Title: State v. Myrick
Citation: 2014 WI 55
Docket Number: 2012AP002513-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2014

2014 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2513-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Raphfeal Lyfold Myrick, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 351 Wis. 2d 32, 839 N.W.2d 129 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI 123 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee  
 
JUDGE: 
Rebecca F. Dallet 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
GABLEMAN, PROSSER, ZIEGLER, JJJ., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven W. Zaleski, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief and oral argument by Leon W. Todd, 
assistant state public defender, with whom on the brief was 
Kelli S. Thompson, state public defender, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin State Public Defender. 
 
 
2014 WI 55
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2513-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF3494) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Raphfeal Lyfold Myrick, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 that reversed a judgment of conviction 
entered by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.2  Relevant to our 
review, a jury convicted defendant Raphfeal Lyfold Myrick of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Myrick, 2013 WI App 123, 351 Wis. 2d 32, 839 
N.W.2d 129. 
2 The Honorable Rebecca F. Dallet presided. 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 941.29(1) (2011-12).3  Myrick argues that the circuit court 
improperly admitted incriminating statements he made during the 
preliminary hearing for charges against Justin Winston.  Myrick 
claims that he made those statements in connection with an offer 
to plead guilty, and therefore Wis. Stat. § 904.10, which 
provides that "[e]vidence of statements made in court . . . in 
connection with . . . an offer . . . to plead guilty . . . [are] 
not admissible," prohibited their admission.  The State counters 
that § 904.10 does not apply because it was the prosecutor, not 
Myrick, 
who 
made 
an 
offer; 
Myrick 
only 
"accepted 
the 
prosecutor's offer to allow him to plead guilty."4   
¶2 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 904.10 prohibited the 
use of Myrick's preliminary hearing testimony at trial.  While 
it is true that the prosecutor made the initial overture to 
begin the plea bargaining process, Myrick offered to plead 
guilty and testified at Winston's preliminary hearing in 
connection with that offer.  We reach this conclusion not out of 
disregard for the distinction between offer and acceptance, but 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
The circuit court also entered a judgment on Myrick's 
guilty plea for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a previously 
convicted felon, which is not part of this review. 
4 Oral 
argument 
at 
9:30, 
available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=8588 (last visited June 20, 2014).   
The State phrases its position slightly differently in its 
brief, contending that "Myrick accepted an offer to make an 
offer to allow him to plead guilty." 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
3 
 
because only a defendant can offer to plead guilty.  We also 
note that a defendant's offer to plead guilty does not need to 
be express or explicit; it can be implied from words and 
conduct.  See State v. Norwood, 2005 WI App 218, ¶¶13, 20, 287 
Wis. 2d 679, 706 N.W.2d 683; State v. Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d 
688, 698, 523 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1994).  In addition to 
reflecting the plain language of the statute, our conclusion is 
consistent with the statute's purpose, which is to encourage 
free and open discussion between prosecutor and defendant during 
plea negotiations.  See State v. Nash, 123 Wis. 2d 154, 159, 366 
N.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1985).  Accordingly, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND5 
¶3 
On July 26, 2009, Winston picked Myrick up from work 
and decided to go look for a man called "Cooper," with whom 
Myrick and Winston had a history of disagreements.  When the two 
arrived at Cooper's house, Winston got out of the car and went 
inside while Myrick remained in the car.  A short while later, 
Winston came out holding a man with a shirt covering his face at 
gunpoint.  That man was not Cooper, but the murder victim, 
Marquise Harris, who was a stranger to Myrick. 
¶4 
After attempting to tell Winston that he had the wrong 
person, Myrick nonetheless opened the hatch of the vehicle so 
that Winston was able to force Harris into the back, where 
                                                 
5 The following facts are taken from Myrick's testimony at 
Winston's preliminary hearing, as well as Myrick's statements to 
the prosecutor.  
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
4 
 
Winston continued to hold Harris at gunpoint.  Following 
Winston's directions, Myrick drove around for a while and ended 
up in an alley.  All three individuals got out of the car.   
¶5 
Winston handed Myrick a pistol and told Myrick to 
shoot Harris.  Myrick fired a shot that missed Harris and went 
into a garage.  Harris hit the ground, and Myrick jumped in the 
passenger seat of the car.  Winston, who was in the driver's 
seat, noticed that Harris was not dead.  Winston then fired 
multiple shots from an assault rifle into Harris and sped off.   
¶6 
Police pulled Winston over minutes later for speeding, 
at which point Winston fled on foot and Myrick got out of the 
car, dropped a gun, and was arrested.    
¶7 
The State charged Myrick with first-degree intentional 
homicide as a party to the crime.  Myrick pled not guilty to the 
homicide charge.  The theory of his defense was that he did not 
help Winston kill Harris; he attempted to hinder Winston by 
intentionally missing when he shot at Harris.   
¶8 
On June 28, 2010, jury selection for Myrick's trial 
began.  Two days later, however, the court declared a mistrial.  
It began voir dire for a new trial that same day, and set the 
trial for July 6. 
¶9 
Before the second trial began, the State sent Myrick a 
letter.  It stated that if Myrick "debriefed" the State and 
agreed to "testify truthfully whenever called upon by the State" 
regarding Winston's criminal conduct, the State "w[ould] amend 
the charge regarding the murder of Marquise Harris to one of 
Felony Murder with an underlying charge of Armed Robbery."  The 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
5 
 
State was particularly interested in Myrick's cooperation 
because it suspected that Winston had killed not only Harris, 
but also Maurice Pulley, a witness for the State in a previous 
trial.  The letter went on to say, however, that "it w[ould] be 
at the discretion of [the] district attorney's office . . . as 
to whether the above negotiation will be conveyed to [Myrick] to 
settle the . . . case short of trial."   
¶10 The same day the State sent the letter, Myrick 
debriefed the State, thereby implicating himself in Harris' 
murder.  When the parties appeared for trial on July 6, they 
informed the court that a resolution had been reached, but no 
plea was taken.  Myrick proceeded to testify at Winston's 
preliminary hearing, making additional incriminating statements 
about his involvement in Harris' murder.  
¶11 Myrick's cooperation ended after he read a newspaper 
article that said Myrick shot Harris in the head.  Myrick became 
distrustful of the State, believing it had leaked false 
information to the press.  Because of his distrust, he refused 
to 
testify 
at 
Winston's 
trial, 
thereby 
terminating 
plea 
negotiations.  Myrick subsequently went to trial on the homicide 
charge.   
¶12 At trial, the State sought to introduce Myrick's 
testimony from Winston's preliminary hearing.  Myrick objected, 
arguing that admitting his testimony was improper because he 
gave it in connection with an offer to plead guilty.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 904.10. 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
6 
 
¶13 The 
circuit 
court 
overruled 
Myrick's 
objection, 
concluding that the statute did not apply to Myrick's testimony 
because he gave it after a plea agreement had been reached.  See 
Nash, 123 Wis. 2d at 159 (explaining that there is no need to 
protect incriminating statements a defendant gives after a plea 
agreement is finalized).  The court of appeals reversed.  It 
concluded that the State's letter to Myrick "reflect[ed] an 
ongoing plea-bargaining process" and that Myrick's testimony was 
"part and parcel of Myrick's reciprocal offer to the State."  
State v. Myrick, 2013 WI App 123, ¶¶2, 7, 351 Wis. 2d 32, 839 
N.W.2d 129.  We accepted the State's petition for review.  
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶14 The arguments in this case center around the circuit 
court's discretionary decision to admit Myrick's preliminary 
hearing testimony.  "[W]e will uphold a circuit court's decision 
to admit or exclude evidence if the circuit court examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper legal standard, and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion." 
State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶36, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610.  
In order to determine whether the circuit court applied the 
proper legal standard, we must interpret Wis. Stat. § 904.10 and 
apply 
that 
interpretation 
to 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case.  
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 
and 
application 
. . . 
present 
questions of law for our independent review, although we benefit 
from the previous interpretations of the court of appeals and 
the circuit court."  Id., ¶21.   
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
7 
 
B.  General Principles 
¶15 Plea bargaining plays a central role in our criminal 
justice system.  Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 
1381 (2012) ("criminal justice today is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials"); Missouri v. Frye, 566 
U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).  This is so because 
"[e]ffective criminal law administration would be difficult if a 
large proportion of the charges were not disposed of by guilty 
pleas."  2 McCormick on Evidence § 266, at 339 (Kenneth S. Broun 
ed., 7th ed. 2013).  Moreover, when properly administered, plea 
bargaining may benefit the State, defendants and the public as a 
whole.  See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) 
(discussing the "essential" and "highly desirable" implications 
of plea bargaining); contra Lafler, 566 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 
1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the "admirable belief 
that the law is the law, and those who break it should pay the 
penalty provided").   
¶16 In order to promote "the desirable[,] or at least 
necessary[,] process of plea bargaining," nearly every American 
jurisdiction has adopted a rule excluding some "admissions made 
in connection with plea negotiations that do not result in final 
pleas of guilty."  1 McCormick on Evidence § 160, at 878 
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013); see David P. Leonard, The 
New Wigmore:  A Treatise on Evidence § 5.1, at 5:3.  Those rules 
have attempted to balance "the practical need to encourage 
compromise through plea bargaining against the need for relevant 
information in criminal cases."  Leonard, supra, at 5:73.  They 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
8 
 
do so by excluding one or more of three types of incriminating 
statements:  (1) judicial confessions, which are incriminating 
admissions made in court, such as a defendant's testimony in a 
prior hearing or different proceeding; (2) guilty pleas and 
"statements made in connection with [a defendant's] offer to and 
acceptance by the trial court"; and (3) admissions made in 
connection with plea bargaining, which usually take place during 
negotiations with a prosecutor.  1 McCormick, supra, at 877-78. 
¶17 This case requires us to determine whether the 
Wisconsin rule, which excludes "[e]vidence of statements made in 
court . . . in connection with . . . an offer . . . to plead 
guilty," 
prohibits 
the 
use 
of 
incriminating 
testimony 
a 
defendant gave in order to keep the possibility of a plea 
bargain open.  Wis. Stat. § 904.10. 
¶18 We begin our interpretation with the plain language of 
the statute.  Wis. Indus. Energy Group, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of Wis., 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 
240; Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶20, 309 
Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  "If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 
236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  We give statutory language 
"its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  And, because 
"[c]ontext is important to meaning," we interpret statutory 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
9 
 
language "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole . . . to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46.  "Where statutory language is unambiguous, 
there 
is 
no 
need 
to 
consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation."  Id.   
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.10 
¶19 In order to "allow for free and open discussion 
between the prosecution and defense during attempts to reach a 
compromise" and "to promote the disposition of criminal cases by 
compromise," Wis. Stat. § 904.10 excludes evidence of offers to 
plead guilty.  Nash, 123 Wis. 2d at 159.  That statute provides 
in full as follows:  
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or 
a plea of no contest, or of an offer to the court or 
prosecuting attorney to plead guilty or no contest to 
the crime charged or any other crime, or in civil 
forfeiture actions, is not admissible in any civil or 
criminal proceeding against the person who made the 
plea or offer or one liable for the person's conduct. 
Evidence of statements made in court or to the 
prosecuting attorney in connection with any of the 
foregoing pleas or offers is not admissible. 
§ 904.10.  The statute "clearly and unambiguously indicates [an] 
intent to prohibit for any purpose the use of statements made in 
connection with a guilty plea, later withdrawn, at a subsequent 
trial."  See State v. Mason, 132 Wis. 2d 427, 433, 393 N.W.2d 
102 (Ct. App. 1986). 
¶20 In order to determine when a defendant made statements 
in connection with an offer to plead guilty, the court of 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
10 
 
appeals has adopted the following standard from the federal 
system: 
The trial court must . . . determine, first, whether 
the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation 
to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, 
and, second, whether the accused's expectation was 
reasonable 
given 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
objective 
circumstances.  
Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d at 698 (quoting United States v. 
Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978)).6  
¶21 This test recognizes that a defendant's offer need not 
be express or explicit; it can be implied from a defendant's 
words and conduct.  See Norwood, 287 Wis. 2d 679, ¶20.  For 
instance, in Norwood, a defendant wrote a letter to the circuit 
court judge in which he said that he wanted the judge to 
                                                 
6 See also United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 935-36 
(9th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Robertson test); United States v. 
Posey, 611 F.2d 1389, 1390 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United States 
v. Kearns, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1315 (D. Kan. 2000) (same); 
United States v. Melina, 868 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Minn. 1994) 
(same).   
The few courts that have questioned Robertson have done so 
because it 
does not require negotiations to be with a 
prosecutor.  See United States v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 818 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (concluding that the amended rule does not embrace 
Robertson's two-tiered test because it encompasses situations 
that are not true plea negotiations, such as those where the 
government agent had "no authority to make a deal"); United 
States v. Jasin, 215 F. Supp. 2d 552, 583-84 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(noting that Robertson was decided under a former version of the 
rule and that many courts have since held that statements to law 
enforcement are not protected); but see United States v. 
Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying 
Robertson to the amended rule); United States v. Ceballos, 706 
F.2d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).  The text of the 
Wisconsin rule, however, plainly requires that a defendant offer 
to plead guilty to a prosecutor or the court.    
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
11 
 
sentence him and place him in a facility with the care of 
"mental doctors" rather than go to trial.  Id., ¶13.  He wrote, 
"I don't want the people involved in my case to have to go to 
trial either.  I know they are good people and should not have 
to suffer for what I've caused to happen, which should not have 
come into their lives."  Id.  Upon considering the totality of 
the circumstances, and recognizing that "the only way he could 
avoid trial was to enter a plea," the court of appeals held that 
the letter was an offer to plead guilty or no contest, and 
therefore inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.10.  Id., ¶20.   
¶22 On the other hand, the Robertson test recognizes that 
every confession is not an offer to plead guilty: 
The offer by the defendant must, in some way, express 
the hope that a concession to reduce the punishment 
will come to pass.  A silent hope, if uncommunicated, 
gives the . . . prosecutor no chance to reject a 
confession he did not seek . . . [therefore,] the 
accused is required . . . to make manifest his 
intention to seek a plea bargain before he takes the 
route of self-incrimination. 
United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1978).  
Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 904.10 will not prevent the admission of 
a defendant's confession that was not made as part of plea 
negotiations with the district attorney.  Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d 
at 698. 
D.  Parties' Arguments 
¶23 The State makes several arguments as to why Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.10 does not prohibit the use of Myrick's preliminary 
hearing testimony.  Its main argument is that Myrick did not 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
12 
 
make an offer of any kind; rather, he accepted the prosecutor's 
offer to "allow him to plead guilty" at some point in the 
future.  Stated otherwise, the State says that the prosecutor 
offered "to consider making an offer to allow Myrick to plead to 
a reduced charge if Myrick complied with the conditions of the 
prosecutor's initial offer."  We reject this interpretation of 
§ 904.10.  
¶24 We begin with the observation that only a defendant 
can offer to plead guilty.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 
751 (1983).  Neither counsel, nor the circuit court, and 
certainly not the prosecutor, can plead guilty on a defendant's 
behalf.  Id.  It makes sense, then, that Robertson does not 
distinguish between a defendant's offer to plead guilty and a 
defendant's 
actions 
taken 
in 
accord 
with 
a 
prosecutor's 
suggested terms of a plea bargain.  It also explains why the 
State does not cite a single case outside of contract law, which 
it concedes does not apply, in support of the idea that 
statements a defendant makes while assenting to a prosecutor's 
proposal are not related to a defendant's own offer to plead 
guilty.  Put simply, "[p]lea bargaining implies an offer to 
plead guilty upon condition."  Levy, 578 F.2d at 901.    
¶25 Still, the State attempts to transform offering to 
plead guilty into something that a prosecutor can do.  The State 
says that Wis. Stat. § 904.10 does not apply when, as here, a 
prosecutor offers to allow the defendant to plead guilty.  Not 
only does this ignore the basic principle that a defendant can 
plead guilty with or without the prosecutor's consent, but it 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
13 
 
