Title: State v. Miller
Citation: 313 So. 2d 656
Docket Number: 45865
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1975

313 So. 2d 656 (1975)
STATE of Florida, Plaintiff,
v.
Walter Alonzo MILLER, Defendant.
No. 45865.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 19, 1975.
Robert Eagan, State's Atty., and Jeffords D. Miller, Asst. State's Atty., for plaintiff.
R. Philip Haddock, Lakeland, for defendant.
ERVIN (Retired), Justice.
We have for consideration pursuant to Appellate Rule 4.6 certified questions from Honorable Russell S. Thacker, Acting Circuit Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit, which are presented to us in the following form:
"STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
"QUESTION OF LAW:
"Does F.S. 27.324 conflict with F.S. 27.181(3)?
We conclude that both questions should be answered in the affirmative.
Section 27.181(3), F.S., originally enacted as Section 3 of Chapter 67-188, Laws of Florida, 1967, pursuant to the limitations of the 1885 Florida Constitution, has been superseded in respect to the certified questions by Section 27.324, F.S., originally enacted as Chapter 69-212, Laws of Florida, 1969, which provides that assistant state attorneys appointed by each state attorney are "vested with all the powers, duties and responsibilities of state attorneys." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 27.324, F.S. conforms to Section 17, Article V, State Constitution, which became effective January 1, 1973. Section 17 of Article V contains no limitations on the Legislature affecting its power to grant assistant state attorneys authority to sign informations, as had been the construction given Section 10, Article I, and Section 15 of Article V of the 1885 Florida Constitution in State ex rel. Ricks v. Davidson (1935), 121 Fla. 196, 163 So. 588. This appears so because when said sections were construed to require signature of the state attorney on an information as a condition precedent to filing, the Governor appointed assistant state attorneys while now under Section 17, Article V the state attorneys pursuant to authorization of law appoint them. They now serve as the alter egos of the state attorney appointing them and to consistently carry out this nonconflicting relation are given by Section 27.324 "all powers of state attorneys," which includes the power to sign informations. When an assistant state attorney signs and files a felony information it is tantamount to the state attorney himself filing it under present law.
Said sections of the 1885 Florida Constitution have thus been superseded by revised Section 17, Article V, and implementing statutes thereunder, insofar as there were any constitutional limitations that assistant state attorneys may not sign informations.
The rule-making authority to make rules for all courts is reposed in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 2(a), Article V. This Court has already provided in its rules of procedure that assistant state attorneys may sign informations charging misdemeanors. See R.Cr.P. 3.140(g), which accords with the view expressed above that assistant state attorneys have the same power as state attorneys to sign informations generally.
By the authority of Section 2, Article V, Constitution of Florida, this Court has promulgated rules for the practice and procedure in all courts of Florida. It has imposed upon the state attorneys of Florida the duties of "Criminal Intake" (R.Cr.P. 3.115), and requires that informations be *658 filed against persons arrested, where the evidence justifies it, within a time period measured in hours.
The administrative burdens upon state attorneys constantly enlarge, and correspondingly necessitate greater reliance upon assistants and the delegation of authority to them. Innovations such as teletyped informations have been authorized in order to expedite the functions of the state attorneys in criminal intake, thus expediting the prompt disposition of the business of the courts. To rule that assistant state attorneys can sign felony informations will greatly facilitate the expeditious handling and prompt disposition of criminal cases in Florida. Under today's Constitution, there is no prohibition against it.
State ex rel. Ricks v. Davidson, supra, and all other holdings of this Court contrary to our answers herein are expressly overruled.
We reiterate what has often been held by this Court that constitutional provisions are limitations upon legislative powers, not grants. Unless it clearly appears in the present Florida Constitution or the United States Constitution that the Legislature in its enacting authority or this Court in its rule-making authority is expressly or impliedly constitutionally limited, the Legislature is free to enact any statute and the Court is free to adopt any procedural rule.
Here, it does not appear there is any constitutional impediment upon a grant of statutory power to assistant state attorneys to sign informations charging either felony or misdemeanor violations. Therefore, for the reasons stated, the limiting language in Section 27.181(3), F.S., "except, however, that due to constitutional limitations, no such assistant may sign informations," is no longer applicable because the present constitution does not contain such limitations either expressly or impliedly.
The certified questions are answered accordingly.
ADKINS, C.J., and McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, J., dissents with opinion.
ROBERTS, Justice (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the majority decision and would answer the certified question herein posited by the Circuit Court, Ninth Judicial Circuit, in the negative.
Article V, Section 17, Constitution of Florida (1973), explicitly provides:
and Article I, Section 15(a), Constitution of Florida (1973), provides:
The prosecuting officer of the State is the State Attorney of the judicial circuit whose required qualifications are stated in *659 Article V, Section 17, Constitution of Florida. Relative to powers and duties of Assistant State Attorneys, Section 27.181, Florida Statutes, contains the following language.
As I have recently stated in my dissent to the majority opinion in State ex rel. Harris v. McCauley, 297 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1974), opinion filed July 17, 1974, "[C]harging a person with a felony is a serious matter and the people of this State by ratifying Article V have decided that five years experience as a member of The Florida Bar is requisite to the holding of the position as prosecuting officer of the court. This requirement is implicitly contained in Section 27.16, Florida Statutes, which permits the appointment of an acting state attorney. This is evidenced by the language of Section 27.181, Florida Statutes, that `due to constitutional limitations, no such assistant may sign informations.'"
This Court expressly stated in State ex rel. Ricks v. Davidson, 121 Fla. 196, 163 So. 589 (1935), wherein two informations charging felonies, one signed by the assistant state attorney and the other signed in the state attorney's name by an assistant, were held void,
With emphasis, I must restate the following from my dissent in McCauley, supra:
Accordingly, I would find that the assistant state attorney is not authorized to sign felony informations.