Title: Ex Parte Kelley
Citation: 256 P.2d 211, 57 N.M. 161
Docket Number: 5551
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 1953

256 P.2d 211 (1953) 57 N.M. 161 Ex Parte KELLEY. No. 5551. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 11, 1953. Rehearing Denied May 5, 1953. Joe L. Martinez, Atty. Gen., Willard F. Kitts, Asst. Atty. Gen., N. Randolph Reese, Dist. Atty., Hobbs, for appellant. M.W. Hamilton, Santa Fe, for appellee. SADLER, Chief Justice. We are asked to determine whether an information charging rape on a female under the age of 16 years, contrary to Section 41-3901, New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated, which fails to give the name of the victim states an offense which will support a conviction. The offense charged was committed in Lea County, New Mexico, on December 20, 1949. Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term in the state penitentiary from 70 to 99 years. The information reads: The defendant was transported to the state penitentiary shortly after his plea of guilty and began serving his sentence. Thereafter and on February 20, 1952, he filed a petition in habeas corpus in the District Court of the First Judicial District sitting within and for the County of Santa Fe, that being the county in which he was imprisoned in the state penitentiary, under which he sought his release upon the primary ground that the information to which he pleaded guilty failed to state an offense. After hearing, the district court entered an order discharging the prisoner from which this appeal is prosecuted by the state under statutory authority. Incidentally, although it has no bearing on the decision of this appeal, new informations were filed in Lea County immediately after the order of discharge and the defendant was rearrested directly following his discharge. It should be stated since petitioner's counsel seeks to make some point of the matter in his argument that defendant was charged with raping three separate females under the age of 16 years on the same day. *212 Pertinent statutes to be considered will be set out prior to discussing the legal question involved. 1941 Comp., Sec. 41-3901, reads as follows: It is provided by 1941 Comp., Sec. 42-606, touching the form of information and by Sec. 42-607, as to charging an offense, as follows: A related statute having a bearing upon the question involved is 1941 Comp., Sec. 42-638(1)(d), which provides that no indictment or information shall be invalid or insufficient because of any uncertainty therein if it charges an offense in accordance with section 42-607. Furthermore, paragraph (3) of this section provides for a bill of particulars in the following language: Counsel for the state, the former Attorney General, Joe L. Martinez and his staff, and N. Randolph Reese, Esquire, former district attorney for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of New Mexico within and for the County of Lea, place main reliance in their claim of error on our earlier decisions in the cases of State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1, and State v. Shroyer, 49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 444. See, also, People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A.L.R. 1378. We think this case is controlled by the two New Mexico decisions cited next above, State v. Roy and State v. Shroyer, more especially the latter. Indeed, the Shroyer case is almost on all fours with the one now considered. There, an information charging larceny of two sheep failed to allege ownership of the stolen animals. An objection based on omission of this allegation was called to the attention of the trial judge who now is a member of this Court, Mr. Justice McGhee, whereupon he permitted an amendment by interlineation to specify the owner. But if the omission of such an allegation in the first instance was fatal, that is to say, if the information as it stood failed to charge an offense, it was not subject to amendment and several indispensable conditions to proceeding with the trial, such as waivers of preliminary hearing and of a jury, occurring prior to *213 amendment, could not now be relied upon since the information as amended constituted an entirely new charge. We held against the contentions made and pointed out that under the liberal provisions of the reformed Rules of Criminal Procedure, a crime was charged by the information as it stood prior to amendment, reserving to defendant the right, nevertheless, to demand by bill of particulars the omitted allegation as to ownership. So it is in the information here challenged. The name of the victim is not given, to be sure, but the offense of rape of a female under 16 years of age was charged almost in the language of the statute. It is called to our attention, however, that the defendant is charged in separate informations with raping two other females under 16 years of age on the same occasion upon invading in the nighttime the home they were occupying at a slumber party. He claims he could not know or tell which of the three he was to be charged with raping on a given setting for trial. The state answers he would have a very easy and ready means of finding out by a motion for bill of particulars. Our Reformed Rules of Criminal Procedure, approving among other things the short form of indictment, effective July 1, 1934, and providing among other things for a bill of particulars, contained this introductory "Interpretation by Court," as section 35-4400 (Supplement No. 2, page 1) reading: The case of State v. Williams, 213 La. 1105, 36 So. 2d 400, while not cited in the briefs of either party, might be deemed an authority against the conclusion we announce in its holding in first paragraph of the syllabi, reading: In its opinion in that case, the court had this to say touching the question now at issue, to wit: It is important to note, however, that Louisiana apparently adopted some sections of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure which were not adopted by us. So much is indicated by this language of Article 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that state. It reads: We do not think the permissive use of name of the victim in a suggested form of information charging rape in Art. 235 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure (our 1941 Comp., Sec. 42-641, Trial Court *214 Rule 35-4446, Code of Criminal Procedure) where no provision similar to the Art. 230 of the La. Code is found, compels a conclusion by us similar to that reached by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Williams, supra. We now reaffirm the language we employed in State v. Shroyer on the subject in hand, as follows [49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 448]: It follows from what has been said that the trial court erred in discharging the petitioner. The information was not fatally defective in failing to name the victim of the rape charged. The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded to the district court of Santa Fe County with directions to remand the prisoner to custody of the Superintendent of the State Penitentiary. It is so ordered. McGHEE, COMPTON, COORS and LUJAN, JJ., concur.