Title: People v. Lidster
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91522
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2002

Docket No. 91522-Agenda 12-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								ROBERT S. LIDSTER, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Du Page County
convicted defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol (625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 1996)). The appellate court found that
the roadblock where the police arrested defendant did not comply
with the constitutional standards set forth in City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000).
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction.
319 Ill. App. 3d 825. We granted the State's petition for leave to
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and allowed the Illinois Association
of Chiefs of Police to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the
State. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	On August 30, 1997, the Lombard police department set up a
roadblock on North Avenue in Lombard, Illinois. A police officer
stopped defendant at the roadblock and directed him to a side
street where another police officer had defendant perform several
field-sobriety tests. Defendant failed a number of the tests and was
taken into custody.
	Defendant was subsequently charged with the offense of
driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion to quash
his arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing on the motion,
Detective Ray Vasil testified that Lieutenant Glennon, third in
command at the Lombard police department, authorized the
roadblock. The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain information
from motorists regarding a hit-and-run accident that took place one
week earlier, at the same location, and at the same time of day. In
particular, the police wanted information regarding a Ford Bronco
or full-sized pickup truck implicated in the accident.
	The Lombard police department has a general order regarding
the use of roadblocks. The order, however, does not contain
guidelines regarding the use of roadblocks to obtain information
from crime witnesses. The roadblock at issue was not videotaped.
Further, the police did not publicize the roadblock.
	Between 6 and 12 police vehicles participated in the
roadblock. Detective Vasil wore an orange reflective vest with the
word "Police" on it, and stood between the eastbound lanes of
North Avenue, 15 feet from the roadblock. A line of cars formed
at the roadblock. As each vehicle pulled up to Detective Vasil, he
handed a flyer to the driver of the vehicle requesting information
regarding the accident. Because defendant's Mazda minivan
almost hit him, Detective Vasil requested defendant's driver's
license and insurance card. Detective Vasil smelled alcohol on
defendant's breath and noticed that defendant's speech was
slurred. Detective Vasil directed defendant to a side street where
Detective Roy Newton had defendant perform several sobriety
tests.
	The trial court denied defendant's motion.
	At defendant's subsequent bench trial, Detective Newton
testified that he was assigned to the corner of North Avenue and
Craig. His duties were to ensure that drivers did not skirt the
roadblock and to provide help to the officers in the event they
experienced any problems with the vehicles or drivers stopped at
the roadblock. The officers at the roadblock directed several cars,
including defendant's vehicle, to Detective Newton's location. At
Detective Newton's request, defendant produced a driver's license
and insurance information. Detective Newton then had defendant
perform several sobriety tests and placed defendant under arrest.
	The court found defendant guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol. The court sentenced defendant to one year of
conditional discharge and required that defendant participate in
counseling, complete 14 days in the "Sheriff's Work Alternative
Program," and pay a fine of $200.
ANALYSIS
	As noted above, the appellate court relied on Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447, in finding the
roadblock at issue invalid. In Edmond, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated checkpoints set up by the police on Indianapolis
roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. Initially, the Court
observed:
			"The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and
seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. [Citation.] While such suspicion is not an
'irreducible' component of reasonableness [citation], we
have recognized only limited circumstances in which the
usual rule does not apply. For example, we have upheld
certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the
program was designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement.' [Citations.] ***
			We have also upheld brief, suspicionless seizures of
motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to
intercept illegal aliens, Martinez-Fuerte, [428 U.S. 543,
49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)], and at a
sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from
the road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444[, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481] (1990)."
Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 340-41, 121 S. Ct.  at 451-52.
The Edmond Court then reviewed its decisions in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz, detailing the need for the checkpoints at issue and the
important governmental interests they served. The Court observed:
			"We have never approved a checkpoint program whose
primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have
recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that
a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of
individualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse that we
would not credit the 'general interest in crime control' as
justification for a regime of suspicionless stops.
[Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 671 n.18, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 n.18 (1979).]
Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint
programs that we have approved was designed primarily
to serve purposes closely related to the problems of
policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway
safety." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 41, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 343,
121 S. Ct.  at 454.
The Edmond Court firmly rejected the suggestion that the
Indianapolis checkpoints could be upheld pursuant to Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz:
			"Petitioners propose several ways in which the
narcotics-detection purpose of the instant checkpoint
program may instead resemble the primary purposes of
the checkpoints in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Petitioners
state that the checkpoints in those cases had the same
ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of
committing crimes. *** Securing the border and
apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law
enforcement activities, and law enforcement officers
employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of
these goals. [Citations.] If we were to rest the case at this
high level of generality, there would be little check on the
ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for
almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose.
Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily
to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions
from becoming a routine part of American life." Edmond,
531 U.S.  at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 343-44, 121 S. Ct.  at 454.
The Edmond Court concluded that the Indianapolis checkpoints
were invalid, stating:
			"The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics
checkpoints is in the end to advance 'the general interest
in crime control,' [citation]. We decline to suspend the
usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the
police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the
ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot
sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may
reveal that any given motorist has committed some
crime." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 345,
121 S. Ct.  at 455.
See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 218-19, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1290 (2001) (in invalidating
a program at a state hospital whereby urine samples from pregnant
women were tested for drugs and the results communicated to the
police, the Court stated: "Respondents argue in essence that their
ultimate purpose-namely, protecting the health of both mother and
child-is a beneficent one. In Chandler [v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997)], however, we did not
simply accept the State's invocation of a 'special need.' Instead,
we carried out a 'close review' of the scheme at issue before
concluding that the need in question was not 'special,' as that term
has been defined in our cases. [Citation.] In this case, a review of
the M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served by
the [hospital] searches 'is ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control.' Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)").
	In the present case, the appellate court held the roadblock at
issue invalid under Edmond. The appellate court noted "that the
roadblock's ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of 'ordinary
criminal wrongdoing.' " 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828. The court
concluded "[t]his is the type of routine investigative work that the
police must do every day and does not justify the extraordinary
means chosen to further the investigation." 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828.
	The State asserts that Edmond is distinguishable because the
roadblock at issue had a specific purpose of assisting the
authorities in solving a crime that had already been committed and
was known to the police. Thus, police efforts were not directed at
general crime control. Unlike in Edmond, the Lombard police
department did not seek to interrogate and inspect motorists to
ferret out evidence that the motorists themselves had committed
crime that was as yet unknown to police. Defendant was only
subjected to further investigation because he narrowly missed
hitting an officer in the area where vehicles were stopped.
	The State's interpretation of Edmond is incorrect. First, as the
Court reaffirmed in Edmond, the general rule is that "a search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d 
at 340, 121 S. Ct.  at 451. The checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)
(immigration checkpoints located near the Mexican border), and
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint), are
"limited exceptions to the general rule." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 41,
148 L. Ed. 2d  at 343, 121 S. Ct.  at 454. Certainly the Lombard
roadblock does not fall within the scope of the limited exceptions
heretofore approved by the Supreme Court.
	Second, the Court in Edmond was keenly aware that an
exception for roadblocks "designed primarily to serve the general
interest in crime control" would abrogate the general rule requiring
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See 4 W. LaFave, Search
&amp; Seizure §9.6 (3d ed. Supp. 2002). Accordingly, the Court drew
a bright line that when the primary purpose of a roadblock is
general crime control, the roadblock is unconstitutional. The Court
explained:
		"Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the
Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American
life." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 121 S. Ct.  at 454.
The Court declined "to suspend the usual requirement of
individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a
checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 345, 121 S. Ct. 
at 455.
	In the case at bar, the State ignores the concerns expressed by
the Court in Edmond. In spite of the clear admonishment in
Edmond against the use of roadblocks to advance "the general
interest in crime control," the State requests that we allow a
roadblock for precisely that purpose.
	Third, the State finds a distinction between gathering
information leading to the arrest and prosecution of a motorist as
the perpetrator of a crime, and gathering information from a
motorist leading to the identification of another motorist as the
perpetrator of a crime. According to the State, gathering
information leading to the arrest and prosecution of a motorist as
the perpetrator of a crime is a part of general crime control.
However, the State maintains that gathering information from a
motorist leading to the identification of another motorist as the
perpetrator of a crime is not considered a part of general crime
control. Taking the State's reasoning a step further, a police
investigation tool such as canvassing a neighborhood to find
identification witnesses to a crime is not considered to be a part of
general crime control. In the State's view, crime control involves
arresting the perpetrator directly; it does not involve gathering
information leading to the arrest of the perpetrator. We must reject
this contention. In investigating and solving any crime, police
efforts are directed at general crime control. This holds true
whether the police happen upon the perpetrator of the crime at the
roadblock or obtain information from a roadblock detainee
identifying the perpetrator of the crime.
	Lastly, an exception for informational roadblocks has the
potential to make roadblocks "a routine part of American life."
Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 121 S. Ct.  at 454.
In 2000, 870 murders, 49,652 assaults, 25,168 robberies, 77,947
burglaries, 306,805 thefts, 55,222 motor vehicle thefts, and 2,899
arsons were known by police to have been committed in Illinois.
J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 764 (16th ed. 2001). Of
those, 706 murders, 31,655 assaults, 21,691 robberies, 41,464
burglaries, 168,890 thefts, 45,083 motor vehicle thefts, and 1,525
arsons were known by police to have been committed in Cook
County. J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 764 (16th ed.
2001). In the City of Chicago, there were 627 murders, 26,660
assaults, 19,449 robberies, 28,401 burglaries, 105,728 thefts,
35,570 motor vehicle thefts and 1,106 arsons. J. Fitch, 2001
Illinois Statistical Abstract 766 (16th ed. 2001). Should the police
have been allowed to set up roadblocks to obtain information from
potential witnesses for each murder? What of a robbery, an
aggravated criminal sexual assault, an arson or any other serious
crime? According to the State, for a period of at least a week after
each crime, police could set up roadblocks with the specific
purpose of making inquiries of persons who were possibly
witnesses to a crime. The troubling specter then arises that the
streets of Cook County, or at least the streets of Chicago, would be
adorned with roadblocks, an outcome clearly unacceptable under
Edmond.
	Amicus suggests that exigent circumstances justified the use
of the roadblock. Amicus asserts that police needed to act quickly
to contact possible witnesses or else risk losing vital information.
The Court in Edmond left open the possibility that an emergency
may justify a law enforcement roadblock. The Court explained:
			"Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a
law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose
would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to
ordinary crime control. For example, as the Court of
Appeals noted, the Fourth Amendment would almost
certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up
to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a
dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a
particular route. [Citation.] The exigencies created by
these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances
under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter
of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving
the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that
may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of
categories, we decline to approve a program whose
primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at
44, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 345, 121 S. Ct.  at 455.
	In the present case, the hit-and-run accident happened a week
before the roadblock. There was no indication that the motorist
involved posed any further danger to local residents or, indeed,
that the motorist remained in the vicinity. There was also no
indication that the motorist was driving recklessly or was driving
under the influence of alcohol. While this court understands the
efforts of the Lombard police department to obtain information
leading to the identification of the motorist, the limited, exigent
circumstances of the nature identified by the Supreme Court in
Edmond are not present in the matter at bar. Absent such exigent
circumstances, the fourth amendment's prohibition against
suspicionless seizures should not give way to the normal needs of
law enforcement, be they identified as crime control, criminal
investigation or canvassing efforts to obtain information leading
to the identification and apprehension of the perpetrator of a crime.
	The State and amicus fail in their attempts to distinguish
Edmond. Edmond clarifies that "[w]hen law enforcement
authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at
checkpoints such as here, *** stops can only be justified by some
quantum of individualized suspicion." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 47,
148 L. Ed. 2d  at 347, 121 S. Ct.  at 457.
CONCLUSION
	The laws of this state require that a motorist remain at the
scene of an accident. In the present case, the motorist left the scene
of the accident. The police set up a roadblock to obtain
information regarding the identity of the motorist. The goals of the
police in doing so are laudable.
	This court is sympathetic to the efforts of the police in
identifying the motorist involved in the accident. Sympathy,
however, does not justify the roadblock at issue. As the Supreme
Court observed in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973):
		"The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension
with the Constitution's protections of the individual
against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely
the predictability of these pressures that counsels a
resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards. It is well to
recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his
return from the Nuremberg Trials:
				'These [fourth amendment rights], I protest, are not
mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights,
none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing
the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first
and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government.' Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (Jackson,
J., dissenting)." Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S.  at 273-74,
37 L. Ed. 2d  at 603, 93 S. Ct.  at 2540.
	The right of an individual to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures is an indispensable freedom, not a mere
luxury. It cannot give way in the face of a temporary need for the
police to obtain information regarding the identity of the motorist
at issue. As the protector of the constitutional rights of all citizens
of this state, this court is commanded to draw a "line at roadblocks
designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control."
Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 121 S. Ct.  at 454.
Without such a line, the fourth amendment will do little to prevent
intrusive searches and seizures from becoming a routine part of
American life. Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 121 S. Ct.  at 454.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	The majority has misconstrued City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000),
by reading it to prohibit the type of roadblock at issue here.
Edmond is factually distinguishable, and its language does not
condemn the strictly informational roadblock instituted by the
Lombard police department in this case. Additionally, I believe
that the majority erroneously creates a per se rule that roadblocks
involving police canvassing for information about a specific,
known crime are constitutionally impermissible. Consequently, the
majority abrogates the balancing test of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979), which is normally
applied in roadblock cases. For all of these reasons and as more
fully explained below, I respectfully dissent.
I. Edmond Is Distinguishable and Is Not Determinative
	In Edmond, the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Indianapolis checkpoint program that had as its primary purpose
the interdiction of illegal drugs. In contrast to the 10 to 15 second
stops in the present case, which were conducted for the sole
purpose of handing out an informational flyer, the total duration of
the stops in Edmond lasted between two and five minutes.
Moreover, unlike the roadblock here, drivers in Edmond were
asked to produce a license and registration while an officer looked
for signs of impairment. The officer also conducted an open-view
examination of the vehicle from the outside. Meanwhile, a
narcotics-detection dog was walked around the outside of the
stopped vehicle. Thus, the nature, purpose, and scope of the
roadblocks were completely different in the two cases.
	In the course of discussing its prior roadblock seizure cases,
the Edmond Court declared that it had never approved "a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at
38, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 341, 121 S. Ct.  at 452. The Court noted that
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976), it upheld a highway checkpoint
established for the purposes of intercepting illegal aliens because
of the significant interest in policing the nations borders (Edmond,
531 U.S.  at 38, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 341, 121 S. Ct. at 452), and in
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), it upheld a police roadblock
instituted to detect intoxicated drivers because of the gravity of the
drunken driving problem and the obvious connection between
highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue
(Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453).
The Court also discussed Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), which invalidated a
discretionary, suspicionless stop of a single motorist to check his
license and registration, noting that the officer's conduct in that
case was unconstitutional primarily because of his exercise of
discretion without standards promulgated by the police
department. Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342, 121 S. Ct.  at 453. The Court noted with approval the suggestion in
Prouse that the questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops to ensure that only those qualified to operate a vehicle
are permitted to do so would be a lawful means of serving the
interest in highway safety, but it specifically pointed out that it
considered the purpose of such a hypothetical roadblock "to be
distinct from a general purpose of investigating crime." Edmond,
531 U.S.  at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342, 121 S. Ct.  at 453.
	In concluding that a checkpoint designed primarily to catch
drug offenders and interdict illegal narcotics violates the fourth
amendment, the Edmond Court stated the following:
		"We decline to suspend the usual requirement of
individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ
a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of
investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified
only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that
interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given
motorist has committed some crime." (Emphasis added.)
Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 345, 121 S. Ct. 
at 455.
	In applying Edmond to the present case, the majority
erroneously seizes upon language in Edmond that prohibits
roadblocks "designed primarily to serve the general interest in
crime control," or stated another way, the "ordinary enterprise of
crime control," while ignoring other language in the Edmond
opinion modifying and explaining what is meant by "ordinary
crime control." I believe that the majority improperly relies on the
first sentence in the above-quoted passage from Edmond and
disregards the second sentence, which, modifying the first, plainly
proscribes checkpoints for the purpose of exposing unknown
crimes to the police. Edmond should not be read as categorically
enjoining police from stopping all vehicles pursuant to an
informational roadblock designed to make reasonable inquiry of
persons who were possibly witnesses to a specific crime. Instead,
I would find that absent either exigent circumstances or a
sufficient relationship to highway safety or border concerns,
Edmond categorically prohibits only checkpoints whose primary
purpose lies in discovering that the subjects of the seizure have
committed some crime (Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 43-44, 148 L. Ed. 2d 
at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455). Again, the Court in Edmond specifically
noted that it could not sanction stops "justified only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and
inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some
crime." (Emphasis added.) Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d 
at 345, 121 S. Ct.  at 455.
	Here, the roadblock at issue had a specific purpose of
assisting the authorities in solving a crime that had already been
committed and was known to the police. Thus, police efforts were
not directed at general crime control within the meaning of
Edmond. Unlike in Edmond, the Lombard police department did
not seek to interrogate and inspect motorists to ferret out evidence
that the motorists themselves had committed a crime that was as
yet unknown to police. The present defendant was subjected to
investigation only because his erratic driving nearly resulted in his
collision with an officer in the area where vehicles were stopped
for purposes of handing out flyers. Once the officers witnessed
defendant's erratic driving, they clearly had reasonable suspicion
to detain defendant for further inquiry. See People v. Sorenson,
196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001); People v. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d
71, 74 (1998). As the Court in Edmond recognized, its holding was
not meant to "impair the ability of police officers to act
appropriately upon information that they properly learn during a
checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary purpose, even where
such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense
unrelated to that purpose." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 48, 148 L. Ed. 2d 
at 347, 121 S. Ct.  at 457.
	While Edmond stated that "[a] search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing" (Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 340, 121
S. Ct. at 451), it did not create a per se rule announcing that
henceforward only roadblocks involving DUI checkpoints or
border control would ever be considered constitutional. Instead,
Edmond discussed with approval the rationale of Prouse, which
involved a license check. The Court noted that the spot check in
that case was invalid because of a lack of standards to guide the
discretion of the patrolling officer. Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342, 121 S. Ct.  at 453. As previously noted, the
Edmond Court approved of the assertion in Prouse that the
questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops to
ensure that only those qualified to operate a vehicle are permitted
to do so would be a lawful means of serving the interest of
highway safety, and that it considered the purpose of such a
hypothetical roadblock "to be distinct from a general purpose of
investigating crime." Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at
342, 121 S. Ct.  at 453.
	Aside from the fact that the roadblock in this case was distinct
from general crime control because it was not designed to detect
through "interrogation and inspection *** that any given motorist
has committed some crime" (Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455), the purpose of the present roadblock
is also distinct from general crime control because of its
connection to highway safety just as the hypothetical roadblock in
Prouse was distinct from general crime control. The canvassing
for information about a deadly hit-and-run crime that happened on
the roadway would serve the purpose of highway safety in a
similar fashion to checking licenses to ensure that only qualified
drivers are operating motor vehicles.
	The conclusion that Edmond does not compel the result
reached by the majority here is supported by the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Burns v. Commonwealth, 261
Va. 307, 541 S.E.2d 872 (2001), which is the only other reported
case decided in the aftermath of Edmond to assess the validity of
a roadblock established with the hope of discovering witnesses to
a specific, known crime, as opposed to a roadblock established to
discover evidence of crime in general. There, police set up a
roadblock at a particular location on September 21-22, 1998,
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 11:30 a.m. in the hopes of
discovering witnesses to a brutal murder that occurred in a nearby
house between the same hours on September 20-21, 1998.
According to the sheriff who decided to establish the roadblock,
its purpose was to " 'canvas drivers who were passing through the
area, to see whether they had seen or heard anything' during the
time period when the crime had probably been committed the
previous day." Burns, 261 Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d  at 883. The
sheriff also directed officers to stop all vehicles and to ask the
operators if they had been through that section during the time in
question and, if they had, whether they had seen anything of a
suspicious nature in and around the victim's house. Fortuitously,
the defendant, who was a relative of the victim, was stopped and
eventually made statements implicating himself in the crime.
	In holding that the roadblock did not violate the fourth
amendment, the Supreme Court of Virginia first considered and
weighed the factors enunciated in Brown. Burns, 261 Va. at 322,
541 S.E.2d  at 883. The court concluded that the murder was a
matter of grave public concern and that the roadblock advanced
that concern by aiding in the investigation of the crime. Burns, 261
Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d  at 883. Furthermore, the court emphasized
that the roadblock was carried out pursuant to an explicit plan that
contained neutral criteria and limited the discretion and conduct of
the law enforcement officers charged with the responsibility of
stopping vehicles at the roadblock. Burns, 261 Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d  at 883.
	The Virginia Supreme Court then distinguished Edmond,
noting that while the roadblock in the case before it was obviously
not related to policing the borders or ensuring highway safety, its
purpose was not "simply to investigate ordinary criminal
wrongdoing as was the checkpoint in Edmond." Burns, 261 Va. at
323, 541 S.E.2d  at 883. Instead, it noted, the roadblock was
"specifically designed to investigate a particular murder that had
recently occurred in the area where the roadblock was placed," and
police "were not stopping vehicles merely to discover evidence of
crimes in general." Burns, 261 Va. at 323-24, 541 S.E.2d  at 883-84. Finally, the court noted that Edmond had recognized that
" 'there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement
checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for
some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control.' " Burns, 261
Va. at 323, 541 S.E.2d  at 883, quoting Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 44,
148 L. Ed. 2d  at 345, 121 S. Ct.  at 455. The court concluded that
the roadblock fell within the exception recognized by Edmond
and, therefore, did not contravene the fourth amendment. Burns,
261 Va. at 324, 541 S.E.2d  at 884.
	Similarly, I would find that the roadblock in the present case
did not violate fourth amendment principles. At the time police set
up the roadblock, the offender remained at large with his identity
unknown. Thus, he continued to pose a safety risk to others on the
road. Moreover, even if the perpetrator was not an immediate
threat, the same exigent circumstances found to exist in Burns
were present here because police had to move relatively quickly to
canvass the area at the appropriate time or risk losing information
about the crime. At any rate, the underlying purpose behind the
roadblock furthered highway safety because of its potential to
solve this particular road crime. Importantly, police did not stop
vehicles to discover evidence of crime in general, and the
roadblock was appropriately tailored in terms of timing and
placement to provide for the most reasonably likely opportunity of
discovering further information about the crime. Also like Burns,
the intrusion on motorists in the present case-they were merely
stopped long enough to alert them of the crime and to ask them if
they had seen anything-was much less than the intrusion in
Edmond.
	Additionally, I note that the roadblock in the present case was
perhaps even more justifiable than the one in Burns when
comparing the two cases with Edmond. Here there was the
additional connection to roadway safety in that the crime was
accomplished through the use of an automobile at the same
location on the highway where the roadblock was eventually
conducted. Under these circumstances, I would hold that a police
roadblock does not per se violate the fourth amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures where the
roadblock is designed to gather information about a specific,
known crime that is a matter of grave public concern.
II. Application of the Brown Balancing Test
	Given my conclusion that Edmond does not categorically
prohibit the type of roadblock at issue in the present case, I believe
that it is incumbent upon this court to assess the validity of the
roadblock in relation to the factors noted in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979). It is well settled
that a vehicle stop at a roadblock or highway checkpoint
effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 40, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342, 121 S. Ct.  at 453;
People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 280 (1985). However, a
roadblock where individuals are stopped without probable cause
or individualized suspicion is not a per se violation of the fourth
amendment; the question of whether a roadblock violates the
fourth amendment is one of reasonableness, requiring the
weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.
Brown, 443 U.S.  at 50-51, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 361-62, 99 S. Ct.  at
2640; Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d  at 280.
	The factors set forth in Brown require a court to balance the
State's asserted interest for the roadblock against the "objective"
and "subjective" intrusion on the motorist. Prouse, 440 U.S.  at
656, 59 L. Ed. 2d  at 669, 99 S. Ct.  at 1397; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.  at 558, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 1128, 96 S. Ct.  at 3083. The objective
intrusion is measured by such factors as the length of the stop, the
nature of the questioning, and whether a search is conducted; the
subjective intrusion relates to the concern, fright, or annoyance on
the part of the motorist. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d  at 282. The crucial
inquiry in assessing the subjective intrusion involves a
consideration of whether the field officers were acting with
unbridled discretion. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d  at 289. Factors important
in that inquiry include the following: (1) whether the decision to
establish the roadblock and its location are made by supervisory
personnel of the police department such as a lieutenant or captain;
(2) whether all vehicles are stopped in a systematic, preestablished
manner such as stopping all traffic in a given direction; (3)
whether guidelines exist on the operation of the roadblock; (4)
whether advance publicity of the intention of police to establish
the roadblock was given; and (5) whether a sufficient show of the
official nature of the operation was made through such means as
the presence of a number of police vehicles with flashing lights
and uniformed officers. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d  at 288-91.
	Application of the Brown factors to the instant case leads to
the conclusion that the roadblock established by the Lombard
police department passed constitutional standards. The department
made the decision to set up the roadblock because of a fatal hit-and-run accident that had been committed in the precise area of the
roadblock, and officials did not know the identity of the offender
responsible for the crime. That the perpetrator was still at large
was indeed a matter of grave public concern, and the roadblock
advanced that concern by aiding in the investigation of the crime.
Moreover, the timing of the roadblock, exactly one week after the
crime at approximately the same time of day, was purposely
designed to stop motorists who might routinely travel that route at
the end of their work shift and thus was narrowly tailored for
maximum effectiveness. Thus, I would find that the State's
interest in the roadblock was sufficient to outweigh a minimal
intrusion on the motorist.
	Additionally, the intrusion in this case was in fact minimal.
Objectively, the physical nature of the intrusion was insubstantial.
Motorists were detained approximately 10 to 15 seconds, just long
enough for police to hand out a flyer and alert motorists of the
accident the previous week. Drivers were not asked for their
names, driver's licenses, or insurance cards and they were not
checked for seat belt violations. In relation to the vehicle
occupants subjected to the stop, there was indisputably no crime-detection purpose behind the roadblock.
	Likewise, the subjective nature of the intrusion was minimal.
The record indicates that a high-ranking lieutenant in the police
department called the meeting to inform the officers that they were
to participate in the roadblock. Vehicles were stopped in a
systematic and preestablished manner-all eastbound traffic was
stopped and this was not a roving patrol. Although an officer
participating in the roadblock admitted that there were no written
guidelines for "informational roadblocks" contained in the
department's written guidelines, the department did have
guidelines for roadblocks generally, and there is no indication that
the officers in the field did not follow the preestablished procedure
for this particular roadblock. Although the roadblock itself may
not have been publicized in advance, it is clear that the basis for
the roadblock had been well-publicized, which would have likely
minimized any apprehension motorists may have otherwise
experienced upon encountering it. Finally, any anxiety motorists
may have felt was dissipated by the official nature of the
operation-there was a large number of emergency vehicles present
with flashing lights and officers clad in orange police vests.
III. Proliferation of Roadblocks
	Lastly, I note that the majority cites statistics of the thousands
of felonies that occur in Illinois each year to support its argument
that, if this particular roadblock were upheld, roadblocks generally
would become a routine way of life. The statistics cited by the
majority, however, are irrelevant to this discussion, and the
majority's argument based thereon is unfounded and unpersuasive.
The majority misses the point that the justification for this
particular roadblock was that a fatal hit-and-run accident had
occurred on the highway, that the roadblock was also justified by
its connection to highway safety, and that it amounted to mere
canvassing for information. Missing from the list of statistics cited
by the majority is the amount of fatal hit-and-run accidents that
occur on major thoroughfares like Route 64, the scene of the fatal
vehicular crime that lead to the roadblock in this case.
	The majority's reasoning is also defused by the reality that the
amount of roadblocks would be limited by the scarce public
resources available to police. Moreover, even when a police
department determines that it is a justifiable use of their limited
manpower and resources to set up an informational roadblock, the
constitutionality of the roadblock would still be subject to the
three-prong reasonableness test of Brown as well as the principles
set forth in Edmond.
IV. Conclusion
	For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the
appellate court and reinstate defendant's conviction. Accordingly,
I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and GARMAN join in this dissent.