Title: Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S262699
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
PAMELA POLLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents.  
 
S262699 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B294872 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC676917 
 
 
July 26, 2021 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.   
 
1 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
S262699 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Plaintiff 
Pamela 
Pollock 
is 
a 
customer 
service 
representative at defendant Tri-Modal Distribution Services, 
Inc. (Tri-Modal), a corporation that ships freight by truck.  She 
alleges that Tri-Modal passed her over for several promotions in 
part because she refused to have sex with defendant Michael 
Kelso, Tri-Modal’s executive vice-president.  We granted review 
to address two questions.  First, when does the statute of 
limitations begin to run in a failure to promote case brought 
under the harassment provision of the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, §§ 12940, subd. (j), 12960)?  We 
hold that such a FEHA claim accrues, and thus the statute of 
limitations begins to run, at the point when an employee knows 
or reasonably should know of the employer’s allegedly unlawful 
refusal to promote the employee. 
Second, 
does 
Government 
Code 
section 12965, 
subdivision (b)’s directive that a prevailing FEHA defendant 
“shall not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the 
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, 
or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so,” 
apply to an award of costs on appeal?  The answer is yes.  The 
Court of Appeal in this case erred in awarding costs on appeal 
to defendants without first finding that Pollock’s underlying 
claim was objectively groundless.  
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
I. 
Kelso initiated a dating relationship with Pollock in 2014.  
He wanted the relationship to become sexual, but Pollock 
refused and ended the relationship in 2016.  In this action, 
Pollock alleges that Tri-Modal and Kelso denied her a series of 
promotions even though she was the most qualified candidate, 
and that her refusal to have sex with Kelso was a substantial 
factor motivating those adverse employment actions.  On 
April 18, 2018, she filed an administrative complaint with the 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), alleging 
quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA. 
Although Pollock’s administrative complaint challenged 
the promotion of several individuals, this appeal concerns the 
promotion that went to Leticia Gonzalez.  Gonzalez received and 
accepted an offer of promotion in March 2017, and the promotion 
took effect on May 1, 2017.  There is no evidence as to whether 
or when Tri-Modal notified Pollock that she did not receive the 
promotion that went to Gonzalez.  And there is no evidence that 
Pollock knew or had reason to know that Gonzalez was offered 
the promotion and accepted it in March 2017. 
The March 2017 and May 2017 dates are relevant because 
when Pollock filed her administrative complaint, Government 
Code section 12960, former subdivision (d) required litigants 
seeking relief under the FEHA to file an administrative 
complaint with the DFEH within one year “from the date upon 
which the alleged unlawful practice . . . occurred.”  (All 
undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.)  
If the failure to promote “occurred” on May 1, 2017, as Pollock 
argues, then her April 2018 administrative complaint was 
timely filed.  If the failure to promote “occurred” in March 2017, 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
as Kelso argues, then her April 2018 administrative complaint 
was filed one month too late. 
The trial court concluded that the failure to promote 
occurred in March 2017, when Gonzalez was offered the 
promotion and accepted it.  Because Pollock did not dispute that 
Gonzalez received and accepted the promotion offer in 
March 2017, the court found no triable issue of fact as to Kelso’s 
statute of limitations defense and granted his motion for 
summary judgment.  
The Court of Appeal agreed that Pollock’s claim was time-
barred.  (Ducksworth v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services (2020) 
47 Cal.App.5th 532, 545–547 (Ducksworth); the named plaintiff, 
Bonnie Ducksworth, is not a party to this appeal.)  It explained 
that “[t]he statute of limitations for a failure to promote runs 
from when the employer tells employees they have been given 
(or denied) a promotion.  That date is key, and not the date when 
the promoted worker actually starts the new work.”  (Id. at 
p. 546.)  Construing the term “occurred” in section 12960, the 
Court of Appeal said that “[l]ogically and thus textually, an 
employer injures the employee by denying a deserved promotion 
as an instrument of sexual harassment.  That moment ‘occurred’ 
when Tri-Modal allegedly did not promote the deserving Pollock 
because of sexual harassment.  That was in March 2017.  So 
Pollock’s injury ‘occurred’ in March 2017, according to the plain 
meaning of the word ‘occurred.’  [¶] This definition of ‘occurred’ 
is simple and straightforward and thus desirable and correct.”  
(Id. at pp. 546–547.) 
After concluding that the trial court properly granted 
Kelso’s summary judgment motion and the summary judgment 
motions of two other defendants, the Court of Appeal awarded 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
costs on appeal to all three defendants.  (Ducksworth, supra, 
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.)  The court did not find, as a predicate 
to awarding costs, that Pollock’s underlying claim “was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought” or that 
she “continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”  (§ 12965, 
subd. (b).)  Pollock petitioned for rehearing on the award of costs, 
and the Court of Appeal summarily denied her petition.   
We granted review.   
II. 
We begin with the statute of limitations.  A statute of 
limitations “does not begin to run until the cause of action 
accrues,” and a cause of action accrues at the moment when the 
party alleging injury is entitled to “ ‘ “begin and prosecute an 
action thereon.” ’ ”  (Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 479, 487 (Romano).)  An employee who wishes to file 
suit under the FEHA “must exhaust the administrative remedy 
provided by the statute by filing a complaint with the” DFEH, 
“and must obtain from the [DFEH] a notice of right to sue.”  
(Romano, at p. 492.)  “The timely filing of an administrative 
complaint” before the DFEH “is a prerequisite to the bringing of 
a civil action for damages.”  (Ibid.)   
At the time of the alleged misconduct here, the FEHA 
provided that no administrative complaint alleging a violation 
of its provisions could be filed with the DFEH “after the 
expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged 
unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.”  (§ 12960, 
former subd. (d).)  The current statute uses virtually identical 
language but allows for a period of three years.  (§ 12960, 
subd. (e).)  This requirement is “[t]he statute of limitations for 
FEHA actions.”  (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
798, 811 (Richards).)  The question is whether Tri-Modal’s 
allegedly unlawful refusal to promote Pollock “occurred” within 
the then-applicable one-year statute of limitations period.  
Pollock says Tri-Modal’s failure to promote her occurred on 
May 1, 2017, the effective date of Gonzalez’s promotion.  Kelso, 
echoing the Court of Appeal, says the promotion denial occurred 
in March 2017, when Tri-Modal offered the promotion to 
Gonzalez and she accepted.  We conclude that neither is correct. 
A. 
At the outset, we note that Pollock’s failure to promote 
claim was pleaded as a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim 
under section 12940, subdivision (j), not as a discrimination 
claim 
under 
section 
12940, 
subdivision 
(a). 
 
FEHA 
discrimination claims focus on the conduct of employers.  
(§ 12940, subd. (a) [it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or 
an employer . . . to discriminate against [a] person in 
compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” on the basis of a protected characteristic, subject 
to certain exceptions].)  By contrast, FEHA harassment claims 
focus on the conduct of employers and the conduct of “any other 
person.”  (§ 12940, subd. (j).) 
Our precedent explains that the primary difference 
between discrimination claims and harassment claims is that 
discrimination claims “address[] only explicit changes in the 
‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ [citation]; that 
is, changes involving some official action taken by the employer.”  
(Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706 (Roby), 
italics added by Roby.)  “In the case of an institutional or 
corporate employer, the institution or corporation itself must 
have taken some official action with respect to the employee, 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, adverse job 
assignment, significant change in compensation or benefits, or 
official disciplinary action.”  (Ibid.)  Harassment claims, on the 
other hand, “focus[] on situations in which the social 
environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the 
harassment . . . communicates an offensive message to the 
harassed employee.”  (Ibid.)  Such conduct becomes actionable 
as quid pro quo harassment when, as alleged in this case, “ ‘ “a 
term of employment is conditioned upon submission to 
unwelcome sexual advances . . . .” ’ ”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043 (Hughes); cf. ibid. [harassing conduct also 
actionable as hostile work environment when so pervasive or 
severe that it “ ‘ “alter[s] the conditions of employment and 
create[s] an abusive work environment” ’ ”].)  In sum, 
“discrimination refers to bias in the exercise of official actions 
on behalf of the employer, and harassment refers to bias that is 
expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in 
the workplace.”  (Roby, at p. 707.) 
“The FEHA’s distinction between discrimination and 
harassment does not mean that harassment claims are 
relegated to a lower status.”  (Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 707.)   
To the contrary, “an aggrieved employee can obtain full 
compensation for any resulting injury,” whether the alleged 
unlawful 
employment 
practice 
at 
issue 
constitutes 
discrimination, harassment, or both.  (Ibid.)  An employee who 
is the victim of discrimination based on some official action, such 
as a failure to promote, can “also be the victim of harassment” 
based on the same or similar underlying conduct.  (Ibid.)   
Indeed, “[a]lthough discrimination and harassment are 
separate wrongs, they are sometimes closely interrelated, and 
even overlapping, particularly with regard to proof.”  (Roby, 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 707.)  In a case where a supervisor 
threatens to deny an employee a promotion unless the employee 
provides the supervisor with sexual favors and the threat is 
realized after the employee refuses, the aggrieved employee can 
bring suit against both the employer and the supervisor.  The 
cause of action against the employer may take the form of a 
section 
12940, 
subdivision (a) 
discrimination 
claim, 
a 
subdivision (j) harassment claim, or both.  The cause of action 
against the supervisor would take the form of a subdivision (j) 
harassment claim.  In such a case, the promotion decision itself 
“constitute[s] the evidentiary basis of the harassment cause of 
action, because the supervisor used [an] official action[] as [a] 
means of conveying his offensive message.”  (Roby, at p. 708.)  In 
other words, sometimes “the hostile message that constitutes 
the harassment is conveyed through official employment 
actions, and therefore evidence that would otherwise be 
associated with a discrimination claim can form the basis of a 
harassment claim.”  (Id. at p. 708.)  As noted, a supervisor can 
be liable for harassment but not discrimination; the Legislature 
did not make co-employees liable under the FEHA’s 
discrimination provision.  (§ 12940, subd. (a).) 
With this backdrop in mind, we note there are two ways to 
understand a quid pro quo harassment claim.  We express no 
view on whether one or both views are correct; our case law has 
not addressed this issue, and it was not briefed by the parties 
here.  One view is that a quid pro quo harassment claim targets 
essentially the same unlawful conduct as a hostile work 
environment claim:  the communication of an offensive message 
in the workplace.  Hostile work environment harassment occurs 
when a sufficiently severe or pervasive offensive message is 
communicated to the aggrieved employee in the workplace 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
(Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1043); a quid pro quo 
harassment claim challenging an official employment action can 
be understood to target the offensive message conveyed by that 
action — namely, the message that an employment benefit has 
been conditioned on submission to unwanted sexual advances. 
Alternatively, quid 
pro 
quo 
harassment may 
be 
understood as the very act of conditioning an employment 
benefit on submission to unwanted sexual advances.  The notion 
is that the act itself comprises a distinct wrong, separate and 
apart from communication of an offensive message in the 
workplace.  On this view, a quid pro quo harassment claim 
alleging unlawful denial of a promotion directly challenges the 
denial as based on forbidden considerations; the promotion 
denial does not play a meaningfully different role from the one 
it would play in a discrimination lawsuit brought against an 
employer. 
In this case, we are addressing a quid pro quo sexual 
harassment claim that Pollock raised against Kelso, her 
supervisor and the executive vice-president of Tri-Modal.  Our 
task is to determine when the actionable harassment “occurred” 
within the meaning of section 12960, former subdivision (d).  
Under either conception of quid pro quo harassment set forth 
above, the focus of our statute of limitations analysis is on the 
employment action itself.  Pollock’s claim can be understood to 
mean that an offensive message was allegedly communicated 
through an official employment action or that the official 
employment action allegedly constitutes Kelso’s act of 
conditioning a job benefit (i.e., a promotion) on her submission 
to his unwanted sexual advances.  Either way, our analysis 
must focus on when the promotion denial occurred. 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
B. 
As a textual matter, it is reasonable to say that a failure 
to promote has “occurred” when the person seeking the 
promotion has been informed or is otherwise put on notice that 
he or she will not receive the promotion.  But there are other 
plausible understandings of when a failure to promote has 
“occurred,” such as the moment when the employer decides not 
to promote the aggrieved employee or when the employer 
decides to promote someone else.  The term “occurred,” by itself, 
is susceptible to more than one interpretation. 
Our task in construing any statute is “ ‘to determine the 
Legislature’s intent and give effect to the law’s purpose.’ ”  
(Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 633–634.)  
When enacting the FEHA, “the Legislature spoke at length 
about its purposes.”  (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 203, 223.)  Section 12920 explains:  “It is hereby 
declared as the public policy of this state that it is necessary to 
protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons 
to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or 
abridgment on account of . . . sex,” and “[i]t is recognized that 
the 
practice 
of 
denying 
employment 
opportunity 
and 
discriminating in the terms of employment for [that reason] 
foments domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of the 
fullest utilization of its capacities for development and 
advancement, and substantially and adversely affects the 
interests of employees, employers, and the public in general.” 
The Legislature further declared that in order to eliminate 
discrimination and harassment in the workplace, “it is 
necessary to provide effective remedies that will both prevent 
and deter unlawful employment practices and redress the 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
adverse effects of those practices on aggrieved persons.”  
(§ 12920.5.)  It framed “[t]he opportunity to seek, obtain, and 
hold employment without” experiencing discrimination or 
harassment as a “civil right,” and instructed that the FEHA 
“shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of [its] 
purposes.”  (§§ 12921, subd. (a), 12993, subd. (a).) 
The Court of Appeal took the view, adopted by Kelso here, 
that “according to the plain meaning of the word ‘occurred,’ ” 
Pollock’s injury occurred when Tri-Modal decided not to 
“promote the deserving Pollock because of sexual harassment.”  
(Ducksworth, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.)  This reading of 
“occurred” is not unreasonable.   But it includes no mention of 
notice to the employee.  The Court of Appeal’s holding would 
presumably allow an employer or supervisor to decide not to 
promote an employee but never inform the employee of that 
decision, and then later rely on the employer’s or supervisor’s 
own record of when the decision was made to assert that the 
limitations period for challenging the decision has expired.  This 
is at odds with the principle that “section 12960 should not be 
interpreted to impose serious practical difficulties on an 
employee’s ability to vindicate” the right to hold employment 
without experiencing discrimination or harassment “if it can be 
reasonably interpreted otherwise.”  (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 821; see People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 50 
[“The words of a statute must be construed in context, keeping 
in mind the statutory purpose.”].) 
“In order to carry out the purpose of the FEHA to 
safeguard [this right], the limitations period set out in the 
FEHA should be interpreted so as to promote the resolution of 
potentially meritorious claims on the merits.”  (Romano, supra, 
14 Cal.4th at pp. 493–494.)  We have difficulty seeing how it 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
would serve the goal of promoting resolution of potentially 
meritorious claims to hold that the limitations period for a 
harassment claim based on a failure to promote may start to run 
without any notice of the promotion denial to the aggrieved 
employee.  The better view, in light of the FEHA’s purposes, is 
that such a claim does not accrue, and the limitations period 
does not begin to run, until an aggrieved employee knows or 
reasonably should know of the employer’s decision not to 
promote him or her. 
Aspects of the Court of Appeal’s opinion implicitly 
recognize the importance of notice.  At one point, the court said 
that “[t]he statute of limitations for a failure to promote runs 
from when the employer tells employees they have been given 
(or denied ) a promotion.”  (Ducksworth, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 546, italics added.)  In light of this statement, it is unclear 
why the court focused on “when Tri-Modal offered and Gonzalez 
accepted the promotion” (ibid.) instead of when Tri-Modal told 
Pollock she had been denied the promotion. 
Toward the end of its opinion, the Court of Appeal posed a 
hypothetical in which “Kelso would tell Pollock [in March 2017], 
‘Today I am giving this promotion to someone else, even though 
you deserve it, because you rejected my sexual advances.’  Such 
a candid admission would describe grossly illegal discrimination 
that ‘occurred’ in March 2017, when Kelso denied Pollock a 
benefit she deserved because Kelso wanted sex from her and she 
would not give it.  So that date triggered the one-year clock.  
That Kelso allegedly was less than candid would not change 
anything fundamental about this analysis.”  (Ducksworth, 
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.)  Kelso need not have spelled 
out an illicit reason for giving the promotion to someone else for 
the clock to start running.  (See Williams v. City of Belvedere 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 84, 92–93 (City of Belvedere); post, at 
p. 17.)  But a key fact in the hypothetical is that Kelso informed 
Pollock of his decision not to promote her.  The Court of Appeal 
did not elucidate the full import of its hypothetical when it held 
that the moment of injury “ ‘occurred’ ” simply when Tri-Modal 
decided not to promote Pollock.  (Ducksworth, at p. 546.)  “To the 
extent [Kelso] may be understood to ask this court to adopt a 
rule that discourages lawsuits alleging wrongful [failure to 
promote] by setting the statute of limitations to run at a time 
that makes it inconvenient or impossible for the employee to 
bring a lawsuit, we decline to do so.  We do not view the statute 
of limitations as properly performing such a function.”  
(Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 500.) 
C. 
The parties do not cite, and we have not found, any 
published authorities on the meaning of “occurred” in 
section 12960 when the alleged unlawful practice involves quid 
pro quo harassment based on a failure to promote.  In Romano, 
we addressed the meaning of “occurred” in a FEHA wrongful 
discharge action where the employer notified the plaintiff 
William Romano, two and a half years before the actual 
termination, that he would be terminated.  We held that the 
limitations period began to run at the time of actual termination 
rather than at the time of notification.  (Romano, supra, 
14 Cal.4th at p. 503.)  If an “administrative complaint must be 
filed within one year ‘after’ the unlawful practice — here, a 
discharge — ‘occurred,’ then for the purpose of that complaint, 
the administrative cause of action must accrue and the statute 
of limitations must run from the time of actual termination.  It 
would not run from the earlier date of notification of discharge, 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
because on that date the unlawful practice (that is, the 
discharge) had not yet ‘occurred.’ ”  (Id. at p. 493.) 
Pollock contends that under Romano, the limitations 
period for her harassment claim did not begin to run until 
Gonzalez’s promotion took effect.  But this conflates a promotion 
with a failure to promote.  Consistent with Romano, a promotion 
may be said to occur when an employee begins working in the 
new position; until that point, no promotion has occurred, even 
if the employee has been selected for promotion.  But an 
employer’s refusal to promote an employee — the “unlawful 
employment practice” alleged here (§ 12940) — does not depend 
on any decision by the employer to promote someone else. 
Suppose Employees A, B, and C apply for a promotion, and 
Employee A is the first applicant to be rejected.  Once the 
employer tells Employee A that he or she will not be promoted, 
the employer’s refusal to promote Employee A has occurred.  (Cf. 
City of Belvedere, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 [distinguishing 
Romano and concluding that the statute of limitations began to 
run in a FEHA failure to hire case when the employer informed 
the plaintiff by letter that he would not be hired].)  It does not 
matter whether or when the employer decides to promote 
Employee B or Employee C, or whether or when the promotion 
takes effect.  Pollock’s approach is unpersuasive because, in 
many cases, an employer may refuse to promote the aggrieved 
employee well before promoting another employee.  Moreover, 
Pollock’s rule provides no guidance in cases where the denial of 
a promotion to one employee is not accompanied by a decision to 
promote another.  (See Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 
Colo. (10th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 [“the elimination of a 
position, if done for racially motivated reasons, can potentially 
form the basis of a discrimination claim” in a failure to promote 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
case]; Barefield v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State University, 
Bakersfield (E.D.Cal. 2007) 500 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1261 
[elimination of a position for budgetary reasons does not defeat 
prima facie case of unlawful failure to promote if “some vacancy 
exist[ed] at the time the application is made”].)  
In determining how section 12960 applies to a FEHA 
harassment claim based on a failure to promote, we look not only 
to California precedent but also to cases interpreting similar 
federal employment antidiscrimination laws.  (See Guz v. 
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 [“Because of 
the 
similarity 
between 
state and 
federal employment 
discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal 
precedent when applying our own statutes.”].)  The statute of 
limitations provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII) and the FEHA are substantially the same in their 
usage of the word “occurred.”  (Compare § 12960, former 
subd. (d) [requiring a plaintiff to file an administrative 
complaint within one year “from the date upon which the alleged 
unlawful practice . . . occurred”] with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) 
[requiring a plaintiff to file an administrative complaint within 
180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred”].)  Other federal antidiscrimination laws incorporate 
Title VII’s statute of limitations provision by reference.  (See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) [Americans with Disabilities Act].)  
Federal authorities interpreting such provisions thus aid our 
interpretation of the FEHA’s statute of limitations, and those 
authorities indicate that a failure to promote claim accrues not 
simply when the employer has made the adverse promotion 
decision, but rather when the employee knows or reasonably 
should know of the employer’s decision.  In many cases, this 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
point in time is when the employer notifies the employee of its 
decision. 
In Delaware State College v. Ricks (1980) 449 U.S. 250 
(Ricks), the high court addressed whether a college professor, 
Columbus Ricks, “timely complained under the civil rights laws 
that he had been denied academic tenure because of his national 
origin.”  (Id. at p. 252.)  On March 13, 1974, the college board of 
trustees formally voted to deny Ricks tenure.  On June 26, 1974, 
the college, following its usual practice after denying tenure, 
offered Ricks a one-year “ ‘terminal’ ” contract expiring on 
June 30, 1975, which he accepted.  (Id. at p. 253 [“When that 
contract expires, the employment relationship ends.”].)  
Meanwhile, Ricks filed a grievance with the college board of 
trustees to contest the tenure denial, and the board denied his 
grievance on September 12, 1974.  On April 4, 1975, Ricks filed 
a complaint under Title VII with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  As mentioned, Title VII 
requires a plaintiff to file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 
days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”  
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Ricks, at p. 256.)  After the EEOC 
issued a “right to sue” letter, Ricks proceeded to district court 
and argued that the limitations period on his claim of unlawful 
tenure denial did not begin to run until his one-year contract 
expired.  (Ricks, at pp. 252–257.) 
Rejecting this argument, the high court held that the 
“alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations 
period[] therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision 
was made and communicated to Ricks.”  (Ricks, supra, 449 U.S. 
at p. 258, italics added; see id. at p. 259 [“the only challenged 
employment practice” was the denial of tenure, and it 
“occur[red] before the termination date”].)  The EEOC urged the 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
alternative view that the limitations period did not begin until 
the board denied Ricks’s grievance on September 12, 1974 
because the board could have changed its decision if it had found 
Ricks’s grievance meritorious.  (Id. at pp. 260–261.)  The high 
court rejected this argument as well, observing that “[t]he 
grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior 
decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it 
is made.”  (Id. at p. 261.) 
The district court in Ricks concluded that the limitations 
period “had commenced to run by June 26, 1974,” when the 
college offered Ricks a “ ‘terminal’ ” one-year contract.  (Ricks, 
supra, 449 U.S. at p. 261.)  The high court declined to decide 
“whether the District Court correctly focused on the June 26 
date, rather than the date the Board communicated to Ricks its 
unfavorable tenure decision made at the March 13, 1974, 
meeting,” because Ricks’s EEOC complaint was “not timely filed 
even counting from the June 26 date.”  (Id. at p. 262, fn. 17.)  The 
high court explained:  “By June 26, the [faculty committee on 
promotions and tenure] had twice recommended that Ricks not 
receive tenure; the Faculty Senate had voted to support the 
tenure committee’s recommendation; and the Board of Trustees 
formally had voted to deny Ricks tenure.  In light of this 
unbroken array of negative decisions, the District Court was 
justified in concluding that the College had established its 
official position — and made that position apparent to Ricks — 
no later than June 26, 1974.”  (Id. at p. 262, fn. omitted, italics 
added; see id. at p. 262, fn. 16 [“We recognize . . . that the 
limitations periods should not commence to run so soon that it 
becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the 
civil rights statutes.  [Citations.]  But . . . there can be no claim 
here that Ricks was not abundantly forewarned.”].) 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
In Romano, we declined to apply Ricks’s holding under 
Title VII to a wrongful discharge claim under the FEHA.  
(Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 495–499.)  But nothing we 
said in Romano casts doubt on Ricks’s persuasive value in a 
FEHA failure to promote case.  We explained that the FEHA 
differs from Title VII insofar as “the FEHA defines a ‘discharge’ 
as a discriminatory practice” in contrast to “the federal law’s 
focus . . . on the decision” to terminate employment.  (Romano, 
at p. 498; see id. at pp. 492–493, quoting §§ 12940, former 
subd. (f), 12941.)  But an employer’s decision not to promote the 
aggrieved employee is the gravamen of a failure to promote 
claim under either Title VII or the FEHA; there is no distinction 
like the one we drew in Romano between the decision and the 
wrongful act.  Further, in explaining Ricks’s inapplicability to 
Romano’s wrongful discharge claim, we observed that the high 
court in Ricks “was at pains to assert that it was the denial of 
tenure, and not the ultimate dismissal, that was the 
discriminatory act alleged by the plaintiff.”  (Romano, at p. 497; 
see Ricks, supra, 449 U.S. at pp. 257–258.)  That aspect of 
Ricks’s claim makes it analogous to a failure to promote claim 
and highlights the relevance of the high court’s analysis to the 
case before us.  Finally, Romano expressed concern that 
following Ricks would “ ‘increase the number of unripe and 
anticipatory lawsuits . . . that should not be filed until some 
concrete harm has been suffered, and until the parties, and the 
forces of time, have had maximum opportunity to resolve the 
controversy.’ ”  (Romano, at p. 498.)  But this concern, which 
applies where an employee receives notice of termination before 
the date of actual termination, has no applicability here.  Once 
the employer has told the employee that he or she will not be 
promoted or the employee otherwise gains actual or constructive 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
knowledge of the allegedly unlawful promotion decision, a 
“ ‘concrete harm has been suffered’ ” (ibid.), and any FEHA 
claim contesting the promotion denial accrues. 
In Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 
2008) 535 F.3d 1044, the court observed that Ricks “focused on 
when the plaintiff became aware of the adverse employment 
decision” and applied this focus to determine when the 
limitations period began to run on an unlawful failure to hire 
claim.  (Lukovsky, at p. 1050, citing Ricks, supra, 449 U.S. at 
pp. 258–259, 261–262.)  The Ninth Circuit clarified that “the 
claim accrues upon awareness of the actual injury, i.e., the 
adverse employment action, and not when the plaintiff suspects 
a legal wrong.”  (Lukovsky, at p. 1049; see id. at p. 1051 
[plaintiffs’ claims accrued, and the limitations periods began to 
run, when they “knew they had been injured and by whom, 
[citation], even if at that point in time the plaintiffs did not know 
of the legal injury, i.e., that there was an allegedly 
discriminatory motive underlying the failure to hire”].)  Other 
federal circuits are in accord.  (See, e.g., Hanani v. State of N.J. 
Dept. of Environmental Protection (3d Cir. 2006) 205 Fed.Appx. 
71, 76 [failure to promote]; Amini v. Oberlin College (6th Cir. 
2001) 259 F.3d 493, 498–500 (Amini) [failure to hire]; Merrill v. 
Southern Methodist Univ. (5th Cir. 1986) 806 F.2d 600, 605 
[tenure denial].) 
Although many cases, like Ricks, involve clear notification 
by the employer to the employee of the adverse employment 
decision, others do not.  In assessing when a limitations period 
begins to run, courts have spoken in terms of actual or 
constructive notice — i.e., “ ‘[o]nce the employee is aware or 
reasonably should be aware of the employer’s decision, the 
limitations period commences.’ ”  (Amini, supra, 259 F.3d at 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
p. 498, quoting EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (6th Cir. 
2001) 249 F.3d 557, 561–562; see Harris v. City of New York (2d 
Cir. 1999) 186 F.3d 243, 247 (Harris); Miller v. Beneficial 
Management Corp. (3d Cir. 1992) 977 F.2d 834, 843 (Miller).)  
Determining what an employee knew or should have known 
requires a careful examination of the circumstances in each 
case. 
In Harris, a police officer, Gerard Harris, alleged (among 
other claims) that he had been denied promotion to sergeant.  
(Harris, supra, 186 F.3d at pp. 246–247.)  Harris had taken a 
civil service exam that placed him on a four-year eligibility list 
for sergeant from April 7, 1989 to April 7, 1993.  In August 1991, 
Harris suffered a back injury in the line of duty; he was placed 
on “ ‘restricted duty’ ” status and later applied for and received 
disability benefits.  (Id. at p. 246.)  On August 31, 1994, he filed 
an EEOC complaint alleging that the city unlawfully 
discriminated against him on the basis of disability in refusing 
to promote him to sergeant, and he filed suit in district court on 
October 4, 1996.  (Id. at pp. 247–248; see id. at p. 247 [statute of 
limitations under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12117(a), incorporates by reference the statute of limitations 
under Tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)].)  The Second Circuit 
held that because civil service eligibility lists “are ordinarily in 
effect for no more than four years” under state law, and because 
a 1990 police department policy memo said the department 
“would not promote any officer on less than full duty,” Harris 
“should have known” by April 7, 1993 that “he was not going to 
be promoted to sergeant.”  (Harris, at p. 248; see ibid. [“we look 
not only at what Harris actually knew but also at what he had 
reason to know”].)  The commencement of the applicable 
limitations periods on that date meant that his claims before the 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
EEOC and in court challenging the denial of promotion to 
sergeant were filed too late.  (Harris, at pp. 248–249.) 
In Miller, an attorney, Elizabeth Miller, alleged that her 
employer refused to promote her to vice-president in violation of 
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 
and other laws.  (Miller, supra, 977 F.2d at p. 841; see id. at 
p. 842 [limitations periods for filing EEOC complaint under 
Tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(d)(1), start to run after the alleged unlawful practice 
“occurred”].)  In July 1984, Miller was transferred from the 
company’s legal department to an associate counsel position in 
the government relations department.  In assuming that role, 
she replaced a man, Charles Walsh, who was serving as vice-
president of government relations, and another man who 
worked with the vice-president.  (Miller, at pp. 836–837.)  Miller 
kept working in the government relations department until 
October 1998 and was never promoted to vice-president.  (Id. at 
p. 840.) 
The district court held that the limitations periods for her 
failure to promote claim began to run in July 1984, reasoning 
that “ ‘Miller does not assert she was unaware that Walsh’s 
position was Vice President when she accepted the position as 
Associate Counsel.  Accordingly, Miller had actual knowledge of 
any alleged discrimination [in the company’s failure to promote 
her to vice-president] at the time she accepted and assumed the 
position in July 1984.’ ”  (Miller, supra, 977 F.2d at p. 842.)  But 
the Third Circuit cited evidence that from September 1987 to 
June 1988, Miller’s supervisor had told her that “she deserved 
to be a Vice President” and “she would soon be getting the title 
of Vice President,” and had “recommended Miller for promotion 
to Vice President.”  (Id. at p. 843.)  Miller argued it was not until 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
October 1988, when she was removed from the government 
relations department, that “it became apparent that she would 
not be made a Vice President.”  (Ibid.)  On these facts, the Third 
Circuit held that the timeliness of her complaint presented a 
triable issue.  (Ibid. [“A reasonable jury could agree with Miller 
that the statute did not begin to run until October 1988, when 
she knew or should have known that she would never be made 
a Vice President.”].) 
In this case, Pollock focuses on the effective date of 
Gonzalez’s promotion, and Kelso focuses on when Gonzalez 
received and accepted the promotion offer.  Both dates, 
depending on how Tri-Modal communicated the information, 
may be relevant evidence of when Pollock knew or should have 
known she did not get the promotion.  But neither is sufficient 
by itself to trigger the limitations period. 
Consistent with the case law construing analogous 
language in federal antidiscrimination statutes, we hold that a 
FEHA harassment claim based on a failure to promote accrues, 
and the limitations period under section 12960 begins to run, 
when the aggrieved employee knows or reasonably should know 
of the employer’s decision not to promote him or her.  It is not 
enough to identify when an employer made its decision not to 
promote the employee; what starts the clock is the employee’s 
actual or constructive knowledge of the employer’s decision. 
D. 
The approach we elucidate today “protect[s] defendants 
from the necessity of defending stale claims and require[s] 
plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently.”  (Romano, supra, 
14 Cal.4th at p. 488; see ibid. [statutes of limitation “are 
‘ “designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared” ’ ”].)  Focusing the analysis on when the 
employee knew or should have known of the adverse promotion 
decision in many cases gives the employer control over when the 
clock begins to run.  Once the employee obtains actual or 
constructive notice, he or she is then prompted to diligently 
pursue any claims. 
This approach also protects the employee’s interests.  
Because the clock starts running only when the employee knows 
or reasonably should know of the adverse promotion decision, 
any period of time during which the decision is not disclosed or 
otherwise known to the employee does not count against the 
limitations period.  The rule urged by Kelso, which focuses on 
the employer’s moment of decision without requiring notice to 
the employee, would reward secrecy by employers to the 
potential detriment of employees with legitimate claims.  As 
noted, we must interpret section 12960 “so as to promote the 
resolution of potentially meritorious claims on the merits.”  
(Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 494.) 
Further, by leaving an employee guessing as to when an 
employer has made an adverse promotion decision, Kelso’s rule 
may incentivize plaintiffs to file claims as early as possible to 
avoid being time-barred, even if the employer (unbeknownst to 
the employee) has not yet “established its official position.”  
(Ricks, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 262.)  Requiring actual or 
constructive notice reduces the risk of plaintiffs filing unripe 
claims.  (Cf. Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 494–495 [§ 12960 
should be interpreted so that DFEH and the courts are not 
prematurely drawn into investigating and adjudicating FEHA 
claims].) 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
In Pollock’s view, starting the limitations period in a 
failure to promote case at the point of notice would depart from 
Romano and thereby create different rules for different 
circumstances within the FEHA statute of limitations case law.  
But lack of notice was not at issue in Romano, so we had no 
occasion to address situations where it may be unclear when the 
aggrieved employee knew or should have known of the allegedly 
unlawful conduct.  In Romano, the plaintiff was told he would 
be discharged, but at that point, the employer had not yet 
discharged him.  Here, Tri-Modal denied Pollock a promotion, 
but we do not know when Pollock learned of the denial.  Both 
cases are consistent with a rule requiring both wrongful conduct 
by the employer and actual or constructive notice to the 
employee for the limitations period to start. 
Finally, our construction of the FEHA statute of 
limitations is not at odds with section 12960, former 
subdivision (d)(1), which provided that the one-year limitations 
period may be extended “[f]or a period of time not to exceed 
90 days following the expiration of that year, if a person 
allegedly aggrieved by an unlawful practice first obtained 
knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice after the 
expiration of one year from the date of their occurrence.”  (See 
§ 12960, subd. (e)(1) [similar language in current statute].)  
Citing this provision, Kelso contends that “the Legislature has 
provided a remedy for delayed discovery of unlawful 
discriminatory employment acts”; the implication is that 
construing the statute of limitations to require notice before the 
clock begins to run would render the delayed discovery provision 
surplusage. 
We reject Kelso’s argument for two reasons that track the 
two views of quid pro quo harassment described above.  (Ante, 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
at pp. 7–8.)  On the first view, which focuses on communication 
of an offensive message, a quid pro quo harassment claim cannot 
accrue until the offensive message — here, that an employee 
was denied a promotion because of her refusal to submit to a 
supervisor’s sexual advances — actually or constructively 
reaches the employee.  In other words, notice of the employment 
action is integral to the existence of a claim of quid pro quo 
harassment.  Such notice cannot be characterized as “delayed 
discovery of unlawful discriminatory employment acts”; rather, 
the notice — by virtue of its communicative impact — is a 
necessary 
component 
of 
the 
unlawful 
discriminatory 
employment act.  On this view, the 90-day delayed discovery 
provision is not relevant to this case.    
Under the second view of quid pro quo harassment, the 
failure to promote Pollock is relevant not because it 
communicates an offensive message, but instead because it 
demonstrates that Kelso in fact conditioned a job benefit on 
Pollock’s submission to his sexual advances.  Kelso asserts that, 
on this view, the 90-day delayed discovery provision is relevant 
to 
Pollock’s 
claim 
because 
section 
12960, 
former 
subdivision (d)(1) indicates that the Legislature did not intend 
for notice to be part of the accrual rule for FEHA claims, 
including discrimination and quid pro quo harassment claims.   
But Kelso’s argument misapprehends the import of 
section 12960, former subdivision (d)(1), which the court in City 
of Belvedere, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 84, elucidated.  The plaintiff 
in that case, Lewis Williams, applied to be a police officer.  On 
June 21, 1994, the city notified Williams by letter that he had 
not been selected.  On October 27, 1995, he learned that racial 
discrimination may have played a part in the city’s decision not 
to hire him.  On November 13, 1995, he filed a complaint with 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
the DFEH alleging racial discrimination and thereafter 
proceeded to superior court.  (Id. at pp. 87–88.)  In assessing the 
timeliness of his DFEH complaint, the Court of Appeal held that 
“the unequivocal wording of the June 21, 1994, letter” notified 
Williams that the city had made a “final” decision not to hire 
him, and thus the limitations period began to run on that date.  
(Id. at p. 91; see id. at pp. 91–92 [distinguishing Romano].)  The 
court then addressed Williams’s argument that the limitations 
period “was tolled during the period he did not know he was the 
subject of discrimination” as a matter of “equitable principles.”  
(Id. at p. 92.)  On this point, the court cited section 12960’s 
delayed discovery provision (a predecessor version virtually 
identical to the provision at issue here) and explained:  “Thus 
the Legislature anticipated there may be situations where a 
person does not learn he was the subject of discrimination until 
after the one-year period has passed, and it provided a remedy 
when that occurs:  an extension ‘not to exceed 90 days.’  Since 
the Legislature has provided a remedy for the problem Williams 
has identified, we decline to formulate a different remedy.”  (City 
of Belvedere, at p. 93.)  Because Williams had filed his DFEH 
complaint more than 90 days beyond the one-year limitations 
period, the court concluded that it was untimely.  (Id. at p. 94.) 
We express no view on whether City of Belvedere correctly 
held that equitable tolling is unavailable in light of the delayed 
discovery provision.  (Cf. McDonald v. Antelope Valley 
Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 107 [“We discern 
in [section 12960, former subdivision (d)(1)–(4)] no basis for 
limiting the application of equitable tolling.”]; id. at p. 107, fn. 4 
[distinguishing without approving City of Belvedere’s holding].)  
For present purposes, we simply observe that City of Belvedere’s 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
understanding of the scenario addressed by the 90-day delayed 
discovery provision flows from a natural reading of its terms. 
The provision addresses a situation where “a person 
allegedly aggrieved by an unlawful practice first obtained 
knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice after the 
expiration of one year from the date of their occurrence.”  
(§ 12960, former subd. (d)(1), italics added; see § 12960, 
subd. (e)(1).)  The provision does not address a situation where 
a person “first obtained knowledge of the alleged unlawful 
practice” after the one-year limitations period.  The phrase 
“knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice” 
suggests the discovery of specific features or circumstances of 
the alleged unlawful practice, not its mere existence.  (§ 12960, 
former subd. (d)(1), italics added.)  The scenario, as in City of 
Belvedere, is one in which a person is aware of the alleged 
unlawful practice (i.e., the person knows he or she has been 
harassed, fired, not promoted, not hired, or otherwise injured) 
but does not become aware of relevant facts until after the 
ordinary limitations period has expired.  As case law suggests, 
this scenario is not uncommon (ante, at p. 17), and the provision 
is naturally read to address it.  By contrast, there is scant 
indication of cases where a person was entirely unaware of the 
alleged unlawful practice throughout the ordinary limitations 
period and only later became aware of it.  There is little basis to 
infer that the provision was meant to address such a scenario. 
In sum, section 12960, former subdivision (d)(1) does not 
undermine our conclusion that a FEHA quid pro quo 
harassment claim based on a failure to promote begins to run at 
the point when the aggrieved employee knows or reasonably 
should know of the allegedly unlawful promotion decision. 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
E. 
A further question that divides the parties is whether the 
burden of proving when the employee knew or should have 
known of the adverse promotion decision falls on the plaintiff or 
defendant.  Pollock argues that because notice to the aggrieved 
employee is an element the statute of limitations defense, the 
burden falls on the defendant.  Kelso contends that the burden 
falls on the aggrieved employee to prove lack of knowledge in 
response to the defendant’s statute of limitations defense.  We 
hold that Pollock has the better view. 
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and as 
with any affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant to 
prove all facts essential to each element of the defense.  (Evid. 
Code, § 500 [“Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has 
the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence 
of which is essential to the . . . defense that he is asserting.”]; see 
Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10 [“a defendant must prove 
the facts necessary to enjoy the benefit of a statute of 
limitations”]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 57, 67, fn. 8 [“The running of the 
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense . . . and the 
burden of proving it has run, therefore, is on the party opposing 
the claim” (citation omitted)].)  In a FEHA harassment case 
based on a failure to promote, an element of the statute of 
limitations defense is that the plaintiff knew or should have 
known about the employer’s adverse promotion decision more 
than one year (or now, three years) before filing his or her 
administrative complaint.  (§ 12960, former subd. (d); see 
§ 12960, subd. (e).)  The burden is on the defendant to prove all 
facts essential to that element.   
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
This approach makes sense because the timing and 
manner of notifying an employee of an adverse promotion 
decision are often uniquely within the defendant’s control.  The 
defendant is often a supervisor or employer that has control over 
the promotion process, and it is such a defendant’s prerogative 
to decide if, when, and how an employee will be notified of a 
promotion decision.  To be sure, the employee has personal 
knowledge that is relevant to the inquiry.  And there may be 
cases where the defendant does not have control over the 
notification process or where express notification is difficult to 
effectuate.  But, on balance, placing the burden of proof on the 
defendant properly incentivizes clear and timely notification to 
the employee by the party that is in the best position to promote 
clarity and certainty as to when the limitations period begins. 
Kelso argues that “[e]ven if it is true that the statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense and defendants must prove 
that the plaintiff’s claim is untimely, a plaintiff seeking to 
establish a triable issue of material fact regarding the 
affirmative defense has the burden of producing evidence to 
create a dispute.”  In his view, once he “proved that Pollock’s 
claimed harm accrued before the one-year limitation period, the 
burden shifted to Pollock to prove that she did not have 
knowledge, did not discover, and did not know of facts that 
would cause a reasonable person to suspect she has suffered 
harm that was caused by someone’s wrongful conduct.” 
But Kelso has not proven that Pollock’s claimed harm 
accrued before the beginning of the one-year statute of 
limitations period.  The Directions for Use for CACI No. 454 
explain that “ ‘[c]laimed harm’ refers to all of the elements of the 
cause of action, which must have occurred before the cause of 
action accrues and the statute of limitations begins.”  Kelso has 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
merely shown that Gonzalez received and accepted an offer of 
promotion in March 2017.  He has not shown that Pollock had 
actual or constructive notice of the disputed promotion decision 
in March 2017.  Thus, he has not shown sufficient facts to make 
out his statute of limitations defense. 
Kelso relies on Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 826, 850, but that case does not help his argument.  
Aguilar involved a summary judgment motion contesting a core 
element of the plaintiff’s underlying antitrust claim.  (Id. at 
pp. 838–840.)  We noted that “how the parties moving for, and 
opposing, summary judgment may each carry their burden of 
persuasion and/or production depends on” the issues addressed 
in the given summary judgment motion.  (Id. at p. 851.)  For 
example, we explained that how the parties meet their 
respective burdens can depend on “which [party] would bear 
what burden of proof at trial.”  (Ibid.)  Because Aguilar does not 
discuss how the parties might meet their respective burdens 
with regard to a statute of limitations defense, it does not speak 
to the question here.   
Kelso also relies on CACI Nos. 454 and 455 to argue that 
if Pollock did not know of the adverse promotion decision in 
March 2017, the burden was on her to invoke the common law 
delayed discovery rule.  Courts have relied on that rule to toll or 
expand the statute of limitations in cases where starting the 
limitations period on the date of the plaintiff’s injury would be 
“ ‘manifestly unjust’ ” because “[t]he injury or the act causing 
the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff to detect.”  
(April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 826, 
831.)  The rule has been applied in cases involving breach of a 
fiduciary relationship, professional malpractice, underground 
trespass, personal injury, invasion of the right to privacy, libel, 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
and latent defects in real property.  (Id. at pp. 827–830.)  In such 
cases, the burden typically falls on the plaintiff to “plead facts 
sufficient to convince the trial judge that delayed discovery was 
justified.  And when the case is tried on the merits the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof on the discovery issue.”  (Id. at p. 832.) 
Here, however, discovery of the adverse promotion 
decision is part of the accrual rule.  (See Cada v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp. (7th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 446, 450 [elucidating 
the distinction “between the accrual of the plaintiff's claim and 
the tolling of the statute of limitations”].)  The date of accrual 
“is not the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff 
occurs, but the date — often the same, but sometimes later — 
on which the plaintiff discovers that he has been injured. . . .  
The discovery rule is implicit in the holding of Ricks that the 
statute of limitations began to run ‘at the time the tenure 
decision was made and communicated to Ricks,’ 449 U.S. at 258, 
101 S.Ct. at 504 (emphasis added).”  (Ibid.)  As case law 
indicates (ante, at pp. 12–20), a refusal to promote has not 
“occurred” for purposes of the statute of limitations until the 
aggrieved employee has had actual or constructive notice. 
In sum, when a defendant asserts a statute of limitations 
defense against a FEHA failure to promote claim, the burden is 
on the defendant to prove when the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the adverse promotion decision.  The Court of 
Appeal in this case concluded that the statute of limitations 
began to run when Tri-Modal offered the promotion to Gonzalez 
and she accepted it.  It did not discuss when Pollock knew or 
should have known that she was denied the promotion, nor did 
it discuss whether Kelso, in asserting his statute of limitations 
defense, established any facts concerning Pollock’s actual or 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
constructive knowledge.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
III. 
We now turn to costs on appeal.  Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1034, subdivision (b) charges the Judicial Council with 
establishing “allowable costs on appeal and the procedure for 
claiming those costs.”  The Judicial Council promulgated 
California Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (Rule 8.278), which says:  
“Except as provided in this rule, the party prevailing in the 
Court of Appeal in a civil case other than a juvenile case is 
entitled to costs on appeal.”  (Rule 8.278(a)(1).)  The rule further 
says:  “In the interests of justice, the Court of Appeal may also 
award or deny costs as it deems proper.”  (Rule 8.278(a)(5).) 
Separately, the Legislature spoke directly to the subject of 
costs and fees in the FEHA itself.  Section 12965, subdivision (b) 
(section 12965(b)), which provides a private right of action to 
enforce the FEHA, says in relevant part:  “In civil actions 
brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may 
award to the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs, . . . except that . . . a prevailing defendant shall not be 
awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the 
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” 
The question is whether costs on appeal in a FEHA action 
are governed by section 12965(b) or by Rule 8.278(a).  The 
former requires a finding that the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous 
before costs may be awarded to a prevailing defendant; the 
latter does not.  The Court of Appeal here made no such finding 
before awarding costs to defendants. 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
As an initial matter, section 12965(b) by its terms governs 
the authority of “the court” to award fees and costs, with no 
limitation on “the court” to which the provision applies.  There 
is no reason why an appellate court cannot determine whether 
“the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when 
brought” or whether “the plaintiff continued to litigate” — 
including by taking an appeal — “after it clearly became so.” 
(Ibid.)  Nothing in the text of section 12965(b) suggests it does 
not apply to appellate courts. 
Kelso argues that Rule 8.278 speaks directly to costs on 
appeal, whereas section 12965(b) “is silent regarding its 
application to costs on appeal” and should be understood to 
govern costs only in the trial court.  We rejected a similar 
argument in Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924 
(Morcos).  The Court of Appeal in Morcos had held that because 
section 31536 authorizes “ ‘the superior court in its discretion’ ” 
to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs in 
cases involving retirement benefits and says “nothing about the 
Courts of Appeal or Supreme Court having a similar authority 
to award fees, the statute should not be construed to grant such 
authority to the appellate courts.”  (Morcos, at p. 927, italics 
added by Morcos, quoting § 31536.)  We disagreed, explaining 
that such an interpretation would undermine “the purpose of 
section 31536 — to place the government and individual 
pensioners on a level playing field when it comes to litigation 
over benefits.”  (Morcos, at p. 929.)  That goal could only be 
achieved, we concluded, if successful pensioners could recover 
attorney’s fees in appellate courts as well as the superior court.  
(Ibid.) 
Although the text of section 31536 “only made express 
reference to the superior court,” we unanimously concluded in 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
Morcos that the statute also applied to appellate courts based on 
its purpose and legislative history.  (Morcos, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
p. 928.)  Section 12965(b), by comparison, makes express 
reference to “the court,” without limitation.  And construing 
section 12965(b) to apply to appellate costs and fees furthers the 
statute’s purpose of promoting vigorous enforcement of our civil 
rights 
laws 
by 
“ ‘encourag[ing] 
persons 
injured 
by 
discrimination to seek judicial relief.’ ”  (Williams v. Chino 
Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 112 
(Williams) [quoting legislative history of § 12965(b)].) 
When the Legislature in 2018 amended section 12965(b) 
by adding the phrase “a prevailing defendant shall not be 
awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the 
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so” (Assem. 
Bill No. 9 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2019, ch. 709, § 2, 
subd. (b)), it made its intentions clear.  The Assembly Judiciary 
Committee explained that California courts depart from the “so-
called ‘American Rule’ where each party is responsible for its 
own fees and costs” in civil rights cases and that “the provision 
in this bill limiting the ability of a prevailing defendant to 
recover fees and costs unless the plaintiff’s case is deemed 
frivolous or without merit appears to codify existing case law.”  
(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1300 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 8.)  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee said that “[u]nder existing law, 
FEHA provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing 
plaintiff, but not to a defendant except under narrow 
circumstances,” in order to “reflect[] the public policy that 
society should incentivize enforcement of our civil rights laws.”  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1300 (2017–
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 2018, p. 24.)  To allow a 
prevailing FEHA defendant to collect fees and costs on appeal 
when the plaintiff brought a potentially meritorious suit that 
ultimately did not succeed would undercut the Legislature’s 
intent to promote vigorous enforcement of our civil rights laws.  
(See Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 113–115.) 
Kelso contends that costs on appeal are likely lower on 
average than costs at the trial level.  Even if so, such costs “can 
be substantial, and the possibility of their assessment could 
significantly chill the vindication of employees’ civil rights.”  
(Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 114.)  In Williams, we held 
that the award of ordinary trial court costs in FEHA litigation 
is governed by section 12965(b), not by the general fee-shifting 
provision 
of 
Code 
of 
Civil 
Procedure 
section 1032, 
subdivision (b).  (Williams, at p. 99.)  Although the language of 
section 12965(b) at the time did not “distinguish between 
awards to FEHA plaintiffs and to FEHA defendants,” we 
concluded on the basis of legislative history and public policy 
that “the Legislature intended trial courts to use the 
asymmetrical standard of [Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412] as to both fees and costs.”  (Williams, 
at p. 109.)  Under that standard, “an unsuccessful FEHA 
plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s fees or 
costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the 
action without an objective basis for believing it had potential 
merit.”  (Id. at pp. 99–100.)  We observed that “ordinary costs in 
FEHA cases,” though typically less than attorney’s fees, can still 
be substantial and that “[t]he Legislature could well have 
believed the potential for a cost award in the tens of thousands 
of dollars would tend to discourage even potentially meritorious 
suits by plaintiffs with limited financial resources.”  (Id. at 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
p. 113.)  These considerations informed our conclusion that a 
trial court must find the plaintiff’s FEHA claim objectively 
groundless before awarding costs to a prevailing defendant.  (Id. 
at pp. 113–115.)  Similarly here, even if costs on appeal are 
lower on average than the “tens of thousands of dollars” typical 
at the trial court level, such costs can still be large enough to 
discourage employees from coming forward with potentially 
meritorious claims.  (Id. at p. 113.) 
Kelso says Williams is distinguishable because Rule 8.278, 
unlike Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), 
does not include the phrase “except as otherwise expressly 
provided by statute.”  (See Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 105 
[“section 12965(b) is an express exception to Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1032(b)”].)  But even without such language, 
a rule of court must yield to an applicable statute when “ ‘it 
conflicts with either the statute’s express language or its 
underlying legislative intent.’ ”  (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 83, 92; see People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960; 
Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (d) [rules adopted by the Judicial 
Council 
“shall 
not 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
statute”].)  
Section 12965(b) expressly governs “the court” in FEHA actions 
without limitation, and allowing an award of costs on appeal to 
a prevailing defendant without a finding that the plaintiff’s 
action was objectively groundless would undermine the statute’s 
purpose. 
Finally, Kelso argues that construing section 12965(b) to 
apply to costs on appeal would “incentivize FEHA plaintiffs who 
do not prevail in the trial court to appeal nonetheless, even in 
appeals that arguably lack merit.”  But an appeal that 
“arguably” lacks merit may well be recast as an appeal that 
“arguably” has merit, and we see no indication that the 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
Legislature intended to discourage such appeals.  To the 
contrary, the Legislature sought to encourage aggrieved 
employees to pursue potentially meritorious FEHA claims, and 
exposing plaintiffs who bring nonfrivolous appeals to the risk of 
paying defendants’ costs if unsuccessful would be inconsistent 
with that objective.  
In sum, we hold that section 12965(b) applies to costs on 
appeal.  An appellate court may not award costs or fees on 
appeal to a prevailing FEHA defendant without first 
determining 
that 
the 
plaintiff’s 
action 
was 
frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or that the plaintiff 
continued to litigate after it clearly became so.  In making this 
determination, the court “should exercise caution to avoid 
‘hindsight bias.’ ”  (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 
47 Cal.4th 970, 986; see id. at p. 987 [noting that Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, supra, 434 U.S. 412, 421–422, 
“caution[ed] courts, in deciding whether to award attorney fees 
to a prevailing defendant in an antidiscrimination action, to 
‘resist the understandable temptation to engage in post 
hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not 
ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or 
without foundation’ ”]; Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 99–
100 [“an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to 
pay the defendant’s fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or 
continued litigating the action without an objective basis for 
believing it had potential merit”].) 
Upon such a finding, an appellate court has discretion to 
award the full amount of costs and fees, a reduced amount, or 
no amount at all.  Because the Court of Appeal made no finding 
as to whether Pollock’s claims were objectively groundless, we 
vacate its award of costs to defendants. 
POLLOCK v. TRI-MODAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, INC.  
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment, vacate its 
award of costs on appeal, and remand the matter to that court 
so that it may remand the case to the superior court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 47 Cal.App.5th 532 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S262699 
Date Filed:  July 26, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior     
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Lia R. Martin    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Lipeles Law Group, Kevin A. Lipeles, Thomas H. Schelly and Julian B. 
Bellenghi for Plaintiff and Appellant.  
 
Larson & Gaston, Daniel K. Gaston and Gloria G. Medel for 
Defendants and Respondents Scotts Labor Leasing Company, Inc., and 
Pacific Leasing, Inc. 
 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jack E. Jimenez, Jeffrey B. Ranen, 
Lann G. McIntyre and Tracy D. Forbath for Defendant and 
Respondent Mike Kelso. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Julian B. Bellenghi 
Lipeles Law Group, APC 
880 Apollo St., Suite 336 
El Segundo, CA 90245 
(310) 322-2211 
 
Lann G. McIntyre 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP 
550 West C St., Suite 1700 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 699-4976