Title: Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev. LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11926
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2016

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SJC-11926 
 
MICHAEL SKAWSKI & others1  vs.  GREENFIELD INVESTORS PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT LLC. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     January 7, 2016. - February 11, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Jurisdiction, Land Court, Housing Court.  Land Court, 
Jurisdiction.  Housing Court, Jurisdiction.  Statute, 
Construction, Repeal. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Hampden Division of the 
Housing Court Department on June 7, 2011. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Dina E. Fein, J., and the 
ruling was reported by her. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Thomas Lesser (Michael E. Aleo with him) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Marshall D. Senterfitt (David S. Weiss with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Isaac J. Mass, for Citizens for Growth, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Melani Skawski; Ralph Gordon, Jr.; Susan Gordon; Joanna W. 
Mann; Joanna J. Mann; and Shirley Lowe. 
2 
 
 
Ashley Grant, for Massachusetts Fair Housing Center, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  On August 2, 2006, the Legislature enacted 
G. L. c. 185, § 3A, which established the permit session of the 
Land Court department and provided that "[t]he permit session 
shall have original jurisdiction, concurrently with the superior 
court department," over civil actions adjudicating the grant or 
denial of permits for "the use or development of real property" 
where "the underlying project or development involves either 
[twenty-five] or more dwelling units or the construction or 
alteration of 25,000 square feet or more of gross floor area."  
St. 2006, c. 205, § 15.  At the time § 3A was enacted, G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, authorized "[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision 
of the board of appeals or any special permit granting 
authority" to appeal to the Land Court, the Superior Court, the 
Housing Court, or the District Court.2  The issue before us is 
whether the Legislature, by enacting G. L. c. 185, § 3A, 
intended to grant exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to the 
permit session of the Land Court and to the Superior Court to 
                                                          
 
 
2 A party may only file an appeal in the Housing Court if 
the land is situated in an area served by a division of the 
Housing Court and may not file in the District Court if the land 
is situated in Hampden County.  G. L. c. 40A, § 17, first par.  
If the appeal is filed in the District Court, "any party shall 
have the right to file a claim for trial of said appeal in the 
superior court department within twenty-five days after service 
on the appeal is completed."  Id. 
3 
 
hear this subset of major development permit appeals, or 
intended simply to create a permit session in the Land Court to 
hear these cases without eliminating the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Housing Court to adjudicate this subset of 
appeals.  We conclude that the Legislature intended that major 
development permit appeals should be adjudicated only in the 
permit session of the Land Court or in the Superior Court.  We 
also conclude that, where the permit appeal in this case was 
timely filed in the Housing Court in accordance with G. L. 
c. 40A, § 17, the appropriate remedy is not to dismiss the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but to transfer the case 
to a court with jurisdiction, that is, the permit session of the 
Land Court or the Superior Court.3 
 
Background.  The defendant, Greenfield Investors Property 
Development LLC4 (developer), seeks to build a retail development 
of not more than 135,000 square feet of commercial space in 
Greenfield (project).  On May 17, 2011, the planning board of 
Greenfield (planning board) granted a special permit in favor of 
the developer to construct the project, subject to various 
conditions.  The notice granting the special permit advised that 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus curiae briefs submitted by 
Citizens for Growth and the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center. 
 
 
4 The members of the planning board of Greenfield, as 
required by G. L. c. 40A, § 17, second par., and the planning 
board itself are also defendants in this action, but they have 
not been joined as appellants. 
4 
 
"[a]n appeal from the decision of the [p]lanning [b]oard may be 
made by any person aggrieved pursuant to [G. L. c. 40A, § 17,] 
. . . within twenty (20) days after the date of filing of a 
notice of decision in the [o]ffice of the [t]own [c]lerk." 
 
The plaintiffs, who own property abutting the proposed 
development (abutters), filed a timely appeal to the grant of 
the special permit in the Housing Court on June 7, 2011.  On 
July 19, 2011, the defendants, without challenging the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Housing Court, requested the Chief 
Justice of the Trial Court5 to transfer the appeal from the 
Housing Court to the permit session of the Land Court, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 185, § 3A.  The abutters opposed the motion, and, on 
August 31, 2011, the then-sitting Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court denied the motion to transfer, without explanation. 
 
The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, 
claiming that the abutters lacked standing to appeal the grant 
of the special permit and that their due process allegations 
failed to state a valid constitutional claim.  On January 15, 
2013, the judge allowed the motion as to the due process claims 
                                                          
 
 
5 At the time of the enactment of G. L. c. 185, § 3A, the 
Chief Justice of the Trial Court was known as the Chief Justice 
for Administration and Management.  See G. L. c. 211B, § 1, as 
amended through St. 2011, c. 93, § 49.  Section 3A was amended 
in 2011 only to reflect the change in nomenclature from "chief 
justice for administration and management" to "chief justice of 
the trial court."  St. 2011, c. 93, §§ 25-26.  Although some of 
the events relevant to this case occurred before the change in 
title, we use the current title to avoid confusion. 
5 
 
but denied it as to standing, thereby allowing the abutters to 
proceed with their appeal of the special permit. 
 
On December 28, 2012, the Appeals Court issued its decision 
in Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lenox, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 40, 43-44 (2012) (Buccaneer), where it held that 
G. L. c. 185, § 3A, deprived the Housing Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear major development permit appeals.  In 
Buccaneer, the zoning board of appeals (board) denied the 
special permit for a major housing development and the developer 
filed an appeal in the permit session of the Land Court.  Id. at 
40, 42.  The board filed a notice in the permit session to 
transfer the case to the Housing Court, invoking G. L. c. 185C, 
§ 20, which provides that "[a]ny civil action within the 
jurisdiction of the housing court department which is pending in 
another [trial] court department may be transferred to the 
housing court department by any party."  Id. at 41.  After the 
case was transferred to the Housing Court, the developer moved 
that it be remanded to the permit session of the Land Court; the 
motion was denied, and the board's denial of the special permit 
was affirmed.  Id.  The Appeals Court declared that, "[b]y 
explicitly granting jurisdiction to the permit session and the 
Superior Court to hear permit-based civil actions involving 
large-scale projects, the Legislature implicitly denied such 
jurisdiction to the Housing Court."  Id. at 44.  The court 
6 
 
vacated the judgment and directed the Housing Court to remand 
the case to the permit session of the Land Court.  Id. at 45. 
 
On January 25, 2013, the developer in this case, citing the 
Appeals Court decision in Buccaneer, moved to dismiss the appeal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  On February 26, the 
judge denied the motion but conditioned her denial on allowance 
of her request for administrative transfer of the case and 
herself to the Superior Court.  On February 28, the judge wrote 
a letter to the then-sitting Chief Justice of the Housing Court, 
requesting, in light of the "uncertainty" created by the Appeals 
Court decision in Buccaneer and the pending application for 
further appellate review in that case, that the instant case be 
transferred administratively to the Superior Court Department 
and that she be cross-designated and assigned to handle it.  The 
developer opposed the transfer.  The Housing Court Chief Justice 
failed to act on the request and, on July 25, the judge withdrew 
it and thereafter declared her intention to rule on the merits 
of the motion to dismiss. 
 
On August 27, the judge denied the defendants' motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The judge 
noted that the procedural posture of this case differed from 
Buccaneer in that the plaintiffs here had initially filed their 
appeal in the Housing Court, not the permit session of the Land 
Court.  The judge distinguished the holding in Buccaneer, 
7 
 
stating that "the Appeals Court ruled effectively that the 
developer's choice of forum trumped the defendants' right under 
G. L. c. 185C, § 20[,] to transfer the case to the Housing 
Court."  The judge declared that the Housing Court had 
jurisdiction under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, to hear permit appeals 
and that, where the Chief Justice of the Trial Court6 had 
exercised the discretion granted to him under G. L. c. 185, 
§ 3A, to deny the developer's request to transfer the case to 
the permit session of the Land Court, allowance of the 
defendants' motion to dismiss "would deprive the plaintiffs 
entirely of their statutory right to judicial review of the 
[p]lanning [b]oard's decision."  The judge subsequently granted 
the joint motion of the parties to report her ruling to the 
Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 
423 Mass. 1403 (1996). 
 
The Appeals Court reversed the judge's order denying the 
defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the enactment of 
G. L. c. 185, § 3A, deprived the Housing Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over major development permit appeals.  Skawski v. 
Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev., LLC, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 
905-906 (2015).  We granted the abutters' application for 
further appellate review. 
                                                          
 
 
6 See note 5, supra. 
8 
 
 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 185, § 3A, established the 
permit session of the Land Court and granted that session 
"original jurisdiction, concurrently with the superior court 
department," over major development permit appeals.7  It also 
                                                          
 
 
7 General Laws c. 185, § 3A, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"There shall be established a separate session of the land 
court department, which shall be known as the permit session of 
the land court department. 
 
