Title: State v. Wilson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001014-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2022

2022 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1014-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Christopher D. Wilson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 632, 962 N.W.2d 273 
 (2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 23, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Borowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by David Malkus, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by David Malkus, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
2022 WI 77 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1014-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CM2829) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher D. Wilson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 23, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Christopher 
Wilson, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming both his judgment of conviction and the 
circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.1  
                                                 
1 State v. Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 11, 2021) (affirming the judgment and order 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, David L. Borowski, 
Judge).  The appeal was decided by one judge, Judge M. Joseph 
Donald, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2017-18). 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
2 
 
Wilson argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when police officers entered his fenced-in backyard without a 
warrant. 
¶2 
Specifically, 
Wilson 
contends 
that 
the 
officers' 
warrantless entry was not a valid "knock and talk" investigation 
because the officers lacked an implicit license to enter his 
fenced-in backyard and therefore the entry violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  He further contends that the officers' warrantless 
entry was not justified by the exigent circumstance of hot 
pursuit.  The State argues to the contrary, advancing that it 
had an implicit license to enter and that it was in hot pursuit 
of Wilson. 
¶3 
We conclude that the police officers did not conduct a 
valid "knock and talk" investigation because the officers did 
not have an implicit license to enter Wilson's backyard.  
Additionally, we conclude that the officers' entry into Wilson's 
backyard was not permissible under the exigency of hot pursuit 
because the officers did not immediately or continuously pursue 
Wilson from the scene of a crime and therefore violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court with directions to 
vacate Wilson's judgment of conviction and grant the motion to 
suppress evidence. 
                                                                                                                                                             
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
3 
 
I 
¶5 
On January 16, 2017, South Milwaukee police received a 
call from a citizen witness describing a grey BMW driving 
erratically and traveling "all over the road."  The caller 
provided an address at which the car had stopped and described 
the driver of the vehicle as wearing a black hat and bright 
orange shoes.  Further, the caller reported that the driver 
exited the vehicle, climbed onto a fence, reached over the fence 
to open it, and then entered the yard. 
¶6 
Officer Nathan Siefert of the South Milwaukee Police 
Department responded and arrived at the address the caller had 
given.  He testified that upon his arrival he observed a "silver 
BMW, just as the caller had described, which was parked in the 
back parking slab partially on a snowbank."  The car was running 
and the back tailgate was open.  Officer Siefert ran the car's 
license plate and discovered that it was not registered to the 
address at which it was located. 
¶7 
Next, Officer Siefert telephoned the caller to confirm 
the information given.  They discussed the details of the 
complaint, including that the car was changing speeds and 
driving erratically over the course of about three and a half 
miles and the fact that the caller observed the car pull into 
the location where Office Siefert eventually found it.  Officer 
Siefert confirmed with the caller that the caller saw a white 
male wearing bright orange shoes climb onto a fence, reach over 
the fence, open it, and enter the yard. 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
At this point, Officer Siefert testified that he 
treated the situation as "possibly an OWI and possibly a 
burglary."  Specifically, he "believed that this was a burglary 
possibly because the vehicle didn't belong anywhere in the area.  
It was left running.  Perhaps for a quick get-away, the tailgate 
was left open, and due to the description of someone climbing 
onto the fence and going in." 
¶9 
The backyard area of the property was surrounded by a 
high, solid wooden fence that obstructed any view of the yard.  
When Officer Siefert and his partner arrived, the gate was open, 
but a large garbage can blocked the entry way.  The officers 
removed the garbage can from their path, walked through the open 
gate into the backyard, and proceeded to knock on the side door 
of the unattached garage.  At no point prior to entering the 
property did the officers obtain a warrant. 
¶10 Wilson, who was wearing a black cap and bright orange 
shoes as the caller had described, opened the garage side door.  
As they conversed, Officer Siefert observed that Wilson had 
slurred speech and stumbled on the dry, level, concrete garage 
floor.  Wilson also stated that he had taken his prescribed 
Methadone that day.   
¶11 Officer Siefert accompanied Wilson back to the car so 
Wilson could retrieve his identification.  Upon arriving at the 
vehicle, Officer Siefert observed in plain view a handgun inside 
the vehicle.  Wilson was subsequently found to have a revoked 
driver's license, and Officer Siefert placed him under arrest.  
In the course of a pat-down search, Officer Siefert found a 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
5 
 
