Title: LULA ELEZOVIC V FORD MOTOR CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125166
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2005

LULA ELEZOVIC, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
FILEDDDAnd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 1, 2005 
LULA ELEZOVIC, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and 
JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, 
Plaintiff, 
v 
No. 125166 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DANIEL P. 
BENNETT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, C.J.  
At issue in this case is (1) whether the Michigan 
Civil Rights Act (CRA)1 provides a cause of action against 
an individual agent of an employer and (2) whether 
plaintiff’s employer, Ford Motor Company, was entitled to a 
1 MCL 37.2101 et seq. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
directed verdict in plaintiff’s sexual harassment lawsuit 
against it. 
We hold that an agent may be individually sued under § 
37.2202(1)(a)2 of the CRA. 
Thus, we overrule Jager v 
Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, 252 Mich App 464, 485; 652 
NW2d 503 (2002), because it held to the contrary,3 and 
reverse the Court of Appeals judgment in favor of Daniel 
Bennett that followed Jager. 
We also hold, consistently with the lower courts, that 
Ford was entitled to a directed verdict. 
Thus, we affirm 
the trial court and Court of Appeals judgments in favor of 
Ford. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in November 1999 pursuant to 
the CRA against Ford Motor Company and Daniel Bennett, a 
2  MCL 37.2202(1)(a) provides: 
An employer shall not do any of the following: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, because of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or
marital status. 
3 Jager had concluded that “a supervisor engaging in
activity prohibited by the CRA may not be held individually
liable for violating a plaintiff's civil rights." Id. 
2  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
supervisor at Ford’s Wixom assembly plant where she worked. 
As relevant here, her claim was that she had been sexually 
harassed as a result of a hostile work environment.4
 The 
CRA allows such a lawsuit against an employer.5 
Plaintiff’s lawsuit named Bennett as an individual 
defendant consistently with the then-controlling case of 
Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red 
4 As set forth in Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 382­
383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), the five elements necessary to
establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on
a hostile work environment are: 
(1) the employee belonged to a protected group; 
(2) 
the employee was subjected to communication
or conduct on the basis of sex; 
(3) 
the employee was subjected to unwelcome
sexual conduct or communication; 
(4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication 
was intended to or in fact did substantially
interfere 
with 
the 
employee’s 
employment 
or 
created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment; and 
(5) respondeat superior. [Emphasis added.] 
See also Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 311;
614 NW2d 910 (2000). 
Respondeat superior liability exists 
when an employer has adequate notice of the harassment and
fails to take appropriate corrective action. Id. at 312. 
5 M Civ JI 105.10, Employment Discrimination—Sexual
Harassment. 
3  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
Cross, 141 Mich App 785; 369 NW2d 223 (1985),6 which held 
that individual supervisors could be liable under the CRA.7 
Regarding the specifics in her complaint, plaintiff 
alleged that, while she was on the job in the summer of 
1995, Bennett exposed himself to her while masturbating and 
requested she perform oral sex. 
Further, she claimed that 
after that he repeatedly continued to harass her by 
grabbing, rubbing, and touching his groin and licking his 
lips and making sexually related comments. 
Before trial, defendants filed a joint motion in 
limine to exclude from evidence an unrelated, prior 
criminal misdemeanor conviction of Bennett for indecent 
exposure. Defendants pointed out that the incident did not 
occur on Ford property and involved non-Ford employees. 
Plaintiff, however, argued that the indecent exposure 
conviction was evidence of a scheme or plan Bennett had of 
exposing himself to women and that it provided notice to 
6 Jager overruled Jenkins while plaintiff’s appeal was
pending in the Court of Appeals. 
7 The CRA states that an “employer” includes an “agent”
of the employer. 
MCL 37.2201(a) provides: 
“‘Employer’ means a person
who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent of that
person.” (Emphasis added.) 
MCL 37.2103(g), in turn, provides: “‘Person’ means an 
individual, agent, association, [or] corporation . . . .” 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Ford that Bennett engaged in inappropriate sexual acts. 
The trial court ruled that the indecent exposure conviction 
was inadmissible with regard to Bennett under MRE 404(b)(1)8 
because it was not offered for any purpose other than to 
show that he had a propensity to expose himself. The court 
also held it was inadmissible with regard to Ford pursuant 
to 
MRE 
4039 
because 
any 
probative 
value 
would 
be 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
The case was tried before a jury for three weeks. 
Plaintiff testified consistently with the allegations in 
her complaint against Bennett. 
While it was uncontested 
8 MRE 404(b)(1) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It 
may, 
however, 
be 
admissible 
for 
other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in
doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident when the same is material,
whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are 
contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to
the conduct at issue in the case. 
9 MRE 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if 
its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
5  
 
 
 
that she had not filed a formal written complaint of sexual 
harassment 
pursuant 
to 
Ford’s 
antiharassment 
policy, 
plaintiff attempted to establish that Ford was otherwise 
aware, or on notice, of the sexual harassment for several 
reasons. 
She claimed that she told two first-line 
supervisors (friends of hers who were under Bennett in the 
chain of command) that Bennett had exposed himself to her, 
but admitted that she had pledged them to secrecy. 
She 
also introduced two letters her psychologist had written to 
the Wixom plant physician, one indicating that in his view 
plaintiff was descending into mental illness “[d]ue to the 
harassment she perceived from Mr. Bennett” and a second 
stating that plaintiff continued “to feel uncomfortable 
with Dan Bennett.” These letters were offered with a third 
letter from the same psychologist to the Wixom plant 
manager regarding complaints against a different coworker 
in which it was said “there has been harassment going on 
for the past year and a half at her Wixom plant job.” Also 
introduced was testimony from an employee to a Ford Labor 
Relations Department representative to the effect that the 
employee would remain on medical leave until someone did 
something 
about 
the 
situation 
between 
plaintiff 
and 
Bennett. 
Finally, reference was made to a letter from 
plaintiff’s attorney (her son-in-law) to the Ford Labor 
6  
 
 
                                                 
Relations Department in which he asserted he might take 
legal action “to insure that our client [plaintiff] is not 
subjected to working in a hostile environment.” 
At the close of plaintiff’s proofs, defendants filed a 
joint motion for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff 
had not presented a prima facie case against them.10  Ford 
emphasized that plaintiff had not established that it had 
notice of the alleged sexual harassment by Bennett and, 
thus, it could not be held liable for any improper acts by 
him. 
The 
trial 
court 
took 
the 
joint 
motion 
under 
advisement, with defendants continuing to present their 
cases to the jury. 
Bennett testified that he had not 
sexually harassed the plaintiff and that her claims were 
false. 
Ford presented evidence showing that the only time 
plaintiff had ever filed a sexual harassment complaint was 
in 1991, involving a UAW committeeman, and that none of the 
several grievances and complaints plaintiff filed against 
Bennett had mentioned sexual harassment. 
Rather, with 
regard to Bennett, her complaints concerned having her 
shift 
changed 
from 
days 
to 
afternoons 
and 
disputes 
10 MCR 2.515 provides: 
“A party may move for a
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an
opponent.” 
7  
 
 
                                                 
 
regarding overtime. 
She also filed a complaint alleging 
that a female coworker had physically threatened her. 
Upon the close of defendants’ proofs, the trial court 
granted directed verdicts to the defendants. 
The trial 
court held that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment with regard to either 
defendant and, in particular, found that Ford could not be 
liable because it had no notice of Bennett’s alleged 
harassment. 
Plaintiff, asserting that she had established a prima 
facie case against Bennett and Ford, appealed to the Court 
of Appeals. 
That Court, however, affirmed the orders of 
the trial court in a published opinion.11
 In ruling for 
Bennett, the majority in Elezovic relied on the then-recent 
holding in Jager, supra at 485, that “a supervisor engaging 
in activity prohibited by the CRA may not be held 
individually liable for violating a plaintiff's civil 
rights.” 
The Jager Court had reached its conclusion by 
relying largely on federal court holdings that under Title 
VII of the federal civil rights act, the federal analogue 
11 Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 259 Mich App 187; 673 NW2d
776 (2003). 
8  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
to our CRA, there is no individual liability.12
 While it 
was obligatory that the majority in Elezovic follow Jager 
pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1), the majority indicated at the 
same time that, but for that court rule, it would have 
reached the opposite result.13
 It was the majority’s view 
that Jager was wrongly decided simply because it was not 
consistent with the actual language of our CRA, which it 
concluded made agents individually liable. 
Moreover, it 
believed Jager was inconsistent with Chambers v Trettco, 
Inc, 463 Mich 297; 614 NW2d 910 (2000), which it read as 
recognizing that an individual may be held liable for 
sexual harassment under the CRA.14 
12 The Jager panel noted that its conclusion that
individuals could not be sued under our CRA was consistent 
with federal court rulings such as Wathen v Gen Electric 
Co, 115 F3d 400 (CA 6, 1997), in which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined, consistently with numerous
other federal courts of appeals, there was no individual
liability under Title VII of the federal civil rights act. 
13 Under MCR 7.215(J)(1) a panel of the Court of
Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior
published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or
after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or
modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the
Court of Appeals. 
The judges of the Court of Appeals were polled
pursuant to MCR 7.215(J), but a conflict resolution panel
was not convened because a majority of the judges opposed
convening such a panel. 259 Mich App 801 (2003). 
14 In making this point, the majority noted that
Chambers held that certain language in the CRA “‘allows
(continued…) 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
With regard to the directed verdict for Ford, the 
Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that her 
evidence regarding notice had been sufficient to enable her 
to reach the jury. 
The Court held that plaintiff's report 
of Bennett's conduct to her supervisors did not constitute 
actual notice to Ford because of her request at the same 
time that this information not be conveyed to their 
supervisor or other appropriate persons. 
Elezovic v Ford 
Motor Co, 259 Mich App 187, 194; 673 NW2d 776 (2003). 
As 
for the letters that had been sent to Ford, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that these also did not provide notice 
because, importantly, none of them referred to sexual 
conduct. The Court held that this fact, when viewed in the 
context that plaintiff’s previous harassment complaints had 
not been sexual in nature, but were explicitly nonsexual 
concerning Bennett and others (with the exception of the 
1991 complaint against a UAW committeeman that plaintiff 
did not rely on as part of her case), meant Ford would not 
reasonably have been put on notice. 
Id. at 195. 
Finally, 
the Court also affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
(…continued)
this Court to determine whether the sexual harasser's 
employer, in addition to the sexual harasser himself, is to
be held responsible for the misconduct.’ 
Chambers, supra
at 320 (emphasis in original).” Elezovic, supra at 201. 
10  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
exclude evidence regarding Bennett’s indecent exposure 
conviction. 
It was the Court’s conclusion that plaintiff 
failed to establish that the evidence was offered for a 
proper purpose because Bennett's act of indecent exposure 
outside the workplace was not sufficiently similar to 
sexually 
harassing 
an 
employee 
in 
the 
workplace 
to 
establish a common plan, scheme, or system. 
Id. at 206. 
The Court further concluded that the trial court had not 
abused its discretion, concerning defendant Ford, in 
holding that the probative value of this evidence would 
have been substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.15 
Id. at 207-208. 
Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in this Court, 
and we granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to 
include among the issues briefed whether a supervisor 
engaging in activity prohibited by the Michigan Civil 
Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., may be held individually 
liable for violating a plaintiff's civil rights. 
470 Mich 
892 (2004). 
15 That is, the marginally probative evidence could be
given undue or preemptive weight by the jury. 
11  
 
 
 
II. Standards of Review 
We review de novo the question whether our CRA 
authorizes a cause of action against an individual agent 
for workplace sexual harassment because it is a question of 
law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand), 469 Mich 
487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003). 
In reviewing the statute, 
if its language is clear, we conclude that the Legislature 
must have intended the meaning expressed, and the statute 
is enforced as written. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 
Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). 
We also review de novo a trial court's ruling 
regarding a motion for a directed verdict, viewing the 
evidence and all legitimate inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Sniecinski v Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 
(2003); Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 707­
708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). 
Finally, the decision whether to admit or exclude 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
People v 
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 
III. Individual Agent Liability Under the CRA 
The CRA prohibits an employer from discriminating on 
account of sex, which includes sexual harassment. 
MCL 
37.2202(1)(a); MCL 37.2103(i) (“Discrimination because of 
12  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
sex includes sexual harassment.”). 
As previously set 
forth, the statute expressly defines an “employer” as a 
“person,” which is defined under MCL 37.2103(g) to include 
a corporation, and also states that an “employer” includes 
an “agent of that person.” MCL 37.2201(a).16 
This statutory language uncontroversially means that 
Ford Motor Company is an “employer” under the CRA. What is 
contested is whether an agent of the corporation is also 
subject to individual liability. 
Bennett and Ford have argued that the statutory 
definition of “employer,” which includes an “agent of that 
person,” should not be read as providing individual 
liability because (1) inclusion of the term “agent” in the 
statutory definition of “employer” operates solely to 
confer vicarious liability on the employer, (2) 
federal 
courts of appeals have all held that Title VII—the 
analogous federal sexual discrimination statute with its 
similar definition of “employer”—does not allow individual 
liability, and (3) the amendment history of our CRA 
suggests 
a 
different 
intention 
on 
the 
part 
of 
the 
Legislature. 
16 These legislatively provided definitions are binding
on this Court. 
Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 
Mich 129, 136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). 
13  
 
 
 
