Title: McLean v. State Ind. Acc. Comm.
Citation: 189 Or. 405, 221 P.2d 566
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 1950

Affirmed July 18, 1950.
*407 Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were George Neuner, Attorney General, and T. Walter Gillard and Roy K. Terry, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Salem.
C.S. Emmons, of Albany, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Willis, Kyle &amp; Emmons, of Albany.
Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, BELT, ROSSMAN, HAY, and LATOURETTE, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
BRAND, J.
The plaintiff brings this action under the Workmen's Compensation Act, seeking recovery on account of the accidental injury to her husband, arising out of and in the course of his employment, and resulting in his death. Plaintiff's husband, John N. McLean, met his death by electrocution while engaged in work at Camp Adair, a former army camp, and in that portion of the camp which was being operated by the Oregon National Guard under a revocable license from the War Department. The workman was not a member *408 of the National Guard. The plaintiff sues for the benefit of herself and four minor children, the fruit of the marriage. The military department of the State of Oregon is a duly organized department of that state and is authorized by law to employ workmen and to carry out its various functions. Within the time provided by law, the plaintiff filed with the State Industrial Accident Commission a claim for compensation and furnished the required proofs of marriage and births of the children. The defendant denied plaintiff's claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and within the required time plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing which, after hearing by the Commission, was denied, and the former order rejecting plaintiff's claim was affirmed. The plaintiff then filed a complaint in the circuit court under the provisions of statute. The facts set forth in plaintiff's petition for rehearing were substantially realleged in her complaint.
In addition to the allegations of the complaint which were admitted and which we have summarized in the statement of fact, the complaint alleged:
The quoted allegations are denied by the answer. After trial of the issues, the jury returned a special verdict as follows:
The plaintiff had judgment in accordance with the verdict.
The issues which are presented here were raised by motion for nonsuit and for directed verdict and for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. The motions were all *410 denied by the court. The motions sufficiently raised the issues which are presented by the assignments of error.
1. By the fourth assignment the defendant asserts that the court erred in denying appellant's motions in that the deceased workman was an employee of the United States government. He will assume that by this assignment the defendant means to assert that there is no substantial evidence in the record that the workman was an employee of the military department of the State of Oregon as alleged in the complaint. The answer admits that the workman at the time of his injury and death "was on the payroll of the Military Department of the State of Oregon as a maintenance helper and property caretaker". Brigadier General Raymond F. Olson, one of the two commanding generals of the Oregon National Guard, who was familiar with the details by which the National Guard took over Camp Adair from the War Department, testified that the military department of the State of Oregon applied to the War Department for 300 acres of Camp Adair and that a revocable license was issued under which the National Guard took over that area and agreed to turn the buildings back to the War Department in the same condition in which they were received, less ordinary wear and tear. "The use of all buildings within a certain described area including the utility service thereon, water mains, electrical distribution system, things of that nature" were turned over to the military department of the state. He testified further:
Again he testified:
General Olson testified that Mr. Clack, who was the unit caretaker and range maintenance man, and who supervised the deceased workman, was paid by the federal government, but he added, "Mr. McLean was a State employee paid entirely from the State." The Adjutant General of Oregon was authorized by federal statute to perform such duties as may be described by the laws of the state, U.S.C.A., Title 32, § 11. He issued instructions to Mr. Clack concerning work to be done at Camp Adair. The Adjutant General is an appointee of the Governor of Oregon. We are cited to section 42 of Title 32, U.S.C.A. as amended in 1947. That section authorizes the appointment of civilians as caretakers and provides that the secretary of the army shall fix the salaries of all caretakers "and shall also designate by whom they shall be employed". That provision does not, as a matter of law, render a person in a position of the deceased workman, an employee of the United States, nor does that result follow from the fact that the state may be reimbursed in part for *412 wages paid by it to the workman. Upon the record made in this case, we hold that there is substantial evidence supporting the allegation of the complaint and the verdict of the jury to the effect that the workman was employed by the military department of the State of Oregon.
By its first three assignments the defendant asserts that the court erred in denying the motions for nonsuit and for directed verdict and for judgment non obstante. These assignments of error present the contention that the evidence fails to show that the deceased was employed in any of the three hazardous occupations specified in the quoted portions of the statute and in which he was allegedly employed. Relevant provisions of the statutes are as follows:
If we determine that the state or its military department is an "employer" within the meaning of O.C.L.A., §§ 102-1703, 102-1712, 102-1728 and 102-1752, then, it will be our duty to determine whether any part of the occupation of the military department at *414 Camp Adair included any of the activities specified in the complaint and defined as hazardous in paragraphs (a), (e) or (f) of O.C.L.A., § 102-1725. It is to the latter question that the parties have devoted a large part of their briefs. However, we must first determine a basic question on which the entire case depends: Is the State of Oregon or its military department subject to the Act as an "employer", and are its employees covered by the Act when it engages in the occupations specified in the complaint and defined as hazardous in paragraphs (a), (e) or (f) of O.C.L.A., § 102-1725? The plaintiff relies especially upon the following statutory provision:
We now return to the provision of O.C.L.A., § 102-1725, a portion of which we have quoted supra. That section enumerates the occupations which are defined as hazardous. Subparagraphs (a) to (g) inclusive enumerate occupations which are hazardous, if an "employer" is engaged therein. Subparagraph (h) adopts a different procedure. It enumerates "services performed by" persons, peace officers, etc., working for the state or some of its instrumentalities. We quote:
The defendant commission argues that the State of Oregon is not within the intent and scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law as an employer. Concerning subparagraph (h) of O.C.L.A., § 102-1725, defendant concedes that by itself that portion of the statute "would seem to be a definition of the state and counties as employers" but defendant asserts that in view of its legislative history the provision in the last portion of (h) to the effect that "the state, counties and municipal corporations shall be deemed employers under the terms of this act" relates only to "the services performed by" peace officers, surveyors, firemen and bridge employees.
The defendant draws attention to the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 102-1716 and to the amendment of that *416 section in 1947, both of which read, so far as this question is concerned, as follows:
may elect to contribute to the accident fund and thereafter "The employer and his workmen * * * shall be subject to all of the provisions of this act * * *".
Defendant says with some reason "it is thus clearly contemplated in the law that there may be hazardous occupations to which the state or state departments are not automatically subject". The substance of defendant's contention is that under well recognized rules of construction the State of Oregon and its instrumentalities do not come within the purview of the words "any person". See O.C.L.A., § 102-1703, supra. It is argued in substance that, although all of the occupations specified in O.C.L.A., § 102-1725 including those enumerated under (h) are made hazardous, the history of the legislation shows that an occupation is not brought under the Act unless it is (1) defined as hazardous, and (2) engaged in by an "employer" as defined in the Act. Lastly, it is argued that the various session laws show that the legislature intended the state and its instrumentalities to be deemed "employers" only as to the services performed by police officers and others enumerated. There is substance to these contentions. Turning back to O.C.L.A., § 102-1714, we observe that the language employed is purely negative; the state "shall not have the right to reject". It might be said that if the legislature intended to provide that the state should be subject to the Act as to all activities defined as hazardous, apt language was *417 available, but none was availed of. The same section provides that if the state engages "as an employer" it shall not have the right to reject the Act. We are constrained to reject the contention of the defendant, however, on the ground that this court has squarely announced a contrary doctrine. In King v. Union Oil Company, 144 Or. 655, 24 P.2d 345, 25 P.2d 1055, the plaintiff, an injured workman brought an action for damages based on negligence against the Oil Company. The workman was a water boy working on a road crew employed by the county in constructing a market road. At that time, though the law has since been changed, the section O.C. 1930, 49-1825, defining hazardous occupations, after the usual enumeration, added the words "and all occupations for which rates are expressly established by section 49-1825". The last-named section expressly established a rate for "road making". It was held that the action against the Oil Company would not lie because plaintiff's case was covered by the Compensation Act. The court said:
The King case was decided in 1933. Since that time there have been eight regular sessions of the legislature, at each of which the Workmen's Compensation Act has been overhauled, but no change has been made in the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 102-1714 which was construed and applied in the King case. We have reason *418 to assume that the administrative construction of the Act by the Commission has been in harmony with the decision of the court, notwithstanding the contention of counsel for that Commission.
In the recent case of Stuhr v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 186 Or. 629, 208 P.2d 450, this court cited the King case with approval, though the ruling pursuant thereto was perhaps not necessary to the decision. The construction of the Act as it applies to the state is not free from doubt. We apprehend that the practice of the Commission might be seriously disrupted if the construction placed on the Act by the King case were now rejected. The legislature will soon be in session and will have the opportunity to clarify the Act if the judicial construction of 1933 does not express the present legislative intent.
2. Construing O.C.L.A., § 102-1714 and O.C.L.A., § 102-1725, supra, as legislative declarations that the state is to be deemed an employer as to all of the hazardous occupations enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (h) inclusive, and therefore subject to the Act, we turn to the first three assignments of error and will consider whether in the case at bar, there is any substantial evidence that the employer was engaging in a hazardous occupation. Under O.C.L.A., § 102-1712, if the military department was engaged in an occupation partly hazardous and partly nonhazardous, then it is under the terms of the Act "as if said occupation were wholly hazardous".
3. In Bennett v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 113 Or. 627, 233 P. 537, the employer was operating a sawmill. The employee was injured while engaged in moving a donkey-engine to the mill. The *419 operation of the sawmill was admittedly a hazardous occupation. The plaintiff recovered. The court said:
See also Union Oil Co. of California v. Hunt, 111 F.2d 269. The word "occupation" as used in the statute, cannot be interpreted to mean "the business in which one is principally engaged" as indicated in Childers v. Brown, 81 Or. 1, 158 P. 166. In that case this court was construing the statute which exempts from execution a team "necessary to enable any person to carry on the trade, occupation or profession by which such person habitually earns his living * * *". The section with which we are now concerned, of necessity, implies that an employer may have two or more occupations which may be carried on, either separately or together. In dealing with the many activities of the state or of its military department, we take judicial notice that it may have many separate occupations, some of them wholly nonhazardous. The evidence presented in this case tends to show that the administration of the Camp Adair project was a separate occupation. Our decision does not therefore affect all of the activities of the military department as would be the case if we construed the word "occupation" as inclusive of all of the activities of the department.
*420 As we have shown, the military department assumed the obligation to carry on such maintenance and repairs as would be necessary in order to return the property to the War Department in the same condition in which the property was received, less ordinary wear and tear. Concerning the carpenter shop which was maintained and operated at the camp, the witness Clack testified as follows:
The plaintiff testified concerning her husband's work as follows: "Well, he greased trucks and he build cabinets in the carpenter shop and they repaired on high lines, put back missing wires. Well, they kept the firing range clean and repaired minor repairs like windows." His work was diversified and every day he had a different job. His duties as utility man were "general maintenance and repair". The over-all work that the men did at the camp was "just general repair work, necessary repairs, minor repairs most". The installations at the camp included a shop for the repair of vehicles as well as a carpenter shop. In this shop an electric pump and electric air compressor were used. There were federal vehicles at the camp which had been turned over to the state for their use and maintenance. The witness Clack testified:
He also testified:
He further testified that they replaced locks, rehung doors and made minor roof repairs. Under instructions from the headquarters of the National Guard the witness Clack and the deceased workman built in the carpenter shop a mailing cabinet, a pigeonhole cabinet for various addressed envelopes, on which they worked at odd times for about a week. The cabinet was delivered to the Salem office of the military department.
4. As provided in O.C.L.A., § 102-1725 (e), the repair of buildings is defined as a hazardous occupation. There is substantial evidence that the occupation of the military department at Camp Adair included repair of buildings and that such repair was a part of the regular duties of the injured workman. As in Bennett v. State Industrial Accident Commission, supra, we find that the military department at Camp Adair was engaged in one occupation, and not two different or separate occupations. It was engaged in maintenance and repair of buildings. It thus becomes unnecessary to consider whether the activities of the military department at the camp, other than repair of buildings, were hazardous within the definitions of the statute. The employer being in an occupation partly hazardous is brought within the terms of the statute "the same as if said *423 occupation were wholly hazardous" and the workman engaged in the occupation and in all work incidental thereto was subject to the provisions of the Act. We find it unnecessary to decide, therefore, whether the carpenter shop operated by the employer was a workshop within the meaning of the somewhat ambiguous definition thereof, which is found in the statute O.C.L.A., § 102-1702, nor is it necessary to consider the extraordinary contention that the throwing of a switch on a power line constitutes the operation of power plants or lines within the terms of O.C.L.A., § 102-1725. We hold that the injured workman was employed by an "employer" in an occupation partly hazardous. The employer and his workmen in that occupation at Camp Adair were under the Act.
Defendant's fifth contention is that employment by the National Guard is excluded from the Workmen's Compensation Act. In support of this position it is said that a separate system of compensation is provided by Oregon law for personnel of the National Guard. The workman was not a member of the National Guard. He was a civilian employee of the military department. O.C.L.A., § 103-285, to which reference is made, provides for relief to injured officers or enlisted men of the National Guard. It has no application here.
5. It is next contended that O.C.L.A., §§ 102-1714 and 102-1715 are void "their titles being in violation of Article IV, Sec. 22 of the Constitution * * *". The sections, the validity of which is challenged, first appear as a part of Chapter 326 of the Laws of 1927, under a title which reads as follows:
That chapter amends the original Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913, as amended. The title to Chapter 112 of the Laws of 1913 reads as follows:
6, 7. The title does not refer to "persons, firms and corporations" but to the duties of employers and workmen subject to the Act. We think that it was competent for the legislature under this title to declare who shall be deemed employers and what their duties under the Act shall be. The original Act has been amended with reference to the duties or rights of various governmental bodies, as employers, by nearly every legislative session from 1917 to 1949. In many instances the amendments referred only to the right to elect to come under the Act; in others, mandatory duties were imposed. *425 We are not disposed at this late date to invalidate all of the legislation of the past thirty years which has dealt with the rights and duties of the state and its instrumentalities under the Act, in view of our plain duty to give a liberal construction to remedial statutes of this character. Stuhr v. State Industrial Accident Commission, supra. We hold that the amendments were germane to the subject expressed in the title to the original Act.
8-10. Defendant's seventh contention is that O.C.L.A., §§ 102-1714 and 102-1715 are violative of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and of section 20, Article I of the Constitution of Oregon. This argument is based on a false premise. Defendant assumes correctly that the National Guard is a department of the state and that the sovereign immunity from suit applies. It then assumes that the Compensation Commission would be compelled to pay the claim in the case at bar out of funds contributed by private employers without any right to sue the state for reimbursement. If the legislature has placed the state or its military department under the Act, then by the same token it has imposed upon the state the duty to contribute and to pay to the accident fund the payments required of employers by the Act. O.C.L.A., § 102-1725. This court must presume that the state will take such action as will not impose on private employers, burdens which are not rightly theirs.
11. Lastly, the defendant contends that "if the work was hazardous, the workman was performing an illegal act and therefore was not in the course of his employment." The evidence shows that the deceased workman was not a licensed electrician. So it is claimed that if he performed services in the operation of a *426 power plant or line he was doing an illegal act. The throwing of a switch for the purpose of turning on the electricity is not operating a power plant or line regardless of whether the switch be at the back door of a private residence or on a power pole. Nor was the act of turning the switch one which required a license under the provisions of O.C.L.A., § 112-612 or any other section of the chapter requiring licenses for electrical workers. The evidence shows that the workman could have used a "hot stick" six feet long with which to throw the switch, but preferred to climb the pole into close proximity to the high power wires. In throwing the switch he was performing a duty expressly imposed upon him and was within the course of his employment when killed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.