Title: State v. Fries
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055136
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2008

FILED: May 30, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
THOMAS PATRICK FRIES,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 03CR0773; CA A124253; SC S055136)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 8, 2008.
Stephanie Hortsch, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Anne Fujita Munsey, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Legal Services Division.
Janet Klapstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are
affirmed.
*Appeal from Coos County Circuit Court, Martin E. Stone, Judge. 212 Or App
220, 158 P3d 10 (2007).
KISTLER, J.
The issue in this case is whether defendant possessed marijuana when he
helped a friend move marijuana plants from one place to another.  Defendant has argued
that, because he was moving the plants at his friend's direction, he did not possess them.
The trial court held otherwise and entered a judgment of conviction for possessing
marijuana.  A divided en banc Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v. Fries, 212 Or App
220, 158 P3d 10 (2007).  We allowed defendant's petition for review to consider the issue
that divided the Court of Appeals and now affirm the Court of Appeals decision and the
trial court's judgment.
Because this case arises on defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal,
we state the facts in the light most favorable to the state.  One evening, defendant's friend
Albritton called defendant and told him that he (Albritton) was being evicted.  Albritton
asked defendant if he would help him move his marijuana plants to his new home. 
Because Albritton had a medical marijuana card, defendant understood (and we assume
for purposes of review) that Albritton lawfully possessed the marijuana plants.  Defendant
went to Albritton's new home, picked him up, and drove Albritton to his former home to
pick up the marijuana plants.  Albritton's former home was in an upstairs apartment, on
the top floor.  Defendant and Albritton went into the back bedroom of the apartment. 
Albritton pointed out the plants and said, "This is what I really needed help moving." 
According to defendant, there were three or four marijuana plants in "one long, big-type
thing," which defendant moved from Albritton's apartment to defendant's Jeep. (1)
Defendant loaded the plants and some of Albritton's other belongings into
the back of his Jeep. (2)  Albritton got in the front passenger seat of the Jeep, and
defendant started driving to Albritton's new home.  As they were driving, a police car
began following them.  Defendant pulled into a driveway.  The officer drove past, circled
around, and later observed defendant driving on a different street.  The officer followed
defendant's Jeep as defendant turned onto another street and then pulled into another
driveway.  Defendant and Albritton remained in the Jeep.  The officer approached them
and spoke with them briefly.  When asked why "they were being so evasive tonight,
[defendant] said, 'We didn't want to get stopped and have to answer any questions about
the marijuana.'"  The officer then arrested defendant and Albritton.
The state charged defendant with possessing marijuana.  At the end of
defendant's trial, he argued that there was no evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find that he had possessed the marijuana plants.  Specifically, he contended
that, because the evidence showed only that he moved the plants under Albritton's
direction, he did not "possess" them.  The trial court denied defendant's motion for a
judgment of acquittal and, sitting as the trier of fact, found defendant guilty.  The court
found initially that defendant knew that the plants were marijuana.  It then found that
defendant "actually physically possessed [the marijuana plants] because he moved [them]
from Point A to Point B, knowing * * * what it was."  The trial court explained that,
although the medical marijuana statutes permit designated caregivers to possess medical
marijuana, defendant was not Albritton's designated caregiver.  The court concluded:
"Is it fair?  Perhaps not.  In the overall scheme of things, he was someone
helping his buddy.  And perhaps it's unfair that [defendant] didn't have legal
permission to have that particular controlled substance.  But there's actually
no doubt in my mind that he knowingly possessed that controlled substance,
the growing marijuana."
The court accordingly found defendant guilty of possessing marijuana and sentenced him
to 18 months probation, conditioned on serving five days in jail and paying a $500 fine
and costs.
As noted, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment,
and we allowed defendant's petition for review to consider whether there was sufficient
evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant possessed the marijuana plants.  See State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339, 768 P2d
391 (1989) (stating standard of review for motions of judgment of acquittal).  On that
point, defendant reiterates his argument that possession of marijuana requires more than
proof that he knowingly moved the marijuana plants at Albritton's direction.  In his view,
persons who move or hold controlled substances at another person's direction lack
sufficient "sovereignty, supremacy, power or authority" over those substances to possess
them.
Defendant's argument presents an issue of statutory construction, and we
begin by examining the text and context of the relevant statutes.  ORS 475.840(3) makes
it unlawful for "any person knowingly * * * to possess a controlled substance." (3) 
ORS 161.015(9) in turn provides that "'[p]ossess' means to have physical possession or
otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property." (4)  As the text of that
definition makes clear, a person may possess property in one of two ways.  He or she may
"have physical possession" of the property, which customarily is referred to as actual
possession.  See State v. Connally, 339 Or 583, 591, 125 P3d 1254 (2005) (discussing
actual and constructive possession in construing city ordinance).  Alternatively, even if a
person does not have actual possession of the property, he or she may have constructive
possession of it if the person "otherwise * * * exercise[s] dominion or control over [the]
property."
Because the trial court found that defendant actually possessed the
marijuana plants, we begin with the first part of the statutory definition.  The legislature
used the infinitive phrase "to have physical possession" to define actual possession.  We
note, as an initial matter, that the definition of actual possession is somewhat circular; the
legislature said "possess" means to have physical "possession."  That said, the definition
contains some clues that aid our analysis.  The dictionary defines possession as meaning,
"1 a : the act or condition of having in or taking into one's control or
holding at one's disposal   b : actual physical control or occupancy of property
by one who holds for himself and not as a servant of another without regard
to his ownership and who has legal rights to assert interests in the property
against all others having no better right than himself  * * *."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1770 (unabridged ed 2002). (5)  The dictionary
thus distinguishes possession from ownership and defines possession to mean, at its core,
"control."  "Physical" is an adjective that defines the type of control necessary to establish
actual possession.   In this context, physical means "of or relating to the body."  Id. at
1706.  As a general rule, "to have physical possession" of property means to have bodily
or physical control of it.
The statutory definition of actual possession follows the generally
understood use of that concept in the criminal law.  See Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236,
241, 951 P2d 693 (1998) (recognizing that statutory context includes preexisting common
law).  In State v. Oare, 249 Or 597, 599, 439 P2d 885 (1968), for example, the court
explained that a person who had a narcotic "upon his person" would actually possess it. 
Similarly, in State v. Hall, 269 Or 63, 65-66, 68, 523 P2d 556 (1974), the court held that a
defendant who sat on a bag of marijuana when the police entered an apartment occupied
by several people and then threw the bag to the ground disclaiming any knowledge of its
contents actually possessed the marijuana.  Those authorities confirm that "to have
physical possession" of property means actual physical control of property, although some
physical contacts with property may be so momentary or fleeting that they are insufficient
as a matter of law to establish physical control.  See Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Substantive
Criminal Law § 6.1(e) at 432-33 (2003) (summarizing generally understood use of
possession in the criminal law).
Defendant argues that the definition of constructive possession in the
second part of ORS 161.015(9) demonstrates that a person who holds property at
another's direction does not actually possess it.  Defendant's argument runs as follows. 
He notes that ORS 161.015(9) provides that "'[p]ossess' means to have physical
possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property."  Defendant
argues that, in order to prove sufficient dominion or control to establish constructive
possession, the state must offer evidence of "sovereignty, supremacy, power or authority"
over property.  He then contends that, in using the word "otherwise," the legislature
manifested its intent that actual possession requires proof of the same type of "dominion
or control" that constructive possession does.  From that premise, defendant concludes
that a person who holds property at another's direction does not exercise sufficient
sovereignty, supremacy, power, or authority over the property to constitute actual
possession. 
One problem with defendant's argument is that it gives too little weight to
the legislature's use of the word "otherwise."  "Otherwise" means "in a different way or
manner."  Webster's at 1598.  As used in ORS 161.015(9), "otherwise" signals that the
state may prove "possession" either by showing physical control or by showing dominion
or control "in a different way or manner."  To be sure, as defendant argues, actual and
constructive possession share a common element -- control.  But the legislature's use of
the word "otherwise" makes clear that actual and constructive possession contemplate
different types of proof.  The former requires proof of physical control.  The latter
contemplates proof of other attributes of dominion or control.  See Oare, 249 Or at 599
(discussing proof of actual and constructive possession).  The fact that a person holds
property at another's direction does not necessarily mean that he or she does not actually
possess it.
The statutory context leads to the same conclusion.  The legislature has
established a number of exceptions to the general prohibition against possessing
controlled substances.  Among other things, a "common * * * carrier * * * or an
employee thereof" may "lawfully possess controlled substances" if the possession occurs
"in the usual course of business or employment."  ORS 475.125(3)(b).  Similarly, an
"agent or employee of any registered manufacturer, distributor or dispenser of any
controlled substance" may "lawfully possess controlled substances" if the "agent or
employee is acting in the usual course of business or employment."  ORS 475.125(3)(a).
If defendant were correct that "possess" does not include persons who
handle or transport controlled substances at another's direction, then there would have
been no need for the legislature to provide that common carriers or agents lawfully may
possess controlled substances in certain circumstances.  Common carriers and agents
ordinarily act at another's direction.  See Richardson v. Railway Exp. Agency, 258 Or 170,
178, 482 P2d 176 (1971) (recognizing "well established rule that common carriers * * *
are [generally] held strictly to the performance of their duty to make delivery of goods at
the place of destination to the person designated to receive them"); ORS 475.005(4)
(defining an agent for purposes of the controlled substances laws as an "authorized person
who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser")
(emphasis added).  We should not read the definition of "possess" in a way that would
render those exemptions largely redundant.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (explaining that statutes should be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all their provisions).
Defendant argues that one of this court's cases, State v. Gordineer, 229 Or
105, 366 P2d 161 (1961), is contextual support for his position.  The defendant in
Gordineer was charged with contributing to the delinquincy of a minor.  The question, as
the court stated it in Gordineer, was whether, if the defendant "gave a bottle of
intoxicating liquor to the minor with intent to relinquish all right of possession and
control over it," the minor would possess the liquor in violation of ORS 471.430.  Id. at
111.  In answering that question, the court reasoned:
"'Possession', as used in ORS 471.430, is preceded by the words 'purchase,
acquire'.  These words indicate a legislative intent that the minor must know
that he is in the physical possession of intoxicating liquor.  * * * Nor can
we attribute to the legislature the intent to make a criminal of a minor child
who, though knowing there is intoxicating liquor in a package, carries the
liquor from an automobile into the home of a neighbor at the neighbor's
request.
"In our opinion 'possession', as used in this statute, includes in
addition to guilty knowledge the intent of the minor to possess full control
over the liquor with the right to enjoy its consumption to the exclusion of
others."
Id. (citation omitted).  As we understand the court's interpretation of "possession" in
Gordineer, it was limited to the term "as used in this statute," i.e., ORS 471.430. 
Specifically, the court looked to the fact that the terms "purchase" and "acquire" preceded
the word "possession" in holding that proof of possession under ORS 471.430 required
proof of "the intent of the minor to possess full control over the liquor with the right to
enjoy its consumption to the exclusion of others."  In enacting ORS 161.015(9), the
legislature did not define "possess" as "possess[ing] full control over [property] * * * to
the exclusion of others."  It chose instead a narrower definition -- physical control. (6)
Considering the text and context of ORS 161.015(9), we conclude that the
statutory phrase "to have physical possession" means what it says:  to have physical
control.  That said, we recognize that some physical contacts with property may be too
transient or fleeting to say that a person has established physical "control" over the
property and that, when the duration of the physical contact is minimal, the circumstances
surrounding the contact can bear on the question whether the defendant exercised
sufficient physical control to find actual possession.  See LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal
Law § 6.1(e) at 432 (discussing actual possession); compare United States v. Santore, 290
F2d 51, 64-65 (2d Cir 1960) (holding that no reasonable trier of fact could find a
defendant who held a package of narcotics "one brief moment" before voluntarily
declining to take them possessed them), with United States v. Gregory, 309 F2d 536, 538
(2d Cir 1962) (holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that a codefendant who
held narcotics briefly before throwing them away on seeing police officers approach had
sufficient control to establish actual possession).
With that background in mind, we turn to the only question that defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal presents:  whether the evidence was sufficient to permit
a reasonable trier of fact to find that defendant possessed the marijuana.  On this record, a
reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant carried Albritton's marijuana plants out
of the back bedroom of Albritton's apartment, took them down the stairs, loaded the
plants in the back of defendant's Jeep, and drove the Jeep for several minutes before the
police stopped him.  This was not a fleeting, momentary, or unintentional physical
touching, or so a reasonable trier of fact could find.  Cf. Gregory, 309 F2d at 537
(evidence that a codefendant carried marijuana from a hotel to a car parked across the
street sufficient to establish actual possession); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass
452, 253 NE2d 346 (1969) (evidence that a defendant who arranged a marijuana sale and
passed marijuana three to four feet from seller's car to buyer's car sufficient to establish
possession).  Rather, defendant's acts were part of an extended effort to move the
marijuana plants from one location to another location in a different part of Coos Bay --
an effort that defendant and Albritton's arrest cut short.
To be sure, defendant argues that, because he was only moving the
marijuana plants at Albritton's direction, the trial court was required to conclude that he
did not possess them.  However, neither the definition of possession nor the statutes
criminalizing possession of controlled substances contain a categorical exception for
persons who possess controlled substances at another person's direction.  We thus agree
with the majority of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the evidence was
sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that defendant possessed the
marijuana plants.
In reaching that conclusion, we note, as the trial court did, that, for all that
appears from the record, defendant was helping a friend who lawfully possessed the
marijuana plants.  The statutes prohibiting possession of controlled substances and
authorizing the use of medical marijuana contain a number of specific exceptions.  They
permit, for example, designated caregivers, as well as common carriers, to possess
marijuana in certain specified circumstances.  See ORS 475.309 (permitting designated
caregivers to possess marijuana if certain conditions are met); ORS 475.125(3)(b)
(permitting common carriers to possess controlled substances if certain conditions are
met).  Defendant does not argue that he falls within any of those exceptions, and we may
not add to the exceptions that the legislature has created.  See US West v. City of Eugene, 336 Or 181, 188, 81 P3d 702 (2003) (explaining that courts may not
rewrite statutes to insert what legislature omitted).  Rather, the only question before us is
whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant knowingly possessed
marijuana plants.  The answer to that question is "yes."  Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's judgment and the Court of Appeals decision.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court
are affirmed.
1. At defendant's trial, his lawyer asked, "Did [Albritton] indicate in any way
that -- that you independently could possess or, uh, move the plants?  That they were
anything but his possession?"  Defendant replied, "Well, he -- he wouldn't let them out of
his sight."
2. Defendant explained that he has a four-door Jeep Cherokee.  "[I]t's got a big
hatch in it.  It opens up.  You can put the seats down in it.  And it will look like a truck." 
Defendant lowered the back seat and put "a stereo, some other boxes * * * and the
[marijuana] plants" in the back of the Jeep.
3. When defendant moved the marijuana in 2002, former ORS 475.992(4)
prohibited possessing controlled substances.  In 2005, the legislature renumbered former
ORS 475.992 and made minor changes that are not relevant to the issue presented here. 
See Or Laws 2005, ch 708, § 39 (making those changes).  For ease of reference, we refer
to the current version of the statutes prohibiting possession of controlled substances.  
4. ORS 161.035(2) provides that the definition of "possess" in ORS
161.015(9) "shall govern the construction of * * * any offense defined outside [the
Oregon Criminal Code]," such as the prohibition against possession of controlled
substances defined in ORS chapter 475.  
5. Webster's divides definitions of a word into senses and subsenses. 
Webster's at 17a.  The first sense of the word possession contains four subsenses.  The
first two subsenses are quoted in the text.  The third subsense of possession is
"copulation," and the fourth is "control of [a] playing piece (as a ball or puck) in football,
basketball, ice hockey, or other game."  Webster's at 1770.  We think that, in defining
"possess" as "physical possession," the legislature did not intend to refer to the third or
fourth subsenses of possession.
6. In a memorandum of additional authorities, defendant quotes a treatise on
criminal law for the proposition that, at common law, an employee who held property for
an employer had custody but not possession of the property.  He argues that the Oregon
Criminal Code perpetuates the common-law distinction between possession and custody. 
The treatise explains, however, that the distinction on which defendant relies was a fiction
unique to the common law of larceny and was designed to permit prosecution of
employees who appropriated property that their employers had entrusted to them.  Wayne
R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 84 at 619 (1972).  Not
only was the distinction unique to common-law larceny, but the legislature abrogated that
distinction when it enacted the modern analogue of larceny (theft) in the Oregon Criminal
Code.  The legislature defined the "owner" of property taken to mean "any person who
has a right to possession thereof superior to that of" the person who takes it.  ORS 
164.005(4).  Oregon's definition thus recognizes that -- contrary to defendant's argument -- an employee has "possession" of the property his or her employer entrusts to him, just
not a superior right of possession.