Title: Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents v. Decker
Citation: 2014 WI 68
Docket Number: 2011AP002902
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2014

2014 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2902   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Board of Regents - UW System, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jeffrey S. Decker, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 279, 827 N.W.2d 929 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2013 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John Markson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by R. Duane Harlow, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was brief by Gary 
Grass, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Gary Grass. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Dustin B. Brown, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, 
Inc., and oral argument by Dustin B. Brown. 
   
 
 
2014 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP2902 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV4619) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Board of Regents - UW System, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey S. Decker, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a 
decision and order of the Dane County Circuit Court2 issuing a 
harassment injunction against defendant Jeffrey S. Decker 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.125 (2009-10).3  
                                                 
1 Board of Regents v. Decker, No. 2011AP2902, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2013). 
2 The Honorable John W. Markson presiding. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The question before us is whether the circuit court 
properly granted a harassment injunction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125, Wisconsin's harassment injunction statute. Decker 
argues that (1) Wis. Stat. § 813.125 does not extend protection 
to institutions; (2) his behavior did not constitute harassment 
under the statute; and (3) the harassment injunction granted by 
the circuit court was overbroad and vague. The Board of Regents 
concedes4 that the injunction was overbroad but asserts that Wis. 
Stat. § 813.125 protects institutions as well as people, and 
further argues that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 
lacked a legitimate purpose. 
¶3 
We 
hold 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125 
can 
extend 
injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural 
persons. We further hold that the circuit court's decision to 
grant a harassment injunction was a proper exercise of its 
discretion, and sufficient evidence existed for the court to 
find that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and lacked a 
legitimate purpose. However, because the parties agree the 
injunction was overbroad, we remand to the circuit court to 
refine the injunction and clarify its terms. For these reasons, 
the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause 
is remanded to the circuit court.  
 
                                                 
4 This court is "not bound by the parties' interpretation of 
the law or obligated to accept a party's concession of law." 
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶50, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
3 
 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
Jeffrey S. Decker ("Decker") is a former student of 
the University of Wisconsin—Stevens Point ("UWSP"). On August 
13, 2010, Decker met with the UWSP Chancellor, Dr. Bernie 
Patterson, in the Chancellor's office to discuss Decker's 
concerns regarding segregated fees charged to students.5 During 
the meeting, Decker became agitated and began to talk about 
university employees in a derogatory manner. Decker also swore 
at 
the 
Chancellor 
and 
threatened 
to 
interfere 
with 
the 
Chancellor's upcoming State of the University address and donor 
function if his demands were not met.6 As tensions escalated 
during the meeting, Decker reached for a stack of papers on the 
Chancellor's conference table. The Chancellor informed Decker 
the papers did not belong to him and tried to pull the documents 
away, but Decker yanked the papers back and forcibly stabbed 
                                                 
5 Segregated fees are "charges in addition to instructional 
fees assessed to all students for services, programs and 
facilities that support the primary mission of the university." 
Segregated 
Fees 
Information, 
Office 
of 
the 
Registrar, 
http://registrar.wisc.edu/segregated_fees_information.htm 
(last 
visited 
Dec. 
24, 
2013). 
Decker 
believes 
that 
university 
officials must consult student government prior to assessing 
segregated fees. 
 
6 Decker sent several emails to the Chancellor prior to 
their meeting. For instance, on August 4, 2010, Decker emailed 
the Chancellor regarding segregated fees and stated, "There is 
only one answer to the question I pose, and unless you answer it 
by 9 am tomorrow I will embarrass you before your peers for 
being in charge of an utterly corrupt and despicable scheme." On 
August 5, 2010, Decker wrote, "It'll be a few hours before you 
discover how I've chosen to embarrass you personally for your 
new role in this scam. Just because I believe in fairness and 
opportunity, here's this second notice." 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
4 
 
them with a pen. The Chancellor then called the police to remove 
Decker from his office.7 The Chancellor returned to his office 
approximately thirty minutes later and found the following note: 
Threat: Due to rampant violations of of [sic] state 
law, ethical and professional standards and multiple 
commitments for communication, I shall soon demand the 
resignation of Kevin Reily [sic] and Bernie Patterson, 
or a dragon shall do it for all students. Jef Decker  
¶5 
As a result of Decker's behavior during his meeting 
with the Chancellor, Decker was brought before a Nonacademic 
Disciplinary Committee ("the Committee"), which found that 
Decker had engaged in Disorderly Conduct in violation of Wis. 
Admin. Code § 18.11(2).8 The Committee suspended Decker from UWSP 
                                                 
7 Decker provided a slightly different version of events in 
a written statement he made to UWSP Police. Decker claims he 
informed the Chancellor that he would demand the resignation of 
UW System President Kevin Reilly "from within a giant dragon 
costume." Decker maintains that the Chancellor reacted by 
"visibly shaking with rage" and vowing to document Decker's 
threats. Decker alleges he then offered to write down his 
statements for the Chancellor on a packet of papers in front of 
Decker. As Decker began to write, Vice Chancellor Bob Tomlinson, 
who was also present at the meeting, attempted to remove 
Decker's pen from the papers. Decker resisted and applied more 
pressure to the pen as the Chancellor seized the papers, 
resulting in the papers becoming crumpled. 
8 Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 18.11(2) states: 
No person may engage in violent, abusive, indecent, 
profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise 
disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the 
conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance, in 
university buildings or on university lands. 
Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 17.09(14) provides university 
officials with disciplinary authority over students in 
violation of Chapter 18. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
5 
 
for the period of November 19, 2010, through January 1, 2012. At 
the end of the disciplinary meeting, Decker informed the 
Committee that he had no intention of complying with the 
suspension.  
¶6 
Decker was true to his word. University of Wisconsin 
("UW") 
regulations 
provide 
that 
a 
suspended 
student 
is 
prohibited from being "present on any campus without the written 
consent of the chief administrative officer of that campus." 
Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 17.17(4).9 Nevertheless, Decker continued 
to enter university property on at least four separate occasions 
after he was suspended, which are described in detail below.10   
¶7 
On January 22, 2011, Decker requested permission from 
Chancellor Richard Wells of UW-Oshkosh to enter the campus, 
                                                 
9 Decker later testified before the circuit court that 
approximately one week after his suspension, he "became aware 
that the university's position was that Administrative Code 
17.17 prohibited me from being on campus." Decker also stated, 
"it's clear based on my actions after [the suspension], that I 
do not regard the Administrative Code to be lawful in a free 
country where public property can be accessed by citizens of 
this great land." 
10 Although the Board of Regents chronicles only four 
incidents in which Decker entered UW property after his 
suspension, Decker was charged with two additional violations of 
Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 18.11(7)(a), which prohibits suspended 
students from entering university lands. The first charge 
stemmed from conduct occurring on February 15, 2011, in 
Winnebago County, and was dismissed on May 9, 2011. The second 
charge related to conduct occurring on October 12, 2011, in 
Winnebago County, and Decker was convicted after a bench trial 
on January 26, 2012. In addition, although only one of the 
incidents described by the Board of Regents occurred on the UW-
Oshkosh campus, Decker testified before the circuit court that 
he had been at UW-Oshkosh "several times" since his suspension. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
6 
 
which was denied. In spite of Wells' denial, Decker went to an 
intercollegiate basketball game at UW-Oshkosh and distributed 
literature to attendees.  
¶8 
On September 1, 2011, Decker entered UW-Fox Valley 
property to attend a meeting between members of the UW student 
government and Ray Cross, the UW Colleges and UW-Extension 
Chancellor.11 Decker interrupted the meeting while the Chancellor 
was posing a question to student government members. The 
Chancellor asked Decker to leave, but Decker continued to 
disrupt the meeting. The Chancellor then asked a colleague to 
call the police and apologetically explained to Decker: "I 
really hate to do this. If you had remained quiet, Jeff, I 
wouldn’t have done that." Decker responded by admonishing the 
Chancellor for not returning his phone calls, at which point the 
Chancellor started to leave the meeting. A student then asked 
Decker to remain silent: "Mr. Decker, this is our time to visit 
with the Chancellor. . . . I think it would be respectful if we 
could spend our time with him. We don’t get a whole lot of 
time."  
¶9 
Decker promised to be quiet, then after a brief pause, 
he hijacked the meeting entirely, spending several minutes 
talking about his suspension from UW. The Chancellor dismissed 
the meeting and left, followed by the students. The meeting was 
                                                 
11 An unofficial transcript of the meeting was published by 
The Forum, the student newspaper for UW-Marathon County. See 
John Kronenwetter, Transcript: UW Colleges Convocation, Student 
Governance Council Meeting, Sept. 1, 2011 at UW-Fox Valley, The 
Forum at UW-Marathon County, Nov. 1, 2011. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
7 
 
later reconvened in another room without Decker, who had moved 
on to a different meeting with the UW Colleges Assistant Deans 
for Administrative Services, where he was removed by police.  
¶10 Decker's next recorded trespass onto UW property 
occurred on September 8, 2011, when Decker entered a meeting of 
the Board of Regents held at Van Hise Hall, located on the UW 
campus at Madison. Decker began to videotape and photograph the 
proceedings and was asked to leave by university police.12 Decker 
declined and continued to film the meeting. University police 
informed Decker that he was in violation of his suspension and 
repeated their request that Decker leave the meeting. Decker 
again refused, and campus police arrested him, at which point 
Decker went limp and was dragged out of the meeting. Decker was 
charged with criminal Trespass to Land under Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.13(1m)(a),13 but charges were ultimately dismissed on April 
23, 2012. 
                                                 
12 Decker later posted his footage of the September 8, 2011, 
meeting on the internet. See UW Corruption, (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6VfXogJSEQ&feature=c4overview&li
st=UUI5M8zovksT35zw07ScBdsw. 
The 
video 
also 
shows 
Decker 
approaching 
UW-Oshkosh 
Chancellor 
Richard 
Wells 
with 
his 
videocamera as Wells was getting into his car. Decker asked 
Wells to speak with him and Wells declined. Decker exclaimed, 
"If you happen to know exactly why you say I'm not stable enough 
for a university environment, please do tell me." Decker 
continued to videotape Wells as he drove away. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.13(1m)(a) prohibits entry onto "any 
enclosed, cultivated or undeveloped land of another . . .  
without the express or implied consent of the owner or 
occupant." 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
8 
 
¶11 Decker's fourth documented trespass onto UW property 
occurred on September 19, 2011, when he entered a meeting of the 
UW-Fox Valley Board of Trustees held on the UW-Fox Valley 
campus. Decker began to speak at the meeting, but Interim Dean 
Keogh reminded Decker he was prohibited from entering UW 
property during his suspension and asked Decker to leave. Decker 
refused and began handing out literature to meeting attendees as 
he remarked:  
I, myself, was personally assaulted by the chancellor 
of the UW-Stevens Point and [the] UW system saw fit to 
railroad and suspend me, all to protect hundreds of 
millions of dollars of corruption and the end of rule 
of law at the University of Wisconsin. . . . I'm not 
going to leave this meeting. You know, I'll just sit 
here until the cops haul me out.  
By this time, the police had indeed been called. Decker again 
went limp and continued to denounce university fees as he was 
dragged from the room.14 Decker was charged with Disorderly 
Conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01,15 and he pled no contest on 
January 9, 2012. 
                                                 
14 According to The Fox Journal, the UW-Fox Valley student 
newspaper, Decker returned to campus later that afternoon and 
distributed literature in the office of Senior Student Affairs 
Coordinator Jeff Kuepper. See Kari Toland, Police arrest former 
UW-Stevens Point student at Fox, The Fox Journal, Oct. 17, 2011. 
The article also explained that Decker had been protesting 
student fees at UW for five years at the time of his September 
19 arrest. Id. 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 947.01(1) provides: 
Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in 
violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, 
boisterous, 
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
9 
 
¶12 The UW Board of Regents petitioned the Dane County 
Circuit Court, Judge John Markson presiding, for a temporary 
restraining order against Decker on October 17, 2011.  The 
petition named the University of Wisconsin System as the 
protected party. It requested Decker be required to (1) cease or 
avoid harassing the protected party; (2) avoid the protected 
party's residence and/or any premises it temporarily occupies; 
(3) avoid contact that harasses or intimidates the protected 
party; and (4) refrain from entering upon any real property 
owned by, leased by, or otherwise subject to the control of the 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. The 
temporary restraining order was granted and an injunction 
hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2011.  
¶13 UW-Oshkosh Police Chief Joseph LeMire attempted to 
serve the temporary restraining order papers on Decker on 
October 18, 2011. Decker was on his porch when the Chief arrived 
at his house, but when the Chief got out of his car, Decker went 
inside, closed the door, and refused to answer the doorbell. The 
Chief left and drove around the block, but when he returned, 
Decker's car was gone. A handgun hotline report later informed 
the Chief that, after Decker had left his house, he had 
immediately attempted to purchase a handgun.  
                                                                                                                                                             
cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
10 
 
¶14 On October 24, 2011, Judge Markson held an injunction 
hearing to discuss the Board of Regents' petition.  The circuit 
court found that Decker attended meetings at UW, 
knowing that he would be asked to leave, knowing that 
he was not intending to leave, and then necessarily 
what that would entail, which would be calling the 
officers and causing the sort of disturbance that was 
present on each of the occasions that were the subject 
of testimony. 
The circuit court concluded that Decker's repeated entry onto UW 
property in willful violation of his suspension "constitutes 
conduct of a sort that is harassing and intimidating" and was 
"not done for any lawful or legitimate purpose." The circuit 
court also found "clear and convincing evidence that there is a 
real concern that Mr. Decker may use a firearm to cause physical 
harm to another or endanger the public safety." The circuit 
court reasoned that the persistence of Decker's harassing 
behavior, his resistance to law enforcement, and his purchase of 
a handgun immediately after Chief LeMire attempted to serve him 
with the restraining order were sufficient to order a firearm 
restriction for the pendency of the harassment injunction. The 
circuit court noted Decker already possessed four other guns and 
remarked, "It has not been satisfactorily explained to me the 
reason for his needing to buy yet another handgun and doing so 
immediately after being aware that process is being served on 
him in this case." 
¶15 The circuit court granted a harassment injunction 
against Decker based on the Board of Regents' petition and 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.125, effective through October 24, 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
11 
 
2015. The harassment injunction named the "Board of Regents UW 
System," as the protected party, although the Board of Regents' 
petition requested protection for the "University of Wisconsin 
System."    Decker was ordered to cease or avoid harassment of 
the "Board of Regents UW System," avoid the residence and any 
premises temporarily occupied by the Board of Regents, and 
refrain from contacting the Board of Regents. Decker was also 
prohibited from possessing a firearm until the harassment 
injunction expired.  
¶16 In an unpublished, per curiam decision, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's order for a harassment 
injunction. 
Board 
of 
Regents 
v. 
Decker, 
No. 
2011AP2902, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2013). The court of 
appeals reasoned that the harassment injunction statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 813.125, requires a party seeking an injunction to prove 
"(1) that the defendant intentionally engaged in a course of 
conduct which harassed the victim; and (2) that the defendant's 
conduct served no legitimate purpose." Id., ¶7. The court of 
appeals 
assumed, 
without 
deciding, 
that 
Decker's 
conduct 
constituted 
harassment, 
but 
it 
determined 
Decker 
had 
a 
legitimate purpose for his actions. Id., ¶10. The court found 
that Decker's purpose in attending the UW meetings was to 
protest university student fees, which was conduct he had been 
engaging in since at least 2010. Id., ¶12. The court of appeals 
noted that Decker's right "to publicly demonstrate, protest and 
persuade others" is constitutionally protected. Id., ¶13. Since 
"legitimate protest of government policies is protected by law," 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
12 
 
the court of appeals concluded Decker had a legitimate purpose, 
and the harassment injunction was therefore improperly granted 
by the circuit court. Id. 
¶17 The Board of Regents petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on June 14, 2013. We now reverse and remand to 
the circuit court for the reasons discussed below. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 This case requires us to examine the harassment 
injunction statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.125, to determine if the 
statute applies to conduct against institutions in addition to 
natural persons. Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo. State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, 
¶18, 349 Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126; Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. 
Orion Constr. Grp., LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶12, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 
N.W.2d 332. 
¶19 We review a circuit court's decision to grant a 
harassment injunction for an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶23, 312 Wis. 2d 435, 752 
N.W.2d 359. We look for reasons to sustain a discretionary 
ruling. Id., ¶24. In addition, "[t]he scope of an injunction is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id.  
¶20 Though the decision to issue an injunction is within 
the discretion of the circuit court, in order to grant an 
injunction under Wis. Stat. § 813.125, the circuit court must 
find "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has 
engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the 
petitioner." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(4)(a)3. 
Such 
a 
finding 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
13 
 