Regarding the first of these arguments, that this 
statute should not be read to expand the class of potential 
defendants to include agents, defendants assert that 
Chambers, supra at 310, supports this narrowing conclusion 
because it held that the inclusion of an “agent” within the 
definition of an “employer” in MCL 37.2201(a) served to 
confer vicarious liability on the agent’s employer. 
We 
disagree with this analysis. While Chambers held that this 
language establishes vicarious liability, our discussion 
did not limit it to that function.  The reason is that, 
when a statute says “employer” means “a person who has 1 or 
more employees, and includes an agent of that person,” it 
must, if the words are going to be read sensibly, mean that 
the Legislature intended to make the agent tantamount to 
the employer so that the agent unmistakably is also subject 
to suit along with the employer. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, 
when we said in Chambers, supra at 320, that categorizing a 
given pattern of misconduct allows the Court “to determine 
whether the sexual harasser's employer, in addition to the 
sexual harasser himself, is to be held responsible for the 
misconduct,” we believe we said as much. 
(Emphasis in 
original.) 
Accordingly, we reject the argument that 
including “agent” within the definition of “employer” 
serves only to provide vicarious liability for the agent’s 
14  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
employer and we conclude that it also serves to create 
individual liability for an employer’s agent.17 
With respect to defendants’ second argument, which is 
effectively that we should piggyback on the rationale 
federal courts have used with Title VII,18 defendants refer 
17 Justice Weaver states in her dissent that we offer 
“no clear reason for rejecting the conclusion that the
phrase ‘agent of the employer’ denotes respondeat superior
liability.” Post at 7. 
But, as our discussion above makes
clear, we do not reject this conclusion. 
Rather, we hold
that the Legislature’s use of the words “agent of the
employer” denotes respondeat superior liability and also 
that individual liability may exist under the statute. 
Justice Cavanagh argues in his dissent that 
the statute means that an employer is a person
who has one or more employees and this includes
an agent of the employer. 
This means that an 
employer still falls within the purview of the 
statute even if its “employees” are mere agents,
such as family members who are helping with the
business. 
To 
determine 
employer 
liability,
agents are considered employees. [Post at 2-3.] 
We believe Justice Cavanagh is misreading the statute.
The statute says an agent can be an employer—not an 
employee. The reference in the statute to "agent" modifies
"employer." 
It does not expand the scope of "employee."
This is evident from the parallel verbs: 
"Employer" means a person who has 1 or more
employees, and includes an agent of that person.
[MCL 37.2201(a) (emphasis added).] 
18 Title VII defines “employer” to mean “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person . . 
. ." 42 USC 2000e(b). (Emphasis added.) Thus, while the
definition of “employer” under Title VII is similar to that
of our CRA, as pointed out in Chambers, unlike the federal 
(continued…) 
15  
 
 
                                                 
 
us to numerous federal decisions that, on the basis of the 
“policy” and “object” of Title VII rather than what the 
statute actually says, have read Title VII to preclude 
individual liability.19  This Court has been clear that the 
policy behind a statute cannot prevail over what the text 
actually says. 
The text must prevail. 
In fact, in 
Chambers, when an invitation to follow “policy” over “text” 
was presented with regard to the CRA, we said: 
We 
are 
many 
times 
guided 
in 
our 
interpretation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act
by 
federal 
court 
interpretations 
of 
its 
(…continued) 
law, the CRA expressly establishes a cause of action for 
sexual 
harassment 
and 
employer 
liability 
based 
on 
 
traditional agency principles. 
Chambers, supra at 311, 
315-316, 326.  
19 For example, in Wathen, supra at 405, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined there was no individual
liability under Title VII of the federal civil rights act,
even though a reading of 
the language contained in Title
VII would lead to the conclusion that an individual could,
in fact, be held liable for acts of discrimination. 
The 
Sixth Circuit, however, citing the “object” and “policy” 
behind Title VII instead of its language, ultimately 
rendered a decision in conflict with that language.
Similarly, in Tomka v Seiler Corp, 66 F3d 1295, 1314 (CA 2,
1995), the Second Circuit ruled individual liability was 
not 
available 
under 
Title 
VII 
even 
though 
what 
it 
grudgingly referred to as “a narrow, literal reading of the
agent clause” in Title VII “does imply that an employer’s
agent is a statutory employer for purposes of [Title VII]
liability . . . .” 
As in Wathen, the Second Circuit went 
on to read Title VII not on the basis of its language, but
on the basis of what it viewed as the real “intentions of 
the legislators.” 
16  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
counterpart federal statute. 
However, we have
generally been careful to make it clear that we
are 
not 
compelled 
to 
follow 
those 
federal 
interpretations. 
Instead, our primary obligation
when interpreting Michigan law is always “to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature, . . . ‘as gathered from the act
itself.’” . . . 
[W]e cannot defer to federal
interpretations if doing so would nullify a 
portion 
of 
the 
Legislature's 
enactment. 
[Chambers, supra at 313-314 (citations omitted).] 
As in Chambers, we again decline to follow the 
tendered “policy” over “text” federal court interpretations 
of Title VII for the same reason: it would be contrary to 
the very wording of our CRA. 
Because MCL 37.2201(a) 
provides that an “employer” includes an “agent” of the 
employer, an agent can be held individually liable under 
the CRA.20 
20 Justice Weaver states in her dissent that our 
holding may be a “shallow victory” for plaintiffs because
sexual harassers may not be “agents” if they were acting
outside the scope of their authority. We neither agree nor
disagree with any aspect or premise of this proposition,
and do not address it here, because this issue has not been
raised or argued by the parties. 
Further, whether or not
some later holding by this Court may prove to be a “shallow
victory” is in sharp contrast with the “certain defeat”
that 
plaintiffs 
in 
sexual 
harassment 
cases 
against
individuals would suffer under Justice Weaver’s “common 
sense” interpretation of the statute. 
Post at 7. 
Justice 
Weaver further claims that under our opinion a supervisor, 
but not a coemployee, may face individual liability. 
This 
also is a proposition that has no basis in our opinion.
All we have said is, if the individual was an agent of the
employer, individual liability may exist. 
Whether a 
distinction 
can 
be 
drawn 
under 
the 
statute 
between 
(continued…) 
17  
 
 
 
                                                 
Moreover, several federal courts in Michigan have 
anticipated our holding that, under our CRA, individual 
agent liability exists even if it did not exist under Title 
VII. 
This can be seen in Hall v State Farm Ins Co, 18 F 
Supp 2d 751, 764 (ED Mich, 1998), in which the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
explained: 
ELCRA 
[Elliot-Larsen 
Civil 
Rights 
Act]
covers 
any 
employer 
“who 
has 
1 
or 
more 
employees.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2201(a). Thus,
ELCRA undeniably envisions placing liability on
individuals, such as two-member business entities
where one person is the principal and the other
person serves as the employee. Moreover, ELCRA's
remedy provision authorizes “person[s] alleging a
violation of this act [to] bring a civil action
for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or
both,” with “damages” being awarded for an 
“injury or loss caused by each violation of this
act, 
including 
reasonable 
attorney's 
fees.” 
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2801(1), (3). These ELCRA 
remedies further distinguish it from Title VII
because damages can be obtained from individuals
as well as employers. 
Similarly, another judge of the same federal district 
court also questioned the Jager Court’s conclusion that 
individual liability did not exist under Michigan’s CRA, 
stating that 
(…continued) 
supervisory and nonsupervisory employees has again not been 
raised or argued in this case.  
18  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the 
language 
“includes 
an 
agent 
of 
that 
employer,” could, under principles of strict 
statutory construction, well be read as extending
liability to individuals. Otherwise, this phrase
is merely surplusage, as it adds nothing to the
definitional scope of “employer,” which itself
defines the term “employer” as a person. [United 
States v Wayne Co Comm College Dist, 242 F Supp
2d 497, 507 n 11 (ED Mich, 2003).][21] 
We conclude, then, that while federal courts have the 
power to construe Title VII as they will, that does not 
compel us to follow them, especially if the language being 
construed is at loggerheads with the purported policy. 
With respect to the third argument regarding the 
amendment history of our CRA, defendants assert that it 
precludes a finding of individual liability. 
They advance 
this by positing that when the CRA was first enacted in 
1976, it defined “employer” to mean “a person who has 4 or 
more employees, and includes an agent of that person.” 
1976 PA 453. 
This meant, as defendants read it, that an 
agent could not be individually liable because the CRA did 
21 Millner v DTE Energy Co, 285 F Supp 2d 950, 964 n 16
(ED Mich, 2003), also expressed the same qualms as those
indicated in Wayne Comm College. 
We also note that, in Poches v Electronic Data Systems 
Corp, 266 F Supp 2d 623, 627 (ED Mich, 2003), and Rymal v
Baergen, 262 Mich App 274, 296-297; 686 NW2d 241 (2004),
the courts distinguished Jager and allowed retaliation 
claims against individuals to go forward because the 
antiretaliation provision of the CRA, MCL 37.2701, is 
broader than the antidiscrimination provision of the CRA,
MCL 37.2202. 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
not apply at all unless there were at least four employees. 
With that predicate of no agent liability under the 1976 
act understood, they then turn to the amended statute, 
which reflects the 1980 amendment22 that broadened the 
protection of the CRA by sweeping under its aegis companies 
with only one employee, but left unchanged the definition 
of “employer” to include an “agent,” and argue that even 
though the old theory of nonliability of agents cannot be 
sustained under the new language, we should read it in 
anyway. 
This we cannot do. 
The Legislature is held to 
what it said. It is not for us to rework the statute.  Our 
duty is to interpret the statute as written. 
The binding 
nature of this responsibility was reiterated by this Court 
recently in Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 
161; 680 NW2d 840 (2004), in which we said: 
Our task, under the Constitution, is the
important, but yet limited, duty to read and
interpret what the Legislature has actually made
the law. We have observed many times in the past
that our Legislature is free to make policy
choices 
that, 
especially 
in 
controversial 
matters, some observers will inevitably think 
unwise. 
This dispute over the wisdom of a law,
however, cannot give warrant to a court to 
overrule the people's Legislature. 
22 In 1980, the Legislature amended the statute to say
that an “employer” means “a person who has 1 or more
employees, and includes an agent of that person.” 
1980 PA 
202. 
20  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Thus, what this comes down to is that perhaps the 
Legislature’s policy choice can be debated, but the 
judiciary is not the constitutional venue for such a 
debate. 
The Legislature is the proper venue.  It is to 
that body that the defendants should make their argument. 
Accordingly, we reject the claim that the amendment history 
of our CRA precludes a finding of individual liability 
where the actual wording of the statute as currently 
written unambiguously provides that an agent may be 
individually liable.23 
Because we find that (1) inclusion of an “agent” 
within the definition of the word “employer” is not limited 
to 
establishing 
vicarious 
liability 
for 
the 
agent’s 
employer, 
but 
in 
fact 
means 
agents 
are 
considered 
employers, (2) federal decisions construing Title VII 
23 Notwithstanding Justice Weaver's view that the 
Legislature could have acted in a more "straightforward
manner" in communicating its intentions, we cannot think of
a more clearcut statement on its part concerning liability
under the statute. 
While Justice Weaver would prefer to
rely on her own "common sense," post at 7, in interpreting
"employer" to exclude from coverage individual employees,
the majority would prefer to rely on the statute itself,
which states that "[e]mployer . . . includes an agent of
that person." 
It is a caricature of the concept of
"judicial restraint" (which concept she invokes on her own
behalf, post at 7) for Justice Weaver to assert that her
"common sense" should be allowed to override the language
of the statute. 
21  
 
 
 
                                                 
should not be followed because it would lead to a result 
contrary to the text of our CRA, and (3) the amendment 
history of the CRA does not preclude a finding of 
individual liability, we conclude that liability under our 
CRA applies to an agent who sexually harasses an employee 
in the workplace. 
IV. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Ford 
It is the case in this area of the law that employer 
responsibility for sexual harassment can be established 
only 
if 
the 
employer 
had 
reasonable 
notice 
of 
the 
harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective 
action. Chambers, supra at 312. In Chambers, we also held 
that "notice of sexual harassment is adequate if, by an 
objective standard, the totality of the circumstances were 
such that a reasonable employer would have been aware of a 
substantial 
probability 
that 
sexual 
harassment 
was 
occurring." 
Id. at 319. 
Thus, actual notice to the 
employer is not required; rather, the test is whether the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment. 
Radtke, supra at 396 n 46.24  As is apparent, the issue is 
24 Justice Weaver agrees with the majority that an
employer must have notice before it can be liable. Post at 
10. 
But, she later arguably undercuts this by citing
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 72; 106 S Ct
2399; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986) (a case construing Title VII),
(continued…) 
22  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
whether Ford knew or reasonably should have known, under 
the totality of the circumstances, of Bennett’s harassment 
of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff claims she made a prima facie showing of 
notice when she told two low-level supervisors of Bennett’s 
exposure, and that Ford was also put on notice by the 
letters her psychologist and son-in-law sent to Ford. 
We 
agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that 
plaintiff’s notice evidence was insufficient to allow the 
case to be submitted to the jury. 
We first consider whether plaintiff’s telling two low­
level supervisors in confidence that Bennett had exposed 
himself to her constituted notice to Ford. We find that it 
did not. 
It must be recalled that, if an employee is 
sexually harassed in the workplace, it is that employee’s 
(…continued)
for the proposition that the “absence of notice to an
employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from
liability.” 
As for this language from Meritor, we note 
that it has been interpreted to mean that "employers are
liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or
offensive 
work 
environment 
of 
which 
management-level
employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have known." 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm v
Hacienda 
Hotel, 
881 
F2d 
1504, 
1515-1516 
(CA 
9,
1989)(emphasis added). 
Thus, the language from Meritor 
should be understood to mean actual notice is not required.
This is consistent with Michigan law because the test is
whether the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment. Radtke, supra at 396 n 46. 
23  
 
 
   
                                                 
choice whether to pursue the matter. 
In other words, the 
victim of harassment “owns the right” whether to notify the 
company and start the process of investigation. 
Until the 
employee takes appropriate steps to start the process, it 
is not started. 
As stated in Perry v Harris Chernin, Inc, 
126 F3d 1010, 1014 (CA 7, 1997): 
[T]he law against sexual harassment is not
self-enforcing. 
A plaintiff has no duty under
the 
law 
to 
complain 
about 
discriminatory
harassment, but the employer in a case like this
one will not be liable if it had no reason to 
know about it. 
Thus, when an employee requests confidentiality in 
discussing workplace harassment, and the request for 
confidentiality is honored, such a request is properly 
considered a waiver of the right to give notice.25 
Thus, 
we 
conclude 
that 
plaintiff’s 
telling 
two 
supervisors in confidence about one instance of Bennett’s 
improper 
conduct 
does 
not 
constitute 
notice, 
notwithstanding Ford’s policy that required the supervisors 
25 An employer, of course, remains free to discipline a
supervisor for failing to report a sexual harassment 
complaint to the proper persons as required by the 
employer’s policy. 
But, that is a different issue, and it
does not mean that a confidential report of sexual 
harassment to a supervisor constitutes notice to the 
employer. 
24  
 
 
  
                                                 
to report the information to human resources personnel.26 
Our holding is consistent with other courts that have 
considered this issue. For example in Hooker v Wentz, 77 F 
Supp 2d 753, 757-758 (SD W Va, 1999), the court held there 
was no notice to the employer where the plaintiff confided 
in her immediate supervisor about sexual advances but asked 
that he not report it to others. 
And, in Faragher v Boca 
Raton, 111 F3d 1530 (CA 11, 1997), rev’d on other grounds 
524 US 775 (1998), the court held that, for vicarious­
liability purposes, notice to a manager does not constitute 
notice to management when the complainant asks the manager, 
as a friend, to keep the information confidential. 
With regard to the letters that were sent to Ford, we 
concur with the Court of Appeals that where the evidence 
showed that plaintiff had filed numerous grievances and 
labor relations complaints over the years against Bennett 
and others that were unrelated to sexual harassment,27 the 
mentioning of the word “harassment” alone or the phrase 
“hostile environment” in the letters was insufficient to 
26 Accord Hooker v Wentz, 77 F Supp 2d 753, 757-758 (SD
W Va, 1999) (where the plaintiff confided in her immediate
supervisor about sexual advances, but asked that he not
report it to others, there was no notice to the employer). 
27 There were several disputes regarding plaintiff’s
shift assignment. 
25  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
give Ford notice that sexual harassment was being claimed. 
This is especially true where plaintiff was aware, and the 
employer was aware that she was aware, of the terminology 
at issue because she had previously filed a written 
complaint asserting that her UAW committeeman had sexually 
harassed her.28  Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that Ford 
was entitled to a directed verdict because, under the 
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable employer would 
not have been on notice of a substantial probability that 
sexual harassment was occurring.29 
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that, even if her 
evidence of notice to Ford was insufficient, it would have 
been sufficient if the trial court had not erroneously 
granted the motion in limine that precluded introduction of 
evidence of Ford’s knowledge of Bennett’s indecent exposure 
conviction. 
This conviction had been expunged before the 
28 Justice Weaver’s dissent advocates what might be
characterized as a “near miss” theory of notice, i.e., if a
male employee had problems at work with female employees or
was accused of harassing someone in a nonsexual way, this
somehow constitutes notice that such an employee was a
sexual harasser. 
The perils of such an approach are
apparent and we decline to adopt it. 
29 A directed verdict is proper where no prima facie
showing of liability is made. 
Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich
216, 222-223; 521 NW2d 786 (1994). 
26  
 
 
  
                                                 
trial in this matter. 
We conclude that the trial court’s 
ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 
First, we note that MCL 780.623(5) provides: 
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
subsection 
(2)
[pertaining to certain law enforcement purposes],
a person, other than the applicant, who knows or
should have known that a conviction was set aside 
under this section and who divulges, uses, or
publishes information concerning a conviction set
aside 
under 
this 
section 
is 
guilty 
of 
a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 90 days or a fine of not more than
$500.00, or both. 
Pursuant to this statute, evidence of Bennett’s 
expunged misdemeanor conviction was not admissible. 
While 
this statute clearly made evidence of the conviction 
inadmissible, that leaves the question whether the facts 
that led to the conviction, which occurred while Bennett 
was not at work and involved individuals with no connection 
to Ford, were admissible to establish that Ford knew or 
should have known that Bennett was sexually harassing 
plaintiff. 
The trial court ruled that the evidence was 
inadmissible 
because 
the 
prejudice 
to 
Ford 
would 
substantially outweigh any probative value the evidence 
might have. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.30 
30 See, e.g., Tomson v Stephan, 705 F Supp 530, 536 (D
Kan, 1989) (excluding evidence that the defendant made
sexual advances outside the employment setting because the
advances were not made toward an employee); Longmire v
(continued…) 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Indeed, we question how Ford’s knowledge of Bennett’s 
improper off-site behavior involving nonemployees could 
constitute notice to Ford that plaintiff’s work environment 
was sexually hostile. 
Context is important; improper 
behavior of a given type is not an inevitable predictor of 
other types of improper behavior especially where, as here, 
they 
occur 
at 
entirely 
different 
locales 
and 
under 
different circumstances. Tomson v Stephan, 705 F Supp 530, 
536 (D Kan, 1989). 
And, as we stated in Chambers, supra at 315-316, an 
employer can be vicariously liable for a hostile work 
environment only if it “failed to take prompt and adequate 
remedial action upon reasonable notice of the creation of a 
hostile [work] environment . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 
Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly 
held that plaintiff’s notice evidence was insufficient to 
allow the case to be submitted to the jury. 
V. Conclusion 
Because employers can be held liable under the CRA, 
and because agents are considered employers, agents can be 
(…continued)
Alabama State Univ, 151 FRD 414, 417 (MD Ala, 1992) (the
defendant’s 
“activities 
outside 
the 
work 
place 
are 
irrelevant” to determining the existence of a hostile work
environment). 
28  
 
 
held liable, as individuals, under the CRA. 
Thus, we 
accept the invitation of the Court of Appeals and reverse 
that part of the Court of Appeals opinion that relied on 
Jager in holding that agents may not be held individually 
liable under our CRA. 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that 
Ford was entitled to a directed verdict and that the trial 
court’s pretrial ruling on the motion in limine was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings regarding Bennett 
and consistent with this opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LULA ELEZOVIC, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and 
JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, 
Plaintiff, 
No. 125166 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY AND DANIEL P. 
BENNETT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I believe that the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 
et seq., does not provide for individual liability against 
an agent of an employer; therefore, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority on this issue. 
I also dissent from the 
majority on the issue of notice. 
As discussed by Justice 
Weaver in her partial dissent, I likewise believe that 
plaintiff provided evidence of notice to defendant Ford 
Motor Company (Ford) that was sufficient to allow the issue 
to be decided by a jury. Finally, I concur with the result 
reached by the majority regarding the trial court’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
decision to grant defendants’ motion in limine to preclude 
evidence 
of 
Ford’s 
knowledge 
of 
the 
alleged 
sexual 
harasser’s expunged indecent exposure conviction. 
I. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
This issue involves the proper interpretation of the 
CRA. 
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 
In re MCI 
Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
The first step is to review the language of the statute. 
If the statutory language is unambiguous, the Legislature 
is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the 
statute and judicial construction is not permissible. 
MCL 37.2201(a) states the following: 
“‘Employer’ 
means a person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an 
agent of that person.” 
According to the statute, “that 
person” refers to the employer.1  Simply, the statute means 
that an employer is a person who has one or more employees 
association, corporation, joint apprenticeship 
and this includes an agent of the employer. 
This means 
1 MCL 37.2103(g) states the following: 
“Person” 
means 
an 
individual, 
agent, 
committee, 
joint 
stock 
company, 
labor 
organization, 
legal 
representative, 
mutual 
company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in
bankruptcy, 
unincorporated 
organization, 
the 
state or a political subdivision of the state or
an agency of the state, or any other legal or
commercial entity. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
that an employer still falls within the purview of the 
statute even if its “employees” are mere agents, such as 
family members who are helping with the business. 
To 
determine 
employer 
liability, 
agents 
are 
considered 
employees. 
Thus, an employer cannot escape liability 
because the alleged sexual harasser is not officially an 
employee, but is instead, for example, a family member who 
is “helping out” with the business. If the sexual harasser 
is an employee or agent of the employer, the employer is 
liable if it had notice and failed to act reasonably. 
See 
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 396; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). 
According to the unambiguous language selected by the 
Legislature, the plain text of the statute provides for 
employer liability for the acts of its employees and 
agents, but it does not provide for individual liability. 
Because policy considerations cannot be taken into account 
in this case, I offer no position on whether it would be 
best for plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases to also hold 
an alleged sexual harasser individually liable under the 
CRA. 
That decision is solely for the Legislature to 
determine. 
II. NOTICE TO FORD OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
I concur with part II of Justice Weaver’s partial 
dissent. 
I believe Justice Weaver outlines sufficient 
evidence to support plaintiff’s claim that Ford had notice
3 
 
 
 
 
 
of plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment. 
While 
plaintiff requested confidentiality from two supervisors 
whom she told about the alleged sexual harassment, it is 
critical to note that the supervisor of labor relations had 
notice of plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment from 
one of plaintiff’s coworkers and from the alleged sexual 
harasser himself. In addition to the other facts presented 
by plaintiff, because the supervisor of labor relations had 
notice of plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment, I 
believe that this issue should be determined by a jury. 
III. EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED SEXUAL HARASSER’S 
EXPUNGED CONVICTION FOR INDECENT EXPOSURE 
I concur with the result reached by the majority that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
granted defendants’ motion in limine to preclude evidence 
of Ford’s knowledge of the alleged sexual harasser’s 
expunged indecent exposure conviction. 
I also concur with 
the majority’s conclusion that, in this case, the facts 
that led to the conviction were not sufficient to put Ford 
on notice of sexual harassment. However, I note that there 
certainly may be instances where the facts of a conviction, 
even one that occurs off-site and involves nonemployees, 
may lead to notice because of the context in which the 
incident occurred and the totality of the circumstances. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Because the CRA does not provide for individual 
liability against an agent of an employer, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority on this issue. 
I also dissent 
from the majority on the issue of notice and, accordingly, 
I concur with Justice Weaver because I believe that 
plaintiff provided evidence of notice to Ford that was 
sufficient to allow the issue to be decided by a jury. 
Finally, I concur with the result reached by the majority 
regarding the trial court’s decision to grant defendants’ 
motion in limine to preclude evidence of Ford’s knowledge 
of the alleged sexual harasser’s expunged indecent exposure 
conviction. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LULA ELEZOVIC, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and 
JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, 
Plaintiff, 
No. 125166 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY AND DANIEL P. 
BENNETT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the majority’s conclusions that the trial 
court’s ruling on the defendants’ motion in limine was not 
an abuse of discretion and that its decision to exclude the 
evidence of defendant Daniel Bennett’s expunged conviction 
should therefore be affirmed. 
But I write separately 
because I respectfully dissent both from the majority’s 
conclusion that Michigan’s Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 
37.2101 et seq., provides for individual liability against 
an agent of an employer and from its conclusion that 
defendant Ford Motor Company was entitled to a directed 
 
 
 
 
 
verdict because plaintiff failed to establish that Ford had 
notice of the sexual harassment. 
Instead, 
I 
would 
conclude 
that 
the 
Legislature 
included the word “agent” in the definition of “employer” 
in MCL 37.2201(a) to denote respondeat superior liability, 
not individual liability. 
Accordingly, I would not 
overrule Jager v Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, 252 Mich 
App 464; 652 NW2d 503 (2002), and I would affirm the Court 
of Appeals conclusion in this case that there is no 
individual liability under the statute. 
Further, I would 
conclude that plaintiff offered sufficient evidence during 
trial to allow the question of notice to go to the jury. 
Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision 
that the trial court properly granted a directed verdict in 
Ford’s favor because plaintiff failed to show that she 
provided notice of her sexual harassment claim. 
I 
The CRA provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n 
employer shall not do any of the following”: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, because of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or
marital status. 
(b) 
Limit, 
segregate, 
or 
classify 
an 
employee or applicant for employment in a way
that deprives or tends to deprive the employee or
2 
 
 
applicant 
of 
an 
employment 
opportunity, 
or 
otherwise adversely affects the status of an 
employee or applicant because of religion, race,
color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight,
or marital status. 
(c) 
Segregate, 
classify, 
or 
otherwise 
discriminate against a person on the basis of sex
with respect to a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, including, but not limited to, a
benefit plan or system. [MCL 37.2202.] 
The CRA defines discrimination because of sex to include 
sexual harassment. 
MCL 37.2103(i). 
It defines “sexual 
harassment” to mean “unwelcome sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or 
communication of a sexual nature under the following 
conditions”: 
(i) 
Submission 
to 
the 
conduct 
or 
communication is made a term or condition either 
explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment,
public 
accommodations 
or 
public 
services,
education, or housing. 
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the 
conduct or communication by an individual is used
as 
a 
factor 
in 
decisions 
affecting 
the 
individual’s employment, public accommodations or
public services, education, or housing. 
(iii) The conduct or communication has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering
with 
an 
individual’s 
employment, 
public
accommodations or public services, education, or
housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive 
employment, 
public 
accommodations,
public 
services, 
educational, 
or 
housing
environment. [MCL 37.2103(i).] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The term “employer” is defined as “a person who has 1 or 
more employees, and includes an agent of that person.” MCL 
37.2201(a). 
The majority concludes that because the definition of 
the word “employer” includes an “agent” of the employer, 
“an agent can be held individually liable under the CRA.” 
Ante at 17. 
I disagree and, instead, agree with the 
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals in Jager, supra 
at 484, that by defining “employer” to include an “agent” 
of the employer, the Legislature “meant merely to denote 
respondeat superior liability[1] rather than individual 
liability.”2
 Thus, I would not overrule the Jager 
decision. 
Had the Legislature intended the CRA to impose 
liability on the individuals who commit harassment, it 
would likely have done so in a more straightforward manner 
than by defining “employer” to include an “agent” of the 
1 Respondeat superior “means that a master is liable in
certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a
principal for those of his agent.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th ed). It is an element of a prima facie case of sexual
harassment based on hostile work environment. 
Radtke v 
Everett, 442 Mich 368, 383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). 
For all 
five elements, see p 10 of this opinion. 
2 See also Miller v Maxwell’s Int’l Inc, 991 F2d 583 
(CA 9, 1993), and Wathen v Gen Electric Co, 115 F3d 400 (CA
6, 1997), which interpret the phrase as used in Title VII. 
4  
 
 
                                                 
employer.3  Relying on the word “agent” to impose individual 
liability would, under the majority’s interpretation, only 
allow individual liability against supervisors and others 
in similar positions who, under agency law, might be 
considered “agents” of the employer.4
 But it would not 
permit 
coemployees 
who 
harass 
a 
victim 
to 
be 
held 
individually liable. 
If the Legislature truly intended to 
impose individual liability under the CRA on those who 
commit sexual harassment, one would expect that it would 
choose language that would allow all individuals who commit 
the harassment to be held liable, regardless of their 
status as a supervisor or coemployee. 
Further, 
the 
“round-aboutness” 
of 
the 
majority’s 
approach becomes more evident when one realizes that 
recognizing individual liability under the CRA may be a 
very shallow “victory” for plaintiff and may actually 
result in very few individuals being held liable. 
In this 
3 For example, the Legislature could have said in MCL
37.2202 that an “employer or employee of the employer shall
not . . .,” or it could have included a separate section in
the statute addressing individual liability. 
4 An agent has been defined as a “person authorized by
another (principal) to act for or in place of him; one
intrusted with another’s business” or “[o]ne who deals not
only with things, as does a servant, but with persons,
using his own discretion as to means, and frequently
establishing contractual relations between his principal
and third persons.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). 
5  
 
 
                                                 
 
case, the majority assumes that Mr. Bennett was an “agent” 
of Ford without analyzing the issue. 
But if the issue 
whether the perpetrator of the harassment was an agent of 
the employer were analyzed under strict agency principles, 
in many cases, it may be concluded that the perpetrator of 
the harassment cannot be held individually liable as an 
agent because the perpetrator did not have actual or 
apparent authority from the employer to harass employees of 
the employer; therefore he cannot be considered an “agent” 
of the employer because he was acting outside the scope of 
his authority.5
 It does not seem reasonable that the 
Legislature 
would 
create 
individual 
liability 
using 
language 
that 
might, 
in 
actuality, 
foreclose 
most 
5 See, e.g., AMCO Builders & Developers, Inc v Team Ace
Joint Venture, 469 Mich 90, 103-104; 666 NW2d 623 (2003)
(Young, J. concurring)(stating that agency principles are
applicable to the attorney-client relationship and that a
client may be bound by the acts of his agent when the agent
is acting within the scope of his authority); James v 
Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 15; 626 NW2d 158 (2001)(noting that
“a principal is bound by an agent’s actions within the
agent’s actual or apparent authority”). 
In light of this, I now question the correctness of
our decision in Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 312,
316; 614 NW2d 910 (2000), which concluded that the CRA is
firmly “rooted in traditional agency principles.”  While 
agency principles may be a helpful guide in applying the
CRA, I question whether they should be rigidly applied in
this setting. 
6  
 
 
  
individuals from being held individually liable under the 
CRA. 
The majority offers no clear reason for rejecting the 
conclusion that the phrase “agent of the employer” denotes 
respondeat superior liability. Rather, it simply concludes 
that the phrase “includes an agent of that person” must 
mean “if the words are going to be read sensibly” that 
agents are subject to individual liability under the 
statute. 
Ante at 14. 
Thus, the majority’s reasoning 
amounts to little more than it must mean this because we 
say it does. 
But, as suggested above, rather than a 
“sensible” reading of the statute, this seems a very round­
about way to create individual liability. 
I also disagree with the majority’s suggestion that 
concluding 
that 
the 
word 
“agent” 
denotes 
respondeat 
superior liability and not individual liability places 
“policy” over the “text” of the statute. 
Ante at 15—17. 
Interpreting the text of the statute does not mean that we 
read a phrase in the statute in isolation from the act as a 
whole or from the purpose of the act. 
Interpreting a 
statute with judicial restraint and common sense may, in 
fact, require us to consider the act as a whole and its 
purpose 
while 
we 
endeavor 
to 
understand 
what 
the 
Legislature intended by including a particular phrase. 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In this case, a purpose of MCL 37.2202 is to prohibit 
employers from sexually discriminating against employees. 
By imposing liability on employers for sexual harassment, 
employers will be encouraged to take steps to prevent 
sexual harassment from occurring in the workplace. 
But 
often in a large company or corporation, there is not one 
“person” that could be considered the “employer” for 
purposes of determining whether an “employer” discriminated 
against an employee. 
The employer is an entity. 
Thus, it 
is reasonable for the Legislature to include in the 
definition 
that 
an 
“employer” 
includes 
an 
“agent.” 
Including this respondeat superior aspect in the statute 
ensures that employees can hold employers liable for 
harassment while still balancing the interests of the 
employer by limiting employer liability to those who can be 
considered 
the 
employer’s 
“agents” 
and 
incorporating 
respondeat superior principles that require notice to the 
employer of the alleged harassment.6
 Considering this 
“policy” behind the provision does not place policy over 
“text.” Rather, it is another way a judge exercises common 
6 As noted in footnote 3 of this opinion, I question
whether agency principles should be rigidly applied to the
CRA 
rather 
than 
used 
as 
a 
general 
guideline 
for 
interpreting the CRA, and I do not mean to suggest that by
using the word “agent” to denote respondeat superior 
liability, the Legislature clearly intended to incorporate
any and all principles of agency law into the CRA. 
8  
 
 
 
                                                 
sense and judicial restraint while attempting to reach a 
reasonable interpretation of what the Legislature intended 
the words to mean. 
Therefore, 
until 
the 
Legislature 
clearly 
creates 
individual liability under the statute, I would conclude 
that plaintiff does not have a cause of action against Mr. 
Bennett under the CRA.7 
II 
The majority also concludes that the trial court 
properly granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant 
Ford Motor Company because plaintiff failed to establish 
that Ford had notice of the harassment. 
I disagree and 
would allow the jury to determine, under the totality of 
the circumstances, whether Ford had notice of the alleged 
sexual harassment. 
The elements required to establish a prima facie case 
of sexual harassment based on hostile work environment are: 
(1) the employee belonged to a protected
group; 
(2) 
the 
employee 
was 
subjected 
to 
communication or conduct on the basis of sex; 
(3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome
sexual conduct or communication; 
7 I note that although I would conclude that plaintiff
does not have a claim against Mr. Bennett under the CRA,
she can pursue any traditional tort claims that she may
have against him. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(4) 
the 
unwelcome 
sexual 
conduct 
or 
communication was intended to or in fact did 
substantially 
interfere 
with 
the 
employee’s
employment or created an intimidating, 
hostile,
or offensive work environment; and 
(5) respondeat superior. [Radtke v Everett,
442 Mich 368, 382-383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).] 
As further explained, under the fifth element, an employer 
may avoid liability if, upon notice of the hostile work 
environment, it adequately investigated and took prompt 
remedial action. 
Id. at 396 (quoting Downer v Detroit 
Receiving Hosp, 191 Mich App 232, 234; 477 NW2d 146 
[1991]). 
An employer must have notice of the alleged 
harassment before it can be held liable, and it does not 
have a duty to investigate and take prompt remedial action 
until it has actual or constructive notice. 
Radtke, supra 
at 396-397 and n 44. 
In this case, the trial court granted a directed 
verdict in Ford’s favor on plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claim on the basis that there was no notice to 
Ford.8  The trial court stated: 
The fact of the matter is that there was no 
notice to Ford. This 1998 letter to Mr. Rush, if
it 
went 
to 
him, 
from 
the 
son-in-law, 
the 
defendant never made mention of any sexual 
harassment. 
And again, the only people she told
were supervisors. 
Under normal circumstances I 
8 Defendant Ford moved for summary disposition of
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim only on the
issue of notice. 
10  
 
 
   
would agree that that would be enough. 
But in 
this case it was told to them in confidence. She 
asked them not to repeat it. 
And again, she
complained that she couldn’t come forward because
of her culture. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 
This Court reviews de novo the grant of a motion for a 
directed verdict. Cacevic v Simplimatic Engineering Co (On 
Remand), 248 Mich App 670, 679; 645 NW2d 287 (2001); see 
also Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 77; 684 NW2d 296 
(2004) (stating that a decision on a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed de novo). 
In 
reviewing the trial court’s decision on the motion, “we 
examine the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.” 
Hord v Environmental Research Institute 
of Michigan (After Remand), 463 Mich 399, 410; 617 NW2d 543 
(2000). 
“A directed verdict is appropriately granted only 
when no factual questions exist on which reasonable jurors 
could differ.” 
Cacevic, supra at 679-680; see also 
Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388, 391; 617 NW2d 305 (2000) 
(stating that a directed verdict is appropriate only if the 
evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, fails to establish a claim as a matter 
of law). Thus, while not insurmountable, the threshold for 
obtaining a directed verdict is high. Hord, supra at 410. 
11  
 
 
In my opinion, considering all the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, there are 
factual questions about which reasonable jurors could 
differ regarding whether Ford had notice. 
Therefore, the 
issue of notice is not one that the trial court can 
properly decide as a matter of law; instead, it is a 
question of fact to be decided by the jury. 
Consequently, 
I would reverse the Court of Appeals affirmance of the 
trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in Ford’s favor 
and remand this case to the trial court. 
Plaintiff testified that in 1995, she told her 
supervisor, Gary Zuback, that Mr. Bennett had been sexually 
harassing her. 
She also testified that around the same 
time, she told another supervisor, Butch Vaubel, who said 
that he would talk to Mr. Bennett, and that on different 
occasions, she told her coworkers Dan Welch, Dave Perry, 
and Brad Goatee. 
She admitted that when she told Mr. 
Zuback and Mr. Vaubel, she told them confidentially. 
Dan 
Welch testified that he did not tell anyone about the first 
incident of harassment that plaintiff described to him, but 
that he later spoke to Jerome Rush, the supervisor of labor 
relations, in October 1998, as well as Ron Mester and 
perhaps Richard Greenfield about the situation. Mr. Goatee 
testified that he was called down to labor relations in 
1996 or 1997 to discuss Mr. Bennett. 
Mr. Rush testified 
12  
 
 
 
that before plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed, Mr. Bennett told 
him that plaintiff was trying to set Mr. Bennett up on a 
sexual harassment claim and that Ford, therefore, knew 
about the lawsuit before it was filed. 
Labor relations notes written by Pete Foley to Jerome 
Rush on August 25, 1998, indicate that plaintiff was very 
upset and felt that Mr. Bennett and another worker, Tammy 
Holcomb, were looking at her and laughing. 
Notes dated 
August 28, 1998, state the plaintiff told Pete Foley that 
Mr. Bennett came near her when no one was around and that 
she was scared. Notes from Jerome Rush dated September 30, 
1998, stated that plaintiff told him that Mr. Bennett was 
“harassing” her. 
Letters from plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Fran 
Parker, on September 19, 1997, and November 10, 1997, 
reference plaintiff’s discomfort with Mr. Bennett, 
A 
letter sent by plaintiff’s son-in-law, Paul Lulgjuraj, who 
is an attorney, on April 9, 1998, to Mr. Rush states that 
his 
office 
was 
investigating 
“ongoing 
acts 
of 
discrimination and retaliation,” references threats made by 
Tammy Holcomb, and advises that his office may be taking 
actions “to insure that our client is not subjected to 
working in a hostile environment.” 
On December 17, 1998, 
Dr. Parker wrote to Mr. Rush to explain that Rush had 
misunderstood Parker’s phone call on October 6, 1998, to
13 
 
 
 
 
Rush to tell Rush that plaintiff had homicidal and suicidal 
thoughts. 
Parker’s letter stated that Parker did not tell 
Mr. Rush that plaintiff intended to kill Dan Bennett, but 
that the call was meant to ask Mr. Rush to intervene on 
plaintiff’s behalf because the stress of plaintiff’s job 
was “breaking her down.” 
The majority, in affirming the trial court’s grant of 
a directed verdict in Ford’s favor, improperly creates a 
rule of automatic waiver. 
Under the majority’s analysis, 
any 
time 
an 
employee 
requests 
confidentiality 
when 
reporting sexual harassment, the employee will have waived 
notice. Ante at 23-24. While a request of confidentiality 
is certainly something that the jury should consider in 
determining whether the employer had notice, such a request 
should not constitute an automatic waiver of notice. 
Rather, all the evidence presented and the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered when determining whether 
the employer had actual or constructive notice. See, e.g., 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 72; 106 S Ct 
2399; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986), where in rejecting a rule of 
automatic liability for employers for sexual harassment by 
supervisors, the United States Supreme Court also stated 
that the “absence of notice to an employer does not 
necessarily insulate that employer from liability.” 
14  
 
 
 
 
Considering all the evidence presented in this case in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there are issues 
of fact to be decided by the jury about whether defendant 
Ford Motor Company had notice that plaintiff was being 
sexually harassed. 
While it is true that plaintiff may 
have requested confidentiality from her supervisors and 
that 
many 
of 
the 
letters 
and 
documents 
mentioning 
“harassment” generally do not detail the specific instances 
of sexual harassment on which plaintiff’s lawsuit is based, 
evidence was also presented that she told coworkers of the 
harassment and that the coworkers in turn spoke with 
employees in the labor relations department. 
Further, 
considering all the documentation in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, there is certainly evidence that 
plaintiff 
complained 
to 
Ford 
that 
Mr. 
Bennett 
was 
“harassing” her and doing something to make her job very 
stressful. 
Therefore, I would conclude that the question of 
notice is not one that can be decided as a matter of law by 
the trial court, but one that must be decided by the jury 
after it considers the entire record and weighs the 
conflicting evidence. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
15