Title: Warncke v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 300, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 8, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAYMOND WARNCKE, 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
No. 300, 2022 
 
 
Defendant-Below,   
   § 
 
 
Appellant 
    
 
   §  
 
   § 
v.                                         § 
Court Below—Superior Court   
   § 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
   § 
Cr. ID No:  2110003724(K) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below,        
   § 
 
 
Appellee.   
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 7, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 8, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
ORDER 
This 8th day of August 2023, after consideration of the parties’ briefs, the 
record on appeal, and the argument of counsel, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On October 8, 2020, Raymond Warncke, then 40-years-old, asked 
Tyrone Henry, a 71-year-old man, for a ride to the liquor store.  Upon returning to 
the house where he was staying, Warncke grew violent, repeatedly punching the 
older man in the face, refusing to calm down once police arrived, cursing the 
officers, resisting arrest, and kicking the door of one of the patrol vehicles.  As a 
result, Warncke was charged with, and ultimately convicted of,  assault on a person 
over 62 years of age, terroristic threatening, criminal mischief for “intentionally or 
2 
 
recklessly caus[ing] damage in an amount less than $5,000[,]”1 and disorderly 
conduct.  He was thereafter declared a habitual offender—he had previously been 
convicted of three violent felonies; aggravated menacing, resisting arrest, and rape 
in the fourth degree—and sentenced on the assault charge to 25 years at level V 
supervision suspended after 15 years for probation.  Both the terroristic-threatening 
and criminal-mischief convictions resulted in one-year sentences suspended for one 
year of concurrent probation.  And he was fined $575 for disorderly conduct. 
(2) 
Warncke appeals his sentence on two grounds.  The first is that the 
Superior Court erred by treating his criminal-mischief conviction as a class A 
misdemeanor despite the jury’s failure to make a specific finding that he had caused 
more than $1,000 in pecuniary damage.  And the second is that the court failed to 
consider mitigation evidence when sentencing him for his assault conviction.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we affirm Warncke’s fifteen-year-prison sentence for 
assault in the second degree and remand his criminal-mischief conviction for 
resentencing as an unclassified misdemeanor. 
 
 
(3) 
Warncke first challenges the validity of his criminal-mischief sentence.  
There are three degrees of criminal mischief under 11 Del. C. § 811: it is a felony 
when the pecuniary loss exceeds $5,000; a class A misdemeanor when the loss 
exceeds $1,000 but is below $5,000; and an unclassified misdemeanor when the loss 
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A6. 
3 
 
is $1,000 or less.  Here, although Warncke was charged with class-A-misdemeanor 
criminal mischief, the State failed to introduce evidence at trial—besides the 
arresting officer’s report, which, in an effort to process the warrant, estimated the 
damages at $3,000—showing the specific amount in pecuniary loss to the vehicle.   
But what is more important, the trial court failed to specify the amount in damages 
needed to justify a guilty verdict on the charge.  As a result, no factual finding was 
made as to whether the damage to the patrol vehicle exceeded $1,000.   
(4) 
Despite the absence of such a finding, the trial court sentenced Warncke 
as if he had been convicted of a class A misdemeanor.  The State admits that this 
was error and requests that Warncke’s sentence be vacated and remanded for 
resentencing as an unclassified misdemeanor.  We agree with the State—the jury’s 
conclusion that Warncke intentionally or recklessly caused some damage to the 
police vehicle, although insufficient to support a class A misdemeanor criminal-
mischief charge, is enough to support the unclassified misdemeanor form of the 
charge. 
(5) 
Warncke’s second argument challenges the validity of the 15-year 
sentence that he received for his assault conviction.  Specifically, Warncke argues 
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigation evidence 
4 
 
during his sentencing, relying heavily on the trial judge’s statement at sentencing 
that “there are no mitigating factors found in this case[.]”2 
(6) 
“When [a] sentence is within the statutory limits,” as was the case here, 
“this Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless it is clear that the sentencing 
judge relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.”3  “A judge 
sentences with a closed mind when the sentence is based on a preconceived bias 
without consideration of the nature of the offense or the character of the defendant.”4  
Stated differently, a “judge must have an open mind for receiving all information 
related to the question of mitigation.”5 
(7) 
Warncke believes that the trial judge’s statement—that “there are no 
mitigating factors found in this case”—is per se evidence of a closed mind, 
particularly when viewed against the myriad mitigating factors  the defense pointed 
to in its sentencing presentation, which included Warncke’s life-long struggles with 
mental health and alcoholism and his abusive and dysfunctional childhood. 
(8) 
Although the judge’s statement, when viewed in isolation, might seem 
uncharitable, the totality of his comments made at sentencing demonstrate a 
thorough consideration of the mitigation arguments Warncke presented.  The 
 
2 Id. at A103. 
3 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
5 
 
sentencing judge acknowledged, for example, Warncke’s claim that he was no 
longer a violent person, but nevertheless concluded that his extensive criminal 
record and current lack of remorse—demonstrated through his insistence that he 
acted in self-defense—weighed against taking him at his word.  Warncke’s claim to 
non-violence was also undermined by his admission, in a pre-sentencing letter to the 
court, that he had recently gotten into a fight at the correction facility in which he 
was being held.  The judge also recognized Warncke’s mental-health needs, ordering 
the Department of Correction to conduct the appropriate evaluations and transferring 
him to his preferred prison, the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, where 
Warncke believed there to be better treatment options.  These considerations, taken 
together, lead us to conclude that the court did not sentence with a closed mind and 
thus did not abuse its discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be AFFIRMED IN PART and REMANDED IN PART for resentencing 
consistent with this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice