Title: State v. Jones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97696
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 2012

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 97,696 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH JONES, JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Although statements made to medical professionals for treatment purposes and 
recorded in medical records, along with corresponding laboratory testing, are generally 
not testimonial in nature for purposes of the right of confrontation, the ultimate 
determination of a statement's testimonial character rests with the primary purpose of the 
medical professional's questioning or testing.  
 
2. 
 
Where the defendant has failed to provide a sufficient record to permit an adequate 
review of the primary purpose of a medical professional's questioning or testing, the 
ruling below must be affirmed. 
 
3. 
When a single criminal offense is alleged that may be committed in more than one 
way, the court is presented with an alternative means case and the State must prove each 
alternative means. When several acts are alleged, any one of which could constitute the 
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crime charged, the court is presented with a multiple acts case that requires the jury to be 
unanimous as to which one of the acts the defendant committed.  
 
4. 
 
A district court is under no duty to provide a lesser included offense instruction if 
the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of that lesser included offense based 
on the evidence presented at trial. Under the facts of this case, where the uncontroverted 
trial evidence established that the victim was 12 years old at the time the defendant 
committed oral sodomy on her, the evidence was insufficient for a jury to reasonably 
convict the defendant of simple criminal sodomy, and the district court did not err in 
failing to give a lesser included offense instruction on that crime. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 19, 
2008. Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed November 9, 
2012. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.   
 
Matthew J. Edge, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Jennifer L. Myers, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Joseph Jones, Jr., seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, 
State v. Jones, No. 97,696, 2008 WL 4291467 (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished opinion), 
affirming his convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, furnishing alcohol to a minor 
for an illicit purpose, and endangering a child. We granted Jones' petition for review in 
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part to clarify whether a nurse's testimony about hospital laboratory results was 
testimonial in nature within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. But the evidence in 
the record is insufficient to make that determination in Jones' favor, and we find no other 
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Jones was employed as a live-in farmhand at a stable where H.F. and other 
children volunteered to work in exchange for free horseback rides. On October 16, 2005, 
Jones called H.F., asking if she could come to work. When she arrived at the stable, the 
owner and a few other volunteers were there looking at horses. However, after H.F. had 
completed a few chores, she discovered that she had been left alone with Jones.   
 
When H.F. entered the tack room where Jones resided to get a drink, Jones offered 
her two glasses of soda that contained alcohol. H.F. said she drank both glasses despite 
the fact that "[i]t made [her] whole chest burn." Jones also gave her a "joint" and 
repeatedly pressured her to smoke it with him. Despite her initial protests, H.F. 
eventually agreed to smoke it "once or twice."   
 
When H.F. began feeling dizzy, she attempted to call her grandmother to come for 
her, but Jones pushed her to the ground, pinned her wrists, knelt on top of her, and put his 
penis in her mouth. Although she was unsure why, Jones obeyed her command to get off 
of her. Once free, H.F. threatened Jones with a fork she retrieved from a nearby table and 
then called her grandmother to come pick her up, before running out into the street.   
 
When the grandmother arrived, she found H.F. staggering down the middle of the 
road with Jones trailing behind her. In the car, the grandmother noticed that H.F. was 
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acting upset, hysterical, and drugged. Upon arriving at grandmother's house, H.F. 
vomited several times and then told her grandmother that Jones had touched her.   
 
After learning what had happened, H.F.'s mother took her to the hospital where 
nurse Gannon, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), conducted an examination. 
Nurse Gannon collected two sets of physical samples:  (1) oral swabs and blood samples 
for the Kansas Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit provided by the Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation (KBI), and (2) blood and urine samples pursuant to the doctor's orders to 
test H.F.'s "basic chemistries to see if she was generally healthy." The first set of physical 
samples was given to the local police as part of the assault kit, which was logged into 
evidence and sent to the KBI forensic laboratory. Those samples were not analyzed for 
drugs or alcohol. The second set was given to the hospital laboratory for analysis, the 
results of which included a positive indication of alcohol and marijuana in H.F.'s system.   
 
Jones was charged with three counts:  aggravated criminal sodomy, furnishing 
alcohol to a minor for an illicit purpose, and endangering a child. At trial, Jones made a 
hearsay objection to nurse Gannon's testimony that the hospital laboratory results 
indicated that H.F.'s blood and urine contained alcohol and marijuana. Initially, the 
district court sustained the objection based on the State's failure to lay a proper 
foundation for the medical records. After the State presented further foundational 
testimony, the court overruled Jones' objection when the testimony was offered a second 
time. Pointedly, the written laboratory report was never admitted into evidence; rather, 
the State only offered Gannon's testimony as to what was stated in the laboratory report.   
 