 
"Sessions of the permit session shall be held in Suffolk, 
Middlesex, Essex, Norfolk, Plymouth, Worcester and Hampden 
counties, and other counties as the chief justice of the land 
court department shall from time to time designate. 
 
 
"The permit session shall have original jurisdiction, 
concurrently with the superior court department, over civil 
actions in whole or part:  (a) based on or arising out of the 
appeal of any municipal, regional or state permit, order, 
certificate or approval, or the denial thereof, concerning the 
use or development of real property, including without 
limitation appeals of such permits, orders, certificates or 
approvals, or denials thereof, arising under or based on or 
relating to [G. L. c. 21; G. L. c. 30, §§ 61 to 62H, inclusive; 
G. L. cc. 30A, 40A to 40C, inclusive, 40R, 41, 43D, 91, 131, 
131A; or G. L. c. 249, §§ 4 and 5; or St. 1956, c. 665]; or any 
local bylaw or ordinance; . . . but . . . only if the underlying 
project or development involves either [twenty-five] or more 
dwelling units or the construction or alteration of 25,000 
square feet or more of gross floor area or both. 
 
 
"Notwithstanding any other general or special law to the 
contrary, any action not commenced in the permit session, but 
within the jurisdiction of the permit session as provided in 
this section, may be transferred to the permit session, upon 
motion by any party to the chief justice of the trial court. 
There shall be a presumption against more than one transfer of a 
case between any departments of the trial court.  If a party to 
an action commenced in or transferred to the permit session 
claims a valid right to a jury trial.  Then [sic] the action 
shall be transferred to the superior court for a jury trial. 
 
9 
 
provides that, "[n]otwithstanding any other general or special 
law to the contrary, any action not commenced in the permit 
session, but within the jurisdiction of the permit session as 
provided in this section, may be transferred to the permit 
session, upon motion by any party to the chief justice of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
"Each case filed in the permit session shall be assigned to 
a single judge from the commencement to the conclusion of the 
case.  The judge assigned to the case will hold all hearings and 
preside at the trial, except in the case of death, disability, 
expiration of judicial appointment to the permit session or 
emergency. 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"The chief justice of the land court shall report to the 
chief justice of the trial court, the clerks of the house and 
senate, and the chairs of the judiciary committee of the general 
court on an annual basis, with:  (1) the number of cases handled 
under this session; (2) the timelines achieved in cases pursuant 
to this session; (3) any additional resources required by the 
land court to meet its goals for this session; and (4) the 
number of cases before the land court according to the county 
from which they originate.  To the extent that the chief justice 
of the land court does not have sufficient resources to maintain 
the timeframes mentioned above, then the chief justice of the 
trial court shall assign judges with land use and environmental 
expertise from other departments of the trial court to sit as 
justices of the permit session.  In making such appointments, 
the chief justice of the trial court shall make reasonable 
efforts to select justices who, by reason of their past 
experience in private practice or practice with public agencies 
or as jurists have particular skills related to environmental 
and land use permitting and disputes concerning the same. 
 
 
"The final disposition of cases in the permit session by 
the court by dismissal, judgment or otherwise shall be in 
accordance with the following timeframes which shall commence on 
the filing of the trial transcript with the court or in the case 
of a summary judgment motion, from the date the motion is taken 
under advisement:  A Track in 4 months, F Track in 3 months and 
X Track in 2 months." 
10 
 
trial court."  G. L. c. 185, § 3A, fourth par.  The statute 
notes, however, that "[t]here shall be a presumption against 
more than one transfer of a case between any departments of the 
trial court."  Id. 
 
1.  Subject matter jurisdiction.  At the time § 3A was 
enacted in 2006, G. L. c. 40A, § 17, gave subject matter 
jurisdiction in all permit appeals to the Housing Court, along 
with the Land Court, Superior Court, and District Court, and 
G. L. c. 185C, § 20, gave any party the power to transfer such 
an appeal to the Housing Court if it were not initially filed 
there.  The question we must grapple with is whether the 
Legislature, by enacting § 3A, intended to divest the Housing 
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over what we call major 
development permit appeals (that is, appeals arising from action 
on any permit concerning the use or development of real property 
in projects that involve the construction of twenty-five or more 
dwelling units or 25,000 square feet or more of gross floor 
area) and to grant exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over 
such appeals to the permit session of the Land Court and to the 
Superior Court. 
 
