Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13032
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13032 
 
DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 7546  vs.  SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 3, 2021. - June 3, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Constitutional Law, Sex discrimination.  
Due Process of Law, Sex offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex 
offender.  Administrative Law, Exhaustion of remedies, Time 
of decision. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 6, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Joseph F. Leighton, Jr., J., on 
motions for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Matthew J. Koes for the plaintiff. 
 
Nicole Nixon for the defendant. 
 
Nancy Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 2012, years before her potential release 
date from prison, Doe was classified as a level three sex 
offender.1  At the time, she did not challenge the 
classification.  In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 484 (2015) (Doe No. 
7083), we held that "a final classification must be based on an 
evaluation of the offender's risk of reoffense at a time 
reasonably close to the actual date of discharge" in order to 
satisfy due process.  In 2019, based on Doe No. 7083, Doe sought 
to vacate the final classification on the grounds that it was 
premature, despite her decision not to challenge the 
classification at the time it was finalized.  The Sex Offender 
Registry Board (board) denied the motion.  Applying the familiar 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), balancing test, 
we conclude that the premature classification here violates due 
process, as it serves little to no purpose, poses an unnecessary 
risk of harm and error, and is not justified by the board's 
limited interest in finality or administrative efficiency.2 
 
Background.  Doe was convicted of sex offenses in 1970 and 
1977, and she was sentenced to life in prison in 1977.  In 
 
 
1 Doe has transitioned from male to female.  Therefore, we 
refer to her with she/her/hers pronouns. 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
December 2012, the board notified Doe of her responsibility to 
register as a sex offender and of her recommended classification 
as a level three, high-risk sex offender.  Doe accepted the 
recommended classification and declined a hearing, and her 
classification was finalized. 
 
On April 4, 2019, Doe filed a "motion to vacate final 
classification and for further evidentiary hearing" with the 
board.  She argued, based on Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 479, 
that her classification was finalized too far in advance of her 
release and should therefore be vacated.  She also claimed the 
classification had become stale and materially inaccurate, 
contending that the passage of time, her completion of sex 
offender treatment, and her advanced age reduced her risk of 
recidivism.  On April 8, 2019, a board hearing examiner denied 
the motion, concluding that the Supreme Judicial Court's holding 
in Doe No. 7083 did not apply because, unlike the offender in 
Doe No. 7083, Doe accepted her classification, thereby waiving 
her right to a hearing.  In the denial, the hearing examiner 
noted that Doe would be eligible to request reclassification 
three years after her release from incarceration.3 
 
 
3 Doe was denied parole on May 20, 2015.  On March 3, 2020, 
another parole hearing was held.  Parole was subsequently denied 
on September 2, 2020.  Doe will not be eligible for review of 
parole again until 2025. 
4 
 
 
Doe sought judicial review in Superior Court.  The parties 
cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings.  A Superior Court 
judge entered judgment in favor of the board on the grounds of 
waiver and finality.4  We allowed Doe's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the board's 
denial of a motion to vacate a classification and hold a further 
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 209081 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 478 Mass. 
454, 457 (2017) (Doe No. 209081).  In reviewing a board decision 
for abuse of discretion, "we look to see whether the decision 
was reasonable" based on "the specific context of the 
circumstances presented and the statutory scheme involved."  Id. 
at 457-458.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014) (abuse of discretion involves clear error of judgment 
"such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives").  A "judge may not exercise her discretion in 
such a way that . . . deprives the defendant of the right to 
. . . due process of law."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 
 
 
4 The board also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  The judge partially allowed this 
motion as to counts I and II, seeking review under G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (the administrative procedures act), and declaratory 
judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 2.  The judge denied the 
motion as to count III, seeking certiorari pursuant to G. L. 
c. 249, § 4, and addressed the merits of Doe's claims. 
5 
 
747 (2010).  See Matthews v. Appeals Court, 444 Mass. 1007, 1008 
(2005) (clear error of law is one form of abuse of discretion). 
 
