Title: In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2020

In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The Ridgefield Park Board of Education (Board) and the Ridgefield Park Education Association (Association) negotiated a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) covering 2011-2014 that went into effect three days after the New Jersey Legislature enacted Chapter 78. The 2011-2014 CNA expired before the employees achieved full implementation of the premium share set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 4). After the 2011-2014 CNA expired, the Board and the Association negotiated a CNA covering 2014-2018, which, like its predecessor, stated that employees would contribute 1.5% of their salary towards health insurance or the minimum set forth by statute, regulation, or code. During the 2014-2015 school year, the employees contributed to the cost of their health care at the full premium share required by Tier 4. The Board and the Association disputed Chapter 78’s impact on employee contributions for the CNA’s remaining three years. The Board contended that Chapter 78 preempted any negotiated term for those contributions and that the Association’s members were required to contribute to their health benefits at the Tier 4 level for the duration of the CNA. The Association contended that Chapter 78 did not preempt the 1.5% contribution rate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA. PERC held that the health insurance premium contribution rate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA was preempted by Chapter 78 and granted the Board’s request for a restraint of binding arbitration as to that issue. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that adherence to Chapter 78’s plain language would bring about an “absurd result” contravening legislative intent, and required the employees to contribute only 1.5% of their salaries for the three contested years. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the health insurance premium contribution rates paid by the Association’s members were preempted by statute and therefore non-negotiable. PERC’s construction of Chapter 78 comported with the statute’s language and the Legislature’s stated objective to achieve a long-term solution to a fiscal crisis. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education (A-2-19) (083091)Argued March 3, 2020 -- Decided August 17, 2020Patterson, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court reviews the Public Employment Relations Commission’s (PERC) decision that the employees’ health insurance premium contribution rates for the duration of the 2014-2018 collective negotiations agreement (CNA) between the Ridgefield Park Board of Education (Board) and the Ridgefield Park Education Association (Association) were non-negotiable because those rates were preempted by L. 2011, c. 78 (Chapter 78). Chapter 78 prescribed annual increases in health care contributions over four years for those employed by a local board of education and required those employees to achieve full implementation of the increased contributions (Tier 4) in the fourth year after the statute’s effective date or, for employees already subject to a CNA, in the fourth year after the expiration of that agreement. Chapter 78 also provided that when an employer and its employees negotiated the next CNA after the employees in a bargaining unit reached full implementation of the share of the cost of health care premiums mandated by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c, they would negotiate employee health care contributions as if that premium share were part of their previous CNA. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2. The Board and the Association negotiated a CNA covering 2011-2014 that went into effect three days after the Legislature enacted Chapter 78. The 2011-2014 CNA expired before the employees achieved full implementation of the premium share set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 4). After the 2011-2014 CNA expired, the Board and the Association negotiated a CNA covering 2014-2018, which, like its predecessor, stated that employees shall contribute 1.5% of their salary towards health insurance or the minimum set forth by statute, regulation, or code. During the 2014-2015 school year, the employees contributed to the cost of their health care at the full premium share required by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 4). The Board and the Association disputed Chapter 78’s impact on employee contributions for the CNA’s remaining three years. The Board contended that Chapter 78 preempted any negotiated term for those contributions and that the 1 Association’s members were required to contribute to their health benefits at the Tier 4 level for the duration of the CNA. The Association contended that Chapter 78 did not preempt the 1.5% contribution rate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA. The Board and the Association petitioned PERC for a scope-of-negotiations determination. PERC held that the health insurance premium contribution rate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA was preempted by Chapter 78 and granted the Board’s request for a restraint of binding arbitration as to that issue. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that adherence to Chapter 78’s plain language would bring about an “absurd result” contravening legislative intent, and required the employees to contribute only 1.5% of their salaries for the three contested years. 459 N.J. Super. 57, 61, 70-72 (App. Div. 2019). The Court granted the Board’s petition for certification. 239 N.J. 393 (2019).HELD: The health insurance premium contribution rates paid by the Association’s members were preempted by statute and therefore non-negotiable. PERC’s construction of Chapter 78 comports with the statute’s language and the Legislature’s stated objective to achieve a long-term solution to a fiscal crisis.1. The determination of whether a subject is properly negotiable in negotiations between public employers and their employees is governed by the three-part test set forth in In re Local 195, 88 N.J. 393, 403-04 (1982). This case implicates the preemption prong of that test. Thus, to review PERC’s decision that the rates in question were non-negotiable, the Court considers whether the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 evinces the Legislature’s intent to preempt any negotiated provision in the parties’ 2014-2018 CNA regarding employee contributions to their health care benefits. (pp. 20-23)2. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2’s first sentence addresses “public employer[s] and employees who are in negotiations for the next collective negotiations agreement to be executed after the employees in that unit have reached full implementation of the premium share . . . .” (emphases added). And in its final sentence, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 provides that after “full implementation,” the employees’ contribution levels “shall become part of the parties’ collective negotiations and shall then be subject to collective negotiations in a manner similar to other negotiable items between the parties.” Accordingly, during the negotiations for the next CNA after full implementation is reached -- here, the negotiations for the agreement that would succeed the 2014-2018 CNA -- the Tier 4 contribution levels would constitute the status quo. The Legislature did not expressly discuss the scenario in this case, in which the employees reached “full implementation” of the premium share with three years remaining in the term of their current CNA. It implicitly addressed the setting 2 of this case, however, by making the Tier 4 contribution rate the status quo from which a successor CNA would be negotiated. Moreover, nothing in the statute authorizes an immediate reduction of employee health care contribution rates to their pre-Chapter 78 levels. (pp. 23-26)3. To the extent that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 leaves any ambiguity as to legislative intent, the legislative history of Chapter 78 resolves that ambiguity. The Legislature viewed public employee health care costs to present a fiscal crisis and acted to provide a long-term solution to that crisis. The Legislature did not enact Chapter 78 to achieve only a transient increase in employees’ health insurance premium contributions, followed by an immediate reversion to pre-statute contribution rates as soon as employees had contributed at the Tier 4 level for a year. Instead, it envisioned that Chapter 78 would increase employee health insurance premium contributions over the long term. In short, the construction of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 urged by the Board and adopted by PERC is consonant with the Legislature’s intent, as reflected by Chapter 78’s stated goals and legislative history. (pp. 26-30)4. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2’s impact on employee health benefit contributions based on the timing of a given CNA is not an “absurd result” warranting a departure from the statute’s terms. The Legislature clearly understood that school districts negotiate contracts on different schedules, and that the statute’s impact would vary from district to district. Nonetheless, the Legislature envisioned that the transition between Tier 4 health insurance premium contribution rates set by Chapter 78 and contribution rates negotiated by school boards and employees would take place in the negotiations for the next CNA, not at some earlier stage. (pp. 30-32) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to PERC. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that the result reached by the majority is mandated by neither the language nor the legislative history of Chapter 78 and deprives the Association the benefit of its CNA with the Board. Had the Association the prescience to foresee how the majority would interpret Chapter 78, Justice Albin writes, it undoubtedly would have entered a one-year contract with the Board, during which Tier 4 would have been implemented, and begun negotiations anew. Justice Albin concludes that the decision here, which strikes down terms in a negotiated agreement, is unfair and unreasonable, and not consistent with the Legislature’s probable intent in Chapter 78.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 2 September Term 2019 083091 In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education, Respondent-Appellant, and Ridgefield Park Education Association, Petitioner-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 459 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2019). Argued Decided March 3, 2020 August 17, 2020Kerri A. Wright argued the cause for appellant (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, attorneys; Kerri A. Wright, of counsel and on the briefs, David L. Disler and Thomas J. Reilly, on the briefs).Steven R. Cohen argued the cause for respondent (Selikoff & Cohen, attorneys; Steven R. Cohen, of counsel and on the briefs, Keith Waldman and Hop T. Wechsler, on the brief).Kathleen Asher argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey School Boards Association (New Jersey School Boards Association, attorneys; Kathleen Asher and on the brief). 1 Ira W. Mintz argued the cause on behalf of amicus curiae Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Weissman & Mintz, attorneys; Ira W. Mintz, on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal arises from a dispute between the Ridgefield Park Board ofEducation (Board) and the Ridgefield Park Education Association(Association) concerning Board employees’ obligations to contribute to thecost of their health care benefits under L. 2011, c. 78 (Chapter 78). Chapter 78 prescribed annual increases in health care contributions overfour years for those employed by a local board of education at the time of thestatute’s enactment. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1(a); N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c. Itrequired those employees to achieve full implementation of the increasedcontributions (Tier 4) in the fourth year after the statute’s effective date or, foremployees already subject to a collective negotiations agreement (CNA), in thefourth year after the expiration of that agreement. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1(c); N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28d(c). Chapter 78 also provided that when an employerand its employees negotiated the next CNA after the employees in a bargainingunit reached full implementation of the share of the cost of health carepremiums mandated by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c, they would negotiate employee 2 health care contributions as if that premium share were part of their previousCNA. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2. Here, the Board employees achieved the Tier 4 contribution levels, andthus full implementation of the mandated premium share, at the end of the firstyear of their 2014-2018 CNA. The Board and the Association agreed thatChapter 78 preempted the parties’ CNA as it applies to employees’ premiumshare for the 2014-2018 CNA’s first year but disputed the statute’s impact onemployee contributions for the CNA’s remaining three years. The Boardcontended that Chapter 78 preempted any negotiated term for thosecontributions; the Association countered that the parties agreed to a lower levelof contributions and that their CNA, not Chapter 78, determined theemployees’ obligations. The Board and the Association petitioned the New Jersey PublicEmployment Relations Commission (PERC) for a scope-of-negotiationsdetermination. PERC ruled in the Board’s favor. In re Ridgefield Park Bd. ofEduc., P.E.R.C. No. 2018-14, 44 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. 12), 2 017 N.J.PERC LEXIS 82 at *13-14 (2017). The Appellate Division reversed PERC’s determination. In reRidgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J. Super. 57, 72 (App. Div. 2019). Itrecognized that Chapter 78’s plain language required the Association’s 3 members to contribute to their health care costs at the Tier 4 level for anadditional three years because they had achieved that level in the first year of afour-year CNA. Id. at 70-71. It determined, however, that application of thestatute consistent with its plain language would bring about an “absurd result,”contravening legislative intent. Id. at 61, 70-71. The Appellate Divisionrequired the employees to contribute only 1.5% of their salaries for their healthcare benefits for the three contested years. Id. at 72. We recognize a legitimate argument that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 makesclear that when employees reach the Tier 4 contribution level in the first yearof a CNA, they must continue to contribute at that level until they negotiate asuccessor CNA providing for a lower rate of contribution, and that successorCNA goes into effect. When the statutory language is considered inconjunction with Chapter 78’s purpose and legislative history, that legislativeintent is plain. We view PERC’s construction of Chapter 78 to comport withthe statute’s language and the Legislature’s stated objective to achieve a long-term solution to a fiscal crisis. We do not share the Appellate Division’s viewthat PERC’s interpretation of the statute gives rise to an absurd result. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and remandthe matter to PERC for further proceedings. 4 I. A. When the Legislature enacted Chapter 78 on June 28, 2011, it amendedseveral statutes relating to public employee health benefits. See L. 2011, c. 78.Among other provisions, Chapter 78 required that a public employeecontribute a specified percentage of the premiums charged for his or her healthcare benefits based on his or her annual income. N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c. As part of Chapter 78, the Legislature enacted two Title 18A provisionsthat are relevant to this appeal. First, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1(a) prescribescontribution levels for current school board employees that increase annuallyover four years: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, public employees, as specified herein, of a local board of education shall contribute, through the withholding of the contribution from the pay, salary, or other compensation, toward the cost of health care benefits coverage for the employee and any dependent provided pursuant to L. 1979, c. 391 ([N.J.S.A.] 18A:16-12 et seq.), unless the provisions of subsection b. of this section apply, in an amount that shall be determined in accordance with section 39 of L. 2011, c. 78 ([ N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c), except that, employees employed on the date on which the contribution commences, as specified in subsection c. of this section, shall pay: 5 during the first year in which the contribution is effective, one-fourth of the amount of contribution; during the second year in which the contribution is effective, one-half of the amount of contribution; and during the third year in which the contribution is effective, three-fourths of the amount of contribution, as that amount is calculated in accordance with section 39 of L. 2011, c. 78 ([ N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c). Pursuant to Chapter 78’s “sunset” provision, several sections of thatstatute, including N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1, “shall expire four years after theeffective date.” L. 2011, c. 78, § 83. Second, in N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2, the Legislature addressed the impactof Chapter 78’s tiered health care contributions on CNAs that govern board ofeducation employees: A public employer and employees who are in negotiations for the next collective negotiations agreement to be executed after the employees in that unit have reached full implementation of the premium share set forth in section 39 of L. 2011, c. 78 ([N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c) shall conduct negotiations concerning contributions for health care benefits as if the full premium share was included in the prior contract. The public employers and public employees shall remain bound by the provisions of sections 39 and 41 of L. 2011, c. 78 ([ N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c and [N.J.S.A.] 18A:16-17.1), notwithstanding the expiration of those sections, until the full amount of the contribution 6 required by section 39 has been implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth in section 41. Employees subject to any collective negotiations agreement in effect on the effective date of L. 2011, c. 78, that has an expiration date on or after the expiration of sections 39 through 44, inclusive, of L. 2011, c. 78 ([ N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c et al.), shall be subject, upon expiration of that collective negotiations agreement, to sections 39 and 41 until the health care contribution schedule set forth in section 41 is fully implemented. After full implementation, those contribution levels shall become part of the parties’ collective negotiations and shall then be subject to collective negotiations in a manner similar to other negotiable items between the parties. The import of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 is the central issue in this appeal. B. On June 28, 2011, when Chapter 78 became law, the Board and theAssociation were governed by a CNA effective from July 1, 2008 to June 30,2011 (2008-2011 CNA), which required the Board to “provide the health careprotection hereinafter set forth” in the CNA and to “pay the full premium foreach employee and, in cases where appropriate, for family insurancecoverage.” While the 2008-2011 CNA was in effect, the Legislature enacted astatute requiring employees of local boards of education to pay 1.5% of basesalary for their health care benefits coverage. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17(b). 7 After the 2008-2011 agreement expired, the Board and the Associationnegotiated a successor CNA for the period between July 1, 2011 and June 30,2014 (2011-2014 CNA). That CNA went into effect three days after theLegislature enacted Chapter 78. The 2011-2014 CNA, like its predecessor, stated that the Board “shallpay the full premium for each employee and, in cases where appropriate, forfamily insurance coverage,” but it also provided that “[e]mployees coveredunder this Article shall contribute the following percentage of their salarytowards health insurance: 1.5% or the minimum set forth by statute,regulation, or code. Contributions shall be made through payroll deduction.” In accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1, the Board’s employees paidone-fourth of the contribution required by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 1)during the first year in which the mandated contribution was effective, the2011-2012 school year. They paid half of the contribution required by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 2) during the second year in which the mandatedcontribution was effective, the 2012-2013 school year. The employees paidthree-fourths of the contribution required by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 3)during the third year in which the mandated contribution was effective, the2013-2014 school year. The 2011-2014 CNA expired before the employees 8 achieved full implementation of the premium share set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 4). After the 2011-2014 CNA expired, the Board and the Associationnegotiated a successor agreement to be effective from July 1, 2014 to June 30,2018 (2014-2018 CNA). On June 11, 2014, they entered into a Memorandumof Agreement (MOA) that stated that “[a]ll portions of the expired agreementnot modified by the terms of this Memorandum shall continue to be of fullforce and effect and be incorporated into the successor agreement.” The MOAidentified agreed-upon changes to be incorporated into a successor agreement.None related to employees’ contributions to the cost of their health carebenefits. The 2014-2018 CNA, like its predecessor, stated that “[e]mployeescovered under this Article shall contribute the following percentage of theirsalary towards health insurance: 1.5% or the minimum set forth by statute,regulation or code. Contributions shall be made through payroll deduction.” During the 2014-2015 school year, the first year in which the 2014-2018CNA was in effect, the employees contributed to the cost of their health care atthe full premium share required by N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c (Tier 4). The Boardand the Association agreed that Chapter 78 required the Association’smembers to contribute at the Tier 4 level during that initial year of the 2014 - 9 2018 CNA. During the second year of the 2014-2018 CNA, however, theAssociation’s members contributed only 1.5% of their salaries to the cost oftheir health care. On August 13, 2015, PERC decided Clementon Board of Education v.Clementon Education Ass’n, P.E.R.C. No. 2016-10, 42 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 34, 2 015 N.J. PERC LEXIS 76 (2015). In Clementon, the Board of Educationpetitioned for a scope-of-negotiations determination that the health benefitsprovision of its CNA was preempted by N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2. Id. at 118.PERC agreed with the Clementon Board of Education, and ruled that thestatute “expressly, specifically and comprehensively sets forth that healthbenefit contribution levels become negotiable in the 'next collectivenegotiations agreement after . . . full implementation’ of the four-tiered levelof employee contributions is achieved.” Id. at 118-19 (ellipsis in original)(emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2). On December 21, 2015, the Board informed the Association that itviewed the health insurance provision in the 2014-2018 CNA to violateChapter 78, as interpreted by PERC in Clementon. The Board asked theAssociation to voluntarily “revise and reform” the CNA so that theAssociation’s members would contribute to their health benefits at the Tier 4 10 level for the duration of the CNA, “to comply with the law.” The Associationdisagreed and declined to amend the CNA. The Board then reinstated payroll deductions reflecting employeecontributions to health care costs at the Tier 4 level. The Board took theposition that employee contributions would remain at the Tier 4 level for theduration of the 2014-2018 CNA and announced that it would freeze employeesalaries until the employees had contributed amounts sufficient to satisfy theirobligations under Chapter 78. C. 1. The Association filed a grievance with respect to its members’ healthcare contributions. The Board and Association agreed to hold the grievance inabeyance pending the Appellate Division’s review of PERC’s decision inClementon. The Appellate Division, however, did not decide the question raised inthe Clementon appeal. In the wake of PERC’s decision in that matter, theparties in Clementon negotiated two new agreements to replace their four-yearCNA: a CNA to be in effect for only one year, during which the employeeswould contribute to their health care costs at Tier 4 levels, and a three-yearCNA, under which the employees would contribute at a negotiated rate. Given 11 the parties’ resolution of the dispute in Clementon, the Appellate Divisiondismissed the appeal in that case as moot. After the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal in Clementon, theAssociation reinstated its grievance in this matter. The Superintendent ofSchools denied the grievance, citing PERC’s decision in Clementon. TheAssociation advanced its grievance to the Board, which also denied it. At theAssociation’s request, PERC referred the matter to arbitration and appointedan arbitrator. The Association filed with PERC a petition for a scope-of-negotiationsdetermination, requesting binding arbitration. The Association contended thatChapter 78 did not preempt the 1.5% contribution rate set forth in the 2014 -2018 CNA. The Board petitioned for a scope-of-negotiations determination inwhich it sought to enjoin the binding arbitration requested by the Board. PERC consolidated the two scope-of-negotiations petitions. Relying onits decision in Clementon, PERC ruled in favor of the Board. In re RidgefieldPark Bd. of Educ., 44 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op.at 12). PERC noted that “ N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 expressly, specifically andcomprehensively sets forth that health benefit contribution levels becomenegotiable in the 'next collective negotiations agreement after . . . fullimplementation’ of the four-tiered level of employee contributions is 12 achieved.” Id. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. at 4-5) (quoting Clementon Bd. of Educ.,42 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 34 at 118-19). PERC reiterated its holding in Clementon that“depending on the length of the successor agreement that the Board andAssociation agree to,” the disputed health care costs provision of the parties’CNA “may be preempted by N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2.” Id. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op.at 5) (quoting Clementon Bd. of Educ., 42 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 34 at 118-19). Itrestated the example it gave in the Clementon decision: if the parties agree to a contract with a one-year term, [the parties’ negotiated health care contribution provision] would be preempted by N.J.S.A. 18A:16- 17.2 from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015, the final year of employee contributions at Tier 4 levels. However, it would not be preempted in the “next” agreement when employee contribution levels would become negotiable. Alternatively, if the parties agree to a multi-year successor agreement, the express language of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 would preempt [the parties’ negotiated health care contribution provision] for the first year of the successor agreement as well as any additional years in the agreement until the “next” agreement when employee contribution levels would become negotiable. [Id. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. at 5) (quoting Clementon Bd. of Educ., 42 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 34 at 118-19).] Addressing this matter, PERC reasoned that because “the tier fourcontribution level was reached in the first year of the parties’ 2014-2018 CNA,the 'next collective negotiations’ agreement within the meaning of [N.J.S.A. 13 18A:16-17.2] will be the agreement that succeeds the 2014-2018 CNA.” Id. ¶49 at ___ (slip op. at 10). PERC found “[n]othing in Chapter 78 pertaining toemployee health care contributions” to suggest a different construction of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 and concluded that “any other interpretation fails to givemeaning to the specific terms” of the statute. Id. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. at 11). Accordingly, PERC held that the health insurance premium contributionrate set forth in the 2014-2018 CNA was preempted by Chapter 78 and grantedthe Board’s request for a restraint of binding arbitration as to that issue. 1 Id. ¶49 at ___ (slip op. at 11). 2. The Association appealed. The Appellate Division granted amicuscuriae status to the New Jersey School Boards Association and theCommunications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. The Appellate Division acknowledged that PERC’s determinations areordinarily afforded deference and will be disturbed only if they are “clearlydemonstrated to be arbitrary or capricious.” Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 4591 PERC noted that the record was unclear as to whether the Association had requested negotiation of the amount and timing of any recoupment from employees of underpaid amounts. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 44 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. at 11). It ordered that if the Association had not previously sought negotiations on the amount and timing of recoupment, “the Board shall meet and negotiate with the Association over those issues upon request.” Id. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. at 12). 14 N.J. Super. at 69 (quoting City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police OfficersBenevolent Ass’n, 154 N.J. 555, 568 (1998)). The court reasoned, however,that it “'owe[d] no particular deference to PERC’s interpretation of Chapter[78],’ because despite 'affect[ing] employer/employee relations, PERC is notcharged with administering’” that statute. Ibid. (third alteration in original)(quoting In re New Brunswick Mun. Emps. Ass’n, 453 N.J. Super. 408, 413(App. Div. 2018)). The court accordingly reviewed PERC’s interpretation ofChapter 78 de novo. Ibid. The Appellate Division recognized that “[t]he unambiguous language ofthe first sentence of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 provides that Chapter 78 Tier 4contribution rates shall be deemed the status quo in any negotiations after fullimplementation of Chapter 78 rates,” and that, in this matter, it was not untilthe end of the 2014-2015 school year that “full implementation” of those ratesoccurred. Id. at 70. The court acknowledged that “when the parties werenegotiating the 2014-2018 CNA, they were not negotiating 'the next collectivenegotiations agreement to be executed after the employees in that unit havereached full implementation of the premium share[,]’ and the terms on healthcare contributions were not subject to collective negotiations.” Id. at 70-71(quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2). 15 The Appellate Division, however, found the parties’ actions to be“telling,” in that the Board required the Association’s members to pay only1.5% of their salaries as the 2014-2018 CNA provided until PERC decidedClementon. Id. at 72. The court dismissed as “shortsighted” PERC’ssuggestion that the Association could have avoided a four-year period of Tier 4contributions by entering into a one-year agreement followed by a three-yearagreement. Ibid. In the Appellate Division’s view, PERC’s interpretation ofChapter 78 “create[d] an absurd result” by compelling employees to“contribute at the Tier 4 level over the entirety of the 2014-2018 CNA” -- or toadhere to the statutorily imposed rates for a total of seven years -- whichwould be contrary to the Legislature’s “clear intent that public employeesmake these statutorily imposed increases over the course of four years.” Id. at71. The Appellate Division therefore reversed PERC’s determination andremanded for PERC to implement a remedy that would “refund Associationmembers for all of their health insurance contributions exceeding 1.5% of theirsalaries for the pay periods covering July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2018.” Id.at 72. It denied the Board’s motions for reconsideration of its decision and fora stay of its judgment. 16 3. We granted the Board’s petition for certification. 239 N.J. 393 (2019). II. A. The Board contends that the only question before the Appellate Divisionwas whether Chapter 78 preempted the provision in the parties’ 2014-2018CNA that set employee contributions for health care at “1.5% or the minimumset forth by statute, regulation, or code.” In the Board’s view, the AppellateDivision agreed with the Board’s assertion that Chapter 78 preempted thatlanguage in the parties’ CNA. The Board asserts that the Appellate Division’sinterpretation of the statute’s plain language should have ended the inquiry. The Board argues that because N.J.A.C. 19:13-1.1 precludes theresolution of factual issues during a scope-of-negotiations proceeding beforePERC, it did not submit evidence to PERC that would have demonstrated thatthe parties never agreed to the 1.5% limitation found by the AppellateDivision. It contends that the Appellate Division improperly considered theAssociation’s certification and engaged in factfinding to rule in favor of theAssociation, thus usurping the role of PERC and the designated arbitrator. 17 B. The Association disputes the Board’s contention that the AppellateDivision viewed Chapter 78 to preempt the 2014-2018 CNA. It states that theAppellate Division declined to find preemption in order to avoid an absurdresult that would have contravened public policy, and that the court properlyconstrued the statute as the Legislature intended to achieve a rational outcome . The Association argues that the Appellate Division did not engage inimproper factfinding in its scope-of-negotiations determination, and that thecourt properly decided the appeal based on the facts stated in an uncontestedcertification that it submitted to the court. It asserts that the remedy sought bythe Board would nullify a negotiated, executed, and implemented CNAprovision, merely because the parties agreed to a single CNA, not two separatecontracts, for the 2014-2018 period. C. PERC advised the Court that it took no position on the Board’s petitionfor certification. PERC similarly takes no position on the merits of thisappeal. D. Amicus curiae New Jersey School Boards Association asserts thatChapter 78 preempts collective negotiations with respect to employee health 18 benefit contributions for any CNA that is effective prior to the fullimplementation of Tier 4 contributions that the statute requires. Amicuscontends that PERC’s decision, which may encourage parties to enter intoshorter-term contracts, does not contravene public policy or destabilize laborrelations. E. Amicus curiae Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO concurswith the Association that the Appellate Division properly held that PERC’sdecision gave rise to an absurd result. It contends that if the Legislatureintended that employees contribute to their health care costs at Tier 4 levels forthe four years of a CNA, Chapter 78 would have clearly mandated thatoutcome. III. A. “PERC has primary jurisdiction to determine in the first instancewhether a matter in dispute is within the scope of collective negotiations.”New Brunswick Mun. Emps. Ass’n, 453 N.J. Super. at 413 (citing N.J.S.A.34:13A-5.4(d)). As we have noted, [t]he judicial role when reviewing an action of an administrative agency is generally restricted to three inquiries: 19 (1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policy to the facts, the agency erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass’n, 154 N.J. at 567 (quoting In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996)).] Thus, “[i]n the absence of constitutional concerns or countervailingexpressions of legislative intent, we apply a deferential standard of review todeterminations made by PERC.” Ibid. Nonetheless, “when an agency’s decision is based on the 'agency’sinterpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,’ we arenot bound by the agency’s interpretation.” Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27(2011)). Instead, we review that determination de novo. Ibid. B. In this appeal, we review PERC’s decision that the employees’ healthinsurance premium contribution rates for the duration of the parties’ 2014 -2018 CNA were non-negotiable. See Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 44N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 49 at ___ (slip op. at 10-11). 20 PERC’s scope-of-negotiations determination is governed by a “time-honored” standard. Robbinsville Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Washington Twp.Educ. Ass’n, 227 N.J. 192, 199 (2016). In negotiations between publicemployers and their employees, a subject is properly negotiable when it satisfies a three-part test: “(1) the item intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees; (2) the subject has not been fully or partially preempted by statute or regulation; and (3) a negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy.” [Ibid. (quoting In re Local 195, 88 N.J. 393, 403-04 (1982)).]See also In re Cty. of Atl., 230 N.J. 237, 253 (2017) (same). This case implicates the preemption prong of the Local 195 test. In thepreemption inquiry, “the mere existence of legislation relating to a given termor condition of employment does not automatically preclude negotiations.”Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 91 N.J. 38, 44(1982). Instead, “[n]egotiation is preempted only if the regulation fixes a termand condition of employment 'expressly, specifically and comprehensively.’ ”Ibid. (quoting Council of N.J. State Coll. Locals, NJSFT-AFT/AFL-CIO v.State Bd. of Higher Educ., 91 N.J. 18, 30 (1982)). Under the preemptionstandard, 21 [t]he legislative provision must “speak in the imperative and leave nothing to the discretion of the public employer.” If the legislation, which encompasses agency regulations, contemplates discretionary limits or sets a minimum or maximum term or condition, then negotiation will be confined within these limits. Thus, the rule established is that legislation “which expressly set[s] terms and conditions of employment . . . for public employees may not be contravened by negotiated agreement.” [Ibid. (citations omitted).] Thus, to review PERC’s decision that health insurance premiumcontribution rates governing the Board’s employees were non-negotiable, wedetermine whether the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 to preemptthe parties’ negotiations as to that issue during the relevant years. C. When a court construes a statute, its “paramount goal” is to discern theLegislature’s intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). We “lookfirst to the statute’s actual language and ascribe to its words their ordinarymeaning.” Kean Fed’n of Teachers v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018).“'[T]he best indicator of [the Legislature’s] intent is the statutory language,’thus it is the first place we look.” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007) (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 22 492). “If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then ourinterpretive process is over.” Ibid. Nonetheless, “not every statute is a model of clarity.” Wilson ex relManzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012). “Where thestatutory language is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic materials such aslegislative history, committee reports, and other relevant sources.” KeanFed’n of Teachers, 233 N.J. at 583. “Where available, '[t]he officiallegislative history and legislative statements serve as valuable interpretiveaid[s] in determining the Legislature’s intent.’” State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197,209 (2007) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464,480 (1997)). D. 1. Guided by those principles of statutory construction, we considerwhether the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 evinces the Legislature’sintent to preempt any negotiated provision in the parties’ 2014-2018 CNAregarding employee contributions to their health care benefits. 22 We do not concur with the Board that the Appellate Division conceded that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 preempts the health care contribution terms of a negotiated CNA. Invoking “[t]he unambiguous language of the first sentence of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2,” the Appellate Division acknowledged that the 2014- 2018 CNA was not the “'next collective negotiations agreement to be executed 23 As the parties agree and the Appellate Division recognized, theemployees in this matter did not reach “full implementation” of the “premiumshare set forth in [N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c]” until the 2014-2015 school yearconcluded. See N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2; Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J.Super. at 70 (noting that “full implementation of Chapter 78 did not occur untilthe end of the 2014-2015 school year, which was the first year of the 2014-2018 CNA”). Accordingly, the CNA in effect when the employees reached“full implementation” of the premium share was the 2014-2018 CNA. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2’s first sentence addresses “public employer[s] andemployees who are in negotiations for the next collective negotiationsagreement to be executed after the employees in that unit have reached fullimplementation of the premium share set forth in [N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c].”(emphases added). Applied here, that statutory language refers not to theafter the employees in that unit have reached full implementation of the premium share,’” and that under the statute, “the terms on health care contributions were not subject to collective negotiations.” Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J. Super. at 70-71 (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2). The appellate court nonetheless declined to construe the statute to preempt the parties’ CNA on the grounds that a literal interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:16- 17.2 would produce an “absurd result,” and would contravene “the clear intent that public employees make these statutorily imposed increases over the course of four years.” Id. at 61, 70-71. Having construed N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 as the Association urged, the Appellate Division held that the statute did not preempt the 2014-2018 CNA’s health care contribution provisions. Id. at 71- 72. 24 parties’ negotiations for the 2014-2018 CNA, but to their negotiations for itssuccessor agreement. Thus, notwithstanding L. 2011, c. 78, § 83 -- Chapter78’s “sunset” provision -- the Board argues that the statute indicates that theemployees’ health insurance premium contribution rate was not negotiableuntil the Board and the Association negotiated a successor CNA. In its final sentence, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 provides that after “fullimplementation,” the employees’ contribution levels “shall become part of theparties’ collective negotiations and shall then be subject to collectivenegotiations in a manner similar to other negotiable items between the parties.”The Legislature thus made the achieved Tier 4 contribution level the status quofor purposes of negotiating contributions for the successor contract.Accordingly, during the negotiations for the next CNA after fullimplementation is reached -- here, the negotiations for the agreement thatwould succeed the 2014-2018 CNA -- the Tier 4 contribution levels wouldconstitute the status quo. In N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2, the Legislature did not expressly discuss thescenario in this case, in which the employees reached “full implementation” ofthe premium share with three years remaining in the term of their currentCNA. It implicitly addressed the setting of this case, however, by making theTier 4 contribution rate the status quo from which a successor CNA would be 25 negotiated. Moreover, nothing in the statute authorizes an immediatereduction of employee health care contribution rates to their pre-Chapter 78levels. To the contrary, the Board submits, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 provides thatonce achieved, Tier 4 contribution levels are to remain in effect unless anduntil the parties negotiate lower health insurance premium contribution rates inthe next CNA. The Board has thus presented a legitimate argument that the plainlanguage of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 requires that the employees sustain theirhealth insurance premium contributions at Tier 4 levels for the entire span ofthe 2014-2018 agreement, and that the statutory language resolves the parties’dispute. 2. To the extent that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 leaves any ambiguity as tolegislative intent, the legislative history of Chapter 78 resolves that ambiguity.It demonstrates that the Legislature viewed public employee health care coststo present a fiscal crisis and that it acted to provide a long-term solution to thatcrisis. The legislative history bolsters the Board’s argument that theLegislature intended that Tier 4 contribution rates would remain in effect forthe duration of the term of the CNA in effect when the employees reached“full implementation.” N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2. 26 When the Legislature enacted Chapter 78, it addressed state and localgovernment contributions to employee health benefits that a succession ofgovernors and legislators viewed to be unsustainable. In his 2005 ExecutiveOrder appointing the Benefits Review Task Force, Governor Richard J. Codeystated that “continuing increases in employee benefits costs contribute to thestructural deficit that New Jersey faces every year,” and noted that employeehealth care costs were expected to increase to twenty percent of the statebudget by 2010. Exec. Order No. 39 (May 25, 2005), 37 N.J.R. 2109(c) (June20, 2005). In its Report issued later that year, Governor Codey’s Task Forcefound that “[h]ealth care changes are the most difficult to address but in lightof the rapid increase in costs, changes are necessary,” and that “while wagesare known and increases prescribed, healthcare costs are unknown, notprescribed, and annual increases often far exceed the rate of wage increases.”Report of the Benefits Review Task Force to Acting Gov. Richard J. Codey 4,27 (Dec. 1, 2005). The Task Force recommended “that all active and retiredemployees share in the cost of health care,” with the State’s contribution fixedat a specific amount. Id. at 27. The following year, by concurrent resolution, the Legislature appointedfour joint legislative committees to identify methods of addressing “[t]hisState’s high property taxes,” viewed by the public “as regressive, inequitable, 27 burdensome, and a threat to the financial security of individuals andcommunities.” Assemb. Con. Res. No. 3, 212th Leg. 2 (July 28, 2006). Oneof the committees that the Legislature created, the Joint Legislative Committeeon Public Employee Benefit Reform, reported to the Legislature later that yearthat its “investigation of health benefits issues revealed a system plagued bythe skyrocketing costs of health care that have dramatically increased the costof health benefits for both current and retired public employees.” Spec. Sess.J. Leg. Comm., Pub. Emps. Benefits Reform Final Report 57 (2006). TheJoint Legislative Committee commented that “[w]hether some [of theCommittee’s recommendations] are achieved through collective bargainingrather than through legislation is less significant than ensuring that they are, infact, achieved. Collective bargaining notwithstanding, it is clear that theLegislature needs to attach permanency to a number of the recommendedreforms.” Id. at 2. In testimony before the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee insupport of Senate Bill 2937 -- the bill later enacted as Chapter 78 -- itssponsor, Senate President Stephen M. Sweeney, stressed the need for greateremployee contributions to combat rising health care costs. See DarrylIsherwood, Observer, Full Text of Sen. Steve Sweeney’s Testimony onPension and Benefit Reform (June 16, 2011), https://observer.com/2011/06/ 28 full-text-of-sen-steve-sweeneys-testimony-on-pension-and-benefit-reform/.Stating that “[p]ublic employees need to pay a greater share of their healthcosts,” Senate President Sweeney commented that the Legislature “must befair to them and their families. But we must also be fair to the taxpayers whoare on the hook. Anyone in this day and age who thinks health care can comepractically free is simply not living in reality.” Ibid. After Chapter 78 was enacted, Governor Christopher J. Christie issued astatement that the health care benefit provisions in the statute “willsubstantially lower health benefits costs for local governments, including thoseat the county, school and municipal levels, representing another major stepforward in providing real, long-term property tax relief.” Press Release,Office of the Governor, Governor Christie Signs into Law Bold, BipartisanPension and Health Benefits Reform (June 28, 2011). The gubernatorial and legislative initiatives that led to Chapter 78 andthe legislative history of the statute itself thus confirm the Legislature’s intent.The Legislature clearly viewed the increasing cost of employee health care tobe among the State’s most serious fiscal challenges, destined to worsen absentsignificant reform. The Legislature did not enact Chapter 78 to achieve only atransient increase in employees’ health insurance premium contributions,followed by an immediate reversion to pre-statute contribution rates as soon as 29 employees had contributed at the Tier 4 level for a year. Instead, it envisionedthat Chapter 78 would increase employee health insurance premiumcontributions over the long term. In short, the construction of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 urged by the Boardand adopted by PERC is consonant with the Legislature’s intent, as reflectedby Chapter 78’s stated goals and legislative history. 3. Finally, we do not share the Appellate Division’s view that N.J.S.A.18A:16-17.2 should be construed contrary to its plain language because thestatute would otherwise produce an “absurd result.” Ridgefield Park Bd. ofEduc., 459 N.J. Super. at 61, 70-71. To the Appellate Division, the absurdresult was that by virtue of the “timing and length of the successor contract,”the Association’s members would be required to “contribute at the Tier 4 levelfor three additional years,” thus suffering a financial hardship. Id. at 61. It is clear that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2’s financial impact on school districtemployees varied from district to district. If a four-year CNA governingemployees in a particular district went into effect in 2011, the year thatChapter 78 was enacted, those employees would achieve “full implementation”in the last year of that contract and could immediately negotiate healthinsurance premium contribution rates for the next CNA. N.J.S.A. 18A:16- 30 17.2. The timing was less favorable for employees of the Ridgefield ParkSchool District, who did not achieve “full implementation” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 until the first year of their 2014-2018 CNA. TheAssociation had the option to seek a one-year contract followed by a three-yearcontract as did the employees in Clementon Board of Education, but if thatproved impossible, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 required the Board’s employees payat Tier 4 levels until the next CNA took effect. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2’s impact on employee health benefit contributionsbased on the timing of a given CNA is not an “absurd result” warranting adeparture from the statute’s terms. The Legislature has the authority to makejudgments about how best to achieve its objectives, subject to constitutionalconstraints. See Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 40 (1976) (rejecting equal protection and due process challenges to azoning ordinance regarding senior housing because the disputed age restrictionwas “a legislative judgment which ought not be disturbed by the judiciaryunless it exceeds the bounds of reasonable choice”); State League ofMunicipalities v. State, 257 N.J. Super. 509, 519 (App. Div. 1992) (holding,with respect to an equal protection challenge to a statute, that “[t]heLegislature in addressing an issue must invariably draw lines and makechoices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or excluded. As 31 long as 'the bounds of reasonable choice,’ are not exceeded, the courts mustdefer to the legislative judgment”) (quoting Taxpayers Ass’n of WeymouthTwp., 80 N.J. at 40); Piscopo v. Lemi Excavating Co., 215 N.J. Super. 149,152 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that the Legislature’s determination that ageeighteen marked the end of a child’s dependency did “not warrant [thestatute’s] invalidation” even though “the classification [was] in some respectimperfect or result[ed] in some inequities in practice” because the decision didnot exceed “the bounds of reasonable choice” (quoting Taxpayers Ass’n ofWeymouth Twp., 80 N.J. at 40)). Here, the Legislature intended to prescribe employee health insurancecontribution rates until the employees achieved full implementation of thepremium share and the parties negotiated a successor CNA. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2. It clearly understood that different school districts negotiate contracts ondifferent schedules, and that the statute’s impact would vary from district todistrict. Nonetheless, the Legislature envisioned that the transition betweenTier 4 health insurance premium contribution rates set by Chapter 78 andcontribution rates negotiated by school boards and employees would take placein the negotiations for the next CNA, not at some earlier stage. N.J.S.A.18A:16-17.2. We do not view the Legislature’s determination to generate anabsurd result, and we decline to nullify its judgment. 32 E. We concur with PERC’s determination that the health insurancepremium contribution rates paid by the Association’s members were“preempted by statute” and therefore non-negotiable under the second factor ofthe Local 195 test. See Local 195, 88 N.J. at 403-05. We conclude that PERCproperly granted the Board’s request for a restraint of binding arbitration as tothe health insurance premium contribution rates applicable to the Association’smembers. IV. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the matter isremanded to PERC for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. 33 In the Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education, Respondent-Appellant, and Ridgefield Park Education Association, Petitioner-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. Neither the language nor the legislative history of L. 2011, c. 78(Chapter 78) mandates the result reached today by the majority, a result thatdenies the Ridgefield Park Education Association (Association) the benefit ofits collective negotiation agreement (CNA) with the Ridgefield Park Board ofEducation (Board). The majority’s strained interpretation of Chapter 78 -- aninterpretation that the Appellate Division concluded “creates an absurd result”-- means that teachers and other employees in the school district will see theirsalaries substantially reduced to pay for health care costs in clearcontravention of the agreement they reached with the Board. See In reRidgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J. Super. 57, 71 (App. Div. 2019). 1 Because, in my view, the majority has not read Chapter 78 in a way thatfulfills the probable legislative intent consistent with the bargained foragreement between the Association and the Board, I respectfully dissent. I. The Legislature enacted Chapter 78 to address the fiscal crisis faced bythe State and local governments saddled with rising health care costs. Theobjective of the legislation was to require greater health care contributions bypublic employees -- a scheme to be implemented over a four-year period -- andthen to allow public employees and local governments to negotiate the level ofpublic-employee health care contributions with the starting point being thefourth-year contribution rate under Chapter 78. See N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1 and-17.2. Chapter 78’s sunset provision did not mandate that the fourth-yearcontribution rate continue into a fifth, sixth, or seventh year, unless those werethe terms agreed to by an education association and a school board. SeeL. 2011, c. 78, § 83. We are hampered by a limited record, but this much we do know. TheBoard and the Association signed a CNA effective July 1, 2011 to June 30,2014 that required employees to contribute 1.5% of their salary or the statutoryminimum to health care costs for the duration of the agreement. Chapter 78went into effect shortly before the start of the CNA. 2 By operation of law, Chapter 78 superseded the 2011-2014 CNA’s termson the subject of employees’ health care contributions. Over the next fouryears, Chapter 78 imposed on public employees the obligation to contribute, ineach succeeding year, a greater percentage of their salaries to pay for healthcare coverage. The Tier 1, 2, and 3 contribution rates covered the length of thethree-year 2011-2014 CNA. As that agreement neared its end, the Board and the Associationnegotiated a four-year CNA effective July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2018, requiringthe Board’s employees to contribute 1.5% of their salary or the statutoryminimum for their health care coverage. The Board and the Association knewthat the Tier 4 contribution rate applied to the first-year of the CNA, and theappropriate deductions were made to the employees’ salaries in accordancewith Chapter 78.1 The Board and Association also knew that Chapter 78 had asunset provision and that, after the Tier 4 year, the parties could mutuallyagree to health care contributions below the Tier 4 rate. Had the Board and the Association intended the Tier 4 contribution rateto govern the length of the four-year contract, the CNA’s language presumably1 The record reflects that under Tier 4, employees earning from $50,000 to over $95,000 would contribute anywhere between 20% and 35% of the cost of their health care benefits for single coverage; between 12% and 30% for family coverage; and between 15% and 30% of the cost of health care benefits for member/spouse/partner or parent/children coverage. 3 would have said so. Surely, had the parties intended the Tier 4 contributionrate, the CNA would not have included the language they put in the contract-- that employees would contribute 1.5% of their salary or the statutoryminimum for their health care coverage. The best evidence of theunderstanding of the parties’ intent is the Board’s actions. In the second yearof the new CNA, the Board deducted not the Tier 4 contribution rate, but the1.5% of salary rate. Not until the August 13, 2015 Public Employment RelationsCommission decision in Clementon Board of Education v. ClementonEducation Ass’n, P.E.R.C. No. 2016-10, 42 N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 34, 2 015 N.J. PERCLEXIS 76 (2015), did the Board have a change of heart and demand that itsemployees pay the Tier 4 rates rather than the negotiated rates for theremainder of the 2014-2018 CNA. II. The outcome of this appeal turns on the interpretation of N.J.S.A.18A:16-17.2. The relevant portion of that statute provides: A public employer and employees who are in negotiations for the next collective negotiations agreement to be executed after the employees in that unit have reached full implementation of the premium share set forth in section 39 of L. 2011, c. 78 ([N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c) shall conduct negotiations concerning contributions for health care benefits as if the full premium share was included in the prior contract. The 4 public employers and public employees shall remain bound by the provisions of sections 39 and 41 of L. 2011, c. 78 ([ N.J.S.A.] 52:14-17.28c and [ N.J.S.A.]18:16-17.1), notwithstanding the expiration of those sections, until the full amount of the contribution required by section 39 has been implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth in section 41. .... After full implementation, those contribution levels shall become part of the parties’ collective negotiations and shall then be subject to collective negotiations in a manner similar to other negotiable items between the parties. [ N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2 (emphasis added).] For sure, the statute is not a model of clarity, and the Legislature likelydid not contemplate the contractual scenario before us. One point is clear, however. The Board and the Association went intotheir contractual negotiations understanding that Tier 4 had to be implementedin the first year of the four-year contract and that after that first year theemployees would have “reached full implementation.” One reasonable interpretation of the statute is that “the next collectivenegotiations agreement” refers to the CNA that would begin on July 1, 2018.But if that is the case, only then would the Tier 4 rate “become part of theparties’ collective negotiations” and only then would the parties “conductnegotiations concerning contributions for health care benefits as if the full 5 premium share was included in the prior contract.” See N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.2.If that interpretation is correct, nothing in Chapter 78 states that the partieswere not free to negotiate the 2014-2018 CNA without the Tier 4 level as thestarting point of the negotiations. Nonetheless, we should not presume that the Tier 4 levels did not“become part of the parties’ collective negotiations” when the Board and theAssociation hammered out the terms of the 2014-2018 CNA. There is noreason not to effectuate the intent of the parties according to the terms of theCNA. Chapter 78 does not mandate nonnegotiable Tier 4 contribution ratesafter employees reach full implementation. Nor does Chapter 78’s legislativehistory suggest such an outcome. Nowhere in Chapter 78 did the Legislature dictate that the negotiatingparties could not agree to a four-year CNA in which, after the employees mettheir Tier 4 obligation in the first year of the contract, the employees would besubject to lesser health care contributions in the three succeeding years. TheLegislature did not require an artificial construct -- compelling the parties toenter a single-year contract covering the Tier 4 obligation and then negotiate anew contract. The majority reads Chapter 78 in a way to extinguish the expectations ofthe negotiating parties and impose on the public employees the more onerous 6 Tier 4 obligations for an additional three years beyond the sunset provision.The majority has construed Chapter 78 not to reach a logical but an inequitableconclusion. III. Had the Association the prescience to foresee how the majority wouldinterpret Chapter 78, it undoubtedly would have entered a one-year contractwith the Board, during which Tier 4 would have been implemented, and begunnegotiations anew. The wholly unfair and unreasonable result reached in thiscase, which strikes down terms in a negotiated agreement, is not consistentwith the Legislature’s probable intent in passing Chapter 78. I therefore respectfully dissent. 7