We use as our starting point the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation.  "It is well established that '[a] 
statute is not to be deemed to repeal or supersede a prior 
statute in whole or in part in the absence of express words to 
11 
 
that effect or of clear implication.'"  Commonwealth v. Palmer, 
464 Mass. 773, 777 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 
Mass. 714, 725 (2005).  The words of § 3A do not explicitly 
divest the Housing Court of jurisdiction over major development 
permit appeals.  Section 3A makes no reference to G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17, or to the subject matter jurisdiction over permit appeals 
granted to the Housing Court by that statute.  Nor does it grant 
"exclusive jurisdiction" over major development permit appeals 
to the permit session of the Land Court and to the Superior 
Court; it simply grants these courts "original jurisdiction" 
over these appeals.  Contrast G. L. c. 185, § 1 ("The land court 
department shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of the 
following matters:  . . ."); G. L. c. 212, § 3 ("The [superior] 
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil 
actions for the foreclosure of mortgages . . ."). 
 
Therefore, if § 3A divests the Housing Court of 
jurisdiction over major development permit appeals, it must do 
so by "clear implication," see Palmer, supra, that is, 
implication so clear that it overcomes our "strong presumption 
against implied repeal of a prior law."  Dartmouth v. Greater 
New Bedford Reg'l Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 
366, 374 (2012).  See generally 1A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie 
Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23:10 (7th ed. 
2009) (discussing judicially created presumption against repeal 
12 
 
of prior laws by implication).  Implied repeal is clear where 
"the earlier statute 'is so repugnant to and inconsistent with 
the later enactment covering the subject matter that both cannot 
stand.'"  See Dartmouth, supra at 374-375, quoting Doherty v. 
Commissioner of Admin., 349 Mass. 687, 690 (1965).  It may also 
be clear where the subsequent legislation comprehensively 
addresses a particular subject and impliedly supersedes related 
statutes and common law that might frustrate the legislative 
purpose.  See id. at 375-376, and cases cited.  See generally 1A 
N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction, supra at § 23:9 (discussing implied repeal where 
later legislation covers whole subject of earlier legislation 
and is intended as substitute).  Ultimately, the touchstone is 
"the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Weems v. Citigroup Inc., 453 Mass. 147, 153 
(2009), quoting Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 
Mass. 718, 720 (2002). 
 
Placing § 3A within the context of the larger legislative 
enactment illuminates the legislative purpose underlying the 
statute.  Section 3A is found in one of twenty-four sections in 
13 
 
St. 2006, c. 205 (act), whose purpose is clear from its title, 
"An Act relative to streamlining and expediting the permitting 
process in the commonwealth," and its preamble -- "to forthwith 
expedite the permitting process in the commonwealth."  To 
accomplish this purpose, the Legislature created a comprehensive 
statutory program that, among other things, (1) provided funding 
for technical assistance grants to assist State and local 
governments and agencies in streamlining their permitting 
processes, St. 2006, c. 205, §§ 2, 6; (2) provided for the 
appointment of a director of the permit regulatory office within 
the Executive Office of Economic Development to "serve as the 
state permit ombudsman to new and expanding businesses, [and] to 
provide one-stop licensing for businesses and development in 
order to streamline and expedite the process of obtaining state 
licenses, permits, state certificates, state approvals, and 
other requirements of law," id. at § 4; and (3) provided 
expedited permitting for property designated as a "priority 
development site," id. at § 11.  From the text of the act and 
its legislative history, it is plain that the Legislature sought 
to reduce the costs and delays of the permitting process 
required to conduct business and develop property.  See, e.g., 
State House News Service (Senate Sess.), July 25, 2006 
(statement of Sen. Jack Hart) ("the number-one issue of concern 
to businesses here in the Commonwealth is the long permitting 
14 
 
process.  It may take anywhere from three to five years for a 
business to get permitted. . . .  We're not trying to supplant 
the process; we're trying to expedite it"). 
 
