Title: State v. Bartelt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP002506-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 2018

2018 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2506-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daniel J. H. Bartelt, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 148, 895 N.W.2d 86 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 23 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 20, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 14, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd K. Martens 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and an oral argument by Leon W. Todd, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Amy C. 
Miller, assistant solicitor general, Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general, Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, and Ryan J. Walsh, 
chief deputy solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by 
Amy C. Miller. 
 
 
2018 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2506-CR 
(L.C. No.  2013CF276) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
FILED 
 
Feb 20, 2018 
 
Sheila Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a published decision of the court of appeals.  
Affirmed.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This review concerns 
the point in time at which a person is "in custody" for purposes 
of Miranda.1  Daniel J.H. Bartelt asks us to overturn a decision 
of the court of appeals, affirming the circuit court's2 judgment 
entered in favor of the State regarding Bartelt's motion to 
suppress incriminating statements, and concluding that Bartelt 
was not in custody at the time the statements were made. 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); cf. Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).   
2 The Honorable Todd K. Martens of Washington County, 
presided. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Bartelt presents two issues:  first, whether Bartelt's 
confession to a serious crime transformed his custody status 
from noncustodial to "in custody;" and second, whether Bartelt's 
request for counsel was unequivocal such that police officers 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights when they questioned him the 
following day without counsel present. 
¶3 
On the first issue we conclude that, under the 
totality of the circumstances attendant to his interview, 
Bartelt's confession did not transform his custody status.  
Rather, Bartelt was not in custody until Detectives Joel 
Clausing and Aaron Walsh of the Washington County Sheriff's 
Department took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after 
his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview 
room.  Because we determine that Bartelt was not in custody 
until this point, which was after his alleged request for 
counsel, we need not and do not reach the issue of whether his 
alleged request for counsel was unequivocal. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
This case arises from two crimes committed in July 
2013.  On July 12, 2013, M.R. was assaulted by a male suspect 
with a knife while walking her dog in Richfield Historical Park 
in the Village of Richfield.  M.R. was tackled to the ground and 
suffered several knife wounds before disarming the suspect, who 
fled the scene in a blue Dodge Caravan.  Three days later, on 
July 15, 2013, Jessie Blodgett, a friend and former girlfriend 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
3 
 
of Bartelt, was found dead in her home in the City of Hartford.  
According to preliminary autopsy findings, the cause of death 
was ligature strangulation. 
¶6 
As of July 16, 2013, Clausing and Detective Richard 
Thickens of the Hartford Police Department had identified 
Bartelt as a person of interest in the attack on M.R.  Earlier 
that month, a deputy had noticed a blue Dodge Caravan at the 
same park and had run the license plate, which revealed that the 
vehicle was registered to Bartelt's parents.  Police learned 
that the Bartelts had a son, and were then able to match 
Bartelt's 
photograph 
from 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Transportation with the composite sketch drawn at M.R.'s 
direction.  Clausing contacted Bartelt around 5:00 p.m. on July 
16, and told him that the police were investigating an incident, 
and that they needed to speak with him.  Bartelt was "very 
compliant," and agreed to meet with detectives at the Slinger 
Police Department.   
¶7 
The Slinger Police Department is located inside a 
municipal building that it shares with various other offices and 
departments.  There is one main entrance to the building.  Once 
inside, a separate entrance leads to the police department. 
Neither the main door to the building nor the door to the police 
department is secured during normal business hours, and there 
are no metal detectors or other security screening devices.  
Inside the police department, another door leads to the 
"internal portion" of the department.  This door is locked from 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
4 
 
the outside, but one can freely exit.  The interview room is 
located about twenty-five feet inside this secured area.  The 
room is thirteen and one-half feet by ten and one-half feet, and 
contains a table, three chairs and a window.  The room can be 
accessed by either of two doors, neither of which can be locked.   
¶8 
Bartelt was dropped off by two friends at the Slinger 
Police Department around 5:12 p.m.  His friends waited outside.  
Clausing testified that Bartelt was escorted to the interview 
room but was not searched.  Bartelt chose the seat on the far 
side of the table, while Clausing sat at the end, and Walsh sat 
opposite Bartelt.  Clausing and Walsh were wearing civilian 
clothes; however, they both had their badges displayed on their 
belts, as well as their service weapons.  Clausing testified 
that one of the doors to the room was left open.  Unbeknownst to 
Bartelt, the interview was recorded by both audio and visual 
means. 
¶9 
Clausing began the interview by telling Bartelt that 
he was not in trouble, he was not under arrest, and he could 
leave at any time.  Clausing did not read Bartelt his Miranda 
rights.  Bartelt, who had just come from the Blodgett residence 
to pay his respects to the family, believed the police were 
meeting with him about Blodgett's murder.  However, Clausing 
explained that law enforcement was investigating an attack that 
had occurred at Richfield Historic Park on the previous Friday.  
Bartelt was asked a number of preliminary questions and 
initially denied any involvement.  Bartelt stated that he had 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
5 
 
been with his girlfriend on the day in question, although he 
could not "remember any specifics."  Clausing then explained 
that cell phones "are kind of like GPS's," and told Bartelt, "I 
don't want any lies."  
¶10 Clausing then observed some scrapes and a cut on 
Bartelt's hand and arm.  Bartelt stated he did not remember how 
he scraped his arm, but that he had stabbed his hand "with a 
screw at work."  The following exchange then occurred: 
DET. 
CLAUSING:  . . . So 
what 
do 
you 
think 
evidence is? 
MR. BARTELT:  Incriminating items, documents. 
DET. CLAUSING:  First -- but I'm more of a nuts-
and-bolts type of guy.  Like, what would you consider 
to be evidence? 
MR. BARTELT:  Well --  
DET. CLAUSING:  Fingerprints? 
MR. BARTELT:  Yeah. 
DET. CLAUSING:  Okay.  Fibers?  Hairs? 
MR. BARTELT:  Yeah. 
DET. CLAUSING:  Any DNA?  You know, footwear 
impressions? 
MR. BARTELT:  Yeah. 
DET. CLAUSING:  Witness statements, right?  Video 
surveillance, stuff like that, right? 
MR. BARTELT:  Yeah. 
DET. CLAUSING:  Is there any evidence that we 
just talked about which would show that you would be 
in this park at the time of this incident that had 
occurred?  Is there any evidence out there that would 
show that? 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
6 
 
MR. BARTELT:  I don't think so . . . What is this 
about? 
¶11 After reminding Bartelt that police were investigating 
an incident at Richfield Historical Park, Clausing said, "What 
if I were to tell you that there might be something that links 
you there."  Clausing then proceeded to explain "Locard's 
exchange principle," which holds that the perpetrator of a crime 
will bring something into the crime scene——such as fingerprints, 
sweat, DNA, or clothing fibers——and leave it behind.  The 
detectives added that they had found evidence "from the person 
that was out there," which needed to be analyzed by the state 
crime laboratory.  
¶12 Clausing 
next 
told 
Bartelt 
that 
they 
had 
an 
eyewitness, stating, "I would hate to put down your picture in 
front of the eyewitness and have them say, that's the guy that 
was out there."  Further, Clausing stated, "I can prove that you 
were out there.  It's not just a tip.  I can prove it.  And all 
I'm getting at is that if you were out there, just talk to us 
about what happened or what you saw or what you observed or 
whatever."  Walsh told Bartelt they knew that his vehicle had 
been spotted at the park on several occasions when Bartelt was 
supposed to be at work.  Bartelt admitted that he had been laid 
off for several months, and that the injury was actually the 
result of a cooking accident. 
¶13 At this time Clausing moved his chair closer to 
Bartelt.  When Clausing's face was about two feet from 
Bartelt's, Clausing told him, "No more lies.  It just makes 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
7 
 
things worse.  It is spiraling out of control right now . . . .  
Nobody in their right mind would lie about cutting themselves if 
it happened at home cooking . . . .  What happened?  Just be 
honest."  Bartelt admitted that he had been to the park before 
and that he had seen the sketch on television, but that "it 
wasn't me."   
¶14 Walsh then urged Bartelt to help bring closure to M.R.  
"Daniel, the truth is going to help us bring some resolution to 
this for everybody involved . . . .  We have one scared person 
out there right now . . . and the easiest way to put some 
resolution to this is [for] the [ ] person that did this to take 
responsibility."  Walsh added that he could understand why 
someone would do this, "especially if the person that did it 
explains to us what they were thinking, where they were in their 
life."  For example, Bartelt had lost his job and hid that from 
his parents, and he had dropped out of college after only one 
semester.  Walsh stated that "when things are not going well for 
people, they do things that are very out of character."  He 
added, "I think you are a good person . . . [g]ood people can 
explain things away and we can understand why they do things.  
So tell us about the park."  
¶15 Following a lengthy narrative from Clausing about the 
two 
types 
of 
people 
in 
this 
situation——those 
who 
take 
responsibility and those who say "prove it"——Bartelt admitted to 
being at the park and going "after that girl" because he "wanted 
to scare someone."  Bartelt told the officers that he had been 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
8 
 
reading when he saw M.R., and in the "spur of the moment," he 
decided to "run at her and knock her down and scare her." 
Bartelt admitted there was no real explanation or motive for the 
attack; he was "just numb" and scared because "life scares me."  
Bartelt targeted M.R. because "[t]here was no one else there." 
Following this admission, Clausing asked Bartelt if he would be 
willing to provide a written statement of confession.  Walsh 
explained that the written statement would be Bartelt's chance 
to apologize.  When Bartelt asked what would happen after he 
gave his statement, Clausing responded, "I can't say what 
happens then.  We'll probably have more questions for you, quite 
honestly."  Clausing later testified that, once Bartelt had 
confessed, he "was going to be under arrest, and he probably 
wasn't free to get up and leave."  
¶16 It was at this point that Bartelt asked, "Should I or 
can I speak to a lawyer or anything?"  Clausing told him, "Sure, 
yes.  That is your option."  Bartelt responded, "I think I'd 
prefer that."  At 5:45 p.m., roughly 33 minutes after Bartelt 
arrived at the station for questioning, Clausing and Walsh 
suspended the interview, took Bartelt's cell phone, and left the 
room.  When the detectives returned seven or eight minutes 
later, Clausing told Bartelt he was under arrest, handcuffed 
him, and searched him.  Bartelt was then transported to the 
Washington County Jail.   
¶17 Clausing testified that, during the course of the 
interview, both he and Walsh spoke in a conversational tone, 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
9 
 
which did not change even after Bartelt's admission.  Neither 
detective ever made reference to or unholstered their weapons.  
Bartelt never asked to use the restroom or take a break.  At one 
point during the interview Clausing gave Bartelt permission to 
answer his cell phone, which Bartelt declined to do.   
¶18 The following day, on July 17, 2013, Bartelt was 
brought to the interview room at the Washington County Sheriff's 
Department to be questioned by Thickens and Detective James Wolf 
regarding his relationship with Blodgett.  Before commencing 
with questioning, Thickens read Bartelt his Miranda rights, 
which Bartelt knowingly and voluntarily waived. 
¶19 Bartelt was questioned for approximately 90 minutes 
about his relationship with Blodgett and his whereabouts on the 
day of Blodgett's death.  Bartelt denied being at the Blodgett 
residence on July 15, 2013, or having any knowledge of 
Blodgett's death.  Bartelt stated that on the morning of July 15 
he had left his house at 6:30 a.m. and drove "all over" before 
spending a few hours at Woodlawn Union Park.  Bartelt then asked 
for an attorney, at which point the questioning stopped.   
¶20 Thickens later drove to Woodlawn Union Park to 
investigate, and in doing so he collected garbage from the 
park's receptacles.  In one container he found a Frosted Mini-
Wheats cereal box containing paper toweling, numerous types of 
rope and tape, and antiseptic wipes with red stains.  One of the 
ropes later revealed DNA that belonged to both Bartelt and 
Blodgett, and which matched the ligature marks on Blodgett's 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
10 
 
neck.  Another rope matched the ligature marks on her wrists and 
ankles.  Based on this evidence and the confession Bartelt made 
during his first interview, Bartelt was charged with attempted 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
first-degree 
reckless 
endangerment, and attempted false imprisonment for the attack on 
M.R., as well as first-degree intentional homicide for the 
murder of Blodgett.   
¶21 Bartelt moved to suppress his statements, and any 
evidence derived from them, on the grounds that the officers had 
violated his Miranda rights when they questioned him.  The 
circuit court denied Bartelt's motion, concluding that at the 
time of his July 16, 2013, interview, Bartelt had voluntarily 
agreed to speak with police.  The circuit court concluded that 
Bartelt was not in custody until after he had requested an 
attorney, roughly ten minutes after his confession.  Therefore, 
no Miranda warnings were necessary with respect to the July 16 
interview, and police were free to initiate questioning on July 
17 because "an assertion of Miranda . . . which a person makes 
while they are not in custody, does not prospectively prohibit 
law enforcement from attempting to interview an individual 
later."  Further, with respect to the July 17 interview, the 
circuit court found that Bartelt was properly given his Miranda 
warning, which he voluntarily waived. 
¶22 Following the denial of Bartelt's suppression motion, 
the circuit court ordered that the Blodgett homicide charge be 
separated from the charges related to M.R.  After a seven-day 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
11 
 
jury trial, Bartelt was found guilty of Blodgett's murder.  
Consequently, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release to extended supervision.  Shortly 
thereafter, the parties reached a plea agreement regarding the 
attempted murder, reckless endangerment, and false imprisonment 
charges.  In exchange for Bartelt's guilty plea to first-degree 
reckless endangerment, the State agreed to dismiss and read-in 
the remaining counts, and Bartelt was sentenced to five years' 
imprisonment and five years' extended supervision consecutive to 
his life sentence. 
¶23 Bartelt appealed his murder conviction on the grounds 
that the circuit court improperly denied his suppression motion.  
Specifically, Bartelt argued that once he confessed to attacking 
M.R., a reasonable person in his circumstances would have 
believed he was not free to leave the station, thereby 
transforming the non-custodial interview into a 
custodial 
interrogation.  Bartelt therefore argued that all statements 
made after his admissions about M.R. were inadmissible under the 
principles of Miranda and Edwards.  As a consequence, Bartelt 
alleges that detectives violated his Fifth Amendment rights when 
they approached him to question him about Blodgett's murder 
without counsel being present.  Under the exclusionary rule,3 
                                                 
3 The exclusionary rule was first adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914), which held that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible.  This holding was expanded to 
include state court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961).  However, Wisconsin courts have aligned themselves with 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
12 
 
Bartelt alleged that all derivative evidence discovered as a 
result of his statements should have been suppressed.4   
¶24 The court of appeals rejected Bartelt's arguments and 
affirmed the circuit court's judgment.  Bartelt sought review, 
which we granted.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm 
the court of appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶25 A determination of when custody begins presents a 
question of constitutional fact that we review under a two-part 
standard.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 
647 N.W.2d 142.  The circuit court's findings of historical fact 
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613.  
Whether those findings support a determination of custody for 
purposes of Miranda is a question of law that we independently 
review.  Id. 
B.  Miranda and Custody 
¶26 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that "[no person] shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the federal rule since long before the Mapp holding.  See Hoyer 
v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 417, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). 
4 See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶2, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899 ("Where physical evidence is obtained as the direct 
result of an intentional Miranda violation, we conclude that our 
constitution requires that the evidence must be suppressed."). 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
13 
 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."  We 
have interpreted Article I, Section 8(1)5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution consistent with the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 
60, ¶18 n.3, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236. 
¶27 In 1966, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment requires law enforcement to inform suspects of their 
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during 
custodial interrogations.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 
(1966).6 
 
These 
warnings 
are 
required 
because 
"[t]he 
circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate 
very quickly to overbear the will of [the suspect]."  Id. at 
469; see also State v. Quigley, 2016 WI App 53, ¶31, 370 
Wis. 2d 702, 883 N.W.2d 139 ("[W]hen a suspect is in police 
custody, there is a heightened risk of obtaining statements that 
'are not the product of the suspect's free choice.'" (internal 
citation omitted)).   
                                                 
5 Article I, Section 8(1) reads:  "[n]o person may be held 
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of 
law . . . ." 
6 "[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning 
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right 
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 
if he so desires."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  If the accused 
indicates that he or she wishes to remain silent, questioning 
must stop.  If he or she requests counsel, questioning must stop 
until an attorney is present.  Id. at 474.   
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
14 
 
¶28 In Edwards, the Supreme Court added a second layer of 
protection to the Miranda right to counsel by fashioning a 
bright-line rule requiring law enforcement to immediately cease 
questioning once a suspect has asserted his or her right to 
counsel during a custodial interrogation.  Further, 
[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his 
right 
to 
have 
counsel 
present 
during 
custodial 
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to 
further police-initiated custodial interrogation even 
if he has been advised of his rights.  
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).  Stated otherwise, 
once a suspect has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, 
the Miranda-Edwards rule prohibits police from engaging in 
subsequent, uncounseled interrogations regarding the same or 
separate investigations.  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 
677-78 (1988).7   
¶29 Over the years, particular emphasis has been placed on 
when a suspect may effectively invoke his or her Fifth Amendment 
rights.  Miranda stated that "[a]n individual need not make a 
pre-interrogation request for a lawyer.  While such request 
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask 
for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver."  Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 470.  The Supreme Court later clarified this statement, 
noting that the Court has "never held that a person can invoke 
                                                 
7 However, if it is the accused who initiates further 
communication with the police, courts typically will conclude 
that a valid waiver has been made.  State v. Kramar, 149 
Wis. 2d 767, 785-86, 440 N.W.2d 317 (1989). 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
15 
 
his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 
'custodial interrogation' . . . ."  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 
U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).  The Court continued: 
If the Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a 
preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no 
logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter 
prior 
to 
arrest, 
or 
indeed 
even 
prior 
to 
identification as a suspect.  Most rights must be 
asserted when the government seeks to take the action 
they protect against.  The fact that we have allowed 
the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be 
effective 
with 
respect 
to 
future 
custodial 
interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will 
allow it to be asserted initially outside the context 
of 
custodial 
interrogation, 
with 
similar 
future 
effect. 
Id. 
¶30 These Supreme Court decisions explain that the right 
to counsel may not be invoked until a suspect is "in custody."  
Wisconsin courts interpret Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Fifth Amendment.  "Miranda and its progeny are aimed at 
dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.  
Thus, 
the 
Miranda 
safeguards 
apply 
only 
to 
custodial 
interrogations" under both constitutions.  State v. Pheil, 152 
Wis. 2d 523, 530-31, 449 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1989) (citation 
omitted).8  "[U]nless a defendant is in custody, he or she may 
not invoke the right to counsel under Miranda."  State v. 
                                                 
8 This exact language has been cited in numerous subsequent 
decisions.  See, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, ¶9, 294 
Wis. 2d 780, 720 N.W.2d 459 (quoting State v. Hassel, 2005 WI 
App 80, ¶9, 280 Wis. 2d 637, 696 N.W.2d 270). 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
16 
 
Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, ¶9, 294 Wis. 2d 780, 720 N.W.2d 459.  
We therefore turn our attention to what "in custody" means such 
that an invocation of the right to counsel becomes immediately 
effective. 
¶31 In Miranda, the Supreme Court defined custodial 
interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  The test to determine whether a 
person is in custody under Miranda is an objective test.  State 
v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶27, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552.  
The inquiry is "whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of a degree associated with a formal 
arrest."  Id. (quoting State v. Leprich, 160 Wis. 2d 472, 477, 
465 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also California v. Beheler, 
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).  Looking at the totality 
of the circumstances, courts will consider whether "a reasonable 
person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave 
the scene."  State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶33, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 
816 N.W.2d 270 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 
(1995)). 
¶32 We consider a variety of factors to determine whether 
under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person 
would feel at liberty to terminate an interview and leave.  Such 
factors include:  the degree of restraint; the purpose, place, 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
17 
 
and length of the interrogation; and what has been communicated 
by police officers.  State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶¶30, 31, 
362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26.  "When considering the degree of 
restraint, we consider:  whether the suspect is handcuffed, 
whether a weapon is drawn, whether a frisk is performed, the 
manner in which the suspect is restrained, whether the suspect 
is moved to another location, whether questioning took place in 
a police vehicle, and the number of officers involved."  State 
v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23. 
¶33 If we determine that a suspect's freedom of movement 
is curtailed such that a reasonable person would not feel free 
to 
leave, 
we 
must 
then 
consider 
whether 
"the 
relevant 
environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as 
the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda."  
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).  In other words, we 
must consider whether the specific circumstances presented a 
serious danger of coercion, because the "freedom-of-movement 
test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition 
for Miranda custody."  Id. (citation omitted).  Importantly, a 
noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda 
applies simply because the environment in which the questioning 
took place was coercive.  Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.  "Any 
interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will 
have coercive aspects to it . . . [b]ut police officers are not 
required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they 
question."  Id.  Therefore, "Miranda warnings are not required 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
18 
 
'simply because the questioning takes place in the station 
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police 
suspect.'"  Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (citing Mathiason, 429 
U.S. at 495).9  And finally, "the initial determination of 
custody 
depends 
on 
the 
objective 
circumstances 
of 
the 
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either 
the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."  
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).   
C.  Bartelt and Custody 
¶34 We now turn to whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances of this case, Bartelt was in custody at any time 
prior to Clausing taking his cell phone and telling him to 
remain in the interrogation room.  Although the parties agree 
that the interview was not initially custodial, Bartelt argues 
that his confession to the attack on M.R. transformed his 
custody status into one in which a reasonable person would not 
have felt free to leave.  As a result, all further questioning 
should have ceased once Bartelt invoked his right to counsel.10  
                                                 
9 The oft-used example of a situation in which one is 
physically detained but not in custody is that of a Terry stop 
or roadside traffic stop.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).  In Berkemer, the 
Supreme 
Court 
analogized 
traffic 
stops 
to 
Terry 
stops, 
concluding that the "noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic 
stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained 
pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of 
Miranda."  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. 
10 This argument assumes, although we do not decide, that 
Bartelt's request for counsel was unequivocal. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
19 
 
Accordingly, Bartelt alleges his constitutional rights were 
violated when detectives from the City of Hartford approached 
him the following day about the murder of Blodgett without 
counsel present.  Bartelt therefore argues that, under the 
exclusionary rule, all statements made during the July 17 
interview 
and 
the 
evidence 
that 
was 
derived 
from 
those 
statements must be suppressed.   
¶35 First, 
we 
consider 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
Clausing and Walsh's interrogation of Bartelt.  Second, given 
those circumstances, we consider whether a reasonable person in 
Bartelt's position would have felt that he or she was at liberty 
to terminate the interview and leave.  "Once the scene is set 
and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, [we] must 
apply an objective test to resolve 'the ultimate inquiry': 
'[was] there a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest[?]'"  
Keohane, 516 U.S. at 112 (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125) 
(quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495); see also Lonkoski, 346 
Wis. 2d 523, ¶27. 
¶36 As to Bartelt's custody status, the parties agree that 
Bartelt was not in custody at the beginning of the interview and 
up until the point that he confessed to attacking M.R.  Bartelt 
came to the Slinger Police Department voluntarily.  He was 
dropped off by two friends who waited for him in the parking 
lot, indicating that a reasonable person in Bartelt's position 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
20 
 
would have believed he or she would be free to leave at the end 
of the interview.   
¶37 Once inside the building, Bartelt was taken through a 
secured door, locked from the outside only, to the internal 
portion of the police department.  He was then led to an 
interview room that had two doors, neither of which could be 
locked, and one of which was left ajar during the interview 
itself.  See Lonkoski, 346 Wis. 2d 523, ¶¶30-32 (holding that 
where defendant voluntarily came to police department, interview 
room was locked for entry purposes only, and door was repeatedly 
opened, defendant was not in custody).  The detectives did not 
search Bartelt, and he was not restrained in any way.  All of 
these circumstances imply he was not in custody.  Id., ¶32 
(holding that lack of handcuffs and failure to search indicates 
lack of custody). 
¶38 At the outset of the interview, Clausing told Bartelt 
that he was "not in trouble" and that he was "not under arrest."  
See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (considering that defendant came 
to police department voluntarily and was immediately informed 
that he was not under arrest were indicative of lack of 
custody).  Bartelt showed that he understood that when he nodded 
and responded, "that's good."  Clausing further advised Bartelt 
that he could "get up and walk out of here any time [he] 
want[ed]."  See Quigley, 370 Wis. 2d 702, ¶¶40-41 (holding that 
a police officer's advisements that an interviewee was not under 
arrest and was free to leave are "of substantial importance," 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
21 
 
and further concluding that a suspect's acknowledgement and lack 
of objection are "highly significant").  Additionally, Clausing 
testified that neither he nor Detective Walsh ever raised their 
voice or made a show of authority, such as referencing or 
removing their weapons.11  Lonkoski, 346 Wis. 2d 523, ¶32.  When 
Bartelt's phone rang, he was given the opportunity to answer it.  
See United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 722 (8th Cir. 2004) 
("While the mere possession of a cellular phone without more 
will not transform a custodial interrogation into a noncustodial 
one, it is relevant to the question of whether the interview was 
coercive 
and 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
same 
circumstances would feel restrained.").  And finally, the 
interview lasted only thirty-five minutes.  Lonkoski, 346 
Wis. 2d 523, ¶31 (holding that a "relatively short" interview of 
approximately thirty minutes indicated lack of custody).  We 
agree that these factors support the conclusion that, prior to 
his confession, there was no restraint on Bartelt's freedom to 
the degree associated with an arrest. 
¶39 Nonetheless, Bartelt argues that, as the interview 
progressed, he was increasingly treated as though he were the 
target of a serious felony investigation.  At the outset of the 
interview, Clausing told Bartelt that he was investigating an 
                                                 
11 At one point, having caught Bartelt in a lie about his 
employment and the nature of the cut on his hand, Clausing moved 
his chair closer to Bartelt, from approximately four or five 
feet away to within two feet. The ambiance of the interview 
remained otherwise unchanged.  
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
22 
 
"incident" that had occurred in Richfield Historical Park on the 
previous Friday.  He did not specify the nature of the incident, 
nor did he accuse Bartelt of being involved.  However, after 
Bartelt's initial denials and hesitations, the detectives began 
to insinuate that not only had Bartelt been at the park, but 
that they suspected——and indeed had evidence——that Bartelt was 
involved in an attack in the park.  The detectives said they 
knew what happened and just wanted to understand why.  Clausing 
testified that he and Walsh were attempting to minimize 
Bartelt's moral liability by offering justifications for his 
behavior.  Bartelt argues that the inherently coercive nature of 
the interview, coupled with the fact that the detectives 
essentially told Bartelt they believed he was guilty, created an 
environment such that from the moment Bartelt confessed, no 
reasonable person would have felt free to leave.   
¶40 The court of appeals acknowledged that the detectives 
"applied some psychological pressures on Bartelt to persuade him 
to confess . . . ."  State v. Bartelt, 2017 WI App 23, ¶35, 375 
Wis. 2d 148, 895 N.W.2d 86.  We agree that this factor tends to 
favor custody.  However, when combined with all of the other 
circumstances 
present 
here,12 
neither 
the 
use 
of 
certain 
interrogation techniques nor that the interview took place at a 
police station is enough to conclude that Bartelt could not have 
terminated the interview and left, even after his confession. 
                                                 
12 See supra ¶¶35-36. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
23 
 
¶41 In support of this conclusion, the court of appeals 
cited to an Eighth Circuit decision, United States v. LeBrun, 
which itself relied heavily on both Mathiason and Beheler.  In 
LeBrun, the suspect in a felony murder voluntarily agreed to 
accompany police to a nearby patrol office.  As they arrived, 
LeBrun was told that he was not under arrest, that he was free 
to terminate the interview at any time, and that he was free to 
leave at any time.  LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 718.  LeBrun was led to 
a windowless interview room, where the police used psychological 
ploys to facilitate a confession.  For example, the agents told 
LeBrun that he was the prime suspect, and that they had 
significant evidence against him.  However, at no point did the 
officers shout or use physical force, and LeBrun was not 
restrained in any way.   
¶42 After thirty-three minutes of questioning, LeBrun 
confessed to the crime.  Id.  In concluding that LeBrun was not 
in custody before, during, or after his confession, the Eighth 
Circuit reiterated that "[n]ot every confession obtained absent 
the Miranda warnings is inadmissible."  Id. at 720 (citing 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).  The critical inquiry, the court 
concluded, "is not whether the interview took place in a 
coercive or police dominated environment, but rather whether the 
defendant's 'freedom to depart was restricted in any way.'"  Id. 
(citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).13  "In answering this 
                                                 
13 In Mathiason, a police officer contacted Mathiason after 
he had been identified as a potential suspect by a burglary 
victim.  The officer asked Mathiason where it would be 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
24 
 
question, we look at the totality of the circumstances while 
keeping in mind that the determination is based 'on the 
objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the 
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers 
or the person being questioned.'"  Id. (citing Stansbury, 511 
U.S. at 322-23).  The Eighth Circuit concluded that "the 
purportedly coercive aspects of [the] interview are largely 
irrelevant to the custody determination and that the district 
court 
erred 
in 
giving 
such 
great 
weight 
to 
certain 
facts . . . ."  Id. at 720-21. 
¶43 This issue was similarly discussed in Beheler, where 
the defendant, having been told he was not under arrest, 
                                                                                                                                                             
convenient to meet, and they agreed to meet at the state patrol 
office.  Once Mathiason arrived, the officer led Mathiason to an 
office, where he was told that he was not under arrest.  During 
the course of the interview, the officer told Mathiason that he 
was a suspect and falsely indicated that police had discovered 
his fingerprints at the scene of the crime.  The Supreme Court 
of Oregon overturned Mathiason's conviction, holding that the 
interrogation took place in a coercive environment such that 
Mathiason was in custody.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed: 
[T]here is no indication that the questioning took 
place in a context where respondent's freedom to 
depart was restricted in any way.  He came voluntarily 
to the police station, where he was immediately 
informed that he was not under arrest.  At the close 
of a ½-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the 
police station without hindrance.  It is clear from 
these facts that Mathiason was not in custody "or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
25 
 
accompanied police to the station for questioning.  Beheler was 
not provided a Miranda warning, and he ultimately confessed 
during the course of the thirty-minute interview.  The Supreme 
Court concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, 
Beheler was neither taken into custody nor significantly 
deprived of his freedom of action.  In so holding, the Court 
reiterated that a noncustodial situation is not converted to a 
custodial situation simply because the questioning took place in 
a coercive environment.  Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124 (citing 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).   
¶44 As the court in LeBrun aptly noted, "Mathiason and 
Beheler teach us that some degree of coercion is part and parcel 
of the interrogation process and that the coercive aspects of a 
police 
interview 
are 
largely 
irrelevant 
to 
the 
custody 
determination except where a reasonable person would perceive 
the coercion as restricting his or her freedom to depart." 
LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 721.  Furthermore, presenting a suspect with 
incriminating suggestions does not automatically convert an 
interview into a custodial interrogation.  United States v. 
Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008). 
¶45 Given the totality of the circumstances presented 
herein, we conclude that Bartelt was not in custody at the time 
of his confession.   
¶46 We now turn to Bartelt's argument that from the moment 
of his confession no reasonable person in his position would 
have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.  In 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
26 
 
answering this inquiry, the court of appeals focused on whether, 
given the totality of the circumstances, the environment of the 
interview after Bartelt's confession "present[ed] the same 
inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house 
questioning at issue in Miranda."  Howes, 565 U.S. at 509.  The 
court of appeals concluded: 
[A] defendant making an incriminating statement does 
not necessarily transform a noncustodial setting to a 
custodial one.  Indeed, "no Supreme Court case 
supports [the] contention that admission to a crime 
transforms an interview by the police into a custodial 
interrogation." 
Bartelt, 375 Wis. 2d 148, ¶40 (citing Locke v. Cattell, 476 F.3d 
46, 53 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
¶47 As an issue of first impression in Wisconsin courts, 
the court of appeals relied on several out-of-state and federal 
court decisions, including LeBrun, supra.  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that while a confession is undoubtedly one of the 
circumstances 
we 
must 
consider, 
Miranda 
is 
specifically 
"concerned 'with a type of interrogation environment created by 
the police' and it is this 'atmosphere 
created by the 
authorities 
for 
questioning' 
that 
necessitates 
Miranda 
warnings."  Bartelt, 375 Wis. 2d 148, ¶46 (citing State v. 
Clappes, 117 Wis. 2d 277, 283, 344 N.W.2d 141 (1984)).  As the 
court of appeals noted, Miranda itself stated that Miranda 
warnings are required "when an individual is taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any 
significant way and is subjected to questioning."  Bartelt, 375 
Wis. 2d, ¶47 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478).  Therefore, the 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
27 
 
court of appeals focused on whether the atmosphere of Bartelt's 
interview changed after his confession such that a reasonable 
person would not feel free to leave.  Considering the totality 
of the circumstances, Bartelt's confession was not immediately 
associated with a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 
associated with an arrest. 
¶48 First, we note that both before and after Bartelt's 
confession, Clausing and Walsh spoke in a conversational tone.  
United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding, in part, that tone of interview, unchanged even 
after confession to a serious crime, indicates lack of custody).  
Although Clausing moved his chair closer to Bartelt after 
catching Bartelt in a series of lies, the discussion otherwise 
was not aggressive or confrontational.  Thomas v. State, 55 A.3d 
680, 696 (Md. 2012) (holding that a confession does not per se 
render a suspect in custody, especially where the atmosphere of 
the room never changed); Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 
396 (Mass. 2005) ("[A]n interview does not automatically become 
custodial at the instant a defendant starts to confess.").  
Rather, following Bartelt's admission, the detectives simply 
continued to ask for details about the attack, which Bartelt 
continued to supply.  United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 
473 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that it is the presence or absence 
of compelling pressures that renders an interview custodial); 
State v. Lapointe, 678 A.2d 942, 958 (Conn. 1966) ("While we 
agree that admissions of culpability may lead the police either 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
28 
 
to arrest a suspect or to place restraints on his freedom 
approximating an arrest, the police in this case never altered 
the circumstances of their interviews of the defendant in such a 
way that his initial noncustodial status became custodial."). 
¶49 Second, that Bartelt was arrested at the end of his 
interview does not necessarily mean that he was in custody at 
any point prior to his arrest.  Thomas, 55 A.3d at 692 (noting 
that when a suspect is arrested at the end of an interview that 
does not demonstrate that he was in custody prior to the 
arrest); Chee, 514 F.3d at 1114 (concluding that until a suspect 
who has confessed to a crime is arrested, he is merely subject 
to arrest).  Stated otherwise, although Clausing and Walsh 
clearly suspected Bartelt and had enough evidence to arrest him 
when he confessed, that in itself did not restrain Bartelt's 
freedom of movement.  Indeed, the defendants in Chee, Beheler, 
and Mathiason were permitted to go home following their 
incriminating statements.  See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 ("Even 
a clear statement from an officer that the person under 
interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive 
of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go 
until the police decide to make an arrest."). 
¶50 On review, Bartelt argues that the court of appeals 
ignored the "many more cases" from other jurisdictions that have 
gone the other way.  Specifically, Bartelt points to several 
cases indicating that, after confession to a serious crime, a 
person should generally be considered to be in custody for 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
29 
 
Miranda purposes, regardless of whether the confession altered 
the atmosphere of the interrogation.  See State v. Pitts, 936 
So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Jackson v. State, 528 
S.E.2d 232 (Ga. 2000); People v. Ripic, 587 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992); People v. Carroll, 742 N.E.2d 1247 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. 1997);  
Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1996); Ackerman v. State, 774 
N.E.2d 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
¶51 Bartelt contends that the court of appeals erred in 
relegating its discussion of these cases to a footnote, in which 
it asserted that at least two of the cases are not persuasive 
because they treat a defendant's confession as dispositive.  We 
disagree with Bartelt because the aforementioned cases are 
readily distinguishable.  Furthermore, it is law enforcement's 
conduct that determines whether a suspect has been taken into 
custody.  As we have explained above, whether a suspect is in 
custody is a fact-specific inquiry where the totality of the 
circumstances must be evaluated in full.  The totality of the 
circumstances herein differ from those in the cases Bartelt 
cites. 
¶52 Although the specific question we address today——
whether confession to a serious crime transforms a noncustodial 
interview into a custodial interrogation in these circumstances—
—is an issue of first impression in Wisconsin, Bartelt contends 
that our decision in State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 418 N.W.2d 
804 (1988), supports the conclusion that no reasonable person 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
30 
 
would have felt free to leave following his confession to a 
serious, violent crime.  In Koput, we considered whether a 
defendant, who had arrived for questioning at 9:30 a.m., was in 
custody by the time he gave an inculpatory statement at 4:15 
p.m.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, we concluded 
that Koput was not in custody "until after his confession, 
sometime after 4:15 PM."  Id. at 380.14  As the court of appeals 
correctly noted, Koput does not stand for the proposition that 
it was the confession itself which transformed Koput's custody 
status.  Rather, it was the combination of circumstances after 
the confession that amounted to custody.   
¶53 We therefore conclude that although an admission of 
guilt to a serious crime is a factor to consider in a custody 
analysis, Bartelt's admission to attacking M.R. was not enough 
to transform his status to that of "in custody" given the 
totality of the circumstances.  Because Bartelt was not in 
custody when he asked about counsel, his Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel did not attach. 
                                                 
14 Koput goes on to state, "It was only then that a 
reasonable person viewing the situation objectively would 
conclude that he was not free to leave but was in custody."  
State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 380, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988).  
Bartelt argues that in omitting this language from its opinion, 
the court of appeals omitted Koput's indication that the 
defendant's custody status changed after (and because) of his 
confession.  We disagree.  Even with this language, Koput does 
not stand for the proposition that the confession, in and of 
itself, transformed his custody status. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR 
 
 
31 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 There were two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
considered whether Bartelt was in custody for the purposes of 
Miranda once he confessed to attacking M.R.  We concluded that, 
in light of the totality of the circumstances, Bartelt's 
confession did not transform his status to that of "in custody."  
Rather, Bartelt was not in custody until Detectives Clausing and 
Walsh took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his 
confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room.  
Second, because we determine that Bartelt was not in custody 
until this point, which was after his alleged request for 
counsel, we need not and do not reach the issue of whether his 
alleged request for counsel was unequivocal. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  "I committed a 
serious, violent felony."  If suspects uttered these words, 
would law enforcement let them walk out of the station?  Would a 
reasonable person feel free to simply get up and leave?  
Engaging in a work of fantasy, the majority says yes.  Mired to 
the grips of reality, I say no. 
¶56 Legal decisions regarding what the "reasonable person" 
would do in a given situation do not always reflect the real 
world.  In reality, any reasonable person would not feel free to 
leave a police interrogation room after confessing to a serious, 
violent felony.  Yet, the majority again finds "a perceived 
freedom to depart in circumstances when only the most thick-
skinned of suspects would think such a choice was open to them."  
See Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey:  
Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 729, 
739-40.1 
¶57 To further the fantasy, the majority omits relevant 
facts from its analysis that would lead to the conclusion that 
Bartelt was in custody after confessing to the attack on M.R.  
As a result it does not reach a critical issue in this case——
whether the defendant clearly and unequivocally invoked his 
right to counsel.  Unlike the majority, I would reach that 
issue. 
                                                 
1 See also Michelle R. Ghetti, Seizure Through the Looking 
Glass:  Constitutional Analysis in Alice's Wonderland, 22 S.U. 
L. Rev. 231, 253 (1995); Thomas v. State, 55 A.3d 680, 702-03 
(Md. 2012) (Bell, C.J., dissenting). 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶58 I conclude that a reasonable person in Bartelt's 
position would not have felt free to leave the station house 
interrogation room, and that Bartelt clearly and unequivocally 
invoked his right to counsel.  When considering the totality of 
the circumstances (namely all of the facts of record), I 
determine that Bartelt's Fifth Amendment rights were violated.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶59 The majority engages in fantasy by determining that a 
reasonable 
person 
would 
feel 
free 
to 
leave 
the 
police 
interrogation room under the circumstances presented here.  
Academic studies, the facts of this case, and common sense 
support a conclusion contrary to that of the majority. 
A 
¶60 A suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes if, under 
the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not 
feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.  State 
v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552 
(citing State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶33, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 
N.W.2d 270). 
¶61 Studies demonstrate that the "free to leave" standard 
that courts apply does not generally reflect what reasonable 
people actually think and how they act when interacting with law 
enforcement.  Cty. of Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, ¶71, 356 
Wis. 2d 343, 
850 
N.W.2d 253 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
(citing David K. Kessler, Free To Leave:  An Empirical Look at 
the Fourth Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. Crim. L. & 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Criminology 
51 
(2009); 
Edwin 
J. 
Butterfoss, 
Bright 
Line 
Seizures:  The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth 
Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 437, 
439-42 (1988); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout:  Bus Sweeps and 
the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153 (2002)).2 
¶62 Indeed, one study concluded that the average person 
does not feel free to leave even a simple interaction with law 
enforcement on a bus or sidewalk.  See Kessler, supra, at 74-75.  
This result held true even among people who knew they had the 
right to leave such an encounter.  Id. at 78. 
¶63 Our jurisprudence should reflect reality.  It should 
be based on true inclinations and thought processes rather than 
pushing the mythical "reasonable person" even further from the 
bounds of the real world.  The majority in this case 
accomplishes the latter. 
B 
¶64 Although the majority correctly invokes analysis of 
the totality of the circumstances, it errs by ignoring relevant 
facts that, in the aggregate, support a determination that 
Bartelt was in custody immediately after confessing to the 
attack on M.R.   
                                                 
2 Although these studies address the "free to leave" 
standard with regard to a Fourth Amendment seizure, they are 
equally applicable to the same standard in relation to the Fifth 
Amendment.  In both situations, a court must determine whether a 
reasonable person would feel free to leave.  It defies logic to 
argue that a person being questioned in a police station under 
threat of custody would feel more free to leave than a person 
stopped pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶65 First, the majority correctly sets the scene by 
observing that "Bartelt chose the seat on the far side of the 
table, while Clausing sat at the end, and Walsh sat opposite 
Bartelt."  Majority op., ¶8.  The majority fails to mention, 
however, that in order to leave the room (unless he went under 
the table), Bartelt would have had to walk around either 
detective.  Thus, from the outset of the interview, he would 
have had to squeeze by a detective in his path if he tried to 
leave the room. 
¶66 Second, the majority observes that at one point during 
the interrogation, Detective Clausing "moved his chair closer to 
Bartelt, from approximately four or five feet away to within two 
feet."  Id., ¶38 n.11.  Yet, according to the majority, "[t]he 
ambiance of the interview remained otherwise unchanged."  Id.3  I 
disagree.  Under the totality of the circumstances, cutting the 
distance by half and bringing the detective within arms reach of 
the suspect changed the atmosphere of the room considerably. 
                                                 
3 The majority focuses its analysis on law enforcement's 
conduct, not the suspect's.  See majority op., ¶48 (observing 
that "both before and after Bartelt's confession, Clausing and 
Walsh spoke in a conversational tone"); see also id. ("Although 
Clausing moved his chair closer to Bartelt after catching 
Bartelt in a series of lies, the discussion otherwise was not 
aggressive or confrontational"). 
To the extent that this line of analysis evinces a 
departure from the totality of the circumstances test in favor 
of a narrow focus on law enforcement conduct, this suggestion 
can be quickly dispatched.  In the next sentence after stating 
that "it is law enforcement's conduct that determines whether a 
suspect has been taken into custody," the majority reaffirms 
that a custody determination is made with reference to the 
totality of the circumstances.  See id., ¶51. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶67 Detective Clausing's movement in effect shrunk the 
size 
of 
the 
room 
and 
further 
blocked 
Bartelt's 
exit.4  
Subsequently, in order to leave the room, Bartelt would have had 
not only to walk past either detective, but also if he chose to 
leave in Detective Clausing's direction, carefully maneuver 
around Detective Clausing, who now sat a mere two feet away from 
him. 
¶68 Finally, the majority also fails to note an important 
shift in the tone of the conversation:  Detective Clausing's 
language becomes coarser.5  In fact, Detective Clausing does not 
utter a curse word over the course of the entire interview until 
after he pulls his chair closer to Bartelt.  The change in 
language coupled with the close proximity of the detective to 
                                                 
4 A suspect's purported belief at the beginning of the 
interview that he would be free to leave at the end of the 
interview is irrelevant.  See majority op., ¶36.  During the 
course of the interview, circumstances can change.  Indeed they 
did here. 
5 Detective Clausing lectured Bartelt: 
There is [sic] two different types of people that are 
in your chair at this time.  Okay?  There is a person 
that says, no, f--- this.  F--- you.  Prove it.  And, 
okay, we will.  But there is a person, you know, I f--
-ed up, I made a mistake, I screwed up, but here is 
the reason why.  Okay?  Maybe I have a problem with A, 
maybe I have a problem with B.  I was out of 
character.  I'm making bad decisions, and I regret it, 
and I will do everything in my power to reverse what I 
did and make things right. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
the suspect enhances coercive pressure.6  In other words, it puts 
more pressure on the suspect and weighs in favor of a custody 
determination, even if the officer's comments otherwise remain 
conversational. 
¶69 To summarize:  two detectives, one of them two feet 
away and now swearing at him, block Bartelt's exit path.  Yet 
under the majority's analysis, Bartelt should have felt free to 
stand up in the interrogation room, squeeze by a hovering 
detective, and walk out of the police station. 
¶70 Add to this atmosphere the fact that the suspect 
confessed to a serious, violent felony——the assault of M.R.  
Essentially, the majority determines that a suspect in Bartelt's 
situation could state to the police, "I committed a serious, 
violent felony.  I'm leaving, see you later," and then march 
past detectives on the way out of the interrogation room and the 
police station.  This stretches the bounds of credulity. 
¶71 Additionally, Detective Clausing testified that he 
subjectively believed that after Bartelt confessed, Bartelt 
would not have been free to leave.7  Is Detective Clausing not a 
reasonable person? 
                                                 
6 Although neither the detective's word choice nor his 
positioning is by itself determinative of custody, each provides 
further weight in favor of a custody determination when 
analyzing the totality of the circumstances. 
7 During 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
Detective 
Clausing 
testified as follows: 
COUNSEL FOR BARTELT:  Okay.  And when, from your 
perspective, did [Bartelt being able to walk out of 
the room] change during the course of this interview? 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶72 I acknowledge that Detective Clausing's subjective 
view of when Bartelt was in custody is not dispositive.  See 
Lonkoski, 346 Wis. 2d 523, ¶35.  However, his view certainly 
provides a window into the perspective of one reasonable person 
with a front seat view of the situation.  It further 
demonstrates law enforcement's expected response if Bartelt had 
simply walked out as the majority contends he could have done. 
¶73 If even the interrogating detective testified that a 
suspect was not free to leave, would a reasonable suspect in 
such a position really think he could just get up and walk out?  
Only in a fantasy world would a suspect act in this manner.  
Common sense tells us that a real world suspect would do no such 
thing. 
¶74 In 
sum, 
I 
determine 
that 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances clearly indicates that Bartelt was not free to 
leave.  Rather, he was in custody for Miranda purposes 
immediately after confessing to the attack on M.R. 
II 
¶75 Finally, because the majority concludes that Bartelt 
was not in custody until the detectives took his cell phone and 
                                                                                                                                                             
DET. CLAUSING:  When he admitted to attacking [M.R.]. 
COUNSEL FOR BARTELT:  So at that point in time, he was 
in trouble, he was going to be under arrest, and he 
probably wasn't free to get up and leave, true? 
DET. CLAUSING:  In my mind? 
COUNSEL FOR BARTELT:  Yes. 
DET. CLAUSING:  Yes. 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
instructed him to remain in the interview room, approximately 
ten minutes after his confession, it does not reach the issue of 
whether Bartelt unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.  See 
majority op., ¶¶3, 54.  As explained above, because I determine 
that Bartelt was in custody for Miranda purposes immediately 
after confessing to the attack on M.R., I would reach the issue, 
and determine that Bartelt's invocation of the right to counsel 
was clear and unequivocal. 
¶76 To successfully invoke the right to counsel, a suspect 
must make a clear and unequivocal request.  State v. Edler, 2013 
WI 73, ¶34, 350 Wis. 2d 1, 833 N.W.2d 564.  "Although a suspect 
need not 'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,' he 
must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."  
Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).  
Under 
this 
objective 
test, 
the 
court 
must 
examine 
the 
circumstances surrounding the request.  Edler, 350 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶34. 
¶77 The relevant circumstances here are as follows:  
Bartelt stated, "Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or 
anything?"  Detective Clausing responded, "Sure, yes.  That is 
your option."  Bartelt then told him, "I think I'd prefer that."  
See majority op., ¶16. 
¶78 "That" clearly refers to the option to speak to a 
lawyer.  The circumstances surrounding the statement present a 
question, an answer, and a subsequent follow-up.  Given this 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
exchange, a reasonable officer would have understood that 
Bartelt was accepting the "option" the officer had just 
presented to him. 
¶79 Bartelt's invocation of the right to counsel was 
informal, but that does not make it ineffective.  See Edler, 350 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶36; State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 425 (R.I. 2000) 
("A suspect asserting his or her right to counsel need not speak 
with perfect formality, but may use any manner of colloquial 
speech, so long as his or her statement would be reasonably 
understood as a request for an attorney").  The most reasonable 
interpretation is that Bartelt used the word "think" as 
colloquial filler, not as an indication of ambiguity. 
¶80 Conversely, ambiguous or equivocal statements not 
invoking the protection, are those from which a reasonable 
officer "would have understood only that the suspect might be 
invoking the right to counsel."  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 
¶36, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 
459). 
¶81 In Jennings, the defendant stated, "I think maybe I 
need to talk to a lawyer."  Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶36.  The 
word "maybe" coupled with "think" in Jennings' statement adds 
ambiguity not present here.  Instead, Bartelt's response was 
made in reply to the detective's statement that having counsel 
was his "option."  Bartelt clearly chose that option. 
¶82 An analogy presented in Bartelt's brief further 
illustrates 
that 
Bartelt's 
statement 
was 
an 
unambiguous 
invocation of the right to counsel:  "if a customer went to a 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
restaurant and asked the waiter, 'What kind of light beers do 
you have on tap?,' and the waiter responded, 'Miller Lite and 
Bud Light.'  If the customer then said, "Okay.  I think I'd 
prefer a Miller Lite,' no reasonable person would think this was 
anything other than a clear request for a Miller Lite."  Indeed, 
this analogy clarifies that neither the word "think" nor the 
word "prefer" necessarily demonstrates equivocation. 
¶83 In sum, Bartelt was in custody for Miranda purposes 
immediately after confessing to the attack on M.R., and he 
invoked his right to counsel.  Because a reasonable person in 
Bartelt's position would not have felt free to leave the station 
house interrogation room, and because Bartelt clearly and 
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, I determine that 
Bartelt's Fifth Amendment rights were violated. 
¶84 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶85 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP2506-CR.awb 
 
1