Title: In re Colvin ( Published censure) video
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111735
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 17, 2014

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 111,735 
 
In the Matter of WILLIAM E. COLVIN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed October 17, 2014. Published censure. 
 
Deborah L. Hughes, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and William E. 
Colvin, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, William E. Colvin, of Overland Park, 
an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1990. 
 
 
On December 13, 2013, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on January 6, 2014. On February 19, 
2014, and March 11, 2014, the parties entered into written stipulations of facts. A hearing 
was held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys 
on March 11, 2014, where the respondent was personally present and was represented by 
counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 3.1 (2013 Kan. Ct. 
R. Annot. 584) (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
594) (candor toward tribunal); 8.4(c) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) (engaging in conduct 
involving misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
2 
 
 
 
administration of justice); and 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on 
lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"9. 
In September, 1999, P.S. filed an action in divorce from her husband, 
J.S. Later that month, on September 30, 1999, P.S. and J.S. entered into a written 
separation agreement. The court granted the divorce and on December 23, 1999, the court 
entered a decree of divorce. 
 
"10. 
In the divorce decree, the court incorporated the terms of the separation 
agreement, which provided that J.S. was to pay P.S. $175,500 and one-half of J.S.'s 
401(k) account as it existed at the time of the divorce. Neither the parties in the 
separation agreement nor the court in the divorce decree specified whether a qualified 
domestic relations order (hereinafter 'QDRO') would be prepared or when the payments 
were due. J.S. did not pay the $175,500 or one-half of the balance of the 401(k) account 
to P.S. 
 
"11. 
On August 31, 2001, David K. Martin, counsel for P.S. wrote to J.S. 
regarding the $175,500 payment and the division of the 401(k) account. In the letter, Mr. 
Martin stated: 
 
'[P.S.] contacted me recently. Apparently numerous provisions of the 
Separation Agreement and court ordered Decree of Divorce have not 
been complied with. The most significant items are the $175,000 
payment and division of the 401(K) account. 
 
3 
 
 
 
'I want to have a discussion of what steps are necessary to have the 
provisions of the court ordered Decree of Divorce satisfied. I need to 
speak with you or an attorney of your choice within the next 14 days to 
begin that discussion. 
 
'If I do not hear from you or an attorney on your behalf within 14 days, I 
will recommend to [P.S.] that further action be taken in front of the court 
to enforce the provisions of the Decree of Divorce and Separation 
Agreement.' 
 
J.S. did not respond to Mr. Martin's letter and no further action was taken by P.S. or on 
behalf of P.S. following the demand letter. 
 
'12. 
Thereafter, P.S. retained Jeffrey A. Kincaid to represent her in an attempt 
to collect the outstanding amounts from J.S. On December 18, 2003, Mr. Kincaid, sent 
J.S. a letter demanding payment of the $175,500, plus interest to date. The letter 
provided: 
 
'This is to inform you that this law office represents [P.S.] 
concerning her claim against you for nonpayment of monies due 
pursuant to the Property Settlement Agreement, "Agreement", 
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce entered in 1999. This 
correspondence relates to a debt and any information derived shall be 
used for that purpose. 
 
'According to the information given me, you have not tendered 
the sum of $175,500 set forth in the Agreement, section B. Division of 
Net Worth paragraph 1.d. As of this date, including interest, the sum due 
and owing is $234,924.78. I have not been advised of any basis for the 
nonpayment of this judgment. 
 
'You have the right to dispute the claim of $234,924.78. In the 
event that you dispute all or part of this claim, you must contact this 
4 
 
 
 
office within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter. Further, should 
you demand verification of the claim, you must contact this office within 
thirty (30) days of the date of this letter. Your failure to do so will lead us 
to the conclusion that neither the claim nor the amount of the claim is in 
dispute. You must contact the undersigned within thirty (30) days of the 
date of this letter. The failure to do so will result in our pursuing this 
matter to the fullest extent allowed by law, including wage and property 
garnishment and execution upon nonexempt property.' 
 
J.S. did not respond to the letter. Thereafter, P.S. took no further action nor was action 
taken on her behalf to collect the amounts owing at that time. 
 
"13. 
In July, 2009, P.S. retained the respondent to assist in collecting the 
amounts due from J.S. On September 9, 2009, the respondent wrote to J.S., demanding 
payment of the outstanding amounts. The letter provided: 
 
'Please be advised that I have been retained by your former wife, [P.S.] 
regarding various issues relative to your divorce that remain unresolved. 
[P.S.] has asked me to attempt to contact you directly in an effort to 
negotiate a final resolution privately, without initiating further litigation. 
I hope you will accept this letter as a good faith effort to accomplish this 
objective. 
 
'My records indicate that you and [P.S.] executed a Separation 
Agreement, effective November 20, 1999, that settled all ownership 
rights and interests relative to certain assets accumulated by you and 
[P.S.] as part of the dissolution of your marriage. A Decree of Divorce 
was entered by default in Johnson County District Court on December 
23, 1999. The Decree of Divorce incorporated the Separation Agreement, 
which was adopted by the Court. Specific provision for the distribution 
of assets to [P.S.] were incorporated in the Separation Agreement. These 
provisions include the following: 
 
5 
 
 
 
1. 
Page 4, Section B.1.d.  The "Division of Net 
Worth" states that [P.S.] is entitled to payment 
of $175,000 [sic] from you. After nearly ten (10) 
years following the divorce, this amount has still 
not been paid. 
 
. . . .  
 
3. 
Page 5, Section B.1.f.  This section states that 
[P.S.] is entitled to 1/2 of your 401(k) account 
effective as of the date of your divorce, plus any 
appreciation/gain on this asset, less any tax 
liability relative to any transfer. My records 
indicate that the beginning balance of your 401k 
[sic] account on January 1, 2000, was 
$80,151.25. To date, [P.S.] has not received her 
division of funds from this asset. 
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
'I would welcome an opportunity to discuss your position relative to 
these matters. Please contact me within ten (10) days of the date of this 
letter if you would like to exercise this option. If I have not heard from 
you within such time, my client has authorized me to take any and all 
legal action within my perusal to enforce the provisions of the divorce 
decree.' 
 
Again, J.S. did not respond to the respondent. Because J.S. did not respond to the 
respondent's demand letter, the respondent filed a breach of contract action, Johnson 
County District Court case number 09CV9367. Additionally, the respondent filed a 
motion in the divorce case to 'resolve the divorce decree'. 
 
6 
 
 
 
"14. 
In the motion, the respondent argued that the decree was not final and 
was therefore unenforceable because the incorporated separation agreement did not 
include a due date for payment of the $175,500 payment or require the creation of a 
QDRO to divide the 401(k) account. The respondent argued that these omissions were 
'clerical errors' that should be corrected under K.S.A. 60-260(a).The respondent 
requested, in the alternative, that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing and render a 
final adjudication of all unresolved issues relative to the property rights of the parties. 
The relief the respondent sought in the motion to resolve the divorce decree was based 
upon a previous ruling by the Kansas Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Haynes, 115 
P.3d 181, 2005 WL 1661517 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished opinion in Docket No. 
92,807, filed July 15, 2005). 
 
"15. 
On October 23, 2009, J.S. sent P.S. an electronic mail message, offering 
her one-half of the existing balance of the 401(k) account. Under J.S.'s offer, P.S.'s share 
would have been approximately $32,000. It is unclear whether P.S. or the respondent 
responded to J.S.'s offer. 
 
"16. 
On January 8, 2010, through counsel, J.S. filed a response to the motion. 
In his response, J.S. argued that the separation agreement became a judgment when it was 
incorporated into the divorce decree and was, therefore, effective on December 23, 1999, 
the date the decree was entered. J.S. further argued that the judgment was extinguished 
and thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because P.S. failed to timely 
execute or timely revive the judgment. 
 
"17. 
On February 10, 2010, the district court denied the motion to resolve the 
decree of divorce, concluding that the judgment against J.S. for payment of $175,500 and 
one-half of the 401(k) account had become effective and due upon the filing of the decree 
and that the judgment had become dormant and had not been revived. 
 
"18. 
Based on the court's denial of P.S.'s motion, J.S. filed a motion to dismiss 
the breach of contract case, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the breach of 
contract action on the theory of res judicata. 
 
7 
 
 
 
"19. 
On March 30, 2010, the district court denied J.S.'s motion to dismiss. 
The court held a scheduling conference, granted P.S. leave to amend her petition on or 
before April 2, 2010, ordered discovery to be completed on or before September 24, 
2010, ordered that all dispositive motions be filed by October 22, 2010, and set the final 
pretrial conference for December 13, 2010. Further, the court ordered that a pretrial order 
be prepared consistent with the local rule. Finally, the court ordered P.S. to provide a 
statement of her itemization of damages as part of her factual contentions. 
 
"20. 
On April 2, 2010, the respondent filed an amended petition in the breach 
of contract case. 
 
"21. 
On April 12, 2010, the respondent filed a motion to amend the journal 
entry in the divorce case. With the motion, the respondent provided an affidavit from 
P.S., which stated that she intended 'that payment would become due and owing upon my 
demand' and '[t]hat on September 9, 2009, [the respondent] mailed written demand for 
payment of these debts to [J.S.] at my direction.' Neither the affidavit nor the motion 
mentioned the two earlier letters P.S.'s attorneys had sent to J.S. in 2001 and 2003. 
 
"22. 
On May 14, 2010, P.S. submitted to a deposition. P.S. testified that her 
theory, as set out in the affidavit, was that the statute of limitations for the $175,500 and 
401(k) debts did not begin to run until the respondent sent the September 9, 2009, 
demand letter and that the respondent's demand letter was the first time she had ever 
made demand for payment of those debts. When J.S.'s counsel showed P.S. the August 
31, 2001, letter Mr. Martin sent to J.S., P.S. testified she had never seen the letter before. 
 
"23. 
On May 20, 2010, J.S. filed a motion for sanctions against P.S. and the 
respondent under K.S.A. 60-211. On July 14, 2010, J.S. filed a supplement to the motion 
that included the 2003 letter sent by Mr. Kincaid to J.S. demanding payment of the 
$175,500, plus interest. 
 
"24. 
In responding to the motion for sanctions, the respondent argued that the 
affidavit was not false, as it did not state that the September 9, 2009, demand letter was 
the first and only demand letter. The respondent also argued that because J.S. did not 
8 
 
 
 
agree that the debts were due on P.S.'s demand, the letters were not relevant to J.S.'s 
claims. Finally, the respondent raised a new argument—that the statute of limitations 
only began to run upon J.S.'s repudiation of the September 9, 2009, demand for payment. 
 
"25. 
On August 30, 2010, the respondent stipulated that the demand letters 
sent by Mr. Martin and Mr. Kincaid were genuine and authentic. The respondent 
however, did not stipulate that P.S. specifically directed each attorney to send each letter. 
 
"26. 
After two days of hearing, the district court granted J.S.'s motion for 
sanctions. Additionally, the court denied the respondent's motion to amend the journal 
entry. The court concluded that the respondent violated K.S.A. 60-211. Further, the court 
concluded that the failure to mention the two prior demand letters in the affidavit when 
mentioning the September 9, 2009, letter was misleading by omission, that omission was 
material because the purpose of the motion's due-on-demand theory was to set aside the 
March 30, 2009, order ruling that the debts were 'effective and due' on the date the 
divorce decree was filed; the respondent had failed to correct the omission as soon as he 
became aware of the prior letters demanding payment and instead 'maintained the 
position . . . that the demand for payment and performance was first made by [the 
respondent] in 2009,' and up to the date of the hearing and during the hearing, the 
respondent 'persisted in contesting and denying' whether the 2001 and 2003 letters were 
'authorized' by P.S. 
 
"27. 
On November 4, 2010, the court ordered the respondent and P.S., jointly 
and severally, to pay J.S. $2,500 in attorney fees and expenses. 
 
"28. 
On November 24, 2010, P.S. appealed the district court's decisions on the 
motion to resolve the decree and the motion to amend. Both P.S. and the respondent 
appealed the sanctions order. 
 
"29. 
On December 8, 2010, the court dismissed the breach of contract case. 
 
"30. 
In approximately February, 2011, the respondent deposited $2,500 with 
the court as a supersedeas bond, pending appeal. 
9 
 
 
 
 
"31. 
On May 4, 2012, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's denial of the motion to resolve the decree. Additionally, the Kansas Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's sanctions order. Finally, the Kansas Court of 
Appeals dismissed the appeal of the motion to amend the journal entry as moot. 
 
"32. 
In affirming the sanctions order, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that 
the respondent violated his duty of candor to the court when he failed to correct the 
omission of the prior demand letters in the motion and affidavit: 
 
'Even if we were to entertain the notion that [P.S.] forgot having 
authorized the Martin and Kincaid demand letters and did not notify [the 
respondent] of their existence, [the respondent] at the very least became 
aware of the Martin letter during [P.S.]'s deposition on May 14, 2010, 
and the Kincaid letter on July 14, 2010, when Jeffrey included it with the 
supplemental motion for sanctions. [The respondent] had ample time to 
either withdraw or amend the motion before the district court conducted 
the September 1, 2010, hearing. In short, [the respondent] failed to take 
remedial measures to fulfill his responsibility to be candid towards the 
district court in advancing the merits of [P.S.]'s motion to amend journal 
entry so as to not undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process and 
cause unnecessary delay and expense.' 
 
Smith v. Smith, No. 105,365, unpublished opinion filed May 4, 2012, at p. 13. 
 
"33. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals also found that the appeal was frivolous 
and awarded attorney fees in the amount of $10,000 against the respondent and P.S. 
under Supreme Court Rule 7.07(c) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 64). Smith, at p. 14. 
 
"34. 
On May 4, 2012, the Kansas Court of Appeals forwarded a copy of the 
Court's unpublished decision to the Disciplinary Administrator. Based on the Kansas 
Court of Appeals' opinion, the disciplinary administrator docketed a complaint against 
the respondent. 
10 
 
 
 
 
"35. 
On May 25, 2012, the respondent filed a written response to the 
complaint. 
 
"36. 
On July 30, 2012, the respondent paid the $10,000 sanction ordered by 
the Kansas Court of Appeals. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
"37. 
Based upon the findings of fact and the stipulations of the parties, the 
hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1, KRPC 
3.3(a)(3), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and KRPC 8.4(g), as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 3.1 
 
"38. 
Lawyers must refrain from bringing frivolous proceedings. KRPC 3.1 
provides: 
 
'A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. . . .' 
 
In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 3.1 by appealing the district court's denial of 
the motion to resolve the divorce decree and the motion to amend the journal entry. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals concluded that the appeal was frivolous and ordered the 
respondent to pay $10,000 in attorney fees. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 3.1. 
 
"KRPC 3.3 
 
"39. 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
11 
 
 
 
lawyer.' In the pleadings, the respondent argued that the $175,500 and the proceeds from 
the 401(k) did not become owing until P.S. made the demand in 2009. The respondent, 
however, failed to inform the court that P.S. had previously made two demands for the 
money. 
 
"40. 
Assuming that the respondent did not initially know about the letters, he 
certainly knew about Mr. Martin's letter on May 14, 2010, and of Mr. Kincaid's letter on 
July 14, 2010. Yet, the respondent failed to correct the false statement by omission. 
 
"41. 
As the Kansas Court of Appeals stated, the respondent 'had ample time to 
either withdraw or amend the motion before the district court conducted the September 1, 
2010, hearing. In short, [the respondent] failed to take remedial measures to fulfill his 
responsibility to be candid [to] the district court in advancing the merits of [P.S.]'s motion 
to amend journal entry so as to not undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process 
and cause unnecessary delay and expense.' Smith, at p. 13. 
 
