Title: State v. Denny
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000202-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2017

2017 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP202-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jeffrey C. Denny, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 28, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 26, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph W. Voiland 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ROGGENSACK, C.J. concur and dissent (opinion 
filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, A. W. J. dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (Opinion filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, with whom on the 
brief was Daniel P Lennington, deputy solicitor general, Donald 
V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel 
attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Keith A. Findley, and Wisconsin Innocence Project, 
with whom on the brief was Steven D. Gunder, assistant state 
public defender.  
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP202-CR 
(L.C. No. 
1982CF425) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey C. Denny, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
FEB 28, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Denny, 2016 
WI App 27, 368 Wis. 2d 363, 878 N.W.2d 679, which reversed the 
Ozaukee County circuit court's1 order denying Jeffrey C. Denny's 
("Denny") postconviction motion for forensic deoxyribonucleic 
acid ("DNA") testing of evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07 
(2013-14)2 and remanded the case for forensic DNA testing at 
private or public expense.  Denny, 368 Wis. 2d 363, ¶¶1, 64. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Joseph W. Voiland presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
On November 15, 1982, a jury found Denny and his 
brother Kent guilty of the murder of Christopher Mohr ("Mohr").  
Denny was sentenced to life imprisonment.  Over three decades 
later, in 2014, Denny filed a motion claiming innocence and 
requesting forensic DNA testing of evidence taken from the scene 
of Mohr's murder. Denny asked the circuit court to order that 
the testing occur at public expense, or, in the alternative, at 
Denny's own expense.  
¶3 
Whether, and the conditions under which, a court will 
order such postconviction forensic DNA testing are questions 
governed by Wis. Stat. § 974.07 ("Motion for postconviction 
deoxyribonucleic 
acid 
testing 
of 
certain 
evidence.").  
Interpreting this statute, the circuit court below concluded 
that Denny was not entitled to testing either at public or at 
private expense.  The court of appeals disagreed.  We are asked 
to determine whether Denny has met the statutory requirements 
for forensic DNA testing of the evidence he has identified. 
¶4 
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
denying Denny's postconviction motion for forensic DNA testing 
of certain evidence.  Consequently, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.    
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On January 26, 1982, police discovered Mohr's body in 
a room on the second floor of a house in Grafton, Wisconsin.  On 
June 25, 1982, a criminal complaint was filed against Denny in 
Ozaukee County circuit court charging him as party to the crime 
of the first-degree murder of Mohr, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
3 
 
§ 940.01 (1981-82) and Wis. Stat. § 939.05 (1981-82).  Denny's 
brother Kent was also charged.  
¶6 
From November 9 to November 15, 1982, Denny and Kent 
were tried jointly before a jury.3  At trial, the State presented 
its case against Denny and Kent in the following general4 manner.  
¶7 
Jonathan Leatherman ("Leatherman") testified that on 
January 26, 1982, at around 9:30 a.m., he spoke to Mohr on the 
phone about traveling to Mohr's house to smoke marijuana.  
Around 10:45 or 10:50 a.m., Leatherman began walking to Mohr's 
house, arriving there minutes later.  Leatherman entered the 
house, went upstairs, and upon opening the door to "[Mohr's] 
room" saw Mohr's body on the floor.  Leatherman called the 
"rescue squad" and reported a suicide.  He then returned to 
Mohr's room to retrieve a quarter pound of marijuana which he 
suspected was in Mohr's room in order to "save [Mohr] from 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Warren A. Grady presided. 
4 We provide the following account of the trial proceedings 
because, as will become apparent, these details are relevant to 
our evaluation of whether, in the words of the postconviction 
forensic DNA testing statute, "[i]t is reasonably probable that 
[Denny] would not have been prosecuted . . . [or] convicted" of 
his crime "if exculpatory [DNA] testing results had been 
available before the prosecution . . . [or] conviction."  Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2.   
This summary is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
discussion of the testimony given at Denny's jury trial or of 
the cross-examination of the witnesses discussed.  The witnesses 
are not presented in this section in the exact order in which 
they testified at trial. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
4 
 
trouble," but ultimately went outside to wait for the police 
empty-handed. 
¶8 
Later that day, Leatherman received a call from Kent.  
When asked when he had last spoken to Kent prior to that call, 
Leatherman replied, "I'm not sure, maybe a week, I'm not sure, 
maybe more."  Kent asked Leatherman if he "knew to [sic] get any 
pot" and after Leatherman said he did not, Kent "said what about 
[Mohr]," and Leatherman informed Kent that Mohr had killed 
himself.  Kent asked Leatherman if he wanted to "stop over" 
later that day, and Leatherman did so.  At Kent's house, 
Leatherman had a conversation with Kent and Denny about 
Leatherman's experiences that day.  
¶9 
Gary Helm ("Helm") testified that he worked for the 
Grafton Street Department and was also part of the Grafton 
rescue squad.  On January 26, 1982, at around 10:55 a.m. to 
11:00 a.m., Helm was "picking up garbage" as part of his 
employment when he received notification of an attempted 
suicide.  Helm traveled to the reported address where he met a 
police officer outside of Mohr's house.  There, "a fella in 
front of the house . . . was yelling help him, please help him, 
I don't believe he did it."  According to Helm's testimony, Helm 
and the officer went inside and up to Mohr's room.  Helm tried 
but failed to obtain a pulse reading.  
¶10 Daniel Palkovic ("Officer Palkovic") of the Grafton 
Police Department testified that he was dispatched to Mohr's 
residence on January 26, 1982, and that he accompanied Helm to 
Mohr's room.  Officer Palkovic described a number of items 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
5 
 
retrieved from the scene of Mohr's murder, from areas nearby, or 
from Mohr's body at the autopsy.  These items were introduced as 
exhibits at trial and included: (1) a jacket found in Mohr's 
room which appeared to have blood on it; (2) a torn shirt 
removed from Mohr which had blood on it; (3) jeans removed from 
Mohr which had blood on them; (4) socks removed from Mohr which 
had blood on them; (5) "under briefs" removed from Mohr which 
had blood on them; (6) a hat found in Mohr's room which had 
blood on it; (7) gloves found in Mohr's room; (8) a yellow towel 
taken from the hallway directly outside of Mohr's room which had 
blood on it; (9) samples of Mohr's head and pubic hair; (10) 
hair that had been "clenched in . . . Mohr's left hand"; (11) 
hair located between the fingers of Mohr's right hand, which was 
"closed somewhat, but . . . not fully clenched"; (12) hair stuck 
to Mohr's chin and neck by dried blood; (13) loose hair "taken 
from [Mohr's] mouth area" which "[a]ppeared to be" "stuck" there 
by "a combination of dried blood and possibly saliva"; (14) hair 
at least apparently stuck to Mohr's pants by dried blood; (15) 
hair, "a possible seed of some type," and some glass fragments 
stuck to Mohr's skin and shirt in his "upper chest area"; (16) 
the "top or main portion of a bong pipe" found in Mohr's room 
which "appear[ed] to have been shattered or broken on one end" 
and which appeared to have blood on its "tube"; (17) the "base 
portion" of the bong pipe, which was found in Mohr's room; (18) 
the "bowl portion" of the bong pipe, which was found in Mohr's 
room and which had blood on it; (19) "fragments of . . . maroon 
plexiglass material, similar to the top portion of the bong 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
6 
 
pipe," found "scattered about" Mohr's room in "[r]oughly the 
immediate area of [Mohr's] body itself" and which had blood on 
them; (20) "pieces of the maroon plexiglass portion of the bong 
pipe and . . . a metallic[-]type of rod which was found to be 
located on the floor under [Mohr] after his body was moved" 
which had blood on them; (21) a "rubber-type of grommet" used 
with the bong pipe and found "just inside of the doorway leading 
into" Mohr's room; (22) a "glass drinking container" which was 
found on the floor next to an ice cube, had blood on it, and had 
"a small amount of orange liquid at the bottom of the glass"; 
(23) ice cubes (by the time of trial, water) collected from 
various areas of Mohr's room and observed around 11:30 a.m.; and 
(24) a phone directory found in the hallway on the second floor 
of Mohr's house with a "footwear impression on the cover" which 
appeared to be caused at least in part by blood.  On cross-
examination, Officer Palkovic conceded that the "shoe bottom 
pattern" imprinted on the phone book was a common one.  
¶11 There were additional items discussed during Officer 
Palkovic's testimony which were not, ultimately, received by the 
court: (1) a yellow stool which was taken from a room of Mohr's 
house different from the room Mohr was found in and which 
appeared to have blood on it; (2) a "small water faucet-type 
screen" stuck to Mohr's shirt by dried blood, similar to other 
screens found in Mohr's room; (3) "several screens, safety pins 
and some screws and some thumb tacks" which "gave the 
appearance, were attached to the back of the victim's neck and 
head 
area, 
the 
hair 
area 
itself" 
by 
"blood 
which 
had 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
7 
 
coagulated"; (4) certain "fragments or pieces of the plexiglass 
portion of the bong pipe" found "on the floor of . . . [Mohr's] 
bedroom alongside" Mohr's body; (5) scissors found in Mohr's 
room; (6) a red disposable lighter found in Mohr's room under 
Mohr's right shoulder which appeared to have blood on it; and 
(7) blood samples removed from an overturned "metal lawn chair" 
found in Mohr's room.  
¶12 Samples of the defendants' head and pubic hair taken 
directly from the defendants were also introduced.  
¶13 Ozaukee County Deputy Coroner Ruth Heiser testified 
that on January 26, 1982, she was dispatched to Mohr's house and 
that she pronounced Mohr dead at 12:05 p.m. that day.  
¶14 Dr. Hellen Young ("Dr. Young"), who performed an 
autopsy of Mohr, discussed the nature and extent of the wounds 
on Mohr's body and her opinion of the cause of Mohr's death.  
According to Dr. Young, Mohr's death was caused by "massive 
hemorrhage due to multiple incised wounds."  Dr. Young described 
over 50 wounds on Mohr's body and opined that at least some of 
these wounds were caused by a knife.  One wound in particular 
was a "good-sized gaping wound" in Mohr's "back directly over 
the area of where the heart would be reflected" requiring "at 
least two to three" "gashes."  Mohr's heart, however, was 
"intact within [his] body."  Mohr had a "large gaping wound" on 
his throat.  He had two wounds in his stomach "made by one stab 
wound" which Mohr would have sustained "early in the series of 
wounds that were received."  Dr. Young further discussed 
injuries to Mohr's head caused by "blunt trauma" and agreed that 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
8 
 
at least a portion of the bong pipe introduced into evidence 
could have produced such injuries.  
¶15 The "meat and potatoes of the case," in the State's 
words, were the collection of witnesses called by the State who 
testified as to numerous statements made by Denny and Kent about 
Mohr's murder.  
¶16 Trent Denny ("Trent"), Denny and Kent's brother, 
testified that "two, three days" after Trent was released from 
the Ozaukee County Jail on February 21, 1982, Kent told Trent 
that Kent had killed Mohr.  On a separate occasion ("I think it 
was the day after I talked to Kent," according to Trent), Trent 
asked Kent "if he really did it," and Kent replied "yes."  Two 
or three days after that, Trent asked Denny "if it was true." 
Denny "asked [Trent] why did Kent tell[?]"  After Trent told 
Denny that "Kent told [Trent] he killed" Mohr, Denny "looked at 
[Trent] like he was mad."  Trent offered his assistance to 
Denny.  Denny told Trent that Denny and Kent had stabbed Mohr.  
Specifically, Kent asked Mohr "how he felt," then stabbed Mohr 
once in the stomach, then asked Mohr "how he felt now," then 
gave the knife to Denny, after which Denny stabbed Mohr.  Mohr 
"was coming after [Denny] while [Denny] was stabbing him."  Kent 
"hit [Mohr] over the head with the bong."  On yet another 
occasion, Trent again asked Kent "if it was true," and Kent 
affirmed that it was. 
¶17 "Maybe two, three" weeks after Trent spoke with Denny, 
Trent had a conversation with Kent and Denny.  They told Trent 
"we had to get rid of the clothes."  That night, Kent, Trent, 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
9 
 
and Lori Jacque ("Jacque") drove to a cemetery.  Kent got out of 
the car and went to the cemetery.  Five minutes later, he 
returned carrying a paper bag and the three drove away.  Kent 
"said something that there was blood on the clothes," and "asked 
[Trent and Jacque] if [they] could smell it."  At some point 
while in the car that night, Kent pulled a shirt out of the bag 
and Trent saw a "stain" on it.  On cross-examination, Trent 
agreed that he did not "really know what was in [the] bag," and 
instead "just assumed it was the clothes."  Eventually the three 
drove to Jacque's house, Jacque retrieved a plastic bag, and 
Kent put the paper bag into the plastic bag.  The three then 
drove to a dump in either "Port or Fredonia," and Kent "shot the 
bag into the dump."  
¶18 On another date, behind Trent's house, Denny showed 
Trent what Denny said was a knife.  Trent saw the handle, but 
not the blade.  Finally, a separate time Trent asked Kent and 
Denny together "if they did it," and "[t]hey told [Trent] yes." 
¶19 Jacque testified that on February 20, 1982, while at a 
party in "the Denny room" (referred to later as Kent's bedroom), 
Kent "looked very upset" and told Jacque that he had killed 
Mohr.  Later that night, Kent indicated to Jacque that "[h]e 
wanted to go get the clothing back from the graveyard."  "About 
a week after that," Kent again spoke with Jacque about the 
clothing.  A "couple weeks after" the initial conversation, 
according to Jacque, Jacque, Trent, and Kent drove to a 
"graveyard."  Kent exited the car and came back "with a bundle 
of clothes under his arm."  Back in the car, Kent held up a 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
10 
 
shirt.  The three stopped at Jacque's house, where they 
retrieved a paper bag.  They then drove to the town dump in the 
"Town of Port."  Kent had placed the clothing in the bag.  He 
exited the car and walked to the dump.  Jacque and Trent "drove 
down the road and turned around and came back and picked him 
up."  That night, Kent said that he was "glad to get rid of the 
clothes."  
¶20 On another date, Jacque was in a car with Kent and 
Denny.  She heard Kent and Denny have a conversation about how 
"they forgot the tennis shoes."  On another date, "Kent had said 
that he wanted to turn himself in" because "[i]t was just 
getting to be too much."  Kent was crying at the time.  On 
another date, in Kent's room, Denny "said something about a 
scratch on his leg," namely "[t]hat that was from where [Mohr] 
had scratched him."  Jacque did not actually see any scratches.  
Finally, when asked "Were there any other conversations that you 
remember?"  Jacque replied, "Well, several times there was 
things said about it."  However, Jacque did not "remember any of 
those in any specifics besides what [she had] already stated."  
¶21 On 
cross-examination, 
Jacque 
testified 
that 
on 
separate occasions Kent had told her, with regard to the reason 
for Mohr's murder, that "somebody put a gun to his head" and 
that "he did it to prove it to his brother."  Jacque was also 
asked "on another occasion did he do it to say it was because it 
was either him or [Mohr]?", and she replied "Yes, I think I 
heard something like that done."  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
11 
 
¶22 Diane Hansen ("Hansen") testified that "approximately 
a week after" Mohr's death, at the Sundance Tavern, Kent told 
Hansen that "he killed [Mohr]," and then, after Hansen started 
crying, that "he was only kidding."  On cross-examination Hansen 
agreed that Kent also said "do you think I'd do something like 
that?"  A "[c]ouple weeks later," Kent told Hansen that he went 
to Mohr's house, that Mohr was "standin' by the fish tank and 
[Kent] stabbed" Mohr in the stomach, then left the room and 
"[g]ot sick."  
¶23 "[A] long time after that," Hansen asked Kent "if 
there was any truth to the rumor that [Mohr's] heart was cut 
out," and Kent told Hansen "[y]es."  Hansen also testified, in 
response to the question of whether Kent had, at any time, told 
Hansen "that he saw anyone walking up the street as he got out 
of 
[Mohr's] 
house," 
that 
"[Kent] 
said 
he 
thought 
he 
saw . . . Leatherman," specifically "[o]n a road behind a 
garbage truck."  On cross-examination, Hansen testified that in 
her "very first" conversation with Kent about Mohr's death, Kent 
told Hansen that Leatherman "had found [Mohr] and [Mohr] was 
dead," and that "it was an accidental death."  On re-direct, 
Hansen explained that the conversation was the "same day" as 
Mohr's death. 
¶24 Lori Ann Jastor Commons ("Commons") testified that, 
while at a party at Kent's house the night before Trent "got out 
of jail," she heard Kent say: 
[Mohr] was at his fish tank and Kent went up to him 
and 
stabbed 
him 
and 
asked 
him 
how 
he 
felt, 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
12 
 
and . . . [Mohr] replied that he felt all right and 
that he proceeded to stab him one more time and he had 
gotten sick and run into the bathroom and [Denny] had 
taken over. 
At that point Denny "just stabbed him."  Commons clarified that 
Kent told Commons that he stabbed Mohr "[i]n his side."  
¶25 Commons also discussed a conversation she heard that 
occurred "approximately three weeks after the murder" at the 
"Sundance Bar in Port":  
[Kent] 
was 
talking 
to 
a 
friend 
of 
mine, . . . Hansen, when I came out of the bathroom, 
and [Hansen] was crying and I went up to her to see 
what was wrong and Kent was talking to her and said 
that he had to do it, otherwise it would have been 
him. 
¶26 Robin Doyle ("Doyle") testified that she asked Kent 
"how, out of curiosity if he had killed" Mohr.  Kent said "[y]es 
he did."  Kent also told Doyle that "he had told everybody, that 
he ever told, something different so that the stories wouldn't 
match up." 
¶27 Kent's coworker, Carl Winker ("Winker"), testified 
that at the end of April 1982 Kent told him that he "knew the 
guy" who killed, in the words of the State, "a boy in Grafton."  
Kent told Winker that "the guy started stabbin' him and he just 
kept doin' it," that "the guy" "liked it, got into it," and that 
"the guy's heart was cut out."  Kent also told Winker that the 
killing "was for drug money."  Some time later, Kent told Winker 
that he would not be coming to work anymore.  When asked why, 
Kent stated it was because he was going to jail.  When asked why 
he was going to jail, Kent said "because of that guy that got 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
13 
 
killed."  Winker asked Kent, "[W]hy, do you know something about 
it?"  Kent replied, "[N]o, I'm the guy that did it."  On another 
occasion, Kent told Winker "there was a coat and a knife and a 
dump in Sheboygan and the coat was full of blood."  
¶28 Steven Hansen ("Steve H.") testified that in early 
March 1982 Denny told Steve H. that "[Denny] and Kent had 
killed" Mohr.  Denny told Steve H. that Denny and Kent went to 
Mohr's 
bedroom, 
that 
Kent 
"pulled 
out 
a 
knife 
and . . . proceeded to stab" Mohr.  Steve H. also testified that 
he remembered telling Officer Palkovic that Denny told Steve H. 
the following: 
Mohr was facing the window when the Denny boys were in 
the bedroom and Kent pulled a knife out and looked at 
[Mohr], and looked at . . . Denny and then . . . Denny 
nodded his head and Kent started stabbing [Mohr] in 
the stomach[.] 
. . .  
Mohr would not fall, but subsequently he did fall to 
the floor and . . . [Denny] kicked . . . Mohr[.] 
. . . 
[Denny] and Kent . . . walked out of the house and 
they didn't think anyone saw them[.] 
. . . 
[Either Kent or Denny told Steve H. that] Kent and 
[Denny] might have seen . . . Leatherman when they 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
14 
 
were leaving the . . . Mohr residence the day of the 
murder[.]5 
¶29 Patricia Robran ("Robran") testified that in either 
March or April 1982 she was present in the basement of her 
parents' house with Denny.  Denny was crying.  Eventually Denny 
told Robran "that him and . . . Kent were the ones who killed 
that one boy in Grafton," that "him and Kent stabbed him and 
they hit him" with a bong, that "there was no reason for it and 
alls I got was a quarter pound [of marijuana] out of it."  Denny 
informed Robran that "Kent stabbed [Mohr] first and he handed 
[Denny] the knife and Kent told him to continue what he was 
doing until he got back, so [Denny] did, and he didn't remember 
if he did it five or ten or fifteen times."  Robran added that 
Denny told her that before the stabbing occurred, "Kent had 
asked [Mohr] how he was feeling, he said he was feeling fine, 
and then Kent stabbed him and asked him how he'd feel now.  They 
just kept doin' it." 
¶30 Daniel Johansen ("Johansen"), an inmate at the Ozaukee 
County Jail, testified that Denny told him about Mohr's murder.  
Johansen stated that Denny told him: 
[Denny] and Kent went over to . . . Mohr's house, and 
I'm not sure, but it was either the, that [Mohr] owed 
Kent money or they were going to pick up some pot, and 
[Denny] . . . went out of the room and that [Mohr] and 
Kent were in and he said all of a sudden he heard how 
                                                 
5 These statements were read to Steve H. by the State, and 
Steve H. simply assented to having told them to Officer 
Palkovic.  On cross-examination, Steve H. agreed that he did not 
"really remember how these statements which [the State] ha[d] 
read to [him] got to Officer Palkovic or into his report." 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
15 
 
does this feel, and he came back in the room and Kent 
had stabbed him in the stomach.  
. . .  
[T]hen he said that Kent just started stabbing him and 
then he went to the bathroom and looked in the mirror 
at himself because he couldn't believe it. 
. . .  
[Denny] . . . hit [Mohr] over the head with a bong and 
kicked him a couple times. 
. . .  
[Denny] said the shoes he, he took 'em over to some 
sewage plant in here, in Port or some sewage plant 
around here. 
. . .  
[H]e . . . threw 'them in. 
¶31 Tod Trierweiler ("Trierweiler") testified that in late 
March of 1982 he was in the Denny house with Russ Schram 
("Schram"), Tammy Whitaker ("Whitaker"), Kent, and Denny.  
Trierweiler left with Denny in a car.6  They stopped at a gas 
station in Grafton.  Denny asked for and obtained the keys to 
Trierweiler's car and put a brown bag "rolled about half-way" 
into the trunk of the car.  Trierweiler drove Denny to the 
Sundance Tavern, then went to his girlfriend Cindy Otto's 
("Otto") house, where he told Otto "about the keys."  Later, 
Trierweiler found a bag that "looked like it was half-way down 
and it was rolled up" in his car and opened it.  Inside were a 
                                                 
6 It is unclear from the testimony whether, in Trierweiler's 
account, other individuals accompanied the two.  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
16 
 
pair of tennis shoes and a pair of brown loafers.  Trierweiler 
wore the tennis shoes for about three months.  As to the 
loafers, Trierweiler testified, "[M]y girlfriend's brother came 
up from Texas with no pairs of shoes . . . and I guess he took 
'em."  Eventually Trierweiler gave the tennis shoes to Sergeant 
Fred Goetz ("Sergeant Goetz"), who was "looking for the shoes."  
Trierweiler stated on cross-examination that when he retrieved 
the tennis shoes from his car he examined them and there was no 
blood on them.  For his part, Sergeant Goetz testified as to 
receiving the shoes from Trierweiler, and as to the chain of 
custody following his receipt of the shoes.  Sergeant Goetz 
agreed that Trierweiler had told him that "he could not state 
for certain if [the shoes] were the ones that . . . Denny had 
placed in his trunk."  These shoes were admitted into evidence. 
¶32 Otto 
testified 
that 
she 
and 
Trierweiler 
had 
a 
conversation about the keys, that she and Trierweiler discovered 
a "brown grocery bag" which contained two pairs of shoes in the 
trunk of Trierweiler's car, that Trierweiler wore the tennis 
shoes, and that her brother took the second pair of shoes, which 
she described as "suede tied shoes."  Otto also discussed an 
occasion when Denny asked Trierweiler "if he could go back to 
look at [Trierweiler's] house to look in or at [Trierweiler's] 
car."  Trierweiler refused at the time because he was late to 
drop Otto off at home.  Otto also discussed how Trierweiler came 
to give the tennis shoes to Sergeant Goetz.  
¶33 Whitaker testified that she was at a party in late 
March 1982 with Kent, Denny, Schram and Trierweiler at the Denny 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
17 
 
house.  At one point Schram, Trierweiler, and Whitaker went 
outside.  Schram "put the shoes in, on the bag, I should say, 
into the back seat [sic]" of a car and told Whitaker "those were 
the murder shoes."  Denny then exited the house and the four 
went to a gas station.  At the gas station, Schram and Denny 
"put the bag in the trunk."  Whitaker described the bag as a 
"rolled," "brown paper bag." 
¶34 Whitaker further explained that she was Denny's 
girlfriend of about eight months and testified to two accounts 
of Mohr's murder Denny had related to her, though she prefaced 
her testimony with the statement that her account was "a rough 
estimate of what [she] remember[ed]."  First, Denny told 
Whitaker 
"[t]hat . . . Leatherman 
and 
[Denny] 
went 
over 
to . . . Mohr's house and [Leatherman] got in a fight with 
[Mohr] and started stabbing him, and then . . . [Leatherman] 
asked [Denny] to help 'im so [Denny] hit him."  Second, Denny 
told Whitaker "[t]hat him and Kent went over to . . . Mohr's 
house and then they went up there . . . [and] Kent started 
stabbin' him and then [Denny] went into the bathroom, looked in 
the mirror and said my God, what'd I get myself into."  Denny 
also told Whitaker that "they got" a quarter pound of "[p]ot" 
out of the murder.  
¶35 Schram testified to events that occurred at a party in 
late March of 1982 at the Denny house.  Schram, Trierweiler, 
Whitaker, Kent, and Denny were at the party.  Schram stated, "We 
were gonna leave" and that Denny "took a bag out of the closet 
and took it with us."  Schram described the bag as a "[r]egular 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
18 
 
brown paper bag."  Denny put the bag in the back seat of a car.  
At some time before Denny placed the bag in the car, he told 
Schram that the bag contained "[m]urder shoes."  Schram 
testified that although he did not "exactly" remember who 
brought the shoes out to the car, he was "pretty sure it was" 
Denny.  Schram continued that he and at least some of the others 
drove to a gas station, where Denny asked Trierweiler for the 
keys to the trunk of his car.  Trierweiler gave Denny the keys 
and Denny "put the bag in there."  The bag was "rolled up so you 
could carry it with a handle like."  The parties eventually 
"dropped [Denny] off at a bar."  Afterwards, Denny contacted 
Schram a "couple times, saying to get it out of the car."  
Schram told Denny that "he knew where [Trierweiler] lived and 
that he could get it from him anytime." 
¶36 On another occasion, Schram, Kent, Denny, Whitaker, 
and Jacque were together in Grafton.  Denny told Schram, "you'd 
be surprised how long it took a person to die."  Another time 
"between March and April," according to Schram, Denny "was mad 
at Trent and . . . said that he'd take him out and put an arrow 
through 
him" 
because 
of 
"something 
about 
testifying."  
Additionally, on September 1, Schram received a call from Denny 
"from jail."  Denny told Schram "[t]o not say anything about the 
shoes because [Schram would] be an accessory" to "[m]urder."  
¶37 The State called Jeffrey Nilsson ("Nilsson"), who 
previously worked for the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory and 
who analyzed blood and hair from the crime scene.  Certain of 
the 
blood 
tested 
came 
from 
an 
individual 
of 
the 
same 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
19 
 
international blood group to which Mohr belonged.  Other testing 
produced inconclusive results or was not possible.  Nilsson also 
examined "over two hundred hairs" and only two were inconsistent 
with the samples taken from Mohr when analyzed by "microscopic 
comparison."  These two hairs were also not consistent with 
samples taken from Denny and Kent.  The hairs were retrieved 
from a sterile sheet used to wrap Mohr's body and from Mohr's 
shirt.  These hairs were admitted into evidence. 
¶38  Arthur Varriale of the State Crime Lab testified that 
he examined the phone book found in Mohr's house and "was able 
to detect the presence of human blood stains upon" the book.  He 
was not able to detect any blood on the shoes allegedly worn by 
Trierweiler.  Charles Hannah ("Hannah") of the State Crime Lab, 
who compared the tread on one of the shoes allegedly recovered 
from Trierweiler to the impression on the phone book, also 
testified.  Hannah explained that while the pattern on the 
bottom of the shoe was the same pattern as the incomplete 
impression on the phone book, he could not determine whether the 
shoe in fact made the impression.  
¶39 Neither Kent nor Denny testified at trial.  Denny's 
attorney did not call any witnesses to testify.  Kent's attorney 
attempted to call several witnesses, but ultimately obtained 
meaningful testimony from only one: Gordon Denny ("Gordon"), the 
father of Kent, Trent, and Denny.  Gordon testified that his 
sons had been competing with each other "all their lives"; that 
Trent and Kent had a poor relationship; that Kent was sometimes 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
20 
 
a practical joker, with some jokes being "quite elaborate"; and 
that Kent had "a habit of fabulation" or of "tell[ing] stories."  
¶40 During closing arguments, the State pointed to, inter 
alia, the dozens of inculpatory statements allegedly made by 
Kent and Denny to various of the witnesses who had testified, 
the evidence relating to the alleged destruction of clothing, 
the episode in which Denny allegedly showed Trent the knife, and 
the 
evidence 
relating 
to 
the 
shoes 
allegedly 
worn 
by 
Trierweiler, including Hannah's opinion as to the similarity 
between the impression on the phone book and the pattern on one 
of those shoes.  The attorneys for Kent and Denny, in turn, 
attacked the State's witnesses and the State's physical evidence 
on numerous grounds, arguing that the State had not met its 
burden of proving their clients guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  To take one example, Denny's attorney characterized some 
of the State's evidence as consisting of: 
[S]tatements which in my view have been made by 
unreliable, incredible braggarts, liars, to equal[ly] 
unreliable persons, who in my view, are drug users, 
possibly alcoholics, certainly drunkards, people who, 
themselves admitted on that witness stand to being 
people who exaggerate, who lie, who make up stories, 
who had faulty memories, who had to have their 
recollections refreshed by police. 
¶41 According to the record, on November 15, 1982, the 
jury departed the courtroom to deliberate at 4:56 p.m.  At 
10:49 p.m. the court reconvened and the jury's verdict was read.  
The jury found Denny (and Kent) guilty of first-degree murder.  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
21 
 
On November 16, 1982, the circuit court sentenced Denny to life 
imprisonment and a judgment of conviction was filed.  
¶42 On 
April 
14, 
1983, 
Denny 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  On July 1, 1983, an order was filed 
denying that motion.  On July 8, 1983, Denny filed a notice of 
appeal.  On December 5, 1984, the court of appeals affirmed 
Denny's 
conviction. 
 
State 
v. 
Denny, 
No. 
1983AP1311-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1984).  On 
February 5, 1985, this court denied review of that appeal.  
¶43 Since that time, Denny has unsuccessfully attempted to 
upset his conviction on a number of occasions.  See Denny v. 
Gudmanson, 252 F.3d 896, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2001). 
¶44 On 
May 
1, 
2014, 
Denny 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction forensic DNA testing under Wis. Stat. § 974.07.  
On August 4, 2014, he supplemented the motion.7  Denny claimed he 
was innocent and sought to prove his innocence through forensic 
DNA testing of various items of evidence related to Mohr's 
murder and comparison of "any genetic profile found on the 
evidence with the DNA profiles of offenders in" state and 
federal DNA databanks.  The items Denny sought to test included: 
(1) pieces of the bong pipe; (2) hair found on different areas 
of Mohr's body and on the sterile sheet used to wrap Mohr's 
body; (3) the yellow towel; (4) blood removed from the metal 
chair; (5) articles of Mohr's clothing; (6) the hat; (7) the 
                                                 
7 There appear to be related filings in the record, but 
Denny directs us to these two. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
22 
 
gloves; (8) the lighter; (9) the screens; (10) the glass cup; 
(11) "facial breathing masks found at the scene," "one of which 
appeared 
to 
be 
quite 
heavily 
soiled," 
according 
to 
a 
supplemental report of the Grafton Police Department authored by 
Officer Palkovic; and (12) Mohr's hair.  Denny theorized that 
the perpetrator's DNA was left at the crime scene, and that 
testing could produce several types of results supportive of 
Denny's claim: (1) "testing on many or most of the items [could] 
exclude[] [Denny]"; (2) "the same unknown third-party profile 
[could be] found on multiple items"; and (3) "DNA results on one 
or more items could exclude [Denny] and match a convicted 
offender in the state or federal databank."  Denny claimed he 
was entitled to forensic DNA testing at public expense, or, in 
the alternative, at his own expense. 
¶45 On January 2, 2015, the circuit court denied Denny's 
motion.  On January 22, 2015, Denny filed a notice of appeal.  
On March 23, 2016, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's order denying Denny's motion and remanded the case for 
forensic DNA testing at private or public expense.  Denny, 368 
Wis. 2d 363, ¶¶1, 64.  The court of appeals concluded that 
Denny's motion met the pertinent requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07.  See id.8  On April 21, 2016, the State filed a 
                                                 
8 Judge Hagedorn concurred in part and dissented in part, 
concluding that while Denny was entitled to testing at private 
expense, the circuit court's determination regarding testing at 
public expense should not be disturbed.  State v. Denny, 2016 WI 
App 27, ¶89, 368 Wis. 2d 363, 878 N.W.2d 679 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
23 
 
petition for review in this court.  On June 15, 2016, this court 
granted the petition.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶46 In this case we interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07.  "The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citing State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 
73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238).  
[W]e 
have 
repeatedly 
held 
that 
statutory 
interpretation "begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
(citations 
omitted) 
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  The standard of review applicable to the 
circuit court's denial of Denny's motion will be discussed 
below. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶47 Our analysis proceeds in three basic parts.  First, we 
provide an overview of the postconviction forensic DNA testing 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 974.07.  Second, we discuss State v. 
Moran, 2005 WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884, our 2005 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
24 
 
decision interpreting portions of that statute, and overrule a 
part of Moran's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6).  
Finally, we examine whether the circuit court erred in denying 
Denny's postconviction motion for forensic DNA testing of 
certain evidence, and conclude that it did not. 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 974.07 
¶48 We begin with an overview of Wis. Stat. § 974.07, 
"Motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid testing of 
certain evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07.  The statute is 
composed of 13 subsections, but the core of the testing regime 
is contained in subsections (2), (6), (7), (9)-(10), and (12).  
Respectively, these subsections govern: making a motion for 
postconviction forensic DNA testing; the sharing of pertinent 
information and evidence between the district attorney and the 
movant; the circuit court's decision on the movant's motion; 
disposition of the case; and payment of the costs of testing. 
¶49 The process begins in sub. (2) when one of a few types 
of persons entitled to do so——here, a person "convicted of a 
crime"——"make[s] a motion [in the proper court] for an order 
requiring forensic [DNA] testing of evidence".  Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(2).9  Critical to an understanding of the entire statute 
is 
that 
the 
framework 
functions 
to 
dispose 
of 
a 
"motion . . . for 
an 
order." 
 
Id. 
(emphases 
added).  
                                                 
9 Subsection (1) contains definitions.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(1).  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
25 
 
Importantly, the evidence sought to be tested must meet three 
requirements under sub. (2): 
(a) The evidence is relevant to the investigation 
or prosecution that resulted in the conviction, 
adjudication, or finding of not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect. 
(b) The evidence is in the actual or constructive 
possession of a government agency. 
(c) 
The 
evidence 
has 
not 
previously 
been 
subjected to forensic [DNA] testing or, if the 
evidence has previously been tested, it may now be 
subjected to another test using a scientific technique 
that was not available or was not utilized at the time 
of the previous testing and that provides a reasonable 
likelihood of more accurate and probative results.    
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2)(a)-(c).  
¶50 Next, sub. (6) enables "the movant" to obtain access 
to certain information and evidence possessed by "the district 
attorney," and vice versa.10  Specifically:  
(a) Upon demand the district attorney shall 
disclose to the movant or his or her attorney whether 
biological material has been tested and shall make 
                                                 
10 Subsections (3) and (4) involve notice requirements aimed 
at apprising the appropriate district attorney's office and the 
victim of the motion proceedings and giving the district 
attorney the chance to "respond" to the motion.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(3)-(4).  
Subsection (5) requires the district attorney, upon receipt 
of the motion or notice from a court of the motion, to "take all 
actions necessary to ensure that all biological material that 
was 
collected 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
investigation 
or 
prosecution of the case and that remains in the actual or 
constructive custody of a government agency is preserved pending 
completion of the proceedings under this section."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(5). 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
26 
 
available to the movant or his or her attorney the 
following material:  
1. Findings based on testing of biological 
materials.  
2. Physical evidence that is in the actual or 
constructive possession of a government agency and 
that contains biological material or on which there is 
biological material.  
(b) Upon demand the movant or his or her attorney 
shall disclose to the district attorney whether 
biological material has been tested and shall make 
available to the district attorney the following 
material:  
1. Findings based on testing of biological 
materials.  
2. The movant's biological specimen. 
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(a)-(b).  This information and material 
must be "relevant to the movant's claim at issue in the motion 
made under sub. (2)."  § 974.07(6)(d).  Subsection (6) also 
enables 
the 
court 
to 
"impose 
reasonable 
conditions 
on 
availability of material requested under pars. (a) 2. and (b) 2. 
in 
order 
to 
protect 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
evidence."  
§ 974.07(6)(c). 
¶51 Subsection (7) governs the circuit court's decision on 
the movant's motion.  Subsection (7) sets forth two means by 
which a movant may obtain forensic DNA testing under the 
statute: first, the court "shall order" testing if the four 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a) "apply"; second, the 
court 
"may 
order" 
testing 
if 
the 
three 
requirements 
of 
§ 974.07(7)(b) "apply."  § 974.07(7)(a)-(b). 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
27 
 
¶52 Both avenues to testing require that "[t]he evidence 
to be tested meets the conditions under sub. (2)(a) to (c)" (set 
forth above).  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)3., (b)2.  Both also 
require that the "chain of custody of the evidence to be tested 
establishes that the evidence has not been tampered with, 
replaced, or altered in any material respect or, if the chain of 
custody does not establish the integrity of the evidence, the 
testing itself can establish the integrity of the evidence."  
§ 974.07(7)(a)4., (b)3.  
¶53 The two sets of requirements differ in two crucial 
respects.  First, a court "may order" testing if, among other 
things:  
It is reasonably probable that the outcome of the 
proceedings that resulted in the conviction, the 
finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect, or the delinquency adjudication for the 
offense at issue in the motion under sub. (2), or the 
terms of the sentence, the commitment under s. 971.17, 
or the disposition under ch. 938, would have been more 
favorable to the movant if the results of [DNA] 
testing had been available before he or she was 
prosecuted, convicted, found not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect, or adjudicated delinquent 
for the offense.  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(b)1.  In contrast, a court "shall order" 
testing if, among other things:  
It is reasonably probable that the movant would 
not have been prosecuted, convicted, found not guilty 
by reason of mental disease or defect, or adjudicated 
delinquent for the offense at issue in the motion 
under sub. (2), if exculpatory [DNA] testing results 
had been available before the prosecution, conviction, 
finding of not guilty, or adjudication for the 
offense. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
28 
 
§ 974.07(7)(a)2.  
¶54 Second, the mandatory testing scheme includes an 
additional requirement: "[t]he movant [must] claim[] that he or 
she is innocent of the offense at issue in the motion under sub. 
(2)."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)1.  
¶55 Subsections (9) and (10) govern disposition of the 
case following the circuit court's decision under sub. (7) and 
any testing that occurs.11  Under sub. (9), if the court does not 
order forensic DNA testing, "or if the results of forensic [DNA] 
testing ordered under this section are not supportive of the 
movant's claim, the court shall determine the disposition of the 
evidence 
specified 
in 
the 
motion 
subject 
to" 
certain 
particulars.  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(9)(a)-(b).  
¶56 Under sub. (10)(a):  
If the results of forensic [DNA] testing ordered 
under this section support the movant's claim, the 
court shall schedule a hearing to determine the 
appropriate relief to be granted to the movant. After 
the hearing, and based on the results of the testing 
and any evidence or other matter presented at the 
hearing, the court shall enter any order that serves 
the interests of justice . . . . 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.07(10)(a). 
 
Subsection 
(10)(a) 
provides 
examples of orders the court may enter, such as "[a]n order 
                                                 
11 Subsection (8) authorizes the court to "impose reasonable 
conditions on any testing ordered under this section in order to 
protect the integrity of the evidence and the testing process."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(8).  The subsection also discusses where 
testing may take place.  Id. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
29 
 
granting the movant a new trial or fact-finding hearing."  
§ 974.07(10)(a)2.  
¶57 Finally, sub. (12) pertains to payment of the costs of 
testing.12  First, "[t]he court may order a movant to pay the 
costs of any testing ordered by the court under this section if 
the court determines that the movant is not indigent."  Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07(12)(a).  Indigency is defined via guidelines set 
forth 
in 
§ 974.07(12)(b). 
 
Second, 
"[t]he 
state 
crime 
laboratories shall pay for testing ordered under this section 
and performed by a facility other than the state crime 
laboratories if the court does not order the movant to pay for 
the testing."  § 974.07(12)(c).13 
¶58 Having set forth the relevant provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07, we now discuss Moran. 
B.  State v. Moran 
                                                 
12 Subsection (10)(b) exempts a court ordering a new trial 
under (10)(a) from the necessity of "making the findings 
specified 
in 
s. 
805.15 
(3)(a) 
and 
(b)." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.07(10)(b).  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.15(3) relates to new 
trials "ordered on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence."  
Wis. Stat. § 805.15(3). 
Subsection (11) requires a court to "refer the movant to 
the state public defender for determination of indigency and 
appointment of counsel under s. 977.05(4)(j)" under specified 
circumstances.  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(11). 
13 The final subsection of the statute, sub. (13), explains 
that "[a]n appeal may be taken from an order entered under this 
section as from a final judgment."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(13). 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
30 
 
¶59 As 
shown 
above, 
whether 
a 
movant 
may 
obtain 
postconviction forensic DNA testing of evidence depends on, 
among other things, whether one of the two "reasonably probable" 
formulations set forth in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7) applies in the 
case.  Before this court, Denny argues that "[i]t is reasonably 
probable that [he] would not have been prosecuted . . . [or] 
convicted" of his crime "if exculpatory [DNA] testing results 
had 
been 
available 
before 
the 
prosecution . . . [or] 
conviction."  § 974.07(7)(a)2.14  As we explain in the next 
section, this contention fails.    
¶60 But we must first discuss our decision in Moran 
because Denny claims that under Moran he is entitled to forensic 
DNA 
testing 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.07(6) 
even 
if 
§ 974.07(7)(a)2. remains unmet.  While we agree that Moran 
supports 
this 
claim, 
we 
overrule 
this 
interpretation 
of 
§ 974.07(6). 
¶61 The movant in Moran——who had been convicted of crimes 
relating to an incident during which he allegedly injured two 
individuals with a knife——sought postconviction forensic DNA 
testing of certain blood samples pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07.  Moran, 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶¶5-20, 22-24.  Before 
assessing the merits of the case, we explained:  
In 
their 
briefs, 
the 
parties 
focused 
our 
attention 
almost 
exclusively 
on 
§ 974.07(7), 
                                                 
14 Denny does not develop an argument suggesting that 
testing under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(b)1. is appropriate.  We do 
not address application of that provision. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
31 
 
pertaining to court-ordered DNA testing.  However, at 
oral argument on April 12, 2005, [defense] counsel 
directed our attention to § 974.07(6), under which a 
movant may request certain biological material from 
the district attorney.  We requested supplemental 
briefs from both parties regarding the impact of [the 
movant's] argument under § 974.07(6).    
Id., ¶25.  Proceeding to the interpretation of the statute, we 
concluded that § 974.07(6) provided the movant not only access 
to "[p]hysical evidence that is in the actual or constructive 
possession of a government agency and that contains biological 
material 
or 
on 
which 
there 
is 
biological 
material," 
§ 974.07(6)(a)2., but also "the right to test the sought-after 
evidence containing biological material" at his own expense, 
assuming other statutory conditions were met.  Moran, 284 
Wis. 2d 24, ¶¶43, 57.  
¶62 We did "acknowledge the plausibility of the position 
that all motions for testing, as opposed to inspection, should 
proceed under Wis. Stat. § [974].07(7)."  Id., ¶49.  But we 
rejected this interpretation.  In our view, "[s]ubsection (6) 
allows the movant access to the test results and/or material 
under some circumstances, but the movant must decide whether to 
test the material and must pay for the testing himself.  
Subsection (7), on the other hand, pertains to court-ordered 
testing at the State's expense."  Id., ¶55.  We thus drew a 
distinction between testing at private expense under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(6) and testing at public expense under § 974.07(7).  
See id., ¶57 ("Moran must conduct any testing of the evidence at 
his own expense.  If a movant seeks DNA testing at public 
expense, the movant must proceed under § 974.07(7)(a) or (b), 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
32 
 
and satisfy the heightened requirements in subsection (7)."); 
id., ¶56 ("We are unable to discern from the plain language of 
§ 974.07 a clear legislative intent to block testing demanded by 
a person willing and able to pay until that person satisfies the 
requirements for publicly funded DNA testing."). 
¶63 Today we conclude that, for several reasons, this 
interpretation constitutes an error which we must now correct.15 
¶64 To begin with, Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) says nothing 
about allowing the movant to conduct forensic DNA testing of 
evidence.  See § 974.07(6).  Subsection (6)(a) states only that 
the district attorney must "make available" the specified 
physical evidence.  § 974.07(6)(a).  It does not authorize the 
movant to send away the evidence for testing.   We understand 
the argument that sub. (6) does not explicitly prohibit a movant 
from testing evidence, either.  But "[c]ontext" and "the 
structure of the statute in which the operative language 
appears" are "important to meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46. 
 
"A 
statute's 
purpose . . . may 
be 
readily 
apparent . . . from its context or the structure of the statute 
as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49.  
¶65 Review of the whole statute leads us to conclude that 
the "textually [and] contextually manifest statutory purpose" of 
                                                 
15 Although the State did not raise this issue in its 
petition for review, we exercise our discretion to address it 
anyway.  See, e.g., State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, ¶¶29-31, 284 
Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884 (citing Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 
Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998)).  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
33 
 
Wis. Stat. § 974.07 is for a movant to obtain "an order 
requiring 
forensic 
[DNA] 
testing" 
of 
certain 
evidence.  
§ 974.07(2).  In fact, the subsection from which this language 
is taken, sub. (2), is cited in subs. (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), 
(9), and (11) of the statute.  See § 974.07(3)-(7), (9), (11).  
Subsection 
(2) 
is 
the 
linchpin 
of 
the 
testing 
regime.  
Subsection (6) in particular contains a provision explaining 
that sub. (6) "does not apply unless the information being 
disclosed or the material being made available is relevant to 
the movant's claim at issue in the motion made under sub. (2) 
[for an order requiring forensic DNA testing]."  § 974.07(6)(d).  
Subsection (7) explains the conditions under which an order will 
issue, and subsection (12) of the statute determines whether 
testing occurring pursuant to this order will take place at 
public or private expense.  See § 974.07(7), (12).  The "order" 
continually referred to is undoubtedly the "order" discussed in 
sub. (7).  § 974.07(7)(a)-(b). 
¶66 We find it unlikely that the legislature would set 
forth detailed requirements regarding whether DNA testing may 
occur (sub. (7)) and who will pay for that testing (sub. (12)), 
only for a movant to bypass these provisions and obtain testing 
at private expense using a subsection of the statute that does 
not say a word about such testing.  Further, allowing testing 
under sub. (6) would require only the barest of showings.  See 
Moran, 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶3.  It is equally difficult to believe 
that the statute is most properly read to permit convicted 
offenders who are unable to meet the surmountable sub. (7) 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
34 
 
standard to engage in postconviction fishing expeditions in 
attempts to cast doubt upon and upset those convictions.  
¶67 Moran did not even discuss sub. (12).  In Moran we 
suggested that sub. (6) related to testing at private expense, 
while sub. (7) related to testing at public expense.  See id., 
¶¶55, 57.  But review of the entirety of the statute makes clear 
that sub. (12) governs whether a movant must pay for court-
ordered testing.  Pursuant to sub. (12), a non-indigent movant 
who prevails under sub. (7) may yet have to pay for the DNA 
testing that results.  See Wis. Stat. § 974.07(12).  Moran's 
interpretation of § 974.07(6) ignores sub. (12) entirely.  While 
it is possible to read § 974.07 as creating two systems for 
testing at private expense (under subs. (6) and (12)) and one 
system for testing at public expense (under sub. (12)), we do 
not find this to be the most sensible interpretation of the 
statute.  Again, given that the legislature took such pains in 
sub. (12) to explain how courts should determine who pays for 
testing, it would be strange for the legislature to fail to 
mention the costs of testing at all in sub. (6), even to explain 
that the movant must fund such testing himself.  
¶68 Other subsections of the statute also cast doubt on 
Moran's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6).  As explained, 
in Moran we concluded that sub. (7), as opposed to sub. (6), 
"pertain[s] 
to 
court-ordered 
DNA 
testing." 
 
Moran, 
284 
Wis. 2d 24, ¶25; see id., ¶55 ("Subsection (6) allows the movant 
access 
to 
the 
test 
results 
and/or 
material 
under 
some 
circumstances, but the movant must decide whether to test the 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
35 
 
material and must pay for the testing himself.  Subsection (7), 
on the other hand, pertains to court-ordered testing at the 
State's expense.").  Indeed, sub. (6) says nothing about court-
ordered testing.  § 974.07(6).  But subs. (9) and (10), which 
govern disposition of the case following testing——including, 
presumably, Moran's sub. (6) testing——speak solely in terms of 
testing pursuant to court order.  See § 974.07(10)(a) ("If the 
results of forensic [DNA] testing ordered under this section 
support the movant's claim, the court shall schedule a hearing 
to determine the appropriate relief to be granted to the 
movant."  (Emphasis added.)); § 974.07(9) ("If a court in which 
a motion under sub. (2) is filed does not order forensic [DNA] 
testing, or if the results of forensic [DNA] testing ordered 
under this section are not supportive of the movant's claim, the 
court shall determine the disposition of the evidence specified 
in the motion subject to the following: . . . ." (Emphases 
added.)).  The link between subs. (9) and (10) and sub. (7) is 
evident, while no such link between subs. (9) and (10) and sub. 
(6) appears in the text of the statute.  Moran did not resolve 
this inconsistency.  See Moran, 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶47 ("[I]f the 
testing [at Moran's expense] is done, the circuit court will 
determine whether or not the results 'support the movant's 
claim.'  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(9)-(10)."). 
¶69 "This court follows the doctrine of stare decisis 
scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule of 
law."  State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶40, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 
N.W.2d 592 (quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
36 
 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257); 
Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 
202 (1991) ("Time and time again, this Court has recognized that 
'the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to 
the rule of law.'" (quoting Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and 
Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (plurality opinion))).  
"[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
special justification."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶94 
(quoting Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 
653 N.W.2d 266).  We conclude that such special justification is 
present in the current case, and overrule Moran's interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) as independently authorizing forensic 
DNA testing at private expense under certain circumstances.  
Moran, 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶3.  
¶70 For 
the 
reasons 
already 
explained, 
Moran's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) is simply "unsound in 
principle."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶99.  But the 
error also is not a containable one; it renders the rest of the 
statute incoherent in a manner we obviously did not contemplate 
in Moran.  The decision has thus "become detrimental to 
coherence and consistency in the law."  Id., ¶98.  Moreover, in 
Moran 
we 
did 
not 
attempt 
to 
undertake 
a 
comprehensive 
examination of § 974.07; we did not analyze sub. (12) of that 
statute.  Reconsideration of the statute with the benefit of a 
clear understanding of that subsection convinces us that our 
interpretation of sub. (6) must be modified to take account of 
sub. (12).  Cf. Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶98 (among the 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
37 
 
"criteria in Wisconsin for overturning prior cases" are whether 
"changes or developments in the law have undermined the 
rationale behind a decision" and whether "there is a need to 
make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts").16  
                                                 
16 Also material to our decision to overrule Moran's 
understanding of the function of sub. (6) is the potential 
effect 
of 
that 
case 
on 
the 
legislature's 
determinations 
regarding the best way to protect the rights and interests of 
crime victims in Wisconsin.  Although postconviction forensic 
DNA testing is important, and although a crime victim assuredly 
has an interest in seeing that the true criminal offender in a 
case is prosecuted, it is not difficult to imagine why such 
testing might cause significant distress to victims of Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07 movants and prevent these victims from obtaining 
some amount of closure following the infliction of harm upon 
them. Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, 
¶25, 
259 
Wis. 2d 630, 
658 
N.W.2d 427 
("consider[ing] 
the 
interests that the State, crime victims, and others have in the 
finality of cases" and noting the possibility of "inequitable 
results" due to "open[ing] up cases that have long been thought 
by everyone, including crime victims, to have been final"). 
While not dispositive in the case at issue, we note that 
the legislature appears to have had crime victims in mind when 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 974.07.  See § 974.07(4) (providing for 
notification 
of 
the 
victim 
of 
the 
movant's 
crime). 
It 
understandably needed to strike a balance between the rights and 
interests of convicted offenders attempting to establish their 
innocence and the rights and interests of crime victims, while 
at the same time ensuring prosecution of the actual perpetrators 
of crimes.  Thus, although in some cases it is appropriate for 
this court to acquiesce in an erroneous prior decision, see, 
e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 
2401, 2409 (2015) ("Respecting stare decisis means sticking to 
some wrong decisions."), doing so here is especially troubling.  
In essence, we would be purposefully perpetuating a much more 
expansive postconviction forensic DNA testing regime than the 
legislature saw fit to enact, to the possible detriment of 
Wisconsin crime victims. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
38 
 
¶71 Ultimately stare decisis is a "'principle of policy' 
rather than 'an inexorable command.'"  Hohn v. United States, 
524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991)).  Each suggestion that one of our cases must be 
overturned must be scrutinized individually, and sometimes stare 
decisis must yield to other important principles of policy.  
This is one such occasion.  We thus overrule Moran insofar as it 
concluded that "the plain language of § 974.07(6) gives a movant 
the right to conduct DNA testing of physical evidence that is in 
the actual or constructive possession of a government agency and 
that 
contains 
biological 
material 
or 
on 
which 
there 
is 
biological material, if the movant meets several statutory 
prerequisites."  Moran, 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶3 (emphasis omitted). 
Henceforth, we adopt the interpretation we "acknowledge[d]" as 
"plausib[le]" 
in 
Moran: 
that 
"all 
motions 
for 
testing . . . should proceed under Wis. Stat. § [974].07(7)."  
Id., ¶49.  Wisconsin Stat. § 974.07(6) should be applied 
according to its terms, allowing the district attorney and the 
movant to share information and "make available" specified 
material.  
See 
§ 974.07(6)(a)-(b). Of course, § 974.07(6) 
provides "the movant or his or her attorney" with the ability to 
obtain 
"whether 
biological 
material 
has 
been 
tested," 
"[f]indings based on testing of biological materials," and 
"[p]hysical evidence that is in the actual or constructive 
possession of a government agency and that contains biological 
material or on which there is biological material," as long as 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
39 
 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
statute 
are 
otherwise 
met.  
§ 974.07(6)(a)1.-2.17 
¶72 This opinion should not be read to denigrate the 
importance of postconviction forensic DNA testing.  "The advent 
of DNA technology is one of the most significant scientific 
advancements of our era," and "the utility of DNA identification 
in the criminal justice system is already undisputed."  Maryland 
v. King, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013).  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07, properly interpreted, convicted offenders can 
obtain postconviction forensic DNA testing of evidence.  This 
opinion simply recognizes the existence of, and applies, the 
limits that the legislature set on such testing.18    
 
C.  Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Denying  
Denny's Postconviction Motion for Forensic  
DNA Testing of Certain Evidence 
                                                 
17 For those who would argue that sub. (6) is of little 
value 
because 
it 
only 
allows 
inspection 
and 
does 
not 
independently allow for testing, the facts in the case at issue 
demonstrate why inspection is useful.  For example, in his 
supplemental motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing, 
Denny explained that after filing his initial motion, two law 
students assisting him "reviewed the physical evidence on file 
at the Ozaukee County Clerk of Courts" and "found additional 
items with which the perpetrator likely came into contact that 
were previously overlooked."  Denny then supplemented his 
initial request, "seek[ing] to have additional items subjected 
to DNA testing."  Thus, the ability to inspect allows one to 
ascertain what, if any, testing should be sought. 
18 We note also that, in some cases, the parties may 
stipulate to testing.  We deal here with a contested motion for 
DNA testing. 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
40 
 
¶73 We now address the merits of Denny's postconviction 
motion for forensic DNA testing.  Although there are a number of 
conditions that Denny must meet before a court may conclude he 
is entitled to testing, see, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2), we 
find it appropriate to decide this case on the basis of 
§ 974.07(7)(a)2. alone.  Because this provision is fatal to 
Denny's claim, we need not address whether he has satisfied 
other portions of the statute.  See, e.g., Maryland Arms Ltd. 
P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 
N.W.2d 15 ("Typically, an appellate court should decide cases on 
the narrowest possible grounds." (citing State v. Blalock, 150 
Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
¶74 In State v. Hudson, 2004 WI App 99, 273 Wis. 2d 707, 
681 N.W.2d 316, decided before Moran, the court of appeals 
addressed the proper standard of review to apply to the circuit 
court's decision regarding whether a movant has satisfied Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2.  See Hudson, 273 Wis. 2d 707, ¶¶13-16.  
The court concluded that an erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard should be used.  Id., ¶16.  In Moran the parties 
briefed the question of the standard of review that this court 
should apply in reviewing circuit court decisions pertaining to 
§ 974.07(7)(a)2. and (b)1.  The movant argued that a de novo 
standard was appropriate for the former, and an erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard was appropriate for the latter.  
The State's position was somewhat more complicated.  However, 
Moran did not definitively settle the issue.  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
41 
 
¶75 Here, the parties barely addressed the standard of 
review applicable to Wis. Stat. § 974.07(a)2., although the 
State suggests that a deferential approach is appropriate.  We 
need not decide this issue without adequate briefing, because 
Denny's claim fails whether we review the circuit court's 
conclusions under a deferential standard or de novo.  
¶76 The question before this court is whether "[i]t is 
reasonably probable that [Denny] would not have been prosecuted 
[or] convicted" of his crime "if exculpatory [DNA] testing 
results 
had 
been 
available 
before 
the 
prosecution 
[or] 
conviction."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2.  The State does not 
dispute that we are to assume for purposes of this analysis that 
if 
DNA 
testing 
were 
to 
occur, 
the 
results 
would 
be 
"exculpatory."  Denny argues that "[t]hree types of DNA test 
results would create a reasonable probability of a different 
result: DNA that matches a convicted offender; DNA that excludes 
Denny and Kent on all items; or DNA on multiple items matching 
the same unknown third party."19 
¶77 Like the circuit court, we are convinced that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.07(7)(a)2. 
has 
not 
been 
met. 
 
