Title: SKRUKRUD v GALLATIN LAUNDRY CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13359
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 1976

No. 13359 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 JOHN K E N N E T H S K R U K R U D , Claimant and Appellant, GALLATIN L A U N D R Y CO., INC., Employer, and E M P L O Y E R S C O M M E R C I A L UNION INSURANCE C O M P A N Y , INSURER, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Eighteen, Workers'Compensation Court William E. Hunt, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Morrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana James H. Morrow argued, Bozernan, Montana For Respondents : Keefer and Roybal, Billings, Montana Neil S. Keefer argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: October 19, 1976 M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by an injured employee from the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the workers' compensation court i n favor of the employer and i t s insurer. In substance, the workers' court held that the injured employee's proper category of dis- a b i l i t y was "temporary t o t a l disability"; that h i s compensation was fixed i n amount and duration by such classification u n t i l further order; that a statutory offset for social security dis- a b i l i t y applied t o h i s workers' compensation benefits; that he was not entitled t o a lump sum settlement from the insurer; and, that h i s workers' compensation benefits were t o cease when he a t t a i n s the age of sixty-five. The relevant facts are shown by the record: John Kenneth Skrukrud, claimant, was injured i n an automobile accident i n October 1972, while i n the course and scope of h i s employment with Gallatin Laundry Company, Inc., employer. Employer was enrolled under Plan I1 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as it existed i n 1972; Employers Commercial Union Insurance Company was its insurance carrier. Claimant was single with no dependents a t the time of the accident. A s a result of h i s injury, claimant received chiropractic treatments and medical attention. H e continued t o work u n t i l March 8, 1973, when he was referred t o an orthopedist. Thereafter he was hospitalized and received surgery f o r a herniated cervical disc and fusion of cervical vertebrae, and was twice again surgi- cally treated for vertebrae fusion. Claimant has not worked since March 8, 1973, and continues t o receive frequent medical attention. Claimant has been receiving federal social security disability benefits from April 1973, to the present. In May 1975, claimant made settlement with the United Statesgmennnent in compensation for the injuries he sustained in October 1972. The insurer has been partially satisfied as to its subrogation rights under section 92-204, R.C.M. 1947, as it existed in 1972. There is no dispute as to insurer's continuing right to subrogation to claimant's settlement. Insurer has been paying bLweekly compensation to claimant effective since March 1973, based upon the classification of claimant's injury as "temporary total disability". Initially these payments were $50 per week, then corrected to $55 per week. However, when insurer established that claimant was receiving social security disability benefits, it reduced its weekly workers' compensation benefits by offsetting fifty percent of his weekly social security benefit against the payments made under workers' compensation. This was done pursuant to section 92-701, R.C.M. 1947 as it existed in 1972 (Sec. 1, Ch. 174, Laws 1971), which section pertained solely to compensation for injury producing temporary total disability. The effect was to reduce claimant's workers' compensation benefits by almost half. As a result of the higher payments made to claimant prior to commencement of the offset reduction, insurer asserted it had overpaid claimant. In July 1975, the insurer requested a hearing before the workers' compensation court to resolve factual and legal disputes which had arisen between claimant and insurer. Hearing was had in September 1975 before Workers' Compensation Judge William E . Hunt in Bozeman, Montana. On March 2, 1976, the workers' court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law which held as hereinbefore set forth. As no judgment or order was forthcoming, claimant appealed from the findings and conclusions to this Court pursuant to section 92-852(2), R.C.M. 1947. Claimant presents five issues for review: 1 . Did the workers' court err in finding that claimant's injury resulted in temporary total disability rather than permanent total disability? 2. Did the workers' court err in its determination of claimant's pre-injury earnings? 3. Did the workers' court err in refusing to order the balance of workers' compensation payments to be made in a lump sum settlement? 4 . Did the workers' court err in holding that claimant's workers' compensation benefits shall cease absolutely when he attains the age of sixty-five years? 5. Do the various social security offset reduction pro- visions of Montana's workers' compensation laws violate the state and federal constitutions? A determination of issues one through four requires this Court to review the record, findings and conclusions of the workers' court. This is the first appeal from the workers' compen- sation court to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The law as it applied to judicial review of Workmen's Compensation Division decisions prior to July 1, 1975 is summarized in Miller v. City of Billings, - Mont . , 555 P.2d 747, 749, 33 St.Rep. 984, 986 : "The findings and decision of the Workmen's Compen- sation Division are presumed to be correct and if supported by credible evidence must be affirmed. Section 92-822, R.C.M. 1947 (since repealed; Birnie v. United States Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 44, 328 P.2d 133; Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co., Mont., 538 P.2d 344,347, 32 St. Rep. 752, 755. The d i s t r i c t court must affirm the Division order i f the evidence does not clearly preponderate against i t s findings. Becktold v. Ind. Acc. Bd., 137 Mont. 119, 125, 350 P.2d 383; Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95; 3 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Q 80.20. Section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947 (in effect i n 1966, but since repealed), provided the d i s t r i c t court, may upon good cause shown admit additional evidence. Section 92-835, R,C.M, 1947 (in effect i n 1966, but since repealed), provided that i f t h i s additional evidence is substantial, the d i s t r i c t court may be justified i n reversing the Division even though the evidence adduced before the Division clearly preponderates i n favor of i t s order. Murphy v. Industrial Accident Board, 93 Mont, 1, 16 P.2d 705; Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co., supra. "Where the appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court is heard only on the Division's certified record or when the d i s t r i c t court permits additional evidence t o be introduced that is not important or adds nothing new t o the case, the court i s bound by the same rule of appeal which applies where the appeal is heard only on the certified record and the Division is en- t i t l e d t o a presumption the case was decided correctly. Kelly v. West Coast Construction Co., 106 Mont. 463, 78 P.2d 1078; McAndrews v. Schwartz, 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379; Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Co., Mont., 546 P.2d 1055, 33 St.Rep. 302." See also: Kimball v. Continental O i l Co., Mont . - 9 550 Under the law a s it now exists, t h i s Court directly re- views the decision of the workers' court, section 92-852(2), R.C.M. 1947. The workers' court proceedings a r e administrative i n nature and quasi-judicial, sections 92-852(1) and 82A-1016, R.C.M. 1947. The appropriate scope of t h i s Court's review should be no different than it was under former law a s expressed i n above cited cases; that is, worker's court decisions w i l l not be overturned i f there i s substantial evidence t o support its findings and conclusions. With the foregoing i n mind, we discuss the issues. With respect t o claimant' s injuries, the workers' court made t h i s finding: "* * * That the medical evidence viewed i n its t o t a l i t y and particularly the report of July 7, 1975, from D r . Robert C. Wood, neurosurgeon, with the Billings Clinic of Billings, Montana, claimant's Exhibit 5, wherein D r . Wood states: "'It is m y impression t h i s man has the following diagnosis: 1. Postoperative anterior cervical disc removals and fusions x 3 with chronic residual neck and right arm pain. 2. Secondary severe cervical spine limitation of motion. 3. Functional weakness of both arms. "'This man i s permanently disabled by h i s disease and h i s operations. These problems have rendered t h i s man 100 percent permanently and t o t a l l y disabled. Solidifying t h i s patient's disability i s h i s emotional reaction t o the problem as he i s obviously convinced i n h i s own mind that he has been t o t a l l y disabled and he w i l l ever be so. "'I do not think there i s a ghost of a chance of ever returning t h i s man t o gainful employment. H e is certainly not an operative candidate due t o h i s functional augmentation of h i s present problems; and, i f anything, he has had more than h i s share of surgery already.' "Place claimant's disability under the category of 'tem- porary t o t a l disability,' for a period of time-not t o exceed 300 weeks from date of injury, as provided by Section 92-701, R.C.M. 1947, as it provided on October 14, 1972, * * *. That the emotional reaction complication t o claimant's disability has not been determined t o be permanent i n nature and not subject t o psychiatric t r e a t - ment. That u n t i l t h i s showing has been made t o the satis- faction of t h i s Court by e i t h e r the claimant o r the insurance c a r r i e r the proper classification for claimant's disability should be 'temporary t o t a l disability' * * *.I' The record, including D r . Wood's report, does not sustain t h i s finding. A l l that is necessary is t o read the quoted portion of D r . Wood's report. D r . Wood was retained by insurer t o examine claimant, and h i s "Attending Physician's" report unequivocally classified claimant as "100%", "permanently" disabled. claimant' s orthopedic surgeon stated several t i m e s that claimant should be considered unemployable for any kind of work. There is no evidence to contradict these matters of record. The fact that claimant's "emotional reaction" to his condition is "solidifying" to his problem does not warrant the workers' court to find that the problem is temporary; there is simply no evidence which supports any conclusion other than that claimant was found by insurer's own choice of doctor to be permanently totally disabled as a result of his injuries. Because the workers' court erred in placing claimant in the category of "temporary total disability", its conclusion of law number 2, that claimant's disability was governed by section 92-701, R . C . M . 1947, is error. At the time of claimant's injury, section 92-702, pertaining to permanent total disability, was in effect and is controlling in this case. Upon remand, the workers' court shall apply the provisions of section 92-702, as it existed in 1972, to determine claimant's proper compensation rate. Claimant's second issue concerns the workers' court deter- mination of claimant's pre-injury earnings. Inasmuch as we have held that former section 92-702 applies to his rate of compensation, this question becomes moot. Under either claimant's or insurer's calculations, claimant is entitled to the same statutory maximum of compensation for the 500 week period provided in section 92- 702, R.C.M. 1947, in 1972. Claimant's third issue concerns his request in writing that he be awarded a lump sum settlement for the balance of his compensation, as authorized in former section 92-715, R.C.M. 1947. The workers ' court found claimant had demonstrated no financial need for such settlement. In view of the fact that section 92-715 vested the Industrial Accident Board (now the Workers' Compensation Division) with discretion in matters of settlement, and there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding, we see no reason to reverse the workers' court finding; if good cause later appears for such a settlement, the Workersr Compensation Division has continuing authority to so order. Claimant's fourth issue concerns the worker's court decision that when claimant attains age sixty-five in January 1977, and his social security disability payments automatically convert by operation of federal law into equal social security retirement payments, claimant is deemed by federal law to have completely withdrawn from the regular labor market and is there- fore no longer entitled to any workers' compensation benefits under state law. That is, removal from the labor market terminates the state's obligation to compensate one who is no longer a member of the federally recognized labor force; or, as insurer states in its brief, "compensation ceases when the fact of inability to earn in the open labor market ceases." It is difficult to determine from the workers' court findings or from the insurer's brief and argument whether this position is related to the statutory offset for social security benefits under section 92-701, R . C . M . 1947, or whether it is urged as a general proposition relating to all workers' compensation beneficiaries. In either case, however, it is clear the workers' court erred. No authority is cited, and we have found none, for the flat proposition that workers' compensation benefits terminate upon retirement. Insurer asserts this practice is suggested by the statutory framework of Montana's Workers' Compensation Act because workers' compensation is compensation for loss of earning capacity and retired persons do not have earning capacity. The superficial logic of this argument is overcome by the specific statute appli- cable in the instant case. Section 92-702, R . C . M . 1947, as effective in 1972, provided the rates of compensation for permanent total disability and stated in part: "* * * Such compensation shall be paid during the period of disability, but for the period not ex- ceeding five hundred (500) weeks from the date of injury. * * *I1 No provision is made for early cessation of benefits, if the injured employee reaches retirement age before the running of the 500 week period. Obviously, the legislature would have included such an important provision if it had so intended the statute to operate. In construing a statute, courts cannot insert what has been omitted. Section 93-401-15, R . C . M . 1947; Dunphy v . Anaconda Co., 151Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660 and cases cited therein. Therefore, claimant's workers' compensation benefits shall not terminate when he attains the age of sixty-five. Finally, claimant asks this Court to rule on the constitu- tionality of the social security offset reduction provisions of sections 92-701 (now repealed), 92-701.1 and 92-702.1, R.C.M. 1947. We have determined that section 92-701 is inapplicable to this case; and, the latter two sections were not enacted until after claimant's injury and were not relied upon by the workers' court. Therefore, the constitutional question is not in issue and this Court will not decide such questions when not necessary to its decision. Taylor v. Taylor, 167 Mont. 164, 537 P.2d 483, 32 St.Rep. 575; Montana State University v . Ransier, 167 Mont. 149, 536 P.2d 187, 32 St.Rep. 569, and cases cited therein. This case i s remanded t o the workers' court with direc- tions t o enter a finding t o the effect that claimant is permanently t o t a l l y disabled, and that h i s compensation s h a l l be paid over a period of 500 weeks from the date of injury. There s h a l l be no reduction of workers' compensation benefits for social security payments received by claimant since April 1973, and benefits s h a l l not cease when claimant attains age sixty-five. Past pay- ments t o claimant s h a l l be adjusted i n conformity with the law. Reversed and remanded with directions. . Justice Concur: Qi?t?t/!LL- Hon. Jack L. Green, District Judge, s i t t i n g for justice Wesley Castles.