would require us to add the words "to allow" to the statute.  
Because "[w]e decline to read into the statute words the 
legislature did not see fit to write," we cannot accept the 
State's interpretation.  Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, 
¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316. 
¶26 Additionally, the State's argument ignores the reality 
of plea bargaining and is contrary to the purpose of the 
statute.  We agree with the following assessment of the office 
of the Wisconsin State Public Defender, which filed an amicus 
curiae brief in this case: 
[P]lea bargaining does not begin in any uniform or 
standard way.  Some prosecutors make plea offers at 
the outset of cases, others do not.  Some prosecutors 
put their offers in writing, others do not.  Sometimes 
defense attorneys begin the negotiations by proposing 
a plea agreement to the prosecutor.  These proposals 
may be in writing, or they may not.  Sometimes defense 
attorneys initiate plea negotiations informally by 
email or by asking the prosecutor something like, "is 
there room for a deal here?" or "can we work something 
out?"  It all depends on the individual facts of a 
case, the strengths and weaknesses of each side, what 
a 
defendant 
wants, 
and 
the 
personalities 
and 
strategies of the lawyers involved. 
The State's interpretation does not fit in this 
diverse world of plea bargaining.  The statute's goal 
is to encourage free and open negotiations in all 
criminal cases.  Yet under the State's theory, offers 
to plead guilty and related statements would be 
encouraged 
only 
if 
a 
defendant 
initiated 
the 
negotiations, and discouraged if the State did so.  
Prosecutors often make the initial plea offer.  So why 
should 
§ 904.10 
be 
construed 
to 
discourage 
negotiations in those cases?  What difference does it 
make who starts the bargaining?  The distinction is 
completely arbitrary. 
(citation omitted).   
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 The State also attempts to define "offer" by reference 
to the comparable federal rule.  The State claims that by 
protecting only offers to the prosecutor to plead guilty, the 
drafters of the rule intended to protect a narrower swath of 
statements than Fed. R. Evid. 410, which protects "statement[s] 
made during plea discussions."  Its position, the State says, 
preserves this "carefully considered departure[]" from the 
federal rule.  See John A. Decker, A New Wisconsin Evidence 
Code?, 56 Marq. L. Rev. xix, xxi (1973) ("In formulating the 
Wisconsin rules, uniformity with the Proposed Federal Rules was 
the overriding principle. . . . Changes from the federal rules 
were proposed only in instances where legal tradition or 
legislative enactment seemed substantially compelling or where 
Wisconsin law was more advanced.").  Again, we disagree.  
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.10 was enacted in 1974.  At that 
time, no federal rule on the topic had been enacted.  The 
proposed federal rule, however, provided as follows:  
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or 
a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead 
guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any 
other crime, or of statements made in connection with 
any 
of 
the 
foregoing 
pleas 
or 
offers, 
is 
not 
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against 
the person who made the plea or offer.  
Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 410, 56 F.R.D. 183, 228-29 
(1973). 
¶29 Therefore, at the time the Wisconsin rule was enacted, 
the proposed federal rule did not contain the language upon 
which the State relies.  Instead, it contained similar language 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
15 
 
about a defendant's "offer to plead guilty," making the State's 
comparison of the Wisconsin rule to the current federal rule 
inapposite. 
¶30 To be sure, the Wisconsin rule differed from the 
proposed federal rule in important ways at that time.  Relevant 
for 
our 
purposes, 
the 
Wisconsin 
rule 
specified 
that 
a 
defendant's offer must be to a court or prosecuting attorney.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.10, Judicial Council Committee's Note——1974 
("is narrowed to apply only to in-court proceedings or offers to 
the court to plead guilty").7  The federal rule, by contrast, 
originally contained no such limitation, and was interpreted by 
some courts to apply to incriminating statements a defendant 
made to a person other than the prosecutor.  United States v. 
Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The pre-amendment 
language could incorrectly be interpreted to make 'an otherwise 
voluntary admission to law enforcement officials inadmissible 
merely because it was made in the hope of obtaining leniency by 
a plea.'" (citation omitted)).8  Therefore, the change in the 
federal rule from "offer to plead guilty" language to "plea 
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority," had 
the effect of making the federal rule more similar to the 
                                                 
7 See also State v. Pischke, 198 Wis. 2d 257, 261-62, 542 
N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1995) (letter to a police offer not 
protected because it was not an offer to a court or prosecutor).  
8 E.g., United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 
1977) (statement to postal inspector protected under the former 
federal rule); United States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 
(6th Cir. 1976) (same).   
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
16 
 
Wisconsin rule, which expressly provides that offers must be to 
a court or prosecutor.  See Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(4); § 904.10; 
Rachlin v. United States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(amendment limited "the rule's application to plea negotiations 
between the defendant or his attorney" and a prosecutor).  As 
such, we cannot conclude that the State's comparison to the 
federal rule supports its argument. 
¶31 Finally, the State argues that even if Myrick made an 
offer, it was not an offer to plead guilty; rather, he offered 
to debrief the State and testify.  It is certainly true that not 
every confession is an offer to plead guilty.  For instance, in 
Nicholson, the court of appeals held that a prosecutor's promise 
to stand silent at sentencing in exchange for a truthful 
statement was not a plea negotiation.  Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d at 
698.9  However, Wis. Stat. § 904.10 excludes more than just 
offers to plead guilty; it says that statements made "in 
connection" with those offers are inadmissible as well.  As we 
explain in the following section, we have no trouble concluding 
                                                 
