Title: Richard Joseph Donovan v. Michael W. Moore (Revised Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93-305
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2000

Supreme Court of Florida
   
                                                                                                                                                                                     THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2000
RICHARD JOSEPH DONOVAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,,
Respondent.
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CASE NO. SC93305
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The Motion for Correction, Rehearing and Clarification  filed by Respondent,
having been considered in light of the revised opinion, is hereby denied.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior
Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., dissents.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
A True Copy
  TEST:
Debbie Causseaux
Acting Clerk, Supreme Court
JB
cc:
Judy Bone
Richard J. Donovan, Pro se
Hon. Robert A. Butterworth
Louis A. Vargas
Supreme Court of Florida
  
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No. SC93305
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RICHARD JOSEPH DONOVAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[February 3, 2000]
REVISED OPINION
OVERTON,  Senior Justice.
Richard Joseph Donovan has petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  We
have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, section 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  
This is a gain time case related to our decision in State v. Lancaster, 687 So.
2d 1299 (Fla. 1997), which was vacated by the United States Supreme Court.  See
Lancaster v. Florida, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).  On remand, we reconsidered the case in
light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433
1.  Donovan received a 15-year prison sentence for the crime of burglary, a 30-year term
of probation for the crime of arson, and a five-year term of probation for the crime of grand theft. 
Both probationary terms were to be served consecutively to the 15-year sentence. 
2.  The 27-year prison term was ordered on the arson count.  Donovan received  a 15-year
sentence on the burglary count and five years on the grand theft count.
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(1997), and decided it in accordance with that decision.  See State v. Lancaster, 731
So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1591 (1999).
The relevant facts in this case reflect that in 1987, in Lee County Case No. 86-
1548,  Donovan began an overall prison sentence of fifteen years followed by five
years’ probation for a number of crimes committed on September 22, 1986.1  As
pertinent to our inquiry, while in service of the fifteen-year prison term, Donovan
received 600 days of Administrative Gain Time under section 944.276, Florida Statutes
(1987), and 1230 days of Provisional Credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1988).  Due in part to these awards, Donovan was released early and began
service of his probation.  
Donovan violated his probation and in 1995, the trial court revoked his
probation and resentenced Donovan to an overall sentence in the same case of twenty-
seven years.2  Donovan was not given credit for his previously awarded Administrative
Gain Time and Provisional Credits.  
In 1998, Donovan filed a petition for writ of mandamus.  On June 4, 1999, we
granted Donovan's petition pursuant to our decision in State v. Lancaster, 731 So. 2d
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1227 (Fla. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1591 (1999).  Shortly thereafter, Respondent,
Michael W. Moore, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (hereinafter the
Department), filed a notice of compliance with the order granting the petition.
Donovan disagreed with the Department and filed a motion for issuance of the writ and
enforcement of mandate.  
In its notice of compliance with the order granting the petition, the Department
asserts that Donovan's case is different from that of Lancaster and thus, while it may
not forfeit Donovan's Provisional Credits and Administrative Gain Time pursuant to
either sections 944.28(1) or 948.06(7), it may utilize section 944.278, Florida Statutes
(1997), to do so under the reasoning in Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So.
2d 1029 (Fla. 1998).  
 For the reasons discussed below, we find that, while the Department has
complied with this Court's order which instructed it to restore any Administrative Gain
Time or Provisional Credits it had forfeited upon probation revocation, the Lynce
decision also forbids the cancellation of Donovan's credits under section 944.278,
Florida Statutes (1997), enacted as part of the Safe Streets Initiative of 1994.  See ch.
93-406, § 35, at 2967, Laws of Fla.  
In the Meola case, the petitioners  received overcrowding credits under a
statute that provided for credits when the prison overcrowding exceeded ninety-eight
3.  One of the petitioners in Meola, Jones, committed his relevant offense prior to the
enactment of any of the overcrowding statutes.  See Meola, 732 So. 2d at 1032-33. 
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percent of lawful capacity.  However, the overcrowding statute in effect at the time of
their offenses provided for the award of credits only when prison overcrowding
exceeded ninety-nine percent of lawful capacity,3 and prison overcrowding never
reached that level during the period in which such credits were being awarded.  We
noted that the United States Supreme Court had indicated in Lynce that if the prison
population did not exceed the relevant percentage threshold during a certain time-frame
and an inmate received overcrowding credits during those years, "there is force to the
argument that the cancellation of that portion [of the credits] did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause."  Lynce, 519 U.S. at 449.  Thus, we held in Meola that the petitioners
were not entitled to relief under the more generous statutes because they were part of
a "separate, intervening gain-time statute that [was] more lenient than both the statute
in effect at the time of the offense and the one presently in effect."  Meola, 732 So. 2d
at 1034 (quoting Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 695 (Fla. 1990)) (alteration in
original).  
Nevertheless, in Meola, none of the petitioners had been released due to the
award of the subject credits.  In this case, on the other hand, the fact that Donovan
received overcrowding credits and was released, due in large part to the award of the
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overcrowding credits, makes this case much more similar to the situation in Lynce.
Further, if the State cannot use statutes enacted in 1989 to forfeit a releasee's credits
based on ex post facto principles, it would make no sense to allow the State to take the
credits through use of a statute enacted in 1993.  See § 944.278, Fla. Stat. (1997); ch.
93-406, § 35, at 2967, Laws of Fla. (the Safe Streets Initiative).  
Even though the petitioners in Meola were not entitled to relief because the
statute in effect when they committed their offenses required a ninety-nine percent
prison overcrowding threshold, and the statute in effect when Donovan committed his
offenses also had a ninety-nine percent threshold, we believe that the fact that Donovan
was released removes the "speculativeness" that may have been present before the
credits were awarded and before Donovan's early release based on those statutes.  As
we stated in Lancaster, explaining the United States Supreme Court decision in Lynce,
After Lynce, however, an ex post facto inquiry involves not only
looking at the time of offense, but also involves looking at subsequent
time frames as well to determine whether a possible, yet speculative
benefit has become more definite.  See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. at
446.  In Lynce, the grant of overcrowding credits was speculative at the
time of that inmate's offense because no one could tell for sure whether
the prison overcrowding levels would become so extreme as to trigger
the relevant overcrowding statutes.  Nevertheless, Lynce was
subsequently awarded a certain amount of credits which ultimately led
to his release from incarceration. Therefore, by the time Lynce was
released, the credits were clearly no longer  non-quantifiable or
unknown.  On the contrary they had become a certainty.  Id.
(concluding that "unlike in Morales, the actual course of events makes
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it unnecessary to speculate").
In [Lancaster's] case, as in
Lynce's case, at the time of Lancaster's offense overcrowding gain time
had already been provided for by statute. . . .  Furthermore, when
Lancaster was released on probation, the 1993 Safe Streets Initiative
had not been enacted yet.  Thus, akin to the situation with Lynce,
Lancaster's "hope" of receiving overcrowding gain time had become a
reality.
. . .  If the State were to now
apply that later-enacted law to Lancaster and cancel his overcrowding
gain time, the effect of that law would be to retroactively take away
something to which Lancaster had an expectation at the time of his
offense, actually received during his incarceration, and actually retained
after revocation or must now be awarded because the 1989 forfeiture
provision[s] may not be applied to him . . . .  We find that the
application of the Safe Streets Initiative to Lancaster now would result
in the taking of something which was certainly not speculative.
Accordingly, we conclude that under the analysis of Lynce, the State
cannot apply section 944.278 (the Safe Streets Initiative) to Lancaster
to cancel his Administrative Gain Time or Provisional Credits without
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Lancaster, 731 So. 2d at 1233 (parallel citations omitted).  
Similarly, we find in this case that the application of the Safe Streets Initiative
to Donovan now would result in the taking of something that is no longer speculative.
Accordingly, we hold consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Lynce that the State may not cancel or forfeit Donovan's Administrative Gain Time and
Provisional Credits under the Safe Streets Initiative.  See also Jackson v. Singletary,
695 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(applying first part of section 944.278, canceling
awards for all inmates, to petitioner would be an ex post facto violation based on
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analysis in Lynce);  State ex rel. Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Stevenson, 695 So. 2d
727 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (finding it unconstitutional to apply second part of section
944.278 to inmates released prior to the statute's enactment, because such inmates
could not have contemplated the later-enacted statute's "additional consequences for
their violation of probation"), review dismissed, 743 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1999). 
While the Department must now credit Donovan with his previously awarded
Administrative Gain Time and Provisional Credits, we find no need to issue a writ
commanding that the Department do so as we are confident that it will comply with this
opinion.  Accordingly, Donovan's motion for issuance of the writ and enforcement of
mandate is denied.  
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s decision.  I believe that this case should be
controlled by Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998).  This
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case is distinguishable from Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997), because here this
defendant was reincarcerated by reason of his probation violation, and in fact, the
original split sentence had not been completed but was rather being served through the
probation which he violated.  Under these circumstances, there is no reason that
Donovan should be treated differently than Meola.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
Richard Joseph Donovan, pro se, Sneads, Florida
for Petitioner
Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel and Judy Bone, Assistant General Counsel,
Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent