Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GROSHON, JR.
Citation: 2003 OK 112, 82 P.3d 99
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2003

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GROSHON, JR. Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GROSHON, JR. 2003 OK 112 82 P.3d 99 Case Number: SCBD-4663 Decided: 12/16/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, ROBERT F. GROSHON, JR., Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ¶0 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the complainant alleges in three counts numerous instances of unprofessional conduct deemed to warrant disciplinary sanctions. A trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal found that respondent's actions constitute grounds for professional discipline and recommended a public reprimand with an assessment of the costs of the investigation, record and proceeding. Upon de novo review of the evidentiary materials presented to the trial panel and this court's acceptance of the parties' stipulations, RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED BY PUBLIC CENSURE AND DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING, WHICH SHALL BE DUE NOT LATER THAN NINETY DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL. Loraine Dillinder Farabow, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Robert F. Groshon, Jr., pro se, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent. OPALA, V.C.J. ¶1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: (1) Does the record1 submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful de novo consideration of the complaint and of its disposition? and (2) Is a public censure and the payment of costs associated with this proceeding an appropriate disciplinary sanction for respondent's breach of professional discipline? We answer both questions in the affirmative. I. INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD ¶2 The Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA) charged Robert F. Groshon, Jr. (Groshon or respondent), a licensed Oklahoma lawyer, with three counts of professional misconduct by filing a formal complaint in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP).2 The complaint alleges in three counts Groshon's violation of the RGDP and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC)3. The Bar rests its counts on ORPC Rules 1.1,4 1.7(b)(2),5 1.8(b),6 2.1,7 8.4(a) and (d),8 and RGDP Rule 1.3;9 it withdraws its reliance on ORPC Rule 8.4(b).10 ¶3 The Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) held a hearing on 24 June 2003 to consider the charges. The trial panel recognized for the record the parties' admitted fact stipulations, conclusions of law and agreed disciplinary recommendation. Respondent concedes (by stipulation)that his conduct violates RGDP Rules 1.3 and ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.7(b)(2), 1.8(b), 2.1 and 8.4(a) and (d). ¶4 Upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the stipulations and testimony on file, the trial panel issued its report (which incorporates the parties' stipulations). It recommends that the respondent (1) receive a public reprimand and (2) pay the costs of this proceeding. II. THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL DE NOVO CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING ¶5 In a bar disciplinary proceeding this court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original jurisdiction. ¶6 This court's duty can be discharged only if the trial panel submits a complete record of the proceedings. ¶7 Groshon admits, and the proof supports, the charge of professional misconduct. Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that its contents are adequate for this court's de novo consideration of respondent's professional misconduct. III. FACTS ADMITTED BY STIPULATION ¶8 The parties have tendered their stipulations by which respondent admits the facts which serve as the basis of the charges against him. A stipulation of fact is an agreement by the parties that a particular fact (or facts) in controversy stands admitted. It serves as an evidentiary substitute that dispenses with the need for proof of facts that are conceded by the parties' agreement. Stipulations are subject to the approval of the court in which they are entered. A. Count I ¶9 The charges against respondent arise from a client complaint that respondent made suggestive comments to and engaged in inappropriate touching of her of a sexual nature. Shortly after her divorce in February, 2000 Mrs. C. hired Groshon to represent her in an emergency hearing for child custody brought by her former husband. ¶10 Over the next few months Mrs. C. continued to call respondent concerning other matters relating to the child custody issue, including harassment and nonpayment of alimony by her former husband, possible modification of the divorce decree and repeated threats by the ex-husband of taking custody of the minor child. During one of these conversations respondent asked Mrs. C. if she would like to go out or meet him for drinks. She refused. Respondent stipulated that he was not aware of nor did he ever advise her of the possible conflict of interest which might arise should she have accepted this invitation. B. Count II ¶11 In September of 2000 Mrs. C. contacted Groshon and indicated that her former husband had filed a motion to modify the divorce decree, asking for full custody of the parties' minor child, and that he be released from the duties of support alimony. Respondent informed Mrs. C. that she needed to make an appointment with his partner to sign a fee agreement with the firm. She complied with this request. On 18 April 2001 Mrs. C. met with respondent in his office to prepare for trial. She became emotional and began to cry. C. Count III ¶12 The next day Mrs. C telephoned respondent's secretary to advise the office that she would be coming in to obtain a document she had left on respondent's desk, and an appointment was made for her with Groshon for the next day. ¶13 A few days later Mrs. C. contacted Groshon's office requesting an itemized bill for the legal services provided. Mrs. C. obtained a new attorney and, on 22 May 2001, filed this grievance against respondent with the OBA. ¶14 Groshon is charged with (1) failure to provide competent representation to a client, ORPC Rule 1.1, (2) failure to inform a client and obtain consent where representation of that client may be limited by the lawyer's own interests, ORPC Rule 1.7(b)(2), (3) use of information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client without the client's consent, ORPC Rule 1.8(b), (4) failure to exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice, ORPC Rule 2.1, (5) violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, ORPC Rule 8.4(a), (6) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, ORPC 8.4(d), and (7) the commission of an act which would reasonably be found to bring discredit upon the legal profession, whether or not the act is a felony, misdemeanor or a crime at all, RGDP Rule 1.3. Groshon stipulates that his actions violated these provisions. We accept respondent's stipulations - and find by clear and convincing evidence - that his admitted conduct offends each rule with whose violation he stands charged. IV. MITIGATING FACTORS ¶15 Mitigating circumstances may be considered in arriving at the assessment of the appropriate measure of discipline. V. RESPONDENT'S MISCONDUCT WARRANTS A PUBLIC REPRIMAND ¶16 A license to practice law is not conferred for the benefit of the licensee, but for that of the public. ¶17 Extant jurisprudence teaches that a lawyer's sexual advances toward a client take advantage of the attorney-client relationship and constitute professional misconduct that will result in disciplinary action against the attorney when the matter is brought to the attention of the Bar. ¶18 The parties are in agreement concerning discipline and submit that a public censure is warranted for respondent's misconduct. The parties cite to State ex rel. Bar Ass'n v. Sopher VI. SUMMARY ¶19 In sum, the record bears clear and convincing proof that respondent's participation in unprofessional conduct violates the rules that govern professional responsibility. After a thorough review of the record and due recognition of the factors tendered in mitigation, ¶20 RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED BY PUBLIC CENSURE AND DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING, WHICH SHALL BE DUE NOT LATER THAN NINETY DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL. ¶21 OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, SUMMERS, AND WINCHESTER, JJ., CONCUR. ¶22 WATT, C.J., KAUGER AND BOUDREAU, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART. ¶23 Boudreau, J., with whom Watt, C.J., and Kauger, J., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I would impose a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law. FOOT