The jury convicted Jones on all three counts, the court sentenced him to a term of  
months in prison, and Jones appealed both his convictions and sentences to the Court of 
Appeals. In that court, he argued that several errors warranted reversal of his convictions:  
(1) the admission of Gannon's testimony regarding the hospital laboratory results violated 
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his right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, as well as under § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; (2) he 
was convicted of child endangerment based on alternative means without jury unanimity; 
(3) the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of 
criminal sodomy; and (4) his sentence was enhanced in violation of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments based on prior convictions that were not proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones' convictions and sentences. With respect to 
the Confrontation Clause issue, the panel noted that the alcohol and marijuana test results 
were not part of the KBI forensic investigation; rather, they were obtained from the 
hospital's testing in connection with H.F.'s treatment. The panel observed that there was 
nothing in the record to suggest that the laboratory technician performing the tests would 
have known the samples came from a minor or a crime victim, and that if the technician 
would not have anticipated their use in a criminal prosecution, the results would not be 
testimonial in nature. We granted review.   
 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
 
Jones' complaint involves nurse Gannon's brief testimony based upon the 
hospital's laboratory report:  "There [were] positive results for marijuana and for alcohol 
both in her drug test." Because the nurse did not perform the testing, Jones made a 
hearsay objection at trial, contending that the nurse's testimony related an out-of-court 
declaration by the laboratory technician that was offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. The district court ultimately overruled the objection, apparently determining that 
the State had laid sufficient foundation to establish that the laboratory report was a 
business record, even though no report or record was ever proffered or admitted into 
evidence. 
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Jones does not specifically challenge the district court's ruling on his hearsay 
objection. Rather, for the first time on appeal, Jones argues that the nurse's hearsay 
testimony violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, as well as violating § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill 
of Rights. Ordinarily, the failure to specifically base a trial objection on the Confrontation 
Clause precludes appellate review of that issue. See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 
708-09, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (appellate issue on right of confrontation not preserved 
with a hearsay objection); State v. Bryant, 272 Kan. 1204, 1208, 38 P.3d 661 (2002) 
(declined to entertain a Confrontation Clause challenge for the first time on appeal). 
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, the Court of Appeals applied an exception to the 
preservation requirement and addressed the merits of Jones' Confrontation Clause claim. 
The State did not formally seek our review of the panel's employment of a preservation 
exception, so that issue is not before us.   
 
In the watershed case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 
158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court clarified and tightened the requirements to 
admit testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Crawford 
rendered inadmissible at trial those statements to which the Confrontation Clause applies, 
unless the statement's maker is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination of the maker. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. But to implicate a defendant's 
constitutional right of confrontation, the statement being offered must have been 
testimonial in nature. 541 U.S. at 68; see also State v. Miller, 284 Kan. 682, 711-12, 163 
P.3d 267 (2007) (citing State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 575, 158 P.3d 317 [2007]). At the 
heart of this appeal is the question of whether the hospital laboratory technician's 
statement of the testing results was testimonial in nature. 
 
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Standard of Review 
 
"'We employ an unlimited standard of review when addressing issues pertaining to 
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 
State v. Leshay, 289 Kan. 546, 547, 213 P.3d 1071 (2009); State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 
697, 708-09, 207 P.3d 208 (2009) (whether confrontation rights have been violated is a 
question of law subject to unlimited review)." State v. Marquis, 292 Kan. 925, 928, 257 
P.3d 775 (2011). 
 
Analysis 
 
The Crawford Court did not specifically define testimonial statements, opting 
instead to identify types of statements that could qualify: 
 
 
"Various formulations of this core class of 'testimonial' statements exist: 'ex parte 
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, 
or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially,' . . . 'extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,' [citation 
omitted]; 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial' 
[citation omitted]." 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
 
The Court later refined its Crawford analysis in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009), holding that the sworn 
statements of laboratory analysts made in contemplation of litigation were testimonial 
and, thus, subject to Crawford's confrontation requirements. See also State v. Laturner, 
289 Kan. 727, 733-34, 750-51, 218 P.3d 23 (2009) (relying on Melendez-Diaz in finding 
a Kansas statute unconstitutional where it authorized the admission of a sworn forensic 
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lab report in lieu of the preparer's in-court testimony). Most recently, in Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011), the Court 
determined that a forensic laboratory report certifying the defendant's blood-alcohol 
concentration was testimonial. The Court found it significant that while the analyst who 
prepared the report may not have had to exercise any independent judgment in creating it, 
the certification he signed included more than the "raw, machine-produced data" 
regarding Bullcoming's blood-alcohol level, such as his adherence to specific protocols 
and information regarding chain of custody. 131 S. Ct. at 2714. It was those additions 
which placed the analyst's certification squarely within confrontation requirements. 131 
S. Ct. at 2714 ("These representations, relating to past events and human actions . . . , are 
meet [sic] for cross-examination."). 
 
At the time we granted review in this case, our decision in State v. Brown, 285 
Kan. 261, 291, 173 P.3d 612 (2007), provided the best guidance for discerning a 
statement's testimonial nature by providing a list of factors. But recently we reevaluated 
Brown in light of subsequent opinions issued by the United State Supreme Court that 
have refined the concept of statements made in the context of medical treatment. See 
State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 264 P.3d 461 (2011); State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 
264 P.3d 440 (2011). 
 
In Miller, we were asked to decide whether the statements made by a 4-year-old 
victim of sex crimes to a SANE were testimonial. In doing so, we synthesized the United 
States Supreme Court's holdings in Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 
1156, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011); Bullcoming, 564 U.S. ___; Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009); and Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 171 L. Ed. 2d 488 (2008), and concluded that 
a more refined approach in analyzing these types of statements was necessary. Miller, 
293 Kan. at 568-74.   
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Although we acknowledged that, generally, statements made to medical 
professionals for treatment purposes and recorded in medical records are not testimonial, 
we discerned that the ultimate determination of a statement's character rests with the 
"primary purpose" of the questioning. 293 Kan. at 570. In that regard, whether statements 
made to a SANE are testimonial is a "highly context-dependent inquiry." Miller, 293 
Kan. at 574. "Because the focus is on objective facts, 'the relevant inquiry is not the 
subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved . . . , but rather the purpose that 
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements 
and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.' Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 
1156." Miller, 293 Kan. at 571. Relying primarily on Bryant, Miller adopted a 
nonexclusive list of the most relevant considerations for establishing the testimonial 
nature of a victim's statement to a SANE. Those factors include "whether the SANE was 
a State actor or agent, whether there was an ongoing emergency, whether the encounter 
was formal, and whether the statements and actions of both [the victim] and the SANE 
reflect a primary purpose focusing on the later prosecution of a crime." Miller, 293 Kan. 
at 575. 
 
Unfortunately, because Jones did not raise the right of confrontation issue at trial, 
we have no findings relevant to whether the laboratory results were testimonial in nature. 
Specifically, we have no findings as to the primary purpose of the hospital technician's 
laboratory report. That absence precludes us from a proper review on this issue.   
 
As the Court of Appeals opined, there is evidence in the record which would 
support a finding that the laboratory results in question were generated primarily for 
medical treatment purposes. Nurse Gannon testified that the doctor directed her to 
withdraw samples to be used for tests other than the KBI kit, and she said that the tests 
were to check the victim's "basic chemistries to see if she was generally healthy." In 
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contrast, the nurse testified that she was also assisting law enforcement, and Officer 
Simmons testified that he encouraged the family to take H.F.to the hospital to "get a rape 
kit and . . . to also check on her medical condition."   
 
In short, H.F.'s hospital visit accomplished dual purposes, and it is unclear at what 
point the SANE's activities might have transitioned from medical treatment to law 
enforcement purposes. We do not even have a finding on when H.F.'s mother consented 
to collecting the samples. See Miller, 293 Kan. at 578 (transition of SANE's inquiries 
from those made for medical treatment purposes to those made by an agent of the State 
for the use in a later prosecution may be determined by the timing of consent for 
collection). Moreover, the absence from the record of the written laboratory report is 
problematic. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (whether a blood-alcohol concentration 
report was testimonial depended on the context in which it was taken and the purpose of 
the technician in running the report).   
 
