Title: Terrence A. Borneman v. Corwyn Transport, Ltd.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002511
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2511 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Terrence A. Borneman, as surviving spouse of 
Jason S. Borneman, deceased,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Corwyn Transport, Ltd. and Great West Casualty 
Company  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Employers Insurance of Wausau, a mutual  
company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
212 Wis. 2d 25, 567 N.W.2d 887 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 25, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 3, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Raymond Thums 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Jeffrey J. Strande and Terwilliger, Wakeen, 
Piehler & Conway, S.C., Wausau and oral argument by Jeffrey J. 
Strande. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Randy L. Frokjer and Ament, Wulf & Frokjer, S.C., Merrill and 
oral argument by Randy L. Frokjer. 
 
No.  96-2511 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2511 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Terrence A. Borneman, as surviving spouse  
of Jason S. Borneman, deceased,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Corwyn Transport, Ltd. and Great West  
Casualty Company  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Employers Insurance of Wausau, a mutual  
company,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Borneman 
v. Corwyn Transp., Ltd., 212 Wis. 2d 25, 567 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Marathon County, Raymond F. Thums, Judge.  The 
circuit court granted the motion of Corwyn Transport, Ltd., for 
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint of Terrence A. 
Borneman, the plaintiff, for wrongful death as the surviving 
spouse of Jason S. Borneman.  The circuit court concluded that 
at the time and place of the accident resulting in Jason 
Borneman's death, Monty Szydel was an employee loaned by Corwyn 
No.  96-2511 
 
2 
Transport to Major Industries, Inc., making Szydel a co-employee 
of Jason Borneman, an employee of Major Industries.  Therefore, 
the circuit court ruled that Wis. Stat. § 102.03 (1993-94), the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act,1 
precluded the plaintiff from recovering damages from Szydel and 
Szydel's general employer, Corwyn Transport.  
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court, concluding as a matter of law that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists to support Corwyn Transport's 
loaned employee defense.  The court of appeals directed the 
circuit court to enter summary judgment precluding Corwyn 
Transport from asserting the loaned employee defense and 
remanded the cause to the circuit court for trial on the issue 
of Szydel's negligence. 
¶3 
The only issue before this court is whether Szydel, an 
employee of Corwyn Transport, became a loaned employee of Major 
Industries when he assisted employees of Major Industries in 
loading a flatbed trailer.  If Szydel was a loaned employee of 
Major Industries at the time and place of the accident, then 
Jason Borneman and Szydel were co-employees of Major Industries 
and the plaintiff is precluded under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) from 
                     
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(2) 
(1993-94) 
provides 
in 
pertinent part that "the right to the recovery of compensation 
under this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer, any other employe of the same employer and the 
worker's compensation insurance carrier." 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  96-2511 
 
3 
suing Szydel and Szydel's general employer, Corwyn Transport, 
for negligence.  Alternatively, if Szydel was not a loaned 
employee of Major Industries at the time and place of the 
accident, then the plaintiff can pursue a wrongful death action 
against Corwyn Transport, Szydel's employer. 
¶4 
For the reasons set forth, we hold that Szydel was not 
a loaned employee of Major Industries at the time and place of 
the accident.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
The relevant facts including those that are in dispute 
are set forth below.  The material facts and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom necessary to a resolution of the loaned 
employee defense in this case are undisputed.   
¶6 
Corwyn Transport contracted with Major Industries to 
furnish a trailer truck to haul two loads for Major Industries 
from Marathon County, Wisconsin, to Georgia.  Monty Szydel, a 
truck driver for Corwyn Transport, dropped off the trailer truck 
at Major Industries on Friday, September 24, 1994.  The trailer 
was to be loaded by employees of Major Industries, and Szydel 
was to pick up the loaded trailer truck the following Monday 
morning.   
¶7 
Because of inclement weather, the trailer was not 
loaded and ready for pickup on Monday morning.  Szydel was told 
to pick up the trailer mid-morning on Monday.  When Szydel 
arrived at Major Industries sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 
No.  96-2511 
 
4 
a.m. that morning, Major Industries had not yet loaded the 
trailer. 
¶8 
After 
Szydel's 
arrival, 
four 
Major 
Industries 
employees began to load the trailer in heavy mist conditions.  
Major Industries' standard loading procedure required four 
employees.  Although four Major Industries employees were 
available, Szydel participated in the loading. 
¶9 
It is unclear why Szydel helped load the trailer.  
Szydel stated that he was unsure whether he was asked to 
participate in the loading process or simply offered his 
services.  Szydel was not compensated by Major Industries or 
Corwyn Transport for helping to 
load 
the 
trailer. 
 No 
arrangement 
existed 
between 
Major 
Industries 
and 
Corwyn 
Transport for Szydel to help load the trailer.  Szydel's only 
obligation was to secure the load once it was placed on the 
trailer and to drive the truck delivering the load to its 
intended destination. 
¶10 The parties dispute Szydel's role in the loading 
process.  One employee of Major Industries claimed that Szydel 
was on top of the load immediately before it fell and that 
Szydel was in the best position to determine the stability of 
the load.  According to another employee of Major Industries, 
Szydel had directed the Major Industries' foreman in the loading 
process, had made suggestions about how to position the aluminum 
boxes and had helped the foreman position the boxes on the 
trailer.  Both Szydel and the foreman claim that Szydel did not 
No.  96-2511 
 
5 
direct the sequence, method, manner or any other detail of the 
loading process. 
¶11 The accident occurred around 1:00 p.m., when Jason 
Borneman was placing the last box or two onto the load.  Part of 
the load weighing more than one ton fell on him, tragically 
causing his death. 
¶12 On April 3, 1995, Jason Borneman's surviving spouse, 
Terrence Borneman, filed a wrongful death action against Corwyn 
Transport, alleging that Szydel negligently caused the death of 
Jason Borneman.   
¶13 The circuit court granted Corwyn Transport's motion 
for summary judgment, concluding on the basis of the facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom that as a matter of law Szydel 
was a loaned employee of Major Industries at the time and place 
of the accident. 
¶14 The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court and remanded the cause to the circuit court with 
directions that the circuit court enter summary judgment 
precluding the loaned employee defense and set the matter for 
trial on the issue of Szydel's negligence.   
II 
¶15 In reviewing a summary judgment, this court applies 
the same methodology as used by the circuit court, which is set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  See Jeske v. Mount Sinai Med. 
Ctr., 183 Wis. 2d 667, 672, 515 N.W.2d 705 (1994).  Under 
§ 802.08(2), summary judgment must be entered "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
No.  96-2511 
 
6 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."   
¶16 Although there are numerous facts in dispute in this 
case, all the material facts necessary to a resolution of the 
loaned employee defense are undisputed.  When the material facts 
are undisputed, the determination of whether an employee is a 
loaned employee is a question of law which this court determines 
independent of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.  See Bauernfeind v. Zell, 190 
Wis. 2d 701, 714, 528 N.W.2d 1 (1995) (citing Gansch v. Nekoosa 
Papers, Inc., 158 Wis. 2d 743, 753, 463 N.W.2d 682 (1990)). 
III 
¶17 We begin with a brief summary of Wisconsin law 
regarding loaned employees.  It is well settled that an employee 
of one employer (sometimes referred to as the general employer) 
may under certain circumstances become the employee of another 
employer (sometimes referred to as the borrowing employer or 
special employer). 
¶18 The rationale of the loaned employee doctrine as it 
relates to worker's compensation is that an employee who is on 
loan to a borrowing employer becomes a loaned employee of the 
borrowing 
employer 
and 
should, 
for 
worker's 
compensation 
purposes, be treated as an employee of the borrowing employer.  
The loaned employee doctrine is one way of promoting the 
compromises and policies underlying the Worker's Compensation 
Act.  See Bauernfeind, 190 Wis. 2d at 713-14.  
No.  96-2511 
 
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¶19 Over the years the court has decided many cases 
involving the application of the loaned employee doctrine.  The 
test to determine whether an employee remains in the employ of 
the general employer or becomes the loaned employee of the 
borrowing employer was first set forth 67 years ago in Seaman 
Body Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 204 Wis. 157, 163, 235 N.W. 433 
(1931).  The Seaman loaned employee test has two aspects:  three 
elements and four vital questions as follows:  
 
The relation of employer and employee exists as 
between a special employer to whom an employee is 
loaned whenever the 
following facts concur: (a) 
Consent on the part of the employee to work for a 
special employer; (b) Actual entry by the employee 
upon the work of and for the special employer pursuant 
to an express or implied contract so to do; (c) Power 
of the special employer to control the details of the 
work to be performed and to determine how the work 
shall be done and whether it shall stop or continue.   
 
The vital questions in controversies of this kind are: 
(1) Did the employee actually or impliedly consent to 
work for a special employer?  (2) Whose was the work 
he was performing at the time of injury?  (3) Whose 
was the right to control the details of the work being 
performed?  (4) For whose benefit primarily was the 
work being done? 
Seaman, 204 Wis. at 163. 
¶20 Although the two aspects of the Seaman test are, as 
the court of appeals decision recognized, closely related, most 
of the cases interpreting and applying the Seaman test have 
emphasized the four vital questions rather than the three 
elements.  
¶21 The Seaman test is often difficult to apply to 
determine whether Employer A's employee who gives some temporary 
No.  96-2511 
 
8 
help to Employer B becomes B's loaned employee.  See Braun v. 
Jewett, 1 Wis. 2d 531, 536, 85 N.W.2d 364 (1957).  The prior 
cases are difficult to fit together because the test is so 
"fact-oriented."  Gansch, 158 Wis. 2d at 750. 
¶22 Over the years this court has acknowledged the 
deficiencies of the Seaman test as well as the confusing and 
sometimes conflicting case law interpreting and applying it.2  On 
more than one occasion the court has expressed dissatisfaction 
with the application of the Seaman test, declaring that "this 
court, as well as others, has found the question of the 'loaned 
employee' troublesome.  The definition and factual essentials 
necessary to establish the legal relationship of the loaned 
employee are not uniform in all the reported cases, nor is the 
same emphasis always to the necessary elements."  Gansch, 158 
Wis. 2d at 751.  Although the test is "readily comprehensible, 
when applied to specific factual situations, the distinctions 
are 
sometimes 
slight 
and 
the 
decisions 
well-nigh 
                     
2 The following decisions have recognized the confusion and 
conflict in the case law applying the Seaman test.  See, e.g., 
Meka v. Falk Corp., 102 Wis. 2d 148, 158 n.13, 306 N.W.2d 65 
(1981); DePratt v. Sergio, 102 Wis. 2d 141, 145, 306 N.W.2d 62 
(1981); Huckstorf v. Vince L. Schneider Enter., 41 Wis. 2d 45, 
49, 163 N.W.2d 190 (1968); Braun v. Jewett, 1 Wis. 2d 531, 536, 
85 N.W.2d 364 (1957); Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 206 Wis. 215, 217, 239 N.W. 412 (1931). 
Commentators also note that the law of loaned employees is 
confusing and conflicting.  See J. Dennis Hynes, Chaos and the 
Law of Borrowed Servant: An Argument for Consistency, 14 J. L. & 
Com. 1 (1994); Jack B. Hood, Benjamin A. Hardy, Jr. & Harold S. 
Lewis, Jr., Workers' Compensation and Employee Protection Laws 
in a Nutshell 45 (2d ed. 1990).  
No.  96-2511 
 
9 
irreconcilable."  Freeman v. Krause Milling Co., 43 Wis. 2d 392, 
394, 168 N.W.2d 599 (1969).   
¶23 Despite the difficulties in applying the Seaman test, 
neither courts nor commentators have devised a better one, and 
this court has declined to revise the Seaman test.3   
¶24 In this case Corwyn Transport attacks the court of 
appeals decision on two grounds:  (1) that the court of appeals 
decision incorrectly applied the Seaman test; and (2) that the 
court of appeals decision significantly modified the Seaman 
test. 
¶25 First, Corwyn Transport asserts that the court of 
appeals incorrectly applied the Seaman test by emphasizing the 
three-elements aspect of the test rather than the four vital 
questions.  We disagree with Corwyn Transport's reading of the 
court of appeals decision.  Although many of the loaned employee 
cases refer only to the four vital questions and do not 
specifically discuss the three-elements aspect of the Seaman 
test, the cases implicitly recognize that the four vital 
questions are intended to facilitate analysis of the three-
elements aspect of the Seaman test.   
¶26 In this case the court of appeals started with the 
three-elements aspect of the Seaman test and then used the four 
vital questions to analyze the three elements.  The court of 
appeals suggested courts should "use the three-element test of 
                     
3 See DePratt, 102 Wis. 2d at 146-47; Freeman v. Krause 
Milling Co., 43 Wis. 2d 392, 394 n.2, 168 N.W.2d 599 (1969).  
No.  96-2511 
 
10
Seaman as it was originally stated, with a focus on whether a 
special employment contract has been created, considering not 
only the 'vital questions' of Seaman in the inquiry, but all 
queries 
and 
inferences 
that 
assist 
in 
making 
that 
determination."  Borneman, 212 Wis. 2d at 34.  Although the 
court of appeals' statement of the Seaman test does not use the 
same language used in prior cases, its summary of the Seaman 
test is consistent with the application of the Seaman test in 
prior cases.  
¶27 The court of appeals in the present case focused on 
"whether a new employment contract was created" between the 
employee and the borrowing employer.  Borneman, 212 Wis. 2d at 
33.  The court of appeals restates the reasoning of prior cases 
in which this court has declared that the consent of an employee 
to enter into a new employment relationship with a borrowing 
employer is the most critical inquiry in the Seaman test.4  
                     
4 The court has stated the importance of this inquiry as 
follows:  
In compensation law, the spotlight must now be turned 
upon the employee, for the first question of all is:  
Did he make a contract of hire with the special 
employer? If this question cannot be answered "yes," 
the investigation is closed, and there is no need to 
go on into the tests of relative control and the like. 
 
3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law, § 48.12, at 8-440 (cited by Ryan, Inc. v. ILHR Dep't, 39 
Wis. 2d 646, 650-51, 159 N.W.2d 594 (1968); Skornia v. Highway 
Pavers, Inc., 39 Wis. 2d 293, 299, 159 N.W.2d 76 (1968); 
Springfield Lumber, Feed & Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 10 
Wis. 2d 405, 410, 102 N.W.2d 754 (1960)). 
No.  96-2511 
 
11
¶28 The court has often stated that an employee cannot 
become a loaned employee of a borrowing employer without the 
employee's consent.5  The court of appeals recognized, as have 
prior cases, a presumption that an employee remains in the 
employ of the general employer.  See Ryan, Inc. v. ILHR Dep't, 
39 Wis. 2d 646, 650, 159 N.W.2d 594 (1968); Skornia v. Highway 
Pavers, Inc., 39 Wis. 2d 293, 299-300, 159 N.W.2d 76 (1968) 
(quoting with approval Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 cmt. 
b (1958)).6   
¶29 The essence of the Seaman test, therefore, lies in 
determining whether an employee consented to leave his or her 
general employment and to enter into a new employer-employee 
relationship, if only of a temporary nature.  See Escher v. ILHR 
Dep't, 39 Wis. 2d 527, 533, 159 N.W.2d 715 (1968).  Emphasizing 
the consent of the employee acknowledges that the employee loses 
                                                                  
See also Meka, 102 Wis. 2d at 152-53; Nelson v. L. & J. 
Press Corp., 65 Wis. 2d 770, 779 n.7, 223 N.W.2d 607 (1974); 
Escher v. ILHR Dep't, 39 Wis. 2d 527, 533, 159 N.W.2d 715 
(1968). 
5 See Skornia, 39 Wis. 2d at 298; Rhinelander, 206 Wis. at 
217.    
6 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 cmt. b, at 501 (1958) 
states: 
b.  Inference that original service continues.  In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, there is an 
inference that the actor remains in his general 
employment so long as, by the service rendered 
another, he is performing the business entrusted to 
him by the general employer.  There is no inference 
that because the general employer has permitted a 
division of control, he has surrendered it. 
No.  96-2511 
 
12
and gains rights when a new employment relationship is forged.7  
The distinction between the mere consent of an employee to 
perform certain acts for a borrowing employer and the employee's 
consent to enter into a new employment relationship with the 
borrowing employer is important.8   
¶30 We conclude that the three elements and the four vital 
questions of the Seaman test are intertwined and closely 
related, as the court of appeals opinion demonstrates.  The 
court of appeals properly focused its principal inquiry on 
whether Szydel, an employee of Corwyn Transport, consented to a 
new employee-employer relationship with Major Industries.  
¶31 Corwyn Transport's second challenge to the decision of 
the court of appeals is that the decision significantly modified 
the Seaman test by adding a new requirement of a "formal" 
contract 
between 
the 
general 
employer 
and 
the 
borrowing 
employer.  According to Corwyn Transport, the court of appeals 
has ruled that in the absence of a formal arrangement between 
the two employers, the employee will always remain the employee 
of the general employer.  Corwyn Transport contends that this 
modification of the Seaman test conflicts with the traditional 
rationale for the loaned employee doctrine, which is to address 
                     
7 See Meka, 102 Wis. 2d at 152-53 n.9; 3 Arthur Larson & Lex 
L. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 48.12, at 8-440 
(1991). 
8 See Escher, 39 Wis. 2d at 533; Elmer H. Blair, Workmen's 
Compensation, § 5.07, at 5-22 (1974).  
No.  96-2511 
 
13
employment arrangements established between employers on an ad 
hoc basis to meet problems that arise during the work day. 
¶32 We conclude that Corwyn Transport mischaracterizes the 
court of appeals decision.  We do not read the decision of the 
court of appeals as establishing a new requirement of a "formal" 
contract 
between 
the 
general 
employer 
and 
the 
borrowing 
employer.  The word "formal" is found nowhere in the court of 
appeals decision.  Rather the court of appeals considered the 
existence of an express or implied agreement, or lack thereof, 
between Corwyn Transport and Major Industries as a factor 
bearing on the issue of whether Szydel consented to work for 
Major Industries.  "Knowledge of the two employers [about the 
working 
arrangement] 
certainly 
has 
a 
bearing 
on 
the 
establishment of any new, temporary contractual relationship." 
Borneman, 212 Wis. 2d at 36.   
¶33 The court of appeals did not rewrite the Seaman test 
but rather properly applied a factor that Wisconsin courts have 
long considered in determining whether an employee consented to 
work for a borrowing employer.  In previous cases involving 
loaned employees some arrangement or understanding existed 
between the two employers about the work to be performed by the 
employee for the borrowing employer.  In determining the status 
of an employee, the court has considered the arrangement between 
the two employers.9  
                     
9 See, e.g., Springfield, 10 Wis. 2d at 412; Braun, 1 
Wis. 2d at 538; Rhinelander, 206 Wis. at 217.   
No.  96-2511 
 
14
¶34 We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
existence of an arrangement or understanding between a general 
employer and a borrowing employer is relevant to the issue of an 
employee's consent to enter into a new employment relationship 
with the borrowing employer.  
¶35 In the case at bar the two employers did not have a 
prior arrangement or understanding to loan Szydel or any other 
employee to Major Industries to load the trailer.  Szydel's job 
as truck driver did not require him to help load the trailer.  
He was not compensated by either employer for helping to load 
the trailer.  Szydel was paid only for delivery of the load to 
the intended destination. 
¶36 Furthermore, Szydel's help in the loading process was 
not needed.  It was standard practice for Major Industries to 
use four employees to load a trailer, and in this case Major 
Industries had four employees on site to load the trailer.  
                                                                  
If the employee was instructed by the general employer to 
perform some work for the borrowing employer and, in so doing, 
the employee carried out the general employer's orders, no new 
employment relationship was created.  See Rhinelander, 206 Wis. 
at 217.  Consent cannot be inferred merely by the fact that the 
employee obeyed the commands of the general employer in entering 
the services of the borrowing employer.  See Bauernfeind v. 
Zell, 190 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 528 N.W.2d 1 (1995) (citing 
Rhinelander, 206 Wis. at 218).  "While the employee may be 
subject to the direction of the temporary master, he is there in 
obedience to the command of his employer, and in doing what the 
new master directs him to do he is performing his duty to the 
employer who gave the order."  Rhinelander, 206 Wis. at 217.  
See also Springfield, 10 Wis. 2d at 412; Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 227 cmt. d, at 503 (1958). 
No.  96-2511 
 
15
Szydel's only obligation with respect to the load was to secure 
and deliver it to the intended destination. 
¶37 It is one thing for Szydel to have assisted the 
employees of Major Industries with loading the trailer and an 
entirely different matter for Szydel to have consented to enter 
into an employment relationship with Major Industries.  The 
record does not support an inference that Szydel consented to 
employment with Major Industries for purposes of loading the 
trailer.  Szydel's cooperation with the employees of Major 
Industries in the loading process was not sufficient to rebut 
the presumption that Szydel remained in the employ of Corwyn 
Transport. 
¶38 We agree with the court of appeals that the factual 
dispute about Szydel's role in the loading process does not 
present a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of this 
summary 
judgment 
and 
is 
insufficient 
to 
support 
Corwyn 
Transport's loaned employee defense.  We conclude as a matter of 
law that Szydel did not consent to establish employment with 
Major Industries immediately before the fatal accident.  
¶39 Because we conclude that Szydel did not consent to 
enter a new employment relationship, we need not, and do not, 
address the other elements or vital questions of the Seaman 
test.  
¶40 In conclusion, we hold that Szydel was not a loaned 
employee of Major Industries at the time and place of the 
accident resulting in Jason Borneman's death.  For the foregoing 
reasons we affirm the decision of the court of appeals which 
No.  96-2511 
 
16
remanded the cause to the circuit court for trial on the issue 
of Szydel's negligence.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1