Title: Walter v. Scherzinger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51669
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 13, 2005

FILED:  October 13, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
D. GRANT WALTER
and SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 140,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
JAMES SCHERZINGER
and PORTLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1J,
Respondents on Review.
(ERB DR-4-02; CA A118491; SC S51669)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 10, 2005.
James S. Coon, of Swanson, Thomas &amp; Coon, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review.
William H. Walters, of Miller Nash LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for respondents on review.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
declaratory ruling of the Employment Relations Board is reversed.
Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which Carson, C. J., and Gillette, J., joined.
*Appeal from Employment Relations Board declaratory ruling. 193 Or App 355, 89 P3d 1265 (2004).
DE MUNIZ, J.
The issue in this case is whether, in accordance with 
the text of the Custodians' Civil Service Law (CCSL), ORS 242.310
to 242.640 and ORS 242.990, (1) the Portland Public School
District (the district) must employ custodians and whether the
district must do so consistently with the merit system set out in
that law.  The Service Employees International Union Local 140
(Local 140) and its president, D. Grant Walker (collectively
"petitioners"), sought a declaratory ruling from the Employment
Relations Board (ERB) that the district's proposal to terminate
its existing custodial workforce and contract for custodial
services violated the CCSL and, therefore, was a prohibited
subject of bargaining.  The ERB concluded that the CCSL did not
prohibit the district from contracting for its custodial
services.  Local 140 appealed that decision, and the Court of
Appeals concluded, like the ERB, that the district could contract
for custodial services notwithstanding the provisions of the
CCSL.  Walter v. Scherzinger, 193 Or App 355, 89 P3d 1265 (2004). 
We allowed Local 140's petition for review, and, for the
following reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the declaratory ruling of the ERB.
We take the facts and positions of the parties from the
Court of Appeals decision:
"At all pertinent times, [the district] employed
approximately 340 custodians, assistant custodians, and
custodial helpers represented by Local 140.  In early
2002, [the district] faced existing and projected
budget deficits, which led to what interim
superintendent James Scherzinger characterized as a
'mission-threatening moment' for the district's
schools.  In response to that financial situation, on
February 5, 2002, Scherzinger sent a letter to Walter
notifying him that [the district] was 'proposing to
subcontract out all of the custodial services currently
being performed by members of the bargaining unit
represented by Local 140.'
"[The district] offered to bargain with
petitioners over the proposal.  Petitioners objected to
the proposal but agreed to bargain with [the district]
while reserving objections to the plan.  On March 18,
2002, the [district] board adopted a budget based on
the assumption that [the district] would contract out
all custodial services and lay off the Local
140-represented employees effective July 1, 2002.
"In April 2002, petitioners requested an expedited
declaratory ruling from [the] ERB to determine whether
the contracting proposal was a prohibited subject of
bargaining.  * * *  Petitioners argued that, because
the CCSL provides [that] 'the only legal method by
which the District may hire custodial workers,' the
contracting proposal would violate the law.  The
essence of petitioners' argument * * * is that (1) the
CCSL describes a comprehensive and fully integrated
merit-based system for the appointment and promotion of
custodians and assistant custodians providing services
to [the district]; (2) [the district]'s private
contracting proposal would, effectively, bypass those
protections, rendering the entire statutory design a
'dead letter'; and (3) the legislature implicitly, but
necessarily, precluded such a wholesale circumvention
of the CCSL.
"[The district] responded that the contracting
proposal did not violate the CCSL because the CCSL does
not prohibit independent contracting arrangements--and,
indeed, expressly applies only to 'employees' of [the
district].  * * *  Thus, [the district] reasoned that
persons performing custodial services pursuant to
private independent contracting arrangements would not
be 'employees' and, consequently, would not be subject
to the CCSL.
"[The] ERB adopted [the district]'s position. 
Applying the template for statutory analysis prescribed
in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), [the] ERB concluded:
"'The CCSL is intended to apply to custodians
who are employees of the District.  Nothing
in the law states that the District cannot
subcontract custodial services; rather, the
CCSL applies if the District decides to hire
custodians as employees of the District. 
Thus, there is no conflict between the CCSL
and the District's proposal.  The District's
proposal does not require it to violate the
CCSL, because, as a threshold matter, for
CCSL to apply, the custodians must be
District employees.
"'Petitioners emphasize various
provisions of the CCSL that state [that] the
District 'shall' do certain things in
connection with the employment of custodians,
such as, certain required actions and
procedures [that] the civil service board
must follow filling vacancies and
establishing classifications. * * *
Petitioners argue that these statutory
provisions would be rendered meaningless if
the District contracts out custodial
services.  It is true that[,] if the District
employs no custodians, these provisions cease
to have effect.  Still, the CCSL clearly was
intended to cover only those custodians in
the District's employ.  There is simply
nothing in the law that extends its reach to
independent contractors of the District, or
that prohibits the District from
subcontracting custodial services.  The
mandatory language of the CCSL, relied upon
by Petitioners, takes effect only if
custodians are employees of the District.
"'* * * Petitioner[s] contend[ ] that[,]
if the legislature had intended the CCSL to
be optional, it would have said so, as it did
in these other laws.  Petitioners' argument,
however, ignores the definitions of the CCSL
that clearly limit its applicability to
employees of the District.  As stated above,
while the language of the CCSL contains many
'shalls,' these provisions apply only to
custodians who are District employees.
"'* * * * *
"'Even if it were necessary to examine
legislative history, the fact remains that
nothing in the statute, or its legislative
history, extends the CCSL's reach to prohibit
subcontracting.  By the plain terms of the
statute, its coverage is limited to employees
of the District.  If the legislature had
intended to ban contracting with private
firms for custodial services, or if it had
intended to extend the coverage of the CCSL
to private contractors of the District, it
would have said so.  It did not.  We will not
read a prohibition into the CCSL that simply
is not there.'
"On judicial review, the parties reiterate their
arguments to [the] ERB."
Walter, 193 Or App at 357-59 (footnotes and citations omitted).  
Like ERB, the Court of Appeals concluded that the CCSL
does not prohibit the district's proposal to terminate its
existing custodial workforce and contract for custodial services:
"[T]he CCSL does not preclude [the district]'s private
contracting proposal.  Nothing in the CCSL's text or
pertinent context requires [the district] to hire
persons providing custodial services as employees. 
Similarly, and concomitantly, nothing in the CCSL
limits [the district]'s ability to procure custodial
services through contracts comporting with the public
contracting laws.  Rather, the CCSL merely provides
that, in those circumstances in which [the district]
does, in fact, employ persons as probationary or
permanent custodians or assistant custodians, the
appointment, retention, promotion, and discharge of
those employees must comply with the requirements of
the CCSL.  Nothing more."  
Id. at 370.
In this court, petitioners reassert that the text of
the CCSL requires the district to employ custodians and that it
must do so consistently with the merit system described in the
CCSL.  Petitioners argue that, in enacting the CCSL the
legislature intended to ensure the protection of children. 
According to petitioners, that intent is reflected in the text of
ORS 242.550, which provides:
"The civil service board may require an applicant
for a custodial position to furnish evidence
satisfactory to the board of good character, mental and
physical health, and such other evidence as it may deem
necessary to establish the applicant's fitness,
including any information concerning a criminal
conviction for a crime involving the possession, use,
sale or distribution of a controlled substance, sexual
misconduct listed in ORS 342.143(3), theft or a crime
of violence.  The board shall not approve the
employment of any applicant unless the board is
satisfied that the applicant poses no danger to school
children."
(Emphasis added.)  Petitioners further argue that it is unlikely
that the legislature would have mandated the existence of a civil
service board and a secretary for the board, and, inter alia,
that vacancies be filled within 10 days unless it intended "the
civil service system to continue to apply indefinitely, as long
as the Portland District had need of custodial services." 
In response, the district argues that the CCSL, like
many similar laws enacted in other states, was a response to
custodial, and other jobs, being "subject to nepotism and to
political and religious cronyism."  Additionally, and
consistently with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
district argues that the CCSL, by its terms, applies only if the
district decides to employ custodians.  Therefore, the district
argues, the CCSL does not preclude it from contracting with
private parties for custodial services.  In addition, the
district argues that a 1965 amendment to ORS 332.155, adding what
is now subsection (7), indisputably provides the district with
the authority to contract for custodial services.  That provision
provides:  
"A district school board:
"* * * * *
"(7) Shall furnish the schools with supplies,
equipment, apparatus and services essential to meeting
the requirements of a standard school and may furnish
such other supplies, equipment, apparatus and services
as the board considers advisable."
ORS 332.155(7). (2)
As the parties' arguments make clear, this case
presents a question of statutory interpretation.  We therefore
apply the statutory interpretation methodology set out in PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993), to determine the legislature's intent when it enacted the
CCSL. 
Pursuant to PGE, we turn first to the relevant text and
context of the CCSL.  317 Or at 610.  ORS 242.320 (3) defines
the terms "assistant custodian" and "custodian."  With certain
exceptions not relevant here, ORS 242.320(1) defines "assistant
custodian" as "any employee who works under the supervision of a
custodian[.]"  ORS 242.320(2) similarly defines "custodian" as
"an employee of the school district" who has certain duties with
respect to the supervision of school property.  ORS 242.330(1)
further provides:
"In all school districts having a population of
300,000 or more persons according to the last federal
census, there is created a civil service board with
jurisdiction over the appointment, employment,
classification and discharge of custodians and
assistant custodians in the employ of the school
district."
The district in question is a school district with a population
of 300,000 or more persons. (4)  Notably, ORS 242.520(1)
provides that "[n]o appointment or promotion to any position
shall be made except as provided in the [CCSL]  ."  The CCSL
continues on to require "public competitive examinations to
ascertain the fitness of applicants for beginning employment
positions[,]" ORS 242.530, specifies the content of those
examinations, ORS 242.540, requires the civil service board to
scrutinize the character of all applicants to ensure that none
"poses a danger to school children[,]" ORS 242.550, and sets out
other requirements pertaining to the board's management and
termination of employees, ORS 242.560 to 242.640.
Most relevant to our analysis is the text of ORS
242.520(1).  Petitioners argue that ORS 242.520(1) requires that
the district observe the merit system set out in the CCSL when
acquiring its custodial services.  The effect of that provision
turns on the meaning of the terms "appointment" and "position." 
Because the CCSL does not define those terms, we turn to a
dictionary to ascertain the "plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning" of those terms.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.  The relevant
dictionary definition of "appointment" is the "designation of a
person to hold a nonelective office or perform a function." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 105 (unabridged ed 2002). 
Additionally, the relevant definition of "position" is "the group
of tasks and responsibilities making up the duties of an
employee[.]"  Id. at 1769.  ORS 242.520(1), therefore, properly
can be understood as prohibiting the district from designating
any person (5) to hold an office or perform a function that
involves the tasks and responsibilities of a custodial employee
without doing so pursuant to the CCSL. (6)  
The district asserts, however that the text of the CCSL 
applies only if the district chooses to employ custodial workers. 
We now address that contention.  We begin with a brief discussion
of the development of the statutes governing the duties of school
districts as context for our understanding of the legislature's
intent when it enacted the CCSL in 1937.  
In 1901, as part of a complete revision of the laws
governing the Oregon public school system, (7) the legislature
enacted statutes addressing the organization of school districts
and the duties of school boards.  The revision required that all
school districts be classified as "first class," "second class,"
or "third class" based on "the number of children of school age,
as shown by the last school census."  The Codes and Statutes of
Oregon, title XXXIII, ch I, § 3364 (Bellinger &amp; Cotton 1901).  At
section 3389, the new law set out the duties of the school boards
and, as relevant here, provided, in part:
"The duties of school boards shall be:--
"* * * * *
"4.  They shall furnish their schools, from the
common school fund, with fuel already prepared for use,
chalk, janitor, brooms, blackboards, erasers, stoves,
window curtains, reference books, library books and
other apparatus for use in their schools:  Provided,
that the sum expended for this purpose shall not exceed
fifteen per cent of the five-mill county school fund
and the irreducible school fund apportioned to said
district."  
Id. at § 3389 (emphasis in original).  That provision remained
virtually unchanged until 1941, when the legislature amended it
to read:
"The general duties of the district school boards
of the state of Oregon shall be as follows:
"* * * * *
"4.  They shall furnish their schools with
supplies, equipment, apparatus and services essential
to meeting the requirements of a standard school and
may furnish such other supplies, equipment, apparatus
and services as the board deems advisable."    
Or Laws 1941, ch 155, § 1. (8)  Thus, it is clear that the
substance of what is now ORS 332.155(7) has governed the
administration of schools by district school boards since the
late nineteenth century.  Both the Court of Appeals, Walter, 193
Or App at 367, n 11, and the district are incorrect in their
assertions that that provision first became a part of Oregon law
in 1965.  As a consequence, it also was incorrect to conclude
that the later enactment indicated an intent by the legislature
to provide the district discretion to avoid application of the
CCSL to its custodial hiring decisions.  
The 1901 act also included a section dedicated
specifically to school districts of the first class, and, within
that section, set out the duties of school boards in such
districts.  Those duties included "employ[ing] teachers,
janitors, carpenters, etc."  The Codes and Statutes of Oregon,
title XXXIII, ch I, § 3408(2) (Bellinger &amp; Cotton 1901).  They
became duties "to be exercised in [the district school boards']
discretion" in 1931.  Or Laws 1931, ch 92, § 1.  The legislature
also authorized school districts of the first class to solicit
bids from private parties for the provision of certain supplies
and services in the event that the cost for such items would
equal or exceed five hundred dollars:
"In all such districts, when in the opinion of the
board the cost of any lot of furniture, stationery,
apparatus, fuel, buildings, or improvements or repairs
to the same, will equal or exceed the sum of five
hundred dollars, it shall be the duty of said board to
give due notice, by publication in at least one daily
newspaper published within said corporate limits, of
their intention to receive bids for such lot of
furniture, stationery, etc., and they shall determine
the specifications for such bids and appoint the time
and place for opening of all bids, which shall be
public; and it shall be unlawful for any member of the
school board to bid or to be an interested party in any
bid before such board."
The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XXXIII, ch I, § 3417
(Bellinger &amp; Cotton 1901).  That provision remained the same,
with the exception of a slight modification in punctuation, until
1951.  The legislature later repealed that provision in 1975 as
part of a wholesale revision of the statutes governing public
contracts.  Or Laws 1975, ch 771, § 33. 
By 1937, the legislature also had enacted provisions
governing school districts of the first class with a population
of 20,000 or more school-aged children.  OCLA § 111-1211; OCLA §§
111-1401 to 111-1409 (1937).  Specifically, at OCLA section 111-1211, the legislature provided that, in such school districts,
the board of directors would consist of seven directors, but in
all other districts of the first class, the board would consist
of five directors.  That population requirement increased
gradually over time.  The present analogue to that provision is
ORS 332.015, which provides, in part, that "[t]he board of
directors of a school district with a population of 300,000 or
more * * * shall consist of seven members." 
The forgoing indicates that, by 1937, school boards in
districts of the first class (1) had a duty to provide certain
supplies and services (9) to their schools; (2) had the
discretion to hire necessary personnel; and (3) had a duty to
receive bids for "any lot of furniture, stationery, apparatus,
fuel, buildings, or improvements or repairs to the same" when the
cost of such items might "exceed the sum of five hundred
dollars[.]"  In short, the legislature conferred on school boards
in districts of the first class the authority to contract for
essential supplies and services related to the maintenance of
school property.  Furthermore, the legislature recognized that
school districts with large student bodies required more
supervision and administration than did smaller school districts.
The legislature also recognized a distinction between
"employees" and "independent contractors" in other statutes.  For
example, at OCLA § 102-609, the 1931 Legislative Assembly defined
the term "employe[e]" to mean:
"any individual who otherwise than as copartner of the
employer or as an independent contractor renders
personal services wholly or partly in this state to an
employer who pays or agrees to pay such individual at a
fixed rate, based on the time spent in the performance
of such services[.]"
OCLA § 102-608 specifically had excluded "any state, county,
municipal corporation, town or other governmental division" from
the scope of the term "employer" for purposes of that scheme,
but, even so, the legislature clearly had made distinctions
between employees and independent contractors by 1937.  The
legislature apparently likewise had not defined the term
"independent contractor," but at the time that the legislature
passed the CCSL, this court understood that term to mean "'[o]ne
who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a
piece of work according to his own methods, and without being
subject to control of his employer, except as to the result of
his work.'"  Streby v. State Indus. Acc. Com., 107 Or 314, 330,
215 Pac 586 (1923) (quoting Scales v. First State Bank, 88 Or
490, 496-97, 172 Pac 499 (1918)) "[T]he test for determining
whether a person employed to do certain work is or is not an
independent contractor, is the control which the employer
reserves over the work and has the right to exercise.  Where the
person doing the work is an independent contractor[,] the will of
the employer is represented in the result contracted for while
the general control over means and methods is given to the
contractor").
It was against that legal backdrop that, in 1937, the
legislature enacted the CCSL.  OCLA § 111-1501 set out the name
of the act, and OCLA § 111-1502 set out its scope:
"In all school districts of this state in which
there is a population of 100,000 or more persons,
according to the last federal census, there hereby is
created a civil service board with jurisdiction over
the appointment, employment, classification and
discharge of custodians and assistant custodians in the
employ of such school district.  Custodians hereby are
defined as employes of such school district, who shall
have supervision of property, keeping the same in a
sanitary condition and tending to the cleaning and
operation of heating plants and other necessary work in
the way of care and labor to keep the physical plants
of the school board in maintenance and operation; and
assistant custodians hereby are defined as those
employes who work under such custodians' supervision. 
Any assistant custodian receiving less than $60 per
month as a wage shall not be deemed to come within the
provisions of this act."
(Emphasis added.)  The provisions that followed set out,
respectively, the number of commissioners who would constitute
the board and the manner of their appointment, OCLA § 111-1503, a
requirement that the board appoint a secretary, OCLA § 111-1504,
and a requirement that all persons already employed as custodians
would become permanent employees without the need to take an
examination, OCLA § 111-1505.  
Furthermore, OCLA § 111-1506 provided:
"Upon the effective date of this act, the said
civil service board shall classify, with relation to
the character of work and the compensation attached
thereto, all of the positions as custodians and
assistant custodians in the service of the school board
within the district.  The places and employment so
classified shall constitute the classified civil
service of the school district, and after taking effect
of this act, no appointments or promotion to any such
place or position shall be made, except as herein
provided."
(Emphasis added.)  OCLA § 111-1508 also prohibited certain
persons from being eligible for appointment to a position:
"No person shall be eligible for examination and
appointment unless he or she be a citizen of the United
States and a resident of the said school district for
at least one year immediately prior to applying for
said examination.  Such person must be able to read and
write the English language.  No person habitually using
intoxicating beverages to excess or who has been an
inmate of an insane asylum or who has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude shall be eligible for
appointment." 
The legislature revised that provision in 1979, and, as noted
above, added a specific requirement that, before the civil
service board approves an applicant for employment, the board
must be assured that the applicant does not pose a danger to
school children.  Or Laws 1979, ch 738, § 3 (now ORS 242.550). 
OCLA § 111-1509 conveyed all control over examinations
to the civil service board, and OCLA § 111-1510 set out
parameters for registering and ranking eligible candidates.  OCLA
§ 111-1511 further required, in part:
"Whenever there shall be a vacancy in any
position in the said classified civil service, the
school board, or its designated representative,
immediately shall notify the civil service board
thereof.  The civil service board thereupon shall
certify to such appointing authority the names and
addresses of the three eligible candidates
standing highest upon the register for the class
or grade to which such position belongs[.]" (10) 
For the reasons discussed below, the foregoing
provisions demonstrate that, when it enacted the CCSL, the
legislature intended to enact a comprehensive statutory scheme to
govern the selection of custodial workers in school districts
with "a population of 100,000 or more persons[.]"  The 1937
Legislative Assembly also chose to confer upon the civil service
board jurisdiction over the employment of such custodial workers
before defining the terms "custodian" and "assistant custodian." 
The legislature then defined such personnel, in part, as
"employe[e]s" of the school district.  The question that we must
resolve is whether the legislature's intent was to limit the
persons to whom the CCSL would apply, rather than to define the
legal status of custodial workers who the civil service board
hired to fill vacant district positions.  
Pursuant to ORS 174.010, this court must construe
statutes in a manner that will give effect to all provisions at
issue.  We think that the choice of the 1937 Legislative Assembly
to define the terms "custodian" and "assistant custodian" as
"employe[e]s," taken with its mandate that, "after taking effect
of this act, no appointments or promotions to any such place or
position shall be made, except as herein provided[,]" (11)
demonstrates that the legislature intended to define the legal
status of such workers.  
That proposition is supported by the fact that the
legislature did not base the civil service board's authority on
an employment relationship; i.e., whether the individuals who
perform custodial work within the school district are employees
of the school district.  Instead, in creating the CCSL, the
legislature invested the civil service board with authority at a
much more fundamental level.  As ORS 242.510 makes plain, the
civil service board's authority does not begin with the type of
worker used to fill a custodial position in a school district;
instead, the civil service board's authority begins with the
custodial positions themselves: 
"The civil service board shall classify, with
relation to the character of work and the compensation
attached thereto, all positions in the service of the
school board within the district including those under
the supervision of a custodian except those described
in ORS 242.320(1)(a), (b) or (c).  The positions so
classified shall constitute the classified civil
service of the school district." (12)
The legislature's reference to "all positions in the
service of the school board" in the statute's text underscores
several aspects of the CCSL that are important here.  First,
"positions" can exist even when they are vacant and regardless of
the category of workers who ultimately fill them, be they
employees, subcontractors, or even volunteers.  In creating
authority in the civil service board to classify such "positions"
by character of work and compensation, the legislature
essentially granted the civil service board authority over the
concept of custodial positions within the qualifying school
districts as much as it granted the civil service board authority
to make the concept a concrete reality through a classified civil
service.  As a result, filling the positions at issue here with
nonemployees would not divest the civil service board of its
statutory authority, because, under the CCSL, the civil service
board's authority begins with the position itself.
Second, the legislature could have referred to such 
positions as being "in the employment of the school board" when
it drafted ORS 242.510, but it did not.  Instead, the legislature
drafted a statute that referred to positions "in the service of
the school board."  Giving the term "service" its plain meaning,
the word is most properly understood in the context used here as
simply "the performance of work commanded or paid for by
another." Webster's at 2075.  As a result of that broad
definition, just as a "position" can conceivably be filled in a
variety of ways -- by employees, subcontractors, or volunteers --
so too, the "service" to the school board provided by those
positions can also be realized in a variety of ways, none of
which appear limited to relationships based only on employment.
Simply put, ORS 242.510 invests custodial civil service
boards with a broad authority that begins with board
classification of the applicable custodial positions within a
qualifying school district.  That, in turn, translates into
statutory authority over all appointments and promotions within
the custodial classified civil service.  ORS 242.520 provides:
"(1) No appointment or promotion to any position
shall be made except as provided in the Custodians'
Civil Service Law.  All appointments to beginning
employment positions in the classified civil service
shall be made according to fitness, to be ascertained
by open competitive examinations.  All promotions in
the classified civil service shall be made according to
merit in service, fidelity in service and seniority in
service.
"(2) No person shall be appointed or employed by a
school board under any title not appropriate to the
duties to be performed.
"(3) The appointing authority shall immediately
notify the board of any appointment or discharge."
Of course, as ORS 242.510 makes clear, not all
custodial positions are part of the classified civil service. 
Exceptions -- listed in ORS 242.320(1) -- exist for positions
where workers either work less than eight hours per day, work
less than 12 months a year, or receive an hourly pay rate. 
Still, even though such positions are not part of the classified
civil service, the civil service board nevertheless maintains a
degree of authority over who will fill them.  As the text of ORS
242.550 suggests, applicants for custodial positions in general,
not just those subject to the classified civil service, are
subject to civil service board's scrutiny during the hiring
process:
"The civil service board may require an applicant
for a custodial position to furnish evidence
satisfactory to the board of good character, mental and
physical health, and such other evidence as it may deem
necessary to establish the applicant's fitness,
including any information concerning a criminal
conviction for a crime involving the possession, use,
sale or distribution of a controlled substance, sexual
misconduct listed in ORS 342.143(3), theft or a crime
of violence. The board shall not approve the employment
of any applicant unless the board is satisfied that the
applicant poses no danger to school children."
(Emphasis added.)  The legislative intent behind that provision
is clear.  ORS 242.550 prohibits the civil service board from
approving any applicant's employment unless the board satisfies
itself, from its review of the applicant's fitness, that the
applicant poses no danger to the school children in the
district's care.  The beneficiaries of that requirement are the
district school board and the public, especially parents and
students.  The district's proposed interpretation of the statute
thwarts that legislative intent because it would authorize the
district to contract with custodians who have never established,
to the satisfaction of the civil service board, that they are fit
for service and pose no danger to school children.  That approach
simply would eliminate the assurance of the safety of school
children that ORS 242.550 was designed to secure.
Read together, the statutes discussed above establish
the breadth of the civil service board's authority over custodial
positions within a qualifying school district.  At the same time,
they underscore a conscious legislative choice to limit the
authority of certain school districts in the course of filling
those positions.  Moreover, because the CCSL governs a specific
subgroup of school district personnel and was enacted after the
text of ORS 332.155(7) (13) first became a part of Oregon law,
we deem the district's continued obligation to provide "essential
services" to its schools as being subject to the terms of the
CCSL.  See Balzer Mch. v. Klineline Sand &amp; Grav., 271 Or 596,
601, 533 P2d 321 (1975) (noting that, when the text of a statute
is inconsistent with a previously enacted statute, the later
statute will prevail).
We conclude that, when the 1937 legislature defined
custodians and assistant custodians as "employe[e]s," it intended
to define the legal status of those workers.  That definition
served to facilitate the civil service board's control over that
workforce.  Finally, ORS 242.520(1) requires the district to
employ custodians pursuant to the terms of the CCSL.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
declaratory ruling of the Employment Relations Board is reversed.
BALMER, J., dissenting.
When the Portland Public School District
(district) faced a severe budget shortfall in early 2002, it
proposed to reduce expenses by, among other things, contracting
with a private provider to obtain custodial services that were
then being performed by district employees who were members of
Service Employees International Union Local 140. (14)  Whether
that decision was wise from a financial, operational, or safety
perspective is not, of course, an issue for this court to decide. 
The issue before us -- the only issue -- is whether Oregon law
permits the district to obtain custodial services through a
contract with a private service provider, rather than from
individuals whom it hires as district employees.  The Employment
Relations Board concluded that Oregon law permitted the
district's action, and the Court of Appeals agreed. (15)  
A majority of this court, however, now holds that
the Custodians' Civil Service Law (CCSL), ORS 242.310 to 242.640,
bars the district from obtaining custodial services other than
from district employees who are subject to the CCSL.  Because the
majority's conclusion lacks support in the specific wording of
the CCSL and rests instead on inferences that stray from the
legislature's stated intent in enacting that law, I respectfully
dissent.
The CCSL was enacted in 1937 and applies only to
the district.  It created "a civil service board with
jurisdiction over the appointment, employment, classification and
discharge of custodians and assistant custodians in the employ of
[the district]."  ORS 242.330(1); see also Or Laws 1937, ch 355,
§ 2.  As detailed in the majority opinion (and in the opinion of
the Court of Appeals), the CCSL established a merit-based civil
service scheme for the district's custodial employees, requiring
competitive examinations for appointment and charging the board
with responsibility for classifying the work and compensation of
custodians and assistant custodians.  Although the legislature
has amended the CCSL since 1937, its essential features remain
the same.  The CCSL also defines "custodian" and "assistant
custodian" as those terms are to be used in the statute:
"(1) 'Assistant custodian' means any
employee who works under the supervision of a
custodian except those who:
"(a) Work less than eight hours per day;
or
"(b) Work less than 12 months per year;
or
"(c) Receive an hourly rate of pay.
"* * * * * 
"(3) 'Custodian' means an employee of
the school district who has supervision of
property, keeping it in sanitary condition
and tending to the cleaning and operation of
heating plants and other necessary work by
way of care and labor to keep the physical
plants of the school board in maintenance and
operation."
ORS 242.320 (emphasis added).  The CCSL imposes specific
obligations on the civil service board, requiring it to make
reports, hold competitive public examinations for custodial
positions, and prepare and keep a register.  ORS 242.390 -
242.570.  The law also provides that "[n]o appointment or
promotion to any position shall be made except as provided in the
[CCSL]."  ORS 242.520(1). 
Based on those and other provisions of the
CCSL, (16) the district argues that the CCSL applies only to
district "employees" who perform custodial services and that
persons working for a private contractor are not subject to the
CCSL because they are not district employees.  The district
further asserts that nothing in the CCSL requires that custodial
services for the Portland public schools be performed by district
"employees."  Local 140 counters that the entire structure of the
CCSL and the board that it creates assumes that custodial
services will in fact be performed by district employees whose
employment will be regulated by the CCSL. 
Although Local 140 may be correct that the 1937
legislature "assumed" that most custodial services for the
district would be performed by persons directly employed by the
district, such an assumption merely reflected the circumstances
of the time, including the district's limited authority to obtain
services by contracting with private providers and the apparent
rarity of that practice.  However, nothing in the CCSL or in any
legislative history to which the parties direct us suggests that
the legislature intended to require the district to hire every
person who performs custodial services in the Portland public
schools as an employee. (17)  On the contrary, the statute, as
quoted above, gives the civil service board "jurisdiction" over
"custodians and assistant custodians in the employ" of the school
district, and then defines "custodians" and "assistant
custodians" as "employees" of the district who perform the duties
described in ORS 242.320(1) and (3).  Nothing in the text of the
statute requires that every person who performs those duties must
be hired by the district as an employee; neither does it bring
within the compass of the CCSL persons who are not district
"employees."
Even if Local 140 is correct in asserting that the
legislature "assumed" or "believed" that all persons performing
custodial services would be district employees, the corollary
proposition that is critical to their position in this case --
that the legislature also assumed that those employees would be
subject to the CCSL -- does not follow.  Local 140 argues that
ORS 242.520(1), by prohibiting any "appointment or promotion
* * * except as provided in the [CCSL]," demonstrates that the
legislature intended to bring within the scope of the CCSL not
only every district employee who performs custodial services, but
also persons not employed by the district who perform those
services.  That position is not supported by the CCSL.
The original CCSL excluded from its coverage
"[a]ny assistant custodian receiving less than $60 per month as a
wage * * *."  Or Laws 1937, ch 355, § 2, and the current CCSL
excludes, by excluding from the definition of "assistant
custodian," any employee who works less than eight hours per day
or less than 12 months per year or who receives an hourly rate of
pay.  ORS 242.320(1).  Thus, nothing in the CCSL itself would
prohibit the district from obtaining all of its custodial
services by hiring part-time employees who would not be subject
to the CCSL.
I also note in passing that the record in this
case demonstrates that some custodial services in the district's
schools are performed by persons who are not district employees,
while others are performed by district employees who are not
subject to the CCSL.  The record identifies six contracts signed
before the present dispute arose between the district and private
providers of custodial services.  The record also indicates that
the district does, in fact, employ part-time assistant custodians
and student custodians who do not come within the statutory
definitions of "custodian" or "assistant custodian" quoted above
and thus are not subject to the CCSL, even though they perform
custodial services.  Finally, the parties have stipulated that
approximately 75 district employees represented by an association
of skilled trades unions perform work that involves keeping
district property in a sanitary condition, cleaning and operating
heating equipment, and otherwise maintaining district facilities. 
If Local 140's interpretation of the CCSL were correct, the
district's existing practices -- to which Local 140 apparently
has not objected -- of having some custodial services performed
by district employees who are not subject to the CCSL and other
custodial services performed by persons who are not district
employees, would be unlawful. 
It is striking that the majority takes a different
approach from Local 140.  It agrees with Local 140 that the CCSL
applies to any worker who performs custodial services for the
district, whether that worker is a district employee or an
employee of a private contractor.  The majority reaches that
conclusion, however, on a basis that Local 140 did not argue,
viz., that, by using the word "employee" in ORS 242.320's
definitions of "custodian" and "assistant custodian," the
legislature did not intend to "limit" the persons to whom the
CCSL would apply, but rather "to define the legal status of
custodial workers who the civil service board hired to fill
vacant district positions."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 18)
(emphasis in original).  That is, rather than reading the
statutory definition of custodian -- that a custodian "means an
employee of the school district" who has certain defined
responsibilities, ORS 242.320(3) -- in the ordinary sense to
include only a person who is "an employee of the school
district," the majority concludes that any person who has those
defined responsibilities is a custodian, and, therefore, must
have (or must be given) the "legal status" of an "employee."  In
my view, there is a reason that Local 140 did not advance that
interpretation:  That interpretation is unsupportable. 
As noted, the 1937 legislation gave the civil
service board "jurisdiction over the appointment, employment,
classification and discharge of custodians," and, in the next
sentence of the same section, provided that "custodians hereby
are defined as employees of [the district] * * * ."  Or Laws
1937, ch 355, § 2 (emphasis added). (18)   The only plausible
way to read that section is as an expression of the legislature's
intent that the word "employee" describe those persons to whom
the statute applies, rather than, as the majority would have it,
to prescribe that the district hire as an employee any person who
performs custodial services.  See Walter v. Scherzinger, 193 Or
App 355, 368, 89 P3d 1265 (2004) (legislature's use of word
employee "was descriptive, based on contemporary reality, and not
prescriptive"). 
The statute's words will not support the
majority's conclusion that by defining a "custodian" for purposes
of the CCSL as an "employee" who performs certain functions, the
legislature intended to impose an affirmative obligation on the
district.  The majority states that "when the 1937 legislature
defined custodians and assistant custodians as 'employe[e]s,' it
intended to define the legal status of those workers."  ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 23).  The majority's approach, however, elevates
a statutory definition -- which ordinarily tells us the meaning
of a particular word as it is used in a statute -- into an
affirmative requirement (that the district hire all custodians as
employees) that appears nowhere in the statute.  This court has
rejected such an approach to statutory interpretation, stating
that "[o]rdinarily the function of a definition section is not to
impose duties but to specify the meaning of the defined term
whenever it appears elsewhere in the statute."  Jackson County v.
Bear Creek Authority, 293 Or 121, 126, 645 P2d 121 (1982); see
also Amer. F. of L. et al. v. Bain et al., 165 Or 183, 205, 106
P2d 544 (1940) (statutory definition is device for shortening
statute by "describing" certain class of cases).
For the reasons described above, the CCSL does not
require the district to hire its own employees to provide
custodial services, and I would hold that the district's proposal
to contract out those services does not violate the Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Act.
I respectfully dissent.
Carson, C.J., and Gillette, J., join in this
dissent.
1. Below, we set out the relevant text of the law and
discuss it in greater detail.
