Title: Bailey v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992840
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, Senior Justice 
 
MARK WESLEY BAILEY 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 992840,         JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
                000151                 April 21, 2000 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Walter J. Ford, Judge 
 
As mandated by Code § 17.1-313, we review the convictions 
and death sentences imposed upon Mark Wesley Bailey (Bailey), 
for the capital murder of Nathan Mark Bailey (Nathan), Bailey’s 
two-year-old son.  We also review Bailey’s convictions for the 
first-degree murder of Katherine Ester Bailey (Katherine), 
Bailey’s wife, and use of a firearm in the commission of capital 
murder and first-degree murder.1
                     
1By order entered January 27, 2000, we certified from the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia to this Court the record of 
Bailey’s appeal of the noncapital convictions (Record No. 
000151).  The effect of the certification is to transfer 
jurisdiction over the noncapital appeal to this Court.  Code 
§ 17.1-409(A).  Because the certification occurred after the 
filing of the opening brief in the capital appeal (Record No. 
992840), we permitted Bailey to file a supplemental brief based 
upon the petition for appeal he had filed in the Court of 
Appeals.  Only the first of Bailey’s assignments of error in the 
supplemental brief raises an issue not already raised in the 
capital appeal.  The remaining assignments of error in the 
supplemental brief, numbers 2, 3, and 4, correspond to 
assignments of error numbers 10, 11, and 12 in the capital 
appeal.  Accordingly, we will address those issues in this 
opinion with reference to the latter designations.  
 
 
2
BACKGROUND 
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we will 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the party prevailing below.  Clagett v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 84, 472 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997).  In his opening brief, Bailey 
recounts a self-serving narrative of his wife’s infidelity which 
he contends drove him to commit these crimes.  The facts 
underlying this narrative were developed during the penalty-
determination phase of Bailey’s trial as evidence in mitigation 
against the death penalty.  The prurient details of this 
evidence are not relevant to any issue to be considered in these 
appeals other than the appropriateness of the imposition of the 
death penalty.  Accordingly, we will limit our present 
recitation of the facts to those relevant to our consideration 
of Bailey’s assignments of error. 
Bailey was married to Katherine, his cousin whom he had 
known most of his life and with whom he had been romantically 
involved for over a year, on December 25, 1993 in Reno, Nevada.  
In March 1996, Katherine gave birth to the couple’s son, Nathan.  
After the birth of their son, the couple became emotionally 
estranged, although they continued living in the same household. 
 
 
3
In mid-1998, Bailey began relating to his co-workers a 
fabricated account of his wife having received threatening 
telephone calls and notes.  Bailey subsequently admitted to 
police that he invented these stories in order to divert 
suspicion from himself when he murdered his wife.  In August 
1998, Bailey borrowed a .22-caliber pistol from a friend and 
purchased ammunition for the pistol. 
On September 10, 1998, Bailey awoke about 4:30 a.m., went 
to the bedroom where his wife was sleeping, and shot her three 
times in the head with the borrowed pistol.  Bailey then heard 
Nathan awaking in the next bedroom.  He went to his son’s 
bedroom and shot the child twice in the head as the child was 
climbing out of bed. 
Bailey washed blood off his face and dressed for work.  He 
cut the bathroom window screen with a razor knife and cut the 
outside telephone line in order to give the appearance that a 
break-in had occurred.  Bailey then left for work, taking the 
pistol and razor knife with him. 
When Bailey arrived at work, he told Richard Moravec, his 
supervisor, that his wife had received another threatening note 
that read “X-U-T” or “X-U-P” and that he believed this meant 
“Time’s up.”  Bailey repeated this story to Joseph Yount, 
Moravec’s supervisor.  A short time later, Bailey told Moravec 
 
 
4
that he had received a telephone call from someone claiming that 
he “had [Bailey’s] wife.”  Moravec reported these events to 
Yount, who instructed Moravec to call the police.  Yount then 
accompanied Bailey to Bailey’s home. 
When Yount and Bailey arrived at Bailey’s home, police had 
already arrived and an officer emerging from one of the bedrooms 
stopped the two men in the living room.  Yount suggested that 
they wait outside.  Yount later testified that as they waited 
Bailey “was stone-faced and cold-looking.”  Thomas Killilea, a 
detective with the Hampton Police Department, informed Bailey 
that his wife and son were dead.  Killilea testified that upon 
hearing this, Bailey lurched forward and appeared to have tears 
in his eyes.  Bailey then told Killilea about the threatening 
telephone calls and notes that he claimed his wife had received. 
Killilea asked Bailey to accompany him to the police 
station and Bailey agreed.  Bailey rode in the front of 
Killilea’s police vehicle; Yount rode in the back seat.  Bailey 
was not under arrest at this time.  At the police station, 
Bailey signed a consent form allowing the police to search his 
home; he also consented to take a polygraph test.  While at the 
police station, Bailey was offered food, drink, and the 
opportunity to use the lavatory.  He engaged the police officers 
in casual conversation and was allowed to step outside to smoke 
 
 
5
cigarettes.  During this time, Bailey wrote a statement 
detailing the fictitious story of the threats made against his 
wife. 
The polygraph was administered to Bailey at 12:15 p.m.  
During the polygraph, the examiner detected deception in 
Bailey’s response to the question, “Are you intentionally 
withholding the name of the killer . . .?”  The examiner asked 
Bailey if he thought it was time to tell the detectives “what 
was really going on.”  Bailey looked at the floor and answered, 
“[Y]eah.” 
At 1:42 p.m., Bailey was taken to an interview room where 
Killilea and Detective Jimmy L. Forbes spoke to him for a little 
over an hour.  Bailey was mostly unresponsive during this 
interview.  Forbes raised the subject of his own religious 
beliefs.  He suggested that Bailey needed to get his “heart 
right with the Lord and that his soul would not rest until he 
did.”  Bailey asked for a soft drink.  When Killilea left the 
room to get the soft drink, Bailey took a legal pad and pen from 
the table in the interview room and wrote, “I Mark Bailey do 
hereby without any coercsion [sic] admit to the murder of my 
wife and son.” 
When Killilea returned with the soft drink, Forbes showed 
him the statement Bailey had written.  Bailey then said, “You 
 
 
6
got what you wanted.  I guess I’m not leaving now.”  At 3:19 
p.m., Bailey was advised of his Miranda rights, and the 
detectives began an interrogation that lasted until 5:45 p.m.  
During this period Bailey wrote out answers to the detectives’ 
questions and a videotape of his confession to the murders was 
made. 
During his stay at the police station Bailey never asked to 
leave, nor did he request an attorney.  At the conclusion of the 
interrogation, Bailey remarked to Killilea, “You probably think 
I’m an [expletive deleted] for killing my wife and family - - or 
my wife and son.”  The detective explained that if he had 
thought that he would not have treated Bailey with dignity and 
respect.  Bailey agreed he had been “treated well.” 
PROCEEDINGS 
A. Pre-trial
On December 7, 1998, the grand jury of the City of Hampton 
returned an indictment against Bailey charging him with the 
capital murder of Nathan as part of the same act or transaction 
as the killing of Katherine, Code § 18.2-31(7), “and/or” as the 
killing of a person under the age of fourteen by a person 
twenty-one years of age or older, Code § 18.2-31(12).  In 
separate indictments, Bailey was also charged with the first-
degree murder of Katherine, Code § 18.2-32, and with one count 
 
 
7
of the use of a firearm in each of the two killings, Code 
§ 18.2-53.1. 
On January 12, 1999, Bailey filed a motion for the 
appointment of an “expert investigator.”  Bailey contended that 
he needed the assistance of an investigator to “locate essential 
witnesses and data, [and] examine and evaluate testimony and 
documents . . . likely to be significant at a capital murder 
trial.”  By order entered that same day, the trial court denied 
the motion, finding there was no “sufficient reasonable cause 
for an investigator to be assigned to the defense in this case.” 
On February 9, 1999, Bailey filed a motion to have the 
Virginia capital murder and death penalty statutes declared 
unconstitutional.  Within a supporting memorandum filed with 
that motion, Bailey set out various arguments that the manner in 
which capital murder trials are conducted and death sentences 
reviewed on appeal violated aspects of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  
Since Bailey challenges the denial of his motion by the trial 
court in this appeal, we need not recite those arguments here, 
but will address them in our discussion of Bailey’s assignments 
of error. 
On that same day, Bailey filed a motion for discovery and 
inspection.  Within that motion, Bailey made a litany of 
 
 
8
requests for information from the Commonwealth, which, as his 
counsel subsequently conceded during argument of the motion, 
went well beyond any reasonable interpretation of what the 
Commonwealth could be required to provide a defendant under Rule 
3A:11 and the dictates of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
The trial court, acknowledging that the Commonwealth had an 
“open file” policy, granted the motion only to the extent that 
criminal discovery is required by Rule 3A:11. 
On March 29, 1999, Bailey filed a motion to suppress the 
statements he made to the police on September 10, 1998.  During 
oral argument in support of that motion, Bailey contended that 
any statements made to the police prior to his having been read 
his Miranda rights were the product of an improper custodial 
interrogation.  He further contended that his confession given 
thereafter was not voluntary because the detectives through 
trickery and manipulation had overborne his will.  After hearing 
evidence from the three detectives principally responsible for 
the interview and interrogation of Bailey, the trial court found 
that Bailey had not been in custody prior to his initial 
admission of culpability for the murders and that his subsequent 
confession was not the result of his will having been overborne 
by the detectives.  The trial court denied the suppression 
motion. 
 
 
9
On May 5, 1999, Bailey filed a motion for a bill of 
particulars requesting, inter alia, that the Commonwealth 
specify which of the aggravating factors of future dangerousness 
or vileness it would rely upon in seeking to impose the death 
penalty and the evidence in support thereof it would present.  
Following oral argument on this motion, the trial court denied 
the motion, finding that the indictment adequately informed 
Bailey of the nature of the charges brought against him. 
B. Guilt-determination Phase 
On July 20, 1999, a three-day jury trial commenced in the 
trial court.  Evidence in accord with the facts recited above 
concerning the events of September 10, 1998 was developed 
through the testimony of various police officers and Bailey’s 
co-workers.  In addition, the Commonwealth presented forensic 
evidence through the testimony of Assistant Chief Medical 
Examiner Dr. Leah L.E. Bush. 
Dr. Bush performed autopsies on the bodies of both victims.  
She testified that Katherine had sustained three gunshot wounds 
to the parieto-occipital area of the skull behind the left ear.  
From the absence of powder stippling on the body, Dr. Bush 
estimated that the shots had been fired from a distance of three 
feet or more and that any one of the three wounds would have 
been lethal.  Dr. Bush further testified that Nathan had 
 
 
10
sustained two close range gunshot wounds to the head and that 
both shots penetrated the brain and either alone would have been 
lethal. 
The Commonwealth introduced photographs of the crime scene 
through the testimony of Patrol Officer Keith Tucker and 
paramedic Chris Skutans, who were among the first to arrive at 
the crime scene.  Each testified that these photographs depicted 
what they saw inside the house, the only difference being that 
the house had been dark when they entered it and the photographs 
showed the scene illuminated rather than dark.  The trial court 
admitted these photographs in evidence over Bailey’s objection 
that a proper foundation had not been laid for their admission.  
Bailey also objected to several of these photographs and to 
autopsy photographs of both victims on the grounds that they 
were inflammatory and irrelevant.  The trial court overruled 
this objection, finding that the photographs were relevant to 
show the nature of the victims’ wounds. 
Bailey did not testify or offer any evidence in his defense 
in the guilt-determination phase.  Rather, Bailey relied on the 
content of his statement to police, arguing to the jury that it 
showed he had not planned or intended to kill his son, but that 
he had done so in a moment of passion after he panicked when he 
realized that Nathan would be traumatized by finding his 
 
 
11
mother’s dead body.  Similarly, he contended that the killing of 
Katherine was not premeditated, but the result of his mental 
anguish and emotional disturbance. 
Bailey objected to two instructions proffered by the 
Commonwealth that permitted the jury to find Bailey guilty of 
two counts of capital murder based upon the two theories of 
capital murder stated in the indictment.  Bailey contended that 
the indictment charged only one count of capital murder.  The 
trial court found that the “indictment is subject to two 
different, separate sections of the statute . . . and [it would 
be] proper to actually have two capital murder charges.” 
The jury found Bailey guilty of two counts of capital 
murder in the killing of Nathan as charged in the indictment, of 
first-degree murder in the killing of Katherine, and of both 
firearm charges. 
C. Penalty-determination Phase 
Prior to the commencement of the penalty-determination 
phase, the Commonwealth elected not to present evidence of 
Bailey’s future dangerousness to society.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth relied solely upon the vileness aggravating factor 
to establish the appropriateness of imposing death sentences for 
the two capital murder convictions.  The Commonwealth presented 
evidence of vileness based upon the statutory definition that 
 
 
12
“the offense . . . involved . . . depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim.”  Code § 19.2-264.2. 
Dr. Bush again testified for the Commonwealth and 
reiterated her prior testimony concerning the gunshot wounds 
sustained by the two victims.  She further testified that the 
manner in which Nathan was killed was consistent with an 
“execution-style gunshot wound.”  The Commonwealth also 
presented victim-impact testimony from Katherine’s mother.  
Prior to resting its case, the Commonwealth asked the trial 
court to instruct the jury to also consider all the testimony 
from the guilt-determination phase in considering the sentences. 
Testifying for the defense, Dr. Evan Nelson, a clinical 
psychologist, described Bailey as suffering from a borderline 
personality disorder.  Dr. Nelson testified that impulsive 
actions are characteristic of this condition.  Dr. Nelson 
further opined that the killing of Nathan was “a very impulsive 
act . . . an impulsive, stupid, terrible, senseless act . . . 
and that fits with [a diagnosis of a] borderline personality.” 
As mentioned previously, the balance of Bailey’s evidence 
during the penalty-determination phase was directed toward 
establishing that his wife’s infidelity and aberrant lifestyle 
had emotionally traumatized Bailey and, thus, mitigated his 
culpability for having committed these crimes.  Although the 
 
 
13
Commonwealth does not dispute the essential facts as recounted 
by Bailey’s witnesses, Bailey’s interpretation that the evidence 
showed him to be the “victim” of his wife’s emotional 
manipulation was by no means established beyond controversion.  
It was for the jury to determine what weight to accord this 
evidence in determining Bailey’s sentence.  We are cognizant of 
the record and will consider it in our review of the jury’s 
sentence even though we do not recount that evidence. 
Bailey objected to the Commonwealth’s proposed verdict 
forms for the capital murder charges, which permitted the jury 
to impose a death sentence upon finding either that the killing 
of Nathan was vile because it resulted from an aggravated 
battery or because the murder resulted from a depravity of mind, 
or that both of these circumstances were present.  Bailey 
contended that the forms were confusing, but acknowledged that 
the forms properly instructed the jury that it should impose a 
life sentence if it found that there was insufficient proof of 
the vileness aggravating factor under either theory relied upon 
by the Commonwealth.  Bailey further indicated that he did not 
have alternative forms to proffer.  The trial court adopted the 
Commonwealth’s verdict forms. 
 
 
14
The jury imposed the death sentence for each of the capital 
murder charges, a life sentence for the first-degree murder 
charge, and a total of eight years for the firearm charges. 
D. Post-trial 
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Bailey filed a motion 
requesting that the trial court obtain the records of capital 
murder cases maintained by this Court pursuant to Code § 17.1-
313.  The trial court denied the motion, indicating that it had 
already reviewed “a large volume” of relevant cases in 
anticipation of Bailey’s trial and sentencing and that it was 
therefore not necessary for the trial court to obtain and review 
additional records from this Court. 
In that same motion, Bailey sought to have the jury’s death 
penalty verdict set aside on the ground that the sentence was 
disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases.  
Following the preparation of a pre-sentencing report, the trial 
court held a sentencing hearing and heard argument from Bailey 
concerning the appropriateness of imposing the death sentences.  
Bailey contended that the death sentence was not appropriate 
because the killing of a child by his parent was an “emotional 
trigger” which clouded the jury’s judgment, but which did not 
indicate the requisite depravity of mind.  Bailey asserted that 
the vileness of the crime was thus based solely on the question 
 
 
15
of an aggravated assault, and that the forensic evidence showed 
that the victims “never knew what hit them” because the first 
shots would have been fatal or rendered the victims unconscious.  
The trial court confirmed the death sentences and the other 
sentences imposed by the jury.  These appeals followed. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Moot Issues
Bailey’s fourth assignment of error challenges the 
constitutionality of the Virginia death penalty statute on the 
ground that the Commonwealth may prove the aggravating factor of 
future dangerousness through evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
conduct.  Because the Commonwealth did not present evidence 
during the penalty-determination phase concerning Bailey’s 
future dangerousness to society, this issue is moot and need not 
be addressed.  See Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 228 n.2, 
441 S.E.2d 195, 200 n.2, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994); 
Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 53 
(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989).  For the same 
reason, Bailey’s challenges to the constitutionality of the 
future dangerousness aggravating factor that are part of his 
first and third assignments of error are also moot. 
 
 
16
B. Issues Previously Decided 
In his fourteenth assignment, Bailey asserts that the trial 
court erred in denying as overbroad that portion of his 
discovery motion that requested information from the 
Commonwealth beyond that requisite to meet the requirements of 
Rule 3A:11.  Bailey contends that a capital murder defendant 
should be afforded more extensive discovery because of “the 
unique and irreversible nature of the death penalty.”  At the 
hearing on his motion, Bailey conceded that his motion requested 
any and all evidence Rule 3A:11 required the Commonwealth to 
provide him and “anything else including the kitchen sink.”  
Bailey’s motion and argument are virtually identical to those 
discussed in Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 63, 515 S.E.2d 
565, 570-71 (1999).  As in that case, the record here reflects 
that Bailey received all of the discovery to which he was 
entitled.  We find nothing in Bailey’s argument that would 
warrant an extension of his discovery rights.  Id. at 63, 515 
S.E.2d at 571. 
Bailey further contends in his fifteenth assignment of 
error that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
bill of particulars.  There is no merit to this contention.  In 
Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227, cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991), we held that when the indictment is 
 
 
17
sufficient to give the accused “notice of the nature and 
character of the offense charged so he can make his defense,” a 
bill of particulars is not required.  Id. at 490, 404 S.E.2d at 
233; see also Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 
S.E.2d 411, 413 (1976).  Here, there is no challenge to the 
sufficiency of the indictment.  As in Strickler, those parts of 
Bailey’s request for a bill of particulars seeking disclosure of 
the evidence upon which the Commonwealth intended to rely in the 
guilt and sentencing phases of the trial “are sweeping demands 
for pretrial disclosure of all the Commonwealth’s evidence.”  
Strickler, 241 Va. at 490, 404 S.E.2d at 233.  As such, the 
request for a bill of particulars was nothing more than an 
effort to obtain the same material Bailey had sought to obtain 
through his overbroad discovery motion.  We find nothing in this 
record to warrant reconsideration of the well established 
principles reiterated in Strickler concerning a defendant’s 
right to a bill of particulars. 
C. Matters Within the Trial Court’s Discretion 
Bailey’s tenth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error 
concern rulings committed to the trial court’s discretion.  In 
each instance we find no evidence to support a finding of an 
abuse of that discretion and, accordingly, we hold that no error 
occurred. 
 
 
18
Bailey contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to be provided the services of an “expert investigator.”  
We have consistently rejected the contention that defendants, 
even in capital murder cases, have an indiscriminate entitlement 
to the assistance of an investigator.  See, e.g., George v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 271, 411 S.E.2d 12, 16 (1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992).  Rather, as with any request for 
the Commonwealth to provide a defendant with expert assistance, 
the defendant must demonstrate that he has a particularized 
need, meaning one which is material to the preparation of his 
defense, for the services of an expert, and that the denial of 
such services would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.  See 
Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 212, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 
(1996).  The determination whether a defendant has adequately 
demonstrated a particularized need for the assistance of an 
expert rests within the discretion of the trial court.  Id. at 
212, 476 S.E.2d at 926. 
Bailey asserted in his motion that he required an 
investigator to “locate essential witnesses and data, [and] 
examine and evaluate testimony and documents . . . likely to be 
significant at a capital murder trial.”  At the hearing on his 
motion, Bailey merely reiterated his “need [for] some additional 
assistance by way of the investigation” being conducted by his 
 
 
19
counsel.  These assertions fall far short of demonstrating a 
particularized need for the services of an expert.  “Mere hope 
or suspicion that favorable evidence is available is not enough 
to require that such help be provided.”  Id. at 212, 476 S.E.2d 
at 925.  Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying Bailey’s motion for the services of an 
expert investigator. 
Bailey contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence thirteen photographs of the crime scene without 
proper foundation.  He contends that these photographs were not 
initially proffered by the photographer who produced them and 
that they did not accurately reflect the crime scene at the time 
the subscribing witness first observed it.2  The thirteen 
photographs at issue were introduced during the testimony of 
Officer Tucker and Skutans, the paramedic.  Each testified that 
the photographs accurately depicted the murder scene except that 
the scene was more brightly lit in the photographs than it had 
been. 
                     
2Detective James A. Dillabough of the Hampton Police Crime 
Scene Unit subsequently testified and identified the photographs 
as those he had taken during the investigation of the murders 
later on the morning of September 10, 1998.  Bailey, however, 
stated that he would not waive his prior objection. 
 
 
 
20
We consistently have held that the admission of photographs 
into evidence rests within the sound discretion of a trial 
court, and that the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the record discloses a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91-92, 501 
S.E.2d 134, 138, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998); Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 459, 470 S.E.2d 114, 126, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 887(1996).  Photographs are generally admitted 
into evidence for two purposes: to illustrate a witness’ 
testimony, and as an “independent silent witness” of matters 
revealed by the photograph.  See Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 
Va. 745, 746, 187 S.E.2d 189, 190, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861 
(1972).  “[A] photograph which is verified by the testimony of a 
witness as fairly representing what that witness has observed is 
admissible in evidence and . . . it need not be proved by the 
photographer who made it.”  Id.
Here, the testimony of the two witnesses that the 
photographs fairly represented what they had observed was 
adequate to establish the authenticity of the representation of 
the photographs.  Clagett, 252 Va. at 87, 472 S.E.2d at 268.  
The mere fact that the lighting was different at the time the 
photographs were taken is not sufficient to render their 
admission into evidence by the trial court an abuse of 
 
 
21
discretion.  See id. at 86, 472 S.E.2d at 267 (permitting jury 
to view videotape of crime scene where bodies of victims had 
been moved by emergency personnel was not abuse of discretion). 
Bailey also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
four photographs of the crime scene and eight autopsy 
photographs of the victims, on the ground that they were 
cumulative, gruesome, and unduly inflammatory.  Specifically 
with respect to the photographs of Nathan, Bailey asserts that 
because he stipulated to “the manner of the child’s death” as 
depicted by diagrams in the autopsy report, the crime scene and 
autopsy photographs “added nothing to the information the jurors 
already possessed” and “did not tend to show motive, intent, 
method, premeditation, malice, or the degree of atrociousness of 
the crime.”  We disagree. 
Admission of graphic photographs rests within the 
discretion of the trial court so long as they are relevant and 
accurately portray the scene of the crime or the condition of 
the victim.  See Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 135, 321 
S.E.2d 273, 280 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).  
Contrary to Bailey’s assertion, his stipulation to “the manner 
of the child’s death” did not render the crime scene and autopsy 
photographs cumulative or irrelevant.  The autopsy photographs 
were relevant to explain the clinical illustrations of Nathan’s 
 
 
22
wounds in the autopsy report.  Moreover, it is self-evident that 
all these photographs tended to establish the method, 
maliciousness, and degree of atrociousness of the crime.  
Walton, 256 Va. at 92, 501 S.E.2d at 138; Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 
470 S.E.2d at 126.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial 
court’s discretion in the admission of any of these photographs. 
D. Constitutionality of the Virginia Capital Punishment Statutes 
Bailey’s first, second, third, fifth, and sixth assignments 
of error repeat the challenges to the constitutionality of the 
Virginia death penalty statute and the statutory scheme under 
which capital murder trials are conducted and death sentences 
are reviewed on appeal that the trial court rejected in 
addressing Bailey’s pre-trial motion.  We have thoroughly 
addressed and rejected in numerous prior capital murder cases 
the arguments raised in these assignments of error, and we find 
no reason to modify our previously expressed views on these 
issues. 
In Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 
674-75, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994), we rejected the 
assertion that capital punishment statutes do not give 
meaningful guidance to a jury because they do not require the 
jury to find that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
ones before fixing the death penalty.  In Breard we also 
 
 
23
rejected the contention that the method of instructing jury on 
mitigation impermissibly interferes with jury’s consideration of 
evidence offered in mitigation.  Id.
In Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 552, 364 S.E.2d 
483, 488, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988), we rejected the 
assertion that the vileness aggravating factor is 
unconstitutionally vague.  Similarly, we have repeatedly 
rejected the contentions that the death penalty constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, see, e.g., Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82, 
452 S.E.2d 862, 865, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995), and that 
the method of review of a death sentence by trial court and by 
this Court on appeal are unconstitutional, see, e.g., Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 61, 515 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1999), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 955 (2000). 
In his seventh assignment of error, Bailey contends, inter 
alia, that this Court has failed in its statutory duty under 
Code § 17.1-313(E) to maintain “records of all capital felony 
cases” for use in the proportionality review required by Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(2), and that this constitutes a violation of 
“Bailey’s due process and other constitutional rights.”  We 
disagree. 
 
 
24
Code § 17.1-313(A) requires that “[a] sentence of death, 
upon the judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit court, 
shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court.”  As part 
of that mandatory review, subsection (C)(2) of the statute 
directs this Court to determine “[w]hether the sentence of death 
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  
Code § 17.1-313(E) further provides that: 
The Supreme Court may accumulate the records of 
all capital felony cases tried within such period of 
time as the court may determine.  The court shall 
consider such records as are available as a guide in 
determining whether the sentence imposed in the case 
under review is excessive.  Such records as are 
accumulated shall be made available to the circuit 
courts. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
This statute uses discretionary language permitting this 
Court to determine the period of time within which the records 
of all capital felony cases will be accumulated for purposes of 
a proportionality review of a death sentence.  Thus, in the 
first capital murder case reviewed by this Court following the 
enactment of the former version of Code § 17.1-313, the Court 
exercised that discretion by entering an order 
directing the Clerk of this Court henceforth to 
segregate and accumulate the printed records and 
opinions in all class 1 felony cases, to maintain a 
current index of those cases, and to make the index, 
records, and opinions of this Court available for 
 
 
25
examination upon the request of any court of record in 
the Commonwealth or in the federal jurisdiction. 
 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 482 n.8, 248 S.E.2d 135, 151 
n.8 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); see also Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 450, 323 S.E.2d 554, 567 (1984), 
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985). 
This archive now maintained by the Clerk pursuant to our 
order contains the records of all appeals of convictions under 
Code § 18.2-31, whether the sentence imposed was death or life 
imprisonment, filed in this Court since Smith and, from 1986, 
those capital cases resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment 
first reviewed in the Court of Appeals of Virginia.  In 
addition, these records have been summarized in digest form, and 
are cross-indexed according to the offense of conviction, the 
sentence imposed, and whether a jury or the trial court imposed 
that sentence.3
                     
3Although Bailey offers no supporting authority for the 
proposition that these records are incomplete, we recognize that 
a small number of defendants convicted of capital murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment waive their right of appeal and, 
thus, records of those cases are not included in the archive 
maintained by this Court pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E).  
However, we are of opinion that such cases almost invariably 
involve guilty pleas and the Commonwealth’s agreement not to 
seek the death penalty.  Thus, their value for making a 
proportionality analysis is minimal because the record would 
contain little or no background upon which to make the 
proportionality comparison.  
 
 
26
Moreover, contrary to Bailey’s assertion that the 
maintenance of “complete” records is requisite to the 
preservation of his right to a proportionality review of his 
death sentence, nothing in the statute, nor in the case law 
relied upon by Bailey, prescribes the method by which an 
appellate court conducts a proportionality review of a death 
sentence.  Rather, so long as the methods employed assure that 
the death sentence is not disproportionate to the penalty 
generally imposed for comparable crimes, due process will be 
satisfied and the defendant’s constitutional rights protected. 
Additional challenges to the constitutionality of the 
capital appellate review process raised within Bailey’s seventh 
assignment of error have been previously addressed, and we find 
no reason to modify our previously expressed views.  See, e.g., 
Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 473-74, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508-
09, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987)(procedures for appellate 
review of death penalty cases, including expedited review, 
provide a meaningful appeal and are constitutional). 
On a related issue, in his twentieth assignment of error, 
Bailey contends that the trial court erred in refusing his 
motion that it obtain from this Court and review the records of 
prior capital murder cases maintained pursuant to Code 17.1-
313(E) before determining whether the death sentences were 
 
 
27
appropriate, or to set them aside for “good cause shown” 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5.4  This contention is without 
merit. 
As noted above, Code § 17.1-313(E) requires that “[s]uch 
records as are accumulated [by this Court] shall be made 
available to the circuit courts.”  We have previously supplied 
our records to a circuit court upon request.  See Bunch v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 448, 304 S.E.2d 271, 285, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).  However, nothing in the statute 
requires the circuit court to make such a request, the matter 
being one committed to the trial court’s discretion.  Here, the 
trial court indicated that it had reviewed a large number of 
cases to permit it to fairly determine whether the death 
sentences were appropriate.  Moreover, nothing in the record 
constitutes good cause shown to set these sentences aside and 
for the trial court to have imposed life sentences.  
                     
4Bailey further contends that the trial court’s denial of 
his motion constitutes a violation of his constitutional right 
to a proportionality review.  Bailey did not raise this argument 
below and, thus, we shall not consider it for the first time on 
appeal.  Rule 5:25.  Moreover, Bailey confuses the 
appropriateness review conducted by the trial court pursuant to 
Code § 19.2-264.5 with the proportionality review conducted by 
this Court pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(2).  The 
proportionality review conducted by this Court in all death 
sentence cases suffices to secure the rights of the defendant in 
this regard.  
 
