Title: New Jersey v. Hyppolite
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2018

New Jersey v. Hyppolite Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In March 2017, police officers responded to a report of a shooting in a parking lot at Lafayette Gardens in Jersey City and found Terrel Smith’s body; he had been shot multiple times. The police identified “Michael Gregg” as a witness and interviewed him. Over time, he made two separate -- and inconsistent -- statements. Gregg identified defendant Shaquan Hyppolite from a photo array. Defendant was charged and arrested for murder and weapons offenses. The affidavit of probable cause in support of the complaint stated that “an eyewitness . . . positively identified Shaquan Hyppolite AKA Quan as the actor who” killed Terrel Smith. The State moved for pretrial detention the next day. Two days later, the State made available fifty-one pages of discovery materials and a DVD recording of Gregg’s interview. On the day of the detention hearing, the State also turned over a four-page written summary of that interview titled “Second Interview of [Gregg].” The State did not disclose Gregg’s first statement before the hearing. At the detention hearing, the court ordered that defendant be detained. Two months later, a grand jury indicted defendant. The State turned over additional discovery, including Gregg’s first statement to the police, recordings of interviews of "Bill" and "Frank," and an application for a communications data warrant for Gregg’s cell phone. This marked the first time defendant received Gregg’s initial statement to the police, in which he denied having seen the shooter. Bill’s statement revealed that he told the police he was in jail at the time of the homicide. Frank told the police that he was en route to Popeyes when he heard gunshots from Lafayette Gardens. The application for the communications data warrant noted that an eyewitness saw the victim engaged in a conversation with three men before the shooting, “which conflicts with [Gregg’s] version of events.” Based on the new discovery, defendant moved to reopen the detention hearing. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that when exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detention hearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whether to reopen the hearing. "If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the detention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed, the hearing should be reopened." Applying that standard in this case, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to reopen the detention hearing. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Shaquan Hyppolite (A-48-17) (080302)Argued September 13, 2018 -- Decided December 11, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. When the State seeks to detain a defendant pretrial under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), prosecutors must disclose “all exculpatory evidence” before the detention hearing, see R. 3:4-2(c)(2)(E). In this case, the Court considers the appropriate remedy when the State fails to disclose exculpatory evidence before a detention hearing. In March 2017, police officers responded to a report of a shooting in a parking lot at Lafayette Gardens in Jersey City and found Terrel Smith’s lifeless body. Smith had been shot multiple times. The police identified “Michael Gregg” as a witness and interviewed him. Over time, he made two separate -- and inconsistent -- statements. A few hours after the shooting, Gregg said that he was in the victim’s Jeep around the time of the shooting. After the victim got out of the car, Gregg said he heard three to four gunshots but did not see the shooter. Gregg spoke to the police again on June 8, 2017 and gave a second statement. Gregg said the victim had picked him up on the day of the shooting, and the two were selling drugs. Gregg said he recognized several other men in the area including Quan, “Bill,” and “Frank.” During a break in the interview, Gregg told the police he was worried about his safety and the safety of his family. He provided more details after the break: Quan approached the victim when he left the car to get more drugs; Quan was clutching something inside his hooded sweatshirt, which Gregg thought was a firearm; Quan and the victim had a short conversation on the driver’s side of the car before Gregg heard a gunshot; and Gregg ran away as he heard several more gunshots. Gregg identified defendant Shaquan Hyppolite from a photo array. Defendant was charged and arrested for murder and weapons offenses. The affidavit of probable cause in support of the complaint stated that “an eyewitness . . . positively identified Shaquan Hyppolite AKA Quan as the actor who” killed Terrel Smith. The State moved for pretrial detention the next day. Two days later, the State made available fifty-one pages of discovery materials and a DVD recording of Gregg’s interview on June 8, 2017. On the day of the detention hearing, the State also turned over a four-page written summary of that interview titled “Second Interview of [Gregg].” The State did not disclose Gregg’s first statement before the hearing. 1 At the detention hearing, the court ordered that defendant be detained. Two months later, a grand jury indicted defendant. The State turned over additional discovery, including Gregg’s first statement to the police, recordings of interviews of Bill and Frank, and an application for a communications data warrant for Gregg’s cell phone. This marked the first time defendant received Gregg’s initial statement to the police, in which he denied having seen the shooter. Bill’s statement revealed that he told the police he was in jail at the time of the homicide. Frank told the police that he was en route to Popeyes when he heard gunshots from Lafayette Gardens. The application for the communications data warrant noted that an eyewitness saw the victim engaged in a conversation with three men before the shooting, “which conflicts with [Gregg’s] version of events.” Based on the new discovery, defendant moved to reopen the detention hearing. The trial court issued a written opinion and denied the application. The court found that the additional discovery contained exculpatory evidence, and that the State therefore violated Rule 3:4-2(c) by failing to disclose the items before the hearing. The court, however, found that the evidence withheld was not material. The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. The Court granted leave to appeal. 232 N.J. 370 (2018).HELD: When exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detention hearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whether to reopen the hearing. If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the detention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed, the hearing should be reopened. Applying that standard in this case, the Court reverses and remands to the trial court to reopen the detention hearing.1. When the State seeks to detain a defendant pretrial, the prosecutor must provide the defendant with “all exculpatory evidence” “no later than 24 hours before the detention hearing.” R. 3:4-2(c)(2)(E). At any time before trial, a defendant may apply to reopen a detention hearing under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f). (pp. 9-12)2. The requirement to turn over exculpatory evidence before a detention hearing is grounded in the State’s affirmative obligation to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant. Brady v. Maryland held that the prosecution’s “suppression . . . of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83 , 87 (1963). Impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, is governed by the Brady rule. Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 682 (1985). (pp. 13-14)3. In State v. Hogan -- which applies to grand jury proceedings -- the Court “impos[ed] a limited duty on prosecutors” to inform the grand jury of exculpatory evidence “that both directly negates the guilt of the accused and is clearly exculpatory.” 144 N.J. 216, 237 (1996). In contrast, Rule 3:4-2(c)(2)(E) calls for disclosure of “all exculpatory evidence” before a detention hearing. Hogan does not govern pretrial detention hearings. (p. 14) 2 4. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) imposes a materiality standard to determine whether to reopen a detention hearing when information “that was not known . . . at the time of the hearing” later surfaces. Brady and its progeny, of course, set forth the traditional materiality standard to assess the prosecution’s withholding of exculpatory evidence. Although that standard provides a fair and workable approach for motions filed after trial, the test is not ideal for evidence withheld before a detention hearing. To require pretrial detainees to show a “reasonable probability” that their detention hearing would have ended differently may well be impractical and set the bar too high. Conversely, requiring a new hearing every time exculpatory evidence is not disclosed would serve only to punish or deter the State in some instances, not to enhance fairness or satisfy due process. (pp. 15-19)5. The Court adopts a modified materiality standard for detention decisions: Judges should examine whether there is a reasonable possibility -- not probability -- that the result of the hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. The burden is on the State to demonstrate that a new hearing is not required under that standard. If the State cannot make that showing, the detention hearing should be reopened. The test does not require defendants to show that they reasonably would have prevailed at the earlier hearing. At the same time, a fanciful possibility that the outcome would be different would not satisfy the standard. The approach presents no due process concerns under federal or state law: It is more favorable to defendants than what Brady and Bagley call for, and it would be difficult for defendants to claim a constitutional right to reopen a hearing when the State shows that there is no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the case would be different. Release is not an appropriate remedy for a discovery violation, as a general proposition. (pp. 19-21)6. The Court adds guidance for judges and practitioners in this novel area, outlining the streamlined process it envisions. (pp. 21-23)7. Overall, the CJRA statistics generally demonstrate good faith and a commitment by counsel to abide by the court rules. If, however, a court found that a prosecutor engaged in willful or egregious misconduct by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence, the court should refer the matter to the Office of Attorney Ethics. (pp. 24-25)8. The homicide charge in this matter rested heavily on a single witness -- Gregg -- who identified defendant as the shooter. That evidence was undermined by Gregg’s earlier statement that he did not see the shooter. Two other statements -- by Bill and Frank -- and the communications data warrant also conflict with Gregg’s account and could be used to impeach him. Defendant should have an opportunity to use the new evidence to try to rebut the presumption of detention. Even with a presumption of detention, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b), and defendant’s juvenile record, there is a reasonable possibility that the result would have been different. Defendant is therefore entitled to a new detention hearing. (pp. 25-26) REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 48 September Term 2017 080302 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Shaquan Hyppolite, Defendant-Appellant. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 13, 2018 December 11, 2018Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit and Mary J. Ciancimino, First Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephanie Davis Elson, on the brief).Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Edward Barocas and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). 1 Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the brief). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. When the State seeks to detain a defendant pretrial under the CriminalJustice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, prosecutors mustdisclose “all exculpatory evidence” before the detention hearing, see R. 3:4-2(c)(2)(E). We now consider the appropriate remedy when the State fails todisclose exculpatory evidence before a detention hearing. In this case, defendant Shaquan Hyppolite was charged with murder andweapons offenses. At the outset, the State relied on a single witness whospoke to the police and identified defendant as the shooter. The Statesuccessfully moved to detain defendant and released a statement by the witnessalong with other discovery before the detention hearing. Defendant was indicted two months later, and the State disclosedadditional materials afterward. Those materials revealed that the witnessinitially told the police he did not see the shooter. The witness had alsoidentified two others he claimed were at the scene of the crime, but their newly 2 disclosed statements contradicted him. Other evidence conflicted with thewitness’s version of events as well. The trial court correctly found that the additional discovery containedexculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed before the detentionhearing, pursuant to Rule 3:4-2(c)(2)(E) (then Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)). The judgeconcluded the evidence was not material and declined to reopen defendant’sdetention hearing. We hold that when exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detentionhearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whetherto reopen the hearing. If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of thedetention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed,the hearing should be reopened. Applying that standard in this case, we reverse and remand to the trialcourt to reopen the detention hearing. I. To recount the facts, we rely on the record of the detention hearing alongwith discovery the State provided before and after the hearing. On March 29, 2017, police officers responded to a report of a shootingin a parking lot at Lafayette Gardens in Jersey City. When they arrived, theysaw Terrel Smith’s lifeless body lying on the pavement behind his car, a Jeep 3 Liberty. According to an autopsy report, Smith had been shot multiple times.He was later pronounced dead at the hospital. The police identified “Michael Gregg” 1 as a witness and interviewedhim. Over time, he made two separate -- and inconsistent -- statements to thepolice. In his first statement, a few hours after the shooting on March 29,2017, Gregg said that he was in the victim’s Jeep around the time of theshooting. After the victim got out of the car, Gregg said he heard three to fourgunshots but did not see the shooter. Gregg then ran from the area. Gregg spoke to the police again on June 8, 2017 and gave a secondstatement. According to the police report, early in the interview, Gregg saidthe victim had picked him up on the day of the shooting, and the two wereselling drugs. They then drove to Lafayette Gardens to pick up more drugsfrom the victim’s stash location. Gregg said he recognized several other menin the area including Quan, “Bill,” and “Frank.” During a break in the interview, Gregg told the police he was worriedabout his safety and the safety of his family. He provided more details afterthe break: Quan approached the victim when he left the car to get more drugs;Quan was clutching something inside his hooded sweatshirt, which Gregg1 We use fictitious names for all of the witnesses to protect their privacy at this stage. 4 thought was a firearm; Quan and the victim had a short conversation on thedriver’s side of the car before Gregg heard a gunshot; and Gregg ran away ashe heard several more gunshots. Gregg told the police he had known Quan for about seven years andbelieved his real name was Shaquan. Gregg identified defendant ShaquanHyppolite from a photo array. On June 20, 2017, defendant was charged and arrested on a three-countcomplaint that accused him of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); possession of aweapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); and unlawfulpossession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). The affidavit of probablecause in support of the complaint stated that “an eyewitness . . . positivelyidentified Shaquan Hyppolite AKA Quan as the actor who” killed TerrelSmith. The State moved for pretrial detention the next day. Two days later, theState made available fifty-one pages of discovery materials and a DVDrecording of Gregg’s interview on June 8, 2017. On the day of the detentionhearing, July 6, 2017, the State also turned over a four-page written summaryof that interview titled “Second Interview of [Gregg].” The State did notdisclose Gregg’s first statement before the hearing. 5 Pretrial Services recommended that defendant be detained. The PublicSafety Assessment (PSA) scored defendant 1 out of 6 for risk of failure toappear and 2 out of 6 for risk of new criminal activity. At the detention hearing, the State highlighted that a presumption ofdetention applied because of the homicide charge. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b).The State also stressed that defendant, who had recently turned eighteen, hadan extensive juvenile history. Defendant did not challenge the existence ofprobable cause and took no position on detention. The trial court found probable cause and concluded that defendant hadnot rebutted the presumption in favor of detention. The court also observedthat defendant’s PSA scores did not “take into account his extensive andserious juvenile record,” which includes adjudications for aggravated assault,assault, and a weapons offense. The court accordingly ordered that defendantbe detained. Two months later, on September 12, 2017, a grand jury indicteddefendant on the charges in the complaint. The State turned over additionaldiscovery after the indictment, which included the following materials:Gregg’s first statement to the police; a DVD recording of an interview of Billon June 20, 2017; a police report and DVD recording of an interview of Frankon June 14, 2017; an application for a communications data warrant for 6 Gregg’s cell phone; and a report that summarized some surveillance footagefrom the day of the shooting. As noted earlier, Gregg had told the police thathe saw both Bill and Frank at the shooting. This marked the first time defendant received Gregg’s initial statementto the police, in which he denied having seen the shooter. Bill’s statementrevealed that he told the police he was in jail at the time of the homicide.Frank told the police that he was en route to Popeyes when he heard gunshotsfrom Lafayette Gardens. The application for the communications data warrantnoted that an eyewitness saw the victim engaged in a conversation with threemen before the shooting, “which conflicts with [Gregg’s] version of events.” Based on the new discovery, defendant filed a motion to reopen thedetention hearing. Defendant argued that the State violated Rule 3:4-2(c)when it failed to disclose Gregg’s first statement and other exculpatorymaterials before the hearing. Defendant claimed that he should be releasedbecause of the discovery violation. The trial court issued a thirteen-page written opinion and denied theapplication. The court found that the additional discovery containedexculpatory evidence, and that the State therefore violated Rule 3:4-2(c) byfailing to disclose the items before the hearing. The court, however, did notfind that defendant’s due process rights had been violated because the 7 evidence withheld was not material. The court explained that “introduction ofthe exculpatory impeachment evidence at the detention hearing would not havehad the reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the probable causedetermination.” For that reason, and because defendant had been indicted andnow possessed the discovery materials, the court concluded that no furtheraction was required. The Appellate Division denied defendant’s motion for leave to appeal.We granted leave to appeal, 232 N.J. 370 (2018), and also granted amicusstatus to the Attorney General and the American Civil Liberties Union of NewJersey (ACLU). II. Defendant argues that the State violated the court rules and his right todue process when it failed to disclose exculpatory evidence before thedetention hearing. In all such cases, defendant contends, courts should order anew detention hearing and not first assess whether the evidence is material .Defendant also submits that trial judges should impose appropriate sanctions todeter future discovery violations. The ACLU echoes defendant’s arguments and adds that courts shoulddeter willful or egregious violations with a referral to an ethics board. 8 In its brief in opposition to the motion for leave to appeal, the Statemaintained that “[n]one of the evidence at issue in this appeal is exculpatory.”At oral argument, the State conceded the evidence was exculpatory and shouldhave been disclosed before the detention hearing. In any case, the State agreeswith the trial judge that the evidence was not material and would not haveaffected the court’s rulings on probable cause or detention. As a result, theState contends that defendant’s due process rights were not violated. The Attorney General also argues that the trial court properly denieddefendant’s motion to reopen the detention hearing. Although “failure todisclose exculpatory evidence may violate the discovery rule,” the AttorneyGeneral submits that “it does not violate due process unless the evidence is'clearly exculpatory’ and directly negates the defendant’s guilt.” (citing Statev. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 237 (1996)). The appropriate remedy in those cases,according to the Attorney General, is to reopen the affected phase of thedetention hearing. III. We reviewed the history of criminal justice reform and the CJRA inState v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 52-62 (2017). This appeal relates to pretrialdetention, so we briefly review parts of the new law and court rules to providerelevant context. 9 Overall, the CJRA “shall be liberally construed” to rely “primarily . . .upon pretrial release,” without the use of monetary bail, to achieve three aims:to ensure that defendants appear in court, to protect the safety of thecommunity, and to guard against “attempt[s] to obstruct the criminal justiceprocess.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. A rebuttable presumption of detention exists in only two circumstances:when a court finds probable cause that a defendant committed murder or acrime that carries a sentence of life imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). Inall other instances, the statute affords defendants a presumption of release. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b). The State can seek to detain certain defendants pretrial. See N.J.S.A.2A:162-19(a) (listing offenses for which prosecutors may file detentionmotion). Critical to this appeal, when the State seeks pretrial detention, theprosecutor must provide the defendant with “all exculpatory evidence” “nolater than 24 hours before the detention hearing.” R. 3:4-2(c)(2)(E). Theprosecution must also disclose “any available preliminary law enforcementincident report,” “the affidavit of probable cause,” “all statements or reportsrelating to the affidavit,” and “all statements or reports” that relate to (1)“additional evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the 10 hearing” and (2) the risk of flight, danger, and obstruction “the Stateadvances.” Rule 3:4-2(c).2 Section 19(e)(1) outlines important procedural protections defendantsare guaranteed at the hearing, including the right to counsel, to testify, topresent and cross-examine witnesses, “and to present information by proffer orotherwise.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1). At the hearing, the State must demonstrate two things. First, it mustestablish probable cause for the offenses charged, unless the defendant hasalready been indicted. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). Second, to rebut thepresumption of release, the State must “prove[] by clear and convincingevidence that no release conditions would reasonably assure the defendant’sappearance in court, the safety of the community, or the integrity of thecriminal justice process.” State v. Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 200-01 (2017) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)). In a case like this, when a defendant is charged withmurder, if he or she successfully rebuts the presumption of detention, N.J.S.A.2 Robinson outlined those areas of discovery and listed them in Rule 3:4- 2(c)(1)(B) at the time. 229 N.J. at 69-72. The rule was amended and revised afterward; it now appears at Rule 3:4-2(c)(2) (effective September 1, 2018). The current rule retains the same categories of discovery materials and adds that they must be disclosed at least twenty-four hours before a detention hearing. R. 3:4-2(c)(2). 11 2A:162-19(e)(2), the State must then present clear and convincing evidencethat detention is warranted, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(3). To decide whether the State has satisfied its burden to justify pretrialdetention, “the court may take into account . . . [t]he nature and circumstancesof the offense,” “[t]he weight of the evidence,” the defendant’s “history andcharacteristics,” the “nature and seriousness” of the risk of danger andobstruction the defendant presents, and Pretrial Services’ recommendation. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. At any time before trial, a defendant may apply to reopen a detentionhearing under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f), which states that [t]he hearing may be reopened . . . if the court finds that information exists that was not known to the prosecutor or the eligible defendant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, or that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process. IV. This case poses a discrete question under the CJRA: what is theappropriate remedy when the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatoryevidence before a detention hearing? Because the grand jury returned anindictment in this case, which established probable cause, N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 12 19(e)(2), we are concerned only with the effect of late disclosure on thedetention decision. A. The requirement to turn over exculpatory evidence before a detentionhearing is grounded in the State’s affirmative obligation to disclose evidencefavorable to a defendant. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 432 (1995);State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 544 (2013). That well-settled concept is discussedat length in the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Brady v.Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 87 (1963). Brady held that the prosecution’s“suppression . . . of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due processwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective ofthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87; accord State v.Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 110 (1982) (quoting Brady). Impeachment evidence, aswell as exculpatory evidence, is governed by the Brady rule. United States v.Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 676 (1985); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 245-46(1996). Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had theevidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding wouldhave been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also State v. Marshall, 148 13 N.J. 89, 156 (1997). “A 'reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient toundermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The State and Attorney General point to a related standard outlined inHogan, which applies to grand jury proceedings, not detention hearings. InHogan, the Court “impos[ed] a limited duty on prosecutors” to inform thegrand jury of exculpatory evidence “that both directly negates the guilt of theaccused and is clearly exculpatory.” 144 N.J. at 237. The standard“recognize[d] that the sole issue before the grand jury is whether the State hasmade out a prima facie case of the accused’s guilt,” ibid. -- in other words,whether there is probable cause to indict. Disclosure of all exculpatoryevidence follows later -- after indictment and well in advance of trial. R. 3:13-3(b)(1). In contrast to Hogan, Rule 3:4-2(c)(2)(E) calls for disclosure of “allexculpatory evidence” before a detention hearing for a simple reason: toensure that defendants receive a fair hearing at which courts decide not onlythe issue of probable cause but also whether a defendant’s liberty will berestrained. To craft and present arguments for release, defendants are entitledto all exculpatory evidence before the hearing. Hogan, thus, does not governpretrial detention hearings. 14 B. Neither the statute nor the Rule outline what should happen if allexculpatory evidence is not disclosed. We consider certain options the partiesand amici advance and then outline a modified materiality standard that webelieve aligns with the goals of the CJRA and related court rules. 1. The Attorney General points to section 19(f), which offers guidance in adifferent setting. The section imposes a materiality standard to determinewhether to reopen a detention hearing when information “that was notknown . . . at the time of the hearing” later surfaces. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f).The court may reopen the hearing if the newly revealed evidence “has amaterial bearing” on whether the defendant poses a risk of flight, danger, orobstruction. Ibid. Section 19(f) addresses real-life situations that occur in ongoinginvestigations. As investigators for the State and defense continue to gatherevidence and prepare a case for trial, they may well learn of new informationthat relates to the three detention factors. Section 19(f) eliminates the need foran additional hearing any time new information -- no matter howinconsequential -- is revealed or developed. 15 Brady and its progeny, of course, set forth the traditional materialitystandard to assess the prosecution’s withholding of exculpatory evidence. SeeBagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The “reasonable probability” standard, though, isroutinely applied after trial. When evidence is disclosed in time for itseffective use at trial, no denial of due process has occurred. United States v.Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984). After trial, courts measure newlydisclosed exculpatory evidence against the backdrop of a full trial record.Judges can then assess whether there is a “reasonable probability that . . . theresult of the proceeding would have been different” in light of the fullpresentation of the State’s case, any defense case, and cross-examination byboth sides. See Knight, 145 N.J. at 246 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Although the pure materiality standard in Brady provides a fair andworkable approach for motions filed after trial, the test is not ideal forevidence withheld before a detention hearing. Detention hearings, unliketrials, are abbreviated proceedings. See Robinson 229 N.J. at 68 (“[T]he focusis not on guilt, and the hearing should not turn into a mini-trial.”). And partiesroutinely proceed by proffer, as the statute permits. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1);Ingram, 230 N.J. at 212-13. Counsel can thus rely on hearsay evidence that isnot subject to cross-examination. 16 Detention hearings also ordinarily take place within days of an arrest. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(d). At such an early stage, a defense attorney mightdecide not to proffer particular evidence or raise certain arguments forstrategic purposes. For all of those reasons, the record of a detention hearing is not nearly ascomplete as the record a court can examine to assess a post-trial Brady motion.Equally important, defense counsel cannot always fully exercise optionsavailable under the CJRA, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1), without firstreviewing exculpatory evidence. Under the circumstances, to require pretrial detainees to show a“reasonable probability” that their detention hearing would have endeddifferently -- based on the abridged record before the trial court -- may well beimpractical and set the bar too high. 2. A different option that defendant proposes -- requiring a new hearingevery time exculpatory evidence is not disclosed -- would not always serve thepurpose of the Rule and the statute. Together, they advance twin yetcompeting aims. They help protect public safety by allowing judges to detainhigh-risk defendants in appropriate cases. They also help ensure that 17 defendants facing the loss of liberty can prepare adequately for the hearing andchallenge the State’s application for detention. Balancing those interests, the CJRA and accompanying court rulesinclude various procedural safeguards for the benefit of defendants. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19, -20; R. 3:4-2. And Robinson calls for “far broaderdiscovery” at detention hearings than federal law requires. 229 N.J. at 61. Those guarantees are designed to ensure fairness, not to punish the State.As this Court explained a half century ago when it discussed the Brady rule, its“purpose . . . is not to punish society for a prosecutor’s conduct, but to avoidan unfair trial of an accused.” State v. Vigliano, 50 N.J. 51, 61 (1967). Morerecently, in State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 28 (2018), we noted that it isimproper to release a defendant as a “sanction” for the prosecution’s failure tocomply with its discovery obligations before a pretrial detention hearing. “Thepublic cannot be imperiled” to punish what the court “perceives to be badconduct.” Ibid. The same fairness and public safety concerns are paramount here, andthey guide our application of the court’s discovery rules. To require a newdetention hearing each time the prosecution does not disclose all exculpatoryevidence would serve only to punish or deter the State in some instances, notto enhance fairness or satisfy due process. Imagine a case, for example, in 18 which five witnesses saw the accused shoot a victim, and the State disclosedall of their statements but failed to provide a single prior inconsistentstatement for one eyewitness. The evidence is plainly exculpatory because itis favorable to the accused. Yet it could hardly have an impact on the outcomeof the hearing. The same could well be true of minor inconsistencies thatmight be used to impeach a witness. Although exculpatory, if the evidencebore little relation to the detention factors or the weight of the evidence in agiven case, what purpose would a new hearing serve? 3. In light of the concerns set forth above, we adopt a modified materialitystandard for detention decisions: Judges should examine whether there is areasonable possibility -- not probability -- that the result of the hearing wouldhave been different had the evidence been disclosed. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Knight, 145 N.J. at 246.3 That standard focuses the parties and the court3 The “reasonable possibility” standard can be found in various other areas of the law. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 9:17-48(d) (standard for genetic testing when parentage is in doubt); Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 , 434-35 (1983) (standard to establish prima facie violation of illegal price discrimination); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 , 192-93 (1981) (standard to determine whether failure to inquire into racial prejudice during voir dire in appropriate cases amounts to reversible error); United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[A]n [immigration judge’s] duty is limited to informing an alien of a reasonable possibility that the alien is eligible for relief at the time of the 19 on whether evidence is important to the hearing’s outcome from a reasonablyobjective vantage point. The burden is on the State to demonstrate that a new hearing is notrequired under that standard. In other words, when the State withholdsexculpatory evidence, it has the burden to show that there is no reasonablepossibility the withheld evidence would have changed the outcome of thehearing. If the State cannot make that showing, the detention hearing shouldbe reopened. The test does not require defendants to show that they reasonably wouldhave prevailed at the earlier, abbreviated hearing. At the same time, a fancifulpossibility that the outcome would be different would not satisfy the standard. The approach presents no due process concerns under federal or statelaw. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 99 (1995)(discussing N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1); see also Robinson, 229 N.J. at 74-76[deportation] hearing.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B) (standard to establish asylum eligibility). Moreover, this is not the first time a possibility standard is advanced in the context of exculpatory evidence. Justice Souter raised questions about Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard in his opinion in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 297-301 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because he believed the term could be confused with “more likely than not,” he recommended “speaking of a 'significant possibility’ of a different result to characterize the Brady materiality standard.” Id. at 300. 20 (concluding that discovery protections under CJRA “satisfy the requirementsof due process”). To begin with, the standard is more favorable to defendantsthan what Brady and Bagley call for. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (finding dueprocess violation when prosecution fails to disclose material exculpatoryevidence); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (using higher “reasonable probability”threshold to establish materiality). It would also be difficult for defendants toclaim a constitutional right to reopen a hearing when the State shows that thereis no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the case would be different.See Robinson, 229 N.J. at 74-76. In his brief requesting leave to appeal, defendant notes that he “soughtimmediate release to remedy the harm caused by the State in withholdingexculpatory evidence at the detention hearing.” For the reasons expressed inDickerson, release is not an appropriate remedy for a discovery violation, as ageneral proposition. 232 N.J. at 28. Such an outcome is not required by theFederal or State Constitutions and is not an appropriate response to legitimatepublic safety concerns. C. We add the following to give judges and practitioners greater guidancein this novel area. We envision a streamlined practice: When a defendantlearns that exculpatory evidence was not disclosed before a detention hearing, 21 counsel may move to reopen the hearing. In support of the motion, defendantsshould present a concise, specific statement about how the new evidence couldreasonably have affected the outcome. Among other things, counsel canexplain how the evidence undermined a finding at the initial hearing, such asthe weight of the evidence, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(b), or how the defendantwould have proffered other information or presented different arguments orcounter-arguments had the exculpatory materials been disclosed earlier. Theapplication need only contain a modest showing of the reasons a new hearingis warranted; the request itself is not intended to serve as a substitute for thehearing. The prosecution’s response can be similarly focused and brief in itsattempt to satisfy its burden. Judges retain discretion to decide whether to reopen a detention hearing.For example, they can dispense with a hearing under the hypotheticalconsidered earlier -- if newly disclosed exculpatory evidence would impeachonly one of five witnesses who saw a defendant shoot a victim. Otherinconsistencies would likewise need to be assessed in light of thecircumstances of the case. In some instances, it might matter if a witnessplaced the time of an event at precisely 2 p.m. and later estimated the time at2:05 p.m.; in other cases, the difference might be nothing more than a minordiscrepancy. 22 When a court denies a motion and declines to reopen the hearing, itshould provide a statement of reasons for review on appeal. From a practicalstandpoint, judges can consider how best to use scarce judicial resources.Here, faced with a novel question, the trial court issued a thoughtful, thirteen-page written decision and carefully considered what standard should apply. Inthe next case, it might take considerably less time simply to conduct a newhearing. At different places, the parties discuss whether the proper relief is to“reopen” the hearing or hold a “new” one. In practice, the two terms amountto essentially the same thing. At the hearing, the trial court must again decidewhether the State has presented clear and convincing evidence to justifydetention. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15, -18(a)(1), -19(e)(3). To make thatdetermination, the court can take into account all relevant factors that bear ondetention, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20, including all exculpatory evidencedisclosed before and after the initial hearing as well as any other evidence orarguments presented at either hearing. The parties may also rely on andproffer the record from the prior hearing. After assessing the full body of evidence, judges must make the requiredstatutory findings. When appropriate, judges may incorporate previousfindings that are still relevant. 23 V. The Public Defender estimated that since the CJRA was implemented onJanuary 1, 2017, the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory material hasbeen raised in only a handful of cases. For context, there were more than14,000 detention hearings in the first calendar year of the CJRA. See CriminalJustice Reform Report to the Governor and Legislature 14 (Feb. 2018),https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf. Like thePublic Defender, we recognize that the small number could be understated forvarious reasons. Also, some cases may reflect unintentional mistakes by theprosecution. Overall, the statistics generally demonstrate good faith and acommitment by counsel to abide by the court rules. The State, of course, mustcontinue to exercise diligence in fulfilling its discovery obligation. If, however, a court found that a prosecutor engaged in willful oregregious misconduct by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence, thecourt should refer the matter to the Office of Attorney Ethics. See Code ofJudicial Conduct, r. 3.15(B); see also RPC 3.8(d) (“The prosecutor in acriminal case shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidenceknown to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused ormitigates the offense . . . .”). Such referrals would deter deliberate andegregious misconduct. To decide whether a referral is warranted in an 24 appropriate case, the trial court should hold a hearing to assess the reason forthe violation and the prosecution’s intent. VI. We find that the detention hearing in this case should be reopenedbecause of the belated disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The trial court properly found that the State failed to discloseexculpatory evidence before the hearing. The affidavit of probable cause andpreliminary law enforcement incident report, coupled with the State’spresentation at the detention hearing, reveal that the homicide charge in thismatter rested heavily on a single witness -- Gregg -- who identified defendantas the shooter. That evidence was undermined by Gregg’s earlier statementthat he did not see the shooter. Two other statements -- by Bill and Frank --and the communications data warrant also conflict with Gregg’s account andcould be used to impeach him. Defendant should have an opportunity to use the new evidence to try torebut the presumption of detention. At a minimum, he can proffer the newevidence and present arguments on the overall weight of the evidence. To beclear, though, we do not decide the merits of the hearing today and do not findthat the proceeding should end differently because of the new evidence. Buteven with a presumption of detention, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b), and defendant’s 25 juvenile record, there is a reasonable possibility that the result would havebeen different. Defendant is therefore entitled to a new detention hearing. VII. For the reasons outlined above, we reverse the trial court’s ruling not toreopen the detention hearing. The case is remanded for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 26