Title: Karrigan v. Valentine
Citation: 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52
Docket Number: 41,369
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 1959

184 Kan. 783 (1959)
339 P.2d 52
PHILIP KARRIGAN, Appellant,
v.
HARRY E. VALENTINE and L.F. VALENTINE, Appellees.
No. 41,369

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 16, 1959.
John Berglund, of Clay Center, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
W.M. Beall, of Clay Center, argued the cause, and H.L. Sheppeard, of Clay Center, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is an action against the publishers of a newspaper to recover for an alleged libel.
Defendants' demurrer to the petition, on the ground that pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, was sustained.
Plaintiff has appealed.
The nature of the case and the questions presented are such that we consider it necessary to set out the petition in full. Omitting caption and signature, it reads:
"COUNT ONE.
"I.
"II.
"III.
"IV.
"COUNT TWO.
"I.
"II.
"III.
"IV.
"V.
"VI.
"VII.
"VIII.
It is the contention of plaintiff that count one of his petition states a cause of action for libel per se, and that count two states a cause of action for libel per quod.
Defendants, of course, contend otherwise.
Consideration of the question necessarily involves a discussion of the two types of libel.
*787 Words libelous per se are words which are defamatory themselves and which intrinsically, by their very use, without innuendo and the aid of extrinsic proof, import injury and damage to the person concerning whom they were written. They are words from which, by the consent of mankind generally, damage follows as a natural consequence and from which malice is implied and damage is conclusively presumed to result. Where libel per se is claimed the question presented is whether the words on their face, without explanation or extrinsic proof, would necessarily, or as a natural and immediate consequence cause injury and whether a newspaper article is libelous pe se is a question of law for the court to determine. (Jerald v. Houston 124 Kan. 657, 261 Pac. 851; Bennett v. Seimiller, 175 Kan. 764, 267 P.2d 926; Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 304 P.2d 926; 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 5, p. 39, et seq., and 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 8, p. 41, et seq.)
Words libelous per quod, on the other hand, are words ordinarily not defamatory but which become actionable only when special damages are shown, that is, they are words the injurious character of which appears only in consequence of extrinsic facts. Thus, words not defamatory per se, may become actionable per quod, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and this gives rise to the rule that in order to recover for a libel per quod special damage and injury must be alleged and proved. (See authorities above cited.)
Tested by these general principles, may it be said the published article constitutes a libel per se?
We think not.
Standing alone, the article contains nothing of a defamatory or derogatory nature, and merely follows the pattern of the usual and common birth-announcement notices carried in newspapers. It does not accuse plaintiff of crime or immoral or reprehensible conduct of any kind. To the reader it is a routine announcement of the legitimate birth of a child in the local community. Without further discussion we hold that count one of the petition fails to state a cause of action for libel per se, and as to such count defendants' demurrer was properly sustained.
This leads, therefore, to the question whether count two of the petition states a cause of action for libel per quod.
Determination of this question depends upon whether plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded special damage and injury to him resulting *788 from the publication. The petition has been set out in full, its detailed allegations speak for themselves, and will not be repeated. While it is true that plaintiff has not alleged special damage to his trade, profession or business  if he is so engaged  we think it would be incorrect to hold that recovery in an action for libel per quod is restricted and limited merely to damage of that nature. In other words, pecuniary loss to one's trade, profession or business should not be the sole test in a case of this kind. The article in question being nondefamatory on its face, plaintiff, in order to state a cause of action for libel per quod, was required to allege explanatory extrinsic facts in connection with the subject of the article and the resulting special damage and injury to him.
Has he done so?
Of a certainty, libel per quod cannot be created out of thin air, and in order to support a recovery evidence of the damage and injury resulting must be definite and substantial, not fictitious or imaginary. It may be that plaintiff will be unable to prove his allegations, including those as to special damage to him. It may well be that defendants have a valid defense to the action, but with those matters we are not concerned at the present time. Nevertheless, after a most careful study of the petition, we are constrained to hold that, in view of all the facts and circumstances pleaded, it may not be said that count two thereof fails to state a cause of action for libel per quod.
In passing, it should be stated that our conclusion in this matter is in no way based upon the items of expense and attorney fees mentioned in the petition, none of which, in the absence of a statute so providing, is properly recoverable in an action of this kind.
The result, therefore, is this:
Count one of the petition fails to state a cause of action for libel per se, and as to it the demurrer was properly sustained. Count two of the petition states a cause of action for libel per quod, and as to it the demurrer was erroneously sustained.