Title: Deason v. Florida Dept. of Corrections
Citation: 705 So. 2d 1374
Docket Number: 90218
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 1998

705 So. 2d 1374 (1998)
Glen R. DEASON, Petitioner,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Florida Parole Commission, Respondents.
No. 90218.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 15, 1998.
Glen R. Deason, pro se, Petitioner.
William L. Camper, General Counsel, and Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
HARDING, Justice.
We have for review a decision ruling on the following question certified to be of great public importance:
Deason v. State, 688 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). We have jurisdiction,[1] and answer the certified question in the affirmative.
At issue here is the 1989 version of the conditional release statute, which provides in pertinent part:
§ 947.1405(2), Fla. Stat. (1989)(emphasis added). We find that the legislature's use of the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" in the same sentence, without enumeration or other decisive demarcation, renders this statute ambiguous  it is not clear whether habitualization is a separate, free standing criterion for conditional release. Thus, the majority below was correct in turning to accepted aids of statutory construction (i.e., legislative history, related statutes, and subsequent statutory amendments) to conclude *1375 that the legislature indeed intended habitualization to be a separate, free-standing criterion for conditional release. We agree with and adopt the majority opinion below and reach the same conclusion.
Assuming, without deciding, that the subject statute is penal in nature, we are of course cognizant of the legal maxim that ambiguity in penal statutes should generally be resolved in favor of the defendant. Significantly, however,
State v. Nunez, 368 So. 2d 422, 423-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Lincoln v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 643 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("Although strict construction of penal statutes is appropriate, no statute should be construed so as to defeat the intention of the Legislature."); State ex rel. Washington v. Rivkind, 350 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)("[S]trict construction [of penal statutes] is subordinate to the rule that the intention of the lawmakers must be given effect.").
Finding such evident legislative intent in the present case, we hold that habitualization is a separate, free-standing criterion for conditional release under section 947.1405(2), Florida Statutes (1989). We accordingly answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision under review.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion in which KOGAN, C.J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, Justice, dissenting.
I agree with, and would adopt, Judge Allen's dissent in the district court, which opinion speaks for itself both on the issue of statutory construction and the plain meaning of the statute:
Deason v. State, 688 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (Allen, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
[1]  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.