Title: Ex Parte University of South Alabama
Citation: 812 So. 2d 341
Docket Number: 1991955
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2001

812 So. 2d 341 (2001)
Ex parte UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA d/b/a University of South Alabama Medical Center Hospital.
(Re University of South Alabama d/b/a University of South Alabama Medical Center Hospital v. Escambia County et al.)
1991955.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 8, 2001.
*343 Thomas R. Boller, Mobile, for petitioner.
James B. Rossler, Mobile, for Escambia County
WOODALL, Justice.
We granted the petition for the writ of certiorari filed by the University of South Alabama d/b/a University of South Alabama Medical Center (hereinafter "USAMC") to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that USAMC is not entitled to recover from Escambia County charges for medical care for three indigent Escambia County jail inmates. We reverse and remand.
The Court of Civil Appeals set forth the following facts:
University of South Alabama v. Escambia County, 812 So. 2d 336, 338 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (emphasis added).
USAMC appealed to this Court. We transferred the case to the Court of Civil Appeals, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975. The Court of Civil Appeals *344 held that the 1983 agreement between USAMC and Escambia County barred USAMC from recovering charges it had incurred in providing medical care for the indigent Escambia County inmates and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The 1983 agreement was in the form of a letter, dated December 1, 1983, written by Maurice A. Downing,[1] the attorney for USAMC, to Brock B. Gordon,[2] as the attorney for Escambia County. The letter read:
*345 The standard by which this Court will review a motion for summary judgment is well established:
Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala.1999).
Our rules relating to construing contracts are also well established. "General contract law requires a court to enforce, as it is written, an unambiguous and lawful contract. A court may not make a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract under the guise of construing it." Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 736 So. 2d 564, 570 (Ala. 1999). With regard to ambiguity, this Court has stated:
Yu v. Stephens, 591 So.2d, 858, 859-60 (Ala.1991).
The 1983 agreement is not ambiguous. It specifically prohibits USAMC from filing "further claims or suits against... Escambia County under the Alabama Health Care Responsibility Act." The Alabama Health Care Responsibility Act (hereinafter "AHCRA") became effective in 1979 for the purpose of placing "the ultimate financial obligation for the medical treatment of indigents on the county in which the indigent resides." § 22-21-291, Ala.Code 1975. A medical provider can sue under AHCRA, and the suit "is in the nature of a suit on a contract implied by law." Tuscaloosa County v. Children's Hosp., Inc., 486 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (Ala.Civ. App.1986).
This action is not one arising out of AHCRA. Instead, USAMC bases its claim on the obligation imposed upon Escambia County by § 14-6-19, Ala.Code 1975, which provides:
This section became effective in 1852, and allows a medical provider to sue to recover charges for medical services rendered to inmates in the county jail who are unable to pay for medicines or medical services. Malone v. Escambia County, 116 Ala. 214, 22 So. 503 (1897). Obviously, a county's obligationand a medical provider's corresponding rightwith regard to inmates in the county jail predated AHCRA by many years. Also, while AHCRA deals with a county's obligation with regard to resident indigents, § 14-6-19 deals with the county's obligation with regard to indigent inmates in its jails, regardless of their county residence. The 1983 agreement, by its clear terms, does not bar USAMC's claim for payment of its charges for treating the indigent inmates of the Escambia County jail. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting Escambia County's summary-judgment motion, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., concurs specially.
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I write specially to explain my rationale in concurring with the main opinion. I believe that USAMC may pursue this claim because the two statutes at issue cover two different classifications of indigents. Section 14-6-19, Ala.Code 1975, requires a county to provide necessary medical attention to indigent prisoners housed in the county, whether or not they are residents of the county in which they are imprisoned. Section 22-21-291, Ala. Code 1975 (hereinafter "AHCRA"), enacted over 100 years later, places the responsibility for the medical care of indigent residents on the county in which they reside. To be classified as an indigent under AHCRA, a person must have "resided continuously in this state for not less than one year." Ala.Code 1975, § 22-21-292. There are probably numerous indigent prisoners in this State who are neither residents of this State nor residents of the county in which they are imprisoned, yet § 14-6-19 requires that the county provide medical care for them. Furthermore, a health-care provider who seeks remuneration for medical care provided to indigent prisoners should seek relief under § 14-6-19 rather than under § 22-21-291. Surely if USAMC and Escambia County had intended that their 1983 agreement encompass indigent prisoners, they would have expressly so provided. In addition to specifically referring to § 22-21-291 in the agreement, the parties referred to "indigent residents," in accordance with the statute. If the parties to the 1983 agreement intended that indigent prisoners be covered by the agreement, they could have cited the earlier statute, § 14-6-9. For these reasons, I agree with the main opinion that USAMC may pursue a claim against Escambia County under § 14-6-9, Ala.Code 1975.
[1]  Mr. Downing is deceased.
[2]  USAMC offered the following affidavit from Mr. Gordon in opposition to Escambia County's summary-judgment motion:

"I am Brock Gordon and I have been an attorney licensed to practice in Mobile County for years. I have reviewed a copy of the letter to me from [Maurice] Downing dated 1 December 1983 which is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A. Based upon my best recollection of the matter, i.e., my letter, the agreement between the University of South Alabama Medical Center and Clarke and Escambia Counties represented by this letter was not intended to and did not include any consideration of prisoners or either [County's] responsibilities for medical treatment for prisoners."