Title: People v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97744
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2004

Docket No. 97744-Agenda 19-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
CLEMMIE L. CARTER, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 2, 2004. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Lake County,
defendant, Clemmie L. Carter, was found guilty under section 24-1.1
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1996)) of
four counts of unlawful possession of weapons by a felon, based on
his simultaneous possession of two handguns and clips of ammunition
for those two guns. Defendant was also found guilty under section
2(a)(1) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS
65/2(a)(1) (West 1996)) of possession of a firearm without a valid
firearm owner's identification (FOID) card. The trial court sentenced
defendant to five years' imprisonment for each offense, to run
concurrently.
	The appellate court affirmed defendant's four convictions for
unlawful possession of weapons by a felon and vacated defendant's
FOID card violation conviction based on the one-act, one-crime
doctrine. The appellate court also vacated defendant's sentences based
on the trial court's consideration of an improper sentencing factor and
remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing. 344 Ill. App. 3d
663.
	We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). The only issue in
this appeal is whether multiple convictions can be entered for unlawful
possession of weapons by a felon based on the simultaneous
possession of two handguns and the ammunition for those guns. We
hold, in the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary,
and under the particular facts of this case, the simultaneous possession
of multiple firearms and firearm ammunition by defendant constituted
a single offense. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate
court in part, reverse the judgment of the circuit court in part, and
remand the cause for further proceedings.


I. BACKGROUND
	On September 22, 1997, defendant and another man were
arrested after fleeing from a car pursued by police in connection with
a shooting incident. Two loaded semiautomatic weapons, a .22-caliber
handgun and a .25-caliber handgun, were found in the car, and an
additional ammunition clip containing .22-caliber bullets.
	On October 8, 1997, an indictment was filed, charging defendant
with, among other crimes, four counts of unlawful possession of
weapons by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1996)) and possession
of a firearm without a valid FOID card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West
1996)). The unlawful possession of weapons charges were based on
defendant's possession of a .22-caliber handgun, a .25-caliber
handgun, ammunition for the .25-caliber handgun, and ammunition for
the .22-caliber handgun.
	A bench trial was conducted on April 7, 1998. The trial court
found defendant guilty on all five counts. Defendant was sentenced to
five years' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.
	On appeal, defendant argued that his multiple convictions
violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine and that the trial court relied
on several improper factors in determining his sentence. The appellate
court affirmed defendant's four convictions for unlawful possession
of weapons by a felon and vacated defendant's FOID card violation
conviction based on the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The appellate
court also vacated defendant's sentences based on the trial court's
consideration of an improper sentencing factor and remanded the
cause for a new sentencing hearing. 344 Ill. App. 3d 663. Justice
McLaren dissented in part, asserting that convicting defendant for
unlawful possession of weapons by a felon, and then also convicting
him for the ammunition that was contained in the firearms, violated
the one-act, one-crime doctrine. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 674-78 (McLaren,
J., dissenting). We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

II. ANALYSIS
	In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether multiple
convictions can be entered for unlawful possession of weapons by a
felon based on the simultaneous possession of two guns and the
ammunition for those guns. Initially, we note that defendant did not
preserve this issue in the trial court. The rule of waiver is, however,
a limitation on the parties, not a limitation on this court's jurisdiction.
Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994).
This court may review an argument not properly preserved for review
if plain error occurred. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 386 (2004). The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing
court to address defects affecting substantial rights (1) if the evidence
is closely balanced or (2) if fundamental fairness so requires rather
than finding the claims waived. People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 58
(1998). Defendant does not claim that the evidence is closely balanced
in this case. Moreover, our review of the record confirms that the
evidence in defendant's case cannot reasonably be regarded as closely
balanced. As the State acknowledges, however, this court has recently
held that "the potential for a surplus conviction and sentence affects
the integrity of the judicial process, thus satisfying the second prong
of the plain error rule." Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d  at 389. The issue in this
case unquestionably turns on whether the convictions and sentences
are surplus. Accordingly, we will review defendant's arguments under
the plain error doctrine.
	Defendant argues that because all four of his convictions for
unlawful possession of weapons by a felon were based on a single,
simultaneous act of possession, three of his convictions must be
vacated based on the one-act, one-crime rule of People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). According to defendant, nothing in the statute
suggests that each article of contraband possessed constitutes a
separate offense and that any ambiguity in the statute should be
resolved in his favor by prohibiting multiple convictions for the
simultaneous possession of firearms. Defendant contends that this case
should be controlled by People v. Manning, 71 Ill. 2d 132 (1978). In
Manning, we held that simultaneous possession of different types of
drugs could not support multiple convictions, absent an express
statutory provision to the contrary.
	The State contends defendant was properly convicted of four
counts of unlawful possession of weapons by a felon based on his
possession of two guns and two types of ammunition. The State
argues that the legislature did not intend that the simultaneous
possession of more than one weapon or ammunition should support
only one conviction for unlawful possession of weapons by a felon.
According to the State, a felon who possesses a loaded gun is more
dangerous than a felon who possesses a gun but no ammunition and
the statute was drafted to allow separate convictions for possession of
a weapon and the ammunition for it.
	In his brief, defendant mixes Manning statutory construction
principles with the King one-act, one-crime doctrine. This case
requires that we first interpret the unlawful possession of weapons
statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1996)) to determine whether the
statute permits separate offenses to be charged for simultaneous
possession. One-act, one-crime principles apply only if the statute is
construed as permitting multiple convictions for simultaneous
possession.
	The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review
de novo. People v. Harris, 203 Ill. 2d 111, 116 (2003). When
construing a statute, a court is required to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature. People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269
(1998). "The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the
language of the statute, which, if plain and unambiguous, must be read
without exception, limitation, or other condition." People v. Davis,
199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). Criminal or penal statutes must be strictly
construed in the defendant's favor, "and nothing should be taken by
intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the
statute." Davis, 199 Ill. 2d  at 135 (citing People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (1998), People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435 (1997), and
People v. Shinkle, 128 Ill. 2d 480, 486 (1989)).
	The relevant portion of the statute at issue provides:
			"(a) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or
about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed
place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1
of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if this
person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this
State or any other jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS
5/24-1.1(a) (West 1996).
	In applying the principles of statutory construction to this case,
we conclude that the statute neither prohibits nor permits the State to
bring separate charges for the simultaneous possession of firearms and
firearm ammunition. The term "any," as used in the statute, may be
construed to mean "some," "one out of many" or "an indefinite
number." See Black's Law Dictionary 94 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, the
term "any" has categorical meanings of "any one of a kind," "any
kind," or "any number." Indeed, the State conceded during oral
argument that the term "any" may mean either the singular or the
plural. Where a criminal statute is capable of two or more
constructions, courts must adopt the construction that operates in
favor of the accused. People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 366,
370-71 (1976).
	Whether the legislature intended for the simultaneous possession
of weapons and ammunition to be the same offense or separate
offenses requires us to determine the statute's "allowable unit of
prosecution." See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 220-21, 97 L. Ed. 260, 263-64, 73 S. Ct. 227, 229 (1952)
(whether a prosecutor may treat each breach of a statute as a separate
offense requires a determination of what Congress has made the
allowable unit of prosecution). The use of the term "any" in the statute
does not adequately define the "allowable unit of prosecution."
Consequently, we find the statute to be ambiguous, and we must
adopt a construction that favors the defendant. See Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 
at 370-71.
	This court has consistently held, where a statute is ambiguous, in
the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, simultaneous
possession could not support multiple convictions. See People v. Cox,
53 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1972), overruled on other grounds, People v.
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149 (1993); Manning, 71 Ill. 2d  at 137. In Cox, the
defendant was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, two counts of
indecent liberties with a child. The offenses were based on two almost
simultaneous acts, involving one victim. This court held, "[I]n the
absence of a statutory provision to the contrary the conduct here
constituted a single offense and only one sentence should be
imposed." Cox, 53 Ill. 2d  at 106.
	In Manning, the defendant was convicted of one count of
burglary and two counts of possession of controlled substances. The
State argued that defendant committed two separate offenses of
possession in that he knowingly possessed two types of controlled
substances. The defendant contended that the simultaneous possession
of both controlled substances arose out of a single act of possession.
This court held,
		"[I]n the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the
simultaneous possession of more than one type of controlled
substance, under the circumstances shown on this record,
constituted a single offense, and only one sentence should
have been imposed." Manning, 71 Ill. 2d  at 137.
In reaching the decision in Manning, this court relied primarily on the
following language from Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 99 L. Ed. 905, 910, 75 S. Ct. 620, 622 (1955):
		"When Congress has the will it has no difficulty in expressing
it-when it has the will, that is, of defining what it desires to
make the unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make
each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When Congress
leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
lenity." Bell, 349 U.S.  at 83, 99 L. Ed.  at 910, 75 S. Ct.  at
622.
	We acknowledge that Manning was superceded by an
amendment to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, expressly
authorizing multiple convictions based on simultaneous possession of
different drugs. See 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2002) ("[a] violation of
this Act with respect to each of the controlled substances listed herein
constitutes a single and separate violation of this Act"). The
amendment, however, does not change the underlying holding of
Manning. More importantly, the amendment demonstrates that the
legislature knows how to authorize, specifically, multiple convictions
for simultaneous violations of a single criminal statute, and the
absence of such language in the unlawful possession of weapons
statute should be construed in defendant's favor. Bell, 349 U.S.  at 83,
99 L. Ed.  at 910, 75 S. Ct.  at 622; see also City of Chicago v. Roman,
184 Ill. 2d 504, 517 (1998) (the legislature knows how to limit the
exercise of home rule authority when it so intends, and the absence of
an express limitation will be construed in favor of home rule unit). We
therefore apply the principles of Cox and Manning, and we hold that
under the facts of this record, in the absence of a specific statutory
provision to the contrary, the simultaneous possession of two firearms
and firearm ammunition constituted a single offense, and that only one
conviction for unlawful possession of weapons by a felon could be
entered.
	Today's holding is in accord with other courts of appeal that have
relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Bell in addressing the
"allowable unit of prosecution" under felon-in-possession-of-weapons
statutes. In United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 1999),
the federal court held that the term "any," as contained in a similar
federal felon-in-possession-of-weapons statute, created an ambiguity
as to the "allowable unit of prosecution" and that the ambiguity had
to be resolved in favor of the defendant by prohibiting multiple
convictions for the simultaneous possession of several firearms.
Verrecchia, 196 F.3d  at 297-98. Verrecchia recognized that all of the
federal courts of appeal have relied on Bell in holding that the
simultaneous possession of multiple firearms, or a firearm and
ammunition, constitutes only one crime. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294 at
297-98, citing United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 168-69 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.
1982); United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1976); McFarland
v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 668-70 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Wiga,
662 F.2d 1325, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Valentine,
706 F.2d 282, 292-94 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 565, 568-69 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
	Only one federal circuit court has held the simultaneous
possession of weapons and ammunition constitutes multiple offenses.
In United States v. Walker, 380 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2004), the court
recognized that its result differed from the position established by
decisions of its own federal circuit court and decisions of all other
federal circuit courts, and expressed that, ultimately, the issue could
be resolved by that court sitting en banc. Walker, 380 F.3d  at 395.
Walker relied on United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir.
1989). In Peterson, the court examined whether multiple firearm
violation counts violated double jeopardy under Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932).
Peterson, 867 F.2d  at 1115. The Peterson court did not base its
decision on statutory interpretation. The issue of legislative intent and
whether a statute permits separate convictions for simultaneous
possessions is distinct from the issue of whether separate convictions
for simultaneous possessions violate the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment. The parties have not raised double jeopardy as an
issue here and, consequently, we do not find Walker or Peterson
instructive.
	Several state courts have also held that simultaneous possession
of multiple weapons can support only one conviction under similar
statutes referring to "any" weapon because the term is ambiguous and
the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Acey v.
Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 240, 511 S.E.2d 429 (1999); State v.
Auwae, 89 Haw. 59, 968 P.2d 1070 (App. 1998), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Jenkins, 93 Haw. 87, 997 P.2d 13 (2000); People v.
Kirk, 211 Cal. App. 3d 58, 259 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1989); State v. Watts,
462 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1985); State v. Woods, 8 Ohio App. 3d 56, 455 N.E.2d 1289 (1982).
	While we agree with the State that a felon who possesses a
loaded gun may be more dangerous than a felon who possesses a gun
but no ammunition, it is for the legislature to " 'defin[e] what it desires
to make the [allowable] unit of prosecution.' " Manning, 71 Ill. 2d  at
137, quoting Bell, 349 U.S.  at 83, 99 L. Ed.  at 910, 75 S. Ct.  at 622.
Consequently, "in the absence of a statutory provision to the
contrary," simultaneous possession of multiple firearms and
ammunition constituted a single offense. Manning, 71 Ill. 2d  at 137.
	Based on established rules of statutory interpretation, the statute,
as written, can only support one conviction. Therefore, we need not
address defendant's contention that multiple convictions for
simultaneous possession violate the one-act, one-crime rule.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of the appellate
court judgment affirming defendant's four convictions for unlawful
possession of weapons by a felon, we affirm in part and reverse in part
the judgment of the circuit court, and we remand to the circuit court
with directions to vacate three of those convictions. In all other
respects, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in partand reversed in part;circuit court judgment affirmedin part and reversed in part;cause remanded with directions.