Title: State v. McClelland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 109044
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2015

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,044 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KYREE MARSHON MCCLELLAND, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Felony murder is the killing of a human being committed in the commission of, 
attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony. In interpreting the 
felony-murder statute, this court has rejected a narrow reading of the statute requiring that 
the death occur during the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from the felony. 
Instead, a less restrictive construction of the statute prevails in the caselaw, where the 
requirement is that the killing be some part of the underlying felony. 
 
2. 
In order to establish felony murder, the State must prove two causation elements. 
First, the death must lie within the res gestae of the underlying crime, which is defined in 
this context as acts committed before, during, or after the happening of the principal 
occurrence, when those acts are so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to 
form, in reality, a part of the occurrence. Second, the felony and the homicide must have 
a direct causal connection, which exists unless an extraordinary intervening event 
supersedes the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of death. 
 
2 
 
 
 
3. 
When applying the felony-murder rule, the felony and the victim's death do not 
need to occur simultaneously, nor does the felony need to occur before the death. Time, 
distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are 
factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and 
therefore subject to the felony-murder rule. 
 
4. 
A jury instruction on the elements of a crime that is broader than the complaint 
charging the crime is erroneous. The reason for this is because the charging instrument 
sets out the specific offense alleged to inform the defendant of the nature of the 
accusation, to permit the development of a defense to meet that accusation, and to protect 
against conviction based on facts not contemplated in the accusation. Accordingly, the 
State is bound by the wording of its charging document, and the prosecution and district 
court must use caution in conforming the jury instructions to the charges. 
 
5. 
 
Generally, if a jury instruction on the elements of a crime adds alternate statutory 
elements that were not contained within the language of the complaint or information 
charging the defendant with the crime, the instruction is overly broad and, thus, 
erroneous. 
 
6. 
When a defendant is sentenced to multiple convictions in Kansas, K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 21-6819(b)(2) requires that the district court establish a base sentence for the 
primary crime. The primary crime is the on-grid crime which has the highest severity 
level among all the on-grid crimes of which the defendant was convicted. K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6819(b)(4) provides that the total prison 
3 
 
 
 
sentence imposed in a case involving multiple convictions arising from multiple counts 
within an information, complaint, or indictment cannot exceed twice the base sentence. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; EVELYN Z. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed April 24, 2015. 
Affirmed in part, sentences vacated in part, and case remanded with directions. 
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Rachel Pickering, of 
the same office, was on the brief for appellant. 
 
Jodi E. Litfin, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.: A jury found Kyree Marshon McClelland guilty of felony murder, three 
counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. The 
district court sentenced McClelland to a hard 20 life sentence for the felony-murder 
conviction, imposed standard guidelines sentences for each of the remaining convictions, 
and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in a 153-month sentence 
consecutive to the life sentence. 
 
On appeal, McClelland argues:  (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to 
convict him of felony murder because one of the three attempted aggravated robberies 
relied on by the State to support the felony-murder charge was complete by the time 
McClelland shot the victim and, thus, the victim's death did not result from all three 
underlying felonies; (2) the district court's jury instruction on felony murder was broader 
than the charged crime; and (3) the district court violated the "double-rule" of K.S.A. 
2011 Supp. 21-6819(b)(4) when it imposed the 153-month prison sentence because the 
4 
 
 
 
sentence exceeded twice the base sentence McClelland received for the primary crime of 
attempted aggravated robbery. 
 
We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence showing that the victim's 
death resulted from any one of the three aggravated robberies McClelland attempted to 
commit. We also conclude that jury instruction on felony murder was not erroneous. 
Finally, as conceded by the State, we agree with McClelland that his 153-month prison 
sentence violates K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6819(b)(4) because the sentence is more than 
double the amount of prison time McClelland received for his primary crime of attempted 
aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we vacate the 153-month sentence and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
FACTS 
 
During the evening of August 29, 2011, Use David Laeli invited his neighbors, 
Timothy Stone and Cecil Penry, into his home so Penry could try on a pair of shoes that 
he was interested in buying from Laeli. As Penry was trying on the shoes near the kitchen 
area of the house, Laeli noticed a man he had never seen before, later identified as 
McClelland, inside his dining room. McClelland asked Laeli whether he had any 
marijuana. Laeli told McClelland that he had none and that McClelland needed to leave 
the house. At that point, McClelland pulled a handgun from behind his back and pointed 
it at Laeli. He ordered Laeli to give him money and to get on the floor. Laeli kneeled 
down on the floor. 
 
At this same time, McClelland noticed Penry and Stone standing near the kitchen 
area. He pointed his gun at them and demanded money. McClelland approached the men 
and attempted to strike Stone with his gun. At this point, Stone and Penry started 
5 
 
 
 
struggling with McClelland for control of the gun, and Laeli ran out of his home to a 
neighbor's house get help. 
 
During the struggle to disarm McClelland, the gun fired, striking Stone in the 
chest. Laeli heard the gunshot as he was returning from the neighbor's house with two 
other men to assist Stone and Penry. When the men entered the home, they saw Penry 
struggling with McClelland. The men eventually subdued McClelland, and shortly 
thereafter, he was taken into custody by police. Stone later died as a result of the gunshot 
wound. 
 
The State charged McClelland with one count of felony murder based on the 
underlying felony of attempted aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted aggravated 
robbery for each of the three victims (i.e., Stone, Penry, and Laeli), and one count of 
aggravated burglary. Notably, in charging McClelland with felony murder, the State did 
not specify which attempted aggravated robbery it was relying on to serve as the 
underlying felony. 
 
At trial, the State presented several witnesses, including Penry and Laeli. The 
defense presented no witnesses, and McClelland did not testify. 
 
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of the felony murder charged 
in this case: 
 
 
"The defendant is charged with the crime of murder in the first degree. The 
defendant pleads not guilty. 
 
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 1. That the defendant killed Timothy Stone; 
6 
 
 
 
 2. That such killing was done while attempting to commit aggravated 
robbery; and  
 3. That this act occurred on or about the 29th day of August, 2011, in 
Shawnee County, Kansas. 
 
"The elements of attempting to commit aggravated robbery are as follows: 
 
1. That the defendant performed an overt act toward the 
commission of the crime of aggravated robbery; 
 
2. That the defendant did so with the intent to commit the crime 
of aggravated robbery; 
 
3. That the defendant failed to complete the commission of the 
crime of aggravated robbery; and  
 
4. That this act occurred on or about the 29th day of August, 
2011, in Shawnee County, Kansas. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"The elements of the completed crime of aggravated robbery are as follows: 
 
1. That the defendant intentionally took property from the person 
of Timothy Stone, and/or Use David Laeli, Jr., and/or Cecil Penry, Jr.; 
 
2. That the taking was by threat of bodily harm to Timothy Stone, 
and/or Use David Laeli, Jr., and/or Cecil Penry, Jr.; 
 
3. That the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon; and 
 
4. That this act occurred on or about the 29th day of August, 
2011 in Shawnee County, Kansas." (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
Ultimately, the jury found McClelland guilty of all the charged crimes. The district 
court ordered McClelland to serve a hard 20 life sentence for the felony-murder 
conviction and imposed a consecutive 153-month sentence for the remaining convictions. 
McClelland filed a timely notice of appeal.  
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
As noted above, the district court instructed the jury that if it found McClelland 
killed Stone while attempting to rob Stone, Penry, or Laeli, then McClelland was guilty 
7 
 
 
 
of felony murder. Accordingly, the jury was instructed on alternative means of 
committing the felony murder charged in this case. See State v. Bailey, 292 Kan. 449, 
458, 255 P.3d 19 (2011) ("[D]ifferent underlying felonies supporting a charge of felony 
murder are alternative means rather than multiple acts."). 
 
In State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 289-90, 875 P.2d 242 (1994), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 317 P.3d 54 (2014), this court, quoting State v. 
Kitchen, 110 Wash. 2d 403, 410, 756 P.2d 105 (1988), stated: 
 
 
"'In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in 
more than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime 
charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was 
committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means.'" 
 
Subsequently, in State v. Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 203-06, 224 P.3d 1159 (2010), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 317 P.3d 54 (2014), this 
court held that appellate courts should apply a super-sufficiency of the evidence test in 
alternative means cases. Under this test, the State must present sufficient evidence to 
permit a jury to find each means of committing the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Therefore, when the jury is instructed on alternative means of committing a single crime 
and the State fails to present sufficient evidence to support each means, reversal is 
required. Wright, 290 Kan. at 202-03. 
 
Based on this caselaw, McClelland argues that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to convict him of felony murder because the evidence failed to establish each 
means of committing the felony murder charged in the case—namely, that Stone's death 
resulted from the attempted robbery of Laeli (McClelland does not dispute that Stone's 
death resulted from the attempted robberies of Stone and Penry). McClelland notes that 
Stone was shot after Laeli had escaped from the house. Thus, McClelland contends that 
8 
 
 
 
his attempted robbery of Laeli was completed by the time he shot Stone, rendering 
Stone's death unconnected to the attempted robbery. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this court 
reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational 
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374-75, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). An appellate court does not reweigh 
evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses. State v. 
McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 8, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). Furthermore, this court has 
recognized that there is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in 
terms of probative value. State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 105, 62 P.3d 220 (2003). "A 
conviction of even the gravest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence 
and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom. If an inference is a reasonable one, the jury 
has the right to make the inference." McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 9. 
 
Analysis 
 
Felony murder is the killing of a human being committed "in the commission of, 
attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-
5402(a)(2). Aggravated robbery is considered an inherently dangerous felony for 
purposes of applying the felony-murder rule. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5402(c)(1)(D). 
 
In interpreting the felony-murder statute, we have rejected a narrow reading of the 
statute requiring that the death occur during the commission of, attempt to commit, or 
flight from the felony. As noted in State v. Griffin, 279 Kan. 634, 641, 112 P.3d 862 
(2005), "[a] less restrictive construction of the statute prevails in the caselaw, where the 
requirement is that the killing be some part of the [underlying] felony." For example, in 
9 
 
 
 
Griffin, during the burglary of an apartment, the defendant and an accomplice pushed 
over a stove, causing the gas supply pipe to break. The defendant and his accomplice 
heard the gas hissing from the broken pipe and fled from the apartment. Gas continued to 
escape into the apartment until an explosion occurred sometime between 2 1/2 and 2 3/4 
hours later, killing two people. Reviewing this evidence, the Griffin court affirmed the 
defendant's felony-murder convictions, finding that the evidence was sufficient to show 
that the victims' deaths resulted from the defendant's commission of an inherently 
dangerous felony (i.e., burglary). 
 
Similarly, in State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 14 P.3d 409 (2000), the defendant 
hatched a plan with his cousin to purchase cocaine from an acquaintance. The defendant 
was to remain at a grocery store while the cousin completed the transaction at the 
acquaintance's house. The defendant grew bored waiting for his cousin, so he walked to 
the house where, after knocking on the door, the cousin came out of the house and the 
two of them got into an altercation, resulting in the defendant stabbing his cousin. The 
defendant then went into the house and purchased cocaine. The cousin later died as a 
result of his stab wound. The Jacques court reviewed the evidence and found that a 
reasonable factfinder could have concluded that the stabbing occurred within the res 
gestae of possessing cocaine because the cousin's attempt to purchase cocaine, the 
defendant's act of stabbing his cousin, and the defendant's subsequent purchase of cocaine 
were part of one continuous transaction. The court also noted that the defendant had the 
opportunity to take his cousin to the hospital but chose instead to enter the house and 
complete the purchase. Accordingly, this court affirmed the defendant's felony-murder 
conviction based on the underlying felony of possessing cocaine. 270 Kan. at 189-90. 
 
The requirement that the killing be some part of the underlying felony is reflected 
in the test for determining application of the felony-murder rule. In State v. Cameron, 300 
Kan. 384, 396-97, 329 P.3d 1158 (2014), we stated: 
10 
 
 
 
"In order to establish felony murder, the State must prove two causation 
elements. First, the death must lie within the res gestae of the underlying crime, which is 
defined in this context as acts committed before, during, or after the happening of the 
principal occurrence, when those acts are so closely connected with the principal 
occurrence as to form, in reality, a part of the occurrence. Second, the felony and the 
homicide must have a direct causal connection, which exists unless an extraordinary 
intervening event supersedes the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of 
death." 
 
Furthermore, in Jacques, we stated: 
 
"When applying the felony-murder rule . . . the felony and the victim's death do 
not need to occur simultaneously, nor does the felony need to occur before the death. 
Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing 
are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and 
therefore subject to the felony-murder rule." 270 Kan. at 189-90. 
 
Regarding the causal connection between an attempted aggravated robbery and a 
subsequent death, this court in State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383, 573 P.2d 
1041 (1978), stated: 
 
"A felon's attempt to commit a robbery sets in motion a chain of events which 
should cause him to contemplate that a death might occur. This is particularly true of a 
robber who carries a deadly weapon . . . and forces his way into an occupied dwelling. 
The impulse for an individual to resist the sudden show of force, to defend himself or to 
come to the aid of a family member or loved one, is a basic human instinct. Under such 
circumstances every robber who expects human opposition to his quest to steal, as he 
must when he commits a statutory robbery, is a potential assassin because he knows he 
may be forced to use his weapon either to carry out his criminal act or to escape without 
being pursued and captured by his victim." 
 
We rejected an argument similar to McClelland's in State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 
929, 287 P.3d 245 (2012). In that case, the defendant entered a home armed with a gun 
11 
 
 
 
and robbed two individuals of money in the front part of the residence. After taking their 
money, the defendant then moved to the back of the residence where he saw a female 
acquaintance involved in an altercation with the victim. The victim eventually rushed 
towards the defendant, and the defendant shot at him while walking backwards towards 
the front door. The defendant was subsequently convicted of felony murder based on the 
theory that the killing occurred during the commission of the aggravated robberies of the 
two individuals. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the State presented insufficient evidence to 
show that he killed the victim during the commission of the aggravated robberies because 
the robberies were complete by the time the shooting occurred. This court rejected the 
defendant's argument, stating: 
 
"The res gestae element is satisfied because [the victim's] murder occurred 
immediately after the happening of the principal occurrence—aggravated robbery—and 
thus became so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to form a part of the 
occurrence. A direct causal connection is also present. The time element is met because 
there was evidence the events happened quickly and that [the defendant] moved from his 
aggravated robbery of [one individual] immediately to the bedroom where [the female 
acquaintance] struggled with [the victim]. The distance factor is satisfied because the 
aggravated robberies of [the individuals] occurred in the same house where [the victim] 
was shot. Lastly, the causal relation is also satisfied because it is foreseeable that violence 
will erupt during an aggravated robbery in which the robber carries a gun. 
 
"The very nature of an aggravated robbery is violent. Moreover, [the defendant] 
stuck a potato on the end of his gun, indicating his preparation to silently shoot the 
gun. . . . [The defendant] set off a chain of violent events when he planned on robbing a 
house and brought a gun in furtherance of that plan. The elements of time, distance, and 
causal relationship were met. Accordingly, the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
12 
 
 
 
the murder occurred during the res gestae of the aggravated robberies." Phillips, 295 Kan. 
at 941-42. 
 
We reached a similar conclusion in State v. Kaesontae, 260 Kan. 386, 920 P.2d 
959 (1996). In that case, the defendant was riding in a car with an acquaintance late at 
night when they came upon a man walking by himself. The defendant said he wanted "'to 
jack' the walking man, which meant that he wanted to rob him." 260 Kan. at 387. The 
driver of the car pulled up alongside the man, and the defendant, sitting in the front 
passenger seat, pointed a gun at the man and asked for his wallet. The man threw his 
hands up in the air and backed towards the rear of the car. He continued moving away 
from the front passenger-side window until his back was against the rear end of the car on 
the passenger side. Then, keeping his back against the side of the car, the man walked 
towards the front of the car and swung his right arm into the open passenger-side 
window. The man was leaning into the car, fighting with the defendant, when the 
defendant shot him twice. The man later died. The defendant was charged and convicted 
of felony murder based on the underlying felony of attempted aggravated robbery. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence did not support his conviction 
for felony murder because his attempt to rob the man was complete by the time he was 
shot. This court rejected the defendant's argument, finding that that the chain of events set 
in motion by the defendant when he attempted to rob the victim continued even after the 
defendant stopped trying to rob him. We found that the killing and the underlying felony 
were part of the same principal occurrence, even though they did not occur at precisely 
the same time. We applied the time, distance, and causal relationship factors and 
concluded the victim's killing was part of the attempted aggravated robbery. Kaesontae, 
260 Kan. at 390-91. 
 
13 
 
 
 
McClelland cites State v. Becker, 290 Kan. 842, 235 P.3d 424 (2010), in support 
of his argument that his attempted aggravated robbery of Laeli was complete by the time 
he shot Stone. Becker does not provide the support McClelland claims. In Becker, the 
defendant, along with two accomplices, forced Stephens, Dupree, and others to remain in 
a back bedroom while they tortured and questioned another individual in the living room 
about a missing safe containing drugs and money. While this was going on, 
Richardson—a person the defendant and his accomplices believed might know where the 
missing safe was located—arrived at the house. At gunpoint, Richardson was forced to sit 
on a couch while being questioned by the defendant and his accomplices about the 
missing safe. Richardson eventually grew bold, getting off the couch and forcing his way 
out of the house. The defendant and his accomplices followed Richardson outside where 
one of them shot Richardson, causing him to bleed to death. The defendant was 
subsequently charged and convicted of felony murder for killing Richardson during the 
commission of a kidnapping of Stephens and/or Dupree and/or Richardson. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the underlying kidnappings were completed 
by the time Richardson was shot outside the house. Specifically, he noted that the 
shooting occurred after Richardson was forced to sit down on the couch. Furthermore, the 
defendant argued that the kidnappings of Stephens and Dupree were in no way causally 
connected to Richardson's shooting. 
 
The Becker court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that acceptance of it 
 
"requires an impossible stretch of the imagination. The four people in the back bedroom 
were being held there in part so that [the defendant] and the others could terrorize and 
beat [one individual] and then Richardson. The kidnappings and the murder were closely 
related. Although Richardson got up to leave the house, the perpetrators attempted to 
stop him, and it was as he was attempting to escape his captivity that he was shot. We 
14 
 
 
 
cannot conclude that the attempted kidnapping of Richardson was completed by that 
time." (Emphasis added.) 290 Kan. at 855-56. 
 
McClelland argues that the italicized portion of the above quote supports his 
argument that his attempted aggravated robbery of Laeli was complete by the time Stone 
was shot. Unlike in Becker, where the defendant and his accomplices were trying to 
prolong Richardson's captivity when he was shot, McClelland contends that the facts here 
show that he was not attempting to rob Laeli when Stone was shot. In fact, Laeli had 
escaped and was returning from the neighbor's house with two other men by the time he 
heard the gunshot that killed Stone. 
 
By making this argument, McClelland assumes that Stone's death must have 
strictly occurred within the confines of his attempted robbery of Laeli in order for the 
felony-murder rule to apply. But as the caselaw cited above establishes, in order for a 
killing to be considered a felony murder, all that is required is that the killing be some 
part of the underlying felony. See Griffin, 279 Kan. at 641. Becker exemplifies this rule. 
Technically, the kidnappings of Stephens and Dupree were "complete" by the time 
Richardson was shot—the defendant and his accomplices forced Stephens and Dupree 
into the bedroom with the intent to injure or terrorize them before Richardson even 
arrived at the house. But the Becker court still considered these kidnappings part of the 
later shooting because the kidnappings aided the defendant and his accomplices with 
questioning Richardson in the living room, which eventually resulted in Richardson being 
shot when he attempted to leave the house. Accordingly, "[t]he kidnappings and the 
murder were closely related," and, thus, the felony-murder rule could be properly applied 
to the facts of the case. 290 Kan. at 855. 
 
As mentioned above, in order to establish a felony murder, the State must prove 
two causation elements: (1) the death occurred within the res gestae of the crime and (2) 
the felony and homicide must have a direct causal connection. See Cameron, 300 Kan. at 
15 
 
 
 
396-97. Furthermore, "[t]ime, distance, and the causal relationship between the 
underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the 
killing is a part of the felony and therefore subject to the felony-murder rule." Jacques, 
270 Kan. at 189-90. Turning to the facts of this case, the res gestae element is satisfied 
because Stone's murder occurred shortly after the happening of the principal 
occurrence—the attempted aggravated robbery of Laeli—and thus became so closely 
connected with the principal occurrence as to form a part of that occurrence. A direct 
causal connection is also present. The time element is met because the evidence presented 
at trial indicated that the events happened quickly—McClelland moved seamlessly from 
attempting to rob Laeli, to attempting to rob Stone and Penry, to finally shooting Stone 
during his struggle with Stone and Penry over control of the gun. The distance factor is 
satisfied because the attempted robbery of Laeli occurred in the same house where Stone 
was shot. Lastly, the causal relation is also satisfied because "it is foreseeable that 
violence will erupt during an aggravated robbery in which the robber carries a gun." 
Phillips, 295 Kan. at 942. 
 
As the Branch court similarly put it, McClelland set off a chain of violent events 
when he planned on robbing a house and brought a gun in furtherance of that plan. The 
elements of time, distance, and causal relationship were met. Therefore, the evidence, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder occurred during the res gestae of the 
attempted aggravated robbery of Laeli.  
 
JURY INSTRUCTION ON FELONY MURDER 
 
Next, McClelland argues that the district court's jury instruction on felony murder 
was broader than the charged crime because the instruction identified three alternate 
felonies (i.e., the attempted aggravated robberies of Stone, Penry, and/or Laeli) that the 
16 
 
 
 
jury could rely on to satisfy the element that Stone's death occurred during the attempted 
commission of an inherently dangerous felony. As noted above, in the complaint, the 
State simply identified attempted aggravated robbery as the underlying felony supporting 
the felony-murder charge; the charge did not specify which attempted aggravated robbery 
was being relied on as the inherently dangerous felony. McClelland contends that the 
State, by charging felony murder in this manner, limited itself to the theory that 
McClelland committed felony murder solely by killing Stone during the attempted 
commission of an aggravated robbery upon Stone. Accordingly, because the jury 
instruction on felony murder indicated that any one of the three attempted aggravated 
robberies could satisfy the inherently-dangerous-felony element, the jury instruction was 
broader than the charged crime and, thus, erroneous. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
McClelland did not object to the district court's instruction on felony murder; 
therefore, the standard of review is governed by K.S.A. 22-3414(3) and State v. Williams, 
295 Kan. 506, 511, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). In Williams, this court noted that K.S.A. 22-
3414(3) imposes a procedural hurdle when a party fails to object to or request a jury 
instruction: 
 
"K.S.A. 22-3414(3) establishes a preservation rule for instruction claims on 
appeal. It provides that no party may assign as error a district court's giving or failure to 
give a particular jury instruction, including a lesser included crime instruction, unless: (a) 
that party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds for objection; or (b) the instruction or 
the failure to give the instruction is clearly erroneous. If an instruction is clearly 
erroneous, appellate review is not predicated upon an objection in the district court." 295 
Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 3. 
 
17 
 
 
 
A two-step process is utilized to determine whether an instruction is clearly 
erroneous: 
 
"First, 'the reviewing court must . . . determine whether there was any error at all. To 
make that determination, the appellate court must consider whether the subject instruction 
was legally and factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the entire 
record.' 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 4. If error is found, then we proceed to the second step of 
assessing whether we are firmly 'convinced that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict had the instruction error not occurred. The party claiming a clearly erroneous 
instruction maintains the burden to establish the degree of prejudice necessary for 
reversal.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Cruz, 297 Kan. 1048, 1066-67, 307 P.3d 199 
(2013). 
 
Analysis 
 
"A jury instruction on the elements of a crime that is broader than the complaint 
charging the crime is erroneous." State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 802-03, 217 P.3d 15 
(2009). The reason for this is because "the charging instrument sets out the specific 
offense alleged to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation, to permit the 
development of a defense to meet that accusation, and to protect against conviction based 
on facts not contemplated in the accusation." State v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494, 508, 301 P.3d 
1279 (2013). Accordingly, the State is bound by the wording of its charging document, 
and the prosecution and district court must use caution in conforming the jury 
instructions to the charges. State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 210-11, 290 P.3d 640 
(2012).  
 
McClelland cites Trautloff in support of his argument that the jury instruction on 
felony murder was broader than the charged crime. In Trautloff, we found that a jury 
instruction on sexual exploitation of a child was broader than how the State had charged 
the crime. The State had charged the defendant with "displaying" an offending 
18 
 
 
 
photograph or video of a child, but the instruction allowed the jury to convict the 
defendant of "displaying, procuring or producing" such a photograph or video. At trial, 
there was ample evidence that the defendant procured and produced sexually explicit 
photographs and videos. Consequently, this court found that the instruction was 
erroneous because it allowed the jury to convict the defendant of sexual exploitation 
based on conduct that was not charged in the information. Trautloff, 289 Kan. at 801-02. 
 
This court has reached similar conclusions in other cases. Generally, if an 
instruction adds alternate statutory elements of a crime that were not included in the 
complaint or information, the instruction is overly broad and, thus, erroneous. See, e.g., 
Hart, 297 Kan. at 508-10 (finding overbroad jury instruction requiring crime of indecent 
liberties be committed with intent to arouse the sexual desires of the victim or defendant 
or both, but complaint only alleged intent to satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant); 
State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 383-84, 228 P.3d 394 (2010) (finding overbroad jury 
instruction for aggravated kidnapping that included additional statutory elements beyond 
what was charged); State v. Hemby, 264 Kan. 542, 547-50, 957 P.2d 428 (1998) (finding 
overbroad jury instruction for sodomy that allowed conviction for oral or anal copulation 
when complaint only charged oral copulation); State v. Turbeville, 235 Kan. 993, 997-98, 
686 P.2d 138 (1984) (finding overbroad jury instructions for kidnapping that included 
statutory alternate intents "to terrorize another" and "to facilitate flight" that were not 
included in complaint). 
 
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those present in Trautloff and the 
cases cited above because the instruction at issue here did not contain an alternate 
statutory element that was not included within the language of the charged crime. 
Furthermore, the felony-murder instruction did not cite a new underlying felony that 
could be relied on to satisfy the inherently-dangerous-felony element. Cf. State v. Wade, 
284 Kan. 527, 537, 161 P.3d 704 (2007) (finding overbroad jury instruction for 
19 
 
 
 
aggravated burglary predicated on underlying felony of either first-degree murder or 
aggravated assault when defendant was not put on notice that aggravated assault could 
serve as underlying felony). Both the instruction on felony murder and the charged crime 
identified attempted aggravated robbery as the inherently dangerous felony. The only 
difference is that the instruction, unlike the language of the charged crime, specified three 
alternate attempted aggravated robberies that could satisfy the inherently-dangerous-
felony element. 
 
Contrary to McClelland's assertion, the language of the complaint did not identify 
or imply that a specific attempted aggravated robbery was the underlying felony 
supporting the felony-murder charge, i.e., the felony-murder charge did not identify or 
imply that Stone was the victim of the underlying felony. Thus, the State was not limited 
to pursuing that sole theory at trial. Consistent with the complaint, the instruction on 
felony murder identified attempted aggravated robbery as the inherently dangerous felony 
and then specifically identified three alternate attempted aggravated robberies that could 
satisfy the element that Stone's death occurred during an attempted inherently dangerous 
felony. If anything, the instruction on felony murder was more precise, not broader, than 
the charged crime.  
 
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the jury instruction on felony 
murder was legally appropriate. The instruction was not broader than the charged crime. 
Furthermore, based on evidence showing that Stone's death occurred during the course of 
McClelland's attempt to rob Stone, Penry, and Laeli, it was factually appropriate for the 
district court to instruct the jury that any one of the attempted aggravated robberies could 
satisfy the inherently-dangerous-felony element. Accordingly, the district court's 
instruction on felony murder was not erroneous. 
 
20 
 
 
 
VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE RULE 
 
Finally, McClelland argues that the district court violated the "double-rule" of 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6819(b)(4) when it ordered his sentences for three counts of 
attempted aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary to run consecutively, 
resulting in a 153-month prison sentence. Admirably, the State concedes this issue. 
 
Under K.S.A. 22-3504, an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time. In State v. 
LaBelle, 290 Kan. 529, Syl. ¶ 1, 231 P.3d 1065 (2010), this court stated the applicable 
standard of review:  
 
"The question of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which this 
court has unlimited review. An illegal sentence is a sentence imposed by a court without 
jurisdiction, a sentence which does not conform to the statutory provision, either in 
character or the term of the punishment authorized, or a sentence which is ambiguous 
with regard to the time and manner in which it is to be served." 
 
When a defendant is sentenced to multiple convictions in Kansas, K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 21-6819(b)(2) requires that the district court establish a base sentence for the 
primary crime. The primary crime is the on-grid crime which has the highest severity 
level among all the on-grid crimes of which the defendant was convicted. K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). The "double rule" is found in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6819(b)(4), 
which provides that "[t]he total prison sentence imposed in a case involving multiple 
convictions arising from multiple counts within an information, complaint or indictment 
cannot exceed twice the base sentence." 
 
Here, McClelland was sentenced to a hard 20 life sentence for felony murder, an 
off-grid crime. In addition, the district court sentenced McClelland to 57 months for the 
primary crime of attempted aggravated robbery in count 2 and imposed 32-month prison 
21 
 
 
 
sentences for counts three (attempted aggravated robbery), four (attempted aggravated 
robbery), and five (aggravated burglary). The district court ordered that all of these 
sentences run consecutively, resulting in a hard 20 life sentence plus a sentence of 153 
months. 
 
Because McClelland's base sentence for the primary crime of attempted 
aggravated robbery was 57 months, his total prison sentence for his on-grid crimes could 
not exceed 114 months. Accordingly, the controlling 153-month prison sentence 
McClelland received for his on-grid crimes violates the double rule of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 
21-6819(b)(4). Thus, we vacate McClelland's 153-month prison sentence and remand for 
resentencing on counts two through five. 
 
We affirm all of McClelland's convictions and affirm his hard 20 life sentence for 
felony murder. McClelland's sentences for counts two through five are vacated, and his 
case is remanded for resentencing on those counts.