Title: American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Hendricks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2018

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Hendricks Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review focused on state action based on, among other grounds, the Religious Aid Clause of Article I, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution, specifically its prohibition against the use of public funds “for the maintenance of any minister or ministry.” The challenge arose following the Secretary of Higher Education’s (Secretary) determination to award grant monies to a yeshiva and to a theological seminary as part of a state program to subsidize facility and infrastructure projects for higher education institutions. The Appellate Division determined that prior case law concerning the New Jersey Constitution’s Religious Aid Clause required invalidation of the grants to the yeshiva and theological seminary. The State maintained the proper constitutional analysis in this matter turned on the use to which these higher education institutions would put the monies, not the nature of the institutions themselves. The Supreme Court determined judicial review was premature because factual disputes required resolution before the Secretary could make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter was remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Rochelle Hendricks (A-22-16) (077885)Argued October 23, 2017 -- Decided May 2, 2018PER CURIAM In this appeal, the Court addresses a challenge to state action based on, among other grounds, the Religious Aid Clause of Article I, Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution, specifically its prohibition against the use of public funds “for the maintenance of any minister or ministry.” The challenge arose following the Secretary of Higher Education’s (Secretary) determination to award grant monies to a yeshiva and to a theological seminary as part of a state program to subsidize facility and infrastructure projects for higher education institutions. In 2012, the “Building Our Future Bond Act” authorized the State to effectuate the means to subsidize capital improvement projects for institutions of higher education. Secretary of Education Rochelle Hendricks submitted a list of 176 higher education capital construction projects for forty-six institutions of higher education, which included funding for research laboratories, computerized classrooms, and interconnected cyber networks. Of the forty-six higher education institutions, at least nine were religiously affiliated. Two of those institutions were the Beth Medrash Govoha (the Yeshiva) and the Princeton Theological Seminary (the Seminary). The Yeshiva received a grant award totaling $10,635,747, including $5,118,000 to fund construction of a new library and research center, and $5,517,747 to fund construction of a three-story academic center. The Seminary was awarded three grants totaling $645,323. One grant, for $241,722, was to enhance the library’s information technology system. A second grant, for $113,711, was to be applied toward construction of a software training room. The Seminary subsequently withdrew its application for a third grant, for $289,889. The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ), joined by several other parties, filed a complaint in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, against Secretary and State Treasurer in their official capacities (State or State defendants). The complaint asserted that the grants to the Yeshiva and the Seminary were improper because they were awarded to sectarian schools that “provide sectarian educations and ministerial training,” in violation of Article I, Paragraphs 3 (the Religious Aid Clause) and 4 (the Establishment Clause) and Article VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 3 (the Donation Clause) of the State Constitution. Plaintiffs also alleged that the grants to the Yeshiva violated the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. The ACLU-NJ sought to enjoin the State defendants from disbursing the grant funds to the Yeshiva and the Seminary. On July 15, 2013, the trial court entered a Consent Order under which plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their request for an injunction and the State defendants agreed to give plaintiffs notice before disbursing any of the contested funds. Determining that the lawsuit was an appeal from an agency action, the trial court transferred jurisdiction of the case to the Appellate Division pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The Appellate Division invalidated the grants to the Yeshiva and the Seminary, holding that the grants violated the Religious Aid Clause of the State Constitution. 445 N.J. Super. 452, 454-55 (App. Div. 2016). The panel did not address the arguments pertaining to the alleged Establishment Clause or Donation Clause violations, or the LAD claim, id. at 477-78, because it determined that prior case law concerning the Religious Aid Clause required invalidation of the grants, id. at 454-55. The Court granted certification. 228 N.J. 440-41 (2016).HELD: Judicial review is premature because factual disputes require resolution before the Secretary can make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter is remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants. 1 1. The New Jersey State Constitution provides as follows: “No person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretense whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3. (p. 18)2. Until recently, this Court’s most authoritative prior application of the Religious Aid Clause arose in Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Education, 77 N.J. 88 (1978). Resnick involved a challenge to a rule whereby religious groups could rent school facility space for religious worship and instruction during non-school hours at the same rates as charged to other secular community groups. Id. at 93-95, 98. The Court invalidated the rule, holding that Article I, Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution “prohibits any lease arrangement between a school board and religious groups under which the out-of-pocket expenses of the board directly attributable to the use by the religious body are not fully reimbursed.” Id. at 103. However, the Court stated that the “constitutional infirmity may be remedied by an upward adjustment of rentals to religious groups which would fully cover extra utility, heating, administrative and janitorial costs which result from the leasing by these groups.” Ibid. In sum, religious organizations were not excluded from a public benefit under Resnick, but were required to pay the entire freight for using the public facility. (pp. 19-21)3. The issue decided in Resnick is not the same as the question presently before the Court. Here, the Court is not concerned with the Yeshiva’s and the Seminary’s use of public space for worship or religious instruction purposes. Rather, the Court confronts the direct disbursement of grant funds for the improvement of physical and technological infrastructure of higher education facilities, a general and statewide benevolent program to which two entities seek to gain access like other higher education institutions. Specifically at issue is whether the disbursement of funds for avowed secular purposes becomes violative of our Religious Aid Clause when granted to sectarian schools that offer curricula steeped in theological study, as plaintiffs say. (p. 21)4. The arguments of the parties reveal competing views of (1) the sectarian nature of these institutions of higher education; (2) whether, in the setting of the curriculum and training programs of these particular institutions, the grant funds will necessarily be used in the “maintenance of any minister or ministry”; and (3) the adequacy of promised restrictions or other curbs against sectarian use of the grant proceeds. In light of the contrary assertions by the parties and the state of this record, the Court can only conclude that the facts are murky on critical details that will affect the constitutional conclusions to be reached. The record simply does not equip the Court to answer whether the award of the challenged grant funds to these two institutions violates the Religious Aid Clause. (pp. 4, 22-23)5. In assessing the Religious Aid Clause issue that was reached by the Appellate Division, there is a corollary question concerning whether the denial of the requested funds would run afoul of the federal Free Exercise Clause. U.S. Const. amend. I. Upon close examination of two Supreme Court cases highly relevant to the argument involving the federal Free Exercise Clause, the Court again finds that the inadequacies and unresolved questions about the present record hobble any ability to address the question. Because resolution of factual matters is a necessary basis for the additional claims, this matter similarly requires factual development prior to undertaking any analysis of the state Establishment Clause, Donation Clause, and LAD claims raised in the complaint and which are, as yet, undecided. (pp. 24-27)6. With respect to the Religious Aid Clause issue—the only claim decided by the Appellate Division, whose judgment is under review—the Court remands the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Among the questions to be explored are those previously identified based on the contrary views of the parties. The record does not reveal enough about the nature of the educational training and curriculum offered by the Yeshiva and Seminary and how it is delivered, nor does the record present sufficient detail about how the grant fund projects will be put to use in the institutions’ respective settings. It is imperative that those issues be more fully developed below, through the crucible of an adversarial process, before the constitutional questions raised in this matter are addressed. (pp. 27-29) The judgment of the Appellate Division is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Secretary of Higher Education for proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Court leaves in place the Consent Order entered by the trial court. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON and TIMPONE join in this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER did not participate. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 22 September Term 2016 077885AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST LEGISLATIVE MINISTRY OF NEW JERSEY, GLORIA SCHOR ANDERSEN, PENNY POSTEL, and WILLIAM FLYNN, Appellants-Respondents, v.ROCHELLE HENDRICKS, Secretary of Higher Education for the State of New Jersey, in her official capacity; and ANDREW P. SIDAMON-ERISTOFF, State Treasurer, State of New Jersey, in his official capacity, Respondents-Appellants. Argued October 23, 2017 – Decided May 2, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 445 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 2016). Stuart M. Feinblatt, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Stuart M. Feinblatt, of counsel and on the briefs; Jennifer J. McGruther, on the briefs). Edward L. Barocas argued the cause for respondents (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation; Barry, Corrado & Grassi; American Civil Liberties Union Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief; 1 Americans United for Separation of Church and State; and American Civil Liberties Union – Women’s Rights Project, attorneys; Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero, Frank L. Corrado, Lenora Lapidus, on the brief, and Galen Sherwin of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, Daniel Mach of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, Alex J. Luchenitser of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). Ross A. Lewin argued the cause for amicus curiae Princeton Theological Seminary (Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys; Ross A. Lewin, of counsel and on the brief). Avi Schick (Dentons US) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for amicus curiae Beth Medrash Govoha (Dentons US, attorneys; Avi Schick, of counsel and on the brief, and Joel N. Bock on the brief). Gedalia M. Stern submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (Hafetz & Necheles; Lewin & Lewin; and Dennis Rapps, attorneys; Gedalia M. Stern, on the brief, and Nathan Lewin of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Dennis Rapps of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM This appeal involves a challenge to state action based on,among other grounds, the Religious Aid Clause of Article I,Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution, specifically itsprohibition against the use of public funds “for the maintenanceof any minister or ministry.” The challenge arose following theState Secretary of Higher Education’s (Secretary) determination 2 to award grant monies to a yeshiva and to a theological seminaryas part of a state program to subsidize facility andinfrastructure projects for higher education institutions in NewJersey. The Appellate Division ended the challenge by focusingon the Article I, Paragraph 3 issue to the exclusion of allother state constitutional and statutory claims raised in thecase. The appellate panel determined that prior case lawconcerning our Constitution’s Religious Aid Clause requiredinvalidation of the grants to the yeshiva and theologicalseminary. We granted the State’s petition for certificationseeking review of that determination. The State maintains that the proper constitutional analysisin this matter turns on the use to which these higher educationinstitutions will put the monies, not the nature of theinstitutions themselves. While plaintiffs do not dispute thatthe use of funds must be addressed, they emphasize thepervasively sectarian nature of the institutions and the avowed,and practically implemented, purpose of each to trainindividuals in theological and religious study, which plaintiffscontend profoundly affects the analysis in this matter. This case comes before us as an appeal from finaladministrative action by the Secretary approving the grants.The present record is comprised essentially of the grantapplications submitted by the institutions to the Secretary. 3 The arguments of the parties reveal competing views of (1) thesectarian nature of these institutions of higher education; (2)whether, in the setting of the curriculum and training programsof these particular institutions, the grant funds willnecessarily be used in the “maintenance of any minister orministry”; and (3) the adequacy of promised restrictions orother curbs against sectarian use of the grant proceeds.Because those factual disputes require resolution before theSecretary can make a properly informed decision on the grantapplications, we conclude that judicial review is premature. A remand is necessary to allow for the development of aproper record, with fact-finding. Adversarial testing of theevidence in support of the parties’ presentations is requiredhere. Only based on such a record can the courts appropriatelyreview the Secretary’s decision to award, or not, grants tothese institutions, in light of the constitutional argumentsraised by plaintiffs. Because we conclude that an informedadministrative decision could not have been made without thebenefit of such a record, we remand this matter to theSecretary, and not to the trial court, in order that a contestedcase proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimateadministrative decision of the Secretary concerning thechallenged grants. I. 4 A. The background to this appeal is the “Building Our FutureBond Act” (the Act), which was enacted into law on August 7,2012. L. 2012, c. 41. The Act authorized the State toeffectuate the means to subsidize capital improvement projectsfor institutions of higher education. At the ensuing ElectionDay in November 2012, New Jersey voters approved a referendumauthorizing the issuance of $750 million in general obligationbonds, the proceeds of which were to support the purposes of theAct. The State proceeded to issue bonds and secure funds to beavailable to support higher education capital-improvementprojects; at about the same time, the State solicitedapplications from higher education institutions interested inreceiving such funding. Following the receipt and review ofsubmitted applications, on April 29, 2013, the Governorannounced that Secretary of Education Rochelle Hendricks hadsubmitted to the Legislature for approval a list of 176 highereducation capital construction projects to forty-sixinstitutions of higher education, which included funding forresearch laboratories, computerized classrooms, andinterconnected cyber networks. See L. 2012, c. 41, § 5(g);N.J.A.C. 9A:18-1.7. After sixty days elapsed, the grants weredeemed approved by the Legislature. See N.J.A.C. 9A:18-1.7(d). 5 Of the forty-six higher education institutions thatreceived funding, at least nine were religiously affiliated.Relevant for our purposes, two of those institutions were theBeth Medrash Govoha (the Yeshiva) and the Princeton TheologicalSeminary (the Seminary). B. From the administrative record submitted to the AppellateDivision, we glean the following information. Largely, exceptwhere noted, the information comes from material gathered duringthe application process conducted by the Secretary, either inthe form of representational responses to the State’sapplication questions or in attachments submitted with theapplication. The Yeshiva is located in Lakewood Township and serves morethan 6,000 students. It is accredited by the Association ofAdvanced Rabbinical and Talmudic Schools. The Yeshiva describesTalmudic Studies as “a broad compendium of scholarship thatdraws on knowledge from a wide array of sources and disciplines,among which are references to religious texts such as theBible.” For purposes of elucidating the discussion, we add thata commonly accepted definition describes the Talmud as the basic compendium of Jewish law and thought; its tractates mainly comprise the discussions collectively known as the Gemara, which elucidate the germinal statements of law (mishnayot) collectively known as the Mishnah; 6 when unspecified refers to the Talmud Bavli, the edition developed in Babylonia, and edited at the end of the fifth century C.E.; the Talmud Yerushalmi is the edition compiled in the Land of Israel at the end of the fourth century C.E. [Talmud, Chabad.org, https://www.chabad. org/search/keyword_cdo/kid/2700/jewish/ Talmud-The.htm (last visited April 17, 2018).]Courts have employed similar descriptions. See, e.g., State v.Freedom From Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013 , 1022 n.9 (Colo.1995) (“The Talmud, an 'all-embracing constitution of medievalJewish life,’ is an extended, multivolume compilation ofrabbinic teachings, including law, morality, and theology. TheHebrew word talmud means 'study.’ The original writings, whichwere substantially supplemented over time, were 'completed’ bythe middle of the fifth century.” (citing 14 The Encyclopediaof Religion 256-57 (Mircea Eliade et al. eds., 1987))). According to its mission statement, the Yeshiva is “aninstitution of Higher Education that specializes in advancedTalmudic scholarship. Its primary objective is to produceTalmudic scholars and to thereby provide firm, lifelongfoundations for its students, graduates and their communities.”The Yeshiva further represents that “[a]n integral part of [its]scholastic and professional aims is ethical and moral growth andmaturity of the students, based on Jewish ethics andphilosophy.” 7 The Yeshiva offers four programs: a bachelor’s degree inTalmudic Studies, a master’s degree in Rabbinical and TalmudicStudies, and two certificates in graduate Talmudic Studies. TheYeshiva explained that fewer than five percent of studentsparticipate in a program that leads to ordination, and that theordination program’s religious instruction is “opt-in, not opt-out.” The application record does not clarify whether the othercourses constitute religious instruction, but does specify that“portions of the curriculum may utilize or reference texts withreligious origin.” That said, the graduate course catalog included with theYeshiva’s grant application lists a series of courses thatappear to correspond almost exclusively to tractates of Talmud,with a few additional course offerings that explore the work ofselected rabbis, largely in the context of ethics. Theundergraduate program mandates that each student complete aBachelor of Talmudic Studies, including 150 credit hours, 140 ofwhich are taught by the Talmud Department. The samplecurriculum for this program illustrates that each student isexpected to complete four courses each semester: two in Talmud,one in jurisprudence -- a course not described in the coursedescription, and one in Jewish ethics. From the record aspresently developed, the Yeshiva does not provide any programunrelated to Talmudic scholarship and does not offer courses in 8 science, technology, engineering, mathematics, or generalsecular study. The Yeshiva received a grant award totaling $10,635,747.The award included a grant of $5,118,000 to fund construction ofa new library and research center, and a grant of $5,517,747 tofund construction of a three-story academic center, which wouldcontain study halls, classrooms, a reference library, a computerroom, faculty offices, and academic service rooms. As acondition of its receipt of grant funds, the Yeshiva wasrequired to submit a Sectarian/Religiously AffiliatedEducational Institution Questionnaire to the State. Inanswering the questions posed by that form, the Yeshiva statedthat it was an “independent institution rooted in Jewishtradition,” that it has “no formal affiliation to anyhierarchical religious organization,” and that the funds wouldnot be used to finance any chapels or places of worship. In asupplemental questionnaire provided to the State, the Yeshivafurther stated that “all classes may be offered” in thefacilities subsidized by grant funds, but that the projectfacilities would not be used for “anything associated withordination.” The Yeshiva acknowledged that its curriculum includes“religious study,” focusing, as noted, on its answers in respectto ordination, that its faculty are all of the Jewish faith, and 9 that only men are accepted for admission. The Yeshiva furtherstated that “[a] small number of specialized faculty administera set of oral, one-on-one examinations on topics of practicalreligious matters.” There is no other concession that theYeshiva provides religious instruction. The Yeshiva contends that their programs focused onTalmudic Studies “contain a critical thinking liberal-arts core. . . [and] [a]lthough [the Yeshiva] does not directly offerdegree programs in the STEM concentrations, it does provide itsstudents with broad-based knowledge and the transferable skillsto exceed in graduate programs in Science, Technology,Engineering, and Mathematics.” For example, the coursedescription for Beginning Talmud Survey 1 and 2 states that thestudy of portions of Talmud tractates is “to gain acquaintancewith the broad panoply of Talmudic knowledge and approach to thedisciplines of Logic, Ethics, Philosophy, Religion, Economics,Law, Sociology, History, Psychology, Literature, ClassicalCivilizations, Science, Mathematics, Language, and PoliticalScience.” C. The Seminary is a coeducational denominational schoollocated in Princeton offering graduate programs in theologicaleducation. It is accredited by the Association of TheologicalSchools and the Middle States Commission on Higher Education. 10 The Seminary offers the following degrees: Master of Divinity;Master of Arts (Christian Education); Master of Theology; andDoctor of Philosophy (Biblical Studies, History and Ecumenics,Theology, Practical Theology, or Religion and Society). It alsooffers a number of continuing education programs through variousinitiatives, institutes, and inter-institutional agreements.According to its mission statement, it “prepares women and mento serve Jesus Christ in ministries marked by faith, integrity,scholarship, competence, compassion, and joy, equipping them forleadership worldwide in congregations and the larger church, inclassrooms and the academy, and in the public arena.” TheSeminary also refers to itself as [a] professional and graduate school of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) [that] stands within the Reformed tradition, affirming the sovereignty of the triune God over all creation, the Gospel of Jesus Christ as God’s saving word for all people, the renewing power of the word and Spirit in all of life, and the unity of Christ’s servant church throughout the world. The Seminary applied for and was awarded three grantsthrough the program totaling $645,323. One grant, for $241,722,was to enhance the information technology system at theSeminary’s library. Counsel, at oral argument, informed us thatthe award would provide for infrastructure improvement only andwould not include digitalization of the library’s contents. Asecond grant, for $113,711, was to be applied toward 11 construction of a “training room,” which would service faculty,students, and staff with software training.1 The Seminary also submitted to the Secretary aSectarian/Religiously Affiliated Educational InstitutionQuestionnaire in which it stated that it is an “independenteducational institution with an historical and continuingrelationship with the Presbyterian Church (USA).” It explainedthat the proposed projects did not “contain any existing orproposed areas to be used for prayer or worship,” that thegrants would not fund any “chapels or other places of worship,”and that there would not be “any religious use of or religiousinstruction in any of the Project Facilities.” In its projectsummary for the upgrades to the library’s information-technology(IT) infrastructure, the Seminary asserted that the grant fundswill allow the public to access its scholarly content, includingacademic materials and publications, and will “create arepository to expand scholarly communications as well as makescholarly material open to interested parties outside theseminary.” The Seminary also maintained that the enhanced ITinfrastructure will increase inter-institutional communication1 The third grant, for $289,889, would have subsidized the renovation of a conference room and upgrades to the room’s telecommunications equipment, but the Seminary subsequently withdrew that application. 12 and education, stating that the grant funds will “result in theenhancement of Open Educational Resources (OER) for scholarlycollaboration and support services for educators andresearchers” and will “connect infrastructure for intra- andinter-institutional repositories.” According to the Seminary,that connected infrastructure will allow the Seminary to shareits repository with other institutions with which it has areciprocal relationship, including Princeton University and theWestminster Choir College of Rider University, whose studentswill be able to access the library electronically. The Seminarystated that by connecting its infrastructure it will be able toshare its “world-class research library” and meet the growingdemand for electronic and interactive access to its academic andresearch resources. The Seminary made similar assertions concerning the grantfor the training room, stating in its application that the grantfunds will add a number of technological enhancements to thetraining room that will “increase its telecommunicationofferings, as well as facilitate access to key video, audio, anddata resources,” and keep the training room “compatible withinter-institutional communication.” The training room willapparently be used for software and other computer training,providing “on-site and distance training” to train faculty andstudents on “emerging tools necessary for their academic work.” 13 The Seminary acknowledged a number of other, sectarian usesto which the projects may be put. The Seminary stated in itsproject description for the library that it is “developing acore Internet resource for the study of theology and religion.”In its application for grant funds for the training room, theSeminary noted that its expansion through the use of grant fundswill allow for building partnerships with organizations such asthe Administrative Personnel Association of the PresbyterianChurch. In its technology plan, submitted as part of itsapplication for renovation of the library, the Seminary statedthat the services provided as part of the upgrades to theiraudio and video equipment will include “[a]ll lectures andspecial campus events, from Presidential lectures to Chapelservices.” The Seminary also stated in its questionnaire that“the training facility potentially may be used for softwareprograms employed in both religious instruction and religiousstudy.” Moreover, the Seminary also stated that “[a]ll degreestudents are expected to be of the Christian faith”; that thefaculty are required to be of the Christian faith; and that thecurriculum includes religious instruction. It also stated inthat report that the “proposed project is essential to theSeminary’s educational mission” of “preparation of men and women 14 for ministry to congregations and for Christian leadership incommunities and professional environments.” II. The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ),joined by several other parties,2 filed a complaint in theSuperior Court, Chancery Division, on June 21, 2013 againstSecretary of Higher Education Rochelle Hendricks and StateTreasurer Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff in their official capacities(hereinafter State or State defendants). The complaint did notname either the Yeshiva or the Seminary as parties in thematter. The complaint asserted that the monetary grants to theYeshiva and the Seminary were improper because they were awardedto sectarian schools that “provide sectarian educations andministerial training,” in violation of Article I, Paragraphs 3(the Religious Aid Clause) and 4 (the Establishment Clause) andArticle VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 3 (the Donation Clause) ofthe State Constitution. Plaintiffs also alleged that the grantsto the Yeshiva violated the Law Against Discrimination (LAD),N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, because the Yeshiva “discriminates onthe basis of sex” by not allowing women admission to theYeshiva. The ACLU-NJ sought to enjoin the State Treasurer and2 The ACLU-NJ has taken the lead in pursuing this matter. Therefore, we hereinafter refer to plaintiffs collectively as ACLU-NJ. 15 State Secretary of Higher Education from disbursing the grantfunds to the Yeshiva and the Seminary. On July 15, 2013, the trial court entered a Consent Orderunder which plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their request for aninjunction and defendants agreed to give plaintiffs noticebefore disbursing any of the contested funds. Determining thatthe lawsuit was an appeal from an agency action, the trial courttransferred jurisdiction of the case to the Appellate Divisionpursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The Appellate Division laterdenied plaintiffs’ motion to remand the matter for further fact-finding. The Appellate Division invalidated the grants to theYeshiva and the Seminary, holding that the grants violated theReligious Aid Clause of the State Constitution. ACLU of N.J. v.Hendricks, 445 N.J. Super. 