Title: Kennedy v. Justus
Citation: 325 P.2d 716, 64 N.M. 131
Docket Number: 6314
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 1958

325 P.2d 716 (1958) 64 N.M. 131 Floyd T. KENNEDY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C.T. JUSTUS and Arron Justus, Defendants-Appellees. No. 6314. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 9, 1958. *717 Mears &amp; Mears, J. Fred Boone, Portales, for appellant. Hartley, Buzzard &amp; Patton, Clovis, J.T. Morgan, Portales, for appellees. BRAND, District Judge. Plaintiff-appellant is a real estate broker in Portales, New Mexico, and brought this action for a commission alleged to be due him from the defendants C.T. Justus and Arron Justus, father and son, for having been the procuring cause of a sale of 160 acres of land owned by the father. Plaintiff had been given a written listing of the farm which was signed, "C.T. Justus, Owner, by Arron Justus". Two sons lived on the land and had during the past several years listed it for sale with other brokers and had represented that they had authority from their father, who lived in Texas, to offer the farm for sale. The father denied the agency of his son and asserted that he never authorized or permitted him to list the property for sale. Plaintiff adduced testimony to show that C.T. Justus, the father, had during the past several years advised him and other real estate brokers that his sons had authority to list the farm for sale; that his two boys had an interest in the property; and, that any transactions had with the boys would be satisfactory with him. Our statute governing such matters reads as follows: On objection being made by defendants to the introduction of the line of testimony mentioned above, the Court said in answer to the argument of plaintiff's attorney: And further, when plaintiff's attorney quoted from a New Mexico case which *718 held "an agency may be established by circumstantial evidence," the court replied: Ruling on the admissibility of this and similar testimony was reserved, but at the conclusion of the trial, the court found that a sale had been brought about through plaintiff's efforts but that the owner had not listed the property with plaintiff either in person, in a manner required by statute, nor by any other person lawfully authorized by him as required by statute, and dismissed the complaint. The court also stated, after announcing its decision: It is apparent that the Court was persuaded that the statute in question requires not only a written listing or contract employing the broker, but also a writing, such as a power of attorney, to evidence the authority of the agent who lists property for an owner. We find this not to be a proper construction of the statute but conclude that such a listing is binding on the principal if the purported agent was in fact an agent for such purpose under the general law of agency, and such an agency may be created by parol or estoppel, and proven by circumstantial evidence. Our court has said that the analogy between this statute and the Statute of Frauds is strong, and it has been called "an extension of the Statute of Frauds". Section 4 of the English statute pertains to "any contract or sale of lands", etc., and concludes with the language, "unless the agreement * * * shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." Thus it will be seen that our Brokers' Act uses the exact wording of the English statute in referring to the qualifications of an agent. In treating of this class of legislation, it is said: We find also that the courts have generally held it unnecessary for an agent's authority to be written to enable him to bind his principal to contracts within the various Statutes of Frauds: Our Court said in Harris v. Dunn, 55 N.M. 434, 234 P.2d 821, 822, 27 A.L.R.2d 1277: In Ginn v. MacAluso, 62 N.M. 375, 310 P.2d 1034, 1038, a real estate broker's action against a husband and wife for a commission on sale of property, the memorandum or listing was signed by the wife, writing her husband's name only, with the verbal consent of the husband but not in his presence. The court held the husband to be bound by the wife's action although she was found not liable, stating: It is held in all jurisdictions which have passed upon this question that the language of the statute "or by some other person thereunto lawfully authorized" means simply "by an agent", and that such agent may be verbally authorized to act for his principal. No authority to the contrary has been cited, and, indeed counsel for appellees concede the point by stating in their brief: They contend, nevertheless, that the trial court found that there was no relation of principal and agent existing between the father and son and quote in support thereof the judgment reading in part: We are convinced that by the language italicized the court meant, as is indicated throughout the record, that the agency was required to be established by some written instrument. We are, however, unable, on the state of the record, to render judgment here. Had the trial court been requested to find that the father had made the son his agent to list the land for sale by means other than a written instrument, its action on such request would have decided this issue. The record discloses no such request in the form required by the rules. The court was instead asked to find, as facts, the following: Request No. 4 sets forth evidentiary matter instead of the ultimate facts upon which to base a decision. Request No. 5 is also bad because it is not complete in itself, and is also evidentiary and not factual. Conclusions of law were requested, reading: which were refused. These conclusions stand alone without the support of appropriate findings of fact having been requested, and will not be considered as governing the court's decision. Moreover, they and the decision entered by the court evidently were arrived at because of the initial error into which the court fell concerning the construction and meaning of the statute in question. It follows that the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded. The trial court is instructed to expand its decision to include a finding of fact as to whether or not the relation of principal and agent obtained between father and son, although not founded upon a writing, whereby the son had been authorized to list the land for sale with plaintiff. If, of course, the answer to this is in the affirmative, judgment will enter for plaintiff as prayed. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and McGHEE and COMPTON, JJ., concur. SHILLINGLAW, J., not participating.