Title: State v. Toliver
Citation: 2014 WI 85
Docket Number: 2012AP000393-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2014

2014 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP393-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Cortez Lorenzo Toliver, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 348 Wis. 2d 263, 831 N.W.2d 824 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 23, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 3, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Faye M. Flancher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Jeffrey O. Davis, Matthew C. Vogel, James E. Goldschmidt, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by James E. 
Goldschmidt.  
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP393-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2009CF459) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Cortez Lorenzo Toliver, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 23, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals.1 
¶2 
The case involves the prosecution of a juvenile 
offender in adult court.2  Wisconsin's Juvenile Justice Code 
gives 
adult 
courts 
exclusive 
original 
jurisdiction 
over 
                                                 
1 State v. Toliver, No. 2012AP393-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2013). 
2 As used in this opinion, "adult court" means a court 
operating under the Criminal Procedure Code.  "Juvenile court" 
refers to a court that is operating under the Juvenile Justice 
Code in Wis. Stat. ch. 938. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
2 
 
juveniles who are alleged to have committed certain serious 
offenses.  Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) (2009-10).3  The statute also 
gives exclusive original jurisdiction over juveniles who are 
alleged to have attempted to commit a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.01 (first-degree intentional homicide).  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(am). 
¶3 
A juvenile who is charged in adult court with a 
violation of one of the offenses enumerated in § 938.183(1) is 
entitled 
to 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(1).  The court must find that "there is probable cause 
to believe that the juvenile has committed the violation of 
which he or she is accused under the circumstances specified in 
s. 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), (b), or (c), whichever is 
applicable," if the adult court is to retain exclusive original 
jurisdiction of the juvenile.  Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (emphasis 
added).   
¶4 
The 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
the 
record 
demonstrates that the adult court made a sufficient probable 
cause determination in a § 970.032(1) preliminary hearing when 
it said that "there is probable cause to believe a felony has 
been committed." 
¶5 
Cortez Lorenzo Toliver (Toliver) was 16 years old when 
he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 after 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
3 
 
shooting Dontai Gorman (Gorman) in the back.  As noted, 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide is an offense 
enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(am).  Possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a person under 18——a misdemeanor——is not.  
At the preliminary hearing, Gorman discussed the details of the 
shooting, and an investigator with the Racine Police Department 
testified that Gorman had identified Toliver as the shooter with 
certainty.  The circuit court stated that "there is probable 
cause to believe a felony has been committed" and ordered a 
bindover. 
¶6 
Toliver later pled guilty to other charges.  After 
sentencing, Toliver appealed and argued in his reply brief4 that 
the circuit court failed to find probable cause of a violation 
of the specific crime charged under Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1), as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1).  The court of appeals 
declined to address the argument, relying on the rule that 
courts generally do not review issues raised for the first time 
in reply briefs.  Toliver now argues that the circuit court's 
probable 
cause 
determination 
was 
deficient 
and 
that 
the 
deficiency may be raised at any point in the proceedings because 
it implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
¶7 
Although 
Toliver 
raises 
an 
argument 
regarding 
jurisdiction, we will focus on a narrower issue that disposes of 
                                                 
4 Although Toliver raised the issue of the sufficiency of 
the probable cause determination in the circuit court several 
months after the preliminary examination, he did not raise the 
argument in the court of appeals until his reply brief. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
4 
 
the case.  The question we address is whether the record 
demonstrates that the circuit court made the requisite finding 
of probable cause to believe Toliver committed attempted first-
degree 
intentional 
homicide 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(1). 
¶8 
We conclude the following. 
¶9 
First, when a juvenile is charged in adult court with 
a violation of one of the offenses enumerated in § 938.183(1), 
the juvenile is entitled to a preliminary examination under Wis. 
Stat. § 970.032(1) at which the court must find that "there is 
probable cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the 
violation of which he or she is accused under the circumstances 
specified in s. 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), (b), or (c), 
whichever is applicable," if the adult court is to retain 
exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.032(1) (emphasis added).  This means that the court should 
make a specific finding on the record that there is probable 
cause to believe the juvenile committed the specific Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. 
¶10 Second, if an adult court's determination of probable 
cause in a preliminary examination under Wis. Stat. § 970.032 
relates to an unspecified felony and the facts are undisputed, 
an appellate court may review the record independently to 
determine whether the court did find "probable cause to believe 
that the juvenile has committed the violation of which he or she 
is 
accused 
under 
the 
circumstances 
specified 
in 
s. 
938.183(1)(a), 
(am), 
(ar), 
(b), 
or 
(c), 
whichever 
is 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
5 
 