2.  Exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The board 
argues that we should not address the merits of Doe's claim 
because she did not properly exhaust all her administrative 
remedies.  The board contends that Doe should have first 
requested a reclassification pursuant to 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.31(2) (2016), even though the board can summarily deny her 
application without a hearing if she seeks reclassification 
while incarcerated, and no appeal is allowed from the decision.  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(e).  Once Doe is released, the 
soonest she can request reclassification is three years after 
her release.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2). 
As we discuss at greater length in our due process 
analysis, infra, this procedure is not a reasonably adequate 
remedy when challenging an obviously premature classification.  
See Noe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 195, 202-206 (2018) (Noe) (addressing 
due process protections against inaccurate classifications); Doe 
No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 484-485 (interests implicated by 
premature classification).  The solution to a premature final 
classification is not a premature reclassification.  The correct 
remedy is vacating the premature final classification until such 
time as it is appropriate to classify the petitioner.  Further, 
6 
 
as explained infra, the board routinely denies all such 
reclassification requests by incarcerated offenders.  Thus, Doe 
need not proceed with a reclassification request, but may 
proceed to seek to vacate the premature classification, as she 
did here. 
 
3.  Time of classification.  The primary issue in this case 
is whether our holding in Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 484, that 
"a final classification must be based on an evaluation of the 
offender's risk of reoffense at a time reasonably close to the 
actual date of discharge" applies to incarcerated offenders who, 
like Doe, accepted their classification. 
 
a.  Registration statute.  "The purpose of the sex offender 
registration statute is to protect the vulnerable members of our 
communities from sexual offenders and from the danger of 
recidivism posed by sex offenders" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 481.  To this end, the 
board is responsible for developing guidelines to determine 
"each sex offender's level of risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.04(1) (2016).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  "[A]n offender's 
recent behavior and current treatment [must] be considered as 
factors relevant to this determination."  Doe No. 7083, supra at 
481, citing G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  Based on these guidelines, 
the board makes initial recommendations regarding classification 
7 
 
level, which the sex offender may either accept or reject.5  803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(2).  All sex offenders must register 
with the board, and the board may release their information to 
certain governmental agencies.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2); 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.05(1) (2016).  Identifying information of 
sex offenders who receive a level two or level three 
classification (the highest classifications) is available to the 
public on the board's comprehensive registry, easily accessible 
through the Internet.  G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 178K (2). 
 
When an offender is incarcerated, the registration statute 
establishes deadlines for completion of steps in the 
classification process, but not a timeline for when the 
classification process may begin.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E 
("shall classify such a sex offender at least [ten] days before 
the offender's earliest possible release date"), § 178L (1) (a) 
(board must notify offender of right to submit evidence "not 
less than [sixty] days prior to" release or parole).  The board 
is required to prioritize classification of certain offenders 
sentenced to less than ninety days incarceration, followed by 
offenders recently released from incarceration, then offenders 
currently on probation or parole or scheduled to be released 
 
 
5 Because Doe did not challenge the initial recommendation, 
we do not address the procedures that follow an offender's 
challenge. 
8 
 
from incarceration within six months.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (3).  
Indefinitely incarcerated offenders are not included in the 
prioritization.  See id. 
 
b.  Due process implications.  "A sex offender has 
sufficient liberty and privacy interests constitutionally 
protected by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights] that [s]he is entitled to procedural due process before 
[s]he may be required to register and before information may 
properly be publicly disclosed about h[er]" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 482.  To assess 
procedural due process, we apply the test from Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 335, which balances the private interests affected by an 
agency decision; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of those 
interests and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and the governmental interests 
involved.  Doe No. 7083, supra at 482.  "In the context of sex 
offender classification, we examine the fit between a 
classification and the policy that the classification serves" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 483. 
 
In Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 476, we considered a 
substantially similar due process question in the context of an 
incarcerated and civilly committed offender whose classification 
hearing was scheduled ten months before his earliest parole 
9 
 
eligibility date and eighteen months before the trial on his 
petition for discharge.  There, we stated, 
"our decisions recognize that the registration statute 
requires [the board] to base its classification 
determinations on a sex offender's 'current' risk to the 
community, in order to protect the offender's right to due 
process. . . .  Reaching a final classification 
determination close to the actual date of discharge 
promotes accuracy of classification determinations, which 
advances both the interests of the community and of the sex 
offender." 
 
