Title: Sadlier v. State
Citation: 251 N.E.2d 27, 252 Ind. 525
Docket Number: 369S54
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 1969

252 Ind. 525 (1969)
251 N.E.2d 27
SADLIER ET AL.
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 369S54.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 24, 1969.
*526 William F. LeMond, Indianapolis, for appellants.
Theodore L. Sendak. Attorney General, Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
ARTERBURN, J.
The state of Indiana filed a complaint against the appellants, which sought to condemn the land owned by the appellant, Mrs. DeEtta Sadlier, and leased to appellant, Warren M. Atkinson. The complaint asked for the appointment of appraisers and alleged that the land was needed for the building of a public highway in Marion County, Indiana. The complaint further alleged that the highway was "one of and a part of the State Highway System of the State of Indiana." The complaint described by legal description the land sought to be condemned and recited that the state, through the Indiana State Highway Commission, had made an effort to purchase the needed real estate and temporary easement described in the complaint, but had been unable to reach an agreement with the appellants.
Appellant Atkinson filed objections to the complaint, which were as follows:
The appellants assign as error the overruling of the objections and the appointing of appraisers.
For the purpose of this appeal the appellants combine their objections one and two and objections three and four. We will likewise combine the objections.
Although the state avers in the complaint that an effort to purchase the real estate from the owners was made, appellants contend that the filing of objections to the complaint contesting the averment puts the alleged attempt to purchase in issue.
Appellants' position ignores the provisions of Burns' § 3-1707a, which provides in substance that in all proceedings by the State Highway Department of Indiana or any state agency acting in its stead that has the right to exercise the power of eminent domain for such public use, "... the said department in its action for condemnation shall not be required to prove that an offer to purchase was made ..."
The appellants urge that Burns' § 3-1707a does not apply unless the condemnation suit is brought by the State Highway Department of Indiana. Here the sole plaintiff is the State of Indiana and the appellants contend the provisions would not apply. We do not agree with appellants' position. The State Highway Department of Indiana has been held to be incapable of bringing suit in its own name.
We further point out that Burns' § 3-1707a is a portion of the Acts of 1961, Ch. 317, § 2, p. 884. This amends the old Condemnation Act of 1905, Ch. 48, upon which the appellants rely for their contention that the state, in condemnation actions brought on behalf of the State Highway Department, must prove that an offer was made to the land-owner. Although we as a Court may feel that land-owners are entitled to have offers and attempts at settlement made prior to condemnation actions, nevertheless the legislature constitutionally is the one that has the right to determine such prerequisites to condemnation actions, and we have no right to override the plain statement of the legislature in regard to actions brought on behalf of the State Highway Department. We therefore find that the appellants' contention may not be sustained in this case.
The appellants next argue that even if the jurisdictional requirement of an offer is met, the complaint is still defective because it excluded from the property sought to be appropriated a tract of land containing 3.855 acres. Appellants' position is that the 3.855 acre tract of land should be included in the description of the land appropriated since the state's action has substantially destroyed the beneficial use and enjoyment of the land. The appellants contend such action by the state amounted to a total taking.
The facts are that the appellant, Mrs. Sadlier, owned land which appellant Atkinson leased with an option to purchase. The land was abutted to the north by East 82nd Street and to the west by Indiana Highway #100. The state seeks to obtain the fee title to a portion of appellant's land for use as an interstate highway. The proposed plan calls for the *530 interstate to take such a path through the ground that the extreme northwest corner of appellant's property is severed from the residue. A single point of access to the "island" of land is provided in the southwest corner.
The appellants' fourth objection alleges that the state should have also included in the land sought to be condemned the appellants' fee interests in Highway #100 and East 82nd Street. The plans for the interstate highway call for the construction of a limited access fence between these fee interests and the residual lands of appellants.
Both of these objections can be disposed of together. In order to appropriate the necessary land the complaint is sufficient if the actual land sought to be appropriated is described. As stated in 11 I.L.E., Eminent Domain, § 92, p. 647:
This statement is further amplified by the case of Darrow v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 99, 81 N.E. 1081, which holds at pages 103 and 104:
As pointed out by the numerous cases cited by the appellants and specifically by statute, injuries suffered by the residual land which occur due to the taking of land by eminent domain proceedings, have been held compensable. Burns' § 3-1706. However, the question of whether the injury to the residual land of appellants is compensable in this case is not now before us. Our holding is *531 that the state needs only to include the actual land sought to be appropriated in the complaint. The damage sustained by the residuary land can be made the subject of an instruction to the court-appointed appraisers. The issue of compensation is formed by filing objections to the appraisers' award. Van Sickle v. Kokomo Water Works Co. (1959), 239 Ind. 612, 158 N.E.2d 460.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DeBruler, C.J., and Hunter and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 251 N.E.2d 27.