Title: P. v. Leon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S137137
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2007

1 
Filed 1/25/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S137137 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B173851 
AVELINO LEON et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA207150 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendants Avelino Leon and Victor Aceves were arrested as part of an 
investigation into the Arellano-Felix drug trafficking organization, which was 
“believed by law enforcement agencies to be one of the most violent drug 
trafficking organizations in the Republic of Mexico.”  (U.S. v. Hodoyan-Palacios 
(S.D.Cal. 1998) 993 F.Supp. 789, 790.)  Defendants seek to suppress the contents 
and all fruits of five wiretaps that were instituted as part of the investigation, 
claiming that the wiretaps violated California law (Pen. Code, § 629.52, subd. (d)) 
and the Fourth Amendment in that the government’s affidavits in support of the 
applications failed to establish necessity for the wiretaps.   
Both the superior court and the Court of Appeal determined that the 
wiretaps were lawful and denied defendants’ motion to suppress.  (Pen. Code, § 
629.72.)  We affirm. 
       
    
 
2 
BACKGROUND 
The five wiretaps at issue here—wiretap Nos. 00-02 and 00-04, wiretap No. 
00-02 extension No. 1, and wiretap No. 00-39 extension Nos. 1 and 2—were part 
of a multiagency task force investigation of a major Mexico-based narcotics 
trafficking organization that culminated in the arrest of 23 people in the United 
States.  The arrests included narcotics suppliers, importers, distributors, 
transporters, and customers.  Approximately 214 kilos of cocaine, 1,150 pounds of 
marijuana, $1.2 million in United States currency, and numerous firearms 
(including assault weapons) were seized.     
Evidence obtained from the wiretaps was used to prosecute defendants 
Avelino Leon and Victor Aceves in state court.  After the superior court denied 
their motions to suppress the contents of the wiretaps and any evidence seized 
therefrom (Pen. Code, § 629.72), Leon pleaded no contest to possession with 
intent to distribute in excess of 20 kilos of cocaine and was sentenced to 17 years 
in prison.  Aceves pleaded no contest to conspiracy to sell in excess of 10 kilos of 
cocaine, as well as use of a false compartment in a motor vehicle with intent to 
conceal controlled substances, and was sentenced to 15 years, eight months.         
Wiretap No. 00-02 
The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s application for wiretap No. 
00-02, dated January 25, 2000, was supported by an affidavit from Stephen P. 
Diederich, a special agent with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration.  The 
application described “Target Telephone #1” as a prepaid cell phone subscribed to 
by one Guillermo Rodriguez of 4727 W. 17th Street in Lawndale and requested 
authorization to intercept communications by Rodriguez, Leon, Aceves, 
unidentified males Nos. 1 and 2, and other coconspirators.  Special Agent 
Diederich stated that Guillermo Rodriguez was an “unidentified person” and that 
the Lawndale address was a fictitious address—although defendants Leon and 
 
3 
Aceves did reside at 4727 W. 149th Street in Lawndale.  Diederich explained that, 
in his experience, high-level drug traffickers frequently use prepaid cell phones 
because no identification is required, the phones can be thrown away at any time, 
and the replacement phone cannot be traced back to the user.   
The affidavit described an ongoing investigation using wiretaps into a 
Mexican-based drug trafficking organization with associates in Los Angeles.  The 
investigation had resulted in the arrests of several conspirators and the issuance of 
arrest warrants for other fugitives.  A prior wiretap on a discarded prepaid cell 
phone (wiretap No. 99-32) had revealed numerous contacts during the period of 
April to June 1999 between narcotics traffickers from the Los Angeles-based 
distribution network and an unidentified male, who was believed to be a top-
ranked United States-based manager for the organization.  Special Agent 
Diederich believed that Target Telephone #1 was being used by the holder of the 
discarded cell phone that was the subject of the prior wiretap (No. 99-32), or by a 
person playing a similar role in the organization, because the phones had dialed 
more than two dozen numbers in common.  Prior intercepts of conversations 
involving those common numbers related to the manufacturing of 
methamphetamine, money laundering, and illegal border crossings.   
The affidavit declared that a wiretap was necessary in order to achieve the 
objectives of the investigation—namely, obtaining direct evidence to convince a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the full scope, extent, and personnel of the 
narcotics trafficking conspiracies; the identity and role of all suppliers of narcotics 
to the identified conspirators; the identity and role of the main customers of the 
identified conspirators; the stash location where the narcotics were stored before 
distribution; the organization’s method of distributing narcotics; and the 
management and disposition of proceeds generated by the organization’s narcotics 
trafficking.  Special Agent Diederich then listed the investigative techniques he 
 
