Title: State v. Scott E. Williams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1993AP002517-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 1996

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-2517-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Scott E. Williams, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
FEB 1, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  This case is before the court on 
petition for review of a decision of the court of appeals 
reversing an order of the circuit court.  The issue presented to 
this court is whether Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10) (1993-94)
1 requires 
the State to establish probable cause at the preliminary hearing 
that the defendant committed the precise felony set forth in each 
count of a multiple-count criminal complaint.  We hold that the 
State need only establish probable cause that a felony occurred as 
to one count in a set of transactionally related counts for there 
to be a valid bind over on that set, and need not establish 
                     
     
1  All future reference to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1993-94 
version.   
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
2 
probable cause that the specific felony alleged in each count was 
committed. 
 
  The defendant was charged in a ten-count criminal complaint 
alleging various drug offenses, including the delivery, or the 
intent to deliver, controlled substances.  Four of these counts  
concerned drug offenses which were allegedly committed within 
1,000 feet of a park.  Each one of these four counts was 
transactionally related to one of the other counts in the 
complaint in regard to time, place and persons involved.  However, 
because of the additional element regarding the proximity to a 
park, the State decided to charge these offenses as separate 
counts under a penalty enhancer statute.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 161.41(1) and 161.49.
2  The Honorable Bruce K. Schmidt, 
                     
     
2  Wis. Stat. §§ 161.41(1) and 161.49 provide as follows:   
 
 
161.41(1) Prohibited acts A ÄÄ penalties. (1) Except as 
authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any 
person to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. 
 Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:   ... . 
 
 
161.49 Distribution of or possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance on or near certain 
places.  (1) If any person violates s. 161.41(1)(cm), 
(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) by distributing, or violates 
s. 161.41(1m)(cm), (d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) by 
possessing 
with 
intent 
to 
deliver, 
a 
controlled 
substance 
included 
under 
s. 
161.14(7)(L) 
or 
161.16(2)(b), 
heroin, 
phencyclidine, 
lysergic 
acid 
diethylamide, 
psilocin, 
psilocybin, 
amphetamine, 
methamphetamine or any form of tetrahydrocannabinols 
while in or on the premises of a scattered-site public 
housing project, while in or otherwise within 1,000 feet 
of a state, county, city, village or town park, a jail 
or correctional facility, a multiunit public housing 
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
3 
Winnebago County Circuit Court, who presided over the preliminary 
hearing, found probable cause that a felony had been committed by 
the defendant as to each count in the complaint, including the 
counts containing the penalty enhanced offenses.   As such, Judge 
Schmidt ordered the defendant bound over for trial on each count.
3  
 
Although the State offered no evidence at the preliminary 
hearing supporting its allegations that any offenses occurred 
within 1,000 feet of a park, it filed an information containing 
all ten of the counts alleged in the complaint, including the four 
counts containing the penalty enhanced offenses.  The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss these four counts on the grounds that 
(..continued) 
project, a swimming pool open to members of the public, 
a youth center or a community center, while on or 
otherwise within 1,000 feet of any private or public 
school premises or while on or otherwise within 1,000 
feet of a school bus, as defined in s. 340.01(56), the 
maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that 
crime may be increased by 5 years.  
  
     
3  It should be noted that there is a significant difference 
between the facts of this case and the facts of its companion case 
State v. [John] Williams, No. 93-2444-CR (S. Ct. February 1, 
1996).  In this case there are basically four transactions which 
give rise to the counts at issue.  Two offenses were charged 
relating to each transaction.  It is undisputed that the four 
transactions from which these counts stem are clearly unrelated.  
As such, according to the procedure set forth in State v. [John] 
Williams, it was necessary for the trial judge at the preliminary 
hearing to only find probable cause that a felony was committed as 
to one count in each set of transactionally related counts for 
there to be a valid bind over on that set.   
 
The relationship between the four distinct transactions is 
not relevant to our opinion in this case.  Instead, our decision 
focuses on the relationship between the two counts which stem from 
each of the four distinct transactions.  There is no doubt that 
these counts are transactionally related.  
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
4 
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing did not 
establish probable cause that he delivered, or possessed with the 
intent to deliver, controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a 
park.  This motion was denied by the Winnebago County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Robert A. Hawley, who held that it was not 
necessary to find probable cause that the exact felony in each 
count had been committed for there to be a valid bind over as to 
that count.   The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and 
ordered the penalty enhanced counts in the information dismissed. 
 See State v. Williams, 186 Wis. 2d 506, 520 N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 
1994).  The court of appeals concluded that 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(10) requires the State to establish probable cause as to 
the precise  felony in each count of a multiple-count complaint to 
bind over the defendant on that count.  The court felt that simply 
establishing probable cause that the defendant committed "a 
felony" for each count was not sufficient according to the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10).  See id. at 511.  Since the 
evidence presented at the preliminary examination did not show 
that the defendant intended to deliver controlled substances 
within 1,000 feet of a park, the court of appeals held that the 
four counts dependent upon this element were improperly included 
in the information.   
 
This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
regarding 
the 
proper 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10).  Questions of statutory 
interpretation are reviewed de novo by this court.  The ultimate 
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
5 
goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature.  See Rolo v. Goers, 174 Wis. 2d 709, 715, 497 N.W.2d 
724, 726 (1993).  The first step of this process is to look at the 
language of the statute.  See In Interest of Jamie L., 172 Wis. 2d 
218, 225, 493 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1992).  If the statute is 
unambiguous, this court will apply the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the language of the statute to the facts before it.  
See State v. Swatek, 178 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 502 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  It is only if the language of the statute is 
ambiguous that this court looks beyond the statute's language and 
examines the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose 
of the statute.  See Rolo, 174 Wis. 2d at 715. 
 
The language of the statute, therefore, provides the 
starting point for this court's analysis.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(10) states:   
In multiple count complaints, 
the court shall order dismissed any count for which it 
finds there is no probable cause.  The facts arising out 
of any count ordered dismissed shall not be the basis 
for a count in any information filed pursuant to ch. 
971.   
 
The difficulty the circuit court and court of appeals encountered 
in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10) stems from the phrase:  
"the court shall order dismissed any count for which it finds 
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
6 
there is no probable cause."
4  The circuit court felt that this 
phrase only required the circuit court to find probable cause that 
a felony was committed as to each count for there to be a bind 
over as to that count.  The court of appeals, however, held that 
the circuit court must find probable cause that the specific 
felony in each count had been committed for the bind over to be 
valid as to that count. 
 
It is not difficult to see why this phrase presented problems 
for the courts below.  The subsection begs the question:  probable 
cause as to what?  Clearly it requires probable cause as to the 
"count."  Does the use of the word "count," however, mean the 
count itself or the offense contained in the count?  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals' interpretations provide 
reasonable answers to this question.  If a statute can support two 
reasonable interpretations, a court must find the language of the 
statute ambiguous.  See, e.g., Hauboldt v. Union Carbide Corp., 
160 Wis. 2d 662, 684, 467 N.W.2d 508, 517 (1991); Girouard v. 
Jackson Circuit Ct., 155 Wis. 2d 148, 155, 454 N.W.2d 792, 795 
(1990).     
 
When faced with an ambiguous statute, courts should use the 
rules of statutory construction to help determine the intent of 
                     
     
4 In this case, we need only address the first sentence of 
the subsection.  The second sentence, which we also find to be 
ambiguous, will be construed in the companion case State v. [John] 
Williams, No. 93-2444-CR (S. Ct. February 1, 1996).   
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
7 
the legislature.
5  See State v. Charles, 180 Wis. 2d 155, 158, 509 
N.W.2d 85, 86 (Ct. App. 1993).  One such rule is that a subsection 
should be construed so as to support the overall purpose of the 
statute.  See Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 
335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1969); Swatek, 178 Wis. 2d at 7.  
Wisconsin Statute § 970.03(1) clearly states that a preliminary 
hearing is required to determine "if there is probable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed by the defendant."  This court 
has identified a number of purposes underlying this requirement 
including:  
[To protect the] defendant's due process rights and guard[s] 
against undue deprivations of the defendant's liberty 
... 'to prevent hasty, malicious, improvident and 
oppressive prosecutions, to protect the person charged 
from open and public accusations of crime, to avoid both 
for the defendant and the public the expense of a public 
trial, and to save the defendant from the humiliation 
and anxiety involved in public prosecution, and to 
discover whether or not there are substantial grounds 
upon which a prosecution may be based.' 
See State v. Richer, 174 Wis. 2d 231, 240-41, 496 N.W.2d 66, 68-69 
(1993).  In Richer we held that these purposes are met if "all 
charges 
included 
in 
the 
information 
. . . [are] . . . transactionally related to charges which are 
themselves supported by evidence adduced at the preliminary 
                     
     
5 Courts should also look to the legislative history of the 
statute to determine the legislature's intent.  Although there is 
some legislative history concerning Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10), it is 
unfortunately not helpful in answering the specific question 
before this court.  It is, however, comprehensively addressed in 
the companion case of State v. [John] Williams, No. 93-2444-CR (S. 
Ct. February 1, 1996).    
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
8 
hearing . . . ."  See id. at 247. Or in other words, this test is 
met if the counts included in the information are not "wholly 
unrelated" to those for which the defendant is bound over.  See 
id. at 238.  In State v. Burke, 153 Wis. 2d 445, 455, 451 N.W.2d 
739, 744 (1990), this court listed seven factors for determining 
whether the counts in the information are "wholly unrelated."  
These include:  "the parties involved, [the] witnesses involved, 
geographical proximity, time, physical evidence, motive and 
intent."  Id.    
 
Any interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10) must coincide 
with the purposes of the preliminary hearing as construed by 
Richer and Burke.
6  The circuit court's decision, that a circuit 
court judge must only find probable cause that a felony occurred 
rather than finding probable cause that the specific felony 
alleged occurred, clearly preserves the "transactionally related" 
test of Richer in all circumstances.   
 
The court of appeals' decision, however, impermissibly goes 
beyond this requirement of Richer and conflicts with our holding 
in Burke.   In Burke, we stated that a circuit court should: 
[D]etermine whether on the basis of the transactions or facts 
considered 
or 
testified 
to 
at 
the 
preliminary 
examination 'there is probable cause to believe a felony 
                     
     
6 State v. Burke, 153 Wis. 2d 445, 451 N.W.2d 739 (1990) and 
State v. Richer, 174 Wis. 2d 231, 496 N.W.2d 66 (1993) involve 
single count complaints and only discuss the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 970.03(7).  However, their holdings regarding the 
purposes of the preliminary hearing and the role which should be 
played by the trial judge overseeing the hearing are equally 
applicable to multiple count complaints. 
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
9 
has been committed by the defendant.'  The statute does 
not require the circuit court to state the specific 
felony it believes the defendant committed, nor does it 
limit the circuit court to considering only whether the 
defendant probably committed the specific felony charged 
in the complaint.  
Burke, 153 Wis. 2d at 456.  A circuit court judge's sole 
obligation, at the preliminary hearing, is to determine whether 
there is probable cause that some felony has been committed by the 
defendant.  See id.  See also Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 
341, 222 N.W.2d 871, 876 (1974).  Once the circuit court does this 
for each count in a complaint, it is then the responsibility of 
the district attorney to prepare the information,
7 subject only to 
an abuse of discretion review under the "transactionally related" 
standard of Richer.  See Burke, 153 Wis.2d at 456.  This is where 
the court of appeals erred.  Its interpretation expands the 
requirements of Burke and Richer, thereby interfering with the 
                     
     
7  Wis. Stat. § 971.01 provides as follows:   
 
 
971.01 Filing of the information. (1) The district 
attorney shall examine all facts and circumstances 
connected with any preliminary examination touching the 
commission of any crime if the defendant has been bound 
over for trial and, subject to s. 970.03(10), shall file 
an information according to the evidence on such 
examination subscribing his or her name thereto. 
 
(2) The information shall be filed with the clerk within 
30 days after the completion of the preliminary 
examination or waiver thereof except that the district 
attorney may move the court wherein the information is 
to be filed for an order extending the period for filing 
such information for cause.  Notice of such motion shall 
be given the defendant.  Failure to file the information 
within such time shall entitle the defendant to have the 
action dismissed without prejudice. 
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
10 
long-protected 
independence 
of 
the 
district 
attorney's 
prosecutorial power and its autonomy as a quasi-judicial officer. 
 See State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 531, 305 N.W.2d 110, 117 
(1981).  Application of Bentine, 181 Wis. 579, 587, 196 N.W. 213, 
216 (1923); Unnamed Petitioner v. Walworth Circuit Ct., 157 
Wis. 2d 157, 160, 458 N.W.2d 575, 567 (Ct. App. 1990).  The court 
of appeals presented no argument why such an expansion is 
necessary, and we are not inclined to take such a step without 
significant reason.  
 
 The circuit court's interpretation is further supported by 
another basic rule of statutory construction:  the language of one 
subsection should be construed so as to be consistent with 
identical language in other subsections of the same statute.  See 
Charles, 180 Wis. 2d at 159-60; In re R.H.L., 159 Wis. 2d 653, 
659, 464 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 1990); General Castings Corp. 
v. Winstead, 156 Wis. 2d 752, 758, 457 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Ct. App. 
1990).  When Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10) refers to "probable cause," 
it is presumably referring to the same "probable cause" standard 
that appears throughout the rest of Wis. Stat. § 970.03.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 970.03(1), (7).  If these subsections are interpreted so 
as to be consistent with each other, it becomes apparent that 
multiple-count complaints should be treated the same as single 
count complaints:  the state must establish probable cause that a 
felony occurred as to one count in a set of transactionally 
related counts for there to be a valid bind over on that set.  See 
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
11 
State v. [John] Williams, No. 93-2444-CR, op. at 16-17 (S. Ct. 
February 1, 1996).  This is true whether the complaint contains 
one set of transactionally related counts or one hundred.  Again, 
this interpretation does not require the state to establish 
probable cause as to the precise felony alleged in each count.   
 
Finally, interpretations which lead to absurd or unreasonable 
results should be avoided.  State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 17, 517 
N.W.2d 149, 153 (1994); State v. Pham, 137 Wis. 2d 31, 34, 403 
N.W.2d 35, 36 (1987).  Courts should not normally construe 
statutes so as to create an anomaly in criminal procedure.  See 
State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980).  The 
court of appeals openly concedes that its decision may bring about 
"questionable results" and make Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10) "look 
silly."  See Williams, 186 Wis. 2d at 513.  It is correct in these 
findings.  As the court of appeals itself recognized, its 
interpretation "imposes a different set of preliminary hearing 
rules and procedures for single count criminal complaints as 
opposed to multiple count complaints."  See id.   If we would 
adopt the court of appeals' interpretation, prosecutors would 
simply charge each count in a multiple count complaint in separate 
single count complaints and avoid the use of the multiple count 
complaint entirely.  This, as the court of appeals acknowledged, 
would functionally render sub. (10) meaningless.  See id.  We 
decline to impose this type of artifice on the criminal procedure 
of this state.     
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
12 
 
It is undisputed that the State showed probable cause that a 
felony had been committed as to each one of the counts in the 
complaint.  The circuit court rightfully disregarded the fact that 
the State failed to prove the penalty enhancing element when the 
court made its bind over decision.
8   Since each offense charged 
in the information was transactionally related to a felony for 
which probable cause was found at the preliminary hearing, the 
prosecutor properly exercised his broad charging discretion by 
including all ten counts in the information.  See Richer, 174 
Wis. 2d at 244-47, 250-51, 253-54; Burke, 153 Wis. 2d at 451-58.  
 
In State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 704, 499 N.W.2d 152, 162 
(1993), we discussed the meaning of probable cause in the context 
of a preliminary hearing and the standard under which appellate 
courts should review bind over decisions.  We stated:   
 
 
The probable cause that is required for a bindover is 
greater than that required for arrest, but guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt need not be proven.  State v. Berby, 
81 Wis. 2d 677, 683, 260 N.W.2d 798 (1978).  A 
preliminary hearing is not a preliminary trial or 
evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 396, 
359 N.W.2d 151 (1984).  The role of the judge at a 
preliminary hearing is to determine whether the facts 
and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them 
support the conclusion that the defendant probably 
committed a   felony.  The judge is not to choose 
between conflicting facts or inferences, or weigh the 
                     
     
8 The law treats the penalty enhancers as an "element" of the 
crime which must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt 
at trial.  See generally State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 20-21, 517 
N.W.2d 149, 155 (1994).  What must be proven at trial, however, 
has little to do with the procedures governing the preliminary 
hearing.  
 
No. 93-2517-CR 
 
 
 
13 
state's evidence against evidence favorable to the 
defendant.  Probable cause at a preliminary hearing is 
satisfied when there exists a believable or plausible 
account of the defendant's commission of a felony.  Id. 
121 Wis. 2d at 397-98, State v. Cornelius, 152 Wis. 2d 
272, 276, 448 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1989).   
 
 
On review, this court will search the record for any 
substantial ground based on competent evidence to 
support the circuit court's bindover decision.  State v. 
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 251, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988). 
 
 
Very little "searching" is required here.  The evidence 
presented at the preliminary examination clearly supports a 
finding of probable cause that a felony had been committed as to 
each count in the multiple-count complaint.  Furthermore, the 
offenses alleged in the information were all transactionally 
related to this evidence.  This is all that Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(10) requires.     
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.     
 
  
 
No. 93.2517.wab 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  (concurring).   For the reasons 
stated in the concurrence to State v. John T. Williams (#93-2444), 
I concur.    
 
I am authorized to state that Justices Shirley S. Abrahamson 
and Ann Walsh Bradley join in this concurrence.  
 
No. 93.2517.wab 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2517-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitoner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Scott E. Williams, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  186 Wis. 2d 506, 520 N.W.2d 920 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 1, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 6, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
ROBERT HAWLEY 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
BABLITCH, J. concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
   ABRAHAMSON AND BRADLEY, J.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by James M. 
Shellow, Craig W. Albee and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Craig W. Albee.