Title: Barrett v. Virginia State Bar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060248
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2006

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TIMOTHY MARTIN BARRETT 
 
v.  Record No. 060248     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
September 15, 2006 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, EX REL. 
SECOND DISTRICT COMMITTEE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
William N. Alexander, II, William H. Ledbetter, and 
H. Selwyn Smith, Judges Designate 
 
 
Timothy Martin Barrett appeals the imposition of a 30-
month suspension of his license to practice law. 
A Subcommittee of the Second District, Section II, of the 
Virginia State Bar certified three charges of misconduct to 
the State Bar Disciplinary Board.  Barrett requested a three-
judge court and the Virginia State Bar (the Bar) filed a 
Complaint with that court pursuant to Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13.I.1.a.(1)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 
consolidating the certifications.  The three-judge court 
considered the three certified charges in a one-day ore tenus 
hearing. 
All three certifications were based on actions Barrett 
took during litigation in which he was a named party and in 
which he represented himself.  The first certification 
involved Barrett's divorce proceeding against his wife, Jill 
Barrett.  In that litigation, Barrett procured a witness 
subpoena for his former employer, Hayden I. DuBay, alleging 
DuBay had information regarding his wife's earning capacity.  
 
2
Barrett sent two letters to DuBay's attorney reciting the 
expense and inconvenience that DuBay would incur if he had to 
appear and testify and then offered to release DuBay from the 
subpoena if DuBay would withdraw a claim for an attorney's 
lien DuBay had filed against Barrett.  The three-judge court 
found that these actions violated Rules 4.4. and 8.4(b) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.1 
 
The second certification also related to the divorce 
proceeding.  At that trial, Barrett called opposing counsel, 
Martin L. Davis, as an adverse witness because Barrett "ha[d] 
reason to believe that Mr. Davis and Ms. Barrett have a 
romantic relationship."  When Davis denied the allegations, 
Barrett abandoned his request to call Davis as a witness.  The 
three-judge court found that Barrett violated Rules 3.1 and 
3.4(j) by these actions.2 
 
The final certification related to an action a former 
client, Debra Eller, brought against Barrett and his law firm, 
                     
1 Rule 4.4 requires an attorney to respect rights of third 
parties when representing a client and not "use means that 
have no purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a 
third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that 
violate the legal rights of such a person," and Rule 8.4(b), 
states that an attorney is guilty of professional misconduct 
when he or she "commit[s] a criminal or deliberately wrongful 
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer." 
2 Rule 3.1 mandates a lawyer assert only non-frivolous 
claims, and Rule 3.4(j) precludes a lawyer from asserting a 
position on behalf of a client that "would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure another." 
 
3
The Injury Law Institute of Virginia, PLC, in which Eller 
alleged negligence and malpractice based on Barrett's failure 
to file her personal injury lawsuit prior to the expiration of 
the statute of limitations.  Barrett filed a special plea of 
immunity claiming that he was immune from liability because he 
practiced as a professional limited company.  Eller's counsel 
filed a response citing the statutory provisions that 
specifically affirm the personal liability of attorneys who 
are members of professional limited companies.  Barrett 
declined to withdraw his plea until the trial court convened 
to hear the motion.  The three-judge court held that these 
actions constituted a violation of Rules 1.1 and 3.1 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.3 
 
The three-judge court issued an opinion and final order 
imposing a 30-month suspension of Barrett's license to 
practice law based on these violations.  Barrett assigns 
seventeen errors to the rulings of the three-judge court. 
DEMURRER 
 
First, Barrett claims that the three-judge court erred in 
dismissing the demurrer he filed in response to the Bar's 
Complaint.  The three-judge court dismissed Barrett's demurrer 
holding that the Rules governing these proceedings contained 
                     
3 Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to "provide competent 
representation to a client [including] legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation." 
 