Section 3A, which is found in § 15 of the act, must be 
interpreted in light of that legislative purpose.  The abutters 
contend that the Legislature's purpose in enacting § 3A was to 
create the permit session in the Land Court to hear these major 
development permit appeals, not to affect the jurisdiction of 
other court departments granted by G. L. c. 40A, § 17.  But, if 
its purpose were simply to create a new permit session in the 
Land Court, there would be no need to mention the concurrent 
original jurisdiction of the Superior Court.  By specifying that 
the Superior Court Department shared concurrent jurisdiction 
with the permit session of the Land Court, and not also 
specifying any other court department as having concurrent 
jurisdiction, the Legislature impliedly reflected its intent 
that these major development permit appeals be adjudicated only 
by these two courts.  See Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 
515, 521 (2001) ("The Legislature enumerated three courts in the 
immunity statute, but did not include the Juvenile Court.  
Accordingly, the Legislature's actions suggest that it intended 
to exclude the Juvenile Court"); Bagley v. Illyrian Gardens, 
Inc., 401 Mass. 822, 824-825 (1988), and cases cited ("By 
explicitly singling out the Hampden County division of the 
15 
 
Housing Court and granting it concurrent jurisdiction over such 
appeals, the Legislature implicitly denied such jurisdiction to 
the other divisions of the Housing Court").  See also Tilman v. 
Brink, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 845, 852-854 (2009) (District Court 
cannot award attorney's fees under G. L. c. 231, § 6F, because 
it is not included in statutory definition of "court" under 
G. L. c. 231, § 6E).  This interpretation is consistent with the 
statutory maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," 
meaning "the expression of one thing in a statute is an implied 
exclusion of other things not included in the statute."  See 
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 619 (2013); Bagley, 
supra. 
 
The comprehensive scope of the act further suggests that 
the Legislature intended to be equally comprehensive in 
declaring which court departments would have original 
jurisdiction to adjudicate major development permit appeals.  
See Dartmouth, 461 Mass. at 375, quoting Doherty, 349 Mass. at 
690 (noting that implied repeal may be found where "the 
Legislature enacts a law covering a particular field but leaves 
conflicting prior prescriptions unrepealed"). 
 
Moreover, if we were to adopt the abutters' interpretation 
of § 3A that the Housing Court continues to have jurisdiction to 
hear these cases, the legislative purpose in having these cases 
heard by the permit session of the Land Court would be 
16 
 
frustrated because any party could exercise its authority under 
G. L. c. 185C, § 20, to transfer to the Housing Court any case 
that was filed in or transferred to the permit session of the 
Land Court.  The establishment of the permit session of the Land 
Court to hear major development permit appeals was an integral 
part of the act's over-all plan to expedite the permitting 
process because § 3A establishes demanding time frames for the 
final disposition of such appeals in the permit session.8  See 
G. L. c. 185, § 3A, sixth and eighth pars.  Although a party 
could file a major development permit appeal in the Superior 
Court, § 3A allows any party, with the approval of the Chief 
Justice of the Trial Court, to transfer the appeal to the permit 
session.  See id. at § 3A, fourth par.  But, if the Housing 
Court continued to have jurisdiction over these cases, any party 
could invoke G. L. c. 185C, § 20, and ensure that the final 
disposition of the appeal would be decided, not by the permit 
session, but by the Housing Court. 
 
A careful review of the legislative history suggests that 
the Legislature's intent regarding jurisdiction over major 
development permit appeals evolved during the legislative 
process.  Initially, the Joint Committee on Labor and Workforce 
                                                          
 
 
8 General Laws c. 185, § 3A, also directs the Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court to assign justices from other trial court 
departments with "particular skills related to environmental and 
land use permitting" to sit in the permit session if the Land 
Court has insufficient resources to meet these time frames. 
17 
 
Development proposed in the House bill that a separate permit 
division of the Superior Court be established that "shall have 
original jurisdiction, concurrently with the Superior Court," 
over all permit appeals.  2006 House Doc. No. 4741.  The bill 
also provided: 
 
"Notwithstanding any other General Law to the 
contrary, any action not commenced in the Permit Division, 
but within the jurisdiction of the Permit Division . . . , 
shall be transferred to the Permit Division upon motion by 
any party to the Chief Justice for Administration of the 
Trial Courts.  There shall be a presumption against more 
than one transfer of a case between any Departments of the 
Trial Court."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Id.  Under this bill, any party to any permit appeal had the 
right to transfer the appeal to the permit division.  It is 
doubtful that the proponents of this bill intended to divest the 
jurisdiction of the Land Court, Housing Court, and District 
Court over all permit appeals within the jurisdictional scope of 
G. L. c. 40A, § 17, if only because the presumption against more 
than one transfer of a case between trial court departments 
would make no sense if only the Superior Court Department had 
jurisdiction over these cases.  But under this bill, even with 
no limitation of jurisdiction, a developer could be assured 
that, if it wanted a permit appeal to be decided in the permit 
division, the appeal would be decided there. 
 
The House bill was subsequently amended to establish a 
permit session in the Land Court rather than a permit division 
18 
 
in the Superior Court.  2006 House J. 1659.  This amendment 
provided that the permit session "shall have original 
jurisdiction, concurrently with the superior court department," 
over all permit appeals.  Id. at 1659-1660.   This amended 
version retained the language providing that, on motion by any 
party, the Chief Justice of the Trial Court "shall" transfer any 
permit appeal that was not in the permit session to that 
session.  Id. at 1660. 
 
The House bill was then further amended in three other 
important ways.  First, the scope of jurisdiction of the permit 
session was limited to major development permit appeals; it no 
longer had jurisdiction over all permit appeals.  2006 House J. 
1661.  Second, with respect to a party's motion to transfer an 
appeal to the permit session, the word "shall" was struck and 
replaced with "may," thereby giving the Chief Justice of the 
Trial Court the discretion to allow or deny a motion to 
transfer.  Id. at 1665.  Third, a provision was added declaring 
that where a party in the permit session claims a right to a 
jury trial, "then the action shall have a trial in the superior 
court."9  Id.  See G. L. c. 185, § 25 (Land Court "shall hold no 
trials by jury"); G. L. c. 186, § 15 (where trial by jury is 
                                                          
 
 
9 This language was later revised before enactment.  General 
Laws c. 185, § 3A, provides, "If a party to an action commenced 
in or transferred to the permit session claims a valid right to 
a jury trial.  Then [sic] the action shall be transferred to the 
superior court for a jury trial." 
19 
 
claimed, questions of fact resolved in Superior Court).  As a 
result of these amendments, a party to a major development 
permit appeal no longer has a right to have its case adjudicated 
in the permit session; it could request such a transfer, but the 
allowance of that transfer rests in the discretion of the Chief 
Justice of the Trial Court.  See 2006 House J. 1665.  And even 
if the appeal were filed in or transferred to the permit 
session, it would nonetheless be tried in the Superior Court if 
any party claimed a right to a jury trial.  See id. 
 
We conclude that the clear implication of these amendments 
is that the Legislature intended that major development permit 
appeals be adjudicated in the permit session and, if they could 
not be, either because the Chief Justice of the Trial Court 
denied the motion to transfer the case to that session or 
because a party claimed a right to a jury trial, that they be 
adjudicated in the Superior Court Department, which was the 
department that had sole jurisdiction over permit appeals under 
the earlier version of the House bill and concurrent 
jurisdiction under the later version of that bill.  And, once 
the Legislature gave the Chief Justice of the Trial Court the 
discretion to deny transfer of cases to the permit session of 
the Land Court, even where no right to a jury trial was claimed, 
the only way the Legislature could effectuate this intent was to 
limit the scope of jurisdiction over these appeals to the permit 
20 
 
session of the Land Court and the Superior Court.10  In short, we 
conclude that the clear implication of § 3A is that the 
Legislature wanted all major development permit appeals to be 
adjudicated either in the permit session of the Land Court or in 
the Superior Court and therefore limited jurisdiction over these 
cases to these courts. 
 
2.  Remedy.  Having concluded that the Housing Court lacks 
jurisdiction to decide this major development permit appeal, we 
address whether the remedy should be the outright dismissal of 
                                                          
 
 
10 The abutters argue that the inclusion in G. L. c. 185, 
§ 3A, of the sentence, "There shall be a presumption against 
more than one transfer of a case between any departments of the 
trial court," demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend 
that the permit session of the Land Court and the Superior Court 
would have exclusive jurisdiction over major development permit 
appeals because there could be multiple transfers of a case only 
if there were jurisdiction in more than two trial court 
departments.  We recognize that this sentence was originally 
included in the House bill, see 2006 House Doc. No. 4741, whose 
proponents did not intend to divest jurisdiction over permit 
appeals from the Housing Court, but we disagree that its 
survival in § 3A suggests that the legislative intent did not 
change with the revisions to that bill.  Section 3A grants 
discretion to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court to determine 
whether to transfer a case from the Superior Court to the permit 
session but requires transfer to the Superior Court from the 
permit session where there is a claim of a right to a jury 
trial.  This sentence creates a presumption that discretionary 
transfer to the permit session should not be granted if a party 
earlier exercised its right to transfer an appeal from the 
permit session to the Superior Court by claiming a right to a 
jury trial and then sought to return to the permit session after 
waiving its right to a jury trial. 
 
21 
 
the case, or transfer to a court with jurisdiction to decide it.  
We conclude that transfer is the fair and appropriate remedy.11 
 
The developer contends that the permit appeal should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that, if the abutters 
wish to appeal the grant of the special permit, they should be 
required to refile their complaint in a court with jurisdiction.  
The developer also made clear at oral argument, however, that 
were the abutters to refile, it would move to dismiss the 
refiled complaint as untimely, because G. L. c. 40A, § 17, 
requires that any such appeal be filed within twenty days after 
the planning board filed the notice of decision in the office of 
the town clerk, which occurred in 2011.  The result would be 
that the permit appeal would be procedurally barred, and the 
merits of the appeal would never be reached by a court. 
                                                          
 
 
11 The Appeals Court declined to address the question of 
transfer or the possibility of the abutters refiling their 
appeal in either the Land Court or the Superior Court, 
concluding that "[t]hese questions are outside of the bounds of 
the reported question and were not made below."  Skawski v. 
Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev., LLC, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 906 
n.9 (2015).  We disagree.  The judge's report brings before us 
the entirety of her ruling on the motion to dismiss, and the 
question of remedy -- transfer as an alternative to dismissal -- 
is intimately and necessarily tied to that ruling.  Moreover, it 
is plain from the judge's earlier request to transfer the case 
and from the express language of the judge's ruling that she was 
concerned that dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction 
might have the consequence of denying the abutters the 
opportunity to litigate the merits of their appeal.  In these 
circumstances it would not serve the interests of justice to 
avoid deciding this issue and leave it to be decided below, 
where it could, and likely would, be the subject of yet another 
appeal and further delay. 
22 
 
 
We have long rejected dismissal in comparable 
circumstances.  "[W]hen a court of limited jurisdiction is 
confronted with a case over which its jurisdiction is doubtful 
or lacking, the court should not dismiss the case out of hand; 
rather, 'the proper procedure is for the judge to ask the Chief 
Administrative Justice to transfer the case, or the judge, or 
both, to the appropriate department of the Trial Court.'"  Arno 
v. Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 434, 446 (2010), quoting 
Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 123, 129 (1981).  Thus, in 
ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 607-608 (2000), 
where we concluded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
over a summary process action it had adjudicated, we stayed the 
order of dismissal to allow time for the judge to apply to the 
Chief Justice for Administration and Management to "appoint the 
District Court judge to sit as a Superior Court judge for the 
purposes of this case."  Similarly, in Konstantopoulos, supra at 
130, 138, where we concluded that the Probate Court lacked 
jurisdiction to review the revocation of an entertainment 
license, we did not dismiss the case but instead remanded the 
case to the Probate Court "with instructions to the judge to ask 
the Chief Administrative Justice to transfer the case, or the 
judge, or both to the Superior Court." 
 
Dismissal would be especially unfair here, where the 
abutters timely filed their appeal in a court that appeared at 
23 
 
the time to have jurisdiction under G. L. c. 40A, § 17; where 
the defendants did not challenge the Housing Court's 
jurisdiction until the Appeals Court issued its opinion in the 
Buccaneer case in 2012, eighteen months after the appeal was 
filed and well after the abutters might have filed a timely new 
appeal in the Land Court or Superior Court; and where our 
conclusion regarding the absence of jurisdiction in the Housing 
Court rests principally on the doctrine of implied repeal rather 
than the express language of § 3A. 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendants' motion to 
dismiss is hereby vacated, and the case is remanded to the 
Housing Court, where the parties are to be given an opportunity 
to apply within thirty days to the Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court to have the case transferred either to the permit session 
of the Land Court or to the Superior Court.12  The Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court will act on that request forthwith.  Once the 
case is transferred, it should proceed expeditiously in the 
court selected by the Chief Justice, so that the parties may 
obtain a prompt decision on the merits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
12 We note that on March 23, 2015, shortly after filing 
their application for further appellate review, the abutters 
made a written request to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 3A, and G. L. c. 211B, § 9, for such 
a transfer.  That request has not been acted on while this 
appeal has been pending.