Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MARK DREW PERKINS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120461
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2003

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 18, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 120453  
MARK DREW PERKINS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120461  
MARK DREW PERKINS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine  
whether the prosecutor presented enough evidence to secure a  
 
bindover of defendant in the district court.  The charges  
against defendant were criminal sexual conduct in the first  
degree (CSC-I),1 the common-law offense of misconduct in  
office,2 and two counts of possession of a firearm during the  
commission of a felony (felony-firearm).3  The magistrate  
dismissed the charge of CSC-I, but bound over defendant on the  
charges of misconduct in office and felony-firearm.  The  
circuit court affirmed with regard to CSC-I, but quashed the  
information with regard to the remaining charges. The Court  
of Appeals reversed, finding probable cause that the crime of  
CSC-I had been committed.4  Dismissal of the felony-firearm  
charges was not raised on appeal beyond the circuit court  
level.  
We hold that there was insufficient evidence to support  
a finding of the commission of CSC-I or misconduct in office.  
Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Defendant was a Bay County deputy sheriff who was  
1MCL 750.520b(1)(f).  
2MCL 750.505.  
3MCL 750.227b.  
4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 8, 2001 
(Docket No. 229111).  
2  
prosecuted for acts arising from his sexual relationship with  
the 
complainant, 
a 
sixteen-year-old girl.  The complainant was  
a close friend of defendant's family.  
At the time of the charged incident, the complainant had  
known defendant and his family for approximately four years.  
Defendant's wife had been the complainant's basketball coach  
and defendant often had assisted his wife when the team  
practiced. From the date that the complainant met defendant  
until the incident involved here, the complainant regularly  
babysat for defendant's children, attended church with the  
family, and, for a time, resided with them.  During that  
period, the complainant and defendant began having sexual  
relations.  
On the date of the charged incident, the complainant was  
living with her mother and had just returned from a month-long  
excursion in Mexico.  While the complainant was in Mexico,  
defendant telephoned her twice.  During one call, defendant  
told the complainant that he had left a present for her under  
her mother's porch.  
The complainant returned from Mexico and discovered that  
defendant had placed a ring under the porch.  She then called  
defendant and left a voice mail message for him.  They agreed  
to meet on the following Sunday in an industrial park while  
the complainant was on her way to church.  
3  
On Sunday, the complainant drove to the industrial park,  
found defendant, who was on duty in a marked police cruiser,  
and got into the car with him.  The complainant and defendant  
hugged and talked about her trip to Mexico.  Finally, the  
complainant fellated defendant.  
The prosecutor charged defendant with four felony  
offenses: CSC-I, misconduct in office, and two counts of  
felony-firearm deriving from the other charged infractions.  
At the preliminary hearing on these charges, the magistrate  
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to bind  
defendant over on the CSC-I charge. However, the prosecutor  
had presented sufficient evidence to proceed on the charge of  
misconduct in office. Accordingly, the magistrate dismissed  
the CSC-I charge and the related felony-firearm charge and  
bound defendant over on the misconduct in office and the  
related 
felony-firearm charge.  The circuit court then quashed  
the information.  It also denied the prosecutor's motion to  
amend the information to reinstate the CSC-I charge.  
The prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeals, which  
held that the magistrate committed an abuse of discretion in  
refusing to bind defendant over on the CSC-I charge.  It also  
affirmed the circuit court order quashing the charge of  
misconduct in office.  
On appeal to this Court, defendant challenges the Court  
4  
 
 
of Appeals decision reinstating the charge of CSC-I.  The  
prosecutor appeals, challenging that portion of the Court of  
Appeals ruling that affirmed the circuit court decision to  
quash the charge of misconduct in office.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review a district court decision to bind over a  
defendant under an abuse of discretion standard.  People v  
Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 344; 562 NW2d 652  
(1997). We review any question of the proper interpretation  
of the underlying criminal law de novo.  People v Mass, 464  
Mich 615, 622; 628 NW2d 540 (2001).  
III. DISCUSSION  
The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine  
whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was  
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that  
the defendant committed it. MCR 6.110. The prosecutor need  
not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was  
committed.  He need present only enough evidence on each  
element of the charged offense to lead "'a person of ordinary  
prudence 
and 
caution 
to 
conscientiously 
entertain 
a 
reasonable  
belief of [the defendant's] guilt.'"   Justice, supra at 344,  
quoting Coleman v Burnett, 155 US App DC 302, 317; 477 F2d  
1187 (1973).  Thus, charges should not be dismissed merely  
because the prosecutor has failed to convince the reviewing  
5  
 
 
  
tribunal that it would convict.  That question should be  
reserved for the trier of fact.  People v Goecke, 457 Mich  
442, 469-470; 579 NW2d 868 (1998).  
If the prosecutor fails to present evidence on each of  
the elements of a charged offense, it would be an abuse of  
discretion to bind over the defendant for trial.  Goecke,  
supra at 469, citing People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 100-101; 276  
NW2d 9 (1979).  
A. Criminal Sexual Conduct  
The prosecutor asserts that defendant's encounter with  
the complainant in his patrol car constituted CSC-I.  The CSC- 
I statute, MCL 750.520b, provides in relevant parts:  
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual 
conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in 
sexual penetration with another person and if any 
of the following circumstances exists:  
* * *  
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the 
victim[5] and force or coercion is used to accomplish 
sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but 
is 
not 
limited 
to 
any 
of 
the 
following  
circumstances: 
 
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim  
through the actual application of physical force or 
physical violence.  
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to 
submit by threatening to use force or violence on 
the victim, and the victim believes that the actor  
5The question of personal injury to the complainant was 
not raised in this appeal.  
6  
 
 
has the present ability to execute these threats.  
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to 
submit by threatening to retaliate in the future 
against the victim, or any other person, and the 
victim believes that the actor has the ability to 
execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, 
"to 
retaliate" 
includes 
threats 
of 
physical 
punishment, kidnaping, or extortion.  
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical 
treatment or examination of the victim in a manner  
or for purposes which are medically recognized as 
unethical or unacceptable.  
(v) When the actor, through concealment or by 
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the 
victim.  
At the preliminary examination, the prosecutor's theory  
was that defendant was guilty of CSC-I through coercion. As  
an authority figure, defendant had engaged the complainant in  
continuing 
sexual 
conduct beginning when she was much younger.  
The prosecutor reasoned that defendant thus established a  
pattern of abuse that eroded the complainant's ability to  
resist his sexual advances during the incident in question.  
The prosecutor presented evidence that a child can be  
psychologically subjugated in this manner.  There was no  
testimony that the complainant had been so subjugated. 
 In any event, the record shows that no evidence was  
presented at the preliminary hearing to support the  
prosecutor's assertion that the complainant was coerced, in  
any sense of that term, to fellate defendant on the occasion  
in question.  
7  
 
The facts were that the complainant had been out of the  
country for a month before the charged conduct occurred.  The  
complainant initiated the meeting. 
Moreover, the sexual  
relationship between defendant and the complainant continued  
beyond the date of the charged conduct and lasted until the  
complainant entered into a relationship with her husband.  
The unrebutted preliminary examination facts indicate  
that, on the date of the incident in question, the  
relationship was consensual and the complainant was involved  
in it of her own volition.  If it were true that the  
complainant's 
actions 
were 
the 
result 
of 
defendant's  
subjugation of her will, then or at an earlier date, the  
prosecutor failed to present evidence of it. Because of the  
lack of evidence, it is unnecessary for this Court to reach  
the question whether psychological subjugation is a viable  
theory on which to rest a charge of CSC-I.  
Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court  
committed an abuse of discretion by dismissing the charge of  
CSC-I.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision  
with regard to that charge.  
B. Misconduct In Office  
Defendant 
was 
also charged with committing the offense of  
8  
common-law misconduct in office.6  The Court of Appeals held  
that the circuit court  properly quashed the information  
because the prosecutor failed to show a nexus between the  
charged conduct and defendant's status as a deputy sheriff.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals.  
1. The elements of common-law misconduct in office  
When the Legislature codifies a common-law crime without  
articulating its elements, we must look to the common law for  
the definition of the crime.  People v Couch, 436 Mich 414,  
419-420; 461 NW2d 683 (1990).  We are bound by the common-law  
definition until the Legislature modifies it. People v  
Schmitt, 275 Mich 575, 577; 267 NW 741 (1936); People v  
Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 126; 649 NW2d 30 (2002).  
At common law, misconduct in office was defined as  
“corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties  
of his office or while acting under color of his office.”  
People v Coutu, 459 Mich 348, 354; 589 NW2d 458 (1999)(Coutu  
I), quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 543.  An  
officer could be convicted of misconduct in office (1) for  
6MCL 750.505 provides:  
Any person who shall commit any indictable 
offense at the common law, for the punishment of 
which no provision is expressly made by any statute 
of this state, shall be guilty of a felony, 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not 
more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than 
$10,000.00, or both in the discretion of the court.  
9  
 
committing any act which is itself wrongful, malfeasance, (2)  
for committing a lawful act in a wrongful manner, misfeasance,  
or (3) for failing to perform any act that the duties of the  
office require of the officer, nonfeasance. Perkins, p 540.  
However, 
committing 
nonfeasance 
or 
acts 
of 
malfeasance 
or  
misfeasance 
are 
not 
enough to constitute misconduct in office.  
In the case of malfeasance and misfeasance, the offender also  
must act with a corrupt intent, i.e., with a "sense of  
depravity, perversion or taint."  See Perkins, p 542. 
See  
also People v Coutu (On Remand), 235 Mich App 695, 706; 599  
NW2d 556 (1999)(Coutu II). In the case of nonfeasance, an  
offender must willfully neglect to perform the duties of his  
office. Perkins, p 547.  
Moreover, the officer's wrongdoing must result from or  
directly affect the performance of his official duties.  
The mere coincidence that a crime has been  
committed by one who happens to be a public officer 
is not sufficient to establish official misconduct.  
For this offense it is necessary not only that the 
offender be an officer, or one who presumes to act 
as an officer, but the misconduct, if not actually 
in the exercise of the duties of his office, must 
be done under color of his office.  On the other  
hand the act of one who is an officer, which act is 
done because he is an officer or because of the  
opportunity afforded by that fact, is under color  
of his office despite his gesture of removing his 
badge plus his statement that he is not acting in 
the name of the law. [Perkins, p 541].  
With this understanding, we now consider whether there was  
10  
enough evidence to bind over defendant.  
2.  There is insufficient evidence to bind over defendant  
for misconduct in office  
To be guilty of misconduct in office, one must first be  
a public officer. 
In this case, defendant is a deputy  
sheriff.
 In Coutu I, we held that a deputy sheriff is a  
public officer for purposes of misconduct in office when the  
allegations against him arise from the performance of his  
official duties. Coutu I, supra at 357-358.  
Although defendant is a deputy sheriff, there is no  
evidence that his alleged conduct arose from the performance  
of his official duties.  Rather, the charged conduct arose  
from a longstanding sexual relationship with the complainant.  
It is undisputed that defendant was on duty when he engaged in  
the conduct.  However, the prosecutor presented no evidence  
correlating that conduct with defendant’s public office.  The  
act was neither initiated nor consummated in the exercise of  
defendant’s duties.  It is not alleged that the opportunity to  
commit the specific corrupt behavior in question, when it  
occurred, arose from or was furthered by defendant’s status as  
a deputy sheriff. Whatever influence defendant's office may  
once have had on the complainant, there was no evidence that  
it influenced her to have sexual relations with defendant on  
the subject occasion.  
In short, the prosecutor failed to offer evidence  
11  
establishing a nexus between defendant’s alleged conduct and  
defendant’s status as a sheriff’s deputy.  From that we  
conclude that defendant was not acting as a public officer for  
purposes of misconduct in office. 
Coutu I, supra.  
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision regarding  
this issue on the basis that there was insufficient evidence  
to support the charge of misconduct in office.  
CONCLUSION  
We hold that the prosecutor presented insufficient  
evidence of coercion to sustain the charge of CSC-I against  
defendant.  Because the prosecutor failed to meet this burden,  
we need not reach the question whether psychological  
subjugation is a viable theory of coercion.  
We also hold that the evidence presented at the  
preliminary examination did not establish probable cause to  
believe that defendant committed the common-law offense of  
misconduct in office.  
The Court of Appeals decision in this case is accordingly  
reversed in part and affirmed in part.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
12