Title: v TERRANCE LEE WAGNER V 00-C R-284 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2003-SC-000770-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2005

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (e), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED AS AUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THIS STATE. TERRANCE LEE WAGNER V ,*ixyrrmQ 0.11aurf of 2003-SC-0770-MR v APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE KELLY M . EASTON, JUDGE 00-C R-284 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Terrance Lee Wagner, then age eighteen, was arrested on June 18, 2000, at the home of his foster parents, Joseph and Martha B., after attempting to anally sodomize their four-year-old daughter, J .B . Following a bench trial in the Hardin Circuit Court, Appellant was convicted of Criminal Attempt to Commit Sodomy in the First Degree, KRS 506 .010 ; KRS 510 .070(1)(b)(2), and sentenced to twenty years in prison . He appeals to this court as a matter of right, Ky . Const § 110(2)(b), asserting that the trial court committed reversible error by : (1) finding that he was competent to stand trial ; and (2) overruling his motion to suppress his confession . Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court . I. COMPETENCY. The Due Process Clause prohibits proceedings against an accused who lacks the competency to stand trial . Medina v . California , 505 U .S . 437, 439, 112 S .Ct . 2572, 2574, 120 L.Ed .2d 353 (1992) ; Gabbard v. Commonwealth , 887 S .W .2d 547, 551 (Ky . 1994) . An accused is incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks the capacity to either (1) appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or her, or (2) participate rationally in his or her defense . RCr 8 .06 . Once the trial court has reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court must appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine and report on the defendant's mental condition and hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial . KRS 504.100 ; Mills v . Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (Ky . 1999) . A trial court's finding with respect to competency is reviewed for clear error and will not be reversed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence adduced at the competency hearing . Fugate v . Commonwealth , 62 S .W.3d 15,18 (Ky . 2001) ("Since the trial judge's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, it was not clearly erroneous .") ; Jacobs v . Commonwealth , 58 S .W .3d 435, 442 (Ky . 2001) ("The trial court properly weighed the credibility of the witnesses and reached conclusions which were supported by substantial evidence . Thus, we find no error.") ; Harston v. Commonwealth , 638 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky . 1982) ("Harston argues the weight of the expert evidence . This misses the point . The finding is supported by substantial evidence and as such will not be disturbed .") . Appellant was examined by two psychologists, Dr. Robert Noonan, who was appointed by the court, and Dr . Thomas Bergandi, who was retained by Appellant with court-awarded funds . The trial court conducted a full competency hearing in this case. Although Appellant had an I .Q . of only 72, Drs . Noonan and Bergandi agreed that he had the capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him . They disagreed with respect to whether he was capable of participating rationally in his defense . Dr . Bergandi opined that Appellant's competency in this respect was "questionable" and that it would be "real difficult" for Appellant to assist in his own defense . Dr . Noonan opined that Appellant was "clearly competent" and that it "was not a close call ." The trial court weighed the testimony and qualifications of the experts, relied on "his own observations and impressions" of Appellant, Mozee v . Commonwealth , 769 S .W.2d 757, 758 (Ky . 1989), and found that Appellant was competent to stand trial . That finding was supported by substantial evidence; thus, it was not clearly erroneous and must be affirmed . II . CONFESSION . When Joseph B . discovered Appellant attempting to sodomize J .B . while she was asleep, he threw Appellant off of J.B . and called the police . When Officer Terry Moore arrived, Joseph B . told him what happened, then left with his wife to take J.B . to the hospital for examination and treatment, if necessary . Officer Moore sat down with Appellant at the kitchen table and read Appellant a "Statement of Your Rights" which detailed Appellant's Miranda rights . Appellant initialed a box before the description of each right and signed the form at the bottom . Moore then conducted a tape-recorded interview during which Appellant confessed to attempting to sodomize J .B . Appellant claims that his confession was coerced and that he did not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights . The Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination requires that a waiver of that right be "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" made . Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U.S . 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) . The propriety of the waiver is determined by considering the "totality of the circumstances." Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S . 412, 421, 106 S.Ct . 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) . The inquiry has two distinct components : First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception . Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it . Id . at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1142 ; Mills, 996 S.W .2d at 482 . The trial court conducted a suppression hearing and found that Appellant voluntarily waived his rights . If that finding was supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive of the issue. RCr 9.78; Watkins v. Commonwealth , 105 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Ky. 2003) . The first component, voluntariness, turns on state action . In other words, it requires examination only of police conduct at the time of the waiver, i .e . , whether there was intimidation, coercion, or deception. Mills, 996 S.W .2d at 482 . Appellant testified that he "felt" intimidated by Detective Moore and signed the form because "that was the right thing to do" and that he was "always taught to do what he was told ." This does not constitute police coercion . The traditional indicia of coercion consist of "the duration and conditions of detention . . ., the manifest attitude of the police toward [the defendant], [the defendant's] physical and mental state, [and] the diverse pressures which sap or sustain [the defendant's] powers of resistance and self-control . . . . . . Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S . 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) . There was no such evidence here . Appellant may have believed that signing "was the right thing to do," but clearly that is not coercion . Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment ; it goes no further than that . Respondent's perception of coercion flowing from the "voice of God," however important or significant such a perception may be in other disciplines, is a matter to which the United States Constitution does not speak . Colorado v . Connelly , 479 U .S . 157,170-71, 107 S.Ct . 515, 523-24, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) . Appellant's assertion that he "felt" intimidated by Officer Moore was not supported by any facts showing actual intimidation . Officer Moore simply sat across the kitchen table from Appellant and read the waiver form to him word by word . There is no evidence that Moore threatened Appellant or even raised his voice . The second component analyzes whether the waiver was given knowingly and intelligently . This analysis requires the judge to examine whether the defendant, himself, knew "that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence against him ." Colorado v . Spring , 479 U .S . 564, 574, 107 S .Ct . 851, 857-58, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) . The record establishes and it is undisputed that Appellant's rights were read to him; that he read those rights, himself ; that he initialed the waiver form in five separate places ; and that he signed the waiver form . Officer Moore testified that Appellant never asked to speak to a lawyer and never indicated that he did not understand his rights or that he was waiving them . During the audiotaped confession, Appellant acknowledged that he had been read his rights and that he understood them . Appellant argues now that because of his low I .Q ., he did not fully understand his rights or the consequences of the waiver . The record shows that Appellant had advanced to the eleventh grade in school, though he was in special education classes . When asked at the suppression hearing -5- what "You may remain silent" means, Appellant responded, "to be quiet, don't say nothing ." When asked what "Anything you do say may be used against you in court or in other proceedings" meant, he responded, "if you say something, it might hurt you in court ." When asked what "You may request the court to appoint an attorney for you if you cannot afford one" meant, he responded, "if you're poor and can't afford one, the court will appoint one." When asked about the language in the waiver section, Appellant testified that he understood this to mean "signing something over." However, when asked what "You have the right to consult an attorney" meant, he stated that he did not know what "consult" meant . The trial court found that "despite [Appellant's] apparent limitations, the Court cannot say that he lacked the requisite understanding to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver." The mere fact that Appellant had limited intelligence is not conclusive that he lacked the ability to understand or waive his rights . Rogers v . Commonwealth , 86 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Ky . 2002) . See also United States v. Turner , 157 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir . 1998) (where defendant had a "low-average to borderline" I .Q., but "was cooperative, reviewed and initialed each admonition of the waiver form, agreed to answer questions, and gave accurate information," his waiver was nevertheless knowing and intelligent); Henderson v . DeTella , 97 F.3d 942, 948-49 (7th Cir . 1996) (despite "below-average I.Q . and limited reading abilities," defendant's conduct showed he "was able to comprehend what his rights were and to waive them knowingly and voluntarily") . The trial court's finding that Appellant's waiver of his rights and subsequent confession were voluntary is supported by substantial evidence, thus is conclusive . RCr 9 .78 . Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the Hardin Circuit Court . All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Linda Roberts Horsman Department of Public Advocacy Suite 302 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Room 118, State Capitol Frankfort, KY 40601 Michael Harned Carlton S . Shier Assistant Attorneys General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204