4 
had already used or had considered using in the investigation and explained why 
these techniques were not likely to succeed in identifying all members of the 
organization and establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the full scope of the 
conspiracy.  These techniques included the use of a confidential informant; the 
conduct of physical surveillance; the use of pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, 
toll analysis, and telephone subscriber information; search warrants and trash 
searches; and witness interviews, grand jury subpoenas, and grants of immunity.  
Diederich noted, in particular, that he had been unable to identify the true user of 
Target Telephone #1 or to locate the target telephone’s physical whereabouts.   
Special Agent Diederich also explained that, based on his training and 
experience, leaders of narcotics trafficking organizations often do not physically 
handle the narcotics.  Because high-level traffickers issue logistical instructions by 
telephone (and thus avoid contact with the narcotics), law enforcement would be 
able to discover, through the interception of Target Telephone #1, when narcotics 
shipments arrive and which cell heads are to receive those shipments.     
Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Larry P. Fidler approved the 
application on January 25, 2000, finding probable cause to believe that the target 
subjects had committed, were committing, and were about to commit offenses 
involving the importation, possession for sale, transportation, and sale of cocaine 
(and conspiracy to commit these offenses) (Pen. Code, § 629.52, subd. (a));1 
probable cause to believe that communications concerning these crimes had been, 
were being, and would be made over Target Telephone #1, and that information 
concerning those crimes would be obtained through the interception (§ 629.52, 
subds. (b), (c)); and that normal investigative procedures had been tried and had 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.  
 
5 
failed or reasonably appeared either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous (§ 629.52, subd. (d)).  The wiretap was approved for 30 days.   
The Remaining Wiretaps 
Based on the information obtained from wiretap No. 00-02, Special Agent 
Diederich confirmed that Leon was the user of Target Telephone #1 and submitted 
a new application (wiretap No. 00-04) for that cell phone, four other cell phones, 
and two pagers.  The affidavit disclosed that aerial surveillance in January 2000 
had proved unhelpful, that the intercepted conversations had been “extremely 
coded” and the participants had identified themselves for the most part only by 
moniker, and that the identities of the users and the physical whereabouts of most 
of the phones were unknown. 
The affidavits for the remaining wiretap application extensions recounted 
the progress of the investigation, including the seizure of eight kilos of cocaine 
from a Los Angeles hotel and the seizure of $260,125 in cash at the Los Angeles 
International Airport in January 2000, the seizure of 1,150 pounds of marijuana at 
an Alhambra apartment in February 2000, and the seizure of 172 kilos of cocaine 
in three separate incidents in April and May 2000.  The affidavits also recited that 
the seizures nonetheless had yielded little information as to the organization’s 
source of supply or method of distribution; that the task force’s attempts at 
physical and aerial surveillance had been detected and, on occasion, compromised; 
and that Leon appeared to be coordinating a large shipment of narcotics in the near 
future.  On September 13, 2000, agents from the Drug Enforcement 
Administration arrested 23 people, including Leon and Aceves.   
DISCUSSION 
“In general, California law prohibits wiretapping.”  (People v. Zepeda 
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1195; see § 631.)  The Presley-Felando-Eaves 
Wiretap Act of 1988 authorized specified law enforcement officials to apply for a 
 
6 
court order to intercept wire communications, but only where there was probable 
cause to believe the target was involved in the importation, possession for sale, 
transportation, manufacture, or sale of heroin, cocaine, PCP, or methamphetamine 
in specified quantities, or in a conspiracy to commit those offenses.  (Former § 
629.02, subd. (a)(1), (2), added by Stats. 1988, ch. 111, § 2, p. 450.)  In 1995, the 
Legislature enacted section 629.50 et seq. in order “to expand California wiretap 
law to conform to the federal law.”  (Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Rep. on Sen. Bill 
No. 1016 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 3, 1995, p. i.)  Thus, the district 
attorney or other specified individual could apply to the presiding judge of the 
superior court (or a designee) for an order to intercept not only wire 
communications but also “electronic digital pager” and “electronic cellular 
telephone” communications.  (Former § 629.50, added by Stats. 1995, ch. 971, 
§ 10, p. 7395.)  The new scheme also expanded the list of target crimes to include 
murder, solicitation to commit murder, the commission of a crime involving the 
bombing of public or private property, or aggravated kidnapping.  (§ 629.52, 
former subd. (a)(2), added by Stats.1995, ch. 971, § 10.)  Subsequent amendments 
added to the list of target crimes the participation in a criminal street gang 
(§ 629.52, subd. (a)(3), amended by Prop. 21, approved Mar. 7, 2000) as well as 
felonies involving weapons of mass destruction or restricted biological agents (id., 
subd. (a)(4), amended by Stats. 2002, ch. 605, § 3).     
Under current section 629.52, the designated judge may authorize a wiretap 
if there is probable cause to believe that an individual has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit one or more of the listed crimes (§ 629.52, 
subd. (a)); there is probable cause to believe that communications concerning the 
illegal activities will be obtained through that interception (§ 629.52, subd. (b)); 
there is probable cause to believe that the communications device will be used by 
the person whose communications are to be intercepted (§ 629.52, subd. (c)); and 
 
7 
“[n]ormal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably 
appear either to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous” (§ 629.52, 
subd. (d) (section 629.52(d))).   
Defendants do not challenge the issuing court’s finding of probable cause 
as to any of the wiretaps.  They complain only that the wiretap applications were 
not supported by an adequate showing of necessity within the meaning of section 
629.52(d), and that the evidence seized as fruit of the wiretaps must be suppressed 
under section 629.72.2  Because defendants’ claim of constitutional error parallels 
their claim of statutory error, we begin with their claim that the wiretap 
applications failed to support Judge Fidler’s finding of necessity under section 
629.52(d).  (People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 149 & fn. 38; see 
generally People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 608, fn. 3.)   
Our analysis of section 629.52 is necessarily informed by title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 United States Code 
sections 2510-2520, which “provides a ‘comprehensive scheme for the regulation 
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance.’ ”  (People v. Otto (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
1088, 1097.)  As we have previously observed, Title III “establishes minimum 
standards for the admissibility of evidence procured through electronic 
surveillance; state law cannot be less protective of privacy than the federal Act.”  
(Otto, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1098.)  With respect to necessity, the sole issue 
presented here, state law and federal law employ identical language.  Each 
                                              
2  
Section 629.72 provides:  “Any person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding, 
may move to suppress some or all of the contents of any intercepted wire, 
electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communications, or evidence 
derived therefrom, only on the basis that the contents or evidence were obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or of this 
chapter.  The motion shall be made, determined, and be subject to review in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in Section 1538.5.”   
 
8 
requires the judge, before authorizing a wiretap, to find that normal investigative 
techniques “have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”  (18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c); Pen. Code, 
§ 629.52(d).) 
The requirement of necessity is designed to ensure that wiretapping is 
neither “routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation” (United 
States v. Giordano (1974) 416 U.S. 505, 515) nor “resorted to in situations where 
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”  (United 
States v. Kahn (1974) 415 U.S. 143, 153, fn. 12.)  The necessity requirement can 
be satisfied “by a showing in the application that ordinary investigative 
procedures, employed in good faith, would likely be ineffective in the particular 
case.”  (U.S. v. McGuire (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 1192, 1196.)  As numerous 
courts have explained, though, it is not necessary that law enforcement officials 
exhaust every conceivable alternative before seeking a wiretap.  (Id. at p. 1197; 
see also Twenty-seventh Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Investigation and 
Police Practice:  Electronic Surveillance (1998) 86 Geo. L.J. 1289, 1294-1295, fn. 
420 [collecting cases].)  Instead, the adequacy of the showing of necessity “ ‘is “to 
be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion,”. . . that does not “hamper 
unduly the investigative powers of law enforcement agents.” ’ ”  (U.S. v. Oriakhi 
(4th Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 1290, 1298.)  A determination of necessity involves “ ‘a 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances.’ ”  (United States v. Hyde (5th 
Cir. 1978) 574 F.2d 856, 867, quoting Sen.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 2112, 2190.) 
The finding of necessity by the judge approving the wiretap application is 
entitled to substantial deference.  (People v. Zepeda, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 
 
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1204; accord, U.S. v. Martinez (1st Cir. 2006) 452 F.3d 1, 4; U.S. v. McLee (7th 
Cir. 2006) 436 F.3d 751, 763; U.S. v. Butz (9th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2d 1378, 1383.)3  
A.  The Application for Wiretap No. 00-02 
We begin our review of Judge Fidler’s findings of necessity by examining 
the affidavits filed in support of the wiretap applications.  (§ 629.50, subd. 
(a)(4)(B); see United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 1227, 1231.)  In 
light of defendants’ arguments in this court, we need focus only on wiretap 
application No. 00-02.4  The 23-page affidavit in support of this wiretap 
application established probable cause to believe that communications involving 
the importation, transportation, and sale of cocaine had been, were being, and 
would be made over Target Telephone #1 by the target subjects and also 
established the necessity for the wiretap.    
                                              
3  
Although the parties agree that we review deferentially the issuing judge’s 
determination that the wiretap was necessary, they disagree as to the precise 
formulation of the standard of review.  Defendants, for the first time in this 
proceeding, urge us to follow the Eighth Circuit, which has held that the necessity 
finding predicate to the issuance of a wiretap order under 18 United States Code 
section 2518(3)(c) is a factual determination reviewed for clear error.  (U.S. v. 
Jackson (8th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 638, 644.)  The Attorney General argues instead 
that the necessity finding should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, citing the 
rule followed in the majority of federal circuits (see U.S. v. Ramirez-Encarnacion 
(10th Cir. 2002) 291 F.3d 1219, 1222, fn. 1, citing cases), the Court of Appeal 
(People v. Zepeda, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204), and the courts of other states 
(e.g., State v. Cisneros (Wash.Ct.App. 1992) 821 P.2d 1262, 1264).  Because our 
decision would be the same under either formulation, we need not decide here 
precisely how to phrase the deference due a judicial finding of necessity under 
section 629.52(d).  (See U.S. v. Smith (4th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1294, 1298.)     
4  
Leon makes no independent challenge to the other wiretap applications; he 
argues summarily only that those subsequent filings suffer from “essentially the 
same” defects as the affidavit in support of wiretap No. 00-02 to the extent they 
reiterate its analysis or, to the extent they contain new information, are the tainted 
fruit of the prior wiretap.  Aceves, who simply joins in Leon’s arguments on the 
merits, likewise makes no separate challenge to the other wiretap orders. 
 
