Title: LAPEER COUNTY CLERK V LAPEER CIRCUIT JUDGE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118102
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2002

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 12, 2002  
LAPEER COUNTY CLERK and MICHIGAN  
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY CLERKS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v
 118091  
LAPEER CIRCUIT JUDGES,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
LAPEER COUNTY,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
LAPEER COUNTY CLERK and MICHIGAN  
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY CLERKS,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v
 118102  
LAPEER CIRCUIT JUDGES,  
Defendants-Appellants,  
and  
LAPEER COUNTY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiffs filed this superintending control action  
challenging the Lapeer Circuit Court’s plan for the operation  
of the family division of the circuit court.  The Court of  
Appeals granted part of the relief sought, finding that the  
plan improperly denied the county clerk the right and duty to  
function as clerk of the court for the family division.  We  
conclude that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction of the  
superintending control action, and reverse.  
I  
In 1996 PA 388, the Legislature created the family  
division of the circuit court.  See MCL 600.1001 et seq.,  
effective January 1, 1998.  The act consolidated in the family  
division jurisdiction of many types of proceedings formerly  
heard in the circuit court and the probate court.  See  
MCL 600.1021.  
MCL 600.1011(1) provides for the development of a plan  
for the operation of the family division in each judicial  
circuit:  
Not later than July 1, 1997, in each judicial 
circuit, the chief circuit judge and the chief  
probate judge or judges shall enter into an  
agreement that establishes a plan for how the 
family division will be operated in that circuit 
. . . .  
On February 25, 1997, this Court issued Administrative  
Order No. 1997-1, entitled “Implementation of the Family  
Division of the Circuit Court.”  The order required all chief  
2  
circuit and probate judges to “develop a plan for the  
implementation and operation of the family division, and to  
identify the manner in which services will be coordinated to  
provide effective and efficient services to families by the  
family division of the circuit court.”  Chief judges were  
required to seek input from judges, court staff, and other  
entities 
providing 
service 
to 
families 
within 
the 
jurisdiction  
or who will be affected by the operation of the family  
division. The order required filing of plans with the State  
Court 
Administrative 
Office and approval by that office before  
implementation.  
According to the affidavit of the chief judge of the  
Lapeer 
Circuit 
Court, 
he 
followed 
the 
implementation 
directive  
and met with the judges in the circuit.  It was agreed that  
the family division would be staffed with the employees of the  
probate court, who were trained in and accustomed to dealing  
with juvenile cases and other matters formerly within the  
jurisdiction of the probate court.  To implement the plan,  
Local Administrative Order No. 2000-1 was adopted on  
February 2, 2000, providing:  
In order to implement the changes required by 
the legislation creating the Family Division of the 
Circuit Court (PA 374 and 388 of 1996), to enhance 
and clarify the procedures to be followed in the 
new Family Court, to clarify the role of the County 
Clerk in the operations of the Family Court, to 
merge 
the 
procedures 
previously 
followed 
in  
juvenile, 
child 
protective 
proceedings 
and  
ancillary proceedings into the Family Court, to 
maintain the Court’s data entry system, and to  
3  
adopt new procedures for efficient administration 
of the Family Court, the Court issues the following 
administrative order:  
1.  The County Clerk will continue to accept 
pleadings, maintain files and complete entries into 
the Court’s data system in all domestic cases and 
PPOs and shall be responsible for the care and 
maintenance of those records.  
2.  The Family Court staff will continue to 
accept filings, maintain files, prepare orders and 
complete entries into the Court’s data system in 
all juvenile cases, child protective proceedings, 
name changes, adoptions, and ancillary proceedings 
and shall be responsible for the care and  
maintenance of those records.  
3.  The Family Court staff will be responsible 
for scheduling all juvenile cases, child protective 
proceedings, name changes, adoptions, and ancillary 
proceedings.  In addition, the Family Court staff  
will 
be 
responsible 
for 
making 
referrals, 
scheduling hearings, preparation of orders and 
arranging pretrials and trials in domestic cases. 
The Family Court staff will make appropriate 
entries into the Court’s data systems of these 
proceedings.  
4.  The County Clerk staff will continue to 
manage the motion day dockets, no-progress docket 
and non-service dismissals in domestic cases. The  
County Clerk staff will continue to attend the 
domestic motion docket sessions of the Family Court 
and make appropriate entries into the Court’s data 
system of those proceedings.  
5.  The Family Court staff shall continue to  
be responsible for all filing fees, receipts, 
disbursements and accountings for support payments, 
restitution, administrative and program fees, and 
child care funds received in juvenile cases, child 
protective proceedings, name changes, adoptions and 
ancillary proceedings.  The County Clerk shall 
continue to accept all filing fees in domestic 
cases for the Family Court.  
6.
 Local Administrative Order 1999-02 is  
hereby rescinded and replaced by this order.  
4  
 
 
 
This order is issued pursuant to MCR 8.112 and 
will be effective upon approval by the State Court 
Administrator.  The matters covered in this order  
will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and this order 
will expire on December 31, 2000, unless extended 
by order of the Court.  
On February 9, 2000, the Acting Director of Trial Court  
Services 
for 
the 
State Court Administrative Office advised the  
circuit court that  
we 
have 
reviewed 
the 
above 
referenced  
Administrative Order and find that it conforms with  
the requirements of MCR 8.112(B).  This order is  
being accepted and filed until advised by your 
court of any change.  
II  
The Lapeer County Clerk and the Michigan Association of  
County Clerks filed this original action in the Court of  
Appeals requesting a writ of superintending control.  Their  
complaint alleged, among other things:  
17.
 The Court’s Administrative Order, No. 
2000-01 violates Michigan’s Constitution, laws, and 
court rules by preventing the Clerk from performing 
her constitutional and statutorily mandated duties. 
Specifically, 
by 
issuing 
and 
implementing 
Administrative Order No. 
2000-01, the Court  
usurped the Clerk’s constitutional and statutory 
duties with respect to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of 
the Order.  
* * *  
18.  Both family division judges in Lapeer 
County (Judges Preisel and Higgins) prohibit the 
County Clerk from performing her circuit court 
duties 
with 
respect 
to 
juvenile 
matters 
by 
preventing her from opening new cases, maintaining 
the care and custody of the court records, entering 
data into the Court’s JIS system, performing court 
room functions, preventing the Clerk from assisting  
5  
 
the public as well as other judicial staff and 
employees, and accounting for the court’s finances.  
* * *  
20.  Judges Higgins and Preisel further refuse 
to allow the County Clerk to perform as Clerk of 
the circuit court with respect to trials.  
Plaintiffs’ complaint requested the Court of Appeals to  
declare unlawful the Lapeer Circuit Court administrative  
order, and to direct the judges of the family division of the  
Lapeer Circuit Court to comply with Const 1963, art 6, § 14,  
statutes, and court rules by permitting the county clerk to  
perform her legal authorized duties as clerk of the court for  
the family division of the circuit court.1  
Lapeer County intervened as a party defendant, and the  
defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the Court of  
Appeals 
lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction.  The circuit court  
also claimed that the clerks’ association lacked standing and  
that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim on which  
relief could be granted.  
The Court of Appeals rejected defendants’ argument that  
it 
lacked 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
and 
granted  
superintending control. 
The Court of Appeals declared  
unlawful those portions of Local Administrative Order No.  
2000-01 that direct family court staff, rather than the county  
clerk, to perform the duties assigned to the county clerk by  
1 MCL 600.1007 designates the county clerk as the clerk 
of the court for the family division.  
6  
 
 
statute or court rule, and directed the judges of the family  
division to permit the county clerk to perform those duties  
assigned her by statute or court rule as a clerk of the court  
for the family division.  It declared lawful the remaining  
portions of the administrative order, and dismissed the  
clerks’ association’s claims for lack of standing.2  
The circuit court and the county filed applications for  
leave to appeal.  After staying the precedential effect of the  
Court of Appeals opinion, we granted leave to appeal, limited  
to the issue: “[W]hether the Court of Appeals had subject  
matter jurisdiction over the complaint for superintending  
control . . . .”3  
III  
In this case, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction  
turns on questions of interpretation of statutes and court  
rules, which we review de novo.  Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464  
Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001); Brown v Michigan Health  
Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 (2000); McAuley v  
General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).  
2 In re Lapeer Co Clerk, 242 Mich App 497; 619 NW2d 45 
(2000).  
3 
 463 Mich 969 (2001). 
The order held the remaining 
issues raised in the applications in abeyance pending  
resolution of the jurisdictional question.  In light of our 
conclusion that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction, it 
is unnecessary to reach those issues, and in those respects 
the applications are denied as moot.  
7  
 
 
IV  
Const 1963, art 6, § 10, provides the basis for the  
jurisdiction of and procedure in the Court of Appeals:  
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall 
be provided by law and the practice and procedure 
therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme 
court.  
In addition to the appellate jurisdiction granted by  
MCL 600.308, the Court of Appeals is authorized to hear  
certain original actions. MCL 600.310 provides:  
The court of appeals has original jurisdiction 
to issue prerogative and remedial writs or orders 
as provided by rules of the supreme court, and has 
authority to issue any writs, directives and  
mandates that it judges necessary and expedient to 
effectuate its determination of cases brought 
before it.  
In several court rules, we have exercised that statutory  
authority to enable the Court of Appeals to exercise  
superintending control jurisdiction.4
 MCR 3.302 is the  
general 
jurisdictional 
provision 
applicable 
to 
all 
courts 
with  
superintending control jurisdiction:  
4 MCR 3.302 makes superintending control the general form 
of proceeding for control of lower courts and tribunals:  
(A) Scope. 
A superintending control order 
enforces the superintending control power of a 
court over lower courts or tribunals.  
* * *  
(C) Writs Superseded. 
A superintending 
control order replaces the writs of certiorari and 
prohibition and the writ of mandamus when directed 
to a lower court or tribunal.  
8  
(D) Jurisdiction.  
(1) The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, 
and the circuit court have jurisdiction to issue 
superintending control orders to lower courts or 
tribunals. In this rule, the term “circuit court” 
includes the Recorder’s Court of the City of  
Detroit[5] as to superintending control actions of 
which that court has jurisdiction.  
(2) When an appeal in the Supreme Court, the 
Court of Appeals, the circuit court, or the  
recorder’s court is available, that method of 
review must be used. If superintending control is 
sought and an appeal is available, the complaint 
for superintending control must be dismissed.  
MCR 7.203 is the specific provision regarding the Court  
of Appeals authority to issue such orders:  
(C) Extraordinary Writs, Original Actions, and 
Enforcement Actions. The [C]ourt [of Appeals] may 
entertain an action for:  
(1) superintending control over a lower court 
or a tribunal immediately below it arising out of  
an action or proceeding which, when concluded,  
would result in an order appealable to the Court of  
Appeals . . . . [Emphasis added.]  
This limitation on the superintending control authority  
of the Court of Appeals is in contrast to the far broader  
superintending control power given by the constitution to the  
Supreme Court and the circuit court:  
The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
general  
superintending control over all courts; power to 
issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial 
writs; and appellate jurisdiction as provided by 
rules of the supreme court.  The supreme court 
shall not have the power to remove a judge.  [Const 
1963, art 6, § 4 (emphasis added).]  
5 
 The Recorder’s Court for the city of Detroit was 
abolished by 1996 PA 374.  
9  
 
The 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; 
appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; 
power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and 
remedial writs; supervisory and general control  
over inferior courts and tribunals within their  
respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules  
of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other  
cases and matters as provided by rules of the 
supreme court. [Const 1963, art 6, § 13 (emphasis 
added).]  
The 
case 
law 
interpreting the predecessor court rules had  
recognized 
this 
distinction 
between 
the 
superintending 
control  
authority of the Supreme Court and circuit court on the one  
hand, and the Court of Appeals on the other.  As we said in  
Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672,  
680-681; 194 NW2d 693 (1972):  
The Supreme Court has by GCR 1963, 711  
provided that the Court of Appeals has the power to 
issue superintending control orders which are in 
the 
nature 
of 
certiorari, 
mandamus 
and  
prohibition.[6]  
6 Later in the Genesee Prosecutor opinion we briefly 
explained the nature of these common-law writs, which  
contemplate intervention by the higher court in a particular 
action or proceeding:  
The writ of certiorari is for review of errors  
of law and our inquiry is limited to determining 
“if the inferior tribunal, upon the record made, 
had jurisdiction, whether or not it exceeded that 
jurisdiction and proceeded according to law.”  In  
re Fredericks, 285 Mich 262, 267 [280 NW 464] 
(1938).  In [People v] Flint Municipal Judge [383 
Mich 429; 175 NW2d 750 (1970)], we noted that 
mandamus would lie to require the magistrate to 
perform a clear legal duty.  Here it is contended  
that the judge acted without jurisdiction and 
therefore has a clear legal duty to vacate the 
(continued...)  
10  
  
 
This superintending control has nothing to do 
with the general supervisory superintending control 
over all courts given to the Supreme Court by  
art 6, § 4 of the 1963 Constitution or the  
supervisory and general control over inferior  
courts and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the  
Supreme Court, given the circuit courts by art 6, 
§ 13 of the 1963 Constitution.  
No general control of inferior courts exists 
in the Court of Appeals.[7]  
That 
principle 
was also recognized in Morcom v Recorder’s  
Court Judge, 15 Mich App 358, 360; 166 NW2d 540 (1968):  
[W]e are persuaded that the Supreme Court has 
delegated to us only the power to issue such writs 
in respect of a particular error in an actual case 
and controversy, and that we have not been  
delegated superintending control over the general 
practices of an inferior court or any judge 
thereof.  
In sum, then, this Court has general system-wide  
superintending control over the lower courts, whereas, in  
contrast, 
the 
Court 
of Appeals only has superintending control  
in an actual case.  
6 (...continued) 
guilty plea and reinstate the criminal proceedings 
as filed in the information. 
The writ of  
prohibition is a common-law remedy designed to 
prevent excesses of jurisdiction.  It is a proper 
remedy where the court exceeds the bounds of its 
jurisdiction or acts in a matter not within its 
jurisdiction. Hudson v Judge of Superior Court, 42 
Mich 239, 248 [3 NW 850] (1879). [386 Mich 681].  
7 GCR 1963, 711, the predecessor of MCR 7.203(C), did not 
include the limiting language of current subrule (C)(1).  The  
addition of that language in 1985 incorporates our decision in 
Genesee Prosecutor.  
11  
 
V  
The Court of Appeals opinion cites a number of cases for  
the proposition that superintending control is an appropriate  
procedure to review the general practices of a lower court.  
Some include general language to the effect that the Court of  
Appeals, like the Supreme Court and the circuit court, has the  
power to issue superintending control orders, e.g., Lockhart  
v 36th Dist Judge, 204 Mich App 684; 516 NW2d 76 (1994); In re  
Lafayette Towers, 200 Mich App 269; 503 NW2d 740 (1993).  
However, none of those cases supports the conclusion that the  
Court of Appeals has superintending control jurisdiction over  
the general practices of the circuit court.  
All the cases cited by the Court of Appeals fall into one  
of three categories.  Most are cases in which an action was  
filed in the circuit court seeking exercise of that court’s  
superintending control authority over a lower court or  
tribunal, e.g., In re Lafayette Towers, supra; Lockhart,  
supra; Saginaw Library Bd v Judges of the 70th Dist Court, 118  
Mich App 379; 325 NW2d 777 (1982); Cahill v 15th Dist Judge,  
393 Mich 137; 224  NW2d 24 (1974).  One of the cases was  
brought in the Supreme Court seeking superintending control  
over the circuit court.  Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v Wayne  
Circuit Court, 443 Mich 110; 503 NW2d 885 (1993). 
The  
remaining cases involved actions filed in the Court of Appeals  
seeking 
to 
invoke 
the 
limited 
superintending 
control  
12  
 
 
 
jurisdiction of that Court over the actions of the circuit  
court (or Recorder’s Court) in a particular case, as permitted  
by MCR 7.203(C)(1).  Frederick v Presque Isle Co Circuit  
Judge, 439 Mich 1; 476 NW2d 142 (1991) (an action by an  
appointed 
attorney 
seeking 
compensation);8 
Genesee  
Prosecutor, supra (an action by a prosecuting attorney  
claiming the circuit court lacked authority to accept a guilty  
plea 
to 
an 
uncharged 
offense over the prosecutor’s objection);  
Wayne Co Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge (On Remand), 167  
Mich App 282; 421 NW2d 665 (1988) (an action by a prosecutor  
challenging the circuit court’s granting of a new trial in a  
criminal case).  
8 Both the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals rely 
heavily on language in Frederick, in which we held that the 
Court of Appeals should have exercised superintending control 
over the circuit court.  However, Frederick merely stands for 
the proposition that superintending control is an appropriate 
remedy for a court with jurisdiction to exercise authority 
over a lower court when an appeal is not available.
 In fact, 
Frederick and our decision in Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n well  
illustrate the differing superintending control jurisdiction 
of this Court and the Court of Appeals.  Each case involved a  
challenge to action by the lower court regarding the payment 
of fees to appointed counsel.  In Frederick, the plaintiff 
sought payment for the services that he provided in a  
particular case. 
Because the dispute arose out of a 
particular action in circuit court, the Court of Appeals had 
authority to exercise superintending control under MCR  
7.203(C)(1).  By contrast, in Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n, the 
plaintiffs challenged the fee schedule for appointed counsel 
jointly established by the Wayne Circuit and Detroit  
Recorder’s Courts. Because the challenge was to the general 
practices of the lower courts, only this Court had  
jurisdiction, and the case was properly filed here.  
13  
Despite this consistent line of authority, the Court of  
Appeals concluded that it could exercise superintending  
control jurisdiction in this case. It said:  
Pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 4 "[t]he 
supreme court shall have general superintending 
control over all courts . . . ."  In contrast, 
"[n]o general control of inferior courts exists in 
the Court of Appeals."  Genesee Prosecutor v  
Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672, 681; 194 NW2d 
693 (1972).  Nonetheless, by operation of Const 
1963, art 6, § 10, MCL 600.310; MSA 27A.310, MCR 
3.302, and MCR 7.203(C) this Court has subject­
matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
issue 
writs 
of  
superintending 
control 
to 
lower 
courts 
and  
tribunals in those limited cases in which (1) the 
general practices of the inferior court or tribunal 
are contrary to a clear legal duty, (2) there is no 
other adequate remedy, and (3) an action or  
proceeding could have been brought in the lower  
court or tribunal that, when concluded, would  
result in an order appealable to the Court of  
Appeals. [242 Mich App 514-515 (emphasis added).]  
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs could  
have brought an action in the circuit court for a declaratory  
judgment or could have challenged the local administrative  
order in individual actions in the family division:  
In 
regard 
to 
the 
present 
controversy, 
plaintiff Marlene M. Bruns could have filed a  
complaint for a declaratory judgment in the circuit 
court challenging, in a specific case or cases, her 
displacement as clerk of the court for the family 
division of the circuit court. See MCR 2.605.  
* * *  
In the instant action, defendant circuit court 
admitted in its answer that "Judges Preisel and 
Higgins refused to allow the county clerk to 
perform the clerical duties of the circuit court 
with respect to trials in the family division" and 
have refused to allow the county clerk "to perform  
14  
 
 
duties such as opening new cases, maintaining the 
care and custody of court records, entering data in 
the court's JIS system, performing other courtroom 
functions, and for accounting for the finances with 
regard to juvenile matters under the jurisdiction 
of the family division of the circuit court."  In  
view 
of 
these 
admissions, 
we 
conclude 
that  
plaintiff Bruns could have challenged, in specific 
cases, the refusal of the circuit court to allow 
her to perform her legally authorized duties by 
filing a complaint for declaratory relief in the 
circuit court. [242 Mich App 511-512].  
The Court of Appeals concluded:  
We hold plaintiffs' complaint for a writ of 
superintending control is within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of this Court because the criteria set 
forth in the court rules have been met. [242 Mich 
App 515].  
The Court of Appeals analysis fails on a fundamental  
level.
 It concludes that it is sufficient if the party could  
have filed an action that would have been appealable to the  
Court of Appeals.  However, the Court cited no authority  
whatsoever for that proposition, and it is plainly contrary to  
MCR 7.203(C)(1), which requires that the Court of Appeals may  
entertain an action for superintending control arising out of  
an action in the lower court or tribunal. Here, there was no  
action pending in the Lapeer Circuit Court.9  
9 
 Moreover, the Court of Appeals conclusion that the 
plaintiffs could have sought a declaratory judgment in a 
circuit court action is both speculative and highly 
questionable. The declaratory judgment rule merely provides 
an additional remedy that a party may seek; it does not create 
a basis for jurisdiction. MCR 2.605 provides:  
(A) Power to Enter Declaratory Judgment. 
(continued...)  
15  
 
VI  
It may well be that an action for superintending control  
is the proper means for the county clerk to challenge the  
validity of the circuit court’s administrative order.  If so,  
however, only this Court has jurisdiction to entertain such an  
action.  That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the  
circuit court’s plan for the family division was adopted  
pursuant to our Administrative Order No. 1997-1, which  
directed that circuit courts prepare implementation plans and  
submit them to the State Court Administrative Office for  
approval.  In these circumstances, the circuit court’s  
challenged practices were intertwined with our supervisory  
9 (...continued) 
(1) In a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of an 
interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, 
whether or not other relief is or could be sought 
or granted.  
(2) For the purpose of this rule, an action is 
considered within the jurisdiction of a court if 
the court would have jurisdiction of an action on 
the same claim or claims in which the plaintiff 
sought relief other than a declaratory judgment.  
The county clerk could not have brought a circuit court 
action on the claim made in this case. Such an action would  
have sought superintending control over the general practices 
of the circuit court, but, under Const 1963, art 6, § 13, the 
circuit court only has superintending control jurisdiction 
over lower courts. 
Also, contrary to the Court of Appeals 
suggestion, the county clerk could not have raised the 
question of the validity of Local Administrative Order No. 
2000-1 in a case pending in the family division because the 
clerk would not be an interested party in such a proceeding.  
16  
  
 
 
 
 
control over the court system, making it particularly  
inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to intervene to review  
the circuit court’s plan.10  
The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue an  
order 
of 
superintending control to the circuit court regarding  
its plan for the implementation of the family division.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is  
reversed.11  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
10 On its face, the Court of Appeals decision in this case 
is limited to the Lapeer circuit plan.  However, the 
published 
decision 
would affect practices in other circuits as 
well. See MCR 7.215(C)(2), (I)(1).  
11 After oral argument, amicus curiae Michigan Judges 
Association filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental 
brief. That motion is denied as moot.  
17