The 
evidence 
                                                 
19 Whether we are bound to consider each of Denny's 
hypothetical sets of test results exactly as he has presented 
them is not settled.  For example, the State does not 
necessarily concede that "exculpatory" means that the DNA would 
"match[] a convicted offender."  Regardless, we will assume 
without 
definitively 
resolving 
the 
issue 
that 
Denny's 
interpretation of the statute is valid given that it does not 
change the result in this case.  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
42 
 
incriminating Denny was, to put it mildly, extensive.  Testimony 
indicated that Denny confessed, made inculpatory statements to, 
and took inculpatory actions in front of, multiple witnesses.  
"[T]he statements were . . . made at different times and places, 
in some instances corroborated by physical evidence."  Denny v. 
Gudmanson, 252 F.3d at 905.20 
                                                 
20 In 1987 Denny attempted to obtain a new trial "arguing 
that the admission of Kent['s] . . . confessions violated his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as 
interpreted in the Supreme Court's decision of" Cruz v. New 
York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).  Denny v. Gudmanson, 252 F.3d 896, 
899 (7th Cir. 2001).  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court order denying Denny's motion, concluding that "Kent's 
statements were directly admissible against [Denny]," but that 
"even if Kent's statements were not directly admissible, it was 
harmless error to admit them."  State v. Denny, 163 Wis. 2d 352, 
355, 359, 471 N.W.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1991).  Thereafter, Denny 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, 
and both the Seventh Circuit and the district court below it 
denied relief.  See Denny v. Gudmanson, 252 F.3d at 899, 905.  
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.  Denny 
v. Gudmanson, 534 U.S. 938 (2001). 
Case law pertaining to the Confrontation Clause has 
developed in the time since these other proceedings.  Compare, 
e.g., Denny v. Gudmanson, 252 F.3d at 902-03 (discussing Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)), with Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 69 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(criticizing "the Court's decision to overrule" Roberts).  Denny 
does not now suggest that consideration of certain portions of 
the testimony presented at the trial against him is improper.  
Consequently, in our discussion of the background of this case, 
above, we provided the testimony introduced at Denny's trial as 
it actually occurred, including statements allegedly made by 
both Kent and Denny.  Nevertheless, and without expressing an 
opinion on any constitutional question, we observe that our 
decision would be the same even if we did not consider Kent's 
statements.  Cf. State v. Denny, 163 Wis. 2d at 359 ("Upon 
reviewing the record, we conclude there is evidence sufficient 
to convict [Denny] even without the statements made by Kent.").  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
43 
 
¶78 Additionally, given the way this case proceeded, the 
reasoning of the circuit court below is sound: "Mohr's killing 
has 
never 
been 
presented 
as 
a 
single-perpetrator 
crime. . . . Finding DNA from persons other than Denny"——even 
convicted offenders——"would not 'prove Denny's innocence.'  It 
may only reveal the identity of others who may have been 
involved."  In light of this fact, and given that there is no 
single account of what transpired in this case, the absence of 
DNA belonging to Denny and Kent would not be particularly 
compelling, either.  Indeed, the fact that there were various 
inconsistencies between the accounts of the witnesses actually 
serves to insulate Denny's conviction. 
¶79 We note (as did the circuit court) that the jury in 
Denny's case was even presented with a less-sophisticated 
preview of what Denny now seeks to obtain through DNA testing: 
two 
of 
the 
hairs 
tested 
by 
Nilsson 
using 
"microscopic 
comparison" were not consistent with samples taken from Mohr, 
Denny, or Kent.  In other words, the jury was aware of the 
possibility that an unknown third party might have been 
involved. 
¶80 Denny suggests that the witnesses in his case were not 
credible——because of, for example, grants of immunity or of 
admitted drug and alcohol use at pertinent times——but of course 
the jury was not convinced by this line of argument.  The idea 
that the DNA results Denny seeks would tip the scales and cause 
police or a jury to reject the substantial evidence against 
Denny is simply conjecture.  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
44 
 
¶81 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2. has not been met.21  
Even if exculpatory DNA testing results were available before 
prosecution and conviction, we are unable to conclude that it is 
reasonably probable that Denny would not have been prosecuted or 
convicted of his crime.  As put by the separate writing below, 
"The evidence was vast, overwhelming, and damning.  It was not 
even close."  Denny, 368 Wis. 2d 363, ¶86 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The circuit court 
below compared this case to hypothetical cases in which the 
truth of who really committed the crime is more readily verified 
through DNA testing, such as one involving "a semen match in a 
single assailant sexual assault."  The evidence provided by the 
                                                 
21 The parties offer nuanced, and differing, interpretations 
of 
the 
phrase 
"reasonably 
probable." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.07(7)(a)2.  The State asserts that "reasonably probable" 
means a "reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the 
[old evidence] and the [new evidence], would have a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt."  State v. McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d 463, 475, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997).  In contrast, Denny 
believes 
that 
"reasonably 
probable" 
means 
"a 
probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  We decline to resolve 
the parties' dispute over the precise meaning of "reasonably 
probable," given that Denny's motion should be denied under 
either standard.   See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 
2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that 
are not dispositive need not be addressed." (citing Gross v. 
Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938)).  
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
45 
 
State in 1982 is not so easily displaced.22  The circuit court 
below correctly denied Denny's motion.23  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
denying Denny's postconviction motion for forensic DNA testing 
of certain evidence.  Consequently, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.    
                                                 
22 This is not to say that Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2. will 
only be satisfied in cases involving a single perpetrator. For 
instance, there may be cases involving multiple actors in which 
the preconviction evidence establishes that the movant could 
only have played one role in the crime and postconviction 
forensic DNA testing sufficiently discredits that possibility. 
Because those circumstances are not present here, we need not 
analyze this issue further.  
23 Citing State v. Hudson, 2004 WI App 99, ¶16, 273 
Wis. 2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 316, for the proposition that a circuit 
court's determination under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2. is 
reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion, the court of 
appeals below concluded that the circuit court applied multiple 
"improper standards of law" in reaching its ultimate decision 
regarding § 974.07(7)(a)2.  Denny, 368 Wis. 2d 363, ¶59.  More 
specifically, the court of appeals found error in certain 
conclusions of the circuit court relating to the relevance of 
the evidence that Denny sought to test and whether those results 
would be exculpatory or could exculpate Denny.  Id., ¶¶38, 59.  
Regardless of the propriety of these conclusions or of the 
technical accuracy of the court's phrasing of certain legal 
propositions, review of the circuit court's entire decision 
makes clear that it properly analyzed the question at issue 
here, namely whether § 974.07(7)(a)2. was met.  Cf., e.g., 
Englewood Cmty. Apartments Ltd. P'ship v. Alexander Grant & Co., 
119 
Wis. 2d 34, 
39 
n.3, 
349 
N.W.2d 716 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984) 
("[R]emand directing the trial court to make an explicit finding 
where it has already made unmistakable but implicit findings to 
the same effect would be both superfluous and a waste of 
judicial resources."). 
No. 
2015AP202-CR   
 
46 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶83 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  Although the majority opinion correctly 
overrules Moran's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6), in 
which portion of the opinion I concur and join, I dissent from 
the part of the majority opinion that concludes that Jeffrey 
Denny is not entitled to DNA testing of evidence collected at 
the crime scene.  I conclude that Denny met the statutory 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a); and therefore, the 
circuit court was required to grant Denny's motion for forensic 
DNA testing.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part with, and from, the majority opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶84 The majority opinion ably sets forth the facts that 
underlie the dispute before us.  I will not repeat them, in 
full, here.  However, I do relate a few facts to turn the 
reader's attention to my discussion that follows.    
¶85 On January 26, 1982, Christopher Mohr was found dead 
in his home by Jonathan Leatherman.  Police received a tip that 
Kent Denny was involved in the crime.  Eventually, the police 
pursued Kent's brother, Jeffrey Denny (Denny), as a suspect.  
Both Denny and Kent were charged with first-degree homicide and 
were tried together.  On November 15, 1982, the jury found Denny 
and Kent guilty.  
¶86 On 
May 
1, 
2014, 
Denny 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction forensic DNA testing pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(7)(a).  As the majority opinion notes, Denny claimed he 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
was innocent of the murder and sought DNA testing of several 
objects recovered from the crime scene.  These items include: 
"(1) the large section of a bong pipe; (2) the base of the bong 
pipe; (3) the hairs collected from the victim's left hand; 
(4) stray hairs found on various items of clothing from the 
victim's body; (5) a yellow hand towel; and (6) facial breathing 
masks found at the scene."1  In a supplemental memorandum, Denny 
asked 
for 
DNA 
testing 
of 
several 
additional 
items: 
"(1) additional pieces of the bong pipe; (2) blood from the 
metal chair found by the victim's head; (3) the victim's bloody 
clothing; (4) the bloody hat found near the victim; (5) the 
bloody gloves found near the victim; (6) stray hairs found on 
various items of clothing from the victim's body; (7) the 
victim's hair; (8) the lighter found under the victim's body; 
(9) the screens found on the victim's body; and (10) the glass 
cup found near the victim."2   
¶87 The circuit court denied Denny's motion, but the court 
of appeals reversed.  We granted the State's petition for 
review. 
                                                 
1 Denny's Mot. for Postconviction DNA testing (May 1, 2014).   
2 Denny's Supp. Mot. for Postconviction DNA testing (August 
4, 2014). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶88 This case requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07.  "Questions of statutory interpretation and 
application are questions of law that we review independently."  
State v. Hanson, 2001 WI 4, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 
390. 
B.  General Wis. Stat. § 974.07 Principles 
¶89 Denny sought DNA testing pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(7)(a).  Unlike § 974.07(7)(b) in which the circuit 
court has discretion, paragraph § 974.07(7)(a) requires the 
circuit court to order DNA testing if the movant satisfies the 
criteria set forth therein.  The difference in the two 
provisions, as the majority opinion correctly notes, is that a 
movant is required to maintain his innocence in order to prevail 
on a motion for DNA testing made pursuant to paragraph (a).  
¶90 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.07(7)(a) has four requirements a 
movant must meet in order to be successful.  First, as mentioned 
above, the defendant must maintain "that he or she is innocent 
of the offense."  Wis. Stat. § 947.07(7)(a)1.  
¶91 Second, it must be "reasonably probable that the 
movant would not have been . . . convicted . . . if exculpatory 
deoxyribonucleic acid testing results had been available before 
the 
prosecution, 
[or] 
conviction, 
. . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.07(7)(a)2.   
¶92 "Reasonably probable" is an outcome determinative test 
akin to the test we apply when determining if newly discovered 
evidence warrants a new trial.  Similar to the test we apply in 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
that context, "we must determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at all the relevant evidence in 
regard to whether the defendant did or did not commit the crime, 
would have reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.  This 
examination requires an assessment of all the evidence to 
determine what effect, if any, the newly discovered evidence 
would be reasonably probable to have on a jury's verdict at a 
new trial."  State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶167, 283 Wis. 2d 
639, 700 N.W.2d 98 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (internal 
citation marks omitted).  Moreover, under this prong, the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. 947.07(7)(a)2. requires that we are to 
assume, as we consider Denny's motion, that all of the evidence 
he seeks to have tested will be exculpatory because the test he 
must meet, which is set out in subdivision (a)2., concerns 
"exculpatory deoxyribonucleic acid testing results."3  Stated 
otherwise, if we did not assume that the DNA testing results 
would be exculpatory, we could not decide whether it would be 
reasonably probable that Denny would not have been convicted if 
the DNA testing results had been available at trial.   
¶93 Third, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)3., the 
movant must meet the criteria set forth in § 974.07(2)(a)-(c).  
Section 974.07(2)(a) provides that "[t]he evidence [must be] 
relevant to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in 
the conviction."  The evidence must be in the possession of a 
                                                 
3 Exculpatory evidence is defined as "Evidence tending to 
establish a criminal defendant's innocence."  
Exculpatory 
Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary 637 (9th ed. 2009). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
government agency.  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2)(b).  Finally, the 
evidence 
was 
not 
"previously 
[] 
subjected 
to 
forensic 
deoxyribonucleic acid testing or, if the evidence has previously 
been tested, it may now be subjected to another test using a 
scientific technique that was not available or was not utilized 
at the time of the previous testing and that provides a 
reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results."  
Wis. Stat. §  974.07(2)(c).  If a movant meets each of these 
criteria, then he has satisfied the third statutory requirement 
necessary to obtain DNA testing.   
¶94 Fourth, "The chain of custody of the evidence to be 
tested [must] establish[] that the evidence has not been 
tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material respect or, 
if the chain of custody does not establish the integrity of the 
evidence, the testing itself can establish the integrity of the 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)4.  This requirement 
ensures the integrity of the evidence the defendant seeks to 
test.  
¶95 As discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a) provides 
that a movant who meets each of these statutory criteria is 
entitled to DNA testing of evidence relevant to the crime of 
which he was convicted.    
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
C. Denny's Motion for DNA Testing 
¶96 In the present case, we must decide whether Denny 
satisfied the criteria set forth in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a).  
Contrary to the majority, I would conclude that Denny has met 
the statutory requirements, and therefore his motion for 
postconviction DNA testing must be granted.   
¶97 Without 
discussion 
of 
the 
remaining 
statutory 
requirements,4 the majority concludes that Denny has not 
fulfilled the second statutory criteria.  In essence, the 
majority holds that it is not "reasonably probable that [Denny] 
would not have been prosecuted. . . [or] convicted of his crime 
if exculpatory [DNA] testing results had been available."5   
¶98 Consistent with the circuit court's analysis, the 
majority reasons that the State did not present this to the jury 
as a single-perpetrator crime.  The majority's analysis can be 
summed up simply:  the State theorized that other individuals 
were involved in the crime, and some witnesses testified that 
Denny was minimally involved, so a lack of Denny's DNA on the 
                                                 
