Title: Randol v. Roe Enterprises, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93-1058
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 1994

524 N.W.2d 414 (1994) Marjory L. RANDOL, Appellant, v. ROE ENTERPRISES, INC., a/k/a Roe Oil Company and Conoco Corner Mini-Mart, Appellees. No. 93-1058. Supreme Court of Iowa. November 23, 1994. *415 Robert M. Benton of Stuyvesant &amp; Benton, Carlisle, and Thomas P. Slater of Meyer &amp; Slater, Des Moines, for appellant. Kenneth R. Munro of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor &amp; Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ. LAVORATO, Justice. This slip and fall case comes to us on further review. The court of appeals affirmed a district court order granting summary judgment to the defendant Roe Enterprises, Inc., a/k/a Roe Oil Company, a/k/a Conoco Corner Mini-Mart (Roe) in Marjory L. Randol's comparative fault action. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that Marjory had generated no genuine issue of material fact on proximate cause. Because we conclude otherwise, we vacate the court of appeals' decision, reverse the district court order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On the evening of May 2, 1990, Marjory stopped at the Conoco station in Osceola for gas. While Marjory was pumping her gas, someone drove in behind her and waited for her to finish. Marjory then pulled her car ahead of the pumps and went into the station to pay for her gas. There was a drop-off between the paved and gravel portions of the parking lot. Marjory fell on her return to her car when she stepped from the paved portion to the gravel portion of the parking lot. In the fall, Marjory injured her shoulder. The injury required a total shoulder replacement. No one witnessed her fall. Later, Marjory filed a two-count petition against Roe. Count I alleged negligent failure to repair or make the drop-off safe and failure to warn of the drop-off. Count II alleged negligent failure to provide for the safety of inviteeslike Marjoryunlikely to realize the danger of the drop-off. After answering, Roe filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, after a hearing, in a calendar entry. Marjory then filed a motion to reconsider. The court overruled this motion, concluding that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that Marjory's fall was proximately caused by a drop-off. Marjory appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court order. We then granted Marjory's petition for further review. In Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393 N.W.2d 320, 321 (Iowa 1986), we summarized the principles governing the grant of a summary judgment motion: (Citation omitted.) Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is determined from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237. Marjory says that when she is afforded every legitimate inference reasonably deducible from the evidence, it is evident that she generated a genuine issue of material fact on proximate cause. After carefully reviewing the summary judgment record, we agree. In both counts of her petition, Marjory alleges the following: In an interrogatory Marjory was asked to "[p]lease describe in narrative fashion exactly how this accident occurred." Her response was: About a month later, in a deposition Marjory answered accident causation questions this way: The district court's original ruling on Roe's summary judgment motion was a calendar entry, stating "[d]efendant's motion for summary judgment is sustained. Petition is dismissed." In overruling Marjory's motion to reconsider, the district court expanded on its original ruling, explaining: We think the district court erroneously discounted the probative value of the circumstantial evidence in this case. In the past, we said this about circumstantial evidence: State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 205 (Iowa 1979) (en banc) (citations omitted). Affording Marjory every legitimate inference reasonably deducible from the evidence, a reasonable mind could conclude that the drop-off caused her fall. The mechanics of her fallhead over heelsare consistent with the conclusion that she fell as a result of stepping off a paved surface onto a lower graveled surface. Marjory's testimony as to where she was when she fell, the nature of the terrain where she fell, and how she fell generate a genuine issue of material fact on proximate cause. "Proximate cause is ordinarily a question for the jury," and "it is only in rare cases that a party establishes proximate cause as a matter of law." Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 324 (Iowa 1992). Because Marjory generated a genuine issue of material fact on whether the drop-off proximately caused her fall, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Roe. We vacate the court of appeals decision which affirmed the district court order granting the summary judgment motion. We reverse the district court order granting the summary judgment motion. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT ORDER REVERSED; REMANDED.