Title: Douglas M Jackson Jr v. Florida Dept of Corrections Rehearing Previous Opinion Withdrawn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-827
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2000

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC92827
____________
DOUGLAS M. JACKSON, SR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
[May 4, 2000]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner’s motion for rehearing is granted in part.  The opinion issued in
this case on November 18, 1999, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is
substituted.
Douglas M. Jackson, Sr., petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
1 There has been no change made to the 1999 version of this statute.
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FACTS
Jackson is a prisoner currently serving a life sentence for multiple murders
committed in 1981.  On April 20, 1998, Jackson filed a petition for writ of
mandamus against the Florida Department of Corrections ("the Department").  On
April 23, 1998, this Court granted Jackson's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.  However, upon further review, it came to this Court's attention that
Jackson had not complied with the requirements of section 57.085(7), Florida
Statutes (1997)1 (Prisoner Indigency Statute),  which provides in full:
A prisoner who has twice in the preceding 3 years been adjudicated
indigent under this section, certified indigent under s. 57.081, or
authorized to proceed as an indigent under 28 U.S.C. s. 1915 by a
federal court may not be adjudicated indigent to pursue a new suit,
action, claim, proceeding, or appeal without first obtaining leave of
court.  In a request for leave of court, the prisoner must provide a
complete listing of each suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal
brought by the prisoner or intervened in by the prisoner in any court or
other adjudicatory forum in the preceding 5 years.  The prisoner must
attach to a request for leave of court a copy of each complaint,
petition, or other document purporting to commence a lawsuit and a
record of disposition of the proceeding.
Accordingly, on September 18, 1998, this Court vacated its earlier order
granting Jackson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and denied the motion. 
This Court instructed Jackson that the denial was without prejudice to his filing
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another motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which complied with the
requirements of section 57.085(7).  
In our opinion filed November 18, 1999, we found Jackson’s subsequently
filed motion insufficient as well, since it still did not comply with the requirements
of the statute.  In that opinion, while we applauded the Legislature’s attempt to
curtail the filing of frivolous inmate petitions, we also expressed our concern that
strict enforcement of the copy requirement part of the statute might result in a long,
drawn-out factual inquiry.  Such an inquiry might be necessary, we noted, if an
inmate were to allege inability to comply with the requirement because the inmate
had been forced by prison officials to dispose of his or her copies of prior
proceedings, especially if prison officials asserted that the inmate had not been
forced to dispose of the documents.  In our prior opinion we also went to great
lengths to stress that enforcement of the copy requirement portion of the statute
had imposed an “administrative nightmare” on this Court and the judicial system as
a whole.  We asked the Legislature to attempt to remedy this situation.  No action
has been forthcoming.
Jackson now asserts in his motion for rehearing that the prison forced him to
do away with his copies of pleadings in all his prior proceedings, so he cannot
comply with the copy requirement of the statute.  The Department responds that it
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never forced Jackson to do away with his legal papers.  In Jackson’s reply he again
asserts that his documents were destroyed and requests an evidentiary hearing.  In
other words, our original concern has come into fruition—we are now faced with
the unhappy possibility that we must now conduct some sort of fact-finding inquiry
(or appoint a referee) to determine what documents have been destroyed and what
documents have not been destroyed.  Again, under the statute, all this must be done
before this Court can even begin to examine the merits of the petition itself.  This
outcome clearly results in another administrative burden placed on this Court by the
copy requirement part of the statute.  Thus, we are now forced to withdraw our
original opinion in this case.
ANALYSIS
In our original opinion in this case we reaffirmed the long-standing
proposition that the existence of a right for indigents to proceed without payment
of costs is a substantive one and is properly provided for by the Legislature.  See
Amos v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 416 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1982).  We also noted that the right could be properly limited by the
Legislature, including a requirement that inmates contribute toward the costs of their
lawsuits and ultimately pay for the lawsuits in full if they subsequently become able
2 The statute also provides for circumstances under which a court may determine that an inmate
is only partially indigent.  In such circumstances, the court may require the inmate to pay a reduced
payment at the time of filing and then make periodic payments toward the full payment of the filing fee. 
See § 57.085(4), Fla. Stat. (1999).
3  We hereby ask The Florida Bar Appellate Court Rules Committee to propose amendments
to  rule 9.430 to comply with the substantive payment portions of the statute and that it suggest
procedures (to be placed in the rule) for implementation of the statute.
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to do so.  See § 57.085(5), Fla. Stat. (1999).2  We reaffirm that proposition today. 
See generally Kleinschmidt v. Estate of Kleinschmidt, 392 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d DCA
1981); Lee v. City of Winter Haven, 386 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Hillman
v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 375 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).  We
again applaud the efforts of the Legislature in this regard and intend to fully enforce
the substantive payment-related provisions of the Prisoner Indigency Statute.3
A statute can, however, have both substantive provisions and procedural
requirements.  If the procedural requirements conflict with or interfere with the
procedural mechanisms of the court system, they are unconstitutional under both a
separation of powers analysis, and because formulating procedures for granting in
forma pauperis status is the exclusive province of the Supreme Court pursuant to
the rulemaking authority vested in it by the Florida Constitution.  See art. II, § 3,
art. V, § 2, Fla. Const.; see also State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969)
(noting that procedural law has been described as the legal machinery by which
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substantive law is made effective); Z & O Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Lakow, 519 So.
2d 3, 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); State v. J.A., Jr., 367 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979) (stating that substantive law, the responsibility of the Legislature, prescribes
duties and rights while procedural law, determined by the Supreme Court, 
concerns the means and methods to apply and enforce those duties and rights).
This Court has already promulgated a rule which regulates the procedure for
seeking indigency status.  The prerequisite imposed by the Prisoner Indigency
Statute that inmates file copies of their prior actions in the court before the court
may even consider making an indigency determination is an additional procedure
imposed by the statute which does not appear in this Court’s rule and conflicts
with that rule. 
Further, since prisoners attempting to comply with the copy requirement are
not required to send copies to the State, we are assuming that the copy requirement
subsection was included in the statute so that the courts could determine whether
an inmate had previously filed a frivolous or successive petition.  While we
appreciate the effort the Legislature appears to have made in an attempt to lessen
the judicial workload, the effort has had the opposite effect.  The copy requirement
has greatly increased the courts’ workload because it sets forth new procedures for
the granting of indigency status.  
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 This Court’s clerk’s office has spent countless hours explaining the copy
requirement to inmates, receiving partial submissions and sending out additional
letters informing inmates that they still have not submitted all of the required copies. 
The copy requirement has greatly increased this Court’s workload as a whole as
well.  We have, on a number of occasions, been forced to request preliminary
responses when inmates asserted that the Department of Corrections would not
make the copies necessary for compliance with the statute.  This is only one
example of the many occasions in which this Court was called upon to spend its
valuable time dealing with matters completely unrelated to the merits of the litigant’s
case.
The copy requirement must surely be a burden on the Department of
Corrections as well since even assuming an inmate has not lost possession of one
set of the copies of his or her prior legal actions, if the inmate has insufficient funds
to pay to have the prison make additional copies for the court, the Department is
still required to make the photocopies.  See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-602.405(4). 
Further, it is not uncommon for an inmate's prior pleadings to consist of several
hundred or even thousands of pages.  Clearly, this requirement must be a
tremendous burden on the Department  and, ultimately, on the taxpayer.
Moreover, while inmate pleadings are often difficult to read as they are
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usually handwritten, these pleadings are many times more difficult to read when
they have been photocopied numerous times.  A large number of the photocopies
we routinely receive from inmates are absolutely useless because they are
completely illegible.  Even if we could read them, that would increase exponentially
the amount of time it takes us to examine and rule upon each case.  The longer the
petition, the more time it takes to review and the more time it takes for this Court to
render a decision.  In other words, the copy requirement delays the administration
of justice.
Finally, once a litigious inmate has actually complied with the statute by
sending in his or her thousands of pages of prior pleadings, this Court's clerk must
place it with the court file and, due to its tremendous size and weight, literally wheel
the file up to each justice's office, where the stacks of pleadings must be reviewed. 
Ultimately, once the case is completed, the storage of these large files also poses
problems.
If the copy requirement procedure were not so cumbersome and provided
some benefit to this Court, we might merely accept the “suggested” procedure and
amend our indigency rule to implement the copy requirement.  See e.g. Kalway v.
Singletary, 708 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1998) (noting that the Court on occasion has
deferred to the expertise of the Legislature in implementing the Court’s rules of
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procedure); see also Amendments to Fla. Rules of App. Pro., 696 So. 2d 1103
(Fla. 1996).   Contrary to those cases, however, compliance with the copy
requirement  “procedure” by this Court has been extremely cumbersome and of
little, if any, use at all. 
 This Court has already promulgated a rule which regulates the procedure
and practice utilized by the courts in considering whether to grant an inmate’s
request to proceed in forma pauperis.  See, e.g., Fla. R. App. P. 9.430.  The statute
adds new procedures to the ones already in the rule and they conflict with it.  Thus,
we conclude that this legislatively imposed “procedure” is interfering with and
intruding upon the procedures and processes of this Court and conflicts with this
Court’s own rule regulating the procedure for indigency determinations (rule 9.430). 
Under such circumstances, this Court has the authority, perhaps even the duty, to
declare the copy requirement portion of the Prisoner Indigency Statute void and
state that the judiciary will not comply with it or require that inmates comply with it. 
Accordingly, we find the copy requirement portion (only) of subsection (7) of
section 57.085 to be unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers and as
a usurpation of our exclusive rulemaking authority.  We will no longer require
inmates to comply with this procedure and instruct the courts of this State to
disregard that requirement.  We suggest to the Legislature that it may wish to
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consider creating and funding a mechanism to provide the courts and the parties,
perhaps via the Internet, with access to or information about the legal actions an
inmate petitioner has filed in any of Florida’s courts.  This mechanism might
provide the information the Legislature apparently intended the copy requirement to
fulfill, that is, it might provide the courts (and the State) with a quick and easily
accessible information source to see if certain litigants have filed similar or abusive
actions before.  
Having determined that Jackson need not provide copies of his prior actions,
we have now decided that under rule 9.430, Jackson has satisfied his burden that he
has no funds with which to pay the filing fee in this case.  Accordingly, we grant
Jackson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and proceed to examine the merits
of this case. 
Upon consideration of the merits of Jackson’s case, however, we must
conclude that Jackson’s arguments have no merit.  In order to be entitled to a writ
of mandamus the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested relief and
the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested
action.  See Turner v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). 
Jackson asserts that he has a right to payment for the duties and tasks he performs
in the prison and that the Department of Corrections has a duty to pay him and to
4 Incidentally, while Florida’s constitution does not specifically outlaw slavery, the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United Statues contains a specific prohibition against slavery. 
Interestingly enough, however, convicted felons are exempted from the general prohibition contained in
the Constitution.  The Thirteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
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promulgate rules to that effect pursuant to section 944.09(m), Florida Statutes
(1997).  Nevertheless, the Department has already adopted a number of rules
relating to inmate compensation under circumstances not applicable to Jackson’s
situation.  See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-203.101(11); 33-203.201(2).  Since
the Department has promulgated rules in reference to this statute and Jackson has
no right to require the promulgation of any particular rules, Jackson’s assertions
concerning the rule promulgation are without merit.  
Jackson also argues that being forced to work without compensation violates
the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that section
946.002(3), Florida Statutes (1997), mandates that he be compensated for his work. 
Nonetheless, numerous cases, including cases cited by Jackson, hold that
requiring incarcerated prisoners to work without pay does not violate the Thirteenth
Amendment outlawing slavery,4 the Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel or unusual
punishment, or the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841
5 The 1999 version of this section has not been changed.
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F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1988); Borrer v. White, 377 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Va. 1974);
Rochon v. Blackburn, 727 So. 2d 602 (La. Ct. App.1998).   The only situation in
which an entitlement to compensation might arise is where a state statute mandates
payment to prisoners.  See, e.g., Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.
1985) (plaintiff stated claim where Arizona statute created a right to compensation
where inmate performed certain labor); Borrer v. White, 377 F. Supp. 181 (W.D.
Va. 1974) (holding that there was no federal constitutional right to payment but if
there were a state statute providing for compensation, inmate might be entitled to
such compensation under the statute).   
Section 946.002, Florida Statutes (1997),5 does not mandate that prisoners
be compensated.   It provides that all able-bodied prisoners shall engage in daily
labor.  See § 946.002(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).   As pertinent to Jackson’s assertion
concerning compensation, subsection (2)(a) provides: 
Each prisoner who is engaged in productive work in any state
correctional institution, program, or facility . . . may receive for work
performed such compensation as the department shall determine. 
Such compensation shall be in accordance with a schedule based on
quality and quantity of work performed and skill required for
performance, and said compensation shall be credited to the account
of the prisoner or the prisoner's family. 
§ 946.002(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).  
6 This Court has not been specifically advised of Jackson's pleadings in other courts.  However,
based on an examination of this Court's records, from 1992 when this Court reversed Jackson's death
sentence, see Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1992)(No. 79,970), to just prior to filing the
instant petition, he has filed or taken part in thirteen petitions in this Court.  See Coleman [and Jackson]
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Subsection (3) provides in pertinent part:  “Said compensation shall be paid
from the Department of Corrections Correctional Work Program Trust Fund.” 
None of these statutes mandate payment for inmate work.  
Therefore, since neither the cases nor the statutes Jackson cites support his
proposition that prisons must pay inmates for their work, Jackson’s petition is so
clearly without merit that we deem the petition to be frivolous and deny it.
 This Court has recognized that "[t]he resources of our court system are
finite and must be reserved for the resolution of genuine disputes." Rivera v. State,
728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998).  The United States Supreme Court itself has
restrained indigent petitioners who have abused the system in order to allocate the
resources of the Court "in a way that promotes the interests of justice."  In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989).  In a decision addressing adequate prison
law libraries, the Court held that the constitutional right of access to courts does not
"guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines." 
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (emphasis added).  Jackson's lawsuits
against the Department of Corrections have become so numerous that one could
describe him similarly.6  We agree with the Supreme Court's assertion that "paupers
v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 717 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,828); Jackson v. Florida Dep't of
Corrections, 718 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,793); Jackson v. Singletary, 717 So. 2d 533 (Fla.
1998)(No. 92,121); Coleman  v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 717 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1998)(No.
92,116); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 717 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1998)(No. 92,114); Jackson v.
Davis, 705 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1997)(No. 91,796); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 707 So. 2d
1125 (Fla. 1997)(No. 91,381); Vega [and Jackson] v. Singletary, 704 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1997)(No.
90,021); Jackson v. McAndrew, 687 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1997)(No. 89,675); Jackson v. Schapiro,
680 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1996)(No. 88,860); Jackson v. Singletary, 675 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1996)(No.
87,961); Jackson v. Singletary, 670 So. 2d 938  (Fla. 1996)(No. 87,372); Jackson v. Department of
Corrections, 617 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1993)(No. 81,061).  Seven of those petitions were for writ of
mandamus filed against the Department of Corrections or employees of the prison.  
As a general rule, Jackson's petitions against the Department concern the manner in which it
conducts prison affairs and how it disciplines its inmates.  In each of the petitions listed above, Jackson
was granted in forma pauperis status and thus was not required to pay the filing fee.  Jackson paid no
filing fee in his two petitions for review filed in this Court, and he paid no filing fee for the four habeas
petitions filed here since there is no filing fee for such petitions.
 Since the filing of the instant petition against the Department on April 20, 1998, Jackson has
filed eleven additional petitions against the Department which are either still pending, were transferred,
or were dismissed.  See Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 93,227 (Fla. petition
filed May 6, 1998)(pending); Jackson v. Singletary, No. 94,196 (Fla. petition filed Oct. 26,
1998)(pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,195 (Fla. petition filed Oct. 26,
1998)(pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,234 (Fla. petition filed Nov. 3,
1998)(pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,271 (Fla. petition filed Nov. 9,
1998)(pending); Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,700 (Fla. petition filed June 1, 1999)(pending); Jackson v.
Moore, No. 95,891 (Fla. Jul. 19, 1999)(transferred); Jackson v. Moore, No.
95,931 (Fla. Jul. 19, 1999)(transferred);Stridison [and Jackson] v. Moore,
No. 95,992 (Fla. Jul. 23, 1999)(transferred); Jackson v. Moore, No. 96,321 (Fla.
petition filed Aug. 19, 1999)(pending); Stridison [and Jackson] v. Moore, No. 96,382 (Fla. Aug. 31,
1999)(dismissed).  In all likelihood, Jackson will have filed more petitions in this Court before this
decision is published.
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filing pro se petitions are not subject to the financial considerations  .  .  .  that deter
other litigants from filing frivolous petitions" and that "[e]very paper filed with the
Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion
of the institution’s limited resources."  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at  184. 
Therefore, we find that we must restrain Jackson's ability to monopolize this
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Court's resources. 
Accordingly, we hereby order Jackson to show cause why he should not be
barred from filing pro se pleadings in this Court and why this Court should not
refuse to accept for filing any actions he files without representation by counsel.
Jackson shall serve his response to the order to show cause on or before May 19,
2000.  The Respondent may file a reply to Jackson’s response on or before May
29, 2000.  
A motion for rehearing concerning this substituted opinion may be filed on
or before May 19, 2000.  A reply to any motion for rehearing filed by either party
may be filed within ten days of service of the motion.  The filing of a motion for
rehearing shall not affect the due date for the response to the order to show cause
or any reply thereto.   
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
Douglas M. Jackson, Sr., pro se, Starke, Florida,
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for Petitioner
Louis A. Vargas, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida,  and
Donna M. La Plante, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida.
for Respondent