Title: Emerald Partners v. Berlin, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 295, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EMERALD PARTNERS, a New  
§ 
Jersey limited partnership, 
 
§  No. 295, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  Court Below–Court of Chancery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
RONALD P. BERLIN, DAVID L. 
§  in and for New Castle County 
FLORENCE, REX A. SEBASTIAN, §  C.A. No. 9700 
and THEODORE H. STRAUSS, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  November 18, 2003 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  December 23, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices, and COOCH, Judge.1  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of December 2003, on consideration of the briefs and 
arguments of the parties, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
The basic facts are set forth in several prior opinions of this 
Court.2 
 
2) 
Emerald Partners now appeals from a decision of the Court of 
Chancery, following remand from this Court, holding that the 1988 merger 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 2 and Del. Const. art. IV § 12. 
2 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 
A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 552 A.2d 482 (Del. 1988). 
 
2
between May Petroleum, Inc. and Hall Real Estate Group was entirely fair.  
Emerald Partners argues that the seriously flawed process by which the 
merger was negotiated precludes a finding of entire fairness; that May’s 
directors breached their duty of good faith; that the disclosures in connection 
with the merger were inaccurate and misleading; and that the May 
defendants failed to establish that the merger price was entirely fair. 
 
3) 
The Court of Chancery found several deficiencies in the merger 
negotiations, and we agree with its comment that “process laxity . . . cannot 
be condoned . . .”3  Indeed, we find that the many process flaws in this case 
raise serious questions as to the independent directors’ good faith, e.g., the 
independent directors evidenced a “we don’t care about the risks” attitude by 
repeatedly failing to exclude Hall from their deliberative process and by 
giving Hall continuous direct and prior access to the valuation expert hired 
to advise the independent directors.4  But, the Court of  Chancery found that 
the price was fair and this Court accords a “high level of deference” to Court 
of Chancery findings based upon the evaluation of expert financial 
testimony.5  In this case, we agree with its analysis on the issue of price. 
                                          
 
3 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2003 WL 21003437 (Del. Ch.) at *23. 
4 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
5 Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995). 
 
3
4) 
Thus, we need not address the good faith claim because, even if 
the May directors would not be protected by the exculpation provision in 
their company’s certificate of incorporation, they are not liable for any 
monetary damages.6  Finally, we conclude the Court of  Chancery’s analysis 
rejecting Emerald Partners’ disclosure claim is supported by the record and 
the product of a logical deductive process. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Court of Chancery be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
6 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).