Title: State v. Laughlin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117156
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2019

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 117,156 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DERRICK LAUGHLIN, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
If either a motion to correct an illegal sentence or a postsentence motion to 
withdraw a plea presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact and the 
movant is indigent, then the district court must appoint counsel to represent the movant. 
And if the district court conducts a hearing at which the State will be represented by 
counsel, then due process of law requires the movant to be represented by counsel unless 
the movant waives that right. But the district court's consideration of the State's written 
response to either motion, standing alone, does not constitute a hearing or require the 
appointment of counsel. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFFREY E. GOERING, judge. Opinion filed July 12, 2019. 
Affirmed. 
 
Carl Maughan, of Maughan Law Group, of Wichita, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
STEGALL, J.:  Derrick Laughlin filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence 
and a pro se motion to withdraw his plea over a decade after his felony-murder 
conviction. The Sedgwick County District Court summarily denied the motions. On 
appeal, Laughlin argues the district court erred when it considered the State's written 
responses to his motions without appointing counsel to represent him. We hold 
Laughlin's right to counsel was not triggered and, as a result, we affirm.  
 
 
In May 1993, Laughlin and two teenaged friends kidnapped, robbed, and killed a 
pizza delivery person. Laughlin was prosecuted as an adult. He ultimately pled guilty to 
felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm 
by a minor. The district court imposed two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment, 
plus another consecutive sentence of 10 years to life. We affirmed his convictions on 
direct appeal. State v. Laughlin, No. 73,594, unpublished opinion filed April 19, 1996 
(Kan.). 
 
 
In July 2016, Laughlin filed three pro se motions in district court:  a motion for 
appointment of counsel, a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and a motion to withdraw 
his plea. His motion to correct an illegal sentence alleged that his aggravated kidnapping 
and aggravated robbery convictions were multiplicitous with his felony-murder 
conviction. His plea withdrawal motion alleged many errors, including that his plea was 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 
 
 
The State filed written responses to Laughlin's motions. It argued that the court 
could summarily deny the motions without appointing counsel for Laughlin; that his 
multiplicity challenge fell outside the scope of an illegal sentence; and that his plea 
withdrawal motion was untimely and failed to show excusable neglect. See K.S.A. 2018 
Supp. 22-3210(e)(2) (stating the time limitation for postsentence plea withdrawal may be 
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extended "only upon an additional, affirmative showing of excusable neglect by the 
defendant").  
 
 
The district court summarily denied Laughlin's motions. First, the court ruled it 
was unnecessary to appoint counsel for Laughlin because the motions, files, and record of 
the case showed he was not entitled to relief. Second, the court determined Laughlin's 
motion to correct an illegal sentence was a collateral attack on his convictions, which 
falls outside the scope of an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504. See State v. Nash, 
281 Kan. 600, 602, 133 P.3d 836 (2006) (holding that K.S.A. 22-3504 is not a vehicle for 
a collateral attack on a conviction). Third, the court found Laughlin's plea withdrawal 
motion was untimely and he failed to establish excusable neglect.  
 
 
Laughlin appealed the summary denial of these motions directly to this court. See 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) (permitting appeal from a district court judgment 
directly to the Supreme Court in "any [criminal] case in which a maximum sentence of 
life imprisonment has been imposed"). Now through counsel, Laughlin argues the district 
court erred when it considered the State's written responses without appointing counsel to 
represent him on both the motion to correct an illegal sentence and the motion to 
withdraw plea. Laughlin also claims his sentence is illegal because his convictions are 
multiplicitous. He does not otherwise argue the merits of his motions.  
 
 
To what extent Laughlin had a right to counsel to represent him on these motions 
is a question of law subject to unlimited review. See Stewart v. State, 309 Kan. ___, ___, 
___ P.3d ___ (No. 115,149, this day decided), slip op. at 6; Mundy v. State, 307 Kan. 
280, 294, 408 P.3d 965 (2018). Summary denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
is reviewed de novo. State v. Gilbert, 299 Kan. 797, 801, 326 P.3d 1060 (2014).  
 
 
Laughlin argues the district court violated his statutory right to counsel when it 
considered the State's written response to his K.S.A. 22-3504 motion without appointing 
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counsel to represent him. He concedes that a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion may be summarily 
denied without the appointment of counsel when the motion, files, and records of the case 
conclusively show the defendant is not entitled to relief. See, e.g., State v. Hoge, 283 
Kan. 219, 224, 150 P.3d 905 (2007). But he claims the district court effectively held a 
hearing when it considered the State's response to his motion, which triggered his 
statutory right to appointed counsel. He anchors this argument in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-
3504(1), which states that "the defendant shall have a right to a hearing, after reasonable 
notice to be fixed by the court, to be personally present and to have the assistance of 
counsel in any proceeding for the correction of an illegal sentence." In other words, 
Laughlin claims that considering the State's response was tantamount to holding a 
hearing. 
 
 
Today in State v. Redding, 309 Kan. ___,___, ___ P.3d ___ (No.115,037, this day 
decided), slip op. at 8-10, we affirmed our long practice of treating K.S.A. 22-3504 
motions like K.S.A. 60-1507 motions when determining whether appointment of counsel 
is required. See Redding, 309 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 2. Following that practice, we held a 
district court is statutorily required to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent K.S.A. 
22-3504 defendant when the motion presents a substantial question of law or triable issue 
of fact. Redding, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 8-10; see Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. 
at 9 ("[A] district court has a statutory duty to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent 
60-1507 movant whenever the motion presents substantial questions of law or triable 
issues of fact."). We also held that due process of law requires a defendant to be 
represented by counsel at a hearing on a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion where the State is 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives that right. Redding, 309 Kan. at ___, 
slip op. at 10; see Stewart, 309 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 2 ("[I]f the court conducts a hearing [on a 
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion] at which the State will be represented by counsel, due process of 
law requires that the movant be represented by counsel unless the movant waives that 
right to counsel.").  
 
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But importantly, in Redding we determined that a district court's consideration of 
the State's response to a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion is not the equivalent of a hearing. Thus, 
we held the State's written response to a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion, standing alone, does not 
trigger the defendant's procedural due process right to appointed counsel. Redding, 309 
Kan. at ___, slip op. at 10; see Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 16.  
 
 
In like manner, Laughlin argues the district court also erred when it considered the 
State's written response to his postsentence plea withdrawal motion without appointing 
counsel to represent him. He claims that he needed counsel to develop his excusable 
neglect argument, which would have cleared the way for the district court to consider the 
merits of his motion. He does not specify the source of his alleged right to counsel here. 
But regardless, we conclude that no right to counsel was triggered.  
 
 
A district court "may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw the plea" after sentencing "[t]o correct manifest injustice." K.S.A. 
2018 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2). As with illegal sentence motions, we have long treated 
postsentence plea withdrawal motions like K.S.A. 60-1507 motions when it comes to the 
right to counsel. See State v. Jackson, 255 Kan. 455, 461, 874 P.2d 1138 (1994). In 
Jackson, we explained that "[i]f a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing reveals facts 
which, if true, would show manifest injustice such that withdrawal of the plea may be 
warranted, then the motion has clearly brought into play the substantial rights of the 
defendant." 255 Kan. at 461. At that point, counsel must be appointed to protect the 
defendant's rights. 255 Kan. at 461. "However, if there is no substantial question of law 
or triable issue of fact and the files and records conclusively show that the defendant is 
not entitled to relief on the motion, then there is no requirement that a hearing be held or 
that counsel be appointed." 255 Kan. at 461. This mirrors the statutory right to counsel 
for K.S.A. 60-1507 motions that we affirmed today in Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. 
at 9. 
 
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In State v. Hemphill, 286 Kan. 583, 186 P.3d 777 (2008), another postsentence 
plea withdrawal case, we also emphasized that "even though a court need not 
automatically hold a hearing or appoint counsel in all post-conviction matters, when a 
hearing is held 'at which the State will be represented, then due process of law does 
require that the defendant be represented unless the defendant waives the right to 
counsel.'" 286 Kan. at 596 (quoting State v. Pierce, 246 Kan. 183, 199, 787 P.2d 1189 
[1990]). In Stewart, we drew the same due process line for K.S.A. 60-1507 motions. See 
Stewart, 309 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 2. 
 
 
Taken together, Jackson and Hemphill confirm that postsentence plea withdrawal 
motions are treated like K.S.A. 60-1507 motions for purposes of determining whether the 
right to counsel was triggered. Thus, the rules we announced today in Stewart apply 
equally to postsentence plea withdrawal motions, as to illegal sentence motions.  
 
 
In sum, if an illegal sentence motion or postsentence plea withdrawal motion 
presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact and the movant is indigent, 
then the district court must appoint counsel to represent the movant. And if the court 
conducts a hearing at which the State will be represented by counsel, then due process of 
law requires the movant to be represented by counsel unless the movant waives that right. 
Importantly, the district court's consideration of the State's written response, standing 
alone, does not constitute a hearing. See Stewart, 309 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶¶ 1-3; Redding, 309 
Kan. ___, Syl. ¶¶ 2-4.  
 
 
Applying these rules, we arrive at the same result for both of Laughlin's right to 
counsel challenges. We conclude that Laughlin's statutory right to counsel was not 
triggered for either motion because the district court did not find a substantial issue of 
law or triable issue of fact in them. Moreover, the district court did not conduct a hearing 
on either motion, and its consideration of the State's written response did not equate to 
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one. As a result, the district court did not err when it considered the State's responses to 
Laughlin's motions without appointing counsel to represent him.  
 
 
Lastly, Laughlin argues his sentence was illegal because his aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated robbery convictions were multiplicitous with his felony-
murder conviction. But based on established precedent, we can quickly conclude as a 
matter of law that summary denial was appropriate because multiplicity challenges fall 
outside the scope of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See, e.g., State v. Bradford, 
299 Kan. 288, 289-90, 323 P.3d 168 (2014) (affirming well-established caselaw that 
precludes raising a multiplicity challenge in a motion to correct an illegal sentence).  
 
 
Affirmed.