Title: Commonwealth v. Wentworth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12633
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 2019

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SJC-12633 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EZARA WENTWORTH. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 7, 2019. - July 24, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Assault and Battery.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, 
Sentence, New trial, Indictment, Assistance of counsel.  
Evidence, Prior violent conduct, Guilty plea. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 21, 2011. 
 
 
A motion to vacate a sentence and for a new trial, filed on 
September 14, 2017, was considered by David Ricciardone, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jessica LaClair for the defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case presents an opportunity to clarify 
the application of the Massachusetts armed career criminal act 
2 
 
(ACCA), G. L. c. 269, § 10G.  Specifically, we address whether 
the "modified categorical approach," as discussed in our recent 
cases, is the appropriate analytical framework, in certain 
statutes, when determining whether a predicate offense under the 
ACCA involved "force."  The defendant, Ezara Wentworth, was 
indicted for a number of unlawful firearm offenses.1  The 
indictments charging the firearm offenses also alleged that the 
defendant previously had been convicted of three violent crimes 
and thus was subject to enhanced penalties under the ACCA.  
After negotiations with the Commonwealth, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to carrying a loaded firearm unlawfully as an armed 
career criminal with one predicate offense.2  See G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (a). 
Following this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Beal, 
474 Mass. 341 (2016), where we declared the residual clause of 
the ACCA unconstitutionally vague, the defendant filed a motion 
to vacate the ACCA conviction and sentence and for a new trial, 
                     
1 A grand jury returned additional indictments against the 
defendant:  assault and battery on a police officer; vandalizing 
property; negligent operation of a motor vehicle; operating a 
motor vehicle with a suspended license; failure to stop for 
police; and resisting arrest. 
 
2 The defendant also pleaded guilty to assault and battery 
on a police officer, possessing a firearm with a defaced serial 
number, vandalizing property, negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle, operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and 
resisting arrest. 
3 
 
which was denied.  The defendant appealed from the denial, and 
we granted his application for direct appellate review.  On 
appeal, he argues that (1) his indictment was defective and 
therefore void because it did not set forth the alleged ACCA 
predicate convictions; (2) none of his predicate offenses is a 
violent crime under the ACCA; (3) his plea counsel was 
ineffective; and (4) his guilty plea on the ACCA charge was not 
entered into intelligently and voluntarily. 
We conclude that the defendant's indictment was not void 
because the indictment along with the grand jury minutes 
provided sufficient notice to the defendant of the crimes 
charged.  We also conclude that the defendant's conviction of 
assault and battery was a conviction of a violent crime in these 
circumstances and could serve as a predicate offense under the 
ACCA.  Finally, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective and 
that the defendant's guilty plea was made intelligently and 
voluntarily.  We affirm.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Arrest.  We briefly discuss the facts, 
reserving more detail for later discussion.  On February 13, 
                     
3 The Commonwealth argues that "several" issues on appeal 
are not properly before this court because they were not raised 
below.  However, all four issues on appeal are present in the 
defendant's pro se motion to vacate the charges brought under 
the Massachusetts armed career criminal act (ACCA), G. L. 
c. 269, § 10G, and for a new trial.  Therefore, all issues on 
appeal are properly before this court. 
4 
 
2011, responding to a report that several gunshots had been 
fired in the area, police encountered the defendant behind the 
wheel of a vehicle parked in the middle of the street.  As 
police approached to question him, the defendant fled in his 
vehicle.  Police pursued the defendant until he struck a parked 
vehicle, lost control of his vehicle, hit a snowbank, and came 
to a stop after hitting a utility pole.  The defendant ran from 
the scene, but a police officer caught him.  In the ensuing 
quarrel, the defendant struck an officer in the face.  After the 
defendant's arrest, police found a loaded handgun in his 
vehicle. 
b.  Indictments and pleas.  A grand jury returned ten 
indictments against the defendant, including two ACCA level 
three indictments:  one premised on possession of the handgun 
found in the vehicle, and another premised on possession of the 
ammunition in the handgun found in the vehicle.  The ammunition-
related indictment alleged that the defendant "had previously 
been convicted of three violent crimes or three serious drug 
offenses . . . or any combination thereof totaling one," and the 
firearm-related indictment alleged that he "had previously been 
convicted of three violent crimes or three serious drug 
offenses, or any combination totaling three or more."  The 
indictments did not list any prior convictions, except that the 
firearm-related indictment also alleged that that charge was a 
5 
 
second or subsequent offense based on the defendant's previous 
conviction of carrying a dangerous weapon.  The grand jury heard 
an officer testify about the defendant's previous convictions of 
resisting arrest, assault and battery, and carrying a dangerous 
weapon. 
The Commonwealth agreed to dismissal of the ammunition-
related ACCA level three charge and to reducing the firearm-
related ACCA level three charge to a level one charge.  In 
exchange, the defendant pleaded guilty to the majority of the 
charges, including the ACCA level one charge.  At the plea 
colloquy, the judge and the Commonwealth made it apparent that 
the defendant was pleading guilty to possession of a firearm 
with one prior ACCA conviction -- a domestic assault and battery 
from 2005.  The prosecutor stated:  "As to the predicate [ACCA] 
offense, [the defendant] was convicted in 2005 of a domestic 
assault and battery . . . .  The allegations of that domestic 
for the [assault and battery] predicate, we have to show 
violence; that he . . . struck his girlfriend at the time in the 
face and shoved her down on the bed."  To follow up, the judge 
asked the defendant, "[D]id you hear everything that the 
prosecutor just told me? . . .  Are the facts as stated by the 
prosecutor correct?"  The defendant answered, "Yes."  Again, the 
judge ascertained from the defendant that he understood he was 
"being charged with a crime that involves an enhanced penalty or 
6 
 
a more serious punishment," in this case, "a firearm as a career 
criminal, with a prior predicate offense."  The judge warned the 
defendant that, by pleading guilty, he could face enhanced 
penalties in the future.  The defendant acknowledged that he 
understood and pleaded guilty to the charges. 
c.  Motion to vacate the conviction and sentence and for a 
new trial.  After we declared that the residual clause of the 
ACCA was unconstitutional in Beal, the defendant filed a motion 
to vacate the ACCA conviction and sentence and for a new trial.  
The defendant's motion was denied without a hearing.  The motion 
judge, who was also the plea judge, concluded that the 
defendant's guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily; that 
the predicate conviction of assault and battery was 
unquestionably violent; and that, by pleading guilty, the 
defendant waived any challenge to the grand jury proceedings. 
2.  Standard of review.  A judge may grant a motion for a 
new trial if it appears that justice may not have been done.  
Commonwealth v. Duart, 477 Mass. 630, 634 (2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 1561 (2018).  The decision to deny such a motion lies 
within the sound discretion of the judge and will not be 
reversed unless it is manifestly unjust or unless the trial was 
infected with prejudicial constitutional error.  Commonwealth v. 
Nieves, 429 Mass. 763, 770 (1999).  Therefore, we review the 
denial of a motion for a new trial for a significant error of 
7 
 
law or other abuse of discretion.  Duart, supra.  We give 
special deference to the decision of a judge who was, as here, 
the plea judge.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 316 
(2014). 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Indictment.  As an initial matter, the 
defendant argues that the ACCA indictment and subsequent plea 
are void because the indictment itself did not set forth any 
prior violent crimes or serious drug offenses.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the defendant was provided sufficient notice of the 
crime and enhanced sentence in the indictment.  Additionally, 
the Commonwealth contends that at no time did the defendant seek 
a bill of particulars, per Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (b) (1), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004), nor did he indicate at the 
plea colloquy that the indictment was void or defective. 
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
provides:  "No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or 
offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and 
formally, described to him . . . ."  "'[F]air notice of the 
charges is a touchstone' of due process under art. 12" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 547 (2013).  
Rule 4 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 378 
Mass. 849 (1979), sets out the necessary components of an 
indictment, including "a plain, concise description of the act 
which constitutes the crime or an appropriate legal term 
8 
 
descriptive thereof."  "A complaint or indictment will not be 
dismissed . . . 'if the offense is charged with sufficient 
clarity to show a violation of law and to permit the defendant 
to know the nature of the accusation against him.'"  Canty, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 519-520 
(1999), cert denied sub nom. Martinez v. Massachusetts, 530 U.S. 
1281 (2000).  Moreover, "[a]n indictment shall not be dismissed 
or be considered defective or insufficient if it is sufficient 
to enable the defendant to understand the charge and to prepare 
his defense; nor shall it be considered defective or 
insufficient for lack of any description or information which 
might be obtained by requiring a bill of particulars."  G. L. 
c. 277, § 34. 
Here, the indictment was not defective.  The indictment 
stated that the defendant was charged with unlawful possession 
of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and that he "had 
previously been convicted of three violent crimes or three 
serious drug offenses, or any combination totaling three or 
more, making [him] subject to the penalty provisions of [G. L. 
c. 269, § 10G (c)]."  The indictment sufficiently stated the 
charge against the defendant and the sentence enhancement, 
tracking the language of the statute, and provided notice that 
the enhanced sentence relied on the three predicate offenses.  
Notably, the ACCA does not identify a "freestanding crime"; 
9 
 
rather, it provides sentence enhancements, based on prior 
offenses, for violations of § 10.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c).  
See also Fernandes, 430 Mass. at 520-521, quoting Bynum v. 
Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 708-709 (1999) ("The prior offense 
is not an element of the crime for which a defendant is charged 
but concerns the punishment to be imposed if he is convicted 
. . ."). 
Further, had the defendant not understood the charge, "he 
could have moved for a bill of particulars under Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 13 (b) (1) . . . or moved to dismiss the indictment under 
G. L. c. 277, § 47A."  Canty, 466 Mass. at 548.  Although the 
defendant can raise at any time an "objection based upon a 
failure to show jurisdiction . . . or the failure to charge an 
offense," per G. L. c. 277, § 47A, the indictment did not fail 
to charge the defendant with a crime.  That the indictment 
failed to list the three predicate offenses relied upon does not 
render it defective, as the defendant was provided fair notice 
of the charge and the accompanying sentence enhancement based 
upon three previous convictions of violent crimes or serious 
drug offenses. 
The defendant cites Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 
169 (2005), to argue that "the predicate offense must be alleged 
in the . . . indictment."  See Commonwealth v. Harrington, 130 
Mass. 35, 36 (1880) ("the offence . . . is not fully and 
10 
 
substantially described to the defendant, if the complaint fails 
to set forth the former convictions which are essential features 
of it").  Unlike in Pagan and Harrington, where the indictments 
failed entirely to set forth that they were based on prior 
convictions, this ACCA indictment stated that it was based on 
three predicate charges.  See Fernandes, 430 Mass. at 522 
("Article 12 requires some statement regarding the prior 
conviction before a defendant can be subjected to an enhanced 
penalty").  The transcript from the grand jury minutes provided 
to the defendant and the plea colloquy demonstrate that the 
defendant was on notice and sufficiently understood, and 
accepted as fact, the predicate convictions on which the 
indictment was based.  During the plea hearing, the prosecutor 
read into the record that the ACCA indictment was based on a 
2005 assault and battery where the defendant "struck his 
girlfriend at the time in the face and shoved her down on the 
bed."  The judge asked the defendant whether he understood what 
the prosecutor was alleging, and the defendant answered that he 
did.  See Canty, 466 Mass. at 549 ("it is clear from the plea 
colloquy that the defendant admitted to the missing element of 
the . . . indictment by admitting to the prosecutor's statement 
of facts").  The judge also repeatedly confirmed with the 
defendant and defense counsel that they had spoken and that the 
defendant understood the charges against him.  Although the 
11 
 
better practice is for the ACCA indictment to specify at least 
the date of the prior offense, the date of the conviction, and 
the court in which such a conviction was obtained, see 
Fernandes, supra at 523, all things considered, the defendant 
was on notice of the crimes with which he was charged.  
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976), quoting Smith v. 
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941) (defendant must have "real 
notice of the true nature of the charge against him").  See 
Commonwealth v. Colantoni, 396 Mass. 672, 679 (1986). 
b.  Assault and battery as "violent crime."  The defendant 
pleaded guilty to an ACCA level one offense with assault and 
battery as the predicate.  G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a).  He argues 
that even if his ACCA indictment were valid, his prior 
convictions of assault and battery, resisting arrest, and 
carrying a dangerous weapon do not qualify as predicate offenses 
under either the "force clause" or the "residual clause" of the 
ACCA.  He contends that the invalidated "residual clause" of the 
ACCA cannot be applied retroactively.  Furthermore, he claims 
that the "force clause" of the ACCA demands a strictly 
categorical, elements-focused approach, which prohibits inquiry 
into the factual means underlying the prior conviction.  That 
is, by pleading guilty to assault and battery, he did not 
necessarily admit to committing a battery involving "force." 
12 
 
We begin by discussing how we have interpreted predicate 
offenses under the ACCA.  The ACCA provides a staircase of 
mandatory minimum and maximum enhanced punishments for certain 
weapons-related offenses if a defendant has been previously 
convicted of a "violent crime" or a serious drug offense.  See 
G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a).  For example, a defendant convicted of 
a first offense of unlawful possession of firearm under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h), faces a maximum penalty of two years in a 
house of correction and no mandatory minimum sentence.  The same 
offense committed after a person incurs a prior conviction under 
the ACCA carries a three-year mandatory minimum sentence in 
State prison and up to fifteen years in State prison.  See G. L. 
c. 269, § 10G (a).  The mandatory minimum rises with each prior 
conviction under the ACCA:  two prior convictions mandate a 
sentence of from ten to fifteen years in State prison, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10G (b); three prior convictions mandate a sentence of 
from fifteen to twenty years in State prison.  G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (c). 
Under the ACCA, a "violent crime" is 
"any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year . . . that:  (i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force or a 
deadly weapon against the person of another; (ii) is 
burglary, extortion, arson or kidnapping; (iii) involves 
the use of explosives; or (iv) otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious risk of physical injury to 
another." 
 
13 
 
G. L. c. 140, § 121.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (e).  In Beal, 474 
Mass. at 351, we held that the fourth clause of the definition 
of a violent crime, the "residual" clause, is unconstitutionally 
vague.  Accordingly, to constitute a violent crime under the 
ACCA, the crime must fall within the scope of either the "force" 
clause or the enumerated crimes provisions.  Id. at 349.  Only 
the "force" clause is in play in the present case. 
 
Historically, we have used two approaches to determine 
whether a prior conviction is applicable conduct that falls 
under the ACCA.  The first approach, the "categorical approach," 
generally requires a court to look only to the fact of 
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.  
Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 15 (2011).  This 
approach has been applied when interpreting the "serious drug 
offense" prong of the ACCA.  See Commonwealth v. Ware, 75 Mass. 
App. Ct. 220, 223 (2009), and cases cited. 
In other cases, we have applied the categorical approach 
when determining whether a defendant has allegedly committed an 
offense that subjects him or her to pretrial detention for 
dangerousness, G. L. c. 276, § 58A.4  See Scione v. Commonwealth, 
                     
4 We note that although we have applied a strictly elements-
based approach for dangerousness hearings, those hearings are 
pretrial determinations conducted by a judge in the Superior 
Court.  Unlike sentencing enhancement trials, a defendant does 
not have the right to a trial by jury to determine whether he or 
she is dangerous under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
14 
 
481 Mass. 225, 228 (2019) ("we take a categorical approach, that 
is, we look at the elements of the offense, rather than the 
facts of or circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct"); 
Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 711–716 (2009). 
In Commonwealth. v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 814 (2012), we 
first considered how we analyze prior convictions where the 
conviction was under a broad statute, that is, a statute in 
which different types of conduct -- not all being violent -- can 
result in a conviction.  There, a defendant argued that a 
certified conviction of assault and battery did not suffice, by 
itself, to prove that his prior conviction was for a "violent 
crime" under the ACCA.  We began by analyzing the common-law 
crime of assault and battery.  We stated that under the common 
law there are two theories of assault and battery:  intentional 
battery and reckless battery.  Id. at 818 & n.13.  Offensive 
battery and harmful battery are forms of intentional battery.  
Id. at 818.  A harmful battery is "[a]ny touching with such 
violence that bodily harm is likely to result" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Id.  An offensive battery occurs when "the 
defendant, without justification or excuse, intentionally 
touched the victim, and . . . the touching, however slight, 
occurred without the victim's consent" (citation omitted).  Id.  
We concluded that the "physical force" required to make an 
offense a "violent crime" must be violent force, and that 
15 
 
because a conviction of assault and battery, as appearing on a 
certified conviction, may rest on a nonviolent "touching, 
however slight," the defendant's certified conviction alone did 
not suffice to show that he had been convicted of a "violent 
crime."  Id. at 818-819. 
We noted that the straightforward categorical approach 
applies to predicate offenses under the ACCA when the statutory 
definition of the prior offense unambiguously qualifies that 
offense as a predicate conviction.5  However, we stated that 
"[t]he categorical approach does not always produce a conclusive 
determination whether the defendant has been convicted of a 
'violent crime.'"  Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 816.  In some cases, 
where the defendant's predicate conviction is based on a "broad 
statute that encompasses multiple crimes, not all of which are 
'violent crimes,'" we employ a "modified categorical approach."  
Id.  Under this approach, the jury at an ACCA enhancement trial 
are permitted to consider additional evidence, after a judge 
determines that it is admissible, to determine whether a 
predicate conviction is a "violent crime" under the force 
clause.  Id. at 817.  Using the modified categorical approach, 
for a predicate conviction to count against the defendant, the 
                     
5 For example, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (rape), states:  "Whoever 
has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a 
person, and compels such person to submit by force and against 
his will . . ." (emphasis added). 
16 
 
jury must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction 
involved violence.  Id. 
 
Since our decision in Eberhart, we twice have stated that 
at an ACCA subsequent enhancement trial, the Commonwealth may be 
able to show that a crime was "violent" even if the elements of 
the crime alone do not show that it was violent.  In Beal, 474 
Mass. at 351, the defendant was convicted of numerous firearm 
offenses.  In his subsequent ACCA enhancement trial, the 
Commonwealth entered in evidence certified copies of previous 
convictions of assault and battery and assault and battery on a 
public employee.  Much like in Eberhart, we held that because 
neither of his previous convictions was a categorically violent 
crime, the certified copies of the convictions alone were not 
enough to sustain the Commonwealth's burden of proving a violent 
crime under the force clause.  Id. at 352-353.  We once again 
restated that the use of the modified categorical approach is 
appropriate in circumstances where the predicate conviction 
falls under a broad statute, like assault and battery.  Id. at 
351.  We also confirmed that harmful battery and reckless 
battery each qualify as a "violent crime" under the force clause 
because each "has as an element the use, attempted use or 
threatened use of physical force."  Id. at 351-352, quoting 
G. L. c. 140, § 121.  Therefore, assault and battery 
necessitates a modified categorical approach to determine 
17 
 
whether the committed offense was "violent" within the meaning 
of the ACCA.  Id. at 352. 
 
A year later, in Commonwealth v. Mora, 477 Mass. 399, 406 
(2017), we were asked to decide whether a certified conviction 
of unarmed robbery alone provided probable cause that the 
defendant had committed a "violent crime."  Again, we held that 
because a robbery conviction may be returned without proof of 
violent physical force, the certified conviction by itself did 
not show that the defendant was convicted of a "violent crime."  
Id. at 407-408.  And once again, we recognized that "[b]ecause 
the crime of robbery can encompass conduct satisfying one of 
several definitions, not all of which are violent, to determine 
whether robbery is a violent crime for purposes of the act, the 
Commonwealth must provide not only the certified record of 
conviction but also evidence of the circumstances surrounding 
the robbery."  Id. at 408. 
 
Applying our guidance from Eberhart, Beal, and Mora, it is 
apparent that the assault and battery to which the defendant 
pleaded guilty in this case involved "violence."  As part of a 
favorable deal from the Commonwealth, the defendant pleaded 
guilty as a ACCA level one offender with a 2005 domestic assault 
and battery as the predicate offense.  He therefore waived any 
claim to the lack of sufficient evidence that he committed a 
"violent" crime.  See Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 449 Mass. 825, 
18 
 
831 (2007) ("By pleading guilty, the defendant gave up his right 
to pursue a challenge to [the sufficiency of the evidence], and 
therefore his plea generated a judgment that is final . . .").  
During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor stated:  "As to the 
predicate [ACCA] offense, [the defendant] was convicted in 2005 
of a domestic assault and battery . . . ."  The prosecutor 
acknowledged that the Commonwealth had to show "violence."  To 
do so, the prosecutor elaborated that the facts of the domestic 
assault and battery were that the defendant "struck his 
girlfriend at the time in the face and shoved her down on the 
bed."  The defendant agreed to the facts presented by the 
prosecutor.  This evidence is sufficient "evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding" the assault and battery to 
demonstrate a touching with such violence that bodily harm is 
likely to result -- i.e., a harmful battery.  See Mora, 477 
Mass. at 408. 
Nonetheless, the defendant contends that the United States 
Supreme Court's decisions in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2251 (2016), and Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 
263-264 (2013), overrule our cases and compel us to use an 
elements-based approach in determining whether a predicate 
offense constitutes one of force.6  We disagree with this 
                     
6 In Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016), 
the United States Supreme Court considered Iowa's burglary 
19 
 
                     
statute, which forbids entering "an occupied structure" without 
permission with the intent to commit a felony.  Iowa Code 
§ 713.1.  "Occupied structure" is defined, for purposes of this 
statute, as "any building, structure, appurtenances to buildings 
and structures, land, water or air vehicle, or similar place 
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied by 
persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other 
activity therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything 
of value."  Iowa Code § 702.12.  The Supreme Court first 
explained that the Iowa statute is broader than "generic 
burglary," which is an enumerated violent felony under the 
Federal armed career criminal act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
See Mathis, supra at 2248, 2250–2251.  The Court next considered 
how Iowa courts interpret this statute and determined that the 
different locations are not alternative elements creating 
separate crimes but, instead, are simply alternative means of 
violating a single locational element.  Id. at 2250–2251, 2255–
2256.  The Court concluded that the District Court's reliance on 
a conviction of burglary under Iowa law could not be saved by 
the "categorical approach" -- i.e., looking to charging papers 
and considering whether the defendant actually burglarized a 
building or dwelling.  Id. at 2257.  See Dawkins v. United 
States, 829 F.3d 549, 550 (7th Cir. 2016), citing Mathis, supra.  
The Court held that the statute is nondivisible and 
categorically not a violent felony.  Dawkins, supra, citing 
Mathis, supra at 2248–2249, 2257–2258. 
 
Under the Federal ACCA, sentencing judges use a 
"categorical approach" to determine whether a prior conviction 
qualifies as a predicate offense.  See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2251; Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).  
Courts "compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of 
the defendant's conviction with the elements of the 'generic 
crime' -- i.e., the offense as commonly understood.  The prior 
conviction qualifies as [a Federal] ACCA predicate only if the 
statute's elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of 
the generic offense."  Descamps, supra.  Where the prior 
conviction was predicated on a "divisible" statute in which the 
elements of the offense were listed in the alternative, such 
that one alternative formed the basis of an ACCA predicate while 
another did not, a trial court could determine which set of 
elements formed the basis of the conviction by considering "a 
limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury 
instructions" in the record of conviction.  Id.  This "modified 
categorical approach" is not an exception to the categorical 
approach but, rather, a tool that "retain[ed] the categorical 
20 
 
contention for primarily two reasons.7  First, under Federal law, 
a judge, not a jury, determines whether a defendant's prior 
offenses are considered predicate felonies under the Federal 
ACCA.  See Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 816.  The Supreme Court's 
rationale for the Federal categorical approach is based on 
concerns arising under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution from "sentencing courts' making findings of fact 
that properly belong to juries."  Descamps, supra at 267.  See 
United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 29 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018).  Sixth Amendment concerns that 
compel the judicial use of the categorical approach are not 
present here because, in Massachusetts, a defendant is entitled 
to a jury trial to determine whether a sentence enhancement 
under the ACCA is applicable.8  See Beal, 474 Mass. at 351; 
                     
approach's central feature:  a focus on the elements, rather 
than the facts, of a crime."  Id. at 2285. 
 
7 Under the Federal categorical approach, courts ask whether 
there is any realistic way of committing the crime that does not 
satisfy the force clause or the elements of the generic version 
of the enumerated offense.  See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248; 
United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 29 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018). 
 
8 At this subsequent offender jury trial, the trial judge 
may admit any evidence that would have been admissible at the 
original trial of the alleged predicate offense.  Commonwealth 
v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 816 (2012).  The evidence presented 
at that trial has the same standard of proof as it would a 
regular trial.  Thus, the subsequent jury must find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the previous crime of which the defendant 
21 
 
Eberhart, supra.  See also G. L. c. 278, § 11A.  In this case, 
the defendant had the right to a jury trial for his ACCA 
enhancement, but pleaded guilty.  Had the defendant gone to 
trial on the ACCA enhancement charges, the Commonwealth would 
have had the same burden of proof as it would have had at a 
regular trial -- to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
previous crime of which the defendant was convicted was a 
violent crime.  Beal, supra.  As the Court explained in 
Descamps, the categorical approach is essential in the context 
of a sentencing enhancement in order to ensure that a 
defendant's punishment is not increased on the basis of facts 
that were not found by a jury.  See Descamps, supra at 269-270.  
And "the only facts the court can be sure the jury so found are 
those constituting elements of the offense -- as distinct from 
amplifying but legally extraneous circumstances."  Id. 
Although the Supreme Court's discussion of Sixth Amendment 
principles pointedly reveals the limits of a judge's authority 
to make the findings necessary to characterize a prior 
conviction as a crime involving "violence," we are not faced 
with the same concern that a judge will have unfettered 
discretion in making that determination.  Because we may 
establish the applicability of the Massachusetts ACCA by using 
                     
was convicted was a "violent crime."  Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 
Mass. 341, 351 (2016). 
22 
 
witness testimony and a wider range of documentary evidence than 
is available in the Federal courts, we ensure the same 
procedural protections at the ACCA enhancement trial as we do at 
a regular trial.  Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 14–15. 
 
Second, another of the Supreme Court's justifications for 
the categorical approach is that it serves practical purposes:  
it promotes judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding 
the relitigation of past convictions and minitrials conducted 
long after the fact.  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 
200-201 (2013).  Judicial efficiency does not raise the same 
level of concern in cases involving the Massachusetts ACCA, 
because, as previously stated, the defendant has a 
constitutional right to a jury trial for any sentencing 
enhancement.  See G. L. c. 278, § 11A. 
In sum, the interest of judicial economy and the concern of 
sentencing judges making improper findings of fact, although 
substantial in Federal courts, are not persuasive reasons to 
overrule the use of our modified categorical approach.  We 
reiterate that at the subsequent offender trial, "the 
Commonwealth need not retry the prior conviction . . . ; the 
Commonwealth need only prove which statutory or common-law 
definition was the basis of the prior conviction."  See 
Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 816, quoting Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 
16 n.8.  Under the modified categorical approach we restate 
23 
 
today, a certified record of conviction referencing a particular 
statute may prove that the defendant committed a violent crime 
only where all crimes encompassed within that statute are 
violent crimes.  Eberhart, supra at 817.  Our modified 
categorical approach is still appropriate in circumstances where 
the defendant is convicted under a broad statute.  Here, the 
facts to which the defendant pleaded guilty involved a violent 
harmful battery sufficient to satisfy the force clause.9 
c.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that, if assault and battery is a "violent crime" under 
the ACCA, he should be allowed to withdraw his ACCA guilty plea 
on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He contends 
that defense counsel's failure to challenge the ACCA indictment 
was unreasonable, because the grand jury heard insufficient 
evidence from which to conclude that the defendant's alleged 
assault and battery qualified as a "violent crime" and because 
the grand jury did not even see a certified record of conviction 
to support the predicate offenses.  He further contends that he 
would not have pleaded on the ACCA indictment had his counsel 
moved to dismiss the charges.  Relatedly, he argues that he did 
not enter into his plea agreement intelligently and voluntarily. 
                     
9 Because of our holding, we do not address whether the 
invalidated residual clause applies retroactively. 
24 
 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant bears the burden of showing "that there has been a 
'serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -
- behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might 
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,' and that 
counsel's poor performance 'likely deprived the defendant of an 
otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Simon, 481 Mass. 861, 866 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 429–430 (2016).  See 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  We apply 
this two-prong test when evaluating the defendant's request to 
withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Commonwealth v. Lastowski, 478 Mass. 572, 575-576 
(2018).  In reviewing an attorney's conduct, "a discerning 
examination and appraisal of the specific circumstances of the 
given case" is necessary.  Saferian, supra. 
First, insofar as the defendant's argument is premised on 
assault and battery not being a "violent crime" under the ACCA, 
our analysis supra forecloses this argument.  Additionally, 
although the ACCA indictment fails to list the predicate 
offenses and the release of our decision in Eberhart may have 
presented defense counsel with an opportunity to move to dismiss 
the ACCA indictment, the defendant presents no evidence to 
suggest that the decision not to make such a motion was 
25 
 
