Title: People v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S250829
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ANTHONY LOPEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S250829 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F074581 
 
Tulare County Superior Court 
VCF314447 
 
 
April 30, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
S250829 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
Defendant Anthony Lopez entered a Walmart and stole 
items worth $496.37.  He was charged with shoplifting and 
theft, but was convicted solely of theft because the jury could not 
reach a verdict on shoplifting.  On appeal, defendant raised a 
claim that his conviction must be reversed because he had been 
charged in violation of Penal Code section 459.5, subdivision (b)1 
(section 459.5(b)), which provides:  “Any act of shoplifting as 
defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting.  No 
person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with 
burglary or theft of the same property.”  (Italics added.)  The 
Court of Appeal recognized that defendant had been improperly 
charged with shoplifting and theft of the same property.  
Nevertheless, it affirmed the conviction, reasoning that 
defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to 
object to the charges, because section 459.5(b) would have 
permitted the prosecutor to respond to any such objection by 
amending the information to charge shoplifting and theft in the 
alternative, which would have resulted in the same theft 
conviction.  We granted review to determine the scope of section 
459.5(b)’s limits on prosecutorial charging discretion. 
Before this court, the parties agree that section 459.5(b) 
precludes charging shoplifting and theft of the same property, 
                                        
1 
All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless 
otherwise specified. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
even in the alternative.  But they disagree whether section 
459.5(b) would have permitted the prosecutor to amend the 
information (1) to charge shoplifting such that petty theft would 
have been a lesser included offense under the accusatory 
pleading test or (2) to charge solely petty theft. 
We hold that section 459.5(b) prohibits charging 
shoplifting and theft of the same property, even in the 
alternative.  But a prosecutor may charge shoplifting with an 
allegation stating that “the value of the property taken does not 
exceed $950,” such that petty theft is an uncharged lesser 
included offense under the accusatory pleading test.  Consistent 
with the principles governing instructions on lesser included 
offenses, if shoplifting is so charged, and if there is substantial 
evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant 
committed petty theft but not shoplifting, the trial court is 
required to instruct the jury on petty theft, and the jury is 
required to return an acquittal on shoplifting before it may 
return a verdict on petty theft. 
Additionally, we hold that, as a general rule, section 
459.5(b) prohibits a prosecutor from charging theft when there 
is probable cause that a defendant has committed shoplifting of 
the same property.  As an exception to this general rule, 
however, even when there is probable cause that a defendant 
has committed shoplifting, a prosecutor may charge theft 
instead of shoplifting if the prosecutor can articulate a theory 
supported by the evidence under which the defendant would be 
guilty of theft but not shoplifting. 
Having so interpreted section 459.5(b), we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 12, 2015, defendant Anthony Lopez and a 
female companion were inside a Walmart store when they 
attracted the attention of a Walmart asset protection officer.  
After noticing defendant select a home stereo unit, the asset 
protection officer followed defendant throughout the store and 
watched as defendant placed items into an empty Walmart 
plastic bag within his shopping cart.  When the couple reached 
the register, defendant’s female companion paid for the items 
that she had placed in the cart, but defendant pushed the cart 
towards the exit without paying for his items.  As soon as the 
couple exited the store, the asset protection officer confronted 
defendant, who admitted that he had not paid for the 
merchandise.  The asset protection officer identified the 
unpurchased items—a home stereo unit, a candle wax warming 
kit, a flashlight, and a TV wall mount—and determined their 
combined value to be $496.37. 
Later, defendant told the police that he had gone to 
Walmart with $5 to purchase a few items, but with no intention 
of stealing anything.  According to defendant, once he was inside 
the store, he decided he needed money, so he placed some items 
into his shopping cart and left without paying for them. 
Initially, the prosecutor filed a complaint charging 
defendant with felony shoplifting under section 459.5, 
subdivision (a) (section 459.5(a)).  Ultimately, the prosecutor 
filed an amended information charging defendant with felony 
shoplifting under section 459.5(a) and felony petty theft with 
priors under sections 484, subdivision (a), and 666.  For 
purposes of both felony charges, the amended information 
alleged that defendant had suffered a prior conviction requiring 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
him to register as a sex offender under section 290.  (See §§ 
459.5(a); 666, subds. (a), (b).)  For purposes of the petty theft 
with priors charge only, the information also alleged that 
defendant had suffered multiple prior theft convictions and 
served multiple prior prison terms.2  (See § 666, subd. (a).)  
Defendant did not demur to the amended information or 
otherwise object to the charges. 
On August 29 to 30, 2016, the court held a bifurcated trial.  
After requesting a read-back of testimony and asking three 
questions, the jury submitted a note to the court stating that it 
was “split on the decision for shoplifting, based on intent.”  
Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of petty theft, but it 
could not reach a verdict on shoplifting.  The court declared a 
mistrial on the shoplifting charge and, upon the prosecution’s 
motion, dismissed it.  In a bench trial, the court found true all 
the remaining allegations.3 
On appeal, defendant raised a claim that his conviction 
must be reversed because section 459.5(b) prohibits a person 
who is “charged with shoplifting” from “also be[ing] charged 
with burglary or theft of the same property.”  Anticipating that 
this claim may have been forfeited, defendant also raised a claim 
that his trial counsel had rendered constitutionally ineffective 
assistance by failing to demur to the amended information or 
otherwise object to the charges. 
                                        
2 
The amended information included several additional 
allegations that are not relevant to the issues before us. 
3 
For purposes of the petty theft with priors charge, the 
parties had stipulated to the truth of the allegation that 
defendant had suffered a qualifying prior theft conviction.  (See 
§ 666, subd. (a).) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
In response, the Attorney General conceded that the 
prosecutor had violated section 459.5(b) by charging shoplifting 
and theft in the conjunctive but contended that defendant’s 
improper charging claim had been forfeited.  Additionally, the 
Attorney General argued that defendant was not prejudiced by 
his trial counsel’s failure to object to the charges, because section 
459.5(b) would have permitted the prosecution to respond to 
such an objection by amending the information to charge 
shoplifting and theft of the same property in the alternative, 
which would have resulted in the same theft conviction. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General and 
affirmed the conviction.  We granted defendant’s petition for 
review and ordered briefing on several questions related to 
section 459.5(b). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
“Proposition 47 has generated many interpretive issues 
for this court.”  (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 423 
(Valenzuela).)  This case is no exception. 
In the 2014 general election, Californians passed this 
voter initiative to “ ‘[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies 
for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug 
possession, unless the defendant has prior convictions for 
specified violent or serious crimes.’ ”  (People v. Gonzales (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 858, 870 (Gonzales), quoting Voter Information Guide, 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 3, subd. (3), p. 70 
(Voter Information Guide).)  As is relevant here, the measure 
added section 459.5 to the Penal Code, “carving out” the new 
offense of “ ‘shoplifting’ ” from the preexisting offense of 
burglary.  (People v. Martinez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 647, 651.)  Before 
Proposition 47, any entry into a commercial establishment with 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
the intent to commit larceny was second degree burglary.  
(§§ 459 [definition of burglary], 460 [degrees of burglary].)  After 
Proposition 47, this conduct is shoplifting if the establishment 
is open during regular business hours and the property taken or 
intended to be taken is worth $950 or less, but “[a]ny other entry 
into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny” 
continues to be second degree burglary.  (§ 459.5(a), italics 
added.)  While shoplifting “shall be punished as a misdemeanor” 
unless the defendant has a prior conviction as specified in 
section 459.5(a), second degree burglary remains an alternative 
felony-misdemeanor or wobbler.  (§§ 459.5(a) [punishment for 
shoplifting], 461 [punishment for burglary]; see People v. Colbert 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 599 (Colbert).) 
Of course, if a person enters a commercial establishment 
with the intent to commit theft and carries out his or her 
intent—by taking another’s property without consent and with 
the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property—
that person also commits theft.4  (§ 484, subd. (a).)  Therefore, a 
                                        
4 
After Proposition 47, this conduct is petty theft if the 
property taken is worth $950 or less.  (§§ 486–488, 490.2.)  
Under section 490.2, petty theft is punishable as misdemeanor 
petty theft unless the defendant has a prior conviction as 
specified in that section.  But under section 666, petty theft is 
punishable as wobbler petty theft with priors if the defendant 
has a qualifying prior theft conviction, has served a term in a 
penal institution as a result of that theft conviction, and has 
another qualifying prior conviction as specified in that section.  
Proposition 47 eliminated the former wobbler of petty theft with 
three theft priors, as defined by former section 666, subdivision 
(a), and amended the former wobbler of petty theft with one 
theft prior and one additional prior, as previously defined by 
former section 666, subdivision (b) and as currently defined by 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
single course of conduct may constitute both shoplifting and 
theft or both burglary and theft. 
Section 459.5(b) limits a prosecutor’s charging discretion 
in this context.  It provides:  “Any act of shoplifting as defined in 
subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting.  No person who 
is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary 
or theft of the same property.”  We granted review to determine 
whether these directives permit a prosecutor to charge 
shoplifting and theft of the same property in the alternative; to 
charge shoplifting such that petty theft would be a lesser 
included offense under the accusatory pleading test; or to charge 
theft instead of shoplifting when there is evidence that the 
defendant may have committed shoplifting. 
A.  Charging Shoplifting and Theft of the Same 
Property 
 
1.  Background 
On appeal, both the Attorney General and the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that the plain meaning of section 
459.5(b)’s second directive—“[n]o person who is charged with 
shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the 
same property”—prohibits charging shoplifting and theft, even 
in the alternative.  (See People v. Lopez (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 
382, 386–392 (Lopez).)  But the Attorney General argued, and 
the court agreed, that a literal reading of this language would 
lead to absurd results and contradict voters’ intent in cases 
where it is unclear whether defendant formed the intent to 
                                        
section 666, subdivisions (a) and (b).  (Voter Information Guide, 
text of Prop. 47, § 10, p. 72.)  For ease of reference, we refer to 
the current wobbler as “petty theft with priors.” 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
commit theft before or after he entered the commercial 
establishment.  In these cases, if the prosecution charges theft, 
an “act of shoplifting” could be charged as theft—apparently in 
violation of section 459.5(b)’s first directive that “[a]ny act of 
shoplifting . . . shall be charged as shoplifting.”  But if the 
prosecution charges shoplifting, a defendant who has committed 
theft could escape criminal liability simply because the jury 
entertains a reasonable doubt that he possessed the intent to 
commit theft upon entry—an “absurd” result in the view of the 
Attorney General and the Court of Appeal.  (Lopez, at p. 392.) 
Using the facts of this case, the Attorney General 
illustrated these points:  “[The prosecutor] could have charged 
appellant [Lopez] with petty theft.  By the plain meaning of 
section 459.5, she could not have also charged shoplifting, even 
as an alternative charge—in choosing to charge appellant with 
petty theft, she would be precluded from charging shoplifting.  
However, appellant could then simply argue that his intent to 
commit theft was formed prior to his entry into Walmart.  As 
the prosecutor pointed out, he only had five dollars at the time 
and also brought an empty bag to conceal merchandise.  If the 
jury found this to be true, then appellant’s conduct would 
constitute shoplifting and the prosecutor will necessarily have 
violated section 459.5’s requirement that conduct constituting 
shoplifting be charged as shoplifting.  [¶]  Alternatively, the 
prosecutor could have charged appellant with shoplifting.  
Under the plain meaning of section 459.5, the prosecutor could 
not also charge petty theft, even as an alternative charge.  But 
appellant could then argue that his intent to commit theft was 
formed after his entry into Walmart.  And if the jury found this 
to be true, . . . then the prosecutor has failed to prove the 
shoplifting charge.  Because she was not permitted to 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
alternatively charge petty theft (or any other theft offense), 
appellant faces no criminal consequences even though it may be 
apparent that he has committed a crime.” 
In sum, the Attorney General took the position that the 
section 459.5(b) “should be interpreted to permit alternative 
charging of shoplifting and other theft-related offenses while 
continuing to prevent multiple convictions based on theft of the 
same property.”  The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that 
section 459.5(b) does not prohibit charging shoplifting and theft 
of the same property in the alternative “when the element of 
intent upon entering the commercial establishment is absent or 
in question.”  (Lopez, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 390.) 
 
2.  Discussion 
Despite prevailing below, the Attorney General adopts a 
different position before this court.  He now agrees with 
defendant that section 459.5(b)’s second directive “prohibits a 
prosecutor from charging a defendant with both shoplifting and 
petty theft of the same property, even in the alternative.” 
Before interpreting section 459.5(b), we briefly review the 
canons that guide our process.  In construing a voter initiative, 
“ ‘[W]e apply the same principles that govern statutory 
construction.’  [Citation.]  As a law adopted by the voters, ‘their 
intent governs.’  [Citation.]  In ascertaining that intent, ‘we turn 
first to the language of the statute, giving the words their 
ordinary meaning.’  [Citation.]  This language is interpreted in 
the context of the statute as a whole, as well as the overall 
statutory scheme.  [Citation.]”  (Valenzuela, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 423.) 
We begin with the observation that section 459.5(b)’s 
second directive—“[n]o person who is charged with shoplifting 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same 
property”—must be read together with its first directive—“[a]ny 
act of shoplifting . . .  shall be charged as shoplifting.”  Together, 
these directives must be understood in light of section 459.5(a)’s 
provision 
that 
“[s]hoplifting 
shall 
be 
punished 
as 
a 
misdemeanor” unless the defendant has suffered a specified 
prior conviction, and in light of Proposition 47’s purpose to 
“ ‘[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, 
nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless 
the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or 
serious crimes.’ ”  (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, quoting 
Voter Information Guide, text of Prop. 47, § 3, subd. (3), p. 70; 
see Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 992 [“One of 
Proposition 47’s primary purposes is to reduce the number of 
nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and 
focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the 
terms of the initiative.”].) 
When section 459.5(b) is read in this context, it appears 
that Proposition 47’s voters primarily intended the subdivision’s 
charging directives to ensure that defendants who commit an 
“act of shoplifting”—but who have not suffered a specified prior 
conviction—are charged with and convicted of a single 
misdemeanor offense.  In other words, the voters made a 
determination that the conduct that they defined as shoplifting 
deserves a single misdemeanor conviction, and they wanted to 
prevent prosecutors from circumventing this determination by 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
charging and convicting such conduct as felony burglary, felony 
theft, both shoplifting and theft, or both burglary and theft.5 
Although we are not bound by their interpretation of the 
law, we agree with the parties that section 459.5(b)’s second 
directive unambiguously prohibits charging shoplifting and 
theft of the same property, even in the alternative, and that the 
plain meaning of the directive should control.  (See Desny v. 
Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [court not bound to accept 
parties’ concessions on issues of law]; Bradley v. Clark (1901) 
133 Cal. 196, 209–210 [same].)  We recognize the Court of 
Appeal’s concern that this interpretation may lead to the 
unintended consequence that a defendant who has committed 
theft may escape criminal liability simply because he is charged 
with shoplifting and the jury entertains a reasonable doubt 
about one of shoplifting’s elements.  But we are not persuaded 
that this possibility is so absurd as to justify a departure from 
the plain meaning of the statutory language.  (See Lopez v. Sony 
Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 638 [“To justify departing 
from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the result 
must be so unreasonable that the Legislature could not have 
intended it.”].) 
First, as we explain below, we believe prosecutors can 
avoid this unintended consequence by charging shoplifting such 
                                        
5 
As previously explained, a single course of conduct may 
constitute both shoplifting and theft or both burglary and theft.  
(See ante, at pp. 6–7.)  Generally, a defendant may be charged 
with and convicted of (but not punished for) multiple offenses 
based on the same course of conduct.  (See §§ 954 [permitting 
multiples charges and multiple convictions], 654 [prohibiting 
multiple punishment]; People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 
1225.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
that petty theft is an uncharged lesser included offense under 
the accusatory pleading test.  (See post, at pp. 12–18.)  Second, 
both the statutory language and the Voter Information Guide 
indicate that Proposition 47 was intended to prohibit multiple 
charges based on shoplifting conduct—not merely multiple 
convictions, as the Attorney General argued on appeal.  To this 
end, the Voter Information Guide specifically informed voters 
that “shoplifting property worth $950 or less” could have been 
“charged as burglary, which is a wobbler” prior to Proposition 
47, but “would always be a misdemeanor and could not be 
charged as burglary” if the Proposition 47 passed.  (Voter 
Information Guide, analysis of Prop. 47 by Legislative Analyst, 
p. 35, italics added; see Colbert, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 599 
[“[Section 459.5(b)] limits a prosecutor’s discretion in charging.” 
(Italics added.)].)  Although we do not know why Proposition 47’s 
drafters chose to prohibit multiple charges rather than multiple 
convictions, one possible reason is that a prohibition on multiple 
convictions would have allowed a jury to find a defendant guilty 
of burglary or theft charged as a felony before returning a 
verdict on an alternative charge of misdemeanor shoplifting.  
(See §§ 459.5, subds. (a) [“Shoplifting shall be punished as a 
misdemeanor” 
unless 
defendant 
has 
a 
specified 
prior 
conviction.], (b) [“Any act of shoplifting . . . shall be charged as 
shoplifting.”].)  Accordingly, we read section 459.5(b) to be a 
prohibition on multiple charges, as it is written. 
B.  Charging Shoplifting with Petty Theft as a 
Lesser Included Offense 
Before this court, the Attorney General advances two 
arguments as to why defendant was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to object.  First, we consider his contention that 
the prosecutor could have responded to an objection by 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
amending the information to charge shoplifting such that petty 
theft would be a lesser included offense under the accusatory 
pleading test. 
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on 
any uncharged lesser offense that is necessarily included in a 
charged offense if there is substantial evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed 
the lesser included offense but not the charged offense.  (People 
v. Smith (2017) 57 Cal.4th 232, 244.)  “To determine if an offense 
is lesser and necessarily included in another offense for this 
purpose, we apply either the elements test or the accusatory 
pleading test.  ‘Under the elements test, if the statutory 
elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory 
elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included 
in the former.  Under the accusatory pleading test, if the facts 
actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the 
elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included 
in the former.’ ”  (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404, 
quoting People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227–1228.)  
Once instructed on a lesser included offense, a jury may find 
defendant guilty of that offense, but only after it has returned 
an acquittal on the charged offense.  (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 
46 Cal.3d 322, 330 (Kurtzman); see § 1159 [“The jury, or the 
judge if a jury trial is waived, may find the defendant guilty of 
any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in 
that with which he is charged, or of an attempt to commit the 
offense.”])  The defendant may not be convicted of both offenses; 
if substantial evidence supports the conviction of the charged 
offense, a conviction of the lesser included offense will be set 
aside.  (People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
Here, the Attorney General argues that section 459.5(b) 
does not prevent a prosecutor from charging shoplifting with an 
allegation that “the value of the property taken does not exceed 
$950,” such that petty theft is a necessarily included offense of 
shoplifting under the accusatory pleading test.6  He posits that, 
had defendant’s trial counsel objected to the charges, the 
prosecutor could have responded by amending the information 
to charge shoplifting in this manner and, if so, the court would 
have been required to instruct the jury on petty theft as an 
uncharged lesser included offense of shoplifting.7  In the 
Attorney General’s view, this would have led to a conviction of 
petty theft.  In response, defendant contends that this practice 
would constitute an improper end run around section 459.5(b)’s 
prohibition on charging shoplifting and “also” theft, thereby 
allowing the prosecution “to do implicitly what it was prohibited 
                                        
6 
Petty theft is not a necessarily included offense of 
shoplifting under the elements test because the elements of 
shoplifting do not require a taking.  In other words, a defendant 
can commit shoplifting without also committing petty theft—as 
when he enters a commercial establishment while it is open 
during regular business hours with the intent to commit theft of 
property worth $950 or less, but does not take anything. 
7 
In the shoplifting count of the amended information, the 
prosecutor alleged that defendant “did unlawfully, with intent 
to commit theft, enter a commercial establishment during 
regular business hours, to wit, WALMART, where the property 
taken or intended to be taken was valued at less than $950.00.”  
(Italics added.)  The Attorney General acknowledges that, as 
charged in the amended information, petty theft was not a 
necessarily included offense of shoplifting under the accusatory 
pleading test, because defendant could have committed 
shoplifting as charged without also committing petty theft—if 
he entered Walmart with the intent to commit theft, but did not 
take anything. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
from 
doing 
explicitly” 
and 
“[e]ffectively 
restoring 
the 
prosecutorial discretion that the voters plainly intended to take 
away.”  Additionally, defendant warns that this practice would 
mark an “unwarranted and problematic expansion of the 
accusatory pleading test,” inviting prosecutors to allege 
extraneous facts to make “nearly any crime” a lesser included 
offense of a charged offense. 
We agree with the Attorney General that, consistent with 
section 459.5(b), a prosecutor may charge shoplifting with an 
allegation that “the value of the property taken does not exceed 
$950,” such that petty theft is an uncharged lesser included 
offense of shoplifting under the accusatory pleading test.  In 
accord with the principles governing instructions on lesser 
included offenses, if shoplifting is so charged and if there is 
substantial evidence the defendant has committed petty theft 
but not shoplifting, the trial court must instruct the jury on 
petty theft, and the jury must return an acquittal on the 
shoplifting charge before it may return a verdict on petty theft.  
If defendant is convicted of shoplifting, he may not also be 
convicted of petty theft. 
First, charging shoplifting with an allegation that “the 
value of the property taken does not exceed $950” neither 
requires nor permits prosecutors to allege facts extraneous to a 
shoplifting charge.8  Section 952 allows prosecutors to charge an 
                                        
8 
We agree with defendant that section 459.5(b) forbids 
prosecutors from alleging facts extraneous to a shoplifting 
charge in an attempt to circumvent the prohibition on charging 
both shoplifting and theft of the same property.  To use the facts 
of this case as an example, if the prosecutor had charged solely 
shoplifting, she could not have alleged that defendant had 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
offense “in the words of the enactment describing the offense or 
declaring the matter to be a public offense, or in any words 
sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is 
accused.”  Section 459.5(a) defines shoplifting as “entering a 
commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while 
that establishment is open during regular business hours, where 
the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does 
not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).”  (Italics added.)  
Therefore, not only is an allegation that “the value of the 
property taken does not exceed $950” directly relevant to one of 
the elements of shoplifting, but it also tracks the “words of the 
enactment describing the offense.”  (§ 952.)  Additionally, this 
allegation commits the prosecution to the theory that defendant 
stole the property after entering with the intent to steal it, 
thereby providing the defendant with greater notice of “the 
offense of which he is accused.”  (Ibid.) 
Second, we find this practice to be consistent with the 
section 459.5(b)’s directive that “[n]o person who is charged with 
shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the 
same property.”  (Italics added.)  When there is substantial 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that a 
defendant committed an uncharged lesser offense that is 
necessarily included in the charged offense, the trial court is 
required to instruct the jury on the uncharged lesser included 
offense.  Because lesser included offenses are not formally 
charged in separate counts of an accusatory pleading, we have 
consistently referred them as “uncharged” offenses.  (See, e.g., 
                                        
suffered a qualifying prior theft conviction and served a 
qualifying prior prison term, because such allegations would be 
relevant only to the uncharged section 666 petty theft with 
priors offense. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
People v. Eid (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 655, 656, 660; People v. Reed 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227, 1229, 1231.) 
Third, we reject defendant’s assertion that Proposition 
47’s voters “made clear that they wanted the jury [to be] 
presented with an all-or-nothing choice”—shoplifting or 
acquittal.  As mentioned above, we believe the voters wanted to 
prevent prosecutors from circumventing their determination 
that shoplifting conduct deserves a single misdemeanor 
conviction by charging and convicting such conduct as felony 
burglary, felony theft, both shoplifting and theft, or both 
burglary and theft.  But nothing indicates that the voters 
wanted to prevent the jury from considering whether a 
defendant committed petty theft when the evidence would 
support a finding that the defendant committed petty theft but 
not shoplifting.  If the jury were precluded from considering 
petty theft as an uncharged lesser included offense of 
shoplifting, prosecutors would be left with no way to avoid the 
unintended consequence that a defendant who commits theft 
may escape criminal liability simply because the jury entertains 
a reasonable doubt about one of shoplifting’s elements.  
Although Proposition 47 was intended to reduce penalties for 
“nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft,” nothing 
suggests that the measure was intended to eliminate the 
penalties altogether.  (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 
quoting Voter Information Guide, text of Prop. 47, § 3, subd. (3), 
p. 70; see §§ 459.5(a) [“Any other entry into a commercial 
establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.”]; 
490.2, subd. (a) [“[O]btaining any property by theft where the 
value of the . . . property taken does not exceed nine hundred 
fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be 
punished as a misdemeanor,” unless the defendant has a 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
specified prior conviction.].)  Additionally, barring the jury from 
considering petty theft as an uncharged lesser included offense 
of shoplifting would “impair the jury’s truth-ascertainment 
function.”  (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196.)  As we 
have explained, the purpose of the rule requiring courts to 
instruct juries on necessarily included offenses is “to assure, in 
the interest of justice, the most accurate possible verdict 
encompassed by the charge and supported by the evidence.”  
(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 161.)  “ ‘[T]he rule 
prevents either party, whether by design or inadvertence, from 
forcing an all-or-nothing choice between conviction of the stated 
offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other.’ ”  
(People v. Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 239, quoting People v. 
Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 119.) 
Finally, when construing voter initiatives, we presume the 
voters were “aware of existing laws and the judicial construction 
thereof.”  (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11.)  
Therefore, we presume Proposition 47’s voters were aware of the 
principles discussed above that would permit a defendant 
charged with shoplifting to be convicted of an uncharged lesser 
included offense of petty theft when the evidence would support 
a finding that defendant committed petty theft but not 
shoplifting. 
C.  Charging Theft Instead of Shoplifting 
Next, we turn to the Attorney General’s argument that the 
prosecutor could have responded to an objection by amending 
the information to charge solely theft. 
The Attorney General does not dispute that section 
459.5(b)’s first directive—“[a]ny act of shoplifting . . . shall be 
charged as shoplifting”—prohibits a prosecutor from charging 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
theft of the same property when the evidence is “clear” that 
defendant’s conduct constitutes an “act of shoplifting.”  But 
when the evidence is “ambiguous,” he argues that a prosecutor 
may charge theft if there is “probable cause to believe [a 
defendant] committed only theft.”  Under his reasoning, had 
defendant’s trial counsel objected to the charges, the prosecutor 
could have responded by amending the information to charge 
solely theft, which would have led to the same theft conviction.  
In defendant’s view, a prosecutor’s initial discretion to charge 
shoplifting or theft “can be given meaningful deference,” but 
once a prosecutor has charged shoplifting, section 459.5(b) 
generally prohibits her from amending the accusatory pleading 
to substitute a theft charge for the original shoplifting charge.  
And while there may be some cases where section 459.5(b) would 
permit such an amendment—for example, if a defendant 
charged with shoplifting later testified that he formed the intent 
to steal after entering a commercial establishment—this is not 
one of them.  Therefore, defendant argues, had his trial counsel 
objected to the charges, the prosecutor could not have pursued 
the theft charge only, and the result would have been a hung 
jury on the original shoplifting charge. 
As the Attorney General observed in the court below, 
“ ‘[S]ection 459.5 presumes that it will be clear whether a 
defendant’s conduct constitutes shoplifting or not, before the 
prosecutor makes the charging decision.’ ”  (Lopez, supra, 26 
Cal.App.5th at p. 389.)  But this presumption does not apply 
universally, as the facts of this case demonstrate.  If defendant 
possessed the intent to commit theft upon entering the Walmart 
store, he committed both shoplifting and petty theft; if he formed 
the intent once inside, he committed petty theft only.  Consider 
another example:  a defendant enters a pawn shop with the 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
intent to commit theft and steals a diamond ring with an 
undetermined value.  If the ring is worth $950 or less, the 
defendant committed shoplifting and petty theft; but if the ring 
is worth more than $950, he committed second degree burglary 
and grand theft.  (See § 487, subd. (a) [grand theft].)  In our 
system, only the factfinder—the jury or the court, if a jury trial 
is waived—can make the determination that a defendant has 
committed the criminal offense of shoplifting, but the factfinder 
may do so only if the prosecutor charged shoplifting in the first 
place.  Consequently, in cases where it is unclear at the time of 
charging whether defendant committed an “act of shoplifting,” 
section 459.5(b)’s first directive is ambiguous. 
Once again, Proposition 47’s voters likely intended section 
459.5(b)’s charging directives to prevent prosecutors from 
circumventing their determination that shoplifting conduct 
deserves a single misdemeanor conviction by charging and 
convicting such conduct as felony burglary, felony theft, both 
shoplifting and theft, or both burglary and theft.  Therefore, we 
presume the voters generally would have preferred prosecutors 
to charge shoplifting instead of burglary or theft when a 
defendant may have committed shoplifting.  That way, the jury 
generally will have the opportunity to decide whether a 
defendant actually committed an “act of shoplifting” and, if so, 
the defendant will be convicted of shoplifting only. 
Accordingly, we conclude that, as a general rule, section 
459.5(b) prohibits a prosecutor from charging burglary or theft 
instead of shoplifting when there is probable cause that a 
defendant has committed shoplifting of the same property.  
Therefore, in the common situation where a defendant is 
apprehended leaving a store with unpurchased merchandise 
worth $950 or less, the prosecutor may charge shoplifting only—
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
even though there would also be probable cause to support a 
charge of petty theft.  As we stated in Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
858, at page 876, “A defendant must be charged only with 
shoplifting when the statute applies.  [Section 459.5] expressly 
prohibits alternate charging and ensures only misdemeanor 
treatment for the underlying described conduct.”  (Italics 
added.) 
We also agree with the Attorney General, however, that 
there are exceptions to this general rule.  Even when there is 
probable cause that a defendant has committed shoplifting, 
section 459.5(b) does not prevent a prosecutor from charging 
burglary or theft instead of shoplifting—initially, or in an 
amendment to the accusatory pleading within the constraints of 
section 1009—if the prosecutor can articulate a theory 
supported by the evidence under which the defendant would be 
guilty of the charged offense but not shoplifting.9  In these cases, 
section 459.5(b)’s prohibition on “alternate charging” does not 
apply.  (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 896.) 
To illustrate these points, we use the facts of this case.  
The asset protection officer observed defendant place items into 
                                        