Id. at 483-484.  When the offender appealed the board's denial 
of his request to continue the hearing, we held that the board's 
early classification "risked classifying Doe based on factors 
that would be stale at the time of his discharge, in violation 
of due process protections . . . [that are not] adequately 
addressed by Doe's ability to request reclassification."  Id. at 
478.  We come to the same conclusion again today.6 
 
i.  Private interests.  "The private interests at stake in 
sex offender registration and classification are significant."  
Noe, 480 Mass. at 202.  Offenders must submit to "stringent 
affirmative reporting requirements" and public dissemination of 
their crimes, their identifying information, and their 
photograph (citation omitted).  Id.  "Internet dissemination," 
 
 
6 Reclassification procedures, particularly the burden of 
proof, have changed since our decision in Doe No. 7083.  See 
Noe, 480 Mass. at 205.  Thus, our analysis of the procedure is 
different from that in Doe No. 7083, but our conclusion is the 
same:  the existing procedures do not adequately address due 
process concerns. 
10 
 
required of offenders classified as level two and level three, 
"exposes [offenders], through aggressive public notification of 
their crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide 
ostracism."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 307–308 (2015) (Doe No. 
380316), quoting Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 485.  For prisoners, 
or at least prisoners held outside the sex offender treatment 
center, there is also a threat of physical danger from other 
inmates.7  In Doe's case, her primary interest is preventing the 
perpetuation of the harm caused by the ongoing, unnecessary 
Internet dissemination of her level three classification.8  See 
Doe No. 380316, supra at 307 ("Internet allows for around-the-
clock, instantaneous, and worldwide access" to information on 
 
 
7 See Noe, 480 Mass. at 202 (liberty interests include 
"possible threats of physical harm"); Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. 
at 307-308 (consequences of public dissemination may include 
"harassment[] and assault"); Cubellis, Evans, & Fera, Sex 
Offender Stigma:  An Exploration of Vigilantism against Sex 
Offenders, 40 Deviant Behavior 225, 232 (2018) (study reporting 
attacks on sex offenders within correctional facilities as 
result of stigma); Ricciardelli & Moir, Stigmatized among the 
Stigmatized: Sex Offenders in Canadian Penitentiaries, 55 
Canadian J. Criminology & Crim. Justice 353, 358-359 (2013) 
(incarcerated sex offenders stigmatized among other prisoners at 
risk of victimization); Schwaebe, Learning to Pass:  Sex 
Offenders' Strategies for Establishing a Viable Identity in the 
Prison General Population, 49 Int'l J. Offender Therapy & 
Comparative Criminology 614, 616-618 (2005) (incarcerated sex 
offenders subject to denigration, harassment, and violence from 
other inmates). 
 
 
8 Doe is held at a sex offender treatment facility. 
11 
 
registry, with "[n]o limits" on secondary dissemination of 
information); Doe No. 7083, supra at 478 ("dissemination, which 
can result in a wide variety of harms, cannot be revoked" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
ii.  Government interests.  First, the government has an 
interest "in protecting vulnerable members of the community 
through reliable notification of an offender's risk of reoffense 
and degree of dangerousness."  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 488.  
In general, "[t]hat interest is best served . . . by ensuring 
that the classification of each individual offender is 
accurate," as overclassification "distracts the public's 
attention from those offenders who pose a real risk of 
reoffense" (citation omitted).  Noe, 480 Mass. at 206.  
Importantly for this case, however, the public is already 
protected from an offender who, like Doe, will remain 
incarcerated, so long as that offender is separated from the 
public by the prison walls.  Classification and dissemination of 
accurate information serve to protect the public from offenders 
who are within the community, but are unnecessary to protect the 
public from offenders who are incarcerated and not in contact 
with the general community.  See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 
136, 142 (1997) (Attorney General), quoting State v. Ward, 123 
Wash. 2d 488, 503 (1994) ("Absent evidence that the offender 
12 
 
poses a threat to the community, disclosure would serve no 
legitimate purpose" [alteration omitted]). 
 
Second, the government has an interest in the finality of 
its classification decisions.  See Doe No. 209081, 478 Mass. at 
459 (statutes reflect "legislative acknowledgement that there is 
value in finality of sex offender classification proceedings"). 
This court has described the interest in finality of judgments 
as "weighty, [but] not always paramount."  Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  However, the government's 
finality interest in a premature sex offender classification is 
quite different from finality in a final criminal judgment or 
even other types of civil judgments, which require "a sufficient 
reason to reopen what society has a right to consider closed."  
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 637 (1997).  See 
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 486 Mass. 801, 805 (2021), quoting 
Amirault, supra (final criminal judgments are typically left 
undisturbed barring "the possibility of error and of grave and 
lingering injustice").  By statute and regulation, sex offender 
classifications are subject to regular reclassification, without 
any requirement that the original classification be erroneous.9  
 
 
9 The sex offender classification process provides for 
reclassification at appropriate times, so that a classification 
reflects current and changing conditions.  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 1.31, 1.32 (2016).  Indeed, the board itself regularly 
monitors final classifications to determine if a classification 
13 
 
Additionally, here the original classification was premature.  A 
premature classification of an incarcerated person, as explained 
above, serves little to no purpose, and causes unnecessary harm.  
The board's finality interest in such a classification is 
necessarily limited. 
 
Finally, the government has an interest in limiting its 
administrative burden.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (government 
interest includes "fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").  
In evaluating the administrative burden, we must consider the 
relief requested here.  Importantly, the substitute procedural 
safeguard -- vacating Doe's classification -- would impose 
virtually no additional burden on the board.  It would simply 
require that the board vacate the prior classification. 
 
The effect of a vacated decision on subsequent proceedings 
would also be minimal.  If the classification is vacated and Doe 
is scheduled for release, the board will reinitiate 
classification proceedings at an appropriate time prior to her 
release.  If the classification is not vacated, Doe has made 
clear that she intends to challenge it when the reclassification 
timeline allows her to do so.  Consequently, whether or not the 
current classification is vacated, the board will eventually be 
 
level should be changed.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3); 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.32. 
14 
 
required to prove the correctness of her classification by the 
same burden of proof:  clear and convincing evidence.  Noe, 480 
Mass. at 203-205 (board has clear and convincing evidence burden 
of proof at both classification and reclassification 
proceedings).  Thus, if we institute Doe's requested safeguard 
of vacating her classification, the additional administrative 
burden on the board would be minimal.10 
 
iii.  Risk of erroneous deprivation.  "A premature, and 
potentially unreliable or inaccurate [final] classification" has 
"severe consequences" that affect the offender's private 
interests.  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 485.  It also undermines 
the public's interest, which depends on currentness and accuracy 
of final classifications.  See id.; see also Noe, 480 Mass. at 
206 ("all of the interests at stake in the classification and 
reclassifications of sex offenders depend on accuracy in the 
classification process.  We have repeatedly recognized the 
importance of ensuring such accurate classifications").  As we 
have stated: 
"Ensuring that a sex offender's final classification 
reflects a level of risk and dangerousness that is current 
at a time when the offender's release is imminent furthers 
both [the board]'s interest, and that of the public, in 
protecting vulnerable members of the community through 
reliable notification of an offender's risk of reoffense 
and degree of dangerousness, and better protects Doe's 
 
 
10 In the event that Doe is never released from the 
treatment center, the board will bear no additional burden, as 
there will be no need to reinitiate classification proceedings. 
15 
 
liberty interest in receiving a classification that 
reflects consideration of current, rather than stale, risk 
factors." 
 
Doe No. 7083, supra at 488. 
 
Premature classifications, which are based on the 
circumstances at the time of classification rather than the time 
of release, may become inaccurate with the passage of time 
before release of an incarcerated offender.  See Doe No. 7083, 
472 Mass. at 483 ("registration statute requires [the board] to 
base its classification determination on a sex offender's 
'current' risk to the community").  This is particularly true 
for a petitioner such as Doe with a long prison sentence.  The 
risk factors assessed to determine classifications include many 
factors that are subject to change over time.  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016) (risk factors include offender's 
behavioral history while incarcerated, age, physical condition, 
participation in sex offender treatment, substance use, and 
mental health).  "Moreover, advances in scientific research on 
sex offender recidivism over the course of an offender's 
commitment could indicate that additional factors should be 
considered, or that factors thought to be relevant to a 
determination of risk are not as predictive as initially 
believed."  Doe No. 7083, supra at 485.  Thus, a premature 
classification may become an inaccurate overclassification, 
16 
 
leading to an erroneous deprivation of an offender's liberty 
interests. 
 
The board claims that the existing procedure of 
reclassification is a sufficient safeguard against erroneous 
risk of deprivation.  We disagree.  As the hearing examiner 
noted in her denial of Doe's motion, the regulations provide 
that Doe may seek reclassification three years after she is 
released.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31.  Allowing a potentially 
inaccurate classification to continue for years while a 
petitioner is incarcerated and at least three years after 
release presents significant due process concerns.  If 
erroneous, this classification continues a "wide variety of 
harms" caused by dissemination without advancing any public 
interest, potentially indefinitely.  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 
478 (harm caused by dissemination of inaccurate classification 
cannot be undone by subsequent reclassification).  See Attorney 
General, 426 Mass. at 142, quoting Ward, 123 Wash. 2d at 503 
("Absent evidence that the offender poses a threat to the 
community, disclosure would serve no legitimate purpose" 
[alteration omitted]); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(e). 
 
The board also relies on the procedure purportedly 
available for seeking reclassification while incarcerated as a 
protection against erroneous classification.  A premature 
reclassification is not, however, a proper solution to a 
17 
 
premature classification.  Rather, the solution to a premature 
classification is vacating the premature final classification 
and then classifying the petitioner at a time appropriately 
close to her release based on current conditions.  See Doe No. 
7083, 472 Mass. at 489. 
 
Further, the reclassification process for incarcerated 
offenders raises serious due process concerns.  The regulations 
permit Doe to seek reclassification while incarcerated, but the 
board can summarily deny her application without a hearing, and 
the board's decision is not subject to judicial review.  803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(e).  When pressed, the board 
confirmed that since January 2014, twenty-one petitions for 
reclassification have been filed by incarcerated offenders.  All 
have been summarily denied.  A summary, predetermined process, 
subject to no appeal, is not a legitimate protection against 
erroneous classification.  Indeed, the creation of and reliance 
on this type of illusory process for incarcerated prisoners is a 
flashing warning sign of a constitutional due process violation.  
See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 326573 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 477 Mass. 361, 369 (2017) (rejecting 
board's argument described as "heads, we win, tails, you [the 
offender] lose"); Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 479 (2015), S.C., 476 Mass. 298 (2017), 
quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement 
18 
 
of due process is the opportunity to be heard '. . . in a 
meaningful manner'"); Devine v. Nantucket, 449 Mass. 499, 511 
(2007), quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 315, (1950) ("process which is a mere gesture is not 
due process").  Finally, the board hearing examiner did not even 
reference this process in her decision, stating only that Doe 
would be eligible to seek reclassification three years following 
her release. 
 
iv.  Balancing.  When balancing the Mathews factors "[i]n 
the context of sex offender classification, we examine the fit 
between a classification and the policy that the classification 
serves" (quotation and citation omitted).  Doe No. 7083, 472 
Mass. at 483.  Thus, we assess the private interests, government 
interests, and risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value 
of substitute safeguards through the lens of the statutory 
purpose of "protect[ing] the vulnerable members of our 
communities from sexual offenders, and from the danger of 
recidivism posed by sex offenders" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Id. at 481. 
 
As we explained in Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 484-488, an 
incarcerated petitioner has a liberty interest in protection 
against premature classification, particularly when it results 
in dissemination of the classification over the Internet.  
Internet dissemination leads to "a wide variety of harms," 
19 
 
including stigma and reputational harm, that "cannot be 
revoked."  Id. at 478.  That interest is weighed against the 
government's interest in protecting the public from sex 
offenders, but such protection is provided by the incarceration 
itself.  See Attorney General, 426 Mass. at 142, citing Ward, 
123 Wash. 2d at 503.  Thus, the practice of classifying an 
offender far in advance of release does nothing to serve the 
government's interest in (and the statutory purpose of) 
protecting the public, while unnecessarily subjecting the 
offender to further stigma and harm.  Id.  See Doe No. 7083, 
supra at 483 (examining fit between classification and policy 
served by classification). 
There is also a risk that the premature classification was, 
or will become, erroneous, thereby increasing the harm to the 
petitioner.  Even if accurate at the time of acceptance, the 
premature classification does not account for any changes in the 
offender's behavior, attributes, and experience following the 
classification.  It therefore poses a significant risk of 
inaccurate classification at the time of release.  As both the 
petitioner and the government share an interest in accurate 
classification, neither side is served by premature 
classification.  See Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 484 ("Reaching a 
final classification determination close to the actual date of 
discharge promotes accuracy of classification determinations, 
20 
 
which advances both the interests of the community and of the 
sex offender").  See also Noe, 480 Mass. at 206. 
 
The government's interest is therefore confined to finality 
and the administrative burden of additional process.  As 
discussed above, the government's interest in finality of a 
premature sex offender classification is quite limited.  Even 
sex offender classifications that were properly determined are 
regularly subject to review by the board, and offenders may seek 
reclassification on their own initiative without proof of error 
in an original classification.  When the classification is 
premature, the interest in preserving it for finality purposes 
is greatly reduced, if not eliminated, as it serves no ongoing 
purpose and causes ongoing harm.  Therefore, the government's 
interest is primarily in the administrative burden of vacating 
the existing classification, which is, as we explained, 
minimal.11 
 
 
11 The board contends that to avoid rendering "the finality 
in accepted classifications a nullity," the government interest 
in finality is weightier where, as here, an offender has 
accepted a recommended classification.  It is true that Doe 
knowingly and voluntarily accepted her classification in 2012, 
but accepted classifications are still subject to the same 
monitoring and reclassification procedures as contested 
classifications.  Doe's acceptance does not change the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of her interests implicated by a premature 
classification with potential to become inaccurate, nor does it 
enhance the protection of the public.  Therefore, it does not 
change our due process analysis. 
21 
 
 
Finally, the alternative reclassification process that the 
board suggests here does not adequately protect the petitioner's 
interests.  Even more troubling, the reclassification process 
for incarcerated prisoners appears illusory.  Thus, the only 
actual safeguard against deprivation of Doe's interest is the 
possibility of reclassification three years after her release.  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(e).  This belated opportunity to 
seek reclassification does nothing to alleviate the ongoing risk 
of harm caused by her premature classification. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the petitioner was entitled to 
have her existing classification vacated.  The Mathews balancing 
test compels this result.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (factors 
to be balanced in due process analysis).  Preserving the 
premature classification was therefore an abuse of discretion.  
See Doe No. 209081, 478 Mass. at 457 (abuse of discretion of 
board's decision is reasonableness determination); L.L., 470 
Mass. at 185 n.27 (abuse of discretion involves clear error of 
judgment "such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives"); Cruz, 456 Mass. at 747 ("a judge may 
not exercise her discretion in such a way that . . . deprives 
the defendant of the right . . . to due process of law).12 
 
 
12 Because we conclude that the classification was premature 
and therefore must be vacated, we need not address Doe's 
argument that it was materially inaccurate. 
22 
 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that our holding in Doe No. 7083, 
472 Mass. at 484, that "a final classification must be based on 
an evaluation of the offender's risk of reoffense at a time 
reasonably close to the actual date of discharge" is rooted in 
principles of procedural due process that apply to incarcerated 
offenders who, like Doe, waived their classification hearing.  
Therefore, denial of Doe's motion to vacate her final 
classification was an abuse of discretion.  Her classification 
and the Superior Court judgment affirming the board's decision 
are vacated.  At a reasonable time prior to Doe's actual release 
date, the board may reinitiate classification proceedings, at 
which time Doe is entitled to submit documentary evidence and 
request an evidentiary hearing.  The matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for entry of a judgment consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.