Title: DeCormier v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Group, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93702
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2014

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
CYNTHIA DeCORMIER,  
 
        ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        ) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
        ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
        )     No.  SC93702 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        ) 
HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTOR   
        ) 
COMPANY GROUP, INC. and  
        ) 
ST. LOUIS MOTORCYCLE, INC. 
        ) 
d/b/a GATEWAY HARLEY-DAVIDSON,     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        ) 
 
 
 
 
Respondents.         ) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable John D. Warner, Jr., Judge  
 
Opinion issued November 12, 2014 
 
Cynthia DeCormier filed a personal injury action against Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company Group, Inc., (Harley-Davidson) and St. Louis Motorcycle, Inc., d/b/a Gateway 
Harley-Davidson (Gateway), after sustaining injuries while participating in a motorcycle 
training course.  Harley-Davidson and Gateway filed a motion for summary judgment on 
the basis of a liability release Ms. DeCormier signed before participating in the course.  
The circuit court sustained the motion and granted summary judgment in favor of Harley-
Davidson and Gateway.  On appeal of the circuit court’s judgment, Ms. DeCormier 
claims the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because the liability release 
she signed is unenforceable against claims of gross negligence or recklessness and there 
is a genuine dispute as to whether the defendants were grossly negligent or reckless.  
Even if Ms. DeCormier pleaded the type of claim against which a release of liability is 
unenforceable, Ms. DeCormier failed to demonstrate that a genuine dispute exists 
regarding whether Harley-Davidson and Gateway acted in reckless disregard for her 
safety and, therefore, whether the release is unenforceable.  Accordingly, this Court 
affirms the circuit court’s judgment.   
Facts and Procedural Background 
On April 13, 2008, Ms. DeCormier participated in the Rider’s Edge New Rider’s 
Course, an instructional course for new motorcycle riders sponsored by Harley-Davidson 
and conducted by employees of Gateway at Gateway’s place of business in St. Louis.  
The Gateway employees instructing the course were certified by the Motorcycle Safety 
Foundation (MSF), and MSF supplied the curriculum for the course. 
Before participating in the course, Ms. DeCormier signed a “Release and Waiver,” 
which provided in pertinent part:  
I hereby RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE (i) Harley–
Davidson Motor Company, Inc., Harley–Davidson, Inc., . . . each of their 
respective parent, subsidiary, and affiliated companies . . .; [and] (ii) all 
authorized dealers of Harley–Davidson Motor Company . . . who are 
sponsoring or conducting the [New Rider Course] . . . (hereinafter all 
collectively referred to as “Released Parties”) from ANY AND ALL 
CLAIMS, DEMANDS, RIGHTS, CAUSES OF ACTION AND 
LOSSES (collectively, “CLAIMS”) OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER 
THAT I . . . NOW HAVE OR LATER MAY HAVE AGAINST ANY 
RELEASED PARTY IN ANY WAY RESULTING FROM, OR 
ARISING 
OUT 
OF 
OR 
IN 
CONNECTION 
WITH, 
MY 
PARTICIPATION IN THE [NEW RIDER COURSE] . . .. 
 
I acknowledge and understand that this Release EXTENDS TO AND 
RELEASES AND DISCHARGES ANY AND ALL CLAIMS I . . . have 
or may have against the Released Parties arising out of my participation in 
the [New Rider Course], including without limitation all such Claims 
resulting from the NEGLIGENCE of any Released Party. . ..  
 
While riding her motorcycle during the course, Ms. DeCormier sustained injuries. 
 
Ms. DeCormier filed a two-count petition against Harley-Davidson and Gateway, 
alleging that the course instructors directed her to perform motorcycle exercises while the 
range was icy and slippery.  In the first count, labeled “Negligence,” Ms. DeCormier 
alleged that the instructors “instructed [Ms. DeCormier] to perform motorcycle exercises 
on the training course,” “knew or should have known that the icy conditions of the course 
created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm,” and “knew or should have known that an 
inexperienced rider on icy or slippery conditions created an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm.”  In the second count, labeled “Premises Liability,” Ms. DeCormier stated that 
Harley-Davidson’s and Gateway’s negligence and recklessness directly caused the 
accident in that the instructors “knew or should have known that the motorcycle track 
[had] become wet and icy, therefore creating a dangerous condition;” and “knew, or by 
the use of ordinary care, could have known that the existence of the wet and icy 
conditions posed a substantial risk of bodily harm to its students, but continued to instruct 
students to ride on the motorcycle track.” 
Harley-Davidson and Gateway jointly moved for summary judgment on the basis 
of the affirmative defense of release.  They asserted that, prior to taking the course,                 
Ms. DeCormier signed an agreement releasing them from any future claim of negligence 
arising out of Ms. DeCormier’s participation in the program.  Harley-Davidson and 
Gateway claimed the release barred Ms. DeCormier’s action.   
In her response to the summary judgment motion, Ms. DeCormier admitted to 
signing the release but asserted that Harley-Davidson and Gateway were not entitled to 
judgment because the release could not, as a matter of law, waive liability for gross 
negligence or recklessness and there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Harley-
Davidson’s and Gateway’s negligence rose to the level of recklessness or gross 
negligence.  Ms. DeCormier alleged in her “statement of additional facts” that: (1) the 
MSF has promulgated rules for instructors conducting courses for new riders; (2) in the 
instructor’s guide, MSF “takes the position that training not be conducted during a 
thunderstorm, snowstorm, windstorm, with ice on the range, or if the [instructors] 
determine the safety of the students is at risk;” and (3) “there was rain, drizzle, snow, and 
mist on the day of the course, as indicated by the certified record of river and 
climatological observations.”  The reference to evidentiary support for these statements 
was to the MSF Basic RidersCourse Rider Coach Guide and the Certified Records of 
River and Climatological Observations.  Harley-Davidson and Gateway admitted these 
additional facts.  Ms. DeCormier further stated that, despite the weather conditions, the 
instructors continued to send riders out on the range to perform motorcycle exercises and 
instructed her to perform an exercise when her bike slipped and landed on her leg.  The 
reference to evidentiary support for these statements was to paragraphs of the defendants’ 
Exhibit A, which was Ms. DeCormier’s petition.  Harley-Davidson and Gateway denied 
these facts.   
The circuit court sustained the motion for summary judgment and entered 
judgment in favor of Harley-Davidson and Gateway.  Thereafter, Ms. DeCormier 
appealed.  After an opinion by the court of appeals, the case was transferred to this Court.  
Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 
Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates there 
is no genuine dispute about material facts and, under the undisputed facts, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Fin. 
Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Mo. banc 1993).  One 
way a defending party may establish a right to summary judgment is to show there is no 
genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support a properly 
pleaded affirmative defense.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 381.  “Facts set 
forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party’s motion are taken as true unless 
contradicted by the non-moving party’s response to the summary judgment motion.”  Id.  
The non-moving party’s “denial may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
party’s pleading.  Rather, the response shall support each denial with specific references 
to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial.”  Rule 74.04(c)(2).  The non-moving party must attach to its 
response copies of all discovery, exhibits, or affidavits on which the non-moving party 
relies.  Id.  This Court’s review of summary judgment is de novo.  Roe v. Replogle, 408 
S.W.3d 759, 763 (Mo. banc 2013). 
Release Cannot Exempt Liability for Reckless Conduct 
On appeal, Ms. DeCormier asserts the circuit court erred in entering judgment in 
favor of Harley-Davidson and Gateway on the basis of the release because a party cannot 
exonerate oneself from future liability for gross negligence or recklessness and there 
exists a genuine dispute whether Harley-Davidson and Gateway were grossly negligent 
or reckless.  While exculpatory agreements will be strictly construed, this Court will 
enforce exculpatory agreements to protect a party from liability for their own negligence.  
Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. banc 1996).                
Ms. DeCormier cannot avoid this rule by alleging Harley-Davidson and Gateway were 
grossly negligent because Missouri courts do not recognize degrees of negligence at 
common law.  See Fowler v. Park Corp. 673 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Mo. banc 1984); Warner 
v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d 596, 603 (Mo. 1968); Edwards v. Gerstein, 363 S.W.3d 
155, 165 (Mo. App. 2012).   
Assuming, without deciding, that Harley-Davidson and Gateway’s release cannot 
be enforced to protect them against liability for reckless conduct and that Ms. DeCormier 
sufficiently pleaded the affirmative avoidance of the unenforceability of her release,1 
Harley-Davidson and Gateway were still entitled to summary judgment because          
Ms. DeCormier failed to meet her burden to show Harley-Davidson and Gateway were 
reckless.  The definition of “recklessness” in the Restatement (Second) of Torts has been 
long utilized in Missouri cases.  See Hoover’s Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, 
Inc./Special Prods., Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 435 (Mo. banc 1985); Sharp v. Robberson, 
495 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Mo. banc 1973); Nichols v. Bresnahan, 212 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo. 
                                              
1 Harley-Davidson and Gateway assert that they were entitled to summary judgment on 
the basis of the release because Ms. DeCormier failed to plead the unenforceability of the 
release as an affirmative avoidance. 
1948); Jordan v. Gen. Growth Dev. Corp., 675 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Mo. App. 1984).  
Conduct is in reckless disregard of another if the actor: 
[A]ct[s] or fails to do an act which it is [the actor’s] duty to the other to do, 
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable 
man to realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk 
of . . . harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that 
substantial harm will result to [the other.]   
 
Nichols, 212 S.W.2d at 573. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 500 (1965)).   
It is undisputed that the MSF training materials used by the instructors stated that 
“training [should] not be conducted during a thunderstorm, snowstorm, windstorm, [or] 
with ice on the range.”  It is also undisputed that “there was rain, drizzle, snow, and mist” 
in the area on the day Ms. DeCormier was injured, a fact that gives rise to the reasonable 
inference that there was rain, drizzle, snow, and mist on the range during the course.2  It 
is further undisputed that the training was performed according to MSF standards and 
that those standards require RiderCoaches to continuously observe and evaluate 
participants.  From these facts, it could be concluded that Harley-Davidson and Gateway 
should have known facts from which a reasonable person would realize that continuing to 
send out riders to perform motorcycle exercises would create a high degree of probability 
of substantial harm to the riders.   
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Ms. DeCormier also stated that 
the track started to become icy and slippery but that, despite those conditions, the 
                                              
2 To prove the weather conditions on that date, Ms. DeCormier attached to her statement 
of additional material facts a certified record of river and climatological observations.  
This record was not a part of the legal file before this Court; however, Harley-Davidson 
and Gateway admitted to the fact that there was rain, drizzle, snow, and mist on April 13, 
2008, in their reply brief, which is a part of the record in this Court. 
instructors failed to take any action to remedy the slick and dangerous condition and 
continued to send riders out on the course to perform exercises.  She further stated that 
the instructors directed her to perform motorcycle exercises in icy and slippery conditions 
and that, while she was doing so, her bike slipped and landed on her leg, causing her 
severe injuries.  The evidentiary support for these facts cited in her response was 
defendant’s Exhibit A.  Harley-Davidson and Gateway’s Exhibit A was Ms. DeCormier’s 
petition.   
Ms. DeCormier’s allegations in her petition are insufficient support for her 
statement of additional uncontroverted facts.  “The purpose of summary judgment is to 
move the parties beyond the bare allegations in their pleadings . . ..”  Martin v. City of 
Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Mo. banc 1993).  A party cannot rely on its own 
petition to provide the necessary evidentiary support for additional facts alleged in 
response to a summary judgment motion.  See Bilyeu v. Vaill, 349 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo. 
App. 2011). 3    
Accordingly, Ms. DeCormier fails to show a genuine dispute as to whether 
Harley-Davidson and Gateway intentionally acted or failed to act to cause her injury, 
which is necessary to show recklessness.  See Nichols, 212 S.W.2d at 573.  Therefore, 
                                              
3 Bilyeu holds that a party citing to its own petition does not comply with the 
requirements in Rule 74.04(c)(1) to support uncontested facts.  349 S.W.3d at 482.  Here, 
Ms. DeCormier set forth additional facts as allowed by Rule 74.04(c)(2).  Nevertheless, 
because Rule 74.04(c)(2) requires that any additional facts stated in a party’s response to 
a motion for summary judgment be supported in the manner prescribed in Rule 
74.04(c)(1), Bilyeu is applicable here.   
Harley-Davidson and Gateway were entitled to judgment on their affirmative defense of 
release.   
Conclusion 
 
A party is in reckless disregard of others if the party intentionally acts or fails to 
act while knowing or having reason to know of facts from which a reasonable person 
would realize such conduct creates an unreasonably high degree of risk of substantial 
harm.  Id.  In response to Harley-Davidson and Gateway’s motion for summary 
judgment, Ms. DeCormier did not show a genuine dispute as to whether Harley-Davidson 
and Gateway were reckless by specifically referencing discovery, exhibits, and affidavits, 
as a non-moving party is required to do to defeat a summary judgment motion.  Rule 
74.04(c)(2).  Therefore, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Harley-
Davidson and Gateway.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Stith and 
Wilson, JJ., concur; Draper and  
Teitelman, JJ., dissent.