Title: Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc.
Citation: 2013 WI 56
Docket Number: 2011AP000788
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2013

2013 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP788   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Christopher T. Beidel, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Sideline Software, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Michael C. Hall and Kevin C. Austin, 
          Defendants.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 340 Wis. 2d 433, 811 N.W.2d 856 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC NO: 2012 WI App 36    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William W. Brash III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, J.J., concur. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
GABLEMAN, J., dissent.(Opinion filed.)  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Kim Grimmer and Travis J. West and Solheim Billing & Grimmer, 
S.C., Madison, with oral argument by Travis J. West. 
 
For the plaintfiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Michael J. Aprahamian, Michael A. Bowen, Brian P. Keenan, and 
Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, with oral argument by Brian P. 
Keenan. 
  
 
 
 
      2013 WI 56 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP788 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV5862) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Christopher T. Beidel,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant  
 
 
v. 
 
Sideline Software, Inc.,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Michael C. Hall and Kevin C. Austin, 
 
 
Defendants.   
FILED 
 
July 2, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   We review a published court of 
appeals decision1 involving a dispute over the amount of money 
due to a shareholder for his shares in Sideline Software, Inc. 
(Sideline), a company that serves the fantasy football league 
market with an online league-management program.  Because we 
agree that the balancing of the equities required in a specific 
performance claim did not occur and summary judgment was 
                                                 
1 Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 2012 WI App 36, 340 
Wis. 2d 433, 811 N.W.2d 856. 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
2 
 
improperly granted, we affirm the court of appeals' decision to 
reverse and remand for the circuit court to evaluate the claim 
under the principles governing specific performance, determining 
1) whether specific performance is available as a remedy, 2) 
whether there was a substantial enough breach to warrant 
specific performance, 3) whether the equities lie on the 
plaintiff's or defendant's side, and 4) whether anything would 
make an order of specific performance unfair, unreasonable or 
impossible.   
¶2 
The minority shareholder, Christopher Beidel, sought 
specific performance of the Stock Repurchase Agreement2  that he 
and Michael Hall, the majority shareholder, had signed.  
Beidel's claim rests on two provisions of the Agreement.  One 
provision sets a stipulated price per share that is in effect 
for two years; if that price expires without a new stipulation, 
the share value is to be determined by an appraiser selected by 
Sideline.  The other provision gives a shareholder whose 
employment is terminated without cause while a stipulated price 
is in effect the right to exercise a put option3 to sell his 
                                                 
2 In the Agreement, the parties stipulated that "[i]f a 
controversy arises concerning the right or obligation to 
purchase or sell any of the shares of Stock, such right or 
obligation shall be enforceable in a court of equity by a decree 
of specific performance."  "When a contract specifies remedies 
available for breach of contract, the intention of the parties 
generally governs."  Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 
2010 WI 44, ¶37, 324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294. 
3 A put option is "[a]n option to sell something (esp. 
securities) at a fixed price even if the market declines; the 
right to require another to buy." Black's Law Dictionary 1121 
(7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
3 
 
shares at the stipulated price.  The dispute: Sideline thinks it 
must pay only the appraised value for Beidel's shares, and 
Beidel thinks Sideline must pay the stipulated share price, 
which is some six times more.4  
¶3 
After it became clear that Sideline was planning to 
terminate him and was transitioning his duties to others while 
delaying the termination until the stipulated price expired, 
Beidel gave written notice that he was exercising his put option 
and demanding that 2,490 of his shares be purchased at the 
stipulated price of $1,600 per share, which had not yet expired.  
When Sideline refused to purchase Beidel's shares, Beidel 
brought a claim for specific performance, seeking to have the 
court order Sideline to purchase the shares at the stipulated 
price, for a total of nearly four million dollars. 
¶4 
At the heart of the equitable claim this case presents 
is the question of whether it was fair for Sideline to time a 
planned termination without cause to avoid paying Beidel $1,600 
per share and instead choose to let the stipulated price expire 
before terminating him so that Sideline could instead pay only 
the fair market value of the shares.  Beidel contends that Hall 
had explicitly told him in 2008 Sideline would terminate Beidel 
as soon as the stipulated purchase price expired; Beidel 
contends that Sideline essentially terminated him in 2008, 
                                                 
4 The record does not disclose the precise difference 
between the two prices, but there is evidence that the 
difference is substantial; a purchase offer made to Sideline in 
early 2009 was for an amount that would have bought out the 
shareholders at $260 per share.  
No. 
2011AP788   
 
4 
 
transitioning his duties to others and unfairly delaying the 
formal termination solely to avoid paying the stipulated 
purchase price then in effect.   
¶5 
Sideline does not dispute that the delay was due to a 
desire to avoid the stipulated share price; rather, it asserts 
that it was free to time the termination as it saw fit.  Under 
Sideline's interpretation of the contract, refusing to pay 
Beidel the stipulated share price was not a breach of the 
Agreement because Beidel's option to sell the shares for that 
price was never triggered: no termination actually occurred 
until September 17, 2009.  Sideline says Beidel is therefore 
entitled, under the applicable provision of the Agreement, only 
to "the fair market value of the [s]tock as determined by an 
appraiser selected by Sideline."   
¶6 
The court of appeals decision we review reversed a 
grant of summary judgment for Sideline on the grounds that 
"[t]he circuit court did not . . . consider the balancing of 
equities required in a case where a party seeks specific 
performance of a contract."  Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 
2012 WI App 36, ¶16, 340 Wis. 2d 433, 811 N.W.2d 856.  The court 
of appeals considered the fact that Beidel had sought specific 
performance and focused on "the special implications of that 
request for relief."  Id., ¶14. The court of appeals concluded 
that although the circuit court's analysis correctly disposed of 
one aspect of Beidel's argument, "there is more" to evaluating a 
claim seeking specific performance.  Id., ¶13.    
No. 
2011AP788   
 
5 
 
¶7 
The circuit court had granted Sideline's motion for 
summary judgment on the claim of specific performance, basing 
its holding on the conclusion that the claim could not rest on 
an allegation that Sideline had constructively terminated Beidel 
because a required element of constructive termination was 
undisputedly absent.5  That is a correct statement of Wisconsin 
law concerning the test for constructive termination.  This was 
not, however, a claim for wrongful termination, and, as the 
court of appeals rightly recognized, the claim that was made was 
never properly addressed.   
¶8 
The record indicates, too, that the circuit court 
voiced observations that would be relevant to the task of 
balancing the equities.  As the court of appeals noted, the 
circuit court appeared somewhat reluctant to dismiss Beidel's 
claim on these facts; the circuit court stated that "[a] strong 
argument can be made that this scenario is so strong [that it 
resembles constructive termination]."   
¶9 
Besides that, it is potentially relevant to consider 
the circuit court's disposition of two other counts that were a 
part of this multi-count lawsuit,6 claims that were against Hall 
                                                 
5 At several points in the transcript, the circuit court 
appears to make reference to equitable considerations, but the 
basis for its ruling is clearly stated in terms of a 
constructive termination analysis.     
6 The amended complaint in this case, 09CV5862, lists three 
claims, characterized as follows: Count I: Specific Performance 
(as to Sideline Software, Inc.), Count II: Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty (as to Michael C. Hall) and Count III: Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty (as to Kevin C. Austin).  
No. 
2011AP788   
 
6 
 
and another individual and arose from the same underlying facts.  
When those counts were before the circuit court for summary 
judgment disposition along with this one, the court declined to 
grant the defendants summary judgment for a notable reason: it 
found that "there are questions of fact with respect to 
[whether] they act[ed] in good faith" and whether they were 
acting in the best interest of the company or were "out to get 
Mr. Beidel."  Those counts remained after this count was 
dismissed, and they proceeded to a jury trial after this count 
was dismissed.7  While this appeal does not concern those claims, 
the motion hearing transcript in which the circuit court 
addressed all three counts clearly reflects the circuit court's 
conclusion that summary judgment was precluded as to Counts 2 
and 3 by genuine issues of material fact that related to good 
faith among the parties and their dealings with each other.  
There is no evidence in the record that those concerns were 
addressed in the context of the specific performance claim, a 
claim that by definition turns on equitable considerations.  
                                                 
7 Beidel moved the court of appeals to take judicial notice 
of the special verdict form from the jury trial.  The court of 
appeals denied the motion, stating that "the verdict does not 
affect either the result of this appeal or the analysis of this 
opinion." Beidel, 340 Wis. 2d 433, ¶16 n.5.  While reference was 
made in the briefs to this verdict, we are limited to the 
information in the record, which includes the summary judgment 
motion hearing transcript referenced above but not the jury 
verdict.  See Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 309, 313, 311 
N.W.2d 600 (1981) (materials that are not a part of the record 
cannot be considered). 
      
No. 
2011AP788   
 
7 
 
Such a claim should not be disposed of on summary judgment 
without addressing them.   
¶10 Further, as the court of appeals observed, "[t]he rule 
that parties to a contract act in good faith is universal."8    
We have held that "[e]very contract implies good faith and fair 
dealing between the parties to it," and that mere "compliance in 
form, not in substance" is a breach of "the covenant of good 
faith that accompanies every contract."9      
¶11 We therefore agree with the court of appeals that 
summary judgment was improperly granted in this case without the 
required balancing of the equities that are due to a specific 
performance claim and without a consideration of the potential 
application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  In 
order to make a prima facie case that Sideline was entitled to 
summary judgment, its motion would need to show a defense that 
would defeat Beidel's claim. That is, it must successfully 
attack the requirements for obtaining specific performance:  
- that specific performance is available as a remedy10;  
                                                 
8 Beidel, 340 Wis. 2d 433, ¶15 (citing Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 205 (1981)). 
9 Chayka v. Santini, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 107 & n.7, 176 N.W.2d 
561 (1970). 
10 Ash Park, 324 Wis. 2d 703, ¶37 (when a contract specifies 
remedies available for breach of contract, the intention of the 
parties generally governs). Otherwise "the primary criterion for 
the availability of specific performance has been the inadequacy 
of the legal remedy." 12 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts 
§ 63.1 (rev. ed. 2012).   
No. 
2011AP788   
 
8 
 
- that there has been a substantial enough breach to 
warrant specific performance11; and 
- that the equities lie on [the plaintiff's] side,12 and 
that nothing would make an order of specific performance 
unfair, unreasonable or impossible.13 
In determining whether the requirements for specific performance 
have been met in this case, it will be necessary for the court 
to interpret and apply the provisions of the Stock Repurchase 
Agreement, with special reference to Section 6, Termination of 
Employment without Cause, as well as Sections 8(b) and (c), 
which 
relate 
to valuation.  In this case the analysis 
necessarily involves interpreting the contract and determining 
whether the undefined term "termination" is ambiguous, and if 
so, what the parties intended the term to mean.  Extrinsic 
evidence may be needed in order to make the determination of the 
parties' intent. 
¶12 Sideline's motion for summary judgment does not set 
forth such a defense, and therefore fails to make a prima facie 
                                                 
11 Huntoon v. Capozza, 57 Wis. 2d 447, 452, 204 N.W.2d 649 
(1973).   
12 Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis. 2d 38, 51, 150 N.W.2d 347 
(1967); Gaugert v. Duve, 2001 WI 83, ¶46, 244 Wis. 2d 691, 628 
N.W.2d 861 (describing the circuit court's balancing process in 
that case thus: "The circuit court also concluded that as 
between the [plaintiffs] and the defendants the equities were 
perhaps equal due to the uniqueness of the property and the 
competing interests at stake" and explaining that the circuit 
court had concluded that one party's failure to take steps to 
preserve a remedy tipped the scales). 
13 Gaugert, 244 Wis. 2d 691, ¶47. 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
9 
 
case.14  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
for "the circuit court's determination where the bulk of the 
equities lie, including an evaluation of what the parties 
intended when they agreed to the stock re-purchase agreement, 
and whether it should grant specific performance as Beidel 
requested."  Beidel, 340 Wis. 2d 433, ¶16.  A circuit court may 
grant summary judgment to a party on remand as warranted after 
the equities have been balanced, recognizing the implications of 
the nature of a claim for specific performance and the well-
established obligation of good faith and fair dealing.15   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶13 The case arises in the context of a deteriorating 
relationship between a majority shareholder and a minority 
shareholder.  We briefly set forth a description of the parties, 
their relationship and the terms of the contract at the center 
of this dispute.   
¶14 Sideline began by selling a computer program for 
fantasy football league management; it later moved to online 
                                                 
14 See Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61-62, 531 
N.W.2d 45 (1995) (describing the summary judgment methodology of 
examining first whether a claim has been stated, then turning to 
whether a prima facie case was made by the movant, and if so, 
examining the opposing party's materials). The validity of the 
claim in this case, the first step of the summary judgment 
analysis, is not at issue. 
15 Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 146 
Wis. 2d 568, 577, 431 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1988) (Wisconsin law 
does recognize that "[e]very contract implies good faith and 
fair dealing between the parties to it, and a duty of 
cooperation on the part of both parties.") (citation omitted). 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
10 
 
products for that same purpose.  It was incorporated in 1998 by 
Hall and Beidel, who had been college friends.  Though the 
distribution of the shares changed over the years, Hall was from 
the beginning the majority shareholder, and at the relevant 
time, Hall owned 2,505 shares (slightly over half) and Beidel 
owned 2,495 shares.  In the course of expanding the business, 
the company purchased in 2001 a small company that had developed 
an online product.  Its owner, Kevin Austin, possessed the kind 
of programming skills that such online products required; he was 
initially engaged as a consultant and ultimately was hired and 
granted options to purchase outstanding shares of the company.  
Austin and Beidel did not have a good relationship; the 
deterioration of that relationship appears to have played a 
significant role in Beidel's eventual departure from the 
company.   
¶15 In 2004, Beidel and Hall signed a Stock Repurchase 
Agreement that was intended to "provide a means of assuring a 
market for the sale of their Stock in certain specified events." 
As relevant to this appeal, the Agreement contained the 
following provisions.  It contained a stipulation that specific 
performance is the appropriate remedy for breach.16  It contained 
a provision that if a shareholder (that is, Hall or Beidel) were 
fired without cause, Sideline would buy that shareholder’s stock 
                                                 
16 In the Agreement, the parties stipulated that "[i]f a 
controversy arises concerning the right or obligation to 
purchase or sell any of the shares of Stock, such right or 
obligation shall be enforceable in a court of equity by a decree 
of specific performance." 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
11 
 
at an agreed price.  The clause, section 6 of the Agreement, 
reads: 
Termination of Employment Without Cause; Shareholder's 
Put Option.  Upon the termination of a Shareholder's 
employment with Sideline without cause (as defined in 
section 7(b) below), the terminated Shareholder shall 
have a continuing option to sell all or any part of 
the Stock owned by him, and upon exercise of such 
option, Sideline shall have the obligation to purchase 
all of Shareholder's Stock so elected for sale by such 
Shareholder, at the price and on the terms provided in 
sections 8 and 9 below.  Provided, however, that such 
purchase and sale shall be subject to the restrictions 
and limitations set forth in section 11 hereof.  The 
terminated Shareholder shall exercise such option by 
providing 30 day[s'] prior written notice to Sideline 
of his decision to sell his Stock.  
(Emphasis added.)  The referenced sections relevant here, 
sections 8(b) and 8(c), provided for a two-year expiration 
date and an alternative valuation:  
If no review of the Purchase Price is undertaken, the 
Purchase Price set forth in the prior year(s) shall 
continue in effect unless a period of 24 months 
expires from the last time in which the Shareholders 
and Sideline stipulated a Purchase Price.   
If the Purchase Price has not been stipulated within 
the 24 months prior to a Purchase Event, and a 
Purchase Event occurs, the Purchase Price shall be the 
fair market value of the Stock as determined by an 
appraiser selected by Sideline.   
¶16 Pursuant to the Agreement, Beidel and Hall set the 
stock price over the years between 2004 and 2007.  As the court 
of appeals explained:  
The last stipulated price was agreed to in a document 
signed by both Hall and Beidel, dated March 6, 2007.  
It provided for a per-share valuation of $1,600, and 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
12 
 
thus expired twenty-four months later because Hall and 
Beidel never agreed on a new valuation.  
Beidel, 340 Wis. 2d 433, ¶4. 
¶17 Because there was no new agreed-upon valuation, the 
price stipulated to on March 6, 2007, was set to expire on March 
6, 2009.  In October 2008, Hall told Beidel of his intention to  
terminate Beidel.  In December of 2008, the two met to discuss 
the transitioning of Beidel's duties prior to April of the 
following year.  Following that meeting, the process of 
transitioning duties seemed to be underway in January of 2009.  
That month another company interested in purchasing Sideline 
made an offer to purchase.  The offer contained an employment 
agreement and stock options for Hall, but none for Beidel.  On 
January 20, Beidel submitted written notice to Hall that he was 
thereby exercising his put option under the Agreement with 
regard to 2,490 shares of Sideline stock.  The notice asserted 
that 
he 
had 
already 
been 
"stripped 
. . . of 
[his] 
job 
responsibilities" 
and 
his 
employment 
had 
"already 
been 
terminated by Sideline."  He demanded that Sideline purchase the 
stock at the stipulated price in accordance with the Agreement.        
¶18 When Sideline refused, Beidel filed a claim against 
Sideline for specific performance.17  Sideline moved for summary 
judgment.  Sideline claimed that it was entitled to summary 
judgment 
because 
"Beidel 
was 
motivated 
to 
claim 
he 
was 
constructively discharged in order to increase his buy-out," 
                                                 
17 He also filed related claims against Hall and Austin 
individually. 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
13 
 
because "there was no termination of Beidel prior to March 6, 
2009," and because "Beidel cannot establish a single element of 
constructive discharge" to establish that events prior to March 
6, 2009, constituted termination.  The summary judgment motion 
described "Hall's right to postpone the termination, in order to 
avoid the stipulated price," as "a significant contract right 
that 
Hall 
and 
Sideline 
had 
under 
the 
Agreement." 
 
