Title: Martin v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13294
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2023

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SJC-13294 
 
CLIFFORD MARTIN  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2022. - May 22, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Wendlandt, & 
Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Appellate Division, Sentence, Double 
jeopardy.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 10, 2021. 
 
 
The case was heard by Kafker, J. 
 
 
Ethan C. Stiles for the petitioner. 
Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  "Equality consists in the same treatment of 
similar persons."1  This case presents the question whether a 
defendant who has been serving the incarcerated portion of an 
illegal sentence imposed by the Appellate Division of the 
 
 
1 Aristotle, The Politics 286 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1905) (Dover thrift ed. 2000). 
2 
 
Superior Court -- a panel comprising three Superior Court judges 
-- has the same double jeopardy protections under our common law 
as a defendant who has been serving the incarcerated portion of 
an illegal sentence imposed by a single Superior Court judge. 
The defendant, Clifford Martin,2 was resentenced by the 
Appellate Division to a term of from four to six years 
(resentence).  The resentence was illegal because the four-year 
term was less than the minimum term mandated by the Legislature 
for the offense of which the defendant was convicted.  See G. L. 
c. 265, § 13F.  Approximately six months after he was 
resentenced, a clerk of the Superior Court became aware of the 
error.  The defendant, who was serving his term pursuant to the 
resentence, was notified; and, following a hearing in the 
Appellate Division, the defendant's resentence was altered, this 
time to comply with the statutory mandate of a minimum term of 
five years (altered sentence). 
The defendant petitioned a single justice of this court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, contending, inter alia, that the 
altered sentence violated our common-law principles of double 
jeopardy.  Reaching the merits of the petition, the single 
 
2 Although Clifford Martin commenced this action by filing a 
petition in the county court, for convenience, we refer to him 
as the defendant. 
3 
 
justice affirmed the Appellate Division's order imposing the 
altered sentence. 
Concluding that the resentence was illegal but that the 
altered sentence violated our principles of double jeopardy as 
set forth in our jurisprudence, see Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 
Mass. 502, 513-514 (2014), we now reverse the decision of the 
single justice and direct that the Appellate Division's order 
issuing the altered sentence be vacated and the order issuing 
the resentence be reinstated. 
 
1.  Background.  Following a jury trial, the defendant was 
convicted of three counts of indecent assault and battery on a 
person with an intellectual disability, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 265, § 13F (§ 13F counts), and one count of indecent assault 
and battery on a person 14 or older, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13H (§ 13H count).  The trial judge sentenced the defendant to 
concurrent terms of from six to eight years in State prison on 
two of the § 13F counts, and to three years of probation to be 
served after his term of incarceration for the § 13H count and 
the remaining § 13F count. 
 
The defendant timely appealed his sentence to the Appellate 
Division.  On November 17, 2020, following a hearing, the 
Appellate Division issued an order revising the defendant's 
sentence, reducing the period of incarceration of from six to 
eight years in prison on the two § 13F counts to from four to 
4 
 
six years in prison.  In February 2021, the defendant 
voluntarily withdrew his direct appeal from his conviction. 
 
On May 5, 2021, a clerk of the Superior Court notified the 
defendant that the resentence was illegal and that another 
sentencing hearing would be held.  The defendant objected to any 
revision of the resentence on the ground that, given the passage 
of more than sixty days from the date the resentence was 
imposed, any alteration would violate principles of double 
jeopardy.3  On May 13, 2021, following a hearing, the Appellate 
Division revised the incarcerated portion of the defendant's 
sentence to concurrent terms of from five to six years. 
 
On December 10, 2021, the defendant filed a petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single justice denied the 
petition on the merits, concluding that the resentence was 
illegal, that the correction of the resentence after almost six 
months did not violate double jeopardy principles, and that the 
sixty-day time limit provided by Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), 
as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016) (rule 29 [a]), did not 
 
 
3 The defendant relied on Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), as 
appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016), which provided that "[t]he 
trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion 
of the prosecutor, filed within sixty days of a sentence, may 
revise or revoke such sentence if the judge determines that any 
part of the disposition was illegal."  The rule was subsequently 
amended to replace the word "sentence" with "disposition."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), as appearing in 489 Mass. 1503 
(2022). 
5 
 
apply to proceedings in the Appellate Division.4  The defendant 
timely appealed to the full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  This court 
"review[s] a decision of a single justice pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, for clear error of law or abuse of discretion."  
Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 552, 556 (2022).  
"Because the defendant raises an issue of law, [this court] 
review[s] the single justice's decision de novo."  Garcia v. 
Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 97, 101 (2021). 
 
b.  Legality of the resentence.  We readily dispose of the 
defendant's contention on appeal5 that the resentence was not 
 
 
4 The defendant also filed, in the trial court, a motion for 
relief from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (rule 30 [a]), 
seeking relief from the altered sentence, and arguing that the 
Appellate Division violated double jeopardy principles when it 
revised his resentence six months after its imposition.  The 
trial judge denied the motion on the ground that he had been 
divested of jurisdiction when the defendant appealed to the 
Appellate Division.  The defendant then appealed from the denial 
of his rule 30 (a) motion to the Appeals Court.  Proceedings in 
the Appeals Court were stayed pending the resolution of the 
defendant's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.  After the single 
justice denied his petition, the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss his appeal in the Appeals Court; it was dismissed with 
prejudice. 
 
 
5 Before the Appellate Division, the defendant acknowledged 
that "[t]he sentence of [from] four to six years was illegal" 
because "the statute under which [the defendant] was convicted 
requires a minimum of five years imprisonment."  He altered 
course in his memorandum of law in support of his rule 30 (a) 
motion.  See note 4, supra.  As did the single justice, we 
assume without deciding that the argument was not waived and 
proceed to address it on the merits. 
6 
 
illegal.6  Such an argument is untenable for the reasons this 
court recently explained in Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 
589 (2022).  In particular, the defendant was convicted of three 
counts of indecent assault and battery on a person with an 
intellectual disability, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13F, 
which provides, in relevant part: 
"Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a 
person with an intellectual disability knowing such person 
to have an intellectual disability shall for the first 
offense be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison 
for not less than five years or not more than ten years 
. . . .  Except in the case of a conviction for the first 
offense for violation of this section, the imposition or 
execution of the sentence shall not be suspended, and no 
probation or parole shall be granted until the minimum 
imprisonment herein provided for the offense shall have 
been served."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Accordingly, the minimum term of a sentence of incarceration 
cannot be less than five years, and the single justice correctly 
determined that the resentence of from four to six years was 
illegal.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 777 (2000) 
(addressing a similarly worded statute and concluding that 
 
 
6 A sentence is illegal if it: 
 
"is in excess of the punishment prescribed by the relevant 
statutory provision or in some way contrary to the 
applicable statute[;] . . . is premised on a major 
misunderstanding by the sentencing judge as to the legal 
bounds of his authority[;] . . . [or it] contradicts the 
statutory provision in question, even where those 
contradictions favor the defendant" (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Walters, 479 Mass. 277, 280-281 (2018). 
7 
 
"[l]anguage such as this has always been interpreted in the same 
manner:  the 'not less than' phrase denotes a minimum 
sentence").  See also Rossetti, supra at 594 ("when the 
Legislature prescribes in an offense-specific statute that a 
defendant shall be incarcerated for 'not less than' a certain 
number of years, such language generally defines the 'minimum 
term' permitted under the statute, according to the plain 
meaning of such phrase. . . .  In other words, if a judge 
sentences a defendant to a term of incarceration, the judge has 
no discretion to sentence the defendant to less than the minimum 
term provided by the Legislature");7 id. at 623 n.4 (Wendlandt, 
J., dissenting) ("where a statute sets forth both a minimum 
sentence and a maximum sentence and specifies that the minimum 
sentence is 'not less than' a specified number of years, the 
sentence cannot be for 'less than' that specified number of 
years"). 
 
c.  Finality in resentencing by the Appellate Division.  We 
turn to the novel question before us:  whether the Appellate 
Division's increase of a defendant's illegal resentence, six 
 
 
7 Contrary to the defendant's contention, the discretion 
afforded in the statute to allow a judge alternatively to 
sentence a defendant to a term of probation does not allow the 
judge to reduce the minimum term where, as here, the judge 
imposed a sentence of incarceration.  See Rossetti, 489 Mass. at 
596, 604. 
8 
 
months after it imposed the resentence, violates the principles 
of double jeopardy. 
 
