Title: In re Estate of Slavin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13393
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2023

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SJC-13393 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA ANN SLAVIN. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 1, 2023. - July 31, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Executor and Administrator, Voluntary administrator, 
Appointment.  Uniform Probate Code.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Bristol Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department on August 5, 2016. 
 
 
A petition for formal appointment, filed on September 25, 
2020, was heard by Katherine A. Field, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Mark F. Itzkowitz (Kenneth I. Kolpan also present) for the 
petitioner. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  General Laws c. 190B, § 3-108, requires probate, 
testacy, and appointment proceedings to be filed within three 
years of a decedent's death.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108.  
Section 3-108, however, provides several exceptions to this 
2 
 
rigid three-year time limit, including for "appointment 
proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been a 
prior appointment."  The issue in this case is whether the 
position of voluntary personal representative, charged with 
administering a small estate pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
1201, constitutes a "prior appointment" within the meaning of 
§ 3-108's exception to the three-year limit.  We conclude that 
it does.  We therefore reverse the judgment dismissing the 
petition for formal appointment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
Background.  Patricia Slavin (decedent) was murdered on May 
10, 2016, in circumstances allegedly giving rise to claims for 
wrongful death under G. L. c. 229, § 2.  On August 5, 2016, the 
decedent's daughter, Kathleen Slavin (petitioner), filed a 
voluntary administration statement, along with other documents 
required under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201, in the Probate and 
Family Court.  Upon being duly filed, the register of probate 
certified the statement of voluntary administration pursuant to 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201.  At this point, the petitioner became 
the voluntary personal representative of the decedent's estate. 
 
Subsequently, the petitioner suspected that her authority 
as voluntary personal representative under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
1201, might have been insufficient to pursue wrongful death 
3 
 
claims on behalf of the decedent's estate.1  Accordingly, on 
September 25, 2020, the petitioner filed in the Probate and 
Family Court a petition for formal probate, seeking appointment 
as personal representative, pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 3-402.2  
The petition form for the appointment as personal representative 
under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-402, contains certain statements to 
which a petitioner must aver.  One such statement is that the 
petition "is filed within the time permitted by law," under 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, because either "[t]hree years or less 
[had] passed since the [d]ecedent's death," or "the . . . 
circumstances authorize tardy proceedings."  In her petition, 
the petitioner clarified under this statement that the three-
year time limit for probate proceedings in G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
108, was inapplicable because "this is  . . . an estate in which 
there has been a prior appointment."  All five of the decedent's 
other children assented in writing to their sister's petition 
for appointment as personal representative under G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 3-402, and waived notice. 
 
 
1 In Marco v. Green, 415 Mass. 732, 739 (1993), this court 
held that a voluntary administratrix under G. L. c. 195, § 16, 
repealed by St. 2008, c. 521, § 14 (the predecessor statute to 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201, see infra) lacked authority to bring or 
settle a wrongful death claim. 
 
 
2 In her petition, the petitioner also sought appointment as 
special personal representative, pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
614.  She later filed a motion requesting the same. 
4 
 
 
Thereafter, a Probate and Family Court judge conducted a 
hearing.  At the hearing, the judge expressed doubt that the 
position of voluntary personal representative under G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-1201, constitutes a "prior appointment" under G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-108, such that a subsequent formal petition for 
appointment under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-402, could be filed more 
than three years after the decedent's death.  The judge 
requested briefing on the issue.  After the petitioner filed an 
unopposed brief in support of her petition of appointment as 
personal representative, the judge dismissed the petition as 
untimely.3  The petitioner appealed.4  We allowed her application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  In 2008, the Legislature enacted the 
Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code, G. L. c. 190B (MUPC).  St. 
2008, c. 521.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 1-101.  Article III of 
c. 190B governs probate proceedings.  In § 3-108 of art. III, 
the Legislature imposed what it termed an "ultimate time limit" 
for probate proceedings, which provides that "[n]o informal 
 
 
3 On the petitioner's motion for appointment of special 
representative, the judge wrote in a margin endorsement:  "This 
petition cannot be filed beyond [three] years and shall be 
dismissed." 
 
 
4 The petitioner subsequently filed a so-called late and 
limited petition for appointment as personal representative, 
which was allowed.  Under such an appointment, however, the 
petitioner still lacks the full authority granted by formal 
appointment.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108 (4). 
5 
 
probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or 
appointment proceeding . . . may be commenced more than [three] 
years after the decedent's death."  G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108.  
Several exceptions to this ultimate time limit are set out in 
§ 3-108, including, as relevant here, for the commencement of 
"appointment proceedings relating to an estate in which there 
has been a prior appointment."  Id. 
 
When the Legislature enacted the MUPC, it adopted the 
"ultimate time limit," and its exceptions, directly from the 
Uniform Probate Code (UPC).  Indeed, much of the MUPC is adopted 
wholesale from the UPC.5  Importantly, though, the Legislature 
rejected a provision of the UPC governing the administration of 
small estates.6  The Legislature instead chose to retain and 
 
 
5 In addition to the official comments to each section 
prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, there are Massachusetts comments, prepared by the 
reporter of the Massachusetts Bar Association and Boston Bar 
Association Joint Committee on the UPC (Massachusetts comments), 
which discuss Massachusetts-specific provisions or edits to the 
UPC.  See Massachusetts Bar Association and Boston Bar 
Association Joint Committee on the Uniform Probate Code, MUPC 
(July 2012) https://www.mass.gov/doc/mupc-table-of-
contents/download [https://perma.cc/4F79-R2B3] (table of 
contents); https://www.mass.gov/doc/article-iii-probate-of-
wills-and-administrations/download [https://perma.cc/L5PD-XF96] 
(art. III). 
 
 
6 See Massachusetts comment to G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201 
("Rather than utilizing the UPC method of collection of assets 
by affidavit without [c]ourt involvement, this section adopts 
G. L. c. 195, §§ 16 and 16A, which provide for informal 
voluntary administration of estates . . ."). 
6 
 
integrate into the MUPC a preexisting Massachusetts provision 
that allows for the administration of small estates by a 
voluntary personal representative who files and verifies by oath 
or affirmation a statement of voluntary administration, which is 
attested by the register.7  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201. 
 
At issue here is whether the petitioner's status as 
voluntary personal representative under § 3-1201 constituted a 
"prior appointment" within the meaning of § 3-108's exception to 
the ultimate time limit for "appointment proceedings relating to 
an estate in which there has been a prior appointment," such 
that her subsequent formal petition for appointment as personal 
representative could be filed outside the three-year time limit.  
Based upon the plain language of § 3-108 and § 3-1201, the 
structure of art. III and the MUPC as whole, and the purposes 
underlying each, we conclude that it did. 
 
We begin, as we must, with the plain language of the 
statute.  See Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019).  While the MUPC contains 
a "definitions" section, defining many of its terms, it does not 
define the term "appointment."  See G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201.  
 
 
7 Section 3-1201 governs estates "consisting entirely of 
personal property the total value of which may include a motor 
vehicle of which the decedent was the owner, and other personal 
property not exceeding $25,000 in value."  This section raised 
the prior limit of $15,000 to $25,000.  See Massachusetts 
comment to G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201. 
7 
 
"When a statute does not define its words we give them their 
usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are 
consistent with the statutory purpose. . . .  We derive the 
words' usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known 
to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal 
contexts and dictionary definitions."  Williams v. Board of 
Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 693-694 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Morasse, 446 Mass. 113, 116 (2006).  Where a 
statute contains specific definitions, but does not define the 
word at issue, "[i]t is particularly appropriate . . . to 
interpret the word according to its common usage."  Commonwealth 
v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 778 n.6 (2013).  The term 
"appointment" is commonly understood to mean "[t]he choice or 
designation of a person . . . for a job or a duty."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 124 (11th ed. 2019). 
 
Defined as such, the language of § 3-1201 reflects that the 
position of voluntary personal representative constitutes an 
appointment.  Section 3-1201 designates a person who follows the 
procedures therein as the voluntary personal representative, 
with the duty of administering the decedent's small estate.  To 
obtain such a designation, an interested person must file a 
statement of voluntary administration, "verified by oath, or 
affirmation," containing, inter alia, the person's relationship 
to the decedent, a schedule of the estate's assets and their 
8 
 
estimated value, and "a statement that the petitioner has 
undertaken to act as voluntary personal representative of the 
estate of the deceased and will administer the same according to 
law."  G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201.  Upon proper payment of a fee, 
the register issues an attested copy of the statement and may 
also "issue a certificate of appointment to such voluntary 
personal representative."  Id. 
 
Thereafter, the voluntary personal representative has 
authority to receive payments of any debts or delivery of 
chattel or assets scheduled in the statement, sell any chattel 
so received, pay necessary funeral expenses and necessary 
expenses of administration, and "pay the debts of the deceased 
. . . and any other debts of the estate, and then distribute the 
balance, if any," in accordance with the principles governing 
intestate succession.  Id.  In other words, the voluntary 
personal representative has virtually full authority to 
administer the decedent's small estate.  And any "person paying, 
delivering, transferring, or issuing personal property or the 
evidence thereof pursuant to [§] 3-1201 is discharged and 
released to the same extent as if he dealt with a personal 
representative of the decedent."  G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1202.  
Furthermore, the voluntary personal representative is liable for 
administering the estate in the same manner as a personal 
9 
 
representative appointed by the court or a magistrate.  G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-1201. 
 
It is significant to our conclusion that § 3-108's 
exception to the three-year time limit for "appointment 
proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been a 
prior appointment" does not limit the type of prior appointment 
that qualifies.  Specifically, the exception does not say that 
the prior appointment must be as a personal representative.  See 
Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 712 
(2018) ("ordinarily we will not add language to a statute where 
the Legislature itself has not done so").  Voluntary personal 
representatives under § 3-1201 and personal representatives 
under §§ 3-301 and 3-402,8 while alike in name and in some 
functions, are different positions under the MUPC,9 and each 
 
 
8 The appointment of a personal representative in formal 
probate proceedings is governed by G. L. c. 190B, § 3-402, while 
the appointment of a personal representative in informal probate 
proceedings is governed by G. L. c. 190B, § 3-301. 
 
 
9 Unlike estates administered by voluntary personal 
representatives under § 3-1201, there is no monetary cap for 
estates administered by personal representatives under § 3-301 
or § 3-402.  Some examples of tasks that a personal 
representative may undertake when administering an estate that a 
voluntary personal representative may not include the ability to 
transfer or improve real property, vote or sell stocks, and 
continue an unincorporated business or incorporate a business of 
the decedent.  Compare G. L. c. 190B, § 3-715, with G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-1201.  Additionally, as stated in note 1, supra, we 
interpreted the predecessor statute to § 3-1201 as barring a 
voluntary personal representative from bringing or settling a 
10 
 
achieves its position by different means.  While a personal 
representative must be appointed by a court or a magistrate, see 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-103, a voluntary personal representative need 
not be under § 3-1201.10  Nevertheless, § 3-1201 allows a 
voluntary personal representative to receive a certificate of 
appointment by following the procedures therein.  We do not 
consider this language in the statute mere surplusage.  See 
Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412 (2009) ("A 
statute should be construed so as to give effect to each word, 
and no word shall be regarded as surplusage"). 
 
wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate.  See Marco, 415 
Mass. at 739. 
 
 
10 Section 3-103 of G. L. c. 190B, titled "Necessity of 
Appointment for Administration," provides that "to acquire the 
powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of a personal 
representative of a decedent, a person shall be appointed by 
order of the court or a magistrate, qualify and be issued 
letters.  Administration of an estate is commenced by the 
issuance of letters."  G. L. c. 190B, § 3-103.  To read § 3-103 
consistently with § 3-1201, which permits a voluntary personal 
representative to administer a small estate, § 3-103 must be 
interpreted as governing the appointment of a personal 
representative for the administration of estates in formal and 
informal proceedings, while § 3-1201 governs the appointment of 
voluntary personal representatives for the administration of 
small estates.  See Lockwood v. Adamson, 409 Mass. 325, 334 
(1991) ("we construe statutory language [where possible] to be 
consistent with adjacent sections of the same statute").  This 
interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the letters issued 
to a personal representative to commence administration of an 
estate under § 3-103 serve the same purpose as a certificate of 
appointment issued to a voluntary personal representative under 
§ 3-1201.  See Massachusetts comment to G. L. c. 190B, § 3-103. 
11 
 
 
In denying the petitioner's petition for appointment as 
personal representative, the judge relied on a procedural guide 
published by the administrative office of the Probate and Family 
Court, which provides that "the authority of a [voluntary 
personal representative] is limited by law and does not result 
in an official appointment by the court."  See E.M. Moriarty, 
R.A. Nesi, L.A. Roberts, T.P. Jalkut, C.G. Mehne, & E.J. Patsos, 
MUPC Estate Administration Procedural Guide § 2.2 (2d ed. 2016).  
A "Practice Alert" in the guide states:  "Despite the fact that 
the MUPC currently says otherwise, there can be no [c]ertificate 
of [a]ppointment issued to [a voluntary personal representative] 
because no official appointment is made."  Id. at § 2.4.  As the 
practice alert in the guide recognizes, this interpretation 
conflicts with the plain language of § 3-1201.  As explained, 
the MUPC does not limit the term "appointment" to what the guide 
refers to as "official appointments" performed by a court or 
magistrate. 
 
Where the term "appointment," under its common usage, 
encompasses voluntary personal representatives, the language of 
§ 3-108 does not limit the term "appointment" to those 
appointments performed by a court or magistrate, and the plain 
language of § 3-1201 refers to the position of voluntary 
personal representative as an appointment, our principles of 
statutory interpretation lead us to conclude that the 
12 
 
Legislature intended a person serving as voluntary personal 
representative of an estate under § 3-1201 to fall within scope 
of a "prior appointment" such that subsequent appointment 
proceedings relating to that estate may be filed outside the 
three-year time limit. 
 
This interpretation, moreover, is consistent with the 
purpose of the ultimate time limit.  Section 3-108 is intended 
to "establish[] a basic limitation period of three years within 
which it may be determined whether a decedent left a will and to 
commence administration of the estate."  See Massachusetts Bar 
Association and Boston Bar Association Joint Committee on the 
Uniform Probate Code, MUPC § 3-108 comment (July 2012), quoting 
Uniform Probate Code § 3-108 comment (1969), 
https://www.mass.gov/doc/article-iii-probate-of-wills-and-
administrations/download [https://perma.cc/L5PD-XF96].  Where a 
voluntary administration statement has been filed and certified, 
and a person is serving as voluntary personal representative of 
the estate, the determination whether a will exists has been 
made, and administration of the estate has commenced.  Thus, 
allowing appointment proceedings to commence more than three 
years after the decedent's death in such circumstances would not 
extend the time for the two inquiries that the section intends 
to limit to three years. 
13 
 
 
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with a key 
attribute of art. III of the MUPC:  flexibility.  Indeed, 
article III was designed for flexibility "to provide persons 
interested in decedents' estates with as little or as much by 
way of procedural and adjudicative safeguards as may be suitable 
under varying circumstances."  Uniform Probate Code, art. III, 
general comment (2006).  Article III's goal of flexibility is 
furthered where the procedural safeguard of the ultimate time 
limit -- the purpose of which has already been served -- yields 
to allow a person serving as voluntary personal representative 
under § 3-1201 to increase his or her authority to that of a 
personal representative under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-402, beyond 
three years. 
 
More generally, the MUPC directs that its provisions "shall 
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes and policies," including "to promote a speedy and 
efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and 
making distribution to the decedent's successors."  G. L. 
c. 190B, § 1-102 (a), (b) (3).  By integrating § 3-1201 into the 
MUPC, the Legislature demonstrated a priority that small estates 
be administered expeditiously, without the more arduous 
requirements of appointment in formal and informal probate 
proceedings.  To treat a person designated as a voluntary 
personal representative under § 3-1201 differently from how a 
14 
 
person designated as a personal representative under § 3-301 or 
§ 3-402 is treated for the purpose of determining whether a 
subsequent appointment proceeding may be filed outside the 
three-year time limit, where the underlying purpose of the time 
limit would not be undermined, would disincentivize the use of 
voluntary administration for small estates.  Such an 
interpretation would be contrary to the Legislature's intent in 
enacting this provision and would thwart the goal of flexible 
and efficient administration, particularly for small estates. 
 
Conclusion.  Because we conclude that the position of 
voluntary personal representative under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201, 
is an appointment, falling within the exception to the three-
year time limit in § 3-108 for "appointment proceedings relating 
to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment," the 
petitioner's petition for formal appointment was timely.  We 
therefore reverse the judgment dismissing her petition and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.