Title: APPLICATION OF BARRON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13345
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 1976

I N THE SUPREME C O U K T OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A I N 3 E THE APPLICATION OF J. VAUGHAN RARRON F O R A WRIT OF M A N D A T E and No. 13328 ! J . W r J L L L I A M LEAPHART, Court -appointed counsel f o r Merrel Cline and S h i r l e y Cline, P l a i n t i f f , Respondent and Cross -Appellant. COUhTY LOP~PALSS IOTJERS of Lewis and Clark County, S t a t e of Montana, Defendants and Respondents, -VS - No. 13345 ROBERT WOODAHL, Attorney General of t h e S t a t e of Montana and Head of t h e Department of J u s t i c e , Defendant and Appellant. ORIGINAL PKOCEED1:NG : Counsel of Record: For Appellants : J. Vaughan Barron argued, Great F a l l s , Montana S t u a r t L. Kellner argued, Helena, Montana ' o r Respondents: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Jock 0. Anderson, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Thomas Honzel argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 28, 1976 I>ec ided : 3UL F i l e d : JkfQliitHS 1. ADi8$EY Clerk Supreme Court Hon. W. W. Lessley, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is a consolidation of an appeal from the d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County, and an o r i g i n a l w r i t of mandate from the d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County; both causes basically deal with the payment f o r services of appointed counsel of criminal defense of Workmen's Compensation cases. Peripheral matters i n t h i s appeal a r e the claim of Timothy S. Thane, court reporter, f o r preparation of t r a n s c r i p t s of the d i s t r i c t court t r i a l ; Leaphart, a court appointed attorney's claim f o r h i s fees on t h i s appeal i n one of these causes; and the question of the reasonableness of Barron's attorney fees. It i s admitted t h e services of the court appointed counsel were performed. It i s further admitted the fees f o r the services performed i n the Lewis and Clark County case a r e reasonable. The reasonableness of counsel fees i n the Cascade County case i s not admitted. The c e n t r a l issue t o be answered on t h i s appeal i s who pays f o r the attorneys' services and costs. Both d i s t r i c t courts have held t h a t i n these Workmen's Compensation cases the department of j u s t i c e must pay. The attorney general a s head of the department of j u s t i c e appeals. These criminal cases before us are the r e s u l t of a s t a t e - wide program investigated and prosecuted by the attorney general as head of the department of justice. The authority t o so a c t comes t o the attorney general by section 79-2315, R.C.M., 1947. The s t a t u t e was enacted i n 1974 and provides : "The attorney general s h a l l conduct on behalf of the s t a t e , a l l prosecutions f o r public offenses disclosed by an audit of a s t a t e agency performed by the l e g i s l a - t i v e auditor . I 1 This Court prior t o enactment of t h i s special s t a t u t e held t h a t the attorney general had no such authority. S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d 182. Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e f u l l y intended t h i s state-wide program of investigation and prosecution be carred on t o a f i n a l conclusion, i n what the media has called the Workmen's Compensa- tion scandals; it appropriated money f o r t h a t specific task. A reading of H.B. 520, Laws of 1975, makes c l e a r the money is appropriated f o r a d e f i n i t e purpose; the b i l l describes t h a t purpose i n these words: !'FOR INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WORKMEN'S C O M P E N S A T I O N DIVISION R E L A T E D M A T T E R S JC * *.I1 Armed with the specific authority of the s t a t u t e , section 79-2315, K.C.M. 1947, and furnished with money by the l e g i s l a t u r e for t h a t purpose, the department of j u s t i c e , acting through i t s head, the attorney general, proceeded with the task. These cases a r e now before us because the department of j u s t i c e i s acting under the mandates of those s t a t u t e s . W e now reach the c r u c i a l question: W h o pays f o r these court appointed services? The answer must come from section 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947, enacted i n 1967, amended i n 1973, and i n i t s present form a s of 1974, and provides: "Whenever, i n a criminal action o r proceeding, an attorney a t law represents o r defends any person by order of the court, on the ground t h a t the person i s financially unable t o employ counsel, such attorney s h a l l be paid f o r h i s services such sum a s a d i s t r i c t court or j u s t i c e of the s t a t e supreme court c e r t i f i e s t o be a reasonable com- pensation therefor and s h a l l be reimbursed f o r reasonable costs incurred i n the criminal pro- ceeding. Such costs s h a l l be chargeable to the county i n which the proceeding arose, except t h a t (a) i n proceedings solely involving the violation of a c i t y ordinance o r s t a t e s t a t u t e prosecuted i n a municipal, c i t y or police court wherein costs s h a l l be chargeable t o the c i t y o r town i n which the proceeding arose, and (b) i n a r r e s t s i n criminal proceedings by agents of the department of f i s h and game and a r r e s t s by agents of the department of j u s t i c e , the costs (including attorneys' fees of attorneys appointed by the court for the defendant) must be borne by the s t a t e agency causing the arrest." (Emphasis added). A reading of t h i s s t a t u t e makes evident (1) costs a r e chargeable t o the county with two exceptions and (2) costs include attorneys' fees f o r attorneys appointed by the court i n criminal causes f o r the defendant. Here, we a r e faced with the more specific question of who must pay under the exception of t h i s s t a t u t e . W e a r e dealing with t h e exception of subdivision (b). This is a single sentence s t a r t i n g with the words " i n arrests" and concluding with the words "causing the arrest." The attorney genera1,underlines and 11 emphasizes the phrase, a r r e s t s i n criminal proceedings by agents * * * of the department of justice." He takes one narrow step further i n h i s construction of the s t a t u t e and i n i t s appli- cation t o the f a c t s here, and s t a t e s t h a t i n these cases no agent of the department of j u s t i c e physically made an a r r e s t ; t h i s is true; he further s t a t e s t h a t i n those cases where a r r e s t s were necessary the a r r e s t s were physically made by l o c a l law enforcement agencies o r agents, such as the sheriff of Toole County. Merely t o s t a t e t h i s construction and the meaning inferred by the attorney general i s t o show and emphasize i t s narrowness. H e i n s i s t s the statutory exceptions deal with and a r e intended t o deal only with a r r e s t s actually made by game wardens and highway patrolmen in their respective departments, fish and game and justice. When we consider what was actually done here in the Cline cases now before us, we illustrate the absurdity of such a narrow approach. There the department of justice, through Dzivi, re- quested the warrants of arrest; the warrants, after issue by the court, were returned to the department of justice; a telephone call was made by an agent of the department to Sheriff Brooks of Toole County; later a teletype copy of the warrant was sent to the sheriff by an agent of the department of justice and the sheriff was asked to apprehend and physically take into custody the Clines and then notify the department of that occur- rence; the Clines were physically taken into custody by the sheriff, the department notified, and then the Clines were phy- sically transported to Helena by investigators of the department of justice. In the other cases before us no actual physical act of arrest was made; it is clear however that the defendants appeared at arraignments as the result of Informations filed by officers and agents of the department of justice. The record is barren of any acts by any agents of any counties except Sheriff Brooks' directed activities by the department of justice. Is the mere ministerial physical act of arrest to determine the operative effect of the subsection ( b ) exception? We think not. Are we to say the single physical act of arrest by a sheriff in Toole County or the lack of a physical act of arrest is the pivotal question? Surely we must not gather the intent and purpose of the legislature on such narrow ground. The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s purpose of section 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947, was t o assure payment of the services of appointed defense counsel i n criminal proceedings. I n State ex r e l . Langan v. D i s t r i c t Court, 1 1 1 Mont. 178, 180, 107 P.2d 880, it was said: "In construing a s t a t u t e courts must look t o the language employed and the object sought t o be accomplished . I ' The further purpose of the l e g i s l a t u r e was t o e s t a b l i s h a specific and p r a c t i c a l payment f o r such court appointed counsels' services. By the two amendments t o section 95-1005, the l e g i s l a t u r e made it c l e a r t h a t a l l costs of prosecution does include attorney fees f o r court appointed counsel; it was and i s a workable, p r a c t i c a l plan i n t h a t it provides: (1) Where the case i s prosecuted i n c i t y court, the c i t y o r town is responsible. (2) Where the department of f i s h and game o r the department of j u s t i c e causes the a r r e s t , then costs of the resulting criminal proceedings must be borne by the agency. ( 3 ) I n other cases the costs a r e properly chargeable t o the county wherein the proceeding arose. The l e g i s l a t u r e s e t i n exceptions t o the general r u l e t h a t counties s h a l l pay. The exception we a r e concerned with is subsection (b) on department of j u s t i c e . It must be given meaning and purpose. I n B u r r i t t and Safeway v. City of Butte, 161 Mont. 530, 534,535, 508 P.2d 563, the Court stated: 11 The Court's function i s t o construe the language of the s t a t u t e i n accordance with i t s usual and ordinary acceptance, with a view t o be giving v i t a l i t y t o and making operative a l l provisions of the law and accomplishing the intention of the l e g i s l a t u r e when ascertainable * * *. "The goal of statutory interpretations is t o give e f f e c t t o the purpose of the s t a t u t e . * 9 ; 9 ; To give e f f e c t t o the purpose of the s t a t u t e a s intended by the legislature, the context in which the words are used is more important than precise grammatical rules or a dictionary definition." The phrase in subsection ( b ) "must be borne by the state agency causing the arrest" goes beyond the mere act of arrest. In Doull v. Wohlschlager, 141 Mont. 354, 364, 377 P.2d 758, it was said: "* * * A statute will not be interpreted to defeat its evident,. object or purpose * fi *. The objects sought to be achieved by legislation are of prime consideration in interpretation of such legislation. Corwin v. Beiswanger, 126 Mont. 337, 251 P.2d 252." Let us look at the peripheral problems here presented. J. Vaughan Barron serving as attorney for the defendant in Cause No. 6537B, was allowed $9,068.74 for services rendered, plus costs. The reasonableness of that fee has been challenged. The statute providing such fees is section 95-1005, R.C.M. "Whenever, in a criminal action or proceeding, an attorney at law represents or