9 See also United States v. Morgan, 91 F.3d 1193, 1196 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (defendant's unconditional cooperation, with no 
discussion of a plea, in hopes of "bettering [his] situation 
somewhere down the road" was not part of plea negotiations); 
United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(defendant's spontaneous and unsolicited cooperation that placed 
no 
condition 
on 
his 
admissions 
was 
not 
part 
of 
plea 
negotiations); State v. Crockett, 886 So. 2d 1139, 1148 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004) (defendant's statements were not part of plea 
negotiations when the prosecutor "stated on the record that no 
deals were on the table nor would there ever be for the 
foreseeable future"). 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
17 
 
that Myrick testified in connection with his offer to plead 
guilty.  
E.  Application 
¶32 We conclude Myrick testified at Winston's preliminary 
hearing in connection with his offer to plead guilty that the 
State had not then accepted.  The prosecutor's letter discussed 
"settlement short of trial," which the court of appeals has 
previously held is an "implicit" way of discussing a plea.  
Norwood, 287 Wis. 2d 679, ¶20 (defendant's letter to the court 
that said he wanted to avoid trial and receive a sentence was an 
offer to plead guilty).  The prosecutor's letter said that if 
Myrick debriefed the State and provided testimony when asked, 
the State "w[ould] amend the charge regarding the murder of 
Marquise Harris to one of Felony Murder with an underlying 
charge of Armed Robbery" and "recommend a period of 12 to 13 
years of initial confinement."   
¶33 True to the public defender's description of plea 
bargaining, the remainder of negotiations were not perfectly 
memorialized in writing.  We do know, however, that Myrick began 
taking the steps the letter said were necessary to keep the 
possibility of a plea agreement on the table by debriefing the 
State on the same day the letter was dated.  We also know that 
when the parties appeared back in court four days later, the 
prosecutor informed the circuit court that an agreement had been 
reached and that Myrick "was willing to plead guilty to the 
charge of felony murder."  Finally, we know that after Myrick 
testified 
at 
Winston's 
preliminary 
hearing, 
the 
parties 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
18 
 
requested a date for entry of a plea.  From these circumstances, 
we conclude that Myrick exhibited a subjective expectation to 
negotiate a plea, and that Myrick's expectation was objectively 
reasonable.  As a final matter, we note that an exception the 
court of appeals recognized in Nash does not apply. 
¶34 In Nash, the defendant testified at the trials of 
other defendants as part of a plea bargain.  Nash, 123 Wis. 2d 
at 158.  At the time Nash gave that testimony, "the plea 
agreement had been reached" and there "was to be no more 
negotiation."  Id. at 159-60.  A federal district court later 
vacated Nash's conviction upon his habeas petition.  Id. at 156.  
Nash then stood trial and testified in his own defense.  Id. at 
158.  The State used Nash's earlier testimony from the trials of 
other defendants for impeachment purposes because his testimony 
at his own trial was inconsistent with his testimony at the 
other defendants' trials.  Id.   
¶35 The court of appeals upheld the use of Nash's prior 
testimony.  It concluded that Wis. Stat. § 904.10 does not 
exclude statements a defendant makes after plea negotiations are 
finalized.  In so doing, the court of appeals adopted the 
reasoning of two federal decisions, United States v. Stirling, 
571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1978) and United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 
677 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  Id. at 159.   
¶36 In Stirling, defendant Schulz entered into a written 
plea agreement that required him to testify before a grand jury.  
Stirling, 617 F.2d at 730.  Schulz testified as required, but 
after testifying, withdrew from the plea agreement and went to 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
19 
 
trial, where his grand jury testimony was used against him.  Id.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the use of the testimony.  It concluded that there was 
no need to exclude Schulz's statements because he made them 
"after formalization of a negotiated plea agreement."  Id. at 
731. 
¶37 Davis adopted the reasoning of Stirling.  In Davis, 
the defendant gave incriminating grand jury testimony "after 
formalization of a plea agreement but before the defendant ha[d] 
entered his plea."  Davis, 617 F.2d at 684.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that 
the district court properly admitted the statements because the 
testimony came after "all negotiations."  Id. at 685.10  As with 
Stirling, the court reasoned that "[e]xcluding testimony made 
after and pursuant to the agreement would not serve the purpose 
of encouraging compromise."  Id. 
¶38 Myrick's testimony does not come within exceptions 
recognized in Nash, Stirling, or Davis because negotiations were 
ongoing when Myrick testified at Winston's preliminary hearing.  
The State's letter to Myrick unequivocally informed Myrick that 
the State reserved discretion to refuse to amend the charge or 
recommend 12 to 13 years initial confinement.  It stated that 
"it will be at the discretion of [the] district attorney's 
                                                 
10 See also United States v. Watkins, 85 F.3d 498, 500 (10th 
Cir. 1996) ("both the language of, and the policy underlying 
[the rule] verify that once a plea agreement is reached, 
statements made thereafter are not entitled to the exclusionary 
protection of the Rule").   
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
20 
 
office as represented by the parties named above as to whether 
the above negotiation will be conveyed to you to settle the 
above-captioned 
case 
short 
of 
trial." 
 
Additionally, 
it 
characterized Myrick's testimony against Winston as "part of 
this negotiation" and said that it would amend the charge and 
recommend a reduced sentence "[s]hould we ultimately reach a 
negotiation."   
¶39 The State never amended the charge, and Myrick never 
entered a plea.  Nor did the parties formalize an agreement, as 
in Stirling and Davis.   
¶40 Moreover, Myrick's obligations under the district 
attorney's written proposal were not limited to testifying at 
Winston's preliminary hearing for the Harris murder.  The 
proposal required Myrick to "testify truthfully whenever called 
upon by the State."  This presumably referred to Winston's trial 
for the murder of Harris.  It also could have referred to the 
prosecution of Winston for the murder of Maurice Pulley, 
referenced above.  There is no indication that Myrick had given 
that testimony at the time of his preliminary hearing testimony 
against Winston.   
¶41 For these reasons, we conclude that there remained an 
incentive to protect Myrick's testimony given at the preliminary 
hearing. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 904.10 prohibited the 
use of Myrick's preliminary hearing testimony at trial.  While 
it is true that the prosecutor made the initial overture to 
No. 
2012AP2513-CR   
 
21 
 
begin the plea bargaining process, Myrick offered to plead 
guilty and testified at the preliminary hearing in connection 
with that offer.  We reach this conclusion not out of disregard 
for the distinction between offer and acceptance, but because 
only a defendant can offer to plead guilty.  We also note that a 
defendant's offer to plead guilty does not need to be express or 
explicit; it can be implied from conduct.  See Norwood, 287 
Wis. 2d 679, ¶¶13, 20; Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d at 698.  In 
addition to reflecting the plain language of the statute, our 
conclusion is consistent with the statute's purpose, which is to 
encourage free and open discussion between prosecutor and 
defendant during plea negotiations.  See Nash, 123 Wis. 2d at 
159.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I would 
read the Wisconsin rule regarding the admissibility of defendant 
statements made in connection with plea bargaining1 the same as 
the federal rule2 rather than continue to split hairs over the 
distinction between Wisconsin's "offer" rule and the federal 
"discussions" rule.  In my view, once plea negotiations have 
started, all statements made in connection with the negotiations 
should be excluded at trial, even if the negotiations break 
down.3 
¶44 Other 
states 
with 
similar 
textual 
discrepancies 
between the federal and state rule have adopted the federal 
test.4  I espouse a similar approach. 
¶45 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 904.10. 
2 Fed. R. Evid. 410. 
3 See United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 681 (7th Cir. 
2006) ("Statements made in the course of plea discussions with a 
prosecutor generally are inadmissible under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(f) and Federal Rule of Evidence 410."). 
4 See, e.g., People v. Tanner, 45 Cal. App. 3d 345, 351-52 
(4th Dist. 1975) (construing the evidentiary rule to cover 
"admissions made in the course of bona fide plea bargaining 
negotiations" despite limited statutory text); State v. Lavoie, 
551 A.2d 106, 108 (Me. 1988) ("Whether a statement ought to be 
excluded under [Maine Rule of Evidence] 410 depends on whether 
the discussion in which the statement was uttered may properly 
be characterized as a plea negotiation.") (quoting State v. 
Little, 527 A.2d 754, 756 (Me. 1987)). 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶46 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that Myrick made an offer to the State to plead 
guilty.  However, unlike the majority, I believe that the 
exception in State v. Nash, 123 Wis. 2d 154, 366 N.W.2d 146 (Ct. 
App. 1985), applies to this case because a final plea agreement 
was reached.  As a result, Myrick's testimony was properly 
introduced at trial.   
¶47 The established rule from Nash is that Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.10 does not bar testimony given after a plea agreement has 
been finalized.  The majority maintains that Nash does not apply 
in this case because "negotiations were ongoing when Myrick 
testified at Winston's preliminary hearing."1  However, the 
majority also goes on to observe that "the prosecutor informed 
the circuit court that an agreement had been reached"2 over a 
month prior to Myrick's testimony at Winston's preliminary 
hearing.  These two statements cannot be reconciled.  Put 
simply, the majority cannot have its cake and eat it, too——
either the plea negotiations were ongoing or negotiations were 
concluded.  The majority errs when it concludes that plea 
negotiations were ongoing at the time Myrick gave his testimony 
when, in fact, those negotiations had concluded.  The State 
described its arrangement with Myrick as a "plea agreement" on 
numerous occasions.  Moreover, a significant portion of Myrick's 
brief to this court is devoted to arguing that a plea agreement 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶38. 
2 Majority op., ¶33. 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
existed.  I would therefore hold that Myrick's testimony was 
properly admitted pursuant to the long-established rule in Nash.   
I. 
DISCUSSION 
¶48 In Nash, the defendant provided testimony against 
others pursuant to a plea agreement with the State.  123 
Wis. 2d at 149-50, 160.  Nash later withdrew from his agreement 
and decided to proceed to trial, and his earlier testimony was 
admitted against him.  Id. at 158.  Nash argued that his 
testimony was inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.10 because it 
was given "in connection with" his guilty plea, but the court of 
appeals disagreed, concluding that Wis. Stat. § 904.10 does not 
bar testimony provided after a plea agreement has been reached.  
Id. at 158-60. 
¶49 The court of appeals in Nash based its reasoning in 
part on two federal cases, United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 
708 (2d Cir. 1978), and United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 
(D.C. Cir. 1979).  In these cases, the defendants entered into 
plea agreements that required them to testify before grand 
juries, and the defendants withdrew from the agreements after 
testifying but before entering guilty pleas.  Both Stirling and 
Davis concluded that the statements were not barred by Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(e)(6), which contained identical language to Fed. R. 
Evid. 410.  See Stirling, 571 F.2d at 730 n.17, 731-32; Davis, 
617 F.2d at 682 n.13, 686.  The federal courts reasoned that, 
notwithstanding the fact that neither defendant had entered a 
guilty plea, "exclusion of the grand jury testimony would not 
serve the purpose of the rule because the testimony was given 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
3 
 
