Title: Commonwealth v. Robinson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-09265
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-09265 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JASON ROBINSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 6, 2023. – January 11, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Joint Enterprise.  Robbery.  
Evidence, Joint enterprise, Statement of codefendant, 
Hearsay, Third-party culprit, Expert Opinion.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Hearsay, Trial of 
defendants together, Instructions to jury, Argument by 
prosecutor, Sentence.  Constitutional Law, Sentence. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 27, 2000. 
 
Following review by this court, 480 Mass. 146 (2018), a 
motion for a new trial was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., and a 
motion for reconsideration was also heard by him. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (Jillise McDonough also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, & Cailin M. 
Campbell, Special Assistant District Attorney (John C. Verner, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Darina Shtrakham, of California, Matt K. Nguyen, of the 
District of Columbia, & Adam Gershenson for Jeffrey Aaron & 
others. 
2 
 
Jasmine Gonzales Rose, of Oregon, Duke K. McCall, III, & 
Douglas A. Hastings, of the District of Columbia, Robert S. 
Chang, of Washington, Caitlin Glass, Neda Khoshkoo, & Katharine 
Naples-Mitchell, for Boston University Center for Antiracist 
Research & others. 
Kenneth J. Parsigian, Avery E. Borreliz, Erin M. Haley, & 
Martin W. Healy for Carol S. Ball & others. 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
John J. Barter for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  Following a joint jury trial with his 
codefendant, the defendant, Jason Robinson, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory of felony-
murder, with armed robbery as the predicate offense, in 
connection with the shooting death of Inaam Yazbek (victim).1  
The defendant appeals from his convictions and from the denial 
of his motion for a new trial, claiming that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him as well as reversible error 
on the part of the Commonwealth and the judge.  In the 
alternative, he asks us to declare his life sentence without 
parole to be unconstitutional because he was nineteen years old 
at the time of the crime, based on Diatchenko v. District 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of unlicensed possession 
of a firearm as a coventurer, for which he received a sentence 
of from four to five years to run concurrently with his life 
sentence.  However, as no evidence was presented that the 
defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm, the 
judgment as to this conviction must be reversed and the verdict 
set aside, so that the defendant may be retried.  See 
Commonwealth v. Guardado, 493 Mass. 1, 7 (2023). 
3 
 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013), and 
sentence him to life with parole after fifteen years. 
We affirm the defendant's conviction of murder in the first 
degree, as well as the order denying his motion for a new trial.  
After full consideration of the record, we further conclude that 
extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is not 
warranted.  However, pursuant to our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Mattis, 493 Mass.     (2023), the defendant's sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional where he 
was nineteen years old at the time of the offense of murder in 
the first degree.2  We therefore remand this matter to the 
Superior Court for resentencing on the charge of murder in the 
first degree in accordance with that decision.3 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for later discussion.  On 
March 27, 2000, the defendant was with codefendant Tanzerius 
 
2 This case was paired with the one underlying Mattis, 
because, similarly to the defendant here, Mattis asked this 
court to consider whether a sentence of life without parole is 
constitutional when applied to those who committed their crime 
while under twenty-one years of age. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs on this issue submitted 
by seventeen neuroscientists, psychologists, and criminal 
justice scholars; Boston University Center for Antiracist 
Research, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Center 
on Race, Inequality, and the Law, and Criminal Justice Institute 
at Harvard Law School; twenty-three retired Massachusetts 
judges, Boston Bar Association, and Massachusetts Bar 
Association; and Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
Anderson, Joleena Tate (Anderson's girlfriend), Heather Coady, 
and Edward Gauthier at Gauthier's home.  While there, Tate asked 
Anderson if he wanted to rob someone.  She told Anderson that 
she knew someone named "Yaz," who always carried a large amount 
of cash and was a "passive" person who would not "put up a fight 
if ever approached."  After indicating that he was interested in 
committing the robbery, Anderson called the defendant into the 
room to ask him whether he was "down for a robbery."  The 
defendant agreed. 
 
The trio planned that Tate would meet the victim and then 
lead him to an apartment building in Brighton, where Anderson 
and the defendant would ambush him.  After having dinner with 
the victim at a restaurant in Watertown, Tate asked him to drive 
her to the designated location and, using the victim's cell 
phone, sent "1145" to the defendant's pager to signal when she 
would be at the appointed meeting place. 
 
When Tate and the victim arrived, she led him into a 
hallway of the building and then back out again, where they 
encountered Anderson and the defendant.  Tate said to the 
victim, "[W]e're being robbed," and walked away.  Anderson and 
the defendant led the victim by his arms back into the building. 
 
Once inside, Anderson told the victim to keep his hands up 
and not to turn around to look at them.  Anderson further told 
the victim that he was going to be frisked for his belongings.  
5 
 
At that point, the victim began to plead with them and to reach 
for a doorknob.  Anderson told the victim to stop reaching.  The 
victim continued to plead and said that he was not a police 
officer.  Anderson then became "nervous" and shot the victim in 
the back of the head.  Anderson and the defendant ran out of the 
building, got into Anderson's car with Tate, and drove away.  
The defendant, who was seated in the back, was holding a cell 
phone and wallet and began to count the cash inside the wallet.  
When Tate asked Anderson what happened, Anderson replied, 
"[H]e's murked," which Tate understood to mean dead.  Anderson 
also said, "I got my body for the summer."  Anderson then 
removed a gun from his right vest pocket and passed it to the 
defendant.  Anderson parked the car in a vacant lot, took the 
gun from the defendant, hid it under a piece of construction 
equipment, and drove away.  Anderson returned to the lot later 
that evening with Tate and the defendant, retrieved the gun, and 
passed it to the defendant again.  The Commonwealth did not 
present evidence of a recovered gun to the jury.4 
Hours later, a resident of the apartment building found the 
victim outside the building lying in a pool of blood.  The 
medical examiner later determined that the cause of death was a 
 
4 The prosecutor represented to the court, outside the 
presence of the jury, that no gun was ever recovered in this 
case. 
6 
 
single gunshot wound to the head, fired within one-half inch, or 
closer, from the side of the victim's face. 
We stayed the defendant's direct appeal in order for a 
Superior Court judge to hear his motion for a new trial.  After 
the defendant's motion for a new trial was allowed, we reversed 
that order on appeal and remanded for additional findings.  
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 155 (2018).  The motion 
for a new trial ultimately was denied on all but one issue, 
sufficiency of the evidence for the felony-murder conviction, 
which was reserved for this court. 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In order for 
a jury to convict a defendant of joint venture felony-murder 
with armed robbery as the predicate offense, the Commonwealth 
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
participated in committing the armed robbery as a joint venturer 
with the intent to commit that offense and that the victim was 
killed in furtherance of that armed robbery.  Commonwealth v. 
Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 673 (2019).  To prove armed robbery, the 
Commonwealth must prove that a defendant (1) was armed with a 
dangerous weapon; (2) either applied actual force or violence to 
the victim, or by words or gestures put the victim in fear; (3) 
took the money or the property of the victim; and (4) did so 
with the intent to steal it.  Commonwealth v. Chesko, 486 Mass. 
314, 320 (2020).  Thus, to convict the defendant of armed 
7 
 
robbery by joint venture, the Commonwealth was required to show 
that the defendant knew that Anderson was armed and that the 
defendant assisted Anderson in committing the armed robbery 
while sharing the intent to steal the property of the victim.  
See Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 11 (2010). 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove 
that he committed joint venture armed robbery (and consequently 
failed to prove joint venture felony-murder) because there was 
insufficient evidence that he knew Anderson was armed.  For the 
reasons discussed infra, we disagree. 
In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we assess the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  In so 
doing, we keep in mind that "[p]roof of the essential elements 
of the crime may be based on reasonable inferences drawn from 
the evidence, . . . and the inferences a jury may draw need only 
be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or 
inescapable."  Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791 
(2022), quoting Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021). 
We conclude that, taken together, the evidence was 
sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant knew that 
Anderson would be armed when they committed the robbery.  See, 
8 
 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 118, cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018); Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 
22, 32-33 (2017).  First, prior to the robbery, Anderson, the 
defendant, and Tate planned that it would take place in the 
hallway of an apartment building.  The defendant's knowledge 
that Anderson was armed therefore could be inferred, where a 
weapon was likely to be of particular use to "persuade the 
victim to surrender his property quickly and without resistance" 
to avoid being seen by potential witnesses.5  Commonwealth v. 
Colon, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 728 (2001).  See Commonwealth v. 
Quinones, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 220 (2010) (knowledge that 
codefendant was armed inferred where robbery needed to be 
effectuated quickly).  In addition, neither Anderson nor the 
defendant had a mask, and they therefore would need a weapon to 
discourage the victim from looking at them. 
Notably, the defendant and Anderson spent between one and 
two hours together, after dropping Tate off to meet and spend 
time with the victim before the robbery.  It is reasonable to 
infer that, during that period of time, the defendant and 
Anderson discussed their plan further and that Anderson made the 
 
5 The defendant contends that the evidence demonstrated that 
he would not expect that a weapon would be necessary because 
Tate told Anderson that the victim was "passive."  However, the 
defendant was not present to hear this exchange, thus it is not 
probative as to whether the defendant knew that Anderson brought 
a gun to the robbery. 
9 
 
defendant aware of the gun.  See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 
Mass. 131, 139-140 (2012) (defendant "had an opportunity to see 
the gun earlier that evening on the trip" to site of robbery); 
Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 703 (2003), citing 
Commonwealth v. Tracy, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 458 (1989). 
Even assuming that the defendant was unaware that Anderson 
had a gun until Anderson pulled it out, the defendant did not 
withdraw from participation in the joint venture at that time.  
Instead, the defendant had possession of a wallet and cell 
phone, which the jury could infer belonged to the victim, when 
he returned to Anderson's car.  See Commonwealth v. Eagles, 491 
Mass. 210, 219-220 (2023) (jury could infer that defendant had 
requisite intent for armed robbery where, after learning of 
coventurer's use of weapon, defendant continued to take victim's 
valuables).  "Where a defendant continues to act in furtherance 
of the joint venture even after learning of a coventurer's 
weapon, we have allowed an inference that the coventurer had the 
requisite intent for the joint venture."6  Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 
 
6 The defendant argues that Rosemond v. United States, 572 
U.S. 65, 78 (2014), establishes a different standard, requiring 
that proof of a "defendant's knowledge of a firearm must be 
advance knowledge."  Notwithstanding that the United States 
Supreme Court was interpreting a particular Federal criminal 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), it went on to clarify, "Of course, 
if a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun 
was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can permissibly 
infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had such 
 
10 
 
at 117.  Compare Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 48-49 
(2016) (defendant guilty of joint venture where he remained at 
scene with coventurer after crime), with Commonwealth v. 
Fickett, 403 Mass. 194, 200-201 (1988) (evidence presented that, 
if believed, would have raised reasonable doubt whether 
defendant had withdrawn from joint venture where he explicitly 
informed coventurer of his withdrawal from robbery plot). 
The totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support the 
jury's finding that the defendant intended to participate with 
Anderson in an armed robbery of the victim.  Where the 
circumstances of the robbery gave rise to a reasonable inference 
that a weapon would be needed, and where the evidence suggested 
that the defendant did not withdraw from the venture after 
Anderson drew the gun, the jury were permitted to infer that the 
defendant possessed the requisite knowledge and intent to be 
convicted of the predicate offense of armed robbery.  There thus 
was sufficient evidence to convict him of felony-murder. 
2.  Admission of codefendant's statements and acts.  The 
defendant argues that the admission of certain evidence over his 
 
knowledge."  Id. at 78 n.9.  This is compatible with our case 
law.  See, e.g., Phap Buth, 480 Mass. at 117. 
11 
 
objection unduly prejudiced him.7  For the reasons discussed 
infra, we are not persuaded. 
a.  Before the shooting.  The defendant suggests that 
Tate's testimony regarding events involving only Tate and 
Anderson had an adverse impact on the defendant.  First, Tate 
testified that, prior to the robbery, she and Anderson had 
discussed a scheme Anderson had to rob drug dealers.  She also 
testified that, two days before the shooting, she and Anderson 
had traveled to New Hampshire, broke into Tate's father's 
condominium, and stole firearms and ammunition, including a .357 
magnum revolver. 
On appeal, the defendant does not specify how this evidence 
was prejudicial to him.  He was not implicated in either 
Anderson's planned scheme to rob drug dealers or the theft of 
the firearm.  Moreover, at the time of Tate's testimony, the 
judge provided limiting instructions emphasizing to the jury 
that they could not consider evidence concerning one defendant 
against the other unless they determined that the acts or 
 
7 As the defendant objected to the admission of this 
evidence at trial, we review any erroneous admission of hearsay 
for prejudicial error and determine whether any error of a 
constitutional dimension was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 465 (2019).  
However, as discussed infra, we ultimately find no error in the 
admission of this testimony. 
12 
 
statements occurred during a joint venture.8  She reemphasized 
this point in the final jury charge.  As we presume that the 
jury followed the judge's instructions, see Commonwealth v. 
Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 195 (2010), the defendant was not 
prejudiced by the admission of this evidence. 
b.  After the shooting.  The defendant also challenges the 
admission of various statements Anderson made after the 
 
8 The judge instructed the jury: 
 
"[B]efore you can consider any evidence of acts or 
statements allegedly made by one of the participants 
against the defendants here under a theory of joint 
venture, you first need to determine whether the 
Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence which is 
independent of those acts or statements to support a fair 
inference that there was a joint venture between the 
participants and the defendants. . . .  If you find that 
there was sufficient evidence to support a fair inference 
that a joint venture existed, then you can consider 
evidence of the acts and statements of each of the 
participants against the defendants." 
 
The judge further instructed that only the "acts and 
statements occurring while the joint venture exists or made when 
the joint venturers were acting to conceal the crime, and that 
are relevant to the joint venture," could be so admissible.  
Although it would have been more accurate to instruct that only 
the acts and statements made "in furtherance of," as opposed to 
"relevant to," the joint venture were admissible, see 
Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 175 (2020), the 
instructions nonetheless conveyed that only certain acts and 
statements -- those that were a part of the joint venture -- 
could be admissible against the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 697 (2015) ("We do not require that judges 
use particular words, but only that they convey the relevant 
legal concepts properly"). 
13 
 
shooting.  As discussed infra, we conclude that these statements 
were properly admitted. 
Tate testified that immediately after the shooting, when 
she initially asked Anderson "what happened" to the victim, he 
responded, "[H]e's murked," which she understood to mean that he 
was dead.  She further testified that days later Anderson 
provided more details about the shooting that implicated the 
defendant in the crime.9 
Out-of-court statements, such as Anderson's, may be offered 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted and are admissible 
against a defendant if made by a coventurer "during the 
cooperative effort and in furtherance of its goal."  Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2023).  See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 
482 Mass. 454, 459-460 (2019).  Before admitting such evidence, 
however, a judge must make a preliminary determination, based on 
a preponderance of the evidence, separate from the out-of-court 
statement itself, that a joint venture existed between the 
declarant and the defendant and that the statement was made 
 
9 Because neither defendant testified, the details of the 
robbery and killing were presented at trial through Tate's 
testimony, which was based on this conversation with Anderson. 
 
14 
 
during and in furtherance of that venture.10  See Commonwealth v. 
Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 142-144 (2023). 
Anderson's statements describing the crime to Tate were 
made immediately after the shooting and a few days later.  There 
was ample evidence from which to conclude that Tate was a joint 
venturer, as she was a central party in the robbery's planning, 
preparation, and execution.  See Rakes, 478 Mass. at 40, citing 
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 436 n.21 (2012).  Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
these statements were made during and in furtherance of the 
concealment of the joint venture, and thus were admissible 
against the defendant.11  See Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 
517, 523 (2016) ("appellate courts . . . have deemed admissible 
statements made by joint venturers during the so-called 
concealment phase of their criminal enterprise when such phase 
is relatively close in time to the commission of the crime").  
In making these statements, Anderson was sharing information 
 
10 Additionally, the jury also must be instructed that they 
may consider such statements as against a coventurer (here, the 
defendant) "only if they find that a joint venture existed 
independent of the statements, and that the statements were made 
in furtherance of that venture" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 521 (2016). 
 
11 There is no question that Anderson's second statement 
describing the shooting occurred during the concealment phase of 
the joint venture, as Tate testified that Anderson also said at 
that time, "[A]s long as we stick to the story no one was going 
to be in trouble."  Cf. Rakes, 478 Mass. at 41. 
15 
 
with a fellow joint venturer and revealed no details of the 
crime to anyone outside the joint venture.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 291-292 (2012).  The 
judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting them.  See 
Winquist, supra at 521 ("A judge's determination as to the 
existence and scope of a joint venture is reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard").12 
The defendant also argues that the statements Anderson made 
to Tate, as well as a statement Anderson made to police 
approximately one week after the robbery and killing, were 
inadmissible in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123 (1968).  We disagree. 
Under Bruton, "the introduction at a joint trial of a 
nontestifying codefendant's statement, which names and 
incriminates the other defendant, violates that defendant's 
 
12 The defendant references, in passing, statements that 
Anderson made in the presence of Coady.  But neither these, nor 
statements Anderson made to Gauthier, were improperly admitted.  
While Anderson told Tate the details of the robbery and killing, 
Coady was sitting with the defendant about twenty feet away.  
The defendant, however, does not allege, and there is no 
evidence, that Coady heard Anderson's statements at that time.  
Although Anderson and the defendant later talked to Gauthier, 
the evidence clearly shows that the point of the discussion was, 
as Gauthier testified that Anderson had told him, to get 
Gauthier not to say anything more and "to stick to [his] story."  
See Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 Mass. 372, 380 (2022) (joint 
venturer statements to third party admissible where statements 
were "an attempt to enlist [his or] her aid in concealing the 
crime"). 
16 
 
right to confront his accusers under . . . the Sixth Amendment 
[to the United States Constitution]."  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
464 Mass. 56, 69, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 907 (2013), citing 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137.  Such a statement that "expressly 
implicate[s]" the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would be 
"powerfully incriminating," is prohibited under Bruton (citation 
omitted).  Rivera, supra.  A codefendant's statement that 
becomes incriminating when linked with trial evidence is also 
prohibited by Bruton, but only where the circumstances and 
nature of the statement "so obviously implicate the defendant in 
the crime itself as virtually to constitute direct 
incrimination" (citation omitted).  Id. at 70.  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60-61 (1998) (no Sixth Amendment issue 
where statements referred to but did not inculpate defendant). 
As an initial matter, the defendant's argument that 
Anderson's account of the robbery and killing to Tate violates 
Bruton is unpersuasive, as it hinges on an assertion that Tate 
was not a part of the joint venture.  See Commonwealth v. 
Robertson, 489 Mass. 226, 232 (2022); Commonwealth v. DePina, 
476 Mass. 614, 629 n.13 (2017).  For the reasons explained 
supra, we disagree with that premise. 
The defendant also challenges the judge's admission of a 
statement that Anderson made to police on April 4, one week 
after the robbery and killing.  But to the extent the defendant 
17 
 
argues that this evidence violated the prohibition on a 
nontestifying codefendant's statement that implicates the 
defendant in the crime, his argument mischaracterizes Anderson's 
statement.  The statement Anderson gave did, as the defendant 
points out, place the two together on the day of the crime.  
However, Anderson also explicitly denied being with the 
defendant at any time during which the crime in question 
occurred.13 
Therefore, Anderson's "statements were not sufficiently 
inculpatory to offend the defendant['s] Sixth Amendment rights."  
Blake, 428 Mass. at 60.  Anderson told the police that during 
the time the crime actually occurred, he was not with the 
defendant and that he thought the defendant had gone home.  
"Even if we take the statement of [Anderson] to suggest that the 
defendant['s] whereabouts were unknown to him around the time of 
the shooting[]," the statement did not inculpate the defendant 
in any concrete way.  Id. at 62.  See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 
462 Mass. 827, 843-844 (2012). 
 
13 Indeed, Anderson told the police that, on the night of 
the murder, he had been with the defendant earlier in the 
evening for a short time and gave the defendant a ride, but that 
he (Anderson) had dropped off the defendant and did not see the 
defendant again until the next day.  Anderson further stated 
that he spent that night drinking beers with another friend 
approximately from 9 P.M. until 11 P.M., when he went to sleep. 
18 
 
Additionally, because Anderson's false statements to 
police, made only a few days after the crime had occurred and 
during the concealment phase of the joint venture, "were 
designed to keep the police from discovering" that Anderson and 
the defendant were involved in the victim's killing, these 
statements were admissible as nonhearsay as well, as they were 
made by a coventurer in furtherance of the joint venture's 
concealment.  Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 721 (2021).  
See Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 863-864 (2000).  
There was no error. 
3.  Severance.  The rules of criminal procedure allow for 
defendants to be joined in the same indictment "if the charges 
against them arise out of the same criminal conduct or episode 
or out of a course of criminal conduct or series of criminal 
episodes so connected as to constitute parts of a single scheme, 
plan, conspiracy or joint enterprise."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (b), 
378 Mass. 859 (1979).  Severance is appropriate, however, where 
a defendant demonstrates that "(1) the defenses are antagonistic 
to the point of being mutually exclusive, . . . or (2) the 
prejudice resulting from a joint trial is so compelling that it 
prevents a defendant from obtaining a fair trial" (quotations 
and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 
Mass. 535, 542 (2011).  The defendant argues on appeal that the 
judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to be tried 
19 
 
separately from Anderson, claiming that, as was apparent prior 
to trial, the overwhelming evidence of Anderson's guilt spilled 
over to inculpate him.  We are not convinced. 
The defendant does not suggest that his theory of the case 
was incompatible with Anderson's.  In fact, both defendants 
focused on attacking Tate's credibility, pointing out the 
inadequacy of the police's investigation, and suggesting the 
existence of third-party culprits.  Nor has the defendant 
demonstrated that being tried with Anderson resulted in 
prejudice so acute as to deprive him of a fair trial. 
As discussed supra, evidence of Anderson's statements and 
actions properly were admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 418 
Mass. 207, 218-219 (1994) (severance not required where 
codefendant's statements were admissible).  We detect no 
potential for "prejudicial spillover effect" where much of the 
evidence admitted against Anderson was also admissible against 
the defendant, and the jury were provided with appropriate 
instructions as to how to view the evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 229-231 (1986).  Contrary to the 
defendant's assertions, the evidence against him clearly 
established that he willingly agreed to participate in the joint 
venture, was involved in its planning, and was present for its 
execution.  As a result, "a second proceeding" against the 
defendant would have been "largely duplicative of the first."  
20 
 
Id. at 231.  See Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 259-260 
(2005).  The judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion to sever.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 
Mass. 156, 168 (2021) (orders regarding severance are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion). 
4.  Jury instructions.  The defendant also argues that the 
judge failed to instruct the jury that they were to consider the 
evidence against each defendant separately,14 resulting in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.15  We 
disagree. 
During her preliminary instructions to the jury, prior to 
opening statements, the judge explained that the Commonwealth 
was required to "prove the guilt of each defendant."  As 
discussed supra, during the trial the judge gave limiting 
instructions at appropriate points, admonishing the jury to 
consider evidence relating to a particular defendant against 
 
14 Specifically, the defendant contends that the judge 
should have instructed the jury that (1) "they were to consider 
each element against each defendant separately," (2) "the fact 
that the defendants were on trial together is not evidence that 
there is any connection between them and is not any evidence of 
their guilt," and (3) they were "not to consider evidence of 
Anderson's bad acts (i.e.[,] the Commonwealth's claim that he 
had engaged in an uncharged robbery of a firearm) against [the 
defendant]." 
 
15 As the defendant neither requested these instructions nor 
objected to the instructions provided, any error is reviewed for 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Toolan, 490 Mass. 698, 705 (2022). 
21 
 
that defendant only unless they find sufficient evidence to 
support that a joint venture existed, in which case the acts and 
statements of coventurers done in furtherance of the joint 
venture could be attributed to the defendant.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 175 (2020).  Moreover, 
during her final instructions, she repeatedly stated that the 
jury were required to assess and carefully consider the evidence 
as it related to each defendant individually. 
Judges are "not required to grant a particular instruction 
so long as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the 
issue."16  Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 742 (2022), 
quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 154 (2014).  This 
is especially true where, as here, the defendant did not request 
instructions on this issue.  As the judge's instructions were 
entirely proper, there was no error and, thus, no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
5.  Third-party culprit and Bowden evidence.  The defendant 
contends that the judge erred in excluding evidence relating to 
two persons that he sought to present as third-party culprits 
and as suspects whom police failed to investigate.  See 
 
16 The fact that the jury found Anderson guilty of murder in 
the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and 
felony-murder, but found the defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of felony-murder only, suggests that 
they followed the judge's instructions to consider the evidence 
against each defendant separately. 
22 
 
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 532 (2021).  We conclude 
that no error occurred. 
 
"Third-party culprit evidence is 'a time-honored method of 
defending against a criminal charge.'"  Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  A defendant generally is given 
"wide latitude to the admission of relevant evidence that a 
person other than the defendant may have committed the crime 
charged."  Silva-Santiago, supra at 800-801.  However, the 
evidence "must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the 
defense raises[] and . . . cannot be too remote or speculative."  
Id. at 801, quoting Rosa, supra.  Additionally, if the third-
party culprit evidence constitutes hearsay that does not fall 
within a hearsay exception, it is admissible if "the evidence is 
otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the 
jury, and there are other 'substantial connecting links' to the 
crime" (citation omitted).  Silva-Santiago, supra.  See 
generally Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2023). 
 
At trial, the defendant proffered that one person was a 
possible third-party culprit because allegedly he had been 
Tate's boyfriend, lived in the same development where the crime 
occurred, and was "known by the police" to have been in 
possession of two "three fifty-seven magnums" approximately one 
23 
 
month before the killing.17  The second person was alleged to 
have lived in an apartment above Gauthier's, been present in 
Gauthier's apartment on March 27, visited Tate at a boarding 
school near the condominium from which the gun was taken, and 
been friends with both Gauthier and Tate.  Based on the 
information provided, the judge excluded the third-party culprit 
evidence, concluding that it did not provide "substantial 
connecting links" between either person and the crime "so as not 
to confuse the jury."  This decision was not error, where the 
proffered evidence had no rational tendency to prove that either 
of the two was involved in the killing.  See Andrade, 488 Mass. 
at 532 (to be admissible, third-party culprit evidence "must 
have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, 
and [it] cannot be too remote or speculative" [citation 
omitted]). 
In addition to presenting third-party culprit evidence, 
defendants may "base their defense on the failure of police 
adequately to investigate a murder in order to raise the issue 
of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."  Commonwealth 
v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 165 (2006).  See Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  Whether evidence of 
 
17 Aware of this, the police conducted fingerprint testing 
to see if this individual's prints matched those found in Tate's 
father's condominium.  They did not. 
24 
 
shoddy police work may be admitted, however, is left to the 
discretion of the trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. Steadman, 
489 Mass 372, 385 (2022); Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 800-801.  
Here, the defendant's argument that he was prevented from 
presenting Bowden evidence fails based on the trial record.  The 
judge was clear in her ruling that she was only excluding third-
party culprit evidence and had not "excluded anything on 
Bowden," so the defendant was "free to explore Bowden 
[evidence]." 
6.  Commonwealth's opening statement and closing argument.  
The defendant contends that errors made by the prosecutor in his 
opening statement and closing argument warrant reversal.  
Specifically, the defendant contends that the prosecutor 
impermissibly appealed to the jurors' sympathy and improperly 
vouched for Tate's credibility.  As the defendant objected to 
the remarks at issue, we review them to determine whether any 
error was prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Alemany, 488 Mass. 
499, 511 (2021). 
a.  Appeals to sympathy.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathy during 
his opening statement in characterizing the victim's final 
moments as spent "begging . . . for his life" and, as attributed 
by defense counsel, describing the victim's face after the 
25 
 
shooting as being "ripped off."18  The defendant also takes issue 
with the prosecutor having raised that one of the victim's 
brothers was planning to visit the victim, but the victim was 
killed before he arrived.  Neither was error. 
The prosecutor's description of the gunshot wound to the 
victim's face made during opening statement was accurate based 
on the evidence presented at trial.19  See Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 670 (2017) (closing not improper where 
"the prosecutor's description of the victim's murder was based 
on the evidence and was relevant to establish the nature of the 
crime").  Where the Commonwealth was proceeding, in part, on a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty,20 the "[d]etails regarding 
 
18 This word choice was an inaccurate characterization made 
by defense counsel when he objected at sidebar.  The prosecutor 
never stated that the victim's face was "ripped off," but 
variously described the victim's face as having been "peeled 
off," "basically annihilated," and "blown off."  We construe the 
defendant's argument on appeal as pertaining to all of these 
descriptions, as his objection at trial indicated. 
 
19 One witness testified that the victim's "face was 
distorted" and "wasn't attached," and another witness testified 
that it "wasn't . . . a pretty sight."  The medical examiner 
described a laceration on the victim's face that was six inches 
long and about two inches deep.  A police officer testified 
that, when he first observed the victim, he believed that the 
injury to the victim's face had been caused by "a machete or a 
hatchet" and not by a gun. 
 
20 Although the defendant ultimately was convicted only of 
felony-murder, the Commonwealth also proceeded against both the 
defendant and Anderson on theories of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty and deliberate premeditation. 
26 
 
how the victim died were relevant to the jury's determination as 
to the manner of killing necessary to justify a conviction of 
murder in the first degree."  Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 
95, 132 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 
748 (1999).  Thus, the description of the extent of the victim's 
injuries did not amount to error.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
476 Mass. 186, 199 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 
Mass. 336, 350-351 (1998). 
The same is true of the prosecutor's description of the 
victim as begging for his life.  Where the evidence suggested 
that the victim had pleaded with Anderson and the defendant 
while a gun was pointed at him, the prosecutor's description, if 
enthusiastic, was based on the evidence.  See Barbosa, 477 Mass. 
at 670-671. 
Nor did the mention of the victim's brothers constitute an 
improper appeal to the jury's sympathy.  A prosecutor may "tell 
the jury something of the person whose life had been lost in 
order to humanize the proceedings" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491 Mass. 788, 797-798 (2023).  The 
prosecutor's comments, while "certainly sympathetic, . . . were 
not excessive, nor were they the focal point."  Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 567 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. 
Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 326-328 (2000).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Cheng 
Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 210 (2022).  They did not constitute error. 
27 
 
b.  Vouching.  During his closing argument, the prosecutor 
told the jury that they would be able to see Tate's plea 
agreement, which demonstrated that she was obligated "to tell 
the truth" or "be prosecuted."  The prosecutor also asked, 
"[W]ith that obligation, what motivation is there for [Tate] to 
lie?"  The prosecutor then stated that "[t]here is no motivation 
for [Tate] to do anything but to tell the truth in this case" 
and that Tate had "no motive to lie."  The defendant argues that 
this constitutes vouching.  We disagree. 
Where a witness testifies pursuant to a plea agreement, a 
prosecutor may not suggest that the government has special 
knowledge of that witness's credibility.  See Commonwealth v. 
Webb, 468 Mass. 26, 31-32 (2014).  However, 
"[a] prosecutor may generally bring out on direct 
examination the fact that a witness has entered into a plea 
agreement and understands his [or her] obligations under 
it, but any attempts to bolster the witness by questions 
concerning his [or her] obligation to tell the truth should 
await redirect examination, and are appropriate only after 
the defendant has attempted to impeach the witness's 
credibility by showing the witness struck a deal with the 
prosecution to obtain favorable treatment." 
 
Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 44 n.21 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 264 (1989). 
This is exactly what happened here.  On cross-examination, 
trial counsel for both defendants asked Tate extensive questions 
about her plea agreement with the Commonwealth in order to 
impeach her credibility.  Trial counsel for the defendant made 
28 
 
Tate's plea deal a central part of his closing argument, 
suggesting that she lacked credibility.  The prosecutor 
responded to the attack on Tate's credibility by asking the jury 
what motivation Tate had to lie, given that the government was 
recommending a sentence for her of from eight to ten years.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 39-40 (2012).  Although he 
referenced Tate's plea agreement, the prosecutor stopped short 
of suggesting that the government had "special knowledge by 
which it can verify the witness's testimony."21  Webb, 468 Mass. 
at 32, quoting Washington, 459 Mass. at 44 n.21.  See Cheng Sun, 
490 Mass. at 219.  There was no improper vouching. 
7.  Ballistics expert evidence.  The defendant argues that 
the opinion testimony provided by the Commonwealth's ballistics 
expert, Sergeant Detective Mark Vickers, that the victim's 
injuries were consistent with the use of a high velocity weapon 
and that a .357 magnum firearm is a "perfect example" of a high 
velocity weapon, was unreliable and prejudicial.  It was 
neither. 
Expert testimony is admissible if reliable, relevant, and 
helpful to the jury in understanding matters "outside their 
common experience."  Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass. 212, 217-
 
21 Moreover, during her final charge, the judge thoroughly 
instructed the jury to "examine . . . Tate's credibility . . . 
with greater caution than you would that of other witnesses."  
See Ciampa, 406 Mass. at 266. 
29 
 
218 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 
(2010).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2023).  "We review a judge's 
determination to admit or exclude expert testimony . . . for an 
abuse of discretion."  Hinds, supra at 218, quoting Commonwealth 
v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 729 (2015). 
Here, the Commonwealth's expert, who was the head of the 
Boston police department's ballistics unit at the time of his 
testimony, based his opinion on his knowledge of firearms, his 
observations of gunshot wounds to other individuals, the autopsy 
report, and photographs of the victim's injuries.  As the bases 
for his opinion, Vickers pointed to, among other things, the 
bullet's path, the type of laceration, and the presence of 
bullet fragments rather than an intact bullet. 
We note that, on cross-examination, Vickers testified that 
he could not rule out that numerous other types of firearms, 
including an automatic weapon, could have been used as the 
murder weapon.  In response to a question, however, he did 
conclude that, based on the victim's injuries, a rifle had not 
been used.  In other words, Vickers did not express any view on 
whether "a particular firearm" or type of firearm had been used; 
rather, he "offer[ed] an opinion . . . that narrow[ed] the scope 
of possible firearms" that could have been used as the murder 
weapon.  Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848 (2011).  
Given the expert's qualifications and experience, the judge did 
30 
 
not abuse her discretion in admitting the opinion testimony that 
the victim's injuries, as well as the recovered fragments, were 
consistent with the use of a high velocity firearm.  See 
Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 153 (2014) (no error in 
admitting opinion "concerning the gun's membership in the class 
of guns that could have" been murder weapon). 
The defendant also argues that the expert's testimony was 
unduly prejudicial to him because it potentially connected the 
firearm stolen by Anderson and Tate to the shooting.  We 
disagree.  The fact that a .357 magnum revolver is a "perfect 
example" of a high velocity weapon merely demonstrated why the 
expert's testimony was particularly relevant.22  See Commonwealth 
v. Kindell, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 187-188 (2013) ("the measure 
of prejudice is not whether the evidence simply is adverse to 
the party against whom it is offered"). 
8.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, we have 
reviewed the entire record and discern no basis upon which to 
exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
the motion for a new trial is affirmed.  The judgment as to the 
 
22 We also note that the testimony was cumulative of other 
evidence suggesting that the stolen .357 magnum was used to kill 
the victim, including Tate's testimony that she saw Anderson 
with that firearm immediately after the shooting.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 469 (2000). 
31 
 
defendant's conviction of unlicensed possession of a firearm is 
reversed, and that verdict is set aside.  The defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree is affirmed, and the 
matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with our decision 
in Mattis, 493 Mass. at    . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.