Title: MYERS v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
Citation: 2002 OK 60, 52 P.3d 1014
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2002

MYERS v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. Annotate this Case MYERS v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. 2002 OK 60 52 P.3d 1014 Case Number: 93313 Decided: 07/02/2002 Mandate Issued: 08/01/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STEVE and VIOLET MYERS, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Lesa Myers, Respondents/Appellants v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, and/or UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and JIM Q. COLLINS, Petitioners/Appellees [52 P.3d 1014] ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II ¶0 Steve and Violet Myers brought an action in the District Court, Caddo County, Richard G. Van Dyck, trial judge, against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., d/b/a Union Pacific Railroad Co., and Jim Q. Collins, a locomotive engineer, to recover damages for the wrongful death of their minor daughter, Lesa Myers, in a grade crossing accident. The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial. On certiorari granted upon defendants' petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AFFIRMED. Roy Dickinson, Norman, Oklahoma, for Appellants Tom L. Armstrong and Robert D. Hart, GIBBS ARMSTRONG HARMON BOROCHOFF CALVERT & MULLICAN, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellees. OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issues tendered on certiorari are (1) does federal law preempt plaintiffs' state-tort-law theory that the railroad provided inadequate warning devices at the grade crossing in question? and (2) does federal law preempt plaintiffs' state-tort-law theory that the train was traveling at an excessive speed at the time of the collision? We answer both of these questions in the affirmative and then consider other questions that, though raised by plaintiffs' appeal, were left undecided by the intermediate appellate court's opinion. I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 In the late afternoon of 20 February 1995 four teenage girls got into a pickup truck in Apache, Oklahoma and began a short journey that would end in injury and death. Traveling west on Highway 19, the pickup truck struck the lead car of a northbound train owned by the Union Pacific Railroad Company (the "railroad") and operated that day by engineer, Jim Q. Collins ( collectively "defendants"). The driver of the pickup, Raewynn Gilmore ("Gilmore") and passenger Lesa Myers were killed. Two other passengers were injured but survived. ¶3 On 18 February 1997Lesa Myers' parents, Steve and Violet Myers ("plaintiffs"), brought a wrongful death action against defendants in the District Court, Caddo County, in which they sought compensatory and punitive damages for their daughter's death. They alleged inter alia that defendants were negligent in (1) failing to equip the Highway 19 crossing with adequate warning devices, (2) traveling at an excessive speed, (3) failing to reduce the train's speed in sufficient time to avoid the accident, (4) failing to maintain the crossing's warning devices in proper working order, and (5) failing to adequately sound the train's whistle. In their quest for punitive damages, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' acts and omissions evidenced a wilful, wanton, and reckless disregard for the safety of the public. ¶4 On 10 August 1998 defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Gilmore's failure to stop for the flashing lights at the crossing constituted negligence per se and was the proximate cause of the collision. ¶5 On 16 March 1999 defendants sought summary adjudication of plaintiffs' claim in-[52 P.3d 1018] sofar as it based negligence liability on (1) the inadequacy of the crossing's warning devices, (2) the unreasonableness of the train's speed, and (3) the inadequacy of the locomotive's warning devices. Defendants argued that each of these theories was preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs conceded the motion insofar as it asserted the inadequacy of the locomotive's warning devices, and the trial court ruled that federal law did indeed preempt the other two theories. ¶6 In April/May 1999 the case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for defendants. Judgment was entered on the verdict and plaintiffs appealed, assigning as error the trial court's pretrial summary rulings regarding federal preemption, certain of its evidentiary rulings at trial, and several of its decisions to give or refuse to give instructions to the jury. ¶7 The Court of Civil Appeals, Division II (COCA), reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court's speed preemption ruling was overbroad, preventing plaintiffs from presenting non-preempted theories of recovery. COCA concluded that preemption does not bar proof, including that of the train's actual speed, that the railroad failed "to operate its train safely, with due regard for the locale and other conditions within its knowledge." ¶8 We granted certiorari on defendants' petition and now vacate COCA's opinion. Because COCA viewed the question of speed preemption as dispositive, it left unaddressed certain of plaintiffs' other assignments of error. We must hence treat those issues as undecided in the Hough v. Leonard II STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY PROCESS ¶9 Summary process is a procedural pretrial device for the prompt and efficient disposition of an action sans forensic combat. It is applied where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from undisputed facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense. PLAINTIFFS' INADEQUATE WARNING DEVICE THEORY OF LIABILITY IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW ¶12 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were negligent for having provided inadequate warning devices at the Highway 19 crossing. Defendants moved for summary adjudication of that theory on the grounds that it was preempted by the federal warning device regulations. In support of their motion, defendants tendered a copy of a contract between the railroad's predecessor and the State of Oklahoma dated 30 January 1962, which provides for the installation of an "Automatic Grade Crossing Protective Device" at the Highway 19 crossing. The contract states that the project was to be financed with federal funds provided through the Federal Aid Program. Defendants also tendered an affidavit from the railroad's Director of Public Projects, Cliff Shoemaker, confirming that federal money was in fact expended and comprised 90% (ninety percent) of the funds for the project. ¶13 Plaintiffs did not dispute the 1962 participation of federal money in installing the existing warning devices, but argued that the use of federal money in 1962 could not give rise to federal preemption under the FRSA because that legislation was not enacted until eight years after the expenditure of federal funds at the Highway19 crossing. The trial court disagreed and ruled that plaintiffs' inadequate warning device theory was preempted. ¶14 On the morning the trial of this cause was set to begin, defendants presented to the court a number of newly discovered documents showing that the Highway 19 crossing's protective devices had again been upgraded using federal funds in 1987. Defendants did not ask leave of court to supplement the summary adjudication record with these documents, but simply announced their existence and provided copies of them to the court and opposing counsel. Defendants did not request a revised preemption ruling to take into account the additional evidentiary material. ¶15 Plaintiffs reacted to defendants' eleventh-hour production of the documents by [52 P.3d 1021] asking the trial court to sanction defendants, but did not specifically object to the trial judge taking them into consideration nor make a motion to strike or for a continuance. ¶16 Plaintiffs urge this court to reverse the nisi prius preemption ruling on the grounds that the only evidentiary material properly before the trial court in making its summary ruling was that pertaining to the 1962 upgrade of the Highway 19 crossing. Pre-FRSA federal funding, plaintiffs argue, does not support preemption. Plaintiffs contend that even if the 1987 documents do in fact show post-FRSA federal funding, a matter plaintiffs now deny, they are beyond this court's reviewing cognizance because they were never properly made part of the summary process record. While we agree with plaintiffs that the 1962 federal funding would not support preemption, we disagree that the 1987 documents are beyond our power to consider on review. ¶17 A summary disposition of fewer than all issues in a cause is simply a judicial pretrial designation of those issues which are to be treated as resolved. ¶18 Ordinarily, an appellate court will not take notice on review of any material that was not properly before the trial court in the decisional process that led to summary judgment. "A party may move for judgment in his favor on the ground that the depositions, admissions in the pleadings, stipulations, answers to interrogatories and to requests for admissions, affidavits, and exhibits on file, filed with his motion or subsequently filed with leave of court show that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact. . . ." The 1987 documents were not presented to the trial court in conformity with the procedure set forth in Rule 13. Nevertheless, they were placed before the trial court in the decisional process leading to summary judgment. The filing requirement contained in Rule 13 is for the benefit of nonmovants so that they may have an opportunity to respond. It may be waived. IV PLAINTIFFS' EXCESSIVE SPEED AND KINDRED THEORIES OF LIABILITY ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW ¶19 The FRSA permits continued state regulation of railroad safety concerns until such time as the Secretary of Transportation prescribes regulations or issues an order covering the subject of the state requirement. ¶20 Plaintiffs alleged that the train in question "was traveling at a speed which was greater than reasonable, prudent, or proper for the crossing." Defendants moved for summary rejection of this theory. In support of their motion, defendants attached the affidavit of Dan Armstrong, the railroad's track inspector, who stated that it was his duty to inspect the track for compliance with federal regulations regarding track classifica-[52 P.3d 1023] tion, that the Highway 19 crossing was among the track over which he had inspection duties at the time the accident in question occurred, and that on the date of the accident the track at the Highway 19 crossing was classified as Class 3. Defendants also attached the railroad timetable which showed the speed limit for the track intersecting Highway 19 to be forty (40) miles per hour. ¶21 Plaintiffs concede that the speed limit for Class 3 track is 40 miles per hour and that the train with which plaintiffs' decedent collided was traveling within the speed limit, but argue that the motion should have been denied because defendants' evidentiary material failed to establish that the track in question was actually Class 3 at the time of the collision. They insist that proof of the track's classification cannot be in the form of conclusory statements by the railroad's track inspector but must consist of the inspection reports required by the federal regulations ¶22 The track inspector's affidavit meets the requirements of District Court Rule 13 that it be made on personal knowledge and that it state specific facts that would make it admissible in evidence. ¶23 Plaintiffs next contend that defendants are not automatically entitled to preemption of all theories involving speed even if they have complied with all the preconditions for speed preemption. In this contention plaintiffs are correct. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Easterwood that the FRSA's preemption provision, §20106, is not absolute. It contains a saving clause under which a state may enact or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation or order pertaining to a safety concern already regulated by the Secretary of Transportation, provided that the state law (1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, (2) is not incompatible with any federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and (3) does not create an undue burden on interstate commerce. ¶24 In Easterwood, the widow of a truck driver who was killed when his vehicle was struck by a train pressed a negligence claim against the railroad on the theo-[52 P.3d 1024] ry that even if the train was traveling within the federally permitted speed limit, the railroad could still be held liable for breach of its common-law duty to operate the train at a moderate and safe speed given the "time and place." The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that common-law speed restrictions are not preserved by the preemption section's saving clause. The Court stated: The state law on which respondent relies is concerned with local hazards only in the sense that its application turns on the facts of the case. The common law of negligence provides a general rule to address all hazards caused by lack of due care, not just those owing to unique local hazards. Respondent's contrary view would completely deprive the Secretary of the power to pre-empt state common law, a power clearly conferred by § 434 [now §20106]. In other words, for a state law to meet the requirements of the FRSA saving clause, it must be narrowly addressed to a particular (essentially) local safety hazard. ¶25 Plaintiffs argue that the Highway 19 crossing was ultrahazardous and that the conditions making it so constituted an essentially local safety hazard within the meaning of the preemption provisions's saving clause. Whether the conditions at the Highway 19 crossing at the time of this collision might arguably have constituted an essentially local safety hazard which the state could have regulated had it chosen to do so is immaterial because there is no evidence that the state did so. The sine qua non of §20106 is the enactment of a state law which is "necessary to reduce or eliminate an essentially local safety hazard." Plaintiffs urge this court to find such a law in the common law of negligence, but Easterwood makes clear that state tort law does not address local safety hazards in the sense contemplated by §20106. Plaintiffs have failed to iden-[52 P.3d 1025] tify any state law enacted for the purpose of reducing or eliminating alleged safety hazards at the Highway 19 crossing. In light of Easterwood, we hold that the saving clause of §20106 does not contemplate the survival of an excessive speed claim based upon the generalized application of state tort law to what are characterized as ultrahazardous conditions. ¶26 Plaintiffs also argue that they may premise liability on the theory that the railroad breached a common-law duty to stop or reduce its speed to avoid a "specific, individual hazard." This argument is derived from a footnote in Easterwood in which the United States Supreme Court suggested in obiter dictum that some common-law negligence claims related to speed "such as the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard" might yet be viable despite the FRSA. Because Mrs. Easterwood's allegation that the train was traveling "too quickly given the 'time and place'" presented nothing more than an excessive speed claim, the Court in Easterwood declined to address the FRSA's pre-emptive effect on such related claims. V WAS THE JURY CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED? ¶29 Plaintiffs assign four errors to the instructions given or refused by the trial court. In reviewing assigned error in [52 P.3d 1028], jury instructions, this court must consider the instructions as a whole. ¶30 Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on negligence per se in relation to the railroad's failure to comply with two statutes, the first requiring a railroad to erect suitable signs of caution and the second requiring a railroad to maintain its crossings in good condition. ¶31 Plaintiffs next assign error to the trial court's failure to instruct the jurors that they must apportion fault under Oklahoma's comparative negligence regime between all potentially liable persons, including persons not parties to the lawsuit. ¶32 Plaintiffs next assert that the trial court committed reversible error in giving the following instruction: INSTRUCTION NO. 21 You are instructed that where a railroad train and a motor vehicle are approaching an intersection of a street and a railroad track, the railroad train has the right of way over the approaching vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that this instruction places the entire burden of avoiding an accident on the motorist and is therefore tantamount to a directed verdict for the railroad. We agree that this instruction standing alone is overbalanced in favor of the railroad,60 but upon [52 P.3d 1030]consideration of the instructions as a whole conclude that they fairly and accurately reflect the Oklahoma law on the relative duties of railroads and motorists. The instructions advised the jury to consider all the instructions together and not to focus on one to the exclusion of the others. They informed the jurors that the public has a right to rely upon the exercise of reasonable care by the railroad in maintaining crossing signals in good repair and efficient working condition, and that a motorist is required to stop at a railroad crossing only if: (1) a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives sufficient warning of the train's proximity, (2) the train emits a signal audible from approximately 1,500 feet from the crossing and the train is an immediate hazard based upon its speed, or (3) the train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to the crossing. Upon consideration of the instructions in their entirety, we conclude that they were adequate and that they did not misdirect the jury or constitute a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. ¶33 Finally, plaintiffs assign error to the trial court's refusal to give four proffered instructions on the issue of the ultrahazardousness of the Highway 19 crossing.61 The ultrahazardous crossing doctrine holds that a railroad's common-law duties may be expanded at ultrahazardous crossings to require extra-statutory warnings deemed necessary to alleviate the dangers posed by special circumstances.62 To the extent that the question of ultrahazardousness was raised by [52 P.3d 1031] plaintiffs to prove that defendants breached common-law duties regarding warning devices and speed, the trial court's refusal to instruct on ultrahazardousness was correct in light of today's pronouncement that those theories of liability are preempted. ¶34 With respect to plaintiffs' theory that the warning devices were improperly maintained, the trial court gave the following instruction: Where the railroad crossing signals are maintained by a railroad, even though the law does not require them to be installed, the public has a right to rely upon the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the railroad to keep them in good repair and in efficient working condition, and the failure to do so is a fact for you to consider in determining whether or not the railroad was negligent. We conclude that this instruction correctly states the railroad's duty of care. The duty to maintain the signals "in good repair and efficient working condition" does not vary depending on the degree of hazardousness of the crossing. ¶35 We also conclude that the absence of instructions on ultrahazardousness in relation to the train's auditory warnings did not result in a verdict different from that which would have been reached had such instructions been given. While the testimony was mixed, there was ample evidence that the train's crew blew the whistle not just at the distance required by statute, but as near to the Highway 19 crossing as the immediately preceding crossing,63 and again as it entered the Highway 19 crossing. There was testimony, too, that the crew sounded the whistle continuously as the train proceeded through Apache. The jury's general verdict found this issue in favor of defendants and is conclusive as to all disputed facts and conflicting statements.64 The verdict must be understood as having resolved the factual dispute regarding the frequency and effectiveness of the whistle in favor of defendants. Even assuming the crossing was ultrahazardous, there is competent evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict that the train's crew gave adequate auditory warnings of its approach. Additionally, the jury's general verdict constitutes a finding that the flashing signals were working as they were intended and should have given Gilmore warning of the train's approach even if the whistle had never sounded.65 VI THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE CORRECT ¶36 Plaintiffs assign error to two [52 P.3d 1032] of the trial court's evidentiary rulings.66 Under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, the trial court stands as a "gatekeeper," admitting or excluding evidence based on the judge's assessment of its relevance and reliability.67 All relevant evidence is admissible,68 unless the trial court determines that "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise."69 A trial court has discretion in deciding whether proffered evidence is relevant and, if so, whether it should be admitted, and a judgment will not be reversed based on a trial judge's ruling to admit or exclude evidence absent a clear abuse of discretion.70 We conclude that no abuse of discretion attended the trial court's evidentiary rulings. ¶37 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by excluding from the liability stage of the trial evidence of railroad policies illustrating the latter's indifference to safety issues as well as evidence demonstrating that the railroad benefited financially from ignoring maintenance and safety issues.71 We disagree. It was within the trial court's discretion to exclude such evidence as was only marginally relevant to a determination of the railroad's negligence with respect to the particular crossing in question, or was highly prejudicial to a reasoned evaluation of the railroad's conduct, or both. VII POST-TRIAL REVIEW OF PROCESS UPON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE UNDERTAKEN AFTER THE MOTION'S PRETRIAL DENIAL ¶38 Among the issues tendered for certiorari review by defendants is the trial court's error in the denial of their 10 August 1998 motion for summary judgment upon plaintiffs' entire claim based on Gilmore's purported negligence per se in failing to stop at the crossing for the flashing lights. Although defendants characterize the error as harmless in light of the judgment in their favor, they nevertheless continue to press for its review [52 P.3d 1033]. ¶39 This court has not previously decided whether post-trial review may be undertaken of the nisi prius denial of a motion for summary judgment.72 We hold today that it may not. A motion for summary judgment, if denied, simply determines that material fact issues exist which warrant a trial. Once that trial occurs, the ends of orderly procedure sought to be achieved by summary process to expeditiously dispose of cases where the absence of material factual disputes demonstrates that the expense and delay of a trial is unnecessary would not be furthered by a post-trial inquiry into the correctness of the pretrial ruling. Furthermore, it would be anachronistic after a case has been tried on the merits to review that case on pretrial submissions alone rather than upon the evidence and record as a whole. In short, summary process and trial are separate decisional tracks conducted according to different evidentiary rules. Once a decision in the latter has been reached, the two tracks merge and summary-disposition process disappears as a separately reviewable procedure. We review only that process by which the actual disposition of the case was made. ¶40 At least ten federal circuit courts have held that the denial of a summary judgment motion is not reviewable on appeal.73 A number of state appellate courts have made similar pronouncements.74 ¶41 Our refusal to grant review of a denial of summary adjudication does not preclude post-trial appellate review of the contention that a party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Procedural mechanisms for pressing the issue after a trial commences or has concluded include a demurrer to the evidence,75 a motion for a directed verdict76 and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,77 the denial of any of [52 P.3d 1034] which produces after trial a reviewable ruling. VIII SUMMARY ¶42 COCA's reversal of the judgment in this case is vacated and the trial court's judgment on jury verdict is affirmed. Plaintiffs may not press their claim of negligence on the theories of inadequate signalization or speed because those theories are preempted by federal law. As for the issues left unaddressed by COCA, we hold that any errors at nisi prius in the instructions given or refused were harmless and that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were correct. Viewing plaintiffs' negligence claim within the parameters authorized by federal law, the jury has determined that legal responsibility for the tragic loss of life at the Highway 19 crossing is not assignable to the railroad. We find no error in the proceedings which requires that decision to be reversed. ¶43 THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AFFIRMED. ¶44 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR [ 52 P.3d 1035 ]. FOOT