Title: NICKOLAS REDNOUR V HASTINGS MUTUAL INSUR CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119187
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 30, 2003  
NICKOLAS REDNOUR,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119187  
HASTINGS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider the proper  
definition 
of 
the 
word “occupying” in the no-fault automobile­
insurance policy at issue in this case.  We hold that  
plaintiff was not “occupying” the vehicle as that term is  
defined in the policy because he was outside the vehicle and  
approximately six inches from it when the other automobile  
struck him.  We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s decision.  
 
I. Underlying facts and procedural posture  
Plaintiff was driving a friend’s car in Ohio. The left  
rear tire of the vehicle became flat.  To change the tire,  
plaintiff left the car, loosened the lug nuts, and began to  
walk toward the rear of the car.  An oncoming automobile then  
struck plaintiff and threw him against the car he had been  
driving, injuring him.  Plaintiff admitted that he had not  
been touching his friend’s car and that he had been  
approximately six inches from it when the other vehicle struck  
him.  
The vehicle plaintiff had been driving was insured under  
Michigan’s no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., with  
defendant Hastings Mutual Insurance Company. 
Plaintiff  
contended that he was “occupying” the vehicle as that term had  
been defined in defendant’s policy and that he thus was  
entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits.  After  
defendant denied the claim, plaintiff filed a complaint  
seeking payment of the benefits.  Defendant moved for summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that  
plaintiff had not established a genuine issue of material fact  
regarding whether he had been “occupying” the insured vehicle  
when he was injured.  The trial court granted defendant’s  
motion.  
2  
 
On review, the Court of Appeals reversed.1  It treated  
the word “occupying” as ambiguous and construed it against  
defendant, the drafter of the policy.  On that basis, the  
Court concluded that plaintiff was “occupying” the vehicle  
within the meaning of that term in the policy.  
Defendant 
filed 
an application for leave to appeal, which  
we granted. 467 Mich 869 (2002).  
II. Standard of review  
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for  
summary disposition. Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467 Mich 337,  
340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002).  The interpretation of a contract  
presents a question of law that we also review de novo.  
Archambo v Lawyers Title Ins Corp, 466 Mich 402, 408; 646 NW2d  
170 (2002).  
III. Discussion  
A. Statutory and contractual provisions  
The no-fault act sets forth the circumstances in which  
benefits are available for out-of-state accidents.  MCL  
500.3111 states:  
Personal protection insurance benefits are  
payable for accidental bodily injury suffered in an  
accident occurring out of this state, if the  
accident occurs within the United States, its 
territories and possessions or in Canada, and the  
person whose injury is the basis of the claim was  
at the time of the accident a named insured under a  
1245 Mich App 419; 628 NW2d 116 (2001). 
3 
 
personal protection insurance policy, his spouse, a 
relative of either domiciled in the same household  
or an occupant of a vehicle involved in the  
accident whose owner or registrant was insured 
under a personal protection insurance policy or has 
provided security approved by the secretary of 
state under subsection (4) of section 3101.  
[Emphasis added.]  
Plaintiff was not a named insured or a spouse or relative of  
a named insured.  Thus, the statute provides that to obtain  
PIP benefits, plaintiff must qualify as an “occupant” of an  
insured vehicle involved in the accident.  The no-fault act  
does not define the word “occupant.”  
The insurance policy at issue states:  
A. 
We 
do 
not 
provide 
Personal 
Injury 
Protection Coverage for “bodily injury”:  
* * *  
3. Sustained by any “insured” while not  
“occupying” an “auto” if the accident takes place 
outside Michigan.  However, this exclusion does not  
apply to:  
a. You; or  
b. Any “family member”.  
The policy defines “occupying” as “in, upon, getting in, on,  
out or off.”  
B. Case law  
This 
Court 
has 
previously considered whether a person was  
either an “occupant” of, or “occupying,” a vehicle.  In  
Nickerson v Citizens Mut Ins Co, 393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896  
(1975), a case before the no-fault act, the plaintiff left a  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
stalled vehicle and walked to the front of the car.  An  
uninsured 
motorist 
struck the stalled automobile and pushed it  
into the plaintiff, injuring him.  The plaintiff sought  
uninsured-motorist benefits.  The policy provided benefits to  
an “assured” who was “occupying the insured automobile.”  The  
policy defined “occupying” as “in or upon or entering into or  
alighting from.” Id. at 328.  
The Nickerson Court construed the policy against the  
drafter to grant benefits.  Id. at 330. It stated that the  
insured vehicle had touched the plaintiff when he was injured  
and that the plaintiff was thus “upon” the car. Id. at 330­
331.  The Court further suggested that physical contact was  
not required in the circumstances presented in Nickerson.  
In Royal Globe Ins Co v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 419 Mich  
565; 357 NW2d 652 (1984), a priority dispute between two  
insurers hinged on whether the injured person was “an  
occupant” of a company vehicle under § 3114 of the no-fault  
act.  A woman had gotten out of her husband’s company car and  
walked sixty feet to a garage.  The husband then accidently  
struck the garage and his wife with the car.  This Court held  
that she was not “an occupant” of the company car under §  
3114.  This Court distinguished Nickerson as a case predating  
no-fault:  
5  
 
  
And, unlike the concern in Nickerson, what is  
more directly implicated here is the need to 
further the goal of the no-fault act which seeks to 
provide victims of motor vehicle accidents with 
prompt reparation for their losses. That purpose 
is better served in cases such as the one before us  
by the certainty and predictability that a literal 
construction of the word “occupant” will yield, 
when it is assigned its primary and generally 
understood meaning. [Id. at 575.]  
“Whatever her status was after she left the motor vehicle in  
the street and walked some 60 feet to the rear of the garage  
where the [company car] struck her, [the wife] was ‘not an  
occupant’ of the vehicle when she was injured.” Id. at 576.  
Next, in Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co (Rohlman I),  
442 Mich 520; 502 NW2d 310 (1993), the plaintiff was struck  
and injured on a highway in Ohio while attempting to retrieve  
a trailer that had become unhitched from a van.  The plaintiff  
sought PIP benefits and uninsured-motorist benefits from the  
insurer of the van.  This Court held that the plaintiff was  
not an “occupant” of the van for the purpose of obtaining PIP  
benefits.  This Court again noted that Nickerson was a case  
predating no-fault. Under the no-fault act, most “accidents  
are now covered by personal injury protection benefits or the  
assigned claims plan.  Therefore, the repeal of the uninsured  
motorist statute and passage of the no-fault act largely  
eliminated the motivating factors underlying the Nickerson  
decision.” Id. at 529. This Court did not decide whether the  
6  
 
 
policy in Rohlman I afforded broader coverage than the no­
fault act because the parties did not raise that issue.  
In addressing the meaning of “occupant” in § 3111, the  
Rohlman I Court noted that subsection 3106(1)(c) of the no­
fault act provides coverage for a person injured “while  
occupying, entering into, or alighting from [a parked]  
vehicle.” The Rohlman I Court concluded:  
The Legislature expressly recognized that  
“entering into” and “alighting from” are acts 
separate from “occupying” a vehicle. . . . Section 
3111 does not include “entering into” or “alighting 
from” the vehicle as acts that would trigger 
personal protection benefits for an out-of-state 
accident.  
By giving the term occupant its primary and 
generally understood meaning coupled with the above 
statutory reference, we conclude that the plaintiff  
was not an occupant of the van because he was not  
physically inside the van when the accident  
occurred.  We find this interpretation consistent 
with our Royal Globe decision and the intent of the  
no-fault 
act. [Rohlman 
I, 
supra 
at 
531-532  
(emphasis added).]  
The Rohlman I Court remanded the case to the Court of  
Appeals to consider whether the plaintiff was an occupant of  
the trailer for the purposes of the no-fault statute and  
whether the plaintiff was occupying the van or the trailer for  
the purposes of the uninsured-motorist provision of the  
policy.  The Court of Appeals considered those issues on  
remand in Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co (On Remand)  
(Rohlman II), 207 Mich App 344; 526 NW2d 183 (1994).  It  
7  
 
concluded that the plaintiff was not an occupant of the  
trailer under the Rohlman I definition because he was not  
“physically inside” it.  
The policy in Rohlman II required the plaintiff to have  
been “occupying” the insured vehicle to obtain uninsured­
motorist benefits.  The policy defined “occupying” as “in,  
upon, getting in, on, out or off.”  Id. at 351. The Court  
noted that the word “getting” appears to modify the words “in,  
on, out, or off” because the policy could not cover everyone  
who was “out” or “off” the vehicle, and because the word “on”  
was synonymous with “upon,” which was included elsewhere in  
the definition.  The plaintiff was not getting in, on, out, or  
off the van or the trailer when the accident occurred.  
A question remained whether the plaintiff was “upon” the  
van or the trailer.  The Rohlman II Court noted that The  
Random House College Dictionary (Rev ed, 1988) defined “upon”  
to mean “up and on; upward so as to get or be on: He climbed  
upon his horse and rode off.” 
Rohlman II, supra at 356.  
Webster’s 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
defined 
“upon” 
to  
mean “on.”  Rohlman II, supra at 356. The Court acknowledged  
another definition of “upon” listed in the Random House  
dictionary: “in or into complete or approximate contact with,  
as an attacker or an important or pressing occasion: The enemy  
was upon us.  The Christmas holiday will soon be upon us.”  
8  
 
 
 
Rohlman II, supra at 355. 
That latter definition did not  
apply.  
We doubt that anyone would argue that the 
parties to the insurance contract intended that the 
word “upon” be used in the sense of “approximate 
contact . . . with an attacker” or “in close  
proximity . . . with an attack.” Moreover, we are 
convinced that the parties did not intend that 
“upon” 
should 
be 
interpreted 
as 
“immediate  
proximity.”  That interpretation would provide (and 
require payment for) supplemental coverage in the 
form of uninsured motorist benefits for anyone who 
happens to be near the covered auto and injured 
when the auto is struck by an uninsured motorist 
even though the person has no connection with the 
owner, named insured, or covered vehicle. [Id. at  
356-357.]  
Nonetheless, 
the Rohlman II Court suggested that a person  
need not be completely supported by an object to be “upon” it.  
The Court stated that the term requires, at a minimum,  
physical contact with the covered auto when the injury occurs.  
Id. at 357.  The plaintiff was not in physical contact with  
the van when the accident occurred.  A question of fact  
remained, however, whether the plaintiff was in physical  
contact with the trailer at the time of the accident.  The  
Court remanded the case to the trial court to resolve that  
issue.  
C. Analysis and application  
No-fault PIP benefits are not available to plaintiff  
under § 3111. A person must be physically inside a vehicle to  
be an “occupant” of it under the no-fault act.  Rohlman I,  
9  
 
 
supra at 523. Plaintiff was not physically inside the vehicle  
during the accident and thus was not an “occupant” of it.  
We need not reach the question left open in Rohlman I,  
i.e., whether a policy may provide coverage broader than that  
required by the no-fault act. Plaintiff was not “occupying”  
the vehicle under the policy definition of that term.  He was  
outside the vehicle, approximately six inches away from it.  
He was not in the vehicle, nor was he getting in, on, out, or  
off the vehicle when he was injured.  
Plaintiff suggests that he was “upon” the car because he  
was pinned against it after being struck.  Physical contact by  
itself does not, however, establish that a person is “upon” a  
vehicle such that the person is “occupying” the vehicle.2  The  
relevant dictionary definitions discussed above clarify that  
2The dissent, citing plaintiff’s assertion that he was
injured when he was pinned between the two cars, concludes
that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to enable a jury
to conclude that he was “on” or “upon” the insured vehicle
when the accident occurred. However, this analysis fails to
take account that “on” or “upon” must be interpreted in the
context of the word that they are defining: “occupying.”  The 
dissent 
ignores 
the 
definitional word itself because it cannot
be said that plaintiff here was “occupying” the vehicle in
question, however broadly “on” and “upon” are defined.
Further, the arbitrariness of the dissent’s interpretation
must be noted.  Under the dissent’s reasoning, if there are
two persons who are struck by a vehicle while in the vicinity
of the insured vehicle, and if one is thrown into the insured
vehicle while the other is thrown into a tree, a highway, a
curb, or a fence, only the former would be covered by the
policy as interpreted by the dissent.  Such happenstance does
not form a rational basis for understanding the scope of
coverage under an insurance policy. 
10  
 
 
 
 
one must be on or up and on a vehicle in order to be “upon”  
it.3  We reject the dicta in Rohlman II that suggests physical  
contact alone may be sufficient to show that the person was  
“upon” the vehicle so as to be “occupying” the vehicle.4  
We overrule Nickerson because it departed from the plain  
language of the policy definition.  In Royal Globe and Rohlman  
I, this Court observed that the concerns underlying the  
Nickerson decision were not compelling following the passage  
of the no-fault act.  We agree and note that the Nickerson  
Court was bound to apply the clear policy language regardless  
of whether the insurance contract was entered into before the  
no-fault act took effect.  The definition of “occupying” in  
the Nickerson policy is essentially identical to the  
definition in the policy before us.  Because Nickerson did not  
follow that definition, we overrule that decision to the  
extent that it is inconsistent with our analysis here.  Courts  
3The Rohlman II Court properly rejected the definition of
“upon” that refers to close proximity, as in “the enemy is
upon us.”  That definition is wholly inapposite in the context
of physical occupancy and, moreover, it would expand coverage
to anyone near the vehicle regardless of their relationship to
it.  The more pertinent definition of “upon” is “on” or “up
and on.” 
4Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the majority has
not made credibility determinations. We have considered the 
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
nonmoving party, as we must when reviewing an order granting
or denying summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28
(1999). 
11  
  
may 
not 
elevate 
preferential rules of interpretation above the  
unambiguous text of a statute or contract.5 Crowe v Detroit,  
465 Mich 1, 16; 631 NW2d 293 (2001); Koontz v Ameritech  
Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 319; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).  
IV. Conclusion  
Under the policy definition of “occupying” that was  
adopted by the vehicle owner and the insurance company,  
plaintiff was not occupying the insured automobile when he  
sustained 
bodily 
injury.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court  
for entry of an order of summary disposition in favor of  
defendant.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
5The dissent purports to construe the policy against
defendant, but does not explain how or why it believes the
contractual language is unclear.  “[A] court should not create
ambiguity in an insurance policy where the terms of the
contract are clear and precise.  Thus, the terms of a contract
must be enforced as written where there is no ambiguity.”
Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 354; 596
NW2d 190 (1999) (citations omitted). Also, “[t]he fact that
a policy does not define a relevant term does not render the
policy ambiguous.” Id. 
12  
___________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
NICKOLAS REDNOUR,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119187  
HASTINGS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
The majority concludes that the Court of Appeals in  
Rohlman II1 correctly read the policy language at issue here  
when it construed "upon" to mean "on."  However, it rejects  
the Rohlman II conclusion that being "on" an insured  
automobile requires only having contact with it.  
Moreover, the majority concludes that its decision would  
control whenever "upon" is used in an insurance contract.  
Thus, it overrules our holding in Nickerson v Citizens Mut Ins  
1Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co (On Remand) (Rohlman 
II), 207 Mich App 344; 526 NW2d 183 (1994). 
Co,2 although the policy language at issue in that case is not  
present here.  
I 
dissent 
from 
the 
majority's 
holding 
because, 
construing  
the disputed terms against the drafter, I find that plaintiff  
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the  
policy covers his injuries.  Thus, defendant was not entitled  
to summary disposition.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Plaintiff 
was 
driving a vehicle insured by defendant when  
the rear tire of the vehicle went flat.  As plaintiff was  
changing the tire, he was struck by an oncoming vehicle.  
He filed with defendant a claim for personal injury  
protection (PIP) benefits.  Defendant denied the claim.  
Plaintiff then brought an action for benefits in the circuit  
court. In his complaint, plaintiff contended that defendant  
owed him PIP benefits because, under the terms of the policy,  
he was "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the  
accident. Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(10), and the trial court granted the motion.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held  
that, under the language of the contract, it was unclear  
whether plaintiff, when injured, was an "occupant" of the  
insured vehicle. 
Accordingly, it construed the policy  
2393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896 (1975). 
2 
language against defendant, its drafter.  The Court then  
concluded that plaintiff was an occupant of the vehicle.  
Defendant 
filed 
an application for leave to appeal, which  
we granted.  The majority now reverses the Court of Appeals  
and holds that plaintiff was not an occupant of the insured  
vehicle.  
II. DISCUSSION  
Issues of contract interpretation are questions of law  
that we review de novo.  Archambo v Lawyers Title Ins Corp,  
466 Mich 402, 408; 646 NW2d 170 (2002). When interpreting a  
contract, we first consider the language of the contract.  If  
it is unambiguous, we apply it as written.  
If the language, reasonably read, has more than one  
meaning, we are required to interpret it.  In so doing, we  
construe ambiguous language against its drafter.  
A. OCCUPANCY UNDER THE NO-FAULT ACT  
MCL 500.3111 prescribes when PIP benefits are available  
for out-of-state automobile accidents. It provides:  
Personal protection insurance benefits are 
payable for accidental bodily injury suffered in an 
accident occurring out of this state, if the  
accident occurs within the United States, its 
territories and possessions or in Canada, and the 
person whose injury is the basis of the claim was 
at the time of the accident a named insured under a  
personal protection insurance policy, his spouse, a 
relative of either domiciled in the same household  
or an occupant of a vehicle involved in the 
accident whose owner or registrant was insured 
under a personal protection insurance policy or has  
3  
 
 
provided security approved by the secretary of 
state under subsection (4) of section 3101.  
Although the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., does not  
further define the term "occupant," we have previously  
considered its meaning as used in the act.  
In Royal Globe Ins Co v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co,3 we  
stated that the purposes of the act are best served "by the  
certainty and predictability that a literal construction of  
the word 'occupant' will yield when it is assigned its primary  
and generally understood meaning." Id. at 575.  
We also discussed the meaning of "occupant" in the act in  
the case of Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co (Rohlman I), 442  
Mich 520; 502 NW2d 310 (1993).  After first noting that  
subsection 3106(1)(c) provides benefits for persons injured  
"while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the  
vehicle," we concluded that:  
The Legislature expressly recognized that  
"entering into" and "alighting from" are acts 
separate from "occupying" a vehicle. . . . Section  
3111 does not include "entering into" or "alighting 
from" the vehicle as acts that would trigger 
personal protection benefits for an out-of-state 
accident.  
By giving the term occupant its primary and 
generally understood meaning coupled with the above 
statutory reference, we conclude that the plaintiff 
was not an occupant of the van because he was not 
physically inside the van when the accident  
occurred. . . . [Id. at 531-532.]  
3419 Mich 565; 357 NW2d 652 (1984). 
4 
 
Applying the ordinary definition of "occupant" to this case,  
it is evident that plaintiff was not an occupant of the  
insured vehicle for purposes of the no-fault act.  
B. OCCUPANCY UNDER THE HASTINGS POLICY  
Although 
plaintiff 
cannot 
receive 
benefits 
under 
the 
act,  
it does not necessarily follow that he cannot receive benefits  
under the insurance policy issued by defendant.  
The policy states:  
A. 
We 
do 
not 
provide 
Personal Injury 
Protection Coverage for "bodily injury":  
* * *  
3. 
Sustained by any "insured" while not 
occupying an "auto" if the accident takes place 
outside Michigan.  
The policy defines "occupying" as "in, upon, getting in, on,  
out, or off." 
In Nickerson, a case interpreting an  
automobile-insurance policy, this Court held that a plaintiff  
was an occupant of an insured vehicle under circumstances  
similar to those in this case.  
The policy in Nickerson defined "occupant" as a person  
who was "in or upon or entering into or alighting from" an  
insured vehicle.  Nickerson, supra at 328. Applying the rules  
of contract interpretation to that language, the Nickerson  
Court held that the policy extended to plaintiff's injuries.  
It applied a standard definition of "upon" to the policy  
language.
 It then concluded that the plaintiff was an  
5  
 
occupant of the car under the terms of the policy because he  
was "on" the insured car at the time of the accident.  
In Rohlman II, the Court of Appeals reached a similar  
result.  In that case, the policy language was analogous to  
that used in the policy at issue in this case. It defined an  
"occup[ant]" as a person who was "in, upon, getting in, on,  
out or off" an insured vehicle. Rohlman II, supra at 350.  
In interpreting this language, the Court of Appeals held  
that, in the context of the policy's definition of "occupant,"  
the term "upon" was merely a substitute for the term "on."  
Accordingly, the Court held that a person who was completely  
out or off the vehicle was not an occupant under the policy.  
However, it also held that, where a person is injured while he  
is in contact with an insured vehicle, he is "on" the vehicle  
and an "occupant" of the vehicle for purposes of the insurance  
contract.  
C. APPLICATION  
1. DEFENDANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION  
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(10).  A motion under that rule tests the legal  
sufficiency of a claim.  Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club,  
466 Mich 155, 163; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).  "In reviewing a  
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition 
brought 
under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10),  
a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions,  
6  
  
admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or  
submitted by the parties . . . ." Quinto v Cross & Peters Co,  
451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Summary disposition  
is appropriate if the evidence demonstrates that there is no  
genuine issue concerning any material fact and the moving  
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Haliw v  
Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 302; 627 NW2d 581 (2001).  
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition, courts  
are required to construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving  
party, in this case, the plaintiff.  Quinto, supra. Moreover,  
courts may not assess credibility in considering whether to  
grant the motion. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161;  
516 NW2d 475 (1994). However, in this case, in reaching its  
holding, the majority construes the facts in defendant's  
favor.  
At the hearing on defendant's motion for summary  
disposition, 
plaintiff 
argued 
that 
his 
injuries 
occurred 
while  
he was pinned between the cars.  Defendant argued that  
plaintiff sustained his injuries before he came into contact  
with the insured auto.  In support of their arguments, both  
parties relied on statements that plaintiff made in reporting  
the accident to the police.  To determine whether this dispute  
regarding the mechanism of plaintiff's injuries presents an  
issue of material fact, we need only apply the majority's own  
7  
 
 
  
interpretation of the policy language.  
The 
majority 
asserts 
that 
the 
sole 
reasonable  
interpretation of "upon" in the context of this contract is  
that it means simply "on."  Ante at 10 n 2.  It then concludes  
that plaintiff did not suffer his injuries while he was "on"  
the car.  
However, Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2000  
ed) indicates that "on" means: "so as to be or remain  
supported by or suspended from . . . ."  A person who is  
pinned between two automobiles is supported by them.  Thus,  
plaintiff has alleged facts that, if believed by a jury, would  
support a finding that plaintiff was "on" the insured  
automobile at the time of the accident.  
Given this analysis, I find unconvincing the majority's  
bald assertion that substituting the word "on" for "upon"  
necessitates a finding that the policy excludes coverage for  
plaintiff's injuries.4  
4Although I have not joined in the majority's reliance on Rohlman II, I also have not 
advanced the definition that the majority would assign to me.  Ante at 10 n 2. I follow the 
majority's own interpretation of this policy's language.  In doing so, I agree that "upon" refers 
to "occupying."  However, "upon" is meant to define "occupying," not the other way around. 
The Hastings policy provided: 
II. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE INSURING 
AGREEMENT 
A. We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or for an 
(continued...) 
8  
4(...continued) 
"insured" who sustains "bodily injury".  The "bodily injury" must: 
1. Be caused by accident; and 
2. Result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an "auto" as an 
"auto" 
The Hastings policy also states that: 
2. "Auto accident" means a loss involving the ownership, operation, 
maintenance or use of an "auto" as an "auto" . . . . 
An "insured" is 
1. You or any "family member" injured in an "auto accident"; 
2. Anyone else injured in an "auto accident" : 
a. While "occupying" "your covered auto"; or 
b. If the accident involves any other "auto": 
(1) Which is operated by you or any "family member"; and 
(2) To which Part A of this policy applies. 
c. While not occupying any "auto" if the accident involves "your 
covered auto". 
Consequently, neither of the plaintiffs in the majority's hypothetical example would recover 
because, under the policy, there would not be a sufficient nexus between their injuries and 
the insured vehicle. 
Given the policy's limitations on liability, the majority's application of its definition 
is arbitrary.  Under its application, plaintiff would have been able to recover if he had stayed 
in the vehicle and been injured when it was hit by the other car.  However, because plaintiff 
left the car to change the tire, plaintiff cannot recover, even if he sustained injuries while he 
was on the car.  I cannot accept that this was the intent of the parties when agreeing to this 
policy. 
The majority asserts that a person must be "on" a vehicle to be an occupant under the 
Hastings policy.  But it fails to explain why the straightforward application of its own 
(continued...) 
9  
 
 
2. THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF NICKERSON  
The majority also holds that Nickerson was wrongly  
decided because it departed from the language of the insurance  
policy at issue there.  It appears to me inappropriate for the  
Court to make that decision given the Citizens Mutual policy  
language.  
That language differed significantly from the Hastings  
language at issue in this case.  Thus, I would reserve  
judgment on the continuing viability of Nickerson until the  
Court is presented with an issue regarding the interpretation  
of the policy language in that case.  
CONCLUSION  
Plaintiff has presented a genuine question of material  
fact concerning whether he was an occupant of the insured  
vehicle at the time he was injured.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the  
plaintiff, defendant has not established that it is entitled  
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.  Regardless of  
the definition advanced by the majority, the evidence adduced  
at the hearing on defendant's motion for summary disposition  
failed in this respect:  it did not conclusively establish  
that plaintiff was not "upon" the vehicle at the time of the  
4(...continued) 
definition is inapplicable in this case. 
10  
accident.  
If a jury believed the facts presented by plaintiff, it  
could conclude that plaintiff was on the car when injured,  
hence he was an occupant.  It follows that summary disposition  
was improper.  
Accordingly, I would remand the case to the circuit court  
for trial on the merits.  
Marilyn Kelly  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the conclusion reached by Justice Kelly.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
11