Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael F. Hupy
Citation: 2011 WI 38
Docket Number: 2007AP001281-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2011

2011 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1281-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  Michael F. Hupy, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael F. Hupy, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HUPY 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 27, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 6, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK and ZIEGLER, JJ. dissent (Opinion 
filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: GABLEMAN, J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Jeremy P. 
Levinson, Joseph M. Peltz and Friebert, Finerty & St. John, 
S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Jeremy P. Levinson. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Julie M. Scott, n/k/a Spoke, Office of Lawyer 
Regulation, Madison. 
 
 
2011 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2007AP1281-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael F. Hupy, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael F. Hupy, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Michael F. Hupy appeals from 
the report and recommendation of the referee, Attorney James J. 
Winiarski, that he be publicly reprimanded for his professional 
misconduct and that he be required to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
In 
particular, 
Attorney 
Hupy 
challenges the referee's conclusions that he committed three 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
After thoroughly reviewing the matter, the court is 
evenly split as to whether there is a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) 
as alleged in Count 1 of the complaint filed by the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR).  Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice 
Bradley, and Justice Crooks conclude that Attorney Hupy engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c),1 by sending out 
a mass-mailing postcard at issue in Count 1.  Justice Prosser, 
Justice Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler conclude that the 
postcard does not constitute an ethical violation.  With respect 
to Count 2, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, Justice 
Crooks, and Justice Prosser conclude that Attorney Hupy violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c) 
by 
sending 
out 
a 
mass-mailing 
brochure 
to 
potential clients in 2006 that contained a false statement.2  
Finally, the court determines that the OLR failed to prove a 
violation on Count 3, which alleged that Attorney Hupy had 
violated former SCRs 20:7.1(a)3 and 20:7.5(a)4 by affixing a 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
2 Justice Roggensack and Justice Ziegler conclude that the 
OLR did not prove a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) on Count 2 and 
therefore dissent. 
3 Former SCR 20:7.1(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided as follows: 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication 
about 
the 
lawyer 
or 
the 
lawyer's 
services.  A communication is false or misleading if 
it: 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
3 
 
sticker to his correspondence in 2004 that announced the "35th 
Anniversary" of his law firm, known at the time as Michael F. 
Hupy and Associates, S.C.5   
¶3 
We determine that a public reprimand is appropriate 
discipline 
for 
Attorney Hupy's professional misconduct in 
conducting mass mailings of a false advertising brochure.  We 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact 
or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement 
considered 
as 
a 
whole 
not 
materially 
misleading; 
 
(2) is 
likely 
to 
create 
an 
unjustified 
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or 
states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results 
by means that violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law; 
 
(3) compares the lawyer's services with other 
lawyers' 
services, unless the comparison can be 
factually substantiated; or 
 
(4) contains any paid testimonial about, or paid 
endorsement of, the lawyer without identifying the 
fact that payment has been made or, if the testimonial 
or endorsement is not made by an actual client, 
without identifying that fact. 
4 Former SCR 20:7.5(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
stated: 
A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or 
other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.  
A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private 
practice if it does not imply a connection with a 
government agency or with a public or charitable legal 
services 
organization 
and 
is 
not 
otherwise 
in 
violation of Rule 7.1. 
5 The law firm is now known as Hupy and Abraham S.C.  For 
ease of reference, this decision will refer to the law firm as 
the "Hupy law firm." 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
4 
 
emphasize that attorneys must be careful to ensure that the 
advertising materials they send to members of the public are 
truthful about themselves and about other attorneys. 
¶4 
There are not four justices who would reach the same 
result regarding the amount of costs to be imposed on Attorney 
Hupy.  Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice 
Crooks would impose all costs, with the exception of OLR's pre-
appeal attorney fees that it attempted to add in response to 
this court's questions at oral argument.  Justice Prosser would 
impose a total of $35,000 in costs against Attorney Hupy.  
Justice Roggensack and Justice Ziegler would not impose any 
costs because they have concluded that the OLR failed to prove 
any violations against Attorney Hupy.  Thus, because three 
justices would impose more than $35,000 in costs and Justice 
Prosser would impose $35,000 in costs, the decision of the 
majority of the participating justices is to impose $35,000 in 
costs on Attorney Hupy. 
¶5 
Attorney Hupy was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in 1972.  He has never before been the subject of 
professional discipline. 
¶6 
The first two counts of the OLR's complaint relate to 
advertising pieces issued by the Hupy law firm to potential 
clients, in which Attorney Hupy criticized Attorney Charles 
Hausmann.  According to the referee's findings of fact, Attorney 
Hupy worked for Attorney Hausmann's law firm, then known as 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
5 
 
Hausmann-McNally S.C.,6 from 1976 to 1989.  In 1989 there was a 
falling out between Attorney Hausmann and Attorney Hupy, and 
Attorney Hupy left the Hausmann-McNally firm to join the law 
firm of Jacobson, O'Dess, and Krings S.C.  At the time that 
Attorney Hupy left, there was considerable animosity between 
Attorney Hupy and Attorney Hausmann, and that animosity has 
continued to the present day.  Both Attorney Hupy and Attorney 
Hausmann practice in the area of plaintiffs' personal injury 
law.  They and their respective law firms have competed for 
personal injury clients since 1989.   
¶7 
In June 2002 Attorney Hausmann pled guilty to a 
federal charge of interstate mail and wire fraud by depriving 
his clients of the right to his honest services in connection 
with a kickback scheme with a chiropractor to whom Attorney 
Hausmann referred clients.  The federal district court sentenced 
Attorney Hausmann to two months imprisonment and 16 months of 
supervised release.  It also required Attorney Hausmann to 
complete 40 hours of community service and to pay $77,000 in 
restitution to his clients.  Attorney Hausmann began serving his 
federal prison sentence in November 2003.   
¶8 
The 
OLR 
filed 
a 
disciplinary 
complaint 
against 
Attorney Hausmann in connection with his federal conviction in 
January 2004.  That disciplinary case ended in July 2005 with 
this court suspending Attorney Hausmann's license for a period 
                                                 
6 This law firm is currently known as McNally Law Offices, 
S.C.  It will be referenced as "Hausmann-McNally" in this 
decision. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
6 
 
of one year, effective as of August 30, 2005.  The referee in 
the present case specifically found that Attorney Hausmann had 
ceased practicing law prior to the effective date of his 2005 
suspension.  Attorney Hausmann's license was reinstated by this 
court in a decision dated May 17, 2007.   
¶9 
Shortly 
after 
Attorney 
Hausmann 
was 
sentenced, 
Attorney Hupy and his law firm began to include language in 
their 
advertisements to potential clients that publicized 
Attorney Hausmann's conviction and criticized the Hausmann-
McNally firm.  It has been the practice of Attorney Hupy and the 
firm in which he has practiced to send out every month direct 
mailings to a large number of individuals who have recently been 
involved in automobile accidents. 
¶10 Count 1 of the OLR's complaint relates to a postcard 
that Attorney Hupy began to include in those direct mail 
packages beginning in December 2003.  The postcard was entitled 
"Beware:  You will Probably Get a Letter from a Law Firm Whose 
Senior Partner Went to Prison on November 28, 2003."  After a 
greeting line of "Dear Friend," the postcard contained the 
following text: 
Listen to one example of what lawyer advertising has 
come to:  Hausmann McNally law firm Senior Partner, 
Charles J. Hausmann, went to prison for defrauding 
approximately 
200 of his firm's personal injury 
clients.  He and his firm still send direct mail 
advertising to accident victims telling them to hire a 
lawyer they can really trust.  Lawyers can mail 
letters and advertise on television without ever 
having tried a personal injury case. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
7 
 
By separate mailing we have sent you a letter 
containing an article entitled How to Find a Good 
Personal Injury Lawyer and information about our firm.  
Please take the time to read this article and ask 
questions before you hire a lawyer. 
¶11 The referee found that the primary purposes of the 
postcard (and the other direct mail pieces sent out by Attorney 
Hupy and his firm) were to solicit the legal business of 
individuals involved in automobile accidents and to discourage 
those individuals from hiring Attorney Hausmann and his firm.  
Thus, the referee concluded that the content of the postcard was 
commercial speech. 
¶12 The referee also found that by placing the statement 
"Lawyers can mail letters and advertise on television without 
ever having tried a personal injury case" in the same paragraph 
as statements about Attorney Hausmann's conviction and the 
Hausmann-McNally firm, Attorney Hupy "gave recipients of the 
postcard the false impression that Hausmann and the lawyers at 
the Hausmann-McNally firm had never tried a personal injury 
case."7  The referee further found that the placement of the last 
sentence in the first paragraph of the postcard next to 
statements about Attorney Hausmann and the Hausmann-McNally law 
firm had been done "deliberately, knowingly, and in reckless 
disregard of the truth."   
¶13 On the basis of these findings, the referee concluded 
that the statement about not having tried a personal injury case 
                                                 
