Title: Schneider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 374, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THOMAS SCHNEIDER and LINDA ) 
SCHNEIDER, 
 
 
 
)  No. 374, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 99C-08-106 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
 
) 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE  
) 
COMPANY, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  December 10, 2002 
Decided:  December 26, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 26th day of December 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court as follows: 
(1) 
The appellants, Thomas and Linda Schneider (“Schneider”), filed a 
complaint seeking Personal Injury Protection benefits from appellee, State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.  The parties refer to this case as 
Schneider I.  In March 2001, shortly before trial, Schneider I settled.1  Shortly 
                                                          
 
1 Schneider I was not automatically dismissed after settlement because Schneider never signed a 
full and final release.  However, Schneider cashed the settlement check issued by State Farm.  
Understandably, the trial judge found this “disturbing.”  See Appellants’ Appendix at A-13 – A-
14. 
 
2
thereafter, appellants initiated a companion suit against State Farm, alleging bad 
faith and seeking punitive damages.  The parties refer to this case as Schneider II. 
(2) 
On October 17, 2001, the Prothonotary issued notice to both parties 
that Schneider I would be dismissed pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Rule 
41(e) because no action had been taken in six months.  The court sent notice to 
Schneider’s counsel, but Schneider’s counsel claim they never received the notice.  
On December 6, 2001, the Prothonotary sent an order to both parties dismissing 
Schneider I.  Appellants’ counsel, according to their brief, received the dismissal 
order on January 8, 2002.  Appellants sent a letter to the assigned judge asking that 
the case be reopened.  Appellants needed Schneider I reopened because State Farm 
sought summary judgment in Schneider II based on res judicata.  On May 8, 2002, 
Schneider filed a formal motion to reopen and stay Schneider I until Schneider II 
could be decided on its merits.  The trial judge denied Schneider’s motion to 
reopen and stay Schneider I.  This appeal followed.   
(3) 
Schneider argues that the trial judge improperly denied his motion to 
reopen and stay because (i) Schneider has no record of receiving the Rule 41(e) 
notice, and (ii) Schneider had been involved in the companion bad faith case, 
Schneider II, before the Rule 41(e) dismissal notice.2 
                                                          
 
2 Schneider was advised to include in the formal motion a more persuasive argument on why the 
Rule 41(e) dismissal should be vacated.  In particular, the trial judge advised him that he should 
include what activity has been taken in the case.  In his brief, Schneider does not include any 
suggestion of activity. 
 
3
(4) 
Schneider’s primary argument is that he never received the Rule 41(e) 
notice of dismissal.  There is a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that mail, correctly 
addressed, stamped and mailed was received by the person to whom it was 
addressed.3  Merely denying receipt does not rebut the presumption.4  Appellants 
have presented no reason why they never received the notice nor why the notice 
was never returned as undeliverable to the Post Office or to the sender.  
Schneider’s statement that counsel did not receive notice is not enough to rebut the 
presumption that the notice, addressed and mailed, was not delivered. 
(5) 
Schneider also argues that because Schneider II is based on “what 
occurred in Schneider I,” and State Farm is raising res judicata as a defense in 
Schneider II, Schneider I should be reopened and stayed until Schneider II can be 
resolved on the merits.  There are two reasons why Schneider I should not be 
reopened.  First, Schneider must show “extraordinary circumstances” to reopen a 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).5  Schneider settled his case with State Farm, and for 
eight months there was no activity in the case.  There is nothing extraordinary 
                                                          
 
3 Haas v. Indian River Volunteer Fire Co., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. Ch.), aff’d 2001 Del. 
LEXIS 126 (Del. Supr.).   
4 Robledo v. Stratus, Del Super Ct., C.A. 00A-09-001HDR, Ridgley, President J., (March 29, 
2001). 
5 Bachtle v. Bachtle, 494 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Del. 1985).  Schneider did not cite any section of the 
Delaware Code under which the court could have reopened the case.  State Farm states in its 
brief “the only conceivably applicable subsections are Rule 60(b)(2), ‘newly discovered 
evidence’, and Rule 60(b)(6) which allows the court to open a judgment for ‘any other reason 
justifying relief from the judgment.’”  The only “newly discovered evidence” would be 
Schneider’s realization that their counsel never received notice of the Rule 41(e) dismissal.  
 
4
about a case being dismissed under these circumstances.  Second, the trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the case because there was “nothing else 
to be done in [Schneider I].”6  Schneider I was settled and dismissed.  If the trial 
judge were to reopen the case, there would be nothing else to decide.  Schneider 
abandoned Schneider I, and now wants it reopened to preclude State Farm from 
asserting res judicata in Schneider II.  The trial judge is within his discretion to 
deny a motion to reopen a case that was dismissed under Rule 41(e) under these 
circumstances.     
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Schneider does not even argue that the lack of notice is newly discovered evidence.  In any 
event, it would not qualify as newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(6). 
6 Appellants’ Appendix at A-11 (Transcript of Motion Hearing).