Title: Grimes v. Suzukawa
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002536
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CORINNE GRIMES 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 002536 
September 14, 2001 
 
RONALD SUZUKAWA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
J. Peyton Farmer, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff, who 
filed an action alleging intentional torts against a defendant 
was entitled to rely upon the tolling provision contained in 
Code § 8.01-229(D). 
 
Plaintiff, Corinne Gruber Grimes, filed her motion for 
judgment against the defendant, Ronald Suzukawa, on May 12, 
2000.  She alleged the following.  On September 27, 1992, the 
plaintiff was threatened and sexually assaulted by the 
defendant, "who had broken and entered into her apartment at 
approximately 2:45 a.m."  The defendant covered his face with 
a mask, entered the plaintiff's bedroom, and threatened to 
hurt her if she screamed.  The defendant bound the plaintiff's 
hands with a cord and sexually molested her. 
 
The plaintiff alleged causes of action against the 
defendant for sexual assault and battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, trespass, false 
imprisonment, and assault and battery.  The plaintiff sought 
compensatory and punitive damages for her alleged injuries. 
 
The defendant filed a responsive pleading and a plea in 
bar.  He asserted in his pleadings that the plaintiff's causes 
of action arose on September 27, 1992, and that her actions 
were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
 
The plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to the 
defendant's plea in bar and asserted that her claims were 
tolled by Code § 8.01-229(D), which states in relevant part: 
 
"When the filing of an action is obstructed by 
a defendant's . . . (ii) using any other direct or 
indirect means to obstruct the filing of an action, 
then the time that such obstruction has continued 
shall not be counted as any part of the period 
within which the action must be brought." 
 
The plaintiff argued that she "had no way of knowing her 
assailant's identity until 16 July 1999 when [d]efendant 
confessed his crimes to the police [and, therefore,] she could 
not until then bring an action to redress the injuries that 
[d]efendant had deliberately inflicted upon her." 
 
The litigants did not submit any evidence to the circuit 
court, which decided the case based on the pleadings, 
argument, and memoranda of counsel.  The circuit court entered 
an order sustaining the defendant's plea in bar and dismissing 
the plaintiff's motion for judgment with prejudice.  The 
plaintiff appeals. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiff "concedes that her causes of 
action arose on 27 September 1992, more than seven years prior 
 
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to the filing of her motion for judgment."  The plaintiff also 
concedes that in the absence of an applicable statutory 
tolling provision, her claims are barred.  However, the 
plaintiff asserts that the defendant deliberately concealed 
his identity from her when he committed his crimes and he 
evaded capture by the police for nearly seven years and that 
these acts tolled the statute of limitations.  The defendant 
responds that the plaintiff failed to establish that his 
conduct constituted a direct or indirect means to obstruct the 
filing of the plaintiff's tort actions within the meaning of 
Code § 8.01-229(D) and, therefore, the circuit court did not 
err in dismissing the motion for judgment.  We agree with the 
defendant. 
 
A plaintiff who seeks to rely upon the tolling provision 
in Code § 8.01-229(D) must establish that the defendant 
undertook an affirmative act designed or intended, directly or 
indirectly, to obstruct the plaintiff's right to file her 
action.  See Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 814, 146 S.E.2d 
187, 190 (1966); Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Tidewater Improvement 
Co., 119 Va. 73, 82-84, 89 S.E. 118, 121 (1916); see also 
Fines v. Kendrick, 219 Va. 1084, 1086-87, 254 S.E.2d 108, 110 
(1979). 
 
In this case, the plaintiff presented no evidence that 
the defendant used any direct or indirect means to obstruct 
 
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the filing of her motion for judgment.  At best, the plaintiff 
pled in her motion for judgment that the defendant wore a mask 
during the commission of his heinous crimes, but his use of 
the mask was intended to conceal his identity and not to 
obstruct her filing of an action within the intendment of Code 
§ 8.01-229(D). 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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