Title: Waters v. Coleman
Citation: 361 S.W.2d 268
Docket Number: 5-2770
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 1962

361 S.W.2d 268 (1962) Mathew WATERS, Appellant, v. George COLEMAN, Appellee. No. 5-2770. Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 15, 1962. Rehearing Denied November 19, 1962. M. V. Moody, Little Rock, for appellant. Wright, Lindsey, Jennings, Lester &amp; Shults, Little Rock, for appellee. *269 JOHNSON, Justice. This case arises out of an automobile collision. Appellant, Mathew Waters, sued appellee, George Coleman, for personal injuries and damages to his automobile sustained by appellant when appellee's car hit the rear of appellant's car on Highway 67, south of Jacksonville, October 19, 1960. Appellant was turning or about to turn left; appellee overtook him and tried to pass on the left, when the collision occurred. Appellant and his witnesses testified that appellee was traveling at a high rate of speed, which was contradicted by testimony of appellee and his witnesses, including an Arkansas State Police officer introduced as an expert on accident investigations. This officer was allowed to testify, inter alia, as to his opinion of appellee's speed and point of impact. Appellant objected to all of this witness' testimony and also objected to certain of appellee's instuctions to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for appellee, and from the judgment comes this appeal. The jury instructions give us a great deal of concern. To say the least, they could have been better worded, and appellant's position improved by more specific objections. However, since it is not necessary for a determination of this case, we do not pass on the instructions in this opinion. For reversal appellant specifically urged that the trial court erred in permitting a state police officer to testify as an expert witness over appellant's general and specific objections, because there were four eye-witnesses in close proximity to the collision who testified seeing the collision and the impact, and that this evidence invades the province of the jury. The officer's testimony abstracted from the record is as follows: On cross-examination, the witness testified that he did not see the accident, and that at the time of the accident he was probably at State Police Headquarters about twenty miles from the scene of the accident. Appellee argues in effect that the officer's testimony simply explained to the jury the foundation upon which he reached his conclusions as to the single issue of the speed of the vehicles. Ergo, the evidence was admissible under the rule laid down in St. Louis &amp; S. F. R. Co. v. Fithian, 106 Ark. 491, 155 S.W. 88. In our view, the witness' testimony went much further than contended by appellee. In fact it was tantamount to a reconstruction of the collision and a comment on the weight of the evidence. In this case there were five eye-witnesses who testified on behalf of appellant (including appellant) and two who testified on behalf of appellee (including appellee) in addition to the expert. While the testimony was in such hopeless conflict as to amount to a swearing match, the facts to be determined were not complicated. This was a relatively simple collision. Certainly there was no evidence to indicate that it was beyond the jury's ability to understand the facts and draw its own conclusions. The state of the record being thus, we find that the trial court erred in allowing appellee to resort to expert opinion. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Barry, 172 Ark. 729, 290 S.W. 942, Henshaw v. Henderson, 235 Ark. 130, 359 S.W.2d 436. Reversed.