Title: County of Butte v. Dept. of Water Resources
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S258574M
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2022

Filed 8/24/22 (unmodified opn. attached) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  
CALIFORNIA 
 
COUNTY OF BUTTE,  
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Defendant and Respondent; 
STATE WATER CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., 
Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.  
 
COUNTY OF PLUMAS et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants,  
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Defendant and Respondent; 
STATE WATER CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., 
Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
S258574 
 
Third Appellate District  
C071785 
 
Yolo County Superior Court 
CVCV091258* 
 
* 
Two cases (Nos. 144282, 144283) were consolidated and 
transferred from the Butte County Superior Court to the Yolo 
County Superior Court (No. CVCV091258).  
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION  
 
THE COURT: 
 
The majority opinion in this case, filed on August 1, 2022, 
and appearing at __ Cal.5th __, is modified as follows: 
 
The last full sentence on page 13 of the filed opinion, 
beginning “The document must include”, is modified to read:   
The document must include a description of the 
proposed project and its environmental setting and 
discussions of (1) the possible environmental effects 
of the project, (2) feasible measures to mitigate any 
significant, adverse environmental effects of the 
project, (3) the comparative environmental effects of 
a range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed 
project, including a “no project” alternative, and (4) 
the cumulative impact of the project’s various 
environmental effects.  (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15124, 
15126, 15126.4, 15126.6, 15130.)  An EIR may also 
include a discussion of the economic and social 
effects of the project.  (Id., § 15131.) 
 
This modification does not affect the judgment.   
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
COUNTY OF BUTTE,  
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Defendant and Respondent; 
STATE WATER CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., 
Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.  
 
COUNTY OF PLUMAS et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants,  
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Defendant and Respondent; 
STATE WATER CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., 
Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
S258574 
 
Third Appellate District  
C071785 
 
Yolo County Superior Court 
CVCV091258* 
 
 
* 
Two cases (Nos. 144282, 144283) were consolidated and 
transferred from the Butte County Superior Court to the Yolo 
County Superior Court (No. CVCV091258).  
 
 
August 1, 2022 (unmodified version) 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed a concurring and dissenting 
opinion, in which Justice Corrigan concurred. 
 
 
1 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT  
OF WATER RESOURCES 
S258574 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
Operation of a dam, reservoir, or hydroelectric power plant 
requires a license from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).  (16 U.S.C. § 817(1).)  For decades, 
California has required public entities seeking licensing of state-
owned and state-operated hydroelectric projects to conduct 
environmental review under the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).  In 
this case, California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR or 
Department) prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) 
under CEQA in connection with its application for renewal of its 
50-year license to operate the “Oroville Facilities,” an 
interrelated group of public works operated by DWR in Butte 
County.  Butte and Plumas Counties (the Counties) filed writ 
petitions challenging the sufficiency of the EIR. 
The trial court found the Department’s EIR adequate, and 
the Counties appealed.  The Court of Appeal did not reach the 
merits of the Counties’ CEQA claims, instead finding their 
actions in part preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA; 16 
U.S.C. § 791a et seq.) and otherwise premature.  In 2019, we 
granted the Counties’ petitions for review and transferred the 
matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider its 
decision in light of Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast 
Railroad Authority (2017) 3 Cal.5th 677 (Eel River).  On remand, 
the Court of Appeal again found the Counties’ actions in part 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
preempted and otherwise premature.  (County of Butte v. Dept. 
of Water Resources (Sept. 5, 2019) C071785, opn. ordered 
nonpub. Dec. 11, 2019, S258574 (County of Butte).) 
The Court of Appeal held that the FPA preempts the 
Counties’ challenge to the environmental sufficiency of the 
settlement agreement DWR prepared as part of FERC 
proceedings.  We agree that the Counties’ claims are preempted 
to the extent they attempt to unwind the terms of the settlement 
agreement reached through a carefully established federal 
process and seek to enjoin DWR from operating the Oroville 
Facilities under the proposed license.  As the Court of Appeal 
recognized, FERC has sole jurisdiction over disputes concerning 
the licensing process employed here (County of Butte, supra, 
C071785; see 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(6)(vii)), and the requested 
injunction would be akin to the “veto power” prohibited by First 
Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Comm’n (1946) 328 U.S. 152, 164 
(First Iowa).   
But the Counties’ writ petitions also challenged the 
sufficiency of the EIR more generally, and they have now 
abandoned their requests to enjoin the operation of the Oroville 
Facilities under the proposed license.  In this court, the parties 
have fully briefed and asked us to decide whether the FPA 
preempts what remains of the Counties’ CEQA claims.  On this 
question, we observe that DWR relied on the EIR to analyze the 
environmental impact of operating the Oroville Facilities under 
the settlement agreement or an alternative proposed by FERC 
staff.  The EIR serves as the informational source for DWR’s 
decisionmaking as to whether to request particular terms from 
FERC as it contemplates the license (18 C.F.R. § 4.35(b) (2022)) 
or to seek reconsideration of terms once FERC issues the license 
(id., § 4.200(b) (2022); 16 U.S.C. § 825l), avenues available to 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
any applicant under federal law.  It also informs decisionmaking 
about potential measures that may be outside of or compatible 
with FERC’s jurisdiction.  Nothing in the FPA suggests 
Congress intended to interfere with the way the state as owner 
makes these or other decisions concerning matters outside 
FERC’s jurisdiction or compatible with FERC’s exclusive 
licensing authority.  (See Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 724 
[CEQA not categorically preempted where the federal scheme 
permits the state as owner to “make its decisions based on its 
own guidelines”]; Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 
[congressional intent is the “ ‘ultimate touchstone in every pre-
emption case’ ”].)  Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeal erred in finding the Counties’ CEQA claims entirely 
preempted. 
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
I. 
The license governing DWR’s operation of the Oroville 
Facilities (sometimes Facilities) was issued in 1957 and was set 
to expire in 2007.  DWR began public preparations to apply for 
renewal of the license in October 1999.  DWR has yet to achieve 
relicensing of the Facilities, and it currently operates the 
Facilities under annual, interim licenses.  (See 18 C.F.R. 
§ 16.18(b)(1) (2022).) 
A. 
At the time DWR undertook the relicensing process, FERC 
regulations allowed applicants to pursue the traditional 
licensing process or an alternative.  DWR chose to pursue the 
alternative licensing process (ALP), a voluntary procedure 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
designed to achieve consensus among interested parties on the 
terms of the FERC license before the licensing application is 
submitted.  (18 C.F.R. §§ 4.34(i), 4.34(i)(2)(iv) (2022).)  The ALP 
requires persons and entities with an interest in the operation 
of the project to cooperate in a series of hearings, consultations, 
and negotiations.  (18 C.F.R. §§ 4.34(i)(3), (4) (2022).)  The 
objective of the process is to identify areas of concern and 
disagreement among the stakeholders regarding the license 
terms 
and 
to 
resolve 
those 
differences. 
 
(18 C.F.R. 
§§ 4.34(i)(2)(ii), (iv), (v) (2022).)  The ALP “[c]ombine[s] into a 
single process the pre-filing consultation process [of the 
traditional licensing procedure], the environmental review 
process under the National Environmental Policy Act[ of 1969 
(42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.),] and administrative processes 
associated with the Clean Water Act [(33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.)] 
and other statutes.”  (18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(2)(i) (2022).)  Ideally, 
ALP participants conclude the process by entering into a 
settlement agreement reflecting the terms of a proposed license.  
(Id., subd. (i)(2)(v) (2022).)  The settlement agreement then 
becomes the centerpiece of the license application and serves as 
the basis for FERC’s “orderly and expeditious review” in setting 
the terms of the license.  (Ibid.)  Although FERC does not 
surrender its regulatory authority when it allows an applicant 
to pursue the ALP, the process permits the interested parties to 
prepare what is effectively a first draft of the license. 
FERC approved DWR’s request to use the ALP in January 
2001, and the process consumed the next five years.  The ALP 
participants included representatives from 39 organizations — 
five federal agencies, five state agencies, seven local government 
entities, five Native American tribes, four local water agencies, 
and 13 nongovernmental organizations.  From late 2000 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
through 2004, the six working groups formed to conduct the ALP 
each met at least monthly, eventually logging an estimated 
1,500 hours of meeting time. 
During the early stages of the ALP, in September 2001, 
DWR issued a document combining a CEQA notice of 
preparation and a “scoping document.”  The latter plays a role 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that is 
similar to a notice of preparation under CEQA.  (See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1501.9 (2022) [describing role of scoping]; Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 14 (CEQA Guidelines), § 15082 [describing the notice of 
preparation and determination of scope of an EIR].)  A primary 
purpose of the joint document was to solicit comment on the 
scope of a preliminary draft environmental assessment (PDEA) 
for the renewed license, a document whose preparation is 
mandated by the ALP.  (18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(4)(iii) (2022).)  The 
PDEA eventually prepared for the Facilities, issued in January 
2005, is a 700-page analysis of the Facilities’ proposed operation 
and likely environmental impact, including consideration of 
alternatives to the proposed project and mitigation measures.  
The PDEA’s analysis was supported by an additional 1,500 
pages of appendices. 
After three years of hearings and consultations, the ALP 
participants began negotiating an agreement in April 2004.  The 
28-page settlement agreement (with 96 pages of attached 
appendices), concluded in March 2006, was signed by more than 
50 parties.  Butte and Plumas Counties, which participated in 
the ALP, were dissatisfied with the terms of the settlement and 
declined to sign the agreement.  One appendix to the settlement 
agreement contains more than 40 pages of provisions governing 
the Facilities’ operation that were intended by the parties to be 
included in the new FERC license.  These provisions address 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
environmental protection, recreation, protection of cultural 
properties, flood control, land use, and expenditures.  A second 
appendix added nearly 20 pages of further provisions that were 
not intended for inclusion in the new license, but which, as DWR 
told the trial court, DWR “nonetheless agreed to undertake to 
obtain consensus.”   
The settlement agreement and PDEA were submitted to 
FERC as DWR’s application for a renewed license, with the first 
appendix serving as DWR’s proposal for the terms of the new 
license.  The settlement agreement stated that “[n]othing in this 
[a]greement is intended or shall be construed to be . . . a pre-
decisional determination by a Public Agency.  After the Effective 
Date of this Settlement Agreement but prior to the issuance of 
the New Project License, each Public Agency shall participate in 
the relicensing proceeding, including environmental review and 
consideration of public comments, as required by applicable 
law.” 
The relicensing process required FERC to comply with 
NEPA.  Relying in part on the PDEA, FERC prepared a 500-
page draft environmental impact statement (EIS), which issued 
in September 2006.  As FERC explained, “In this draft [EIS], we 
assess the effects associated with the operation of the project as 
well 
as 
alternatives 
to 
the 
proposed 
project; 
make 
recommendations to [FERC’s governing commission] about 
whether to issue a new license; and if so, recommend terms and 
conditions to become part of any license issued. . . .  In addition 
to the power and developmental purposes for which licenses are 
issued (e.g., flood control, irrigation, and water supply), [FERC] 
must give equal consideration to the purposes of energy 
conservation; protection of, mitigation of damage to, and 
enhancement of fish and wildlife (including related spawning 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
grounds and habitat); protection of recreational opportunities; 
and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality.”  
In the draft EIS, FERC analyzed the environmental impact of 
three different alternatives:  a “Proposed Action” that assumed 
the Facilities would operate under a new license incorporating 
the terms of the settlement agreement; a “No-action 
Alternative” that assumed continued operation under the 
existing license; and a “Staff Alternative” that assumed 
operation of the Facilities under a license based on the 
settlement agreement but containing modifications and 
additional provisions developed by FERC staff.  The draft EIS 
concluded that the staff alternative was the “preferred 
alternative.” 
B. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 
et seq.), commonly known as the Clean Water Act, requires an 
applicant for a federal license to operate a facility that “may 
result in any discharge into the navigable waters” to obtain a 
certification from a state agency that the discharge will comply 
with state and federal water quality laws.  (33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(1).)  Because there is no question that operation of the 
Facilities involves discharge into California rivers, DWR was 
required to obtain such a certificate from the State Water 
Resources Control Board (Water Board).  DWR submitted its 
application for this certification in October 2005, a few months 
after the submission of its relicensing application to FERC. 
Although, as noted, DWR issued a CEQA notice of 
preparation in 2001, it did not undertake further CEQA 
procedures, including the preparation of an EIR, until several 
years later, after its submission of the settlement agreement to 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
FERC.  In May 2007, DWR issued a draft EIR analyzing the 
environmental impact of the same three alternatives considered 
in FERC’s draft EIS.  The EIR characterized the project under 
CEQA review as implementation of the settlement agreement, 
which would allow “the continued operation and maintenance of 
the Oroville Facilities for electric power generation.”  According 
to the EIR, DWR undertook CEQA procedures because (1) the 
Water Board required preparation and certification of an EIR as 
part of DWR’s application for certification under the Clean 
Water Act and (2) the CEQA process could inform DWR’s 
decision whether to accept the license containing the terms of 
either the settlement agreement or the alternative proposed by 
FERC staff, both of which were analyzed in the EIR.   
After receiving and responding to public comment on the 
draft EIR, DWR finalized the EIR and issued a notice of 
determination in July 2008.  The notice contained findings that 
the adoption of mitigation measures was required for approval 
of the project but that the project, so mitigated, would not have 
a significant effect on the environment.  Consequently, “as 
conditions of project approval,” DWR adopted a six-page slate of 
mitigation measures “that will be implemented by DWR” and a 
mitigation monitoring program to ensure that implementation. 
The mitigation measures adopted by DWR addressed the 
Facilities’ impacts on wildlife resources, botanical resources, 
noise, air quality, public health and safety, and geology, soils, 
and paleontological resources.  In general terms, the mitigation 
measures require DWR to operate the Facilities and to conduct 
any construction activities associated with the Facilities in a 
safe and environmentally sensitive manner.  The first measure, 
for example, requires DWR to “[m]inimize direct habitat loss or 
disturbance through project design and construction timing,” 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
using various specified measures.  Other mitigation measures 
place similar constraints on the manner in which DWR can 
operate the Facilities.  The mitigation monitoring program 
requires DWR to assign specialists to monitor mitigation 
activities, incorporate the mitigation measures into DWR’s 
design and planning activities and its contracting, generate 
written documents reflecting the mitigation measures and their 
implementation, and certify the completion of actions taken to 
implement them.  The EIR designated DWR as the agency 
“responsible for the implementation and management of the 
[mitigation monitoring program] and for ensuring that the 
procedures and measures described [in the EIR] are 
implemented.”   
During the CEQA review process, proceedings continued 
before the Water Board, which relied on the analyses in the 
Department’s EIR and FERC’s EIS to define the scope of the 
project and evaluate its environmental impact.  In December 
2010, the Water Board certified that the project considered in 
the EIR would comply with water quality requirements.  The 
certification contained its own conditions, many of which 
overlapped with the requirements of the settlement agreement.  
By operation of law, these conditions must be included as terms 
of any new FERC license.  (33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).)   
The appellate record contains no information about FERC 
proceedings following DWR’s certification of the final EIR, but 
the parties inform us that FERC has yet to take final action on 
DWR’s application for a renewed license. 
C. 
In August 2008, following DWR’s certification of the EIR, 
Butte County and Plumas County filed separate petitions for 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
writ of mandate challenging DWR’s compliance with CEQA in 
connection with the relicensing.  The Plumas County lawsuit 
also includes as a petitioner the Plumas County Flood Control 
and Water Conservation District, a special law district that 
receives water from the Facilities.  We refer to the County and 
the District jointly as “Plumas County.”  Butte County’s claims 
challenged the EIR’s analysis of the environmental impact of the 
project, as well as the project definition, assessment of 
alternatives, and adoption of mitigation measures with respect 
to government services and socioeconomic effects, recreation, 
water resources and quality, and climate change.  Its petition 
sought an order setting aside DWR’s certification of the EIR and 
enjoining “DWR’s project,” as well as any “such further relief 
that the Court deems just.”  Plumas County’s petition raised 
similar claims and sought similar relief, including an order 
requiring the Facilities to “suspend all activity under the [EIR] 
certification that could result in any change or alteration in the 
physical environment” until certification of an adequate EIR 
and “other equitable or legal relief that the Court considers just 
and proper.” 
The parties stipulated to consolidation of the two 
petitions.  In May 2012, the trial court issued a statement of 
decision rejecting the Counties’ claims and finding the EIR 
adequate, and the Counties appealed.  The Court of Appeal 
requested supplemental briefing to address whether the FPA 
preempted the Counties’ actions.  It subsequently held that the 
Counties’ actions were preempted to the extent they challenged 
the settlement agreement, challenges over which FERC has 
exclusive jurisdiction, and premature to the extent they 
challenged the Water Board’s certification, which had not issued 
at the time the Counties filed their actions.  We granted the 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
Counties’ petitions for review and transferred the matter to the 
Court of Appeal to reconsider its decision in light of Eel River, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th 677.  The Court of Appeal reached the same 
conclusions on remand.   
We granted review of this second decision to address two 
issues:  (1) whether the FPA preempts application of CEQA 
when the state is acting on its own behalf and exercising its 
discretion in pursuing relicensing of a hydroelectric dam, and (2) 
whether the FPA preempts challenges in state court to an EIR 
prepared under CEQA to comply with section 401 (33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341) of the Clean Water Act.  Upon review of the appellate 
record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the second issue 
is not properly presented, and we decline to address it.   
II. 
We describe here the interrelated federal and state 
statutory schemes at play in this case. 
A. 
The FPA, the original predecessor of which was enacted in 
1920, was created to facilitate development of the nation’s 
hydropower resources, in part by removing state-imposed 
roadblocks to such development.  (First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at 
p. 174 [“Congress was concerned with overcoming the danger of 
divided authority so as to bring about the needed development 
of water power”].)  “[The FPA] was the outgrowth of a widely 
supported effort of the conservationists to secure enactment of a 
complete scheme of national regulation which would promote 
the comprehensive development of the water resources of the 
Nation, in so far as it was within the reach of the federal power 
to do so . . . .”  (Id. at p. 180.) 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
Under the FPA, the construction and operation of a dam 
or hydroelectric power plant requires a license from FERC.  
(16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e) [authorizing license issuance], 817(1) 
[unlawful to operate a hydropower plant without a FERC 
license].)  Operation of a licensed facility is “conditioned upon 
acceptance by the licensee of all the terms and conditions of [the 
FPA] and such further conditions, if any, as [FERC] shall 
prescribe,” which must be stated in the license.  (16 U.S.C. 
§ 799.)  A FERC license must provide for, among other things, 
“the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish 
and wildlife . . . , and for other beneficial public uses, including 
irrigation, flood control, water supply, and recreational and 
other purposes.”  (16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1); see id., § 803(j).)  To 
achieve this and other objectives of the FPA, FERC is granted 
express authority “to require the modification of any project and 
of the plans and specifications of the project works before 
approval.”  (16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1).)   
B. 
“CEQA embodies a central state policy to require state and 
local governmental entities to perform their duties ‘so that 
major consideration is given to preventing environmental 
damage.’  [Citations.]  [¶] CEQA prescribes how governmental 
decisions will be made when public entities, including the state 
itself, are charged with approving, funding — or themselves 
undertaking — a project with significant effects on the 
environment.”  (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 711–712, 
italics omitted.)  CEQA applies to any discretionary “project,” 
defined as an activity that may cause a physical change in the 
environment and that is undertaken or financed by a public 
agency or requires a public agency’s approval.  (Pub. Resources 
Code, §§ 21065, 21080; see id., § 21001.1 [projects proposed by 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
public agencies are subject to the same level of review as private 
projects].)  If, after performing an initial study, the agency 
responsible for CEQA compliance, referred to as the “lead 
agency,” finds substantial evidence that a project may have a 
significant environmental impact, the agency must prepare and 
certify an EIR before approving or proceeding with the project.  
(Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1187; Pub. Resources Code, § 21100, 
subd. (a).) 
The EIR is often referred to as the “ ‘ “heart’ ’ ” of CEQA.  
(E.g., Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 713.)  “Its purpose is to 
inform the public and its responsible officials of the 
environmental consequences of their decisions before they are 
made.”  (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 553, 564.)  Ideally, an EIR serves “to identify the 
significant effects on the environment of a project, to identify 
alternatives to the project, and to indicate the manner in which 
those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.”  (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (a).)  The document must 
include a description of the proposed project and its 
environmental setting and discussions of (1) the possible 
environmental effects of the project, (2) feasible measures to 
mitigate any significant, adverse environmental effects of the 
project, (3) the comparative environmental effects of a range of 
reasonable alternatives to the proposed project, including a “no 
project” alternative, (4) the cumulative impact of the project’s 
various environmental effects, and (5) the economic and social 
effects of the project.  (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15124, 15126, 
15126.4, 15126.6, 15131.)  Given the role it plays and its 
required analysis, the EIR is commonly referred to as an 
“informational document.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21061; 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
CEQA Guidelines, § 15121.)  It serves to inform decision makers 
and the general public about the nature and environmental 
impact of a proposed project, feasible ways to reduce that impact 
(often through the mechanism of mitigation measures), and 
possible alternatives to the project.  (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21061.) 
Mitigation measures are modifications of the proposed 
design and implementation of a project imposed by the lead 
agency to reduce the project’s adverse environmental effects.  If 
an EIR identifies significant environmental effects, CEQA 
requires the adoption of mitigation measures when “it is feasible 
to do so.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b).)  CEQA 
recognizes that “economic, social, or other conditions [may] 
make it infeasible to mitigate one or more significant effects on 
the environment” and that in those circumstances “the project 
may nonetheless be carried out or approved at the discretion of 
a public agency if the project is otherwise permissible under 
applicable laws and regulations.”  (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21002.1, subd. (c); see CEQA Guidelines, § 15364 [“ ‘Feasible’ 
means capable of being accomplished in a successful manner 
within a reasonable period of time, taking into account 
economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological 
factors”].)  To move forward with the project, the lead agency 
must find that “specific overriding economic, legal, social, 
technological, or other benefits of the project outweigh the 
significant effects on the environment.”  (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21081, subd. (b).) 
When the project is publicly financed or undertaken, as 
here, feasible mitigation measures must be incorporated into 
the plan or project design.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, 
subd. (a)(2); see also Pub. Resources Code, § 21081.6, subd. (b).)  
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
Further, to “ensure that the mitigation measures and project 
revisions identified in the EIR . . . are implemented,” the lead 
agency, when approving the EIR, must also adopt “a program 
for monitoring or reporting on the revisions which it has 
required in the project and the measures it has imposed to 
mitigate or avoid significant environmental effects.”  (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15097, subd. (a); see also Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21081.6, subd. (a)(1).)  In this way, CEQA’s mitigation 
measures play a crucial role in reducing the environmental 
impact of projects undertaken in California.   
III. 
“The Supremacy Clause provides that ‘the Laws of the 
United States’ (as well as treaties and the Constitution itself) 
‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution 
or Laws 
of 
any 
state 
to the 
Contrary 
notwithstanding.’  [U.S. Const.] Art. VI, cl. 2.  Congress may 
consequently pre-empt, i.e., invalidate, a state law through 
federal legislation.  It may do so through express language in a 
statute.  But even where . . . a statute does not refer expressly 
to pre-emption, Congress may implicitly pre-empt a state law, 
rule, or other state action.”  (Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. (2015) 
575 U.S. 373, 376–377 (Oneok).)   
There are “three different types of preemption — ‘conflict,’ 
‘express,’ and ‘field,’ [citation] — but all of them work in the 
same way:  Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or 
confers rights on private actors; a state law confers rights or 
imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and 
therefore the federal law takes precedence and the state law is 
preempted.”  (Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. 
(2018) 584 U.S. __, __ [138 S.Ct. 1461, 1480] (Murphy).)   
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
Conflict preemption “exists where ‘compliance with both 
state and federal law is impossible,’ or where ‘the state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” ’ ”  (Oneok, supra, 
575 U.S. at p. 377.)  “[T]he threshold for establishing” such an 
obstacle “is demanding:  ‘It requires proof Congress had 
particular 
purposes 
and 
objectives 
in 
mind[ 
and] 
a 
demonstration that leaving state law in place would compromise 
those objectives . . . .’ ”  (People v. Rinehart (2016) 1 Cal.5th 652, 
661; see Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
v. Whiting (2011) 563 U.S. 582, 607 (plur. opn. of Roberts, C. J.) 
[a “ ‘high threshold must be met if a state law is to be pre-empted 
for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act’ ”].)  “ ‘[P]re-
emption analysis is not “[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into 
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives” ’ ” 
(Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail 
Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 939), but a focused 
inquiry into “whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict 
between the federal and state regulatory schemes” (Rice v. 
Norman Williams Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 654, 659).  “The existence 
of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant 
the pre-emption of the state statute.”  (Ibid.) 
Further, when it comes to considering preemption of state-
owned or state-operated projects, we apply a presumption that 
“protects against undue federal incursions into the internal, 
sovereign concerns of the states.”  (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 705, citing Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) 501 U.S. 452 and Nixon 
v. Missouri Municipal League (2004) 541 U.S. 125; see also 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 518.)  “To 
determine the reach of the federal law preempting state 
regulation of a state-owned [project] we must consider a 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
presumption that, in the absence of unmistakably clear 
language, Congress does not intend to deprive the state of 
sovereignty over its own subdivisions to the point of upsetting 
the usual constitutional balance of state and federal powers.”  
(Eel River, at p. 690.)  And there is a “related presumption” that 
“Congress does not intend to reach and preempt a state’s 
proprietary arrangements in the marketplace in the absence of 
evidence of such an expansive congressional intent.”  (Id. at 
p. 705.) 
A. 
Respondent State Water Contractors, Inc., an association 
of public water agencies, is the only party asserting that the 
Counties’ claims are fully preempted.  It argues that the FPA 
contains the requisite “unmistakably clear” indication of 
congressional intent to occupy the field and preempt the 
Counties’ challenges.  If the issue before us involved state 
regulation of private entities, these arguments may have 
prevailed.  Although the FPA does not contain an express 
preemption clause, the high court recognized 70 years ago in 
First Iowa that “the FPA establishes a broad and paramount 
federal regulatory role.”  (California v. FERC (1990) 495 U.S. 
490, 499.)  “That broad delegation of power . . . , however, hardly 
determines the extent to which Congress intended to have the 
Federal Government exercise exclusive powers, or intended to 
pre-empt concurrent state regulation of matters affecting 
federally licensed hydroelectric projects.”  (Id. at pp. 496–497.)   
In two decisions, First Iowa and California v. FERC, the 
high court determined that state regulatory efforts that 
conflicted with the exclusive federal licensing authority granted 
by the FPA were preempted.  First Iowa concerned the state’s 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
attempt to require an applicant for a federal license to secure a 
state permit for a privately operated project that would regulate 
“the very requirements of the project that Congress has placed 
in the discretion” of the federal agency.  (First Iowa, supra, 328 
U.S. at p. 165.)  California v. FERC similarly involved 
“overlapping federal and state regulation.”  (California v. FERC, 
supra, 495 U.S. at p. 493.)  In that case, the high court rejected 
an attempt by the state to mandate minimum stream flow 
requirements on a private project that were higher than federal 
flow requirements.  Both decisions interpreted the FPA to leave 
“the permit requirements at issue to the federal sphere.”  (Id. at 
p. 503.)   
First Iowa and California v. FERC could be read to apply 
either conflict or field preemption.  (See First Iowa, supra, 328 
U.S. at pp. 167, 171, 178, 180–181; California v. FERC, supra, 
495 U.S. at pp. 493, 496–497, 505, 506; cf. California Oregon 
Power Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 858, 868 
[“Implicit in [First Iowa] is the concept that the field is not 
exclusively occupied for all purposes by the [FPA] or [FERC’s 
predecessor]”].)  As the Ninth Circuit noted in Sayles Hydro 
Assn. v. Maughan (9th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 451 (Sayles Hydro), 
“[t]he dichotomy between the two types of preemption is not so 
sharp in practical terms as the legal characterization makes it 
appear, so the mixed language has little significance.”  (Id. at 
p. 456; see Murphy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at 
p. 1480] [“field preemption[,] . . . like all other forms of 
preemption, . . . concerns a clash between a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s legislative power and conflicting state 
law”].)  Sayles Hydro ultimately applied field preemption in a 
case that, similar to First Iowa and California v. FERC, involved 
the licensing of a private entity.   
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
None of these cases considered whether Congress 
intended to occupy the field to the extent of precluding a state 
from exercising authority over its own subdivision’s license 
application.  Field preemption requires not only a determination 
that Congress intended to occupy the field, but consideration of 
what the “boundaries of the pre-empted field” are.  (English v. 
Gen. Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 82 (English).)  First Iowa, 
California v. FERC, and Sayles Hydro each involved state 
regulation of private parties rather than the type of self-
government we discussed in Eel River, which is also at issue 
here.  (See Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 723 [“CEQA 
embodies a state policy adopted by the Legislature to govern 
how the state itself and the state’s own subdivisions will exercise 
their responsibilities.”].)  None of those cases defined the field to 
include the state’s prerogative to govern the work of its own 
agency in a manner that does not conflict with federal law.  (See, 
e.g., First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at p. 171 [“The [FPA] leaves to 
the states their traditional jurisdiction”].)   
The concurring and dissenting opinion relies on the FPA’s 
savings clause, 16 United States Code section 821 (commonly 
referred to as section 27), in concluding that Congress intended 
to occupy the field to preclude CEQA’s application here.  Section 
27 states:  “Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed 
as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with 
the laws of the respective States relating to the control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or 
for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired 
therein.”  (16 U.S.C. § 821.)  Notably, the statute does not say 
that these matters are the only matters reserved.  (See Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating 
Dist. (2d Cir. 2012) 673 F.3d 84, 97 (Niagara Mohawk Power 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
Corp.) [“just because the savings clause fails to mention certain 
state-law powers does not mean that all unmentioned powers 
are federally preempted”].)  In Eel River, we found an explicit 
and broad preemption clause insufficiently clear to overcome the 
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt a state’s 
internal decisionmaking under CEQA, even if it intended to 
preempt the state’s regulation of private parties in the same 
context.  (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 723.)  The language of 
section 27, a savings clause, does not support a different 
preemption conclusion here.   
Our concurring and dissenting colleagues also rely on 
judicial interpretations of section 27 in First Iowa, California v. 
FERC, and Sayles Hydro.  But none of these decisions is 
probative of congressional intent on the issue before us, nor do 
any address whether section 27 evinces an “unmistakably clear” 
(Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 690) intent by Congress to 
preempt a state’s environmental review of its own project as 
opposed to its regulation of a private entity.  The concurring and 
dissenting opinion does not explain how any of these cases 
supports defining the preempted field to include the specific 
conduct at issue today.  We must determine whether Congress 
intended to preclude “the state [from] trying to govern itself — 
to engage in ‘decision[s] of the most fundamental sort for a 
sovereign entity.’ ”  (Id. at p. 729; see, e.g., English, supra, 496 
U.S. at p. 82; Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm’n 
(1983) 461 U.S. 190, 205; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra, 
673 F.3d at pp. 95–96.)  Reliance on these opinions in the 
absence of evidence that Congress intended to reach this far is 
contrary to the “strong presumption against preemption” that 
applies “to the existence as well as the scope of preemption.”  
(Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088, citing 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 485; see Eel River, 
at p. 729 [“Without plainer language to that effect, we do not 
believe Congress intended to displace the exercise of a state’s 
ordinary power of self-governance when the state does not 
propose to act in contravention of the dictates” of federal law].)   
The concurring and dissenting opinion contends that 
Congress has accepted these interpretations of section 27 and by 
so doing “has made unmistakably clear the broad preemptive 
reach it intends for [the] FPA.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 29.)  
But “[a]rguments based on supposed legislative acquiescence 
rarely do much to persuade.”  (Scher v. Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
136, 147; see Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing 
Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1395–1396.)  And they do nothing 
at all when premised on acquiescence to judicial opinions that 
do not concern the same subject matter.  (Scher, at p. 147.)  To 
the extent legislative acquiescence is relevant at all, it is notable 
that the concurring and dissenting opinion places no weight on 
the Counties’ claim that “[f]or decades, CEQA review for such 
projects has coexisted with federal regulation without FERC [or 
Congress] ever suggesting that CEQA is preempted.”  (See conc. 
& dis. opn., post, at p. 22, fn. 8.) 
Neither the FPA’s legislative history nor its language 
suggests that Congress intended this to be one of the “rare cases” 
where it has “ ‘legislated so comprehensively’ . . . that it ‘le[aves] 
no room for supplementary state legislation’ ” of the type at 
issue here concerning how a state entity conducts its own 
decisionmaking.  (Kansas v. Garcia (2020) 589 U.S. __, __ [140 
S.Ct. 791, 804]; see First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at p. 171 [the 
FPA, when “read in the light of its long and colorful legislative 
history, . . . discloses both a vigorous determination of Congress 
to make progress with the development of . . . water power . . . 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
and a determination to avoid unconstitutional invasion of the 
jurisdiction of the states”].)  This does not appear to be “an area 
the Federal Government has reserved for itself,” which is “the 
basic premise of field preemption.”  (Arizona v. United States 
(2012) 567 U.S. 387, 402.)   
As DWR states in its briefing, “[t]he fact that the [FPA] 
has a significant preemptive sweep says nothing about 
congressional intent to prohibit state action that is non-
regulatory.”  When the state or a subdivision proposes to develop 
its own property, CEQA “operates as a form of self-government 
. . . .  Application of CEQA to the public entity charged with 
developing state property is not classic regulatory behavior, 
especially when there is no encroachment on the regulatory 
domain of the [federal authority] or inconsistency with [federal 
law] . . . .  Rather, application of CEQA in this context 
constitutes self-governance on the part of a sovereign state and 
at the same time on the part of an owner.”  (Eel River, supra, 3 
Cal.5th at p. 723.)   
State Water Contractors argues that the reasoning of Eel 
River is inapt because the federal scheme at issue in that case 
deregulated the industry while the federal legislation here 
requires every dam and hydroelectric power plant to obtain a 
federal license to operate and grants FERC the exclusive right 
to issue such licenses.  (See also conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 26.)  
But our reasoning in Eel River did not hinge on the industry’s 
deregulation; rather, it was based on what the federal scheme 
permitted the state as owner to do as a result of that 
deregulation — namely, make its own choices about its project, 
guided by an EIR.  (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 724.)  There 
is “no indication in the language of the [FPA] that Congress 
intended to preempt [state] self-governance” when it is carried 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
out by means of a state law permitting challenges to a state 
agency’s EIR.  (Id. at p. 704; see id. at p. 730 [“The availability 
of citizen enforcement mechanisms does not change our view 
that CEQA operates as a system of self-governance . . . in this 
case”].)  Without more, we cannot conclude that “Congress . . . 
intended ‘to foreclose any state [activity] in the area,’ 
irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent 
with ‘federal standards.’ ”  (Oneok, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 377, 
italics omitted.) 
B. 
At the same time, the fact that CEQA is not categorically 
preempted does not mean that no CEQA applications or 
remedies are preempted by the federal scheme.  (Eel River, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 740; id. at pp. 740–741 (conc. opn. of 
Kruger, J.).)  To the contrary, the Counties made clear during 
oral argument that they are no longer seeking injunctive relief 
that would interfere with the federal licensing process, 
conceding preemption on this issue, and all parties agree that 
no state court can issue a remedy that conflicts with federal law.  
In this respect, the Counties now appear to acknowledge that 
the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that they cannot, in 
this CEQA action, challenge the terms of the settlement 
agreement reached through the ALP.   
We agree.  The overriding purpose of the FPA is to 
facilitate the development of the nation’s hydropower resources.  
(First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at pp. 174, 180.)  A primary tool in 
achieving that goal was to centralize regulatory authority in the 
federal government in order to remove any obstacles to such 
development posed by state regulation.  (Ibid.)  A CEQA 
challenge to the terms of a settlement agreement reached 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
through the ALP would raise preemption concerns to the extent 
the action would interfere with the federal process detailed 
above or with FERC’s jurisdiction over the proceedings.  (See 18 
C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(6)(vii) (2022); International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette (1987) 479 U.S. 481, 494 [“A state law . . . is pre-
empted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal 
statute was designed to reach [its] goal”].)  A state court order 
granting the injunctive relief the Counties initially sought 
would stand as a direct obstacle to the accomplishment of 
Congress’s objective of vesting exclusive licensing authority in 
FERC.  (See California v. FERC, supra, 495 U.S. at pp. 506–
507.) 
If that were all the Counties had requested, we would 
affirm the judgment below directing the trial court to dismiss 
the action in its entirety.  But the Counties’ writ petitions 
challenge the Department’s EIR more broadly.  Beyond seeking 
to enjoin DWR’s project, the Counties also requested a writ of 
mandate setting aside the certification of the EIR as adequate 
and whatever “further relief . . . the Court deems just.” 
State Water Contractors defends the Court of Appeal’s 
complete dismissal on the sole ground that all of the Counties’ 
CEQA claims are preempted.  As discussed, the Court of Appeal 
was correct to hold that the Counties’ challenge to the 
environmental sufficiency of the settlement agreement was 
preempted.  But the Counties not only sought an injunction 
against DWR’s operation of the Facilities under the terms of the 
settlement agreement.  They also challenged the environmental 
sufficiency of the EIR itself, which they claim DWR can use in 
connection with its decisionmaking about the licensing process 
and the operation of the Facilities without interfering with 
FERC’s authority. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
The EIR characterized the project under CEQA review as 
implementation of the settlement agreement and analyzed the 
environmental impact of the settlement agreement as well as 
the FERC staff alternative.  At this stage in the proceedings, 
review of the Department’s EIR does not interfere with FERC’s 
jurisdiction or exclusive licensing authority.  Federal law 
expressly allows applicants (public or private) to amend their 
license application or seek reconsideration once FERC has 
issued a license.  (See 18 C.F.R. § 4.35(b) (2022) [application may 
be amended pending review]; id., § 385.713 (2022) [authorizing 
request for rehearing]; 18 C.F.R. § 4.200(b) (2022) [allowing 
application to amend license after issuance]; 16 U.S.C. § 825l 
[authorizing rehearing application and judicial review].)  And 
we are aware of no federal law — and the concurring and 
dissenting opinion cites none — that limits an applicant’s ability 
to analyze its options or the proposed terms of the license before 
doing so.  That is, DWR can undertake CEQA review, including 
permitting challenges to the EIR it prepares as part of that 
review, in order to assess its options going forward.  Nothing 
about such use of CEQA review is incompatible with federal 
authority.  (See Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 724 [where 
federal law does not otherwise require, “the state as owner may 
make its decisions based on its own guidelines rather than some 
anarchic absence of rules of decision”].)  These activities are a 
far cry from the conflicting state regulations imposed on private 
actors at issue in First Iowa and California v. FERC.   
DWR’s decision document recognized that “[a]pproval of 
the Proposed Project . . . will not lead to immediate 
implementation of the [settlement agreement (SA)] articles.  
DWR’s implementation of the SA actions that are within FERC’s 
jurisdiction depend[s] on FERC issuing and DWR accepting a 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
license materially consistent with the Proposed Project.”  It also 
noted that if the license FERC issues involves “terms and 
conditions not included in the Proposed Project or FERC Staff 
Alternative,” additional CEQA review will be required by DWR.  
The Department’s EIR is programmatic in nature, meaning it 
contemplates additional CEQA review in connection with later 
activities that are part of the project.  (See CEQA Guidelines, 
§§ 15168, 15152.)  There is no indication Congress “believe[d] 
that it was inconsistent to vest [FERC] with exclusive 
regulatory authority . . . while at the same time allowing” 
applicants to analyze ongoing environmental considerations, 
request certain terms, or seek reconsideration of the terms of 
any license offered within the means federal law supplies.  
(Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp (1984) 464 U.S. 238, 258.) 
State Water Contractors takes issue with the Counties’ 
desire to see particular mitigation measures imposed on the 
project.  But any preemption concerns related to DWR’s ability 
to adopt additional mitigation measures in the EIR, if 
warranted, are premature.  At this stage, the Counties challenge 
only the sufficiency of the EIR, and they contend the EIR can 
inform DWR’s decisionmaking in ways that do not conflict with 
FERC’s authority.  They do not ask the court to impose or 
enforce any CEQA mitigation measures, much less any that are 
contrary to federal authority.  A CEQA challenge to the 
Department’s EIR is not inherently impermissible, nor is it clear 
that any mitigation measures will conflict with the terms of the 
license ultimately issued by FERC.  As noted, an EIR may 
contain mitigation measures that fall outside of FERC’s 
jurisdiction or are compatible with FERC’s exclusive licensing 
authority.  Meanwhile, federal law provides avenues for any 
mitigation measures identified by the Department’s CEQA 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
review that fall under FERC’s jurisdiction to be incorporated 
into the eventual license if FERC so decides.  If they are 
incorporated, then it is no obstacle to FERC’s authority that 
they originated with the state as applicant.  If they are not, then 
FERC has simply exercised its discretion to dictate the terms of 
the license offered, preempting any particular applications or 
enforcement mechanisms of CEQA that conflict with that 
authority.  (See Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 740; id. at 
pp. 740–741 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.).)  In either case, CEQA can 
inform the public entity’s decisionmaking without encroaching 
on FERC’s ultimate licensing authority. 
The concurring and dissenting opinion mistakes today’s 
inquiry and our holding at several turns.  We do not consider Eel 
River’s rationale to be inapplicable here, nor do we understand 
Eel River to have found CEQA “exempt from preemption” by the 
federal statute at issue in that case.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at 
p. 24; see id. at p. 26.)  In Eel River, we conducted traditional 
preemption analysis to determine that the state’s use of CEQA 
in particular circumstances was not preempted, while carefully 
delineating the circumstances in which it was preempted.  
Today’s opinion likewise does not conclude that DWR’s actions 
are “not subject to” the usual analysis for field preemption and 
purposes and objectives preemption.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at 
p. 33.)  Instead, we find that State Water Contractors has not 
carried its burden to establish field preemption here.  And in 
determining “ ‘whether, under the circumstances of this 
particular case, [CEQA] stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress’ ” (Jones v. Rath Packing Co. (1997) 430 
U.S. 519, 526), we find the Counties’ claims preempted in part.  
Although the concurring and dissenting opinion considers 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
today’s ruling to go “beyond the holding of” Eel River (conc. & 
dis. opn., post, at p. 33; see id. at pp. 30–31), Eel River itself 
considered certain applications of CEQA preempted (Eel River, 
at pp. 739–740) and took no issue with the observation that 
“particular CEQA remedies might be preempted” on remand (id. 
at p. 741 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.)).  We do the same here. 
The concurring and dissenting opinion’s concerns about 
the workability of today’s holding are misplaced.  In contending 
that there is or will be conflict between our decision and federal 
case law, our colleagues overlook the distinction between state 
regulation of private parties and the state’s self-governance at 
issue here.  We are not aware of any authority contrary to our 
holding today.  As noted, Sayles Hydro involved state regulation 
of a private party, and Eel River did not involve the FPA.  The 
closest case that our concurring and dissenting colleagues can 
find is a New York appellate court decision that applied field 
preemption, based on two sentences of analysis, to an issue we 
do not address here.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 22, fn. 8.)  
Further, the concurring and dissenting opinion says this 
lawsuit has resulted in years of delay to FERC’s issuance of the 
license.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 3, fn. 1, 38.)  But this 
assertion is mere conjecture.  No party has argued that the delay 
in obtaining a license from FERC is attributable to the Counties’ 
litigation, and there is no evidence in the record to that effect.  
There are more than a dozen relicensing applications other than 
this one that were filed prior to 2010, when the section 401 
certification issued in this project, that are still pending before 
FERC.  (See FERC, Licensing: Pending License, Relicense, and 
Exemption Applications, updated 7/15/2022, available at 
 [as of Jul. 28, 2022]; all 
Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.) 
 
And 
a 
cursory 
inspection of FERC’s docket reveals numerous requests for 
delays in the proceedings unrelated to this litigation.  Moreover, 
even if the delay were attributable solely to the litigation, there 
is little reason to assume any future litigation will be as 
prolonged.  Today’s opinion resolves the matter in dispute, and 
a challenge to the environmental sufficiency of the Department’s 
EIR need not delay issuance of FERC’s license in these 
circumstances. 
The concurring and dissenting opinion says our holding 
will have little practical impact.  As an initial matter, the 
question of the sufficiency of the EIR or the merits of the 
Counties’ claims is not before us.  But even if the Counties’ 
lawsuit is not meritorious, that does not mean a finding of 
preemption is warranted.  Our colleagues repeatedly note the 
fact that environmental review was conducted at earlier stages.  
(Conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 4, 5, 34–36.)  But it is incorrect to 
suggest the Department’s EIR is identical to those prior 
inquiries when it involves matters that were not yet before them 
or are beyond their scope.  An EIR can play a role in DWR’s 
evaluation of matters outside of or compatible with FERC’s 
jurisdiction, and the concurring and dissenting opinion does not 
identify any mitigation measures DWR has adopted that conflict 
with FERC’s authority.  At this stage, any concerns about 
conflicting mitigation measures are exaggerated or at least 
premature. 
In sum, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the 
Counties “cannot challenge the environmental sufficiency of the 
[settlement agreement]” (County of Butte, supra, C071785) or 
seek to unwind it.  To do so would pose an obstacle to FERC’s 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
congressionally granted exclusive authority on those matters.  
But the same is not the case for the Counties’ challenge to the 
environmental sufficiency of the EIR more generally, insofar as 
a compliant EIR can still inform the state agency concerning 
actions that do not encroach on FERC’s jurisdiction.  Nothing 
clearly precludes our courts from considering a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the EIR in these circumstances and ordering, for 
example, DWR to reconsider its analysis if warranted.  
Accordingly, we reverse in part and remand for further 
consideration of the Counties’ remaining claims, largely 
unaddressed by the Court of Appeal’s decision, and for 
resolution of any open questions such as whether there are 
procedural or other bars to those claims.   
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur:  
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
1 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT  
OF WATER RESOURCES 
S258574 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
 
I agree with my colleagues that the decision of the 
Department of Water Resources (DWR) to engage in review 
under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21000 et seq) is subject to the dictates of the 
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.  (U.S. 
Const., art. VI, cl. 2.)  My disagreement concerns the scope and 
consequences of that preemption. 
CEQA is a powerful regulatory statute, requiring a lead 
agency to adopt tailored regulations, referred to as “mitigation 
measures,” designed to reduce to insignificance any potentially 
significant adverse environmental effects of a project.  The 
majority holds that the doctrine of preemption takes effect in 
this case only when these mitigation measures prove to be 
inconsistent with a license granted by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) or when a private action to 
enforce CEQA seeks to interfere with FERC licensing 
proceedings.  Such limited preemption is an unavoidable 
concession to the most basic doctrine of implied preemption, 
which holds that “[w]here state and federal law ‘directly 
conflict,’ state law must give way.”  (PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing 
(2011) 564 U.S. 604, 617.)  If that were all the supremacy clause 
requires, I would have no quarrel with the majority’s holding 
today. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
The scope of preemption, however, is considerably 
broader.  For one, Congress can choose to occupy a regulatory 
field entirely, thereby precluding all state regulation, regardless 
of its content.  (See Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 387, 
401 [“Where Congress occupies an entire field, . . . even 
complementary state regulation is impermissible”].)  Equally 
applicable is “purposes and objectives” preemption, a partner of 
the rule acknowledged by the majority:  State legislation is 
preempted not only when it directly conflicts with federal law, 
but also when the state law “ ‘ “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.” ’ ”  (Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. (2015) 575 
U.S. 373, 377 (Oneok).)  CEQA is preempted here under either 
category. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
interpreted the Federal Power Act (FPA; 16 U.S.C. § 791a et 
seq.) to reflect Congress’s intent to occupy the field of 
hydropower regulation, as the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recognized nearly 30 years ago.  (Sayles 
Hydro Assn. v. Maughan (9th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 451, 454–455 
(Sayles Hydro).)  Through a savings clause, the FPA limits the 
states to a narrow band of regulation, and no one contends that 
CEQA falls within that band.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit found 
CEQA preempted in connection with FPA proceedings, although 
it did not identify the statute by name.  (Sayles Hydro, at p. 455.) 
In addition, CEQA stands as a clear obstacle to the 
Congressional objective of vesting exclusive control over 
hydropower licensing and regulation in FERC.  The key to 
CEQA’s success in limiting the environmental impact of 
regulated activities in California is its mitigation mandate.  
A CEQA lead agency must, in approving a project, adopt both a 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
slate of mitigation measures, which have the effect of law, and 
a mitigation monitoring program designed to ensure compliance 
with those mitigation measures.  That regulatory tool, however, 
conflicts with the exclusive authority granted to FERC under 
the FPA.  The mitigation measures required by CEQA, enforced 
by the equally compulsory mitigation monitoring program, 
create a competing state regulatory regime that stands as a 
direct obstacle to the accomplishment of the congressional 
purpose and objective of vesting unchallenged regulatory 
authority over hydropower in FERC. 
Further, as this case glaringly demonstrates, the private 
enforcement provisions of CEQA stand as an inevitable 
impediment to the congressional purpose of granting to FERC 
exclusive control over the hydropower licensing process.  FERC’s 
licensing 
regulations 
were 
clearly 
designed 
to 
render 
unnecessary the application of state environmental review 
statutes.  Imposing such state proceedings adds nothing to the 
licensing process, but it appears to have created, in this case, a 
delay of 12 years (and counting).1 
Because these critical features of CEQA — the mandatory 
imposition of mitigation measures and the allowance for private 
enforcement — stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
 
1  
All of the regulatory pieces appear to have been in place 
for FERC to issue a new license in 2010, but no license has 
issued.  The parties have not addressed the cause of the 
intervening 12-year delay, but no one has suggested there is a 
continuing legal barrier to license issuance.  An obvious 
inference is that FERC decided to let the state proceedings play 
out before issuing a new license.  And FERC is still waiting.  The 
litigation is 14 years old, and the majority’s remand will 
guarantee it another year of life, at a minimum. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
congressional purposes and objectives, invocation of the CEQA 
statute is wholly preempted in these circumstances.  On this 
basis, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
dismissing the consolidated actions brought by the County of 
Butte and the County of Plumas. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
As the majority explains, this matter comes to us in the 
midst of a federal relicensing proceeding for the Oroville 
Facilities (Facilities), a collection of dams and hydropower 
projects operated by DWR in Butte County.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 3–7.)   The unfinished relicensing proceeding is, at present, 
22 years old. 
FERC’s alternative licensing process (ALP) is hardly 
insensitive to environmental concerns.  At the outset, the ALP 
required DWR to prepare a preliminary draft environmental 
assessment (PDEA), an analysis of the likely environmental 
impact of Facilities operation.  (18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(4)(iii) (2022).)  
As the majority notes, this was a 700-page document supported 
by 1,500 pages of appendices.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  In its 
content, the PDEA was materially indistinguishable from an 
environmental impact report (EIR), whose preparation is 
required by CEQA.  Only after the preparation of this PDEA, 
DWR and the other 50-odd participants in the ALP convened to 
negotiate the terms of a proposed license for presentation to 
FERC.  Inasmuch as the ALP participants included a wide 
variety of public agencies, managing the possible environmental 
effects of Facilities operations undoubtedly played an important 
role in the negotiations.  In any event, no one contends that 
environmental concerns were given inadequate consideration 
during the ALP. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
The ALP participants — with the exception of the present 
two counties — managed to agree on the terms of a proposed 
license, which DWR forwarded to FERC as its application for 
relicensing.  A FERC license must provide for, among other 
things, “the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement 
of fish and wildlife . . . , and for other beneficial public uses, 
including 
irrigation, 
flood 
control, 
water 
supply, 
and 
recreational and other purposes.”  (16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1); see  id., 
§ 803(j).)  After time for study, FERC prepared its own formal 
environmental analysis, an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) prepared under the authority of the federal analog to 
CEQA, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA; 
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.)  Again, the informational requirements 
for an EIS are not materially different from those for an EIR.2  
In the EIS, FERC outlined the additional terms it proposed to 
add to the license terms proposed in the settlement agreement 
and evaluated the environmental impact of these additional 
measures, as well as the impact of the settlement agreement’s 
proposal. 
 At this point in the licensing process, two complete EIR 
equivalents had been prepared.  Yet DWR elected to prepare a 
third environmental analysis under the authority of CEQA, 
defining as its project the implementation of the settlement 
agreement, which it viewed as equivalent to “the continued 
operation and maintenance of the Oroville Facilities for electric 
 
2  
Like an EIR, an EIS “must contain, among other things, a 
detailed discussion of ‘the environmental impact of the proposed 
action,’ ‘adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided,’ 
‘alternatives to the proposed action,’ and possible mitigation 
measures.”  (Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Lacounte (9th Cir. 
2019) 939 F.3d 1029, 1035.) 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
power generation.”  Once triggered, however, CEQA required 
much more than the preparation of an EIR.  As part of its CEQA 
compliance, DWR issued a notice of determination finding that 
the adoption of mitigation measures was required for approval 
of the project.3  Consequently, “as conditions of project 
approval,” DWR adopted a series of mitigation measures and a 
mitigation monitoring program to ensure that implementation.  
The mitigation measures largely overlapped with the 
environmental concerns of the settlement agreement and the 
anticipated FERC license.  As the majority explains, they 
imposed constraints on future operation of the Facilities to 
minimize the project’s environmental effects.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 8–9.) 
Following DWR’s certification of the EIR, Butte County 
and Plumas County filed petitions for a writ of mandate, 
contending that DWR’s compliance with CEQA was deficient 
and seeking to stay the licensing proceedings.  Although no court 
order halting the proceedings ever issued, the counties’ petitions 
had the desired effect.  All of the pieces appear to have been in 
place for FERC’s issuance of a new license in 2010, but the 
federal agency has, to date, taken no action on DWR’s 
application. 
 
3  
The notice of determination’s reference to project 
approval, of course, was approval under state law.  Because 
FERC has exclusive authority over Facilities’ operation, this 
approval 
had 
no 
practical 
significance 
beyond 
CEQA 
compliance. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Governing Law 
1.  Federal Power Act 
The construction and operation of a dam or hydroelectric 
power plant requires a license from FERC, which has broad 
discretion to require changes in the project design and impose 
conditions on project operation.  (16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 799, 
803(a)(1), 817(1).)  This authority places the design and 
operation of hydroelectric power plants and related facilities 
squarely under FERC’s comprehensive regulatory control. 
2.  California Environmental Quality Act 
“CEQA embodies a central state policy to require state and 
local governmental entities to perform their duties ‘so that 
major consideration is given to preventing environmental 
damage.’ ”  (Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad 
Authority (2017) 3 Cal.5th 677, 711 (Eel River).)  As discussed 
more fully by the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–15), CEQA 
applies to discretionary public and private projects that may 
cause a change in the physical environment.  (Pub. Resources 
Code, §§ 21065, 21080; see id., § 21001.1.)  Projects that may 
have 
a 
significant 
environmental 
impact 
require 
the 
preparation of an EIR (Pub. Resources Code, § 21100, subd. (a)), 
which must discuss the possible environmental effects of the 
project, measures to mitigate those effects, and possible 
alternatives to the project.  (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15124, 15126, 
15126.4, 15126.6, 15131.)4 
 
4  
CEQA is implemented by an extensive series of 
administrative regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the 
 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
An 
EIR 
provides 
decision 
makers 
with 
copious 
information about the potential impact of a proposed project, but 
the CEQA process is not solely informational.  It also plays a 
critical regulatory role, largely through the mechanism of 
mitigation measures, which are conditions placed on the design 
and operation of a project to reduce the project’s adverse 
environmental effects.  CEQA mandates their imposition, when 
feasible, if significant environmental effects are identified in an 
EIR.  As CEQA declares in its opening provisions, “the 
procedures required by this division are intended to assist public 
agencies in systematically identifying both the significant 
effects of proposed projects and the feasible alternatives or 
feasible mitigation measures which will avoid or substantially 
lessen such significant effects.”  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002, 
italics added.)  “Each public agency shall mitigate or avoid the 
significant effects on the environment of projects that it carries 
out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so.”  (Id., § 21002.1, 
subd. (b), italics added.)  To serve this end, an EIR is required 
to 
“identify 
mitigation 
measures 
for 
each 
significant 
environmental effect identified in the EIR.”  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(A).) 
Once identified in an EIR, the feasible mitigation 
measures must be adopted by the lead agency as legally 
enforceable features or conditions of the project.  (Sierra Club v. 
County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 524–525 [agencies are 
 
Natural Resources Agency, codified at title 14, division 6, 
chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations, which I will 
refer to as the “CEQA Guidelines.”  Courts must “afford great 
weight” to them when interpreting CEQA.  (Laurel Heights 
Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 
47 Cal.3d 376, 391, fn. 2.) 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
required “to implement all mitigation measures unless those 
measures are truly infeasible”].)  CEQA expressly forbids a lead 
agency from approving or carrying out a project unless 
“[c]hanges or alterations have been required in, or incorporated 
into, the project which mitigate or avoid” any significant effects 
on the environment identified in the EIR.5  (Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(1).)  When the project under 
consideration is a private project, the mitigation measures must 
be 
made 
“fully 
enforceable” 
through 
“legally-binding 
instruments.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(2); see 
also Pub. Resources Code, § 21081.6, subd. (b).)  When, as here, 
the project is publicly financed or undertaken, the mitigation 
measures must be incorporated into the plan or project design.  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(2); see also Pub. 
Resources Code, § 21081.6, subd. (b).)  To ensure compliance 
with the mitigation measures, CEQA also requires the adoption 
and implementation of a mitigation monitoring program.  
 
5  
An exception is recognized if mitigation of the significant 
environmental effects is not feasible, but a project having such 
effects may only be approved if the lead agency expressly finds 
that the benefits of the project outweigh its unmitigable 
environmental effects.  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subds. 
(a)(3), (b).)  Although the majority appears to view this as a 
significant exception to the requirement of mitigation (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 14), the adoption of such a finding (called a “statement 
of overriding considerations”) is not the preferred course.  
(CEQA 
Guidelines, 
§ 15093, 
subd. 
(c).) 
 
Agencies 
understandably seek to avoid the approval of projects that will 
generate significant adverse environmental effects, and most 
proposed 
mitigation 
measures 
are 
“capable 
of 
being 
accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period 
of time,” the standard for feasibility.  (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21061.1.) 
 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
10 
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15097, subd. (a); see also Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21081.6, subd. (a)(1).) 
CEQA’s mitigation measures play a crucial role in 
controlling and reducing the environmental impact of projects 
undertaken in California.  The proposed mitigation measures in 
an EIR outline a series of constraints on the design and 
execution of a project intended to reduce its environmental 
impact.  The lead agency’s adoption of these measures in 
approving the project imposes these constraints on the project’s 
implementation.  Further, by the adoption of a mitigation 
monitoring program, the lead agency ensures compliance with 
this CEQA-imposed regulation. 
3.  Federal Preemption and the Federal Power Act 
The Supreme Court has organized preemption into three 
categories:  Conflict, express, and field preemption.  (Murphy v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (2018) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [138 
S.Ct. 1461, 1480] (Murphy).)  Although the FPA does not 
expressly preempt state law, the application of CEQA in these 
circumstances triggers the two other varieties, field and conflict 
preemption. 
“Field preemption occurs when federal law occupies a 
‘field’ of regulation ‘so comprehensively that it has left no room 
for supplementary state legislation.’ ”  (Murphy, supra, ___ U.S. 
at p. ___, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1480.)  “Where Congress occupies an 
entire field . . . , even complementary state regulation is 
impermissible.  Field pre-emption reflects a congressional 
decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it 
is parallel to federal standards.”  (Arizona v. United States, 
supra, 567 U.S. at p. 401.)   
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
11 
Conflict preemption is further divided into two separate 
and independent doctrines.  It exists (1) “where ‘compliance with 
both state and federal law is impossible,’ ” or (2) “where ‘the 
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” ’ ”  
(Oneok, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 377.)  The lower federal courts refer 
to these distinct subcategories of conflict preemption as 
“impossibility” and “obstacle” preemption, respectively (e.g., 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta (9th Cir. 
2021) 13 F.4th 766, 774), but the Supreme Court has 
characterized 
the 
latter 
as 
“purposes 
and 
objectives” 
preemption.  (Hillman v. Maretta (2013) 569 U.S. 483, 490.)  
I will use the language of the high court. 
The FPA has long been recognized to preempt state 
regulation of hydropower facilities.  As the Supreme Court first 
held 70 years ago in First Iowa Coop. v. Power Comm’n (1946) 
328 U.S. 152 (First Iowa) and subsequently reaffirmed nearly 
40 year later, “the FPA establishes a broad and paramount 
federal regulatory role.”  (California v. FERC (1990) 495 U.S. 
490, 499.)  Through a savings clause, 16 United States Code 
section 821 (Section 27),6 the FPA preserves some state 
regulatory authority, but that authority is limited to the 
determination of “ ‘proprietary rights’ ” in the use of water.  
(California v. FERC, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 498; see also First 
Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at p. 176.)  The high court held that state 
regulation outside the scope of this preserved authority is 
preempted.  (First Iowa, at p. 176 [“in those fields where rights 
 
6  
Title 16 United States Code section 821 is commonly 
referred to as “Section 27” due to its numbering in the original 
legislation, and I observe that convention here. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
12 
are not thus ‘saved’ to the States, Congress is willing to let the 
supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its 
natural course”].)  As the Ninth Circuit later characterized this 
holding, “The Supreme Court has read the broadest possible 
negative pregnant into this ‘savings clause.’  [Citation.]  The 
rights reserved to the states in [Section 27] are all the states 
get.”  (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 454.) 
In its seminal First Iowa decision, the Supreme Court 
found preempted the state’s attempt to require the proponent of 
a proposed dam and power plant to obtain a state license for the 
project, the terms of which would have implemented state law 
governing the use of its waterways.  (First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. 
at pp. 161, 166, 176–178.)  As the high court noted, requiring 
compliance with state law under these circumstances “would 
subject to state control the very requirements of the project that 
Congress has placed in the discretion of the Federal Power 
Commission.”  (Id. at p. 165.)  The court ultimately concluded 
that “[t]he detailed provisions of the [FPA] providing for the 
federal plan of regulation leave no room or need for conflicting 
state controls.”  (Id. at p. 181.) 
The high court reaffirmed the FPA’s broad preemptive 
effect in California v. FERC, which addressed an order issued 
by our State Water Resources Control Board (Water Board) 
requiring the operator of a hydropower plant to maintain a 
greater minimum flow rate in a stream than the minimum rate 
set by FERC in the plant’s license.  (California v. FERC, supra, 
495 U.S. at pp. 494–496.)  In addressing the preemptive effect of 
the FPA, the court first rejected the Water Board’s challenge to 
First Iowa’s narrow interpretation of the FPA’s savings clause, 
Section 27.  Although recognizing that Section 27 might 
plausibly be read to reserve to the states the power to regulate 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
13 
stream flow to protect wildlife (California v. FERC, at p. 497), 
the court declined to revisit the earlier ruling.  (Id. at p. 499.)  In 
holding the Water Board’s attempt to impose its own minimum 
flow rate preempted, the high court reaffirmed that state law is 
preempted when it either conflicts with federal law or obstructs 
congressional purposes.  It explained:  “As Congress directed in 
[the] FPA [citation], FERC set the conditions of the license, 
including the minimum stream flow, after considering which 
requirements would best protect wildlife and ensure that the 
project would be economically feasible, and thus further power 
development.  [Citations.]  Allowing California to impose 
significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements would 
disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in that 
considered federal agency determination” “and would ‘constitute 
a veto of the project that was approved and licensed by FERC.’ ”  
(Id. at pp. 506, 507.)  Because the minimum stream flow 
requirement was not concerned with proprietary rights in 
water, the court concluded, it was not insulated from federal 
preemption.  (Id. at pp. 498, 506.) 
B.  DWR’s Use of CEQA Is Preempted by the 
Doctrine of Field Preemption 
As explained above, it is well settled that Section 27 of the 
FPA limits state regulation in this area to proprietary rights in 
water and precludes state regulation outside those confines.  
(First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at pp. 175–176.)   
In Sayles Hydro, the Ninth Circuit reasonably applied 
high court precedent in holding that the FPA preempts under 
the doctrine of field preemption all state regulation beyond the 
scope of Section 27.  (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 455; 
see id. at p. 456 [“Once [California v. FERC] made it clear that 
the state could control only proprietary rights to water, that 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
14 
established the category as ‘occupy the field’ preemption for 
everything but proprietary rights to water”].)  I find no basis for 
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.  Because DWR’s 
application of CEQA purported to regulate the environmental 
consequences of the Facilities, it falls far outside the regulatory 
authority left to the states by Section 27 and is therefore 
preempted. 
In Sayles Hydro, the Water Board withheld a state 
operating permit from a hydroelectric plant licensed by FERC 
because the applicant eventually declined to respond to the 
Water Board’s requests for “a shifting, expanding range of 
reports and studies, to assure that the project satisfies the 
[Water] Board’s concerns regarding recreation, aesthetics, 
archaeology, sport fishing, and cultural resources.”  (Sayles 
Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 453.)  In considering the Water 
Board’s authority over the project, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the state’s power was restricted to matters authorized by 
Section 27.  The court recognized that the scope of state 
authority, judged solely from the language of that statute, was 
“capable of different interpretations.”  (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 
F.2d at p. 454.)  But, the court observed, “we cannot . . . construe 
this statute on a blank slate.  The Supreme Court has read the 
broadest possible negative pregnant into this ‘savings clause.’  
[Citation.]  The rights reserved to the states in this provision are 
all the states get.”  (Ibid.)  Explaining the court’s interpretation 
of the savings clause, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n many 
states where water is scarce, a state property law regime 
enables users of streams and wells to obtain proprietary rights 
in a continuing quantity of water.  By perfecting state water 
rights, users can enjoin other users who deprive them of their 
share of the flow.  [Citation.]  This state property law regime in 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
15 
water is what the savings clause reserves, under First Iowa.”7  
(Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 455.)  In contrast, the court 
held, “[s]uch proprietary rights are not at issue in the case before 
us. . . .  Since forcing [the plaintiffs] to provide environmental 
impact reports to the [Water] Board has nothing to do with 
determining proprietary rights in water, federal preemption 
bars the state requirements.”  (Ibid.)  Although Sayles Hydro did 
not mention CEQA by name, its reference to “environmental 
impact reports” gives the game away.  (Ibid.)  The court was 
holding CEQA preempted in connection with the licensing of 
hydropower projects. 
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit addressed and rejected the 
very approach to preemption adopted in the majority opinion:  
“The [Water] Board urges that we read California v. FERC as 
establishing federal preemption only where a state requirement 
conflicts with a federal requirement, not where it supplements 
a federal requirement. . . .  [⁋] . . .  The ratio decidendi, however, 
does 
not 
take 
that 
course. 
 
Instead, California 
v. 
FERC reaffirms First Iowa’s narrow interpretation of the 
savings provision, so that the only authority states get over 
federal power projects relates to allocating proprietary rights in 
water.  First Iowa said that the separation of authority between 
state and federal governments ‘does not require two agencies to 
share 
in 
the 
final 
decision 
of 
the 
same 
issue.’  
[Citation.]  California v. FERC reaffirms First Iowa, uses the 
‘occupy the field’ characterization ‘broad and paramount federal 
 
7  
The court recognized that First Iowa’s discussion of 
Section 27 could be regarded as dictum, but it held that this 
contention became moot when California v. FERC reaffirmed 
the ruling.  (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 455.) 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
16 
regulatory 
role,’ 
[citation], and 
plainly 
states 
that 
‘constricting § 27 to encompass only laws relating to proprietary 
rights’ accomplishes this ‘no sharing’ purpose. . . .”  (Sayles 
Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at pp. 455–456, fn. omitted.)  As the 
court added:  “Once the [First Iowa] Court made it clear that the 
state could control only proprietary rights to water, that 
established the category as ‘occupy the field’ preemption for 
everything but proprietary rights to water.”  (Id. at p. 456.) 
Sayles Hydro continued, in an observation of obvious 
application here:  “In the case at bar, it is clear that the federal 
laws have occupied the field, preventing state regulation.  This 
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that most or all of the 
[Water] Board’s concerns were considered by [FERC] in 
granting the license, and conditions were imposed in the license 
to protect these multiple values. . . .  There would be no point in 
Congress requiring the federal agency to consider the state 
agency recommendations on environmental matters and make 
its own decisions about which to accept, if the state agencies had 
the power to impose the requirements themselves.”  (Sayles 
Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 456.) 
The majority argues that “First Iowa and California v. 
FERC could be read to apply either conflict or field preemption.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  Sayles Hydro acknowledged as much 
(Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at pp. 455, 456), and the point 
does not answer the Ninth Circuit’s careful analysis of the 
language of those cases in finding field preemption.  As Sayles 
Hydro determined, the high court’s decisions lead inescapably 
to the conclusion that field preemption precludes state 
regulation in this area.   
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
17 
The majority faults Sayles Hydro for relying on a savings 
clause, noting that “the statute does not say that these matters 
are the only matters reserved.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  The 
Supreme Court, however, has long since resolved this issue, 
holding that matters outside the savings clause are preempted, 
a ruling that is binding on us regardless of the language of 
Section 27.  (First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at p. 176 [“in those fields 
where rights are not thus ‘saved’ to the States, Congress is 
willing to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal 
legislation take its natural course”].)   
The majority points out that none of the cases cited, First 
Iowa, California v. FERC, and Sayles Hydro, expressly declared 
that field preemption applies to federally regulated public 
agencies.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  The omission is 
understandable because all of the cases concerned state 
regulation of private parties, rather than a public agency.  But 
if Congress occupies a field, it does so regardless of the identity 
of the party affected by the state regulation; application of the 
doctrine of field preemption has never been held to depend upon 
the nature of the party being regulated.  Notably, the majority 
cites no case holding that state regulation preempted by the 
doctrine of field preemption when applied to a private party is 
not similarly preempted if applied to a public agency, even when 
the public agency applies that regulation to its own conduct.  Eel 
River comes closest, but, for the reasons discussed below, it does 
not apply here. 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis and conclusions in Sayles 
Hydro are sound.  Under First Iowa and California v. FERC, 
Congress has occupied the field of hydropower licensing and 
operation outside the authority reserved to states under 
Section 27.  DWR’s application for relicensing did not concern 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
18 
proprietary rights to water.  The agency’s use of CEQA was 
therefore preempted. 
C.  DWR’s Use of CEQA Is Also Preempted by the 
Doctrine of Purposes and Objectives 
Preemption 
 
Even if Congress had not occupied the field of hydropower 
regulation, the nature of CEQA and its application in these 
circumstances would still require a finding of preemption 
because CEQA stands as a substantial obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress in 
enacting the FPA. 
It bears repeating that CEQA is an important regulatory 
statute, requiring the imposition of restrictions on the manner 
in which public and private projects are designed and operated 
to minimize their adverse environmental impacts.  When it 
undertook to comply with CEQA, DWR characterized the project 
under review as implementation of the settlement agreement — 
in other words, as the future operation of the Facilities under 
the terms proposed in that agreement.  DWR’s use of CEQA 
therefore required it to adopt a series of mitigation measures, 
enforceable by DWR through a mitigation monitoring program, 
addressing the precise subject matter of the FERC license.  The 
FPA, however, vests exclusive regulatory authority over the 
operation of hydropower projects like the Facilities in FERC.  
DWR’s use of CEQA necessarily stands as an obstacle to the full 
accomplishment of the congressional purpose and objective of 
vesting exclusive regulatory authority over the operation of 
hydroelectric power plants in the federal government.   
In addition, DWR’s invocation of CEQA in the midst of the 
ALP, a unique federal licensing process clearly designed to 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
19 
duplicate 
and 
thereby 
supplant 
the 
need 
for 
state 
environmental review, constituted a second, equally disruptive 
obstacle to achieving the congressional purpose of vesting 
exclusive control over hydropower licensing in FERC. 
In applying the doctrine of purposes and objectives 
preemption, 
“[w]hat 
is 
a 
sufficient 
obstacle 
[to 
the 
accomplishment of Congress’s purposes and objectives] is a 
matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal 
statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended 
effects.”  (Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 
U.S. 363, 373 (Crosby).)  As this instruction suggests, “ ‘the 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ ” in determining 
whether state law is preempted.  (Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 
U.S. 555, 565.)  Even if the federal and state laws share the same 
goal, “[a] state law also is pre-empted if it interferes with the 
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this 
goal.”  (International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987) 479 U.S. 481, 
494 (Ouellette).) 
The obvious first step in a purposes and objectives 
preemption analysis is to identify the purposes and objectives of 
the federal law.  (Crosby, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 373.)  As the 
majority acknowledges, “The overriding purpose of the FPA is to 
facilitate the development of the nation’s hydropower resources.  
(First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. at pp. 174, 180.)  A primary tool in 
achieving that goal was to centralize regulatory authority in the 
federal government in order to remove any obstacles to such 
development posed by state regulation.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 23.)  This intent is made manifest by Section 27, which 
restricts state law in this area to laws governing proprietary 
rights in water.  (California v. FERC, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 498; 
First Iowa, at p. 176.)  The Congressional objective was therefore 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
20 
to promote the development of hydropower resources; an 
important means it chose to accomplish that objective was to 
grant FERC exclusive control over the licensing and regulation 
of hydropower facilities. 
DWR’s invocation of CEQA following its submission of a 
license application to FERC necessarily created the risk that the 
EIR would identify significant potential environmental effects 
resulting from operation of the Facilities, which would, in turn, 
trigger the required formulation and adoption of mitigation 
measures to reduce those effects.  The mitigation measures, 
legally enforceable constraints governing the manner in which 
a project is designed and operated, are regulations in all but 
name.  Because the project identified in the EIR, the operation 
of the Facilities under the terms proposed in the settlement 
agreement, was, as a practical matter, indistinguishable from 
the subject of the FERC license, at least some, if not all, of the 
mitigation measures identified in the EIR would inevitably 
overlap with the authority granted FERC by the FPA.  Once 
adopted, such mitigation measures would impose mandatory 
conditions on the operation of the Facilities that were in 
addition to the license conditions ultimately imposed by FERC. 
And that is what occurred.  In certifying the EIR, DWR 
identified significant adverse environmental effects and adopted 
six pages of mitigation measures and a mitigation monitoring 
program.  The mitigation measures directly addressed, and 
purported to constrain, the manner in which the Facilities could 
operate with respect to the many factors affecting its impact on 
the environment.  Because these same factors are subject to 
FERC’s regulatory authority, DWR’s certification of the EIR, in 
effect, created an alternative set of regulations governing 
operation of the Facilities and designated an agency other than 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
21 
FERC to enforce these regulations.  DWR’s use of CEQA in this 
manner presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress precisely because a primary 
purpose of the FPA, by vesting exclusive regulatory authority 
over the operation of hydropower facilities in FERC, was to 
preclude just the type of state regulation created by adoption of 
the mitigation measures and their monitoring program. 
The majority acknowledges that any mitigation measures 
adopted by DWR that conflict with the eventual FERC license 
would be preempted (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27), but that does not 
solve the more fundamental problem.  CEQA serves as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional purposes 
regardless of whether the mitigation measures adopted by DWR 
are in direct conflict with the provisions of the FERC license, 
including when state law interferes with the methods by which 
the federal statute was designed to reach its goals.  (Ouellette, 
supra, 479 U.S. at p. 494.)  Regardless of whether DWR’s 
mitigation measures are in direct conflict with the eventual 
terms of the FERC license, the adoption of the mitigation 
measures and a program to enforce them created an alternative 
regulatory regime governing operation of the Facilities that is 
independent of the FERC license and purports to vest regulatory 
authority in an agency other than FERC.  These actions will 
cause unnecessary confusion about the nature of the regulations 
properly governing operation of the Facilities and create the 
potential for future conflict over the proper roles of DWR and 
FERC in regulating those operations.  They are therefore 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
22 
preempted as an obstacle to achieving the full Congressional 
purpose.8 
In addition, to meet its objectives Congress granted FERC 
exclusive control not only over the terms of an eventual license 
but also over the conduct of the licensing proceedings.  Because 
the implementation of CEQA in the midst of an ALP proceeding 
is inconsistent with that process, it stands as an independent 
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes and 
objectives.  Again, that risk was realized here. 
The ALP was designed not merely to focus the 
participants’ attention on environmental concerns, but also to 
supplant the need for independent environmental review under 
state law.  The ALP commences with the preparation of a PDEA, 
the functional equivalent of the type of informational document 
typically required by environmental review statutes such as 
CEQA and NEPA.  In other words, state environmental review 
is already an integral part of the ALP.  The inclusion of this 
requirement was clearly intended to make it unnecessary for an 
 
