Title: KLAUDT v FLINK
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-247
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 1983

No. 82-247 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA NEIL L. KLAUDT, Personal Rep. of the Estate of SCOTT A. KLAUDT, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, < j + & V I - - STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, b~issoula, Montana Sam Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Hughes, Kellner, Sullivan and Alke, Helena, Montana Stuart L. Kellner argued, Helena, Montana !-arm. Submitted: November 16, 1982 Decided: January 28, 1983 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s is an a p p e a l from a f i n a l judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Missoula County. S t a t e Farm Mutual f i l e d a motion to d i s m i s s Count I11 o f t h e c o m p l a i n t , which named it as d e f e n d a n t , f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim on which r e l i e f could be g r a n t e d . The District Court g r a n t e d t h i s motion and e n t e r e d f i n a l judgment on May 25, 1982, p u r s u a n t t o Rule 5 4 ( b ) M.R.Civ.P. The c o u r t used t h e language c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r u l e i n its judgment and s t a t e d . " t h e C o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o Rule 54 ( b ) M.R.Civ.P., having e x p r e s s l y determined t h a t t h e e is no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y i n e n t e r i n g f i n a l judgment on s a i d Count 111," Thus, c o r r e c t l y c e r t i f y i n g t h e i s s u e to t h i s C o u r t . The f a i l u r e of t h e District Court t o p r o v i d e its r e a s o n s f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d does n o t r e n d e r t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e f e c t i v e as long as t h e g u i d e l i n e s i n r u l e 5 4 ( b ) M.R.Civ.P. have been complied w i t h . T h e r e f o r e , o u r p r e v i o u s c o n t r a r y h o l d i n g i n C h u r c h i l l v. Holly Sugar Corp. 1981, -- Mont . , 629 P.2d 758, 38 St.Rep. 860, t h a t no supplemen- t a l f i n d i n g s can be c o n s i d e r e d af t e r n o t i c e of appeal is f i l e d is o v e r r u l e d . A s both s i d e s have a p t l y s t a t e d i n t h e i r b r i e f s , when con- s i d e r i n g a motion to d i s m i s s , t h e material a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e p l e a d i n g a t t a c k e d are t a k e n as t r u e . P e l t o n v. Markegard (1978) 179 Mont. 102, 586 P.2d 306. Based on t h i s r u l e t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e seem t o be: 1. That N e i l Klaudt is t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e d e c e d e n t , S c o t t A. K l a u d t , and N i e l and C a r y l K l a u d t are t h e p a r e n t s of t h e d e c e d e n t . 2 . That t h e d e f e n d a n t , i n s u r e d , C a l v i n F l i n k , w a s d r i v i n g h i s car i n which t h e d e c e d e n t was a p a s s e n g e r , a t a high rate of speed and r o l l e d it on Mullen Road w e s t of Missoula. 3 . That t h e d e c e d e n t w a s thrown from t h e v e h i c l e and s u f - f e r e d i n j u r i e s c a u s i n g h i s d e a t h . 4. That t h e d e c e d e n t was e i g h t e e n a t t h e t i m e of h i s d e a t h . 5. That f o l l o w i n g t h e a c c i d e n t d e f e n d a n t , F l i n k , admitted r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s acts i n o p e r a t i n g t h e v e h i c l e . 6 . That S t a t e Farm was d e f e n d a n t F l i n k ' s , i n s u r e r a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t . 7 . That F l i n k was i n t o x i c a t e d a t t h e t i m e of s a i d a c c i d e n t , and l a t e r pleaded g u i l t y t o a r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g charge a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e a c c i d e n t . 8 . That S t a t e Farm h a s denied l i a b i l i t y and h a s r e f u s e d to n e g o t i a t e . The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s a p p e a l is whether t h e Montana U n f a i r Trade P r a c t i c e s s e c t i o n of t h e I n s u r a n c e Code, s p e c i f i c a l l y s e c t i o n 33-18-201(6), MCA, g i v e s the p l a i n t i f f s a c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s u r e r , which can be pro- s e c u t e d j o i n t l y w i t h an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e d ? T h i s is a c a s e of f i r s t impression i n o u r j u r i s d i c t i o n , and c e n t e r s around whether s e c t i o n 33-18-201, MCA, of t h e U n f a i r Trade P r a c t i c e s S e c t i o n of t h e Montana I n s u r a n c e Code c o n f e r s a p r i v a t e c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r , upon t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t s . I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e c l a i m a n t is a l l e g i n g a f a i l u r e of t h e d u t y t o s e t t l e under s u b s e c t i o n ( 6 ) of s e c t i o n 33-18-201, MCA. Under Montana l a w t h e d u t y t o s e t t l e h a s always been a f i d u - c i a r y d u t y running from t h e i n s u r e r t o t h e i n s u r e d , by v i r t u e of t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . Thompson v. S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 