presents a mixed question of fact and law. Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 
435, ¶23. This court will uphold the factual findings of the 
circuit court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. However, 
whether reasonable grounds exist to grant the injunction is a 
question of law that we review de novo. Id.  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶21 The question before us is whether the harassment 
injunction against Decker was properly granted by the circuit 
court under Wis. Stat. § 813.125, the harassment injunction 
statute. The Board of Regents argues Wis. Stat. § 813.125 
protects institutions as well as people. The Board of Regents 
further claims Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 
lacked a legitimate purpose because his intent was to harass the 
board and his actions were illegal as a matter of law. Decker 
responds that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 does not provide authority to 
issue a harassment injunction to protect an institution. Decker 
also maintains he had a legitimate purpose to protest the 
Board's activities, and therefore his conduct did not constitute 
harassment as defined by Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b). Decker's 
final argument is that the circuit court's harassment injunction 
is overbroad and vague in its scope. 
¶22 We begin in Part A by addressing whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125 applies to institutions as well as people. In Part B, 
we discuss whether Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 
lacked 
a 
legitimate 
purpose 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(1)(b). Finally, in Part C, we discuss the scope of the 
harassment injunction. For the reasons discussed below, we find 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
14 
 
that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 applies to institutions, and Decker's 
conduct constituted harassment that was properly enjoined. 
However, because the parties agree the injunction was overbroad, 
we remand to the circuit court to refine the harassment 
injunction and clarify its terms. 
A. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 813.125 Protects Institutions 
¶23 Wisconsin's harassment injunction statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) Definition. In this section, "harassment" means 
any of the following: 
(a) Striking, shoving, kicking or otherwise subjecting 
another person to physical contact; engaging in an act 
that would constitute abuse under s. 48.02(1), sexual 
assault under s. 940.225, or stalking under s. 940.32; 
or attempting or threatening to do the same. 
(b) Engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly 
committing acts which harass or intimidate another 
person and which serve no legitimate purpose. 
¶24 The Board of Regents contends Wis. Stat. § 813.125 
protects institutions as well as individuals. For support, the 
Board of Regents relies on Wis. Stat. § 990.01, which contains 
the general definitions and rules of construction for Wisconsin 
laws.  Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01 provides: 
In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and 
phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated 
unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(26) goes on to define "person" as 
including "all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or 
corporate." The Board of Regents argues that it is a political 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
15 
 
body, and under Wis. Stat. § 36.07(1), it is also a corporate 
body: "The board and their successors in office shall constitute 
a body corporate by the name of 'Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System.'" The Board of Regents also 
notes 
that 
in 
Village 
of 
Tigerton 
v. 
Minniecheske, 
211 
Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of 
appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 can protect a municipal 
corporation.  
¶25 Decker 
argues 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(1)(a) 
clearly 
contemplates harassment directed towards an individual and not 
institutions. An institution such as the Board of Regents cannot 
be the target of "[s]triking, shoving, kicking or . . . physical 
contact," nor can it be subjected to physical or sexual abuse, 
sexual assault, or stalking. Although Decker's harassment 
injunction was issued under Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b), Decker 
maintains the language of this subsection also suggests a human 
subject. Relying on dictionary definitions of "harass," Decker 
argues an institution cannot be "subjected to mental agitation, 
worry, grief, anxiety, distress, or fear." 
¶26 We agree with the Board of Regents' argument that Wis. 
Stat. § 813.125 protects institutions as well as people. 
Although Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b) describes harassment as 
"committing acts which harass or intimidate another person," 
Wisconsin's general definitions statute defines a "person" as 
including "all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or 
corporate." Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) (emphasis added). This 
definition is presumed applicable to the harassment injunction 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
16 
 
statute "unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature." Wis. 
Stat. § 990.01. In Tigerton, the court of appeals noted, "the 
legislature's definition of 'person' predates the harassment 
statute." Tigerton, 211 Wis. 2d at 784. The court of appeals in 
Tigerton relied on the "maxim that assumes the lawmakers acted 
with full knowledge of existing laws, including statutes" and 
concluded 
the 
legislature 
intended 
the 
general 
statutory 
definition of "person" to govern the harassment injunction 
statute. Id. Likewise, we assume the legislature was aware of 
the statutory definition of "person" when it enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125 and intended that definition to apply.  Nothing in 
Wis. Stat. § 813.125 indicates such a reading would be contrary 
to the "manifest intent" of the legislature. Moreover, our 
conclusion is supported by the court of appeals' decision in 
Tigerton, which held that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 applies to 
municipal corporations.  Id. at 783. 
¶27 Having determined that the statutory definition of 
"person" in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) applies to the harassment 
injunction statute, we must next consider whether the Board of 
Regents qualifies as a "person" under this definition. Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(26) 
defines 
a 
"person" 
as 
including 
"all 
partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate." 
There is ample reason to think the Board of Regents constitutes 
a body politic. The Board of Regents is empowered to enact 
policies and promulgate rules; employ police officers to enforce 
its rules; appoint officers and delegate authority to those 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
17 
 
officers; 
allocate 
funds 
and 
set 
institutional 
budgets; 
establish a mission statement; and purchase, lease, and manage 
property. Wis. Stat. § 36.11; see also Rouse v. Theda Clark Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 2007 WI 87, ¶31, 302 Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30 
(holding that the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics 
Authority is a political corporation because of "the power 
granted [to it] by the legislature"). In addition, members of 
the Board of Regents are primarily appointed by the Governor. 
Wis. Stat. § 15.91; see also University of Wisconsin System 
Board 
of 
Regents, 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
System, 
http://www.wisconsin.edu/bor/ (last visited July 8, 2014). In 
Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Commission, we held 
that the Milwaukee County Civil Service Commission is a "body 
politic" because the Commission "consist[s] of appointed members 
who 
perform 
statutorily 
defined, 
important 
governmental 
functions entirely independent of the governmental entity which 
appoints members." Watkins v. Milwaukee Cnty. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 417-418, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979).  
¶28 Moreover, regardless of whether the Board of Regents 
is a body politic, it is plainly structured as a body corporate 
under Wis. Stat. § 36.07(1): "The board and their successors in 
office shall constitute a body corporate by the name of 'Board 
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.'" Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Board of Regents is a "person" as defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) and is therefore eligible for 
injunctive protection under Wis. Stat. § 813.125. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
18 
 
¶29 We agree with Decker that Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(a), 
when read in isolation, does appear to contemplate harassment 
directed towards a natural person. However, a party seeking a 
harassment injunction must establish the requirements of either 
Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(a) or (1)(b). The harassment injunction 
against Decker was issued under Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b), and 
nothing in the language of that provision invites the same 
conclusion. 
It 
is 
an 
established 
canon 
of 
statutory 
interpretation that "statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
¶30 Decker claims an institution cannot be "harassed" or 
"intimidated," as described in Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b), but 
the very fact that the Board of Regents sought a harassment 
injunction against Decker indicates otherwise. After all, an 
institution is nothing more than a collection of individuals 
engaged in a common purpose. An institution, as well as an 
individual, can be the subject of threats and intimidation, 
which is why protests and picket rallies are often organized 
outside of an institution's headquarters. Protestors frequently 
target institutions in an attempt to elicit a response and draw 
attention to themselves and their cause. Likewise, Decker 
obviously sought to influence the Board of Regents through a 
calculated, 
long-term 
scheme 
of 
protesting, 
handing 
out 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
19 
 
literature, filming university board members and officials, and 
disrupting university events. Decker might as easily be arguing 
that an institution cannot be "influenced" or "persuaded," but 
this is clearly not what he believes. Decker's actions are a 
manifestation of his belief that an institution can be harassed 
or intimidated in the same way that it can be influenced or 
persuaded.  
¶31 Our conclusion that institutions are eligible for 
injunctive protection under Wis. Stat. § 813.125 is also 
supported by public policy concerns. An injunction has several 
features that make it an especially desirable remedy for 
harassment victims. First, an injunction can be quickly obtained 
when circumstances demand an immediate remedy. Second, a victim 
can proactively seek protection by taking the initiative to seek 
an injunction. Third, injunctive relief does not depend on the 
criminal justice system, which can take months or even years to 
render a final judgment. Other hindrances such as understaffed 
prosecutor's offices, limited judicial resources, and the higher 
burden of proof required by the criminal justice system may, 
separately or in the aggregate, serve to deny a harassment 
victim any protection.  
¶32 Decker argues the Board of Regents does not need 
access to injunctive relief because it already possesses a 
sufficient 
remedy 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.01, 
Wisconsin's 
criminal 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute. 
The 
American 
Civil 
Liberties Union ("ACLU") took a similar position in its amicus 
brief. The ACLU also asserted during oral arguments that a 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
20 
 