It 
acknowledges that Hall "was not motivated to coerce Beidel into 
resigning in advance of March 2009" and that Hall "was 
motivated" to keep him employed "until at least after the 
stipulated 
price 
expired." 
 
It 
states 
that 
"Hall 
had 
specifically represented to Beidel that he would have a job 
until at least then . . . ."  It also acknowledges that Beidel's 
duties were documented for the purpose of "transitioning them to 
others."  The motion for summary judgment does not contain any 
argument concerning the equitable considerations relevant to a 
claim of specific performance.    
¶19 The circuit court for Milwaukee County, the Honorable 
John J. DiMotto presiding, initially granted partial summary 
judgment to Sideline as follows:   
The 
plaintiff 
may 
not 
proceed 
on 
the 
specific 
performance claim against Sideline . . . by claiming 
that he was constructively discharged.  There is no 
genuine issue of material fact that one of the 
essential 
elements 
of 
a 
claim 
of 
constructive 
discharge, actual resignation by the employee, did not 
occur in this case.  . . .  The plaintiff will be 
permitted to proceed to trial on Count No. I, but he 
will be required to prove that he was actually 
discharged by Sideline Software Inc., without cause, 
prior to the expiration of the stipulated price. 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
14 
 
¶20 Following a subsequent hearing, the Honorable William 
W. Brash, III, denied Beidel's motion for reconsideration and 
dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice as to Sideline, 
noting that Beidel did not contend that he was actually 
terminated by Sideline prior to March 7, 2009.  A subsequent 
motion for reconsideration was denied. 
¶21 As noted above, the circuit court denied summary 
judgment as to related claims because the court found genuine 
issues of material fact concerning the good faith dealings of 
the parties.   
¶22 The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary 
judgment; Sideline petitioned for review, and this court granted 
review. 
II. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
¶23 The question presented by the claim is whether Beidel 
is entitled to specific performance of the repurchase of his 
shares at the stipulated price of $1,600 each after Sideline 
refused to honor Beidel's exercise of his put option under the 
agreement.  We look to our case law on specific performance for 
the principles that govern a specific performance claim.  There 
we see a series of determinations that a court is obligated to 
make and the showing a party must make to prevail in such a 
claim.   
¶24 The threshold question is whether specific performance 
is available.  In this case, as noted above, the parties agreed 
in advance that it would be.  In the agreement, the parties 
stipulated that "[i]f a controversy arises concerning the right 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
15 
 
or obligation to purchase or sell any of the shares of Stock, 
such right or obligation shall be enforceable in a court of 
equity by a decree of specific performance."  We have stated 
that when a contract specifies remedies available for breach of 
contract, the intention of the parties generally governs. Ash 
Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 44, ¶37, 324 Wis. 
2d 
703, 
783 
N.W.2d 
294 
(affirming 
grant 
of 
specific 
performance).  Where there is not such an agreement in advance, 
"the 
primary 
criterion 
for 
the 
availability 
of 
specific 
performance has been the inadequacy of the legal remedy." 219 
Corbin on Contracts § 63.1.  "[T]he general rule defining the 
instances where specific performance will be granted may be 
stated as follows: where damages are an inadequate remedy and 
the nature of the contract is such that specific enforcement of 
it will not be impossible or involve too great practical 
difficulties . . . equity will grant a decree of specific 
performance." 25 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts 
§ 67:1 
(4th 
ed. 
2002). 
"Specific 
performance . . . will not be ordered if damages would be 
adequate to protect the expectation  interest of the injured 
party."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (1981).  See 
also Negus v. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 112 Wis. 2d 52, 64, 331 
N.W.2d 
658, 
665 
(Ct. 
App. 
1983) 
(holding 
that 
specific 
performance was unavailable because statute limits plaintiff to 
particular remedies:  "Because Negus must pursue a statutory 
remedy available to him, the trial court erred in concluding 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
16 
 
that specific performance was an available remedy. The order 
granting specific performance therefore must be reversed."). 
¶25 After 
the 
threshold 
determination 
is 
made 
that 
specific performance is available, the analysis proceeds with a 
series of questions. 
¶26 First, is there a substantial enough breach to warrant 
specific performance? In a case involving a contract, this 
necessarily requires the court to interpret the terms of the 
contract.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts describes the 
relationship of a breach and a claim of specific performance: 
"[Specific performance] is seldom granted unless there has been 
a 
breach 
of 
contract, 
either 
by 
non-performance 
or 
by 
repudiation."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 cmt. a 
(1981).18  In the context of a land contract, Huntoon v. Capozza 
refined the question further to weigh the significance of the 
alleged breach.  The court focused its analysis on whether there 
were 
breaches 
"substantial 
enough" 
to 
warrant 
specific 
performance.  Huntoon v. Capozza, 57 Wis. 2d 447, 452, 204 
N.W.2d 649 (1973).  Huntoon concerned a contract between a 
seller and buyer of a bar.  The seller filed a claim for 
specific performance seeking the full balance of the purchase 
price and other costs after the buyer defaulted on the payments 
following a fire at the property.  In addressing the claim, the 
                                                 
18 It also acknowledges the possibility of seeking specific 
performance prior to a breach: "In unusual circumstances, 
however, it may be granted where there is merely a threatened 
breach."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 cmt. a (1981). 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
17 
 
court differentiated between various claimed breaches on the 
basis of whether they were "substantial enough to justify 
equitable relief to the vendors." Id.  With respect to one 
claim, the failure of the buyer to pay an agreed-upon portion of 
the real estate taxes, the court said, "[W]e are not prepared to 
state on this record that such breach was material."  Id. at 
453.  The other two claimed breaches, failure to make the 
monthly 
payment 
on 
time 
and 
failure 
to 
maintain 
the 
establishment's tavern license in good standing, were, the court 
found, "substantial enough to justify equitable relief to the 
vendors." Id. at 452.  It is apparent from this distinction that 
absent the "substantial enough" breach, equitable relief is not 
justified.   
¶27 In determining whether a substantial enough breach 
occurred, it will be appropriate to consider, as the court of 
appeals discussed, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
As this court has observed, "Every contract implies good faith 
and fair dealing between the parties to it, and a duty of 
cooperation on the part of both parties." Chayka v. Santini, 47 
Wis. 2d 102, 107 n.7, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).  The Chayka case 
illustrates the common disfavor for following the letter but not 
the spirit of an agreement,19 and in that case, it was deemed a 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Mendelson v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 56 F. 
Supp. 2d 436, 438 (D. Del. 1999) (rejecting a Maryland 
jurisdictional challenge that "look[ed] only to the letter of 
its contract, ignoring the spirit of the agreement" where the 
contract stated that the product would be shipped to Virginia 
but the manufacturer knew that the specially manufactured item 
was intended for installation in Maryland). 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
18 
 
violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to do 
so.  What had happened in Chayka has been concisely summarized 
this way: 
In Chayka, a husband and wife contracted to execute 
joint and reciprocal wills, which, upon one party's 
death, would leave all property to the other and, upon 
the survivor's death, would leave all property owned 
by the survivor to another relative. After the 
husband's death, the wife remarried and, shortly 
thereafter, conveyed virtually all of her property to 
her new husband (or, in some instances, to herself and 
her husband in joint tenancy). On the wife's death, 
her 
estate 
sought 
to 
overturn 
the 
conveyances. 
Resisting the challenge, the second husband argued 
that the will contract had been fully performed 
because a will with all of the agreed-upon terms had 
been executed (and fully performed, in that the wife 
did 
leave 
the 
property 
that 
remained 
to 
the 
relative).20  
The Chayka court did not accept the second husband's argument 
that the contract had been complied with, as the "property that 
remained" had indeed been left to the other relative:   
This, as another court has well stated it to be, is "a 
mere play upon words."  What she in fact has done has 
stripped nearly all of the flesh from the bones, 
leaving only a skeleton for testamentary disposition 
to [the relative who was to receive the property]. 
This is a compliance in form, not in substance, that 
breaches the covenant of good faith that accompanies 
every contract, by accomplishing exactly what the 
agreement of the parties sought to prevent.  
Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d at 107.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
20 Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis. 2d 772, 
795, 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted).   
No. 
2011AP788   
 