Relevant to the present appeal, double jeopardy principles 
prohibit the State from increasing a defendant's sentence once 
the defendant's reasonable expectation of finality in the 
imposed sentence has "crystallized."  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 513.  
In Selavka, we concluded that, after sixty days, double jeopardy 
principles preclude the Commonwealth from altering a defendant's 
sentence so as to make it more punitive.  Id. at 513-514.  This 
protection from governmental overreach, we held, was required by 
principles of double jeopardy even where the defendant's 
sentence was "illegal" insofar as the imposed sentence did not 
comply with the minimum sentence prescribed by the relevant 
statute for the offense of which the defendant was convicted.  
Id., quoting Dunbrack v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502, 506 (1986) 
(correction of illegal sentence permissible only when error "is 
discovered in a timely manner" [emphasis added]).  Sixty days 
was a reasonable period, we determined, because rule 29 (a), as 
appearing in 378 Mass. 899 (1979), set forth a period of sixty 
days to revise and revoke a sentence to correct any errors.  See 
Selavka, supra.8  Even though rule 29 (a) did not provide a 
 
 
8 Limiting the period for detecting sentencing errors to 
sixty days creates "an effective institutional incentive for the 
State to ascertain the correctness of sentencing orders at or 
near the time of punishment, thereby preventing the harm and 
9 
 
mechanism for the Commonwealth to appeal an illegal sentence, we 
nonetheless construed rule 29 (a) to permit the Commonwealth to 
do so, id. at 508;9 but, we explained, once that sixty-day period 
had lapsed, the Commonwealth was no longer free to "shatter" the 
defendant's legitimate interest in repose, id. at 513, quoting 
Double Jeopardy, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 101, 102 (1977).  Absent some 
action during this window, the time for the appellate process 
has come to an end, and the defendant has a reasonable 
expectation of finality in the sentence, even an illegal one.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 507 (2020) ("the 
 
injustice that occur when the defendant's reasonable expectation 
of finality has been frustrated for the legitimate but not 
indomitable sake of accuracy."  Weisbord & Thomas, Judicial 
Sentencing Error and the Constitution, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1617, 
1617-1618 (2016). 
 
 
We have determined that a sentence may even become final 
before sixty days if the defendant has completed her sentence.  
Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 485 Mass. 29, 30-31, 34-35 (2020). 
 
 
9 Until it was amended in 2016 to comply with our decision 
in Selavka, rule 29 (a) provided: 
 
"The trial judge upon his own motion or the written motion 
of a defendant filed within sixty days after the imposition 
of a sentence, . . . may, upon such terms and conditions as 
he shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it 
appears that justice may not have been done." 
 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a), 378 Mass. 899 (1979).  Pursuant to the 
2016 and 2022 amendments, the trial judge now may also do so 
"upon . . . the written motion of the prosecutor" (emphasis 
added).  Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), as appearing in 489 Mass. 
1503 (2022); Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), as appearing in 474 
Mass. 1503 (2016). 
10 
 
defendant is understood to remain in continuing jeopardy from 
the first prosecution throughout the appellate process").  This 
protection, we said, was required by our common law of double 
jeopardy principles to secure a defendant's finality interest.  
Selavka, supra at 513. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that the defendant's finality 
interest in this case is different from the interest of the 
defendant in Selavka; it contends that because the defendant 
here appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division, he has no 
finality interest in an illegal sentence imposed by that body 
even though 177 days had lapsed -– a period of time almost three 
times as long as the sixty-day period set forth in Selavka.10  
 
 
10 In Selavka, 469 Mass. at 514, the defendant had served 
seven months of the incarcerated portion of his illegal sentence 
and had been released on parole when the Commonwealth sought to 
correct it; here, the defendant already had served over one and 
one-half years before the Appellate Division acted on his timely 
motion and, more significantly, had served another six months 
after the Appellate Division issued its illegal resentence 
before the defendant was notified that the Appellate Division 
would change it.  At this point, the defendant has served 
approximately four years of the incarcerated portion of his 
sentence –- the minimum term imposed (albeit illegally) by the 
Appellate Division. 
 
 
We explained in Selavka that the delayed resentencing was 
particularly unfair where "the defendant was given no 
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea" when he was resentenced 
with an additional probationary term, id., because the revision 
did not "conform to [his] legitimate sentence expectation," id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 21 (2010).  
Similarly, here, the defendant argues that he withdrew his 
direct appeal in February 2021 because of his expectation that 
his November 2020 resentence was final. 
11 
 
The finality interest protected by our double jeopardy 
principles, the Commonwealth argues, does not prohibit the 
Commonwealth from altering the defendant's sentence despite this 
lengthy delay because the Appellate Division has no comparable 
rule 29 (a).11  Instead, because the Appellate Division's 
decisions are not subject to appeal under rule 29 (a) -– because 
they are "final," G. L. c. 278, § 28B -- the defendant's 
interest in repose, the Commonwealth urges, is not protected 
despite the substantial time that lapsed between the imposition 
of the resentence and the Appellate Division's corrective 
action.  See Commonwealth v. Callahan, 419 Mass. 306, 308-309 
(1995) ("order of the Appellate Division is final").  In other 
words, the Commonwealth contends that, because the decision of 
the Appellate Division is, by statute, final, the defendant has 
no legitimate finality interest in its determination. 
 
 
11 The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish the defendant's 
altered sentence from the resentencing in Selavka on the basis 
that rule 29 (a) does not apply to the Appellate Division.  
However, as set forth supra, prior to its amendment in 2016, 
rule 29 (a) did not permit the Commonwealth to appeal an illegal 
sentence, regardless of how many days had passed since the 
imposition of the sentence.  Nevertheless, in Selavka, 469 Mass. 
at 513-514, we adopted a sixty-day period for resentencing, even 
though rule 29 (a) did not technically permit the appeal brought 
by the Commonwealth in that case.  In other words, we applied 
the sixty-day period from rule 29 (a) even though, at the time, 
rule 29 (a) did not govern the appeal.  There is no basis to 
proceed differently in this case. 
12 
 
 
The Commonwealth's argument cannot be squared with our 
fundamental commitment to justice as embodied in our common-law 
double jeopardy jurisprudence.  See Selavka, 469 Mass. at 513.  
Indeed, in view of the statutory mandate that the Appellate 
Division's sentences are "final," G. L. c. 278, § 28B, and not 
appealable, our reasoning in Selavka applies with even greater 
force to protect the defendant in this case from this "grievous 
harm" to his finality interest, Selavka, supra (citation 
omitted).  There is no basis to treat the defendant here, who 
availed himself of the Appellate Division, worse than a 
defendant who did not do so.12 
 
Mistakes happen; and when timely brought to the Appellate 
Division's attention, they should be correctable.13  However, as 
we explained in Selavka, 469 Mass. at 509, "even an illegal 
 
 
12 The defendant had the right to appeal his sentence.  See 
G. L. c. 278, § 28B ("A person aggrieved by a sentence which may 
be reviewed may appeal to the appellate division for a review of 
such sentence").  See also Commonwealth v. Knight, 392 Mass. 
192, 196 n.3 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 379 
Mass. 640, 644 (1980) ("For any relief from the alleged severity 
of the sentences[,] recourse . . . is to the Appellate Division 
of the Superior Court under G. L. c. 278, §§ 28A-28D"). 
 
 
13 In fact, the Superior Court is authorized to amend Rule 
64 of the Rules of the Superior Court (2022) to provide a short 
period of time to permit the Appellate Division to correct 
errors such as the one made by the Appellate Division here.  See 
G. L. c. 278, § 28B ("The [S]uperior [C]ourt . . . may by rule 
make . . . regulations of procedures relative thereto, 
consistent with law, as justice may require").  See also Gavin 
v. Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 331, 333 & n.5 (1975). 
13 
 
sentence will, with the passage of time, acquire a finality that 
bars further punitive changes detrimental to the defendant."  
The guarantee against double jeopardy is "not simply res 
judicata dressed in prison grey"; "[i]t was called forth more by 
oppression than by crowded calendars."  Twice in Jeopardy, 75 
Yale L.J. 262, 277 (1965).  The overriding concern underlying 
the prohibition against double jeopardy has been "with 
'oppressive' tendencies in even well-motivated prosecutions, 
arising from the inherent powers, prerogatives, and resources of 
the sovereign in criminal cases and the devastating and one-
sided nature of the jeopardy to which the individuals confronted 
by these powers are subjected."  Rosenthal, Prosecutor 
Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy:  Case Studies in 
an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 887, 942 (1998). 
 
Accordingly, when sufficient time has lapsed, even an 
illegal sentence becomes final, and double jeopardy principles 
preclude upward adjustments thereto by the State.  We concluded 
in Selavka, 469 Mass. at 513-514, that the requisite time period 
was sixty days.  Our common law of double jeopardy affords the 
defendant in this case no less protection. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We reverse the decision of the single 
justice and remand the case to the county court for entry of a 
judgment, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, vacating the Appellate 
14 
 
Division's May 13, 2021 sentencing order and reinstating the 
Appellate Division's November 17, 2020 sentencing order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (dissenting).  The defendant was not punished 
twice for the same offense.1 
The guarantee against double jeopardy "protects against 
multiple punishments for the same offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 509 (2014), quoting Aldoupolis v. 
Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 271-272, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864 
(1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 (1983).  The defendant's sentence 
was merely corrected to comply with the minimum sentence 
required by law.  After availing himself of the right to appeal 
his sentence to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, he 
received, even after the revised May 2021 sentence of from five 
to six years in State prison (May sentence), a sentence 
significantly more favorable than his initial sentence of from 
six to eight years in State prison.  Although I agree with the 
court that the November 2020 sentence of from four to six years 
(November sentence) was illegal, I would conclude that in the 
circumstances here, the Appellate Division's delay in correcting 
the sentence did not implicate principles of double jeopardy.  I 
would also conclude that the holding of Selavka does not apply 
to this case. 
 
1 Although Clifford Martin commenced this action by filing a 
petition in the county court, for convenience, I refer to him as 
the defendant. 
2 
 
 
To understand why Selavka does not apply, one must begin by 
looking at the history and procedure of the Appellate Division.  
The Appellate Division is a creature of statute.  I.R. Macey, 
Handbook of Practice and Procedure for the Appellate Division of 
the Superior Court of Massachusetts 2 (1981) (Macey).  In 1942, 
the Judicial Council of Massachusetts proposed that there "be 
provision by which the Superior Court itself in an appellate 
session should be able to review a sentence in a summary 
proceeding."  Eighteenth Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. 
Doc. No. 144, at 28 (1942).  The Judicial Council recommended 
that the Appellate Division be created to correct mistakes and 
disparities in sentencing without subjecting a defendant to a 
lengthy and costly appellate process.  Id. at 29.  See Macey, 
supra at 2, 38 (Appellate Division's "purpose is not to seal an 
appellant's judgment by simple agreement with the sentencing 
judge, but, rather, to closely scrutinize the action of another 
justice and, from a variety of factors before it, arrive at a 
just determination of whether such action was appropriate or was 
inappropriate or arbitrary").  Enacted in 1943, G. L. c. 278, 
§§ 28A-28C, were intended to permit review of whether a sentence 
imposed by a trial judge was appropriate at the time it was 
3 
 
imposed.2  Macey, supra.  The Appellate Division is the only 
authority permitted to review a lawful sentence.  Commonwealth 
v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 746 (1999). 
 
"[T]he only question . . . open before the Appellate 
Division [is] the appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the 
trial [or sentencing] judge."  Hicks v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 
89, 92 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963).  The Appellate 
Division is "a vehicle whereby extreme harshness or leniency by 
judges in sentencing could be corrected" (citation omitted).  
Lena v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 571, 574 n.2 (1976).  "It has no 
authority over the judgment of conviction."  Commonwealth v. 
Callahan, 419 Mass. 306, 308 (1995) (Appellate Division not 
appellate court within meaning of Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 [a], 378 
Mass. 899 [1979]).  The Appellate Division is limited in the 
types of sentences that it may review:  sentences to State 
prison except in any case where a different sentence could not 
have been imposed, and sentences "to the reformatory" for women 
for terms of more than five years.  G. L. c. 278, § 28A.  It 
also may review any other sentence which was imposed when the 
sentence appealed from was imposed.  G. L. c. 278, § 28B. 
 
2 General Laws c. 278, § 28D, which since has been repealed, 
discussed the salaries of various Appellate Division employees.  
See St. 2007, c. 61, § 31, effective July 1, 2007. 
4 
 
The Appellate Division is comprised of three judges of the 
Superior Court who are designated from time to time by the chief 
justice of the Superior Court, with two judges constituting a 
quorum.3  G. L. c. 278, § 28A.  Gavin v. Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 
331, 332 (1975).  The clerk of the Superior Court for criminal 
business in Suffolk County is designated as the clerk of the 
Appellate Division, and the clerk or an assistant clerk shall 
attend all sittings, retain all records, and record the 
proceedings.  G. L. c. 278, § 28A. 
 
When a sentence is imposed which may be subject to review 
by the Appellate Division, the clerk shall notify a defendant of 
the right of appeal.  G. L. c. 278, § 28B.  A defendant has ten 
days after the imposition of his or her sentence to file an 
appeal to the Appellate Division; this does not stay the 
execution of the sentence.  Id.  The judge who imposed the 
sentence on review may submit a statement of his or her reasons 
underlying the sentence to the Appellate Division and must do so 
within seven days, if requested by the Appellate Division.  Id.  
"An appeal from a sentence is analogous to an appeal from any 
judgment or order in that, once a party enters an appeal, the 
judge issuing the order from which an appeal is taken is 
 
3 No judge may sit on an appeal of a sentence that he or she 
imposed.  G. L. c. 278, § 28A. 
5 
 
divested of jurisdiction to act on motions to rehear or to 
vacate."  Callahan, 419 Mass. at 309. 
The Appellate Division may amend a judgment by ordering a 
different appropriate sentence or disposition that could have 
been made at the time of the imposition of the initial sentence, 
but it may not increase a sentence without giving a defendant an 
opportunity to be heard.4  G. L. c. 278, § 28B.  The Appellate 
Division has the power to "reduce, increase, or affirm" the 
sentence initially imposed.  Croteau, petitioner, 353 Mass. 736, 
738 (1968).  Where it decides that the initial sentence should 
stand, the Appellate Division may dismiss the appeal.  G. L. 
c. 278, § 28B. 
Any time served on a sentence which was appealed shall be 
applied to a substituted sentence.  G. L. c. 278, § 28C.  The 
Appellate Division's "decision shall be final."  G. L. c. 278, 
§ 28B.  Commonwealth v. Barros, 460 Mass. 1015, 1015 (2011).  
The statute gives the Superior Court the power to establish 
rules surrounding such appeals, "as justice may require."  G. L. 
c. 278, § 28B.  See Rule 64 of the Rules of the Superior Court 
(2020).  The Superior Court has left this power "largely 
unexercised."  Gavin, 367 Mass. at 333. 
 
4 The Appellate Division is not otherwise required to hold a 
hearing.  G. L. c. 278, § 28B.  Here, in both November 2020 and 
May 2021, the defendant was given an opportunity to be heard. 
6 
 
The constitutional right to counsel applies to proceedings 
in the Appellate Division.5  Croteau, petitioner, 353 Mass. at 
738.  This court has held that an increase in sentence by the 
Appellate Division does not constitute double jeopardy, and the 
Appellate Division need not state its reasons for increasing a 
sentence.  Walsh v. Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 193, 197, 201 (1970) 
("when a convicted defendant resorts to the statutory procedure 
[of an appeal to the Appellate Division] for review of a 
sentence he assumes the same risks inherent in an appeal from a 
conviction" [citation omitted]).6 
To better place the double jeopardy analysis in context, I 
discuss Federal jurisprudence on the double jeopardy clause of 
the United States Constitution before focusing on State-specific 
protections against double jeopardy.  The double jeopardy clause 
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
 
5 Rule 64 of the Rules of the Superior Court specifies that 
counsel representing a defendant at sentencing shall continue to 
do so at the Appellate Division "unless (a) specifically excused 
by the court, or (b) successor counsel enters an appearance with 
the Appellate Division." 
 
6 In Gavin, 367 Mass. at 343-344, the court posed the 
question whether a rule regarding the provision of a statement 
of reasons for increasing a sentence should be promulgated in 
the "interests of the 'proper administration of criminal 
justice,'" but indicated that, if change is to be made, the 
Superior Court should be the body to effect such change 
(citation omitted). 
7 
 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  The prohibition 
against double jeopardy consists of three separate protections:  
"It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction.  And it protects against 
multiple punishments for the same offense."  Selavka, 469 Mass. 
at 509, quoting Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 271-272.  "[T]he 
primary purpose of the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause was to 
protect the integrity of a final judgment."  United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978), citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 
28, 33 (1978).  "[T]here can be no doubt that the protection 
against double jeopardy possesses a long history."  Rudstein, A 
Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double 
Jeopardy, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 193, 197 (2005).7  The 
 
7 "Ancient Jewish law contains several references to 
principles encompassed by double jeopardy law."  Rudstein, supra 
at 197.  Both early Greek and Roman law contained some form of 
protection against double jeopardy.  Id. at 198, citing Bartkus 
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-152 (1959) (Black, J., 
dissenting).  Demosthenes, the Greek orator and pleader in law 
courts, stated in 355 B.C. that "the laws forbid the same man to 
be tried twice on the same issue, be it a civil action, a 
scrutiny, a contested claim, or anything else of the sort."  
Rudstein, supra, quoting Demosthenes, Against Leptines, 
Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches, Speech Against 
Leptines, XX § 147, at 589 (J.H. Vince trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1998) (1930).  "The Roman law contained the maxim nemo 
debet bis puniri pro uno delicto, that is '[n]o one ought to be 
punished twice for the same offense'" (footnote omitted).  
Rudstein, supra at 200, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1736 (8th 
ed. 2004).  Canon law also contained protections against being 
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.  Rudstein, supra.  
8 
 
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense 
emerges from the understanding that "judges should not impose 
multiple punishment for a single legislatively defined offense."  
Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 267 (1965).  See Jones v. 
Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989), quoting United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989) ("in the multiple punishments 
context, that interest [which the double jeopardy clause seeks 
to protect] is 'limited to ensuring that the total punishment 
did not exceed that authorized by the legislature'"); Albernaz 
v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) ("the question of 
what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not 
different from the question of what punishments the Legislative 
Branch intended to be imposed"). 
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights does not contain a double jeopardy clause; 
nonetheless, "we consider our common law to embrace the same 
principles and protections."  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 509 n.8.8  In 
 
"[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy became firmly 
entrenched in the common law in the form of the pleas of 
autrefoits acquit (a former acquittal), autrefoits convict (a 
former conviction), and pardon."  Id. at 204. 
 
8 "The first colonial enactment containing an express 
guarantee against double jeopardy appeared in 1641 when the 
General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted the Body 
of Liberties," which served as a model and was "the most 
important . . . forerunner of the federal Bill of Rights."  
Rudstein, supra at 221-222, quoting 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of 
Rights:  A Documentary History 69 (1971).  This guarantee 
9 
 
a sentencing context, "[i]ssues of double jeopardy . . . turn on 
the question of the defendant's legitimate expectation of 
finality."  Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 485 Mass. 29, 34 (2020).  
See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 687 (1998), quoting 
Jones, 491 U.S. at 394 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen a 
sentence is increased in a second proceeding 'the application of 
the double jeopardy clause . . . turns on the extent and 
legitimacy of a defendant's expectation of finality in that 
sentence.  If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of 
finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited'"); 
United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).  
"The ban on increased punishment may be overcome . . . in 
certain limited situations in which society's interest in the 
administration of justice outweighs the defendant's interest in 
finality," including where the defendant's "initial sentence is 
invalid."  A Definition of Punishment for Implementing the 
Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 
Yale L.J. 632, 638 (1981). 
The United States Supreme Court has discussed double 
jeopardy in relation to an increase in a sentence for which 
service has begun.  In Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 164 (1873), 
 
provided that "[n]o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill 
Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or Trespasse."  
Hessick & Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a Limit on Punishment, 97 
Cornell L. Rev. 45, 51 (2011), quoting Rudstein, supra at 222. 
10 
 
the defendant was sentenced to serve a year in prison in 
addition to the payment of a $200 fine, despite the fact that 
the statute only allowed punishment by imprisonment for not more 
than one year or the payment of a fine.  After the defendant 
paid the fine, and served five days in prison, the trial court 
vacated that judgment entirely and sentenced him to one year of 
imprisonment.  Id. at 175.  This violated the constitutional 
protection from being put in jeopardy twice.  "If there is 
anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it 
is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same 
offence."  Id. at 168.  In this situation, the defendant was 
"put to actual punishment twice for the same thing."  Id. at 
175.  When the defendant "had fully suffered one of the 
alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, 
the power of the court to punish further was gone."  Id. at 176.  
In United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931), interpreting 
Lange, the Court stated in dicta that the distinction "that the 
court during the same term may amend a sentence so as to 
mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it, . . . [is 
based] upon the ground that to increase the penalty is to 
subject the defendant to double punishment for the same 
offense." 
Nonetheless, in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 
(1947), the Court indicated that it had "rejected the 'doctrine 
11 
 
that a prisoner, whose guilt is established by a regular 
verdict, is to escape punishment altogether because the court 
committed an error in passing the sentence.'"  Id., quoting In 
re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 260 (1894).  There, the sentencing 
judge inadvertently omitted mandatory fines and penalties, which 
he then imposed five hours after the sentence was announced.  
Bozza, supra at 165.  In affirming the sentence, the Court 
indicated: 
"The Constitution does not require that sentencing should 
be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity 
for the prisoner. . . .  In this case the court 'only set 
aside what it had no authority to do, and substitute[d] 
directions required by the law to be done upon the 
conviction of the offender.'  [Bonner, supra].  It did not 
twice put petitioner in jeopardy for the same offense.  The 
sentence, as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for an 
offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense"  
(footnote omitted). 
 
Id. at 166-167.  In a footnote, the Court explained the 
difference between Bozza and Lange; in Lange, the defendant 
already had completed a "lawful" punishment when he was 
resentenced, contrary to the petitioner in Bozza, who was 
prescribed an illegal sentence which was not yet fully served.  
Id. at 167 n.2. 
The opinion in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 
(1980), clarified Lange and Benz and discussed the Court's 
double jeopardy precedent in detail.  See United States v. 
Henry, 680 F.2d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 1982) (mentioning 
12 
 
DiFrancesco's discussion of purpose and history of double 
jeopardy clause).  Generally, 
"[t]he constitutional prohibition against 'double jeopardy' 
was designed to protect an individual from being subjected 
to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than 
once for an alleged offense. . . .  The underlying idea, 
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo–American 
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated 
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty." 
 
DiFrancesco, supra at 127-128, quoting Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).  Primary purposes of the clause 
include preserving finality of judgments and the prohibition of 
successive prosecutions on the same offense.  DiFrancesco, supra 
at 128.  Where absolute finality is afforded to an acquittal, 
"[t]he result is definitely otherwise in cases where the trial 
has not ended in an acquittal," including situations such as a 
mistrial occasioned by either manifest necessity or a 
defendant's motion, termination of a trial at a defendant's 
request prior to a jury verdict, or retrial after a defendant's 
convictions are set aside for reasons other than insufficiency 
of the evidence.  Id. at 130-131. 
 
"Historically, the pronouncement of sentence has never 
carried the finality that attaches to an acquittal."  
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 133.  At common law, an increase of a 
13 
 
sentence by the trial court was permissible during the same term 
of court.  Id. at 133-134.  Where the defendant in DiFrancesco 
was "charged with knowledge of the statute" allowing the 
government to appeal his sentence with respect to an increase 
after a dangerous special offender hearing, he "ha[d] no 
expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is 
concluded or the time to appeal has expired."  Id. at 125, 136.  
The defendant is no longer subject to the "risk of being 
harassed and then convicted, although innocent."  Id. at 136.  
"The [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause does not provide the defendant 
with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the 
exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be."  Id. at 137. 
The Court distinguished Lange, and the "dictum in Benz," as 
confined "to Lange's specific context."  Id. at 139.  Henry, 680 
F.2d at 410-411 (court in DiFrancesco indicated Lange "should 
not be read as standing for the proposition that the trial court 
may not increase a defendant's sentence if he has begun to serve 
it").  DiFrancesco "stands for the proposition that the double 
jeopardy clause does not provide an absolute bar to increasing a 
defendant's sentence."  Henry, 680 F.2d at 411.  See Fogel, 829 
F.2d at 87 ("the Court in DiFrancesco left undisturbed the 
principle announced in Bozza that a court may permissibly 
increase a sentence if necessary to comply with a statute"). 
14 
 
In Massachusetts, when determining whether a defendant has 
a legitimate expectation of finality in his or her sentence 
based on double jeopardy principles, we consider several 
different factors, including the legality of the original 
sentence, the timeliness of any motion to revise or revoke, 
whether a motion to stay the execution of the sentence was 
filed, and whether the sentence already has been fully served.  
Ellsworth, 485 Mass. at 34.  See Commonwealth v. Grundman, 479 
Mass. 204, 207-208 (2018); Commonwealth v. Scott, 86 Mass. App. 
Ct. 812, 815 (2015).  In the context of revisions made by a 
sentencing judge, we have said that "[a] sentence is considered 
final once the sixty-day window within which to file a motion to 
revise or revoke has expired," as set out in Mass. R. Crim. P. 
29, 489 Mass. 1503 (2022) (rule 29).  Ellsworth, supra.  See 
Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 274 (sentence is final subject to 
judge's limited power to revise and revoke within sixty days 
after imposition).9 
 
9 This sixty-day period set out in rule 29 (a) "substitutes 
a fixed time period . . . for the exercise of a judge's power in 
lieu of the traditional -- and more uncertain -- common law 
period of 'term of court.'"  Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 271.  See 
District Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Superior Court, 342 Mass. 
119, 122 (1961) ("At common law the sentences could not have 
been revised . . . after the end of the term or sitting"); 
Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 2 Allen 144, 145 (1861) ("It seems to 
have been recognized as one of the earliest doctrines of the 
common law, that the record of a court may be changed or amended 
at any time during the same term of the court in which a 
judgment is rendered").  Therefore, I would reject the 
15 
 
Because an illegal sentence "contravenes the intention of 
the Legislature . . . the modification of an illegal sentence, 
in itself, has not been seen as subjecting a defendant to 
multiple punishments."  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 510.  The 
corrected sentence simply "imposes a valid punishment for an 
offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense," even 
where the corrected sentence is harsher.  Id., quoting Bozza, 
330 U.S. at 167.  A sentencing judge has the flexibility to 
respond if an error in the sentence "is discovered in a timely 
manner."  Dunbrack v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502, 506 (1986).  
See Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-167; State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 
309 (2012), quoting State v. Austin, 335 N.J. Super. 486, 494 
(App. Div. 2000) ("An illegal sentence that has not been 
completely served may be corrected at any time without impinging 
upon double-jeopardy principles"); People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 
198, 212, cert. denied, 562 U.S 947 (2010) ("Our precedent has 
long recognized that courts have the inherent authority to 
correct illegal sentences"). 
 
defendant's suggestion to limit the time period for a judge to 
correct an illegal sentence to the same "term of court" in which 
a defendant has been sentenced.  The Appellate Division was not 
created by statute until 1943.  Macey, supra at 2.  The common-
law rule that sentences were not to be revised after the end of 
the term or sitting was not established with such a judicial 
body in mind. 
16 
 
A defendant's expectation of finality is diminished when 
his or her sentence is illegal.  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 513.  
Nonetheless, where a defendant's expectation of finality in his 
or her initial sentence has "'crystallized' after enough time," 
even an illegal sentence may become final for purposes of double 
jeopardy.  Id., quoting United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 
987 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986). 
Generally, other jurisdictions have held that an illegal 
sentence can be corrected while a defendant still is serving his 
or her sentence but have rejected such an upward modification 
where a defendant has completed the original sentence.  See 
Williams, 14 N.Y.3d at 215-216 & n.2 (discussing Federal circuit 
and State cases).  See, e.g., United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 
95, 101 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Although an expectation of finality 
does not legitimately accrue by the mere commencement of the 
sentence, once a defendant fully serves a sentence for a 
particular crime, the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause's bar on 
multiple punishments prevents any attempt to increase thereafter 
a sentence for that crime"); United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 
262, 265 (7th Cir. 1993) (where time for appeal passed and 
defendant completed incarcerated portion of sentence and paid 
all fines and restitution, those portions of sentence could not 
be amended without violating legitimate expectation of 
finality); United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th 
17 
 
Cir. 1992) ("defendant cannot acquire a legitimate expectation 
of finality in a sentence which is illegal, because such a 
sentence remains subject to modification"); United States v. 
Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 524-525 (9th Cir. 1986) (jeopardy 
attaches on completion of sentence and it may not be increased 
after that point); United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 555 
(6th Cir. 1982) (double jeopardy clause does not prohibit 
amending sentence to add mandatory special parole term); Oksanen 
v. United States, 362 F.2d 74, 80 (8th Cir. 1966) (sentencing 
defendant to three years' probation beyond original probationary 
sentence after completion of original probationary term violated 
double jeopardy clause); Smith v. State, 334 So.3d 377, 379 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) ("when a defendant serves the 
entirety of his or her sentence, it violates the prohibition 
against double jeopardy to resentence the defendant"); Allen v. 
State, 853 So.2d 533, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("It does 
not offend double jeopardy principles to resentence a defendant 
to harsher terms when the original sentence was invalid, 
particularly when, as in the instant case, it is the defendant 
who brings his sentence into question").  Contrast Breest v. 
Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 99-101 (1st Cir. 1978) (court had duty to 
correct statutorily invalid sentence even after petitioner began 
service and did not violate double jeopardy principles in doing 
so, though time for court to correct invalid sentence is subject 
18 
 
to some temporal limit to prevent violation of due process); 
Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016) 
(illegally lenient sentence not "meaningfully imposed," thus, 
upward modification to extent necessary to cure illegality not 
violative of double jeopardy); Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, 
¶ 14 ("Double [j]eopardy [c]lauses may function as a shield 
against multiple punishments, [but] they may never be used as a 
sword to enforce an illegal sentence"); People v. District 
Court, 673 P.2d 991, 997 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) ("Granting 
defendants a right to benefit from illegal sentences serves no 
sound public policy"); State v. Fry, 61 Haw. 226, 228-230 (1979) 
(court had duty to correct illegal sentence and impose original 
prison term even after seven-year delay and after defendant was 
released from prison because "[w]here the original punishment 
was invalid, as here, a correction which produces a valid 
sentence does not place the defendant in double jeopardy even if 
that correction increases his punishment"); State v. Calmes, 632 
N.W.2d 641, 649 (Minn. 2001) (correction of illegal sentence did 
not violate double jeopardy because it did "not impose multiple 
punishments, but simply the single punishment that was mandatory 
at the time of sentencing"); State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ¶ 17, 
quoting State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) ("district 
19 
 
court can correct the [illegal] sentence at any time, which 
includes before, after, 'and even if there is no appeal'").10 
In Massachusetts, the court in Selavka set out a sixty-day 
time period, as specified in rule 29 (a), for the Commonwealth 
to seek to correct sentencing errors under the rule.  Selavka, 
469 Mass. at 513-514.  "Even an illegal sentence will become 
final for the purposes of double jeopardy after the expiration 
of that time period, and no longer will be subject to revision 
or revocation within the terms of rule 29 (a)."  Id. at 514.  
Until Selavka, it was unclear whether the Commonwealth could 
file a motion pursuant to rule 29 (a).  This sixty-day time 
 
10 Other courts have concluded that resentencing a defendant 
who already has been released from confinement is 
unconstitutional.  See DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 35-36 
(1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1032 (1994) (considering 
multiyear period between suspension and reimposition of 
sentence, reasonableness of defendant's reliance, his release 
from prison and formation of new roots, tardiness of State in 
failing to correct error, and existence of alternative parole 
revocation remedy, "very rare exception to the general rule that 
courts can, after sentence, revise sentences upward to correct 
errors"); Lundien, 769 F.2d at 986-987 (due process may be 
denied when sentence enhanced after defendant has served so much 
of sentence that expectations as to finality have crystallized); 
Jordan v. United States, 235 A.3d 808, 816 n.10, 818 (D.C. 2020) 
(later upward revision to defendant's sentence may constitute 
substantive due process violation; but declining to take 
concurrence's approach that double jeopardy clause, as opposed 
to due process protections, imposes limits on court's ability to 
correct illegal sentence, as court "has never found a violation 
of double jeopardy where a court corrects a sentence that, when 
imposed, was outside its statutory authority"); Williams, 14 
N.Y.3d at 217 (after release from prison and once time to appeal 
has expired, legitimate expectation of finality arises and 
double jeopardy prevents upward modification to sentence). 
20 
 
period, coupled with a finding that either "any part of the 
disposition was illegal," rule 29 (a) (1), or "that justice may 
not have been done," rule 29 (a) (2), "reasonably balances the 
defendant's interest in finality against society's interest in 
law enforcement."  Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 275. 
Despite his concession in his memorandum in support of his 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition that rule 29 (a) does not apply to 
the Appellate Division, the defendant now argues that rule 29 
(a) should apply to sentences imposed by the Appellate 
Division.11  Today, the court endorses this view.  I agree with 
the single justice that rule 29 (a) does not apply to the 
Appellate Division; therefore, the sixty-day rule discussed in 
Selavka is not conclusive on the double jeopardy issue.  See, 
e.g., Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (referencing "trial judge"). 
In Callahan, 419 Mass. at 308, the court discussed the 
Appellate Division in relation to rule 29 (a).  There, the 
defendant argued that he filed his motion to revise his sentence 
within the sixty-day time period set out in rule 29 (a) because, 
although it was not filed within sixty days of the imposition of 
 
11 The defendant points to Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. 
v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 450, 
S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020), to support his argument that this 
court has acknowledged the limitations of the judicial branch as 
a whole to revise and revoke sentences after sixty days.  That 
case does not help the defendant's position.  There, the court 
stated that a sentencing judge may review a sentence imposed 
within the limits of rule 29 (a).  Id. at 450-451. 
21 
 
his initial sentence, he filed it within sixty days of the 
Appellate Division increasing his sentence.  Id.  This court 
rejected that argument "because the Appellate Division is not an 
appellate court within the meaning of rule 29 (a)," as it does 
not have authority to review a judgment beyond the sentence 
imposed.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Malick, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
174, 185 (2014) (appeal to Appellate Division "functions as an 
exclusive and final challenge to a sentence," and its affirmance 
of sentence "precluded any separate relief by motions to revise 
or revoke under" rule 29). 
As previously noted, the Appellate Division was created in 
response to a suggestion from the Judicial Council of 
Massachusetts to allow for "the Superior Court itself" in an 
appellate session to review a sentence.  Eighteenth Report of 
the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, at 28 (1942).  Its 
purpose is to correct "extreme harshness or leniency by judges 
in sentencing" (citation omitted).  Lena, 369 Mass. at 574 n.2.  
Review in the Appellate Division "has to some extent the 
character of an extension . . . of the trial judge's effort to 
attain a just sentence."  Gavin, 367 Mass. at 342.  "[I]t can be 
doubted that such distinctions as can be pointed to between the 
functions of the trial judge and the Appellate Division are such 
as to make a constitutional difference" in analyzing a sentence 
imposed by the Appellate Division.  Id. 
22 
 
Despite the similarity between the Appellate Division and a 
sentencing judge in the focus for both entities to ensure a just 
sentence, the purpose of the Appellate Division is distinct from 
that of an ordinary trial court judge imposing an initial 
sentence in that its focus is limited to reviewing the sentence 
to correct "extreme" deviations.  Lena, 369 Mass. at 574 n.2.  
See Gavin, 367 Mass. at 341 (statement of reasons may be written 
more easily by Appellate Division revising sentence than by 
trial judge imposing original sentence, because "the former 
would be a more focused analysis looking to correction of 
possible misjudgment embodied in the sentence reviewed rather 
than to the formation of an original judgment").  See also 
Callahan, 419 Mass. at 308 (Appellate Division has no authority 
over judgment of conviction).  The Appellate Division is the 
only judicial body permitted to review a lawful sentence, 
D'Amour, 428 Mass. at 746, and it has the power to reduce, 
increase, or affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing 
judge, Croteau, petitioner, 353 Mass. at 738.  Additionally, 
although a defendant has a right to appeal his or her sentence 
where it qualifies for review, G. L. c. 278, §§ 28A, 28B, the 
defendant makes the choice whether to open his or her sentence 
to revision by the Appellate Division, affecting his or her 
legitimate expectation of finality.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tinsley, 487 Mass. 380, 391-392 (2021); Walsh, 358 Mass. at 197 
23 
 
(when defendant appeals sentence to Appellate Division "he 
assumes the same risks inherent in an appeal from a 
conviction"). 
It is apparent then, in my view, that the nature of 
sentences altered by the Appellate Division markedly is 
different from those imposed by a trial judge or a plea judge.  
In accordance with the statutorily granted permission to 
promulgate rules and regulations for proceedings in the 
Appellate Division, the Superior Court created Rule 64 of the 
Rules of the Superior Court specifically to address the 
procedure in the Appellate Division.  This rule makes no mention 
of the sixty-day period to move for revision or revocation of a 
sentence issued by the Appellate Division.12  For all of these 
reasons, I do not think that rule 29 (a) applies to the 
Appellate Division, and the sixty-day time restriction that the 
rule imposes for revising or revoking sentences is 
inapplicable.13 
 
12 Because the statute entrusts "[t]he superior court" to 
establish by rule "forms for appeals" to the Appellate Division 
and "regulations of procedure relative thereto, consistent with 
law, as justice may require," G. L. c. 278, § 28B, I do not 
think it appropriate for the court to create its own rule 
surrounding the timing of such revisions where there is a 
distinction between the jeopardy surrounding sentencing 
decisions of the Appellate Division and those of a sentencing 
judge. 
 
13 I do not violate principles of equal protection by saying 
so.  See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) ("The 
24 
 
This is not to say that the Appellate Division can revise 
and revoke illegal sentences it has imposed without limitation.  
Although Selavka does not apply to sentence revisions by the 
Appellate Division, I take from it that the diminished 
expectation of finality stemming from an illegal sentence "does 
not afford carte blanche to correct erroneous sentences at any 
point subsequent to their initial imposition."  Selavka, 469 
Mass. at 513.  The focus in a double jeopardy context is "the 
question of the defendant's legitimate expectation of finality."  
Ellsworth, 485 Mass. at 34.  As discussed supra, the 
modification of an illegal sentence, even where the revised 
sentence is harsher, does not subject a defendant to multiple 
punishments if done in a timely manner.  Selavka, supra at 510-
511.  In determining whether a defendant has a legitimate 
expectation of finality in a sentence, a reviewing court 
considers whether the defendant filed a motion for 
postconviction relief putting his sentence at issue, the 
illegality of the sentence, and whether the sentence has been 
fully served.  See Tinsley, 487 Mass. at 391-392; Ellsworth, 
supra; Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013). 
 
guarantee of equal protection . . . is not a source of 
substantive rights or liberties, but rather a right to be free 
from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and 
other governmental activity" [footnote omitted]). 
25 
 
In Selavka, 469 Mass. at 514, the defendant had served 
seven months of incarceration before being released on parole.  
He had completed his committed sentence and begun serving a 
seven-year probationary term when the Commonwealth sought to 
impose the statutorily required global positioning system (GPS) 
monitoring condition, which was not imposed during his plea 
colloquy or at the subsequent sentencing hearing.  Id. at 503.  
Additionally, the defendant in Selavka was sentenced as a result 
of his guilty plea and was given no opportunity to withdraw the 
plea on the addition of the GPS monitoring condition, which did 
not "conform to [his] legitimate sentence expectation."  Id. at 
514, quoting Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 21 (2010).14  
There, it would have been "contrary to the spirit of [Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 12 (c) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004),] for 
a judge to accept a plea bargain and impose the recommended 
sentence, and then, after the defendant has lost the opportunity 
to withdraw his plea, increase the sentence."  Selavka, supra at 
 
14 The defendant here was not in a "similar" position 
because he withdrew his direct appeal in February 2021 in 
reliance on his illegal sentence.  Ante at note 10.  There is a 
significant distinction.  In the defendant's case, he did not 
relinquish his constitutional right to have a trial by jury by 
admitting to guilt and agreeing with the Commonwealth to a 
particular punishment.  He exercised his right to go to trial, 
was convicted by a jury, and, as a result, had no control over 
his sentence.  These circumstances are markedly different, as 
"defendants 'pleading guilty pursuant to a sentencing 
[agreement] bargain more certainty about their fate'" (citation 
omitted).  Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 20-21. 
26 
 
515, quoting Goodwin, supra.  The defendant here is in a 
considerably different situation. 
Here, the defendant, after being convicted by a jury, 
initially was sentenced by the trial judge to from six to eight 
years in State prison (for the incarcerated portion of his 
sentence) on April 23, 2019.  He appealed to the Appellate 
Division, where he received a revised sentence (albeit an 
illegal one in his favor) in November 2020 of from four to six 
years in State prison.  "[A]lthough '[t]he double jeopardy 
proscription protects the defendant against governmental 
oppression, it does not "relieve a defendant from the 
consequences of his voluntary choice" to invalidate his original 
punishment'" (citation omitted).  Cumming, 466 Mass. at 471.15  
Neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth filed a motion to 
 
15 The court states:  "The Commonwealth maintains that the 
defendant's finality interest in this case is different from the 
interest of the defendant in Selavka; it contends that because 
the defendant here appealed his sentence to the Appellate 
Division, he has no finality interest in an illegal sentence 
imposed by that body."  Ante at    .  This describes the concept 
of continuing jeopardy, which characterizes the position of 
every defendant who chooses to appeal his or her conviction.  
See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 506-507 (2020) 
(protections against double jeopardy not offended where 
"defendant has knowingly unsettled the finality of his or her 
conviction and sentence by appealing" and "defendant is 
understood to remain in continuing jeopardy . . . throughout the 
appellate process").  Although I recognize that the defendant 
may have assumed that his "appellate" process had ended once the 
illegal November sentence had issued, his voluntary appeal of 
his sentence carries significant weight in determining whether 
he had a legitimate expectation of finality. 
27 
 
revise or revoke the November sentence, despite its illegality.  
Contrast Cumming, supra (defendant not placed twice in jeopardy 
for resentencing after defendant challenged his original 
sentences in motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 [a], as appearing 
in 435 Mass. 1501 [2001]).  In May 2021, approximately six 
months after the imposition of the November sentence of from 
four to six years and approximately two years after he had 
received his initial sentence of from six to eight years, the 
Appellate Division notified him of its intention to revise and 
revoke what it now recognized to be an illegal sentence. 
The May sentence imposed by the Appellate Division, of from 
five to six years, was considerably more favorable to the 
defendant than the original sentence that he received from the 
trial judge.  It did not increase the potential maximum amount 
of imprisonment that the defendant may serve, but rather 
increased the illegal four-year floor to a five-year floor, the 
minimally required period of incarceration.  See Stewart v. 
Scully, 925 F.2d 58, 63-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff had 
expectation of finality where court could have reduced minimum 
term to comply with statute but chose to increase maximum term 
instead); Fogel, 829 F.2d at 90 ("The . . . court . . . was free 
to correct the defect in the original sentence but only to the 
extent necessary to bring the sentence into compliance with the 
statute.  Because the . . . court unnecessarily increased the 
28 
 
appellant's sentence, [it produced] a violation of the double 
jeopardy clause").  The defendant still was incarcerated for 
these offenses when his sentence was corrected, and he had a 
significant period remaining on his term of incarceration.  
Contrast Schubert, 212 N.J. at 313 (increase of sentence after 
it has been completed violative of double jeopardy principles).  
This situation patently is different from the facts in Selavka, 
where the defendant received an additional condition after his 
release from confinement that had a severe impact on his privacy 
interests and to which he did not agree when tendering a plea to 
the offenses with which he was charged.  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 
514.  See Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 704 (2019), 
S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020) (GPS monitoring cannot be deemed 
"minimally invasive" where it gathers significant information 
over long period of time and causes several "practical problems 
and life inconveniences"). 
Although the decision of the Appellate Division "shall be 
final," meaning the defendant may not appeal his or her sentence 
on fairness grounds to the appellate courts, G. L. c. 278, 
§ 28B, and "[a] defendant's expectation of finality in his 
sentence increases once he has begun to serve that sentence," 
Selavka, 469 Mass. at 514, the defendant's expectation of 
finality in the illegal November sentence had not yet 
29 
 
"crystallized" for all of the above reasons.16  I would therefore 
decline to invalidate the corrected, legal May sentence imposed 
by the Appellate Division and to order reinstatement of the 
illegal November sentence.17 
Finally, I briefly address the defendant's assertion that 
the May sentence was correctable, in the alternative, under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a).  Although the single justice did not 
 
16 Recognition of the "shall be final" language in § 28B 
must be read in light of all of the other factors characterizing 
the Appellate Division, its purpose, and the defendant's 
legitimate expectation of finality in this particular case, 
discussed at length supra.  See Barros, 460 Mass. at 1015 
("shall be final" in statute means that party may not appeal "as 
a matter of right to the appellate courts from the Appellate 
Division's decision").  I do not conclude that "because the 
decision of the Appellate Division is, by statute, final, the 
defendant has no legitimate finality interest in its 
determination."  Ante at    .  Instead, after closely analyzing 
the nature of the Appellate Division and the factors surrounding 
the illegal sentence and its subsequent revision, I conclude 
that the defendant's expectation of finality in the illegal 
sentence had not "crystallized" in this case. 
 
Furthermore, despite the court's decision in Selavka, and 
even if this case were not distinguishable, I am hesitant to 
conclude that this court should sanction an illegal sentence.  
See Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 542 (2020) ("We are 
bound by [the] choice[s]" of Legislature in interpreting and 
applying statutes). 
 
17 Although I appreciate the power that the Commonwealth and 
the courts wield in criminal cases, it is important that we 
consider the arguments on both sides in coming to a fair and 
just conclusion.  See Mele v. Fitchburg Dist. Court, 850 F.2d 
817, 822 (1st Cir. 1988) ("opportunity to consider arguments on 
both sides . . . is [a concept] at the root of our adversarial 
system of justice").  There are legitimate interests and 
arguments on both sides of most issues that reach us. 
30 
 
address this claim, the defendant preserved the issue by raising 
it in his memorandum in support of his G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition to the single justice.  Contrast Lykus v. Commonwealth, 
432 Mass. 160, 164 (2000) ("As the defendant did not raise this 
issue before the lower court, or the single justice, it is not 
properly before us on appeal"). 
Rule 30 (a) states: 
"Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is 
restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any 
time, as of right, file a written motion requesting the 
trial judge to release him or her or to correct the 
sentence then being served upon the ground that the 
confinement or restraint was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts." 
 
