Title: State v. Barone
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S42900
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 1999

Filed: July 29, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

	Respondent,

	v.

CESAR FRANCESCO BARONE,

	Appellant.

(CC C93066CR, C940570CR, C930806CR;

SC S42900 (Control), S42901)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgments of
conviction and sentences of death imposed by the Washington
County Circuit Court.

	Michael J. McElligott, Judge.

	Argued and submitted May 6, 1999.

	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  On the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, Janet
A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, and Holly Ann Vance,
Assistant Attorney General.

	David E. Groom, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
brief and argued the cause for appellant.  With him on the brief
was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*

	RIGGS, J.

	The judgments of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.

	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

	RIGGS, J.

	This is an automatic and direct review of defendant's
judgments of conviction and sentences of death.  ORS
163.150(1)(g); ORAP 12.10(1).  Defendant seeks reversal of his
convictions on five counts of aggravated felony murder, two
counts of felony murder, and one count of murder.  In the
alternative, defendant asks this court to vacate his sentences of
death and remand for resentencing.  We affirm the judgments of
conviction and sentences of death.

FACTS

	Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
facts in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Hayward, 327 Or 397, 399, 963 P2d 667 (1998).

	The charges in this case arise from the deaths of
Chantee Woodman,(1) Betty Lou Williams, and Margaret Schmidt. 
Woodman accepted a ride from defendant and Leonard Darcell in
downtown Portland during the early morning hours of December 30,
1992.  Defendant and Darcell beat and sexually assaulted Woodman,
dumped her along Highway 26, and began to drive away.  When they
looked back, they noticed that she appeared to be alive and
moving.  Defendant returned, beat her with the butt of a pistol,
shot her in the head, and threw her body over a guard rail.  A
highway worker discovered Woodman's body later that day.

	Defendant was drinking with 63-year-old Betty Lou
Williams at her apartment during the early morning hours of
January 6, 1993.  Williams went into her bathroom.  Defendant
followed her, produced a weapon, and began to sexually assault
her.  Williams suffered a heart attack and died.  Defendant left
Williams' partially-clothed body in her bathtub, where her son
discovered it the next day.

	Margaret Schmidt was an elderly woman who lived by
herself in Hillsboro.  On the night of April 18, 1991, defendant
entered her home, sexually assaulted her, and smothered her with
a pillow.  A caregiver discovered her body the next day. 

	Investigations into the Woodman, Williams, and Schmidt
murders led police to conclude that defendant was responsible for
all three.  Defendant ultimately was charged with four counts of
aggravated felony murder in the Woodman case, ORS 163.095(2)(d),
two counts of aggravated felony murder in the Schmidt case, ORS
163.095(2)(d), and two counts of felony murder in the Williams
case, ORS 163.115(1)(b). 

	Those charges originally were consolidated for trial
with four additional counts of aggravated murder arising from the
fatal shooting of a fourth woman, Martha Bryant.  The state moved
to sever the charges relating to the Bryant murder, and the trial
court granted the motion.  Before his trial on the charges in
this case, defendant was convicted of Bryant's murder and
sentenced to death.  This court has affirmed that conviction and
sentence.  State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 969 P2d 1013 (1998)
(Barone I).  Defendant moved three times to sever the charges
relating to the Woodman, Williams, and Schmidt murders, but the
trial court denied the motions.

	After jury selection, defendant's trial on those
charges began on November 6, 1995.  Twelve jurors and four
alternates were empaneled.  The court gave detailed preliminary
instructions outlining the jurors' responsibilities, but
neglected to administer the oath to the jury.

	Defense counsel and defendant noticed the court's
failure to swear the jury almost immediately.  To confirm his
belief that the court had forgotten to administer the oath to the
jurors, defense counsel, on the first or second day of trial,
requested a copy of the transcript of the first day of trial from
the court reporter.  The reporter informed counsel that, if she
provided him with a certified transcript, she also would have to
provide a transcript to the prosecutor and inform the court. 
Counsel then requested a rough draft copy of the transcript,
which the reporter provided.  Neither the prosecutor nor the
court was told that defendant had requested a transcript.  The
draft transcript confirmed counsel's belief that the court had
not administered the oath to the jury.

	After a twelve-day trial, the jury retired to
deliberate and returned verdicts of guilty on seven counts of the
indictment.  As to one charge of aggravated felony murder, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser-included offense
of murder.  In the meantime, however, the court had become aware
of rumors that the jury had not been sworn.  The court consulted
the transcript and discovered its error.  Before announcing the
verdicts as received and dismissing the jury, the trial court
described its mistake to the parties and requested motions from
counsel.

	Defendant then filed a "Motion To Quash Verdicts, To
Declare Trial a Nullity, And To Dismiss Jury."  The state filed a
motion to delay acceptance and filing of the jury's verdicts. 
The court held a hearing on the motions.  At the hearing, defense
counsel stated that he was aware that the court had failed to
administer the oath to the jury after the first day of trial. 
Defendant himself stated that he also was aware of the court's
failure on the first day of trial, but had told counsel, "I want
to sit on it until after the verdict comes in."

	The court denied defendant's motion.  In denying the
motion, the court noted that defendant simply could have asked
the court to administer the oath to the jury but instead had made
"an intentional choice to forego that remedy."  The court also
stated that there was no evidence, and indeed no claim, that the
jury had acted improperly in any respect.  The court asked
defense counsel what remedy he would prefer, short of quashing
the verdict and dismissing the jury.  Counsel replied that he had
no preference, because no other remedy would cure the error.

	The court then called the members of the jury
individually and asked each of them the following questions on
the record: 

		"Under penalty of perjury, do you solemnly swear
that the two answers you are about to give will be the
truth?

		"Did you well and truly try each of the three
cases at issue between the parties and true verdicts
reach in accordance with the law and the evidence?

		"To the best of your knowledge and belief, did
each and every member of the jury well and truly try
each of the three cases in accordance with the law and
the evidence?"

The jurors all answered "Yes" to those questions.  The court then
informed the jurors that it had forgotten to administer the oath,
apologized, and administered the oath.  

		After administering the oath, the court instructed the
jurors to "set aside any thoughts of the earlier verdicts" and
"begin anew" to "redeliberate and arrive at verdicts in each of
the three cases."  The court gave the jurors new verdict forms
and instructed them that they were not bound by their earlier
verdicts.  The jury retired to deliberate and returned with the
same verdicts on all charges.(2)  The court received those
verdicts.  After a separate penalty-phase proceeding, the jury
imposed the death penalty.

		Defendant challenges the verdicts, the sentences of
death, and the resulting judgments, raising 19 assignments of
error.(3)  Three of those assignments of error pertain to the trial
court's denial of pretrial motions, eleven to the guilt phase,
and five to the penalty phase of defendant's trial.  We arrange
our discussion accordingly.(4)

PRETRIAL MOTIONS 

		In his second assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in denying his motions to sever the
charges related to the three homicides for which he was indicted. 
Defendant moved three times to sever the charges, and the trial
court denied all three motions.  In denying the third motion, the
court stated that the prosecution would be required to build a
"fire wall" between the three cases and to "present the cases
totally separately."  

		To that end, the court stated in preliminary jury
instructions:

		"This trial involves the presentation of three
separate cases.  Each case will be presented by the
state separately.  Each must be decided separately. 
The fact that three cases are being presented in one
trial cannot affect the absolute requirement that you
must deliberate each case separately.  Evidence from
one case cannot and must not be used in deciding a
separate case.

		"Similarly, the verdict in one case cannot affect
the verdict in another.  In other words, when you
deliberate one case to verdict, that verdict, whether
not guilty or guilty, cannot enter into deliberations
on either of the other two cases."

The state made three separate opening arguments, one for each
case.  Then the cases were tried separately:  First the Woodman
murder, then the Schmidt murder, then the Williams murder.  The
state made separate closing arguments in the three cases. 
Throughout the guilt phase, the parties and the court gave the
jury numerous reminders that the three charges were separate and
that the state was required to prove each charge independently of
the other charges.

		ORS 132.560 governs joinder of charges and provides, in
part:

		"(1)  A charging instrument must charge but one
offense, and in one form only, except that:

		"* * * * *

		"(b)  Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same charging instrument in a separate count for each
offense if the offenses charged are alleged to have
been committed by the same person or persons and are:

		"(A)  Of the same or similar character;

		"* * * * *

		"(3)  If it appears, upon motion, that the state
or defendant is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses
under subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court
may order an election or separate trials of counts or
provide whatever other relief justice requires."

The trial court allowed joinder of the charges because they were
"of the same or similar character."  ORS 132.560(1)(b)(A).
Defendant does not argue that that determination was error. 
Rather, defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the joinder
of charges and, accordingly, that the trial court should have
ordered separate trials under ORS 132.560(3).  We review for
errors of law the trial court's determination that the facts
presented in defendant's motion to sever did not show the
existence of prejudice.  State v. Miller, 327 Or 622, 629, 969
P2d 1006 (1998).

		In State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 257, 971 P2d 879
(1999), we rejected the defendant's claim that he was prejudiced
by joinder of charges because he did "not support his claim of
error with arguments based on the facts of [his] case."  So too
here.  Defendant does not explain what specific prejudice arose
from the joinder of these charges.  Rather, he states that it is
"obvious" that joinder of the charges was "highly inflammatory"
and that the "unfair prejudice of consolidating these cases was
so overwhelming as to prevent the fair trial on any of these
alleged crimes."  He also urges that the "state should have been
required to prove each case on its merits, rather than combining
the cases to make defendant look guilty of multiple murders." 
Such general arguments, however, could be made in any case in
which charges are joined.  Further, the record demonstrates that
the trial court did require the state to prove each case
separately, on its own merits.  Absent an argument of prejudice
related to the specific facts of this case, we conclude, as in
Thompson, that defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced within the meaning of ORS 132.560(3). 

		Defendant also argues, without elaboration, that the
trial court's refusal to sever the charges for trial denied him
due process of law under the United States Constitution. 
Defendant's summary reference to "due process" is insufficient to
present any specific due process argument to this court, and,
accordingly, we decline to address the issue.  See State v.
Montez, 309 Or 564, 604, 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (declining to
address undeveloped claim of constitutional error).  The trial
court did not err in denying defendant's motions to sever the
charges for trial.

		In his third assignment of error, defendant challenges
the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion for change of
venue.  The trial court originally denied that motion in
September 1995.  Defendant renewed the motion on the first day of
jury selection, in October 1995, and the trial court again denied
it.  Defendant argued to the trial court that the publicity
surrounding his trial and conviction for the murder of Martha
Bryant was so pervasive that he could not receive a fair trial in
Washington County.  As evidence for that argument, defendant
noted that prospective jurors' answers to the trial court's jury
questionnaire revealed that a majority of the jury pool had some
familiarity with defendant or with the Bryant murder generally. 
He also provided the court with copies of local newspaper and
television reports of the Bryant murder.

		In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that
the questionnaires did not establish that the jurors' exposure to
pretrial publicity was of such a nature that defendant could not
receive a fair and impartial trial.  The court noted that the
remainder of the jury selection process would provide more
information on that issue and stated to defense counsel:

		"It may well be you're right, that the information
is of a type that a significant portion of the jurors
are not going to be able to set it aside.  I need to
find that out for sure.  I doubt that right now, but I
need to find that out for sure, and I think that's part
of what we will find out through this process.

		"So at this point, I'm going to deny that renewed
motion, but I expect to hear it at least one more time after
we've had some actual prospective juror input into the
problem, and that will help make it clear that there is, in
fact, a problem or that there is, in fact, not a problem."

Although he did not renew the motion later, defendant argues that
the denial of his motion at the time that he made it was error.

		ORS 131.355 governs changes of venue for prejudice and
provides:

		 "The court, upon motion of the defendant, shall
order the place of trial to be changed to another
county if the court is satisfied that there exists in
the county where the action is commenced so great a
prejudice against the defendant that the defendant
cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial."

We review trial court denials of motions for change of venue for
abuse of discretion.  State v. Pratt, 316 Or 561, 570, 853 P2d
827 (1993).

		The defendant is correct that the jury questionnaires
did reveal that most prospective jurors had some familiarity with
defendant or with the Bryant murder.  However, juror exposure to
adverse pretrial publicity does not necessitate a change of venue
automatically:  "[A]dverse publicity in a murder case is common
and does not, of itself, necessarily make it impossible for a
defendant to get a fair and impartial trial."  State v. Langley,
314 Or 247, 260, 839 P2d 692 (1992), on recons 318 Or 28, 861 P2d
1012 (1993).  Because defendant moved for a change of venue
before individual questioning of the jury pool, the only evidence
of prejudice that was before the trial court at the time of the
motion was contained in the jury questionnaires.  Those
questionnaires reveal some general level of juror familiarity
with defendant and with the Bryant murder.  By themselves,
however, the questionnaires are not sufficient to compel the
conclusion that the jury pool was so prejudiced against defendant
that seating a fair and impartial jury was impossible. 
Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that the jury
questionnaires did not, by themselves, indicate an unacceptable
level of prejudice was reasonable.  We conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion
for change of venue.(5)    

		In his fourth assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to
disqualify the trial judge.  Defendant sought to disqualify the
trial judge under ORS 14.250 and 14.270.  ORS 14.250 provides, in
part:

		 "No judge of a circuit court shall sit to hear or
try any suit, action, matter or proceeding when it is
established, as provided in ORS 14.250 to 14.270, that
any party or attorney believes that such party or
attorney cannot have a fair and impartial trial or
hearing before such judge."

This case was tried in the twentieth judicial district.  Because
the twentieth district has a population of over 100,000, motions
to disqualify the trial judge must be made at the time and in the
manner prescribed in ORS 14.270.  ORS 14.260(4).

		Defendant filed his motion to disqualify and
accompanying affidavit on July 27, 1995.  The trial court denied
the motion at a hearing on September 19, 1995, concluding that
the motion was untimely.  Defendant orally renewed the motion
during jury selection, and again the trial court rejected it,
this time without explanation.  

		At the time when defendant filed his motion to
disqualify the trial judge, the trial judge already had ruled on
a number of motions in this case, including one of defendant's
motions to sever.  ORS 14.270 provides, in part:

		"No motion to disqualify a judge * * * shall be
made after the judge has ruled upon any petition,
demurrer or motion other than a motion to extend time
in the cause, matter or proceeding * * *."

That statutory provision unambiguously requires that motions
under ORS 14.270 be filed before the court has ruled on any other
motion, except for a motion for an extension of time. 
Defendant's motion to disqualify the judge did not satisfy that
requirement.  It follows, as the trial court concluded, that
defendant's motion was untimely.  See Oregon State Bar v. Wright,
280 Or 693, 705, 573 P2d 283 (1977) (motion to disqualify judge
was untimely under ORS 14.270, where defendant filed motion after
trial judge had ruled on motions in case).  The trial court did
not err in denying defendant's motion to disqualify the judge.

GUILT PHASE

		In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in denying his "Motion To Quash Verdicts,
To Declare Trial a Nullity, And To Dismiss Jury," which he filed
in response to the trial court's belated administration of the
jury oath.(6)  As a preliminary matter, we note that defendant's
motion, however captioned, is the equivalent of a motion for
mistrial.  We address defendant's motion according to its
substance, not its caption.  See Employee Benefits Ins. v. Grill,
300 Or 587, 589, 715 P2d 491 (1986) (addressing motion based on
the nature of the relief sought, not on the wording of the
caption); Cooley v. Roman, 286 Or 807, 810-11, 596 P2d 565 (1979)
(to the same effect).  We review the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.  State
v. Larson, 325 Or 15, 22, 933 P2d 958 (1997).

		As noted, the trial court neglected to administer the
oath to the jury until after the jury had deliberated and
returned its initial set of verdicts.  ORCP 57 E governs the
administration of the jury oath.  That rule, which applies to
criminal trials under ORS 136.210(1),(7) provides:

		"As soon as the number of the jury has been
completed, an oath or affirmation shall be administered
to the jurors, in substance that they and each of them
will well and truly try the matter in issue between the
plaintiff and defendant, and a true verdict give
according to the law and evidence as given them on the
trial."

The temporal requirement of that rule is unambiguous.  ORCP 57 E
requires a trial court to administer the jury oath "[a]s soon as
the number of the jury has been completed,"(8) and we may neither
ignore nor modify that plain statutory requirement.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143
(1993).  Here, the trial court did not administer the jury oath
as soon as the number of the jury had been completed.  It
follows, as the court acknowledged at trial, that the oath was
not timely administered and that the court therefore erred in
that regard.

		The question remains whether defendant was entitled to
a mistrial as a result of that error.  Defendant did not object
to the untimely administration of the oath at trial and does not
assign it as error on appeal.  Rather, he assigns error only to
the trial court's denial, on the twelfth day of trial, of his
motion for mistrial.  Thus, the question before us is whether, in
light of its error, the trial court abused its discretion by
denying defendant's motion for mistrial. 

		That question is a narrow one.  Defendant does not
argue that the oath, once administered, was in any way defective. 
Nor does he argue that there is any evidence of juror misconduct
or anything in the record to suggest that any juror violated the
substance of the oath at any point in the proceedings.  Rather,
he argues that, even absent any showing of specific prejudice,
the untimeliness of the oath rendered the entire trial "a
nullity."  Under the circumstances, defendant urges, the trial
court had no choice but to grant his motion.  Accordingly, we
must answer the question whether a trial court's untimely
administration of the jury oath automatically necessitates a
mistrial, even where there is no showing of case-specific
prejudice to the defendant and despite any efforts the court
might make to cure the error.

		We begin by noting that nothing in the text of ORCP 57
E requires a mistrial in a case in which a trial court
administers the oath to the jury after the time specified in the
rule.  The rule is silent as to the remedy for such an error. 
The legislature at other places in the criminal code and rules of
civil procedure has declared that certain procedural errors
require that a new trial be granted or judgment not be entered
following a verdict of guilty.  See ORS 136.500, 135.630 (setting
out grounds for motion for arrest of judgment); ORCP 64 B, C
(setting out grounds for motion for new trial).  However, the
legislature has not prescribed such a remedy with respect to the
procedural error at issue here.  We do not mean to suggest that
the legislature's failure to prescribe a remedy or sanction for
failure to comply with the temporal requirements of ORCP 57 E
means that those requirements lack significance.  However, we
also may not assume from the legislature's silence an intention
that a mistrial must be granted following every untimely
administration of the jury oath.

		Notwithstanding the lack of a requirement for a
mistrial in the text of ORCP 57 E, defendant argues that a
mistrial was required on the facts of this case.  Although
variously iterated, defendant's claims in this assignment of
error reduce to an argument that his motion should have been
granted because the trial court's error naturally and inevitably
affected his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution(9) and Article 1, section 11, of
the Oregon Constitution.(10)  According to defendant, the jurors,
being unsworn, were not accountable to the court, to defendant,
or to one another, to follow the trial court's instructions or
properly to consider the case.  Because the untimely
administration of the oath affected his right to an impartial
jury, defendant continues, the trial court was required to grant
his motion.  Put another way, defendant essentially contends
that, where a trial court's error affects a defendant's right to
an impartial jury, the court always would abuse its discretion by
refusing to declare a mistrial.

		The difficulty with that argument is that, in this
case, there is no basis in this record from which to conclude
that defendant's right to an impartial jury in fact was affected
by the trial court's untimely administration of the jury oath. 
Defendant does not direct us to any evidence in the record that
would support even an inference that the jury was less than
impartial, and we find no such evidence.  Further, the individual
jurors' sworn responses to the trial court's questions indicate
that the jurors in fact tried the case according to the terms of
the jury oath during the period before the court administered the
oath.  Thus, even if defendant is correct that the untimely
administration of the oath denied him a pretrial guarantee of an
impartial jury, the trial court was not required to grant a
mistrial on that basis, because nothing in the record suggests
that defendant's case in fact received less than proper
consideration from an impartial jury.

		Defendant nevertheless asserts that a mistrial was
required under case law from Oregon and other jurisdictions.  He
first argues that the result here is dictated by State v. Wolfe,
147 Or 405, 34 P2d 304 (1934).  In that case, the jury was
selected, but the trial court did not administer the oath.  The
trial court then postponed the trial and permitted the jurors to
separate.  When they reassembled a week later for trial, the
court administered the oath but did not permit the parties to
question the jurors regarding their conduct during the
postponement.  This court reviewed the trial court's actions for
abuse of discretion and concluded that the trial court had erred
in postponing the administration of the oath and the trial.  Id.
at 407.

	 Here, neither defendant nor the state sought to examine the
jurors in that manner.  The trial court conducted its own
examination, however.  Wolfe establishes that it is error
requiring reversal to fail to voir dire a jury that was not
timely sworn, at least when a party wishes to make the inquiry. 
But the converse of that proposition is that, if an inquiry is
made and no reason appears requiring that the jury be discharged,
the error does not constitute a basis for requiring a mistrial. 
Here, the inquiry was made; defendant asked for nothing more.  It
follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and
therefore did not err, in denying defendant's motion for a
mistrial.

		Defendant also cites case law from other jurisdictions
that, he asserts, stands for the proposition that an untimely
jury oath may be harmless if administered during the presentation
of the case, but not if administered after the jury begins
deliberations.  We are not persuaded.  First, jurisprudence in
other jurisdictions involves statutes and rules different from
our own.  Second, ORCP 57 E unambiguously requires that the oath
be administered as soon as the number of the jury is completed. 
It follows that a trial court errs if the swearing of the jury is
delayed to any extent.  If that error results in unfair prejudice
or affects a substantial right of a party, the trial court is
without discretion to deny a motion for mistrial; if the error
does not, then a mistrial is not required.  We see nothing in
ORCP 57 E, or in any other relevant rule or statutory or
constitutional provision, to support defendant's suggestion that
our analysis should depend on whether the untimely swearing
occurs before or after the jury retires to deliberate.

		Defendant further argues that the untimely
administration of the oath resulted in prejudice because the
jury's second verdict, which was returned after the oath was
administered, irrevocably was tainted by the first, unsworn
verdict.  Because of that prejudice, defendant continues, the
trial court had no discretion to deny his motion for mistrial. 
We disagree.  The trial court instructed the jurors to
redeliberate and put aside all thoughts of their earlier
verdicts.  Although defendant asserts that the court's
instruction was a "futile gesture," we assume that jurors follow
their instructions, "absent an overwhelming probability that they
would be unable to do so."  State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 26, 791 P2d
836 (1990).  Here, defendant's assertions do not provide a
substantial basis for concern that the jury would not follow the
court's instructions.  Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's
argument that he was prejudiced in this respect is unpersuasive,
and his contention that the trial court was required to grant a
mistrial on this basis is not well taken.