207, 505 P.2d 423, (and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ) . However, we now must l o o k t o see i f a cause of a c t i o n is c o n f e r r e d upon t h i r d p a r t i e s by t h i s s t a t u t e . There a r e no d e c i s i o n s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s code s e c t i o n and its e f f e c t i n Montana. B u t , t h i s i s s u e h a s a r i s e n i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c - t i o n s w i t h s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s . There is a s p l i t of a u t h o r i t y i n t h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n s as to whether such s t a t u t e s do indeed con£ e r a p r i v a t e r i g h t of a c t i o n on t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t s f o r breach of d u t y t o s e t t l e ; see Royal Globe I n s u r a n c e C o . v . S u p e r i o r Court o f B u t t e County ( 1 9 7 9 ) r 153 C a l . R p t r . 842, 592 P.2d 329. Kranzush v. Badger S t a t e Mutual C a s u a l t y C o . ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 1 0 3 Wis.2d 5 6 , 307 N.W.2d 256; Scroggins v. Allstate I n s u r a n c e Co. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 74 Ill.App.3d 1027, 30 I11.Dec. 682, 393 N.E.2d 718, J e n k i n s v. J .C. Penney C a s u a l t y I n s u r a n c e C o . ( 1 9 8 1 ) , W.Va. , 280 S.E.2d 2522 T u f t s v. Madesco I n v e s t m e n t Corp. (E.D.,Mo. 1 9 8 1 ) , W e must now view o u r s t a t u t e and c o n s t r u e it according to o u r r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . These a r e b e s t summarized i n Montana Power v. C r e m e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 182 Mont. 277, 596 P.2d 483, where t h i s Court s t a t e d : " [ t ] he development of t h e case law of Montana w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n may be summarized by t h e f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s . (1) Is t h e i n t e r p r e t a - t i o n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u t e as a whole? ( 2 ) Does t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e f l e c t t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e ? ( 3 ) Is t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e a s o n a b l e so as to a v o i d absurd r e s u l t s ? and ( 4 ) H a s t h e agency charged w i t h t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e p l a c e d a c o n s t r u c t i o n on t h e S t a t u t e ? ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ." 596 P.2d 484. Looking a t s e c t i o n 33-18-201, MCA, as a whole, as is r e q u i r e d when i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s , it seems r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r t h a t t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t s are p r o t e c t e d . Although a l l t h e s u b s e c t i o n s d o n ' t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o c l a i m a n t s , c e r t a i n of them d o . I t would be absurd to assume t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e would i n s e r t t h e s e words i n t o t h e s t a t u t e w i t h o u t them having some meaning, as t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is presumed n o t t o p a s s u s e l e s s o r m e a n i n g l e s s l e g i s l a t i o n . S t a t e ex rel. Dick I r v i n I n c . v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 513, 525 P.2d 564, 570. The i n s e r t i o n of t h e word " c l a i m a n t " i n t h e s t a t u t e e v i d e n c e s t h a t such p a r t i e s are owed an o b l i g a t i o n or d u t y under t h a t sta- t u t e . When t h a t o b l i g a t i o n is viewed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h s e c t i o n 33-10-1004, MCA, which is t h e remedies p r o v i s i o n of t h e U n f a i r Trade P r a c t i c e s S e c t i o n of t h e I n s u r a n c e Code, it is clear t h a t a p r i v a t e c a u s e of a c t i o n can be m a i n t a i n e d . S e c t i o n 33-18-1004(5), MCA, p r o v i d e s : "This s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t b e deemed to a f f e c t or p r e v e n t - tKe %r@osiition -- o f - any p e n a l t y - - - - p r o v i d e d - . by t h i s code o r by o t h e r law f o r v i o l a t i o n of any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r , whether o r n o t any such h e a r i n g is c a l l e d or held o r s u c h d e s i s t o r d e r i s s u e d . " (Emphasis added. ) Based on t h e above s u b s e c t i o n , it is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e i n s u r a n c e commissioner's a c t i o n is n o t t h e e x c l u s i v e remedy f o r an u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e v i o l a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , a c i v i l a c t i o n may be main- t a i n e d , because as s e c t i o n 27-1-104(1), MCA, a p t l y p o i n t s o u t a c i v i l a c t i o n a r i s e s o u t of breach of an o b l i g a t i o n . The i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is c l e a r ; under s e c t i o n 33-18-201, MCA, a n i n s u r e r h a s an o b l i g a t i o n t o c l a i m a n t s as w e l l as i n s u r e d s where u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e s are concerned. The t h i r d c r i t e r i a of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is e a s i l y s a t i s