Title: State v. Patrick E. Richter
Citation: 2000 WI 58
Docket Number: 1998AP001332-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2000

2000 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Patrick E. Richter,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  224 Wis. 2d 814, 592 N.W.2d 310 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 15, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles D. Heath 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-sppellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Eileen W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross petitioner 
there were briefs and oral argument by Susan E. Alesia, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
 
2000 WI 58 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1332-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick E. Richter,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent- 
          Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This case involves a warrantless 
entry of a home, and the recurring question of whether the 
circumstances under which it took place were sufficiently 
exigent to justify it.  The circumstances were these: a 
Marinette County sheriff's deputy responded to an early-morning 
dispatch of a burglary in progress at a trailer park.  The 
victim flagged down the deputy as he arrived on the scene and 
told him that someone had broken into her mobile home, and that 
she had seen the intruder flee her trailer and enter the 
defendant's trailer across the street.  The deputy observed 
signs of forced entry at the defendant's trailera window screen 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
2 
was knocked out and lying on the ground.  The deputy shined his 
flashlight in the open window and attracted the attention of two 
people who were sleeping on the floor.  They opened the door and 
identified the defendant, who was sleeping on the couch, as the 
owner of the trailer.  The deputy entered the trailer, woke the 
defendant, told him what had happened and asked his permission 
to search the trailer for the burglary suspect. Permission was 
granted. During the search, the deputy observed marijuana in 
plain view, which the defendant admitted was his. 
¶2 
The defendant was charged with several marijuana 
possession offenses, and moved to suppress the physical evidence 
and his statements, alleging an illegal entry.  The circuit 
court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, 
finding 
the 
circumstances 
insufficiently 
exigent 
and 
the 
defendant's consent insufficiently attenuated to justify the 
search.  State v. Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 817, 592 N.W.2d 310 
(Ct. App. 1999).  Because we conclude the entry was justified by 
exigent circumstancesspecifically, the deputy's "hot pursuit" 
of the burglary suspect and his need to protect the safety of 
those inside the trailerwe reverse.  We also conclude that the 
court of appeals' application of the attenuation doctrine was 
based upon a misconstruction of several of the doctrine's 
elements. 
¶3 
The facts of the case are not in dispute.  In the 
early morning hours of October 12, 1997, Marinette County 
Sheriff's Deputy Rick Berlin was on patrol in the City of 
Marinette.  At approximately 4:30 a.m., Berlin overheard a City 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
3 
of Marinette police dispatch reporting a burglary in progress at 
the Golden Sands Trailer Park.  Berlin, who was near the area, 
responded to the call.  When he arrived at Golden Sands, he was 
immediately flagged down by Linda Champion, who reported that an 
unknown man had just broken into her mobile home on lot 438.  
She told the officer that she had yelled at the intruder, and he 
then ran from her trailer into the trailer on lot 439 directly 
across the street.  Her husband confirmed this account. 
¶4 
Deputy Berlin went to the trailer on lot 439.  The 
trailer had a front picture window just west of its front door. 
 As he approached, Berlin noted that the window was open and its 
screen had been knocked out onto the ground outside.  Since the 
temperature was in the 40s, Berlin took this as a sign of forced 
entry, given the information he had obtained from the Champions 
across the street.  
 
Q. 
What was going through your mind at that time as 
far as what you were thinking when you saw that 
open window? 
 
A. 
I believed whoever this male was ran to that 
trailer at 439 and broke into that trailer 
because the screen was laying on the sidewalk or 
the front porch. 
 
Q. 
Did you have any concerns for the safety of 
whatever occupants may have been in that mobile 
home? 
 
A.  Yes, I did. 
 
Q.  What concerns did you have?  
 
A. 
I 
felt 
that 
there 
could 
be 
possibly 
some        
endangerment there because this male did break 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
4 
into that trailer at 438 and then ran across and 
ran into the trailer at 439. 
¶5 
Berlin approached the open window and shined his 
flashlight into the darkened trailer.  He saw at least three 
people sleeping in the front roomtwo on the floor and one man 
on the sofa directly across from the window.  He tried waking 
the occupants by shining his flashlight on them and announcing, 
"Sheriff's Department, come to the door."   
¶6 
Two of the occupants, Nicholas Dufek and Debra Sable, 
woke up and came to the door.  Berlin told them there had been a 
break-in at the home across the street and asked whether they 
had seen a man enter their trailer.  Dufek and Sable said they 
had been sleeping and had not seen anyone enter.  Berlin then 
asked permission to enter the home and search for the intruder. 
 Dufek and Sable told Berlin that they did not own the trailer, 
but that the man sleeping on the sofa, Patrick Richter, did. 
¶7 
Berlin entered the trailer and woke Richter.1  Berlin 
told Richter that someone had just broken into the trailer 
across the street and that a witness had seen the intruder flee 
into Richter's trailer.  Berlin then asked if he could search 
Richter's home for the intruder.  Richter replied, "[y]eah, 
that's cool."  Upon entering the trailer, Berlin also noticed a 
fourth individual sleeping on the floor of the front room.  
                     
1 There is some confusion in the record as to who woke 
Richter.  Berlin testified that he did.  However, his sworn 
search warrant application, which was apparently received into 
the suppression hearing record by stipulation, says Dufek and 
Sable did.  The circuit court found that Berlin woke Richter. 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
5 
Linda Champion and her husband later identified that man, Shawn 
McFadden, as the person who broke into their mobile home.  
McFadden was Richter's roommate at the time. 
¶8 
Having obtained Richter's consent, Berlin and City of 
Marinette Police Officer Scott Asplund, who also responded to 
the burglary dispatch and arrived at some point after Berlin, 
searched the trailer for the intruder.  Berlin found a portable 
scale and a clear plastic bag containing marijuana in plain view 
on a nightstand in one of the bedrooms.  In the bedroom closet, 
Berlin found a marijuana branch hanging from a hanger. 
¶9 
Berlin questioned Richter about the marijuana, and 
Richter admitted it was his.  He consented to a pat-down search, 
and Berlin recovered a brass marijuana pipe from his front pants 
pocket.  Berlin placed Richter under arrest.  Later that day, 
during a search pursuant to a warrant, officers found more 
marijuana and another scale in Richter's trailer and garage. 
¶10 Richter was charged with one count of manufacture of a 
controlled 
substance 
(THC), 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 961.41(1)(h)1 and 961.14(4)(t) (1995-96);2 one count of 
possession of THC contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.14(4)(t) and 
961.41(3g)(e); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1).  The charges were later 
upgraded to allege repeater status (second offense).  See Wis. 
Stat. § 961.48. 
                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Wisconsin 
statutes are to the 1995-96 version.  
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
6 
¶11 Richter moved to suppress the physical evidence and 
his statements, alleging an illegal entry and search.  A 
suppression hearing was held on January 5, 1998, and the 
Marinette County Circuit Court, the Honorable Charles D. Heath, 
denied the motion, concluding that Richter's consent to the 
search cured any problem with the initial entry. 
¶12 At a second hearing held on February 12, 1998, the 
circuit court judge reversed himself, finding that the State had 
failed 
to 
show 
any 
exigent 
circumstances 
justifying 
the 
warrantless entry.  The court concluded that Richter's consent 
to the search and the subsequent discovery of the drugs flowed 
directly from the illegal entry and thus could not cure it.  
Based on the Fourth Amendment and art. I, secs. 1, 2, 9, and 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, the court suppressed Richter's 
statements and the drug evidence. 
¶13 On March 18, 1998, the circuit court judge signed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order granting the 
defendant's suppression motion.  This order had been submitted 
the previous day by Richter's attorney but had not been approved 
in advance by the district attorney.  That same dayMarch 18, 
1998the district attorney submitted his own proposed findings 
and conclusions, together with a cover letter explaining that he 
had "problems with the way [the defense attorney's proposed 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
7 
order] was drafted."  On March 30, 1998, the circuit court judge 
signed and entered the district attorney's order.3 
¶14 On May 11, 1998, the State filed an appeal pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2 and 3.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 817.  The court concluded 
that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless 
entry, rejecting the State's argument that a threat to the 
safety of the trailer's occupants was present.  Id. at 821.  The 
court of appeals also rejected the State's argument that this 
was a case of "hot pursuit," concluding that because Berlin did 
not personally observe the crime or the fleeing suspect, his 
actions did not constitute an "'immediate or continuous pursuit 
of [a suspect] from the scene of a crime. . . . '"  Id. at 821 
(quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984)). 
¶15 The court of appeals also rejected the State's 
alternate 
theory 
that 
Richter's 
consent 
was 
sufficiently 
attenuated from the initial entry to be valid.  Id. at 823.  
Relying on State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 205, 577 N.W.2d 
794 (1998), and State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 33, 585 N.W.2d 
628 (Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals found Richter's 
consent to be too close in time to the entry and not adequately 
insulated 
from 
the 
initial 
illegality 
by 
an 
acceptable 
intervening circumstance in order for attenuation theory to 
apply.  In particular, the court of appeals was troubled by the 
                     
3 The order prepared by the district attorney differed from 
the order prepared by Richter's attorney, but in ways not 
significant to the substantive issues presented on this review. 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
8 
fact that Berlin did not tell Richter he did not have to consent 
to the search.  Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 825-26.  The court also 
concluded that Berlin purposefully exploited Richter's state of 
sleep in order to gain consent.  Id. at 827. 
¶16 The State petitioned for review.  Richter filed a 
petition for cross review alleging that the State's notice of 
appeal was untimely.4  We address Richter's cross petition first 
because it presents a question that bears upon our ability to 
reach the substantive issues in this case. 
¶17 The State filed its notice of appeal pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2, which states, "[w]ithin the time period 
specified by s. 808.04(4) and in the manner provided for civil 
appeals under chs. 808 and 809, an appeal may be taken by the 
state from any . . . (d) Order or judgment the substantive 
effect of which results in: . . . 2. Suppressing evidence."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 808.04(4) states that the relevant time period 
is 45 days from the entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. 
¶18 The controversy arises here because the circuit court 
entered two separate orders, the first on March 18, 1998, and 
the second on March 30, 1998, both of which accomplished the 
same resultthe suppression of evidencealthough pursuant to 
somewhat different findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
                     
