Title: Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. JOHNSON-SAMPSON CONSTR.
Citation: 174 Kan. 693, 258 P.2d 268
Docket Number: 38,979
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1953

174 Kan. 693 (1953)
258 P.2d 268
THE FARMERS UNION ELEVATOR COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee,
v.
THE JOHNSON-SAMPSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Incorporated, and THE CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellants.
No. 38,979

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 6, 1953.
James P. Mize, of Salina, argued the cause, and C.L. Clark and Jason K. Yordy, both of Salina, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
John V. O'Donnell, of Ellsworth, argued the cause, and V.E. Danner, of Ellsworth, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEDELL, J.:
This was an action on three counts by The Farmers Union Elevator Company, a corporation, against The Johnson-Sampson *694 Construction Company, Incorporated, the contractor, and the The Central Surety and Insurance Corporation, to recover damages for breach of contract for the building of a grain elevator.
Defendants appeal from orders overruling their separate general demurrers to the separate counts of the petition after having unsuccessfully motioned the petition and from the overruling of their separate demurrers based on the ground several causes of action were improperly joined.
The material parts of the separate counts were:
"SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
"THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
The prayer was for the recovery of $7,220.00, $8,131.46 and $2,556.45 together with interest and costs.
For present purposes it is unnecessary to set forth the full contract between the owner and contractor together with the detailed plans and specifications or to copy in full the performance bond. We shall, however, set forth such portions thereof as are involved in the present contentions of the parties. Such parts of the contract are:
..............
"DUTIES OF CONTRACTOR ...
"PRIVILEGES OF OWNER
The provision of the plans and specifications discussed by the parties is:
The necessity of using a caisson was eliminated by agreement of the parties and a reduction was made in the cost thereof to the owner in the sum of $1,500 when the contractor concluded other methods for pit construction could be used instead.
The parties to the performance bond were the contractor and surety, appellants, and each of them signed it. In addition to the portion thereof set forth in the petition the bond, in part, reads:
Part of appellants' motion to require appellee to make the petition definite and certain was:
This motion was presented as to paragraph seven of the first cause of action. It was overruled. Appellants then filed the following motions:
The motion was overruled. Thereafter appellants demurred separately to each cause of action on the ground each failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the petition as a whole was demurrable for the same reason and several causes of action were improperly joined. It is from the orders overruling the demurrers that the appeal is taken.
In order to avoid confusion we have refrained from stating all parts of appellants' motion to make definite and certain. The omitted portion will be treated later.
We shall first consider the motion and demurrer with special reference to paragraph seven of the first count to which the motion was primarily directed and on the basis of which the demurrer is partly argued. It is true paragraph seven employs the words, "... in an unskillful and negligent a manner." Appellants argue this constitutes a confusion of theories relative to the nature of the action, that is, whether it is based on contract or tort and the demurrer should have been sustained on that ground as well as on others. Appellee contends it is an action on contract. We agree. The above quoted words were intended to indicate the pleader's complaint the work was not performed in a proper manner and the materials used were unsuitable.
*698 Are the allegations sufficient to allege a breach of the building contract? We think they are. It is alleged the contractor "... did not fulfill said contract on its part; but on the contrary, erected said elevator building in an unskillful and negligent a manner and of so unsuitable materials, the exact character, nature and kind of which are unknown to plaintiff and for that reason not set out herein in particular." These statements are tantamount to an allegation the contractor did not complete the job according to the plans and specifications, one of which was:
It also is alleged in count one "... that shortly after its completion the walls of the elevator pit, floor and leg became and are leaky to subsurface waters, to such an extent as to prohibit the use of the same for the purposes intended by the contract...."
It is true count two states the pit commenced to leak in the summer of 1951, which was approximately a year after its completion. These allegations in the separate counts, if inconsistent, may constitute proper matters to be considered on defense but do not render the separate counts demurrable. Appellants stress the following privilege of the owner:
They point out the petition fails to disclose appellee made any complaint during the construction work; that count two discloses the contractor on or about August 21, 1950, represented to appellee the elevator was completed; appellee made final payment therefor on August 26, 1950, and appellee began to use the elevator for its intended purpose of storing grain. Appellants further emphasize the following provision of the contract:
The petition, however, alleged the job was not completed in accordance with the plans and specifications. We think the court did not abuse sound judicial discretion in overruling the previously discussed portion of the motion to make definite and certain and that the demurrer as to portions of the petition thus far considered was properly overruled.
*699 Ordinarily an order overruling a motion to make a pleading definite and certain is not reviewable on appeal. An order overruling a motion to make a petition definite and certain is considered on appeal, where a general demurrer is later lodged against the petition, only to the extent of determining whether the district court abused sound judicial discretion in ruling on the motion and to determine whether the petition thereafter should be liberally or strictly construed on the demurrer thereto.
Where a ruling on a motion to make a petition definite and certain is considered on appeal for the limited purpose indicated in the preceding paragraph the motion must be considered in view of all allegations of the petition together with the terms and provisions of exhibits made a part of the petition and not merely with respect to some isolated paragraph of the petition.
Appellants seriously stress the fact count 2 discloses no loss from storage of grain in the elevator was suffered until September 18, 1951, more than one year from the acceptance of the elevator by appellee; that this court may take judicial notice of the unprecedented 1951 flood and that Bridgeport where the elevator is located is on the west bank of the Smoky Hill river. They further argue in view of the allegations of the petition we are obliged to indulge in speculation as to the cause of the damage and that it would seem at least as probable the unprecedented 1951 flood caused the wet elevator pit as well as any other speculative cause. We are not indulging in speculation of any character. We are dealing here only with allegations appearing on the face of the instant petition. Obviously we are not in this opinion passing on defenses appellants may assert concerning the cause of damage, whether it be the 1951 flood, matter of estoppel or any other defense. The question of liability of the contractor or bondsman, if the damage were caused by an act of God, is not raised on demurrer to this petition and we express no views thereon.
This brings us to a consideration of the other portion of appellants' motion to make the separate counts definite and certain. It was that the court order appellee to state in each of the three counts whether the counts were based on appellee's contract with the contractor, dated March 14, 1950, or whether they were based on the bond, dated March 27, 1950, or on both the contract and bond. That part of the motion was likewise overruled. The petition disclosed it was an action against the contractor and the surety who furnished *700 the performance bond. The bond, as heretofore shown, expressly refers to the contract between the owner and the contractor. The bond was made in the name of both the contractor and surety and was signed by each of them. The action, therefore, was on the contract and bond and no further allegation in that respect was required as requested by the motion.
In further support of the demurrer to the entire petition appellants assert the petition does not allege the leakage was caused by any fault of the contractor. It is true the petition does not contain that direct and precise statement. It does, however, in substance, allege that upon failure of the contractor to fulfill the contract, "... the elevator pit, floor and leg became and are leaky to subsurface waters, to such an extent as to prohibit the use of the same for the purposes intended by the contract." We think the allegations are sufficient to withstand the general demurrer on that, as well as on other grounds urged.
Was there a misjoinder of causes of action? G.S. 1949, 60-601 provides:
We have already indicated how the instant action affects both the contractor and his bondsman. It has been held the extent of a bondsman's liability is limited by the penalty named in the bond plus interest from the time the surety becomes liable to pay it. (School District v. DeLano, 96 Kan. 499, 152 Pac. 668.) The prayer is merely the pleader's notion of the amount of relief to which he is entitled. If a cause of action is stated the court will determine the proper legal redress which may or may not conform to the pleader's idea. (Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193, 170 Pac. 389.) The contractor ultimately may or may not be found liable in an amount greater than the penal sum of the bond. If it be determined the contractor is liable in a greater amount the bondsman will not suffer thereby. Although the authorities are not in complete harmony on the subject it has been held in this state the joinder of such causes of action does not result in injury to the substantial rights of appellants. (Houston v. Delahay, 14 Kan. 125.)
The orders overruling the separate demurrers are affirmed.
WEDELL, J., (dissenting in part):
I dissent from paragraph 4 (c) of the syllabus and the corresponding portion of the opinion.