Title: Shamblin v. Beasley
Citation: 1998 OK 88, 69OBJ3098, 967 P.2d 1200
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 1998

Shamblin v. Beasley Annotate this Case Shamblin v. Beasley 1998 OK 88 967 P.2d 1200 69 OBJ 3098 Case Number: 88965 Decided: 09/15/1998 Modified: 01/28/1999 Mandate Issued: 10/15/1998 Supreme Court of Oklahoma JAMES E. SHAMBLIN, Plaintiff/Defendant on Counterclaim-Appellee, v. ALLEN BEASLEY and HELEN J. BEASLEY, husband and wife, PORT DUNCAN REALTY COMPANY, PORT DUNCAN OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, and ESTEY CABINET DOOR, Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellants. [967 P.2d 1203] ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. II. ¶0 In an action by an out-of-possession purchaser (a) to quiet title in property acquired at tax resale and (b) for ejectment of spousal possessors from the land, the defendants (previous owners and present occupiers as well as the mortgage lender) counterclaimed to cancel the resale tax deed and to quiet the spousal owners' title in the land. Their counterclaims were rested on the county treasurer's failure to comply with statutory pre-sale notice requirements. The District Court, Delaware County, Sam C. Fullerton, trial judge, gave summary judgment to the purchaser. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari granted upon counterclaimants' (spousal owners and mortgage lender) petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED ONLY (a) INSOFAR AS IT ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE TITLE OF SPOUSAL DEFENDANTS AND (b) REVERSED INSOFAR AS IT ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE INTEREST OF THE LENDER; AND CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR DISPOSITION OF LENDER'S DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT Tommy R. Dyer, Jr., Davis & Thompson, Jay, Oklahoma for Appellants Richard D. James, W. Neil Wilson, Wallace, Owens, Landers, Gee, Morrow, Wilson, Watson & James, Miami, Oklahoma for Appellee OPALA, J. ¶1 The three dispositive issues presented on certiorari are: (1) Does the evidentiary material in the record provide undisputed proof that the service of statutory pre-sale notice on the wife-owner by delivery to her husband satisfies the fundamental law's due process standards? (2) Do the alleged irregularities in the publication notice invalidate the tax resale? and (3) Does the evidentiary material tendered by the lender at nisi prius raise a fact issue on the merits of the controversy which was not fit for disposition by summary process? We answer the first and the third questions in the affirmative and the second in the negative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 The spousal possessors, Allen and Helen Beasley [counterclaimants, former or spousal owners, or husband and wife], had failed to pay ad valorem taxes on their [967 P.2d 1204] homestead, which was sold to the county at a delinquent tax sale. A. Tax Resale Purchaser's Plea For Summary Judgment ¶3 The purchaser's suit is based on his claim to a superior title acquired by resale tax deed, which operates in law to extinguish the spousal owners' and the lender's statutory opportunity for redeeming the land from ad valorem lien. There is no dispute that the husband signed both the receipt for the notice-bearing certified mail directed to his wife as well as for that which was addressed to him. B. Former Owners' Counterclaim and Their Summary Judgment Quest ¶4 The spousal defendants argue several affirmative defenses to defeat the purchaser's suit. According to their joint answer, the wife's due process rights were violated because (a) she failed to receive "actual notice" of the resale and (b) her notice of resale, given by certified mail, went to the husband, who neither delivered the critical letter to her nor informed her of the impending sale.8 Both spouses claim the sale is fatally tainted by irregularities because the published notice (a) fails to inform them of the location of the sale, (b) states that the property was being sold under certain cited statutory provisions which had been renumbered in a subsequent official compilation and were no longer in force, (c) fails to include the date the property was sold to the county for delinquent taxes9 and (d) improperly refers to the 1991, 1992 and 1993 tax rolls, rather than to the "last tax rolls in the treasurer's office".10 Spousal defendants, who aver in their counterclaim that the resale tax deed is void for all the reasons stated in their answer, seek to have their own title quieted. ¶5 In support of their quest for relief by summary process, husband and wife submitted separate affidavits. According to that of the wife (a) her husband failed to deliver to her the notice of sale that was mailed by the county treasurer in an envelope addressed to her, (b) she did not receive "actual notice" that her home was to be sold for delinquent taxes on 10 June 1996, (c) her husband was not an authorized agent to sign the receipt for certified mail directed to her or to acknowledge her receipt of the notice from the county treasurer and (d) her husband did not [967 P.2d 1206] tell her about the sale of her home for delinquent tax liability until after the sale had been completed. The husband's affidavit states that (a) the certified letter addressed to him and that directed to his wife were both delivered to him at his jobsite (rather than at his residence),11 (b) he was not aware of any attempt to serve the certified letter upon his wife, (c) he still has possession of the unopened notice-bearing envelope addressed to his wife, (d) his wife had neither appointed him as her agent nor authorized him to accept certified mail on her behalf, and (e) he and his wife do not file joint income tax returns; each of them bears individual responsibility for a self-assessment to be declared. C. Lender's Counterclaim and Quest For Summary Judgment ¶6 The lender's affirmative defenses are nearly identical to those of the spousal defendants. He alleges that notice of the tax resale, delivered by certified mail, restricted delivery, and signed for by his grandson, Mike Laubach, does not satisfy the fundamental requirements of due process. Lender's counterclaim similarly argues that the resale tax deed is void and that, subject to lender's mortgage, the spousal defendants' title should be quieted. ¶7 According to the lender's summary judgment affidavit, his grandson (a) picked up the notice-bearing envelope from the mortgage company's post office box but failed to deliver it to the addressee-lender, (b) is not an officer or employee of the mortgage company and was not expressly authorized to receive mail on the lender's behalf, (c) is an employee of a building supply company that shares a post office box with the mortgage company and (d) was not authorized to sign the receipt for the notice of sale addressed to the lender which had called for restricted delivery to the addressee. D. The Efficacy Of Facially Valid Service That Is Assailed As Fraught With A Hidden Infirmity Ordinarily Presents A Question Of Fact ¶8 The validity of service on the wife and on the lender presents here both a matter of defense against the purchaser's quiet title suit as well as a critical "issue on the merits"12 in the respective parties' counterclaims.13 What is on or dehors the merits depends on whether the issue at hand affects one or more elements of the claim for relief or any elements of the defense that stands interposed against the claim.14 If a case tenders a fact issue on the merits of the controversy it is unfit for disposition by summary process.15 The issue must be resolved by submission to the trier.16 A resale tax deed, facially meeting the basic statutory [967 P.2d 1207] prerequisites, cuts off the redemption opportunity for those affected parties who are not then under some legal disability.17 Service that is facially valid, but latently ineffective, is not impervious to attack for an infirmity that lies beneath the record's surface.18 A challenge launched under the provisions of 12 O.S. 1991 §103119 to the validity of service that is facially regular, though alleged to be fraught with a hidden defect, presents an issue of fact that must be resolved upon consideration of proof extraneous to the face of the record. The attack is timely if brought within three years.20 The defendants' challenge to the validity of service was hence timely pressed. II STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ¶9 The focus in summary process is not on facts a plaintiff might be able to prove at trial (i.e., the legal sufficiency of evidence that could be adduced), but rather on whether the tendered evidentiary material, viewed as a whole, (a) shows undisputed facts on some or all material issues, which facts (b) support but a single inference that favors the movant's quest for relief.21 [967 P.2d 1208] Summary process - a special procedural track to be conducted with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes22 - is a search for undisputed material facts that would support but a single inference which favors the movant. It is a method for identifying and isolating non-triable fact issues, not a device for defeating the opponent's right to trial. Only that evidentiary material which entirely eliminates from testing by trial some or all material fact issues will provide legitimate support for nisi prius use of summary relief in whole or in part. All inferences to be drawn from the evidentiary material must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.23 The function of summary process is not to set the stage for trial by affidavit, but to afford a method of summarily terminating a case (or eliminating from trial some of its issues) when only questions of law remain.24 Summary process applies in a like manner to issues that are tendered in legal as well as in equitable claims (or counterclaims).25 III THE WIFE CANNOT SUCCEED IN SECURING A SENTENCE OF NULLITY FOR THE SERVICE EFFECTED BY THE HUSBAND'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOTICE-BEARING ENVELOPE ADDRESSED TO HER AS ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THE CASE ¶10 Both spousal owners seek to reinstate the legal redemption period by setting aside the tax resale. One of the wife's affirmative defenses (and her counterclaim) must stand or fall on the adequacy of personal notice to her by service of process effected on the husband. The remainder of spousal defenses, which are joint, rests on the validity of the published notice, whose content is alleged not to comport with the statutory requirements. A. The Principles Of Agency Law Do Not Govern The Constitutional Quality of Notice Served Through Another ¶11 The binding effect that acceptance of service by one person for another may have on the latter, although often characterized in terms of agency,26 is not truly governed by the principles of agency law,27 but rather by constitutional norms that shape the quality of notice that is one's due. A person statutorily appointed to receive service for another is not a true agent within the meaning of agency law.28 For the rules of agency to come into play, the "representation" of one person by another must be intended to affect the principal's legal position.29 The wife's challenge to service in this case does not call for a test based on agency rules; rather, it raises the constitutional question of whether, in the context of this litigation, one spouse's receipt of notice directed to another may be binding on the other spouse as the latter's "actual notice". [967 P.2d 1209] B. Notice Must Pass Muster Under The Criteria of Due Process ¶12 Service is not subject to invalidation for any departure from the mode prescribed by statute. When it is alleged that there was want of strict compliance with statutory requirements for service, the court must in every case determine whether the found departure offends the standards of due process and thus may be deemed to have deprived a party of its fundamental right to notice.30 Notice is a jurisdictional requirement and a sine qua non element