Title: WA Barber Grocery Co. v. Fleming
Citation: 229 Ind. 140, 96 N.E.2d 108
Docket Number: 28,664
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 1951

229 Ind. 140 (1951)
96 N.E.2d 108
W.A. BARBER GROCERY CO., INC., ET AL.
v.
FLEMING, SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL.
No. 28,664.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 11, 1951.
*144 Anderson, Lesow &amp; Gemmer, and Dailey, Dailey &amp; Lesh, all of Indianapolis, for appellants.
J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General; Frank E. Coughlin, Harold V. Whitelock and Norman J. Beatty, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellees.
JASPER, J.
This is an action brought by appellants seeking a declaratory judgment that chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 be declared unconstitutional, and for an injunction against the enforcement thereof, and to declare the validity of chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949. Appellants' complaint was filed in three paragraphs, to each of which paragraphs appellees filed answer. The judgment of the trial court declared that chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949 is a valid amendatory measure of section 25, chapter 304, Acts of 1945; that section one of chapter 258, Acts of 1949, is invalid; that the remainder of chapter 258 is valid; and denied the injunction.
Appellants assign as error the overruling of their motion for a new trial, which presents only one question, that the decision of the court is contrary to law.
Chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949 was approved March 8, 1949, and became effective September 18, 1949. It amended section 25, chapter 304, of the Acts of 1945, concerning motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers. Section 1 of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 also sought to amend section 25 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945. Chapter 258 was approved March 10, 1949, and became effective January 1, 1950. Section 2 thereof sought to amend section 29 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, and section 3 sought to amend section 64 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945.
Appellants brief their contentions by reference to each of the three paragraphs of complaint. We shall *145 answer the contentions as raised by referring to the numbered paragraph of complaint.
Appellants' first paragraph of complaint contends that chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 attempts to convert the police power measure into a tax measure, that the subject of taxation is not expressed in the title of the act and exceeds the subject and matters properly connected with the 1945 act, and is therefore in violation of article 4, section 19, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides as follows:
For a full discussion of this contention, it is necessary to set out the title of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, which is as follows:
The title of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, which amended the last-cited act, is as follows:
It is to be noted that the last two cited titles are titles of acts "concerning motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers ..." and "providing for the registration and licensing thereof." The titles of these acts embrace only the subject that is commonly known as motor vehicles, and matters properly connected therewith. It is one general subject. State v. Griffin (1948), 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E.2d 537; Baldwin v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 303, 141 N.E. 343. The remainder of the act, other than the general subject, may be disregarded and considered as surplusage. Kelly v. Finney (1935), 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157. The body of the act of 1949, chapter 258, provides for the registration and licensing of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers, and appellants contend that the licensing and regulation are purely police measures under chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, but that, under chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, the licensing and regulation became a tax measure. Appellants do not question the validity of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945; in fact, they admit its validity. In Baldwin v. State, supra, the appellant was convicted of violating the motor vehicle act (ch. 214 of the Acts of 1921). This act amended chapter 300 of the Acts of 1913. Identical constitutional questions were raised in this last-cited case as in the case now before this court. The title of chapter 300 of the Acts of 1913, which was questioned, is as follows:
The court, in discussing the title, stated (pp. 305, 306 of 194 Ind., p. 345 of 141 N.E.):
The court further said (pp. 308, 309 of 194 Ind., pp. 345, 346 of 141 N.E.):
In the case before this court there was a stipulation of fact entered to the effect that, under chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, and in the year 1948, while this act was still in effect, over $13,000,000 was collected, and that the expenses of operation under this chapter were over $1,000,000. Under chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, for the year 1950, there would be raised approximately $19,235,000. From these figures, it is plain that both chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945 and chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 are revenue-raising measures as well as regulatory measures. In DeHaven v. Municipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 199, 200, 201, 7 N.E.2d 184, 186, 187, the court, in discussing titles of acts concerning public utilities, said:
*151 The title of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, being general and embracing but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, is not in violation of section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana. Because of what we have heretofore said, this act is not in violation of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or in violation of article one, section 23, of our State Constitution.
Further, the question is raised as to double taxation. This question has been specifically waived by appellants in their brief.
The contentions of appellants under their first paragraph of complaint are without merit.