 
28
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
denial of Bailey’s motion. 
In his motion to have the Virginia death penalty statute 
and the statutory scheme under which capital murder trials are 
conducted and death sentences are reviewed on appeal declared 
unconstitutional, Bailey contended that the Commonwealth’s 
system of appointing counsel in capital cases results in a 
denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel.  The 
trial court rejected this contention without comment. 
In addition, in his eighth assignment of error, Bailey 
asserts that “Virginia has no system for appointment of counsel 
. . . [and] expends no public funds on education, assistance, or 
training of capital defense counsel.”  Bailey further asserts 
that appointed counsel in capital cases are “disproportionately 
from small firms with resources inadequate to defend a capital 
murder charge.”  Bailey also contends that the Commonwealth 
fails to provide meaningful review of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims raised in habeas corpus petitions.  According to 
Bailey, “[t]hese factors, individually and collectively, violate 
Bailey’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”  We disagree. 
Bailey’s assertion that Virginia has no system for the 
appointment of counsel in capital cases is demonstrably in 
error.  Code §§ 19.2-163.7 and 19.2–163.8 provide, in capital 
 
 
29
cases, for the appointment of counsel who meet qualifications 
determined by the Public Defender Commission in conjunction with 
the Virginia State Bar.  These statutes provide the criteria to 
be considered in determining the qualifications for attorneys so 
appointed, including the requirements that they have “current 
training in death penalty litigation . . . [and a] demonstrated 
proficiency and commitment to quality representation.”  We are 
of opinion that this statutory scheme for identifying and 
appointing qualified attorneys to represent indigent defendants 
in capital murder cases adequately safeguards those defendants’ 
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. 
Bailey cites no authority for the proposition that a state 
is required, as part of its obligation to afford indigent 
defendants with appointed counsel in capital cases, to further 
provide for the education, assistance, or training of such 
counsel.  In any case, there is no merit to Bailey’s contention 
that Virginia fails to allocate public funds for these purposes.  
In addition to establishing and funding the Public Defender 
Commission, the General Assembly, through the appropriation made 
for the Virginia State Bar, allocates funds for the Virginia 
Capital Representation Resource Center.  See, e.g., 1998-2000 
Executive Budget, 1999 Amendments, page B-17 (1999). 
 
 
30
Moreover, in 1998, the General Assembly authorized a study 
of “the quality of capital representation of indigent defendants 
in Virginia . . . [and] the standards for qualification of 
counsel promulgated pursuant to [Code] § 19.2-163.8.”  House 
Joint Resolution 190, Acts 1998, at p. 2649.  Although 
recommending certain improvements in the manner in which counsel 
are appointed in capital cases, the authors of the study 
concluded that “[t]he overall state of the system for 
representation of indigent capital defendants is good.”  Report 
of the Virginia State Crime Commission, Capital Representation 
of Indigent Defendants, House Document 60, at 1 (1999).  
According to a survey conducted as part of the study, the 
quality of representation by appointed counsel in capital murder 
trials, as appraised by the trial court judges, met or exceeded 
the desired level of expertise and performance ninety-eight 
percent of the time.  Id. at 19.  This empirical data refutes 
Bailey’s wholly unsupported assertion that appointed counsel in 
capital murder cases are generally unqualified to provide 
effective representation. 
We further reject Bailey’s contention, also unsupported by 
reference to any credible data, that appointed counsel in 
capital murder trials are “disproportionately from small firms 
with resources inadequate to defend a capital murder charge.”  
 
 
31
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-163, counsel appointed in capital murder 
cases may receive a fee in “an amount deemed reasonable by the 
court” and “payment of such reasonable expenses incurred.”  
Accordingly, the ability of an appointed attorney to represent a 
capital murder defendant is not limited to the independent 
resources available to that attorney from his or her law firm 
because the trial court will compensate the attorney for any 
reasonable expenditure of time and expenses.  Moreover, we are 
unwilling to accept Bailey’s unsupported assertion that 
attorneys in “small firms” are not in a position to adequately 
defend a client charged with capital murder. 
Bailey’s contention that Virginia fails to provide 
meaningful review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
raised in habeas corpus petitions does not state an allegation 
of a facial or systemic violation of the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to counsel.  Moreover, Bailey has not proffered 
any evidence in support of this contention.  Accordingly, we 
reject this unsupported contention. 
For these reasons, we hold that Virginia’s statutory scheme 
for the conduct of capital murder trials and the review of death 
sentences does not violate the due process rights and other 
protections afforded by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
 
 
32
E. Suppression of Bailey’s Statements to Police 
In his thirteenth assignment of error, Bailey contends that 
the trial court should have suppressed all statements made by 
him to the police because his initial confession was made before 
he received Miranda warnings.  He further contends that his 
detailed confession was the result of police coercion.  We 
disagree with both of these contentions. 
Bailey premises his argument that his initial statements 
were inadmissible and, thus, taint his subsequent full 
confession, given after he received Miranda warnings, on the 
ground that he had not waived his rights against self-
incrimination and to the benefit of counsel “during in-custody 
questioning.”  The difficulty with this argument is that it 
fails to address the trial court’s finding that prior to 
Bailey’s making his initial confession he was not in custody. 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that, before an 
individual may be questioned by police, he must be warned of his 
right to remain silent and his right to an attorney only when 
that “individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of 
his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is 
subjected to questioning.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
478 (1966).  The Supreme Court subsequently explained in Oregon 
 
 
33
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), that Miranda warnings are 
implicated only during a custodial interrogation: 
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police 
officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by 
virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of 
a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause 
the suspect to be charged with a crime.  But police 
officers are not required to administer Miranda 
warnings to everyone whom they question.  Nor is the 
requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because 
the questioning takes place in the station house, or 
because the questioned person is one whom the police 
suspect.  Miranda warnings are required only where 
there has been such a restriction on a person’s 
freedom as to render him “in custody.”  It was that 
sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its 
terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited. 
 
Id. at 495. 
 
We have also observed that Miranda warnings are not 
required in every instance when a suspect is interrogated at a 
police station.  Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47, 307 
S.E.2d 864, 872 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984).  We 
have stated that “[i]t is the custodial nature rather than the 
location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for 
giving Miranda warnings.”  Id. at 47, 307 S.E.2d at 872; accord 
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 124, 129 
(1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995). 
Bailey clearly was not in custody such as is contemplated 
by Miranda at the time he made his initial confession.  The 
record shows that he voluntarily accompanied police to the 
 
 
34
police station in an effort to continue the ruse that his wife 
had received threatening telephone calls and notes.  His 
interaction with police throughout the morning and into the 
early afternoon was entirely voluntary and Bailey was made aware 
on more than one occasion that he was free to leave, if he so 
desired.  Accordingly, we find no merit to Bailey’s contention 
that any statements he made prior to being given the Miranda 
warnings were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights.  Thus, Bailey’s initial confession was admissible and 
did not taint his subsequent confession. 
Bailey nonetheless contends that the detailed confession, 
obtained after he had been taken into custody and was given the 
Miranda warnings, was not voluntary.  He contends that “[t]he 
interrogators effectively tricked, coerced and cajoled [him] 
into making incriminating statements” and, thus, that his “will 
was overborne by the interrogators.”  We disagree. 
When determining whether a defendant’s will has been 
overborne, the totality of the circumstances, including the 
defendant’s experience and background as well as the conduct of 
the police, must be examined.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 
313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 
(1987). While the question whether a statement is voluntary is 
ultimately a legal rather than a factual one, subsidiary factual 
 
 
35
determinations made by the trial court are entitled to a 
presumption of correctness.  Thus, the trial court’s finding 
that Bailey’s will was not overborne is a factual finding, 
entitled on appeal to the same weight as a finding by a jury, 
and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong.  Witt v. 
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674-75, 212 S.E.2d 293, 297 (1975).  
The evidence summarized above is fully sufficient to support the 
trial court’s finding that Bailey knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he gave his detailed 
confession to the police.  Thus, the trial court’s denial of 
Bailey’s suppression motion was not error. 
F. Jury Instructions and Sentencing Form 
In his sixteenth assignment of error, Bailey contends that 
the trial court erred during the guilt-determination phase in 
giving separate instructions proffered by the Commonwealth 
defining capital murder as the killing of more than one person 
as a part of the same act or transaction, Code § 18.2-31(7), and 
capital murder as the killing of a person under the age of 
fourteen by a person age twenty-one or older, Code § 18.2-
31(12).  Bailey contends that the instructions were confusing in 
that they implied to the jury that “it might convict Bailey of 
capital murder twice, even though Bailey had only been indicted 
on a single count of capital murder, which set forth 
 
 
36
disjunctively the two grounds for the capital murder charge.”  
The Commonwealth contends that the indictment was worded to 
permit convictions for two offenses of capital murder.  We agree 
with the Commonwealth. 
In Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293 
(1999), the defendant was charged in separate indictments with 
two offenses of capital murder of one victim.5  We held that “it 
is clear, as well as logical, that the General Assembly intended 
for each statutory offense [in Code § 18.2-31] to be punished 
separately ‘as a Class 1 felony.’”  Id. at 228, 509 S.E.2d at 
301.  In this case, two offenses of capital murder were charged 
in a single indictment.  This distinction from Payne does not, 
however, preclude the conclusion that the indictment charged two 
capital murder offenses upon which Bailey could be convicted and 
sentenced. 
A single indictment may charge “[t]wo or more offenses 
. . . if the offenses are based on the same act or transaction.”  
Rule 3A:6.  Contrary to Bailey’s assertion, the indictment for 
the capital murder of Nathan does not charge two offenses of 
capital murder exclusively in the disjunctive.  Rather, the 
                     
5In Payne, the Court consolidated two separate capital 
murder appeals.  In both instances, however, there were multiple 
indictments charging the defendant with two counts of capital 
murder of one victim. 
 
 
37
indictment clearly charges that the killing occurred as part of 
the same act or transaction as the killing of Katherine “and/or” 
as the killing of a person under the age of fourteen by a person 
age twenty-one or older.  Thus, here, as in Payne, the 
Commonwealth was entitled to seek a separate conviction and 
death sentence on each offense of capital murder charged in the 
indictment. 
In his seventeenth assignment of error, Bailey contends 
that the trial court erred in presenting the jury with verdict 
forms in the penalty-determination phase that “were inherently 
confusing and led to a substantial risk of an unreasoned and 
hence arbitrary and capricious jury verdict.”  Bailey contends 
that this is so because the verdict forms set out three 
alternative theories under which the jury might find that the 
“vileness” predicate would apply. 
The Commonwealth contends that because Bailey proffered no 
alternative verdict forms, he is deemed to have waived his 
objection to the forms used by the trial court.  Cf. Atkins v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 178 n.8, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 n.8 
(1999).  However, unlike the circumstance in Atkins, where we 
held that a proffer of alternative verdict forms was sufficient 
to preserve an objection even though there was no express 
objection to the improper verdict forms proffered by the 
 
 
38
Commonwealth, here there is an express objection on the record.  
When a principle of law is materially vital to the defendant in 
a criminal case, it is reversible error for the trial court to 
fail to correct a defective instruction or verdict form when the 
error is patent or the subject of a proper objection.  Id. at 
178, 510 S.E.2d at 456; accord Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 
353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973); Bryant v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 390, 392-93, 219 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (1975).  Thus, 
although the better practice would have been for Bailey to 
proffer alternative verdict forms, he was not required to do so 
in order to preserve his objection. 
We agree with the Commonwealth, however, that the verdict 
forms in this case were not confusing and did not misstate the 
law.  The verdict forms merely recited the alternative findings 
the jury might make in reaching its sentencing decision.  Thus, 
unlike the situation in Atkins, the trial court’s instructions 
on sentencing and the verdict forms were in accord with and 
correctly reflected the law. 
G. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
In his ninth assignment of error, Bailey contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to strike the Commonwealth’s 
evidence presented during the guilt-determination phase with 
respect to the capital murder charges arising from the killing 
 
 
39
of Nathan.  He asserts that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
insufficient to show that he acted with premeditation in that 
killing.  In the appeal of his related convictions, Bailey 
further contends that the evidence was insufficient to support 
his conviction for the first-degree murder of Katherine, 
asserting that the evidence showed that he was “emotionally 
distraught” and “acted impulsively and without malice.”6  We 
disagree. 
The question of premeditation is a question to be 
determined by the fact-finder.  Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 
Va. 289, 295, 302 S.E.2d 520, 524, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 
(1983).  “To establish premeditation, the intent to kill need 
only exist for a moment.”  Id.  
The evidence showed that Bailey acquired the murder weapon 
several weeks in advance of the killings and made elaborate 
efforts over several months to deflect future suspicion from 
himself.  From this evidence alone, there can be no doubt that 
the murder of Katherine was deliberate and premeditated. 
Even accepting Bailey’s contention that initially he had 
not considered the impact of Katherine’s murder on his son and 
                     
6This is the only assignment of error in the noncapital 
appeal that is not duplicated by an assignment of error raised 
in the capital appeal.  See note 1, supra. 
 
 
 
40
had not intended to kill him also, the record, including 
Bailey’s own statement, shows that his decision to kill his son 
was not a sudden impulsive act, as he contends.  Rather, the 
record shows that he took deliberate action after contemplation, 
however brief.  The evidence in this case is closely on point 
with that in Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 
394, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993), where the defendant was 
convicted of killing his estranged wife and their infant son.  
In Stewart, we said that “evidence that a weapon was placed 
against a victim’s head when the fatal shot was fired . . . is 
sufficient alone to support a finding that ‘the shot was fired 
deliberately and with premeditation.’”  Id. at 240, 427 S.E.2d 
406 (citation omitted).  The record in this case shows that 
Bailey went to Nathan’s bedroom and shot the child twice in the 
head at close range.  This evidence was sufficient for the jury 
to determine that the killing of Nathan was a deliberate and 
premeditated act. 
In his eighteenth assignment of error, Bailey contends that 
the trial court erred in failing to set aside the death 
sentences imposed by the jury on the ground that there was 
insufficient evidence of vileness in the killing of Nathan.  We 
disagree. 
 
 
41
Bailey premises his argument on this issue on his 
contention that the killing of Nathan was an impulsive act of 
misguided compassion.  We have already rejected this contention, 
finding that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation even 
under Bailey’s self-serving characterization of the events.  
Similarly, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the Commonwealth’s contention that the killing of Nathan was 
committed in the course of an aggravated battery and with 
depravity of mind.  Cf. Walker, 258 Va. at 72, 515 S.E.2d at 575 
(multiple gunshot wounds establish aggravated battery); Stewart, 
245 Va. at 246, 427 S.E.2d at 409 (manner of killing and 
attempts to disguise crime reflect depravity of mind). 
H. Sentence Review 
In his nineteenth assignment of error, Bailey contends that 
the trial court erred in failing to set aside the two death 
sentences on the ground that they were “excessive and 
disproportionate” and “imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, and other arbitrary factors.”  These contentions are 
reflective of the requirements of Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) that we 
determine “[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor” 
and Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) that we determine “[w]hether the 
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
 
 
42
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and 
the defendant.”  Accordingly, we will address Bailey’s 
assignment of error and conduct the review required by statute 
jointly. 
Bailey contends that the death sentences were excessive and 
disproportionate because the evidence showed that the capital 
murder of Nathan did not involve torture or a predicate felony, 
and that death was instantaneous.  He further contends that “it 
was an impulsive killing with a gun, indistinguishable from 
literally thousands of gun-related killings across the country 
where the punishment is a term of imprisonment rather than 
death.”  We disagree. 
Without giving any credence to Bailey’s unsupported 
assertion that there are “literally thousands” of similar 
murders committed in this country, we may nonetheless 
distinguish this crime on several grounds from the type of 
impulsive killings to which Bailey alludes.  The forensic 
evidence that Nathan’s wounds resulted from an “execution-style” 
shooting rebuts Bailey’s claim that the killing was impulsive.  
Moreover, the evidence amply supports the conclusion that Bailey 
planned this killing along with the killing of Katherine and 
that he took elaborate steps to deflect suspicion from himself. 
 
 
43
We have examined the records of all capital murder cases 
reviewed by this Court, including those cases in which a life 
sentence was imposed.  We have given particular attention to 
those cases in which, as here, the death penalty was based on 
the “vileness” predicate alone.  Based on this review, we 
conclude that Bailey’s death sentences are not excessive or 
disproportionate to penalties generally imposed by other 
sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for comparable crimes.  
See, e.g., Stewart, 245 Va. at 247, 427 S.E.2d at 410; Davidson 
v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 136, 419 S.E.2d 656, 660, cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992); Buchanan, 238 Va. at 418, 384 
S.E.2d at 774. 
Bailey makes no particularized argument that the death 
sentences were imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.  However, within his 
argument on disproportionality, Bailey contends that “the jury’s 
passions and prejudice had been inflamed by the mere fact that 
the killing involved a two-year-old boy.”  Assuming this 
statement is intended to address the review required by Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(1), it is merely conclusory and we find nothing in 
the record to support it. 
Undeniably, the killing of one’s own child is among the 
most abhorrent crimes for a jury to contemplate when considering 
 
 
44
an appropriate sentence, especially when, as here, that crime 
occurs in conjunction with the equally abhorrent crime of the 
killing of one’s wife.  Nonetheless, the mere fact that a crime 
is abhorrent does not raise a presumption that the jury will be 
unable to set aside its natural emotions and fairly consider all 
the evidence.  Our review of this record does not disclose that 
the jury failed to give fair consideration to all the evidence 
both in favor and in mitigation of the death sentences, and we 
find nothing in this record which suggests that the jury, or the 
trial court in reviewing the verdicts, imposed the death 
sentences under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 
arbitrary factors. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the capital murder convictions, the death 
sentences imposed thereon, and the related convictions and 
sentences for first-degree murder and the firearm charges, we 
find no reversible error in the record, and perceive no reason 
to commute the death sentences.  For these reasons, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Record No. 992840 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 000151 — Affirmed.