7 The referee expressly found that at the time the postcards 
were created and distributed all of the lawyers at the Hausmann-
McNally firm had tried personal injury cases.   
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
8 
 
was "dishonest, deceitful, and misleading," and constituted a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  
¶14 The referee rejected Attorney Hupy's argument that the 
OLR was estopped from prosecuting Count 1 because it had 
previously reviewed the postcard and had raised no objection.  
In particular, Attorney Hupy pointed to the fact that in 
December 2003 he had submitted the postcard to the OLR as an 
advertisement pursuant to SCR 20:7.3(c)8 and the OLR had not 
objected to the postcard at that time as being false or 
misleading.9  In addition, when a grievance was subsequently 
filed regarding the postcard, an OLR investigator left a voice-
mail message for an attorney at the Hupy law firm stating that 
the 
investigator 
had 
not 
found 
anything 
wrong 
with 
the 
advertisement and had sent the matter to the OLR's deputy 
director "for closure."   
                                                 
8 SCR 20:7.3(c) provides as follows: 
Every 
written, 
recorded 
or 
electronic 
communication from a lawyer soliciting professional 
employment from a prospective client known to be in 
need of legal services in a particular matter shall 
include the words "Advertising Material" on the 
outside envelope, if any, and at the beginning and 
ending 
of 
any 
printed, 
recorded 
or 
electronic 
communication, 
unless 
the 
recipient 
of 
the 
communication is a person specified in pars. (a)(1) or 
(a)(2), and a copy of it shall be filed with the 
office of lawyer regulation within five days of its 
dissemination. 
9 As discussed below, because Attorney Hupy made this same 
argument on appeal, this court ordered additional memoranda on 
the scope of the review of advertising materials conducted by 
the OLR. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
9 
 
¶15 The referee concluded that the initial review of the 
postcard and the voice-mail message by the OLR investigator did 
not estop the OLR from subsequently pursuing a claim of 
professional misconduct.  As the voice-mail message made clear, 
an initial review of an advertisement does not preclude the OLR 
from a subsequent review if the OLR receives a grievance or 
determines that the advertisement is potentially in violation of 
the ethical rules.  With respect to the investigator's statement 
that he had sent the subsequent grievance for closure, the 
referee noted that the grievance was not, in fact, closed by the 
deputy director, who makes the final decision, subject to review 
by the director, whether to close a grievance or proceed with an 
investigation. 
¶16 Count 2 of the OLR's complaint related to another 
direct mail item that was critical of Attorney Hausmann and the 
Hausmann-McNally firm.  This writing was in the form of an 
article in a direct mail brochure rather than a postcard. 
¶17 The 
article, 
entitled 
"Read 
Mail 
from 
Lawyers 
Cautiously," began with the following paragraph: 
A lawyer with an office at 633 West Wisconsin 
Avenue in Milwaukee, who pleaded guilty to a felony 
after defrauding 200 personal injury clients and was 
sentenced to Federal prison is still practicing law 
pending his appeal.  His law firm is still sending 
letters soliciting personal injury cases to people who 
have been involved in motor vehicle accidents.  The 
lawyer's partner sends a 28 page brochure telling 
injury victims they should "Find a lawyer and law firm 
they can really trust."  What the brochure does not 
tell you is that the senior partner was convicted of 
conduct that betrayed the trust and confidence placed 
in him by his clients. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
10 
 
¶18 The referee found that the lawyer referenced in this 
paragraph was Attorney Hausmann and the law firm was Hausmann-
McNally.  Attorney Hupy's appellate brief acknowledges that 
while the article does not mention Attorney Hausmann or his law 
firm by name, a reader would likely have made that connection. 
¶19 The brochure containing this article was initially 
mailed to prospective clients in November 2003.  The Hupy law 
firm sent this brochure and article to approximately 4,000 
potential clients each month for several months.  The OLR did 
not allege and the referee did not find that the article was 
false or misleading when it was mailed out during this initial 
time period.  At that time Attorney Hausmann's appeal of his 
criminal case was indeed pending.  In addition, although 
Attorney Hausmann began serving his prison sentence in November 
2003, his license to practice law in Wisconsin was not suspended 
until August 2005, when the disciplinary proceeding against him 
was completed.  Thus, in late 2003 and early 2004 it was not 
false to say that Attorney Hausmann could have been practicing 
law pending the outcome of his federal criminal appeal while the 
disciplinary investigation and proceeding were in progress. 
¶20 The referee found, however, that Attorney Hupy and his 
firm once again included the article in direct mailings in the 
period of March to November 2006.  No changes were made to the 
article.  It continued to state that Attorney Hausmann was 
"still practicing law pending his appeal."  The referee, 
therefore, found that the article as reprinted in 2006 was false 
in two respects.  First, by March 1, 2006, Attorney Hausmann's 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
11 
 
criminal appeal had been long concluded and he had even been out 
of prison for more than two years.  Second, Attorney Hausmann's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin had been suspended as of 
August 2005, and he remained under suspension during the 2006 
time period when the article was distributed a second time.  
Although Attorney Hupy attempted to argue to the contrary, the 
referee explicitly found that Attorney Hausmann was not engaged 
in the practice of law during the suspension of his law license.   
¶21 Thus, the referee found that the article's statement 
in 2006 that Attorney Hausmann "is still practicing law pending 
his appeal" was dishonest, deceitful, and misleading, and 
constituted a 
material misrepresentation, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  The referee further found that Attorney Hupy's 
use of that statement from March to November 2006 was done 
"deliberately, knowingly, and in reckless disregard of the 
truth." 
¶22 The referee rejected Attorney Hupy's argument that the 
failure to correct any factual inaccuracies when the article was 
used for a second time in 2006 was merely an oversight.  The 
referee pointed to the fact that neither Attorney Hupy nor his 
partner 
could 
provide 
evidence 
of 
periodic 
reviews 
of 
advertising material to ensure its factual accuracy.  The 
referee expressly found that Attorney Hupy had intentionally 
turned a blind eye to the inaccurate statement: 
It is unconscionable that the respondent would 
draft 
such 
time 
sensitive 
advertising 
and 
then 
essentially 
"forget" 
about 
the 
advertising 
and 
continue its use long after it had become factually 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
12 
 
inaccurate.  I do not find that the respondent simply 
"forgot" about the offending language, or that he 
never reviewed the content of the brochure, which had 
by then been used tens of thousands of times.  
Respondent chose to ignore the problem language for an 
extended period of time for financial gain, and for 
purposes of deliberately harming his major competitor. 
¶23 The referee also rejected Attorney Hupy's contention 
that the statement was factually accurate in 2006 because 
Attorney Hausmann was indeed practicing law at that time.  
Although Attorney Hupy claimed that Attorney Hausmann was 
practicing law because his name remained on some Internet 
website in connection with the law firm's name and on an annual 
report for the Hausmann-McNally law firm service corporation, 
the referee found that Attorney Hausmann had not, in fact, 
engaged in the practice of law during his suspension.  The 
referee made the following specific finding:  "There is no 
evidence that [Attorney Hausmann] performed legal work on any 
client file or was present on the premises of the law firm when 
any 
legal 
business 
was 
conducted 
during 
his 
period 
of 
suspension." 
¶24 Attorney Hupy made a number of other arguments against 
a conclusion of professional misconduct on Counts 1 and 2 
relating to the postcard and brochure article.  He asserted that 
the postcard and article were protected speech under the First 
Amendment because they were part of Attorney Hupy's purported 
campaign to educate the public about the dangers of lawyer 
advertising.  The referee concluded, however, that both the 
postcard and brochure article constituted commercial speech.  He 
noted that both Attorney Hupy and his partner acknowledged at 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
13 
 
the disciplinary hearing that the Hupy law firm had a profit 
motive in sending out the direct mail advertising at issue in 
Counts 1 and 2.  Indeed, the postcard and the brochure were 
mailed with other documents that clearly solicited the legal 
business of the recipients.  Having determined that the 
communications at issue were commercial speech, the referee 
concluded that neither communication was protected by the First 
Amendment 
because 
they 
contained 
false 
and 
misleading 
statements.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) ("The States and 
the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination of 
commercial 
speech 
that 
is 
false, 
deceptive, 
or 
misleading, . . . ."). 
¶25 Attorney Hupy also argued that he could not be found 
in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) on Counts 1 and 2 because the OLR 
was obligated under that rule to prove that he had actual 
knowledge or "substantial doubt" as to the falsity of the 
statements.  The referee responded that SCR 20:1.0(h) defines 
"misrepresentation" as the "communication of an untruth, either 
knowingly or with reckless disregard."  In addition, the rule 
states that a person's knowledge may be inferred from the 
circumstances of the communication.  The referee found that 
Attorney Hupy had knowingly made false statements in the two 
direct mail pieces.  First, he found that Attorney Hupy knew 
that at the time the postcard was distributed Attorney Hausmann 
and the lawyers at Hausmann-McNally had tried personal injury 
cases.  Second, he found that Attorney Hupy knew in 2006 that 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
14 
 
the statement that Attorney Hausmann was still practicing law 
pending his appeal was false.  Attorney Hausmann's appeal had 
ended well before that time and his license to practice law had 
also been suspended.  Attorney Hupy did not show that at the 
time of the second use of the brochure article in 2006 he had 
knowledge of any facts to support the statement that Attorney 
Hausmann was still practicing law pending his criminal appeal. 
¶26 The referee rejected Attorney Hupy's claim that Counts 
1 and 2 violated due process because SCR 20:8.4(c) did not give 
him sufficient notice of what communications are prohibited.  
The referee concluded that the prohibition against engaging in 
"conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation" 
provided sufficient notice such that a 
reasonable attorney, with knowledge of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court rules, would know that he or she could not make false 
advertising claims like the ones made by Attorney Hupy in the 
postcard and brochure article. 
¶27 The referee also rejected Attorney Hupy's contention 
that Counts 1 and 2 should have been charged under SCR 20:7.1, 
which prohibits false or misleading communications about a 
lawyer or the lawyer's services, rather than SCR 20:8.4(c).  The 
referee stated that it was within the OLR's discretion as to 
what charges to pursue.  In addition, the referee noted that the 
factual findings he had made would also have supported finding 
violations of SCR 20:7.1. 
¶28 Count 3 of the OLR's complaint involved Attorney 
Hupy's use of a sticker on his firm's letterhead in 2004 that 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
15 
 
indicated that Michael F. Hupy and Associates, S.C., as the firm 
was then known, was celebrating its 35th anniversary.  The OLR 
alleged 
that 
this 
sticker 
constituted 
a 
material 
misrepresentation about Attorney Hupy and his law firm, in 
violation of SCR 20:7.1(a) and SCR 20:7.5(a), because Attorney 
Hupy's "purchase" of a service corporation in 1997 did not allow 
him to trace the lineage of his then-current law firm all the 
way back to 1969, as the sticker indicated.   
¶29 Attorney Hupy has not been associated with the same 
firm throughout his legal career.  After graduating from law 
school in 1972, he worked as an associate attorney for a firm by 
the name of Eisenberg, Kletchke, and Eisenberg.  As noted above, 
from 1976 to 1989 Attorney Hupy was an associate attorney, a 
partner, and then a shareholder with the Hausmann-McNally law 
firm. 
¶30 In 1989 Attorney Hupy left Hausmann-McNally to become 
an associate attorney with the law firm then known as Jacobson, 
O'Dess, and Krings, S.C.  The first attorney listed in that firm 
name was Attorney Thomas Jacobson. 
¶31 Attorney 
Hupy became a shareholder in Jacobson, 
O'Dess, and Krings, S.C., either later in 1989 or in 1990.  At 
some time thereafter the name of that law firm was changed to 
Jacobson and Hupy S.C.  At that point Attorney Jacobson and 
Attorney Hupy were the only two shareholders in the service 
corporation.   
¶32 In late 1996 Attorney Hupy and Attorney Jacobson 
decided to part ways.  They ultimately entered into a Stock 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
16 
 
Redemption 
and 
Compensation 
Agreement 
(the 
Redemption 
Agreement), which took effect as of January 1, 1997.  Pursuant 
to the Redemption Agreement, the service corporation purchased 
all of Attorney Jacobson's shares, leaving Attorney Hupy as the 
sole shareholder in the corporation.  Attorney Jacobson then 
left the firm to start up a new law firm.  Attorney Hupy 
subsequently changed the name of the service corporation to 
Michael F. Hupy and Associates, S.C. 
¶33 In paragraph 19 of the Redemption Agreement, Attorney 
Jacobson and Attorney Hupy agreed that after Attorney Jacobson 
left the firm each of them would "have the sole and exclusive 
right to the use of their respective names and such names may 
not be used (in a firm name or otherwise) by the other for 
purposes of engaging in the practice of law . . . ." 
¶34 The OLR essentially alleged in Count 3 that because 
Attorney Hupy had not been associated with the Jacobson and Hupy 
law firm until 1989 and had agreed in the Redemption Agreement 
not to use Attorney Jacobson's name after 1997, it was a 
misrepresentation for him to claim in 2004 that his law firm was 
celebrating its 35th anniversary. 
¶35 Attorney Hupy argued that the 35th anniversary sticker 
used in 2004 was not a misrepresentation because the history of 
the firm he owned as of 2004 could be traced back to at least 
1969.  This led the referee to make findings regarding Attorney 
Jacobson's legal career and the firm(s) he owned and ultimately 
transferred to Attorney Hupy's control. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
17 
 
¶36 From 1962 to 1967 Attorney Jacobson practiced in a law 
firm by the name of "Barbee & Jacobson." In 1967 Attorney 
Jacobson and Attorney Barbee each took the legal files on which 
they were working and went their separate ways.  Attorney 
Jacobson then began to practice law as a sole proprietor under 
the name "Law Offices of Thomas Jacobson."  In 1969 Attorney 
David Melnick began working for Attorney Jacobson.  According to 
Attorney Melnick, he soon became a partner with Attorney 
Jacobson, but he could not state whether that occurred in 1969 
or 1970.  Once the partnership was formed, the law firm went by 
the name of "Jacobson and Melnick." 
¶37 In 1972 Attorneys Jacobson and Melnick "merged" with 
the practice of Attorneys Boris Sodos and Sid Sodos.  The firm 
in which the four lawyers practiced together was known initially 
as "Sodos, Jacobson, Sodos, and Melnick."  Attorney Melnick 
described the arrangement between the four attorneys as a 
partnership, but testified that it was not "formalized."  For 
example, when Attorney Boris Sodos left the arrangement shortly 
after it came into existence, "all he did was take his practice 
with him."  No money exchanged hands when Attorney Sodos 
allegedly gave up his partnership interest.  The name of the law 
firm simply changed to "Jacobson, Sodos, and Melnick." 
¶38 The 
referee 
found 
that 
the 
witnesses 
at 
the 
disciplinary hearing were unaware of any written partnership 
agreements.  The referee further found that if there had been an 
oral partnership agreement, there was little evidence presented 
as to what the terms of the agreement had been.  Indeed, there 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
18 
 
was no evidence as to the terms and conditions by which each 
partner had joined or left the firm between 1970 and 1974.  The 
referee commented that the testimony suggested more of an 
office-sharing arrangement than a true law firm partnership, 
although there was evidence of the splitting of some fees 
between the partners.  The referee ultimately concluded that the 
evidence supported a series of separate partnerships with 
different partners rather than one continuing partnership with 
additional partners joining and exiting.  As support for this 
conclusion, the referee pointed to the fact that the name of the 
firm changed each time a new partner was added or an existing 
partner left. 
¶39 In 1974 the remaining partners incorporated their 
practice as a service corporation.  The referee found, however, 
that the shareholders of the service corporation continued to 
operate with much of the same informality that marked the period 
from 1970 to 1974. 
¶40 From 1974 to 1989 shareholders joined and left the 
service corporation, and the law firm changed names at least 
three times.  As noted, Attorney Hupy joined the firm in 1989 
and soon thereafter became a shareholder.  The name of the law 
firm/service corporation then became "Jacobson & Hupy." 
¶41 The referee concluded that it was misleading for 
Attorney Hupy to claim the lineage of the firm or firms that 
Attorney Jacobson had owned prior to 1997.  First, the referee 
pointed to paragraph 19 of the Redemption Agreement, which the 
referee interpreted to mean that, after January 1, 1997, 
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2007AP1281-D   
 
19 
 
Attorney Hupy could not use any of the pre-1997 history of the 
firm that had been associated with Attorney Jacobson.  Even if 
Attorney Hupy was allowed under the Redemption Agreement to use 
Attorney Jacobson's "history," the referee concluded that at 
most Attorney Hupy could trace the history of the law firm known 
in 2004 as Michael F. Hupy and Associates, S.C. only back to 
Attorney Jacobson's incorporation of the service corporation in 
1974.  The referee believed that any history that existed prior 
to that incorporation date belonged only to Attorney Jacobson, 
not Attorney Hupy, because Attorney Hupy was not part of any 
pre-1974 arrangements.  Moreover, the referee concluded that the 
pre-1974 arrangements were a series of separate partnerships 
rather than a single, ongoing partnership that changed into a 
corporate form in 1974.   
¶42 Because the referee determined that Attorney Hupy 
could not validly trace the lineage of his firm back to 1969, he 
concluded that the use of the 35th anniversary sticker in 2004 
without any additional explanation was a misrepresentation about 
Attorney Hupy and his firm's name and letterhead, in violation 
of SCRs 20:7.1(a) and 20:7.5(a).  The referee further stated 
that a discrepancy of even five years regarding the founding 
date of the firm was a material misstatement because it was made 
by Attorney Hupy in an attempt to influence the choice of a law 
firm by potential clients. 
¶43 Having 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Hupy 
had 
committed 
professional misconduct on all three of the counts set forth in 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
20 
 
the OLR's complaint, the referee turned to the issue of the 
proper level of discipline.   
¶44 The referee properly stated the primary factors this 
court 
considers 
when 
assessing 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline:  (1) the seriousness, nature, and extent of the 
professional misconduct, (2) the level of discipline needed to 
protect the public, the courts, and the legal system from 
repetition of the attorney's misconduct, (3) the need to impress 
upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and (4) the 
need 
to 
deter 
other 
attorneys 
from 
engaging 
in 
similar 
misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 
2005 WI 40, ¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.  The referee 
determined that the misconduct he had found on Counts 1 and 2 
was serious because it had been intentionally deceptive and 
misleading in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage over 
another lawyer.  The referee also concluded that a public form 
of discipline was needed to impress upon Attorney Hupy and other 
attorneys 
the 
seriousness 
of 
engaging 
in 
such 
improper 
advertising, especially since Attorney Hupy had attempted to 
portray the inaccurate statements in the postcard and brochure 
as minor and insignificant. 
¶45 The 
referee 
noted 
a 
number 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating factors.  On the aggravating side, the referee stated 
that Attorney Hupy's misconduct had stemmed from a dishonest and 
selfish motive and that he had demonstrated a pattern of 
improper advertising that had resulted in multiple counts of 
misconduct.  Further, the referee concluded that Attorney Hupy's 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
21 
 
