Title: Allen v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130304
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2014

Present: All the Justices 
 
RICHARD WARREN ALLEN 
 
v.  Record No. 130304 
 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
 January 10, 2014 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia erred in affirming the circuit court's finding that 
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to slightly 
corroborate the corpus delicti of aggravated sexual battery. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
Richard Warren Allen confessed to his daughter to having 
engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with his grandson, who 
was four years old at the time.  The following day, Allen, on 
his own initiative, went to the City of Lynchburg police 
station and voluntarily repeated his confession to Officer 
Timothy L. Dooley and Detective Kevin T. Poindexter.  The 
substance of Allen's confession is as follows. 
First, Allen confessed to touching the clothing covering 
his grandson's genital area while his grandson was sleeping.  
This was done only while his grandson was sleeping, and his 
grandson was wearing shorts or pants during every one of these 
events.  Also while his grandson was sleeping, Allen would rub 
his grandson's feet and masturbate. 
 
2 
Second, Allen confessed to wrestling with his grandson on 
Allen's bed when they were alone.  During these wrestling 
events, his grandson would "brush up against [Allen's] penis."  
This aroused Allen, causing him to get an erection.  Every time 
Allen got an erection, he would allow his grandson to use his 
hands and feet to touch the clothing covering Allen's penis 
while Allen was still in underwear or shorts. 
Based on this confession, a grand jury returned a true 
bill for aggravated sexual battery.1  Allen pled not guilty to 
the indictment, waived a jury trial, and did not testify.  
After the Commonwealth presented its evidence, Allen made a 
motion to strike which was overruled, and the circuit court 
found Allen guilty of aggravated sexual battery.  Allen filed a 
motion to reconsider, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to 
prove the corpus delicti of aggravated sexual battery by 
failing to sufficiently corroborate Allen's confession, thus 
failing to establish Allen's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The circuit court denied Allen's motion for reconsideration and 
sentenced Allen to incarceration for seven years and six 
months, with seven years suspended upon good behavior and 
intensive supervised probation. 
                     
1 See Code § 18.2-67.3 (setting forth the elements of 
aggravated sexual battery); Code § 18.2-67.10 (setting forth 
the definition of "sexual abuse" as used in Code § 18.2-67.3). 
 
3 
Allen timely appealed to the Court of Appeals.  A single 
judge of the Court of Appeals, by a per curiam order, denied 
Allen's appeal on the basis that the circuit court did not err 
in holding that (1) sufficient evidence existed for the 
Commonwealth to prove the corpus delicti of aggravated sexual 
battery and (2) sufficient evidence existed to convict Allen 
for the crime of aggravated sexual battery.  Allen v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0924-12-3 (Nov. 28, 2012).  Upon 
Allen's demand for panel review pursuant to Rule 5A:15A(a), a 
three judge panel of the Court of Appeals entered an order 
denying Allen's appeal for the reasons stated in the per curiam 
order.  Allen v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0924-12-3 (Jan. 17, 
2013). 
Allen timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court.  
This appeal presents two assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals was in error by failing to grant 
the Petition for a Writ of Error of the Appellant based 
on the failure of the Commonwealth to prove a corpus 
delicti, . . . based upon the lack of evidence other 
than the Appellant's testimony. 
2. The Court of Appeals failed to grant a Writ of Error to 
the Appellant on the basis of the sufficiency of the 
evidence, . . . based upon the lack of evidence other 
than the Appellant's testimony. 
 
4 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
"When [reviewing a defendant's] challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, this Court 
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to [the 
Commonwealth, as] the prevailing party at trial[,] and 
consider[s] all inferences fairly deducible from that 
evidence."  Crawford v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 84, 111, 704 
S.E.2d 107, 123 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
lower court will be reversed only if that court's "judgment is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."  Id. at 112, 
704 S.E.2d at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
B. 
The Corpus Delicti Rule 
"In every criminal prosecution" the Commonwealth must 
prove the corpus delicti:  "the fact that the crime charged has 
been actually perpetrated."  Maughs v. City of Charlottesville, 
181 Va. 117, 120, 23 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1943) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  This general requirement of proof, however, is 
different from the corpus delicti rule.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 395 (9th ed. 2009).  The corpus delicti rule 
requires the Commonwealth to introduce evidence independent of 
an extrajudicial confession to prove that the confessed crime 
actually occurred—that is, to prove the corpus delicti.  Moore 
v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 741, 745, 111 S.E. 128, 129 (1922). 
 
5 
1. 
The History of the Corpus Delicti Rule 
The origin of the corpus delicti rule can be traced back 
at least as far as seventeenth century England.  In 1660, John 
Perry was subjected to continuous and repeated questioning as 
to the disappearance of his master, William Harrison.  After 
initially denying all wrongdoing, Perry finally confessed that 
he, his mother, and his brother had together robbed and 
murdered Harrison.  Although a body was never found, and 
Perry's mother and brother denied all wrongdoing, all three 
suspects were convicted and executed on the strength of Perry's 
confession.  Several years later, however, Harrison returned 
home, claiming to have been kidnapped and sold into slavery in 
Turkey.  In short, Perry had admitted to a falsehood resulting 
in the execution of himself, his mother, and his brother.  See 
Perry's Case (1660), 14 Howell St. Tr. 1312, 1312-24 (Eng.).2 
The injustice of Perry's Case and similar cases triggered 
the creation of the corpus delicti rule, although the corpus 
delicti rule is not uniformly applied as part of the English 
common law.  Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90 & n.5 
(1954) ("[English] courts have been hesitant to lay down a rule 
that an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession may not send an 
accused to prison or to death."); 7 John H. Wigmore, Evidence 
                     
 
2 14 T.B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials 
(London, T.C. Hansard 1816). 
 
6 
in Trials at Common Law § 2070, at 508-10 (James H. Chadbourn 
ed., 1978). 
In the United States, the corpus delicti rule took root 
after the Boorn trial in Vermont, which replicated the false 
confession scenario of Perry's Case, was widely publicized.  
See Trial of Stephen and Jesse Boorn, 6 Am. St. Tr. 73, 73-95 
(1819).3  The Boorn trial influenced Professor Simon Greenleaf 
to endorse the corpus delicti rule in his evidence treatise.  
See 1 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 214, 
at 275 n.2 (14th ed. 1883) (discussing the Boorn trial in 
conjunction with cautious acceptance of verbal confessions); 
id. § 217, at 278-79 (approving the corpus delicti rule).  In 
turn, Professor Greenleaf's treatise has been noted as having 
contributed to the corpus delicti rule's near-universal 
adoption by the states.  Wigmore, supra, § 2071, at 511. 
2. 
The Corpus Delicti Rule and the Slight Corroboration 
Requirement 
In Virginia, we long ago established that it is 
"essential" in a criminal prosecution that the Commonwealth 
must prove the corpus delicti, that is, "that a [crime] has 
been committed."  Smith v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 
809, 813, 819 (1871); Forde v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 
                     
 
3 6 John D. Lawson, American State Trials (1916). 
 
7 
547, 550 (1864).4  From this bedrock principle, we adopted the 
corpus delicti rule for when the Commonwealth seeks to prove 
the existence of the crime by means of the accused's 
extrajudicial confession.  See Brown v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 
379, 382, 16 S.E. 250, 251 (1892).  This was a necessary 
precaution because "evidence as to confessions of parties is 
intrinsically weak and is inconclusive to establish a fact 
without the aid of other testimony."  Collins v. Commonwealth, 
123 Va. 815, 821, 96 S.E. 826, 828 (1918). 
We therefore recognized that, under the corpus delicti 
rule, "an accused cannot be convicted solely on his 
uncorroborated extrajudicial admission or confession."  Watkins 
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 348, 385 S.E.2d 50, 54 (1989).  
Instead, "slight corroboration of the confession is required to 
establish corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt."  Cherrix 
v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 305, 513 S.E.2d 642, 651 (1999) 
(emphasis added).  However, such slight corroboration need not 
be "of all the contents of the confession, or even all the 
                     
4 Requiring the Commonwealth to prove "that the [criminal] 
act itself was done" is, standing alone, an insufficient 
protection against wrongful prosecution of innocent defendants.  
Smith, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 813.  We have therefore also 
required the Commonwealth to prove "that [the criminal act] was 
[actually] done by the person charged" in tandem with requiring 
proof of the corpus delicti.  Id.; see also Boswell v. 
Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 875 (1871) ("The 
Commonwealth having proved the corpus delicti, and that the act 
was done by the accused, has made out her case."). 
 
