Title: Porter v. Super. Ct.
Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 125
Docket Number: S152273
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2009

1 
Filed 7/23/09 (this opn. follows companion case, S152695, filed same date) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ANTHONY PORTER, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
)  
 
 
)  
S152273 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
) 
MONTEREY COUNTY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
 
)  
Ct.App. 6 H029884 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SS042332A 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
This is a companion case to People v. Anderson (July 23, 2009, S152695) 
__ Cal.4th __ (Anderson), also filed today.  In Anderson, we held that retrial of a 
penalty allegation on which a jury has deadlocked is not barred by constitutional 
double jeopardy principles or by Penal Code section 1023.1  We also concluded 
that retrial may be limited to the deadlocked allegation alone and need not 
encompass the underlying offense. 
 
Petitioner here raises the same arguments we addressed in Anderson but in 
a different procedural context.  A jury convicted petitioner of all substantive 
offenses and found all attached penalty allegations and enhancements to be true.  
The trial court granted a new trial on some of these penalty factors.  Sitting, in 
effect, as a “13th juror,” the court concluded the allegations had not been proven 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (§ 1181, subd. 6 (hereafter section 1181(6)).)  
Petitioner then objected that a second trial on the sentencing allegations would 
violate double jeopardy.  The trial court rejected that argument, but the Court of 
Appeal disagreed.  Relying on language in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466 (Apprendi) requiring that certain sentencing factors be treated as the 
“functional equivalent” of elements of greater offenses, as compared with the 
underlying offense alone, the Court of Appeal concluded retrial of the penalty 
allegations would violate the double jeopardy clause and section 1023.  
Accordingly, that court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial 
court to dismiss the allegations.  We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Based on his participation in a drive-by shooting, petitioner Anthony Porter 
was indicted on two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault with a 
semiautomatic firearm, shooting at an inhabited dwelling, shooting from a motor 
vehicle, and carrying a loaded firearm registered to a different owner.2  The 
indictment alleged that the attempted murders were committed willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)), and that all of the offenses 
were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  
Enhancements to the attempted murder and assault charges were alleged for 
personal use of a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (c)).  The jury 
convicted on all counts and found all the allegations true. 
 
Petitioner sought a new trial under section 1181(6), arguing there was 
insufficient evidence to prove he acted with premeditation and deliberation, with 
intent to kill, or for the benefit of a street gang.  The trial court rejected the 
argument relating to intent, observing, “It‟s impossible to summon up what the 
intent could have been under these circumstances if not the intent to kill . . . .”  
                                              
2  
We grant petitioner‟s unopposed request for judicial notice of the 
indictment and the motion for new trial.  These two documents are relevant to our 
discussion but were not included in the record prepared for this writ proceeding. 
 
3 
However, the court found it “a closer question” whether sufficient, credible 
evidence supported the finding of premeditation and deliberation.  It conceded that 
some evidence supported premeditation, including testimony that petitioner‟s car 
drove past the victims two or three times before petitioner opened fire.  But, “on 
balance, given the really uncontroverted evidence of [petitioner‟s] extreme 
intoxication in the hours preceding the shooting,” the court did not believe 
petitioner acted with the more exacting mental state.  The court also found the 
evidence of gang involvement to be weak.  In the court‟s view, scant evidence 
showed the “Krazy Ass Pimps” gang was still in existence at the time of the 
shooting.  The court characterized the testimony identifying petitioner as a 
member of this gang as “very, very vague.”  Accordingly, the court granted a new 
trial on the gang enhancements and the allegation of premeditation and 
deliberation. 
 
After announcing this ruling, the trial court proceeded to sentencing.  The 
court remarked that the People could request a date for a new trial on the 
premeditation allegation and gang enhancements, and if a jury later found them to 
be true petitioner could be resentenced.  Petitioner‟s counsel agreed to this 
proposal.  The court then imposed a total imprisonment of 25 years. 
 
Several months later, petitioner filed a demurrer, along with a motion to 
dismiss, and entered pleas of former judgment and once in jeopardy (§ 1016, 
subds. 4, 5) with respect to the premeditation and gang allegations.  Reasoning that 
these sentencing factors were elements of greater offenses under Apprendi, as 
construed by this court in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 (Seel), petitioner 
argued the court lacked the power to grant a section 1181 motion as to an element 
alone and could not limit retrial to an element of an offense.  Petitioner argued 
that, to grant relief under section 1181, the trial court either had to “reduce the 
verdict to a lesser included offense or order a new trial of the principal offense.”  
In addition, based on the court‟s comments at the section 1181 hearing that “no” 
evidence supported the allegations, petitioner asserted that the court found the 
 
4 
evidence legally insufficient to support the jury‟s verdicts, such that double 
jeopardy barred retrial.  (See Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1.)  The trial 
court rejected these arguments.  Retrial of the sentencing allegations was stayed, 
however, when petitioner sought a writ of mandate. 
 
In the Court of Appeal, petitioner renewed his arguments that double 
jeopardy barred further trial on the penalty allegations and that Apprendi, supra, 
530 U.S. 466, precluded trial of the allegations alone because they constituted 
discrete elements of greater offenses.  The Court of Appeal determined the 
granting of a new trial could not be construed as an implied acquittal of the 
sentencing allegations but agreed that Apprendi rendered the allegations the 
equivalent of elements of greater offenses.  It remained skeptical whether a 
defendant who creates the need for a second trial by bringing a motion seeking 
precisely this relief can then claim double jeopardy.  The court observed, “Retrial 
of a greater offense after a defendant has successfully brought a statutory new trial 
motion is not the type of governmental oppression or prosecutorial overreaching 
targeted by the double jeopardy clause.”  The court ultimately did not resolve the 
federal double jeopardy question because it concluded retrial of the allegations 
was barred by section 1023 and our holding in People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
289 (Fields).  Based on its view that sentencing allegations are elements of an 
offense under Apprendi, it concluded that retrial of the allegations alone would be 
no different from having piecemeal jury trials of discrete elements of an offense, a 
prospect at odds with the Sixth Amendment‟s jury trial guarantee. 
 
The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to dismiss the premeditation 
and gang enhancement allegations.  We granted review to decide whether double 
jeopardy principles permit retrial of a penalty allegation after the jury‟s verdict is 
found “contrary to . . . evidence” under section 1181(6). 
 
5 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Order Granting New Trial Is Not Equivalent to an Acquittal 
 
In the trial court, a defendant may attack the evidence against him in two 
ways.  A motion under section 1118.1 seeks a judgment of acquittal for 
insufficient evidence.  It may be made at the close of the prosecution‟s case or at 
the close of the defense evidence, before the case is presented to a jury.  
(§ 1118.1.)  A motion under section 1181(6) seeks a new trial because the verdict 
is “contrary to law or evidence.”  The court performs significantly different tasks 
under these two provisions. 
 
In ruling on an 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal, the court evaluates 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  If there is any 
substantial evidence, including all inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, 
to support the elements of the offense, the court must deny the motion.  (People v. 
Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 175; see also People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1269, 1286.)  In considering this legal question, “a court does not „ “ask itself 
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  [Citation.]  Instead, the relevant question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038, 
fn. 6 (Lagunas).)  This test is the same as that used by appellate courts in deciding 
whether evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict.  (Ibid.; see also People 
v. Harris, at p. 1286.)  The grant of a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1 
bars “any other prosecution for the same offense.”  (§ 1118.2.)  Because the 
prosecution had a full opportunity to prove the facts necessary for a conviction but 
failed to do so, double jeopardy bars a second bite at the apple.  (Hudson v. 
 
6 
Louisiana (1981) 450 U.S. 40, 43-44; Burks v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. at 
pp. 16-18.)3 
 
A grant under section 1181(6) is different.  The court extends no 
evidentiary deference in ruling on an 1181(6) motion for new trial.  Instead, it 
independently examines all the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to 
prove each required element beyond a reasonable doubt to the judge, who sits, in 
effect, as a “13th juror.”  (Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1038 & fn. 6; see also 
People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 523-524; People v. Serrato (1973) 9 
Cal.3d 753, 761 (Serrato), overruled on another ground in People v. Fosselman 
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1.)  If the court is not convinced that the charges 
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it may rule that the jury‟s verdict is 
“contrary to the . . . evidence.”  (§ 1181(6); see People v. Veitch (1982) 128 
Cal.App.3d 460, 467-468.)  In doing so, the judge acts as a 13th juror who is a 
“holdout” for acquittal.  Thus, the grant of a section 1181(6) motion is the 
equivalent of a mistrial caused by a hung jury.  (Veitch v. Superior Court (1979) 
89 Cal.App.3d 722, 727.)  We have repeatedly held that an order granting a new 
trial under section 1181(6) is not an acquittal and does not bar retrial on double 
jeopardy grounds.  (Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1038-1039; Serrato, supra, 9 
Cal.3d at p. 761.) 
 
Significantly, a court has no authority to grant an acquittal in connection 
with an 1181 motion.  (Serrato, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 762.)  “[A] trial court 
considering a section 1181 motion to modify a verdict on the ground that it is 
contrary to the evidence is limited to the three options specified in the statute:  
(1) It can set aside the verdict of conviction and grant the defendant a new trial; 
(2) it can deny the motion and enter judgment on the verdict reached by the jury; 
or (3) it can modify the verdict either to a lesser degree of the crime reflected in 
                                              
3  
Petitioner did bring a motion for acquittal before his case was submitted to 
the jury.  The motion was denied. 
 
7 
the jury verdict or to a lesser included offense of that crime as specified by 
[section 1181(6)].”  (Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1039, italics omitted.)  
Whereas a jury must acquit if it finds the evidence insufficient, a trial court ruling 
on an 1181 motion may only grant the defendant a new trial if it is not convinced 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Serrato, at p. 762.)  This rule permits trial 
court oversight of the verdict but ensures that the People, like the defendant, have 
the charges resolved by a jury. 
 
The trial court here chose the first of the Lagunas options and set the 
allegations for a new trial.  However, this ruling cannot be construed as an express 
or implied acquittal triggering constitutional double jeopardy protections.  
(Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1038 & fn. 6; Serrato, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 761.) 
II. 
Double Jeopardy Does Not Bar Retrial Under Section 1181 
 
The next question is whether these relatively straightforward principles 
have been altered by the United States Supreme Court‟s holding in Apprendi, 
supra, 530 U.S. 466, at least as they apply to sentencing allegations.  In Apprendi, 
the high court rejected any distinction between “elements” and “sentencing 
factors” for purposes of determining a criminal defendant‟s rights under the Sixth 
Amendment.  (Apprendi, at p. 494.)  Except for facts relating to a prior conviction, 
the court held, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 490, italics added.)  In explaining this holding, the 
court reasoned that “when the term „sentence enhancement‟ is used to describe an 
increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury‟s 
guilty verdict.”  (Id. at p. 494, fn. 19, italics added; see also People v. 
Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326 (Sengpadychith).)  But, as discussed in 
greater detail below, the application of Apprendi in these circumstances means 
only that a defendant is entitled to a jury determination of facts that would support 
an increased sentence. 
 
8 
 
The sentencing allegations in this case come within Apprendi‟s holding 
because, if found true, they will increase the penalty for petitioner‟s attempted 
murder offenses beyond the statutory maximum.  The crime of attempted murder 
carries a determinate sentence of five, seven, or nine years.  (§§ 187, 664, 
subd. (a).)  However, if the jury finds the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated, the defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole.  (Ibid.; see Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 540-541.)  This 
substantial increase in potential penalty brings a section 664, subdivision (a) 
premeditation allegation under the Apprendi rule.  (Seel, at p. 548; see also 
Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 327.) 
 
Whether the gang enhancements would increase the penalty for attempted 
murder in this case is more difficult to discern.  In general, a true finding on the 
allegation that a defendant has attempted murder for the benefit of a criminal street 
gang will increase the defendant‟s sentence by an additional five years in the case 
of a serious felony (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)), or 10 years when attached to a 
violent felony (id., subd. (b)(1)(C)).  However, if the defendant is already subject 
to a life sentence because of a conviction for attempted murder with deliberation 
and premeditation, section 186.22 does not increase the punishment beyond this 
indeterminate life term.  Instead, it sets a minimum term of 15 years before the 
defendant may be considered for parole.  (Id., subd. (b)(5); see Sengpadychith, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 327.)  Under these circumstances, a section 186.22 gang 
enhancement does not increase the defendant‟s sentence, and thus it is not subject 
to Apprendi.  (Sengpadychith, at p. 327.)  Because a new jury has not yet decided 
the issue of premeditation in this case, there is still a potential for the gang 
enhancements to increase petitioner‟s total sentence.  For purposes of the issues 
presented here, we assume this potential brings the enhancements within the scope 
of Apprendi‟s directive that they be treated, for certain purposes, as the “functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense.”  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 
p. 494, fn. 19.) 
 
9 
 
The Court of Appeal applied Apprendi‟s “functional equivalen[ce]” 
language to conclude that a penalty provision or sentence enhancement cannot be 
separated from the underlying offense and must be considered, for all purposes, as 
an element of a greater offense.  This misinterpretation led the court to confront a 
double jeopardy problem under section 1023 and our holding in Fields, supra, 13 
Cal.4th 289.4 
 
Section 1023 states:  “When the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has 
been once placed in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction, 
acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged in 
such accusatory pleading, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offense 
necessarily included therein, of which he might have been convicted under that 
accusatory pleading.”  In Fields, we held that section 1023 prohibits the retrial of a 
greater offense after a defendant‟s conviction of a lesser included offense even 
when there has been no express or implied acquittal of the greater offense.  
(Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307.)  As discussed at greater length in Anderson, 
supra, __ Cal.4th __ [pp. 21-23], our decision in Fields was grounded on the 
“acquittal first” rule, which requires that a jury be instructed it must acquit the 
defendant of a greater offense before it returns a verdict on any lesser included 
offense.  (Fields, at p. 309; see People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329-
330.)  We reasoned that a jury‟s verdict on a lesser included offense alone is 
“mistaken in law,” and section 1023 requires that the consequences of this mistake 
must be borne by the People, not the defendant.  (Fields, at pp. 310-311.)  
                                              
4  
Petitioner apparently did not raise a federal double jeopardy claim.  If he 
had, it would have been foreclosed by Supreme Court authority.  In Tibbs v. 
Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, the high court held federal double jeopardy principles 
do not bar retrial after a reversal on the ground that the verdict is against the 
weight of the evidence.  “When the State has secured one conviction based on 
legally sufficient evidence, it has everything to lose and little to gain by retrial.  
Thus, the type of „second chance‟ that the State receives when a court rests 
reversal on evidentiary weight does not involve the overreaching prohibited by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.”  (Id. at p. 43, fn. 19.) 
 
10 
Accordingly, a conviction of the lesser offense alone will bar the People from 
retrying the greater offense notwithstanding the jury‟s deadlock on that charge.  
(Id. at p. 311.) 
 
However, our holding in Fields is limited to greater and lesser included 
offenses and does not apply to sentencing enhancements or penalty allegations, 
which the jury does not address until after it has reached a verdict on the 
underlying offense.  As we noted in Anderson, this court has never held that a 
jury‟s conviction of an offense alone, without an accompanying acquittal on 
alleged penalty factors, is a mistaken or illegal verdict.  Petitioner‟s attempt to 
extend Fields to the circumstances here is even more problematic.  Petitioner‟s 
jury did not return an irregular or mistaken verdict.  It found petitioner guilty of 
every offense and allegation set before it.  The only conflicting findings in this 
case occurred when the trial judge granted petitioner‟s new trial motion. 
 
Petitioner does not cite, nor have we found, any case applying section 1023 
or our holding in Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th 289, to the situation that arises when a 
court grants a defendant‟s motion for new trial because it disagrees with the jury‟s 
evaluation of the evidence.  A fundamental problem with petitioner‟s position is 
that he sought a new trial by bringing a section 1181 motion.  Section 1180 
expressly provides that “[t]he granting of a new trial places the parties in the same 
position as if no trial had been had.  All the testimony must be produced anew 
. . . .”  (Italics added.)  In filing a motion for new trial, petitioner impliedly waived 
any double jeopardy protections he might have had under state law, just as if he 
had consented to a mistrial.  (See, e.g., Serrato, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 759 [“It is a 
familiar principle that a defendant who has succeeded in having his conviction set 
aside impliedly waives any objection to being retried on the charge of which he 
was convicted”]; see also 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) 
Criminal Judgment, § 90, p. 121 [“A new trial can only be granted on the 
defendant’s motion”].)  A contrary result would mean that any time a trial court 
enters judgment on a jury‟s conviction of a substantive offense but grants an 1181 
 
11 
new trial motion on a sentencing allegation, retrial of the allegation would be 
barred.  In such cases, an 1181 ruling would have the same effect as an acquittal.  
Yet the law is well settled that a court reviewing the jury‟s verdict under 
section 1181 lacks the power to acquit the defendant based on the court‟s view of 
the evidence.  (Serrato, at p. 762.)  The Court of Appeal‟s extension of Fields to 
cover rulings on new trial motions thus undermines the limits on trial court 
authority the Legislature established in section 1181 and runs counter to the 
provisions of section 1180. 
 
Another problem with applying Fields to petitioner‟s case is the lack of 
authority for extending this statutory double jeopardy protection to sentencing 
allegations.  We rejected the application of section 1023 to penalty allegations in 
People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652 (Bright), a case the Court of Appeal‟s 
opinion does not mention.  We explicitly held in Bright that “a defendant‟s 
conviction of the underlying substantive offense does not (on double jeopardy 
grounds) bar further proceedings, such as retrial, on a penalty allegation.  
[Citation.]  Thus, the circumstance that the jury has returned a verdict on the 
underlying offense, but is unable to make a finding on the penalty allegation, does 
not constitute an „acquittal‟ of (or otherwise bar retrial of) the penalty allegation 
on the ground of double jeopardy.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at pp. 661-662.) 
 
For reasons explained more fully in Anderson, our double jeopardy holding 
in Bright remains good law despite intervening pronouncements of the United 
States Supreme Court.  Apprendi required us to reconsider the constitutional 
double jeopardy consequences of an acquittal on a penalty allegation (see Seel, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 547-550), but Apprendi does not control the statutory 
double jeopardy protection California provides in section 1023 when there has 
been no express or implied acquittal. 
 
In the context of a Sixth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court in 
Apprendi described sentence enhancements as the “functional equivalent” of 
elements of greater offenses.  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19.)  This 
 
12 
characterization means only that a defendant is entitled to have a jury determine 
whether those facts supporting an increased sentence have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The high court chose its language carefully and has expressed 
no intention to alter state law procedures that have no bearing on the jury trial 
right.  Indeed, when the court recently held that Apprendi does not govern the 
decision whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, it explicitly 
recognized states‟ sovereign interest in administering their own criminal justice 
systems.  (Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. __ [129 S.Ct. 711, 718-719].) 
 
We recently rejected the notion that the high court‟s “functional equivalent” 
statement requires us to treat penalty allegations as if they were actual elements of 
offenses for all purposes under state law.  (People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
126, 133-134 (Izaguirre).)  Specifically, we held that Apprendi did not convert 
conduct enhancements into offenses for purposes of our rule that multiple 
convictions may not be imposed for necessarily included offenses.  (Izaguirre, at 
p. 134.)  Because “enhancements are not legal elements of the offenses to which 
they attach” under California law, and because Apprendi did not change this 
aspect of our state law, we concluded enhancements should not be considered in 
defining necessarily included offenses under the multiple conviction rule.  
(Izaguirre, at p. 128.) 
 
The same analysis applies to petitioner‟s claims.  Apprendi did not convert 
the penalty allegations here into actual elements of greater offenses for purposes of 
the statutory double jeopardy protection of section 1023.  Thus, petitioner‟s 
conviction of the underlying attempted murder offenses did not bar retrial of the 
allegations.  (Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 661.)5 
 
Finally, in his briefing to this court, petitioner argues for the first time that 
retrial of the allegations is impermissible under section 654, which prohibits 
                                              
5  
Having reached this conclusion, we decline the invitation of amicus curiae 
California District Attorneys Association to abandon Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
289, and adopt a more expansive construction of the “acquittal first” doctrine. 
 
13 
punishment under different code provisions for a single “act or omission.”  This 
claim was not raised in the trial court or the Court of Appeal.  At this late stage of 
the proceedings, we consider it waived.  Moreover, it has long been settled that 
section 654 addresses punishment alone.  It does not bar multiple convictions for 
different crimes based on the same act.  (See § 954; People v. Reed (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 1224, 1226-1227.) 
III. 
Scope of Retrial 
 
Although the Court of Appeal believed retrial of the sentencing allegations 
was barred by section 1023 and Fields, it nevertheless opined that such allegations 
may never be tried in isolation because a defendant‟s right to a jury trial requires 
that a single jury decide all elements of an offense.  For the reasons just discussed, 
the premise of this assertion fails.  Penalty allegations are not elements of an 
offense under California law.  (People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 307, 
overruled on another ground in Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 326.) 
 
Moreover, requiring an expanded scope of retrial after the granting of a new 
trial motion would pose serious practical difficulties, as petitioner‟s case 
illustrates.  He sought a new trial, urging the court to disagree with the jury‟s 
conviction on the attempted murders and true findings on the attached 
premeditation and gang allegations.  The trial court upheld the verdicts of 
attempted murder, concluding the evidence was “certainly sufficient” to support 
them.  Nevertheless, under the Court of Appeal‟s view, every element of these 
attempted murder offenses would have to be retried because the trial court 
disagreed with the jury‟s findings on some of the penalty allegations attached to 
them.  In issuing its dictum, the Court of Appeal chose not to address what, if 
anything, the second jury would be told of petitioner‟s prior conviction on the 
attempted murder charges.  Nor did it explain what would become of that 
conviction, or of the first jury‟s true finding on an attached firearm enhancement 
 
14 
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)),6 if the second jury reached a different conclusion.  As a 
practical matter, there can be little doubt that a rule requiring retrial of the 
underlying offense along with a challenged sentencing allegation could result in 
some, if not all, of the first jury‟s verdict being ignored or superseded even though 
much of this verdict has not been challenged or has been determined to be sound.  
Such disregard for valid jury findings cannot be what the Supreme Court intended 
when it clarified the scope of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right in Apprendi. 
 
Finally, petitioner makes a statutory argument for an expanded scope of 
retrial.  Quoting the portion of section 1180 that states the “granting of a new trial 
places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had,” petitioner 
argues he was entitled to “a whole new trial . . . at which no reference could be 
made to former verdicts or findings.”  Petitioner cites no authority for this 
conclusion, and we will not adopt such an all-or-nothing interpretation of the relief 
available on a new trial motion.  Section 1181(6) permits the trial court to grant a 
“new trial” when “the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence,” and 
section 1179 defines “new trial” as “a reexamination of the issue.”  (Italics added.)  
Read together, these provisions allow the court to grant a new trial on an “issue,” 
i.e., on an offense or a sentencing allegation, if the court concludes the jury‟s 
finding on that issue is contrary to the evidence.  Under petitioner‟s view, if a trial 
court wished to order a new trial because it independently found the evidence 
insufficient to support a single jury finding in a case involving multiple charges 
and allegations, that retrial would have to encompass all charges and allegations, 
even the ones for which the jury‟s verdict was unobjectionable.7  We have never 
                                              
6  
Petitioner did not challenge these findings in his new trial motion, and a 
sentence for the enhancement was imposed. 
7  
It is no answer to say that the court could avoid this problem by modifying 
the verdict to a lesser degree of the offense or to a lesser included offense.  (See 
§ 1181(6) [permitting such modification].)  The statute gives the trial court the 
choice between granting a new trial and modifying the verdict in this manner.  
Petitioner‟s interpretation could render this choice all but illusory in multiple-
 
15 
interpreted the new trial statutes in this manner, and there is no indication the 
Legislature intended to foreclose trial courts‟ ability to grant new trials on a 
limited issue under section 1181(6). 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  The matter is remanded 
to the Court of Appeal for entry of an order lifting the stay of proceedings and 
denying the petition for writ of mandate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
count cases, in which the new trial option would be excessively burdensome for 
the court and unfair to the People. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
In this case, the court rejects a claim that retrial of an allegation that 
defendant‟s commission of an attempted murder was “willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated” would violate the constitutional prohibition against trying a 
criminal defendant twice for the same offense.  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; see also 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  This decision mirrors the holding of the majority in 
People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652 (Bright).  I thought this court was wrong in 
Bright, and I said so in a dissenting opinion.  (Id. at pp. 683-693 (dis. opn. of 
Kennard, J.).)  I still hold that view.  I write separately to explain why I 
nonetheless join today‟s decision.    
I 
 
Because this court‟s decision in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, plays a 
significant role in this case, I discuss it in considerable detail.  The defendant there 
was charged with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, subd. (a)),1 which 
the prosecution alleged was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” (§ 664, subd. 
(a)).  Such an allegation, if found to be true, would increase the sentence for 
attempted murder from five, seven, or nine years to mandatory life imprisonment 
with the possibility of parole.  (Ibid.)   
                                              
1   
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
 
The jury in Bright convicted the defendant of attempted murder.  But it was 
unable to reach a verdict on whether commission of the crime was willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated.  When the trial court ordered a retrial on that issue, 
the defendant argued that retrial would violate the constitutional principle 
prohibiting double jeopardy.  (See Ex parte Nielsen (1889) 131 U.S. 176, 188 
[when a defendant “has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various 
incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents 
without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence.”].)  The trial court 
agreed with the defendant; it then imposed a sentence for attempted murder, 
dismissing the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” allegation.  After the Court 
of Appeal reversed the order of dismissal, this court granted the defendant‟s 
petition for review.  (Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 657-660.) 
The majority in Bright affirmed the Court of Appeal, holding that the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy did not bar a retrial of the 
allegation in question.  (Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 660-671.)  The defendant 
had argued that attempted murder was divided into two degrees:  attempted second 
degree murder being a lesser degree included within attempted willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated first degree murder.  Therefore, according to the defendant, 
retrial of the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” allegation would be trying him 
for a greater degree of the same offense.  (Id. at p. 668.)  The majority in Bright 
rejected that contention.  (Id. at pp. 668-669.)  Instead, it construed section 664, 
subdivision (a), which defines an attempt, as simply “prescribing an additional 
penalty for attempted murder where the jury finds true as charged the aggravating 
circumstance that the offense was willful, deliberate, and premeditated . . . .”  
(Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 668, italics added.)  Under that construction, “a 
defendant‟s conviction of the underlying substantive offense [would] not (on 
double jeopardy grounds) bar further proceedings, such as retrial, on a penalty 
3 
allegation.”  (Id. at p. 661, citing People v. Bryant (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1584, 
1597-1598.)   
I dissented in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pages 683-693 (dis. opn. of 
Kennard, J.).  So did Justice Stanley Mosk, in a separate opinion.  (Id. at pp. 671-
683 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  Each of us concluded that double jeopardy principles 
barred retrial of the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated.   
Unlike the majority in Bright, I construed attempted murder and attempted 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder to comprise two degrees of the same 
crime.  (Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 687 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  I stated:  
“Simple attempted murder is, in essence, attempted second degree murder, that is, 
attempted murder not falling in any of the categories . . . that elevate murder from 
the second to the first degree.”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)  I reasoned that if the 
defendant attempted “ „willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder,‟ ” that would 
be attempted first degree murder, in which case the jury‟s conviction for “the 
lesser included crime of attempted second degree murder” would preclude 
convicting the defendant of a greater degree of the same crime.  (Ibid., italics 
omitted; see Ex parte Nielsen, supra, 131 U.S. at p. 188.)  Dissenting separately, 
Justice Mosk reached the same conclusion.  (Bright, supra, at pp. 671-683 (dis. 
opn. of Mosk, J.).) 
My disagreement with the majority in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, did not 
center on any constitutional principle.  Instead, it hinged solely on the different 
views we took of the statutory definition of attempted murder.  The Bright 
majority‟s statutory construction is now, with a limited exception discussed below, 
the settled law of this state.  As I have noted in the past, “repetition of dissenting 
views is rarely justified.”  (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1073 (conc. 
4 
opn. of Kennard, J.).)  Thus, following the doctrine of stare decisis, I “ „yield to the 
obligation . . . to live with the law as it has been stated.‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
I now address the case at hand.   
II 
Here, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of attempted murder 
(§ 187), and it determined that in each instance defendant attempted to commit a 
“willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder” (§664, subd. (a)).  (As noted earlier, 
such a finding increases the punishment for attempted murder from five, seven, or 
nine years to a mandatory life term with the possibility of parole.  (§ 664, subd. 
(a).).)  Ruling on defendant‟s motion for a new trial (§ 1181, subd. 6), the trial 
court granted the motion only as to the allegations that the two attempted murders 
were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.   
This court has long held that the granting of a new trial under section 1181, 
subdivision 6, “is „not an acquittal‟ ” and thus does not implicate the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy.  (People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 
1038.)  Is this rule affected by the United States Supreme Court‟s sentencing 
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), when, as in 
this case, the granting of a new trial pertains to a sentencing allegation?   
As relevant here, Apprendi held that “when the term „sentence 
enhancement‟ is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized 
statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense. . . .”  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19, italics added.)  In this 
case, the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing allegation that an attempted 
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated was, in the language of Apprendi, 
the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense” of attempted willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated murder.  In effect, the Court of Appeal held that this 
5 
court‟s decision in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, was no longer good law in light 
of Apprendi.   
The majority reverses the Court of Appeal.  I agree.  As the majority 
explains (maj. opn., ante, pp. 11-13), the Apprendi language in question pertains to 
the federal Constitution‟s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, an issue not 
implicated here.  More specifically, as explained in the companion case of People 
v. Anderson (July 23, 2009, S152695) ___Cal.4th ___,___ [pp. 11-12], Apprendi 
holds that a sentencing allegation that increases the statutory maximum penalty is 
the “functional equivalent” of an element of a greater crime, thus entitling the 
defendant to a jury trial on each of that crime‟s elements.  (Apprendi, supra, 530 
U.S. at p. 490 [“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Italics added.)].)  
Thus, Apprendi requires that a jury decide whether an attempted murder was 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  But there is nothing in Apprendi that would 
preclude the prosecution in this case from retrying defendant before a different 
jury on the sentencing allegations in question.  (As mentioned earlier, the trial 
court sustained the jury‟s findings that defendant committed two counts of 
attempted murder, but the court granted a new trial on the allegations that those 
attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.) 
 
Nor does this case fall within the limited exception to the majority‟s holding 
in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652.  Under that exception, the double jeopardy 
prohibition does apply to retrial of a sentencing allegation that an attempted murder 
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  That exception was carved out in People 
v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 (Seel), which is discussed in the companion case of 
People v. Anderson, supra, ___ Cal.4th at pp. ___-___ [pp. 12-14].  
6 
 
In Seel, this court followed the teachings of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 
and concluded that the double jeopardy prohibition barred retrial of the “willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated” allegation in an attempted murder case after the 
Court of Appeal‟s determination that the evidence was insufficient with respect to 
“premeditation and deliberation.”  (Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 540, 550.)  Seel 
distinguished this court‟s earlier decision in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, as 
arising in a different procedural posture:  In Seel, “the Court of Appeal reversed 
the judgment based on its determination of evidentiary insufficiency,” whereas in 
Bright “[n]either a court nor a jury made a determination that the prosecution 
failed to prove its case.”  (Seel, supra, at p. 550.)  Seel expressly overruled Bright, 
but only to the extent that Bright “conflict[ed] with intervening high court 
decisions as discussed [in Seel],” mainly Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466.  (Seel, 
supra, at p. 550, fn. 6.)  As articulated in Seel, the “conflict” that Seel perceived 
between the high court‟s decision in Apprendi and the majority opinion in Bright 
is limited to cases involving evidentiary insufficiency.   
 
The case at bench pertains to a trial court‟s grant of new trial (§ 1181, subd. 
6) on a sentencing allegation, a ruling that does not implicate evidentiary 
insufficiency (see People v. Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1038 [granting of new 
trial “ „not an acquittal.‟ ”]).  Thus, when, as here, evidentiary insufficiency is not 
an issue, this court‟s decision in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 669, remains 
controlling law.  This means that with respect to defendant‟s retrial in this case on 
the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” sentencing allegation, that allegation is 
not an element of the offense of attempted murder, and retrial on that issue does 
not violate double jeopardy principles.   
7 
For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeal erred 
in holding that retrial of the allegations in question would violate the constitutional 
principle of not putting a defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Porter v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 148 Cal.App.4th 889 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S152273 
Date Filed: July 23, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Russell D. Scott 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson, under appointment by the Supreme Court; Glenn A. Nolte, Acting Public Defender, 
James S. Egar, Public Defender, and Romano Clark, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, 
Seth K. Schalit and William Kuimelis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney (Orange), Mitchell Keiter, Deputy District Attorney; and W. Scott 
Thorpe for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson 
316 Mid Valley Center 
Carmel, CA  93923-8516 
(831) 625-6581 
 
Seth K. Schalit 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1371