Title: State v. Moore
Citation: 101 N.W.2d 579
Docket Number: N/A
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1960

101 N.W.2d 579 (1960) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David MOORE, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. Cr. 296. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 4, 1960. *581 Murray &amp; Rosenberg, Bismarck, for defendant-appellant. Leslie R. Burgum, Atty. Gen., Lyle E. Huseby, State's Atty., Cass County, Fargo, for plaintiff-respondent. MORRIS, Judge. Wesley Moore was murdered during the early morning hours of May 1, 1955. David Moore, Jr. and Joseph Munnell were charged with the crime, tried before a jury and convicted of murder in the second degree. The evidence was circumstantial. The immediate cause of death was multiple skull fractures and brain hemorrhage. The body was discovered by two residents of the area in which it was found at about 5:00 a. m. and the police were called. It was found in a street-side ditch near where an alley intersects First Street South in the City of Fargo about one-half block south of Front Street. The point is at the rear of 98 Front Street. Front Street runs east and west, extends eastwardly from First Street South for about a block and without an intersection continues onto the approach of a bridge which leads over the Red River into Moorhead, Minnesota. Front Street continues westerly from First Street into downtown Fargo. The intersecting streets bear numbers ascending in a westerly direction. The places and events involved in the testimony cover an area embracing a row of blocks immediately south of and adjacent to Front Street, extending from First Street where the body was found westward to Fourth Street and eastward to the bridge. Both defendants made motions for a new trial. The motion of Joseph Munnell was granted. That of David Moore, Jr. was denied. He appeals from the order denying his motion. On the evening of April 30, 1955 David Moore and Munnell went to Mother's Cafe on Fourth Street where they met Wesley Moore and Joyce Fisher. She had been previously acquainted with both Moores but they had not met each other before. Some liquor was brought in and consumed. At about 11:00 p. m. all four of them went in David Moore's car to the Pedro Flores residence at 86 Front Street. Neither David Moore nor Munnell was acquainted with the Flores family. Mr. Flores was not at home. The original party of four re-entered the car and drove to Moorhead where they drank more liquor. They returned to the Flores residence at about 1:30 on the morning of May 1. Mr. Flores had returned and they were invited in, where drinking continued. Shortly after they returned, a brief altercation *582 took place between Pedro Flores and David Moore whose face was slapped by Flores. The matter was adjusted, they shook hands and sat down. Records were played and more drinks were had. Miss Fisher and Mrs. Flores were former schoolmates. Both are part Indian, as is Munnell. Mr. Flores is a Mexican. About 4:00 a. m. Flores and David Moore went out into the back yard. Wesley Moore then came out, hit David Moore and knocked him down. Munnell came out and Wesley Moore pursued him. He may have hit Munnell. In any event Munnell ran westward and disappeared. In the meantime Mrs. Flores had come out and ministered to David Moore who was on the ground. Pedro Flores held Wesley Moore from attacking the prostrate man. Finally Mr. and Mrs. Flores got Wesley Moore back into the house. Another member of the party present was Willie Flores, a brother of Pedro. He did not participate in the fight but he helped David Moore to his feet and he and Pedro got David Moore into his car that was standing nearby. David Moore then shut the car door, started the motor and drove off in an easterly direction. In about fifteen minutes Wesley Moore left the house and went west. Wesley Moore used violent and abusive language toward David Moore, who was a Negro, particularly reflecting upon his race. He appears to have been angered by remarks that David Moore had made from time to time regarding displays of affection by Miss Fisher toward Wesley Moore. Patrolman Posey and officer Drenth came into the police station shortly after the dispatcher had been notified of the body and immediately went to the scene where the deceased, who was later identified as Wesley Moore, was lying. The body was nude. They saw a car up the alley one block west. This was approximately 5:30 a. m. It was a rust-colored Pontiac. It was the car of David Moore who was in it asleep. The car faced north on Second Street. They approached and woke him up. There were bloodstains on his shirt and a handkerchief was lying on the front seat with blood on it. They put handcuffs on Moore and took him to the police station. The patrolman testified that nothing was said to him about robbing or murdering anyone but "He asked us, he says, `Why you got the handcuffs on me? I never robbed nobody. I never murdered nobody. Why you got the handcuffs on me?'" They left the