19 
 
¶28 The court of appeals in Foseid acknowledged what was 
implicit in Chayka's holding——that "accomplishing exactly what 
the agreement of the parties sought to prevent" constituted an 
independent breach even if there was no other technical breach 
alleged.  "[W]e do not consider that reference as a holding that 
violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not 
be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of 
the underlying contract. Indeed, such a holding would run 
contrary to the supreme court's decision in [Chayka]."  Foseid 
v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis. 2d 772, 795, 541 N.W.2d 
203 (Ct. App. 1995)(citations omitted).   
¶29 A party may not, however, employ the good faith and 
fair dealing covenant to undo express terms of an agreement.  
Reliance on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not 
avail 
a 
franchisee 
who 
complained 
that 
"even 
if 
[the 
franchisor's] 
conduct 
comported 
with 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
agreement," the covenant required that the franchisor "not 
franchise a second store in [the franchisee's] market area."    
Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 
568, 577, 431 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1988).  In Super Valu Stores, 
the franchise agreement "specifically authorized" the franchisor 
to act in a manner which could harm the franchisee.  The 
franchise agreement explicitly stated that the franchise was 
non-exclusive and the franchisor had the "sole choice and 
discretion" as to whether to enter another franchise agreement 
in the same community or any other.  Id. at 572.  As the court 
of appeals said in that case, 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
20 
 
[W]here, as here, a contracting party complains of 
acts of the other party which are specifically 
authorized in their agreement, we do not see how there 
can be any breach of the covenant of good faith. 
Indeed, it would be a contradiction in terms to 
characterize an act contemplated by the plain language 
of the parties' contract as a "bad faith" breach of 
that contract.   
Id. at 577.  Unlike in Chayka, in Super Valu Stores there was 
compliance with both the form and substance of the contract. 
¶30 Having 
determined 
that 
specific 
performance 
is 
available and warranted by a substantial enough breach by a 
party, the court arrives at the heart of the matter——the 
"balancing of the equities" in which it takes into consideration 
all the facts and circumstances and determines whether the 
plaintiff is entitled  to the equitable relief he seeks.  "The 
fairness of ordering specific performance depends on the facts 
and equities of the individual case before the circuit court and 
will vary from case to case."  Ash Park, 324 Wis. 2d 703, ¶38.  
This balancing has been described as "a judicial discretion": 
But this discretion is not one to be exercised at the 
mere will and pleasure of the judge. It must be a 
judicial discretion, controlled and governed by the 
principles and rules of equity. Its exercise therefore 
depends upon the existence of a multitude of facts, 
events, and incidents surrounding the transaction 
. . . .  
Mulligan v. Albertz, 103 Wis. 140, 144, 78 N.W. 1093 (1899). 
"Accordingly, specific performance will be granted when it is 
apparent from a view of all the circumstances of the particular 
case that it will serve the ends of justice."  81A C.J.S. 
Specific Performance § 4 (2004).   Indeed, as one treatise has 
stated, "[I]n determining the question [of whether to grant or 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
21 
 
refuse a decree of specific performance], a greater variety of 
facts is to be taken into consideration than is the case in an 
action for damages for breach of contract."  12 Joseph M. 
Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 63.1 (rev. ed. 2012).   
¶31 As a part of its equitable balancing, the court must 
consider 
countervailing 
concerns: 
 Are 
there 
any 
factual 
considerations that would make specific performance unfair, 
unreasonable, impossible, oppressive, harsh or unjust?  See 
Gaugert v. Duve, 2001 WI 83, ¶47, 244 Wis. 2d 691, 628 N.W.2d 
861 (stating, "The circuit court's analysis did not reveal any 
factual considerations that would make specific performance 
unfair, unreasonable, or impossible." (citing Anderson v. 
Onsager, 155 Wis. 2d 504 at 512-13, 455 N.W.2d 885 (1990))).  
This determination has been phrased in various ways:  "The court 
will not grant the relief unless satisfied that the claim is 
fair and the contract equal and founded on consideration, that 
it is not opposed to public policy, that the plaintiff is guilty 
of no inequitable conduct or of delay constituting laches, and 
that the result will not be oppressive, harsh or unjust."  9 Jay 
Grenig, Wisconsin Pleading and Practice § 81:2 (5th ed. 2012) 
(citing cases).   
¶32 Consistent with the latitude the circuit court has to 
consider many factors is the latitude the circuit court has to 
fashion a remedy. Wisconsin cases have recognized that once a 
court has determined that equitable relief is appropriate, it 
has wide latitude to fashion the remedy based on the equities of 
the case. "This being an action for specific performance the 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
22 
 
circuit court sits as a court of equity and should be able to 
fashion relief which will be equitable to both plaintiffs and 
defendants."  Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis. 2d 38, 51, 150 N.W.2d 
347 (1967).  See also Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du 
Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 525, 531–32, 126 N.W.2d 206 (1964) ("A court of 
equity has inherent power to fashion a remedy to the particular 
facts. Continued failure to do so would render equity . . . 
sterile and . . . arbitrary in its relief . . . ."); Am. Med. 
Servs., Inc. v. Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 198, 
205, 188 N.W.2d 529 (1971) ("The court of equity has always had 
a traditional power to adapt its remedies to the exigencies and 
the needs of the case; that was one of the great virtues and 
reasons for the existence of courts of equity.");  Ash Park, 324 
Wis. 2d 703, ¶73 ("[T]he court of equity has the power of 
devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing 
circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the 
parties." (quoting 1 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity 
Jurisprudence § 109 (5th ed. 1941)).  
¶33 Finally, we note that this case arises in the posture 
of a summary judgment motion. We review a summary decision de 
novo, applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  Green 
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  "Under [Wis. Stat. § 802.08], summary judgment must be 
entered 
'if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
23 
 
judgment as a matter of law.'"  Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 
Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995).  The methodology is 
straightforward——evaluate the claim first, then see if the 
moving party has presented a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, and if so, examine the opposing party's proof:  
Our first step is to discern whether the pleadings set 
forth a claim for relief as well as a material issue 
of fact.  If the pleadings meet this initial test, our 
inquiry shifts to the moving party's affidavits or 
other proof to determine whether a prima facie case 
for summary judgment has been presented. If the moving 
party has made a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, we then examine the affidavits and other 
proof of the opposing party to discern whether there 
exist disputed material facts, or undisputed material 
facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may 
be drawn, sufficient to entitle the opposing party to 
a trial.  
Id. at 61-62. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶34 Having set out the analytical framework that applies 
to a specific performance case, we now turn to the task of 
applying it to the case at hand.    We apply the methodology as 
described by Swatek.  There is no dispute, as to the initial 
question, that the pleadings set forth a claim for relief, 
specifically for equitable relief, pursuant to a contractual 
provision, as well as a material issue of fact.  The amended 
complaint alleges that Sideline failed to pay the stipulated 
price after Beidel exercised his put option.   
¶35 The next question is whether the moving party, in this 
case Sideline, has made a prima facie case for summary judgment. 
"To make a prima facie case for summary judgment, a moving 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
24 
 
defendant must show a defense which would defeat the plaintiff." 
 Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473  (1980), 
overruled on other grounds by Meyers v. Bayer AG, Bayer Corp., 
2007 WI 99, 303 Wis. 2d 295, 735 N.W.2d 448.    
¶36 In order to prevail on his equitable claim, as we have 
set forth above, Beidel would have to show that that specific 
performance is available to him as a remedy,21 that there was a 
substantial enough breach to warrant specific performance, that 
the equities lie on his side, and that nothing would make an 
order 
of 
specific 
performance 
unfair, 
unreasonable 
or 
impossible. In order to make a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, Sideline must therefore show "a defense which would 
defeat the plaintiff."  Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338.  In the 
context of a specific performance claim, the motion for summary 
judgment must address the specific requirements the case law 
sets forth for such a claim.  
A. 
The Summary Judgment Motion 
¶37 An examination of Sideline's summary judgment motion 
shows that while it has shown a defense which would defeat a 
constructive termination argument in a wrongful termination 
claim, it has not shown a defense which would defeat the claim 
                                                 
21 In the Agreement, the parties stipulated that "[i]f a 
controversy arises concerning the right or obligation to 
purchase or sell any of the shares of Stock, such right or 
obligation shall be enforceable in a court of equity by a decree 
of specific performance." When a contract specifies remedies 
available for breach of contract, the intention of the parties 
generally governs.  Ash Park, 324 Wis. 2d 703, ¶37. 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
25 
 
Beidel actually brought.  Not only does the summary judgment 
motion fail to address the equitable claim directly, it attempts 
to support its position with facts and arguments that could be 
construed to support Beidel's position on the equitable claim 
(e.g., Sideline claims that it had a "right to postpone the 
termination, in order to avoid the stipulated price," that Hall 
"was not motivated to coerce Beidel into resigning in advance of 
March 2009," and that Hall "was motivated" to keep him employed 
"until at least after the stipulated price expired").  None of 
these assertions are inconsistent with Beidel's theory that 
Sideline unfairly refused to purchase his shares at the 
stipulated price after delaying his termination for that express 
purpose.  Because the summary judgment motion does not show a 
defense that would defeat the equitable claim, it does not make 
a prima facie case.  The analysis ends there, and the motion 
fails.     
¶38  We turn next to the two legal concepts that are likely 
to arise again when the case is remanded: the doctrine of 
constructive termination and the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  We examine each of the issues in order to acknowledge 
and respond to the parties' arguments. 
B.  Constructive Termination 
¶39 As noted above, Beidel was formally terminated by the 
board of Sideline in September 2009.  He has asserted that he 
was, in reality, terminated long before that.  The significance 
of the timing is that if the termination took place while the 
stipulated price was still in effect, Beidel's shares are worth 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
26 
 
$1,600 each.  If the termination took place after the expiration 
of the stipulated price, his shares are worth many times less.   
¶40 The constructive discharge doctrine "recognizes that 
some resignations are coerced, tantamount to a termination." 
Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶68, 237 
Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443.  We addressed this scenario in 
Strozinsky and described the purpose of the doctrine this way:  
Actual 
discharge 
carries 
significant 
legal 
consequences 
for 
employers, 
including 
possible 
liability for wrongful discharge. In an attempt to 
avoid liability, an employer may refrain from actually 
firing an employee, preferring instead to engage in 
conduct causing him or her to quit. The doctrine of 
constructive 
discharge 
addresses 
such 
employer-
attempted 'end runs' around wrongful discharge and 
other claims requiring employer-initiated terminations 
of employment. 
Strozinsky, 237 Wis. 2d 19, ¶68.   
¶41 The court stated that the significance of the holding 
was that "employers cannot escape liability by coercing a 
resignation instead of formally uttering the words 'you're 
fired.'" Id., ¶83.  It then stated what a plaintiff seeking to 
establish that a resignation was coerced must show: "The 
plaintiff must prevail under an objective standard, establishing 
that conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person 
confronted with same circumstances would have been compelled to 
resign." Id. 
¶42 Beidel asserts that the situation here is governed by 
the principle underlying the constructive discharge doctrine—
No. 
2011AP788   
 
27 
 
that substance is more important than form.  Essentially, he 
seeks, at least in the context of an equitable claim, an 
interpretation of the constructive discharge test under which 
the meaning of being "substantially terminated" would encompass 
situations where an employer does not formally terminate an 
employee, and the employee does not resign.  He has not, 
however, brought to our attention any cases in which a court 
found constructive termination had occurred where the employee 
had not resigned.  Sideline agrees that the doctrine is key in 
this case; indeed, it asserts that the dispositive question in 
this case is whether Beidel can show that he was constructively 
discharged prior to the expiration of the stipulated price of 
the shares.  Sideline argues that Beidel concedes that his 
formal termination happened later, and he cannot show that he 
resigned, as required by the Strozinsky elements.  Sideline 
asserts that those facts are fatal to his claim that the put 
option was triggered before the stipulated price expired. 
¶43 We disagree in key respects with both approaches.  
Beidel is wrong because he thinks in an equitable case, the test 
for constructive discharge can be applied in a less formalistic 
way such that constructive discharge can be found to occur even 
where there is not a resignation by an employee. Even though the 
rationale underlying the constructive discharge doctrine is, as 
Beidel points out, one of making sure that "substance prevails 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
28 
 
over form," courts have established the test for a constructive 
termination, and every Wisconsin case we have found that meets 
that test involves a resignation.  See Strozinsky, 237 Wis. 2d 
19, ¶68.  The fact that the test was developed in order to help 
courts do justice does not mean that it is to be applied without 
regard to the required elements.  We see no need to alter the 
Strozinsky approach to testing constructive discharge claims.  
We recognize that this case is unusual in that it involves an 
employee who is also a shareholder and director, who is arguably 
compelled by his own self-interest to help keep the company 
functioning 
and 
profitable 
and 
therefore 
prevented 
from 
resigning as might an employee without those additional roles.  
We do not think it wise to alter an established and workable 
test to fit the unusual situation presented here.   
¶44 However, we cannot agree that this conclusion——that 
the constructive termination test is not satisfied——disposes of 
Beidel's equitable claim.  Sideline argues that specific 
performance 
of 
the 
contract 
is 
precluded 
because 
the 
constructive termination elements cannot be shown.  But that 
argument is based on a fundamental misapprehension of the claim 
for specific performance: Beidel was not pursuing a claim for 
wrongful termination and does not allege that the termination of 
his employment, whenever it happened, violated any contract.  As 
the court of appeals held, the analysis does not end with the 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
29 
 
disposal of the constructive termination claim.  Further, it is 
unhelpful and unnecessary to graft the constructive termination 
requirements onto the equitable analysis.  On that point, we 
agree with Beidel that "[t]he court's discretion in deciding 
whether to grant specific performance should not be limited by a 
test 
imported 
from 
an 
entirely 
different 
legal 
theory 
implicating entirely different concerns."   
¶45 There is one further, related consideration, given 
that Beidel's claim turns on the timing of the ending of his 
employment with Sideline.  The foundation for Beidel's specific 
performance claim is that his treatment by Sideline triggered 
his right to exercise his put option prior to the expiration of 
the stipulated share price.  The contract, in section 6, 
"Termination of Employment Without Cause; Shareholder's Put 
Option," cross-references section 7(b) for the definition of 
"Cause": 
"Cause" means (i) the commission of a felony or a 
crime involving moral turpitude or the commission of 
any 
other 
act 
or omission involving dishonesty, 
disloyalty or fraud with respect to Sideline, (ii) 
failure to devote his entire business time to the 
business of Sideline (subject to normal vacation leave 
or time off, illness or sick leave, or other periods 
of permitted absence), (iii) conduct tending to bring 
Sideline 
into 
substantial 
public 
disgrace 
or 
disrepute, (iv) gross negligence or willful misconduct 
with respect to Sideline, or (v) any material breach 
of this Agreement. 
 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
30 
 
However, 
we 
observe 
that 
the 
contract 
does 
not 
define 
"termination."22  In the course of weighing the equities in a 
specific performance claim based on a contract, a court needs to 
of course consider the terms of the contract, and whether 
"termination" is ambiguous, and if so, what the parties intended 
the term to mean.23  All of this is appropriate to consider when 
the circuit court weighs the equities involved.  
C. 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
¶46 The parties also dispute the application of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of a 
                                                 
22 We 
briefly 
note again the language in Section 6 
concerning what triggers the obligation of Sideline to purchase 
the shareholder's stock at the price in effect at the relevant 
time: 
Termination of Employment Without Cause; Shareholder's 
Put Option.  Upon the termination of a Shareholder’s 
employment with Sideline without cause (as defined in 
section 7(b) below), the terminated Shareholder shall 
have a continuing option to sell all or any part of 
the Stock owned by him, and upon exercise of such 
option, Sideline shall have the obligation to purchase 
all of Shareholder's Stock so elected for sale by such 
Shareholder, at the price and on the terms provided in 
sections 8 and 9 below. 
23 Capital Investments, Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., 91 
Wis. 2d 178, 190, 280 N.W.2d 254 (1979) ("After a contract has 
been found to be ambiguous, it is the duty of the courts to 
determine the intent of the parties at the time the agreement 
was entered into. In resolving the ambiguity and determining the 
parties' intent, the court may look beyond the face of the 
contract and consider extrinsic evidence. Additionally, the 
court may rely on the canons of construction which are designed 
to ascertain the intentions of the parties entering into a 
contract." (Citations omitted.)). 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
31 
 
specific performance claim, especially one that involves an 
employee's termination.  We set out above the basic principles 
that Wisconsin cases have discussed: that every contract implies 
good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it, and a 
duty of cooperation on the part of both parties; that a 
violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may be 
considered independent of any breach of the underlying contract; 
and that the covenant cannot be used to turn what was 
specifically authorized in the agreement into a breach.24    
¶47 Sideline makes several arguments related to this 
topic.  It argues that Beidel waived the opportunity to have 
this doctrine discussed in connection with his claim, and it 
appears to take the position that it is not appropriate or 
permitted for the court to consider the application of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing unless Beidel "pled a 
second cause of action that is independent and severable from 
the claim for breach of contract based upon constructive 
                                                 
24 See discussion at ¶¶27-29, supra.  Contrary to the 
dissent's claim (Dissent, ¶5), we do not conclude that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can "be used to vitiate 
clear contractual language."   
No. 
2011AP788   
 
32 
 
discharge."25  Sideline also argues that there is no application 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the 
covenant is employed as a "gap-filler," to be applied to 
circumstances that are not contemplated by the language of the 
parties' contract. In this case, Sideline asserts, the contract 
has no gaps to fill because the Stock Repurchase Agreement 
contemplated 
that 
Sideline 
"might 
[choose] 
to 
make 
the 
termination effective after the stipulated price expired because 
of changes in market conditions or other uncertainties impacting 
the accuracy of the stipulated price."  Finally, it asserts that 
to the extent that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
comes into play here, it was Beidel who breached the duty of 
good faith by seeking to obtain a premium for his shares to 
which he was not entitled under the terms of the contract.  
Beidel argues that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
is applicable in the analysis of an equitable claim and asserts 
that because it is a part of all contracts, there has been no 
waiver of its application here. 
¶48 Sideline's waiver argument is not persuasive.  It 
would be absurd to remand for the balancing of the equities 
                                                 
25 We would note that Beidel's claim is pled as an equitable 
claim.  The complaint lists three claims, characterized as 
follows: Count I: Specific performance (as to Sideline Software, 
Inc.), Count II: Breach of fiduciary duty (as to Michael C. 
Hall) and Count III: Breach of fiduciary duty (as to Kevin C. 
Austin).   
No. 
2011AP788   
 
33 
 
where a party seeks specific performance and to do so on the 
condition that the circuit court ignore breaches of good faith 
and fair dealing by the parties.  While the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is implicit in all contracts and thus 
relevant to all types of contract claims, it is most relevant in 
an equitable case, which by its nature deals with the ideal of 
fairness.  There is no requirement that a claim be pled as a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in order 
for the doctrine to play a part in the analysis of the case.  As 
discussed above at paragraph 29, the situation in Super Valu 
Stores 
was 
one 
in 
which 
the 
franchisee 
countersued 
the 
franchisor on the grounds that the franchisor's decision to 
grant another franchise in the same city violated the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing "even if [the franchisor's] conduct 
comported with the terms of the agreement." Super Valu Stores, 
146 Wis. 2d at 577.  In that case, the contract explicitly 
permitted the franchisor to act to the detriment of the 
franchisee: The franchise agreement explicitly stated that the 
franchise was non-exclusive and gave the franchisor "the 
right . . . to enter into . . . Retailer Agreements with other 
parties at [its] sole choice and discretion."  Id. at 572.  
Entering into retailer agreements with other parties, therefore, 
did not constitute a lack of good faith and fair dealing because 
the franchisee had consented to it in the contract.  Whether 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
34 
 
Sideline's alleged action was "contemplated by the plain 
language of the parties' contract," as the franchisor's right in 
Super Valu Stores was, will be a matter for the circuit court to 
decide.    Sideline's and Beidel's remaining arguments about the 
application of good faith and fair dealing may also be 
appropriately directed to the circuit court on remand.26   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶49 We reiterate that the case law on specific performance 
is abundantly clear that the equities must be weighed.  It is 
clear from a review of the record that such a balancing has 
never happened in this case.  The motion for summary judgment 
                                                 
26 The standard jury instruction on the implied duty of good 
faith, Wis JI-Civil 3044, may be of assistance.  It states in 
part: 
Under Wisconsin law, the contract between (defendant) 
and (plaintiff) requires that each party act in good 
faith towards the other party and deal fairly with 
that party when (performing) (enforcing) (carrying 
out) the expressed terms of the contract.  This 
requirement to act in good faith is a part of the 
contract just as though the contract stated it. 
 . . . Whether the duty to act in good faith has been 
met in this case should be determined by deciding what 
the contractual expectations of the parties were.  
Therefore, in deciding whether the defendant breached 
the duty of good faith by (e.g., terminating the 
contract  . . . ), you should determine the purpose of 
the agreement; that is, the benefits the parties 
expected at the time the agreement was made.  This 
duty of good faith means that each party to a contract 
will not do something which will have the effect of 
injuring or destroying the (rights) (ability) of the 
other party to receive the benefits of the contract. 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
35 
 
failed to make a prima facie case that Sideline was entitled to 
specific performance because it did not show a defense that 
would defeat the equitable claim it opposed.   
¶50 We therefore agree with the court of appeals that 
summary judgment was improperly granted in this case without the 
required balancing of the equities that are due to a specific 
performance claim and without a consideration of the possibility 
of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  In 
order to make a prima facie case that Sideline was entitled to 
summary judgment, its motion would need to show a defense that 
would defeat Beidel's claim. That is, it must successfully 
attack the requirements for obtaining specific performance:  
- that specific performance is available as a remedy;  
- that there has been a substantial enough breach to 
warrant specific performance; and  
- that the equities lie on his side, and that nothing would 
make 
an 
order 
of 
specific 
performance 
unfair, 
unreasonable or impossible.  
In determining whether the requirements for specific performance 
have been met in this case, it will be necessary for the court 
to interpret and apply the provisions of the Stock Repurchase 
Agreement, with special reference to Section 6, Termination of 
Employment without Cause, as well as Sections 8(b) and (c), 
which 
relate 
to valuation.  In this case the analysis 
No. 
2011AP788   
 
36 
 
necessarily involves interpreting the contract and determining 
whether the undefined term "termination" is ambiguous, and if 
so, what the parties intended the term to mean.  Extrinsic 
evidence may be needed in order to make the determination of the 
parties' intent. 
¶51 Sideline's motion for summary judgment does not set 
forth such a defense, and therefore fails to make a prima facie 
case.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
for "the circuit court's determination where the bulk of the 
equities lie, including an evaluation of what the parties 
intended when they agreed to the stock re-purchase agreement, 
and whether it should grant specific performance as Beidel 
requested."  Beidel, 340 Wis. 2d 433, ¶16.  A circuit court may 
grant summary judgment to a party on remand as warranted after 
the equities have been balanced, recognizing the implications of 
the nature of a claim for specific performance and the well-
established obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed.   
DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2011AP788.akz 
 
1 
 
¶52 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur and join the majority opinion's discussion concerning 
termination which is consistent with this concurrence and the 
majority's conclusion that the question of when Beidel was 
terminated should proceed before the trial court.  I agree that 
this case should be remanded because the facts need development 
as to when a "termination" occurred under the terms of the Stock 
Repurchase Agreement such that the proper remedy can be 
determined.  Here, the remedy hinges upon when the termination 
occurred.  Based on the record before the court, it is unclear 
whether Beidel is entitled to the stipulated price of $1,600 per 
share or the lower fair market value price.   
¶53 As this case is a matter of contract interpretation, I 
repeat the relevant contract language.  Section 6 of the Stock 
Repurchase 
Agreement 
governs 
when 
a 
shareholder 
who 
is 
terminated without cause is entitled to the stipulated stock 
price: 
Shareholder's Put Option.  Upon the termination of a 
Shareholder's employment with Sideline without Cause 
(as defined in section 7(b) below), the terminated 
Shareholder shall have a continuing option to sell all 
or any part of the Stock owned by him, and upon 
exercise of such option, Sideline shall have the 
obligation to purchase all of Shareholder’s Stock so 
elected for sale by such Shareholder, at the price and 
on 
the 
terms 
provided 
in 
sections 
8 
and 
9 
below. . . .  
 
The 
terminated 
Shareholder 
shall 
exercise such option by providing 30 day[s'] prior 
written notice to Sideline of his decision to sell his 
Stock. 
No.  2011AP788.akz 
 
2 
 
Sideline does not allege that Beidel was terminated for cause.  
Its brief states that "Beidel was terminated as an officer and 
employee."     
¶54 Section 8 of the contract governs the initial per 
share price and how the price would be determined thereafter, 
including an annual review of the price.  "Upon such review, the 
Shareholders 
and 
Sideline 
shall 
either 
stipulate 
by 
an 
instrument in writing that there is no change in the price last 
stipulated or agree upon a new Purchase Price by an instrument 
in writing signed by them and Sideline . . . ."  If the parties 
did not negotiate a new price, the prior year's price continued 
for one more year, such that a stipulated price could stay in 
effect for a maximum of two years.  If the parties still did not 
negotiate a price two years after the last stipulated price, the 
price of shares that were sold "shall be the fair market value 
of the Stock as determined by an appraiser selected by 
Sideline."  The most recent stipulated price of $1,600 per share 
was entered into on March 6, 2007, and it was set to expire on 
March 6, 2009.      
¶55 The threshold question that the circuit court must 
consider is whether Beidel was "terminated" before March 6, 
2009, as that term is used in the contract.  If he was, then he 
is entitled to the stipulated price of $1,600 per share.  If he 
was not, then he is entitled to a per share price determined by 
the fair market value.1   
                                                 
1 The majority opinion agrees this is a question to be 
resolved on remand.  See majority op., ¶¶44, 45, 46 n.24. 
No.  2011AP788.akz 
 
