Title: Hendricks v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 505, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL A. HENDRICKS,  
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 505, 2004 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. No. 9806014577A 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  February 23, 2005 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  April 21, 2005 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Sandra W. Dean, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Michael Hendricks, appeals from six final 
judgments, entered as a result of his convictions for various drug-related 
criminal offenses.  Hendricks was convicted following a jury trial in the 
Superior Court.  This is Hendricks’ direct appeal. 
Hendricks asserts three issues on appeal.  First, Hendricks argues that 
the Superior Court erred in admitting evidence that Hendricks contends was 
not properly authenticated.  Second, Hendricks claims that he was 
improperly denied a mistrial because a State’s witness testified about having 
found court documents bearing Hendricks’ name in the course of a search.  
Third, Hendricks contends that he was entitled to a “missing evidence” 
instruction because the police destroyed evidence before his trial.  We have 
concluded that Hendricks’ arguments are without merit.  Therefore, the 
judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
 
Between 1997 and 1998, the Delaware State Police used a 
confidential informant to arrange controlled cocaine “buys” from Hendricks.  
An undercover officer, Detective David Wainwright,1 purchased cocaine 
from Hendricks on December 23, 1997, April 20, 1998 and June 16, 1998.  
                                          
 
1 For purposes of this opinion, a pseudonym is being used for the undercover detective. 
 
3
Based upon those purchases, the police obtained and executed arrest 
warrants for Hendricks. 
When Hendricks was arrested, the police found $651 cash in his 
pocket, along with a key to a nearby hotel room.  Hendricks consented to a 
police search of the hotel room.  During that search, the police found a 
digital scale, sandwich-size plastic bags, and paperwork bearing Hendricks’ 
name.   
 
On October 3, 2000, the State rested its case against Hendricks.  
Hendricks did not return to the courtroom after the luncheon recess.  
Thereafter, the trial judge made a factual determination that Hendricks was 
voluntarily absent.  The trial then proceeded to closing arguments, jury 
instructions, and jury deliberations.  The jury convicted Hendricks of the 
following crimes: three counts of Delivery of a Narcotic Schedule II 
Controlled Substance,2 two counts of Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping 
Controlled Substances,3 and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.4   
                                          
 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4751. 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4755 (a)(5). 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4771.  The jury acquitted Hendricks of a seventh charge, the 
count of Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping a Controlled Substance.  Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 16, § 4755(a)(5). 
 
 
4
On September 17, 2004, Hendricks was arrested on a capias warrant.  
Hendricks was sentenced for his six drug convictions on November 10, 
2004.  He filed a timely direct appeal with this Court. 
Cocaine Properly Admitted 
Hendricks first argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting into 
evidence the cocaine that Delaware State Police undercover Detective David 
Wainwright purchased from Hendricks in June 1998.  Hendricks contends 
that the State did not sufficiently establish the cocaine’s chain of custody 
because the evidence tag had been altered before trial.  The record reflects 
that the State established a sufficient chain of custody to permit the 
admission of the cocaine into evidence. 
The State introduced the cocaine Detective Wainwright had purchased 
from Hendricks, during Detective Wainwright’s testimony.  During his 
direct examination, Detective Wainwright testified that according to the 
evidence tag, he collected the cocaine at 16:58 (military time) on June 16, 
and that he placed it in the evidence locker at 18:00 (military time) that same 
day.  During his cross-examination, Detective Wainwright acknowledged 
that he had scratched out and rewritten the time that the cocaine was placed 
in the evidence locker.  On his redirect examination, Detective Wainwright 
explained that because his handwriting on the original tag was unclear, he 
 
5
scratched out and rewrote the number 8 in “18:00” to make it clearer.  To 
corroborate this testimony, Detective Wainwright explained that his police 
report “state[d] on 6/16/1998 at approximately 1800 hours I responded back, 
field tested, weighed and logged in the crack cocaine that was purchased 
during this investigation.” 
Pursuant to D.R.E. 901(a), a party offering an item into evidence 
bears the burden of proving that the item in question is what the proponent 
claims it to be.  It is within the discretion of the trial judge to decide whether 
evidence has been properly authenticated.5  The State may authenticate 
physical evidence in two ways.  The State “may have witnesses visually 
identify the item as that which was actually involved with the crime, or it 
may establish a ‘chain of custody,’ which indirectly establishes the identity 
and integrity of the evidence by tracing its continuous whereabouts.”6   
Generally, it is within the trial judge’s discretion whether to admit 
evidence in particular circumstances.7  When presented with a challenge to 
the chain of custody of an item of evidence, the trial judge should examine 
“whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence offered has been 
                                          
 
5 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Del. 1997); Ciccaglione v. State, 474 A.2d 126, 
130 (Del. 1984). 
6 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 152 (Del. 1987) (quoting Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 
13, 16 (Del. 1987)). 
7 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d at 152; Ciccaglione v. State, 474 A.2d at 130; Lampkins v. 
State, 465 A.2d 785, 790 (Del. 1983); Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194, 198-99 (Del. 
1979). 
 
6
properly identified and that no adulteration or tampering has occurred.”8  
The State must prove the “reasonable probability of each proposition.”9 
The record reflects that Detective Wainwright’s testimony is sufficient 
to establish that the cocaine had been properly authenticated and that it had 
not been adulterated or tampered with in any manner.  Detective Wainwright 
testified that he scratched out and rewrote the number 8.  He verified the 
time by referring to his police report.  There was no evidence that anyone 
other than Detective Wainwright had possession of the cocaine before it was 
admitted into evidence.  Accordingly, the record reflects that the Superior 
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cocaine into evidence. 
Proper Denial of Mistrial 
 
Hendricks’ next contention on appeal is that his motion for a mistrial 
was improperly denied.  During the testimony of Dover Police Department 
Detective Todd Case, reference was made to a court notice Detective Case 
found in Hendricks’ hotel room.  According to Hendricks, that reference was 
prejudicial because the jury could infer from it that Hendricks had been 
charged for criminal conduct on a prior occasion.  
                                          
 
8 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1153 (Del. 1993); Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d at 153; 
Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13, 16 (Del. 1987). 
9 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d at 1153; Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d at 153; See also Tatman 
v. State, 314 A.2d 417, 418 (Del. 1973); Clough v. State, 295 A.2d 729, 730 (Del. 1972). 
 
7
 
At Hendricks’ trial, Detective Case testified that during the hotel room 
search he found several pieces of paper bearing Hendricks’ name, and that 
one of the papers was a “standard court paper of notice.”  Hendricks 
objected to this testimony and moved for a mistrial.  The trial judge denied 
the motion for a mistrial but immediately struck Detective Case’s reference 
to the court papers, and instructed the jury to disregard that statement. 
 
A curative instruction is generally sufficient to remedy any prejudice 
that may result from the jury hearing inadmissible evidence.10  “A trial judge 
should grant a mistrial only where there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends 
of public justice would be otherwise defeated.’”11  This Court reviews the 
denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.12   
 
Hendricks has not established a manifest necessity for a mistrial.13  
Detective Case neither stated nor implied that the court papers were criminal 
in nature.  Detective Case’s reference was vague notwithstanding the 
prosecutor’s instruction not “to identify specifically the nature of [the] 
paperwork.”  That mere reference to “court papers” did not automatically 
                                          
 
10 Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 66 (Del. 1993).  See also Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 
845, 849 (Del. 1999) (“The trial judge’s immediate clarifying instructions after each 
objection by Mills’ attorney permitted the jury to properly discharge its function within 
the bounds of the law.”). 
11 Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 
A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1974)). 
12 Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2003); Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 
(Del. 2002). 
13 But see Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1987). 
 
8
create an inference that Hendricks was involved in another criminal 
proceeding, or subject to other criminal charges.   
 
A mistrial is “mandated only when there are ‘no meaningful and 
practical alternatives’” to granting a mistrial.14  The practical alternative in 
this case, which was immediately exercised by the trial judge, was to strike 
Detective Case’s comment from the record and to instruct the jury to 
disregard Detective Case’s statement.  The trial judge did strike the 
statement from the record and immediately instructed the jury to disregard 
the statement.  It is presumed that a jury will follow the judge’s instruction.15 
Detective Case’s comment was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a 
mistrial.16  Accordingly, the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion 
in giving a curative instruction and did not err in denying a mistrial.   
Preservation of Evidence 
 
Hendricks’ final contention is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by denying his request for a Lolly jury instruction that the missing 
evidence, if available, would have been exculpatory.17  The standard of 
review of denial to give a jury instruction on missing evidence is plenary or 
                                          
 
14 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 
1077 (Del. 1987)). 
15 See Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 589 (Del. 2001). 
16 Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607 (Del. 1988). 
17 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 961-62 (Del. 1992).  
 
9
de novo.18  We hold that, under the circumstances in this case, the Superior 
Court properly denied Hendricks’ request to give a “missing evidence” 
instruction to the jury.19 
 
Upon arrest, Dover Police Department Officer Anthony Digirolomo 
found and confiscated $651 cash and a hotel room key from Hendricks’ 
pants pocket.  Prior to trial, Officer Digirolomo forfeited the cash to the 
State Law Enforcement Fund, in accordance with State procedure.  Officer 
Digirolomo testified that he did not record the serial numbers on the seized 
bills and did not photocopy the bills before they were turned over to the 
State Law Enforcement Fund. 
The hotel room key that was found in Hendricks’ pants pocket led 
officers to Room 120 at the nearby Relax Inn.  Hendricks consented to a 
search of his hotel room, during which officers found a small electronic 
digital scale, sandwich-size plastic baggies, and paperwork containing 
Hendricks’ name.  Prior to trial, the police mistakenly destroyed the digital 
scale and plastic bags that were found in Hendricks’ possession.  A detective 
assigned to the case mistakenly believed that Hendricks’ case had been 
resolved, and ordered the police to destroy the digital scale and bags.  
                                          
 
18 Lunnon v. State, 710 A.2d 197, 199 (Del. 1998). 
19 See Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992); and Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 
1989). 
 
10
Hendricks was charged with, and convicted of, possession of drug 
paraphernalia based upon the digital scale and plastic bags that were found 
in his hotel room.   
The “‘obligation to preserve evidence is rooted in the due process 
provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and the Delaware Constitution, article I, section 7.’”20  In Deberry v. State, 
this Court adopted a unitary approach to this question, which consists of 
examining not only the conduct of the State, but also the nature of the 
missing evidence.21  The analysis established in Deberry asks essentially six 
questions.  The first three inquiries are:   
(1) [W]ould the requested material, if extant in the possession 
of the State at the time of the defense request, have been subject 
to disclosure under Criminal Rule 16 or Brady [v. Maryland];22 
(2) if so, did the government have a duty to preserve the 
material?; [and] (3) if there was a duty to preserve, was the duty 
breached, and what consequences should flow from [that] 
breach?23 
 
                                          
 
20 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d at 85 (quoting Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 751-52 
(Del. 1983)). 
21 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 750. 
22 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (Brady requires the prosecution to turn over 
potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant, upon request). 
23 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 750.  See e.g., Brown v. U.S., 372 A.2d 557, 559 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319 
(2nd Cir. 1975).  See also Lunnon v. State, 710 A.2d 197, 200-01 (Del. 1998) (holding 
that where the State did not act negligently or in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence, 
and the missing evidence did not substantially prejudice the defendant’s case, a Lolly 
instruction was not required). 
 
11
If it is determined that the State breached its duty to preserve 
evidence, this Court will then undertake a separate three-part analysis 
to determine the consequences that will flow from that breach.  That 
three-part analysis involves an examination of:  
(1) the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the 
importance of the missing evidence considering the probative 
value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that 
remains available, and (3) the sufficiency of the other evidence 
produced at the trial to sustain the conviction.24 
 
As we noted in Hammond, “there may well be cases in which the 
defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the 
loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to 
make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.”25  Alternatively, there may be 
circumstances when the State failed to preserve evidence that was material 
to the defense and the defendant would be entitled to a missing evidence 
instruction but not a dismissal of the charges.26  In this case, however, the 
record reflects that Hendricks was not entitled to either a dismissal of the 
charges or a “missing evidence” instruction, notwithstanding the 
unavailability of certain evidence.   
                                          
 
24 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d at 86 (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d at 1091). 
25 Id. at 87 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
26 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 961-62 (Del. 1992) (emphasis added). 
 
12
“Missing Evidence” Instruction Properly Denied  
 
The State concedes that all of the missing evidence would have been 
subject to disclosure under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, and that the 
government had a duty to preserve the drug paraphernalia, but not the cash.  
The Superior Court concluded that the State was not negligent in forfeiting 
the currency because the forfeiture was consistent with the State’s standard 
operating procedures and the defense did not request that the State record the 
serial numbers on the bills.  We agree.  Therefore, we hold that the State did 
not breach its duty to preserve the currency and Hendricks was not entitled 
to a Lolly “missing evidence” instruction as to the missing cash.27   
Regarding the drug paraphernalia, the Superior Court concluded, and 
the State conceded, that the State had breached its duty to preserve that 
evidence by negligently destroying the digital scale and plastic bags.  
Therefore, it is unnecessary to address the three aspects of the Deberry 
analysis that inquires into the nature of this drug paraphernalia evidence.  
Accordingly, we proceed directly to the “consequence” portion of the 
Deberry “missing evidence” paradigm.   
 
The first part of the consequence analysis is to determine the degree of 
negligence or bad faith involved.  Dover Police Department Detective Todd 
                                          
 
27 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992). 
 
13
Case testified about the inadvertent disposition of the evidence and the 
procedure for periodic disposition of evidence at the police department.  He 
stated on direct examination that: 
[u]nfortunately we are asked to periodically go through our 
evidence by our technicians to see if it is still of value, and we 
are required as the individual officer assigned to that evidence 
to enter into the DELJIS computer, which is the state wide 
criminal computer.  In that capacity you can obtain the 
information of a particular criminal case and its status or 
disposition. 
 
Unfortunately in this case I interpreted the information 
from the computer stating that the three charges had either been 
pled away or disposed of; therefore, I instructed the evidence 
technician to dispose of the digital scale and baggies in a proper 
manner and that has been done, so were not physically available 
today. 
 . . . . 
 
They were retained for a period of time until 
approximately February of this year when I then made that 
request accidentally and had them destroyed. 
 
The record reflects that the Dover Police Department mistakenly 
destroyed this evidence in February 2000, prior to Hendricks’ trial.  
There is no evidence that the State acted in bad faith.  The Superior 
Court found that the State had been negligent, and that factual 
determination of negligence is supported by the record. 
 
The second part of the consequence analysis is to determine the 
importance of the missing evidence after considering the probative value and 
reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available.  
 
14
Hendricks argues that the missing drug paraphernalia evidence was 
important to his defense because, if the drug paraphernalia had been 
available, the defense could have tested it for drug residue or fingerprints in 
order to rule out Hendricks’ involvement.  The State submits that the 
absence of drug residue or fingerprints would not have changed the ultimate 
outcome of the case.   
 
The third part of the consequence analysis involves an examination of 
the sufficiency of alternative evidence produced at the trial to sustain the 
conviction.  The trial judge found that there was “sufficient circumstantial 
evidence based upon the testimony and observations of the officers to 
support a conviction on the maintaining a dwelling and possession of drug 
paraphernalia charges.”  We agree.  The record reflects that Hendricks’ 
possession of the drug paraphernalia was established independent of the 
missing evidence because he had a key to the hotel room in which that 
evidence was found, according to the police testimony at trial. 
 
The drug paraphernalia evidence was found pursuant to a search of a 
place where Hendricks was staying and which was under his control.  The 
search was performed after Hendricks had consented.  All of these 
circumstances support the State’s position that a logical circumstantial 
 
15
inference could be drawn that Hendricks possessed any items found in that 
hotel room. 
The record reflects that the destruction of the digital scale and plastic 
bags was negligent, but was not done in bad faith.  The record also reflects 
that there was reliable secondary testimonial evidence that made the actual 
availability of that drug paraphernalia unimportant to the State’s case.  The 
secondary evidence presented by the State was sufficient to establish 
Hendricks’ guilt and to support his convictions.   
The missing drug paraphernalia evidence would not have been 
exculpatory.  Even if neither the plastic bags nor the digital scale contained 
drug residue or Hendricks’ fingerprints, the presence of those items in his 
hotel room was sufficient to establish his possession of that drug 
paraphernalia.  Therefore, the physical existence of the drug paraphernalia 
evidence at the time of the trial was not material to Hendricks’ defense.  
Although Hendricks’ attorney was free to argue to the jury the significance 
of the drug paraphernalia that was missing because of its negligent 
destruction, the Superior Court properly denied Hendricks’ request for a 
“missing evidence” jury instruction. 
Conclusion 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.