Title: Canova Land & Investment Co. v. Lynn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 200476
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2021

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
CANOVA LAND AND INVESTMENT COMPANY 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 200476 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
APRIL 15, 2021 
CAROLYN G. LYNN, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Angela L. Horan, Judge 
 
In this case, the Court decides whether a deed restriction for the use of a particular church 
was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In 1875, Edna and Levi Lynn executed a deed granting one acre of land to the Woodbine 
Baptist Church (“Woodbine”) “in exchange for five dollars.”   The deed states in relevant part: 
the said Trustees will hold said property for the use and benefit of the Baptist 
Church (commonly called the “New School” ) and that they will allow the proper 
authorities of said Church to use it for the worship of God in accordance with the 
customs and regulations of said Church and the laws of Virginia: The being those 
confirmed by the Circuit Court of Prince William at the May Term thereof for the 
said church known as the "Woodbine" Baptist Church, said property to revert to 
the grantors or their heirs if it ceases to be used for the purposes expressed in the 
deed. 
 
Woodbine, which since its inception had been an unincorporated association, continued 
to use the land until 2006, when its trustees gifted it to the Woodbine Family Worship Center and 
Christian School (“Woodbine Worship Center”), a Virginia corporation.1  The land continued to 
be used for worship by the corporation. 
 
1 Prior to 2002, the Virginia Constitution forbade the General Assembly from “grant[ing] 
a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination.”  That provision was held to 
be unconstitutional in Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632 (W.D. Va. 2002).  The 
Virginia Constitution and the Code of Virginia were subsequently amended to allow churches to 
incorporate. 
 
2 
In 2007, Woodbine Worship Center received a loan of $1,373,000 from Virginia 
Commerce Bank.  The loan was secured by a deed of trust, in which Woodbine Worship Center 
granted all of its “present and future right, title and interest” in a five-acre parcel of land, 
including the one acre conveyed by the 1875 deed.  The bank’s title search of the property 
extended only to the year 1900, so it did not disclose the 1875 deed. 
Woodbine Worship Center defaulted on the loan in 2011.  Canova Land and Investment 
Company (“Canova”), a wholly owned subsidiary of United Bank,2 acquired title to the property 
at a foreclosure sale in September 2012.  Canova has not taken possession of, attempted to sell, 
or used the property due to concerns about implicating the reverter clause in the deed.  Woodbine 
Worship Center continues to use the land for worship. 
Canova brought suit to quiet title to the property in the Circuit Court of Prince William 
County, claiming that the reverter clause in the 1875 deed should be voided as an unreasonable 
restraint on alienation.  It asserted that because the deed by its terms allows use only by the 
“Woodbine Baptist Church,” the restraint is irrationally limited in scope and should be voided as 
contrary to public policy.  It also argued that upholding the deed restriction would hinder its 
efforts to develop the larger five-acre parcel, thus preventing it from being put to its most 
efficient use. 
Appellees Carolyn Lynn and Cheryl Crawford, descendants of Edna and Levi Lynn, 
argued that the restraint in the 1875 deed only affects Canova’s use, rather than its ability to 
alienate, and is therefore valid.  They also argued that it “is the creator of its own alleged 
misfortune” because it failed to search the title prior to 1900.  As to the reasonableness of the 
restriction, they note that Virginia precedent clearly recognizes a charitable exception to the rule 
 
2 Virginia Commerce Bank merged with United Bank in 2014. 
 
3 
against restraints on alienation, citing this Court’s opinion in County School Board of Scott 
County v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 680 (1950).  Appellees Unknown Heirs of Levi and Edna Lynn 
also countered Canova’s claim that the restraint is unreasonably limited in scope.  They argued 
that the restriction allows for use by the broader Baptist denomination and “not merely the 
Woodbine Congregation,” and is therefore sufficiently general. 
The parties went to trial in July 2019.  The circuit court dismissed Canova’s complaint 
with prejudice, but suspended the dismissal after Canova filed a post-trial motion.  After 
reconsidering, the circuit court ultimately dismissed the complaint with prejudice in January 
2020, finding that the reverter clause was a reasonable land use restriction imposed on a 
charitable gift.  The court explained in its letter opinion that the deed granted a fee simple 
determinable subject to a possibility of reverter and not a fee simple absolute.  Therefore, in 
acquiring the restricted property from Woodbine Worship Center, Canova “ha[d] acquired no 
more than its predecessor in title had.”  Relying upon Dowell, the circuit court also reasoned that 
a landowner has the right to grant a defeasible fee when the land is transferred for charitable 
purposes.  On appeal, Canova claims that the 1875 deed imposes an unreasonable restraint on its 
ability to alienate the property.  It assigns error to the lower court’s finding that the restraint was 
reasonable in scope.  We granted the petition for appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The interpretation of a deed is a mixed question of law and fact that this Court reviews de 
novo.  Caplan v. Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 225 (2002).  It is axiomatic that “a lawful owner, as a 
general rule, has the power to convey his real property to whomever he wishes under whatever 
conditions they agree to.”  Hamm v. Hazelwood, 292 Va. 153, 157 (2016).  In interpreting the 
 
4 
Lynns’ 1875 deed, we must give full effect to their intent unless such intent is inconsistent with 
the law.  Id. 
One limitation on a grantor’s absolute right to transfer property is the rule against 
restraints on alienation.  “A condition totally prohibiting the alienation of a vested fee simple 
estate or requiring a forfeiture upon alienation is void.”  Edwards v. Bradley, 227 Va. 224, 228 
(1984).  However, reasonable restraints are generally valid.  See Hamm, 292 Va. at 159 (noting 
that lesser forms of restraint are not “per se repugnant,” and will be upheld if “under all the 
circumstances of the case, the restraint is found to be reasonable”) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 4.2 (1983)).  Additionally, we use a “liberal 
interpretation to uphold” deeds involving land granted for charitable purposes.  Shenandoah 
Valley Nat’l Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 148 (1951). 
The 1875 deed granted Woodbine a fee simple determinable subject to the possibility of 
reverter, not a fee simple absolute.  The deed language is comparable to the deed in Dowell, in 
which we found that a deed granting land to trustees of a local school district “so long as it is 
used for a public school” conveyed a valid defeasible fee.  190 Va. at 687, 689.  We held that the 
limitation on the grant proved it “was not intended to be and was not in fact an absolute fee 
simple, but an estate whose duration should exist and continue until the happening of a specified 
event.”  Id. at 689. 
As in Dowell, the Lynns never intended to grant a fee simple absolute to the Woodbine 
congregation.  They used conditional language that is typical of a defeasible fee by specifying 
that the property will revert to the grantors “if it ceases to be used for the purposes expressed in 
the deed.”  As the circuit court correctly stated, “There is ample authority in Virginia that 
restrictions triggering reverters of fee simple determinable estates are generally valid.”  When a 
 
5 
grantor clearly intends to create a limited estate, we are less inclined to find the condition 
imposed on the grant to be unreasonable.3 
Canova agrees that the deed creates a fee simple determinable, but it maintains that the 
restriction is nevertheless “all-encompassing” and constitutes an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation.  It points to the Restatement (Second) of Property to buttress its claim that a forfeiture 
restraint on alienation must be “reasonable under all the circumstances of the case.”  Restatement 
(Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 4.2 (1983).  However, § 3.4 of the same Restatement 
distinguishes restraints on use, explaining that “a restraint on the use that may be made of 
transferred property by the transferee is not a restraint on alienation, as that term is used in this 
Restatement.”  While there is “no precise rule” for determining whether a restraint controls the 
use of property or its alienation, we look to the form of the restraint, the reasons for imposing the 
restraint, and the practical effect of the restraint when making our decision.  See id. 
Regarding form, the language of the deed granting land to Woodbine “to use it for the 
worship of God” clearly suggests that this is a restraint on use.  (Emphasis added.)  Additionally, 
the Lynns clearly stated their reason for imposing the restraint: “for the worship of God.”  That 
too suggests that the restraint focuses on the use of the property.  Nonetheless, Canova claims 
that the “all-encompassing” nature of the reverter clause makes it a restraint on alienation in 
practical effect, if not in form. 
 
3 See Hamm, 292 Va. at 161 (upholding a deed granting property that would 
“automatically revert … in the event Reginald Wayne Clark … ever acquires any interest therein 
by grant, inheritance or otherwise” as a valid defeasible fee); Talbot v. Norfolk, 152 Va. 851, 854 
(1929) (upholding a deed granting company land for a bridge “for its uses and purposes forever, 
provided, nevertheless, that if the said company shall abandon, or cease to keep in use, its bridge 
… that the said strip of land … shall ipso facto thereupon revert” as a determinable fee). 
 
6 
Canova claims that this case is comparable to Dunlop v. Dunlop, in which we held that a 
reverter clause requiring a son to forfeit three-fourths of his father’s business if he attempted to 
sell any part of it was unreasonable because it was unlimited in time and scope.  144 Va. 297, 
309 (1926).  We disagree.  The testator in that case granted a fee simple absolute, suggesting that 
he wanted his son to have “absolute control and complete ownership of [his business].”  Id. at 
305.  By contrast, the Lynns’ deed conveyed a defeasible fee to Woodbine. 
This case is more aptly compared to Hamm, where we emphasized the flexibility with 
which we evaluate reasonableness, noting that our determination must involve a consideration of 
“all the circumstances of the case.”  292 Va. at 159.  In that case, we upheld a deed that required 
reversion if the beneficiary’s son ever acquired interest in the deeded property as a reasonable 
alienation, given the limited duration and scope of the restraint.  Id. at 159-60.  We found it 
persuasive that the deed was limited in scope because it restricted only one person from 
occupying or possessing the property, and that it was similarly limited in time because the 
restriction could only last during the recipient’s son’s lifetime.  Id.  We further found that the 
condition did not impose a restraint on alienation, although “the provision had the practical effect 
of precluding [the sister] … from ever selling or devising the property to [her son].”  Id. at 163.  
Like in Hamm, although the practical effect of the Lynns’ deed limits Canova’s ability to sell the 
property, the form and context of the grant suggest that it is a restraint on use. 
In arguing that the 1875 deed restraint is unreasonable, Canova has adopted an overly 
restrictive interpretation that would create significant unintended consequences for church 
landowners.  Under Canova’s interpretation, the deed permits use only by Woodbine as the 
congregation existed in 1875.  We disagree.  At oral argument, Canova conceded that, under its 
interpretation, the deed may have been violated when Woodbine incorporated in 2006 to become 
 
7 
the Woodbine Worship Center, a transition adopted by countless congregations in Virginia once 
incorporation was permitted.  Indeed, following Canova’s interpretation to its logical conclusion, 
if Woodbine changed its denominational affiliation – such as joining or leaving the Southern 
Baptist Convention, for example – the subsequent use by the newly-affiliated entity could 
constitute a violation of the restraint in the deed.  To adopt such a narrow and rigid interpretation 
would ignore the practical realities of individual congregations and denominations over decades 
and even centuries.  The more reasonable interpretation of the deed is that the land must be used 
“for the worship of God” by a congregation that generally follows the tenets of Baptist 
churches.4 
We acknowledge that this deed is more restrictive than the reverter clause in Hamm.  Yet, 
the other circumstances of this case weigh in favor of finding that it is reasonable.  First, as 
mentioned above, the Lynns’ original grant was clearly intended as a defeasible fee, a grant that 
“was not intended to be and was not in fact an absolute fee simple.”  See Dowell, 190 Va. at 689.  
Second, as discussed above, the form of the restraint and the circumstances in which it was 
granted strongly suggest that this is a restraint on use, rather than a restraint on alienation, and is 
therefore more likely to be reasonable.  Third, and of key import, the reasonableness of the 
restraint must be considered in light of Virginia’s longstanding policy preference for charitable 
gifts. 
Both the Restatement and our precedents recognize a preference to uphold charitable 
gifts.  The Restatement (Third) of Property provides that if a land is held for charitable purposes, 
even “very severe restraints on alienation are normally justified to assure that the land continues 
 
4 We decline to opine regarding what those tenets may be.  We note that Baptist churches 
are generally congregationalist in their polity, whereby local congregations maintain substantial 
independence and autonomy. 
 
8 
to be used for the intended purposes.”  Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 3.4, cmt. c 
(2000).5  This Court has consistently affirmed the notion that charitable gifts are “favored 
creatures of the law.”  Shenandoah Valley Nat’l Bank, 192 Va. at 141.  In Shenandoah, we 
“applied a liberal interpretation to uphold” a trust establishing periodic payments to students in a 
local elementary school, despite the trust having an indefinite number of beneficiaries.  Id. at 
141, 148.  The Shenandoah Court defined “the advancement of religion” as a charitable purpose 
falling within the policy exemption.  Id. at 140.6 
Given that the Lynns’ original grant to Woodbine constituted a charitable gift,7 we hold 
that our longstanding policy preference for such gifts applies in this case.  Although we have not 
previously addressed whether the preference for charitable gifts applies in the context of 
restraints on alienation, our holding in Dowell suggests that it does.  In Dowell, we upheld a deed 
granting land to trustees of a local school district “so long as it is used for a public school.”  190 
Va. 676.  We recognized that the reverter clause may have been insufficient because it failed to 
adequately determine in whom the possibility of reverter would vest, but that by looking at the 
intent of the grantor the conditions could be upheld because the grant “clearly fixed its quality” 
as a determinable fee gifted to the school.  Id. at 690 (citing First Universalist Soc’y v. Boland, 
29 N.E. 524, 525 (Mass. 1892)). 
 
5 Restraints on charitable trusts “will be upheld though the alienation of the property 
involved is restrained indefinitely.” 1 Frederick D.G. Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 555, at 
729 (2d ed. 1928). 
6 Similarly, in Collins v. Lyon we stated that “all doubts will be resolved in [] favor” of 
trusts created for charitable purposes when we held that such trusts do not fall within the rule 
against perpetuities.  181 Va. 230, 252 (1943). 
7 Canova claims that the 1875 deed does not constitute a charitable gift because the 
Lynns granted Woodbine the land in consideration of five dollars.  However, we have held that 
grants in exchange for nominal consideration nevertheless constitute charitable gifts.  Brown v. 
Bonner, 35 Va. 1, 2 (1837) (upholding a deed in exchange for “the nominal consideration of one 
dollar” as a valid gift). 
 
9 
The Lynns clearly expressed their charitable intent to grant their land to Woodbine to be 
used for church purposes, a purpose which we have previously held constitutes a charitable gift.  
See Shenandoah, 192 Va. at 140.  As such, upholding the deed’s use restriction is most 
consistent with our preference for such gifts, as well as our overarching policy preference to 
allow the land to continue to be used according to the Lynns’ stated desire. 
We have recognized that “public policy is at the heart” of challenges involving restraints 
on alienation.  Lipps v. First American, 223 Va. 131, 137 (1982).  In Lipps, we noted that 
determining whether a restraint is reasonable requires “considering whether [the restraint] is such 
only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not 
so large as to interfere with the interest of the public.”  Id. at 136 (quoting Merriman v. Cover, 
104 Va. 428 (1905)). 
As in Lipps, we must weigh the policy preference for charitable gifts against the 
countervailing societal interest in allowing Canova to alienate their property.  Canova claims that 
upholding the restraint would significantly limit its ability to develop the land for arguably more 
efficient purposes, and would, to quote Minor, “put the lands of the living in the cold grip of the 
hands of the dead.”  1 Frederick D.G. Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 553, at 720 (2d ed. 
1928).  We sympathize with these concerns, but we cannot agree that Canova’s legitimate 
interest in robustly developing the larger parcel of land it has acquired outweighs the equally 
legitimate interest in protecting and promoting charitable giving.  To hold otherwise, as appellees 
have noted, would put into jeopardy innumerable charitable gifts with restraints like those 
included in the Lynns’ deed.  See Dowell, 190 Va. at 680.  In light of the significant chilling 
effect that such a holding could have on charitable giving, we cannot agree that Canova’s interest 
in developing all of its acquired land should take priority. 
 
10 
Because the Lynns’ deed granted Woodbine a fee simple subject to the possibility of 
reverter, the reverter by its terms is a restraint on use, and the reverter is not unreasonable in light 
of the charitable context in which it was given, we affirm the circuit court’s decision to uphold 
the 1875 deed as valid.8 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court of Prince William County’s dismissal of 
Canova’s complaint. 
Affirmed. 
 
8 Canova assigned error to the trial court’s finding that a conveyance of property by a fee 
simple determinable deed cannot constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation as matter of 
law.  We do not reach this broader issue because we find, considering these specific facts, that 
this particular grant by fee simple determinable was reasonable.