Title: People v. Fuller
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89220
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2002

Docket No. 89220-Agenda 6-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								TYRONE FULLER, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 22, 2002.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Tyrone Fuller, pled guilty in the circuit court
of Cook County to three counts of first degree murder, one count
of attempted murder, and one count of armed robbery, in
connection with the robbery of a jewelry store and the shooting
death of Marc Feldman, the owner of the store. At the conclusion
of a sentencing hearing, a jury found that the defendant was
eligible for the death penalty based on the statutory aggravating
factor that the murder was committed in the course of an armed
robbery. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996). Following a hearing
in aggravation and mitigation, the same jury found that there were
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced the defendant to
death.
	The defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct
review by the this court. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134
Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). In this appeal of the defendant's
convictions and death sentence, the defendant raises 12 issues,
including (1) that the trial court improperly admonished him as to
the maximum penalty on two of the murder counts at the guilty
plea hearing, (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
allowed the defendant to plead guilty to counts of knowing and
intentional first degree murder, and (3) that the trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury on the requisite mental states to prove
death eligibility on a felony-murder count. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the defendant's convictions in part and vacate in
part. Furthermore, we vacate the defendant's death sentence and
remand the cause for a new death-eligibility hearing.

BACKGROUND
	At a hearing on December 1, 1999, defense counsel informed
the trial court that after extensive conversations with his client, the
defendant had decided to waive his right to a jury trial and wanted
to enter blind pleas of guilty to all pending charges. At that point,
the trial court read the various charges of the indictment and asked
the defendant if he understood each of those charges. With respect
to the murder charges of the indictment, count I alleged that the
defendant shot Marc Feldman in the head with a handgun without
lawful justification and with the intent to kill him, thereby causing
his death. Count II alleged that the defendant shot and killed
Feldman knowing that his act created a strong probability of death,
and count III alleged that the defendant shot and killed Feldman
while committing a forcible felony, armed robbery. The defendant
responded that he understood each of the charges. In addition, the
trial court admonished the defendant concerning the possible
penalties, including the possibility of a death sentence for the
felony murder charge described in count III. The court then
explained the various phases of sentencing and that the defendant
would be entitled to have a jury determine his eligibility for the
death penalty.
	As part of a factual basis for the pleas, the parties stipulated
to the proposed testimony of various State witnesses. The State
recited that Aaron Smith would testify that he was an employee of
Marc Feldman, at a jewelry store located in Oak Park, Illinois. On
December 18, 1997, he and Feldman were working at the store
around 10 a.m., when the defendant entered the showroom with
codefendant, Kimberly Britt. Feldman proceeded to show various
items of jewelry to the defendant and Britt, while Smith remained
in a back room of the store. At some point, Feldman came to the
back room to get more jewelry.
	As Feldman was returning to the showroom, Smith observed
the defendant fire a gunshot, striking Feldman in the center of the
forehead and causing him to fall to the ground. At that moment,
the defendant jumped over the counter and came into the back
room where Smith was located. Smith fell to the ground and the
defendant placed his gun to Smith's head. Smith heard two clicks,
but the gun did not fire. The defendant then ordered Smith to get
underneath a desk. Smith observed the defendant and Britt take
various items of jewelry and United States currency. The
defendant then came toward Smith a second time, and he
attempted twice to shoot Smith in the leg, but the gun again would
not fire. The defendant and Britt then fled the scene. The next day,
Smith identified the defendant and Britt from a live lineup as the
perpetrators of the crimes committed the previous day.
	The stipulated testimony of other State witnesses would show
that following the crimes, an Oak Park police officer responded to
a radio transmission of an armed robbery in progress. The officer
observed the getaway car and pursued it at a high rate of speed
until it crashed into a railroad pylon. The defendant and Britt were
passengers in the vehicle, which had been driven by Eric Hughes.
The defendant exited the vehicle after it crashed, holding a
handgun. The officer drew his gun and ordered the defendant to
stop. At that point, the defendant dropped his gun and fled. Police
found the defendant a short time later hiding under a porch and he
was arrested. Defendant had jewelry from the store in his
possession and was wearing a torn surgical glove on his right hand
at the time of the arrest. The torn glove worn by the defendant
matched exactly the ripped portions recovered from the cash
register at the crime scene of the jewelry store. A ballistics expert
determined that the gun dropped by the defendant and recovered
by police fired the bullet that killed Feldman.
	Additionally, the defendant's 36-page court-reported
confession was stipulated to and entered into evidence. In that
statement, the defendant admitted that he went to the jewelry store
on the morning in question to commit a robbery. The defendant
further admitted that when Feldman came out of the backroom, the
defendant reached into his pocket for his gun and pulled it out.
The defendant raised the gun and it went off. After the bullet hit
Feldman, causing him to fall to the floor, the defendant jumped
over the counter and went into the back room. He let Britt into the
back room through another door and told Smith to sit by a desk.
The defendant and Britt then proceeded to place jewelry and cash
inside a bag. The defendant acknowledged that he put on latex
medical gloves that he brought with him to the store because he
did not want to leave any fingerprints. The defendant and Britt
took the "loot" from the scene and fled in the getaway car driven
by Hughes.
	After hearing a factual basis for the defendant's pleas, the trial
court accepted the pleas and found the defendant guilty of all
charges. Following the empaneling of the jury, the case proceeded
to the eligibility phase of the bifurcated capital sentencing hearing.
The State sought to have the defendant declared death eligible
based on the felony-murder provision contained in section
9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Criminal Code),
which provides:
			"(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time
of the commission of the offense has attained the age of
18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree
murder may be sentenced to death if:
* * *
				(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course
of another felony if:
					(a) the murdered individual:
						(i) was actually killed by the defendant, ***
						(ii) *** and
					(b) *** the defendant acted with the intent to kill
the murdered individual or with the knowledge that
his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the murdered individual or
another; and
					(c) the other felony was one of the following:
armed robbery ***." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996).
	During his opening statement at the eligibility phase, defense
counsel told the jurors that their job was "simple" and there was
"nothing to dispute" as to what they had to do at the first phase
because the defendant had admitted the crimes and pled guilty to
the three separate ways that he was charged for this single murder.
Defense counsel concluded by asking the jury to keep an open
mind at the second phase of the sentencing proceeding.
	At the eligibility hearing, several witnesses gave testimony
that was substantially similar to the factual basis recitation given
by the State at the guilty plea proceeding. Melissa Peterson, the
victim's fiancé, testified that Feldman left for work around 8 a.m.
the day of the murder. Feldman told Peterson that he loved her,
and that was the last time they spoke to one another. She noted
that she was also scheduled to work that morning but did not do so
because of a prior family engagement. Later that day, she learned
that the store had been robbed and that Feldman had been
murdered.
	Aaron Smith, a 76-year-old employee of Feldman, testified
that when he arrived at the jewelry store on the morning of the
robbery and shooting, Feldman was already at the store waiting on
the defendant and a female companion of the defendant. Smith
made coffee and waited on a blind lady who had entered the store.
After the blind lady left, Feldman came to the back room to
retrieve a pair of earrings to show the defendant. Smith told
Feldman that he thought that something was wrong because the
couple had been in the store for such a long time. Feldman
reassured Smith that he knew the defendant and that he was a
regular customer.
	Smith stated that when Feldman stepped around the corner to
go back into the showroom, the defendant shot Feldman in the
head. Feldman fell to the ground in a location that made it
impossible for Smith to shut the door to the back room. After the
defendant shot Feldman, he jumped over the counter and came
into the back of the store. Smith ran toward the back of the store,
but tripped and fell. When Smith fell, the defendant came over the
top of him and placed a gun to Smith's head. As Smith begged for
his life, he heard two clicks, but the defendant's gun would not
fire. After the second click, the defendant called Smith a "mother
f--" and ordered him to get under a desk. After the defendant and
his female companion loaded a bag full of jewelry and emptied out
the store safe, the defendant told Smith to lie down and that he was
going to shoot him in the leg. Because Smith was lying down, he
could not see how the defendant was pointing the gun, but Smith
did hear it click again.
	On cross-examination, Smith testified that store records
revealed that the defendant was a customer of the store. Smith
acknowledged that he did not actually see the defendant point the
gun or pull the trigger, but he did hear the shot that killed
Feldman.
	Oak Park police Detective Arthur Borchers testified that the
murder weapon was a .25-caliber semiautomatic pistol. He noted
that in order to fire the weapon, a person would have to put a
magazine in and operate the slide by pulling it back to load it. He
further noted that if the gun were loaded and it was not
chambering a bullet while the trigger was being pulled and
clicked, there would have to be some malfunction with the
magazine.
	On cross-examination, Borchers stated that he found a
shotgun about 10 feet from the safe at the jewelry store. He further
stated that a semiautomatic weapon is more sensitive in some of
its functions and that it is generally easier to fire a round when
pulling the trigger than it would be with a revolver.
	Assistant State's Attorney Colin Simpson testified on behalf
of the State that after the defendant was taken into custody on the
day of the offenses, he talked with the defendant about the events
that had transpired that day. Simpson's testimony substantially
recounted much of the matter covered by the defendant's written
statement. According to Simpson, the defendant appeared calm at
the time of his statement, and his speech was clear. Simpson noted
that the defendant initially blamed Smith, the 76-year-old store
employee, for planning the armed robbery. However, after
Simpson informed the defendant later in the evening that he had
been identified in a live lineup, the defendant admitted that he,
Britt and Hughes had planned the crime for about two weeks. The
defendant further told Simpson how he shot Feldman:
			"A. [Witness] *** So I said, 'What happened next?'
[The defendant] said, 'The owner said he was going to go
into the back room and try and figure out how much it
was going to cost.' I said, 'Did the owner go into the back
room?' He said, 'Yes.' I said, 'Did the owner come out of
the back room?' He said, 'Yes.' *** [I said,] 'What
happened at that time?' He said, 'I put my hands in the
coat and I brought out a gun and the gun went off.'
			MR. BAKER [Assistant State's Attorney]: Just
indicating for the record he raised his hand and arm
straight from his shoulder in a forward fashion.
			THE WITNESS: I said, 'When the gun went off what
happened?' [The defendant] answered, 'The man was hit
and he dropped straight down.'
	On cross-examination, the following colloquy between
Simpson and defense counsel took place:
			"Q. All right. [The defendant] also told you that he
reached into his pocket at the gun? Is that right?
			A. He reached into his pocket and pulled out the gun.
			Q. Those are his exact words, he reached into his
pocket at the gun, and then pulled it out, and he said these
words to you in that conversation before you, 'I pulled it
out and I went to raise it and it went off.' Were those his
exact words?
			A. Those are the words he said, correct.
			Q. Mr. Simpson, he never told you that he intentionally
pulled the trigger of that gun, did he?
			A. No, sir.
			Q. And you never asked him if he pulled the trigger to
that gun, did you?
			A. No, sir."
	At the conclusion of the first phase of the sentencing hearing,
the jury found the defendant eligible for the death penalty. The
cause then proceeded to the hearing in aggravation and mitigation.
During his opening statement at this second stage of the
sentencing proceedings, defense counsel did not argue that the
shooting of Feldman was an accident, but he instead told the jury
that the defendant had taken full responsibility for his crimes by
pleading guilty, that the defendant's crimes stemmed from his drug
addiction, and that the defendant is now sober and can be a lesson
to his children.
	The State presented evidence in aggravation that the
defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon in
1992, and that in December of that year, the defendant and Britt
robbed Sandra Cooper and her eight-year-old daughter at knife
point when the victims attempted to leave a shopping mall. The
defendant was convicted of armed robbery for that crime and was
on parole at the time he committed the instant offenses. The State
also presented victim impact evidence. Marc Feldman's fiancé,
mother and sister each read victim impact statements into the
record.
	The defendant's case in mitigation consisted of the testimony
of six witnesses, including the defendant. The defendant's brother,
a Cook County correctional department sheriff, testified that the
defendant's behavior began to deteriorate when he became
addicted to heroin around the age of 17 or 18. He noted that after
being released from prison after serving his sentence for the first
armed robbery, the defendant became employed at a legal
consulting firm. The defendant was employed there for about two
years until a criminal background check resulted in his dismissal.
At that point, the defendant became reacquainted with Britt and
began to slide into heroin addiction once again.
	The defendant's mother testified that she had successfully
raised her other three children and that the defendant was her only
child to have problems with the law. She noted that the defendant
had been a good child and had never been cruel or given her any
problems. She too noted that the defendant's problems were tied
to his association with Britt and his use of drugs. She stated that
the defendant could be a useful citizen even in prison if he was not
sentenced to death. Other family members also testified on behalf
of the defendant that if he was not on drugs he could be a good
father to his five children and encourage other young men not to
make the same mistakes that he had.
	The defendant was the last witness to testify in mitigation. He
acknowledged that taking Feldman's life was wrong and asked the
victim's family for forgiveness. He stated that his addiction to
heroin had affected him mentally and physically, but that he had
been drug free the past two years while in jail. When he was
released from prison the first time, he obtained a job at a law firm,
but lost that job because of a criminal background check. He then
began abusing heroin once again and was using up to one gram per
day.
	The defendant further testified that before committing the
crimes in this case he spent the night snorting heroin and drinking
cognac. He stated that about two weeks before the day in question,
he had talked to Hughes and Britt about robbing the jewelry store.
However, on the morning of the crime he did not discuss robbing
the store. When he was asked what led to his taking the gun out of
his pocket, the defendant claimed that he drew the gun because he
was intoxicated and was angry because Feldman could not find his
jewelry that he had on pawn. The defendant claimed that Feldman
made a move and the gun went off. The defendant then testified as
follows:
			"Q. How did the gun go off? You took it from your
pocket and it went off?
			A. Right. When I brung it out of my pocket, my finger
was on the trigger.
			Q. So you were strung out, stoned and drunk?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Walking around with a live gun?
			A. Yes.
			Q. You confessed to the crime the next day, is that
right?
			A. Yes.
			Q. And then you pled guilty in this courtroom on a
previous occasion, is that right?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Do you feel remorseful for what you did?
			A. Yes."
	On cross-examination, the defendant was asked by the
prosecutor if he was insisting that it was an accident when he shot
Feldman. The defendant answered, "I pled guilty to first degree
murder. Marc Feldman died at my hands." When pressed further
about his intent to shoot Feldman, the following exchange took
place:
			"Q. That's not my question.
			A. And I pled guilty to it.
			Q. My question is surrounding the facts of what
happened. Are you stating today that when you shot Marc
Feldman it was an accident?
			A. Yes.
			Q. So you are still not admitting that you killed Marc
Feldman intentionally, isn't that correct?
			A. Yes.
			Q. But you pled guilty to first degree murder,
intentional murder, is that right?
			A. First degree murder, yes.
			Q. So as of today, two years later, you are still not
admitting your full involvement in this crime, isn't that
correct?
			A. I admitted it when I signed the paper to plead guilty.
			Q. But you are telling me today it was an accident.
			A. Regardless.
			Q. You either intended to kill him or it was an accident.
			A. Regardless he died at my hands.
			Q. Was it an accident or did you intend to kill him?
			A. It was an accident.
			Q. It was an accident, okay.
			You are telling me it was an accident, that your gun
shot and hit him directly in the forehead?
			A. Yes."
	On redirect examination, the defendant testified that he did
not even remember what precisely happened that day. He stated
that it was not his intent to shoot the victim when he pulled his
gun out that day. The gun went off and therefore he caused the
victim's death and felt responsible. He stated that he pled guilty
because he felt remorseful and did not want to tie up the
courtroom for weeks or months over something for which he felt
responsible. He also stated that he pled guilty because he did not
want to put the Feldman family through a murder trial where he
would be denying something.
	In his closing argument to the jury, which encompasses 15
pages of the transcript from the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel emphasized that the defendant's crime was the result of
his drug addiction and that if he was not sentenced to death he
could be a role model to others of what not to become. Defense
counsel also noted that the defendant had taken full responsibility
for his crimes by pleading guilty and that that showed his remorse.
Furthermore, he stated that if the defendant had not pled guilty, the
prosecutor would be arguing that the defendant was not
remorseful. Defense counsel also told the jury that the defendant
had shown great remorse by taking the position that he was
responsible for the crime no matter how it happened, whether it
was an accident or not.
	At the close of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that
there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. The trial court subsequently
sentenced the defendant to death for the felony-murder conviction.
The trial court denied the defendant's post-sentencing motions to
withdraw his guilty pleas or to have a new sentencing hearing.

ANALYSIS
I. Adequacy of the Admonishments
	The defendant first argues on appeal that the trial judge
improperly admonished him that the maximum sentence for the
murder offenses in counts I and II (the intentional and knowing
counts) of the indictment was a term of imprisonment rather than
death. In order to satisfy due process, a guilty plea must be
affirmatively shown to have been made voluntarily and
intelligently. People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 64 (1995), citing
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274,  89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) was
adopted to ensure compliance with these due process
requirements. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d  at 64. The rule provides in relevant
part that a court may not accept a guilty plea until a defendant has
been admonished as to the "minimum and maximum sentence
prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to
which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions
or consecutive sentences." 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(2). The defendant
acknowledges that the trial judge properly admonished him that
the maximum sentence for felony murder, count III of the
indictment, was death, but he contends that the judge helped to
confuse him by characterizing that felony-murder count as "capital
murder." The defendant maintains that the judge's improper
admonishment combined with the reference to "capital murder"
misled him to believe that his plea to felony murder alone
established all of the elements necessary to satisfy his eligibility
for the death penalty.
	In response, the State initially argues that because the
defendant did not allege in either of his post-sentencing motions
a deficiency in the admonishments provided to him at the time of
his guilty plea, the defendant has waived the issue on appeal.
Under Supreme Court Rule 604(d), any issue not raised in a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is waived. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
However, if a trial court fails to give the defendant the
admonishments required by Rule 402, it is possible that this action
can amount to plain error, an exception to the waiver rule, as set
forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Before
invoking the plain error exception, however, we determine
whether any reversible error occurred. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 226 (2000).
	The failure to properly admonish a defendant, standing alone,
does not automatically establish grounds for reversing the
judgment or vacating the plea. People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240,
250 (1991). Substantial compliance with Rule 402 is sufficient to
establish due process. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d  at 64. Moreover, whether
reversal is required for an imperfect admonishment depends on
whether real justice has been denied or whether the defendant has
been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d  at 250. Additionally, we may consider the entire record in order
to determine whether the defendant understood the nature of the
charges against him. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d  at 64.
	In the present case, the defendant argues that the maximum
penalty for first degree murder is death, while the State contends
that for admonishment purposes, the maximum sentence for the
crime is a term of imprisonment when the State is not seeking the
death penalty on the particular count of murder in question and
there are no aggravating factors that would arguably make the
defendant eligible for the death penalty on that count. Neither
party cites any case law in support of their respective positions.
Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the
Code) provides the following:
			"Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining
the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall
be a determinate sentence set by the court under this
Section, according to the following limitations:
				(1) for first degree murder,
					(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not
more than 60 years[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a)
(West 1996).
Pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of the Code, a defendant can
receive a life sentence if "the court finds that the murder was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection
(a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed
in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 are
present ***." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 1996). A
defendant can receive life imprisonment under section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c) only in a case where the death penalty is not
imposed, and only if previously convicted of murder, or if found
guilty of murdering certain enumerated classes of individuals. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c) (West 1996). Furthermore, a defendant can
receive the death penalty for a conviction on a murder count only
upon a finding of at least one statutory aggravating factor listed in
section 9-1(b) of the Criminal Code. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West
1996).
	Additionally, under section 5-8-2(a) of the Code, a defendant
can be sentenced to an extended-term sentence for murder. That
section provides:
			"A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of
imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence
authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the class of the most
serious offense of which the offender was convicted
unless the factors in aggravation set forth in [section
5-5-3.2(b)] were found to be present." 730 5/5-8-2(a)
(West 1996).
Section 5-5-3.2(b) of the Code provides in relevant part:
			"The following factors may be considered by the court
as reasons to impose an extended term sentence under
Section 5-8-2 upon any offender:
* * *
				(7) When a defendant is convicted of first degree
murder, after having been previously convicted in
Illinois of any offense listed under [section 5-5-3(c)(2)
of the Code], when such conviction has occurred within
10 years after the previous conviction, excluding time
spent in custody, and such charges are separately
brought and tried and arise out of different series of
acts[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b) (West 1996).
Section 5-5-3(c)(2) of the Code lists any offense that is a Class II
felony or greater (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(2) (West 1996)), and
therefore a defendant would be eligible for an extended-term
sentence for a murder conviction if he had a previous Class II or
greater felony conviction within the past 10 years (730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(b) (West 1996)). If such a factor is present, a defendant
may be sentenced for first degree murder to "a term [that] shall be
not less than 60 years and not more than 100 years." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a)(1) (West 1996).
	Turning to the admonishments given at the guilty plea
proceeding in the present case, we note that the trial judge read the
essence of the intentional and knowing murder counts as described
in the indictment, including the requisite mental states required to
prove those offenses. When the judge asked the defendant if he
understood the nature of those charges, the defendant responded
that he did. The judge then admonished the defendant that the
intentional and knowing first degree murder charges carried a
minimum penalty of 20 years and a maximum penalty of 60 years.
The court further admonished the defendant that he could receive
an extended term sentence of up to 100 years, depending upon
whether there was proof of an aggravating factor of a prior
conviction. The defendant responded that he understood this, and
then pleaded guilty to the knowing and intentional murder counts.
	The defendant was then admonished that he was charged with
a third count of murder, which provided that he shot and killed
Marc Feldman with a gun, during the course of a forcible felony,
namely, armed robbery. The defendant stated that he understood
the nature of the charge. He was then admonished that he could
receive a sentence of between 20 and 60 years, or an extended-term sentence of up to 100 years, or, depending on the factors
presented, a sentence of natural life imprisonment, or a sentence
of death. The judge then informed the defendant that the question
of whether he was eligible for the death penalty would be
determined by a jury and that if the defendant was found eligible
there would be a second proceeding to determine if there were
sufficient mitigating factors to preclude imposition of the death
penalty. The defendant told the judge that he understood that
admonishment.
	The judge then asked defense counsel if there was anything he
wished to add to make sure that the defendant understood the
factors outlined in section 9-1 of the Criminal Code and the death
penalty procedure. Defense counsel stated that he had nothing
further to add. The judge then asked the defendant how he wanted
to plead "to Count three, the count of capital murder?" The
defendant responded, "Guilty." After further admonishments, the
defendant told the court that he understood what a jury trial was
and he was voluntarily waiving it. Defense counsel stated that he
had explained to the defendant the right to a jury trial.
	After reviewing the entire record in this case in view of the
statutory scheme, we have determined that even if the theoretical
maximum penalty for the intentional and knowing first degree
murder counts in this case was death, the defendant did not suffer
any prejudice as a result of the trial court's allegedly incomplete
admonishment. Where a defendant who is convicted upon a plea
of guilty is sentenced to the greatest maximum sentence with
respect to a charge upon which he has been properly admonished
as to the greatest maximum and minimum sentence and there are
no consecutive sentences involved, failure to properly admonish
the defendant on other counts does not amount to reversible error.
See People v. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d 105, 109-10 (1975). The
incompleteness of the admonishment in this case was harmless
given that the State was clearly seeking the death penalty on the
felony-murder count and not on the other two murder counts.
Moreover, the defendant was correctly admonished as to the
maximum penalty on the felony-murder charge, and the defendant
was not sentenced at all on the other two counts of murder.
Therefore, the defendant was not in fact sentenced to a penalty
beyond that set forth in the admonishments.
	Additionally, we are not persuaded that the defendant was
confused at the time he entered his pleas. Approximately seven
months before the guilty plea proceeding, the defendant filed a
motion to compel the prosecution to disclose whether it would
seek the death penalty and a motion for a bill of particulars as to
aggravation. In those motions, the defendant noted that the only
conceivable basis upon which the State could seek the death
penalty was that the killing occurred during the course of an armed
robbery and that the State would have to prove that the defendant
intended to kill the victim in this case. In both a written motion in
response to the defendant's motions and at a hearing held on the
motions, the State responded that it would seek the death penalty
in relation to the felony-murder count. The State noted that it
could prevail in its attempt to declare the defendant death eligible
in relation to the felony-murder charge if it proved either that the
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly, citing section
9-1(b)(6)(b) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b)
(West 1996)), which lists the required mental states for death
eligibility based on felony murder. Following the hearing on the
matter, the defendant's motion to preclude the death penalty
procedure was denied. The State remained true to its previous
representations and subsequently sought the death penalty at the
eligibility phase solely in relation to the felony-murder aggravating
factor.
	The defendant concedes on appeal, and we agree, that there is
no requirement that a trial judge admonish a defendant that his
plea to intentional murder could serve to help prove his death
penalty eligibility. Moreover, the judge was not required to
instruct and admonish the defendant on the differences among the
various subsections of the murder statute. Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379, 1386 (7th Cir. 1992). There is a presumption that
defense counsel informed the defendant on these matters. Stewart,
958 F.2d  at 1386, citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,
436-37, 74 L. Ed. 2d 646, 660, 103 S. Ct. 843, 852 (1983);
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 115-16, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2258 (1976). Arguably, counsel would be
ineffective if he did not. In this case, however, there is no support
in the record for the defendant's claims that he was not properly
informed of the consequences of his guilty pleas. Given that the
defendant's allegation to the contrary is de hors the record and was
not properly raised or resolved in a post-plea proceeding, the
defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel properly
informed the defendant of the elements necessary to make him
death eligible. Instead, we find on the record before us, and as
discussed more fully below, that the defendant's pleas were part
of an overall strategy to take responsibility for his crimes and
throw himself at the mercy of the jury at the second phase of
sentencing.
	The defendant also argues that he was confused by the trial
judge's reference to the felony-murder charge as "capital murder."
However, we find no merit to that contention. From the context of
the record at the plea proceeding, it is clear that the judge merely
used the term "capital murder" to point out the potential sentence
of death in the event the defendant was found to be eligible for a
capital sentence by the jury at the sentencing hearing. In fact, the
judge informed the defendant that he was entitled to have a jury
determine his eligibility for the death penalty in connection with
that charge. The phrase "capital murder" has been used by courts
to describe felony murder when, under the circumstances of the
case, it could expose the defendant to the death penalty. See, e.g.,
People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 223-24 (2000); People v.
Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 971 (2001); Stewart, 958 F.2d  at
1386. Under the circumstances of the present case, we find that the
defendant did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the judge's
reference to "capital murder."

II. Effectiveness of Guilty Plea Counsel
	The defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective
because he allowed the defendant to plead guilty to intentional and
knowing murder, even though the defendant's confession to the
police indicated only that the "gun went off" and the defendant
testified at the second phase of his sentencing hearing that he
accidentally shot the victim and did not intend to kill him. The
defendant argues that his counsel was ignorant of the mental states
necessary to establish death penalty eligibility under section
9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West
1996)). He contends that counsel's ignorance is demonstrated by
a series of alleged omissions: (1) counsel failed to object to the
absence of the mental states in the issues instruction for the felony-murder count at the eligibility hearing, or tender a correct
instruction; (2) counsel failed to object to the prosecutors's
argument omitting the mental states; (3) counsel failed to present
defendant's testimony that the shot was an accident at the
eligibility stage when it would have been relevant to eligibility; (4)
counsel essentially conceded the defendant's eligibility for a death
sentence rather than arguing that the shooting was an accident; (5)
there is no indication from the record that counsel investigated the
defendant's claim that the shooting was an accident; and (6) in the
preplea proceedings, counsel filed a motion seeking to preclude
imposition of the death penalty, which did not cite the Illinois
statute setting forth the appropriate mental states, but instead
argued pursuant to Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), that the defendant could not be
sentenced to death without an intent to kill. In support of his
position, the defendant argues that this case is similar to People v.
Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d 1 (1993), where this court found that the
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's misapprehension of the
law and was therefore entitled to a new death eligibility and
sentencing hearing.
	A court is not precluded from accepting a plea of guilty, in
spite of a defendant's claim of innocence, if the record reflects a
factual basis from which a jury could find the defendant guilty of
the offenses to which the plea was entered. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 25.
A plea based on the reasonably competent advice of counsel is an
intelligent plea not open to attack on the grounds that counsel
erred in his judgment. People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 475, 476
(1994). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
in entering a plea of guilty, the same two-part standard set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), is applicable. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d  at 475; Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 209, 106 S. Ct. 366,
369-70 (1985).
	To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland standard in a case
where a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea
process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the
defendant must show that his counsel's advice fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and not whether a court
would in retrospect consider the advice to be right or wrong.
People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 254 (1991). In recognition of the
variety of factors that go into any determination of trial strategy,
courts have held that such claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel must be judged on a circumstance-specific basis, viewed
not in hindsight, but from the time of counsel's conduct, and with
great deference accorded counsel's decisions on review. Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 995, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034-35 (2000); Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065. A defendant is entitled to
reasonable, not perfect, representation, and mistakes in strategy or
in judgment do not, of themselves, render the representation
incompetent. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d  at 476. Counsel's strategic
choices are virtually unchallengeable. Thus, the fact that another
attorney might have pursued a different strategy, or that the
strategy chosen by counsel has ultimately proved unsuccessful,
does not establish a denial of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d  at 476, 479.
	In order to establish the "prejudice" requirement in such
cases, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 15; Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 210, 106 S. Ct. 
at 370-71. As the Court in Hill observed, the question of prejudice
depends in large part on a prediction of whether the defendant
likely would have succeeded at trial:
			"In many guilty plea cases, the 'prejudice' inquiry will
closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts
reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions
obtained through a trial. For example, *** where the
alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant
of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the
resolution of the 'prejudice' inquiry will depend largely
on whether the affirmative defense likely would have
succeeded at trial." Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at
210, 106 S. Ct.  at 370-71.
	The defendant's principal contention in his argument that his
counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty is that
counsel was operating under a misapprehension of the law as to
the culpable mental state necessary for a finding of death
eligibility based on the felony-murder aggravating factor as set
forth in section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996)). To establish this aggravating factor, the
State must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill or
that he acted knowing his conduct created a strong probability that
the victim would die or suffer great bodily harm. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996).
	After carefully examining the record, however, we find no
indication that defense counsel did not understand the law at the
time the guilty pleas were entered. There is no admission from
defense counsel that he did not understand the law, and he has not
filed an affidavit to that effect. As previously noted, the
defendant's motion to preclude the death penalty indicated that to
declare the defendant death eligible on the basis of felony murder,
the State would have to show that the defendant intended to kill
the victim. Defense counsel asserted at that time that the State had
no evidence in its possession that would show that the defendant
intended to kill the victim. In response, the State filed a written
motion and the issue was argued at a hearing. In its written motion
and at the hearing, the State cited Illinois statutory law, section
9-1(b)(6), and pointed out that the defendant could be death
eligible for felony murder if the State showed that the defendant
had knowledge that his conduct created a strong probability of
death (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1996)). The State also cited
People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514 (1986), noting that in that case the
court held that the knowledge element of section 9-1(b)(6) could
support a death eligibility finding where the defendant's "gun went
off" when the victim jerked away. In King, the shooting occurred
as the defendant walked the victim to the back of the store while
holding a loaded gun to the victim's head. See King, 109 Ill. 2d  
at 522, 542.
	The hearing on the defendant's motion to preclude the death
penalty occurred some seven months before the defendant's guilty
pleas. Thus, it is apparent from the record that defense counsel was
well aware of the mental states required to prove felony murder
long before the defendant's pleas were entered. Based on the fact
that there was some indication in the record that the defendant
pointed a loaded gun in the direction of the victim in anger,
defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that it was best
to plead guilty to all charges as a matter of strategy because of the
likely possibility that the defendant would have been found death
eligible based on the knowledge element, similar to the defendant
in King, 109 Ill. 2d 514.
	Furthermore, we believe that instead of indicating a
misapprehension of the law, the alleged omissions of defense
counsel cited by the defendant were consistent with his counsel's
strategy to have the defendant take full responsibility for his
crimes by pleading guilty and then use that to show his remorse to
the jury in hopes of avoiding the death penalty at the final phase
of sentencing. Defense counsel expressed that strategy during his
closing argument at the aggravation and mitigation phase as
follows:
		"It was an all or nothing proposition. He wanted to take
responsibility so he took it all, and he took the stand and
told you about it. He is remorseful. ***
			***
			When he killed him, he pointed the gun at him, pulled
the trigger and shot him or *** it went off when he took
it [out], he accepted the blame. He stepped up to the plate
and said, 'I did it,' *** It's one or the other. He pled
guilty or he didn't plead guilty.
* * *
			How much more remorse can you have than saying
yeah, I did it no matter how it happened. He doesn't even
remember how the hell it happened. He was whacked out,
and it was a dream, it was a blur.
			He thinks about it every day, all the time, but, you
know, he is not the same type of brain as you folks are
when you are sober. You can remember events, things
that happened. To him, he screwed up the cause of death
and he accepted responsibility and that's what he
remembers.
			Why would he even want to lie now? There is no more
reason to. I did it. He just doesn't know how he did it.
Maybe he can't face how he did it but he accepted the fact
that he did it and he told you all that. He can't remember
how it happened start to finish. He was stoned.
			Ladies and gentlemen, don't say he did not show
remorse. What more remorse can you have? ***
			Did you hear me yesterday trying to argue with you that
he was not death eligible? No, I wasn't trying to sell you
a load of goods. I told you your job is simple, and today
is the hard part, and I told you the truth."
	The defendant argues that defense counsel could have pursued
the same strategy of taking responsibility if he would have advised
the defendant to plead guilty to felony murder, yet insist on a guilt-phase trial on the intentional and knowing murder counts and then
contest death eligibility. The defendant's suggestion is an
invitation to view counsel's strategy with precisely the sort of
hindsight prohibited by Strickland. Although pleading guilty to the
felony-murder count only, and then contesting eligibility, would
certainly have been a reasonable trial strategy, it would not have
allowed defense counsel to argue that the defendant had taken full
responsibility for the crimes no matter how they happened. Based
on the record before us, we can only conclude that defense counsel
took a calculated and informed risk to have the defendant throw
himself on the mercy of the jury at the final phase of sentencing.
See Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d  at 482 (counsel found not to be ineffective
where it was counsel's strategy not to pursue plea negotiations but
have defendant throw himself on the mercy of the court and enter
blind pleas of guilty on three counts of murder which established
his death eligibility based on felony murder).
	The defendant also argues that it was unsound strategy not to
contest eligibility, but then later give testimony as to the accidental
nature of the shooting. It is true that defendant's trial counsel
attempted through his cross-examination and closing argument to
suggest that the killing may have been an accident. However, we
view counsel's efforts as an attempt to ameliorate the harshness of
the defendant's actions of shooting the victim in the forehead
without giving him an opportunity to hand over valuables from the
store. Counsel may well have believed that he could effectively
argue that the defendant had taken full responsibility by pleading
guilty while, at the same time, suggesting the possibility that the
shooting was an accident. To the extent that the prosecutor saw the
need to try and thwart that strategy by rigorously cross-examining
the defendant as to the claimed accidental nature of the shooting,
the potential for success that defense counsel's strategy possessed
is underscored. At any rate, we will not in hindsight substitute our
judgment for counsel's. "There are countless ways to provide
effective assistance in any given case[;] [e]ven the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2065.
	The defendant additionally asserts that counsel had a duty to
make an investigation as to whether the shooting was an accident.
Initially, we note that there is no evidence in the record from
which it can be definitively concluded that defense counsel did not
investigate the claim of accident. Nevertheless, even assuming that
defense counsel did not investigate, we note that such a decision
"must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's
judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. Moreover, counsel is allowed latitude to make a
reasonable decision that makes a particular investigation
unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. In this case, counsel was aware of the State's
evidence about the functioning of the gun and that the malfunction
of the gun showed that it had a problem with not firing when the
trigger was pulled and not the opposite problem of firing without
pulling the trigger. The defendant was also aware that the gun in
question was a semiautomatic and that such weapons have a more
sensitive trigger. The defendant does not explain how any further
testing of the weapon would have affected his counsel's strategy.
Under the circumstances, we find the defendant's argument to be
unpersuasive.
	People v. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d 1 (1993), relied upon by the
defendant, is distinguishable from the present case. In Pugh, the
defendant shot the victim in the chest with a sawed-off shotgun
during the course of an armed robbery. The defendant pled guilty
to three counts of murder, including felony murder, in connection
with the offense. At the guilty plea hearing, defense counsel
referred to the defendant's pleas to knowing and intentional
murder as "technical pleas" of guilty. Defense counsel
subsequently stipulated to the defendant's death eligibility. The
defendant testified at the second phase of the sentencing hearing
that he did not intend to kill the victim. The defendant was
thereafter sentenced to death on the felony-murder conviction.
New counsel filed a post-plea motion to vacate the guilty plea,
alleging, among other things, that defense counsel was ineffective
because he did not understand that to receive the death penalty for
felony murder, the defendant must have intended to kill the victim.
Additionally, new counsel presented the affidavit of previous
defense counsel indicating that the defendant consistently told
previous counsel that he did not intend to kill the victim and that
counsel advised the defendant to plead guilty because he did not
understand that a finding of felony murder by itself, in the absence
of intent, was insufficient to render the defendant death eligible.
	This court found that counsel was ineffective and vacated the
defendant's death sentence and remanded for a new death
eligibility hearing. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 23. In so doing, this court
held that the defendant's motion to preclude imposition of the
death penalty, which did not refer to Illinois law, combined with
defense counsel's affidavit, showed a lack of understanding of the
law. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 17-18.
	This court in Pugh also rejected the State's argument that
defense counsel's actions amounted to reasonable strategy, finding
that the argument was not supported by the record. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 19. Finally, this court found that the defendant was
prejudiced by his counsel's lack of knowledge. In that regard, this
court noted that "there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's error, defendant would have rejected the stipulation to
death penalty eligibility because defendant's evidence pointed to
an accidental shooting." Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 20. The court
continued by stating that "[n]one of defendant's evidence was
presented by defense counsel at the first phase of sentencing
because counsel believed such evidence was irrelevant once felony
murder was established." Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 20. Further, other
evidence brought out at the post-plea motion hearing would have
discredited the prosecution's case. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 20-21.
	The present case is readily distinguishable from Pugh. First,
and most significantly, there is no affidavit from counsel in the
present case that he did not understand the law. Second, no hearing
was ever held in Pugh on the motion to preclude the death penalty,
while in the present case, the State filed a response and, if there
was any doubt before the hearing about defense counsel's
knowledge of Illinois law, there could be none afterwards. Third,
the defendant did not present any evidence in the post-plea
proceedings to substantiate his claims that counsel did not know
the law or that he failed to investigate. Thus, counsel's actions in
this case are presumed to be due to trial strategy, unlike in Pugh,
where they were clearly due to ignorance of the law. From our
review of the instant record, we can conclude only that counsel in
this case believed that a claim of accident would not have
succeeded at the eligibility phase and that it was best to wait to
throw the defendant at the mercy of the jury at sentencing.
	Having concluded that counsel's decision to advise the
defendant to plead guilty to the charges and not contest eligibility
at sentencing was a matter of trial strategy, we note that the
defendant's claim is defective for the additional reason that he did
not suffer any prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies.
Again, the question of whether the error prejudiced the defendant
by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial depends in
large part on a prediction of whether the defendant would likely
have succeeded at trial. Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 210,
106 S. Ct.  at 370-71.
	In the present case, there was a great deal of circumstantial
evidence indicating that the shooting was intentional. The victim
was shot in the middle of the forehead immediately upon entering
the showroom. The defendant confessed that he planned the
robbery in advance, which leads to the question of how he planned
to escape detection for the robbery if he did not plan to kill the
victim, given that he was a known customer with his information
on file at the store. As previously noted, there was also some
evidence from which it could be concluded that the defendant
raised the gun and pointed it in the direction of the defendant.
Thus, there was a likely possibility that the jury could have found
at the very least that the defendant was death eligible because he
acted with knowledge that his actions created a strong probability
of death, as was the case in People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514 (1986).
	Additionally, the defendant was not a good witness. He could
have been impeached with the fact that he first tried to blame the
planning of the robbery on Smith, the 76-year-old victim of the
attempted murder in this case. The defendant's account of the
shooting as stated in his confession would also not have likely
been helpful to the defendant, as the trier of fact would have been
free to discredit the self-serving portion, while at the same time
believe the central feature of the confession that the defendant shot
the victim during the course of an armed robbery that he had
planned in advance. See People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 11
(1991).
	Accordingly, we find that the defendant has failed to establish
the requisite showing of either prong of the Strickland standard.
Therefore, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
must fail.

III. Erroneous Jury Instruction
	Citing People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498 (1992), the defendant
next argues that his death sentence must be vacated and the cause
remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court
failed to instruct the jury on the mental states necessary for a
finding of death eligibility based on the felony-murder aggravating
factor in section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996)). As previously noted, section 9-1(b)(6)
provides that the State must prove that the defendant acted with
the intent to kill the murdered individual or with knowledge that
his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to the murdered individual. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996).
	At the eligibility hearing, the jury was instructed as follows:
		"Before the defendant may be found eligible for a death
sentence under the law, the State must prove the
following propositions:
			First: That the defendant was 18 years old or older at
the time of the commission of the murder of which he was
found guilty; and
			Second: That one or more of the following aggravating
factors exists:
		The murdered person was killed in the course of another
felony if the murdered person was actually killed by the
defendant; and the other felony was armed robbery.
			If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the First and Second Propositions has [sic] been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is
eligible for a death sentence.
			If you cannot unanimously find that both the First and
Second Propositions have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant is not eligible for a death
sentence."
	When comparing the instruction given by the court with the
statutory language, it is clear that the court gave an incorrect
instruction in this case. The correct instruction under the
circumstances here is contained in Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Criminal, No. 7B.07(6) (3d ed. 1992), which provides
in relevant part:
			"Before the defendant may be found eligible for a death
sentence under the law, the State must prove the
following propositions:
			First Proposition: That the defendant was 18 years old
or older at the time of the commission of the murder[s] of
which he has been found guilty *** ; and
			Second Proposition: That [(the following) (one or more
of the following)] statutory aggravating factor[s] exist[s]:
* * *
			[6] The murdered person was killed in the course of
another felony if
				[a] the murdered person was actually killed by the
defendant; [and]
				***
				[c] in performing the acts which caused the death of
the murdered person, the defendant acted with the
intent to kill the murdered person or with the
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered person [or
another];
				***
				[e] the other felony [(was) (was one or more of the
following:)] [(armed robbery) ***].
* * *
			If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the First and Second Propositions have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant is eligible
for a death sentence.
			If you cannot unanimously find that both the First and
Second Propositions have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the defendant is not eligible for a
death sentence."
We also note that, in addition to the above-mentioned defect in the
jury instruction, the verdict form used at the eligibility phase of the
defendant's sentencing hearing was a general verdict form that did
not set forth the requisite mental state for the aggravating factor.
	In People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498 (1992), the jury
instructions used for the felony-murder aggravating factor failed
to mention the requirement that the defendant must have acted
with knowledge or intent in causing the death of the victim.
Moreover, the jury had returned a general verdict of murder at the
conclusion of the guilt phase trial. Thus, the requisite finding had
not been made by a trier of fact at any other stage of the
proceeding. In reversing the defendant's death sentence and
remanding for a new sentencing hearing, this court noted that a
defendant can be found eligible for the death penalty only if the
jury unanimously finds that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the eight
aggravating factors. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 544. In Ramey, this court
distinguished People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d 1 (1979) (a case where a
jury instruction omitted the requisite intent but it was found not to
be reversible error), on the basis that the intent to kill was
"blatantly evident" from the facts-the defendant shot the victim
four times in the head and back and defense counsel admitted
intent was "blatantly evident." Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 546.
	Subsequent cases have distinguished Ramey in situations
where the same jury that found the culpable mental states at the
guilt phase after being properly instructed declared the defendant
eligible for the death penalty. In those cases, the failure of the
instructions to include the requisite elements at the eligibility stage
was harmless. For example, in People v. Armstrong, this court
found that the failure to give the proper jury instruction at
sentencing tracking section 9-1(b)(6) did not rise to the level of
plain error where the sentencing jury was properly instructed on
the mental state at the guilt phase and the same jury returned a
general verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder. People v.
Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 151-52 (1998) (court further observed
that intent to kill victim was overwhelming where defendant beat
victim with a cane, smashing her head in three pieces). Similarly
in People v. Childress, this court distinguished Ramey and found
that the failure to give the instruction on the mental state at the
eligibility phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where
the verdicts from the guilt phase made it clear that the same jury
had found that the defendant acted with knowledge or intent in
causing the victim's death. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275,
305-07 (1994); see also People v. Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d 461, 489-90
(2000) (no error occurred where jury was properly instructed as to
mental states at the guilt phase and returned a general verdict of
guilty).
	In response to the defendant's argument, the State argues that
the defendant waived the issue of whether the jury instructions
were proper by failing to object to the instructions at sentencing or
to include the error in a motion to vacate the sentence. The State
maintains that the issue should not be considered under the plain
error doctrine because the evidence of the defendant's guilt was
overwhelming and the defendant was not denied a fair sentencing
hearing. Additionally, the State contends that any error was
harmless because the defendant pled guilty to charges of
intentional and knowing murder.
	A defendant must object to alleged errors at trial and include
the objection in a post-trial motion in order to preserve the issue
for appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The
waiver doctrine is not absolute, however, and Supreme Court Rule
615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) provides that we may review plain
errors affecting substantial rights, though not objected to at trial or
in a post-trial motion. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d  at 151. In criminal
cases, the plain error doctrine may be invoked where the evidence
is closely balanced or the error was of such a magnitude that the
accused was deprived of a substantial right and denied a fair
sentencing hearing. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d  at 151.
	Here, we invoke the plain error doctrine to consider the issue
because we find that the failure to give the instruction under the
circumstances presented in this case deprived the defendant of a
substantial right and denied him a fair sentencing hearing. See
People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (1991). The function of
instructions is to convey to the jurors the correct principles of law
applicable to the facts so that they can arrive at a correct
conclusion according to the law and the evidence. People v.
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 318 (1998). Fundamental fairness
requires the trial court to give correct instructions on the elements
of the offense in order to insure a fair determination of a case by
a jury. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 318.
	While the right to a jury trial under the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution does not apply to sentencing, even
in capital cases, Illinois law establishes a liberty interest, protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in having
a jury make particular findings relative to sentencing. See People
v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 534 (1995). Under Illinois law, if the
prosecution seeks the death penalty, the defendant is entitled to
have a jury decide whether the death penalty should be imposed.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1996). Moreover, during the eligibility
phase of the sentencing hearing, the State must prove all of the
elements of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 720
ILCS 5/9-1(f) (West 1996).
	The jury instructions in the present case, just like those in
Ramey, failed to mention that the defendant acted with knowledge
or intent in causing the death of the victim. Also like Ramey, the
required finding was not made by the jury at any other stage of the
proceeding and the requisite mental states were not blatantly
evident from the facts. The State's argument that the defendant's
guilty pleas obviated the necessity for a jury finding as to the
required elements must be rejected as contrary to the statute
providing that the jury decide eligibility (720 ILCS 5/9-1(d), (f)
(West 1996)). Moreover, we note that while the defendant's guilty
pleas to intentional and knowing murder might be significant
evidence of the defendant's eligibility, they are not conclusive
proof and do not establish eligibility per se. In other words, the
State was yoked anew with the burden of proving that the
defendant acted with knowledge or intent in killing the victims.
See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 534; Simms, 143 Ill. 2d at 170-71;
Stewart, 958 F.2d  at 1387 (despite defendant's guilty pleas, State
set out to prove at eligibility phase of sentencing defendant's
intent to kill).
	We acknowledge that defense counsel did not strenuously
object to the defendant's death eligibility. At the same time,
however, counsel did not concede that the defendant's intent to
kill was "blatantly evident" from the facts. Thus, we do not, as the
State suggests, find this case distinguishable from Ramey.
	People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), though not directly on
point, is instructive here. In Mack, the defendant pled guilty to
three counts of murder, which included intentional, knowing and
felony murder. See People v. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d 103, 108-09
(1984). The State subsequently sought to prove the defendant
death eligible based on the aggravating factor set forth in section
9-1(b)(6). The jury was properly instructed as to the aggravating
factor, but the verdict form supplied to and returned by the jury in
connection with the aggravating factor failed to specify that the
defendant acted with the requisite mental state of intent or
knowledge. On the State's appeal from the defendant's successful
post-conviction petition, this court addressed the defendant's
challenge to his death sentence on the basis that the jury's verdict
did not specify that the defendant acted with the requisite mental
state.
	In affirming the reversal of the defendant's death sentence,
this court held that "where the verdict purports to set out the
elements of the offense as specific findings, it must do so
completely or be held insufficient." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538.
Despite the defendant's guilty pleas and the significant evidence
in the record that the defendant intentionally killed the victim, this
court rejected the State's argument that the defect in the verdict
was cured by the correct jury instructions on the requisite mental
state requirements which were additionally emphasized by the
prosecutor during closing argument. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 535-36.
	In the instant case, the jury instructions as well as the verdict
form failed to set forth the requisite mental state for the
aggravating factor as listed in section 9-1(b)(6). Thus, the error in
the present case is arguably even more egregious and prejudicial
than the one in Mack. While the Mack court noted that the same
type of general verdict form used in the present case is
appropriately used when only one statutory aggravating factor is
at issue (Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 538), we believe that the use of the
general verdict form presumes a correct instruction will be given
especially when the trier of fact has not found the requisite mental
state at any other stage in the proceeding. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at
170-71 (jury's return of a general verdict of eligibility does not
cure error in the instructions).
	For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the defendant's
sentence of death must be vacated and the cause remanded for a
new sentencing hearing with correct instructions. Consequently,
we will address only those additional contentions raised by the
defendant which are likely to be a factor on remand.

IV. Multiple Convictions
	The defendant argues that his convictions for knowing and
felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1996)) must be
merged into the single most culpable murder count, intentional
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)). The State confesses
error, and we agree. If only one person has been murdered, there
can be but one conviction for murder; only the conviction for the
most culpable charge will be upheld, while the other less culpable
murder charges must be vacated. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105,
130 (2001). An intentional murder involves a more culpable
mental state than knowing or felony murder. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d  at
137. Accordingly, we vacate the defendant's convictions for
knowing and felony murder.

V. Improper Evidence Presented at Sentencing
	The defendant next argues that testimony from the victim's
fiancé about her relationship with the victim was irrelevant to any
issue at the eligibility phase and denied the defendant a fair
hearing, citing People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342 (1985), and
People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439 (1983). The defendant further
argues that his eighth amendment right to a fair sentencing hearing
was violated when the trial court allowed evidence from the
victim's family members that they believed the death penalty
should be imposed in this case. People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453
(1996). The defendant acknowledges that he waived both of the
issues by failing to object at the respective phases of the
sentencing hearing; however, he argues that the matters should be
considered on appeal because they amounted to plain error and his
counsel was ineffective for failing to object.
	In response, the State essentially concedes that the admission
of the complained-of evidence was error but argues that it was
harmless. Given the State's acknowledgment that these matters
amounted to error, we do not believe that they are likely to recur
on remand and therefore we will not address them further here.

VI. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	In light of our decision to vacate the defendant's capital
sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing, we need not
address the two issues that the defendant raises as to the
constitutionality of the death penalty statute. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 358 (1998).

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we vacate the defendant's convictions
for felony murder and knowing murder. The defendant's
remaining convictions are affirmed. We also vacate the
defendant's death sentence and remand the cause to the circuit
court for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to section 9-1 of the
Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1996)).
Convictions affirmed in part and vacated in part;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
	I agree that we should vacate Fuller's convictions for felony
murder and knowing murder. In my view, however, we should
also set aside his remaining convictions and grant him the
opportunity to be tried in accordance with the new rules
promulgated by our court for the conduct of cases in which the
State is seeking the death penalty. Adherence to those rules is
indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt, and the rules apply to all capital cases now
coming before us on review, including cases commenced before
they were enacted. People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 38
(September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); see also People
ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510, 513 (2001).
	Even if Fuller were not entitled to a new trial, I would regard
the majority's disposition as inadequate. In remanding for
resentencing, this court should bar the State from seeking the death
penalty. As set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent
in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty
law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent a new trial
conducted in accordance with the new rules, there is no basis for
altering that conclusion.
	I concur in part with the judgment to vacate Fuller's
convictions for felony murder and knowing murder. Nevertheless,
I agree with Chief Justice Harrison that defendant's remaining
convictions and sentence should also be set aside because the trial
proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my
dissents in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39 (September
27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No.
85084, slip op. at 35 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's
adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not
sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights.
Consequently, the rules, promulgated to help remedy the flaws of
the old system, must be applied retroactively to all capital cases
currently pending on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson,195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For this
reason, defendant should receive a new trial in compliance with
the new rules.