Title: B.B. v. County of Los Angeles
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S250734
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
B.B., a Minor, etc., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
T.E., a Minor, etc., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
D.B., a Minor, etc., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S250734 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B264946 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
TC027341, TC027438 and BC505918 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 10, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Cuéllar 
concurred. 
 
1 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
S250734 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
In this case, we consider the application of Civil Code 
section 1431.21 to tortfeasors held liable for injuries based on the 
commission of an intentional tort.  Here, the intentional tort was 
a battery that, combined with other factors, tragically led to the 
death of Darren Burley.  While attempting to subdue Burley, 
deputies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 
after getting Burley facedown on pavement, used their knees to 
pin him to the ground with as much body weight as possible.  
One of the deputies — defendant David Aviles — pressed one 
knee into the center of Burley’s back and another onto the back 
of Burley’s head, near the neck.  Aviles disengaged after Burley’s 
hands were cuffed behind his back and his ankles tightly 
cinched together with a nylon cord.  But when paramedics 
arrived, they found Burley, still cuffed and facedown on the 
pavement, with a different deputy  pressing a knee into the 
small of his back and with no pulse.  They restored Burley’s 
                                        
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Civil 
Code. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
pulse through resuscitation efforts, but he never regained 
consciousness and died 10 days later.2 
 
A jury found that Aviles had committed battery by using 
unreasonable force against Burley.  The court later entered a 
judgment against Aviles for the entire amount of the 
noneconomic damages the jury awarded — $8 million — even 
though the jury also found that only 20 percent of the 
responsibility for Burley’s death was “attributable to” Aviles’s 
actions.   
 
On review, the Court of Appeal held that the judgment 
against Aviles had to be reduced in accordance with the jury’s 
allocation of responsibility to him.  (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles 
(2019) 25 Cal.App.5th 115.)  It relied on section 1431.2, which 
provides in relevant part:  “In any action for personal injury, 
property damage, or wrongful death, based upon principles of 
comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-
economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint.  
Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-
                                        
2  
Burley was African American.  We are cognizant that the 
facts of this case bear similarities to well-publicized incidents in 
which African Americans have died during encounters with 
police.  These incidents raise deeply troubling and difficult 
issues involving race and the use of police force.  But the 
question plaintiffs raise in this case — whether and how section 
1431.2 applies to intentional tortfeasors — does not turn upon 
either the decedent’s race or the fact that a law enforcement 
officer, rather than a civilian, committed the intentional tort. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct 
proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a 
separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for 
that amount.”  (§ 1431.2, subd. (a).)  This statute, the Court of 
Appeal held, requires reduction of an intentional tortfeasor’s 
liability for noneconomic damages to the extent that the 
negligence of other actors — including the plaintiffs, any 
codefendants, injured parties, and nonparties — contributed to 
injury.  In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly 
disagreed with the holding in Thomas v. Duggins Construction 
Co., Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1108 (Thomas), that “an 
intentional tortfeasor is [not] entitled to a reduction or 
apportionment of noneconomic damages under” section 1431.2, 
subdivision (a).   
 
We granted review to address this split of authority and to 
consider section 1431.2’s application to intentional tortfeasors.  
For reasons that follow, we agree with Thomas and reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On the evening of August 3, 2012, the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department received a report of an ongoing assault in 
Compton, California.  Upon arriving at the scene, Deputies 
David Aviles and Steve Fernandez observed Darren Burley 
approach them in slow, stiff, exaggerated robotic movements 
with his fists clenched at his sides and a blank stare on his face.  
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
He was foaming at the mouth and making grunting and 
growling noises.  Based on these observations, the deputies 
suspected Burley might be under the influence of PCP.  The 
deputies ordered Burley to get on his knees facing away from 
them.  Burley did not respond.  
 
A distraught woman suddenly appeared in the street, 
pointed at Burley and yelled, “He tried to kill me!”  She began 
to flee, and Burley ran after her.  Fernandez, in an effort to stop 
Burley’s pursuit and knock him down, “hockey checked” Burley, 
ramming a shoulder into Burley’s side.  Burley lost balance and 
fell, hitting his head on a parked truck and then landing 
facedown on the pavement.  Aviles attempted to handcuff 
Burley, but Burley resisted.  A struggle ensued, during which 
Burley punched Aviles — who was wearing a bulletproof vest — 
in the chest and Aviles punched Burley in the face 
approximately five times.  Fernandez came to Aviles’s aid, and 
the two deputies wrestled Burley to the pavement, facedown.  As 
Burley continued to struggle, Fernandez tried “to get [Burley’s 
lower body] pinned to the ground” by kneeling “with all [his] 
weight on [Burley’s] hamstring area.”  Meanwhile, Aviles tried 
“to pin” Burley’s upper body to the ground by mounting Burley 
and pressing one knee into the center of his back, at the top of 
his diaphragm, and another knee down on the back of his head, 
near the back of his neck.  Aviles, who weighed 200 pounds, used 
“as much [body] weight [as he] was able to apply.”  Burley 
struggled, trying to raise his chest from the ground.  According 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
to a witness, one of the deputies — who, from the witness’s 
description, appeared to be Aviles — held Burley in “some type 
of head-lock” during most of the struggle and was “choking” him.  
 
More deputies arrived on scene and found Burley 
facedown with Aviles and Fernandez trying to restrain him.  
Deputy Paul Beserra attempted to restrain Burley’s left arm, 
while Deputy Timothy Lee assisted on the right and Deputy 
Ernest Celaya held Burley’s feet.  Celaya “Tasered” Burley 
multiple times in the calf area, and Lee “Tasered” him once in 
the rib cage area, all without apparent effect.  The deputies 
eventually maneuvered Burley’s hands behind his back and 
cuffed him.  Even though restrained, Burley was still “flinging” 
and “twisting” his upper body, so Aviles remained on Burley’s 
back, using his “upper body weight” to push down on Burley and 
“keep him in place.”  Other deputies applied a “hobble restraint” 
to Burley’s legs by wrapping a nylon cord around his ankles and 
“cinch[ing] it tight.”  A witness testified that one of the deputies 
hit Burley in the head “at least seven to ten times” with a 
flashlight, and that Burley appeared to be gasping for air.  
 
After Burley was handcuffed and hobbled, all of the 
deputies disengaged except Beserra, who “took over” from Aviles 
and “relieve[d]” him of “attempting to control [Burley’s] upper 
body.”  From that point forward, Beserra was the only deputy to 
“touch[]” Burley.  According to Beserra, he continued to keep 
Burley “restrained” facedown on the ground because Burley, 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
though “handcuffed and hobbled,” was “still violently fighting 
against the restraints” and thus posed “a threat to himself and 
to” the officers.  During this time, Beserra did not use “any more 
force” or place any of his weight “on top of” Burley.  “After about 
30 seconds,” Beserra “felt that [Burley] was no longer fighting 
against the restraints,” so he “placed [Burley] on his left side in 
order to put him in a recovery position” and “to facilitate . . . 
medical 
monitoring.” 
 
About 
90 
seconds 
later — 
or 
“approximately two minutes” after Burley was handcuffed and 
hobbled — Beserra heard Burley’s breathing become labored.  
Beserra then “motioned” for the other deputies “to bring . . . 
over” paramedics, who were already on scene and “about 10 to 
20 feet away . . . rendering aid to” the woman Burley had earlier 
chased.  The paramedics responded “immediately,” but as they 
were “walking over to render aid,” Beserra felt Burley’s body “go 
limp” and “motionless.”  This occurred “approximately . . . a 
minute after [Beserra] placed [Burley] on his side and after 
[Beserra] heard [Burley’s] breathing become shallow.”  
 
Baserra’s account was sharply contradicted at trial by 
Jason Henderson, Sr., a fire captain and paramedic with the 
Compton Fire Department.  Henderson testified that when he 
and other paramedics arrived at the scene, they “got out of 
[their] rigs and then [immediately] started moving towards 
where [Burley] was.”  Henderson did not recall any of the 
deputies calling them over or indicating that Burley needed 
help, or any medical personnel treating the woman Burley had 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
chased; she was already in one of the deputy’s vehicle when they 
arrived.  When they reached Burley, he was not “on his side,” 
but was “face down” on the pavement with his hands cuffed 
behind his back and a deputy “leaning on” him and applying 
“weight” with a “knee in the small of [his] back.”  Burley 
“appeared to be unresponsive,” so Henderson “asked the deputy 
to get off [Burley] and to unhook him” so Burley could be 
assessed.  After Burley was “uncuffed,” the paramedics “rolled 
him over” and “checked his pulse,” but could find none.  They 
restored his pulse after five minutes of resuscitation efforts, but 
he never regained consciousness and died 10 days later.  
According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was brain 
death and swelling from lack of oxygen following a cardiac arrest 
“due to status post-restraint maneuvers or behavior associated 
with cocaine, [PCP] and cannabinoids intake.” 
  
Burley’s children and estranged wife, on behalf of 
themselves and Burley, sued the County of Los Angeles 
(County) and the deputies, asserting, as here relevant, claims 
for battery, negligence, and wrongful death (based on the 
alleged acts of battery and negligence).  Regarding Aviles, the 
jury found in a special verdict that he had committed battery by 
using unreasonable force against Burley, and that 20 percent of 
the responsibility for Burley’s death was “attributable to” 
Aviles’s use of unreasonable force.  The jury also found that 
Burley himself had been negligent and that he bore 40 percent 
of the responsibility for his own death.  The jury attributed the 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
remaining 40 percent of the responsibility to the other deputies.  
Despite this allocation, the trial court entered a judgment 
against Aviles for 100 percent of the noneconomic damages — 
set by the jury at $8 million — because his liability was based 
on commission of an intentional tort:  battery.  
 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that 
section 1431.2 limits the liability for noneconomic damage of all 
defendants — including intentional tortfeasors — to their 
proportionate share of fault.  (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles, 
supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 115, 123–128.)  The court expressly 
disagreed with the contrary holding in Thomas.     
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The issue here is the extent of Aviles’s liability for “ ‘non-
economic damages,’ ” which, for purposes of applying section 
1431.2, are defined as “subjective, non-monetary losses 
including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and 
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and 
humiliation.”  (§ 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).)  As set forth above, section 
1431.2, subdivision (a), provides:  “In any action for personal 
injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based upon 
principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant 
for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be 
joint.  Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-
economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a 
separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for 
that amount.”  The question before us is how, if at all, this 
section applies to intentional tortfeasors like Aviles. 
 