8  
The majority contends that this analysis disregards a 
decades-long history of coexistence between CEQA and 
exclusive federal regulation.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  But I am 
hardly the first to suggest that CEQA is preempted in this 
context.  Sayles Hydro so holds (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d 
at p. 455); we suggested as much in Eel River (Eel River, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 715); and a New York appellate court held that 
application of the state’s environmental protection law was 
preempted when applied to a Section 401 certification in Matter 
of Eastern Niagara Project Power Alliance v. State Department 
of Environmental Conservation (N.Y.App.Div. 2007) 840 
N.Y.S.2d 225, 229.  In light of this history, the mere fact that 
CEQA’s application to a public project has not been the subject 
of a published appellate opinion says nothing about the merits 
of the claim. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
23 
applicant to perform its own environmental review under state 
law, thereby streamlining the licensing process and avoiding 
delays and regulatory conflicts found here.  To further ensure 
the protection of environmental values, the ALP also requires 
FERC to prepare an EIS.  Given the design of the ALP, the 
preparation of an EIR is redundant and unnecessary to ensure 
proper consideration of environmental concerns.  
There is another problem (and one readily apparent from 
these proceedings):  CEQA’s provision for judicial review is not 
contemplated by the ALP and is entirely inconsistent with an 
efficient licensing process.  The ALP provides for judicial review 
of FERC licensing decisions, but that review occurs in the 
United States Courts of Appeals after an order has been issued.  
(16 U.S.C. § 825l(b).)  A judicial action in state court challenging 
the conduct of the licensing proceeding, as here, is wholly 
outside the contemplation of the ALP.  There is little doubt that 
CEQA’s provision for judicial review stands as a sizable obstacle 
to Congress’s objective of granting FERC exclusive control over 
hydropower licensing. 
The majority rightly maintains that “ ‘ “a high threshold 
must be met if a state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with 
the purposes of a federal Act.” ’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16, 
quoting Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
v. Whiting (2011) 563 U.S. 582, 607 (plur. opn. of Roberts, C. J.).)  
I am persuaded that the threshold is satisfied here.  The 
required adoption of mitigation measures and a mitigation 
monitoring program unavoidably interferes with FERC’s 
exercise of exclusive federal authority; the preparation of an EIR 
needlessly replicates procedures already a part of the federal 
licensing process; and the provision for civil enforcement of 
CEQA creates a readily realized risk of interference with 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
24 
FERC’s control of the licensing process.  In sum, there are 
compelling reasons to find CEQA preempted in its entirely, and 
little reason to resist that conclusion. 
D.  Eel River Does Not Exempt CEQA from 
Preemption in These Circumstances  
As the majority concedes, the foregoing considerations 
might well be conclusive in requiring field preemption of state 
regulation if the applicant were a private entity.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 17 [if a private party were being regulated, “these 
arguments may have prevailed”]; id at p. 18 [distinguishing 
Sayles Hydro as involving “the licensing of a private entity”].)  
But the majority consistently relies on DWR’s status as a public 
entity and my decision in Eel River to justify its decision to 
impose limited preemption in these circumstances.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 21–22.)  Unlike the majority, however, Eel River did 
not find partial preemption.  Rather, as discussed below, we 
found CEQA exempt from preemption by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA; 
49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.), which grants the federal government 
exclusive jurisdiction over the nation’s rail transport.  In 
acknowledging that CEQA is preempted by the FPA, at least to 
the extent it directly conflicts with the FPA, the majority 
implicitly concedes that the factors exempting CEQA from 
preemption in the circumstances of Eel River are not present 
here. 
The lead agency in Eel River, the North Coast Railroad 
Authority (Railroad Authority), was created by the Legislature 
to revitalize an abandoned intrastate rail line in Northern 
California.  (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 691–692.)  Those 
efforts were governed by the ICCTA, which grants exclusive 
regulatory authority over railroads to the federal government.  
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
25 
The ancestor statute of the ICCTA was motivated by concerns 
over state regulation comparable to those that brought about the 
FPA (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 708), but by the time of 
Eel River the legislation had long since been amended to 
promote deregulation.  While regulation of the rail industry was 
greatly diminished, exclusive federal regulatory authority was 
maintained.  (Eel River, at pp. 709–710.)   
As part of its deregulatory mission, the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB), the federal agency responsible for 
enforcing the ICCTA, had exempted the Railroad Authority 
from the ordinary requirement to obtain a certificate of 
operation, leaving the agency’s proposed activity effectively 
unregulated by federal authorities.  (See Eel River, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at pp. 695, 709–710.)  The Railroad Authority initially 
followed CEQA procedures in planning for the resumption of rail 
service (Eel River, at pp. 696–697), but it later reversed course, 
declaring CEQA preempted by the ICCTA.  (Eel River, at p. 700.)  
Despite the long history of federal preemption of local rail 
regulation, Eel River rejected the Railroad Authority’s claim 
that the ICCTA preempted the state’s application of CEQA.   
We began our discussion by acknowledging that the 
application of CEQA to an equivalent private project would be 
preempted.  (Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 715.)  As we 
observed, “Although CEQA does not on its face specifically 
regulate rail transportation, its enforcement mechanisms 
requiring environmental compliance as a condition of project 
approval involving a private rail carrier would have the effect of 
regulating rail transportation, a result inconsistent with 
49 United States Code section 10501.”  (Eel River, at p. 715.)  
But we contrasted this with a state agency’s application of 
CEQA to its own rail project, which “operates as a form of self-
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
26 
government” because the agency is, in effect, regulating itself.  
(Eel River, at p. 723.) 
Importantly, our conclusion in Eel River that CEQA was 
not preempted under the circumstances did not purport to 
constitute a general ruling that CEQA is insulated from 
preemption in connection with all federal regulation of state-
sponsored projects.  The majority’s application of impossibility 
preemption here is an implicit acknowledgment of this limit.  
Rather, the ruling in Eel River that the Railroad Authority was 
exempt from preemption rested on two circumstances unique to 
the ICCTA.  The first was the absence of federal regulation, 
made manifest by the STB’s issuance of an exemption from the 
certificate requirement.  As we noted, upon issuance of such an 
exemption, “the railroad owner has a protected domain that is 
subject neither to federal nor to state regulation, a freedom to 
plan, develop, and restore rail service on market principles . . . .”  
(Eel River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 723–724.)  “[W]ithin the 
deregulated zone, the state as owner may make its decisions 
based on its own guidelines . . . .”  (Id. at p. 724.)  In light of 
CEQA’s role in planning for the operation of the rail line, we 
held, its application was not preempted in this deregulated 
context. 
It cannot be seriously contended that this rationale 
supports a finding of no preemption in this matter.  The 
regulatory circumstances here are in direct contrast to those 
prevailing in Eel River.  FERC has exercised its exclusive right 
to regulate operation of the Facilities, and DWR has engaged in 
a years-long licensing process in compliance with FERC’s 
exercise of that authority.  There is no “deregulated zone.” 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
27 
Our second ground for declining to find CEQA preempted 
in Eel River recognized CEQA’s role in intergovernmental 
regulation.  We noted that the application of CEQA “constitutes 
the state’s governance of its own subdivision [i.e., the Railroad 
Authority], a matter of self-management that the ICCTA 
presumptively was not intended to entirely preempt.”  (Eel 
River, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 725–726.)  We found the language 
of the ICCTA insufficiently clear to justify an interpretation that 
“would infringe on state sovereignty” in the manner proposed.  
(Eel River, at p. 726.) 
This aspect of our reasoning relied on two Supreme Court 
decisions, Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) 501 U.S. 452 (Gregory) and 
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League (2004) 541 U.S. 125 
(Nixon).  In Gregory, the court held that federal age 
discrimination laws did not preempt a state’s constitutional 
provision requiring state judges to retire at age 70.  (Gregory, at 
p. 464.)  In explanation, the high court noted that setting judicial 
qualifications “goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by 
the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a 
sovereign entity. . . . [⁋] Congressional interference with this 
decision . . . would upset the usual constitutional balance of 
federal and state powers.”  (Id. at p. 460.)  The court declined to 
find preemption in such circumstances unless Congress had 
made “ ‘its intention to do so “unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute.” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Nixon addressed the preemptive effect of a federal statute 
that prevented states from “prohibiting the ability of any entity 
to provide” telecommunications services.  (Nixon, supra, 541 
U.S. at p. 128, quoting 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).)  Despite the statute’s 
broad language, Nixon declined to find preempted a state law 
prohibiting the state’s own local governments from providing 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
28 
such services.  (Nixon, at p. 138.)  Drawing on Gregory, the court 
recognized that preempting the telecommunications ban “would 
come only by interposing federal authority between a State and 
its municipal subdivisions.”  (Nixon, at p. 140.)  Given this 
circumstance, the court in Nixon “invoke[d] our working 
assumption that federal legislation threatening to trench on the 
States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments 
should be . . . read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen 
disposition of its own power, in the absence of the plain 
statement Gregory requires.”  (Ibid.)  Finding no unmistakably 
clear language in the federal statute requiring preemption in 
the circumstances, Nixon declined to do so.  (Id. at p. 141.) 
The FPA’s language, as consistently interpreted by the 
Supreme Court since First Iowa, makes unmistakably clear 
Congress’s 
intent 
to 
preempt 
CEQA 
in 
the 
present 
circumstances, regardless of CEQA’s impact on inter-
governmental relations.  As discussed, Section 27, the FPA’s 
savings clause, defines the rights reserved to the states under 
the statute.  The high court has on numerous occasions 
emphasized the limited nature of Section 27 and the broad reach 
of the FPA.  As the high court held in First Iowa, “in those fields 
where rights are not thus ‘saved’ to the States, Congress is 
willing to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal 
legislation take its natural course.”  (First Iowa, supra, 328 U.S. 
at p. 176.)  Section 27 contains no exception to preserve state 
regulation touching inter-governmental relations.   
In other words, well over a half-century ago the FPA was 
construed to preempt all state laws relating to the licensing of 
hydroelectric power plants, except to the extent such state 
legislation governs proprietary rights in water.  The limited 
scope of the FPA’s savings clause was subsequently reaffirmed 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
29 
in California v. FERC, which held that Section 27 “provides the 
clearest indication of how Congress intended to allocate the 
regulatory authority of the States and the Federal Government” 
under the act.  (California v. FERC, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 497.)  
The high court recognized that it has “endorsed and applied 
First Iowa’s limited reading of [Section] 27, [citations], and has 
employed the decision with approval in a range of decisions, both 
addressing the FPA and in other contexts.”  (California v. FERC, 
at p. 499.)  Further, “Congress has amended the FPA to 
elaborate and reaffirm First Iowa’s understanding that the FPA 
establishes a broad and paramount federal regulatory role,” 
including by amending the statute to require FERC to adopt 
provisions for the protection of fish and wildlife in its licenses.  
(Id. at p. 499; see also id. at p. 500.) 
The majority notes the lack of any express language in the 
FPA requiring the preemption of state regulation touching 
inter-governmental relations.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  But 
neither Eel River, Nixon, nor Gregory requires a literal 
statement of intent to preempt self-government.  Rather, these 
decisions require that congressional intent to preempt the 
relevant state law must be “unmistakably clear.”  (Eel River, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 731; see Gregory, supra, 501 U.S. at 
pp. 460–461; Liberty CableVision of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. 
Municipality of Caguas (1st Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 216, 221 
[finding “unmistakably clear” requirement met despite absence 
of any reference to inter-governmental relations in statutory 
preemption clause].)  By accepting a well-settled and 
consistently restrictive judicial interpretation of the savings 
clause, augmented by statutory amendments accommodating 
that interpretation, Congress has made unmistakably clear the 
broad preemptive reach it intends for the FPA:  State regulation 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
30 
outside the savings clause — i.e., state law regulating matters 
other than proprietary rights in water — is preempted.  For the 
reasons discussed above, that reach compels the conclusion that 
CEQA is preempted under these circumstances, regardless of 
any interference that preemption might cause to relations 
between the state and its subdivisions. 
The majority’s holding, if not its discussion, makes clear 
that the majority does not find applicable here the second 
rationale in Eel River.  That rationale relied on high court 
authority holding that the overriding importance of state 
legislation governing intergovernmental relations makes it 
immune from preemption unless Congress has unmistakably 
indicated otherwise.  As a consequence, any legislation subject 
to this second rationale is exempt from preemption.  In Gregory, 
the Supreme Court held that a state’s mandatory judicial 
retirement age prevailed over the contrary requirements of 
federal anti-discrimination law.  Nixon held the same.  Although 
a federal law forbade states from precluding entities from 
providing telecommunications services, the Supreme Court 
upheld a state statute that did just that.  When the 
circumstances addressed by these cases are present, preemption 
simply does not operate.   
In 
holding 
that 
CEQA 
is 
preempted 
in 
these 
circumstances, the majority implicitly finds that the unusual 
circumstances underlying Eel River are absent.  If the FPA 
indeed 
lacks 
language 
making 
unmistakably 
clear 
a 
congressional intent to preempt CEQA in these circumstances, 
Gregory and Nixon — and Eel River, for that matter —  demand 
the conclusion that preemption is absent entirely.  Yet the 
majority concedes that CEQA is preempted here to the extent it 
directly conflicts with FERC regulation.  This would appear to 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
31 
be an expansion of Eel River, but the scope and application of 
the exception is left unclear. 
E.  The Majority’s Ruling Is Unworkable and 
Serves Little Practical Purpose 
Preemption is ultimately an issue of law, not practicality.  
But the difficulty of meshing the majority’s scheme of partial 
preemption with the implementation of CEQA in these 
circumstances illustrates the wisdom of precluding state 
regulation when the federal government has assumed exclusive 
regulatory authority. 
This unworkability begins with the majority’s treatment 
of CEQA’s civil enforcement mechanism.  The majority permits 
a CEQA compliance lawsuit to proceed, so long as it does not 
seek to interfere with the FERC licensing proceedings.  But, as 
noted above, FERC is not bound, either by the majority’s ruling 
or CEQA.  Once any other necessary permits are obtained, 
including a Clean Water Act certificate, FERC is free to issue a 
license and move on.  It need not await the resolution under 
state law of issues of CEQA compliance.  Yet issuance of a 
license plainly moots any compliance lawsuit, practically if not 
legally.  If the EIR is found deficient, DWR can, perhaps, be 
forced to compile a compliant EIR, but it will be for naught.  The 
FERC license will have issued, and any DWR dissatisfaction 
with the license must be resolved in a federal lawsuit, not 
through CEQA proceedings.  Although DWR is presumably 
permitted to impose further mitigation measures consistent 
with the FERC license after its issuance, the agency would be 
free to adopt such practices outside the context of CEQA in any 
event.  The FERC license inevitably provides no more than a 
guide to project operation that must be implemented by DWR 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
32 
through its administration of the facilities.  CEQA adds nothing 
to this process.   
The practical problems with the majority’s treatment of 
mitigation measures inconsistent with the FERC license are 
more significant.  Because, as here, CEQA compliance will 
precede issuance of the FERC license, DWR will be unable to 
determine at the time of their adoption whether any particular 
mitigation measures will be consistent with the terms of the 
FERC license.  Yet the majority concedes that inconsistent 
mitigation measures are preempted.  Because inconsistent 
mitigation measures are not self-preempting, they will remain 
binding on the agency as a matter of (non-preempted) state law 
unless declared preempted by an appropriate court.  In the 
meantime, DWR will be bound by two inconsistent regulations, 
one binding under state law and one binding under federal law, 
and forced to violate either one or the other.   
Even assuming FERC, DWR, or a third party brings an 
appropriate action to have a conflicting mitigation measure 
declared preempted, the problems do not end there.  Given the 
majority’s holding that CEQA applies to projects covered by a 
FERC licensing proceeding, those projects require lead agency 
approval under CEQA.  Any such approval will require, as 
discussed above, a finding that the project’s adverse 
environmental effects have been mitigated to insignificance, a  
finding based on adoption of mitigation measures.  As a 
consequence, any declaration that a mitigation measure is 
unenforceable necessarily invalidates the agency’s project 
approval under CEQA, premised on the mitigation measure.  
Operation of the project may thereby be rendered unlawful 
under state law until a new CEQA proceeding results in a valid 
project approval.   
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
33 
These conundrums highlight a fundamental problem with 
the majority’s holding.  CEQA was enacted to govern projects 
governed by state law and requiring state regulatory approval.  
CEQA was not intended or designed to operate in a manner 
subordinate to a superior federal regulatory scheme.  There is 
no provision in CEQA for partial implementation.  An agency 
cannot use CEQA solely for informational purposes, without 
adopting mitigation measures when required.  Nor can an 
agency implement CEQA without exposing its compliance to a 
civil enforcement lawsuit.  The practical problems cited above 
are all a result of the majority’s attempt to shoehorn CEQA into 
a circumstance in which its use is redundant and, under 
governing federal law, preempted.  There is no indication that 
the Legislature intended CEQA to operate in the manner 
required by the majority, or would approve of it. 
The lack of a clear doctrinal basis for the majority’s version 
of preemption will create further problems of its own.  The 
majority seems to hold that when a public agency sponsors a 
project requiring federal approval, the ordinary rules of 
preemption do not apply; at a minimum, the agency’s action is 
not subject to field preemption and purposes and objectives 
preemption.  The majority justifies this partial preemption 
under Eel River, but, as discussed above, because the ruling goes 
well beyond the holding of that case, the boundaries, 
application, and jurisprudential basis of this partial preemption 
remain obscure.  And there is no way to determine what other 
state statutes, if any, are covered by the ruling.  All of this 
uncertainty will guarantee further litigation every time a public 
agency invokes a state statute in the midst of a federal licensing 
proceeding, adding to the cost, length and burden of such 
proceedings.  In addition, because there is no reason to believe 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
34 
the federal courts will follow the majority in its flight — the 
federal district courts in California, for example, are bound by 
Sayles Hydro’s adherence to First Iowa and California v. 
FERC — we can expect different results in litigation commenced 
in the respective jurisdictions.  As a result of the majority’s 
ruling, CEQA is deemed preempted in litigation commenced in 
federal court, while it is subject only to impossibility preemption 
in litigation commenced in our courts. 
 