10 
The affidavit began by recounting an investigation begun in 1997 into the 
Arellano-Felix drug trafficking organization, which engaged in the transportation 
of multi-ton quantities of cocaine from Mexico into the United States.  The 
investigation resulted in the arrest in June 1998 of Jorge Castro, a high-ranking 
member of the organization, and other coconspirators, as well as the seizure of 
3,500 kilos of cocaine and over $15 million in proceeds.  Unfortunately, even after 
the arrests, many of the distribution cells to which Castro had delivered cocaine 
remained intact.  Through wiretaps on a since-discarded target telephone, the task 
force had discovered that an unidentified person was in contact with narcotics 
traffickers from the Los Angeles-based distribution network cells that used to 
receive cocaine from the Castro organization and with numerous Mexico-based 
telephone numbers known to be used by members of the Arellano-Felix 
organization.  Based on its investigation, the task force believed the unidentified 
person who had used the discarded target telephone was a top-ranked United 
States-based manager for the Arellano-Felix organization, with responsibilities 
that paralleled those formerly held by Castro.  Although the discarded target 
telephone was deactivated for lack of payment in July 1999, the task force 
believed, based on the large number of telephone numbers in common, that Target 
Telephone #1 was being used by the same person or a close associate.     
The affidavit also noted that Target Telephone #1 was a prepaid cell phone 
and had been purchased by someone providing a fictitious address and possibly a 
fictitious name.  High-level drug traffickers frequently use prepaid cell phones 
because no identification is required for activation, the phone can be discarded at 
any time, and law enforcement will be unable to track down the user’s new 
telephone.         
The discussion of the necessity for the wiretap was set forth in a separate 
section of the affidavit consisting of 20 numbered paragraphs.  The affidavit stated 
 
11 
that normal investigative techniques had failed, appeared reasonably unlikely to 
succeed if tried, or were too dangerous to achieve the objectives of the 
investigation, “that is, to obtain direct evidence that will convince a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt of [¶] a.  The full scope, extent and personnel of the narcotics 
trafficking conspiracies to which I believe [the target subjects] belong; [¶] b.  The 
identity and role of all suppliers of narcotics to the identified conspirators; [¶] c.  
The identity and role of the main customers of the identified conspirators; [¶] d.  
The stash location where the narcotics are stored before distribution; [¶] e.  The 
organization’s method of distribution of narcotics; and [¶] f.  The management and 
disposition of proceeds generated by the organization’s narcotics trafficking.”  The 
affidavit then listed the investigative techniques the task force had used or had 
considered using, with an explanation as to why each was unlikely to succeed in 
identifying all members of the organization and establishing beyond a reasonable 
doubt the full scope of the conspiracy: 
As to undercover agents and confidential informants, the affidavit stated 
that a confidential informant could not be introduced at that time because the true 
user of Target Telephone #1 and the phone’s physical whereabouts were unknown.  
Nor, for the same reasons, would it be useful to introduce an undercover agent.  
When the user of Target Telephone #1 was identified, the task force would 
consider the use of a confidential informant or undercover agent.  Such a person, 
however, would be unlikely to assist in achieving the goals of the investigation, 
inasmuch as members of a large narcotics trafficking organization generally deal 
only with known and trusted individuals; the organization’s structure is 
compartmentalized such that suppliers, transporters, distributors, customers, and 
money launderers do not even know each other; and the organization could 
become suspicious merely by having an unknown person attempt to engage the 
organization.  
 
12 
As to physical surveillance, the affidavit reiterated that the user of Target 
Telephone #1 and the phone’s whereabouts were unknown and therefore could not 
be subjected to physical surveillance.  The task force had conducted limited 
physical surveillance of defendants’ residence, but “nothing significant was 
observed.”  Special Agent Diederich also stated, based on his training and 
experience with over 100 narcotics investigations as an agent with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, that physical surveillance alone, without wiretap 
intercepts, could not achieve this investigation’s objectives.  Although physical 
surveillance can be useful in confirming the fact of meetings and other interactions 
among participants, such observations are generally insufficient to prove their 
purpose or their content.  Moreover, inasmuch as narcotics traffickers run trivial 
errands most of the time, it was highly likely that blanket surveillance would be 
detected by the target prior to the pickup or delivery of any significant amount of 
narcotics, which would compromise the larger investigation.  High-level narcotics 
traffickers, such as the ones here, use sophisticated countersurveillance driving 
techniques to thwart surveillance.  Wiretap intercepts, by contrast, would permit 
the task force to assemble surveillance for specific meetings and to conduct the 
surveillance at the meeting place, not at the target’s home, which further reduces 
the risk that the surveillance would be detected.   
As to pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, toll analysis, and subscriber 
information, the affidavit explained that these measures, at best, could provide 
only a list of the telephone numbers called and the identity provided to the 
telephone provider but not the content of or the parties to the calls.  Inasmuch as 
toll records had already been used to establish the connection between the 
discarded target telephone and Target Telephone #1, little more could be gained 
by these methods of investigation without the assistance of a wiretap.  The 
affidavit also stated that narcotics traffickers often use fictitious information or the 
 
13 
assistance of unwitting persons as subscribers for their telephones in order to 
thwart investigation into their illegal activities—and pointed out that such false 
information had indeed been given for Target Telephone #1.     
As to search warrants, the affidavit explained that they would not be 
effective because the true user of Target Telephone #1 and the phone’s physical 
location were unknown.  Search warrants at this stage thus “could result in law 
enforcement compromising the larger investigation with minimal results.”  Once 
the wiretap revealed the timing of cocaine deliveries and stash locations, the task 
force would consider the use of search warrants.  However, such searches alone 
would not disclose the full scope of the organization’s criminal activities, the 
methods used by members of the organization, or the identities of those involved.  
Special Agent Diederich added that, in his experience, records kept by narcotics 
conspirators are coded and difficult to interpret.   
As to witness interviews, grand jury subpoenas, and immunity, Special 
Agent Diederich declared, based on his training and experience, that these were 
unlikely to advance—and, indeed, would likely impede—the investigation.  
Narcotics dealers and customers are unwilling to talk to police or testify before 
grand juries or at trial because of fears for their safety or for their own culpability.  
Even when granted immunity, a member of the organization who was of sufficient 
rank to provide meaningful testimony about the entire organization would be 
unlikely to share it because of the fear of retribution against himself or his family.  
For these reasons, Diederich believed that any attempt to contact a member of the 
organization would likely cause that person to inform other members of the 
organization and thus jeopardize the investigation.   
As to trash searches, the affidavit reiterated that the true user of Target 
Telephone #1 and the phone’s physical location were unknown.  Once locations 
were identified, the task force would consider the use of trash searches.  However, 
 
14 
even if trash could be removed without detection (and thus without compromising 
the investigation), Special Agent Diederich declared, based on his experience, that 
it would be unlikely to yield significant evidence.  Narcotics traffickers go to great 
lengths to destroy evidence that is possibly incriminating and frequently will 
dispose of their trash at a site away from their residence.   
As to consensual recordings, the affidavit stated that these techniques are 
subject to the same limitations as confidential informants and undercover agents, 
discussed above.   
Special Agent Diederich concluded by emphasizing that, in his experience, 
leaders of narcotics trafficking organizations rarely touch the contraband 
themselves and coordinate the logistics of their criminal activities over the phone.  
He therefore believed that the only viable means of building an effective case 
against the target subjects was to intercept their telephone communications, 
including those made over Target Telephone #1.     
B.  The Record Supported the Finding of Necessity for the Wiretaps 
Within the Meaning of Section 629.52(d)     
Defendants attack Judge Fidler’s finding of necessity on a number of 
grounds.  None has merit.   
1.  Boilerplate Allegations 
Defendants complain first that the affidavit included “boilerplate” 
discussion of the limitations of traditional investigative techniques and failed to 
identify any ways in which the investigation into this drug trafficking conspiracy 
differed from drug trafficking conspiracies generally.  Although it is true that 
“ ‘[g]eneralities, or statements in the conclusory language of the statute, are 
insufficient to support a wiretap application’ ” (U.S. v. Cline (10th Cir. 2003) 349 
F.3d 1276, 1280-1281), the affidavit here did not simply reiterate conclusory 
language.  It instead analyzed with particularity the limitations of each alternative 
 
15 
investigative technique in achieving the goals of this investigation.  That many of 
those limitations are common to most drug conspiracy investigations does not 
necessarily preclude a finding of necessity.  (U.S. v. Thompson (8th Cir. 2000) 210 
F.3d 855, 859.)  In cases of this nature, the same reasons for futility of certain 
investigative techniques will frequently recur.  But “the fact that drug 
investigations suffer from common investigatory problems does not make these 
problems less vexing.”  (U.S. v. Milton (8th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3d 891, 895.)  There 
is thus no requirement that the government establish that an individual narcotics 
investigation differs in some particular way from an ordinary narcotics 
investigation.  “Necessity is a function of the specifics of the case, not its 
uniqueness.  If a seemingly ‘ordinary’ drug investigation requires a Title III 
wiretap, and the government establishes that necessity with the particulars of a 
given investigation, no more is needed.  The ordinariness of the investigation does 
not preclude a finding of necessity for the use of wiretaps to further the 
investigation.”  (U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at pp. 5-6.)  
Defendants’ reliance on United States v. Kalustian (9th Cir. 1975) 529 F.2d 
585, which contained some contrary language in suppressing electronic 
surveillance evidence in a gambling investigation, is misplaced.  There, “no 
mention was made of the defendants or the particular circumstances to be 
investigated.”  (United States v. Tufaro (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 593 F.Supp. 476, 489.)  
Hence, “Kalustian teaches no more than that” an “affidavit composed solely of 
conclusions unsupported by particular facts gives no basis for a determination of 
compliance” with the necessity requirement.  (United States v. Spagnuolo (9th Cir. 
1977) 549 F.2d 705, 710; see also United States v. Williams (D.C. Cir. 1978) 580 
F.2d 578, 588 [distinguishing Kalustian as involving “generalized and conclusory 
statements that other investigative procedures would prove unsuccessful”].)  By 
contrast, the affidavit here described with particularity the problems with 
 
16 
conventional investigative techniques, including those posed by the fact that the 
identity of the user and the location of Target Telephone #1 were unknown. 
Defendants’ reliance on U.S. v. Blackmon (9th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 1204, in 
which a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit suppressed the fruits of a wiretap in a 
narcotics investigation, is likewise unconvincing.  In that case, the panel majority 
found that the affidavit contained material misstatements, including untrue claims 
that surveillance of Blackmon had been attempted and had failed and that 
cooperating informants possessed only limited knowledge concerning the scope of 
the criminal enterprise, and omitted any discussion of the potentially successful 
use of informants, including one who had “special access” to Blackmon.  (Id. at p. 
1209.)  Because of these defects, the court elected to review the affidavit, purged 
of its misstatements, “de novo,” without deferring to the judicial finding of 
necessity below.  (Id. at p. 1211 (dis. opn. of Wardlaw, J.); see U.S. v. Yeje-
Cabrera (1st Cir. 2005) 430 F.3d 1, 8 [distinguishing Blackmon].)  Here, however, 
we have found (and defendants have conceded) that the judicial finding of 
necessity below should be reviewed deferentially and that the affidavits contain no 
material misstatements or omissions.  Inasmuch as the Ninth Circuit has 
subsequently explained that its holding in Blackmon “was premised on a finding 
that the affidavits supporting the wiretap applications were plagued by material 
misstatements and omissions” (U.S. v. Fernandez (9th Cir. 2004) 388 F.3d 1199, 
1237), we do not find Blackmon persuasive here.  (U.S. v. Canales Gomez (9th 
Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 1221, 1225 [distinguishing Blackmon on the ground that “[n]o 
such misstatements are alleged in this case”]; accord, U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 
F.3d at p. 6.) 
2.  The Relevance of the Conspiracy Allegations  
Defendants argue next that section 629.52(d) does not set forth a lower 
standard of necessity for conspiracy cases.  We agree that a mere allegation “that a 
 
17 
person is a member of a conspiracy . . . is not a sufficient reason to obtain a 
wiretap” (U.S. v. Carneiro (9th Cir. 1988) 861 F.2d 1171, 1181), but the People 
make no such argument here.  They argue instead, correctly, that the fact of a 
conspiracy is a circumstance to be considered, along with all the other facts and 
circumstances, in determining whether conventional investigative techniques have 
failed, are unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to try.  For example, 
persons involved in a conspiracy almost invariably will discuss their plans, 
methods, and goals with other members of the conspiracy.  A solitary criminal, on 
the other hand, is unlikely to discuss the crime with others.  Concerted action, 
moreover, “increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully 
attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart 
from their path of criminality.” (Callanan v. United States (1961) 364 U.S. 587, 
593; accord, People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 555-556.)  And, “[u]nlike 
individual criminal action, which comes to an end upon the capture of the 
criminal, collective criminal action has a life of its own.  Like the Hydra of Greek 
mythology, the conspiracy may survive the destruction of its parts unless the 
conspiracy is completely destroyed.  For even if some or many of the conspirators 
are imprisoned, others may remain at large, free to recruit others eager to break the 
law and to pursue the conspiracy’s illegal ends.”  (U.S. v. McGuire, supra, 307 
F.3d at pp. 1197-1198.)  Thus, in many cases, the existence of a conspiracy will 
suggest not only that there will be communications in order to plan the crime, but 
that such planning will occur almost exclusively during such communications.  
Furthermore, the existence of the conspiracy may not only increase the likelihood 
any given crime will succeed, but also the likelihood the criminal enterprise will 
survive the arrest of less than all of its participants—which is precisely what 
occurred when the government made its first round of arrests of members of the 
Arellano-Felix drug trafficking organization.  In sum, the existence of a 
 
18 
conspiracy, while not determinative, is an important factor in analyzing the 
necessity for a wiretap.  (Cf. Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 140 
[“when the investigation is focusing on what is thought to be a widespread 
conspiracy more extensive surveillance may be justified in an attempt to determine 
the precise scope of the enterprise”].)   
In this case, no one disputes that telephones were the primary means of 
communication among the conspirators.  “It would have been difficult if not 
impossible by means other than wiretap to determine the scope of the conspiracy 
or to develop enough evidence to successfully prosecute the conspirators.”  (U.S. 
v. Carrillo (D.Colo. 2000) 123 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1245; accord, U.S. v. Khan (9th 
Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1368, 1370, 1375.) 
3.  Failure to Exhaust or Otherwise Justify the Failure to Attempt Normal 
Investigative Techniques  
Defendants then argue that the government failed to exhaust several 
investigative techniques.  As they concede, however, the adequacy of the showing 
concerning other investigative techniques is “ ‘to be tested in a practical and 
commonsense fashion,’ [citation] that does not ‘hamper unduly the investigative 
powers of law enforcement agents’ ” (U.S. v. Smith, supra, 31 F.3d at p. 1297) and 
that “ ‘does not mandate the indiscriminate pursuit to the bitter end of every non-
electronic device’ ” (U.S. v. Bennett (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3d 1117, 1122).  The 
government “ ‘need only lay a “factual predicate” sufficient to inform the judge 
why other methods of investigation are not sufficient.’ ”  (U.S. v. Williams (3d Cir. 
1997) 124 F.3d 411, 418.)  We cannot say that Judge Fidler acted unreasonably in 
finding that normal investigative techniques had failed or were unlikely to succeed 
if tried in this case. 
 
 
 
19 
(a) Confidential Informants   
Defendants, pointing to a sealed portion of the affidavit that indicated the 
existence of a confidential informant, fault the affidavit for failing to explain why 
the investigation could not proceed through that informant.  Yet defendants fail to 
explain how the informant could even have identified the user of Target Telephone 
#1, whose identity and location were unknown, without raising suspicion.  As the 
affidavit explained, members of the organization could be “alarmed by an 
informant simply approaching one of them and could become concerned that the 
organization was under investigations.”  More generally, the affidavit recited that 
large-scale narcotics organization are compartmentalized in order to protect the 
organization and that confidential informants therefore would not be successful in 
identifying the full nature and scope of the organization.  (U.S. v. Canales Gomez, 
supra, 358 F.3d at p. 1226.)  Under these circumstances, the government could 
reasonably have concluded that attempting to connect the informant to this part of 
the organization would have aroused the suspicions of other participants, thus 
endangering both its informant and the investigation, without providing sufficient 
information to achieve its goals.  (U.S. v. Carter (D.C. Cir. 2006) 449 F.3d 1287, 
1294; U.S. v. Guerra-Marez (5th Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 665, 671.) 
(b) Pen Registers 
Defendants complain that the affidavit merely identified the limitations of 
pen registers and similar techniques and therefore could not establish necessity for 
a wiretap.  We disagree.  “[A]lthough the affidavit’s assertions of inadequacy 
‘might appear boilerplate, the fact that drug investigations suffer from common 
investigatory problems does not make these problems less vexing.’ ”  (U.S. v. 
Thompson, supra, 210 F.3d at p. 859.)  Moreover, the affidavit stated that the task 
force had already compared toll records for Target Telephone #1 with the 
discarded target telephone, which had provided the basis for their suspicion that 
 
20 
the users were the same or close associates, and announced that the task force 
intended to initiate a pen register on Target Telephone #1.  Because these alternate 
techniques had not (and could not) identify the persons making or receiving the 
communications, the contents of the conversations, or whether the 
communications were in furtherance of the drug operation, they “could not 
significantly advance” or “achieve the objectives of the investigation.”  (U.S. v. 
Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1241; see also U.S. v. Decoud (9th Cir. 2006) 
456 F.3d 996, 1007.) 
(c) Search Warrants 
Defendants once again fault the affidavit for relying on limitations that 
would apply to “ ‘most if not all narcotics investigations.’ ”  What defendants 
overlook, however, is that the affidavit also explained why those generic 
limitations applied to this investigation.  In particular, defendants do not challenge 
Special Agent Diederich’s statement that “[a]t this time, I know of no locations at 
which to [execute] search warrants,” given that the stash locations, the timing of 
deliveries, the identity of the user of Target Telephone #1, or the user’s location 
were all unknown.  Defendants also challenge the affidavit’s failure to discuss the 
possibility of searching their residence, which was known to the task force—yet 
offer nothing to suggest that probable cause existed to search their residence.  (See 
U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1237.)  More importantly, defendants 
fail to grapple with the affidavit’s concern that a search conducted prematurely 
could compromise the larger investigation while providing minimal results.  (U.S. 
v. Carter, supra, 449 F.3d at p. 1294; U.S. v. Smith, supra, 31 F.3d at p. 1299.)  
(d) Physical Surveillance 
Defendants characterize the affidavit’s analysis of physical surveillance as 
“stating that it is just too bothersome to follow a suspect around while he does 
‘trivial errands’ ” and assert that “[b]lanket surveillance may be inconvenient and 
 
21 
costly, but it can be done and does work.”  Yet, as the affidavit discloses, limited 
surveillance had already been conducted at defendants’ residence without success, 
and the task force knew of no other locations at which to conduct surveillance, 
especially since the identity and whereabouts of the user of Target Telephone #1 
were unknown.  Moreover, the affidavit’s reference to “trivial errands” was 
merely to illustrate that without the wiretap, the task force would have to place the 
known targets under blanket surveillance, which would make it “highly likely” the 
surveillance would be detected and the investigation compromised.  (See U.S. v. 
Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at p. 5; see generally U.S. v. Ashley (1st Cir. 1989) 876 
F.2d 1069, 1075.)   
(e) Trash Searches 
Defendants’ contention that the affidavit failed to provide a specific, 
particularized reason for rejecting this technique is belied by the affidavit itself, 
which reiterates that the address of the user of Target Telephone #1 was unknown, 
that narcotics traffickers go to great lengths to destroy incriminating evidence 
(including carrying their trash away to a different site), and that trash removal by 
law enforcement poses the risk of detection.  Although defendants suggest that the 
task force could have conducted a trash search of their residence, they have not 
shown that there was a basis for believing significant evidence would be 
uncovered though such a search.  Defendants thus offer no basis for second-
guessing the relative risks and benefits of trash searches in this case.  (U.S. v. 
Canales Gomez, supra, 358 F.3d at p. 1224.)   
(f) Interviews, Grand Jury Subpoenas, and Immunity 
Defendants claim that the affidavit’s discussion of these techniques 
“completely ignore[s] the possibility of a confession being obtained, perhaps 
based upon a promise of leniency” as well as the potential of detaining a material 
witness in custody, which “might solve the problem of tipping off others with 
 
