Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Tim Osicka
Citation: 2014 WI 33
Docket Number: 2012AP000060-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2014

2014 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP60-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Tim Osicka, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Tim Osicka, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST OSICKA 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
       
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 33
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP60-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Tim Osicka, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Tim Osicka, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review Reserve Judge Robert E. 
Kinney's 
recommendation 
that 
this 
court 
suspend 
Attorney Tim Osicka's license to practice law in Wisconsin for a 
period of 60 days for professional misconduct.  The referee also 
recommended that Attorney Osicka be required to pay restitution 
to an injured client, and that he pay the costs of this 
proceeding. 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Because no appeal has been filed, we review the 
referee's report pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  After conducting our 
independent review of the matter, we accept and adopt the 
referee's findings of fact, which were based on the allegations 
of the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), 
due to Attorney Osicka's default.  We agree that the OLR is 
entitled 
to 
a 
default 
judgment, 
and 
we 
determine 
that 
Attorney Osicka's misconduct warrants a suspension of 60 days.  
We impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Osicka.  
The costs totaled $1,579.97 as of July 30, 2012. 
¶3 
Attorney Osicka was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1986.  His Wisconsin law license is currently 
suspended for noncompliance with continuing legal education 
(CLE) requirements, for nonpayment of bar dues, for failing to 
comply with the trust account certification requirement, and for 
failing to cooperate with the OLR's investigation. 
¶4 
Attorney 
Osicka 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
prior 
professional 
discipline. 
 
In 
2002 
this 
court 
publicly 
reprimanded 
Attorney 
Osicka 
for 
failing 
to 
communicate 
adequately with his client, failing to act with reasonable 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
3 
 
diligence, failing to provide competent representation, making 
statements regarding the integrity of a judge with reckless 
disregard for truth or falsity, and violating the attorney's 
oath 
by 
disrespecting 
the 
court. 
 
Public 
Reprimand 
of 
Tim Osicka, 
No. 
2002-02. 
 
In 
2009 
this 
court 
publicly 
reprimanded Attorney Osicka for willfully failing to disclose 
information to the OLR during a grievance investigation and 
failing to comply promptly with a client's requests for 
information.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 
2009 WI 38, 317 Wis. 2d 135, 765 N.W.2d 775.  In 2010 this court 
publicly reprimanded Attorney Osicka for failing to deposit a 
client's advance fee into a client trust account, failing to 
communicate adequately with his client, failing to either refund 
the unearned portion of an advance fee or provide an accounting 
to the client upon termination of representation, and engaging 
in the unauthorized practice of law by practicing law when his 
law license was suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues.  
Public Reprimand of Tim Osicka, No. 2010-OLR-7. 
¶5 
On January 11, 2012, the OLR filed the current 
complaint against Attorney Osicka.  It alleges four counts of 
professional 
misconduct, 
all 
involving 
Attorney 
Osicka's 
representation of A.L.'s minor daughter. 
¶6 
The complaint alleges that in September 2008, A.L. 
retained Attorney Osicka to represent her minor daughter on a 
delinquency petition filed in Marathon County circuit court.  
The minor had been arrested for marijuana possession as a 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
4 
 
juvenile, and A.L. sought to minimize her daughter's potential 
punishment. 
¶7 
Attorney Osicka charged A.L. a $750 advance fee, which 
A.L. paid.  Attorney Osicka and A.L. entered into a fee 
agreement which provided, "Client agrees to pay a flat fee of 
$750 for this service.  That fee, upon payment, becomes the 
property of the law firm.  It will be deposited in Attorney's 
business account, rather than the firm's trust account, and 
Client hereby specifically agrees that Attorney may do so." 
¶8 
Attorney Osicka did not place any of the advanced fees 
in trust, nor did he provide any of the notices required under 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)2 for the alternative treatment of advanced 
fees. 
                                                 
2 SCR 
20:1.15(b)(4m) 
states 
as 
follows: 
 
Alternative 
protection for advanced fees.   
 
A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of fees 
may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business 
account, provided that review of the lawyer's fee by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is available in the 
proceeding to which the fee relates, or provided that 
the lawyer complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
 
a. Upon accepting any advanced payment of fees 
pursuant to this subsection, the lawyer shall deliver 
to the client a notice in writing containing all of 
the following information: 
 
1. the amount of the advanced payment; 
 
2. the basis or rate of the lawyer's fee; 
 
3. any expenses for which the client will be 
responsible; 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
5 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4. that the lawyer has an obligation to refund 
any unearned advanced fee, along with an accounting, 
at the termination of the representation; 
 
5. that the lawyer is required to submit any 
unresolved 
dispute 
about 
the 
fee 
to 
binding 
arbitration within 30 days of receiving written notice 
of such a dispute; and 
 
6. the ability of the client to file a claim with 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection if 
the lawyer fails to provide a refund of unearned 
advanced fees. 
 
b. Upon termination of the representation, the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
 
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees; 
 
2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
binding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting; and 
 
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
 
c. Upon timely receipt of written notice of a 
dispute from the client, the lawyer shall attempt to 
resolve that dispute with the client, and if the 
dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the 
dispute to binding arbitration with the State Bar Fee 
Arbitration Program or a similar local bar association 
program within 30 days of the lawyer's receipt of the 
written notice of dispute from the client.  
 
d. Upon receipt of an arbitration award requiring 
the lawyer to make a payment to the client, the lawyer 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
6 
 
¶9 
Attorney Osicka negotiated with Marathon County's 
district attorney and social services department on the minor's 
behalf, and the parties agreed to a consent decree.  The parties 
scheduled a court hearing for November 21, 2008, to consider the 
consent decree. 
¶10 On or about November 17, 2008, Attorney Osicka met 
with A.L., and A.L. signed the decree. 
¶11 On November 19, 2008, Attorney Osicka informed A.L. 
that he would be appearing in an out-of-town court on the day of 
the hearing, that he would be calling the court in Marathon 
County at the appointed time to discuss the decree, and that 
A.L. 
and 
her 
daughter 
should 
attend 
the 
hearing.  
Attorney Osicka explained the hearing's purpose to A.L. and the 
minor. 
¶12 Attorney Osicka did not appear at the hearing, 
however, because he learned that the State Bar of Wisconsin had 
administratively suspended his law license for his failure to 
pay mandatory dues and assessments.   Attorney Osicka informed 
the district attorney that he would not attend the hearing to 
consider the consent decree.  A.L. and her daughter appeared at 
the 
hearing, 
only 
to 
be 
advised 
by 
the 
court 
that 
Attorney Osicka's license had been suspended, that A.L. needed 
to find another attorney on behalf of her daughter, and that the 
matter would need to be rescheduled. 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall pay the arbitration award within 30 days, unless 
the client fails to agree to be bound by the award of 
the arbitrator. 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
7 
 
¶13 Attorney Osicka paid his State Bar dues by credit card 
and forwarded a required trust account certification to the 
State Bar.  The State Bar reinstated Attorney Osicka's law 
license on November 24, 2008. 
¶14 In the meantime, the circuit court appointed a 
different 
lawyer 
as 
the 
minor's 
attorney. 
 
This 
lawyer 
successfully negotiated a consent decree with the State and the 
county's social services department, and the circuit court 
approved the decree on December 23, 2008. 
¶15 Attorney Osicka did not refund any advanced fees to 
A.L. for his representation of the minor. 
¶16 A.L. filed a grievance against Attorney Osicka.  The 
OLR 
forwarded 
a 
notice 
of 
formal 
investigation 
to 
Attorney Osicka, requiring Attorney Osicka to respond fully and 
fairly to the grievance. 
¶17 Attorney Osicka submitted a partial response to the 
notice 
of 
formal 
investigation. 
 
In 
his 
response, 
Attorney Osicka noted that he had successfully negotiated a 
consent decree for the minor, that he had been initially unaware 
of his suspension, and that he was unable to appear in court on 
the minor's behalf.  Attorney Osicka did not reply to 
allegations that his conduct may have violated certain rules of 
professional conduct.  In addition, Attorney Osicka did not 
provide the OLR with a copy of his file, as had been requested 
of 
him. 
 
The 
OLR 
sent 
Attorney 
Osicka 
a 
supplemental 
investigative letter, to which Attorney Osicka did not respond. 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
8 
 
¶18 On January 11, 2012, the OLR filed the complaint in 
the present case.  The OLR's complaint alleged four separate 
counts of misconduct.  Count One alleged that by failing to 
deposit the $750 into his trust account and instead depositing 
the money into his law firm operating account, with no evidence 
he intended to utilize the alternative fee placement procedures 
permitted by SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), Attorney Osicka violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).3  Count Two alleged that by accepting a $750 
fee for a representation he did not complete, Attorney Osicka 
charged an unreasonable fee, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).4  
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) states as follows:  Unearned fees and 
cost advances. 
 
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
4 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
9 
 
Count Three alleged that by failing to refund unearned fees to 
A.L., Attorney Osicka violated SCR 20:1.16(d).5  Count Four 
alleged that by failing to provide relevant information to the 
OLR in a timely fashion and by failing to answer questions fully 
in response to the OLR's investigation, Attorney Osicka violated 
SCR 22.03(2) and (6)6 enforceable through SCR 20:8.4(h).7  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;  
 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  
5 SCR 20:1.16(d) states: 
 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
6 SCR 22.03(2) and (6) state: 
 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
10 
 
OLR 
sought 
a 
60-day 
suspension 
and 
an 
order 
requiring 
Attorney Osicka to pay restitution to A.L. in the amount of 
$750. 
¶19 The OLR made multiple unsuccessful attempts to serve 
the complaint and order to answer on Attorney Osicka, both via 
personal service and via certified mail.  Having made reasonably 
diligent attempts to serve Attorney Osicka, the OLR moved for a 
finding of default.  Notice of the hearing on the OLR's default 
motion was sent to the last known address Attorney Osicka had 
provided to the State Bar of Wisconsin, but Attorney Osicka did 
not respond or appear at the hearing.  On June 18, 2012, 
Referee Kinney granted the OLR's default motion. 
¶20 The referee subsequently filed a report finding the 
facts as alleged in the OLR's complaint and concluding that 
                                                                                                                                                             
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
 
. . . . 
 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
7 SCR 20:8.4(h) says it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 
SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 
SCR 22.04(1); . . . ." 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
11 
 
Attorney Osicka had committed each of the four counts of 
misconduct.  Based on the conclusions of misconduct, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Osicka's license to practice law in 
this state be suspended for 60 days.  The referee also 
recommended that Attorney Osicka be ordered to pay restitution 
to A.L. in the amount of $750. 
¶21 Attorney Osicka did not appeal from the referee's 
report and recommendation.  Thus, we proceed with our review of 
the matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).  We review a referee's 
findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 
¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  We review the referee's 
conclusions of law de novo.  Id.  We determine the appropriate 
level of discipline independent of the referee's recommendation.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶22 In light of Attorney Osicka's failure to appear or 
participate in this case, we accept the referee's recommendation 
and agree that Attorney Osicka has defaulted.  In light of 
Attorney Osicka's default, we accept the allegations set forth 
in the complaint as true and conclude that the OLR has met its 
burden of proof with respect to the allegations in the 
complaint. 
¶23 The referee's findings of fact have not been shown to 
be clearly erroneous, and we adopt them.  We also agree with the 
referee's conclusions of law, and we agree with the referee's 
recommendation for a 60-day suspension of Attorney Osicka's 
No. 
2012AP60-D   
 
12 
 
license to practice law.  Finally, we agree with the referee's 
recommendation that Attorney Osicka be required to pay the costs 
of this proceeding. 
¶24 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Tim Osicka to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days 
effective the date of this order. 
¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Tim Osicka shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Tim Osicka shall pay restitution to his former 
client, A.L., in the amount of $750. 
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Tim Osicka shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶28  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution is to be 
completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
¶30 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
No.  2012AP60-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the per curiam opinion.   
¶32 Although Attorney Osicka's repeated violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys in the present case 
are not the most horrific the court has encountered, Attorney 
Osicka did harm his clients. (And this is not the first time.  
Attorney Osicka is a repeat offender.)  His clients have 
registered complaints and they want to be assured that this 
court's lawyer discipline system cares about them as victims of 
an attorney's misconduct and that the court will provide the 
victims with relief.  
¶33 Victims do not expect the court to ignore them and to 
treat them as not important enough to redress their grievances.  
Victims of attorney misconduct deserve OLR's and the court's 
attention. 
¶34 I turn to a procedural issue relating to current OLR 
practice.   
¶35 The OLR filed another complaint against Attorney 
Osicka on February 25, 2013, about a year after filing the 
complaint in the present case.  See OLR v. Osicka, 2014 WI 34, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  The OLR filed the complaint 
that is the subject of the present proceedings against Attorney 
Osicka on January 11, 2012.  The same referee presided over both 
proceedings against Attorney Osicka.  The referee's report and 
recommendation in the second action is dated August 23, 2013 and 
is an open public file.   
No.  2012AP60-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶36 I note here that the referee commented critically as 
follows about the OLR filing two complaints within about a year 
of each other complaining about conduct in which Attorney Osicka 
engaged during approximately the same time period.  The referee 
stated: 
It is unclear why the matters involving [Attorney 
Osicka] resulted in the filing of two separate 
cases. . . . [E]verything else charged in the present 
Complaint . . . pre-dated the filing, on January 11, 
2012, of the earlier complaint in 2012AP60-D, and the 
OLR had knowledge of all the violations at least 
several months before January 11, 2012 when the 
earlier Complaint was filed. . . . The point is, there 
should have been only one Complaint. 
¶37 As I have written in OLR v. Johns, 2014 WI 32, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, of even date, the OLR disciplinary 
system is about 15 years old.  Several anomalies and proposed 
amendments have been brought to the court's attention.  It is 
time for the court to institute a review of the system rather 
than to make piecemeal adjustments at this time.   
¶38 The present case presents issues that should be 
considered in such a review. 
¶39 For the reasons stated, I write separately.      
 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
¶40 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Attorney Tim 
Osicka (Osicka) is not an angel.  He has been disciplined on 
several occasions.  Nonetheless, after looking at his recent 
prosecutions, one has to wonder whether Osicka's conduct 
warrants the zealous attention it has consistently received from 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), or whether Osicka has 
simply become an easy target because he can no longer afford to 
defend himself.  Osicka understands from experience that, unless 
he prevails on every allegation of misconduct against him, he 
will be required to pay all or substantially all costs of the 
OLR prosecution. 
¶41 This policy has troubled me for years.  The supreme 
court must be vigilant in protecting the public from attorneys 
who do not comply with the ethical obligations of the legal 
profession.  But not all violations of the code of professional 
responsibility are equal in importance.  Some violations are 
mala in se, others are merely mala prohibitum.  Given its 
limited resources, OLR should give priority to the former and 
balance to the latter.  In my view, it has not met that test in 
this case. 
¶42 I write separately to discuss some background facts 
that put this mala prohibitum prosecution in perspective. 
I 
 
¶43 Osicka was the subject of a public reprimand in 2002.  
Public Reprimand of Tim Osicka, No. 2002-02.  My concern here is 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
2 
 
not with that prosecution but rather with four later efforts to 
prosecute him, of which this is the third.   
A 
¶44 "In 2009 this court publicly reprimanded Attorney 
Osicka for willfully failing to disclose information to the OLR 
during a grievance investigation and failing to comply promptly 
with a client's requests for information."  Per Curiam op., ¶4 
(citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2009 WI 
38, 317 Wis. 2d 135, 765 N.W.2d 775).  This is true.  What the 
Per Curiam does not explain is that the OLR filed four counts 
against Osicka and sought to suspend his license for 60 days.  
Although OLR failed to prove two of its four counts, the referee 
still recommended a 60-day suspension.  Osicka was thus forced 
to appeal to this court.  This court reduced the sanction to a 
public reprimand but socked Osicka with $10,116.17 in OLR costs.  
Osicka also had to pay for his own attorney.  In short, Osicka 
had to pay the full costs of his defense and almost all costs of 
the OLR prosecution, even though he substantially prevailed.  
This was a crippling burden for a sole practitioner. 
¶45 The critical events in the present case occurred in 
November 
2008 
during 
the 
OLR's 
prosecution 
of 
the 
2009 
disciplinary matter. 
B 
¶46 "In 2010 this court publicly reprimanded Attorney 
Osicka for failing to deposit a client's advance fee into a 
client trust account, failing to communicate adequately with his 
client, failing to either refund the unearned portion of an 
advance fee or provide an accounting to the client upon 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
3 
 
termination of representation, and engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law by practicing law when his law license was 
suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues."  Per Curiam op., ¶4 
(citing Public Reprimand of Tim Osicka, No. 2010-OLR-7).  Osicka 
claims that he provided little or no defense to these charges 
because of the high cost of defending himself. 
 
¶47 With respect to this second of the four recent 
disciplinary matters, it should be noted that violations of the 
old trust account rule, with respect to advance fees, were 
commonplace among criminal defense attorneys and others whose 
work on cases quickly exhausted the advance fees.  In fact, this 
court created an alternative to the standard trust account rule 
in response to the old rule's inflexibility.  Although Osicka 
was found to have violated the old trust account rule, he was 
not required to refund any money to his client, implying that he 
had earned the whole advance fee. 
 
