Title: Hopkins v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families (DSCYF)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 420, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TORI HOPKINS,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 
THEIR FAMILIES (DSCYF), 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 420, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below–Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File No. 23-02-04TN 
§  Petition No. 23-02881 
§   
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 11, 2024 
Decided: 
June 12, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the no-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the appellee’s response, the 
Child Attorney’s response, and the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
(1) 
By order dated October 30, 2023, the Family Court terminated the 
parental rights of the appellant, Tori Hopkins, in her minor son, born in June 2022 
(the “Child”).2  Mother appeals. 
(2)  
On appeal, Mother’s counsel has filed an opening brief and motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26.1(c).  Counsel asserts that she has conducted a conscientious 
review of the record and the relevant law and has determined that Mother’s appeal 
is wholly without merit.  Counsel informed Mother of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c), 
provided her with a copy of counsel’s motion to withdraw and the accompanying 
brief, and advised her that she could submit in writing any additional points that she 
wished for the Court to consider.  Mother has not provided any points for the Court’s 
consideration.  The appellee, the Delaware Department of Services for Children, 
Youth and Their Families (DSCYF), and the Child’s Attorney have responded to 
counsel’s Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the Family Court’s judgment should be 
affirmed. 
(3) 
In June 2022, Mother gave birth to the Child at Christiana Hospital in 
Wilmington, Delaware.  Hospital staff refused to discharge the Child to Mother’s 
custody because they were concerned that Mother was unable to care for the Child, 
and DSCYF (which had custody of four of Mother’s older children) filed for and 
 
2 The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s father.   We refer only 
to facts in the record that relate to Mother’s appeal. 
3 
 
received emergency custody of the Child.  With the filing of DSCYF’s dependency-
and-neglect petition, the mandated hearings ensued.3  Mother failed to appear at the 
preliminary protective hearing or the adjudicatory hearing.  The Child had been 
placed with a maternal relative and was doing well in foster care.  At the adjudicatory 
hearing, DSCYF noted Mother was not in compliance with the case plan that 
DSCYF had designed to facilitate her reunion with her older children who were in 
DSCYF’s custody (the “original plan”)—specifically, Mother was not receiving 
appropriate mental health or substance abuse treatment.  The Family Court found 
that the Child was dependent in Mother’s care given Mother’s mental health 
problems, substance abuse, and her unwillingness to care for the Child as evidenced 
by her failure to communicate with DSCYF. 
(4) 
At the August 11, 2022 dispositional hearing, the Family Court 
reviewed the case plan that DSCYF had developed to facilitate Mother’s 
reunification with the Child.  Mother’s case plan largely tracked the original plan, 
with two additional components: (i) Mother was required to resolve her criminal 
charges and not incur any additional charges, and (ii) Mother, who had a history of 
outbursts during her visits with her children in her other dependency-and-neglect 
 
3 When a child is removed from his home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court 
is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute 
and the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. P. Rs. 212-219. 
4 
 
case, was required to demonstrate appropriate behavior during her interactions with 
the Child. 
(5) 
At the November 15, 2022 and December 2, 2022 review hearings, the 
Family Court found that Mother had made no progress on her case plan.  Mother had 
been re-arrested in October and was incarcerated.  Moreover, Mother had not had 
any contact with the Child and had not been in contact with DSCYF, aside from one 
text she sent to her treatment worker before she was arrested.  On January 11, 2023, 
DSCYF moved to change the permanency goal from reunification to the concurrent 
goals of reunification and termination of parental rights for purposes of adoption. 
(6) 
On January 23, 2023, the Family Court held a permanency hearing.  
Mother abruptly left in the middle of the hearing, informing the parties that she had 
no desire to participate.  The Child continued to do well in his foster placement—he 
was placed with his half-sister and was able to visit with his other half-siblings.  At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court: (i) found that Mother had not made 
any progress on her case plan; (ii) granted DSCYF’s motion to change the 
permanency goal; and (iii) ordered DSCYF to explore a competency evaluation or 
mental health evaluation for Mother to ensure that she understood the nature of the 
dependency-and-neglect proceedings. 
(7) 
As of the March 9, 2023 post-permanency hearing, Mother was on 
probation, having been released from prison, and expressed a willingness to 
5 
 
complete her case plan.  The Family Court found that, to date, Mother had not made 
any progress on her case plan.  The Child continued to do well in foster care.   
(8) 
The Family Court held another post-permanency hearing on May 18, 
2023.  As of the hearing, Mother was incarcerated for violating the terms of her 
probation and was enrolled in the Road to Recovery Program, which could help her 
complete certain elements of her case plan.  Mother had not had any contact with the 
Child.  The Child continued to do well in her foster home, and the foster mother was 
an adoptive resource. 
(9) 
At the October 30, 2023, termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) hearing, 
the Family Court heard testimony from Mother, Mother’s DSCYF treatment worker, 
and the Child’s DSCYF permanency worker.  DSCYF acknowledged that Mother 
had completed the parenting-class component of the original plan.  However, the 
evidence presented at the TPR hearing fairly established that Mother: (i) was 
incarcerated at the Department of Correction’s Hazel D. Plant Treatment Center and 
the Child was not permitted to live there; (ii) was unemployed; (iii) had not 
completed a substance abuse evaluation; (iv) had not completed a mental health 
evaluation despite DSCYF’s repeated efforts to schedule one; and (v) had not had 
any contact with the Child.  
6 
 
(10) Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a bench ruling 
terminating Mother’s parental rights in the Child on the basis of her failure to plan 
and issued a written order summarizing its findings.  This appeal followed. 
(11) On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as 
well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.4  We review legal 
rulings de novo.5  We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial 
court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly 
erroneous.6  If the trial judge has correctly applied the law, then our standard of 
review is abuse of discretion.7  On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the trier of fact.8 
(12) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate 
parental rights requires two separate inquiries.9  First, the court must determine 
whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.10  
When the statutory basis for termination is failure to plan, the Family Court must 
 
4 Wilson v. Div. of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010).   
5 Id. at 440.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.   
8 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
9 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).   
10 Id. at 537. 
7 
 
also find proof of at least one additional statutory condition.11  If the Family Court 
finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, the court must then 
determine whether, under 13 Del. C. § 722, severing parental rights is in the best 
interests of the child.12  Both of these requirements must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.13 
(13) Here, the Family Court found that DSCYF had proved, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was 
appropriate based on her failure to plan adequately for the Child’s physical needs or 
mental and emotional health and development14 and that the Child, who came into 
care as an infant, had been in DSCYF custody for more than six months.15  The 
Family Court then examined the best-interests factors set out in 13 Del. C. § 722 
and—giving particular weight to factors 4 (the Child’s adjustment to his home, 
school, and community), 5 (the mental and physical health of the individuals 
involved), 6 (Mother’s past and present compliance with her rights and 
responsibilities to the Child), and 8 (the parties’ criminal histories)—found, by clear 
 
11 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)-(e) (listing additional conditions). 
12 Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 536-37. 
13 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 
2008). 
14 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). 
15 Id. § 1103(a)(5)(b). 
8 
 
and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 
Child’s best interests.   
(14)  Having carefully reviewed the parties’ positions and the record on 
appeal, we find that the Family Court’s factual findings are supported by the record, 
and we can discern no error in the court’s application of the law to the facts.  We 
therefore conclude that Mother’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
arguably appealable issues.  We are satisfied that Mother’s counsel made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that 
Mother could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court be AFFIRMED.  Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice