Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Frederick P. Kessler
Citation: 2010 WI 120
Docket Number: 2008AP000834-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 2010

2010 WI 120 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP834-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Frederick P. Kessler, Attorney at Law:   
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation 
     Complainant-Appellant,   
 
v. 
Frederick P. Kessler,   
     Respondent-Respondent.   
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KESSLER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 14, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
February 8, 2010   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart and Lee, Kilkelly, Paulson & Younger, S.C., 
Madison. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Jeremy 
P. Levinson and Matthew W. O’Neill, and Friebert, Finerty & St. 
John, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
2010 WI 120 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP834-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Frederick P. Kessler, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
 
Frederick P. Kessler, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
   
FILED 
 
OCT 14, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.   Proceeding dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
has appealed from a referee's report and recommendation finding 
that the OLR failed to satisfy its burden of proof that Attorney 
Frederick P. Kessler violated SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).1   
¶2 
OLR's appeal raises three issues:   
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c) state it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to:  "(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to 
do so, or do so through the acts of another;" and "(c) engage in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
2 
 
• Does SCR 20:8.4(c) require that an attorney's 
untrue or deceptive statement be used to defraud 
another in order to be actionable? 
• Was 
Attorney 
Kessler's 
deceptive 
statement 
privileged under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution? 
• If a violation is found, what is the appropriate 
discipline? 
¶3 
This court will affirm a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  We 
adopt the referee's findings of fact.  Although we disagree with 
the referee's conclusion of law that in order to constitute 
misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(c) a deceptive statement must be 
used to defraud another, we nevertheless agree with the referee 
that the OLR failed to satisfy its burden of proof that Attorney 
Kessler violated the rule.  Consequently, we dismiss the 
proceeding.2 
¶4 
Attorney Kessler was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1966 and practices in Milwaukee.  He is also 
currently a member of the Wisconsin legislature.  He was first 
elected to public office in 1960 and has participated in 
                                                 
2 In most cases the dismissal of a proceeding occurs by 
unpublished order.  Because the conduct at issue here occurred 
in 
the course of 
a judicial campaign conducted by the 
respondent's spouse, Joan F. Kessler, and because Ms. Kessler is 
now a sitting judge, we deem it appropriate to issue our 
decision in the form of a published per curiam decision in order 
to provide a full explanation for the decision we reach. 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
3 
 
campaigns for the Wisconsin State Assembly, the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, and the United States House of Representatives.   
¶5 
In the spring 2004 election for District I Court of 
Appeals, Judge Charles Schudson was the incumbent seeking re-
election.  Attorney Kessler's wife, Joan Kessler, who was then 
in private practice with the Milwaukee law firm of Foley & 
Lardner, declared her candidacy for the position and ran against 
Judge Schudson.   
¶6 
On July 1, 2002, Judge Schudson wrote a letter (the 
Schudson letter) to Judge Charles Clevert, Jr., district judge 
for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, in relation to the sentencing of Attorney Charles 
Hausmann for a criminal conviction.  Judge Schudson's letter was 
unsolicited and recommended leniency in sentencing.   
¶7 
Attorney Kessler became aware of the Schudson letter 
and believed it might constitute a violation of SCR 60.03(2).3  
He asked Joan Kessler to obtain a copy of the letter because he 
thought it would provide Joan Kessler an advantage in the 
campaign if Judge Schudson were disciplined.  Joan Kessler 
obtained a copy of the Schudson letter and other information 
                                                 
3 SCR 60.03(2) reads:  
A judge may not allow family, social, political 
or other 
relationships to influence the judge's 
judicial conduct or judgment.  A judge may not lend 
the prestige of judicial office to advance the private 
interests of the judge or of others or convey or 
permit others to convey the impression that they are 
in a special position to influence the judge.  A judge 
may not testify voluntarily as a character witness. 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
4 
 
