Title: Taylor v. Melton
Citation: 274 P.2d 977
Docket Number: 17228
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 1954

274 P.2d 977 (1954) Delford TAYLOR and Alameda M. Taylor, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Clarence F. MELTON, Cleo Melton, William W. Murphy, Louise Murphy, Goldie R. Prinster, and Doris A. Snyder, Defendants in Error. No. 17228. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. October 4, 1954. Rehearing Denied November 1, 1954. *978 Moynihan, Hughes &amp; Bjelland, Montrose, for plaintiffs in error. Adams, Heckman &amp; Traylor, Grand Junction, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. We will hereinafter refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, where plaintiffs in error were defendants and defendants in error were plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in their complaint alleged, in substance, that one Fairley, who was the owner of a parcel of land, platted and subdivided the same, and a map thereof was filed February 4, 1941, with the county clerk and recorder of Mesa county; that on the map said tract of land was divided into numerous lots and streets; that Fairley sold a portion of the tract to Howard J. Nesbitt and Mildred A. Nesbitt, the deed to which was dated March 20, 1941, and thereafter recorded; and that said deed contained the following restrictions: "That grantees agree that neither they nor their successors and assigns will construct a residence on the above-described land at a cost of less than $2500.00, and that they will not during *979 a period of 20 years from the date hereof keep or permit to be kept on said land any horses, cattle, sheep or goats or pigs. The grantor agrees that he will not build nor permit to be built upon any of the land now standing in his name in the NW ¼ NE ¼ NW ¼ of Sec. 26 Twp 1 S R1W Ute Meridian any structure other than a residence of a construction value of not less than $2500.00 and the incidental outbuildings after said residence of not less than $2500.00 has been built, provided, however, that this restriction does not apply to that portion of the NW ¼ NE ¼ NW ¼ of said Section 26 described as the W ½ SW ¼ NE ¼ NW ¼ of said Sec. 26. The above restriction is a covenant running with the land, and is binding upon the grantor herein, his successors and assigns forever." It further was alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs are owners of certain lots in said Fairley Addition and that defendants are the owners of Block 3 thereof; that plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, acquired their titles to said lots or parcels of land with notice and knowledge of the restrictions set forth in the deed to Howard J. Nesbitt and Mildred A. Nesbitt; that notwithstanding such restrictions, defendants in February, 1952, "planned and commenced, and unless restrained by the order of this court, intend to and will complete a structure to be utilized as a used car lot for the purchase and sale of used automobiles, in violation of said restrictions." Defendants denied that they had knowledge of any restrictions, and alleged that the deed conveying Block 3 to them contained none; admitted that they were engaged in the used car business on said Block 3; denied that such use of the premises was prohibited; and alleged that any restrictions claimed by plaintiffs were not binding on them. The findings and judgment of the trial court contained, inter alia, the following: "In the judgment of the Court, the restrictions contained in the Nesbitt deed were binding upon all of the property then owned by said Fairley with the exception of those parts of the general tract which were specifically excepted, and that the plain meaning of the restrictions was that no structures of any kind other than a dwelling to cost at least $2500.00 and the necessary outbuildings could be constructed thereon, that the word `Dwelling' was meant to be construed in its ordinary sense as a house occupied as a residence, and that such a restriction would be violated in the *980 building of a filling station and the use of the premises for the sale of used and second-hand cars. As grounds for reversal counsel for defendants contend that the only covenant, made by a grantee in any deed containing restrictions, was not to build a residence costing less than $2,500 and that this promise does not prevent a business use of the property. They further contend that when the grantor (Fairley) provided in the deed to the Nesbitts that he would not build nor permit to be built upon the land retained by him "any structure other than a residence," subsequent grantees who acquired property without restrictions contained in their deed of conveyance were not bound by Fairley's promise. It further is contended that the deed from Fairley to the Nesbitts did not create a restriction against a business use enforceable by these plaintiffs who held lots under deeds from Fairley which contained no specific restrictions. First: Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, does the record justify the conclusion of the trial court that the common grantor, Fairley, imposed the restriction in question in pursuance of a general plan for the development and improvement of all lots included within his plat? This question is answered in the affirmative. Of the property included by Fairley in his plat of Fairley's Addition, filed February 4, 1941, two lots were conveyed by him by deed which included the identical restrictions set forth in the deed to the Nesbitts, and twenty-seven lots were conveyed by him without mention of any restrictions. *981 The Nesbitt property and a tract conveyed to one Nash, were not included in the plat of Fairley's Addition because they were sold prior to the filing thereof. It is argued by counsel for defendants that the percentage of lots sold without restrictions in the several deeds is so large that it has the effect of destroying any general plan which Fairley might originally have intended for the development and improvement of the property. In the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781, 785, 168 A.L.R. 513, we find the following statement upon which defendants rely: "Just what percentage of the lots of a tract can be conveyed without restrictions in the deed without destroying a general building plan is not settled." In the instant case counsel for defendants argue that certainly a greater percentage of deeds with restrictions, than is present in the case at bar, is necessary in order to warrant the finding that a general building plan had been established; however, the opinion in Hayes v. Gibbs, supra, also contains the following pertinent statement: Suffice it to say that there was competent evidence, notwithstanding the small percentage of deeds containing restrictions, to warrant the finding of the trial court that a general building plan had been agreed upon. Where there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of fact made by a trial court, it will not be disturbed on review. As bearing upon the elements to be considered in determining whether the restrictive covenants involved in this case can be enforced between purchasers, we quote from Thompson on Real Property (permanent edition) volume 7, page 92, section 3607, as follows: Within the meaning of the tests hereinabove mentioned the covenants are enforceable by purchasers between themselves. Second: Are defendants, who purchased lots from Fairley subsequent to the latter's deed to the Nesbitts, bound by the covenant in that deed under which Fairley agreed that he would not "build or permit to be built" upon the lots now owned by *982 defendants, "any structure other than a residence of a construction value of not less than $2500.00"? This question is answered in the affirmative. The deed to the Nesbitts which contained the covenant of Fairley, the common grantor of all the parties, appeared in the abstract of title to the lots acquired by defendants. The trial court found that, in addition to the constructive notice arising from the recorded instrument, defendants had actual notice of the existence of the restriction. There was ample evidence to support this finding. It is argued by counsel for defendants that there was no "corresponding benefit" to the land sold to Nesbitts and that retained by Fairley, in that a business use was not prohibited on the property purchased whereas it was forbidden on the area retained by Fairley, and that the restrictive covenants are unenforceable for lack of mutuality. It further is contended on behalf of defendants that there is no privity of estate between plaintiffs and defendants, and that the Nesbitts are the only persons who can complain concerning the failure of Fairley to impose restrictions by deed upon the lots acquired by defendants. We find no merit in this contention. With reference to the point that only Nesbitts can assert a claim, we direct attention to the principle of law stated in volume 3, Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.) page 449, as follows: From Thompson on Real Property (permanent edition), volume 7, page 105, we quote the following statement of the applicable rule: Recco v. Chesapeake &amp; Ohio Railway Co., 127 W.Va. 321, 32 S.E.2d 449; Hayes v. Gibbs, supra. The argument of defendants' counsel on other points, namely: That the trial court committed error in basing its findings in part upon a personal inspection of the premises; and that plaintiffs had waived any right to enforce the restriction if any existed, has been considered and found to be without substantial merit. The judgment is affirmed. HOLLAND, J., dissents. STONE, C. J., and CLARK, J., not participating.