applicable."  Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1).  A reviewing court may 
inspect the record ab initio to determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.  Cf. 
State v. Roger Williams, 104 Wis. 2d 15, 21-22, 310 N.W.2d 601 
(1981).  The principal purpose of the specific probable cause 
finding is to ensure that the adult court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction over the juvenile.  This purpose is served if, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the court implicitly 
finds probable cause for a Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) crime charged 
in the complaint, and the record demonstrates there is probable 
cause for that specific offense. 
¶11 Third, although the articulation of the probable cause 
determination in this case should have been more precise, the 
preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates that the circuit 
court found probable cause that Toliver committed attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide.  Gorman testified that 
Toliver held a gun to his head, threatened to shoot him, and 
then shot him in the back.  Toliver did not introduce any 
evidence of mitigating circumstances.  The circuit court had the 
complaint and the information, both of which listed Toliver's 
date of birth at the top and contained only one felony charge 
and a charge for possession of a dangerous weapon by a person 
under 18.  Toliver did not object that the court's probable 
cause be more specific, and the court did not discharge Toliver 
as would be required if it failed to find probable cause for the 
specific offense.  Thus, the record demonstrates that when the 
court found probable cause to believe Toliver committed a 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
6 
 
felony, the felony to which the court referred was attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide, the only felony with which 
Toliver was charged. 
¶12 Because we conclude that the circuit court made the 
finding required by Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1), we need not reach 
the 
jurisdictional 
issue. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Castillo, 
213 
Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) (citation omitted) ("An 
appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible 
grounds.").  Accordingly, the bindover and prosecution of 
Toliver in adult court were not improper. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶13 According to the complaint, on April 11, 2009, Toliver 
called Gorman and asked him to play dice so that Toliver could 
try to win back money that he lost to Gorman two days earlier.  
They met and shot dice for a couple of hours, during which 
Gorman won almost all of Toliver's money.  According to Gorman, 
Toliver said he needed his money to get to Milwaukee and 
demanded that Gorman return it.  Toliver then produced a handgun 
and "racked the slide."5  Gorman turned to run away, and Toliver 
shot him once in the middle of the back.  Toliver fled, leaving 
Gorman lying on the ground with no feeling in his legs.  At the 
time of the shooting, Toliver was a little over 16 years old.  
Gorman was 23. 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals explained that racking the slide 
"manually loads the chamber and cocks a semi-automatic pistol."  
State v. Toliver, No. 2012AP393-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶2.  
Racking the slide puts the round in the chamber so that the gun 
is ready to fire and arguably makes an "intimidating sound."  
See United States v. Morales, 684 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2012).   
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
7 
 
¶14 About 8:56 p.m., City of Racine police officers were 
dispatched to the location of the shooting in Racine.  When 
Investigator Don Nuttall (Investigator Nuttall) arrived, he 
found Gorman on the sidewalk.  Gorman told Investigator Nuttall 
that "Cortez did this over a dice game."  Investigator Nuttall 
found Toliver's phone at the scene of the incident and called 
Toliver's mother.  Soon after Investigator Nuttall spoke with 
Toliver's mother on April 12, Toliver called and agreed to come 
to the Racine Police Department.  When he was informed of his 
Miranda6 rights, Toliver asked for an attorney and was arrested. 
¶15 Gorman identified Toliver in a photograph array and 
said that he was certain that it was Toliver who shot him.  On 
April 13, 2009, the State filed a complaint charging Toliver 
with attempted first-degree intentional homicide contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.50(3)(a), and 939.32.  The 
complaint also charged Toliver with possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a person under 18 years of age contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.60(2)(a) and 939.51(3)(a). 
¶16 The Racine County Circuit Court, Charles Constantine, 
Judge, held a preliminary hearing on May 7, 2009.  Gorman 
testified by telephone from a hospital and said that Toliver 
shot him in the back and that as a result, he was paralyzed from 
the waist down.  Gorman testified: 
He got angry, like very high tempered, and 
started to throw the dice and told me that I was going 
to have to give him all of his money back or else he 
                                                 
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
8 
 
would hit me.  That was his way of saying shoot me, 
you know, otherwise he would shoot me. 
Gorman stated that he was unarmed and that during the incident, 
Toliver "had the gun to [Gorman's] head."  Gorman recounted the 
details of the shooting: 
[Toliver] pulled out a gun, and I thought he had 
kind of pulled up, like he was going to put it——like 
he was going to shoot me in the brain or in the head, 
and then you know, I kind of got scared, you know?  He 
was trying to, basically, rob me, so I was kind of 
loose, like, scared.  I don't be around guns like 
that.  I didn't believe that he would shoot me at all, 
so you know, I turned around and ran with all of the 
speed that I had, and he shot me right in the back—— 
 . . . . 
He shot me right in the back, and then he went 
back. . . .  He got his book bag and came up, you 
know, he ran.  He ran.  I'm pretty sure he thought I 
was dead. 
¶17 Investigator Nuttall also testified that Gorman picked 
Toliver's picture out of a photograph array and identified him 
as the shooter with certainty.  At the end of Investigator 
Nuttall's testimony, the State moved for bindover, and the 
defense 
responded 
with 
a 
general 
objection: 
"Object 
to 
bindover."  The court stated, "I would note, there is probable 
cause to believe a felony has been committed.  The testimony we 
have is from the victim.  You have identification.  You have a 
shooting.  Bindover is ordered.  I do have an information, two 
counts."  Toliver waived the reading of the information and 
entered pleas of not guilty to both counts.  The information to 
which the judge referred contained the same two counts as the 
complaint: 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
and 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
9 
 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18.  The 
information listed Toliver's date of birth next to his name at 
the top of the document. 
¶18 On July 28, 2009, Toliver filed a petition for reverse 
waiver pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2).7  The petition 
requested an evidentiary hearing and asserted that the case 
should be transferred to juvenile court.  On September 10, 2009, 
Toliver filed a separate motion to reopen the preliminary 
hearing, and argued that the circuit court failed to make the 
                                                 
7 "Reverse waiver" refers to the procedure by which an adult 
court transfers a case against a juvenile offender to juvenile 
court.  Wisconsin Stat. § 970.032(2) reads: 
(2) If the court finds probable cause to believe 
that the juvenile has committed the violation of which 
he or she is accused under the circumstances specified 
in s. 938.183 (1)(a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), the 
court shall determine whether to retain jurisdiction 
or to transfer jurisdiction to the court assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938.  The 
court shall retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 
following:  
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could 
not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice 
system. 
(b) That transferring jurisdiction to the 
court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 
and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense. 
(c) That 
retaining 
jurisdiction 
is 
not 
necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles 
from committing the violation of which the juvenile is 
accused under the circumstances specified in s. 
938.183 (1)(a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is 
applicable.  
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
10 
 
specific 
probable 
cause 
finding 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032. 
¶19 On November 2, 2009, the Racine County Circuit Court, 
Faye M. Flancher, Judge,8 held a motion hearing, which included 
argument on the motion for reverse waiver and on the motion to 
reopen the preliminary hearing.  Judge Flancher noted that at 
the preliminary hearing, "the Court did have at its disposal the 
court file which has Mr. Toliver's name and date of birth in 
bold on the face of the criminal complaint."  Judge Flancher 
stated: 
So clearly from this transcript the Court did 
indeed 
find 
probable 
cause 
that 
Cortez 
Lorenzo 
Toliver, that there was probable cause to support 
Count 1, attempted first degree intentional homicide, 
and Count 2, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
person under the age of 18. 
 . . . . 
And so the motion to reopen the preliminary 
hearing is denied, and the Court does find based on 
the preliminary hearing transcript that there is in 
fact probable cause based on that record supporting 
both Count 1, attempted first degree intentional 
homicide, and Count 2, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a child. 
The court also denied the motion for reverse waiver. 
¶20 On 
June 
3, 
2011, 
Toliver 
filed 
a 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form in which he pled guilty to 
first-degree reckless injury while armed and attempted robbery 
                                                 
8 According to Toliver's brief, Judge Flancher replaced 
Judge Constantine after a judicial rotation. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
11 
 
while armed.9  On June 6, 2011, consistent with the plea, the 
State filed an amended information charging Toliver with first-
degree reckless injury by use of a dangerous weapon contrary to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.23(1)(a), 
939.50(3)(d), 
and 
939.63(1)(b) 
(Count 1), and with attempted robbery with threat of force by 
use 
of 
a 
dangerous 
weapon 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.32(1)(b), 939.50(3)(e), and 939.63(1)(b) (Count 2).  At 
the sentencing hearing on July 7, 2011, the State requested that 
the court impose a lengthy prison sentence.  The court agreed 
and imposed consecutive sentences of 20 years of initial 
confinement and ten years of extended supervision for Count 1 
and seven years of initial confinement and two and a half years 
of extended supervision for Count 2.  The judgment of conviction 
was filed on July 13, 2011. 
¶21 On July 27, 2011, Toliver filed a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction relief.  In his postconviction motion 
filed 
on 
December 
14, 
2011, 
Toliver 
requested 
sentence 
modification.  The circuit court denied the postconviction 
motion in an order filed January 23, 2012.  Toliver filed a 
notice of appeal on January 31, 2012. 
¶22 On appeal, Toliver argued that the circuit court erred 
in denying his motion for reverse waiver and erroneously 
exercised its discretion with regard to the sentence it imposed.  
State v. Toliver, No. 2012AP393-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 
                                                 
9 Toliver was 18 years old at the time he filed the plea 
questionnaire. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
12 
 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2013).  In addition, Toliver argued in 
his reply brief that the circuit court did not comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 970.032 because it did not articulate a specific finding 
that there was probable cause to believe Toliver committed the 
crime with which he was charged.  Id., ¶29 n.5.  The court of 
appeals stated: 
We generally do not address arguments raised for the 
first time in a reply brief.  A.O. Smith Corp. v. 
Allstate 
Ins. 
Cos., 
222 
Wis. 2d 475, 
492, 
588 
N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).  We therefore decline to 
address Toliver’s argument that the court failed at 
the preliminary examination to make the specific 
probable cause determination required by § 970.032. 
Id.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment 
of conviction and order denying Toliver's postconviction motion.  
Id., ¶29. 
¶23 Toliver petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on December 17, 2013.10 
                                                 
10 In his petition for review, Toliver raised two issues: 
1. 
Which prevails: the general rule that a 
defect of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at 
any time, or the convention that the Court of Appeals 
will not address an argument first raised in a reply 
brief? 
 
. . . . 
2. 
Where a Wisconsin court fails to make the 
specific probable cause finding required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.032, does this failure cause the court to lose 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
criminal 
proceeding, necessitating that the juvenile defendant 
be discharged? 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
13 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 Essentially, Toliver argues that the circuit court's 
probable cause finding was insufficient under Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.032(1) to support the bindover, depriving the adult court 
of exclusive original jurisdiction.  When the principal facts 
are not in dispute or the presiding official failed to make 
factual findings at the preliminary hearing, the question of 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a bindover is a 
question of law subject to de novo review.  See Williams, 104 
Wis. 2d at 21-22; see also State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 398-
99, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984); State v. Lindberg, 175 Wis. 2d 332, 
340-41, 500 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Blalock, 150 
Wis. 2d 688, 697, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989).  In the 
present case, the principal facts adduced at the preliminary 
hearing are undisputed.  Consequently, we review the preliminary 
hearing independently to determine whether the circuit court 
adequately determined that there was probable cause to support a 
bindover——that is, whether the circuit court determined that 
there was probable cause to believe that Toliver committed 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide.11 
                                                                                                                                                             
We need not address either question because we conclude that 
although the court's articulation of its findings at the 
preliminary hearing was not perfect, the record demonstrates 
that the circuit court found the specific probable cause 
required by Wis. Stat. § 970.032.  Thus, our analysis focuses on 
the preliminary hearing. 
11 We note that the above standards were articulated in the 
context of preliminary hearings conducted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03.  We conclude that they are applicable to preliminary 
hearings conducted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 970.032 as well. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
14 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶25 This case centers around the preliminary hearing for a 
juvenile in adult court.  Thus, we begin with a brief discussion 
of the Juvenile Justice Code and the different probable cause 
requirements for adults and juveniles in adult court. 
A. The Juvenile Justice Code 
¶26 The Juvenile Justice Code——Wis. Stat. ch. 938——became 
effective on July 1, 1996, after a substantial revision of the 
former Children's Code.  State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶42, 328 
Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144; 1995 Wis. Act 77.  Chapter 938 is 
intended to address juvenile delinquency and to "equip juvenile 
offenders 
with 
competencies 
to 
live 
responsibly 
and 
productively."  Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2).  Under Wis. Stat. ch. 
938, 
juvenile 
courts 
generally 
adjudicate 
cases 
against 
delinquent 
juveniles 
ages 
ten 
and 
older. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.12(1).  However, adult courts "have exclusive original 
jurisdiction 
over" 
the 
crimes 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1), 
including 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide.  Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(am). 
B. The Differences between Preliminary Hearings for Adults and 
Preliminary Hearings for Juveniles in Adult Court 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 970.03 is the general statute on 
preliminary examinations in circuit court.  "A preliminary 
examination is a hearing before a court for the purpose of 
determining if there is probable cause to believe a felony has 
been committed by the defendant."  Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1) 
(emphasis added).  This statute applies to adults charged with 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
15 
 
felonies, and to juveniles charged with felonies after they have 
been waived by the juvenile court into adult court.  The main 
purpose of this preliminary examination is "to protect the 
accused from hasty, improvident, or malicious prosecution and to 
discover whether there is a substantial basis for bringing the 
prosecution and further denying the accused his right to 
liberty."  State v. John Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 527, 544 
N.W.2d 406 (1996) (quoting Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 344, 
222 N.W.2d 871 (1974)). 
¶28 By contrast, the preliminary examination under Wis. 
Stat. § 970.032 is for juveniles prosecuted under original 
jurisdiction in adult court.  This preliminary examination has a 
manifest purpose beyond assuring that the prosecution against a 
juvenile is well grounded.  It is intended to determine whether 
the adult court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a 
juvenile who is alleged to have committed a violation of a 
specific offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(a), (am), 
(ar), (b) or (c).  Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶57.  Consequently, 
the court is required to "determine whether there is probable 
cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the violation 
of which he or she is accused under the circumstances specified 
in s. 938.183(1) . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (emphasis 
added).  The statute then provides: "If the court does not make 
that finding, the court shall order that the juvenile be 
discharged but proceedings may be brought regarding the juvenile 
under ch. 938."  Id. (emphasis added). 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
16 
 
¶29 The juvenile "has a strong incentive . . . to negate 
that specific offense during the preliminary examination——to 
prevent the state from prevailing on the specific offense 
charged, or possibly, to deprive the criminal court of its 
'exclusive original jurisdiction.'"  Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 
¶60.  Moreover, the juvenile may not use a reverse waiver 
hearing to contradict the previous finding of probable cause.   
Id., ¶68. 
¶30 As Kleser suggests, the specific probable cause 
determination is designed to ensure that there is probable cause 
that the juvenile committed one of the crimes in § 938.183(1), 
so that the juvenile is tried in the correct court.  Probable 
cause to support a bindover exists in such a hearing when there 
is a reasonable probability "that the juvenile has committed the 
violation of which he or she is accused under the circumstances 
specified in s. 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c)."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(1); 
cf. 
Dunn, 
121 
Wis. 2d at 
398; 
Roger 
Williams, 104 Wis. 2d at 22-23. 
¶31 For Toliver, the specific crime for which the circuit 
court needed to find probable cause was attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(am).  A 
person commits attempted first-degree intentional homicide when 
he attempts to "cause[] the death of another human being with 
intent to kill that person."  Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 
939.32.  We turn now to Toliver's preliminary hearing to 
determine whether the record demonstrates that the circuit court 
made the required probable cause finding. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
17 
 