4
no provision for a demurrer and, in any event, the demurrer 
failed on the merits because the complaint and accompanying 
certifications sufficiently informed Barrett of the charges 
against him.  The three-judge court was correct in concluding 
that the Rules applicable to these proceedings do not 
authorize a reviewing body to dismiss a complaint against a 
lawyer on demurrer.  See Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13(I)(1).  Barrett does not directly dispute this conclusion 
but argues that the failure to allow such a challenge left him 
"unable to mount a proper defense in violation of his rights 
to due process of law."  The record does not support Barrett's 
position. 
The certification listed the specific acts that were the 
basis for the alleged Rule violations.  Furthermore, as 
required by the Rules, Barrett received a copy of the 
investigative report considered by the Subcommittee when it 
referred the case to the three-judge panel.  Va. Sup. Ct. R., 
Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(D)(1)(b).  This information was sufficient 
to put Barrett on notice of the claims against him. 
SUBCOMMITTEE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 
Next Barrett claims that the three-judge panel erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss all charges against him because 
a member of the subcommittee that certified the charges, Bobby 
W. Davis, was not impartial.  Barrett claims Davis was biased 
 
5
because a former client of Davis' retained Barrett and Barrett 
forced Davis to complete some work for the client without 
remuneration.  Barrett raised this issue for the first time 
before the three-judge court.  That court correctly held that 
Barrett waived this issue because he did not raise it before 
the subcommittee, although he was aware of the alleged 
conflict at that time. 
ATTORNEY AS CLIENT 
Barrett claims that the three-judge court erred in 
finding him in violation of Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.4(j), and 4.4 
because these Rules apply only when a lawyer is 
representing a client, not when a lawyer represents himself 
in a proceeding.  Barrett argues that the language of Rules 
1.1, 3.4(j) and 4.4 specifically limit their application to 
actions an attorney takes while representing clients.  
Those Rules state in pertinent part: 
Rule 1:1 
 
A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. 
 
Rule 3.4(j) 
 
A lawyer shall not:  . . . assert a position 
. . . or take other action on behalf of a client 
when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that 
such action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another. 
 
Rule 4.4 
 
 
6
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
use means that have no purpose other than to 
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person 
. . . . 
 
Barrett also maintains that Rule 3.1, although not explicitly 
referring to representation of a client, was intended to apply 
only in the course of such representation based on the 
commentary to that Rule. 
Rules of statutory construction provide that language 
should not be given a literal interpretation if doing so would 
result in a manifest absurdity.  Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 
524, 528, 621 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2005).  Applying these Rules in 
the manner Barrett suggests would result in such an absurdity.  
The Rules of Professional Conduct are designed to insure the 
integrity and fairness of the legal process. It would be a 
manifest absurdity and a distortion of these Rules if a lawyer 
representing himself commits an act that violates the Rules 
but is able to escape accountability for such violation solely 
because the lawyer is representing himself.  Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 668 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1989) (intent and purpose of Maryland's version of Rule 
4.4 served only by applying construction that lawyer is 
representing client when he represents self); Montgomery 
County Bar Ass'n v. Hecht, 317 A.2d 597, 601-02 (Pa. 1974) 
(anomalous to condemn lawyer's knowing participation in 
 
7
introduction of perjured testimony by client and condone 
giving such testimony by lawyer himself). 
Furthermore, an attorney who represents himself in a 
proceeding acts as both lawyer and client.  He takes some 
actions as an attorney, such as filing pleadings, making 
motions, and examining witnesses, and undertakes others as a 
client, such as providing testimonial or documentary evidence.  
See In re Glass, 784 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ore. 1990)(lawyer 
appearing in proceeding pro se is own client); In re Morton 
Allan Segall, 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ill. 1987) ("attorney who 
is himself a party to the litigation represents himself when 
he contacts an opposing party"); Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance 
Committee, 578 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Conn. 1990) (restriction on 
attorneys contacting represented parties limited to instances 
where attorney is representing client, not where attorney 
represents himself). 
The three Rules at issue here address acts Barrett took 
while functioning as an attorney and thus the three-judge 
panel correctly held that such acts are subject to 
disciplinary action. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
We turn now to Barrett's contention that the Bar did not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he violated 
 