4 By order dated December 2, 1998, the court of appeals 
rejected Richter's claim that the State's appeal was untimely.  
State v. Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 818 n.1, 592 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. 
App. 1999).  
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
9 
State filed its notice of appeal on May 12, 1998, 43 days after 
the March 30th order, but 55 days after the March 18th order. 
¶19 Richter argues that the time for appeal under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.05 began to run when the first order was entered.  
The first order was prepared by Richter's attorney and submitted 
to the circuit court by cover letter dated March 17, 1998.  The 
letter indicated that a copy had been given to the district 
attorney for his approval and informed the judge that the 
district attorney "want[ed] to get it cleared by Justice in 
Madison."  Nevertheless, the order was entered the very next 
day.  That same day, March 18, the district attorney submitted 
his own proposed order, by cover letter indicating that he knew 
that the defense attorney had "previously submitted Findings, 
but I had problems with the way that was drafted."  The circuit 
court entered the second order on March 30, 1998.     
¶20 The court of appeals summarily concluded that the 
circuit court intended the second order to control and so the 
State's appeal was timely.  We agree.  Marinette County Circuit 
Court Rules provide for a five-day waiting period for objections 
to proposed orders.5  The circuit court entered the first order 
in this case without waiting for the five-day objection period 
to expire, after having been alerted by the defense attorney who 
                     
5 Marinette County Circuit Court Rule 205 provides:  "When 
counsel submits a document to the court for signature, a copy 
shall be simultaneously forwarded to all other counsel and/or 
unrepresented parties.  Objections to the form or content of the 
document submitted shall be filed in writing with the court 
within 5 days of service or mailing." 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
10
submitted it that the prosecutor wanted to consult with the 
attorney general's office before consenting to its entry.  After 
being notified by the district attorney that there were, indeed, 
objections to the defense attorney's order, and having received 
without objection an alternate proposed order from the district 
attorney, the circuit court entered the district attorney's 
order. 
¶21 Apparently then, this was a situation of competing 
proposed orders, received by the court within a day of each 
other; the first order was entered prior to the expiration of 
the five-day objection period, and after the court was alerted 
to the objection, the second order was entered, replacing the 
first.  All of this occurred within a time frame of less than 
two weeks.  Although the circuit court judge did not explicitly 
vacate the earlier order, it seems clear under the circumstances 
that he intended the second order to supersede the first. 
¶22 This is not one of those situations in which a circuit 
court has issued successive, nonconflicting orders or judgments 
(for example, a memorandum decision and order, followed by an 
order for judgment, followed by a judgment), each purporting to 
resolve the entire matter, and the task is to determine which 
was intended as the final order for purposes of the time for 
appeal.  See, e.g., Radoff v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 109 Wis. 2d 
490, 326 N.W.2d 240 (1982); Fredrick v. City of Janesville, 92 
Wis. 2d 685, 285 N.W.2d 655 (1979); State v. Wright, 143 Wis. 2d 
118, 420 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1988).  Instead, these were 
competing, nonfinal orders dealing with the suppression of 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
11
evidence.  The statute provides that "an appeal may be taken by 
the state from any order or judgment . . .  [s]uppressing 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2 (emphasis added).  The 
analysis of this line of cases is therefore inapplicable. 
¶23 Nor is this issue governed by Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 55 
Wis. 2d 21, 197 N.W.2d 752 (1972).  Ver Hagen held that an 
appeal may not be taken from an order denying a motion for 
reconsideration of an earlier final order if it merely addresses 
the same issues as the earlier order.  Id. at 26.  Here, 
however, we have the serial entry of conflicting proposed 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions 
of 
law 
regarding 
the 
suppression 
of 
evidence, 
rather 
than 
a 
request 
for 
reconsideration of an earlier final order disposing of all 
matters in litigation.  Ver Hagen is therefore distinguishable.  
¶24 Edland v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins. Corp., 210 
Wis. 2d 638, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997), is instructive, although not 
perfectly analogous.  In Edland we allowed an appeal from an 
order of a circuit court vacating and re-entering an earlier 
final order which the court had failed to send to the parties.  
Id. at 641.  We concluded that the circuit court's failure to 
give the parties notice of the entry of the initial final order 
constituted a "mistake" under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a), which 
allows relief from a judgment or order upon a showing of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."  Id. at 
645.  The circuit court's mistake had deprived the parties of 
notice of the entry of the original final order and therefore 
effectively eliminated their opportunity to timely file an 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
12
appeal.  Id. at 647.  We held that this sort of mistake 
"constitutes 
a 
compelling 
equitable 
consideration 
under 
§ 806.07(1)(a) which outweighs the goal of finality and provides 
a basis for effectively extending the time to appeal."  Id. at 
648.  Here, by analogy, the circuit court's second order, while 
not specifically vacating the earlier order, corrected the 
apparent mistaken entry of the first, and the one supplanted the 
other for all purposes, including time to appeal. 
¶25 It is important to note that there is no evidence the 
March 30th order was entered in an attempt to manipulate and 
extend the running of the appellate clock.  Indeed, the second 
order was submitted by the district attorney on the same day the 
first order was entered (and apparently without knowledge that 
it had already been entered), and it was signed 12 days later, 
when the State still had 33 days left to appeal from the earlier 
order, had it still been controlling.  The second order did not 
resuscitate the case after the time for appeal had expired.  
Considerations of finality, therefore, are not seriously in play 
in this case.  Richter cannot have reasonably expected the first 
order to remain controlling after the second order was entered 
without any objection from him.  Accordingly, we conclude the 
March 30th order superseded the March 18th order and was 
controlling for all purposes, including time to appeal.  The 
State’s appeal was therefore timely filed.    
¶26 We now turn to the substantive issue: whether Berlin's 
warrantless entry into Richter's trailer was justified by the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
13
therefore valid under the Fourth Amendment and its Wisconsin 
constitution counterpart.  This is, of course, a mixed question 
of constitutional fact that we review under two different 
standards.  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶15, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 
607 N.W.2d 621.  The trial court's findings of evidentiary or 
historical fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 
604 N.W.2d 552.  We independently determine whether the 
historical or evidentiary facts establish exigent circumstances 
sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into the defendant's 
home.  State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 208, 589 N.W.2d 387 
(1999). 
¶27 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects the rights of citizens against unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures.6 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
contains 
a 
substantively identical provision, art. I, sec. 11, that this 
court 
interprets 
consistently 
with 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  
Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 208.   
¶28 A warrantless search of a home is presumptively 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573 (1980).  Indeed, "[i]t is axiomatic that the 
                     
6 The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
14
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'"  Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984)(quoting United States v. 
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).  However, 
the Fourth Amendment is not an absolute bar to warrantless, 
nonconsensual entries into private residences.  Following United 
States Supreme Court precedent, we have recognized that in 
certain circumstances it would be unreasonable and contrary to 
public policy to bar law enforcement officers at the door.  
State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986); 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).  In such circumstances, we weigh 
the urgency of the officer's need to enter against the time 
needed to obtain a warrant.  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 228. 
¶29 There are four well-recognized categories of exigent 
circumstances that have been held to authorize a law enforcement 
officer's warrantless entry into a home: 1) hot pursuit of a 
suspect, 2) a threat to the safety of a suspect or others, 3) a 
risk that evidence will be destroyed, and 4) a likelihood that 
the suspect will flee.  Id. at 229.  The State bears the burden 
of proving the existence of exigent circumstances.  Id. at 228.  
¶30 As in other Fourth Amendment cases, the determination 
of 
whether 
exigent 
circumstances 
are 
present 
turns 
on 
considerations of reasonableness, and we apply an objective 
test.  The test is "[w]hether a police officer under the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time [of entry] 
reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
15
gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly 
enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape."  Id. at 230. 
¶31 Thus, our analysis focuses on the reasonableness of 
Berlin's decision to enter Richter's trailer based on the facts 
in his possession at the time he stood at Richter's door: a 
break-in 
across 
the 
street 
just 
moments 
earlier, 
a 
contemporaneous eyewitness report that the suspect had entered 
Richter's trailer, tell-tale signs of forced entry at the 
trailer, and sleeping people inside potentially at risk of harm 
from the intruder.  The State argues that there is enough 
exigency here to justify the warrantless entry, because Berlin 
was in hot pursuit of the burglary suspect and because the 
safety of the people inside the trailer was in jeopardy. 
¶32 The 
exigent 
circumstance 
of 
"hot 
pursuit" 
is 
established "where there is an 'immediate or continuous pursuit 
of [a suspect] from the scene of a crime.'"  Id. at 232 (quoting 
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753).  The court of appeals concluded Berlin 
was not in hot pursuit of the burglary suspect because: 
 
The suspected intruder had already left the lot 438 
[the Champion's] trailer by the time Berlin arrived on 
the scene.  The violation was observed by a witness, 
not the officer, and some period of time elapsed 
between the time Berlin arrived at the scene and the 
time he approached the trailer on lot 439.  The record 
does not demonstrate there was immediate or continuous 
pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the unlawful 
entry. 
Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 821-22. 
¶33 This analysis implies that the exigency of "hot 
pursuit" as a justification for a warrantless home entry 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
16
requires that the officer himself personally observe the crime 
or the fleeing suspect.  We do not believe there is such a 
prerequisite.  The exigency of an officer's pursuit of a suspect 
may be just as great when the officer is told of the crime and 
the whereabouts of the suspect by an eyewitness just after its 
commission as when he observes it himself.  To allow a 
warrantless entry when an officer personally observes a crime 
and pursues the suspect, but disallow it when he immediately 
responds to an eyewitness report and pursues the suspect would 
be arbitrary indeed. 
¶34 We note that Welsh itself makes no mention of such a 
distinction.  Welsh did not even reach the question because in 
that case, no one pursued the suspect from the scene of the 
crime or observed his flight at all.  The investigating officers 
only determined the suspect's whereabouts by checking the motor 
vehicle registration of his abandoned car.   
¶35 Hayden supports our conclusion that "hot pursuit" does 
not necessarily require that the officer personally witness the 
crime or the suspect's flight from the scene.  In Hayden, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless entry into the 
home of a man suspected of robbing a cab company.  Hayden, 387 
U.S. at 297.  Two cab drivers had followed the robber from the 
scene of the crime to a house.  Id.  One of the drivers notified 
his dispatcher of the suspect's location and the dispatcher 
relayed the information to the responding police officers, who 
entered the house.  Id.  The Court found these circumstances 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
17
sufficiently exigent to justify the officers' warrantless entry. 
 Id.   
¶36 Like the officers in Hayden, Berlin responded to a 
dispatch and picked up the trail of a fleeing suspect from an 
eyewitness account.  His response to the scene of the crime was 
immediate, and his pursuit of the suspect was immediate and 
continuous upon his arrival on the scene and rapid collection of 
information regarding the whereabouts of the suspect.  There is 
no evidence in this record of any delay in Berlin's response or 
pursuit that would have interrupted the immediacy and continuity 
of the situation and therefore dissipated the exigency.  We 
conclude that Berlin's entry was justified by the exigent 
circumstance of hot pursuit. 
¶37 The State also argues that this entry was justified by 
the exigency of a threat to the safety of the suspect or others. 
 It is well-established that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
require 
police 
officers 
to 
delay 
in 
the 
course 
of 
an 
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or 
the lives of others."  Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.  The court of 
appeals concluded that there was no threat to safety here 
because: 
 
Although Berlin was responding to a dispatch of a 
burglary, when he arrived at the scene he learned no 
burglary had taken place.  Rather, the incident was an 
attempted unlawful entry.  There were no reports that 
firearms were present or indications that the suspect 
was known to be violent or dangerous.  The occupants 
in Richter's trailer were all asleep when Berlin 
arrived.  Berlin calmly conversed with the two 
occupants he initially awoke prior to entering the 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
18
trailer. 
 
We 
conclude 
these 
facts 
support 
the 
conclusion that the officer could not have reasonably 
believed a grave threat to the safety of others 
existed. 
 
Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 821.  This analysis draws inferences and 
reaches conclusions that the facts do not support, and places 
too much emphasis on what was unknown and undiscoverableinstead 
of what was known and could reasonably be inferredat the time 
of the entry. 
¶38 In fact, the record in this case does not establish 
that Berlin learned when he arrived on the scene that a mere 
attempted unlawful entry had taken place rather than the 
burglary-in-progress to which he had been dispatched.  The 
difference between a burglary and some other, less serious form 
of unlawful entry lies in the intent of the perpetrator; 
burglary requires intent to steal or commit a felony. See Wis. 
Stat. § 943.10(1). Because the Champions apparently successfully 
interrupted the crime, Berlin did not know prior to entering 
Richter's trailer whether the intruder he was pursuing intended 
to steal or commit a felony. 
¶39 But this understandable lack of information about mens 
rea at this early and urgent stage of the pursuit does not 
establish, as the court of appeals suggested, that this was an 
attempted unlawful entry and not a burglary.  Nor does it 
support the court of appeals' apparent inference that the 
intruder was therefore benign and not a threat to anyone.  
Similarly, that the crime was not completed (because it was 
interrupted by the victims) has no bearing on the evaluation of 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
19
the threat posed by the suspect.  That the suspect abandoned the 
crime and fled does not mean he was not potentially dangerous to 
those in the home into which he fled. 
 
¶40 The court of appeals also emphasized the lack of 
information about the suspect's known dangerousness and the 
presence of any firearms.  This expects too much and puts too 
much at risk.  In the course of investigating crimes in progress 
and pursuing fleeing suspects, police officers are often called 
upon to make judgments based upon incomplete information.  The 
exigency at issue here is the threat to physical safety.  To 
require a police officer in this situation to have affirmative 
evidence of the presence of firearms or known violent tendencies 
on the part of the suspect before acting to protect the safety 
of 
others 
is 
arbitrary 
and 
unrealistic 
and 
unreasonably 
handicaps the officer in the performance of one of his core 
responsibilities.  Certainly, pursuit of a suspect known to be 
armed and 
dangerous would 
establish 
exigent 
circumstances 
implicating a threat to physical safety.  The absence of 
information about firearms or the propensities of the suspect, 
however, does not mean that no threat could possibly have been 
present. 
¶41 Focusing on what was known and could reasonably be 
inferred by the officer at the time of the entry, we conclude 
that Berlin reasonably believed that the intruder he was 
pursuing posed a threat to the safety of the occupants of 
Richter's trailer.  It was the middle of the night.  A stranger 
had just broken into the Champions' trailer, but was discovered 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
20
and therefore abandoned whatever crime he intended to commit 
inside, fleeing into Richter's trailer across the street.  There 
were obvious signs of forced entry at Richter's traileran open 
window (in 40-degree weather), and the knocked out screen lying 
on the ground.  It was reasonable to infer from this that the 
suspect did not belong there but in fact had broken in, just as 
he did at the Champions'.  There were people sleeping inside 
Richter's trailer at the time the intruder entered, creating a 
situation fraught with potential for physical harm if something 
was not immediately done to apprehend the suspect.7   
¶42 The court of appeals' assertion that two of the people 
inside "calmly conversed" with the officer is not supported by 
the record, which contains no information about their demeanor 
or state of mind.  Nor would such a conclusion, if factually 
supported, necessarily establish that they were not at risk.  In 
a situation such as this, involving an unknown male intruder who 
forcibly entered not one but two occupied homes in the middle of 
the night, a reasonable officer would be completely warranted in 
the belief that a threat to safety existed.   
¶43 In hindsight, there apparently was no threat to those 
inside Richter's trailer, because the intruder was in fact a 
resident there.  But we do not apply hindsight to the exigency 
analysis; we consider only the circumstances known to the 
officer at the time he made the entry and evaluate the 
                     
7 In any break-in situation involving an occupied home there 
is potential for harm to the intruder as well as the occupants 
of the home. 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
21
reasonableness of the officer's action in light of those 
circumstances.  Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 230.  In this regard, the 
United States Supreme Court has said: 
 
It 
is 
apparent 
that 
in 
order 
to 
satisfy 
the 
"reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents 
of the governmentwhether the magistrate issuing a 
warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or 
the police officer conducting a search or seizure 
under 
one 
of 
the 
exceptions 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirementis not that they always be correct, but 
that they always be reasonable. 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990). 
¶44 Because we have concluded that Berlin's entry into 
Richter's 
home 
was 
reasonable 
and 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances, we need not address the attenuation theory 
advanced by the State as an alternate basis upon which to uphold 
this search.  However, we agree with the State that the court of 
appeals misapplied the attenuation doctrine and so for purposes 
of clarification briefly address it. 
¶45 Illegal conduct by law enforcement may taint a 
homeowner's subsequent consent to search.  Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975); State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 205; 
State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991). 
 In Phillips, we applied the test established in Brown for 
determining whether consent to search obtained after an illegal 
entry is sufficiently attenuated from an illegal entry in order 
to purge the taint.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 205-12.  The test 
requires the evaluation of three factors: 1) the temporal 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
22
proximity of the official misconduct and seizure of evidence, 2) 
the presence of intervening circumstances, and 3) the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct.  Brown, 422 U.S. at 
603-04; Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 205; Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 
448. 
¶46 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
found 
the 
first 
of 
the 
attenuation factorsthe temporal proximity of the entry and the 
seizure of the evidenceto weigh against attenuation, since 
Berlin's entry into the trailer was followed almost immediately 
by Richter's consent and the search.  Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 
824.  We do not disagree with this part of the analysis.  But in 
Phillips we held that the evaluation of the timing of the search 
vis-à-vis the entry must also consider the conditions existing 
at the time of the consent.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 206.  In 
that case, we held that even when temporal proximity is very 
close, 
"the 
non-threatening, 
non-custodial 
conditions 
surrounding the search . . . lean toward a finding that any 
taint created by the agents' unlawful entry . . . dissipated 
when the defendant consented to the search."  Id. at 207. 
¶47 Here, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
following conditions aggravated an otherwise concededly non-
threatening, non-custodial situation: 1) Berlin was armed (even 
though he did not draw his gun), and 2) Richter was awakened 
from a deep sleep.  Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 825.  We disagree 
that these particular conditions are sufficiently aggravating to 
transform this non-threatening, non-custodial situation into one 
which weighs against attenuation.  
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
23
¶48 More importantly, however, the court of appeals' 
evaluation of the second and third factors in the attenuation 
analysis suggests certain doctrinal requirements that do not 
actually exist.  In its analysis of the second factorthe 
presence of intervening circumstances between the initial entry 
and the defendant's consentthe court of appeals seemed to 
suggest, based upon Phillips and Bermudez, that intervening 
circumstances for purposes of attenuation cannot be found to 
exist where the officer fails to inform the subject of the 
search that he does not have a warrant and that consent to 
search need not be given.  Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 825-26.  This 
is incorrect. 
¶49 In 
Phillips 
we 
were 
persuaded 
that 
intervening 
circumstances were sufficiently present to support attenuation 
because, among other things, the officers informed the defendant 
that they did not have a warrant.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 209. 
 In Bermudez the court of appeals was persuaded that intervening 
circumstances 
were 
not 
sufficiently 
present 
to 
support 
attenuation, 
but 
this 
was 
because 
of 
what 
the 
court 
characterized as "the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the police misconduct" in the case.  Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d at 
355, 358.  It was not, as suggested by the court of appeals 
here, "because the officers failed to inform the defendant's 
wife that they did not have a search warrant or that she did not 
have to consent to the search."  Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 826. 
¶50 Neither Phillips nor Bermudez, nor the cases read 
together, stand for the proposition that an officer must tell 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
24
the subject of a search that he has the right to refuse consent 
or that the officer has no warrant in order to satisfy the test 
for attenuation.  The absence of such a conversation in this 
case is not fatal to a finding of attenuation.  In Phillips we 
emphasized that a conversation between the officer and the 
subject 
of 
the 
search 
may 
be 
a 
significant 
intervening 
circumstance if "it provided the [subject] with sufficient 
information with which he could decide whether to freely consent 
to the search . . . ."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 208-09.  The 
information that suffices will vary from case to case. 
¶51 Here, Berlin told Richter that an intruder had broken 
into the trailer across the street, that the intruder had been 
seen entering Richter's trailer, and that he wanted to search 
the trailer for the intruder.  It was clear from the 
conversation, however brief and hard on the heels of the entry, 
that Richter was not the target of the search.  We conclude that 
this information was sufficient to allow Richter to freely 
consent to the search. 
¶52 The third factor in the attenuation analysis is the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official conduct.  Id. at 209.  
Applying the test from Phillips, the court of appeals stated:  
 
Conduct which may not be flagrant may still be 
sufficiently purposeful so as to be proscribed under 
the attenuation analysis.  The purpose of Berlin's 
entry was to follow a lead that an unidentified 
suspect had attempted to enter another trailer and 
then apparently run into Richter's trailer.  From his 
position outside the window, Berlin could see Richter 
asleep on the sofa.  Berlin nevertheless entered the 
trailer unannounced sometime after 4:30 a.m. and awoke 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
25
Richter to ask permission to search for an intruder.  
He did not attempt to awaken Richter from outside the 
trailer either by shining his flashlight at Richter, 
as he did the other two occupants, or by knocking on 
the door.  He did not ask the already awakened 
occupants in the trailer to awaken Richter.  These 
circumstances 
give 
the 
appearance 
of 
exploiting 
Richter's state of sleep in order to gain entry.  
Therefore, we conclude that Berlin's conduct displays 
the 
necessary 
level 
of 
purposefulness 
which 
is 
proscribed under the attenuation analysis. 
Richter, 224 Wis. 2d at 826-27 (emphasis added). 
¶53 We have held that this third factor in the attenuation 
analysis is "'particularly' important" because it is most 
closely tied to the rationale of the exclusionary ruleto 
discourage police misconduct.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 209 
(citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, and United States v. Fazio, 914 
F.2d 
950, 
958 
(7th 
Cir. 
1990)). 
"[A]pplication 
of 
the 
[exclusionary rule] does not serve this deterrent function when 
police action, although erroneous, was not undertaken in an 
effort to benefit the police at the expense of the suspect's 
protected rights."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 209 (quoting Fazio, 
914 F.2d at 958).  Thus inherent in the flagrancy or 
purposefulness evaluation is an inquiry into whether there is 
evidence of some degree of bad faith exploitation of the 
situation on the part of the officer. 
¶54 Hereunlike either Phillips or BermudezRichter was 
not the target of the officer's investigation or search.  The 
officer was pursuing a fleeing burglar, not investigating a drug 
crime.  There is simply no evidence in this record to suggest 
that Berlin entered Richter's home with ulterior motives, to 
No. 
98-1332-CR 
 
 
26
undermine Richter's rights, to pressure him to consent, or to 
otherwise exploit the situation in hopes of finding evidence 
against Richter.  So, while Berlin's conduct was of course 
"purposeful"he was trying to gain entry and consent to 
searchthe purpose was directed at apprehending a burglary 
suspect, not getting the goods on Richter.  This is not the sort 
of "purposefulness" that defeats attenuation. 
¶55 Accordingly, we conclude that the warrantless entry of 
the defendant's home was justified based on the exigent 
circumstances of hot pursuit and threat to safety and was 
therefore 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
its 
Wisconsin counterpart.  We also conclude that even if Berlin's 
entry had been contrary to the Fourth Amendment, Richter's 
consent was sufficiently attenuated from the entry to purge any 
taint of illegality. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  I 
agree with the circuit court and court of appeals, both of which 
held that the evidence in this case should be suppressed.  The 
majority opinion, on the other hand, criticizes the court of 
appeals, contending that it "draws inferences and reaches 
conclusions that the facts do not support . . . ."  Majority op. 
at ¶ 37.  I believe this very same criticism can be leveled at 
the majority opinion. 
¶57 A "physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."8 
 A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable.  
Majority op. at ¶ 28.  Therefore the burden is on the State to 
prove the existence of circumstances permitting entry into a 
home without a warrant.  Majority op. at ¶ 29.  The State 
clearly has not met its burden in this case. 
¶58 The majority opinion infers that the intruder's entry 
into trailer #439 was by forced entry through a window.  
According to the complaint, however, Brian Champion said that 
when the intruder left the Champion trailer (#438) the intruder 
"went in the front door [of trailer #439]."  According to the 
officer's 
testimony 
at 
the 
suppression 
hearing, 
witnesses 
reported only that the intruder entered trailer #439.  The 
officer inferred that the intruder entered trailer #439 through 
an open window.  The officer shone his flashlight through the 
                     
8 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984), quoting 
United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972). 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
2 
open window, exposing four adults asleep in the room in which 
the intruder was supposed to have entered.  The officer had no 
reports of physical violence, threats or weapons.  These facts 
are insufficient to support an officer's reasonable belief "that 
delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk 
destruction of evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the 
suspect's escape."9 
¶59 I agree with the court of appeals that the officer was 
not in hot pursuit of a suspect because "[t]he record does not 
demonstrate there was immediate or continuous pursuit of the 
suspect from the scene of the unlawful entry."  State v. 
Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 821-22, 592 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 
1999).  In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), in which the 
police entered the defendant's home only minutes after a witness 
observed the defendant fleeing from his car, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that "the claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing 
because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the 
[defendant] from the scene of a crime."10  Furthermore, a number 
of courts have concluded that hot pursuit must be accompanied by 
                     
9 State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 230, 388 N.W.2d 601 
(1986). 
10 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
3 
a credible threat of violence in order to justify a warrantless 
entry.11 
¶60 I agree with the circuit court and court of appeals 
that no exigent circumstances justify this warrantless search.  
The circuit court stated: 
 
I 
really 
don't 
think 
that 
constitutes 
exigent 
circumstances.  I really don't.  The officer could 
have stood outside and knocked on the door.  He's 
searching for someone that a citizen says ran that 
way. . . .  
 
Clearly the officer is there illegally because he 
doesn't have permission.  I don't think there are 
exigent circumstances.  I don't think there is hot 
pursuit.  As I indicated, the officer could have very 
well knocked on the door and — on the outside, 
explained why he was there, instead of gaining access 
without permission. 
¶61 I agree with the circuit court and court of appeals 
that the warrantless search was unconstitutional. 
                     
11 See, e.g., State v. Bolte, 560 A.2d 644, 654 (N.J. 1989) 
(hot pursuit alone is an insufficient justification for a 
warrantless entry into home); Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412, 
415 
(Ark. 
1992) 
(hot 
pursuit 
alone 
is 
an 
insufficient 
justification 
for 
warrantless 
entry 
into 
home; 
exigent 
circumstances required for disorderly conduct); City of Seattle 
v. Altschuler, 766 P.2d 518, 520-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (hot 
pursuit alone is an insufficient justification for warrantless 
entry into home; exigent circumstances required unless fleeing 
felon); State v. Bowe, 557 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) 
(hot pursuit is an insufficient justification for warrantless 
entry into home unless violent crime involved; burglary without 
violence not sufficient); People v. Sanders, 374 N.E. 2d 1315 
(Ill. App. 1978) (exigent circumstances required for warrantless 
entry in home; burglary without weapons not grave enough offense 
to justify warrantless entry; cited in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 749, 752 (1984)). 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
4 
¶62 But after deciding the entry was constitutional, the 
majority opinion unnecessarily concludes that even if the 
officer's warrantless entry into the defendant's home was not 
constitutional, the suppression motion must nevertheless be 
denied because the defendant's consent to search the trailer was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to remove the 
"taint" of the illegality.   
¶63 I 
disagree. 
 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
officer's 
warrantless, 
middle-of-the-night 
entry, 
awakening 
of 
the 
defendant and failure to conduct an adequate investigation all 
weigh against a finding of attenuation.12  The officer entered 
the defendant's trailer, shook the defendant awake, told him 
that a burglar had been seen entering his trailer and asked for 
consent to search the trailer.  In the officer's own words at 
the 
suppression 
hearing, 
"He 
[the 
defendant] 
was 
sleeping. . . .  I had to shake him and woke him up . . . ."  
                     
12 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, our prior cases 
hold that a warning to the defendant that the officer does not 
have a warrant, while perhaps not necessary, contributes to a 
finding of attenuation.  See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
208-09, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (explaining to defendant that the 
police lacked a warrant supports finding of attenuation); State 
v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991) 
(reading Miranda warnings to defendant and signed waiver support 
finding of attenuation for statement and search); State v. 
Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 358, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(failing to inform defendant of no warrant and no need to 
consent weighs against finding of attenuation); United States v. 
Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1985) (reading Miranda 
warnings and advising defendant of right to refuse consent are 
factors that may satisfy "the requirement of intervening 
circumstances"). 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
5 
¶64 The majority relies on this "brief conversation" to 
support a finding of attenuation.  The majority opinion's 
finding of attenuation in this case is inconsistent with other 
cases and risks making a mockery of the attenuation doctrine.13 
¶65 This case is, unfortunately, just one more in a line 
of recent cases in which the court has not been sufficiently 
protective of the privacy of the home.14  For the reasons set 
forth above, I dissent. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                     
13 See, e.g., United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 695 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (no attenuation where consent to search "followed 
almost 
immediately 
after 
the 
illegal 
seizure" 
and 
"no 
intervening event of any significance occurred between the 
illegal seizure and the consent to break the causal chain"); 
United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996) (for 
attenuation a discontinuity between the illegal stop and the 
consent must occur). 
14 See, e.g., State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 
245 (1982), rev'd Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed our court decision that held law-
enforcement officer may enter home to arrest driver suspected of 
driving under the influence of intoxicants, a noncriminal 
offense); State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 
(1994), State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 
(1996), and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that our court erred in adopting a 
categorical rule holding that a no-knock entry is permissible 
when officers have a warrant to search the home of a suspected 
felony drug dealer); State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 
604 N.W.2d 517 (our court held a search warrant valid despite 
failure to link illegal drugs to accused's residence); State v. 
Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (our court 
curtailed curtilage); State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 233 Wis. 2d 
280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (our court held that odor of marijuana 
justified warrantless entry). 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
 
No. 98-1332-CR.ssa 
 
1