Without findings, we are handcuffed. See State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 161, 199 
P.3d 1265 (2009) (regardless of whether the record contains sufficient evidence to make 
factual findings, that is not the role of this court). "Appellate courts do not make factual 
findings but review those made by district courts." See Thomas, 288 Kan. at 161; In re 
Adoption of A.A.T., 287 Kan. 590, 599, 196 P.3d 1180 (2008) (an appellate court does not 
reweigh evidence, substitute its evaluation of evidence for district court's, or pass upon 
credibility of witnesses). Accordingly, we must affirm the Court of Appeals' 
determination that the testimony of nurse Gannon was not testimonial in nature. 
 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS 
 
Next, Jones presents a curious, albeit creative, alternative means argument. He 
contends that the jury's verdict on the charge of endangering a child was legally 
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inadequate because the State presented evidence of three alternative means for 
committing the offense, two of which were legally insufficient because they were 
multiplicitous with the other charges. Specifically, Jones argues that the crime of 
endangering a child could have been supported by any one of the following acts:  (1) 
placing his penis in H.F.'s mouth while pinning her down; (2) giving her alcohol; and (3) 
providing and encouraging H.F. to smoke marijuana. But because the first act was the 
basis for the sodomy charge and the second was the basis for conviction on furnishing 
alcohol to minors, Jones argues that evidence of those offenses cannot be used to fulfill 
the super sufficiency requirement of alternative means. The Court of Appeals simply 
concluded that this was not an alternative means case and we agree. 
 
 
"When a single offense is alleged that may be committed in more than one way, 
the court is presented with an alternative means case. [Citation omitted.] When several 
acts are alleged, any of which could constitute the crime charged, the court is presented 
with a multiple acts case. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Bailey, 292 Kan. 449, 458, 255 
P.3d 19 (2011).   
 
To convict Jones of endangering a child under K.S.A. 21-3680, the State had to 
prove that he "intentionally and unreasonably caus[ed] or permitt[ed] a child under the 
age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in which the child's life, body or health [might] 
be injured or endangered." An alternative means analysis looks at the material elements 
of the crime, rather than the number of possible factual scenarios that might fit into those 
elements. For instance, a traditional alternative means argument would go something like 
this:  The defendant could have been convicted of one incident of endangering a child by 
either causing the child to be placed in a dangerous situation or by permitting the child to 
be placed in that circumstance, and there was evidence of only one of the means. But that 
is not the situation here. Rather, Jones argues that there are three factual scenarios, 
involving three separate and distinct acts, each of which could have formed the basis for a 
charge of endangering a child.   
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In other words, Jones describes multiple acts whereby the State could have filed 
three counts of endangering a child. In that scenario, the concern is whether the State 
elected the act upon which it was relying or the trial court gave a unanimity instruction. 
Inexplicably, the parties argue over whether the State's closing arguments effected an 
adequate election from among the multiple acts, even though such an election does not 
save an alternative means case. In short, Jones' alternative means issue does not fit the 
facts of this case, and his arguments are without merit. 
 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION 
 
Jones next contends that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
simple criminal sodomy, even though Jones did not request the instruction or object to its 
omission. Accordingly, Jones is not permitted to claim error on appeal unless the failure 
to give the lesser included offense instruction was clearly erroneous. See K.S.A. 22-
3414(3). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Before we can find that the omission of a lesser included offense instruction was 
clearly erroneous, we must find that the instruction was legally and factually appropriate. 
That determination is made through a de novo review. See State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 
___, Syl. ¶ 4, 286 P.3d 195 (September 21, 2012).  
 
Analysis 
 
A district court is under no duty to provide a lesser included offense instruction if 
the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of that lesser included offense based 
on the evidence presented. State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 977, 270 P.3d 1142 
13 
 
 
 
(2012); see K.S.A. 22-3414(3). An element of simple criminal sodomy is that the victim 
was at least 14 years old. K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). At trial, H.F.'s uncontroverted testimony 
was that her date of birth is June 28, 1993, which made her 12 years old at the time of the 
incident. Accordingly, even if the jury had been given a lesser included offense 
instruction on simple criminal sodomy, it did not have sufficient evidence from which it 
could have reasonably convicted Jones of that offense. The omission of the lesser 
included offense instruction on simple criminal sodomy was not erroneous and, therefore, 
it was not clearly erroneous.   
 
APPRENDI CHALLENGE 
 
Finally, Jones argues that use of his prior convictions in his criminal history score 
to enhance his sentences without requiring the State to prove the convictions to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt is prohibited under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). He acknowledges that State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 
44, 46-48, 41 P.3d 781 (2002), controls this issue, but he includes it to preserve the 
argument for federal review. Our position has not changed since Ivory. See, e.g., State v. 
Fewell, 286 Kan. 370, 394-96, 184 P.3d 903 (2008). Accordingly, we affirm Jones' 
sentences. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
DAVIS, C.J., not participating. 
 
PAUL E. MILLER, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Miller was appointed to hear case No. 97,696 
vice Chief Justice Davis pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by Art. 3, 
§ 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.