Title: State v. Kirkland
Citation: 401 So. 2d 1335
Docket Number: 59461
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 1981

401 So. 2d 1335 (1981)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Benjamin Frank KIRKLAND, Respondent.
No. 59461.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 30, 1981.
*1336 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Janet Reno, State Atty. and Ira N. Loewy, Asst. State Atty., Miami, for petitioner.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for respondent.
ALDERMAN, Justice.
We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in State v. Kirkland, 384 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), which conflicts with Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345 (1929). The question is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the first-degree murder indictment against Kirkland on the ground that double jeopardy barred the state from prosecuting him on this charge after he had already pled nolo contendere to a juvenile petition for delinquency based upon the lesser included offense of strong-armed robbery, where at the time he entered this plea, the offense of murder was not completed due to the fact that the victim had not yet died? The district court answered this question in the negative and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment. We disagree and hold that Kirkland was not placed in jeopardy for the crime of first-degree murder. We therefore quash the district court's decision.
On May 11, 1979, Kirkland committed a strong-armed robbery of an eighty-eight-year-old man who sustained a heart attack as a result of the robbery. The victim, in critical condition, was admitted to the hospital where he remained for two months until his death. Kirkland was arrested for the robbery on May 25, 1979, and the state attorney, on May 31, 1979, filed a petition for delinquency charging strong-armed robbery and a motion for order waiving jurisdiction to the adult criminal division of the circuit court. The State withdrew its motion to waive jurisdiction on July 5, 1979, and Kirkland then entered a plea of nolo contendere to the petition for delinquency. Sentencing was set for July 19, 1979. On July 19, 1979, Kirkland was committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
The victim of the robbery died eleven days after Kirkland's plea had been accepted by the court. The matter was then presented to the Dade County grand jury on August 1, 1979, and the grand jury returned an indictment charging first-degree murder. The State concedes that the sole basis for this first-degree murder charge is the theory of felony murder.
Kirkland moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States barred his prosecution for felony murder. The trial court dismissed the indictment on this basis, and the district court affirmed.
Initially, we point out that this case does not implicate our holding in State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1979), wherein we held that a defendant could not be convicted and punished for both first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony where the evidence to sustain the murder conviction is furnished solely by proof that the killing *1337 occurred as a result of the commission of the underlying felony. Pinder did not address the question presented in this case where the victim is alive at the time the defendant pleads nolo to the felony. Although the trial court and the district court relied on Pinder, Kirkland does not contend that this case is controlled by Pinder.
Kirkland, also, does not contest the continued viability of our holding in Southworth v. State but rather objects to applying this holding to the present case on the basis that the facts before us are distinguishable. In Southworth, the victim of a felony murder was still living at the time the defendant was convicted of the felony which later resulted in the victim's death, and, thus, at the time of the robbery conviction, the murder had not been committed. We held that the conviction of the robbery was not a bar to an indictment for the crime of murder and explained:
125 So.  at 347.
Our ruling in Southworth, as Kirkland concedes, is in harmony with federal authority. In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S. Ct. 250, 56 L. Ed. 500 (1912), the victim of an assault and battery died after defendant had been found guilty of the assault and battery. He was then charged and convicted of the crime of homicide. The Supreme Court of the United States rejected his claim of double jeopardy and said:
223 U.S.  at 448-49, 32 S. Ct.  at 251. In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment forbids prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense but acknowledged that the rule announced in Diaz was a viable exception to this rule. It stated:
432 U.S.  at 169 n. 7, 97 S. Ct.  at 2227.
In Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151-52, 97 S. Ct. 2207, 2216, 53 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1977), the Supreme Court stated:
See also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 n. 8, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2267, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1980).
Kirkland contends, however, that the fact that he was allowed to plead to the robbery charge at a time when the robbery victim lay in the hospital in critical condition and was not expected to live takes this case out of the scope of Southworth and presents a case of prosecutorial manipulation. We disagree with this contention. Neither the trial court nor the district court found prosecutorial manipulation, and the record before us does not demonstrate prosecutorial manipulation.
We hold that the rule announced in Southworth applies to the present facts and that, therefore, the State is not barred by the double jeopardy clause from prosecuting Kirkland for first-degree murder.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is quashed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C.J. and BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents.