Title: State v. Berkstresser
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122557
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2022

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 122,557 
  
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
RYAN M. BERKSTRESSER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When a party fails to brief an issue, that issue is deemed waived or abandoned. 
 
2. 
To determine whether a lesser included offense instruction is factually appropriate, 
a court must consider whether there is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the defendant, emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that 
would reasonably justify the defendant's conviction for that lesser included crime. 
 
3. 
A district court commits instructional error by failing to sua sponte give a lesser 
included offense instruction that is both legally and factually appropriate. On appeal, to 
obtain reversal of a conviction based on that error, a defendant who has failed to request 
the instruction bears the burden to firmly convince a reviewing court the jury would have 
reached a different verdict had the error not occurred. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
Appellate courts do not ordinarily consider an issue not raised by the parties but 
may do so sua sponte when the issue's consideration is necessary to serve the ends of 
justice or prevent the denial of fundamental rights after notice to the parties and allowing 
them an opportunity to address the issue raised by the court.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed December 23, 
2021. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID J. KAUFMAN, judge. Opinion filed December 2, 
2022. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district 
court is affirmed, and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  The State challenges a Court of Appeals decision reversing Ryan M. 
Berkstresser's conviction for felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. The 
panel ordered a new trial after it held the district court erred by failing to give an 
unrequested jury instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor offense and that this error 
justified reversal. State v. Berkstresser, No. 122,557, 2021 WL 6068708 (Kan. App. 
2021) (unpublished opinion). We reverse the panel and affirm the conviction because the 
panel misapplied the standard required to determine when such an instructional error 
necessitates reversal. 
 
If a reviewing court determines a district court erred by failing to give an 
unrequested lesser included offense instruction, its next step is to consider the degree of 
3 
 
 
 
resulting prejudice by deciding whether it is firmly convinced the jury would have 
reached a different verdict had this instructional error not occurred. State v. Valdez, 316 
Kan. 1, 6, 512 P.3d 1125 (2022). But here, after the panel found error, it reversed the 
conviction because it held the jury "could have reasonably determined Berkstresser failed 
to yield to the officer but did not drive with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
other persons or property as reflected in the dashcam video." (Emphasis added.) 
Berkstresser, 2021 WL 6068708, at *6. This substantively differs from deciding whether 
the court is firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict on the 
felony charge.  
 
We hold the panel erred by using a lower standard of doubt about the outcome to 
declare this unpreserved error reversible. See State v. Carter, 305 Kan. 139, 159, 380 
P.3d 189 (2016) (clear error is in reality a heightened standard of harmlessness); Garner's 
Modern American Usage, p. 869 (3d ed. 2009) ("Writers often use would to condition 
statements that really ought to be straightforward."). We further hold the failure to give a 
lesser included offense instruction for the misdemeanor offense was not clearly erroneous 
because we are not firmly convinced based on the trial evidence that the jury would have 
reached a different verdict if such an instruction had been given, so we affirm the 
conviction.  
 
That result, however, does not end the matter. We must remand this case to the 
district court with directions to merge Berkstresser's two alternative convictions of felony 
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer under State v. Vargas, 313 Kan. 866, Syl. 
¶¶ 1-3, 492 P.3d 412 (2021). 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Neither party disputes what happened, although they portray the facts very 
differently. Haysville Police Officer Randy Nowak noticed a Mitsubishi sedan following 
too closely to another car. His dispatch advised the Mitsubishi's license plate was 
assigned to a different vehicle. Nowak began a traffic stop by activating his patrol car's 
overhead emergency lights and siren. His car displayed Haysville Police Department 
decals. The driver, later identified as Berkstresser, did not stop. He increased his speed, 
reaching 72 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone. 
 
Berkstresser turned west onto a country road, reaching 65 miles per hour in an 
unposted area where Nowak believed the speed limit was 45. Berkstresser then went 
north. In doing so, he made a complete stop at a stop sign but did not properly signal the 
turn. He pulled into a residential driveway and drove across two front yards—near 
multiple parked vehicles and a bystander—before moving back onto the street without 
stopping or yielding. Again headed north, he swerved right across the fog line toward a 
ditch then left across the center line into the southbound lane before entering another 
driveway without signaling. He stopped and fled on foot. Officer Nowak caught up with 
Berkstresser, who had no valid driver's license or proof of insurance. 
 