"42. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1) by failing to correct a false statement of material fact previously made to 
the court by the respondent. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
"43. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The respondent 
engaged in conduct that involved misrepresentation when he failed to inform the court of 
the existence of the two previous demand letters. As such, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"44. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he appealed the district 
12 
 
 
 
court's decision denying the motion to resolve the divorce decree, denying the motion to 
amend the journal entry, and the award of sanctions. As such, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(g) 
 
"45. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(g). The 
respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when 
he persisted with arguments which lacked merit. The hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"46. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
"47. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the public to maintain 
his personal integrity. 
 
"48.  
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duty. 
 
"49. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
injury to the administration of justice. 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"50. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
"51. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct when he persisted in making arguments which lacked merit. The respondent 
filed a breach of contract case, in addition to motions in the divorce action, which alleged 
the same frivolous arguments. 
 
"52. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 3.1, KRPC 3.3(a)(1), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and 
KRPC 8.4(g). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed 
multiple offenses. 
 
"53. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1990. At the time 
of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for more than 20 years. 
 
"54. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
"55. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
"56. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. 
Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts and the rule violations. 
14 
 
 
 
 
"57. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent paid $12,500 
in sanctions in this case. The district court ordered the respondent to pay $2,500 in 
sanctions. Additionally, the Kansas Court of Appeals ordered the respondent to pay 
$10,000 in sanctions. The respondent paid the sanctions. The respondent satisfied these 
orders in 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
 
"58. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that 
false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or 
that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes 
no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially 
adverse effect on the legal proceeding.   
 
'6.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent 
either in determining whether statements or documents are false 
or in taking remedial action when material information is being 
withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the 
legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse 
effect on the legal proceeding.' 
 
 
"Recommendation 
 
"59. 
During closing argument, the disciplinary administrator stated that it was 
difficult to determine whether the appropriate sanction in the case was censure or 
suspension. However, the disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
censured by the Kansas Supreme Court. The disciplinary administrator further argued 
that the censure should be published in the Kansas Reports. Additionally, the respondent 
also recommended that the Kansas Supreme Court censure him in a published opinion. 
 
15 
 
 
 
"60. 
The hearing panel is mindful that the parties agreed that the respondent 
should be publicly disciplined by a published censure. Had the respondent not stipulated 
that he engaged in dishonest conduct, the hearing panel might have agreed to that 
recommendation. However, because the respondent characterizes his behavior as 
dishonest conduct, in violation of KRPC 3.3(a)(1) and KRPC 8.4(c), the hearing panel 
concludes that a short suspension is warranted. Accordingly, based upon the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously 
recommends that the respondent be suspended for a period of 30 days. 
 
"61. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 356). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this 
court. The respondent did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report. 
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 
(2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 375). 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 3.1 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 584) 
(meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 594) (candor 
toward tribunal); 8.4(c) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) (engaging in conduct involving 
misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice); and 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to 
practice law), and it supports the panel's conclusions of law. We adopt the panel's 
conclusions. 
 
At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office of 
the Disciplinary Administrator and the respondent recommended that the respondent be 
censured publicly. The hearing panel recommended that the respondent be suspended for 
a period of 30 days. 
 
This court is not bound by the recommendations of the Disciplinary Administrator 
or the hearing panel. In re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897, 911-12, 317 P.3d 756 (2014). The court 
bases each disciplinary sanction on the specific facts and circumstances of the violations 
and aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in the case. Mintz, 298 Kan. at 
912. This court has taken the position that, while prior cases may have some bearing on 
the sanctions that the court elects to impose, those prior cases must give way to 
consideration of the unique circumstances that each individual case presents. In re Busch, 
287 Kan. 80, 86-87, 194 P.3d 12 (2008). This court concerns itself less with the sanctions 
that were appropriate in other cases and more with which discipline is appropriate under 
the facts of the case before us. In re Dennis, 286 Kan. at 738. 
 
While we understand the serious nature of the dishonest conduct that the 
respondent stipulated to, we agree with the Disciplinary Administrator's recommendation 
and find published censure to be appropriate in this case. 
17 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that William E. Colvin be and he is hereby disciplined 
by published censure in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(3) (2013 Kan. Ct. 
R. Annot. 300). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
                                                 
 
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 111,735 to fill the 
vacancy on the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the United States 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals.