Title: SCHNEIDER NAT. CARRIERS, INC. v. Tinney
Citation: 776 So. 2d 753
Docket Number: 1982136
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 2000

776 So. 2d 753 (2000)
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.
v.
Kenneth A. TINNEY.
1982136.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 26, 2000.
Rehearing Denied July 28, 2000.
John W. Clark, Jr., and Joseph E. Stott of Clark &amp; Scott, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
R. Ben Hogan III and J. Lee Roberts, Jr., of Hogan, Smith &amp; Alspaugh, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
This case involves the failure of a safety device known as a "rear-impact guard" that was attached to a cargo trailer owned by Schneider National Carriers, Inc. ("Schneider"). On April 17, 1995, Kenneth Tinney was driving an automobile on Interstate Highway 20 when he rear-ended the cargo trailer owned by Schneider. The rear-impact guard failed, and Tinney was injured.
Tinney sued Schneider. (He also sued Alfa Mutual Insurance Company and Wabash National Corporation ("Wabash"). Neither of those defendants is a party to this appeal.) The gravamen of his complaint was that the rear-impact guard had not been reasonably maintained. Schneider moved for a summary judgment. The trial court delayed ruling on the motion until discovery was completed, which was almost seven months after the court had *754 heard oral argument on the motion. After discovery had been completed, Tinney did not oppose the summary-judgment motion; the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Schneider on November 9, 1998. That summary judgment read:
Tinney continued his action against Alfa and Wabash. On May 21, 1999, Tinney moved to reinstate Schneider as a defendant. The factual basis of the motion was newly discovered evidence. The legal basis of the motion was that the trial court's November 9, 1998, order had not been made a final order because the judge had not used the words "no just reason for delay" in the concluding sentence of the summary judgment, quoted above. Tinney contended that Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., required that the judge use those exact words to make an order final under Rule 54(b). On September 1, 1999, almost 10 months after it had entered the summary judgment, the trial court granted the motion to reinstate Schneider, explaining its action in an amended order:
Schneider appeals the trial court's September 1, 1999, order reinstating it as a defendant. Schneider argues that the November 9, 1998, order was a final judgment.
The pertinent portion of Rule 54(b) provides:
(Emphasis added.)
In Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Construction Co., 466 So. 2d 83 *755 (Ala.1985), this Court held that the following language, which concluded two summary-judgment orders, made the two orders final pursuant to Rule 54(b) even though the language did not mention Rule 54(b) and even though it stated no "express direction" for the entry of final judgments: "The Court further finds there is no just reason for delay in the entry of said final judgment." 466 So. 2d  at 87. We held in Sho-Me that if it is clear and obvious from the language used by the trial court in its order that the court intended to enter a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), then we will treat the order as a final judgment:
466 So. 2d  at 87-88.
In this present case, the trial court specifically cited Rule 54(b) as its ground for "expressly" making the summary judgment final. By citing Rule 54(b), the trial court implicitly incorporated the language of Rule 54(b) into its order. It would take a tortured and biased reading of the trial court's summary-judgment order to find anything but an express intent to make the order final under Rule 54(b). We are not generally approving the omission of language stating that the court has made "an express determination that there is no just reason for delay," because Rule 54(b) explicitly calls for such a determination. However, to say the determination is absent in this case would exalt form over substance, given the quoted portion of the trial court's order. Nonetheless, the better practice is for the trial court's order to speak to the point directly. Nothing in Rule 54(b) requires findings to buttress the conclusion "that there is no just reason *756 for delay." All that is required is an "express determination."[3] Therefore, the trial court's November 9, 1998, summary-judgment order was a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., Tinney had four months to seek relief from the November 9, 1998, final judgment, on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. Tinney did not seek such relief until more than six months after the final judgment had been entered. Therefore, the trial court was jurisdictionally barred from reinstating Schneider as a defendant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, COOK, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., dissents.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting).
In reversing, we are further eroding the formal requirements for the entry of a final Rule 54(b) judgment. In this case, the summary judgment neither recited nor explained that "there is no just reason for delay." Thus it was merely interlocutory and subject to revision, as the trial judge revised it. We should affirm.
The purpose of the formal requirements is to ensure that the trial judge has considered and has found the criteria for the entry of a final Rule 54(b) judgment. See 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, &amp; Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2659 at 114. See also Justice Lyons's special concurrence in Ex parte King, 776 So. 2d 31, 37 (Ala.2000), and Precision American Corp. v. Leasing Service Corp., 505 So. 2d 380 (Ala.1987). In Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala.Civ.App.1996), the Court of Civil Appeals explains:
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 54(b) is clear, sensible, and easy. Why not follow it?
[1]  The word "express" is defined as: "Clearly and unmistakably communicated; directly stated." Black's Law Dictionary 601 (7th ed.1999).
[2]  The word "determination" is defined as: "A final decision by a court or administrative agency." Black's Law Dictionary 460 (7th ed.1999).
[3]  The Court of Civil Appeals held in Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala.Civ.App.1996): "The trial court should indicate why it considers that there is `no just reason for delay.' Hereafter, if a trial court should fail to list the factors considered, then the case will be returned so that the trial court can list those factors." Rule 54(b) does not require a trial court to list the factors it considered in finding that there is no just reason for delay. To the extent that Brown conflicts with Rule 54(b), Brown is overruled. Nevertheless, the trial court in this case complied with Brown by explaining in the second paragraph of its November 9, 1998, order:

"The Court expressly finds that the claims which could be presented by the plaintiff against Schneider were significantly different than those claims that the plaintiff could present against the defendant Wabash National Corporation which [deal] specifically with the design defect as to a bumper allegedly manufactured by Wabash. It is clear from the summary judgment motion that the defendant Schneider National Carriers, had nothing to do with the design or manufacture of the bumper."