Title: Ponce v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S04-1308-PC-533
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2014

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Stephen T. Owens 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
James T. Acklin  
 
 
 
 
 
Joseph Y. Ho 
Chief Deputy Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 20S04-1308-PC-533 
 
VICTOR PONCE, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court, No. 20C01-1001-PC-1 
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A04-1208-PC-396 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
June 5, 2014 
 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
Jun 05 2014, 8:48 am
 
2 
Victor Ponce is a non-native English speaker who pleaded guilty under terms of an 
agreement.  He appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief essentially contending 
that the Spanish translation of the rights he was waiving by entering the plea was so inaccurate 
his plea of guilty was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  We agree and 
reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.   
 
Background 
 
Over the last few decades, language diversity across the country has grown rapidly and 
non-English languages increasingly play a “continuing and growing role . . . as part of the 
national fabric.”  Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use in the United States: 2011 
15 (August 2013).  English speaking abilities vary throughout the country and like most states 
across our nation Indiana is no stranger to language diversity.  For example in 2011, 8.2% of 
Indiana’s population spoke a language other than English at home and when asked to classify 
their level of English proficiency nearly 17% responded “not well” or “not at all.”  Id. at 2, 11.  
These linguistic barriers limit individuals’ ability to participate fully in an English-speaking 
society and have a direct impact on their education, employment opportunities, poverty status, 
and even medical care.  Id. at 10.  
 
Among the most significant obstacles that persons of Limited English Proficiency 
(commonly referred to as “LEP”) must overcome are the challenges to meaningful access to the 
courts.  Impaired access to justice resulting from language inequalities is particularly damaging 
in the criminal context when someone’s very liberty is at stake and a faulty trial can have 
irrevocable consequences.  Essentially, for “the ‘language-impaired’ . . . due process is an empty 
charade because of their inability to communicate effectively or to comprehend the proceedings 
against them.”  Virginia E. Hench, What Kind of Hearing? Some Thoughts on Due Process for 
the Non-English-Speaking Criminal Defendant, 24 T. Marshall L. Rev. 251, 253 (1999).  Due 
process is far more than a term of art.  “[T]he fundamental requirement of procedural due 
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  Perdue 
v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 
 
3 
(1970)).  In order for this constitutional protection to have meaning for the LEP litigant, due 
process must include not only the opportunity to be heard but also the opportunity to hear. 
 
Both federal and state courts recognize the daunting challenges faced by LEP individuals; 
and courts are working diligently to eliminate those challenges.  At the forefront of this initiative 
is an effort to provide competent interpreters for all LEP litigants.  State and federal systems as 
well as independent agencies are working collaboratively to provide guidance in developing 
interpreter services.  See generally Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, A National Call to Action Access 
to Justice for Limited English Proficient Litigants: Creating Solutions to Language Barriers in 
State Courts (2013); Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, American Bar 
Association, Standards for Language Access in Courts (February 2012) [hereinafter “ABA 
Standards”].  Ensuring competent interpretation services is “an essential component of a 
functional and fair justice system.”  ABA Standards, supra, 1.  The lack of qualified interpreters 
affects the system of justice as a whole.  Id.  “Judges cannot administer justice when litigants in 
their courtrooms are unable to understand what is going on, or to convey crucial information to 
the court.”  Laura Abel, Brennan Center for Justice, Language Access in State Courts 5 (2009).1 
This is equally damaging to the State’s interests as well as those of the defendant.  See, e.g., 
Arrietta v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 n.2 (Ind. 2008) (recounting instance when charges of 
child abuse were “dismissed on speedy trial grounds after three-year failure to find interpreter 
fluent in defendant’s native language”); Abel, supra, 32 (explaining that lack of interpreters 
exacerbates the problem of unnecessary delays in the court system). 
 
For the last decade the State of Indiana has endeavored to create a more comprehensive 
and centralized interpreter program that ensures competent interpreter services in order to 
improve the quality of language access for LEP litigants.2  “Audits of interpreted court 
                                                 
1 Available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/LanguageAccessinStateCourts.pdf.   
 
2 The Indiana Court Interpreter Program is a statewide court interpreter system, which includes a code of 
ethics for interpreters and sets specific certification standards.  See Ind. Jud. Branch Div. of State Ct. 
Admin., 
Court 
Interpreter 
Certification 
Program, 
About 
the 
Program, 
Introduction, 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/interpreter/2384.htm [hereinafter “Certification Program”]; see also Randall 
T. Shepard, Access to Justice for People Who Do Not Speak English, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 643, 652-57 (2007) 
(explaining “Indiana’s Initiatives on Interpreter Needs”).  At present, in conjunction with the National 
 
4 
proceedings in several states have revealed that untested and untrained ‘interpreters’ often 
deliver inaccurate, incomplete information to both the person with limited English proficiency 
and the trier of fact.”  Certification Program.  Therefore, simply providing “any” interpreter upon 
request is insufficient.  A “failure to accommodate persons with [language] disabilities will often 
have the same practical effect as outright exclusion[.]”  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 
(2004) (discussing claim made by paraplegics that state denied them access to the courts).  Thus, 
it is imperative to ensure accurate interpretation throughout the proceedings lest we run the risk 
of diminishing our system of justice by infringing upon the defendant’s rights of due process.  It 
is with this background that we turn to the facts of this case.   
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In 1999 Victor Ponce was charged with two counts of delivery of cocaine within one 
thousand feet of a school, as a Class A felony.  Pursuant to an agreement Ponce decided to plead 
guilty to one of the counts.  At his guilty plea hearing Ponce requested an interpreter which the 
trial court provided.  As explained in more detail below the trial court, through the interpreter, 
advised Ponce of his Boykin rights3 and Ponce thereafter pleaded guilty as agreed.  Ten years 
later Ponce filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief which was amended by counsel in 
2011.  Among other things the petition alleged that Ponce’s plea was not entered knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily because the court-appointed interpreter failed to translate accurately 
Ponce’s Boykin rights.4  The post-conviction court denied Ponce’s petition for relief, specifically 
                                                                                                                                                             
Center for State Courts Consortium, Indiana’s certification program includes 22 different languages.  See 
Certification Program, Get Certified.  However, interpreter services are needed in even more languages; 
but certification is not currently available. Consequently, this Court is considering the efforts of other 
jurisdictions that employ a process by which interpreters may be classified as “qualified” to conduct 
simultaneous, in-court, oral interpretation or written translation even though they have not undergone the 
requirements for court “certification.” 
 
3 In Boykin v. Alabama the United States Supreme Court declared that the record for a guilty plea must 
show the defendant voluntarily and understandingly waived the following federal constitutional rights: (1) 
“the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination;” (2) “the right to trial by jury;” and (3) “the right to 
confront one’s accusers.”  395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).   
 
4 Ponce also raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the post-conviction court, alleging 
that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to accept a plea agreement that contained what he 
 
5 
rejecting Ponce’s argument that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given.  Ponce 
appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court, 
concluding that although the advisement was “defective” Ponce nonetheless knew at the time of 
the plea hearing that he was waiving his Boykin rights.  Ponce v. State, 992 N.E.2d 726, 731 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), vacated.  Having previously granted Ponce’s petition to transfer thereby 
vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we now reverse the 
judgment of the post-conviction court.  Additional facts are recounted below.  
 
Discussion 
 
As we have previously declared: “In considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea we 
start with the standard that the record of the guilty plea proceeding must demonstrate that the 
defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them.”  
Turman v. State, 392 N.E.2d 483, 484 (Ind. 1979) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242).  And Boykin 
requires that a trial court accepting a guilty plea “must be satisfied that an accused is aware of his 
right against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.”5 
Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ind. 2001) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243).  The failure to 
advise a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights in accordance with Boykin prior to 
accepting a guilty plea will result in reversal of the conviction.  Youngblood v. State, 542 N.E.2d 
188, 188 (Ind. 1989) (quoting White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ind. 1986)).  Accordingly, a 
defendant who demonstrates that the trial court failed to properly give a Boykin advisement 
during the guilty plea hearing has met his threshold burden for obtaining post-conviction relief.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
contended was an “illusory benefit.”  App. at 107 (3d Am. Pet. at 1, ¶8(b)).  The post-conviction court 
rejected this argument.  Ponce does not advance this claim on appeal. 
 
5 As we observed in Weatherford v. State, 697 N.E.2d 32, 35 n.8 (Ind. 1998), Indiana has codified this 
requirement; and a trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless the defendant has been advised, among 
other things, that he waives his right to: “(A) a public and speedy trial by jury; (B) confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against the defendant; (C) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the 
defendant’s favor; and (D) require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a 
trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”  Ind. Code § 35-
35-1-2(a)(2). 
 
6 
The record shows that at the 1999 guilty plea hearing the court appointed Christina 
Castillo as an interpreter.6  The trial court asked Ponce through the interpreter if he read, wrote, 
and understood the English language, to which Ponce responded: “Lo entiendo, y lo hablo un 
poco.”  Ex. G at 5.  Interpreter Castillo restated this to the court in English as: “He understands a 
little and speaks a little English.”  Guilty Plea Tr. at 7.7  The trial court informed Ponce through 
the interpreter: “If you do not understand the words or questions that I use, please let me 
know[.]”  Guilty Plea Tr. at 6.  The court then asked: “Are you able to understand the 
conversation we’re having through the translator?”  Guilty Plea Tr. at 7.  These statements were 
interpreted to Ponce accurately and he indicated that he was able to understand the proceedings 
through Interpreter Castillo.  The trial court then properly advised Ponce in English of his 
Boykin rights.  Interpreter Castillo communicated with Ponce in Spanish regarding these 
advisements and Ponce responded in Spanish that he understood the court’s advisements. 
 
At his post-conviction relief hearing in 2012 Ponce still struggled with the English 
language.  Even at that time—thirteen years after he had pleaded guilty—the post-conviction 
court acknowledged that “when we get to legal terms [Ponce] need[s] a Spanish translator[.]”  
P.C.R. Tr. at 2.  Ponce called as a witness Christina Courtright, a certified court interpreter.  
Interpreter Courtright testified about the discrepancies between the trial court’s advisements and 
the Spanish language statements given to Ponce by Interpreter Castillo.  She explained that 
Interpreter Castillo inaccurately restated the advisements to Ponce as represented below:  
 
Court’s Advisement in English 
English Equivalent of Spanish 
Interpretation Given to Ponce 
 
Mr. Ponce, I now advise you that 
you have the right to a public and 
speedy trial by jury. 
He’s—he’s advising you that you 
have the right to another—another 
judging [2 syllables unintelligible] 
speedier.  Okay? 
 
                                                 
6 At the time of Ponce’s guilty plea hearing Indiana had not yet created the Court Interpreter Certification 
Program.  Thus, Interpreter Castillo was uncertified as there was no formalized certification system for 
court interpreters in the state. 
 
7 The record includes a transcript of the September 9, 1999 guilty plea hearing, which we will refer to as 
“Guilty Plea Tr.”  The record also contains a transcript of the May 25, 2012 hearing on Ponce’s petition 
for post-conviction relief, which we will refer to hereinafter as “P.C.R. Tr.” 
 
7 
You also have the right to face all 
witnesses against you and to see, 
hear, question, and cross-examine 
these witnesses. 
 
*   *   *  
 
And you also have the right to see 
those who have the witnesses and . . . 
to ask if it’s all right [1 syllable 
unintelligible]. 
 
*   *   * 
Further, you cannot be compelled to 
make any statement or testify against 
yourself at any hearing or trial . . . 
but you may remain silent. 
And until that date you cannot make 
other oaths against yourself . . . but 
you can remain silent. 
 
See Ex. G at 7-8.8  At the conclusion of the hearing the post-conviction court found, among other 
things: “At no time did Petitioner indicate that he did not understand the court through the 
translator.”  App. at 161 (P.C. Order at 7, ¶16).  The post-conviction court as well as the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the interpretation was “defective,” Ponce, 992 N.E.2d at 731, even 
calling it “poor,” App. at 161 (P.C. Order at 7, ¶18), but took the position that Ponce knew at the 
time of the plea hearing that he was waiving his Boykin rights.  In particular, like the post-
conviction court, the Court of Appeals concluded that “Ponce never even established that the 
plea hearing was deficient under Boykin[.]”  Ponce, 992 N.E.2d at 732 n.7; see also App. at 161 
(Order at 7, ¶18 (“[T]here is no evidence that Petitioner did not understand his Boykin rights.”)).  
We disagree with our colleagues.    
 
As this Court has observed, “one may fully understand and even acknowledge to others 
an understanding of what is in actuality an inaccurate interpretation of the proceedings.  Put 
another way, one can understand perfectly the words spoken by an interpreter who tells you the 
wrong thing.”  Diaz v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1089, 1095 (Ind. 2010).  Here there is no question that 
the trial court correctly articulated the specific rights enumerated in Boykin.  The problem, 
however, is that those rights were inaccurately interpreted.  Ponce may very well have 
understood exactly what the interpreter said but as the record shows what the interpreter said had 
little to do with what the trial court had actually advised.    
 
                                                 
8 After listening to the audio recording of the guilty plea hearing, Interpreter Courtright compared what 
the judge said in English with what was interpreted to Ponce in Spanish.  Courtright presented her 
comparison in a chart that was admitted into evidence as Exhibit G.  The State does not dispute 
Courtright’s interpretation of the audio recording.  
 
8 
Courts have long recognized that “a foreign language defendant’s capacity to understand 
and appreciate the proceedings, to participate with his counsel, to confront his accusers, and to 
waive rights knowingly and intelligently, is undermined without an interpreter actively 
participating in his defense.”  United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(citing United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970)).  
Undoubtedly, the defendant is denied due process when, among other things, “what is told him is 
incomprehensible [or] the accuracy and scope of a translation at a hearing or trial is subject to 
grave doubt[.]”  Cirrincione, 780 F.2d at 634.  For this reason we have declared that a “defendant 
who cannot speak or understand English has [the] right to have his proceedings simultaneously 
translated to allow for effective participation.”  Diaz, 934 N.E.2d at 1095 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 1989) (citation omitted)).  We 
elaborated that such interpretation must include “the precise form and tenor of each question 
propounded, and . . . in like manner translate the precise expressions of the [defendant].”  Id. at 
1095 (quoting People v. Cunningham, 546 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (quotation 
omitted)).  This is so because the interpreter’s role during a criminal proceeding is a critical one.  
“Language interpreters overcome the barriers and cultural misunderstandings that can render 
criminal defendants virtually absent from their own proceedings.  Interpreters also eliminate the 
misinterpretation of witnesses’ statements made to police or triers of fact during court 
proceedings.”  Lynn W. Davis, et al., The Changing Face of Justice: A Survey of Recent Cases 
Involving Courtroom Interpretation, 7 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 3 (2004).   
 
In this case, although the trial court’s English language advisements were properly given, 
the record shows they were not accurately communicated to Ponce during the guilty plea hearing 
in Spanish—the language he understood.  And the only evidence that Ponce understood the trial 
court’s English advisements is Ponce’s statement, “I understand it, and I speak it a little.”  Ex. G 
at 5.  We simply cannot infer from this statement that Ponce understood an explanation given in 
a foreign language of his legal rights especially where the Spanish interpretation of the 
advisements was wholly inadequate.   
 
Had the trial court uttered the words relayed to Ponce by the interpreter, we doubt that a 
court of review would hesitate to declare that Ponce had not been given his Boykin advisements.  
 
9 
Thus, we are of the view that an advisement from the mouth of the court-appointed interpreter 
instead of that of the trial judge to be a distinction without a difference.  In sum, we conclude 
that Ponce has demonstrated that his 1999 guilty plea hearing was not conducted in accordance 
with the mandates of Boykin.   
 
That is not to say, however, that Ponce is automatically entitled to post-conviction relief.  
“[O]nce a state prisoner has demonstrated that the plea taking was not conducted in accordance 
with Boykin, the state may, if it affirmatively proves in a post-conviction hearing that the plea 
was voluntary and intelligent, obviate the necessity of vacating the plea.”  Youngblood, 542 
N.E.2d at 189 (quoting Todd v. Lockhart, 490 F.2d 626, 628 (8th Cir. 1974)).  Stated somewhat 
differently, once the defendant demonstrates that the trial court did not advise him that he was 
waiving his Boykin rights by pleading guilty, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the 
petitioner nonetheless knew that he was waiving such rights.  And where the record of the guilty 
plea hearing itself does not establish that a defendant was properly advised of and waived his 
rights, evidence outside of that record may be used to establish a defendant’s understanding.  See 
id. (affirming denial of post-conviction relief where no Boykin advisement was given at the plea 
hearing but trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that they had explained these 
rights to defendant prior to the plea). 
 
The record shows that prior to the 1999 guilty plea hearing Ponce had been presented 
with and signed two different plea agreements both of which were written in English and 
contained language advising Ponce of his Boykin rights.  At the post-conviction hearing trial 
counsel testified that with the aid of a translator, he discussed these rights with Ponce.  The 
translator who assisted trial counsel in explaining these agreements to Ponce did not testify at the 
post-conviction hearing; and trial counsel did not testify concerning what the translator said to 
Ponce in Spanish.  In fact, trial counsel admitted that he had an insufficient knowledge of 
Spanish such that he was incapable of “determin[ing] whether or not concepts were being 
appropriately interpreted to [Ponce].”  P.C.R. Tr. at 63.  Rather, trial counsel explained that he 
believed Ponce to have understood his rights based on “his level of contentedness” after the 
translator’s explanation “and not having any additional questions for [him].”  P.C.R. Tr. at 63.  
The State insists that trial counsel’s testimony is sufficient to show that Ponce had been advised 
 
10 
of his Boykin rights and understood that a guilty plea would result in a waiver.  Br. of Appellee 
at 5, 7.  We disagree.  The foregoing testimony is not evidence establishing Ponce’s 
understanding.  Instead, it merely establishes that trial counsel employed a translator who relayed 
something to Ponce at the time counsel presented Ponce with the written plea agreements.   
  
The State also implies that the record of the post-conviction hearing shows that Ponce 
understood the trial court’s advisements because Ponce did not “inform the trial court [that] he 
did not understand the words the court used to describe his rights[.]”  Br. of Appellee at 4.  But 
the trial court’s advisements were in English.  Even though Ponce said he spoke and understood 
English “a little,” “participation in court proceedings requires far more than a very basic level of 
communicative capability.”  Laura K. Abel, Language Access in the Federal Courts, 61 Drake L. 
Rev. 593, 622 (2013) (quoting Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Court Interpretation: Model Guides for 
Policy and Practice in the State Courts 125 (1995)).  “Non-English speakers struggle merely to 
understand the words of court staff, lawyers, and judges, let alone the corresponding processes.  
Without a translator, a non-English speaker is left deaf without the aid of sign language.”  
Shepard, supra, 643.   
 
To the extent that the State’s argument is premised on Ponce’s statement that he 
understood the advisements through the interpreter we reiterate, “one may fully understand and 
even acknowledge to others an understanding of what is in actuality an inaccurate interpretation 
of the proceedings.”  Diaz, 934 N.E.2d at 1095.  In our view this is precisely what occurred here.  
Ponce’s declaration during the guilty plea hearing shows little more than an acknowledgement 
that he understood the interpreter’s faulty advisements.  This too is insufficient to show that 
Ponce knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.  Thus, even considering the record as a 
whole, the State has not demonstrated that Ponce’s legal rights were explained to him such that 
Ponce’s 1999 guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily given.    
 
Ensuring meaningful access to justice requires that all litigants—including those with 
limited English proficiency—are equally given the opportunity to participate meaningfully 
throughout the legal proceedings.  As Justice Frankfurter aptly declared long ago, “there is no 
greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.”  Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 
 
11 
184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  To declare that a defendant with limited English 
proficiency who received an incorrect interpretation of the trial court’s Boykin advisements 
should be equally culpable for his guilty plea as a defendant who is fluent in the English 
language and received an accurate and uninterrupted advisement directly from the trial court 
would work a great injustice not only on the LEP defendant, but on the integrity of our system as 
a whole.9  
  
Conclusion 
 
In this case Ponce carried his initial burden of demonstrating that at the guilty plea 
hearing he was not properly advised of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading 
guilty.  And the State failed to show that the record as a whole nonetheless demonstrated that 
Ponce understood his constitutional rights and waived them.  Therefore, Ponce’s plea of guilty 
must be vacated.  We thus reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this 
cause for further proceedings. 
 
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.  
                                                 
9 Indeed the observations of the United States Supreme Court over five decades ago concerning an 
accused’s right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions has resonance for the case before 
us today: 
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws 
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every 
defendant stands equal before the law.  This noble ideal cannot be 
realized if the [LEP defendant] charged with crime has to face his 
accusers without a [competent interpreter] to assist him.  
 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).