The Reporters' Notes to rule 30 (a) indicate that it is 
available to seek the correction of an illegal sentence, which 
includes "facially illegal sentences" and "sentences premised 
upon a major misunderstanding by the sentencing judge," but not 
an illegally imposed sentence, "where the irregularity lies with 
the procedure employed in imposing the sentence."18  Reporters' 
 
18 "'An "illegal sentence" is one that is in excess of the 
punishment prescribed by the relevant statutory provision or in 
some way contrary to the applicable statute,' Commonwealth v. 
Layne, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19 (1985), or is 'premised on a 
major misunderstanding by the sentencing judge as to the legal 
bounds of his authority,' Commonwealth v. McGuinness, 421 Mass. 
472, 475 (1995)."  Commonwealth v. Walters, 479 Mass. 277, 280 
(2018).  "A sentence that contradicts the statutory provision in 
question, even where those contradictions favor the defendant, 
is also illegal."  Id. at 281. 
 
31 
 
Notes to Rule 30 (a), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, at 339 (LexisNexis 2022-2023).  According to 
the Reporters' Notes, an illegally imposed sentence is 
correctable on a motion filed pursuant to rule 29 (a).  Id. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Hill, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 808-809 
(2011), the Appeals Court held that rule 30 (a) may be used to 
challenge a sentence imposed by the Appellate Division.  This 
conclusion is supported by recent case law from this court.  See 
Sabree v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2018) (defendant 
could have raised claim regarding Appellate Division's authority 
or jurisdiction to restructure and amend sentences pursuant to 
rule 30 [a]); Cucinelli v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 1004, 1004 
n.3 (2017) (to extent defendant claimed that his new sentence 
ordered by Appellate Division was illegal, he could file motion 
under rule 30 [a]); Jones v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 1005, 1005-
1006 (2012) (petitioner had other means to seek relief from 
decision of Appellate Division, one being rule 30 [a] motion).  
But see Callahan, 419 Mass. at 309 (once party enters appeal 
from sentence to Appellate Division, "the judge issuing the 
 
In Layne, the Appeals Court held that a motion was filed 
improperly under rule 30 (a) where it did not allege an "illegal 
sentence," but alleged that the sentencing judge misapprehended 
that the applicable parole eligibility standards soon would be 
relaxed by the Legislature; such a motion would have been filed 
properly under rule 29 (a) within the relevant time constraints.  
Layne, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 18-20. 
32 
 
order from which an appeal is taken is divested of jurisdiction 
to act on motions to rehear or to vacate" under rule 29 [a]).  
Considering our holding in Callahan, in my view, any rule 30 (a) 
motion filed by a defendant would need to be to the relevant 
panel of judges who imposed the sentence in the Appellate 
Division, despite the language in rule 30 (a) specifying that 
the motion is to be filed with the "trial judge."  The original 
sentencing judge, after appeal to the Appellate Division, is 
divested of jurisdiction.  Although "[t]he rule assigns the 
motion to the trial judge who heard the case, on the theory that 
his familiarity with the case can assist in its effective 
handling," where a defendant challenges his sentence as altered 
by the Appellate Division, it would be in the best position to 
respond to such a challenge.  McCastle, petitioner, 401 Mass. 
105, 107 (1987).  See Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 31 
(1989) ("It is sensible to restrict an individual who has been 
convicted and imprisoned to rule 30 postconviction relief before 
the trial judge when that individual objects to the imposition 
of confinement, but it is not free, easy, cheap, or expeditious 
to impose a rule 30 hearing before a judge on a person demanding 
an immediate release from prison on grounds of which the judge 
is completely unaware"). 
In Commonwealth v. Simmons, 448 Mass. 687, 691 (2007), the 
court stated that the defendant's motion to vacate his sentence 
33 
 
because of alleged violations of his constitutional right to 
speedy sentencing and the sentencing judge's consideration of 
impermissible factors appropriately was treated as a motion 
pursuant to rule 30 (a) by the Appeals Court.  In Commonwealth 
v. Layne, 386 Mass. 291, 297 (1982), the defendant filed an 
initial "motion to revise and revoke" under rule 30 (a).  One 
year later, he filed another motion to vacate illegal sentences 
based on rule 30 (a), regarding whether the sentences originally 
imposed were indeterminate as required by G. L. c. 279, § 24, 
and whether he had a constitutionally protected right to have 
his sentences reviewed by a parole board.  Id.  The court stated 
that "these grounds could reasonably have been raised in the 
original motion," and on this basis dismissed the appeal from 
the order denying the motion.  Id. 
In Commonwealth v. Bruzzese, 437 Mass. 606, 614 (2002), the 
court held that a judge's revocation of the defendant's 
probation on one of his complaints, which resulted in him 
serving another year beyond what was contemplated by the order 
of the initial sentencing judge, "violated principles of double 
jeopardy," and thus, his "motion under rule 30 (a) should have 
been allowed."  See Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 143 
(2015) (rule 30 [a] proper mechanism for judge to correct now 
unconstitutional life sentence); Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 
Mass. 318, 320 (2014) (rule 30 [a] was "proper mechanism by 
34 
 
which to challenge constitutionality of the [community parole 
supervision for life] sentencing scheme"); Cumming, 466 Mass. at 
470-472 (considering defendant's double jeopardy challenges to 
judge's resentencing order pursuant to rule 30 [a]). 
In light of this case law, regardless of whether the 
defendant's claim was that the May sentence was "illegal" or 
"illegally imposed," it is my position that rule 30 (a) would 
have been a proper vehicle through which to raise his double 
jeopardy challenge, if he had raised it with the Appellate 
Division.  Cf. Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 269 ("The Reporters' 
Notes, not officially approved or reviewed by this court, are 
not binding on this court").  As I have explained supra, 
however, the delay in the correction of the illegal sentence 
here did not implicate principles of double jeopardy. 
My determination that rule 29 (a) does not apply to the 
Appellate Division is not in conflict with my determination that 
rule 30 (a) does apply.  Rule 30 (a), adopted in 1979, was 
created to "simplify post conviction procedure, while 
maintaining the full scope of relief previously available."  
Reporters' Notes to Rule 30 (a), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 338 (LexisNexis 2022-2023).  
This rule permits a defendant to "seek release from illegal 
confinement or other restraint on their liberty" and seek the 
correction of an illegal sentence at any point while the 
35 
 
defendant's liberty is restricted, consolidating two formally 
separate remedies, a writ of error and habeas corpus.  Id. at 
338-339.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) ("person who is 
imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal 
conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written 
motion"); St. 1979, c. 344, § 12, effective July 1, 1979; 
Commonwealth v. Lupo, 394 Mass. 644, 646 (1985).  There is no 
time limit in rule 30 (a), contrary to the sixty-day limitation 
in rule 29 (a).  In addition to a restraint of liberty such as 
incarceration or probation, the rule also encompasses sentences 
"contain[ing] a requirement that the defendant be subject to 
community parole supervision for life . . . or register as a sex 
offender."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 610, 613 
(2019).  The generous language in rule 30 (a) allowing a 
challenge to the legality of a sentence at any time by a 
defendant whose liberty is restrained suggests that it was 
intended to apply more broadly than rule 29 (a) for the purposes 
of a defendant's challenge to the legality of his or her 
sentence, and thus that rule 30 (a) should apply to the 
Appellate Division.  See Reporters' Notes to Rule 29 (a), Mass. 
Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 327 
(LexisNexis 2022-2023) (rule 29 [a] [1]'s authority to challenge 
illegal sentence limited to Commonwealth and trial judge, 
because, in part, "[q]uite apart from [r]ule 29 [a], [r]ule 
36 
 
30 [a] gives the defendant the right to challenge an illegal 
sentence at any time"). 
In conclusion, because I do not think that rule 29 (a) 
applies to the Appellate Division, and in these circumstances, 
where the defendant still is serving the incarcerated portion of 
his sentence and where the November sentence was illegal, the 
May sentence revision did not violate the protections against 
double jeopardy.  It simply allowed the Appellate Division to 
minimally correct the sentence to bring it within statutorily 
permissible parameters while remaining considerably reduced from 
the original sentence that the defendant received.  Therefore, I 
would affirm the decision of the single justice to uphold the 
May sentence of from five to six years in State prison.