Appellants contend under their second paragraph of complaint that section one of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 is invalid as violating article 4, section 21, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides as follows:
This contention is well taken. They further contend that, because of the unconstitutionality of section one of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, the remaining two sections of chapter 258 are not severable from the invalid section, and, because of uncertainty, these sections are in violation of article 4, section 20, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides as follows:
This contention raises the question of severability, which is primarily the problem of determining legislative *152 intent. The rule of severability is set out in Tucker, Secretary of State v. Muesing (1942), 219 Ind. 527, 530, 39 N.E.2d 738, 739, in which the court said:
It was further said by this court, in School Town of Andrews v. Heiney (1912), 178 Ind. 1, 6, 98 N.E. 628, 630:
Chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949 amended section 25 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945. Following the approval of chapter 169, the Legislature enacted chapter *153 258 of the Acts of 1949, section one of which attempted to amend the same section of chapter 304 which was amended by chapter 169. Chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949 changed only section 25 of chapter 304 by requiring licensed operators to file their application in their home county. Except for this change, section 25 of chapter 304 was reenacted. Section one of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, if valid, would have made only the following change in section 25 of chapter 304:
Without the last quotation, section one of chapter 258 reads the same as chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949.
Subsection 2 of section one of chapter 169 of the Acts of 1949 provides that every application for the registration of a vehicle of the type required to be registered thereunder, shall contain the following:
Section 76 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, which is in effect, provides as follows:
Section 2 of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 amended section 29 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, which amended section, now in effect, reads as follows:
Section 3 of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 amended section 64 of chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, which amended section, now in effect, provides for the fees to be paid and divides the vehicles into two divisions, the first being passenger and the second being commercial vehicles, based upon declared gross weight. Subsection (c) of section 3 provides as follows:
It is further provided by subsection (c) of section 3:
We find a definite formula for declaring the gross weight set out in sections 2 and 3 of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949. Also, from the above-cited sections of the statute, we find provision for registering the vehicles whereby the applicant must apply for registration to the department, through his local county license bureau, on verified forms furnished to him. He must furnish certain information, and such other reasonable information as the department may require, to determine whether the vehicle is entitled to registration. Sections 2 and 3 of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949, without section one, are workable and severable, and there remains such a law as the Legislature intended.
Appellants' third paragraph of complaint contends, first, that the classification provisions of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 are in violation of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of article one, section 23, of the Constitution of Indiana; second, that the last-cited chapter does not provide for re-estimate to allow the hauling of greater loads; and, third, that the severe penalties imposed for violation are disproportionate to the nature of the offense and violate *157 article one, section 16, of the Constitution of Indiana. For an act to be unconstitutional for classification, it must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. State v. Griffin (1948), 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E.2d 537; Denny v. City of Muncie (1925), 197 Ind. 28, 149 N.E. 639. This court said, in Richmond Baking Co. v. Dept. of Treasury (1939), 215 Ind. 110, 115, 116, 18 N.E.2d 778, 781:
See, also, Eavey Company v. Department of Treasury (1939), 216 Ind. 255, 24 N.E.2d 268; and Baldwin v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 303, 141 N.E. 343.
Appellants have no argument concerning the cases last cited, nor do they question the fee schedules.
In the case now before this court they question the classification because they must "estimate" their gross weight. Appellants use the words "estimate" and "declared" synonymously. These words are not synonymous. The statute here in question does not provide for a rough or approximate calculation of gross weight, but does require a declared or known weight for registration, over which weight appellants cannot operate without paying an additional fee for re-registration. This classification, then, becomes as absolute as the manufacturer's weight. It becomes "an actual gross weight" as used in Kelly v. Finney (1935), 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157. The classification under chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and does not violate the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana.
Appellants next contend that there is no provision for a re-estimate. There is a provision for re-registration. Subsection (c) of section 3 of chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 provides, among other things:
This last-cited portion of the statute makes it mandatory to re-register the vehicle and declare the new gross weight if in excess of the weight for which the vehicle was originally registered. It does not mean that the operator must be "caught," as contended by appellants, but does mean, as it says, that the vehicle shall not be moved until there is paid "the difference between the fee paid for registration of such vehicle and the fee for the registration of such vehicle plus a maximum load of a weight equal to the excess load being transported." Thus chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 does contemplate and make provision for re-registration by declaring the gross weight for any vehicle registered and in which appellants desire to haul in excess of the original registration.
Appellants further contend that the penalties provided are not proportioned to the nature of the offense for carrying over-weight without re-registration of the vehicle, and are in violation of article one of section 16 of the Constitution of Indiana, which section provides:
Appellants admit in their brief that:
In Kistler v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 149, 158, 129 N.E. 625, 628, the court said:
From what we have said regarding the re-registering of vehicles, along with the admissions of appellants in their brief, the penalties provided for in chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 do not unmistakably and conclusively carry a punishment shockingly disproportioned to the offense charged.
Chapter 258 of the Acts of 1949 does not violate article one of section 16 of the Constitution of Indiana.
Appellants call attention to the fact that the Attorney General, in his answer to the three paragraphs of complaint, admitted certain rhetorical paragraphs of complaint which could be fatal to the State of Indiana. After examining the answer of the State, and from what we have heretofore said, the admissions could not be fatal to the State of Indiana.
Having considered all of the questions to which our attention has been called, we find no reversible error.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.  Reported in 96 N.E.2d 108.