defendant Moore at the police station and returned to Moore's car. In the meantime patrolman Norcross and another officer had been directed to the scene by radio. They parked near the body and Norcross walked west up the alley to the rust-colored Pontiac where he was joined by the officers who had taken the defendant Moore to the police station. Patrolman Norcross took the keys out of the ignition lock and unlocked the trunk. In it was a gunnysack in which were clothes and a piece of board. The clothes were later identified as those of Wesley Moore and consisted of trousers, shirt, underclothing, belt and shoes. The piece of board was a fragment that matched another piece of board found near the body. There were blood spots on both pieces. The left side of the car on the outside had bloodspots extending from the hood to and onto the trunk. These spots were estimated at 50 to 100 in number by various witnesses. The impression of a Suburbanite automobile tire was found near the body. The defendant Moore's car had Suburbanite tires on the rear wheels. An employee of the Lafayette Hotel located nearby on Front Street was sweeping the sidewalk about ten minutes after 5:00 a. m. when the defendant David Moore drove up and got out of his car. Moore asked where he could buy some clothes. He told Moore that there was nowhere to buy clothes at that time of day. Moore then got in his car and drove away in a westerly direction. Moore admits the incident but contends that his clothes were wet and bloody with his own blood from *583 his mouth and nose which were injured by the blow that had knocked him down in the Flores yard. He denies the crime and testified that he went to sleep in his car that morning because he was tired. The coroner, who was summoned by the police officers, testified regarding the vicinity where the body lay as follows: The defendant Moore denies knowing anything about the clothes found in the trunk of his car and it is argued on his behalf that someone else killed Wesley Moore and placed the clothes in his car in order to cast suspicion on him. The defendant Moore was strong physically and a few years before while he was in the Navy he was a boxer and had engaged in 43 fights. While the evidence is circumstantial the jury in reaching their verdict could have drawn an inference of guilt from a number of facts and circumstances, among the most potent being: (1) motive as a result of being knocked down in the yard behind the Flores residence earlier in the morning and insults directed at the defendant personally and at his race by the deceased; (2) ample opportunity to commit the crime; (3) the fact that he had remained in the vicinity of the crime although a stranger in the neighborhood; (4) that at about the time of the murder he was looking for a place to buy clothes; (5) that all the evidence tending to connect his co-defendant Munnell with the crime is consistent with Moore's guilt; (6) that while the evidence against his codefendant Munnell was so weak that it resulted in the granting of a new trial by the trial court the weakness of that evidence is not inconsistent with Moore's guilt; (7) that the tire track found near the body was made by the same brand of tire that was on the rear wheels of the car that Moore owned and was driving; (8) that the defendant was strong physically and an experienced boxer having engaged in 43 bouts while in the Navy; (9) that there was a quantity of blood scattered about at the scene where the body was found and one side of the defendant's car was spotted with blood; (10) that all of the clothes of the deceased, including underwear, and a fragment of board that matched another fragment at the scene of the crime were found in a sack locked in the trunk of the defendant's car in which he was found sleeping. The trial court in a memorandum decision expressed himself with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence in these words: A motion for a new trial was later made and submitted to the court without argument pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. This motion was denied without any further memorandum. In State v. Ramstad, N.D., 87 N.W.2d 736, 737, Syllabus by the Court, it is said: Lest it be argued that the above rules are inapplicable because the defendant was convicted on circumstantial evidence we would point out that the case is here for review after the jury has found the defendant guilty under unchallenged instructions and after the trial court has denied a motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. In State v. Fouts, 169 Kan. 686, 221 P.2d 841, it is said, in the Syllabus by the Court: In People v. Newland, 15 Cal. 2d 678, 104 P.2d 778, 780, the court quotes from People v. Martinez, 20 Cal. App. 343, 128 P. 952, as follows: See also People v. Robinson, 43 Cal. 2d 132, 271 P.2d 865; Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806, 77 N.W.2d 592; State v. Papernak, 44 S.D. 31, 181 N.W. 955, 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1882. We agree with the trial court that the evidence is sufficient to warrant the jury in finding the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. We will now consider specifications of errors of law argued in the defendant's behalf. The defendants Moore and Munnell were tried jointly but not as conspirators. The prosecution called the witness Ivers and stated: The trial court then stated: After the testimony continued with respect to admissions made by Munnell over the objection of the attorney for the defendant Moore, the court again said: When the case was submitted to the jury the court gave this instruction: In Wharton's Criminal Law and Produre, Anderson, Section 2052, it is said: In State v. Fox, 133 Ohio St. 154, 12 N.E.2d 413, 414, the court thus states the rule in paragraph 2 of the Syllabus by the Court: The trial court in this case correctly and emphatically advised the jury that the admissions of Munnell could not be considered as evidence against Moore. He cannot successfully predicate error upon the testimony with respect to the admissions of Munnell. The state's attorney examined the witness Ivers regarding a conversation with the defendant Moore. He asked Ivers what that conversation was. The witness summarized the conversation which was mainly a recitation of Moore's whereabouts and movements the night of the murder. The final statement by the witness was: The attorney for Moore said: After an exchange of comments between counsel Moore's attorney moved for a mistrial which the court denied. After further comment by counsel the court announced a ten-minute recess. The record further shows that while the courtroom was in the process of dismissing for the recess the witness made this comment: The attorney for Moore then said, out of the presence of the jury: The attorney and the witness then had some dispute as to what was said. After further altercation between the attorneys for the state and the defense, and the trial was resumed, in the presence of the jury the court announced adherence to his ruling. The motion for a declaration of mistrial was renewed and again denied. The court then advised the jury that the remark must be entirely disregarded by them and further stated: It is presumed upon appeal that the jury followed the instructions given to it by the court. 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 951, thus states the rule: This presumption applies in criminal as well as in civil cases. People v. Skelly, 409 Ill. 613, 100 N.E.2d 915; State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So. 2d 333; State v. Autheman, 47 Idaho 328, 274 P. 805, 62 A.L.R. 195; People v. Isby, 30 Cal. 2d 879, 186 P.2d 405; People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 P. 11. In Dolan v. United States, 8 Cir., 218 F.2d 454, 460, it is said: *587 In this instance the objectionable testimony did not have even the temporary blessing of the trial court as would have been the case had he overruled an objection and later changed his mind and ordered the evidence stricken. The challenged statement was made by the witness in apparent response to a question to which such an answer was not anticipated. There was no opportunity for an objection. The trial court immediately and in the presence of the jury took the position that the testimony was inadmissible. He so informed the jury and emphatically directed them to put it out of their minds and disregard it. The evidence in support of the verdict, aside from the challenged testimony, is strong and convincing. In a close and doubtful case such testimony might be deemed prejudicial to the defendant. But in view of the strong evidence of guilt presented in this case the trial court did not nor does this court believe that the jury disregarded the instruction and permitted this testimony to contribute to the defendant's conviction. The incident was such that it did not require the trial court to declare a mistrial. Such error as it involved was cured by the meticulous instruction and admonition of the trial court and in this court it does not constitute reversible error. Davis v. United States, 8 Cir., 229 F.2d 181. At the close of the testimony of a witness called to the stand by the defendant Munnell, counsel for the defendant Moore demanded the right to cross-examine. The court said that he would permit the cross-examination if there was anything hostile or prejudicial to Moore in the testimony of the witness. He then asked Moore's counsel if the testimony was in any way hostile or reflected upon his client and counsel answered in the negative. The court then denied the right to cross-examine which the defendant now contends is error but does not point out any testimony that is claimed to be prejudicial. The court did not err in so ruling. The defendant Moore had a fair trial. The evidence is sufficient to warrant the jury in finding him guilty of murder in the second degree. The record discloses no prejudicial errors of law. The order appealed from is affirmed. SATHRE, C. J., and BURKE, TEIGEN and STRUTZ, JJ., concur.