harassment victim's first recourse should always be to pursue 
criminal charges. We conclude that such a requirement would lead 
to absurd results. As discussed above, many features of a 
harassment injunction make it a superior remedy for victims. 
Harassment 
injunctions 
protect 
a 
variety 
of 
individuals, 
including those faced with serious and imminent threats to their 
safety, such as domestic violence victims. In 2012, circuit 
courts in Wisconsin handled 6,824 petitions for harassment 
injunctions and temporary restraining orders.16 Thousands of 
individuals would be adversely affected if this court agreed 
with the ACLU's position that criminal charges must be pursued 
before a harassment injunction can be issued.  
¶33 Moreover, both Decker and the ACLU fail to note that 
the Board of Regents did pursue criminal relief prior to 
obtaining the harassment injunction. In fact, Decker's history 
with the Board of Regents demonstrates precisely why a criminal 
remedy is sometimes inadequate. Decker was arrested multiple 
times by university police, and as Decker explained to the 
circuit judge, the university was unable to successfully 
prosecute him prior to issuance of the harassment injunction. 
Although Decker was arrested on September 8, 2011, and charged 
with Trespass to Land under Wis. Stat. § 943.13(1m)(a), the 
prosecutor ultimately dropped the charges. Decker was also 
                                                 
16 Civil Disposition Summary—Statewide Report, Wisconsin 
Court 
System, 
https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/statistics/circuit/docs/ci
vildispostate12.pdf.  
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
21 
 
arrested again on September 19, 2011, but he was not convicted 
of Disorderly Conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01 until some two 
and a half months after the circuit court had already granted 
the harassment injunction. 
¶34 In 
addition, 
university 
officials 
have 
a 
responsibility to ensure the health and safety of students. See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 36.11(1)(a), (2)(b) (providing authority for 
the Board of Regents to enact laws "to protect the lives, health 
and safety of persons on property under its jurisdiction" and to 
employ police officers to "preserve the peace" and enforce 
university rules). It cannot be disputed that threats to student 
safety are on the rise. No institution, including a university, 
should be forced to rely on the criminal justice system when a 
more immediate remedy is available. A harassment injunction may 
not prevent a tragedy such as the atrocious shooting at Virginia 
Tech or Sandy Hook,17 but it is nevertheless an important and 
effective tool for university officials to maintain order and 
ensure student health and safety.  
B. 
Decker's Conduct Constituted Harassment and Lacked a 
Legitimate Purpose 
¶35 We next address whether Decker's conduct constituted 
harassment that could be properly enjoined under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
17 For background information on the shootings at Virginia 
Tech, see Christine Hauser & Anahad O'Connor, Virginia Tech 
Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2007. For more 
information about the shooting at Sandy Hook elementary school, 
see Steve Vogel et al., Sandy Hook Elementary shooting leaves 28 
dead, law enforcement sources say, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 2012. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
22 
 
§ 813.125. A circuit court may grant a harassment injunction if 
there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has 
engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the 
petitioner." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(4)(a)3. Harassment is defined 
as "[e]ngaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing 
acts which harass or intimidate another person and which serve 
no legitimate purpose." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b).  
¶36 The Board of Regents argues that Decker's persistent 
disruptions at university meetings demonstrate an intent to 
harass. The Board of Regents also contends that because Decker 
was prohibited from entering UW property during his suspension, 
Decker's conduct was illegal as a matter of law and could not 
serve a legitimate purpose. The Board of Regents acknowledges 
that Decker was protesting student fees but asserts that 
otherwise harassing behavior cannot be transformed into non-
harassing, legitimate conduct simply by labeling it "protest." 
¶37 Decker 
argues 
his 
conduct 
did 
not 
constitute 
harassment because he had the legitimate purpose of protesting 
student fees. Decker points out that harassment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125(1)(b) is conduct that serves "no legitimate purpose." 
Therefore, Decker contends, his conduct could not constitute 
harassment if he was motivated by any legitimate purpose. Decker 
maintains his history of protesting UW's segregated student fees 
demonstrates he was not motivated by a desire to harass.  
¶38 We agree with the circuit court that Decker's conduct 
constituted harassment and lacked a legitimate purpose, and that 
Decker possessed the requisite intent to harass. In Bachowski v. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
23 
 
Salamone, we explained, "conduct or repetitive acts that are 
intended to harass or intimidate do not serve a legitimate 
purpose." Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 408, 407 
N.W.2d 533 (1987). Decker argues conduct can never constitute 
harassment if it is done for any legitimate purpose, such as 
protesting. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument 
suggests that if an individual has both a legitimate and an 
illegitimate 
purpose, 
the 
legitimate 
purpose 
automatically 
protects the individual's conduct from being enjoined. Put 
another way, according to Decker's logic, conduct done with both 
the purpose of protesting and the purpose of harassing cannot 
constitute harassment. This is a senseless argument that flatly 
contradicts 
our 
holding 
in 
Bachowski 
that 
intentionally 
harassing conduct can never serve a legitimate purpose. Decker 
cannot shield his harassing conduct from regulation by labeling 
it "protest." If Decker's purpose was even in part to harass the 
Board of Regents, his conduct may be enjoined under Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125. 
¶39 The circuit court described the evidence presented at 
the injunction hearing regarding Decker's repeated entry onto UW 
property as follows:  
. . . We did have corroborating evidence that people 
have complained about that and found Decker's presence 
at meetings, knowing he would be asked to leave, 
knowing that he was not intending to leave, and then 
necessarily what that would entail, which would be 
calling 
the 
officers 
and 
causing 
the 
sort 
of 
disturbance that was present on each of the occasions 
that were the subject of testimony here . . . . 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
24 
 
I credit the testimony of the witnesses that were 
offered by the university here. I think it was 
credible, and I think it establishes a pattern, and a 
pattern that if not enjoined, I am confident that 
based on Mr. Decker's testimony today, he will intend 
to repeat. And it constitutes harassment. It's not 
done for any lawful or legitimate purpose. 
The circuit court found that Decker had repeatedly trespassed on 
UW property with the intent to disrupt university proceedings. 
We uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶23. Based on the 
evidence presented at the injunction hearing, the circuit court 
concluded that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 
lacked 
a 
legitimate 
purpose. 
The 
circuit 
court, 
in 
its 
discretion, decided to grant the harassment injunction against 
Decker. We give deference to a circuit court's decision to issue 
a harassment injunction, upholding it absent an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. Id. Based on the record, we conclude 
that there was ample evidence to support the circuit court's 
factual findings and its decision to grant the harassment 
injunction against Decker.  
¶40 The evidence presented before the circuit court 
demonstrated 
the 
following: 
first, 
Decker 
swore 
at 
and 
threatened the UWSP Chancellor in a meeting and stabbed the 
Chancellor's documents with a pen during a heated argument. 
Second, Decker told the suspension committee that he had no 
intention of complying with his suspension, and Decker was aware 
his suspension prohibited him from entering UW property. Third, 
Decker trespassed on UW property on numerous occasions after his 
suspension and disrupted several university meetings. Fourth, 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
25 
 
Decker attempted to purchase a handgun immediately after police 
endeavored to serve him with a restraining order. 
¶41 Specifically, the evidence at the injunction hearing 
established that on September 1, 2011, Decker interrupted a 
meeting between student government members and the UW Colleges 
and UW-Extension Chancellor. University police arrested Decker, 
but prior to their arrival Decker was so disruptive that the 
Chancellor was forced to end the meeting. On September 8, 2011, 
Decker returned to UW property and disrupted another meeting. 
When Decker was again arrested, he went limp and police had to 
drag Decker from the meeting. Not to be dissuaded from causing 
further disruption, Decker again trespassed on UW property on 
September 19, 2011, and upset yet another meeting. University 
officials repeatedly asked Decker to be quiet, but he refused. 
Once again, Decker was arrested and forcibly dragged from the 
meeting as he continued his diatribe against student fees. All 
of these events were delineated at Decker's injunction hearing, 
providing the circuit court with overwhelming evidence to 
conclude that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and lacked 
a legitimate purpose. Based on Decker's pattern of knowingly 
trespassing on university property to interrupt university 
meetings, and his blatant disregard for the rights of university 
officials and students, the circuit court could also reasonably 
find that Decker engaged in harassment with the intent to 
harass.  
¶42 The circuit court also concluded that Decker may 
present a threat to public safety. Decker's attempted purchase 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
26 
 
of a handgun immediately after police visited his home led the 
circuit court to find there was "clear and convincing evidence 
that there is a real concern that Mr. Decker may use a firearm 
to cause physical harm to another or endanger the public 
safety."18 The circuit court's public safety concern is bolstered 
by Decker's prior exchanges with the UWSP Chancellor. For 
instance, Decker left a note in the Chancellor's office that he 
specifically designated a "threat." Decker also sent several 
intimidating emails to the Chancellor. The circuit court could 
reasonably conclude that Decker's conduct was unpredictable at 
best and dangerous at worst. The risk to public safety, combined 
with 
Decker's 
pattern 
of 
trespassing 
and 
his 
deliberate 
disruption of university meetings, provides abundant support for 
the circuit court's decision to issue the harassment injunction.  
¶43 We recognize that Decker's protests implicate First 
Amendment concerns.19 "With respect to persons entitled to be 
                                                 
18 Decker also argues in his brief that the harassment 
injunction's firearm restriction was not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence and violated his Second Amendment right to 
bear arms. We disagree and conclude that the circuit court 
correctly determined that Decker's outburst during his meeting 
with Chancellor Patterson, his history of volatile behavior, and 
his attempted purchase of a handgun after police tried to serve 
him with a temporary restraining order supplied a sufficient 
basis to find clear and convincing evidence existed to support 
the firearm restriction. We defer to the circuit court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Welytok, 312 
Wis. 2d 435, ¶23.  
19 Sections 3 and 4, art. I, of the Wisconsin Constitution 
"guarantee the same freedom of speech and right of assembly and 
petition as do the First and Fourteenth amendments of the United 
States 
constitution." 
Lawson 
v. 
Hous. 
Auth. 
of 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 274, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955). 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
27 
 
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights 
of speech and association extend to the campuses of state 
universities." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981). 
The United States Supreme Court applies a forum-based approach 
to government restrictions on speech. The applicable level of 
judicial scrutiny is determined based on whether the forum 
involved is a traditional public forum, a designated public 
forum, or a non-public forum.20 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); see also Kevin 
Francis O'Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 
Loy. L. Rev. 411, 422-23 (1999). Public meetings at state 
universities are designated public forums and, consequently, are 
afforded the same constitutional protections as traditional 
public forums. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68, 270.  
¶44 Under this standard, a time, place, and manner 
restriction is constitutional if it is reasonable and content-
neutral. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. 
                                                 
20 Traditional public forums are places such as parks, 
streets, 
and 
sidewalks, 
"which 
by 
long 
tradition 
or 
by 
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Perry 
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). A designated public forum is "created by government 
designation of a place or channel of communication for use by 
the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain 
speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects." Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985). Non-public forums are places "which, by tradition or 
design, 
are 
not 
appropriate 
platforms 
for 
unrestrained 
communication" such as "military installations and federal 
workplaces." Paulsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d 
Cir. 1991). 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
28 
 
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. An 
individual's ability to protest is therefore not unlimited.21 
Rather, it is subject to reasonable regulation.  
¶45 We 
have 
recognized 
that 
an 
individual's 
First 
Amendment speech rights are "not absolute." State v. Givens, 28 
Wis. 2d 109, 
118, 
135 
N.W.2d 780 
(1965). 
"The 
right 
to 
demonstrate (even peaceably) in pursuance of our constitutional 
rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom to 
petition for redress of grievances might be appropriate in one 
place and not in another." Id. at 121. The United States Supreme 
Court has explained that a student may express his opinions, 
If he does so . . . without colliding with the rights 
of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class 
or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not 
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of speech. 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (statute restricting distribution 
of literature in an airport terminal is constitutional); Frisby 
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (upholding an ordinance 
prohibiting picketing before or about the residence or dwelling 
of any individual); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800 ("Nothing in 
the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access 
to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every 
type of Government property without regard to the . . . 
disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities."); 
Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 213 (3d Cir. 2011) (ejection of a 
resident from a county legislative meeting who objected during a 
period not open to public comment was constitutional); M.A.L. ex 
rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841, 847 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding a policy restricting middle school student from 
distributing literature in school hallways). 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
29 
 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969). Decker's right to protest on UW property can be 
restricted when he engages in harassment with the intent to 
harass or intimidate. The circuit court's conclusion that Decker 
engaged in harassment with the intent to harass or intimidate 
the Board of Regents was supported by an abundance of evidence, 
and we give deference to the circuit court's decision to issue 
the harassment injunction.  We conclude that the circuit court's 
decision to grant a harassment injunction was a proper exercise 
of its discretion.  
C. 
The Scope of the Harassment Injunction 
¶46 Decker's 
final 
argument 
is 
that 
the 
harassment 
injunction is vague and overbroad in its scope. Decker maintains 
that because the harassment injunction prohibits him from 
contacting 
any 
university 
representatives, 
the 
injunction 
proscribes contact with all 40,000 university employees and, 
arguably, all 181,000 university students. By its terms, Decker 
asserts that the injunction "forbid[s] benign association with 
one 
25th 
of 
the 
state 
population." 
Decker 
claims 
the 
injunction's reach extends to members of Decker's religious 
congregation and his professional contacts. Decker also contends 
the injunction infringes on his First Amendment rights by 
enjoining contact with thousands of people who were unaffected 
by the complained-of conduct.  
¶47 The Board of Regents did not address the scope of the 
harassment injunction in its brief, but it conceded at oral 
argument that the harassment injunction was overbroad.  
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
30 
 
¶48 Because the parties both concede that the injunction 
is overbroad, we need not address this issue.  Rather, we remand 
to the circuit court to refine the injunction.22  In Bachowski, 
we explained that, because the violation of a harassment 
injunction is a criminal offense, the injunction "must be 
specific as to the acts and conduct which are enjoined." 
Bachowski, 
139 
Wis. 2d at 
414. 
Clarity 
in 
a 
harassment 
injunction is essential, not just for the parties involved, but 
also in order for law enforcement to effectively enforce it.  
See, e.g., State v. Sveum, 2002 WI App 105, ¶24, 254 Wis. 2d 
868, 648 N.W.2d 496 ("Before the violation of a harassment 
injunction may be found, the State must prove at least that: (1) 
an injunction was issued against the defendant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125; and (2) the defendant committed an act that violated 
the terms of the injunction.)".  
¶49 The protected party named in the harassment injunction 
is the "Board of Regents UW System." However, the petition for 
the injunction requested protection for the "University of 
Wisconsin System" as a whole, and the petitioner for the 
harassment injunction was the "Board of Regents – Univ. of 
                                                 
22 For instance, the circuit court ordered Decker to 
"avoid[] the residence and any premises temporarily occupied by 
the petitioner/protected person."  We note that the University 
of Wisconsin System may include entities such as the University 
of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics, UW-affiliated bookstores and 
theaters, and the University of Wisconsin Foundation, an 
independent charitable institution.  By refining the harassment 
injunction, the circuit court can clarify whether it intended 
such an expansive reach. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
31 
 
Wisconsin System." In addition, the circuit court explained at 
the 
injunction 
hearing 
that 
Decker 
was 
restrained 
from 
contacting "the UW or any of its representatives." Consequently, 
it may be unclear to both Decker and law enforcement who the 
protected party is.23  
¶50 We are not equipped with sufficient facts to undertake 
the task of refining the harassment injunction.  In this case, 
the circuit court found that Decker's conduct constituted 
harassment24 and made a discretionary decision to grant the 
injunction. The circuit court is therefore better situated to 
assess the facts and apply its discretion to craft an injunction 
tailored to the particularized facts of each case.  
                                                 
23 We do not suggest that a harassment injunction that 
protects an institution can never proscribe contact with 
specific individuals. An institution can be defined in many 
different ways, from its organizational structure or real estate 
holdings to its list of members, employees, or representatives. 
The larger the institution, the greater the difficulty in 
defining the scope of the protection afforded by the injunction. 
These issues do not arise in the context of a typical harassment 
injunction protecting an individual, such as a domestic violence 
victim.  Therefore, the scope of an injunction protecting an 
institution may need to be structured with greater care than an 
ordinary injunction protecting an individual. Obviously, nothing 
in this opinion limits the authority of a circuit court to craft 
an appropriate injunction to protect an individual.   
24 We acknowledge that Decker's suspension was set to expire 
on January 1, 2012.  There is nothing in the record to indicate 
whether Decker's suspension actually expired, whether it was 
extended, or whether Decker has since been suspended again for 
other reasons.  In the time this case has taken to come before 
us, the terms of Decker's suspension might very well have 
changed, and we decline to speculate on its current status.  The 
parties are free to request an amendment to the injunction from 
the circuit court if they have additional particularized needs 
or concerns that pertain to facts not before us. 
No. 
2011AP2902   
 
32 
 
¶51 We conclude the circuit court properly determined that 
a harassment injunction can be granted to protect the Board of 
Regents from Decker's harassing behavior, and it provided ample 
support for its reasoning on a difficult issue that implicated 
both First Amendment and public safety concerns. However, we 
remand to the circuit court to refine the injunction and clarify 
its terms.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶52 We 
hold 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125 
can 
extend 
injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural 
persons. We further hold that the circuit court's decision to 
grant a harassment injunction was a proper exercise of its 
discretion, and sufficient evidence existed for the court to 
find that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and lacked a 
legitimate purpose. However, because the parties agree the 
injunction was overbroad, we remand to the circuit court to 
further clarify the scope of the injunction. For these reasons, 
the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause 
is remanded to the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate.  
 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  Everyone 
involved in the instant case——including the Board of Regents,1 
Decker, and this court2——agrees that the circuit court's 
harassment injunction does not pass muster:  the scope of the 
injunction is impermissibly broad.  The majority opinion 
correctly asserts that the circuit court's harassment injunction 
fails to identify the protected party and fails to specify the 
conduct to be enjoined.3   
¶55 Because the injunction is overbroad, the injunction is 
invalid.4  On remand, the circuit court must refine the 
injunction and clarify its terms.  Majority op., ¶3.  In effect, 
the circuit court must craft a new injunction. 
¶56 The harassment statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.125, is 
obviously 
designed 
to 
address 
harassment 
of 
individuals, 
especially instances of domestic child and family harassment or 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶¶48-49. 
2 "[I]t may be unclear to both Decker and law enforcement 
who the protected party is."  Majority op., ¶49. 
3 Majority op., ¶48 & n.22 (noting that both parties 
"concede that the injunction is overbroad," that it is unclear 
who the protected party is, and that the "expansive reach" of 
the circuit court injunction extends to broad property). 
There are even discrepancies between the circuit court's 
oral ruling on the injunction and the written form injunction 
that it issued. 
4 Bachowski 
v. 
Salamone, 
139 
Wis. 2d 397, 
414, 
407 
N.W.2d 533 (1987) ("[T]he injunction is drafted too broadly and 
is therefore invalid."). 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
2 
 
violence.  Such cases are very different from the instant case.5  
The instant case does not fit easily into the statute.6  The 
statute is somewhat difficult to adapt to the present case 
because the statute was intended to safeguard one individual 
from another individual's harassment.  Although I agree with the 
majority opinion that our case law has interpreted the statute 
to permit harassment injunctions to protect "persons" (defined 
more broadly than "individuals" in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26)),7 the 
                                                 
5 See 2005 Wis. Act 272 (defining "harassment" to include 
sexual assault, abuse under Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1), and stalking 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.32). 
6 The 
majority 
opinion 
agrees 
that 
"Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(1)(a) . . . does 
appear 
to 
contemplate 
harassment 
directed towards a natural person."  Majority op., ¶29.  
The forms used in the circuit court are designed for 
individuals (not for harassment of a body politic or a corporate 
body).  The forms, like many forms, have to be supplemented to 
fit the facts presented.  The Board of Regents did supplement 
its petition, but the circuit court did not supplement the form 
injunction in the instant case.  The circuit court's injunction 
is attached as an appendix.  
7 Majority op., ¶¶26-27; see also Village of Tigerton v. 
Minniecheske, 211 Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The 
majority 
opinion 
acknowledges 
the 
difficulty 
of 
determining how to characterize a non-individual person for the 
purposes of a harassment injunction.  The majority opinion 
refers to the Board of Regents variously as:  
(1) A non-individual "body politic." Majority op., 
¶¶26-27;   
(2) A non-individual "body corporate." Majority op., 
¶¶24, 26; and  
(3) An "institution," defined by the majority opinion 
as "a collection of individuals engaged in a common 
purpose."  Majority op., ¶¶24, 30. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
3 
 
statutory language and the one-size-fits-all required forms 
designed to protect individuals are difficult to apply to non-
individuals and to the present case.8  Therefore, circuit courts 
should exercise caution in crafting harassment injunctions to 
protect non-individual persons. 
¶57 I write to point out matters that the circuit court 
must consider in crafting a new injunction.  I begin by 
concisely 
summarizing 
in 
chart 
form 
the 
circuit 
court's 
injunction and what remains of the injunction under the majority 
opinion. 
INJUNCTION  
 
CIRCUIT COURT 
MAJORITY OPINION 
PROTECTED PARTY 
The Board of Regents; 
"the UW or any of its 
representatives"9 
"[I]t may be unclear 
to both Decker and law 
enforcement who the 
protected party is."10 
HARASSING CONDUCT Trespassing onto UW 
land in violation of 
terms of suspension 
Trespassing onto UW 
land in violation of 
terms of suspension  
ENJOINED BEHAVIOR Harassment; avoid the 
residence; contacting 
The majority opinion 
notes the expansive 
                                                 
8 The circuit court used form CV-407, 11/13 Injunction 
(Order of Protection – Harassment), which is mandated for use in 
civil actions under Wis. Stat. §§ 807.001 and 758.18(1).   
9 The harassment injunction could conceivably extend to 
thousands of people, including UW faculty, staff, and students.  
The University has about 40,000 employees and 181,000 students. 
10 Majority op., ¶49. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
4 
 
the UW or any of its 
representatives 
unless they consent 
in writing.  Avoid 
premises occupied by 
University of 
Wisconsin System, all 
of its campuses, any 
premises under the 
control of the Board  
of Regents.11 
reach of the 
injunction but 
mentions no enjoined 
conduct.12 
¶58 In effect, the majority opinion vacates the circuit 
court's injunction, because as the majority opinion explains, 
the injunction is unclear in its description of the party 
protected or the enjoined conduct.   
¶59 The mandate of the majority opinion is somewhat 
misleading when it "reverse[s]" the court of appeals and 
"remand[s]" the issue to the circuit court.13  Both the majority 
                                                 
11 The written circuit court injunction required Decker to 
"avoid the residence and any premises temporarily occupied by 
the protected party."   
At the hearing, the circuit court orally ordered Decker "to 
avoid any premises occupied by the petitioner or protected 
person, namely the University of Wisconsin system, all of its 
campuses, any premises under the control of the Board of 
Regents."  
12 Majority op., ¶47 & n.21. 
13 Majority op., ¶52. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
5 
 
opinion and the court of appeals agree that the circuit court 
must craft a new injunction. 
¶60 In crafting a new injunction, the circuit court must 
adhere to the legal standards for a harassment injunction as 
stated in Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 414-15, 407 
N.W.2d 533 (1987), the lead case interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125, the harassment statute.  If an injunction fails to 
meet the criteria in Bachowski, the injunction is "invalid."14   
¶61 According to the Bachowski case, 139 Wis. 2d at 414-
15, upon which the majority openly relies, the proceedings and 
harassment injunction must meet the following requirements: 
I. 
The petitioner being protected by the injunction must 
be specific and named;15 
II. The harassing conduct that is the basis for the 
injunction must be set forth;16   
                                                 
14 Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 414. 
15 Wis. Stat. § 813.125(5)(a)1.-2. (requiring the name of 
the person who is the alleged victim and the name of the 
respondent in the petition); see Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 412-
13. 
16 See Wis. Stat. § 813.125(5)(a)3. (requiring that the 
complaining party show "[t]hat the respondent has engaged in 
harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner").   
The 
Petition 
for 
Temporary 
Restraining 
Order 
and/or 
Petition and Motion for Injunction Hearing form (form CV-405) 
asks the complaining party to "[s]tate when, where, what 
happened, and who did what to whom."  This is largely similar to 
language that the court found to be sufficient notice in 
Bachowski.  The Bachowski court stated:  "Thus, it would be 
insufficient, for example, pursuant to sec. 813.125(5)(a) for a 
petitioner to simply allege that he or she has been 'harassed or 
intimidated' by the [defendant]."  Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 
412-13.   
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
6 
 
III. The specific harassing acts or conduct to be enjoined 
must be either identical to or substantially similar 
to the conduct found to be harassing by the circuit 
court;17 and 
IV. An injunction must be "specific as to the acts and 
conduct which are enjoined" such that the defendant 
has notice of what he or she is prohibited from 
doing.18 
I 
¶62 To assist the circuit court, I begin with the first 
Bachowski criterion:  the petitioner and the party protected 
must be specific and named.   
¶63 In the instant case, a real issue exists about who the 
petitioner is and who the protected party is.  They need not be 
the same person.   
                                                 
17 "Only the acts or conduct which are proven at trial and 
form the basis of the judge's finding of harassment or 
substantially similar conduct should be enjoined."  Bachowski, 
139 Wis. 2d at 414. 
See also III Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook, Family Actions, 
Miscellaneous Actions, Harassment FA 18-54 (4th ed. 2011) 
(similarly 
stating 
the 
injunction 
"must 
be 
tailored 
to 
necessities of particular case").  (The Benchbook states that it 
is not intended that the Benchbooks be cited as independent 
authority.) 
18 Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 414.  See also III Wisconsin 
Judicial Benchbook, supra note 17, at 18-54 (adhering to 
Bachowski:  "The injunction must be specific as to prohibited 
acts and conduct so one enjoined may know what actions to 
avoid."). 
Specificity is required because violation of an injunction 
is a criminal offense. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶64 The written order names "Board of Regents UW System" 
as the petitioner.  In its oral ruling, the circuit court stated 
that Decker was "specifically prohibited from contacting or 
causing any person to contact the UW or its representatives 
unless they consent in writing" (emphasis added).  I agree with 
the majority opinion that it is "unclear to both Decker and law 
enforcement who the protected party is."19 
¶65 The circuit court's injunction appears to include as 
protected parties between 18 individuals (the individual members 
of the Board of Regents) and 200,000 or more individuals (the 
students, staff, and faculty of the university).   
¶66 The lack of clarity of the protected party's identity 
in the circuit court's injunction renders it invalid under the 
first Bachowski criterion:  the protected party is undefined and 
unknown.  The identity of the protected party must be clear from 
the injunction. 
II 
 
¶67 The second Bachowski criterion is that the harassing 
conduct that is the basis for the injunction must be set forth. 
                                                 
19 See 
majority 
op., 
¶49 
(listing 
various 
potential 
formulations of the protected party from the record in the 
instant case). 
The majority opinion lists other parties that may be 
"protected parties" under the circuit court's injunction.  
Majority op., ¶48 n.22. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶68 Trespass is the gravamen of the harassing conduct used 
to justify the injunction.  Trespass in turn is based on 
Decker's status as a suspended student.20   
¶69 The circuit court described the trespasses as the 
harassing conduct, as follows: 
[T]here are several incidents described as a matter of 
the record here that Mr. Decker, contrary to the clear 
terms 
of 
the 
lawful 
existing 
order 
that 
is 
established . . . . It specifically says he may not 
enroll in any UW system institution and may not be 
present on any campus without the written consent of 
the chief administrator of that campus.  He has done 
so on several occasions without the written consent of 
the administration on the particular campus. . . .  
And in my view, that constitutes conduct of a sort 
that is harassing and intimidating. 
¶70 According to the circuit court, the harassment was the 
disruption of a meeting at the Stevens Point campus before 
Decker's suspension and at least four documented trespasses on 
university land after Decker was suspended as a student, 
including additional disruption of meetings.  One of the 
trespasses, leafleting, is not described as being disruptive.  
See majority op. ¶¶4-5, 39-41.  
                                                 
20 A 
suspended 
student, 
according 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Administrative Code §§ UWS 17.02(16) and UWS 18.11(7)(a), may 
not be present on any campus "without the written consent of the 
chief administrative officer" of that campus and "may [not] 
enter the university lands of any institution without the 
written consent of the chief administrative officer."  According 
to § UWS 17.02(17), "university land" is defined as "all real 
property owned by, leased by, or otherwise subject to the 
control of the board of regents . . . ."      
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶71 The 
majority 
opinion 
specifically 
identifies 
the 
harassing conduct (which forms the basis for the injunction) as 
trespassing conduct violating the terms and conditions of 
Decker's suspension and the Wisconsin Administrative Code as 
follows: 
• Contrary to the terms and conditions of his suspension 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code, 
Decker 
trespassed on the UW-Oshkosh campus and distributed 
leaflets 
at 
a 
UW-Oshkosh 
basketball 
game. 
 
No 
disruption or adverse consequences are described.  
Majority op., ¶7. 
• Contrary to the terms and conditions of his suspension 
and the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Decker twice 
trespassed on the campus of UW-Fox Valley by attending 
meetings, during which he was disruptive and was 
forcibly removed by police officers.  Majority op., 
¶¶8, 11. 
• Contrary to the terms and conditions of his suspension 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code, 
Decker 
trespassed by attending a meeting of the Board of 
Regents in Madison and was disruptive.  Majority op., 
¶10.21  
                                                 
21 To obtain an order relating to Decker's guns, the circuit 
court and majority opinion rely on Decker's pre-suspension 
conduct at Stevens Point of striking the Chancellor's papers and 
the timing of Decker's purchase of guns.  Majority op., ¶42. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶72 According to the record before us, Decker's suspension 
ended January 1, 2012.   
¶73 I do not speculate as to the present status of 
Decker's suspension.  Yet if the suspension no longer exists, 
any harassing conduct created by "trespass" may also no longer 
exist.   
¶74 When the circuit court crafts its new injunction, it 
may need to consider whether trespass in violation of Decker's 
suspension can continue to serve as the basis of harassing 
conduct.   
III 
¶75 The third Bachowski criterion is that "[o]nly the acts 
or conduct which are proven at trial and form the basis of the 
[circuit court] judge's finding of harassment or substantially 
similar conduct should be enjoined."  Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 
414.   
¶76 As noted above, the harassing conduct the circuit 
court found as the basis for the injunction was Decker's 
trespass as a suspended student and disruption of meetings.  As 
the majority opinion notes, the circuit court's injunction was 
not limited to the conduct that forms the basis of the circuit 
court's finding of harassing conduct or similar conduct.22     
¶77 In crafting a new injunction, the circuit court must 
limit the enjoined conduct to the acts or conduct that form the 
basis of the harassment finding or substantially similar 
                                                 
22 Majority op., ¶48 n.22. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
11 
 
conduct:  the trespass as a suspended student and the disruption 
of meetings.   
IV 
¶78 The fourth Bachowski criterion is that the injunction 
must be "specific as to the acts and conduct which are 
enjoined," such that the defendant has notice of what he is 
prohibited from doing.23  Law enforcement also needs clarity in 
the terms of an injunction in order to enforce the injunction.24 
¶79 The majority opinion notes the “expansive reach" of 
the injunction.  Majority op., ¶48 n.22. 
¶80 In crafting a new injunction, the circuit court must 
remedy the defects in the original injunction that the majority 
opinion details, namely that the injunction fails to be specific 
about what person or persons Decker may be enjoined from 
contacting and fails to be specific about what property Decker 
is enjoined from entering.25   
                                                 
23 Injunctions must be specific as to the prohibited acts 
and conduct in order for the person being enjoined to know what 
conduct must be avoided.  Disobeying an injunction is a criminal 
offense.  Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶24, 312 
Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359.   
24 Laws must provide "reasonably clear guidelines for law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."  City of Madison v. 
Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 674, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, the statute requires 
that the injunction must be sent to "the sheriff or to any local 
law enforcement agency which is the central repository for 
orders and injunctions and which has jurisdiction over the 
petitioner's premises."  Wis. Stat. § 813.125(5g). 
25 Majority op., ¶48 n.22. 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
12 
 
