Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN V JONES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121355
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 2002

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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED OCTOBER 22, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121355  
JOHN V. JONES,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
Defendant has applied for leave to appeal from the Court  
of Appeals order directing the trial court to immediately  
revoke his bond. He argues that his pending application for  
a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court is an “appeal” for  
the purpose of MCL 770.8, so that he remains entitled to be  
free on bond.  We hold that an application for a writ of  
habeas corpus is not an appeal within the meaning of MCL  
770.8.   We thus affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
 
I  
In 1999, defendant conditionally pleaded guilty1 to a  
charge of possessing 225 or more grams, but less than 650  
grams, of cocaine in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii), and  
the 
court sentenced him to a 
seven-and-one-half 
to 
thirty-year  
term of imprisonment.  The plea agreement permitted defendant  
to appeal the legality of a search warrant that led to the  
discovery of the cocaine.  The agreement also permitted  
defendant to remain free on bond “pending appeal.”  The trial  
court accepted the plea, sentenced defendant in accordance  
with the agreement, and entered an order that permitted him to  
be free on bond of $50,000 or ten percent pending appeal.  
The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for  
leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented.2  
This Court also denied leave to appeal.3  Defendant then  
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of  
1Conditional pleas are permitted under MCR 6.301(C)(2) 
(permitting 
conditional 
pleas 
to 
preserve 
for 
appeal 
specified 
pretrial rulings and entitling the defendant to withdraw his 
plea if the specified pretrial ruling is overturned on 
appeal); see also People v Reid, 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 655  
(1984).  
2Unpublished order, entered August 30, 2000 (Docket No. 
228299).  
3463 Mich 976; 623 NW2d 599, reconsideration den 463 Mich 
976 (2001).  
2 
 
certiorari, which it denied.4  
The prosecutor then moved in the trial court to revoke  
defendant’s bond.  While that motion was pending, defendant  
filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United  
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan  
pursuant to 28 USC 2254.  The prosecutor argued before the  
trial court that the federal habeas corpus proceeding was an  
independent civil action rather than a continuation of direct  
appellate review, and that the trial court therefore no longer  
had authority to continue bond.  The trial court denied the  
prosecutor’s motion, but increased defendant’s bond to  
$100,000.  
The prosecutor then filed an emergency application for  
leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals  
reversed and ordered the trial court to immediately revoke  
defendant’s bond and remand him to the custody of the  
Department of Corrections.5  Defendant then filed in this  
Court an application for leave to appeal and a motion for stay  
of proceedings.  We denied the motion for stay while we  
4Jones v Michigan, 534 US 954; 122 S Ct 354; 151 L Ed 2d  
267 (2001).  
5Unpublished order, entered April 4, 2002 (Docket No. 
239673), clarified, unpublished order, entered April 22, 2002 
(clarifying that the prior order had immediate effect under 
MCR 7.215[F][2]).  
3  
considered the application for leave to appeal.6
 We now  
affirm.  
II  
Defendant argues that he is entitled to remain at liberty  
during the pendency of his application for a writ of habeas  
corpus because the federal proceeding is an appeal for the  
purpose of MCL 770.8.  
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation  
that we review de novo.  Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466  
Mich 95, 99; 643 NW2d 553 (2002).  
MCL 770.8 provides:  
During the time between the trial court  
judgment and the decision of the court to which an 
appeal is taken, the trial judge may admit the 
defendant to bail, if the offense charged is  
bailable and if the offense is not an assaultive  
crime as defined in section 9a of this chapter.  
This provision permits bail only during the process of  
appeal. The statute does not define the word “appeal,” so we  
may consult a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the term.  
Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163,  
n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999) (citing MCL 8.3a).  The Legislature  
requires that “technical words and phrases, and such as may  
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,  
6644 NW2d 762 (2002).  
4 
   
shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar  
and appropriate meaning.”  MCL 8.3a. Because “appeal” is a  
legal term of art, resort to a legal dictionary to determine  
its meaning is appropriate.  See Consumers Power, 460 Mich  
163.
 An “appeal” is “[r]esort to a superior (i.e.,  
appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e.,  
trial) court or administrative agency.  A complaint to a  
higher tribunal of an error or injustice committed by a lower  
tribunal, in which the error or injustice is sought to be  
corrected or reversed.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).  
This 
definition 
does 
not 
describe 
the 
instant  
relationship in which state courts are not “inferior” to or  
“lower” than federal courts, and federal courts are not  
“superior” to or “higher” than state courts.  Rather, such  
courts constitute separate systems of justice.  
28 USC 2254 does not grant federal courts the power of  
appellate review of state court convictions.  Rather, it  
provides for an original proceeding in a federal court  
challenging the custody of a person who is detained under a  
judgment of a state court.  It sets forth a process of  
“application” for a writ and denominates one who seeks a writ  
as an “applicant” rather than an “appellant.” In short, the  
statute does not provide for direct or appellate review of the  
5  
 
state court judgment of conviction and sentence.  28 USC  
2254(a)-(h).  
Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has  
explained:  
The whole history of the writ—its unique 
development—refutes a construction of the federal 
courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate 
their task to that of courts of appellate review. 
The function on habeas is different.  It is to test  
by way of an original civil proceeding, independent 
of the normal channels of review of criminal  
judgments, the very gravest allegations.  State  
prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas 
corpus only upon proving that their detention 
violates the fundamental liberties of the person, 
safeguarded against state action by the Federal 
Constitution.  [Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293, 311­
312; 83 S Ct 745; 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963), overruled 
in part on other grounds Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504 
US 1; 112 S Ct 1715; 118 L Ed 2d 318 (1992).]  
Similarly, Michigan case law has long distinguished  
applications for the writ of habeas corpus from appeals from  
criminal proceedings:  
Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding the main 
purpose of which is to cause the release of persons 
illegally confined, to inquire into the authority 
of law by which a person is deprived of his  
liberty.  Application for the writ of habeas corpus 
is not made in the criminal proceedings; it is made 
in a new and independent civil action instituted to 
enforce a civil right, the right to liberty.  
[People v McCager, 367 Mich 116, 121; 116 NW2d 205 
(1962)(citations omitted).]  
See also In re Palm, 255 Mich 632, 634; 238 NW 732 (1931)  
(“The writ of habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
error”).  
A 
federal 
district 
court 
considering 
an 
application 
under  
28 USC 2254 is simply a trial court exercising original  
jurisdiction over an application for a writ authorized under  
federal law.  See 28 USC 1331.  That its habeas corpus  
jurisdiction 
permits 
it, 
under 
carefully 
defined  
circumstances, to scrutinize state court proceedings for  
alleged violations of the United States Constitution and  
federal laws does not transform the federal district court  
into a superior appellate court with jurisdiction to reverse  
the judgment of a prisoner’s conviction.  Rather, its power is  
limited to granting a writ that compels the release of the  
prisoner from unlawful detention.  
Accordingly, we hold that an application for a writ of  
habeas corpus does not constitute a criminal “appeal” within  
the meaning of MCL 770.8.  A court’s authority to grant a bond  
under MCL 770.8 is limited to the time during the appellate  
process, and federal habeas corpus proceedings are not a  
continuation of that process.  
III  
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
7  
 
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
8