8
the relevant Rules in any of the circumstances charged.4  In 
reviewing the decision of the three-judge court, we conduct an 
independent examination of the record, considering the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party below, and we give the 
factual findings of the three-judge court substantial weight, 
viewing them as prima facie correct.  Anthony v. Virginia 
State Bar, 270 Va. 601, 608-09, 621 S.E.2d 121, 125 (2005).  
The factual conclusions, while not carrying the weight of a 
jury verdict, will be sustained unless they are not justified 
by the evidence or are contrary to law.  Id. at 609, 621 
S.E.2d at 125. 
1.  Witness subpoena for DuBay 
Barrett argues that because DuBay had employed Barrett's 
former wife, Jill, DuBay had information regarding her earning 
capacity, and he alleged that DuBay would not provide certain 
employment records.  Therefore, Barrett asserts he issued a 
lawful subpoena to a material witness and did not engage in 
actions that had "no purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person," Rule 4.4, or reflected "adversely 
                     
4 Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13, Section (I)(2)(e)(2) 
of the Rules provides that at a disciplinary hearing before 
the Bar Disciplinary Board, Bar Counsel must present clear and 
convincing evidence to prove a violation of the Rules.  Code 
§ 54.1-3935(B) makes this same evidentiary standard applicable 
to proceedings before a three-judge court. 
 
9
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer," Rule 8.4(b). 
The record shows that Jill worked for DuBay for a total 
of approximately 30 hours and was paid $10 an hour.  DuBay had 
provided Jill's attorney with Jill's employment records.  He 
never received a subpoena or written request for those records 
from Barrett, although he testified he believed that Barrett 
sought the records from Jill's attorney.   
Even though DuBay's information may have been relevant in 
Barrett's divorce action, Barrett's two letters containing 
offers to release DuBay from the witness subpoena if DuBay 
would waive the attorney's lien claim were not designed to 
secure DuBay's testimony regarding Jill's employment.  The 
clear intent of Barrett's letters was to harass DuBay and 
compel him to waive the lien.  This record provides clear and 
convincing evidence that Barrett violated both Rules 4.4 and 
8.4(b), and the three-judge court did not err in finding such 
violations.5  
                     
5 We also reject Barrett's claim that the three-judge 
court erred in admitting testimony and letters regarding 
Barrett's interaction with his former client, Wade Bell.  Part 
6, Section IV, Paragraph 13(E)(3) adopted in three-judge court 
proceedings pursuant to 54.1-3935(B) sets the evidentiary 
standard:  "evidentiary rulings shall be made favoring receipt 
into evidence of all reasonably probative evidence to satisfy 
the ends of justice.  The weight given such evidence received 
shall be commensurate with its evidentiary foundation and 
likely reliability."  Barrett's treatment of Bell bore on the 
question whether Barrett had committed "a deliberately 
 
10
2.  Calling Opposing Counsel as a Witness 
Barrett argues that the Bar did not establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that he violated Rules 3.1 and 3.4(j) 
when he called opposing counsel, Martin Davis, as a witness in 
the divorce proceeding.  These two Rules prohibit an attorney 
from asserting a position that is frivolous and from taking 
action designed "merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another," respectively. 
Barrett maintains that he called Davis as a witness 
because he had a reasonable belief that Davis had a romantic 
relationship with Jill, Barrett's former wife, and therefore 
Davis' testimony regarding child rearing would be relevant to 
the custody issues in the proceeding. 
Prior to the hearing, Barrett sent a letter to Davis 
describing Barrett's perception of a romantic relationship.  
Davis did not respond to the letter.  At trial, Barrett called 
Davis as a witness stating that he believed Davis had 
"knowledge as to this matter that is outside of his attorney-
client relationship."  In response, Davis objected referring 
to rules that state an attorney cannot continue representation 
of a client if he is going to be a witness in an adversarial 
proceeding and claiming that he had no knowledge of matters at 
                                                                
wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty" 
in violation of Rule 8.4(b).  DuBay had personal knowledge of 
 
11
issue other than those acquired in the course of his 
representation of Jill, which were protected by the attorney-
client privilege.  Barrett then revealed his suspicion of a 
romantic relationship and stated that if Davis would state on 
the record that there was no romantic relationship, "I have no 
reason to talk to him."  Davis denied the existence of such a 
relationship, and Barrett ended his attempt to call Davis as a 
witness. 
The record shows that Barrett's "reasonable belief" of a 
romantic relationship was based on statements made by his 
current wife who was his girlfriend at the time of the divorce 
proceeding.  She testified that she considered the interaction 
between Jill and Davis, which she observed during the divorce 
proceedings, as "romantic flirtation."  Barrett stated that he 
had concluded "the same thing."  Davis testified at the 
disciplinary proceeding that he and Jill had eaten dinner 
together once during the divorce proceeding.  The tenuous 
nature of Barrett's suspicions is reflected in Barrett's 
agreement to drop his request upon Davis' statement denying 
such a relationship.  Barrett made no attempt to challenge 
Davis' statement nor to disclose to any information that would 
contradict the denial.  The lack of any investigation into the 
relationship at issue prior to or further inquiry at trial 
                                                                
these dealings; thus, the three-judge court properly admitted 
 
12
reinforces the notion that Barrett had no purpose other than 
engaging in a frivolous act or harassing Davis.  Furthermore, 
Davis' dinner with Jill was not proof of a "romantic 
relationship," nor was it shown to have been a factor upon 
which Barrett relied when he called Davis as a witness.6 
At trial, the Bar emphasized the extraordinary and 
disruptive measure of calling an adverse counsel to testify in 
the middle of a hearing.  Under such circumstances counsel 
generally must cease representation of the client and the 
client must secure new counsel.  See Rule 3:7.  Furthermore, 
the basis of Barrett's actions in this case – an alleged 
romantic relationship between Davis and his client - impugned 
the personal and professional reputation of the attorney.  
Rule 1.7, Comment 11 ("A lawyer's romantic or other intimate 
personal relationship can also adversely affect representation 
of a client.").  Calling Davis as a witness under these 
circumstances qualified as action taken to harass or injure 
another.  Accordingly, we conclude that the three-judge court 
did not err in finding that these actions violated Rules 3.1 
and 3.4(j).  
3.  Pleadings in the Malpractice Litigation 
                                                                
this evidence. 
6 Barrett also claimed that his belief was based on 
statements from his children that their mother had dinner with 
Davis but these statements were not submitted or admitted as 
evidence in the proceeding. 
 
13
The three-judge court concluded that Barrett violated 
Rule 1.1 and Rule 3.1 by the following acts which occurred in 
conjunction with the Barrett's representation of Eller and her 
legal malpractice action against him:  failing to file or 
settle a lawsuit within the two year statute of limitations 
period, filing a special plea of immunity that "was not 
warranted by existing law or the good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," and 
failing to read the motion to strike the plea and memorandum 
in support thereof until the day of the hearing on the motion 
at which time he withdrew the plea.   Barrett argues that 
these facts are insufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that he violated either Rule.  We agree. 
Rule 1.1 requires that a lawyer provide "competent 
representation" to a client, which requires "legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 
the representation."  Disciplining an attorney on the basis of 
incompetent representation under Rule 1.1, as reflected in the 
commentary, involves attorney performance that extends 
significantly beyond mere attorney error.  See Motley v. 
Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 262-64, 536 S.E.2d 101, 106-
07 (2002) (imposing discipline under former DR 6-101 for 
incompetence when attorney allowed client to sign promissory 
note to complete a real estate transaction which did not 
 
