Title: People v. Ng
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S080276
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES CHITAT NG, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
S080276 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
94ZF0195 
 
 
July 28, 2022 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Jenkins, Guerrero, and Pollak* 
concurred. 
 
 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. NG 
S080276 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant, Charles Chitat Ng, of 11 
counts of first degree murder against Sean Dubs, Deborah Dubs, 
Harvey Dubs, Clifford Peranteau, Jeffrey Gerald, Michael 
Carroll, Kathleen Allen, Lonnie Bond, Sr., Lonnie Bond, Jr., 
Robin Scott Stapley, and Brenda O’Connor.  (Pen. Code, § 187.)1  
The jury found true the multiple-murder special circumstance.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  The jury returned a death verdict, and 
the trial court sentenced defendant to death in 1999.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment 
in its entirety. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Between July 1984 and April 1985, 12 people went 
missing from Northern California.  In July 1984, Harvey Dubs, 
his wife Deborah, and their 16-month-old son Sean disappeared 
from their San Francisco apartment.  In November 1984, Paul 
Cosner disappeared from San Francisco; he tried to sell his car 
on his way home from work and was never seen again.  In 
January 1985, Clifford Peranteau failed to show up for work in 
San Francisco and was never seen again.  One month later, in 
February, Jeffrey Gerald disappeared from San Francisco after 
telling his roommate he was going to do a “side job” of helping 
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
someone move.  In April 1985, Kathleen Allen disappeared from 
Milpitas after getting into a car with a stranger who was 
supposed to take her to see her boyfriend, Michael Carroll, in 
Lake Tahoe.  Carroll also disappeared.  Later that month, 
Lonnie Bond, Sr. (Bond), his fiancée Brenda O’Connor, and their 
infant son Lonnie Bond, Jr. (Lonnie), disappeared from the 
house they rented in Wilseyville.  Their friend Scott Stapley, 
who often visited, also disappeared.2 
These disappearances remained unsolved and seemingly 
unrelated until defendant, along with accomplice Leonard Lake, 
attempted to shoplift a vise from a lumber store in June 1985.  
While Lake spoke with police officers, defendant walked away 
from the scene.  After officers searched his vehicle, Lake was 
arrested for possession of a firearm and subsequently committed 
suicide while in police custody.  Officers then began searching 
for defendant.  This search led officers to Lake’s property in 
Wilseyville, where they uncovered evidence that connected 
defendant and Lake to the missing persons. 
Shortly after Lake’s arrest, defendant fled to Canada.  He 
was arrested in a shoplifting incident a few weeks later.  
Defendant was ultimately extradited in 1991, at which time 
proceedings in the present case began.  After resolving dozens of 
motions filed by the defense, a venue change, and a competency 
hearing, trial began in September 1998.  The jury returned its 
verdicts on February 24, 1999.  The penalty phase began on 
March 8, 1999; the jury returned a sentence of death on April 
30, 1999.  
 
2  
Stapley’s full name is Robin Scott Stapley, but he 
generally went by the name Scott Stapley. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
a.  Lake’s Capture 
On June 2, 1985, John Kallas visited South City Lumber 
Company in South San Francisco.  Kallas had been a reserve 
police officer for the South San Francisco Police Department for 
28 years.  While at the lumber store, he saw an Asian man, later 
identified as defendant, carrying a large vise that was sold at 
the store.  Suspicious that the man was shoplifting, Kallas 
continued observing defendant as he walked past him, 
continued to walk past the checkout counter, and exited the 
store with the merchandise.  After a salesclerk confirmed that 
they had not sold that vise to defendant, Kallas and one of the 
clerks walked outside.  Approximately 50 feet away, he observed 
the Asian man standing by the passenger door of a gold Honda.  
The man then started walking toward the street and away from 
the store.  Kallas walked over to the vehicle and saw a box of 
wrenches in the back seat but did not see the vise.  He saw the 
trunk was ajar, opened it, and saw the missing vise.  Kallas 
called the police department.  While he was on the phone, a 
bearded man, later identified as Lake, approached Kallas and 
started talking to him.  He asked if he could pay for the vise; 
Kallas told him to speak to a clerk because he did not work 
there. 
South San Francisco Police Officer Daniel Wright 
responded to the store.  Wright ran the license plate for the 
vehicle and found that it was registered to Bond.    Wright looked 
inside the open trunk and saw the vise, as well as a backpack.  
He opened the backpack and found a semiautomatic gun and a 
silencer.  He ran the serial number for the gun through the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
computer system and found it was registered to R. Scott Stapley.  
He put the gun and silencer back in the backpack as Lake 
approached.  Lake explained that he paid for the vise that his 
friend took.  When Wright asked for Lake’s name, Lake 
identified himself as R. Scott Stapley and provided Wright with 
a California driver’s license bearing the name Robin Scott 
Stapley.  Lake acknowledged that the vehicle belonged to Bond 
and said that Bond was “up north.” 
Wright arrested Lake for possession of a firearm that had 
a silencer.  At the police station, Lake ingested cyanide and 
started convulsing.  He was taken to the hospital where he died 
a few days later.  Before convulsing, Lake wrote a note to “Lyn” 
that stated, in part, “I love you.  I forgive you.  Freedom is better 
than all else.  Tell Fern I’m sorry . . . I’m sorry for all the 
trouble.” 
Police officers subsequently ran the vehicle identification 
number from the Honda and learned it was associated with a 
missing person, Paul Cosner.  After that, the South San 
Francisco Police Department turned the vehicle over to 
Inspector Irene Brunn of the San Francisco Police Department.  
She worked in the missing persons unit and had been 
investigating Cosner’s disappearance.  Inside the vehicle, 
Inspector Brunn found a Pacific Gas and Electric Company bill 
addressed to Lake’s ex-wife Claralyn B.  The envelope listed an 
address in Wilseyville, 
a town in Calaveras County, 
approximately three hours west of San Francisco. 
b.  Wilseyville Property 
Inspector Brunn contacted Claralyn on June 3 hoping she 
could help the police find defendant.  Inspector Brunn and 
Claralyn met at a local café and made arrangements to meet at 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
the Wilseyville property the following day.  Claralyn gave 
Inspector Brunn a key and permission to search the premises.  
Inside the living room, Inspector Brunn discovered two pieces of 
equipment, including a VCR, that had been missing from the 
Dubs residence; unrelated to the Cosner case, Inspector Brunn 
had also been investigating the Dubs family disappearance.  She 
called her office, provided them the serial number for the VCR, 
and confirmed it was from the Dubs residence. 
At that point, Claralyn revoked her permission for the 
officers to search the property.  The officers left the house, 
secured the premises, and obtained a search warrant. 
An investigation of the Wilseyville property subsequently 
commenced.  The investigation lasted five weeks and involved 
four law enforcement agencies.  Investigators discovered 
thousands of bone and tooth fragments buried throughout the 
property.  At least four dental specimens belonged to a child 
under the age of three years old.  After reviewing all the found 
fragments, two forensic anthropologists concluded that they 
belonged to at least four adults, one child, and one infant.  
“Many hundreds” of the bone fragments showed various degrees 
of burning.  Investigators also found a child’s liver buried on the 
property.  
In addition to the main house, there was also a bunker on 
the Wilseyville property.  The bunker contained three rooms, 
two of which were behind a hidden doorway.  One of the hidden 
rooms contained a bed, a desk, dressers, and some food.  The 
second room was approximately seven by three feet and enclosed 
by a wooden door.  Inside that room was a small bed with a foam 
pad on it, a plastic bucket, a roll of toilet paper, and a small 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
lamp.  The door into the small room could only be opened from 
the outside. 
c.  Search for Defendant 
Police searched defendant’s San Francisco apartment on 
June 7, five days after he walked away from the lumber store.  
They found items belonging to Bond and Peranteau, as well as 
a map of San Francisco on which the Dubses’ street had been 
circled.  The police also found two boxes of .22-caliber 
ammunition, a pamphlet about how to make a silencer for a .22-
caliber gun, and photos of the bunker under construction.  
Toward the end of June, a 14-year-old boy was playing in 
a wildlife park in Calgary, Canada with a friend.  He came 
across a lean-to near some bushes and saw an Asian man lying 
down inside.  The man said that he was tired and asked the boy 
to leave.  The boy had seen a photograph of defendant in the 
news and thought that might have been the person he saw in 
the park.  He told his parents about the man. 
On July 6, defendant was arrested for shoplifting.  Officers 
seized a pair of handcuffs and a key, a .22-caliber handgun that 
previously belonged to Lake, and ammunition. 
The following day, a detective met with the young boy and 
his father at the wildlife park.  He asked the boy to show him 
where the man had been camping.  The detective found the lean-
to and approximately 30 meters away found a cleared area with 
a sleeping bag.  The sleeping bag lay on top of wood planks; 
underneath the planks was a dugout big enough to fit a person.  
The dugout contained a camera belonging to Stapley and a towel 
from Peranteau’s apartment. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
d.  Discovery of Bond’s and Stapley’s bodies 
On July 8, back in Calaveras County, police officers were 
patrolling the area near the Wilseyville property.  The officers 
observed some tufts of material and cloth scattered on the 
ground approximately one quarter mile away from the property.  
The material looked like it was insulation from a sleeping bag.  
Upon further investigation, it appeared that animals had dug 
up the material along with some bone.  Investigators began 
excavating the site and discovered bodies, later identified as 
Bond and Stapley.  The bodies were in separate sleeping bags, 
one on top of the other. 
Bond had been shot once in his head.  His wrists were 
handcuffed together.  He had a plastic bag over his head.  He 
had a leather strap with a ball gag wrapped around his neck. 
Stapley had been shot three times:  in the front of his 
mouth; above his right eyebrow; and in his right collarbone.  He 
had a plastic bag over his head and shoulders, and his hands 
and ankles were bound with duct tape.  A leather strap with a 
ball gag was wrapped around his neck. 
e.  Evidence of the Murders 
i.  Dubs family 
In July 1984, Harvey Dubs, his wife Deborah, and their 
16-month-old son Sean lived in an apartment in San Francisco.  
Harvey worked at Petrov Graphic Types World, also in San 
Francisco.  In addition to his day job, Harvey was trying to start 
a new videotaping business that he ran out of their home. 
On July 25, Harvey left work around 5:00 p.m., which was 
earlier than usual.  He told a coworker, Lauren Bradbury, that 
he had put an ad in the newspaper to sell video equipment, and 
he was meeting someone who had responded to his ad.  Shortly 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
after, around 5:45 p.m., Deborah spoke on the phone with her 
friend Karen Tuck.  Deborah told Tuck that she was expecting 
someone to come over to talk to Harvey about his video 
equipment.  Someone either rang the bell or knocked on the 
door, so Deborah terminated the phone conversation to go 
answer the door.  Tuck tried to call Deborah the following day, 
but Deborah did not answer. 
Dorice Murphy lived across the street from the Dubs 
family.  At approximately 5:45 p.m. on July 25, Murphy saw an 
Asian man walking down the Dubses’ front steps struggling to 
carry a suitcase.  He approached a waiting car.  A second man 
walked out of the driver’s side and opened the trunk.  The Asian 
man put the suitcase in the trunk, entered the vehicle, and they 
drove away. 
Harvey did not show up for work the following day, nor did 
he notify his boss in advance that he would not appear at work.  
It was unusual and “totally out of character” for him to not notify 
his boss that he would miss a day of work.  Another man, 
identifying himself as James Bright, did call Petrov Graphic 
Types World and told Bradbury that Harvey was not coming 
into work.  The caller said that Harvey had to go to Washington 
State for a family emergency.  Bradbury found the conversation 
to be odd because Harvey was from New York, did not have any 
other relatives, and would never leave the company “stranded.”  
Bradbury also knew that Deborah was from the Bay Area.  
Bradbury asked the caller for his phone number, after which he 
became very irritated and hung up.  Deborah’s father filed a 
missing persons report that evening, on July 26. 
Barbara Speaker lived in an apartment directly below the 
Dubs family.  On July 27, she heard footsteps around 11:30 a.m. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
coming from the Dubses’ apartment.  She stepped outside and 
saw defendant closing the Dubses’ front door.  He left the keys 
in the door and then walked down the stairs carrying a “flight 
bag” and a duffle bag.  The bags appeared full and heavy.  
Speaker followed defendant down the stairs and outside to the 
street.  She said, “Excuse me” to try to get his attention, but he 
continued walking.  When defendant reached the end of the 
street, a car came around the corner quickly and pulled over.  
Defendant entered the car, and it drove away.  Speaker believed 
the car was the Dubses’ car.  While testifying, defendant 
confirmed that the driver of the car was Lake. 
Around half an hour later, Tuck’s husband George visited 
the Dubses’ apartment to see if he could find out anything.  He 
recognized Deborah’s key ring in the front door.  He went inside 
and saw empty space on shelving in the bedroom where Harvey 
usually kept his cassette tapes and VCR machines.  George 
believed items had recently gone missing in light of the fact that 
there was dust on the shelf but no dust in the specific spots 
where items had been removed. 
Later that night, as Speaker arrived home, she saw a man 
through the living room window of the Dubses’ apartment.  Once 
inside her apartment, she heard footsteps upstairs.  She looked 
out her window and saw the man walking down the stairs 
carrying something large.  The man resembled the man she had 
seen walking out of the Dubses’ apartment that morning.  
The Dubs family disappearance received extensive media 
coverage, including in the newspaper and television press 
conferences.  Investigators had no leads on their disappearance 
until Inspector Brunn discovered the family’s VCR in 
Wilseyville the following summer. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
A few days after that discovery, officers showed Dorice 
Murphy a photographic line up.  She identified defendant as the 
man she had seen walking out of the Dubses’ apartment the day 
they disappeared.  Speaker identified defendant in a 
photographic line up as well. 
ii.  Paul Cosner 
Paul Cosner lived in San Francisco with his girlfriend, 
Marilyn Namba.  On November 2, 1984, Cosner called his sister 
and made plans to meet with her the next morning.  Later that 
evening, Namba called Cosner while she was at her work, and 
they made plans to watch a movie on television when she got 
home.  Cosner seemed rushed on the phone.  He told Namba that 
he was going to deliver a car he was selling.  The car was a gold 
Honda Prelude and matched the vehicle Lake and defendant 
were using when Lake was arrested at the lumber store seven 
months later. 
Cosner did not come home for his date with Namba.  He 
also failed to show up the following morning to meet his sister.  
Neither Namba nor Cosner’s sister saw or heard from him again.  
The following day, Cosner’s sister filed a missing persons 
report.3 
iii.  Clifford Peranteau 
Clifford Peranteau worked with defendant at Dennis 
Moving Company in San Francisco.  They were on the same crew 
and worked together on a regular basis.  Hector Salcedo also 
worked at Dennis Moving Company and was close with 
Peranteau.  Salcedo and Peranteau often spent time at 
 
3  
The jury failed to reach a verdict on the murder charge 
against Cosner. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
Peranteau’s house after work.  One night in December 1984 or 
January 1985, defendant arrived unexpectedly at Peranteau’s 
home.  At some point, he took out a bag of marijuana and showed 
it to Salcedo and Peranteau.  He told them he had a friend with 
a plantation and if they wanted to help work on the plantation, 
they could take some marijuana home for themselves. 
One Friday night in January 1985, Salcedo and Peranteau 
went out for drinks to celebrate the San Francisco 49ers making 
it into the upcoming Super Bowl.  Around midnight or 1:00 a.m. 
early Saturday morning, Salcedo dropped off Peranteau at his 
home and then went home himself.  Peranteau did not appear 
for work the following day.  Salcedo, concerned, tried to reach 
Peranteau on the telephone several times, but his friend did not 
answer.  After work, Salcedo went to Peranteau’s home, but 
nobody answered the door.  Salcedo returned to Peranteau’s 
home several times to try to reach his friend.  Around one week 
after Peranteau went missing, he noticed that Peranteau’s 
motorcycle was missing.  The motorcycle had still been there 
when Salcedo previously checked the house.  Peranteau’s ex-
girlfriend also checked on the house after he was reported 
missing.  She noticed that “[m]ostly everything” was gone.  She 
had last been inside the home three to four weeks prior, and 
nothing was missing at that time. 
After Peranteau disappeared, Dennis Goza, the owner of 
Dennis Moving Company, received a letter, purportedly from 
Peranteau, explaining his absence.  The letter read, “Dennis:  
Sorry to leave you on such short notice but a new job, place to 
live, and a honey all came together at once.  Please send my 
check for the last three days I worked and my W-2 to my new 
address below.  Thanks, Cliff.”  The address provided was for a 
post office box in Mokelumne Hill, a town about 20 miles from 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
Wilseyville.  The main body of the letter was typed, but the 
signature and address were handwritten.  The signature did not 
look genuine.  Subsequent analysis revealed that the letter had 
been typed on a typewriter found at the Wilseyville property.  A 
police investigator testified that Lake had forged the letter. 
In April 1985, about three months after Peranteau 
disappeared, Lake sold Peranteau’s motorcycle to a man in 
Wilseyville.  Lake told the buyer that Peranteau was a friend in 
San Francisco who had asked Lake to sell the motorcycle for 
him. 
In July, while investigating defendant’s hideout in 
Calgary, officers found a striped towel that had been taken from 
Peranteau’s home.  In defendant’s San Francisco apartment, 
officers found a pen and pencil set that belonged to Peranteau.  
At the Wilseyville property, officers found additional items that 
had been taken from Peranteau’s apartment. 
iv.  Jeffrey Gerald 
Jeffrey Gerald also worked on a crew with defendant at 
Dennis Moving Company.  Gerald lived in an apartment in San 
Francisco with his roommate Terry Kailer.  Over the course of 
six weeks, on 12 occasions, Kailer answered the phone to a caller 
who identified himself as Charlie or Charlie Ng. 
On the morning of February 24, 1985, Kailer answered 
two calls from the same caller.  Later that day, Gerald told 
Kailer that it had been defendant on the phone and he was going 
to meet him at a bus station to do “a side job” for a move.  Gerald 
told Kailer that he would be home by dinner and would bring 
Chinese food.  At the bus station, Gerald called his girlfriend, 
Sandra Krumbein, and said he was going to help a friend move 
for $100.  They made plans for Krumbein, who lived in New 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
Jersey, to come to San Francisco.  Neither Krumbein nor Kailer 
ever saw or heard from Gerald again.  
Three days later, Kailer came home from work and found 
Gerald’s bedroom door ajar.  She noticed that some things had 
been moved, and several things were missing, including his 
clothes, bedding, guitar and amplifier, and pictures.  Kailer filed 
a missing persons report. 
Investigators later found Gerald’s guitar at the Wilseyville 
property.  They found Gerald’s Social Security card buried on 
the property. 
v.  Michael Carroll and Kathleen Allen 
Michael Carroll lived with his foster brother, John 
Gouveia, in Milpitas in 1984.  Carroll and defendant were 
acquainted, and sometime before Carroll disappeared, Gouveia 
answered a phone call from someone who identified himself as 
Chuck.  The caller asked to speak with Carroll.  Gouveia asked, 
“Is this Charles Ng?”  The caller laughed and said, “Yeah.  Just 
tell Mike I called.” 
Kathleen Allen was Carroll’s girlfriend.  Allen worked at 
a Safeway store in Milpitas.  On April 14, 1985, Allen received 
a phone call at work.  After the call, she told a coworker that 
“Mike” had been shot and might be dead.  She said that someone 
was going to pick her up and take her to Lake Tahoe.  That 
evening, Allen called her friend James Baio.  She told Baio that 
Carroll had been gone for two days, and she had received a 
phone call from him saying that “he had gotten into some 
trouble” and was going to the Lake Tahoe Area.  Carroll had told 
her that he wanted her to meet him, and he was going to send 
someone to pick her up.  Telephone records indicate that at 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
1:01 p.m. that afternoon, someone at the Wilseyville property 
called the Safeway store. 
Allen left work between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.  She 
entered a gold Honda Prelude, later identified as Cosner’s car.  
Inside the vehicle was a Caucasian male.  
Allen spoke with Baio again; he called her at a Milpitas 
hotel.  She told him that she could not talk at that moment 
because somebody else was in the room with her.  Allen sounded 
like she was in a hurry.  She told him the person “was kind of a 
weird guy” and that he wanted to take pictures of her.  Baio 
asked her to call him when she got to her destination, but he 
never heard from her again. 
The next day, on April 15, Allen called her manager at 
Safeway and asked for four weeks off from work.  She told her 
manager that her boyfriend had found a job, or had a good lead 
on a job, near Lake Tahoe and she wanted to go with him.  Phone 
records indicate that someone at the Wilseyville residence called 
the Safeway store on the morning of April 15. 
At some point, Lake gained possession of Carroll’s car.  On 
April 14, the same day that Allen left work to drive to Lake 
Tahoe, Lake called George Blank, a friend in San Jose, and 
asked for help with a car that had been stranded in Milpitas.  
Lake said that the car belonged to some friends, and he would 
send a man by the name of Charles to the bus depot with the car 
keys.  Blank arranged for his daughter, Debra Blank, to receive 
the call from Charles. 
On April 16, Debra received a call from someone who 
identified himself as Charles and said he was a friend of Lake.  
Debra went to the bus station to meet Charles, later identified 
as defendant, to pick up the car keys.  Defendant also gave her 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
a letter which contained directions to the car’s location.  Debra 
gave the keys and letter to her father.  Blank followed the 
directions and found the car in the parking lot at the Milpitas 
Safeway.  The car, a Mercury Capri, belonged to Carroll.  Blank 
drove the car home.  On April 26, Lake went to Blank’s house to 
inspect the car and remove some items.  Lake asked Blank to fix 
the car and then try to sell it.  On May 8 or 9, Blank received a 
letter and paperwork from Lake.  The letter told Blank that 
after he sold the car and took his share for the repairs, he should 
deposit the remaining balance into a specific account using the 
enclosed deposit slip.  The paperwork included a pink slip for 
the Capri, a release of liability, and an insurance policy all 
bearing Carroll’s name.  Lake also sent a stamped, preaddressed 
envelope from the Safeway Federal Credit Union and a bank 
deposit slip bearing Allen’s name. 
Investigators found a videotape titled “M Ladies, Kathi, 
Brenda” buried on the Wilseyville property.  The first scene of 
the video shows Allen shackled in a chair.  Lake and defendant 
tell her that if she cooperates with them, 30 days later they will 
drug her, blindfold her, and release her somewhere.  If she does 
not, they will shoot her and bury her in the same place they 
buried Carroll.  They told her to provide information on Carroll’s 
bank accounts and “who we need to write to make things 
correct.”  Lake tells Allen that she will need to write letters to 
explain that Carroll got a job and moved away because “we want 
to phase Mike off, just sort of just move him over the horizon, 
and, uh, let people know that, yea, Mike moved off to God knows 
where, and we never heard from him again.  That’s semi-
acceptable.”  Lake tells Allen they will keep her busy, and she 
must agree to cook, clean, and “fuck” for them.  He continues, 
“That’s your choice in a nutshell.  It’s not much of a choice unless 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
you’ve got a death wish.”  Lake acknowledges that he and 
defendant are being “selfish bastards” and tells Allen that if she 
cooperates, they will be “as nice as we can to you within the 
limits of keeping you prisoner.”  If she did not cooperate, they 
would tie her onto the bed, rape her, shoot her, and bury her.  
After Allen agrees to cooperate, Lake unshackles her, and the 
men force her to strip naked.  Defendant tells Lake he wants to 
take a shower with Allen, and defendant says it “won’t be the 
last time.”  When Allen appears nervous, Lake says they do not 
want to have to make an example of her and requests that she 
cooperate.  Allen fully undresses and walks off camera with 
defendant. 
 In the next scene, a nearly naked Allen massages a naked 
defendant.  In the last scene with Allen, she is lying face down 
and shackled to a bed, wearing only shorts.  Lake admonishes 
Allen that she needs to cooperate with them while also taking 
pictures of her.  When Allen asks how she has not cooperated, 
Lake tells her she tried to beat down the door.  Lake tells Allen 
he has cyanide pills and if he ever got caught, he would take 
them.  Lake threatens to hit and whip Allen if she tries to escape 
again.  Lake tells Allen that he normally does not confess his 
“sadistic tendencies” to strangers, but that he could talk to Allen 
because she was “going to go away, and I’m never going to have 
to deal with you again, unfortunately for you.”  Lake makes 
Allen put on lingerie and then takes more photographs of her.  
He tells her to get dressed because they are going outside. 
Investigators found a two-gallon plastic barrel buried at 
the Wilseyville property containing several items belonging to 
Carroll and Allen.  Inside the Wilseyville house, investigators 
found books with Carroll’s name printed inside. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
Investigators obtained copies of Allen’s canceled checks 
from April and May 1985.  One of the checks was dated May 2, 
1985, more than two weeks after Allen disappeared.  The check 
was made out to Randy Jacobson, whose body was found at the 
Wilseyville property.  A handwriting expert testified that Lake 
wrote the “face detail” of the check and probably signed Allen’s 
name. 
vi.  Lonnie Bond, Sr., Brenda O’Connor, Lonnie 
Bond, Jr., and Scott Stapley 
In January 1985, Lonnie Bond, Sr., rented the house, 
known as the Carter house, next door to the Wilseyville 
property.  The two houses shared a common driveway.  Bond 
lived there with his fiancée, Brenda O’Connor, and their infant 
son, Lonnie Bond, Jr. 
Sometime after Bond moved in, the property manager for 
the Carter house received a call from Lake.  He complained to 
the property manager that someone was firing gunshots from 
the house and that Bond was failing to lock the gate to their 
common driveway. 
Stapley lived in San Diego with his girlfriend, Tori Doolin.  
In February 1985, Stapley and Doolin visited Bond and 
O’Connor in Wilseyville.  Doolin met Lake when he came to the 
Carter house to talk to Bond and Stapley. 
Doolin last saw Stapley on the evening of April 19, 1985, 
in San Diego.  Stapley had retrieved Bond and O’Connor’s 
belongings from a storage locker and loaded the items in his 
truck.  He was planning to drive O’Connor and the baby from 
San Diego back to the Carter house. 
A few days later, on April 23, defendant got into a traffic 
accident in Kern County while driving Stapley’s truck.  The 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
following day, defendant and Lake appeared at Doolin’s 
apartment in San Diego.  Defendant waited in the car while 
Lake and Doolin spoke.  Lake told Doolin that he had found 
Stapley, Bond, O’Connor, and the baby dead in the Carter house.  
He said that he had burned their bodies in a type of funeral 
ceremony, buried the bodies, and then cleaned the house.  Lake 
wanted to take Stapley’s belongings back to Wilseyville to make 
it appear like Stapley had moved out.  Doolin gave Lake his 
bicycle, clothing, and other miscellaneous items.  Doolin walked 
outside with Lake, where defendant was still waiting.  Lake 
showed Doolin the damage to Stapley’s truck from the accident. 
Doolin never saw Stapley again.  O’Connor’s mother never 
saw or heard from O’Connor or the baby again.  In May, Lake 
called the property manager for the Carter house and said that 
he thought her tenants had left town.  He also told her that Bond 
had left his car for Lake because he owed Lake money. 
O’Connor was also featured in the M Ladies video.  The 
first scene with O’Connor shows her sitting in the same chair 
where Allen sat, with her hands bound.  O’Connor is asking 
what Lake and defendant did to her family.  They tell her they 
did not kill Bond or Lonnie, but when she asks if they are going 
to let her family go, they respond “probably not.”  Lake tells 
O’Connor that they hate her, and that the neighborhood hated 
her family after they moved into the Carter house.  He says that 
they were going to give Lonnie to a family in Fresno that did not 
have kids.  O’Connor repeatedly pleads for her baby.  Lake tells 
O’Connor she must work, clean, and “fuck” for them or they will 
tie her to the bed, rape her, and shoot her.  O’Connor agrees to 
cooperate. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
Defendant cuts off O’Connor’s T-shirt and bra with a knife 
and tells her that she is “totally ours.”  He says, “You can cry 
and stuff like the rest of them, but it won’t do you no good.  We 
are pretty, ha, cold-hearted, so to speak.”  They ask if she is 
ready for a shower.  When Lake says she will shower with 
defendant, he replies, “Yep.  I always do that.  It’s luckier.”  Lake 
says defendant has his heart set on showering with O’Connor, 
and he does not want to turn defendant down.  O’Connor strips 
and repeatedly tells Lake and defendant that she is dizzy, hot, 
and does not feel well.  They tell her to “suffer” but eventually 
get her some water.  She tells the men she does not need to take 
a shower, but defendant responds that it is a “house rule” that 
she be clean before he and Lake “fuck” her.  The scene ends with 
O’Connor and defendant going to take a shower, and Lake tells 
defendant to be careful with her. 
When Lake was arrested at the lumber store, he had a gun 
registered to Stapley as well as credit cards and a bank card in 
Stapley’s name.  As mentioned earlier, police discovered Bond’s 
and Stapley’s bodies buried near the Wilseyville property. 
f.  Maurice Laberge 
Maurice Laberge met defendant in 1986 while they were 
both imprisoned in Canada.4  They had neighboring cells and 
passed items back and forth.  They exercised together in the 
yard every day between March and June or July 1986. 
Laberge kept notes of the conversations he had with 
defendant on the exercise yard.  Defendant shared cartoons 
related to what they discussed in the yard, and he gave them to 
 
4  
Laberge died in a car accident before trial.  His testimony 
from defendant’s extradition hearing was read into evidence. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
Laberge.  Laberge sent the cartoons defendant shared, and his 
notes, to his lawyer. 
During one of Laberge’s conversations with defendant, 
defendant seemed “very worried” that the police would watch a 
videotape found on the Wilseyville property.  He told Laberge 
that the videotape featured Kathi Allen and Brenda O’Connor, 
two women whom he and Lake had kept in a cell for some time.  
Defendant described scenes from the video to Laberge.  He also 
shared cartoons depicting scenes from the video, some in graphic 
detail.  They are discussed in more detail below in section II.E.1. 
In addition to the cartoons, Laberge testified at the 
extradition hearing that defendant admitted his involvement in 
several of the murders.  Defendant told Laberge that killing 
Sean Dubs, the baby, was “not easy, but it was just business, a 
part of the operation.”  Defendant told him that they took video 
equipment from the Dubs residence.  Regarding Cosner, 
defendant told Laberge that he did not want to kill “that punk, 
but Lake wanted his fucking Honda, a cheap fucking Honda.”  
He also described the sounds that Cosner made after defendant 
shot him.  Regarding Peranteau, defendant told Laberge that he 
made a mistake in keeping Peranteau’s pen set after killing him.  
He believed he could say that Lake gave him the pens as a 
defense.  He described for Laberge the process of shooting 
Peranteau while Peranteau pleaded for his life.  Defendant 
further said that authorities would not find Peranteau or Gerald 
because he burned their bodies after he and Lake killed them.  
Defendant told Laberge that he killed Gerald so he could move 
up in seniority at the moving company. 
Regarding Allen, defendant told Laberge that he killed her 
“quicker” because she tried to break out of her cell.  He said that 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
he put his gun inside her vagina and made her call Safeway to 
ask for time off.  Finally, he admitted shooting Stapley and Bond 
and then burying the bodies. 
g.  Defendant’s Relationship with Lake 
The prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s 
relationship with Lake.  Lake’s sister, Fern Ebeling, testified 
that in 1984, she acted as an intermediary between defendant 
and Lake, receiving mail from Lake and forwarding it to 
defendant, and receiving mail from defendant and forwarding it 
to Lake.  That same year, defendant attended Thanksgiving 
dinner at Lake’s mother’s house.  He was the only nonfamily 
member present.  The following month, in December 1984, 
defendant introduced Lake to a coworker who needed work done 
on his house. 
2.  Defense Case 
a.  Leonard Lake 
The defense presented evidence of Lake’s involvement in 
several uncharged murders, including his brother, Donald, and 
his best friend, Charles Gunnar.  Several witnesses, including 
defendant, testified that Lake frequently went by the name 
Charles Gunnar. 
The defense presented evidence of Lake’s controlling and 
abusive relationships with women.  Witnesses also testified 
about Lake’s interest in photographing women nude and in 
sexually provocative positions, including girls as young as 10 
years old.  Some women testified about their personal 
experiences being photographed by Lake, including one who was 
coerced into being photographed and was subsequently raped by 
Lake when she was 16 years old. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
Lake carried cyanide in his pocket and told several 
witnesses that he would take it if he were ever captured.  Lake 
also told witnesses about wanting to build a bunker to use in a 
nuclear war.  Lake had fantasies of keeping women hostage in 
the bunker. 
While he was posted in Hawaii with the United States 
Marine Corps, defendant met a man who was posted there while 
serving in the Army.  In the summer of 1981, the man told 
defendant about Lake and provided defendant with Lake’s 
address at the time.  During part of 1982, defendant lived with 
Lake and Claralyn in Philo, a town in Mendocino County.  
Lake’s neighbor, Ernie Pardini, testified that Lake frequently 
reprimanded defendant and spoke to him in a degrading and 
domineering manner.  Pardini believed Lake was verbally 
abusive toward defendant.  He testified that defendant seemed 
very timid around Lake and behaved like he was trying to win 
Lake’s approval. 
b.  Charged Offenses 
The defense presented evidence that Lake was the 
dominant or sole offender in the charged offenses.  A few days 
before Cosner disappeared, a neighbor saw him speaking with 
Lake in the building’s garage.  One of Lake’s neighbors in 
Wilseyville testified that the day after Gerald disappeared, he 
saw Lake with a bloody sheet wrapped around his body.  That 
same day, a local doctor treated Lake for a gunshot wound in his 
hand. 
Lake told another neighbor in Wilseyville that he thought 
the Bond family were “pests” and that he believed it was okay 
to kill someone if they were bugging you. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
c.  Defendant’s Testimony 
After the defense rested and the prosecution finished its 
closing argument, the defense moved to reopen its case to allow 
defendant to testify.  The court granted the motion. 
Defendant was born in Hong Kong and moved to the 
United States when he was 18 years old.  He met Lake when he 
was 22 or 23 years old.  Defendant looked up to Lake and trusted 
and respected him.  Defendant appreciated that Lake accepted 
him as a friend even though he was not a United States citizen, 
could not drive, did not have a job, and had a criminal record.  
He knew that Lake was a survivalist and was preparing for the 
end of the world by building survival shelters and stockpiling 
supplies.  When defendant was court-martialed, Lake sent him 
photos of construction on the bunker.  Defendant did not know 
that Lake was building a place to keep sex slaves. 
Sometimes Lake would stay with defendant in San 
Francisco.  Lake kept bedding, a change of clothing, tools, 
ammunition, and marijuana in defendant’s apartment. 
Defendant 
denied 
being 
involved 
in 
Gerald’s 
disappearance.  He never met Gerald at a bus station nor did he 
ever call Gerald’s number and ask to meet at a bus station.  He 
was not in Wilseyville the day that Gerald disappeared because 
he was scheduled to work an eight-hour shift at Dennis Moving 
Company the following day.  He also worked the day that 
Gerald’s apartment was burglarized. 
Defendant denied being involved in the disappearance of 
the Dubs family.  Defendant denied being the person that 
neighbor Dorice Murphy saw walking out of the Dubses’ 
apartment the day they disappeared.  He admitted being the 
person that neighbor Barbara Speaker saw leaving the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
apartment two days later, but asserted he did so after Lake 
asked him for help with a “job.”  Defendant denied making any 
comments to Laberge about his involvement in the Dubs 
murders and did not know how the map with their residence 
circled ended up in his apartment.  He acknowledged that a VCR 
without a serial number was found in his apartment but said it 
belonged to Lake and he did not know where Lake got the VCR 
from. 
Defendant testified that he had nothing to do with the 
disappearance of Cosner and did not enter into any sort of 
agreement with Lake to kill Cosner.  Lake had told defendant 
that Cosner’s Honda was a “hot car,” and he obtained it from 
drug dealers.  Defendant denied telling Laberge that Lake killed 
Cosner because he wanted the Honda.  He also denied telling 
Laberge that Cosner was “a hard operation because he wouldn’t 
cooperate” and that Cosner made strange noises when 
defendant shot him. 
Defendant denied having anything to do with Peranteau’s 
disappearance.  He denied ever visiting Peranteau’s apartment 
and testified that he did not know where Peranteau lived.  He 
claimed he had no involvement in taking Peranteau’s property 
to Wilseyville and did not know how it got there.  He denied 
telling Laberge that he had shot Peranteau in the head and 
burned the body. 
Defendant testified that the M Ladies video was Lake’s 
idea.  Allen was the first woman he helped Lake imprison.  He 
knew that Allen was not there willingly and believed that Lake 
was trying to modify Allen’s behavior to turn her into a willing 
sex slave.  They did not agree nor plan to kill Allen.  Defendant 
acknowledged his participation in the video but asserted that he 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
could not confront Lake or ask not to be involved.  He stated that 
he did not have sexual intercourse or oral sex with Allen.  When 
defendant left Wilseyville to go back to San Francisco, Allen was 
still alive.  Defendant did not know anything about Carroll’s 
death.  He acknowledged that on the video, Lake told Allen to 
cooperate or else they would bury her in the same place that 
they buried Carroll.  He claimed, however, that he was not 
paying attention when Lake said that and he did not actually 
help Lake kill or bury Carroll.  Defendant denied making any 
statements about Allen to Laberge. 
Defendant testified that the first time he saw O’Connor 
was when they started filming her in the M Ladies video.  He 
knew that Lake hated O’Connor for several reasons.  He assisted 
Lake in threatening O’Connor to comply but did not intend to 
physically hurt her or kill her.  He helped Lake by projecting 
solidarity so that O’Connor knew two people were involved and 
she would be more likely to comply.  Defendant testified that he 
was not present when Bond and Stapley were killed.  Sometime 
after they recorded the video with O’Connor, Lake showed 
defendant two bodies under the porch:  Bond and Stapley.  
Defendant bound Bond’s body, put a gag in his mouth, and put 
the body in a sleeping bag.  Lake did the same thing to Stapley’s 
body.  Lake wanted it to appear like they had been killed by rival 
drug dealers. 
Defendant said he regretted his actions in the M Ladies 
video.  He said he was “young and adventurous” and did not 
exercise independent judgment. 
The day that Lake was arrested, defendant thought 
someone saw him take the vise and he panicked.  He was 
worried the police would discover Cosner’s car, the M Ladies 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
video, and the buried bodies.  He was also worried that he would 
be deported back to Hong Kong.  He met up with Claralyn and 
together they drove back to the lumber store to check on Lake.  
Defendant crouched down in the backseat as Claralyn drove by 
and saw Lake standing in the lot with police.  Later that night, 
he bought a one-way plane ticket to Chicago and eventually 
made his way into Canada. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
The prosecution presented evidence that on July 15, 1982, 
defendant was convicted by military court for conspiracy to 
commit larceny of government property valued at more than 
$100; larceny of government property valued at more than $100; 
and unlawful entry with intent to commit larceny of government 
property.  On November 14, 1981, after arrest for the larceny 
offenses, defendant escaped from confinement in a military 
facility until he was captured on April 29, 1982.  Lake and 
Claralyn were present in the apartment that officers searched 
after defendant’s April arrest. 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s arrest 
for shoplifting in Canada and the discovery of the lean-to in the 
wildlife park, described above. 
Several people testified about the victims and the impact 
of their deaths.  Sharon O’Connor, Brenda O’Connor’s mother, 
testified that she was very close with her daughter and loved her 
very much.  O’Connor’s death was very difficult for her and tore 
the family apart.  Her grandson, Lonnie, was “the sweetest little 
guy.”  The absence of remains was very hard for the family 
because they could not have a funeral.  Sandra Bond testified 
that she was O’Connor’s sister and was also married to Bond’s 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
brother, so she was “getting it from both sides.”  She explained 
that her mother was grieving O’Connor while her mother-in-law 
was grieving Bond, which was hard on her and her husband.  
She “kind of lost [her] identity” after O’Connor died. 
Robert McCourt, Clifford Peranteau’s brother, testified 
that Peranteau “was a nice guy” who “liked anybody and 
everybody.”  They had 10 other siblings, and they all had a hard 
childhood, but Peranteau tried to keep all the siblings connected 
to each other.  Their mother had been hospitalized five times 
“because of this mess” and refused to accept that Peranteau had 
died. 
Jeffrey Nourse testified that Deborah Dubs was his 
cousin, but they were very close and she was more like a sister 
to him.  Deborah was very artistic and “always had a zest for life 
and [was] just a joy to be around.”  Harvey Dubs was a “very 
quiet, very loving, very caring human being.”  Nourse said that 
he thought about Deborah, Harvey, and their son Sean every 
day.  Their family had still not gotten used to the Dubs family’s 
absence 
at 
family 
gatherings, 
especially 
holidays 
like 
Thanksgiving. 
Roger Gerald, Jeffrey Gerald’s father, testified that his son 
was fun-loving, humorous, and nonviolent.  He was very close 
with his son.  Gerald’s death had been very difficult on the 
family and left an unexplainable void in their everyday lives.  He 
continued to ask himself why this had happened but knew he 
would never get an answer.  Denise Gerald, Gerald’s sister, 
testified that her brother “was and still is probably the finest 
person I have ever been able to spend time with; funny, passive, 
life loving, comical, [and] warm.  He was a very wonderful 
person.”  She testified that Gerald’s death “has taken [my] 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
mother from me.  She is alive but part of her died with that one 
phone call.  I lost my father that I knew.” 
Diane Allen, Kathleen Allen’s sister, testified that 
Kathleen “was a very strong, intelligent person” who always 
made her laugh and always had the answer to a problem.  Her 
sister’s death “destroyed” her family; her mother could not 
handle losing her daughter.  Diane missed her sister very much, 
and she felt it was not fair that Kathleen missed out on so much 
in life. 
Dwight Stapley, Scott Stapley’s father, testified that 
Stapley played a lot of sports growing up and was very active.  
While Stapley was in community college, his parents lived in 
separate houses due to their jobs and Stapley lived with his dad.  
During that time, they “went from being father and son to 
roommates, buddies,” and it was “quite a wonderful experience.”  
His wife learned of their son’s death when a news anchor phoned 
their home and left a message asking to talk.  The way they 
learned of his death was difficult for the family.  Dwight 
explained that he and his wife carefully followed defendant’s 
case and went to court proceedings in Canada, Calaveras 
County, and Orange County.  They had spent their life savings 
traveling to court hearings.  Their other children were just 
starting to deal with the impact of losing their brother.  Lola 
Stapley, Stapley’s mother, testified that her son was “a great big 
overgrown teddy bear.  Everybody loved him.”  His death left her 
“absolutely devasted.”  Stapley’s sister was pregnant when 
Stapley was murdered and named her son after her brother.  
The family keeps an empty chair at the table when they get 
together for dinners to signify that Stapley was with them 
spiritually. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
2.  Defense Case 
Several of defendant’s family members testified on his 
behalf.  Alice Shum, defendant’s aunt, testified that she lived 
with defendant’s family during part of his childhood in Hong 
Kong.  Shum saw defendant’s father beat him with a stick for 
getting poor grades in school or failing to complete his 
homework.  Defendant was a quiet child and did not talk to other 
people very often.  Shum moved to the United States in 1973; 
defendant moved to the United States in 1979 to attend college.  
Defendant visited Shum and played with her young sons.  
Defendant sent Shum Mother’s Day cards and holiday cards 
while he was in prison.  Shum’s son, Hubert, testified that he 
was eight years old when he last saw defendant and was 23 
years old at the time of trial.  He talked to defendant 
occasionally when defendant called Shum.  Hubert said that 
defendant means a lot to him, and he thought that they would 
have been close if not for this case. 
Defendant’s sisters, Alice and Betty, did not testify but 
their statements made to a psychologist were introduced by way 
of stipulation.  Alice explained that they had a sheltered and 
protective upbringing, and she believed the three siblings 
tended to be naïve, easily influenced, gullible, and overly 
trusting of others.  She described defendant as “curious and 
naughty” and said he liked to play pranks on other people.  Alice 
related that their father punished defendant for his 
transgressions by hitting him with a feather duster cane.  Betty 
explained that during his teenage years, defendant appeared 
sad most of the time, would sleep in the afternoon after coming 
home from school, appeared withdrawn and lonely, and did not 
speak to other family members very much.  She opined that 
their protective upbringing resulted in her, Alice, and defendant 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
being dependent on others to make decisions for them.  Betty 
believed defendant was kind at heart. 
Defendant’s father, Kenneth Ng, testified.  Education was 
very important to Ng, and he worked hard to have his children 
accepted into private schools.  He admitted punishing defendant 
for not doing his homework or for not getting good grades.  He 
would beat defendant “very hard” with a stick.  Ng 
acknowledged that, looking back, there might have been a better 
way to discipline and teach his children.  Defendant’s mom, Oi 
Ping Ng, also testified.  She explained that defendant was very 
shy as a child and did not talk much.  She knew that Ng beat 
defendant, but she was unable to stop him. 
Several witnesses testified about defendant’s time in the 
Marines.  Ray Guzman explained that he and defendant would 
go to dinner or to the movies.  They would sometimes stop at a 
martial arts school and watch students practicing.  He never 
saw defendant involved in a fight with anyone.  Hugh Daugherty 
explained that defendant always followed orders and did 
everything Daugherty asked him to do.  Defendant was very 
quiet and “did his own thing.”  He had observed defendant 
practicing martial arts.  David Burns testified that he was 
surprised to learn of defendant’s involvement with the armory 
theft and said it was out of character.  He occasionally observed 
defendant practicing martial arts but never saw him fighting 
with anyone.  Bradley Chapline testified that defendant was 
quiet, well spoken, and appeared to be well educated. 
The defense presented expert testimony regarding 
defendant’s character and mental state.  Psychologist Abraham 
Nievod conducted psychological testing on defendant in 1993, 
1996, and 1998.  Dr. Nievod also reviewed the reports from two 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
court appointed experts who had also evaluated defendant.  Dr. 
Nievod explained that defendant scored very high on schizoid, 
avoidant, and dependent personality disorders.  Schizoid people 
do not relate well with other people or know how to have long-
term relationships, which Dr. Nievod explained was consistent 
with defendant’s history as a “loner.”  People with avoidant 
personality disorder avoid groups of people and forming close 
relationships with people because they are afraid of being 
rejected or failing.  If they find one person they can trust, they 
will model behavior after that person and will do almost 
anything to maintain that relationship.  Dr. Nievod opined that 
defendant latched onto Lake as a sort of caregiver and as 
someone who would teach him how to operate in the world. 
Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian testified that in the previous 
12 to 13 years, defendant had spent 10 years in solitary 
confinement.  After meeting with defendant, he observed 
“terribly, very profound, very pronounced obsessional thinking.”  
Dr. Grassian said that defendant was preoccupied with constant 
hunger and smells, and “the enormous overriding preoccupation 
with his desperate need to have Michael Burt reassigned to his 
case.”  Dr. Grassian testified that solitary confinement can affect 
a person’s ability to think, concentrate, remember, and to 
cooperate in their own defense.  He described defendant as a 
docile, passive, and compliant person.  Dr. Grassian reviewed 
Dr. Nievod’s reports and agreed that defendant suffered from 
dependent personality disorder. 
Psychiatrist Paul Leung specialized in Asian family 
structure and culture.  He explained that in a traditional Hong 
Kong family at the time defendant grew up, the father is an 
authoritative figure in the family, and children are expected to 
do what their parents tell them to do.  The father is sometimes 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
viewed as a person for children to fear and the disciplinarian of 
the family.  Beating one’s children was not uncommon, but 
defendant’s father was “a bit more harsh” than fathers in the 
typical family.  Parents generally have high expectations for 
their sons, especially when there is only one son in the family.  
Dr. Leung explained that defendant’s father had very high 
expectations for him and disciplined him more because of those 
expectations. 
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Right to Representation 
Defendant raises several contentions regarding his right 
to representation.  First, he asserts the trial court deprived him 
of his constitutional rights when it appointed the Orange 
County Public Defender as standby counsel while he 
represented himself.  Second, defendant contends the trial court 
erroneously revoked his right to represent himself without 
justification.  Third, he asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied one of his motions to substitute 
counsel, made during jury selection.  Finally, defendant 
contends the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to 
appoint his preferred attorney as counsel. 
1.  Factual Background 
Defendant’s representation in this case involved several 
attorneys, 37 Marsden motions, and a brief period of 
representing himself. 
Proceedings began on June 8, 1985, when the Calaveras 
County Justice Court issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest.  
On July 15, 1985, the court appointed the Calaveras County 
Public Defender to represent defendant, who at the time was in 
custody in Canada.  On December 10, 1985, the court appointed 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
Garrick Lew, who had previous experience working with 
defendant, to represent him.  On January 14, 1987, the court 
appointed Michael Burt as second counsel.  Burt represented 
defendant in San Francisco and worked for the San Francisco 
Public Defender (SFPD), but the court appointed him as an 
independent contractor.  Shortly after, the United States asked 
Canada to extradite defendant.  On September 20, 1988, while 
defendant was still in Canada, the court ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction to appoint counsel and removed Burt and Lew from 
the case. 
Defendant made his first appearance in Calaveras County 
for arraignment on September 27, 1991.  On October 4, 1991, 
Burt and Lew filed a motion requesting appointment as counsel.  
The motion included a declaration from defendant stating a 
desire for Burt and Lew to represent him and to appoint the 
entire SFPD’s office.  At a hearing on the matter, Burt explained 
that his current caseload included preparing two other capital 
cases for trial.  If SFPD were appointed to defendant’s case, a 
second lawyer would get caught up on the case while Burt would 
supervise the new attorney and Lew.  He acknowledged that it 
was possible sometime in the future he would have a scheduling 
conflict, but if that were to happen, the second lawyer would be 
able to handle the matter. 
When the court asked Burt if he could give “adequate 
representation to all three of these cases,” Burt admitted that 
SFPD was “not excluding the possibility” of having a third 
lawyer work on the case as well.  Burt requested the court 
appoint SFPD generally, rather than him personally, to the 
case, because he did not believe he could adequately represent 
defendant alone while also working on the other two cases.  The 
prosecutor argued that if Burt was not personally representing 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
defendant, “it takes him outside the grounds for Harris, where 
a client imposes a certain trust and confidence in a particular 
attorney, and that particular attorney has a superior 
understanding of the facts of the case.”5  He further expressed 
concern that if Burt’s other cases took too much time, the 
defense would request further continuances on defendant’s case. 
The court noted that in a declaration submitted by Lew, 
Lew stated that his practice would be in “jeopardy of financial 
ruin” if he were appointed counsel in defendant’s case.  Lew said 
he had been with defendant for seven years and that “was not 
something that you walk away from over money,” but he would 
need “sufficient time” to tend to other clients and cases.  Lew 
stated that his estimates on how long it would take to prepare 
the case for trial were dependent on whether Burt and SFPD 
were also appointed.  
The court denied defendant’s motion to have Lew and Burt 
appointed based on concerns over Burt’s availability.  The court 
appointed Thomas Marovich and James Webster, both of whom 
had capital case experience. 
Defendant made his first appearance with Webster and 
Marovich on November 1, 1991.  Defendant filed a Marsden 
motion and stated it was “imperative” that Burt and Lew 
represent him.  The court denied the motion.  Three weeks later, 
defendant filed a second Marsden motion again requesting Burt 
and Lew as counsel.  The court denied the motion.  Between 
January 10, 1992, and October 2, 1992, defendant filed nine 
 
5  
Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 (Harris).  In 
Harris, we held that a trial court has the discretion to appoint 
an 
indigent 
defendant’s 
counsel 
of 
choice 
in 
certain 
circumstances.  (Id. at p. 799.) 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
more Marsden motions, again requesting appointment of Burt 
and Lew, all of which the court denied.  At each hearing, the 
trial court addressed defendant’s concerns and allowed counsel 
an opportunity to respond. 
The preliminary hearing began on October 6, 1992, and 
ended on November 12, 1992.  Between October 6 and October 
16, defendant filed five Marsden motions again requesting 
appointment of Burt and Lew; the court denied each one on the 
day each motion was filed. 
On October 28, Webster and Marovich informed the court 
that defendant was suing them for malpractice.  Counsel argued 
that the lawsuit created a conflict and continuing with the 
preliminary hearing would violate State Bar rules.  After 
holding a recess to review relevant materials, the court declined 
to continue the preliminary hearing or find that the lawsuit 
created a conflict.  The court noted that with two exceptions, the 
lawsuit contained allegations previously addressed in Marsden 
motions.  The court stated that if it allowed the lawsuit to create 
a conflict, then anytime a defendant was denied a Marsden 
motion, the defendant would simply need to file a lawsuit 
against counsel.  Defendant filed three more Marsden motions 
on November 3, 5, and 12, respectively. 
On November 20, 1992, the Calaveras County District 
Attorney filed an information charging defendant with the 
current offenses, and the case moved from the Calaveras County 
Justice Court to the Calaveras County Superior Court.  On 
December 2, 1992, the court temporarily reappointed Webster 
and Marovich.  The attorneys objected, arguing that defendant’s 
lawsuit created a conflict of interest.  The court declined to 
dismiss them. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
On January 12, 1993, Marovich and Webster filed a 
motion to set aside their appointment.  They also asked the court 
to designate separate counsel to prepare a motion seeking 
appointment of defendant’s preferred counsel pursuant to 
Harris.  The court appointed Ephraim Margolin and Eric 
Multhaup to prepare the Harris motion.  The court denied 
defendant’s 21st Marsden motion on June 9, 1993. 
On July 26, 1993, Margolin and Multhaup filed a 
combined Marsden and Harris motion requesting the court 
discharge Webster and Marovich and appoint Burt and Lew.  On 
September 1, Webster and Marovich filed a motion to withdraw. 
On December 8, 1993, the judge who had been handling 
the case recused himself.  The Judicial Council appointed 
Donald McCartin, a retired judge from Orange County, to the 
case.  McCartin took the bench for the first time on January 21, 
1994.  He believed it was appropriate to grant the Marsden 
motion 
but 
stated 
the 
venue 
change 
should 
precede 
appointment of counsel.  McCartin conditionally relieved 
Marovich and Webster pending the appointment of new counsel 
after the venue change. 
The parties made their first appearance in Orange County 
on September 30, 1994.  The court noted that Burt and the SFPD 
consented to appointment conditionally but certain of those 
conditions could not be met, most notably trying the case in San 
Francisco.  The court further noted that even if it appointed 
SFPD, according to its paperwork, the San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors and the San Francisco Mayor could abrogate the 
appointment.  The court stated the case had already faced 
significant delay and a review by the board of supervisors could 
take years.  The court denied defendant’s motion to appoint 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
SFPD as counsel and instead appointed the Orange County 
Public Defender (OCPD). 
On July 29, 1996, defendant made his 23d Marsden 
motion.  The court granted the motion, relieved OCPD, and 
appointed two attorneys from the court’s list of available capital 
case counsel, Gary Pohlson and George Peters as counsel.  On 
August 9, defendant filed another Marsden motion seeking to 
relieve Pohlson and Peters and reappoint OCPD.  The court 
denied the motion.  Defendant filed a petition for writ of 
mandate challenging the court’s decision, and on February 14, 
1997, the Court of Appeal granted the petition.  The appellate 
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in relieving 
OCPD and therefore erred in denying defendant’s subsequent 
request to have OCPD reinstated.  (Ng v. Superior Court (1997) 
52 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023–1024 (Ng).)  The appellate court 
ordered the trial court to reinstate OCPD and reassign the case 
to a different judge.  (Id. at p. 1024.)  The case was reassigned 
on February 24. 
Defendant filed his 25th Marsden motion on May 27, 1997.   
The trial court denied his request for separate counsel to handle 
the Marsden claim and denied the motion.  Defendant filed 
another Marsden motion requesting Burt be appointed on 
August 13, 1997, and again asked the court to appoint counsel 
to assist him with the motion.  On September 12, the court heard 
argument on appointing Burt as counsel.  Burt stated that his 
office was available to accept appointment “depending upon the 
circumstances of appointment and specifically issues of where 
the case gets tried and when it gets tried and issues such as 
funding.”  On October 10, the court agreed to appoint Burt as 
cocounsel if Burt and the presiding judge could agree on Burt’s 
compensation.  Defendant withdrew his pending Marsden and 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
Harris motions.  To accommodate Burt’s schedule, the parties 
agreed to a trial date of September 1, 1998. 
On January 16, 1998, defendant filed his 27th Marsden 
motion and said he was reviving all related motions.  
Additionally, Burt announced he could not accept the 
appointment 
because 
he 
was 
not 
satisfied 
with 
the 
compensation offered by the court.  The court denied the 
Marsden motion on February 6.  Defendant filed his 28th 
Marsden motion less than two weeks later, which the court 
denied on March 20. 
On March 31, 1998, defendant filed a motion to represent 
himself, and on April 17, he filed his 29th Marsden motion.  The 
court denied the Marsden motion and deferred ruling on the 
Faretta motion until the conclusion of defendant’s competency 
hearing.  After finding defendant mentally competent on April 
20, the court denied the Faretta motion.  The court ruled that 
defendant did not want to represent himself, and his real 
purpose was to obstruct justice and delay proceedings. 
On May 8, 1998, defendant filed another Faretta motion.  
At a hearing on the matter, he requested advisory counsel and 
an investigative team not associated with OCPD.  The court 
again found the motion was made to obstruct justice and denied 
defendant’s request.  One week later, on May 15, defendant filed 
another Faretta motion and stated he was willing to accept 
anyone as his advisory counsel.  The court granted the motion 
and appointed OCPD as advisory and standby counsel. 
On May 26, 1998, OCPD filed a motion to withdraw as 
advisory and standby counsel.  The court denied the motion.  In 
written comments on the motion, the court noted that it did its 
best to try to have Burt appointed as counsel per defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
wishes.  A few days later, defendant filed a motion to discharge 
the OCPD as advisory and standby counsel.  The court denied 
the motion. 
On August 5, 1998, defendant filed a motion to continue 
the trial six months, to March 1, 1999.  At a hearing on the 
motion, the court reminded defendant that he had stated that 
he would be ready to proceed on the scheduled trial date.  The 
court asked defendant if he wanted to continue representing 
himself; defendant confirmed that he did.  The court then asked 
defendant why he specifically asked for six months.  Defendant 
said that if he was not ready to proceed in six months, then 
counsel would take over to not cause any further delay.  The 
court stated that it was considering revoking defendant’s pro se 
status and if, at the time trial started, he was ready to represent 
himself, the court would reconsider a renewed Faretta motion.  
The court ruled that defendant was not willing to cooperate with 
OCPD in preparation for trial, was not actively preparing for 
trial, and was “doing everything to avoid trial in the near 
future.”  The court revoked defendant’s pro se status and stated 
that if he was able to comply with the rules of the court, it would 
revisit the issue.  The court reappointed OCPD and agreed with 
OCPD’s assessment that the continuance motion was now moot. 
On August 26, the defense moved for a six-month 
continuance.  The court denied the motion and instead granted 
a two-week continuance.  Defendant filed his 30th Marsden 
motion on August 28, 1998, which the court denied. 
Jury selection began on September 14, 1998.  Defendant 
filed his 31st Marsden motion the following day.  The court 
found that defendant was attempting to manufacture a conflict 
and create a delay and denied the motion. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
Defendant filed two more Marsden motions during the 
remainder of jury selection, both of which the court denied. 
Defendant filed his 34th Marsden motion during the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief, and his 35th motion during the 
defense case.  The court denied both motions.  Defendant filed 
his 36th Marsden motion after the prosecution finished its 
closing argument; the court denied the motion. 
After the jury returned its guilty verdicts, the court 
learned that defendant had filed a malpractice lawsuit against 
the OCPD.  The lawsuit named defendant’s lead attorney and 
one other deputy public defender as codefendants. 
On June 3, 1999, after the conclusion of the penalty phase, 
defendant filed his 37th Marsden motion.  The court denied the 
motion on June 30. 
2.  Public Defender’s Role 
After granting defendant’s motion to represent himself, 
the trial court appointed OCPD as standby counsel and 
instructed OCPD to continue preparing for trial.  Defendant now 
contends the manner in which OCPD prepared for trial 
conflicted with his own trial strategies.  This conflict, he asserts, 
interfered with his right to represent himself and thus violated 
his rights pursuant to Faretta.  Defendant specifically argues 
that the instructions provided to a mental health expert by 
OCPD conflicted with his own instructions, which caused the 
expert to resign.  He does not, however, explain what conflicting 
instructions were provided to the expert and, as discussed 
below, the record does not support his contention. 
As previously noted, the trial court granted defendant’s 
Faretta motion on May 15, 1998.  The court appointed OCPD as 
advisory and standby counsel.  Counsel William Kelley opined 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
that this put OCPD in conflicting positions.  He said, “The 
advisory counsel role, that we do just that, we advise Mr. Ng.  
He is making the decisions on the case.  We may say we think 
that is a bad decision, but he can say, ‘Too bad.  That is what we 
are going to do,’ and then he is going to do what he is going to 
do.  Whereas, my role or our role as standby counsel would be to 
go ahead and independently proceed and prepare as if we are 
still the attorney of record, and that is that.  My question to you 
is what happens when those two roles clash?  We say as attorney 
of record in a standby role we think we need to go down this road 
and as an advisory counsel we are advising Mr. Ng we have to 
go down this road.  He goes, ‘Nope.  I am the attorney of record 
on this case.  We go down that road.’ ”  The court replied, “Go 
down both roads.”  The court acknowledged the possibility of 
problems but told Kelley, “I want you to do exactly what you 
have been doing, and that is putting all your resources towards 
trying this case in Mr. Ng’s best interest, and you are going to 
do that as standby counsel.  As advisory counsel, you are there 
to advise Mr. Ng.”  The court clarified that the government had 
invested a lot of money in OCPD to represent defendant, and the 
office had put in significant time and effort into preparing his 
defense.  The court explained it “is not a willy-nilly thing that I 
am appointing your office over your objection to assist” 
defendant as advisory counsel.  The court warned that if 
defendant made any attempt to disrupt proceedings or delay 
trial, OCPD would be reinstated as counsel. 
Just two weeks later, on May 26, 1998, OCPD filed a 
motion to withdraw as advisory and standby counsel.  Carl 
Holmes, the Orange County Public Defender, explained that he 
brought the motion “with great reluctance,” but his office 
reached a point where acting as advisory and standby counsel to 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
defendant would “compromise [their] ethical duty” to provide a 
meaningful defense.  Holmes continued that he could not, 
without divulging confidence of defendant, reveal “how deep and 
serious his mistrust of the Public Defender’s Office is.”  The 
court opined that defendant did not simply mistrust OCPD; he 
mistrusted anyone who was not Burt.  Holmes agreed with the 
court’s assessment.  The court stated that it had recently asked 
defendant for an example of a true conflict between himself and 
Kelley, and defendant could not provide one.  The court 
continued, “Appointing a different . . . advisory counsel will not 
help at all.  We will hear exactly the same thing we have been 
hearing since day one.  And that is why I asked you for examples 
in camera, and those are the same problems you are going to 
have with any attorney.”  The court also stated that defendant 
created a breakdown in his relationship with counsel, rather 
than counsel’s actions or inactions causing a breakdown, and his 
distrust of OCPD was because he did not want to trust OCPD.  
The court denied the motion, finding no conflict, but stated that 
if a true conflict arose the court would address it. 
On June 8, defendant filed his own motion to discharge 
OCPD as standby counsel.  The court denied the motion, 
reminding defendant that he had been willing to accept OCPD 
as standby counsel when he filed his Faretta motion a few weeks 
prior. 
On July 21, both OCPD and defendant were directed by 
the judge assigned to handle section 987.9 matters6 to share 
 
6  
Section 987.9 authorizes a capital defendant to “request 
the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, 
experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the 
defense.”  (Id., subd. (a).) 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
previously retained experts and separately apply for their own 
funding for each expert, in lieu of requiring defendant to locate 
and retain his own experts now that he represented himself.  
The court explained that the experts had been in place for quite 
a while, and it would be impossible for defendant to find new 
qualified experts, get them caught up on his case, and conduct 
testing and interviews by the September 1 trial date.  The court 
further explained that the defense had already retained top 
caliber experts, and requiring defendant to select new experts 
would, in essence, punish him by excluding those experts from 
his defense.  The court acknowledged the plan was not perfect 
but believed that using the existing defense experts would best 
facilitate defendant’s preparations for trial. 
Kelley noted that using the same experts would require 
him to know what the experts were working on for defendant, 
but defendant told the experts not to disclose that information 
to Kelley.  He explained that this put him in a difficult position 
and that the experts were “still giving [him] some general ideas 
because they are uncomfortable with their role.  Four experts 
have called me up independently and said so.”  Kelley agreed, 
however, with the court’s statement that it would be a “real 
gross violation” of defendant’s due process rights, given all of the 
experts the defense had lined up, to suddenly require he find his 
own experts.  He argued that nonetheless, the experts were 
“having difficulty with the position this puts them in.”  The court 
again acknowledged that “it’s not a perfect world” and that 
Kelley was in an unusual position, and said that defendant could 
get separate funding for his use of the experts without Kelley’s 
assistance to avoid defendant needing to tell Kelley what he 
uses the experts for.  When the court asked defendant if he had 
any concerns with the arrangement, he said not at that time.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
Approximately one month later, the court revoked defendant’s 
pro se status and reappointed OCPD as counsel. 
On August 25, after Kelly was reinstated as counsel, he 
filed a motion to continue.  He explained that a key expert 
witness had resigned as a result of the different directives she 
received from him and from defendant, and she could not 
perform antithetical tasks.  Kelley explained to the trial court, 
“When [defendant] was given his pro. per. status, she was 
having problems because, you know, I would want her — I am 
interested in her developing information that I believe to be 
pertinent to the defense of the substantive case, and [defendant] 
was having her go in a different direction, and she was in a bit 
of a dilemma because the direction he was having her go in was 
going to put her in direct conflict with me.  And she called me 
up one day very disturbed and distraught about it and couldn’t 
deal with it and felt she had a conflict of interest and told me 
she had to resign from the case.” 
Defendant now argues that there was significant conflict 
between himself and OCPD regarding the strategy for 
developing evidence.  He asserts that the trial court’s insistence 
that OCPD continue preparing for trial with strategies that 
conflicted with his own violated his Faretta rights.  But he points 
to nothing specific in the record except for one example:  
defendant asserts that his and OCPD’s conflicting instructions 
to mental health expert Dr. Kaser-Boyd, and her subsequent 
resignation interfered with his ability to represent himself.  
Aside from vaguely asserting that he and OCPD instructed her 
to prepare for trial in a “conflicted manner,” defendant does not 
provide any additional information regarding how they each 
provided conflicting instructions. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
The Attorney General asserts that defendant abandoned 
his right to self-representation by failing to renew his request to 
represent 
himself 
and 
thus 
acquiesced 
in 
subsequent 
representation. 
 
