Title: Ex parte Alabama State Bar. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Alabama State Bar v. Stuart Craig Dubose) (ASB No. 05-137
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061743
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2008

REL:03/14/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061743
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama State Bar
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Alabama State Bar
v.
Stuart Craig Dubose)
Appeal from the Board of Disciplinary Appeals of the Alabama
State Bar
(No. 07-02)
BOLIN, Justice.
1061743
2
The Alabama State Bar ("the State Bar") petitions this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Board of
Disciplinary Appeals of the Alabama State Bar ("the Board of
Appeals") to enter an order reversing its decision finding
that the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar ("the
Disciplinary Board") was divested of its jurisdiction to
discipline Stuart Craig Dubose after Dubose assumed the bench
as an incumbent circuit court judge for the First Judicial
Circuit.
In April 2003 Cheryl Weaver asked Dubose, then a
practicing attorney, to prepare and draft a will for Joseph J.
Sullivan. Sullivan, an elderly widower, lived in Washington
County and had no immediate family living nearby.  Weaver had
been Sullivan's caretaker for more than a decade, and when
Sullivan became ill he eventually moved in with Weaver, who
continued to care for him.  Weaver informed Dubose that
Sullivan was dying and that he wanted to leave his entire
estate to her. Sullivan's estate was substantial; it consisted
of various bank accounts, stocks in various companies, and
real property.  Dubose drafted a will naming Weaver as the
executor and sole beneficiary of Sullivan's estate.  According
1061743
3
to Dubose, Weaver also told him that she wanted him to be
named in the will as the attorney for the estate.  Dubose
included in the will provisions naming himself as the
successor personal representative as well as the attorney for
the estate.  Dubose stated that he explained to Weaver the
proper procedure to effectuate the due execution of the will
by Sullivan.  He also prepared a certificate to be signed by
Sullivan's physician stating that Sullivan was competent and
directed Weaver to have it signed.  Dubose did not meet with
or speak to Sullivan regarding the will or its provisions
before preparing the will.
Sullivan signed the will on April 11, 2003; he died on
April 29, 2003.  On May 6, 2003, Weaver and Dubose, apparently
in anticipation of an action by Sullivan's heirs contesting
the will, entered into a contingency contract whereby Dubose
was employed to represent both Sullivan's estate and Weaver.
Sullivan's estate and Weaver agreed to pay Dubose 33% from the
proceeds of any settlement obtained before the filing of a
will contest and 40% from the proceeds of any settlement
obtained after the filing of any will contest.  The agreement
1061743
4
also provided that Sullivan's estate and Weaver would pay the
cost of any investigation that might be required. 
On August 15, 2003, Sullivan's heirs filed an action
contesting 
his 
will. 
Dubose 
discovered 
during 
his
representation of the estate and Weaver in the will contest
that the notary public who notarized the physician's signature
was not actually present when Sullivan's physician signed the
certificate declaring that Sullivan was competent.  Dubose
deleted the notary's signature from the certificate because he
believed that if it was discovered that the notary did not
actually witness the physician signing the certificate it
would "blow the whole case out of the water."  However, Dubose
subsequently deposed Sullivan's physician and verified that
the physician had signed the certificate and that Sullivan was
indeed competent at that time. The parties to the will contest
ultimately settled the action, and the case was dismissed on
February 14, 2005.
On February 14, 2005, Weaver moved the court to appoint
Dubose as a coexecutor of the estate.  Weaver and Dubose also
petitioned the court for the admission to probate of
Sullivan's will and for letters testamentary. The court
1061743
At some point that is not entirely clear from the record
1
before this Court, the matter of Sullivan's estate was
transferred from the Washington Circuit Court to the Mobile
Circuit Court.
5
granted the letters testamentary to Weaver and Dubose on that
same date.
A dispute subsequently arose between Weaver and Dubose as
to the fee due Dubose under the contingency contract.  Dubose
contended that he was entitled to 40% of the portion of the
estate Sullivan received as part of the settlement, which was
valued at approximately $2.5 million, including stock and
land.  Weaver contended that the stock and land were not to be
included in calculating Dubose's fee and that he was entitled
to only 40% of the cash assets of her portion of the estate.
On February 18, 2005, Dubose  filed a claim against Weaver and
the estate, seeking a fee for his services as personal
representative and attorney for the estate.   Despite having
1
filed a claim against Weaver and the estate, Dubose continued
to represent Weaver and to serve as coexecutor of the estate.
Dubose's claim was eventually settled by the parties, and the
trial court, on October 2, 2006, entered an order naming
Dubose as the sole executor of Sullivan's estate and awarding
him fees for his service as personal representative and as
1061743
6
attorney for the estate in the amounts of $127,630 and
$969,992, respectively. The trial court granted letters
testamentary to Dubose on that same date.
Before Dubose and Weaver settled Dubose's claim, an
anonymous complaint was filed with the State Bar on May 10,
2005, alleging that Dubose had violated the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct during his representation of Weaver and
Sullivan's estate.  On September 19, 2006, Dubose waived the
filing of formal charges and entered a guilty plea to
violating Rules 1.1, 1.4(b), 1.7(b), 1.8(c), 8.4(a), and
8.4(g), Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct.  On October 4,
2006, the State Bar's Disciplinary Commission accepted
Dubose's guilty plea and entered an order suspending him from
the practice of law for 45 days. On October 19, 2006, this
Court entered an order denying the Disciplinary Commission's
request to suspend Dubose from the practice of law for 45
days, 
concluding 
that 
the 
requested 
discipline 
was
insufficient. The next day, the State Bar filed formal charges
against Dubose alleging violations of Rules 1.1, 1.4(b),
1.5(a), 1.7(a), 1.7(b), 1.8(c), 3.4(a), 3.4(b), 8.4(a),
1061743
7
8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g), Alabama Rules of Professional
Conduct.
In November 2006, Dubose was elected circuit judge for
the First Judicial Circuit.  He was sworn into office on
December 22, 2006, and officially assumed the office of
circuit judge on January 15, 2007. On February 8, 2007, Dubose
moved the Disciplinary Board for a summary judgment on the
complaint against him arguing, among other things, that the
State Bar was divested of its jurisdiction to discipline him
once he became an incumbent circuit judge. On February 13,
2007, the State Bar filed a response to Dubose's motion for a
summary judgment, arguing that it retained jurisdiction over
Dubose for alleged violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct occurring while he was engaged in the private practice
of law before he assumed the office of circuit judge. On
February 22, 2007, a panel of the Disciplinary Board entered
an order denying Dubose's motion for a summary judgment.
On March 1, 2007, Dubose moved the Disciplinary Board to
reconsider 
its 
denial of his summary-judgment motion.
Following a hearing, the Disciplinary Board, on March 13,
2007, entered an order finding that the State Bar did have
1061743
8
jurisdiction 
over 
Dubose to proceed with disciplinary
proceedings for the alleged violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct occurring before Dubose assumed the
office of circuit judge.  The Disciplinary Board certified the
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. On
March 19, 2007, Dubose appealed the decision of the
Disciplinary Board to the Board of Appeals.
The Board of Appeals issued a show-cause order on July
25, 2007, noting that an order denying a motion for a summary
judgment is inherently "non-final" and cannot be made final by
Rule 54(b) certification.  See Continental Cas. Co. v.
Southtrust Bank, N.A., 933 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 2006).  The Board
of Appeals further concluded that it had the discretion to
treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus.  F.L.
Crane & Sons, Inc. v. Malouf Constr. Corp., 953 So. 2d 366
(Ala. 2006), and directed Dubose to answer why his appeal
should not be treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus.
After receiving responses from the parties, the Board of
Appeals, on August 31, 2007, entered an order granting
Dubose's petition for the writ of mandamus and finding that
the Disciplinary Board did not have jurisdiction to continue
1061743
9
the disciplinary proceedings against Dubose once he became an
incumbent circuit court judge.  The Board of Appeals ordered
that all disciplinary proceedings against Dubose be stayed
until such time as he is no longer serving as judge. This
petition followed.
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'[M]andamus is 
a 
drastic 
and 
extraordinary 
writ
that will be issued only when there is: (1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex parte
Horton, 711 So. 2d 979, 983 (Ala. 1998).  'Subject
to certain narrow exceptions ..., the denial of a
motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment
is not reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.'
Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d
758, 761 (Ala. 2002) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 780
So. 2d 681, 684 (Ala. 2000)).   One of the
exceptions is the denial of a motion grounded on a
claim of lack of personal jurisdiction, Ex parte
Sekeres, 646 So. 2d 640 (Ala. 1994), Ex parte Paul
Maclean Land Servs., 613 So. 2d 1284 (Ala. 1993),
and Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443
So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983)."
Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int'l, Ltd., 882 So. 2d 819, 821-22
(Ala. 2003).  "Questions of law are reviewed de novo."  Ex
parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 455, 457 (Ala. 2006).  Therefore, a
petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle by which
1061743
10
to review the State Bar's claim that the Board of Appeals
erred in determining that it was divested of its jurisdiction
to discipline Dubose once he assumed office as an incumbent
circuit judge, and our review will be de novo.
Discussion
The issue whether the Disciplinary Board has jurisdiction
to discipline an incumbent judge for an alleged violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct while the incumbent judge
was engaged in the private practice of law presents a question
of first impression.  
The State Bar acknowledges that Rule 1(a)(2), Ala. R.
Disc. P., divests it of the jurisdiction to discipline an
incumbent judge for misconduct occurring while the judge is in
office.  Rule 1(a)(2) provides: "Incumbent Judges.  Incumbent
judges are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary
Commission or the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State
Bar."  Indeed, the discipline of an incumbent judge for
conduct occurring while in office is provided for by Art. VI,
§§ 156 and 157, Ala. Const. of 1901.  See also Alabama State
Bar ex rel. Steiner v. Moore, 282 Ala. 562, 213 So. 2d 404
(1968) (holding that the State Bar cannot discipline a judge
1061743
11
during the term in which the judge is holding office for
misconduct performed in a judicial capacity and that a judge
can be disciplined only according to the exclusive method
provided for in the constitution).  Leaving the discipline of
judges to the procedures prescribed in the constitution is of
"fundamental soundness, and is essential to the maintenance of
an independent judiciary."  In re Alonzo, 284 Ala. 183, 188,
223 So. 2d 585, 590 (1969).
However, 
the 
State 
Bar 
contends 
that 
it 
retains
jurisdiction over all disciplinary matters involving any
member of the State Bar for violations of the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct that were committed while the member was
engaged in the practice of law.  See generally Rule 1(a)(1),
Ala. R. Disc. P.  It is a compelling argument, especially
where, 
as 
here, 
the 
violations, 
the 
institution 
of
disciplinary procedures, and a guilty plea by Dubose all
occurred prior to Dubose's taking office as a member of the
judiciary.  Implicit in the State Bar's argument is the fact
that even though Dubose may hold judicial office, he
nevertheless remains on the roll of attorneys and must be a
member of the bar in order to hold judicial office.  See In re
1061743
Section 146, Ala. Const. of 1901 (Off. Recomp.), provides
2
that "[j]udges of the supreme court, courts of appeals,
circuit court, and district court shall be licensed to
practice law in this state ...."
12
Alonzo,  284 Ala. at 189, 223 So. 2d at 592 ("When one is
admitted to the bar of this state and licensed to practice law
by this court, he remains enrolled as an attorney from that
time on unless his right to practice is destroyed by a
judgment of suspension or disbarment.  True, during the time
an attorney may hold certain judicial offices, his right to
practice is suspended.  He yet remains on the roll of
attorneys of this court, and must be a member of the bar to be
qualified to hold certain judicial offices.").   Specifically,
2
the State Bar argues that its jurisdiction over Dubose
attached on October 20, 2006, with the filing by the State Bar
of formal charges alleging violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct while Dubose was engaged in the private
practice of law and that it was not subsequently divested of
that jurisdiction when he assumed the office of circuit judge.
Reluctantly, we disagree.
In In re Alonzo, supra, Alonzo had been elected to the
office of circuit judge at the November 1966 general election.
After being elected judge but before being sworn into office,
1061743
13
Alonzo  devised a scheme to extort money from a particular
party that would be appearing in his court.  Once on the
bench, Alonzo forced the extortion by entering unfavorable
judgments against the party being extorted.  Alonzo's scheme
was discovered, and the State Bar brought disciplinary action
against him. However, before the State Bar took disciplinary
action against Alonzo, a judgment of impeachment was rendered
against him, and he was removed from office.
This Court considered the issue whether the State Bar
could proceed with disciplinary action against Alonzo.  In
holding that the State Bar could proceed with disciplinary
action against Alonzo, the Court noted that the important
constitutional issue of maintaining an independent judiciary
was not an impediment to the State Bar's bringing disciplinary
action against Alonzo because he had been impeached and
removed from office.  In re Alonzo, supra.  Further, this
Court stated:
"Where, as here, a member of the bar holding
judicial office commits fraudulent, corrupt, and
immoral acts by originating an extortion plan prior
to entering upon a judgeship, and executes that plan
after assuming the powers of the judgeship, by
actions 
that 
cannot 
by 
any 
stretch 
of 
the
imagination, 
rationally be deemed judicial or
official acts, and where such judge has been removed
1061743
14
from office by due and legal impeachment proceedings
prior to disciplinary action by the Bar Association,
it would indeed be sadly anomalous to conclude that
the Bar could not cleanse itself of such unfit
member on any theory that judicial robes protected
such conduct."
284 Ala. at 190, 223 So. 2d at 592.
This Court's holding in Alonzo is embodied in Rule
1(a)(3), Ala. R. Disc. P., which, we conclude, controls the
the present situation. Rule 1(a)(3) provides:
"Former Judges.  Former judges who have resumed
their 
status 
as 
lawyers 
are 
subject 
to 
the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Alabama and the
Disciplinary Commission and the Disciplinary Board
of the Alabama State Bar for misconduct that
occurred while they were judges, before they became
judges, or after the resumption of the practice of
law and that would have been grounds for lawyer
discipline."
(Emphasis added.)  It is clear from the plain and unambiguous
language of Rule 1(a)(3), Ala. R. Disc. P., that the State Bar
does not currently have the jurisdiction to discipline Dubose
so long as he is serving as an incumbent judge; however, at
such time when Dubose becomes a "former judge" and is no
longer serving in a judicial capacity, the State Bar would
then regain jurisdiction to discipline Dubose for those acts
of misconduct that occurred before he became a judge.
Therefore, Dubose is entitled to have the disciplinary
1061743
15
proceedings initiated against him by the State Bar stayed
until such time as he is no longer serving in his capacity as
circuit judge.
Because the State Bar has failed to establish a clear
legal right to the relief sought, we deny the petition for the
writ of mandamus.
PETITION DENIED. 
See, Woodall, Stuart, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Smith, and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
1061743
16
LYONS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Sections 156 and 157 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901
create the Judicial Inquiry Commission and the Court of the
Judiciary, respectively, and prescribe the procedures for
hearing complaints 
involving 
charges that a 
judge 
has violated
any of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, has been guilty of
misconduct in office, has failed to perform his or her duties,
or has become physically or mentally unable to perform his or
her duties.  All of these charges relate to conduct occurring
while holding judicial office.  
Section 158 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901
recognizes 
the 
applicability 
to 
all 
appellate 
court 
judges 
and
justices of provisions for impeachment found at § 173, in
addition to the authority of the Court of the Judiciary.  The
grounds for impeachment as set forth in § 173 consist of
"willful neglect of duty, corruption in office,
incompetency, or intemperance in the use of
intoxicating liquors or narcotics to such an extent,
in view of the dignity of the office and importance
of its duties, as unfits the officer for the
discharge of such duties, or for any offense
involving moral turpitude while in office, or
committed 
under 
color 
thereof, 
or 
connected
therewith ...."  
1061743
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All of these charges relate to conduct occurring while holding
office.  
Nowhere in the Alabama Constitution is there any
provision describing the sections dealing with removal of a
judge from office for conduct occurring while holding office
as exclusive of any other proceedings that could lead to
removal from office based on a judge's conduct before taking
office.  See Sullivan v. State ex rel. Attorney General of
Alabama, 472 So. 2d 970, 973 (Ala. 1985) ("Neither of these
Amendments [creating the Judicial Inquiry Commission and the
Court of the Judiciary] indicate they vest exclusive
jurisdiction in these bodies to remove sitting judges from
office.").  
Judge Dubose relies upon Alabama State Bar ex rel.
Steiner v. Moore, 282 Ala. 562, 213 So. 2d 404 (1968), as
authority for the proposition that the State Bar can take no
action that could indirectly lead to his removal from office.
Judge Dubose quotes the following from Moore where, after the
Moore Court restated the rule that once a judge is inducted
into an office he was competent to hold when elected, he can
1061743
The Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Alabama were
3
superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility on
October 1, 1974, which in turn was superseded by the Rules of
Professional Conduct on January 1, 1991.
18
be ousted or removed only in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution, the Court stated:
"This, in substance, means that there can be no
collateral approach to ousting a judge, for such
prerogative is reserved to the State by the
Constitution.  In effect, the action of the [State]
Bar amounts to an attempt to remove a judge by
indirection rather than by constitutional means."
282 Ala. at 565, 213 So. 2d at 407.  The next sentence puts
the previous observation in proper context.  The Moore Court
stated:
"Here, the acts complained of were not by a
judge in his alleged capacity as a lawyer, but were
judicial actions.  Erroneous or reprehensible as
they may be, the conduct complained of was not
conduct unbecoming an attorney at law enumerated by
Rule 36, Section A of the Rules Governing Conduct of
Attorneys in Alabama."  
3
282 Ala. at 567, 213 So. 2d at 407 (emphasis added).  Because
Moore did not relate to conduct prior to taking judicial
office and because the Constitution nowhere proscribes any
proceedings against an incumbent judge for conduct prior to
taking office that could result in his or her removal from
office, it is inappropriate to limit the jurisdiction of the
1061743
19
State Bar over incumbent judges in disregard of this crucial
distinction.
The Board of Appeals relied upon Rule 1(a)(2), Alabama
Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, which states:
"Incumbent Judges. Incumbent judges are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Commission
or the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar."
This rule should not be read as restricting the jurisdiction
of the State Bar in a manner inconsistent with the Alabama
Constitution and beyond the context of Moore, which address
the conduct of judges after assuming office.  Treating the
rule as preventing the State Bar from disciplining a judge for
conduct that occurred before taking office gives the judge an
unwarranted immunity.  I agree with the sound analysis of the
Supreme Court of Missouri in In re Mills, 539 S.W.2d 447,
449-50 (Mo. 1976), where, after acknowledging contrary
authority and rejecting it as unpersuasive, the court stated:
"Here, we are presented with an action to discipline
a person, now serving as a judge, for misconduct
committed while he was a lawyer and before he became
a judge.  Does his position on the bench render him
immune to discipline for violation of the Code of
Professional 
Responsibility 
applicable 
to 
all
persons licensed to practice law in this state?
Respondent argues that since he may not practice law
while a judge, he may not be disciplined while a
judge for misconduct committed while a lawyer.
1061743
20
Although he may not practice law while a judge, he
still 
holds 
a 
license 
to 
practice 
law 
(a
qualification he must have to hold the office of
judge), he is still a lawyer, and if he has violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility he is, as an
officer of this court, amenable to discipline even
though it result directly in cancellation of his
license and, thereby, lead indirectly to his removal
from office.  He may not take refuge in a judicial
office from discipline for prior misconduct, the
effect of which would be removal of one of his
qualifications for occupying the refuge.  To permit
the use of a judicial office as such a sanctuary
would be a travesty upon justice."
(Emphasis added.)  
The main opinion relies upon Rule 1(a)(3), Alabama Rules
of Disciplinary Procedure, which provides:
"Former Judges.  Former judges who have resumed
their status as lawyers are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Alabama and the
Disciplinary Commission and the Disciplinary Board
of the Alabama State Bar for misconduct that
occurred while they were judges, before they became
judges, or after the resumption of the practice of
law and that would have been grounds for lawyer
discipline."
This rule dealing with former judges, a circumstance not here
presented, merely codifies the holding of this Court in In re
Alonzo, 284 Ala. 183, 223 So. 2d 585 (1969), in which we
rejected a former judge's plea of immunity from State Bar
disciplinary proceedings.  In Alonzo, we observed:
1061743
21
"When one is admitted to the bar of this state
and licensed to practice law by this court, he
remains enrolled as an attorney from that time on
unless his right to practice is destroyed by a
judgment of suspension or disbarment.  True, during
the time an attorney may hold certain judicial
offices, his right to practice is suspended.  He yet
remains on the roll of attorneys of this court, and
must be a member of the bar to be qualified to hold
certain judicial offices."
284 Ala. at 189, 223 So. 2d at 592.  Rejecting the plea of
immunity, the Alonzo Court held:
"Where, as here, a member of the bar holding
judicial office commits fraudulent, corrupt, and
immoral acts by originating an extortion plan prior
to entering upon a judgeship, and executes that plan
after assuming the powers of the judgeship, by
actions 
that 
cannot 
by 
any 
stretch 
of 
the
imagination, rationally be deemed judicial or
official acts, and where such judge has been removed
from office by due and legal impeachment proceedings
prior to disciplinary action by the Bar Association,
it would indeed be sadly anomalous to conclude that
the Bar could not cleanse itself of such unfit
member on any theory that judicial robes protected
such conduct."
284 Ala. at 190, 223 So. 2d at 592.  The main opinion expands
Rule 1(a)(3) beyond its field of applicability and, in so
doing, ignores the crucial distinction between conduct
occurring before a lawyer enters upon judicial office, over
which the Bar has authority, and conduct occurring after the
1061743
22
lawyer becomes a judge, over which the Bar has no
jurisdiction.
A majority of this Court disagrees with my interpretation
of the State Bar's authority, and I urge the immediate
amendment of Rule 1 of the Alabama Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure to protect the public from judges who were unethical
lawyers and relieve this Court of further embarrassment from
the absurd consequences of its own rules.  
Cobb, C.J., and Smith and Murdock, JJ., concur.
1061743
23
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I join Justice Lyons's dissenting opinion.  I would add
the following:  
The fact that it is the State Bar that would enforce the
Rules of Professional Conduct and possibly perform the
disciplinary act of removing Dubose from the roll of licensed
attorneys for misconduct committed by him while he was an
attorney and before he took judicial office does not mean that
Dubose would be removed from his judicial office in a manner
contrary to the Alabama Constitution.  To say that the State
Bar may remove Dubose from the roll of licensed attorneys is
not to say that it can take the further step of acting upon
that development and ousting Dubose from judicial office.
Clearly, the authority to do so lies elsewhere. 
Authority and responsibility for addressing violations of
the Rules of Professional Conduct by attorneys while engaged
in the practice of law, however, is in the State Bar.  The
Judicial Inquiry Commission and the Court of the Judiciary
have no such authority.  I am confident that this Court, in
promulgating the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules
of Disciplinary Procedure, did not intend for an attorney to
1061743
24
be able to postpone or even avoid altogether any real
consequence for his violation of the former because he
succeeds in being appointed or elected to a judgeship in the
interval between his commission of an offense and disciplinary
action by the State Bar.  Cf. Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So. 2d
7, 10 (Ala. 2001)("'In deciding between alternative meanings
..., we will not only consider the results that flow from
assigning one meaning over another, but will also presume that
the legislature intended a rational result, one that advances
the legislative purpose in adopting the legislation, that is
"workable and fair," and that is consistent with related
statutory provisions.'  John Deere Co. v. Gamble, 523 So. 2d
95, 100 (Ala. 1988) (citations omitted)."); Karrh v. Board of
Control of Employees' Ret. Sys. of Alabama , 679 So. 2d 669,
671 (Ala. 1996)(to similar effect); League of Women Voters v.
Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 131, 290 So. 2d 167, 169 (1974) ("Where
there is doubt as to the legislative intent in a statute,
weight will be given to the practical effect which a proposed
construction will have." (citations omitted)).