Title: In re Jusstice W.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19017
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: May 21, 2013

terminate the commitment at any time. Indeed, the stat-
utory scheme for delinquent juveniles allows the court
even more autonomy than a judge sitting in criminal
court, where judges may be compelled to impose man-
datory minimum sentences for some offenses. There-
fore, we reject the respondents’ suggestion that our
opinion today will curtail judicial autonomy.
We recognize that all of the commitments involved in
this consolidated appeal were the result of plea bargains
agreed to by the state and the respondents. The respon-
dents maintain that the use of plea bargaining has been
indispensable in resolving the vast majority of juvenile
cases that are processed. The respondents suggest that
our interpretation of the statute will curtail the ability
to plea bargain in juvenile court. We disagree. As we
explained previously herein, there are a number of dis-
positions available to the court short of commitment.
Plea bargains may be discussed regarding any of the
various dispositions, for example, type of placement,
terms of probation, restitution or community service.
See General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-140 (b). Further,
although the initial commitment is for an indeterminate
period up to a maximum of eighteen months, there is
nothing that prevents juveniles from entering a plea
bargain regarding the timing of any reports and motions
to terminate the commitment. It is within the discretion
of the trial court, for instance, to require updates at
frequent intervals in order to follow the juvenile’s prog-
ress and determine whether further commitment is war-
ranted. Moreover, there may be negotiations regarding
the appropriate placement for the child. Consequently,
we do not envision a sharp decline in the availability
of plea bargaining as the result of our opinion herein.
We next address the respondents’ assertion that the
trial court’s authority to issue commitment orders of
less than eighteen months is aligned with the depart-
ment’s initiative to reduce the time that committed
delinquents spend in the training school and residential
placement. Specifically, the respondents assert that
within the juvenile justice system the best practice is
to maintain a delinquent child in the community under
the supervision of a juvenile probation officer and that,
it is only when the child’s behavior commands more
drastic measures that the court must consider removal
from the community and placement at either the train-
ing school or a residential treatment facility. From this
premise, the respondents contend that the duration of
time that a child spends in an out-of-home setting should
be limited to the minimum necessary to ensure that
the child does not continue with his or her offending
behavior. Moreover, the respondents assert that, since
the juvenile court was established in Connecticut, the
legislature has continually shortened the length of time
a judge may commit a child for placement outside of
the home. See General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-140
(f). The respondents further contend that the depart-
ment has, through their representations and actions in
decreasing the stays of out-of-home placements, dem-
onstrated that commitment periods of eighteen months
or longer appear to be beyond what is required to ade-
quately meet the out-of-home needs of committed
youth. This argument founders on the fact that the rele-
vant statutory scheme allows the department and the
court to terminate a commitment at any time, an
approach that squarely meets the concern expressed
by the respondents.14
In sum, the court finds the issues in favor of the
department. Section 46b-141 (a) (1) (A) requires a judge
to commit the delinquent child to an indeterminate com-
mitment of eighteen months subject to any subsequent
modification as provided by statute. We find in favor
of the department in all five cases because each of the
commitments was for an indeterminate period of time
less than eighteen months.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial courts in the
present cases improperly sentenced the respondents to
commitment for an indeterminate time up to a maxi-
mum period of less than eighteen months.
The judgments of the trial court are reversed and the
cases are remanded with direction to vacate both the
commitments and the pleas of the respondents upon
presentment and for further proceedings according
to law.15
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the Appellate Court.
** December 19, 2012, the date that the order was issued in this case, is
the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 The department of children and families appealed from the judgments
of the trial court to the Appellate Court, which consolidated these appeals.
Thereafter, we granted the department of children and families’ motion to
transfer the consolidated appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes
§ 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
2 General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-141 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
(1) Except as otherwise limited by subsection (i) of section 46b-140 and
subdivision (2) of this subsection, commitment of children convicted as
delinquent by the Superior Court to the Department of Children and Families
shall be for (A) an indeterminate time up to a maximum of eighteen months
. . . .’’ Hereinafter, all references to § 46b-141 are to the version appearing
in the 2012 supplement to the General Statutes.
3 This issue is presented identically in all five cases.
4 The five separate judgments of the trial court were rendered by two
different judges and one judge trial referee.
5 For the sake of clarity, we refer to all five juveniles collectively as the
respondents throughout this opinion.
6 In light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to reach the additional
issues raised in In re Jonathan S.
7 The trial court issued a single memorandum of decision for In re Jusstice
W. and In re Hakeem A. The department has referred to this memorandum
of decision as the ‘‘leading’’ trial court decision for the purpose of these
appeals. The reasoning contained within that decision was later adopted
expressly by the trial court in both In re William M. and In re Jahquise
K. Moreover, although this same reasoning was not adopted explicitly by
the trial court in In re Jonathan S., the trial court in that case did deny the
department’s motion for reconsideration after being presented with that
memorandum of decision as a source of persuasive authority.
