Title: Moynihan v. Lynch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2022

Moynihan v. Lynch Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Kathleen Moynihan and defendant Edward Lynch were involved in a long-term “marital-style relationship.” Anticipating the potential dissolution of that relationship, they signed and notarized a written agreement, without the assistance of counsel, that finalized the financial obligations each owed to the other. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was the validity of that palimony agreement. In 2015, the parties parted ways, and Lynch refused to abide by their written agreement. Moynihan filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the written agreement and an alleged oral palimony agreement that she claimed the parties had entered before the Legislature in 2010 amended N.J.S.A. 25:1-5 to include subparagraph (h), which mandated that palimony agreements be reduced to writing and “made with the independent advice of counsel.” She challenged N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) on constitutional grounds and urged enforcement as a typical contract; alternatively, she sought enforcement of the agreement on equitable grounds. Lynch denied the existence of an oral palimony agreement and asserted that the written agreement was unenforceable because the parties did not receive the independent advice of counsel before entering it. The Supreme Court concluded the palimony agreement, as written and signed, without the attorney review requirement, was enforceable. That portion of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which imposed an attorney-review requirement to enforce a palimony agreement, contravenes Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded the parties did not enter an oral palimony agreement. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Kathleen M. Moynihan v. Edward J. Lynch (A-64-20) (085157)Argued November 29, 2021 -- Decided March 8, 2022ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. Plaintiff Kathleen Moynihan and defendant Edward Lynch were involved in a long-term “marital-style relationship.” Anticipating the potential dissolution of that relationship, they signed and notarized a written agreement, without the assistance of counsel, that finalized the financial obligations each owed to the other. In this appeal, the Court considers the validity of that palimony agreement. The parties met in 1997 and developed a romantic relationship. In the beginning, Lynch occasionally slept at Moynihan’s home. In 2000, Moynihan and her children moved to a home in Bordentown. Moynihan made the down payment on the home, which Lynch purchased with a mortgage and titled in his name. The parties shared the financial responsibilities of the home. Over time, Lynch moved into the home and became more active in the life of the Moynihan family. The parties discussed marriage but never wed. In 2007, Lynch placed the title of the home into a trust and named Moynihan as the beneficiary upon his death. In 2013, Lynch converted his ownership of the home into a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, naming himself and Moynihan on the deed. Sometime between 2012 and 2014, the parties entered into a handwritten agreement, drafted by Lynch, which provided that, within five years of vacating their jointly owned home, Lynch would pay off the mortgage, deed it over to Moynihan, pay her $100,000, and, within two years of vacating the home, pay the real estate taxes on the property for two years. In 2015, the parties parted ways, and Lynch refused to abide by their written agreement. Moynihan filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the written agreement and an alleged oral palimony agreement that she claimed the parties had entered before the Legislature in 2010 amended N.J.S.A. 25:1-5 to include subparagraph (h). That amendment mandated that palimony agreements be reduced to writing and “made with the independent advice of counsel.” She challenged N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) on constitutional grounds and urged enforcement as a typical contract; alternatively, she sought 1 enforcement of the agreement on equitable grounds. Lynch denied the existence of an oral palimony agreement and asserted that the written agreement was unenforceable because the parties did not receive the independent advice of counsel before entering it. At trial, Moynihan testified that their relationship “was like a marriage,” and that Lynch told her there was “no reason” to consult an attorney about their agreement and notarizing the agreement “makes it legal.” Lynch diminished their relationship and gave conflicting testimony about whether he intended to be bound by the agreement. The trial court found that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-review requirement did not contravene Moynihan’s constitutional rights. The court determined that the written agreement was not a palimony agreement but more akin to an “orderly removal” in a landlord/tenant matter and enforced the agreement. The court also found that the couple did not enter an enforceable oral palimony agreement. The Appellate Division reversed, but it upheld the finding that the parties did not reach an oral palimony agreement. The Court granted certification. 246 N.J. 324 (2021).HELD: The palimony agreement, as written and signed, without the attorney review requirement, is enforceable. That portion of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which imposes an attorney-review requirement to enforce a palimony agreement, contravenes Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The parties did not enter an oral palimony agreement.1. The Statute of Frauds generally requires that certain agreements be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. N.J.S.A. 25:1-5. In 2010, the Legislature amended the Statute to include palimony agreements. N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). Prior to the amendment, New Jersey’s common law recognized that an unwed couple could enter into a palimony agreement and courts enforced oral palimony agreements involving “marital-type relationships” where one party induced the other to enter or remain in the relationship by a promise of support. The feature that distinguishes N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) from all other provisions of the Statute of Frauds is the requirement that each party to the palimony agreement secure the “independent advice of counsel.” No other law in this state conditions enforceability of an agreement between private parties on attorney review. Furthermore, none of the jurisdictions that enforce palimony agreements mandate that the parties consult with attorneys before entering into such agreements. (pp. 22-25)2. N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-review requirement does not violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, which bar the state legislature from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3. The essential aim of the Federal and State Contract Clauses is to restrain a state legislature from passing laws that retrospectively impair preexisting contracts. That concern is not present here; Moynihan and Lynch signed their written agreement well after the effective date of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). (pp. 26-28) 2 3. The question is whether, under the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the State Constitution, the State generally can impose on an individual the burden of retaining counsel to review a private contract. The right to “personal liberty” guaranteed in Article I, Paragraph 1 protects against the government arbitrarily interfering with the right to individual “autonomy.” A.A. v. Att’y Gen., 384 N.J. Super. 