Title: Desmond v. JW Hancock Enterprises
Citation: 123 Ariz. 474, 600 P.2d 1106
Docket Number: 14446
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 1979

123 Ariz. 474 (1979) 600 P.2d 1106 James E. DESMOND and Pamela K. Desmond, husband and wife, Appellants, v. J.W. HANCOCK ENTERPRISES, INC., dba Camelot Homes, Trevor J. Hancock and Jane Doe Hancock, husband and wife, Appellees. No. 14446. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. September 25, 1979. *475 Parham &amp; Cox by Ingeborg E. Cox, Phoenix, for appellant. Burch, Cracchiolo, Levie, Guyer &amp; Weyl by C. Michael Pierce, Arda S. Rutherford and Amy S. Fisher, Phoenix, for appellees. HAYS, Justice. This suit arises out of a demand for specific performance of a contract for the construction and sale of a house. Appellants' case was dismissed at the trial level for failure to timely file an amended complaint. Appellees moved for dismissal of this appeal as untimely but the Court of Appeals denied that motion by written order, August 28, 1978. The order refers to a previous decision of this court but does not explain the applicability of that decision to the particular facts of this case. In briefs to the Court of Appeals, appellees again urged that the lack of a timely appeal was jurisdictionally fatal to appellants' cause. We have consistently held that failure to appeal timely is a jurisdictional defect. Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 486 P.2d 181 (1971). Since our jurisdiction in this instance is derivative in nature under Rule 19(e), Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, we must establish whether the Court of Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction. For that reason, we shall consider first the timeliness of the appeal and then the timeliness of the amended complaint. I. WAS THE APPEAL TIMELY? For purposes of considering the appeal, we must examine the following chronology: The crux of appellants' argument is that, in substance, the motion for clarification and reconsideration, filed April 28, was equivalent to a motion for a new trial and thereby extended the time limits for appeal. Under this rationale, the period for appeal did not begin to run until May 17, when the written order denying the motion for clarification was filed. Consequently, appellants argue, the notice of appeal filed June 16 was timely. Appellants cite Hegel v. O'Malley Ins. Co., Agents and Brokers, 117 Ariz. 411, 573 P.2d 485 (1977), as authority for their position. In opposition, appellees pointed out that Hegel requires more than what is contained in appellants' motion for clarification and reconsideration. The essence of our holding in Hegel is as follows: 117 Ariz. at 412, 573 P.2d at 486. In order for a party to avail himself of this ruling, he must satisfy two requirements: 1) refer to Rule 59 as authority for the motion; 2) describe grounds set forth under that rule. The "motion for clarification and reconsideration" states that it is brought pursuant to Rules 52 and 59. The Memorandum *476 of Points and Authorities contains the following language: Although the motion is not precisely and artfully drawn, we hold that it substantially satisfies the requirements enunciated in Hegel, supra. While there is no specific reference to subsection (a), the motion does refer to Rule 59 and the language quoted above clearly alleges that the plaintiffs had been denied a trial on the merits because of the order of dismissal. An order depriving the moving party of a fair trial is one of the grounds for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(1). Under Hegel, supra, a motion for a new trial automatically extends the time for appeal under Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Rule 9(b)(4) [former Rule 73(b), Rules of Civil Procedure]. Consequently, the period did not commence to run until entry of the formal order of May 17 denying the motion for clarification. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the appeal was timely filed June 16. Accordingly, jurisdiction attached under A.R.S. § 12-120.21 and § 12-2101(F)(1) and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 19(e), Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. II. WAS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED ON TIME? For purposes of discussion on this point, we consider the following events: Appellants contend that since notice of the minute entry granting the motion to dismiss with leave to plaintiffs to amend within 20 days was mailed on February 10, the first day of the applicable period was February 11 under Rules 6(a) and 5(c) of Civil Procedure. In pertinent part these rules provide as follows: We agree that the first day to be counted was February 11. In addition, appellants urge that Rule 6(e) permits five additional days to respond when service is effected by mail: Thus, construing the foregoing rules together, appellant concludes that he had a total of twenty-five days, commencing from February 11, in which to file the amended complaint and that the amended complaint filed March 7 was timely. Appellees take the position that our holding in Union Interchange, Inc. v. Benton, *477 100 Ariz. 33, 410 P.2d 477 (1966), is dispositive of the question. That case involved an order of court giving plaintiff a foreign corporation fifteen days in which to file security for costs. When plaintiff failed to do so, the case was dismissed. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that his filing would have been timely if there had been allowance for notice by mail pursuant to Rule 6(e) [at that time Rule 6(e) allowed for three additional days]. We made the following observation: Since Union Interchange, supra, we have amended both 6(e) and 77(g); the amendments became effective on October 1, 1976. Rule 6(e), supra, now provides for the addition of five days to the prescribed period when service is made by mail as in this case. More significant, however, is the specific exclusion of notice of entry of judgment required in 77(g). There was no reference to 77(g) in the previous version of Rule 6(e). Bearing this in mind, we examine the relevant portions of Rule 77(g): Former 77(g), titled "Notice of orders or judgments," did not distinguish between minute entries and judgments as defined in Rule 54(a). Obviously not every minute entry order is a judgment under 54(a), which reads, in pertinent part: Consequently, Rule 6(e) does allow an additional five days to reply after service by mail unless the mail notice is an entry of judgment as that term is defined in Rule 54(a), which is incorporated by specific reference in Rule 77(g). It is clear that the minute entry order of February 8, which was mailed February 10, was not an appealable order under any of the criteria of A.R.S. § 12-2101. Since it was not appealable, it was not a "judgment" within the contemplation of Rule 77(g) or 54(a). Considering that Rule 6(e) excludes only notice of entry of judgment required by Rule 77(g), we hold that appellant did have an additional five days in which to file an amended complaint and that the amended complaint was timely filed on March 7, the twenty-fifth day of the permissible period. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CAMERON, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concurring.