after all of the negotiations had been completed and the plea 
agreement was formalized."  Nash, 123 Wis. 2d at 159.   
¶50 In Nash, the court of appeals concluded that the 
analysis in Stirling and Davis applies with equal force in 
Wisconsin, reasoning that the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 904.10 "is 
the same as the purpose of the federal rule——to promote the 
disposition of criminal cases by compromise."  Id.  The court of 
appeals explained that when a plea agreement has been reached, 
there is "no more negotiation and, therefore, no more reason to 
promote negotiation."  Id. at 160.  This is particularly true 
when, like Myrick's testimony, the evidence in question is 
testimony delivered under oath, because unlike statements made 
in connection with plea negotiations, testimony given under oath 
is presumed truthful.  Id.  We offer protection to defendants 
during plea negotiations to incentivize truthfulness, but such 
protection is unnecessary when the defendant voluntarily agrees 
to testify under oath.  
¶51 Like the defendants in Stirling, Davis, and Nash, 
Myrick entered into a plea agreement that required him to 
testify against another.  Myrick later breached this agreement 
and decided to go to trial, and like these other defendants, his 
prior testimony was admitted against him.  The purpose of Wis. 
Stat. § 904.10 is not served by excluding Myrick's testimony, 
because he had already formalized an agreement with the State 
and agreed to plead guilty.  Likewise, there was no need to 
encourage Myrick to testify truthfully, because he had already 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
4 
 
agreed to provide truthful testimony as part of his plea 
agreement,3 and his testimony was delivered under oath.   
¶52 The majority relies on the terms of the State's 
proffer letter to argue that Myrick had not reached a formalized 
plea agreement with the State when he testified at Winston's 
preliminary hearing.4  To address this argument, we must look to 
the terms of the State's proffer letter and the circumstances 
surrounding Myrick's testimony at Winston's preliminary hearing.  
¶53 On July 2, 2010, four days before Myrick's case was 
scheduled for trial, the State sent Myrick a proffer letter with 
"an offer of resolution."  The letter explained that the State 
sought "debriefing and testimony in any case involving criminal 
conduct of Justin Winston."  The letter proposed an agreement in 
which Myrick testified against Winston "in exchange for" the 
State's recommendation of a reduced sentence.  According to the 
terms of the letter, the State would remain free to pursue "any 
or all investigative leads derived" from the debriefing, and 
after the debriefing was concluded, "it will be at the 
discretion of said district attorney's office . . . as to 
whether the above negotiation will be conveyed to you to settle 
the above-captioned case short of trial."  The letter also 
described Myrick's testimony against Winston as something that 
                                                 
3 The State's proffer letter to Myrick explained that if 
Myrick debriefed the State and the State then decided to enter 
into a plea agreement with Myrick, the State would recommend a 
reduced sentence "in exchange for" Myrick's "truthful testimony" 
against Winston.  
4 See majority op., ¶38.  
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
5 
 
would occur "should we ultimately reach a negotiation in this 
case." 
¶54 Myrick provided the State's requested debriefing on 
the same day the State sent its proffer letter.  On July 6, 
2010, the morning opening arguments were scheduled to begin in 
Myrick's trial, the State informed the circuit court that a 
"resolution had been reached" between the parties.  In response, 
the circuit court discharged the jury and scheduled the case for 
a status hearing.   
¶55 On August 13, 2010, Myrick testified against Winston 
at Winston's preliminary hearing.  Shortly thereafter, on 
September 9, 2010, and February 24, 2011, the parties appeared 
for status hearings before the circuit court and requested that 
the case be set over pending Myrick's testimony at Winston's 
trial.  The parties then informed the circuit court on May 23, 
2011, that they wished to schedule a date for entry of a plea 
after Winston's trial had concluded.  At the plea hearing two 
months later, the parties told the circuit court that Myrick had 
refused to testify in Winston's trial and, as a result, Myrick 
would not be entering a plea and the parties would proceed to 
trial. 
¶56 The facts in this case clearly demonstrate that Myrick 
had entered into a formalized plea agreement with the State that 
required his testimony in Winston's trial.  I agree with the 
majority that there was no formal plea agreement when the State 
wrote its letter; rather, the letter simply explained that the 
State wished to debrief Myrick and, based on the information he 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
6 
 
provided, it may choose to enter a plea agreement with him in 
which he would testify against Winston "in exchange for" a 
reduced sentence.  This comports with common sense, as the State 
would have no incentive to offer an agreement to Myrick until it 
ascertained what Myrick knew and would be willing to testify to 
under oath.  Therefore, the State indicated in the letter that 
"[a]fter the substance of the proffer/debriefing is conveyed to 
the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office . . . it will be 
at the discretion of said district attorney's office . . . as to 
whether the above negotiation will be conveyed to you to settle 
the above-captioned case short of trial."  The majority confuses 
the 
negotiation 
process——which 
continued 
through 
Myrick's 
debriefing——with the terms of Myrick's finalized plea agreement, 
which included his testimony at Winston's preliminary hearing in 
exchange for a reduced sentence. 
¶57 In other words, the letter recited the terms of a 
possible future plea agreement.  Myrick would testify for the 
State "should we ultimately reach a negotiation."  (Emphasis 
added).  There is a difference between the 
process of 
negotiation, which may or may not result in an agreement, and 
reaching a negotiation, which is an agreement by another name.  
Because the State ultimately "reach[ed] a negotiation" with 
Myrick, Myrick in turn testified for the State. 
¶58 Although there was no further written correspondence 
between the State and Myrick, it is obvious that the State 
ultimately opted to enter into a formalized plea agreement with 
Myrick after his debriefing, because pursuant to the terms of 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
7 
 
the proffer letter, Myrick later testified against Winston, and 
the parties scheduled a date for entry of a plea.  If there had 
been no plea agreement, the parties would not have scheduled a 
plea hearing, and Myrick would not have testified for the State.  
As Myrick's brief to this court makes clear, even he agrees that 
a plea agreement had been reached: 
Why would Myrick, in the middle of a first degree 
intentional homicide case and after exercising his 
right to remain silent for over one year, make 
incriminating statements in open court, unless he had 
the benefit and security of a "plea agreement?"  
A review of the record shows that the existence of a plea 
agreement was never in doubt.  For example, when the parties 
argued before the circuit court as to whether Myrick's testimony 
should be admitted, Myrick's counsel explained, "the only reason 
[Myrick testified] was because of the agreement he made pursuant 
to the proffer letter . . . ."  Likewise, if the parties had not 
reached an agreement, the State would not have informed the 
circuit court on the morning of trial, after a jury had already 
been selected, that "a resolution had been reached" between the 
parties.  Absent a plea agreement, the parties would have had no 
apparent reason to delay scheduling a trial through two 
subsequent status hearings and then specifically request a plea 
hearing on a date following Winston's trial.  Nor is it likely 
that the circuit court would have discharged the jury and 
scheduled a status hearing or agreed to schedule a plea hearing 
without a finalized plea agreement.  
¶59 The State also referred to the plea agreement between 
the parties in describing what testimony it wished to read to 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
8 
 
the jury: "Where I am gonna end is [line] 25, because then it 
goes into the plea agreement and what the plea agreement was, 
and that he had a plea agreement to testify."  The circuit court 
responded, "No, we're not getting into any plea agreement."  The 
State also asked Myrick's counsel if he wanted the jury to hear 
that "[w]e would recommend 12 to 13 years and he was willing to 
plead guilty to the charge of felony murder?"  Myrick's counsel 
replied, "I -- excise the portion about the plea deal, fine."  
Later, the State claimed, "The jury will know the reason he is 
giving testimony is pursuant to a proffer where he has a – 
agreed to plead guilty to felony murder and do 13 years in 
prison."  In sum, upon review of the record and the parties' 
briefs to this court, there is no question that Myrick's 
testimony at the preliminary hearing was given pursuant to the 
terms of a finalized plea agreement with the State.     
¶60  The majority's position is that, while Myrick made an 
offer to plead guilty, that offer never materialized into a 
formal plea agreement and remained in the negotiation phase at 
the time Myrick testified at the preliminary hearing.5  This 
position raises the obvious question: at what point, under the 
majority's reasoning, would the parties' negotiations have 
transformed into a plea agreement?  The majority provides no 
clear guidelines to indicate when the exception in Nash would 
apply.  Although the majority notes that "the State never 
amended the charge, and Myrick never entered a plea,"6 this 
                                                 
5 See majority op. ¶¶32, 38. 
6 Majority op. ¶39. 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
9 
 
clearly cannot be the baseline for when a plea agreement has 
been reached, because in both Stirling and Davis——the federal 
cases relied upon in Nash——the defendants never entered a guilty 
plea but still testified in accordance with a plea agreement.  
It cannot be reasonably argued that a plea agreement exists only 
once a defendant has formally entered a guilty plea.  Entry of a 
guilty plea is a condition of a plea agreement, but the 
agreement must exist prior to the actual plea——otherwise, how 
would the defendant know whether to plead?  The majority is left 
concluding that there was no plea agreement, without ever 
indicating how to determine whether a plea agreement exists.  In 
this case, the State expressly referred to a plea agreement, 
Myrick maintains there was a plea agreement, and the circuit 
court believed there was a plea agreement.  If this is not 
enough to conclude there was an agreement, it is difficult to 
fathom what is.  
¶61 I also note that the majority's rationale may have 
far-reaching practical implications for future cases.  No great 
imaginative leap is required to envision a scenario where the 
State elicits testimony from a defendant pursuant to a proffer 
letter like Myrick's, only to later claim that the parties never 
reached an agreement and refuse to fulfill its end of the 
bargain.  If the majority is correct that no plea agreement 
existed between the parties, nothing would have prevented the 
State from refusing to recommend a reduced sentence even if 
Myrick had testified at Winston's trial.  This preposterous 
result is the natural extension of the majority's reasoning, but 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
10 
 
its unfairness is self-evident.  Although this cannot possibly 
be the law, the majority opinion does not merely invite such a 
conclusion; the majority opinion would, in fact, require it.7   
¶62 The established rule from Nash is that testimony 
provided pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement is not barred 
by Wis. Stat. § 904.10.  The facts in this case——from the 
State's proffer letter and the parties' statements to the 
circuit court, to the circuit court's own comments and its 
decision to discharge the jury and later schedule a plea 
hearing——all unequivocally indicate that Myrick's testimony was 
delivered as part of a finalized plea agreement with the State 
and was admissible under Nash.  For this reason, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
7 Moreover, even if the majority is correct in its assertion 
that Myrick's testimony should not have been admitted during the 
State's case-in-chief, it is not at all clear that the testimony 
will be inadmissible in Myrick's new trial following this 
decision.  The State's proffer letter clearly stated, "nothing 
shall prevent the State . . . from using the substance of the 
proffer/debriefing at sentencing, or for any purpose at trial 
for 
impeachment 
or 
in 
rebuttal 
to 
testimony 
of 
your 
client . . . ." 
No.  2012AP2513-CR.mjg 
 
1