about Hausmann's case through a colleague in Foley & Lardner's 
Chicago office, who used the firm's PACER account to obtain at 
least some of the information.  The PACER system is a federal 
internet-based service that allows individuals or law firms to 
access documents and other information from federal judicial 
case files. 
¶8 
On October 25, 2003, Attorney Kessler spoke to Mary 
Moser, the widow of former District I Court of Appeals Judge 
William 
Moser, 
at 
a 
memorial 
service 
for 
Judge 
Moser.  
Mrs. Moser was a supporter of Joan Kessler's candidacy and had 
previously 
on 
her 
own 
initiative 
telephoned 
the 
Kessler 
residence to indicate her support and to offer assistance to 
Joan Kessler's campaign.  While at the memorial service, 
Attorney Kessler invited Mrs. Moser to lunch.   
¶9 
On October 27, 2003, Attorney Kessler telephoned 
Mrs. Moser to schedule a luncheon meeting for the purpose of 
asking her if she would be willing to file a complaint against 
Judge Schudson with the Wisconsin Judicial Commission based on 
the letter Judge Schudson wrote on Attorney Hausmann's behalf.  
Mrs. Moser agreed to meet Attorney Kessler for lunch.  On 
October 28, 2003, Attorney Kessler met with Mrs. Moser at a 
Milwaukee restaurant.  He gave her copies of the Schudson letter 
and the docket sheet from the Hausmann case, which indicated 
that the letter was a public document, along with a copy of 
portions of the judicial code.  He also provided her with a 
draft of a letter complaint to the Judicial Commission.  
Attorney Kessler told Mrs. Moser that he believed Judge Schudson 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
5 
 
had violated the judicial code by writing the letter on 
Hausmann's behalf, and he asked if she would be willing to file 
a complaint with the Judicial Commission against Judge Schudson. 
¶10 In soliciting Mrs. Moser to file a complaint, Attorney 
Kessler sought to remain anonymous.  At the lunch meeting, 
Mrs. Moser asked Attorney Kessler how she could explain how she 
learned about the Schudson letter if she were asked.  According 
to a statement Mrs. Moser made to a special investigator, 
Attorney Kessler said she could just tell people she had heard 
it at a cocktail party and that it didn't matter because the 
letter was a public record.4   
¶11 Mrs. Moser initially told Attorney Kessler that she 
wanted to think about filing the complaint.  After discussing it 
with her family and a friend who had served on the Judicial 
Commission, she told Attorney Kessler she would file the 
complaint.  She edited the draft letter that Attorney Kessler 
had provided her and filed a complaint against Judge Schudson 
with the Judicial Commission, attaching copies of the Schudson 
letter and the PACER document.   
                                                 
4 Mrs. Moser did not testify at the hearing before the 
referee so her statement to the special investigator is the only 
evidence in the record of how Attorney Kessler responded to her 
question about how she should respond if someone asked how she 
had learned about the letter.  The "cocktail party" reference 
was made in response to a leading question posed by the special 
investigator.  Attorney Kessler says he has no specific 
recollection of making the "cocktail party" comment but he also 
said he had no reason to believe that Mrs. Moser would testify 
falsely. 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
6 
 
¶12 The Judicial Commission notified Judge Schudson of the 
complaint on January 23, 2004.  On January 26, 2004, Judge 
Schudson responded, acknowledged that the letter had violated 
SCR 60.03(2), and apologized.   
¶13 On March 8, 2004, a column in the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel reported on the Schudson letter and the complaint that 
had been filed with the Judicial Commission.  Because Judge 
Schudson had not waived his right to confidentiality in writing 
to the Judicial Commission, the filing of the complaint and his 
response were supposed to be confidential under Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.93 (2003-04).5   
                                                 
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 757.93 
(2003-04) 
provided:  
Confidentiality of proceedings.  
(1)(a) All proceedings under ss. 757.81 to 757.99 
relating to misconduct or permanent disability prior 
to the filing of a petition or formal complaint by the 
commission are confidential unless a judge or circuit 
or supplemental court commissioner waives the right to 
confidentiality in writing to the commission. Any such 
waiver does not affect the confidentiality of the 
identity of a person providing information under par. 
(b).  
(b) Any person who provides information to the 
commission concerning possible misconduct or permanent 
disability 
may 
request 
that 
the 
commission 
not 
disclose his or her identity to the judge or circuit 
or supplemental court commissioner prior to the filing 
of a petition or a formal complaint by the commission.  
(2) If prior to the filing of a formal complaint 
or a petition an investigation of possible misconduct 
or permanent disability becomes known to the public, 
the commission may issue statements in order to 
confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify 
the 
procedural 
aspects 
of 
the 
disciplinary 
proceedings, to explain the right of the judge or 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
7 
 
¶14 The election for the District I Court of Appeals seat 
occurred on April 6, 2004.  In the final weeks before the 
election, Joan Kessler's campaign ran radio and television ads 
referring to the complaint filed with the Judicial Commission 
against Judge Schudson.  The ads stated the Judicial Commission 
was investigating whether Judge Schudson had violated the 
                                                                                                                                                             
circuit or supplemental court commissioner to a fair 
hearing without prejudgment, to state that the judge 
or circuit or supplemental court commissioner denies 
the allegations, to state that an investigation has 
been completed and no probable cause was found or to 
correct public misinformation.  
(3) The petition or formal complaint filed under 
s. 757.85 by the commission and all subsequent 
hearings thereon are public.  
(4) This 
section 
does 
not 
preclude 
the 
commission, in its sole discretion, from:  
(a) Referring to the director of state courts 
information relating to an alleged delay or an alleged 
temporary 
disability 
of 
a 
judge 
or 
circuit 
or 
supplemental court commissioner.  
(b) Referring to an appropriate law enforcement 
authority information relating to possible criminal 
conduct 
or 
otherwise 
cooperating 
with 
a 
law 
enforcement authority in matters of mutual interest.  
(c) Referring to an attorney disciplinary agency 
information relating to the possible misconduct or 
incapacity of an attorney or otherwise cooperating 
with an attorney disciplinary agency in matters of 
mutual interest.  
(d) Disclosing to the chief justice or director 
of state 
courts information relating to matters 
affecting the administration of the courts.  
(e) Issuing an annual report under s. 757.97. 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
8 
 
judicial code by "using his influence to try and help a 
convicted felon."  Joan Kessler prevailed in the election.   
¶15 The complaint against Judge Schudson was resolved on 
June 26, 2004, by the Judicial Commission issuing a letter 
notifying him that the complaint was dismissed "with an 
expression of warning." 
¶16 After the election Mrs. Moser was contacted by the 
special investigator retained to investigate a grievance that 
Judge Schudson had filed against Joan Kessler.6  Mrs. Moser 
contacted Attorney Kessler about the contact from the special 
investigator and Attorney Kessler told her to tell the truth. 
¶17 On April 4, 2008, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Kessler alleging two counts of misconduct.  The first 
count alleged that by inducing and assisting Mrs. Moser to file 
the complaint with the Judicial Commission for the purpose of 
concealing that he and/or the Joan Kessler campaign was the true 
source 
of 
the 
information 
and 
impetus 
for 
the 
Judicial 
Commission complaint, and by advising Mrs. Moser that if asked 
                                                 
6 An attorney disciplinary complaint was later filed against 
Joan Kessler by the Lawyer Regulation System.  The complaint 
alleged 
that 
Joan 
Kessler 
had 
falsely 
told 
a 
special 
investigator that to her knowledge neither she nor anyone in her 
campaign nor anyone she knew had any part in filing the 
complaint against Judge Schudson with the Judicial Commission.  
The complaint also alleged that Joan Kessler had falsely told a 
special investigator that she did not know who had leaked 
information about the complaint against Judge Schudson to the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.  The disciplinary proceeding against 
Joan Kessler is being resolved in a separate opinion issued 
today.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kessler, 2010 WI 
121 (Case No. 2009AP1529-D). 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
9 
 
she should falsely state she learned about the matter at a 
cocktail party, Attorney Kessler violated SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).   
¶18 Count Two of the complaint alleged an additional 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).  This count arose out of an 
e-mail invitation to a fundraiser sent by the Joan Kessler 
campaign.  The Joan Kessler campaign Website showed a copy of a 
solicitation letter containing only Joan Kessler's signature 
block.  Four people calling themselves "Friends of Judge 
Schudson" sent a letter to Joan Kessler saying that her campaign 
Website had included her personal solicitation of financial 
contributions, contrary to SCR 60.06(4).7  In response, Attorney 
Kessler drafted an affidavit for the signature of Joan Kessler's 
                                                 
7 SCR 
60.06(4) 
reads 
as 
follows: 
 
Solicitation 
and 
Acceptance of Campaign Contributions. 
A judge, candidate for judicial office, or judge-
elect shall not personally solicit or accept campaign 
contributions. A candidate may, however, establish a 
committee 
to 
solicit and accept lawful campaign 
contributions. The committee is not prohibited from 
soliciting and accepting lawful campaign contributions 
from lawyers, other individuals or entities even 
though the contributor may be involved in a proceeding 
in which the judge, candidate for judicial office, or 
judge-elect is likely to participate. A judge or 
candidate for judicial office or judge-elect may serve 
on the committee but should avoid direct involvement 
with the committee's fundraising efforts. A judge or 
candidate for judicial office or judge-elect may 
appear at his or her own fundraising events. When the 
committee solicits or accepts a contribution, a judge, 
candidate for judicial office, or judge-elect should 
also be mindful of the requirements of SCR 60.03 and 
60.04(4); provided, however, that the receipt of a 
lawful campaign contribution shall not, by itself, 
warrant judicial recusal. 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
10 
 
Website developer saying that the claim was untrue.  The 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported the Joan Kessler campaign 
alleged that Judge Schudson's campaign had tampered with the 
Kessler campaign Website to make it look as though Joan Kessler 
had 
violated 
an 
ethics 
rule. 
 
The 
parties 
subsequently 
stipulated that Count Two of the complaint be dismissed.  
¶19 Jonathan V. Goodman was appointed referee in the 
matter.  A hearing was held before the referee on August 19, 
2009.  The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
September 16, 2009.  The referee concluded that Attorney 
Kessler's directive to Mrs. Moser that, upon inquiry, she say 
that she heard about Judge Schudson's misconduct at a cocktail 
party was not dishonest, fraudulent, or a misrepresentation.  
The referee concluded that the directive was deceptive in that 
it was not true.  However, the referee adopted the definition of 
"deceit" as contained in Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, as cited in State v. Dalton, 98 Wis. 2d 725, 298 
N.W.2d 398, (Ct. App. 1980):  "[T]he act or practice of 
deceiving 
(as 
by 
falsification, 
concealing 
or 
cheating) . . . any 
trick, 
collusion, 
contrivance, 
false 
representation, or underhand practice used to defraud another." 
(Emphasis supplied by referee.)  Id. at 739. 
¶20 The referee concluded since there was no evidence that 
Attorney Kessler's directive to Mrs. Moser was actually used to 
defraud another, the OLR failed to prove the allegations in 
Count 
One 
of 
the 
complaint 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
11 
 
convincing evidence.  Accordingly, the referee recommended that 
Count One of the complaint be dismissed. 
¶21 The OLR has appealed, arguing that Attorney Kessler 
did violate SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c) when he advised Mrs. Moser to 
lie in order to conceal his role in supplying her information 
and in drafting the complaint for her to file with the Judicial 
Commission.  The OLR is not challenging the referee's findings 
of 
fact, 
but 
rather 
is 
challenging 
the 
referee's 
legal 
conclusion that Attorney Kessler's statement to Mrs. Moser did 
not constitute a violation of SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c).  The OLR 
asserts that the referee's legal conclusion is predicated on an 
erroneous understanding of the law.  
¶22 The 
OLR 
argues 
that 
the 
referee 
erred 
by 
deconstructing the verbiage of SCR 20:8.4(c), and in doing so, 
adding another element to the rule, i.e., that a deceitful 
statement must be acted upon, in this case by a third person.  
The OLR argues that neither the language of the rule, nor cases 
construing it, suggest that an attorney's deceptive statement 
must be used to defraud another in order to be actionable under 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  The OLR asks this court to reverse the referee's 
legal conclusion that Attorney Kessler did not violate the rule 
by telling Mrs. Moser to lie in order to conceal his involvement 
in filing the complaint against Judge Schudson. 
¶23 Attorney 
Kessler 
asserts 
the 
referee 
correctly 
recommended dismissal of Count One of the OLR's complaint based 
on the absence of evidence that he engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation within the 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
12 
 
meaning of SCR 20:8.4(c).  Attorney Kessler says although 
SCR 20:8.4(c) is a kind of catch-all rule that extends beyond 
conduct constituting the practice of law, it does not reach 
every utterance made in every sphere of an attorney's life.  He 
says the referee was correct in concluding that although 
characterizing the lunch with Mrs. Moser as a "cocktail party" 
was not true, the OLR proved no violation of the rule.  Attorney 
Kessler says the "cocktail party" comment was nothing more than 
a suggestion as to how Mrs. Moser might deflect a casual 
question about the source of her knowledge.  He says similar to 
attributing information to "a little birdie" or "the grapevine," 
the "cocktail party" comment is an example of how people 
innocently deflect questions they would rather avoid in a manner 
that is less awkward than a flat refusal to answer. 
¶24 Attorney Kessler also argues that the First Amendment 
protected his anonymous participation in a meritorious complaint 
about Judge Schudson, a public official.  Attorney Kessler 
argues the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
criticism of judges and other public officials is entitled to 
the highest level of protection.  See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, 
Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).  He notes the Supreme Court has also held 
that the intent to conceal identity in the exercise of political 
speech is protected.  He argues anonymity has long been 
recognized as an important aspect of encouraging criticism of 
officials and candidates.   
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
13 
 
¶25 The OLR responds that the First Amendment does not 
shield false statements, and if Attorney Kessler's statement to 
Mrs. Moser is properly construed as a suggestion to lie, then it 
is not protected by the First Amendment. 
¶26 The referee's findings of fact have not been shown to 
be clearly erroneous, and we therefore adopt them.  Although we 
disagree with the referee's legal conclusion that in order to 
constitute misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(c) a deceptive statement 
must be used to defraud another, we nevertheless agree with the 
referee's ultimate conclusion that the OLR failed to meet its 
burden of proving that Attorney Kessler's comment to Mrs. Moser 
violated the rule.   
¶27 We find no support for the referee's conclusion that a 
deceitful statement must actually defraud someone before it will 
be found to violate SCR 20:8.4(c).  State v. Dalton, the court 
of appeals decision cited by the referee in support of this 
proposition, is not on point.  Dalton was convicted of first-
degree murder, kidnapping by deceit, and first-degree sexual 
assault.  One of the issues raised on appeal was whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for kidnapping 
by deceit.  Evidence presented at Dalton's trial showed that he 
represented he would transport his victim to the unemployment 
compensation office.  While Dalton did not challenge the other 
elements 
of 
the 
kidnapping 
charge, 
he 
argued 
there 
was 
insufficient evidence to show the kidnapping was carried out 
with deceit since there was no proof that he made express or 
implied representations to the victim.  The court of appeals 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
14 
 
rejected this argument, saying that deceit necessarily implies 
that the victim be unaware that he or she is being kidnapped.   
¶28 The court of appeals said, "Limiting proof of deceit 
to 
express 
or 
implied 
misrepresentations 
would 
offer 
no 
protection to the victim who was artfully deceived by a person 
who 
lured 
and 
trapped 
his 
victim 
without 
resort 
to 
misrepresentation."  Dalton, 98 Wis. 2d at 740.  Because the 
Dalton court was defining "deceit" in the context of a criminal 
statute, that case is inapposite here.  There is no language in 
SCR 20:8.4(c) or in prior attorney regulatory cases that would 
engraft onto the rule a requirement that a deceitful statement 
must be actually used to defraud someone before a rule violation 
may be found.   
¶29 Although we disagree with the referee's interpretation 
of the rule, we nonetheless agree with the referee that Attorney 
Kessler's 
"cocktail 
party" 
comment 
did 
not 
constitute 
a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).8  Attorney Kessler's statement to 
Mrs. Moser did not itself contain a misrepresentation.  For 
example, Attorney Kessler did not tell Mrs. Moser that he had 
                                                 
8 We note that the OLR has not alleged that any of Attorney 
Kessler's 
other 
statements 
to 
Mrs. 
Moser 
were 
misrepresentations.  For example, there is no claim that 
Attorney Kessler misrepresented to Mrs. Moser what Judge 
Schudson had done or what the applicable provision of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct required.  Likewise, the OLR has not 
contended that Attorney Kessler violated any ethical rule by 
soliciting Mrs. Moser to file the complaint rather than filing 
it himself.  We do not find it laudatory that Attorney Kessler 
attempted to hide behind a third person for political reasons, 
but there is no claim of an ethical violation in that regard 
presented to us here. 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
15 
 
learned of the Schudson letter at a cocktail party or that Judge 
Schudson had telephoned Judge Clevert as well as wrote a letter.   
¶30 What 
Attorney 
Kessler 
did 
was 
to 
suggest 
that 
Mrs. Moser make a misrepresentation in the future if confronted 
with a particular situation.  There is no evidence in the 
record, however, that (1) Mrs. Moser was ever confronted with 
the question of how she learned of the Schudson letter, and (2) 
that she ever told anyone that she had heard about the Schudson 
letter at a cocktail party.  Had Mrs. Moser actually made the 
statement pursuant to Attorney Kessler's suggestion, we would be 
confronted by a different case. 
¶31 This does not mean that we are, in effect, adopting 
the referee's interpretation that someone must be defrauded in 
order for there to be a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  The concept 
of someone being defrauded includes the requirement that the 
hearer relied on a false statement and took action (or refrained 
from taking action) that led to the person incurring damage of 
some sort.  The rule makes no reference to the impact of a 
misrepresentation on a hearer of the false statement. 
¶32 The rule does, however, require that there be, at a 
minimum, 
a 
dishonest 
or 
deceitful 
statement 
or 
a 
misrepresentation.  That did not occur in this case.  Attorney 
Kessler's 
statement 
suggested 
that 
Mrs. 
Moser 
make 
a 
misrepresentation in the future, but it did not itself make a 
false statement of fact.  Moreover, Mrs. Moser apparently did 
not follow through with Attorney Kessler's suggestion and she 
never made any false statement of fact about the source of her 
No. 
2008AP834-D   
 
16 
 
knowledge.  Thus, we cannot find a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) 
under the particular facts of this case.  In addition, since we 
find that the OLR failed to establish a violation of any supreme 
court rule, we do not address Attorney Kessler's First Amendment 
argument. 
¶33 Our application of the requirements of the rule, 
however, should not be interpreted to be an endorsement of 
Attorney Kessler's behavior.  Suggesting that someone not tell 
the truth is never laudable.  If Attorney Kessler did not want 
Mrs. Moser to divulge his name, he could have simply asked her 
not to answer any question about the source of her knowledge of 
the Schudson letter.  He should have advised her that if she 
chose to respond to a question about the source of her 
knowledge, she should reveal his identity. 
¶34 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary proceeding against 
Frederick P. Kessler is dismissed without costs. 
 
No.  2008AP834-D.akz 
 
1 
 
¶35 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur and agree that in this case, we are bound by the 
referee's findings of fact because they have not been shown to 
be clearly erroneous.  Per curiam, ¶26.  As Justice Prosser, 
Justice Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler noted in the Gableman 
decision, see In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Gableman, 2010 WI 62, ¶52, 325 Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631, this 
court is to observe the findings of facts or stipulation of 
facts as they exist in the record.  As Justice Prosser, Justice 
Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler further observed in the Gableman 
decision, it is not within our province to call for a jury trial 
or a further fact-finding process.  See id., ¶54 n.24.  I am 
pleased that we now have unanimous agreement on our proper role 
in such matters. 
¶36 Simply stated, the per curiam's analysis in this case 
is consistent with the analysis of Justice Prosser, Justice 
Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler in the Gableman decision.  See 
id., ¶52 ("On review, we employ the rules applicable to civil 
proceedings and we accept the Panel's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  No party contends the Panel's fact 
findings are clearly erroneous or that there is any need for 
further fact-finding.").  However, the per curiam's analysis is 
inconsistent with the writing of Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
Justice Bradley, and Justice Crooks in the Gableman decision, in 
which those three justices disregarded the Judicial Conduct 
Panel's findings of fact and the parties' stipulation of facts. 
See In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 
No.  2008AP834-D.akz 
 
2 
 
2010 WI 61, ¶¶37, 46, 325 Wis. 2d 579, 784 N.W.2d 605.  I am 
pleased to see that here, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice 
Bradley, and Justice Crooks afford proper deference to the facts 
before this court.  The level of deference which we apply to the 
referee's findings of fact in this case should be consistent 
with the deference we owed the Judicial Conduct Panel's findings 
of fact and the factual stipulation in the Gableman decision.  
See Gableman, 325 Wis. 2d 631, ¶52. 
¶37 For the foregoing reason, I respectfully concur. 
¶38 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2008AP834-D.MJG 
 
1 
 
¶39 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
and 
fully 
adopt 
the 
conclusions 
of 
Justice 
Zeigler's 
concurrence.  We are bound by the referee's findings of fact in 
this case because they have not been shown to be clearly 
erroneous.  I write separately merely to avoid even the 
appearance of commenting directly or indirectly on a case in 
which I was a party.