Title: Schorzman v. Kelly
Citation: 429 P.2d 217, 71 Wash. 2d 457
Docket Number: 38852
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 1967

71 Wn.2d 457 (1967) 429 P.2d 217 LEONARD SCHORZMAN et al., Appellants, v. ALTA M. KELLY et al., Respondents.[*] No. 38852. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. June 15, 1967. Hennessey, Curran, Jansen, Bentley &amp; Kelly and Leonard F. Jansen, for appellants. Engst &amp; Phelps and Edward T. Engst, for respondents. BARNETT, J.[] On September 20, 1955, the plaintiffs Schorzman leased for a term of years from Ida M. Quirk farm lands situated in the counties of Douglas and Grant, state of Washington. The lease was notarized by the plaintiffs on September 20, 1955, and by Ida M. Quirk on October 1, 1955. The time provision of the lease provides as follows: "WITNESSETH, that the landlord hereby leases to the tenants for ten years, commencing on January 1, 1956, and ending December 31, 1966, ...." *458 Subsequent to the execution of the lease Ida M. Quirk died and Alta M. Kelly succeeded to her interest. On February 3, 1965, the defendant Kelly advised each plaintiff by written notice that the lease would expire December 31, 1965, being the end of the 10-year term and would not be renewable thereafter. On April 12, 1965, Alta M. Kelly entered into a written lease with Oscar Schuh covering the property in issue. Defendant Schuh began to prepare a portion of the land for seeding the crop to be harvested in 1966, in accordance with another provision in the Schorzman lease granting that right if the land was sold or rented to another tenant. Whereupon the plaintiffs brought this action against Kelly and Schuh in which plaintiffs seek to enjoin them from asserting any claim adverse to the plaintiff's in and to the non-pasture and non-stubble portions of the land. From an adverse ruling of the trial court the plaintiffs press this appeal. The trial court found: And, It thereafter concluded: Hence, it was the conclusion of the trial court that the defendants have full right to go upon the leased land to make repairs, fall plow and sow wheat and other grain and do *459 those other things usual and customary to the preparation of the land for the subsequent cropping, all without the consent or interference of the plaintiffs. [1] The plaintiffs assign error to the court's refusal to admit extrinsic evidence regarding the termination date of the lease. This assignment is not argued, and no authority is cited; therefore it will not be considered. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 372 P.2d 193 (1962). The other assignments of error present the pivotal question. "When does the lease of September 20, 1955, terminate?" The plaintiffs contend that it terminated December 31, 1966, and the defendants argued that it terminated December 31, 1965. The trial court gave the following oral opinion on the question presented by this appeal. [2, 3] Our objective is to determine the intent of the parties to the lease. Felton v. Menan Starch Co., 66 Wn.2d 792, 405 P.2d 585 (1965); Chaffee v. Chaffee, 19 Wn.2d 607, 145 P.2d 244 (1943). The defendants do not argue with the various rules of construction for contracts cited by the plaintiffs. Basically, the plaintiffs are contending that the specific and more necessary language in the term of rental provision, i.e., "commencing on January 1, 1956 and ending December 31, 1966," shall have legal precedence over the general language, "for ten years," in the interpretation of the lease. The plaintiffs correctly state rules of construction; however, they are inconclusive and not controlling in view of other rules which apply in this case. We must keep in mind that the commencement date of January 1, 1956, is uncontradicted. It would be simple error for the scrivener when computing the ending date of the term to add to the beginning year, 1956, ten and come up with 1966 for the ending date. This would be correct if one counted from January to January, but in this case the lease deals with complete years, beginning January 1 and ending December 31. Add 10 calendar years to January 1, 1956 and you have a termination date of December 31, 1965. "In case of an inconsistency *461 between words and figures in a contract the words govern." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 311 at 171. The lease contains an inconsistency to which this rule applies. In addition, we think the words "for ten years" in conjunction with the unquestioned commencement date, January 1, 1956, outweigh the expression of the ending date. In Klein v. Miles, 35 A.2d 243, 244 (D.C. 1944), the time provision of a lease was in question. It too had a term stated "one year," and the beginning and ending dates which made the lease period one year and one day. The court resolved the problem in favor of the stated one year term. We quote from the opinion: In the circumstances of this case we conclude that the lease was intended to end December 31, 1965; we affirm the decision of the trial court. FINLEY, C.J., WEAVER and ROSELLINI, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 429 P.2d 217. [] Judge Barnett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.