Title: Ex parte Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., d/b/a BMA Magnolia a/k/a Fresenius Medical Care Magnolia Grove.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150362
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2016

Rel: 07/15/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1150362
____________________
Ex parte Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., d/b/a
BMA Magnolia a/k/a Fresenius Medical Care Magnolia Grove
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: William Corey Howard, administrator of the Estate of
Pamela G. Howard, deceased
v.
Providence Hospital et al.)
____________________
1150363
____________________
Ex parte Providence Hospital
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: William Corey Howard, administrator of the Estate of
Pamela G. Howard, deceased
v.
Providence Hospital et al.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-14-901859)
PER CURIAM.
Providence Hospital and Bio-Medical Applications of
Alabama, Inc., 
d/b/a 
BMA 
Magnolia a/k/a 
Fresenius Medical Care
Magnolia Grove (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
defendants") separately petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to enter a summary
judgment in their favor.  Because we conclude that the
wrongful-death action filed against the defendants is a
nullity, we grant the petitions.
Pamela G. Howard ("Pamela") died on September 24, 2012. 
One of Pamela's sons, Michael Darrick Howard ("Darrick"),
petitioned the probate court to probate her will and to grant
him letters testamentary.  Attached to Darrick's petition was
a document in which Pamela's other son, William Corey Howard
("Corey"), agreed that Darrick should be granted letters
testamentary.  On January 6, 2014, the probate court granted
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1150362, 1150363
Darrick 
letters 
testamentary, 
establishing 
him 
as 
the 
personal
representative of Pamela's estate.  Under § 6-5-410, Ala. Code
1975, only Darrick, as personal representative, had the
authority to bring a wrongful-death action.  See Ex parte
Hubbard Props., Inc.,[Ms. 1141196, March 4, 2016] ___ So. 3d
___ (Ala. 2016).  
On June 26, 2014, Corey filed a wrongful-death action
against the defendants, which had provided health-care
services to Pamela shortly before her death.  On September 26,
2014, more than two years after Pamela's death, the defendants
filed separate motions for a summary judgment; they argued,
among other things, that Corey's wrongful-death action was a
nullity because it had not been initiated by Darrick, the
personal representative of Pamela's estate.  A few days later,
Corey filed a motion under Rule 17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to
substitute Darrick as the plaintiff.  The trial court held a
hearing on the defendants' summary-judgment motions and on
Corey's motion to substitute Darrick as the plaintiff.  On
December 2, 2015, the trial court denied the summary-judgment
motions and ordered the substitution of Darrick as the
plaintiff.  The 
defendants 
then filed their separate petitions
3
1150362, 1150363
for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to direct the trial
court to enter a summary judgment in their favor.
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it will be 'issued only when there is: 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex parte United
Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
1993)."
Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894
(Ala. 1998). 
The defendants correctly argue that this case is "on all
fours" with this Court's recent decision in Ex parte Hubbard
Properties, supra, which summarized the law regarding the
effect of the filing of a wrongful-death action under § 6-5-
410 by someone other than the personal representative and a
subsequent 
effort 
to 
substitute 
the 
personal 
representative 
as
the plaintiff.  Ex parte Hubbard Properties demonstrates that
Corey's wrongful-death action is a nullity and that the
defendants are entitled to a summary judgment.
In Ex parte Hubbard Properties, after the decedent's
death, letters of administration were issued to the county
administrator, making her the personal representative of the
4
1150362, 1150363
decedent's estate.  The decedent's widow then filed a
wrongful-death action under § 6-5-410 as the decedent's
"attorney in fact."  However, under that statute, the personal
representative, not the decedent's widow, is the proper party
to file a wrongful-death action.  More than two years after
the decedent's death, the decedent's widow sought to
substitute the personal representative as the plaintiff in 
her
wrongful-death action, and the trial court allowed the
substitution.  The defendants filed a motion for a summary
judgment, which the trial court denied.  The defendants then
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court,
arguing that the wrongful-death action was a nullity because
it had not been filed by the personal representative and that
the personal representative could not be substituted as the
plaintiff.  We agreed, explaining:
"In Waters v. Hipp, 600 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala.
1992), this Court explained:
"'A wrongful death action is purely
statutory; no such action existed at common
law.  Simmons v. Pulmosan Safety Equipment
Corp., 471 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ala. 1979). 
Section 6–5–410 provides that the personal
representative of the deceased may bring a
wrongful death action.  A "personal
representative," for the purposes of §
6–5–410, 
is 
an 
executor 
or 
an
5
1150362, 1150363
administrator.  Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala.
65, 175 So. 2d 759 (1965).  One who sues
under this section without having been
appointed executor or administrator does
not qualify under this section as a
personal representative, and the suit is a
nullity.  Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Pool, 375 So. 2d 465 (Ala. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 930, 100 S. Ct. 1318, 63
L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980).'
"In 
this 
case, 
the 
undisputed 
evidence
establishes that [the personal representative] was
appointed the administratrix of [the decedent's]
estate 15 days before [the decedent's widow] filed
the 
wrongful-death 
action. 
 
Therefore, 
[the
decedent's widow] was without the authority to file
the wrongful-death action, and that action is a
nullity.  See Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., 146 So. 3d
1041, 1042-43 (Ala. 2013) ('The statute providing
for a wrongful-death action, § 6–5–410(a), Ala. Code
1975, allows only a personal representative of the
deceased's estate to bring such an action.'); see
also Waters, supra.  Finally, because the action is
a nullity, [the personal representative] could not
be substituted as the plaintiff.  See generally
Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465,
466 (Ala. 1979) ('In the present case, Johnnie E.
Parker filed suit without having been appointed
executor or administrator.  Since he did not qualify
under § 6-5-410 as a personal representative this
suit was a nullity.  Therefore, the doctrine of
relation back, found in Rule 15(c), [Ala. R. Civ.
P.], does not apply.').
"... [W]e conclude that the action [the
decedent's widow] filed is a nullity and that the
substitution of [the personal representative] as the
plaintiff was not sufficient to overcome that fatal
error. ..." 
Ex parte Hubbard Properties, ___ So. 3d at ___.
6
1150362, 1150363
Ex 
parte 
Hubbard 
Properties 
is 
materially
indistinguishable from this case.  Darrick was appointed
personal representative of Pamela's estate; thus, Darrick was
the only person with the authority to file a wrongful-death
action under § 6-5-410.   However, Corey filed the wrongful-
1
death action.  Because Corey lacked the authority to file the
wrongful-death action, that action is a nullity, like the
action in Ex parte Hubbard Properties.  Further, because the
action is a nullity, Darrick could not be substituted as the
plaintiff. 
Corey, however, argues that this case is distinguishable
from Ex parte Hubbard Properties. He argues that, unlike the
personal representative in Ex parte Hubbard Properties,
Darrick authorized Corey to bring the wrongful-death action
under § 43-2-843(17), Ala. Code 1975, which allows a personal
representative to employ an agent to perform "any act of
administration."  The defendants, however, argue that § 43-2-
843(17) is inapplicable.  Corey contends that we may not
consider the defendants' argument addressing § 43-2-843(17)
This 
case 
concerns 
§ 
6-5-410, 
Alabama's 
general 
wrongful-
1
death statute.  We note that § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975, which
provides for a wrongful-death action based on the death of a
minor, permits a father or mother to sue under that statute. 
7
1150362, 1150363
because they did not present those arguments in the trial
court or in their mandamus petitions.  The defendants first
directly addressed the applicability of § 43-2-843(17) in
their reply briefs filed in this Court in response to Corey's
argument that that statute is applicable.  Thus, Corey argues
that we should accept his argument that § 43-2-843(17)
authorized Darrick to employ Corey to file the wrongful-death
action as uncontroverted and deny the defendants' 
petitions on
that basis.  
Typically an appellant or a petitioner may not present an
argument that was not raised in the trial court or that was
presented to this Court for the first time in a reply brief. 
Birmingham Bd. of Educ. v. Boyd, 877 So. 2d 592, 594 (Ala.
2003).  However, those prohibitions are inapplicable here.  In
the trial court, Corey argued that § 43-2-843(17) allowed him
to file the wrongful-death action despite the fact that he was
not the personal representative.  That argument was a
secondary one, and, significantly, it was not a basis of the
trial court's December 2, 2015, order, which was founded on a
separate argument made by Corey.  Although the defendants did
not mention § 43-2-843(17) in their arguments to the trial
8
1150362, 1150363
court, they essentially addressed Corey's argument regarding
§ 43-2-843(17) by maintaining that the action commenced by
Corey 
is 
simply 
a 
nullity 
because 
only 
a 
personal
representative may file a wrongful-death action under § 6-5-
410.  See, e.g., Ex parte Hubbard Properties.  Further, the
defendants cannot be faulted for failing to discuss § 43-2-
843(17) in their mandamus petitions because that statute was
not a basis of the trial court's order, which was grounded on
another argument made by Corey.  Finally, the defendants in
their reply briefs are allowed to respond to arguments raised
by Corey in his brief, including the argument that § 43-2-
843(17) is applicable.  "[I]t is well settled that 'where an
appellee raises a[n] argument not addressed by the appellant
in its opening brief, the appellant may reply.'"  McCray v.
Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 241 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 69–70 n. 2 (7th
Cir. 1987)).  The defendants' arguments regarding the
applicability of § 43-2-843(17) are therefore properly before
us.
We now turn to the merits of Corey's argument that this
case is distinguishable from Ex parte Hubbard 
Properties 
based
9
1150362, 1150363
on the application of § 43-2-843(17), which is a part of the
Probate Procedure Act, § 43-2-830 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
Corey argues that, unlike the personal representative in Ex
parte Hubbard Properties, Darrick authorized Corey to bring
the wrongful-death action under § 43-2-843(17).  
Section 
43-2-
843 provides, in pertinent part:
"Except as restricted or otherwise provided by
the will or by an order of court and subject to the
priorities stated in Section 43-8-76, a personal
representative, acting prudently for the benefit of
the interested persons, may properly:
"....
"(17) 
Employ 
necessary 
persons,
including appraisers, attorneys, auditors
(who 
may 
include 
certified 
public
accountants, 
public 
accountants, 
or
internal 
auditors), 
investment 
advisors, 
or
agents, even if they are associated with
the personal representative, to advise or
assist the personal representative in the
performance of administrative duties; act
without independent investigation upon
recommendations of agents or advisors; and
instead of acting personally, employ one or
more 
agents 
to 
perform 
any 
act 
of
administration, 
whether 
or 
not
discretionary."
(Emphasis added.)  Corey argues that § 43-2-843(17) allowed
Darrick, as the personal representative of Pamela's 
estate, 
to
appoint Corey as Darrick's agent to bring the wrongful-death
10
1150362, 1150363
action.  Corey cites his and Darrick's affidavits as evidence
of such an appointment.  In their affidavits, Corey and
Darrick testified that they had mistakenly believed that they
were both personal representatives of the estate and that they
had agreed that Corey would be responsible for filing the
wrongful-death action. 
However, § 43-2-843(17) does not apply to this wrongful-
death action.  Section 43-2-843(17) allows the personal
representative to employ an agent "to perform any act of
administration," and filing a wrongful-death action is not an
"act of administration."  "In [a wrongful-death action], the
personal representative 
acts 
as 
agent of legislative
appointment" and, upon recovery, "acts as a quasi trustee for
those who are entitled thereto under the statute of
distribution. Such damages are not subject to administration
and do not become a part of the deceased's estate." United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Birmingham Oxygen Serv., Inc., 290
Ala. 149, 155, 274 So. 2d 615, 621 (1973).  
"[The 
wrongful-death] 
statute 
authorizes 
suit 
to
be brought by the personal representative for a
definite legislative purpose –– to prevent homicide. 
In 
prosecuting 
such 
actions, 
the 
personal
representative does not act strictly in his capacity
as administrator of the estate of his decedent,
11
1150362, 1150363
because he is not proceeding to reduce to possession
the estate of his decedent, but rather he is
asserting a right arising after his death, and
because the damages recovered are not subject to the
payment of the debts or liabilities of the
decedent."
Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 68, 175 So. 2d 759, 761 (1965). 
This is a long-established principle in Alabama law. 
Discussing an earlier version of Alabama's wrongful-death
statute, this Court observed that the legislature has
"impose[d] upon the administrator a trust separate
and distinct from the administration.  The trust is
not for the benefit of the estate, but of the widow,
children, or next of kin of the deceased. The
administrator fills this trust, but he does not do
it in the capacity of representative of the estate.
It is altogether distinct from the administration,
notwithstanding it is filled by the administrator."
Hicks v. Barrett, 40 Ala. 291, 293 (1866) (discussing Ala.
