Title: State v. Eric Caldwell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-210-97
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). GARIBALDI, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether defendant's seizure by the police violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. On April 12, 1995, Passaic County Sheriff's Department Detective Anthony Smith received a tip from a confidential informant who had provided him with reliable information over the past four and a half years. The informant told him that Curtis Stuart, who was wanted on a warrant, was standing in front of a multi-unit dwelling at 86 Butler Street, in Paterson, New Jersey. In fact, although Stuart was wanted on a warrant at one time, the warrant had been vacated ten months earlier. Unfortunately, the warrant list the detective checked did not disclose that the warrant had been vacated. In addition, the informant was not able to give Detective Smith a detailed description of Stuart, stating that he only caught a glimpse of his face. Acting on the tip and the belief that the warrant list was correct, Detective Smith, Sergeant Ferrara, and Detective Arcieri proceeded to 86 Butler Street in an unmarked police unit. They arrived in front of the building within five minutes of receiving the tip. As the three officers approached the dwelling, they saw a black male, later identified as Eric Caldwell, standing alone in front of the building. When Caldwell saw the unmarked police car approaching, he looked at them and ran into the building. The officers followed. When Caldwell was a quarter way down the hallway, Detective Smith called to him to stop. Caldwell complied. After Caldwell stopped, he turned to face the police officers and, in the process, tossed an object from his right hand. The object landed on the hallway floor in plain view of the officers. Detective Smith retrieved the object, which was a large plastic bag containing sixty smaller plastic bags of crack cocaine. After retrieving the contraband, the detectives patted down Caldwell and handcuffed him. The pat-down uncovered seven more plastic bags filled with marijuana and cash. The officers then placed Caldwell under arrest. Caldwell was subsequently indicted on several charges, all involving possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and some involving an intent to distribute. Thereafter, he moved to suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest, contending that he had been subjected to an illegal search and seizure. At the suppression hearing, Detective Smith testified that had Caldwell produced identification and not thrown the narcotics, he would have been released. He further testified that if another individual had been walking by, he might have detained him for identification purposes. The trial court granted Caldwell's motion to suppress. The State appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. On remand, Caldwell pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within a school zone. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment with a two-and-a-half year period of parole ineligibility. Caldwell appealed the excessiveness of the sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court granted Caldwell's petition for certification. HELD: Because the police detention of Caldwell was more than minimally intrusive and insufficiently supported by information demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that he was the fugitive whom the police were seeking, the evidence seized at the time of his arrest must be suppressed. 1. Although even a brief detention can constitute a seizure, New Jersey courts have long recognized that a temporary street detention based on less than probable cause may be constitutional. (pp. 7-9) 2. To determine the reasonableness of a specific investigatory stop under New Jersey law, the reviewing court must evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be free from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. (pp. 9-10) 3. Although an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge are two highly relevant factors under the totality of circumstances test, given the absence of detail in the information, an adequate basis for the informant's tip did not exist. (pp. 10-12) 4. Although law enforcement officials must be encouraged to act reasonably and to trust their professional judgment without fear that hindsight analysis may eradicate their work despite their objectivity, the record in this case discloses that the police detention of Caldwell was more than minimally intrusive and insufficiently supported by information demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that he was the fugitive whom the police were seeking. (pp. 12-13) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate concurring opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. While Justice Handler concurred in the Court's disposition of the appeal, he believes that Caldwell discarded the contraband pursuant to an investigatory stop and that, therefore, his initial detention must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, which need not be supported by probable cause. More importantly, however, Justice Handler was concerned by the Court's failure to recognize that the officers in this case lacked not only probable cause, but also reasonable suspicion that Caldwell was guilty of a crime. JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, and STEIN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate concurring opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ERIC CALDWELL, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 20, 1999 -- Decided June 17, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Paul B. Halligan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Robert H. Corrado, Assistant Prosecutor and Steven E. Braun, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Ronald S. Fava, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney). Marcy H. Speiser, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter Verniero, Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by GARIBALDI, J. In this appeal, we decide whether defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest was properly denied. More specifically, we consider whether his seizure by the police violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. [Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-210, 22 S. Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 833 (1979).] New Jersey courts have "long recognized that a temporary street detention based on less than probable cause may be constitutional." State v. Tucker, supra, 136 N.J. at 167; see also, State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 507 (1968) (holding that "particularized suspicion" that youth was engaged in criminal activity justified seizure.) In State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 477 (1998), we held that "when the intrusion on the individual is minimal, and the law enforcement interests outweigh the privacy interests infringed in a Terry encounter, a stop based on objectively reasonable and articulable suspicions, rather than upon probable cause, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment." The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interest can support a seizure based on less than probable cause. ... The context of a particular law enforcement practice, of course, may affect the determination whether a brief intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests on less than probable cause is essential to effective criminal investigation." [United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-704, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 118-19 (1983).] The Supreme Court recognized in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 242 (1983), that "there is [no] litmus-paper test for . . . determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop." Therefore, in State v. Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 504, we held that to determine the reasonableness of a specific investigatory stop under New Jersey law, the reviewing court must "evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be free from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions." Ibid. We recognized that "[n]o mathematical formula exists for deciding whether the totality of circumstances provided the officer with an articulable or particularized suspicion that the individual in question was involved in criminal activity." Id. at 505. The reviewing court must conduct a "sensitive appraisal" of the facts and decide if the officer's conduct tipped the constitutional scales in favor of suppression of the evidence. Ibid. The reviewing court must decide if the officer's observations, in "view of the officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts," warrant a "limited intrusion upon the individual's freedom." Id. at 504. Against that background, we consider the officers' conduct as revealed by this record. Unquestionably, the officers intended to attempt an investigatory stop of the black male that they observed in front of 86 Butler Street and whom they suspected to be Curtis Stuart. Before any attempt at an investigatory stop occurred, Caldwell turned and ran into the building and down the hallway, pursued by the officers, and stopping only after Detective Smith shouted "stop, police, . . . don't run any more. It is clear that when the officers chased defendant into the building, commanding him to "stop," a seizure of defendant occurred, see U.S. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, ___ (1980), and that seizure constituted something more than a limited intrusion on defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. It also is evident that the police did not have sufficient information to justify the degree of intrusion involved. The fatal flaw in the State's position arises from the unwarranted degree of reliance on the informant's tip. Under the totality of circumstances test an informant's "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" are two highly relevant factors. State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 110 (1998) (quoting State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 91, 93, certif. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 576, 142 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1998). Detective Smith offered some support for the informant's veracity when he testified that he had received reliable information from that informant over the past four and a half years. However, an examination of the contents of the tip and the level of detail contained in the information disclose that there is nothing in this record that reflects an adequate basis of knowledge for the informant's tip. The description of the suspect in this case was clearly inadequate. The informant's tip identified the wanted individual only as a "black male in front of 86 Butler Street." The building identified as 86 Butler Street is a multi-unit dwelling in a predominantly black community. The informant did not give Detective Smith a physical description of the individual. The informant did not describe the individual's height, weight, or the clothing he was wearing. He offered no distinguishing characteristics that would have assisted Detective Smith in making a positive identification of the suspect. The only information the officer possessed concerning the suspect was that he was a black male and that he was at a certain address. The police must have a sufficiently detailed description of the person to be able to identify that person as the suspect named by the informant. Without such a requirement, police could theoretically conduct wide-ranging seizures on the basis of vague general descriptions. Not only was the informant's information vague, it also was inaccurate. The officers' reliance on the outstanding warrant was misplaced. The trial court that issued the warrant on June 6, 1994, vacated it the very next day. The information about the status of the warrant was never communicated to the recordkeeping entity of the Sheriff's Department. As a result, the warrant was over ten months old and Curtis Stuart had been incarcerated for five days when Detective Smith mistakenly identified defendant as Stuart. Detective Smith's testimony that he would have apprehended any black male standing at or near 86 Butler Street, combined with his reliance on a ten month old stale warrant and on a vague tip that a black male was standing in front of a multi-unit apartment complex, provided insufficient circumstances to justify the degree of intrusion involved. Here, as in Tucker, what again began as a minimally intrusive stop escalated into a seizure more intrusive than the limited information possessed by the officers would support. Tucker, supra, 136 N.J. at 173. Hence, the contraband discarded after the seizure must be suppressed. Law enforcement officials must be encouraged to act reasonably and to trust their professional judgment without fear that hindsight analysis may eradicate their work despite their objectivity. We have consistently held that an evaluating court must give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise. State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997). Nevertheless, this Court is committed to the protection of individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Smith, supra, 155 N.J. at 100; Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 107. A study of the record discloses that the police detention of defendant was more than minimally intrusive and insufficiently supported by information demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that defendant was the fugitive whom the police were seeking. Accordingly, the evidence must be suppressed. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, and STEIN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate concurring opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ERIC CALDWELL, Defendant-Appellant. HANDLER, J., concurring. I am in accord with the Court's determination that the police did not have sufficient information to justify the degree of intrusion involved. See ante at __ (slip op. at 10-11). Accordingly, I concur in the Court's disposition of this appeal and agree that defendant's motion to suppress must be granted. I write separately because I take issue with the Court's holding in two respects. First, the majority opinion obscures the distinction between investigatory stops and arrests, and between the discrete levels of knowledge needed to justify those respective intrusions. I believe that defendant discarded the contraband he now seeks to suppress pursuant to an investigatory stop. Therefore, the initial detention of defendant must have been justified only by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity; it need not have been supported by probable cause. The majority opinion is not clear on this issue. More importantly, I emphasize that the officers in this case acted only on an informant's tip that a "black man standing outside 86 Butler Street" was wanted on a warrant. That information was not sufficiently descriptive to provide an adequate basis for the investigatory stop. NO. A-210 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ERIC CALDWELL, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED