Title: Najem v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 3, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MOHAMMED NAJEM, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 3, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN01-10-0975 and 
§  -0976 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 13, 2003 
  Decided: June 10, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 10th day of June 2003, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The 
defendant-appellant, 
Mohammed 
Najem, 
and 
his 
codefendant, Shacin Patel,1 were convicted by a Superior Court jury of 
felony theft and second degree conspiracy.  The Superior Court sentenced 
Najem on both charges to a total period of two years at Level V 
incarceration, suspended entirely for two years probation.  This is Najem’s 
direct appeal. 
                                                 
1 Patel, through his trial counsel, filed a separate appeal in case No. 718, 2002. 
 
 
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(2) 
Najem's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Najem's counsel asserts that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, the appeal is wholly without 
merit.  Counsel, however, has asserted one arguable issue on Najem’s 
behalf.  By letter, Najem's attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 
26(c) and provided Najem with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the 
accompanying brief.  Najem also was informed of his right to supplement 
his attorney's presentation.  Najem has not raised any issues for this Court's 
consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by Najem's 
counsel and has moved to affirm the Superior Court's decision. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.* 
                                                 
*Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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(4) 
Najem’s counsel asserts that the only arguable issue raised by 
the record is whether the evidence at trial was sufficient for the jury to find 
Najem guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  In reviewing a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the State, whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.2 
 
(5) 
In this case, the testimony at trial established that Najem and 
his codefendant, Shacin Patel (Shacin), entered a Sunoco minimart on 
August 24, 2001 between 6 pm and 7 pm.  The clerk on duty, Priten Patel 
(Priten), testified that he knew Najem, who was a former employee of the 
minimart, and Shacin, who was an acquaintance of the store’s owner, Fazal 
Rashid.  Priten testified that Najem stood talking to him while Priten waited 
on customers.  Priten did not see where Shacin was at that time, but later saw 
Shacin exiting the store’s office.  When Priten asked what he was doing, 
Shacin replied he needed to make a phone call.  Priten did not see Shacin 
leave the office with anything in hand.  After they left the store, Priten called 
                                                 
2 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995). 
 
 
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Rashid to tell him that Najem and Shacin had been to the store and that 
Shacin had been in Rashid’s office. 
 
(6) 
Rashid also testified at trial.  He stated that he kept prepaid 
phone cards in the desk of his office in the minimart.  He testified that he 
had taken an inventory of the cards on August 23, 2001, as part of his 
regular closing procedures.  After receiving the phone call from Priten on 
August 24, 2001 about Najem and Shacin, Rashid returned to the store and 
discovered that 350 phone cards, worth more than $1000, were missing from 
his office.  Rashid testified that Najem was the only other person who knew 
where Rashid kept the phone cards.  Neither Najem nor Shacin testified at 
trial, nor did Najem present any other evidence in his defense. 
(6) 
To find Najem guilty of felony theft, the jury had to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Najem took, or aided Shacin to take,3 the 
minimart’s phone cards with the intent to appropriate them.4  To convict 
Najem of second degree conspiracy, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Najem intended to facilitate the commission of the theft, agreed 
                                                 
3 The jury could find Najem guilty of felony theft as an accomplice if they found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Najem intended to facilitate Shacin’s commission of the 
theft and aided Shacin in planning or committing the offense.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
271(2) (2001).   
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 841 (2001). 
 
 
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with Shacin to commit the theft, and Najem or Shacin committed an overt 
act in committing theft.5 
 
(7) 
On the record presented, viewing the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the State,6 we hold that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Najem and Shacin agreed to steal the phone cards and helped each other 
to do so.  Accordingly, we conclude that Najem’s appeal is wholly without 
merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We also are satisfied 
that Najem's counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record 
and the law and has properly determined that Najem could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 512 (2001). 
6 See Dixon v. State, 567 A.2d 854, 857 (Del. 1989).