		Finally, we address a contention that defendant raised
at oral argument.  In response to questioning from the court,
defendant argued that the apparent lack of prejudice was
irrelevant in this case, because the trial court's failure to
comply with the timing requirements of ORCP 57 E was the
equivalent of "structural" or "systemic" error, which required
the trial court to declare a mistrial.  "Structural error" is a
term from federal constitutional jurisprudence that refers to
errors that require automatic reversal because, where such an
error occurs, the trial court "cannot reliably serve its function
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."  Rose
v. Clark, 478 US 570, 577-78, 106 S Ct 3101, 92 L Ed 2d 460
(1986) (citation omitted).  Examples of such errors are the
denial of the right to counsel at trial and the denial of the
right to a trial conducted before an unbiased judge.  Id. at 577. 

		This court has not adopted the doctrine of "structural"
or "systemic" error in analyzing questions of Oregon law.  Even
if we were to adopt it, however, the doctrine would not apply in
this case.  Structural error analysis applies to denials of
fundamental constitutional rights in criminal prosecutions.  We
conclude that a delay in the administration of the jury oath is
not such a denial.  The jury oath is designed to vindicate a
defendant's fundamental constitutional rights to a fair trial
before an impartial jury.  However, the temporal requirement of
the oath itself is not such a right.  Nothing in the relevant
text of ORCP 57 E -- "[a]s soon as the number of the jury has
been completed, an oath or affirmation shall be administered to
the jurors" -- indicates that the temporal aspect of the oath
requirement was intended to confer a "right" on the parties at
all.  Rather, that part of the rule appears to be designed simply
to place an affirmative obligation on trial courts in their
conduct of trial proceedings.  Because the trial court's error
did not deny defendant a fundamental right, defendant's
"structural error" argument is not well taken.(11)

		In sum, we find no basis in this record from which to
conclude that the trial court's untimely swearing of the jury
resulted in grounds for a mistrial.  Accordingly, the trial court
had the discretion to remedy its error by curative efforts short
of a mistrial.  Where, as here, a defendant receives the benefits
of the oath in the form of a fair trial before an impartial jury,
the untimely administration of the jury oath, in the absence of
demonstrable prejudice, is not an error that compels granting a
mistrial.

		In his fifth assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred during jury selection in denying his
request for six additional peremptory challenges.  In the
alternative, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for mistrial, which motion was based in part
on the court's refusal to grant those additional peremptory
challenges.

		The trial court allowed defendant and the state twelve
peremptory challenges each.  During jury selection, defendant
exercised his twelve challenges.  As noted, he also sought to
disqualify six jurors for cause, arguing that their exposure to
pretrial publicity and media accounts of the Bryant murder
resulted in unfair prejudice.  The trial court refused to dismiss
the jurors for cause, and defendant does not assign error to that
ruling.

		Defendant then requested six additional peremptory
challenges to allow him to remove the six jurors to whom he
objected.  The trial court denied the request, again stating that
it believed that the six jurors in question were not biased
against defendant.  Defendant challenges that ruling.  

		ORS 136.230(1) governs peremptory challenges in
criminal cases.  It provides, in part:

		 "If the trial is upon an accusatory instrument in
which one or more of the crimes charged is * * * a
capital offense, both the defendant and the state are
entitled to 12 peremptory challenges, and no more."

(Emphasis added.)  In discerning the meaning of that statutory
provision, we look first to its text and context, PGE, 317 Or at
610-11, mindful not to omit from the statute what the legislature
has inserted, ORS 174.010.  In ORS 136.230(1), the legislature
has directed that defendants in capital cases are entitled to "no
more" than twelve peremptory challenges.  That statute disposes
of defendant's objection; he received the prescribed number of
peremptory challenges and was entitled to no more.  

		Defendant does not argue that ORS 136.230(1) is
inapplicable to this case or that the statute is defective in any
manner.  Rather, he argues -- as he did in his third assignment
of error -- that he was denied a fair trial by the inclusion on
the jury of persons with some knowledge of the Bryant murder.  In
the context of jury selection, that argument appears to be
directed more naturally to the trial court's denial of
defendant's attempts to dismiss those allegedly biased jurors for
cause.  However, as noted, defendant does not separately assign
error to the denial of his challenges for cause.  In the face of
the unambiguous limitation on peremptory challenges in ORS
136.230(1), the proper course for a defendant who has exhausted
his peremptory challenges but who believes that there still are
biased jurors on the panel is to challenge those jurors for
cause, and appeal if his challenges are denied.  The legislature
did not empower trial courts to grant more than twelve peremptory
challenges in capital cases and, accordingly, the trial court
here was without discretion to grant defendant's motion.

		Defendant also argues in this assignment of error that
the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial made at
the close of the state's case-in-chief in the Woodman murder. 
The substance of that motion was that the trial court's refusal
to grant additional peremptory challenges, combined with the
court's denial of defendant's objections to the testimony of
witnesses Leonard Darcell(12) and Alyssa Lake,(13) created
"cumulative" prejudice so severe as to deny defendant a fair
trial.

		Assuming without deciding that a mistrial motion of
this sort -- which is based on cumulative prejudice arising from
three temporally and logically unrelated decisions of the trial
court -- might under some circumstances be successful, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying such a motion in
this case.  Defendant predicated his motion on three claims of
error.  The first, related to the denial of additional peremptory
challenges, was not error, as discussed above.  Nor were the
others.  As we discuss below in response to defendant's sixth and
seventh assignments of error, see ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 27-38), the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of
Darcell and Lake.  Thus, the three claims of error that predicate
defendant's "cumulative" motion for mistrial are unavailing. 
Under the circumstances, there can be no "cumulative" prejudice
of the sort defendant alleges.  It follows that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for
mistrial.

		In his sixth assignment of error, defendant challenges
the trial court's decision to allow the state to call Darcell to
testify.  Darcell, the other participant in the kidnaping and
murder of Chantee Woodman, was convicted of felony murder for his
role in that crime.  His conviction was upheld on appeal before
defendant's trial on these charges.  State v. Darcell, 133 Or App
602, 891 P2d 25, rev den 321 Or 246 (1995). 

		The state intended to call Darcell during defendant's
trial for the Woodman murder to testify about defendant's role in
the murder.  Before Darcell was called, however, defendant moved
to exclude Darcell's testimony, on the ground that Darcell had
indicated that he would invoke his federal constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify.(14) 
According to Darcell's lawyer, the basis for that assertion of
privilege was Darcell's belief that he might receive a new trial
after a successful challenge to his conviction through post-conviction or habeas corpus proceedings.  Darcell did not want to
testify, his counsel asserted, because he was concerned that his
statements might be used against him in a subsequent prosecution 
-- following a grant of a new trial -- for the same crime for
which he already had been convicted.  At the time, Darcell had
not initiated proceedings for post-conviction or habeas corpus
relief. 

		The trial court ruled that the state could call Darcell
to testify.  The court first concluded that Darcell retained no
Fifth Amendment privilege, because he had been convicted and
sentenced and had exhausted his direct appeals.  The court noted
that Darcell appeared sincerely to believe that he retained the
privilege based on the possibility that his conviction might be
overturned.  However, the court also stated that it was
reasonable to conclude that Darcell had another motivation for
refusing to testify, namely, a desire to protect defendant.

