Title: Dyksterhouse v. Parrot
Citation: 105 N.W.2d 205
Docket Number: 9837
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: October 5, 1960

105 N.W.2d 205 (1960) Al DYKSTERHOUSE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Vinal PARROT, Jr., Defendant and Respondent. No. 9837. Supreme Court of South Dakota. October 5, 1960. *206 Newell E. Krause, Lemmon, for plaintiff and appellant. Johnson &amp; Price, Lemmon, for defendant and respondent. SMITH, Judge. In this action for damages growing out of a personal injury, a substituted service of summons and complaint, void for noncompliance with SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0808, was attempted before the applicable statute of limitations had run. After the elapse of the statute, defendant filed a voluntary appearance, demanded, and through stipulation received a change of venue, and interposed an answer pleading the bar of the statute. That issue was tried to the court. Plaintiff advanced the theory that the voluntary general appearance of defendant should relate back to the attempted substituted service and therefore the cause of action was not barred. The trial court refused to give defendant's general appearance such a retrospective effect, and entered an order dismissing the cause of action. Whether in so holding the trial court erred is the narrow question presented to this court by plaintiff's appeal. Controlling statutes in substance provide: a civil action for personal injury can be commenced only within three years after the cause of action accrues, SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0232(5)(c); and an action is commenced as to a defendant when the summons is served on him, SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0202. The question we are considering arose under like controlling statutes in New York in Guilford v. Brody, 237 App.Div. 726, 262 N.Y.S. 722 at page 724. The court's opinion reads in part as follows: The issue arose in United States v. French, 95 F.2d 922, at page 926, and writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice Stone said, In 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 14, p. 44, it is written, In dealing with a decree entered by default, predicated on constructive service, this court in Henry v. Henry, 15 S.D. 80, 87 N.W. 522, said, "The failure to file the complaint, as required by statute, when considered with the further fact that there was seemingly an unwarranted delay in mailing to the defendant a copy of the summons and complaint, may be deemed fatal to the jurisdiction of the trial court, but the defendant, who now appears generally, has cured such jurisdictional defect" and held that the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the decree. And in Union Bond &amp; Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 S.D. 600, at page 611, 269 N.W. 474, at page 479, 107 A.L.R. 1089, in treating of the effect of a general appearance in a similar instance, this court by way of obiter wrote: In arguing that we should not follow the holdings of other jurisdictions from which we have quoted supra, counsel points to Henry v. Henry and Union Bond &amp; Mortgage Co. v. Brown and advocates that we should employ the doctrine of relation to avoid the elapse of the statute of limitations. We are told that because the summons and complaint actually came into the hands of defendant before the statute had run, justice will be served if we relate defendant's appearance back and require him to defend on the merits. Whether in like circumstances we would adhere to the holding of Henry v. Henry we need not now determine. Our present inquiry is whether the circumstances at hand warrant application of the doctrine of relation. In Windey v. North Star Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 231 Minn. 279, 43 N.W.2d 99, at page 102, it is written: No fact appears of record which, in our opinion, invokes the doctrine. The course *208 followed by plaintiff in attempting to make service on defendant was of his counsel's choosing and the result thereof was known sufficiently before the bar of the statute of limitations was raised to have made possible a proper and valid commencement of the action, either by personal service, or by the equivalent of such service provided by SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0202. No word or act of defendant misled plaintiff. That defendant intended to waive service of process as of the date of his general appearance is manifest. Surely it would be unrealistic to hold that by the very act of appearing for the purpose of pleading the statute of limitations in the manner provided by SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0201 the defendant intended such a waiver as would be destructive of that defense. We are unable to avoid the conclusion that to employ either the doctrine of relation or of waiver in these circumstances would be to use it as an excuse, rather than a just reason, for depriving defendant of a meritorious defense which has been acquired in accordance with law. This we do not feel at liberty to do. Our conclusion is in keeping with Carroll v. Fowler, 33 S.D. 303, 145 N.W. 545, and McHarg v. Commonwealth Finance Corporation, 44 S.D. 144, 182 N.W. 705. The order of the trial court is affirmed. RENTTO and BIEGELMEIER, JJ., concur. ROBERTS, P. J., and HANSON, J., concur in result.