defends any person by order of the court, on the ground that the Derson is financially unable to employ counsel, such attorney shall be paid for his services such sum as a district court or justice of the state supreme court certifies to be a reasonable compensation therefor and shall be reimbursed for reasonable costs incurred in the criminal proceeding .I1 (Emphasis added. ) The record before us is barren of any evidentiary hearing, of affidavits, of time estimates, or of guide lines used to arrive at the reasonableness of the fee allowed to Barron by Judge Truman G. Bradford. Such procedures must be before us, that we may determine the reasonableness of the fees allowed. State v. Mempa, 78 Wash 2d 530, 477 P.2d 178, 182 (1970); State v. Horton, (qq?, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961), Gant v. State, ( F l a ) ' , 216 S .2d f 4 4 (1968). W. William Leaphart seeks fees f o r h i s services on t h i s appeal. S t a t e ex r e l . Stephens v. D i s t r i c t Court, Mont . 9 P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 469, i s controlling, t h i s i s allowable. He i s granted $1,000 f o r h i s attorney fee on t h i s appeal. W e deny the w r i t of mandamus and return the cause t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r hn evidentiary hearing i n conformity with the guide l i n e s suggested a s t o the amount and reasonableness of J. Vaughan Barron's fees and costs. It i s conceded W. William Leaphart's fees and costs a r e reasonable and they w i l l be granted. W e r e f e r t o our previous order of June 11, 1976, on Court Reporter Thane's claim f o r t r a n s c r i p t . W e affirm the d i s t r i c t courts and hold the department of j u s t i c e must pay the appointed attorneys' compensation and costs. Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. W e Concur: Justices. - 8 - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison specially concurring: While I concur with the majority i n t h e above matter, I desire f o r the information of Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e , t o put focus upon the r i s i n g costs of defense i n the various counties of the s t a t e . The majority opinion provides t h a t the c o s t s a r i s i n g out of cases i n t h e Workmen's Compensation investigation s h a l l be paid by the s t a t e . However, during recent years several counties of the s t a t e have had t o shoulder heavy t r i a l costs due t o the necessity of providing counsel f o r indigent defendants. The time has come, i n m y opinion, f o r the l e g i s l a t u r e t o study the r i s i n g costs of defense and adopt one of several methods now i n use t o provide costs of attorney fees f o r indigent defendants. For example, i n two r u r a l counties of t h i s s t a t e , Pondera and Big Horn, because of prolonged murder t r i a l s , t h e taxpayers have had t o assume extraordinary expense. I n the instance of Pondera County defense attorney fees a t the d i s t r i c t court l e v e l amounted t o $28,000 plus $7,815.25 i n costs. In Big Horn County, i n a multiple defendant murder case, attorney fees amounted t o $35,391.57 and costs of $2,529.95. Both cases are now on appeal and the cost of appellate counsel remains t o be determined. These two examples, I f e e l , highlight the growing problem. A number of j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s of the s t a t e provide f o r a f u l l time defense counsel s t a f f f o r the indigent and budget the costs as a p a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l budget. Whether the s a l a r i e s paid a r e adequate o r not may be debatable, but i n several cases we have had c a l l e d t o our a t t e n t i o n , t h a t a defense counsel drawing a monthly salary, a s the county attorney does, has been paid an additional fee f o r some unusual case t h a t has arisen. Such an arrangement is the b e s t of two worlds, but i s an unnecessary burden on the taxpayer. A study by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association released January 7 , 1976, provides a d r a f t report and guide l i n e for the defense of e l i g i b l e persons. This report covers both the federal system and those of the various s t a t e s . The federal government since the passage of the Criminal J u s t i c e Act of 1964, handles the payment of the defense on a s e t fee cost and administers it "under the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts". It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note from a Summary of the Report of the Committee t o Implement the Criminal J u s t i c e Act t h a t throughout the federal system payments a r e made on the basis of $50 per hour court time and $20 per hour o f f i c e time. A report on the cumula- t i v e payments t o private attorneys for the f i s c a l year 1975 as of December 31, 1975, indicates t h a t under the federal system the following figures cover the defense of the indigent i n Mortana: Number of persons represented ...................... 157 Number of cases i n which counsel was paid ........... 135 ............................. In court compensation $6,803.50 ....................... Out of court compensation $30,239.86 ....................... Out of pocket expenses,.. $2,430.19 Total paid t o counsel .............. $39,473.55 Average payment t o counsel ..................... $292.39. During t h i s period t h e federal government paid for the defense of two murder cases i n the Montana d i s t r i c t . One f e e was s e t a t $1,570.00 and the other $1,914.00. The time has come, i n m y opinion, f o r the l e g i s l a t u r e t o e i t h e r adopt a s e t fee system a s is done under the Federal Criminal J u s t i c e Act o r t o provide f u l l time defense counsel i n each j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t of Montana.