Title: Stirling v. Sapp
Citation: 229 So. 2d 850
Docket Number: 37573
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 1969

229 So. 2d 850 (1969)
Ronald C. STIRLING and Colleen Finney Stirling, His Wife, Petitioners,
v.
James W. SAPP and Sandra Ash Sapp, His Wife, Respondents.
No. 37573.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 2, 1969.
Rehearing Denied September 9, 1969.
*851 George A. Routh and Carleton L. Weidemeyer, Clearwater, for petitioners.
Luke R. Kaleel, of Kaleel, Kaleel &amp; Kaleel, St. Petersburg, for respondents.
ADKINS, Justice.
By petition for a writ of certiorari, we are requested to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal because of alleged conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and decisions of other District Courts of Appeal. Fla. Const., Art. V, § 4 (F.S.A.); Stirling v. Sapp, 209 So. 2d 251 (Fla.App.2d 1968).
Petitioners, plaintiffs below, brought suit for damages sustained as the result of an automobile accident at an unmarked intersection. Final judgment for plaintiffs was entered upon a jury verdict in the amount of $15,000.00. This judgment was set aside upon motion and final judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered by the trial court in favor of the defendants. The final order which set aside the judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed on appeal.
In its opinion the District Court of Appeal quoted pertinent portions of the trial judge's final order as follows:
Motions for judgment notwithstanding verdict, like motions for directed verdict, should be resolved with extreme caution since the granting thereof holds that one side of the case is essentially devoid of probative evidence. The trial judge is authorized to grant such motion only if there is no evidence or reasonable inferences to support the opposing position. Hendricks v. Dailey, 208 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1968). The rules governing motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict are substantially the same as those which guide the disposition of a motion for directed verdict. This Court in Nelson v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1956) said:
See also Greer v. Thweatt, 202 So. 2d 574 (Fla.App. 1st 1967).
In evaluating the facts as stated in the District Court opinion (209 So.2d 251), it is apparent that the defendants' automobile was to the plaintiffs' left and the plaintiffs' automobile was to the defendants' right. Fla. Stat. § 317.401(2), F.S.A. reads as follows:
The plaintiff driver, having the right-of-way, could legally assume that the approaching motorist on the intersecting street would yield the right-of-way, as this Court has approved the following principle of law:
Lloyd v. McKenna, 179 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App.3d 1965) involved a collision at an unmarked intersection between a taxicab, in which plaintiff was a passenger, and an automobile driven by defendant McKenna. *853 Plaintiff joined the taxicab company as a defendant. The jury returned a verdict holding the cab company liable but exonerating defendant McKenna. On appeal the only point preserved for review was the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiff against McKenna because defendant McKenna admitted he did not see the cab approaching from the left. In affirming, the Court said:
A jury should determine what is or what is not negligence in a particular case where there are disputes or conflicts in the testimony, 18 F.L.P., Negligence, § 37, or where the facts are such that reasonable persons may fairly arrive at different conclusions. Rofer v. Jensen, 141 So. 2d 791 (Fla.App.2d 1962); Sandford v. Firestone Tire &amp; Rubber Co., 139 So. 2d 916 (Fla. App.2d 1962).
Where the facts are undisputed and the evidence is reasonably susceptible of but a single inference, the question of defendant's negligence or plaintiff's contributory negligence becomes one of law for the court.
Nelson v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1956) was an action by a pedestrian for injuries sustained when struck by defendant's automobile while crossing a four-lane high-way. Defendant was proceeding near the center of the north-bound traffic lanes at a lawful rate of speed. Her lights were bright. She offered no explanation whatever for having failed to see the plaintiff, who, at the time, was fairly well "in his cups." Due to a condition diagnosed as "retrograde amnesia," plaintiff had no recollection of anything that had happened. The point where the vehicle struck plaintiff was approximately 21 feet from the curb. After hearing the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for defendant. This Court in its opinion described the trial judge's reasoning as follows:
Upon appeal this Court held that the verdict was improperly directed for the defendant, saying:
Barr v. Mizrahi, 124 So. 2d 508 (Fla.App.2d 1960) involved the collision of two automobiles at an unmarked intersection where the plaintiffs had an unobstructed view in the direction from which the defendants' vehicle was approaching. The jury found for plaintiffs and the defendants successfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The District Court of Appeal applied the rule stated in Nelson v. Ziegler, supra, reversed the trial judge and ordered that the jury verdict be reinstated.
In the case sub judice the jury, as reasonable men, drew conclusions and inferences from the evidence which differed from those of the trial judge. Although plaintiff driver could have been negligent, this is not, in itself, an absolute bar to recovery unless such negligence contributed to the proximate cause of the accident. The decision of the District Court of Appeal is in conflict with Nelson v. Ziegler, supra, and Kerr v. Caraway, supra, and should be quashed.
In passing, we might point out that the facts in Kokotoff v. Higman, 101 So. 2d 166 (Fla.App.3d 1958) are materially different from the facts of this case. In the Kokotoff case the "side front parts" of the two cars met within a few feet of the center of the intersection. In the instant case not only was plaintiffs' vehicle past the center of the intersection when it was struck in the left rear by the defendants' vehicle, but the speed of the defendants' vehicle was in dispute.
For the reasons stated the decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause is remanded with instructions that the cause be further remanded to the Circuit court with instructions that the verdict and final judgment for plaintiffs be reinstated.
ROBERTS, Acting C.J., DREW, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., MANN, District Court Judge, and WILLIS, Circuit Judge, concur.