A.  The Statute’s Meaning 
 
Section 1431.2 became part of the Civil Code in June 1986, 
through the electorate’s adoption of Proposition 51, an initiative 
measure entitled the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986.  To 
interpret a statute enacted by initiative, we apply the same 
principles we apply to interpret statutes enacted by the 
Legislature.  “We first consider the initiative’s language, giving 
the words their ordinary meaning and construing [them] in the 
context of the statute and initiative as a whole.  If the language 
is not ambiguous, [then] we presume the voters intended the 
meaning apparent from that language, and we may not add to 
the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not 
apparent from that language.  If the language is ambiguous, 
[then we] may consider ballot summaries and arguments in 
determining the voters’ intent and understanding of [the] ballot 
measure.”  (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
564, 571.)   
 
Plaintiffs argue that the key language for determining the 
statute’s applicability to intentional tortfeasors is the phrase, 
“based upon principles of comparative fault.”  (§ 1431.2, subd. 
(a).)  This phrase, they assert, establishes that the statute, “by 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
its own terms, . . . requires several liability for non-economic 
damages only . . . in an action in which comparative fault 
principles apply.”  “[W]hen section 1431.2 was enacted,” 
plaintiffs 
further 
assert, 
comparative 
fault 
principles 
“preclud[ed] intentional tortfeasors from reducing their liability 
based on [another’s] negligence,” and “nothing in section 1431.2 
purports to change [that] long established” rule.  Thus, because 
of the phrase “based upon principles of comparative fault” 
(§ 1431.2, subd. (a)), the statute should be read “as excluding 
intentional tortfeasors from profiting from the statute’s 
limitation on damages liability amongst negligent parties.”  
 
Defendants, by contrast, assert that the key language in 
the statute is the phrase, “the liability of each defendant.”  
(§ 1431.2, subd. (a), italics added.)  The “plain,” “clear and 
unambiguous” meaning of this phrase, they argue, is that the 
statute “guarantees apportionment to every defendant in a 
wrongful death case, without exception” and “regardless of the 
nature of the defendant’s wrongdoing.”  In defendants’ view, 
under canons of statutory construction, the phrase on which 
plaintiffs rely — “based upon principles of comparative 
fault” (§ 1431.2, subd. (a)) — “modifies the subject of the 
sentence — ‘the liability of each defendant’ — not [the] term 
‘action’ in the preceding clause” of the sentence. As such, it 
functions, not “as a limitation” on the statute’s applicability, but 
“as an instruction” on “how a defendant’s liability should be 
calculated under the statute — i.e., ‘based [up]on principles of 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
comparative fault.’ ”  In other words, defendants alternatively 
assert, it “instructs courts how the percentage of fault should be 
calculated — i.e., according to the proportion of fault determined 
by the fact-finder.”  In short, defendants assert, under the “plain 
and commonsense meaning” of the statute, intentional 
tortfeasors like Aviles are entitled to reduce their liability based 
on the negligent acts of others. 
 
We agree with plaintiffs that there are several problems 
with defendants’ textual analysis.  First, defendants’ assertion 
that “[t]he statutory text mandates its application to ‘each 
defendant’ without exception” is inconsistent with our 
precedent.  In Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1156 
(Diaz), we considered the statute’s application to a defendant 
who was liable both vicariously for the actions of its employee 
and in its own right for its negligence in hiring and retaining the 
employee.  We first explained that, under case law, certain 
“type[s] of defendant[s] [are] excluded from allocations of fault 
under Proposition 51.”  (Id. at p. 1158.)  “One [such] type,” we 
stated, is “an employer who faces only vicarious liability under 
the respondeat superior doctrine for torts committed by its 
employees in the scope of employment.  [Citation.]  In a case 
involving such an employer-defendant, the ‘ “ ‘universe’ of 
tortfeasors” ’ among whom the jury must apportion fault 
[citation] does not include the employer.  Instead, the employer’s 
share of liability for the plaintiff’s damages corresponds to the 
share of fault that the jury allocates to the employee.”  (Ibid.)  
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
This rule, we then held in Diaz, applies even where the 
employer’s “own” separate act of “negligence” — such as 
“negligent entrustment” of a vehicle — contributes to the 
plaintiff’s injury, if “the employer admits vicarious liability for” 
the employee’s “negligent driving.”  (Id. at p. 1152.)  Diaz 
establishes that, contrary to defendants’ assertions, the phrase 
“each defendant” in section 1431.2, subdivision (a), does not 
mean “all defendants, without exception,” and the statute’s 
application may, in fact, depend on the basis of the defendant’s 
liability.   
 
In arguing otherwise, defendants ignore Diaz and rely 
principally on DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 
600 (DaFonte), which predated Diaz.  The plaintiff in DaFonte 
was injured by a machine he was using while performing his job, 
and we held that section 1431.2 required reduction of the 
product manufacturer’s liability by the proportion of fault 
attributable to the negligence of the plaintiff’s employer, even 
though the employer could not be sued for negligence and its 
liability to the plaintiff was limited to workers compensation 
benefits.  (DaFonte, at p. 596.)  As relevant to defendants’ 
argument, in reaching this conclusion, we stated:  “Section 
1431.2 declares plainly and clearly that in tort suits for personal 
harm or property damage, no ‘defendant’ shall have ‘joint’ 
liability for ‘non-economic’ damages, and ‘[e]ach defendant’ shall 
be liable ‘only’ for those ‘non-economic’ damages directly 
attributable to his or her own ‘percentage of fault.’ ”  (DaFonte, 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
at p. 601.)  It “expressly affords relief to every tortfeasor who is 
a liable ‘defendant,’ and who formerly would have had full joint 
liability.”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)  It “contains no ambiguity 
[that] would permit resort to . . . extrinsic constructional aids,” 
such as “ballot materials.”  (Id. at p. 602.)  It “plainly attacks the 
issue of joint liability for noneconomic tort damages root and 
branch.  In every case, it limits the joint liability of every 
‘defendant’ to economic damages, and it shields every 
‘defendant’ from any share of noneconomic damages beyond that 
attributable to his or her own comparative fault.”  (Ibid.)  It 
“plainly limits a defendant’s share of noneconomic damages to 
his or her own proportionate share of comparative fault.”  (Id. at 
p. 604.)   
 
Notwithstanding these statements, for several reasons, 
DaFonte does not require reduction under the statute of 
defendants’ liability in the case now before us.  First, DaFonte 
did not involve an intentional tortfeasor, did not examine the 
purpose and effect of the phrase “based upon principles of 
comparative fault” in section 1431.2, subdivision (a), and did not 
even quote that phrase.  Indeed, there was no need in DaFonte 
to focus on or examine this phrase, because that case involved 
the statute’s application to a quintessential comparative fault 
tortfeasor:  a negligent actor.  As we have repeatedly observed, 
“ ‘cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’ ”  
(American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals 
Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017, 1039.)   
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
 
Second, close examination of our DaFonte opinion 
suggests that defendants overstate the breadth of its scope and 
effect.  We rested our analysis there in part on the fact that, 
“[l]ong before” the statute’s enactment, we had held in American 
Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 
(American Motorcycle), that “[n]either the allocation of fault, nor 
the amount of a joint and several damage award, ‘var[ied] by 
virtue of the particular defendants who happen[ed] to be before 
the court.’ ”  (DaFonte, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 602–603, quoting 
American Motorcycle, at p. 589, fn. 2.) The holding in American 
Motorcycle we were referencing was that “ ‘the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff must be proportioned to the combined 
negligence of plaintiff and of all the tort-feasors, whether or not 
joined as parties . . . whose negligence proximately caused or 
contributed to plaintiff’s injury.’ ”  (American Motorcycle, at p. 
589, fn. 2 italics added.)  “In this context,” we stated in DaFonte, 
“the only reasonable construction of section 1431.2 is that a 
‘defendant[’s]’ liability for noneconomic damages cannot exceed 
his or her proportionate share of fault as compared with all fault 
responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, not merely that of 
‘defendant[s]’ present in the lawsuit.”  (DaFonte, at p. 603, 
italics omitted.)  Given this analysis, DaFonte does not establish 
the statute’s applicability in the very different context now 
before us, involving an intentional, rather than negligent, 
tortfeasor.  On the contrary, DaFonte’s analysis suggests that 
the law’s treatment of intentional tortfeasors “before the 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
enactment of Proposition 51” — i.e., the legal “context” at the 
time of the measure’s adoption — is relevant in determining 
section 1431.2’s meaning in the context at issue.  (DaFonte, at 
pp. 602–603.)   
 
Finally, in our subsequent Diaz decision, we effectively 
rejected defendants’ expansive reading of DaFonte.  The plaintiff 
in Diaz argued that section 1431.2, as construed in DaFonte, 
required “inclu[sion]” of a negligent employer “in the 
‘ “ ‘universe’ of tortfeasors” ’ to whom the jury will allocate fault,” 
even if the employer is also vicariously liable for the act of its 
employee.  (Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1158.)  We disagreed, 
holding, as noted above, that section 1431.2 does not require, or 
even permit, a share of liability to be allocated to a negligent 
employer for its own negligent act if the employer admits 
vicarious liability for the negligent act of its employee.  (Diaz, at 
pp. 1159–1160.)  Notably, we quoted DaFonte in explaining that 
the “ ‘ “ ‘universe’ of tortfeasors” ’ among whom the jury must 
apportion fault [citation] does not include the employer.”  (Diaz, 
at p. 1157, italics added.)  Thus, Diaz makes clear that 
defendants overstate DaFonte’s scope and effect. 
 
The second problem with defendants’ plain language 
analysis is its treatment of the phrase “based upon principles of 
comparative fault” in section 1431.2, subdivision (a).  As noted 
above, defendants insist that, under canons of statutory 
construction, the phrase “modifies” the phrase that follows it:  
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
“the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages.”  
(§ 1431.2, subd. (a).)  However, plaintiffs argue that under the 
same canons of statutory interpretation, it is “at least as 
reasonable” to conclude that the phrase instead modifies “what 
precedes it, ‘any action for personal injury, property damage, or 
wrongful death.’ ”  In support of their argument, plaintiffs note 
that “[t]his Court . . . has used [the latter] construction” in 
several opinions.  (See Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1156 
[discussing effect of § 1431.2 “[i]n cases ‘based upon principles 
of comparative fault’”]; Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520, 539  [finding § 1431.2 applicable 
because the plaintiff’s “cause of action . . . [was] based upon 
‘principles of comparative fault’ ”]; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 959, fn. 1 [§ 1431.2 “provides” for 
proportionate liability as to noneconomic damages “in a tort 
action governed by principles of comparative fault”); Richards v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 988 [same]; DaFonte, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 600 [“section 1431.2 declares that in 
actions for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage 
based on comparative fault, ‘the liability of each defendant for 
non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be 
joint’ ”].)  Under this construction, plaintiffs further argue, the 
statute does not apply to intentional tortfeasors because 
intentional tort actions “are not based on principles of 
comparative fault.”   
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
 
Ultimately, we need not decide whether defendants’ 
parsing of the statutory language is correct because their view 
of the statute’s meaning is problematic even if, as they assert, 
the phrase “based upon principles of comparative fault” (§ 
1431.2, subd. (a)) modifies what follows.  As noted above, 
according to defendants, that phrase “supplies only the manner 
for calculating percentages”; its sole function is to “instruct[] 
courts how the percentage of fault should be calculated — i.e., 
according to the proportion of fault determined by the fact-
finder.”  However, as plaintiffs point out, under that reading, 
the phrase would serve no purpose given that (1) the 
immediately following clause specifies that “the liability of each 
defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and 
shall not be joint,” and (2) the next sentence sets forth detailed 
instructions for calculating each defendant’s share, stating that 
“[e]ach defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-
economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct 
proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault . . . .”  
(§ 1431.2, subd. (a).)  Because defendants’ construction renders 
the phrase “wholly without . . . effect,” adopting it would be 
inconsistent with the well-established principle that courts 
should, if possible, give meaning to every word of a statute and 
avoid constructions that make any word surplusage.  (People v. 
Franco (2018) 6 Cal.5th 433, 437.) 
 
On the other hand, as plaintiffs further argue, there is a 
construction of the statute, even under defendants’ parsing of its 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
language, that is both reasonable and does not render the 
phrase “based upon principles of comparative fault” superfluous.  
(See Rumetsch v. City of Oakland  (1933) 135 Cal.App. 267, 269 
[courts should not construe “[w]ords in a statute . . . as 
surplusage if a reasonable construction can be given them which 
will give them some force and meaning”].)  Under plaintiffs’ 
construction, the phrase functions to “incorporate[]” otherwise 
“existing ‘principles of comparative fault’ ” into the statute, such 
that a defendant’s liability is “several and not joint” — and 
subject 
to 
apportionment 
based 
on 
percentage 
of 
responsibility — only in cases where the extent of that 
defendant’s liability is otherwise determined according to 
“principles of comparative fault.”  (§ 1431.2, subd. (a).)  In the 
end, then, we agree with plaintiffs that for purposes of deciding 
this case, “it is irrelevant whether the phrase ‘based upon 
principles of comparative fault’ modifies the word ‘actions’ or 
‘liability.’  Whatever the referent,” the key question is the 
extent, if any, to which existing principles of comparative fault 
otherwise apply under the law to intentional tortfeasors.     
 
To that question, we now turn. 
 
B.  Comparative Fault Principles and Intentional 
Tortfeasors 
 
Not surprisingly, the parties disagree as to whether, under 
existing principles of comparative fault, intentional tortfeasors 
are entitled to a reduction of liability based on the negligent acts 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
of others.  Plaintiffs assert that California law has never 
sanctioned application of “principles of comparative fault” in 
this manner.  Defendants, on the other hand, assert that “[n]o 
rule in California excludes intentional tortfeasors from a 
comparative fault analysis,” and that no court “had held” before 
Proposition 51’s adoption “that intentional tortfeasors were 
excluded from the comparative fault doctrine.”  Therefore, 
defendants argue, “the language referencing comparative fault 
principles in section 1431.2, subdivision (a) cannot be read to 
exclude intentional tortfeasors from its scope.”  As shown below, 
plaintiffs have the better of the argument.   
 
Since 1872, California law has provided that “[e]veryone 
is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, 
but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want 
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her 
property or person . . . .”  (§ 1714, subd. (a), as enacted 1872.)  
Until 1975, this broad principle was significantly limited by the 
contributory negligence doctrine, which barred all recovery if 
any negligent conduct of the injured plaintiff “contributed as a 
legal cause in any degree to the harm suffered.”  (Li v. Yellow 
Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 808 (Li).)  This “ ‘all-or-nothing 
rule’ ” came to be viewed as unjustifiably harsh, because it 
“ ‘exonerate[d]’ ” even “ ‘very negligen[t]’ ” defendants “ ‘for even 
the slight fault of [their] victim.’ ”  (Id. at p. 810, fn. 3.)   
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
 
To address this harshness, courts developed several 
limitations on the contributory negligence doctrine.  One 
relevant limitation was that the doctrine applied only where the 
defendant was liable on the basis of negligence, and was 
inapplicable where the defendant was liable on the basis of 
“willful misconduct” (Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 825) or “an 
intentional wrong” (Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. 
Earp (1942) 19 Cal.2d 774, 777).  And because battery is an 
“intentional tort[],” courts held that the contributory negligence 
defense was “unavailable” to defendants in actions for battery,  
(Bartosh v. Banning (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 378, 385.)  “As 
between the guilty aggressor and the person attacked the former 
[could] not shield himself behind the charge that his victim may 
have been guilty of contributory negligence . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
 
In 1975, in Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 829, we abolished 
the contributory negligence defense and replaced it with “a 
system of ‘pure’ comparative negligence” that “assess[es] 
liability in proportion to negligence.”  Under that system, we 
explained, “liability for damage will be borne by those whose 
negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective 
fault” (id. at p. 813), meaning “the amount of [their] negligence” 
(id. at p. 829).  In setting forth this rule, we also explained that 
the terms “fault” and “negligence” are interchangeable, the 
latter “import[ing] nothing more than ‘negligence’ in the 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
accepted legal sense.”3  (Li, at p. 813, fn. 6.)  Thus, the new rule 
of proportionate liability, we said, applies “in all actions for 
negligence.”  (Id. at p. 829.)  We expressly declined to address 
the rule’s applicability in actions based on willful or intentional 
misconduct.  (Id. at p. 826.) 
 
Three years later, in American Motorcycle, we considered 
Li’s impact on a tort principle that would later become the target 
of Proposition 51:  the rule of “joint and several liability” for 
concurrent tortfeasors “who have negligently inflicted the 
harm.”  (American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 583.)  
Under this rule, “each tortfeasor whose negligence is a 
proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains individually 
liable for all compensable damages attributable to that injury” 
(id. at p. 582), “and the injured person may sue one or all of the 
tortfeasors to obtain a [full] recovery for his [or her] injuries” (id. 
at p. 587).  The defendant in American Motorcycle argued that 
Li compelled replacement of the joint and several liability rule 
with “a new rule of ‘proportionate liability,’ under which each 
concurrent tortfeasor who has proximately caused an indivisible 
                                        
3 
Long before Li, California precedent held in the tort 
context that the terms “fault” and “negligence” were 
“synonymous.”  (Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co. (1962) 208 
Cal.App.2d 367, 380; Marston v. Pickwick Stages (1926) 78 
Cal.App. 526, 534; see Gackstetter v. Market St. Ry. Co. (1933) 
130 Cal.App. 316, 323 [“The word ‘fault’ in the instruction was 
the equivalent of negligence”].) 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
harm may be held liable only for a portion of plaintiff’s recovery, 
determined on a comparative fault basis.”  (American 
Motorcycle, at pp. 585–586, italics omitted.)  We disagreed, 
holding that “after Li, a concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence 
is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains liable for 
the total amount of damages, diminished only ‘in proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering.’ ”  (Id. at p. 590.) 
 
We further held, however, that “the principles underlying 
Li” warranted “modification” of a separate common law 
principle that governed the allocation of loss, not vis-à-vis the 
plaintiff, but among multiple tortfeasors:  the “equitable 
indemnity doctrine.”  (American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 
p. 591.)  Under “[e]arly California decisions,” we explained, a 
tortfeasor held liable for all of the plaintiff’s damages had no 
“right to contribution” from other tortfeasors who had 
contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.  (Id. at p. 592.)  In later 
years, out of concern about the “injustice of requiring one 
tortfeasor to bear an entire loss while another more culpable 
tortfeasor escaped with impunity,” courts “develop[ed] an 
equitable exception to the no contribution rule” (ibid.), which 
allowed “a ‘passively’ or ‘secondarily’ negligent tortfeasor to shift 
his [or her] liability completely to a more directly culpable party” 
(id. at p. 583).  But the “all-or-nothing aspect of” this supposedly 
equitable exception “ha[d] precluded courts from reaching a just 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
solution in the great majority of cases in which equity and 
fairness call[ed] for an apportionment of loss between the 
wrongdoers in proportion to their relative culpability, rather 
than the imposition of the entire loss upon one or the other 
tortfeasor.”  (Id. at p. 595.)  “ ‘[T]here is obvious lack of sense and 
justice,’ ” we said, “ ‘in a rule [that] permits the entire burden of 
a loss, for which two defendants were . . . unintentionally 
responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, . . . while the latter 
goes scot free.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 607–608, quoting Prosser, Law of 
Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 50, p. 307, italics added.)  Therefore, we 
concluded, in order to “attain” the system that Li envisioned — 
“ ‘under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose 
negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective 
fault’ ” (id. at p. 598) — “the long-recognized common law 
equitable indemnity doctrine should be modified to permit, in 
appropriate cases, a right of partial indemnity, under which 
liability among multiple tortfeasors may be apportioned on a 
comparative negligence basis” (id. at p. 583).  
 
In considering our authority to modify the rule of equitable 
indemnity, we discussed in American Motorcycle a separate but 
related doctrine:  “contribution among tortfeasors.”  (American 
Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal. 3d at p. 596.)  “In traditional terms,” 
we explained, the difference between the two doctrines is that 
indemnity involves the complete “shift[ing]” of loss “from one 
tortfeasor to another,” whereas contribution involves only the 
pro rata “shar[ing]” — or “apportionment” — of loss.  (Id. at p. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
591.)  Until 1957, California followed the common law rule 
“denying a tortfeasor any right to contribution whatsoever.”  (Id. 
at p. 592.)  In that year, the Legislature established a statutory 
“right of contribution among” multiple “defendants in a tort 
action” against whom “a money judgment has been rendered 
jointly.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1957, 
ch. 1700, § 1, p. 3076.)  According to the statute’s legislative 
history, the “ ‘purpose’ ” of this change was “ ‘to lessen the 
harshness of’ ” the rule prohibiting contribution, which 
precluded a tortfeasor “ ‘forced to pay the [plaintiff’s] whole 
claim for . . . damages’ ” from “ ‘recover[ing] . . . [a] pro rata 
share’ ” from other tortfeasors who had contributed to the 
injuries.  (American Motorcycle, at p. 601, fn. 7, italics omitted.)  
Among other things, the legislative history explained, the 
common law rule “ ‘ignore[d] . . . the fact that most tort liability 
results from inadvertently caused damage and leads to the 
punishment of one wrongdoer by permitting another wrongdoer 
to profit at his expense.’ ”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Consistent with 
this explanation, the Legislature expressly denied the “right of 
contribution” to tortfeasors who have “intentionally injured the 
injured person.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd. (d).)  As several 
appellate courts later observed, this “unequivocal” exclusion of 
intentional tortfeasors followed “the rule . . . [that] ha[d] been 
recognized uniformly in all jurisdictions.”  (Bartneck v. Dunkin 
(1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 58, 61; see Martinez v. De Los Rios (1960) 
187 Cal.App.2d 28, 34.)     
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
 
About a month after American Motorcycle, in Daly v. 
General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 730 (Daly), we 
extended Li’s “comparative negligence” principles to “actions 
founded on strict products liability.”  In reaching this conclusion, 
we rejected the argument that because strict liability “is not 
founded on negligence or fault, [it] is inhospitable to 
comparative principles.”  (Daly, at p. 734.)  We relied in part on 
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which made comparative 
liability principles applicable in actions “ ‘based on fault’ ” and 
defined the term “ ‘ “Fault” [to] include[] acts or omissions that 
are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or 
property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict 
tort liability.’ ”  (Id. at p. 741, quoting § 1 of the act, italics 
omitted.)  Among the “notable” features of these provisions, we 
explained, was their use of a term — “ ‘fault[]’ ” — that was 
expressly defined to encompass “negligence and strict liability.”  
(Id. at p. 742.)  To reflect this usage and our expansion of Li to 
both negligence actions and “actions founded on strict liability,” 
we adopted “the term ‘comparative fault’ ” to describe the 
doctrine.  (Daly, at p. 742.)     
 
Two months after Daly, in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-
Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 325 (Safeway), we extended American 
Motorcycle’s comparative indemnity doctrine “for apportioning 
liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors” to actions where 
the liability of some tortfeasors “rests” on “strict product 
liability.”  We reasoned in part that the social policy underlying 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
strict liability — “assign[ing] liability to a party who possesses 
the ability to distribute losses over an appropriate segment of 
society” — “ha[d] never been viewed as so absolute as to require, 
or indeed as to permit, negligent tortfeasors who have also 
contributed to the injury to escape all liability whatsoever.  
Instead, from the initial adoption of strict product liability in 
[California], the propriety of awarding contribution between 
strictly liable and negligent defendants ha[d] been uniformly 
recognized.”  (Safeway, at p. 330.)  Applying American 
Motorcycle’s comparative indemnity doctrine in this context 
would simply “achieve a more precise apportionment of 
liability . . . by allocating damages on a comparative fault or a 
comparative responsibility basis, rather than by fixing an 
inflexible pro rata apportionment pursuant to the contribution 
statutes.”  (Id. at p. 331.)  We also reasoned that a contrary 
conclusion “would lead to bizarre, and indeed irrational, 
consequences.”  (Id. at p. 332.)  If “only” the “negligent 
defendant” may invoke the comparative indemnity doctrine, 
then “a manufacturer who was actually negligent in producing 
a product would frequently be placed in a better position than a 
manufacturer who was free from negligence but who happened 
to produce a defective product, for the negligent manufacturer 
would be permitted to shift the bulk of liability to more negligent 
cotortfeasors, while the strictly liable defendant would be denied 
the benefit of such apportionment.”  (Ibid.)  “[N]o policy 
considerations . . . demand or justify such a result . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
 
In the years between our 1975 decision in Li and 
Proposition 51’s adoption in 1986, several published court of 
appeal decisions addressed the comparative fault doctrine’s 
applicability to willful conduct.  In 1976, the Third District 
Court of Appeal held that Li’s “comparative negligence 
doctrine . . . does not apply to willful misconduct.”  (Kindt v. 
Kauffman (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 845, 855.)  But courts in the 
First, Second, and Fifth Appellate Districts, and one federal 
appellate court, later held otherwise, extending comparative 
fault principles to tortfeasors liable for willful and wanton 
conduct.  (Blake v. Moore (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 700, 707; Allen 
v. Sundean (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 216, 226 (Allen); Zavala v. 
Regents of University of California (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 646, 
650; Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. State of California 
(1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 116, 118; Sorensen v. Allred (1980) 112 
Cal.App.3d 717, 726; Plyler v. Wheaton Van Lines (9th Cir. 1981) 
640 F.2d 1091, 1093.)  In the earliest of these decisions — 
Sorensen — which the later decisions largely followed, the court 
reasoned that willful and wanton conduct is simply an 
aggravated “type[] of negligence,” which is “suitable for 
comparison with any other kind of negligence.”  (Sorenson, at p. 
725.)  As relevant to the issue before us, the Sorenson court also 
relied on the following:  (1) our statement in Li, which had been 
endorsed by “[t]he most comprehensive historical and analytical 
treatise on the subject of comparative negligence,” that “ ‘a 
comprehensive system of comparative negligence should allow 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
28 
for the apportionment of damages in all cases involving 
misconduct which falls short of being intentional’ ” (Sorensen, at 
p. 722, italics added); (2) our observation in Daly that “ ‘ “[t]here 
is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule [that] permits the 
entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were . . . 
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone,  
. . . while the latter goes scot free” ’ ” (Sorensen, at p. 724, italics 
added); and (3) a “legislative study . . . recommend[ing] that the 
Legislature include recklessness and wilful misconduct short of 
intentional injury among the kinds of fault capable of reducing, 
but no longer necessarily barring recovery” (ibid., italics added).  
In one of the decisions that later adopted Sorensen’s analysis 
and conclusion, the court declared that allocation under 
principles of comparative fault is necessary “[u]nless a 
defendant has intentionally injured a plaintiff.”  (Southern, at p. 
121.)  
 
Consistent with this declaration, decisions before 
Proposition 51’s adoption uniformly held that reduced liability 
under principles of comparative fault is not available to 
defendants liable for intentional torts.  In Allen, supra, 137 
Cal.App.3d at page 226, the court held that although 
“comparative fault principles” apply to willful conduct, they do 
not apply to “the intentional tort of fraudulent concealment.”  
The plaintiff in Allen sought recovery for property damage 
caused by a landslide, and the trial court, as trier of fact, found 
that the defendant property developer had committed both 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
29 
“wilful misconduct” and “fraudulent concealment.”  (Id. at p. 
220.)  The trial court, based on “doubt as to whether comparative 
fault principles apply” to such conduct, “declined to allocate any 
portion of the judgment” to a negligent codefendant.  (Ibid.)  The 
appellate court held that the trial court had erred as to the 
developer’s liability for “wilful misconduct,” but had acted 
correctly regarding “damages attributable to [the developer’s] 
fraudulent concealment.”  (Id. at p. 227.)  Regarding the latter 
conclusion, the appellate court explained:  “[T]he Supreme Court 
in Li, and again in American Motorcycle, used language which 
appears to exclude intentional torts from the comparative fault 
system.  Nor has there been support for an extension of 
comparative fault principles to intentional torts, as there was to 
wilful misconduct or to strict liability, in other states, among the 
commentators generally, or in the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act.  Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 875, subdivision 
(d), still provides:  ‘There shall be no right of contribution in 
favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured 
person.’  Thus, while there may be sound policy arguments for 
extending comparative fault principles to intentional tortfeasors 
[citation], there is as yet no authority to support such an 
extension.”  (Allen, at pp. 226–227, italics added, fns. omitted.)   
 
In another 1982 decision, Godfrey v. Steinpress (1982) 128 
Cal.App.3d 154, 176 (Godfrey), the appellate court affirmed the 
trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that an award of 
damages for infliction of emotional distress and fraud by 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
30 
concealment could be reduced based on the plaintiffs’ 
negligence.  The appellate court explained in part:  “We do not 
see how contributory negligence could have any application to 
fraud by concealment.  The concealment alleged by the 
amendment and proved by the evidence was a deliberate, 
calculated act by [the defendant].”  (Ibid.) 
 
In a third 1982 decision — Phelps v. Superior Court (1982) 
136 Cal.App.3d 802, 815 — the court held that “damages 
resulting from intentional torts,” including “battery,” are not 
“subject to apportionment” based on the jury’s allocation of fault 
among a plaintiff and defendants.  The jury in Phelps found the 
defendants liable for the plaintiff’s injuries on “theories of [both] 
negligence and battery.”  (Id. at p. 805.)  The trial court declared 
a mistrial because of “inconsistency in the voting of jurors on 
issues pertaining to the comparative negligence issues” (id. at p. 
804), specifically regarding the “apportionment of fault as 
between” the plaintiff and the defendants (id. at p. 807).  The 
plaintiff moved for entry of “a partial interlocutory judgment” 
regarding the defendants’ liability for battery, arguing (1) there 
was no inconsistency in the special verdicts regarding the 
defendants’ commission of “intentionally tortious” acts, and (2) 
the inconsistency “concerning contributory negligence [was] 
irrelevant to [that] finding of liability because contributory 
negligence is no defense to an intentional tort.”  (Ibid.)  The trial 
court denied the motion.  (Id. at p. 808.)  Upon a challenge to the 
trial court’s ruling, the appellate court, retroactively applying 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
31 
new precedent, held that the liability verdicts on both the 
negligence 
and 
intentional 
tort 
theories 
were 
valid, 
notwithstanding the inconsistency in the verdicts regarding 
comparative negligence issues.  (Id. at pp. 809–812.)  However, 
the court further held that the damage award was problematic 
because the special verdicts failed to “include a break-down of 
general damages 
as between 
damages resulting 
from 
intentional torts (conversion and battery) and damages 
resulting from negligence.”  (Id. at p. 815.)  The damages 
resulting from negligence, the court explained, “are subject to 
apportionment, . . . 
while 
[the 
damages 
resulting 
from 
intentional torts] are not.  Accordingly, upon retrial . . . , the 
trier of fact should . . . determine what portion of the total 
general damages . . . is subject to apportionment of fault and 
what portion is not.”  (Ibid.) 
 
In sum, by June 1986, when the electorate adopted 
Proposition 51, the state of the law in California was as follows:  
This court’s precedents established that (1) for purposes of 
allocating liability under “principles of comparative fault,” the 
term “fault” includes both negligence and strict liability (Daly, 
supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 744); (2) even where comparative fault 
principles apply, the liability of codefendants vis-à-vis the 
plaintiff remains joint and several, subject to reduction based on 
the plaintiff’s conduct (American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 
p. 582); and (3) under “comparative fault principles,” a right of 
partial indemnity exists as to the defendants in actions based on 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
32 
negligence and strict liability, such that they may recover from 
each other on a comparative responsibility basis (Safeway, 
supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 325).  Our Courts of Appeal uniformly held 
that intentional tortfeasors may not, under comparative fault 
principles, reduce their liability based on the negligent acts of 
others.  And section 875 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
authorized pro rata contribution among the defendants held 
liable “in a tort action” (id., subd. (a)), but expressly precluded 
“contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally 
injured the injured person” (id., subd. (d)).   
 
Published appellate authority after Proposition 51’s 
adoption similarly held that intentional tortfeasors may not 
obtain reduction of their liability under principles of 
comparative fault.  As noted at the outset, almost 15 years ago, 
in Thomas, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at page 1108, the court 
confronted the precise issue now before us and held that “an 
intentional tortfeasor is [not] entitled to a reduction or 
apportionment of noneconomic damages under Proposition 51.”  
Citing Allen and Godfrey, the court first explained that “[a]t the 
time Proposition 51 was adopted, the law was well established” 
that “a defendant who committed an intentional tort against the 
plaintiff was not entitled to a reduction of the judgment because 
the plaintiff’s injuries also resulted from his or her own 
negligence or the negligence of a third party.”  (Thomas, at p. 
1111.)  The court then held that “Proposition 51 did not alter” 
this principle.  (Ibid.)     
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
33 
 
The Thomas court relied in part on Heiner v. Kmart Corp. 
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335, 337, which involved the extent of the 
defendant’s liability for a battery committed by its employee — 
a security guard — against the plaintiff.  The defendant in 
Heiner argued on appeal that the trial court had erred by 
“declining to apply principles of comparative fault to allocate the 
damages resulting from the battery” (ibid.) “based on [the 
plaintiff’s] ‘contributory negligence’ ” (id. at p. 348).  The Court 
of Appeal disagreed, finding it “reasonably clear” under 
California law “that apportionment of fault for injuries inflicted 
in the course of an intentional tort — such as the battery in this 
case — would have been improper.”  (Id. at p. 349.)  The court 
reasoned that Li’s “adoption of a regime of ‘comparative fault’ ” 
had not abrogated this rule.  (Heiner, at p. 349.)  On the 
contrary, the court stated, Li, “along with” American Motorcycle, 
Allen and Godfrey, “constitute an unbroken line of authority 
barring apportionment where, as here, the defendant has 
committed an intentional tort and the injured plaintiff was 
merely negligent.”  (Heiner, at p. 350.)   
 
In support of their contrary view of California law, 
defendants rely on a single, post-Proposition 51 decision:  
Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1 
(Weidenfeller).  According to defendants, the Weidenfeller court, 
in the course of holding that “a negligent defendant was entitled 
to apportionment under section 1431.2 when a plaintiff’s harm 
was also caused by a non-party who acted intentionally,” 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
34 
“acknowledged 
that 
no 
authority 
excluded 
intentional 
tortfeasors from the comparative fault doctrine.”  This decision, 
defendants assert, “suggests that section 1431.2 should apply to 
intentional tortfeasors.”   
 
Defendants’ reliance on Weidenfeller is misplaced.  As 
defendants acknowledge, because the party who acted 
intentionally in that case “was not named as a defendant,” 
Weidenfeller “did not address” whether an intentional tortfeasor 
“is entitled to apportionment” under the law.  The plaintiff in 
Weidenfeller, after being injured during an unprovoked assault 
in a bar parking lot, sued — and obtained a verdict 
against — the bar and its owners based on their “negligence” in 
failing “to provide adequate lighting and a security presence.”  
(Weidenfeller, supra, 1 Cal.App. 4th  at p. 4.)  Thus, as here 
relevant, the sole issue before the appellate court was whether 
the judgment against the negligent defendants for noneconomic 
damages should be reduced pursuant to section 1431.2 based on 
the percentage of fault the jury attributed to the assailant’s 
intentional acts.  (Weidenfeller, at p. 4.)  The court’s affirmative 
answer to that question did not, as defendants assert, 
“suggest[]” the converse, i.e., that intentional tortfeasors are 
entitled to reduce their liability based on the negligent acts of 
the plaintiff or other actors.  This is clear from the fact that the 
court expressly distinguished Godfrey and Allen on the ground 
that they precluded “intentional actor[s]” from “shift[ing] [their] 
financial burden to a negligent party,” and did not involve “the 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
35 
converse situation” — at issue in Weidenfeller — where 
“transfer [of[ the intentional actor’s responsibility to the 
negligent tortfeasor” is sought.  (Weidenfeller, at p. 7.)   
 
But the Weidenfeller court did not merely distinguish 
Godfrey and Allen, it endorsed and ultimately relied on their 
holding that intentional tortfeasors may not shift liability to 
negligent actors.  In seeking to preclude reduction of the 
negligent defendants’ liability under section 1431.2, the plaintiff 
in Weidenfeller argued that the statute did not apply because (1) 
“[c]omparative fault principles . . . are inapplicable whenever 
one party . . . acted intentionally,” (2) his assailant’s “conduct 
was intentional,” and (3) his lawsuit therefore was “not an action 
‘based upon principles of comparative fault’ ” within the 
meaning of the statute.  (Weidenfeller, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 5.)  In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeal reasoned 
in part that the plaintiff’s interpretation would “distort[] the 
meaning” of the statute by precluding “a negligent tortfeasor” 
from invoking its benefits “where the other tortfeasors act 
intentionally.”  (Id. at p. 6.)  This “absurd[]” result, the court 
explained, would “violate[] the commonsense notion” that an 
“intentional actor [should] bear full responsibility for its act” 
(ibid.) and “the common law determination that a party who 
commits intentional misconduct should not be entitled to escape 
responsibility for damages based upon the negligence of the 
victim or a joint tortfeasor” (id. at p. 7).  These principles, the 
court stated, are “reflected in the Legislature’s enactment of 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
36 
Code of Civil Procedure section 875,” which expressly 
“preclud[es] 
contribution 
for 
‘any 
tortfeasor 
who 
has 
intentionally injured the injured person’ ” (Weidenfeller, at p. 6), 
and in Godfrey and Allen, which held “that an intentional actor 
cannot rely on someone else’s negligence to shift responsibility 
for his or her own conduct” (Weidenfeller, at pp. 6–7).  Given 
these authorities, the court concluded, “[t]here is no principled 
basis” for construing the statute to allow an “injured party . . . to 
transfer the intentional actor’s responsibility to the negligent 
tortfeasor.”  (Id. at p. 7.)  As this analysis shows, Weidenfeller 
actually provides further support for the view that, under 
existing principles of comparative fault, intentional tortfeasors 
are not entitled to reduction of their liability based on the 
negligent acts of others.   
 
For similar reasons, the post-Proposition 51 decisions 
cited by amici curiae on behalf of defendants — the Association 
of Southern California Defense Counsel and the Association of 
Defense Counsel of Northern California and Nevada — do not 
constitute contrary authority.  As amici curiae note, in Rosh v. 
Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1233 
(Rosh), the court stated that “the comparative fault doctrine . . . 
is designed to permit the trier of fact to consider all relevant 
criteria in apportioning liability” and allows jurors to “ ‘evaluate 
the relative responsibility of various parties for an injury 
(whether their responsibility for the injury rests on negligence, 
strict liability, or other theories of responsibility).’ ”  (Rosh, at p. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
37 
1233.)  As amici curiae also note, in Scott v. County of Los 
Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 151 (Scott), the court, after 
declaring itself to be “in accord with” Weidenfeller, stated:  “It 
follows that in all cases in which a negligent actor and one or 
more others jointly caused the plaintiff’s injury, the jury should 
be instructed that, assuming 100 percent represents the total 
causes of the plaintiff’s injury, liability must be apportioned to 
each actor who caused the harm in direct proportion to such 
actor’s respective fault, whether each acted intentionally or 
negligently or was strictly liable [citations], and whether or not 
each actor is a defendant in the lawsuit . . . .”  (Some italics 
omitted.) 
 
But Rosh and Scott, like Weidenfeller, involved negligent 
tortfeasors seeking to reduce their liability based on the 
intentional acts of a third party.  (Scott, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 133–134; Rosh, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1229, 1232–
1233.)  Given this context, and the rule that “ ‘cases are not 
authority 
for 
propositions 
not 
considered’ ” 
(American 
Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 1039), the statements on which amici curiae rely 
are not authority for the proposition that intentional tortfeasors 
may, under existing principles of comparative fault, shift 
liability to negligent actors.  Indeed, to view Scott more broadly 
would be to ignore the fact that the Scott court primarily relied 
on Weidenfeller and that Weidenfeller, for reasons explained 
above, actually supports the conclusion that under existing 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
38 
California 
principles 
of 
comparative 
fault, 
intentional 
tortfeasors are not entitled to reduce their liability based on the 
negligent acts of others.  Finally, Scott’s statement that “the jury 
should be instructed” to make an allocation of responsibility as 
to “each actor who caused the harm in direct proportion to such 
actor’s respective fault (Scott, at p. 151, italics omitted) says 
nothing about whether the judgment the court later enters 
against an intentional actor should be in the amount of the 
plaintiff’s entire damages — i.e., joint and several — or in an 
amount reduced to reflect the jury’s allocation.  Under Scott’s 
holding that “a negligent actor” is entitled to have its liability 
reduced based on the acts of intentional tortfeasors (ibid.), the 
jury must make an allocation of responsibility as to those 
intentional tortfeasors, or there would be no basis for making 
the reduction of the negligent defendant’s liability.  Scott’s 
direction that juries be instructed to make such allocations 
therefore does not imply that the eventual judgment the court 
later enters against any intentional tortfeasors should also be 
reduced in accordance with the jury’s allocation.   
 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that California 
principles of comparative fault have never required or 
authorized the reduction of an intentional tortfeasor’s liability 
based on the acts of others.  Because section 1431.2, subdivision 
(a), incorporates those “principles of comparative fault,” we 
agree with plaintiffs that the statute does not entitle Aviles to 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
39 
reduce his liability based on the acts of Burley or the other 
defendants.   
   
C.  Other Indicia of Intent 
 
In addition to the language of section 1431.2 itself, 
defendants rely on several other sources to support their view 
that section 1431.2 provides for reduction of an intentional 
tortfeasor’s liability based on the negligent acts of others.  For 
reasons explained below, we disagree. 
 
1.  Section 1431.1 
 
Invoking the principle that courts should construe a 
statute’s language, not “in isolation, but in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole” (Sierra Club v. Superior Court 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165), defendants argue that the findings 
and declarations the voters codified in section 1431.1 when they 
adopted Proposition 51 “confirm[]” section 1431.2’s “application 
to all defendants no matter the nature of their fault.”  The 
former section, defendants argue, “makes no exception for any 
category of defendants, declaring in relevant part:  ‘The legal 
doctrine of joint and several liability . . . has resulted in a 
system of inequity and injustice’; it further states that ‘to 
remedy these inequities, defendants in tort actions shall be held 
financially liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault.  To 
treat them differently is unfair and inequitable.’ ”  According to 
defendants, “[t]he only way to fulfill Proposition 51’s purpose of 
ensuring that ‘defendants in tort actions shall be held 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
40 
financially liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault’ 
(Civ. Code, § 1431.1) is to treat intentional and negligent 
tortfeasors equally.” 
 
For 
several 
reasons, 
defendants’ 
argument 
is 
unpersuasive.  First, it presumes that the word “fault” in section 
1431.1 includes intentional conduct.  However, as explained 
above, at the time the voters considered Proposition 51, the word 
“fault” in tort law generally — and in the comparative fault 
context in particular — included negligent (even willful) conduct 
and liability based on strict liability, but not intentional 
conduct.  And section 1431.1, like section 1431.2, contains no 
reference to intentional conduct.   
 
Second, defendants fail to explain how or why it would be 
“ ‘unfair’ ” or “ ‘inequitable’ ” to treat those who intentionally 
commit tortious acts differently from those who act negligently 
or whose responsibility arises from principles of strict liability.  
As previously explained, before and after Proposition 51’s 
passage, California law, both common and statutory, has 
treated intentional tortfeasors differently from negligent and 
strictly liable tortfeasors with respect to the doctrines of 
contributory negligence and contribution.  In this regard, it is 
notable that Proposition 51 did not even mention Code of Civil 
Procedure section 875, which since 1957 has established “a right 
of contribution among” multiple “defendants in a tort action” 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
41 
(id., subd. (a)), but has expressly denied that right to intentional 
tortfeasors (id., subd. (d)).     
 
Third, defendants also fail to explain how intentional 
tortfeasors fit within the category of defendants that section 
1431.1 identifies as needing relief:  “ ‘deep pocket’ ” entities and 
individuals (id., subd. (a)) “included in lawsuits even though 
there [is] little or no basis for finding them at fault,” simply 
because they are “perceived to have substantial financial 
resources or insurance coverage” (id., subd. (b)).  As to those 
committing intentionally tortious conduct that inflicts injury, it 
can hardly be said there is “little or no basis for finding them at 
fault.”  (Ibid.)  As for the financial ability of such defendants to 
pay damages, when Proposition 51 was adopted, California law, 
as it does today, precluded insurance coverage “for loss 
intentionally caused by the insured.”  (Taylor v. Superior Court 
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 904, citing Ins. Code, § 533 [insurers are 
“not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured”], and 
Civ. Code, § 1668 [“contracts which have for their object, directly 
or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for . . . willful 
injury to the person . . . of another . . . are against the policy of 
the law”].)  For these reasons, we see nothing in the findings and 
declarations set forth in section 1431.1 that signals an intent to 
change long-standing law regarding intentional tortfeasors or 
that convinces us to alter our construction, based on that long-
standing law, of section 1431.2’s language. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
42 
 
2.  Unpassed Bill 
 
Defendants also base their reading of section 1431.2 on the 
difference between its language and that of an unpassed statute, 
introduced in the Legislature about four months before 
Proposition 51’s passage, that addressed apportionment of 
noneconomic damages.  The proposed statute, defendants 
emphasize, contained the following “exception for intentional 
tortfeasors:  ‘The allocation provided for by this section shall not 
apply to any person who intentionally injures another.’ ”  (See 
Assem. Bill No. 4271 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 
21, 1985, § 2.)  “[B]y contrast,” defendants assert, “[n]othing in 
the text of section 1431.2, subdivision (a) qualifies or modifies 
the phrase ‘each defendant’ in a manner that excludes 
defendants found liable for an intentional tort.”  Thus, the 
drafters of Proposition 51 “included,” and the voters “approved,” 
“no exception” for intentional tortfeasors, and this court 
“ ‘cannot create’ ” one absent “ ‘an explicit legislative intention 
to do so.’ ”   
 
Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.  As we have 
stated, “ ‘legislative antecedents’ ” of an initiative statute that 
were “ ‘not directly presented to the voters . . . are not relevant’ ” 
in construing the statute.  (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 894, 904–905.)  Nor is the “ ‘motive or purpose of [an 
initiative’s] drafters . . . relevant to its construction, absent 
reason to conclude that the [voters were]  aware of that purpose 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
43 
and believed the language of the proposal would accomplish it.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 904.) Moreover, defendants’ argument ignores a 
significant textual difference between section 1431.2 and the 
unpassed statute.  The latter did not contain the qualifying 
phrase in the former that is at the heart of this case — “based 
upon principles of comparative fault” (§ 1431.2, subd. (a)) — but 
instead broadly provided, without qualification, for allocation of 
noneconomic damages “[i]n an action for personal injury, 
property damage or wrongful death where an indivisible injury 
has been sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the 
wrongful conduct of two or more persons” (Assem. Bill No. 4271 
(1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb 21, 1986, § 2).  As 
plaintiffs argue, in light of the proposed statute’s broad and 
unqualified language, a provision “specifically refer[ring] to 
intentional tortfeasors” would have been called for were the 
intent “to exclude them from benefiting from apportionment.”  
As our prior analysis demonstrates, because section 1431.2, 
subdivision (a), calls for apportionment “based upon principles 
of comparative fault,” the absence of an express exclusion for 
intentional 
tortfeasors 
does 
not 
have 
the 
significance 
defendants assert.  As our prior analysis also demonstrates, 
adopting defendants’ construction would render this additional 
phrase without meaning.   
 
Moreover, defendants’ argument is inconsistent with 
several 
California 
decisions 
involving 
section 
1431.2, 
subdivision (a).  For example, although that section is silent 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
44 
regarding defendants who are liable both vicariously and based 
on their own negligence, in Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pages 
1159–1160, we construed the statute, consistent with an express 
provision of the same unpassed bill on which defendants here 
rely, to preclude allocation of a share of liability based on the 
defendant’s negligence, where the defendant admits to vicarious 
liability for negligent acts of its employee.  And in Wilson v. John 
Crane, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 847, 856, the court, in holding 
that apportionment under section 1431.2 applies to strict 
liability claims, rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on the fact that 
the statute makes no express reference to such claims, unlike 
proposed but “unenacted” statutes that “explicitly prescribed 
the application of comparative fault principles to claims 
sounding in strict products liability.”  Such claims, the court 
reasoned, “are of a type clearly understood at the time of 
[Proposition 51’s] enactment to fall within the description 
chosen,” i.e., an “ ‘action for personal injury, property damage, 
or wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative fault.’ ”  
(Wilson, at p. 586, quoting § 1431.2, subd. (a))  By contrast, as 
we have demonstrated, an intentional tort claim clearly is not of 
such a type.  For all of these reasons, defendants’ reliance on the 
fact that section 1431.2, unlike the unpassed statute, does not 
contain an express exclusion for intentional tortfeasors, is 
unpersuasive. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
45 
 
3.  Ballot Materials 
 
Defendants also argue that, to the extent section 1431.2’s 
text is ambiguous, “[t]he official Proposition 51 ballot materials 
confirm that the voters intended [the statute] to apply to all 
defendants, without exception.”  Defendants base their 
argument principally on the following:  (1) the statement of the 
Legislative Analyst that “[t]his measure . . . limits the liability 
of each responsible party in a lawsuit to that portion of non-
economic damages that is equal to the responsible party’s share 
of fault” (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 3, 1986) analysis of 
Prop. 51 by Legis. Analyst, p. 32 (Ballot Pamphlet)); and (2) the 
absence “in the ballot materials” of “the terms ‘intent’ or 
‘intentional’ ” or of any “mention” that there were “exceptions to 
Proposition 51’s applicability” or that “the actions subject to 
Proposition 51 were limited to only those ‘based upon’ principles 
of comparative fault.”  
 
Again, for several reasons, defendants’ arguments are 
unpersuasive.  First, as explained earlier, we have previously 
rejected the argument that, in light of the statutory language, 
the statute makes reduction of liability available to all 
defendants, without exception.  (Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 
1156–1150.)  The broad and general statement of the Legislative 
Analyst on which defendants rely does not convince us we 
should now hold otherwise.  In this regard, we note that that 
statement is also overbroad insofar as it refers to limiting 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
46 
liability of responsible parties “in a lawsuit.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
supra, analysis of Prop. 51 by Legis. Analyst, p. 32.)  By its 
terms, section 1431.2, subdivision (a) applies, not in any lawsuit, 
but only in “action[s] for personal injury, property damage, or 
wrongful death.”  “[T]he generality and brevity of the Legislative 
Analyst’s commentary . . . cannot plausibly be viewed as 
implicitly [expanding] the scope of the statute in the manner 
advocated by defendants.”  (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior 
Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 308 [construing Health & Safety 
Code provisions enacted through initiative.)   
 
Second, contrary to defendants’ argument, the ballot 
materials did, in fact, inform voters that application of section 
1431.2, subdivision (a), was subject to “principles of comparative 
fault.”  Those materials included the text of the proposed statute 
itself, including the phrase “based upon principles of 
comparative fault.”  (See Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 51, 
§ 4, p. 33.)  That the phrase was not mentioned in any of the 
accompanying commentary or arguments is not a basis for 
expanding the statute’s application.  (See DaFonte, supra, 2 
Cal.4th at p. 602 [ballot arguments and analyses, though 
sometimes helpful in resolving ambiguities in an initiative 
measure, “cannot vary its plain import”].) 
 
Third, in several respects, the comments in the ballot 
materials, though not expressly referring to liability for 
intentional torts, suggest that Proposition 51 was directed at 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
47 
other types of tort liability.  The Attorney General’s “Official 
Title and Summary” stated that (1) “[u]nder existing law,”  
where a plaintiff obtains a damage award “against multiple 
defendants,” “[a] defendant paying all the damages may seek 
equitable reimbursement from other defendants,” and (2) 
“[u]nder” the proposed law, “this rule” would “[c]ontinue[] to 
apply to ‘economic damages.’ ”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, Official 
Title and Summary of Prop. 51, p. 32.)  These comments describe 
the state of California law, both before and after Proposition 51’s 
adoption, only with respect to liability for nonintentional torts.  
As we have previously explained, at the time of Proposition 51’s 
adoption, both statutory and common law precluded intentional 
tortfeasors from “seek[ing] equitable reimbursement from other 
defendants.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, Official Title and Summary 
of Prop. 51, p. 32.)  And Proposition 51 did nothing to alter that 
preclusion and allow intentional tortfeasors to seek equitable 
indemnity for economic damages.   
 
Comments in the Legislative Analyst’s analysis similarly 
refer to California law as it applied only to nonintentional torts.  
In explaining the measure’s background, the analysis stated 
that in “a lawsuit” by “someone [who] is injured or killed, or 
suffers property damage,” “[i]f the court finds that the injured 
party was partly responsible for the injury, the responsibility of 
the other party is reduced accordingly.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, 
analysis of Prop. 51 by Legis. Analyst, p. 32.)  As previously 
explained, under California law as it existed when the voters 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
48 
adopted Proposition 51, this accurately described the rule in 
cases involving negligence and strict liability, but not in cases 
involving intentional torts; in the latter context, the law 
precluded intentional tortfeasors from reducing their liability 
based on the injured party’s conduct.  In this respect, the 
comments of the Legislative Analyst, like those of the Attorney 
General, suggest that Proposition 51 was directed at liability for 
nonintentional torts. 
 
Nothing in the ballot arguments — either pro or con — 
persuades us that Proposition 51’s scope is, or was intended to 
be, broader.  In arguing that section 1431.2 makes reduction of 
liability available to all defendants regardless of the basis for 
liability, defendants cite the statement in the argument in favor 
of the measure that taxpayers and consumers ultimately pay the 
costs of “huge ‘deep pocket’ court awards” — “through high 
taxes, increased costs of goods and services, and reduced 
governmental services” — “[r]egardless of whether it is a city, 
county or private enterprise.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, argument 
in favor of Prop. 51, p. 34.)  But this statement merely suggests 
that the universe of defendants to which the statute may apply 
includes cities, counties, and private enterprises; it does not 
suggest that such defendants may invoke the statute even when 
they 
commit 
intentionally 
tortious conduct. 
 
Notably, 
immediately after the statement defendants cite, the argument 
in favor of the measure, in explaining “[h]ow . . . the ‘deep pocket’ 
law work[s],” discussed a hypothetical “ACCIDENT VICTIM” 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
49 
who, after being injured when a drunk driver runs a red light 
and hits another car, seeks recovery from a city for having a 
“faulty” stop light.  (Ibid.)  Similarly, the argument against the 
measure explained that Proposition 51 would “scrap[]” the 
existing system for allocating fault among “everyone found 
guilty [of having] caused [an] accident to occur,” which “put[s] 
the responsibility where it belongs:  not on innocent victims, but 
on drunk drivers, manufacturers of dangerous products or toxic 
waste and unsafe roads and highways.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, 
argument against Prop. 51, p. 35, italics added.)  These 
statements do not suggest that the measure’s scope included 
liability for intentionally tortious conduct, or hinted to voters 
that if they were injured in a criminal attack, and either they or 
someone else negligently contributed to their injury, they would 
no longer be able to fully recover from the perpetrator.  “One 
could reasonably expect [that] a change [in the law] of this 
magnitude would be made clear in both legal text and ballot 
argument.”  (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1161; see 
People v Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 364 [“ ‘We cannot 
presume. . . the voters intended the initiative to effect a change 
in law that was not expressed or strongly implied in either the 
text of the initiative or the analyses and arguments in the 
official ballot pamphlet.’ ”].)  For this reason, we are not 
persuaded that the failure of the ballot materials to expressly 
mention the measure’s effect on intentional tortfeasors supports 
defendants’ position. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
50 
 
Based on the preceding analysis, we hold that section 
1431.2, subdivision (a), does not authorize a reduction in the 
liability of intentional tortfeasors for noneconomic damages 
based on the extent to which the negligence of other actors — 
including the plaintiffs, any codefendants, injured parties, and 
nonparties —  contributed to the injuries in question.4   
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J.  
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J.  
KRUGER, J.  
GROBAN, J.  
                                        
4 
We express no opinion on whether negligent tortfeasors 
may, under section 1431.2, subdivision (a), obtain a reduction in 
their liability for noneconomic damages based on the extent to 
which an intentional tortfeasor contributed to the injured 
party’s injuries.  We also express no opinion on whether, for 
policy reasons, existing common law principles of comparative 
fault should be changed vis-à-vis intentional tortfeasors.   
 
 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
S250734 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
In Compton, on the evening of August 3, 2012, several 
witnesses called the police after they saw Darren Burley 
attacking a woman in the street.  When police arrived and 
attempted to stop him, Burley resisted arrest; the police 
suspected that Burley was under the influence of drugs.  Deputy 
David Aviles then pinned Burley to the ground while other 
officers beat him with a flashlight and tasered him repeatedly.  
Deputy Aviles pressed his knees on Burley’s neck and back with 
the full weight of his 200-pound body.  A witness saw Burley 
gasping for air.  When Burley lost consciousness, none of the 
officers rendered aid.  Burley never regained consciousness and 
died 10 days later. 
Darren Burley was Black.  By happenstance, we heard 
oral argument in this case one week after another Black man, 
George Floyd, was killed by a Minneapolis police officer who 
pressed his knee into Floyd’s neck with the full weight of his 
body for 8 minutes and 46 seconds — an incident that galvanized 
protests in every state across the country and throughout the 
world.  (Burch et al., How Black Lives Matter Reached Every 
Corner of America, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2020); Bender & 
Winning, Antiracism Protests Erupt Around the World in Wake 
of George Floyd Killing, Wall Street Journal (June 7, 2020).)  In 
all likelihood, the only reason Darren Burley is not a household 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
2 
name is that his killing was not caught on videotape as Floyd’s 
was. 
Sadly, what happened to these men is not happenstance.  
Variants of this fact pattern have occurred with distressing 
frequency throughout the country and here in California.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1133 
[“[Oscar] Grant protested, ‘I can’t breathe.  Just get off of me.  I 
can’t breathe.  I quit.  I surrender.  I quit.’ ”]; Garlick v. County 
of Kern (E.D.Cal. 2016) 167 F.Supp.3d 1117, 1134 [“[David] 
Silva was chest-down with weight on his back. . . .  [T]hroughout 
the altercation, Silva was . . . yelling out ‘help,’ and ‘help me.’ ”]; 
Martinez v. City of Pittsburg (N.D.Cal., Mar. 8, 2019, No. 17-cv-
04246-RS) 2019 WL 1102375, p. *3 [“Once [Humberto] Martinez 
was secured, Elmore . . . continued to apply pressure to the side 
of Martinez’s head and kept his knee on Martinez’s upper back 
for approximately 30 seconds. . . .  Eventually, one of the officers 
noticed that Martinez was turning purple, at which point they 
rolled him to his side and removed the handcuffs.”]; People v. 
O’Callaghan (Mar. 13, 2017, B265928) 2017 WL 958396, p. *1 
[nonpub. opn.] [“[Alesia] Thomas remarked, ‘I can’t move’ and ‘I 
can’t breathe’ ” and officer “proceeded to kick Thomas three 
times in her lower abdomen”]; C.R. v. City of Antioch (N.D.Cal., 
June 25, 2018, No. 16-cv-03742-JST) 2018 WL 3108982, p. *2 
[witness “testified that he heard [Rakeem] Rucks say at some 
point while he was on the ground, ‘Get me up out of the dirt.  I’m 
breathing dirt.  It’s hard to breathe.’ ”].) 
Today’s opinion holds that Civil Code section 1431.2 does 
not permit an intentional tortfeasor to offset liability for 
noneconomic damages based on the negligence of other actors.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3–7, 49.)  Thus, Burley’s family may 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
3 
recover the full amount of their noneconomic damages.  But even 
as the wrongful death judgment here affords a measure of 
monetary relief to Burley’s family, it does not acknowledge the 
troubling racial dynamics that have resulted in state-sanctioned 
violence, including lethal violence, against Black people 
throughout our history to this very day.  (See Felker-Cantor, 
Policing Los Angeles:  Race, Resistance, and the Rise of the 
LAPD (2018); Coates, Between the World and Me (2015); 
Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (1963).) 
Wrongful death statutes trace their origins to the 19th 
century, when state legislatures, alarmed at the increasing rate 
of fatal workplace accidents, attempted to force corporations to 
compensate the family members of accident victims.  (Malone, 
The Genesis of Wrongful Death (1965) 17 Stan. L.Rev. 1043, 
1043; see Hillbrand v. Standard Biscuit Co. (1903) 139 Cal. 233 
[wrongful death action by father and mother for death of their 
daughter while employed at biscuit factory]; Daves v. Southern 
Pac. Co. (1893) 98 Cal. 19 [wrongful death action for death of 
husband while repairing railroad].)  The elements of a wrongful 
death action are the underlying tort (in this case, battery), a 
resulting death, and damages.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60; see 
Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)  Although 
this tort encompasses the wrong inflicted on Burley and 
provides compensation to his family, it gives no hint that what 
happened here has a history.  And reckoning with that history 
is necessary if we are to prevent the wrongful deaths of more 
African Americans in the future. 
The Legislature has at times attempted to redress the 
specific harm of violence against African Americans.  Burley’s 
family has also sought relief under the Tom Bane Civil Rights 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
4 
Act (Bane Act), which provides a right of action against a person 
who, whether or not acting under the color of law, violates “by 
threat, intimidation, or coercion” another person’s federal or 
state rights.  (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b).)  The Bane Act was 
passed to “ ‘stem a tide of hate crimes’ ” against minorities in the 
1980s.  (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 
843.)  In addition, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 (Ralph Act) 
forbids violence or intimidation “on account of” certain protected 
characteristics, including race.  (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b).)  
These laws acknowledge the racial dimensions of acts of violence 
against African Americans.  But in the excessive force context, 
applying the coercion element of a Bane Act claim has not been 
straightforward, as the Burley family’s litigation in the Court of 
Appeal demonstrates.  (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2018) 
25 Cal.App.5th 115, 129–134.)  And although the Ralph Act 
provides liability for intentional discrimination (Gabrielle A. v. 
County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291), one may 
ask what other measures are necessary given what we know 
about unconscious bias.  (See Banks, Eberhardt & Ross, 
Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society 
(2006) 94 Calif. L.Rev. 1169, 1182–1189.) 
Moreover, the efficacy of these laws has sometimes been 
undermined by the very racial disparities they were meant to 
correct.  When litigants have recovered damages, verdicts have 
often reflected racial disparities in income and health outcomes.  
Until the Legislature prohibited the practice this year, 
California juries routinely consulted tables estimating earning 
potential based on race and gender when awarding economic 
damages to prevailing plaintiffs.  (Civ. Code, § 3361, added by 
Stats. 2019, ch. 136, § 2.)  This “perpetuate[d] systemic 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
5 
inequalities” and “disproportionately injure[d] women and 
minority individuals,” who on average earn less than white men.  
(Stats. 2019, ch. 136, § 1; see Avraham & Yuracko, Torts and 
Discrimination (2017) 78 Ohio St. L.J. 661, 664.) 
Nor should we assume that damages are enough to 
reliably deter police misconduct.  Local jurisdictions must 
indemnify officers for any nonpunitive damages judgments or 
settlements in suits brought against them (with few exceptions), 
which effectively means that taxpayers foot the bill.  (Gov. Code, 
§§ 825, subd. (a), 825.2.)  And these payouts often come from law 
enforcement budgets specifically set aside for such purposes or 
from the local jurisdiction’s general funds.  (See Schwartz, How 
Governments Pay:  Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform (2016) 
63 UCLA L.Rev. 1144, 1165; id. at p. 1241 [Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department budgeted more than $35 million for lawsuit payouts 
annually between 2012 and 2014].)  As a result, officers and 
their departments are often insulated from the financial 
consequences of their actions.  (See Schwartz, Police 
Indemnification (2014) 89 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 885, 953.) 
Separate from this action, Burley’s family also sought 
redress under federal law, specifically 42 United States Code 
section 1983 (section 1983).  (T.E. v. County of Los Angeles 
(C.D.Cal., Feb. 25, 2016, No. 15-cv-5826).)  On several occasions, 
Congress has enacted civil rights statutes in response to law 
enforcement violence against African Americans.  Although 
these laws, including section 1983, provide a measure of 
recognition that the police officer’s knee on Darren Burley’s neck 
is part of a legacy of anti-Black violence, their efficacy has been 
much debated.  The Burley family’s federal suit was dismissed 
because the statute of limitations had run (T.E., at p. *1), but 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
6 
even if the suit had gone forward, the family would have needed 
to overcome a number of hurdles in order to obtain relief. 
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state and 
local officials who violate individual constitutional and statutory 
rights while acting “under color of” state law.  (42 U.S.C. § 1983.)  
After the Civil War, the Ku Klux Klan continued to terrorize 
African Americans in the South.  Beatings, lynchings, and 
destruction of Black-owned property were common, and local 
authorities and courts routinely refused to enforce state 
criminal laws against perpetrators and often participated in the 
violence themselves.  (See Monroe v. Pape (1961) 365 U.S. 167, 
171, overruled in part by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658; Gilles, Breaking the Code of 
Silence:  Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal 
Liability (2000) 80 B.U. L.Rev. 17, 55.)  Congress enacted section 
1983 to “interpose the federal courts between the States and the 
people,” providing African Americans redress when the very 
officials sworn to protect them from violence were its 
perpetrators.  (Mitchum v. Foster (1972) 407 U.S. 225, 242; see 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983).) 
But the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials 
from liability under section 1983 so long as their “conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.”  (Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800, 818.)  To show that a right was 
clearly established at the time of the conduct, a plaintiff must 
identify precedent governing “the specific facts at issue” that has 
“ ‘placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.’ ”  (Kisela v. Hughes (2018) 584 U.S. __, __, __ [138 S.Ct. 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
7 
1148, 1153, 1152].)  Applying this standard, a federal appeals 
court has concluded that even if binding authority has held it is 
excessive force to unleash a police dog on a surrendering suspect 
in a canal in the woods, it is not necessarily clearly established 
that unleashing a police dog on a motionless suspect in a bushy 
ravine is excessive force.  (Compare Priester v. City of Riviera 
Beach (11th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 919, 927, with Jones v. Fransen 
(11th Cir. 2017) 857 F.3d 843, 854.)  Such examples have led one 
federal judge to observe that qualified immunity has allowed 
“public officials [to] duck consequences for bad behavior — no 
matter how palpably unreasonable — as long as they were the 
first to behave badly.”  (Zadeh v. Robinson (5th Cir. 2019) 928 
F.3d 457, 479 (conc. & dis. opn. of Willett, J.), italics omitted.)  
Another federal judge, in a powerful and extensive account of 
the racial history of section 1983 and the continuing lack of 
accountability for police harassment and violence against 
African Americans, has noted that qualified immunity in its 
present form is “extraordinary and unsustainable.”   (Jamison 
v. McClendon (S.D.Miss., Aug. 4, 2020, No. 3:16-cv-00595-CWR-
LRA) 2020 WL 4497723, p. *29.)  Today there are numerous 
proposals to narrow or eliminate this judicially created 
limitation on section 1983 liability.  (H.R. No. 7085, 116th Cong., 
2d Sess. (2020); H.R. No. 7115, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. (2020); 
H.R. No. 7120, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. (2020); Sen. No. 4036, 
116th Cong., 2d Sess. (2020); Sen. No. 4142, 116th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (2020); Sen. No. 3912, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. (2020).) 
With respect to injunctions, high court precedent has 
constrained substantive review of police misconduct claims.  In 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983) 461 U.S. 95, the high court 
held that Adolph Lyons, a Black man pulled over and put in a 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
8 
chokehold by Los Angeles police officers, did not have standing 
to seek an injunction against the use of chokeholds because he 
could not establish that he would again be subject to the same 
abuse.  (Id. at p. 105.)  Moreover, in order to hold municipalities 
liable for failure to train or supervise officers (often a necessary 
component of structural reform), the high court has held that a 
plaintiff must show that the department’s conduct amounted to 
“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons.”  (City of Canton 
v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 388.) 
Another federal law allows the United States Department 
of Justice to sue police departments for engaging in a pattern 
and practice of constitutional rights violations.  (34 U.S.C. 
§ 12601, former 42 U.S.C. § 14141.)  Enacted in 1994 as part of 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (Pub.L. No. 
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796), section 12601 revived a bill that was 
introduced in the aftermath of the police beating of Rodney King 
in Los Angeles.  (See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform 
Litigation:  Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights (2000) 100 Colum. L.Rev. 1384, 1401; compare 34 
U.S.C. § 12601 with H.R. No. 2972, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 
(1991).) 
Since 1994, the United States Department of Justice has 
formally investigated 70 police departments and reached more 
than 40 agreements requiring departments to overhaul internal 
oversight 
measures, 
officer 
training, 
and 
disciplinary 
procedures.  (Childress et al., Fixing the Force, Frontline PBS 
(2018), 
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/
fixingtheforce/> [as of Aug. 7, 2020].  All Internet citations in 
this opinion are archived by year, docket number, and case name 
at .)  The structural 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
9 
reforms resulting from federal intervention have shown signs of 
effectively “reduc[ing] officer uses of force, reduc[ing] civil 
liability for police misconduct, increas[ing] citizen satisfaction, 
and increas[ing] apparent compliance with legal norms.”  
(Rushin & Garnett, State Labor Law and Federal Police Reform 
(2017) 51 Ga. L.Rev. 1209, 1213 [collecting empirical studies].)  
But such investigations and settlements are costly and depend 
on the political will of the governing federal administration.  
(See Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal 
Estrangement (2017) 126 Yale L.J. 2054, 2129.)  Under the 
current administration, the number of formal investigations 
launched by the Department of Justice has declined to just one, 
and the Department has sharply curbed enforcement of existing 
agreements.  (See Childress, supra; Mazzone & Rushin, State 
Attorneys General As Agents of Police Reform (2020) 69 Duke 
L.J. 999, 1028–1029.) 
A wrongful death judgment with substantial damages is 
one way of affirming the worth and dignity of Darren Burley’s 
life, and I join today’s opinion.  But the racial dimensions of this 
case should not escape our notice.  How are we to ensure that 
“the promise of equal justice under law is, for all our people, a 
living truth”?  (Cal. Supreme Ct., Statement on Equality and 
Inclusion (June 11, 2020), <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/
news/supreme-court-of-california-issues-statement-on-equality-
and-inclusion>.)  Whatever the answer, it must involve 
acknowledging that Darren Burley’s death at the hands of law 
enforcement is not a singular incident unmoored from our racial 
history.  With that acknowledgment must come a serious effort 
to rethink what racial discrimination is, how it manifests in law 
enforcement and the justice system, and how the law can 
B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
10 
provide effective safeguards and redress for our neighbors, 
friends, and citizens who continue to bear the cruel weight of 
racism’s stubborn legacy. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur:  
CUÉLLAR, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  B.B. v. County of Los Angeles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 25 Cal.App.5th 115   
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S250734  
Date Filed:  August 10, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Ross M. Klein    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Pine Tillet Pine, Norman Pine, Stacy Freeman, Scott Tillett, Chaya M. Citrin; The Sweeney Firm and John 
E. Sweeney for Plaintiffs and Appellants B.B. and B.B. 
 
Schonbrun Seplow Harris & Hoffman, Michael D. Seplow, Paul L. Hoffman, Aidan C. McGlaze, John 
Washington; Orange Law Offices, Olu Orange; Antablin & Bruce, Drew Antablin; Douglas / Hicks Law,  
Carl E. Douglas and Jamon Hicks for Plaintiff and Appellant T.E. and for Plaintiffs and Respondents.  
 
O'Melveny & Myers, Sabrina Heron Strong, Dimitri D. Portnoi, Jefferson J. Harwell; Manning & Kass, 
Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Eugene P. Ramirez, Louis W. Pappas, Steven J. Renick, Julie M. Fleming and 
Angela M. Powell for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants 
and Appellants. 
 
Cole Huber and Derek P. Cole for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Polsinelli, David K. Schultz, J. Alan Warfield; Mansukhani, Don Willenburg and Gordon Rees Scully for 
the Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Association of Defense Counsel of Northern 
California and Nevada as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Mark A. Behrens, Cary Silverman and Patrick Gregory for Coalition for Litigation 
Justice, Inc. as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Cole Pedroza, Curtis A. Cole, Cassidy C. Davenport and Bethany J. Peak for California Medical 
Association, California Dental Association and California Hospital Association as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
Kazan, McClain, Satterly & Greenwood and Ted W. Pelletier for Michael and Cindy Burch as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Olu Orange 
Orange Law Offices, P.C. 
3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2910 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(213) 736-9900, ext. 103 
 
Norman Pine 
Pine Tillett Pine LLP 
14156 Magnolia Blvd., Ste. 200 
Sherman Oaks, CA 91423-1182 
(818) 379-9710 
 
Sabrina H. Strong 
O’Melveny & Myers, LLP 
400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 
(213) 430-6000