Title: Faye v. Hotel Riviera, Inc.
Citation: 403 P.2d 201
Docket Number: 4886
State: Nevada
Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1965

403 P.2d 201 (1965) Frances FAYE, Appellant, v. HOTEL RIVIERA, INC., Respondent. No. 4886. Supreme Court of Nevada June 22, 1965. Murray Posin, Las Vegas, for Appellant. Peter Echeverria, Reno, Singleton &amp; DeLanoy and Rex A. Jemison, Las Vegas, for Respondent. BADT, Justice. This is an appeal from an order dismissing the case below for failure to bring the action to trial within five years after the filing of the action pursuant to NRCP, Rule 41 (e), reading in part as follows: "Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced or to which it may be transferred on motion of the defendant, after due notice to plaintiff or by the court upon its own motion, unless such action is brought to trial within five years after the plaintiff has filed his action, except where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended." The case was not brought to trial within the statutory five-year period and there was no written stipulation between the parties extending the time. No application was made to the court for any relief, nor was the court made aware of the plaintiff's problem. Although as we have said in Smith v. Garside, 81 Nev. ___, 402 P.2d 246: "We are confident that, had the court been so advised, *202 it would have accommodated her by at least commencing trial." The chronology of proceedings in the court below was as follows: Appellant does not seek to have this court overrule Thran v. District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 380 P.2d 297, in which we said: "We are of the opinion that NRCP 41 (e) is clear and unambiguous and requires no construction other than its own language. Whenever plaintiff has failed for two years after action is filed to bring it to trial, the court may exercise its discretion as to dismissing it, but when it is not brought to trial within five years, the court in the absence of a written stipulation extending time, shall dismiss it. In the latter case the *203 exercise of discretion in not involved. Miller &amp; Lux v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333, 219 P. 1006." It is to be noted that on October 18, 1961, plaintiff asked for a trial setting "the middle of January, 1962"; that on June 6, 1962, plaintiff asked for a trial setting "early in 1963," "* * * in view of the fact that plaintiff is an entertainer and that Melvin Belli, Esq. [a California attorney] will be associated in the trial of this action"; that on July 6, 1962, plaintiff sought a trial setting for April 1, 1963, for the same reason; and that finally on January 29, 1964, with the mandatory five-year period about to expire on July 13, 1964, plaintiff requested a "firm setting as a courtesy to out-of-state counsel for plaintiff, and out-of-city counsel for defendant, in order that they may adjust their calendars." On such request a pretrial hearing was set for January 14, 1965, and trial set for March 1, 1965, both dates being beyond the five-year period. Appellant says that it is a matter of general knowledge that for upwards of the past 10 to 12 months the trial calendar of the court has been so congested that divers procedures were initiated by the master calendar judge to relieve the congestion, and that notices were sent to all counsel in the judicial district deferring trials of all civil cases. However, from the record before us, it is apparent that a great many months of the delay were primarily chargeable to the plaintiff herself and to her out-of-state-appointed counsel. The plaintiff was an entertainer by profession, with many engagements both within and out of the United States. Her California counsel was notably engaged in much trial work in various jurisdictions. The order dismissing the action is affirmed on the authority of Thran v. District Court, supra, and Smith v. Garside, supra, and cases therein cited. THOMPSON, J., and ZENOFF, D.J. concur.