 
¶81 As stated previously, the injunction is unclear 
because it can be read to enjoin Decker from contacting 18 
individuals or 200,000.26    
¶82 The injunction is also unclear regarding what property 
Decker is enjoined from entering.  Decker was prohibited from 
entering "the University of Wisconsin system, all of its 
campuses, any premises under the control of the Board of 
Regents."        
¶83 The 
Board 
of 
Regents 
controls 
18,000 
acres 
of 
property, with campuses across 25 counties.  The UW has 
approximately 1,814 buildings covering 60 million square feet of 
space.27  UW property extends from UW medical facilities across 
the state, including doctor's offices and emergency rooms, to 
conservation tracts and nature preserves, to apartments, to golf 
courses, and so on.  
¶84 How should Decker or law enforcement identify which 
properties are "controlled by" the Board of Regents?  
• The University of Wisconsin Hospital and its medical 
facilities are run by a separate authority that 
includes members of the Board of Regents.  May Decker 
                                                 
26 The circuit court in its oral ruling stated that Decker 
is "specifically prohibited from contacting or causing any 
person to contact the UW or its representatives unless they 
consent in writing." 
27 Capital Planning & Budget, University of Wisconsin System 
Capital 
Assets, 
http://www.uwsa.edu/capbud/documents/capbud_description.htm 
(last visited June 30, 2014).  
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
13 
 
visit his physician who has an office in one of the 
many university medical facilities across the state? 
• May Decker visit a graduate student friend at a UW-
managed dormitory or apartment complex?   
• May Decker attend a theater production at a UW 
theater? 
• May Decker patronize one of the multiple retail 
locations of the University of Wisconsin Bookstore? 
• May Decker enter property controlled by the University 
of Wisconsin Foundation?  
• May Decker distribute material on or near streets in 
or near a University campus?   
¶85 Thus, 
neither 
Decker 
nor 
law 
enforcement 
can 
understand what conduct is enjoined, both with regard to persons 
Decker cannot contact and to real property Decker cannot enter.  
Without knowing what conduct is enjoined, the circuit court 
cannot determine whether the enjoined behavior is identical to 
or substantially similar to the conduct found harassing, namely 
the third criterion in Bachowski.   
¶86 Thus, the injunction is invalid under the fourth 
Bachowski criterion. 
* * * * 
¶87 I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit 
court's injunction fails to meet the criteria set forth in 
Bachowski.  Under Bachowski, an injunction that fails to meet 
the criteria is invalid.  Thus, the majority opinion in effect 
vacates the injunction and advises the circuit court to start 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
14 
 
over.  Circumstances may have changed significantly since 
October 24, 2011, when the injunction was issued.  
¶88 Before I conclude, let me quickly note the issues that 
I do not address. 
¶89 I do not address whether the conduct at issue meets 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
harassment 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(1)(b).28  "Harassment" is defined as repeated conduct 
that harasses or intimidates another person "and which serves no 
legitimate 
purpose." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(1)(b) 
(emphasis 
added).  I do not address the statutory language "serves no 
legitimate purpose."29  
                                                 
28 The statutory definition of "harassment" is problematic; 
"harassment" is defined as "acts which harass," a form of the 
very word being defined. 
To grant an injunction, the circuit court must find 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has engaged in 
harassment with the intent to harass or intimidate a named party 
and 
which 
serves 
no 
legitimate 
purpose. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(4)(a)3.   
29 The parties expend considerable effort addressing the 
"legitimate purpose" statutory language.  The majority opinion 
takes language out of context from Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 
408, treating the case as saying that "intentionally harassing 
conduct can never serve a legitimate purpose."  Majority op., 
¶38. 
The majority opinion treats the statutory phrase "which 
serves no legitimate purpose" as surplusage, contravening our 
rules of statutory interpretation.  See Crown Castle USA, Inc. 
v. Orion Const. Grp., LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶13, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 
N.W.2d 332. 
Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 408, treats the inquiry into 
legitimate 
purpose 
as 
a 
separate 
element 
of 
harassment, 
declaring: 
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶90 I do not address First Amendment issues, although I 
agree with the court of appeals that there are freedom of speech 
implications presented by the instant case.30 Injunctions carry 
great risks of freedom of speech violations and deserve 
additional scrutiny from courts.31     
                                                                                                                                                             
The definition of harassment further requires that the 
harassing and intimidating acts "serve no legitimate 
purpose."  This is a recognition by the legislature 
that conduct or repetitive acts that are intended to 
harass or intimidate do not serve a legitimate 
purpose.  Whether acts or conduct are done for the 
purpose of harassing or intimidating, rather than for 
a purpose that is protected or permitted by law, is a 
determination that must of necessity be left to the 
fact finder, taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances.     
The court of appeals opinion reads Bachowski as stating 
that conduct can be harassment only if "done for the purpose of 
harassing or intimidating, rather than for a purpose that is 
protected or permitted by law."  Bd. of Regents-UW Sys. v. 
Decker, No. 2011AP2902, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Jan. 24, 2013). 
In Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶¶30-31, the court of appeals 
viewed the "no legitimate purpose" language as establishing a 
separate element and concluded that the circuit court found that 
the defendant was "motivated by one thing and one thing only and 
that was to harass," that the circuit court "saw through" the 
defendant's "attempts to manufacture a legitimate purpose," and 
that the circuit court's finding that no legitimate purpose was 
intended was supported by the evidence.     
30 A case should be decided on non-constitutional grounds 
whenever possible.  Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. 
31 See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 
765-66 (1994).  For an overview of the potential impact of civil 
harassment injunctions on freedom of speech, see Aaron H. 
Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 Hastings 
L.J. 781 (2013).  
2011AP2902.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶91 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority opinion intimates that its injunction is akin 
to a "time, place, and manner" restriction that does not offend 
the First Amendment.  Majority op., ¶44.  The circuit court's 
overbroad injunction bans every manner of "conduct" (which 
includes speech) by Decker at all times and in all places 
controlled by the university. 
No.  2011AP2902.ssa 
 
1 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2902.ssa 
 
2 
 
 
No.  2011AP2902.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶92 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The majority 
opinion makes a powerful case for the issuance of a harassment 
injunction against Jeffrey Decker (Decker).  Decker's campaign 
regarding the use of student segregated fees in the University 
of Wisconsin System has been self-defeating because his tactics 
alienate 
people 
who 
might 
otherwise 
share 
his 
concerns.  
Whatever Decker's message is, it is completely overshadowed by 
his 
tactics, 
which 
have 
crossed 
the 
line 
and 
become 
unreasonable.  I concur in the majority opinion because I agree 
that something had to be done. 
¶93 I 
also 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
(and 
with 
the 
concurrence of the Chief Justice) that the circuit court's 
injunction is too broad and must be redone.  If a remand for 
revision were not part of the majority opinion, I would feel 
obligated to dissent.   
¶94 Having explained my reasons for concurrence, I must 
register my reservations about the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125.   
¶95 In my view, this statute was never intended to cover 
institutions as well as natural persons.  It was intended to 
address a wide variety of harassment problems when people have 
to deal with the irrational conduct of other people.  Thus, the 
remedies that must be afforded to an abused spouse, and may be 
afforded to a corporate officer or a member of the University of 
Wisconsin Board of Regents as an individual, are not the same as 
the remedies that may be afforded to everyone who is part of a 
corporation or an educational institution. 
No.  2011AP2902.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶96 Once the court determines that the broad definition of 
"person"1 applies to an institution as a victim, then necessarily 
it also applies to an institution as a perpetrator.  I am 
confident 
that 
many 
people 
believe 
some 
institution, 
association, or body politic or corporate is engaging in a 
course of conduct to harass or intimidate them in a manner that 
serves no legitimate purpose. 
¶97 The statute has been interpreted more broadly than I 
would read it in Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 211 
Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997), and now in this 
case.  But the legislature has failed to give much guidance on 
how judges should apply the statute in these cases.  This lack 
of guidance is bound to spawn future controversy.   
¶98 I respectfully suggest that the legislature review the 
language and effectiveness of all the specialized statutes on 
injunctions and restraining orders in Wis. Stat. ch. 813 and 
consider adopting a new statute for "persons" who are not 
people. 
¶99 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(26) 
("'Person' 
includes 
all 
partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate."). 
No.  2011AP2902.dtp 
 
1