Title: Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corporation
Citation: 279 So. 2d 281
Docket Number: 43265
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1973

279 So. 2d 281 (1973)
Edward Delano PIERCE, Petitioner,
v.
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, et al., Respondents.
No. 43265.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 6, 1973.
Rehearing Denied July 23, 1973.
Paul A. Gamba of the Law Offices of C.R. McDonald, Jr., Fort Pierce, for petitioner.
Michael Jeffries, of Neill, Griffin, Jeffries &amp; Lloyd, Fort Pierce, and Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Tallahassee, for respondents.
ROBERTS, Justice.
By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review an order of the Industrial Relations Commission reversing and remanding this cause to the Judge of Industrial Claims for further findings of fact.
Claimant Pierce allegedly sustained an industrial accident on May 12, 1971, while he was at work at Piper Aircraft Corporation instructing several employees, and as a result of which accident, petitioner contends a disc in his back was ruptured. Respondent controverted on the ground that the claimant had not sustained an industrial accident and was, therefore, entitled to no benefits. Finding that claimant had suffered a compensable injury, the Judge awarded future medical care and treatment as the nature of claimant's injuries shall require, temporary total disability until such time as claimant shall reach maximum medical improvement, and in the event that claimant commences earnings prior to that time, shall pay claimant temporary partial disability. In entering said order, the Judge made the following findings, inter alia:
The Industrial Relations Commission quoted brief excerpts from the above findings and then concluded that the critical findings of the Judge were devoid of and unsupported elsewhere by,
Respecting the requirement imposed upon the Judge of Industrial Claims in making findings of fact, this Court has set out certain guidelines. In Ball v. Mann, 75 So. 2d 758, 760 (Fla. 1954), this Court declared,
Subsequently in Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, 81 So. 2d 503 (1955), we quoted the preceding excerpt from Ball v. Mann, supra, as authority, but further explicated,
Therein we held that it was not necessary that the Deputy Commissioner (now Judge of Industrial Claims) set out in detail every fact brought out in evidence; however, the statement of facts should be clear and unambiguous and should be sufficiently definite and detailed to enable the reviewing authority to test the validity under the law of the decision resting upon those facts. Chapter 67-374, Laws of Florida 1967, amended Section 440.25(3)(c) to provide,
This Court in Brown v. Griffin, 229 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1969), held that Ch. 67-374, Laws of Florida, was valid but it did not operate to relieve Judges of Industrial Claims from making findings of fact sufficient to meet the requirements of Ball v. Mann, supra, and Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, supra. Thus according to Brown v. Griffin, supra, the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims was required to include ultimate facts defined as all those facts necessary to be found in a given case in order that the determination of the rights of the parties shall become a pure question of law.
At the time these aforecited decisions were rendered, the Deputy Commissioner's (Judge of Industrial Claims) orders were only theoretically reviewed by a part-time Commission not required to have legal training, and who, we take notice, usually did not have such. The need for detailed and precise findings of fact was clear, when hurriedly reviewed by a part-time Commission predominated by laymen.
In 1971, the Industrial Relations Commission began a new era when the Governor reorganized it into the fashion *284 of a court. Legislative sanction was given to this reorganization by Section 20.17(7), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which creates an Industrial Relations Commission, providing, in pertinent part,
The Commissioners are now required to be full-time and to have been members of The Florida Bar for at least five years. They have research assistants and operate much like our District Courts of Appeal. Also, Judges of Industrial Claims (formerly Deputy Commissioners) have consequently been elevated in the sphere of workmen's compensation to a status somewhat akin to circuit judges. The process from the time the claim is filed through the time petition for writ of certiorari is filed with this Court has become more judicial in nature since the 1971 reorganization. In view of these facts, particularly the fact that the Commissioners are now full-time lawyers, we feel compelled to reevaluate our prior decisions of Ball v. Mann, supra, Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, supra, and Brown v. Griffin, supra, respecting requirements imposed upon the Judge of Industrial Claims in making his findings of fact. Recognizing the tremendous magnitude of the caseload on Judges of Industrial Claims and in light of the new posture of the Commission, we have decided to reexamine the stringent requirements for findings of fact set forth in the abovecited decisions of this Court. We now hold the Judge of Industrial Claims need make only such findings of ultimate material fact upon which he relies, as are sufficient justification to show the basis of an award or a denial of the claim. A long, verbose explanation of the reasoning for making such findings of fact is not required. However, where testimony of two or more expert witnesses of comparable qualification are in direct conflict, it will be helpful to the Commission and this Court if some explanation is given as to why the testimony of one is accepted and the other rejected.
Our objective is to reduce to a substantial degree the workload of Judges of Industrial Claims where such can be accomplished without substantial diminution of the value of their work product. Insofar as this ruling may appear to be in conflict with Ball, supra, Hardy, supra, or Brown, supra, the rule in those opinions is modified to conform to the restatement herein expressed. It is only fair to state that in deciding this case by the Industrial Relations Commission they did not have the benefit of this restatement and were relying on the Ball, Hardy and Brown cases for their decisions which cases have now been modified by our decisions in this cause.
With regard to the instant cause, we hold that the findings of the Judge were sufficiently explicit and the Commission erred in remanding for further findings of fact. In so ruling, we do not pass upon the substantive issues involved in this case.
Accordingly, we quash the Order of the Commission and remand with directions to entertain the application for review upon the findings submitted.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.