Title: State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Association v. Stilwell
Citation: 1998 OK 120, 69OBJ4206, 990 P.2d 835
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 1998

State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Association v. Stilwell Annotate this Case State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Association v. Stilwell 1998 OK 120 990 P.2d 835 69 OBJ 4206 Case Number: SCAD 4314 Decided: 12/08/1998 Modified: 03/08/1999 Supreme Court of Oklahoma STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. LEE STILWELL, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE. ALLEN J. WELCH, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for Complainant, JACK MATTINGLY, Mattingly & Snow, Seminole, Oklahoma, Attorney for Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING. ¶0 Complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association, brought disciplinary proceeding against Respondent, Lee Stilwell, claiming that Stilwell, who is now Associate District Judge for Seminole County, Oklahoma, had violated [990 P.2d 836] Rules 1.1, 1.3, 4.2 and 8.4(c) and (d) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. After a hearing before a Trial Panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal, the Trial Panel concluded that Judge Stilwell had not violated any of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that the complaint against him be dismissed and that he be relieved of the obligation to pay any costs. COMPLAINT DISMISSED; APPLICATION FOR ASSESSMENT OF COSTS DENIED. WATT, J. ¶1 This matter is here for consideration of a report of a Trial Panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal recommending that the complaint against Respondent, Lee Stilwell, be dismissed and he be relieved of any obligation to pay costs. Respondent is currently Associate District Judge in Seminole County, Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Bar Association filed a complaint against Judge Stilwell for conduct that occurred in 1980, while Judge Stilwell was in private practice in Hughes County. The Bar's complaint alleged that Judge Stilwell had violated the following Rules Governing Disciplinary Procedure: 1.1 (failure of competence), 1.3 (failure of diligence), 4.2 (improperly causing another to contact a person he knew to be represented by counsel), 8.4(c) (conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, or deceit), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The Bar subsequently withdrew its competence and diligence claims (Rules 1.1 and 1.3). In its brief the Bar withdrew its claim that Judge Stilwell violated Rule 8.4(c). Thus, the only issues remaining for determination are whether Judge Stilwell violated either Rule 4.2 or Rule 8.4(d). We hold that Judge Stilwell did not violate either rule. FACTS ¶2 In 1980 Benjamin Clayton retained Judge Stilwell, who was then in private practice, to represent Clayton in a divorce action against his wife, Patricia Lynn Clayton. Mrs. Clayton testified that she accompanied Mr. Clayton to the appointment Mr. Clayton had made with Judge Stilwell and that she was "just going to sign" the waiver for the divorce. Mrs. Clayton had agreed to the terms of the divorce and paid $230 to Judge Stilwell on behalf of Mr. Clayton, which she had to borrow from her mother, because neither she nor her husband had the money to pay Judge Stilwell's fee. The Trial Panel found that Mrs. Clayton was not represented by Judge Stilwell. At the hearing Mrs. Clayton was asked, "And your, opinion, then, back in 1980, did you ever establish an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Stilwell?" Mrs. Clayton answered, "No sir." The Bar resists the Trial Panel's finding on this score but our independent review of the transcript of the hearing before the Trial Panel convinces us that the Trial Panel's finding that Judge Stilwell represented only Mr. Clayton, and not Mrs. Clayton, was correct. ¶3 Mrs. Clayton testified that she thought she was divorced after she signed the waiver and gave it to Judge Stilwell. The fact was, however, that Mr. Clayton's petition for divorce was never filed. Mr. and Mrs. Clayton both remarried. In 1983 Mrs. Clayton married a Mr. Smith, who is both an oil company employee and a minister, and they have had two children. They live in Payne County. ¶4 Sometime in 1996, Mrs. Smith sought a copy of her decree of divorce from Mr. Clayton because she needed it in order to qualify for mission work in her church. She was advised by the Hughes County Court Clerk that no decree granting her a divorce was on file in Hughes County. Mrs. Smith then called Judge Stilwell and informed him of her problem. Judge Stilwell promised to check to see if he still had the old file. Judge Stilwell found the file and told Mrs. Smith that the petition for divorce had never been filed. [990 P.2d 837] ¶5 Before she contacted Judge Stilwell, Mrs. Smith had discussed her problem with a Payne County lawyer, William Boyce, who said that he would require a $500 retainer to secure a divorce for her. Mrs. Smith then called on Judge Stilwell and asked him to pay for her divorce, which he declined to do because he had children in college. Mrs. Smith testified that Judge Stilwell apologized on several occasions for her plight. Judge Stilwell explained that the probable reason the divorce petition was never filed was that it was inadvertently packed away when he moved his office from Wetumka to Holdenville. The record is undisputed that Judge Stilwell was completely honest with Mrs. Smith, never attempted to shift the blame for his failure to file the divorce action to anyone else, and made no attempt to give Mrs. Smith any legal advice. ¶6 In a meeting with Mrs. Smith at the Seminole County courthouse, Judge Stilwell told Mrs. Smith that a lawyer, George Butner, whose office was across the street from the courthouse, might be able to advise Mrs. Smith. Mrs. Smith did see Mr. Butner. She testified that she did so because she thought "it would be easier" if Butner handled the divorce. Nevertheless, when Mrs. Smith saw Butner she did not ask him to handle the divorce for her. Butner did, however, ask Judge Stilwell to return the $230, originally advanced by Mrs. Smith's mother in 1980. Judge Stilwell then refunded the $230 fee. DISCUSSION ¶7 The Trial Panel found that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that Judge Stilwell had violated Rule 4.2, Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. ¶8 We reject the Bar's contention that Mrs. Smith's statement to Judge Stilwell that she "had" an attorney established that she was, as a matter of law, represented by counsel. As the Trial Panel concluded, Mrs. Smith's statement to Judge Stilwell that Boyce required a $500 retainer supported the inference drawn by Judge Stilwell from Mrs. Smith's statement that she had not yet retained Boyce as her lawyer. The correctness of this conclusion is made clear if one asks one's self, "What obligation did Boyce have toward Mrs. Smith before she paid him the $500 retainer he required?" The answer is, clearly, "None." ¶9 The Trial Panel also concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that Rule 8.4(c) and (d) had been violated. ¶10 The Bar candidly admits that the Trial Panel correctly found that Rule 8.4(c) was not violated. The Bar claims, however, that Judge Stilwell violated Rules 4.2 and 8.4(d). The Bar contends that the record shows that Mrs. Smith was represented by Boyce and had interests that were "potentially distinct" from Judge Stilwell's. The Bar claims that Mrs. Smith had a potential malpractice claim against Judge Stilwell and that he feared she would complain to the Bar or to the Council of Judicial complaints. Thus, claims the Bar, Judge Stilwell violated both Rule 4.2 and Rule 8.4(d) because violation of rule 4.2 constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. ¶11 We reject the Bar's contention for two reasons. First, the record does not support the Bar's claim that Judge Stilwell knew or should have known Mrs. Smith was represented by counsel. Second, the record fails to support the Bar's contention that Judge Stilwell had anything to fear from a malpractice claim by Mrs. Smith or from complaints by her to the Oklahoma Bar Association or the Council on Judicial Complaints. ¶12 At the hearing Judge Stilwell testified that he "never considered [a malpractice claim by Mrs. Smith] as a possibility," and "I really don't think I considered that." With respect to the danger of a Bar complaint, Judge Stilwell testified, "I didn't consider that." When asked if he was worried about a Judicial complaint Judge Stilwell testified, "Again, I never considered it." The Bar's claim that Judge Stilwell was concerned about a malpractice claim, or a Bar or Judicial complaint is not supported by the testimony in the record. ¶13 The Bar claims that this case should be governed by State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n. v. Eakin, 1995 OK 106, 914 P.2d 644 . In Eakin, we disciplined a judge under Rule 8.4 (c) and (d) based on a pattern of ex parte communication with a party to a proceeding which was pending before his court. There is no similar conduct here. Smith was not a party to any legal proceeding and his communication with her was not improper. The Bar's sole basis for its claim that Judge Stilwell violated Rule 8.4(d) is its contention that he violated Rule 4.2. Judge Stilwell had no attorney-client relationship with Mrs. Smith, and there is no reason to disbelieve his undisputed testimony that his actions were not motivated by concerns that Mrs. Smith might assert a malpractice claim or a complaint to the Bar or the Council on Judicial Complaints. Thus there is no basis for holding that Judge Stilwell violated Rule 4.2. By the Bar's own theory, its claim that Judge Stilwell violated Rule 8.4(d) fails because its claim that he violated Rule 4.2 fails. ¶14 The Bar's sole basis for its claim that Judge Stilwell violated Rule 8.4(d) is its contention that he violated Rule 4.2. ¶15 We fail to understand the dissents position that Judge Stilwell owed Mrs. Clayton Smith a duty despite the facts that (1) the record establishes that Judge Stilwell did not represent her and (2) Judge Stilwell represented Mr. Clayton, who had a potentially adversarial relationship with his wife. We share the dissent's apparent sympathy for Mrs. Smith. Nevertheless, we may not use our sympathy as an excuse to impose discipline where none is warranted. ¶16 The Bar has also applied for assessment of costs in this matter. Because of our dismissal of the matter, and the Trial Panel's recommendation that no costs be assessed, the Bar's application for costs is denied. COMPLAINT DISMISSED; APPLICATION FOR ASSESSMENT OF COSTS DENIED. SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, WATT, JJ., STUBBLEFIELD and TAYLOR, S.JJ. (IN LIEU OF HARGRAVE and WILSON, JJ. WHO CERTIFIED THEIR DISQUALIFICATION) - CONCUR. KAUGER, C.J., LAVENDER, SIMMS, and OPALA, JJ. - CONCUR IN PART, DISSENT IN PART. FOOT