Title: Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC97069
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2019

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
SHEREEN KADER, 
   ) 
   ) 
Respondent, 
   ) 
   ) 
v. 
   ) 
No.  SC97069 
   ) 
BOARD OF REGENTS OF 
   ) 
HARRIS-STOWE STATE  
   ) 
UNIVERSITY, 
   ) 
   ) 
Appellant. 
   ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Mark H. Neill, Circuit Judge 
The board of regents of Harris-Stowe State University appeals the circuit court’s 
judgment following a jury verdict.  The jury found Harris-Stowe liable on Dr. Shereen 
Kader’s claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human 
Rights Act after Harris-Stowe declined to renew Dr. Kader’s teaching contract.  The jury 
awarded Dr. Kader $750,000 in actual damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages.  
On appeal, Harris-Stowe claims the circuit court improperly instructed the jury on Dr. 
Kader’s claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation.  Because the circuit court’s 
jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial, the judgment is reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
Opinion issued January 15, 2019
2 
Factual and Procedural History 
Dr. Shereen Kader, Ph.D., came to the United States in 1999 to pursue graduate 
education.  Dr. Kader is an Egyptian national with prior teaching experience in her home 
country.  Dr. Kader received her master’s degree in literacy from Indiana University and 
her Ph.D. in early childhood education, creativity, and innovation from Pennsylvania State 
University.  Dr. Kader accepted a faculty position at Harris-Stowe shortly before 
completing her doctorate in 2007.  Harris-Stowe promoted her to assistant professor upon 
receiving her degree.  Thereafter, Harris-Stowe renewed Dr. Kader’s teaching contract 
annually from 2007 to 2009. 
In 2009, Harris-Stowe promoted Dr. LaTisha Smith to dean of the college of 
education, making her Dr. Kader’s supervisor.  Dean Smith evaluated Dr. Kader’s teaching 
performance in October 2009.  The faculty evaluation contains 16 categories, each of which 
are rated on a scale of 1 (unsatisfactory) to 5 (outstanding).  Dean Smith gave 
Dr. Kader ratings of 5 in 12 categories and 4 (excellent) in the remaining categories. 
Dr. Kader gave herself a rating of 5 in all 16 categories.  Dean Smith testified she based 
Dr. Kader’s slightly reduced marks on written and verbal complaints from students about 
Dr. Kader’s teaching.  Dr.  Kader testified she believed she received lower ratings because 
of her race, religion, and national origin.  Dr. Kader lodged a complaint of discrimination 
with Harris-Stowe.  Harris-Stowe arranged for Dr. Kader and Dean Smith to meet with the 
human resources department to discuss Dr. Kader’s concerns, but Harris-Stowe cancelled 
the meeting after Dr. Kader informed Harris-Stowe she would be bringing an attorney with 
3 
 
her to the meeting.  Dr. Kader testified Dean Smith told her bringing an attorney to the 
meeting could cause her to “face visa complications.” 
 
Dr. Kader was authorized to reside and work in the United States during her time at 
Harris-Stowe pursuant to a J-1 visa, a non-immigrant visa for individuals approved to 
participate in work- and study-based exchange visitor programs.  J-1 visas require an 
employer sponsor.  Harris-Stowe supplied information necessary to maintain Dr. Kader’s 
visa while she was on the faculty, but Penn State officially sponsored her visa from 2007 
until it expired in 2010.  When she joined the faculty, Harris-Stowe indicated it would 
assist Dr. Kader with obtaining a new visa after her J-1 visa expired.  Exchange visitors in 
the United States on J-1 visas usually return to their home countries for at least two years 
after their J-1 visas expire.  Visitors then apply for a new visa when they wish to return to 
the United States.  Dr. Kader, however, did not wish to return to Egypt for any period of 
time, so she filed for a waiver of the two-year waiting period to obtain an H1-B visa so she 
could continue teaching at Harris-Stowe.  Dr. Kader did not receive the waiver before her 
J-1 visa expired June 13, 2010.  After June 13, Dr. Kader no longer had J-1 status, and she 
was required to depart the United States during a 30-day grace period unless she secured 
another visa. 
While waiting to learn if she would receive a waiver of the two-year waiting period 
and obtain an H1-B visa, Dr. Kader also applied for an O-1 “extraordinary person” visa in 
a final effort to maintain work authorization.  Dr. Kader, through her immigration attorney, 
requested Harris-Stowe provide documentation to supplement her application, and  
Harris-Stowe complied.  After several weeks without hearing whether her O-1 visa was 
4 
granted, Dr. Kader contacted the agency responsible for processing the visa application.  
The agency told Dr. Kader it had requested additional information and supporting 
documentation from Harris-Stowe and received no response.  On June 11, 2010, two days 
before her J-1 visa was set to expire, Dr. Kader contacted Harris-Stowe about her O-1 visa 
application and the agency’s request for additional information and supporting 
documentation.  Harris-Stowe denied receiving any such request.  The O-1 visa application 
was subsequently denied, and Harris-Stowe did not appeal.  Because she lacked a valid 
visa, Harris-Stowe notified Dr. Kader her teaching contract for the 2010-11 academic year 
would not be renewed, and Harris-Stowe began seeking another individual to fill her 
position. 
Dr. Kader sued Harris-Stowe under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA),1 
alleging discrimination based on race and national origin.   She also sued for retaliation.  
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in Harris-Stowe’s favor on the 
race discrimination claim, but in Dr. Kader’s favor on her retaliation and national origin 
discrimination claims, awarding $750,000 in actual damages and $1.75 million in punitive 
damages.  The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.2  Harris-Stowe appeals, 
arguing the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial.3  Among the 
1  Chapter 213, RSMo 2016.  Statutory references, including references to chapter 213, are 
to to RSMo 2016.  Chapter 213 was amended, effective August 28, 2017.  Dr. Kader’s suit 
was filed in 2013 and went to trial in December 2015, so the case is governed by the statute 
prior to the 2017 amendments. 
2  Dr. Kader did not appeal the circuit court’s judgment entered in favor of Harris-Stowe 
on the race discrimination claim. 
3  This Court granted transfer of this case following an opinion by the court of appeals 
pursuant to Rule 83.04.
5 
circuit court’s jury instructions were two disjunctive jury instructions, instruction Nos. 8 
and 9, which are the subject of this appeal. 
Standard of Review 
“Whether a jury was instructed properly is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo.”  Ross-Paige v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep’t, 492 S.W.3d 164, 172 (Mo. banc 
2016).  Instructional error requires reversal only if the error resulted in prejudice materially 
affecting the merits of the case.  Hervey v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 379 S.W.3d 156, 159 (Mo. 
banc 2012).  “This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to submission of 
the instruction.”  Ross-Paige, 492 S.W.3d at 172.  “The party challenging the instruction 
must show that the offending instruction misdirected, misled, or confused the jury, 
resulting in prejudice to the party challenging the instruction.”  Id. 
Analysis 
In its dispositive point on appeal, Harris-Stowe argues the circuit court’s disjunctive 
jury instructions 8 and 9 misled and confused the jury, thereby resulting in prejudice. 
Harris-Stowe contends the instructions permitted the jury to find Harris-Stowe liable for 
conduct that is not actionable under the MHRA, resulting in prejudice.  This Court agrees. 
Because the evidence presented at trial does not establish Harris-Stowe violated the MHRA 
when it did not appeal the denial of Dr. Kader’s O-1 visa application, the circuit court’s 
jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial.   
A. National Origin Discrimination
Harris-Stowe argues the circuit court erred by including at least one alternative in 
the disjunctive national origin discrimination instruction that did not constitute actionable 
6 
conduct under the MHRA.  The MHRA prohibits discrimination in the workplace.  Howard 
v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Mo. banc 2011).  “The MHRA protects
important societal interests by prohibiting unlawful employment practices on the basis 
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).   
“[F]or disjunctive verdict directing instructions to be deemed appropriate, each 
alternative must be supported by substantial evidence.”  Ross-Paige, 492 S.W.3d at 172.  
A disjunctive instruction is prejudicial when substantial evidence does not support each 
disjunctive alternative because “there is no way of discerning which theory the jury chose.”  
Id. at 176.   
Jury instruction No. 8 was the verdict director submitted to the jury for Dr. Kader’s 
national origin discrimination claim.  The instruction stated: 
Your verdict must be for Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s national origin discrimination 
claim if you believe: 
First, either: 
Defendant did not respond to the USCIS request for evidence to 
support the O-1 Visa Petition; or 
Defendant did not appeal the denial of the O-1 Visa Petition; or 
Defendant did not renew Plaintiff’s employment contract; or 
Defendant denied Plaintiff a work leave of absence; and 
Second, Plaintiff’s national origin was a contributing factor in Defendant’s 
conduct in any one or more of the respects submitted in paragraph First, and 
Third, such conduct directly caused or directly contributed to cause damage 
to Plaintiff. 
7 
(Emphasis added).  Accordingly, substantial evidence must have been presented at trial 
showing Harris-Stowe’s failure to appeal the denial of Dr. Kader’s O-1 visa application 
was an “unlawful employment practice” under the MHRA.4 
Section 213.055 defines unlawful employment practices.  It provides, in pertinent 
part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . For an employer . . . 
(a) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s … national origin … ; [or]
(b) To … otherwise adversely affect [her] status as an employee, because
of such individual’s … national origin …. 
§ 213.055.1(1)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).  Dr. Kader argues seeking an appeal of her O-1
visa denial was a privilege of her employment with Harris-Stowe under § 213.055.1(1)(a).  
“Privileges of employment” are not defined in the MHRA or the code of state regulations. 
“In the absence of statutory definitions, the plain and ordinary meaning of a term may be 
derived from a dictionary, and by considering the context of the entire statute in which it 
appears.”  Mantia v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp., 529 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Mo. banc 2017).  A 
privilege is “a right … granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor.”  WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INT’L DICT. 1805 (2002).  Dr. Kader alleges Harris-Stowe denied her a 
4  This Court limits its holding to the second disjunctive option concerning Harris-Stowe’s 
failure to appeal the denial of Dr. Kader’s O-1 visa application.  This Court does not address 
the validity or invalidity of the other disjunctive options. 
8 
“peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor” of her employment when Harris-Stowe did not 
appeal her visa denial.   
What constitutes a privilege of employment necessarily varies depending on where 
the person is employed and what is considered a privilege, term or condition of that 
employment.  While appealing the denial of a visa application for a foreign teacher could 
be a privilege of employment at some institutions, there was no evidence Harris-Stowe 
specifically agreed to seek an appeal of an O-1 visa denial on Dr. Kader’s behalf.  There 
was no evidence it was Harris-Stowe’s practice to appeal O-1 visa denials for employees 
nor that it appealed O-1 visa denials for some employees but not for Dr. Kader.   
Furthermore, while Dr. Kader also argues Harris-Stowe’s failure to seek an appeal 
of her O-1 visa denial “adversely affected [her] status as an employee” in violation of 
§ 213.055.1(1)(b), her argument is misplaced in that it assumes she was eligible for the O-
1 visa and would have received the extraordinary person visa had Harris-Stowe appealed 
its denial.  The O-1 “extraordinary person” visa is reserved for aliens who possess 
“extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been 
demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim …, and whose achievements 
have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(O)(i) (2010).  “Extraordinary ability means a level of expertise indicating
that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field 
of endeavor.”  8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2) (2010).  “The ‘extraordinary ability’ designation is 
thus ‘extremely restrictive’ by design.”  Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (D.D.C. 
2013).  Indeed, federal courts have upheld the denial of extraordinary person visas to 
9 
remarkable individuals and overturned denial only in the rarest of circumstances.  Compare 
Kazarian v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 596 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming denial of theoretical physicist’s application who solved 20-year old physics 
problem) with Muni v. I.N.S., 891 F. Supp 440, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (overturning denial of 
professional hockey player’s application who played on the NHL’s best team for several 
years, won three Stanley Cups, earned a salary significantly higher than the average player, 
and was widely regarded as one of the league’s best defenders).  To qualify for the O-1 
extraordinary person visa, an applicant must present “documentation of either (1) a 
one-time achievement (that is, a major, international [sic] recognized award); or (2) at least 
three of the ten types of lesser achievements enumerated in the regulations.”  Visinscaia, 4 
F. Supp. 3d at 131 (internal quotations and citation omitted).5
Dr. Kader was just beginning her professional career.  Although she gained teaching 
experience in Egypt before coming to the United States, there was no evidence presented 
at trial Dr. Kader had become a preeminent expert in her field.  Dr. Kader’s immigration 
attorney did not provide documentation, and the evidence presented at trial does not show, 
Dr. Kader had received a major internationally recognized award or that she had 
accomplished at least three of the “lesser” achievements.  To be sure, this Court does not 
5 Although labeled “lesser” achievements, they are by no means insignificant.  Such 
achievements include: receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes; 
membership in an association requiring outstanding achievements of its members; 
publications in a major trade publication or major media; participation as a judge of others’ 
work in the alien’s field; authorship of scholarly articles; display of work at exhibitions or 
showcases; performing a leading or critical role for distinguished organizations; 
commanding 
a 
high 
salary; 
and 
commercial 
success 
in 
performing 
arts.  
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) (2010). 
10 
 
wish to diminish the significance of Dr. Kader’s academic achievements, but the evidence 
presented at trial does not show Dr. Kader is “one of that small percentage who have risen 
to the very top” of her field.  8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). 
Dr. Kader may have preferred Harris-Stowe seek an appeal of her denied O-1 visa 
application, but the failure to act on such an appeal does not automatically constitute an 
unlawful employment practice.  See Cunningham v. Kansas City Star Co., 995 F. Supp 
1010, 1025 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (applying the MHRA).  Rather, the “action must have had 
some adverse impact” on the plaintiff before it becomes actionable.  Id. (emphasis added).  
The evidence presented at trial did not provide a basis for the jury to find the failure to 
appeal the denied O-1 visa prevented Dr. Kader from obtaining an O-1 visa.  Rather,  
Dr. Kader’s ineligibility for the visa prevented her from receiving it.  Therefore, the failure 
to pursue the appeal did not have an impact on Dr. Kader’s employment status. 
Accordingly, the failure to appeal the denied O-1 visa application was not an 
unlawful employment practice under the MHRA.  The circuit court, therefore, erred by 
including in instruction 8 a disjunctive alternative concerning Harris-Stowe’s failure to 
seek an appeal of Dr. Kader’s denied O-1 visa application in its national origin 
discrimination instruction because the evidence presented at trial failed to establish that 
either appealing the denial of the visa application was a privilege of Dr. Kader’s 
employment with Harris-Stowe or failing to seek an appeal of the denial otherwise 
adversely affected her status as an employee. 
 
 
11 
B. Retaliation
Harris-Stowe also argues the circuit court’s disjunctive jury instruction on 
Dr. Kader’s retaliation claim was erroneous and prejudicial because at least one option did 
not constitute actionable retaliation under the MHRA.  Jury instruction No. 9 was the 
verdict director submitted to the jury for Dr. Kader’s retaliation claim.  Instruction No. 9 
stated: 
Your verdict must be for Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation if you 
believe:  
First, Plaintiff made complaints of discrimination, and 
Second, either: 
Defendant did not respond to the USCIS request for evidence to 
support the O-1 Visa Petition; or 
Defendant did not appeal the denial of the O-1 Visa Petition; or 
Defendant did not renew Plaintiff’s employment contract; or 
Defendant denied Plaintiff a work leave of absence; or 
Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s application for unemployment benefits; 
and 
Third, Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination were a contributing factor in 
any such actions described in the preceding paragraph Second, and 
Fourth, such conduct directly caused or directly contributed to cause damage 
to Plaintiff. 
(Emphasis added).  Similar to the instruction on Dr. Kader’s national origin discrimination 
claim, substantial evidence must have been presented at trial based on which the jury could 
12 
find the failure to appeal the denied O-1 visa prevented Dr. Kader from obtaining an O-1 
visa.  Ross-Paige, 492 S.W.3d at 172.6 
Dr. Kader argues Harris-Stowe failed to seek an appeal of the denial of her O-1 visa 
application in retaliation for Dr. Kader alleging she received an unfavorable faculty 
evaluation because of her race, religion, and national origin.  Under the MHRA, it is 
unlawful “To retaliate … in any manner against any other person because such person has 
opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter.”  § 213.070.1(2).  Although § 213.070 
proscribes retaliation “in any manner,” the “manner” in which an employer retaliates must 
nevertheless have some adverse impact on the plaintiff before it becomes actionable. 
McCrainey v. Kansas City Mo.Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Mo. App. 2011) (“To 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove … the 
employer took adverse action against him ….”).  Otherwise, the language of § 213.070 
would create a retaliation claim under the MHRA for any action occurring after an 
employee lodged a complaint of discrimination – so long as the complaint was found to be 
a contributing factor to the action – regardless of whether the action adversely effected the 
employee.   
Here, the evidence presented at trial does not provide a basis for finding 
Harris-Stowe’s failure to seek an appeal of the denied O-1 visa application adversely 
impacted Dr. Kader.  As explained above, failing to seek an appeal of the denied application 
6  Again, this Court limits its holding to the second disjunctive option, concerning 
Harris-Stowe’s failure to appeal the denial of Dr. Kader’s O-1 visa application.  This Court 
does not address the validity or invalidity of the other disjunctive options. 
13 
did not have an adverse impact on Dr. Kader because there was no evidence to suggest the 
appeal had any chance of succeeding.  O-1 visas are reserved for “that small percentage 
who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.”  8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2).  The 
evidence presented at trial does not show Dr. Kader is a member of this elite class eligible 
for the O-1 visa, so there was no evidence presented at trial showing the appeal would have 
been successful.  Therefore, the failure to seek and pursue the appeal did not have an 
adverse impact on Dr. Kader’s employment status. 
An action is not adverse simply because it is upsetting or disappointing to an 
employee.  Cunningham, 995 F. Supp at 1025.  Accordingly, the failure to appeal the 
denied visa application, therefore, was not unlawful retaliation under the MHRA.  The 
circuit court, therefore, erred by including a disjunctive alternative concerning 
Harris-Stowe’s failure to seek an appeal of Dr. Kader’s denied visa application in its 
retaliation instruction because the evidence presented at trial did not establish that failing 
to appeal Dr. Kader’s denied O-1 visa application adversely affected her employment with 
Harris-Stowe.   
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s disjunctive verdict directing instructions 8 and 9 were erroneous 
and prejudicial because they included at least one alternative that did not constitute 
actionable conduct under the MHRA.  The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the 
14 
case is remanded for a new trial on Dr. Kader’s retaliation and national origin 
discrimination claims.7  
        _____________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge
All concur. 
7  Dr. Kader also filed a motion in this Court to order Harris-Stowe to pay her attorney fees 
and costs on appeal “if the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.”  The MHRA 
authorizes a court to “award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.”  § 213.111.2.  “A prevailing party is one that succeeds on any significant issue in 
the litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”  
Holmes v. Kansas City Mo. Bd. of Police Comm’rs ex rel. its Members, 364 S.W.3d 615, 
631 (Mo. App. 2012).  This Court does not affirm the circuit court’s judgment, and 
Dr. Kader is not the prevailing party in this appeal.  Accordingly, the motion is overruled.