misconduct had caused harm both to the public and to another law 
firm.  Finally, the referee emphasized that Attorney Hupy had 
demonstrated little appreciation for the seriousness of his 
misconduct, and indeed, had refused to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his actions.  The referee stated that Attorney Hupy's 
claim that he had disseminated the false advertisements for an 
"educational" purpose was both inaccurate and troublesome. 
¶46 On the mitigating side of the ledger, the referee did 
note that Attorney Hupy had not previously been the subject of 
professional discipline and that he had been cooperative during 
the OLR's investigation of his conduct. 
¶47 Ultimately, the referee stated that the OLR's request 
for a public reprimand appeared to be lenient, but fell within 
the range of appropriate discipline for the three counts of 
misconduct he found.  The referee therefore recommended that 
Attorney Hupy be publicly reprimanded.  He also recommended that 
Attorney Hupy be required to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
¶48 Before turning to Attorney Hupy's arguments on appeal 
from the referee's report and recommendation, we discuss the 
standard of review that we will apply.  Generally, when 
reviewing a referee's report and recommendation in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings, we will affirm a referee's findings of 
fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review the referee's conclusions 
of law, however, on a de novo basis.  See id.  Finally, we 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
22 
 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline 
given 
the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶49 Attorney Hupy contends, however, that we should apply 
a standard of independent review because he raises First 
Amendment arguments.  We agree to the limited extent that we are 
called upon to decide First Amendment issues and to apply First 
Amendment law to the facts of this case.  As to those issues, 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
precedent 
requires 
us 
to 
conduct 
an 
independent examination of the record to determine whether 
Attorney Hupy's conduct is within or without the free speech 
protections of the First Amendment.  See Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 & n.31 (1984) 
(federal rule of civil procedure requiring finding of fact to be 
clearly erroneous before being overturned did not apply to 
determination of First Amendment issue of actual malice, but 
clearly erroneous standard could be applied to findings of fact 
not relevant to the First Amendment issue). 
¶50 Attorney Hupy's appeal challenges all three of the 
counts of misconduct found by the referee.  Some of his 
arguments apply to one specific count while others apply to 
multiple counts.  We will address each count in turn. 
¶51 On Count 1, the referee found that Attorney Hupy's 
mailing of the postcard containing the sentence "Lawyers can 
mail letters and advertise on television without ever having 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
23 
 
tried a personal injury case" constituted conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶52 All 
four 
of 
the 
descriptive 
words 
used 
in 
SCR 20:8.4(c) require that there be an untruth.  Attorney Hupy 
begins his challenge to Count 1 on the grounds that neither the 
OLR's allegations nor the evidence demonstrated that the 
postcard contained a "specific, concrete, and meaningfully 
inaccurate representation of fact."  He notes that the OLR's 
complaint alleged that the challenged sentence in the postcard 
created a false or misleading impression that the lawyers in the 
Hausmann-McNally firm had advertised without ever having tried a 
personal injury case.   
¶53 Attorney Hupy contends that there is no evidence in 
the record to show what impression was made on any recipient of 
the 
postcard. 
 
No 
recipient 
of 
the 
postcard 
testified.  
According to Attorney Hupy, those individuals that did testify 
gave differing views as to whether the challenged sentence 
referred to Attorney Hausmann, all of the lawyers at the 
Hausmann-McNally law firm, or lawyers generally.  If the 
sentence referred either to Attorney Hausmann individually or to 
the lawyers at the Hausmann-McNally firm collectively, the 
statement would have been untrue.  On the other hand, if the 
sentence simply referred to lawyers generally, it is true in 
theory that lawyers can mail letters and advertise on television 
without ever having tried a personal injury case.  In Attorney 
Hupy's view, since the recipients of the postcard did not 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
24 
 
testify that they viewed the challenged sentence as referring 
specifically to Attorney Hausmann or the lawyers at the 
Hausmann-McNally firm, the OLR failed to prove that the sentence 
was untrue. 
¶54 Attorney 
Hupy 
further 
argues 
that 
the 
simple 
juxtaposition of the challenged sentence next to other sentences 
that 
specifically 
referred 
to 
Attorney 
Hausmann 
and 
the 
Hausmann-McNally firm is not enough to render the sentence 
untrue and a basis for imposing sanctions.  He argues that the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration 
and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), 
rejected the notion that the juxtaposition of true statements 
can create a misleading impression that can be prohibited or 
penalized.  He contends that without evidence that recipients in 
fact were misled, the only support for a finding that the 
sentence was false or misleading is an unproven hypothesis that 
the recipients viewed the challenged sentence as referring to 
Attorney Hausmann or the lawyers in the Hausmann-McNally law 
firm. 
¶55 Attorney Hupy also argues that the evidence does not 
show that he made the statement in the postcard with the 
required knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth.  He starts from the premise that the referee did not find 
the challenged sentence to involve dishonesty, fraud, or deceit 
because those terms require intentionality by the actor/speaker, 
but instead relied solely on the final term in SCR 20:8.4(c)——
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
25 
 
misrepresentation.10  He then points to the definition of 
misrepresentation in SCR 20:1.0(h), which defines the term as 
"communication of an untruth, either knowingly or with reckless 
disregard, whether by statement or omission, which if accepted 
would lead another to believe a condition exists that does not 
actually exist."   
¶56 Attorney Hupy asserts that the definition of "reckless 
disregard" should be further developed by reference to civil 
defamation law.  In particular, he points to the court of 
appeals' statement in Biskupic v. Cicero, 2008 WI App 117, ¶27, 
313 Wis. 2d 225, 756 N.W.2d 649, that to demonstrate reckless 
disregard, a complainant "must show that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the publication's truth."  He 
therefore argues that the OLR was required to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that he recognized the impression of the 
sentence that the OLR now claims to be misleading and in fact 
had serious doubts as to whether that impression was true. 
¶57 Attorney Hupy contends that the OLR cannot meet this 
standard because there is no evidence that he ever believed the 
challenged statement in the postcard referred to the lawyers in 
the Hausmann-McNally law firm.  He points to the fact that both 
he and his law partner testified at the disciplinary hearing 
that they believed the sentence referred only to lawyers 
generally and was meant only to be a general criticism of lawyer 
                                                 
10 Paragraph 21 in the referee's findings of fact, however, 
states that the statement in the postcard "is dishonest, 
deceitful, and misleading." 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
26 
 
advertising.  He contends that the only thing the OLR was able 
to present was ambiguity or differing potential interpretations 
of the sentence, which are not sufficient evidence of a false 
statement. 
¶58 The OLR responds that to establish a violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) it is not required to plead or prove the tort of 
misrepresentation or to demonstrate that an attorney engaged in 
an outright fraud.  It points to the language of the rule, which 
prohibits 
attorneys 
from 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  It further 
emphasizes that the rule does not require it to establish 
specific intent; recklessness by an attorney in making a 
statement is sufficient for a violation of the rule.   
¶59 In response to Attorney Hupy's claim that the use of 
the challenged sentence in the postcard was essentially an 
innocent oversight, the OLR points to the referee's finding that 
the placement of the challenged sentence in the same paragraph 
as criticisms of Attorney Hausmann and the Hausmann-McNally law 
firm was done deliberately and knowingly to give recipients the 
impression that Attorney Hausmann and the lawyers in the 
Hausmann-McNally law firm had not tried personal injury cases.  
The OLR emphasizes that the sentence at issue was placed in an 
advertisement that began with the following headline:  "Beware:  
You Will Probably Get A Letter From A Law Firm Whose Senior 
Partner Went To Prison On November 28, 2003."  Thus, the OLR 
argues that the postcard was clearly intended to refer to 
Attorney Hausmann and the Hausmann-McNally law firm. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
27 
 
¶60 Attorney Hupy also continues to argue that the OLR 
should be estopped from proceeding with any claim related to the 
postcard because (1) it approved (or at least did not object to) 
the postcard when Attorney Hupy originally submitted a copy of 
it to the OLR pursuant to SCR 20:7.3(c), and (2) after a 
grievance regarding the postcard was subsequently filed by the 
OLR, an OLR investigator left a voice-mail message for Attorney 
Hupy's partner indicating that he would be sending the grievance 
for closure.  Attorney Hupy essentially asserts that because the 
OLR did not object to the postcard and in his view closed the 
subsequent grievance relating to the postcard, it would be 
impermissibly arbitrary for the OLR to "reopen" the matter and 
pursue an ethical charge that is based on the postcard. 
¶61 Following oral argument, this court directed the OLR 
to submit an additional memorandum discussing the scope of its 
review of advertising materials under SCR 20:7.3 and the nature 
of its procedures for communicating with attorneys who have 
submitted materials pursuant to SCR 20:7.3(c).  The OLR's 
response explains that its review under SCR 20:7.3(c) is 
generally limited to determining whether the submitted document 
has been properly labeled as "Advertising Material" as required 
by 
SCR 
20:7.3(c). 
 
The 
submitted 
advertisement 
is 
not 
specifically reviewed for its content, unless there is patently 
visible language that raises an unmistakable issue of possible 
misconduct, in which case the OLR may begin an investigation.  
The OLR further states that it generally will not send any 
communication to the submitting attorney if the advertisement 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
28 
 
has 
been 
properly 
labeled. 
 
If 
the 
submitting 
attorney 
affirmatively asks for a positive response following the OLR's 
consideration, the OLR will generally advise the attorney only 
that the submitted document complies with SCR 20:7.3.  On the 
other hand, if the advertisement is not properly labeled, the 
OLR will also notify the attorney of that fact.  The OLR 
emphasizes that it does not ever communicate that a submitted 
advertisement has been "approved" or "authorized for use."  
Thus, 
the 
review 
of an advertisement by the OLR under 
SCR 20:7.3(c) and the lack of any objection by the OLR following 
that review should not be taken as a stamp of approval that the 
advertisement complies with all ethical rules.  
¶62 With respect to Attorney Hupy's argument regarding the 
voice-mail message left by its investigator, the OLR contends 
that the voice-mail message cannot form the basis for any 
estoppel because, despite the investigator's stated intention to 
send the grievance regarding the postcard to the OLR's deputy 
director for closure, the referee expressly found that the 
grievance was never, in fact, closed.  Instead, the deputy 
director determined that the matter should be forwarded for a 
formal investigation.  The OLR argues that because it never 
communicated a final decision to Attorney Hupy, it cannot be 
estopped from pursuing a course of action contrary to the 
initial course of action suggested by the investigator. 
¶63 As noted above, the court is evenly split with respect 
to whether the statement in the postcard constituted a violation 
of SCR 20:8.4(c).  Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
29 
 
and Justice Crooks conclude the message of the postcard was that 
lawyers in the Hausmann-McNally firm had advertised without 
having tried a personal injury case, which constituted conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4(c). 
 
Justice 
Prosser, 
Justice 
Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler conclude that the OLR has not 
proven that the specific statement at issue in the postcard was 
a misrepresentation.  Because the court is evenly split as to 
whether there was a violation on Count 1, we need not further 
address Attorney Hupy's constitutional and other challenges to 
the application of SCR 20:8.4(c) to the postcard. 
¶64 With respect to Count 2, Attorney Hupy's initial 
argument is that the brochure article at issue did not contain 
any meaningful inaccuracy and the referee relied on an overly 
literal construction of the phrase "is still practicing law 
pending his appeal."  He emphasizes that the challenged 
statement that Attorney Hausmann is still practicing law pending 
his appeal was accurate when the brochure was written and 
initially distributed in 2003.  He contends that for a number of 
reasons he should not be found to have violated SCR 20:8.4(c) 
because he reprinted and distributed the same article in 2006. 
¶65 First, he asserts that the premise of the article was 
a criticism of the lawyer regulatory system for allowing 
Attorney Hausmann to practice law after he had been convicted of 
a felony.  He therefore contends that this "message" of 
criticism remained true in 2006, even if one sentence of the 
article had become outdated.  He argues that his opinion on a 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
30 
 
matter of public concern should not be transformed into 
professional misconduct due to a "technical debate of the verb 
tense of an isolated phrase." 
¶66 Attorney Hupy's brief also claims that the article did 
not expressly identify Attorney Hausmann, which supports his 
assertion that the article had a larger focus on criticism of 
lawyer advertising and lawyer regulation. 
¶67 Next Attorney Hupy asserts that Attorney Hausmann was, 
in fact, still practicing law in 2006 when the article at issue 
was reprinted.  He points to the fact that an annual corporate 
report filed by the Hausmann-McNally firm with a state agency in 
2005, which remained on file in March 2006, identified Attorney 
Hausmann as a shareholder, officer, and director of the law 
firm.  He also points to the fact that Attorney Hausmann 
remained a shareholder of the service corporation and received a 
certain type of compensation from the Hausmann-McNally firm 
during his suspension.  He asserts that, at a minimum, there was 
enough evidence of Attorney Hausmann's practice of law in 2006 
that the issue was debatable and that he therefore cannot be 
found to have made a knowing misrepresentation.   
¶68 Attorney Hupy also makes a number of arguments that 
pertain to both Counts 1 and 2.  We did not reach these 
arguments with respect to Count 1 due to the even split in the 
participating members of the court.  We address them now in 
connection with Count 2.  
¶69 Attorney Hupy contends that any misstatement in the 
article as reprinted in 2006 was a technical inaccuracy that 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
31 
 
cannot be the basis for professional discipline because it does 
not call into question his fitness to practice law.  In other 
words, Attorney Hupy asserts that SCR 20:8.4(c) must be 
interpreted to prohibit only misrepresentations that reflect 
adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law because a 
broader scope of the rule could significantly inhibit a lawyer's 
exercise of his/her free speech rights.  As support for this 
position, Attorney Hupy points to this court's decision in In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, 22, 510 
N.W.2d 129 (1994), in which we stated that the context of the 
term "offensive personality" in the attorney's oath11 and its 
application to attorney disciplinary proceedings required that 
it be limited to conduct that reflects adversely on a person's 
fitness as a lawyer. 
¶70 He also argues that he cannot be found to have 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) because the OLR did not submit proof that 
he reprinted the article in 2006 with actual knowledge of, or 
reckless disregard for, the allegedly false statement in the 
reprinted article.  He says that in March 2006, when the article 
was reprinted verbatim, he did not perceive that the events that 
had occurred between 2003 and 2006 warranted a review of the 
statements in the article and "was not actually aware that the 
                                                 
11 The attorney's oath taken by all attorneys who are 
licensed to practice in this state, now located in SCR 40.15, 
states in pertinent part, "I will abstain from all offensive 
personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or 
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice 
of the cause with which I am charged; . . . ." 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
32 
 
three year old article contained the specific, challenged 
phrase." 
¶71 Next Attorney Hupy asserts that applying SCR 20:8.4(c) 
to the reprinted article would cause the rule to "violate 
principles of due process by denying attorneys fair notice of 
what is prohibited."  He argues that SCR 20:8.4(c) does not 
provide lawyers with sufficient notice that it imposes standards 
for the accuracy of advertising communications, especially since 
such communications are also subject to SCRs 20:7.1 through 
20:7.5. 
¶72 Finally, Attorney Hupy argues that SCR 20:8.4(c) must 
not be interpreted to apply to the reprinted article because 
such an interpretation would infringe on his free speech rights 
under the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.  He 
asserts, contrary to the referee's conclusion, that the brochure 
article is not commercial speech because it does not propose a 
transaction.  See City of Milwaukee v. Blondis, 157 Wis. 2d 730, 
735, 460 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Commercial speech is 
speech that proposes a commercial transaction.").  Thus, he 
contends that the article deserves the fullest protection of the 
First Amendment because it discusses matters of public interest.  
He asserts that the "inexact standards" propounded by the OLR 
and the referee regarding the application of SCR 20:8.4(c) would 
not meet the strict scrutiny applied to political speech because 
those standards do not serve the government interests typically 
served by rules that discipline individuals for engaging in 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
33 
 
¶73 In addition, Attorney Hupy contends that even if the 
brochure article is characterized as commercial speech, it 
cannot form the basis for professional discipline because 
suppressing the article or disciplining Attorney Hupy for it 
would serve only the private interests of Attorney Hausmann 
rather than the interests of the public in deterring misleading 
speech by attorneys. 
¶74 The OLR responds that the referee's finding of a 
violation is supported by the record.  It asserts that by 
March 1, 2006, it was clear that Attorney Hausmann had been out 
of prison for more than two years and that his criminal appeal 
had already been completed for a long time, making the 
challenged statement undoubtedly false.  It points to the 
referee's credibility determinations that Attorney Hupy did not 
simply forget about the statement in the article that Attorney 
Hausmann was still practicing law pending his appeal and that 
Attorney Hupy chose to ignore the falsity of that statement for 
an extended period of time for his own financial gain and in 
order to harm a competing lawyer. 
¶75 The OLR contends that sending out the mailing again in 
2006 was not an innocent mistake.  It states that if Attorney 
Hupy and his partner had reviewed all advertising communications 
prior to their circulation, as Attorney Hupy's brief asserts, he 
would have known that the article was no longer correct in 2006.  
Thus, the OLR argues that the circulation of the reprinted 
article was done at least with reckless disregard. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
34 
 
¶76 The OLR disputes that Attorney Hausmann was practicing 
law during his suspension in 2006.  It emphasizes that the 
referee 
expressly 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Hausmann 
was 
not 
practicing law at that time.  It points to the referee's 
statement that Attorney Hausmann and the Hausmann-McNally firm 
"went to great lengths to comply with all parts of the 
suspension order," including changing all signage, letterhead, 
advertising, etc., and hiring outside counsel to advise them on 
complying with the order.  Moreover, the OLR stresses that in 
2006, when the brochure article was used for the second time, 
Attorney Hupy had no knowledge of any of the actions by Attorney 
Hausmann and the law firm that he now claims constituted the 
practice of law by Attorney Hausmann.  Attorney Hupy developed 
that evidence only after the fact when facing charges in this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
¶77 With 
respect to Attorney Hupy's First Amendment 
claims, the OLR notes that commercial speech, including attorney 
advertising, can be regulated or prohibited if it is false, 
deceptive, or misleading.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637-38.  The 
OLR contends that the referee appropriately concluded that the 
brochure article was commercial speech because the primary 
purpose of the article was to solicit business and to harm a 
major competitor.  It further asserts that the brochure article 
is not entitled to First Amendment protection because the 
statement about Attorney Hausmann still practicing law in 2006 
was untruthful and Attorney Hupy knew it was untruthful. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
35 
 
¶78 Under our standard of review, we first determine that 
the referee's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.  We 
therefore adopt those findings and use them to determine whether 
the use of the brochure article in 2006 was a violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶79 We conclude that the facts as found by the referee 
show that Attorney Hupy did violate SCR 20:8.4(c) by mailing to 
prospective clients in 2006 a brochure containing the statement 
that an attorney, who was clearly Attorney Hausmann, "is still 
practicing law pending his appeal."   
¶80 We first address Attorney Hupy's contention that the 
brochure article did not identify Attorney Hausmann by name.  
Although the article did not use Attorney Hausmann's name, it 
clearly identified him by giving the address of the Hausmann-
McNally law firm and referring to him as the attorney who had 
pled guilty to defrauding personal injury clients.  Indeed, 
Attorney Hupy's opening brief to this court acknowledged that 
the article referred to Attorney Hausmann. 
¶81 We also do not agree with Attorney Hupy's claim that 
he cannot be disciplined for using the article in 2006 because 
the 
article 
contained 
only 
a 
technical 
inaccuracy. 
 
We 
acknowledge that the "still practicing" statement in the article 
was accurate when it was first disseminated in 2003.  Attorney 
Hupy acknowledges, on the other hand, that the statement was not 
true when the article was reprinted verbatim in 2006 because by 
that time Attorney Hausmann's criminal appeal had been completed 
and his license to practice law in Wisconsin had been suspended.  
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
36 
 
The statement was clearly a misrepresentation of fact when it 
was made again in 2006.  That it was a repetition of a formerly 
true statement does not change its nature as a false statement 
in 2006. 
¶82 We further reject Attorney Hupy's argument that the 
false statement cannot be a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) because 
it was not substantial enough and did not relate to Attorney 
Hupy's fitness to practice law.  The statement in the article 
made 
in 
2006 
asserted 
that 
Attorney 
Hausmann 
was 
still 
practicing law.  This is not a de minimis accusation.  Since 
Attorney Hausmann's license to practice law in this state was 
suspended at that time, Attorney Hupy's statement was an 
accusation that Attorney Hausmann was violating this court's 
suspension 
order, 
a 
serious 
allegation 
of 
professional 
misconduct. 
¶83 Moreover, without deciding whether a misrepresentation 
must relate to an attorney's fitness to practice law in order to 
be a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), we conclude that Attorney 
Hupy's misrepresentation here does implicate his fitness to 
practice law.  Thus, even under the standard Attorney Hupy 
desires, his statement in the brochure article violates the 
rule.  He made a clearly false statement about one of his 
primary competitors in a brochure that was part of a direct mail 
advertising package sent to a targeted audience of potential 
clients.  Making false statements about a competing lawyer in 
order to obtain more clients for one's self clearly implicates 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
37 
 
one's fitness to exercise the privilege of practicing law in 
this state.   
¶84 Indeed, that conclusion is supported by the fact that 
another rule of professional conduct explicitly prohibits making 
false or misleading communications about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services.  See SCR 20:7.1.  If it is an ethical 
violation to make a false or misleading statement about one's 
self in a communication with prospective clients, there is no 
reason why it should not also be an ethical violation to make a 
false 
statement 
about 
a 
competing 
lawyer 
in 
such 
a 
communication.  Both types of statements may wrongly influence a 
potential client's decision about which lawyer to retain or not 
retain. 
¶85 We next address Attorney Hupy's contention that the 
statement at issue was not a misrepresentation because Attorney 
Hausmann was "still practicing law" in 2006.  In order to 
prevail on this argument, Attorney Hupy must demonstrate that 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
were 
clearly 
erroneous.  
Specifically, the referee found that (1) "there is no evidence 
in this case that [Attorney] Hausmann practiced law during his 
suspension" and (2) "[t]here is no evidence that he performed 
legal work on any client file or was present on the premises of 
the law firm when any legal business was conducted during his 
period of suspension."  
¶86 It is important to recognize that the statement in the 
brochure article was not meant for an audience of legal ethics 
professors, but for the general public, specifically potential 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
38 
 
personal injury clients.  Thus, the phrase "is still practicing 
law" must be read according to its ordinary meaning of 
representing clients.  None of the evidence on which Attorney 
Hupy relies supports a finding that Attorney Hausmann was doing 
anything related to the representation of clients.  Regardless 
of whether or not Attorney Hausmann should have relinquished his 
shares in the service corporation during the period of his 
suspension, an issue we need not decide in this proceeding, 
merely passively owning shares in a service corporation, without 
more, does not mean that Attorney Hausmann was "practicing law" 
as that phrase is generally understood.  Moreover, the 2005 
corporate report cited by Attorney Hupy was filed before 
Attorney Hausmann's suspension took effect.  It does not 
undercut the referee's finding that Attorney Hausmann was not 
practicing law in early 2006, especially given the fact that the 
2006 corporate report showed that Attorney Hausmann was no 
longer president of the service corporation. 
¶87 In a related vein, Attorney Hupy argues that he should 
not be disciplined for the article because the OLR did not prove 
that he was reckless in stating that Attorney Hausmann was still 
practicing law in early 2006.  We disagree that there is no 
evidence to support a conclusion that Attorney Hupy acted 
recklessly.   
¶88 First, the referee found that Attorney Hupy was aware 
of the suspension of Attorney Hausmann's license to practice law 
in August 2005.  Indeed, Attorney Hupy had his firm's outside 
legal counsel stand outside the Hausmann-McNally firm's offices 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
39 
 
on the date the suspension took effect in 2005 to ensure that 
Attorney Hausmann's name had been removed from all signage.  
This was not a situation where Attorney Hupy was ignorant of 
what the situation was at the time that he republished the 
brochure in 2006. 
¶89 Second, Attorney Hupy's brief in this court points to 
contradictory statements that demonstrate that Attorney Hupy's 
second publication of the brochure article was done either 
knowingly or recklessly.  First, Attorney Hupy points to 
testimony by himself and his partner that they reviewed all 
communications written for circulation by their firm to ensure 
their accuracy.  On the other hand, Attorney Hupy's brief 
contends that he "was not actually aware that the three year old 
article contained the specific, challenged phrase" or that the 
passage of time warranted review of the contents of the article.  
Given Attorney Hupy's knowledge of the suspension and the steps 
taken by Attorney Hausmann and his firm to comply with the 
suspension order, if Attorney Hupy did actually review the 
brochure article in early 2006, as he claims he always did, he 
would have noticed that the article falsely stated that Attorney 
Hausmann was still practicing law pending his criminal appeal.  
Thus, his continued use of that brochure article would have been 
with 
knowledge 
of 
the 
article's 
falsity 
regarding 
that 
statement.  On the other hand, if Attorney Hupy was not actually 
aware in early 2006 that the article contained the allegation 
that Attorney Hausmann was still practicing law, then he could 
not have reviewed the article prior to using it a second time.  
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
40 
 
Publishing a statement, especially a statement that a fellow 
lawyer is violating a supreme court order, without knowing the 
contents 
of 
the 
statement, 
is 
a 
quintessential 
act 
of 
recklessness. 
¶90 Third, it is important to note that the referee 
explicitly found that Attorney Hupy looked for and created the 
reasons he now gives as proof of Attorney Hausmann practicing 
law in early 2006 only well after the brochure had been 
published again in March 2006 and even after the grievance 
against him in this matter had been filed with the OLR. 
¶91 Attorney Hupy's claim that SCR 20:8.4(c) violates his 
due process rights because it is too vague to provide an 
attorney with notice of what is prohibited has previously been 
rejected by this court.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 388 N.W.2d 176 (1986).  In that 
case, Attorney Schalow alleged that the prohibition against 
engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation," located at the time in SCR 20.04(4), was 
overbroad and vague.  After noting that there needs to be a 
greater degree of flexibility with respect to vagueness in 
attorney disciplinary rules than in criminal statutes, we 
concluded that the rule against conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation provided sufficient notice of 
prohibited conduct to satisfy due process: 
Our rule, SCR 20.04(4), while set forth in general 
and, arguably, less than definite terms, is neither so 
indefinite as to leave a lawyer, at his or her peril, 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
41 
 
to guess its meaning nor so lacking in ascertainable 
standards as to render it constitutionally infirm. 
Id.  Attorney Hupy's arguments do not convince us otherwise.  At 
a minimum, the rule provided sufficient notice to Attorney Hupy 
that attorneys licensed in this state must avoid making false 
statements about other lawyers in advertising communications to 
potential clients. 
¶92 We also reject Attorney Hupy's claim that imposing 
discipline on him for republishing the statement in the brochure 
article in 2006 would violate his free speech rights.  First, we 
conclude, as did the referee, that the brochure article 
constituted commercial speech.  Attorney Hupy contends that the 
article was not commercial speech because it did not expressly 
propose a commercial transaction.  The brochure article, 
however, was not distributed as a stand-alone communication.  It 
was part of a packet of materials that Attorney Hupy and his 
firm sent to potential personal injury clients.  The brochure 
article was clearly meant to act together with the other 
materials in the packet to convince the recipient to contact 
Attorney Hupy and his firm so that a client relationship could 
be formed, or at least discussed.  The use of the brochure in an 
ongoing direct mail advertising campaign belies Attorney Hupy's 
claim that the brochure article was simply intended to educate 
or advise the public about the dangers of lawyer advertising.  
¶93 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
brochure 
article 
was 
commercial speech, we have no trouble concluding that the 
statement in the article was not protected by either the First 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
42 
 
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, 
section 3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
even 
under 
an 
independent standard of review.  While commercial speech 
generally merits some protection under the First Amendment, that 
protection does not extend to commercial speech that is false, 
deceptive, or misleading.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638.  Because 
the statement in the article that Attorney Hausmann was still 
practicing law pending his appeal was clearly false when it was 
republished in 2006, the First Amendment does not protect 
Attorney Hupy from being disciplined for that ethical violation. 
¶94 We next turn to Count 3 of the complaint, which 
involved Attorney Hupy's use of a 35th anniversary sticker on his 
firm's letterhead in 2004.  In addition to raising many of the 
same arguments he made with respect to Counts 1 and 2, Attorney 
Hupy contends that the referee effectively shifted the burden of 
proof from the OLR to him.  Specifically, he contends that there 
was a stipulation that the law firm corporation had a continuous 
existence back to 1974 and that the referee's conclusion that 
the law firm's existence did not extend back to 1969 was based 
on a finding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude 
that there was one continuous partnership between 1969 and 1974 
instead of a series of partnerships.  He asserts that the 
referee therefore required him to prove that there had been one 
continuous partnership between 1969 and 1974 rather than 
requiring the OLR to prove that there had been a series of 
separate partnerships.   
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
43 
 
¶95 Attorney Hupy also contends that the referee's finding 
of fact that the law firm he owned in 2004 could not trace its 
existence back to at least 1969 is erroneous.  He asserts that 
the various lawyers associated with the firm over the years all 
testified that the firm never ceased to exist after 1969 and 
that they understood the firm's founding date to be no later 
than 1969. 
¶96 In addition, Attorney Hupy argues that the referee 
erred 
in 
making 
an 
unsubstantiated 
determination 
that 
a 
difference between a 1974 founding date and a 1969 founding date 
was material.  He notes that the OLR submitted no evidence 
regarding the materiality of any such difference, while his 
expert witness opined that no reasonable consumer would make a 
decision on hiring a law firm based on a difference of a few 
years in its founding date. 
¶97 Although it acknowledges that there has never before 
been an attorney disciplinary case involving the founding date 
of a law firm, the OLR contends that the referee's finding of a 
violation here should be upheld.  It urges that under Wisconsin 
partnership law, the burden of proof should be on the party 
claiming that a single partnership existed prior to 1974, which 
would be Attorney Hupy.  It further asserts that Attorney Hupy 
did not demonstrate that a single partnership existed prior to 
1974 because there was insufficient evidence to establish that 
the individuals who practiced together prior to 1974 actually 
had a community of interest in the capital employed by them, had 
equal voices in the management of a single entity, and shared 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
44 
 
the profits and losses of a single organization, which are all 
elements necessary to create a valid partnership under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 178.  See Stern v. Dep't of Revenue, 63 Wis. 2d 506, 
509-10, 217 N.W.2d 326 (1974).  With respect to the question of 
materiality, the OLR simply points to the referee's statement 
that a reasonable client would have felt misled if he or she had 
later learned that the 35th anniversary sticker had been false. 
¶98 We conclude that Count 3 can be resolved on the issue 
of materiality.  Supreme court rule 20:7.1 prohibits a lawyer 
from making false or misleading communications about the lawyer 
or the lawyer's services.  Former SCR 20:7.1(a) explains that a 
communication is false or misleading if it "contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to 
make the statement considered as a whole not materially 
misleading."  It is therefore clear that a false or misleading 
statement about the attorney or the attorney's services must be 
material for there to be a violation of the rule. 
¶99 First, we address the referee's comments about the 
Redemption Agreement under which Attorney Jacobson sold all of 
his shares back to the service corporation, leaving Attorney 
Hupy as the remaining shareholder.  Because the Redemption 
Agreement contained a provision that each attorney would have 
the exclusive right to the use of their respective names, the 
referee stated that Attorney Hupy had improperly made use of 
Attorney Jacobson's name and history by using the date on which 
Attorney Jacobson started the firm in which Attorney Hupy is now 
a shareholder. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
45 
 
¶100 We disagree that the Redemption Agreement prohibited 
Attorney Hupy from communicating about the date when the firm 
which he now partially owns was started.  Placing a 35th 
anniversary sticker on the firm's letterhead did not use 
Attorney Jacobson's name in violation of the contractual 
provision.  The referee points to no contractual provision that 
prohibited Attorney Hupy from speaking about the history of the 
legal 
service 
corporation 
he 
solely 
owned 
following 
the 
redemption of Attorney Jacobson's shares.  Thus, since there is 
no dispute that this service corporation was incorporated in 
1974 and has been in continuous existence as a law firm since 
that time, we find no reason why Attorney Hupy could not make 
statements in 2004 that the law firm of which he was then an 
owner had at least a 1974 founding date. 
¶101 Given this background, the question of materiality 
becomes clearer.  The issue is not whether a potential client or 
other 
reader 
of 
the 
anniversary 
sticker 
would 
find 
the 
difference between a 35th anniversary sticker and no anniversary 
sticker material.  Attorney Hupy was entitled at least to 
communicate in 2004 that the law firm he then owned was 30 years 
old.  The true question presented is therefore whether a 
potential client or other reader would have found it to be a 
material difference if the sticker had read "30th Anniversary" 
instead of "35th Anniversary."  We agree with Attorney Hupy that 
no reasonable person would be influenced by a five-year 
difference between a personal injury law firm that was either 30 
years old or 35 years old.  In other words, we do not believe 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
46 
 
that any reasonable person would have retained Attorney Hupy's 
law firm on the belief that it was 35 years old but would not 
have retained the firm if he/she knew that it was really only 30 
years old.  Consequently, because we determine that the 
anniversary sticker, even if false or misleading, was not 
material, we conclude that Attorney Hupy's use of the sticker 
was not a violation of former SCRs 20:7.1(a) or 20:7.5(a). 
¶102 With a majority of the court having concluded that 
Attorney Hupy violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by recirculating a brochure 
article in early 2006, as alleged in Count 2 of the OLR's 
complaint, we address the proper level of discipline.  We 
conclude that a public reprimand is appropriate in this 
situation.    
¶103 We acknowledge that Attorney Hupy has not previously 
been the subject of professional discipline and that he 
cooperated with the OLR's investigation.  We agree with the 
referee, however, that the use of the brochure article with the 
false statement in early 2006 was a serious violation that 
requires a public reprimand.  As the referee found, Attorney 
Hupy sent out a false statement essentially alleging that one of 
his primary lawyer competitors was violating this court's 
suspension order and engaging in unethical conduct in order for 
Attorney Hupy to gain a competitive advantage over the other 
lawyer.  This not only harmed the other lawyer, but more 
importantly harmed the public.  Indeed, it harmed a portion of 
the public that may very well have been looking for legal 
representation at the time it received the brochure article.  
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
47 
 
Moreover, this was not a false statement made to a limited 
number of potential clients.  It is clear that Attorney Hupy and 
his firm included this false statement in mailings that were 
sent to thousands of individuals who had recently been involved 
in a vehicle collision and therefore may have been potential 
clients. 
¶104 Moreover, the referee found that Attorney Hupy has 
little appreciation for the seriousness of his misconduct.  The 
referee found troublesome Attorney Hupy's attempt to justify his 
false statement about Attorney Hausmann as being part of an 
"educational" plan rather than acknowledging that he should not 
have mailed out the same brochure in 2006 when it now contained 
a false statement about a competing lawyer.  Although a lawyer 
accused of misconduct may certainly litigate the matter, we 
agree with the referee's finding that it strains credulity too 
far to claim that a brochure that Attorney Hupy labeled as 
"advertising" and directed to individuals who were likely to be 
considering hiring a lawyer was merely "educational."  Attorney 
Hupy's failure to acknowledge the true nature of the brochure 
article and the seriousness of the false statement within it 
counsels in favor of public discipline in this case. 
¶105 In addition, although every disciplinary case is 
unique, there are precedents that support the imposition of a 
public reprimand for a violation like the one committed by 
Attorney Hupy.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against 
Campbell, 
113 
Wis. 2d 715, 
335 
N.W.2d 881 
(1983) 
(accepting stipulation and imposing public reprimand on attorney 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
48 
 
who falsely advertised that he was a partner in a law firm 
rather than an employee); Public Reprimand of James S. Lindgren, 
2010-8 (consensual public reprimand imposed on attorney who used 
law firm letterhead indicating he had continuing and full 
affiliation with law firm when he had either no status or of 
counsel status for a limited purpose); Public Reprimand of 
Nancy L. Bergstrom, 2009-4 (consensual public reprimand imposed 
on attorney with no prior discipline who issued press release 
containing false statement). 
¶106 Finally, we address the issue of the costs of this 
proceeding.  Prior to the appeal in this matter, the OLR 
submitted a statement of costs that requested a pre-appeal cost 
assessment of $45,916.88 against Attorney Hupy.  Of that amount, 
$29,356.42 was for the referee's fees and expenses.  The OLR 
requested $6,174.00 in attorney fees for 88.2 hours of work and 
$630.86 in disbursements.   
¶107 Attorney Hupy made a number of objections to this 
requested 
amount 
and 
asked 
that 
the 
costs 
be 
reduced.  
Specifically, he contended that the majority of the OLR's 
allegations against him had been shown to be baseless.  He 
further argued that the misconduct found by the referee was 
subject to dispute and that he should not be required to pay 
such high costs when he was acting in the public interest by 
educating the public about lawyer advertising.  Attorney Hupy 
also specifically objected to the amount of the referee's fees.  
He asserted that the number of hours the referee had spent on 
this case (481.6 hours) was excessive because it was nearly five 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
49 
 
times greater than the 88.2 hours identified by the OLR.  He 
requested that the referee's fees be reduced so that they 
correlated with the number of hours requested by the OLR. 
¶108 At oral argument, this court questioned OLR's counsel 
about its fee records.  Specifically, we noted that it appeared 
that the OLR's billing itemization did not contain entries for 
at least some dates on which the disciplinary hearing had been 
held.  OLR's counsel responded that she would review the billing 
records. 
¶109 Following 
oral 
argument, 
the 
OLR 
submitted 
a 
"supplemental and amended" statement of costs.  Most of the 
costs were the same as in the original statement, including the 
fees requested for the referee.  However, in addition to adding 
a request for the fees it incurred during this appeal (35 hours 
and $2,450), the OLR also stated that after reviewing its time 
records, its counsel had discovered an additional 58.53 hours of 
pre-appellate work, which increased its pre-appellate fees from 
$6,174 to $10,271.11, a difference of $4,097.11.  The total 
amount requested by the OLR in its "supplemental and amended" 
statement of costs was $52,463.99. 
¶110 Attorney Hupy did not object to the fees incurred by 
the OLR on appeal, but he did restate his earlier objections and 
did specifically raise a new objection to the OLR's increased 
request for pre-appellate fees.  He noted that the OLR had 
offered no explanation for how or why the increased pre-
appellate fees had been omitted from the OLR's initial statement 
of costs, which he claimed deprived him of an opportunity to 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
50 
 
evaluate them.  In addition, he contended that the submission of 
those additional pre-appellate fees came months after the 
deadline for such fee requests, which was 20 days after the 
filing of the referee's report.  See SCR 22.24(2). 
¶111 In response, the OLR acknowledged that its counsel had 
made mistakes in listing her pre-appellate hours in its original 
statement of costs.  It asserted, however, that it should be 
allowed 
to 
correct 
its 
mistake. 
 
It 
claimed 
that 
its 
supplemental statement was timely because the rules allow the 
OLR to file a supplemental statement when an appeal is filed.  
See SCR 22.24(2) (supplemental statement of costs may be filed 
within 14 days after an appeal is assigned for submission to the 
court or briefs ordered by the court are filed).  To the extent 
that the pre-appellate fee request was increased after the 
filing of the appeal, the OLR simply contended that the time 
limit for initial cost statements is not jurisdictional and 
should be extended here. 
¶112 First, we address the OLR's "amendment" of its pre-
appellate fees in its post-appellate statement of costs.  The 
four justices who have found a violation on Count 2 (Chief 
Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, Justice Crooks, and Justice 
Prosser) conclude that in the present case the OLR should be 
bound by the hours and fees that it submitted in its original 
statement of costs.  The rules do require that the OLR is to 
submit its primary statement of costs within 20 days after the 
filing of the referee's report.  SCR 22.24(2).  That initial 
statement of costs should set forth all of the OLR's fees 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
51 
 
through the time of the referee's report.  The "supplemental" 
statement of costs that is contemplated in cases where an appeal 
is filed is designed to allow the OLR to add fees and expenses 
that it incurred during the appellate process.  It is not 
intended to allow the OLR to change its pre-appellate fee 
request, at least not without a demonstration of some valid 
reason for doing so.   
¶113 In this situation the OLR has not provided an adequate 
reason for why it failed to include all of its counsels' hours 
in the original statement of costs.  This was not a situation 
where 
some inadvertently overlooked entry was immediately 
corrected.  Indeed, the OLR was not even aware that its listing 
of hours could not possibly be complete until this court brought 
the issue to its attention at oral argument.  Moreover, the OLR 
has provided no explanation as to how the additional hours it is 
now requesting were discovered or recovered after oral argument.  
Without that sort of explanation, we have no way of knowing 
whether that process, which was clearly outside of the normal 
process, produced a reliable listing of hours expended and fees 
incurred.  Thus, having eliminated the OLR's "amended" pre-
appellate fees, the largest amount of costs that could be 
imposed on Attorney Hupy would be $48,366.88. 
¶114 Three members of this court (Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
Justice Bradley, and Justice Crooks) conclude that Attorney Hupy 
should be liable for this amount.  They note that under the 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
52 
 
current version of SCR 22.24(1m),12 the court's general policy 
is, upon a finding of misconduct, to impose all costs upon the 
respondent attorney, unless the attorney is able to demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances.  They conclude that, with the 
exception of the "amended" pre-appellate costs denied above, 
Attorney Hupy has not provided an adequate reason to deviate 
from the court's general practice of imposing full costs.   
¶115 The fourth justice who has determined that Attorney 
Hupy engaged in at least one count of misconduct (Justice 
Prosser) believes that the costs in this proceeding should be 
reduced to some degree.  Justice Prosser believes that a 
                                                 
12 SCR 22.24(1m) provides: 
The court's general policy is that upon a finding 
of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, 
including the expenses of counsel for the office of 
lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In cases 
involving extraordinary circumstances the court may, 
in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount 
of costs imposed upon a respondent.  In exercising its 
discretion regarding the assessment of costs, the 
court will consider the submissions of the parties and 
all of the following factors: 
(a) The number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven. 
(b) The nature of the misconduct. 
(c) The level of discipline sought by the parties 
and recommended by the referee. 
(d) The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
(e) Prior discipline, if any. 
(f) Other relevant circumstances. 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
53 
 
relatively small reduction in the costs is appropriate in this 
case given that Attorney Hupy has been found to have engaged in 
misconduct on only one out of the three counts the OLR alleged.  
In addition, Justice Prosser notes that this disciplinary 
proceeding did not stem from Attorney Hupy's betrayal of his 
clients.  Rather, it stemmed initially from a dispute between 
competing attorneys.  Moreover, given the nature of the 
misconduct at issue, the end result of this proceeding will be a 
public reprimand on an attorney who has never previously been 
disciplined.  Justice Prosser concludes that it would simply be 
unfair to impose nearly $50,000 in costs on Attorney Hupy under 
these circumstances. 
¶116 Consequently, although there are four justices who 
would impose costs, there is not full agreement among those four 
justices as to the amount of costs.  Three justices would impose 
costs in excess of $35,000 and one justice would impose costs of 
$35,000.  Because there must be at least four justices out of 
the six participating justices to form a majority for any 
result, there is a majority only to impose $35,000 in costs on 
Attorney Hupy.  Four justices agree that costs of at least 
$35,000 should be imposed.  There are not four justices who 
agree on any higher cost amount.  Thus, the court determines 
that Attorney Hupy must pay costs in this proceeding in the 
amount of $35,000. 
¶117 To summarize, the court is evenly split with respect 
to whether Attorney Hupy's use of a postcard stating that 
lawyers can mail letters and advertise on television without 
No. 
2007AP1281-D   
 
54 
 
ever having tried a personal injury case violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  
A 
majority 
of 
the 
court 
concludes 
that 
Attorney 
Hupy's 
distribution of a brochure article in early 2006 that indicated 
Attorney Hausmann was still practicing law pending his criminal 
appeal constituted conduct involving a misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  The court further concludes that 
Attorney Hupy's use of a 35th anniversary sticker on his firm's 
letterhead in 2004 was not a violation of former SCRs 20:7.1(a) 
or 
20:7.5(a). 
 
Given 
the 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) 
in 
connection with the brochure article, the court determines that 
Attorney 
Hupy 
should 
be 
publicly 
reprimanded 
for 
his 
professional misconduct.  Finally, a majority of the court 
concludes that Attorney Hupy should be required to pay costs in 
the amount of $35,000. 
¶118 IT IS ORDERED that Michael F. Hupy is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶119 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michael F. Hupy pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation costs in the amount of $35,000.  If the costs are not 
paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Michael F. Hupy to practice law in Wisconsin shall be 
suspended until further order of the court. 
¶120 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did not participate. 
No.  2007AP1281-D.pdr-akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶121 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. and ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, J. (dissenting).   We conclude that the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation has failed to meet its burden to prove any of 
the counts alleged in the Complaint.  Accordingly, we would 
dismiss the Complaint against Attorney Hupy and we respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion. 
 
 
No.  2007AP1281-D.pdr-akz 
 
 
 
1