Title: Woods v. Dixon
Citation: 193 Or. 681, 240 P.2d 520
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1952

Reversed February 6, 1952.
*682 Laurence Morley argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Morley &amp; Thomas, of Lebanon, and Willis, Kyle &amp; Emmons, of Albany.
John A. Boock, of Albany, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED.
LATOURETTE, J.
Verdict for the plaintiff in a replevin action. Plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral contract whereby plaintiff agreed to sell and defendant agreed to purchase a certain truck on which there was a balance payable under a chattel mortgage of the sum of $7,950, executed by plaintiff to a third party. The chattel mortgage covered not only the truck but also a Buick sedan, and was payable in installments of $450, there being at the time of the sale a default in payment thereon of the sum of $750. It was agreed between the parties that defendant would pay to plaintiff the sum of $750 and the next two installments, when due, aggregating $900, it being contemplated that the total of $1,650 would be paid by plaintiff to the mortgagee, at which time the mortgagee would release from the chattel mortgage the sedan. It was agreed that the defendant would thereafter keep up the installment payments *683 on the chattel mortgage. At the time the contract was entered into, defendant paid plaintiff $750, whereupon plaintiff gave possession of the truck to the defendant. Plaintiff claims that the defendant failed to pay in the $900, and by reason of such default, he was entitled to recover possession of the truck. He brought replevin action, executed the appropriate affidavit and bond and secured the immediate possession of the truck.
Defendant in his answer denied that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the truck and counterclaimed for damages for its alleged illegal seizure. The case came on for trial before a jury and plaintiff prevailed. Defendant appeals.
1, 2. The first and second assignments of error are directed to the court's failure to allow defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the failure to grant defendant's requested instruction to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. It is well settled that a motion for a directed verdict must specify the grounds therefor. No grounds having been stated for either the motion or the requested instruction, we cannot consider these assignments of error. Ingalls v. Isensee, 170 Or 393, 133 P2d 614.
Assignment of Error No. III follows:
It is seen that the above requested instruction is predicated on an alleged tender, dated June 21, 1948, the same being as follows:
It was asserted by defendant throughout the trial that at the time the agreement was entered into plaintiff *686 agreed to furnish defendant with a written contract embracing the terms of the oral contract, and that when he made the aforementioned tender he was "ready, willing and able" to pay over the $900, provided plaintiff complied with his obligation under the agreement to furnish a written contract. There was evidence adduced at the trial in accordance with defendant's theory.
3. It is the law that a tender, in order to be effectual, must be absolute and unconditional; however, a tender may be good if accompanied by a condition upon which the buyer has a right to insist. Comstock Mfg. Co. v. Schiffmann et al., 113 Or 677, 234 P 293; Lowe v. Harmon, 167 Or 128, 115 P2d 297; 52 Am Jur, 232, § 24.
The tender hereinbefore set out included a condition, the furnishing of a written contract by plaintiff, on which, according to defendant's theory, he had a right to insist.
Plaintiff argues that defendant's tender was not sufficient because the money was not brought into court. Section 10-920, OCLA, reads as follows:
Section 72-101, OCLA, is as follows:
4, 5. It will, therefore, be seen that where there is an action for recovery of money or damages, the tender must be made good by bringing the money into court, and that an offer in writing to pay money, if not accepted, obviates the necessity of producing the money, which means at the time of the tender. We held in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 160 Or 679, 86 P2d 960, a suit to foreclose a mortgage, including a recovery on a note, that the money must be brought into court. However, the case at bar is not for the recovery of money; it is an action in claim and delivery, and since defendant submitted a written tender, under the facts in this case, it was unnecessary for him to bring the money into court. The law does not require the doing of a vain or useless thing. 12 Am Jur, 889, 892, §§ 333, 336; Bussard v. Hibler, 42 Or 500, 71 P 642.
6. The court erred in not submitting defendant's theory of the case by giving the proposed instruction. Reversed.