Title: State v. Jones
Citation: 353 N.C. 159
Docket Number: 347A99
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2000

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS RICHARD JONES
No. 347A99
Filed 21 December 2000
1.
Homicide--felony murder--DWI--implied intent
First-degree murder convictions which arose from driving while impaired were reversed
where the defendant was found guilty under the felony murder rule, based upon injuries to others
in the victims’ car and resulting assault convictions.  The North Carolina murder statute.
N.C.G.S. § 14-17, designates five specific felonies as the basis for felony murder, each requiring
actual intent to commit the crime; while there is a catchall category of felonies committed with a
deadly weapon (such as an automobile), all of the crimes qualified by case law require actual
intent to commit the underlying crime.  There is no first-degree murder case premised on implied
intent as evidenced by culpable or criminal negligence and no language in N.C.G.S. § 14-17
suggesting that the legislature intended or even contemplated that first-degree murder might be
premised on implied intent; however, the General Assembly has  passed N.C.G.S. § 20-141.4,
felony and misdemeanor death by vehicle, in contemplating situations similar to the case at hand. 
 Moreover, the State’s theory as to the applicability of the felony murder rule in reckless driving
cases has the potential for profoundly unjust results, and it is presumed that the legislature did
not intend an unjust result.  If culpable negligence is to be a building block in a capital case, it
must be by clear mandate of the legislature and not through judicial fiat or through innovative
application by prosecutors.  There is, however, ample evidence in the record to support a charge
of second-degree murder.
2.
Evidence--murder prosecution--pending DWI charge--malice
The trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder and assault arising from driving
while impaired by admitting defendant’s pending DWI charge.  The circumstances attendant to
the pending charge, such as speeding on the wrong side of the road and running another motorist
off the road, demonstrate that defendant was aware that his conduct was reckless and inherently
dangerous.  The evidence therefore tended to show malice, an element of second-degree murder,
and was properly admitted under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b).
3.
Homicide--DWI--proximate cause and insulating negligence--denied--instructions
denied
The trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder and assault resulting from driving
while impaired by not instructing the jury on proximate cause and insulating acts of negligence. 
The requested instruction that defendant’s actions must be the sole and only proximate cause of
the collision in order to hold him criminally liable was a misstatement of the law and the record
shows no evidence of any negligence by the driver of the other car.  Defendant was in her lane
and she was forced to swerve into the left lane to try to avoid a collision; defendant’s argument
that she should have swerved to the right and hit a telephone pole and/or mailboxes is entirely
unpersuasive.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 133 N.C. App. 448, 516
S.E.2d 405 (1999), finding no error in judgments entered by
Freeman, (William H.) J., on 6 May 1997 in Superior Court,
Forsyth County.  On 2 December 1999, the Supreme Court retained
defendant’s notice of appeal as to a substantial constitutional
question pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) and allowed
discretionary review of additional issues.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 13 March 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III,
Special Deputy Attorney General, and Jonathan P. Babb,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
David B. Freedman, Dudley A. Witt, and Carol L. Teeter for
defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
Defendant was indicted on 21 October 1996 for the first-
degree murders of Julie Marie Hansen and Maia C. Witzl. 
Defendant was simultaneously indicted for assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury (AWDWISI) on Aline J. Iodice,
Melinda P. Warren, and Margaret F. Penney.  The State later
reduced the charge related to Penney to assault with a deadly
weapon (AWDW).  On 10 February 1997, an additional indictment
charged defendant with AWDWISI on Lea Temple Billmeyer and
driving while impaired (DWI).
Defendant was tried capitally at the 21 April 1997 Criminal
Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County.  The State’s evidence
at trial tended to show that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on
4 September 1996, defendant crashed his vehicle into another
vehicle occupied by six Wake Forest University students.  Two of
the students were killed in the collision, while three others
were seriously injured.
Shortly before the crash, defendant was involved in an
altercation while stopped at a red light at an intersection in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina.  Defendant repeatedly bumped
another vehicle from behind with his own vehicle.  A witness to
the incident heard the defendant use profanity and tell the other
driver to get out of the way.  According to the witness, when the
light changed defendant “zoomed” around the car and “shot on
off,” moving at an excessive rate of speed.  The driver defendant
bumped from behind followed defendant to obtain his vehicle tag
number and observed defendant’s car run up on a curb, causing a
hub cap to fall off.  After obtaining defendant’s plate number,
the driver and his passenger stopped and called 911.  The
passenger told a police officer that defendant was “driving real
crazy” and that “if somebody doesn’t get him, he’s going to kill
somebody.”
Prior to the collision at issue in this case, the six
students from Wake Forest University were traveling eastbound on
Polo Road, while defendant was traveling westbound on the same
road at an excessive rate of speed.  As the students rounded a
curve, they observed two headlights moving quickly toward them in
their lane of travel.  Iodice, a passenger in the front seat of
the vehicle driven by Penney, testified that the headlights “were
moving so quickly and I realized they were in our lane from the
very first time I saw them until” the collision occurred.  Penney
raised her foot off the accelerator pedal but could not pull her
car to the right because of a telephone pole and mailboxes lining
the side of Polo Road.  Penney attempted to turn left onto
Brookwood Drive to avoid colliding with defendant’s vehicle, but
defendant moved his vehicle back into his proper lane and crashed
into the side of Penney’s vehicle.
Hansen and Witzl, each nineteen-year-old passengers in
Penney’s vehicle, were killed.  Billmeyer sustained serious
injuries, including a contusion of her kidney, a concussion, and
a fractured pelvis.  Iodice was diagnosed with a ruptured
bladder, internal bleeding, a fractured hip and pelvic bone, and
a concussion.  Warren’s injuries included fractures to her ankle,
femur, and pelvis, as well as internal bleeding.  Penney received
minor injuries, including abrasions and bruises.
The crash investigation revealed that defendant had been
drinking alcohol and had a blood-alcohol content level of .046,
well below the legal limit of .08.  However, the presence of the
drugs Butalbital, Alprazlam, and Oxycodone was also found. 
Although these controlled substances were prescribed by a
physician, defendant’s doctor and a registered nurse had
previously instructed him not to drink or drive while taking the
medications.  The State’s expert at trial testified that the
combination of controlled substances and alcohol caused defendant
to be appreciably impaired and unfit to operate a motor vehicle
safely.  Furthermore, the State introduced a record of
defendant’s 1992 conviction for DWI, as well as testimony
concerning a pending DWI charge.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found defendant
guilty of the first-degree murders of Hansen and Witzl under the
felony murder rule.  The jury also found defendant guilty of
AWDWISI on Billmeyer, Iodice, and Warren; AWDW on Penney; and
DWI.  After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the murders of
Hansen and Witzl, and the trial court entered judgments in accord
with that recommendation.  The trial court arrested judgment on
the three convictions for AWDWISI and sentenced defendant to an
active term of 120 days for the AWDW on Penney and 90 days for
the DWI.  Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, found no error. 
State v. Jones, 133 N.C. App. 448, 516 S.E.2d 405 (1999). 
Defendant appealed to this Court as a matter of right based on a
constitutional question and on the dissent below.  On 2 December
1999, we allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary review of
additional issues.
The paramount issue in the case, as raised by the dissent
and, in the alternative, defendant’s Petition for Discretionary
Review, is whether the defendant was properly convicted of first-
degree murder under the felony murder rule.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court to allow defendant to be
tried capitally for first-degree murder.  For reasons outlined
and discussed below, we hold the Court of Appeals erred in that
for purposes of felony murder:  (1) culpable negligence may not
be used to satisfy the intent requirements for a first-degree
murder charge; and, (2) a defendant may not be subject to a
potential death sentence absent a showing of actual intent to
commit one or more of the underlying felonies delineated or
described in our state’s murder statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-17.  As a
consequence of so holding, we find it unnecessary to address
defendant’s alternative arguments concerning alleged
constitutional violations, see State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163
S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780
(1969), and the so-called “merger doctrine.”  As for defendant’s
conviction for AWDW, he offers no arguments for appeal.  It,
therefore, stands affirmed.  In addition, we affirm the Court of
Appeals holding that the trial court committed no error by
admitting evidence of defendant’s prior acts or by omitting
defendant’s proposed jury instruction.  Thus, defendant’s
convictions for DWI and AWDWISI are affirmed.