452, 454-55 (App. Div. 2016). Thepanel reached only the constitutional argument premised on aviolation of the Religious Aid Clause and did not address thearguments pertaining to the alleged Establishment Clause orDonation Clause violations, or the LAD claim, because the casewas decided under the Religious Aid Clause. Id. at 477-78. The panel reasoned that its analysis under Article I,Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution was controlled by thisCourt’s holding in Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board ofEducation, 77 N.J. 88 (1978). Id. at 454-55. That said, the 16 panel observed that “the intended meaning of Article I,Paragraph 3 of the Constitution -- a provision included in ourState’s first Constitution in 1776 and readopted in the 1844 and1947 Constitutions -- is not entirely clear” and that theprovision’s history was not discussed “at length in Resnick.”Id. at 455. The panel examined Article I, Paragraph 3’sincorporation into our current Constitution and concluded thatits history did not reveal whether it “was or was not intendedto prohibit public aid to religious organizations to supporttheir activities in religious instruction and the training offuture clerics.” Id. at 468-69. With Article I, Paragraph 3’s ambiguities providing no easyanswer to the issue, the panel turned to Resnick for guidanceconcerning the clause. Id. at 470. After examining the factsand holding of that case, the panel determined that it could“discern no principled distinction between the consumption ofpublic resources that was invalidated under Article I, Paragraph3 in Resnick and the payment of taxpayer-funded grants to theYeshiva and the Seminary.” Id. at 475. Although noting theState’s argument that Resnick is an older case, “out of stepwith more recent national trends in constitutional jurisprudenceconcerning religion,” the panel noted that Resnick has neverbeen overruled and that therefore the panel was “bound” by itsholding. Id. at 476-77. The panel concluded “that Resnick 17 compels invalidation of the grants to the Yeshiva and theSeminary under Article I, Paragraph 3 of the New JerseyConstitution.” Id. at 477. As noted, the State defendants petitioned this Court forcertification. They argue that the Appellate Division failed toapply the plain language of the Religious Aid Clause of theState Constitution and that Resnick does not control thedisposition of this case. We granted the petition forcertification. 228 N.J. 440-41 (2016). We also granted themotions of the Yeshiva, the Seminary, and the National JewishCommission on Law and Public Affairs to appear as amici curiaein the appeal. III. A. The New Jersey State Constitution provides as follows: No person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretense whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform. [N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3.] 18 Until recently, when this Court thoroughly examined thehistory and import of the Religious Aid Clause of our StateConstitution in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. MorrisCounty Board of Chosen Freeholders, ___ N.J. ___ (2018), thisCourt’s most authoritative prior application of the provisionarose in Resnick, 77 N.J. 88. Resnick involved a challenge tothe East Brunswick Board of Education’s adoption of a rulewhereby religious groups could rent school facility space forreligious worship and instruction during non-school hours at thesame rates as charged to other secular community groups. Id. at93-95, 98. We invalidated the Board’s rule, holding thatArticle I, Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution “prohibits anylease arrangement between a school board and religious groupsunder which the out-of-pocket expenses of the board directlyattributable to the use by the religious body are not fullyreimbursed.” Id. at 103. In explaining that holding, reached in the setting ofreligious organizations conducting worship services andreligious instruction on rented public property subsidized bythe public fisc, the Court in Resnick stated that the StateConstitution is explicit and requires “that religiousorganizations be singled out among nonprofit groups in generalas being ineligible for certain benefits which are partly 19 subsidized by tax-generated funds.” Id. at 103-04.3 Aworkaround to that constitutional problem was recognized inResnick, however; the Court stated that the “constitutionalinfirmity may be remedied by an upward adjustment of rentals toreligious groups which would fully cover extra utility, heating,administrative and janitorial costs which result from theleasing by these groups.” Id. at 103. Resnick’s broad summary language about religiousorganizations should not be misconstrued. To be viewedproperly, the Court’s statements in Resnick must be tethered toits holding, and its holding rooted the application of ArticleI, Paragraph 3 of the State Constitution to the facts of thecase. Specifically, Resnick’s holding allowed a church -- a“religious organization” -- to rent public facilities fortemporary worship and for the provision of religiousinstruction, just as other community organizations werepermitted to rent such public space under the Board’s policy.3 The requirement was not to be “carried to an extreme,” the Court noted. Id. at 103 (noting specifically exception for police and fire protection for property held by sectarian groups). Police and fire protection was considered different from the rental question posed in Resnick. Ibid. So too is busing of pupils to school considered part of general public benefits that do not transgress constitutional limits on aid to religion. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 133 N.J.L. 350, 355-56 (1945), aff’d, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that government reimbursement of busing costs incurred by parents of students who attended parochial schools did not contravene the State or Federal Constitutions). 20 But, the decision made clear that such organizations mustcompletely pay their own way for the rental use of publicproperty so that there was no public subsidizing of the use ofschool facilities for religious worship or instruction. In sum,religious organizations were not excluded from a public benefitunder Resnick, but a religious organization such as a church,renting public space to enable it to minister to its flockthrough worship or religious instruction, was required to paythe entire freight for its use of the public facility. B. The issue decided in Resnick is not the same as thequestion presently before us. Here, we are not concerned withthe Yeshiva’s and the Seminary’s use of public space for worshipor religious instruction purposes. Rather, here we confront thedirect disbursement of grant funds for the improvement ofphysical and technological infrastructure of higher educationfacilities, a general and statewide benevolent program to whichtwo entities seek to gain access like other higher educationinstitutions. Specifically at issue is whether the disbursement of fundsfor avowed secular purposes becomes violative of our ReligiousAid Clause when granted to sectarian schools that offercurricula steeped in theological study, as plaintiffs say.According to plaintiffs, giving public grant funds to two 21 educational institutions so pervasively sectarian and orientedto the training of persons for instructing in a particularreligion constitutes religious use prohibited under theReligious Aid Clause. Plaintiffs argue that the grants “would directly supportand enhance the grantees’ religious training and instruction.”They assert that the grants to the Yeshiva would supportconstruction of classrooms, libraries, and other facilities thatwould be used for religious instruction.” Quoting directly fromapplication records, plaintiffs note that the Yeshiva’s “grantswould 'significantly increase the capacity of’ the Yeshiva’sreligious 'academic programs,’” and that “the grants to theSeminary would be 'essential to’ and 'multiply the impact of’'the Seminary’s educational mission’ of 'preparation of men andwomen for theological leadership.’ They would pay fortechnological training and equipment that would enhancereligious study through aids such as 'biblical softwareprograms.’” The educational institutions assert that the improvementsto the infrastructure of their facilities would assist adherentsto their faith and earnest students alike. Both claim they arenot training for ordination and therefore would not be usingfunds for the “maintenance of any minister or ministry.”Further, the Seminary emphasizes that the grant funds for 22 improving its library’s IT infrastructure will allow for publicaccess to the Seminary’s library materials, which includescholarly articles and books, although the record contains fewspecifics on the contents of the theological library. Whenquestioned about the contents at argument, counsel’s proffer wasgeneral in nature. The Yeshiva also claims that greater publicaccess to its library materials will be a beneficial byproductof the grants. In light of the contrary assertions by the parties and thestate of this record, we can only conclude that the facts aremurky on critical details that will affect the constitutionalconclusions to be reached. Different religions use varyingapproaches to what constitutes religious instruction and formsof worship. There are many questions left unanswered by thisrecord, which does not explore or define the relationship ofreligious instruction and study to worship, devotion to thereligion, and ministry at these two institutions. Also, greaterdetail is needed concerning the exact purpose and ultimate useto which the grant funds will be put. The record simply doesnot equip us to answer whether the award of the challenged grantfunds to these two institutions violates the Religious AidClause of the State Constitution. IV. A. 23 In assessing the Religious Aid Clause issue that wasreached by the Appellate Division, there is a corollary questionconcerning whether the denial of the requested funds would runafoul of the federal Free Exercise Clause. U.S. Const. amend.I. Although not raised in plaintiffs’ complaint, the issueabout the Free Exercise Clause has been raised by the State, theeducational institutions, and amicus. The Free Exerciseargument advanced before our Court was not addressed below.Upon close examination of two Supreme Court cases highlyrelevant to the argument involving the federal Free ExerciseClause, we again find that the inadequacies and unresolvedquestions about the present record hobble any ability to addressthe question at this time. In Locke v. Davey, the United States Supreme Courtaddressed the constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clauseof a scholarship program established by the State of Washingtonthat excluded otherwise eligible students who were pursuingdegrees in theology. 540 U.S. 712 , 715-17 (2004). The Courtbegan by noting that the Free Exercise Clause and EstablishmentClause are often in tension with each other, but that there isalso “'room for play in the joints’ between them.” Id. at 718(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664 , 669(1970)). The Court then explained that Washington’s stateconstitution “has been authoritatively interpreted as 24 prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction thatwill prepare students for the ministry.” Id. at 719. Thus,Washington’s constitution “draws a more stringent line than thatdrawn by the United States Constitution.” Id. at 722. Thequestion was therefore whether the scholarship program violatedthe Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 719. The Court examined Washington’s scholarship program, notingthat “[t]he program permits students to attend pervasivelyreligious schools, so long as they are accredited,” and thatstudents were “still eligible to take devotional theologycourses.” Id. at 724-25. The Court therefore held: [W]e find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11 of the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the [State of Washington’s] Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus towards religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey’s claim must fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on [scholarship recipients]. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold the . . . Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State of Washington. [Id. at 725.] 25 Locke was distinguished by the Supreme Court’s recentdecision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). We scrutinized that casein Freedom From Religion Foundation, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at1), in our determination of whether historical trust grantsprovided for the repair of churches with active congregationsviolated the Religious Aid Clause of our State Constitution. InFreedom From Religion Foundation, we noted that Footnote 3 ofthe Court’s opinion, in which four Justices joined, appeared tocreate a distinction between religious identity and religioususe, and that the Court explained in that footnote that it was“not address[ing] religious uses of funding or other forms ofdiscrimination.” Id. at ___ (slip op. at 39) (quoting TrinityLutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3). Moreover, Chief JusticeRoberts’s majority opinion explained that the difference betweenthe facts at issue in Trinity Lutheran and the facts of Lockewas that the scholarship recipient in Locke “was not denied ascholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarshipbecause of what he proposed to do -- use the funds to preparefor the ministry.” Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. Our task in this matter will eventually require anassessment of whether the grant distributions to the Yeshiva andto the Seminary are more like the program at issue in Locke ormore like the one at issue in Trinity Lutheran, and of how the 26 Religious Aid Clause’s prohibition against “maintenance of anyminister or ministry” comports with that assessment. At present, we are ill-equipped to answer those questionsbased on the uncertainties in the factual record. Becauseresolution of those factual matters is a necessary basis for theadditional claims, this matter similarly requires factualdevelopment prior to undertaking any analysis of the stateEstablishment Clause, Donation Clause, and LAD claims raised inthe complaint and which are, as yet, undecided. With respect to the Religious Aid Clause issue -- the onlyclaim of plaintiffs’ to be decided by the Appellate Division,whose judgment is under review -- we see only one appropriatecourse of action. Rather than address a matter ofconstitutional importance on an insufficiently developed record,the better course is to remand the matter for an evidentiaryhearing to bring the relevant factual material into betterfocus. Among the questions to be explored are those previouslyidentified based on the contrary views of the parties concerning(1) the sectarian nature of these institutions of highereducation; (2) whether, in the setting of the curriculum andtraining programs of these particular institutions, the grantfunds will necessarily be used in the “maintenance of anyminister or ministry”; and (3) the adequacy of promised 27 restrictions, or other curbs, against sectarian use of the grantproceeds at present and into the future. B. This case comes before us under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) as anappeal from final agency action. An action that comes to us asa result of final agency action must have a fully developedrecord so that a reviewing court may engage in meaningfulappellate review. See, e.g., In re Issuance of Permit by DEP,120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (explaining that reviewing court “hasno capacity to review [administrative action] at all unlessthere is some kind of reasonable factual record developed by theadministrative agency” (quoting State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978))). Where the agency record isinsufficient, we may order a remand to the agency to more fullydevelop the record. See R. 2:5-5(b) (“At any time during thependency of an appeal from a state administrative agency, if itappears that evidence unadduced in the proceedings below may bematerial to the issues on appeal, the appellate court, on itsown motion or on the motion of any party, may order, on suchterms as it deems appropriate, that the record on appeal besupplemented by the taking of additional evidence and the makingof findings of fact thereon by the agency below . . . .”); seealso, Noble Oil Co. v. DEP, 123 N.J. 474, 475 (1991) (holdingthat administrative record was inadequate for review and 28 remanding to agency to supplement record). We conclude thatthis is a case requiring such action. The record does not reveal enough about the nature of theeducational training and curriculum offered by the Yeshiva andSeminary and how it is delivered, nor does the record presentsufficient detail about how the grant fund projects will be putto use in the institutions’ respective settings. It isimperative that those issues be more fully developed below,through the crucible of an adversarial process, before theconstitutional questions raised in this matter are addressed.Accordingly, we will remand to the Secretary for the developmentof a record in accordance with this opinion. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is necessarilyvacated, and the matter is remanded to the Secretary forproceedings consistent with this opinion. We leave in place theConsent Order entered by the trial court. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON and TIMPONE join in this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER did not participate. 29