of due process.31 The latter notion requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.32 As the Constitution inexorably commands, no one's rights may be adversely affected in the absence of due and timely notice that affords a full and fair opportunity to defend.33 The right to be heard is of little value unless a party is fairly and timely apprised of what interests are sought to be affected by process that is triggered.34 C. The Reasonable Probability That The Person Who Was Not Individually Served Will Receive Actual Notice By One Who Accepted Service For Another ¶13 Failure to open delivered certified mail containing vital notice is not by itself a vitiating infirmity in the course of imparting knowledge that is the addressee's due. So long as the notice-giving process does not fall below the standard of that which is due, it is not subject to invalidation.35 When it is tested by the gauge of due process, judicial approval (or condemnation) of the husband's receipt of notice directed to his wife must depend on whether in the context of the case there is a reasonable probability that the person who was not individually served will receive actual notice from one by whom service was accepted.36 A [967 P.2d 1210] finding of agency is neither critical nor indispensable to the constitutional standard for measuring the reasonable probability of actual notice reaching the intended party. It is the totality of circumstances - not the particular norms of statutory requirements - that dictates the quality of service necessary to safeguard an individual's property interest at stake.37 D. Service Effected On A Member Of One's Household Is Recognized As Valid ¶14 Legislation in force since statehood recognizes as effective that service which was made on a member of one's household by leaving a copy of the process with any person (15 years or older) who is then residing at the "dwelling house" or "usual place of abode" of the person to whom process is directed. See the provisions of 12 O.S.Supp.1996 §2004(C)(1)(c)(1)38 The statute also provides that an appointment may be made by the addressee or "by law" for acceptance of service for another. This provision represents our legal system's long-standing confirmation that effective service need not be made exclusively on one to whom process is addressed.39 The conceptual underpinning for the provisions of §2004(C)(1)(c)(1) is not in a notion of agency or of kinship (by consanguinity or affinity), but rather in the law's perceived bond by cohabitation in a common dwelling.40 The test we apply today has the very same underpinning. The constitutional norms of quality are not dependent on where service was effected on another. The fundamental-law test is based on the reasonable probability41 that [967 P.2d 1211] the person to whom service is directed will receive actual notice from one who accepted service for another as the latter's lawful designee. The service in this case is to be treated as within the guidelines prescribed by §2004(C)(1)(c)(1) and of the general policy expressed in it. E. The Combined Components Of Notice-Giving Process In Contest Militate In Favor Of Concluding That Service Of Wife's Notice On The Husband Does Not Offend The Minimum Standards Of Due Process ¶15 The commonality of the affected owners' interests - both in the conjugal as well as in the property ownership regime sense - is critical in ascertaining whether, consistently with the "reasonable probability" test, service on the husband will in this case be deemed binding on his wife. Among the circumstances to be considered here are the following combined components: (a) the existence of spousal status (the owners' matrimonial bond), (b) their joint ownership of the property in question, (c) the fact that by the legal impact of proceedings for tax resale their respective interests were affected alike, (d) the notice was critical and beneficial to the preservation of both spousal owners' interests, (e) the fact of their cohabitation, at the critical time in question, by maintaining a joint residence in a common dwelling, and (f) the property's homestead status. Another important factor to be weighed here is the absence of allegation in any of the spouses' affidavits that at the time material to the notice the spousal owners were either estranged or living separately from one another, or that they otherwise stood, with respect to the property interest in litigation, in a position antagonistic to one another. ¶16 We hence apply the totality-of-circumstances test to conclude that there was here a reasonable probability that if the service of process directed to the wife was accepted and signed by the husband on her behalf, the nonreceiving spouse will be afforded actual notice of the pendency of the tax resale. The notice served on the husband was beneficial to the preservation of both spousal parties' interests in the then commonly owned and possessed property, and the impact of the then-impending tax resale upon their individual interest was identical.42 In sum, the service on the wife through her husband does not fall here below the minimum standards of process that was her due. ¶17 The wife - having tendered no fact issue in this case which would overcome the presumption of regularity in the service of process made through the husband - is not entitled to a judicial declaration that would relieve her of the legal consequences flowing from the husband's acceptance of service for her. It follows that the critical resale tax deed did extinguish both spousal owners' equity of redemption. Today's holding is not to be enlarged by reading into it the principle that the wife would be bound by service delivered to the husband in a context other than the circumstances presented by this case. IV ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES IN THE PUBLICATION NOTICE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE THE TAX RESALE ¶18 The counterclaimants argue that because the tax resale is fatally tainted by irregularities in the text of the published statutory notice of tax resale, it should be invalidated and the deed canceled under the doctrine of strictissimi juris.43 According to their argument, the published notice (a) [967 P.2d 1212] failed to identify the location of the resale, (b) states that the property was being sold under certain statutory provisions which had been renumbered in the official compilation and were no longer in force, (c) failed to include the date the property was sold to the county for delinquent taxes44 and (d) improperly refers to the 1991, 1992 and 1993 tax rolls, rather than to the date of the last tax rolls in the treasurer's office. ¶19 The attack on the notice wrongly presupposes that any deviation from the statutory requirements renders the tax resale fatally defective.45 The essence of notice in this case lies in its effective warning (to the affected parties) of the impending tax resale and in affording them a timely opportunity to redeem the property from the tax lien.46 ¶20 The opportunity to redeem is unrelated to the geographical location of a sale; it hinges on the well-known public fact that the county treasurer's office is situated at the courthouse, where redemption rights may be exercised up until their extinction is brought about by the resale tax deed. This case is distinguishable from Cate v. Archon, ¶21 We conclude that none of the alleged irregularities is critical to the constitutional efficacy of the published notice. V LENDER'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY PROCESS RAISES A HOST OF FACT ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION AT TRIAL ¶22 Lender argues that his grandson was not authorized to receive process on behalf of the mortgage company and hence the service received by him fails to meet the minimum due process standards. ¶23 Generally, a letter placed in the mail is presumed to have been received. ¶24 By affidavit stating that an intruder retrieved the certified letter addressed to the mortgage company, lender overcame the law's presumption that the critical notice-bearing letter mailed by the county treasurer was received by the addressee-defendant. Moreover, the lender's position is aided by the principle that his knowledge - that the ad valorem taxes were then delinquent - did not equate with notice that a tax resale proceeding had been instituted and the redemption opportunity would stand subject to extinguishment. ¶25 In the light of pertinent constitutional jurisprudence, among the material issues of fact tendered by lender's affidavit, which must be resolved by trial, are: (a) Was the mail in question directed to the lender's address shown on some recorded instrument or to any other place? (b) In whose name (or names) was the post office box registered? (c) Was the post office box rented by the entity to whom the letter was addressed or intended for delivery? (d) What was the lender's relationship to the person who retrieved the letter of notice from the post office box? (e) What means, if any, did the retriever use to secure the content of the lender's post office box? and (f) How did the letter's retriever obtain access to the box? Upon these material issues of fact the lender was entitled to an adversary hearing, and the county treasurer to an opportunity to refute the lender's denial-of-actual-notice scenario. This may be done by showing, among others, that the retriever's access to the box was gained either with lender-provided means or with his prior knowledge (or acquiescence). Although this contest over the quality of notice is litigated here within the framework of a purchaser's quiet title suit, the governing principles are the same as those which would apply in a suit for cancellation of the resale tax deed or in a contest over the efficacy of a judgment secured upon constitutionally infirm service. VI SUMMARY ¶26 Based on the commonality of interests, both in the conjugal and in the property [ 967 P.2d 1214 ] ownership regime sense, the minimum due process standard for effective notice to the wife has been met. Service on her through the husband was not so wanting in the quality of process that was her due as to warrant the deed's cancellation. No facts tendered by the spousal owners' affidavits raise issues calling for a trial. Absent from the wife's affidavit are any allegations that, at the critical contest stage, either party-spouse stood in a posture adverse to the other with respect to the property interest at stake. The wife, having tendered no fact issue, may not secure a judicial declaration that would relieve her of the legal consequences attendant upon the service accepted for her by the husband. ¶27 The text of the published notice is free from any vitiating constitutional deficiency. ¶28 The lender's evidentiary material has raised a host of fact issues on the merits of the controversy, which must be resolved by trial. The dispute tendered is critical to resolving the question of whether the service on the lender meets the minimum standards of due process. By today's pronouncement we are not declaring that service on the lender is legally infirm. What we hold is that summary process is unfit for disposition of the lender's attack on the service made on him. Whether the letter addressed to the lender fell into the hands of an intruder or was retrieved by one to whom the addressee-lender had afforded the means of access to the box which was his chosen method for receiving mail presents a question for the trier. ¶29 On certiorari granted upon the counterclaimants' (spousal owners and mortgage lender) petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated; the trial court's summary judgment is affirmed only (a) insofar as it adversely affects the title of spousal defendants and (b) reversed insofar as it adversely affects the interest of the lender; and cause is remanded for disposition of lender's defense and counterclaim in a manner not inconsistent with today's pronouncement. ¶30 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, WILSON and WATT, JJ., concur; ¶31 SIMMS, J., concurs in judgment. FOOT