I
[1] In 1893 the General Assembly codified the common law
offense of murder and subdivided first-degree murder into three
categories, one of which was “killings occurring in the
commission of certain specified felonies ‘or other felony.’” 
State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 423, 290 S.E.2d 574, 588 (1982). 
In 1977, the General Assembly amended this third category of
first-degree murder, commonly known as felony murder, so that it
applies to any killing “committed in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense,
robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or
attempted with the use of a deadly weapon.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-17;
for a discussion on the history of section 14-17, see Davis, 305
N.C. at 422-23, 290 S.E.2d at 588.  When a killing is committed
in the perpetration of an enumerated felony (arson, rape, etc.)
or other felony committed with the use of a deadly weapon, murder
in the first degree is established “‘irrespective of
premeditation or deliberation or malice aforethought.’”  State v.
Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 537, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985) (quoting
State v. Maynard, 247 N.C. 462, 469, 101 S.E.2d 340, 345 (1958). 
Moreover, intent to kill is not an element of felony murder.  See
State v. York, 347 N.C. 79, 97, 489 S.E.2d 380, 390 (1997).
In the instant case, defendant was charged with first-degree
murder under the felony murder rule based on the underlying
felony of AWDWISI.  The elements of AWDWISI are: (1) an assault,
(2) with a deadly weapon, (3) inflicting serious injury, (4) not
resulting in death.  See N.C.G.S. § 14-32(b) (1999).  We have
defined assault as “an overt act or attempt, with force or
violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the person of
another, which is sufficient to put a person of reasonable
firmness in fear of immediate physical injury.”  State v. Porter,
340 N.C. 320, 331, 457 S.E.2d 716, 721 (1995).  A deadly weapon
is “‘any article, instrument or substance which is likely to
produce death or great bodily harm.’”  State v. Bagley, 321 N.C.
201, 212, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987) (quoting State v.
Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 301, 283 S.E.2d 719, 725 (1981))
(alteration in original), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed.
2d 912 (1988).
It is well settled in North Carolina that an automobile can
be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a reckless or dangerous
manner.  State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 65, 86 S.E.2d 774, 779
(1955).  Thus, a driver who operates a motor vehicle in a manner
such that it constitutes a deadly weapon, thereby proximately
causing serious injury to another, may be convicted of AWDWISI
provided there is either an actual intent to inflict injury or
culpable or criminal negligence from which such intent may be
implied.  Id. at 65, 86 S.E.2d at 778.  Culpable or criminal
negligence has been defined as “‘such recklessness or
carelessness, proximately resulting in injury or death, as
imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless
indifference to the safety and rights of others.’”  State v.
Weston, 273 N.C. 275, 280, 159 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1968) (quoting
State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 30, 167 S.E. 456, 458 (1933). 
Moreover, “‘[a]n intentional, wilful or wanton violation of a
statute . . . , designed for the protection of human life or
limb, which proximately results in injury or death, is culpable
negligence.’”  State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90,
92-93 (1985) (quoting Cope, 204 N.C. at 31, 167 S.E. at 458
(1933)).  When a safety statute is unintentionally violated,
culpable negligence exists where the violation is “‘accompanied
by recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature,
when tested by the rule of reasonable [foreseeability], amounting
altogether to a thoughtless disregard of consequences or of a
heedless indifference to the safety of others.’”  State v.
Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 435, 103 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1958) (quoting
Cope, 204 N.C. at 31, 167 S.E. at 458).  We note, too, that
N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1, which prohibits drivers from operating motor
vehicles while under the influence of impairing substances, is a
safety statute designed for the protection of human life and limb
and that its violation constitutes culpable negligence as a
matter of law.  McGill, 314 N.C. at 637, 336 S.E.2d at 93.
In the case sub judice, Hansen and Witzl were killed while
defendant committed the crime of AWDWISI on Billmeyer, Iodice,
and Warren.  Defendant perpetrated the assault by operating his
automobile, a deadly weapon, in a culpably or criminally
negligent manner.  His criminal or culpable negligence was
established, as a matter of law, when he was convicted of DWI by
the jury, see id.; such negligence was also demonstrated by other
evidence tending to show that defendant was driving his vehicle
substantially in excess of the posted speed limit and on the
wrong side of the road.  See N.C.G.S. § 20-141 (1999); N.C.G.S. §
20-146 (1999), respectively.  Moreover, it is clear from the
evidence presented at trial that defendant’s actions proximately
caused serious injury to Billmeyer, Iodice, and Warren.  Thus,
the elements of AWDWISI have been satisfied, and defendant was
properly convicted of that offense as to each of the three
victims.  We next examine whether AWDWISI may serve as the
underlying felony for defendant’s first-degree murder conviction
under the felony murder rule.
From the outset, we recognize that our analysis of
defendant’s conviction for AWDWISI demonstrates that culpable or
criminal negligence may be used to satisfy the intent requisites
for certain dangerous felonies, such as manslaughter, assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and AWDWISI.  See
N.C.G.S. § 14-32; Eason, 242 N.C. at 65, 86 S.E.2d at 778; State
v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 755, 114 S.E. 828, 829 (1922). 
However, we are aware of no circumstance in which such negligence
has served to satisfy the intent element of first-degree murder,
a capital offense in North Carolina.  Moreover, in interpreting
our state’s homicide statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-17, we can find no
language suggesting that the legislature either contemplated or
intended such a result.
A close examination of our state’s murder statute reveals
three types of criminal conduct that qualify as first-degree
murder:  (1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated killings
(category 1); (2) killings resulting from poison, imprisonment,
starvation, torture, or lying in wait (category 2); and
(3) killings that occur during specifically enumerated felonies
or during a “felony committed or attempted with the use of a
deadly weapon” (category 3).  N.C.G.S. § 14-17.  All of these
categories require that the defendant have a mens rea greater
than culpable or criminal negligence; that is, they all require
that the defendant had “actual intent” to commit the act that
forms the basis of a first-degree murder charge.
First-degree murders committed under circumstances of
willful deliberation and premeditation (category 1), by
definition, require an actual intent on the part of a defendant
to kill another.  State v. Duncan, 282 N.C. 412, 193 S.E.2d 65
(1972) (holding that a specific intent to kill is an essential
element of first-degree murder).  Case law has also established
that a murder perpetrated by lying in wait (category 2)
demonstrates by circumstance an actual intent to participate in
conduct that results in a homicide.  State v. LeRoux, 326 N.C.
368, 390 S.E.2d 314, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871, 112 L. Ed. 2d
155 (1990).  Other specifically designated criminal conduct under
category 2, while not necessarily mandating an actual intent to
kill, requires at minimum an actual intent to undertake the
conduct resulting in death.  Thus, even if the killing itself was
not intended, the actual intent to torture, poison, starve, or
imprison the victim must be present in order for the killing to
qualify as first-degree murder.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 317
N.C. 193, 344 S.E.2d 775 (1986) (killing by poison is murder in
first degree if evidence tends to show only an intent to poison
and not a specific intent to kill).  Felony murder, as
exemplified by criminal conduct in category 3, operates
similarly.  Again, the actual intent to kill may be present or
absent; however, the actual intent to commit the underlying
felony is required.  This is not to imply that an accused must
intend to break the law, but rather that he must be purposely
resolved to participate in the conduct that comprises the
criminal offense.
N.C.G.S. § 14-17 initially enumerates five specific crimes
that may serve as underlying felonies for purposes of the felony
murder rule (arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, and burglary). 