9 
As is relevant here, section 1009 provides:  “An indictment 
or accusation cannot be amended so as to change the offense 
charged, nor an information so as to charge an offense not shown 
by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.  A 
complaint cannot be amended to charge an offense not 
attempted to be charged by the original complaint, except that 
separate counts may be added which might properly have been 
joined in the original complaint.”  We also observe that after a 
defendant has pleaded not guilty, the prosecutor may not amend 
a complaint to include prior conviction allegations in an attempt 
to convert a misdemeanor trial into a felony trial.  (See §§ 682, 
737, 969a, 969.5, 1009; see also Cal. Const. art. IV, § 5, 
subd. (e).) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
an empty Walmart plastic bag within his shopping cart and exit 
the store without paying for them.  Defendant then admitted 
that he had not paid for the items, and the asset protection 
officer determined their combined value to be $496.37.  
Although these facts constitute probable cause that defendant 
committed both shoplifting and petty theft, section 459.5(b)’s 
general rule—that a prosecutor may charge only shoplifting 
when there is probable cause that the defendant has committed 
shoplifting—would have prohibited the prosecutor from 
charging defendant with petty theft based on this evidence.  
Now, consider the added facts that defendant later told the 
police that he had gone to Walmart with no intention of stealing 
anything and only decided to take the items once he was inside 
the store.  Because these facts would support a theory that 
defendant committed petty theft but not shoplifting—that 
defendant stole items but that he did not have the intent to steal 
the items when he entered the store—section 459.5(b) would not 
have prevented the prosecutor from charging defendant with 
petty theft instead of shoplifting based on all the evidence.10 
Although Proposition 47’s voters intended to limit 
prosecutorial charging discretion, we do not believe they wanted 
to require a prosecutor to charge shoplifting instead of burglary 
or theft when the evidence would support a theory that 
defendant committed burglary or theft but not shoplifting.  As 
                                        
10  
Even within this exception to section 459.5(b)’s general 
rule that a prosecutor may charge only shoplifting when there 
is probable cause that the defendant has committed shoplifting, 
however, section 459.5(b) only allows the prosecutor to charge 
theft instead of shoplifting, not in addition to shoplifting.  (See 
ante pp. 11–12.) 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
mentioned above, the voters made a determination that 
shoplifting conduct (without any of the specified prior 
convictions) deserves a single misdemeanor conviction; but they 
also made clear that “[a]ny other entry into a commercial 
establishment with intent to commit larceny” remains 
punishable as wobbler second degree burglary (§ 459.5(b)), and 
that “obtaining any property by theft where the value of the . . . 
property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars 
($950)” is punishable as misdemeanor petty theft (§ 490.2, 
subd. (a)). 
A contrary rule—one that would require a prosecutor to 
charge shoplifting instead of burglary or theft in these 
situations—raises ethical concerns and constitutional doubts.  
As the Attorney General emphasizes, a prosecutor has a duty 
“to charge only those offenses she believes she can prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 
109, quoting People v. Dunn–Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 
899, 914–915 [“A prosecutor abides by elementary standards of 
fair play and decency by refusing to seek indictments until he or 
she is completely satisfied the defendant should be prosecuted 
and the office of the prosecutor will be able to promptly establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)  And, as we have recognized, 
“[P]rosecuting authorities, exercising executive functions, 
ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine whom to charge 
with public offenses and what charges to bring.  [Citations.]  
This prosecutorial discretion to choose, for each particular case, 
the actual charges from among those potentially available arises 
from ‘ “the complex considerations necessary for the effective 
and efficient administration of law enforcement.” ’  [Citations.]  
The prosecution’s authority in this regard is founded, among 
other things, on the principle of separation of powers, and 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
generally is not subject to supervision by the judicial branch.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 134; see 
Cal. Const., art. III, § 3; People v. Superior Court (Romero) 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509 [“ ‘If a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the 
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and 
doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the 
construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable 
meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, 
or free from doubt as to its constitutionality . . . .’ ”].)  When it is 
clear that a defendant committed criminal conduct but unclear 
whether that conduct constituted shoplifting, forcing the 
prosecutor to choose between no charge and a shoplifting charge 
that she does not believe she can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt would be a troublesome intrusion upon a prosecutor’s 
authority and responsibility to make appropriate charging 
determinations on behalf of the People.  (See Gov. Code, 
§§ 26500, 26501.) 
As we explain below, our interpretation of the statutory 
scheme is faithful to the voters’ intent that an act of shoplifting 
deserves a single misdemeanor conviction whenever a defendant 
does not have any of the prior convictions specified in 
Proposition 47. 
The general rule—that a prosecutor may charge only 
shoplifting when there is probable cause that the defendant has 
committed shoplifting—is subject to just a few narrow 
exceptions.  First, where there is probable cause to support 
charges of shoplifting and second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460) 
or grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), a prosecutor may charge the 
wobblers of second degree burglary or grand theft instead of 
shoplifting under a theory supported by the evidence that the 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
property in question is worth more than $950.  But in order to 
return a guilty verdict on either of these charges, the jury must 
actually find the property to be worth more than $950.  (See e.g., 
CALCRIM Nos. 1700, para. 3 [burglary instruction where “the 
evidence supports a defense theory that the crime was 
shoplifting”], 1801 [grand theft]; CALJIC Nos. 14.50, para. 4 
[burglary instruction where “the building entered was a 
commercial establishment while that establishment was open 
for business during regular business hours”], 14.32 [grand 
theft].)  Likewise, where there is probable cause to support 
charges of shoplifting and second degree burglary, a prosecutor 
may charge second degree burglary instead of shoplifting under 
a theory supported by the evidence that the defendant did not 
enter a commercial establishment open during regular business 
hours.  But in order to return a guilty verdict on the burglary 
charge, the jury must actually find that the structure defendant 
entered was not a commercial establishment or that the 
defendant entered the commercial establishment outside of its 
regular business hours.  (See e.g., CALCRIM No. 1700, para. 3; 
CALJIC No. 14.50, para. 4.)  In these cases, the jury’s 
determination that the defendant committed second degree 
burglary or grand theft effectively doubles as a determination 
that the defendant did not commit shoplifting. 
Finally, where there is probable cause to support charges 
of shoplifting and petty theft (§§ 487, 490.2), a prosecutor may 
charge petty theft instead of shoplifting under a theory 
supported by the evidence that the defendant formed the intent 
to steal only after entering the commercial establishment.  But 
petty theft must be charged as a misdemeanor unless the 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
defendant has a prior conviction specified in Proposition 47.11  
(§ 490.2, subd. (a); see § 666, subds. (a), (b).)  So, even though a 
defendant charged with and convicted of petty theft may have 
also committed shoplifting, he may only receive a single 
misdemeanor conviction for such conduct, provided that he has 
not suffered any of the relevant prior convictions. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We agree with Court of Appeal’s conclusion that defendant 
was charged in violation of section 459.5(b)’s prohibition on 
charging a person with shoplifting and theft of the same 
property.  (Lopez, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 388.)  But we 
disagree with the court’s holding that section 459.5(b) would 
have permitted the prosecutor to charge defendant with 
shoplifting and theft in the alternative.  Otherwise, we express 
no view on the proper resolution of defendant’s claims. 
                                        
11  
The decision to charge petty theft instead of shoplifting 
generally will not affect the severity of punishment because the 
list of prior convictions to charge petty theft as a felony 
(§§ 490.2, subd. (a), 666, subds. (a), (b)) is nearly identical to the 
list of prior convictions to charge shoplifting as a felony 
(§ 459.5(a)).  In a rare case, a defendant who does not have any 
of the prior convictions to charge shoplifting as a felony under 
section 459.5(a) may have the prior convictions and the prior 
term in a penal institution to charge petty theft with priors as a 
felony under section 666.  Because Proposition 47 amended 
section 666’s list of qualifying prior convictions to include some 
offenses not listed in section 459.5(a), however, this is a 
consequence that the voters could have contemplated.  (See ante, 
pp. 6–7, fn. 4; Voter Information Guide, text of Prop. 47, § 10, 
p. 72; see id. at §§ 5, 8, pp. 71, 72.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with our opinion.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lopez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 26 Cal.App.5th 382 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S250829 
Date Filed: April 30, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Tulare 
Judge:  Kathryn T. Montejano 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Caitlin M. Plummer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, 
Assistant Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall, F. Matt Chen, Kathleen A. McKenna and Rachelle A. 
Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Caitlin Plummer 
Law Office of Lichstein & Plummer 
2852 Willamette St., #164 
Eugene OR 97405 
(541) 505-7895 
 
F. Matt Chen 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-7768