Title: City of Eau Claire v. Booth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000869
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2016

2016 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP869 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
City of Eau Claire, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Melissa M. Booth, n/k/a Melissa M. Booth 
Britton, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Gabler, Sr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by Douglas 
J. Hoffer, assistant district attorney and Jenessa Stromberger, 
assistant district attorney, and oral argument by Douglas J. 
Hoffer. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Diane C. 
Lowe and Lowe Law, L.L.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by 
Diane C. Lowe.  
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Sarah Schmeiser and 
Tracy Wood & Associates, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.   
 
 
2016 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP869 
(L.C.  
2014GF804) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Eau Claire, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Melissa M. Booth, n/k/a Melissa M. Booth Britton, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire 
County, William M. Gabler, Sr., Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on the City of Eau Claire's petition to bypass the court of 
appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2013-14).1  We 
are asked to determine whether a circuit court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter a civil forfeiture under a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.  Although this 
case involves a 1992 violation, no changes to the applicable 
statutes are dispositive of the issue we address. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
2 
 
municipal 
ordinance 
for 
a 
first-offense 
operating 
while 
intoxicated (OWI) that factually should have been criminally 
charged as a second-offense OWI due to an undiscovered prior 
countable conviction.2  We conclude that a circuit court lacks 
competency but retains subject matter jurisdiction when it 
enters a civil forfeiture judgment for a first-offense OWI that 
should have been criminally charged as a second-offense OWI due 
to an undiscovered prior countable offense.  Unlike defects in 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, 
challenges 
to 
circuit 
court 
competency may be forfeited.  We conclude that Melissa M. Booth 
Britton forfeited her right to challenge her 1992 first-offense 
OWI judgment by failing to timely raise it; as a result, the 
circuit court erred when it granted her motion to reopen and 
vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment.  
Therefore, we reverse with directions to the circuit court to 
reinstate Booth Britton's 1992 first-offense OWI judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In 1990, Booth Britton was convicted in Minnesota of a 
first-offense OWI.  In 1992, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court 
entered a civil forfeiture judgment against Booth Britton for 
another first-offense OWI.  The Eau Claire City Attorney 
prosecuted Booth Britton in the 1992 OWI action.  The record 
                                                 
2 The petition to bypass states an additional issue:  "Is a 
municipality legally precluded from pursuing a civil OWI 
citation if the defendant could also be charged criminally?"  
The briefs and oral argument, however, did not sufficiently 
address this issue.  As a result, we do not consider it. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
3 
 
does not indicate the reason why the 1992 offense was charged as 
a first offense rather than a second offense.  However, the 
parties appear to agree that the countable 1990 Minnesota 
conviction was unknown to the City Attorney's office when it 
prosecuted the 1992 OWI as a first offense.3 
¶3 
In 2014, Booth Britton filed a motion to reopen and 
vacate her 1992 Eau Claire County first-offense OWI civil 
forfeiture judgment because "it was [a] second OWI offense 
improperly charged as a first offense."  At the time Booth 
Britton filed her motion to reopen and vacate the 1992 OWI, she 
had OWI (7th, 8th, or 9th) related charges pending against her 
in Douglas County.  She argued that because the 1992 OWI should 
have been charged as a criminal second-offense OWI, the circuit 
court must void her 1992 judgment for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The City responded that any "[a]lleged defects in 
the 1992 action may have implicated court competency, but did 
not implicate subject matter jurisdiction."  The City argued 
Booth Britton forfeited any right to challenge the 1992 OWI 
civil forfeiture judgment by failing to object in the 1992 
circuit court action. 
¶4 
The circuit court voided the 1992 conviction on 
subject matter jurisdiction grounds.  It relied on County of 
                                                 
3 The only remaining record related to the 1992 OWI is the 
citation Booth Britton received from a City of Eau Claire police 
officer.  This citation indicates that Booth Britton violated 
City of Eau Claire Ordinance 10.04, which adopted Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a). 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
4 
 
Walworth v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982), 
concluding that "[s]ince a second offense OWI cannot be 
prosecuted 
as 
a 
civil 
action 
in 
Wisconsin, 
the 
Court 
Commissioner did not have the proper jurisdiction in the 1992 
prosecution to render a civil judgment." 
¶5 
The City filed a notice of intent to appeal and both 
parties filed briefs with the court of appeals.  The City then 
filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.60, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶6 
We independently review questions of subject matter 
jurisdiction and competency.  See Vill. of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶7, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  We also 
independently review whether a party forfeits the right to 
challenge circuit court competency.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶7 
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided by 
law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal within this state . . . ."  Subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, 
established 
by 
this 
section 
of 
our 
constitution, "refers to the power of a court to decide certain 
types of actions."  See State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 
Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508.  Because this power is granted to 
circuit courts by our constitution, it cannot be "curtailed by 
state statute."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶8; see also Eberhardy 
v. Circuit Court for Wood Cty., 102 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 307 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
5 
 
N.W.2d 881 (1981) (noting that the constitutional language "only 
allows for a legislative reallocation of jurisdiction from the 
circuit court to another court").  However, "a circuit court's 
ability to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction vested in it 
by the constitution may be affected by noncompliance with 
statutory requirements pertaining to the invocation of that 
jurisdiction in individual cases."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶9.  
Noncompliance 
with 
statutory 
mandates 
affects 
a 
court's 
competency 
and 
"a 
court's 
'competency,' 
as 
the 
term 
is 
understood in Wisconsin, is not jurisdictional at all, but 
instead, is defined as 'the power of a court to exercise its 
subject matter jurisdiction' in a particular case."  Smith, 283 
Wis. 2d 57, ¶18 (quoting Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 204 Wis. 2d 327, 
337, 555 N.W.2d 640 (1996)). 
¶8 
Here, 
the 
parties 
disagree 
as 
to 
whether 
the 
mischarged OWI affected the circuit court's subject matter 
jurisdiction or its competency.  The City argues that Booth 
Britton's objections to her 1992 OWI conviction implicate court 
competency rather than subject matter jurisdiction.  The City 
further asserts that Booth Britton forfeited her right to 
challenge the circuit court's competency when she failed to 
object to the OWI first offense in the 1992 circuit court 
action.  The City primarily relies on our 2004 decision in 
Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶1, which stated that "a circuit court 
is never without subject matter jurisdiction."  Booth Britton, 
in contrast, points to Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 722, a 1982 
decision, which she argues held that circuit courts do not have 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
6 
 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
subsequent 
criminal 
OWI 
offenses that were improperly charged and tried as civil first 
offenses.  Booth Britton asserts then that her 1992 OWI 
conviction is void under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d).4  We reject 
Booth Britton's argument. 
A 
¶9 
In Rohner, the defendant, Paul Rohner, was cited for a 
first-offense OWI in violation of a county ordinance despite the 
fact that he had a prior countable OWI conviction.  Rohner, 108 
Wis. 2d at 715.  Rohner contemporaneously objected to the 
improper charge in the circuit court and argued that the 
improper 
charging 
resulted 
in 
a 
lack 
of 
subject 
matter 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 is titled: "Relief from judgment 
or order."  This section "attempts to achieve a balance between 
fairness in the resolution of disputes and the policy favoring 
the finality of judgments."  Edland v. Wis. Physicians Serv. 
Ins. Corp., 210 Wis. 2d 638, 644, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997).   
Section (1)(d) allows for relief "from a judgment, order or 
stipulation" "on motion and upon such terms as are just" if 
"[t]he judgment is void."  Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d). 
In her supplemental brief to this court, Booth Britton 
appears to raise an alternative argument for relief based on 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), which allows for consideration of 
"[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment."  This subsection is to be used sparingly in 
extraordinary 
cases 
and 
any 
motion 
for 
relief 
based 
on 
§ 806.07(1)(h) must be brought within a reasonable time period.  
Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶35-36, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  We do not address whether Booth 
Britton meets the legal standards to obtain relief under 
§ 806.07(1)(h) because she failed to request relief under this 
subsection in her motion to vacate her 1992 conviction.  See 
id., ¶37. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
7 
 
jurisdiction because he should have been charged with a second-
offense OWI under state law rather than a first-offense OWI 
under a municipal ordinance.  Id.  The circuit court disagreed, 
reasoning that it had "jurisdiction" because "the district 
attorney had the prosecutorial discretion to charge under either 
the ordinance violation or the state statute."  Id.  We 
disagreed and reversed the circuit court. 
¶10 In doing so, we reviewed the statutory language 
governing OWI penalties in Wisconsin, prior cases interpreting 
that language, legislative history, and the purpose of drunk 
driving laws generally to conclude "that the legislature 
intended a second offense for drunk driving to be within the 
exclusive province of the state to prosecute as a crime."  Id. 
at 716-21.  Therefore, under our OWI statutes, a prosecutor has 
no discretion to charge what is factually a second-offense OWI 
as a first-offense municipal ordinance OWI.  Id. at 721.  As a 
result, we held that "[b]ecause the complaint is to be dismissed 
for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, there could not have 
been a valid proceeding against Rohner."  Id. at 722 (emphasis 
added). 
¶11 Following Rohner, we decided Mikrut, which made great 
strides in clarifying the concepts of circuit court competency 
and subject matter jurisdiction.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶¶1-3, 
8-14.  In Mikrut, the circuit court imposed forfeitures on the 
defendant for multiple violations of village ordinances.  Id., 
¶4.  After the defendant exhausted his direct appeal rights, he 
filed a motion to vacate the circuit court's order and judgment, 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
8 
 
claiming the Village's noncompliance with certain aspects of the 
ordinances 
deprived 
the 
circuit 
court 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.  Id., ¶6.  We disagreed and held that any defect 
caused by noncompliance with the applicable ordinances affected 
court competency but not subject matter jurisdiction.  See id., 
¶¶2-3.  We also concluded that challenges to court competency 
are forfeited5 if not timely raised in the circuit court.  Id., 
¶¶30, 38.  Mikrut, however, explained that even when a challenge 
to circuit court competency is forfeited: 
[A] 
reviewing 
court 
has 
inherent 
authority 
to 
disregard a [forfeiture] and address a competency 
argument in appropriate cases.  Also, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 751.06 and 752.35 may provide an avenue for 
discretionary 
review 
of 
an 
otherwise 
[forfeited] 
competency challenge in extraordinary cases.  In 
addition, Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) may provide a 
vehicle for collateral relief from judgment on the 
basis of an otherwise [forfeited] competency argument—
—again, however, only in extraordinary cases. 
Id., ¶38.  We did not address Mikrut's competency argument; 
instead, we held he forfeited his challenge to court competency 
by failing to make a timely objection in the circuit court.  
Id., ¶31. 
                                                 
5 Although Mikrut used the term "waiver" instead of 
"forfeiture," we have since clarified that "[a]lthough cases 
sometimes 
use 
the 
words 
'forfeiture' 
and 
'waiver' 
interchangeably, the two words embody very different legal 
concepts.  'Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely 
assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right.'"  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 
¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (quoting United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).  Properly construed, although 
Mikrut says "waiver" it means "forfeiture." 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
9 
 
¶12 In setting forth the law in Wisconsin on subject 
matter jurisdiction and competency and differentiating between 
these two related concepts, Mikrut relied on Article VII, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We explained: 
Circuit courts in Wisconsin are constitutional courts 
with general original subject matter jurisdiction over 
"all matters civil and criminal."  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 8.  Accordingly, a circuit court is never 
without subject matter jurisdiction. 
A circuit court's ability to exercise its subject 
matter jurisdiction in individual cases, however, may 
be 
affected 
by 
noncompliance 
with 
statutory 
requirements pertaining to the invocation of that 
jurisdiction.  The failure to comply with these 
statutory conditions does not negate subject matter 
jurisdiction 
but 
may 
under 
certain 
circumstances 
affect the circuit court's competency to proceed to 
judgment in the particular case before the court.  A 
judgment rendered under these circumstances may be 
erroneous or invalid because of the circuit court's 
loss of competency but is not void for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶¶1-2. 
¶13 Thus, Rohner and Mikrut contain conflicting language.  
In the former6 we determined that a circuit court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction in an action where the prosecutor knowingly  
mischarged an OWI first offense that should have been criminally 
                                                 
6 There are two notable factual differences between Rohner 
and this case.  First, Rohner did not appear to involve an 
unknown out-of-state prior OWI conviction.  Cty. of Walworth  v. 
Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 715, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982).  Second, 
the defendant in Rohner filed a motion to dismiss the improperly 
charged first-offense OWI in a timely manner by raising it in 
the original circuit court action instead of waiting 22 years 
and many OWI convictions later.  See id. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
10 
 
charged as a second-offense OWI due to a prior countable 
conviction.  In the latter, we stated that a circuit court's 
noncompliance with statutory mandates may affect a circuit 
court's 
competency, 
but 
does 
not 
negate 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.7 
¶14 We harmonize the conflicting language in Rohner and 
Mikrut and determine that mischarging an OWI affects competency, 
not subject matter jurisdiction.  At the time we decided Rohner, 
our case law did not clearly distinguish between the concepts of 
subject matter jurisdiction and competency.  See Xcel Energy 
Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶27 n.8, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 
N.W.2d 665 (explaining that older case law does not clearly 
differentiate between the two concepts).  Our decision in Mikrut 
further clarified Wisconsin's jurisprudence on the distinct, but 
related concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and competency.  
Although 
Rohner 
referred 
to 
a 
lack 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction due to noncompliance with state statutes, we 
clarified, in Mikrut, that noncompliance with statutory mandates  
affects only a court's competency and will never affect its 
                                                 
7 As a result of the conflicting language in Mikrut and 
Rohner, the court of appeals has reached different results in a 
series of recent unpublished opinions involving mischarged 
first-offense OWIs.  Compare, e.g., State v. Navrestad, No. 
2014AP2273, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 2, 2015) 
(following Mikrut and determining that the circuit court lacked 
competency) with City of Stevens Point v. Lowery, No. 2014AP742, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (following 
Rohner and determining that the circuit court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction) and Clark Cty. v. Potts, No. 2012AP2001, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 28, 2013) (same). 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
11 
 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.8 
 
As 
a 
result, 
the 
proper 
characterization of the circuit court's deficiency in Rohner was 
loss of circuit court competency to proceed to judgment rather 
than negation of subject matter jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we 
withdraw any language from Rohner and any other case that 
suggests otherwise. 
¶15 Our decision to withdraw such language leaves intact 
Rohner's holding "that the state has exclusive jurisdiction over 
a second offense for drunk driving."  See Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 
716.  Furthermore, nothing in our decision today alters Rohner's 
confirmation of our state's policy to strictly enforce drunk 
driving laws.9  See id. at 721. 
¶16 Finally, Booth Britton relies on State v. Bush, 2005 
WI 103, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80, to assert that the 
circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the 
1992 OWI action because "[i]f a complaint fails to state an 
                                                 
8 The fact that Mikrut did not cite to Rohner in clarifying 
the concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and court competency 
does not impact our decision.  See Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶42 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (recognizing that Mikrut "cast[] 
great doubt" on many prior opinions not specifically discussed 
by the opinion). 
9 Although under our decision today Booth Britton's 1992 
undercharged OWI first-offense conviction stands, we note that 
affirming the circuit court's decision to vacate the 1992 
conviction with prejudice would do nothing to further our 
state's policy of strictly enforcing OWI laws.  Instead, 
affirming the circuit court's dismissal with prejudice would 
erase the 1992 conviction, prevent it from being counted in 
subsequent OWI prosecutions, and forever prohibit the State from 
correctly charging Booth Britton for the 1992 OWI offense. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
12 
 
offense known at law, no matter civil or criminal is before the 
court, resulting in the court being without jurisdiction in the 
first instance."  Booth Britton specifically argues that the 
circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction because "a 
second offense criminal OWI charged as a first offense civil OWI 
is not an offense known at law."  Put differently, "[w]here the 
offense charged does not exist, the trial court lacks [subject 
matter] jurisdiction."  State v. Christensen, 110 Wis. 2d 538, 
542, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983).  Booth Britton's argument fails 
because first-offense and second-offense OWIs are both offenses 
known at law as set forth in our statutes.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1), 346.65(2)(am)1.-2.  In addition, Booth Britton was 
charged with a first-offense OWI, an offense that irrefutably 
exists under our statutes.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1), 
346.65(2)(am)1.  The parties appear to agree that Booth Britton 
was mischarged in 1992 because the City Attorney's office failed 
to discover the prior first-offense Minnesota OWI and because 
she failed to disclose it.  The fact she should have been 
charged with a second-offense OWI, which would have increased 
the penalty imposed when convicted in 1992, does not make her 
1992 drunk-driving offense lawful conduct. 
¶17 Booth Britton's argument fails for another reason as 
well:  Bush's conclusion that a court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction if a complaint fails to state an offense known at 
law is not entirely accurate.  See Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶18.  
Bush states:  "If a complaint fails to state an offense known at 
law, no matter civil or criminal is before the court, resulting 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
13 
 
in the court being without jurisdiction in the first instance."  
Id., ¶18 (emphasis added).  A court, however, cannot be without 
jurisdiction "in the first instance" because when "a complaint 
fails to state an offense known at law," id., the court must 
retain subject matter jurisdiction to dispose of the matter. 
¶18 We also clarify Bush's brief discussion of the 
interplay 
between 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
and 
facial 
challenges to the constitutionality of statutes.  Id., ¶17.  In 
Bush, where the constitutionality of a statute was challenged, 
the court asserted that "[i]f a statute is unconstitutional on 
its face, any action premised upon that statute fails to present 
any civil or criminal matter in the first instance" and "if the 
facial attack on the statute were correct, the statute would be 
null and void, and the court would be without the power to act 
under the statute."  Id. (emphasis added).  In Bush, the court 
construed a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute as implicating a court's subject matter jurisdiction:  
"We conclude that because Bush has facially challenged the 
constitutionality of chapter 980, his challenge goes to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court."  Id., ¶19.  Bush 
ultimately 
concluded 
that 
chapter 
980 
is 
not 
facially 
unconstitutional.  Id., ¶40.  If, as Bush suggests, a facially 
unconstitutional statute negates a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction, the court would be constrained from ever ruling on 
the constitutionality of the statute.  However, "no circuit 
court is without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 
actions of any nature whatsoever."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶8 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
14 
 
(quoting Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 313 N.W.2d 790 
(1982)).10  Bush likely meant that if a statute is facially 
unconstitutional, the court lacks the power to enforce it 
because such statute would be void.  We withdraw any language 
from Bush purporting to impair the ability of a court to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to the 
constitutionality of a statute. 
¶19 Based on the Wisconsin Constitution's broad grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction to circuit courts as well as this 
court's clarification of the principles of subject matter 
jurisdiction and competency in Mikrut, we conclude that the 
circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 1992 OWI 
first-offense action.  Therefore, the 1992 civil forfeiture 
                                                 
10 We recognize that the broad constitutional grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court is subject to 
the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law."  See Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 8.  This phrase, however,  
only 
allows 
for 
a 
legislative 
reallocation 
of 
jurisdiction from the circuit court to another court.  
It does not permit the legislature to divest the 
constitutional grant of jurisdiction from the unified 
court system; and under the unified system created by 
the amendment of 1977, original jurisdiction is vested 
wholly in the circuit court. 
Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood Cty., 102 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 
307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).  Put differently, this limiting phrase 
forecloses the legislature from enacting a statute that would 
circumscribe the broad constitutional grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction to circuit courts.  See Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. 
LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶27, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665; Mikrut, 
273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶8; Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 549-50. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
15 
 
judgment is not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d).  
B 
¶20 Having determined that the circuit court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the 1992 OWI, we next consider the 
circuit court's competency to exercise its subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See Vill. of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, 
¶16, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121 ("The circuit court's 
determination of competency refers to its 'ability to exercise 
the subject matter jurisdiction vested in it' by Article VII, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.") (quoting Mikrut, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, ¶9). 
¶21 As previously indicated, a circuit court may lose 
competency to enter judgment in a particular case if statutory 
requirements are not met.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶9.  We have 
explained that "a failure to comply with a statutory mandate 
pertaining to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction may 
result in a loss of the circuit court's competency to adjudicate 
the particular case before the court."  Id.  Statutory 
noncompliance results in a lack of circuit court competency 
"[o]nly when the failure to abide by a statutory mandate is 
'central to the statutory scheme' of which it is a part . . . ."  
Id., ¶10 (citing State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 567-68, 587 
N.W.2d 908 
(Ct. 
App. 
1998) 
and 
Arreola 
v. 
State, 
199 
Wis. 2d 426, 441, 544 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1996)).  Even when a 
court lacks competency to proceed to judgment, a challenge to 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
16 
 
court competency can be forfeited if not timely raised in the 
circuit court.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶38. 
¶22 Here, the circuit court lacked competency to proceed 
to judgment in Booth Britton's 1992 OWI case because mischarging 
a second-offense OWI as a first-offense OWI results in a failure 
to abide by mandatory OWI penalties central to the escalating 
penalty scheme.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) prohibits 
operation of a motor vehicle while "[u]nder the influence of an 
intoxicant . . . ."  Violations of § 346.63(1) are penalized 
under an escalating penalty scale.  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2).  A 
first-offense OWI conviction is civil in nature and punishable 
by forfeiture.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.11  Under the 
current OWI penalty scheme, penalties for subsequent OWI 
convictions generally depend on the total lifetime number of 
convictions under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.09(1) and 940.25, plus 
countable "suspensions, revocations, and other convictions" 
under § 343.307(1).  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2.-7.  At the 
time of Booth Britton's 1992 OWI in Eau Claire County, the 
escalating penalty scheme was similar to the current penalty 
scheme except that it counted "the total number of suspensions, 
revocations and convictions" under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) in a 
five-year period.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(b)-(e) (1991-
92) with Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2.-7. 
                                                 
11 The same was true of first-offense OWIs when Booth 
Britton was cited for her 1992 OWI in Eau Claire County.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (1991-92). 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
17 
 
¶23 The parties agree that Booth Britton's 1990 Minnesota 
conviction was a prior countable OWI offense under Wisconsin's 
OWI penalty scheme; therefore, her 1992 first-offense OWI in Eau 
Claire County was in fact a second-offense OWI, and therefore 
should have been charged as a criminal offense.  The parties' 
analysis is correct.  The legislature's use of "shall" in 
Wisconsin's 
OWI 
escalating 
penalty 
scheme, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2), is mandatory and, as a result, criminal penalties 
are required of all OWI convictions following an OWI first-
offense conviction.  See, e.g., Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 717-18; 
State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 39, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981).  
Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) requires a court to 
count "[c]onvictions under the law of another jurisdiction that 
prohibits a person from . . . using a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated . . . as those or substantially similar terms are 
used in that jurisdiction's laws."  A Minnesota OWI is a 
countable conviction under Wisconsin's OWI penalty scheme.  
State v. White, 177 Wis. 2d 121, 125, 501 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 
1993). ("Minnesota OWI convictions count as prior convictions 
under sec. 346.65(2), Stats., because the Minnesota OWI statute 
meets the prerequisites of sec. 343.307."). 
¶24 The central concept underlying the mandatory OWI 
escalating 
penalty 
scheme 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am) 
is 
exposure 
to 
progressively 
more 
severe 
penalties for each subsequent OWI conviction as the number of 
countable convictions increases.  See State v. Williams, 2014 WI 
64, ¶30, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467.  That Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
18 
 
§ 346.65(2)(am)2.-7. set forth escalating penalties for OWI-
related convictions is apparent from a plain reading of these 
statutes. 
 
Compare, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)3. 
(governing a third-offense OWI conviction and imposing a minimum 
of 45 days of imprisonment in the county jail), with Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)4. (governing fourth-offense OWI convictions, 
generally, and imposing a minimum of 60 days of imprisonment); 
see also Williams, 355 Wis. 2d 581, ¶32 ("Even a cursory glance 
at the structure of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am) reveals a 
pattern: the mandatory minimum sentences generally increase with 
the number of OWIs.").  In addition, "[t]he statutory history of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) reveals a general trend toward harsher 
mandatory minimum sentences as the number of OWIs increases."  
Williams, 355 Wis. 2d 581, ¶30.  As we explained in Williams, 
"the 
current 
statute 
makes 
eight 
different 
OWI-offense 
distinctions and provides increasing penalties depending on the 
number of OWIs the offender has committed and, in some 
instances, on the temporal proximity of an offense to the 
offender's previous OWI."  Id.  This escalating penalty scheme 
is frustrated if an OWI is mischarged as a civil first offense 
rather than a criminal second offense due to an undiscovered 
prior countable offense.  Accordingly, failure to abide by the 
mandatory penalty scheme in Booth Britton's 1992 OWI case 
resulted in a loss of circuit court competency. 
¶25 The lack of circuit court competency in this case does 
not end the matter, however.  Booth Britton did not timely 
object to the circuit court's competency in the 1992 circuit 
No. 
2015AP869   
 
19 
 
court action.  In fact, she did not challenge her mischarged 
1992 OWI until 2014.  Booth Britton's considerable delay in 
raising the issue suggests an attempt to play fast and loose 
with the court system, which is something this court frowns 
upon.  See State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 346-47, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996).  We conclude that Booth Britton forfeited her 
ability to challenge the 1992 OWI first-offense civil forfeiture 
judgment.  We decline to exercise our inherent authority to 
reach a challenge that Booth Britton forfeited and then waited 
22 years to raise. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 We conclude that the circuit court, while retaining 
subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, lacked competency 
to enter a civil judgment of conviction for a first-offense OWI 
that factually should have been charged criminally as a second-
offense OWI due to a prior countable OWI conviction.  Here, 
Booth Britton forfeited her challenge to the circuit court's 
competency when she failed to raise any objection to the first-
offense OWI charge in the original 1992 action. 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶27 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided 
by 
law, 
the 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state 
and 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
circuit 
as 
the 
legislature may prescribe by law."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8 
(emphasis added).   
¶28 The instant case is an example of the interplay 
between two confusing doctrines this court has developed in 
interpreting this constitutional provision: a circuit court's 
subject matter jurisdiction and a circuit court's competency.1  
¶29 In addressing whether an error in a proceeding results 
in a circuit court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction or lack 
of competency, the essential issue is which of two competing 
                                                 
1 See State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, ¶16, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 
N.W.2d 80 
("[T]he 
jurisprudence 
concerning 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction and a circuit court's competence to exercise its 
subject matter jurisdiction is murky at best.").   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
2 
 
principles is to govern: the validity of a judgment or the 
finality of a judgment?2    
¶30 Labeling an error as resulting in a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction gives greater emphasis to the error and the 
invalidity of the judgment.  If the circuit court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction, the error renders the judgment 
void.3  A void judgment is forever vulnerable to attack.4       
                                                 
2 For discussions of the competing values of validity and 
finality in judgments, see, for example, Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 12 cmt. a at 116-17 (1982); Edward T. Matthews, 
Civil Procedure: The Unfortunate Elevation of Finality Over 
Validity——Bode v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 28 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 1217, 1218-19 (2002) (discussing a Minnesota Supreme 
Court decision that "chose to adopt section 12 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgements and its preference for 
finality instead of adhering to its own precedent which held 
that validity was of paramount importance") (footnotes omitted); 
Karen 
Nelson 
Moore, 
Collateral 
Attack 
on 
Subject 
Matter 
Jurisdiction: 
A 
Critique 
of 
the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 534, 534 (1981) ("Courts, as well 
as both Restatements [of Judgments], seek to resolve the 
conflict between two important policies: insuring that judgments 
are rendered only by courts having the power to do so (the 
policy of validity) and enforcing a termination point for 
litigation after the opportunity for full and fair litigation 
(the policy of finality).  The tension between these two 
policies is readily apparent.").    
3 "[T]he traditional doctrine was that a judgment of a court 
shown to have lacked subject matter jurisdiction was 'void.'"  
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt b at 117 (1982).  
See State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, ¶43, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 
718 N.W.2d 649. 
4 See Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 97, 368 N.W.2d 648 
(1985) ("A void judgment may be expunged by a court at any 
time.").   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶31 Labeling an error as resulting in a lack of circuit 
court competency gives greater emphasis to the finality of the 
judgment rather than any invalidity.  A challenge to competency 
may be forfeited.5  Thus, a judgment entered when the circuit 
court lacks competency is not forever vulnerable to attack.   
¶32 The problem in our case law attempting to distinguish 
between a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction and a 
circuit court's competency is the failure to approach the two in 
a sound, consistent, and analytical way.  The cases are 
confusing and imprecise in their use of the terms and in their 
application of the terms to the facts of the case.6   
¶33 At issue in the instant case is a 22-year-old judgment 
of conviction for first-offense civil OWI in violation of a 
local ordinance prosecuted by the City of Eau Claire.  The error 
in the proceeding was that the defendant, Melissa Booth Britton, 
                                                 
5 See Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶27, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. 
Mikrut used the word "waiver," but later cases interpret 
"waiver" (in the sense 
Mikrut 
used that word) to mean 
"forfeiture."  See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶28-29, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612. 
The 
Mikrut 
court 
did 
not 
address 
whether 
mandatory 
statutory time limitations can be waived.  See State v. Matthew 
S., 2005 WI 84, ¶27, 282 Wis. 2d 150, 698 N.W.2d.  
6 "This confusion has taken on a life of its own over the 
years and shows no sign of abating."  Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. 
v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶65, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
4 
 
had a prior Minnesota OWI conviction.  "[T]he State has 
exclusive jurisdiction over a second offense for drunk driving." 
Walworth Cnty. v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 716, 324 N.W.2d 682 
(1982).  Thus, Booth Britton should have been prosecuted by the 
State for violation of a criminal statute, second-offense 
criminal OWI, not by Eau Claire for first-offense civil OWI for 
a violation of a local ordinance.     
¶34 The OWI statutes create progressive penalties for 
successive OWI offenses.  "[T]he legislature's intent in 
drafting [the progressive penalty scheme] was to require 
criminal proceedings and penalties for a second drunk driving 
offense within a five-year period," and the language of the 
statutes "demonstrates that the legislature intended that a 
second offense for drunk driving be exclusively within the 
province of the state."  Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 717-18 (second 
emphasis added).   
¶35 The question the majority opinion presents in the 
instant case is whether the circuit court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction or competency in convicting Booth Britton of first-
offense civil OWI.  The answer to this question raises 
significant public policy issues. 
¶36 The interests at stake in the instant case regarding 
how to characterize the error are governmental and societal.   
¶37 On the one hand, the public policy requiring a second 
(or subsequent) OWI offense be prosecuted as a crime by the 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
5 
 
State, as well as the policy favoring the validity of judgments, 
would be advanced by labeling the error in the instant case as a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the 22-year-old judgment of 
conviction would be void.     
¶38 On the other hand, the public policy favoring the 
finality of judgments would be advanced by labeling the error in 
the instant case as a lack of circuit court competency.  If the 
error is labeled as a lack of circuit court competency, the 
defendant has forfeited her challenge to the judgment and 
brought her motion for relief from the judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 too late; the 22-year-old judgment of conviction would 
stand.    
¶39 I write separately to address two areas of the law 
raised by the instant case:   
I. 
The instant case is a motion based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 and should be addressed as a motion under 
that statute; and  
II. The instant case involves  
A. 
interpreting and applying Article VII, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution; and  
B. 
analyzing 
the 
case 
law 
defining 
and 
differentiating between circuit court "subject 
matter 
jurisdiction" 
and 
circuit 
court 
"competency."  
The case law is confusing and based on misunderstandings. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶40 When I apply precedent in addressing these two areas 
of the law, I conclude that the 22-year-old first-offense civil 
OWI judgment against Booth Britton is void under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 because the circuit court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction under the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶41 Unfortunately, the majority opinion rewrites precedent 
and fails to clarify or develop the law.7   
¶42 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.   
I 
¶43 I begin where the instant case began, with a motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) and (1)(d) in the Circuit Court for 
Eau Claire County to vacate the first-offense civil OWI judgment 
entered against Booth Britton in 1992.8        
¶44 "Sec[tion] 806.07 attempts to achieve a balance 
between the competing values of finality and fairness in the 
                                                 
7 Although I do not agree with several other aspects of the 
majority opinion, I do not address them. 
8 The majority opinion suggests that "Booth Britton's 
considerable delay in raising the issue suggests an attempt to 
play fast and loose with the court system, which is something 
this court frowns upon."  Majority op., ¶25.  This criticism is 
unwarranted.  Nothing in the record or law suggests that Booth 
Britton is attempting to play fast and loose with the court 
system.  Rather, Booth Britton argues that the 1992 judgment is 
void and that there is no time limit on motions to vacate void 
judgments.  See Neylan, 124 Wis. 2d at 97.  Booth Britton's 
position has significant support.  Indeed, recent decisions of 
the court of appeals have divided on the question presented in 
the instant case.  See infra, n.38.   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
7 
 
resolution of a dispute.  The court must construe section 806.07 
to achieve this balance."9  
¶45 The 1992 judgment imposed a civil forfeiture under a 
local ordinance for a first-offense civil OWI.  Because Booth 
Britton had previously been convicted in Minnesota of OWI at the 
time Eau Claire charged her with first-offense civil OWI, the 
civil charge did not apply to her.  She should have been charged 
with and punished for a second-offense criminal OWI under the 
escalating penalty scheme delineated in the statutes.  Civil 
penalties are not authorized for a second-offense OWI in 
Wisconsin.  See Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 721.    
¶46 Without a civil statute prohibiting second-offense 
OWI, Booth Britton could not be prosecuted for a civil OWI.  The 
facts upon which the prosecution of Booth Britton was based must 
fall within the statutory description of the offense with which 
she was charged.  The prosecution of any second or subsequent 
                                                 
9 State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 542, 363 
N.W.2d 419 (1985) (citing Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapters 805–807, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 
671, 727 (1976), and explaining that the court refers to 
Wisconsin cases interpreting § 806.07 and to federal cases 
interpreting Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
upon which § 806.07 is based); see also Edland v. Wis. Phys. 
Serv. Ins. Corp., 210 Wis. 2d 638, 644, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997) 
(citing M.L.B. with approval). 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
8 
 
offense OWI is "within the exclusive province of the state to 
prosecute as a crime."  See Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 721.10 
¶47 In seeking relief from the first-offense civil OWI 
judgment entered in Eau Claire, Booth Britton relied on Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1) 
and 
(1)(d), 
which 
provides 
that 
"the 
court . . . may relieve a party or legal representative from a 
judgment" if "[t]he judgment is void . . . ."11   
¶48 Although Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2) further requires that 
motions for relief from judgments be made "within a reasonable 
time," the court has held that "[a] void judgment may be 
expunged by a court at any time."  See Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2); 
                                                 
10 The 
majority 
opinion 
(¶14) 
asserts 
that 
it 
is 
"harmonizing" Rohner and Mikrut by withdrawing language from 
Rohner.  The majority opinion creates additional confusion by 
withdrawing language not only from Rohner but also from "any 
other case." 
To my mind, withdrawing language from a prior case or 
unidentified prior cases amounts to overruling those cases in 
part or in whole, not harmonizing them.  Withdrawing language 
from unidentified prior cases is a recipe for further confusion.   
The majority opinion does not withdraw the language I 
quote.    
11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1) 
and 
(1)(d) 
provide 
as 
follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court, 
subject 
to 
subs. 
(2) 
and 
(3), 
may 
relieve 
a 
party . . . from a judgment . . . for the following 
reasons: 
. . . . 
(d) the judgment is void.  
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
9 
 
Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 97, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985).12  
If a judgment is void, it cannot acquire validity because of the 
lapse of time, and the judgment should be treated as legally 
ineffective in a subsequent proceeding.  See Neylan, 124 Wis. 2d 
at 98-100. 
¶49 Therefore, the issue presented is whether the first-
offense civil OWI judgment against Booth Britton is void under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d).  In deciding this § 806.07(1)(d) 
issue, the majority opinion addresses whether the Eau Claire 
circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction.       
¶50 The majority opinion gives two reasons for concluding 
that 
the 
Eau 
Claire 
circuit 
court 
had 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction to enter judgment for first-offense civil OWI under 
the facts of the instant case.   
¶51 First, the majority opinion repeatedly recites and 
perpetuates by rote the court's pronouncement in Village of 
Trempealeau 
v. 
Mikrut, 
2004 
WI 
79, 
273 
Wis. 2d 76, 
681 
N.W.2d 190, that a circuit court is never without subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶8, 12, 14.   
                                                 
12 In Neylan, 124 Wis. 2d at 97, after reviewing the history 
of Wis. Stat. § 806.07 and its federal counterpart, Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b), the court concluded that although the 
"reasonable time limit" stated in § 806.07 and the Federal Rule 
seem literally to apply to a motion to vacate a void judgment, a 
motion to vacate a void judgment may be brought at any time.   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶52 "Never" in Mikrut, however, does not mean "Never 
Ever."   
¶53 Our cases recognize that exceptions exist to Mikrut's 
broad pronouncement that a circuit court is never without 
subject matter jurisdiction.13  I return to this issue in Part II 
of this dissent. 
¶54 Second, the majority opinion (at ¶17) states that  
State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80, 
was "not entirely accurate" in stating that a circuit court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction if the error in a proceeding 
is the failure to state an offense known at law.  I address this 
aspect of the majority opinion in this part of the dissent.    
¶55 The majority opinion asserts that Bush is "not 
entirely accurate" because "when 'a complaint fails to state an 
offense known at law,' the court must retain subject matter 
jurisdiction to dispose of the matter."14  The majority opinion 
attempts to revive a straw man that was knocked down a long time 
ago.   
                                                 
13 See, 
e.g., 
Campbell, 
294 
Wis. 2d 100, 
¶¶45-56 
(unanimously acknowledging that "[t]here are exceptions to 
[Mikrut's] principles about subject matter jurisdiction and 
competency," stating exceptions for a judgment premised upon an 
unconstitutional statute and a judgment premised on a criminal 
complaint that failed to allege any offense known at law, and 
recognizing that "there may be other exceptions"). 
14 Majority op., ¶17 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶18).   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶56 Obviously 
a 
circuit 
court 
has 
jurisdiction 
to 
determine its own jurisdiction (and thus jurisdiction "to 
dispose of the matter," majority op., ¶17).  The law has long 
avoided the paradox that results if a court is without 
jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.15   
¶57 But the fact that a circuit court has jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction is irrelevant to the real issue 
Bush, the parties, and I address:  Is a judgment rendered on a 
civil or criminal offense not known at law void?  The answer to 
this question is yes.  
¶58 The precept that the failure to state an offense known 
at law is a jurisdictional defect is well-accepted:  A circuit 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment in a 
proceeding based on an offense not known at law, and any 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 Wis. 2d 38, 43-
44, 203 N.W.2d 633 (1973) ("A court must have subject-matter 
jurisdiction in order to have the authority to hear and 
determine the primary object of the action.  In order to make 
this determination this court has jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction.  That is, whether the circuit court and this court 
have jurisdiction to hear the instant case.") (citing State v. 
Omernik, 54 Wis. 2d 220, 194 N.W.2d 617 (1972); McCabe v. 
Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 2d 34, 191 N.W.2d 926 (1971); Brachtl v. DOR, 
48 Wis. 2d 184, 179 N.W.2d 921 (1970); Bublitz v. Matulis, 34 
Wis. 2d 23, 148 N.W.2d 64 (1967); Monahan v. Dep't of Taxation, 
22 Wis. 2d 164, 125 N.W.2d 331 (1963)); Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 11 cmt. c at 110 (1982) ("[A] court has authority to 
determine its own authority, or as it is sometimes put, 
'jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.'").   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
12 
 
judgment premised on an offense not known at law is void.16  
Thus, without a civil or criminal statute prohibiting drunk 
driving, an individual could not be prosecuted for drunk 
driving, and if he or she were convicted, the judgment would be 
void.  "In short, Wisconsin law clearly establishes that a 
                                                 
16 This proposition has been repeated both before and after 
Bush.  See, e.g., Campbell, 294 Wis. 2d 100, ¶45 ("[A] criminal 
complaint that fails to allege any offense known at law is 
jurisdictionally defective and void"); State v. Christensen, 110 
Wis. 2d 538, 542, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983) ("Where the offense 
charged does not exist, the trial court lacks jurisdiction."); 
State v. Schneider, 60 Wis. 2d 563, 567, 211 N.W.2d 630, 633 
(1973) (stating that a complaint that charges no offense known 
at law is jurisdictionally defective and cannot sustain a 
conviction); Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 754, 193 
N.W.2d 868 (1972) (a complaint which charges no offense is 
jurisdictionally defective and the conviction is void); State v. 
Lampe, 26 Wis. 2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965) ("If the 
defendant is correct that no offense is charged then the court 
had no jurisdiction to proceed to judgment."); In re Carlson, 
176 Wis. 538, 545, 186 N.W. 722 (1922) ("[I]f the information 
charged no offense the court had no jurisdiction to proceed to 
judgment," citing Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution); State v. Howard, 139 Wis. 529, 534, 121 N.W. 133 
(1909) (holding that when the facts do not fall within the 
statutory 
offense 
charged, 
the 
sentence 
and 
judgment 
of 
conviction must be reversed because the information does not 
charge an offense known at law); 
State v. Briggs, 218 
Wis. 2d 61, 65, 579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998) (Roggensack, J., 
authored; "[T]here is no crime of attempted felony murder in the 
State of Wisconsin; therefore, the circuit court was without 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
accept 
a 
plea, 
enter 
a 
conviction, and sentence [the defendant] for attempted felony 
murder."); 
State 
v. 
Cvorovic, 
158 
Wis. 2d 630, 
631, 
462 
N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that because Wisconsin 
law does not recognize the offense of attempted fourth degree 
sexual assault, a conviction for that offense was void for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction).  
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
13 
 
judgment resulting from a complaint or information which charges 
no offense recognized in law is void ab initio."17    
¶59 The premise underlying Bush and the other cases 
addressing offenses not known at law is simple:  Circuit courts 
have original jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal, 
except as otherwise provided by law.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 8.  If the offense is not known at law, no offense, civil or 
criminal, is before the circuit court; as a result, the circuit 
court is without subject matter jurisdiction in the first 
instance.  See Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶18. 
¶60 The majority opinion neglects the teachings of these 
many, long-standing cases by simply asserting that in the 
instant case "first-offense and second-offense OWIs are both 
offenses known at law as set forth in our statutes."  Majority 
op., ¶16 (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1), 346.65(2)(am)1.-2.).  
In the majority's view (¶16), Booth Britton was charged and 
convicted of an offense known at law because she "was charged 
with a first-offense OWI, an offense that irrefutably exists 
under our statutes."   
¶61 These sentences and the assertion that Bush is "not 
entirely accurate" are the entirety of the majority opinion's 
conclusory explanation that Booth Britton's offense was known at 
law.  
                                                 
17 Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d at 68-69. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶62 Apparently the majority opinion (¶16) believes that 
circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any and all 
OWI-related conduct, regardless of the nature of the conduct or 
the text of the statutes.  True, a first-offense civil OWI is 
proscribed by the statutes.  The facts upon which Booth Britton 
was charged and found guilty, however, do not comport with the 
proscribed civil offense. 
¶63 By granting circuit courts subject matter jurisdiction 
over any and all OWI-related conduct regardless of the text of 
the statutes, the majority opinion rewrites legal history and 
usurps legislative power.  In our system of government, the 
legislature defines civil and criminal offenses against the 
government.     
¶64 If an individual may be found guilty of a first-
offense civil OWI even though the individual has a prior OWI 
conviction, then what is left of the rule espoused in numerous 
cases 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
is 
without 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction when "a complaint fails to state an offense known 
at law . . . ?"18  What is left of Rohner's language, 108 Wis. 2d 
at 716, (left intact by the majority opinion, ¶15) that second 
(or 
subsequent) 
OWI 
offenses 
are 
within 
the 
exclusive 
jurisdiction of the state?     
                                                 
18 See majority op., ¶17 (quoting Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 
¶18).    
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶65 The majority opinion does not answer these questions.  
Instead, the majority opinion moves quickly from labeling Bush 
"not entirely accurate" (¶17) and describing all OWI-related 
conduct (including the conduct that was the basis of the charge 
against Booth Britton) as offenses known at law (¶16) to 
discussing 
whether 
circuit 
courts 
have 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute.  
Majority op., ¶18.  Of course they do.  See Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 178 (1803).19  
¶66 Bush does not purport to impair the ability of a 
circuit court to decide challenges to the constitutionality of a 
statute.  Indeed, the majority opinion recognizes that Bush 
addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of chapter 980 of 
the statutes.20   
¶67 In so doing, Bush recognized that a circuit court has 
jurisdiction to address whether a statute is unconstitutional on 
its face.  In addition, Bush declared in ¶¶18-19 that a circuit 
court's judgment premised on an unconstitutional statute is 
                                                 
19 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 178 
(1803) ("So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if 
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so 
that the court must either decide that case conformably to the 
law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine 
which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This is of 
the very essence of judicial duty.").   
20 See majority op., ¶18 (citing Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶¶19, 
40).   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
16 
 
void.21  The court said the same thing in State v. Campbell, 2006 
WI 99, ¶45, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649, declaring:  "Thus, 
if a statute is unconstitutional on its face, any judgment 
premised upon that statute is void."  
¶68 Nevertheless, the majority opinion (¶18) withdraws any 
language in Bush "purporting to impair the ability of a court to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to the 
constitutionality of a statute."  Because Bush does not purport 
to impair the ability of a circuit court to address the 
constitutionality of a statute, this aspect of the majority 
opinion does no damage to Bush or our law.  The majority opinion 
cannot withdraw language in Bush that does not exist.  Thus, 
Bush is undisturbed.   
¶69 Turning from the majority's analysis of Bush to the 
majority's analysis of Rohner, the majority acknowledges that it 
leaves intact "Rohner's holding 'that the state has exclusive 
jurisdiction over a second offense for drunk driving,'" and 
asserts that "nothing in our decision today alters Rohner's 
confirmation of our state's policy to strictly enforce drunk 
                                                 
21 See Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶17.   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
17 
 
driving laws."22  See majority op., ¶15 (quoting Rohner, 108 
Wis. 2d at 716).     
¶70 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
abandons 
the 
legislatively adopted "state policy of strict enforcement of 
these laws."  Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 718.  The majority replaces 
this legislative policy with a court-adopted policy favoring the 
finality of OWI judgments.  Rohner specifically rejected giving 
municipalities and district attorneys discretion over whether to 
charge otherwise criminal OWIs as first-offense civil OWIs.23  
Yet under the majority opinion, what would prevent a state or 
local 
governmental 
official 
from 
choosing 
to 
charge 
and 
prosecute a first offense civil OWI when a criminal charge 
should be brought?24    
                                                 
22 The OWI statutes "requir[e] that criminal penalties be 
imposed for a second offense," and "the legislature intended a 
second offense for drunk driving to be within the exclusive 
province of the state to prosecute as a crime."  Rohner, 108 
Wis. 2d at 717, 721.   
23 See Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 718.   
24 The majority opinion distinguishes the instant case from 
Rohner, stating that the instant case involves an "unknown out-
of-state prior OWI conviction."  Majority op., ¶13 n.6.  Nothing 
in the record in the instant case reveals whether Booth 
Britton's prior Minnesota OWI conviction was (or was not) known 
at the time of her 1992 conviction.  Indeed, the record from 
Booth Britton's 1992 OWI conviction has been destroyed.  The 
majority opinion assumes facts not in the record.   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶71 Ignoring the legislative policy of "strict enforcement 
of drunk driving laws,"25 the majority adopts a policy favoring 
the finality of judgments over the well-established rule that a 
judgment of conviction for a civil or criminal offense not known 
at law is void.  
¶72 In contrast, I view Rohner and Bush as correctly 
stating 
the 
legislative 
policy 
in 
the 
OWI 
statutes 
and 
emphasizing the invalidity of judgments based on offenses not 
known at law.    
¶73 Thus, I conclude that the Eau Claire civil judgment is 
void under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) and (1)(d); the facts of the 
instant case do not fit any common law or statutory civil 
offense.  "Wisconsin law clearly establishes that a judgment 
resulting from a complaint or information which charges no 
offense recognized in law is void ab initio."26  Accordingly, the 
circuit court's order granting Booth Britton's Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(d) motion for relief from the void Eau Claire 
judgment should be affirmed.   
II 
 
¶74 I turn now to address the second area of law I 
outlined earlier, namely:  
                                                 
25 Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 721. 
26 Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d at 68-69.   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
19 
 
A. 
interpreting and applying Article VII, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution; and  
B. 
analyzing the case law defining and differentiating 
between 
"subject 
matter 
jurisdiction" 
and 
"competency." 
The case law is confusing and based on misunderstandings. 
A 
 
¶75 The 
majority 
opinion, 
relying 
on 
Mikrut, 
273 
Wis. 2d 76, concludes that under Article VII, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution "a circuit court is never without subject 
matter jurisdiction." See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶8, 12, 14 
(emphasis added).  This statement is just wrong.  Repeating, 
repeating, and repeating it does not make it correct.   
¶76 Two 
years 
after 
Mikrut, 
the 
court 
unanimously 
acknowledged that there are exceptions to Mikrut's proclamation. 
See 
Campbell, 
294 
Wis. 2d 100, 
¶¶45-56 
(unanimously 
acknowledging 
that 
"[t]here 
are 
exceptions 
to 
[Mikrut's] 
principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency," 
stating two exceptions, and recognizing that "there may be other 
exceptions"). 
 
¶77 The Wisconsin Constitution provides:  "Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state 
and 
such 
appellate 
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
circuit 
as 
the 
legislature may prescribe by law."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
20 
 
 
¶78 Numerous cases interpreting the current version of 
Article VII, Section 8 (as amended in 1977) have omitted any 
reference to the language "except as otherwise provided by law" 
and have concluded that a circuit court is never without subject 
matter jurisdiction.27   
¶79 Numerous cases interpreting the current version of 
Article VII, Section 8 (as amended in 1977) have also concluded 
                                                 
27 For cases referring to post-1977 Article VII, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution that erroneously declare that  
circuit courts have unlimited subject matter jurisdiction and 
omit any reference to the "except" clause, see, for example, 
Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶27, 349 
Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665 ("Given this broad constitutional 
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit courts, we 
have recognized that 'no circuit court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain actions of any nature whatsoever.'"); 
In re Ambac Assurance Corp., 2012 WI 22, ¶28, 339 Wis. 2d 48, 
810 N.W.2d 450 ("It is axiomatic that a circuit court is never 
without subject matter jurisdiction."); DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 
2007 WI 15, ¶21, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 ("Under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, circuit courts in Wisconsin have general 
original subject matter jurisdiction over 'all matters civil and 
criminal.'"). 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
21 
 
that 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
8's 
grant 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction cannot be revoked by statute.28  
                                                 
28 For cases referring to post-1977 Article VII, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution and erroneously declaring that the 
legislature 
cannot 
limit 
or 
revoke 
a 
circuit 
court's 
jurisdiction, see, for example, Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. 
LIRC, 
2013 
WI 
64, 
¶27, 
349 
Wis. 2d 234, 
833 
N.W.2d 665 
("[B]ecause subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on the 
courts by the constitution, it cannot be revoked by statute."); 
State v. Matthew S., 2005 WI 84, ¶16, 282 Wis. 2d 150, 698 
N.W.2d 631 (while the Wisconsin Constitution confers subject 
matter jurisdiction, the legislature may limit the ability of 
circuit courts to exercise it through statutes effecting 
competency, not subject matter jurisdiction); Stern v. Wis. 
Employment 
Relations 
Comm'n, 
2006 
WI 
App 
193, 
¶24, 
296 
Wis. 2d 306, 722 N.W.2d 594 ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is 
plenary and constitutionally-based and is not affected by 
statutes . . . ."); Amy Z. v. Jon T., 2004 WI App 73, ¶6, 272 
Wis. 2d 662, 
679 
N.W.2d 903 
("The 
circuit 
courts 
possess 
'plenary' jurisdiction by virtue of Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 8, 
and that jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power to act, 
does not depend on legislative authorization. . . . Thus '[n]o 
circuit 
court 
is 
without 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
entertain actions of any nature whatsoever.'") (quoted sources 
omitted); State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 565, 587 N.W.2d 908, 
911 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A circuit court has subject matter 
jurisdiction, conferred by the state constitution, to consider 
and determine any type of action . . . ."); Cepukenas v. 
Cepukenas, 221 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 584 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1998) 
("So although a court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction 
by the constitution, the legislature may enact statutes limiting 
a court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.  Such a 
legislative enactment affects that court's competency to proceed 
rather than its subject matter jurisdiction."); Kohler Co. v. 
Wixen, 204 Wis. 2d 327, 336-37, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996) 
("Although a court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction by 
the constitution, the legislature may enact statutes which limit 
a court's power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.  Such 
legislative measures affect a court's competency rather than its 
jurisdiction.").  Compare State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 462, 
484 N.W.2d 138 (1992) (recognizing that "Article VII, sec. 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution and sec. 753.03, Stats., vests within 
the circuit court the power to hear and determine all civil and 
criminal actions and proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction 
is given to some other court. . . .  Section 48.12(1) Stats., 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶80 These broad pronouncements in the cases are "the kind 
of hyperbole that sometimes creeps into opinions . . . ."29 These 
pronouncements have detached our jurisprudence regarding Article 
VII, Section 8 from the very text this court is supposedly 
interpreting.  Ignoring a key phrase in the state constitution 
is not an acceptable form of constitutional interpretation.30 
¶81 Properly interpreted, Article VII, Section 8 allows 
the legislature to divest circuit courts of subject matter 
                                                                                                                                                             
expressly provides that the juvenile [branch of the circuit] 
court 
shall 
have 
exclusive 
jurisdiction" 
over 
certain 
actions . . . ."). 
29 United States v. Dessart, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir. 
2016) (Posner, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. 
Curescu, 674 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2012)).   
30 See Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996) (stating, as prior and subsequent cases have 
stated, that when interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, the 
court should look to "the plain meaning of the words in the 
context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in 
existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and 
the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature 
as manifested in the first law passed following adoption."). 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
23 
 
jurisdiction so long as the legislature places the power to hear 
those cases in other courts within the unified court system.31 
¶82 The majority opinion acknowledges this limitation in a 
footnote (¶18, n.10), but then missteps, asserting that the 
constitutional phrase "except as otherwise provided by law" 
"forecloses the legislature from enacting a statute that would 
circumscribe the broad constitutional grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction to circuit courts."   
¶83 At times, the majority opinion appears to recognize 
that "never" in Mikrut does not mean "never ever."  At other 
times, the majority opinion repeatedly asserts that a circuit 
court never lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   
                                                 
31 The legislature has interpreted Article VII, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution as permitting it to divest circuit 
courts of jurisdiction.  Wisconsin Stat. § 753.03 states:  "The 
circuit courts have power to hear and determine, within their 
respective 
circuits, 
all 
civil 
and 
criminal 
actions 
and 
proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to some other 
court . . . ."  See also Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 
313 N.W.2d 790 (1982) ("We recognize, however, that the 
legislature has the authority to abolish heretofore recognized 
common law actions (e.g., breach of promise suits) and may set 
standards for exhaustion of administrative remedies or for 
primary jurisdiction prior to the proper invocation of the court 
system's subject matter jurisdiction.").   
See State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 462, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992), (recognizing that "Article VII, sec. 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and sec. 753.03, Stats., vests within the circuit 
court the power to hear and determine all civil and criminal 
actions and proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given 
to some other court. . . . Section 48.12(1) Stats., expressly 
provides that the juvenile [branch of the circuit] court shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction" over certain actions . . . . "   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶84 The majority opinion does not attempt to resolve this 
inconsistency or interpret Article VII, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and our case law.  Instead, the majority 
opinion 
single-mindedly 
and 
steadfastly 
repeats 
Mikrut's 
assertions that the legislature is foreclosed from enacting a 
statute that would circumscribe the broad constitutional grant 
of subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit courts and that "a 
circuit court is never without subject matter jurisdiction."   
¶85 Unfortunately, Mikrut rests on a defective foundation.  
¶86 Mikrut misconstrued both Eberhardy v. Circuit Court 
for Wood County, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981), and 
Article VII, Section 8 without genuinely analyzing either.32  I 
shall undertake that analysis, beginning with Eberhardy, and 
recognizing that Eberhardy in turn analyzes and rests upon 
Article VII, Section 8.   
¶87 The issue in Eberhardy was whether a circuit court 
could order sterilization of a woman who was not competent to 
consent to sterilization.  Eberhardy made clear that legislative 
                                                 
32 Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d at 86, cites Eberhardy v. Circuit 
Court for Wood County, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981), 
and Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 313 N.W.2d 790 
(1982), for the proposition that a circuit court is never 
without subject matter jurisdiction.  Mueller does not cite or 
quote 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Mueller 
merely 
cites 
Eberhardy for the proposition that "no circuit court is without 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain actions of any nature 
whatsoever."  Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 176.  Because Mueller adds 
nothing to the discussion in Mikrut or Eberhardy, I address 
Eberhardy, Mikrut, and the Wisconsin Constitution, not Mueller. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
25 
 
authority was not needed for a circuit court to decide the issue 
presented.33  But Eberhardy also made clear that the legislature 
can withdraw categories of cases from a circuit court's decision 
making power, so long as that power is placed elsewhere in the 
unified court system. 
¶88 The Eberhardy court explained the effect of the pre-
1977 and post-1977 constitutional provisions relating to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of circuit courts as follows. 
¶89 Both 
before 
and 
after 
the 
1977 
Wisconsin 
constitutional amendments, Article VII, Section 2 mentions 
                                                 
33 The lack of legislation on this topic did not, however, 
make the circuit courts unable to hear these cases, render 
judgments, or issue orders.  Rather, the court reasoned that 
sound 
judicial 
policy 
militated 
against 
the 
judiciary's 
rendering a decision about the fundamental right to bear 
children 
without 
input 
as 
to 
the 
state's 
public 
policy 
interests.  Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 576.  
The context of Eberhardy is important.  In that case, both 
the guardian ad litem and the legal guardian of the individual 
supported sterilization.  Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 570.  The 
court was uniquely ill-suited to decide the case; no party 
informed the court "why sterilization might be improper."  
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 570.  Lest one think that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court (or circuit courts) would permanently be 
the wrong forum to address these concerns, the court concluded 
its opinion by stating, "[P]ursuant to our supervisory authority 
we direct such jurisdiction shall not be exercised until the 
state's policy to do so is set forth by appropriate legislation 
or until further order of this court."  Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 
at 578-79 (emphasis added).  
Thus, 
the 
legislature 
(through 
inaction) 
could 
not 
permanently prevent circuit courts from exercising their power 
to hear actions on this topic. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
26 
 
circuit courts and authorizes the legislature to establish 
inferior courts.    
¶90 Before the 1977 amendments, Article VII, Section 8 
stated:  "The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal within this state, not excepted 
by 
this 
constitution, 
and 
not 
hereafter 
prohibited 
by 
law . . . ." (emphasis added).   
¶91 The 1977 amendments to Article VII, Section 8 changed 
the language "not hereafter prohibited by law" to read "[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided by law . . . ."   
¶92 In Eberhardy, the court declared that "[t]his change, 
however, is not substantive."34   
¶93 Thus, pre-1977 and post-1977 cases should be examined 
in interpreting the present version of Article VII, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶94 The Eberhardy court explained that under both the pre-
1977 and post-1977 versions of Article VII, Section 8, the 
legislature could divest and reallocate jurisdiction over 
certain types of cases from the circuit courts to other courts. 
The legislature could not, however, transfer jurisdiction to an 
entity outside the unified court system.  Why not?  Because 
Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution vests 
judicial power in "a unified court system."    
                                                 
34 Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 550. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
27 
 
¶95 The Eberhardy court explained the rule that the 
legislature could constitutionally transfer jurisdiction from 
the circuit courts to other courts by referring to a 1954 
article authored by Attorney E. Harold Hallows (who later served 
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court) and Attorney Jack DeWitt as 
follows: 
It has previously been pointed out that this language 
["[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" in Article 
VII, 
Section 
8] 
only 
allows 
for 
a 
legislative 
reallocation of jurisdiction from the circuit court to 
another court.  It does not permit the legislature to 
divest the constitutional grant of jurisdiction from 
the unified court system; and under the unified system 
created 
by 
the 
amendment 
of 
1977, 
original 
jurisdiction is vested wholly in the circuit court.  
The legislative allocation of jurisdiction under the 
constitution as it existed prior to 1977 was discussed 
in [E. Harold] Hallows & [J.R.] DeWitt, The Need for 
Court Organization, 1954 Wis. L. Rev. 377 [sic], 387 
n.54.  It was pointed out therein that the legislative 
authority to reallocate judicial power and to transfer 
it from one court to another could not abrogate the 
court system's powers.  Rather, as was said in State 
v. Wimberly, 55 Wis. 2d 437, 441, 198 N.W.2d 360 
(1972), quoting Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868), 
the language was designed:   
" . . . to enable the legislature to distribute the 
jurisdiction in both matters at law and in equity, as 
between the circuit courts and the other courts in the 
state. . . . " 
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 550-51. 
¶96 Note 54 in the Hallows and DeWitt article explains 
that the pre-1977 Article VII, Section 8, permitted jurisdiction 
to be divested from circuit courts, as follows:  
Cases permitting jurisdiction to be divested from 
circuit court are Bookhout v. State, 66 Wis. 415, 28 
N.W. 179 (1886); Lannon v. Hackett, 49 Wis. 261, 5 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
28 
 
N.W. 474 (1880); Goyke v. State, 136 Wis. 557, 117 
N.W. 1027 (1908); State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 50 
N.W.2d 439 (1951).  See also Hicks v. Hardy, 241 Wis. 
11, 
4 
N.W.2d 150 
(1942), 
holding 
that 
probate 
jurisdiction is in county rather than circuit court. 
E. 
Harold 
Hallows 
& 
J.R. 
DeWitt, 
The 
Need 
for 
Court 
Organization, 1954 Wis. L. Rev. 376, 387 n. 54. 
¶97 Hicks v. Hardy, 241 Wis. 11, 4 N.W.2d 150 (1942), is 
instructive 
in 
understanding 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
8 
and 
Eberhardy.  In Hicks, the plaintiff widow brought an action in 
equity in the circuit court to vacate a county court judgment.  
The Hicks court dismissed the circuit court action, holding that 
only the county court in probate had such jurisdiction. 
¶98 Other cases have also recognized that pre-1977 Article 
VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution "confers upon the 
legislature power to restrict the original jurisdiction of the 
circuit courts."  State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 320, 50 
N.W.2d 439 (1951); see also Bookhout v. State, 66 Wis. 415, 418 
(1886).  
¶99 The case law, including Eberhardy, and the text of 
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution clearly 
demonstrate that (both before and after the 1977 constitutional 
amendments) the legislature is not foreclosed from enacting a 
statute divesting circuit courts of subject matter jurisdiction 
so long as the jurisdiction is reallocated to other courts 
within the unified court system.  Thus, as a matter of law, a 
circuit court may be without subject matter jurisdiction as a 
result of legislative action. 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
29 
 
¶100 I now turn from the majority opinion's misguided 
refrain (taken from Mikrut) that circuit courts never lack 
subject matter jurisdiction to address the confusing cases 
defining and differentiating between circuit court "subject 
matter jurisdiction" and circuit court "competency."  These 
cases are based on misunderstandings. 
B 
¶101 As noted previously, allowing parties to raise subject 
matter jurisdiction challenges at any time "posed difficulty 
chiefly because, if taken literally, it subverted the principle 
of finality."35  In attempting to preserve the finality of 
judgments, this court has manufactured a doctrine, allegedly 
stemming from the state constitution, whereby circuit courts are 
never without "subject matter jurisdiction" but may instead lack 
"competency."   
¶102 The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction 
and competency, apparently first described in Wisconsin in 
Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), and 
supposedly clarified by Mikrut,36 remains unclear and confusing 
and has been applied inconsistently by the court of appeals.   
¶103 As recently as this year, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals explicitly noted the uncertainty regarding these two 
terms.  See DWD v. LIRC, 2016 WI App 21, ¶8, 367 Wis. 2d 609, 
                                                 
35 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. b at 117. 
36 See majority op., ¶¶11, 14, 19 (asserting that Mikrut 
clarified the law of subject matter jurisdiction and circuit 
court competency). 
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
30 
 
877 N.W.2d 620 ("In fairness to the parties, the case law 
addressing competency and jurisdiction in Wisconsin is not a 
beacon of clarity."). 
¶104 In 2005, 13 years after Mueller was decided and just 
one year after Mikrut, this court described the case law on 
subject matter jurisdiction and competency as "murky at best."  
Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶16.  
¶105 In 
1991, 
nine 
years 
after 
Mueller, 
this 
court 
acknowledged that the terms "subject matter jurisdiction" and 
"competency" have been inconsistently used and defined by courts 
and commentators across the country.  See Green Cnty. DHS v. 
H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 656 n.17, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991).   
¶106 The instant case is a prime example of the confusion 
that the "subject matter jurisdiction/competency" terminology 
has wrought on Wisconsin's jurisprudence.  We might expect 
different 
districts 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
occasionally to reach inconsistent conclusions.  Yet a decade 
after Mikrut supposedly "clarified Wisconsin's jurisprudence,"37 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reached 
inconsistent 
decisions 
on 
competency and subject matter jurisdiction issues similar to 
                                                 
37 Majority op., ¶14.   
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
31 
 
those presented in the instant case.38  This continued confusion 
illustrates Mikrut's failure to actually clarify the law 
surrounding subject matter jurisdiction.   
¶107 The confusion between subject matter jurisdiction and 
competency is not surprising for several reasons. 
¶108 First, unfortunately, Mueller defined "subject matter 
jurisdiction" and "competency" using the same words.  This 
language was bound to cause confusion.  See Shopper Advertiser, 
Inc. v. DOR, 117 Wis. 2d 223, 238, 344 N.W.2d 115 (1984) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).39  
¶109 Second, Mueller referred to the Restatement (First) of 
Judgments § 7 (1942) for the distinction between these terms.  A 
careful reading of section 7 and the comments in the Restatement 
                                                 
38 See majority op., ¶13 n.7.  As the majority opinion 
explains 
in 
note 
7, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
reached 
inconsistent results in several recently decided, unpublished 
opinions addressing similar arguments to those raised in the 
instant 
case. 
 
Compare, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Navrestad, 
No. 
2014AP2273, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 2, 2015) 
(following Mikrut's competency-subject matter distinction) with 
City of Stevens Point v. Lowery, No. 2014AP742, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (applying Rohner and holding 
that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction) and 
Clark Cnty. v. Potts, No. 2012AP2001, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. March 28, 2013) (same). 
39 As I pointed out in 1984, the court's opinions do not 
clarify the meaning of the terms "subject matter jurisdiction," 
"competency," and "venue"; the terms are used interchangeably in 
the opinions; and it does not matter what terminology is used as 
long as the court defines the terms, uses the terms in a 
consistent fashion, and explains the consequences of the 
classifications it establishes.  Shopper Advertiser, Inc. v. 
DOR, 117 Wis. 2d 223, 236-38, 344 N.W.2d 115 (1984) (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
No.  2015AP869.ssa 
 
32 
 
shows that the Restatement (First) uses the terms subject matter 
jurisdiction and competency "more or less interchangeably."  
Shopper 
Advertiser, 
117 
Wis. 2d 
at 
237 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Richard H. 
Field & Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure 603 (2d ed. 1968)).  
¶110 Furthermore, 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments, 
Introductory Note at 28 (1982), explains that it uses the term 
"subject matter jurisdiction," rather than "competency," "simply 
because it [subject matter jurisdiction] is much more commonly 
used 
in 
American 
legal 
parlance 
than 
'competence' 
or 
'competency.'"  The Restatement notes, however, that sometimes 
the rules of subject matter jurisdiction are referred to as 
rules of competency.  See comments to § 11 at 108-09.    
¶111 Third, the Wisconsin statutes (and rules promulgated 
by this court) generally refer to a circuit court's subject 
matter jurisdiction, not competency.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 645.04(5), 801.04(1), 801.05, 801.07, 802.06(8)(c).   
¶112 For example, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 801.04(1) defines 
subject matter jurisdiction as "[t]he power of the court to hear 
the kind of action brought. . . .  Jurisdiction of the subject 
matter is conferred by the constitution and statutes of this 
state and by statutes of the United States . . . ." Section 
(Rule) 
802.06(8)(c) 
provides 
that 
if 
"the 
court 
lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action."   
¶113 The statutes also refer to competency.  See, e.g., 
§§ 48.245(7); 
48.25(2); 
938.245(7)(a); 
938.25(2)(a), 
(b); 
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938.315(3) 
(refers 
to 
competency 
and 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction); 980.038(1)(a) (refers to competency and subject 
matter jurisdiction).  These statutes state that the failure to 
object to noncompliance with the specified statutory time period 
waives this challenge to the court's ability to proceed. 
¶114 Fourth, over the years Wisconsin courts have used the 
terms "competency" and "subject matter jurisdiction" "in a 
variety of ways."  Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 700, 
705 n.1, 495 N.W.2d 660, 661 (1993) (citing Green Cnty. DHS v. 
H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 656, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991)).  
¶115 The case law in the more than 30 years that have 
elapsed since Mueller ushered in the distinction between subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
and 
competency 
demonstrates 
that 
clarification and development of the law is needed.  Although 
this court is supposed to clarify and develop the law, the 
majority opinion fails in that task.   
¶116 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  I conclude that 
the first-offense civil OWI judgment entered by the Eau Claire 
circuit court against Booth Britton is void.  Accordingly, the 
judgment should be vacated under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d), and 
the circuit court's decision should be affirmed. 
¶117 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
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