Title: Duncan v. Duncan
Citation: 417 So. 2d 908
Docket Number: 53294
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 1982

417 So. 2d 908 (1982) Clarence Grady DUNCAN v. Paula Leggett DUNCAN. No. 53294. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 21, 1982. *909 Michael Adelman, Andalman, Adelman &amp; Steiner, Hattiesburg, for appellant. Karl W. Kepper, Kepper &amp; Kepper, Hattiesburg, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and WALKER and DAN M. LEE, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of Forrest County wherein Paula Leggett Duncan, petitioner/appellee, filed her petition for citation for contempt and petition to modify a previous divorce decree against her former husband, Clarence Grady Duncan, respondent/appellant. Clarence Duncan failed to file an answer to the petition or make an appearance. Therefore, the chancellor granted the relief prayed for in Paula Duncan's petition and also ordered Clarence Duncan confined to jail until all child support arrearage due at the time of the final decree was paid unto Paula Duncan. The parties to this appeal were divorced on March 12, 1980, by a decree of the Chancery Court of Forrest County. Appellee was awarded custody of the parties' minor child with reasonable visitation rights granted to the appellant. The decree further provided that appellant pay unto appellee, through the chancery clerk's office, $150 per month as child support until the minor child reached twenty-one years of age, or married, or otherwise became emancipated. On February 26, 1981, appellee filed a petition for citation for contempt and petition to modify the previous divorce decree as to visitation rights only. Appellee, in her petition, alleged that appellant was $450 in arrears. Appellant was personally served with process but failed to answer appellee's petition. On May 14, 1981, the chancellor entered his decree adjudging appellant in contempt of court. Appellant was ordered confined to jail until he paid appellee $900 in delinquent child support payments as well as $200 in attorney's fees. Visitation rights were also modified somewhat. However, they are not at issue on appeal. I. Did the chancellor err in committing appellant to jail? Appellant contends the chancellor erred in confining him to jail because appellee failed to allege or offer proof to the effect that appellant was able to abide by the former decree of divorce. In Collins v. Collins, 171 Miss. 891, 158 So. 914 (1935), this Court stated: Where a party is unable to comply with a divorce decree, he should with reasonable promptitude, make the fact known to the court by proper petition and have the decree modified or suspended, and not wait until he has been cited for contempt. If a party fails to take this course of action, he will, in response to the citation for contempt, be required to make out a clear case of inability. Redding v. Redding, 167 Miss. 780, 150 So. 780 (1933). The burden was on appellant to purge himself of the contempt by showing that he had complied with the decree, was unable to do so, or impossibility *910 of performance. Rainwater v. Rainwater, 236 Miss. 412, 110 So. 2d 608 (1959). There is no merit in this argument. II. Did the chancellor err in ordering payment of delinquent child support in a sum greater than that alleged in appellee's petition? Appellee filed her petition on February 2, 1981, alleging an arrearage of child support payments of $450. The final decree in the cause was entered May 14, 1981, and adjudicated appellant in arrearage in the amount of $900. In Seymore v. Greater Mississippi Life Insurance Co., 362 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 1978), we stated: Appellee is bound by her pleadings. The chancellor had no authority to award appellee a greater amount than that prayed for in her petition. Had appellee desired a judgment for the amount of child support in arrearage which had occurred between the filing of her petition for contempt and the entry of the final judgment, an amendment to her petition would have sufficed. However, this was not done and the chancellor was therefore confined to the amount alleged in her petition. Because appellee prayed for only $450 in her petition and specific prayer for relief, the remaining $450 adjudicated by the decree to be owed by appellant for past-due child support payments is stricken therefrom as being outside the scope of the pleadings. However, this is not to say that appellee may not recover other monies due from appellant which become delinquent upon proper petition and showing to the court. *911 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG and WALKER, P. JJ., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. PRATHER, J., took no part.