Title: Nathaniel Williams v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-139
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC03-139
____________
NATHANIEL WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[December 11, 2003]
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Williams
v. State, 834 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), which expressly and directly
conflicts with our decisions in Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1999), and
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), on the harmless error standard of
review.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
In DiGuilio, this Court set out the test to be applied in determining whether
an error is harmful:
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The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not
clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear
and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test. Harmless
error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the
trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus is on the
effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  The question is whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.  The burden
to show the error was harmless must remain on the state.  If the
appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful. 
491 So. 2d at 1139.  We reaffirmed this harmless error standard in Goodwin,
holding that the enactment of section 924.051(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), did
not alter the obligation of the appellate courts to independently review both
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors for harmlessness under the DiGuilio
standard.  See Goodwin, 751 So. 2d at 542-43.  
In this case, the Third District departed from the DiGuilio standard in holding
that a preserved trial court error did not warrant reversal because "given all of the
other evidence as to William's [sic] guilt, we cannot conclude that this error
necessarily deprived Williams of a fair trial."  Williams, 834 So. 2d at 925
(emphasis supplied).  We recently quashed and remanded for reconsideration a
decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in which that court used an
incorrect harmless error test.  See Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1058-59
(Fla. 2003).  Consistent with Knowles, as well as with our decisions in DiGuilio and
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Goodwin, we quash in part the Third District's decision in this case and remand for
reconsideration under the correct harmless error standard.  We decline to address
the additional issue raised by Williams that is beyond the scope of the conflict
issue.  See Asbell v. State, 715 So. 2d 258, 258 (Fla. 1998).
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
BELL, J., concurs in result only.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I would discharge jurisdiction.  I believe the majority gives to the Third
District’s opinion too cramped a reading.  I do not read the opinion to conflict with
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).  The Third District’s decision as to
the merits is correct.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D02-11
(Miami-Dade County)
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Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm
Beach, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Respondent