67, 109 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 78 (1995)), aff’d 189 N.J. 128 (2007). The right of individuals to represent themselves in civil courts -- and presumably to craft their own private contracts -- predates the adoption of the Federal and State Constitutions. The original Statute of Frauds did not require a person to consult with an attorney before entering into a contract. Among the universe of private contracts, the Legislature mandates attorney review only for palimony agreements. (pp. 28-34)4. In determining whether parties have a substantive due process liberty interest under Article I, Paragraph 1, the Court applies a balancing test weighing three factors: “the nature of the right at stake, the extent to which the challenged statutory scheme restricts that right, and the public need for the statutory restriction.” Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 443 (2006). Here, it is the right of personal autonomy -- the right to make decisions without the compelled participation of an attorney. The attorney-review requirement of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) directly infringes on that right. An attorney’s services may impose a cost that the parties do not want to bear or cannot afford. Attorney review almost certainly will result in fewer palimony agreements. The legislative history of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) does not shed light on why only palimony agreements require attorney review. (pp. 34-37)5. The imposition of an attorney-review requirement is an arbitrary government restriction that contravenes Moynihan’s substantive due process rights. The Court strikes down the attorney-review requirement in N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). Palimony agreements must still be in writing and signed, if not by both parties, at least by the party against whom the agreement is to be enforced -- just like all agreements enumerated in the Statute of Frauds. The Court enforces the palimony agreement as written in this case. (pp. 37-38)6. Sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination that Lynch did not make an explicit or implied oral promise to support Moynihan for life. Therefore, the parties did not have an oral palimony agreement before 2010. Because the written palimony agreement is enforceable, the Court does not address any of the equitable remedies pressed by Moynihan for enforcement of that agreement. (pp. 38-40) REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part. REMANDED to the trial court.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 64 September Term 2020 085157 Kathleen M. Moynihan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward J. Lynch, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 29, 2021 March 8, 2022Angelo Sarno argued the cause for appellant (Snyder Sarno D’Aneillo Maceri & Da Costa, attorneys; Angelo Sarno, of counsel and on the briefs, and Scott D. Danaher, on the briefs).Allison M. Roberts argued the cause for respondent (AMR Law, attorneys; Allison M. Roberts, of counsel and on the briefs).Robin C. Bogan argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Domenick Carmagnola, President, of counsel, and Robin C. Bogan, Brian G. Paul, and Brian M. Schwartz, on the brief).Jeralyn L. Lawrence argued the cause for amicus curiae The New Jersey Chapter of the American Academy of 1 Matrimonial Lawyers (Lawrence Law, attorneys; Jeralyn L. Lawrence, Bonnie C. Frost, Christine C. Fitzgerald, and Dina Mikulka, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Kathleen Moynihan and Edward Lynch were involved in a long-term“marital-style relationship.” Anticipating the potential dissolution of thatrelationship, they signed and notarized a written agreement that finalized thefinancial obligations each owed to the other. That palimony agreementprovided that, within five years of vacating their jointly owned home, Lynchwould pay off the mortgage, deed it over to Moynihan, pay her $100,000, andpay the real estate taxes on the property for two years after his departure. The primary issue in this case is the validity of that written palimonyagreement. After the relationship ended, Lynch contended that the agreementwas unenforceable because neither he nor Moynihan had counsel review theagreement before signing it, as required by N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). That statuteprovides that a written promise in a palimony agreement is not “binding unlessit was made with the independent advice of counsel for both parties.” N.J.S.A.25:1-5(h). Moynihan claims, among other things, that the provisioncompelling the parties to secure the assistance of counsel to enter into a 2 written palimony agreement violates the constitutional prohibition onimpairing contracts. The trial court found that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-reviewrequirement did not contravene Moynihan’s constitutional rights. The court,however, determined that the written agreement was not a palimony agreementbut more akin to an “orderly removal” in a landlord/tenant matter and enforcedthe agreement according to its terms. The court also found that the couple didnot enter an enforceable oral palimony agreement. The Appellate Division reversed. It concluded that the Lynch/Moynihanagreement was clearly a palimony agreement, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h),and therefore unenforceable because the parties did not receive the“independent advice of counsel” before signing the agreement. The AppellateDivision further determined that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-reviewrequirement did not violate the federal or state constitutional provisionprohibiting the impairment of contracts. It upheld the trial court’s finding thatthe parties did not reach an oral palimony agreement. We agree with the Appellate Division that Lynch and Moynihan signed awritten palimony agreement. We also find that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) did notretrospectively alter a preexisting contract and therefore did not constitutelegislation impairing a contract. We hold, however, that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s 3 attorney-review requirement contravenes the substantive due process guaranteeof Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Article I, Paragraph 1 limits the power of the State to control individualdecision-making in certain fundamental areas concerning a person’s life andlivelihood. N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) compels individuals to retain attorneys beforethey can enter a palimony agreement -- a contract no more complicated thanother family law or commercial contracts that do not require attorney review.N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-review requirement interferes with anindividual’s right of autonomy, singles out written palimony agreements fromamong all other agreements for differential treatment, and has no parallel inthe legislative history of this state. The State generally cannot compel a person to accept counsel in acriminal or civil case. Because individuals generally have a constitutionalright to represent themselves in our criminal and civil courts, it follows thatgenerally they can enter a contract no more complex than others without anattorney. The attorney-review requirement also unduly burdens those whocannot afford counsel -- those with little or no income -- denying them theopportunity to enter contracts available to their more affluent counterparts. Nosound reason has been given for the public need to compel attorney review ofpalimony agreements to the exclusion of all other agreements. We therefore 4 conclude that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s provision compelling parties to seek theadvice of counsel -- and therefore retain counsel -- before signing a palimonyagreement violates the substantive due process guarantee of our StateConstitution. Although we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division enforcingthe written agreement, we affirm its judgment that sufficient credible evidencein the record supports the trial court’s finding that the parties did not enter anoral palimony agreement. We remand for proceedings consistent with thisopinion. I. A. Kathleen Moynihan filed a complaint and an amended complaint in theSuperior Court, Burlington County, seeking enforcement of a written palimonyagreement, as well as an alleged oral palimony agreement that she claimed theparties had entered before the Legislature in 2010 amended N.J.S.A. 25:1-5 toinclude subparagraph (h). That amendment mandated that palimonyagreements be reduced to writing and “made with the independent advice ofcounsel.” N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). Additionally, Moynihan contended, her writtenagreement should be enforced as a typical contract, not as a palimonyagreement. Alternatively, she urged that if the agreement constituted a written 5 or oral palimony agreement, it should be enforced on a number of equitablegrounds, such as partial performance of the oral and written agreements,equitable estoppel, fraud, and specific performance of an implied contract. In response, Lynch denied the existence of an oral palimony agreementand stated that the written agreement was unenforceable because the partiesdid not receive the independent advice of counsel before entering it, asrequired by N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). He also counterclaimed for partition of thehome that he and Moynihan owned, asserting that the parties should equallysplit the proceeds of the sale. A six-day trial was conducted in the Chancery Division, Family Part.The court heard testimony from Moynihan, her two daughters, and Lynch.Although the parties’ testimony differed greatly on some points, we begin withthose facts that are mostly undisputed. 1. Moynihan and Lynch first met in 1997 when Moynihan served as a flightattendant and Lynch worked as a pilot for U.S. Airways. In time, theydeveloped a romantic relationship. At the beginning of their relationship,Moynihan was in the midst of divorce proceedings and lived in Mansfield withher three children. Lynch had a home in New Hampshire and an apartment in 6 Philadelphia and split his time between the two. In the early part of theirrelationship, Lynch occasionally slept over at Moynihan’s home. In 2000, Moynihan and her estranged husband divorced. BecauseMoynihan’s ex-husband stopped making mortgage payments on the familyhome, a foreclosure action followed. Moynihan then moved with her childrento a home in Bordentown. Although Moynihan borrowed $8,000 from herfather to make a down payment on the home, Lynch primarily financed thepurchase through a mortgage, and the home was deeded in his name. Lynch stayed with greater frequency at the Bordentown home and wouldregularly dine with Moynihan and her children. He also became more active inthe life of the Moynihan family. He frequently attended Moynihan’schildren’s after-school activities and spent a number of holidays with thefamily. By all appearances, Lynch and Moynihan had more than a datingrelationship. During their relationship, they discussed marriage, though theynever wed. Moynihan and Lynch shared the financial responsibilities in maintainingthe home: Moynihan initially paid the monthly mortgage and real estate taxes,along with other household expenses, while Lynch paid for the home’simprovements. Over time, Lynch began to provide Moynihan withapproximately $1,000 a month to pay the mortgage and other expenses. In 7 2007, Lynch placed the title of the home into a revocable trust and namedMoynihan as the trust’s beneficiary upon his death. Lynch also namedMoynihan as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, his 401(k) plan, andhis bond account. Sometime between 2012 and 2014, the parties entered into a prospectiveproperty settlement agreement in the event their relationship dissolved. Thehandwritten agreement drafted by Lynch provided: In the event that Kathleen Moynihan and Edward Lynch terminate their relationship I agree to the following terms: 1. The home . . . in Bordentown NJ will be paid off within five years after Mr. Lynch vacates the property. 2. After paying off the mortgage note Mr. Lynch will sign the deed over to Ms. Moynihan there giving her sole ownership of said property. 3. Until the mortgage is satisfied Mr. Lynch will pay the monthly mortgage payment. 4. Mr. Lynch will pay the property tax [on the Bordentown home] for two years after his departure. 5. Mr. Lynch will pay Kathleen Moynihan a sum of $100,000. dollars by the end of a five year period starting when Mr. Lynch vacates the [Bordentown home]. This agreement finalizes all obligations of Mr. Lynch to Ms. Moynihan. 8 Moynihan and Lynch signed the agreement and had it notarized withoutconsulting attorneys. In 2013, Lynch sold his New Hampshire home and seemingly began tolive full-time with Moynihan. He also converted his sole ownership of theBordentown home into a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, naminghimself and Moynihan on the deed. Although Moynihan and Lynch hadtentative plans to retire together, uncertainty about their financial futureplagued the latter part of their relationship. To allay Moynihan’s concernsabout Lynch’s commitment to her, in March 2014, Lynch texted, “I do loveyou and all I do is planning for your future but you don’t seem to realize that.” In 2015, the bottom fell out of their relationship, and Lynch andMoynihan parted ways. Lynch moved to Florida and continued to pay themortgage on the Bordentown home and, until 2016, the real estate taxes for thehome, but otherwise refused to abide by their written settlement agreement. 2. Beyond that spare narrative, Moynihan and Lynch gave very differentaccounts of their personal and financial relationship. At the trial, Moynihan testified that her relationship with Lynch “waslike a marriage” and that, along with her children, they were akin to a family.Moynihan’s daughters, Megan and Caitlin, viewed Lynch as a “stepfather” and 9 a member of their household. Caitlin recalled that Lynch slept over at theBordentown home “[n]inety percent” of the time. Moynihan stated that Lynch expressed his love for her and his intent tofinancially support her family. According to Moynihan, Lynch purchased theBordentown home because he did not want her family to live in an apartment.When Moynihan’s ex-husband moved to terminate alimony in 2011, Lynch notonly hired an attorney to respond to the motion, but also assured her that shedid not need the alimony because “he would take care of [her] for the rest of[her] life.”1 After Moynihan voluntarily surrendered her alimony, Lynchbegan to pay the mortgage, real estate taxes, and homeowner’s insurance onthe home. Moynihan also described the backdrop to the written settlement that sheand Lynch signed. On an unremarkable day in 2012, while the two weresitting in the family room of the Bordentown home, Lynch broached thesubject of what he would do for her if their relationship ended and suddenlypresented the written agreement. The conversation came as a surprise toMoynihan, and she felt betrayed by his past promises that they would have alife together. When Moynihan asked, “maybe we should go to a lawyer,”1 By consent, Moynihan accepted the termination of alimony in exchange for a lump-sum payment of $40,414 by her ex-husband. 10 Lynch responded that there was “no reason” to see a lawyer: “[I]f I tell youI’m going to do something, I’m going to do it. I’m a man of my word.” Lynchfurther assured her that “getting [the document] notarized is as good as goingto an attorney. It makes it legal.” Moynihan admitted that she signed theagreement freely and voluntarily in the presence of a notary. Afterwards, their relationship deteriorated. Although the couple oftentalked about marriage, Lynch consistently found excuses for not goingforward. At some point, Moynihan realized that they “weren’t looking for thesame thing,” and they went their separate ways. 3. In his testimony, Lynch offered a different view of his personal andfinancial relationship with Moynihan. Lynch admitted that he “lived a goodportion of the time in New Jersey” with Moynihan, dined with the Moynihansas a family, attended the children’s athletic activities, and spent some holidayswith them.2 Lynch, however, declined to describe his eighteen-yearrelationship with Moynihan as a marital-like relationship; instead, he referredto it as “a relationship that worked for us at the time.”2 Lynch also shared holidays with his own daughter, who attended a boarding school. 11 Lynch stated that he purchased the Bordentown property not just tohouse Moynihan and her children, but also as a financial investment -- as arental property -- and claimed that he had a “rental agreement” with Moynihan.He denied that he moved into the family home, but contended that he began topay the mortgage and real estate taxes on the home starting around 2004 .Before the termination of Moynihan’s alimony, he stated that the two did notdiscuss marriage, and afterwards he did not remember having any “strongconversations about marriage” with her; he said it could have happened but“it’s not ringing a bell with me.” Lynch explained that he did not cheerfully name Moynihan as thebeneficiary of his life insurance policy or the trust into which he had placedthe home. According to Lynch, Moynihan badgered him and insisted that hedo so, and he placated her “to keep calm in the house.” Lynch, moreover,denied that he ever promised to support Moynihan for life; instead, he told herthat if they retired together, they would be “all right” based on their aggregatefinances. Lynch recalled signing the written settlement agreement in 2014. Whenasked whether he intended to be bound by the agreement, he gave variedresponses: “[n]ot really but -- no”; “I assumed we were negotiating onward”;and finally, “I expected to be bound. . . . [W]e had an agreement.” He 12 conceded that he knew that Moynihan felt financially insecure and that hisobjective in signing the agreement was to “shut her up.” B. The trial court found Moynihan’s “testimony to be much more crediblethan . . . [Lynch’s] testimony in all respects.” The court credited the testimonythat the parties had a “marital-style and a family-style relationship.” The courtreached that conclusion because Lynch cohabited with Moynihan forapproximately fifteen years, dined with her and her children regularly, went onvacations with the Moynihans as a family, and attended the children’s athleticactivities. Nevertheless, because of the parties’ failure to comply with theattorney-review requirement of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), the trial court dismissedMoynihan’s claim that she had an enforceable written palimony agreement. The court rejected Moynihan’s argument that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’sattorney-review requirement violated the Federal Constitution. The court alsodetermined that Moynihan did not have a viable oral palimony agreementbefore passage of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) because Moynihan failed to prove thatbetween 1997 and 2010 Lynch made any “express or implied promises tosupport [her] for life.” 33 In Maeker v. Ross, we held that the 2010 amendment to the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which included the attorney-review provision, applies prospectively. 219 N.J. 565, 581-82 (2014). Thus, to prevail on her 13 The court found, however, that Moynihan had an enforceable writtencontract despite her palimony claims -- an agreement that represented “thefinal expression of the discussions that the parties had over the yearsconcerning their financial futures.” It concluded that Lynch had handwrittenthe agreement, the parties read and understood the agreement before signing itin the presence of a notary in 2014, and therefore the agreement was a legallyenforceable contract. The court also determined that the contract was supported byconsideration: Moynihan surrendered her alimony based on Lynch’srepresentation that he would take care of her, inducing “her to remain in therelationship”; she borrowed $8,000 from her father to pay the down paymenton the Bordentown home; and she rendered “[seventeen] years of payments tothe home, making a home, taking care of things, and the love and affection thatgoes on with that.” According to the court, the written contract resolved the question about“the distribution of property.” The court compared the dissolution of theMoynihan/Lynch relationship to an orderly removal in a landlord/tenant case.In its view, the written agreement constituted “the orderly breakup of theclaim, Moynihan needed to show that Lynch made an oral promise to support her for life before 2010. See ibid. 14 relationship” setting forth the parties’ responsibilities and the “distribution ofmonies.” The court enforced the written agreement according to its terms. 4 Both Lynch and Moynihan appealed. C. The Appellate Division concluded that the written agreement signed byLynch and Moynihan constituted a palimony agreement under the terms ofN.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h): the couple were in a non-marital relationship, theagreement was in writing, and Lynch promised “to provide support or otherconsideration” to Moynihan. The Appellate Division determined, however,that the agreement was unenforceable because the parties failed to comply withthe attorney-review requirement of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). It noted that thepromise of support for life -- an essential feature of a palimony agreementunder the common law -- is not an element of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), as the trialcourt believed. The trial court erred, according to the Appellate Division, byfinding that the written agreement signed by Lynch and Moynihan was a non-palimony agreement that fell outside the ambit of the attorney-reviewrequirement of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h).4 The court maintained the temporary restraints it had earlier placed on Lynch’s ability to remove funds from his bank account -- funds that might be necessary to satisfy the judgment in favor of Moynihan. 15 The Appellate Division rejected Moynihan’s argument that N.J.S.A.25:1-5(h)’s attorney-review requirement constituted a “Law impairing theObligation of Contracts” in violation of the United States and New JerseyConstitutions. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3.It upheld the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) because mandatingattorney review of palimony agreements (1) does not equate to a substantialimpairment of a contract, (2) “reasonably relate[s] to a significant andlegitimate public purpose,” and (3) advances an “appropriate legislativeobjective[]” -- protecting the rights of the parties entering into palimonyagreements, citing Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175, 193-94 (2015). The Appellate Division also rejected Moynihan’s claims for equitablerelief, including partial performance and specific performance, on the groundthat Moynihan did not satisfy the traditional elements necessary for such relief.It further found that accepting Moynihan’s partial performance claim, based onan alleged “oral agreement between the parties, would essentially permitenforcement of [a] contract the Legislature has expressly prohibited.” Additionally, the Appellate Division dismissed Moynihan’s claim of apre-2010 oral palimony agreement. It credited the trial court’s finding that,before 2010, Lynch did not make an express or implied oral promise to supportMoynihan for life. 16 Last, the Appellate Division reinstated Lynch’s counterclaim forpartition of the Bordentown home and remanded to the trial court forconsideration of that issue.5 We granted Moynihan’s petition for certification. 246 N.J. 324 (2021).We also granted the motions of the New Jersey State Bar Association and theNew Jersey Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers toparticipate as amici curiae. II. A. 1. Moynihan argues that the attorney-review requirement violates theContract Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. 6 See U.S. Const. art.I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3; Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salemv. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 215 N.J. 522, 546-47 (2013). She assertsthat the attorney-review requirement substantially impairs a contractualrelationship because, unlike “every other agreement in a family law setting,”5 In light of its dismissal of Moynihan’s claims, the Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s order freezing Lynch’s bank account. 6 Moynihan states in her petition that she put the Attorney General “on notice during the pendency of both the trial court and Appellate Division cases” of her challenge to the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), as is required by Rule 4:28-4(a)(1). 17 two willing and informed individuals cannot enter a palimony agreement“without the independent advice of counsel for both parties.” She notes thatthose who choose to sign a palimony agreement do not have the option towaive the participation of counsel -- a right conferred even on defendants incriminal trials -- and that the attorney-review requirement will make palimonyagreements unavailable to the class of individuals unable to afford counsel. Because the writing and signing requirements of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)fulfill the general purpose of the Statute of Frauds -- prescribing reliablemethods for proving an authentic contract -- Moynihan contends that theattorney-review requirement lacks a significant and legitimate public purposeand is unrelated to an appropriate governmental objective. She posits thatthere is no logical explanation for imposing an attorney-review requirement forpalimony agreements but not for other agreements. Apart from her constitutional argument, Moynihan submits that Lynchcannot invoke the Statute of Frauds for the purpose of accomplishing a fraud ,citing Cauco v. Galante, 6 N.J. 128, 138 (1951). She claims that she relied onLynch’s oral and written promises during an eighteen-year marital-typerelationship and performed her part of the agreement -- dedicating her life tohim, maintaining a home for him, and surrendering her alimony as he wished.That partial performance of her end of the agreement, Moynihan declares, 18 constitutes the traditional equitable exception to the Statute of Fraudsrecognized in our case law. She therefore urges the enforcement of the writtenagreement. Last, Moynihan urges this Court to reverse the trial court’sdetermination that she and Lynch did not enter into a valid oral palimonyagreement prior to 2010. 2. Amici the New Jersey State Bar Association and the New Jersey Chapterof the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers echo many of thearguments advanced by Moynihan. Both urge us to signal that courts retaintheir equitable powers to ensure that the Statute of Frauds does not become aninstrument to perpetrate a fraud and to confirm that promissory estoppel andpartial performance remain valid defenses to prevent an injustice by aninflexible adherence to the writing or attorney-review requirements of N.J.S.A.25:1-5(h). Additionally, the Bar Association asserts that the attorney-reviewrequirement violates the prohibitions against the impairment of contracts andthe equal protection guarantees of the Federal and State Constitutions. TheBar Association submits that no rational basis supports subjecting palimonyagreements to attorney review while exempting similar agreements made 19 between “[t]wo individuals in a non-dating relationship, such as two businesspartners, or friends, or siblings.” Although the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers confines its argumentsto the realm of equity, it likewise focuses on the disparate impact that theattorney-review requirement will have on “[f]inancially dependent partnerswho are often unable to afford legal counsel” and notes that “'self-representedlitigants comprise the majority of those filing in the Non-Dissolution docket,’”quoting Admin. Off. of the Cts., Directive No. 08-11: Family -- Non-Dissolution Matters (FD Docket) -- Revised Procedures 1 (Sept. 2, 2011)(alteration omitted). The Academy also points out that, even in the case of thetermination of a parent’s custody of a child, a litigant may waive the right tocounsel. B. Lynch urges the Court to affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division,mostly for the reasons stated in its opinion. Lynch submits that the 2010amendment to the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which mandated thatpalimony agreements be in writing, signed, and subject to attorney review, didnot violate the constitutional rights of Moynihan, who should have known therequirements of the law when entering into the 2014 written palimonyagreement. In his view, the attorney-review requirement did not substantially 20 impair Moynihan’s right to contract because she had the funds to securecounsel. According to Lynch, Moynihan cannot complain that the law appliesunequally to her. He further claims that the attorney-review requirement serves “asignificant and legitimate public purpose” related to “appropriategovernmental objectives” -- to safeguard those who enter into palimonyagreements from fraud, human frailty, and unreliable methods of proof,quoting Borough of Seaside Park v. Comm’r of State Dep’t of Educ., 432 N.J.Super. 167, 216 (App. Div. 2013). Simply put, Lynch maintains that “aperson’s choice not to pay, retain or otherwise be involved with counsel is nota protected right.” Additionally, Lynch asserts that the equitable remedies Moynihan seeksto apply to this case would render meaningless the plain language of N.J.S.A.25:1-5(h), a statute intended to supplant this Court’s palimony decisions. Last,he asks that the Court defer to the trial court’s factfindings that, before 2010,Lynch never promised to support Moynihan for life, a requisite condition to apalimony agreement under the common law. 21 III. A. Moynihan’s primary argument is that the attorney-review requirement of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) essentially compels parties entering a palimony agreementto retain counsel and that forcing counsel on unwilling parties isunconstitutional. A brief history of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) will frame the issuebefore us. The Statute of Frauds generally requires that certain agreements “be inwriting, and signed by the party to be charged therewith” -- that is, signed bythe party against whom enforcement is sought. N.J.S.A. 25:1-5. Theunderlying concern of the Statute of Frauds is “that certain [oral] agreementsmay be 'susceptible to fraudulent and unreliable methods of proof,’” and forthat reason the Statute mandates “that those agreements be reduced to writingand signed.” Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 578 (2014) (quoting Lahue v. PioCosta, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 599 (App. Div. 1993)). In 2010, the Legislature amended the Statute of Frauds to includepalimony agreements. See L. 2009, c. 311, § 1 (codified as N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)). The new law stated that the Statute of Frauds’ writing and signingrequirements applied to [a] promise by one party to a non-marital personal relationship to provide support or other consideration 22 for the other party, either during the course of such relationship or after its termination. For the purposes of this subsection, no such written promise is binding unless it was made with the independent advice of counsel for both parties. [N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h).]The requirement “that a palimony agreement be in writing and signed and thatthe parties have 'the independent advice of counsel’” represented “a seachange in the law.” Maeker, 219 N.J. at 576 (quoting N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)). Prior to the 2010 amendment, New Jersey’s common law recognized thatan unwed couple in a “marital-type relationship” could enter into a palimonyagreement -- an agreement in which one party expressly or impliedly promisesto support the other party, generally for life, in return for consideration givenby the other party, such as remaining in the relationship. See Devaney v.L’Esperance, 195 N.J. 247, 253-55, 257 (2008); In re Estate of Roccamonte, 174 N.J. 381, 389-90, 392-93 (2002). Under the common law, our courtsenforced oral palimony agreements involving “marital-type relationships”where one party induced the other to enter or remain in the relationship by apromise of support. Maeker, 219 N.J. at 576 (citing Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 387 (1979)). The purpose of the 2010 amendment to the Statute of Frauds, asexpressed in the legislative history leading to the enactment of N.J.S.A. 25:1- - 23 5(h), was to “overturn recent 'palimony’ decisions by New Jersey courts [suchas Devaney and Roccamonte] by requiring that any such contract must be inwriting and signed by the person making the promise.” Maeker, 219 N.J. at 577-78 (quoting A. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 2091 (Dec. 3, 2009); S.Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 2091 (Feb. 9, 2009) (emphasis added)).Additionally, the amendment provided that “no such written promise isbinding unless it was made with the independent advice of counsel for bothparties.” A. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 2091; accord S. JudiciaryComm. Statement to S. 2091. The feature that distinguishes N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) from all otherprovisions of the Statute of Frauds is the requirement that each party to thepalimony agreement secure the “independent advice of counsel.” That featureraised a serious concern for Governor Corzine, who signed the amendment intolaw on January 18, 2010, the last day of the legislative session and his last fullday in office. See Governor’s Statement on Signing S. 2091 (Jan. 18, 2010).In his signing statement, Governor Corzine expressed his dissatisfaction withthe provision “mandating the involvement or services of an attorney.” Ibid.He noted that the “[l]egislative leadership and the sponsors share my goal of. . . ensuring that this law does not have an adverse impact on parties who maynot be able to afford the services of an attorney.” Ibid. “[I]n light of the 24 representation by legislative leadership and the bill sponsors that this law willbe improved” and “in light of the time constraints that result at the end of alegislative session, which do not afford time for a Conditional Veto torecommend removal of this provision,” the Governor signed the bill into law.Ibid. The Legislature never revisited the attorney-review requirement. No billwas introduced to address the concern raised by Governor Corzine. Notably, no other law in this state conditions enforceability of anagreement between private parties on attorney review. Furthermore, none ofthe jurisdictions that enforce palimony agreements mandate that the partiesconsult with attorneys before entering into such agreements. 77 See Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 , 603-04 (Alaska 1980); Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 , 927 (Ariz. 1986); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976); Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263 , 1267-69 (Colo. 2000); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987); Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662 , 665-66 (D.C. 1984); Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253, 255-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 , 1327-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Mass. 1998); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 572 A.2d 501, 507-09 (Md. 1990); Minn. Stat. § 513.075; Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922 , 926-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 , 80 (Neb. 1981); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 , 674 (Nev. 1984); Joan S. v. John S., 427 A.2d 498, 500 (N.H. 1981); Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159 , 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-57 (N.Y. 1980); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507 , 510 (Or. 1978); Mullen v. Suchko, 421 A.2d 310 , 311-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1093-94 (R.I. 2002); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 26.01; Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Wis. 1987); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594 , 595-96 (Wyo. 1981). 25 B. We do not agree with the arguments made by Moynihan and the StateBar Association that N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h)’s attorney-review requirement violatesthe Contract Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Boththe Federal and State Constitutions bar the state legislature from passing anylaw impairing the obligation of contracts. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“NoState shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”);N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3 (“The Legislature shall not pass any . . . lawimpairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy forenforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made.”). The essential aim of the Federal and State Contract Clauses is to restraina state legislature from passing laws that retrospectively impair preexistingcontracts. See Cleveland & P.R. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 235 U.S. 50 , 53-54(1914) (“It is equally well settled that an impairment of the obligation of thecontract, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, must be bysubsequent legislation.”); Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245, 259 (2016)(“Contract impairment claims brought under either constitutional provisionentail an analysis that first examines whether a change in state law results inthe substantial impairment of a contractual relationship . . . .”). The ContractClause was incorporated into the Federal “Constitution to remedy a particular 26 social evil” after the Revolutionary War -- “the state legislative practice ofenacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certaincontracts.” See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 , 503 n.30 (1987) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 , 256 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see also Sveen v. Melin, 584U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018). A law that retroactively applies to a contract previously entered into byparties may upend the parties’ reasonable expectations. See Energy Rsrvs.Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 , 411 (1983) (discussingthe role that parties’ reasonable expectations play in Contract Clause analysis).That concern about legislation reaching back to alter an already-existingcontract and causing fundamental unfairness is not present here. N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) went into effect in January 2010. See L. 2009, c.311, § 1 (eff. Jan. 18, 2010). Moynihan and Lynch signed their writtenagreement, without consulting attorneys, well after the effective date of thestatute -- by Moynihan’s account in 2012 and Lynch’s account in 2014. Bothare presumed, like all persons, to know the law and its requirements. SeeParagon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 424-25(2010) (“[P]arties are presumed to know the law and are obliged to follow it.”)(citing Emanuel v. McNell, 87 N.J.L. 499, 504 (E. & A. 1915)). 27 In short, any constitutional infirmity in the attorney-review requirementof N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) cannot be ascribed to a violation of the Contract Clause. C. A different constitutional issue is raised, however, by a statute’smandate that the parties to a private contract secure counsel as a preconditionto the enforcement of the contract. This case raises the question whether,under the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of ourState Constitution, the State generally can impose on an individual the burdenof retaining counsel to review a private contract -- even against theindividual’s wishes and without regard to the individual’s means to do so.8 “The right of individuals . . . to govern and manage their own affairs . . .is an implicit guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution.” S.T. v. 1515 BroadStreet, LLC, 241 N.J. 257, 274 (2020). Article I, Paragraph 1 provides that“[a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural andunalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life andliberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing andobtaining safety and happiness.” The right to “personal liberty” guaranteed in8 The broad language of Article I, Paragraph 1 incorporates the principle of substantive due process. See Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008) (construing “the expansive language of Article I, Paragraph 1 to embrace the fundamental guarantee of due process” (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 99 (1995))). 28 Article I, Paragraph 1 of our State Constitution protects against thegovernment arbitrarily interfering with the right to individual “autonomy.”A.A. v. Att’y Gen., 384 N.J. Super. 67, 109 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Doe v.Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 78 (1995)), aff’d 189 N.J. 128 (2007). The right to personal autonomy plays a preeminent role in ourconstitutional system -- “competent people ordinarily can choose what theywant.” See In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 166-67 (1994). An individual has the“right to determine how best to pursue her personal and financial affairs”without the interference of an attorney. See S.T., 241 N.J. at 261 (citing M.R., 135 N.J. at 166). The right of individuals to represent themselves in our civil courts -- andpresumably to craft their own private contracts -- predates the adoption of ourFederal and State Constitutions. “The practice of pro se representation by civillitigants finds its genesis in the English common law, which long respected acompetent civil litigant’s prerogative to decide whether he or she would seekthe assistance of counsel.” In re Civ. Commitment of D.Y., 218 N.J. 359, 374(2014) (footnote omitted). Before the founding of our Republic and evenbefore the provinces of West and East New Jersey were unified into a singlecolony, New Jersey residents were permitted to plead their causes, withoutcounsel, in both civil and criminal cases. Id. at 375. In the Province of West 29 New Jersey, the law provided “[t]hat [in] the trials of all causes, civil andcriminal, . . . no person or persons shall be compelled to fee any attorney . . .but that all persons shall have free liberty to plead his own cause if he please.”Ibid. (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting The Concessions andAgreements of the Proprietors, Freeholders and Inhabitants of the Province ofWest New-Jersey, in America, ch. XXII (1677), available athttp://westjersey.org/ca77.htm#chap22). Similarly, in the Province of EastNew Jersey, the law provided that “in all courts persons of all perswasionsmay freely appear in their own way, and according to their own manner, andthere personally plead their own causes themselves.” Ibid. (quoting TheFundamental Constitutions for the Province of East New Jersey in America ,ch. XIX (1683), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj10.asp). Litigants today, as they did in our colonial past, “frequently representthemselves in New Jersey,” id. at 376, and have the statutory right to do so, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-1 (stating that every competent and of-age person “mayprosecute or defend any action in any court, in person or through another dulyadmitted to the practice of law in this State” (emphasis added)). In criminal cases, the source of the right of self-representation is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10of our State Constitution, but the rationale for that right is grounded in the 30 notion of personal autonomy. Thus, “[t]he right to appear pro se exists toaffirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused,” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 176-77 (1984), and “his choice must be honored out of 'that respectfor the individual which is the lifeblood of the law,’” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 350-51 (1970)(Brennan, J., concurring)).9 See also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 585(2004) (noting that the right of self-representation “is about respecting adefendant’s capacity to make choices for himself, whether to his benefit or tohis detriment”). The historical absence of cases addressing whether the State could forceparties to a contract to retain attorneys is telling. We know that in colonialtimes litigants had a right to represent themselves in court to plead theenforcement of a contract, and we know of no law that compelled them toretain an attorney to draft a contract. Denying competent parties the ability tocontract on their own without the compelled participation of attorneys wouldseemingly have been a notion alien to the founders of our Republic and ourState.9 An accused’s right of self-representation is not absolute. For example, a defendant must provide an appropriate waiver of the right to counsel, and a trial court retains the authority “to terminate self-representation if the defendant engages in 'serious and obstructionist misconduct.’” See State v. Davenport, 177 N.J. 288, 300 (2003) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46). 31 The original Statute of Frauds, passed in England in 1677 and fromwhich N.J.S.A. 25:1-5 is derived, did not require a person to consult with anattorney before entering into a contract. See An Act for Prevention of Fraudsand Perjuryes, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677), available at https://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp839-842; see also Maeker, 219 N.J. at 578-79 (discussing the history of the Statute of Frauds). Indeed, when the NewJersey Legislature passed its own “Act for the Prevention of Frauds andPerjuries” in 1794, it did not require parties to consult with an attorney inorder to make an enforceable contract. See L. 19, c. 496, §§ 1 to 15 (1794).New Jersey’s present-day Statute of Frauds has but one exception -- theattorney-review requirement for palimony agreements. Of all the agreements in a family law setting, only a palimony agreementrequires that, for its enforcement, the parties must have secured theindependent advice of counsel. Without the advice or participation ofattorneys, a married couple in a divorce action can reach an agreement oncustody and parenting time, child support and alimony, equitable distribution,and other important issues. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(e). Even premaritalagreements under the Uniform Premarital and Pre-Civil Union Agreement Actpermit the parties to “voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, the 32 opportunity to consult with independent legal counsel.” N.J.S.A. 37:2-38(c)(4). In a myriad of other settings, parties remain free to enter into contractswithout consulting or retaining attorneys, such as when purchasing real estate,see N.J.S.A. 46:14-2.1;10 entering a commercial transaction to buy goods, see N.J.S.A. 12A:2-201; engaging in a consumer transaction, see N.J.S.A. 56:12-2;creating a will, see N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2; or securing life or health insurance, see N.J.S.A. 17B:25-18.2. Among the universe of private contracts, the Legislature mandatesattorney review only for palimony agreements. Lynch’s comparison of the attorney-review provision in N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) to the attorney-review provision for assigning prizes under the StateLottery Law is inapt. See N.J.S.A. 5:9-1 to -25. Under the State Lottery Law,the Legislature has decreed that any person who has won a lottery prize maynot assign the winnings unless a number of conditions are met, including “thatthe winner has retained, and consulted with, independent legal counsel” and“that the winner has retained, and consulted with, an independent tax advisor.” N.J.S.A. 5:9-13(d)(15), (16) (emphasis added).10 New Jersey regulations afford buyers of residential real estate the opportunity to have attorneys review their contracts but do not require such review in order to make those contracts enforceable. See N.J.A.C. 11:5-6.2(g). 33 Unlike the case before us, the State Lottery involves the disposition ofgovernment-raised funds. The attorney-review provision in the State LotteryLaw is part of a highly regulated scheme “operated by the State [with] theentire net proceeds . . . to be used for State institutions and State aid foreducation” pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution. See N.J.S.A. 5:9-2; seealso N.J.S.A. 5:9-1 to -25 (setting forth the comprehensive regulatory schemeof the State Lottery Law). The assignment of lottery prizes is subject tojudicial scrutiny to prevent exploitation of the winner and to assure that thewinner complies with any enumerated debt obligations, such as a default onchild support or student loan payments. N.J.S.A. 5:9-13(d)(17), (18); N.J.S.A.5:9-13.5; N.J.S.A. 5:9-13.14. A lottery prize may not be assigned without ajudicial order that contains eighteen findings, including a finding of attorneyreview. N.J.S.A. 5:9-13(d). Last, the lottery winner has state-provided prizemonies to retain an attorney and accountant. The constitutionality of the attorney-review requirement governingpalimony agreements does not rise or fall on comparisons to the State LotteryLaw. IV. The ultimate issue is whether, under Article I, Paragraph 1 of our StateConstitution, parties to written palimony agreements have a substantive due 34 process liberty interest in crafting and entering such agreements without theforced involvement of attorneys. The broad language of Article I, Paragraph 1reflects, in part, “a 'general recognition of those absolute rights of the citizenwhich were a part of the common law.’” King v. S. Jersey Nat’l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 178 (1974) (quoting Ransom v. Black, 54 N.J.L. 446, 448 (Sup. Ct.1892), aff’d, 65 N.J.L. 688 (E. & A. 1900)). As discussed earlier, the right toplead one’s case in court without an attorney preceded the adoption of NewJersey’s first Constitution in 1776. In determining whether parties have a particular liberty interest -- here,to enter a written palimony agreement without a compelled attorney review --our Court applies a balancing test weighing three factors: “the nature of theright at stake, the extent to which the challenged statutory scheme restricts thatright, and the public need for the statutory restriction.” Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 443 (2006) (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 567(1985)). We have discussed in detail the nature of that right and its historicalbackdrop. It is the right of personal autonomy, the right to make decisions onone’s own -- whether enlightened or foolish -- without the compelledparticipation of an attorney. To be clear, we recognize the benefit andguidance that attorneys would provide in reviewing or crafting a palimony 35 agreement or any other agreement. The guiding hand of counsel may becritical in a criminal trial, yet an accused has the right to represent himself , tomake choices on his own that may bear on his freedom, given the preeminentrole of individual autonomy in our constitutional system. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77. So too, attorneys will be better able to draft palimonyagreements and other contracts, but individuals are free to do so on their ownwithout consulting or retaining attorneys. The attorney-review requirement of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) directly infringeson the right of parties to enter a palimony agreement without retaining anattorney. We cannot pretend that requiring attorney review means somethingother than that individuals will have to pay for the services of an attorney, whowill then have the obligation to engage in a due-diligence examination of allthe circumstances bearing on the fairness of the agreement. See RPC 1.3(providing that an attorney must act with “reasonable diligence” whenrepresenting a client); Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 260-61 (1992)(same). An attorney’s services may impose a cost that the parties do not wantto bear or cannot afford. As the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers has pointedout, the majority of filings in the non-dissolution docket are by self-represented litigants, see Directive No. 08-11, and parties to palimonyagreements fall within that docket. We cannot ignore the potential disparate 36 impact of the statute -- the reality that a financially dependent partner who is aparty to a palimony agreement may be unable to afford counsel. Nor can weignore the irony that, under N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), the parties cannot enter apalimony agreement without counsel, but can stand in a courtroom and arguefor the enforcement of such an agreement without counsel. Last, we consider the “public need” for mandated attorney review ofpalimony agreements when no other family-law agreement or private contract(to our knowledge) imposes such a requirement. To be sure, attorney reviewwould protect a party -- particularly a dependent party -- from potentialoverreaching. But attorney review presents another hurdle for parties whowant to enter into palimony agreements and almost certainly will result infewer such agreements, putting aside the impact on those who cannot affordcounsel. Additionally, the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) does notshed light on why, among all the category of private agreements covered bythe Statute of Frauds, only palimony agreements require attorney review. In light of the nature and importance of the right of willing parties toenter palimony agreements without the burden of attorney participation, weconclude that the imposition of an attorney-review requirement is an arbitrarygovernment restriction that contravenes Moynihan’s substantive due processrights. We are therefore constrained to strike down the attorney-review 37 requirement in N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). Palimony agreements must still be inwriting and signed, if not by both parties, at least by the party against whomthe agreement is to be enforced -- just like all agreements enumerated in theStatute of Frauds. See N.J.S.A. 25:1-5. We therefore enforce the palimony agreement as written in this case. V. Next, we consider whether Moynihan and Lynch had an oral palimonyagreement before the 2010 enactment of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). We accorddeference to a trial court’s factfindings, particularly in family court matterswhere the court brings to bear its special expertise. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Under that deferential standard of review, we are bound touphold a finding that is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.Ibid.; Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 95 (2010). Here, the trial court had the benefit of hearing the witnesses beforerendering its decision. We conclude that sufficient credible evidence in therecord supports the trial court’s determination that Lynch did not make anexplicit or implied oral promise to support Moynihan for life. Therefore, theparties did not have an oral palimony agreement before 2010. That trial court finding is buttressed by the last line of the writtenpalimony agreement, which provides: “This agreement finalizes all 38 obligations of Mr. Lynch to Ms. Moynihan.” That last line suggests that, ifthere were any previous agreements, they were subsumed into the final writtenagreement. See Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 303 (1953)(stating that “[w]here the parties have made the writing the sole repository oftheir bargain,” any previous understandings are barred from consideration); seealso Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(3) (Am. Law Inst. 1981)(“Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of itscompleteness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agr eement, itis taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidencethat the writing did not constitute a final expression.”). In light of our holding that the written palimony agreement isenforceable, we need not address any of the equitable remedies pressed byMoynihan for enforcement of that agreement. VI. In summary, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of theAppellate Division. In reversing the Appellate Division, we hold that thepalimony agreement, as written and signed, without the requirement ofattorney review, is enforceable. That portion of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), whichimposes an attorney-review requirement to enforce a palimony agreement,contravenes Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. In 39 affirming the Appellate Division, we uphold the trial court’s finding that anoral palimony agreement did not exist before 2010. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with thisopinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 40