Title: People v. Amezcua
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S133660
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
OSWALDO AMEZCUA and JOSEPH CONRAD FLORES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S133660 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
KA050813 
 
 
February 28, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and O’Rourke* concurred. 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
S133660 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
A jury convicted codefendants Oswaldo Amezcua and 
Joseph Conrad Flores of the first degree murders of George 
Flores, John Diaz, Arturo Madrigal, and Luis Reyes and found 
true 
multiple-murder 
and 
drive-by-murder 
special 
circumstance allegations.1  The jury also convicted defendants 
of 
multiple 
counts 
of 
attempted 
willful, 
deliberate, 
premeditated murder, some of them relating to peace officers;2 
multiple counts of false imprisonment3 in a hostage-taking 
incident; custodial possession of a weapon;4 and various other 
offenses and enhancement allegations, including that many of 
the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street 
gang.5  The jury returned death verdicts for both defendants.  
                                        
1  
Penal Code sections 187, 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), (21).  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
2  
Sections 664, 187. 
3  
Section 210.5. 
4  
Section 4502, subdivision (a). 
5  
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provides an enhanced 
sentence for certain offenses if they are committed “for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any 
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.”   
 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
The trial court sentenced each defendant to death for the 
murder 
convictions 
and 
imposed 
determinate 
and 
indeterminate sentences for the noncapital convictions.  This 
appeal is automatic.  We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution 
a. April 11, 2000:  Murder of John Diaz 
The city of Baldwin Park is the home of the Eastside Bolen 
Parque (ESBP) gang.  Defendants were members of ESBP.  
Not long after midnight on April 11, 2000, Paul Gonzales was 
riding a bicycle on Merced Street in Baldwin Park.  His half-
brother, John Diaz, rode on the handlebars.  Diaz was a 
member of the Monrovia gang and had a “Monrovia” tattoo 
above his right knee.  Gonzales was not a gang member.  They 
passed a black sport utility vehicle (SUV) sitting at a red light.  
The SUV made a U-turn and came back toward the brothers on 
the opposite side of the street, then made another U-turn and 
pulled alongside them.  Two people were in the car.  As the 
SUV pulled past them, the passenger shouted, “Where you 
from?”  Gonzales saw gunfire coming from inside the vehicle, 
jumped off the bicycle and crouched behind a parked car.  The 
SUV sped away.  Diaz approached Gonzales, told him to call an 
ambulance, and fell to the ground.  He died at the hospital.   
                                                                                                           
 
The jury found defendants not guilty of several other 
charges and was unable to reach verdicts on yet other charges, 
as to each of which the court declared a mistrial. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
Sheriff’s Sergeant Kenneth Clark processed the scene.  He 
found five expended nine-millimeter shell casings, and a bullet 
hole in a residence on Merced Street.  Gonzales described the 
shooter as being between ages 18 and 22, short-haired or bald-
headed with a light complexion.   
Doctor Vladimir Levicky, M.D., performed the Diaz 
autopsy.  Diaz suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his left side, 
which perforated his liver and inferior vena cava.  A second 
fatal wound to the back perforated his liver, stomach, and 
aorta.  A third wound to the buttocks perforated his bladder.  
The bullet from Diaz’s back was retrieved and booked into 
evidence.   
In a recorded conversation with the trial prosecutor on 
February 21, 2002, defendants admitted they did the shooting.6  
Flores described how Diaz had been on the handlebars of a 
bicycle that his “friend or his brother” had been riding and 
noted that five nine-millimeter shell casings should have been 
found at the scene.  In another recorded conversation with the 
prosecutor on March 28, 2002, defendants again admitted 
shooting Diaz.  Flores said he did not kill the victim’s brother 
because he was not a gang member.   
After these interviews Gonzales identified a photo of 
Flores as the shooter.  He did the same at trial.   
Baldwin Park Police Sergeant David Reynoso, testifying as 
a gang expert, opined the shooting was committed for the 
                                        
6  
Defendants spoke to the prosecutor on February 8 and 21 
and March 28, 2002, when they were representing themselves.  
The circumstances of those conversations are set out in greater 
detail at pages 35–41, post. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
benefit of ESBP.  Based on defendants’ recorded conversations 
with the prosecutor, Reynoso believed defendants shot Diaz 
because he was a rival gang member in territory claimed by 
ESBP, and the shooting was intended to promote ESBP’s 
reputation.   
b. May 25, 2000:  Murder of Arturo Madrigal and 
Attempted Murder of Fernando Gutierrez 
On May 25, 2000, Arturo Madrigal was parking his 
Chevrolet Blazer near the corner of Rexwood Avenue and 
Maine Avenue in Baldwin Park.  Madrigal’s friend Fernando 
Gutierrez, who lived nearby, sat in the passenger seat.  A car 
stopped next to the Blazer and someone inside said, “Where 
you from?”  Gutierrez replied loudly, “We’re not from nowhere.”  
Someone in the other car started shooting and Gutierrez 
ducked under the dashboard.  When the shooting stopped, he 
heard blood dripping from Madrigal.  Gutierrez got out of the 
car and ran for help.   
Gutierrez told police there had been four Hispanic men in 
the car.  All were between 20 and 25 years old, with shaved 
heads.  He testified neither he nor Madrigal belonged to a 
gang.  He saw the assailants only briefly and was unable to 
identify anyone at trial.   
Police Detective Mike Hemenway responded to the scene 
to find the Blazer parked near the corner of Maine and 
Rexwood Avenues with its engine running.  Madrigal was dead 
behind the wheel; blood flowed from his ears and head.  Lisa 
Scheinin, M.D., testified in lieu of the pathologist who 
performed the autopsy.  She reported his conclusions that 
Madrigal died from a gunshot wound to the head that severed 
his brain stem.  Several bullets were recovered and given to 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
investigators.  Madrigal also suffered a grazing wound to one 
knee.   
A sheriff’s deputy recovered four expended nine-millimeter 
cartridge casings and one expended bullet near the Blazer 
along with one expended bullet from inside the driver’s door.  
All had been fired from outside the vehicle and from the same 
gun.  All four bullets from the Madrigal autopsy showed six 
lands and grooves with a right twist, consistent with having 
been fired from a nine-millimeter Smith and Wesson 
semiautomatic pistol.   
Prosecution gang expert Reynoso testified that the 
Madrigal shooting was committed for the benefit of ESBP.  He 
noted that Madrigal’s head was shaved, creating a perception 
he was a rival gang member present in ESBP territory in an 
act of disrespect.  The shooting added to the gang’s notoriety.   
In a recorded conversation on March 28, 2002, defendants 
provided trial prosecutor Levine and Detective Kerfoot with 
details of the shooting.  Defendants were “driving around [the] 
neighborhood looking for people to kill.”  They saw “a gang 
member [that was] in the wrong area,” driving an “older model 
Blazer.”  Amezcua was driving.  Flores, using a nine-millimeter 
pistol, fired “two to three shots” that hit the victim in the face 
and neck.  The passenger fled.  Asked why they went out and 
started shooting people, defendants explained it was their 
“job.”  Flores said, “[W]e were trying to better the gang and 
[instill] fear to the rest of the gangs.”  He explained that the 
victim should not have been driving in “our hood”; he could 
have driven “the long way,” but they had caught him taking 
“the short way,” and Flores “domed him.”   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
c. June 19, 2000:  Murder of George Flores and 
Attempted Murders of Joe Mayorquin, Robert 
Perez, Jr., and Art Martinez 
Katrina Barber7 knew both Amezcua and Flores.  About 
11:30 p.m. on June 18, 2000, she was parked in front of her 
mother’s house in a stolen Toyota Corolla.  Defendants asked 
her for a ride.  She drove around Baldwin Park and Alhambra 
until the Corolla broke down.  Barber then stole a Toyota 
Cressida and drove to the home of Flores’s mother in Hemet.  
They arrived about 3:00 a.m. and stayed the night.  When they 
left the next morning, defendants carried two black duffle 
bags.  One bag held Flores’s clothes.  There were about 10 
firearms in the other duffle.   
Barber drove defendants to the La Puente home of ESBP 
member Luis Reyes.  The four watched television and used 
crystal methamphetamine, then left the house in two vehicles.  
Barber took Flores in the Cressida; Reyes drove Amezcua in 
his Monte Carlo.  Parked near each other in a hotel lot, Barber 
saw Reyes talking with and giving something to a person in 
another car.  
Barber then got on the freeway to go to her mother’s house 
in La Puente.  In Baldwin Park, Barber drove past some men 
sitting on a wall in front of a house on Ledford Street.  At 
Flores’s direction, Barber turned back toward the men and 
stopped.  The Monte Carlo with Reyes and Amezcua drove up 
and also stopped in front of the Ledford Street house.  Flores 
                                        
7  
At the time she testified, Barber was in state prison.  She 
had pled guilty to shooting at an inhabited dwelling during 
this incident.   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
said to the men, “Well, well, well, what do we have here?”  One 
of the seated men started to run.  Standing outside the Monte 
Carlo, Amezcua fired a pistol at them.  Flores, still inside 
Barber’s stolen car and armed with an AK-47, also shot at the 
group.  Then he handed Barber a .22-caliber semiautomatic, 
telling her to shoot.  Barber fired three or four times toward 
the men without trying to hit them.  One victim was shot as he 
tried to get in the house.  When the shooting stopped, Barber 
drove away.   
Robert Perez testified that on the morning of June 19, 
2000, he was standing beside the wall in front of his Ledford 
Street home, chatting with his friends Art Martinez, Joe 
Mayorquin, and George Flores.  Perez was not a gang member, 
but two of his friends were inactive members of the 22nd 
Street gang.  All were unarmed.  A Chevrolet Monte Carlo 
drove by, catching his attention because the men inside were 
staring at them.  Perez’s brother-in-law had been murdered in 
front of the house three years earlier, so he was constantly 
vigilant.  The car turned around and approached.  Perez told 
his friends to go to the back of the house, but Flores and 
Mayorquin stayed to see what would happen.  The Monte Carlo 
and a woman driving a Toyota pulled up.  Flores was seated in 
the Toyota and said, “Well, well, what do we have here?”  
Amezcua got out of the Monte Carlo holding a black pistol, said 
something, and fired the first shot.  Perez jumped for cover and 
crawled toward the side of his house.  He heard a metallic 
sound and the firing of a second gun from around the Toyota.  
When the shooting stopped Perez was uninjured, but George 
Flores lay dead from a neck wound and Joe Mayorquin had 
been shot in the leg.  Perez later found bullet holes in his house 
and garage.   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
Sergeant Reynoso testified that, in his opinion, the 
Ledford Street shootings were committed for ESBP’s benefit.  
The location of the offense was one claimed by ESBP.  Victim 
George Flores belonged to a different gang but openly 
displayed his tattoos in ESBP territory.  Killing him promoted 
ESBP’s notorious reputation.   
d. June 19, 2000:  Murder of Luis Reyes 
After the Ledford Street shooting, Flores told Barber she 
could not go to her mother’s house.  As they drove toward San 
Bernardino the car began to shake.  Barber got off the freeway 
and stopped, followed by Reyes and Amezcua in the Monte 
Carlo.  Gathering her things, she heard gunfire and saw 
Amezcua shoot Reyes.  Flores asked Amezcua, “What are you 
doing that here for?”  Then he and Amezcua began to pull 
Reyes, bleeding and choking, from the car.  Barber started to 
drive the Monte Carlo away, but Reyes’s right leg was still 
inside.  Flores told her to “[j]ust run him over,” but she moved 
him from the car before driving off.  They got back on the 
freeway and eventually stopped at the home of Amezcua’s 
cousin in Pasadena.  They took showers and ate.  A few hours 
later, they went to the house in Hemet, bringing the black bag 
of guns inside.  Flores’s mother told him that if he didn’t get 
rid of the guns she would sell them.  He replied that if she did, 
he would have to kill her.  The group stayed there three or four 
days.  At one point, Barber asked Flores if he was going to kill 
her.  He replied, “If I wanted to kill you, I would take you out 
back and shoot you.  Throw you in the trunk and take you in 
the hills and nobody would ever know.”  Barber observed that 
his mother would know; he responded, “My mom wouldn’t care 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
because she knew I had to do that to one of my friends,” 
referring to his “homeboy Vago.”8  
On June 19, 2000, Andrew Quiroz saw a man lying beside 
the road and rushed to his side.  The man had been shot but 
was still breathing.  Quiroz called for help, which arrived 
within 10 minutes.   
Sergeant Dean Brown responded to find Reyes lying in a 
pool of blood.  A stolen Toyota Cressida parked nearby 
contained five shell casings.  A bullet fell from the victim’s 
clothing when he was lifted.  Brown also found a spent bullet 
and shell casing in nearby weeds.  An autopsy identified 19 
gunshot wounds, shot from a distance of about two feet.  
Bullets recovered from the body came from a Ruger pistol 
linked to Amezcua.   
                                        
8  
The court admonished the jury to consider Flores’s 
comments only against himself.  Other evidence showed that 
ESBP member Paul Ponce was nicknamed Vago.  Defendants 
were charged with Ponce’s murder and related allegations, but 
because they were acquitted of those charges, we briefly 
summarize the evidence.  On June 7, 2000, Katherine Schafer 
and Paul Ponce were in his garage when they heard knocking 
at the front door.  A closed-circuit video monitor showed a car 
parked in front of the house.  Ponce left the garage to answer 
the door.  After about 10 seconds Schafer heard numerous 
gunshots in quick succession.  Several minutes later she found 
Ponce’s body in the living room.  Ponce, who had “Bolen” 
tattooed on his back, had been shot many times by .22-caliber 
and nine-millimeter weapons.  The parties stipulated that on 
the day of the homicide, Schafer told a deputy sheriff that she 
had heard a vehicle drive up and seen a male subject come up 
to the front door.  Ponce went to the door.  As soon as he 
opened it Schafer heard gunshots.  
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
Reyes’s wallet contained a payment receipt for the Monte 
Carlo.  Ontario police posted a bulletin that the car was 
wanted in connection with a homicide and its occupants were 
considered armed and dangerous.   
Detective Reynoso testified that Reyes was considered to 
be a “rat” because he had cooperated with the police.  He 
opined that Reyes was killed because his conduct was 
disrespectful to ESBP and his killing promoted ESBP’s 
reputation.   
e. June 24 and 25, 2000:  Attempted Murder of 
Peace Officer Andrew Putney and Arson of 
Reyes’s Monte Carlo 
During the evening of June 24, 2000, Amezcua, Flores and 
Flores’s girlfriend, Carina Renteria, went to a 7-Eleven store.  
Renteria drove Flores in her Honda Civic.  Amezcua drove the 
Monte Carlo.  Amezcua sped out of the parking lot and was 
followed by San Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputy Andrew 
Putney.  Renteria and Flores followed in the Civic.   
The Monte Carlo’s license plate showed it was stolen.  
Amezcua entered the 10 Freeway.  He cut in and out of lanes 
at speeds between 70 and 85 miles per hour.  After about two 
miles he made a hard right turn in front of Putney’s vehicle, 
missed the offramp, and became airborne.  He landed back on 
the ramp and sped off.  Putney followed, heard gunfire from 
behind him, and a round blew out his front tire.  Putney saw a 
dark compact car with tinted windows, going about 90 miles 
per hour. A Hispanic male was sitting in the passenger door 
window firing at Putney.   
Renteria testified that after they had gotten onto the 
freeway, Flores told her to catch the patrol car.  As she drew 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
closer, Flores rolled down the window, leaned out and began 
shooting.  She had not known he was going to do that.  Flores 
told her to keep driving and get off the freeway.  She drove to 
his mother’s house in Hemet.  Shortly thereafter, Amezcua 
arrived in the Monte Carlo.  He and Flores decided to burn the 
car.  Renteria and Flores’s mother secured a plastic gas 
container.  Amezcua and Flores drove the Monte Carlo to an 
isolated area, and the two women followed in the Honda.  After 
igniting the car, the men ran back to the Honda, and all four 
left together.  Renteria stayed in Hemet overnight, then 
returned to her sister’s house.   
About 3:00 a.m. on June 25, 2000, firefighters found the 
Monte Carlo on fire in San Jacinto, a city adjacent to Hemet.  
Local police checked the license plate and contacted Ontario 
officers.  Inside the car, police found bullets, casings and shells.   
Sheriff’s deputies interviewed Renteria, who thereafter 
pleaded guilty to being an accessory to arson.  She testified at 
defendants’ trial and received no consideration for doing so.   
In a recorded conversation on February 21, 2002, 
prosecutor Levine told defendants, “You guys are—you’re a 
good shot.”  Flores said, “Yeah, it’s hard to shoot when you’re in 
a vehicle and both vehicles are moving and one’s turning.”  
Levine said, “You hit that car a lot of times,” and Flores 
replied, “Yeah.  Oh, and . . . I should’ve had the other gun.”   
In a recorded conversation on March 28, 2002, Flores said 
they “do quite a bit of traveling, okay.”  Amezcua added, “With 
our duffle bags.”  Flores said, “Black . . . duffle bags.”  Later, 
Detective Kerfoot asked, “What’d you guys do with your duffle 
bags?”  Flores said they couldn’t tell him because “[i]f we ever 
get out, will we be able to go get ’em and we’ll be able to finish 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
our mission?  ’Cause our mission was not completed.”  Kerfoot 
asked, “What was your mission?”  Amezcua replied, “To kill as 
much people as I could.  [¶]  Cops included.”   
f. July 4, 2000:  Attempted Murders of Peace 
Officers; Assault with a Semiautomatic 
Firearm; Assault with a Firearm; False 
Imprisonments on Santa Monica Pier 
Close to midnight on the night of July 3–4, 2000, Police 
Officer Robert Martinez received a radio call reporting that a 
triple homicide suspect had made a call from a public 
telephone on the Santa Monica pier.  Martinez went to the pay-
phone, verified the number, and waited for additional units.  
Martinez and six assisting officers walked toward the end of 
the pier and saw defendants standing outside an arcade.  
Flores matched the description of the suspect.  Flores 
approached the officers, while Amezcua went into the arcade.  
Martinez began to pat down Flores, who tried to turn away.  
Martinez grabbed him and both men fell to the ground.  Flores 
was subdued by a police dog.  He had a semiautomatic AP9 
handgun and a loaded semiautomatic pistol on his person.   
Martinez told Sergeant Michael Braaten another suspect 
had gone into the arcade.  As arcade patrons began to leave, 
officers took up various positions.  Martinez yelled, “He’s to the 
right,” and Amezcua grabbed a woman named Cathy Yang.  
Using her as a shield, he fired at Braaten, who took cover 
behind a pillar.  Officer Cristina Coria shouted, “I[’ve] been 
hit,” and Martinez carried her out of the line of fire.  Officer 
James Hirt was also shot in the leg.  Hirt saw Amezcua with 
his left arm around a woman’s neck and his right hand 
pointing a gun.  Officer Steven Wong was struck in the right 
hip.   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
Jing Huali was leaving the arcade when she heard 
gunshots.  She saw Amezcua holding someone and pointing a 
gun at her.  She was wounded in the left leg during the 
gunfire.   
Lorna Cass and Paul Hoffman were in the arcade with 
their respective children.  They heard the sound of gunshots 
and took cover.  Cass saw a man holding an Asian woman 
hostage.  The man said to move the arcade machines closer 
together to form a barricade and told everyone still in the 
arcade to come together so he could see them.   
Bonnie Stone and Michael Lopez were also present.  Stone 
saw Amezcua with a gun in his hand holding an Asian woman 
around her neck.  Amezcua controlled about 15 hostages, 
directing them where to sit.  He told Lopez to reload bullets 
from one magazine into another and gave him the empty 
magazine as a “souvenir.”  After a few hours, Amezcua began 
letting hostages leave, singly and in pairs.  He eventually 
surrendered after about five hours. 
g. Defendants’ Weapon Possession in Custody 
On January 29, 2001, Sheriff’s Deputy Armando Meneses 
found a homemade stabbing device, or shank, hidden under the 
toilet rim in Amezcua’s cell.   
On April 30, 2001, a deputy found two large pieces of 
metal capable of being made into weapons hidden in the 
corners of Flores’s bunk.  Flores occupied the cell alone.   
2.  Defense 
The parties stipulated that Andre Acevedo would have 
testified that Carina Renteria told him she was driving a car 
with three passengers when a police car drove in between 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
them.  The two men in the back seat told her to pull alongside 
the officer. When she did so, “they” rolled down the window 
and began shooting.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution 
a. Amezcua’s Custodial Possession of a Weapon 
On November 19, 2004, a sheriff’s deputy found a shank 
hidden in Amezcua’s jail cell.   
b. Flores’s Armed Robbery 
On March 29, 1995, David Wachtel, Buddy Jacob, and a 
woman named Karen were parked in Baldwin Park, talking.  
Flores and another man approached and tapped on the 
window.  Flores asked if they had any money.  Initially, 
Wachtel refused to give him money or his wallet.  Flores 
showed him a gun and said, “Don’t make me make you.”  
Flores took Wachtel’s pager and wallet, Jacob’s necklace, and 
$20 from Karen’s purse.  Flores left and police were 
summoned.  Wachtel identified Flores at a preliminary 
hearing.   
c. Flores’s Threat Against Jail Officer 
On May 10, 2001, Sheriff’s Deputy Dustin Cikcel removed 
contraband including excess sheets and food from Flores’s cell.  
Flores was belligerent and later said, “You will see, Cikcel.  
Maybe not today, but you will see when you are not expecting 
it.”  Cikcel took the comment as a threat.   
d. Crimes Against Timothy Obregon and Alicia 
Garcia 
On June 13, 2000, Timothy Obregon was living in Baldwin 
Park.  He was not in a gang but was a friend of ESBP member 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Richard Robles.  That evening, Robles called and asked 
Obregon to give his “homeboys” a ride home.  Robles brought 
defendants to Obregon’s house, introduced them, and gave 
Obregon $40.  Flores put a large, dark duffle bag in the trunk.  
Obregon’s girlfriend, Alicia Garcia, went along for the ride.  
Garcia sat in the front passenger seat with Amezcua and 
Flores in the rear.   
Flores told Obregon to take the 10 Freeway east.  No one 
spoke, which made Obregon nervous.  At one point, Garcia 
complained it was taking a long time and asked how far they 
were going.  A minute or two later, Obregon heard gunfire.  
Shots went through the windshield and Garcia “squirmed” in 
her seat.  Amezcua reloaded his gun and started to point it at 
Garcia’s head.  Flores told him not to do that.  Garcia started 
to cry and said, “He shot me, and I am dying.”  Blood streamed 
down from a hole in her chin.  Obregon felt something at the 
back of his neck and Flores said, “Better drive straight, 
motherfucker, or I will shoot you with this nine.”   
At Flores’s direction Obregon left the freeway at the next 
exit.  The road was lined with tall cornfields.  Flores said he 
would let them go in a place where Obregon could get help and 
told him to stop in a residential neighborhood.  Obregon and 
Flores got out of the car.  Flores demanded money, which 
Obregon gave him.  Obregon lifted Garcia from the car and put 
her down on the sidewalk.  Flores asked Obregon, “Do you 
know me?”  Obregon answered in the negative, saying he 
would “tell them that we got carjacked” and he “[wouldn’t] say 
anything.”  Defendants left in the car and Obregon went to a 
nearby house to seek help.  Getting no response, he ran to a 
Circle K store a half block away.  Police and paramedics soon 
arrived and treated Garcia, who had bullet holes in her breasts 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
and chin.  Garcia survived, but the incident changed her 
personality.  She became frightened of “everybody and 
everything.”   
e. Victim Impact Evidence 
Maria de Los Angeles Calvo, the mother of victim George 
Flores, testified he was the youngest of her four children.  He 
was happy and friendly, much loved by family and friends, and 
enjoyed baseball and family gatherings.  He wanted to study 
electronics.  Attending George’s funeral was the saddest, most 
difficult thing she ever had to do.  Many things continued to 
remind her of him.  George’s own son repeatedly asked her why 
his father was gone.  Michelle Gerena, a close friend, described 
learning of George’s death.  She testified that George “was the 
kind of person you could call at [two] o’clock in the morning.  If 
you needed him, he’d get out of bed for you” and “do whatever” 
was needed.  He loved his son and wanted everyone to be 
happy.  His friends continually remember and think about 
him.  
Vivian Gonzales described her son, John Diaz, as a loving 
and caring man.  He had a daughter and was planning to 
marry.  She heard the gunshots that killed her son, and his 
cousin came to tell her John had been shot.  She saw her son 
lying on the grass, dying.  She wanted to go to him and hold 
him but could not bear to watch him die.  Attending his funeral 
was heartbreaking.  Because visiting his grave is too sad, she 
made a garden and finds comfort there in her memories of him.  
She no longer celebrates Christmas.  She is always angry and 
sometimes doesn’t even want to get out of bed.   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
2.  Defense 
Neither defendant presented evidence at the penalty 
phase. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Jury Selection Issues 
1. Trial Court’s Refusal To Ask Prospective Jurors if 
They Would Always Vote for Death if a Defendant 
Were Convicted of Multiple Murders  
Defendants contend the trial court deprived them of their 
right to a fair trial and impartial jury by rejecting a joint 
defense request that the juror questionnaire ask whether, if 
jurors found a defendant guilty of five murders with special 
circumstances, they would always vote for the death penalty.  
The court expressed concern that the question as phrased 
would cause prospective jurors to prejudge the evidence.  It 
suggested asking, “If you found a defendant guilty of five 
murders, would you always vote for death and refuse to 
consider mitigating circumstances (his background, etc.)?”  The 
prosecutor and counsel for Flores agreed to the modification.  
Counsel for Amezcua did not object, and the question was 
included.   
Defendants acknowledge the trial court’s wide latitude in 
conducting voir dire, including in the choice and format of 
questions to be asked.  (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 
83; Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)  Preliminarily, they forfeited this 
claim when neither objected to the court’s modification.  
(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 97; People v. 
Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 617.)  Were the claim 
preserved, it would lack merit.   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
In Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, the high court 
recognized that “part of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to 
an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify 
unqualified jurors.”  (Id. at p. 729.)  Prospective jurors are 
unqualified if their views would prevent or substantially 
impair their performance in accordance with the instructions 
and oath.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  
Inadequate voir dire prevents the trial court from removing 
prospective jurors who will not follow the court’s instructions.  
(Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188.)   
The original defense question sought to identify jurors who 
would always vote to impose the death sentence if they 
convicted defendants of five murders.  Defendants cite People 
v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, which held the trial court erred 
in prohibiting voir dire about Cash’s prior murder, “a fact 
likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors” and one 
that “could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death 
penalty.”  (Id. at p. 721.)  Here, defendants reason, the trial 
court’s reframing of the question to include reference to 
mitigating evidence “blurred the call of the original question in 
a way that suggested that only evidence of mitigating 
circumstances would suffice to prevent a death verdict.”   
The argument fails.  The modification eliminated a 
reference to special circumstances, which the court was 
concerned prospective jurors would not understand.  It asked 
whether the juror would refuse to consider mitigating evidence.  
Such an inquiry is generally relevant to uncovering 
prejudgment of penalty in a case involving multiple murder.  
The modified question did not ask how a panelist might react if 
the defense presented no mitigating evidence.  But the court 
had no indication that the defense would ultimately make that 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
choice, nor did counsel request the question be modified.  
Further, defense counsel had the opportunity to orally question 
prospective jurors.  Defendants point to no instance in which 
the court restricted such inquiry, undermining their ability to 
discern whether a juror could or would not follow the law.  The 
voir dire process as a whole sufficed to identify unqualified 
jurors.  Defendants are correct in asserting broadly that the 
absence of a mitigating factor may not be considered an 
aggravating factor (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 
583) and that the aggravating evidence in a given case may 
still fail to warrant the death penalty, even in the absence of 
mitigation.  (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1061–
1062.)  They do not persuasively suggest how the modified 
question might reasonably have been understood to imply the 
contrary. 
2.  Excusal of Prospective Juror for Cause  
Defendants contend that the trial court erroneously 
excused a prospective juror who expressed reservations about 
the death penalty but said she could vote for death if the 
aggravating evidence were strong enough.  The error, they 
claim, violated their rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, 
and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
federal 
Constitution.   
a. Jury Selection Procedures 
The questionnaire here included the following questions: 
“Are you so strongly opposed to the death penalty that you 
would always vote for life in prison without the possibility of 
parole and never vote for death for a defendant convicted of 
first degree murder and a special circumstance?”   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
“Are you so strongly in favor of the death penalty you 
would always vote for death and never vote for life in prison 
without the possibility of parole for a defendant convicted of 
first degree murder and a special circumstance?”   
“Are you so strongly opposed to the death penalty that you 
would always vote against death regardless of what evidence 
of aggravation or mitigation is presented?”  
“Are you so strongly in favor of the death penalty that you 
would always vote for death regardless of what evidence of 
aggravation or mitigation is presented?”   
“In a penalty phase, would you want to hear evidence of 
aggravation and mitigation?”   
“In a penalty phase would you always vote for death, 
regardless of the mitigating evidence?”   
“In a penalty phase would you always vote for life, 
regardless of the aggravating evidence?”   
“Regardless of your views of the death penalty, would you 
be able to vote for death for a defendant if you believed, after 
hearing all the evidence, that the death penalty was 
appropriate?”   
“Will your feelings about the death penalty impair your 
ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?”   
Before voir dire examination, the court instructed, “Jurors 
who would never impose death cannot sit in this case.  
[¶]  Jurors who would never impose life cannot sit on this 
case.”  The court elaborated:  “Now, in my experience and that 
of other judges . . . people kinda break [themselves] down into 
four categories in a case like this.  [¶]  We have the category 
number one people.  These are folks that don’t believe in the 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
death penalty.  And that’s fine.  Many of you said you could 
never impose death and I respect that decision.  I am not here 
to try to change your mind.  [¶]  . . . [¶]  We have a category 
two person.  This is the person who’s strongly in favor of the 
death penalty.  He is [kind] of an eye for an eye guy who says if 
this person, this defendant, committed murder with special 
circumstances, he must die.  [¶]  I don’t care about his personal 
history or background.  I don’t care about the mitigating 
evidence.  Murder means he should be executed.  That is a 
category number two person.  We have some of those in this 
group.  [¶]  Then we have what I call the category three person.  
And this is the person who says, You know, I believe in the 
death penalty.  I think it’s appropriate for society to have a 
death penalty.  But, you know, I know myself.  And I don’t 
think I could ever vote to put somebody to death.  
[¶] . . . [¶]  Nothing wrong with being a category three 
person. . . . [¶]  . . .  The category four person is the person who 
says, you know, I can go either way.  I want to hear it all. . . .  
Many of you said I want to hear everything that I am entitled 
to hear before I have to make such a decision.  But many of you 
said I could make such a decision.  And that’s all we’re after.  
We want people that can make the decision.”  The court asked 
all prospective jurors to say which category they belonged in.   
Prospective Juror No. 74 wrote in her questionnaire that 
she had “no opinion one way or the other” about the death 
penalty, but “I just don’t want to be the one to decide; I 
wouldn’t choose to kill someone.”  She had never held a 
different opinion on the question.  When asked in the 
questionnaire “Are you so strongly opposed to the death 
penalty that you would always vote for life in prison without 
the possibility of parole and never vote for death for a 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
defendant convicted of first degree murder and a special 
circumstance?” she answered, “Yes.”  But in response to the 
question “Are you so strongly opposed to the death penalty that 
you would always vote against death regardless of what 
evidence of aggravation or mitigation is presented?” she 
answered, “Unsure.”  When asked, “In a penalty phase would 
you always vote for life, regardless of the aggravating 
evidence?” she answered, “Probably.”  But when asked, 
“Regardless of your views on the death penalty, would you be 
able to vote for death for a defendant if you believed, after 
hearing all the evidence, that the death penalty was 
appropriate?” she answered, “[I]f I thought it appropriate, yes.”  
Asked whether her feelings about the death penalty would 
impair her ability to be fair and impartial, she answered in the 
negative.  And when asked, “Would you like to serve on this 
jury?” she answered in the negative, stating in part, “Don’t 
want to decide if defendants should die if it comes to that.”  
During questioning by the trial court, Prospective Juror 
No. 74 initially categorized herself as “pretty much a three,” 
but said, “It would have to be for me to put someone to death, 
the aggravating evidence be a lot and there would be like no 
mitigating evidence.  So it’s a good chance that I am a three.”  
The court asked, “Well, but are you saying that you could put 
somebody to death?”  Prospective Juror No. 74 replied, “It 
would have to be really harsh circumstances.”  The court said, 
“That is all right.  It’s up to the People to persuade you.  [¶]  I 
am saying that number threes are people who say, Judge, I 
know myself, I could never, regardless of what the evidence 
was, put somebody to death.  [¶]  Are you that person?”  Again, 
she equivocated:  “Well, I could be a four with three 
tendencies.”  The court replied, “Yes, and we’re not allowing 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
that this morning.  No four with three tendencies.  But I 
understand what you are saying.  [¶]  So are you a three or a 
four?  [¶]  You sound like you are a four?”  She answered:  “I 
could be a four.”   
During questioning by counsel for Flores, Prospective 
Juror No. 74 acknowledged that in the penalty phase she 
would lean toward life instead of death, “but if I thought the 
aggravating was enough, then you know it would be hard, but I 
could make the decision.”  The prosecutor then vividly 
described the reality of the penalty phase decision making 
process:  “Let’s stop.  Think about it.  It’s not movies anymore.  
It is not T.V., not filling out questionnaires.  It’s really can you 
do it?  To sit on this jury, you have to be able to do that if it’s 
warranted.  And this is very real stuff. . . .[¶]  Is there anybody 
that has listened to what I’ve said and starting to think, whoa, 
wait a minute, in front of the defendants, I am going to have to 
come back and return a verdict of death in front of them.  
[¶]  Maybe with their family sitting out in the audience, I have 
to tell a mother that her son is going to be put to death?  
[¶]  . . .  [¶]  Has anybody had any kind of change of heart, any 
change of feeling inside of them based on what I have said at 
all?”  Prospective Juror No. 74 raised her hand and said, “I 
don’t think I could do it,” and confirmed it was her “final 
determination.”  The court excused her for cause over defense 
objection.   
b. Analysis 
Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee 
criminal defendants the right to trial before an impartial jury.  
(Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 149–150; Turner v. 
Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 466, 471; U.S. Const., 6th & 14th 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)  Prospective jurors cannot be 
excluded for cause simply because they voice general objections 
to the death penalty or express conscientious or religious 
scruples against its imposition.  (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 
391 U.S. 510, 522.)  Prospective jurors in a capital case may be 
excluded for cause, however, if their views would prevent or 
substantially 
impair 
the 
performance 
of 
their 
duties.  
(Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  “[I]n 
determining whether the removal of a potential juror would 
vindicate the State’s interest without violating the defendant’s 
right, the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the 
demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing 
courts.”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9.)  “When the 
prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are conflicting or 
equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the prospective juror’s 
state of mind are binding on appellate courts if supported by 
substantial evidence.”  (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 
10.)    
Defendants contend that Prospective Juror No. 74’s 
questionnaire responses reflected a juror without a fixed 
opinion regarding the death penalty, but one with concerns 
about herself returning a verdict that would end someone’s life.  
In urging error, they rely on statements she made during voir 
dire characterizing herself, in the trial court’s taxonomy, as a 
“category number four” juror, one who would “lean towards . . . 
[life] instead of death,” but could vote for death, even though 
“it would be hard,” if she “thought the aggravating was 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
enough.”9  They observe that it was only after the prosecutor 
asked whether any juror had had a change of heart and could 
not return a death verdict before defendants and their family 
that Prospective Juror No. 74 said, “I don’t think I could do it.”  
They maintain the question about defendants’ family overly 
emotionalized the inquiry. 
Prospective Juror No. 74 gave equivocal and conflicting 
answers throughout the process.  She obviously thought about 
her own views and did her best to explain them.  Her final 
reply to the prosecutor’s question constituted substantial 
evidence on which the trial court could base its excusal.  
(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 659–661.)  There was 
nothing improper in the prosecutor’s request that she assess 
her own ability to return a death verdict in the concrete 
situation in which she might find herself if she served.  There 
was no error. 
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Courtroom Security 
Defendants 
contend 
their 
rights 
to 
a 
fair 
trial, 
presentation of a defense, and the presumption of innocence 
were prejudiced by heightened courtroom security measures 
not based on case-specific reasons.  They claim the court 
deferred to the sheriff regarding the level of security and failed 
to state on the record why the need for the measures employed 
                                        
