Title: Commonwealth v. Acevedo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13131
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2023

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SJC-13131 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANGEL ACEVEDO. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     March 10, 2023. – July 12, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Third-party culprit, Prior 
misconduct.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 5, 2016. 
 
The cases were tried before Renee P. Dupuis, J. 
 
 
Ira Alkalay for the defendant. 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On December 31, 2016, Aaron Gant, Jr. 
(victim), was fatally shot in the back of his head while sitting 
in a sport utility vehicle (SUV) with three friends.  The 
Commonwealth alleged that the defendant, Angel Acevedo, and the 
codefendant, Aaron Bookman, committed the murder as part of a 
long-standing feud between gangs associated with the West End 
2 
 
and South End sections of New Bedford.  In a joint trial, a 
Superior Court jury convicted the defendant and the codefendant 
of deliberately premeditated murder in the first degree and 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  See Commonwealth v. Bookman, 
492 Mass.     (2023). 
 
The defendant raises two issues in this direct appeal.  
First, he contends that the judge erred in excluding evidence 
that the occupants of the SUV were selling drugs on the night of 
the shooting and that knives were found inside and next to the 
vehicle.  He argues that this evidence supported a third-party 
culprit defense because the shooting victims were engaged in 
risky behavior and therefore may have been attacked by an 
unnamed rival drug dealer.  It also was admissible, he argues, 
to show that police failed to investigate a potential lead.  
Second, he contends that the judge abused her discretion by 
allowing evidence that the codefendant possessed a handgun eight 
months prior to the shooting.  Finally, the defendant asks this 
court to exercise its extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to grant him a new trial or to reduce the murder 
in the first degree conviction to a lesser degree of guilt.  
Having carefully examined the record and considered the 
defendant's arguments, we conclude that there is no error and 
find no reason to disturb the verdicts. 
3 
 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found, reserving some details for later discussion of specific 
issues. 
On December 31, 2015, at 7:18 P.M., the victim was shot to 
death on Pleasant Street in the South End section of New 
Bedford.  He was seated in the rear driver's side seat of a 
maroon Mercedes SUV with three friends:  Aaron Watkins (driver), 
Louis Class (front seat passenger), and Desmond Roderick (rear 
seat passenger).1  The occupants of the SUV had grown up in the 
South End and were members of a gang associated with that 
section of the city.  At the time of the shooting, the South End 
group actively was engaged in hostilities with individuals 
affiliated with the West End section of New Bedford.  This long-
standing rivalry had resulted in instances of gang-on-gang 
violence and corresponding retribution. 
The defendant and his "cousin," the codefendant, were 
affiliated with the West End group.  This was evidenced by the 
defendant's signature on a jail "security threat group 
affiliation form" acknowledging his gang membership since 
"[c]hildhood."  The codefendant signed the same type of threat 
assessment form acknowledging affiliation with the West End 
 
1 Given that the spelling of certain names varies in the 
briefs, we use the names as they appear in the trial 
transcripts. 
4 
 
Potter Street neighborhood.  The codefendant also had a Potter 
Street "P" tattooed on his face. 
The Commonwealth introduced evidence of the defendant's 
motive to harm at least some of the occupants of the SUV.2  He 
had fought Watkins in high school, and they did not get along as 
adults.  On May 31, 2015, prior to the fatal shooting, the 
defendant had been shot in the leg while driving through the 
North End section of New Bedford.  He refused to cooperate with 
law enforcement officers investigating the incident.  Months 
later, on October 21, 2015, the defendant and his then 
girlfriend, Lorana Rivera, were ambushed in a drive-by shooting.  
He was shot in the face and had his jaw wired shut until late 
December 2015.  The defendant told medical personnel that he 
knew who shot him but would not talk to police.  Rivera, who was 
shot in the leg, identified South End group associate Rayshawn 
Lewis as the shooter.  Rivera testified that she was unable to 
recall discussing the shooter's identity with the defendant. 
The codefendant also had a history of problems with 
individuals affiliated with the South End gang.  On June 27, 
2014, he and his then girlfriend, Alicia Ryder, were inside her 
 
 
2 Notwithstanding the defendant's affiliation with the West 
End group, he had a friendly relationship with the victim.  The 
judge, at the Commonwealth's request, provided the jury with a 
transferred intent instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 
Mass. 857, 863-864 (2012). 
5 
 
home when it was "shot up."  In or about the late spring of 
2015, the victim and the victim's friends followed and watched 
the codefendant and Ryder at a restaurant and, once or twice, 
drove slowly by her house in an SUV. 
Approximately one week before the fatal shooting, in late 
December 2015, the defendant asked his sister's boyfriend, Mason 
Soto, to rent a car for him.  Soto resided in Saco, Maine, 
having moved from New Bedford.  On December 24, 2015, Soto 
rented a 2016 white Ford Fusion from a car rental office in 
Westbrook, Maine, located near the Portland Airport.  The new 
model car was equipped with a sunroof and black wheel rims and 
had a Connecticut license plate.  Soto, the only authorized 
driver on the rental agreement, paid the rental fee in cash 
supplied by the defendant.  Later that evening, the defendant 
drove the Fusion from Saco to New Bedford, a 150-mile trip. 
On December 31, 2015, the day of the shooting, the 
defendant and the codefendant telephoned or sent text messages 
to each other repeatedly throughout the day.  There was a gap in 
outgoing telephone calls and text messages for both the 
defendant and the codefendant around the time of the 7:18 P.M. 
shooting.  At 6:47 P.M., the defendant telephoned Rivera, and at 
7:19 P.M., he telephoned an individual named Tyrone Mendes.  
According to cell site location information records or cell 
6 
 
tower records, the 7:19 P.M. call registered to a cell tower 
about one-half mile away from the crime scene. 
That afternoon, the defendant and Rivera had gone shopping 
at a mall in Taunton.  A mall parking lot security camera 
recorded the defendant behind the steering wheel of a white Ford 
Fusion at around 2 P.M.  Thereafter, the defendant drove the 
same vehicle to a New Bedford barbershop at 4:30 P.M., and left 
at 5:21 P.M. 
The Commonwealth introduced additional security camera 
footage from numerous New Bedford locations depicting, with 
varying degrees of clarity, a white sedan resembling a Ford 
Fusion traveling throughout New Bedford in the early evening 
hours.  At 6:49 P.M., the defendant, wearing a red sweatshirt, 
and the codefendant, wearing a black sweatshirt, arrived at a 
liquor store on Nauset Street in New Bedford's North End.  They 
left the store minutes later, with the defendant driving and the 
codefendant in the passenger's seat. 
At 6:56 P.M., another security camera captured images of 
the same or a similar white sedan pulling into the parking lot 
of a nearby liquor store on Mount Pleasant Street.  The 
defendant got out of the driver's side, and the codefendant got 
out of the passenger's side.  The defendant and the codefendant 
ran into two friends in the liquor store, and they exchanged 
greetings and small talk.  At 7 P.M., the defendant and the 
7 
 
codefendant left the store.  Again, the defendant entered the 
driver's side of the white sedan, and the codefendant its 
passenger's side.  The defendant drove out of the parking lot 
headed toward the South End section of the city. 
A security camera mounted to a residence on Grinnell Street 
depicted a blurry image of an SUV, at around 7:15 P.M., turn 
onto Pleasant Street, near Louis Class's South End residence.  A 
white sedan followed closely behind the SUV.  A few minutes 
later, at 7:18 P.M., the New Bedford police received ShotSpotter 
acoustic alerts of multiple gunshots in the Pleasant Street 
area.3  Neighbors reported hearing gunfire, but no one had 
witnessed the shooting. 
Police responded within minutes of the alert and found 
evidence of a shooting near the intersection of Pleasant and 
Grinnell Streets.  A gray sedan parked on Pleasant Street had a 
bullet hole near the trunk on the driver's side.  There were no 
ejected shell casings found at the crime scene, suggesting that 
the rounds had been fired from a revolver. 
At 7:20 P.M., the SUV arrived at a local hospital's 
emergency department.  Watkins, Class, and Roderick got out of 
the SUV, seeking medical attention for their friend.  The victim 
 
3 A "ShotSpotter" system "identifies firearm discharges by 
sound and directs officers to the general location of the 
shots."  Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 694 (2020). 
8 
 
was unconscious and lifeless.  He had been shot in the right 
side of the back of his head and died almost immediately from 
the gunshot wound.  The medical examiner recovered a projectile 
from his body. 
Police, dispatched to the hospital for a reported shooting, 
arrived at 7:24 P.M.  The victim's friends were upset and did 
not cooperate with law enforcement officers.  Other individuals 
affiliated with the South End group arrived at the hospital.  
One of them, Larry Pina, Jr., asked Watkins, "[W]ho was it, was 
it?"  Watkins nodded his head, with his "chin [going] up and 
. . . down to [his] chest."  Another, Ceasare Rodderick, 
appeared enraged and with a loud voice stated, "[W]hat are we 
waiting for, let's go." 
At around 8:30 P.M., the defendant met Rivera in the 
parking lot of an elementary school in New Bedford where he had 
parked his vehicle (by inference, the Ford Fusion).  At 8:47 
P.M., Rivera, who was driving her mother's car, drove with the 
defendant to a supermarket to buy juice, leaving the Fusion 
behind.  From the supermarket, they went to Rivera's mother's 
home for a New Year's Eve celebration, staying until the early 
morning hours.  Driving in Rivera's mother's car, they then 
retrieved the Fusion from the school parking lot, returned 
Rivera's mother's car to her home, and drove the Fusion to a 
hotel in Seekonk, checking in at 3:29 A.M. 
9 
 
Later that morning, after checking out of the hotel, the 
defendant and Rivera traveled north to Maine to return the 
Fusion to the rental company.  The defendant, with Soto's 
assistance, exchanged the Fusion for a Chevrolet Malibu.  Rivera 
returned to New Bedford the following day.  On January 3, 2016, 
Soto drove the defendant in the Malibu from Maine to the New 
Bedford police station, where the defendant was questioned by 
New Bedford detectives.  The defendant stated that he was drunk 
on the night of the murder and that whatever his girlfriend told 
them in an earlier interview must be true. 
Police officers and crime scene technicians searched the 
SUV.  They observed three bullet holes in the rear of the 
vehicle -- one round struck the rear bumper and two rounds 
shattered the back window.  Inside the SUV, the investigators 
recovered two projectiles, one in the rear deck and the other 
imbedded in the driver's side door. 
A ballistician compared projectiles recovered from the SUV, 
the gray sedan parked on Pleasant Street, and the victim's body.  
All four projectiles were copper jacketed with consistent 
weights and had been fired from the barrel of a weapon with a 
right rifling twist and the same number of lands and grooves.  
Two of the projectiles, suitable for examination, were 
consistent with .38 caliber class ammunition.  The ballistician 
opined that the same handgun fired the projectiles recovered 
10 
 
from the gray sedan and the victim's body.  He also testified 
that .38 caliber class ammunition most often is fired from 
revolvers. 
On January 7, 2016, investigators tracked down the 2016 
white Ford Fusion that was rented by Soto and used by the 
defendant.  After Soto returned the car, another customer rented 
it in Maine and dropped it off one week later at the rental 
agency branch near Bradley International Airport in Hartford, 
Connecticut.  A police officer who retrieved the Fusion from 
Connecticut observed a burn mark on the right passenger's side 
A-pillar, which was described as the "piece of metal in between 
the windshield and the [front] door[] that the roof connects 
to."  Forensic examiners obtained positive gunshot residue 
results from stubs collected from the Fusion's interior and 
front exterior passenger's side door window frame. 
On January 19, 2016, detectives interviewed the codefendant 
at the New Bedford police headquarters.  Asked about his 
whereabouts on New Year's Eve, the codefendant stated that he 
was at his girlfriend's house from noon to 5 P.M.  The 
codefendant told the detectives that, between 6 and 6:30 P.M., 
the defendant picked him up on Myrtle Street and drove to liquor 
stores in the North End (depicted in video surveillance).  The 
defendant was driving a light-colored vehicle, which most likely 
was a rental car.  The codefendant told the detectives that the 
11 
 
defendant dropped him off at another cousin's house on Liberty 
Street at 6:30 or 7 P.M., and he stayed until ten minutes "after 
the ball dropped."  Other partygoers, however, recalled the 
codefendant arriving around 8 P.M. 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  A grand jury returned indictments 
charging the defendant and the codefendant with murder in the 
first degree (G. L. c. 265, § 1), unlawful possession of a 
firearm (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a]), and assault and battery by 
means of a firearm (G. L. c. 265, § 15E).  The defendant filed a 
motion in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from "[r]eferring 
to [a]ny firearm that is not the firearm [a]lleged to have fired 
the fatal shots."  The Commonwealth filed a number of motions in 
limine, including motions to admit evidence of the codefendant's 
possession of a firearm before and after the murder, and to 
exclude third-party culprit evidence, evidence of drugs, and 
evidence of knives found in or near the SUV.  The defendant 
filed oppositions to the Commonwealth's motions to admit 
evidence of the codefendant's possession of firearms (prior to 
and after the murder), to restrict the defense of third-party 
culprit, and to exclude evidence of drugs.4 
 
4 Although the defendant included in his record appendix 
copies of oppositions to the Commonwealth's motions to exclude 
third-party culprit evidence and evidence of drugs, these 
oppositions, as well as each certificate of service, are not 
dated and do not appear on the docket as having been filed. 
12 
 
 
The trial judge allowed the Commonwealth to introduce 
evidence of only the codefendant's prior possession of a 
firearm.  She also allowed the Commonwealth's motions to exclude 
evidence of drugs, as well as drug dealing, and the presence of 
knives in or near the SUV.  "[B]y agreement," she allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion to exclude third-party culprit evidence. 
Beginning on May 8, 2018, the defendant and the codefendant 
were tried before a Superior Court jury.  At the close of the 
evidence, the trial judge directed verdicts of not guilty for 
both the defendant and the codefendant on the charges of assault 
and battery by means of a firearm.  On June 6, 2018, the jury 
convicted the defendant and the codefendant of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, and the 
jury also convicted them of unlawful possession of a firearm.  
The defendant received a life sentence without parole for the 
murder conviction and a concurrent lesser sentence for the 
unlawful possession of a firearm conviction.  He filed a timely 
appeal. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erroneously excluded evidence that supported a third-party 
culprit defense and a Bowden defense of inadequate police 
investigation.  See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-
486 (1980).  He also challenges the judge's admission of 
evidence that the codefendant possessed a firearm eight months 
13 
 
prior to the murder.  Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise 
our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order 
a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt as to his 
conviction of murder in the first degree.  For the reasons 
discussed infra, we affirm the defendant's convictions and 
decline to exercise our authority under § 33E. 
 
a.  Evidence of third-party culprit or inadequate police 
investigation.  Minutes after the shooting, police secured the 
SUV parked at the entrance to the hospital's emergency 
department.  The engine was running, and all four doors were 
wide open.  Inside the SUV, officers subsequently found a bag 
containing twenty-eight and one-half grams of marijuana on the 
floor of the rear passenger compartment.  They also found two 
folding knives, one located inside the SUV and the other on the 
ground a few feet from the rear passenger's side door where the 
SUV had been parked.  Both knives were closed in a folded 
position.  In addition, a crime scene investigator collected the 
victim's clothing at the hospital and discovered, inside a pants 
pocket, plastic baggies containing a substance, believed to be 
heroin, with a total weight of over ten grams. 
 
The Commonwealth moved, in limine, to exclude evidence 
related to drug dealing, the drugs found in the SUV and the 
victim's clothing, and the two knives.  It argued that there was 
"no relevance, materiality or nexus" between this evidence and 
14 
 
the murder.  The Commonwealth also requested that the defendant, 
prior to introducing evidence of a potential third-party 
culprit, proffer to the judge the basis for such evidence and 
"'substantial connecting links' to the crime." 
 
In response, the defendant filed an opposition5 representing 
that "Aaron Watkins was a known drug dealer in New Bedford" who 
had been arrested for smuggling a large quantity of narcotics 
onto Martha's Vineyard in 2015.  The other occupants of the SUV 
were "similarly notorious."  The evidence was admissible, he 
argued, because "[t]he police are aware that [the occupants] 
have enemies.  Counsel must be able to explore such in order to 
provide a defense."  He argued, in the alternative, that 
evidence of drug dealing might be admissible to "set up a Bowden 
defense" if investigators failed to investigate the possibility 
that the victim was shot by unnamed enemy drug dealers. 
 
Prior to jury selection, the judge conducted a hearing on 
the admissibility of the drugs and third-party culprit evidence.  
The defendant added that evidence of drug dealing was admissible 
to show that the occupants of the SUV "were leading a lifestyle 
that is not conducive to health," and that he should be 
permitted to ask the police officers and other witnesses "who 
these people [(the occupants of the SUV)] were."  This evidence, 
 
5 See note 4, supra. 
15 
 
he contended, countered the Commonwealth's theory that the 
murder was motivated by gang rivalry.  He did not press his 
alternative argument that any failure to explore third-party 
culprit evidence would cast doubt on the adequacy of the police 
investigation. 
 
The judge allowed the Commonwealth's motions in limine to 
exclude evidence of drug dealing, and the drugs found in the SUV 
and the victim's clothing, without prejudice, "until such time 
the defendants establish that there's some relevance to this 
particular homicide."  The judge also allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion in limine to exclude third-party culprit evidence and 
evidence of the knives found inside and near the SUV.  Because 
the exclusion of third-party culprit evidence is an issue of 
constitutional dimension, we conduct a de novo review of the 
judge's decision.  Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66-67 
(2004). 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge 
erroneously thwarted his ability to "expose the role that New 
Bedford's drug trafficking trade may have played in the murder 
by introducing evidence that police officers found a large 
quantity of drugs in the victim's car."  The exclusion of this 
evidence, he argues, "deprived the defense of the plausible 
16 
 
alternative theory that rival drug dealers were responsible for 
the murder."  We disagree.6 
 
"Third-party culprit evidence is 'a time-honored method of 
defending against a criminal charge.'"  Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800 (2009).  A defendant, therefore, 
"may introduce evidence that tends to show that another person 
committed the crime or had the motive, intent, and opportunity 
to commit it" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Smith, 461 
Mass. 438, 445 (2012).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2023) 
("Evidence that a third party committed the crimes charged 
 
 
6 For the first time on appeal, the defendant asserts that 
further "excluded" evidence demonstrated that the occupants of 
the SUV "had other adversaries in the city."  This evidence, he 
argues, consisted of charges pending, at the time of trial, 
against Class (the front seat passenger), including a 2016 
arrest for the murder of a West End group associate, Mateo 
Morales.  This murder occurred approximately eight months after 
the victim's homicide.  At trial, the defendant did not argue 
that the pending murder charge constituted evidence of another 
perpetrator.  Instead, he contended that the evidence was 
admissible to demonstrate the bad character of the occupants of 
the SUV, so that the jurors "know . . . who these people were."  
The defendant having failed to raise the third-party culprit 
issue in the trial court, we limit our review to determining 
whether the exclusion of this evidence created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).  We conclude that it did not.  
The defendant did not provide the judge with an adequate offer 
of proof establishing that Class's pending criminal charges were 
evidence that "other adversaries" were responsible for the 
shooting.  In addition, the Commonwealth contended that Class 
killed Morales in retaliation for the victim's murder.  The 
pending charges, therefore, may have bolstered the 
Commonwealth's theory that the West End and South End gangs were 
engaged in cycles of retaliatory violence. 
17 
 
against the defendant, or had the motive, intent, and 
opportunity to commit the crimes, is admissible provided that 
the evidence . . . is relevant, is not too remote or 
speculative, and will not tend to prejudice or confuse the 
jury").  "We have given wide latitude to the admission of 
relevant evidence that a person other than the defendant may 
have committed the crime charged.  If the evidence is of 
substantial probative value, and will not tend to prejudice or 
confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor of admissibility" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Smith, supra. 
 
The defendant's ability to mount a third-party culprit 
defense is not without limits.  First, the proffered evidence 
"must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense 
raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or speculative" 
(citation omitted).  Smith, 461 Mass. 445-446.  See Commonwealth 
v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 532 (2021) (introduction of third-
party culprit evidence subject to ordinary considerations of 
relevance).  Second, where the proffered evidence is hearsay, 
not subject to another exception, it is admissible only if it 
"is otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse 
the jury, and there are other 'substantial connecting links' to 
the crime" (citation omitted).  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 
801.  "Without these safeguards, 'the admission of feeble third-
party culprit evidence poses a risk of unfair prejudice to the 
18 
 
Commonwealth, because it inevitably diverts jurors' attention 
away from the defendant on trial and onto the third party, and 
essentially requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the third-party culprit did not commit the 
crime.'"  Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 Mass. 372, 383 (2022), 
quoting Silva-Santiago, supra. 
 
We conclude that the judge properly excluded the proffered 
third-party culprit evidence consisting of drug dealing by the 
occupants of the SUV, and the drugs found in the SUV and the 
victim's clothing.  There was nothing more than rank speculation 
that the victim was shot by an unnamed rival drug dealer as a 
consequence of leading an unhealthy "lifestyle."  This court 
previously has considered and rejected the proposition that a 
victim's status as a drug dealer, standing alone, provides a 
ready-made third-party culprit defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 630 (2017) (judge properly rejected as 
pure speculation theory that unknown rival drug dealers had 
motive to kill victim, in absence of any further evidence).  See 
also Andrade, 488 Mass. at 533 (third-party culprit defense 
based on possible rival gang members living in vicinity of 
shooting "was speculative at best"); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
487 Mass. 265, 268 & n.3 (2021) (evidence of purported third-
party culprit's intent and motive to kill victim excluded as 
impermissibly speculative).  The defendant is unable to "escape 
19 
 
the consequences" of a vague third-party culprit proffer.  
Smith, 461 Mass. at 447. 
 
The judge also properly excluded evidence that knives, in 
folded positions, were found in and near the SUV.  Discussing 
the possible relevance of the knives, the judge observed that 
this is "an identification case" and "isn't a self-defense 
case."  Counsel for the codefendant conceded that the knives 
were not relevant, stating:  "There's no use [of the knives].  
There's no flashing."  The defendant responded that the knives 
should be admitted in evidence because "if the car was searched, 
[the jury] . . . should . . . know what was in the car."  This 
argument was a far cry from using the presence of the knives in 
and around the SUV to point the finger of blame at another 
culprit. 
 
We next address the defendant's claim that evidence of drug 
dealing was admissible as part of a Bowden defense.  Unlike the 
exclusion of third-party culprit evidence, the exclusion of 
Bowden evidence "is not constitutional in nature and therefore 
is examined under an abuse of discretion standard."  Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 804 n.26.  "Before the introduction of 
such evidence, the judge should conduct a voir dire hearing to 
determine whether the third-party culprit information had been 
furnished to the police, and whether its probative value is 
20 
 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Steadman, 489 Mass. at 385. 
 
The defendant, in pretrial hearings, did not argue that 
police unreasonably failed to investigate the possibility that 
the victim had been attacked by rival drug dealers.  He also did 
not object to the judge's ruling excluding the evidence on that 
basis.  This raises the issue whether the defendant brought the 
alleged impending error to the judge's attention so as to 
provide the court with an opportunity to correct it.  See 
Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 138 (2018) (discussing 
adequacy of objection to preserve issue for appellate review).  
Where the error is unpreserved, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
Here, we need not decide whether the defendant's claim of 
error was preserved, because we conclude that there was no 
error.  The defendant's rival drug dealer theory, which was "no 
more than speculation and conjecture," did little to cast doubt 
on the adequacy of the police investigation.  Martinez, 487 
Mass. at 271.  "It therefore did not have 'sufficient indicia of 
reliability'" to qualify as Bowden evidence (citation omitted).  
Id. 
 
b.  Prior possession of firearm.  The defendant's second 
claim of error focuses on the judge's decision to allow the 
21 
 
introduction of testimony that the codefendant possessed a 
firearm eight months before the shooting.  The Commonwealth 
filed a motion in limine to permit the codefendant's former 
girlfriend to testify that, in the spring of 2015, while they 
were living in Florida, she observed a gun resembling a revolver 
tucked in the codefendant's waistband.  The absence of shell 
casings at the crime scene, the Commonwealth argued, suggested 
that a revolver was used. 
 
The defendant sought to exclude the testimony as improper 
propensity evidence.  He argued that the codefendant's 
possession of a firearm "has no probative value and the 
potential for unfair prejudice is great."  According to the 
defendant, the firearm had no connection to the facts of the 
case and was excluded as the murder weapon.  The defendant also 
raised the possibility of "guilt by association if [the 
codefendant's] gun possession[] [is allowed] to be used against 
[the defendant]."  Evidence of the codefendant's possession of a 
firearm, he argued, "will give the inaccurate impression that 
[he] has a similar relationship with firearms.  The prejudicial 
evidence will taint the jury." 
 
The judge ruled that the evidence of a firearm possessed by 
the codefendant eight months before the murder was admissible.  
In reaching this conclusion, the judge found that the firearm 
"hasn't been ruled out as the murder weapon," and that the 
22 
 
probative value of such evidence outweighed the risk of unfair 
prejudice.  A judge's decision to admit prior bad act evidence 
is "not disturbed absent palpable error" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 532-533 (2017).  See 
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 (2015); Commonwealth 
v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 478 (2010). 
 
Evidence is not admissible if its purpose is solely to 
establish the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit 
the charged offense.  Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 456 
(2016).  Evidence of prior misconduct may be admissible, 
however, to show that the defendant had the means to commit the 
crime.  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  A 
judge has the discretion to allow the Commonwealth to introduce 
evidence of a weapon that "could have been used in the course of 
a crime," even without direct proof that the particular weapon 
was in fact used in the commission of the crime (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 424 (2020).  
See Holley, 478 Mass. at 532; Corliss, 470 Mass. at 449-450.  
"Nonetheless, '[e]ven if the evidence is relevant to one of 
these other purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant.'"  Pierre, supra at 424-425, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2). 
23 
 
 
Here, the defendant argues that the evidence "at most" 
pointed to the codefendant's familiarity with weapons.  We do 
not agree with the defendant's assessment of the probative value 
of this evidence.  The judge's finding that the firearm had not 
been "ruled out as the murder weapon" is supported by the 
following evidence.  First, approximately eight months before 
the murder, while the codefendant and Ryder were living in 
Florida, Ryder observed a black handgun tucked in the 
codefendant's pants when he removed his shirt at a cookout.  She 
also observed the firearm still tucked in the codefendant's 
pants later that same day while they were in their house.  The 
codefendant explained that it was his friend's gun and that he 
had obtained it "[f]or protection."  Her description of the 
firearm included a reference to a "spinning thing," permitting 
the inference that it was a revolver (characterized by its 
distinctive revolving cylinder).  Second, the projectiles found 
in the SUV were consistent with .38 caliber class ammunition, 
which commonly is fired from revolvers.  Third, investigators 
responded within minutes to the shooting, searched the area with 
a canine trained to detect ballistics evidence, and did not 
locate ejected shell casings.  A revolver retains spent casings 
within the firearm, unlike a semiautomatic pistol that ejects 
casing through a port when firing.  The "evidence was relevant 
as a link in tending to prove that the defendant committed the 
24 
 
crimes charged" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156-157 (2014). 
 
The defendant further argues that the evidence was not 
admissible against the defendant because of the risk of guilt by 
association.  He asked the judge to instruct the jury that "if 
there's evidence against one person, it shouldn't be taken as 
against the other one." 
 
The judge was not required to instruct the jury that the 
firearm evidence was admissible solely against the codefendant.  
In declining the defendant's proposed instruction, the judge 
reasoned that the Commonwealth had introduced sufficient 
evidence to establish that the defendant and the codefendant 
were accomplices in the murder.7  A jury could have found, based 
on the evidence reviewed by the judge, that the defendant and 
the codefendant had different roles in the shooting --the 
defendant drove the Ford Fusion rented in Maine while the 
codefendant fired a gun from the passenger's side window. 
 
 
7 The judge instructed the jury that other evidence of 
uncharged misconduct, such as gang membership, was admissible on 
the "limited issues of the defendant's state of mind . . . [and] 
motive" but "may not be used . . . to infer that either of the 
defendants is of bad character or has a propensity to commit the 
crimes charged."  There was no request for a similar instruction 
limiting evidence of the codefendant's prior possession of a 
firearm to the issue whether the codefendant, or the defendant 
as a joint venturer, had the means to commit the crime, and not 
for propensity purposes.  The judge was not required to provide 
such an instruction.  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 157; Commonwealth 
v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 780 (1997). 
25 
 
 
In these circumstances, evidence that the codefendant had 
the means to commit the crime (i.e., possessed a revolver) was 
admissible against his accomplice.  For example, in Commonwealth 
v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 855, 869-873 (2021), we considered the 
admissibility of photographs of weapons, including a machete, 
cleavers, and knives, found in the codefendant's apartment a few 
weeks after gruesome murders where the victims' bodies were 
dismembered.  The defendant argued that the judge's decision to 
admit the photographs in evidence in his separate trial 
constituted an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 866, 872.  Finding 
no abuse of discretion, we noted that certain weapons "were 
consistent with the tools used to dismember the victims, and 
could have served as the means to accomplish the dismemberment."  
Id. at 872.  "Thus, photographs of the machete and cleavers were 
admissible because these weapons," like the revolver possessed 
by the codefendant eight months before the shooting, "could have 
been used in the commission of the crimes."  Id. at 872-873. 
 
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that there was no 
abuse of discretion by the judge in admitting evidence of the 
codefendant's prior possession of a firearm. 
 
c.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to order a new trial 
26 
 
or to reduce the degree of guilt as to the conviction of murder 
in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.