Title: State v. Knoefler
Citation: 279 N.W.2d 658
Docket Number: 671
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 1979

279 N.W.2d 658 (1979) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Harold R. KNOEFLER, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 671. Supreme Court of North Dakota. May 24, 1979. Rehearing Denied June 8, 1979. *659 William S. Murray, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. Sherrilynn Sperling Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellee. SAND, Justice. Harold R. Knoefler, defendant, in his appeal from a district court judgment of conviction, challenged the constitutionality of § 4-12-03.1, North Dakota Century Code, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The regulations were not separately challenged and will rest or fall with the statute. Knoefler was charged, tried, and convicted in Bottineau County Court of violating §§ 4-12-03.1,[1] 4-12-21, and 4-12-22, *660 NDCC. Knoefler appealed the county court conviction to the district court of Bottineau County and demanded a trial de novo. Pursuant to a stipulation, the District Court of Bottineau County ordered a change of venue to the district court of the Fourth Judicial District, County of Burleigh. The Burleigh County District Court found Knoefler guilty of violating §§ 4-12-03.1, 4-12-21, and 4-12-22, NDCC, and fined him $100 for each violation, for a total fine of $300. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, in both the county court and the district court. Knoefler appealed the judgment of conviction to this court. No issue was raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant, in his brief, made reference to the files and records previously submitted to this court on a prior appeal in a companion case[2] wherein he contended, as he does here, that § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, and its regulations, which prohibit a commercial beekeeper from establishing an apiary within two miles of another commercial operator, violate §§ 20, 69 and 11 of the North Dakota Constitution as well as the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Knoefler contended that § 4-12-03.1 creates an unconstitutional classification between new and established beekeepers for the sole purpose of inhibiting competition. As pertinent to this issue, § 20 of the North Dakota Constitution, in part, provides as follows: The record indicates Knoefler is not a resident or citizen of North Dakota but rather resides in Nebraska, or possibly California. In Benson v. Schneider, 68 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1955), this court said that a person who is not a citizen of this state may not invoke the provisions of § 20, Article I, of the North Dakota Constitution. Knoefler has not illustrated in any manner whatsoever, nor has he established facts giving rise to a presumption, that he is a resident or citizen of this state; consequently he is not in a position to invoke the provisions of § 20 of the North Dakota Constitution. Even if Knoefler had established standing to challenge the constitutionality under § 20, N.D.Const., this court, in Dunn v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 191 N.W.2d 181 (N.D.1971), took cognizance that § 20 does not prohibit appropriate legislative classification where proper facts justify such a classification and the act applies uniformly to all within a class under similar circumstances. The court had under consideration a statutory provision which exempted partners from the Workmen's Compensation Act but at the same time provided executive officers who performed duties similar to those of an employee were not exempt. The court concluded this was not an unconstitutional or invalid classification. Section 69 of the North Dakota Constitution, as pertinent to the issue here, provides "The legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following *661 enumerated cases" and then sets out the 35 subjects covered. In State v. Lawler, 53 N.D. 278, 205 N.W. 880 (1925), and in State v. First State Bank of Jud, 52 N.D. 231, 202 N.W. 391 (1924), this court defined a special law as one relating only to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies to all things or persons of a class, and a local law as one which applies to a specific locality or spot, as distinguished from a law which operates generally throughout the entire state. Section 4-12-03.1, NDCC, is neither a special nor a local lawit is general. It operates equally upon all commercial beekeepers and on all lands within the scope of the statute. It operates alike on all persons and property similarly situated. There is no difference in the law from one locale to another. It operates alike in all cases where the facts are substantially the same and it operates in the same manner with the same effect throughout the entire state. It necessarily follows that it does not violate § 69 of the North Dakota Constitution. The principles of law applying to § 11, N.D.Const., which states that "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." are not dissimilar from those principles applying to the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore we will consider them together. In Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979), we quoted approvingly from Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978), wherein we set up three standards of scrutiny, and stated: The difficulty, however, remains in determining which standard applies. From our research, it appears that neither the United States Supreme Court,[3] nor any Federal or State court has defined what constitutes an inherently suspect classification. Under these circumstances we do not believe it necessary or appropriate to formulate a definition. The United States Supreme Court, however, has treated classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin as inherently suspect, and a plurality, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973), included sex as being a suspect classification and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971). As to alienage, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 53 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1977). As to race, see McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964). As to illegitimacy, see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1976); but Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S. Ct. 518, 58 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1978), should also be considered. *662 Based upon the foregoing decisions, we do not believe that § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, "involves an `inherently suspect classification' or a `fundamental interest,'" and therefore is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Beekeeping has been recognized by this court as a commercial enterprise or activity. Morel v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1975). Thus statutes creating classifications within the beekeeping industry, if indeed such classifications are created by § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, are governed by the constitutional concepts that apply to business or commercial classifications. The United States Supreme Court in Lincoln Federal Union v. Northwestern Iron &amp; Metal Co., 355 U.S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473 (1949), after reviewing Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908); and Coppage v. State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (1915), said: The foregoing statement was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 94 S. Ct. 407, 38 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1973), and is of significance because in Snyder the United States Supreme Court reversed its earlier holding in Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57, 73 L. Ed. 204 (1928), which declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute similar to the North Dakota statute, § 43-15-35, relating to pharmacy ownership by registered pharmacists as a prerequisite to being licensed. The United States Supreme Court in Snyder stated that the Liggett case was decided on grounds of substantive due process and was a derelict in the stream of law. The Liggett case was decided in 1928 and the Snyder case was decided in 1973. It is now settled that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs as long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition or some valid federal law. In determining the constitutionality of statutes regulating commercial affairs under the Equal Protection Clause, courts have required only a rational relationship between the classification and the purpose of the statute. Our court has followed this approach in reviewing equal protection challenges to such statutes. In State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1977), we quoted approvingly from In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 1968): The court in Hanson continued by saying: This case also stands for the proposition that the burden is on the challenger to prove that the statute is clearly unreasonable. State v. Hanson, supra at 366. In reviewing the relationship between the commercial classification and the purpose of the statute, it is not necessary that the purpose of the statute be readily ascertainable upon its face. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778, 82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938), the United States Supreme Court in April of 1938 had under consideration the constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act of Congress. The court, through Justice Stone, said: In Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 (N.D.1973), this court stated at page 83: See also, Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39, 46 (N.D.1974); Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D.1974). Section 4-12-03.1, NDCC, was enacted by Chapter 76 (Senate Bill 208) of the 1967 Session Laws. It was introduced by Senators Wenstrom and Morgan. Historical background and extrinsic aids, i. e., legislative committee reports, may be resorted to in determining legislative intent where the language of the statute is ambiguous. State v. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1977); Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950). Similarly, in the absence of a legislative finding we believe such resort is appropriate to determine the evils and objectives at which the legislation was aimed as distinguished from the meaning of the statute. See State ex rel. Syvertson v. Jones, 74 N.D. 465, 23 N.W.2d 54 (N.D.1946), concurring opinion. Both the Senate Agriculture Committee minutes and the House Agriculture Committee minutes state that the law proposes to protect the North Dakota bee business. There was testimony before the Committees stating that "People from neighboring states move in, harvest their crop and go back to their home state because there are no fees charged or any spacing law." This law was passed with the emergency provision and became effective 28 February 1967. The initial spacing requirement was three miles, however the act was amended by Chapter 84 (Senate Bill 462) of the 1969 Session Laws changing the spacing requirement to two miles. The House Agriculture *664 Committee minutes contain a brief historical background. The minutes state: The minutes also reflect the answer given by a proponent of the bill to the following question: The testimony at the hearing and the county justice's memorandum decision state that the purpose of the restriction is to control disease and to prevent raiding. From the minutes of the House Agriculture Committee pertaining to the legislation in question, we can fairly assume that one of the primary purposes of the section was to prevent one colony of bees from pirating other colonies and to prevent the spreading of diseases. This in itself constitutes sufficient reason to sustain the validity of the act. Knoefler also asserted that § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, violates the Equal Protection Clause because the statute allows an exception to the spacing requirement at the request of a seed grower. He argued that such an exception, when considered with the fact that beekeepers often place their own colonies less than two miles from their other existing colonies and that bee diseases can be controlled by antibiotics, demonstrates the purpose of the statute is for the economic protection of established beekeepers rather than the prevention of disease. An exception per se is not grounds for declaring a statute invalid or unconstitutional. Merely because there are exceptions to the two-mile spacing requirement does not make the section unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation, 426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1976), had under consideration Maryland's junk automobile statute under which it paid a bounty to scrap processors for the destruction of any vehicle formerly titled in Maryland upon proof of ownership, etc. In upholding the statute, the court, at 426 U.S. 813, 96 S. Ct. at 2499-2500, said: In State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1977), we had under consideration the reckless endangerment statute in a criminal case. We said: In City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.1970), this court had under consideration the sabbath-breaking ordinance of the city of Bismarck. In upholding the validity of the ordinance the court said at page 539: See also, McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1960). In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S. Ct. 1028, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93, 95 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1963), the United States Supreme Court had under consideration the validity of a statute which made it a misdemeanor to engage in the business of debt adjusting except as an incident to the lawful practice of law. The court held the statute did not violate the due process clause, nor by excepting lawyers did it deny equal protection of the law to non-lawyers. The Court observed that legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems and that the Court does not sit to "`subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure.'" We conclude that any classification created by § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, is based upon commercial activity and as such need only bear a rational relationship to the purpose of the statute. The spacing requirements of § 4-12-03.1 are rationally related to statutory goals of preventing honey raiding and the spreading of bee diseases. On the basis of the challenge made and the facts presented in support of the challenge, the statute is valid. The district court's judgment of conviction is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., PAULSON, and PEDERSON, JJ., and LARRY M. HATCH, District Judge, concur. HATCH, District Judge, sitting in place of VANDE WALLE, J., disqualified. [1] Section 4-12-03.1, NDCC, provides as follows: Establishment of locationsExceptionLocation rights.No new commercial location may be established within two miles of another commercial location. No commercial operator may establish an apiary within two miles of another commercial operator. The noncommercial beekeeper with one to twenty-four colonies will have territorial rights on one location. If any seed grower requests the commissioner of agriculture to include additional locations for the purpose of pollinating his crop, the restriction prohibiting the maintaining of locations within two miles of one another shall not apply. The name and address of each apiary shall be displayed at each location. The property owner will be exempt from this section. Definitions are found in § 4-12-01, NDCC, and are as follows: Definitions.In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires: 1. "Beekeeper" shall mean any person, firm, association, or corporation owning, possessing, or controlling one or more colonies of bees for the production of honey, beeswax, or byproducts either for personal or commercial use. 2. "Apiary" shall mean any place where one or more hives or colonies of bees are kept. 3. "Person" and "owner" shall mean natural persons, firms, associations, or corporations. 6. "Commercial locations" shall mean apiaries where twenty-five or more hives or colonies of bees are kept. 7. "Commercial operator" shall mean any beekeeper who maintains two hundred and fifty or more hives or colonies of bees. [2] Knoefler Honey Farms v. Just, 270 N.W.2d 354 (N.D.1978). [3] In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, rehearing denied 411 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1919, 36 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1973), the Court identified a "suspect class" entitled to the protections of strict judicial scrutiny as one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."