Title: City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Association
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12077
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2017

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SJC-12077 
 
CITY OF BOSTON  vs.  BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2016. - July 12, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Arbitration, Confirmation of award, Authority of arbitrator.  
Municipal Corporations, Police.  Police, Discharge.  Public 
Employment, Police, Termination.  Public Policy. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 22, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kay H. Hodge (Geoffrey R. Bok also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Alan H. Shapiro (John M. Becker also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  This is an appeal from a judgment of the 
Superior Court confirming an arbitrator's award reinstating a 
Boston police officer terminated for using a choke hold in 
arresting an unarmed suspect for disorderly conduct and making 
2 
 
 
false statements in the ensuing departmental investigation.  The 
arbitrator found that the officer, David Williams, had applied a 
choke hold, but that the choke hold had not actually choked the 
citizen, that the force was reasonable in the circumstances, and 
that the officer's subsequent characterization of events was 
thus truthful.  Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled that the city 
of Boston (city) lacked just cause to terminate Williams, and 
ordered his reinstatement with back pay. 
 
In July, 2013, the city filed a complaint in the Superior 
Court to vacate the arbitrator's award.  The court dismissed the 
complaint in June, 2015, and the city appealed.  We granted the 
city's application for direct appellate review.  Because the 
award neither exceeds the arbitrator's authority nor violates 
public policy, and because we are not free to vacate it where no 
underlying misconduct was found, we affirm. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  On January 18, 2012, the city 
discharged Williams based on specifications arising from a 
disorderly conduct arrest on March 16, 2009.  The specifications 
were use of excessive force, in violation of Boston police 
department rule 304 on use of nonlethal force, and 
untruthfulness in the subsequent investigation, in violation of 
rule 102, § 23, on truthfulness.  Chosen by mutual agreement of 
the city and the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association (union) 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), an 
3 
 
 
arbitrator held three days of hearings, concluded that the city 
had proved neither charge, and ordered Williams's reinstatement 
with back pay.  He based his conclusion on the following factual 
findings. 
 
In 2009, Boston's Saint Patrick's Day Parade fell on 
Sunday, March 15.  Among the revelers that day were Michael 
O'Brien and his friends Thomas Cincotti and Eric Leverone.  
Having consumed some alcohol during the daytime celebrations, 
the three proceeded to a Faneuil Hall bar where O'Brien received 
free drinks by virtue of knowing the staff and owners.  Because 
Leverone had recently returned from active military duty, 
patrons purchased him many drinks, and he became extremely 
intoxicated. 
 
From that bar, the three walked to Cincotti's apartment in 
the North End neighborhood of Boston.  While his friends waited 
on the sidewalk, Cincotti moved his motor vehicle to avoid 
getting a parking citation the next day.  In doing so, he backed 
across a double yellow line and into a double-parked vehicle 
occupied by Guy Fils-Aime.  Cincotti got out of his vehicle, 
asked O'Brien to move it out of the street, and approached Fils-
Aime.  O'Brien testified that, before moving the vehicle to a 
4 
 
 
legal parking space, he heard Fils-Aime say, "I am a federal 
agent and you are fucked."1 
 
Fils-Aime called 911 just after midnight to report the 
accident.  On that recorded call, he can be heard to say, "No, 
no, no.  Don't worry.  I work for Homeland Security.  I'm a 
Federal agent.  You're not going to get in trouble.  Relax."  
After describing the accident to the dispatcher, Fils-Aime 
added, "They're drunk." 
 
Officers Williams and Diep Nguyen arrived on scene at 12:08 
A.M.  O'Brien described their interaction as immediately hostile 
and aggressive, while the officers characterized O'Brien and his 
friends as drunk and uncooperative.  O'Brien, who with Cincotti 
and Leverone is Caucasian, appeared further provoked by the 
officers' friendliness with Fils-Aime, who like Williams is 
African-American.  As the officers spoke with Fils-Aime, O'Brien 
approached and demanded that they issue a citation to Fils-Aime 
for double-parking, and find out whether he was in fact a 
Federal agent.  Receiving no answer, O'Brien began to film the 
officers with his cellular telephone as he repeated his demands 
                                                          