3 
 
¶56 The goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain 
the intent of the parties.  Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 2003 WI 
App 140, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 124, 667 N.W.2d 751.  When the contract 
is plain and unambiguous, "we will construe the contract as it 
stands."  Id. (citation omitted).  Under the contract language 
and its call for specific performance as the remedy, when Beidel 
was terminated is the central issue.     
¶57 The 
Stock 
Repurchase 
Agreement 
does 
not 
define 
"termination."  Black's Law Dictionary defines "termination" as 
"[t]he act of ending something."  Black's Law Dictionary 1482 
(7th ed. 1999).  Another dictionary defines "termination" as 
"[t]he act of terminating or the condition of being terminated."  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1852 
(3d ed. 1992).   
¶58 Sideline argues that Beidel was formally terminated by 
the board of directors on September 17, 2009.  Beidel argues 
that he was terminated before the March 6, 2009, expiration of 
the stipulated price.  He points to the fact that in October 
2008, Sideline informed him that it intended to fire him and in 
January 2009, transitioned his duties to other employees.  See 
majority op., ¶17.  On January 20, 2009, pursuant to Section 6 
of the contract, Beidel submitted written notice purportedly to 
exercise his put option.  Id.   
¶59 One 
reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
the 
word 
"termination" in the Stock Repurchase Agreement is a complete 
separation or a complete end to the shareholder's employment.  
Another reasonable interpretation of "termination" is an act 
No.  2011AP788.akz 
 
4 
 
evidencing an employer's intent to end the shareholder's 
employment.  In this case, Sideline reduced Beidel's employment 
duties significantly and admitted to running out the clock on 
the stipulated price.  Whether that reduction in duties 
constitutes a termination under the terms of the agreement is a 
question of fact that is not resolved by the language of the 
contract or by the record before the court.  Cf. Loos v. George 
Walter Brewing Co., 145 Wis. 1, 4, 129 N.W. 645 (1911) (stating 
that when employer does not permit employee to perform "the 
substantial or principal service he agreed to perform" and 
directs the employee to perform other tasks, an employee who 
refuses to complete new tasks "may treat such refusal and 
direction as a discharge"); 1A Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonada & 
Joshua D. Rogers, Couch on Insurance § 8:68 (3d ed. 2010) ("The 
employee's performance of administrative functions in relation 
to the insured does not conclusively extend the employment.").  
The word "termination" in the Stock Repurchase Agreement is 
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and the facts 
in the record do not conclusively answer what the parties 
intended by "termination."  Justice Gableman asserts that the 
parties stipulated to the time period of the termination.  See 
dissent, ¶67 n.2.  The record in that regard is not crystal 
clear because the record does not contain a copy of the actual 
stipulation.2  Therefore, I would remand this case for a hearing 
                                                 
2 Not only does the record not contain a firsthand copy of 
the actual stipulation, but the secondhand information we do 
have in the record is unclear as to the nature of the 
stipulation.  The attorneys give two different portrayals of 
what was stipulated.  Sideline's attorney stated that "we've had 
No.  2011AP788.akz 
 
5 
 
before the circuit court to determine when the termination 
occurred. 
¶60 The majority opinion remands this case for "the 
circuit court's determination where the bulk of the equities 
lie, including an evaluation of what the parties intended when 
they agreed to the stock re-purchase agreement, and whether it 
should 
grant 
specific 
performance 
as 
Beidel 
requested."  
Majority op., ¶51.  The majority's approach of balancing the 
equities should not be read to preclude summary judgment when 
applying the terms of the contract.     
¶61 I agree that unnecessarily injecting good faith and 
fair dealing into a contract, especially when the terms of the 
contract are clear, is improper.  See dissent, ¶69.  Indeed, the 
Seventh Circuit is rightly wary of using the doctrine of good 
faith 
and 
fair 
dealing 
to 
overcome 
the 
rights 
and 
responsibilities set forth in a contract.  See id., ¶72 (quoting 
Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593, 595 
(7th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is unlikely that Wisconsin wishes, in the 
name of good faith, to make every contract signatory his 
brother's keeper. . . .  It would be quixotic as well as 
presumptuous for judges to undertake through contract law to 
raise the ethical standards of the nation's business people.")).  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
a concession by the plaintiff that there was no actual 
termination."  Beidel's attorney stated that "we did agree and 
stipulate that we would not pursue that," meaning the actual 
termination claim.  As I do not believe the record before this 
court conclusively resolves whether Beidel was terminated under 
the terms of the contract, I would remand.      
No.  2011AP788.akz 
 
6 
 
¶62 Here, the critical contract term, "termination," is 
not fully developed within the facts of this case, the meaning 
of which must be determined on remand.  Therefore, I would 
remand for a circuit court hearing to determine when the 
termination occurred.  If the fact finder concludes Beidel was 
not "terminated" prior to March 6, 2009, he will receive only 
the fair market value of his shares.  If the fact-finder's 
decision is to the contrary, the contract sets the per share 
price he is to be paid.  
¶63 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.       
¶64 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
  
 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
1 
 
 
¶65 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (dissenting).  Today the 
court undermines contract rights in the name of good faith and 
fair dealing, overturns thirty years of precedent, and inverts 
the employer-employee relationship.  I respectfully dissent.   
I. 
BEIDEL FORFEITED HIS ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE COVENANT 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
¶66 Before discussing the majority's legal conclusions, it 
is important to first note that Beidel forfeited1 his argument 
that Sideline violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Beidel never pled a claim related to the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, nor did he raise the issue before 
the court of appeals.  The court of appeals, however, assisted 
Beidel by plucking the remedy out of thin air and making it the 
basis for its decision to remand to the circuit court to 
determine "where the bulk of the equities lie."  Beidel v. 
Sideline Software, Inc., 2012 WI App 36, ¶16, 340 Wis. 2d 433, 
811 N.W.2d 856.   
¶67 So how does the majority get around the forfeiture 
obstacle?  By stating that "[i]t would be absurd to remand for 
the balancing of the equities where a party seeks specific 
performance and to do so on the condition that the circuit court 
ignore breaches of good faith and fair dealing by the parties."  
                                                 
1 The majority refers to Beidel "waiving" his argument but 
"forfeiture" is the more accurate term.  See State v. Ndina, 
2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 ("Whereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right.") (citation omitted).   
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
2 
 
Majority op., ¶48.  But this puts the cart before the horse.  
Given that the majority is holding that the constructive 
discharge doctrine does not apply, and that constructive 
discharge was the entire justification for Beidel's specific 
performance claim, it is unclear why this court is not 
dismissing Beidel's complaint and is instead ordering the 
circuit court to consider a claim that was never pled.2   
                                                 
2 The concurrence considers a remand appropriate for further 
fact-finding on whether Beidel was actually terminated during 
the relevant time period.  Concurrence, ¶59 n.2.  I read the 
record differently.  In my view, Beidel conceded that he was not 
actually terminated within the relevant period and a hearing on 
the issue is therefore unnecessary.     
At a telephonic conference regarding Beidel's motion for 
reconsideration, Sideline's attorney stated: "I think we've had 
a concession by [Beidel] that there was no actual termination of 
him by Sideline . . . . [B]ecause of that prior concession by 
[Beidel], I would like to prepare the order [dismissing Beidel's 
motion for reconsideration]."  Beidel's attorney then asked 
Sideline's attorney to "send it to me before you send it in.  
We'll make sure it's in the right form before we even get it to 
the judge."   The following month the circuit court signed the 
order denying Beidel's motion for reconsideration.  The order 
contained the following language:  "Further, based on an 
agreement of the parties placed on the record on January 27, 
2011, that Plaintiff [Beidel] does not contend he was actually 
terminated by Sideline prior to March 7, 2009, this Order 
resolves all claims as to Sideline's alleged liability to 
Plaintiff."  No party ever objected to this language, and no 
party objects to it now.   
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
3 
 
¶68 While I acknowledge that appellate courts have the 
inherent authority to consider issues raised for the first time 
on appeal, State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶¶27-28, 235 Wis. 2d 
486, 611 N.W.2d 727, this discretionary power should be used 
sparingly.  Green v. Hahn, 2004 WI App 214, ¶21, 277 Wis. 2d 
473, 689 N.W.2d 657.  Moreover, our forfeiture doctrine permits 
us to consider issues or arguments not raised; it does not 
extend to causes of action that were never pled.  Sohns v. 
Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 458, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960) ("Where an 
issue is neither pleaded nor litigated in the trial court, this 
court ordinarily will not consider it on appeal . . . ."); 
Murphy v. Martin, 58 Wis. 276, 280, 16 N.W. 603 (1883) (noting 
that it is not the "province of this court" to "form new 
issues").  As we recently stated, "The mutual consolation of 
forfeiture is that each party can be confident that a right 
forfeited by the other will not be relitigated in some 
subsequent appeal or proceeding."  State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, 
                                                                                                                                                             
I regard the exchange between the attorneys quoted above as 
an oral stipulation, subsequently memorialized in the court's 
order, and binding on the litigants.  See, e.g., Wyandotte 
Chemicals Corp. v. Royal Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 577, 
589, 225 N.W.2d 648 (1975) ("Generally then, oral stipulations 
made in open court, taken down by the reporter, and acted upon 
by the parties and the court are valid and binding.") (citation 
omitted).  In my opinion, the doctrine of claim preclusion would 
thus bar Beidel from making an argument that he was actually 
terminated under the hearing envisioned by the concurrence.  See 
N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 551, 525 N.W.2d 
723 (1995) (describing the elements of claim preclusion as: "(1) 
an identity between the parties or their privies in the prior 
and present suits; (2) an identity between the causes of action 
in the two suits; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in a 
court of competent jurisdiction.").      
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
4 
 