4 There is no dispute that Denny has satisfied the other 
three 
statutory 
requirements. 
First, 
as 
required 
by 
§ 974.07(7)(a)1., 
Denny 
has 
consistently 
maintained 
his 
innocence.  See Denny's motion for postconviction DNA testing 
(May 1, 2013).  Likewise, Denny has satisfied the criteria set 
forth in the third factor: the DNA evidence is relevant; in the 
possession of the Ozaukee County Clerk of Courts office, which 
is a government entity; and neither party contends that the 
evidence has previously been tested.  Similarly, Denny satisfied 
the fourth criteria as the State does not contend that the 
evidence has been tampered with or that the chain of custody has 
been broken, and nothing in the record suggests otherwise.   
5 Majority op., ¶76. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
objects 
retrieved 
from 
the 
scene 
of 
the 
crime 
is 
not 
exculpatory.  
¶99 However, the majority's conclusion is misplaced for 
two interrelated reasons.  First, it understates the importance 
of the manner in which the State actually tried the case.  
Specifically, the State presented witness after witness that 
testified Denny was at the scene of the crime, including 
specific 
details 
about 
Denny's 
active 
participation 
in 
physically attacking Mohr.  Second, if Denny's DNA is not found 
on any of the objects for which DNA testing is sought, the 
majority's analysis undervalues the potential of this lack of 
DNA evidence.  This is so because it would suggest that 
testimony placing Denny at the scene of the crime and physically 
attacking Mohr was not reliable. 
¶100 For example, Trent Denny, Denny's brother, testified 
that Denny admitted he had stabbed Mohr.  According to Trent, 
Mohr "was coming after [Denny] while [Denny] was stabbing him."  
Another witness, Lori Ann Jastor Commons, related that Kent 
stated Denny had stabbed Mohr.  Steven Hansen testified at trial 
that Denny had kicked Mohr.  Patricia Robran testified that 
Denny had informed her that "Kent stabbed [Mohr] first and he 
handed [Denny] the knife and Kent told him to continue what he 
was doing until he got back, so [Denny] did, and he didn’t 
remember if he did it five or ten or fifteen times."  An inmate 
at Ozaukee County Jail testified that Denny confessed he "hit 
[Mohr] over the head with a bong and kicked him a couple times."  
Tammy Whitaker testified that Denny told her two versions of how 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
the murder occurred, both of which involved Denny's active 
participation in the murder.  Another witness testified that 
Denny stated he had a scratch on his leg where Mohr had 
scratched him during their struggle.   
¶101 Consequently, the State relied on the testimony of 
numerous witnesses to prove Denny's direct involvement in the 
murder by physically attacking Mohr.  DNA testing of the 
evidence from the scene of the crime may well impact whether 
this testimony about Denny's involvement was true.  Stated 
otherwise, if none of Denny's DNA is on any of the articles for 
which DNA testing is requested, the jury could have a reasonable 
doubt whether Denny committed the crime. 
¶102 Additionally, this is not a case in which a dearth of 
material recovered from the scene of the crime would make DNA 
testing futile; rather, the police obtained numerous articles  
that likely contain DNA.  The sheer number of articles to be 
tested makes Denny's point all the more compelling.  If he was 
actively involved in the murder by physically attacking Mohr, 
one or more of the objects should contain traces of his DNA.  
And, as discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2. requires us 
to assume that there will be no trace of Denny's DNA because we 
assume the evidence is exculpatory as we consider whether to 
grant his postconviction motion.  
¶103 A brief description of what the police recovered from 
the scene of the crime is helpful to understand the import of 
this evidence.  When police arrived at the scene, a bong pipe 
was shattered around Mohr's body.  An officer that was at the 
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
crime scene testified that there were large amounts of blood on 
pieces of the bong pipe.  Denny seeks testing of this pipe and 
its broken pieces to determine if it contains DNA.  The bong 
pipe is particularly relevant to Denny's claim of innocence 
because the State presented testimony at trial that Denny struck 
Mohr in the head with the bong pipe.  A lack of Denny's DNA on 
the bong pipe could suggest that Denny had not touched it, and 
directly undermine this trial testimony.   
¶104 Moreover, Denny seeks testing of several hairs that an 
officer found in Mohr's left hand.  It requires little 
speculation to surmise that these hairs likely belong to an 
individual that was actively involved in the crime.  And the 
State presented testimony at trial that Denny was one of these 
individuals.  If the hairs do not belong to Denny, it could lead 
a juror to doubt testimony about his active involvement.    
¶105 The same analysis applies to the numerous strands of 
hair stuck to Mohr's body by dried blood.  The State's theory of 
the crime involved a struggle between Denny and Mohr.  And, 
several witnesses testified that Denny stabbed Mohr.  A juror 
could justifiably question the credibility of this testimony if 
none of the hairs found belonged to Denny.  
¶106 Accordingly, the articles that Denny seeks to have 
tested for DNA are not only numerous, but also highly relevant 
to the testimony the State presented against Denny at trial.  
Evidence that could show Denny was not at the scene of the crime 
could affect the credibility of the State's witnesses.   
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶107 Of course, this is not to imply that the testimony 
against Denny at trial was not substantial.  Yet, if the large 
quantity of evidence found at the scene is presumed to be 
exculpatory, i.e. none of it contains Denny's DNA, then the 
testimony proffered against Denny at his trial would be 
significantly undercut.  And, this is where the majority errs.  
It does not adequately view the evidence in light of the State's 
trial presentation of the case.  
¶108 If the DNA testing shows none of Denny's DNA, given 
the State's trial presentation of the case, it is reasonably 
probable that one or more jurors would have had reasonable doubt 
as to Denny's involvement in the crime.  Stated more fully, one 
juror could have concluded that the State's theory that Denny 
actively participated in the murder of Mohr was untenable given 
the lack of Denny's DNA at the scene of the crime, which could 
suggest that Denny was not there.   
¶109 Accordingly, I conclude that Denny is entitled to 
forensic DNA testing in the present case.  Finally, I note that 
Denny is not necessarily entitled to a new trial regardless of 
the results of the DNA tests.  Supreme court review is limited 
to whether Denny met the statutory criteria to entitle him to 
DNA testing.6    
                                                 
6 Likewise, I do not address whether this testing should be 
at Denny's or the public's expense as that is a matter reserved 
for the circuit court.  
No.  2015AP202-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶110 In light of the foregoing, although the majority 
opinion correctly overrules Moran's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(6), in which decision I concur, I dissent from its 
conclusion affirming the circuit court's refusal to order 
forensic DNA testing.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of 
appeals, although on a different basis, and I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion.  
 
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶111 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's excellent dissent.  
¶112 I write separately on the substance of the order the 
court issued on August 12, 2016.  The order denied Jeffrey C. 
Denny's (the defendant's) motion to strike Issue III of the 
State of Wisconsin's opening brief.  My separate writing at that 
time stated I would be filing this writing.1   
¶113 Let me set the background for this separate writing.  
The State petitioned the court for review, seeking reversal of 
the decision of the court of appeals.  The court granted the 
State's petition.  
¶114 The State filed its initial brief in this court.  The 
defendant, Jeffrey Denny, moved to strike the third issue of the 
State's initial brief, i.e., whether this court's decision in 
State v. Moran,2005 WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884, 
should be overruled.  The court denied the motion on August 12, 
                                                 
1 I wrote as follows on the order dated August 12, 2016:  
I write to note my objections to the procedure 
followed in issuing this order and the substance of 
the order.  Chief Justice Roggensack ordered the 
release of this order despite my request that it be 
held pending my completion of research and writing a 
dissent to be circulated at the beginning of this 
coming week.  Issuing the order next week would not 
delay the oral argument of this case at the end of 
October.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's vote was 
awaiting her reading my dissent.  I thus note my 
objections at this time; a separate writing will 
follow. 
I wrote my procedural objection in my writing on August 12, 
2016.  I now write my objection on the substance of the order 
denying the defendant's motion to strike.   
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
2016, without explanation.  I would have either granted the 
motion or denied the motion to strike part of the State's brief.  
In either event I would have advised the State it had erred in 
briefing the issue without seeking the court's consent to do so.  
¶115 The 
rules 
of 
appellate 
practice 
support 
the 
defendant's motion.  The rules of appellate practice do not 
support the court's order denying the defendant's motion without 
commenting on the rule of appellate practice involved.   
¶116 I write because this is not the only case in which the 
court seems to be ignoring the rules of appellate practice.  The 
litigants ought to know whether the court is adhering to its own 
rules of appellate practice, so they can determine whether they 
should adhere to the appellate practice rules.      
¶117 The rules provide that a petition for review "must 
contain [a] statement of the issues the petitioner seeks to have 
reviewed . . . ." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
(Rule) 
§ 809.62(2)(a).  
Furthermore, the rules clearly state the consequences for 
failure of the petition for review to state an issue to be 
reviewed:  "If a petition [for review] is granted, the parties 
cannot raise or argue issues not set forth in the petition 
unless ordered otherwise by the supreme court."  See Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.62(6); Michael Heffernan, Appellate Practice and 
Procedure in Wisconsin § 23.8 D (6th ed. 2014); id., § 23.8 D 
(Supp. 23-1 Dec. 2015) ("Failure to raise an issue in the 
petition for review is deemed a waiver of any claim that the 
supreme court should consider the issue.").   
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶118 Strict adherence to the statement of the issues in the 
petition for review is important for at least two reasons.   
¶119 First, the statement of the issues in the petition for 
review gives notice to the other party to enable it to respond 
to the petition for review.       
¶120 Second, the statement of the issues in the petition 
for review and the opposing party's response (and sometimes an 
amicus curiae filing) are the basis for the court's determining 
whether it will grant the petition to decide the issue(s) 
presented.  If the court grants a petition for review, the court 
might accept all issues for review, might limit review to 
certain stated issues, or might add one or more issues for 
review.   
¶121 With this procedure in mind, I turn to the State's 
petition for review in the instant case.  It raised four issues.2  
                                                 
2 The State's petition for review framed the four issues 
presented for review as follows: 
1. 
Did the court of appeals misapply Moran when it 
held that a defendant seeking postconviction DNA 
testing of "relevant" evidence under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07(2) 
need 
not 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
physical evidence "contains biological material 
or on which there is biological material" as 
provided under subparagraph 974.07(6)(a)2.? 
2. 
In reviewing a motion for DNA testing at State 
expense under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a), must a 
circuit court always assume that a DNA test 
result will be exculpatory? 
3. 
In assessing whether it is "reasonably probable" 
that a defendant would not have been convicted if 
exculpatory 
DNA 
results 
had 
been 
available, 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
No issue sought the overruling of this court's decision in 
Moran.  The petition for review refers to the interpretation and 
application of Moran in the instant case, not its overruling.   
¶122 The State's brief in this court now raises three 
issues, one seeking the overruling of the Moran case.3  
¶123 The order granting the State's petition for review 
(which was the court's standard order granting a petition for 
review) succinctly limited the issues to be briefed or argued by 
the State as follows: The State "may not raise or argue issues 
                                                                                                                                                             
should a circuit court apply a newly discovered 
evidence standard? 
4. 
Did the circuit court erroneously exercise its 
discretion under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a) when 
it found that the jury would have convicted Denny 
even if exculpatory DNA results were present? 
3 The State's initial brief framed the three issues 
presented as follows: 
1. 
To 
obtain 
post-conviction 
DNA 
testing 
of 
evidence, must the movant show that the evidence 
"contains biological material" that "will be 
relevant to his prosecution,"  State v. Moran, 
2005 WI 115, ¶¶3, 46, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 
N.W.2d 884? 
2. 
To obtain post-conviction DNA testing at state 
expense, must the movant also show that there is 
a 
"reasonable 
probability 
that 
a 
jury," 
considering exculpatory DNA results, "would have 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt," 
State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 475, 561 
N.W.2d 707 (1997)? 
3. 
Should this court overrule State v. Moran, 2005 
WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884?  
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
not set forth in the petition for review unless otherwise 
ordered by the court." 
¶124 It is not always easy to tell the difference between 
an issue, an argument, and a subsidiary issue.4  A subsidiary 
issue is deemed to be included in the statement of an issue.  
Wis. Stat. § 809.62 (4)(a).   
¶125 In the instant case it is easy to conclude that the 
request to overrule Moran is an issue, not an argument or a 
subsidiary issue.  Requesting the court to overturn a prior 
decision has not been viewed by this court as an argument (when 
the petition for review seeks interpretation of the decision) 
and has not been viewed as subsidiary to the issue of 
interpreting and applying a prior court decision.       
¶126 The State conceded in its initial brief that it did 
not raise the issue of overruling Moran in its petition for 
review.  The State's brief at 41, n.11 states:  "The Court may 
consider this argument [of overruling Moran] even though it was 
not expressly raised in the Petition for Review."  In its reply 
to the defendant's motion to strike this argument, the State's 
defense was that the need to raise an issue in the petition for 
review is only a "general rule," "not a hard-and-fast rule" that 
bars briefing in every case.  The State cites no case or other 
authority supporting its contention that the need to raise an 
issue in the petition for review is only a general rule that 
does not bar briefing in every case.  I could find none.   
                                                 
4 Michael Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin § 3.4 at 4 (6th ed. 2014; Supp. 3-2 Dec. 2015). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶127 The State bases its right to brief the issue of 
overruling Moran on the court's discretion to consider issues 
not raised by the petition for review.  The court does have the 
power to consider issues not raised by the petitioner.5  But the 
court's power to consider issues not raised by the petitioner 
does not pass to the State (or any petitioner filing a petition 
for review) the right to brief issues it did not raise in its 
petition for review.  If a petitioner wishes to raise a new 
issue, it must seek the court's consent.  Michael Heffernan, 
                                                 
5 If this court addresses an issue not raised by the 
parties, the court should give the parties an opportunity to 
tackle the issue.  A defendant has a due process right to notice 
of issues to be resolved and to be heard in a meaningful way.  
See, e.g.,  Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 (1991) (notice 
of "issues to be resolved by the adversary process is a 
fundamental characteristic of fair procedure"); California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984) ("criminal prosecutions must 
comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness"); 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 
(1950) (due process requires that "adjudication be preceded by 
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of 
the case"); City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, 
¶68, 302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 N.W.2d 428 (Bradley, J., concurring) 
("The rule of law is generally best developed when issues are 
raised by the parties and then tested by the fire of adversarial 
briefs and oral arguments."); Bloomer v. Gibson, 912 A.2d 424, 
433–34 (Vt. 2006) ("The opportunity to present arguments on the 
legal issue upon which a case is to be decided is fundamental to 
sound legal process . . . .") (citing Adam A. Milani & Michael 
R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions 
by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin § 23.14 at 17 (6th 
ed. 2014).6    
¶128 In sum, adhering to the rules of appellate practice 
and procedure, I would have either granted the motion to strike 
or denied the motion to strike but advised the State it had 
erred in briefing the issue without seeking the court's consent 
to do so.     
¶129 Fortunately, the defendant in the instant case had an 
opportunity to respond to the State's challenge to the Moran 
case.  The first issue the defendant addressed in its brief was 
whether the court should abandon the court's unanimous “plain 
language” reading of Wis. Stat. § 974.07 in Moran.     
¶130 I join Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent, and for 
the reasons set forth I write separately on an issue Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley's dissent does not address. 
 
