Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Eric L. Crandall
Citation: 2008 WI 112
Docket Number: 2008AP000570-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2008

2008 WI 112 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP570-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eric L. Crandall, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Eric L. Crandall, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CRANDALL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 31, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 112
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP570-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Eric L. Crandall, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric L. Crandall, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 31, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   In 
this 
matter 
we 
review 
whether 
discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in December 2007 should be imposed against Attorney 
Eric L. Crandall. 
¶2 
Attorney Crandall was admitted to the practice of law 
in this state in September 1991.  He currently maintains a law 
practice in New Richmond. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
2 
 
¶3 
Attorney Crandall has been the subject of professional 
discipline in this state on two prior occasions.  As will be 
discussed more fully below, Attorney Crandall received a three-
month suspension in February 2006 as discipline reciprocal to 
that imposed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in July 2005 for, 
among other things, neglecting three separate client matters, 
failing to communicate with clients, failing to comply with 
discovery rules, and failing to cooperate with a disciplinary 
investigation.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 
2006 WI 6, 287 Wis. 2d 102, 708 N.W.2d 690; see also In re 
Petition 
for 
Disciplinary 
Action 
against 
Crandall, 
699 
N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 2005).  Following that suspension, his 
Wisconsin license was reinstated.  In March of this year, this 
court publicly reprimanded Attorney Crandall for knowingly 
advancing a claim that was unwarranted under existing law, for 
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, for 
failing to keep his clients reasonably informed about the status 
of their matter, for failing to return his clients' file in a 
timely manner, and for failing to cooperate with the grievance 
investigation performed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR).  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2008 WI 
14, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 745 N.W.2d 679. 
¶4 
Pursuant to the practice of the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, the July 2005 disciplinary action suspended Attorney 
Crandall's license to practice law in Minnesota indefinitely, 
with the proviso that Attorney Crandall could petition for 
reinstatement after 90 days.  Although Attorney Crandall sought 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
3 
 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin 
following 
the 
expiration 
of 
his 
reciprocal 
three-month 
suspension in this state, he never sought the reinstatement of 
his Minnesota license.   
¶5 
Attorney Crandall's Minnesota license remained in 
suspended status at the time that the Minnesota disciplinary 
authorities filed their most recent disciplinary petition.  It 
should be noted that the misconduct that formed the basis for 
the 
most 
recent 
disciplinary 
petition 
differed 
from 
the 
misconduct in the three representations that formed the basis 
for the July 2005 Minnesota disciplinary action.  According to 
the Minnesota disciplinary materials that the OLR attached to 
its complaint in this proceeding, the misconduct alleged in the 
most 
recent 
disciplinary 
complaint 
in 
Minnesota 
involved 
Attorney Crandall's failure to act with diligence and promptness 
in representing a client, his failure to communicate with his 
clients, his engaging in dishonesty or misrepresentation, and 
his failure to cooperate with the Minnesota disciplinary 
investigation. 
 
Attorney 
Crandall 
did 
not 
contest 
the 
disciplinary petition, but instead entered into a stipulation in 
which he admitted the allegations in the disciplinary petition 
and joined with the Minnesota disciplinary authorities in 
recommending an extension of the suspension of his license to 
practice law in Minnesota for an additional 30 days. 
¶6 
In line with its practice of indefinite suspensions, 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota accepted the stipulation and 
phrased its December 2007 disciplinary action as a 30-day 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
4 
 
extension of his ongoing suspension.  The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota stated that Attorney Crandall was not allowed to 
petition for reinstatement of his Minnesota license for a 
minimum of 30 days following the date of the December 10, 2007, 
order.  Thus, the suspension of Attorney Crandall's Minnesota 
license lasted for at least an additional 30 days beyond what it 
would have without the December 2007 disciplinary action.   
¶7 
On March 6, 2008, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney 
Crandall 
that initiated the current disciplinary 
proceeding in this court.  Counts 1-7 of the complaint related 
to matters that were not the subject of discipline imposed in 
another jurisdiction.  Count 8 related to the OLR's request 
under SCR 22.221 for the imposition of discipline in Wisconsin 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.22 provides:  Reciprocal discipline. 
(1) An attorney on whom public discipline for 
misconduct 
or 
a 
license 
suspension 
for 
medical 
incapacity has been imposed by another jurisdiction 
shall promptly notify the director of the matter.  
Failure to furnish the notice within 20 days of the 
effective date of the order or judgment of the other 
jurisdiction constitutes misconduct.  
(2) Upon the receipt of a certified copy of a 
judgment or order of another jurisdiction imposing 
discipline for misconduct or a license suspension for 
medical incapacity of an attorney admitted to the 
practice of law or engaged in the practice of law in 
this state, the director may file a complaint in the 
supreme court containing all of the following:  
(a) A certified copy of the judgment or order 
from the other jurisdiction. 
(b) A motion requesting an order directing the 
attorney to inform the supreme court in writing within 
20 days of any claim of the attorney predicated on the 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
5 
 
reciprocal to the 30-day suspension imposed by the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
grounds set forth in sub. (3) that the imposition of 
the identical discipline or license suspension by the 
supreme court would be unwarranted and the factual 
basis for the claim. 
(3) The supreme court shall impose the identical 
discipline or license suspension unless one or more of 
the following is present: 
(a) The procedure in the other jurisdiction was 
so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 
constitute a deprivation of due process. 
(b) 
There 
was 
such 
an 
infirmity 
of 
proof 
establishing the misconduct or medical incapacity that 
the supreme court could not accept as final the 
conclusion in respect to the misconduct or medical 
incapacity. 
(c) 
The 
misconduct 
justifies 
substantially 
different discipline in this state. 
(4) Except as provided in sub. (3), a final 
adjudication in another jurisdiction that an attorney 
has engaged in misconduct or has a medical incapacity 
shall 
be 
conclusive 
evidence 
of 
the 
attorney's 
misconduct or medical incapacity for purposes of a 
proceeding under this rule. 
(5) The supreme court may refer a complaint filed 
under sub. (2) to a referee for a hearing and a report 
and recommendation pursuant to SCR 22.16.  At the 
hearing, the burden is on the party seeking the 
imposition 
of 
discipline 
or 
license 
suspension 
different from that imposed in the other jurisdiction 
to demonstrate 
that the imposition of identical 
discipline or license suspension by the supreme court 
is unwarranted. 
(6) If the discipline or license suspension 
imposed in the other jurisdiction has been stayed, any 
reciprocal discipline or license suspension imposed by 
the supreme court shall be held in abeyance until the 
stay expires.  
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
6 
 
of Minnesota in December 2007.  Count 9 alleged that Attorney 
Crandall had failed to notify the OLR of the suspension of his 
license to practice law in Minnesota within 20 days of the 
effective date of that suspension, in violation of SCR 22.22(1).   
¶8 
The OLR's complaint included a motion requesting the 
court to issue an order directing Attorney Crandall to show 
cause based upon the grounds set forth in SCR 22.22(3) why the 
imposition of discipline identical to that imposed in Minnesota 
would be unwarranted.  The court issued such an order to show 
cause on March 7, 2008. 
¶9 
The court's order to show cause apparently reached 
Attorney Crandall before he was personally served with the OLR's 
complaint and motion.  On March 17, 2008, Attorney Crandall 
filed a letter stating that since he had not seen the OLR's 
complaint or motion, he requested that the order to show cause 
be dismissed on due process grounds for lack of service of the 
underlying complaint and motion or that he be given additional 
time to respond.  His March 17, 2008, letter also objected to 
the imposition of reciprocal discipline by claiming that this 
court has no legal authority to punish conduct that occurred 
outside the borders of this state. 
¶10 On March 19, 2008, the court issued an order directing 
the OLR to respond to Attorney Crandall's March 17, 2008, 
letter, including the allegations of lack of service.  On March 
20, 2008, the OLR responded that it had been informed that 
Attorney Crandall had been personally served with the complaint 
and the motion for an order to show cause on March 18, 2008.  
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
7 
 