22 
specific information.”  In truth, the affidavit considered the possibility that a high-
level member of the organization might provide information in exchange for 
leniency but considered it unlikely “because of fear of retribution against himself 
or his family.”  Special Agent Diederich considered it more likely that the 
conspirator who received such an offer would “inform other members of the 
organization and thus jeopardize the investigation.”  Neither a promise of leniency 
nor the detention of a material witness in custody would alleviate these concerns.  
Moreover, granting immunity to an organization member who was at a sufficiently 
high level to provide significant information would “insulate highly culpable 
members of the conspiracy from prosecution.”  (U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d 
at p. 5.)  “The government’s desire not to alert any of the targets of the 
investigation is reasonable.”  (U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1236.)   
4.  Failure to Consider Aerial Surveillance or Witness Relocation 
Finally, defendants claim the affidavit was deficient in failing to consider 
two additional investigative techniques:  aerial surveillance and witness relocation.  
Before analyzing these techniques, we note at the outset that “courts are reluctant 
to impose their hindsight upon law enforcement agencies, and the proponent of the 
application need not establish that ‘every other imaginable mode of investigation 
would be unsuccessful.’ ”  (U.S. v. Guerra-Marez, supra, 928 F.2d at p. 670.)  In 
particular, “[a]fter-the-fact suggestions by defense attorneys as to how an 
investigation might have been handled are entitled to little weight in the analysis 
. . . .  The fact that the government could have taken some different or additional 
steps in its investigation does not demonstrate that the wiretap orders were issued 
in error,” because “ ‘[t]he government need not exhaust or explain its failure to 
exhaust every conceivable investigative procedure before resorting to 
wiretapping.’ ”  (U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1245.)  Indeed, 
Congress acknowledged that  “[m]erely because a normal investigative technique 
 
23 
is theoretically possible, it does not follow that it is likely.”  (Sen.Rep. No. 1097, 
supra, 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. 2190.)   
Neither of the techniques above was likely to have succeeded in fulfilling 
the goals of the investigation.  Aerial surveillance falls within the affidavit’s 
category of “Physical Surveillance” and suffers from the same limitations and the 
same risks as surveillance on foot or by automobile.  Indeed, as recounted in the 
application for wiretap No. 00-04, the task force did engage in aerial surveillance 
on January 26, 2000.  However, the helicopter lost the “visual” of the open trunk 
because it had to orbit, and a member of the organization subsequently became 
aware of the surveillance and employed countersurveillance techniques.  
Knowledge of the physical surveillance, of course, only increased the necessity for 
the wiretap.  (U.S. v. Decoud, supra, 456 F.3d at p. 1007; U.S. v. Ashley, supra,  
876 F.2d at p. 1075.)  As to placing cooperating high-level members of the 
organization into a witness relocation program, defendants have made no showing 
that any such person had wanted not only to withdraw from the conspiracy but 
also to relocate with his or her loved ones under a new identity.  (U.S. v. Carrillo, 
supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1236 [“The investigators had no basis to believe any of 
the participants would be willing to cooperate”].)  Accordingly, approaching a 
member of the organization with an offer to enter a relocation program posed the 
same risk of compromising the investigation as did approaching a member of the 
organization with an offer of immunity.  (See U.S. v. Gruttadauria (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) 439 F.Supp.2d 240, 248.)  In neither circumstance can the affidavit be 
faulted for failing to identify these particular investigative techniques by name 
instead of by category, nor have defendants offered any reason for second-
guessing law enforcement’s assessment of the relative risks and benefits of either 
technique.     
 
24 
As demonstrated above, the wiretap was not sought as the first step in this 
investigation, nor did the government bypass viable alternative techniques in a 
rush to use this extraordinary method of investigation.  “Few threats to liberty 
exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices” 
(Berger v. New York (1967) 388 U.S. 41, 63) but, as our Legislature has 
recognized, that liberty must yield to the real needs of law enforcement in 
appropriate circumstances.  (See § 630.)  None of defendants’ proposed 
alternatives, taken singly or in combination, offered a realistic prospect of 
exposing “the extent and structure of the conspiracy” without the assistance of 
wiretaps.  (U.S. v. Plescia (7th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 1452, 1463.)  In short, 
defendants have not shown that Judge Fidler acted unreasonably in concluding 
that the affidavit supporting the application for wiretap No. 00-02 established 
necessity for the wiretap.         
C.  Remaining Issues 
Having rejected defendants’ claim that the wiretaps violated section 
629.52(d), we reject as well defendants’ contention that the wiretaps violated the 
Fourth Amendment, which rests on the same facts and legal standards discussed 
above.  (See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  Accordingly, we 
need not resolve the novel questions presented by the People’s petition for 
review—namely, whether a defendant who has procured a cell phone under a false 
name and for a criminal purpose can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
conversations made and received on that telephone within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment and, if not, whether Penal Code section 629.72 (which was 
enacted by a two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature) expanded the 
universe of people who may challenge evidence seized as a result of a wiretap 
beyond the categories defined by the Fourth Amendment.  (See Leroy v. Great 
Western United Corp. (1979) 443 U.S. 173, 181 [“As a prudential matter it is our 
 
25 
practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of novel constitutional questions”]; 
Ashwander v. Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (conc. opn. of 
Brandeis, J.).) 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Leon 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 131 Cal.App.4th 966 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S137137 
Date Filed: January 25, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert J. Perry 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Kenneth H. Lewis, Peter N. Priamos and Arthur Lewis for Defendant and Appellant Avelino Leon. 
 
Sandra Uribe and Nancy Gaynor, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant 
Victor Aceves. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson and Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Kristofer Jorstad and 
Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kenneth H. Lewis 
3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1045 
Los Angeles, CA  90010 
(213) 624-4904 
 
Mary Sanchez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2364