Title: City of Carmel v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 23S-EX-00129
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2024

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-EX-129 
The City of Carmel, Indiana, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
Duke Energy Indiana, LLC, Indiana Utility Regulatory 
Commission, and Indiana Office of Utility Consumer 
Counselor, 
Appellee (Defendants below). 
Argued: September 21, 2023 | Decided: May 30, 2024 
Appeal from the Ind. Utility Regulatory Commission -- No. 45482 
The Honorable James F. Huston, Chairman, The Honorables Sarah E. Freeman, 
Stefanie Krevda, David L. Ober, and David E. Ziegner, Commissioners, and 
The Honorable Jennifer L. Schuster, Senior Administrative Law Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 22A-EX-88 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush concurs.  
Justice Slaughter concurs with separate opinion. 
Justice Goff concurs in result with separate opinion. 
Justice Molter concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 30 2024, 11:11 am
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 2 of 12 
Massa, Justice 
Duke Energy and the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission seek 
review of a Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing the Commission as a 
party on appeal and holding that ordinances adopted by the City of 
Carmel affecting the utility are neither unreasonable nor void. Having 
vacated the Court of Appeals by granting transfer, we now affirm the 
Commission.   
Facts and Procedural History 
Indiana Code section 8-1-2-101 (“Section 101”) gives municipalities 
authority to enact ordinances that determine the means and methods in 
which a public utility occupies the municipality’s space. This authority is 
not, however, unfettered. The same code provision gives the Commission 
the power to determine whether such ordinances are unreasonable and 
thus void. The City of Carmel adopted two relevant ordinances in 2019: 
Ordinance D-2492 (“Underground Ordinance”) and D-24910 (“Relocation 
Ordinance”) (collectively, the “Ordinances”). The Underground 
Ordinance prohibits the construction of above-ground utility lines, poles, 
or related structures in Carmel’s right-of-way unless authorized by 
Carmel. The Relocation Ordinance explains the procedures to be followed 
when a utility facility must be relocated due to road, street, sidewalk, or 
trail projects. The Ordinances impose all costs on the utilities “unless the 
City agrees otherwise.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 44. 
After adopting the Ordinances, Carmel began two municipal 
improvement projects, which required Duke to relocate distribution 
facilities underground. Carmel and Duke could not agree on which party 
should bear the costs of relocation, estimated in excess of $500,000. Carmel 
made the first legal move, filing a complaint with the Commission asking 
it to uphold the Ordinances as reasonable, order Duke to relocate its 
facilities underground, and order Duke to pay the relocation costs. 
Following a hearing, the Commission rejected Carmel’s request and 
instead issued an order finding the Ordinances unreasonable and void 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 3 of 12 
under Indiana Code section 8-1-2-101. Carmel appealed.1 In a separate 
order, the Court of Appeals struck the Commission’s brief and dismissed 
the Commission as a party to the appeal. City of Carmel v. Duke Energy Ind., 
LLC, 198 N.E.3d 1182, 1186 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). In a published 
opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s order that the 
Ordinances were unreasonable and thus void. Id. at 1196.   
Both the Commission and Duke sought transfer, which we granted, 
thus vacating the appellate opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standards of Review 
The General Assembly established the Commission “as a fact-finding 
body with the technical expertise to administer the regulatory scheme 
devised by the legislature.” N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 
N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind. 2009) (citations omitted) [hereinafter NISPCO]. 
Review of Commission orders is two-tiered.  
First, “it requires a review of whether there is substantial evidence in 
light of the whole record to support the Commission’s findings of basic 
fact.” Id. at 1016 (citing Citizens Actions Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. 
Co., 485 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 1985)). Under this substantial evidence 
standard, the Commission’s “order will stand unless no substantial 
evidence supports it.” Id. (citing McClain v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of 
Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317–18 (Ind. 1998)). The reviewing 
appellate court is to neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility 
of witnesses. Id.  
Second, the appellate court reviews whether the order contains 
“specific findings on all the factual determinations material to its ultimate 
conclusions.” Id. (citing Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc., 485 N.E.2d at 612). 
The Court reviews the “conclusions of ultimate facts for reasonableness,” 
 
1 Appeals from decisions of the Commission bypass the trial courts and go straight to the 
Court of Appeals. Ind. Code § 8-1-3-1; see Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(3); App. R. 2(A). 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 4 of 12 
giving deference to the Commission in areas within its expertise. Id. (citing 
McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317–18).  
