Title: State v. Lagrone
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2013AP001424-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2016

2016 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1424-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James Elvin Lagrone, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
A REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 22, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 25, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Kaitlin A. Lamb, assistant state public defender and oral 
argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1424-CR     
(L.C. No. 
2011CF1996) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James Elvin Lagrone, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
APR 22,2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lagrone, 
No. 2013AP1424-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 
2015), which affirmed the Milwaukee County circuit court's 
judgment of conviction and order denying defendant James Elvin 
Lagrone's ("Lagrone") postconviction motion for an evidentiary 
hearing and a new trial on the question of Lagrone's mental 
responsibility.1 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz presided over the most 
relevant hearings in this case and entered the judgment of 
conviction.  The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner entered the order 
denying postconviction relief. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Criminal 
defendants 
possess 
a 
fundamental 
constitutional right to testify in their own defense.  See, 
e.g., State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶¶46, 48, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 
860 N.W.2d 10 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987)). 
Further, this court has stated that a circuit court "should 
conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that the defendant 
is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his or her 
right to testify."  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶2, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485. 
¶3 
The question before this court is whether, upon a plea 
of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect ("NGI") 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 (2013-14),2 such right-to-testify 
colloquies are also required at the responsibility phase of the 
resulting bifurcated trial established by Wis. Stat. § 971.165.  
See generally State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶¶33-40, 355 
Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42 (discussing nature and history of 
bifurcated trials resulting from NGI pleas).  
¶4 
Lagrone does not challenge the plea colloquy that 
occurred 
during 
the 
guilt 
phase 
of 
his 
bifurcated 
NGI 
proceedings.  He does not argue that he was unaware that, by 
pleading guilty to the criminal charges against him, he was 
waiving his fundamental right to testify at a criminal trial 
pertaining to the validity of those charges.  Instead, we must 
analyze Lagrone's opportunity to testify at the responsibility 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
3 
 
phase of his bifurcated trial.  The circuit court below did not 
conduct a right-to-testify colloquy with Lagrone during the 
responsibility phase of his bifurcated trial, and Lagrone argues 
that because he did not understand that he had a right to 
testify at that phase, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
under State v. Garcia, 2010 WI App 26, 323 Wis. 2d 531, 779 
N.W.2d 718, so that a court may determine whether he properly 
waived his right to testify.  Ultimately, determining whether a 
colloquy is necessary during the responsibility phase of NGI 
proceedings requires us to determine whether the fundamental 
right to testify applies at that phase.  The court of appeals 
below 
decided 
that 
resolution 
of 
this 
"issue 
of 
first 
impression" was unnecessary because, it reasoned, the harmless 
error doctrine applied and any error by the circuit court was 
harmless.  See State v. Lagrone, No. 2013AP1424-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶13, 17, 19 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015). 
¶5 
We conclude that, although a better practice, a 
circuit court is not required to conduct a right-to-testify 
colloquy at the responsibility phase of a bifurcated trial 
resulting from a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease 
or defect.3  Further, Lagrone is not entitled to an evidentiary 
                                                 
3 As we will explain, nothing in this opinion affects our  
instruction in State v. Weed that circuit courts conduct an on-
the-record colloquy at a criminal trial, or at the guilt phase 
of bifurcated NGI proceedings, to ensure that the defendant is 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his or her 
fundamental right to testify.  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶2, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
4 
 
hearing because he has not made the requisite showing for such a 
hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On April 30, 2011, at about 10:00 p.m., Lagrone 
arrived at the Milwaukee home of his ex-girlfriend, B.M.J.4  
Lagrone wanted to enter B.M.J.'s home, but she refused to let 
him in.  Lagrone nevertheless forced his way into the home and 
then "proceeded to 'humiliate'" B.M.J., abusing her both 
physically and sexually, until about 1:00 p.m. the following 
day.  This violent episode ceased only when an apparent 
acquaintance of B.M.J. arrived at the home to check on her 
because she was not answering his phone calls.  The acquaintance 
observed that the door to the home was wide open and heard 
screaming.  He entered the home and saw B.M.J. lying on the 
floor; Lagrone was on top of her with his hands around her neck.  
The acquaintance called 911 and Lagrone fled in B.M.J.'s car.  
Lagrone turned himself in later that day. 
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On May 5, 2011, a criminal complaint was filed against 
Lagrone charging him with: (1) strangulation and suffocation, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.235(1) (2011-12); (2) false 
imprisonment, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.30 (2011-12); (3) 
                                                 
4 The facts of this case are not material to the outcome of 
this appeal and are taken from the criminal complaint filed 
against Lagrone.  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
5 
 
second-degree sexual assault (force or violence), contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2011-12); (4) recklessly endangering 
safety (first degree), contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1) (2011-
12); and (5) operating a motor vehicle without owner's consent, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3) (2011-12).  Each count 
carried 
the 
domestic 
abuse 
modifier. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.075(1)(a) (2011-12).  
¶8 
On May 13, 2011, Lagrone's attorney informed the 
Milwaukee County circuit court5 that she had reason to doubt 
Lagrone's competency.  The attorney asked the court to order a 
competency evaluation of Lagrone.  The court granted the 
request.  On May 25, 2011, Dr. Robert Rawski filed a report in 
which he provided his belief to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that Lagrone suffered from paranoid schizophrenia but 
was currently competent to stand trial.  
¶9 
On June 9, 2011, a preliminary hearing was held and 
Lagrone pleaded not guilty and NGI.  On June 21, 2011, the court6 
ordered that Lagrone be examined for purposes of his NGI plea.  
On July 22, 2011, Dr. John Pankiewicz filed a report which 
stated his belief to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
that Lagrone was suffering from schizophrenia on the date of his 
offense.  However, the report also stated that Dr. Pankiewicz 
could not support Lagrone's NGI plea.7  On October 31, 2011, at a 
                                                 
5 The Honorable Mary Kuhnmuench presided. 
6 The Honorable Kevin Martens presided. 
7 The report stated in part: 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
6 
 
final pretrial conference,8 Lagrone's attorney distributed a 
report authored by Dr. Anthony Jurek and dated October 24, 2011.9  
The report stated Dr. Jurek's opinion that Lagrone was suffering 
from paranoid schizophrenia on the date of his offense and that 
"the diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia impaired the subject's 
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his behavior and 
rendered him unable to conform his behavior to the requirements 
of law."  On March 5, 2012, at a final pretrial conference, 
Lagrone's attorney requested an additional competency evaluation 
because she had reason to doubt Lagrone's competency.10  The 
court granted the request.  On March 14, 2012, Dr. Deborah L. 
Collins filed a report in which she provided her belief to a 
reasonable 
degree 
of 
medical 
certainty 
that 
Lagrone 
was 
presently competent to proceed.  The report "urge[d] court 
                                                                                                                                                             
Overall, 
I 
do 
not 
believe 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient evidence to find to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that the predominant factor in 
Mr. Lagrone's 
offense 
related 
behavior 
was 
a 
consequence of his mental illness.  I therefore could 
not find to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
that he lacked substantial capacity to understand the 
wrongfulness of his act or conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law . . . . 
8 The Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz presided. 
9 It is not clear from the record if this report was ever 
actually filed with the circuit court.  The report itself is in 
the record. 
10 The attorney explained that when she had met recently 
with Lagrone, "Lagrone was unable to function.  He was bringing 
up 
inappropriate 
religious 
things 
in 
the 
middle 
of 
our 
discussions.  He was shaking."  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
7 
 
officers to remain sensitive in the event of any significant 
changes in [Lagrone's] overall mental status and/or compliance 
with psychiatric treatment," as "such changes [might] signal 
fluctuations in his competency and warrant his re-examination." 
¶10 On March 16, 2012, a plea hearing was held at which 
the parties informed the court that they had negotiated an 
agreement according to which Lagrone would plead guilty to all 
five criminal counts against him but would proceed to try the 
mental responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial.  If 
Lagrone's NGI plea were rejected, the State agreed to recommend 
a sentence of 15 years of initial confinement and seven years of 
extended supervision.  
¶11 Lagrone then pleaded guilty to all five criminal 
counts against him.  The court confirmed that Lagrone had 
reviewed 
or 
signed 
certain 
documents, 
including 
a 
plea 
questionnaire 
and 
waiver 
of 
rights 
form 
and 
addendum, 
correspondence between the State and Lagrone's attorney, a 
penalty chart, and jury instructions.11  The court also confirmed 
that Lagrone understood his rights as listed in certain of the 
documents and the fact that he was waiving some of the rights by 
pleading guilty, but that he was not waiving his right to the 
                                                 
11 Some of these documents, such as the plea questionnaire 
form, feature handwritten notes in the margins.  For example, on 
the plea questionnaire form under the heading "Constitutional 
Rights," and next to the checked box reading "I give up my right 
to testify and present evidence at trial," the following is 
handwritten: "True for Phase I, not for II."  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
8 
 
second phase of the bifurcated trial.12  The court asked 
Lagrone's attorney whether she was "satisfied Mr. Lagrone 
understands all the rights that he gives up about pleading 
guilty in phase one"; Lagrone's attorney indicated that she was 
satisfied.  
¶12 On March 23, 2012, and April 27, 2012, the court 
conducted the responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial.  
Testimony was offered at this phase by: (1) the police officer 
                                                 
12 A portion of the exchange proceeded as follows:  
THE COURT: Do you see all the rights listed in 
these documents? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand them? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading 
guilty in the first phase of this case, you give up 
all those rights, like the right to have a trial on 
whether you committed these crimes and the right to 
force the State to prove you committed these crimes 
and the right to present witnesses about whether you 
committed the crimes, all those rights, did you 
understand all those and understand that you're giving 
them up? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, there's an important right that 
you did not give up by pleading guilty.  That's the 
right to have the second part of the trial.  That's 
the right to have the court decide whether you should 
be held responsible; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
9 
 
to whom Lagrone had first spoken when Lagrone had turned himself 
in; (2) a social worker who had interacted with Lagrone on 
several occasions; (3) Dr. Jurek, who supported Lagrone's NGI 
plea; and (4) Dr. Pankiewicz, who did not support Lagrone's NGI 
plea.  On April 27, 2012, the court found that Lagrone had "not 
satisfied the court on Phase Two of this two-phase trial" and 
that "he should be held responsible for the crimes for which he 
was convicted in the first phase."  The court adjudged Lagrone 
guilty of the five counts against him and entered a judgment of 
conviction.  
¶13 At no time during the responsibility phase did the 
court inform Lagrone that he had a right to testify or ask 
Lagrone whether he was waiving his right to testify.13  On 
                                                 
13 At 
the 
close 
of 
evidence, 
however, 
the 
following 
conversation 
took 
place 
between 
the 
court, 
Lagrone, 
and 
Lagrone's attorney: 
THE COURT: Ms. Erickson, does Mr. Lagrone want to 
present any additional evidence? 
MS. ERICKSON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lagrone, did you hear what 
Ms. Erickson just told me? 
THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head.) 
THE COURT: You have to say "yes" or "no." 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand what she told me? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you agree with her? 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
10 
 
May 25, 2012, the court sentenced Lagrone to a cumulative six 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
six 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  
¶14 On May 17, 2013, Lagrone filed a postconviction 
motion.  According to the motion, "At no point during the court 
trial did the court conduct an on-the-record colloquy regarding 
Mr. Lagrone's right to testify. . . .  Lagrone asserts that he 
did not understand that he had a right to testify at the mental 
responsibility phase."  Lagrone argued that "the fundamental 
right 
to 
testify . . . is 
applicable 
to 
the 
mental 
responsibility phase" of a bifurcated trial resulting from an 
NGI plea, and requested an evidentiary hearing "at which the 
State carries the burden to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's waiver of the right to testify at 
trial was knowing and voluntary."  Lagrone also requested an 
order granting a new trial on the responsibility phase.  He did 
not provide information regarding the content of his proposed 
testimony.  
¶15 On May 29, 2013, the circuit court14 issued a decision 
and order denying Lagrone's motion.  The court concluded:  
[Lagrone] does not have a fundamental constitutional 
right to testify during the mental responsibility 
phase . . . . In the absence of either a fundamental 
right or a statutory duty on the part of the court to 
conduct a colloquy concerning the right to testify in 
                                                                                                                                                             
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
14 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner presided. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
11 
 
a Phase II proceeding, the court declines to hold an 
evidentiary hearing, particularly where the defendant 
has not set forth anything in his motion of what his 
testimony would have been.  
¶16 On June 17, 2013, Lagrone filed a notice of appeal.  
On April 7, 2015, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of 
the circuit court in an unpublished decision.  Lagrone, 
unpublished slip op., ¶19.  The court of appeals acknowledged 
that the question of whether circuit courts are required to hold 
a right-to-testify colloquy at the responsibility phase of a 
bifurcated trial resulting from an NGI plea was an "issue of 
first impression," but resolved the case on other grounds.  Id., 
¶13.  Relying on State v. Nelson, which held that "the denial of 
a defendant's right to testify is subject to harmless error 
review," State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶43, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 
N.W.2d 317, the court of appeals concluded that "a trial court's 
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing following the failure to 
conduct a colloquy regarding a defendant's right to testify is 
no different than the direct denial of a defendant's right to 
testify at trial" and that harmless error review therefore 
applied.  Lagrone, unpublished slip op., ¶¶16-17.  The court 
subsequently determined that any error that had occurred was 
harmless.  Id., ¶19. 
¶17 On May 7, 2015, Lagrone filed a petition for review in 
this court.  On September 9, 2015, this court granted the 
petition.  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
12 
 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 This court "review[s] constitutional questions, both 
state and federal, de novo."  State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 
¶17, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457 (citation omitted).   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The Fundamental Constitutional Right of Criminal  
Defendants to Testify in Their Own Defense 
¶19 In 1980 we confronted the question of whether criminal 
defendants possess a constitutional right to testify in their 
own behalf at a criminal trial.  State v. Albright, 96 
Wis. 2d 122, 126-29, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980), modified, Weed, 263 
Wis. 2d 434.  We explained that although the United States 
Supreme Court had never determined whether a criminal defendant 
possesses a constitutional right to testify, the right was "part 
of the due process rights of the defendant protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 128.  We thus 
concluded that with reference to a criminal trial, wherein the 
State bears the burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, "there is a constitutional due process right 
on the part of the criminal defendant to testify in his own 
behalf."  Id. at 129. 
¶20 We also examined in Albright whether a criminal 
defendant's right to testify is a "fundamental" constitutional 
right such that, as with rights ranging from the right to an 
appeal to the right to the assistance of counsel, only a 
defendant's personal waiver of the right is an effective waiver.  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
13 
 
Id. at 129-30 (citations omitted).  While recognizing that a 
criminal defendant's right to testify is "important," we 
declined 
to 
characterize 
it 
as 
fundamental, 
ultimately 
concluding, "We perceive no need for courts in post conviction 
hearings to delve into the processes by which an attorney and 
his client determine whether the defendant should waive his 
right to testify."  Id. at 130-32.  Instead, "counsel, in the 
absence of the express disapproval of the defendant on the 
record during the pretrial or trial proceedings, may waive the 
defendant's right to testify."  Id. at 133. 
¶21 Less than a decade later, in Rock v. Arkansas, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that the United States 
Constitution 
guarantees 
"a 
defendant 
in 
a 
criminal 
case . . . the right to take the witness stand and . . . testify 
in his or her own defense."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 49.  Although the 
Court did not isolate any single explicit statement of the right 
in the federal constitution, and although the Court acknowledged 
that the right "is a change from the historic common-law view, 
which was that all parties to litigation, including criminal 
defendants, were disqualified from testifying because of their 
interest in the outcome of the trial," id., the Court explained 
that the right "is essential to due process of law in a fair 
adversary system" and "has sources in several provisions of the 
Constitution."  Id. at 51 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 819, n.15 (1975)).  
¶22 First, the Court explained, a criminal defendant's 
right to testify is a "necessary corollary to the Fifth 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
14 
 
Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony."  Id. at 52.  
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in 
part, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. V.15  
The Court reasoned that a privilege against self-incrimination 
is exercised when an accused decides whether to testify; 
"[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own 
defense, or to refuse to do so."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 53 (quoting 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971)).  
¶23 Second, a criminal defendant's right to testify is 
located in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 52.  The amendment 
provides 
in 
part, 
"In 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.16  "Logically included in the accused's right to call 
witnesses whose testimony is 'material and favorable to his 
defense' is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is 
in his favor to do so."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (citation 
omitted). 
                                                 
15 The Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 
6 (1964). 
16 The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause applies 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
15 
 
¶24 Finally, 
"[t]he 
necessary 
ingredients 
of 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived 
of liberty without due process of law include a right to be 
heard and to offer testimony. . . ."  Id. at 51.  The Rock Court 
added in a footnote that "[t]his right reaches beyond the 
criminal trial: the procedural due process constitutionally 
required in some extrajudicial proceedings includes the right of 
the affected person to testify."  Id. at 51 n.9.  The Court 
cited as examples cases involving probation revocation, parole 
revocation, and the termination of welfare benefits.  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
¶25 After Rock this court revisited Albright and concluded 
that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify in 
his or her behalf is a fundamental right.  Weed, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶37-39.  We further concluded that "a circuit 
court should conduct a colloquy with the defendant in order to 
ensure that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily waiving 
his or her right to testify," though recognizing that only a 
minority of jurisdictions required the practice.  Id. at ¶¶40-
41. 
¶26 Most recently, we recognized that the right to testify 
identified in Rock finds additional support in the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶¶49-54, 335 
Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831.  Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
states 
in 
part, 
"In 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by 
himself and counsel . . . [and] to have compulsory process to 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
16 
 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf . . . ."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 7.  Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution states in part, "No person . . . may be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or 
herself."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1).  Thus the due process, 
compulsory process, and non-incrimination sources of the federal 
constitutional right of criminal defendants to testify in their 
own behalf have analogues in our state constitution. 
¶27 Given this history, Lagrone now argues that an on-the-
record colloquy regarding waiver of his fundamental right to 
testify should also be required at the responsibility phase of 
his bifurcated trial.  In order to test the merits of this 
claim, we must review the nature and purpose of NGI pleas and of 
the responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI trials.17 
 
B.  NGI Pleas and the Responsibility Phase of the  
Bifurcated Trial Resulting From an NGI Plea 
¶28 At the outset, it is critical to understand the 
essential differences between a plea of not guilty and a plea of 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  Typically, 
upon a plea of not guilty, the parties proceed to trial wherein 
the State bears the burden of securing a unanimous jury verdict 
                                                 
17 We recently had occasion to thoroughly examine the nature 
and history of both Wisconsin's NGI plea and the bifurcated 
trial resulting from such a plea.  See generally State v. 
Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶¶32-40, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42; 
State v. Burton, 2013 WI 61, ¶¶42-46, 349 Wis. 2d 1, 832 
N.W.2d 611.  We do not repeat in full the discussion that 
occurred in these cases, but instead set out only the principles 
most germane to the issues before us. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
17 
 
that it has proven each essential element of the offense charged 
against the criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, 
e.g., Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 88 
(1979).  A court may not direct a verdict of guilt against a 
defendant in a criminal case.  State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 
19, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994) (citation omitted).  After the jury 
renders a guilty verdict, the circuit court sentences the 
defendant.  See, e.g., In re Eckart, 85 Wis. 681, 681, 56 
N.W. 375 (1893).  
¶29 If, however, a criminal defendant enters a plea of NGI 
(without joining it with a plea of not guilty), the defendant 
thereby "admits that but for lack of mental capacity the 
defendant committed all the essential elements of the offense 
charged in the indictment, information or complaint."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.06(1)(d).  "[T]he court will find the defendant 
guilty of the elements of the crimes, and the NGI plea will be 
left for trial."  State v. Burton, 2013 WI 61, ¶43, 349 
Wis. 2d 1, 832 N.W.2d 611.  This trial, however, is much 
different than the criminal trial previously discussed.  In this 
proceeding——which is concerned with the criminal defendant's 
mental responsibility——the defendant, not the State, bears the 
burden of establishing mental disease or defect excluding 
responsibility.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.15(3).  The burden on the 
defendant is not "beyond a reasonable doubt," but instead "to a 
reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence."  Id.  The defendant need not obtain a unanimous jury 
verdict, but instead only a five-sixths verdict.  Magett, 355 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 617, ¶39.  And, unlike in a criminal trial, "a judge may 
grant a motion to dismiss the NGI defense or direct a verdict in 
favor of the state if the defendant cannot produce sufficient 
evidence to show mental disease or defect."  Id.  
¶30 Thus, under the posture of the current case, Lagrone 
has already admitted that but for lack of mental capacity he 
committed all the essential elements of the criminal offenses 
charged against him.  If not for his NGI plea, Lagrone would 
have proceeded to sentencing for committing those crimes.  With 
this general background in place, we now proceed to examine in 
closer detail the nature and purpose of NGI pleas and their 
concomitant procedures. 
¶31 Under Wis. Stat. § 971.15, "Mental responsibility of 
defendant," "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct 
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect 
the 
person 
lacked 
substantial 
capacity 
either 
to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his 
or her conduct to the requirements of law."  § 971.15(1).  An 
NGI plea is "an affirmative defense which the defendant must 
establish to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence."  § 971.15(3).  
¶32 The affirmative defense of NGI established by Wis. 
Stat. § 971.15(1) builds upon  
the centuries-long evolution of the collection of 
interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common 
law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of 
an individual for his antisocial deeds.  The doctrines 
of 
actus 
reus, 
mens 
rea, 
insanity, 
mistake, 
justification, and duress have historically provided 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
19 
 
the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the 
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law 
and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and 
medical views of the nature of man.   
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality) 
(emphasis added).  We have recognized with regard to Wisconsin's 
NGI plea that "[w]hether or not there should be criminal 
responsibility is essentially a moral issue."  Steele v. State, 
97 Wis. 2d 72, 96, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).  That is, at the heart 
of any NGI inquiry is the following question: 
[I]s this person who has been found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of criminal conduct to be punished or 
is there to be a different disposition because, in 
good conscience and public morality, the defendant is 
a person, because of mental disease or defect, who 
ought not to be held criminally liable for his or her 
conduct[?]  
State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 389, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988).  
Importantly, however, "a criminal defendant's right to an NGI 
defense is a statutory right that is not guaranteed by either 
the United States or Wisconsin Constitutions."  Magett, 355 
Wis. 2d 617, ¶32 (citations omitted). 
¶33 Under current statutory procedures, the dual issues of 
whether a defendant has committed the criminal offense alleged 
and whether a defendant may be held responsible for committing 
that offense are determined in separate proceedings.  See Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.165; 
Burton, 
349 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶42-46.18 
 
The 
                                                 
18 We explained in Burton: 
If the NGI plea is not joined with a plea of not 
guilty, the plea admits that but for lack of mental 
capacity the defendant committed all the essential 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
20 
 
responsibility phase of an NGI trial, in contrast to the so-
called "guilt phase," contains "elements of civil procedure" and 
is "something close to a civil trial."  Magett, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 
¶¶36, 39-40.  Specifically: (1) the burden of proof to establish 
mental disease or defect, which is on the defendant, is the same 
as the burden required in civil trials for most issues; (2) a 
                                                                                                                                                             
elements of the offenses charged.  Then——when there is 
a substantive basis for finding the crimes charged——
the court will find the defendant guilty of the 
elements of the crimes, and the NGI plea will be left 
for trial.   
Conversely, if the defendant pleads not guilty in 
conjunction with an NGI plea, Wis. Stat.  § 971.165(1) 
provides for the bifurcation of the guilt and mental 
responsibility phases of trial . . . . 
Burton, 349 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶43-44 (citations omitted).  Lagrone 
pleaded guilty to the charges against him but proceeded to trial 
on the question of his mental responsibility at the time of the 
offense.  It might thus seem inaccurate to refer to the 
proceedings in this case as "bifurcated"; only one phase was 
tried.  Put differently, because Lagrone did not contest that he 
committed the offense alleged, there was no need for "a 
separation of the issues [of whether Lagrone committed the 
criminal offense alleged and whether Lagrone is mentally 
responsible 
for 
committing 
the 
offense 
alleged] 
with 
a 
sequential order of proof in a continuous trial."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.165(1)(a). 
Nevertheless, as the court of appeals and the parties 
referred to Lagrone's "bifurcated" criminal proceeding, see, 
e.g., State v. Lagrone, No. 2013AP1424-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015), as the issues of Lagrone's 
guilt and mental responsibility were indeed determined in 
sequence, and as the principles enunciated in this case are 
equally applicable to a bifurcated NGI trial, we will, for 
simplicity, use the practice of referring to the proceedings at 
issue as "bifurcated." 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
21 
 
judge may direct a verdict in favor of the State on the issue of 
mental responsibility; and (3) the defendant need only obtain a 
five-sixths jury verdict on the issue of mental responsibility.  
See id., ¶39 (citations omitted). 
¶34 On the other hand, the mental responsibility phase is 
not "purely civil."  Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 397.  We have instead 
characterized the mental responsibility phase as "a special 
proceeding in the dispositional phase of a criminal proceeding——
a proceeding that is not criminal in its attributes or 
purposes."  Id.  
¶35 In Koput we concluded that, given the nature of the 
responsibility phase, a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of 
mental responsibility was not required.  Id. at 373-74.  In 
rejecting a contrary conclusion, we said that the guilt and 
responsibility phases are not "but divisions of a single 
criminal trial": 
The 
thesis 
of 
the 
public 
defender 
that 
the 
responsibility phase is but one part of a single 
criminal proceeding, and therefore must, in all 
respects, be treated in the same way as the guilt 
phase, is unsupportable.  
The public defender's 
syllogism——a criminal defendant has a constitutional 
right to a unanimous verdict in a criminal case; the 
responsibility phase of a sequential trial is a part 
of a criminal trial, therefore the five-sixths verdict 
returned in Koput's case denied him a constitutional 
verdict——is flawed, because it is demonstrably evident 
that the responsibility phase is not a part of a 
"criminal" trial.  The entire history of bifurcated 
trials . . . makes evident that the purpose of each of 
the two phases is entirely different. 
Id. at 394-95.  With regard to the purpose of the responsibility 
phase, we observed that "in considering the question of 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
22 
 
insanity, 
'we 
are 
largely 
concerning 
ourselves 
with 
the 
difference in the institutional treatment of the defendant,'" 
and added that the question to be answered in the mental 
responsibility phase is "noncriminal": "[t]he mental state, 
other than criminal intent, at the time of a crime is no more a 
matter 
of 
criminal 
inquiry 
than 
an 
inquest 
into 
mental 
responsibility at the time of the execution of a will."  Id. at 
392, 396 & n.17 (citation omitted).  In fact, although an NGI 
plea is described in Wis. Stat. § 971.15(3) as an "affirmative 
defense,"  
[i]t is obvious . . . that the affirmative defense 
mentioned 
in 
sec. 
971.15(3) 
is 
of 
an 
entirely 
different nature from affirmative defenses utilized by 
defendants in the guilt phase, i.e., alibi, privilege, 
et cetera, which if proved result in an outright 
dismissal of the charge.  Success on the affirmative 
defense of mental disease or defect does not have that 
result; rather, it is an affirmative defense to 
"responsibility"——it 
relieves 
the 
person 
of 
the 
sanctions for criminal conduct.  It does not relieve 
the person already found guilty in the first phase of 
the factual finding of criminal conduct.  Rather, the 
successful assertion of the affirmative defense in 
phase 
two 
results 
in 
a 
noncriminal-sanction 
disposition.  
Id. at 388.  
¶36 In sum, in assessing exactly what the federal and 
state constitutions require in this case, we must bear in mind 
that "[t]he civil hues of the responsibility phase, coupled with 
the fact that bifurcation and the NGI plea are statutory in 
nature, not constitutional, remove the proceeding from the 
exacting demands of criminal proceedings and leave it in a 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
23 
 
category of its own."  Magett, 355 Wis. 2d 617, ¶40 (citation 
omitted).  
 
C.  Whether the Fundamental Right of Criminal Defendants to 
Testify in Their Own Defense Applies at the Responsibility Phase 
of Bifurcated NGI Proceedings 
¶37 As stated, the right to testify identified in Rock is 
not explicitly listed in any one provision of the federal 
constitution, but instead has multiple "sources" in that 
document.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 51.  It is therefore appropriate to 
note that "[t]he inference of [constitutional] rights is not, of 
course, a mechanical exercise. . . .  [T]he right must be 
independently found in the structure and history of the 
constitutional text."  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 n.15.  See also 
id. ("The ability to waive a constitutional right does not 
ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite 
of that right" (citation omitted).).  Much of what has been said 
in the realm of substantive due process analysis, which 
sometimes calls for the protection of rights implicit in the 
text and structure of the constitution, see, e.g., Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997), is applicable to the 
general practice of identifying constitutional 
rights not 
explicitly stated in the federal or state constitutions.  "By 
extending 
constitutional 
protection 
to 
an 
asserted 
right . . . we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the 
arena of public debate and legislative action."  Id. at 720. 
"[G]uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered 
area are scarce and open-ended.  The doctrine of judicial self-
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
24 
 
restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we 
are asked to break new ground in this field."  Collins v. City 
of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citations omitted). 
¶38 In Lagrone's view, we need not "break new ground" but 
instead should simply apply the right identified in Rock to the 
responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI proceedings.  Yet, close 
examination of that right establishes that it does not govern 
here.  
¶39 The Rock Court indicated that the right to testify it 
identified was not one established in the common law at the time 
of the framing of the federal constitution.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 
49.  "[T]he historic common-law view . . . was that all parties 
to litigation, including criminal defendants, were disqualified 
from testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the 
trial."  Id. (citation omitted); see also Ferguson v. Georgia, 
365 U.S. 570, 574 (1961) ("Disqualification for interest was 
thus extensive in the common law when this Nation was formed.  
Here, as in England, criminal defendants were deemed incompetent 
as witnesses" (citation omitted).).19  The Court focused on the 
                                                 
19 Care should be taken to distinguish between a criminal 
defendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf and a 
defendant's ability at common law to provide unsworn testimony.  
See generally, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 
332-36 
(1999) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("[C]ommon-law 
evidentiary rules prevented a criminal defendant from testifying 
in his own behalf even if he wanted to do so.  That is not to 
say, however, that a criminal defendant was not allowed to speak 
in his own behalf . . . .  Traditionally, defendants were 
expected to speak rather extensively at both the pretrial and 
trial 
stages 
of 
a 
criminal 
proceeding" 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citation omitted).). 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
25 
 
later formation of the "considered consensus of the English-
speaking world" that criminal defendants were competent to 
testify in their own behalf, and concluded that "[a]t this point 
in the development of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted 
that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the 
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense."  Rock, 
483 U.S. at 49-50 (citation omitted).20  
¶40 The fundamental right identified by the Rock Court is 
not some generalized right to testify; it is instead "[t]he 
right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial."  
Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added); see also id. at 45 ("The 
issue presented in this case is whether Arkansas' evidentiary 
rule 
prohibiting 
the 
admission 
of 
hypnotically 
refreshed 
testimony violated petitioner's constitutional right to testify 
on her own behalf as a defendant in a criminal case" (emphasis 
added).).  The right guarantees a criminal defendant the ability 
to use his or her own words in order to defend against attempts 
by the State to establish the defendant's criminal liability.  
¶41 Thus defined, few could quarrel with the Rock Court's 
statement that the existence of the right, "[a]t this point in 
the development of our adversary system, [] cannot be doubted."  
Id. at 49.  But Lagrone faces a considerably more difficult 
challenge convincing this court that the "considered consensus 
                                                 
20 With regard to the eventual formation of this consensus, 
we note that nine states had enacted competency statutes at the 
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mitchell, 526 
U.S. at 335-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
26 
 
of the English-speaking world" is that criminal defendants 
possess the same fundamental right to testify: (1) at a 
statutory, 
noncriminal 
proceeding 
to 
which 
they 
have 
no 
independent constitutional right; (2) as to matters relevant, 
not to the criminal question of whether they committed the 
conduct alleged, but to the moral question of their future 
institutional treatment.  In a nutshell, the fundamental right 
to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial does not 
exist at the responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI proceedings 
because "it is demonstrably evident that the responsibility 
phase is not a part of a 'criminal' trial."  Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 
at 395.  The responsibility phase does not pertain to defense 
against accusations of criminal behavior. 
¶42 The conception of the Rock right to testify as 
belonging to criminal defendants to use in their own defense 
against criminal charges follows from the nature of certain of 
the right's sources as identified by the Rock Court.  For 
instance, the right arises from the Fifth Amendment because 
"[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own 
defense, or to refuse to do so."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 53 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  The purpose of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege "was to insure that a person should not be compelled, 
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony 
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime."  
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (citation omitted).  
The privilege thus protects against compelled incriminating 
testimony——testimony relevant to the question of whether an 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
27 
 
individual has engaged in criminal conduct.  See Incriminating, 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "incriminating" 
as "[d]emonstrating or indicating involvement in criminal 
activity"); Incriminating Statement, Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining "incriminating statement" as "[a] 
statement that tends to establish the guilt of someone, esp. the 
person making it").  Insofar as the right to testify is a 
"necessary corollary" of the Fifth Amendment, Rock, 483 U.S. at 
52 (emphasis added), it guarantees individuals the right to 
testify as to matters pertaining to the validity of the criminal 
charges against them. Such testimony is not necessary——or 
appropriate——in the responsibility phase, because that phase is 
not concerned with whether a defendant has engaged in criminal 
activity.  Any Fifth Amendment right to testify is instead 
vindicated in the guilt phase.21 
¶43 Lagrone relies on State v. Langenbach, in which the 
court of appeals concluded that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination extends to the responsibility stage 
of bifurcated NGI proceedings, to argue that its corollary must 
also extend to that phase.  State v. Langenbach, 2001 WI App 
222, 247 Wis. 2d 933, ¶20, 634 N.W.2d 916.  But what we have 
already said shows that that claim must fail.  To the extent 
that Langenbach rested its holding on the notion that Fifth 
                                                 
21 The same reasoning applies to the privilege against self-
incrimination contained in Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
28 
 
Amendment protections continue past the entry of a guilty plea, 
Langenbach, 247 Wis. 2d 933, ¶¶9-13, we agree that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is applicable in "any . . . proceeding, 
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 
incriminate [an individual] in future criminal proceedings."  
Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77 (citation omitted).  Yet although a 
witness might incriminate herself at both criminal and civil 
proceedings, the range of settings at which a witness might have 
legitimate reason to offer testimony pertaining to her criminal 
guilt is considerably narrower.  It does not include the 
responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI proceedings, which does 
not pertain to issues of criminal liability.  
¶44 The 
alternative 
interpretation——that 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment right to testify is available wherever the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is available——has no basis in the federal 
constitution and is impracticable.  That is, although the State 
may 
not, 
without 
violating 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination, establish noncriminal statutory proceedings at 
which to "by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of 
his own mouth," Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 450 (1984) 
(citation omitted), this does not require that a witness be 
permitted to use "any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, 
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in 
future 
criminal 
proceedings," 
Lefkowitz, 
414 
U.S. 
at 
77 
(citation omitted), as a rostrum from which to protest her 
innocence or attempt to reduce impending criminal penalties, no 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
29 
 
matter how irrelevant the proceeding to the witness's criminal 
guilt.22 
                                                 
22 The Langenbach court separately premised its holding that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege applied at the responsibility 
phase on its conclusion that the responsibility phase, while not 
criminal in nature, "remains a part of the criminal case in 
general."  State v. Langenbach, 2001 WI App 222, ¶19, 247 
Wis. 2d 933, 634 N.W.2d 916 (citation omitted).  The intended 
constitutional meaning of that statement is unclear.  If the 
court meant that, regardless of whether a criminal defendant's 
testimony in the responsibility phase might incriminate the 
defendant in any future proceeding, the privilege applies 
because a statement might be "incriminating" for purposes of the 
responsibility phase itself, the court was incorrect.  See Allen 
v. 
Illinois, 
478 
U.S. 
364, 
368 
(1986) 
("What 
we 
have 
here . . . is not a claim that petitioner's statements to the 
psychiatrists might be used to incriminate him in some future 
criminal proceeding, but instead his claim that because the 
sexually-dangerous-person proceeding is itself 'criminal,' he 
was entitled to refuse to answer any questions at all.").  As we 
have explained, the responsibility phase is not criminal in 
nature or purpose.  Therefore, a statement at that phase, by 
definition, could only be "incriminating" for purposes of some 
other proceeding.  In any event, that line of reasoning was 
apparently not essential to the Langenbach court's holding. 
The Langenbach court relied in part for this portion of its 
reasoning on its earlier decision in State v. Murdock, 2000 WI 
App 170, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175, where it had concluded 
that 
a 
criminal 
jury 
waiver 
statute 
applied 
to 
the 
responsibility phase.  Murdock, 238 Wis. 2d 301, ¶¶2, 19.  The 
Murdock court stated in the course of its analysis that "[t]he 
statutes 
governing 
the 
procedures 
for 
trying 
[NGI] 
pleas . . . have kept the responsibility phase and guilt phase 
attached in procedure even as they are detached in nature and 
purpose."  Id. at ¶24.  
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
30 
 
¶45 As discussed, the right of criminal defendants to 
testify in their own behalf also has a source in the Compulsory 
Process Clause, because "[l]ogically included in the accused's 
right to call witnesses whose testimony is 'material and 
favorable to his defense,' United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 
458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982), is a right to testify himself, should 
he decide it is in his favor to do so."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 
(emphasis added).  What is not "logically included" in such a 
right, however, is a right to testify as to matters and in a 
proceeding applicable, not to a defendant's criminal defense, 
                                                                                                                                                             
We do not express an opinion on the merits of Murdock's 
holding, because the case is distinguishable.  The question in 
Murdock did not involve the interpretation of any constitutional 
provisions, but instead whether the responsibility phase is part 
of a "criminal case[]" within the meaning of the jury waiver 
statute.  Id., ¶19 (citation omitted).  And the fact that the 
guilt and responsibility phases are "attached in procedure"——
i.e., both "part of the chapter on criminal procedure," id., 
¶27——is arguably much more relevant to the question of whether 
the jury waiver statute applies equally to both phases than it 
is to a question involving the existence or application of a 
constitutional right, especially given our earlier case law 
explaining 
the 
noncriminal 
nature 
and 
purpose 
of 
NGI 
proceedings.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; [and] in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes . . . .").  
Importantly, the Murdock court did not ignore the distinct 
natures of the guilt and responsibility phases, but instead 
rested its holding in part on the fact that the purpose of the 
jury waiver statute is fulfilled both when the jury is sitting 
as fact-finder (in the guilt phase) and when it is sitting as 
"moral decision maker" (in the responsibility phase).  See 
Murdock, 238 Wis. 2d 301, ¶26. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
31 
 
but to a defendant's future institutional treatment.  See, e.g., 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407 (1988) ("[O]ur cases 
establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right 
to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of 
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury 
evidence that might influence the determination of guilt"  
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).).  The right to testify, 
insofar as it is grounded in the Compulsory Process Clause, is 
the right to testify in defense against charges of criminal 
wrongdoing.23 
¶46 The Rock Court clearly carved out a specific right to 
testify: one applicable to criminal defendants with regard to 
matters pertinent to criminal liability.  As we will discuss 
shortly, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process——
which is also a basis of the right identified by the Rock  
Court——still has application to the responsibility phase.  But 
given the previous discussion, we cannot conclude that the right 
which the Rock court identified——the fundamental right of 
defendants to testify in their own behalf in a criminal case——of 
                                                 
23 The same reasoning applies to the guarantee of compulsory 
process in Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
32 
 
necessity applies to a proceeding which is neither criminal in 
nature nor criminal in purpose.24  
 
D.  Whether Any Constitutional Right to Testify Exists at the 
Responsibility Phase of Bifurcated NGI Proceedings 
¶47 Importantly, the Rock Court identified a third basis 
for its right to testify: the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Rock, 483 U.S. at 51, which provides that 
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
                                                 
24 In explaining that a criminal defendant's fundamental 
"right to testify in her own behalf at a criminal trial" is 
premised in multiple constitutional guarantees, the Rock Court 
indicated that the right is properly understood as tied to a 
specific type of testimony——testimony of a criminal defendant 
pertaining to that defendant's criminal guilt——rather than 
simply to any specific proceeding or set of proceedings, however 
denominated.  See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987).  
Whatever might be said in defense of the "broad principles" 
enunciated in Rock, see id. at 64 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), 
we are mindful in considering Rock's sources-plus-consensus 
methodology that "the main danger in judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution . . . is that the judges will mistake their own 
predilections for the law. . . .  It is very difficult for a 
person to discern a difference between those political values 
that he personally thinks most important, and those political 
values that are 'fundamental to our society.'"  Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).  
Rock does not provide a basis for extending the specific 
protection it identified to a special proceeding not criminal in 
nature or purpose and not mandated by the federal or state 
constitutions. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
33 
 
amend. XIV.25  In the words of the Court, "A person's right to 
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to 
be heard in his defense——a right to his day in court——are basic 
in our system of jurisprudence. . . ."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 
(citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).  The Court 
specifically pointed out in a footnote that "[t]his right 
reaches beyond the criminal trial: the procedural due process 
constitutionally required in some extrajudicial proceedings 
includes the right of the affected person to testify."  Id. at 
51, n.9.26  
                                                 
25 Under 
the 
doctrine 
of 
incorporation, 
all 
three 
constitutional sources of the right to testify as applied in 
this case are based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742, 763 (2010).  This section involves discussion of the right 
to due process in the sense of due process unconnected to any 
specific guarantee of the Bill of the Rights. 
26 It was to this due process guarantee of the opportunity 
to be heard and offer testimony that we compared, in Denson, the 
Wisconsin Constitution's own guarantee that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by 
himself and counsel . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 7; see State 
v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶51, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 681 
(citing Wis. Const. art. I, § 7). 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
34 
 
¶48 Although the fundamental right of criminal defendants 
to testify in their own defense, even as based in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not apply in the responsibility phase of 
bifurcated NGI proceedings because that phase is not relevant to 
criminal liability, the phase is not necessarily exempted from 
the broad mandates of the Due Process Clause.  "The requirements 
of procedural due process apply . . . to the deprivation of 
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection 
of liberty and property."  Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).  And where the Due Process 
Clause applies, it requires, "at a minimum, that absent a 
countervailing 
state 
interest 
of 
overriding 
significance, 
                                                                                                                                                             
This court has never concluded that a criminal defendant's 
"right to be heard by himself and counsel" provides, of its own 
force, the same fundamental right to testify in one's own behalf 
at a criminal trial as that identified by the Supreme Court in 
Rock.  Given that criminal defendants as a group were not 
competent to testify as witnesses in Wisconsin until 1869——
decades after the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted——the 
soundness of any such conclusion would be questionable.  State 
v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 127, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); In re 
Estate of Johnson, 170 Wis. 436, 436, 175 N.W. 917 (1920); 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 370, 598 (1961).  Lagrone does not 
offer any evidence in support of such a view.  See also 
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[C]ommon-
law evidentiary rules prevented a criminal defendant from 
testifying in his own behalf even if he wanted to do so.  That 
is not to say, however, that a criminal defendant was not 
allowed to speak in his own behalf . . ." (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).); Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 298, 265 
N.W.2d 540 (1978) ("Every person sui juris, who is charged with 
crime, has the right to try his own case if he so desires. The 
constitution guarantees him the right to be heard 'by himself' 
as well as by counsel. . . " (first emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).). 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
35 
 
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through 
the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard."  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971); see 
also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313 (1950) ("Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and 
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no 
doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, 
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case."); Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 482 N.W.2d 353 
(1992). 
¶49 Although the State has established that Lagrone 
committed 
the 
criminal 
conduct 
alleged, 
"the 
successful 
assertion of the affirmative [NGI] defense in phase two results 
in a noncriminal-sanction disposition."  Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 
388.  We can assume for the sake of argument that Lagrone 
possesses a due process (as opposed to statutory) right to an 
opportunity to be heard and offer evidence, including in the 
form of his own testimony, at the responsibility phase of 
bifurcated NGI proceedings.  See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. 
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (procedural due process 
claims are assessed "in two steps: the first asks whether there 
exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered 
with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures 
attendant 
upon 
that 
deprivation 
were 
constitutionally 
sufficient" (citations omitted)); Langenbach, 247 Wis. 2d 933, 
¶13 (noting the "legitimate impending threat of the deprivation 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
36 
 
of [the defendant's] liberty, either through commitment to a 
mental hospital or imprisonment").  
¶50 We can assume this fact because Lagrone was indeed 
offered such an opportunity to be heard and to offer testimony. 
Lagrone was present at a two-day proceeding during which several 
individuals presented testimony relevant to Lagrone's mental 
responsibility.  The circuit court asked Lagrone directly at the 
close of evidence whether he agreed with his attorney that he 
did not wish to present any further evidence, and Lagrone 
responded in the affirmative.27  We therefore need not determine 
whether Lagrone possessed a due process right to an opportunity 
to be heard and offer testimony at the responsibility phase of a 
bifurcated NGI proceeding, and the contours of such a right, 
because he was afforded such an opportunity in this case.28   
 
E.  Whether a Circuit Court is Required to Conduct a  
Right-to-Testify Colloquy at the Responsibility Phase of 
Bifurcated NGI Proceedings and Whether an Evidentiary  
Hearing is Required When a Defendant Alleges Waiver  
of a Right to Testify at That Phase 
                                                 
27 See supra n.13. 
28 We do not in any way disavow our recent decision in 
Magett.  In that case we examined, among other things, the 
ability 
of 
criminal 
defendants 
to 
testify 
during 
the 
responsibility phase, and the relative value of such testimony.  
See Magett, 355 Wis. 2d 617, ¶¶7-8.  We also discussed the 
proper timing of dismissals or directed verdicts during the 
responsibility phase.  See id., ¶9.  The case did not, however, 
involve an inquiry into the separate question of whether a 
defendant 
has 
a 
constitutional 
right 
to 
testify 
at 
the 
responsibility phase. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
37 
 
¶51 As stated, the fundamental right to testify in one's 
own behalf as a defendant in a criminal case does not exist at 
the responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI proceedings because 
that phase is a noncriminal proceeding to which defendants 
possess no constitutional right.  At most, Lagrone possessed a 
general due process right to be heard and offer testimony during 
the responsibility phase, just as an individual might in other 
noncriminal 
proceedings 
such 
as, 
for 
example, 
certain 
proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, which governs the 
commitment of sexually violent persons.  See State v. Burris, 
2004 WI 91, ¶22, 273 Wis. 2d 294, 682 N.W.2d 812; see also Rock, 
483 U.S. at 51 n.9 (citations omitted); State ex rel. Vanderbeke 
v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 502, 513-14, 563 N.W.2d 882 (1997) 
("Revocation of probation is a civil proceeding in Wisconsin.  A 
probationer is therefore not entitled to the full panoply of 
rights accorded persons subject to criminal process.  It is well 
settled, however, that a probationer is entitled to due process 
of law before probation may be revoked."). 
¶52 Any such right is not independently grounded in the 
Fifth or Sixth Amendments and is not the fundamental right for 
which this court in Weed established the requirement that 
circuit 
courts 
conduct 
waiver 
colloquies 
with 
criminal 
defendants.  See Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶40.  As we recognized 
in Weed, "only a minority of jurisdictions impose an affirmative 
duty on circuit courts to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to 
ensure that a criminal defendant is knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waiving his or her right to testify."  Id.,  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
38 
 
¶41.  Given that the general practice with regard to the 
fundamental right of criminal defendants to testify in their own 
behalf is not to require a colloquy, we decline to create such a 
requirement where a fundamental right has not been identified.  
It is difficult to see why such a requirement would not be 
logically applicable to many other noncriminal proceedings.  
¶53 We emphasize again that Lagrone does not challenge the 
plea colloquy that occurred during the guilt phase of his 
bifurcated NGI proceedings, and does not argue that he was 
unaware that, by pleading guilty to the criminal charges against 
him, he was waiving his fundamental right to testify at a 
criminal trial pertaining to the validity of those charges.  
Nothing in this opinion affects the fundamental right of a 
criminal defendant to testify in his or her own behalf at a 
criminal trial, and nothing in this opinion affects Weed's 
instruction that a right-to-testify colloquy occur at such a 
proceeding.  See id., ¶2.  But because this fundamental right is 
not applicable in the responsibility phase of bifurcated NGI 
proceedings, we decline to mandate that a colloquy occur at that 
phase.  While the responsibility phase is undoubtedly an 
important proceeding for criminal defendants, any requirement of 
a colloquy in that phase should come from the legislature.  We 
note, however, that it may well be the best practice for circuit 
courts to ask defendants directly at the responsibility phase 
whether they wish to testify. 
 See, e.g., Denson, 335 
Wis. 2d 681, ¶¶58, 67 (recommending an on-the-record colloquy 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
39 
 
regarding a criminal defendant's right not to testify as the 
"better practice").  
¶54 Here, without proceeding further to the responsibility 
phase of the trial, Lagrone would stand convicted and poised for 
sentencing.  The responsibility phase is, as a practical matter, 
quite distinct from the guilt phase.  If the State prevails at 
the guilt phase, the defendant, who then bears the burden of 
proof, would seek to prove that he or she should receive mental 
treatment rather than a criminal sentence.  Simply stated, the 
responsibility phase, wherein the defendant bears the burden of 
proof, is altogether different from the guilt phase of the 
trial. 
¶55 To the degree that Lagrone was owed an opportunity to 
be heard, he was granted such an opportunity.  Lagrone has not 
made the requisite showing for an evidentiary hearing; more is 
required.  See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶¶9, 12-13, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433; cf. State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, 
¶¶3, 18, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.  With regard to the 
strategic decision of the specific evidence a defendant will 
present during the responsibility phase in order to meet his or 
her burden, "the decision whether to testify should be made by 
the defendant after consulting with counsel," but "counsel, in 
the absence of the express disapproval of the defendant on the 
record during the pretrial or trial proceedings, may waive" any 
right to testify that a defendant possesses at that hearing.  
Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 133. 
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
40 
 
¶56 Here, Lagrone's attorney informed the circuit court at 
the close of evidence that Lagrone had no further evidence to 
present.  Lagrone, when questioned by the circuit court on that 
point, agreed.  The record is devoid of any indication that 
Lagrone voiced a wish at trial to testify, or that the circuit 
court or Lagrone's attorney prevented Lagrone from testifying.29  
See id.  Lagrone's sole allegation is that he did not understand 
that he could testify, and he does not even explain the 
substance of his proposed testimony.  Without more, we see no 
need to remand for an evidentiary hearing.  The postconviction 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
Lagrone's postconviction motion, because Lagrone was afforded 
                                                 
29 As discussed, supra n. 11, certain of the documents 
signed by Lagrone prior to the responsibility phase, such as the 
plea questionnaire form, contain handwritten notes in the 
margins 
potentially 
relevant 
to 
Lagrone's 
opportunity 
to 
testify.  For instance, on the plea questionnaire form under the 
heading "Constitutional Rights," and next to the checked box 
reading "I give up my right to testify and present evidence at 
trial," the following is handwritten: "True for Phase I, not for 
II."  Although the notes do not affect the outcome of this case, 
we observe that, if anything, they suggest that Lagrone and his 
counsel indeed understood that Lagrone could present evidence 
and testimony during the responsibility phase.  
The provenance of the notes is unknown, and Lagrone argues 
before this court that their precise meaning is ambiguous, but 
this claim alone does not justify remand for an evidentiary 
hearing.  Lagrone's postconviction motion does not set forth any 
factual allegations relevant to why the presence of the 
handwritten notes would mandate a hearing; he simply states in 
the motion, "[T]he plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form 
for phase one note[s] that [Lagrone] was not giving up the right 
to testify in the mental responsibility phase."  
No. 
2013AP1424-CR 
 
41 
 
all the process he was due.  See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶¶9, 
12-13 (if postconviction motion does not raise facts sufficient 
to entitle movant to relief, or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or if record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
relief, 
circuit 
court 
has 
discretion to deny evidentiary hearing, which decision is 
reviewable under deferential erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that, although a better practice, a 
circuit court is not required to conduct a right-to-testify 
colloquy at the responsibility phase of a bifurcated trial 
resulting from a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease 
or defect.  Further, Lagrone is not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing because he has not made the requisite showing for such a 
hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶58 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  At issue in 
this case is whether a circuit court is required to conduct an 
on-the-record colloquy regarding the waiver of the right to 
testify at the responsibility phase of a bifurcated criminal 
trial. 
¶59 Lagrone asserts that he had a right to testify at the 
responsibility phase of a bifurcated criminal trial and that an 
on-the-record right to testify colloquy is required.  Even the 
State concedes that he has such a right, but contends that it is 
not a fundamental right requiring a colloquy.  
¶60 Ultimately the majority concludes that "although a 
better practice," a circuit court is not required to conduct a 
right to testify colloquy at the responsibility phase of a 
bifurcated trial.  In reaching its conclusion that no colloquy 
is required, the majority skews the record and contravenes 
controlling precedent. 
¶61 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that precedent 
mandates more than a "better practice" admonition.  Both the 
United States Supreme Court and Wisconsin precedent support the 
conclusion that there is a fundamental right to testify at the 
second phase of a bifurcated criminal trial conducted pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 971.165(1)(a).1  A right to testify colloquy is 
                                                 
1 When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect, the circuit court follows the procedure for a 
bifurcated trial set forth in Wis. Stat. § 971.165(1)(a) which 
provides:  
(continued) 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
2 
 
required in order to ensure that a defendant knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waived the fundamental right to 
testify.2  I would reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.3  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                                                                                                                                             
There shall be a separation of the issues with a 
sequential order of proof in a continuous trial.  The 
plea of not guilty shall be determined first and the 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect shall be determined second.   
If the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury 
during the first phase, the trial proceeds to the second phase. 
In the second phase, a jury determines whether "as a result of 
mental disease or defect the person lacked substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or 
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.15(1).   
2 Lagrone 
also 
asserts 
a 
claim 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution states in part: "No person . . . may be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or 
herself."  However, he does not argue this claim separately from 
his federal constitutional claim.  Accordingly, we address the 
arguments as presented by Lagrone. 
3 Pursuant to State v. Garcia, 2010 WI App 26, ¶¶1, 9, 14, 
323 Wis. 2d 531, 779 N.W.2d 718, when a circuit court fails to 
conduct a colloquy regarding the waiver of the right to testify, 
the defendant's remedy is an evidentiary hearing.  The harmless 
error analysis set forth in State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317, does not apply because Lagrone 
filed his motion prior to this court's decision in Nelson.  
Additionally, Nelson arguably is distinguishable because it 
applies to the denial of a defendant's assertion of the right to 
testify, not a circuit court's failure to conduct a colloquy.  
Id. at ¶15-16.   
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
3 
 
I. 
¶62 At the outset, I observe that the majority opinion 
skews the evidentiary record in this case.  It obfuscates an 
important fact and minimizes others.   
¶63 The majority obfuscates the fact that the circuit 
court failed to conduct a colloquy regarding the waiver of 
Lagrone's right to testify at either phase of the bifurcated 
trial.  It correctly states that at the responsibility phase the 
circuit court neither informed Lagrone that he had a right to 
testify, nor asked Lagrone whether he was waiving his right to 
testify.  See Majority op., ¶13.  However, it fails to 
acknowledge that at the guilt phase of the trial the circuit 
court also failed to conduct the required colloquy regarding the 
right to testify. 
¶64 The colloquy with Lagrone during the guilt phase of 
the bifurcated trial is buried in a footnote in the majority 
opinion.  See majority op., ¶11 n.12.  The circuit court did not 
question Lagrone about whether he understood that he was waiving 
his right to testify: 
Do you understand that by pleading guilty in the first 
phase of this case, you give up all those rights, like 
the right to have a trial on whether you committed 
these crimes and the right to force the State to prove 
you committed these crimes and the right to present 
witnesses about whether you committed the crimes, all 
those rights, did you understand all those and 
understand that you're giving them up?  Majority op, 
¶11 n. 12. 
¶65 Under State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶43, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 
666 N.W.2d 485, this was an insufficient plea colloquy.  Weed 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
4 
 
requires that a circuit court conduct an on-the-record, right to 
testify colloquy.  "The colloquy should consist of a basic 
inquiry to ensure that (1) the defendant is aware of his or her 
right to testify and (2) the defendant has discussed this right 
with his or her counsel."  Id., ¶43. 
¶66 The majority skirts this deficiency by telling the 
reader only that "Lagrone does not challenge the plea colloquy 
that occurred during the guilt phase of his bifurcated NGI 
proceedings."  Majority op., ¶4.  Further obscuring the 
deficiency in another footnote, the majority explains that 
"nothing in this opinion affects our instruction in State v. 
Weed that circuit courts conduct an on-the-record colloquy at a 
criminal trial, or at the guilt phase of bifurcated NGI 
proceedings, 
to 
ensure 
that 
the 
defendant 
is 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his or her fundamental 
right to testify."  Majority op., ¶5 n.3.   
¶67 Although Lagrone does not challenge the plea colloquy 
at the guilt phase of the trial, it is problematic to obscure 
this significant deficiency from the reader.  The lack of a 
colloquy regarding Lagrone's right to testify and waiver of that 
right at the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial amplifies the 
absence of a colloquy at the responsibility phase.  Without any 
colloquy at either stage in the proceedings, there is nothing in 
the record that indicates Lagrone was knowingly, intelligently  
and voluntarily waiving his right to testify. 
¶68 Perhaps because there is nothing in the record 
regarding Lagrone's waiver of his right to testify, the majority 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
5 
 
relies on a hand-written note on a plea advisement and a waiver 
of rights form to suggest that Lagrone knew he had a right to 
testify.  Tucked away in another footnote, the plea form 
discussion is minimized along with the majority's explanation 
for that form.  See majority op., ¶¶11 n.11, 56 n.29. 
¶69 As relevant to the right to testify, it provides:  
 
The court of appeals interpreted the hand-written notation 
("True for phase I, not for II") to mean that Lagrone was 
preserving his right to testify at the second phase of the 
trial.  State v. Lagrone, No. 2013AP1424-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015) (explaining "Lagrone was 
giving up his right to testify in the first phase but not the 
second phase of the proceeding."). 
¶70 Jettisoning the plain meaning interpretation of the 
court of appeals, the majority instead grasps at a curious 
alternative interpretation.  By conflating the discreet right of 
the defendant to testify with the general right to present 
evidence and testimony, the majority interprets the hand written 
notation to mean "that Lagrone and his counsel indeed understood 
that Lagrone could present evidence and testimony during the 
responsibility phase."  Majority op., ¶56 n.29.  
¶71 If the majority is going to rely on its curious 
interpretation of a hand-written note to assert that Lagrone 
fully 
understood 
his 
right 
to 
testify 
and 
knowingly, 
intelligently 
and 
voluntarily 
waived 
that 
right 
at 
the 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
6 
 
responsibility phase, then it should not minimize this part of 
its analysis by relegating it to a footnote.  Perhaps by tucking 
the discussion of the form in a footnote, the majority indicates 
that it is aware of how slender the reed is upon which it rests 
its 
assertion 
that 
Lagrone 
knowingly, 
intelligently 
and 
voluntarily waived his right to testify.    
II. 
¶72 Not only does the majority opinion skew the record, it 
contravenes controlling precedent.  Unlike the majority, I would 
follow 
well-established 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
and 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
in 
reaching 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
fundamental constitutional right of a criminal defendant to 
testify on one's behalf applies during the second phase of a 
bifurcated criminal trial.  Any waiver of that right must be 
subjected to an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that the waiver 
is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.  
¶73 The legal precedent underpinning my conclusion is 
straightforward.  Although the right to testify at the second 
phase of a bifurcated criminal trial is an issue of first-
impression before this court, the fundamental constitutional 
right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf is well-
established.  See Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶39-40 (a circuit 
court must conduct a personal colloquy on-the-record in order to 
ensure 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
intelligently 
and 
voluntarily waived the fundamental right to testify).    
¶74 In Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the right to testify is a "necessary corollary to 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
7 
 
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony."  
Rock, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 
230 (1971)).  When a criminal defendant has Fifth Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination, 
there 
is 
also 
a 
corresponding right to testify in one's defense.4   
¶75 As 
the 
Rock 
court 
explained, 
"[e]very 
criminal 
defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to 
refuse to do so."  Id. at 53 (citing Harris, 401 U.S. at 225).  
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination "is 
fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the right to remain 
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of 
his own will."  Id. (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 
(1964) (emphasis removed)).  Accordingly, the choice of whether 
to testify is an exercise of the constitutional privilege.  Id. 
¶76 In Wisconsin, the Fifth Amendment privilege applies 
beyond the guilty phase of the bifurcated criminal trial.5  Over 
thirty years ago, this court determined that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege "continues at least until sentencing."  State v. 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 
6 (1964). 
5 The majority acknowledges that Wisconsin's Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence conforms generally with the U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  See Majority op., ¶43.  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973), 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
is 
applicable 
in 
"any [] proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where 
the answers might incriminate [an individual] in future criminal 
proceedings."  
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
8 
 
McConnohie, 121 Wis. 2d 57, 63, 358 N.W.2d 256 (1984).  Twenty 
years ago, this court determined that a defendant retains his or 
her Fifth Amendment privilege while an appeal is pending or 
before the time for an appeal as of right or plea withdrawal has 
expired.  State v. Marks, 194 Wis. 2d 79, 92, 533 N.W.2d 730 
(1995).  
¶77 For the past fifteen years, it has been well-
established that the Fifth Amendment applies to the second phase 
of a bifurcated criminal trial.  State v. Langenbach, 2001 WI 
App 222, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 933, 634 N.W.2d 916.  As the Langenbach 
court 
explained, 
"[b]ecause 
there 
is 
a 
possibility 
that 
Langenbach could be sentenced in this matter if the jury finds 
him to be mentally responsible for his actions, his Fifth 
Amendment privileges survive his no contest pleas."  Id.    
¶78 Thus, the inexorable conclusion is that Lagrone has a 
Fifth Amendment right to testify at the second phase of his 
bifurcated criminal trial.  The United States Supreme Court 
instructs that the right to testify is a "necessary corollary to 
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony."  
Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (citing Harris, 401 U.S. at 230).  Under 
Wisconsin law, the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
testimonial self-incrimination continues through the mental 
responsibility 
stage 
of 
a 
bifurcated 
criminal 
trial.  
Langenbach, 247 Wis. 2d 933, ¶20.   
¶79 Despite the overwhelming weight of the law to the 
contrary, the majority concludes that the fundamental right to 
testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial does not extend 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
9 
 
to the responsibility phase of bifurcated criminal trial.  
Majority op., ¶41.  As observed above, in reaching this 
conclusion the majority contravenes both United States Supreme 
Court precedent and Wisconsin law. 
¶80 The majority protests Rock's determination that the 
right to testify is a "necessary corollary" to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  According to 
the majority, the conclusion that the right to testify is 
available wherever the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
"has no basis in the federal constitution and is impracticable."  
Majority op., ¶44.  In its attempt to deny Lagrone his Fifth 
Amendment right to testify here, the majority creates a straw 
man out of the fear that every litigant in every proceeding——
civil and criminal——will now have a right to testify.            
¶81 The majority's fear of unlimited and impracticable 
expansion of the Fifth Amendment right to testify is unfounded.  
Lagrone never argues that the Fifth Amendment fundamental right 
to testify is applicable to every proceeding.  Rather, the issue 
before the court in this case is limited to whether the Fifth 
Amendment right to testify applies to the second phase of a 
bifurcated criminal trial, not whether it applies to every 
imaginable proceeding.  
¶82 Relying on State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, 355 Wis. 2d 
617, 850 N.W.2d 42 and State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 418 
N.W.2d 804 (1988), the majority misconstrues Wisconsin law by 
arguing that the responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial is 
not a criminal trial and therefore the rights afforded a 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
10 
 
criminal defendant do not apply.6  According to the majority, the 
fundamental right to testify identified by the Rock court "is 
not some generalized right to testify; it is instead '[t]he 
right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial.'"  
Majority op., ¶40 (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 51). 
¶83 The majority disregards Wisconsin case law that is 
directly on point.  In State v. Murdock, the court of appeals 
explained the interconnection between the first and second 
phases of a bifurcated criminal trial.  2000 WI App 170, ¶¶24-
25, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175.   
¶84 Relying on Koput, the Murdock court explained that the 
mental responsibility phase could have evolved as an entirely 
separate procedure from the guilt phase.  Id., ¶24 (citing 
Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 394).  As Murdock correctly acknowledged, 
the statutes governing the bifurcated trial for NGI pleas 
remains in Chapter 971, which governs criminal procedure.  The 
legislature has "kept the responsibility phase and guilt phase 
attached in procedure even as they are detached in nature and 
purpose."  Id.  Thus, the Murdock court considered that "the 
                                                 
6 In State v. Koput, this court determined that "the 
responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial is not an integral 
part of the criminal trial, but is rather a special proceeding 
in the criminal process. . . ."  142 Wis. 2d 370, 374, 418 
N.W.2d 804 (1988).  More recently, in State v. Magett, this 
court explained that the "history of trials involving NGI pleas 
demonstrates that the current responsibility phase has undergone 
a transformation from a criminal proceeding to something close 
to a civil trial."  2014 WI 67, ¶39, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 
42. 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
11 
 
responsibility phase has not been procedurally removed from the 
criminal proceedings."  Id. at ¶25.    
¶85 The majority fails to address Murdock head-on and 
instead attempts to distinguish it in a footnote.  See Majority 
op., ¶44 n.22.  According to the majority, the fact that the 
guilt and responsibility phases are attached in procedure is 
much more relevant to the question in Murdock of whether the 
jury waiver statute applies equally to both phases than it is to 
the constitutional question here.  Id.  The majority's analysis 
of Murdock is cursory and unpersuasive because it provides no 
reason why the wavier of a right might be different in this case 
as it relates to the bifurcated procedure. 
¶86 Furthermore, in Langenbach, the court of appeals 
explained that the responsibility phase "remains a part of the 
criminal case in general."  247 Wis. 2d 933, ¶19.  In the same 
footnote, the majority dispenses with Langenbach.  Majority op., 
¶44 n.22.  It argues that a statement in the responsibility 
phase could only be incriminating for the purpose of some other 
proceeding and that "[i]n any event, that line of reasoning was 
apparently not essential to the Langenbach court's holding."  
Id.  Thus, the majority does not overrule either Langenbach or 
Murdock, but instead dismisses both opinions in a footnote.   
¶87 Rather 
than 
follow 
Murdock 
and 
Langenbach, 
the 
majority relies on differences relating to the defendant's 
burden of proof between the two phases of a bifurcated criminal 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
12 
 
trial in order to argue that the second phase is not part of the 
criminal trial.7  However, as Justice Gableman stated during oral 
argument, regardless of the different burden the stakes are the 
same: 
But in this kind of case, if the defendant does not 
meet his or her burden, then they wind up like Mr. 
Lagrone going to the Wisconsin state prison system.  
And so I'm trying to wrestle with, and I'm wondering 
if you can help me to resolve, how it would be less 
important for the personal colloquy at the NGI phase 
as it is at the guilt or innocence phase? 
 . . .  
The stakes are the same.  Its prison or not prison. 
¶88 Not only is the potential outcome after both phases of 
the trial the same, but the defendant's burden of proof in the 
second phase may make his or her testimony even more critical 
than during the first phase.  Given that expert testimony is not 
a prerequisite to proving a mental disease or defect, it may be 
the defendant's own testimony that provides the most potent 
testimony in meeting the burden of proof.  See Magett, 355 Wis. 
2d 617, ¶41-44.  By testifying, a defendant has the opportunity 
                                                 
7 First, the defendant, rather than the State, bears the 
burden of establishing mental disease or defect.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.15(3).  Second, the defendant's burden is "to a reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence," 
rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.  Third, the 
defendant needs only a five-sixths verdict, rather than a 
unanimous jury.  Magett, 355 Wis. 2d 617, ¶39.  Fourth, in 
contrast to a criminal trial, a judge may grant a motion to 
dismiss the NGI defense or direct a verdict in favor of the 
state if the defendant does not meet his burden."  Id.   
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
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to take the stand, face the jury and explain his side of the 
events, hoping to persuade those who sit in judgment.  
¶89 The majority’s failure to recognize that the stakes 
are the same at both phases of a bifurcated criminal trial also 
impairs the majority's due process analysis.  Its analysis rests 
in part on the faulty premise that it need not address the 
contours of Lagrone's due process right to testify because "he 
was afforded such an opportunity in this case."  Majority op., 
¶50.  It seems to believe that because the circuit court asked 
whether Lagrone wished to present any further evidence, he could 
infer that the circuit court was asking whether he wished to 
testify. The analysis fails to recognize that the right to offer 
evidence and the right to testify on one's behalf are separate 
rights. 
¶90 Although the majority concedes that the responsibility 
phase is "not necessarily exempted from the broad mandates of 
the Due Process Clause," its faulty premise leads the majority 
to abandon the Supreme Court's well-established two-step due 
process test.  Majority op., ¶48.  In a procedural due process 
analysis, the court asks first whether a liberty or property 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
14 
 
interest exists which has been interfered with by the State.8  
Kentucky Dept. of Corr. V. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).  
Next, the court examines whether the procedures employed were 
constitutionally sufficient.  Id. 
¶91 The first step is readily met here.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has determined, procedural due process 
protections apply when the defendant's interest is the loss of 
liberty as a result of incarceration.  See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 
U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 781-82 (1973).  The second phase of a bifurcated criminal 
trial undeniably results in a loss of liberty.  Either Lagrone 
will be committed to an institution for mental health treatment 
or he will be sent to prison.     
¶92 In its conclusory treatment of the second step, the 
majority errs because it does not analyze whether the procedures 
employed were constitutionally sufficient.  Although cases 
involving parole or probation may have required only a hearing 
with the opportunity to testify, not all situations calling for 
procedural safeguards require the same procedure.  Morrissey, 
408 U.S. at 481.  The loss of liberty for Lagrone is even 
                                                 
8 With respect to the first step of the analysis, it is 
well-established that criminal defendants have a due process 
right to testify at a variety of stages during criminal 
proceedings.  See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 
1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 
F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see 
also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
15 
 
greater than that of a parolee or probationer, because he has 
not yet been sentenced or committed.  Thus, the procedure that 
is appropriate for a parolee or probationer may be not 
sufficient for a criminal defendant.   
¶93 The majority's analysis fails to recognize that the 
consequence 
of 
losing 
at 
the 
responsibility 
phase 
of 
a 
bifurcated trial is the same as the consequence of losing at the 
guilt phase.  The stakes are the same——its prison or not prison.  
Because the stakes are the same at both the first and second 
phase of a bifurcated criminal trial, I conclude that due 
process requires the same procedural protection——a right to 
testify colloquy——at both phases of the bifurcated criminal 
trial.  
¶94 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that precedent 
mandates more than a "better practice" admonition.  Both the 
United States Supreme Court and Wisconsin precedent support the 
conclusion that there is a fundamental right to testify at the 
second phase of a bifurcated criminal trial.  A right to testify 
colloquy is required in order to ensure that a defendant 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the fundamental 
right to testify.  I would reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2013AP1724.awb 
 
 
 
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