Title: Mathis v. DSCYF, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 484, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TANYA MATHIS,1 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
Respondent Below,  
§ 
No. 484, 2018 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Family Court  
 
v. 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
§ 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR 
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File No. CS17-12-05TS 
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR 
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Petition No. 17-38676 
FAMILIES, DIVISION OF FAMILY 
§ 
 
SERVICES, and OFFICE OF THE 
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CHILD ADVOCATE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
Petitioner Below, 
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Appellee. 
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Submitted:   March 27, 2019 
Decided:   March 28, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
In this appeal, Tanya Mathis claims that the Family Court erred by terminating 
her parental rights.  In support of that claim, Mathis makes two arguments.  The first 
is that the termination of her parental rights violated a fundamental right under the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  This argument was not presented to 
the Family Court and was thus waived.2  Not only that, it is without merit.  A parent 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the party under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2018); Hill v. Div. of Family Servs., 82 A.3d 729, 2013 WL 6570734, at *3 
n.16 (Del. 2013) (TABLE). 
 
2 
 
of course has a fundamental right not to have her relationship with her children 
severed without due process of law.3  But the statutory regime Delaware employs to 
determine whether to terminate parental rights respects that right by employing 
extensive procedural protections that guarantee the parent counsel, and that impose 
upon the State rigorous requirements before it can terminate a parent’s rights, such 
as meeting a clear and convincing evidence standard.4  The State has a compelling 
interest in protecting children from unfit parents or custodians, and the protections 
of 13 Del. C. §§ 1103 and 722 provide sufficient due process to any parent seeking 
to contest the State’s attempt to terminate her rights. 
 The second argument that Mathis makes is that the Family Court erred in its 
determination under § 722 that terminating her parental rights was in the best 
interests of her children.  As to that argument, we affirm on the basis of the Family 
Court’s decision, which carefully addressed each of the relevant statutory factors, 
and explained why the Court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
termination was in the best interests of the children.5 
 
                                                 
3 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000). 
4 See Powell v. Dep't of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 
2008).  See also Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101 (Del. 2002). 
5 Dep’t Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, Div. of Family Servs. v. T.M., Petition No. 
17–38676, slip op. (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 17, 2018). 
 
 
3 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice