Title: State v. Stip
Citation: 246 N.W.2d 897
Docket Number: 11815
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 1976

246 N.W.2d 897 (1976) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur STIP, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11815. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Argued September 7, 1976. Decided November 12, 1976. *898 John P. Dewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, Wilson Kleibacker, Lake County State's Atty., Madison, for plaintiff and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief. Steve Jorgensen of Willy, Pruitt, Matthews &amp; Jorgensen, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant. DUNN, Chief Justice. The defendant was convicted in a jury trial by the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of obstructing a public officer under SDCL 3-15-3[1] in the discharge of her duty in that defendant prevented the Lake County Director of Equalization from making a property spot check pursuant to SDCL 10-3-23[2] on his farm. Defendant appeals, alleging as error (1) that the director of equalization was introduced as the county assessor, and that county assessors have no power to make such spot checks, (2) that the director had an alternate method of assessment, and thus there was no obstruction in the performance of her duty, and (3) that a search warrant must be obtained prior to entry by a public official under SDCL 10-3-23. Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of this statute under § 11, Article VI of the South Dakota Constitution. We reverse. On June 13, 1975, the director of equalization and her deputy accompanied the Lake County Sheriff to defendant's property at a time set during a previous conversation between the sheriff and defendant. The purpose of the visit was to spot-check defendant's personal property and to measure defendant's buildings. Although properties to be spot-checked were normally determined by a random drawing, defendant's name had been submitted by the township board. When they arrived, defendant's pickup was found blocking the driveway to his farm. Upon being informed of the purpose of the visit, defendant refused their entry. Neither the director nor the sheriff had a search warrant. A complaint was later signed. Defendant was tried before a jury which returned a verdict of guilty. He was given a thirty-day jail sentence which was to be suspended upon his allowing the director to make an appraisal of his property. Upon arriving at defendant's farm, the director was identified by the sheriff and by herself as the county assessor. Defendant claims that the offices of director of equalization and county assessor are not the same. Because SDCL 10-3-23 does not provide that assessors have the power to enter property, defendant maintains that he properly refused entry to the director when she was introduced as the county assessor. He particularly notes that SDCL 10-3 contains several sections which include assessor in enumerating powers of the director, his deputies and assessors. He claims the absence in SDCL 10-3-23 was purposeful and that assessors are precluded from such entry. A review of SDCL 10-3 reveals that two distinct officesassessor and director of equalizationdo exist; however, there are also deputy assessors who serve as deputies to the director and have his powers and duties. SDCL 10-3-11. Evidence was presented that the title of director of equalization may have been mentioned once during the conversations between the director and the defendant or between the sheriff and the defendant. The record indicates *899 that defendant knew the director and knew the purpose of her visit. For that reason we hold it was not prejudicial in this suit for the court to instruct the jury that the director of equalization and county assessor were the same person. Defendant next contends that by refusing the director entry upon his land he did not obstruct her in the performance of her duty because SDCL 10-3-27 provides an alternate method of assessment when a landowner refuses to comply with the requirements of SDCL 10-3. Defendant contends that SDCL 10-3-23 is only one method of assessing property. He claims that because SDCL 10-3-27 was listed as one of the "required duties" of the director under § 7(10), Ch. 477, S.L.1957, and because SDCL 10-3-23 was listed under "additional duties and powers" in § 8(6), Ch. 477, S.L. 1957, these methods must be viewed together and that they provide alternative methods of assessment. SDCL 10-3-27 provides as follows: While the director is required by SDCL 10-3-27 to estimate by this "windshield appraisal" method when a person refuses to comply with the requirements of SDCL 10-3 or 10-6, there are no requirements under SDCL 10-3-23 to which defendant must comply as there are in SDCL 10-3-18, 10-3-19, 10-3-20, 10-6-5, 10-6-6, 10-6-7, 10-6-8, 10-6-12, 10-6-13, 10-6-15 and 10-6-35.7. SDCL 10-3-23 merely empowers the director and his deputies "to enter upon and inspect all property," obstruction of which has been classified by our legislature as a misdemeanor.[3] Finally, defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court cases of Camara v. Municipal Court, 1967, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, and See v. Seattle, 1967, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, require that absent special or emergency circumstances a search warrant must be obtained prior to entry by public officials. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of SDCL 10-3-23 under § 11, Article VI of the South Dakota Constitution, which provides: In determining if warrantless entry under SDCL 10-3-23 is "unreasonable" under our state constitution, we look for guidance from several United States Supreme Court cases in which that Court construed Fourth Amendment reasonableness and warrantless administrative searches. In Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a writ of prohibition should have been granted preventing appellant's prosecution for refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence by a municipal health inspector. Although the proposed inspection was routine and "a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime," 387 U.S. at 530, 87 S. Ct. at 1731, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 936, and although there were procedural safeguards limiting the inspections, the Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment interests were threatened. The Court stated that: Several factors necessitating the warrant requirement were listed. Housing code violations discovered during such an inspection were enforceable by criminal process. In addition, refusal to permit an inspection was punishable by criminal process. The Court went further, stating: Another factor considered by the Court included the assistance a warrant would serve in informing the resident of the need for, authority for, and limits of the inspection; in limiting the discretion of the inspector; and in providing the individualized review that the Court has so long favored. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 1948, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the public interest demanded warrantless administrative searches. Thus, where an emergency exists, warrantless searches may be made, but as in most routine area inspections where "there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day" warrants should be sought, but only after entry is refused. 387 U.S. at 539, 87 S. Ct. at 1736, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 941. In the companion case of See v. City of Seattle, supra, the Court applied the Camara ruling to a businessman's refusal to allow entry by a fire inspector. Later cases have found See and Camara inapplicable in the "closely regulated" liquor industry, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 1970, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60; in "pervasively regulated business" under the Gun Control Act of 1968 where an inspection system was approved "carefully limited in time, place, and scope," United States v. Biswell, 1972, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87; and home visits under New York's aid to families with dependent children where no criminal sanction was provided. Wyman v. James, 1971, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S. Ct. 381, 27 L. Ed. 2d 408.[4] In this case the Court further stressed the criminal sanction test by stating: In the case at bar there was admittedly no emergency present. A criminal sanction may be imposed, and has been under SDCL 3-15-3, for refusal to permit entry by the director of equalization. Upon discovering property on the premises which was not listed, other sanctions may be imposed. SDCL 10-6-20 provides: An official opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General stated that imposition of the penalties of SDC 57.0341 (now SDCL 10-6-20) was mandatory. In addition, SDCL 10-6-21 provides: Finally, a criminal sanction may be imposed by SDCL 10-21-3 for either refusing entry or for discovering property not listed. SDCL 10-21-3 provides: The presence of criminal sanctions would thus place this case within the framework of the Camara and See decisions. Further, in this case, the primary objective of the inspection was not the welfare of the inhabitants of the Stip farm. The director's objective was to discover any property not listed on the defendant's tax assessment statement. This is precisely the same matter for which the monetary penalties and criminal sanctions are provided. The state argues that the public interest in equitable imposition of taxes requires the right of entry; however, no one would argue that there is not a public interest in deterring crime. Where, as here, it would not frustrate the purpose of the law to require a search warrant when entry is refused, we cannot uphold a warrantless right of entry under § 11, Article VI of our constitution. In arriving at this decision we do not hold that SDCL 10-3-23 is unconstitutional; we merely hold that the statute imposes the requirement of a warrant based on *902 probable cause when entry is refused. In determining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate must balance the need for the inspection by the director of equalization against the constitutional grant of privacy to our citizens. Section 11, Article VI, South Dakota Constitution. Reversed. All the Justices concur. [1] "Every person who willfully delays or obstructs any public officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his office is guilty of a misdemeanor." [2] "The director of equalization and his deputies shall have power to enter upon and inspect all property for the purpose of determining the value thereof or to discover and list property that has been omitted from the assessment rolls; and shall each year list the taxpayers whom he has checked and file said list with the county auditor." [3] SDCL 22-6-2 makes the offense "punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment." [4] South Dakota's statute providing for home visits is SDCL 28-7-7. [5] The Wyman decision went on to compare the case to one where the Internal Revenue Service requested a taxpayer to produce proof of a deduction. If the taxpayer refused, the sanction imposed would be disallowance of the claimed deduction, resulting only in additional tax. [6] This section also carries the potential punishment of SDCL 22-6-2, see note 3, supra. We also note that SDCL 10-21-3 and SDCL 3-15-3 were both part of Chapter 13.13 of SDC 1939.