Title: Boyle v. Samotin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1399
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1399 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM BOYLE, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MYLES RUBIN SAMOTIN, M.D., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
April 21, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
In this case we consider the statutory presuit notice 
requirement that section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2018), imposes 
on a claimant who seeks to file a medical negligence suit.  Here the 
claimant mailed the presuit notice before the expiration of the 
applicable limitations period, but the defendant did not receive the 
notice until after the period would have expired absent tolling.  The 
certified conflict issue is whether the applicable limitations period 
for filing a complaint for medical negligence is tolled under section 
766.106(4) upon the claimant’s mailing of the presuit notice of 
 
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intent to initiate litigation, or only upon receipt of the notice by the 
prospective defendant.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), 
Fla. Const. 
 
We have for review Boyle v. Samotin, 313 So. 3d 673 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2020), in which the Second District Court of Appeal, adhering 
to its earlier decision in Bove v. Naples HMA, LLC, 196 So. 3d 411 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016), held that a medical negligence complaint is 
untimely if the presuit notice is not received by the prospective 
defendant within the applicable limitations period.  In other words, 
the Second District held that the limitations period is not tolled 
until receipt of the notice.  Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 674.  In so holding, 
the Second District certified conflict with the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Zacker v. Croft, 609 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1992), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Baxter v. 
Northrup, 128 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), both of which, in the 
Second District’s view, “resolved the same issue and arrived at the 
opposite conclusion—that the statute of limitations period is tolled 
upon mailing of the notice of intent.”  Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 678. 
 
We agree with Judge Smith’s concurring-specially-in-result-
only opinion below that the Second District’s earlier decision in 
 
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Bove was wrongly decided and that the relevant statute and rule 
only require a claimant to timely mail the presuit notice to trigger 
tolling of the applicable limitations period.  This conclusion, as 
petitioner correctly argues, is consistent with what this Court has 
previously said in Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), and 
Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994).  Accordingly, we quash the 
Second District’s decision in Boyle and approve the certified conflict 
cases of Zacker and Baxter to the extent they are consistent with 
this opinion. 
I 
 
Prior to commencing an action for medical negligence, a 
claimant is required to follow certain procedures under section 
766.106.  Subsection (2)(a) of the statute mandates that “a claimant 
shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical 
negligence.”  Subsection (3)(a) then contemplates a “90-day period” 
in which the prospective defendant shall conduct a presuit 
investigation “to determine the liability of the defendant.”  But 
subsection (3) references two different 90-day periods, one triggered 
by mailing of the presuit notice, the other by receipt of the notice.  
 
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Namely, subsection (3)(a) provides in part that “[n]o suit may be 
filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective 
defendant,” whereas subsection (3)(c) provides in part that “[f]ailure 
of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the 
notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection 
of the claim for purposes of this section.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
These differing 90-day periods are relevant here because 
subsection (4) of the statute contains a tolling provision that 
generally references “the 90-day period.”  That subsection, titled 
“Service of Presuit Notice and Tolling,” provides: 
The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served 
within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11.  However, 
during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled 
as to all potential defendants.  Upon stipulation by the 
parties, the 90-day period may be extended and the 
statute of limitations is tolled during any such extension.  
Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an 
extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the 
remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, 
whichever is greater, within which to file suit. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 applies to the presuit 
procedures prescribed by section 766.106.  Subdivision (b)(1) of the 
rule provides that “[n]otice of intent to initiate litigation sent by 
 
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certified mail to and received by any prospective defendant shall 
operate as notice to the . . . prospective defendant receiving the 
notice.”  (Emphasis added.)  Subdivision (d)(1) of the rule provides 
that the presuit notice “shall be served by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, prior to the expiration of any applicable statute of 
limitations or statute of repose.”  Subdivisions (d)(2) and (d)(3) then 
reference the two different 90-day periods referenced in the statute.  
Subdivision (d)(2) provides in part that an “action may not be filed 
against any defendant until 90 days after the notice of intent to 
initiate litigation was mailed.”  And subdivision (d)(3) provides in 
part that “an action must be filed within 60 days or within the 
remainder of the time of the statute of limitations after the notice of 
intent to initiate litigation was received, whichever is longer, 
after the earliest of [certain events],” one of which is “[t]he 
expiration of 90 days after the date of receipt of the notice of intent 
to initiate litigation.”  
II 
The relevant facts outlined by the Second District are 
straightforward.  Just one day before the expiration of the 
applicable limitations period, petitioner “served a notice of intent for 
 
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medical negligence, via certified mail, return receipt requested, 
addressed to [respondents] pursuant to section 766.106(2)(a) and 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(b)(1).”  Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 
675.  Respondents, however, did not sign the return receipt until 
four days after the notice was mailed.  Id.  Petitioner later filed a 
medical negligence complaint, and respondents moved for summary 
judgment on timeliness grounds.  Id. 
The trial court granted respondents’ motion but did so 
begrudgingly.  The trial court recognized it was bound to follow the 
Second District’s decision in Bove, which held that the applicable 
limitations period is not tolled until the prospective defendant 
receives the presuit notice.  But the trial court opined that other 
courts, including the Fifth District in Baxter, correctly concluded 
that tolling commences when the claimant “serves” or mails the 
notice. 
On appeal, the Second District declined petitioner’s invitation 
to recede from Bove and instead affirmed.  Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 674.  
The Second District felt “constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis 
to apply Bove” due to Bove’s “indistinguishable” facts.  Id. at 680.  
The Second District explained that Bove largely based its decision 
 
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on rule 1.650, namely the “received by” language in subdivision 
(b)(1) and the “return receipt requested” requirement in subdivision 
(d)(1).  Id. at 677 (quoting Bove, 196 So. 3d at 414).  The Second 
District further explained that Bove was “[g]uided by the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 
1993), and Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Coffaro, 829 
So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2002),” both of which, in the Second District’s view, 
focused on receipt of the notice.  Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 678.  
After revisiting Bove, the Second District explained that Zacker 
and Baxter reached a different conclusion than Bove even though 
they relied on some of the same caselaw and statutory and rule 
language on which Bove relied.  Id. at 678-79.  The Second District 
also noted Judge Makar’s concurring opinion in Bay County Board 
of County Commissioners v. Seeley, 217 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2017), in which Judge Makar, relying in part on this Court’s 
decision in Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994), opined that 
Baxter was more persuasive than Bove.  Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 679-
80.  But the Second District panel adhered to Bove, affirmed the 
judgment below, and certified conflict with Zacker and Baxter.  Id. 
at 680.  
 
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III 
 
In the certified conflict case of Zacker, the Fourth District held 
in relevant part that a claimant “satisfie[s] the requirements of 
section 766.106 when they mail[] the notice of intent to initiate 
litigation before the expiration of the statute of limitations.”   
Zacker, 609 So. 2d at 141.  For that proposition, the Fourth District 
relied on its earlier decision in Boyd v. Becker, 603 So. 2d 1371 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1992), quashed, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), which 
held that “the ninety day tolling of the limitations period occurs 
from the date the notice of intent was mailed.”  Zacker, 609 So. 2d 
at 141 (quoting Boyd, 603 So. 2d at 1373). 
 
In the other certified conflict case of Baxter, the Fifth District 
in relevant part addressed the defendants’ argument that the 
applicable limitations period had expired because the presuit notice 
was not received within that period.  Baxter, 128 So. 3d at 912.  
The Fifth District rejected that “receipt” argument, reasoning in part 
that “the tolling period commences when the notice is served in 
accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d)(1).”  Id.  
The Fifth District also distinguished this Court’s decision in Boyd v. 
Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), on the ground that Boyd “only 
 
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addresses the commencement of the period within which suit must 
be filed following the service of the notice.”  Baxter, 128 So. 3d at 
912.  The Fifth District further reasoned that although Boyd 
“effected a sua sponte amendment to rule 1.650(d)(3),” Boyd left 
undisturbed “rule 1.650(d)(1), which merely mandates that service 
of the notice of intent by certified mail must be accomplished before 
expiration of the statute of limitations.”  Id. 
IV 
To resolve the certified conflict, we determine whether the 
applicable limitations period for filing a medical negligence 
complaint is tolled upon a claimant’s mailing of the statutorily 
required presuit notice or only upon receipt of the notice by the 
prospective defendant.  This requires us to interpret section 
766.106 and rule 1.650.  Our standard of review is de novo for 
questions of statutory interpretation, Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 
453 (Fla. 2018), and for questions of “interpretation of the rules of 
civil procedure,” Koppel v. Ochoa, 243 So. 3d 886, 889 (Fla. 2018). 
This Court adheres to the “supremacy-of-text principle” that 
“[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what 
they convey, in their context, is what the text means.”  Ham v. 
 
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Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) 
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)).  Here, however, it is difficult 
to “conclude that the meaning of the governing text is clear beyond 
any doubt.”  MRI Assocs. of Tampa, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 46 Fla. L. Weekly S379, S381 (Fla. Dec. 9, 2021).  After all, the 
statute contemplates tolling “during the 90-day period,” but the 
statute and rule both reference two different 90-day periods.  
Indeed, this Court previously explained that the statutory 
provisions at issue here “are in direct conflict.”  Boyd v. Becker, 627 
So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1993).  Because the relevant statutory 
language has remained unchanged since Boyd was decided, we 
begin our analysis with Boyd. 
In Boyd, the conflict issue was whether “the final sixty-day 
extension authorized in [section 766.106(4)]” began ninety days 
after the presuit notice was mailed or “ninety days after [the 
prospective defendant] received the notice.”  627 So. 2d at 483.  
After recognizing there was “no question” that the different 90-day 
periods referenced in section 766.106(3)(a) and section 
766.106(3)(c) were “in direct conflict,” this Court ultimately—and 
 
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unanimously—held that “the conflict should be resolved in a 
manner that allows a claim to be considered on its merits.”  Id.  
That meant “that the ninety-day period described in section 
766.106(3) should be computed from the date the putative 
defendant receives the notice of intent to initiate litigation.”  Id. at 
483-84.  This Court reasoned that such a “construction gives the 
most deference to the legislative intent and purpose of chapter 766 
and will allow each defendant a full ninety days in which to 
evaluate a plaintiff’s claim.”  Id. at 484.  Lastly, this Court sua 
sponte amended rule 1.650(d)(3) to make clear that the 90-day 
period is measured from receipt of the notice.  Id.  In doing so, this 
Court explained that the rule was previously adopted without “the 
benefit of an adversarial proceeding directed to the issue presented 
in [Boyd]” and that, because the matter at issue was substantive, 
the rule nevertheless “[did] not absolutely control which of the two 
statutory provisions applie[d].”  Id. 
Although Boyd held that the 90-day period is measured from 
receipt of the presuit notice, Boyd did not squarely address whether 
a claimant nevertheless triggers tolling upon mailing the notice.  
Boyd did, however, imply that was the case.  See id. at 483 
 
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(“Subsection (3)(a) of [section 766.106] prohibited Boyd from filing 
his lawsuit for a period of ninety days after mailing the notice.  
During this same ninety-day period, the running of the statute of 
limitations was tolled by subsection (4).” (emphasis added)).  That 
implication was confirmed just a few months later when this Court 
in Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994), unanimously explained 
that, under Boyd, a claimant need only properly mail the notice to 
trigger tolling. 
In Patry, the issue was whether the “certified mail, return 
receipt requested” statutory requirement had to be strictly complied 
with or whether acknowledged receipt of a hand-delivered timely 
notice that resulted in no prejudice to the defendant constituted 
sufficient notice for purposes of the statute.  633 So. 2d at 10.  This 
Court held that the hand-delivered notice satisfied the statute.  Id.  
In considering “the statutory scheme as a whole,” this Court 
explained that “[s]ervice of the presuit notice by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, simply assures reliable verification of 1) 
timely service and 2) the date of receipt.”  Id. at 12.  In other words, 
“timely service . . . compli[es] with the general notice requirement.”  
Id.  This Court also noted multiple times that a claimant need only 
 
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serve the notice to trigger tolling.  See id. at 11 (“Under the 
statutory scheme, service of presuit notice tolls the statute of 
limitations during the ninety-day presuit screening period provided 
for in the statute.”); id. at 12 (citing what is now section 766.106(4) 
for the proposition that “timely service of presuit notice tolls the 
statute of limitations”).  Of particular relevance, this Court, citing 
Boyd, explained: “Although the statute is tolled as of the date the 
notice of intent is mailed, the tolling period is measured from the 
date the notice is received by the prospective defendant.”  Id. at 11 
n.4 (emphasis added).1 
Taken together, Boyd and Patry support the conclusion that 
mailing of the presuit notice triggers tolling but that, to ensure the 
prospective defendant receives the benefit of the full investigation 
period, the 90-day period is measured from the date of receipt of the 
 
 
1.  Patry also cited with approval the Fourth District’s decision 
in Zacker, one of the certified conflict cases here.  Namely, in 
rejecting the “absurdity” of the strict-compliance argument 
advanced by the defendant who acknowledged actually receiving the 
hand-delivered notice, this Court cited Zacker for the following 
proposition: “It appears that notice of intent to initiate litigation 
sent certified mail, return receipt requested, would be sufficient to 
toll the statute of limitations, even if the notice was not actually 
received by the defendant.”  Patry, 633 So. 2d at 12. 
 
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notice.  In other words, the applicable limitations period is also 
tolled during “[t]he time period between mailing and receipt.”  Boyle, 
313 So. 3d at 685 (Smith, J., concurring specially in result only). 
This result is the only reasonable one under the relevant 
statutory and rule language.  At bottom, nothing in the statute or 
rule imposes upon a claimant an affirmative obligation to ensure 
that the prospective defendant receives and signs for the notice 
within the applicable limitations period.  On the contrary, a 
claimant is merely required to “notify each prospective defendant by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate 
litigation.”  § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat.  And that notice must “be 
served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11.”  § 766.106(4), 
Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.650(d)(1) (“The notice of intent to 
initiate litigation shall be served by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, prior to the expiration of any applicable statute of 
limitations or statute of repose.”).  Our rules otherwise recognize 
that “[s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing.”  Fla. R. Gen. Prac. 
& Jud. Admin. 2.516(b)(2). 
The confusion in the lower courts on this issue appears to 
stem in part from certain language in this Court’s later decision in 
 
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Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Coffaro, 829 So. 2d 862 
(Fla. 2002).  There, this Court held that “the ninety-day extension of 
the statute of limitations purchased under section 766.104(2) is not 
added to what remains of the original statute of limitations but is 
added after the sixty-day extension period under section 
766.106(4).”  Id. at 863.2  In doing so, this Court twice cited Boyd 
for the proposition that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the 
time the defendant receives the notice of intent, not from the time 
the claimant mails it.”  Id. at 866.  To the extent that language in 
Coffaro can be construed as suggesting that the applicable 
limitations period is not tolled upon mailing of the notice, we reject 
Coffaro’s reading of what we said in Boyd.  Our doing so has no 
impact on Coffaro’s conclusion that the claimant there “had a total 
of 150 days (60 plus 90) from the dates she received the [health 
care providers’ respective] notices of termination to file suit,” id., or 
Coffaro’s conclusion that the claims at issue were all timely filed, id. 
at 867.  Indeed, because the presuit notices in Coffaro were all 
 
 
2.  The 90-day purchased extension under section 766.104(2) 
is not the same as “the 90-day period” in section 766.106(4). 
 
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mailed and received within the limitations period, but with “fewer 
than sixty days remain[ing] in [the] limitations period,” id. at 866, 
the tolling issue presented in this case is wholly irrelevant to 
Coffaro’s conclusions and 150-day calculations. 
The Second District’s earlier decision in Bove—to which the 
Second District here adhered—relied in part on Coffaro while failing 
to mention Patry.  Bove, 196 So. 3d at 415.  We thus reject Bove’s 
analysis.  But Bove is problematic for other reasons.  Bove largely 
relied on the language in rule 1.650 that “refers to the receipt of 
notice and requires that the notice be sent by certified mail.”  Id.  
For example, Bove emphasized the language in rule 1.650(b)(1) that 
a presuit notice “sent by certified mail to and received by any 
prospective defendant shall operate as notice to the person and any 
other prospective defendant who bears a legal relationship to the 
prospective defendant receiving the notice.”  Id. at 414 (quoting Fla. 
R. Civ. P. 1.650(b)(1)).  But that rule language does not impose a 
duty on the claimant to ensure timely receipt of the presuit notice.  
Rather, that language merely provides that, prior to receipt, a 
prospective defendant is not on notice.  That premise, of course, is 
consistent with Boyd’s conclusion “that the ninety-day period 
 
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described in section 766.106(3) should be computed from the date 
the putative defendant receives the notice of intent to initiate 
litigation.”  627 So. 2d at 483-84.  Lastly, Bove’s analysis is 
undermined by its erroneous suggestion that section 766.106(4) 
was amended post-Boyd to delete a reference to receipt of the 
presuit notice.  See Bove, 196 So. 3d at 415 & n.6.  No such 
amendment took place.  In fact, from its original enactment in 
1985—as former section 768.57(4)—section 766.106(4) has never, 
as Bove suggested, “refer[red] to notice of intent being received.”  Id. 
at 415 n.6. 
Here, because respondents’ primary argument for approving 
the decision below is centered on Bove and Coffaro, we reject 
respondents’ argument.  And we decline to address respondents’ 
alternative arguments for why petitioner’s claim should otherwise 
be dismissed, as those arguments are “outside the scope of the 
certified conflict.”  C.N. v. I.G.C., 316 So. 3d 287, 292 (Fla. 2021); 
see also Boyle, 313 So. 3d at 675 n.1 (concluding that the same 
“alternate” arguments respondents advance here were not even 
“properly before [the Second District]”). 
 
 
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V 
 
We hold that under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2018), 
and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, it is the timely mailing of 
the presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation, not the receipt of 
the notice, that begins the tolling of the applicable limitations 
period for filing a complaint for medical negligence.  Accordingly, we 
quash the Second District’s decision in Boyle, and we approve the 
certified conflict cases of Zacker and Baxter to the extent they are 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District – Case No. 2D18-2932 
 
 
(Collier County) 
 
J. Scott Murphy and Landis V. Curry III of Paul Knopf Bigger, PLLC, 
Winter Park, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
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Kirsten K. Ullman, Brian M. Bursa, and Jesse E. LeVine of Ullman 
Bursa Law, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Andrew S. Bolin of Bolin Law Group, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida Hospital Association and Florida 
Medical Association 
 
Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Miami, Florida; and 
Wilbert R. Vancol of McEwan, Martinez, Dukes & Hall, P.A., 
Orlando, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association