Title: Coleman v. State
Citation: 320 A.2d 740
Docket Number: N/A
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 1974

320 A.2d 740 (1974)
Bennie Love COLEMAN, Defendant Below, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
April 19, 1974.
Karl Haller, Asst. Public Defender, Georgetown, for defendant below, appellant.
Lawrence B. Steele, Deputy Atty. Gen., Georgetown, for plaintiff below, appellee.
Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, and CAREY and DUFFY, Associate Justices.
*741 HERRMANN, Chief Justice: (for the majority of the Court)
The defendant seeks review of his conviction for assault and battery on the ground that the Trial Court improperly charged the jury as to the defense of justification. The instruction included the following:
The defendant contends that the charge was improper for the reason that the correct test under present law is not what a reasonable man would believe, but rather what the defendant actually believed. As support for this position, the defendant maintains that 11 Del.C. § 464(a), the portion of the new Criminal Code[1] dealing with the use of self-protective force as a defense, creates such subjective standard in lieu of the "reasonable man" objective test formerly prevailing in this jurisdiction.[2] The new § 464(a) provides:
"§ 464. Justification; use of force in self-protection.
The defendant points out that the word "reasonable" nowhere appears in § 464(a). Further, the defendant points to the codifiers' Commentary on § 464(a):
The provision of § 464(a) must be read in the light of § 307(a) of the new Criminal Code which provides in pertinent part:
The Commentary on § 307(a) includes the following:
Upon the basis of the foregoing, we have concluded that the new Criminal Code has changed the standard to be applied by the trier of fact in determining the issue of justification. The former objective test of what a reasonable man would have believed under the circumstances, as to the necessity of using force in self-defense, has been supplanted by the subjective test of what the defendant actually believed as to such necessity. In applying the subjective standard and in testing the defendant's actual belief as to the necessity of force for self-protection, it is important to note that § 307(a) of the new Code provides that "the jury may consider whether a reasonable man in the defendant's circumstances at the time of the offense would have had or lacked the requisite * * * belief." Thus, the "reasonable man" test is retained as a factor to be considered with all others in the determination of the issue of justification; but it is not necessarily the controlling factor as heretofore.
It follows that the jury instruction in the instant case, based upon the formerly prevailing objective standard, must be declared error.
We are unable to say, in this case in which self-defense was the sole defense, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969); Schnebe v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S. Ct. 1056, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1972). Accordingly, the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.
CAREY, Justice: (dissenting in part)
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects other than the direction for a new trial.
The significant testimony in the case was that of the defendant and the prosecuting witness. The appellant's version, if believed, clearly supported the plea of self-defense; the victim's testimony, if believed, clearly showed that the act was not in self-defense. Actually, the legal issue discussed in the majority opinion could have had little or no bearing upon the jury's determination. Under the victim's version of the facts, there was no justification whatever; under the defendant's version, the act was fully justified. This issue of which witness was to be believed was resolved by the jury against the defendant.
Accordingly, I cannot agree that the verdict should be set aside.
[1]  Although the instant offense occurred prior to the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the defendant elected, as was his option under § 102(b) (2) of the new Code, to use defenses made available thereunder.
[2]  See Brown v. State, 9 Terry 427, 105 A.2d 646 (1954); State v. Robinson, 3 Terry 419, 36 A.2d 27 (1944).