prescription pill bottle in Wilson's pocket which was in a name 
other than Wilson's. 
¶12 Wilson ultimately was charged with one count of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as a second 
offense,2 one count of endangering safety by use of a dangerous 
weapon under the influence of an intoxicant,3 and one count of 
possession of a prescription drug without a valid prescription.4  
He subsequently moved to suppress "all statements, physical 
evidence, blood samples, and any observations obtained by police 
that were derived from" the police's warrantless entry to the 
property. 
¶13 Specifically, 
Wilson 
contended 
that 
the 
officers 
impermissibly entered the curtilage of his home without a 
warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Consequently, he 
argued that all evidence gathered as a result of the officers' 
unlawful actions must be suppressed.  The evidence included his 
statements, the suspected prescription drugs, the gun, and the 
results of a subsequent chemical test of Wilson's blood. 
¶14 After a hearing, the circuit court denied Wilson's 
motion.  It concluded that the "warrantless entry into the 
backyard near Mr. Wilson's garage and the subsequent arrest of 
Mr. Wilson on the parking slab outside of the garage were 
justified by exigent circumstances of a hot pursuit of a fleeing 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a), 346.65(2)(am)2. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(h). 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
6 
 
suspect who had committed jailable offenses."  The circuit court 
cited criminal trespass and burglary as the potential jailable 
offenses justifying the entry. 
¶15 Subsequently, Wilson pleaded guilty to the OWI and 
endangering safety counts, and the prescription drug count was 
dismissed and read in, enabling it to be considered at 
sentencing.5  He was sentenced to a total of four months in jail. 
¶16 Wilson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction and denial of the motion 
to suppress.  State v. Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 11, 2021).  However, rather than 
echoing the circuit court's hot pursuit rationale, it determined 
that the officers' conduct constituted a permissible "knock and 
talk" investigation, which if lawfully conducted does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.  Wilson petitioned for this 
court's review. 
II 
¶17 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
decision affirming the circuit court's denial of a motion to 
suppress.  Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question 
of constitutional fact subject to a two-step inquiry.  State v. 
Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶51, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56.   
                                                 
5 A "read-in" crime is one that either is not charged or is 
dismissed as part of a plea agreement, but that the defendant 
agrees the circuit court may consider at sentencing, along with 
the underlying conduct.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b). 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
7 
 
¶18 First, we will uphold a circuit court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Anderson, 2019 
WI 97, ¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285.  A finding of fact 
is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  Second, the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts presents a question of 
law that we review independently of the decisions rendered by 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  Id. 
III  
¶19 We begin our analysis by setting forth principles of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  This case implicates one of the 
core constitutional guarantees found in the United States 
Constitution.6  The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated."  "It is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.'"  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 
(1984) (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of 
Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).  "[W]hen it comes to 
the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.  At the 
                                                 
6 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is the 
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Wilson makes a single reference to this section 
in his brief-in-chief.  Otherwise, all of his arguments and 
analyses are based on the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Accordingly, we address our review based on 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.   
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
8 
 
Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.'" Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 
(2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)).   
¶20 Fourth Amendment protections also extend to the 
curtilage of one's home, the area "immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home."  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 180 (1984); State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶26, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  The extent and scope of a home's 
curtilage is determined by four factors:  
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 
the home, whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by. 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
¶21 In Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, the United States 
Supreme Court articulated an investigative technique, the "knock 
and talk," that law enforcement may use in entering one's 
constitutionally-protected curtilage.  A "knock and talk" 
investigation is not a search but instead is an investigative 
technique premised on the implicit license that a visitor, or 
neighbor, would have with regard to entering one's curtilage.  
See City of Sheboygan v. Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, ¶9 n.5, 330 
Wis. 2d 760, 769 N.W.2d 429.  
¶22 A warrantless search of a home, on the other hand, is 
presumptively unreasonable.  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
9 
 
586 (1980).  Nevertheless, this court has recognized that a 
warrantless home entry is generally lawful if there are exigent 
circumstances together with probable cause.  See State v. 
Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187; 
State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
N.W.2d 463 (quoting State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 388 
N.W.2d 601 (1986)) (noting that "in special circumstances, when 
there is an urgent need coupled with insufficient time to obtain 
a warrant, 'it would be unrealistic'" to bar a law enforcement 
officer's entry into a home).  In such an exigent circumstance, 
like hot pursuit, the government bears the burden of showing 
that the warrantless search was both supported by probable cause 
and 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances. 
 
Robinson, 
327 
Wis. 2d 302, ¶24 (emphasis added).   
¶23 Wisconsin has recognized four categories of exigent 
circumstances:  (1) hot pursuit of a suspect, (2) a threat to 
the safety of a suspect or others, (3) a risk that evidence will 
be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee.  
Id., ¶30.  Only the first of these circumstances, hot pursuit, 
is raised as an issue in this case. 
A 
¶24 With this framework in mind, we turn next to examine 
whether the officers had an implicit license to enter Wilson's 
constitutionally-protected curtilage and conduct a "knock and 
talk" investigation.  There is no dispute here that Wilson's 
backyard constitutes protected curtilage under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 The test as to whether there exists an invitation or 
license to approach an individual's home generally does not 
require extensive legal acumen.  "Complying with the terms of 
that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal 
knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the 
Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters."  Jardines, 569 U.S. 
at 8.  Accordingly, there is a generally recognized implicit 
license for visitors "to approach the home by the front path, 
knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent 
invitation to linger longer) leave."  Id.  Just as an ordinary 
citizen may approach the curtilage of one's front porch to knock 
on the door, so may the police without a warrant "precisely 
because that is 'no more than any private citizen might do.'"  
Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)). 
¶26 The implicit license to approach an individual's home 
outlined in Jardines is not confined to that individual's front 
door or front porch.  In limited scenarios, it also may extend 
to an alternative approach to the house or back entryway 
depending on the facts of a case.  There is no blanket implicit 
license to enter a backyard.  Rather, the inquiry is highly 
fact-specific.   
¶27 For example, in Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d 
354 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit upheld police officers' 
entrance into a backyard as a permissible warrantless entry when 
the 
officers 
followed 
a 
sign 
pointing 
to 
the 
backyard.  
Officers, responding to a complaint of underage drinking, first 
approached the front door of the Alvarez home before seeing a 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
11 
 
sign in the driveway that read "Party In Back" with an arrow 
pointing toward the backyard.  Id. at 356-57.  The court 
observed that "in light of the sign reading 'Party In Back' with 
an arrow pointing toward the backyard, it surely was reasonable 
for the officers to proceed there directly as part of their 
effort to speak with the party's host."  Id. at 358-59. 
¶28 Similarly, in United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273 
(9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit upheld police officers' 
warrantless entry into a backyard when the back entrance could 
be readily believed to be the main, public entrance to the home.  
The court concluded that a license to enter a home's curtilage 
applies and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated "when 
officers go to the back door reasonably believing it is used as 
a principal entrance to the dwelling."  Id. at 1280.  There, the 
police entered the back porch area of a home believing it was 
the front door of an apartment.  The back porch area was 
"readily accessible from a public place" and could reasonably be 
believed to be the main, public entrance to the home.  Id.   
¶29 In applying the test to the facts of this case, we 
agree with Wilson that the court of appeals erred in determining 
that 
the 
officers 
conducted 
a 
lawful 
"knock 
and 
talk" 
investigation.  See Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, at ¶18.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the officers had an implicit 
license "to enter the backyard in the middle of the day from the 
alley, walk to the side garage door, and knock" because the gate 
was ajar, and therefore "there is no clear indication that 
visitors were intended to be excluded from entering."  Id., ¶23.  
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
12 
 
It further reasoned that the officer's entry was permissible 
because the officers had reason to believe someone was in the 
backyard.  Id., ¶24.  
¶30 We disagree with the court of appeals on both points.  
Wilson's backyard was surrounded by a tall, solid wooden fence 
and even though the gate to the backyard was open, it was 
blocked by a large garbage can.  It is hard to believe that a 
private citizen in the alley would consider Wilson's fence, 
together with the garbage can impeding the opening in the fence, 
as an invitation to approach the side door of the unattached 
garage.  If a private citizen does not have an implicit license 
to do this, neither does law enforcement.       
¶31 The facts of Garcia are in stark contrast to the facts 
of this case.  When the officers pulled up to Wilson's alleyway 
and entered the backyard from the alley in order to knock on the 
side door of the unattached garage they were not under the 
impression that they were approaching the front door of Wilson's 
home.  Unlike in Garcia, Wilson's garage door was not "readily 
accessible from a public place" and could not reasonably be 
believed to be the main, public entrance to the home.  Thus, the 
officers did not have an implicit license to conduct a "knock 
and talk" by operation of a well-intentioned, yet mistaken, 
belief 
that 
they 
were 
approaching 
Wilson's 
main, 
public 
entrance.  Stated simply, private citizens would not feel they 
had an implicit license to enter the backyard——and neither would 
a Girl Scout in the words of the Jardines Court. 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
13 
 
¶32 The court of appeals cites Alvarez, 147 F.3d 354, to 
support the proposition that the officers could lawfully enter 
the backyard without a warrant because the officers believed 
someone was in the backyard.  Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, at ¶24.  
We do not find this contention persuasive for two reasons.  
First, the court of appeals interprets Alvarez too broadly.  
Contrary to the court of appeals' reading, Alvarez does not give 
a blanket license for officers to enter a backyard, even if they 
believe someone may be there.  Rather, the inquiry is fact-
specific.  See Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 358.   
¶33 Second, 
the 
facts 
in 
Alvarez 
are 
significantly 
different from those here.  Unlike in Alvarez, here there was no 
sign directing the officers, or any other visitor, to the 
backyard and there was no indication that a knock on the front 
door would go unanswered (such as because the homeowner was 
hosting a party in the back).  Nothing indicated that the 
implicit license to approach the front door to the house here 
extended to the tall, gated backyard.   
¶34 Accordingly, if officers wished to enter the backyard, 
they needed first to obtain a warrant.  We thus conclude that 
the police officers' "knock and talk" investigation violated 
Wilson's Fourth Amendment rights because the officers did not 
have an implicit license to enter Wilson's backyard without a 
warrant.   
B 
¶35 Having determined that the police officers' entry was 
not a "knock and talk" investigation, but a warrantless 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
14 
 
intrusion that implicated the Fourth Amendment, we turn next to 
examine whether the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement applies.7  Although the court of appeals did 
not address the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit, the circuit 
court relied on that exception.  It concluded that the officers' 
warrantless entry into Wilson's backyard was justified by the 
exigent circumstance of hot pursuit. 
¶36 As noted above, generally, a warrantless entry must be 
"supported 
by 
probable 
cause 
and 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24.  The exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies if 
the need for a search is urgent and there is insufficient time 
to obtain a warrant.  State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶39, 383 
                                                 
7 As a threshold matter, Wilson asserts in his reply brief 
that the State forfeited any argument that the hot pursuit 
doctrine applies because it failed to raise the issue in its 
response to Wilson's petition for review.   
Even 
assuming 
without 
deciding 
that 
the 
issue 
was 
forfeited, we may still exercise our discretion in addressing 
it.  The forfeiture rule is not an inexorable command, but is 
instead a rule of judicial administration, and thus a reviewing 
court may disregard a forfeiture and address the merits of an 
unpreserved issue in an appropriate case.  State v. Counihan, 
2020 WI 12, ¶27, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530.  Here, hot 
pursuit was the rationale explicitly relied upon by the circuit 
court, so that the State may argue hot pursuit should not have 
been a surprise to Wilson.  In the interest of completeness, we 
thus choose to address the issue.  See D.L. Anderson's Lakeside 
Leisure 
Co., 
Inc. 
v. 
Anderson, 
2008 
WI 
126, 
¶41, 
314 
Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803 (addressing a "waived challenge to 
the jury instructions because that challenge involves important 
issues that we wish to address"). 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120; see Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; State 
v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. 
¶37 For the exigency of hot pursuit, "[t]he government 
bears the burden of showing that the warrantless entry was both 
supported 
by 
probable 
cause 
and 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances."  
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24 (emphasis 
added); see Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 
¶17.  Given that both prongs of the test must be met, we need 
not further address probable cause here, because we determine 
that the State's exigent circumstance argument fails. 
¶38 As stated, the hot pursuit of a suspect constitutes an 
exigency such as to authorize a law enforcement officer's 
warrantless entry into a home.  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30.  
This exigency recognizes that it would impede effective law 
enforcement to bar officers from a home in instances when there 
is an urgent need and insufficient time to obtain a warrant.  
Id., ¶24.  The basic ingredient of the exigency of hot pursuit 
is "immediate or continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the 
scene of a crime."  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶32, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.  "[S]ome sort of a chase" is 
required, but it "need not be an extended hue and cry 'in and 
about (the) public streets.'"  United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 38, 43 (1976). 
¶39 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
officers' 
warrantless entry into Wilson's backyard was justified because 
the officers had probable cause that Wilson had committed 
jailable offenses and because the exigent circumstance of hot 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
16 
 
pursuit applies.  Thus, we examine whether the facts here 
support "pursuit" that would justify the officers' warrantless 
entry. 
¶40 The State cites to State v. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 
which concluded that a warrantless entry was reasonable under 
the hot pursuit doctrine.8  Yet, the facts in Richter are 
distinguishable from the case at hand.  In Richter, the victim 
of an attempted break-in saw the suspect run into another 
trailer home, which was then validated by the officers' visual 
confirmation of broken glass and a window screen lying on the 
ground. 
¶41 As we explained in Richter, the officers' pursuit of 
the suspect was both immediate and continuous:  
[The officer] responded to a dispatch and picked up 
the trail of a fleeing suspect from an eyewitness 
account.  His response to the scene of the crime was 
immediate, 
and 
his 
pursuit 
of 
the 
suspect 
was 
immediate and continuous upon his arrival on the scene 
and rapid collection of information regarding the 
whereabouts of the suspect.  There is no evidence in 
this record of any delay in [the officer's] response 
or pursuit that would have interrupted the immediacy 
and 
continuity 
of 
the 
situation 
and 
therefore 
dissipated the exigency.  We conclude that [the 
officer's] 
entry 
was 
justified 
by 
the 
exigent 
circumstance of hot pursuit. 
Id., ¶36.  
                                                 
8  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶41, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 
N.W.2d 29, also concluded that the warrantless entry was 
reasonable under the exigency of a threat to the safety of a 
suspect or others.  This exigency was not raised as an issue in 
this case and thus we confine our discussion of Richter to the 
exigency of hot pursuit. 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
17 
 
¶42 Unlike in Richter, the officers here did not pick up 
Wilson's trail and immediately pursue Wilson based on the 
contemporaneous collection of information.  Instead, they 
received a call to go to a particular location.  Upon arrival, 
the officers delayed in order to gather more information.  After 
observing the location, the officers ran the vehicle license 
plate to obtain vehicle registration information.  Next, they 
contacted the 911 caller to discuss more details of the 
complaint, including the speed of the vehicle, the nature of the 
erratic driving, and a description of its three-and-a-half mile 
route.  Additionally, they discussed what the suspect was 
wearing and his conduct upon exiting the vehicle.  Although we 
do not know the exact amount of time it took the officers to 
check the vehicle registration and contact the 911 caller, the 
record does not support the proposition that the officers were 
acting in hot pursuit.  What occurred was neither hot nor was it 
a continuous pursuit. 
¶43 We find further support in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, for our conclusion that the facts here do not 
constitute hot pursuit.  In Welsh, a concerned driver called the 
police to report an erratic driver who was swerving in the road 
and eventually stopped in an open field.  Id. at 742.  The 
erratic driver got out of his car and approached the concerned 
citizen, asking him for a ride home.  Id.  The concerned citizen 
suggested waiting for assistance but the driver walked away from 
the field, leaving his car.  Id.  A few minutes later, officers 
arrived, checked the registration of the abandoned car, and 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
18 
 
proceeded to the suspect's home.  Id. at 742-43.  The United 
States Supreme Court concluded that "the claim of hot pursuit is 
unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous 
pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime."  Id. at 
753. 
¶44 Similarly here, there was no immediate or continuous 
pursuit from the scene of the crime.  In fact, there was even 
less of a pursuit than what occurred in Welsh.  Police simply 
received a call telling them to go to a specific address and 
they went to that location.  It was not a real time pursuit of a 
suspect. 
¶45 After receiving the complaint from the 911 caller, the 
officers drove to the alleyway of Wilson's house.  The police 
did not end up at Wilson's home after following an erratic 
driver.  Wilson was already inside the property when the police 
arrived.   
¶46 When the police arrived, an officer performed a 
registration check on Wilson's car and then called the citizen 
witness to gather more information.  The officer discussed with 
the caller details of Wilson's erratic driving, the streets on 
which he had driven, and how many miles of driving the witness 
observed.  Additionally, they discussed the details of Wilson's 
entry into his backyard and what he was wearing.  As discussed 
above, the attenuation reflected by these activities does not 
support a hot pursuit conclusion.  
¶47 Hot pursuit requires "some sort of a chase," and such 
an event did not occur here.  See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.  
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
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Welsh further instructs that the pursuit must be immediate and 
continuous.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.  Simply put, police did not 
"pursue" Wilson to his home.  Thus, there was no "pursuit," much 
less a "hot" pursuit, which would justify the hot pursuit 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
IV 
¶48 In sum, we conclude that Wilson's Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated.  The police officers' warrantless entry 
into Wilson's backyard was not a valid "knock and talk" 
investigation because they did not have an implicit license to 
enter nor did their entry satisfy the hot pursuit exception to 
the warrant requirement.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit 
court with directions to vacate Wilson's judgment of conviction 
and grant the motion to suppress.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
No. 
2020AP1014-CR   
 
 
 
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