Title: Potter v. Dept. of Correction & UIAB
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 237, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
REGINA POTTER, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 237, 2013 
 
Claimant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
 
v. 
§ 
Kent County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
C.A. No. K10A-06-009 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
§ 
C.A. No. K12A-06-006 
 
 
§ 
 
Employer Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
and the UNEMPLOYMENT  
§ 
INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:   September 4, 2013 
 
 
Decided:   
 November 13, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 13th day of November 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Claimant-below Regina L. Potter (“Potter”) appeals from two Superior 
Court orders.  The first order, issued in 2011, reversed an Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board (“Board”) decision that because Potter had been 
constructively discharged by her employer, the Delaware Department of 
Correction (“DOC”), she was entitled to unemployment benefits.  On remand, the 
 
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Board found that Potter had voluntarily resigned from her employment without 
good cause, and denied her benefits.  In April 2013, the Superior Court affirmed 
that Board decision.  Potter appeals from both Superior Court orders.  We find that 
Potter’s claims have no merit and affirm.   
2. 
In August 2009, it was discovered that Potter, a Correctional Officer at 
the Plummer Community Corrections Center, had two DOC offenders listed as 
“friends” on her Facebook page.  On Friday, August 21, 2009, Warden Steven 
Wesley sent an e-mail to DOC staff initiating a “210” disciplinary investigation 
into whether Potter’s conduct violated DOC policies.   
3. 
At the beginning of the investigation, Stephen Martelli, the president of 
the Correctional Officers Association of Delaware (the correctional officers’ 
union), spoke with Potter about her situation.  Martelli consulted the union’s 
lawyer about the probable outcome of Potter’s case, examined the content of 
Potter’s Facebook page, and concluded that Potter’s was a “non-win” case. 
Martelli then advised Potter that her best option was to resign; otherwise she would 
be terminated.  Martelli did not speak with the Warden about the case before 
giving Potter this advice. 
4. 
On Monday, August 24, 2009 (before the completion of the disciplinary 
investigation), Potter sent her resignation to the Warden by e-mail, which stated:  
“Following the advice of my union representative in regards to your 
 
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recommendation; I, Regina Potter am resigning . . . .”1  Potter later testified that 
Martelli had told her that, instead of transferring her to another facility, the Warden 
wanted Potter to resign.  Both the Warden and Martelli denied that they had had 
any conversations, either about transfer or resignation, before Potter submitted her 
resignation.   
5. 
In September 2009, Potter submitted a claim for unemployment 
benefits to the Delaware Department of Labor.  Her claim was denied, first by the 
Claims Deputy and then by the Appeals Referee.2  Both concluded that Potter had 
voluntarily quit her employment without good cause.  Potter then appealed the 
Referee’s decision to the Board.  The Board held a hearing in May 2010, during 
which Martelli testified.  The DOC submitted DOC Policy 9.12 as evidence that 
administrative remedies had been available to Potter, which she failed to pursue 
before resigning.  In a June 2010 decision, the Board determined that Potter had 
been constructively discharged from the DOC because Martelli’s advice offered 
her no “reasonable alternative.”3 
6. 
The DOC appealed to the Superior Court, which, in a November 29, 
2011 order, found as a matter of law that, because Martelli was not an agent of the 
                                                 
1 Italics added. 
2 The Appeals Referee held a hearing on November 5, 2009 before issuing its decision.  
3 Potter v. Delaware Dep’t of Corr., UIAB Appeal Docket No. 40112662 (June 18, 2010), at 9. 
 
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DOC, Potter had not been pressured by her employer to resign.  Accordingly, 
Potter was not constructively discharged.4  The court remanded the case to the 
Board for “a determination of whether the Claimant had good cause for her 
voluntary resignation.”5  On remand the Board, without conducting a hearing, 
found that Potter did not have good cause for her voluntary resignation.6  The 
Superior Court affirmed that decision in an April 8, 2013 order.7  This appeal 
followed. 
7. 
We review a Superior Court ruling that, in turn, has reviewed a ruling 
of an administrative agency, by directly examining the decision of the agency,8 to 
determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free 
from legal errors.9  Claims that the agency committed errors of law are reviewed de 
novo.10  Absent an error of law, we review an agency decision for abuse of 
                                                 
4 Delaware Dep’t of Corr. v. Potter, Del. Super., C.A. No. K10A-06-009, Witham, J. (Nov. 29, 
2011), at 5 (“Therefore, the Board’s constructive discharge analysis fails as a matter of law.”). 
5 Id. at 8.  
6 Potter v. Delaware Dep’t of Corr., UIAB Appeal Docket No. 40112662 (June 15, 2012), at 3. 
7 Potter v. Delaware Dep’t of Corr., Del. Super., C.A. No. 12A-06-006, Young, J. (Apr. 8, 
2013), at 9. 
8 Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 380 (Del. 1999). 
9 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009) (citing Stanley v. 
Kraft Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 2410212, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2008)). 
10 Id. 
 
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discretion.11  The agency will be found to have abused its discretion only if its 
decision “exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances.”12   
8. 
Preliminarily, the DOC claims that the issues raised on this appeal are 
time barred because Potter did not challenge the November 2011 order within 30 
days.  We have previously held that, “[c]learly, an order of remand by the Superior 
Court to [an Administrative Board] is an interlocutory and not a final order.”13  
Had Potter sought to appeal the November order, we would have dismissed the 
appeal as interlocutory.14  Accordingly, this appeal is not time barred.  
9. 
Potter first claims the Superior Court erred in its November 2011 order 
by overturning the Board’s finding that Potter was constructively discharged.  We 
find that this claim has no merit.  Constructive discharge may include a resignation 
that is induced by pressure from an employer.15  The record here, however, shows 
that Potter chose to resign based on the advice of Martelli, her union president.  
                                                 
11 Id.  
12 Id. (quoting Stanley, 2008 WL 2410212, at *2). 
13 Taylor v. Collins and Ryan, Inc., 440 A.2d 990, 990 (Del. 1981) (citing Cicamore v. Alloy 
Surfaces Co., 244 A.2d 278 (Del. 1968); McClelland v. General Motors Corp., 214 A.2d 847 
(Del. 1965)).  “We interpret Taylor as applying to all remands except remands for ‘purely 
ministerial’ functions.”  DiSabatino Bros., Inc. v. Wortman, 453 A.2d 102, 104 n.3 (Del. 1982) 
(citing McClelland v. General Motors Corp., 214 A.2d 847, 848 (Del. 1965)).  
14 See e.g., A & J Builders, Inc. v. McKirby, 2009 WL 2972916, at *1 (Del. Sept. 14, 2009) 
(Holland, J.); New Castle Cty. Dep’t of Fin. v. 1001 Jefferson Plaza P’ship, 1994 WL 632635, at 
*1 (Del. Nov. 7, 1994) (Holland, J.). 
15 Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Unempl’t Ins. Appeal Bd. of Delaware, 325 A.2d 374, 376 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1974). 
 
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Martelli was not an agent of the DOC, and Martelli’s advice was not based on any 
communications with the Warden.  Therefore, Martelli’s advice cannot be imputed 
to the DOC.  Because the DOC did not pressure Potter to resign,16 and the Board’s 
conclusion that Potter was constructively discharged was not supported by 
substantial evidence, the Superior Court did not err by reversing and remanding the 
case.   
10. Potter’s second claim is that the Superior Court erred by affirming the 
Board’s 2012 decision.  Potter argues that the Board’s 2012 decision contradicted 
its 2010 decision, and, therefore, should not have been upheld.  The Superior Court 
addressed that claim in its April 2013 order, explaining that: 
[T]he Court found, as a matter of law, that the Board’s June [1]8, 
2010 decision was based on incorrect analysis.  As a result of the 
Court’s decision, the Board was required to engage in different 
analysis (though on the very same evidence) the second time around.  
For that reason, the opinions issued by the Board were by necessity 
very different.17  
 
That reasoning is correct.  The Superior Court’s November 2011 order required the 
Board to determine whether Potter had “good cause” for her voluntary 
                                                 
16 Cf. Id. at 375-76 (affirming a Board finding that claimant was pressured to quit when her 
employer threatened to withhold paychecks and altered her work schedule). 
17 Potter v. Del. Dep’t of Corr., Del. Super., C.A. No. 12A-06-006, Young, J. (Apr. 8, 2013), at 
8. 
 
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resignation.18  In its second decision, the Board, based on the evidence of record, 
found that Potter did not have good cause for her resignation.  The Superior Court 
did not err by upholding that Board decision.  
12. Finally, Potter claims that her due process rights were violated because 
a Deputy Attorney General was present during a closed Board meeting on remand.  
The Deputy Attorney General who was present at the meeting was serving as 
counsel to the Board, and was not the same Deputy who represented the DOC.19  
Potter argues that because the Attorney General’s office represents the DOC, no 
representative from that office, even the Board’s counsel, should have been present 
without Potter or her counsel also present.20  The presence of a Deputy Attorney 
General acting as the Board’s counsel, wholly apart from the DOC’s separate 
                                                 
18 It is well established that the claimant bears the burden of showing “good cause” for 
voluntarily terminating employment.  Lorah v. Home Helpers, Inc., 2011 WL 2112739, at *2 
(Del. May 26, 2011) (citing Longobardi v. Unempl’t Ins. Appeal Bd., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1971) aff’d 293 A.2d 295 (Del. 1972)). “‘Good cause’ for quitting a job must be such 
cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks 
of the unemployed.”  O'Neal's Bus Serv., Inc. v. Empl’t Sec. Comm'n, 269 A.2d 247, 249 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1970).  In order to demonstrate good cause, an employee must, before quitting, make a 
good faith effort to resolve any problems with the employer and exhaust available administrative 
remedies.  Ingleside Homes, Inc. v. Gladden, 2003 WL 22048205, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 
27, 2003).  
19 Potter v. Del. Dep’t of Corr., Del. Super., C.A. No. 12A-06-006, Young, J. (Apr. 8, 2013), at 
8. 
20 Due process requires that parties be given “the opportunity to be heard, by presenting 
testimony or otherwise, and the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears 
on the question of right in the matter involved in an orderly proceeding appropriate to the nature 
of the hearing and adapted to meet its ends.  Further, due process requires that the notice inform 
the party of the time, place, and date of the hearing and the subject matter of the proceedings.”  
Vincent v. Eastern Shore Markets, 970 A.2d 160, 164 (Del. 2009) (footnote omitted). 
 
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representation, did not violate Potter’s right to due process.  Potter presents no 
evidence that the DOC’s counsel was involved in the Board’s decision or that there 
was any communication between counsel for the Board and the DOC during the 
Board’s decision-making process.  Therefore, this claim is without merit as well.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice