Title: Commonwealth v. Castillo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12316
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 6, 2020

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SJC-12316 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER CASTILLO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 13, 2020. - October 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Capital 
case.  Jury and Jurors.  Defense of Others.  
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 26, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
 
Robert L. Sheketoff for the defendant. 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Early in the morning on April 28, 2012, a 
senseless exchange of insults triggered a fight between two 
different groups of friends, culminating when the defendant, 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case and authored this opinion prior to his death. 
2 
 
Peter Castillo, shot the victim, Stephen Perez, once in the 
back, killing him.  A Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and the trial judge imposed the mandatory 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole.2 
The defendant claims that the judge erred in declining to 
instruct the jury on defense of another, in denying his motion 
for a required finding of not guilty on the issue of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and in instructing the jury regarding all 
of the extreme atrocity or cruelty factors set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983), where the 
evidence at most supported a finding as to only one of the 
factors.  The defendant also asks that we reconsider our jury 
instruction regarding the meaning of "extreme atrocity or 
cruelty," specifically the instruction that a jury may find 
extreme atrocity or cruelty if the finding is based on one of 
the Cunneen factors, because that instruction does not provide 
"a fair measure to distinguish between murder in the first 
degree and murder in the second degree."  Finally, the defendant 
requests that we exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the jury's verdict to murder in the 
                                                 
2 The jury also convicted the defendant of possession of a 
firearm without a license.  The judge sentenced the defendant to 
from five to six years in State prison on this conviction, to 
run concurrently with the murder sentence. 
3 
 
second degree based on the paucity of evidence of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
We discern no error in the judge's decision not to instruct 
the jury on defense of another or in his denial of the 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty on the 
conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  However, we agree that we must 
revise our jury instructions regarding the Cunneen factors 
prospectively to more closely comport with the meaning we have 
always given to the term "extreme atrocity or cruelty."  We 
accordingly include a new provisional jury instruction in an 
Appendix to this opinion.  We also conclude that, based on the 
meager evidence of extreme atrocity or cruelty in this case, we 
should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the degree of guilt to murder in the second degree, which 
is a verdict more consonant with justice in light of the facts 
in this case. 
Background.  Where the defendant claims that the evidence 
is insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's finding 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty, we present the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 72 (2004). 
On Friday, April 27, 2012, the victim and four of his 
friends went to a nightclub in Boston.  Just before 2 A.M. on 
4 
 
Saturday morning, as the group headed back to their car, they 
asked a bystander to take a photograph of them together.  While 
the bystander took the photograph, a woman in a passing car, 
Jasmine Montero, shouted, "you fucking white boys," at the 
group, and the victim responded by shouting back, "fat spic."  
The car stopped, and the two continued yelling at each other.  
Montero then got out of the car and angrily approached the 
victim and his friends.  The driver, Hector Lopez, also got out 
of the car, initially trying to calm Montero down; however, he 
soon started arguing with the victim, and the two eventually got 
into a fist fight. 
Lopez and Montero had been out that night with a group of 
their friends:  Luis Sepulveda, Sepulveda's girlfriend, Hector 
Ramirez, Marlon Ramirez, Jonathan Gonzalez, and the defendant.  
When the fight broke out between Lopez and the victim, this 
group had been heading back to their minivan in a nearby parking 
garage.  Gonzalez was speaking with Montero on his cellular 
telephone when he heard "screaming and yelling" on Montero's 
end.  Knowing where Montero had parked, he ran out of the 
parking garage in her direction to see what was happening and 
found her having an argument with the victim and his friends, 
while Lopez and the victim were exchanging blows.  He tried to 
5 
 
hold Montero and Lopez back and then called Marlon3 to help him 
break up the fight.  Marlon ran toward the fight, followed by 
Sepulveda and the defendant, who first grabbed a loaded handgun 
from the minivan. 
When Marlon reached the scene, he saw Lopez, with his face 
bloody, surrounded by the victim and his friends.  The fighting 
had calmed down by that point, and the two groups had largely 
separated, but Marlon reignited the violence by punching one of 
the victim's friends, Christopher Testa, twice in the face.  
Testa put his hands up in a defensive posture and said that he 
had nothing to do with the fight, at which point Marlon switched 
his attention to the victim.  Marlon and Lopez both advanced 
toward the victim, and Marlon and the victim exchanged several 
punches.  While the two continued to fight, the defendant drew 
his gun and shot the victim once in the back from a few feet 
away. 
After the shooting, the defendant fled the scene and was 
picked up by his friends in the minivan.  Marlon, meanwhile, 
apparently unaware that the victim had been shot, chased him 
through the parking lot, still trying to fight, until he saw 
Hector, who said that someone was shooting.  Marlon and Hector 
left the scene and were picked up by Montero, Lopez, Gonzalez, 
                                                 
3 Because they share a last name, we refer to Hector Ramirez 
and Marlon Ramirez by their first names. 
6 
 
and the defendant in the minivan.  The group headed to a party 
in Lynn, where the defendant cleaned the gun.  The next day, he 
threw it into a body of water and booked a ticket to the 
Dominican Republic, where he was eventually apprehended and 
extradited back to the United States. 
When first responders arrived at the scene, they found the 
victim collapsed on the ground, struggling to breathe and in 
apparent pain.  As paramedics transferred him to a stretcher, 
the victim sat up and reached out.  Several times in the 
ambulance, and again in the hospital, the victim opened his 
eyes, gasped for breath, and tried to grasp for anything within 
reach.  The gunshot wound ultimately caused his death:  the 
bullet had entered the left side of his back and had severed his 
abdominal aorta, the main large blood vessel carrying blood to 
the body, causing him to bleed out internally. 
The jury in this case were literally able to see the fight 
because two people at the scene used their cellular telephones 
to video-record the altercation as it happened, one person from 
ground level and the other from above within the parking garage.  
The ground-level video captured the actual shooting:  in that 
video and the still photograph taken from it, the jury could see 
the defendant firing the sole fatal shot. 
Discussion.  1.  Defense of another.  At trial, the focus 
of the defense case was that the shooting was justified because 
7 
 
the defendant acted in lawful defense of his friend Marlon, who 
was fighting the victim when the shot was fired.  However, over 
defense counsel's objection, the judge declined to instruct the 
jury on defense of another.  On appeal, the defendant argues 
that he was entitled to the instruction and that the judge erred 
in declining to provide it.  We disagree. 
Because the defendant objected to the judge's decision not 
to provide the instruction, we review his claim for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 348 (2016).  
"The elements of defense of another are well settled:  'An actor 
is justified in using force against another to protect a third 
person when (a) a reasonable person in the actor's position 
would believe his intervention to be necessary for the 
protection of the third person, and (b) in the circumstances as 
that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third 
person would be justified in using such force to protect 
himself.'"  Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 168 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 (2012).  A 
defendant is entitled to an instruction on defense of another 
only "if the evidence, viewed in its light most favorable to 
him, is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to both these 
elements."  Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 774 (2011). 
Here, even in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
the evidence does not support an instruction on defense of 
8 
 
another.  According to the defendant's own testimony, when he 
reached the scene, the fighting had settled down, and it was 
Marlon who "squared up" against the victim and moved closer 
before the victim punched Marlon in the face.  Marlon then "went 
to approach [the victim] again," and the victim punched him a 
second time.  It was at that point, as Marlon and the victim 
exchanged additional blows, that the defendant shot the victim.  
In these circumstances, no reasonable person would believe that 
Marlon would have been justified in using deadly force to 
protect himself.  See Adams, supra. 
A person who initiates a fight cannot generally claim self-
defense.  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 136 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Maguire, 375 Mass. 768, 772 (1978) ("the 
right of self-defense ordinarily cannot be claimed by a person 
who provokes or initiates an assault").  Only if the initial 
aggressor "withdraws [from the fight] in good faith and 
announces his intention to retire" can he then claim self-
defense if the other party continues to attack.  Commonwealth v. 
Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 110 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. 
Naylor, 407 Mass. 333, 335 (1990).  And "the privilege to use 
deadly force 'arises only in circumstances in which the 
defendant uses all proper means to avoid physical combat.'"  
Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 426 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 209 (2010). 
9 
 
Where a reasonable person, seeing what the third party saw, 
should recognize that the person defended would not be entitled 
to claim self-defense, the third party cannot claim defense of 
another.  See Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 136, citing Adams, 458 Mass. 
at 775.  Here, the defendant's own testimony suggests that 
Marlon initiated the fight and made no attempt to withdraw.  In 
fact, Marlon continued to approach the victim and to escalate 
the fight even after being punched.  Under such circumstances, 
no reasonable person would believe that Marlon would have been 
entitled to use deadly force in his defense.  And because that 
option was not available to Marlon, it was not available to the 
defendant.  We therefore conclude that the judge did not err in 
declining to instruct the jury on defense of another. 
2.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  At the close of the 
Commonwealth's case, defense counsel moved for a required 
finding of not guilty on the ground that the Commonwealth had 
not presented sufficient evidence of premeditation to sustain a 
conviction of murder in the first degree.  The judge denied the 
motion.  Defense counsel renewed the motion, without specifying 
the theory being challenged, at the close of all the evidence, 
and the judge again denied it.  The judge instructed the jury on 
two theories of murder in the first degree:  premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Over the objection of the 
defendant, the judge gave an instruction on extreme atrocity or 
10 
 
cruelty that laid out all seven of the factors specified in 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  On appeal, the defendant raises 
three claims related to the issue of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty:  (1) that the judge erred in denying his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty; (2) that there was no 
evidentiary support for six of the seven Cunneen factors and 
that it was therefore error to instruct the jury on those 
factors; and (3) that we should require a finding that the 
defendant intended to commit an extremely atrocious or cruel 
killing for a jury to find the defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  We 
consider each of these in turn. 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In reviewing the denial 
of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we determine 
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). 
To convict the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the defendant 
committed an unlawful killing with malice aforethought and with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 
11 
 
Mass. 37, 45 (2012).  "Malice is defined in these circumstances 
as an intent to cause death, to cause grievous bodily harm, or 
to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, 
a reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow."  Id. at 45-46, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 377 (2006).  There was 
overwhelming evidence of malice here.  The defendant admitted 
that he believed he was the only person at the scene with a gun, 
that he knew the gun was loaded, and that he pointed it at the 
victim and fired.  There is no question either that he intended 
to kill or seriously injure the victim, or that, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known that his conduct created a plain and strong 
likelihood of death. 
To find that the defendant committed the murder with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty under our existing common law, the 
jury had to find evidence of at least one of the factors 
enunciated in Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227:  "indifference to or 
taking pleasure in the victim's suffering, consciousness and 
degree of suffering of the victim, extent of physical injuries, 
number of blows, manner and force with which delivered, 
instrument employed, and disproportion between the means needed 
to cause death and those employed."  See Commonwealth v. Hunter, 
416 Mass. 831, 837 (1994). 
12 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that, after 
being shot, the victim was struggling to breathe.  The paramedic 
testified that on several occasions in the ambulance and in the 
emergency department, the victim opened his eyes, gasped for 
breath, sat up for a bit, and tried to grasp for anything within 
reach, including the paramedic's hands and wrist.  Based on 
these facts, a reasonable jury could have found that the 
Commonwealth had proved beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 
required Cunneen factors -- consciousness and degree of 
suffering of the victim -- and therefore that the killing was 
unusually cruel or atrocious under our existing case law.  
Because the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant 
was guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, there was no error in the judge's 
denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty. 
b.  Jury instruction.  With regard to the jury instruction 
on extreme atrocity or cruelty, the defendant claims that the 
only basis for the jury to find extreme atrocity or cruelty was 
the victim's suffering and that it was error for the judge to 
instruct the jury on the other six factors, for which there was 
no factual support.  We disagree. 
"It is well established in this Commonwealth that a verdict 
cannot stand unless it appears that the jury reached their 
13 
 
verdict on a theory for which there was factual support."  
Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 635 (1996).  If each of 
the Cunneen factors were distinct elements or separate theories 
of culpability, the judge's instruction would be erroneous.  But 
we have repeatedly concluded that the Cunneen factors are not 
elements of the crime or separate theories of culpability; they 
are simply "'evidentiary considerations' that guide the jury's 
determination as to whether the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the element of a killing with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty."  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 197-198 
(2017).  See Commonwealth v. Obershaw, 435 Mass. 794, 809 
(2002); Commonwealth v. Hunter, 427 Mass. 651, 657-658 (1998) 
(Hunter II).  Therefore, the jury did not need to be unanimous 
as to the particular Cunneen factor or factors they found; it 
suffices that each individual juror found beyond a reasonable 
doubt one of the Cunneen factors.  See Obershaw, supra.  The 
jury needed to be unanimous only in finding the required element 
that the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
We agree with the defendant that the evidence supported 
only one Cunneen factor:  "consciousness and degree of suffering 
of the victim."  The Commonwealth argues that two additional 
Cunneen factors support the verdict:  the extent of the injuries 
suffered and the nature of the weapon used to inflict those 
injuries.  We are not persuaded.  In Commonwealth v. Brown, 386 
14 
 
Mass. 17, 19 (1982), the defendant killed his mother by firing a 
single rifle shot, which passed through her chin to her head.  
We noted that where "her body showed no other signs of injuries, 
the judge correctly instructed the jury that they could not find 
that her murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  
Id. at 28 n.11.  A single gunshot through the victim's back, 
without more, is no different, except that death here was not 
instantaneous and the victim consciously suffered before his 
death.4 
Because there was evidence only of this one Cunneen factor, 
the judge would not have erred had he chosen to instruct the 
jury that they must find the factor of "consciousness and degree 
of suffering of the victim" in order to find the element of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  There is no requirement that 
judges instruct on all of the factors.  See Commonwealth v. 
                                                 
4 This is not to say, however, that a single blow can never 
lead to a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  A single 
strike or blow may implicate "indifference to or taking pleasure 
in the victim's suffering," the "extent of physical injuries," 
the "manner and force with which delivered," and the 
"disproportion between the means needed to cause death and those 
employed."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glass, 401 Mass. 799, 
802–803 (1988) (defendant stabbed victim and twisted blade to 
inflict greater injury); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 
260 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978) (single blow with 
baseball bat showed "evidence of great and unusual violence in 
the blow, which caused a four-inch cut on the side of the 
skull"); Commonwealth v. Eisen, 358 Mass. 740, 746 (1971) 
(victim "died as the result of an extensive head wound inflicted 
by a heavy, blunt instrument, perhaps an axe, applied with 
moderate to severe force"). 
15 
 
Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 454 (1984) ("we do not interpret our 
decisions discussing the factors to be considered on the issue 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty as imposing a mandatory burden on 
a judge to recite each and every factor").  But, where there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty based on one Cunneen factor, the judge did not err in 
instructing the jury on all of the Cunneen factors. 
c.  Refinement of the Cunneen factors.  Before we consider 
whether we should revise our model jury instruction regarding 
the element of extreme atrocity or cruelty, we look at the 
origin of that phrase, its original meaning, and the evolution 
of its interpretation. 
i.  Evolution of "extreme atrocity or cruelty."  At common 
law, murder was defined as "the killing of any person . . . with 
malice aforethought, either express or implied by law" (emphasis 
in original).  Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 304 (1850).  
"There was only one degree [of murder], and it was punishable 
with death."  Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 489 (1905). 
In 1858, the Legislature enacted St. 1858, c. 154, which 
codified the common law of murder but revised it by dividing 
murder into two degrees of guilt:  murder in the first degree 
and in the second degree.  Under St. 1858, c. 154, "murder 
committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or 
16 
 
in the commission of an attempt to commit any crime punishable 
with imprisonment for life, or committed 'with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty,' was declared to be murder in the first degree and 
punishable with death."  Tucker, 189 Mass. at 490.  "Murder not 
appearing to be in the first degree was declared to be murder in 
the second degree, and punishable with imprisonment for life."  
Id.  See St. 1858, c. 154, §§ 2, 5.  This definition, now 
codified as G. L. c. 265, § 1, has remained undisturbed since 
1858, except that murder in the first degree is "punishable with 
death or imprisonment for life."5  See St. 1951, c. 203. 
Until the passage of St. 1858, c. 154, our case law did not 
consider the meaning of "extreme atrocity or cruelty" because 
there was no need to:  all murders committed with "malice 
aforethought" were punished with death, regardless of the extent 
of their atrocity or cruelty.  But in enacting St. 1854, c. 154, 
the Legislature intended "largely to mitigate the harshness of 
the common law rule imposing a mandatory death penalty on all 
murderers."  Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 803 
(1977) (Quirico, J., concurring).  Consequently, only the 
presence of an aggravating element -- deliberate premeditation, 
commission during the course of a felony punishable with death 
                                                 
5 This court declared the death penalty unconstitutional in 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 171-172 (1984). 
17 
 
or life imprisonment, or extreme atrocity or cruelty -- would 
justify capital punishment.  See St. 1858, c. 154. 
In 1879, in Commonwealth v. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253, 255 
(1879), this court first articulated the meaning of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty: 
"The crime of murder always implies atrocity and cruelty in 
the guilty party; but there are degrees of criminality in 
that respect, even in the felonious and malicious taking of 
human life; and, in order to justify a finding of murder in 
the first degree, it requires that something more than the 
ordinary incidents of the crime shall exist -- something 
implying more than ordinary criminality, and manifesting a 
degree of atrocity or cruelty which must be considered as 
peculiar and extreme.  The nature of the question is such 
that it must be largely left to the determination of the 
jury; and, when there is sufficient evidence to justify it, 
their finding must be conclusive." 
 
And in all of the early cases in which this court affirmed 
convictions of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, the defendant's conduct in killing 
the victim manifested "a degree of atrocity or cruelty which 
must be considered as peculiar and extreme."  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 516, cert. denied, 304 
U.S. 565 (1938) ("many blows of extreme violence upon a living 
body"); Commonwealth v. Feci, 235 Mass. 562, 571 (1920) 
("defendant either alone or assisted by others killed the 
deceased by stabbing and wounding him in many parts of his 
body"); Devlin, supra (prostrate victim stomped upon and kicked 
to death over course of several hours); Commonwealth v. 
18 
 
Desmarteau, 16 Gray 1, 10 (1860) (rape, brutal beating, and 
subsequent drowning of eight year old child).  The focus in 
these cases was on the means used to kill the victim and whether 
"the means used were extreme as compared with ordinary means of 
producing death."  Devlin, supra. 
In determining whether the defendant's conduct in killing 
the victim was extreme, we often considered "the resulting 
effect on the victim, in terms of the extent of physical injury 
and the degree of suffering endured."  Commonwealth v. Lacy, 371 
Mass. 363, 367 (1976).  And we also considered whether the 
defendant was indifferent to the pain he or she was inflicting 
on the victim or took pleasure from its infliction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 684 (1980), and cited 
cases.  But the focus remained on the defendant's conduct:  on 
whether the defendant's method or means of killing the victim 
was reasonably likely to substantially increase or prolong his 
or her conscious suffering, on whether the means used by the 
defendant were excessive and out of proportion to what would be 
needed to kill a person, and on the extent to which the 
defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in the victim's 
pain. 
In 1983, in Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 217, the defendant had 
slit the throat of the thirteen year old victim with "multiple 
blows of marked force inflicted by a strong cutting instrument."  
19 
 
We rejected the defendant's argument that the jury should have 
been instructed that, to find extreme atrocity or cruelty, they 
first needed to find that the defendant knew that his acts were 
atrocious or cruel.  Instead, we adhered to our long-standing 
view that "proof of malice aforethought is the only requisite 
mental intent for a conviction of murder in the first degree 
based on murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  
Id. at 226-227.  We then "delineated a number of factors which a 
jury can consider in deciding whether a murder was committed 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty," including the "consciousness 
and degree of suffering of the victim," which have come to be 
known as the Cunneen factors.  See id. at 227. 
 
These factors were not originally meant to be an exhaustive 
list; nor were the jury required to find one or more of the 
factors.  But in 1989, in Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 
282, 289-290, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989), the court 
concluded that our definition of extreme atrocity or cruelty was 
not void for vagueness and noted in support of that conclusion 
that jurors considered the Cunneen factors in determining 
whether a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
Then, in 1994, in Hunter, 416 Mass. at 837, we declared that a 
jury could not find extreme atrocity or cruelty without finding 
at least one of the Cunneen factors. 
20 
 
This requirement was intended to protect defendants by 
ensuring that a jury's finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
was based on a particular finding of fact.  And in most cases, 
it would be protective of defendants because six of the seven 
factors delineated in Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227 -- "indifference 
to or taking pleasure in the victim's suffering, . . . extent of 
physical injuries, number of blows, manner and force with which 
delivered, instrument employed, and disproportion between the 
means needed to cause death and those employed" -- pertain to 
the defendant's conduct and bear directly on whether a murder 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
But the seventh factor -- "consciousness and degree of 
suffering of the victim" -- if it were allowed to stand alone as 
sufficient to support a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
permits a defendant to be found guilty of murder in the first 
degree in some circumstances even if his conduct were not 
extremely atrocious or cruel.  For instance, a jury applying the 
Cunneen factors could find a defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty if he 
shot a victim in the leg, precisely because he did not want to 
kill the victim, where the victim nonetheless died a painful 
death.  In fact, the extent of a victim's conscious suffering 
may bear on matters of chance or on whether the defendant was a 
poor shot, rather than on whether the conduct of the defendant 
21 
 
was unusually atrocious or cruel.  A victim's substantial degree 
of conscious suffering may support a finding of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty where it is the reasonably likely consequence of the 
defendant's actions, as it would have been in Cunneen, but not 
where it stands alone as a factor, divorced from the 
egregiousness of the defendant's conduct. 
The discordance of allowing a finding of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty to be based solely on the degree of the victim's 
conscious suffering is best seen by considering what our model 
jury instruction says about extreme atrocity or cruelty before 
it addresses the Cunneen factors: 
"The third element is that the killing was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Extreme atrocity means an act 
that is extremely wicked or brutal, appalling, horrifying, 
or utterly revolting.  Extreme cruelty means that the 
defendant caused the person's death by a method that 
surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of a human 
life.  You must determine whether the method or mode of a 
killing is so shocking as to amount to murder with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The inquiry focuses on the 
defendant's action in terms of the manner and means of 
inflicting death, and on the resulting effect on the 
victim."  (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 54-55 (2018).  The entire 
focus of this instruction is on the defendant's "actions," his 
"manner and means of inflicting death."  But under our current 
jurisprudence, the jury are permitted to find extreme atrocity 
or cruelty based only on "the consciousness and degree of 
suffering of the deceased."  See id. at 56. 
22 
 
The defendant asks us to remedy this anomalous situation by 
requiring the jury to find that the defendant intended to commit 
an extremely atrocious or cruel murder.  We have declined to 
require this finding many times before.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 442 (1995); Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 
399 Mass. 863, 879 (1987); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 
249, 260 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); 
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 358 Mass. 407, 415 (1970).  And we 
decline to do so again.  As we said in Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 
227, "proof of malice aforethought is the only requisite mental 
intent for a conviction of murder in the first degree based on 
murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  See 
Commonwealth v. Monsen, 377 Mass. 245, 254 (1979) ("we think 
that the Legislature intended to exact the greater punishment 
. . . solely on the basis of the shocking, unnecessary, and 
often painful manner in which the death has been caused.  
Although the inference that the actor possesses a particularly 
brutal state of mind might be warranted by the objective 
circumstances of the killing, no such inference is necessary in 
order to convict"). 
But insofar as our current common law diverges from the 
Legislature's original purpose of reserving capital punishment 
only for the most heinous murders, we agree with the defendant 
that the factors the jury may consider should be connected to 
23 
 
the extreme nature of the defendant's conduct.  "Extreme 
atrocity means an act that is extremely wicked or brutal, 
appalling, horrifying, or utterly revolting" (emphasis added).  
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra.  "[E]xtreme cruelty 
means that the defendant caused the person's death by a method 
that surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of human life" 
(emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 437 
(2003).  Indeed, we have always defined extreme atrocity or 
cruelty with reference to the extreme nature of the defendant's 
conduct and, as noted, we do so in our model jury instructions.  
So, to the extent that the Cunneen factors may, in some 
instances, permit a jury to find extreme atrocity or cruelty 
based only on the degree of a victim's suffering, without 
considering whether the defendant's conduct was extreme in 
either its brutality or its cruelty, we now revise them and set 
forth a new provisional jury instruction in an Appendix to this 
opinion. 
To find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant caused the death of the 
deceased with extreme atrocity or cruelty, future juries must 
consider the following three evidentiary factors.  The first is 
whether the defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in the 
suffering of the deceased.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  The 
second is whether the defendant's method or means of killing the 
24 
 
deceased was reasonably likely to substantially increase or 
prolong the conscious suffering of the deceased.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 546–547 (2010) 
(defendant's use of strangulation, "a method of killing that is 
by its nature slow and painful," increased victim's conscious 
suffering).  The third is whether the means used by the 
defendant were excessive and out of proportion to what would be 
needed to kill a person.  See Cunneen, supra.  In considering 
this final factor, juries may consider the extent of the 
injuries to the deceased; the number of blows delivered; the 
manner, degree, and severity of the force used; and the nature 
of the weapon, instrument, or method used.  Id.  A jury cannot 
make a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty unless it is based 
on one of these three factors, although, as we have stated 
previously, the jury need not unanimously agree on which of the 
factors underlie their verdict.  See Hunter II, 427 Mass. at 
658.  This revision of the factors, we believe, better 
distinguishes the conduct that warrants a conviction of murder 
in the first degree from the conduct that should result in a 
conviction of murder in the second degree. 
ii.  Retroactivity of revised factors.  These revised 
factors are to be applied only in murder trials that commence 
after the date of issuance of this opinion.  Indeed, we do not 
apply them retroactively even here; rather, as discussed infra, 
25 
 
we reduce the defendant's conviction pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "to consider broadly the whole case on the 
law and the facts to determine whether the verdict is 'consonant 
with justice,'" not based on any errors in the proceedings 
below.  Gould, 380 Mass. at 680, quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 
380 Mass. 1, 15 n.20 (1980). 
In enacting St. 1858, c. 154, the Legislature "did not 
change the common law definition of murder as recognized by our 
courts, but simply manifested the intention of the Legislature 
to consider murder as a crime 'the punishment of which may be 
more or less severe according to certain aggravating 
circumstances, which may appear on the trial.'"  Tucker, 189 
Mass. at 490, quoting Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray 438, 444 
(1858).  See Green v. Commonwealth, 12 Allen 155, 170 (1866) 
("the statute establishing degrees of murder did not create any 
new offence or change the definition of murder as it was 
understood at common law"); Desmarteau, 16 Gray at 9 ("The 
court, upon the trial of the present case, properly instructed 
the jury that the technical definition of murder in this 
commonwealth was the common law definition of murder as 
recognized by the court prior to the St. of 1858, c. 154 
. . .").  As we have noted in previous cases, even after passage 
of St. 1858, c. 154, "the elements of murder liability continued 
to rest in the domain of the common law."  Commonwealth v. 
26 
 
Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 828 (2017) (Gants, C.J., concurring), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  And "where we revise our 
substantive common law of murder, we are free to declare that 
our new substantive law shall be applied prospectively, much 
like the Legislature may do when it revises substantive criminal 
statutes."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 645 (2020). 
Likewise, the contours of these aggravating factors have 
always been a matter of common law.  In Gould, 380 Mass. at 685-
686, this court held that "the jury should no longer be 
'restricted to considering only the defendant's course of 
action, but [should be] permitted to consider the defendant's 
[mental impairment] as an additional factor to be weighed in 
determining whether the murder was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.'"  Commonwealth v. Breese, 389 Mass. 540, 
546 (1983), quoting Gould, supra.  But although this decision 
changed the scope of extreme atrocity or cruelty, we did not 
give it retroactive effect.  Breese, supra at 550.  Likewise, in 
Commonwealth v. Semedo, 422 Mass. 716, 726 (1996), we held that 
our decision in Hunter, 416 Mass. at 837, which made evidence of 
at least one of the Cunneen factors a mandatory prerequisite for 
a jury finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty, was not 
retroactive.  See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 573 
(2002); Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 790 (1997).  Where 
we once again merely alter the factors bearing on extreme 
27 
 
atrocity or cruelty, we once again declare that the rule shall 
be applied only prospectively. 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant asks 
that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce his conviction to murder in the second degree.  "Our duty 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is to consider broadly the whole case 
on the law and the facts to determine whether the verdict is 
'consonant with justice.'"  Gould, 380 Mass. at 680, quoting 
Davis, 380 Mass. at 15 n.20.  And although we recognize that our 
authority under § 33E "is to be exercised sparingly," 
Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 95 (1977), we are convinced 
that, here, a conviction of murder in the first degree would not 
be consonant with justice. 
The defendant's conduct -- firing a single shot into the 
victim's back -- was stupid, senseless, and cowardly.  Indeed, 
where it tragically caused the death of a young man, it was 
atrocious and cruel.  See Devlin, 126 Mass. at 255 ("The crime 
of murder always implies atrocity and cruelty in the guilty 
party . . .").  But "extreme cruelty means that the defendant 
caused the person's death by a method that surpassed the cruelty 
inherent in any taking of human life" (emphasis in original).  
Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. at 437.  Nothing about the facts of this 
case suggests that the defendant's conduct met that standard.  
Under our common law of murder at the time of the verdict, the 
28 
 
jury were permitted to find extreme atrocity or cruelty based 
solely on the victim's conscious suffering before his death.  
Having now prospectively revised our common law and having now 
reviewed the entirety of the trial record, we conclude that a 
verdict of murder in the second degree, with its life sentence 
with the possibility of parole, is the more just verdict in this 
case. 
Conclusion.  The verdict of murder in the first degree and 
the sentence imposed are vacated and set aside.  The matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court, where a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the second degree is to be entered and the defendant 
is to be sentenced accordingly.  The verdict of illegal 
possession of a firearm, which is not challenged on appeal, is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
Appendix. 
 
 
Extreme atrocity means an act that is extremely wicked or 
brutal, appalling, horrifying, or utterly revolting.1  Extreme 
cruelty means that the defendant caused the person's death by a 
method that surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of a 
human life.2  You must determine whether the method or mode of a 
killing is so shocking as to amount to murder with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.3  The inquiry focuses on the defendant's 
action in terms of the manner and means of inflicting death, and 
on the resulting effect on the victim.4 
 
In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 546–547 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Perry, 432 Mass. 214, 219-220, 224-227 
(2000). 
 
2 See Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 437 (2003) 
("judge correctly impressed on the jury that '[e]xtreme cruelty 
means that the defendant caused the person's death by a method 
that surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of human 
life'" [emphasis in original]). 
 
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunter, 416 Mass. 831, 837 
(1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 628, 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 843 (1970) ("mode"). 
 
4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. at 581, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 684 (1980) 
("inquiry focuses both on the defendant's actions, in terms of 
the manner and means of inflicting death, and on the resulting 
effect on the victim"). 
2 
 
deceased with extreme atrocity or cruelty, you must consider the 
following factors:5 
1.  Whether the defendant was indifferent to or took 
pleasure in the suffering of the deceased;6 
2.  Whether the defendant's method or means of killing the 
deceased was reasonably likely to substantially increase or 
prolong the conscious suffering of the victim;7 or 
3.  Whether the means used by the defendant were excessive 
and out of proportion to what would be needed to kill a 
person.8  In considering whether the means used by the 
defendant were excessive and out of proportion to what 
would be needed to kill a person, you may consider: 
                                                 
5 Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass.    ,     (2020) 
(revising factors articulated in Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 
Mass. 216, 227 [1983]). 
 
6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 825 (2013) 
(defendant mimicked victim's pleading while describing how he 
"choked her out"); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 202 
(2005) (defendant bragged about brutal murder after crime); 
Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. at 431. 
 
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. at 546–547 
(defendant's use of strangulation, "a method of killing that is 
by its nature slow and painful," increased victim's conscious 
suffering); Commonwealth v. Glass, 401 Mass. 799, 802–803 (1988) 
(defendant stabbed victim and twisted blade to inflict greater 
injury). 
 
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 601 
(2002) (after victim raised arms in act of surrender, defendant 
shot at victim seven times, hitting him four times; two wounds 
were potentially fatal). 
3 
 
a.  the extent of the injuries to the deceased;9 
b.  the number of blows delivered;10 
c.  the manner, degree, and severity of the force 
used;11 and 
d.  the nature of the weapon, instrument, or method 
used.12 
You cannot make a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty unless 
it is based on one or more of the three factors I have just 
listed.13  [Where there is evidence of only a single blow]  A 
murder committed by a single blow may be extremely cruel or 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. at 802-803 
(photograph depicting depressed skull fracture highly probative 
on extent of injury victim sustained). 
 
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 457 Mass. 69, 71 
(2010) (evidence consistent with twenty-five blows from hammer 
to victim's head). 
 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. at 825 (victim 
was hit in back of head with hard, flat object); Commonwealth v. 
Carlson, 448 Mass. 501, 502-503 (2007) (defendant "stomped on 
[victim's] abdomen, kicked her in the groin, and slammed her 
head on the floor ten times"; autopsy revealed "'massive 
contusions' in the abdomen and genitalia that required a degree 
of force that might occur in an automobile accident"). 
 
12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 Mass. 48, 55 
(2009) (defendant used sport utility vehicle to strike former 
wife and then drive back over her). 
 
13 See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. at    . 
4 
 
atrocious where there is evidence of one or more of these three 
factors.14 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glass, 401 Mass. 799, 802–803 
(1988) (defendant stabbed victim and twisted blade to inflict 
greater injury); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 260 
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978) (single blow with 
baseball bat showed "evidence of great and unusual violence in 
the blow, which caused a four-inch cut on the side of the 
skull"); Commonwealth v. Eisen, 358 Mass. 740, 746 (1971) 
(victim "died as the result of an extensive head wound inflicted 
by a heavy, blunt instrument, perhaps an axe, applied with 
moderate to severe force").