14
reflect parties' agreement and the consequences of which 
attorney did not understand). 
Whether an attorney is subject to discipline for failing 
to provide competent representation is a matter decided on a 
case by case basis.  In this case, Barrett admitted that his 
failure to file or settle the personal injury lawsuit within 
the limitations period was negligent; nevertheless, such 
negligence without more is not clear and convincing evidence 
of incompetence under Rule 1.1.  Similarly, discipline of 
Barrett under Rule 1.1 is not justified based on research that 
results in the wrong legal conclusion because incorrect legal 
research alone, although attorney error, is not clear and 
convincing evidence of incompetence for purposes of that Rule. 
Finally, Barrett's failure to read responsive pleadings 
in a more timely manner and his delay in withdrawing the 
special plea, while not the preferred way of practicing law, 
do not support a finding of incompetent representation in this 
case.  Barrett filed his special plea on January 30, 2003; 
opposing counsel filed the motion to strike and supporting 
memorandum on February 18; and Barrett withdrew the plea on 
March 18, the date of the hearing on various motions in the 
case including the special plea and motion to deny the special 
plea.  The delay itself was less than a month, and Barrett 
withdrew the plea before the court was required to consider 
 
15
it.  Accordingly, we conclude that this delay does not provide 
clear and convincing evidence that Barrett violated Rule 1.1. 
We next turn to violations of Rule 3.1.  That rule 
prohibits a lawyer from advancing a position that is 
frivolous.7  The failure to timely file a lawsuit does not 
implicate this rule.  Thus, violation of this rule had to be 
based on the three-judge court's finding that Barrett asserted 
an erroneous legal position that was not a good faith argument 
for extension of the law, and that he failed to timely read 
opposing pleadings and withdraw his special plea. 
An erroneous position is not necessarily a frivolous 
position. In this case, Barrett produced evidence, accepted by 
the three-judge court, that his position, although erroneous, 
was based on principles he learned in his law school classes, 
on legal research he had conducted on the issue, and on a 
"misunderstanding of the law."  This evidence does not support 
a finding that filing the special plea was a frivolous act in 
violation of Rule 3.1.  Compare Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 
269 Va. 583, 596, 611 S.E.2d 375, 382 (2005) (imposing 
discipline for filing frivolous pleading where attorney moved 
to strike wife's divorce pleadings solely because of minor 
                     
7 Compare Code § 8.01-271.1 allowing sanctions against an 
attorney who signs a pleading that is not "grounded in fact," 
"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" for a 
change in the law, or filed for an "improper purpose" such as 
delay, harassment, or increasing the cost of litigation. 
 
16
mistake in wife's legal name, and attorney clearly knew 
correct name and had himself used multiple versions of it in 
own motion). 
Similarly Barrett's delay in reading opposing counsel's 
memorandum and refusal to withdraw his special plea at an 
earlier time do not constitute asserting a position that is 
frivolous. 
 
In summary, we find that the record does not present 
clear and convincing evidence that Barrett violated Rules 1.1 
and 3.1 when he failed to file or settle a lawsuit within the 
limitations period, filed a special plea asserting an 
erroneous legal position, or delayed in reading responsive 
pleadings and withdrawing the special plea.8 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm that part of the 
judgment of the three-judge court finding that Barrett's 
actions in conjunction with his divorce proceeding violated 
Rules 4.4, 8.4(b), 3.1 and 3.4.  We will reverse that part of 
the judgment of the three-judge court holding that Barrett's 
actions in conjunction with his representation of Eller and in 
the legal malpractice action violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3. 
Consequently, because the 30-month suspension of Barrett's 
                     
8 In light of this holding, we need not address Barrett's 
other challenges to evidence admitted in conjunction with 
these charges. 
 
17
license to practice law was a single sanction imposed for all 
violations found by the three-judge court, we will vacate that 
sanction and remand the case for further consideration of an 
appropriate sanction for the remaining violations.9 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part,  
and remanded. 
                     
9 Because the case will be remanded for consideration of 
an appropriate sanction, we need not address Barrett's 
remaining challenges regarding the sanction previously 
imposed.