Title: In re Impounded Case
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13337
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13337 
 
IN THE MATTER OF AN IMPOUNDED CASE. 
 
 
September 28, 2023. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Incompetent Person, Commitment.  Due Process of Law, 
Commitment. 
 
 
 
The petitioner appeals from a judgment of a single justice 
of this court denying a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
We affirm. 
 
The petitioner has been charged in a complaint with one 
count of assault and battery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13A (a), and one count of witness intimidation, in violation 
of G. L. c. 268, § 13B.  At the petitioner's arraignment, the 
petitioner's counsel requested that the petitioner undergo a 
competency evaluation, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  The 
petitioner was released on personal recognizance and returned to 
court two days later to be evaluated by a court clinician.  On 
the basis of that evaluation, he was then involuntarily 
committed to Tewksbury State Hospital for twenty days, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b), for further evaluation.  A doctor 
evaluated both the petitioner's competency to stand trial and 
his criminal responsibility and submitted a report to the court 
recommending that the petitioner be found incompetent to stand 
trial and that he remain in the hospital.  At a hearing held 
nineteen days later, the petitioner's counsel stipulated to 
incompetency but objected to further commitment.  Over the 
petitioner's objection, he was involuntarily committed for an 
additional thirty days, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a). 
 
Four days after that hearing, the petitioner filed his 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court, asking the 
single justice to vacate the involuntary commitment order.  The 
petitioner argued that his involuntary commitments, first 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b), and then pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (a), violated his due process rights.  In 
particular, the petitioner stated that both statutes are silent 
as to the standard of proof necessary to demonstrate that 
involuntarily commitment is warranted.  In its opposition to the 
petition, the Commonwealth argued that relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, was not appropriate where the petitioner had an 
adequate alternative avenue for seeking relief, a point which 
the petitioner failed to address in the petition.  A single 
justice denied the petition without a hearing. 
 
In his appeal from the single justice's judgment, the 
petitioner argues that relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
appropriate both because he has no adequate alternative remedy 
and because his case "presents the type of exceptional matter 
that requires the court's extraordinary intervention."  
Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 25 (2019).  In 
considering a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, a single 
justice "must decide, in his or her discretion, whether to 
review 'the substantive merits of the . . . petition.'"  Id. at 
24, quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 476 Mass. 1041, 1042 n.2 
(2017).  The focus of this initial step is to answer the 
threshold question "whether to employ the court's power of 
general superintendence to become involved in the matter."  
Fontanez, supra.  The single justice is not required to exercise 
the court's extraordinary power of general superintendence if 
the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy.  Id. at 24-
25.  Additionally, where "the single justice exercises 
discretion not to reach the merits of a petition, the appeal to 
the full court 'is strictly limited to a review of that ruling,' 
Commonwealth v. Samuels, 456 Mass. 1025, 1027 n.1 (2010), and 
the full court asks only whether the single justice abused his 
or her discretion in making that decision."  Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 484 Mass. 1047, 1049 (2020). 
 
Here, it is clear that the petitioner has an adequate 
remedy.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 9 (a), "[m]atters of law 
arising in commitment hearings . . . or incompetency for trial 
proceedings in a district court may be reviewed by the appellate 
division of the district courts in the same manner as the civil 
cases generally."  Although the petitioner recognizes this 
avenue for review, he argues that it is not adequate because an 
appeal to the Appellate Division would not, in his view, provide 
timely or effective relief.  As he himself notes, however, he 
could have requested an expedited review of his appeal.  
Instead, he filed this G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition (where, 
again, he failed to address the adequate alternative remedy 
issue).1  "Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied 
where there are adequate and effective routes other than c. 211, 
§ 3, by which the petitioning party may seek relief."  Greco v. 
Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019 (1996).  In this case, the 
petitioner's remedy lay with the Appellate Division. 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Karen Owen Talley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the petitioner. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
1 As both parties note, there is another case currently 
pending before the full court that involves the issue of the 
applicable standard of proof relevant to G. L. c. 123, § 15, 
Commonwealth vs. A.Z., SJC-13455.  That case, however, is before 
the court on a different footing.  Like the petitioner here, 
A.Z. filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking 
review of a § 15 (b) commitment order.  A single justice denied 
the petition on the basis of adequate alternative remedy.  A.Z. 
then pursued that remedy, i.e., by appealing from the District 
Court's commitment order to the Appellate Division.  The 
Appellate Division affirmed the District Court's order, and A.Z. 
appealed from that judgment.  This court subsequently allowed 
A.Z.'s application for direct appellate review.