With respect to Attorney Crandall's objection based on the 
allegedly 
unconstitutional 
extraterritorial 
application 
of 
Wisconsin law, the OLR requested that the objection be rejected 
as patently meritless or that it be given additional time to 
brief the issue. 
¶11 On March 21, 2008, the court issued an order directing 
Attorney Crandall to advise the court in writing by March 27, 
2008, whether he acknowledged the service of the OLR's complaint 
and motion, and whether he was withdrawing his motion to dismiss 
based on lack of service.  The order further stated that if 
Attorney Crandall was not withdrawing that motion, he was 
required to provide specific argument and authority in support 
of his motion to dismiss.  The order also extended the time for 
Attorney Crandall to respond to the order to show cause until 
April 7, 2008, and directed Attorney Crandall to include any 
constitutional arguments against the imposition of reciprocal 
discipline in his response to the order to show cause. 
¶12 Attorney Crandall did not file any document by March 
27, 2008, contesting that he had been served on March 18, 2008, 
or providing specific argument in support of his motion to 
dismiss the order to show cause due to lack of proper service. 
¶13 On April 7, 2008, Attorney Crandall filed his response 
to the order to show cause.  His response initially objected to 
the inclusion of the counts relating to reciprocal discipline 
(Counts 8-9) in the OLR's complaint since the first 7 counts 
addressed claims of alleged professional misconduct that must be 
addressed through the normal process of referral to a referee 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
8 
 
for fact-finding and a recommendation, and then review by this 
court.  Attorney Crandall's response also challenged the 
imposition of reciprocal discipline because the copies of the 
Minnesota disciplinary materials attached to the OLR's complaint 
were not certified copies, as required by SCR 22.22(2)(a).  In 
addition, the response contended that because Attorney Crandall 
had not sought reinstatement of his Minnesota license, the 
December 2007 disciplinary action by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota could not be said to be new discipline that could form 
the basis for reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin.  Finally, 
Attorney Crandall repeated his argument that this court was 
prohibited by the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution from punishing conduct that occurred in another 
jurisdiction.  Among other things, he pointed to Article VII, 
§ 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states that Wisconsin's 
circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all civil and 
criminal matters "within this state," and to various decisions 
of this court and federal courts to the effect that a state's 
statutes do not have effect beyond the borders of the enacting 
state.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (state cannot punish defendant for 
conduct that was lawful where it occurred); State v. Sorenson, 
218 Wis. 295, 260 N.W. 662 (1935) (effect of legislative acts 
limited to borders of state in which enacted). 
¶14 On April 10, 2008, Attorney Crandall filed his answer 
and affirmative defenses to the OLR's complaint.  The answer did 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
9 
 
not include any affirmative defense relating to insufficiency of 
service of process. 
¶15 On May 14, 2008, this court issued an order regarding 
the inclusion of reciprocal discipline counts and "standard" 
professional misconduct counts (i.e., those not arising from 
discipline 
imposed 
in 
other 
jurisdictions) 
in 
the 
same 
complaint.  Given the contrast between the streamlined process 
for considering reciprocal discipline and the lengthier process 
for "standard" professional misconduct counts under SCRs 22.15-
.17, we agreed with Attorney Crandall's position that the 
reciprocal discipline counts should not have been combined in 
the OLR's complaint with unrelated counts arising out of other 
grievances subject to the standard grievance procedure.  We 
therefore ordered that the reciprocal discipline counts (Counts 
8-9) would be considered by this court separately from Counts 1-
7, which were referred to a referee for further proceedings 
under SCRs 22.15 and 22.16.  We now direct that in all future 
situations involving the potential imposition of reciprocal 
discipline, any reciprocal discipline counts should be brought 
in a separate proceeding. 
¶16 The 
May 
14, 
2008, 
order 
also 
denied 
Attorney 
Crandall's motion to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of 
service of the underlying complaint and motion.  We construed 
Attorney Crandall's failure to respond to the March 21, 2008, 
order as a withdrawal of that motion.  Attorney Crandall has not 
objected 
to 
the 
denial 
of 
his 
motion 
or 
asked 
for 
reconsideration of that decision. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
10 
 
¶17 We now turn to the consideration of reciprocal 
discipline for the 30-day suspension imposed in December 2007 by 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota.  Under SCR 22.22(3), this court 
"shall impose the identical discipline or license suspension 
unless . . . [t]he procedure in the other jurisdiction was so 
lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a 
deprivation of due process"; "[t]here was such an infirmity of 
proof establishing the misconduct . . . that [this court] could 
not accept as final" the other jurisdiction's finding of 
professional 
misconduct; 
or 
"[t]he 
misconduct 
justifies 
substantially different discipline" in this state.   
¶18 Attorney Crandall's response to the order to show 
cause does not tie any of his arguments to the three bases for 
objecting to reciprocal discipline in SCR 22.22(3).  Although 
that fact could be a sufficient basis for rejecting his 
arguments, we will briefly address the merits of his claims. 
¶19 Attorney Crandall first argues that the copies of the 
Minnesota disciplinary materials attached to the OLR's complaint 
were not certified, as provided in SCR 22.22(2)(a).  Although 
the rule does provide for a certified copy of the disciplinary 
judgment or order issued by the other jurisdiction to be 
attached to the OLR's complaint, we conclude that the attachment 
of non-certified copies in this case does not require the 
dismissal of the reciprocal discipline counts.  Any error here 
was technical and did not prejudice Attorney Crandall since he 
never alleged that the documents attached to the OLR's complaint 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
11 
 
were not authentic copies of the disciplinary order and filings 
in the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
¶20 Next 
we 
consider Attorney Crandall's claim that 
reciprocal discipline should not be imposed because the 30-day 
suspension in Minnesota was not "new discipline."  This argument 
is without merit.  The order issued by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota noted that Attorney Crandall's Minnesota license was 
already under suspension and therefore the court extended the 
suspension for an additional 30 days before Attorney Crandall 
could petition for reinstatement.  Thus, the addition of a new 
30-day period before a petition for reinstatement could be filed 
clearly constituted new discipline. 
¶21 In addition, although Attorney Crandall argues that he 
should not be punished for not seeking reinstatement of his 
Minnesota license immediately upon expiration of the original 
90-day suspension, he does not explain why the reinstatement of 
his Minnesota license would have caused the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota 
not 
to 
impose 
discipline 
for 
the 
professional 
misconduct at issue in that state's most recent disciplinary 
proceeding.  Indeed, Attorney Crandall does not allege that he 
objected to the imposition of the recent 30-day suspension on 
the ground that his misconduct was covered by the original 90-
day suspension.  Rather, he stipulated to the misconduct and 
agreed that an additional 30-day suspension would be appropriate 
discipline in the Minnesota proceeding.  Moreover, the petition 
upon which the 30-day extension was based referenced misconduct 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
12 
 
that was different than the conduct that led to the original 90-
day Minnesota license suspension imposed in July 2005. 
¶22 As for Attorney Crandall's constitutional arguments 
that this court lacks authority or jurisdiction to "punish" him 
for misconduct that occurred in Minnesota,2 they are based on an 
improper understanding of this court's constitutional obligation 
to regulate the practice of law in Wisconsin and of the nature 
of professional discipline.  The Wisconsin Constitution vests 
the judicial authority of the state in a unified court system, 
Wis. Const. art VII, § 2, and gives this court superintending 
and administrative authority over all courts in the state.  Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 3(1).  As we have noted in prior cases, 
because attorneys are an important part of the administration of 
justice 
in 
the 
courts 
of 
this 
state 
and 
because 
the 
constitutional grants of authority obligate this court to ensure 
that courts function efficiently and effectively to provide for 
the due administration of justice, this court has the inherent 
and exclusive authority and power to regulate and discipline 
                                                 
2 Although we need not and do not decide the issue, as a 
factual matter it is not clear that Attorney Crandall's 
misconduct occurred solely in Minnesota.  Although the lawsuit 
at issue in the Minnesota disciplinary proceeding was filed in a 
federal district court located in Minnesota, Attorney Crandall 
apparently practiced out of his office in Wisconsin.  Thus, by 
way of example, to the extent that he failed to prepare relevant 
court filings or to communicate with his clients, his misconduct 
could be said to have occurred at his law office in Wisconsin.  
We need not decide the issue because we conclude that we are not 
prohibited from imposing reciprocal discipline on an attorney 
licensed in Wisconsin for conduct that occurred in another 
jurisdiction. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
13 
 
members of the bar in this state.  See, e.g., Flynn v. 
Department of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 550, 576 N.W.2d 245 
(1998); 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Fiedler 
v. 
Wisconsin 
Senate, 
155 
Wis. 2d 94, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990); In re Integration of Bar, 5 
Wis. 2d 618, 622, 93 N.W.2d 601 (1958) ("The practice of the law 
in the broad sense, both in and out of the courts, is such a 
necessary part of and is so inexorably connected with the 
exercise of the judicial power that this court should continue 
to exercise its supervisory control of the practice of the 
law."); Rubin v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 214-15, 216 N.W. 513 
(1927) ("This power on the part of the courts [to supervise and 
discipline attorneys] is not based upon legislative action.  It 
inheres in the nature and constitution of judicial tribunals.").  
Thus, our imposition of discipline for professional misconduct 
that allegedly occurred in another state does not accord 
extraterritorial effect to Wisconsin's Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys.  See SCR ch. 20.  Rather, imposing 
reciprocal discipline is a means (1) to ensure that attorneys 
who have been granted the privilege to practice law in this 
state comport themselves in this state in a manner that promotes 
the efficient administration of the law, and (2) to protect the 
citizens of this state who require the assistance of a competent 
and trustworthy attorney.   
¶23 Moreover, the imposition of professional discipline 
related to the practice of law in this state is of a different 
nature than punishing an individual in Wisconsin for a criminal 
act wholly committed in another state.  The imposition of 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
14 
 
discipline does not have as its purpose to punish the respondent 
attorney, but rather to protect the public, the courts and the 
legal profession in Wisconsin from incompetent and unfit 
attorneys.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hankel, 
126 Wis. 2d 390, 394, 376 N.W.2d 848 (1985).  The imposition of 
professional 
discipline 
protects 
the 
public 
by 
deterring 
additional misconduct either by the disciplined attorney or by 
other members of the Wisconsin bar. 
¶24 Consequently, we conclude that the OLR has established 
that Attorney Crandall was the subject of a 30-day suspension 
imposed 
by 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Minnesota 
due 
to 
his 
professional misconduct.  Moreover, we determine that none of 
the three exceptions in SCR 22.22(3) to the imposition of 
reciprocal 
discipline 
in 
this 
state 
applies 
to 
Attorney 
Crandall's 
situation. 
 
Thus, 
we 
determine 
that 
Attorney 
Crandall's license to practice law in this state should be 
suspended under SCR 22.22(3) for a period of 30 days as 
reciprocal discipline to that imposed by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota.3 
¶25 Because Counts 1-7 of the OLR's complaint remain 
pending before a referee and will be addressed by this court at 
                                                 
3 Although generally the minimum length of a suspension of 
an attorney's license in this state is 60 days, in reciprocal 
discipline cases we will impose a 30-day suspension when doing 
so makes the discipline identical to that imposed in the other 
jurisdiction.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grady, 
188 Wis. 2d 98, 523 N.W.2d 564 (1994); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Nora, 173 Wis. 2d 660, 495 N.W.2d 99 (1993). 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
15 
 
a later date, we will not impose costs against Attorney Crandall 
at this time. 
¶26 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Eric L. Crandall to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 30 days, 
effective September 2, 2008. 
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Crandall shall 
comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the 
duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin 
has been suspended. 
¶28 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring). I concur in the 
result. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
 
 
1