9  
While we do not endorse a taxonomy like the one 
employed in this case, we recognize that it may be a helpful 
starting point for determination of a prospective juror’s 
qualification to serve, provided the court, as here, supplements 
it with follow-up questions. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
outweighed potential prejudice to the defendants.  We reject 
the contention. 
At the start of jury selection, there were eight uniformed 
deputy sheriffs in the courtroom.  Counsel for Amezcua 
objected, saying, “I think that it’s onerous.  I think that this is 
a difficult enough case without having the impression that 
would be left by having so many sheriff[’]s deputies sitting in 
the courtroom throughout this trial, so I would object to the 
number of sheriffs that are here.  [¶]  My understanding is that 
neither of these gentlemen, Mr. Amezcua or Mr. Flores, have 
acted up in court and that at this point, there is no reason for 
that kind of a security detail to be present in front of the jury.”  
Counsel for Flores joined in the objection.  The court replied, “I 
normally leave security issues up to the bailiffs, to the experts.  
I feel that in this case, given that there have been a number of 
incidents at the jail, that there is understandably some concern 
above that present in most cases.  I will watch the issue.  [¶]  I 
feel that I am going to allow the number of bailiffs to remain 
for today.  I feel that this is going to be very quick.  The jurors 
are going to be in and out in a matter of minutes.[10]  I will give 
some additional thought to the number of bailiffs that are 
necessary, but given the fact that we have two defendants, we 
have had a number of incidents at the jail, I think it’s 
important for us to have what the security people call a show of 
force.  [¶]  My thought is that once we get going with the trial, 
and I do expect that there will be no problems.  I think that 
                                        