Code of 1852, § 1938).  See also Wood v. Wayman, 47 So. 3d
1212, 1217 (Ala. 2010) (concluding that the relation-back
provision of § 43-2-831, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Probate
Procedure Act, did not apply to a wrongful-death action
brought under § 6-5-410); and Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So. 3d
1038, 1043 (Ala. 2013) (concluding that a part of the Probate
Procedure Act, § 43-2-848, Ala. Code 1975, which entitles the
personal representative to compensation for services, did not
12
1150362, 1150363
allow a personal representative to be compensated from the
proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action). 
Thus, § 43-2-843(17), because it concerns acts of
administration, does not apply to a wrongful-death action. 
Therefore, that statute does not alter our determination that
this case is materially indistinguishable from Ex parte
Hubbard Properties.  Accordingly, there is no need for us to
determine whether the facts indicate that Corey was actually
acting as Darrick's agent under § 43-2-843(17) when Corey
filed the wrongful-death action.  
The wrongful-death action filed by Corey is a nullity,
and, because the action is a nullity, Darrick could not be
substituted as the plaintiff.  Ex parte Hubbard Properties. 
Therefore, we grant the petitions for the writ of mandamus and
direct the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.
1150362 –– PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1150363 –– PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
 
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, and Main, JJ., concur.
Murdock, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
13
1150362, 1150363
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting). 
I agree with the main opinion that § 43-2-843(17), Ala.
Code 1975, does not authorize a personal representative to
delegate to another person the authority to bring a wrongful-
death action.  I also agree that, having concluded that the
wrongful-death action brought by William Corey Howard
("Corey") in this case is a nullity under this Court's holding
in Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc., [Ms. 1141196, March 4,
2016] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2016), the Court acts appropriately
to address the issue of the applicability of § 43-2-843(17) in
the manner that it does.  
As regards the latter point, it was not on the basis of
§ 43-2-843(17) that the trial court denied the defendants'
motions for a summary judgment.  Whether the applicability of
§ 43-2-843(17) was raised in the respondent's brief or not,
therefore, it may be considered by this appellate court as an
alternative basis for affirming the trial court's decision to
deny the summary-judgment motions if, but only if, this Court
can decide that it constitutes an alternative valid, legal
ground for affirming the trial court's decision that can be
addressed without violating the petitioners' due-process
14
1150362, 1150363
rights.  That is, it could provide a basis for affirming the
trial court's decision if this Court could decide (a) as a
matter of law that it represents a (b) valid ground for
affirming the trial court's decision and that our invocation
of it (c) does not implicate due-process concerns.  See
Pavilion Dev., L.L.C. v. JBJ P'ship, 979 So. 2d 24 (Ala.
2007); Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Alabama Health
Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003).
In this case, the Court decides that this ground does not
represent a "valid" legal ground for affirming the trial
court's decision.  That is, the factual issue whether  Michael
Darrick Howard did in fact authorize Corey to act as his agent
in bringing a wrongful-death action against the defendants
need not be reached because of the main opinion's negative
answer to the purely legal question whether § 43-2-843(17)
would be applicable even if such an authorization had occurred
as a factual matter.  And given the procedural history of this
case, I see no due-process implications to the Court's having
considered the question. 
That said, however, I must dissent in this case because
of my disagreement with the premise that the complaint here
15
1150362, 1150363
was a "nullity."  It was based on my disagreement with the
notion that a complaint similar to the one at issue here was 
a "nothing" that I dissented in Hubbard Properties, the
decision upon which the main opinion primarily relies, as well
as in Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd ex rel. Kidd, [Ms. 1140706,
Jan. 29, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2016) (Murdock, J.,
dissenting) (urging a return to the holding in Ogle v. Gordon,
706 So. 2d 707 (Ala. 1997)), Richards v. Baptist Health Sys.,
Inc., 176 So. 3d 179, 179 (Ala. 2014) (Murdock, J.,
dissenting), and Wood v. Wayman, 47 So. 3d 1212, 1220 (Ala.
2010) (Murdock, J., dissenting).
16
1150362, 1150363
BRYAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  See Northstar Anesthesia of
Alabama, LLC v. Noble, [Ms. 1141158, July 8, 2016] ___ So. 3d
___ , ___ (Ala. 2016) (Bryan, J., dissenting).
17