled.  He stated that he would expect to see wet paint on the 
lid if the lid had been on when the paint spilled.  Louhghalam 
agreed with Guilianelli that the absence of paint on the lid 
would suggest that the lid had been removed beforehand.  But 
Louhghalam pointed out that she could not determine from the 
photographs whether there was in fact any paint on the lid or 
when the photographs of the lid were taken.  As such, Louhghalam 
noted that there was not adequate information on which 
Guilianelli could base his opinion.  As a result, the basis for 
Guilianelli's personal observations regarding the lid appears to 
be subjective and questionable, and not based on experimentation 
or technical knowledge. 
Similarly, Guilianelli testified on cross-examination that 
the lack of a spatter pattern indicated that the paint was not 
40 
 
kicked or dropped because "[w]hen you kick [the paint container] 
or something, it's going to spatter."  Defense counsel responded 
by asking, "How do you know that?" to which Guilianelli 
answered, "Because I've dropped paint before."  Without any 
experimentation or research, however, there is no way for 
Guilianelli to assert reliably that the absence of spatter here 
indicates whether the paint was spilled or poured.  Gregory 
stated in his affidavit that "[t]he pouring and the spatter or 
lack thereof . . . that [Guilianelli] refers to is essentially a 
problem in fluid mechanics that has not been tested by means of 
a scientific method."  And, as Louhghalam pointed out, the flow 
of the paint could have covered any spatter, as paint can move 
"in different shapes or directions."  The same is true for 
Guilianelli's observations regarding a "controlled turn" and 
flow patterns on the floor.  Louhghalam added that paint can 
flow in any direction and that its flow depends on variables 
like the slope and topography of the surface it is on.  Yet, 
Guilianelli made no attempt to measure or account for these 
variables in the basement.  Again, the lack of any attempt by 
Guilianelli to measure or control for these variables, and 
instead simply offering an opinion after reviewing crime scene 
photographs, demonstrates the subjectivity and unreliability of 
this methodology, rather than its expert basis. 
41 
 
Guilianelli's testimony is thus precisely the type of 
speculation, even from a qualified expert, that should not be 
admitted.  Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc., 466 Mass. 398, 406 
(2013), quoting Sevigny's Case, 337 Mass. 747, 751 (1958) 
("Expert opinion testimony may be excluded 'where it amounts to 
no more than mere speculation or a guess from subordinate facts 
that do not give adequate support to the conclusion reached'").  
Guilianelli claimed no scientific or technical basis for this 
opinion and offered little more than his own anecdotal 
experience to support it.  Recognizing as much, the judge 
sustained several objections during the direct examination as 
Guilianelli was setting forth his opinion and came close to 
striking this portion of the testimony during trial sua sponte.37  
Guilianelli therefore again lacked a sufficiently reliable 
methodology for concluding that the paint was intentionally 
poured.  See Shanley, 455 Mass. at 761. 
Because the defendant sought to exclude Guilianelli's 
testimony and objected to it at trial, we must determine whether 
 
37 During the cross-examination of Guilianelli, after asking 
counsel to come to sidebar, the judge stated, "I don't want to 
be frank but I'm having great difficulty understanding how this 
witness can or should be testifying about this paint spilled 
versus paint poured hypothesis and it just seems as though the 
hole keeps getting dug deeper and deeper and deeper.  And my 
inclination is to strike at least that portion."  The judge 
ultimately decided to let the cross-examination continue and did 
not strike the testimony. 
42 
 
the error was prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 
589, 591 (2005).  "An error is not prejudicial only if the 
Commonwealth can show 'with fair assurance . . . that the 
judgment was not substantially swayed' by it."  Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 647 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1519 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Rosado, 428 Mass. 76, 79 (1998).  
The admission of Guilianelli's testimony was clearly 
prejudicial.  He testified that the paint was intentionally 
poured by someone approximately thirty minutes before the first 
responders arrived.  Considering the testimony from the various 
medical examiners that the victim had likely died earlier in the 
day, the testimony that someone had intentionally poured the 
paint just before first responders arrived was very strong 
evidence of the defendant's guilt.  Indeed, the Commonwealth 
heavily emphasized the significance of Guilianelli's testimony 
in its closing argument, arguing that "there can be no question 
that paint was intentionally poured, deliberately poured on the 
body" and that "there's no way that if that body had been killed 
at the same time the paint had been poured, that paint would be 
fresh and wet and liquidy when first responders got there."  The 
Commonwealth then tied this testimony to the defendant's efforts 
to cover up the murder, arguing that "nobody but the defendant 
would have a reason to pour that paint."  Indeed, if the jury 
credited Guilianelli's testimony about the timing of the 
43 
 
intentional pouring of the paint, the evidence showed that the 
defendant was likely the only person who could have poured the 
paint on the victim.  And the time of death evidence established 
that the victim would have been dead at the time the paint was 
poured.  Guilianelli's testimony, therefore, was extremely 
powerful evidence of the defendant's guilt.  Moreover, the 
significance of this evidence was accentuated when the judge sua 
sponte instructed the jury that it could consider evidence that 
the defendant "may have altered the scene . . . in the basement" 
as evidence of consciousness of guilt.  We also find it 
significant that there was no expert testimony regarding the 
paint admitted at the first two trials, each of which ended with 
hung juries.  This suggests that the expert testimony may have 
been a significant factor for the jury.  Accordingly, the error 
was prejudicial, and we vacate the judgment against the 
defendant.38 
b.  Remaining issues.  We address several other claims that 
may arise in a potential retrial.39 
 
38 Because we have concluded that the error was prejudicial 
for these reasons, we need not address the comments made by a 
juror in a posttrial televised interview. 
 
39 Because they may not arise on retrial, we do not address 
the defendant's claims related to the judge's sua sponte 
consciousness of guilt instruction and the Commonwealth's 
closing argument.  We note, however, that the consciousness of 
guilt instruction accentuated the focus in the instant case on 
the paint evidence, particularly the intentional pouring of the 
44 
 
i.  Motion for required finding.  The defendant argues that 
the judge erroneously denied her motion for a required finding 
of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case.  She 
argues that the Commonwealth needed to prove that the victim was 
killed before the defendant left the home, which she told 
investigators had been around 3 P.M.  Essentially, the defendant 
argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her.  She 
therefore must show that, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, no "rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
Applying the Latimore standard, we concluded after the 
defendant's second trial that the Commonwealth had presented 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant.  See Rintala v. 
Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1018, 1018 (2016).  As we explained, id. 
at 1019, 
"the evidence against [the defendant] was sufficient to 
permit the jury to conclude that she strangled the victim 
in the basement of their house.  Based on the state of the 
victim's body at the time she was found by first 
responders, the testimony of the Commonwealth's medical 
expert, the activity on the victim's cellular telephone 
(and the abrupt stoppage thereof), and [the defendant]'s 
own statements, the jury could rationally conclude that, at 
the time that the victim was killed, she and [the 
defendant] were the only adults in the house.  There also 
 
paint, making the erroneous admission of Guilianelli's testimony 
particularly prejudicial. 
45 
 
was evidence suggestive of an attempt to compromise the 
crime scene shortly before first responders arrived, of a 
tumultuous relationship between [the defendant] and the 
victim, and of [the defendant]'s consciousness of guilt." 
The evidence in this case largely mirrored that of the prior 
trials.  Therefore, the defendant's motion for a required 
finding was properly denied. 
ii.  Evidence of marital strife.  The defendant challenges 
the admission of evidence of various instances of past marital 
strife between the defendant and the victim.  She argues that 
the evidence should not have been admitted because it was 
irrelevant, too remote in time, and cumulative such that it was 
unfairly prejudicial.  The Commonwealth introduced evidence of 
several incidents that occurred between September 2008 and May 
2009.  This included evidence that the defendant was arrested 
for assault and battery after the victim spoke with the police, 
evidence that the defendant and victim obtained restraining 
orders against one another, and evidence that the defendant and 
victim initiated divorce proceedings against each other.  We 
review the decision to admit this evidence for abuse of 
discretion.  Commonwealth v. Denton, 477 Mass. 248, 250 (2017). 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to admit 
this evidence.  The evidence was relevant and admissible to show 
motive and the hostile nature of the relationship between the 
defendant and the victim.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 
46 
 
445 Mass. 568, 575-576 (2005) (prior bad act evidence admissible 
to demonstrate hostile relationship).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 410 (2012) (evidence of abuse 
prevention order admissible to show status of marital 
relationship and motive to kill spouse).  Moreover, the evidence 
was not too remote, as the incidents all occurred within 
approximately eighteen months of the homicide.  See Commonwealth 
v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 405-406 (2017).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 243-244 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018) (prior bad acts occurring in 2002 
and 2003 not too remote from 2004 homicide).  The prejudice to 
the defendant was also mitigated to some extent because the 
defendant was permitted to introduce ample evidence that the 
defendant and victim had a positive relationship and had 
reconciled.  Finally, the judge properly instructed the jury 
both during testimony and in her final instructions that they 
were only to consider the evidence as evidence of the hostile 
nature of the relationship between the defendant and victim or 
the defendant's state of mind, intent, or motive.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 202-203 (2004).  There 
was no error in the admission of this evidence. 
iii.  Due process.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's "approach to the third trial" violated the double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
47 
 
Constitution and denied the defendant due process.  She argues 
that the Commonwealth's retention of Guilianelli and the 
strategic decision by the Commonwealth not to call two important 
fact witnesses at the third trial violated the defendant's due 
process rights because "[p]rosecutors cannot be permitted to 
revise their case after every mistrial until they find a 
successful mix of evidence to obtain a conviction." 
Double jeopardy does not prevent the defendant from being 
retried if the Commonwealth presents sufficient evidence to 
convict the defendant of the charged offense but the case ends 
with a hung jury.  Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 470, 473-474 
(2012).  As we explained supra, the Commonwealth has presented 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant.  We are not aware 
of any case in which we have held that the Commonwealth's 
decision to alter its trial strategy after a hung jury 
implicates a defendant's double jeopardy or due process rights.  
It is hardly surprising that the Commonwealth sought to retain 
an additional expert and chose to alter its trial strategy after 
two hung juries.  These decisions do not violate the defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
3.  Conclusion.  We vacate the judgment entered against the 
defendant, set aside the verdict, and remand this matter to the 
Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.