10  
The day’s session included introductions, distribution of 
questionnaires, preinstructions, and some hardship excusals, 
but no voir dire. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
Mr. Amezcua and Mr. Flores have conducted themselves in a 
very appropriate manner at all times with this court, and I 
think that once we get going, that the sheriff will see that 
there is probably not the need to have such a number of 
bailiffs, but your objection is noted for the record.”   
Counsel for Amezcua noted that both defendants were 
belted to their chairs with one hand cuffed to their belt, and 
expressed doubt that either defendant could even stand up.  
The court observed that the defense table had been draped to 
prevent prospective jurors from seeing defendants’ cuffed 
hands.  Counsel for Flores objected, arguing that jurors would 
be able to infer that defendants were shackled from the fact 
only their left hands would be above the table.  The court 
overruled the objection, noting that precautions had to be 
taken in this case.  Shortly thereafter prospective jurors 
entered the courtroom.  The record does not reflect whether 
these security arrangements were maintained during the rest 
of the proceedings.  The defense made no further objections on 
this topic. 
“We begin with the familiar principle that a ‘trial court has 
broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly 
proceedings.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]  For this reason, decisions 
regarding security measures in the courtroom are generally 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  [¶]  However, 
despite our traditional deference to the trial court in this area, 
some extraordinary security practices carry an inordinate risk 
of infringing upon a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.  
These 
exceptional 
practices 
must 
be 
justified 
by 
a 
particularized showing of manifest need sufficient to overcome 
the substantial risk of prejudice they pose.  For example, 
visible physical restraints like handcuffs or leg irons may erode 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
the presumption of innocence because they suggest to the jury 
that the defendant is a dangerous person who must be 
separated from the rest of the community.  [Citations.]  . . .  In 
addition to their prejudicial effect on the jury, shackles may 
distract or embarrass a defendant, potentially impairing his 
ability to participate in his defense or serve as a competent 
witness on his own behalf.  [Citations.] . . .  [¶]  Because 
physical restraints carry such risks, the United States 
Supreme Court has long considered their use inherently 
prejudicial.  [Citations.]  Thus, a criminal defendant may not 
appear before the jury in shackles unless the trial court has 
found that the restraints are justified by a state interest 
specific to the particular trial.  [Citation.]  . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  But 
the stringent showing required for physical restraints like 
shackles is the exception, not the rule.  Security measures that 
are not inherently prejudicial need not be justified by a 
demonstration of extraordinary need.  [Citations.]  In contrast 
to physical restraints placed on the defendant’s person, we 
have upheld most other security practices when based on 
proper exercises of discretion. . . . [Citations.]  . . .  [W]e have 
consistently upheld the stationing of security or law 
enforcement officers in the courtroom.”  (People v. Stevens 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 632–634.)   
In Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, Justice Marshall 
explained why different rules apply to physical restraints and 
the deployment of security personnel.  “The chief feature that 
distinguishes the use of identifiable security officers from 
courtroom practices we might find inherently prejudicial is the 
wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw 
from the officers’ presence.  While shackling and prison clothes 
are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
defendant from the community at large, the presence of guards 
at a defendant’s trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he 
is particularly dangerous or culpable. . . .  Our society has 
become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public 
places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their 
numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern 
or alarm.”  (Id. at p. 569.) 
Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion by 
deferring to the sheriff’s determination that eight uniformed 
officers were needed to secure the courtroom in this trial 
instead of justifying the practice by reference to case-specific 
facts.  The contention is not borne out by the record.  In 
overruling defendants’ objection to the presence of eight bailiffs 
at the outset of the trial, the court alluded to the many 
incidents in which Amezcua and Flores were involved in 
violent or nonconforming conduct in jail.  Both were 
categorized as “K-10,” or “high security and/or administrative 
segregated, noteworthy cases.”  In an earlier hearing to 
determine whether defendants would be allowed to possess 
writing implements in their cells, evidence demonstrated the 
following:  (1) An October 2, 2000 search of Flores’s cell yielded 
a five-foot long wooden broom handle, a large piece of jagged 
mirror, 
two 
altered 
razors, 
and 
excessive 
linens, 
all 
contraband.  (2) On November 2, 2001, both defendants, along 
with others, were being removed from their cells for visits.  
Defendants managed to slip out of their handcuffs and waist 
chains and stabbed inmate Steve Matson with a homemade 
shank.  (3) On September 2, 2001, Amezcua was outside his 
cell cleaning up the tier entrance.  He assaulted inmate Steve 
Harvey by stabbing him through the bars of his cell.  (4) On 
May 10, 2001, Flores became belligerent and threatened 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
Deputy Cikcel with the words, “You’ll see — maybe not today, 
but you’ll see it when you’re not expecting it.”  (5) An April 30, 
2001 search of Flores’s cell uncovered excessive linen and two 
pieces of metal capable of being fashioned into shanks.  The 
metal pieces were 12 and eight inches long.  (6) A January 29, 
2001 search of Amezcua’s cell revealed a five-and-a-half-inch-
long shank with a cloth handle.  (7) On January 5, 2001, Flores 
initially refused to leave his cell.  After he did so, deputies 
found a tattoo kit, several pieces of carbon paper (commonly 
used in tattooing), loose razor blades, and a pair of orange jail 
pants that had been cut off into shorts.  Subsequent searches of 
defendants’ cells yielded pencils, which defendants were not 
permitted to possess because of their potential use as stabbing 
weapons.  At another hearing on jail security matters, Deputy 
John Kepley testified that on April 20, 2002, Amezcua’s cell 
contained a pencil and a quantity of jail-made alcohol.  Kepley 
testified to six incidents between November 2001 and 
September 2002 in which Flores was either insubordinate and 
noncompliant with jail staff or was found to possess 
contraband or weapons in his cell.   
The trial court did not improperly substitute the bailiffs’ 
discretion for its own determination regarding the necessary 
level of courtroom security.  The court’s comments reflect its 
permissible consideration of the bailiffs’ views, as well as its 
own assessment that the case presented security concerns 
above those present in most cases and its sense that a “show of 
force” was appropriate.  The court did not abdicate its 
authority over courtroom security. 
Defendants argue that because the enumerated incidents 
occurred several years before the start of trial and none 
reflected courtroom misbehavior, they fail to support the 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
court’s ruling.  They point out that the judge described their 
conduct during court proceedings as “very appropriate.”  But it 
is settled law that a defendant’s violent custodial behavior can 
support a court’s exercise of discretion to order extra courtroom 
security.  (See, e.g., People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 
559–562; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 944.)  
Nothing in the record compels an inference that the conditions 
initially giving rise to the need for extra security had abated by 
the time of trial.  (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390–392.)  Finally, during a hearing 
after the court’s November 2, 2002 ruling, Amezcua said in 
court that he wished he had a gun, simulated a gun with his 
hand, pointed his finger at the prosecutor, and made a 
“shooting noise.”  Defendants characterize the incident as 
“mere macho posturing,” but the trial court could properly 
consider the conduct in a less benign light and take it into 
account in approving these security arrangements.   
The cited incidents of violent or nonconforming custodial 
behavior are likewise a particularized showing of manifest 
need for physical restraints.  There was no abuse of discretion 
in the trial court’s shackling order.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 632; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 293, 
fn. 12.) 
Even if defendants could establish an abuse of discretion, 
the record fails to reflect any prejudice, defendants’ generic 
assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.  (See People v. 
Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 746; People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)  The assertions that the jury noticed 
limitations on defendants’ freedom of movement or inferred the 
court viewed defendants as a threat are mere speculation 
unsupported by any affirmative indications in the record.  (See 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 773; People v. Cleveland 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 740.)  Nor do defendants point to 
anything in the record affirmatively suggesting that the 
restraints had any effect on their ability to conduct their 
defense.  “ ‘[W]e have consistently held that courtroom 
shackling, even if error, [is] harmless if there is no evidence 
that the jury saw the restraints, or that the shackles impaired 
or prejudiced the defendant’s right to testify or participate in 
his defense.’ ”  (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 
1259.)  Moreover, the trial court expressed confidence that once 
the trial was under way there would be no problems and the 
need for such a number of deputies would abate.  The record 
does not reveal whether the court’s prediction was borne out, 
but defendants did not renew their objection. 
2. Admission of Autopsy Results  
Defendants were convicted of the first degree murder of 
Arturo Madrigal during a drive-by shooting for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang.  (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(21), 
186.22, subd. (b)(1).)  A deputy medical examiner other than 
the one who performed the autopsy testified as to the results.  
Defendants assert the testimony violated their right of 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 
Madrigal was shot and killed on May 25, 2000.  Two days 
later, Dr. Carrillo performed an autopsy, and wrote a report 
concluding that Madrigal died from a homicidal gunshot.  Dr. 
Carrillo was away from the office during trial because his wife 
had just had a baby.  In his stead the prosecutor called Dr. 
Lisa Scheinin, a medical examiner in the same office.  
Dr. Scheinin 
described 
Dr. 
Carrillo’s 
observations 
and 
conclusions about wounds and the trajectory of the fatal bullet, 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
as recorded in his autopsy report.  The report itself was not 
admitted into evidence.   
Defendants did not object to Dr. Scheinin’s testimony, thus 
failing to preserve the claim in this post-Crawford case.  (See 
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 42 (Crawford).)11  
Defendants establish no ground for relief because admission of 
the testimony, even if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides 
that, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ”  
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 42.)  Crawford held that the 
clause bars introduction of “testimonial” hearsay against a 
defendant unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  (Id. at p. 68; 
see also id. at p. 42.)  Subsequent decisions by the high court 
and this court have sought to clarify what a “testimonial” 
statement is in the context of written reports documenting 
scientific testing.  (See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 
                                        
11  
Defendants contend that the omission was ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
466 U.S. 668, 687 [ineffective assistance entails deficient 
performance resulting in prejudice].)  Not so.  Defendants fail 
to overcome the presumption that the lack of objection was 
sound trial strategy.  (Id. at p. 689.)  The autopsy results were 
unimportant given the other evidence that Madrigal died of a 
gunshot wound to the head, and an objection would only have 
called attention to this routine evidence with little prospect of 
gain, as Dr. Carrillo could well have been made available to 
testify.  In any event, as discussed in the opinion text, 
admission of the autopsy findings resulted in no prejudice. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
557 U.S. 305, 310–311; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 
564 U.S. 647, 664–665; Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50, 
57–58; id. at pp. 103–104 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); People v. 
Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608.)  A comprehensive definition of 
the term “testimonial” awaits articulation.  (Dungo, at pp. 648–
649 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).)   
However, we need not address the question in depth 
because any error here was harmless.  (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  The cause of Madrigal’s death was 
undisputed.  Defendants acknowledged their responsibility in 
pretrial statements.  Flores admitted he “domed” Madrigal and 
shot him in the face.  A responding officer testified he saw 
Madrigal inside the Blazer with blood coming from his ears 
and head.  Photographic evidence corroborated the testimony.  
Extensive evidence demonstrated that Madrigal died as the 
result of a gunshot wound to the head.12  Defendants contend 
the improperly admitted autopsy results supplied necessary 
corroboration, for purposes of the corpus delicti rule,13 of 
                                        
12  
The same reasoning obviates any need to discuss People 
v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, as it may apply here. 
13  
“In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the 
corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself — i.e., the fact of 
injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as 
its cause.  In California, it has traditionally been held, the 
prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively 
upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions 
of the defendant.”  (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 
1168–1169 [holding that the truth in evidence provision of 
Proposition 8 did not eliminate the independent-proof rule 
insofar as it prohibits conviction absent evidence of the crime 
independent of the defendant’s out-of-court statements].)  
“ ‘The independent proof may be by circumstantial evidence 
 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
Flores’s confession that he “domed” Madrigal.  The contention 
lacks merit.  The responding officer’s testimony and the 
photographic evidence provided ample corroboration. 
3. Admission of Statements Made to Deputy District 
Attorney Levine  
On January 7, 2002, the trial court granted defendants’ 
requests to represent themselves.  (See Faretta v. California 
(1975) 422 U.S. 806.)  They continued to represent themselves 
until May 6, 2002, when the court allowed them to revoke their 
Faretta requests.  Both were represented by counsel for the 
remainder of the proceedings.  In February 2002, trial 
prosecutor Darren Levine met with defendants, at their 
request, to provide discovery.  In an unrecorded conversation, 
defendants made spontaneous statements about the charged 
crimes and other offenses.  Levine and a law enforcement 
officer met with them again on February 21, 2002.  A third 
meeting took place on March 28, 2002, with investigator 
Thomas Kerfoot in attendance.  Levine surreptitiously 
recorded the February 21 and March 28 conversations.  In the 
interval between the two conversations, a preliminary hearing 
was held in connection with the Santa Monica pier charges.  
Following an expanded investigation, Levine convened a grand 
jury.  It indicted defendants for the murders of John Diaz and 
Arturo Madrigal and the attempted murders of Paul Gonzales 
                                                                                                           
 
[citation], and it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt.  A 
slight or prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable 
inference 
that 
a 
crime 
was 
committed, 
is 
sufficient.  
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]  It is not necessary for the independent 
evidence to establish that the defendant was the perpetrator.”  
(People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 404.) 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
and Fernando Gutierrez, with numerous weapons, gang, and 
special circumstance allegations.  The indictments were later 
folded into the amended information on which the case went to 
trial.  The trial court denied defense motions to exclude 
redacted recordings of the statements.  Defendants were 
convicted of the offenses against Diaz, Madrigal, and 
Gutierrez. 
Defendants contend that the statements should have been 
excluded under Penal Code section 1192.4 and Evidence Code 
section 1153 because they were part of settlement negotiations.  
Their suppression motion below did not assert this ground.  
Instead the defense relied on three other grounds not renewed 
here.  Their appellate claim is thus forfeited.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 353, subd. (a).)  It also lacks merit.14  
Evidence Code section 1153 provides that “[e]vidence of a 
plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or of an offer to plead guilty to 
the crime charged or to any other crime, made by the 
defendant in a criminal action is inadmissible in any action or 
                                        
14  
Defendants 
contend 
that 
because 
they 
were 
“unrepresented” during the conversations, prosecutor Levine 
should be held to a “higher standard,” and should have advised 
defendants of the exclusionary rule regarding statements made 
in the context of settlement negotiations.  Under this “higher 
standard” defendants should not be held to have forfeited 
review.  Setting aside the questionable assumption that a 
prosecutor has an obligation to provide legal advice to 
defendants who have exercised their Faretta rights, the 
contention is unavailing; defendants had given up their pro per 
status more than a year before their appointed counsel moved 
to suppress the February 21 and March 28 statements.  We 
review the claim based on the actions and decisions by counsel 
in pursuing their objections.     
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
in any proceeding of any nature, including proceedings before 
agencies, commissions, boards, and tribunals.”  Penal Code 
section 1192.4 provides that “[i]f the defendant’s plea of guilty 
pursuant to Section 1192.1 [plea of guilty specifying degree of 
crime] or 1192.2 [plea before committing magistrate] is not 
accepted by the prosecuting attorney and approved by the 
court, the plea shall be deemed withdrawn and the defendant 
may then enter such plea or pleas as would otherwise have 
been available.  The plea so withdrawn may not be received in 
evidence in any criminal, civil, or special action or proceeding 
of 
any 
nature, 
including 
proceedings 
before 
agencies, 
commissions, boards, and tribunals.”  In the enactment of 
these sections the Legislature extended the earlier rule from 
civil cases to prohibit evidence of offers to compromise.  (People 
v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 156; see former Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2078.)  At least one case has extended the exclusionary rule 
to admissions made in the course of plea negotiations.  (People 
v. Tanner (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 345, 349–351.)   
We assume without deciding that the rule extends to mere 
admissions made during plea negotiations, as opposed to 
withdrawn pleas or offers to plead.  Even so, defendants’ 
statements do not fall under section 1192.4 because they were 
not made in the course of any plea negotiations.  Settlement of 
the case was never on the table.  Defendants were seeking to 
take credit for several uncharged murders and other crimes 
they had committed so that they could be tried, convicted, and 
sent to death row.  They asked only that the prosecutor exert 
efforts to see they received the minimum restitution fine.  They 
did not condition their admissions on any such agreement. 
It is true, as defendants observe, that the subject of a non-
life sentence arose during the February 21 conversation.  After 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
discussing 
discovery 
and 
the 
upcoming 
preliminary 
examination, Flores alluded to an offense (the Diaz killing) 
that law enforcement evidently had not yet tied to defendants.  
Prosecutor Levine asked defendants, “Why do you want me to 
make all these murders on you?  I don’t get it.”  Flores replied, 
“Because I enjoy staying here . . . .”  Levine went on jocularly:  
“You don’t have a thing for me or anything?”  Flores responded, 
“Nah, nah, we just — we think you’re cool, you know.  And 
then after the trial we’ll give you another one.”  Levine asked, 
“You can give me another murder that you did?”  Flores 
replied, “Another one.”  Levine asked why.  Flores answered, 
“Why not?”  Evidently testing their sincerity, Levine reminded 
defendants of an earlier conversation:  “When you came to me 
— remember last time you said to me ‘give me — give me the 
50 years.’  [¶]  . . . [¶]  And without the ‘L [a life sentence].’  
[¶]  . . .  [¶]  I don’t think you want the death penalty.  You said 
that.”  Flores answered, “I’m gonna help.  If you give me 50 
years without the ‘L,’ I can get married and get a bone yard 
visit.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  But if you give me the ‘L,’ I have no sex.”  
Levine said he understood the point, but firmly rejected any 
suggestion he might be open to seeking a noncapital sentence:  
“[N]othing personal . . . but . . . if there’s a death penalty, this 
is the case that — that warrants it.”   
After Levine’s assurance that he would pursue a death 
sentence, defendants continued to make statements.  They 
shifted to diverse topics, mentioning their other criminal 
activities and philosophy, and a recipe for pruno [jail-made 
alcohol].  Eventually, Amezcua said, “Okay if we talk about 
these murders, right, that we did,” and “Can we talk about 
restitution?”  Flores said, “See, that’s what we wanna do.  
Okay, we’re gonna get a lot of restitution.  We’ll give you a 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
murder if [you] drop our restitution, so it’ll only be 200 instead 
of a whole (unintelligible) of restitution, which we’ll never be 
able to pay.”  Defendants explained to Levine that death row 
inmates have restitution deducted from their books [money 
that can be spent in prison].  Flores commented, “Our thing is 
this, see, if we buy a TV, we’re gonna have to pay restitution.”  
He elaborated:  “So, now I’m going to death row, something 
different, something new, right?  And I don’t wanna have a lot 
of restitution because when I buy a TV, they’re gonna make me 
pay to the victims in (unintelligible) or right up front.”   
After further discussion of defendants’ criminal activities, 
Flores again urged a $200 restitution fine.  He said they had 
now admitted three murders and could reveal two more.  
Levine 
asked, 
“[W]hy 
are 
you 
giving 
it 
to 
me? 
[¶]  . . . [¶]  And . . . that doesn’t bother you that I’m gonna use 
that against you[?]”  Amezcua replied, “We know that already.”  
Flores said, “We don’t care.  The whole thing is, we want death, 
right?”   
During the March 28 conversation, Levine observed that 
“a number of times in court you guys have said that you 
wanted us to come talk to you about some cases and maybe 
work out something, either with regard to, uh, restitution issue 
. . . .”  Amezcua and Flores agreed.  Both defendants confirmed 
they understood that “all this stuff” discussed during their 
conversations could be used against them; that they could have 
an appointed lawyer present; and that they did not have to 
speak with Levine.  They agreed that Levine and Kerfoot were 
present at their request and that they wanted to speak with 
them.  Flores’s only expressed concerns were that the record be 
clear that each defendant incriminated himself alone and that 
the prosecution would not “go after” Barber or Flores’s mother.  
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
The conversation turned to a crime committed in Redlands, 
and Flores raised the possibility that defendants would admit 
to two more murders.  Amezcua asked, “So how much of a 
guarantee can we have on the restitution though?”  Levine told 
defendants the decision would be up to the judge, but he would 
use his best efforts to persuade the judge to order $200 in 
restitution fines.  Defendants raised the fate of Katrina 
Barber.  Levine said he would push for a state prison sentence 
that would allow her to be released immediately based on time 
already served.  Defendants then described the Diaz and 
Madrigal murders as well as their attempts to kill Gutierrez 
and Gonzales.   
The February 21 and March 28 conversations never 
involved a potential plea to any of the offenses or allegations 
ultimately charged in this case.  Defendants’ argument to the 
contrary relies on the reference to their earlier exploration of a 
50-year non-life sentence.  Levine promptly rejected that 
option and defendants never again alluded to it.  Nonetheless 
they continued to disclose information about other offenses.  
Defendants contend that because they were seeking resolution 
of “aspects” of the case, specifically restitution, this court 
should read Evidence Code section 1153 and section 1192.4 
broadly and accord them the benefit of the exclusionary rule.  
We decline the invitation.  Defendants would not plead to a 
death sentence and the prosecutor would offer nothing less.  
The public policy embodied in section 1192.4 and Evidence 
Code section 1153, which favors “the settlement of criminal 
cases without the necessity of a trial” (People v. Wilson, supra, 
60 Cal.2d at p. 156), would not have been furthered by 
exclusion of statements made here.  Their admission was not 
improper.  At no point in any of the conversations did either 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
defendant actually make, or engage in negotiations that would 
have led to their making, “an offer to plead guilty to the crime 
charged or to any other crime,” as provided in Evidence Code 
section 1153.  (Italics added.)  Their revelations of guilt for 
other, uncharged crimes to reduce their obligations to pay 
restitution and maximize their in-prison spending ability do 
not bring them within the statute. 
4. CALJIC No. 3.00  
Defendants contend the trial court erred in giving the jury 
former CALJIC No. 3.00, which told them that each principal 
involved in the commission of the crime, whether as a direct 
perpetrator or an aider and abettor, is “equally guilty” of the 
offense.  Neither Amezcua nor Flores objected or requested any 
modification of the standard language.  Nonetheless, section 
1259 allows us to reach the merits of any claim of instructional 
error that potentially affects a party’s substantial rights.  
(People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 639.)  Defendants 
each assert error as to different convictions. 
Amezcua raises the CALJIC No. 3.00 issue in connection 
with his conviction as an aider and abettor in the Diaz and 
Madrigal murders and the attempted murder of Fernando 
Gutierrez during the Madrigal killing.  As noted, Flores was 
the actual killer in those instances.  Diaz was killed by nine-
millimeter gunfire while riding on the handlebars of a bicycle 
pedaled by Paul Gonzales.  Gonzales identified Flores as the 
shooting passenger in a black SUV that made two U-turns to 
drive past the bike.  He did not identify the driver.  The 
prosecution introduced Flores’s extrajudicial admission that 
while being driven by Amezcua, Flores fired five shots from a 
nine-millimeter weapon, killing a man riding on bicycle 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
handlebars.  Hearing this admission, Amezcua laughed and 
said to the prosecutor, “Catch me?”  The prosecution also 
introduced admissions of Flores that he was the shooter and 
Amezcua the driver of a “four-runner” when Flores shot a man 
in the mouth.   
As to the Madrigal killing, evidence showed the victim was 
parking his Chevrolet Blazer when a car stopped alongside and 
someone yelled, “Where you from?”  Madrigal’s passenger, 
Gutierrez, said, “We’re not from nowhere.”  Gutierrez told 
police there were four Hispanic men with shaved heads in the 
car and the passenger shot Madrigal.  The fatal bullet was a 
nine-millimeter.  During discussions with the prosecutor, 
defendants spoke of a shooting involving a Blazer.  Flores said 
he shot the driver in the face and neck, and that the passenger 
ran.  Amezcua agreed.  Asked the reason for the shooting, 
Amezcua said, “He was a gang member, man,” and described 
the act as “a vandal type of thing.  You’re driving around your 
neighborhood looking for people to kill.”   
Flores raises the CALJIC No. 3.00 issue in connection with 
his conviction of the George Flores and Reyes murders, in 
which Amezcua was the actual killer.  Briefly, the 
prosecution’s evidence at trial showed that defendant Flores 
was riding in a stolen Toyota driven by Katrina Barber.  
Defendant Amezcua rode in a Monte Carlo driven by fellow 
ESBP member Luis Reyes.  The cars passed a Ledford Street 
residence where George Flores and several friends were 
socializing outside.  The Toyota and Monte Carlo turned 
around and came toward the home.  Amezcua got out of the 
Monte Carlo, exchanged words with George Flores, and pointed 
a gun at him.  Shots were fired; Flores was killed; and Joe 
Mayorquin was wounded.  The two cars drove off.  Because the 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
Toyota was experiencing engine trouble, Barber pulled off the 
freeway and saw Amezcua shoot Reyes.  Flores asked 
Amezcua, “What are you doing that here for?”  The men 
partially dragged Reyes from the Monte Carlo.  Even though 
his right leg remained in the car, Flores told Barber to drive 
away and “[j]ust run [Reyes] over.”   
Defendants correctly observe that, contrary to a possible 
implication of former CALJIC No. 3.00, an actual killer and an 
aider/abettor are not always guilty of the same offense.  
Rather, in a homicide prosecution not involving felony murder 
or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the 
aider/abettor’s guilt is based on the combined acts of all the 
principals and on the aider/abettor’s own knowledge and 
intent.  Consequently, in some circumstances an aider/abettor 
may be culpable for a greater or lesser crime than the actual 
killer.  (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120.)  People 
v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th 335 
recognized that the standard instruction “generally stated a 
correct rule of law,” in that “[a]ll principals, including aiders 
and abettors, are ‘equally guilty’ in the sense that they are all 
criminally liable.”  (Id. at p. 433.)  However, former CALJIC 
No. 3.00 “could be misleading if the principals in a particular 
case might be guilty of different crimes and the jury interprets 
the instruction to preclude such a finding.”  (Ibid.)   
Here the prosecution sought to prove murder under 
theories of premeditation, lying in wait, and drive-by shooting.  
Defendants contend that as to each theory, the evidence did 
not clearly show that the aider/abettor shared the direct 
perpetrator’s mens rea.  Consequently, the unmodified CALJIC 
No. 3.00 could potentially have misled the jury into convicting 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
the aider/abettor without making the requisite factual 
findings.  The contention is unpersuasive. 
Because the circumstances of this case reflected the 
defendants’ joint participation in the offenses at issue with the 
required intent to kill, the trial court did not err in giving the 
jury the unmodified CALJIC No. 3.00.  Neither the evidence 
nor any theory of defense argued at trial or cited in the briefs 
suggested that Amezcua and Flores entertained different 
states of mind rendering them guilty of different crimes.  In 
relevant portions of statements to the prosecutor, both 
defendants admitted to the Diaz and Madrigal killings.  Flores 
explained that the motivation for those offenses was 
“territorial” and that, by committing them, they were trying to 
instill fear in other gangs.  The attempted murder of Fernando 
Gutierrez in the same incident as the Madrigal killing is 
indistinguishable in the relevant respect.  The Mayorquin and 
George Flores murders fit a similar pattern of a shooting done 
for gang-related purposes and can be analyzed similarly for 
purposes of the current claim of error.  The Luis Reyes murder 
was factually a bit different.  Reyes was a fellow member of 
ESBP, defendants’ own gang.  Flores did ask Amezcua “[w]hat 
are you doing that here for?”  But almost immediately 
thereafter Flores urged Katrina Barber to “run [Reyes] over” 
with the Monte Carlo, evidencing his own intent to kill Reyes.  
Reyes was still alive when defendants left the scene.  The 
evidence thus amply supported an inference that defendants 
shared the same intent with respect to each of the charges, and 
for that reason no modification of the instruction was 
warranted. 
Other instructions, moreover, reinforced the requirement 
that the jury find the intent-to-kill element proven in order to 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
convict of murder or attempted murder on a theory of aiding 
and abetting.  CALJIC No. 3.01, as given in this case, provided 
that “[a] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when 
he or she:  [¶]  (1) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of 
the perpetrator, and [¶]  (2) with the intent or purpose of 
committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of 
the crime, and [¶]  (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, 
encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”  The 
requirement that the aider/abettor know of the perpetrator’s 
unlawful purpose, intend to facilitate that purpose, and do an 
act that assists or facilitates the purpose, sufficiently explained 
the required mens rea.  CALJIC No. 17.00, also given here, 
requires the jury to decide each defendant’s guilt separately.   
5. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Inviting Jury to View 
the Case through the Victims’ Eyes  
Defendants contend prosecutorial misconduct deprived 
them of due process and a fair trial.  They assert that the 
prosecutor made an improper appeal to jurors’ sympathy for 
the victims during guilt phase closing argument.  The 
prosecutor 
expressed 
concern 
that 
jurors 
would 
find 
themselves benumbed by the evidence of so many murders, 
arguing:  “My concern, and I will just tell you right now here 
my concern is okay, you see one murder.  You look at that, 
wow.  You see two murders, wow.  [¶]  Three, wow.  [¶]  Four, 
then the fifth murder you see and you start to think, wow, 
people really do this.  This isn’t a movie.  This is not a movie.  
This is not a television show, but what worries me is over time, 
you can get what?  More pictures you look at it, the more you 
can get numb to it.”  The prosecutor reminded the jurors to 
“remember what justice is.”  He continued:  “Remember what it 
must have been like to be one of their victims being shot and 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
choking and trying to get your last breath out while your blood 
is gurgling in your lungs.  What it must be like to be one of 
those people.”  Turning to Amezcua’s actions on the Santa 
Monica Pier, specifically the assault on Jing Huali, the 
prosecutor said:  “What do we know?  Jing Huali, while she 
was laying down, the defendant shot her.  An assault with a 
firearm.  I point a loaded gun at your head, the assault is 
complete.  That’s it; it’s done.  You do not have to fire.  [¶]  I 
put my left arm around and I put a gun to your head, a loaded 
gun, completed, done, proven.  I bet you would feel assaulted if 
someone had a loaded gun pointed at your head.  [¶]  She was 
shot.”   
Preliminarily, 
defendants 
failed 
to 
object 
to 
the 
prosecutor’s remarks and did not request a jury admonition.  
Consequently, they forfeited their misconduct claims.  (People 
v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 863.)  Defendants seek excusal 
of forfeiture on the ground that an admonition would not have 
cured the harm.  In the alternative, they contend trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to make a timely 
objection. 
Were this court to reach the merits of the claim, it would 
appear the argument crossed the line of impropriety.  “The 
standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled.  
‘A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to 
persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions 
require reversal under the federal Constitution when they 
infect the trial with such “ ‘unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.’ ”  [Citations.]  Under state 
law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct 
even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally 
unfair trial.’ ” (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.)  
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
Although a prosecutor may vigorously argue the case, appeals 
to sympathy for the victim during an objective determination 
of guilt fall outside the bounds of vigorous argument.  (People 
v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 441; People v. Stansbury 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057; People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 
329, 362–363.)  Here, as in Stansbury and Fields, by inviting 
jurors to view the crime through the victims’ eyes, the 
prosecutor made an improper appeal to emotion and sympathy.   
The remarks here constituted but a brief part of the 
argument, however, and the evidence of defendants’ guilt, 
including 
their 
own 
admissions, 
was 
overwhelming.  
Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability the impropriety 
affected the guilt verdicts.  (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at pp. 441–442; People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
at p. 1057.)  Based on that want of prejudice, defendants’ claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the 
remarks lacks merit.  Nor, contrary to Flores’s claim, did the 
remarks prejudice defendants at the penalty phase, where 
“ ‘considerable leeway is given for emotional appeal so long as 
it relates to relevant considerations.’ ”  (People v. Sanders 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 551.)  The terror defendants inflicted on 
victims and their callousness in doing so are legitimate factors 
for consideration. 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Trial Court’s Acquiescence in Defendants’ Refusal 
To Allow Their Counsel To Present Penalty Phase 
Defense  
The day before closing guilt phase arguments, defendants 
and their four counsel asked to meet with the court in camera.  
A transcript of the closed hearing covers 24 pages.  Counsel 
told the court that each client had informed them repeatedly 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
and emphatically that they did not want any defense presented 
should there be a penalty phase.  We summarize that hearing 
in some detail. 
 Counsel for Amezcua reported that “throughout my 
representation,” his client instructed that he did not want his 
family called as witnesses.  He “has expanded that now . . . he 
does not wish me to put on any defense, any witness in the 
course of the penalty phase.”  Amezcua agreed that counsel 
could prepare for the penalty phase, which he did.  Counsel 
explained the “nature of the penalty presentation” and told his 
client that any chance for a life sentence would be “diminished 
if not completely eliminated by the failure to present any 
mitigating evidence.”  Amezcua told his lawyer that he 
understood, and his counsel believed he did so.  Counsel asked 
to bring the matter to the court’s attention, give the court a 
chance to inquire, and “give Mr. Amezcua an opportunity to 
refute anything I am saying.”  
 The court asked if it should discuss the situation with 
each defendant separately.  Counsel related both defendants 
and their lawyers had discussed the question together in the 
last day or two and that both defendants wished to confer with 
the court together.  
 Counsel for Flores reported that his client had the same 
intention.  Counsel had reviewed the penalty-phase evidence 
he had prepared and had “explained it all to him.”  “I have told 
him we have a much better chance of avoiding the death 
penalty” by presenting mitigating evidence.  Counsel had three 
family members and three experts prepared to set out nine 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
points in mitigation.15  After that explanation, Flores had said, 
“ ‘No, I don’t want that.  I don’t want my parents involved.  I 
want no witnesses on my behalf.  Period.’ ”  
 The court asked Amezcua’s counsel to summarize the 
mitigating evidence he was prepared to introduce.  Counsel 
replied his presentation would be “somewhat along the same 
lines.”  He had seven to 10 family members available to testify, 
along with a psychologist and a social historian.  He would 
offer a three-hour tape recording of the hostage negotiations 
which would reveal a different and “much softer side” of 
Amezcua. 
 The court explained to both defendants that it wanted “to 
make sure that it is very clear as to what [each] defendant 
wants” and said it would ask both of them “what it is you 
really want here.”  “It’s also important for me to establish that 
your decision is knowing and voluntarily made.”  
 It went on to explain, “I am also charged with the 
responsibility of trying to persuade one or both of you to 
change your mind, to encourage you to consult further with 
your attorney before making any final decision.”  The court told 
defendants that “a decision not to put on mitigating evidence 
could result in a verdict of death” and would “not be a basis for 
a reversal of that verdict.”  The judge was going to talk first 
with defendants together, and then separately, “just to make 
                                        
15  
Testimony would address parental criminality, drug 
abuse, rejection, and neglect; family instability and poverty; 
Flores’s exposure to domestic abuse; and his asserted learning 
disabilities and head injuries.  An expert would also describe 
conditions of incarceration.   
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
sure that one is not influencing the other.”  The court heard 
from Flores first. 
 Flores repeated that he understood the jury might decide 
a death sentence was too harsh for him, “but I refuse to allow 
my attorneys to attempt to sway their opinion.”  The court 
asked why.  Flores replied:  “I do not want my attorneys to . . . 
put my family and friends or whoever on there and make it — 
blame them for something I may have done.”  “I did it without 
them.  In my mind I stand alone. . . .”  “[I] am very adamant 
about it — will not allow anybody, nobody to get them on the 
stand.”  Asked when he made this decision, Flores replied, 
“2000, Fourth of July,” the day, five years earlier, when he had 
been arrested.  When the court observed, “You’ve been 
thinking about it for quite a while,” Flores confirmed, “Yes.” 
 Turning to Amezcua, the court asked: “Tell me in your 
own words what it is you are thinking.”  Amezcua replied: “I 
don’t want nobody up there crying on my behalf, when I didn’t 
think about them when I was out there. . . . I care about them 
but that’s my own personal thing.”  Told by the court that he 
“might very well get the death penalty,” Amezcua replied:  “I 
fully understand; right?”  “Mr. Perlo and Mr. Miller [his 
counsel] have a done a great job in defending me. . . .  [¶]  I 
talked to them and his investigators, whoever, right?  And, to 
tell you the truth, I feel bad for not letting him do his job to the 
extent I hog-tied him the whole way. . . .  If he would have done 
that, I would have gone pro per.”  
 Returning to defendant Flores, the court asked if he had 
any questions about what mitigating evidence was available.  
It reminded him that “your counsel have worked hard and 
have developed evidence they would like to present.  You 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
51 
understand that?”  Flores responded: “Oh, yeah,” and added, 
“[T]hey did a great job in that.”  
 The court told Amezcua:  “You understand that your 
counsel have put together some information, a lot of 
information.”  He replied:  “I just want really to absolve him 
from any lack of effort on his behalf. . . . It’s been my choice 
from way before, I mean, I ever got arrested.  I understood my 
actions would get me to this point in life way before I ever got 
arrested.” 
 The court asked both defendants if they had heard of the 
phrase “suicide by cop,” and each confirmed he had.  The court 
said, “[M]y fear is that’s kind of what you guys are doing here.”  
Flores rejected the notion:  “I understand your feeling.  I 
understand what you are saying. . . .  But my thing is I feel if I 
do get death, more than likely I will die on death row by 
natural causes of old age. . . . I mean there is 640 people before 
me — actually 639 because one just got a reversal.”  
 Asked if he intended “suicide by cop,” Amezcua 
responded, “No, because I will tell you the reason why it’s not.  
Because the day that I got arrested I had three choices:  Either 
take my own life, get arrested, or either let them do it 
themselves.  And I knew by me taking my life was a coward 
way out.”  He wanted to give his family “an opportunity to say 
good-bye to me and I say good-bye to them, also, and let them 
understand that it’s not their fault, because they blame 
themselves.”  
 Flores elaborated:  “I don’t want to die.  If I want to die 
where I’m at, I’d kill myself. . . .  But my thing is if I do go to 
death row, I am going to get a way better appeal action. . . .  
And if I go to death row, I believe there’s some technicalities in 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
52 
my case that maybe one day with [a lawyer’s] assistance with 
little words or something, that they will get me back out, and I 
may be old, but I believe I will be back in a level four one.”16   
 The court asked if their decision was based on concerns 
for their safety in prison.  Amezcua said: “Never been.”  Flores: 
“No, never.”  The court then said: “And you both understand 
that if you get a death verdict, you know that this is not going 
to be a grounds for reversal.”  Flores responded they were 
“giving that piece only up,” but that all other grounds for 
appeal were open.  The court reminded them that they had the 
right to testify and ask the jury to impose a death sentence.  It 
clarified that it was not encouraging them to do so and would, 
in fact, discourage it.  It did want to make sure they were 
aware of their right to testify, “just like you have the right to 
testify in the guilt phase.”   
 The court ended the discussion by saying:  “The main 
thing is to say this:  You are in control of the evidence that is 
offered at a penalty phase; okay?  [¶]  You seem to know that 
already, but that is the law.  And even though [defense 
counsel] have prepared and want to put on the mitigating 
evidence and they want to argue to the jury that you should 
not get the death penalty, you are the controlling person and 
you can say ‘no, I don’t want you to put that evidence on.’ ” 
 The court began the separate conversations with Flores 
and his counsel.  It noted that the prosecutor had said Flores 
could have been a lawyer and the court said it had been 
impressed with his intelligence.  It complimented him on his 
                                        
16  
Level four refers to the inmate classification housing 
system, a level at which Flores had been held before. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
53 
affection for reading and mentioned two books by a defense 
lawyer describing his courtroom work.  It reminded him that, 
even if he were incarcerated for life he could help other 
inmates and do other worthwhile things in prison.  It urged 
Flores to think more about his decision while the jury was 
deliberating on guilt.  It reminded him that the presentation of 
mitigating evidence might make a big difference.  The court 
asked Flores whether he had any questions. 
 Flores said he understood the court was fulfilling its 
obligation to make sure the choice he was making was his own 
and was made knowingly.  Flores assured the court:  “I am 
fully aware that this is the decision I am making, and I am at 
ease with the decision, and I know my family members 
disagree with it and I’ve asked them not to come [to court] 
several, several times. . . . I’d rather keep this part of my life 
separate.”  Flores told the court he would “take what you said 
in consideration.” 
 The court then met with defendant Amezcua and his 
defense team.  It explained it knew Flores and Amezcua were 
friends but wanted to make sure this decision “is your decision 
and that you are not letting anybody influence you, including 
Mr. Flores.”  It urged Amezcua that the court “would really like 
you to think about this.”  It reminded him that that there is 
always a potential to do good things but that a death sentence 
would be more limiting than a sentence of life.  It added:  “I 
don’t want you to make a decision . . . that you’ll regret.” 
 Amezcua told the court, “I thought about it for five 
years. . . . And I allowed Mr. Perlo to do his extensive research 
on my past.”  He assured the court it need not be concerned.  
The court reminded him that he would have additional time 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
54 
during guilt deliberations to reconsider his choice.  Amezcua 
replied:  “I could have saved you the time and trouble down the 
road.  I am not going to sway from my decision.” 
 The next morning the court met with all defense counsel 
and both defendants.  It asked Flores and Amezcua if they had 
had a chance to think about the previous day’s discussion and 
whether either had changed his mind.  Each defendant 
confirmed he had thought about the question and his mind was 
unchanged.  Both defendants confirmed they wanted no 
mitigating evidence presented, no prosecution witness cross-
examined, and no argument made on their behalf.  Amezcua 
offered to put his wishes in writing, but the court replied that 
the written transcript would serve that purpose.  The court 
went on to discuss the case of People v. Sanders (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 471, wherein the defendant had made a similar choice.  
It again asked each defendant if it was his choice to have no 
defense evidence or argument presented and no cross-
examination of the People’s witnesses.  Again, each stated that 
he had so chosen.  All four counsel told the court they agreed 
that those decisions reflected their client’s sincere belief. 
 The court read excerpts from the Sanders opinion and 
explained again that, based on that precedent, counsel on 
appeal could not argue it was error for the defense not to 
argue, present evidence, or cross-examine.  Flores responded: 
“I am fully aware I am giving up our appeal action.”  Asked if 
he had any questions about what was being said, Amezcua 
replied, “None.”  After further colloquy, the court accepted the 
statements of the defendants and their counsel.  The penalty 
phase proceeded according to defendants’ directives.  When 
counsel requested certain penalty phase instructions, each 
defendant objected.  The instructions were not given. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
55 
Amezcua and Flores rely on the principle that when a 
defendant elects to be represented by counsel, he has no right 
to control the attorney’s strategic and tactical decisions 
regarding the defense, including requests for jury instructions.  
(People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1163, 1164, fn. 14.)  
In their view, the court’s permitting them to override their 
attorneys’ efforts to present a penalty defense, including the 
selection of jury instructions, denied them their rights to 
counsel and a reliable penalty determination.  They also assert 
that the state’s independent interest in fair, accurate, and 
reliable penalty verdicts was violated.  They acknowledge that 
decisions such as People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218–
1228 (Bloom), People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1030 
(Lang), People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 526–527 
(Sanders), and People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 717 
(Deere), denied relief on claims arising from the failure to 
present a penalty defense at trial.  They distinguish those 
cases as involving either self-represented defendants or 
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim they are 
not raising here.  To the extent those decisions are inconsistent 
with the position they assert here, they ask this court to 
reconsider them. 
Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive.  Thirty years of 
precedent, beginning with Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, has 
consistently held, among the core of fundamental questions 
over which a represented defendant retains control is the 
decision whether or not to present a defense at the penalty 
phase of a capital trial, and the choice not to do so is not a 
denial of the right to counsel or a reliable penalty 
determination.  (See People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 119–
121; Deere, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 717; Sanders, supra, 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
56 
51 Cal.3d at pp. 526–527; Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1030; 
Bloom, at p. 1228.)  “ ‘[T]he required reliability is attained 
when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof at the 
guilt and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence and 
within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute, 
the death verdict has been returned under proper instructions 
and procedures, and the trier of penalty has duly considered 
the relevant mitigating evidence, if any, which the defendant 
has chosen to present.  A judgment of death entered in 
conformity with these rigorous standards does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment reliability requirements.’ ”  (Sanders, at p. 
526, fn. omitted.)  Nor is a defendant deprived of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by virtue of counsel’s acquiescence 
in the defendant’s own decision that no defense shall be 
presented on his behalf.  That decision is the defendant’s to 
make.  (Lang, at pp. 1030–1031.)  Despite the general rule that 
counsel is responsible for the selection of jury instructions, the 
requested instructions were properly refused in the face of 
defendants’ objection.  As the court implicitly recognized, the 
only reason for requesting them would be to seek a sentence of 
life without parole rather than death, the very decision the law 
commits to the defendant personally. 
McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1500, 
further supports our conclusion.  There the high court 
distinguished between the different purviews of counsel and 
client.  Trial management is controlled by counsel.  It 
encompasses such functions as determining “ ‘what arguments 
to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what 
agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.’ ”  
(Id. at p. ___ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  Choice of the defense 
objective is the client’s prerogative.  (Ibid.)  Defendants claim 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
57 
that the decision to present certain mitigating evidence or 
request particular jury instructions are aspects of trial 
management.  As such they are controlled by counsel even 
after defendants made clear their desire to present no penalty 
phase defense.  They are incorrect.  To accept their argument 
would be to read out of existence the allocation of 
responsibilities the high court recognized in McCoy.   
The record clearly demonstrates defendants’ objective in 
this case.  The court engaged in extensive and careful colloquy 
with defendants and their counsel to ensure that each 
defendant understood the stakes involved in pursuing his 
choice.  It ensured each defendant had the benefit of the court’s 
own counsel, as well as that of his lawyers.  It confirmed that 
both defense teams had prepared a case in mitigation and were 
ready to present it.  It gave each defendant several 
opportunities to ask questions and to explain his choice in his 
own words.  It expressed its own concerns for each defendant 
as an individual and for the preservation of each man’s 
procedural safeguards. The court interacted with each 
defendant directly and with courtesy.  It took the same kind of 
care that is required when ensuring that the waiver of any 
substantial right is personally and properly made.  It explicitly 
found that each defendant had made his own choice knowingly 
and voluntarily.  The procedure employed here satisfied the 
state’s interest in assuring the fairness and accuracy of the 
death judgments consistently with McCoy.   
2. Instruction that Death Is a Greater Punishment 
than Life Imprisonment without the Possibility of 
Parole 
During voir dire, the trial court instructed prospective 
jurors that death is a greater punishment than life 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
58 
imprisonment without parole:  “The law says life without 
parole is a lesser sentence.  It’s less serious than death.  Many 
of you said [in questionnaire responses], My God, I’d rather be 
dead than spend my life in prison.  I’m telling you, the law that 
you have sworn to follow says, No, you cannot consider that.  
That may be your personal feeling.  But you must agree to 
follow the law and the law says life without parole is a lesser 
punishment to death.”  Counsel for both defendants objected, 
arguing that the law allows a jury to return a verdict of life 
without parole even if factors in aggravation substantially 
outweigh those in mitigation.  Thus, they asserted the law does 
not establish that death is the more serious punishment.  
Defense counsel also asserted that the instruction tended to 
constrain jurors’ decisionmaking by implying that they may 
not return a verdict of life without parole because it is less 
serious than a death verdict.  The court said it found the 
question interesting and would look into it.  Later during jury 
selection, when a prospective juror expressed the view that 
death was “the easy way out,” the court repeated that life 
without parole is the lesser punishment, and the defense again 
objected.  The court overruled the objection, stating it had 
found no law on the point, but the standard jury instructions, 
providing that only if the evidence in aggravation substantially 
outweighs that in mitigation may the jury return a death 
verdict, represented the state of the law.   
Acknowledging that several of this court’s decisions 
support the trial judge’s ruling (see, e.g., People v. Tate (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 635, 707; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 
361), defendants renew their claim of error.  They urge that 
the ranking of the death penalty as more severe than life 
imprisonment without parole is arbitrary and violates the 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
59 
Eighth Amendment.  The authorities to which they point do 
not assist them.  They point to United States Supreme Court 
decisions recognizing a condemned prisoner’s autonomy 
interest in forgoing appellate relief from a death sentence (e.g., 
Gilmore v. Utah (1976) 429 U.S. 1012, 1016–1017); to various 
state laws recognizing a terminally ill person’s right to 
physician-assisted suicide (e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 et seq.; 
Tex. Health & Saf. Code § 166.046(e); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
70.245.010 et seq.), and to the asserted existence of conditions 
in California prisons to argue that a rational person might 
prefer death to continued incarceration (see, e.g., Brown v. 
Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 503–504).  Obviously those cases are 
factually distinguishable.  The state’s policy of exacting the 
ultimate penalty for only the most aggravated crimes is a 
moral 
and 
normative 
choice 
independent 
of, 
and 
distinguishable from, the individual preferences of either 
persons potentially subject to the penalty or those who are 
called upon to impose it.  
D. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law  
Defendants contend that many features of California’s 
capital sentencing scheme, alone or in combination with each 
other, violate the federal Constitution.  They acknowledge that 
this court has rejected similar claims but assert that we have 
never considered the cumulative impact of the purported 
defects or addressed the functioning of the system as a whole.  
In their view, the asserted broad applicability of the death 
penalty, in the context of a statute lacking certain procedural 
safeguards, results in an unacceptable risk of constitutionally 
unreliable death judgments. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
60 
In People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, we considered 
and rejected a similar argument.  “Even considering the 
arguments in combination, and viewing the death penalty law 
as a whole, it is not constitutionally defective.  Defendant’s 
challenges to California’s death penalty scheme ‘are no more 
persuasive when considered together,’ than when considered 
separately.”  (Id. at p. 426.)  We reach the same conclusion 
here.   
Regarding defendants’ specific challenges, we adhere to 
views previously expressed.  Thus: 
The special circumstances set forth in section 190.2 
adequately narrow the class of murderers subject to the death 
penalty.  (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 365.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a), does not permit the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (People v. Virgil 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1288.) 
The death penalty law is not unconstitutional because it 
does not require unanimous jury findings, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that particular aggravating factors (other than prior 
criminality) exist or that jurors all agree on which aggravating 
circumstances outweigh those in mitigation.  (People v. Salazar 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 255.)  Nor is it the case that “ ‘the cruel 
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, [or] 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires 
that jurors in a capital case be instructed that they must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances 
exist or that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances or that death is the appropriate penalty.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  “ ‘The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny, 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
61 
do not establish a Sixth Amendment right to determination of 
particular aggravating factors, or a finding that aggravation 
outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
unanimous jury.’  [Citation.]  Likewise, ‘neither the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a 
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating 
circumstances 
exist 
or 
that 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh mitigating circumstances or that death is the 
appropriate penalty.’ ”  (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 
72.) 
“ ‘Written findings by the jury are not constitutionally 
required.’ ”  (People v. Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 256.)   
The absence of a requirement of intercase proportionality 
review does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. 
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 143.)   
“[T]he jury’s consideration of unadjudicated criminal 
conduct pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), does not offend 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution or analogous provisions of the California 
Constitution.”  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1226.) 
The inclusion in the list of potential mitigating factors of 
such adjectives as “extreme” (see § 190.3, factors (d), (g)) and 
“substantial” (see id., factor (g)) does not act as a barrier to the 
consideration of mitigation in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Foster (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 1301, 1365.)   
The trial court was not required to instruct that certain 
sentencing factors (specifically, section 190.3, factors (d), (e), 
(f), (g), (h), and (j) that are introduced by the phrase “ ‘whether 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
62 
or not’ ”) are relevant only as potential mitigators.  (People v. 
Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.)   
The California sentencing scheme does not violate the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
denying capital defendants certain procedural safeguards 
afforded to noncapital defendants.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 657.) 
California law does not violate international norms, and 
thus contravene the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, by 
imposing the death penalty as regular punishment for 
substantial numbers of crimes.  (People v. Merriman (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 1, 107.) 
E. Cumulative Error  
Amezcua, joined by Flores, contends that errors in his 
trial, even if not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of 
the judgment when considered individually, do warrant 
reversal when assessed cumulatively.  We have concluded any 
error in the prosecutor’s guilt phase closing was harmless, as 
was Dr. Scheinin’s testimony relating autopsy results derived 
from a different pathologist’s report.  Whether considered 
individually or cumulatively the errors do not warrant 
reversal. 
PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA and FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
63 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.  
O’ROURKE, J.*
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Amezcua & Flores 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S133660 
Date Filed: February 28, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert J. Perry 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Oswaldo 
Amezcua. 
 
David H. Goodwin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Joseph Conrad 
Flores. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair 
1609 Border Avenue 
Torrance, CA  90501 
(310) 606-9262 
 
David H. Goodwin 
P.O. Box 50724 
Pasadena, CA  91115 
(323) 666-9960 
 
Viet H. Nguyen 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6125