Putting aside the unworkability of the majority’s vision of 
limited CEQA preemption, the most disturbing aspect of its 
ruling is the lack of any practical benefit from its bending of the 
preemption rules.  The implementation of CEQA here is neither 
necessary, nor even important.  There is no claim on any side 
that environmental concerns are given short shrift in the FERC 
licensing process.  As noted, the ALP appears designed 
specifically to render state environmental review unnecessary.  
The ALP requires, at the outset of the process, the creation of a 
document that is the full equivalent of an EIR.  The majority 
does not contend otherwise.  The applicant is then required to 
negotiate with all other interested parties to reach consensus on 
the terms of a proposed FERC license.  Given the nature of 
hydropower projects and the parties interested in their 
operation, environmental concerns are likely to be in the 
forefront.  The majority does not identify any environmental 
concerns that were overlooked in the formulation of the DWR 
settlement agreement.  Yet FERC then performs its own 
environmental analysis under NEPA, involving the preparation 
of a second environmental review document, the EIS.  
Environmental protection is plainly among the top priorities of 
the ALP.  CEQA adds nothing. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
35 
 
Against this background, the majority fails to articulate 
any persuasive reason for preserving state environmental 
review over the clear dictates of the supremacy clause.  The 
project considered by DWR’s EIR — the operation of the 
Facilities under the settlement agreement — is virtually 
identical to the project considered in FERC’s EIS.  Contrary to 
the majority’s claim (maj. opn., ante, at p. 29), the EIS was not 
prepared at an “earlier stage[]” in the ALP.  It occurred 
immediately prior to DWR’s redundant preparation of the EIR.  
Neither DWR nor the majority have identified a deficiency in 
either NEPA or FERC’s EIS that made this duplication of effort 
necessary, or even efficacious.9 
DWR contends that it invoked CEQA in order to decide 
whether to accept the amendments proposed by FERC to the 
terms of a license proposed in the settlement agreement, and the 
majority accepts the explanation.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)10  
 
9  
The majority also theorizes that “a compliant EIR can still 
inform the state agency concerning actions that do not encroach 
on FERC’s jurisdiction.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  If DWR had 
carefully defined the project under CEQA review in a manner 
that avoided FERC jurisdiction, DWR might also have avoided 
preemption.  But that is demonstrably not this case.  As 
explained above, the project studied by DWR in its EIR was the 
exact subject of FERC regulation — future operation of the 
Facilities under the terms of the settlement agreement.     
10  
As the majority observes, “DWR relied on the EIR to 
analyze the environmental impact of operating the Oroville 
Facilities under the settlement agreement or an alternative 
proposed by FERC staff.  The EIR serves as the informational 
source for DWR’s decisionmaking as to whether to request 
particular terms from FERC as it contemplates the license . . . 
or to seek reconsideration of terms once FERC issues the 
 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
36 
But those new terms had already been the subject of complete 
environmental review in the EIS, in addition to its full 
environmental review of the settlement agreement’s proposal.  
Such review is presumably the very purpose of the ALP’s 
requirement of an EIS at this stage of the process — to make 
unnecessary an independent state environmental review, 
including review of any changes FERC might propose to the 
terms of a settlement agreement.  There was no need for DWR 
to repeat the environmental review process to reach conclusions 
about the effect and desirability of FERC’s proposal.  FERC had 
done the work for them.  Tellingly, neither DWR nor the 
majority has identified deficiencies in the EIS analysis that 
were uncovered by DWR’s EIR. 
DWR’s rationalization ignores the duplication of effort 
represented by its pursuit of CEQA.  Any information developed 
by DWR to aid its decision-making had already been developed 
and revealed in FERC’s EIS.  The EIR added nothing to the store 
of information on which DWR’s decision makers were required 
to act and will add nothing to their evaluation of the FERC 
proposal, should that proposal ever be communicated.  The 
majority’s rationale reduces to this:  DWR was entitled to do the 
analysis itself, even if that duplication of effort served no other 
purpose.  It seems a small benefit to justify upsetting the proper 
application of the rules of preemption. 
The impact of the majority’s ruling is magnified by the 
mandatory nature of CEQA compliance.  The application of 
CEQA is not discretionary; when a public agency proposes to 
 
license . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  Of course, FERC’s EIS 
considered exactly the same matters, and there is no claim that 
FERC’s work was inadequate. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
37 
undertake a project that might cause a physical change in the 
environment, the agency must engage in CEQA procedures.  
(Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21001.1, 21065, 21080.)  In Eel River, 
we found no preemption of CEQA in circumstances in which the 
use of CEQA served an important public purpose, given the 
federal government’s exemption of the state’s project from an 
otherwise exclusive scheme of federal regulation.  That limited 
ruling was well grounded in law and public policy; CEQA was 
permitted to fill the regulatory vacuum created by the 
exemption.  In today’s ruling, the majority appears to have 
extended that ruling — granted, subject to impossibility 
preemption — to every state and local public project subject to 
exclusive federal regulation.  Because CEQA compliance is 
mandatory, public agencies subject to exclusive federal 
regulation now will be required to pursue CEQA regardless of 
whether, as in this case, it serves no practical or regulatory 
purpose.  Public agencies will be required to duplicate federal 
or, as in this case, their own environmental studies, run the risk 
of allowing CEQA enforcement proceedings to interfere with the 
licensing proceedings, and create their own, potentially 
conflicting regulatory scheme through the adoption of 
mitigation measures. 
The absence of any meaningful regulatory or practical 
justification for DWR’s invocation of CEQA reveals the 
majority’s opinion for what it is:  The preservation of state 
regulatory authority for its own sake.  The proper role of our 
court in the application of the Supreme Court’s supremacy 
clause jurisprudence should be to prevent such vain assertions 
of state power, not to promote and facilitate them. 
COUNTY OF BUTTE v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring and dissenting 
 
38 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In its haste to acquiesce to DWR’s pointless and redundant 
invocation of CEQA, the majority has devised its own version of 
federal preemption, relying on a vague and inappropriate 
application of Eel River.  The majority’s new preemption 
tolerates state interference in exclusive federal authority so long 
as the state’s interference does not “directly” conflict with 
federal action — in other words, so long as the state does not 
create a situation in which it is impossible simultaneously to 
comply with state and federal mandates.  This limited 
preemption may seem appropriate to the majority, but it bears 
no resemblance to the United States Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the doctrine of preemption, which must be our 
guide.  In adopting its own version of preemption, the majority 
tolerates DWR’s unnecessary delay of FERC’s licensing 
proceedings, turns a blind eye to Congress’s invocation of field 
preemption through the enactment of Section 27, and sweeps 
purposes and objectives preemption under the rug.  Although 
I concur with the majority to the extent it finds certain aspects 
of CEQA’s implementation here preempted, I decline to adopt 
the majority’s version of preemption and would favor a faithful 
application of the high court’s law of preemption.  I would affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
I Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  County of Butte v. Department of Water Resources 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX Opn. filed 9/5/19, ordered nonpub. 
12/11/19 – 3d Dist 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S258574 
Date Filed:  August 1, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Yolo 
Judge:  Daniel P. Maguire 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Bruce Alpert, County Counsel; Rossmann and Moore, Antonio 
Rossmann, Barton Lounsbury; Law Office of Roger B. Moore, Roger B. 
Moore; Shute Mihaly & Weinberger, Ellison Folk and Edward T. 
Schexnayder for Plaintiff and Appellant County of Butte. 
 
R. Craig Settlemire, County Counsel; Law Office of Roger B. Moore, 
Roger B. Moore; Law Offices of Michael B. Jackson and Michael B. 
Jackson for Plaintiffs and Appellants County of Plumas and Plumas 
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District. 
 
E. Robert Wright for Sierra Club, Center for Biological Diversity, 
Friends of the River, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance and 
Friends of the Eel River as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
 
 
Law Office of Adam Keats and Adam Keats for California Water 
Impact Network and Aqualliance as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Laura E. Hirahara for California State Association of Counties as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Janill L. Richards, 
Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant 
Attorney General, Joshua Patashnik and Aimee Feinberg, Deputy 
State Solicitors General, Randy L. Barrow, Tracy L. Winsor, Deborah 
L. Barnes, Matthew J. Goldman, Carolyn Nelson Rowan and Linda L. 
Gandara, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
The Sohagi Law Group, Margaret M. Sohagi, Philip A. Seymour; 
Duane Morris, Thomas M. Berliner, Paul J. Killion, Jolie-Anne S. 
Ansley; Downey Brand and David R.E. Aladjem for Real Parties in 
Interest and Respondents.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Edward T. Schexnayder 
Shute Mihaly & Weinberger LLP 
396 Hayes Street 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 552-7272 
 
Joshua Patashnik 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3896 
 
Jolie-Anne S. Ansley 
Duane Morris LLP 
Spear Tower  
One Market Street, Suite 2200 
San Francisco, CA 94105-1127 
(415) 957-3320