Title: State v. Nelson
Citation: 222 N.W.2d 445
Docket Number: 56825
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: October 16, 1974

222 N.W.2d 445 (1974) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patsy Ann NELSON, a/k/a Patsy Ann Moriarty, Appellant. No. 56825. Supreme Court of Iowa. October 16, 1974. *446 Hall, Ewalt &amp; Hall, Indianola, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Haskins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Gottschald, Co. Atty., for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C. J. and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REYNOLDSON, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. Although several issues are raised on this appeal, we consider only defendant's assertion the case should have been dismissed for the State's failure to file an information against her within 30 days from the date she was held to answer to the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. See § 795.1, The Code. We hold defendant's position is well taken. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order dismissing the county attorney's information. Before reaching the precise question before us, we review the background events leading to the present controversy. Until April 25, 1973, we had interpreted § 795.1 (relating to speedy indictment) and § 795.2 (relating to speedy trial) to mean the 30-day period allowed in § 795.1 and the 60-day period allowed in § 795.2 were waived by failure of a defendant, when represented by counsel and out on bail, to demand one or the other. Put differently, we had held a demand was necessary to start the running of those periods. On April 25, 1973, we handed down State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973), a case dealing with speedy trial under § 795.2. There we modified our previous rule by holding failure to demand speedy trial, *447 while a factor to be considered, does not alone toll the running of the time period in § 795.2. We did so to conform to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Our new position is fully explained in Gorham and need not be discussed here. Since that case dealt only with a speedy trial demand under § 795.2, it did not necessarily settle any questions arising under the companion statute (§ 795.1) concerning the right to a speedy trial indictment. Nevertheless, it was clear the same reasons which impelled Gorham applied equally to § 795.1 cases. We recognized this in State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973), decided one month after Gorham. Morningstar, although the result there turned on other grounds, contained this significant statement at page 775: Now the issue of whether Gorham's rationale applies also to cases arising under § 795.1 is squarely presented. From what we have already said, our answer to that question is easily predictable. The Gorham rule is the standard for cases arising under § 795.1 as well as for those under § 795.2. One other preliminary matter should be discussed. Gorham was not retroactive. It was made applicable only to certain classes of cases, one of which was those in which an indictment or information was filed after April 25, 1973. We hold today's decision is effective as of that same date with one modification made necessary by the different purposes as which §§ 795.1 and 795.2 serve. In Gorham we said the rule would apply to "cases in which an indictment is returned or a county attorney's information is filed after the filing of this [Gorham] opinion." The critical time under § 795.1 is not the date an indictment or information is filed but the date upon which a defendant "is held to answer." The instant case, therefore, applies to all charges to which one was held to answer after the date of the Gorham opinion. With this in mind, we consider the facts upon which this appeal rests. Defendant was arrested on July 17, 1973, and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. § 321.281, The Code. On July 18, she was taken before a magistrate, where she waived preliminary hearing, and was bound over to the grand jury. At that time she was held to answer under § 795.1. State v. Morningstar, supra, 207 N.W.2d at 775. Since this was some three months after the Gorham opinion, defendant is entitled to the benefit of that decision. The case then remained dormant for 36 days, when a county attorney's information was filed. Defendant promptly filed her motion seeking a dismissal of the charge against her for the State's failure to observe the provisions of § 795.1. After a hearing, the motion was overruled. The pertinent provision of the statute in question contains the following: While it is perhaps unnecessary to do so, we point out that the reference in the statute to the filing of an indictment includes also cases prosecuted on county attorney's information. See § 769.13, The Code, 1973; State v. Morningstar, supra, 207 N.W.2d at 774; State v. Williams, 193 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1972). The trial court correctly found defendant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of § 795.1. However, the court further held *448 the State had shown good cause to the contrary. We cannot agree and hold the case must be reversed. We do not overlook the rule that whether good cause exists or not is a matter which lies largely in the trial court's discretion. Davison v. Garfield, 219 Iowa 1258, 1262, 257 N.W. 432, 434, 260 N.W. 667 (1934) (modified on other grounds); Maher v. Brown, 225 Iowa 341, 343-344, 280 N.W. 553, 554 (1938) and citations. However, under the circumstances now before us, we hold there was no basis upon which the trial court could find it existed and we must therefore reverse. Defendant was arrested, booked and charged in the name of Patsy Ann Nelson. During a previous marriage her name was Moriarty; and, when arrested, her driver's license was still in that name. Defendant submitted to a blood test and the analysis of the blood sample was returned by the laboratory in the name of Patsy Ann Moriarty. However, she still stood charged in the name of Patsy Ann Nelson. With this preface, we set out the county attorney's statement to the trial court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, which was the only showing of good cause offered by the State: In overruling the motion to dismiss the trial court stated, This was error. We find no theory upon which the State can be said to have shown good cause, even giving its explanation the most favorable interpretation possible. As the county attorney candidly stated, the delay was simply due to a mistake on his part, which, while understandable, furnishes no grounds for excusing failure to comply with the statute. We fail to see how the variation in namesNelson and Moriartycontributed to the delay or confused the State, particularly since the county attorney states he did not associate the report in the name of Moriarty with the defendant Nelson. Stripping away all irrelevancies about name variations and blood tests, we are faced with the simple fact the State knew this defendant was held to answer to the present charge on July 18 and that a county attorney's information should be filed within 30 days thereafter. The only excuse offered for not doing so is that the county attorney (not realizing he already had one under a wrong name) was waiting for the results of the blood test to which defendant had consented. Is this "good cause" under the statute? We think not. There may be cases in which such circumstances contribute to a showing of good cause. They are not present here. There is no evidence the State made any inquiries about what must have been considered an unusual delay. There is no claim the charge was sustainable only with the test, which might justify a failure to file until the result was known. In fact at trial three witnesses testified unequivocally that defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or, as one put it, was drunk. We refuse to approve the State's apparent positionthat it may await the production of evidence beyond the statutory period set out in § 795.1 and use that delay as good cause for ignoring that statute. The State had the burden to establish good cause for failure to file a county attorney's information within 30 days from the date defendant was held to answer. State v. Bowers, 162 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Iowa 1968). It did not do so under this record. In State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 354-356 (Iowa 1972) (a § 795.2 case), although holding good cause was there shown, we emphasized the importance and necessity for the State to afford one charged with a crime the speedy trial to which one is entitled under § 795.2. That is equally true of a defendant's corresponding, and independent, right to a quick indictment under § 795.1. In State v. Bowers, supra, we dismissed a case because an indictment was not returned until 44 days after defendant had been held to answer. It is true no resistance was there offered by the State and no reason for the delay was given. However, that case illustrates the weakness in one of the State's arguments herethat the delay was only a "short one." In Bowers, it was 44 days, in the present case 36. Every limitation statute sets up an arbitrary date after which certain actions cannot be brought or certain rights cannot be enforced. One cannot escape the effect of such statutes by showing they were only violated a little bit. The statute prescribes the only way in which its impact may be avoidedby a showing of good cause. As we said in Bowers: *450 We believe the record in this case shows the following facts without dispute: (1) Patsy Ann Nelson was held to answer to the charge of violating § 321.281, The Code, on July 18, 1973; (2) A county attorney's information was filed against her on August 24, 1973, 36 days after that date; (3) The county attorney at all times knew this defendant stood charged with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage; (4) The county attorney's mistaken belief that the report of defendant's blood analysis was not available within 30 days from the date she was held to answer does not constitute good cause for failing to file an information within the statutory period set up in § 795.1, nor would it alone be good cause even if true. We hold the State did not show good cause for failing to observe the provisions of the statute in question. The ruling of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for dismissal of the prosecution. Reversed and remanded with instructions.