Title: Warner v. State
Citation: 254 Ind. 209, 258 N.E.2d 860
Docket Number: 769S170
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 1970

254 Ind. 209 (1970)
258 N.E.2d 860
WARNER
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 769S170.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 3, 1970.
Walter A. Cornell (Deceased), Charles W. Ardery, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.
*210 Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
HUNTER, C.J.
This appeal arises out of a proceeding held in the Juvenile Division of the Hamilton County Circuit Court in which appellant, Ted Warner, age 15, was adjudged to be a delinquent child and ordered committed to the Indiana Boys' School until he reaches the age of 21 years. Said proceeding was conducted pursuant to the provisions of Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215 (1969 Supp.) which provides for the conduct of hearings to determine the merits of a delinquency petition and for the judgments which may be entered therein. A summary of the facts in this cause follows.
Ted Warner was a student at the Hamilton Southeastern High School in Noblesville, Indiana. On March 18, 1969, Warner was in attendance at a mathematics class presented by Mr. Ervin E. Dinn, a teacher at said school. Mr. Dinn was the only witness to testify at Warner's delinquency hearing.
According to Mr. Dinn, Ted Warner and one Randy Ferguson, a fellow student, got up in the middle of his mathematics class at approximately 2:25 P.M. on March 18th and left the room without permission. Under ordinary circumstances Mr. Dinn requires his students to ask permission before leaving the classroom, but in the event of emergency, e.g. sickness, the students are allowed to leave without permission provided they sign out before doing so. In this case neither Warner nor his companion Ferguson asked permission or signed out.
When Mr. Dinn noticed the two boys leaving the room, he interrupted his class and pursued them out the door and down the corridor. He stated that he walked "pretty fast" to catch up with them. He accosted the boys approximately ten feet from the classroom door where, according to Dinn, "he put his hands on his [the appellant's] shoulders and backed him up against the wall to stop him."
Appellant then allegedly struck Mr. Dinn in the stomach causing him to double up in pain. At this point Dinn ordered *211 appellant to report to the principal's office for disciplining. The other student, Randy Ferguson, returned to class on his own without further incident. A preliminary inquiry was held in the above matter in the Juvenile Division of the Hamilton Circuit Court pursuant to Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3208 (1969 Supp.). As a result of that inquiry, the court ordered that a petition of delinquency be filed and set the same for a formal hearing for April 4, 1969.
Appellant's assignments of error in this appeal relate to both the conduct of the formal delinquency hearing, as well as to the procedures followed by the Juvenile Court in matters preliminary thereto. The following is a summary of appellant's objections:
It shall be unnecessary, for the reasons stated below, for this court to deal with each of the above-summarized allegations of error presented by appellant. This court is compelled to reverse the judgment in this cause and remand the same in view of the most recent pronouncement by the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of the rights of juveniles in state delinquency proceedings.
In the case of In the Matter of Samuel Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, that Court held that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" during the adjudicatory stage when the juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. Heretofore this state and most others had imposed the evidentiary standard in juvenile matters of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
In announcing the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan states:
*214 The decision the Court reaches, although one which this Court very reluctantly recognizes, is clear and unequivocal:
Accordingly, we hereby adopt the reasonable doubt standard as the test to be applied in adjudicating the delinquency of a child in cases where the offender commits an act which, but for his age, would constitute a crime.[2] The application of this standard in the determination of delinquency based on any of the other grounds set out in § 9-3204, supra, is patently impractical, and we believe it would seriously interfere with the juvenile court's effectiveness in carrying out its purposes. This is especially true in cases dealing with the parent-child relationship and with a juvenile's relationship with other juveniles. This opinion should in no way be construed to expand the reasonable doubt standard to these other areas.
On rehearing, the Juvenile Court is hereby directed to conduct a full, formal hearing in this matter in accordance with the provisions of § 9-3215, supra, and, upon a determination of the relevant facts in the case, the Court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence of probative value to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of each element of the offense charged. A review by this Court of a judgment of delinquency, where the delinquency is based on the commission of an act which, if committed by an adult would be a crime, will be made now by necessity on the same terms as apply in the review of criminal appeals. E.g. see *215 Easton v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 338, 228 N.E.2d 6; Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N.E.2d 641.
This court would be remiss in its duties if it disposed of this case without some comment as to the totality of events surrounding the proceedings below. We are not unmindful of the deplorable rise in the frequency of acts of violence committed by students against teachers in our schools in Indiana and throughout the nation. The reports of these incidents in official publications as well as in newspapers and over radio-TV are often fraught with shocking brutality and tragic consequences. Where school authorities deem the situation in a school or with a particular pupil so intolerable that they feel it necessary to invoke the aid of our courts for remedial action, we should stand ready to do whatever is judicially appropriate to restore peace and order to the academic institution involved.
Notwithstanding our strong sentiments in this regard, we believe with equal resolve and conviction, that in order for our judicial system to be effective, it must be respected, and in order for it to be respected it must be fair. Convicting a man accused for a dastardly crime by an unfair proceeding or one which appears to be unfair may win favor for the court among the outraged citizenry at the time of the alleged offense. But over the long run, after time has placed events in their proper perspective, the inequitable conduct of the court will invariably prevail in its effect on public opinion, the end result of which will be the overall diminution of the stature of the judiciary. In short, the more emotionally charged or heinous the crime, the greater is the need for judicial circumspection in the conduct of the trial.
In the record before us we note several instances wherein we believe the Court could have improved its conduct of the proceedings so as to insure that, irrespective of the disposition of the cause, the appellant would at least believe that he had received fair treatment from the court.
*216 To begin with, at the preliminary hearing conducted in this cause on March 21, 1969, the Court ordered a delinquency petition filed and informed the appellant Warner that the court was doing so for the following reasons:
At the formal hearing, counsel for appellant sought to cross-examine the victim, Mr. Dinn, in an attempt to show his previous conduct with respect to similar incidents involving students at Hamilton Southeastern High School. The Court, in response to an objection made by prosecutor to this line of questioning stated:
This colloquy was followed immediately by the following:
Not only does the record indicate the Court's inconsistency with respect to its announced intention to get out in the open the entire matter of the incidents of violence at the School, and concerning this very same teacher, but it also indicates that the Court would not accept the theory of provocation either in mitigation or in defense of the charges against appellant. Further, the Court by proclaiming that it had "had enough of this" and that it had quite a few people waiting in other matters, could not have helped but create an atmosphere of impatience in the courtroom, especially in the eyes of a 15 year old young man.
For most young offenders, their first contact with the judicial processes of our society occurs in the juvenile court. It is particularly important that the impression the juvenile receives in his initial courtroom experience is one of solicitude and fairness. In re Adams v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 460, 193 N.E.2d 362. The juvenile court's effectiveness in rehabilitating the allegedly delinquent child, and in helping him avoid the inevitable life of crime depends in large measure on what has become the cornerstone of our juvenile system, that is, fair treatment. Summers v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320.
It is not difficut to surmise that the appellant, who based on the record in this case, had no prior offenses, must have been somewhat less than impressed with the fairness of the Court, upon hearing the Judge in quick succession[1] announce *218 that "he had had enough of this" and then commit him to the Indiana Boys' School. This court is admittedly at a disadvantage when it endeavors to reconstruct from an impersonal and unemotional record, the atmosphere or judicial tenor of a hearing or trial. However in this case we believe the record speaks for itself.
Judgment reversed.
Givan, J., concurs; DeBruler and Jackson, JJ., concur in result; Arterburn, J., dissents with opinion.
ARTERBURN, J.
The majority opinion reverses a juvenile proceeding in which a boy was charged with hitting a teacher. As I read the majority opinion, it reverses on the basis that the standard beyond a reasonable doubt was not observed by the trial court. I have gone through the briefs and the opinion and I cannot find that there is any place that it can be said that the judge failed to observe the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not presume to the contrary unless it is apparent in the record that the judge refused to observe such proper standards. There is no record showing that the trial court used a preponderance of the evidence as a standard instead of beyond a reasonable doubt as a standard.
I further point out that the evidence is uncontradicted. The juvenile struck the teacher in apparent anger because the teacher attempted to stop him from leaving the classroom without permission. There is no contradiction about this evidence. If it is uncontradicted, it is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and we cannot reverse because of an insufficiency of the evidence. I cannot go along with the reversal of a case on a point that has no merit.
NOTE.  Reported in 258 N.E.2d 860.
[1]  This Court has recently decided that the provision at Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215 (1969 Supp.) providing that delinquency hearings shall be held without a jury is constitutional. Bible v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 373, 254 N.E.2d 319.
[2]  No reason or basis is presented by the Court in Winship for limiting the application of the reasonable doubt standard to the proof of delinquency based on a crime. In Indiana, as in most jurisdictions, the juvenile judge can enter the very same judgment for such offenses as truancy or incorrigibility as he can for the commission of a criminal offense.