Title: Warrington v. DSCF
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 554, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
OWEN WARRINGTON,1  
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 
THEIR FAMILIES, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 554, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Petition Nos. CN02-10399  
§                        08-12-02TN 
§  File Nos. 07-40045 
§                  08-38524 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 10, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 24, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 24th day of June 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26.1, his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the 
response of the appellee, the Department of Services for Children, Youth and their 
Families (“DSCYF”), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The respondent-appellant, Owen Warrington (“Father”), has filed an 
appeal from the Family Court’s August 27, 2009 order terminating his parental 
                                                 
1 The Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated September 23, 2009.  
Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
2 
rights (“TPR”) in his minor child, Timmy.2  On appeal, Father’s counsel has filed 
an opening brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26.1.3  
Father’s counsel submits that she is unable to present a meritorious argument in 
support of the appeal.  Despite being afforded an opportunity to do so, Father has 
submitted no points for this Court’s consideration.  DSCYF has moved to affirm 
the Family Court’s judgment.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 
judgment of the Family Court must be affirmed.   
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Timmy, born August 17, 2001, entered the 
care of the Division of Family Services (“DFS”) on December 21, 2007.  Because 
of safety concerns, Timmy was removed from the care of his biological mother 
(“Mother”) and placed with a relative pending a criminal investigation into the 
death of his three month-old sister.  Timmy, then only five years old, had been told 
by Mother to watch his baby sister.  When the baby accidentally fell from a sofa, 
she suffered injuries that led to her death.  Mother later pleaded guilty to 
endangering the welfare of a child in connection with the incident.   
 
(3) 
At a preliminary protective hearing in December 2007, the Family 
Court continued legal custody of Timmy with DFS and physical custody with the 
relative.  At an adjudicatory hearing in March 2008, the Family Court found 
                                                 
2 The Court hereby assigns a pseudonym to the minor child.  The Family Court also terminated 
the parental rights of Timmy’s mother. 
3 Rule 26.1 provides for the continuing obligation of the appellant’s trial counsel in an appeal 
from a termination of parental rights. 
 
3 
Timmy to be dependent.  Subsequently, due to interference by Mother and her 
boyfriend, the relative was no longer willing to care for Timmy and, in June 2008, 
Timmy was placed with a foster family, where he remains to this day.  At a 
dispositional hearing in July 2008, the case plan for Mother’s reunification with 
Timmy was entered as a Family Court order.  
 
(4) 
In November 2008, Father contacted DFS and stated that he had 
suspected for some time that he might be Timmy’s biological father.  Until then, 
Father had played no role whatsoever in Timmy’s life.  Paternity testing confirmed 
Father’s suspicions.  In February 2009, Father was added as a party to the 
litigation.  Ms. Deon Toon, a caseworker with DFS, subsequently met with Father.  
Toon told Father that, because Timmy had already been in foster care for over a 
year and a half, and was unaware of Father’s existence, Father would be expected 
to follow through with his case plan quickly.  Toon stressed to Father the 
importance of his appearing at the next scheduled hearing on May 18, 2009.  She 
wrote the date and time of the hearing on the back of her business card and gave it 
to Father.  Father failed to appear.  As a result, Toon was unable to provide him 
with a copy of his case plan on that date, as she had planned.  DFS filed its TPR 
petition on May  21, 2009.     
 
(5) 
Father finally received and signed his case plan on June 2, 2009 at a 
permanency hearing in the Family Court.  Despite the filing of the TPR petition, 
 
4 
the judge maintained the goal of Father’s case plan as reunification.  Under the 
plan, Father was to obtain employment, complete the Strength in Families 
parenting class, complete a substance abuse evaluation due to his past drug 
convictions, follow through with any needed drug treatment, and obtain 
appropriate housing, all with a view toward ultimately visiting Timmy in a 
therapeutic setting.   
 
(6) 
At a July 2009 review hearing, the Family Court ordered that custody 
of Timmy would remain with DFS and that reunification would remain the goal of 
Father’s case plan.  While Father was present at the hearing, it was clear that he 
had done little to accomplish the goals of his case plan.  He had cancelled the 
appointment with DFS for a home assessment and did not make any effort to 
reschedule the appointment.  He could produce no evidence of serious attempts to 
find stable employment.  He was absent for a month from the home address he had 
provided to DFS and had provided no forwarding address.  He, finally, had not 
shown up for all of his parenting classes.      
 
(7) 
While living with his foster family, Timmy had been diagnosed with 
multiple problems, among them post traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant 
disorder, and attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder.  Although unjustified, he 
felt tremendous guilt over the death of his baby sister.  Timmy also believed that 
his father was a man other than Father.  Because of the probable emotional trauma 
 
5 
for Timmy should he be told of the existence of Father, the Family Court 
consistently required Father to demonstrate good faith in implementing his case 
plan before any visitation with Timmy could occur.       
 
(8) 
On August 24, 2009, DFS’s TPR petition against Mother and Father 
proceeded to trial in the Family Court.  The basis for the TPR petition regarding 
Father was failure to plan.  Despite being properly notified of the trial date, Father 
failed to appear.  The transcript of the hearing reflects the following.  The judge 
described her interview with Timmy, who was then eight years old.  The judge 
found Timmy to be a charming child with lovely manners.  When asked, Timmy 
stated that he got his manners from his foster mother.  Timmy stated that he loved 
his foster family and wanted to continue living with them.   
 
(9) 
Candace Bush, a therapist with the Brandywine Program, testified that 
she had seen Timmy once a week for therapy since February 10, 2009.  She stated 
that Timmy had made progress with his mental health issues and that the care and 
structure his foster family had provided had been the key to his progress.  She also 
stated that Timmy’s foster parents had become very attached to him and wished to 
adopt him.  Bush, finally, testified that Timmy would have great difficulty adapting 
to having Father in his life at that point and that having visitation with Father 
would likely be harmful to his emotional stability.   
 
6 
 
(10) Deon Toon, the DFS case worker, testified concerning her 
conversations with Father and her many failed attempts to contact him and assist 
him in meeting the goals of his case plan.  Toon also stated that Timmy had a 
strong relationship with his foster family and, in particular, with his foster mother.  
Timmy told her that he wanted his foster parents to adopt him.  Toon, finally, 
described the various types of counseling Timmy had received since entering foster 
care and how his mental health issues had improved.   
 
(11) Timmy’s foster mother also testified.  She stated that she had raised 
three sons who are now productive members of society.  She stated that she loved 
Timmy as if he were her own child and wanted to adopt him.  She stated that, when 
Timmy first came to her on June 9, 2008, he was uncomfortable, unhappy and 
distrustful.  However, through months of living with her family and receiving 
support and counseling, Timmy had become a happy child who enjoyed school, 
participated fully in activities and loved his foster family.  She also stated that, 
because Timmy still enjoyed visiting with his biological siblings, she would 
arrange for that to continue, should she be permitted to adopt Timmy.    
 
(12) In its order terminating Father’s parental rights, the Family Court 
found that DSCYF/DFS had established by clear and convincing evidence that 
Father’s parental rights should be terminated for failure to plan4 and that it was in 
                                                 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §1103(a).   
 
7 
Timmy’s best interests for the Father’s rights to be terminated so that he might be 
eligible for adoption.5  In her comments on the record following the hearing, the 
judge noted that, because Father was identified as Timmy’s biological father 
relatively late in the termination process, he was given latitude to demonstrate his 
good faith in carrying out his case plan.  Even after the TPR petition had been 
filed, the goal of Father’s case plan remained reunification.  Moreover, the DFS 
case worker had been aggressive in her efforts to assist Father in carrying out the 
goals of his case plan, to no avail.  Finally, the judge noted that she would have 
been inclined to postpone the termination hearing itself if Father had shown any 
interest in being a father to Timmy.  The record in this case reflects that the judge 
expended much time and energy in talking to Father and admonishing him of the 
importance of quickly implementing the goals of his case plan.   
 
(13) This Court’s review of the Family Court’s decision to terminate 
parental rights entails consideration of the facts and the law as well as the 
inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.6  To the extent that the 
Family Court’s rulings of law are implicated, our review is de novo.7  The 
Delaware statute governing the termination of parental rights requires a two-step 
                                                 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §722(a).  The grounds for the Family Court’s decision were stated at 
length in the trial transcript.  The record reflects that the appellant requested, and was granted, a 
copy of the judge’s rulings at State expense. 
6 Wilson v. DFS, 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010) (citing Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 
(Del. 1983)). 
7 Id. at 440. 
 
8 
analysis.8  First, there must be proof of a statutory basis for termination.9  Second, 
there must be a determination that termination of parental rights is in the best 
interests of the child.10  Both requirements must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.11     
 
(14) We have carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions as well as the 
record below, including the transcript of the TPR hearing.  We conclude that there 
is ample evidence in the record supporting the Family Court’s termination of 
Father’s parental rights, both on the statutory ground of Father’s failure to plan and 
on the ground that such termination is clearly in the best interests of Timmy.  
There was no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the Family Court.    
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion of DSCYF to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.  The 
appellant’s attorney’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §1103 (listing grounds for termination of parental rights); Shepherd v. 
Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000). 
9 Id. 
10 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d at 537; Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §722(a) (listing best interests 
factors). 
11 Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008).