The State charged Berkstresser with:  (1) fleeing or attempting to elude a police 
officer by committing five or more moving violations in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 
8-1568(b)(1)(E), a severity level 9 person felony; (2) in the alternative, fleeing or 
attempting to elude a police officer by engaging in reckless driving in violation of K.S.A. 
2017 Supp. 8-1568(b)(1)(C), a severity level 9 person felony; (3) marijuana possession in 
violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5706(b)(3), a class B nonperson misdemeanor; (4) 
driving with a suspended or canceled license in violation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-
262(a)(1), a class B nonperson misdemeanor; and (5) no proof of insurance in violation 
5 
 
 
 
of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 40-3104(c), a class B misdemeanor. He pled not guilty. Before 
trial, the State dismissed the marijuana possession count. 
 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on the two alternatively charged felony counts of 
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, as well as driving with a suspended 
license. It acquitted him on the proof-of-insurance charge. The district court sentenced 
Berkstresser to 15 months' imprisonment for the reckless driving fleeing and eluding 
conviction but did not sentence him for the alternative conviction (five or more moving 
violations). The court also sentenced him to six months in jail for the suspended license. 
We note the panel states the district court ordered the two sentences run concurrent. 
Berkstresser, 2021 WL 6068708, at *3. But our review of the record reflects the district 
court ordered these sentences run consecutive.  
 
Berkstresser appealed, raising eight trial-error claims. Of those, the panel 
addressed just one that it considered dispositive:  Whether the district court committed 
clear error by not instructing the jury on the lesser included misdemeanor fleeing offense 
for the count alleging reckless driving. The panel held there was error requiring it to 
reverse the reckless driving conviction and remanded for a new trial. 2021 WL 6068708, 
at *6. Inexplicably, the panel did not discuss the trial-error claims associated with the 
jury's remaining alternative felony conviction for five or more moving violations before 
remanding the case for a new trial.  
 
The State petitioned for review on the panel's reversal of the conviction. Neither 
party sought review for the issues left undecided, so those are not before us. See Kansas 
Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 56) ("If the petitioner 
wishes to have the Supreme Court determine issues that were presented to the district 
court and the Court of Appeals but not decided by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner 
must also present those issues."); State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021) 
6 
 
 
 
("Allen did not cross-petition on the panel's decision to drop her third claim, nor did she 
mention that claim in her response to the State's petition for review, so it is not before 
us."). 
 
We granted the State's petition for review. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-
3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals decision); K.S.A. 60-
2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon 
petition for review). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The State argues two points:  (1) a misdemeanor instruction was not factually 
appropriate so no error occurred; and (2) even if the instruction was factually appropriate 
and should have been given, that omission did not prejudice Berkstresser to the degree 
necessary to reverse his felony conviction. As explained, we agree with the State's second 
argument. 
 
Was a misdemeanor instruction factually appropriate? 
 
A court reviews alleged instructional error in a sequential manner. See State v. 
Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (establishing four-step progression 
with step 2 considering whether the instruction was legally appropriate and step 3 
considering whether the instruction was factually appropriate). The State chose not to 
dispute that an instruction for the misdemeanor crime would have been legally 
appropriate, so our focus is drawn to factual appropriateness. See Kansas Supreme Court 
Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 56) ("The Supreme Court will not consider  
. . . issues not presented or fairly included in the petition for review."); State v. Tracy, 311 
Kan. 605, 610, 466 P.3d 434 (2020) ("When a party fails to brief an issue, that issue is 
deemed waived or abandoned."). 
7 
 
 
 
 
A legally appropriate lesser included offense instruction must be given when there 
is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, emanating from 
whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would reasonably justify the 
defendant's conviction for that lesser included crime. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3); 
State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 820, 441 P.3d 52 (2019); State v. Seba, 305 Kan. 
185, 204, 380 P.3d 209 (2016). The State begins by urging us to reconsider this standard's 
perspective. 
 
It asserts appellate courts should instead review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the State when the defendant did not request at trial the lesser included 
offense instruction in dispute. This shift, it argues, more closely aligns with the clear 
error standard required by K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3). It contends criminal 
defendants "who fail to request an instruction at trial should not benefit from the 'light 
most favorable' standard on appeal; rather, that standard should be limited to defendants 
whose request for an instruction was denied by the district court." Said differently, the 
State believes viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant is a 
"benefit" even though the defendant has the burden of firmly convincing a reviewing 
court the trial's outcome would have been different had this instructional error not 
occurred.  
 
But the State faces insurmountable barriers here because it did not ask the panel to 
reconsider the perspective it now finds offensive. In fact, the only caselaw the State cited 
to the panel as supporting authority for the standard of review was Plummer, which 
expressly held "the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have 
supported the instruction." (Emphasis added.) Plummer, 295 Kan. at 163. So when the 
panel referenced the Plummer perspective, it was just following the authority the State 
8 
 
 
 
provided to it. A party cannot be heard to complain when this happens. Cf. State v. 
Gulley, 315 Kan. 86, 91, 505 P.3d 354 (2022) ("'Under the invited error doctrine, a 
litigant may not invite error and then complain of that same error on appeal.'"). 
 
Granted, the State made vague mention of an unrequested instruction's factual 
appropriateness being "closely akin" to evidentiary sufficiency questions that are 
reviewed in a light most favorable to the State when a jury convicts on a charged crime. 
But this meager allusion does not fairly place the question before the panel and equates to 
failing to brief the issue. See Tracy, 311 Kan. at 610; Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i). Given these 
failings, we decline to reconsider the applicable standard of review and will apply our 
existing caselaw. See State v. Roberts, 314 Kan. 835, 844, 503 P.3d 227 (2022) ("To be 
factually appropriate, there must be sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, to support the instruction."). 
 
Moving to the merits, the State argues a misdemeanor conviction must be 
supported by evidence showing Berkstresser did not engage in reckless driving during the 
police pursuit. It reasons reckless driving is a required statutory element for the felony 
charge, so Berkstresser needed to demonstrate a lack of evidence on that felony element 
to reasonably justify giving the misdemeanor instruction. Addressing these arguments 
requires statutory interpretation for which we have unlimited review. State v. Downing, 
311 Kan. 100, 103, 456 P.3d 535 (2020). We start with the statute. 
 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3) states in part:  "In cases where there is some 
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime as 
provided in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5109, and amendments thereto, the judge shall 
instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime." K.S.A. 2021 
Supp. 21-5109(b) covers lesser included offenses, by providing:  "Upon prosecution for a 
crime, the defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or a lesser included 
9 
 
 
 
crime, but not both." The relevant language here defines a "lesser included crime," as 
either "[a] lesser degree of the same crime" or "a crime where all elements of the lesser 
crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-
5109(b)(1)-(2). And as we have noted, the State concedes the misdemeanor crime 
instruction was legally appropriate as the panel held. See Berkstresser, 2021 WL 
6068708, at *5. 
 
Keeping this statutory language in mind, we look first at Berkstresser's felony 
charge. The district court instructed the jury on felony fleeing by committing reckless 
driving under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-1568(b)(1)(C) by itemizing that crime's elements as 
follows: 
 
"In Count 2, the defendant is charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a police 
officer. 
 
"The defendant pleads not guilty. 
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
"1. 
The defendant was driving a motor vehicle. 
 
"2.  
The defendant was given a visual or audible signal by a police officer to 
bring the motor vehicle to a stop. 
 
"3. 
The defendant intentionally failed or refused to bring the motor vehicle 
to a stop, or otherwise fled or attempted to elude a pursuing police vehicle. 
 
"4. 
The police officer's vehicle was appropriately marked showing it to be an 
official police vehicle. 
 
"5. 
The defendant engaged in reckless driving. 
10 
 
 
 
 
"6.  
This act occurred on or about the 17th day of February, 2018, in 
Sedgwick County, Kansas."  
 