C. Toliver's Preliminary Hearing 
¶32 It is abundantly clear from the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing that there was probable cause to believe 
Toliver attempted first-degree intentional homicide.  Gorman 
testified that Toliver threatened to shoot him, held a gun to 
his head, and shot him in the back as he tried to get away.  
Investigator Nuttall testified that Gorman identified Toliver as 
the shooter with certainty.  Thus, there was a reasonable 
probability that Toliver attempted to cause the death of Gorman 
with the intent to kill him.  Because probable cause for the 
specific 
charge 
existed; 
because 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional homicide was the only felony charged in the 
complaint; and because Toliver did not introduce any evidence to 
support 
a 
reduced 
charge, 
we 
conclude 
that 
when 
Judge 
Constantine found probable cause to believe Toliver committed a 
felony, he made the requisite finding under Wis. Stat. § 970.032 
that there was probable cause to believe Toliver committed 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide. 
¶33 When Judge Constantine concluded that there was 
probable cause to believe a felony had been committed, he 
referenced the shooting as well as an information he had been 
given that contained the charges.  He said, "You have 
identification.  You have a shooting.  Bindover is ordered.  I 
do have an information, two counts."  The first count in the 
information was the only felony alleged: attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide.  The second count was possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a person under 18.  Thus, the judge referred 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
18 
 
to a document that alerted him to the fact that the defendant 
before him was under 18 and that he was charged with a felony 
that sustained adjudication in adult court.  In reviewing Judge 
Constantine's determination, Judge Flancher noted "that the 
Court did have at its disposal the court file which has Mr. 
Toliver's name and date of birth in bold on the face of the 
criminal complaint."  Accordingly, the record demonstrates that 
Judge Constantine was aware that Toliver was a juvenile and 
found probable cause to believe that Toliver committed attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide. 
¶34 This might be a different case if Toliver had 
introduced evidence of mitigating circumstances to support a 
charge that was not consistent with the exclusive original 
jurisdiction of the adult court.  Toliver had a right and "a 
strong incentive" to offer evidence "to negate that specific 
offense during the preliminary examination."  Kleser, 328 
Wis. 2d 42, ¶60.  He also had the right to request a specific 
probable cause finding or discharge of the juvenile.  Had he 
done any of these things, it would be difficult to say that 
Judge Constantine found probable cause for attempted first-
degree intentional homicide without saying more.  This would be 
a different case if the judge had specifically stated that he 
did not find probable cause to believe Toliver committed 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide.  However, in the 
absence of any mitigating evidence or finding of lack of 
probable cause, we conclude that the circuit court's probable 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
19 
 
cause determination related to the felony charged and that the 
court's finding complied with Wis. Stat. § 970.032. 
¶35 While the record demonstrates that Judge Constantine 
found probable cause to believe that Toliver committed attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide, his finding should have been 
more precise.12  Wisconsin Stat. § 970.032(1) requires the court 
to "first determine whether there is probable cause to believe 
that the juvenile has committed the violation of which he or she 
is 
accused 
under 
the 
circumstances 
specified 
in 
s. 
938.183(1)(a), 
(am), 
(ar), 
(b), 
or 
(c), 
whichever 
is 
applicable."  Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (emphasis added).  Thus, 
when conducting a preliminary hearing pursuant to § 970.032, the 
court should: (1) acknowledge on the record that the individual 
being charged is a juvenile; (2) refer to the specific charge or 
charges that require adjudication in adult court under Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1); and (3) state on the record that there is 
probable cause to believe the juvenile offender has committed 
the specific crime or crimes charged.  The legislature intended 
that an adult court should be specific in its articulation of 
its probable cause finding against a juvenile offender to avoid 
appeals such as this one.  A general probable cause articulation 
will not always have the support of such a clear record to 
                                                 
12 It must be acknowledged that Judge Constantine made his 
ruling a little over one year before this court's decision in 
Kleser.  State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 
N.W.2d 144.  Kleser emphasized that the finding of probable 
cause should address the specific offense charged.  Id., ¶57. 
No. 
  2012AP393-CR 
 
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demonstrate 
that 
the 
judge 
complied 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(1). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶36 When an adult court conducts a preliminary hearing for 
a juvenile pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1), the court should 
state specifically on the record whether it finds probable cause 
to believe that the juvenile committed the offense under Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1) that is charged in the complaint.  Although 
specificity is strongly preferred, a general probable cause 
determination might comply with Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) if the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the court's 
finding related to the charged offense under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1).  Despite the fact that the court in this case did 
not specifically refer to the charged felony under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(am), the totality of the circumstances leaves no 
doubt that there was probable cause to believe Toliver attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide and suggests that the judge 
made the specific finding required by Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1).  
Thus, the bindover and prosecution of Toliver in adult court 
were not improper. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2012AP393-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
legislature has declared that a circuit court must make 
particular findings in a preliminary hearing in order to 
establish original adult court jurisdiction over a juvenile.1  
See Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1).   
¶38 Section 970.032(1) reads as follows:  
(1) Notwithstanding s. 970.03, if a preliminary 
examination is held regarding a juvenile who is 
subject to the original jurisdiction of the court of 
criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183(1), the court 
shall first determine whether there is probable cause 
to believe that the juvenile has committed the 
                                                 
1 Like the majority opinion, I do not address the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case.  Majority op., 
¶23 n.10.   
Substantial confusion exists in the case law on the meaning 
of the terms "jurisdiction," "subject matter jurisdiction," 
"jurisdictional error," and "competence" of the courts.  The 
jurisprudence concerning subject matter jurisdiction and a 
circuit court's competence to exercise its subject matter 
jurisdiction is "murky at best."  See State v. Bush, 2005 WI 
103, ¶16, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80.  See also Xcel Energy 
Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶¶62-65, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 
N.W.2d 665 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Miller Brewing Co. v. 
LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 700, 705 n.1, 495 N.W.2d 660 (1993); Shopper 
Advertiser, Inc. v. DOR, 117 Wis. 2d 223, 237, 344 N.W.2d 115 
(1984) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
Compare, e.g., Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 
79, ¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 ("[T]he subject matter 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts cannot be curtailed by state 
statute.") with majority op., ¶29 ("The juvenile 'has strong 
incentive . . . to negate that specific offense during the 
preliminary hearing——to prevent the state from prevailing on the 
specific offense charged, or possibly, to deprive the criminal 
court of its "exclusive original jurisdiction."'") (citing State 
v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶60, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144) 
(emphasis added). 
No.  2012AP393-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
violation of which he or she is accused under the 
circumstances specified in s. 938.183(1)(a), (am), 
(ar), (b), or (c), whichever is applicable.  If the 
court does not make that finding, the court shall 
order that the juvenile be discharged but proceedings 
may be brought regarding the juvenile under ch. 938. 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (emphasis added).   
¶39 At the defendant's preliminary hearing, the circuit 
court failed to make the required statutory finding.  Rather, 
the circuit court stated the following: 
[T]here is probable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed.  The testimony we have is from the victim. 
You have identification.  You have a shooting. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶40 The circuit court found probable cause to believe "a 
felony" had been committed.  "A felony" could refer to any 
number of crimes, not all of which would support proceedings in 
adult criminal court for a juvenile.  The circuit court did not 
determine that "there is probable cause to believe that the 
juvenile has committed the violation of which he . . . is 
accused . . ." (emphasis added). 
¶41 The majority opinion rewrites the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing to conclude that the circuit court made the 
required findings.  The majority opinion declares, in effect, 
that the circuit court did not mean what it said on the record.2 
¶42 Unlike the majority opinion, I cannot conclude that 
the circuit court complied with Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1).  If a 
circuit court fails to make the finding required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.032(1), the statute provides a remedy; it mandates that 
the circuit court "shall order that the juvenile be discharged" 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶¶32-35. 
No.  2012AP393-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
(emphasis added).  See also State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶64, 
328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.  
¶43 This court should follow the statute.  See, e.g., 
State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶85, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___N.W.2d ___ (Bradley, J., dissenting); State v. Douangmala, 
2002 WI 62, ¶4, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1 (when a statute 
"expressly sets forth the remedy to be granted" if a circuit 
court 
"fails 
to 
advise 
a 
defendant 
about 
deportation 
consequences as required by [the statute]," the court should 
grant the requested remedy).   
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP393-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1