Because 
defendant 
waived 
his 
Sixth 
Amendment claim by failing to renew his request, the Attorney 
General argues, defendant cannot claim on appeal that the trial 
court violated his rights pursuant to Faretta by appointing 
OCPD as standby counsel.  After the trial court revoked 
defendant’s pro se status, the court stated that if, at the time 
trial started, he was ready to represent himself, the court would 
reconsider a renewed Faretta motion.  (See People v. Dunkle 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909 [the 6th Amend. self-representation 
right may be waived or abandoned when a defendant prior to or 
during trial acquiesces in the assignment or participation of 
counsel in the defense].)  Defendant counters that renewing his 
request would have been futile because self-representation 
would have been accompanied by the same allegedly 
unconstitutional conditions the trial court had previously 
imposed, namely requiring OCPD to remain as standby counsel.  
We need not decide whether defendant waived his claim, 
because there was no Sixth Amendment violation regardless. 
The United States Supreme Court examined the role of 
standby counsel in McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168.  “In 
determining whether a defendant’s Faretta rights have been 
respected, the primary focus must be on whether the defendant 
had a fair chance to present his case in his own 
way.  Faretta itself dealt with the defendant’s affirmative right 
to participate, not with the limits on standby counsel’s 
additional involvement.”  (Id. at p. 177.)  Standby counsel 
unconstitutionally violates a defendant’s Faretta right if 
counsel’s 
“participation 
over 
the 
defendant’s 
objection 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with 
any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning 
of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter 
of importance.”  (Id. at p. 178.)  Counsel also violates a 
defendant’s right if, without the defendant’s consent, counsel 
destroys the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing 
himself.  (Ibid.) 
Because defendant did not represent himself by the time 
voir dire began, we assess whether his Faretta rights were 
vindicated with regard to proceedings occurring outside the 
presence of the jury only.  “Faretta rights are adequately 
vindicated in proceedings outside the presence of the jury if 
the pro se defendant is allowed to address the court freely on his 
own behalf and if disagreements between counsel and the pro 
se defendant are resolved in the defendant’s favor whenever the 
matter is one that would normally be left to the discretion of 
counsel.”  (McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 179.) 
Defendant contends the court’s insistence that he and 
OCPD continue trial preparations irrespective of any conflict 
“virtually guaranteed” that OCPD would substantially interfere 
with his ability to make tactical decisions, but he cites only the 
resignation of Dr. Kaser-Boyd as an example of how OCPD 
allegedly interfered with his ability to prepare his defense.  
Defendant contends he lost Dr. Kaser-Boyd as an expert witness 
because she found it untenable to work for him and OCPD at the 
same time, due to receiving conflicting instructions on how to 
prepare for trial.  Defendant, however, misapprehends the 
reason Dr. Kaser-Boyd resigned from his case.  Importantly, Dr. 
Kaser-Boyd 
initially 
expressed 
concern 
about 
assisting 
defendant before the court ruled that he and OCPD must share 
experts.  Dr. Kaser-Boyd wrote two letters to defendant.  The 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
47 
first letter was written on July 15, 1998, two weeks before the 
court ordered defendant and OCPD to share experts.  The 
second letter was written on July 30, shortly after the court’s 
order.  Together, these letters support a finding that, even before 
the court issued the order that defendant claims resulted in Dr. 
Kaser-Boyd’s resignation, she informed defendant of her desire 
to resign for two different reasons:  (1) she sought to resign 
because of defendant’s desire to have her assist him in having 
OCPD removed as advisory counsel, and (2) she sought to resign 
due to defendant’s generalized distrust of her and OCPD. 
In her first letter, Dr. Kaser-Boyd explained that 
defendant’s request that she actively assist him in having OCPD 
removed as advisory counsel likely created a conflict of interest.  
She explained that because she was working with OCPD on 
other matters, she could not also litigate against OCPD.  Thus, 
the dispute Dr. Kaser-Boyd described was not about receiving 
conflicting tactical instructions from OCPD and defendant with 
respect to her anticipated trial testimony.  Instead, the issue 
was that because she was working with OCPD on other matters, 
she could not also assist defendant in litigating against OCPD.  
This issue was not occasioned by the sharing of experts but, 
instead, was created by the fact that, as Dr. Kaser-Boyd 
explained in the letter, she “believe[d] that it likely would be a 
conflict of interest for me to carry several open cases with 
[OCPD] at the same time that I support your motion to have 
[OCPD] removed as legal advisor for you.”  
Dr. Kaser-Boyd also expressed concern in her first letter 
that defendant “will never be sure that I am in your camp and 
therefore supporting your best interests, and that this will 
seriously undermine your trust of me.”  She continued, “The 
relationships are further contaminated by the fact that I was 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
48 
originally retained by [Kelley], against whom you now struggle.”  
Dr. Kaser-Boyd concluded it would be better for defendant to 
retain an expert that did not have any ongoing work with OCPD 
and offered to help him find one.  Thus, the record does not 
compel defendant’s interpretation that he lost Dr. Kaser-Boyd 
as an expert because he and OCPD were giving her conflicting 
instructions.   
Dr. Kaser-Boyd emphasized these same two reasons for 
wanting to end the retention in a second letter on July 30, 1998.  
She again explained that “after careful deliberation and 
consultation with psychology and legal experts,” it would create 
a conflict of interest for her to help defendant litigate to have 
OCPD removed and also work with OCPD on other matters.  She 
again referenced defendant’s profound distrust of her and 
OCPD.  (“I regret that you feel that failing to help you on this 
issue would mean that you would not speak to me on the main 
issues of your case for which [Kelley] hired me”; see also the July 
15, 1998 letter stating, “[You] will never be sure that I am in 
your camp and therefore supporting your best interests, and 
that this will seriously undermine your trust of me.”)  Defendant 
highlights the fact that Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s second letter also 
referenced that the court’s recent ruling on sharing experts put 
her in an “untenable position,” and she could not “serve two 
masters.”  It is clear from the letters, however, that Dr. Kaser-
Boyd expressed a desire to resign before the court issued its 
ruling.  Although she does indicate in her second letter that the 
court’s ruling was another “reason” for her decision to resign, 
she had already articulated in her first letter that she needed to 
withdraw because defendant simply did not trust her or OCPD.  
As the court explained to the public defender, “It is not his 
mistrust of your office.  It is his mistrust of anybody except 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
49 
Michael Burt.”  During the hearing on OCPD’s motion to 
withdraw as advisory counsel, the trial court further 
underscored defendant’s distrust, stating, “It doesn’t matter 
who is here [as advisory counsel], we are still going to have this 
conflict because [defendant] is going to say, ‘Unless it comes 
from Mr. Michael Burt, I disagree.’  That is what is going to 
happen.”  The record thus supports the finding that Dr. Kaser-
Boyd had decided to withdraw before the court issued its ruling 
for reasons completely independent of that ruling.   
Finally, even if Dr. Kaser-Boyd did ultimately resign in 
part because of the directive to work on different tasks for 
defendant and for OCPD, defendant has not shown that the trial 
court’s order to share experts violated his constitutional rights 
by preventing him from presenting his defense in his own way.  
Specifically, defendant does not show that even if the defense 
intended to call her as a witness and could not, the defense was 
unable to introduce similar testimony from another expert.  In 
her July 15 letter, Dr. Kaser-Boyd opined that Dr. Nievod would 
be a suitable alternate expert.  Indeed, Dr. Nievod, who had 
initially been appointed by OCPD, continued working with 
defendant while defendant represented himself, including 
evaluating defendant one day after the court’s order to share 
experts and writing a declaration on defendant’s behalf nearly 
two weeks later.  The declaration, submitted along with 
defendant’s motion for a renewed competency hearing, suggests 
that Dr. Nievod planned to continue working with him despite 
the court’s order to share experts, had the court granted 
defendant’s motion for a competency hearing.  Dr. Nievod 
continued working with the defense once OCPD was reinstated 
as counsel; the defense introduced his testimony on defendant’s 
mental health during the penalty phase. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
50 
In addition to arguing that OCPD’s interference with 
experts led to defendant’s inability to represent himself, 
defendant further argues that OCPD interfered with his rights 
by interviewing witnesses on topics that were unlike those that 
he sought to develop.  Defendant does not cite anything in the 
record to support his contentions.  He does not identify specific 
witnesses OCPD interviewed, and he does not identify on which 
topics they were interviewed.  Further, he does not identify how 
OCPD possibly doing these things affected his ability to 
represent himself or develop a defense. 
In McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. 168, as in this 
case, most of the incidents the defendant complained of occurred 
outside of the presence of the jury.  The high court noted that on 
several occasions, the defendant adopted standby counsel’s 
initiatives, and on several other occasions the defendant 
opposed counsel’s initiatives.  (Id. at p. 180.)  The high court 
found that standby counsel’s actions did not violate the 
defendant’s Faretta rights because the defendant “was given 
ample opportunity to present his own position to the court on 
every matter discussed.  He was given time to think matters 
over, to explain his problems and concerns informally, and to 
speak to the judge off the record.  Standby counsel participated 
actively, but for the most part in an orderly manner.”  (Id. at 
p. 181.)  Importantly, at no point did the trial court adopt 
standby counsel’s position over the defendant’s “on a matter that 
would normally be left to the defense’s discretion.”  (Ibid.) 
Like in McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. 168, the trial 
court here gave defendant ample opportunity to present his 
positions on every matter discussed.  Moreover, at no point here 
did the trial court resolve a disagreement in OCPD’s favor, 
rather than defendant’s favor.  Although defendant opposed the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
51 
order to share retained witnesses, OCPD strongly opposed the 
court’s order as well.  Defendant remained free to pursue his 
defense in his own way and to address the court freely.  Because 
OCPD acting as standby counsel did not violate defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights, the trial court did not err in 
appointing OCPD and ordering counsel to continue to prepare 
for trial.  
3.  Revocation of Self-Representation 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously revoked 
his right to represent himself without justification. 
As previously noted, the trial court granted defendant’s 
Faretta motion on May 15, 1998.  When the court asked 
defendant if he would be ready for the scheduled trial date of 
September 1, defendant replied that he would try his best.  On 
August 5, less than one month before the scheduled trial date, 
defendant filed his motion to continue the trial for six months.   
Two weeks later, on August 19, defendant filed a motion 
for a new competency trial under section 1368.  The court held 
a hearing on the motion two days later.  Defendant argued he 
was not competent to proceed and requested the court call Dr. 
Nievod to the stand.  When the court asked what Dr. Nievod 
would testify about, defendant said he did not sleep well the 
previous night, was “real tired and confused,” and was unable to 
concentrate on the hearings scheduled for that day.  The 
prosecution questioned whether the issue was competency or 
whether defendant was fatigued that day; the court did not 
know, either.  When the court again asked defendant what Dr. 
Nievod would testify to, defendant responded that he did not 
know exactly and just wanted to establish for the court that he 
had been up late the previous night and was tired.  The 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
52 
prosecution argued that defendant was trying to delay and 
manipulate proceedings.  She7 pointed out that the court had 
four hearings scheduled for that day, and they had witnesses 
who traveled great distances to be present.  When the court 
asked defendant if he wished to be heard on anything else, 
defendant continued questioning the court’s decision to not have 
Dr. Nievod testify and did not present any additional 
information.  The court stated that it had been watching and 
listening to defendant, and there was nothing wrong with his 
mental ability.  The court found that defendant’s competency 
motion was related to his motion to continue, that he was not 
preparing for trial, and he was instead spending time and money 
trying to delay trial.  The court denied defendant’s competency 
motion. 
The court then turned to the continuance motion.  The 
court repeatedly asked defendant if he wanted to continue to 
represent himself; he did not answer.  The court asked 
defendant when he expected to finish writing and filing his 
pretrial motions, but he could not give an estimate.  The court 
asked defendant if he could estimate how long trial would take, 
and he replied that he was “not thinking clearly right now” and 
was “emotionally upset.”  The court ordered a recess to allow 
defendant a chance to gather his thoughts and present an 
argument. 
 When proceedings resumed, the court again asked 
defendant if he wanted to continue representing himself, and he 
said that he did.  The court asked defendant when he would be 
 
7  
The prosecution team consisted of one female prosecutor 
and one male prosecutor.  “She” and “he” are therefore both used 
when referencing the prosecution. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
53 
ready to go to trial, and he replied that he would be ready in six 
months, as his motion for continuance indicated.  Defendant 
said that if he were not ready within that time frame, OCPD 
would take over as counsel.  The court again asked defendant 
how long it would take to complete pretrial motions.  When 
defendant said he did not know, the court reminded defendant 
that trial was scheduled to begin only 10 days later. 
The court said that it was considering revoking 
defendant’s pro se status, but if he was ready to represent 
himself at the start of jury selection, the court would reconsider.  
The court opined that defendant had not put any thought or 
effort into getting ready for trial.  The court commented that 
defendant engaged in “games within games within games.”  The 
court found that defendant had not been sincere at his Faretta 
hearing and was not willing to cooperate with OCPD in the 
preparation of his trial.  The court noted that defendant made 
“unfavorable comments” every time a ruling was not in his favor, 
and while it could not revoke defendant’s status because he 
refused to prepare for trial, it could when defendant was 
unwilling to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom 
protocol.  The court noted that they were on the eve of trial, and 
defendant was trying to obstruct and delay proceedings. 
The court revoked defendant’s pro se status.  The court 
ordered the sheriff to permit defendant to retain his pro se 
materials at the county jail, noting that it gave defendant the 
option to make a renewed Faretta motion at or after the 
beginning of his trial if he could do so in good faith and was 
ready to proceed immediately. 
A defendant’s Faretta right is subject to termination 
whenever he engages in “ ‘deliberate dilatory or obstructive 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
54 
behavior’ [that] threatens to subvert ‘the core concept of a 
trial.’ ”  (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Carson).)  
“When determining whether termination is necessary and 
appropriate, the trial court should consider several factors in 
addition to the nature of the misconduct and its impact on the 
trial proceedings,” including: (1) “the availability and suitability 
of alternative sanctions,” (2) “whether the defendant has been 
warned that particular misconduct will result in termination of 
in propria persona status,” and (3) “whether the defendant has 
‘intentionally sought to disrupt and delay his trial.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The 
intention to disrupt and delay trial is, in many instances, 
sufficient to order termination.  (Ibid.) 
The trial court must make a thorough record establishing 
the basis for termination.  The record must include “the precise 
misconduct on which the trial court based the decision to 
terminate.  [Citation.]  The court should also explain how the 
misconduct threatened to impair the core integrity of the trial.  
Did the court also rely on antecedent misconduct and, if so, what 
and why?  Did any of the misconduct occur while the defendant 
was represented by counsel?  If so, what is the relation to 
the defendant’s self-representation?  Additionally, was the 
defendant 
warned 
such 
misconduct 
might 
forfeit 
his 
Faretta rights?  Were other sanctions available?  If so, why were 
they inadequate?  In most cases, no one consideration will be 
dispositive; rather, the totality of the circumstances should 
inform the court’s exercise of its discretion.”  (Carson, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at pp. 11–12, fn. omitted.)  The trial court has 
considerable discretion in determining whether termination of 
Faretta rights is necessary to maintain the integrity and 
fairness of proceedings.  (People v. Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511, 
518.)  A court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a strong 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
55 
showing of clear abuse.  (Ibid.; see People v. Welch (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 701, 735.) 
Defendant contends the trial court revoked his pro se 
status on two grounds — he engaged in dilatory tactics and he 
failed to abide by courtroom protocol — and that neither are 
supported by the record.  Defendant is mistaken.  Substantial 
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s decision that 
defendant was engaging in dilatory tactics with the intent to 
delay trial.  After his extradition in 1991, defendant’s dozens of 
motions continued proceedings until trial finally began in 1998.  
Defendant filed a total of 37 Marsden motions, several of which 
contained allegations that suggest the motions were not made 
in good faith:  counsel forgot information due to their old age and 
“possibly their alcohol and drug use”; counsel were allied with 
the prosecution; and counsel were participating in a conspiracy 
to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 
After the trial court granted his 23d Marsden hearing and 
relieved OCPD as counsel, the prosecution filed a motion asking 
the court to reconsider.  The motion included a declaration from 
Deputy Sheriff Dean Weckerle.  Weckerle heard defendant tell 
another inmate that when his case got close to trial date, the 
inmate could file a Marsden motion so that his case would have 
to start all over again.  Defendant told the inmate that this 
would stretch his trial into the following year, at which time the 
inmate could make another Marsden motion and start the 
process again with new lawyers.  The court acknowledged that 
it “had not fully appreciated all the things that have gone on 
before” but denied the prosecution’s motion to reconsider. 
One week after the court granted the Marsden motion, 
defendant filed a motion requesting the court reinstate OCPD.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
56 
The court denied the motion, and the subsequent litigation led 
to a nearly six-month delay.  Three months after the Court of 
Appeal ordered the trial court to reinstate OCPD, defendant 
filed yet another Marsden motion. 
When counsel filed a motion declaring a doubt as to 
defendant’s competency, defendant argued they were doing so 
over his objection.  After the court granted his request to 
represent himself, he filed a motion arguing he was not 
competent after all and requested a renewed competency 
hearing along with his motion to continue. 
Before the court granted defendant’s Faretta motion, 
defendant assured the court he would accept OCPD as advisory 
counsel.  Just three weeks later, he moved to discharge OCPD 
as advisory counsel, ostensibly as a dilatory tactic, knowing that 
it would take new counsel several months to get caught up on 
his case.  The length of time needed for any attorney other than 
OCPD to review the case was well known to the parties and 
defendant; when the court granted the Faretta motion and 
contemplated the appointment of advisory counsel, it opined 
that it would take at least six months for an attorney to simply 
review the case to determine if they could advise him.  The 
prosecution opined it could take an attorney up to one year. 
Defendant’s request for a renewed competency hearing 
further supports a finding that he engaged in dilatory tactics.  
When OCPD filed a competency motion in early 1998, defendant 
made clear that counsel was doing so over his objection.  Indeed, 
he accused counsel of using the competency proceedings to 
“discredit [his] colorable claims against them and to falsely 
project the possibility of reconciliation.” Two weeks after 
defendant began to represent himself, in mid-May, he requested 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
57 
funding to employ a psychologist to evaluate his mental state 
and subsequently filed a motion for a new competency trial.  
Defendant argued he had a substantial change in circumstances 
to warrant a new hearing, without providing evidentiary 
support for his position.  The court concluded defendant was 
trying to delay proceedings when it denied his request, and the 
record supports the court’s finding. 
Defendant asserts that he worked diligently in the jail to 
prepare and that jail personnel could attest to his hard work.  
Although that may be true, the trial court acted well within its 
discretion when it found, based on the record before it, that 
defendant was using his pro se status to disrupt and delay trial.  
The court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked his self-
representation on that ground. 
Defendant further contends the trial court erroneously 
revoked his pro se status because he was unable to abide by 
courtroom protocol.  The record, however, does not suggest the 
trial court relied on this basis for terminating defendant’s 
status.  The trial court talked at length regarding defendant’s 
many Marsden motions and the long delay preceding trial.  The 
court reminded defendant that when he refused to cooperate 
with OCPD and had counsel relieved, he then requested OCPD 
and Kelley be reappointed “after another tremendous amount of 
time and money.”  After defendant began to represent himself, 
he again refused to cooperate with OCPD as standby counsel, 
was not preparing for trial, and was “doing everything to avoid 
trial in the near future.”  The court further stated that the case 
was “at the eve of trial,” and that defendant was “just trying to 
obstruct” and “just trying to delay.  And that is not allowed.”  
Although the trial court also noted that defendant made 
inappropriate remarks when a ruling was made not in his favor, 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
58 
as described above, it does not appear that the court relied on 
that as a basis for revoking his status.  Defendant argues 
nonetheless that the trial court failed to warn him that his pro 
se status could be revoked.  The record does not support this 
assertion.  When the trial court granted his Faretta motion, it 
warned defendant that if he attempted to delay or disrupt trial, 
OCPD would be reinstated as counsel.  On the day the court 
terminated his pro se status, the court explained it was 
considering revoking defendant’s status and ordered a break to 
allow defendant to gather his thoughts and make an argument.   
Finally, defendant contends the court failed to consider 
alternative sanctions.  Defendant points to his own suggested 
sanction — that if he was not ready to proceed with trial in six 
months, after his continuance, he would relinquish his pro se 
status and proceed with OCPD as counsel.  Based on defendant’s 
frequent change of position regarding representation, however, 
the record supports the trial court doubting defendant’s 
assertion that he would step aside after six months and allow 
OCPD to represent him.  As previously noted, two weeks after 
the trial court granted a Marsden motion to relieve OCPD in 
1996, defendant sought to have OCPD reappointed.  A few 
months after OCPD’s reappointment, he filed another motion to 
have them relieved.  Defendant promised the trial court he 
would accept OCPD as advisory counsel, and the court granted 
his Faretta motion; just 12 days later, defendant filed a motion 
to discharge OCPD as counsel.  It was reasonable for the trial 
court to believe that defendant would refuse to have OCPD 
appointed six months later and demand new attorneys, further 
delaying his trial. 
Moreover, the trial court was not required to consider any 
alternative sanctions.  In Carson, we explained that when 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
59 
determining whether termination is necessary, the trial court 
should consider, among several factors, the “availability and 
suitability of alternative sanctions.”  (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th 
at p. 10.)  Unlike in defendant’s case, the trial court in Carson 
terminated the defendant’s self-representation because of out-
of-court conduct.  When misconduct “is more removed from the 
trial proceedings” or “otherwise less likely to affect the fairness 
of the trial,” a complete termination of the defendant’s pro se 
status may not be justified.  (Ibid.)  Out -of -court misconduct, 
such as that in custody, for example, may not warrant revoking 
a defendant’s status.  (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 
826.)  Here, defendant’s misconduct was not removed from the 
proceedings; rather, his disruptions and attempt to delay were 
central to them.  We stated in Carson that intentionally 
disrupting or delaying trial would often suffice as a reason to 
terminate a defendant’s self-representation.  (Carson, at p. 10.)  
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Carson 
when it revoked defendant’s self-representation.  
4.  Denial of Marsden Motion 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
constitutional rights when it denied his 31st Marsden motion, 
made just after jury selection began.8  He specifically contends 
the court erroneously denied his request to call witnesses to 
testify at the Marsden hearing, and the court should have 
ordered OCPD to dismiss Kelley as his lead attorney. 
 