Note the first four elements standing alone constitute misdemeanor fleeing when 
the defendant is a first- or second-time offender, and the record shows no prior violation 
of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-1568(a) for Berkstresser. But the panel did not confine itself to 
those four elements when considering whether evidence supported a misdemeanor 
conviction. It instead looked to whether some evidence showed Berkstresser "did not 
drive [recklessly]," which is the fifth element that elevates the offense to a felony when 
accompanied by the first four. (Emphasis added.) Berkstresser, 2021 WL 6068708, at *6. 
This means the panel extended its reasoning beyond deciding whether the evidence 
presented could satisfy the misdemeanor offense's statutory elements. The panel erred in 
its reasoning, although it still reached the correct conclusion of error as we explain. 
 
Our caselaw applying K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3)'s "some evidence" standard 
supports a conclusion that the misdemeanor instruction was factually appropriate here 
because the State put on sufficient evidence for the jury to find each element of the lesser 
crime. See Roberts, 314 Kan. at 852 (holding courts' duty under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-
3414[3] "applies even if the evidence is weak or inconclusive"; stating, "[p]roviding 
lesser included offense instructions allows a jury to consider the full range of possible 
verdicts supported by the evidence"). After oral argument, the State filed a motion for 
additional briefing seeking to argue this "some evidence" standard requires more, but we 
deny the motion because any error in failing to give the lesser instruction—one way or 
the other—does not require reversal in this instance. 
 
We hold the record contains ample support to reasonably justify a misdemeanor 
conviction under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-1568(a)(1)-(2) and (c)(1)(A). This evidence 
11 
 
 
 
includes:  Berkstresser driving the Mitsubishi, a motor vehicle; Nowak giving a visual 
and audible signal to bring the Mitsubishi to a stop by activating the overhead emergency 
lights and siren on his patrol car; the video footage depicting Berkstresser intentionally 
failed or refused to bring his car to a stop, or otherwise fled or tried to elude a pursuing 
police vehicle for about five minutes; and Nowak's car having regular Haysville Police 
Department decals. 
 
Despite the panel's flawed reasoning, it correctly held the district court erred in 
failing to give a misdemeanor fleeing and eluding instruction. We consider next whether 
we are firmly convinced this error prejudiced the trial's outcome. 
 
Was the failure to give a misdemeanor fleeing instruction harmless? 
 
Because Berkstresser did not request an instruction on misdemeanor fleeing, we 
review any prejudice resulting from the district court's failure to give the instruction for 
clear error. See State v. Owens, 314 Kan. 210, 235, 496 P.3d 902 (2021). This means the 
conviction must be affirmed unless the reviewing court is firmly convinced the jury 
would have reached a different verdict had the instructional error not occurred. Valdez, 
316 Kan. at 6. Berkstresser bears the burden to show this. State v. Solis, 305 Kan. 55, 65, 
378 P.3d 532 (2016).   
 
The panel began its prejudice analysis by correctly stating the test. Berkstresser, 
2021 WL 6068708, at *6 ("To reverse, we must be firmly convinced the jury would have 
reached a different verdict had it been given the option."). But its application went askew. 
The panel held the district court committed clear error because "[a] jury could have 
reasonably determined Berkstresser failed to yield to the officer but did not drive with a 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of other persons or property as reflected in the 
dashcam video." (Emphasis added.) 2021 WL 6068708, at *6. It explained its conclusion 
12 
 
 
 
by noting:  "Nowak's dashcam video showed Berkstresser pass a few vehicles throughout 
the pursuit, but the roads were mostly free of traffic. The vehicles Berkstresser did pass 
yielded to the police lights and sirens. Berkstresser used turn signals and stopped at stop 
signs during the chase." 2021 WL 6068708, at *6.  
 
The panel's holding does not align with the correct test for prejudice. Having 
determined the district court should have instructed on the lesser included offense, the 
prejudice question is not whether a jury could have reasonably convicted a defendant on a 
lesser included offense, but whether the jury would have reached a different verdict on 
the felony conviction without the instructional error. Valdez, 316 Kan. at 6. These two 
standards are not interchangeable. See How to use "Could," "Would," and "Should," The 
Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/eb/qa/How-to-Use-Could-
Would-and-
Should#:~:text=Just%20remember%20that%20could%20is,I%20hope%20this%20helps 
("[C]ould is used to talk about something that can happen, [and] would is used to talk 
about something that will happen in an imagined situation."); Garner's Modern American 
Usage, p. 869. 
 
Harmless error rules "'serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting 
aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having 
changed the result of the trial.'" State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 560, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). 
And the various, context-dependent standards for prejudice our court applies represent "a 
'sliding scale of probabilities,'" each of which "is formulated differently to set a higher or 
lower threshold or level of certainty as to whether the error affected the outcome." 292 
Kan. at 563-64.  
 
The harmless error scale is finely graduated. Errors implicating a defendant's 
rights under the United States Constitution, for example, must be "'harmless beyond a 
13 
 
 
 
reasonable doubt.'" 292 Kan. at 564. This requires a court holding an error harmless to 
conclude there is no "'reasonable possibility'" the error contributed to the verdict. 292 
Kan. at 564. On the other hand, a less stringent standard for nonconstitutional errors 
requires a court to find only that there is no "reasonable probability" the outcome would 
have been different, but for the error. 292 Kan. at 565.  
 
Here, the clear error standard bars a conviction's reversal unless the reviewing 
court determines the jury "'would have reached a different verdict.'" Valdez, 316 Kan. at 
6. Clear error is "in reality a heightened standard of harmlessness." State v. Carter, 305 
Kan. 139, 159, 380 P.3d 189 (2016). So by failing to observe the critical distinction 
between what the jury "could have" done and what it "would have" done, the panel's 
analysis diluted the applicable test for prejudice and afforded less deference to the jury's 
verdict. This was error. 
 
K.S.A. 8-1566(a) provides:  "Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving." And 
the undisputed evidence shows multiple instances of illegal and unsafe driving on 
Berkstresser's part while trying to evade police. He drove well over the speed limit; failed 
to timely signal his turn even though he stopped at the stop sign; drove across two 
residential front yards near multiple parked vehicles and a bystander; failed to stop or 
yield when leaving the residential driveway; crossed a fog line and center line; and failed 
to signal when turning into a third residential property. While the panel leaned on its 
observation that what few moving vehicles Berkstresser passed yielded to police, the 
presence of other drivers on the roadway only reinforces the evidence that his conduct 
imperiled the safety of those individuals and their vehicles. 
 
14 
 
 
 
Given this record, we are not firmly convinced the jury would have reached a 
different verdict by rejecting the State's allegation that Berkstresser drove recklessly 
during the pursuit. We affirm his felony conviction.  
 
Remand is required under Vargas. 
 
One issue remains:  Whether we must remand the case to the district court to 
address the alternative convictions because when a jury returns guilty verdicts on two 
alternatively charged counts, a district court must enter only one conviction. See State v. 
Vargas, 313 Kan. 866, Syl. ¶¶ 1-3, 492 P.3d 412 (2021). That was not done here.  
 
Recently in Vargas, this court held "[a] district court has no authority to hold one 
of two convictions for alternatively charged counts in abeyance," and therefore "[w]hen a 
jury returns guilty verdicts on two alternatively charged counts, a district court may enter 
only one conviction." 313 Kan. 866, Syl. ¶¶ 1-2. Two convictions for alternatively 
charged counts "should merge by operation of law . . . and result in one conviction." 313 
Kan. at 873.  
 
Neither party raised the Vargas merger issue, but we directed them to be prepared 
to address it at oral argument. This court has the power to sua sponte address a new issue 
under certain circumstances. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2022 
Kan. S. Ct. R. at 56) (Supreme Court will not consider issues not properly preserved 
below but "may address a plain error not presented"); Valdez, 316 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 5 
("Appellate courts do not ordinarily consider an issue not raised by the parties, but may 
do so sua sponte when the issue's consideration is necessary to serve the ends of justice or 
prevent the denial of fundamental rights after notice to the parties and allowing them an 
opportunity to address the issue raised by the court.").  
 
