Title: Abrahams v. Chrysler Group, LLP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 519, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DWIGHT W. ABRAHAMS, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 519, 2011 
 
 
Claimant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC., 
 
)  C.A. No. N10A-10-016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Employer Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  March 28, 2012 
Decided:  May 11, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of May 2012, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
During closing argument before the Industrial Accident Board, the 
attorney for the defendant asserted that the claimant’s medical expert 
misunderstood the very treatise upon which he based his opinion testimony.  The 
attorney’s argument focused on portions of the treatise that counsel had not 
explored on direct or cross examination.  Defense counsel neither afforded 
claimant’s expert the chance to explain his application of the treatise’s 
methodology to his opinion nor proffered opposing expert testimony explaining the 
error in claimant’s expert’s reliance on the treatise.  Pursuit of a challenge to 
claimant’s expert’s opinion through treatise references alone, without notice, 
2 
 
during closing, deprived claimant of his right to litigate issues of fact.  The IAB 
relied on the argument in its opinion, thereby issuing an opinion without 
substantial record evidence for support.  Consequently, we reverse and remand to 
the Superior Court for action consistent with this Order. 
 
(2) 
Dwight Abrahams worked for Chrysler Group, LLC on June 1, 2002, 
when he was exposed to isocynate fumes.  In an earlier proceeding, the Industrial 
Accident Board awarded Abrahams workers’ compensation benefits for 25% 
impairment to his lungs as a result of his isocynate exposure.  This case began, 
years later, when Abrahams filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation 
Due with the IAB, on December 4, 2008.  The second Petition sought 
compensation for several injuries: an 8% permanent impairment to his lumbar 
spine; a 14% permanent impairment to his cervical spine; a 20% permanent 
impairment to each upper extremity; a 10% permanent impairment to each lower 
extremity; and an 8% permanent impairment to his abdomen. 
 
(3) 
The IAB first held a hearing on the case on September 30, 2009, but 
could not reach a decision.  Consequently, the IAB held a new, de novo, hearing on 
March 26, 2010.  At the later hearing, both sides offered experts discussing 
whether the impairments Abrahams then claimed even existed, and whether 
isocynate exposure caused them.  Chrysler’s expert traced Abrahams’ current 
problems to pre-existing injuries Abrahams had incurred playing sports.  
3 
 
Abrahams’ expert testified the impairments flowed from the exposure, and based 
his assessment of the severity of permanent impairment on a portion of a medical 
treatise.   
 
(4) 
During closing argument, after the IAB had announced the record had 
closed,1 Chrysler’s attorney challenged whether Abrahams’ expert properly 
interpreted the medical treatise upon which he based his testimony.  Her argument 
included references to portions of the treatise not discussed by the expert, in an 
attempt to criticize whether he properly used the treatise: 
Dr. Bandera [Abrahams’ expert] used the DRE categories to rate the 
back and the neck.  Specifically, he said he did that because there 
were findings of spasm and specific injury.  If you look at the chapter 
that allows us to put permanency ratings on back and neck injuries 
chapter 15, there is a chart on page 380 that tells you when to use the 
DRE versus the range of motion model.  The DRE category is used in 
cases of injury.  . . . This case involves occupational exposure.  This is 
an illness case.  Dr. Bandera for the neck and back used the wrong 
rating system.2 
 
In effect, this argument attempted to impeach the expert’s mastery of the 
treatise by referring to another chapter of the treatise. 
                                                           
1 IAB Hearing, Mar. 26, 2010, Tr. at 95. 
 
2 Id. at 106-07. 
 
4 
 
 
(5) 
The IAB denied Abrahams’ petition for additional compensation.3  
The opinion included holdings that Abrahams’ expert misapplied the medical 
treatise in the manner suggested by Chrysler’s counsel during closing argument,4 
that Abrahams’ expert was not credible,5 that Abrahams was not credible,6 and that 
other conditions caused the impairments.7  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed 
the IAB’s decision.   
 
(6) 
Abrahams now challenges the Superior Court’s decision, claiming 
that the IAB erred by undermining his due process rights and by rendering a 
decision that lacked the support of substantial evidence.   
 
(7) 
On appeal, this Court reviews decisions of the Industrial Accident 
Board only to determine if the decision is free from legal error, and “whether the 
                                                           
3 Abrahams v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 1221317, at p. 15 (Del. I.A.B. Aug. 31, 2010) (“For the 
reasons set forth above, Claimant’s Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due is 
denied.”). 
 
4 Id. at p. 13 (“The AMA Guides instructs that the Range of Motion method should be used when 
the injury is a result of an illness. It appears that Dr. Bandera misapplied the AMA Guides.”).   
 
5 Id. at p. 11 (“The Board accepts the opinions of Dr. Meyers [Chrysler’s expert] over the 
opinions of Dr. Bandera.  Dr. Bandera’s testimony was not convincing.”). 
 
6 Id. (“[T]he Board does not find Claimant credible with respect to his degree of his alleged 
permanent impairments and with respect to the causal connections to his work injury.”). 
 
7 Id. at p. 12 (“The Board finds that Claimant’s unrelated degenerative condition contributes to 
Claimant’s current cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine problems.”). 
 
5 
 
agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record before the 
agency.”8     
 
(8) 
The IAB improperly permitted Chrysler’s attorney to offer what 
amounted to expert testimony during her closing argument.  This maneuver, 
defended before this Court as a tactical decision, violated fundamental notions of 
fairness by depriving Abrahams of the opportunity to dispute the facts material to 
the outcome of his case.  Abrahams lost the chance to engage in an adversarial 
process.  Also, Chrysler’s attorney’s decision to avoid pointing out the other 
portions of the treatise until her argument – after the record had closed – assured 
that her assertions would not be based on substantial evidence to support them.  
Each of these problems independently justifies our decision to remand this case for 
a new hearing. 
 
(9) 
In structure, this decision mirrors the analysis from Quaker Hill Place 
v. State Human Relations Comm’n, authored by Justice Moore sitting on the 
Superior Court by designation: 
It is well established law in this State that a tribunal may not refer to 
or rely upon medical treatises that are not in evidence.  Those 
principles apply equally to an administrative tribunal.  The mandate in 
29 Del. C. § 10142(d), that an appellate court determine whether the 
“agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence on the 
                                                           
8 29 Del. C. §§ 10142, 10161(a)(8).  See also Ins. Comm’r of State of Del. v. Sun Life Assurance 
Co. of Canada (U.S.), 21 A.3d 15, 19 (Del. 2011) (demonstrating this Court’s power to review 
for legal error). 
 
6 
 
record” (emphasis added), would otherwise be meaningless.  
Moreover, fairness and due process demand no less than that a party 
has the right to respond to evidence used against it.9 
 
We adopt Justice Moore’s description of the law, and extend it to this situation, 
where one part of a treatise was discussed, and the tribunal referred to a different 
part of the treatise, not part of the record, to support its decision.   
 
 
(10) First, fundamental notions of fairness govern proceedings before the 
IAB.10  In Torres v. Allen Family Foods, this Court stated that the IAB may not 
“relax rules which are designed to ensure the fairness of the procedure.”11  
“Nothing is more repugnant to our traditions of justice than to be at the mercy of 
witnesses one cannot see or challenge, or to have one’s rights stand or fall on the 
basis of unrevealed facts that perhaps could be explained or refuted.”12  Judges 
cannot render a decision when facts to support the basis for that decision do not 
                                                           
9  498 A.2d 175, 180 (Del. Super. 1985) (citations omitted). 
 
10 The IAB rules grant the IAB an impossibly ambiguous power: “The Board may, in its 
discretion, disregard any customary rules of evidence and legal procedures so long as such a 
disregard does not amount to an abuse of discretion.”  IAB R. 14(C).  We of course recognize the 
IAB’s statutory authority to write rules, under 19 Del. C. § 2121(a) (“The Board may promulgate 
its own rules of procedure for carrying out its duties consistent with Part II of this title and the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.”).  Accordingly, we find that this case 
represents an abuse of discretion.  We also recommend the rules be revised to provide some 
content to the notion of what rules of evidence and legal procedure they are intended to free the 
IAB from following.     
 
11 Torres v. Allen Family Foods, 672 A.2d 26, 31 (Del. 1995). 
 
12 Id. at 32 (citation omitted). 
 
7 
 
appear in the record.  This Court will intervene if the other party did not have a 
chance to dispute the point.13   
 
(11) The IAB erroneously allowed Chrysler’s attorney to refer to pages of 
a medical treatise that had not been addressed during examination of either expert.  
In effect, this argument permitted Chrysler’s attorney to offer expert testimony of 
her own without providing notice so Abrahams could offer a response.  The 
Administrative Procedures Act clearly contemplates medical testimony will 
proceed only after notice to the other side.14   Similarly, the IAB rules demand that 
a pre-trial memorandum contain the names of medical witnesses.15   
 
(12) Second, the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting 
the IAB’s decision because the written opinion relies at least in part on portions of 
a medical treatise mentioned for the first time during closing argument.  The record 
consists of the evidence offered through testimony and other evidentiary 
submissions.16  When attorneys make closing arguments, they discuss the evidence 
                                                           
13 Ruggles v. Riggs, 477 A.2d 697, 703 (Del. 1984) (finding that a Family Court judge treated an 
expert’s out of court statements as evidence, despite the judge’s claim that the information 
“wouldn’t be in evidence or anything like that,” because his opinion referenced the statements.  
On that basis, this Court reversed for failure to provide due process to the other party.). 
 
14 19 Del. C. § 2348(i) (“If either party or the Board seeks to utilize the medical testimony of an 
expert, it may do so; provided, that prompt and adequate notice to the opposing party or parties is 
given.”). 
 
15 IAB Rules 9(B)(5)(a) (“The Pre-Trial Memorandum shall contain: (a) names (and, if 
requested, the addresses) of prospective medical and lay witnesses . . . .”). 
 
8 
 
and provide a perspective on it.  Attorneys’ comments in closings do not constitute 
evidence.   
 
(13) Both of these justifications depend on the idea that only portions of a 
treatise that have been discussed enter the record.  This rule ensures that expert 
witnesses will have the chance to clarify and explain, as best they can to the 
laypersons judging the case, why the body of knowledge they have mastered 
supports the conclusion they have reached.  Delaware has long considered medical 
publications inadmissible as evidence on their own, and restricted their use to cross 
examination.17   Our decision, in Chavin v. Cope, to allow all of an article into 
evidence is not comparable to this situation because it was premised on a decision 
by the trial judge to admit the article into evidence for impeachment purposes after 
the expert, on direct examination, read part of the article into the record.18  Here, 
defense counsel never confronted the expert with alternative portions of the treatise 
on which the expert relied in an attempt to impeach him.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 6 Del. Admin. C. § 249(a) (listing the materials that comprise the record; the list does not 
include materials discussed during closing argument). 
 
17 Barks v. Herzberg, 58 Del. 162, 165 (Del. 1965) (“In his opinion, the trial judge cited and 
quoted from excerpts from various medical periodicals and treatises which were not in evidence, 
and had not been used in cross-examination of the medical experts.  We think this an improper 
use by the court of such publications, for in this State at least medical publications are not 
admissible as such in evidence, but may be used only as a basis for cross-examination of such 
witness.” (citation omitted));    
 
18 Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 698 (Del. 1968). 
 
9 
 
 
(14) The IAB defended its decision to look at the AMA Guides on the 
basis that ignoring the evidence would require it to be subservient to doctors, even 
if treatises plainly carry some other meaning.19  The IAB misunderstands its place 
in the system.  As a judicial decisionmaker, the IAB must make decisions on the 
factual record before it, as presented through the adversarial process.  Part of the 
rationale for using expert witnesses is to present the opinion of someone able to 
understand and explain treatises to non-experts.  The IAB may not undertake its 
own review of treatises, in the absence of expert testimony on the disputed portion 
of the treatise, to decide if an expert correctly explained a subject within that 
witness’ area of  expertise.       
 
(15) An attorney who wishes to criticize an expert’s fidelity to the 
methodology announced in a treatise may approach the matter in two ways.  First, 
the attorney may call an expert to discuss the point in question.  Second, the 
attorney may cross examine an expert using other portions of the treatise.  But an 
attorney may not create factual issues about the expert’s testimony during closing 
arguments by introducing portions of a treatise that were never before discussed. 
                                                           
19 Abrahams v. Chrysler Group LLC, at p. 13 n. 2 (“[T]he Board is permitted to check the 
doctor’s references to the AMA Guides to gauge the credibility of a doctor’s testimony.  To hold 
otherwise, would invite doctors to misrepresent application of the AMA Guides because it would 
force the Board to blindly accept all medical representations as true, as representative, and as 
appropriately applied.”). 
 
10 
 
 
(16) Nor can we consider this error harmless.  This case, at its heart, was 
about dueling experts,20 and an attempted impeachment of an expert without notice 
and an opportunity for the party offering the expert to respond might well have 
determined the outcome.     
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for 
action consistent with this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
                                                           
20 Abrahams v. Chrysler Group LLC , No. 1221317, at p. 12 (The IAB’s opinion reflects the 
importance of resolving the disagreement between the experts.  After an introductory paragraph, 
the IAB began the section of the opinion entitled “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” as 
follows: “The Board accepts the opinions of Dr. Meyers over the opinions of Dr. Bandera.  Dr. 
Bandera’s testimony was not convincing.”).