		The state called Darcell as a witness and asked him
four questions:  Where he lived, whether he had seen defendant
attempt to rape Woodman, whether he had seen defendant shoot
Woodman, and whether, after shooting Woodman, defendant had
threatened him with a gun.  Darcell invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege and refused to answer.  The state then asked the trial
court to order Darcell to answer, and the court did so.  The
state again asked if Darcell had seen defendant shoot Woodman,
and Darcell again refused to answer.  In response, the state
asked the trial court to hold Darcell in contempt.  The trial
court excused the jury and held Darcell in contempt.  Defendant
then moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.

		On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in allowing the state to call Darcell.  In Oregon, it generally
is improper for the state to call a criminal defendant's
accomplice to testify, when the state knows that the accomplice
will invoke his or her Fifth Amendment (or Article I, section 12)
privilege and refuse to testify.  State v. Johnson, 243 Or 532,
413 P2d 383 (1966).  However, in State v. Abbott, 275 Or 611, 552
P2d 238 (1976), this court created an exception to that general
rule.  In Abbott, the court held that it was not error to allow
the state to call the defendant's accomplice, who had been
convicted and sentenced following a plea of guilty and had not
appealed, even though the state knew that the accomplice would
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to testify.  Id.
at 617.  The court distinguished Johnson on the ground that the
witness in Johnson, who had been indicted but not tried for his
alleged participation in the crime with which the defendant was
charged, still possessed a valid Fifth Amendment privilege.  The
witness in Abbott, on the other hand, had no ongoing Fifth
Amendment privilege, because he had been convicted and his time
for appeal had run.  Abbott, 275 Or at 616.  Thus, the court
concluded that it was reasonable to infer that the witness was
refusing to testify to protect the defendant, because the witness
could not incriminate himself further by testifying about the
crime.  Under the circumstances, it was permissible for the state
to call the witness for the sole purpose of having the witness
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, in order that the jury
might infer that the witness was protecting the defendant.  Id.
at 617. 

		Relying on Johnson and Abbott, the trial court in this
case reasoned that the state may not put a criminal defendant's
accomplice on the witness stand solely for the purpose of having
the accomplice invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of
the jury, unless the accomplice no longer possesses a valid Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Consistent with
Abbott, the court further concluded that Darcell no longer
possessed a Fifth Amendment privilege and allowed the state to
call Darcell as a witness.  

		According to defendant, that ruling was error, because
Darcell, unlike the witness in Abbott, still possessed a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  That argument is
based on Darcell's statement that he intended to attack his
convictions through post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings
at some point in the future.  Defendant further argues that the
Abbott court's statement, "the witness has no privilege to remain
silent, having been convicted on a plea of guilty," 275 Or at
616, does not apply to Darcell, because Darcell did not plead
guilty.

		Accordingly, the question before us is whether a
witness, who has been convicted of a crime and has exhausted his
direct appeals from that crime, nevertheless possesses a
privilege against self-incrimination and may refuse to answer
questions about the crime, if he intends at some time in the
future to attack his conviction through post-conviction or habeas
corpus proceedings.  We conclude that a witness does not possess
a privilege against self-incrimination under those circumstances. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects
witnesses from the danger of exposing themselves to criminal
liability.  The privilege applies where the risk of self-incrimination is "real and appreciable," not "remote and
improbable."  Brown v. Walker, 161 US 591, 599-600, 16 S Ct 644,
40 L Ed 819 (1896); see also Rogers v. United States, 340 US 367,
372-73, 71 S Ct 438, 95 L Ed 344 (1951) (to the same effect). 
Here, Darcell's asserted risk of self-incrimination was neither
"real" nor "appreciable", because at the time when he claimed the
privilege, Darcell already had been convicted of the charge for
which he feared prosecution.  He could not incriminate himself
further by answering questions about a crime for which he already
had been convicted and sentenced and for which his direct appeals
were exhausted.  See Mitchell v. United States, ___ US ___, ___,
119 S Ct 1307, 1314, 143 L Ed 2d 424 (1999) ("It is true, as a
general rule, that where there can be no further incrimination,
there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege.  We
conclude that principle applies to cases in which the sentence
has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become
final."); Reina v. United States, 364 US 507, 513, 81 S Ct 260, 5
L Ed 2d 249 (1960) (citing "weighty authority" for the
proposition that, "once a person is convicted of a crime, he no
longer has the privilege against self-incrimination as he can no
longer be incriminated by his testimony about said crime

* * *.").

		Nor did Darcell's expressed intention to seek post-conviction or habeas corpus relief in the future render the
danger of self-incrimination "real" and "appreciable."  Defendant
in effect argued to the trial court that Darcell might in the
future petition for post-conviction or habeas corpus relief, on
some basis unknown to the trial court; that some or all of
Darcell's claims for relief might be successful; that, as a
result, Darcell might receive a new trial; and that his testimony
from defendant's trial might be used to incriminate him during
that new trial.  Those speculations did not -- and do not --
establish that Darcell faced real and appreciable danger of self-incrimination at the time when he was asked to testify.  The
possibility of future prosecution based on his testimony in
defendant's trial was too remote to resurrect Darcell's Fifth
Amendment privilege.

		We also reject defendant's argument that Darcell's
privilege against self-incrimination survived because he did not
plead guilty.  The basis for that argument is defendant's
contention that post-conviction and habeas corpus relief are more
likely to be granted from convictions following jury trials than
from convictions following guilty pleas.  Thus, the argument
proceeds, if Darcell sought to attack his conviction
collaterally, he would be more likely to receive a new trial
than, for example, the witness in Abbott, who pleaded guilty. 
That argument is not well taken.  The contention that Darcell's
risk of self-incrimination would be lower if he had pleaded
guilty does not further the argument that his risk of self-incrimination is real and appreciable on the facts of this case.  

		In sum, Darcell did not possess a Fifth Amendment
privilege to refuse to testify in this case.  Under Abbott, the
state could call Darcell as a witness, even knowing that he would
refuse to testify.  As the trial court found, the jury reasonably
could believe that Darcell's refusal to testify was motivated by
a desire to protect defendant.  Accordingly, the inference that
the state sought to establish from that refusal to testify --
namely, that Darcell was trying to protect defendant through his
silence -- also was reasonable.  The trial court did not err in
allowing the state to call Darcell as a witness; nor did the
court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for
mistrial on that ground.(15)

		Defendant's seventh assignment of error addresses the
trial court's admission of the testimony of Alyssa Lake during
the state's case-in-chief on the Woodman murder.  Over
defendant's objection, Lake testified as follows: Shortly before
midnight on December 29, 1992, she accepted a ride from defendant
and Leonard Darcell in downtown Portland.  After driving a short
distance, defendant drove into a parking lot so that he and
Darcell could urinate.  After urinating, defendant returned to
the car, produced a handgun, placed the muzzle of the gun against
Lake's neck, and threatened to kill her unless she performed a
sexual act on him.  Darcell, who knew Lake slightly, then
returned to the car and pleaded with defendant not to harm Lake. 
The two men argued for fifteen to twenty minutes, during which
time defendant continued to threaten Lake with the gun.  Finally,
defendant relented and drove Lake to her home.  At trial, Lake
testified that the handgun with which defendant had threatened
her resembled the handgun with which, according to the state's
theory of the case, defendant had killed Woodman.

		After admitting Lake's testimony, the trial court
cautioned the jury as to the limited purposes for which it could
consider the testimony.  The court stated:

		"This testimony was not offered and was not
allowed on the issue of [defendant's] character or to
prove any criminal activity against this witness by
[defendant], and you may not use it for those purposes. 
It was allowed on the issues of the whereabouts of
[defendant] at the stated time, his possible possession
of a particular firearm, and the relationship between
[defendant] and the person known as [Darcell]."

		Defendant argues that the trial court should have
excluded Lake's testimony under OEC 404(3), which bars the
introduction of evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts * * *
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith."(16)  Such evidence may be
admitted for other, noncharacter purposes under the three-part
test from State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195, 832 P2d 443 (1992):

	"(1) The evidence must be independently relevant for a
noncharacter purpose; (2) the proponent of the evidence
must offer sufficient proof that the uncharged
misconduct was committed and that defendant committed
it; and (3) the probative value of the uncharged
misconduct evidence must not be substantially
outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth
in OEC 403."

(Footnotes omitted.)

		As noted, the trial court admitted Lake's testimony, in
part, to show that defendant had the opportunity to murder
Woodman and to establish the inference that, on the night of
Woodman's murder, defendant possessed the murder weapon. 
Defendant does not argue that Lake's testimony was irrelevant(17)
or that the state did not offer sufficient proof of the acts Lake
described.  Rather, he argues that the third part of the Johnson
test was not met, because the testimony was unfairly prejudicial
under OEC 403.(18)  Specifically, defendant argues that the
evidence was prejudicial because it "cast defendant in a terrible
light and would have weighed heavily in the minds of the jurors."

		To be excluded under OEC 403, testimony must be not
only prejudicial, but unfairly so.  State v. Moore, 324 Or 396,
407, 927 P2d 1073 (1996).  "In the context of OEC 403, 'unfair
prejudice' means 'an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an
improper basis, commonly although not always an emotional one.'" 
Id. at 407-08 (quoting Legislative Commentary, cited in Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, 125 (2d ed 1989)).  Further, the
probative value of the evidence must be "substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice."  OEC 403 (emphasis added).  

		We conclude that the probative value of Lake's
testimony outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.  The
testimony was helpful to the jury's consideration of a number of
relevant issues.  As the trial court concluded, the testimony
placed defendant and Darcell in a car in downtown Portland just
hours before Woodman was taken from downtown Portland and
murdered.  It also tended to establish the inference that
defendant possessed the murder weapon on the night of Woodman's
murder.

		Further, any prejudicial effect of the testimony was
blunted by the trial court's limiting instruction.  The court
clearly instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for the
specific purposes for which it was admitted.  Jurors are assumed
to follow the court's instructions, Smith, 310 Or at 26, and the
record provides no basis on which to conclude that they were
unlikely to do so in this case.

		In sum, we conclude that the probative value of Lake's
testimony outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Accordingly, the third prong of the Johnson test is satisfied,
and the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony under
OEC 404(3).(19)

		In his tenth assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning a letter
that defendant wrote during trial.  The state called an employee
of the jail where defendant was housed, who testified that she
had intercepted a letter from defendant to a fellow inmate.  Over
defendant's objection, the employee read the following passages
from the letter:

		"Anyways, rats testified today, as did the state
crime lab.

		"* * * * *

		"Ask Pope(20) if he remembers asking me if I needed
a hand.  That I said no -- (and it was something you
and I spoke briefly about.)  But now you can tell him
yes -- that his friend, James Lord, who is at [Eastern
Oregon Correctional Institution], doesn't want to be
coming back here to testify, but doesn't know how to
stop doing so.  Maybe Pope knows somebody that can
teach him how to research the problem, and come to an
agreeable solution.  That this would be most helpful,
and it's ASAP.

		"* * * * *

		"P.S.  When you write back, just tell me if Pope
says yes or no.  I need to know ASAP so I know where to
go in dealing with it.  It is important."

(Emphasis in original.)  The quoted parts of the letter were
dated November 9, 1995.  At the time, James Lord had testified
once, during the state's case-in-chief on the Woodman murder.  He
subsequently testified again, during the state's case-in-chief on
the Schmidt murder.

		Defendant objected to the testimony about his letter on
the ground that it was irrelevant under OEC 401(21)

 or, if
relevant, was unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403.  The trial
court overruled defendant's objection, stating that the letter
reasonably could be construed as an attempt to engage a fellow
inmate to take action against Lord, in order to stop him from
testifying further.  Under that construction, the court
concluded, the letter was relevant, because it led to an
"inference of consciousness of guilt" on defendant's part.  The
court further concluded that the evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial under OEC 403.  Defendant assigns error to both
rulings.

		We review trial court determinations of relevance under
OEC 401 for errors of law.  State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, ___
P2d ___ (1999).  OEC 401 establishes a "very low threshold" for
the admission of evidence; evidence is relevant so long as it
increases or decreases, even slightly, the probability of the
existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action.  State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251, 255 n 8, 855 P2d
621 (1993).  

		Defendant argues that the testimony concerning the
contents of his letter was not relevant because the quoted parts
of the letter are vague and subject to more than one
interpretation.  However, the state's interpretation of the
letter as a veiled request by defendant for another inmate to
take steps to stop Lord from testifying again is reasonable, if
not compelled.  See Titus, 328 Or at 481 (evidence susceptible to
multiple inferences admissible if inference desired by proponent
is reasonable).  Defendant was free to argue at trial that the
letter in fact had another meaning.  Under the state's
construction, the letter was relevant to establish an inference
of defendant's consciousness of his guilt in the Woodman and
Schmidt murders.  See Barone I, 328 Or at 92 (evidence leading to
reasonable inference of the defendant's consciousness of guilt
relevant).  The trial court did not err in admitting the
testimony under OEC 401.

		Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in
rejecting defendant's argument that the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial under OEC 403; the probative value of the evidence
outweighed any limited prejudicial effect, as the court
concluded.  In sum, the trial court did not err in admitting
testimony concerning the contents of defendant's letter.(22)

		In his twelfth assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.
The basis for defendant's motion was the trial court's jury
instructions on the charges of aggravated felony murder and
felony murder.  

		The elements of felony murder are set out in ORS
163.115(1)(b), which provides, in part:

		"(1)  Except as provided in ORS 163.118 and
163.125, criminal homicide constitutes murder:

		"* * * * *

		"(b)  When it is committed by a person, acting
either alone or with one or more persons, who commits
or attempts to commit any of the following crimes and
in the course of and in furtherance of the crime the
person is committing or attempting to commit, or during
the immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another
participant if there be any, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants * * *."

(Emphasis added.)  Aggravated felony murder occurs when "the
defendant personally and intentionally commit[s] the homicide
under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115(1)(b)."  ORS
163.095(2)(d).  As noted, defendant was charged with six counts
of aggravated felony murder and two counts of felony murder.

		During closing arguments, the state argued to the jury
that, under the felony murder and aggravated felony murder
statutes, the murder must be committed during the course of or in
furtherance of the underlying felony on which the felony murder
charge is based.  In his closing arguments, defendant argued that
the state was required to prove that the murders had been
committed during the course of and in furtherance of the
underlying felonies.  According to defendant, that was a logical
impossibility in these cases, because none of the underlying
felonies -- kidnaping, attempted rape, and sexual abuse -- could
be "furthered" by murder.  

		Before the state's rebuttal closing argument, the
parties and the trial court discussed the requirements for
proving felony murder.  The trial court ultimately agreed with
the state that the statutes required proof that the murder had
been committed during the course of or in furtherance of the
underlying felony.  The court then informed the parties that the
jury instructions would reflect that interpretation of the
relevant statutes.  Defendant objected to the court's decision to
instruct the jury in that manner.

		The state then made its rebuttal closing arguments. 
During those arguments, the state exhorted the jurors to
"[l]isten to the court's instructions" and urged that defendant
"wants [the jury] to misunderstand the law."  The state also made
the following statements relevant to this issue:

		"I submit to you that you're going to hear that
the crime of aggravated murder, you look for the
kidnaping, that it occurred in the course of or, or in
furtherance of the commission of the crime.

		"* * * * *

		"* * *[Defendant], in his argument, has basically
told you, rather subtly, 'Well, don't convict him of
this, because the state hasn't proved that it was in
the course of and in furtherance.'  But you know that
the instruction is 'or in furtherance of.'  And he's
kind of -- I don't want to characterize his argument. 
You have to characterize his argument.  But he's kind
of left it, 'Well, if you don't buy the rest of my
argument, yeah, maybe he was involved in the kidnaping,
and, yeah, maybe he intentionally did it, but it
doesn't add up to this.  

		"Well, I submit to you it does.  When the judge
explains to you the jury instructions, you will realize
that this is what Mr. Barone did.  He was involved in
the kidnaping of Miss Woodman, and he, himself,
intentionally killed her.  That's aggravated murder.

		"* * * * *

		"The argument that this wasn't done in the course
of and in furtherance of a burglary or that it wasn't
done in the course of and in furtherance of an
attempted rape is ludicrous.  You're being misled. 
Don't be misled.  In the course of:  This killing was
in the course of a burglary.  It was in the course of
an attempted rape."

(Emphasis added.)  Defendant did not object to any of those
statements.

		The trial court then instructed the jury.  In setting
out the elements of felony murder and aggravated felony murder,
the court consistently instructed the jury that the state was
required to prove that the murders were committed "in the course
of and/or in furtherance of" the underlying felonies.  (Emphasis
added.)  Defendant took exception to the court's instructions on
that point.

		After the jury retired to deliberate, the parties and
the court recessed.  When the court reconvened, the jury still
had not returned with its verdicts.  At that point, the
prosecutor informed the court that he never before had been
confronted with defendant's "and/or" argument.  On reflection,
the prosecutor conceded that his argument in response had been
"erroneous" and that he believed that the court had instructed
the jury incorrectly on the elements of felony murder and
aggravated felony murder.  

		The court then asked defendant if he wanted the court
to reinstruct the jury on the elements of the charged offenses. 
After a consultation between defendant and defense counsel,
defendant instead moved for a mistrial.  He asserted two grounds
for that motion:  The allegedly erroneous instruction and the
prosecutor's comments during rebuttal closing, which counsel
characterized as "a direct attack on my credibility."  The trial
court denied the motion for mistrial.  Defendant then asked the
court to reinstruct the jury, and the court agreed.

		By that time, the jury had returned with verdicts.  The
court took the verdict forms from the jury, but neither read nor
received them.  The court then informed the jury that the felony
murder instruction that it had given was erroneous, described the
nature of the error, and stated that the jury would have to
retire with new verdict forms to redeliberate.  Next, the court
reinstructed the jury on the elements of felony murder, this time
clarifying that the state was required to prove that the murder
was committed in the course of and in furtherance of the
underlying felony.  So instructed, the jury retired to deliberate
with new verdict forms.  After deliberating, the jury returned
verdicts of guilty on the two charges of felony murder and on
five of the charges of aggravated felony murder, and, as to the
remaining charge of aggravated felony murder, a verdict of guilty
of the lesser-included offense of murder.  The jury noted on its
verdict form that it had changed its verdict on that final charge
from guilty of the charged offense of aggravated felony murder. 

		Defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of
his motion for mistrial.  As he did before the trial court,
defendant makes two independent arguments in support of his
motion.  First, he argues that the trial court's original
instruction "misstated the law" and that the "bell could not be
unrung by a curative instruction, so a mistrial was necessary." 
Second, he argues that the prosecutor's comments during rebuttal
closing "belittled" defense counsel to the detriment of
defendant, and that a mistrial was required to cure the resulting
prejudice.

		That second argument is untimely and, therefore,
unpreserved.  As noted, a motion for mistrial must be made "as
soon as the objectionable statement or event occurs."  Barone I,
328 Or at 90.  Here, defendant's second argument in support of
his motion relates solely to comments made during the state's
rebuttal closing argument.  In the interval between the last of
those comments and defendant's motion, the prosecutor completed
his closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury, the
jury retired to deliberate, the court recessed, the court
reconvened, there was a colloquy between the court and counsel
for the parties, and defendant consulted with his lawyers.  That
interval was too great; defendant did not make his motion
promptly after the objectionable event occurred and,
consequently, failed to preserve his second argument in support
of his motion for mistrial. 

		We turn to whether the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting defendant's first argument in support of
his motion for mistrial.  As an initial matter, we agree that the
original instructions were erroneous, as the trial court
ultimately concluded.  ORS 163.115(1)(b) plainly requires the
state to prove that the murder was committed "in the course of
and in furtherance of" the underlying felony.  There was no basis
in the statute for the trial court's "and/or" instructions.   

		According to defendant, that error required the trial
court to grant a mistrial.  Defendant argues, without
elaboration, that the trial court's second set of instructions --
which correctly described the law -- were insufficient to
overcome the effect of the initial, erroneous instructions.  We
disagree.  We will not assume that the jury failed to follow the
correct instructions -- which were clear and straightforward --
absent some compelling argument that the jury was incapable of
doing so.  Smith, 310 Or at 26.  Defendant has not made such an
argument.  The trial court's reinstruction on the elements of
felony murder was sufficient to remedy the original error and,
consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant's motion for mistrial.

PENALTY PHASE

		Defendant's fourteenth assignment of error addresses
the trial court's admission during the penalty phase of testimony
reflecting defendant's attitude toward the "Green River Killer." 
The state called as a witness Timothy Woodruff, an inmate who was
incarcerated with defendant.  Woodruff testified that defendant
had stated "that he thought [the Green River Killer] was just a
punk.  You know, compared to [defendant], he was a punk."

		Defendant argues that that testimony should have been
excluded because it was more prejudicial than probative under OEC
403.  We review trial court rulings on the admissibility of
relevant evidence under OEC 403 for abuse of discretion.(23)  State
v. Rose, 311 Or 274, 291, 810 P2d 839 (1991). 

		We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Woodruff's testimony.  Even if
defendant's statements could support other permissible
inferences, the statements reasonably could be construed as
revealing that defendant measured his crimes against those of
other murderers and took pride in his violent acts.  Accordingly,
Woodruff's testimony tended to demonstrate defendant's affinity
for violent crime and was probative of defendant's future
dangerousness under the second question from ORS 163.150(1)(b).(24) 

		Nor was the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice. 
Defendant suggests that the mention of the Green River Killer
"would instill in the jury a fear of unprosecuted killers, and
would perhaps allow the jury to draw the conclusion that
defendant was somehow connected to those Washington serial
killings."  Even granting that the mention of the Green River
Killer might have had some such unfair prejudicial effect -- a
contention that seems to us to be dubious, at best -- the
probative value of the testimony was greater.  As noted, the
testimony supported the inference that defendant took pride in
his violent acts and measured himself against other murderers. 
That inference certainly could figure into the jury's
determination on the second question.  Defendant's speculations
about possible unfair prejudice do not persuade us that the
evidence should have been suppressed under OEC 403.

  		In his fifteenth assignment of error, defendant
challenges the trial court's admission, over defendant's
objection, of photographs taken during the autopsy of Bryant. 
Defendant argues that the photographs were irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403.

		The state argues that the photographs were relevant to
the jury's determination of the probability that defendant would
"commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society."  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B).  We agree. 
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) "permits the introduction of a broad range
of evidence," Moore, 324 Or at 416, including a defendant's
entire previous criminal history, State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 73,
74-76, 786 P2d 111 (1990).  "To be admissible under the second
question * * * the proffered evidence must have a tendency to
show that a probability either does or does not exist that the
defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society."  Moore, 324 Or at
417.

		We have no difficulty concluding that the proffered
evidence meets that standard of relevance.  The photographs were
evidence of the brutality of defendant's attack on Bryant and
supported the prosecution's contention that defendant posed a
continuing threat to society.  Further, the photographs were
evidence of "the range and severity of a defendant's prior
criminal conduct," which also is probative of future
dangerousness.  Moen, 309 Or at 73. 

		The remaining question is whether the photographs were
unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403.  In Barone I, this court held
that the same photographs were not unfairly prejudicial under OEC
403, stating that although "the photographs in question were
graphic, they could not be said to be remarkable in the context
of a murder trial."  328 Or at 88.  We carefully have considered
defendant's arguments in this case and again conclude that
defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of the
photographs.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting them into evidence. 

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

		We carefully have considered defendant's remaining
arguments and assignments of error and conclude that they already
have been resolved against defendant or are not well taken.  An
extended discussion of those arguments and assignments of error
would not benefit bench or bar, and we reject them without
further discussion.

		The judgments of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed. 

1. 	Defendant's indictment for the murder of Chantee
Woodman refers to the victim as "Dantee Elise Oshita aka Chantee
Alyce Woodman."  Defendant's and the state's briefs to this court
refer to her as "Chantee Woodman" or "Shantee Woodman."  For sake
of convenience and clarity, we refer to her as Chantee Woodman in
this opinion.

2. 	The record does not indicate how long the jury took to
redeliberate and return those verdicts.

3. 	Defendant's counsel raised 17 of those assignments. 
With the court's permission, defendant filed a supplemental pro
se brief raising two additional assignments of error.

4. 	Because we arrange our discussion in this manner and
because we address only briefly certain assignments of error that
do not merit extended discussion, we do not address defendant's
assignments of error in the order in which he presents them.

5. 	Defendant suggests that his argument is "buttressed" by
the fact that six of the jurors who eventually served on the
panel had at least some familiarity with defendant or the Bryant
murder.  However, defendant's motion for change of venue was made
before the jury actually was selected.  Therefore, at the time
that the trial court denied defendant's motion, it did not have
any information -- and defendant did not make any argument --
about alleged bias on the part of individual members of the jury. 
Accordingly, that information does not "buttress" defendant's
argument that the trial court erred.  Further, the trial court
found, in response to defendant's motion to disqualify those six
jurors for cause, that none of the six was prejudiced against
defendant.  Nothing in the record or in defendant's arguments to
this court persuades us that the court's finding on that point
was error.

6. 	Defendant's second pro se assignment of error also
addresses the trial court's denial of that motion.  We consider
the two assignments of error together, and our discussion of the
first assignment of error from defendant's counsel's brief
adequately addresses defendant's second pro se assignment of
error. 

7. 	ORS 136.210(1) provides, in part:

		"Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, in criminal cases the trial jury shall consist
of 12 persons unless the parties consent to a less
number.  It shall be formed, except as otherwise
provided in ORS 136.220 to 136.250, in the same manner
provided by ORCP 57 B, D(1)(a), D(1)(b), D(1)(g) and
E."

8. 	The text of ORCP 57 E was adopted wholesale from an
earlier statute.  See Or Laws 1862, ch 2, §193.  The phrase "as
soon as the number of the jury is completed" sounds awkward and
archaic to the modern ear but, in the interest of consistency, we
employ the phrase throughout this opinion.

9. 	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:

		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
* * *."

10. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:

		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to public trial by an impartial jury

	* * *."

11. 	It bears repeating that defendant's argument on this
point is not that the denial of an impartial jury or of a fair
trial is structural error.  Rather, his argument is that the
trial court's failure to comply with the timing requirements of
ORCP 57 E is structural error.

12. 	Defendant also moved for a mistrial at the time that
the trial court denied his objection to Darcell's testimony. 
That motion related solely to Darcell's testimony.  Defendant has
challenged the denial of that motion, and we address his
arguments on that point in our discussion of his sixth assignment
of error.

13. 	Defendant also moved for a mistrial at the time that
the trial court denied his objection to Lake's testimony.  That
motion related solely to Lake's testimony.  Defendant has
challenged the denial of that motion, and we address his
arguments on that point in our discussion of his seventh
assignment of error.

14. 	The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:

		"No person shall be * * * compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself * * *."

The same protection also is contained in Article I, section 12,
of the Oregon Constitution.  However, Darcell did not attempt to
invoke his Article I, section 12, privilege, and defendant does
not make a separate state constitutional argument here. 

15. 	Defendant also argues, without elaboration, that his
"right to confrontation under the Oregon and Federal
Constitutions, and his due process rights under the federal
constitution were violated when the court allowed the state to go
forward with Darcell."  The mere invocation of those
constitutional provisions, unaccompanied by substantial argument
or any reference to authority, is insufficient to provide us a
meaningful basis to review any specific constitutional question. 
Accordingly, we decline to address defendant's assertions
regarding federal due process and the right to confrontation. 
See Montez, 309 Or at 604 (declining to address undeveloped claim
of constitutional error).  

16. 	In 1997, the legislature expanded the circumstances
under which relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
may be admitted in criminal actions.  ORS 40.170(4); Or Laws
1997, ch 313, § 29.  Neither party has raised the issue whether
that provision applies in this case, and, accordingly, we do not
address that issue here.  See State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 530 n
2, 964 P2d 1007 (1998) (declining to address applicability of
that statutory amendment in case where neither party raised the
issue).

17. 	Parts of defendant's brief to this court might be
construed as challenging the relevance of Lake's testimony. 
However, defense counsel conceded its relevance before the trial
court, stating:  "I don't argue with the fact that the evidence
is relevant for the two purposes the Court has indicated * * *." 
Consequently, the question of relevance is unpreserved.  To the
extent that defendant's brief to this court raises that issue, we
decline to address it.

18. 	OEC 403 provides:

		"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

19. 	Defendant also moved for a mistrial based on the trial
court's admission of Lake's testimony.  However, defendant did
not make that motion until the fourth day of trial.  Lake
testified on the second day of trial.  Therefore, defendant's
motion was untimely and is unpreserved.  See, e.g., Barone I, 328
Or at 90 ("To preserve error, a motion for mistrial must be made
timely, i.e., it must be made as soon as the objectionable
statement or event occurs.").

20. 	The transcript reflects that the witness read the name
in the letter as "Hope."  However, the letter in fact refers to
"Pope."

21. 	OEC 401 provides:

		"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."

22. 	In his brief to this court, defendant also suggests
that the evidence was inadmissible under OEC 404(3).  However,
defendant did not make an OEC 404(3) argument to the trial court
and, to the extent he makes such an argument to this court, we
decline to consider it for the first time on appeal.

23. 	In his brief to this court, defendant also argues that
Woodruff's testimony was irrelevant under OEC 401.  However,
defendant did not argue at trial that the testimony was
irrelevant, and we will not consider that argument for the first
time on appeal.  See Moore, 324 Or at 407 (prejudice argument
under OEC 403 not sufficient to preserve relevancy objection
under OEC 401). 

24. 	ORS 163.150(1)(b) provides:

		"Upon conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence, the court shall submit the following issues
to the jury:

		"(A)  Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;

		"(B)  Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;

		"(C)  If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and

		"(D)  Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."