                                                 
6 In a recent case, Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368 
Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520, the court recognized that an 
argument to overrule a prior decision raises a different issue 
than an argument relating to the interpretation and application 
of the prior case.  The parties' briefs in Coyne argued about 
the interpretation and application of Thompson v. Craney, 199 
Wis. 2d 674, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  The amicus brief in Coyne 
argued that the Craney case should be overruled.  Because the 
court was going to consider this new issue raised by the amicus, 
the court allowed the parties to brief this new issue. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶131 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  One of the 
essential tenets of our criminal justice system is that the 
"administration of justice is and should be a search for the 
truth."  Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 651, 655, 245 N.W.2d 654 
(1976).  It is undisputed that DNA testing is "one of the most 
significant scientific advancements of our era" and the most 
powerful technology we have for revealing the truth.  Maryland 
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013). 
¶132 Making several missteps along the way, the majority 
limits the contours of this search.  Dedicating almost half of 
its lengthy opinion to an exposition of the facts, it emphasizes 
the strong evidence of Denny's guilt as a reason to circumscribe 
his ability to conduct DNA testing.  Of course there is strong 
evidence of guilt.  Denny, as well as the multitude of convicted 
persons who have been exonerated after DNA testing, were all 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶133 The question is not whether there is strong evidence 
of guilt.  Rather, the question is whether the legislature has 
written a statute that gives Denny the opportunity to test 
evidence that has the potential to exonerate him.  More 
precisely, at issue in this case is whether Wisconsin's post-
conviction DNA testing statute allows a defendant to test, at 
his own expense, evidence containing biological material that is 
relevant to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in 
his conviction. 
¶134 This same question was answered eleven years ago, when 
this court unanimously determined that the plain meaning of the 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
post-conviction DNA testing statute "gives the defendant the 
right to test the sought-after evidence . . . ."  State v. 
Moran, 2005 WI 115, ¶57, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884.  
Nothing in the DNA testing statute has changed in the decade 
since this court decided Moran, nor has the State presented any 
evidence that the statute has been unworkable in practice.  The 
only thing that has changed is the composition of this court. 
¶135 In reaching its conclusion, the Moran court issued an 
invitation to the legislature.  See id., ¶56 ("We encourage the 
legislature to revisit Wis. Stat. § 974.07 . . . ."); see also 
id., ¶59 (Wilcox, J. concurring) (" . . . I strongly urge the 
legislature to take a hard look at the practical consequences of 
[subsection (6)]."). 
¶136 The legislature did not respond to the invitation.  
Throwing 
caution 
(as 
well 
as 
any 
semblance 
of 
judicial 
restraint) to the wind, the majority steps in to perform the 
legislature's job. 
¶137 It now overrules Moran and runs roughshod over the 
fundamental doctrine of stare decisis.  To justify overturning 
unanimous precedent, the majority unearths a heretofore unknown 
test which it labels "principles of policy."  Majority op., ¶71.  
Apparently not very convinced of the legitimacy of its own 
discovery, the majority obscures the application of the new test 
by tucking it away in a footnote.  Id., ¶70 n.16. 
¶138 In overruling Moran, not only does the majority apply 
a test that courts have never before used, it also attempts to 
justify its action by relying on an "imagine[d]" purpose that 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
the legislature never stated.  Garnering a trifecta of "nevers," 
it then embarks upon rewriting the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.07 by inserting a limitation that the legislature never 
created. 
¶139 Ultimately, the majority arrives at a determination 
that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6), all Denny can do is 
look at evidence with the naked eye when its potential to 
exonerate him is invisible until it is tested.  Id., ¶71.  Such 
a useless procedure renders the majority's determination absurd. 
¶140 The majority further missteps when it deprives Denny 
of the opportunity to test for potentially exculpatory evidence 
under an alternative statutory procedure.  Whether analyzed 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) or (7), the majority impedes the 
search for the truth by erroneously limiting access to post-
conviction DNA testing. 
¶141 Contrary to the majority, I would adhere to this 
court's unanimous decision in Moran.  The plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07(6) gives the defendant the right to test, at his 
own expense, evidence containing biological material that is 
relevant to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in 
his conviction.  In the alternative, I conclude that Denny has 
met the requirements under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a) for post-
conviction DNA testing. 
¶142 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶143 This court follows the doctrine of stare decisis 
"scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule of 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
law."  Johnson Controls Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 208, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  A court's decision 
to depart from precedent is not to be made casually and we 
should 
not 
depart 
from 
precedent 
without 
sufficient 
justification.  Id. 
¶144 In this case "stare decisis carries enhanced force" 
because this court's decision in Moran interpreted a statute.  
See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) 
(without "special justification," the decision to correct 
statutory interpretation should be left to the legislature); see 
also State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶¶208-209, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 
N.W.2d 1 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("[I]t 
is 
not 
alone 
sufficient that we would decide a case differently now than we 
did then.  To reverse course, we require as well what we have 
termed a 'special justification'——over and above the belief 
"that the precedent was wrongly decided.") (quoting Kimble, 135 
S. Ct. at 2409). 
A 
¶145 By overruling Moran, the majority disregards the 
fundamental principle of stare decisis and manufactures a 
heretofore unknown test for overturning precedent. 
¶146 According to the majority, its decision to overrule 
Moran is justified because stare decisis is a "'principle of 
policy,' rather than an 'inexorable command.'"  Majority op., 
¶71 (citing Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) 
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991))).  In 
Johnson Controls, this court explained what is meant by the 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
phrase "principle of policy."  Stare decisis is a "principle of 
policy" because it is "a policy judgment that 'in most matters 
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be right.'"  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶97. 
¶147 In asserting that "sometimes stare decisis must yield 
to other important principles of policy," the majority blatantly 
mischaracterizes the law.  Majority op., ¶71.  It transposes the 
single stated "principle of policy" underlying stare decisis 
(that settled law is of the utmost importance), into an unknown 
and potentially unlimited number of "principles of policy" that 
could justify overruling precedent.  What are these principles?  
Whose are they?  Are they legislative policies or policies that 
this court develops as the need arises? 
¶148 Further, the majority fails to meet its newly minted 
"principles of policy" test because it does not offer a 
compelling policy reason for overturning Moran.  Indeed, the one 
policy the majority identifies is one it admits is "not 
dispositive in the case at issue . . . ."  Id., ¶70 n.16. 
¶149 Apparently not convinced about the legitimacy of its 
principle of policy, the majority tucks it away in a footnote——
asserting that overruling Moran is "the best way to protect the 
rights and interests of crime victims in Wisconsin."  Id., ¶70 
n.16. 
¶150 The majority's footnoted justification for overruling 
Moran is at odds with the rational offered by now-governor Scott 
Walker who co-authored this legislation.  In an interview, then 
former state representative Scott Walker explained that post-
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
conviction DNA testing is focused on keeping us all safe——
victims and the public alike: 
Whether it's proving someone's guilt or someone's 
innocence, in either case, it keeps us safer because 
if somebody is innocent, that means somebody who's 
guilty is still out there, and we can use that 
evidence to get them off the streets.1 
¶151 Unsurprisingly, 
there 
is 
nothing 
in 
the 
record 
indicating that victims have suffered any more harm since Moran 
was decided.  Faced with this void in the record, the majority 
resorts to imagination:  "it is not difficult to imagine why 
such 
testing 
might 
cause 
significant 
distress 
to 
victims . . . ."  Majority op., ¶70 n.16. 
¶152 Based on this speculation, supported and advanced by 
its collective imagination, the majority divines a "principle of 
policy" in its attempt to justify overruling Moran.  It 
concludes 
that 
upholding 
Moran 
"would 
be 
purposefully 
perpetuating a much more expansive postconviction forensic DNA 
testing regime than the legislature saw fit to enact, to the 
possible detriment of Wisconsin crime victims."  Id., ¶70 n.16. 
¶153 The 
rights 
and 
interests 
of 
crime 
victims 
are 
undeniably important considerations, which the legislature has 
already addressed through the notice provisions in Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 Dee J. Hall, Nine people freed on strength of DNA testing 
in 
Wisconsin, 
WisconsinWatch.org, 
Dec. 
13, 
2009, 
http://wisconsinwatch.org/2009/12/nine-people-freed-on-strength-
of-dna-testing-in-wisconsin/. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
§ 974.07(4).2  However, relying on an "imagined" policy reason to 
limit the availability of DNA testing strays too far from 
subsection (4)'s victim-notification mandate.  See State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶48, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  There is nothing in the text of 
the statute that suggests the legislature intended to limit 
post-conviction DNA testing due to the speculative concerns the 
majority identifies here. 
¶154 Contrary to the majority's assertions, allowing DNA 
testing does not undermine finality or lead to "the possibility 
of 'inequitable results'" due to "open[ing] up cases that have 
long been thought by everyone, including crime victims, to be 
final."  Majority op., ¶70 n.16 (citation omitted).  Performing 
DNA testing on relevant evidence is only the first step in a 
process where the defendant must next demonstrate that the 
results of the testing support his claim.  See Moran, 284 
Wis. 2d 24, ¶47 (allowing DNA testing does not guarantee a new 
trial or even an evidentiary hearing). 
¶155 If the DNA test results do not support a defendant's 
claim, the case is not reopened.  And if the DNA testing results 
do support a defendant's claim of innocence, victims will have 
little interest in finality if the true criminal perpetrator is 
still at large.  See majority op., ¶70 n.16. 
                                                 
2 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07(4)(a), if a motion for 
post-conviction DNA testing is made under sub. (2), the circuit 
court shall send a copy of the motion to the victim.  Likewise, 
if a hearing on the motion is scheduled, a notice of the hearing 
shall be sent to the victim.  Wis. Stat. § 974.07(4)(a). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶156 Likewise, there is no evidence that post-conviction 
DNA testing has lead to "inequitable results."  If the majority 
intends to speculate that post-conviction DNA testing might lead 
to the "possibility" of wrongfully exonerating a criminal 
defendant, it has a very steep hill to climb.  The State has 
introduced no evidence that legitimate convictions have been 
overturned.  Additionally, courts have widely acknowledged that 
DNA testing is unparalleled in its ability to exonerate the 
wrongly convicted and identify the guilty.  Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. at 1966. 
B 
¶157 Turning 
away 
from 
the 
majority's 
newly 
created 
"principles of policy" test and instead considering the well-
established 
criteria 
this 
court 
has 
always 
applied 
in 
determining whether it may overrule precedent, it becomes clear 
why the majority saw the need to create a new test justifying 
its decision.  This case satisfies none of the well-established 
criteria that would warrant departing from the doctrine of stare 
decisis and overruling Moran. 
¶158 In Johnson Controls, we identified several criteria in 
Wisconsin for overruling our prior cases:  (1) if "changes or 
developments in the law have undermined the rationale behind a 
decision"; (2) "there is a need to make a decision correspond to 
newly ascertained facts"; or (3) "there is a showing that the 
precedent has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in 
the law."  264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶98.  We explained further that other 
"relevant considerations in determining whether to depart from 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
stare decisis are whether the prior decision is unsound in 
principle, whether it is unworkable in practice, and whether 
reliance interests are implicated."  Id., ¶99. 
¶159 Addressing the first two factors, the majority argues 
that the Moran court did not consider Wis. Stat. § 974.07(12) in 
reaching its analysis.  Majority op., ¶70 (citing Johnson 
Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶98).  According to the majority, 
"[r]econsideration of the statute with the benefit of a clear 
understanding of [subsection (12)] convinces us that our 
interpretation of sub. (6) must be modified to take account of 
sub. (12)."  Id. 
¶160 The 
majority's 
analysis 
suffers 
from 
a 
glaring 
mistake.  Subsection (12) was a part of the statute at the time 
Moran was decided and has not been changed in the interim.  
Although the majority may place a different emphasis on 
subsection (12) than did the 
Moran court, it would be 
meaningless to require "changes or developments in the law" if 
those changes originate from only this decision.  Likewise, 
there are no newly ascertained facts in this case aside from the 
majority's new interpretation of the statute. 
¶161 Equally flawed are the majority's unsubstantiated 
claims that Moran's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) has 
"become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law," 
that it has rendered "the rest of the statute incoherent in a 
manner we obviously did not contemplate in Moran," and that it 
is "unsound in principle."  Id. (citing Johnson Controls, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶98-99). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
¶162 The sole justification the majority offers here is 
that "allowing testing under sub. (6) would require only the 
barest of showings."  Id., ¶66.  According to the majority, it 
is "difficult to believe that the statute is most properly read 
to permit convicted offenders who are unable to meet the 
surmountable sub. (7) standard to engage in postconviction 
fishing expeditions in attempts to cast doubt upon and upset 
those convictions."  Id. 
¶163 The 
majority's 
prospective 
concerns 
carry 
little 
weight when there is no evidence that Moran's interpretation of 
the statute has lead to frivolous requests for testing over the 
last decade.  Indeed, the State has offered no evidence that it 
has been overwhelmed by demands for post-conviction DNA testing 
or that legitimate convictions have been overturned. 
¶164 At oral argument, Denny's counsel explained that the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project "probably does the vast majority, if 
not almost all of the post-conviction DNA testing in this 
State."3  Counsel affirmed that there are very few post-
conviction motions for DNA testing filed each year, explaining 
that "we're talking about a handful of cases each year.  There's 
no overwhelming burden on the system.  It's a handful of cases." 
                                                 
3 The Wisconsin Innocence Project (WIP) is a clinical legal 
education program that is part of the Frank J. Remington Center 
at the University of Wisconsin Law School.  It seeks to 
"exonerate the innocent, educate students, and reform the 
criminal justice system by identifying and remedying the causes 
of 
wrongful 
convictions." 
 
Wisconsin 
Innocence 
Project, 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
Law 
School,   
http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/index.html. 
 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶165 Contrary to the majority's assertions, there is no 
evidence that Moran's interpretation of the post-conviction DNA 
testing statute is incoherent or inconsistent in ways that have 
become detrimental to the law.  In fact, it appears that the 
current statutory scheme has worked well for both defendants and 
the State. 
¶166 Post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to subsection (6) 
avoids litigation and saves judicial resources because a 
defendant does not need a court order to test evidence.  
Additionally, it saves the State the cost of paying for the 
testing and relieves the State from having to acknowledge that 
the defendant has met the reasonably probable standard set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 974.07. 
¶167 Given the legal and logical gymnastics the majority 
performs in order to justify overruling Moran, one would hope 
that its decision at least advances a sound interpretation of 
the statute.  Unfortunately, such hope is unrealized. 
II 
¶168 By rewriting Wis. Stat. § 974.07, the majority inserts 
a limitation the legislature never created and arrives at an 
unreasonable and absurd result. 
¶169 In Moran, this court determined that if a defendant 
met 
the 
threshold 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.07(2), he had two avenues for pursuing post-conviction DNA 
testing.4  284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶55.  Moran explained that "the 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. §  974.07(2) provides in relevant part that a 
defendant may bring a motion for an order requiring DNA testing 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
statutory text makes clear that subsections (6) and (7) are 
intended for different purposes."  Id.  Subsection (6) allows a 
defendant access to test results and evidence containing 
biological material, but he must decide whether to test the 
material and pay for the testing himself.5  Id.  Subsection (7) 
pertains to court-ordered testing at the State's expense.  Id.6 
                                                                                                                                                             
if the evidence:  (a) is relevant to the investigation or 
prosecution that resulted in the conviction; (b) is in the 
actual or constructive possession of a government agency; and 
(c) has not been previously subject to DNA testing or, if it has 
been previously tested, it may now be tested again using a 
technique not previously available or utilized and that provides 
a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results. 
 
5 Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(a) provides in relevant part: 
(6)(a) 
Upon 
demand 
the 
district 
attorney 
shall 
disclose to the movant or his or her attorney whether 
biological material has been tested and shall make 
available to the movant or his or her attorney the 
following material: 
. . . 
 
2. Physical evidence that is in the actual or 
constructive possession of a government agency 
and that contains biological material or on which 
there is biological materials. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a) provides in relevant part: 
A court in which a motion under sub. (2) is filed 
shall order forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing if 
all of the following apply: 
1. The movant claims that he or she is innocent 
of the offense at issue in the motion under sub. 
(2). 
2. It is reasonably probable that the movant 
would not have been prosecuted [or] convicted 
 . . .  
if 
exculpatory 
deoxyribonucleic 
acid 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶170 The majority does not dispute that "it is possible to 
read § 974.07 as creating two systems for testing at private 
expense (under subs. (6) and (12)) and one system for testing at 
public expense (under sub. (12)) . . . "  Majority op., ¶67.7  
However, it overrules Moran because "we do not find this to be 
the most sensible interpretation of the statute."  Id. 
¶171 Contrary to Moran, the majority now concludes that all 
motions for post-conviction DNA testing must proceed by court-
order under Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7).  Id., ¶68.  Additionally, 
the majority determines that Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) allows a 
defendant with only the naked eye to look at, but not test, 
relevant evidence containing biological material.  Id. 
                                                                                                                                                             
testing results had been available before the 
prosecution [or] conviction . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(b) provides in relevant part: 
A court in which a motion under sub. (2) is filed may 
order forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing if all of 
the following apply: 
 
1. It is reasonably probable that the outcome of 
the 
proceedings 
that 
resulted 
in 
the 
conviction . . . would have been more favorable 
to the movant if the results of deoxyribonucleic 
acid testing had been available before he or she 
was prosecuted [or] convicted . . .  
 
7 The payment of costs for post-conviction DNA testing are 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(12).  Subsection 12(a) provides 
that a court "may order a movant to pay the costs of any testing 
ordered by the court under this section if the court determines 
that the movant is not indigent."  Subsection (12)(c) provides 
that "[t]he state crime laboratories shall pay for testing 
ordered under this section . . . if the court does not order the 
movant to pay for testing." 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
¶172 Not only are the majority's complaints about Moran 
unpersuasive,8 its analysis violates a basic premise that it is 
the legislature that writes the statutes——not the courts.  The 
majority usurps the legislature's role when it writes its own 
inspection limitation into subsection (6) that prohibits DNA 
testing of evidence.9 
                                                 
8 The majority asserts that Moran erred in its statutory 
interpretation because: 
 
 Subsection (6) says nothing about allowing the movant 
to conduct forensic testing or sending the evidence 
away for testing.  Majority op., ¶64. 
 
 Moran did not discuss subsection (12).  Id., ¶67. 
 
 Subsection (6) does not reference testing by "court 
order" like other subsections in the statute.  Id., 
¶68. 
 
Each of these points are easily rebutted: 
 
 Even the majority acknowledges that "sub. (6) does not 
explicitly prohibit a movant from testing evidence, 
either."  Id., ¶64. 
 
 Moran harmonized subsection (12) with subsections (6) 
and (7) when it determined that one provided for 
private payment of costs and the other provided for 
public payment of costs.  See 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶57. 
 
 There is no reason why DNA testing must proceed by 
court-order unless the court is ordering the State to 
conduct and pay for the costs of that testing. 
 
9 Not only does the majority fail to exercise deference to 
the legislature, its decision in this case is out of step with 
the legislature's commitment to utilizing DNA testing.  For 
example, the legislature recently enacted 2013 Wis. Act 20, 
which expanded the collection, analysis, and maintenance of DNA 
samples as part of a larger initiative to expand the State's DNA 
databank.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 165.77(2)(a)1&3 (setting 
forth the requirement that the DOJ provide for the analysis of 
collected samples and maintain a state DNA databank). 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶173 In contrast, the Moran court explicitly declined to 
"add language to the statute in order to justify the State's 
interpretation."  Moran, 284 Wis. 2d 24, ¶39.  After careful 
analysis, the Moran court determined that "[w]e are unable to 
discern from the plain language of § 974.07 a clear legislative 
intent to block testing demanded by a person willing and able to 
pay until that person satisfies the requirements for publicly 
funded DNA testing."  Id., ¶54. 
¶174 Additionally, the majority violates a well-established 
canon of statutory construction that we interpret statutes 
"reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The majority's interpretation of the 
statute, unlike the interpretation set forth in Moran, leads to 
an absurd and unreasonable result because without DNA testing, 
the ability only to look at evidence containing biological 
material is essentially useless. 
¶175 Apparently recognizing this fundamental flaw in its 
reasoning, the majority asserts that "the facts in the case at 
issue demonstrate why inspection is useful."  Majority op., ¶71 
n.17.  It then explains that in his supplemental motion for 
post-conviction 
DNA 
testing, 
Denny 
reviewed 
the 
physical 
evidence on file and identified additional relevant items that 
were previously overlooked.  Id.  Thus, according to the 
majority, "the ability to inspect allows one to ascertain what, 
if any, testing should be sought."  Id. 
¶176 Contrary to the majority's explanation, the facts of 
this case demonstrate the futility of examining evidence without 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
being able to test it.  Although Denny identified additional 
relevant items that were overlooked, there is nothing he can do 
with that evidence. 
¶177 According to the majority, he can no longer test the 
evidence at his own expense pursuant to subsection (6) and the 
majority has denied his claim for court-ordered testing pursuant 
to subsection (7).  All Denny can do is look at the evidence 
when its potential to exonerate him is invisible until it is 
tested.  This is an absurd and unreasonable result that 
contravenes the plain language of the statute. 
III 
¶178 Finally, I address the majority's conclusion that 
Denny's motion for post-conviction testing does not entitle him 
to court-ordered testing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.07(7)(a)2.  
According to the majority, Denny has failed to meet the 
reasonably probable standard.  It determines that "[e]ven if 
exculpatory 
DNA 
testing 
results 
were 
available 
before 
prosecution and conviction, we are unable to conclude that it is 
reasonably probable that Denny would not have been prosecuted or 
convicted because of his crime."  Id., ¶81. 
¶179 The majority begins by correctly stating that for the 
purposes of this analysis, we are to assume that if DNA testing 
were to occur, the results would be exculpatory.  Id., ¶76.  It 
errs, however, when it denies Denny the opportunity to test 
potentially exculpatory evidence by failing to acknowledge how 
the witness testimony could be undermined by exonerating DNA-
evidence. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
¶180 Rather than analyze the testimony against Denny in the 
context of exculpatory physical evidence, the majority rests its 
analysis 
on 
the 
broad 
assertion 
that 
"[t]he 
evidence 
incriminating Denny was, to put it mildly, extensive."  Id., 
¶77; see also id., ¶81 (citing State v. Denny, 2016 WI App 27, 
¶86, 368 Wis. 2d 363 (Hagedorn, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("As put by the separate writing below, 
'[t]he evidence was vast, overwhelming, and damning.  It was not 
even close.'")).  
¶181 Although the majority opinion begins with an expansive 
exposition of facts, its analysis relies on a brief summary of 
the conflicting testimony of multiple unreliable witnesses in 
denying Denny's motion for testing.  According to the majority, 
"[t]estimony indicated that Denny confessed, made inculpatory 
statements to, and took inculpatory actions in front of, 
multiple witnesses."  Id., ¶77. 
¶182 The 
majority's 
reliance 
on 
the 
"extensive" 
and 
"overwhelming" evidence presented against Denny is misplaced.  
It ignores the reality that by definition his conviction was 
premised on strong evidence of guilt.  Denny, like all convicted 
persons who have been exonerated after DNA testing, was found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally, the majority 
ignores the ways that witness testimony is undermined by 
exonerating DNA-evidence. 
¶183 Denny argues that three types of DNA test results 
would create a reasonable probability of a different result:  
(1) DNA that matches a convicted offender; (2) DNA that excludes 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
Denny and his brother Kent on all items; or DNA on multiple 
items matching the same unknown third party ("redundant DNA"). 
¶184 The majority dispenses with a DNA result that matches 
a convicted offender or multiple items matching the same unknown 
third party by agreeing with the circuit court that "Mohr's 
killing has never been presented as a single-perpetrator 
crime . . . "  Id., ¶78.  Although this is true, the vast 
majority of the evidence against Denny was testimony in which 
Denny and Kent were the only perpetrators.  In a handful of 
accounts, an individual named Leatherman was also implicated. 
¶185 Contrary to the majority's assertion, DNA evidence 
matching an unknown third party or a convicted offender would 
undermine every piece of testimony in which Denny and Kent were 
presented as the only two perpetrators of the crime.  The 
majority does not acknowledge this possibility.  Instead it 
speculates that if more than one person committed the crime, 
finding a third person's DNA could not change the result because 
any number of people could have committed the crime in addition 
to Kent and Denny. 
¶186 Further, the majority contends that the absence of DNA 
belonging 
to 
Denny 
and 
Kent 
would 
not 
be 
"particularly 
compelling."  Id., ¶78.  The majority dismisses the effect of 
exculpatory evidence excluding both Denny and Kent because there 
was no single account of what transpired in this case and 
various inconsistencies among the accounts of the witnesses.  As 
discussed above, however, Denny and Kent were implicated in 
every account of the crime. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
19 
 
¶187 Excluding both brothers would undermine all of the 
testimony introduced against Denny in which both brothers played 
a role in the crime.  Given the obvious struggle and the violent 
crime scene in which evidence containing DNA was spread 
throughout the bedroom and into the hallway, it is reasonably 
probable that the result at trial would have been different if 
there was no physical evidence connecting Denny and Kent to the 
crime. 
¶188 The 
majority 
even 
contends 
that 
the 
"various 
inconsistencies between the accounts of the witnesses actually 
serves to insulate Denny's conviction."  Id., ¶78.  This strains 
credulity, given the fact that the witnesses were unreliable in 
various ways, admitting to drug and alcohol use at relevant 
times and given grants of immunity so that they would testify.  
Rather than weigh the effect of exculpatory DNA evidence against 
this unreliable testimony, the majority contends that it is not 
persuaded by this argument because the jury was not.  Id., ¶80.  
This ignores the essential fact that the jury, in weighing the 
testimony of the witnesses, was not presented with exculpatory 
DNA evidence. 
¶189 Ultimately, the majority's summary of conflicting 
testimony does not support its conclusion.  Given the various 
inconsistencies in the testimony from unreliable witnesses, it 
is reasonably probable that exculpatory DNA results would have 
lead to a different outcome. 
IV 
¶190 In sum, the majority opinion offers no persuasive 
legal, logical or factual reason for its decision to overrule 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
20 
 
Moran.  Instead it discards the doctrine of stare decisis, 
unearths a test never before used to justify overruling 
precedent, "imagine[s]" a statutory purpose, rewrites the 
statute and ultimately ends with an absurd result.  And for 
what? 
¶191 As we learned at oral argument, only a handful of 
motions for post-conviction DNA testing are filed each year.  
But for the handful of potentially innocent people, the 
majority's decision limiting access to post-conviction DNA 
testing is devastating. 
¶192 Daryl Dwayne Holloway's recent exoneration provides a 
compelling example of how Moran's interpretation of the statute 
worked well in practice for both the State and defendants.  On 
October 5, 2016, three weeks before oral argument in this case, 
Holloway was exonerated based on new DNA evidence after spending 
24 years in prison.  At the request of counsel, the State 
reviewed the evidence against Holloway and agreed to DNA testing 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.04(6)(a).  "In collaboration with 
the District Attorney's Office, the Wisconsin Innocence Project 
had new DNA testing done."  The testing results exonerated 
Holloway and "[t]he Milwaukee District Attorney's office and the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project drafted a stipulation agreeing that 
Holloway's conviction should be vacated . . . ."10 
¶193 The prosecutors were praised for taking on the case 
and serving as "ministers of justice, not just advocate[s] for 
                                                 
10 Innocence 
Project, 
Daryl 
Dwayne 
Holloway, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/daryl-dwayne-holloway/. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
21 
 
convictions."11  Given the majority's approach, no such accolades 
are deserved here. 
¶194 If the majority opinion were the law when prior 
exonerees sought post-conviction DNA testing, who knows if some 
would still be serving time in prison for crimes they never 
committed.  Rather than retaining an established statutory 
pathway enabling a search for the truth, the majority blocks it 
and provides yet another avenue for sustaining convictions——even 
potentially wrongful convictions. 
¶195 Before a jury begins its deliberations, the circuit 
judge instructs:  "Let you verdict speak the truth, whatever the 
truth may be."  Such an instruction falls on the deaf ears of 
the majority.  By erroneously limiting access to post-conviction 
DNA testing, it impedes the criminal justice system's search for 
truth. 
¶196 Contrary to the majority, I would adhere to this 
court's unanimous decision in Moran.  The plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 974.07(6) gives the defendant the right to test, at his 
own expense, evidence containing biological material that is 
relevant to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in 
his conviction.  Additionally, the majority errs when it denies 
Denny the opportunity to test potentially exculpatory evidence 
by failing to acknowledge how the witness testimony could be 
undermined by exonerating DNA-evidence. 
                                                 
11 Ashley Luthern, Milwaukee man exonerated by DNA after 24 
years in prison, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Oct. 5, 2016, 
http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2016/10/05/milwaukee-
man-exonerated-dna-after-24-years-prison/91615854/. 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
22 
 
¶197 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶198 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2015AP202-CR.awb 
 
1