 
 
1 Michael O'Brien was at the time employed as a deputy 
sheriff and correction officer, and said that Guy Fils-Aime's 
comments made him concerned both for his employment and for his 
pending military candidacy. 
5 
 
 
from the middle of Hanover Street, where he was blocking 
traffic.2 
 
After O'Brien failed to heed multiple warnings to get out 
of the street, Nguyen decided to arrest him for disorderly 
conduct.  O'Brien pushed Nguyen away, and the two struggled as 
Nguyen attempted to handcuff him; he managed to cuff one wrist.  
Seeing this struggle from the cruiser where he had been writing 
a citation for Cincotti, Williams came to Nguyen's aid and 
tackled O'Brien to the ground; Nguyen was "fighting off" 
Cincotti and Leverone.  In an effort to extricate O'Brien's 
uncuffed hand from underneath O'Brien's body, Williams pressed 
his upper left arm and shoulder against the right side of 
O'Brien's neck.  He characterized this maneuver as a "semi-bear-
hug hold."  Nguyen testified that Williams had his arm "around 
[O'Brien's] neck" in a "chokehold."  O'Brien testified that he 
could not breathe and began to lose consciousness. 
 
Williams called for assistance using a police radio 
attached to his uniform, and the eight officers who soon arrived 
arrested O'Brien.  As he was being taken to a police wagon, 
O'Brien announced his employment with the sheriff's office and 
shouted the names of officers he knew.  Once in the wagon, he 
realized that he had urinated in his pants. 
                                                          
 
 
2 The video recording was not in evidence, as O'Brien 
testified that he no longer was in possession of that cellular 
telephone. 
6 
 
 
 
O'Brien was charged with resisting arrest, assault and 
battery on a police officer (Nguyen), and disturbing the peace.  
He was booked at 12:40 A.M., with a bruise visible on his left 
temple and an abrasion on the right side of his forehead.  
Lieutenant James Leary, who was duty supervisor at that time, 
examined O'Brien and noted nothing unusual.  Twenty minutes 
later, O'Brien complained of chest pain and head pressure, and 
emergency medical technicians thereafter transported him to 
Massachusetts General Hospital.  The triage nurse, in notes 
recorded at 2:30 A.M., observed O'Brien to be under the 
influence of alcohol.  At 3:43 A.M., O'Brien reported to the 
attending physician, Dr. Andrew Liteplo, that he had been beaten 
and choked by police.  Liteplo noted petechiae, which are 
sometimes associated with choking, on O'Brien's face.  O'Brien 
was otherwise asymptomatic. 
 
On March 19, 2009, O'Brien filed a complaint with the 
internal affairs division (IAD) of the Boston police department 
(department).  Although IAD assigned the complaint to an 
officer, little investigation was done, and O'Brien's counsel 
withdrew it in May, 2009.  Williams did not learn of the 
allegations against him until September 24, 2009, when O'Brien 
filed a Federal lawsuit alleging unreasonable use of force, 
unconstitutional arrest, and assault and battery.  The next day, 
counsel filed another IAD complaint; when IAD still had taken no 
7 
 
 
action in January, 2010, counsel sent a letter demanding that 
the matter be investigated.  Sergeant Philip Owens conducted 
initial interviews of the officers in April, 2010, but not until 
February, 2011, was Williams placed on administrative leave. 
 
A second round of IAD interviews occurred in March, 2011.  
In June, 2011, the department exonerated Nguyen, but issued two 
specifications against Williams:  the use of unreasonable force, 
in violation of rule 304, § 2,3 and untruthfulness during the IAD 
                                                          
 
 
3 Boston police department rule 304, "Use of Non-Lethal 
Force," provides in relevant part: 
 
"Because there are an unlimited number of possibilities, 
allowing for a wide variety of circumstances, no rule can 
offer definitive answers to every situation in which the 
use of non-lethal force might be appropriate.  Rather, this 
rule will set certain specific guidelines and provide 
officers with a concrete basis on which to utilize sound 
judgment in making reasonable and prudent decisions, 
attending to the spirit over the letter of the rule. 
 
"Section 1.  Definitions. . . .  1.  Reasonable Amount of 
Force is the least amount of force that will permit 
officers to subdue or arrest a subject while still 
maintaining a high level of safety for themselves and the 
public. 
 
"Section 2.  General Considerations.  The policy of the 
Boston Police Department is to use only that amount of 
force that is reasonably necessary to overcome resistance 
in making an arrest or subduing an attacker. 
 
"The right to use non-lethal force is extended to police 
officers as an alternative in those situations where the 
potential for serious injury to an officer or civilian 
exists, but where the application of lethal force would be 
extreme." 
8 
 
 
interview, in violation of rule 102, § 23.4  The departmental 
trial board held hearings in November and December, 2011, and 
sustained the charges.  The city terminated Williams on January 
18, 2012, and settled O'Brien's civil lawsuit for $1.4 million 
shortly thereafter. 
 
The union filed a grievance, contending that the city 
lacked just cause to terminate Williams.5  The case went before 
an arbitrator to determine whether the city had just cause to 
terminate Williams, and whether the city violated the CBA by 
placing Williams on administrative leave in February, 2011.  A 
hearing was held in September, October, and December, 2012. 
 
b.  The arbitrator's award.  In June, 2013, the arbitrator 
issued his decision based on the premise that Williams had been 
terminated for use of excessive force, not for application of a 
choke hold ("The Department evidently credited O'Brien's charge 
that [Williams] attacked him for no reason, knocked him to the 
                                                          
 
 
4 Boston police department rule 102, "Conduct and General 
Rights and Responsibilities of Department Personnel," provides 
in relevant part: 
 
"Section 23.  Truthfulness. . . .  Reports submitted by 
employees shall be truthful and complete.  No employee 
shall knowingly enter, or cause to be entered, any 
inaccurate, false or improper information." 
 
 
5 Article V(A), § 1, of the collective bargaining agreement 
provides as follows:  "No bargaining unit member who has 
completed his one-year probationary period shall be disciplined 
or discharged without just cause." 
9 
 
 
ground, grabbed him around the neck, and strangled him almost to 
the point of unconsciousness"). 
 
Characterizing the case as contingent on a credibility 
determination, the arbitrator rejected O'Brien's account of the 
incident as "not truthful," and concluded that Williams used 
only the amount of force reasonably necessary to overcome 
O'Brien's resistance to arrest.  In support of his finding that 
"O'Brien was not a credible witness about any of the events of 
March 16," the arbitrator cited several factors.  First, the 
arbitrator found that O'Brien had been drunk; as a result, the 
accuracy of O'Brien's memory was diminished, and the likelihood 
that he had displayed the conduct Williams and Nguyen described 
increased.  Second, the arbitrator found that the professional 
repercussions potentially facing O'Brien for his drunk and 
disorderly conduct provided a motive to fabricate these 
allegations against the officers.  Third, he found the objective 
physical evidence of choking scant.  Finally, he noted as 
further reasons to discredit O'Brien that the cellular telephone 
video recording was unavailable, and that neither Cincotti nor 
Leverone came forward to corroborate O'Brien's account. 
 
As to Williams, the arbitrator found that he had "knock[ed] 
O'Brien to the ground and tightly gripp[ed] him in a manner that 
placed [Williams's] upper right arm and shoulder against the 
right side of O'Brien's neck.  It would be accurate to call this 
10 
 
 
a chokehold."  Nguyen, who the arbitrator credited as a 
"conscientious and credible witness," agreed that Williams had 
used a choke hold and explained that police were not trained in 
this maneuver.  Nonetheless, Nguyen opined that Williams had not 
choked O'Brien and had used reasonable force in the 
circumstances, and the arbitrator agreed.  Accordingly, the 
arbitrator concluded that Williams's IAD interviews had been 
truthful, and that there was no just cause for termination.  He 
ordered Williams reinstated with back pay. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "A matter 
submitted to arbitration is subject to a very narrow scope of 
review."  Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & 
Co., 407 Mass. 1006, 1007 (1990).  Especially where parties have 
elected to arbitrate disputes as part of a CBA, School Dist. of 
Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 229 (2001) (Cordy, J., 
concurring), we defer to that election and are "strictly bound 
by an arbitrator's findings and legal conclusions, even if they 
appear erroneous, inconsistent, or unsupported by the record."  
Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 61 (2001), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1131 (2002) (Thompson). 
 
In arbitrations pursuant to collective bargaining 
agreements, awards may be vacated only on statutorily enumerated 
grounds.  G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3) ("superior court shall 
vacate an award if . . . the arbitrators exceeded their powers 
11 
 
 
or rendered an award requiring a person to commit an act or 
engage in conduct prohibited by state or federal law").  The 
city argues both grounds exist here, and we address each in 
turn. 
 
b.  Nondelegability of police commissioner's powers and 
scope of arbitrator's authority.  The city argues that the award 
must be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his authority by 
intruding on the nondelegable powers of the Boston police 
commissioner (commissioner) to discipline officers.  The union 
counters that discharge and discipline are at the heart of 
collective bargaining, and the arbitrator merely interpreted the 
relevant terms of the parties' agreement. 
 
Some powers may not be delegated, even with the consent of 
the parties.  Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 
466 Mass. 210, 216 (2013).  "An arbitrator exceeds his authority 
when he intrudes upon decisions . . . left by statute to the 
exclusive managerial control of designated public officials."  
Massachusetts Bd. of Higher Educ./Holyoke Community College v. 
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n/Mass. Community College 
Council/Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 32 (2011). 
The city asserts that the so-called "police commissioner's 
statute" leaves discipline and discharge of officers for 
excessive force or untruthfulness to the commissioner's 
exclusive managerial control.  St. 1906, c. 291, as appearing in 
12 
 
 
St. 1962, c. 322, § 11 ("police commissioner shall have 
cognizance and control of the government, administration, 
disposition and discipline of the department, and of the police 
force of the department and shall make all needful rules and 
regulations for the efficiency of said police").  This argument 
fails for three related reasons. 
 
First, the terms of a CBA trump any authority enumerated 
under the State's collective bargaining law.  G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 7 (d) ("If a collective bargaining agreement . . . contains a 
conflict between matters which are within the scope of 
negotiations pursuant to [§ 6] of this chapter[6] and . . . the 
regulations of . . . a police commissioner . . . the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement shall prevail").  
Accordingly, the CBA's just cause provision permits the 
arbitrator to interpret regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
commissioner's statute, and usurps no authority in so doing. 
 
Second, this conclusion is consistent with courts' 
reluctance to allow broad discretionary powers to subsume 
bargained-for provisions.  See Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 
43 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 182 (1997), citing School Comm. of Newton 
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 564–566 (1983) ("where 
                                                          
 
 
6 General Laws c. 150E, § 6, provides that parties "shall 
negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards 
or productivity and performance, and any other terms and 
conditions of employment." 
13 
 
 
the governmental employer acts pursuant to broad, general 
management powers, the danger is presented . . . that to 
recognize the statutory authority as exclusive would 
substantially undermine the purpose of G. L. c. 150E, § 6, to 
provide for meaningful collective bargaining"). 
 
Finally, although we have recognized the breadth of the 
commissioner's authority in a long line of cases, those cases 
have largely confined nondelegable matters to the administrative 
realm and have never reached the core matters of discipline and 
discharge.  See, e.g., Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 
466 Mass. at 215 (commissioner has exclusive, nondelegable 
authority to assign and transfer police officers).7  Indeed, 
where the parties bargained to arbitrate "any dispute concerning 
                                                          
 
 
7 See also, e.g., Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 
403 Mass. 680, 684 (1989) (nondelegable management prerogative 
to assign one officer, as opposed to two, to marked patrol 
vehicle); Nolan v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 383 Mass. 625, 629-
630 & n.4 (1981) (authority to determine by way of psychiatric 
examination officer's fitness to perform duties); Broderick v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 368 Mass. 33, 41 (1975), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 1048 (1976) (authority to question officers regarding 
private conduct); Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 367 
Mass. 368, 371-372 (1975) (authority to require officers seeking 
elective office to take leave of absence without pay during 
campaign); Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 52 
Mass. App. Ct. 296, 301 (2001) (sole discretion to make and end 
temporary assignments); Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's 
Ass'n, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 269, 271-273 (1996) (authority to 
determine and assign overtime); Boston v. Boston Police Superior 
Officers Fed'n, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1990) (nondelegable 
matters include staffing levels, assignments, uniforms, weapons, 
and definition of duties); Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's 
Ass'n, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 226-227 (1979) (sole authority to 
determine whether officer should be reissued service weapon). 
14 
 
 
the interpretation or application" of the CBA, G. L. 150E, § 8, 
such a broad arbitration clause, see AT&T Techs., Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986), leaves 
discipline well within the arbitrator's ambit.  Boston Police 
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 676–677 
(2004) (severity with which municipal employer treats its police 
officers in disciplinary proceedings can be subject of 
grievance). 
 
c.  Public policy exception.  The city argues that the 
award must be vacated because Williams's reinstatement violates 
public policy.  The union contends that this exception is 
unavailable because the court is bound by the arbitrator's 
finding that Williams committed no misconduct. 
 
Our deference to arbitration notwithstanding, we recognize 
the primacy of certain policy matters over expediency, and will 
not allow an arbitrator to order a party to engage in an action 
that violates well-defined public policy.  G. L. c. 150C, 
§ 11 (a) (3).  Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 
Mass. 813, 818, 823 (2005) (Patrolmen's Association).  If an 
arbitration award violates public policy, "we are obliged to 
refrain from enforcing it."  Massachusetts Highway Dep't v. 
American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 93, 
420 Mass. 13, 16 & n.5 (1995), quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
15 
 
 
Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & 
Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). 
 
In determining whether this narrow public policy exception 
requires the vacation of an arbitrator's award, we apply a 
"stringent, three-part analysis."  Patrolmen's Association, 443 
Mass. at 818.  First, the policy at issue "must be well defined 
and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interests.'"  Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 420 
Mass. at 16, quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766.  Second, 
the exception does not address "disfavored conduct, in the 
abstract, but [only] disfavored conduct which is integral to the 
performance of employment duties" (emphasis in original).  
Massachusetts Highway Dep't, supra at 17, quoting Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 671 
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).  "Finally, 
we require[] a showing that the arbitrator's award reinstating 
the employee violates public policy to such an extent that the 
employee's conduct would have required dismissal."  Patrolmen's 
Association, supra at 819, quoting Thompson, 435 Mass. at 63.  
The question in the third prong is not whether the employee's 
behavior violates public policy, but whether an award 
reinstating him or her does so.  Eastern Associated Coal Corp. 
16 
 
 
v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62-63 
(2000). 
 
The first two prongs of this test are easily satisfied in 
cases of alleged police misconduct toward civilians, as the 
Superior Court recognized below.  See, e.g., O'Brien v. New 
England Police Benevolent Ass'n, Local 911, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
376, 381 (2013) (in police excessive force case, it is "clear" 
that first two prongs of public policy test were met).  It is 
inarguable that well-defined public policy condemns excessive 
force by police officers.  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 
558, 563 (1993); Human Rights Comm'n of Worcester v. Assad, 370 
Mass. 482, 487 (1976). 
 
Similarly, there is no question that refraining from 
excessive force is integral to a police officer's duties to 
protect the public and keep the peace.  Patrolmen's Association, 
443 Mass. at 819.  See Attorney Gen. v. McHatton, 428 Mass. 790, 
793-794 (1999), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371 (1986) ("Police officers must 
comport themselves in accordance with the laws that they are 
sworn to enforce and behave in a manner that brings honor and 
respect for rather than public distrust of law enforcement 
personnel.  They are required to do more than refrain from 
indictable conduct. . . .  In accepting employment by the 
public, they implicitly agree that they will not engage in 
17 
 
 
conduct which calls into question their ability and fitness to 
perform their official responsibilities"). 
 
Thus, only the exception's third prong remains contested 
here.  "To prevail, the city must therefore demonstrate that 
public policy requires that [Williams's] conduct, as found by 
the arbitrator, is grounds for dismissal, and that a lesser 
sanction would frustrate public policy" (emphasis added).  
Patrolmen's Association, 443 Mass. at 819.  Because the 
arbitrator found that Williams acted reasonably and truthfully, 
the public policy exception cannot bar his reinstatement. 
 
The arbitrator found that Williams "placed [his] right arm 
and shoulder against the right side of O'Brien's neck."  Nguyen, 
who the arbitrator found to be "a conscientious and credible 
witness," testified that Williams had his arm "around 
[O'Brien's] neck" in a "chokehold."  But he also found that 
Williams was terminated not for use of a choke hold, which is 
nowhere prohibited by department rules, but for excessive force 
in choking O'Brien.  Because the arbitrator concluded that 
Williams's use of force was reasonable and had not actually 
restricted O'Brien's breathing, he also found that Williams's 
characterization of events had been truthful and that there was 
no just cause for termination. 
 
Without doubt, a de novo analysis of whether Williams's 
actions constituted excessive force in the totality of the 
18 
 
 
circumstances could support a conclusion very different from the 
one reached by the arbitrator.  This was an arrest for 
disorderly conduct.  Williams gave no verbal commands, and used 
neither of the methods of nonlethal force in which he was 
trained before applying a choke hold,8 despite his training to 
avoid a suspect's neck area.9  Williams is significantly larger 
than O'Brien, who was unarmed.  It is unreasonable to justify a 
choke hold -- as the arbitrator did -- on the grounds that a 
suspect could always "grab" an officer's service weapon, because 
this is true of any civilian interaction with police and would 
obviate any continuum of force.10 
                                                          
 
 
8 The department authorizes the use of the following 
nonlethal force methods:  verbal commands, pepper spray, wrist 
locks, and batons.  It is uncontested that Williams attempted 
none of these methods before tackling O'Brien. 
 
 
9 Beyond requiring that officers use "the least amount of 
force" and "only that amount of force that is reasonably 
necessary to overcome resistance in making an arrest," rule 304 
on the use of nonlethal force confines officers to the use of 
procedures on which they have been trained and found 
"proficient."  Nguyen and Williams each admitted that this 
training did not include choke holds as an appropriate means of 
force, and the IAD investigator explained that Boston police 
officers are trained to avoid contact with a person's head or 
neck due to the high risk of injury. 
 
 
10 Indeed, the notion that an unarmed suspect must 
nonetheless be treated as dangerous because he or she interacts 
with an armed police officer ("[e]ven if O'Brien was unarmed, 
there was always the possibility that he would grab Nguyen's 
gun") controverts clear United States Supreme Court precedent, 
see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985), and we reject the troubling 
19 
 
 
 
This is especially true given the unpredictably lethal 
nature of choke holds.  See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 116-117 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is 
undisputed that chokeholds pose a high and unpredictable risk of 
serious injury or death"); Thompson v. Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 
446 (7th Cir. 2006) (officer's application of choke hold 
contributed to suspect's death by asphyxia); Maddox v. Los 
Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (officer's 
application of choke hold for twenty to thirty seconds caused 
suspect's death).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Stockwell, 426 Mass. 17, 
19 n.2 (1997) (posited among methods of strangulation supporting 
conviction of murder in first degree, choke hold occurs when 
"the aggressor's forearm is placed on the neck of the victim"). 
 
Where the city failed to recognize those dangers in any 
rule, however, we are not free to redefine terms the parties 
bargained over.  Had the city prohibited choke holds as 
excessive force, an arbitrator who found a choke hold reasonable 
would have exceeded his authority.  See G. L. c. 150C, 
§ 11 (a) (3) ("the superior court shall vacate an award if . . . 
the arbitrators exceeded their powers"); School Dist. of 
Beverly, 435 Mass. at 229 (Cordy, J., concurring), quoting 
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
presumption of a citizen's dangerousness that this proposition 
would create. 
20 
 
 
593, 597 (1960) ("[A]n arbitrator's 'award is legitimate only so 
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement' that he is confined to interpret and apply").  In 
other words, that a de novo factual analysis would permit a 
finding of felonious conduct does not permit us to proceed as if 
the arbitrator actually made that finding. 
 
We are aware of no prior application of the public policy 
exception to vacate an award ordering reinstatement where the 
arbitrator found no underlying misconduct.  See Patrolmen's 
Association, 443 Mass. at 820-821, 823 (vacating reinstatement 
of police officer found by arbitrator to have committed 
felonious misconduct of perjury and filing of false police 
reports); Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 74 Mass 
App. Ct. 379, 382 (2009) (vacating reinstatement of police 
officer found by arbitrator to have committed off-duty felonious 
misconduct of assault by means of dangerous weapon).  The 
question, in other words, is not whether Williams's conduct 
justified termination, but whether it required termination, such 
that any lesser sanction would violate public policy.  See 
Thompson, 435 Mass. at 63.  Because the arbitrator found that 
Williams used reasonable force and was not untruthful in 
subsequent investigations, the award reinstating him must be 
upheld. 
21 
 
 
 
d.  Prospective guidance.  Today's decision should not be 
read to view the city -- and more importantly, the citizens of 
Boston -- as without remedy moving forward.  First, it is 
incumbent on the city to clarify its own policies with respect 
to excessive force and specifically choke holds if it does not 
wish in the future to relinquish interpretive control of that 
term. 
 
As a threshold matter, it cannot be that when a choke hold 
is applied, the excessive force determination nonetheless 
depends on the extent of resulting harm.  See Stamps v. 
Framingham, 813 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument 
that inadvertent excessive force is shielded from scrutiny under 
Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution, reasoning that 
"[t]he defendants' proposed rule has the perverse effect of 
immunizing risky behavior only when the foreseeable harm of that 
behavior comes to pass").  If anything, it is the unpredictable 
dangerousness of choke holds that warns against their use at 
all.  Indeed, it is untenable to assert both that choke holds 
are so potentially dangerous that reinstating officers who use 
them violates public policy and that the commissioner retains 
the discretion to determine whether a choke hold is excessive 
force in any given case.  As discussed supra, it is because 
choke holds are unpredictably lethal that both officers and the 
public deserve a bright-line rule. 
22 
 
 
 
Second, the city must investigate allegations of excessive 
force with substantially more alacrity than was evidenced here.  
Pursuant to its own existing rules,11 the department owes a duty, 
both to the public and to its own officers, to investigate 
allegations of excessive force thoroughly and promptly.  As with 
the tension between a choke hold's dangerousness and the 
commissioner's desire to retain discretionary review of their 
use, it is difficult to reconcile the department's position that 
an officer's use of a choke hold requires termination with its 
protracted inaction in this case.  See Massachusetts Highway 
Dep't, 420 Mass. at 21 n.8 ("In determining that the safety of 
the work environment was not sufficiently threatened by [the 
employee's] behavior to require permanent discharge, the 
arbitrator could consider the fact that the department waited 
nearly one year after the [misconduct] was discovered" before 
bringing disciplinary action).  There was a two-year delay on 
meaningful internal investigation; the department concedes, as 
it must, that it mishandled an inquiry that took entirely too 
long.  Officers deserve notice of allegations against them, and 
citizens deserve investigations not contingent on the filing of 
Federal lawsuits. 
                                                          
 
 
11 See Boston police department rule 304, "Use of Non-Lethal 
Force," § 7, "Investigation of Use of Force." 
23 
 
 
 
Last, we are troubled by the prospect that any use of force 
not explicitly prohibited by a rule of conduct is essentially 
unreviewable.  It is difficult to fathom why we elevate the 
values of "expediency" and "judicial economy" so high as to 
eclipse the substantive rights of citizens who have no seat at 
the bargaining table.  We recognize, of course, that public 
employers may or may not choose to adopt rules for the 
protection of the public from the excessive use of force.  
Without the benefit of such rules, however, arbitrators remain 
free to find reasonable any level of force that does not 
explicitly require termination.  Absent legislative authority 
for a broader review of arbitration decisions, we are 
constrained in our ability to review the use of excessive force 
by public safety officials. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we affirm 
the Superior Court's decision confirming the arbitrator's award. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.