¶36, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848.  Or as Justice Scalia has 
put it, the purpose of applying the forfeiture rule is to ensure 
that the trial remains "the main event," and not simply a 
"tryout on the road to appellate review."  Freytag v. Comm'r of 
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  The court today provides no justification for 
ignoring the forfeiture rule and giving Beidel——a sophisticated 
party who has been ably represented throughout this litigation——
a shot at a second trial.    In this respect the majority——much 
like the court of appeals before it——serves as advocate rather 
than adjudicator.    
II. THE COVENANT CANNOT OVERRIDE EXPRESS TERMS OF A 
CONTRACT 
¶69 The most important fact in this case is that Sideline 
acted completely in accordance with its contractual rights.  
While it is true that the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inheres in every contract, this equitable doctrine 
cannot, 
contra 
the 
majority, 
be 
used 
to 
vitiate 
clear 
contractual language.  Instead, the notion of good faith is 
meant to serve as a gap-filler where a contract is silent.  
United States v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 248 F.3d 781, 796 (8th 
Cir. 2001).  It may not "block use of terms that actually appear 
in the contract," and it has "nothing to do with the enforcement 
of terms actually negotiated."  Continental Bank, N.A. v. 
Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(citation omitted).  Indeed, in a recent decision the United 
States Supreme Court unanimously held that equitable remedies 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
5 
 
cannot trump the plain terms of a contract and may be used only 
to fill contractual gaps.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 
U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1546-47, 1549-50 (2013).  Here, there 
are simply no gaps to be filled.          
¶70 The majority seems to recognize these principles when 
it states that "[a] party may not, however, employ the good 
faith and fair dealing covenant to undo express terms of an 
agreement."  Majority op., ¶29.  In fact, the majority quotes 
(but then ignores) the following language from a court of 
appeals opinion: 
[When] a contracting party complains of acts of the 
other party which are specifically authorized in their 
agreement, we do not see how there can be any breach 
of the covenant of good faith.  Indeed, it would be a 
contradiction 
in 
terms 
to 
characterize 
an 
act 
contemplated by the plain language of the parties' 
contract as a "bad faith" breach of that contract.   
Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 
568, 577, 431 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1988).  The majority's 
knowing disregard of such a fundamental principle of contract 
law is inexplicable.  It appears that the majority either thinks 
that the concept of good faith and fair dealing is much broader 
than it is, or perhaps it wants to expand the doctrine with this 
case.  In any event, the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing 
is plainly inapplicable when a scenario is covered by the terms 
of a contract.   
¶71 Two of the leading lights of the law and economics 
movement, Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have 
sharply criticized the idea——advanced by the majority——that a 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
6 
 
party's bargained for contractual rights can be superseded by 
the ethereal good faith requirement.  As Judge Easterbrook has 
said, "Parties to a contract are not each others' fiduciaries; 
they 
are 
not 
bound 
to 
treat 
customers 
with 
the 
same 
consideration reserved for their families."  Kham & Nate's Shoes 
No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th 
Cir. 1990).  An individual is "entitled to enforce [a contract] 
to the letter," even if this causes "great discomfort" to the 
other party.  Id.  The essence of an at-will contract is that an 
"employer may sack its employee for any reason except one 
forbidden by law, and it need not show 'good cause.'"  Id. at 
1358.     
¶72 In a similar vein, Judge Posner——in a decision 
interpreting Wisconsin law——wrote that "it is unlikely that 
Wisconsin wishes, in the name of good faith, to make every 
contract signatory his brother's keeper. . . .  In fact the law 
contemplates that people frequently will take advantage of the 
ignorance of those with whom they contract, without thereby 
incurring liability."  Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 
588, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1991).  What is more, "even after you have 
signed a contract, you are not obliged to become an altruist 
toward the other party and relax the terms if he gets into 
trouble in performing his side of the bargain."  Id. at 594.  
Judge Posner warned that "[i]t would be quixotic as well as 
presumptuous for judges to undertake through contract law to 
raise the ethical standards of the nation's business people."  
Id. at 595.  Living in a free enterprise society means that we 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
7 
 
must accept that some contracts may "place one party at the 
other's mercy."  Id.            
¶73 When Beidel and Hall entered into the stock repurchase 
agreement, both knew (or should have known) that the put option 
would be subject to the whims of the marketplace.  For some 
reason, the majority has decided to immunize Beidel and punish 
Hall for the bargain that each struck.  In doing so, this court 
has just loosed a great deal of uncertainty upon contract law in 
the State of Wisconsin, and in the process inverted the 
employer-employee relationship by ceding some of a company's 
termination authority its workers.  At the very least, an at-
will employee can now raise a colorable claim on the meager 
basis that he was terminated at a time inconvenient for him and 
his stock options.  This court would do well to heed the words 
of Judge Learned Hand: "[I]n commercial transactions it does not 
in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in 
aid of those who do not protect themselves."  James Baird Co. v. 
Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).  
III. THE MAJORITY OVERTURNS A THIRTY-YEAR-OLD DECISION OF 
THIS COURT 
¶74 In deciding that Beidel can present a factual argument 
that the timing of his firing was in bad faith, this decision 
overturns, sub silentio, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), a case not even mentioned by 
the majority.  There, Brockmeyer was fired for smoking marijuana 
in front of his employees, poor job performance, and having an 
affair with his secretary.  Id. at 565.  Despite having no 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
8 
 
employment contract, Brockmeyer filed a wrongful discharge 
action.  Id. at 564-65.  The issue in the case was whether an 
at-will employee could bring a wrongful discharge action.  See 
id. at 563.       
¶75 We began by recognizing the American common law rule, 
which was that an employer may discharge an at-will employee 
"for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, 
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."  Id. at 567 
(citations omitted).  We then noted that federal and state 
statutes have since modified the concept of an at-will employee 
such that certain protected classes cannot be fired for 
discriminatory reasons.  Id. at 567-68.  Consistent with these 
statutory trends, state courts across the country developed two 
common law causes of action for terminated at-will employees.  
Id. at 568.  One is the "public policy exception," which allows 
a discharged employee to recover if "the termination violates a 
well-established and important public policy."  Id. at 569.  The 
other cause of action is broader, and provides that an employer 
has an implied duty to terminate an employee only in good faith.  
Id.  A discharge in bad faith would thus constitute a breach of 
contract.  Id.         
¶76 This court adopted the public policy exception while 
expressly rejecting the bad faith termination cause of action.  
As we stated, "We refuse to impose a duty to terminate in good 
faith into employment contracts.  To do so would 'subject each 
discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of 
bad faith.' . . . Imposing a good faith duty to terminate would 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
9 
 
unduly restrict an employer's discretion in managing the 
workforce."  Id. (citation omitted).  That has been the law for 
thirty years.  With today's decision that Sideline is not 
entitled to summary judgment for exercising a clear contractual 
right because the timing of Beidel's termination may have been 
in bad faith, the majority overrules Brockmeyer and erodes at-
will employment contracts.   
IV. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF BAD FAITH 
¶77 Finally, if this court is going to adopt the bad faith 
termination cause of action, it is worth pausing to consider 
whether Sideline actually acted in bad faith towards Beidel.  
Our decision remands this case to the circuit court to determine 
which party has a stronger equitable claim.  As I have made 
clear throughout this dissent, I am unsure when it would ever be 
inequitable for a party to exercise a valid contractual right, 
so I do not know how the circuit court is supposed to proceed 
under the standard crafted by today's opinion.  But be that as 
it may, I can see nothing that could plausibly be characterized 
as bad faith conduct on the part of Sideline. 
¶78 In October 2008, Hall informed Beidel that he planned 
to fire him the following March, after Sideline's stock could be 
revalued from its overinflated price of $1,600 a share.  In 
doing so, Hall acted not only in his best interests, but in the 
best interests of the company as well.  Additionally, by 
providing notice to Beidel when he did, Hall gave him five 
months to prepare for the inevitable.  And during the period 
leading up to his termination, Beidel continued to receive 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
10 
 
compensation from Sideline——to the tune of $269,000 in salary 
and shareholder distributions in 2008.   
¶79 The only options Sideline had, besides the one it 
took, were: (1) act contrary to its own interests and terminate 
Beidel when the stock was overvalued; or (2) keep mum about 
Beidel's impending termination and instead spring the news on 
him the day after Sideline's stock was revalued.  The first 
choice is irrational and the second would seemingly fail the 
equitable test laid down by the majority, but if Sideline is not 
able to rely on the language of the contract, those were its 
only alternatives.  The court is remanding this case for the 
circuit court to determine "whether the equities lie on the 
plaintiff's or defendant's side," majority op., ¶1, but I think 
today’s decision has already stacked the deck against Sideline.   
¶80 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.    
 
 
No.  2011AP788.mjg 
 
1