Title: Fowler v. Winchester Medical Center
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 022260
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2003

PRESENT: All of the Justices 
 
REBECCA FOWLER, ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF ROBERT FOWLER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022260 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JUNE 6, 2003 
WINCHESTER MEDICAL CENTER, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WINCHESTER 
John E. Wetsel, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a suit for wrongful 
death brought by a nonresident party who, at the time the suit 
was filed, was not qualified as a personal representative in 
Virginia or any other state, tolled the statute of limitations 
while the suit was pending. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Robert Fowler (the “decedent”) died intestate on December 
24, 1999.  His wife, Rebecca Fowler (“Fowler”), was appointed 
administrator of the decedent’s estate by the Berkeley County 
Commission of West Virginia on March 9, 2000.  By Final 
Settlement Order dated October 2, 2000, the Berkeley County 
Commission approved the settlement of the decedent’s estate and 
notified Fowler that “the order conferring authority is 
terminated, the bond released and the estate closed.” 
 
On December 21, 2001, Fowler filed a motion for judgment 
for wrongful death in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Winchester alleging medical malpractice against ten health care 
providers who cared for the decedent before his death.  When the 
suit was filed, Fowler had not qualified as the decedent’s 
personal representative in Virginia.  As a result of pretrial 
motions and orders, the number of defendants was narrowed to 
those health care providers before the Court in this appeal.  
The remaining defendants filed various motions to dismiss and 
demurrers alleging, among other things, that Fowler had no 
standing to maintain the cause of action, that the pendency of 
the purported action did not toll the statute of limitations, 
that the statute of limitations had expired, and that the motion 
for judgment should be dismissed with prejudice.  Fowler sought 
to nonsuit the action against all remaining defendants; however, 
the remaining defendants objected because of a pending cross-
claim for contribution. 
 
The trial court denied Fowler’s motion for nonsuit and 
granted defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice.  Fowler 
appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court. 
II. Analysis 
 
On appeal, Fowler concedes that she does not have standing 
to maintain her suit.  Nonetheless, she argues that the trial 
court erred by dismissing the motion for judgment with prejudice 
because she maintains that she is a “real party in interest” as 
defined in McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 198 Va. 612, 95 
S.E.2d 201 (1956), and is entitled to the tolling provision of 
 
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Code § 8.01-244(B).  Fowler contends that she has the right to 
properly qualify as a personal representative under Code § 26-59 
and refile the suit within “the remaining period of such two 
years as if such former action had not been instituted.”  Code 
§ 8.01-244(B).1  The material facts are not in dispute.  We 
review this question of law utilizing a de novo standard.  
Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 410, 559 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2002). 
 
The Virginia Wrongful Death Act, Title 8.01, Ch. 3, Art. 5 
of the Code of Virginia provides in part that such an action 
“shall be brought by and in the name of the personal 
representative of such deceased person within the time limits 
specified in [Code] § 8.01-244.”  Code § 8.01-50(B).  The 
statute governing the period of limitations for such an action 
provides the following in part: 
Every action under § 8.01-50 shall be 
brought by the personal representative of the 
decedent within two years after the death of the 
injured person.  If any such action is brought 
within such period of two years after such 
person’s death and for any cause abates or is 
dismissed without determining the merits of such 
action, the time such action is pending shall not 
be counted as any part of such period of two 
                     
1 In the remaining assignment of error, Fowler maintains 
that the trial court erred by granting the health care 
providers’ motions to dismiss because the statute of limitations 
had not expired.  She argues that Code § 8.01-229(B) and our 
opinion in Douglas v. Chesterfield County Police Dep’t, 251 Va. 
363, 467 S.E.2d 474 (1996) provide for tolling of the statute of 
limitations under the facts of this case. Fowler did not raise 
this argument in the trial court and we will not consider it for 
the first time on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
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years and another action may be brought within 
the remaining period of such two years as if such 
former action had not been instituted. . . . 
 
Code § 8.01-244(B). 
The decedent died on December 24, 1999.  Fowler filed her 
wrongful death action in the trial court on December 21, 2001.  
At that time she had not qualified as the personal 
representative of the decedent in Virginia and her prior 
qualification in West Virginia had been terminated.  Fowler 
incorrectly represented herself in the pleadings as  
“Administrator of the Estate of Robert Fowler, Deceased.”  After 
the expiration of more than two years from the decedent’s death, 
the health care providers moved the trial court to dismiss the 
action with prejudice. 
Fowler conceded that she had not complied with requirements 
of Code § 26-59 concerning the qualification of a nonresident of 
the Commonwealth to serve as a personal representative of the 
decedent.  We have previously held that a motion for judgment 
filed by one who did not have standing to sue did not toll the 
statute of limitations.  See Harbour Gate Owners’ Assoc. v. 
Berg, 232 Va. 98, 107, 348 S.E.2d 252, 258 (1986).  Nonetheless, 
Fowler maintained that she was a “real party in interest” 
pursuant to McDaniel and that her suit tolled the statute of 
limitations which would allow her to properly qualify and refile 
 
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the suit.  The trial court denied Fowler’s motion for nonsuit 
and granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice.2
 
McDaniel involved a wrongful death suit brought in Virginia 
by John R. McDaniel, Jr. (“McDaniel”), the father of the 
decedent.  McDaniel was qualified as the decedent’s personal 
representative in the state of Nevada, but not in Virginia.  
McDaniel, 198 Va. at 613, 95 S.E.2d at 202.  The trial court 
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment because McDaniel 
was not qualified as the decedent’s personal representative in 
Virginia; consequently, he had no standing.  Id. at 614, 95 
S.E.2d at 203. 
 
Four months later, McDaniel filed another wrongful death 
suit in Virginia based on the same cause of action.  In the 
second suit, McDaniel was joined by a co-plaintiff, Mary M. 
Persinger (“Persinger”), who was a resident of Virginia and 
recently had qualified as the decedent’s personal representative 
in Virginia.  The trial court dismissed the second suit holding 
that the statute of limitations had expired.  On appeal, we 
considered the question “whether the action commenced on 
September 22, 1953, by [McDaniel], as the Nevada administrator 
of [the decedent], and concluded on December 10, 1954, was such 
                     
 
2 Fowler moved for a nonsuit; however, the trial court 
denied the motion because a cross-claim was pending. See Code 
§ 8.01-380(D) (Cum. Supp. 2002).  Fowler does not assign error 
to the trial court’s denial of her motion for nonsuit. 
 
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an action, the commencement of which tolled the [statute of 
limitations].”  Id.
 
We reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that 
the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the first 
suit.  We posited the question “whether the plaintiffs in the 
two actions are substantially the same parties,” Id. at 619, 95 
S.E.2d at 206, and held that McDaniel was a “real party in 
interest” because he was qualified as the decedent’s personal 
representative in Nevada when the second suit was filed.  Id.  
We further noted the following: 
 
[McDaniel] could have sued in Nevada for the same 
cause of action, if jurisdiction of the 
defendants could have there been acquired.  He 
could have arranged with the defendants a 
settlement of the claim in controversy and his 
receipt would have been an acquittance of 
liability.  Upon the qualification of [Persinger] 
as administratrix in Virginia, he continued as a 
real party in interest, and was entitled to have 
an accounting from her.  [McDaniel and Persinger] 
. . . were substantially the same plaintiff as 
the plaintiff in the first action, suing in the 
same right.  Only the name of a co-plaintiff was 
added in the second action.  Whatever the name of 
the plaintiff, the real party in interest 
remained the same; the suit was instituted in the 
same right; and the cause of action was the same. 
 
Id.
 
The focal point of our analysis in McDaniel was that 
McDaniel was a qualified personal representative of the 
decedent’s estate, albeit in Nevada rather than Virginia, when 
the first suit was filed.  By contrast, Fowler was not a 
 
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qualified personal representative anywhere.  Although she had 
previously qualified as the decedent’s personal representative 
in West Virginia, her qualification there was terminated by the 
Final Settlement Order of the Berkeley County Commission on 
October 2, 2000.  In contrast to the posture of the case in 
McDaniel, when Fowler filed this wrongful death suit in 
Virginia, she was not qualified as the decedent’s personal 
representative in Virginia or any other state; consequently, she 
will never be able to file a new suit as a qualified personal 
representative and claim that she is “substantially the same 
party” as the plaintiff in the first suit. 
III. Conclusion 
 
Fowler concedes she does not have standing to maintain this 
action for wrongful death of the decedent.  Her circumstances 
are distinguished from McDaniel and she cannot obtain the 
benefit of tolling of the statute of limitations during the 
pendency of the suit.  For the reasons stated, we hold that the 
trial court did not err in dismissing Fowler’s Motion for 
Judgment with prejudice.  We will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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