indicative of "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or 
inattention of counsel."  Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  Defense 
counsel's decision not to move to dismiss the indictment could 
be considered a reasonable tactical or strategic decision as, 
even if counsel had successfully dismissed some or all of the 
indictment, had it been dismissed without prejudice, the 
Commonwealth would have been able to indict the defendant again 
under the ACCA, correcting any errors.  See Bridgeman v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 316 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 200 (1985) 
("Dismissal with prejudice is 'too drastic a remedy' if the 
error can be remedied and the defendant can still obtain a fair 
trial"); Commonwealth v. Vieux, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 527 
(1996) ("failing to pursue a futile tactic does not amount to 
constitutional ineffectiveness").  In that scenario, the 
defendant potentially could have faced trial on an ACCA level 
three charge, which carries with it a mandatory minimum sentence 
of fifteen years in State prison. 
"Where, as here, the defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is based on a tactical or strategic decision, the 
test is whether the decision was 'manifestly unreasonable' when 
made."  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), 
S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 
Mass. 435, 442 (2006).  This test is "essentially a search for 
26 
 
rationality," Kolenovic, supra, and we "do not 'second guess 
competent lawyers,'" Commonwealth v. McCray, 457 Mass. 544, 557 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 713 
(2003).  Defense counsel's decision to negotiate a plea of 
guilty with the Commonwealth rather than filing a motion to 
dismiss was not manifestly unreasonable.  On the contrary, 
defense counsel demonstrated skill in mitigating the impact of 
the ACCA indictment.  Defense counsel successfully negotiated a 
plea deal with the Commonwealth that resulted in dismissal of 
one level three charge and that dropped the other charge from a 
level three offense, which provides for a mandatory minimum of 
fifteen years and up to twenty years, to a level one offense, 
which has a mandatory minimum of three years and a maximum of 
fifteen years.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a), (c).  Not only was 
counsel able to negotiate the level of the offense, he also 
secured a lower agreed-upon sentence of only from three to seven 
years of incarceration -- a significant difference from a 
mandatory minimum of fifteen years.  
Because we find that defense counsel's actions did not fall 
below the performance prong of Saferian, we need not look to the 
second prong.  See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 673 ("Although a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may not prevail 
unless counsel's performance affects the fairness of the trial, 
we need not reach that analysis if we determine that counsel's 
27 
 
representation did not fall measurably below that which might be 
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer"). 
The defendant contends that because he had grounds to seek 
dismissal of the ACCA indictment and because defense counsel 
misinformed him that his past crimes were "violent crimes" under 
the ACCA, his guilty plea was not made intelligently.  "Due 
process requires that a plea of guilty be accepted only where 
'the contemporaneous record contains an affirmative showing that 
the defendant's plea was intelligently and voluntarily made.'"  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 345 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009).  See Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).  "A guilty plea is 
intelligent if it is tendered with knowledge of the elements of 
the charges against the defendant and the procedural protections 
waived by entry of a guilty plea.  A guilty plea is voluntary so 
long as it is tendered free from coercion, duress, or improper 
inducements" (citation omitted).  Scott, supra. 
We conclude that the defendant's plea was made 
intelligently and voluntarily.  The lengthy and detailed plea 
colloquy shows that the plea judge reviewed the waiver of 
rights, the charges, and the terms of the plea deal with the 
defendant.  A plea is made intelligently if (1) "the judge 
explain[s] to the defendant the elements of the crime"; (2) 
counsel "represent[s] that [he] has explained to the defendant 
28 
 
the elements he admits by his plea"; or (3) the defendant admits 
to "facts recited during the colloquy which constitute the 
unexplained elements."  See Furr, 454 Mass. at 107, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Correa, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 717 (1997).  
Here, the judge confirmed with the defendant that he understood 
and voluntarily signed the waiver of rights.  See Furr, supra at 
109 ("the defendant's signed waiver may properly be considered 
as part of the plea record to support a finding that the plea 
was made intelligently").  Moreover, the judge confirmed with 
the defendant that he had the opportunity to discuss the plea 
with his counsel.  Defense counsel stated that he discussed with 
the defendant the nature of the charges, including all the 
elements that must be proved and possible defenses and 
challenges the defendant could bring at trial.  The defendant 
admitted to the facts of the firearm offense and the predicate 
assault and battery offense that the prosecutor recited. 
The judge addressed the defendant's age, education level, 
language, and literacy, and before determining whether the 
defendant was entering into the agreement intelligently, the 
judge assured himself that the defendant was not being treated 
for mental illness and was not under the influence of 
medication, drugs, or alcohol.  In ascertaining whether the 
defendant was entering his plea voluntarily, the judge 
encouraged the defendant to ask questions and speak to his 
29 
 
attorney at any time, and the judge confirmed with the defendant 
that he was not involuntarily entering into the plea.  Although 
the defendant noted that he felt pressure from the charges, he 
explained to the judge nonetheless, "I feel like that's my best 
decision."  See Commonwealth v. Berrios, 447 Mass. 701, 708 
(2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 907 (2007) ("the stress inherent 
in entering guilty pleas, such as the concern of possibly 
receiving a harsher sentence if a defendant is tried and found 
guilty, and pressure from family members and from counsel, do 
not necessarily render pleas involuntary").  To the extent that 
the defendant argues that he was compelled to plea because he 
was misinformed by counsel as to the nature of his prior 
offenses qualifying as "violent crimes" under the ACCA, we 
conclude that this is without merit for the reasons previously 
stated in this decision. 
4.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to vacate the ACCA conviction and sentence and for a new trial 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  Under 
G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a), the Massachusetts armed career criminal 
act, a person previously convicted of a "violent crime," who is 
subsequently convicted of certain firearms offenses, is subject 
to a mandatory minimum sentence of three years in prison.  Here, 
the alleged prior conviction of a "violent crime" was an assault 
and battery.  In Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 819 
(2012), we declared that where the predicate offense is assault 
and battery, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the assault and battery was a harmful or reckless 
battery, and was not an offensive battery, because only a 
harmful or reckless battery "has as an element the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force . . . against 
the person of another."  G. L. c. 140, § 121.  Where there is a 
reasonable doubt whether the battery could be categorized as an 
offensive battery, as there was in Eberhart, supra at 819-820, 
the Commonwealth has failed to meet this burden. 
 
A harmful battery is "[a]ny touching 'with such violence 
that bodily harm is likely to result.'"  Id. at 818, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 482 (1983).  In contrast, 
an offensive battery "occurs when 'the defendant, without 
justification or excuse, intentionally touched the victim, and 
. . . the touching, however slight, occurred without the 
2 
 
 
victim's consent.'"  Eberhart, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hartnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 476 (2008). 
 
Here, all that we know about this predicate assault and 
battery is what was described by the prosecutor at the plea 
hearing for the subsequent firearms offense and admitted to by 
the defendant -- that the defendant "struck his girlfriend at 
the time in the face and shoved her down on the bed."  The court 
concludes that "[t]his evidence is sufficient 'evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding' the assault and battery to 
demonstrate a touching with such violence that bodily harm is 
likely to result -- i.e., a harmful battery."  Ante at    , 
quoting Commonwealth v. Mora, 477 Mass. 399, 408 (2017).  I 
disagree. 
 
These actions, as described, unquestionably indicate an 
offensive, intentional, and unwanted touching.  But we simply 
cannot know beyond a reasonable doubt from so little information 
whether the earlier assault and battery was committed with "such 
violence that bodily harm is likely to result."1  We know nothing 
                     
 
1 "'[B]odily harm' in this context 'has its ordinary meaning 
and includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the 
health or comfort of the [alleged victim].  Such hurt or injury 
need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely 
transient and trifling.'"  Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 
385 n.10 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 
621 (1948).  Because the prosecutor in this case introduced no 
evidence as to any harm that the victim suffered, we are left to 
guess whether the actions described were likely beyond a 
3 
 
 
about the type of force used when the defendant struck his 
girlfriend -- whether it was a punch, a slap, or some other type 
of contact.  Nor do we know anything about the intensity of the 
force used, either in striking her or in shoving her down on the 
bed.  Consequently, we cannot determine from this bare 
description whether bodily harm was likely to result from the 
defendant's use of force, such that this offense must be 
categorized as a harmful battery rather than an offensive 
battery.  Under the prosecutor's spare description of the 
offense, it could be either a harmful or an offensive battery.  
See Commonwealth v. Travis, 408 Mass. 1, 8 (1990), citing Burke, 
390 Mass. at 482-483 (describing "[o]ffensive physical contact" 
for purpose of battery conviction as "a push or a binding of 
hands, undertaken without consent" [emphasis added]); 
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 359 (2002), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Dixon, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 654 (1993) 
("The offensive touching may be direct, as by striking another, 
or it may be indirect, as by setting in motion some force or 
instrumentality with the intent to cause injury" [emphasis 
added]).  See also Parreira v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 667, 668, 
672 (2012) (defendant "physically mov[ing]" victim into bathroom 
was offensive battery); Commonwealth v. Geordi G., 94 Mass. App. 
                     
reasonable doubt to result in "hurt or injury . . . more than 
merely transient and trifling." 
4 
 
 
Ct. 82, 85 (2018) (juvenile pushing teacher after arguing with 
her established probable cause that offensive battery occurred). 
 
Indeed, if that was the only evidence presented at a trial 
for assault and battery, and if that evidence were deemed 
sufficient to support a jury instruction for harmful battery, 
the Commonwealth would be entitled to jury instructions 
regarding both harmful battery and offensive battery, and the 
jury could convict the defendant of assault and battery if some 
jurors found that the defendant was guilty of harmful battery 
and others thought that the defendant was guilty of offensive 
battery.  See Commonwealth v. Mistretta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 
907 (2013); Instruction 6.140 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2016) (assault and 
battery).  Where a jury could be charged on both common-law 
definitions of the crime, we cannot say with so little evidence 
that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the predicate offense was a harmful 
battery and not an offensive battery. 
 
The court recognizes that, under our modified categorical 
approach, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
"which statutory or common-law definition was the basis of the 
prior conviction."  Ante at    , quoting Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 
816.  Because I disagree with the court's conclusion that the 
prosecutor's description of the predicate assault and battery 
5 
 
 
suffices to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a 
harmful battery and not an offensive battery, I dissent.