Whether the Commission is a proper party involves a question of law, 
which we review de novo. See Ind. Bell Tel. Co., v. Ind. Util. Regul. Comm’n, 
715 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind. 1999) (explaining the Commission’s jurisdiction 
is reviewed de novo). 
Discussion and Decision 
The Commission is responsible for assuring “public utilities provide 
constant, reliable, and efficient service” to all Hoosiers. NIPSCO, 907 
N.E.2d at 1015 (citing Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 715 N.E.2d at 354 n.3). “The 
Commission can exercise only power conferred upon it by statute.” Id. 
(citing United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 549 
N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1990)). The General Assembly granted the 
Commission the authority to determine whether a municipality’s 
ordinance(s) that govern the placement of utilities are reasonable. I.C. § 8-
1-2-101. Through its ratemaking expertise, the Commission can determine 
how one municipality’s ordinances and projects can impose resulting 
costs to utility customers statewide. Because we find the Commission’s 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and its conclusion 
of ultimate facts is reasonable, we affirm the Commission. 
I. The Commission is a proper party on appeal. 
The panel below dismissed the Commission as a party to this appeal 
and struck its brief, explaining that “[b]ecause the [Commission] acted as 
a fact-finding administrative tribunal . . . it is not a proper party on appeal 
from its own decision.” City of Carmel, 198 N.E.3d at 1186 n.1. The 
reasoning persuades when first encountered, if the Commission is to be 
strictly analogized to a trial court; but unlike trial courts, the 
Commission’s authority is quasi-legislative, not judicial, as the Attorney 
General’s reply brief notes, “even though adverse parties may be before 
[it], even in general rate cases.” Reply Br. at 5; see Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 495 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (stating the 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 5 of 12 
Commission acts in a “quasi-legislative” role when it promulgates 
regulations), reh’g and trans. denied.   
 There is neither a rule nor a statute that expressly provides for the 
Commission to be a named party when its own final order is appealed but 
it has been a “long-standing custom and practice.” Hamilton Se. Utils., Inc. 
v. Ind. Util. Regul. Comm’n, 101 N.E.3d 229, 231 (Ind. 2018). For more than a 
century, the Commission, under its numerous names, has defended its 
orders on appeal, notwithstanding the appearance of other appellants and 
appellees. See generally Winfield v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 118 N.E. 531 
(Ind. 1911) (defending its denial of increasing telephone rates); Kosciusko 
Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 77 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 
1948) (defending an order granting a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to a service company); Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 715 N.E.2d 351 
(defending its jurisdiction and powers to regulate utilities); Hamilton Se. 
Utils., 101 N.E.3d 229 (defending its order authorizing a lower-than-
expected utility rate); Ind. Off. of Util. Consumer Couns. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 200 N.E.3d 915 (Ind. 2023) (defending its order approving an 
electricity supplier’s petition). “Dismissal of the Commission runs counter 
to a long-standing practice of allowing it to defend its own orders—a 
practice that the legislature has left intact by remaining silent throughout 
the past one hundred years.” Hamilton Se. Utils, 101 N.E.3d at 232.  
Public policy also supports the Commission as a proper party on 
appeal. Id. at 232–33. The Commission is a neutral fact finder that often 
defends issues where no opposition comes forward, it may be “the only 
appellee to submit a brief[,]” or it may oppose an issue because of its 
interests. Id. at 232. “That interest is critical to its mission, and favors 
permitting the Commission’s participation in defending challenged 
orders.” Id. Dismissal of the Commission would “frustrate the 
effectiveness of challenges to appeals” because all the Commission’s 
interests must be represented. Id. at 232–33. Without the Commission’s 
participation on appeal, Indiana appellate courts would lose the benefit of 
the Commission’s expertise. Id. at 232–33. That expertise informs the 
Commission’s determination of whether its interests are “adequately 
represented” and “promotes a more efficient appeals process and upholds 
a century of accepted practice in the courts.” Id. at 233.  
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 6 of 12 
Because we will not disrupt the “long-standing custom and practice,” 
id. at 231, and because public policy supports the Commission’s 
participation, id. at 232–33, we find the Commission was a proper party on 
appeal.  
II. The Commission’s findings of fact are supported 
by substantial evidence. 
When reviewing the Commission’s findings of fact, an appellate court 
will only consider the evidence most favorable to the Commission’s 
findings. NIPSCO, 907 N.E.2d at 1016 (citing McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317–
18). In 1913, the General Assembly enacted the Shively-Spencer Act 
removing “all control over public utilities” from municipalities and 
conferred that control to the Commission “as the agent of the state.” City 
of Huntington v. N. Ind. Power Co., 5 N.E.2d 889, 892 (Ind. 1937). The Act 
thus “conferred upon [the Commission] all the powers of control 
heretofore enjoyed by the municipalities.” Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. City of 
Indianapolis, 137 N.E. 705, 708–09 (Ind. 1922). “There are sound public 
policy reasons why the General Assembly has declared the [Commission] 
to be the exclusive arbiter of enforceability of ordinances affecting utility 
services.” Duke Energy Ind., LLC v. Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d 319, 325 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added). The General Assembly declared the 
Commission to be the exclusive arbiter of enforceability because it “has 
both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-local focus necessary 
to balance [the] competing interests” of public utilities and municipalities. 
Id. 
The General Assembly granted municipalities the power to enact 
reasonable local ordinances affecting a utility’s use of a municipality’s 
“streets, highways, or other public property.” I.C. § 8-1-2-101(a)(1). When 
an ordinance is adopted, under Section 101 the ordinance is considered 
“prima facie reasonable” and will remain in force until successfully 
challenged. Id. If the Commission determines the ordinance is 
“unreasonable,” after a hearing and presentation of the evidence, it “shall 
be void.” Id.  
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 7 of 12 
A party appealing a Commission determination has the burden “of 
overcoming the prima facie reasonableness of the Commission’s 
presumptive impartial finding and order[.]” Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 131 
N.E.2d at 312. The challenger overcomes this presumption by showing 
substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s findings. Id. If the 
reviewing court finds that evidence substantial, the Commission’s order 
will stand. Id. An “appellate court neither reweighs the evidence nor 
assesses the credibility of witnesses and considers only the evidence most 
favorable to the [Commission’s] findings.” Id. (quoting McClain, 693 
N.E.2d at 1317). 
Duke presented the following evidence before the Commission: Duke 
services Hoosiers throughout sixty-nine counties, many of which are 
rural. Duke’s Vice President of Rate and Regulatory Strategy testified that 
“[i]f Duke Energy Indiana were forced to pay for the cost of 
[underground] relocation,” the utility “would seek recovery of those 
costs.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 220 (emphasis added). A senior 
engineering technologist also testified that, if the Ordinances were 
allowed to stand, “other towns and municipalities will enact similar 
ordinances” to avoid paying the cost of utility relocation. Id. at 192 
(emphasis added). And these underground projects can cost on average 
ten times more than above-ground projects. And while the potential 
relocation cost is speculative, requiring an exact figure would require 
Duke to undergo a rate case, which would undermine the Commission’s 
authority and expertise to review a municipal ordinance for its 
reasonableness under Section 101, “which involves a comprehensive 
review of the utility’s entire business operation.” NIPSCO Indus. Grp. v. N. 
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 100 N.E.3d 234, 236 (Ind. 2018). The Commission is 
charged with ensuring the public-utility charges are “reasonable and just, 
and every unjust or unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited 
and declared unlawful.” I.C. § 8-1-2-4. Applying its expertise and 
authority, the Commission considered the evidence presented to it and 
determined the Ordinances were unreasonable and void because they 
threatened to impose unreasonable expenses on Duke, which would in 
turn impact all Duke customers throughout Indiana. 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 8 of 12 
Based on the evidence, the Commission made these findings: Duke 
services customers in sixty-nine counties throughout Indiana, and it is 
thus unlikely that those customers outside of Carmel would benefit from 
Carmel’s aesthetic improvements resulting from buried lines; that 
Carmel’s underground requirements are expensive; and that the 
Ordinances shift costs onto Duke’s customers statewide, forcing all 
Hoosier customers, even distant rural ratepayers, to bear the burden of the 
projects. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission’s findings that costs would be so shifted.  
Because of its expertise, the Commission is in the best position to 
determine whether costs are reasonable and whether costs would shift to 
customers statewide. See Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d at 325 (the Commission 
“has both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-local focus 
necessary to balance competing interests and determine when a local 
entity’s imposition of costs on a public utility exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness”). “The [Commission’s] strong understanding of the 
public interest and its demonstrated expertise in administering the 
regulatory schemes in which utilities operate are essential to a fair 
evaluation of local ordinances that impact utilities.” Id. at 326 (emphasis in 
original).  