8 
elements of the crime."  Watkins, 238 Va. at 348, 385 S.E.2d at 
54. 
Slight corroboration may be proved by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 349, 385 S.E.2d at 54.  To 
this end, slight corroboration exists when physical evidence 
relates to the confessed illegal act.  See, e.g., Magruder v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 283, 307-09, 657 S.E.2d 113, 126 (2008); 
Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 190, 194, 427 S.E.2d 379, 
388, 390 (1993).  Similarly, eyewitness testimony detailing the 
occurrence of the illegal act can help satisfy the slight 
corroboration requirement.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 
255 Va. 625, 645-46, 499 S.E.2d 538, 551-52 (1998). 
However, we must tread carefully when evaluating the 
probative weight of evidence that might provide slight 
corroboration.  As we explained, "the coincidence of 
circumstances tending to indicate guilt, however strong and 
numerous they may be, avails nothing unless the corpus delicti 
. . . be first established."  Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 
207, 211-12, 116 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1960).  Thus, evidence merely 
placing the defendant within the geographic proximity of a 
crime is insufficient corroboration of a confession to having 
committed such crimes within the area.  See Caminade v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 505, 507-08, 510-11, 338 S.E.2d 846, 847-
49 (1986).  Moreover, if the facts offered to satisfy the 
 
9 
slight corroboration requirement are "just as consistent with 
non-commission of the offense as . . . with its commission," 
then slight corroboration does not exist.  Phillips, 202 Va. at 
212, 116 S.E.2d at 285. 
C. 
Whether the Commonwealth Satisfied Its Burden of Proof 
Allen made an extrajudicial confession to having committed 
aggravated sexual battery.  We must therefore determine whether 
the remaining evidence provides the slight corroboration of the 
corpus delicti of aggravated sexual battery.  Cherrix, 257 Va. 
at 305, 513 S.E.2d at 651 (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 
Va. 625, 646, 499 S.E.2d 538, 551 (1998)). 
The only other substantive evidence entered into the 
record was the testimony of Allen's daughter.  Allen's daughter 
testified that she, her husband, and her son lived in a 
basement apartment, and that Allen and other family members 
lived upstairs.  Allen had various opportunities to be alone 
with his grandson.  The grandson would sometimes sleep in the 
same bed with both his grandmother and Allen, though 
occasionally the grandson would sleep alone with Allen.  
Allen's daughter personally knew that Allen and his grandson 
spent a lot of time together to "play bears," watch movies, and 
play around both inside and outside.  Allen's daughter also 
learned from Allen that he and his grandson wrestled. 
 
10 
The Commonwealth contends that the totality of this 
evidence provides the requisite slight corroboration of the 
corpus delicti.  We disagree. 
No physical evidence of the corpus delicti exists.  No 
eyewitness testimony, outside of Allen's own confession, 
supports an inference of the occurrence of any criminal 
activity.  To the extent that circumstantial evidence 
establishes Allen's mere opportunity to commit the corpus 
delicti, this is insufficient to provide slight corroboration.  
See Caminade, 230 Va. at 509-11, 338 S.E.2d at 848-49 (mere 
proximity to an alleged burglary is not sufficient 
corroboration that defendant committed that burglary, even 
though sufficient evidence corroborated defendant's admissions 
to having committed other burglaries in the area, thereby 
proving the corpus delicti of those other burglaries).  The 
Commonwealth must go further and "present evidence of such 
circumstances as will, when taken in connection with the 
confession, establish [the occurrence of] the corpus delicti 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Watkins, 238 Va. at 349, 385 
S.E.2d at 54. 
The Commonwealth, relying upon the per curiam order 
entered by the Court of Appeals, contends that the evidence 
presented establishes more than mere opportunity.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the evidence of Allen sleeping alone 
 
11 
with his grandson, and Allen wrestling alone with his grandson, 
provides the slight corroboration of the corpus delicti.  But 
for that to be true, those actions cannot be "just as 
consistent with non-commission of [aggravated sexual battery] 
as it is with its commission."  Phillips, 202 Va. at 212, 116 
S.E.2d at 285.  Yet, the evidence of Allen's guilt independent 
of his confession is just as consistent with non-commission of 
aggravated sexual battery as with its commission. 
A review of our precedent as set forth in Phillips 
underscores this point.  In that case, the defendant William 
Phillips, on his own initiative, went to the City of Bristol 
police station and voluntarily confessed to police officers to 
having engaged in the criminal act of sodomy with a stranger, 
Charles Campbell.  Id. at 208-09, 116 S.E.2d at 283.  As part 
of his confession, Phillips explained that he picked up and 
drove Campbell around in his car, engaged in the act of sodomy 
with Campbell in that car, and then allowed Campbell to keep 
possession of the car for the following day.  Id. at 209, 116 
S.E.2d at 283.  However, Campbell continued to possess that car 
for more than a day, and it was Campbell's refusal to return 
the car to Phillips that prompted Phillips to go to the City of 
Bristol police station.  Id. at 208, 116 S.E.2d at 283.  
Shortly after Phillips' confession, a deputy sheriff found and 
 
12 
arrested Campbell for possessing Phillips' car without 
authorization.  Id. at 209, 116 S.E.2d at 283. 
Neither Phillips nor Campbell testified at their joint 
trial on the charge of sodomy, and neither co-defendant's 
statements were admissible against the other.  Id. at 210, 116 
S.E.2d at 284.  The only evidence to corroborate Phillips' 
extrajudicial confession was therefore Campbell's unauthorized 
possession of Phillips' car.  Id. at 210-11, 116 S.E.2d at 284-
85.  However, Campbell's unauthorized possession of the car 
only corroborated Phillips' admission "that he and Campbell 
were in each other's presence at the time stated by Phillips in 
his confession."  Id. at 211, 116 S.E.2d at 285.  Because 
Campbell's "possession of the car [was] just as consistent with 
non-commission of the [sodomy] offense as it [was] with its 
commission," that evidence failed to corroborate the "truth of 
the confession as to the corpus delicti—the fact that the crime 
was actually committed."  Id. at 212, 116 S.E.2d at 285. 
Therefore, the additional evidence of Campbell's 
unauthorized possession of Phillips' car supplied no probative 
weight to whether sodomy was actually committed because the 
independent evidence was just as consistent with the corpus 
delicti not occurring as it was with the corpus delicti 
occurring.  Thus, Campbell's unauthorized possession of the car 
 
13 
could only corroborate the opportunity to commit the corpus 
delicti. 
As in Phillips, the additional evidence of Allen sleeping 
alone with his grandson, and wrestling alone with his grandson, 
is not slight corroboration of the commission of aggravated 
sexual battery.  The fact that a grandfather and his grandson 
are sleeping on the same bed, or that a grandfather and his 
grandson are wrestling, is just as consistent with aggravated 
sexual battery not occurring as it is with aggravated sexual 
battery occurring. 
Thus, this additional evidence does nothing more than 
establish the mere opportunity for Allen to commit the corpus 
delicti.  We therefore hold that the Commonwealth failed to 
prove the slight corroboration of Allen's confession required 
to establish the corpus delicti. 
III. Conclusion 
The Commonwealth was required to introduce evidence to 
prove the corpus delicti of aggravated sexual battery.  
Cherrix, 257 Va. at 305, 513 S.E.2d at 651.  At trial, Officer 
Dooley, Detective Poindexter, and Allen's daughter all 
testified as to Allen's confession.  Although this evidence is 
sufficient to show that Allen confessed to aggravated sexual 
battery, the Commonwealth is required to introduce independent 
evidence that slightly corroborates the corpus delicti of 
 
14 
aggravated sexual battery.5  Watkins, 238 Va. at 348, 385 S.E.2d 
at 54.  The testimony of Allen's daughter failed to provide 
such independent evidence, and thus the circuit court's 
judgment against Allen was without sufficient evidence to 
support it.  We will therefore reverse the order of the Court 
of Appeals, vacate Allen's conviction for aggravated sexual 
battery, and dismiss the indictment. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting. 
I. 
Introduction 
It is well-established under Virginia law that when a full 
confession is given by the accused, only slight corroboration 
of the confession is necessary to establish the corpus delicti 
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 
257 Va. 292, 305, 513 S.E.2d 642, 651 (1999).  In this appeal, 
we are required to consider the quantum of corroborating 
evidence the Commonwealth must provide to clear this low 
hurdle. 
                     
5 The Commonwealth argues that we should adopt a 
"trustworthiness" test to replace the slight corroboration 
requirement.  See People v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. 
2013).  We decline to do so. 
 
 
The majority reasons that the corroborating evidence here, 
testimony provided by Allen’s daughter which confirmed that 
Allen spent time alone with his grandson, that Allen and his 
grandson sometimes slept alone in Allen’s bed, and that the two 
would sometimes wrestle together, did not satisfy the corpus 
delicti of aggravated sexual battery because it established 
nothing more than “mere opportunity” to commit the offense.  
Despite the facts that Allen provided were a full and detailed 
confession to police, and that the testimony provided by 
Allen’s daughter confirmed that Allen and his grandson were in 
the precise circumstances detailed in that confession, the 
majority would require the Commonwealth to produce physical 
evidence or eyewitness testimony to satisfy its burden.  This 
overly mechanical interpretation of the corpus delicti 
requirement disregards the underlying purpose of the rule, 
stretches this Court’s precedent to require more than slight 
corroboration, and ignores practical realities about the nature 
of the crime to which Allen confessed. 
II. 
The Purpose of the Corpus Delicti Rule and the Slight 
Corroboration Requirement 
 
 
As the majority correctly points out, Virginia has long 
adhered to the common law rule that an uncorroborated 
extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is insufficient to 
establish the corpus delicti of a crime.  Moore v. 
 
 
16 
Commonwealth, 132 Va. 741, 745, 111 S.E. 128, 129 (1922).  
Although “[e]xtrajudicial confessions of the accused are 
competent evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti,” the 
rule requires that “confession[s] must be corroborated in a 
material and substantial manner by evidence aliunde
1 of the corpus delicti.”  Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 
207, 211, 116 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1960).  However, when the 
accused has fully confessed to an offense, “only slight 
corroboration of the confession is required to establish the 
corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cherrix, 257 Va. at 
305, 513 S.E.2d at 651.  If the Commonwealth’s corroborative 
evidence, “when taken in connection with the confession, 
establish[es] the corpus delicti beyond  reasonable doubt,” the 
Commonwealth has satisfied its burden. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 
192 Va. 665, 669, 66 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1951), overruled on other 
grounds by Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 351, 385 
S.E.2d 50, 56 (1989).  Additionally, “corroborative facts 
supporting the corpus delicti may be furnished by 
circumstantial evidence as readily as by direct evidence.”  
Watkins, 238 Va. at 349, 385 S.E.2d at 54 (citing Epperly v. 
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 229, 294 S.E.2d 882, 891 (1982)).  
Finally, this Court has held that corroborating evidence is not 
                     
1 Defined as "[f]rom another source; from elsewhere." Black's 
Law Dictionary 86 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
 
17 
required to support “all the contents of the confession, or 
even all of the elements of the crime.” Id. at 348, 385 S.E.2d 
at 54. 
In applying this rule, it is important to consider its 
underlying purpose.  Since its inception in 17th Century 
England, the corpus delicti rule has served one limited, yet 
essential function: to guard against the danger of criminal 
convictions based solely upon false confessions of guilt.  1 
Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §145 at 237 (6th ed. 
2006); 7 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 
2070 at 510 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1978).  With the ultimate 
goal of preventing this injustice, corroborating evidence is 
required solely to ensure the accuracy of an accused’s 
confession.  See McCormick on Evidence § 145 at 237 (“Whether 
considerations beyond accuracy can also support the requirement 
is doubtful.”).  For these purposes, this Court has considered 
whether corroborative evidence adduced by the Commonwealth was 
sufficient to indicate “the truth of [a defendant’s] confession 
as to the corpus delicti – the fact that the crime was actually 
committed.”  Phillips, 202 Va. at 212, 116 S.E.2d at 285; See 
also Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 145, 590 S.E.2d 537, 
560 (1987)  (“Although the Commonwealth may not establish an 
essential element of a crime by the uncorroborated confession 
of the accused alone, 'only slight corroborative evidence' is 
 
 
18 
necessary to show the veracity of the confession.”) (citations 
omitted). 
The majority relies on Phillips to conclude that the 
testimony given by Allen’s daughter was “just as consistent 
with non-commission of the offense as it [was] with its 
commission.”  Id. at 212, 116 S.E.2d at 285.  In Phillips, the 
defendant confessed to committing sodomy with a stranger after 
picking him up at a restaurant.  Id at 208-09, 116 S.E.2d at 
283.  In his statement to police, Phillips also said that he 
loaned his car to the stranger after the encounter.  Id.  Three 
days later, Charles R. Campbell was stopped by an officer while 
driving Phillips’ car.  Id.  Upon questioning, Campbell 
admitted that he had met Phillips at the restaurant, but denied 
that they had committed sodomy, claiming instead that Phillips 
had made unwanted advances towards him, which he refused.  Id. 
at 209-10, 116 S.E.2d at 283-84.  Campbell also told police 
that he dropped Phillips at home and took his car. Id.  The 
only evidence offered by the Commonwealth as corroboration of 
Phillips’ confession was that Campbell was found in possession 
of Phillips’ car.  Id. at 209, 211, 116 S.E.2d at 283, 285.  
Ultimately, this Court held that “possession of Phillips’ car 
corroborates Phillips’ statement that he and Campbell were in 
each other’s presence at the time stated by Phillips in his 
confession, yet it furnishes no corroboration that the actual 
 
 
19 
crime of sodomy for which Phillips was convicted was 
committed.”  Id. at 211, 116 S.E.2d at 285. 
The circumstances detailed in Phillips are easily 
distinguishable from the case at bar.  In Phillips, both 
defendants explained that they met at a restaurant, rode away 
in Phillips’ car, and both stated that Campbell kept the car 
after dropping Phillips off at home.  What happened in the 
interim, however, was a matter of dispute.  Consequently, 
Campbell’s possession of Phillips’ car was “just as consistent 
with non-commission of the offense as . . . with its 
commission” because both Campbell’s version of the story and 
Phillips’ version of the story were equally likely to be true.  
Id. at 212, 116 S.E.2d at 285.  In other words, because 
Campbell denied that he had committed sodomy with Phillips, the 
veracity of Phillips’ confession was placed in doubt, and the 
mere fact that Campbell was in possession of Phillips’ car 
failed to corroborate the truth of [Phillips’] confession.  See 
id. at 212, 116 S.E.2d at 285. 
In contrast, Allen’s confession in the instant case was 
uncontroverted.  Furthermore, the testimony given by Allen’s 
daughter established that Allen was often left alone with his 
grandson in Allen’s bedroom and that she was aware that the two 
would sometimes wrestle.  This corroborative evidence provided 
more than a “coincidence of circumstances tending to indicate 
 
 
20 
guilt.” Id. at 211-12, 116 S.E.2d at 285. It detailed the 
precise circumstances during which Allen told police that the 
crime was committed. 
The majority also cites Caminade v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 
505, 509-11, 338 S.E.2d 846, 848-49 (1986), for the proposition 
that evidence establishing Allen’s mere opportunity to commit 
the corpus delicti cannot provide the necessary slight 
corroboration.  This reliance is equally misplaced.  In that 
case, the defendant admitted to numerous burglaries in a 
specific geographic area, but was unable to identify which 
houses he had actually burglarized.  Id. at 507-08, 338 S.E.2d 
at 847.  Caminade was convicted, inter alia, of three 
burglaries, id. at 505, 338 S.E.2d at 846, and this Court 
affirmed two of the convictions after review of corroborating 
evidence with respect to those crimes.2  In overturning 
Caminade’s conviction for the third burglary, however, this 
Court found that Caminade’s statements to police were 
                     
2 In addition to defendant’s admission that he was in the 
neighborhood committing burglaries “within a range of days 
which included the date of the offense,” the Commonwealth’s 
corroborating evidence for those two burglaries included 
signs that the homes in question had been broken into and 
the fact that property was missing.  Additionally, in one 
case, the victims’ neighbor saw a car closely matching 
Caminade’s parked nearby and heard sounds consistent with 
breaking and entering coming from the home around the time 
that property was discovered missing.  In the other, the 
amount of money stolen exactly matched the amount Caminade 
admitted he had taken from one of the homes he had targeted.  
Caminade, 230 Va. at 508-09, 338 S.E.2d at 848. 
 
 
21 
“admissions, not confessions, because they did not furnish all 
facts necessary for conviction.” Id. at 510, 338 S.E.2d at 849.  
Because the Commonwealth offered no evidence establishing “(1) 
that an entry was actually made into the [third] house, and (2) 
by a person having the requisite intent[, and] Caminade's 
admissions could not supply these crucial elements because he 
simply did not know which houses he had entered,” the corpus 
delicti of the third burglary was not established. Id.  
Although the statements “might [have] furnished circumstantial 
evidence from which a fact finder might infer criminal agency, 
after corpus delicti has been established by other evidence, 
the admissions furnish[ed] no proof of corpus delicti in 
themselves.”  Id. 
In contrast, in the present case Allen confessed to 
touching his grandson’s genital area while his grandson was 
sleeping.  He also confessed that he allowed his grandson to 
use his hands and feet to touch his erect penis while they were 
wrestling.  There is no doubt that, consistent with our 
observation in Caminade, 230 Va. at 510, 338 S.E.2d at 849, 
Allen’s statements to police constituted a full confession 
because they “furnish[ed] all facts necessary for conviction” 
for aggravated sexual battery as defined in Code §§ 18.2-67.3 
and 18.2-67.10(6).  Therefore, unlike the admissions by the 
defendant in Caminade, Allen’s confession was “competent 
 
 
22 
evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti,” Phillips, 202 
Va. at 211, 116 S.E.2d at 285, and only slight corroboration of 
Allen’s confession was required for the Commonwealth to satisfy 
its burden.  Cherrix, 257 Va. at 305, 513 S.E.2d at 651. 
As this Court has made clear, it is not necessary for the 
Commonwealth’s corroborative evidence to support “all the 
contents of the confession, or even of all the elements of the 
crime.”  Watkins, 238 Va. at 348, 385 S.E.2d at 54.  Here, the 
corroborative evidence did not, as the majority suggests, 
merely establish “opportunity” or “geographic proximity.”  The 
testimony given by Allen’s daughter also established that she 
was aware of physical contact between Allen and his grandson 
when they wrestled on Allen’s bed.  Thus, when taken in 
connection with Allen’s full confession, this testimony 
constituted slight corroboration that Allen committed 
aggravated sexual battery against his grandson in the manner 
that he described.  See id.; Wheeler, 192 Va. at 669, 66 S.E.2d 
at 607. 
III.  Conclusion 
The majority requires what is functionally more than 
slight corroboration to establish the corpus delicti in a case 
where there is a victim who is too young to testify and no 
physical evidence available, with an uncontroverted full 
confession that is itself competent evidence of each element of 
 
 
23 
the corpus delicti.  See Phillips, 202 Va. at 210-11, 116 
S.E.2d at 284.  I would hold that the corroborative testimony 
provided by Allen’s daughter, taken in conjunction with Allen’s 
uncontroverted full confession, provided the necessary slight 
corroboration and established the corpus delicti of aggravated 
sexual battery beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, I 
dissent.