8  
Defendant claims the denial of some of his earlier Marsden 
motions may have been error but notes that any error was likely 
purged by the court’s grant of his Faretta motion in May 1998.  
He is challenging the denial of his Marsden motion brought after 
the court revoked his pro se status. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
60 
Defendant filed his 31st Marsden motion on September 
15, 1998, the day after jury selection began.  In his motion, he 
asked to call one of his attorneys, Deputy Public Defender Lewis 
Clapp, as a witness at the Marsden hearing.  In defendant’s offer 
of proof, he explained that Clapp would testify that he tried to 
cooperate with Kelley, he was not using his Marsden motions to 
delay proceedings, he could trust other members of the defense 
team but not if they worked under Kelley, and substantial 
impairments to his representation had already occurred.   
A few days later, on September 21, defendant filed a 
request to also call Allyn Jaffrey, a deputy public defender with 
OCPD, and Dr. Nievod to testify as witnesses at the Marsden 
hearing.  In his offer of proof, defendant explained that Jaffrey 
observed his interactions with Kelley and personally witnessed 
Kelley mistreating and provoking him, as well as undermining 
his confidence.  He stated that Jaffrey was willing to testify in 
support of his motion to dismiss OCPD as counsel.  In his offer 
of proof regarding Dr. Nievod, defendant explained that the 
psychologist would testify that his breakdown with Kelley 
resulted from his mental state and that Kelley contacted Dr. 
Nievod to dissuade him from testifying, threatening to rescind 
his expert witness retainer. 
The court held a hearing on September 21.  Defendant told 
the court that the witnesses would testify that there was an 
irremediable breakdown between Kelley and himself, “and the 
breakdown has permeated the rest of the defense case.  And the 
cause of the breakdown is not Michael Burt, but it is Mr. Kelley.”  
Defendant complained that he was unfairly viewed as an escape 
risk, and his attorneys did little to fight that assumption.  Kelley 
explained that he was struggling to find penalty phase evidence 
to evoke sympathy and noted that defendant’s family was not 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
61 
cooperating.  Because defendant’s family lived in Canada and 
Hong Kong, Kelley could not subpoena them.  Defendant argued 
that Kelley was trying to place blame by insinuating that his 
family was choosing not to cooperate, but rather they too just 
did not trust Kelley.  He told the court that Kelley was engaging 
in “deception” because he did not want to relinquish control of 
the case.  Kelley responded that defendant “speaks very 
generally” which makes it hard for him to respond and that 
defendant could not cite to anything specific he had done that 
suggested he was not working toward preparing the case. 
The court asked defendant if he believed Kelley could “just 
step down” from the case.  Defendant opined that Kelley could 
step down.  The court asked defendant if he believed Carl 
Holmes, the public defender, could override the court’s decision.  
Defendant said no, but he thought Holmes could be more 
truthful about the situation rather than “acting like there is no 
conflict.”  The court reminded defendant that Holmes never 
denied a conflict existed between defendant and OCPD.   
The court denied defendant’s request to call Dr. Nievod, 
Clapp, or Jaffrey to the stand.  The court stated that most of 
what defendant wanted Clapp to testify about “are opinions that 
he cannot make.”  The court also noted that it was already aware 
of most of the information contained in Jaffrey’s offer of proof.  
The court further stated that it was “not going to take part in 
creating a conflict between attorneys representing you,” which 
it opined was what defendant was trying to do.  The court later 
continued, “I just think it is poor policy for the court to say, 
‘Okay.  You have three attorneys on your team.  We are going to 
divide them up.  Put one on after another to see what they have 
to say about your relationship with one of them.’  I am not going 
to do that.  In other words, Mr. Ng, I am willing to agree that 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
62 
there is a problem between you and Mr. Kelley, and you don’t 
need Mr. Clapp or Miss Allyn Jaffrey to corroborate that.” 
The court found that defendant was attempting to 
manufacture a conflict and create a delay.  The court denied the 
Marsden motion. 
“When a defendant seeks substitution of appointed 
counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden [(1970)] 2 Cal.3d 
118, ‘the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the 
basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of 
inadequate performance.  A defendant is entitled to relief if the 
record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing 
adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have 
become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that 
ineffective representation is likely to result.’ ”  (People v. Taylor 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.)  We review a trial court’s denial of 
a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion.  (Ibid.)  “Denial is not 
an abuse of discretion ‘unless the defendant has shown that a 
failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the 
defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 Defendant first contends the trial court erred when it 
denied his request to have Clapp, Jaffrey, and Dr. Nievod testify 
at the Marsden hearing.  The trial court, however, was not 
required to call witnesses to adequately evaluate defendant’s 
Marsden motion.  Defendant cites several cases arguing 
otherwise, but we do not understand these cases to stand for the 
proposition, as he suggests, that a defendant must be permitted 
to call live witnesses in a Marsden hearing.  Rather, we read 
these cases only to require that a trial court make an adequate 
inquiry into the defendant’s motion, which in some instances 
may include the calling of witnesses.  (See U. S. v. Nguyen (9th 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
63 
Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 998, 1005, 1003 [trial court did not conduct 
a hearing, did not hear from available witnesses, and asked 
“only a few cursory questions” before denying motion for new 
counsel “without explanation”]; Schell v. Witek (9th Cir. 2000) 
218 F.3d 1017 [court failed to hold a hearing or rule on the 
defendant’s motion]; U. S. v. Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1997) 113 F.3d 
1026 [court refused to hold a hearing after the defendant 
accused his attorney of physically intimidating and coercing him 
into accepting a plea deal; Ninth Circuit held the trial court 
abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing 
because a witness had allegedly seen the altercation between 
the defendant and his attorney]; People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 
Cal.3d 80 [court acknowledged that the defendant could not 
cooperate in a rational manner with his attorney but refused to 
hold a competency hearing or grant a request to substitute 
counsel].)  The cases on which defendant relies, particularly 
Nguyen and Gonzalez, are very different from the facts here. 
Importantly, the trial courts in those cases failed to conduct a 
hearing to determine the bases for the defendants’ motions.  
Here, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion and 
inquired into the nature of the witnesses’ proffered testimony 
before denying defendant’s request to call them.  Additionally, 
the trial court was well-versed in the conflict between defendant 
and OCPD, and the proffered witnesses’ testimony offered no 
information that the court did not already know.   
The trial court had substantial information before it on 
which to rule on the motion without needing to hear from 
additional witnesses.  This was defendant’s 31st Marsden 
motion in which he largely repeated previous allegations.  The 
hearing on the motion lasted nearly three hours, during which 
defendant detailed his complaints against counsel, and Kelley 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
64 
gave extensive responses.  More importantly, defendant points 
to no information that Clapp, Jaffrey, or Dr. Nievod would have 
provided as witnesses that the court did not already have in 
other forms. 
Defendant also asserts the trial court erroneously failed to 
direct OCPD to remove Kelley from the case and appoint 
alternative trial counsel.  Defendant argues that OCPD 
reassigning a different deputy public defender to the case 
“would have conserved much if not all of the prior work that the 
[previous attorneys] had put into the case.”  Defendant ignores 
the fact that it would still take a new attorney a significant 
amount of time to get caught up on the case and be ready to 
proceed with trial.  The trial court denied defendant’s motion 
because it found he was attempting to create a delay; appointing 
new counsel, even within OCPD, would have created a delay 
regardless.  (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 607 [“ ‘It 
is within the trial court’s discretion to deny a motion to 
substitute made on the eve of trial where substitution would 
require a continuance’ ”].)  Furthermore, based on the 
proceedings before it, the trial court had reason to believe 
defendant would refuse to cooperate with any counsel, and thus, 
replacing Kelley would be fruitless. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
defendant’s Marsden motion. 
5.  Refusal To Appoint Counsel 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion 
when it declined to appoint the SFPD and Michael Burt to 
represent him in 1994 and again in 1998. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
65 
a.  1994 Request 
As previously discussed, Burt and Lew were appointed to 
represent defendant prior to his extradition from Canada and 
then subsequently removed when the Calaveras County Justice 
Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to appoint counsel.  
Defendant made his first appearance in Calaveras County for 
arraignment on September 27, 1991.  On October 4, 1991, Burt 
and Lew filed a motion requesting appointment as counsel.  The 
court denied the request due to concerns regarding Burt’s 
availability and appointed attorneys Webster and Marovich.  
Defendant subsequently spent several years attempting to get 
Burt reappointed as counsel. 
On January 21, 1994, the Calaveras County Superior 
Court conditionally relieved Marovich and Webster pending the 
appointment of new counsel after the venue transfer.  After the 
transfer to Orange County, on September 19, 1994, defendant 
and the SFPD jointly filed a notice of conditional intent to 
represent defendant and requested a hearing for “confirmation 
of representation.”  The pleading noted that seven of the charges 
had vicinage in San Francisco, and it was “highly likely” that all 
counts would ultimately be transferred to San Francisco.  The 
pleading included a declaration from Holmes, the Chief Deputy 
Public Defender for Orange County.  Holmes agreed that SFPD 
should be appointed as counsel. 
On September 20, SFPD sent the court a letter 
enumerating its conditions for accepting appointment.  SFPD 
required an advanced approval of sufficient funding, a 
“guarantee of the full amount of time which we will require” to 
effectively represent defendant, and a “forum convenient to this 
office trying the case.”  SFPD suggested San Francisco as the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
66 
appropriate forum.  SFPD further explained that any tentative 
agreement required approval by the SFPD, the San Francisco 
Board of Supervisors, and the Mayor of the City and County of 
San Francisco. 
On September 28, SFPD filed a status report, noting that 
they had been “making every effort to resolve administrative 
and logistical issues affecting their ability to provide effective 
representation” on the charges.  SFPD identified three issues 
that required resolution prior to appointment:  the procedure for 
providing compensation, the procedure for providing ancillary 
defense funds pursuant to section 987.9, and an “assurance” of 
at least two years to prepare for trial.  SFPD requested the trial 
court continue the hearing regarding representation for 30 days 
to allow time to finalize the necessary arrangements. 
The parties made their first appearance in Orange County 
on September 30, 1994.  The prosecution objected to the 
continuance and requested the court appoint counsel at the 
hearing.  The court stated that counsel’s monthly bills had been 
reviewed and paid until that point, and it did not understand 
why SFPD needed another 30 days to determine payment on 
ancillary funds.  The court noted SFPD’s estimate that it would 
need two years to prepare for trial and that new counsel would 
need three years, along with SFPD’s request for a guarantee 
that trial would not start for at least two years.  The court found 
it “absolutely unbelievable” that it would take Burt “or any other 
competent defense death penalty counsel” two years to begin the 
case.  The court stated that “thirty days won’t help resolve these 
issues” and denied the motion to continue. 
The court moved on to the issue of representation.  
Defense Counsel Multhaup explained that under section 987.05, 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
67 
both the defense and the prosecution had the right to present 
evidence regarding the time necessary to prepare for trial, and 
the court should then appoint counsel based on the ability of the 
prospective defense attorneys to meet that reasonable date.  The 
prosecution responded that the Calaveras County court had 
given Burt “a considerable amount of time” to make a reasonable 
estimate of when he could be ready for the preliminary hearing, 
that the defense had provided no documentation justifying why 
it needed the time requested, and that new counsel would need 
eight months to prepare.  Multhaup requested a hearing to 
determine the time required to prepare. 
The court acknowledged that defendant had developed a 
rapport with Burt but noted that Burt had only appeared for 
defendant at one evidentiary hearing in 1991.  The court stated 
that the “interests of justice just can’t handle another delay of 
two or more years which is required” and opined that any 
competent attorney should be prepared to try the case in a 
significantly shorter time.  The court noted that regardless of 
the amount of time required, SFPD has not consented to 
appointment; consent was conditional, and the condition of 
requiring a forum convenient to SFPD could not be met.  The 
court acknowledged that SFPD had “good reasons” for wanting 
the case to be tried in San Francisco, but “that decision has been 
decided adversely to their position.” 
The court further noted that even if SFPD and Burt 
consented to the appointment, it could be abrogated by the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors and the mayor, “so literally the 
decision to accept is out of their control.”  The court stated that 
“it would be reasonable to assume that a political governing 
body would have to take a close look at lending one of their most 
experienced attorneys to another county for two to three or more 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
68 
years.  They would have to look at it.  There has been far too 
much delay in this case, it’s time to get it moving.”  The court 
denied the motion and appointed OCPD. 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in several ways 
when it declined to appoint Burt and SFPD as counsel:  (1) the 
court misinterpreted SFPD’s request to try the case in San 
Francisco and abused its discretion in determining that SFPD 
had not consented within the meaning of section 987.2, 
subdivision (g); (2) the court ignored the requirements of section 
987.05 when it appointed OCPD without conducting a hearing 
as to readiness; and (3) the court failed to properly apply the 
factors provided in Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786.  We conclude 
none of these arguments are meritorious. 
Section 987.2, subdivision (g), states that when an 
indigent defendant is charged in one county and establishes a 
relationship with the public defender and is subsequently 
charged in a second county, the trial court in the second county 
may appoint the public defender from the first county to 
represent the defendant in both counties as long as three 
conditions are met:  (1) the offense charged in the second county 
could be joined for trial with the offense charged in the first 
county if it took place in the same county or involves evidence 
which would be cross-admissible; (2) the trial court finds that 
the interests of justice and economy will be best served by 
unitary representation; and (3) counsel appointed in the first 
county consents to the appointment. 
“The appointment of counsel for indigent defendants 
under section 987.2 rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.”  (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1098; see 
Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934–935.)  “An 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
69 
abuse of discretion is not demonstrated, however, simply by the 
failure of a trial court to appoint a particular counsel whom the 
defendant has requested and who is willing to undertake the 
appointment.”  (Horton, at p. 1098.) 
Section 987.05 states that a trial court shall appoint an 
attorney who represents, on the record, that he or she will be 
ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing or trial within the 
statutory time or, in unusual circumstances, by a reasonable 
time as determined by the court. 
Taking each of defendant’s arguments in turn, first, the 
trial court did not misinterpret SFPD’s request to try the case 
in San Francisco.  SFPD clearly informed the trial court that it 
had three terms which the office “required” prior to accepting 
appointment.  One of those terms was a “forum convenient to 
this office trying the case.”  Defendant asserts that SFPD did 
not demand the trial be held in San Francisco; they merely noted 
it would be most convenient, and therefore SFPD did consent to 
appointment.  The trial court, however, did not abuse its 
discretion when it determined that SFPD was requesting a 
different forum.  If SFPD considered Orange County a 
convenient forum to try the case, they would not have had a 
reason to include that as a condition of appointment.  And as the 
trial court noted, the venue for the case had already been 
decided and there was no expectation that it would be 
transferred again.   
Second, defendant cannot establish prejudice from the 
trial court’s refusal to conduct a readiness hearing pursuant to 
section 987.05 regarding SFPD’s request for at least two years 
to prepare for trial.  Defendant argues that if the court had held 
a readiness hearing prior to appointing OCPD as counsel, OCPD 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
70 
would “presumably” have presented evidence in support of a 
trial two years more in advance of the date of appointment, after 
which the trial court “would have been forced to reconsider its 
refusal to appoint [SFPD] on that basis.”  Defendant’s multiple 
presumptions — that OCPD would have required at least two 
years to prepare for trial and that the trial court would have 
thus reconsidered its ruling regarding SFPD — are simply too 
speculative to establish that he was prejudiced by the court’s 
denial of his request to hold a hearing. 
Third, the trial court did not fail to properly apply the 
factors provided in Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786.  In Harris, we 
held the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to 
appoint requested counsel for two indigent defendants.  A 
complaint was initially filed in the municipal court, and after 
the public defender declared a conflict, the municipal court 
appointed counsel requested by the defendants.  (Id. at p. 789.)  
After an indictment was filed in the superior court on the same 
matter, the People moved to dismiss the complaint in the 
municipal court.  The defendants requested the same attorneys 
be appointed in the superior court, but the court denied the 
request and appointed alternate counsel.  (Id. at p. 790.)  The 
appointed attorneys joined with the defendants and the original 
attorneys in a request to have the original attorneys represent 
them.  The court declined the request, stating that it had 
considered the reputations of the appointed counsel among the 
local bench and bar, their experience in proceedings of similarly 
serious cases, and their certifications as criminal law specialists. 
On appeal, we held the trial court’s refusal to appoint the 
original attorneys was an abuse of discretion.  (Harris, supra, 19 
Cal.3d at p. 799.)  We found significant that the requested 
counsel had previously represented the defendants in related 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
71 
matters, during which the attorneys had established a close 
working relationship with the defendants.  (Id. at pp. 797–798.)  
We further held that this relationship provided counsel with an 
extensive background in factual and legal matters that might 
become relevant in the current proceedings.  The newly 
appointed attorneys had acknowledged to the trial court that it 
would take substantial amounts of effort and time to attain the 
necessary background already possessed by the original 
attorneys.  (Id. at p. 798.)  We also found significant that the 
appointed attorneys vigorously supported the defendants’ 
requests for the original attorneys to be appointed, emphasizing 
their unfamiliarity with the facts and legal issues involved.  (Id. 
at pp. 798–799.) 
In People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, “we 
acknowledged that uncertainty existed on the question 
whether Harris, which permits discretionary appointment of 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants, was applicable to 
situations where the public defender was available for 
appointment.  Ultimately, however, we declined to address the 
question because the facts presented in Daniels were factually 
distinguishable both from Harris and from the situation where 
a defendant is unable to cooperate with the available public 
defender.”  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1186.)  We 
again declined to address this question in Cole, noting that the 
record in that case did not demonstrate that the relationship 
between the defendant and the requested counsel ever 
approached the depth of the relationship between the attorneys 
and defendants in Harris.  (Id. at p. 1187.)  We further noted 
that in Cole, unlike in Harris, the appointed attorney did not 
seek to withdraw or actively support the other attorney’s 
appointment. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
72 
We need not now determine whether Harris applies when 
the public defender is available because regardless, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion here.  Like in Cole, the record 
here does not suggest that defendant and Burt had formed the 
relationship that existed between the attorneys and defendants 
in Harris.  The defendants in Harris, a husband and wife, 
requested the appointment of Leonard Weinglass and Susan 
Jordan, respectively, for the proceedings in 1976.  Prior to that, 
Weinglass had represented Mrs. Harris between October 1975 
and August 1976 in proceedings brought on by an 11-count 
indictment, including numerous pretrial motions and a six-week 
trial.  At the time of the Harris proceedings, he represented both 
defendants on appeal from the prior judgment.  (Harris, supra, 
19 Cal.3d at p. 757, fn. 10.)  In connection with that defense, he 
coordinated facts and trial strategies with eight other people 
also subject to criminal proceedings for activities in connection 
with the so-called Symbionese Liberation Army; representation 
in the current proceedings would require familiarity with 
hundreds of pages of overlapping materials and many common 
witnesses.  Jordan had represented Mrs. Harris in federal 
proceedings and consulted with her during the previous 
proceedings with Weinglass. 
In the present case, Burt had represented defendant on 
September 27, 1991, at defendant’s first appearance after being 
extradited from Canada.  His prior representation had been 
terminated in 1988 when the Calaveras County Justice Court 
determined it lacked jurisdiction over defendant while awaiting 
extradition.  There is nothing in the record to support a finding 
that Burt had devised defense strategies, researched legal 
issues, or interviewed witnesses.  Quite the opposite, in a 
declaration to the court dated October 23, 1991, Burt 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
73 
acknowledged that he had conducted only a preliminary review 
of minimal discovery materials and had yet to meet with 
defendant since his return to California. 
It is true that here, unlike in Cole, OCPD agreed to 
withdraw from representation and supported defendant’s 
motion to appoint Burt and SFPD.  However, we find the lack of 
depth in the relationship between SFPD and defendant to be 
more significant here, and notably, unlike in Harris and in Cole, 
SFPD did not fully consent to appointment.  SFPD conditioned 
its acceptance as counsel on specific terms that the trial court 
could not meet; neither counsel in Harris, nor in Cole, presented 
conditions to the court when requesting appointment. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
defendant’s request to appoint SFPD in 1994. 
b.  1998 Request 
Following defendant’s 26th Marsden motion in August 
1997, Burt told the trial court that his office was available to 
accept appointment “depending upon the circumstances of 
appointment and specifically issues of where the case gets tried 
and when it gets tried and issues such as funding.”  On October 
10, the court agreed to appoint Burt as cocounsel if Burt and the 
presiding judge could agree on Burt’s compensation.  To 
accommodate Burt’s schedule, the court set a trial date of 
September 1, 1998.  On January 16, 1998, Burt told the trial 
court that “there has been discussion, various proposals, counter 
proposals . . . we are at a point where I don’t think there is going 
to be a resolution of this issue.  I believe I have made my best 
proposal.  That has been rejected, and I don’t think there is any 
further room to move at this point.”  The court had offered to 
pay Burt a salary, but he insisted on hourly compensation. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
74 
On March 20, 1998, Burt told the trial court that he was 
willing to pursue the option of replacing Kelley as lead counsel.  
The court pointed out that it had previously been willing to 
appoint Burt but that the financial arrangement did not work 
out.  Burt told the court that when they had previously discussed 
his appointment, the plan was for him to join the existing team 
with Kelley as lead counsel, and he would assist defendant and 
Kelley in resolving their problems.  When he previously told the 
court that the financial arrangement did not work out, he also 
believed “that the larger problem” was joining an existing team, 
and he wanted to be lead counsel with a new team.  Burt 
explained that he was now willing to replace Kelley and keep 
the rest of the OCPD team in place. 
Burt noted that such an appointment would require 
additional 
conversations 
with 
another 
judge 
about 
compensation.  Burt further stated that if he replaced Kelley, he 
did not believe he would be ready by the trial date of September 
1.  He asked for the opportunity to take some time and then 
report back to the court if he could be ready by September 1. 
The prosecution did not oppose the appointment of Burt 
but opposed a further delay in trial.  She acknowledged that 
defendant’s lack of cooperation made preparation difficult for 
his attorneys but opined that the prosecution “should not be 
penalized by delay of the trial.”  In response, Burt explained that 
he had not been connected to the case since 1991, and he needed 
to review more than 100,000 pages of discovery.  The court told 
Burt that it was “not going to play that game,” and Burt should 
not accept appointment unless he could be ready by September.  
Burt replied that he could not commit to the September 1 trial 
date without taking additional time to consider its feasibility. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
75 
The court noted that Burt was still representing defendant 
on separate San Francisco charges, which “has to include every 
bit of what is going on” in Orange County.  The court was, 
therefore, surprised that Burt said he had not been involved in 
the case since 1991.  The court continued, “If you can make a 
good faith representation that you could be ready, again 
understanding that things do change, but a good faith 
representation that you could be ready by September 1, fine; 
come aboard.  But just to get another delay, that won’t work.”  
The court pointed out that it had “tried very hard” to have Burt 
join defendant’s team, and it had previously set a trial date of 
September 1 per Burt’s request.  Burt declined to meet with the 
presiding judge to discuss compensation, and the case proceeded 
with Kelley as lead counsel. 
Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to appoint 
Burt was “arbitrary on its face, and contrary to the spirit of 
Penal Code section 987.05.”  Defendant does not assert the trial 
court actually committed legal error when it declined to appoint 
Burt as counsel.  To the extent we construe defendant’s claim as 
one asserting error, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.  Burt had been seriously considering appointment for 
several months prior to March 1998, and thus had ample time 
to determine if he could be ready by September 1.  When he 
requested more time to decide, he did not provide the trial court 
with a set date for when he would know if he could proceed, nor 
did he provide the court with an estimate for how long a review 
of the case would take.  The trial court was not obligated to 
provide Burt with more time, and defendant does not cite any 
law suggesting otherwise.  As the court explained at length on 
the record, the court did not want to delay the case any further 
and did not understand why Burt did not have enough 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
76 
information about the case to make a determination regarding 
timing; when the court expressed confusion on this, Burt did not 
offer an explanation.  Additionally, Burt would not consent to 
appointment on the date of the hearing.  The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint him as counsel. 
B.  Venue Change Proceedings 
Proceedings in this case began in Calaveras County before 
they were moved to Orange County, following a venue change 
motion.  Defendant contends the trial court made multiple 
erroneous rulings and engaged in misconduct during venue-
related proceedings in both counties.  He further contends the 
trial court erroneously failed to transfer six counts from Orange 
County to the City and County of San Francisco. 
1.  Procedural History 
On April 24, 1991, while the case was still in the Calaveras 
County Justice Court, defendant filed a motion to exclude the 
public from the preliminary hearing.  At a hearing on the 
motion, defendant presented evidence that an “unusually high” 
percentage of the public in Calaveras and Contra Costa 
Counties had already prejudged defendant, as compared to 
other high-profile cases. 
In July 1993, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 
information pursuant to section 995, in which he argued that 
Calaveras County lacked territorial jurisdiction over counts 2 
through 7 — the Dubses, Cosner, Peranteau, and Gerald 
murders — and instead, San Francisco was the proper venue.  
Defendant further argued that trying those charges in 
Calaveras County would violate his right to a jury drawn from 
the vicinage where the crimes occurred, but a trial in San 
Francisco would satisfy that requirement.  The prosecution 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
77 
argued that Calaveras County did have territorial jurisdiction 
and that the vicinage issue was unripe because defendant had 
indicated he would waive vicinage by moving for a venue 
change. 
On December 8, 1993, the Calaveras County Superior 
Court judge who had been overseeing proceedings recused 
himself from the case.  The presiding judge of the Calaveras 
County Superior Court, who had previously been disqualified 
from the case, asked the Judicial Council to assign a new judge.  
In a letter to the Judicial Council, the prosecution stated that 
all parties assumed venue would be transferred to another 
county.  The prosecution expressed a preference for Southern 
California because of a reduced amount of publicity surrounding 
the case.  On December 30, 1993, the Judicial Council assigned 
Judge Donald McCartin, a retired judge from Orange County, to 
the case. 
Judge McCartin held a status conference on January 21, 
1994.  Several issues were pending at the time, including 
defendant’s motion to discharge Webster and Marovich, his 
court-appointed attorneys, and replace them with Burt and 
Lew.  Webster and Marovich had also filed a motion to withdraw 
from the case.  At the hearing, defense counsel explained that 
both parties stipulated that venue would be transferred out of 
Calaveras County and that a change of venue was “a necessity.”  
The prosecution agreed that a change of venue was needed but 
did not believe that the City and County of San Francisco “has 
any more right to the case than any other county in the state.”  
The prosecution also noted that when the defense moved to close 
the preliminary hearing, they presented opinion surveys done in 
Contra Costa County, and defense experts testified that 
defendant could not receive a fair trial in Contra Costa County.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
78 
The prosecutor argued that San Francisco received the same 
media as Contra Costa.  
Judge McCartin stated that he wanted to take care of the 
Marsden matter first.  He indicated that it was appropriate to 
grant the Marsden motion but wanted to wait to appoint new 
counsel until the new venue had been selected.  He opined that 
wherever the case was assigned, it would be in a county large 
enough to have qualified death penalty attorneys to handle the 
case. 
Defense counsel asked the court to address the vicinage 
issue before venue, because if vicinage belonged in San 
Francisco, it could affect the decision regarding venue.  The 
prosecution asked the court to rule on venue first.  Judge 
McCartin suggested the parties first stipulate to a venue 
change, then refer the matter to the Judicial Council to select a 
venue, and then raise any vicinage concerns after the case had 
been transferred.  He noted that publicity might be a concern in 
San Francisco, but he had not read anything about the case in 
Los Angeles or Orange Counties.  Defense counsel agreed to 
transfer the matter to the Judicial Council for a venue change 
but stressed that any stipulation to a venue transfer would not 
waive the vicinage issue.  Judge McCartin told the parties to 
submit documents for the court to forward to the Judicial 
Council.  Judge McCartin conditionally relieved defense counsel 
pending the appointment of new counsel after the venue 
transfer. 
The parties stipulated to having the change of venue 
matter referred to the Judicial Council.  Defense counsel again 
clarified that defendant reserved the right to challenge vicinage 
for counts 2 through 7.  Judge McCartin told the parties that 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
79 
they could submit additional materials to the court to be 
forwarded to the Judicial Council for consideration. 
Six days later, on January 27, Judge McCartin issued a 
supplemental minute order informing the parties that he had 
been mistaken about the procedure for changing the venue.  He 
explained that the Judicial Council would identify which 
counties would accept the case, after which the court would 
conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to McGown v. Superior 
Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 648 (McGown) to select a new 
venue.9  Judge McCartin reappointed defense counsel to 
represent defendant at the McGown hearing. 
Both parties submitted letters to the court, to forward to 
the Judicial Council, explaining their positions on venue and 
vicinage.  On February 1, 1994, the court forwarded to the 
Judicial Council a set of relevant documents, including the 
letters submitted by the parties. 
On March 3, 1994, the Judicial Council informed the court 
that Orange County and Sacramento County were willing to 
accept the case.  John Toker, an attorney for the Judicial 
Council, explained that he had contacted the San Francisco 
Superior Court, and they were not willing to accept the case.  A 
few days later, Toker sent a letter to the court stating that his 
office received the documents sent by the parties in early 
February, but they had been misplaced and he did not receive 
 
9  
McGown, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 648 held that after a 
motion to change venue is granted, the court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing before determining where the case should 
be transferred.  (Id at p. 652.)  Especially when the parties 
disagree as to where the case should be transferred, a hearing 
allows the court to resolve any factual issues contested by the 
parties.  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
80 
them until March 4.  Toker explained, however, that the Judicial 
Council’s role in the venue change matter was “ministerial,” and 
it would not review any papers submitted “for legal or judicial 
purposes.”  Rather, the Judicial Council would rely on 
information from the court based on its own review of any 
pertinent evidence. 
The court set a McGown hearing for April 8, 1994.  
Because Judge McCartin was from Orange County, one of the 
possible trial sites, the Judicial Council assigned a retired judge 
from Siskiyou County to preside over the McGown hearing. 
On March 14, 1994, defendant filed a motion requesting 
the appointment of the SFPD — specifically, Burt — for the 
limited purpose of the McGown hearing.  The court denied the 
motion, stating that Burt could seek appointment as counsel 
after the selection of a new venue and transfer of the case.  The 
court acknowledged Toker’s note that the Judicial Council 
would not consider the parties’ letters and explained that it had 
“specifically advised” Toker that defendant requested San 
Francisco while the prosecution preferred Southern California.  
The court said that it had spoken with Toker, who had indicated 
he was having difficulty finding counties that would accept the 
case and that “San Francisco County specifically refused and 
stated it cannot handle this particular case under any 
circumstances.”  The court concluded that it “has been obvious 
from the beginning, and both parties have repeatedly stated, 
that trial cannot be conducted in Calaveras County, and the 
defendant’s statement that he cannot accept a choice of counties 
that does not include San Francisco as a possible trial site is 
beyond the power of this court to attempt to remedy.” 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
81 
On April 5, 1994, defendant filed a motion attempting to 
revoke his agreement to have counts 2 through 7 transferred to 
an alternate county unless that county was San Francisco.  He 
argued that those counts had vicinage in San Francisco and 
must be tried there under the federal Constitution, and the 
remaining counts should be tried in San Francisco as well to 
further the interests of justice.  He acknowledged that he had 
previously agreed to have all the counts transferred to the 
Judicial Council for assignment but asserted this was only on 
the condition that he could submit materials for the Judicial 
Council to consider. 
That same day, defense counsel filed a motion for a 
hearing 
“to 
correct 
miscommunications” 
regarding 
San 
Francisco’s availability and to continue the McGown hearing.  
Submitted with the motion was a declaration from Defense 
Counsel Margolin, in which he described a conversation he had 
with Judge Raymond Arata, the presiding judge of the San 
Francisco Superior Court.  Judge Arata confirmed that he had 
spoken with the Judicial Council regarding defendant’s case but 
had not been told that there was a related pending case against 
defendant in San Francisco, had not been informed that 
defendant had asserted vicinage rights in San Francisco on six 
counts, had not been informed that a substantial number of 
witnesses were located in San Francisco, had not been told about 
defendant’s desire to be represented by SFPD, and had not been 
informed that the parties estimated that trial would still be two 
or three years away from that date.  Judge Arata further stated 
that he had not categorically refused for the San Francisco 
Superior Court to take on the case under any circumstance. 
Two days later, Webster and Marovich filed a motion to 
suspend all venue-related proceedings.  They asserted that 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
82 
defense counsel never stipulated to a change of venue for counts 
2 through 7 and that the January 21, 1994, minute order 
incorrectly reflected that defendant had agreed to do so.  They 
requested the minute order be corrected and that all venue 
change proceedings be suspended because no stipulation had 
taken place. 
The parties met again on April 8 for the McGown hearing.  
Before turning to the hearing, the court addressed the venue 
change agreement and asked for the prosecution’s position on 
the defense motion to suspend proceedings.  The prosecution 
opined that the defense motion operated as a severance motion 
and suggested the court exercise its discretion and sever counts 
2 through 7 for the remainder of the case.  The court stated that 
it had reviewed all of the materials submitted and most of the 
record thus far and thought the parties all did “an outstanding 
job” briefing the vicinage issue, and it was prepared to rule on 
the vicinage issue if the parties wanted a ruling at that time.  
Defense counsel again emphasized that defendant was not 
waiving any rights regarding vicinage or the ability to challenge 
vicinage at any time in proceedings.  After pausing the venue 
discussion to address press coverage, proceedings resumed at 
which time defense counsel argued their motion that Burt be 
appointed for purposes of the McGown hearing.  The court 
reiterated that counsel would be appointed after the case was 
transferred to a new venue. 
Defense counsel argued that the court could send counts 2 
through 7 to San Francisco based on vicinage.  He asserted that 
San Francisco would have to take those counts, and the SFPD 
and Burt would then be appointed.  Then, he argued, the county 
would likely have the rest of the counts transferred to San 
Francisco as well.  Counsel asserted that this was their “package 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
83 
solution, which seems to cut through the heart of the matter.”  
Counsel explained that Burt recently had a “once-in-a-lifetime 
leave of absence” to work on a high-profile murder trial in Los 
Angeles, and he would not be able to travel to Southern 
California “and make a Harris pitch” on defendant’s behalf.  
Webster acknowledged that defendant had four attorneys 
representing him in Calaveras County and Burt present in the 
courtroom, but no one was prepared to move forward with the 
McGown hearing and although he and Marovich were most 
familiar with the case, they did not have defendant’s 
cooperation.  He asked the court to appoint Burt for the limited 
purpose of advising defendant on the venue change matter and 
the McGown hearing.  The court addressed that request, 
explaining it was inclined to deny it because defendant had four 
competent attorneys present for the previous venue discussions 
and the case needed to move forward.  The court opined that “all 
the hue and cry has arisen because San Francisco didn’t end up 
as one of the trial sites.” 
As to the Judicial Council’s selection of counties available 
to hear the case, the court explained that, according to Toker, 
the Judicial Council’s sole job was to determine which counties 
would not be unduly burdened by the trial.  The Judicial Council 
did not consider vicinage “and all these other factors,” and it was 
the trial court’s responsibility to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
best serve the interests of justice.  The court denied defendant’s 
motion to refer the matter back to the Judicial Council, noting 
that the council would not consider any additional information 
regardless. 
The court turned to the motion to continue the McGown 
hearing.  When Judge McCartin asked the defense why it 
needed 60 to 90 days, counsel responded that they wanted to 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
84 
determine the levels of publicity in Sacramento and Orange 
Counties and wanted to determine the racial compositions of the 
potential jury pool in each county.  The court stated it did not 
know what the publicity was like in Northern California, but in 
Southern California, the publicity was “nil.”  The court denied 
defendant’s motion to continue the McGown hearing, subject to 
reconsideration by the judge presiding over the McGown 
hearing.  Judge McCartin noted that the parties could submit 
additional materials within 30 days of the hearing if new data 
warranted submission. 
The court also ruled that it was clear from the record that 
defendant did not waive any vicinage claims regarding counts 2 
through 7, and the prosecution was estopped from raising any 
waiver arguments on those counts resulting from defendant’s 
stipulation to a venue change. 
Lastly, the court denied the defense’s motion to correct the 
“miscommunication” regarding San Francisco’s availability. 
When Judge Kleaver took the bench later that same day 
for the McGown hearing, he stated that the court would not 
review any decisions made by Judge McCartin that morning.  
Judge Kleaver noted that all parties agreed a venue change was 
necessary due to pretrial publicity in Calaveras County.  Judge 
Kleaver stated that under McGown, and pursuant to California 
Rule of Court, former rule 842 (rule 842), he did not have the 
authority to order the venue be transferred to an undesignated 
county and was limited to the two options that the Judicial 
Council had presented.10  
 
10  
Former rule 842 was amended and renumbered to 
California Rules of Court, rule 4.152 in 2001. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
85 
The court stated that “there are a number of matters on 
the record” between Sacramento County and Orange County, 
that “would make it a rather easy conclusion which of the two is 
the more suitable site for any transfer.”  The court noted that 
two or three Sacramento television station trucks were parked 
outside the courthouse, while the record indicated that interest 
in Orange County was rather minimal.  Defense counsel 
responded that the court did not hear any arguments as to why 
Orange County was inappropriate, and it needed more time to 
determine why Orange County might not be a proper venue.  
The prosecution argued that, based on the record, it was not 
necessary for the defense to have a pretrial survey done.  He 
further argued that the defense’s conclusions about what may 
be found in the survey “are completely speculative” and based 
on the record, the court could order a change of venue to Orange 
County. 
Judge Kleaver questioned the defense why nothing had 
been done since January, aside from requesting funding for the 
pretrial survey.  Defense counsel responded that it was “not true 
that nothing was done.”  He explained that the defense had 
“raised the issue” with the National Jury Project, applied for 
funding, and done the preparatory work.  Counsel found out on 
March 7 that they needed to be prepared for the McGown 
hearing on April 8.  They had conversations with the director of 
the National Jury Project and “boiled down the issues to 
publicity, one; number two, prejudgment, which is a separate 
issue from publicity; and number three, the demographics.”  The 
director told him it would take 60 to 90 days to complete the 
survey, and they simply did not have enough time. 
The prosecution argued that if the case would be further 
delayed by appeals on the court’s ruling, “and it appears obvious 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
86 
that it is, we should have as many rulings in as possible, and the 
People would ask for the venue order.”  The court agreed. 
Defense counsel argued that it had never actually 
stipulated to a venue change for counts 2 through 7.  The court 
responded that it would include all counts in the transfer order.  
The court denied the request to continue the hearing for the 
purpose of conducting a pretrial survey, denied the request to 
consider the City and County of San Francisco as being beyond 
the scope of the McGown hearing and former rule 842, and 
ordered all counts be transferred to Orange County. 
One month later, the defense filed a motion in Calaveras 
County to set aside the venue transfer agreement on January 
21, 1994.  On June 30, 1994, Judge Curtin with the Calaveras 
County Superior Court denied the motion. 
On January 13, 1995, in the Orange County Superior 
Court, defendant filed a motion to have the case transferred to 
San Francisco.  The court denied the motion on March 24. 
Two years later, on April 22, 1997, the defense filed a 
motion to transfer counts 2 through 7 to San Francisco on the 
ground that San Francisco had territorial vicinage to try the 
counts.  At a hearing on the motion, the trial court stated that 
Calaveras County had vicinage for every count because there 
was a high likelihood that every victim had been killed in 
Calaveras County.  The court denied the motion. 
Defendant raised venue and vicinage challenges several 
more times, including in his motion for a new trial at the 
conclusion of the penalty phase. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
87 
2.  Venue Errors 
Defendant contends the courts in Calaveras and Orange 
Counties made multiple erroneous venue-related rulings that 
deprived him of due process.  As an initial matter, we conclude 
that all of defendant’s claims fail based on a lack of prejudice.  
Defendant’s primary goal in the trial court was not simply to 
change venue, but to specifically transfer the case to San 
Francisco.  As defendant himself acknowledges, from the 
beginning of trial site selection proceedings, he “proceeded on 
the basis that if administrative or judicial authorities 
considered the merits of a transfer to San Francisco, the 
overwhelming array of factors favoring San Francisco would 
make the result a virtual foregone conclusion.”  When defendant 
was proven wrong and the City and County of San Francisco 
was not a viable option, he sought to delay proceedings to find a 
way to have San Francisco nonetheless considered.  When 
proceedings were instead transferred to Orange County, he 
refused to accept the trial court’s decision. 
A defendant seeking a change of venue is not entitled to 
choose the venue; the court makes that decision.  (People v. 
Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 804 (Cooper); former rule 842.)  
When a trial court denies a defendant’s motion to change venue, 
as the court did once the case moved to Orange County, “the 
defendant must show both that the court erred in denying the 
change of venue motion, i.e., that at the time of the motion it 
was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in the 
current county, and that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that a 
fair trial was not in fact had.”  (Cooper, at pp. 805–806.)  The 
record does not support a finding that defendant could not 
receive a fair trial in Orange County at the time he made the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
88 
motion, nor does it support a finding that he did not ultimately 
receive a fair trial. 
Defendant provides statistics comparing the Chinese 
American and Vietnamese American populations in Orange 
County and in the City and County of San Francisco.  Regardless 
of the fact that an appellate court does not review information 
outside of the trial record (see Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2), this information is irrelevant to the 
determination of a venue between Sacramento and Orange 
Counties.  Defendant contends that if the case had been in the 
City and County of San Francisco, his jury would have included 
more Chinese Americans.  He further contends that Chinese 
Americans would have evaluated the evidence differently than 
other jurors.  These assertions, however, are impermissible 
speculation.  Furthermore, had the defense presented the above 
statistics regarding Orange County to the trial court, the 
alternative would have been Sacramento County, not San 
Francisco, because San Francisco was not under consideration. 
Defendant further contends that he was prejudiced 
because Orange County lacked jurisdiction over his case.  His 
contention lacks merit.  We have previously stated that “it is 
beyond dispute that a change of venue may be ordered in a 
criminal case under appropriate circumstances, and also beyond 
dispute that any superior court to which a felony proceeding has 
been transferred has subject matter jurisdiction over the 
proceeding . . . .”  (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097 
(Simon).) 
Thus, his claims fail.  Nonetheless, we address each claim 
in turn. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
89 
a.  Trial Site Agreement 
Defendant first contends the trial court deprived him of 
due process by abrogating the terms of the venue change 
agreement.  Specifically, he asserts that his initial consent to 
refer the matter to the Judicial Council was vitiated by (1) the 
Judicial Council’s refusal to consider the documents he 
submitted; (2) the subsequent failure to inform him that the 
Judicial Council knew the prosecution wanted the case tried in 
Orange County; and (3) the failure of Judge McCartin to 
recognize his revocation of consent. 
Defendant likens his agreement to change venue to that of 
a plea bargain and asserts that the principles of due process that 
govern judicial review of plea bargains must guide review of his 
“venue bargain.”  An agreement to change venues, however, is 
not comparable to a plea agreement.  “Plea negotiations and 
agreements are an accepted and ‘integral component of the 
criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair 
administration of our courts.’ ”  (People v. Segura (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 921, 929.)  During the process of negotiating a plea, a 
defendant pleads guilty in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit 
from the prosecution, generally consisting of a less severe 
punishment.  (Id. at p. 930.)  A trial court may decide not to 
approve the terms of a negotiated plea agreement.  (Id. at 
p. 931.) 
“ ‘Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a 
waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state 
criminal trial.’ ”  (People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 299, 
quoting Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243.)  These 
rights include the right to a trial by jury, the privilege against 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
90 
self-incrimination, and the right to confrontation.  (Farwell, at 
p. 299.) 
The agreement between the parties was not the product of 
bargaining between the defense and the prosecution.  Both 
parties agreed that none of the counts should be tried in 
Calaveras County due to pretrial publicity, and as a result, the 
trial court advised the matter be referred to the Judicial Council 
to select a venue.  Furthermore, the agreement to transfer venue 
did not require defendant to waive any constitutional rights.  
The agreement did not serve as an admission of defendant’s 
guilt nor did it relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. 
Defendant contends the court violated the terms of the 
venue change agreement when the Judicial Council failed to 
review the materials he submitted for consideration.  To 
compare the venue change agreement to a plea bargain would 
mean that defendant agreed to change venue only on the 
condition that the Judicial Council review his materials, and no 
such promise was made here.  The trial court told the parties to 
submit materials to the court that it would forward to the 
Judicial Council for review, but nothing was promised and no 
bargain was made dependent on the Judicial Council’s review.  
Thus, under defendant’s own analogy, his claim fails. 
Defendant argues the venue change agreement was 
further vitiated by the fact that at the time the parties made the 
agreement, Judge McCartin knew that the Judicial Council was 
aware the prosecution favored Orange County.  He further 
argues that the trial court affirmatively recommended Orange 
County to the Judicial Council.  He asserts that the court did 
not disclose this information, and if it had done so, he would not 
have agreed to change venue.   
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
91 
Defendant cites the hearing on the defense’s motion to 
withdraw the venue change stipulation as support for his 
argument.  At the hearing, Judge McCartin testified about his 
conversation with Chris Hoffman, a secretary for the Judicial 
Council’s Judicial Assignment Commission.  Hoffman knew that 
the prosecution preferred Southern California, and the defense 
preferred San Francisco.  John Toker, the Judicial Council 
attorney, testified at the hearing that Hoffman told him Orange 
County was available but did not direct him to push the case 
toward Southern California. 
The record does support a finding that the Judicial Council 
knew the prosecution preferred Southern California, but 
defendant ignores that the record also shows that the Judicial 
Council knew that defendant preferred San Francisco. Aside 
from asserting he would not have entered the agreement 
otherwise, defendant does not establish what was improper 
about the Judicial Council knowing each party’s preference nor 
does he establish why he would not have entered the agreement 
had he known. 
Finally, he asserts the agreement was vitiated by Judge 
McCartin’s failure to recognize defendant’s revocation of consent 
after he learned that the Judicial Council would not review the 
materials he had submitted.  Defendant’s argument is based on 
the premise that he was entitled to withdraw his consent 
similarly to a defendant whose consideration was nullified 
following a broken plea bargain.  Because defendant’s venue 
change stipulation is not equivalent to a plea bargain and his 
request to revoke his consent is not equivalent to a broken plea 
bargain, his claim fails. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
92 
In any event, defendant’s argument that the venue change 
agreement was vitiated ignores the basic fact that the Judicial 
Council did consider San Francisco as a venue despite the lack 
of materials from defendant.  It also ignores that the trial court, 
not the Judicial Council, was ultimately responsible for choosing 
the proper venue.  The Judicial Council’s role was to identify all 
available counties, and that included inquiring with San 
Francisco.  Defendant was not misled into believing that his case 
would end up in San Francisco; his only reason for believing San 
Francisco would be chosen was his own insistence that the case 
be tried in San Francisco, not because the prosecution, the court, 
or the Judicial Council had so indicated.   
b.  McGown Hearing 
Defendant next contends the trial court deprived him of 
due process when it refused to continue the McGown hearing 
and denied him the opportunity to present evidence regarding 
the unsuitability of Orange County. 
On January 27, 1994, six days after the parties stipulated 
to a venue change, Judge McCartin informed the parties that he 
had been mistaken about the procedure for changing venue.  He 
explained that the court would conduct an evidentiary hearing 
to select a new venue after the Judicial Council reported its 
findings regarding availability.  The court scheduled the 
McGown hearing for April 8, 1994. 
On April 5, defendant filed a motion to continue the 
McGown hearing.  He argued he needed further proceedings to 
determine the availability of San Francisco as a venue and more 
time to conduct jury surveys regarding the suitability of 
Sacramento and Orange Counties.  Judge McCartin had 
previously directed the parties to conduct the jury surveys by 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
93 
April 8, but after applying for necessary funding, defendant said 
it could not reasonably have been done in the time set by the 
court.  The defense also asked for more time so the court could 
refer the case back to the Judicial Council to again inquire 
whether San Francisco would accept the case. 
Judge McCartin declined to refer the case back to the 
Judicial Council to reconsider San Francisco’s availability.  He 
stated that the factors the defense wanted the Judicial Council 
to consider, such as pretrial publicity and witness hardship, 
were matters for the court to consider following the McGown 
hearing, not the Judicial Council.  Judge McCartin asked the 
defense what information it wanted to obtain through jury 
polling.  Counsel explained that the defense wanted to 
determine the publicity and prejudgment levels in the 
prospective counties and also wanted to “get an idea of the 
County’s position as far as racial factors which might adversely 
affect the fairness of the trial.” 
Defense counsel further argued that under former rule 
842, the court could transfer the case to a county that the 
Judicial Council had not designated.  Judge McCartin told the 
parties that, based on his conversation with Toker, San 
Francisco “wasn’t available, period.”  According to Toker, San 
Francisco had accepted another high-profile case, had a case 
transferred from Contra Costa County, and had several capital 
cases “coming down the lane.”  Regarding a continuance to 
conduct 
polling, 
Judge 
McCartin 
said 
that 
he 
was 
knowledgeable about the media coverage in Southern California 
and did not remember seeing anything about the case except for 
perhaps one article.  He stated that he did not know the level of 
publicity in Northern California but believed that information 
could be obtained within 30 days and offered the parties the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
94 
opportunity to submit publicity information within 30 days of 
the hearing.  Neither party submitted additional information. 
Later that afternoon at the McGown hearing, the 
prosecutor argued that a continuance should be denied because 
the record contained sufficient information for choosing a new 
venue.  He said that the case had attracted substantial publicity 
in Sacramento, and the defense had previously submitted 
“numerous news articles from Sacramento, as well as television 
media accounts from Sacramento.”  Defense counsel conceded 
that there was no reason to doubt Judge McCartin’s statements 
concerning the lack of publicity in Orange County and conceded 
there was a high level of publicity in Sacramento.  Judge 
Kleaver denied the motion to continue the hearing and 
transferred the case to Orange County. 
Defendant contends the McGown hearing was a “sham” 
and fell “woefully short” of what California law requires.  
Defendant is mistaken. 
At a McGown hearing to determine the proper venue to 
transfer a case, “the court should consider such factual issues as 
the ‘presence or absence of prejudicial publicity’ in a possible 
new county, and the ‘relative hardship involved in trying the 
case in various locations.’  [Citation.]  The decision of where to 
transfer the case lies within the discretion of the court, which 
must consider the ‘interest of justice.’ ”  (Cooper, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 804.)  The record in this case included information 
regarding pretrial publicity, and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in considering the pretrial publicity in both 
Sacramento County and Orange County.  Although the parties 
did not discuss any potential hardship of moving the case to 
Orange County, defendant does not assert on appeal that 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
95 
counsel would have provided such information to the court if it 
had more time.  Nor does defendant assert that counsel would 
have presented evidence of pretrial publicity that contradicted 
the trial court’s understanding.  Rather, defendant now argues 
that he wanted a continuance to reexamine San Francisco’s 
availability.  However, he again ignores that the court was only 
choosing between Sacramento and Orange Counties.  The 
Judicial Council followed a process set out by the rules of court, 
and pursuant to that process, San Francisco was not an option.  
Defendant thus cannot establish the court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion for a continuance.  (See People v. 
Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 451 [a trial court’s denial of a 
motion to continue is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) 
c.  Consideration of San Francisco 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of due 
process when it erroneously and arbitrarily interpreted former 
rule 842 as prohibiting its consideration of San Francisco as a 
venue at the McGown hearing. 
Former rule 842 provided that after a trial court grants a 
motion to change venue, “ ‘it shall advise the Administrative 
Director of the Courts of the pending transfer.’ ”  (Cooper, supra, 
53 Cal.3d at p. 803.)   “The director shall, ‘in order to expedite 
judicial business and equalize the work of the judges, suggest a 
court or courts that would not be unduly burdened by the trial 
of the case.’  [Citation.]  Thereafter, the court shall ‘transfer the 
case to a proper court as it determines to be in the interest of 
justice.’ ”  (Id. at p. 804.)  Former rule 842 is “consistent with the 
purpose behind a change of venue, which is to ensure the 
defendant a fair trial [citation], not to encourage forum 
shopping.”  (Cooper, at p. 804.) 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
96 
During 
the 
McGown 
hearing, 
Judge 
Kleaver 
acknowledged defendant’s argument that the court was not 
bound by the counties designated by the Judicial Council.  The 
judge disagreed, noting that if the court were permitted to send 
the case to any county it wanted, there would be no need for 
former rule 842 in the first place.  “There would be no purpose 
to [the rule].  It would, in effect, open up a McGown hearing to 
57 California counties as being prospective counties to which 
venue could be transferred.  And I suggest that leads to 
foolishness, looking at the other side of the coin.” 
As Judge Kleaver noted, defendant’s argument conflicts 
with the purpose of former rule 842.  Moreover, San Francisco 
explicitly told Toker that it could not handle defendant’s case.  
Transferring the case to San Francisco would further defeat the 
rule’s purpose in ensuring the chosen venue was not unduly 
burdened.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.152(1) [after receiving 
notice of a motion for a venue change, the Administrative 
Director “must advise the transferring court which courts would 
not be unduly burdened by the trial of the case”].)  Forcing 
defendant’s case on a county that did not want it when two 
counties were readily available would not have been in the 
interests of justice.  Under former rule 842, once a trial court 
grants a change of venue motion, it cannot transfer the case 
unless the receiving county is identified as available to take the 
case by the Judicial Council.  The trial court’s proper 
interpretation of former rule 842 to prohibit it from transferring 
the case to counties not presented did not violate defendant’s 
due process rights. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
97 
d.  Appointment of Counsel 
Defendant asserts the trial court’s refusal to appoint Burt 
as counsel prior to the McGown hearing deprived him of due 
process and the effective assistance of counsel. 
As previously discussed, the Calaveras County Justice 
Court appointed attorneys Marovich and Webster to represent 
defendant in October 1991.  In January 1993, the court 
appointed Margolin to represent defendant for the limited 
purposes of preparing Marsden and Harris motions, and 
subsequently appointed Multhaup to assist Margolin.  One year 
later, in January 1994, the court conditionally relieved 
Marovich and Webster pending the appointment of new counsel 
after the venue change.  The court relieved Margolin and 
Multhaup except for their work on the Harris motion. 
When Judge McCartin learned that the court would need 
to conduct a McGown hearing prior to changing venue, he 
reappointed Margolin and Multhaup for the limited purpose of 
representing defendant at the hearing.  On March 14, 1994, the 
defense filed a motion asking to have SFPD appointed to 
represent defendant at the McGown hearing.  The court denied 
the motion and told the defense that Burt could seek 
appointment after the transfer. 
The trial court’s refusal to appoint Burt and SFPD before 
the McGown hearing did not deprive defendant of due process.  
Defendant contends that his case was “highly unusual because 
of the interrelationship between appointment of counsel and 
trial site selection,” and the court violated his due process rights 
by “forcing a trial site selection without a trial attorney able to 
evaluate the defense case strategy with respect to the choice of 
county.”  Defendant’s argument is essentially that if Burt had 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
98 
been appointed, he might have had more success in having his 
case transferred to San Francisco.  As previously discussed, 
however, defendant has no constitutional right to the venue of 
his choice.  And more importantly, San Francisco was off the 
table as a possible venue regardless of who represented 
defendant at the McGown proceeding because San Francisco 
would not accept the case. 
Further, the court’s refusal did not deprive defendant of 
the effective assistance of counsel.  To demonstrate counsel’s 
inadequacy, 
“the 
defendant 
must 
first 
show 
counsel’s 
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.  Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, 
i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)  
Defendant does neither of these.  He does not establish that 
OCPD was performing inadequately and that SFPD was better 
situated to handle the matter.  Nor does defendant cite to any 
location in the record that suggests Burt was familiar with his 
case at that time; Burt had not been counsel of record in several 
years.  Finally, even if OCPD had rendered ineffective 
assistance, defendant cannot establish prejudice.  He does not 
identify any incompetent acts or omissions on behalf of counsel 
that, but for their performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different.  (See ibid.)  The trial court repeatedly 
told defendant that San Francisco was not an option, and a 
different attorney would not have changed that. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
99 
e.  Referral Back to Judicial Council 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of due 
process when it denied his motion to set aside the venue change.  
Defendant asserts that Judge McCartin made several errors 
during the process of initially referring the case to the Judicial 
Council, and referring the case back would have remedied these 
errors. 
After Judge Kleaver ordered the case be transferred to 
Orange County, the defense filed a motion to set aside the venue 
change agreement.  Judge McCartin recused himself for 
purposes of hearing that motion only and was replaced by Judge 
Curtin.  Judge McCartin, John Toker, and Mary Beth Todd, the 
superior court clerk, testified at the hearing. 
Judge McCartin testified that he primarily spoke with 
Toker but he also had “an initial conversation” with Hoffman, 
the Judicial Council’s Judicial Assignment Commission 
secretary, about selecting a new venue.  Hoffman opined it 
would likely end up in Southern California because of publicity 
but did not specify which county.  She also acknowledged that 
the defense wanted San Francisco while the prosecution wanted 
Southern California because of publicity.  Judge McCartin told 
Hoffman that he would stay on as trial judge regardless of which 
county accepted the case.  Judge McCartin did not accept the 
case on the belief that it would end up in Southern California.  
He testified that it was “obvious” that defendant was only 
interested in the case moving to San Francisco, and he 
emphasized to Toker that the defense wanted the case in San 
Francisco.  Judge McCartin was surprised when San Francisco 
was not an option and asked Toker if “he did all he could to get 
it in San Francisco.” 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
100 
Toker explained that the Judicial Council could not review 
the parties’ materials because they were for the court to review; 
if the council reviewed them, venue change proceedings would 
be before the council and not the court.  Todd had asked Toker 
to exclude Downtown Los Angeles, and he was not asked to 
exclude any other county.  When discussing what counties 
should be considered, Todd told Toker that the judge would like 
Orange as well as the preferred counties of the prosecution and 
the defense.  Toker confirmed that he spoke with someone in 
San Francisco, who, after speaking with the presiding judge, 
stated that they would not take defendant’s case.  Toker knew 
that defendant had other charges pending in San Francisco and 
may have discussed that with San Francisco, but he did not 
recall for certain.  He confirmed that convenience of witnesses, 
along with publicity, are factors “greatly considered” when 
determining possible venue sites.  Toker opined that most, if not 
all, of the counties in Northern California would have been 
affected by publicity in defendant’s case.  On cross-examination, 
Toker confirmed he had never been directed to try to send the 
case to Orange County.  San Francisco explicitly declined to take 
the case, and no one from the county ever contacted him to say 
they were now available to take the case. 
After hearing the witness’ testimony, Judge Curtin stated 
he did “not find that there was any sham” or that the matter was 
intended to be sent to Southern California upon the 
appointment of Judge McCartin.  He found that there was no 
fraud involved to induce the parties to sign a stipulation to 
change venue as alleged by the defense.  The court did not find 
that the defense met its burden of proof in showing that the 
agreement should be set aside for fraud or that the Judicial 
Council acted in an inappropriate manner.  Judge Curtin 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
101 
concluded that Judge McCartin and the Judicial Council acted 
in good faith and defendant’s due process was not violated in the 
venue change proceedings. 
Defendant contends the evidence at the hearing 
established that Judge McCartin sabotaged his efforts to have 
the case transferred to San Francisco and instead orchestrated 
a transfer to Orange County.  Aside from summarizing Judge 
McCartin’s testimony, defendant does not cite the record to 
support his allegation of fraud. 
Substantial evidence supported Judge Curtin’s finding 
that Judge McCartin arranged the venue transfer agreement in 
good faith, did not use fraud to induce the stipulation, and did 
not know in advance where the case would be transferred.  
Judge McCartin testified that he did not express a desire to the 
Judicial Council for the case to go to a specific county, and Toker 
testified that no one tried to steer the case toward Orange 
County.  Todd told Toker which counties were preferred by both 
the defense and the prosecution.  Toker knew the defense 
wanted the case transferred to San Francisco and investigated 
whether that county would be available to take the case; when 
Toker revealed that San Francisco would not take the case, 
Judge McCartin inquired whether enough had been done to 
have the case sent to San Francisco.  Although Orange County 
as a possible venue did come up in conversation between Judge 
McCartin and Toker, several other counties did as well.  
Substantial evidence in the record supports Judge Curtin’s 
finding of no wrongdoing and the subsequent denial of 
defendant’s motion.  The court, therefore, did not deprive 
defendant of due process when it denied his motion. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
102 
f.  Counts 2 Through 7 
Finally, defendant contends the court deprived him of due 
process when it transferred counts 2 through 7 because he did 
not stipulate to a venue change on those counts.  When viewed 
in its entirety, the record supports a finding that defendant 
requested a venue change on all counts but maintained his right 
to challenge vicinage on counts 2 through 7 after the venue 
change had been decided.  And, as addressed more fully below, 
defendant continually raised the vicinage argument after the 
venue change; the court repeatedly considered and ruled on 
vicinage through the middle of trial in November 1998.  The 
court did not deprive defendant of his due process on this 
matter. 
3.  Vicinage Errors 
Defendant contends the transfer of counts 2 through 7 to 
Orange County, as opposed to the City and County of San 
Francisco, violated his right to vicinage under the state and 
federal Constitutions. 
While venue concerns the location where the trial is held, 
vicinage concerns the area from which the jury pool is drawn.  
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 553 (Clark).)  We have 
previously held that “[t]he vicinage clause of the Sixth 
Amendment has not been incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to apply in a state criminal trial.”  (Id. at pp. 554–
555, fn. omitted; see Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
1046, 1063–1069.)  We decline defendant’s invitation to revisit 
this holding now. 
“For vicinage rights under the state Constitution, ‘the 
vicinage right implied in article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution . . . constitutes simply the right of an accused to a 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
103 
trial by an impartial jury drawn from a place bearing some 
reasonable relationship to the crime in question.’ ”  (Clark, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 555.) 
Defendant’s vicinage claim fails.  When a trial court grants 
a motion to change venue, the Judicial Council must notify the 
transferring court which counties would not be unduly burdened 
by the case.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.152(1) [after 
receiving notice of a motion for a venue change, the 
Administrative Director “must advise the transferring court 
which courts would not be unduly burdened by the trial of the 
case”].)  The City and County of San Francisco explicitly told the 
Judicial Council it was unavailable.  As discussed, pursuant to 
former rule 842, the trial court did not have the authority to 
transfer the case to San Francisco once the Judicial Council 
confirmed that San Francisco could not accept the case.   
Defendant speculates that San Francisco might have 
accepted the transfer of six counts only, but there is no reason 
to think that is true.  San Francisco had clearly indicated it was 
unavailable to accept the case and a trial ostensibly limited to 
counts 2 through 7, which concerned the Dubses, Cosner, 
Peranteau, and Gerald murders, would nonetheless have 
involved much of the same evidence, and similar burdens, as a 
unitary trial of all the charged murders.  In addition, multiple 
trials in this case would have been highly inefficient.  In light of 
San Francisco’s inability to accept the case, defendant has not 
demonstrated error based upon the purported failure to inquire 
whether San Francisco would have accepted the transfer of 
some rather than all of the relevant counts. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
104 
C.  Competency Hearing  
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of due 
process by its adjudication of competency proceedings. 
1.  Procedural History 
At some point prior to trial, Defense Counsel Kelley and 
James Merwin filed a motion doubting defendant’s competency 
pursuant to section 1368.  On October 10, 1997, counsel 
informed the court that it wanted to withdraw the motion.  Burt, 
who was still participating in the defense at that time, explained 
that the motion had been focused on representation problems 
that had since been resolved, and it would be premature to 
proceed on the motion. 
On January 16, 1998, the court held an in camera hearing 
to allow defendant to argue his 27th Marsden motion.  During 
the hearing, Kelley explained to the court that defendant’s 
refusal to cooperate with him, or any attorney who was not Burt, 
led him to believe that defendant was not competent to proceed. 
Merwin told the court that he and Kelley believed they had 
an ethical obligation to present the section 1368 motion, but it 
was over defendant’s objection.  Kelley agreed that they were 
“driven ethically” to declare a doubt and were “setting the whole 
case up for a fall on appeal” if they did not file the motion.  He 
continued, “Even though [defendant] is concerned and disagrees 
with us . . . we have to proceed in a 1368 hearing, and in a jury 
trial hearing.” 
Kelley told the court that if they moved forward with a 
competency hearing, he believed defendant needed independent 
counsel appointed for the proceedings.  He explained that he 
would need to testify regarding defendant’s lack of cooperation, 
and it would be difficult for him to litigate the proceedings while 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
105 
also being a witness.  Merwin believed that if independent 
counsel were appointed, defendant would cooperate in the 
proceedings.  The court opined that his cooperation “would be a 
first.”  The court reminded the parties that independent counsel 
had been appointed previously in a Marsden setting, and 
“nothing has ever been achieved by” such an appointment. 
On February 6, 1998, the trial court heard two motions 
filed by the defense:  a motion to appoint independent counsel 
for competency proceedings, and a motion for the OCPD to 
withdraw for purposes of the competency proceedings.  The 
court stated its belief that Kelley and Merwin did not actually 
want defendant to be found incompetent but just wanted 
defendant to cooperate with them.  The court opined that 
independent counsel could do nothing differently except ask for 
more time to prepare and ultimately present the same 
information that Kelley and Merwin would present.  The court 
denied the motion for independent counsel and OCPD’s motion 
to withdraw.  The trial court suspended proceedings and 
appointed two mental health experts for purposes of the section 
1368 hearing. 
Doctors Paul Blair and Kaushal Sharma filed their reports 
on March 18 and 19, 1998.  On April 17, Kelley filed a 
declaration explaining that defendant had refused to meet with 
three defense experts retained for purposes of the competency 
proceedings “without the approval of Michael Burt.”  As a result, 
Kelley explained, the defense was unable to submit evidence 
regarding defendant’s “obsession” with Burt and that defendant 
was suffering from the effects of isolation. 
 At a hearing on April 20, 1998, the defense submitted 
without argument, relying on the reports of Drs. Blair and 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
106 
Sharma, declarations from Kelley and Merwin, and a 
declaration from Dr. Seawright Anderson, a psychiatrist who 
had also evaluated defendant and opined in a two-page 
declaration that he was mentally incompetent.  The prosecution 
submitted on the reports of Drs. Blair and Sharma. 
The court stated that Dr. Anderson was the only expert 
who believed defendant had a mental disorder.  Dr. Anderson 
had opined that defendant had bipolar disorder, a mixed history 
of major depression, recurrent episodes, and associated 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.  He further opined that 
defendant’s problems would disappear if Burt were appointed, 
and if Burt was not appointed, defendant may become psychotic. 
In his report, Dr. Blair found defendant to be competent, 
but the court acknowledged that Dr. Blair “probably didn’t get a 
real good shot at evaluating [defendant] because [defendant] 
controlled the nature of the discussion and limited what Dr. 
Blair could get in to.”  Dr. Sharma was able to examine 
defendant twice, and the court found his report to be “the most 
telling.”  Dr. Sharma concluded “with a strong level of 
confidence” that defendant was competent, and his lack of 
cooperation with counsel did not stem from mental illness.  Dr. 
Sharma acknowledged that defendant was “obsessed” with Burt 
and wanted Burt as his attorney, but did not indicate that 
defendant provided any specific details as to why he was not 
pleased with the representation received from Kelley and 
Merwin.  Defendant simply kept repeating that he would not 
accept any lawyer other than Burt as his attorney. 
The court found defendant was not mentally incompetent, 
did not have a mental disorder, and was capable of assisting 
counsel in a meaningful way if he chose to do so.  Two weeks 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
107 
later, defendant accused his attorneys of using the competency 
proceedings to “intimidate” him so he would not disclose 
privileged attorney-client communications.  On May 15, 
defendant made another Faretta motion which the court 
subsequently granted. 
On June 11, 1998, defendant requested funding to employ 
Dr. Nievod to evaluate his mental state.  The court approved the 
request. 
On August 19, 1998, while defendant still represented 
himself, he filed a motion for a new competency trial and for the 
appointment of separate counsel for the proceeding.  Defendant 
argued he was incompetent to proceed and relied on Dr. Nievod’s 
accompanying declaration.  Dr. Nievod explained that he had 
interviewed defendant in 1994 and 1996, as well as four times 
the previous month.  He opined that defendant suffered from 
dependent personality disorder, anxiety, and depression, and 
that his conditions had deteriorated from previous levels.  Dr. 
Nievod believed that defendant’s rejection of Kelley was the 
product of his mental condition. 
At a hearing on the motion on August 21, defendant 
argued that the prior competency hearing was “flawed” because 
Kelley “didn’t give certain information” to the mental health 
experts.  He also argued that circumstances had changed in the 
prior four months, and he was no longer competent to proceed. 
The trial court denied the request for a second competency 
hearing.  The court repeatedly told defendant that nothing had 
changed; defendant only wanted Burt to represent him and the 
only purpose of the renewed section 1368 motion was to try to 
have Burt appointed as counsel and to delay proceedings. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
108 
On October 8, 1998, after jury selection had begun, Kelley, 
who had since been reappointed, moved for a renewed 
competency trial.  In support, Kelley cited a “recent report” from 
Dr. Nievod that had been filed with the court in August.  Kelley 
argued that Dr. Nievod’s declaration analyzed and explained 
defendant’s mental state in much greater detail than Dr. 
Anderson had, which constituted a “significant change” in 
defendant’s condition.  The trial court responded that the report 
did not present anything new, and “if you read between the 
lines, it is just telling us all that [defendant] on purpose will not 
cooperate with you and that is not a mental illness.”  The court 
denied the motion and stated it had “no doubt, no question at 
all” that defendant was competent to proceed. 
2.  Refusal To Appoint Independent Counsel 
Defendant raises two claims related to the trial court’s 
adjudication of his competency.  First, he contends the trial 
court erred when it refused to appoint independent counsel for 
the April 1998 competency hearing.  He argues that Kelley 
framed the issue in terms of defendant being incompetent 
because of his obsession with Burt.  He asserts that independent 
counsel “could have framed the issue in a distinctly different 
manner” that reflected defendant’s position:   specifically, that 
defendant and Kelley “had reached an irremediable breakdown 
in their relationship, likely attributable to personality traits and 
conduct on both their parts, but that the breakdown was 
independent of [defendant’s] preference for Michael Burt.”  
Defendant asserts the disagreement between Kelley and himself 
created a conflict of interest. 
“A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the 
assistance of counsel by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
109 
States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution.  This constitutional right includes the correlative 
right to representation free from any conflict of interest that 
undermines counsel’s loyalty to his or her client.  [Citations.]  ‘It 
has long been held that under both Constitutions, a defendant 
is deprived of his or her constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel in certain circumstances when, despite the physical 
presence of a defense attorney at trial, that attorney labored 
under a conflict of interest that compromised his or her loyalty 
to the defendant.’  [Citation.]  ‘As a general proposition, such 
conflicts “embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty 
to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his 
responsibilities to another client or a third person or his own 
interests.” ’ ”  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 
(Doolin).) 
“Under the federal Constitution, prejudice is presumed 
when 
counsel 
suffers 
from 
an 
actual 
conflict 
of 
interest.  [Citation.]  This presumption arises, however, ‘only if 
the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented 
conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” ’  (Strickland v. 
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 692 . . . .)  An actual conflict of 
interest means ‘a conflict that affected counsel’s performance — 
as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.’  [Citation.]  
Under the federal precedents, which we have also applied to 
claims of conflict of interest under the California Constitution, 
a defendant is required to show that counsel performed 
deficiently and a reasonable probability exists that, but 
for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 254, 309–310 [citation omitted].) 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
110 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to discharge 
appointed counsel is left to the discretion of the trial judge.  
(People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1245; see People v. Clark 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 917 [a trial court is not required to 
appoint independent counsel to assist a defendant in preparing 
a Marsden motion but has the discretion whether to do so].)  A 
trial court may, but is not required to, appoint independent 
counsel when the defendant and defense counsel disagree on the 
defendant’s competency.  (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
769, 853 (Blacksher).) 
To succeed on his claim, defendant must establish an 
actual conflict, deficient performance, and prejudice.  Defendant 
can demonstrate none of these.  Defendant argues Kelley had a 
conflict of interest because he refused to acknowledge his own 
role in the breakdown of their relationship.  Regardless of 
whether Kelley played a role in the alleged breakdown of their 
relationship, Kelley did not have a personal interest in having 
defendant found incompetent.  Further, “counsel does not act 
against a defendant’s interest in pursuing a finding of 
incompetency even if it is against the defendant’s wishes.”  
(Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 853.)  There was no conflict 
of interest between defendant and Kelley. 
There was likewise no deficient performance.  When a 
conflict of interest causes an attorney to not do something, we 
examine the record to determine whether the omitted 
arguments would likely have been made by counsel who did not 
have a conflict of interest.  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 
65.)  We further determine whether counsel may have had a 
tactical reason, other than the asserted conflict, that might have 
caused any omission.  (Ibid.)  The record does not support a 
conclusion that independent counsel would have presented 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
111 
different arguments.  As the trial court noted when it denied 
defendant’s request, independent counsel would not have 
presented any new information that Kelley had not presented 
already, and defendant did not indicate otherwise to the court.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant’s motion for independent counsel. 
Finally, defendant cannot establish prejudice.  He 
contends that Kelley argued defendant’s obsession with Burt 
rendered him incompetent to proceed, but independent counsel 
would have presented the argument that Kelley was equally to 
blame for a breakdown in their relationship.  Defendant argues 
that independent counsel would have done a better job 
presenting his position of competency to the court, but he 
ignores the fact that the outcome of the competency proceedings 
resulted in what defendant wanted:  a finding of competency.  
Defendant presents no evidence to establish that having Burt 
represent him, and thus having evidence presented that Kelley 
was to blame for the breakdown in their relationship, would 
have made it more likely that he would have been found 
incompetent.  Further, he does not explain with any specificity 
what evidence he would have wanted presented but for the fact 
that Kelley purportedly contributed to the breakdown in the 
relationship.  Defendant can establish neither a conflict of 
interest from Kelley, nor any prejudice resulting from an 
asserted conflict. 
3.  Renewed Competency Hearings in August and 
October 1998 
Secondly, defendant contends the trial court abused its 
discretion when it refused to order a renewed competency 
hearing in August 1998.  Defendant contends the court again 
abused its discretion when it declined to order a renewed 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
112 
competency hearing in October 1998, following the guilt phase, 
based on Dr. Nievod’s August declaration.  Defendant again 
asserts the more recent psychological evaluations provided 
sufficient basis to require further competency proceedings. 
“ ‘ “When a competency hearing has already been held and 
defendant has been found competent to stand trial . . . . a trial 
court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second 
competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial 
change of circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious 
doubt on the validity of that finding.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 136.)  “A trial court may 
appropriately take into account its own observations in 
determining whether the defendant’s mental state has 
significantly changed during the course of trial.”  (Ibid.)  We 
review a trial court’s determination concerning whether a new 
competency hearing must be held for substantial evidence.  
(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220.) 
Defendant failed to show a substantial change in 
circumstances when he submitted Dr. Nievod’s declaration on 
August 19, 1998.  Dr. Nievod had interviewed defendant in 1993, 
1994, 1996, and in July 1998.  Dr. Nievod did not interview 
defendant between 1996 and July 1998.  Because he did not 
evaluate defendant before the competency hearing in April 
1998, he could not speak to how defendant’s circumstances had 
changed between the previous competency hearing and the 
request for a new one.  Moreover, although Dr. Nievod did opine 
that defendant’s conditions had “deteriorated markedly from 
previous levels,” he also stated that when comparing his 1998 
findings with his 1994 and 1996 findings, the test results and 
results of his clinical interviews “have been consistent 
throughout.”  Furthermore, he did not interview defendant at 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
113 
the same time as Drs. Sharma and Blair before the April 
competency hearing.  Dr. Nievod, therefore, could not actually 
speak to whether defendant’s condition had deteriorated during 
the relevant time period, i.e., in the months since the 
competency hearing in April 1998, thus warranting the need for 
a renewed hearing.  
For the same reasons, the court did not err when it denied 
defendant’s request for a renewed competency hearing in 
October 1998.  
D.  Use of Restraints 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of due 
process when it subjected him to physical constraints. 
Defendant first appeared in Orange County Superior 
Court on September 30, 1994.  He wore a stun belt, a waist 
chain, and ankle chains.  His right hand was released from the 
waist chain upon arrival to the courtroom to allow him to write.  
The court ordered the ankle chains to be removed and suggested 
a future hearing to determine whether the stun belt was 
necessary.  At a hearing on October 21, 1994, defense counsel 
indicated that defendant’s restraints “have been somewhat 
reduced” and he was not wearing the stun belt. 
On April 22, 1997, the defense filed a motion to remove all 
restraints from defendant.  At a hearing on the motion, Burt and 
Marovich testified that they had never seen defendant create a 
disturbance in the courtroom or in custody.  Marovich testified 
that defendant appeared preoccupied with his restraints and 
had trouble focusing on proceedings. 
The court took a recess to review the documents submitted 
by both parties.  When proceedings resumed, Kelley explained 
that defendant’s waist chain was “causing him some pretty 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
114 
grave discomfort” and “cutting into his waist.”  The court asked 
to see the restraints and acknowledged that defendant was in 
discomfort.  Deputy County Counsel James Turner, on behalf of 
the sheriff’s department, stated that a stun belt was an 
alternative option if the court did not want to keep defendant 
shackled.  The court opined that the belt was a viable option.  
Kelley objected, arguing that the prosecution did not meet its 
burden of showing a manifest need for defendant to be 
restrained in any manner.  Kelley noted that defendant had 
been in court for 12 years without incident.  The court responded 
that defendant had been restrained at every appearance and 
therefore an incident was “highly unlikely.”  The court 
continued, “Now, I’m not saying there is no risk.  I just think 
that the risk is not as high as the People would want me to find, 
and certainly not as low as you want me to find.”  
The prosecution argued that defendant “is not one that 
would do an outburst in the courtroom.  The concern is whether 
or not he poses an escape threat.”  The prosecution explained 
that defendant had been found with an item that could be used 
as a handcuff key on multiple occasions while in custody.  The 
prosecution argued it was also relevant that when defendant 
was arrested in Canada for shoplifting, he “went to pretty 
desperate measures” to escape by pulling a gun on the security 
guards. 
The court stated, “There are an awful lot of people very 
concerned about [defendant] and escapes, and there has to be 
some reason for that. . . .  He has been found with contraband 
relevant to a possible escape.  Now, I can’t ignore that.  And right 
now I find there is a manifest need.  If you can produce evidence 
to show that there isn’t any, fine.  But I don’t see why the belt, 
which is available and effective, and I don’t think is 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
115 
uncomfortable as you are making it sound, I don’t see why it is 
not an effective restraint, and not visible to anybody.”  The court 
acknowledged it did not want defendant shackled unless 
necessary and believed the belt would be effective.  The court 
denied defendant’s motion. 
On October 14, 1998, after jury selection commenced, 
defendant filed a motion to have the stun belt removed.  At a 
hearing on the motion on October 23, psychiatrist Stuart 
Grassian testified that defendant “becomes very preoccupied” 
with the belt when sitting in court.  Dr. Grassian explained that 
defendant has “a tendency towards obsessional thinking,” and 
once he gets a thought in his mind, it becomes extremely difficult 
for him to focus on anything else.  He further explained that 
when the stimulus or thought is “noxious, upsetting, 
unpleasant,” defendant’s ability to shift his attention away from 
the stimulus is extremely difficult.  Dr. Grassian testified that 
when defendant wears the stun belt he feels “an enormous sense 
of shame, of degradation of already being condemned as 
dangerous and bad.”  On cross-examination, Dr. Grassian 
admitted that before the hearing, he had not had the 
opportunity to observe defendant in court. 
In a written ruling, the court denied the motion.  The court 
found that Dr. Grassian’s opinion was inconsistent with its 
observations of defendant, and Dr. Grassian failed to 
distinguish between restraint by chains and restraint by a 
hidden stun belt.  The court stated that the evidence from the 
1997 hearing supported the need for a stun belt:  defendant’s 
escape from military custody in Hawaii; his flight to Canada 
after Lake’s arrest; his fight with Canadian security guards who 
tried to arrest him for shoplifting; the fact that he shot one of 
the guards during the struggle; and it appeared defendant was 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
116 
proficient in martial arts.  Further, when defendant was 
imprisoned in Canada, he discussed escaping with Laberge and 
discussed “busting another inmate out” after defendant was 
released.  Finally, a coworker at the moving company saw 
defendant climb an elevator shaft.  The court noted that these 
“are some of the reasons” why the court believed defendant 
should remain restrained. 
“In general, the ‘court has broad power to maintain 
courtroom security and orderly proceedings’ [citation], and its 
decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
[Citation.]  However, the court’s discretion to impose physical 
restraints is constrained by constitutional principles.  Under 
California law, ‘a defendant cannot be subjected to physical 
restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s 
presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such 
restraints.’  [Citation.]  Similarly, the federal ‘Constitution 
forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that use is “justified 
by an essential state interest” — such as the interest in 
courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial.’  
[Citation.]  We have held that these principles also apply to the 
use of an electronic ‘stun belt,’ even if this device is not visible 
to the jury.”  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 558–559 
(Lomax).) 
“ ‘In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial 
court may “take into account the factors that courts have 
traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems 
and the risk of escape at trial.”  [Citation.]  These factors include 
evidence establishing that a defendant poses a safety risk, a 
flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the proceedings or otherwise 
engage in nonconforming behavior.’  [Citation.]  Although the 
court need not hold a formal hearing before imposing restraints, 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
117 
‘the record must show the court based its determination on facts, 
not rumor and innuendo.’  [Citation.]  The imposition of physical 
restraints without evidence of violence, a threat of violence, or 
other nonconforming conduct is an abuse of discretion.”  (Lomax, 
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 559.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered 
defendant to wear the stun belt in 1997 nor when it denied the 
motion to remove the belt in 1998.  We need not parse every 
reason relied on by the prosecutor and the trial court to justify 
restraints because there is enough evidence in the record to 
support the court’s finding of a manifest need for restraints.  
Ample evidence showed that defendant had a history of escape 
or attempted escape.  He had escaped from military custody in 
Hawaii after he was arrested for breaking into the Marine 
armory and evaded capture on the mainland for approximately 
five months.  While being transported from the scene following 
his arrest in Canada, defendant was seen “fooling” with the 
upper portion of his jeans.  Officers located a handcuff key in 
defendant’s pocket, and Canadian authorities concluded he was 
trying to retrieve the key in order to break out of his handcuffs. 
At the extradition hearing in Canada, while in a holding 
facility before entering the courtroom, security personnel saw 
defendant manipulating his shackles.  They discovered that he 
had spread the side of the handcuffs, and with more time, he 
would have been able to free the locking device and break out of 
his handcuffs.  The police were required to replace the damaged 
handcuffs with a new pair.  A police sergeant testified that in 22 
years of law enforcement, he had never heard of anyone 
“fidgeting” with handcuffs to the point of needing to be replaced. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
118 
At Folsom Prison, defendant secreted a metal envelope 
clasp.  At a hearing on the matter, the court did not determine 
what purpose defendant might use the clasp for but found “the 
fact that it was secreted to be a factor indicating its possible use 
as for escape.  That is, there is no reason to secrete something 
that you do not feel is useful or something that you desire to hide 
for some purpose.”  A former San Quentin warden testified that 
the clasp could be used as a handcuff key, and a prosecution 
investigator was able to use the same kind of clasp to unlock a 
pair of standard-issue handcuffs. 
Finally, defendant exhibited behavior toward his handlers 
that supported a need for restraints.  In Canada, he would 
“always brush up next to his plain clothes handlers to determine 
whether or not they were armed.”  In Calaveras County, a 
detective observed that defendant maintained “a constant vigil 
as to what’s going on around him” and would “always observe 
and take in where security personnel are, what they are armed 
with, and distances between himself and them.”  The detective 
found defendant to be “very manipulative” and that he would 
attempt to get acquainted with his immediate handlers.  
Canadian prison authorities replaced his handlers with new 
personnel when they became too familiar with defendant, and 
the Calaveras County authorities continued this practice. 
Defendant argues that People v. Burnett (1980) 111 
Cal.App.3d 661 compels a different conclusion, but he is 
mistaken.  In Burnett, the trial court ordered the defendant to 
be restrained based on one escape conviction seven years prior 
to the current trial.  (Id. at pp. 667–669.)  The appellate court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion.  Defendant now 
argues that in his case, “all of the information” relied on by the 
trial court was older than the seven-year-old information relied 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
119 
on by the court in Burnett.  That case, however, is easily 
distinguished from defendant’s case.  The trial court in Burnett 
relied on one single escape conviction; here, the trial court relied 
on a sustained pattern of escape attempts pre- and postcustody.  
Importantly, in this case, the trial court attributed the lack of 
recent incidents from defendant to the fact that he was 
continuously restrained, and therefore any escape attempt was 
“highly unlikely.”  
Defendant argues the trial court’s ruling nonetheless 
violates People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201.  In Mar, we 
extended previous case law regarding a manifest need 
determination for visible shackles to the use of a nonvisible stun 
belt.  (Id. at pp. 1218–1220.)   We further determined that “a 
trial court must take into consideration the potential adverse 
psychological consequences that may accompany the compelled 
use of a stun belt and should give considerable weight to the 
defendant’s perspective in determining whether traditional 
security measures — such as chains or leg braces — or instead 
a stun belt constitutes the less intrusive or restrictive 
alternative . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1228.)  In cases where the trial 
predated Mar, however, we have not faulted the trial court for 
failing to consider the physical or psychological impacts of the 
belt when making its determination.  (People v. Jackson (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 724, 739; see People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 
1271; Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 562.)   
Defendant asserts that despite his trial predating Mar, 
the court still erred when it called the belt “a painless thing” and 
stated that it was “not uncomfortable like the chains.”  Mar, 
however, states that courts should not always presume that the 
stun belt is less onerous or less restrictive than traditional 
security measures and instead must weigh all available options.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
120 
(Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1228.)  The trial court here made 
no such presumptions.  Defendant complained of pain from the 
chains, marks they left on his waist, and his inability to write 
notes while wearing them.  Recognizing defendant’s discomfort 
with the chains, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it chose the stun belt as a viable alternative.  Even if our holding 
in Mar applied retroactively, the court did not violate its ruling 
here. 
E.  Extradition Testimony 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted 
the prior testimony of Maurice Laberge from his extradition 
hearing. 
1.  Procedural History 
On September 24, 1998, before the prosecution began 
introducing evidence, the defense filed a motion to exclude the 
prior testimony of Laberge, a Canadian jailhouse informant.  
Laberge had testified at defendant’s extradition hearing but had 
since died in an automobile accident.  In its motion, the defense 
argued that Laberge’s testimony was inadmissible under 
Evidence Code section 1291 and that his testimony would 
violate defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses under the 
Sixth Amendment.11 
 
11  
Evidence Code section 1291 states:  “(a) Evidence of former 
testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness and:  [⁋] (1) The former 
testimony is offered against a person who offered it in evidence 
in his own behalf on the former occasion or against the successor 
in interest of such person; or [⁋] (2) The party against whom the 
former testimony is offered was a party to the action or 
 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
121 
In its response, the prosecution argued that it sought to 
introduce a small portion of Laberge’s testimony regarding four 
cartoon drawings defendant gave him and Laberge’s own 
criminal record.  The prosecution offered to stipulate to 
admission of evidence that he had received benefits in exchange 
for cooperating in this case and another case.  The prosecution 
argued that Laberge’s testimony was admissible under state 
and federal law. 
At a hearing on the motion, the court stated that the 
extradition hearing appeared very similar to a preliminary 
hearing.  The court further stated that the cross-examination of 
Laberge was “very extensive.”  The court ruled the testimony 
was admissible under the hearsay exception for former 
testimony and that it satisfied the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. 
At trial, Sergeant Raymond Munro with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police read portions of Laberge’s testimony 
for the jury.  As previously noted, defendant and Laberge met in 
1986 in a Canadian prison.  They exercised together every day 
for a period of four or five months.  Following their meetups on 
 
proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right 
and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest 
and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.  [⁋] (b) 
The admissibility of former testimony under this section is 
subject to the same limitations and objections as though the 
declarant were testifying at the hearing, except that former 
testimony offered under this section is not subject to:  [⁋] (1) 
Objections to the form of the question which were not made at 
the time the former testimony was given.  [⁋] (2) Objections 
based on competency or privilege which did not exist at the time 
the former testimony was given.” 
 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
122 
the exercise yard, defendant would give Laberge cartoons 
related to their discussions.  Laberge testified about four 
cartoons and the discussions he had with defendant regarding 
each cartoon. 
One of the cartoons that defendant gave Laberge depicted 
a scene from the M Ladies video.  Defendant told Laberge that 
he was “very worried” about a videotape that police found 
involving Allen and O’Connor.  Defendant said that in the 
videotape, one of the women complained about being warm, so 
he used a butterfly knife to cut her T-shirt.  Defendant told 
Laberge that at one point while filming Allen, he stopped and 
made some food and then returned to see Lake “carrying on” 
with her.  Defendant gave Laberge a cartoon of Lake holding a 
whip in his right hand, standing over a woman who was naked 
and bound on top of a table in front of Lake.  The woman is 
saying, “Ouch!”  Lake is fondling himself with his left hand while 
saying, “Oh, I love you, Kathi, I really do.”  Defendant is 
standing behind a video camera while eating, and saying, “Rice 
is ready! Dinner time!”  A handwriting expert confirmed that 
defendant had written the words on the cartoon. 
Another cartoon that defendant drew bore the words 
“Calaveras County Remains Claiming Section.”  The cartoon 
featured a man labeled Boyd Stephens, who was a coroner 
involved in the investigation, handing a large bag bearing the 
name “Dubs” to another man.  The coroner says, “[A]nd this bag 
I think is yours.”  On a table is another bag labeled “Bond.”  A 
lady dressed in mourning is leaving the room carrying a small 
bag labeled “Allen.”  A handwriting expert confirmed that 
defendant wrote the words on the cartoon. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
123 
Defendant gave Laberge a cartoon featuring two men, one 
labeled “Lake” and the other labeled “Slant,” Laberge’s 
nickname for defendant.  The two men are carrying a person on 
a stretcher between them; “zzzz” is written above the person.  
Next to this drawing, the two men are shown holding the 
stretcher above a fire.  Next to that, the body is shown burning 
in the fire with the words “Ah! You mother fuckers!” above the 
fire.  Lake is shown laughing while defendant leans against the 
stretcher, watching the fire.  Defendant gave Laberge this 
cartoon after discussing the procedure that he and Lake used to 
kill and burn their victims.  A handwriting expert again 
confirmed that defendant wrote the words on the cartoon. 
The final cartoon that Laberge described was labeled “San 
Quentin . . . Years Later.”  In the cartoon, defendant is sitting 
on a bed in a prison cell.  The words “no kill no thrill!” and “no 
gun no fun” are written on the wall behind him.  Pictures of the 
victims are taped on the wall next to him.  One picture, labeled 
“Bond’s,” showed a man, woman, and baby.  Another picture, 
labeled “Dubs,” also showed a man, woman, and baby.  Pictures 
of individuals were labeled “Carroll,” “Cosner,” “Pearenteau 
[sic],” “Gerald,” and “Allen.”  Defendant drew this cartoon to 
demonstrate what his life would be like once he was extradited 
to the United States.  The words were confirmed to be written 
by defendant. 
Sergeant Munro testified that after the extradition 
hearing, Laberge was placed in a witness protection program.  
As part of the program, he received $36,000 in Canadian dollars.  
His participation in the program was based on his assistance in 
defendant’s case and in an unrelated murder investigation.  The 
prosecutor in the unrelated investigation requested Laberge be 
placed in witness protection. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
124 
Sergeant Munro testified that Laberge had 42 prior 
convictions.  When he testified at the extradition hearing, 
Laberge was serving a 25-year sentence for two counts of armed 
robbery, two counts of kidnapping, and the use of a firearm to 
commit an indictable offense. 
Defendant 
raises 
three 
arguments 
regarding 
the 
admission of Laberge’s prior testimony.  First, he contends 
Laberge’s testimony from the extradition hearing did not qualify 
as a hearsay exception because Evidence Code section 1291 does 
not encompass testimony given in a foreign country.  Second, he 
contends that Laberge’s testimony was inadmissible as former 
testimony because the extradition hearing served a manifestly 
different purpose than the trial.  Finally, he contends that 
Laberge’s testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses. 
2.  Foreign Testimony Under Evidence Code Section 
1291 
Defendant first argues that Laberge’s testimony was 
inadmissible because Evidence Code section 1291 does not 
encompass testimony given in a foreign country.  As discussed 
below, his claim has no merit. 
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1200, subd. (a).)  Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under 
an exception.  (Id., subd. (b).)  Evidence Code section 1291 
provides one such exception by allowing the admission of former 
testimony if the declarant is unavailable, the party against 
whom the evidence is offered was a party in the prior 
proceeding, and that party had the opportunity to cross-examine 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
125 
the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that of the 
trial.  (Id., subd. (a).)  When these requirements are met, the 
admission of former testimony does not violate a defendant’s 
constitutional right of confrontation.  (People v. Herrera (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 613, 621.)  
“ ‘Former testimony’ ” is defined in section 1290 of the 
Evidence Code as testimony given under oath in “[a]nother 
action or in a former hearing or trial of the same action,” or a 
“proceeding to determine a controversy conducted by or under 
the supervision of an agency that has the power to determine 
such a controversy and is an agency of the United States or a 
public entity in the United States,” or a “deposition taken in 
compliance with law in another action,” or an “arbitration 
proceeding if the evidence of such former testimony is a 
verbatim transcript thereof.”  (Id., subds. (a)–(d).)  Evidence 
Code section 105 states that the term action “includes a civil 
action and a criminal action.” 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting the 
introduction of Laberge’s testimony under Evidence Code 
section 1291 because the legislature limited the scope of that 
statute to proceedings occurring only within the United States.  
He asserts Evidence Code sections 1290–1292 contain no 
language conveying an intent that the sections should apply to 
foreign proceedings.  He further asserts that extradition 
hearings in a foreign country are not “actions” within the 
meaning of Evidence Code section 105. We review a trial court’s 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725.) 
As an initial matter, we reject defendant’s argument that 
an extradition hearing is not an “action” within the meaning of 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
126 
Evidence Code section 105.  An “ ‘[a]ction’ includes a civil action 
and a criminal action.”  (Evid. Code, § 105.)  This definition does 
not exclude any proceeding not strictly criminal or civil.  
“ ‘Includes’ is ‘ordinarily a term of enlargement rather than 
limitation.’  [Citation.]  The ‘statutory definition of a thing as 
“including” certain things does not necessarily place thereon a 
meaning limited to the inclusions.’ ”  (Flanagan v. Flanagan 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 774.) 
There is no California authority on whether a foreign 
extradition hearing is admissible under Evidence Code section 
1291, but a review of federal case law is instructive here.  In 
U.S. v. Salim (2d Cir. 1988) 855 F.2d 944 (Salim), the Second 
Circuit held that foreign testimony is admissible as prior 
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence without running 
afoul of the confrontation clause.  Bebe Soraia Rouhani was 
arrested in Paris, France, on a stopover to New York City to 
deliver heroin to the defendant.  (Id. at p. 947.)  Federal 
prosecutors sought the district court’s permission to take 
Rouhani’s deposition in France, where she was being held in 
custody awaiting her own trial.  The deposition was taken 
according to French law and procedures with a French 
magistrate presiding.  (Id. at pp. 947–948.)  Defendant was in 
custody in the United States and unable to attend the 
deposition.  French law prohibited defendant’s counsel from 
being in the room while Rouhani testified, and the Assistant 
United States Attorney voluntarily agreed to be absent from the 
room to avoid the appearance of an unfair advantage.  Attorneys 
on both sides were permitted to submit written questions to the 
magistrate.  Various portions of Rouhani’s deposition testimony 
were read into the record at defendant’s trial.  (Id. at p. 948.) 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
127 
  On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of 
Rouhani’s testimony under rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules 
(28 U.S.C.).  Notably, the operative language of rule 804(b)(1) is 
similar to Evidence Code section 1291.12  The Second Circuit 
rejected his argument, holding that the French government’s 
procedures were “consistent with principles of comity in 
international relations, which instruct us ‘to demonstrate due 
respect . . . for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign 
state.’ ”  (Salim, supra, 855 F.2d at p. 953.)  The court continued, 
“In short, unless the manner of examination required by the law 
of the host nation is so incompatible with our fundamental 
principles of fairness or so prone to inaccuracy or bias as to 
render the testimony inherently unreliable (or, in the words of 
the advisory notes to Rule 28 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(28 U.S.C.)], are ‘so devoid of substance or probative value as to 
warrant its exclusion altogether’), a deposition taken pursuant 
to letter rogatory in accordance with the law of the host nation 
 
12  
Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) 
provides that the admission of former testimony does not violate 
the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness and the former testimony “was given as a witness at a 
trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the 
current proceeding or a different one” and “is now offered 
against a party who had — or, in a civil case, whose predecessor 
in interest had — an opportunity and similar motive to develop 
it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.”  (Id., rule 
804(b)(1)(A), (B).)  There are minor differences in wording 
between rule 804(b)(1) and Evidence Code section 1291.  These 
minor differences — e.g., rule 804(b)(1)(B) says “similar motive” 
while Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2) says 
“motive similar” — are not substantial in way that is relevant 
here nor have any bearing on the admissibility of foreign 
testimony. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
128 
is taken ‘in compliance with law’ for purposes of Rule 804(b)(1).”  
(Ibid.) 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that “foreign laws do 
not always permit witnesses to be deposed in the manner to 
which American courts and lawyers are accustomed.  In certain 
cases, the use of unconventional foreign methods of examination 
may exceed the limits of accepted American standards of 
fairness and reliability, such as underlie the confrontation 
clause and the rule against hearsay.  Concerns of this type are 
addressed best on a case-by-case basis.”  (Salim, supra, 855 F.2d 
at p. 946.) 
The First Circuit agreed with the Salim court in U.S. v. 
McKeeve (1st Cir. 1997) 131 F.3d 1.  In McKeeve, a British 
magistrate took the deposition of a key witness in accordance 
with British law and procedures.  (Id. at p. 7.)  Over the 
defendant’s objection, the district court permitted the 
prosecution to read the deposition into evidence at trial.  (Id. at 
pp. 7–8.)  The First Circuit acknowledged that the deposition did 
not comport in all respects with American practice, but 
nonetheless held that the proceedings substantially conformed 
to our practice and thus satisfied rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.). 
The Eleventh Circuit likewise found a British deposition 
to be admissible under rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (28 U.S.C.).  (U.S. v. Mueller (11th Cir. 1996) 74 F.3d 
1152, 1156–1157.)  The court noted that the defendant was able 
to consult with his lawyer on the telephone during the 
deposition proceedings, the procedures used followed those in 
the United States, and there were no language barriers. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
129 
Thus, while rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(28 U.S.C.) does not explicitly permit the introduction of foreign 
testimony, federal courts have held foreign testimony may be 
admissible regardless.  By extension, with respect to California’s 
analogous rule, the fact that the statutory language does not 
explicitly address foreign testimony does not signify that it must 
be excluded. 
Defendant 
further 
contends 
that 
the 
California 
Legislature intended to exclude foreign testimony from 
Evidence Code section 1291 because foreign matters are 
explicitly referenced in other sections in the Evidence Code.  
Defendant cites three statutes — Evidence Code sections 200 
and 452 and Penal Code section 668 — that include reference to 
foreign matters, none of which supports his assertion that 
Evidence Code section 1291 precludes introduction of foreign 
testimony.  Evidence Code section 200 defines the term “ ‘public 
entity,’ ” which “includes a nation, state, county, city and county, 
city, district, public authority, public agency, or any other 
political subdivision or public corporation, whether foreign or 
domestic.”  Evidence Code section 452 details matters which 
may be judicially noticed and includes the “law of an 
organization of nations and of foreign nations and public entities 
in foreign nations.”  (Id., subd. (f).)  Defendant also cites Penal 
Code section 668, which permits a prior foreign conviction to be 
used for enhancement if it would constitute a felony in 
California. 
Defendant’s contention is not persuasive.  He fails to cite 
any authority to support his argument that two references to 
foreign matters in the Evidence Code  — neither of which have 
anything to do with prior testimony — indicate the Legislature 
intended to exclude foreign matters from all other sections in 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
130 
the Evidence Code.  Moreover, his argument cuts against 
persuasive reasoning about an analogous federal rule by the 
federal courts of appeal.  For example, Federal Rules of Evidence 
rule 902 (28 U.S.C.) explicitly includes foreign matters.  (See 
ibid. [foreign public documents are self-authenticating].)  This 
has not precluded the federal courts from concluding that 
foreign testimony is admissible under Federal Rules of 
Evidence, rule 804 (28 U.S.C.).   
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Evidence 
Code section 1291 categorically excludes foreign testimony.  
Because defendant has not attempted to show that the 
Canadian extradition proceedings were so unconventional as to 
violate American standards of fairness and reliability (see 
Salim, supra, 855 F.2d at p. 946), we need not consider whether 
the testimony was inadmissible for this reason. 
3.  Purpose of the Extradition Hearing 
Second, defendant contends that even if Evidence Code 
section 1291 permits the introduction of foreign testimony, 
Laberge’s testimony was nonetheless inadmissible as former 
testimony.  Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(1), 
requires that the party against whom the former testimony is 
offered have the “opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 
with an interest and motive similar to that” of the trial.  
Defendant asserts that Laberge’s testimony violates this 
requirement because the extradition hearing served a 
manifestly different purpose than the trial.  Defendant argues 
that the purpose of the extradition hearing was to show that if 
he were extradited, he would likely face the death penalty, and 
therefore the interest and motive was to resist extradition, not 
to try to rebut guilt.  He further asserts that defense counsel had 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
131 
no reason to impeach Laberge’s credibility at the extradition 
hearing. 
Defendant raised a somewhat different argument in the 
trial court.  In his motion to exclude Laberge’s testimony, he 
submitted a declaration by his Canadian extradition attorney.  
The attorney stated that defendant’s guilt was a “secondary” 
issue at the extradition hearing to the death penalty question 
but acknowledged that guilt was an issue.  Importantly, one 
motive need not be mutually exclusive with the other.  Defense 
counsel could have been motivated to challenge defendant’s 
guilt and establish that if the evidence did suggest guilt, 
defendant would face the death penalty upon extradition. 
Testimony from the extradition hearing contradicts 
defendant’s assertion that his attorney had no reason to 
impeach Laberge’s credibility.  Cross-examination consumed 
approximately 165 pages of transcript.  Defense counsel asked 
Laberge about his criminal history, his prior history as an 
informant, how he came into contact with defendant and his 
note-taking of defendant’s statements, his access to documents 
that defendant received from his attorneys, his contact with law 
enforcement to report information about defendant’s case, and 
his access to newspapers and periodicals in prison.  The record 
suggests defense counsel had a significant motive and interest 
in attacking Laberge’s credibility.  Additionally, counsel’s 
vigorous and extensive cross-examination of Laberge further 
supports a finding that counsel’s motivation would have been to 
challenge the evidence implicating defendant in the California 
murders (and thus was not solely concerned with the fact that 
defendant would be subject to the death penalty upon 
extradition). 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
132 
Evidence Code section 1291 does not require that the 
motive and interest in cross-examining former testimony be 
identical to the current interest in examining the unavailable 
witness, it only requires that they be similar.  On this record, it 
is clear that defendant’s motive to defend against the charges at 
the extradition hearing was similar enough to that at a 
preliminary hearing.  Much as in a preliminary hearing in 
California, Canada requires the party seeking extradition to 
present a prima facie case establishing the person committed 
acts that would be criminal if done in Canada.  We have 
previously held that preliminary hearing testimony is 
admissible under Evidence Code section 1291 “ ‘not because the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary 
hearing is considered an exact substitute for the right of 
confrontation at trial [citation], but because the interests of 
justice are deemed served by a balancing of the defendant’s right 
to effective cross-examination against the public’s interest in 
effective prosecution.’ ”  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
795, 850; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1173.)  
Although “a defendant’s motive in cross-examining a witness at 
a preliminary hearing may differ somewhat from the motive at 
trial, . . . nevertheless the earlier testimony may be admissible 
at the trial under section 1291 because the ‘motives need not be 
identical, only “similar.” ’ ”  (Samayoa, at p. 850, quoting People 
v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 975.)  Although defendant’s 
motive in cross-examining Laberge at the extradition hearing 
differed somewhat from that of a trial, the record here supports 
a finding that the motives were similar enough.  Therefore, the 
admission of Laberge’s testimony did not violate Evidence Code 
section 1291. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
133 
Finally, defendant contends that Laberge’s testimony 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.  
“[W]hat is significant for the purpose of analyzing whether prior 
testimony is admissible under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution is whether the party against whom 
the prior testimony is offered had an appropriate opportunity for 
cross-examination at the prior hearing.”  (People v. Williams 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 627.)  As discussed, defendant had 
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Laberge at the 
extradition hearing and, indeed, did so at length.  Admission of 
Laberge’s testimony did not violate his right to confrontation 
under the federal Constitution. 
4.  Prejudice 
Even if the admission of Laberge’s testimony had been 
error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 585 [the standard of 
review for a confrontation clause violation is whether the 
admission of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt].)  During a hearing on admissibility of the testimony, the 
trial court expressed the view that even without Laberge’s 
testimony, the four cartoon drawings would have been 
admissible under Evidence Code section 1220 as a hearsay 
exception for admissions of a party.  Although Laberge’s 
testimony was helpful in providing context of the drawings to 
the jury, the cartoon drawings without any explanation were 
sufficiently inculpatory.  The cartoons clearly depicted Lake 
beating Allen while defendant ate rice and watched, a coroner 
handing remains of the victims to grieving family members, and 
defendant and Lake burning the bodies of victims.   
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
134 
Defendant contends the cartoons are not admissible as a 
party admission because the only evidence he actually drew the 
cartoons came from Laberge’s testimony.  Sufficient evidence, 
however, supports a finding that defendant drew the cartoons 
himself.  As the trial court noted at the hearing, defendant and 
Laberge were in one-man neighboring cells, suggesting quite 
plausibly that there was no other way for defendant to possess 
the drawings if he had not drawn them himself.  In addition, the 
handwriting expert testified that defendant wrote the words on 
the cartoons.  A sufficient foundation was laid for the cartoons 
to be admitted under Evidence Code section 1220 without 
Laberge’s testimony. 
Finally, the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including 
defendant’s own testimony, the M Ladies videotape, and the 
physical evidence found in Wilseyville, further supports a 
finding that even if admission of Laberge’s testimony was error, 
any possible error was harmless. 
F.  Evidentiary Issues 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
right to due process when it admitted prejudicial evidence and 
excluded proposed defense evidence. 
1.  Admission of Evidence  
a.  Defendant’s Call to Michael Carroll 
John Gouveia testified that he was Michael Carroll’s foster 
brother.  After Carroll was discharged from the military in the 
early 1980s, he moved in with Gouveia in Milpitas.  On direct 
examination, the prosecution asked Gouveia if Carroll had ever 
mentioned knowing someone by the name of Charles Ng.  The 
court sustained defendant’s hearsay objection.  The prosecution 
asked Gouveia if he ever received a phone call from someone who 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
135 
identified himself as Charles Ng.  Defendant again objected on 
hearsay grounds; the trial court overruled the objection without 
explaining the basis for its ruling.  Gouveia stated that he had 
received such a phone call, and the caller asked to speak to 
Carroll.  On cross-examination, Gouveia acknowledged he had 
never personally met defendant.  Gouveia explained that the 
caller identified himself as “Chuck,” but then he clarified with 
the caller, “Is this Charles Ng?”  The caller laughed and said, 
“Yeah.  Just tell Mike I called.” 
Defendant now argues, as he did in the trial court, that 
Gouveia’s testimony that defendant had called Carroll’s house 
was inadmissible hearsay.  The People respond that the 
testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception set forth 
by Evidence Code section 1220, which provides that “[e]vidence 
of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 
when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a 
party . . . .”  Defendant counters that this section is inapplicable 
because the prosecution failed to establish one of the exception’s 
requirements:  “prima facie proof that [the statement] was made 
by him or by some person whose statements may legally affect 
him.”  (Lewis v. Western Truck Line (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 455, 
465.)  According to defendant, the prima facie proof “must be 
independent of the hearsay [statement] itself,” and the fact that 
the caller identified himself as Charles Ng does not suffice.  
Even assuming arguendo that admission of the statement was 
error, defendant cannot establish prejudice.  Sufficient evidence 
linked him to Carroll without Gouveia’s testimony:  defendant 
assisted Lake in selling Carroll’s car after he went missing, 
Carroll’s girlfriend is featured in the M Ladies video, and several 
items belonging to Carroll were found at the Wilseyville 
property. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
136 
b.  Evidence of Workplace Conduct 
Outside the presence of the jury, the defense moved to 
exclude certain testimony from Kenneth Bruce, defendant’s 
coworker at Dennis Moving Company.  The defense objected to 
the prosecution’s proffer of Bruce’s testimony that defendant 
had said, “No gun, no fun,” “No kill, no thrill,” and “Daddy dies, 
mommy cries, baby fries.”  The defense also objected to possible 
testimony that defendant brought a butterfly knife and stun gun 
to work and bragged to his coworkers about owning guns. 
The trial court told the defense that its argument under 
Evidence Code section 352 was “almost specious.  There is 
nothing prejudicial about it. . . .  These things are relevant.”  The 
court stated that the challenged statements “were said.  They 
can be used as circumstantial evidence.  They can be used as 
corroborating evidence as to the drawings and as to the 
statements up in Canada.  ‘Daddy dies, momma cries, baby 
fries,’ you don’t have much of an imagination, Mr. Kelley, to 
show why that is relevant and it is not prejudicial.  These are 
words.  And guns were found in evidence and evidence of guns 
found in his house.  That is more corroborating evidence 
bragging about having guns.  So there will be, you know, it is 
just stronger evidence that the guns were his.” 
At trial, Bruce testified that he heard defendant use 
phrases such as, “No gun, no fun,” “No thrill, no kill,” and 
“Daddy die, mommy cry, baby fries.”  He heard defendant use 
those phrases more than once around himself and other 
coworkers.  Bruce said that defendant mentioned he owned guns 
and had brought a butterfly knife to work.  
Defendant argues that Bruce’s testimony regarding 
defendant’s statements and the weapons “individually and 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
137 
cumulatively were prejudicial because of the likelihood that the 
jury would view [defendant’s] possession of weapons and his 
coarse rhymes as a proclivity to violence.” 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
admitted Bruce’s testimony.  (See People v. Mora and Rangel 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480 (Mora and Rangel) [ “ ‘We will not 
disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code 
section 352 “ ‘except on a showing that the court exercised its 
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner 
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice’ ” ’ ”].)  As the 
court noted, defendant’s statements were corroborating 
evidence that defendant participated in the killings and owned 
the guns found in his home.  His statement, “Daddy dies, 
mommy cries, baby fries,” was relevant and a compelling 
admission that defendant participated in the Dubs and 
Bond/O’Connor murders, both of which involved killing a father, 
mother, and infant. 
Further, Bruce’s testimony was not unduly prejudicial.  
Defendant used a knife in the M Ladies video to cut off 
O’Connor’s shirt and bra; in comparison, his bringing a knife to 
work and bragging to a coworker about possessing guns was not 
likely to inflame the emotions of the jury.  (See Doolin, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 439 [“evidence should be excluded as unduly 
prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions 
of the jury”].)  Similarly, his statements to Bruce, “No gun, no 
fun” and “No thrill, no kill,” were unlikely to inflame the 
emotions of jury given that the jury had seen those same words 
written out in one of the cartoons that defendant shared with 
Laberge.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
138 
c.  Evidence of Seized VCR 
After the Dubs family disappeared, the police determined 
that a VCR was missing from their apartment.  At trial, the 
prosecution proffered evidence that police had found two VCRs 
in defendant’s apartment of the same model and type as the 
VCR missing from the Dubses’ apartment, one of which had the 
serial number removed.  Defendant argued the evidence was 
irrelevant and prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  He 
argued that authorities never linked the VCRs found in 
defendant’s apartment to the Dubs family, and the evidence 
“doesn’t prove anything.”  
The trial court stated, “If the D.A. in good faith can look at 
the jury and say, ‘We believe that is the VCR taken from Dubs,’ 
how can you prevent them from doing that?”  Kelley responded, 
“Because ‘We believe’ is not proof, your honor, ‘we believe’ is just 
opinion.”  The court said, “But it is the same type and model.”  
Kelley replied, “But it is not an unusual thing.  What if the 
Dubs — ”  The trial court interrupted and stated that it was 
unusual to have a serial number removed unless an item is 
stolen.  Kelley said, “Stolen from where is the question.”  The 
court responded, “Well, that is what they want to argue to the 
jury, that it was taken from the Dubs.  So there is relevance.  I 
don’t see that it is prejudicial.”  The court overruled defendant’s 
objection. 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of the VCRs.  He asserts there was no “foundation to 
establish [the evidence’s] relevance to the charged crimes” — i.e. 
“some independent confirmation that” one of them “was the VCR 
player missing from the Dubs” — and that admission of the 
evidence therefore “permitted a spurious inference that [he] had 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
139 
somehow come into possession of at least one item taken from 
the Dubs[] at the time of their disappearance.” 
We reject defendant’s claim.  Where “the relevance of 
evidence depends on the existence of a preliminary fact,” a trial 
court “should exclude the proffered evidence only if the ‘showing 
of [the] preliminary fact[] is too weak to support a favorable 
determination by the jury.’  [Citations.]  The decision whether 
the foundational evidence is sufficiently substantial is a matter 
within the court’s discretion.”  (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 
415, 466.)  Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that the evidence — i.e., the VCR found in defendant’s 
apartment was the same make and model of the Dubses’ missing 
VCR and its serial number had been removed — was not too 
weak to support a conclusion that the VCR belonged to the 
Dubses.  Nor was the admission of this evidence unduly 
prejudicial.  (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439.) 
d.  Evidence of Marijuana 
The prosecution proffered evidence that police had seized 
four bags of marijuana from defendant’s apartment that were 
packaged similarly to marijuana found at the Wilseyville 
property.  The defense argued the evidence was irrelevant to the 
murder charges.  The prosecution stated that the evidence was 
“relevant because of the conspiracy, the overall method of 
operation, the fact that the two defendants, the two men were 
engaged in this common criminal plan.  And it’s the People’s 
position that the plan involved not just the murder of the 12 
victims but also profiting from various activities.”  The court 
agreed with the defense:  “I understand why [the prosecution] 
think[s] it’s relevant but it’s so watered down.  How much of a 
connection do you want to make?  So under [Evidence Code 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
140 
section] 352 grounds, as the evidence is right now, the objection 
is sustained.” 
Shortly after, the defense objected to defendant’s former 
coworker Hector Salcedo’s testimony that defendant had invited 
Peranteau to come “up to the hills to help him harvest a weed 
field.”  The defense argued the evidence was irrelevant because 
they did not know the time frame of when the conversation 
occurred and how the timing related to when Peranteau 
disappeared.  The court found Salcedo’s testimony to be relevant 
and continued, “I don’t find it prejudicial at all in the sense that 
we use the word ‘prejudice.’  And it is highly relevant.  You have 
somebody who disappears.  They have an accusation who helped 
cause that, and now you have a direct statement made before 
the disappearance.  It is relevant.”  
Salcedo testified that one afternoon in December 1984 or 
January 1985, while he was with Peranteau at his apartment, 
defendant showed up unannounced.  Salcedo did not recall what 
defendant and Peranteau initially discussed but remembered 
defendant “eventually taking a bag of marijuana, showing it to 
us and telling us that he had[,] or a friend had[,] a plantation 
and if we would go help him, we could get some.  We would be 
able to take some home or keep some.”  Salcedo testified that 
Peranteau sometimes smoked marijuana. 
On cross-examination, the defense elicited that Salcedo 
had initially told officers that Peranteau had told him about the 
marijuana conversation with defendant, and he was not actually 
present for that discussion.  On redirect, Salcedo clarified that 
there were two separate incidents with defendant regarding 
marijuana.  At one point Peranteau told him that defendant 
offered to take him up to the hills to harvest marijuana.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
141 
Sometime later, he was at Peranteau’s apartment when 
defendant appeared and again discussed harvesting marijuana. 
After the defense rested its case, but before defendant took 
the stand, the prosecution again sought to introduce evidence of 
the marijuana found in defendant’s apartment as rebuttal 
evidence.  The prosecution explained that the defense 
introduced evidence that Lake may have murdered the victims 
for financial gain and grew marijuana as a way to lure people to 
Calaveras County.  The court ruled the evidence admissible to 
rebut the defense theory that “whatever Lake did, he did it on 
his own.”  The court noted that the jury heard testimony that 
defendant never smoked marijuana, and the jury could infer 
why he would have marijuana at his home if he did not use it.   
The parties stipulated that authorities found four bags of 
marijuana in defendant’s San Francisco apartment.  The bags 
were admitted into evidence. 
Defendant argues the court abused its discretion when it 
admitted testimony from Salcedo that defendant showed him 
and Peranteau marijuana and when it admitted evidence of the 
marijuana bags found in defendant’s apartment.  He contends 
the marijuana evidence “had negligible, if any, probative value, 
but served to portray [defendant] as a criminally-oriented 
character.”  Although the prosecution did not establish at 
exactly what point in time defendant invited Peranteau to 
harvest marijuana as it relates to Peranteau’s disappearance, 
Salcedo testified it happened sometime in December 1984 or 
January 1985, and Peranteau disappeared on January 19, 1985, 
supporting an inference that defendant may have tried to lure 
Peranteau to Wilseyville and may have been connected to his 
disappearance.  As the trial court noted when it admitted the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
142 
evidence, 
defendant’s 
statement 
inviting 
Peranteau 
to 
Wilseyville connected defendant to the victim at around the time 
of the victim’s disappearance.   Further, Salcedo’s testimony was 
not unduly prejudicial because defendant’s invitation to 
Peranteau to help harvest marijuana was not especially 
inflammatory.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it found defendant’s invitation to Peranteau was relevant to his 
disappearance.   
The trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion when 
it admitted evidence of the marijuana bags found in defendant’s 
home.  The evidence corroborated Salcedo’s testimony that 
defendant showed him and Peranteau a bag of marijuana.  The 
jury heard considerable evidence that Lake sold marijuana:  one 
witness saw marijuana drying on the floor of the Wilseyville 
property;  another witness saw Lake at the Bond/O’Connor 
house dividing up three pounds of marijuana with someone; a 
third witness testified that Lake invited her to his ranch to pick 
marijuana; and a fourth witness testified that Lake dropped off 
a bag of marijuana through her window and said, “There is more 
where that came from.”  Evidence that defendant possessed 
marijuana was relevant to further connect him to Lake and 
show that they were participating in a common enterprise, 
particularly in light of testimony that defendant did not smoke 
marijuana himself, making it more likely that he possessed 
marijuana for another purpose.  For the same reasons, as the 
court ruled, the marijuana rebutted the defense theory that 
Lake acted on his own and defendant did not participate.  The 
court ruled that the jury could reasonably infer that defendant 
possessed the marijuana because he was actively working with 
Lake.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
143 
Furthermore, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial.  
Officers found items in defendant’s home that linked him to 
several victims.  Combined with the evidence admitted 
regarding the 12 murders and the M Ladies video, defendant 
cannot establish how evidence that he possessed marijuana 
inflamed the jurors’ emotions and caused them to punish 
defendant based on that emotional reaction.  (See People v. 
Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 220.) 
2.  Exclusion of Defense Evidence 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
federal due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to 
present a defense when it curtailed cross-examination and 
excluded defense evidence regarding Lake.   
Defendant first claims the court erred by excluding 
testimony from Lake’s sister that their mother preferred his 
brother over Lake.  At trial, the prosecutor objected on hearsay 
grounds, and the court sustained the objection.  Defendant 
never offered a nonhearsay basis for admitting Lake’s sister’s 
testimony about what her mother said.  Nor can he assert on 
appeal new reasons why the evidence should have been 
admitted.  (See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 228 [“A 
general objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or 
one based on a different ground from that advanced at trial, does 
not preserve the claim for appeal”].)  Defendant’s claim thus 
fails. 
Defendant next claims the court erred by excluding 
testimony from Lake’s ex-wife.  During direct examination, 
counsel asked her if she thought that Lake had a “God complex.”  
The prosecutor objected based on relevance, and the court 
sustained the objection and also ruled that the question was 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
144 
vague.  On appeal, defendant argues the testimony would have 
“highlighted that Lake . . . viewed himself in a grandiose 
manner as controlling and manipulative of others,” which 
“would have emphasized” that defendant “was not necessarily 
any kind of partner to Lake” or “a knowing aider and abettor to 
Lake’s crimes, but was merely an acolyte who followed 
directions without knowing of Lake’s homicidal mania.” 
We need not decide whether the trial court erred because 
its ruling could not have prejudiced the defense.  Although 
defendant’s ex-wife was not allowed to say whether she thought 
Lake had a “God complex,” she did testify that he “was 
controlling” of her in ways she “didn’t like” and “was able to 
control,” “convince . . . or influence” her without her “realiz[ing]” 
what “was happening.”  Several other defense witnesses 
testified that Lake was “very controlling” and “manipulative.”  
Ernie Pardini, who was Lake’s neighbor for a period of time, 
testified as follows:  Lake “spoke to” defendant “in a very 
degrading and domineering manner, like rode him hard” and 
“ordered [him] around like a slave.”  Defendant “seemed very 
timid around” Lake and had “kind of a hurt look in his eyes,” 
“[l]ike he was trying to win [Lake’s] approval and wasn’t quite 
successful.”  Defendant “seemed to sort of follow [Lake] around,” 
“always . . . seemed very subservient and willing to do whatever 
Lake said,” and “never” ignored or talked back to Lake.  In light 
of this testimony, and the claimed relevance of the excluded 
testimony in question, the court’s ruling could not have 
prejudiced defendant. 
This discussion likewise disposes of defendant’s next 
claim:  the trial court erred by striking Pardini’s testimony that 
defendant “seemed like a lost child trying to win his father’s 
approval.”  The prosecution objected that Pardini’s testimony 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
145 
lacked foundation and was “improper opinion.”  Commenting 
that the testimony was “also vague,” the court sustained the 
objection, ordered the testimony stricken, and directed the jury 
to disregard it.  On appeal, defendant argues this testimony was 
“important to demonstrate that [he] was manipulated into a role 
in which he felt obligated to assist Lake in Lake’s ventures.”  
However, as explained above, Pardini provided ample evidence 
on this point, testifying that defendant “seemed very timid 
around” Lake and had “kind of a hurt look in his eyes,” “[l]ike he 
was trying to win [Lake’s] approval,” that defendant “always . . . 
seemed very subservient and willing to do whatever Lake said,” 
and that he “never” ignored or talked back to  Lake.  In light of 
this testimony, even were defendant correct that the court erred 
by excluding Pardini’s statement that defendant “seemed like a 
lost child trying to win his father’s approval,” the error could not 
have prejudiced the defense. 
Defendant next contends the court erroneously excluded 
testimony that Stapley distributed methamphetamine in San 
Diego and that he and Bond had an antagonistic relationship 
with Lake unrelated to defendant.  The prosecutor argued that 
Stapley’s drug activities in San Diego were irrelevant, and noted 
that the court had admitted an abundance of evidence that Bond 
and Stapley manufactured methamphetamine in Wilseyville.  
The court agreed that the evidence was irrelevant and told the 
defense it would sustain an objection if the defense tried to 
present testimony about Stapley’s activities in San Diego.  On 
appeal, defendant argues this evidence was relevant to establish 
that Lake had an antagonistic relationship with Stapley and 
Bond, and a motive to kill them unrelated to defendant.  
Defendant is mistaken.  As the trial court noted, ample evidence 
was admitted demonstrating Stapley and Bond’s drug activities 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
146 
in Wilseyville, and a juror could reasonably infer that Stapley 
had experience selling drugs prior to arriving in Wilseyville.  
Evidence of Stapley’s drug sales in San Diego was thus 
cumulative and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it excluded this evidence. 
Relatedly, defendant argues that the trial court “excluded 
virtually all testimony” from a witness regarding Bond stating 
that he was taking a pistol to Wilseyville to confront Lake.  He 
further argues the trial court erred when it excluded testimony 
from another witness that Bond stated he was going to 
Wilseyville to confront Lake and to “finish it.”  Defendant 
contends this evidence was relevant to establish that Lake killed 
Bond and Stapley because of a personal feud over drug activity.  
The jury, however, did hear evidence that Bond had plans to go 
to Lake’s house to “confront him and settle a score” and that he 
was armed at the time he left for Wilseyville.  Even if the trial 
court had abused its discretion, defendant cannot establish 
prejudice because the evidence defendant now challenges was 
admitted through another witness.  
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred when it 
excluded testimony that Lake fit the profile of a serial killer.  
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s relevance objection, 
stating that “we don’t need an expert to come in . . . and tell 
these jurors that” Lake was a serial killer.  Defendant argues on 
appeal that this testimony was necessary to establish that Lake 
fit the profile of a serial killer while defendant did not.  At no 
point during counsel’s offer of proof, however, did counsel argue 
that this evidence was relevant to distinguish between Lake and 
defendant.  Moreover, as the trial court noted, whether or not 
Lake was a serial killer was not a disputed fact at issue.  The 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
147 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded this 
testimony.   
Defendant next challenges the trial court’s exclusion of 
selected excerpts from Lake’s journal.  The defense sought to 
introduce a limited number of entries from the journal to show 
Lake’s state of mind and that he murdered many individuals 
without any knowledge or participation from defendant, 
suggesting he likewise could have murdered the current victims 
without defendant’s assistance.  The prosecution argued that if 
the court admitted the defense’s proffered excerpts, additional 
journal entries should be admitted into evidence, including 
entries that implicated defendant, in order to have a complete 
picture of what was going through Lake’s mind.  The court 
agreed that admitting only edited portions of the journal would 
be misleading.  The court explained that the defense wanted to 
admit portions of the diary that suggested Lake killed the 12 
victims without any assistance from defendant.  The court 
pointed out that these selected portions were therefore 
misleading because many of the victims in this case were 
strangers to Lake; their connection to him was through 
defendant.  Additionally, “we know based upon the evidence that 
Mr. Ng was available to assist in those homicides.”  The court 
ruled that the proffered sections of the journal were 
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 356. 
Defense counsel asked if the court would admit the entire 
diary.  The trial court excluded admission of the entire diary 
under Evidence Code section 352, ruling that the diary as a 
whole was “hard to read,” largely “pure junk,” “too time 
consuming, too confusing, and literally not very relevant.”  The 
court offered to reconsider the matter if defense counsel 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
148 
presented a reedited version of the diary or proffered different 
excerpts.   
Two weeks later, the defense proffered one new, edited 
excerpt of Lake’s journal.  The prosecution again objected, 
arguing the proffered excerpts were misleading because they 
removed all references to defendant.  The trial court agreed, 
stating, “I’m not going to let you put in a partial statement when 
the next statement clearly implicates Mr. Ng.”  The court stated, 
“If you can’t get over [relevance grounds], how do you get over 
anything else?”  Counsel argued that the entries were relevant 
because the defense theory was that Lake had a plan and a 
motive that did not involve defendant; the court noted it was not 
relevant because Lake’s motive and plan were uncontested.  The 
court further explained that the evidence the defense wanted to 
raise by way of the journal entries — that Lake engaged in 
criminality without defendant’s involvement and that he had 
fantasies of keeping women hostage in a bunker — were already 
before the jury via other evidence. 
The trial court again noted that excerpts proposed by the 
defense focused exclusively on Lake acting alone while omitting 
many references to contact between Lake and defendant.  
In addition to excluding the entire diary under relevance 
grounds and Evidence Code section 352, the court also sustained 
the prosecution’s objection to the proffered entries under 
Evidence Code section 356.   The court ultimately allowed the 
defense to reference one journal entry regarding Lake’s long-
held bunker fantasies “to show that he did really write a diary 
and he did have this fantasy for some 20-odd years before all 
this started.”  On appeal, defendant argues that the journal 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
149 
reflected Lake’s 20-year criminal scheme and was crucial to the 
defense. 
Evidence Code section 352 states that a trial court has the 
discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  Evidence Code section 356 states:  
“Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is 
given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject 
may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, 
the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, 
conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, 
declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make 
it understood may also be given in evidence.”  “The purpose of 
Evidence Code section 356 is ‘to prevent the use of selected 
aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to 
create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed.’ ”  
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 600.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
excluded the journal entries offered by defendant under 
Evidence Code section 356.  The defense sought to introduce 
excerpts from the journal suggesting that Lake committed the 
murders alone while excluding excerpts concerning defendant.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
defendant’s proposal to include only selected aspects of the diary 
would create a misleading impression in violation of Evidence 
Code section 356.  Defendant’s offer to admit the entire diary 
may have appeased the court’s concern under Evidence Code 
356, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that the entire diary was nonetheless inadmissible under 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
150 
Evidence Code section 352.  (See Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 480.)  The trial court acted within its discretion 
when it determined that the diary would create an undue 
consumption of time and confuse the jury.  As the court noted, 
the diary as a whole was hard to read and largely irrelevant.  
The court properly determined that the proffered entries were 
cumulative because many of the issues, such as Lake’s plan to 
murder and to keep women hostage in his bunker, were already 
before the jury. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
excluded the proffered journal entries on relevance and 
Evidence Code sections 356 and 352 grounds. 
Next, defendant argues the trial court erroneously 
excluded a video of Lake and Claralyn having sex while talking 
about capturing other women and children.  The prosecution 
objected based on relevance, hearsay, and Evidence Code section 
352.  After reading the transcript of the video, the trial court 
agreed.  The court stated that there was no “relevance to any of 
the things” in the video, there were no plans made to do 
anything, it was hard to tell why Lake said what he said or why 
Claralyn said what she said, and that the discussion “appears to 
. . . have been an S and M exercise.”  Additionally, the tape was 
recorded 
prior 
to 
defendant’s 
involvement 
with 
Lake.  
Defendant now argues on appeal that the evidence would have 
established that Lake engaged in criminal conduct with the 
assistance of other people.  Contrary to his own argument, 
however, defendant acknowledges elsewhere in his briefing that 
the video suggests Claralyn did not take Lake seriously because 
she believed that she was “merely a character in his fantasy.”  
The court agreed when it found the comments between Lake and 
Claralyn to be fantasies discussed during a sexual encounter.  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
151 
The conversation does not prove anything regarding Lake and 
defendant’s relationship, nor does it prove anything regarding 
defendant’s involvement in the charged offenses.  The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion. 
Finally, defendant challenges the court’s refusal to permit 
the defense to recall Claralyn.  During her initial testimony, the 
defense introduced, by stipulation, the terms of her immunity 
agreement with the prosecution.  Neither party asked her any 
questions.  After defendant testified, the defense requested to 
recall Claralyn.  Counsel argued that after defendant’s 
testimony, they needed to “put a different light on the defense” 
and while Claralyn’s testimony was not newly discovered, it was 
necessary for their new strategy.  The trial court denied the 
request to recall her because she had previously been on the 
stand and the defense “just asked no questions.”  The court 
further noted that Claralyn was not available to testify that day.  
On appeal, defendant argues that the need to corroborate 
important parts of his testimony outweighed potential damage 
Claralyn could have caused. 
We review a trial court’s decision on whether to reopen a 
criminal case to present additional evidence for an abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836.)  
“[W]e have directed reviewing courts to consider ‘the following 
factors:  “(1) the stage the proceedings had reached when the 
motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) 
in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury 
would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the 
significance of the evidence.” ’ ”  (In re Freeman (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 630, 650.)  These factors support the trial court’s 
ruling here.  The prosecution had already given its closing 
argument when defendant requested to testify; the court 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
152 
allowed the defense to reopen its case at that time for 
defendant’s testimony.  As the prosecution argued in trial, 
allowing the defense to recall Claralyn would unduly emphasize 
her testimony because it would directly follow defendant’s 
testimony, and their testimony would stand out from the rest of 
the evidence.  Lastly, the defense did not have any new evidence 
to present; indeed, the defense declined to make an offer of proof 
regarding the content of Claralyn’s testimony.  As such, the 
defense cannot establish the significance of her testimony.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to allow 
Claralyn to testify. 
Defendant asserts the cumulative effect of the court’s 
exclusionary rulings prevented the defense from adequately 
demonstrating to the jury that Lake was “a highly secretive and 
diabolical psychopath who manipulated people without their 
realizing it.”  Defendant, however, cannot establish any 
prejudice from the exclusion of the challenged testimony.  
Significant evidence was presented to the jury that Lake was 
manipulative and displayed psychopathic tendencies:  evidence 
of uncharged murders, his controlling and abusive relationships 
with women, his fantasies of keeping women hostage in the 
bunker, his alleged control over defendant, and his belief that it 
was okay to kill people. 
G.  Instructional Error  
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
right to due process and a fair trial when it denied several of the 
defense’s proposed jury instructions.  
 Defendant first challenges the court’s failure to instruct 
on unanimity.  While discussing jury instructions, defense 
counsel noted that the court would be instructing on three 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
153 
theories of liability:  direct perpetrator, coconspirator, and 
aiding and abetting.  Counsel requested the court instruct the 
jury that it must unanimously agree on the theory of liability.  
The court denied the request, stating that the law does not 
require a jury to unanimously agree on the theory of liability.  
Defendant contends the trial court erred because a unanimity 
instruction was required.  We have repeatedly held jury 
unanimity regarding the theory of first degree murder is not 
required.  (Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 496–497.)  
Defendant provides no persuasive reason to revisit our 
precedent now. 
Defendant next challenges the trial court’s refusal to 
instruct on what he described as lesser-related offenses.  
Specifically, defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that, 
if it rejected the murder charges, it could still find defendant 
guilty of accessory after the fact as to all 12 counts; kidnapping, 
false imprisonment by menace, and sexual battery as to Allen 
and O’Connor; robbery as to O’Connor; and burglary as to each 
member of the Dubs family.  The prosecutor objected to the 
instructions.  Relying on People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108 
(Birks), the trial court denied defendant’s request. 
In Birks, we held that a trial court cannot instruct the jury 
on lesser related offenses requested by the defendant over the 
prosecution’s objection.  (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136.)  
Defendant acknowledges this holding but argues a contrary 
conclusion is compelled by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Conde 
v. Henry (9th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 734.  That case is inapposite.  
As we have previously pointed out, Conde “involved a trial 
court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included, not a 
lesser related, offense.”  (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
154 
p. 622.)  The trial court thus correctly denied defendant’s 
request. 
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his 
request to instruct the jury on proper vicinage.  Defendant’s 
proposed instruction stated that the Dubs, Peranteau, Gerald, 
and Cosner charges could not be tried in Orange County — and 
the jury must find defendant not guilty — unless the 
prosecution proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
vicinage requirements were satisfied.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s request, explaining that proper vicinage was “a 
legal issue decided several times already.”  Defendant contends 
that the court erred by rejecting his instruction because the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case unless 
vicinage was satisfied.  However, “it is beyond dispute that a 
change of venue may be ordered in a criminal case under 
appropriate circumstances, and also beyond dispute that any 
superior court to which a felony proceeding has been transferred 
has subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding . . . .”  
(Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1097.)   
Moreover, as determined by the trial court, vicinage is a 
legal question for the court, not the jury.  Defendant argues that 
People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193 holds otherwise.  Posey 
held that venue is a question of law, to be determined by the 
court and not a question of fact for the jury.  (Id. at p. 210.)  The 
reasoning appears to rest in part on the fact that venue (unlike 
vicinage) is statutory rather than constitutional.  (Id. at p. 209 
[noting that venue is a statutory right and vicinage a 
constitutional one].)  Defendant argues that under Posey, vicinage 
is an issue of fact, rather than a legal issue, about which the jury 
should have been instructed.  Defendant is mistaken.  The core of 
Posey’s reasoning about venue — that it is not related to guilt, and 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
155 
is better determined prior to trial — applies equally to vicinage 
and suggests it is likewise a question of law to be decided by the 
court.  (Id. at pp. 209–212.)  The trial court did not err. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Motion for a Mistrial  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial after an investigator for the prosecution 
spoke with a juror. 
On April 14, 1999, Kelley informed the trial court that 
earlier that morning he and members of his staff observed 
Calaveras County Investigator Mitch Hrdlicka “having a nice, 
friendly chat” with Juror No. 174.  Kelley continued, “He was 
standing there.  They were laughing and talked.  He had his cup 
of coffee.  It was all very friendly.  And I looked at him quite 
startled.  I said, ‘Mitch, that is one of our jurors you are talking 
to.’  And his response was, and I quote, ‘I am very well aware of 
that.’ ”   Kelley requested the court inquire with Hrdlicka 
regarding the subject matter of his conversation with the juror, 
and the prosecutor agreed.  
The court called Hrdlicka to the stand and asked him the 
nature of his conversation.  Hrdlicka immediately apologized for 
his behavior.  He noted that “as probably everyone is aware,” he 
wears a unique tie to court every day.  That morning, Juror No. 
174 commented on his tie, mentioned that her fiancé would like 
it, and asked where she can buy similar ties.  He knew that the 
juror had an operation scheduled for the following week and 
asked her what her surgery was for.  She told him it was a 
shoulder surgery and because he had just had a shoulder 
replacement, they started talking about shoulder surgery.  At 
that point, Kelley appeared, and the conversation ceased. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
156 
Kelley asked Hrdlicka why he spoke to the juror.  Hrdlicka 
again apologized and stated that he had no excuse.  He knew 
that he should never have a conversation with a juror, and it 
was “poor judgment” on his behalf.  The prosecutor asked 
Hrdlicka how long the conversation lasted; he replied three 
minutes.  Hrdlicka confirmed that they only discussed ties and 
shoulder surgery and did not discuss the case.  
The court excused Hrdlicka and called Juror No. 174.  She 
explained that Hrdlicka wore unusual ties, and several jurors 
like to see what tie he would wear every day.  She noted that the 
day before he wore a light bulb tie with a pull string on it, and 
she told him the tie was “neat.”  The juror also confirmed that 
she discussed her upcoming surgery with Hrdlicka.  She said 
that Hrdlicka also told her that Stapley’s dad had two hips and 
a knee replaced and that it can take time to recover.  She told 
the court that the conversation lasted a few minutes and they 
did not discuss the case. 
Kelley asked the juror to expand on her comment about 
other jurors discussing Hrdlicka’s ties.  The juror explained, “We 
talked about different people.  We have been here so long we talk 
about how different people dress.  And he has very unusual, 
distinctive ties.  And so we usually look to see what type of tie 
he has on.”  Kelley asked if she was aware of any conversations 
between other jurors and Hrdlicka.  She replied, “A couple said, 
you know, ‘Let me see your tie.’ ”  The juror said that Hrdlicka 
will usually show them his tie, and the previous day he 
mentioned that his light bulb tie “has an actual chain.”  When 
asked how many times Hrdlicka had shown the jurors his tie, 
she guessed around 10 to 12 times. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
157 
Juror No. 174 explained that early on in the case, during 
the guilt phase, some of the ladies would look at his tie.  They 
would catch Hrdlicka as he was walking off the elevator while 
they were waiting to enter the courtroom.  The jurors did not 
initially know that he was an investigator, but after he testified, 
they realized he worked for the prosecution. 
Kelley requested an inquiry of all 12 jurors to determine if 
their interactions with Hrdlicka may have influenced them, to 
which the court agreed.  Three additional jurors, and one 
alternate juror who later got seated, stated that they had told 
Hrdlicka that they liked his tie on one or more occasion. 
A few of the jurors noticed Hrdlicka’s ties but did not have 
any conversations with Hrdlicka regarding his ties.  Some jurors 
acknowledged hearing other jurors comment about the ties to 
Hrdlicka or to each other.  A few of the jurors did not notice 
Hrdlicka’s ties or hear any comments or conversations about the 
ties.  When asked, none of the jurors said that Hrdlicka’s ties 
were discussed during deliberations or affected their ability to 
remain impartial about the case.  
After the court questioned each juror, Kelley moved for a 
mistrial of the penalty phase.  Kelley noted that Hrdlicka told 
the court that he discussed ties and shoulder surgery with Juror 
No. 174 and nothing else, but the juror told the court that 
Hrdlicka also mentioned the Stapley family and a hip 
replacement.  Kelley expressed concern that Hrdlicka did not 
tell the court the truth and argued that discussing a victim’s 
family with a juror “could be incredibly influential on the issue 
of whether or not [defendant] should receive the death penalty.”  
The prosecution agreed that Hrdlicka’s conversation about the 
Stapley family was “troubling” and requested the court recall 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
158 
Juror No. 174 to ask whether the conversation about the Stapley 
family had any effect on her deliberation.  
The court agreed that Hrdlicka committed misconduct, as 
well as Juror No. 174 for not obeying the court’s order to not 
converse with anyone involved in the case.  The court 
acknowledged that Hrdlicka wore unusual ties during the trial 
that were “obvious” and “apparent to see.”  The court did not find 
it improper for the jurors to discuss Hrdlicka’s ties amongst 
themselves but found it improper for a juror to comment to him 
about his ties.   
The court found that the misconduct fell “far short of what 
is necessary for a mistrial” because there was “absolutely no 
prejudice.”  The court said, “The only prejudice, and it is 
potential prejudice, is the conversations concerning the health 
of the parents of Mr. Stapley.”  Kelley continued to argue for a 
mistrial and insisted that removing Juror No. 174, who he 
believed to be defense prone, would cause defendant to suffer 
the consequence of the prosecution’s mistake.  Kelley requested 
that if the court removed the juror, it also instruct the jury that 
the juror was removed as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. 
When 
proceedings 
resumed 
that 
afternoon, 
the 
prosecution informed the court that a witness heard a voice from 
a telephone kiosk in the hallway say the words “San Andreas 
Investigator” and “mistrial.”  The witness then saw Juror No. 
174 walk out of the telephone kiosk area and believed it was the 
juror who had been on the phone.  The court questioned the 
witness, who confirmed what the prosecution had said.  The 
court questioned the juror, who admitted to talking on the phone 
but denied discussing the case.  She admitted, however, to 
discussing Stapley’s father’s hip surgery with other jurors 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
159 
during a lunch break.  The court questioned the three jurors and 
two alternate jurors who had eaten lunch with Juror No. 174 
that day.  None of them recalled discussing hip surgery or the 
Stapley family. 
With the parties’ consent, the court dismissed Juror No. 
174.  Although the court found it troubling, it ultimately did not 
believe the other jurors committed misconduct by commenting 
on Hrdlicka’s ties to him but did express concern with Hrdlicka 
responding.  Accordingly, the court banned Hrdlicka from the 
courthouse for the remainder of trial. 
When the jurors rejoined proceedings, the court read the 
following statement:  “After a thorough hearing into the matter, 
the court has concluded that Mitch Hrdlicka, Calaveras County 
District Attorney Investigator and witness in this case, has from 
time to time committed prosecutorial misconduct by speaking to 
jurors.  I urge you to do your best to avoid any future contact 
with all parties, witnesses and spectators in this case.”  The 
court asked the jurors if they understood and could assure him 
they would avoid future contact.  One juror asked, “Does that 
include even saying ‘good morning’?”  The court clarified that 
polite greetings were not misconduct but also “not a great idea” 
and that no juror engaged in misconduct by telling Hrdlicka that 
he had an unusual tie. 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied 
his motion for a mistrial.  The denial of a mistrial motion is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 804, 848.)   
Unauthorized contact between a juror and a witness is 
improper (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 507) and 
raises a presumption of prejudice (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
160 
Cal.4th 347, 397).  Such a presumption will be rebutted if the 
entire record indicates there is no substantial likelihood that 
one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.  
(In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296.)  Contact between a 
juror and witness, however, can be nonprejudicial if there is no 
showing that the contact related to the trial.  (Cowan, at p. 507.) 
Defendant contends the court erred because it failed to 
apply a presumption of prejudice.  Defendant, however, points 
to no place in the record that suggests the trial court failed to 
apply the law correctly.  Quite the opposite:  the trial court 
clearly stated that it found both the investigator and the juror 
committed misconduct and thoroughly questioned each juror 
and Hrdlicka to determine the extent of the conversations and 
interactions, and if there was the possibility of prejudice or bias 
amongst each juror.  
Defendant further contends the court abused its discretion 
when it found there was no prejudice arising from the 
interactions with Hrdlicka and denied defendant’s motion for a 
mistrial.  Defendant’s claim fails because there is no substantial 
likelihood that the jurors’ encounters with Hrdlicka resulted in 
any bias.  Of the 12 seated jurors and three alternates, seven 
had never spoken to or interacted with Hrdlicka.  Three of those 
seven jurors never spoke with Hrdlicka but heard other jurors 
comment in passing that they liked his ties.  Four jurors noticed 
and liked Hrdlicka’s ties but never spoke to him. 
Of those jurors who had some interaction with Hrdlicka, 
five acknowledged commenting to Hrdlicka directly regarding 
his ties, including Juror No. 174.  Juror No. 287 said “unusual 
tie” as Hrdlicka walked past him, but he did not recall if 
Hrdlicka replied and did not even know Hrdlicka’s name.  Juror 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
161 
No. 213 once asked Hrdlicka what was on his tie that day but 
did not remember if or how Hrdlicka responded.  Juror No. 263 
commented once that Hrdlicka had on a “curious tie.”  He 
responded with “nothing more than ‘thank you’ or an 
acknowledgment.”  Alternate Juror No. 157, who was seated 
after Juror No. 174’s dismissal, also told Hrdlicka that she liked 
his light bulb tie.  Hrdlicka did not respond.  Every juror 
confirmed that their interactions with Hrdlicka did not affect 
their deliberations or ability to remain impartial about the case. 
In People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, a juror engaged 
in conversation with the deceased victim’s father about both of 
them serving in the United States Marine Corps and the father’s 
upcoming surgery.  (Id. at pp. 754–755.)  We held that the 
interaction, while misconduct, was harmless.  In People v. Jones 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, a juror asked the victim’s mother if she 
was related to the victim, and a second juror told the victim’s 
husband that a former neighbor said hello.  (Id. at p. 309.)  We 
held the communications were misconduct but not egregious, 
and counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the 
jurors’ continued service.  (Id. at p. 310.)  In People v. Stewart 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, a juror told the defendant’s ex-girlfriend 
that she was beautiful.  (Id. at p. 509.)  We held the trial court 
did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on 
the basis of the misconduct.  
Although Hrdlicka’s engagement with Juror No. 174 was 
misconduct, the conduct in the present case is no more egregious 
than the conduct in these cases.  The interactions between the 
jurors and Hrdlicka were minimal and unrelated to the case, 
with most of them focused on small talk around Hrdlicka’s 
neckties, and the fairness of the trial was in no way affected by 
the misconduct.  (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
162 
117–118 [verdict will not be disturbed when misconduct is of 
such a trifling nature that it does not appear to affect the 
fairness of the trial].)  The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on lack 
of prejudice.  
B.  Absence from Hearing  
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
right to due process, right of presence, and a fair penalty trial 
by holding a hearing in his absence. 
The jury began its penalty phase deliberations on Monday, 
April 26, 1999.  The following Monday, on May 3, the trial court 
held a closed hearing.  The court informed the parties that the 
previous Friday, Juror No. 12 contacted the bailiff and told him 
that she was contacted by an individual who identified himself 
as defendant.  Defendant was not present at the hearing.  The 
court expressed a concern for how the juror would feel if 
defendant were in the courtroom, and the court wanted to hear 
from her what exactly happened the previous Friday.  Defense 
counsel agreed that defendant should not be in the courtroom.  
The court questioned Juror No. 12 regarding the phone 
call.  She explained that on Friday afternoon, she received a 
phone call and the person asked, “Is this (Juror 12)?”  She said, 
“Who is this?”  The caller said, “Well, I need to know if this is 
(Juror 12).  Then I know.”  The juror said, “Well, this is.”  The 
called replied, “This is Charles.”  At first the juror thought the 
caller was her ex-husband, who was also named Charles, and 
that maybe something was wrong.  She said, “Well who is this?”  
The caller again asked if she was Juror 12.  She again said, 
“Well, who is this?”  And he again said, “This is Charles.”  She 
said, “Charles who?  Who is this?”  The caller replied, “Are you 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
163 
the (Juror 12) that is on the jury?”  She asked the caller, “Is this 
Charles Ng?”  He said, “Oh, I am sorry.  I just wanted to tell you, 
you are very nice.”  The juror asked how he got her phone 
number, and he replied, “I had a friend help me.”  The juror told 
him that he could not call her and hung up.  She called the bailiff 
to report the incident. 
Juror No. 12 did not recognize the voice of the caller.  She 
explained that she did not pay attention at first because she 
thought the caller was someone else.  She said the voice sounded 
very quiet and like he had an accent, but she could not identify 
what kind of accent.  The court asked her opinion on her ability 
to remain objective as a juror.  She did not think it would be a 
problem and explained that the call had nothing to do with 
deliberations.  She agreed not to tell the other jurors about the 
phone call. 
The prosecution asked the trial court what time the phone 
call occurred.  The bailiff said 3:30 p.m., and that he had 
contacted the jail to determine if defendant had been on the 
phone at that time.  The sergeant he spoke with confirmed that 
defendant used the phone for two hours until approximately 
3:30 p.m.  The court told the parties that after the bailiff 
received the report from the juror, it ordered defendant not to 
have access to the telephone through the remainder of 
deliberations.   
The court asked defense counsel if he wanted time to think 
about his position and get back to the court later.  Counsel said 
he did not believe prejudice had been shown, and the jurors 
should continue to deliberate.  The prosecution agreed.  The 
court asked if they should bring defendant into the courtroom to 
apprise him of what happened.  Defense counsel stated that he 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
164 
would prefer to inform defendant himself, unless the court felt 
like it needed to do so.  The court said that if it needed to inform 
defendant directly, it would have had defendant at the hearing 
and reiterated that “it was appropriate to have this hearing 
outside of his presence.”   
The court called Juror No. 12 back into the courtroom.  The 
court told the juror that they did not know who exactly placed 
the phone call to her and asked if she could “totally disregard” 
the incident.  The court reminded the juror that if at any point 
she believed she could no longer abide by the court’s instructions 
to please let them know.  The juror said that she would be fine, 
but if she did have a problem, she would let the court know.  
The jury reached a verdict shortly after the hearing.  
Before the jury entered the courtroom, the court confirmed that 
defendant had been told about the closed hearing.  Defense 
counsel confirmed that he told defendant.  The court said, “You 
were not invited for several reasons.  One is I was concerned 
that you would react one way or another; that would create 
problems which we avoided by not having you here.  I didn’t 
want to lose a juror without good cause.  And all counsel agreed 
to the proceeding.”  Defendant replied, “Over my objection.” 
 That evening, investigators from the Orange County 
Sheriff’s Department searched defendant’s cell and found Juror 
No. 12’s home phone number.  The investigation revealed that 
defendant knew the jurors’ names, and Juror No. 12’s phone 
number was listed in the phone book.  Phone records showed 
that on the day the juror received the call, at 3:23 p.m., someone 
placed a three-minute call to her phone number from the 
“Module J vestibule” phone at the Orange County jail.  The jail’s 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
165 
logs confirmed that at the same time, defendant was using that 
phone.  
In defendant’s subsequent motion for a new trial, he 
argued that the trial court violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights by excluding him from the hearing.  In its 
opposition, the prosecution argued that defendant was barred 
from benefitting from his own wrongdoing.  The court denied 
defendant’s claim, noting that defense counsel waived 
defendant’s right to be present at the hearing and, as the 
prosecution argued, he had no right to benefit from his own 
misconduct. 
“Under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause, a 
defendant has the right to be personally present at any 
proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent 
‘interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-
examination.’  [Citations.]  The Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees the right to be present as a matter of due process at 
any ‘stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome’ and where the 
defendant’s ‘presence would contribute to the fairness of the 
procedure.’ ”  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1306.)  
We have previously held, however, that neither the state nor 
federal Constitution, nor any statutory requirement, provides a 
defendant with the right to be present at hearings or discussions 
outside the jury’s presence “on questions of law or other matters 
as to which his presence bears no reasonable, substantial 
relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.”  
(Ibid.; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855.) 
Defendant had no right to be present at the hearing on his 
phone call to Juror No. 12.  It is well settled that the removal of 
a juror is not a matter for which a defendant is entitled to be 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
166 
present.  (People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1310; see 
United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 527; People v. 
Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 435–436.)  Defendant now argues 
that if he had been present, he could have explained that he felt 
alienated by his counsel and the trial court, and that he 
responded to a smile from Juror No. 12 by reaching out to the 
one sympathetic person he saw in the courtroom.  He contends 
he would have explained that he did not call to intimidate, 
frighten, or influence the juror.  Defendant’s reasons for calling 
the juror are irrelevant, however, as any contact between 
defendant and the juror was improper.  (See People v. Harris, at 
p. 1310.)  Defendant’s absence from the hearing did not 
constitute error. 
C.  Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence  
1.  Skipper Error  
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
rights to due process and a fair penalty trial when it excluded 
mitigating evidence.  Specifically, defendant attempted to elicit 
testimony from correctional officers regarding the behavior of 
other inmates as compared to defendant’s behavior in prison. 
The defense called several witnesses to testify regarding 
defendant’s good behavior in prison, including Correctional 
Officers James Tinseth, Maurice Geddis, and Gerald Coleman.  
Tinseth was one of defendant’s “handlers” at Folsom State 
Prison, which meant he assisted with restraining defendant 
during transports from the prison to the courthouse.  Tinseth 
described the type of restraints used on defendant, including a 
“Martin chain,” which ran vertically down defendant’s back and 
then hooked into the leg chain.  The officers also used a leather 
strap that pulled his arms toward his back and was secured by 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
167 
a padlock.  Tinseth testified that defendant was always 
compliant and courteous, and he never had any trouble with 
defendant. 
Geddis testified that he was also assigned to defendant’s 
team of security escorts.  Like Tinseth, Geddis testified that 
defendant never refused a directive and was always compliant 
and courteous.  Defense counsel asked Geddis, “There had been 
other inmates during your time that you did have trouble with; 
is that correct?”  Geddis confirmed it was correct.  Counsel asked 
if when another inmate wore the Martin chains, he would still 
“act out.”  The prosecution objected on relevance grounds, and 
the trial court sustained the objection.  
 Coleman testified that he worked in the Folsom State 
Prison library from 1991 through 1995, during which time he 
came into contact with defendant.  When defendant wanted to 
use the library, two officers would escort him there.  Sometimes 
Coleman would be one of the officers to escort defendant.  
Coleman testified that defendant never acted out or caused a 
problem while walking to and from the library.  He was always 
polite and courteous.  Defense counsel asked Coleman if he had 
ever feared for his safety while escorting other inmates.  The 
prosecution objected on relevance grounds, and the trial court 
sustained the objection.  
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his 
constitutional right to present mitigating evidence.  He asserts 
the excluded testimony was necessary to show that he behaved 
well in prison because of his character, not because of the 
restraints.   
In Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, the United 
States Supreme Court held that “evidence that the defendant 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
168 
would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be 
considered 
potentially 
mitigating. 
 
Under Eddings 
[v. 
Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104], such evidence may not be 
excluded from the sentencer’s consideration.”  (Id. at p. 5, fn. 
omitted.)  The erroneous exclusion of evidence pursuant to 
Skipper does not automatically require reversal, but instead is 
reversible unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1117; see Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) 
Defendant’s argument fails on the merits.  As described 
above, the defense presented extensive testimony from several 
witnesses, including Tinseth, Geddis, and Coleman, that 
defendant was a well-behaved inmate, listened to direction, and 
never acted out.  The trial court sustained the prosecution’s 
objections to defense questions concerning the conduct of other 
inmates in the officers’ custody.  Other correctional officers 
testified that defendant was a “class A inmate,” quiet and 
respectful, and a model inmate.  Without any obvious 
comparison to defendant, evidence regarding other inmates in 
prison was irrelevant to whether defendant would pose a threat 
when incarcerated, and defendant cites no law suggesting 
otherwise.  The trial court did not exclude mitigating evidence 
under Skipper and did not abuse its discretion when it excluded 
the evidence that defendant now challenges.  
2.  Racial Discrimination  
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it excluded 
evidence that he encountered racial discrimination while 
serving in the Marine Corps. 
After defendant was arrested for breaking into the 
military armory in Hawaii in 1981, he escaped custody and fled 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
169 
to California.  Sergeant Bradley Chapline was in charge of 
defendant’s guard detail once he was returned to custody in 
Hawaii.  Chapline testified that defendant was hospitalized 
with a broken leg for several months at the army hospital before 
he could be transferred to federal prison.  Chapline explained 
that he had several conversations with defendant while 
guarding him in the hospital. 
Defense counsel asked Chapline if he ever learned that 
other guards had mistreated defendant while in the hospital.  
The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court 
sustained the objection.  He clarified that some nurses on duty 
reported incidents to him, and he in turn admonished other 
Marines that the incidents “better never happen again.”  When 
counsel asked if it was difficult for minorities to move up in rank 
in the Marines, Chapline opined that it would be difficult.  
Defendant had told Chapline that he believed his race prevented 
him from becoming a Marine officer. 
On redirect, counsel attempted to elicit testimony that 
defendant may have experienced racism while serving in the 
Marine Corps.  Counsel asked Chapline about injuries 
defendant sustained at the hands of other Marines when he was 
in the hospital.  The prosecution objected, arguing that the 
question assumed facts in evidence, called for hearsay, and 
lacked personal knowledge.  The court sustained the objection.  
Counsel asked Chapline if he had ever seen other Marines 
stabbing defendant in the feet with needles while he lay in the 
hospital.  The prosecution objected because the question 
assumed facts not in evidence, and the court sustained the 
objection.  Counsel asked Chapline if the Marines he 
admonished regarding defendant were Caucasian; Chapline 
confirmed that they were. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
170 
Defense counsel then asked, “With regard to the actual 
Marines that you had to admonish who had been guarding 
[defendant], did you see those Marines stabbing [defendant’s] 
feet with these pins?”  The prosecution again objected due to the 
question assuming facts not in evidence, and the court again 
sustained the objection. 
After Chapline finished testifying and the court excused 
the jury for an afternoon recess, defense counsel sought further 
clarification.  The court explained that his question “assumes 
that the latter part happened.  You have to lay the foundation.  
Were you there during the second shift?  No.  If yes, what did 
you observe?  Or, oh, I observed Marines sticking needles in his 
foot.  That is how you get it in.  You know he wasn’t there or you 
would have got it in.  There is a way to do it properly.”  Counsel 
replied, “Perhaps you are right, Judge.” 
Defendant argues that the trial court deprived him of due 
process and a fair penalty trial by excluding Chapline’s 
testimony regarding “racial harassment and tormenting” by 
other Marines.  He asserts this evidence was relevant to help 
explain why defendant broke into the armory and, after facing 
road blocks in the Marine Corps, why he may have attached 
himself to Lake.  Defendant’s argument is unavailing as the trial 
court did not exclude the evidence on relevance grounds but did 
so because counsel’s questions lacked a proper foundation and 
assumed facts not in evidence. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not err.  As the court 
noted, Chapline did not personally observe any mistreatment by 
other Marines and only knew what had been reported to him by 
nurses.  (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [“the testimony of a 
witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
171 
he has personal knowledge of the matter”].)  Chapline properly 
testified regarding his admonitions to the other Marines but 
could not testify regarding an incident he did not perceive 
himself.  Additionally, defendant was successful in admitting 
some evidence of racial discrimination.  Although the defense 
was unable to introduce evidence of specific mistreatment, 
Chapline did opine while testifying that it would be difficult for 
minorities to move up in rank.  Chapline also testified that 
defendant believed his race prevented him from becoming an 
officer and that the Marines he admonished for misbehaving 
were all Caucasian.  The trial court did not exclude competent 
evidence of racial discrimination or possible discrimination.13 
 
13  
Defendant makes a series of arguments concerning the 
exclusion of Chapline’s testimony for the first time in his reply 
brief, asserting that:  (1) the evidence was admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1250, which provides that evidence is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when it is offered to 
prove the declarant’s state of mind; and (2) the Eighth 
Amendment required the admission of the evidence (see Green 
v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95 [holding that a defendant’s due 
process rights at a penalty trial are violated when a trial court 
excludes “highly relevant” hearsay testimony]; see also People v. 
Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 150 [under Green, the proffered 
evidence must bear “ ‘special indicia of reliability’ ”]).  “It is 
axiomatic that arguments made for the first time in a reply brief 
will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other 
party.”  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.)  These 
claims are thus forfeited.  (See People v. Rangel (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218–1219.)  In any event, we note that 
Evidence Code section 1250 and Green address the admissibility 
of evidence that would otherwise be excluded by the hearsay 
rule.  However, the trial court here excluded Chapline’s 
testimony not solely on hearsay grounds, but also because the 
witness lacked personal knowledge and the questions assumed 
facts not in evidence. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
172 
D.  Instructional Error 
1.  Lingering Doubt  
During the penalty phase, the defense requested 
instructions on lingering doubt as a mitigating factor.  The 
prosecution objected, arguing that such an instruction is not 
required under the federal or state Constitutions and the 
concept was adequately covered in other instructions.  The trial 
court agreed and denied the defense’s request but told counsel 
that he could argue lingering doubt to the jury.  During closing 
argument, counsel argued that if the jurors had any lingering 
doubt about whether defendant was actually the killer, that 
should be given a substantial amount of weight when trying to 
decide the appropriate penalty.  
Defendant now contends the trial court erred when it 
refused to instruct the jury on lingering doubt.  We have 
repeatedly held that neither state nor federal law requires the 
trial court to instruct on lingering doubt and see no reason to 
revisit this holding now.  (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 
Cal.5th 983, 1030; People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 
346; People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 425; People v. 
Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 708.) 
2.  Aggravating Factors 
The defense asked the court to instruct the jury that it 
could impose a life sentence even if the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors.  The prosecution objected, 
arguing this was a misstatement of law.  The trial court agreed 
that the defense’s request was inconsistent with controlling 
authority.  Defense counsel asked if the prosecutor would object, 
and if the court in turn would sustain the objection, if he argued 
to the jury that they could still return a verdict of life without 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
173 
the possibility of parole if they found the aggravating factors 
substantially outweighed the mitigating factors.  The court 
confirmed that if counsel argued something inconsistent with 
the law, it would sustain an objection.  The court told counsel, 
however, that he could correctly tell the jury that they are never 
required to return a verdict of death.  
Defendant acknowledges that he is not entitled to an 
instruction that the jury can choose a life sentence when the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and thus, 
his claim fails.  (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 625–
626; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381; People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781–782.)  The trial court did not 
err when it refused to allow counsel to make such an argument.   
E.  Judicial Bias 
Defendant contends he was deprived of due process and 
fair guilt and penalty trials because of pervasive judicial bias 
and misconduct.  Defendant asserts bias from three of the judges 
who oversaw proceedings:  Judge McMartin in Calaveras 
County, Judge Fitzgerald in Orange County, and Judge Ryan in 
Orange County. 
Defendant’s claims lack merit.  He fails to demonstrate the 
presence of misconduct or bias, let alone that “any judicial 
misconduct or bias was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant 
of ‘ “a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ”  (People v. Guerra 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 (Guerra); see People v. Maciel 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 533.)  
Defendant first asserts that Judge McMartin committed 
misconduct by manipulating the selection process to send the 
case to Orange County for trial and deliberately thwarted 
defendant’s efforts for San Francisco to be considered as the 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
174 
venue.  As previously discussed, the court in Calaveras County 
did not err when it transferred the case to Orange County, nor 
did the court deliberately prevent the case from being 
transferred to San Francisco.  Defendant, therefore, cannot 
establish that Judge McMartin committed misconduct or 
exhibited bias. 
Defendant next asserts that Judge Fitzgerald was biased.  
Judge Fitzgerald was assigned to the case in October 1994, after 
it was transferred to Orange County.  The Court of Appeal 
ordered Judge Fitzgerald disqualified from the case in February 
1997.  (Ng, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 1010.)  The Court of Appeal 
explicitly did not determine whether Judge Fitzgerald was 
biased, but rather, found that the interests of justice required a 
different judge to preside over defendant’s proceedings.  (Id. at 
p. 1024.) 
The Court of Appeal’s opinion stemmed from Judge 
Fitzgerald relieving Kelley and OCPD, following a Marsden 
motion in August 1996.  One week later, defendant moved to 
reinstate OCPD as his counsel.  The prosecution also filed a 
motion to vacate the earlier order.  The court denied the request.  
Defendant sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to 
vacate its order denying his motion and reinstate the public 
defender, which the Court of Appeal denied.  We subsequently 
granted his petition for review and transferred the matter back 
to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the order 
denying mandate and to issue an alternative writ.  (Ng, supra, 
52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015.)   
After the appellate court issued an alternative writ, Judge 
Fitzgerald filed a return and a declaration explaining the 
reasons for his decision.  (Ng, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015.)  
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
175 
The Court of Appeal held that with the exception of unusual 
circumstances, “the requirement of neutrality prohibits judges 
from having a stake in the outcome of the appellate decision in 
‘their’ cases.”  (Id. at p. 1020.)  The court found it would be 
inappropriate 
to 
consider 
the 
judge’s 
return 
and 
its 
accompanying declaration.  (Id. at pp. 1020–1021.)   
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its 
discretion by relieving appointed counsel and compounded its 
error by refusing to reinstate the public defender.  (Ng, supra, 
52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1023.)   
In addressing previously filed petitions seeking review of 
orders denying motions to disqualify the judge, the appellate 
court noted that Judge Fitzgerald “had an unusual personal 
interest in handling the case.”  (Ng, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1023.)  As an example, the appellate court noted that in 
connection with a motion to change venue, Judge Fitzgerald 
said, “ ‘Candidly, this court wants to try this case.  My ego tells 
me that I’m in a better posture than anybody around to do it 
with the experience I have had.’ ”  (Ibid.)  This comment and 
comments made by the judge in connection with Marsden 
proceedings, combined with facts disclosed in previous petitions, 
led the appellate court to conclude that Judge Fitzgerald should 
be disqualified.  (Ibid.)  As noted above, however, the court did 
not make a finding of actual bias but instead concluded, because 
of a potential for a perceived appearance of impartiality, Judge 
Fitzgerald should be disqualified.  (Id. at p. 1024.) 
The decision in Ng does not support a conclusion that 
Judge Fitzgerald exhibited misconduct or bias.  A judge should 
be disqualified when “[a] person aware of the facts might 
reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
176 
impartial.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).)  
Disqualification, however, does not necessarily entail a finding 
of bias.  (See People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 996 [“a 
showing 
of 
actual 
bias 
is 
not 
required 
for 
judicial 
disqualification under the due process clause”].)  As detailed 
above, the venue motions that Judge Fitzgerald presided over 
were correctly decided.  Defendant, therefore, can point to 
nothing in the record to demonstrate that Judge Fitzgerald was 
biased or that his trial was unfair. 
Finally, defendant contends Judge Ryan’s evidentiary 
rulings consistently favored the prosecution, supporting an 
inference of judicial bias.  His claim against Judge Ryan also 
fails.  “[A] trial court’s numerous rulings against a party — even 
when erroneous — do not establish a charge of judicial bias, 
especially when they are subject to review.”  (Guerra, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 1112.)  And, as previously discussed, Judge Ryan’s 
evidentiary rulings were not erroneous nor did they indicate 
bias against the defense.   
IV.  OTHER ISSUES 
A.  Challenges to Death Penalty Law  
Defendant raises several challenges to California’s death 
penalty law that we have considered and rejected.  He provides 
no persuasive reason for us to reexamine the following 
conclusions: 
The death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to 
require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating 
factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the 
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
177 
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126 (Snow).)  These conclusions are 
not altered by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 or Ring v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584.  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 149.)  
The high court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92, 
which invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, does not 
invalidate California’s law because our sentencing scheme is 
“ ‘materially different from that in Florida.’ ”  (People v. 
Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1038; People v. Rangel (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235, fn. 16.) 
“Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the 
crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the 
death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”  (People v. 
Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.) 
“Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial 
or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.”  (Snow, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126.) 
“California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  [Citation.]  Section 190.2, 
which sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death 
may be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 
294.) 
California’s death penalty does not violate international 
law or international norms of decency.  (People v. Thomas (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 771, 837.) 
B.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends reversal is warranted because of the 
cumulatively prejudicial effect of the guilt and penalty phase 
PEOPLE v. NG 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
178 
errors.  We have assumed two errors — the court’s failure to 
hold a hearing pursuant to section 987.05 and the admission of 
Gouveia’s testimony — and found no prejudice from either; we 
further conducted a harmless error analysis as an alternate 
conclusion to two additional claims — the admission of 
Laberge’s testimony and excluded defense testimony regarding 
Lake — and concluded that defendant suffered no prejudice.  
Thus, no cumulative effect warrants reversal. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
POLLAK, J. * 
 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Ng 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S080276 
Date Filed:  July 28, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  John J. Ryan 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Eric S. Multhaup, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell and Kenneth 
N. Sokoler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Eric S. Multhaup 
35 Miller Avenue, #229 
Mill Valley, CA 94941 
(415) 381-9311 
 
Kenneth N. Sokoler 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-7751