 The Code requires the Commission to require nondiscriminatory rates 
and charges. See I.C. § 8-1-2-4. This means that the Commission can find a 
municipality’s ordinance unreasonable when the ordinance unfairly shifts 
costs of a municipal project to all Hoosier customers statewide. Similarly, 
the Commission may “prescribe uniform rates” for Hoosiers within a 
region to “avoid unnecessary and unreasonable expense, or to avoid 
discrimination in rates between classes of customers, or, whenever in the 
judgment of the [Commission] public interest so requires.” Id.; id. § 8-1-2-
0.5 (“The general assembly declares that it is the continuing policy of the 
state . . . to use all practicable means and measures, including financial . . . 
to create and maintain conditions under which utilities plan for and invest 
in infrastructure necessary for operation and maintenance while 
protecting the affordability of utility services . . . .”). Using its expertise to 
find that costs would shift to Hoosier customers statewide, the 
Commission concluded the enforcement of the Ordinances would cause 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 9 of 12 
classes of customers to pay more than the cost of Duke’s services or other 
classes of customers to pay less than the cost of Duke’s services. 
The Commission concluded the Underground Ordinance, “in 
conjunction with the Relocation Ordinance,” was unreasonable because it 
“impermissibly shifts these costs to Duke’s customers statewide, most of 
whom will never benefit from these municipal projects[.]” Appellant’s 
App. Vol. II, p. 15. The Commission concluded the Relocation Ordinance 
“unfairly burdens” Hoosier customers because “it shifts onto public 
utilities” the relocation of utility facilities costs “without considering the 
broader public interests of their customers. . . . To force Duke’s customers 
statewide to pay for utility relocations in Carmel is unfair and 
unreasonable.” Id. at 17.  
Having so concluded, the Commission’s only statutory remedial power 
was to declare the ordinance “void.” I.C. § 8-1-2-101(a)(1). The 
concurrence makes a fair point that the Commission went farther than 
necessary in “envision[ing] circumstances where enforcing the ordinance 
might run afoul of Indiana Department of Transportation regulations, or 
where some terms in the ordinance could prove vague.” Post, 1 (Opinion 
of Molter, J.). The separate opinion also raises an intriguing question, in 
the parlance of constitutional law, asking whether the challenge is “facial” 
or “as applied.” See id. at 2–3. This could be important in a future case, 
though not decisive here. Is the ordinance void “as applied” to Duke in 
this case because of the unreasonable cost shifting? Or is it void on its face 
in its entirety because it would be unreasonable under any circumstances 
the Commission might imagine? We would surmise the former, in that 
Carmel could likely still enforce those portions of the ordinances requiring 
the burying of power lines, so long as Carmel pays for it. The problem for 
us at the moment is that the statute doesn’t contemplate any distinction 
between facial challenges and those as applied. The statute gives the 
Commission only one power if it finds an ordinance “unreasonable,” 
whether on its face or as applied, and that is to void it. I.C. § 8-1-2-
101(a)(1). That is what the Commission did here, and the record evidence 
on cost shifting alone supports it. 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 10 of 12 
Conclusion 
Based on Duke’s evidence that it would seek recovery of the 
underground project’s costs, the Commission, using its expertise and 
statutory authority, reasonably concluded the costs would be shifted to all 
Duke customers statewide because they would be included in Duke’s 
rates. See Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d at 325. The evidence presented by Duke 
is substantial enough to support the Commission’s findings that costs 
would be shifted and its ultimately reasonable conclusion that the 
Ordinances are unreasonable. See Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Co. of Ind., 450 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). We affirm the 
Commission’s order. 
Rush, C.J., concur. 
Slaughter, J., concurs with separate opinion. 
Goff, J., concurs in result with separate opinion. 
Molter, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 11 of 12 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  C I T Y O F C A RM EL , I N D IA NA  
Jon Oberlander 
Benjamin J. Legge 
City of Carmel 
Carmel, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E S D U KE E NE R G Y  IN D IA NA , LLC  
Darren Andrew Craig 
Maggie L. Smith 
Frost Brown Todd LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Elizabeth Heneghan 
Ariane S. Johnson 
Duke Energy Indiana, LLC 
Plainfield, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E S I N DI AN A UT IL IT Y  RE G UL ATO R Y  
C O MM ISS I O N  
Beth Heline 
Jeremy Comeau 
Bradford Hines 
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Benjamin M. L. Jones 
Office of the Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 12 of 12 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E S I N DI AN A O F F IC E O F U T IL ITY  
C O N SUM E R C OU NSE L O R  
William I. Fine 
Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA EN E R G Y  ASS O CI AT I O N, I NC .  
Erin C. Borissov 
Leah R. Zoccola 
Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA MU NI CI P AL LA W YE R S A SS O CIAT I O N 
A N D AC CE LE R AT E I N D IA NA  MU N IC I PA LI TI ES  
Karen L. Arland 
Thomas Kennedy Downs 
Kennedy Downs & Arland, PC 
Carmel, Indiana 
Rebecca McCuaig 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 1 of 1 
Slaughter, J., concurring. 
I concur in the Court’s opinion based on my understanding that it is 
affirming only part of the utility regulatory commission’s order—namely, 
the part finding Carmel’s relocation ordinance unreasonable and thus 
void under Indiana Code section 8-1-2-101. I do not understand the Court 
to be affirming the part of the order voiding Carmel’s underground 
ordinance. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 1 of 6 
Goff, J., concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court’s conclusions that the IURC is a proper party on 
appeal, that substantial evidence supports the IURC’s finding that the 
Ordinances improperly shift the project costs to customers beyond the 
City, and that the IURC appropriately applied its expertise by concluding 
that the Ordinances are unreasonable and thus void. I write separately for 
two reasons: (1) to clarify when, in my view, the IURC is a proper party on 
appeal; and (2) to stress the IURC’s expertise and statutory authority to 
review and invalidate a municipal ordinance for its unreasonableness. 
I. The IURC’s status as a party on appeal should not
depend on its “legislative” or “adjudicative”
capacity in the proceedings below.
In Hamilton Southeastern Utilities, Inc. v. Indiana Utility Regulatory 
Commission (HSE), the utility petitioned the IURC for an increase in the 
rates it charged its customers—a process known as a rate case. 101 N.E.3d 
229, 230 (Ind. 2018). The IURC approved an increase in rates but at a 
substantially lower amount than what the utility had requested. Id. On 
appeal, the utility successfully moved to dismiss the IURC as a party. Id. 
This Court disagreed, holding that the IURC was a proper party to the 
appeal. Dismissal of the agency ran “counter to a long-standing practice” 
of allowing the IURC to “defend its own orders,” the Court explained, and 
would “frustrate the effectiveness of challenges to appeals given that 
other parties seldom represent the entirety of the [IURC’s] interests.” Id. at 
232–33. In a separate section of its opinion, the Court pointed out that the 
IURC’s “main function” in the proceeding there “was not adjudicative” 
but rather “legislative in nature” and that, because the petition “was not to 
settle a dispute” between two parties, the IURC proceedings “were not 
akin to those before a trial court.” Id. at 233.  
The parties here dispute the precedential import of HSE. In the IURC’s 
view, the HSE Court “adopted a categorical rule” under which the agency 
“may ‘determine whether its interests are being adequately represented’ 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 2 of 6 
when choosing whether to participate on appeal.” IURC Pet. to Trans. at 
13 (quoting 101 N.E.3d at 233). The City rejects this argument, stressing 
the distinction made in that case between the IURC’s legislative, rate-
making function and the agency’s adjudicative function. Resp. in Opp. to 
Trans. at 9–12. This distinction, the City adds, harmonizes with earlier 
precedent prohibiting the IURC from participating on appeals in which it 
adjudicates a dispute, ultimately creating a “bright line rule allowing the 
IURC to participate on appeal only where it acts in a legislative capacity.” 
Id. at 12–13; see, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 70 N.E.3d 429, 432 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that the IURC 
“is not a proper party on appeal from its own decision” because it “acted 
as a fact-finding administrative tribunal” and because “no statute or 
administrative provision expressly makes the IURC a party on appeal”).  
The implications of the HSE Court’s legislative-versus-adjudicative 
distinctions are not entirely clear from its opinion. On the one hand, the 
language used there could suggest that the IURC is not a proper party on 
appeal if its proceedings are akin to those before a trial court. But the 
Court’s opinion stops short of reaching such a conclusion. What’s more, 
there’s no discussion in the HSE opinion of whether to disapprove or 
reaffirm precedent that prohibits the IURC from participating on appeal 
from cases in which it adjudicated a dispute.  
Here, the Court of Appeals agreed with the City, concluding that the 
IURC “is not a proper party on appeal from its own decision” because it 
“acted as a fact-finding administrative tribunal.” City of Carmel v. Duke 
Energy, LLC, 198 N.E.3d 1182, 1186 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The Court, in 
turn, finds this reasoning persuasive, but only “if the Commission is to be 
strictly analogized to a trial court.” Ante, at 4. “[U]nlike trial courts,” the 
opinion explains, the IURC’s “authority is quasi-legislative, not judicial.” 
Id. While I certainly agree with this view, I’m not quite sure where it 
leaves us. Does it mean we no longer consider the IURC to act in an 
adjudicative capacity, regardless of the nature of the proceedings below? 
In other words, does the Court’s opinion render the legislative/judicial 
distinction—embodied in decades of precedent from Indiana courts—
obsolete? Given the parties’ dispute over the precedential implications of 
HSE, I would clarify the issue to avoid protracted litigation in the future.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 3 of 6 
In my view, there’s no basis for distinguishing the IURC’s decisional 
capacity when deciding whether to allow that agency to proceed as a 
party on appeal. For starters, the reasoning used in cases like Citizens 
Action Coalition—that “no statute or administrative provision expressly 
makes the IURC a party on appeal”—was implicitly rejected by the HSE 
Court. See 101 N.E.3d at 231–32 (citing legislative silence and long-
standing custom as factors for why the IURC may appear on appeal).  
Second, whether in resolving a dispute like this one or in deciding a 
rate case like in HSE, the IURC considers—and ultimately rules on—a 
variety of competing adversarial interests. See id. at 233 (acknowledging 
that there were “opposing parties with competing interests involved 
[t]here”). In fact, the Court of Appeals has observed in other cases that all 
IURC proceedings, including ratemaking cases, “are conducted through 
an adversarial process” involving not only the utility but also the Office of 
Utility Consumer Counselor representing the public and any number of 
intervenors representing diverse interests. IPL Indus. Grp. v. Indianapolis 
Power & Light Co., 159 N.E.3d 617, 621, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis 
added).  
Finally, I consider flawed the analogy between IURC proceedings and 
those of a trial court. Rather than acting in a purely adjudicative capacity 
(like courts), the IURC is “a fact-finding body with the technical expertise 
to administer the regulatory scheme devised by the legislature.” Duke 
Energy Indiana, LLC v. Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d 319, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2017) (internal citation omitted). While the agency may have been 
resolving a dispute between the immediate parties to this litigation, it 
was—at a macro level—exercising “regulatory oversight of ordinances 
directly affecting a public utility’s costs” and, therefore, its utility rates, as 
tasked by the General Assembly. See IURC Pet. to Trans. at 14–15 (citing 
I.C. §§ 8-1-2-4, -68). What’s more, IURC proceedings are less formal than 
proceedings before a trial court. See 170 Ind. Admin. Code 1-1.1-26(a) 
(IURC “may be guided generally by relevant provisions of the Indiana 
Rules of Trial Procedure and the Indiana Rules of Evidence to the extent 
they are consistent with this rule”). And the applicable statutes vest 
discretion in the IURC to hold a hearing before ruling on complaints like 
the one here. See Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d at 326 (citing relevant statutes). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 4 of 6 
The Court may very well agree with these points. But by failing to 
address the ambiguity created by HSE (an ambiguity exploited and 
argued extensively by the parties here), the Court misses an opportunity 
to clarify an area of the law that may lead to even further confusion down 
the road.  
II. The statute plainly directs the IURC to declare 
“void” any ordinance it deems “unreasonable.” 
By concluding that the Ordinances impermissibly shifted costs, the 
IURC declared the Ordinances “unreasonable” and thus “void,” precisely 
as the statute dictates. App. Vol. 2, p. 19 (citing I.C. § 8-1-2-101(a)). 
According to the separate opinion, dissenting in part, this determination 
suggests that, “going forward, Carmel can never enforce” the Ordinances 
“in any circumstances.” Post, at 1 (opinion of Molter, J.). Finding no 
support for this approach, the dissent points to the “primary concerns” 
raised by the IURC in its order—namely, circumstances where 
enforcement “might run afoul” of INDOT regulations and the possibility 
that certain terms “could prove vague.” Id. Invalidating an ordinance on 
its face because it “might operate in an unreasonable manner,” the dissent 
concludes, simply goes too far. Id. at 2–3. And unless the IURC limits its 
review to the “validity of applying the ordinance to the facts of a 
particular case,” the dissent warns, a municipality “may never be able to 
enact valid utility-related ordinances.” Id. at 2. 
The Court concedes that the dissent “makes a fair point” in that the 
IURC “went farther than necessary” by citing tentative or hypothetical 
circumstances to invalidate the Ordinances on their face. Ante, at 9. And 
while acknowledging that the statute limits the IURC to declaring an 
“unreasonable” ordinance “void,” the Court opines that a “facial” versus 
“as applied” distinction “could be important in a future case.” Id. 
In my view, the dissenting opinion is unnecessary and rests on an 
incorrect reading of the record.  
To begin with, the Court cites impermissible cost shifting as the only 
ground for affirming the IURC. Ante, at 10. With no discussion of the 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 5 of 6 
alternative grounds for invalidating the Ordinances (conflict with INDOT 
regulations and vague terms), the Court does not, as the dissent suggests, 
“get ahead” of itself by determining whether the IURC “correctly 
interpreted how another agency would apply its regulations or whether 
the ordinances might prove vague in different circumstances.” See post, at 
1–2 (opinion of Molter, J.). Rather, by affirming on the narrow ground of 
impermissible cost shifting, the Court leaves room for the City (and other 
municipalities for that matter) to enact similar ordinances (requiring 
undergrounding and relocation of utility facilities), so long as the City 
bears the associated costs.  
Second, the proposition that the IURC invalidated the Ordinances 
because they “might operate in an unreasonable manner” overlooks 
critical portions of the IURC order. Rather than invoking “hypothetical 
circumstances,” the IURC was unequivocal in its conclusion that both 
Ordinances “impermissibly invade INDOT’s regulation of projects” and 
that both “are extremely vague.” App. Vol. 2, p. 14; see also id. at 15 (citing 
examples of the Underground Ordinance’s “extremely vague” terms and 
pointing to its “clear conflict” with INDOT regulations), id. at 17 (citing 
examples of the Relocation Ordinance’s “unreasonably vague” terms and 
stressing twice that it “clearly conflicts” with INDOT regulations). These 
conclusions, in my view, are no less definitive—and the supporting 
evidence no less substantial—than the IURC’s conclusion that the 
Ordinances improperly shift “costs to Duke’s customers statewide, most 
of whom will never benefit from these municipal projects.”1 See id. at 15. 
To conclude otherwise undermines the IURC’s “authority and expertise to 
review a municipal ordinance for its reasonableness.” See ante, at 7.  
 
1 While acknowledging that “the potential relocation cost” for an underground project “is 
speculative,” the Court explains that, to require an “exact figure” would ultimately 
“undermine the Commission’s authority and expertise to review a municipal ordinance for its 
reasonableness.” Ante, at 7. See also post, at 1 (opinion of Molter, J.) (agreeing with the Court 
that the IURC “appropriately applied its expertise when reaching the reasonable conclusion 
that municipalities should not be permitted to shift relocation costs to utilities in these sorts of 
circumstances”). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-EX-129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 6 of 6 
Finally, it’s worth bearing in mind the primary role of the IURC: 
ensuring uniformity of utility regulation throughout the state by limiting 
the authority exercised by municipal entities. See City of Huntington v. N. 
Ind. Power Co., 211 Ind. 502, 510, 5 N.E.2d 889, 892 (1937) (describing the 
purpose of the 1913 Shively-Spencer Act as shifting “all control over 
public utilities” from the municipal level to the IURC’s predecessor “as 
the agent of the state”). The General Assembly vested this power in the 
IURC because it “has both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-
local focus necessary to balance competing interests” of public utilities 
and local municipalities. Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d at 325 (internal citation 
omitted). So, to the extent that an ordinance “might operate in an 
unreasonable manner,” I reject the idea that it asks “too much” of our local 
governments to ensure otherwise. See post, at 3 (opinion of Molter, J.).  
Conclusion 
For the reasons above, I concur in the Court’s judgment recognizing the 
IURC as a proper party on appeal and affirming the IURC’s invalidation 
of the Ordinances on the narrow ground of impermissible cost shifting. To 
the extent the Court questions the IURC’s authority to declare the 
Ordinances facially invalid based on the alternative grounds raised by the 
dissent, I consider that portion of the opinion to be unnecessary dicta.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐EX‐129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 1 of 3 
Molter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.  
For both projects in dispute—the trail project and the road project—
Duke is willing to relocate and bury power lines as Carmel’s ordinances 
require, but the parties dispute who should pay for it. Carmel wants Duke 
to pay. Duke wants Carmel to pay.  
The Commission concluded that when, as here, a municipality requires 
a utility to bury power lines for aesthetic reasons, the municipality can’t 
shift the costs to the utility because the utility will ultimately pass the 
costs to ratepayers around the State who received no benefit from burying 
the power lines. The Court’s opinion affirms that conclusion, and I agree 
with that much as it relates to the two projects at issue. As the Court’s 
opinion correctly explains, the Commission is a proper party on appeal; 
the findings of fact that the opinion discusses were supported by 
substantial evidence; and the Commission appropriately applied its 
expertise when reaching the reasonable conclusion that municipalities 
should not be permitted to shift relocation costs to utilities in these sorts of 
circumstances. 
But the Commission didn’t just stop Carmel from shifting the relocation 
costs to Duke for these two projects. The Commission went on to 
invalidate Carmel’s ordinances on their face by ordering: “Carmel’s 
Underground Ordinance and Relocation Ordinance are unreasonable and 
void pursuant to Ind. Code § 8‐1‐2‐101.” App. Vol. II at 19. That seems to 
suggest that, going forward, Carmel can never enforce any part of either its 
Relocation Ordinance or its Underground Ordinance in any circumstances.  
I don’t think the record supports going that far. The Commission’s 
primary concerns when invalidating the ordinances on their face were that 
the Commission could envision circumstances where enforcing the 
ordinance might run afoul of Indiana Department of Transportation 
regulations, or where some terms in the ordinance could prove vague. Id. 
at 14 (“Both of Carmel’s Ordinances impermissibly invade INDOT’s 
regulation of projects, and both are extremely vague, containing 
undefined terms and referencing undefined standards.”). We don’t need 
to get ahead of ourselves to determine whether the Commission correctly 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐EX‐129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 2 of 3 
interpreted how another agency would apply its regulations or whether 
the ordinances might prove vague in different circumstances. And the 
Commission didn’t need to either because those questions have nothing to 
do with whether Carmel can shift costs to Duke for these two projects, 
which is all the Commission needed to decide.  
Both Carmel and Duke agree that Indiana Code section 8‐1‐2‐101 
allowed the Commission to review the reasonableness of the ordinances 
as Carmel was applying them to Duke for the two projects in dispute 
rather than evaluating the facial validity of the ordinances. Oral Argument 
at 9:43–10:50 (Carmel); id. at 32:1237 (Duke). And unless the Commission 
concludes that enforcing an ordinance will always be unreasonable, or at 
least always unreasonable in some particular set of circumstances, it 
should limit its review to the validity of applying the ordinance to the 
facts of a particular case. Otherwise, municipalities may never be able to 
enact valid utility‐related ordinances, as this case illustrates.  
Carmel tried to amend its Relocation Ordinance and its Underground 
Ordinance to comply with the Commission’s recent order invalidating a 
similar Avon ordinance. In re Duke Energy Ind., LLC, No. 44804, 2019 WL 
342923, at *17 (IURC Jan. 23, 2019). The Commission’s Avon order also 
included hypothetical circumstances in which the ordinance might 
operate in an unreasonable manner. Id. at *12 (“One could easily envision 
a circumstance in which a utility and INDOT are still negotiating a work 
plan under 105 IAC 13‐3‐3, but 60 days have passed following a demand 
by Avon to relocate utility facilities, resulting in fines and potential legal 
action by Avon against the utility if the relocation is not complete.”). And 
the Commission’s reasons for invalidating Avon’s ordinance included: 
It fails to provide any procedures for considering less costly 
alternatives to those demanded by Avon. It contains no 
provisions to ensure that any new location to which Avon 
demands that a utility move is legal and feasible under the 
federal and state laws and regulations that public utilities must 
follow in siting and constructing their facilities. It also permits 
no consideration of factors that may prevent utilities from 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐EX‐129 | May 30, 2024 
Page 3 of 3 
complying with Avon’s demand to relocate utility facilities, 
such as weather, design constraints, availability of materials, 
feasibility, acquisition of legal rights, and the like. 
Id.  
Carmel revised its Relocation Ordinance and its Underground 
Ordinance trying to address the Commission’s concerns, yet the 
Commission’s order here laments that Carmel’s attempt to comply with 
the Avon order “reflect[s] a gross misunderstanding of that order’s 
findings.” App. Vol. II at 18. The Commission’s approach of reviewing 
these ordinances and invalidating them on their face if there are 
potentially circumstances where the ordinances may conflict with another 
agency’s regulations means ordinances will only survive if the drafters 
correctly guess every tension with other laws and regulations that either 
the current or future members of the Commission might conceive. That is 
too much to ask of local governments, and Indiana Code section 8‐1‐2‐101 
doesn’t require that approach.  
While the record supports a decision to prohibit Carmel’s request to 
shift the costs of these two projects to Duke, the record does not support 
the Commission’s decision to invalidate the two ordinances on their face. I 
would therefore affirm the Commission’s order to the extent it precludes 
Carmel from enforcing its ordinances to shift the costs of these projects to 
Duke, reverse the order to the extent it invalidates the ordinances on their 
face, and remand for the Commission to amend its order accordingly.