Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Davis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 76, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
In the Matter of a   
 
 
§   
Member of the Bar of 
 
 
§  No. 76, 2012 
the Supreme Court of Delaware: 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
MICHAEL R. DAVIS,  
 
§ 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  March 7, 2012 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  April 10, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
Disciplinary Proceeding Upon Final Report of the Board on 
Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court.  DISBARMENT 
IMPOSED. 
 
 
Frederick W. Iobst, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Joelle E. Polesky, 
Esquire, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware. 
 
 
Charles Slanina, Esquire, Finger & Slanina, LLC, Hockessin, 
Delaware, for Michael R. Davis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
 
2 
 
 
This is an attorney disciplinary proceeding involving charges of 
professional misconduct filed against the Respondent, Michael R. Davis 
(“Davis”).  On October 7, 2011, a panel of the Board on Professional 
Responsibility (the “Board”) issued a report (“Violation Report”)1 that 
concluded Davis violated the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct (the “Rules”) and the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary 
Procedure (“Disciplinary Rules”).  The Board conducted a sanctions hearing 
on November 15, 2011.  On February 15, 2012, the Board issued its 
recommendation that Davis be disbarred (“Sanction Report”).2 Neither the 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (the “ODC”) nor Davis has filed any 
objections to the Board’s recommended sanction of disbarment.   
We have made an independent determination that the sanction 
recommended in the Board’s Sanction Report is appropriate.  Accordingly, 
we have decided that Davis must be disbarred.   
Petition for Discipline 
 
On May 27, 2009, this Court entered an order suspending Davis from 
engaging in the practice of law as a member of the Delaware Bar for a 
period of one year based on misconduct involving “false notarizations, 
                                          
 
1 Appendix I. 
2 Appendix II. 
3 
 
failure to safeguard fiduciary funds, failure to pay taxes, and 
misrepresentations” (“Suspension Order”).3  At the end of the suspension, 
Davis submitted a Reinstatement Questionnaire to the ODC.  In the course 
of investigating the Reinstatement Questionnaire, the ODC determined that 
some of Davis’ answers on the Reinstatement Questionnaire were 
incomplete and misleading.  Further investigation by the ODC led it to 
conclude that Davis had violated Rules 1.3,4 3.4(c),5 5.5(a),6 8.1(a),7 8.4(a)8 
8.4(b),9 8.4(c),10 8.4(d)11 and Disciplinary Rule 7(c)12 in the time before and 
during his suspension, and thereafter, when he sought reinstatement.  
                                          
 
3 In re Davis, No. 301, 2008 (Del. May 27, 2009). 
4 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.” 
5 Rule 3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the 
rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid 
obligation exists.” 
6 Rule 5.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation 
of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.” 
7 Rule 8.1(a) provides that a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not 
“knowingly make a false statement of material fact.” 
8 Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or 
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” 
9 Rule 8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “commit a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.”  Comment 2 to Rule 8.4 states, in part:  “A pattern of repeated 
offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate 
indifference to legal obligation.” 
10 Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” 
11 Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 
12 Disciplinary Rule 7(c) provides that it shall be grounds for disciplinary action for a 
lawyer to “[v]iolate the terms of any conditional diversion or private or public 
disciplinary or disability disposition.” 
4 
 
Therefore, the ODC filed a new Petition for Discipline on January 5, 2011 
(“Petition”) that resulted in this proceeding.   
 
The current Petition is based on four alleged acts:  First, that Davis 
violated the terms of the Suspension Order by engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law by maintaining that part of his law office that performed title 
and settlement services, continuing to meet with clients or prospective 
clients, and continuing to speak at real estate seminars (Counts I-V); second, 
that prior to the Suspension Order, Davis violated the Rules by conducting a 
real estate settlement while under the influence of alcohol (Counts VI-VIII); 
third, that Davis violated the Rules by misleading police in connection with 
a traffic accident and then failing accurately to report the circumstances of 
that traffic violation in his Reinstatement Questionnaire (Counts XI-XV); 
and fourth, that Davis engaged in sanctionable conduct by disrobing in a 
public place while under the influence of alcohol and assisting his son in 
changing out of a bathing suit, and then failing to be fully candid about that 
incident in his Reinstatement Questionnaire (Counts XVI-XVIII). 
The Petition charged Davis with eighteen counts of ethical violations. 
The ODC withdrew two counts.  In its Violation Report, the Board found 
that Davis committed twelve ethical violations.   
5 
 
 
Reinstatement Investigation 
 
In the course of reviewing Davis’ Reinstatement Questionnaire, the 
ODC discovered two prior acts of misconduct, both of which involved 
Davis’ consumption of alcohol.  The first incident involved a single-vehicle 
accident that occurred on September 18, 2008.  Davis did not accurately 
report the circumstances surrounding this accident in his Reinstatement 
Questionnaire.  The second incident involved a November 5, 2008 real estate 
settlement.  The Board also found that during the suspension period, Davis 
knowingly disobeyed the Suspension Order and engaged in conduct that 
reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. 
September 18, 2008  
Single-Vehicle Accident 
Rules 8.1(a); 8.4(b), (c), (d) 
 
 
In the late evening on September 18, 2008, Davis was involved in a 
single-vehicle accident.  The Board found clear and convincing evidence 
that Davis consumed alcohol prior to the accident.  Following the accident, 
Davis went directly home and continued to drink alcohol.  When a New 
Castle County police officer arrived at Davis’ home to investigate the 
accident, Davis answered the door with a glass of wine in his hand.  Davis 
told the officer that “he had a few alcoholic drinks when he got home to 
calm his nerves.”  The lead investigator noted in the police report that he 
6 
 
suspected the accident was alcohol-related based on his initial observation of 
the vehicle.  However, the officer did not administer a blood alcohol test 
because he “would not have been able to determine if [Davis’] blood alcohol 
level was high because he drank when he was home or was it high because 
he was intoxicated while he was driving.”  The ODC presented the 
testimony of two witnesses who testified that Davis admitted to consuming 
alcohol before the accident and to drinking wine at home in order to 
circumvent the police investigation.13   
 
The Board concluded that Davis’ conduct in connection with the 
motor vehicle accident was a violation of Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d).  The 
Board found that Davis violated Rule 8.4(b) by reporting false information 
(i.e. that he did not drink prior to the accident) to a law enforcement officer 
relating to an actual offense or incident in violation of title 11, section 1245 
of the Delaware Code.  The Board found that Davis ingested alcohol after 
the incident with the intent to circumvent the police investigation, and that 
                                          
 
13 The Board credited the testimony of two witnesses, Daniel Logan and Donna Marshall.  
The Board summarized their testimony as follows: 
Logan testified that the day after the accident, Respondent called him to 
say that the lawyer in him came out and he popped open a couple of 
bottles of wine while waiting for the police to arrive so that the police 
would not be able to conclude that he had consumed too much alcohol 
before the accident.  Donna Marshall testified similarly, adding that he 
told her he had gotten out of trouble for DUI by drinking before the police 
arrived at his home and that the police told him that that was a smart 
strategy. 
Violation Report at 44-45, Appendix I. 
7 
 
this conduct involved dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation in violation 
of Rule 8.4(c) and was prejudicial to the administration of justice in 
violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
 
The Board also found that Davis violated Rule 8.1(a) when he 
knowingly made a false statement of material fact concerning the motor 
vehicle accident in his Reinstatement Questionnaire. After answering “yes” 
to the question whether Davis had ever been “cited, charged, warned, 
arrested or prosecuted for any crime or rules violation, including any motor 
vehicle accident or moving violation,” Davis was required to provide 
additional information about the offense.  Davis provided a narrative that 
included the following statements: 
• 
“At the time of the accident I did not have my cell phone 
with me, so I walked home.” 
• 
“Originally, I was charged with Unsafe Speed and 
Failure to Report the Accident, however, upon an explanation 
of the fact that I did not have a means of communication (i.e. 
cell phone) with me at the time of the accident and a full 
explanation of the accident, the charge was reduced to 
inattentive driving.” 
• 
“Upon arriving home, I was greeted by the New Castle 
County Police.” 
• 
“I provided full cooperation with their [the police] 
investigation of the crash.” 
• 
“I provided full cooperation to the officers.” 
 
The Board found that the above narrative by Davis on the 
Reinstatement Questionnaire contained knowingly false statements of 
8 
 
material fact in violation of Rule 8.1(a).  With respect to the statement, “At 
the time of the accident I did not have my cell phone with me, so I walked 
home,” the Board found it was false because the police report indicates that 
Davis informed the investigating officer that he was distracted by talking on 
the cell phone.  The Board also found that the statements, “Upon arriving 
home, I was greeted by the New Castle County Police” and “I provided full 
cooperation with their [the police] investigation of the crash” were false 
based on the “clear and convincing evidence that Davis improperly 
frustrated a police investigation by drinking alcohol after the accident and 
before the police arrived.”14 
November 5, 2008 
Real Estate Settlement 
Rules 1.3 and 8.4(d) 
 
 
The second act of unethical conduct that was discovered during the 
ODC’s investigation of Davis’ Reinstatement Questionnaire involved a 
November 5, 2008 real estate settlement, which Davis admitted conducting 
while under the influence of alcohol—but denied being impaired.  The 
Board heard testimony from Debra Seramone, one of the owners of the 
entity Davis represented at the settlement.  Ms. Seramone testified that 
Davis’ behavior was “kind of unconventional and very uncomfortable.  
                                          
 
14 Violation Report at 44, Appendix I. 
9 
 
Michael just kind of talked and talked and talked about nothing, kind of 
babbled a little bit, didn’t seem himself at all.”  She also testified that “[h]is 
face was flushed,” and his speech “was slurred.”  At the conclusion of the 
settlement, Davis approached one of Ms. Seramone’s partners and “said 
something to the effect of either ‘I love you’ or ‘love you,’ and moved 
forward to kiss her.”  Ms. Seramone testified that the next day, Davis called 
her to apologize for his inappropriate behavior and admitted to having had a 
drink at lunch before the afternoon settlement. 
 
In connection with the November 2008 real estate settlement, the 
Board found that Davis failed to act with reasonable diligence in violation of 
Rule 1.3, and that he failed to treat “all persons involved in the legal process 
with courtesy and respect.”15  The Board also found that Davis’ conduct was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
Disobeying Suspension Order 
Rules 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(d) 
and Disciplinary Rule 7(c) 
 
 
The Board found that Davis knowingly disobeyed the May 27, 2009 
Suspension Order in violation of Rule 3.4(c) by: (1) meeting with a former 
client to provide legal advice; (2) discussing legal services and fees with a 
potential client which led her to believe that his residential services company 
                                          
 
15 Rule 1.3 cmt. 1. 
10 
 
could provide legal services; and (3) using his former law firm email address 
in communications with the public at least six weeks after the Suspension 
Order.  The Board found that this conduct also violated Rules 5.5(a), 8.4(a), 
8.4(d), and Disciplinary Rule 7(c). 
Lums Pond Incident 
Rule 8.4(b) 
 
 
Approximately two months after this Court entered the Suspension 
Order, Davis was involved in his third alcohol-related offense within a ten-
month period.  Davis and his seven-year-old son spent an afternoon at Lums 
Pond.  While there, Davis consumed alcohol.  At the end of the afternoon, 
because Davis’ son objected to changing from his bathing suit into dry 
clothing in the public bathroom, Davis and his son changed in the parking 
lot.  While Davis and his son were changing, a couple and a child walking 
through the parking lot observed Davis naked from the waist down.  One of 
the witnesses argued with Davis about the impropriety of Davis exposing 
himself in public.   
An enforcement officer from the Department of Natural Resources 
and Environment Control, Division of Parks and Recreation was called to 
the scene.  After conducting interviews of Davis and the witnesses, the 
officer issued a Complaint and Summons charging Davis with a conduct 
violation for indecent exposure and an alcohol violation for having a blood 
11 
 
alcohol level of .16, twice the legal limit.  Davis pleaded guilty to the 
charges. 
 
Davis reported this incident in his Restatement Questionnaire and 
attached a copy of the Complaint and Summons.  The Board noted that this 
incident was Davis’ third alcohol-related violation in a ten-month period, 
which resulted in one ethical and two criminal violations.  The Board 
concluded that “[t]his pattern of alcohol-related violations in a short time 
leads [it] to find that this incident, when added to [the other violations],” 
reflects “adversely on [Davis’] fitness as a lawyer in violation of Rule 
8.4(b).”16 
Violation Report Affirmed 
 
The standard of proof required for the Board to find a violation of the 
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct is by clear and 
convincing evidence.17  Our scope of review of the Board’s factual findings 
is limited to a determination of whether the record contains substantial 
evidence supporting the findings.18  Our standard of review of the Board’s 
conclusions of law is de novo.19  If the record reflects substantial evidence to 
                                          
 
16 Violation Report at 49, Appendix I. 
17 Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure R. 15(c).  See also In re Berl, 540 A.2d 
410, 413 (Del. 1988). 
18 In re Lewis, 528 A.2d 1192, 1193 (Del. 1987). 
19 In re Berl, 540 A.2d at 413 (citing Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 613 (Del. 1981)). 
12 
 
support the Board’s factual findings, and the Board has made no error of 
law, its decision will be affirmed on appeal.   
 
We have carefully and completely reviewed the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the Board’s Violation Report.  The record reflects 
clear and convincing evidence to support the Board’s factual findings that 
Davis violated his ethical responsibilities.  Accordingly, we affirm both the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the Board on the basis of 
and for the reasons stated in its Violation Report.20 
Sanction Recommendation 
 
 
Following a hearing, the Board issued its Sanction Report 
recommending that Davis be disbarred.  The Board found that three specific 
acts “cumulatively warrant[ed] the most serious sanction of disbarment.”21  
First, after noting that the underlying conduct that led to Davis’ suspension 
involved acts of deception, the Board found that by making false statements 
in the Restatement Questionnaire concerning the automobile accident, Davis 
engaged in at least one further act of misrepresentation and deceit.  Second, 
the Board noted that Davis’ conduct in connection with the automobile 
accident involved acts of misrepresentation and deceit.  Third, the Board 
noted that Davis knowingly violated the Suspension Order by meeting on 
                                          
 
20 Appendix I. 
21 Sanction Report at 9, Appendix II. 
13 
 
one occasion with a client to provide legal advice.  The Board also 
concluded that disbarment is supported by the additional ethical violation in 
connection with the real estate settlement prior to the suspension and the two 
criminal violations in connection with the Lums Pond incident. 
Attorney Discipline 
This Court has the exclusive authority for admitting and disciplining 
persons with regard to the practice of law in Delaware.22  The nature of the 
relationship between this Court and an attorney was summarized by Victor 
B. Woolley in his seminal treatise on Delaware Practice: 
The chief characteristic of an attorney-at-law is that he is 
an officer of the court . . . .  He is an officer of the court, 
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of his possessing 
sufficient legal learning and fair private character.  The order of 
admission is the judgment of the court that he possesses the 
requisite qualifications as an attorney, and is entitled to appear 
as such and conduct causes therein. 
 
. . . It is a right of which he can be deprived only by the 
judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency.23 
 
Maintaining high standards of professional and personal conduct for 
persons admitted to the Bar of this Court is essential to ensure the proper 
administration of justice within the judicial branch of our government.  In 
discharging that State Constitutional responsibility, this Court has an 
                                          
 
22 In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del. 1983). 
23 1 Victor B. Woolley, Woolley on Delaware Practice § 96 (1906) (citing Ex parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866)).  
14 
 
obligation to protect the public “from incompetent and dishonest lawyers, 
and to assure that those admitted to the Bar possess the requisite attributes of 
good moral character, learning and ability.”24 
 
Accordingly, admission to the Bar is not a right.  It is dependent upon 
an applicant’s ability to demonstrate three fundamental qualifications:  good 
moral character, learning, and competence.25  If an applicant does not meet 
these qualifications, admission to the Bar is denied.  Following a person’s 
admission to the Bar, if these standards are not maintained, the continued 
privilege of practicing law in Delaware is subject to being either limited, 
suspended, or revoked by this Court.   
 
The qualification at issue in Davis’ disciplinary proceeding is good 
moral character.  This Court has held that “[g]ood moral character has many 
attributes, but none are more important than honesty and candor.”26  Honesty 
has been the fundamental qualification for admission to the legal profession 
since ancient times.27   
                                          
 
24 In re Green, 464 A.2d at 885. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s Oath: Both Ancient & Modern, 22 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 3, 4 (2009). 
15 
 
 
Use No Falsehood 
 
All lawyers take an oath upon their admission to the bar.  The oath is a 
solemn promise of competent and ethical conduct, which dates back to the 
beginnings of the legal profession.28  It is a venerable “tradition in both form 
and substance.”29  Honesty was a central requirement in the attorney’s oath 
that was used in the era of Justinian.  During the sixth century, advocates 
were required to swear that: 
 
[T]hey will undertake with all their power and strength, 
to carry out for their clients what they consider to be true and 
just, doing everything with it is possible for them to do.  
However, they, with their knowledge and skill, shall not 
prosecute a lawsuit with a bad conscience when they know 
[beforehand] that the case entrusted to them is dishonest or 
utterly hopeless or composed of false allegations.  But even if, 
while the suit is proceeding, it were to become known [to them] 
that it is of that sort [i.e., dishonest], let them withdraw from the 
case, utterly separating themselves from any such common 
cause.30 
 
The Justinian oath describes the balance between the lawyer’s duties to the 
client and the court that continues today, including the duties to pursue 
“just” objectives and to withdraw from “dishonest” causes.  The Justinian 
oath probably reflects the advocate’s oath in Roman times, since the 
                                          
 
28 Id.   
29 Id. 
30 Joseph Storey, Commentaries on the Law of Agency, as a Branch of Commercial and 
Maritime Jurisprudence, with Occasional Illustrations From the Civil and Foreign Law 
26, n.1 (Boston, Little & Brown 1832) (emphasis added) (quoting Justinian Code) 
(translated from Latin in Story’s text).   
16 
 
Justinian Code included Roman law going back to the time of Hadrian, in 
the second century.31   
 
In 1402, an Act of Parliament provided for the admission of attorneys 
in England by the courts upon examination, an official oath, and regulation 
of the conduct of attorneys.32  The 1402 Act stated that attorneys shall be 
“sworn well and truly to serve in their offices.”33  According to Professor 
James E. Moliterno, the 1402 Act required an attorney to take an oath to be 
“good and virtuous, and of good fame.”34   While the 1402 Act did not 
specify any form, the attorney’s oath adopted in furtherance of the 1402 Act, 
over 600 years ago, was the following pledge to “do no falsehood:” 
 
You shall doe noe Falsehood nor consent to anie to be 
done in the Office of Pleas of this Courte wherein you are 
admitted an Attorney.  And if you shall knowe of anie to be 
done you shall give Knowledge thereof to the Lord Chiefe 
Baron or other his Brethren that it may be reformed you shall 
Delay noe Man for Lucre Gaine or Malice; you shall increase 
noe Fee but you shall be contented with the old Fee 
accustomed.  And further you shall use yourselfe in the Office 
of Attorney in the said office of Pleas in this Courte according 
to your best Learninge and Discrecion.  So helpe you God.35 
 
                                          
 
31 See O.F. Robinson et al., European Legal History ¶¶ 1.2.1-1.2.2 (3rd ed. 2000) 
(summarizing the Justinian Code). 
32 Josiah Henry Benton, The Lawyer’s Official Oath and Office 27 (1909).   
33 Id. 
34 James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
781, 785-86 n.37 (1997). 
35 Josiah Henry Benton, The Lawyer’s Official Oath and Office 28 (1909).  
17 
 
 
Some variation of the “do no falsehood” oath36 continued to be the 
attorney’s oath in England until 1729, when “An Act for the Better 
Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors” replaced the older oath with a new, 
simple oath.  In the new oath, English attorneys and solicitors swore:  “that I 
will truly and honestly demean myself in the practice of an attorney, 
according to the best of my knowledge and ability.”37  Although the exact 
term “do no falsehood” was removed from the attorney and solicitor oath in 
England, the ancient duty to be truthful is clearly perpetuated in the 
synonymous replacement term to “honestly demean myself in the practice of 
an attorney.”   
Even after the 1729 change in England, however, the “do no 
falsehood” oath was the principal form of oath used for attorneys in the 
American colonies.  Its general use continued throughout the United States 
in the nineteenth century.  Today, lawyers in the United States swear to one 
of three basic forms of oath—the English simple oath, the English “do no 
                                          
 
36 See The Book of Oaths and the Several Forms Thereof, both Ancient and Modern 
Faithfully collected out of Sundry Authentic Books and Records not heretofore Extant, 
Compiled in one Volume 29-30 (1649). 
37 An Act for the Better Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors, 2 Geo. 2, ch. 23, §§ 13,14 
(1729).  The Act stated that this new form of oath was to be used “instead of the oath 
heretofore usually taken by the attorneys of such courts respectively.”  Id.  See also 
James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
781, 786 n.38 (1997). 
18 
 
falsehood” oath, or the Swiss (ABA) detailed oath.38  Honesty is a common 
principle that remains a constant in the attorney oath for every state 
regardless of the format.   
Delaware and a number of other states continue to use a version of the 
venerable “do no falsehood” oath.  Delaware first adopted the “do no 
falsehood” oath in 1704.39  In 1721, Delaware shortened its variation of the 
“do no falsehood” oath, and three centuries later, that is essentially the form 
of oath used today.40  Thus, Davis, took the following oath upon his 
admission to the Delaware Bar in 1998: 
I . . . , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the 
State of Delaware; that I will behave myself in the office of an 
Attorney within the Courts according to the best of my learning 
and ability and with all good fidelity as well to the Court as to 
the client; that I will use no falsehood nor delay any person’s 
cause through lucre or malice.”41 
 
                                          
 
38 Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s Oath:  Both Ancient & Modern, 22 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 3, 6, 45-49 (2009). 
39 Josiah Henry Benton, The Lawyer’s Official Oath and Office 44 (1909).   
40 See id.  See also In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487 (Del. 2007) (“[Delaware’s] oath is, in 
its essential language, the same one taken by Delaware lawyers since colonial days.”).  
41 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 54 (emphasis added). 
19 
 
 
Oath and Discipline 
For centuries, the attorney oath served as the primary statement of the 
ethical standards for the legal profession and also as the basis for attorney 
discipline.  In an 1835 disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania recognized a broad range of options for sanctioning lawyers, 
including “expulsion from the bar,” reprimand, and fines.42  The Court 
emphasized the importance of caution in assessing the extreme punishment 
of expulsion.43  Nevertheless, it concluded that expulsion was the appropriate 
penalty for an attorney’s violation of his or her oath: 
It is not doubted that any breach of the official oath is a valid 
cause, for proceeding for the former [expulsion]; for the man 
who deliberately violates the sanctions of a lawful oath, proves 
himself to be unworthy of further confidence; society has no 
other hold upon him.  The most insignificant breach of the 
fidelity enjoined may, therefore, be visited with this measure.44 
 
In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized that “the end to be attained 
by removal, is not punishment, but protection.”45   
In 1908, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted national 
model standards of conduct for lawyers.  Although the oath was part of those 
efforts, the ABA’s 1908 project began promulgating “black letter” model 
                                          
 
42 In re Austin, 1835 WL 2736, *12 (Pa. Mar. 31, 1835). 
43 Id.   
44 Id. 
45 Id.   
20 
 
rules of ethical conduct with more detailed guidance than was provided for 
in the oath alone.  The ABA’s recommended ethical standards for lawyers 
are currently set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.   
The Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, based on the 
ABA’s Model Rules, provide detailed ethical guidance for Delaware 
lawyers, including the duty of honesty.  The Board found that Davis 
violated, inter alia, Rule 8.1(a), Rule 8.4(b) and Rule 8.4(d):  Rule 8.1(a) 
provides that, in connection with a disciplinary matter, a lawyer shall not 
“knowingly make a false statement of material fact.”  Rule 8.4 (b) provides 
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “commit a criminal act that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.”  Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”   
Notwithstanding this Court’s adoption of the Delaware Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the oath remains the primary statement of 
core ethical values for Delaware lawyers.  Two fundamental ethical 
principles in the Delaware oath are to act with fidelity to the Court and to 
use no falsehood.  The record reflects that Davis violated these fundamental 
21 
 
ethical principles before and during his suspension, and thereafter, when he 
sought reinstatement. 
Disbarment Appropriate Sanction 
 
 
This Court has reviewed the Board’s Sanction Report.  When deciding 
upon the appropriate sanction, this Court must consider that “[t]he primary 
purpose of disciplinary proceedings is ‘to protect the public; to foster public 
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter 
other lawyers from similar misconduct.’”46  The lawyer discipline system 
was not designed to be either punitive or penal in nature.47 
We have carefully considered the ethical violations, the nature of the 
violations, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and all of the facts and 
circumstances of this case.  We are in complete agreement with the analysis 
of our prior disciplinary decisions in the Board’s Sanction Report.48  We 
have 
independently 
determined 
that 
the 
sanction 
of 
disbarment 
recommended by the Board is appropriate.   
This Court entered its Suspension Order because of ethical violations 
by Davis involving false notarizations and misrepresentations for personal 
                                          
 
46 In re Figliola, 652 A.2d 1071, 1076 (Del. 1995) (quoting In re Agostini, 632 A.2d 80, 
81 (Del. 1993)). 
47 In re Rich, 559 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Del. 1989). 
48 See, e.g., In re Tonwe, 929 A.2d 774 (Del. 2007) and In re Clyne, 581 A.2d 1118 (Del. 
1990). 
22 
 
gain.  In that Suspension Order, we characterized Davis’ misconduct as 
knowing and deceptive, “if not criminal.”  When Davis filed for 
reinstatement, he was required to demonstrate his rehabilitation.49  Instead, 
the Board found that Davis’ answers on the Reinstatement Questionnaire 
reflected misrepresentation and deceit.  Further investigation of Davis’ 
answers on the Reinstatement Questionnaire by the ODC revealed additional 
ethical violations by Davis before and during the time of this Court’s 
Suspension Order.  In addition, the Board found that Davis violated the 
Suspension Order. 
As Woolley observed, when this Court enters an order of admission to 
the Delaware Supreme Court Bar, it is a judgment of this Court that the 
admittee possesses the requisite qualifications,50 including good moral 
character.  We can no longer make that judgment of Davis.  He was 
suspended for knowingly violating this Court’s ethical rules through deceit 
and misrepresentation.  Davis then defied this Court by violating our 
Suspension Order and compounded that misconduct when he made 
misrepresentations to an arm of this Court in his Reinstatement 
Questionnaire.   
                                          
 
49 Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure R. 22(a). 
50 1 Victor B. Woolley, Woolley on Delaware Practice § 96 (1906). 
23 
 
The record reflects Davis no longer possesses the good moral 
character that is the sine qua non to be a member of the Bar of the Delaware 
Supreme Court, an officer of this Court.  If Davis is not honest with this 
Court, we have no trust or confidence that he will be honest with other 
courts, his clients, or third parties.51  “When there can be no reliance upon 
the word or oath of a party, he is, manifestly, disqualified, and, when such a 
fact satisfactorily appears the court[s] not only have the power, but it is their 
duty to strike the party from the rol[l] of attorneys.”52   
Conclusion 
 
 
We conclude that any sanction other than disbarment would not 
provide the necessary protection for the public, serve as a deterrent to the 
legal profession, or preserve the public’s trust and confidence in the integrity 
of the disciplinary process for Delaware lawyers.  It is ordered that Michael 
R. Davis be disbarred from membership in the Bar of the Delaware Supreme 
Court.  His name shall be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys entitled to 
practice law before the courts of this State. 
                                          
 
51 See In re Clyne, 581 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 1990).  
52 Id. at 1126 (quoting In re Sullivan, 530 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Del. 1987)) (alterations in 
original). 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
OF THE 
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
In the Matter of a 
 
 
 
) 
Member of the Bar of  
 
 
) 
 
the Supreme Court of  
 
 
) 
 
Delaware: 
 
 
 
 
) 
ODC File No. 2010-0404-B, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
MICHAEL R. DAVIS, 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Pending before the Board on Professional Responsibility is a Petition for Discipline filed 
on January 5, 2011 (“Petition”) by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”).  The Petition 
alleges that Michael R. Davis, Esq. (“Davis” or “Respondent”) engaged in professional 
misconduct in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (c),5.5(a), 8.1(a), 8.1(b) (two counts), 8.4(a), 8.4(b) 
(three counts), and 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) (five counts) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Misconduct (“Rules”) and Rule 7 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary 
Procedure.  Davis is a real estate attorney.  On May 27, 2009 the Delaware Supreme Court 
suspended Davis from engaging in the practice of law as a member of the Delaware Bar for a 
period of one year based on misconduct involving real estate transactions in which he had an 
interest, directly or indirectly, and in which he acted as counsel and/or settlement agent.  In the 
Matter of Michael R. Davis, No. 301, 2008 at 13 (Del. May 27, 2009) (per curiam). The Court 
found that Davis’s misconduct involved “false notarizations, failure to safeguard fiduciary funds, 
failure to pay taxes, and misrepresentation.” Id. at 12.  The Supreme Court Order suspending 
Davis (“Suspension Order”) prohibited him from “engaging in the practice of law as a member 
of the Delaware Bar for a period of one year” and from sharing in “any legal fees arising from  
 
 
2 
clients or cases referred by Davis during the period of suspension to any other attorney or from  
sharing in any legal fees earned for services by others during such period of suspension.”  Id at 
13. 
 
On May 27, 2010, Davis through his counsel submitted responses to a Reinstatement 
Questionnaire to Petitioner. Ex. 3.  The ODC investigated the Reinstatement Questionnaire and 
concluded that Respondent had violated the Rules both before and after his suspension and so 
alleged in its Petition. Respondent answered the Petition on January 25, 2011 (“Answer”).  The 
parties presented evidence on whether Davis had violated the Suspension Order on February 23-
24, 2011.  Post-hearing briefing concluded on June 9, 2011.  For medical and logistical reasons 
the Supreme Court extended to October 7, 2011 the date for the Panel’s decision on whether 
Davis had violated any ethical duties.   
The Panel begins by setting forth the claims alleged and summary of recommendations, 
followed by the Panel’s factual findings and the Panel’s conclusions regarding each count. 
I. 
Claims Alleged 
The ODC’s claims arise out of four alleged acts: First, that Davis violated the terms of 
the Suspension Order by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by maintaining that part of 
his law office that performed title and settlement services, continuing to meet with clients or 
prospective clients, and continuing to speak at real estate seminars (Counts I-V); second, that 
prior to the Suspension Order, Davis violated the Rules by conducting a real estate settlement 
while under the influence of alcohol (Counts VI-VIII); third, that Davis violated the Rules by 
misleading police in connection with a traffic accident and then failing accurately to report the 
circumstances of that traffic violation in his Reinstatement Questionnaire (Counts XI-XV); and 
fourth, that Davis engaged in sanctionable conduct by disrobing in a public place while under the 
 
3 
influence of alcohol and assisting his son in changing out of a bathing suit and then failing to be 
fully candid about that incident in his Reinstatement Questionnaire (Counts XVI-XVIII).  The 
ODC voluntarily dismissed Counts IX and X and withdrew from the record all facts and 
evidence relating to those counts at the outset of the hearing. 
Summary of Panel Recommendations 
For the reasons stated, the Panel recommends that the Supreme Court find as follows regarding 
each count of the Petition: 
COUNT I: RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY DISOBEYED THE MAY 27, 2009 
SUSPENSION ORDER IN VIOLATION OF RULE 3.4(c):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
knowingly disobeyed the May 27, 2009 Suspension Order in violation of Rule 3.4(c) by meeting 
with one former client, Herb Gillespie, to provide legal advice, by discussing possible legal 
services and quoting a fee for document preparation to a potential client, Nancy Wolf, a legal 
service subsequently provided by attorney Nixon, and by failing to completely eliminate email 
communications under the name Davis Law more than six weeks after the issuance of the 
Suspension Order.  
 
The Panel also finds that the ODC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent provided legal advice to clients in his management of a real estate settlement 
services business at the offices of his former law firm or in his speaking at seminars for realtors 
and lenders and therefore did not prove that Respondent engaged by those actions in the 
unauthorized practice of law or knowingly violated the Suspension Order.      
 
COUNT II:  RESPONDENT PRACTICED LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE 
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN DELAWARE IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 5.5(a): 
 
Rule 5.5(a) requires that a lawyer “not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the legal 
profession in that jurisdiction.”  For the reasons stated in discussing Count I, the Panel finds that 
Respondent violated Rule 5.5(a) when he met with and provided legal advice to Mr. Gillespie.   
 
COUNT III:  RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY 
VIOLATING OR ATTEMPTING TO VIOLATE THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(a): 
 
Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.” For the reasons stated in our analysis of Count I, the 
Panel finds that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated 
 
4 
Rule 8.4(a). 
 
COUNT IV:  RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY 
ENGAGING IN CONDUCT THAT IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE:  
 
Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  For the reasons stated in our analysis of Count I, the 
Panel finds that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated 
Rule 8.4(d). 
 
COUNT V:  RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HIS PUBLIC DISCIPLINE 
IN VIOLATION OF RULE 7(c) OF THE DELAWARE LAWYERS’ RULES OF 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE: 
 
Rule 7(c) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provides that it shall be 
grounds for disciplinary action for a lawyer to “[v]iolate the terms of any [public] disciplinary 
[disposition].”  For the reasons stated in the Panel’s discussion of Count I, the Panel finds that 
Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the terms of his 
public discipline. 
 
COUNT VI:  RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVIDE COMPETENT 
REPRESENTATION TO A CLIENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 1.1:  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.1 in connection with the November 5, 2008 real estate settlement. 
 
COUNT VII: RESPONDENT FAILED TO ACT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN 
VIOLATION OF RULE 1.3:  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.3 in connection with the November 5, 2008 real estate settlement.  
 
COUNT VIII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(d):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(d) in connection with the November 5, 2008 real estate settlement.  
 
COUNTS IX and X Withdrawn from Record by ODC at Start of Hearing  
 
COUNT XI: RESPONDENT COMMITTED A CRIMINAL ACT IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.4(b):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(b) by reporting false information to a law enforcement officer relating to an 
 
5 
actual offense or incident in violation of  11 Del. C. § 1245. 
 
COUNT XII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT INVOLVING DISHONESTY, 
DECEIT AND MISREPRESENTATION IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(c):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(c) by ingesting alcohol following a motor vehicle accident with the intent to 
prevent the police from performing an alcohol test to determine whether Respondent had been 
driving under the influence.  
 
COUNT XIII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(d):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(d) by ingesting alcohol following a motor vehicle accident with the intent to 
prevent the police from performing an alcohol test to determine whether Respondent had been 
driving under the influence.    
 
COUNT XIV: RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY MADE A FALSE STATEMENT OF 
MATERIAL FACT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.1(a):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.1(a) in his narrative describing his conduct in the September 18, 2008 motor 
vehicle accident.   
 
COUNT XV: RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCLOSE A FACT NECESSARY TO 
CORRECT A MISAPPREHENSION KNOWN TO HAVE ARISEN IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.1(b) 
 
Rule 8.1(b) provides that a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not “fail to 
disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the 
matter.”  The Panel finds that the ODC has not proved a violation of this Rule.  
  
COUNT XVI: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN A CRIMINAL ACT IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.4(b):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence a third alcohol-
related offense in ten months that resulted in one ethical and two criminal violations.   While 
none of these individually would suffice to constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(b), the Panel finds 
that Respondent’s use of alcohol resulted in conduct that reflects indifference to legal obligation 
in a concentrated time period.   
 
COUNT XVII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(d):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
 
6 
violated Rule 8.4(d) in connection with the July 19, 2009 Lums Ponds incident.  
 
COUNT XVIII: RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCLOSE A FACT NECESSARY TO 
CORRECT A MISAPPREHENSION KNOWN TO HAVE ARISEN IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.1(b):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a violation of 
Rule 8.1(b) in connection with the Lums Pond incident.   
 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
Mr. Davis’s Practice Prior to his Suspension 
 
1. 
At the time of his suspension, Mr. Davis was the managing and sole attorney in 
Davis Law, LLC (“Davis Law”), a real estate law practice.1 
 
2. 
Davis Law’s clients generally were home-buyers or homeowners doing 
refinancings referred to Davis Law primarily from builders, real estate agents and 
lenders.2 
 
3. 
Davis sometimes fielded telephone calls at Davis Law directly from parties 
seeking legal advice.  
 
4. 
Davis was a title agent for Fidelity National Title, a title insurance company. 3 
 
5. 
Davis Law earned fees from handling real estate closings for homebuyers or 
homeowners, from a portion of the title insurance fee and for certain ancillary 
services such as preparation of mortgage satisfactions.4  
 
6. 
To market Davis Law, Davis often spoke at seminars for realtors and lenders,5 
including as an accredited instructor with the Delaware Real Estate Commission.6   
 
7. 
Davis also made presentations as the closing attorney to first-time home buyers to 
assist them in receiving preferred financing though the Delaware State Housing 
Authority or New Castle bond program.7  
 
                                                 
1 Tr. 34: 2-9; Tr. 38: 15-24; Tr. 39:1-3. 
2 Tr. 34:5-9; Ex. 23, Deposition transcript of Jennifer Ellis (“Ellis Dep.”) at 10:2-4. 
3 Tr. 497:19-24. 
4 Tr. 39: 4-14. 
5 Tr. 45:3-13. 
6 Tr. 40:1-13; Tr. 553:18 -554:8 (Davis estimating that he did up to 50 first-time homebuyer 
seminars per year and up to 20 continuing education classes per year). 
7 Tr. 40:14-41:14. 
 
7 
8. 
Davis at Davis Law employed and supervised paralegals to prepare documents for 
closings handled by Davis. This work by paralegals included ordering title 
searches and surveys, preparing title commitments, preparing settlement 
statements and preparing packages for closing and post-closing.8   
 
9. 
Davis Law sometimes helped smaller law firms by charging a fixed fee to process 
their files when the smaller firm’s paralegal was on vacation.9 
 
Davis Actions Following Suspension on May 27, 2009 
 
10. 
On May 27, 2009 at 9:40 p.m., Davis sent an email to an attorney who offered to 
cover a seminar for him in light of Davis’s suspension.  Davis replied that Davis’s 
firm had the seminar covered and that “FYI -- we are operating business as 
usual.”10  
 
11. 
On May 28, 2009 at 8:19 a.m. Davis’s counsel advised that he should be careful in 
this kind of response because “it suggests that you intend to defy the Court 
Order.” David replied at 8:20 a.m. “o.k. but I have to be able to get my message 
out.”11 
 
12. 
Based on Davis’s counsel’s advice not to tell those who inquired that it was 
business as usual, Davis’s staff stopped using that phrase.12 
 
13. 
The Supreme Court appointed a receiver, Andrew Taylor, Esq., to take over Davis 
Law following Respondent’s suspension.  Taylor employed Tyler Nixon, Esq. as a 
contract attorney.13  
 
14. 
Davis cooperated with the receiver by among other things, turning over all the 
bank accounts of Davis Law and meeting with him to provide information 
necessary for Taylor to complete closings that had been scheduled for clients of 
Davis Law prior to the suspension.  
 
15. 
Davis ceased to be a title agent after his suspension.14  
 
16. 
Davis ceased doing first-time homebuyer seminars after his suspension.15 
 
17. 
On June 29, 2009, Mr. Davis formed Redwood Settlement Services, LLC d/b/a 
                                                 
8 Ex. 23, Ellis Dep. at 6:11-10:1.  
9 Tr. 547: 15-548:18. 
10 Ex. 4 at 85.  
11 Ex. 4 at 85. 
12 Ex. 23 at 25:13-26:1(Ellis Dep.)  
13 Tr. 72:15-20. 
14 Tr. 497:19 – 498:3.  
15 Tr. 481:2-22.  
 
8 
Redwood Real Estate Services (“Redwood”).16  Redwood is owned 50% by Davis 
and 50% by Gary Bryde, Esq.17  
 
18. 
Redwood is a real estate title and settlement services company that occupied the 
same offices, with a lease in the name of Davis Law, used the same phone number 
and the same staff, and relied on the same referral sources as Davis Law.18  
 
19. 
Non-lawyers in Delaware own and operate similar companies.19  
 
20. 
Respondent removed signage at the Davis law office, removed letterhead and 
business cards identifying Davis Law following Respondent’s suspension20 and 
Bryde never used signage, business cards or letterhead with the name Davis while 
he performed closings for clients referred by Redwood. 21  
 
21. 
Davis’s responsibility at Redwood was to manage the staff including the 
paralegals on a day to day basis and to market Redwood to real estate agents, 
attorneys and lenders.  In those roles he was unsupervised by an attorney.  
 
22. 
If the staff at Redwood had questions about documents being prepared for 
closings, including questions about issues concerning title or a survey or 
encroachments, the staff at Redwood would discuss those issues with Davis.22 
 
23. 
Bryde testified that it was his responsibility to review and approve all documents 
prepared by Redwood for a closing, including reviewing and approving the title 
search and the surveys.23 
 
24. 
Apart from closings performed by the Receiver, and certain other attorneys 
immediately following Respondent’s suspension, Bryde or attorneys under his 
direction generally performed closings for clients for whom Redwood prepared 
settlement packages. 
 
25. 
Bryde employed Nixon after the formation of Redwood.24  
                                                 
16 Ex. 2 Davis Answer to Petition ¶ 8.  
17 Tr. 35:19-22. 
18 Ex. 2 Davis Answer to Petition ¶ 9; Tr. 71:2 – 72:1; Tr. 512: 23-24 & 513:1-7 (Redwood 
employing same paralegals and staff as Davis Law);Tr. 34: 2-24 & 35-39; Ex. 23, Ellis Dep.  at 
10 (clients for Davis Law came from “[r]eferral sources from lenders and real estate agents”); Tr. 
137: 11-14 (Davis Law’s business was “referred by realtors, loan officers, past clients,” as it 
“was a referral business”)).   
19 Tr. 452:15 – 453:16 (Conaty);Tr. 498:7 – 499:14 (Lusky). 
20 Tr. 537:17-22. 
21 Tr. 335: 7- 336:3. 
22 Ex. 23 Ellis Dep. 14: 24 - 15:11. 
23 Tr. 340:16 - 341:3. 
24 Tr. 72:21-23. 
 
9 
 
26. 
Davis neither performed nor attended nor interacted with clients at closings and 
earned no legal fees from real estate closings or otherwise following his 
suspension; legal fees were earned entirely by Bryde.  
 
27. 
Redwood received 80% of the title premium and those funds were used to pay the 
paralegals and office rent and expenses of Redwood.25  
 
28. 
Although Davis testified that following his suspension he removed his email 
signature indicating “Davis Law”26, on July 13, 2009 he sent an email to Nixon 
signed “Davis Law” directing Nixon to refrain from providing direction to 
Redwood’s paralegals.27  
 
29. 
As late at July 26, 2009, Donna Marshall, an employee of Davis Law and then 
Redwood, sent an email to a referral source on which she copied Davis which 
identified her email address as “donna@davislawworks.com.”28   
 
Seminars 
30. 
Davis presented six seminars after his suspension to realtors and lenders.29  The 
titles of the seminars he presented are: “Managing Closing Delays & Loan 
Underwriting,” “Real Estate Transaction Closing Procedures in Maryland,” 
“Understanding the New Good Faith Estimate or “GFE” and HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement,” which he presented on two occasions, “Understanding the New Good 
Faith Estimate or “GFE” and HUD-1 Settlement Statement and Computing Title 
Insurance Premiums,” and “Title Agent Concerns in Back to Back Short Sale 
Transactions”.30 Davis received no compensation for speaking at these 
engagements.31 Davis’s written materials identified him as “Michael R. Davis –
Title Agent”32, Davis stated at the outset that he was not an attorney33, and Nixon 
was at the seminars to answer legal questions.34 
                                                 
25 Tr. 403:2-6. 
26 Tr. 537: 22 – 538:4. 
27 Ex. 4 at 102.  
28 Ex. 4 at 103. 
29 Tr. at 45: 3-13.   
30 Ex. 3 at 76 – 78. 
31 Tr. 51: 6-10. 
32 Tr. 585:7-15 
33  Tr. 483:10-18. 
34 Tr. 583:10-584:8. ODC also contends that Davis gave a seminar on short sales shortly after his 
suspension in June 2009.  That contention is based on the testimony of a disgruntled former 
Redwood employee, Donna Marshall.  Ms. Marshall testified that she attended a seminar in June 
2009 in Rehoboth regarding short sales (Tr. 17:10-11), although the organizer of the seminar 
provided testimony that this did not in fact occur.  (Respondent Ex. 4 – Affidavit of Nora 
Martin).  Ms. Marshall also testified that Davis presented a seminar to potential legal clients who 
 
10 
The November 8, 2008 Settlement 
 
31. 
Davis admitted that on November 5, 2008 he conducted a settlement while under 
the influence of alcohol but denied that he was impaired.35 
 
32. 
At that settlement Mr. Davis represented JAMM Investments, LLC (“JAMM”), an 
entity owned by Debra Seramone (“Ms. Seramone”) and her partners.36  Ms. 
Seramone is a realtor who used Mr. Davis for closings for many years prior to his 
suspension.37 
 
33. 
Ms. Seramone, who attended the closing with her three JAMM partners,38 testified 
that Davis’s behavior “was kind of unconventional and very uncomfortable.  
Michael just kind of talked and talked and talked about nothing, kind of babbled a 
little bit, didn’t seem himself at all.”39  She further testified that Davis did “not 
seem himself”--“[h]is face was flushed.  He talked about just nothing that had to 
do with settlement.  Stupid jokes.”40  His speech “was slurred.”41  At the 
conclusion of the settlement, Davis approached one of Ms. Seramone’s JAMM 
partners and “said something to the effect of either ‘I love you’ or ‘love you,’ and 
moved forward to kiss her.”42  Serramone’s account of Davis’s unusual behavior 
on the day of the closing is corroborated by the testimony of Ellis who testified 
that on that day Davis returned from lunch “inebriated and conducted a closing,”43 
that “he smelled of alcohol” and was talking about “something crazy.”44  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
were first-time homebuyers the day following his suspension which Davis denied.  In light of 
Ms. Marshall’s having lost a claim she filed with the Department of Labor concerning her 
separation from Redwood and her admitted hostility to him, the Panel does not find that reliance 
on her testimony alone is clear and convincing evidence. The Panel finds similarly regarding two 
alleged homebuyer seminars where the sole evidence the ODC presented of Davis’s alleged 
participation was the testimony of Nixon.  That is because Nixon was (i) terminated by Bryde for 
having a secret law practice while under an exclusive employment agreement (prior to his own 
suspension from the practice of law), (ii) described by third parties as “angry” and “vengeful” 
toward both Davis and Bryde (Tr. 358:7-8 & 22-23) and (iii) on the record of having promised to 
do whatever he could to “cease the reinstatement.” (Tr. 359:3-5.)  Again, the Panel does not find 
Nixon’s uncorroborated testimony clear and convincing evidence that Davis in fact spoke at two 
homebuyer seminars. 
35 Ex. 2 at Paragraph 26. 
36 Ex. 18; Tr. 368: 5-12.   
37 Tr. 366:10-24. 
38 Tr. 368:15-18. 
39 Tr. 369:1-5. 
40 Tr.  369:12-16. 
41 Tr. 369: 22-23. 
42 Tr. 370: 2-6. 
43 Ex. 23 (Ellis Dep.) at 44. 
44 Id. at 46.   
 
11 
34. 
After the closing, either that evening or the next day, Davis called Seramone to 
apologize for his inappropriate behavior, and admitted having had a drink at lunch 
before the afternoon settlement.45  
 
The September 18, 2008 Accident 
35. 
In the late evening on September 18, 2008, Davis was in a single vehicle 
accident.46 
 
36. 
Davis consumed alcohol prior to the accident.47  He also had a small glass of wine 
with him in the car which spilled when he crashed.48 
 
37. 
Davis went directly home, and attempted to find a tow truck company to bring the 
car home but was unsuccessful.49 
 
38. 
Davis contacted his “buddy,” Daniel Logan (“Logan”), when he arrived home in 
an attempt to locate a tow truck.50  Logan recalled Mr. Davis telling him he 
wanted a tow truck to get his vehicle “out before the police saw it.”51  Logan 
testified that when Davis called him, he sounded “a little panicked.  Words were 
slurred.”52  
 
39. 
On the same evening as the crash occurred, two New Castle County officers 
investigated.  One of the officers went to Davis’s home to investigate.  Davis 
testified that when the officer arrived at his residence, he answered the door with a 
glass of wine in his hand.53  The officer testified that when Davis answered the 
door it appeared he had been drinking and the officer could smell alcohol on 
him.54  Davis told the officer he had some drinks to “calm his nerves.”55  When 
the officer returned with Davis to the scene of the accident, Davis told the second 
officer, who was the lead investigator, that “he had a few alcoholic drinks when 
he got home to calm his nerves.”56 
 
40. 
The lead investigator wrote in his report that Davis informed him that he “was 
traveling [westbound] on Stone Block Row.  He was rounding the curve, in the 
                                                 
45 Tr. 370: 22-24 & 371:1-9. 
46 Ex. 2 at Paragraph 38. 
47 Id.  
48 Tr. 94: 2-21; Tr. 556: 2-8.   
49 Tr. 100:3-14; Ex. 21 at 175; Tr. 379:18-20. 
50 Tr. 99: 17-21 & 100:3-6. 
51 Tr. 408: 3-11.   
52 Tr. 407: 23-408:1. 
53 Tr. 96: 3-5.   
54 Tr.  403: 5-22. 
55 Tr. 403: 23-24 & 404:1-3. 
56 Ex. 21 at 175; Tr. 100: 23-101:2; Tr. 379: 23-24. 
 
12 
area of Brecks Lane.  He advised he was driving to[o] fast, and was on the cell 
phone.  As a result he lost control.”57 
 
41. 
Although the investigating officer reported that there was “visible” damage to an 
approximate 30-foot section of a wooden fence,58 Davis stated he did not think it a 
reportable accident as he “didn’t know there was any property damage at the time 
it occurred.”59 
 
42. 
The lead investigator noted on the police report that a “hand held cell phone” was 
a “driver distraction.”60  Davis denied that he informed the investigating officers 
that he was on the cell phone, and stated that he told them he did not have it with 
him.61 
 
43. 
The lead investigator also noted on the police report “yes--alcohol suspected”  
 
based on his “initial observations of the vehicle.”62  However, the lead 
 
investigator did not administer a blood alcohol test because: 
 
Based upon what he told me, in my mind, I would not have 
been able to determine if his blood alcohol level was high 
because he drank when he was home or was it high because 
he was intoxicated while he was driving.  That was the 
reason I did not give it because it wouldn’t have painted a 
clear picture of when in fact the alcohol was consumed.63 
 
44. 
The lead investigating officer charged Davis with Unreasonable Speed and 
Failure to Report an Accident on a Public Highway with Property Damage of 
$500 or more.64 
 
45. 
The lead investigator recalled asking Davis whether he drank before the accident 
and Davis “stated no”.65   
 
46. 
Although Mr. Davis “denies that he drank wine before the police arrived in order 
to circumvent the police investigation,”66 Logan testified that the day after the 
September 18 accident he again spoke with Davis, and he sounded “like another 
person. . . .  A degree of arrogance.  Jubilation.  An entirely different person than 
                                                 
57 Ex. 21; Tr. 379: 12-14. 
58 Ex. 21; Tr. 385: 22 – 386:2. 
59 Tr. 103:13-15; Tr. 566:13-14 (“I didn’t know there was a fence there or see it”)). 
60 Ex. 21 at 174. 
61 Tr. 95: 17- 96: 1 & 97:16-18. 
62 Ex. 21; Tr. 381: 3-4.   
63 Tr. 382:13-20. 
64 Ex. 21 at 177. 
65 Tr. 387: 10-15; Tr. 388:11-12. 
66 Ex. 2 ¶38.   
 
13 
the night before.”67  Davis told Logan, “‘I got home and the lawyer in me came 
out, and I popped open a couple bottles of wine.’”68  Davis also informed Logan 
that he drank before the accident and that was “the reason he popped open the 
bottles of wine.”69 Mr. Logan explained: 
 
A: 
He was drinking.  He didn’t want to have someone come to 
their home . . . He didn’t want someone to come to their home – to 
his home and find that he was drinking.  So as a result, he popped 
open the wine so no one could say – he just had the wine while he 
was home. 
 
Q: 
Mr. Davis told you that? 
 
A: 
Yes. Absolutely.  That’s when he said to me “The lawyer in 
me came out.”70 
 
47. 
Marshall also recalls Davis informing her in the days following the accident that 
“he had been drinking and that he had lost control,” after which he “ran back to 
his home . . . and opened two bottles of wine and drank them and waited for the 
police to arrive”.71 She further recalls that “[h]e was pretty proud of himself 
because he had gotten out of being charged with a DUI or any kind of real trouble.  
He did indicate at the time that the police seemed to know exactly what he was 
doing and they knew that their hands were tied.”72 
 
48. 
The Attorney General’s office eventually dismissed the charges of failure to 
report and unsafe speed and Respondent pleaded guilty to inattentive driving as 
reflected in the guilty plea form he attached to his Reinstatement Questionnaire.   
 
49. 
Davis’s description in the Questionnaire of what occurred on September 18 
includes the following: 
 
• 
“At the time of the accident I did not have my cell phone 
with me, so I walked home.” 
 
• 
“Originally, I was charged with Unsafe Speed and Failure 
to Report the Accident, however, upon an explanation of 
the fact that I did not have a means of communication (i.e. 
cell phone) with me at the time of the accident and a full 
explanation of the accident, the charge was reduced to 
                                                 
67 Tr. 409:15-23.   
68 Tr. 410:8-10 (emphasis added).   
69 Tr. 411: 3-4.   
70 Tr. 411: 6-16 (emphasis added). 
71 Tr. 159: 6-13.   
72 Tr. 160:5-10. 
 
14 
inattentive driving.” 
 
• 
“Upon arriving home, I was greeted by the New Castle 
County Police.” 
 
• 
“I provided full cooperation with their [the police] 
investigation of the crash.” 
 
• 
“I provided full cooperation to the officers.”73 
 
The July 19, 2009 Lums Pond Incident 
 
50. 
On July 19, 2009 Davis and his seven-year old son spent an afternoon at Lums 
Pond. 
 
51. 
Davis consumed alcohol while at Lums Pond. 
 
52. 
At the end of the afternoon Davis’s son objected to changing from his bathing suit 
into dry clothing in the public bathroom. 
 
53. 
Davis and his son changed in the parking lot. 
 
54. 
While Davis and his son were changing, a couple and a child (“Witnesses”) 
walking through the parking lot observed Davis naked from the waist down. 
 
55. 
One of the Witnesses argued with Davis about the impropriety of Davis exposing 
his fiancee’s daughter to Davis with his pants down.  
 
56. 
A park patrol officer overheard the argument and radioed an enforcement officer 
from the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control 
(“DNREC”), Division of Parks and Recreation.   
 
57. 
After separately interviewing Davis and each of the Witnesses, the DNREC 
enforcement officer issued Davis a Complaint and Summons.  That document 
charged Davis with two violations titled “Conduct Violation” and “Alcohol 
Violation,” respectively.74 The Conduct Violation was for indecent exposure and 
the alcohol violation was for having a blood alcohol level of .16, twice the legal 
limit.75  
 
58. 
Davis reported this incident on his Restatement Questionnaire as “Conduct 
Violation” and “Alcohol Violation” and attached a copy of the Complaint and 
                                                 
73 Ex. 3 at 71. 
74 Ex. 3 (last two pages). 
75 Tr. 434:10 – 438:5; Ex. 22(DNREC officer’s report). 
 
15 
Summons as an exhibit to the Restatement Questionnaire.76 The Complaint and 
Summons submitted to the ODC reflects an “X” in the box next to “Voluntary 
Assessment” and is signed by Davis.  The description of “Voluntary Assessment” 
reflects that checking this box indicates the undersigned’s “desire to plead guilty 
to the stated charge(s).”77  
  
Legal Analysis/Burden and standard 
As the ODC acknowledges, it bears the burden of proving the charged misconduct by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See Rule 15(c) (standard of proof) and Rule 15(d) (burden of 
proof) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“Procedural Rules”).  The 
Delaware Supreme Court has defined clear and convincing evidence to be that which "produces 
in the mind of the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth of [the] factual contentions [is] 
'highly probable.'" Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 147 (Del. 2002) (citations omitted).  Stated 
differently, "To establish proof by clear and convincing evidence means to prove something that 
is highly probable, reasonably certain, and free from serious doubt."  Id.  
Analysis of Counts I-V Related to Provision of Settlement Services, Speaking at Seminars 
and Communications with Clients or Prospective Clients 
 
COUNT I: RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY DISOBEYED THE MAY 27, 2009 
SUSPENSION ORDER IN VIOLATION OF RULE 3.4(c):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
knowingly disobeyed the May 27, 2009 Suspension Order in violation of Rule 3.4(c) by meeting 
with one former client, Herb Gillespie, to provide legal advice, by discussing possible legal 
services and quoting a fee for document preparation to a potential client, Nancy Wolf, a legal 
service subsequently provided by attorney Nixon, and by failing completely to eliminate email 
communications under the name Davis Law more than six weeks after the issuance of the 
Suspension Order.  
 
The Panel also finds that the ODC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent provided legal advice to clients in his management of a real estate settlement 
services business at the offices of his former law firm or in his speaking at seminars for realtors 
and lenders and therefore did not prove that Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law or knowingly violated the Suspension Order.  
 
 
                                                 
76 Ex. 3 (last two pages). 
77 Id. 
 
16 
Rule 3.4(c) provides that “a lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of 
the tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”  As 
noted above, on May 27, 2009 the Delaware Supreme Court suspended Davis from engaging in 
the practice of law as a member of the Delaware Bar for a period of one year.  In the Matter of 
Michael R. Davis, No. 301, 2008 at 13 (Del. May 27, 2009) (per curiam).  The Supreme Court 
Order suspending Davis prohibited him from sharing in “any legal fees arising from clients or 
cases referred by Davis during the period of suspension to any other attorney or from sharing in 
any legal fees earned for services by others during such period of suspension.”  Id.  Petitioner 
and Respondent agree that the Suspension Order required Davis to comply with it and the case 
law interpreting what a suspended attorney is permitted to do.  
 
After careful consideration of the evidence and the case law, the Panel finds that the ODC 
proved by clear and convincing evidence that Davis knowingly violated the Suspension Order in 
three ways:   
1. He provided legal advice to a client, Herb Gillespie. 
2. He discussed possible legal services and quoted a fee for document preparation to 
a potential client, Nancy Wolf, a service subsequently performed by attorney 
Nixon.  
3. He failed more than six weeks after the Suspension Order to remove the name of 
his former firm from email communications.  
The ODC acknowledges that its claim against Davis raises an issue of first impression, namely, 
whether “a suspended attorney [can] operate a real estate title and settlement services company 
out of the same offices, with the same staff, and obtaining business from the same referral 
 
17 
sources, as his real estate law practice prior to suspension?”78  In stating the question this way 
Petitioner acknowledges that it did not seek to prove that Davis violated the Court’s order by 
working as a real estate attorney for buyers or homeowners at any closing or by sharing in the 
fees from any such legal work or from the referral of any such legal work.  The ODC submitted 
no evidence that any such legal work or attorneys fee-sharing by Davis occurred. The ODC 
argues instead that a suspended lawyer during the period of suspension may not manage a real 
estate title and settlement services company even if the work of that company is reviewed at 
closing by licensed attorneys who alone represent and interact with the clients and who receive 
all attorneys’ fees. Davis counters that his creation of a company to provide support services for 
attorneys and not the public in connection with real estate settlements violates neither the 
Suspension Order nor the case law regarding what a suspended attorney is permitted to do.  
 
The Panel finds that the ODC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that in 
continuing to provide settlement services Respondent knowingly violated the Suspension Order. 
The Panel recognizes that had the Supreme Court specified the type of acts that it intended to bar 
in the Suspension Order, it might not have permitted Respondent without more direct attorney 
supervision to supervise in the same offices the same paralegals who at Davis Law had 
performed settlement services and likewise might have barred him from speaking at real estate 
seminars to lenders and realtors as he had done while an attorney at Davis Law.  Here, unlike in 
the non-Delaware cases relied upon by Petitioner, at the time of suspension, the Delaware 
Supreme Court had issued a well-reasoned decision, In the Matter of Mid-Atlantic Settlement 
Services, Inc., et al., File no. UPL 95-15 (Del. May 31, 2000), that spelled out what aspects of 
the settlement process required attorney review.   Further, the Court in a trilogy of cases 
                                                 
78 ODC Opening Brief at 30. 
 
18 
addressing the limits on a suspended attorney who works as a paralegal in a law office had made 
clear that past or prospective client contact to provide or seek to provide legal advice was 
forbidden. .   The Panel notes that Davis made sure to avoid contact with any client at any 
closing, a prohibition that was clear in the trilogy of cases discussing what a suspended lawyer 
must avoid, and that all work the Supreme Court has held must be done by an attorney at a real 
estate closing was performed by attorneys other than Davis who shared none of their fees with 
Davis.   The Panel finds that, apart from the three items noted above, the ODC failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that Respondent’s behavior in managing the settlement services 
company he formed post-suspension and in speaking at six seminars to lenders and realtors 
constituted the unauthorized practice of law or violated the Suspension Order.  Under these 
circumstances the Panel notes that even the authority relied upon by the ODC reflects caution to 
find that a suspended attorney knowingly violated a Suspension Order when the relevant tribunal 
had never previously found the conduct at issue to violate any rule of professional conduct.  See 
In Re Mitchell, 901 F.2d 1179, 1189 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to discipline suspended attorney 
who handled appeal and licensed attorney who agreed to file papers for him as long as suspended 
attorney remained responsible for the legal work because the novelty of the question compelled 
court to limit ruling to actions taken after the date of its opinion).  Therefore, while we find that 
the Supreme Court may find Davis’s creation of a settlement services company and speaking at 
seminars to realtors and lenders to be beyond what a suspended real estate attorney should have 
done, we cannot recommend that the Court find that Davis knowingly violated the Suspension 
Order by engaging in these activities.  
Before turning to the specific acts at issue, we begin by reviewing the applicable case 
law.  
 
19 
Case Law Re Limits on Suspended Attorneys   
As the ODC correctly states, no Delaware case addresses the precise issue of whether a 
suspended attorney can manage a real estate services company to supply settlement packages to 
attorneys who conduct closings from the same office with the same staff and the same phone as 
his prior law practice.  A trilogy of cases address what a suspended lawyer can and cannot do 
while working as a paralegal in a law office to which we now turn for guidance: In re Sanders, 
1985 WL 5255 (Del. 1985), In Re Frabizzio, 508 A.2d 468 (Del. 1986) and In Re Mekler, 672 
A.2d 23 (Del. 1995).  
In Sanders, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the circumstances under which a 
suspended attorney could serve as a paralegal in a law firm.  The Court approved such 
employment but restricted the suspended attorney to: 
1. 
Review and summarization of documents; 
 
2. 
Legal research and drafting of intra-office memoranda and briefs; 
 
3. 
Drafting of pleadings and other legal instruments, provided all such pleadings 
shall be reviewed, approved, and signed by a member or associate attorney of 
such firm; 
 
4. 
Drafting of suggested correspondence as directed by and under the supervision of, 
the attorney primarily responsible for the case or matter in consideration;  
 
5. 
Such similar duties which are customarily performed by paralegals under the 
supervision of attorneys except that there shall be no contact with clients, 
witnesses, or prospective witnesses. Furthermore, such duties, and those 
designated in the preceding paragraphs, shall in no event include advising or 
counseling clients  or prospective clients of the firm in the client’s legal 
relationships, rights, duties, or responsibilities, the legal consequences of any 
proposed action, or the application of law to any facts or circumstances of the 
client or prospective client. 
 
6. 
The suspended attorney would be compensated on a salary basis and receive no 
share of any legal fee earned by the employer. 
 
7. 
Respondent’s employment with his employer shall not be mentioned in any 
 
20 
professional announcement, office or building signs or directories, office 
letterhead, telephone listing or legal directory. Personal business cards, if used by 
respondent, will clearly designate his status as that of paralegal. 
Id. 
In Frabizzio the Delaware Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a lawyer 
suspended from the private practice of law could nonetheless work as a law clerk/paralegal in 
another attorney’s private law practice with telephone and personal contact with clients, 
witnesses and prospective witnesses.  The Court held that the suspended attorney could “perform 
the tasks usually performed by law clerks and paralegals … except that he may not have direct 
contact as a law clerk or paralegal with clients, witnesses, or prospective witnesses.”  Id. at 469.  
The Court explained its rationale for this restriction by citing with approval the words of the 
Florida Supreme Court as follows: 
To the layman, the difference between mere clerking and the 
unrestrained practice of law is not readily apparent.  He observes 
an attorney, supposedly under suspicion for unethical conduct, 
walking into law offices; necessarily he must wonder whether the 
attorney is indeed being disciplined.  This confusion is 
compounded when the disciplined attorney is interviewing 
witnesses as an investigator on behalf of the law firm or otherwise 
discussing cases with clients.  The resulting detriment to the 
integrity and reputation of the Bar is obvious … I am also 
concerned that the attorney who is suspended or disbarred for 
unethical conduct, upon returning to a law office, will encounter 
difficulty in confining himself to strictly preparatory functions. 
 
Id. at 469, quoting The Florida Bar v. Thomson, Fla. Supr., 310 S.2d 300, 303 (1975). 
 
The Court also cited with approval the observation of the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
that: 
 
A suspended lawyer is not the same as a layman. The public knows 
that he has a legal education, that he has engaged in the practice of 
law, and that his words and opinions are presumably more valuable 
on that account.  We cannot accept the argument that a … 
suspended lawyer may engage in all activities which non-lawyers 
also perform. 
 
 
21 
Id. quoting  Application of Christianson, N. D. Supr., 215 N.W.2d 920, 925 (1974). 
 
Following Frabizzio, in Mekler the Supreme Court denied a suspended attorney the right 
to have “direct contact with clients or prospective clients or witnesses or prospective witnesses 
when acting as a paralegal or law clerk or under the supervision of a member of the Bar, or 
otherwise.” Mekler, 672 A.2d at 26.  The suspended attorney had sought to be able to have such 
contact while working as a paralegal under the supervision of an attorney with a Family Court 
practice.  The suspended attorney had proposed that he be permitted such contact under 
appropriate safeguards including a written disclaimer to all clients in the fee agreement and 
elsewhere that the attorney was suspended and a commitment to offer no advice to clients or to 
convey the legal advice of opinions of the supervising attorney.  Id. at 25.  In denying this 
proposal the Court noted that  
 
Perception is often reality. It would be very difficult for the 
members of the public to be expected to understand Mekler’s status 
if he were permitted such contacts.... It is the responsibility of this 
Court to protect members of the public in their dealings with those 
providing legal services and to prevent non-lawyers (including 
suspended lawyers) from the practice of law or the perceived 
practice of law.  That responsibility would not be advanced if this 
Court were to accede to the Request. It must be clear to the public 
that this Court is effective in its discipline of members of the Bar, 
that its judgments will not be diluted and that it will not send 
mixed signals.  
 
Id. at 25-26. 
 
Of particular concern to the Mekler court was that Mekler had been suspended because of 
a failure to supervise his own non-lawyer staff in their dealings with clients.  Id. at 26. The Court 
was concerned that Mekler as a non-lawyer would exceed the boundaries that limit what non-
lawyers can do. Id.  Notwithstanding Mekler’s protestations that he would not exceed his 
limitations as a non-lawyer, the Court stated that  
 
22 
… [T]his Court cannot countenance conduct by a suspended 
lawyer which would leave the impression to a reasonable person 
that the Court would allow the same kind of “business as usual” 
which it has already found to be impermissible in Mekler’s own 
case, or that it is de facto permitting a suspended lawyer to be 
doing any act which a reasonable member of the public could 
believe to be the practice of law. 
Id. 
 
 
The Supreme Court also has addressed what constitutes the practice of law 
relating to real estate settlements.  In In the Matter of Mid-Atlantic Settlement Services, Inc., et 
al., File no. UPL 95-15 (Del. May 31, 2000), the Court concluded that a Delaware attorney is 
required to conduct a closing for the sale of Delaware real property or of a refinancing loan 
secured by Delaware real property.  Specifically, the Court held that the following actions 
constitute the practice of law: 
a. 
Determining the proper legal description of the property (as set forth on the deed) 
to be included on Exhibit A to the mortgage; 
 
b. 
Explaining to the borrower(s) the terms of many legal documents, including the 
note, mortgage, Planned Unit Development Rider, the Truth-in-Lending 
Disclosure and the first payment letter. 
 
Id. at 17.  The Court held that  
 
An attorney licensed to practice law in Delaware is required to be 
involved in a direct or supervisory capacity in drafting or 
reviewing all documents affecting transfer of title to Delaware real 
property or where Delaware real property is used as security for the 
repayment of a debt or the performance of an obligation, with the 
exception of home equity loans in which the lender is acting in a 
pro se capacity and no evaluation of exceptions to title is required.  
 
The participation of an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Delaware is necessary in evaluating the legal rights and obligations 
of the parties, representing the buyer in examining the title and 
removing exceptions to the title, supervising the disbursement of 
funds, and responding to questions concerning the legal effect of 
documents and ramifications of a transaction by which title to 
Delaware real property is used as security for the repayment of a 
debt or the performance of an obligation, with the exception of 
 
23 
home equity loans in which the lender is acting in a pro se capacity 
and no evaluation of exceptions to title is required. 
 
Id. at 24-25. 
 
Petitioner also relies upon a Kansas decision rendered fifteen months after the Suspension 
Order in which the Kansas Supreme Court denied reinstatement to a suspended attorney who 
engaged an independent contractor to handle his legal practice while he was suspended, In re 
Miller, 238 P.3d 227 (Kan. 2010).  The suspended attorney paid the independent contractor on an 
hourly basis and reported his compensation to the Internal Revenue Service as that of an 
independent contractor. No written agreement documented the relationship.  The independent 
contractor worked out of the office of the suspended attorney. The suspended attorney made all 
financial decisions for the firm.  The sole action taken by the suspended attorney to comply with 
the suspension order was to change the signature page on letters and pleadings and to hire the 
independent contractor to review and sign letters and pleadings and make court appearances.  Id. 
at 232.  On at least one occasion a letter on the letterhead of the suspended lawyer was sent on 
behalf of a client to an opposing party in a legal matter.  When the disciplinary counsel 
investigated, the suspended lawyer failed to provide the file in that matter as requested by 
disciplinary counsel. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, in an opinion dated August 13, 2010, held that the suspended 
attorney had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  The rationale for that conclusion was 
that “Rather than going to work for an attorney, the Respondent appears to have hired an 
attorney to continue his legal work for him.  The supervision that is required by the rules was not 
present in this case.” Id. at 232.  The Kansas Supreme Court held that as neither the suspended 
attorney nor his professional corporation could contract for the professional corporation to 
provide legal services, the suspended attorney lacked the authority to hire an independent 
 
24 
contractor to provide legal services for the clients of the professional corporation.  Id. at 236.   
Although none of these decisions addresses the facts present here, certain principles 
emerge.  First, in the circumstance of a suspended attorney working in a law office under the 
supervision of a Delaware attorney, the Supreme Court has recognized that a suspended attorney 
may do work traditionally done by a paralegal or law clerk, including review and summarization 
of documents; legal research and drafting of intra-office memoranda and briefs; drafting of 
pleadings and other legal instruments, provided all such pleadings are reviewed, approved, and 
signed by a member or associate attorney of such firm; drafting of suggested correspondence as 
directed by and under the supervision of, the attorney primarily responsible for the case or matter 
in consideration; and such similar duties which are customarily performed by paralegals under 
the supervision of attorneys.  Second, the Supreme Court consistently has held that there can be 
no contact with clients, witnesses, or prospective witnesses and no advising or counseling clients 
or prospective clients of the firm in the client’s legal relationships, rights, duties, or 
responsibilities, the legal consequences of any proposed action, or the application of law to any 
facts or circumstances of the client or prospective client, even if the suspended attorney provides 
appropriate disclaimers.   Third, in the context of a suspended lawyer working in a law firm or a 
law office, the Supreme Court has identified a major concern that members of the public not 
perceive that the suspended lawyer is nonetheless practicing law. That is why the Court did not 
accede to the suspended lawyer’s request in Mekler to be allowed client contact while working as 
a paralegal in a law office—members of the public might believe that a suspended lawyer 
meeting with clients in a law office was in fact practicing law, notwithstanding the disclaimers 
and protections the suspended lawyer offered to provide.  Finally, the Kraus case indicates that a 
suspended attorney may not continue to cause his professional corporation to do legal work and 
 
25 
receive legal fees for clients through an independent contractor where there is insufficient 
evidence that the suspended attorney received appropriate supervision.    
The parties agree that non-lawyers run and are permitted to run title and settlement 
service companies.79  They also agree in part on the legal standard, i.e., that a suspended lawyer 
may not have direct contact with clients, witnesses or prospective clients or witnesses and may 
not engage in activities that a reasonable person may construe as the practice of law.  Mekler, 
672 A.2d at 25.  The ODC contends that a suspended attorney may not meet with clients while 
suspended even if those meetings are unrelated to the provision of legal services while Davis 
contends that a suspended lawyer may meet with former law firm clients as long as he does not 
provide legal services and a reasonable former client does not reasonably believe that he is 
providing legal services.  Neither  party disagrees that the Supreme Court “cannot countenance 
any conduct by a suspended lawyer” leaving the impression “that it is de facto permitting a 
suspended lawyer to be doing any act which a reasonable member of the public could believe to 
be the practice of law.”  Id. at 26. 
As a preliminary matter, the Panel rejects the argument of ODC that referral sources are 
legal clients.   While it is true that referral sources for Davis – realtors and lenders – were the 
sources of his clients, his clients for his practice of law were the persons he represented prior to 
his suspension: homebuyers and homeowners.  It is to those persons that he owed duties arising 
out of an attorney-client relationship.  The ODC submits no authority for the ipse dixit that the 
Panel should view the referral sources as clients of Davis Law for purposes of the proscription 
against his meeting with clients or prospective clients during his suspension.80  
                                                 
79 Tr. 449:21 – 450:1 (Conaty); Tr. 498:24 – 499:14 (Lusky). 
80 Petitioner does argue that Davis had served as an agent of the sellers relying upon Norton v. 
Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 1982) and Alejandro and Reinholz v Hornung, 1992 WL 200608, at 
 
26 
Second, the Panel does not find that the ODC met its burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Davis provided legal advice to realtors and lenders.  ODC’s claim that 
Davis provided legal advice to realtors and lenders is based upon the testimony of Marshall and 
Nixon. The Panel does not find general, uncorroborated testimony from Marshall or Nixon alone 
to be clear and convincing evidence that Davis in fact provided legal advice to realtors or 
lenders, given their bias and stated desire to do harm to Davis in the reinstatement process.81  
Also, Marshall could not identify by name a single realtor to whom Davis allegedly said that, 
although he was suspended, he could still provide legal advice.82  Similarly, the only realtor 
Nixon identified as one to whom Davis allegedly provided legal advice was Stephen Marcus. 
Marcus testified that although he did call Davis to ask whether he could assist a client regarding 
a problem with a condo association Davis reminded him that he was suspended and referred the 
matter to Nixon.83  Marcus further testified that Davis provided no legal advice and performed no 
legal services to him during Davis's suspension.84  Both because of the lack of specificity and 
corroboration of the testimony by Marshall and Nixon, the Panel does not find that the ODC 
proved by clear and convincing evidence that Davis provided legal advice to realtors or lenders 
                                                                                                                                                             
*1 (Del. Ch. 1992). Together these cases stand for the proposition that a realtor is an agent of a 
seller.  This does not establish, however, that Davis was an agent of the realtors or sellers or that 
the realtors or sellers were clients of Davis Law.  ODC presented no evidence from any realtor or 
lender that it viewed Davis Law as its agent or counsel.  Indeed, the evidence presented in 
connection with the transaction involving Wolf is that when Davis and later Bryde or Nixon 
performed closings, they did so solely on behalf of the buyers.  That a seller, or real estate agent 
or lender may have preferred Davis Law to handle a closing on behalf of a buyer, did not make 
the seller or those entities clients of Davis Law.  If in fact they were, ODC submitted no such 
evidence.   
81 See n.34, infra. 
82 Tr. 188:9-22. 
83 Tr. 523:1-11. 
84 Id. at 523:24 - 524:4. 
 
27 
during his suspension.85   
Third, the Panel does not believe that the proscription on meeting with former clients 
during the period of suspension was intended to mean that Davis could not meet with them in 
settings where there was no expectation or any evidence of actual provision of legal services or 
legal advice.  Thus, as explained below, the ODC adduced no evidence that Davis provided legal 
advice during his meetings with Nicholson, and therefore the Panel does not believe that Davis’s 
meetings with Nicholson violate the Suspension Order.  
The harder question is the one of first impression: may a suspended Delaware real estate 
attorney whose legal practice prior to suspension included providing settlement services continue 
to provide the settlement services out of the same offices as long as a different Delaware attorney 
handles all closings, the suspended attorney avoids contact with clients or prospective clients, the 
suspended attorney eliminates all communications with the public under the name of the former 
firm, and the suspended attorney receives no legal fees? 
The Christianson case, cited approvingly by the Delaware Supreme Court in Frabizzio, 
well stated the issue: 
[T]o what extent, if any, may a suspended attorney engage in activities 
which, when performed by a licensed attorney, constitute a part of his practice of 
law, but which also may be performed lawfully by laymen….On the one hand, it 
seems extremely harsh to rule that a suspended lawyer, who already has been 
subjected to the deprivation of his means of livelihood, should further be deprived 
of opportunities to earn a living by doing things which laymen are permitted to 
do, such as investigating accidents, preparing tax returns, filling out simple deed 
forms as a real estate broker and doing legal research as a law clerk to a licensed 
attorney. On the other hand, the petitioner appears to take the extreme position 
that he is permitted to do anything that a layman could do, and, as a law clerk, 
everything that an attorney could do except appear in court. To adopt this view 
would mean that a suspension of one’s license to practice law would be a penalty 
                                                 
85 For similar reasons the Panel does not find that the ODC proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that while suspended Davis represented that he was an attorney in communications 
with lenders or collection agencies as the sole testimony to that effect came from Ms. Marshall. 
 
 
28 
lightly borne.  
 
Christianson, 215 N.W. 2d at 924.  See generally Nature of Legal Services or Law-
Related Services Which May Be Performed for Others by Disbarred or Suspended 
Attorney, 87 ALR 3d 279 (1978) (hereafter “Nature of Legal Services”). 
 
 
Davis argues that as long as he complies with the exact terms of the Suspension 
Order and follows the guidance from the case law of no contact with clients or 
prospective clients, he should be free as a suspended attorney to engage in activities that 
non-lawyers otherwise routinely perform.  Further, Davis does not consider it 
problematic that as a suspended attorney he supervises paralegals in the provision of the 
same settlement services from the same office at the same phone number from which he 
practiced law because he took appropriate steps to change the name and the signage and 
to ensure that he did not have contact with or provide advice to clients. Indeed, Davis 
concedes that for the settlement portion of his former practice, it was his intent to have 
the lenders and realtors know that it was business as usual. 
 
The Delaware case law provides that a suspended attorney cannot engage in all 
activities that non-lawyers may do.  Thus, even accepting that paralegals for family law 
practitioners meet with clients, the Supreme Court in Mekler held that a suspended 
attorney may not do that because there was too great a risk that the suspended attorney 
would give legal advice and the public might be confused.  Similarly, although a non-
lawyer can run an incorporation service, a suspended lawyer may not necessarily 
incorporate entities for clients.  Application of Christianson, 215 N.W.2d at 923.  At least 
one court has found that a suspended attorney can perform title abstracts where he 
expresses no opinion as to the quality of the title and provides his work to a supervising 
attorney in an office other than his or the supervising attorney’s law office.  See In Re 
 
29 
Stoldt, 181 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1962).  The principle allowing certain activities by a 
suspended lawyer that may be performed by non-lawyers was stated in Christianson as 
follows:  
 
A suspended lawyer may engage in some such activities if he is otherwise 
qualified to do so, but not if his qualifications come from having been a 
lawyer. For example, a suspended lawyer who is also a public accountant 
may prepare tax returns as a public accountant. But a suspended lawyer 
may not prepare the papers necessary to incorporate a corporation merely 
because one of the stockholders of the corporation might also be able to 
fill in the blanks on a printed form by himself.  When professional 
expertise enters into the activity, and when the activity is one which is 
customarily performed by lawyers, then such activity is forbidden to a 
suspended attorney, even though under some conditions members of other 
professions may sometimes be allowed to perform the same acts.   
 
Christianson, 215 N.W. 2d at 926 (emphasis supplied). See also Nature of Legal Services 
at 9[b]. 
 
 
The evidence at the hearing established that the provision of settlement services is 
not customarily done by lawyers alone but instead is often done by companies where no 
attorneys are involved. The ODC does not contend that work by those entities is the 
practice of law.86  The Panel is not persuaded as a general matter that a suspended 
attorney who manages an office that provides settlement services violates a suspension 
order or engages in the unauthorized practice of law, as long as the suspended attorney 
follows scrupulously the terms of the suspension order and the existing case law 
regarding what a suspended lawyer can do.  
 
The ODC argues that Davis explained at two seminars for realtors and lenders how a 
change in the law affected the HUD-1 forms and that that conduct exceeded the limit of what a 
suspended attorney is permitted to do.  Davis does not dispute that he conducted two such 
seminars post-suspension but testified that his remarks were limited to explaining how the new 
                                                 
86 Tr. at 19:18 - 20:9. 
 
30 
four-page forms differed from the former two-page forms.  The sole attendee who testified at the 
hearing, Helena Davidson, a realtor, testified that in her view Davis offered no legal advice to 
any person and that no homebuyers attended.87  
The Panel finds that the ODC failed to prove by  clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent's speaking at seminars to realtors and lenders violated the Suspension Order.  The 
ODC offered no evidence of what Respondent said at those seminars other than the testimony of 
Respondent which did not reflect the giving of legal advice. We note that Respondent avoided 
homebuyer seminars post-suspension which would have reflected improper communications to 
potential clients. The Panel finds that the ODC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that Respondent presented at such homebuyer seminars post-suspension.   
 
Allegations of Improper Client Contacts 
 
The ODC alleges that Davis met with three clients following his suspension to provide 
legal advice: Herb Gillespie, Donald Nicholson, and Nancy Wolf. The ODC called Nicholson 
and Wolf to testify; the ODC did not call Gillespie to testify. 
Gillespie 
The ODC contends that Davis met with Herb Gillespie, a client prior to Davis’s 
suspension, on the morning of a hearing in the JP Court on a litigation matter.  Davis had filed 
the litigation prior to his suspension on behalf of an entity in which Gillespie was a principal, 
PHS, Inc.  Nixon testified that he met with Davis the night before the hearing to go over the case. 
At a meeting the next morning among Davis, Gillespie and Nixon, Nixon testified that Davis 
provided “the entire strategy as to how the litigation would be, the case would be conducted, 
                                                 
87 Tr. at 492. 
 
31 
[what] were the relevant points to bring out.” 88 Davis testified he had no recollection of such a 
meeting.89  
The Panel is troubled that ODC did not call Mr. Gillespie to corroborate the testimony of 
Nixon. Nonetheless, in carefully assessing the demeanor of the witnesses, including the 
specificity and clarity of Nixon’s recollection90 and the weakness of Davis’s explanation that he 
recalled no such meeting,91 the Panel finds that the ODC met its burden by clear and convincing 
evidence that Respondent met with Gillespie and Nixon on the morning of his hearing and 
provided legal advice and that this conduct violated the Suspension Order.    
Nicholson 
Nicholson is a financial advisor and a principal in Nicholson & Associates.92  Before 
Davis’s suspension, Nicholson hired Davis for closings and refinancing on both his primary 
residence and his personal investment properties.93  One of the closings Davis handled before his 
suspension was for a property Nicholson purchased with Gillespie.94 After Davis’s suspension, 
Nicholson hired Redwood to provide the settlement packages for refinancings.95   
Davis met with Nicholson on two occasions after his suspension.96  At those post-
suspension meetings Nicholson and Davis discussed, among other issues, “general 
economic conditions” in the real estate market.97 The Panel finds that Nicholson’s 
testimony of having met twice with Davis and discussed general conditions in the real 
                                                 
88 Tr. 270: 23 -271: 2. 
89 Tr. 571:24 – 572:12. 
90 This contrasts with other testimony of Nixon which the Panel did not find credible.   
91 Tr. 572:2-12. 
92 Tr. 295:21 – 296:8. 
93   Tr. 297: 15-24 – 298: 3. 
94 Tr. 300: 21 – 301:15. 
95 Tr. 298: 14 -18; Tr. 302: 4-9. 
96 Tr. 303: 5-11; Tr. 304:12-14. 
97 Tr. 304: 7-11 & 305: 5-13 
 
32 
estate market hardly constitutes the practice of law.  The ODC does not even argue that 
Davis gave any legal advice to Nicholson.  It argues instead that the phrase “or 
otherwise” from the Mekler decision reiterating the proscription against meeting with 
clients means that a suspended lawyer cannot meet with a former client at all during the 
lawyer’s suspension, regardless of the context.  The language at issue is the sentence 
from Mekler that the suspended attorney can have no “direct contact with clients or 
prospective clients or witnesses or prospective witnesses when acting as a paralegal or 
law clerk or under the supervision of a member of the Bar, or otherwise.”  Id at 26.
 
The Panel reads that language to reflect the Supreme Court’s care to make clear 
that a suspended attorney cannot meet with clients for the purpose of providing legal 
advice or in a legal setting in whatever capacity, whether acting as a paralegal or law 
clerk or under the supervision of a member of the Bar or otherwise.  The Panel finds no 
support in the case law for the proposition that a suspended lawyer, for example, cannot 
meet with family members at family functions if the suspended lawyer had represented 
those family members prior to his suspension. He surely could not meet with them to 
provide legal advice but it cannot be that the Supreme Court intended that a suspended 
lawyer must be deprived of his contacts with friends and family simply because he once 
represented them prior to his suspension.  Yet that is the effect of the ODC’s proposed 
unduly expansive reading of that language.  Similarly, the Panel does not find that 
language to have precluded Davis from meeting on two occasions with Nicholson to 
discuss, among other things, general conditions in the real estate market. Accordingly, the 
Panel finds that the meetings with Nicholson did not violate the Suspension Order.   
Wolf 
 
33 
On June 18, 2010, Wolf sold property owned by an LLC of which she was a member.98 
Before the settlement date, Wolf discussed the sale of this property with Davis, and from this 
discussion Wolf assumed that Redwood could represent her, as the seller, in the transaction.99 
Wolf testified that Davis did not tell her that but that it “was an assumption on my part.”100  
Davis did quote Wolf a price of $320 - $350.101 
On June 16, 2010, two days before closing, Nixon, who handled the closing, emailed 
Wolf the following: 
Just to follow up, can you recap what Michael Davis had promised 
to you in terms of this firm providing you services and 
representation, as well as the costs to you, when you had lunch 
with him last week? 
 
Are you sure he said we could represent the buyer and the seller in 
the same transaction?102 
 
At closing Wolf thought that Nixon represented her, when in fact he represented the 
purchasers.103  Nixon had Wolf execute an Acknowledgement of Non-Representation clarifying 
that he only represented the buyer.104 
Wolf testified that Davis neither provided legal advice nor held himself out as being 
permitted to practice law.105  She also testified that she paid no legal fee to Davis.106  However, 
she also testified that she believed based on her conversation with Davis that Redwood would be 
handling the matter of legal representation but that Davis could not participate because his 
                                                 
98 Tr. 283: 22-24 & 284:1 - 285:2. 
99 Tr. 285: 3-21.   
100 Tr. 287: 16 – 288: 1.  
101 Tr. 286: 13-16. 
102 Ex. 12.   
103 Tr. 289: 4-9; Tr.  293: 15-18; Tr. 219: 2 - 220: 3. 
104 Ex. 13; Tr. 220:16-23. 
105 Tr. 293:19 – 294: 2. 
106 Tr. 293:1-4. 
 
34 
license had been suspended.107  Her uncontradicted testimony reflects that Davis caused her to 
believe that Redwood could handle the legal aspects of a closing even if Davis himself did not do 
the closing.   This is a communication with a member of the public that an entity created by a 
suspended attorney could handle a closing.  The Panel finds that in so communicating Davis 
violated the Suspension Order.  
Allegations Regarding Failure to Eliminate Public References to Davis Law LLC   
 
The Supreme Court in Sanders held that a suspended attorney must be careful to avoid 
communications with the public that suggest that he is a practicing attorney.  Davis 
acknowledged that the Suspension Order so required by describing the care he took to remove 
signage, business cards, letterhead or emails containing “Davis Law.”108 Yet the ODC provided 
evidence that Davis sent on July 13, 2009 an email to Nixon with the email address 
mdavis@davislawworks.com. in response to an email from Nixon to the Redwood paralegals 
that similarly reflects that their email addresses ended in “davislawworks.com”.109 He also was 
copied on an email an email dated July 26, 2009 to two realtors from Donna Marshall, then a 
Redwood employee, whose email address was listed as donna@davislawworks.com.” to a 
member of the public that reflects the email address “davislawworks.com”.110  The Panel finds 
that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that Davis knowingly violated the 
Suspension Order by failing to eliminate references to Davis Law in post-suspension 
communications, including in communications to members of the public by a Redwood 
employee.   
COUNT II:  RESPONDENT PRACTICED LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE 
                                                 
107 Tr. 288:9-11. 
108 Tr. at  437:17 – 438:4.  
109 Ex.4 at 102. 
110 Id. at 103. 
 
35 
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN DELAWARE IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 5.5(a) 
 
Rule 5.5(a) requires that a lawyer “not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the legal 
profession in that jurisdiction.”  For the reasons stated in discussing Count I, the Panel finds that 
Respondent violated Rule 5.5(a) when he met with and provided legal advice to Mr. Gillespie.   
COUNT III:  RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY 
VIOLATING OR ATTEMPTING TO VIOLATE THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(a). 
 
Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.” For the reasons stated in our analysis of Count I, the 
Panel finds that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated 
Rule 8.4(a). 
COUNT IV:  RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY 
ENGAGING IN CONDUCT THAT IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE.  
 
Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  For the reasons stated in our analysis of Count I, the 
Panel finds that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated 
Rule 8.4(d). 
COUNT V:  RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HIS PUBLIC DISCIPLINE 
IN VIOLATION OF RULE 7(c) OF THE DELAWARE LAWYERS’ RULES OF 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. 
 
Rule 7(c) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provides that it shall be 
grounds for disciplinary action for a lawyer to “[v]iolate the terms of any [public] disciplinary 
[disposition].”  For the reasons stated in the Panel’s discussion of Count I, the Panel finds that 
Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the terms of his 
public discipline. 
 
36 
Analysis of Counts Related to November 5, 2008 Closing 
 
 
 
COUNT VI:  RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVIDE COMPETENT 
REPRESENTATION TO A CLIENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 1.1:  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.1 in connection with the November 5, 2008 real estate settlement. 
 
COUNT VII: RESPONDENT FAILED TO ACT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN 
VIOLATION OF RULE 1.3:  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.3 in connection with the November 5, 2008 real estate settlement.  
 
COUNT VIII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(d):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(d) in connection with the November 5, 2008 real estate settlement.  
 
Rule 1.1 requires that a “lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.”  Rule 
1.3 requires that a “lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence [in] representing a client.” Rule 
8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  The ODC contends that that Mr. Davis violated 
each of these rules when he conducted a real estate settlement for a client in his law office while 
under the influence of alcohol.  Respondent admits that he was under the influence of alcohol 
when he conducted the real estate settlement but denies that he failed to provide competent 
representation. Answer, Paragraph 28.  He also denies that he was not diligent in conducting the 
settlement and contends that the mere consumption of alcohol, without more, prior to providing 
legal services, is not a per se violation of Rule 1.1, Rule 1.3 or Rule 8.4(d).  
Neither party submitted any Delaware authority on this point. The ODC relies in its 
opening brief upon one decision from Ohio, Disciplinary Counsel v. Scurry, 874 N.E.2d 521, 
 
37 
524 (Ohio 2007).  Although in that case the Ohio Supreme Court stated generally that an 
attorney who met with clients while drunk violated duties to provide competent representation to 
clients and to assist in the administration of justice (Id. at 524), the facts of that case were more 
egregious.  For example, the attorney subject to discipline admitted that, as a result of his 
drunken condition, his judgment was impaired while meeting with criminal defendant clients.  
Id. at 523.  The defendants were so concerned about his being impaired on three occasions that 
they reported him to the court which appointed new counsel. Id. Neither the client nor the ODC 
contend here that Respondent’s being under the influence of alcohol prevented him from 
completing the closing without error. And the client here used Respondent for legal work after 
this incident occurred, reflecting that this lapse did not affect her confidence in his capacity to 
represent her in other matters.111  In its reply, Respondent also cited to Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. 
Giger, 37 P.3d 856, 861 (Okla. 2001).  That case involved an attorney who attended a hearing 
and “exhibited slurred speech, and appeared to be under the influence of some unknown 
substance (Id.),” which the court found violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3.  Unlike this matter, however, 
the attorney’s drunken condition so adversely affected his client that the District Attorney 
agreed to a second preliminary hearing. It was not merely the attorney’s having been under the 
influence but rather the attorney’s misconduct in handling the client’s defense that led to the 
conclusion that the attorney had violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3. Id.   
 
This is not a case then of a client whose impairment due to alcohol prevented him from 
exercising appropriate judgment in the carrying out of legal tasks or duties.  But nor is this a 
case of an attorney being under the influence entirely outside of the practice of law.  Respondent 
admitted he was under the influence of alcohol during a real estate closing.  And Respondent 
                                                 
111 Tr. 372:21-24. 
 
38 
does not deny that he acted inappropriately in speech and action with one of the female 
participants at the end of the closing. Therefore, this is not simply a case of an attorney under 
the influence of alcohol, without more.  
After considering all the facts and circumstances, the Panel concludes that (i) the ODC 
has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence of violation of Rule 1.1 but that (ii) the 
ODC has proved by clear and convincing evidence a violation of Rule 1.3 and Rule 8.4(d) 
because an attorney’s “duty to act with reasonable diligence” requires that the attorney treat “all 
persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.”  Rule 1.3, cmt 1.  Mr. Davis’s 
behavior was neither courteous nor respectful.  In so finding, the Panel relies upon the vividness 
of Ms. Serramone’s testimony that “I couldn’t wait for that hour to be over. I can remember as 
though I am sitting here”112 which for the Panel takes this case beyond an attorney acting 
boorishly and raises it to the level of a lack of the respect and courtesy which Rules 1.3 and 
8.4(d) require.  
COUNTS IX and X Withdrawn from Record by ODC at Start of Hearing  
 
Analysis of Counts Related to September 8, 2008 Motor Vehicle Accident 
 
COUNT XI: RESPONDENT COMMITTED A CRIMINAL ACT IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.4(b):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(b) by reporting false information to a law enforcement officer relating ot an 
actual offense or incident in violation of  11 Del. C. § 1245. 
 
Rule 8.4(b) provides that a lawyer engages in professional misconduct if he were to 
“commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” The ODC argues that “Not only did Mr. Davis drive while 
under the influence of alcohol, he also had a cup of alcohol in the car at the time of the accident, 
                                                 
112 Tr. 369:5-8. 
 
39 
supra at 22, both of which are criminal acts.   See 21 Del. C. §§ 4177 & 4177J.”113  This 
argument fails for lack of a valid premise.  First, the police did not charge Mr. Davis with 
violations of either of these statutes. Second, Section 4177(j) appears to require that an offender 
ingest alcohol while in the act of operating a motor vehicle in the presence of, or in the view of, 
a police officer. The facts do not support such a violation here.  
The evidence also fails to support the ODC’s charge that Respondent fled the scene to go 
home and drink so as to prevent an investigation of his behavior.  Again, the police did not 
charge Respondent with fleeing the scene of an accident even though they knew that 
Respondent consumed alcohol after he arrived at his home.  He was charged with failure to 
report an accident with property damage in excess of $500 and driving at an unsafe speed. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that when Respondent left the accident scene to go home, he 
intended to drink so as obstruct a police investigation. Even accepting the testimony of Mr. 
Logan as discussed more fully below, Davis’s alleged idea to drink to prevent the police from 
doing a sobriety test occurred only after he was already at home.  
What the Panel finds more troubling is the ODC’s contention that Respondent reported 
false information to a law enforcement officer “relating to an actual offense or incident” in 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1245. Specifically, the ODC contends that Respondent now admits that 
he consumed alcohol prior to the accident114 but the investigating officer testified that Davis 
denied doing so.115 Davis contends that he was not asked this question and denies giving this 
answer.116  The Panel notes that the investigating officer’s report does not include any reference 
to Respondent having denied or the investigating officer having asked whether the Respondent 
                                                 
113 ODC Opening Brief at 39. 
114 Ex. 2 at ¶ 38 
115 Tr. 388:5-13. 
116 Tr. 557:11-15. 
 
40 
consumed alcohol prior to the accident. For the following reasons we find the officer’s testimony 
clear and convincing that he asked and Davis denied drinking prior to the accident: 1) the 
officer’s report indicates that he suspected alcohol was involved in the accident,117 2) the report 
noted that there was liquid on the dash and a slight odor of an alcoholic beverage from inside the 
vehicle, 118 and 3) there was a plastic cup outside the vehicle on the ground.119  The Panel 
therefore concludes that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(b) by reporting false information to a law enforcement officer relating to an 
actual offense or incident in violation of  11 Del. C. § 1245. 
COUNT XII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT INVOLVING DISHONESTY, 
DECEIT AND MISREPRESENTATION IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(c):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(c) by ingesting alcohol following a motor vehicle accident with the intent to 
prevent the police from performing an alcohol test to determine whether Respondent had been 
driving under the influence.  
 
Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” For the reasons set forth in our 
discussion of Count XIV and in reliance upon In re Melvin, 807 A.2d 550, 552-553 (Del. 2002) 
(Respondent violates Rule 8.4(c) by concealing or destroying evidence which may have led to a 
criminal charge), the Panel finds that petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
                                                 
117 Ex. 21 at 174. 
118 Id. at 175. 
119 Id. The Panel finds that the ODC did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent falsely denied that the cup found outside the car with residue of wine was his. The 
reason for this is the investigating officer’s testimony that it was possible he asked Davis 
whether he would try and tell the officer the cup was not his and that if Davis said no, he would 
interpret that to mean he was being deceptive. This suggests either the officer was confused by 
the double negative or that he misinterpreted Davis’s response. Either way, the officer’s 
testimony precludes the Panel from finding that the ODC met its burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that Davis falsely denied that the cup found outside the motor vehicle was 
his.   
 
41 
Respondent violated Rule8.4(c). 
COUNT XIII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(d):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(d) by ingesting alcohol following a motor vehicle accident with the intent to 
prevent the police from performing an alcohol test to determine whether Respondent had been 
driving under the influence.    
 
Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.” For the reasons set forth in our discussion of Count 
XIV and in reliance upon In re Melvin, 807 A.2d 550, 552-553 (Del. 2002) (Respondent violates 
Rule 8.4(d) by concealing or destroying evidence which may have led to a criminal charge), the 
Panel finds that petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated 
Rule 8.4(d). 
COUNT XIV: RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY MADE A FALSE STATEMENT OF 
MATERIAL FACT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.1(a):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.1(a) in his narrative describing his conduct in the September 18, 2008 motor 
vehicle accident.   
 
 
Rule 8.1(a) provides that a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall 
not “knowingly make a false statement of material fact.” “Knowingly” denotes “actual 
knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from the 
circumstances.” Rules, 1.0(f).   
In connection with his potential Reinstatement, Respondent submitted a 
Reinstatement Questionnaire.120 The Reinstatement Questionnaire asked whether since 
Respondent’s admission to the Bar, he had ever been cited, charged, warned, arrested or 
prosecuted for any crime or rules violation, including any motor vehicle accident or 
                                                 
120 Ex. 3. 
 
42 
moving violation. Since Respondent checked “Yes”, he was asked to provide additional 
information for each offense, including a. Nature of warning or charges against you and 
citation to criminal custody; b. Names and addresses of complaining witnesses, c. A 
certified copy of the citation, warning or indictment and disposition or judgment, d. 
Name, court and address of trial judge (if not contained in information supplied in 
response to “c”, and e. Name, organization and address of law enforcement agency or 
authority and prosecutor (if not contained in “c” above). For the September 18, 2008 
motor vehicle accident Respondent submitted a narrative which included the following 
statements: 
• 
“At the time of the accident I did not have my cell phone with me, so I 
walked home.” 
 
• 
“Originally, I was charged with Unsafe Speed and Failure to Report the 
Accident, however, upon an explanation of the fact that I did not have a 
means of communication (i.e. cell phone) with me at the time of the 
accident and a full explanation of the accident, the charge was reduced to 
inattentive driving.” 
 
• 
“Upon arriving home, I was greeted by the New Castle County Police.” 
 
• 
“I provided full cooperation with their [the police] investigation of the 
crash.” 
 
• 
“I provided full cooperation to the officers.” 
 
Respondent also reported under section a. that he was charged with “inattentive driving” 
in violation of 11 Del. C. 4176(b).   
The ODC contends that the first statement -- “At the time of the accident I did not 
have my cell phone with me, so I walked home” -- was false in that the police report 
indicates that Respondent informed the investigating officer that he was distracted by 
talking on the cell phone. The Panel finds no reason to doubt the contemporaneous 
 
43 
writing of the investigating officer in the police report that Davis “advised he was driving 
too fast and was on the cell phone. As a result he lost control of vehicle.”121  Therefore, 
the Panel finds that ODC has met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that Davis’s statement to the contrary in the Reinstatement questionnaire was false.  
The ODC also contends that Respondent obstructed the investigation of his motor 
vehicle accident by intentionally consuming alcohol while he waited for the police to 
arrive, not to calm his nerves as Respondent contends, but rather to prevent the 
investigating officers from doing an alcohol test. Therefore, the ODC contends that the 
statement that upon arriving home he was greeted by the police is knowingly false 
because he knew when he made the statement that the police arrived after he had returned 
to his home. Also the ODC contends that the statements that he fully cooperated with the 
police and with the crash investigation are also false because he deliberately drank 
alcohol to prevent the police from conducting an alcohol test. 
Respondent acknowledges that his statement concerning being greeted by the 
police upon his return home was not completely accurate. He concedes that a completely 
accurate statement would have been to say “shortly after arriving home, I was greeted by 
the police.” 122  The question then is whether this inaccurate statement was knowing and 
material.  In part the answer to this question depends upon whether the ODC proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that Respondent improperly frustrated a police 
investigation by drinking alcohol after the accident and before the police arrived.  The 
evidence for this claim is the testimony of Dan Logan and Donna Marshall.  Logan 
testified that the day after the accident, Respondent called him to say that the lawyer in 
                                                 
121 Ex. 21 at 175. 
122 Tr. 101:21- 102:3. 
 
44 
him came out and he popped open a couple of bottles of wine while waiting for the police 
to arrive so that the police would not be able to conclude that he had consumed too much 
alcohol before the accident.123  Donna Marshall testified similarly, adding that he told her 
he had gotten out of trouble for DUI by drinking before the police arrived at his home 
and that the police told him that that was a smart strategy.124 
The Panel is mindful that each of these witnesses has grudges against Respondent, 
Logan because Davis broke a promise to hire his daughter-in-law at Redwood and 
Marshall because she felt that Davis was responsible for her losing her claim for 
unemployment benefits when she left Redwood.  But the Panel, having carefully 
observed the demeanor of each witness,  finds them to be credible on this point, in part 
because each independently corroborated similar statements from Davis and each had a 
trusting relationship with Davis at the time the statements were made.  So the question is 
whether an attorney who consumes alcohol after he has earlier ingested alcohol and then 
had a motor vehicle accident intending to preclude the police from administering an 
alcohol test knowingly obstructs a police investigation. If so, the timing of when the 
police arrived at his home becomes material as does the accuracy of the statement that 
Respondent cooperated with the police investigation.    
As a preliminary matter, the Panel notes that Respondent did cooperate with 
police in the sense of responding to questions at home and at the scene of the accident.  
There is no contention that Davis was hostile or threatening or unwilling to answer 
questions. The Panel also observes that Respondent was open with the police that he had 
consumed alcohol while he was at home and after the accident.  In that sense he 
                                                 
123 Tr. 410:4 – 411:16.  
124 Tr. 160:3 – 14. 
 
45 
cooperated fully with the officers. But Davis also certified in the Reinstatement 
Questionnaire that he cooperated fully with the investigation.  However, the investigating 
officer testified that he was unable to administer an alcohol test based on Respondent’s 
stating that he had been drinking after the accident when he returned home.125  Based on 
the testimony of Logan and Marshall, the Panel concludes that the statements in 
Respondent’s narrative on the Reinstatement Questionnaire that   “Upon arriving home, I 
was greeted by the New Castle County Police.” and “I provided full cooperation with 
their [the police] investigation of the crash.” were “knowingly false statements of 
material fact” in violation of Rule 8.1(a). 
COUNT XV: RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCLOSE A FACT NECESSARY TO 
CORRECT A MISAPPREHENSION KNOWN TO HAVE ARISEN IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.1(b) 
 
Rule 8.1(b) provides that a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not “fail 
to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in 
the matter.”  The ODC does not allege a “misapprehension known to have arisen.” Instead, in its 
proposed conclusion of law for this count, it reasserts that Respondent knowingly made false 
statements of material fact, allegations which the Panel found that it proved.126  At the time 
Respondent completed his Reinstatement Questionnaire, however, which is the factual predicate 
for this count, there was no misapprehension known to have arisen in a disciplinary proceeding. 
The Panel therefore finds that this Rule does not apply to the facts alleged by the ODC.  
Analysis of Counts Related to the July 19, 2009 Lums Pond Incident 
COUNT XVI: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN A CRIMINAL ACT IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.4(b):  
 
                                                 
125 Tr. 381:6-14; 382:13-20. 
126 See ODC Opening Brief at 62. 
 
46 
The Panel finds that Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence a third alcohol-
related offense in ten months that resulted in one ethical and two criminal violations.   While 
none of these individually would suffice to constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(b), the Panel finds 
that Respondent’s use of alcohol resulted in conduct that reflects indifference to legal obligation 
in a concentrated time period.   
 
COUNT XVII: RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4(d):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(d) in connection with the July 19, 2009 Lums Ponds incident.  
 
COUNT XVIII: RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCLOSE A FACT NECESSARY TO 
CORRECT A MISAPPREHENSION KNOWN TO HAVE ARISEN IN VIOLATION OF 
RULE 8.1(b):  
 
The Panel finds that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a violation of 
Rule 8.1(b) in connection with the Lums Pond incident.   
 
The evidence shows that Respondent pled guilty to public intoxication and indecent exposure 
and attached to his Reinstatement Questionnaire the citation he received which describes his 
misconduct as a “Conduct Violation” and an “Alcohol Violation”.  The ODC argues that because 
Respondent pled guilty to public intoxication and indecent exposure, he has a fortiori violated 
Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d).  Rule 8.4(b) provides that a lawyer engages in professional misconduct 
if he were to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”  As to the latter, the Panel finds that the ODC did not prove with clear 
and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) because he was intoxicated on 
public property and inadvertently exposed himself while changing from his bathing suit in a 
parking lot.  This event does not reflect well on Respondent’s judgment but the behavior is not 
the type of moral turpitude for which Respondent should be professionally answerable. The 
absence of legal authority supporting a violation of Rule 8.4(d) coupled with one respected 
 
47 
commentator’s admonition that “subsection (d) raises the specter of a disciplinary authority 
creating new offenses by common law” informs the Panel’s judgment not to find a violation of 
Rule 8.4(d) on the facts presented. See G. Hazard and W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering,  Section 
65.6 at 65-15 (2009 Supplement). 
Similarly, the Panel concludes that the ODC has failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that Respondent has violated Rule 8.1(b) in his narrative and other disclosures in the 
Reinstatement Questionnaire.  The Panel does not find it material that Respondent stated that he 
was with his “family” when he was with his son alone and not his entire family.  Nor does the 
Panel find materially misleading Respondent’s statement that someone inadvertently viewed him 
while he was disrobing and complained to a DNREC officer.  The evidence reflects that one 
person from the family who complained contacted the park officer.  And the citation that 
Respondent submitted with his Questionnaire reflects that two adults and one juvenile had 
viewed him while he was disrobed. Finally, while in his narrative Respondent did not state that 
he had pled guilty to public intoxication and lewdness, the citation he attached to his 
Reinstatement Questionnaire reflected that he pled guilty to those charges.   As noted above, the 
citation reflects that the DNREC officer charged him with what the DNREC officer titled as a 
“Conduct” and an “Alcohol” violation. Therefore, the Panel concludes that Petitioner has failed 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence a violation of Rule 8.1(b) in connection with 
Respondent’s account of the Lums Pond incident. 
Were this not the third incident involving alcohol in ten months, two of which resulted in 
criminal charges and one of which we have found to have resulted in a violation of Rule 1.3,  the 
Panel would also find that  the ODC had not proved a violation of Rule 8.4(b). However, the 
commentary to Rule 8.4 states that “A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor 
 
48 
significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.”  In this 
case, the Panel observes three instances of alcohol-related violations which have led to ethical 
and criminal violations within a ten-month period.   This pattern of alcohol-related violations in a 
short time leads the Panel to find that this incident, when added to the violations noted above, 
suffice to reflect adversely on the Respondent’s fitness as a lawyer in violation of Rule 8.4(b).    
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above findings of violations of Rules 1.3, 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 8.1(a),  8.4(a), 
8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and Rule 7(c) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, 
the Panel will schedule a sanctions hearing at the earliest convenience of the parties and the 
Panel.   
 
 
 
 
By: 
/s/ Lewis H. Lazarus 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewis H. Lazarus, Esq. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel Chair 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
/s/ Robert K. Beste, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert K. Beste, Jr., Esq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
/s/ John Stafford 
 
 
 
 
Mr. John Stafford 
 
 
 
Dated:  October 7, 2011 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
OF THE 
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
In the Matter of a 
 
 
 
) 
Member of the Bar of  
 
 
) 
 
the Supreme Court of  
 
 
) 
 
Delaware: 
 
 
 
 
) 
ODC File No. 2010-0404-B, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
MICHAEL R. DAVIS, 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
SANCTIONS RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
Following issuance of a report dated October 7, 2011, in which the Panel proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the Supreme Court find that 
Respondent violated Rules 1.3, 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 8.1(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of The 
Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct, and Rule 7(c) of the Delaware Lawyers’ 
Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“October 7, 2011 Report”), the Panel conducted a sanctions 
hearing on November 15, 2011 (“Sanctions Hearing”).   At the Sanctions Hearing the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) offered no witnesses.  Respondent testified on his own behalf and 
also proffered the testimony of one character witness, Thomas Conaty, Esq., and Carol 
Waldhauser of the Lawyers Assistance Program.  Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, counsel for 
the parties submitted briefs reflecting their conflicting positions on the appropriate sanctions.  
This is the Panel’s sanctions recommendation.  For the reasons stated below, the Panel 
recommends that Respondent be disbarred. 
 
50 
I. 
The Applicable Standard 
 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court has set forth the goals of the disciplinary system and the 
applicable standard: 
The objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system are to protect the 
public, to protect the administration of justice, to preserve 
confidence in the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from 
similar misconduct. To further these objectives and to promote 
consistency and predictability in the imposition of disciplinary 
sanctions, the Court looks to the ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions as a model for determining the appropriate 
discipline warranted under the circumstances of each case.  The 
ABA framework consists of four key factors to be considered by 
the Court:  (a) the ethical duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental 
state; (c) the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the 
lawyer's misconduct; and (d) aggravating and mitigating factors. 
 
In Re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 866 (Del. 2003).  The Delaware Supreme Court also has emphasized 
that the purpose of the rules is not to punish lawyers. In Re Reardon, 759 A. 2d 568, 575 (Del. 
2000), citing In Re Benge, 754 A.2d 871, 879 (Del. 2000).  
II. 
Application of the Standard 
A. Ethical Duties Violated 
The Panel recommended that the Supreme Court find that:  
1. 
Respondent knowingly violated Rule 3.4(c) of the Delaware 
Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct by knowingly disobeying a Suspension Order by (a) 
meeting with a former client to provide legal advice; (b) discussing legal services and fees with a 
potential client which led her to believe that his residential services company could provide legal 
services; and (c) using his former law firm email address in communications with the public at 
least six weeks after the suspension order; and that the aforementioned misconduct also violated 
Rules 8.4(a) (violate or attempt to violate the Rules) and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice) and Rule 7 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure 
 
51 
(“Procedural Rules”) (disciplinary action appropriate for violation of the Procedural Rules);  
2. 
Respondent knowingly violated Rule 5.5(a) by practicing law in 
violation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction when he met with a former client to provide 
legal advice; 
3. 
Respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 8.4(d) by failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he 
conducted a real estate settlement on November 5, 2008 while under the influence of alcohol;  
4. 
Respondent violated Rules 8.4(b) in reporting false information to 
a law enforcement officer regarding whether he consumed alcohol before a September 18, 2008 
auto accident; 
5. 
Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and violated Rule 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice when he consumed alcohol with the intent to prevent 
the police from performing an alcohol test to ascertain whether he was driving under the 
influence of alcohol at the time of the auto accident; 
6. 
Respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact in 
violation of Rule 8.1(a) when he misstated the circumstances of the September 18, 2008 accident 
and his cooperation with the police investigation; and 
7. 
Respondent’s alcohol-related violation on July 19, 2009 reflected 
an indifference to legal obligation in violation of Rule 8.4(b) when considered in light of his 
two alcohol-related violations within the prior 15 months.   
The Panel’s recommended findings reflect violations of duties owed to clients, 
the public, the legal system and the profession. Respondent violated his duties to clients, the 
 
52 
legal system and profession when he handled a settlement while under the influence of alcohol 
and when he met with Mr. Gillespie for the purpose of rendering legal advice while suspended.  
He violated duties owed the public, legal system and the legal profession when he did not 
honestly respond to a police officer’s question regarding his drinking prior to an accident, when 
he misstated on his Reinstatement Questionnaire the circumstances of the accident and his 
cooperation with police, when he acted deliberately to prevent the police from performing a 
sobriety test,127 and when he committed another legal violation while under the influence of 
alcohol in a public park.  These are all acts of misconduct that reflect a failure to maintain 
standards of personal integrity upon which the community relies. Finally, he violated duties 
owed the public, the legal system and the profession when he mistakenly advised a potential 
client of Redwood’s capacity to provide legal services and failed to eliminate email references to 
his former firm in communications by his office with the public six weeks after he was 
suspended in violation of the Suspension Order.  
2. 
The Lawyer’s Mental State 
The ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent acted 
knowingly in (a) meeting with a former client to provide legal advice; (b) discussing legal 
services and fees with a potential client which led her to believe that his residential services 
company could provide legal services; (c) using his former law firm email address in 
communications with the public at least six weeks after the suspension order; (d) in making a 
false statement to a law enforcement officer regarding whether he consumed alcohol before the 
September 18, 2008 auto accident and (e) in making a false statement of material fact when he 
misstated the circumstances of the September 18, 2008 accident and his cooperation with the 
                                                 
127 The Panel notes that it is an unusual case when the ODC will be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that an attorney consumed alcohol with the intention to preclude police from conducting a sobriety test.  Here, that is 
what Respondent admitted to two trusted friends and colleagues contemporaneously with the incident.   
 
53 
police investigation.  It proved he acted intentionally in consuming alcohol to prevent the police 
from performing an alcohol test to ascertain whether he was driving under the influence of 
alcohol at the time of the September 18, 2008 auto accident.  His state of mind regarding the 
performance of the real estate settlement while under the influence and the conduct at Lums 
Pond reflects negligence.    
3. 
The extent of the actual or potential injury 
The ODC did not prove that the conduct of Respondent resulted in any actual 
harm to any client. Indeed, with the exception of meeting with Mr. Gillespie to provide legal 
services, and his performance of a real estate settlement while under the influence, his 
misconduct did not directly involve any clients.   As to the former, he arranged for another 
attorney to actually handle the litigation proceeding at issue and the record reflects that the real 
estate settlement was completed without error. Therefore, the record reflects no actual injury to 
any clients. Nonetheless, there was potential for actual injury due to his conduct of a settlement 
while under the influence of alcohol.   
The harm to the public, the legal system and the profession is more serious.  The 
misstatements to law enforcement and intentional conduct to frustrate a police investigation, and 
attempt to deceive the ODC, the Board and the Supreme Court in his Reinstatement 
Questionnaire reflect a failure to maintain standards of personal integrity upon which the 
community relies.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, one of an attorney’s fundamental 
duties is “to abide by the law and to maintain the standards of personal integrity and honesty 
upon which the community relies.” In re Howard, 765 A.2d 39, 44-45 (Del. 2000).  
4. 
Appropriate Sanction 
“Severe sanctions should be imposed on lawyers who violate the terms of prior 
 
54 
disciplinary orders.” ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) 8.0. 
Standard 8.1 provides that 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
 
a. intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such 
violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession; or 
 
b. has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or 
knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury 
to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession. 
 
Respondent contends that Standard 8.0 is inapplicable because absent mitigating 
circumstances, suspension is generally appropriate where a lawyer has been reprimanded for the 
same or similar misconduct and engages in further similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or 
potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession. (ABA Standard 8.2) 
Respondent contends that the Panel made no finding that Respondent was reprimanded for the 
same or similar misconduct and then engaged in the same or similar conduct thereafter. He 
argues that the terms and conditions of the Suspension Order were not directly related to the 
misconduct that led to the suspension.   
That argument depends on how one views “similar acts of misconduct”. The prior 
suspension was for false notarizations and misrepresentation for personal gain. The Supreme 
Court found the Respondent’s conduct to be “undeniably “knowing” and was deceptive, if not 
criminal.”  In re Michael R. Davis, No. 301, 2008 at 9 (Del. 2009) (Per Curiam).  The Panel’s 
October 7 Report recommends that the Supreme Court find that Respondent misrepresented that 
he had not been drinking in response to a question from the officer investigating his auto 
accident, acted intentionally to frustrate the investigation by preventing a sobriety test, and then 
misrepresented the facts and circumstances attendant to that incident in his Reinstatement 
 
55 
Questionnaire.  While the current recommended finding of misconduct did not involve a real 
estate transfer, it did involve additional acts of misrepresentation to public officials and 
institutions. In view of the auto accident having occurred prior to the initial suspension, the Panel 
notes that it is only the misrepresentation in the Reinstatement Questionnaire that constitutes a 
further act of similar misconduct. At the same time, the record reflects a continuing pattern of 
misrepresentation for a personal benefit.  For that reason the Panel believes that in 
misrepresenting the circumstances of his September 18, 2008 auto accident in connection with 
his Reinstatement Questionnaire, the Respondent knowingly engaged in a further act of 
misconduct that caused injury or potential injury to the profession.  Moreover, the Panel also 
recommended in its October 7, 2011 Report that the Supreme Court find that Respondent 
knowingly violated the terms of his Suspension Order by on one occasion meeting with a client 
to provide legal services, by failing to take appropriate steps to extinguish email references to his 
former firm in communications with the public at least six  weeks after the issuance of the 
Suspension Order and by misrepresenting to a potential client that his new real estate services 
firm could provide legal services in connection with a real estate transaction. This constitutes a 
knowing violation of the terms of a prior disciplinary order which created the risk of potential 
injury to a client, and injury to the public, and the profession.     
Section 5.1 is also relevant. That provides as follows:    
5.1 
Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity 
 
 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 
Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving commission of 
a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation: 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
a. a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which  
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation or theft, or the 
sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional 
killing of another; or an attempt conspiracy or solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses; or 
 
b. a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously and adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice. 
 
5.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal 
conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that 
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice. 
 
Respondent argues that because the misconduct occurred outside Mr. Davis’s 
practice of law and in fact occurred during his suspension,128 such conduct does not meet the 
standard of seriously and adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law. The Panel cannot 
agree. Section 5.11(b) provides that disbarment generally is appropriate when a lawyer engages 
in “intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
and adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”  The Panel’s findings reflect 
intentional conduct involving dishonesty, misrepresentation and deceit in connection with a 
criminal investigation and his potential reinstatement to the Bar.  
Respondent also argues that Section 5.13 provides the more apt sanction. That 
section provides that a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  However, the Commentary to the ABA 
Standards for Section 5.13 notes that “There are few situations not involving fraud or dishonesty 
which are sufficiently related to the practice of law to subject a lawyer to discipline.” As noted, 
                                                 
128 In fact the September 18, 2008 accident pre-dated his suspension. It is only the false account of the circumstances 
of that incident and the investigation that occurred during his suspension. 
 
57 
the Panel’s recommended findings do involve dishonesty. And because the Panel’s findings 
reflect a pattern of repeated offenses regarding dishonesty – the conduct underlying the original 
suspension, the false statement to a police officer in a criminal investigation, and the dishonesty 
in the Reinstatement Questionnaire, the Panel finds inapplicable Section 5.13 and its 
commentary.  
Accordingly, before considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Panel 
recommends that the violation of a prior suspension order grounded in misrepresentation and 
deceit by engaging in at least one further act of misrepresentation and deceit,  the proof of other 
previously unknown acts of misrepresentation and deceit in connection with the September 18, 
2008 auto accident, and the knowing violation of the Suspension Order by meeting on one 
occasion with a client to provide legal advice cumulatively warrant the most serious sanction of 
disbarment.  The additional ethical violation in connection with the real estate settlement prior to 
the suspension and two criminal acts cumulatively reflect an indifference to legal obligation 
which further supports the sanction.  The Panel thus concludes that the appropriate sanction here 
is disbarment, subject to the aggravating and mitigating factors.   
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
Section 9.21 of the ABA Standards defines aggravating factors as “any considerations, or 
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”  Section 9.22 lists 
the following factors which may be considered in aggravation: 
(a) 
prior discipline offenses; 
(b) 
dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) 
a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) 
multiple offenses; 
(e) 
bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing 
to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
(f) 
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices 
during the disciplinary process; 
 
58 
(g) 
refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 
(h) 
vulnerability of victim; 
(i) 
substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) 
indifference to making restitution. 
 
The parties agree that the aggravating factors include (a) prior disciplinary 
offenses; (c) pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (f) submission of false evidence, false 
statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; and (i) substantial 
experience in the practice of law.  The ODC contends that additional aggravating factors are a 
pattern of misconduct, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally 
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary process, and refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his conduct.  The Panel agrees that Respondent’s misconduct does reflect a 
pattern of dishonesty and misrepresentation and thus that is an additional aggravating factor. The 
Panel does not agree that the ODC proved a bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding 
by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary process or that 
Respondent failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  The Panel believes that at 
the Sanctions Hearing the Respondent did acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.   
 
 
Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.  Section 9.32 of the ABA Standards 
lists the following factors which may be considered in mitigation: 
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; 
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) personal or emotional problems; 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of 
misconduct; 
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward 
proceedings; 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(g) character or reputation; 
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment; 
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings; 
 
59 
(j) interim rehabilitation; 
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(l) remorse; 
(m) 
remoteness of prior offenses. 
 
Respondent argues that the Panel should consider as mitigating factors: (c) 
personal and emotional problems to which he testified at the Sanctions Hearing; (g) character 
and reputation based on the testimony of Thomas Conaty, Esq.; (h) physical or mental disability 
or impairment as supported by the testimony of Carol Waldhauser at the Sanctions Hearing; (j) 
interim rehabilitation as supported by the testimony of Carol Waldhauser; and (l) remorse as 
expressed by Respondent at the Sanctions Hearing. The ODC contends that the mitigating factors 
have no application or should be given little weight and that in any event the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors.   
As a preliminary point, the Panel does not consider physical or mental disability 
or impairment based on Ms. Waldhauser’s testimony to be a mitigating factor because she had no 
contact with Respondent during the time of the violations. Further, she testified at the Sanctions 
Hearing that she offered no opinion as to whether Respondent’s depression or alcohol abuse was 
a causal factor in any of the conduct as to which the Panel recommends the Supreme Court find 
constitutes ethical violations. A recent amendment to the commentary on mitigation in the ABA 
Standards provides that “direct causation between the disability or chemical dependency and the 
offense must be established.” As Respondent asks that we consider this factor based solely on the 
testimony of Carol Waldhauser, her testimony that she had no opinion as to whether 
Respondent’s depression or alcoholism were causally related to the misconduct, precludes us 
from considering this factor in mitigation.  The Panel does consider as mitigating factors the 
personal and emotional problems as to which Respondent testified, in particular, his emotional 
reaction to his father’s illness and death and his reputation as a reliable and capable real estate 
 
60 
attorney as to which Mr. Conaty testified.  This latter testimony only marginally mitigates the 
dishonesty which is at the core of the misconduct at issue. Finally, the Panel does consider as 
mitigating factors the remorse expressed by Respondent at the Sanctions Hearing (Sanctions 
Hearing Transcript at 26-28) and the attempts at rehabilitation with Carol Waldhauser.  
In the aggregate the Panel finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors and therefore those factors do not cause the Panel to modify its sanctions 
recommendation of disbarment.  
Discussion of Case Law 
 
The most apt case law is that addressing attorneys who knowingly violate a 
suspension order (In re Tonwe, 929 A.2d 774 (Del. 2007)); whose misconduct involves a pattern 
of dishonesty (In re Clyne, 581 A.2d 1118 (Del. 1990)); and whose violations are numerous such 
that they reflect indifference to legal obligation.  In Tonwe, the Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized that the “ ‘ most common case’ “ for disbarment is “ ‘ one where a lawyer has been 
suspended but, nevertheless practices law’  and that “ ‘when  the record establishes a lawyer’s 
willingness to violate the terms of his suspension order, disbarment is appropriate as a 
prophylactic measure to prevent further misconduct.’” Id. at 780, quoting ABA Standard 8.0, 
Commentary) (internal citation and quotations omitted).  In Clyne the Supreme Court accepted 
the Board’s finding that the respondent’s alcoholism did not excuse his conduct because of the 
“involved pattern of the Respondent’s misrepresentations, their persistence and the Respondent’s 
resourcefulness in that regard.” Id. at 1123.   Clyne’s misrepresentations included  
misrepresentation to a court and the submission of false documents to support those false 
statements which did not occur here. But Respondent here was suspended for false notarizations 
in real estate transactions for his own financial gain and then while suspended made 
 
61 
misrepresentations as to the facts and circumstances of an automobile accident in his 
Reinstatement Questionnaire to mask a crime of lying to a police officer and the equivalent of 
the destruction of evidence by drinking with the intent of avoiding a sobriety test.  As in Clyne 
this conduct reflects an “abandonment of the fundamental concept of candor that is essential to 
the continued practice of law.” Id. at 1126.   See also Matter of Melvin, 807 A.2d 550, 555 
(Del.002) (knowing violation of a court order and deliberate document destruction are “flagrant 
violations of [an attorney’s] professional duties to the legal system and reflect a lack of respect 
for his position as an officer of the Court.”) While the Court in Melvin  suspended the attorney 
for 18 months, the attorney there had no disciplinary record, did not violate a prior suspension 
order, did not have multiple violations and did not present a pattern of deceitful and dishonest 
conduct.   
In making its recommendations for the ultimate sanction of disbarment, the Panel has 
attempted to follow the specific directives of this Court in Tonwe, Clyne and Melvin.  
Nonetheless, the Panel acknowledges that the specific facts of this case are not squarely 
addressed by the factual circumstances of those cases.   
For example, in Clyne, the Court confronted multiple and substantial material 
misrepresentations in open court to the Supreme Court, and material misrepresentations 
regarding case actions which could be characterized as nothing less than bold-faced lying to the 
Court.  Additional violations involved neglect of client matters, as well as failure to cooperate 
with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In Tonwe, a Pennsylvania attorney (not licensed in 
Delaware) opened a practice in Delaware out of her home.  When confronted by the ODC, a 
Cease-and-Desist Order was entered into prohibiting the attorney from practicing in Delaware.  
Thereafter, in 1991, the attorney was convicted of bribing a Federal Immigration official and 
 
62 
served 37 months in prison.  As a result, the attorney was disbarred in Pennsylvania, as well as in 
Ohio and the District of Columbia, where she also was barred.  Although the attorney was 
reinstated in Pennsylvania in 2002, between 2003 and 2006 the attorney represented in excess of 
100 Delaware residents in Delaware matters in clear violation of the Cease-and-Desist Order, 
clearly a gross series of intentional violations, for someone not admitted to practice in Delaware 
in the first place. 
The Melvin decision involved an 18-month retroactive suspension involving charges of 
felonies and misdemeanors and an ultimate plea to two misdemeanors, for contempt of a 
Protection from Abuse Order, and hindering prosecution by concealing or destroying evidence, 
in this instance, his wife’s journals. 
In Re Benge, 783 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2001), cited by ODC, involves an attorney who was 
disbarred based on the respondent’s having neglected numerous cases, improper conduct, failure 
to follow Court Rules, acting in conflict of the interest of his client – all on top of a prior private 
admonition and probation, additional disciplinary proceedings while on probation, resulting in a 
public reprimand and two years of probation, and also a one year suspension for numerous 
additional and similar violations. 
In Re Kingsley, 950 A.2d 659 (Del. 2008), involves a Pennsylvania attorney practicing in 
Delaware, and improperly holding himself out as a Delaware attorney, systemic and continuing 
legal presence in Delaware, and the violation of a prior Cease-and-Desist Order. 
The Panel considered the Respondent’s arguments that the violations found here are not 
of the same nature and extent of the conduct described in the disbarment cases referenced above.  
The Panel believes that Respondent made significant efforts to avoid the practice of law, but 
made a misstep with respect to the Gillespie meeting, the e-mail with an attorney reference, and 
 
63 
the misstatement to a potential client that his new company could provide legal services.   The 
November 8, 2008 settlement showed poor judgment but not a knowing and intentional 
consumption of alcohol with the knowledge that a settlement was upcoming.  The 2008 auto 
accident, and Lums Pond incident did not affect directly the practice of law, but certainly 
reflected poor judgment and an alcohol problem that would not normally constitute actions 
resulting in disbarment.  On the other hand, none of the prior case law involved an attorney 
suspended for misrepresentations for personal gain who then, while suspended, violated the 
suspension order and also intentionally misstated the facts and circumstances of a criminal 
violation arising from an auto accident while applying for reinstatement.    
In essence, it is clear that Respondent needs help and deserves significant sanctions.  The 
Panel understands, however, that the Supreme Court, consistent with the ABA Standards, “takes 
very seriously a lawyer’s fundamental duty to foster public confidence in our Bar and to 
maintain the integrity of the legal profession.  A lawyer must abide by the law and maintain the 
standards of personal integrity and honesty upon which the public relies and which reflect on 
every member of the legal profession.” Howard, 765 A.2d a 46.  Respondent before and during 
suspension violated those standards in what even Respondent concedes was a pattern of 
misconduct. Accordingly, while the facts underlying prior disbarment decisions involved 
conduct more directly related to the practice of law, and sometimes more egregious 
circumstances, the Panel concludes that a sanction of disbarment is supported by the relevant 
case law.  
 
 
 
3864098/1 
 
64 
For the reasons stated, the Panel recommends that the Supreme Court disbar 
Respondent and order that he pay the costs of this proceeding.   
 
By:  
/s/ Lewis H. Lazarus 
 
 
Lewis H. Lazarus 
 
 
Panel Chair 
 
By: 
/s/ Robert K. Beste, Jr. 
 
Robert K. Beste, Jr., Esq. 
 
 
By: 
/s/ John Stafford 
 
Mr. John Stafford