Title: Ex Parte Alabama Real Estate Appraisers Bd.
Citation: 739 So. 2d 14
Docket Number: 1970818
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1999

739 So. 2d 14 (1999)
Ex parte ALABAMA REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS BOARD.
(Re Alabama Real Estate Appraisers Board and the State of Alabama v. James Walker).
1970818.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 19, 1999.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Tori L. Adams-Burks, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
E. Allen Dodd, Jr., of Scruggs, Jordan, Dodd, Dodd &amp; Thompson, P.A., Fort Payne, for respondent.
LYONS, Justice.
James Walker appealed to the circuit court from a decision by the Alabama Real Estate Appraisers Board (hereinafter "the Board") to subject him to certain disciplinary sanctions. Walker contended, among other things, that the Board's use of an assistant attorney general as its hearing officer and another assistant attorney general as its prosecutor violated § 41-22-18(a), Ala.Code 1975. The circuit court held that this practice violated the statute. The Board and the State appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals; that court affirmed. See Alabama Real Estate Appraisers *15 Board v. Walker, 739 So. 2d 8 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). We granted the Board's petition for certiorari review. We reverse and remand.
The Court of Civil Appeals set out the following pertinent facts:
Walker, 739 So. 2d  at 10. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the State's appeal, Walker, 739 So. 2d  at 12, and the State is not a party in this certiorari proceeding. Because the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the Board had violated § 41-22-18(a), neither court addressed Walker's other arguments.
As the Court of Civil Appeals stated, the review in this case is de novo because it involves a question of law only.
Walker, 739 So. 2d  at 10.
The Board contends that the Court of Civil Appeals erred (1) in holding that the Board's practice of employing two assistant attorneys general as prosecutor and hearing officer violates § 41-22-18(a), and (2) in concluding that in the hearing Walker had properly objected to the impropriety of the practice.
Section 41-22-18(a) provides:
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the statute prohibits an "individual" who (1) has prosecuted or represented a party in connection with a contested case (or a factually related case), or (2) is subject to the control of another person who has prosecuted or represented a party in connection with a contested case (or a factually related case), from participating in the making of a proposed order or final decision.
Walker argues that the Board violated the statute because the hearing officer and the prosecuting attorney are the same "individual" for purposes of the statute because they are both controlled by the attorney general under § 36-15-17, Ala. Code 1975. He contends that this "individual" violated the statute by participating in the making of the final decision when that "individual" had ruled on evidentiary matters, decided whether certain witnesses could be deposed, and ruled on Walker's motion for a directed verdict.
Even assuming, arguendo, that § 36-15-17 makes the prosecutor and the hearing officer the same "individual," we cannot conclude that the Board violated the statute. Only Board members participated in preparing a proposed order and rendering a final decision. The Board members deliberated outside of the presence of the hearing officer and the prosecutor. They made their decision and prepared an *17 order without the assistance of either the hearing officer or the prosecutor. Therefore, the person Walker alleges to be the "individual" he says violated the statute did nothing to trigger the statute, because the statute is directed only to an "individual who participates in the making of a proposed order or final decision."
We find it unnecessary to address the Board's second contention because we conclude that the Board's practice did not violate § 41-22-18(a). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded. The Court of Civil Appeals is instructed to remand this case so that the circuit court may rule on the other arguments raised by Walker in his appeal to that court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, SEE, and BROWN, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY and COOK, JJ., dissent.
[1]  Because the trial court disavowed any reliance upon due-process law as a rationale for reversing the Board's order, and because Walker does not argue this ground as a basis for upholding the trial court's judgment, we are not called upon to consider whether Horn would allow the attorney general in every case to dispatch two assistants to prosecute and to adjudicate contested matters before state administrative boards.