Title: Ailey v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
Citation: 570 So. 2d 598
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 1990

570 So. 2d 598 (1990)
Harrison AILEY, et al.
v.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
89-791.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 31, 1990.
Rehearing Denied November 2, 1990.
*599 Leila Hirayama, Birmingham, for appellants.
Edgar M. Elliott III and Deborah Alley Smith of Rives &amp; Peterson, Birmingham, for appellee.
STEAGALL, Justice.
Plaintiffs Harrison Ailey, James Gurley, and Bartley Thornton appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Nationwide") on their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction regarding an insurance policy issued to Ailey, a Tennessee resident, by Nationwide. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that Nationwide was obligated under its policy with Ailey to provide uninsured motorist benefits to the plaintiffs for injuries they suffered in a multi-vehicle automobile accident in Alabama. The plaintiffs also sought to enjoin Nationwide from withholding its consent to their settlement with four of the defendants. The trial court denied the injunction on July 13, 1989, and entered summary judgment for Nationwide on March 8, 1990.
The accident that was the subject of that action involved a car driven by Lola Patterson, a Central Packaging Corporation truck driven by Willie Joe Davis, and an Adolph Coors Company truck driven by John James Sage. The plaintiffs sued all three drivers, as well as Central Packaging and Adolph Coors. Patterson was insured by Allstate Insurance Company, which paid the limits of liability under her policy, or $39,750. Central Packaging and its driver settled with the plaintiffs for $25,000, as did Adolph Coors and its driver.[1]
At the time of the accident, Ailey had in effect an automobile insurance policy with Nationwide that provided uninsured motorist benefits. Because that policy was issued to Ailey in Tennessee, we will apply Tennessee law in interpreting it. See Best v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 1381 (Ala.1989), and Cotton v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 1387 (Ala.1989).
Nationwide refused to pay Ailey any uninsured motorist benefits, arguing that the other vehicles were not uninsured because the sum of the limits of all of the liability policies exceeded the uninsured *600 motorist limits under Ailey's policy. The plaintiffs take the position that, because Patterson's insurance was insufficient to pay their damages,[2] Ailey is entitled to "underinsurance" coverage under his policy with Nationwide.
Ailey's policy defines "uninsured automobile" as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Nationwide correctly argues that the plaintiffs are not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the policy because, at the time of the accident, all of the vehicles involved had liability insurance with limits in at least the amounts required by the financial responsibility laws of the states where those vehicles were principally garaged. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-12-102(12) (1988); Ala.Code 1975, § 32-7-1 et seq. To determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to underinsured motorist coverage by virtue of Tennessee law on stacking, which could override the limitations in the policy, we must turn to the relevant statutes and cases.
In 1982, Tennessee amended its uninsured motorist statute and eliminated a previous reference to "underinsured motorists," combining the two classifications under one definition:
Tenn.Code Ann. § 56-7-1202(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
A recent Tennessee case, Dockins v. Balboa Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn.1989), explained the amendment and its effect:
"These partial definitions were deleted by the 1982 amendments, and the substituted section 56-7-1202 eliminated the terms `insolvency' and `underinsured' and the proviso for cooperative use vehicles. It appears to us the Legislature simply combined those two categories in a single paragraph to require coverage by the insured's own insurer when the funds to which she is entitled from other policies, bonds, and securities cannot be collected. The reference to collectibility also appears in the last paragraph of section one of the amendment, now T.C.A. XX-X-XXXX(d).[3]
764 S.W.2d  at 532 (emphasis added). Even though it was decided prior to the 1982 amendment, Rogers v. Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1981), also emphasized the fact that Tennessee does not embrace broad coverage under its uninsured motorist statute.
Applying § 56-7-1202(a) to these facts, we consider it apparent that Nationwide is correct in its position that the available limits of liability on all policies applicable to the injury must be less than the limits of Ailey's uninsured motorist coverage before the uninsured motorist carrier is obligated to pay. The language of § 56-7-1202(a) supports that conclusion: "the sum of the limits of liability available to the insured under all valid and collectible insurance policies ...."
Although the limits of the policies covering Central Packaging, Adolph Coors, and their drivers are unknown, it is undisputed that the $25,000 offered under each policy did not exhaust those limits. Only if the sum of those limits is "less than the applicable limits of uninsured motorist coverage [here, $100,000] provided to the insured under the policy against which the claim is made," § 56-7-1202(a), is Nationwide responsible for underinsured motorist benefits.
The summary judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  Although the limits of liability under those parties' policies are unknown, the parties concede that the settlements did not exhaust their coverages.
[2]  Although Nationwide agrees that Patterson's insurance was insufficient to cover the plaintiffs' damages, it does not concede that their damages exceeded $200,000, which is the amount they allege as damages in their declaratory judgment action.
[3]  That statute reads:

"(d) The limit of liability for an insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage under this section is the amount of that coverage as specified in the policy less the sum of the limits collectible under all liability and/or primary uninsured motorist insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death of the insured." (Emphasis added.)