The statute also incorporates a sixth umbrella grouping of 
“other felon[ies] committed or attempted with the use of a deadly
weapon,” which includes such crimes as AWDWISI and shooting into
an occupied dwelling or vehicle.  See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 14-32 and
N.C.G.S. § 14-34.1 (1999), respectively.  Each of the five
enumerated felonies requires that the perpetrator “intends” to
commit the offense.  Burglary requires specific intent as one of
its elements while rape, kidnapping, and robbery are general
intent crimes.  See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-51 (1999) (burglary), 14-27.2
(1999) (rape), 14-39 (1999) (kidnapping); for elements of
robbery, a common law crime, see State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162,
136 S.E.2d 595 (1964).  Arson, as a “malice” type crime, is
neither a specific nor a general intent offense but requires
“willful and malicious” conduct.  State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90,
100, 291 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1982) (emphasis added), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Barnes, 333 N.C. 666, 430 S.E.2d 223
(1993).
Whether “general intent,” “specific intent,” or “malice”
crimes, all of the enumerated offenses require a level of intent
greater than culpable negligence on the part of the accused.  In
short, the accused must be purposely resolved to commit the
underlying crime in order to be held accountable for unlawful
killings that occur during the crime’s commission.  See, e.g.,
Maynard, 247 N.C. 462, 101 S.E.2d 340 (holding that first-degree
murder conviction is appropriate if killing occurred during
defendant’s perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery);
other case examples showing defendant’s actual intent to commit
the underlying enumerated offense include State v. Simmons, 286
N.C. 681, 213 S.E.2d 280 (1975) (burglary), death sentence
vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (1976); State v.
McGlaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975) (arson), death
sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (1976); State
v. Mays, 225 N.C. 486, 35 S.E.2d 494 (1945) (rape); and State v.
Roseborough, 344 N.C. 121, 472 S.E.2d 763 (1996) (kidnapping).
Specific crimes that have qualified as an underlying felony
under both the pre- and post-amendment statute’s catchall
grouping include: discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle
or structure, see, e.g., State v. King, 316 N.C. 78, 340 S.E.2d
71 (1986); felonious escape, see, e.g., State v. Lee, 277 N.C.
205, 176 S.E.2d 765 (1970); armed felonious breaking and entering
and larceny, see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185
S.E.2d 666 (1972); sodomy under threat of deadly weapon, see,
e.g., State v. Doss, 279 N.C. 413, 183 S.E.2d 671 (1971), death
sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939, 33 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1972); assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill or with intent to
inflict serious injury, see, e.g., State v. Terry, 337 N.C. 615,
447 S.E.2d 720 (1994); and felonious child abuse, see, e.g.,
State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 488 S.E.2d 576 (1997).  Without
exception, each of these crimes, whether individually typed as
specific intent or general intent in nature, have required actual
intent on the part of the perpetrator.  As with the enumerated
felonies, in order to be held accountable for unlawful killings
that occur during the commission or attempted commission of these
crimes, the perpetrator must have been purposely resolved to
commit the underlying offense.  For example, a defendant may face
a first-degree murder charge for an unintended killing that
resulted from his firing a weapon into an occupied structure, but
only if the defendant intended to shoot into the building.  See,
e.g., State v. Cannon, 341 N.C. 79, 459 S.E.2d 238 (1995)
(evidence supported instruction that defendant confessed to
first-degree murder [under felony murder rule] when he stated he
willfully fired three times into an occupied vehicle).  An
examination of cases involving other felonies qualifying as
“committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon” yields
identical results:  actual intent to commit the felony is
required.  See, e.g., Terry, 337 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 720
(holding that facts show defendant intentionally committed
assault with deadly weapon with intent to kill, an underlying
felony for purposes of the felony murder rule).  Moreover, after
an exhaustive review, we can find in our jurisdiction no capital
case of any variety which suggests that the intent element of
first degree murder can be satisfied without a showing of either
a specific intent to kill or an actual intent to participate in
the conduct described in N.C.G.S. § 14-17.  In every conviction
for first degree murder by torture, poisoning, etc., the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually
intended to commit those acts.  Similarly, in every felony murder
conviction of which we are aware, the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt either that the defendant specifically intended
to kill or that the defendant actually intended to commit the
underlying offense.  Although a showing of culpable negligence
can satisfy the intent requirement for certain aforementioned
crimes, it has not formed the basis of intent for a first-degree
murder conviction.
 In sum, the North Carolina murder statute designates five
specific felonies as qualifying to act as a basis for felony
murder.  Each requires a minimum of actual intent on the part of
the accused to commit the crime.  As for the statute’s catchall
 We recognize that the statute does not preclude second-
1
degree murder prosecutions for deaths resulting from DWI-related
accidents when evidence proves defendant acted with malice or a
category of felonies committed with the use of a deadly weapon,
case law has qualified a host of other crimes, all of which share
the requirement of actual intent to commit the underlying crime). 
Conspicuously absent is a first-degree murder case premised on
implied intent as evidenced by a defendant’s culpable or criminal
negligence.  Moreover, we can find no language in N.C.G.S. §
14-17 suggesting that our state’s legislature even contemplated,
no less intended, that the crime of first-degree murder might be
premised on a defendant’s implied intent (to kill or commit the
underlying offense).  If anything, recent action by our General
Assembly indicates just the opposite is true for homicides
resulting from impaired or negligent drivers.  In contemplating
situations similar to the case sub judice, the legislature passed
N.C.G.S. § 20-141.4, titled “Felony and misdemeanor death by
vehicle.”  The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a1) Felony Death by Vehicle -- A person commits
the offense of felony death by vehicle if he
unintentionally causes the death of another person
while engaged in the offense of impaired driving . . .
and commission of that offense is the proximate cause
of death.
(a2) Misdemeanor Death by Vehicle -- A person
commits the offense of misdemeanor death by vehicle if
he unintentionally causes the death of another person
while engaged in the violation of any State law or
local ordinance applying to the operation or use of a
vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, other than
impaired driving . . . , and commission of that
violation is the proximate cause of the death.
(b) Punishments -- Felony death by vehicle is a
Class G felony.  Misdemeanor death by vehicle is a
Class 1 misdemeanor.
(c) No Double Prosecutions -- No person who has
been placed in jeopardy upon a charge of death by
vehicle may be prosecuted for the offense of
manslaughter arising out of the same death . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 20-141.4 (1999).   Significantly, the sanctions
1
depraved heart.  See, e.g., State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 527
S.E.2d 299 (2000) (upholding second-degree murder conviction in
DWI-related collision causing death).  However, as defendant in
the case sub judice was not convicted of second-degree murder or
charged with or convicted of felony death by vehicle, we do not
address the issue of whether such charges may have proved more
appropriate under the circumstances.
 Georgia, among other states, has adopted a similar
2
statutory scheme for vehicular deaths.  Georgia’s statute, in
particular, extends to prohibit murder prosecutions for reckless
drivers.  See Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-393 (2000) (vehicular homicide
defined as deaths resulting from driving in reckless manner,
under the influence of stimulants, or while fleeing police).
 Although this Court has expressly disavowed the so-called
3
“merger doctrine” in felony murder cases involving a felonious
assault on one victim that results in the death of another
victim, see, e.g., State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 451 S.E.2d 131
(1994), cases involving a single assault victim who dies of his
injuries have never been similarly constrained.  In such cases,
associated with these crimes are substantially less draconian
than the capital trial defendant faced in the instant case.  It
is apparent that the General Assembly has demonstrated its belief
that the conduct described, though egregious and deserving of
severe punishment, does not warrant the severity of sanctions
concomitant with felony murder.2
When interpreting statutes, this Court presumes that the
legislature did not intend an unjust result.  King v. Baldwin,
276 N.C. 316, 325, 172 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1970).  The State’s theory
as to the applicability of the felony murder rule in reckless
driving cases has the potential for just such a result.  Consider
the following:  Driver A, who drives with criminal negligence,
hits another car containing only its driver, who is killed. 
