Title: Fulton v. City of Starkville
Citation: 645 So. 2d 910
Docket Number: 91-KA-01257
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 1994

645 So. 2d 910 (1994) William E. FULTON v. CITY OF STARKVILLE. No. 91-KA-01257. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 10, 1994. *911 Charles T. Yoste, Starkville, for appellant. Roy E. Carpenter, Jr., Starkville, for appellee. En Banc. SMITH, Justice, for the Court: William Fulton appealed from the Municipal Court of the City of Starkville to the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court his conviction of driving a motor vehicle while having greater than .10% blood alcohol level. After a jury trial in circuit court, Fulton was found guilty and fined $500 and court costs. The trial court overruled Fulton's motion for a new trial. Fulton's sole issue on appeal is as follows: Fulton's argument is without merit. The statutes in question allow for reliable methods of testing blood alcohol content in addition to the chemical test or test of a person's breath. The breath test used in this case clearly was authorized by statute and has been held valid by this Court as well as in other jurisdictions. This Court has consistently stated that the test under this statute raises an issue of admissibility of evidence. Therefore, it is the accuracy, reliability and proper administration of the test which must be shown as proof of intoxication. The concerns of this Court were answered by the City of Starkville when the proof showed that the test had been administered by a properly trained officer, *912 that the machine had been checked and calibrated according to the statutory requirements and that the proper steps had been taken to satisfy the accuracy and reliability of the test. This case is affirmed. On March 14, 1990, William Fulton was driving on Highway 25 into the city limits of Starkville. Fulton was stopped for speeding by Police Officer Earl Edison. Suspecting that Fulton had been drinking, Edison transported Fulton to the city jail for a breath test. Fulton agreed to take the Intoxilyzer test. Fulton's breath was tested for alcohol on the Intoxilyzer 4011-A breath testing machine. The test showed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .16%. Fulton was charged with violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(c). At the trial de novo in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court, Fulton filed a motion to suppress the BAC results in that the test administered was not a "chemical test" as required by statute. Fulton contended that the test was instead a "physical test" and not admissible. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. Fulton was found guilty by the jury of having greater than .10% weight volume of alcohol in his blood while operating a motor vehicle. Fulton was fined $500 and assessed court costs. Fulton appeals from this conviction. Fulton argues that the test referred to within the statute is a "physical test" rather than a "chemical" test. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-5 provides as follows: Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (Supp. 1989) provides the penalties for operation of a vehicle with ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more by weight volume of alcohol in the person's blood. Section 63-11-19 sets forth the approved methods of testing and states as follows: In support of his argument that the test performed was a "physical" test and not a "chemical" test, Fulton presented the testimony of Alvin Rosenhan. Rosenhan was accepted as an expert on Intoxilyzer breath testing machines. Rosenhan testified that the test performed was not a chemical test but a physical measurement of the absorption of gases using infrared beams. Fulton failed to raise issues questioning the accuracy of the test, the reliability of the test, or any factor concerning the competency of the test as proof of intoxication. All of these concerns were addressed in the testimony showing that the officer administering the test had been trained and that the machine had been checked and calibrated according to the statutory requirements. The question of the admissibility of evidence is not the same as the State's authority to test for alcohol content in the driver. The competency and admissibility of the evidence is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990). The Johnston opinion holds: Id. The Johnston case was reversed and remanded for failure of proof that the certification of calibration met the requirements of the statute. This case involved the model 4011-A &amp; A S Intoxilyzer. If the breath test is performed according to the methods approved by the State Crime Laboratory, there is an "assumption of validity" of the test. Estes v. State, 605 So. 2d 772, 776 (Miss. 1992). Where there is substantial compliance with the statute there is no error in admitting the test results into evidence. Id.; Williams v. State, 434 So. 2d 1340, 1343 (Miss. 1983). Although Section 63-11-5 speaks of a "chemical test," when read with Section 63-11-30, which uses the term "chemical analysis," it clearly shows that the drafters did not intend the methods of testing to be narrowly limited to only one type test. Section 63-11-5 actually says "chemical test or test of his breath" indicating that the chemical test is not the only valid method which may be used in determining the alcoholic content of the blood. Any one of the three methods listed are sufficient methods of measuring blood alcohol content. Section 63-11-30 clarifies this further by indicating that the tests can be of breath, blood or urine. Obviously "chemical test" includes a breath test. The Intoxilyzer used in the present case meets all the requirements set out in the statute and the result of the test is not invalid because Fulton claims that it was not a chemical test. A review of other jurisdictions with similar statutes on this issue indicates the same concerns about accuracy and reliability of the test administered. In State of Arizona v. *914 Velasco, 165 Ariz. 480, 799 P.2d 821 (1990), the Arizona Supreme Court, in a discussion of the reliability of the Intoxilyzer machine as a testing device for determining the amount of ethyl alcohol in a breath sample, stated: Velasco, at 485, 799 P.2d at 826. (emphasis added). The Velasco Court also noted that "the Intoxilyzer analyzes the breath sample without destroying it... . Several factors may affect the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer test results: random error, radio frequency interference, mouth alcohol, chemical interference, insufficient alveolar samples, and operator error." Velasco, at 485, 799 P.2d at 826. (emphasis added). Additionally, in the case of State of Montana v. Christopherson, 217 Mont. 449, 705 P.2d 121 (1985), the Supreme Court of Montana referred to the Intoxilyzer test as a "chemical test" in interpreting Montana's implied consent statute. This case involved questions concerning the Intoxilyzer Model 5000, one of the same type machines authorized by the Mississippi Crime Lab for detection of blood alcohol content in accordance with 63-11-5 and 63-11-30 of the Miss. Code Ann. (1972). The Montana statute is very similar to Mississippi's. Montana's implied consent statute § 61-8-402(1), (3), MCA, states as follows: Christopherson, 705 P.2d at 122. Mississippi utilizes the Intoxilyzer Model 4011-A &amp; A S, and 5000 to test for alcohol content of blood. As previously mentioned, the Mississippi statute is very similar to Montana's. Both statutes refer to three types of tests that may be administered when checking for alcohol content; breath, blood and urine. Both statutes refer to the test of one's breath as being a "chemical" test. We conclude the language, "chemical test or test of his breath," as provided by § 63-11-5 and 63-11-30 Miss. Code Ann. (1972) contemplates the use of an Intoxilyzer machine as a proper means of measuring alcohol content of the blood. As long as accuracy, reliability, and all other factors questioning the competency of the test as proof of intoxication are complied with by administering officers, the proof thereunder is admissible. Admissibility is the ultimate issue to be decided. There is no merit to Fulton's argument. The statutes under the Implied Consent Law allow not only a chemical test or tests of a person's breath but also, other tests of a person's blood or urine for determining alcoholic content. All three methods are valid tests for determining alcoholic content in a person's body which would impair that person's ability to operate a motor vehicle. The ultimate question is one of admissibility and whether the chosen test meets the statutory requirements of § 63-11-30, as set out in Johnston. Accuracy, reliability and competency of the machine and its operator are still of paramount concern to this Court. These requirements were all established satisfactorily by the City of Starkville in the case sub judice. CONVICTION OF DRIVING WHILE HAVING GREATER THAN .10% BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT AND SENTENCE TO PAY A FINE OF $500.00 AND COST OF COURT AND ASSESSMENTS AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur. McRAE, J., not participating.