8 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
9 The respondents contend that the legislature chose to utilize both the
term ‘‘indeterminate’’ and the phrase ‘‘up to a maximum of eighteen months’’
in setting the parameters of the commitment order. Therefore, they argue
that a commitment order is valid if it is indeterminate and does not exceed
eighteen months. They further claim that the department’s construction of
the statute ignores the phrase ‘‘up to a maximum.’’ The respondents further
assert that interpreting § 46b-141 (a) (1) (A) so as to prohibit a trial court
from entering a commitment for an indeterminate period of less than eigh-
teen months renders the term ‘‘indeterminate’’ superfluous because it
requires the trial court to enter an order of commitment for a period of
time up to a maximum of eighteen months. We recognize that ‘‘[i]nterpreting
a statute to render some of its language superfluous violates cardinal princi-
ples of statutory interpretation.’’ American Promotional Events, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 285 Conn. 192, 203, 937 A.2d 1184 (2008). ‘‘[I]n construing
statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause
or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. Going Forward, Inc., 281 Conn.
417, 424, 915 A.2d 298 (2007). In the present case, however, interpreting
General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-141 (a) (1) (A) to require a trial court
to enter an order of commitment for an indeterminate time which cannot
exceed eighteen months gives effect to both the terms ‘‘indeterminate’’ and
‘‘up to a maximum . . . .’’ Accordingly, we reject the respondents claim.
10 We also note that General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-140 (j) provides:
‘‘Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court may order a child
be (1) committed to the [department] and be placed directly in a residential
facility within this state and under contract with [the] department, or (2)
committed to the Commissioner of Children and Families for placement by
the commissioner, in said commissioner’s discretion, (A) with respect to
the juvenile offenders determined by the [department] to be the highest
risk, in the [training school], if the juvenile offender is a male, or in another
state facility, presumptively for a minimum period of twelve months, or (B)
in a private residential or day treatment facility within or outside this state,
or (C) on parole. No such commitment may be ordered or continued for
any child who has attained the age of twenty. The commissioner shall use
a risk and needs assessment classification system to ensure that male chil-
dren who are in the highest risk level will be placed in the [training school].’’
11 General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-140 (i) provides: ‘‘If the delinquent
act for which the child is committed to the [department] is a serious juvenile
offense, the court may set a minimum period of twelve months during which
the child shall be placed in a residential facility operated by or under contract
with said department, as determined by the Commissioner of Children and
Families. No such commitment may be ordered or continued for any child
who has attained the age of twenty. The setting of such minimum period
shall be in the form of an order of the court included in the mittimus.
For good cause shown in the form of an affidavit annexed thereto, the
[department], the parent or guardian of the child or the child may petition
the court for modification of any such order.’’ We observe that although
this subsection allows the court to set a minimum period for residential
placement, it does not allow the court to set a minimum period for the
length of the commitment. Again, this subsection demonstrates that if the
legislature had intended that the court have discretion in setting a minimum
period of time for a commitment, it knew how to insert those words in the
statute. We also note the use of the term ‘‘may’’ in the statute suggests that
the court has discretion in the length of placement regarding a serious
juvenile offender. The absence of the term ‘‘may’’ in the statute under review
in this decision further strengthens our interpretation of the same. General
Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-141 (a) (2) provides: ‘‘Commitment of children
convicted as delinquent by the Superior Court to the [department] shall
terminate when the child attains the age of twenty.’’
12 We interpret § 46b-141 (a) (1) (B) to the extent required to respond to
the respondents’ claims and to provide a thorough analysis of § 46b-141 (a)
(1) (A).
13 General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 46b-141 (b) provides in relevant part:
‘‘The Commissioner of Children and Families may file a motion for an
extension of the commitment as provided in subparagraph (A) of subdivision
(1) of subsection (a) of this section beyond the eighteen-month period on
the grounds that such extension is for the best interest of the child or the
community. The court shall give notice to the parent or guardian and to the
child at least fourteen days prior to the hearing upon such motion. The
court may, after hearing and upon finding that such extension is in the best
interest of the child or the community, continue the commitment for an
additional period of not more than eighteen months, except that such addi-
tional period shall not continue beyond the date the child attains the age
of twenty. . . .’’
14 We can find no authority in § 46b-141 (b) that would allow for the
extension of a commitment that had been issued for less than eighteen
months. Furthermore, we can find no authority in the statute that allows a
judge to order, at any time, that there be no further motions for modification.
Such an order would seem to frustrate the purpose of § 46b-141 (b).
15 On December 19, 2012, we issued the following order: ‘‘The court finds
the issues in favor of the [department]. Section 46b-141 (a) (1) (A) requires
a judge to commit the delinquent child to an indeterminate commitment of
eighteen months subject to any subsequent modification as provided by
statute. We find in favor of the department in all five cases because each
of the commitments was for an indeterminate period of time less than
eighteen months. A full opinion will follow.
‘‘The judgments of the trial court are reversed and the cases are remanded
for further proceedings. This court’s order reversing the judgments is hereby
stayed until the department presents each respondent at a hearing to be
held in the respective trial court not later than January 4, 2013. Accordingly,
the respondents shall remain in the custody of the department until the
hearings. At the future hearings, this court’s stay shall be lifted upon present-
ment and the trial court is ordered to vacate the prior pleas and commit-
ments. The trial court shall then exercise whatever options are available to
it pursuant to the General Statutes.
‘‘All prior motions are deemed moot as the result of this order and our
subsequent full decision.’’
This opinion represents the full decision referenced in the order. Nothing
contained herein shall be interpreted as contrary to the terms or instructions
contained in that order.