Meanwhile, Driver B acts precisely the same way, but has the
added misfortune of injuring a third party.  In the State’s view,
Driver A can be convicted of, at most, second-degree murder;
there is no “second victim” and, hence, no underlying felony on
which a felony murder charge could depend.   Driver B, on the
3
the assault on the victim cannot be used as an underlying felony
for purposes of the felony murder rule.  Otherwise, virtually all
felonious assaults on a single victim that result in his or her
death would be first-degree murders via felony murder, thereby
negating lesser homicide charges such as second-degree murder and
manslaughter.
other hand, could well be charged with first-degree murder and
capitally tried, with the AWDWISI on the third party serving as
the underlying felony for felony murder.
While we acknowledge the legislature considered killing one
person and injuring another a more serious crime than killing
only one person, we conclude the increased punishment for
hypothetical Driver B would bear no rational relationship to the
punishment for Driver A.  Driver A, who kills one person and is
convicted of second-degree murder, may receive a sentence as
short as ninety-four months, while Driver B, who kills one person
and injures another, is subject to the death penalty and upon
conviction receives, at minimum, a sentence of life in prison
without parole.  See N.C.G.S. § 14-17; N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (1999)
(sentencing options for first-degree murder convictions); and
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17 (1999) (sentencing guidelines for
felonies).
Although common sense, case law, and legislative history
each suggest a driver who kills one person and injures another
can expect greater sanction than a driver who kills only one
person, the offenses and their respective punishments must
reflect a rational relationship.  In our view, that means Driver
B may be punished for:  (1) the death he caused -- as felony
death by vehicle, manslaughter, or second-degree murder; and
(2) the separate injury he caused -- as assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to inflict serious injury.  Such a limitation
 When a safety statute (such as one designating a specific
4
bolt size or length) is violated, culpable negligence exists
where the violation is “accompanied by recklessness or probable
consequences of a dangerous nature.”  Hancock, 248 N.C. at 435,
103 S.E.2d at 494 (1958).  Thus, using the theory espoused by the
State in the instant case, the contractor’s actions as described
would qualify for prosecution as first-degree murder under the
felony murder rule.
simultaneously eliminates the result of subjecting the accused to
the extreme sanction of the death penalty while providing a means
to enhance a defendant’s punishment in proportion to his crimes. 
For the conduct as described, Driver B would face one prison
sentence for the killing and an additional prison sentence for
his assault on the injured person.  Thus, if Driver B were
convicted of second-degree murder for the killing and AWDWISI for
the assault, he would receive a sentence of at least ninety-four
months for the killing, and an additional sentence of fifteen to
seventy-four months for the assault.  Alternative conviction
combinations would follow suit.
Finally, the potential effects of defendant’s first-degree
murder conviction serve well as harbingers of profoundly unjust
results that could lie ahead.  Consider the following:
(1)
A mother, late for a PTA meeting, weaves through
traffic driving 80 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. speed zone. 
If she causes a collision that kills another driver and
hurts his passenger, might she be subject to a death
sentence for her actions?
(2)
A corner-cutting contractor building a bleacher for a
local college uses five-inch bolts instead of the six-
inch bolts required by a safety statute.   If those
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bleachers later collapse, killing one fan and injuring
another, could the contractor face a capital trial?
Under the felony murder rule as espoused by the State in the
instant case, both the mother and contractor could be tried
capitally for their respective offenses -- an extreme result to
be sure and, not insignificantly, one without precedent in our
state’s jurisprudence.  As our courts have never before yielded
such results, we are equally certain the legislature neither
contemplated nor intended such apparent injustices when it
amended the state’s murder statute in 1977.  Moreover, we refuse
to rely on prosecutorial discretion as a means to determine
whether one criminally negligent driver should be tried capitally
(as defendant in the instant case was) while another (the
hypothetical mother) should not.  If culpable negligence is to be
a building block of a capital case, it must be by clear mandate
of the legislature and not by judicial fiat or through innovative
application by prosecutors.  See Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493,
101 S.E. 33 (1919) (holding that General Assembly is not presumed
to intend innovations upon the common law and, accordingly,
innovations not within the Assembly’s intentions shall not be
carried into effect).  As a consequence, we hold that defendant’s
first-degree murder convictions must be reversed.  In addition,
we find there is ample evidence in the record to support a charge
of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. 
Therefore, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1447(c), this case is
remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
II
[2] Defendant additionally contends that the trial court
erred by admitting evidence of his pending DWI charge and by
omitting his proffered jury instruction on proximate cause and
insulating acts of negligence.  We disagree.
Evidence of defendant’s pending DWI charge was used to
demonstrate that he had the requisite state of malice, one of the
elements of the charge of second-degree murder that was submitted
to the jury.  Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
allows evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by a defendant
if it is used to show a mental state such as malice.  State v.
Byers, 105 N.C. App. 377, 383, 413 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992).  While
we recognize that such evidence may not be used to show a
defendant’s propensity to commit a crime, id., we agree with the
State’s contention that the circumstances attendant to the
pending DWI charge -- defendant was speeding on the wrong side of
the road and ran another motorist off the road while impaired --
demonstrate that defendant was aware that his conduct leading up
to the collision at issue here was reckless and inherently
dangerous to human life.  Thus, such evidence tended to show
malice on the part of defendant and was properly admitted under
Rule 404(b).
[3] As for defendant’s contention that the trial court erred
by failing to instruct the jury on proximate cause and insulating
acts of negligence, we find his arguments to be unpersuasive. 
Defendant’s requested instruction required the jury to find his
actions were the sole and only proximate cause of the collision
in order to hold him criminally liable.  As such an instruction
is a misstatement of the law, the trial court properly rejected
it.  See State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 39, 334 S.E.2d
463, 465 (1985) (holding that defendant’s culpable negligence
need not be the only proximate cause of a victim’s death in order
to be found criminally liable; a showing that defendant’s actions
were one of the proximate causes is sufficient).
As to the jury instruction for insulating acts of
negligence, the trial court again was correct in not submitting
the charge.  In order for the negligence of another to insulate
defendant from criminal liability, that negligence “must be such
as to break the causal chain of defendant’s negligence;
otherwise, defendant’s culpable negligence remains a proximate
cause, sufficient to find him criminally liable.”  Id.  As the
Court of Appeals duly noted in the case sub judice, see Jones,
133 N.C. App. at 461, 516 S.E.2d at 414, the record shows no
evidence of any negligence on the part of Penney while driving
her automobile.  Defendant was in Penney’s lane of travel and she
was forced to swerve into the left lane in an effort to avoid a
collision.  Defendant’s argument that Penney should have swerved
to the right and hit a telephone pole and/or mailboxes is
entirely unpersuasive and is, accordingly, overruled.
As a result, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding of no
error on the part of the trial court involving defendant’s
multiple convictions for AWDWISI, AWDW or DWI.  However, as we
have reversed defendant’s convictions of and sentences for first-
degree murder, it is not necessary to arrest judgments for the
AWDWISI convictions, as they are no longer underlying felonies
for the murders.  We thus remand the AWDWISI convictions to the
Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for
sentencing.
In conclusion, as a result of the foregoing analysis, we
affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding of no error as to
defendant’s convictions and sentences for AWDW and DWI.  We
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as
defendant’s convictions and sentences of life imprisonment
without parole for the first-degree murders of Julie Marie Hansen
and Maia C. Witzl, and we remand those cases to the Court of
Appeals for further remand to the trial court for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.  Finally, we affirm the Court of
Appeals’ holding of no error as to defendant’s convictions for
AWDWISI, but we remand those three cases to the Court of Appeals
for further remand to the trial court for sentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, AND
REMANDED FOR SENTENCING IN PART.