15 
 
 
 
Consistent with Vargas, we remand this case to the district court with directions to 
enter an amended journal entry reflecting Berkstresser's K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-1568 
convictions merged, making a single conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude an 
officer. 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed, and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
* * * 
 
ROSEN, J., concurring:  I agree with the majority's conclusion there was no 
reversible instructional error, and I agree with the direction to enter an amended journal 
entry reflecting merged convictions. I write separately because I would not have 
repudiated the Court of Appeals analytical approach to assessing whether an instruction 
on misdemeanor fleeing and eluding was factually appropriate.  
 
The State charged Berkstresser with felony fleeing and eluding. This crime 
consists of five elements, including reckless driving. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-1568(b)(1)(C). 
The lesser included offense of misdemeanor fleeing and eluding contains identical 
elements except it does not require reckless driving. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 8-1568(a). Per 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3), it would have been factually appropriate for the district 
court to instruct the jury on misdemeanor fleeing and eluding so long as there was "some 
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of [the] lesser included crime." The 
majority interprets this language to require the district court to instruct the jury on a lesser 
included crime whenever there is sufficient evidence to support the elements of the lesser 
included crime. I interpret this language to require the district court judge to also assess 
whether the evidence would "reasonably justify" a jury's rejection of the higher crime in 
favor of the lesser crime. In this case, that would amount to a rejection of the reckless 
16 
 
 
 
driving element. The Court of Appeals undertook this assessment and, in my opinion, 
correctly concluded the evidence would reasonably justify a conviction of the lesser 
offense because there was plenty of evidence to suggest Berkstresser did not drive 
recklessly. Ultimately, however, like the majority of this court, I am not firmly convinced 
the jury would have reached a different verdict even if the instruction had been offered.  
 
The majority called the panel's approach error, admonishing it for going beyond a 
sufficiency test to assess whether the evidence suggested the jury would have rejected the 
reckless driving element of the charged crime. This court explicitly set out the majority's 
chosen approach in State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204, 290 P.3d 640 (2012). In 
Haberlein, the defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder. While there 
was overwhelming evidence of premeditation—the only element setting premeditated 
murder apart from the lesser count of intentional murder—the majority held an 
instruction on intentional murder would have been factually appropriate because "at least 
in theory, the jury could have chosen to convict Haberlein of second-degree intentional 
murder without having its verdict subject to reversal for insufficient evidence." 296 Kan. 
at 204. I wrote separately, because "the test set forth in K.S.A. 22-3414(3) is not a 
theoretical one. Instead, it requires the trial judge, who has heard the evidence in the case, 
to determine whether there is 'some evidence which would reasonably justify a 
conviction.'" 296 Kan. at 214.  
 
I have reiterated my position many times prior to and since Haberlein, and I 
maintain it today. See State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 1463, 430 P.3d 448 (2018); State 
v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 350, 409 P.3d 1 (2018); State v. Fisher, 304 Kan. 242, 265, 373 
P.3d 781 (2016); State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, 73, 298 P.3d 311 (2013); State v. Tahah, 
293 Kan. 267, 280-84, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011); State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 627-31, 186 
P.3d 755 (2008). The factual appropriateness inquiry on jury instruction errors should not 
be synonymous with a theoretical sufficiency of the evidence assessment. Such a test 
17 
 
 
 
requires a district court to instruct a jury on a lesser included offense regardless of how 
unbelievable it would be for a jury to reject the higher crime and convict of the lesser. 
This conflicts with K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3)'s directive to district courts to offer 
instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence would "reasonably justify" a 
jury to convict of a lesser offense. The majority's approach also renders the factual 
appropriateness inquiry of our instructional error analysis a nullity in most cases. There 
will always be sufficient evidence to support the lesser included offense when all its 
elements are included within the charged offense. Otherwise, the case is subject to 
dismissal on a motion for acquittal. See K.S.A. 22-3419 (directing court to grant motion 
for acquittal at close of State's evidence when there is not sufficient evidence to support 
charge).  
 
Because the majority's opinion conflicts with the directive in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 
22-3414(3) and eliminates a mandated role of the trial court judge, I concur in the 
judgment only on the instructional error issue.  
 
 
STEGALL, J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion.