Title: Derek Maxwell v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-995
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2001

1See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).  
Supreme Court of Florida
 
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No. SC95995
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DEREK MAXWELL,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 25, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Maxwell v. State, 732 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999),
which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in State v. Cotton, 728 So.
2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed,769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000).  We have
jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Maxwell received a fifteen-year prison sentence pursuant to the Prison
Releasee Reoffender Act1 (the “Act”).  He challenges his sentence on several
2The district court, in affirming Maxwell’s sentence, cites to Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
5th DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1999).  In Cotton, we disapproved the decision in Speed
to the extent that it was inconsistent with our opinion in Cotton. 
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grounds, all of which have been addressed by this Court in other opinions.  See
McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a defendant has the
right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for
sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the
defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v.
State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act,
and holding that the Act neither violates the single subject rule for legislation, nor
does it violate principles of equal protection or subject defendants sentenced under
it to double jeopardy); Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing that,
“[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all
citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v.
Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla. 1991)); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.
2000) (holding that the Act does not violate separation of powers, is not void for
vagueness, and does not violate principles of due process by allowing a “victim
veto” precluding application of the Act).  Accordingly, the decision in Maxwell is
approved to the extent it is consistent with Cotton,2 Ellis, McKnight, and Grant. 
It is so ordered.
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WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ, concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d
345, 358-59 (Fla. 2000).
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D98-3460 
(Volusia County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Dee Ball, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Belle B. Schumann, Kristen L.
Davenport, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach,
Florida,
for Respondent