2. Chapter 279 of the Oregon Revised Statutes sets out
provisions authorizing certain public entities to enter into
contracts for services.  The district relies on that authority
and the text of ORS 332.155(7) to support its position.
3. ORS 242.320 provides:
"As used in ORS 242.310 to 242.640,
unless the context requires otherwise:
"(1) 'Assistant custodian' means any
employee who works under the supervision of a
custodian except those who:
"(a) Work less than eight hours per day;
or
"(b) Work less than 12 months per year;
or
"(c) Receive an hourly rate of pay.
"(2) 'Board' means a civil service board
created pursuant to ORS 242.330.
"(3) 'Custodian' means an employee of
the school district who has supervision of
property, keeping it in sanitary condition
and tending to the cleaning and operation of
heating plants and other necessary work by
way of care and labor to keep the physical
plants of the school board in maintenance and
operation."
4. The provisions that follow ORS 242.330(1) set out, in
detail, the requisite number of members (termed "commissioners")
the civil service board, ORS 242.330(2), requirements for
eligibility to be a commissioner, ORS 242.340, commissioners'
terms in office and compensation, ORS 242.350, provisions for the
removal of commissioners and the mandatory filling of a vacancy
within 10 days of such vacancy, ORS 242.360, the mandatory
appointment of a secretary to keep a record of proceedings, ORS
242.370, and the requirement that the school board provide the
civil service board with an appropriate work space, ORS 242.380. 
The CCSL also authorizes the civil service board to "make
appropriate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of
the Custodians' Civil Service Law."  ORS 242.390.  
5. As used in Oregon law, "'[p]erson' includes
individuals, corporations, associations, firms, partnerships,
limited liability companies and joint stock companies."  ORS
174.100.
6. We acknowledge that ORS 242.320(1) defines "assistant
custodian" as excluding part-time workers and those receiving an
hourly rate of pay.  Those exclusions from the designation
"assistant custodian," do not, however, inform the inquiry
whether the district must employ "custodians" pursuant to the
text of the CCSL.  It is that inquiry that we address in this
case.
7. Specifically, the 1901 act repealed, among other
statutes, title IV of chapter XVI of the Laws of Oregon as
compiled and annotated by W. Lair Hill in 1892.  At section 2595,
that title had provided for the election of three directors and a
clerk for the school district.  At section 2602(3), the title
further provided, in part:
"3.  The directors shall furnish their
schools with fuel already prepared for use,
chalk, brooms, blackboards, and erasers,
stoves, window curtains, and other things
necessary for the use of schools[.]"
8. As a result of the conversion from the Oregon Compiled
Laws Annotated to the Oregon Revised Statutes in 1953, that
provision became ORS 332.050(4).  The statute later was
renumbered ORS 332.105 in 1963, and, in 1965, the legislature
moved the text of subsection (4) to ORS 332.155(4), see Report of
the Law Revision Subcommittee to the Legislative Interim
Committee on Education:  Proposed Revision of the Education Law
135 (April 1964).  ORS 332.155 subsequently was amended and
several new subsections were added.  As a result, what was
subsection (4) in 1965, eventually became -- and currently
remains -- subsection (7).
9. We base that conclusion on the text of Title XXXIII, ch
I, § 3389 of the Bellinger &amp; Cotton Code, which provided, in
part, that school boards "shall furnish their schools * * *
with[,]" inter alia, "chalk, janitor, brooms [and]
blackboards[.]" (Emphasis added.)
10. The provisions that followed limited the manner in
which permanent employees could be discharged, OCLA § 111-1512,
permitted the school district to suspend members of the
classified civil service for a period not to exceed 30 days, OCLA
§ 111-1513, required the civil service board to provide a report
to the school board annually, OCLA § 111-1514, granted the civil
service board authority to conduct investigations, OCLA § 111-1515, and set out criminal penalties for noncompliance with the
CCSL, OCLA §§ 111-1516 to 111-1517.
11. At the time that the legislature enacted the CCSL,
Webster's dictionary defined "appointment," in part, as the
"designation of a person to hold an office[.]" Webster's Int'l
Dictionary of the English Language 73 (unabridged ed 1907). 
Webster's dictionary also defined "position" to mean, "[t]he spot
where a person or thing is placed or takes a place[.]" Id. at
1117.
12. The exceptions listed in ORS 242.320 are for workers
who either (1) work less than eight hours per day; (2) work less
than 12 months a year; or (3) receive an hourly pay rate.  As we
explain below, however, even those exceptions are subject to a
degree of civil service board control in the hiring process.
13. As noted above, ORS 332.155(7) provides:
"A district school board:
"* * * * *
"(7) Shall furnish the schools with
supplies, equipment, apparatus and services
essential to meeting the requirements of a
standard school and may furnish such other
supplies, equipment, apparatus and services
as the board considers advisable."
14. The district estimated that it would save $4.5 to $5
million annually by contracting for custodial services and that
doing so would have a less negative impact on programs for
students than other reductions that would be required if that
contracting did not occur.  The district eventually proposed a
total of $40 million in budget cuts for the 2002-2003 fiscal
year. 
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