Title: Crittenden v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12503
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12503 
 
JOHN CRITTENDEN  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
January 28, 2019. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Civil, Sex offender. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, John Crittenden, filed a paper in the 
county court titled "Respondent's Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal and Stay of Proceedings."  A single justice of this court 
treated it as a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and 
denied relief without a hearing.1  We affirm. 
 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court 
seeking civil commitment of Crittenden as a sexually dangerous 
person pursuant to G. L. c. 123A.  He was temporarily committed 
to the Massachusetts Treatment Center, and a probable cause 
hearing was scheduled.  Meanwhile, Crittenden was evaluated and 
a report was prepared pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a).2  
                     
 
1 There was no error in treating the petition as arising 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  While the petitioner cited Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), as the 
basis for his petition, the rule does not apply to proceedings 
involving G. L. c. 123A.  "[A] G. L. c. 123A proceeding is 
neither criminal nor penal in nature, but is a civil 
proceeding."  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 374 
(2008).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630 
(2018).  See also Sheridan, petitioner, 422 Mass. 776, 780-781 
(1996).   
 
 
2 General Laws c. 123, § 18 (a), provides that 
 
2 
 
 
 
Before the hearing, an assistant district attorney provided a 
copy of the § 18 (a) report to Crittenden's counsel.  Asserting 
that the district attorney was not properly in possession of the 
§ 18 (a) report, Crittenden moved, among other things, for an 
order preventing future dissemination of the report by the 
district attorney for purposes of the G. L. c. 123A proceeding, 
or for any other purpose.  The judge denied the motion.   
 
 
Crittenden filed a petition in the county court seeking 
review of that interlocutory order.  He argues that records of 
evaluations under G. L. c. 123, § 18, are protected from 
disclosure to third parties except by court order, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 36 and 36A.  He also argues that dissemination 
of the § 18 (a) report, including material that he contends are 
privileged, will result in irremediable violation of his rights.  
The single justice denied relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
and Crittenden appeals. 
 
 
 The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a petitioner to 
"set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision 
cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse 
judgment in the trial court or by other available means."  
S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  Crittenden failed to meet that burden.  
The single justice properly declined to exercise the court's 
extraordinary power of superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
in light of an adequate alternative remedy, namely, a petition 
for relief in the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first 
par.3  See Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 
                     
"[i]f the person in charge of any place of detention within 
the commonwealth has reason to believe that a person 
confined therein is in need of hospitalization by reason of 
mental illness . . . , he shall cause such prisoner to be 
examined at such place of detention by a physician or 
psychologist . . . .  After completion of such examination 
and observation, a written report shall be sent to [the] 
court and to the person in charge of the place of 
detention."  
    
 
3 The court has "recognized, in sexually dangerous person 
proceedings, that an individual may seek interlocutory relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of a motion to 
dismiss a petition on the basis that the Commonwealth failed to 
timely petition for trial."  Flood v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 
1015, 1016 (2013), citing Gangi v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 158 
(2012).  We have done so in that very limited circumstance 
3 
 
 
 
(1996).  See also Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 188 
(2018) (noting proceedings before single justice of Appeals 
Court concerning interlocutory rulings in G. L. c. 123A case); 
Commonwealth v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 579 (2007) (noting use 
of G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., for review of interlocutory 
ruling in c. 123A proceeding); Sheridan, petitioner, 422 Mass. 
776, 777 (1996).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Rachel A. Scotch, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the petitioner. 
 
                     
because the "right at issue is a right not to be tried," Flood, 
supra, emphasizing the "expedited pace" established by G. L. 
c. 123A, § 13 (a).  See Gangi, supra at 160-161 & n.2.  We 
underscore, however, that G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not "an 
available avenue for all petitioners seeking relief from the 
denial, in the trial court, of a motion to dismiss a petition 
for civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person," Flood, 
supra at 1017 n.4, or from other types of interlocutory orders 
in a sexually dangerous person case where an adequate 
alternative remedy is available.  See Schumacher v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 1005, 1005-1006 (2017).