Title: South Metropolitan Fire Protection District, Respondent v. City of Lee's Summit, Missouri, Appellant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC89558
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
SOUTH METROPOLITAN FIRE  
 
) 
PROTECTION DISTRICT, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89558 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
CITY OF LEE 'S SUMMIT, MISSOURI, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Marco A. Roldan, Judge 
 
 
The city of Lee's Summit, Missouri acquired property pursuant to a 
voluntary annexation that was located in the boundaries of the South Metropolitan 
Fire District.  After the annexation, a dispute arose over whether fire protection 
services and receipt of related revenues for the annexed property would remain 
with South Metro or be transferred to the city.  The city claimed that the annexed 
property was excluded from the fire protection district pursuant to section 
321.320.1  South Metro argued that the annexed property remained part of the fire 
protection district pursuant to section 72.418.2   
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise noted.  
 
South Metro filed suit for a declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive 
relief.  The trial court found that sections 72.418.2 and 72.418.3 applied and 
granted relief in favor of South Metro.  The city appeals, arguing that section 
321.320 applies and that, if section 72.418.2 applies, it is unconstitutional.  
Because the city challenges the validity of a statute, this Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.    
                                                                                                                                                 
Section 321.320 provides: 
If any property, located within the boundaries of a fire protection district, is included within a city 
having a population of forty thousand inhabitants or more, which city is not wholly within the fire 
protection district, and which city maintains a city fire department, the property is excluded from 
the fire protection district. 
 
2 Section 72.418 provides: 
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no new city created pursuant to 
sections 72.400 to 72.423 shall establish a municipal fire department to provide fire protection 
services, including emergency medical services, if such city formerly consisted of unincorporated 
areas in the county or municipalities in the county, or both, which are provided fire protection 
services and emergency medical services by one or more fire protection districts. Such fire 
protection districts shall continue to provide services to the area comprising the new city and may 
levy and collect taxes the same as such districts had prior to the creation of such new city. 
 
2. Fire protection districts serving the area included within any annexation by a city having a fire 
department, including simplified boundary changes, shall continue to provide fire protection 
services, including emergency medical services to such area. The annexing city shall pay annually 
to the fire protection district an amount equal to that which the fire protection district would have 
levied on all taxable property within the annexed area. Such annexed area shall not be subject to 
taxation for any purpose thereafter by the fire protection district except for bonded indebtedness 
by the fire protection district which existed prior to the annexation. The amount to be paid 
annually by the municipality to the fire protection district pursuant hereto shall be a sum equal to 
the annual assessed value multiplied by the annual tax rate as certified by the fire protection 
district to the municipality, including any portion of the tax created for emergency medical service 
provided by the district, per one hundred dollars of assessed value in such area. The tax rate so 
computed shall include any tax on bonded indebtedness incurred subsequent to such annexation, 
but shall not include any portion of the tax rate for bonded indebtedness incurred prior to such 
annexation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the residents of an area 
annexed on or after May 26, 1994, may vote in all fire protection district elections and may be 
elected to the fire protection district board of directors. 
 
3. The fire protection district may approve or reject any proposal for the provision of fire 
protection and emergency medical services by a city. 
  
 
2 
 
 
Sections 72.418 and section 321.320 are in conflict, each providing a 
different result for whether the city or the fire protection district provides fire 
protection services to the annexed property.  When section 72.418 is placed in the 
context of the boundary commission act, it can be read to apply to counties with a 
boundary commission, and section 321.320 can be read to apply to counties with 
no boundary commission.  This Court applied section 321.320 in this manner in 
Battlefield Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Springfield, 941 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. banc 
1997).  Because the city is not located in a county with a boundary commission, 
section 321.320 applies in this case.  The judgment is reversed. 
I. Facts 
The city is a constitutional charter city, located in Jackson County and Cass 
County.  The city maintains and operates its own city fire department and 
emergency ambulance services.  
South Metro is a fire protection district formed in accordance with chapter 
321 and is a political subdivision of the state of Missouri.  South Metro provides 
fire protection services and emergency ambulance services to the property within 
its geographic boundaries, which includes some property in Cass County. 
In January 2005, the city annexed approximately 320 acres of undeveloped 
property in Cass County pursuant to a voluntary annexation agreement.  Prior to 
annexation, the property was within the geographic boundaries of South Metro.  
As the city began developing the annexed property in January 2007, South Metro 
3 
 
became aware that the city was using its fire department and emergency 
ambulance services for the area.   
In October 2007, South Metro filed suit for a declaratory judgment and 
preliminary and injunctive relief.  The trial court found that section 72.418 applied 
and granted declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief in favor of 
South Metro.  
II. Statutes 
 
The legislature has enacted three statutes that address fire protection 
services and revenues for property included in a fire protection district and a city.  
These statutes are sections 321.320, 321.322,3 and 72.418. Sections 321.320 and 
321.322 are included in chapter 321, titled "Fire Protection District."  Section 
72.418 is included in chapter 72, titled "Classification and Consolidation of Cities, 
Towns and Villages," in sections 72.400 to 72.430, titled "Boundary 
Commission." 
a. Section 321.320 
Section 321.320 provides:  
If any property, located within the boundaries of a fire protection district, is 
included within a city having a population of forty thousand inhabitants or 
more, which city is not wholly within the fire protection district, and which 
city maintains a city fire department, the property is excluded from the fire 
protection district. 
 
The section was enacted in 1949 and amended in 1961 and 1969.  As first 
enacted, the section provided:  
                                                 
3 All references to section 321.322 are to RSMo Supp. 2007. 
4 
 
If any property, located within the boundaries of the fire protection district 
in a county of the first class now or hereafter having a population of four 
hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants or more is now or hereinafter 
included with a city not wholly within such district, such property is 
excluded from the district.   
 
Section 321.320, RSMo 1949. 
 
The 1961 amendment made several changes to the 1949 version.  It deleted 
the requirement that the property be located in a county of 450,000 inhabitants or 
more and added a requirement that the city have 40,000 inhabitants or more.  The 
amendment also excluded application in first-class counties with a charter form of 
government and removed "now or hereinafter" from the verb phrase.   As 
amended, the section provided: 
If any property, located within the boundaries of the fire protection district 
in a county of the first class, except those having a charter form of 
government, is included within a city having a population of forty thousand 
inhabitants or more, which city is not wholly within the fire protection 
district, and which city maintains a city fire department, the property is 
excluded from the fire protection district. 
 
Section 321.320, RSMo Supp. 1961. 
 
 
 
The 1969 amendment deleted the phrase "in a county of the first class, 
except those having a charter form of government."  There have been no further 
amendments to this section. 
b. Section 321.322 
 
Section 321.322 is the subsequent section to section 321.320 and provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
1. If any property located within the boundaries of a fire protection district 
 
shall be included within a city having a population of at least two thousand 
5 
 
 
five hundred but not more than sixty-five thousand which is not wholly 
 
within the fire protection district and which maintains a city fire 
 
department, then upon the date of actual inclusion of the property within 
 
the city, as determined by the annexation process, the city shall within sixty 
 
days assume by contract with the fire protection district all responsibility 
 
for payment in a lump sum or in installments an amount mutually agreed 
 
upon by the fire protection district and the city for the city to cover all 
 
obligations of the fire protection district to the area included within the city, 
 
and thereupon the fire protection district shall convey to the city the title, 
 
free and clear of all liens or encumbrances of any kind or nature, any such 
 
tangible real and personal property of the fire protection district as may be 
 
agreed upon, which is located within the part of the fire protection district 
 
located within the corporate limits of the city with full power in the city to 
 
use and dispose of such tangible real and personal property as the city 
 
deems best in the public interest, and the fire protection district shall no 
 
longer levy and collect any tax upon the property included within the 
 
corporate limits of the city; except that, if the city and the fire protection 
 
district cannot mutually agree to such an arrangement, then the city shall 
 
assume responsibility for fire protection in the annexed area on or before 
 
January first of the third calendar year following the actual inclusion of the 
 
property within the city, as determined by the annexation process, and 
 
furthermore the fire protection district shall not levy and collect any tax 
 
upon that property included within the corporate limits of the city after the 
 
date of inclusion of that property: 
            .... 
 
2. Any property excluded from a fire protection district by reason of 
 
subsection 1 of this section shall be subject to the provisions of section 
 
321.330. 
 
3. The provisions of this section shall not apply in any county of the first 
 
class having a charter form of government and having a population of over 
 
nine hundred thousand inhabitants. 
 
4. The provisions of this section shall not apply where the annexing city or 
 
town operates a city fire department and was on January 1, 2005, a city of 
 
the fourth classification with more than eight thousand nine hundred but 
 
fewer than nine thousand inhabitants and entirely surrounded by a single 
 
fire district. In such cases, the provision of fire and emergency medical 
 
services following annexation shall be governed by subsections 2 and 3 of 
 
section 72.418, RSMo. 
This section was enacted in 1985 and was amended in 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1991, 1999, and 2005.  The most recent amendment in 2005 occurred as part of 
6 
 
Senate Bill No. 256, which amended section 72.418 and repealed certain sections 
in chapter 321 that applied to St. Louis County.  It changed the population 
requirement and added subsection 4, which excludes application of this section to 
certain cities.  The city of Harrisonville is the only city currently meeting the 
criteria of this exclusion. 
c. Section 72.418 
Section 72.418 provides in pertinent part: 
2. Fire protection districts serving the area included within any annexation 
by a city having a fire department, including simplified boundary changes, 
shall continue to provide fire protection services, including emergency 
medical services to such area. The annexing city shall pay annually to the 
fire protection district an amount equal to that which the fire protection 
district would have levied on all taxable property within the annexed area. 
Such annexed area shall not be subject to taxation for any purpose 
thereafter by the fire protection district except for bonded indebtedness by 
the fire protection district which existed prior to the annexation. The 
amount to be paid annually by the municipality to the fire protection district 
pursuant hereto shall be a sum equal to the annual assessed value multiplied 
by the annual tax rate as certified by the fire protection district to the 
municipality, including any portion of the tax created for emergency 
medical service provided by the district, per one hundred dollars of 
assessed value in such area. The tax rate so computed shall include any tax 
on bonded indebtedness incurred subsequent to such annexation, but shall 
not include any portion of the tax rate for bonded indebtedness incurred 
prior to such annexation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the 
contrary, the residents of an area annexed on or after May 26, 1994, may 
vote in all fire protection district elections and may be elected to the fire 
protection district board of directors. 
 
3. The fire protection district may approve or reject any proposal for the 
provision of fire protection and emergency medical services by a city. 
 
Section 72.418 enacted in House Bill No. 487 as one of seven sections - 
sections 72.400 to 72.420, RSMo Supp. 1991- to address the creation of boundary 
7 
 
commissions4 in certain counties ("St. Louis County Boundary Commission 
Act").5  Pursuant to section 72.400, only a "first class county with a charter form 
of government which adjoins a city not within a county" could establish a 
commission.  In O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Mo. banc 
1993), this Court declared the boundary commission act unconstitutional as a 
special law because it only authorized St. Louis County to establish a boundary 
commission. 
Following this decision, the legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 256 in 
1993, which repealed, amended and added several sections in chapter 321 and 
chapter 72.6  The bill was enacted with an emergency clause that stated: 
Because immediate action is necessary to provide several municipalities 
 
who have annexation proposals pending before the boundary commission, 
 
and because there is a dispute as to fire protection and emergency medical 
 
services jurisdiction between municipal fire departments and fire protection 
 
districts, this act is deemed necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
 
public  
health, welfare, peace and safety, and is hereby declared to be an 
 
emergency act within the meaning of the constitution, and this act shall be 
 
in full force and effect upon its passage and approval.  
 
The bill retained the preceding version of section 72.418 as section 72.418.1 and 
added subsection 2.  The section was amended in 1995, adding subsection 3.  
                                                 
4 A boundary commission is a commission established by county ordinance with the purpose to review 
proposed boundary changes, including annexations, of any area within the county.  The sections provide 
the powers and duties of the commission, the standard and method the commission applies to approve a 
proposed boundary change, and the procedure to adopt boundary changes in the county.   
5 See O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. banc 1993). 
6 Senate Bill No. 256 was titled "An Act to repeal sections 321.655, 321.660, 321.665, 321.670, 321.675, 
321.680 and 321.685, RSMo 1986, and sections 72.418, 321.300 and 321.650, RSMo Supp. 1992, relating 
to fire protection districts, and to enact in lieu thereof three new sections relating to the same subject, with 
an emergency clause."   
8 
 
Nonetheless, St. Louis County is still the only county with a boundary 
commission. 
d. Economic Considerations 
 
The determination of whether the city or the fire protection district provides 
fire protection services to the annexed property is important because of its 
economic impact, particularly to the fire protection district.  The fire protection 
district must plan to provide services, invest in infrastructure, and allocate 
financial resources without control of any possible annexation.  Practical and 
financial considerations of providing fire protection are also important to any 
annexing city.  However, as for the cities, annexation is a voluntary activity.  
Sections 72.418 and 321.322, although providing different results, craft an 
economic adjustment to address this concern for both entities. 
 
Pursuant to section 72.418, the fire protection district will continue to 
provide the fire protection services, but the fire protection district can no longer 
tax the annexed property except for bonded indebtedness in existence prior to the 
annexation.  To provide the district with the appropriate funding, section 72.418 
provides that the city will pay annually to the district what it would have levied on 
the taxable property in the annexed area.  
 
Pursuant to section 321.322, the city will provide the fire protection 
services, but the city shall compensate the district with a mutually agreed upon 
amount to cover all obligations of the fire protection district to the annexed 
property.  The district shall convey to the city title to any tangible real and 
9 
 
personal property the district owned in the annexed property.  The district no 
longer can levy taxes in that area except for bonded indebtedness existing prior to 
the annexation pursuant to section 321.330. 
 
Section 321.320 does not address the economic impact of the exclusion of 
the annexed property from the fire protection district.  This section provides the 
district with no direct compensation from the city.  The district only is able to levy 
taxes on the property for the payment of indebtedness existing prior to the 
annexation pursuant to section 321.330. 7   
III. Sections 321.320 and 72.418 are in conflict 
 
Sections 321.320 and 72.418 are unambiguous standing separately.  
However, when the sections are examined together, they conflict with respect to 
whether the city or the fire protection district provides fire protection services to 
the property at issue and what resources are available to each entity.  
 
Section 321.320 provides: 
 
If any property, located within the boundaries of a fire protection district, is 
included within a city having a population of forty thousand inhabitants or 
more, which city is not wholly within the fire protection district, and which 
city maintains a city fire department, the property is excluded from the fire 
protection district. 
 
 
The annexed property is located in South Metro's boundaries and is 
included in the city, which has a population in excess of 40,000 inhabitants, 
maintains a fire department, and is located within, but not wholly within, the 
                                                 
7 The Court is not aware why the legislature would choose such different models for these three statutes. 
10 
 
boundaries of South Metro.  According to section 321.320, the property will be 
excluded from the fire protection district. 
 
Section 72.418.2 provides in pertinent part: 
 
Fire protection districts serving the area included within any annexation by 
 
a city having a fire department, including simplified boundary changes, 
 
shall continue to provide fire protection services, including emergency 
 
medical services to such area … 
 
The city acquired the property through annexation and subject to the provisions of 
section 72.418, the fire protection district shall continue to provide the services. 
 
The annexed property in this case fits the requirements for application of 
both sections.  However, because each section provides for a different result, the 
legislature could not have intended both to apply to this situation.  The Court must 
determine which statute to apply. 
IV. Analysis 
a. Traditional Rules of Statutory Construction 
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo.  
See Finnegan v. Old Republic Title Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 928, 930 
(Mo. banc 2008).  "The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the 
intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if 
possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning."  State v. 
McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 267 (Mo. banc 2008).  In determining the intent and 
meaning of statutory language, the words must be considered in context and 
11 
 
sections of the statutes in pari materia, as well as cognate sections, must be 
considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words.  Id. 
Where two statutory provisions covering the same subject matter are 
unambiguous standing separately but are in conflict when examined together, a 
reviewing court must attempt to harmonize them and give them both effect.  City 
of Clinton v. Terra Found., Inc., 139 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Mo. App. 2004).  If 
harmonization is impossible, "a chronologically later statute, which functions in a 
particular way will prevail over an earlier statute of a more general nature, and the 
latter statute will be regarded as an exception to or qualification of the earlier 
general statute."  Smith v. Mo. Local Govt. Employees Retirement System, 235 
S.W.3d 578, 582 (Mo. App. 2007); see also State ex rel. City of Springfield v. 
Smith, 125 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Mo. banc 1939). 
Rules of statutory construction cannot be rigidly applied.  Most often, for 
every rule suggesting one resolution, another rule exists that suggests the contrary. 
See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 
(1950).  However, the main purpose of these rules of statutory construction is to 
determine legislative intent and give meaning to the statutory language.  Counsel 
for each party has thoughtfully presented their respective clients' best arguments as 
follows. 
12 
 
i. The City's Argument 
The city argues that the plain language of section 321.320 provides that 
property that is within the boundaries of a fire protection district and "is included 
within a city" will be excluded from the district and the use of the present tense 
indicates legislative intent to apply this statute prospectively to all inclusions.  The 
city further states that the 1969 amendment supports the argument that the 
legislature intended a broad application of section 321.320 because it removed the 
requirement that the county be a first-class county.   
The city makes several arguments that section 72.418 should be read in 
context of the boundary commission act and should only apply to counties with a 
boundary commission.  First, the city emphasizes the reference in section 72.418 
to "boundary changes," which is a term used exclusively in the boundary 
commission act.  Second, the city notes that the emergency clause of SB 256, the 
bill that enacted section 72.418, stated that "immediate action is necessary to 
provide several municipalities who have annexations pending before the boundary 
commission...." Third, the city argues that several legislative acts do not support 
the trial court's interpretation that the legislature intended section 72.418 to apply 
to all annexations by any city.  The legislature did not repeal section 321.320 when 
it enacted section 72.418, and the addition of subsection 4 to section 321.322- 
expressly stating that subsections 2 and 3 of 72.418 applied to certain cities- would 
be unnecessary if section 72.418 applied so broadly. 
13 
 
The city finally claims that the statutes can be harmonized by placing 
section 72.418 in the context of the boundary commission act and limiting its 
application to annexed property located in counties with a boundary commission.  
Section 321.320 would apply to annexed property in counties with no boundary 
commission.  In the alternative, if the sections are in irreconcilable conflict, 
section 321.320 applies because it is more specific, only applying to those cities 
meeting the population requirement. 
ii. South Metro's Argument 
South Metro argues that section 72.418 applies because the plain language 
of section 72.418.2 provides that fire protection districts serving property included 
within "any annexation by a city" shall continue to provide these services.  It 
argues that the court does not need to look to the context of the act to determine 
the meaning or legislative intent because the plain language of section 72.418 is 
unambiguous. 
South Metro makes several arguments that the legislature did not intend to 
limit the application of section 72.418 to only counties with a boundary 
commission as the city argues.  First, it argues that if the legislature intended such 
a limited application, it would not have used the phrase "any annexation," but 
would have used the term "boundary change," which only occurs in counties with 
a boundary commission and includes annexations.  Further, the phrase "including 
simplified boundary changes" following "any annexation" actually expands its 
application to reach changes that occur in counties with a boundary commission. 
14 
 
Second, South Metro argues that SB 256 was not enacted only to address 
counties with a boundary commission.  The bill amended sections in chapter 321 
that did not affect or have any relationship to the boundary commission chapter.  
Although the city argues that the emergency clause calls for immediate action 
because of pending annexations before the boundary commission, the clause also 
calls for immediate action "because there is a dispute as to fire protection and 
emergency medical services jurisdiction between municipal fire departments and 
fire protection districts...." Further, the bill was enacted after the decision in 
O'Reilly which declared the boundary commission act unconstitutional as a special 
law.  850 S.W.2d at 100.  As a result of this, South Metro argues it is logical that 
the legislature would enact some sections that apply to all counties to prevent 
future constitutional challenges.  
Third, South Metro argues the amendment of subsection 4 to section 
321.322 indicates intent to apply section 72.418 when two sections potentially 
apply to an annexation.  Accordingly, it argues that even though this subsection 
does not apply here, it is evidence of a legislative intent to favor applying section 
72.418 to annexed property. 
South Metro claims that the statutes can be harmonized by limiting the 
application of section 321.320 to property included in a fire protection district and 
a city in 1961.  This interpretation is supported by the 1961 amendment deleting 
"now or hereinafter" from the verb phrase.  In the alternative, if the sections are in 
irreconcilable conflict, section 72.418 controls because it addresses the subject 
15 
 
matter more specifically.  Section 72.418 is more specific, South Metro argues, 
because it references "annexation" as the method by which the property is 
included in both boundaries, addresses the taxing authority over the annexed 
property, as well as provides that the fire protection district will have the authority 
to accept or reject proposals from the city to assume responsibility for these 
services.  This section is also the most recently enacted.8   
b. 
Despite the skillful efforts of counsel, none of the above arguments is more 
persuasive than its corollary.  Each argument is of relatively equal weight, and 
neither establishes a strong enough foundation on which to rule.  Two issues tip 
the balance in favor of the application of section 321.320.   
i. Context 
The first determinative consideration is the historical context of these 
statutes.  Section 72.418 was enacted as part of the boundary commission act, 
addressing the creation of a boundary commission for certain counties. Subsequent 
amendments to section 72.418 did not change the fact that the section only applies 
in counties that establish a boundary commission.  Section 321.322 also signals 
                                                 
8 Both parties mention sections 320.300 and 320.310, RSMo Supp. 2007, in the "Volunteer Fire Protection 
Association" subsection of chapter 320, titled "Fire Protection."  South Metro argues that section 320.310 
presents evidence of a legislative intent to favor the fire protection district as the provider of fire protection 
services.  Section 320.310.2 provides that "fire protection districts, municipal fire departments, and 
volunteer fire protection associations, as defined in section 320.300, shall be the sole provider of fire 
suppression and related activities."  Section 320.310.3 provides that "only upon approval by the governing 
body of a municipal fire department, fire protection district, or volunteer fire protection association ... shall 
any other association, organization, group or political subdivision be authorized to provide the fire 
suppression response and related activities…." The city argues that these sections are only intended to 
apply in volunteer fire protection districts.  Because these sections do not directly address property included 
in a fire protection district and a city, the Court need not consider these sections.   
16 
 
that the intended interaction between these two chapters is determined by the 
boundary commission distinction. 
Section 321.322 immediately follows section 321.320.  Section 321.320 
applies to cities with a population of more than 40,000 inhabitants, while section 
321.322 applies to cities with populations of at least 2,500 but not more than 
65,000. 9   
Particularly significant to the present controversy are subsections 3 and 4 of 
section 321.322.  Subsection 3, which provides that this section "shall not apply in 
any county of the first class having a charter form of government and having a 
population of over nine hundred thousand inhabitants," excludes application in St. 
Louis County, the only county currently with a boundary commission.  This 
exclusion is evidence of intent to provide a different result for the providers of fire 
protection services depending on whether the annexation takes place in a county 
with a boundary commission or with no boundary commission.  This distinction 
makes the placement of section 72.418 in the boundary commission act highly 
significant, intended to address annexed property in counties with a boundary 
commission excluded from the general application of section 321.322.  
                                                 
9 Sections 321.320 and 321.322 also have the potential to overlap in application.  Section 321.322 applies 
only to cities with a population of 2,500 but not more than 65,000.  Section 321.320 applies to cities with a 
population in excess of 40,000.  Because the city’s population here is 70,000, section 321.322 does not 
apply in this case.  However, cities with a population between 40,000 inhabitants and 65,000 inhabitants 
would fit the requirements of each section.  Although this issue is not presented here, it is unclear how 
these sections would apply in that situation. 
 
17 
 
Subsection 4 provides an additional exception to section 321.322.  That 
subsection provides that section 72.418 will apply "where the annexing city or 
town operates a city fire department and was on January 1, 2005, a city of the 
fourth classification with more than eight thousand nine hundred but fewer than 
nine thousand inhabitants and entirely surrounded by a single fire district."  In 
effect, this provision authorizes section 72.418 to apply to Harrisonville, a city in a 
county with no boundary commission.  However, this application was explicitly 
provided and narrowly drawn, providing further evidence that section 72.418 is 
primarily intended to apply in counties with a boundary commission.  If section 
72.418 is to apply in counties with no boundary commission, this exception would 
not be necessary.  In short, subsection 4 is the exception that proves the rule. 
ii. Battlefield Decision 
The most compelling reason to apply section 321.320 is the Court's 
previous decision in Battlefield Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Springfield, 941 S.W.2d 
491 (Mo. banc 1997).  In Battlefield, a fire protection district brought an action 
challenging the annexation by the city of Springfield of property included in the 
district.  Id. at 491.  The district argued that it had standing to contest the 
annexation based on the loss of tax revenues.  Id. at 492.  The Court stated that the 
loss in revenue would have been sufficient for standing were in not for section 
321.320,  
… which provides that whenever a city having a population of forty 
thousand or more inhabitants annexes an area previously lying within a fire 
18 
 
protection district, the fire protection district no longer has the obligation to 
provide service to that area.  Id. 
  
As a result, the district was not adversely affected by the annexation because the 
decline in the need to provide fire services offset the loss in tax revenues.10  Id. 
South Metro argues that Battlefield can be distinguished because the Court 
addressed section 321.320 in the context of standing and did not directly address 
the interplay between section 321.320 and section 72.418.  Although South Metro 
is correct, the application of section 321.320 was necessary to support the holding 
to deny the fire protection district standing.   
The Court's interpretation of section 321.320 in Battlefield is not contrary to 
any existing statute or any case law, and the legislature has not amended or 
repealed this section as a result of this interpretation.11  The discussion noted 
above provides fair reason to apply sections 72.400 to 72.430 to boundary 
commission counties and to apply chapter 321 and the sections therein to counties 
with no boundary commission. 
For South Metro to prevail, it would be necessary to distinguish or overrule 
Battlefield.  There is not a sufficient reason to do so. 
                                                 
10 As discussed earlier, the economic considerations may be more complicated than assumed in Battlefield. 
11 Although the Court in Med. Shoppe Int'l v. Dir. of Rev,156 S.W.3d 333, 334 (Mo. banc 2005), stated that 
it was speculative to infer legislative approval from legislative inaction following a decision interpreting 
the statute, it is undisputed that the legislature has power to amend or change the statute following the 
decision if it disagrees with the Court's interpretation.  Although the inaction is not conclusive of legislative 
approval, such inaction can be considered.  
19 
 
V. Conclusion 
In summary, applying the rules of statutory construction to sections 72.418 
and 321.320 does not conclusively resolve their conflicting application.  The 
provision in section 321.322 and section 72.418's placement in the boundary 
commission act indicate that the application of each statute may turn on whether 
the county has a boundary commission.  Further, Battlefield is precedent for 
applying section 321.320. 
To harmonize and give both sections meaning, the conflict between the two 
sections is resolved by applying section 72.418 to counties with a boundary 
commission and section 321.320 to counties with no boundary commission.  The 
city is not located in a county with a boundary commission, and section 321.320 
applies to exclude the annexed property from the fire protection district.  The 
judgment is reversed.  
 
___________________________            
William Ray Price, Jr., Judge 
 
All concur. 
 
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