f i e d as no absurd r e s u l t is a r r i v e d a t by a l l o w i n g a c l a i m a n t to s u e under t h e s t a t u t e . Indeed t h e s t a t u t e would have l i t t l e e f f e c t on s e t t l e m e n t of l a r g e claims i f a c o n t r a r y conclu- s i o n were reached. The f i n a l s t e p i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a t u t e is to see i f t h e agency i n c h a r g e of a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e s t a t u t e h a s placed any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on it. N e i t h e r s i d e i n t h i s case h a s c a l l e d o u r a t t e n t i o n to any such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , n o r h a s o u r r e s e a r c h r e v e a l e d any. W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t s e c t i o n 33-18-201(6), MCA, d o e s create a n o b l i g a t i o n running from t h e i n s u r e r to t h e c l a i m a n t . When s u c h an o b l i g a t i o n is breached t h e c l a i m a n t has the b a s i s f o r a c i v i l a c t i o n . However, a t t h i s p o i n t , w e must d i f f e r w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n adopted by t h e o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which allow an a c t i o n such as t h i s to be p r o s e c u t e d o n l y a f t e r t h e i n s u r e d s l i a b i l i t y h a s been a d j u d i c a t e d . W e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a c t i o n may be f i l e d and t r i e d b e f o r e , c o n c u r r e n t w i t h , or a f t e r l i a b i l i t y h a s been d e t e r m i n e d . W e see no problems w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t r a r y f i n d i n g s i n t h e t w o a c t i o n s , t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s j u d i c a t a , collateral e s t o p - p e l or t h e l i k e because d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s a r e involved i n t h e t w o c a s e s . The i s s u e i n t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r f o r v i o l a t i o n of t h e i n s u r a n c e code is s i m p l y an a c t i o n to d e t e r m i n e whether or n o t t h e i n s u r e r v i o l a t e d its d u t y of f a i r d e a l i n g i n s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e c l a i m a n t , while t h e a c t i o n to d e t e r m i n e t h e u l t i m a t e l i a b i l i t y of t h e d r i v e r rests on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e and comparative n e g l i g e n c e . The o b l i g a t i o n to n e g o t i a t e i n good f a i t h and to promptly settle claims does n o t mean t h a t l i a b i l i t y has been determined. S e c t i o n 33-18-203(6) states t h a t t h e i n s u r e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n arises when l i a b i l i t y has become " r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r . " I n e v a l u a t i n g t h e i n s u r a n c e case, t h e j u r y must d e t e r m i n e whether t h e i n s u r e r nego- t i a t e d i n good f a i t h g i v e n t h e f a c t s it t h e n had. T h i s con- s i d e r a t i o n is s e p a r a t e and a p a r t from t h e j u r y ' s u l t i m a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e merits of any g i v e n a c t i o n . W e have c o n s i d e r e d whether t h e r e s u l t h e r e reached c o n t r a - v e n e s t h e purpose of Rule 411, M.R.Evid., on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of i n s u r a n c e . The r u l e o n l y p r o h i b i t s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of i n s u r a n c e where it is o f f e r e d f o r t h e purpose of showing n e g l i g e n c e or l i a b i l i t y . Here, t h e i s s u e s t o be t r i e d are s e p a r a t e and t h e r u l e is n o t v i o l a t e d . W e r e a l i z e t h a t many w i l l view t h i s r e s u l t a s h a r s h . However, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s r e a c t e d to what it p e r c e i v e s to be a n i m p o r t a n t problem. I n s u r a n c e companies have, and a r e a b l e to e x e r t , l e v e r a g e a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m a n t s because of t h e d i s p a r i t y i n r e s o u r c e b a s e . J u s t i c e delayed is o f t e n j u s t i c e d e n i e d . P u b l i c p o l i c y c a l l s f o r a meaningful s o l u t i o n . The l e g i s l a t u r e h a s spoken and w e , by t h i s d e c i s i o n , b r e a t h l i f e i n t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p r o d u c t . W e must n o t e , however, t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f imposes l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e p u r s u i t of any such a c t i o n . W e cannot i g n o r e t h e o r d i n a r y p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e s t a t u t e ; t h e y a r e presumed t o have t h e i r o r d i n a r y meaning. I n R e Woodburns Estate ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 128 Mont. 1 4 5 , 1 5 3 , 273 P.2d 391. T h e r e f o r e , t h e i n i t i a l r e q u i r e m e n t , set o u t i n t h e opening c l a u s e of s e c t i o n 33-18-201, MCA, o f showing t h e l a c k of good f a i t h i n s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s or o t h e r u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e s , t o be g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e s of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r company, must be m e t b e f o r e an a c t i o n may be s u c c e s s f u l l y m a i n t a i n e d . A s was s t a t e d by t h e Court i n J e n k i n s v . J .C. Penney C a s u a l t y Co., s u p r a , it is p o s s i b l e t h a t m u l t i p l e v i o l a t i o n s o c c u r r i n g i n t h e same claim could be s u f f i c i e n t to show a f r e q u e n t b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e , as would v i o l a t i o n s by t h e same company i n d i f f e r e n t cases. 280 S.E.2d a t 260. Proof of v i o l a t i o n s e v i d e n c i n g a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e , by t h e same company i n d i f f e r e n t cases, c a n be o b t a i n e d from o t h e r a t t o r n e y s , c l a i m a n t s , o r people having knowledge of t h e company's g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e ; J e n k i n s v. J . C . Penney C a s u a l t y I n s u r a n c e C o . , 280 The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d and t h e cause is remanded f o r t r i a l . < , R Justice Chief Justice - Justices Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., concurs and dissents as follows: I concur in the majority's holding that the statutes in question create an independent action on behalf of a tort victim against the tort feasor's insurer. I dissent from the holding in the majority opinion which permits the action against the insurer to be consolidated with the action against the tort f easor . The failure of insurance companies to expeditiously settle claims gave rise to passage of the legislation now before this Court. The majority holding in this case will certainly cause a much more expeditious handling of claims. I am concerned a.bout the prejudice which can result from consolidating the two actions. Additionally, lay jurors will have a very difficult time separating evidence which relates to the case against the insurer from evidence which bears upon the issues in the principle action against the tort feasor. The likely confusion and potential prejudice lead me to oppose consolidation. I would reverse and remand allowing the action against the insurance company to be brought at any time but would hold that the action against the insurer cannot be consolidated with the action aqainst the tort feasor. Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J . Weber d i s s e n t s a s f o l l o w s : I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t f r o m t h e h o l d i n g of t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t s e c t i o n 33-18-201 ( 6 ) , MCA, c r e a t e s an o b l i g a - t i o n running from t h e i n s u r e r t o t h e noninsured c l a i m a n t ( t h e c l a i m a n t normally d e s c r i b e d a s a t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t , a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an i n s u r e d c l a i m a n t ) , t h e breach of which may be t h e b a s i s of a c i v i l a c t i o n . I f u r t h e r r e s p e c t - f u l l y d i s s e n t from t h e m a j o r i t y c o n c l u s i o n t h a t such an a c t i o n may be f i l e d and t r i e d , b e f o r e , c o n c u r r e n t w i t h , o r a f t e r l i a b i l i t y h a s been determined. I a g r e e with t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e r u l e s o f s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o b e a p p l i e d a r e c o r r e c t l y summarized i n Montana Power v. Cremer ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 182 Mont. 277, 596 P.2d 483. However, t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n h a s f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y a p p l y t h e f i r s t two r u l e s of t h e Cremer summary: " ( 1 ) Is t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e s t a t u t e a s a whole? ( 2 ) Does t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e f l e c t t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e ? " W e a r e r e q u i r e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t e a s a whole and t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e language. The p r o v i s i o n s i n q u e s t i o n a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e Unfair Trade P r a c t i c e s c h a p t e r of t h e Montana I n s u r a n c e Code. The g e n e r a l purposes of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c h a p t e r a r e d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 33-18-101, MCA: "The purpose of t h i s c h a p t e r is t o regu- l a t e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s i n t h e b u s i n e s s of i n s u r a n c e . . . by d e f i n i n g . . . a l l such p r a c t i c e s i n t h i s s t a t e which con- s t i t u t e u n f a i r methods of c o m p e t i t i o n o r u n f a i r o r d e c e p t i v e a c t s o r p r a c t i c e s and by p r o h i b i t i n g t h e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s s o d e f i n e d o r determined." The p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t u n f a i r methods is d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 33-18-102, MCA: "(1) No person shall engage . . . in any trade practice which is defined in this chapter as or determined pursuant to this chapter to be an unfair method of compe- tition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance." The "person" referred to in the preceding section is defined by section 33-1-202, MCA, to include an insurer, company, reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, corporation, or other legal entity. The defendant insurance company therefore fits the definition of a "person" in that section. I fail to see how the statutory language of section 33-18-201, MCA, can be construed to create an obligation running from the insurance company to a third party claimant. It states: "Unfair claim settlement practices pro- hibited. No person may, with such frequency as to indicate a g e n e r a l --- ....................... ------ business practice, do any of the following: "(6) neglect to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;" (Under- scoring added.) In substance this provides that an insurance company cannot engage in a general business practice of denying lia- bility where such liability is reasonably clear. Section 33-18-201, MCA, contains fourteen paragraphs which set forth unfair claims settlement practices. Other sections in the chapter set forth prohibitions against misrepresentation, false advertising, twisting, publishing false financial statements, unfair discrimination as to rates, preferred rates as to fictitious groups, no rebates, illegal dealings in premiums, extension of credit to policy holders, defaming an insurer, boycott, coercion or intimi- dation, false applications, restrictions on solicitation, and a number of other activities. See sections 33-18-202 to 33-18-501, MCA. This is a very comprehensive list of unfair trade practices in the business of .insurance. Nowhere in this extensive statutory framework of unfair trade practices is there a specific provision granting to either insureds or third party claimants the right to bring an action to enforce any of the provisions of this chapter. Sections 33-18-1001 to 1005, IJICU, set forth enforcement provisions which essentially grant to the insurance commissioner the power to examine the actions of insurance companies and to seek cease and desist orders. The ultimate penalties for violation of a cease and desist order include fines of up to $1,000 for each day with a total penalty not to exceed $10,000. In addition, section 33-1-104, MCA, provides that each violation of the Insurance Code "in addition to any administrative penalty" upon conviction shall be punishable by a fine of not less than $50 or more than $1,000 or in by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than thirty days or more than ninety days or by both fine and imprisonment. The purpose of the chapter is to regulate trade practices. The prohibition is against an insurance company engaging in trade practices which are unfair or deceptive as described. Of particular significance is the prohibition against an insurance company neglecting to effectuate settlement of claims "with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice." When followed by enforcement sections which require action by the commissioner of insurance only, I must conclude that the interpretation of t h e m a j o r i t y is n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u t e a s a whole a s is r e q u i r e d under Cremer. I f u r t h e r conclude t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n d o e s n o t r e f l e c t t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when we s t u d y t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e s t a t u t o r y language. The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i g n o r e s t h e absence of any p r o v i s i o n i n t h e l e g i s l a t i o n g r a n t i n g a r i g h t of s u i t by e i t h e r t h e i n s u r e d s o r t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t s . T h i s r e a d i l y c o u l d have been i n s e r t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had t h a t been i t s i n t e n t . The m a j o r i t y h a s d i s r e g a r d e d t h e r u l e c o n t a i n e d i n o u r r e c e n t o p i n i o n of S t a t e of Montana e x r e l . Palmer & Conrad v. H a r t ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Nont. 1 - I ? . 2d , 39 St.Rep. 2277, i n which w e s t a t e d : "This C o u r t must a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e s t a t u t e it con- s t r u e s . W e may n o t i n s e r t what h a s been o m i t t e d . S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA. Chennault v. Sager ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Mon t . , 610 P.26 173, 176, 37 St.Rep. 857, 861." The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n h a s i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e s t a t u t e e l e m e n t s which had been o m i t t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Regard- less of our v i e w p o i n t s on t h e e q u i t i e s of e n a b l i n g t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t s t o s u e i n s u r a n c e companies, w e s h o u l d n o t presume t o i n s e r t i n t o a s t a t u t e t h a t which h a s been o m i t t e d . Such a c t i o n is f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , n o t t h i s Court. I n t h e i n t e r e s t of b r e v i t y , I w i l l n o t a t t e m p t t o a n a l y z e t h e v a r i o u s cases on t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e p r i v a t e r l g h t of a c t i o n by t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m a n t s f o r breach of d u t y t o settle, a s c i t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . I d o n o t e t h a t t h e l e a d i n g c a s e i n C a l i f o r n i a , Royal Globe I n s u r a n c e Co. v . S u p e r i o r Court of B u t t e County ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 153 Ca1.Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329, is based upon a s t a t u t e w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s from our Montana code s e c t i o n s , none of which have been analyzed o r c o n s i ~ e r e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . The d i s s e n t i n Royal Globe I n s u r a n c e Co. c o n t a i n s many of t n e arguments which I b e l i e v e t o be p e r s u a s i v e . T h i s is summarized i n t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n from 592 P.2d a t 340: " I f , a s t h e m a j o r i t y a s s e r t s , t h e Legis- l a t u r e had i n t e n d e d t o change t h e c o u r s e of C a l i f o r n i a law 180 d e g r e e s and t h e r e - a f t e r t o impose upon c a r r i e r s c i v i l l i a - b i l i t y t o i n j u r e d t h i r d p e r s o n s f o r f a i l i n g t o s e t t l e c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e i r i n s u r e d , t h e n s u r e l y much more d i r e c t and p r e c i s e l a n g u a g e would have been select- ed." (Underscoring added.) - The l a s t p a r a g r a p h of t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n h o l d s t h a t proof of v i o l a t i o n s e v i d e n c i n g a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e is r e q u i r e d b e f o r e an a c t i o n can be s u c c e s s f u l l y m a i n t a i n e d . T h i s r e c o g n i z e s t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h a t i n s e c t i o n 33-18-201(6), MCA, which p r o h i b i t an i n s u r a n c e company from engaging i n t h e p r o h i b i t e d c l a i m s e t t l e m e n t p r a c t i c e s "with such frequency a s t o i n d i c a t e a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e . " The f u r t h e r r e s u l t of t h e m a j o r i t y holding is t h a t t h e f i r s t person t o be s o m i s t r e a t e d by a n i n s u r a n c e company would be unable t o recover because he could n o t prove a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e . Presumably t h e f i r s t "few" p e r s o n s s o m i s t r e a t e d by an i n s u r a n c e company could n o t recover u n t i l t h e m i s t r e a t m e n t had become s o c o n s i s t e n t a s t o become a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e . Had it been t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o g r a n t a r i g h t of a c t i o n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , it seems a b s u r d t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e f i r s t few m i s t r e a t e d p e r s o n s have no c a u s e of a c t i o n because of t h e absence of a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s p r a c t i c e . I s u g g e s t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n v i o l a t e s t h e t h i r d r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i n Cremer: " ( 3 ) Is t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e a s o n a b l e s o a s t o avoid absurd r e s u l t s ? " I n a d d i t i o n , I j o i n i n t h e d i s s e n t of J u s t i c e Morrison i n which he would n o t p e r m i t an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r t o be c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e t o r t f e a s o r . T h i s would a l s o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Rule 411, Mont.R.Evid., a s s t a t e d i n DIHoodge v. McCann ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151 Mont. 353, 433 P.2d 477, where t h i s Court s t a t e d : " O r d i n a r i l y i n j e c t i o n of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t is p r o t e c t e d by l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e i n t o such a c a s e , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , by evidence, arguments, o r remarks c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . " I would a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d i s s e n t s a s f o l l o w s : I j o i n i n t h e d i s s e n t of J u s t i c e Weber. I f u r t h e r a g r e e w i t h J u s t i c e s Morrison and Weber t h a t t h e c l a i m s of t h e t h i r d p a r t y should n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o be joined w i t h and t r i e d w i t h t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e claimed t o r t f e a s o r . By i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a t u t e s a s p e r m i t t i n g t h i r d p a r t y c l a i m s a g a i n s t i n s u r a n c e companies who i n s u r e an a l l e g e d t o r t f e a s o r , w e have ignored t h e p l a i n woraing of t h e U n f a i r Trade P r a c t i c e s c h a p t e r of t h e Montana Insurance Code. I n r e s o r t i n g t o t h e s o - c a l l e d r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t o reach t h i s r e s u l t , t h e m a j o r i t y has f u r t h e r ignored and t o r t u r e d t h e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . The r e s u l t is j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n run rampant. A