¶48 The count involving the unauthorized practice of law——
from October 31, 2008, through November 21, 2008——covers the 
critical period in the present case.  Osicka claimed then that 
he sent a check to the State Bar office on November 3, 2008, for 
his dues payment.  In the 2010 discipline case, the referee 
wrote: "There [is] no indication that the State Bar received 
Osicka's letter and the check was not negotiated."  This 
language does not constitute a finding that Osicka never sent 
such a check, nor does it rule out the possibility that Osicka's 
check bounced because of insufficient funds. 
C 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
4 
 
 
¶49 In the present case, Osicka is found to have violated 
a revised version of the trust account rule, and he is subjected 
to "progressive" discipline.  However, Osicka's new violation 
preceded the 2010 discipline as well as the 2009 discipline, and 
he is putting up no defense.  He is once again defaulting, at 
least in part, to avoid costs. 
¶50 The present prosecution also involves violations of 
SCR 20:1.5(a) and SCR 20:1.16(d). 
¶51 Rule 20:1.5(a) provides in part: "A lawyer shall not 
make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or 
an unreasonable amount for expenses."  SCR 20:1.5(a).  The Per 
Curiam sums up this count, saying that "by accepting a $750 
[advance] fee for a representation he did not complete, Attorney 
Osicka charged an unreasonable fee."  Per Curiam op., ¶18.  Here 
is the rest of the story.  Osicka was retained by A.L. in 
September 2008 before he was told that he had been suspended for 
failing 
to 
pay 
his 
bar 
dues. 
 
Thereafter, 
he 
worked 
conscientiously to represent A.L.'s daughter and negotiated a 
consent decree with the district attorney for the benefit of the 
daughter.  Paragraphs 6-12 of the Per Curiam show that Osicka's 
problems stemmed from his failure to timely pay his bar dues, 
not because he overcharged his client or did not diligently 
represent his client.  Osicka paid his bar dues on November 21, 
2009, by credit card.  If, on November 21, the circuit court had 
accepted the consent decree as it had been negotiated, or if the 
court had rescheduled the hearing without appointing a new 
lawyer, there would have been no problem.  It was the circuit 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
5 
 
court's 
discretionary 
action 
that 
prevented 
Osicka 
from 
completing the representation. 
¶52 On the third count, the referee concluded that Osicka 
violated a rule by failing to refund unearned fees, and Osicka 
was ordered to refund A.L.'s $750.  This means that the referee 
determined that Osicka earned nothing for all his work and that 
because of the circuit court's decision to oust Osicka from the 
case, Osicka was required to refund his entire advance fee.  
This may be fair to A.L., who was forced to pay twice for the 
same service, but it was not fair to Osicka who is denied 
payment for service he performed. 
¶53 The lesson to be learned from these counts is twofold: 
(1) always pay your bar dues on time, and (2) always defend 
yourself if you have a defense.  For Osicka, however, the 
legitimacy of this response is affected by the costly result of 
his 2009 discipline.  Now he is ordered to pay another $1,579.97 
in costs in this case. 
D 
¶54 A fourth prosecution is pending.  It was filed on 
February 25, 2013.  This third prosecution was filed January 11, 
2012, concerning events that occurred largely before the 2009 
discipline.  As the Per Curiam notes, Osicka's law license "is 
currently suspended for noncompliance with continuing legal 
education (CLE) requirements, for nonpayment of bar dues, for 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
trust 
account 
certification 
requirement, and for failing to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation."  Per Curiam op., ¶3. 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
6 
 
¶55 The plain truth is that OLR knew Osicka had closed his 
law office and moved out of it no later than September 2011.  In 
December 2011 OLR filed a sworn affidavit from one of its 
investigators alleging, on information and belief, that "Osicka 
has ceased practicing law."  Thus, OLR knew Osicka had ceased 
practicing law before filing this case and before filing the 
fourth prosecution.   
II 
 
¶56 Why is OLR continuing to file charges against an 
attorney who has ceased practicing law?  Why is it piling up 
legal costs that it expects Osicka to pay? 
¶57 These prosecutions raise questions about how OLR uses 
its limited resources to protect the public interest——questions 
about its priorities. 
¶58 Because the answers to questions of this sort are 
seldom addressed, I feel compelled to respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP60-D.dtp 
 
 
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