Title: State ex rel. Fleming v. Missouri Board of Probation & Parole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95764
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2017

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE ex rel. WILLIAM FLEMING, 
  ) 
  ) 
Relator, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC95764 
  ) 
THE MISSOURI BOARD OF  
  ) 
PROBATION AND PAROLE, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent.   ) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN HABEAS CORPUS 
William Fleming’s probation was revoked and execution of his concurrent seven-
year prison sentences was ordered after he failed to pay his court costs within the first three 
years of his probation.  Mr. Fleming subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
alleging that his liberties were being unlawfully restrained because the sentencing court 
violated his due process and equal protection rights by revoking his probation solely 
because he was indigent.   
This Court finds that the sentencing court improperly revoked Mr. Fleming’s 
probation because it failed to inquire into the reasons for Mr. Fleming’s failure to pay his 
court costs.  Despite Mr. Fleming raising the issue of his inability to pay and several reports 
from his probation officer stating that Mr. Fleming was struggling financially, the 
sentencing court did not question Mr. Fleming as to his ability to pay prior to revoking his 
Opinion issued April 4, 2017
2 
 
probation.  Instead, the sentencing court relied on the fact that Mr. Fleming admitted he 
violated a condition of his probation by failing to pay his court costs within the first three 
years of his probation.  Mr. Fleming’s admission, however, was only that he did not make 
his payments as ordered.  It does not establish that he had the ability to pay but willfully 
refused to do so or that he failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay 
his court costs.  
Because there was no inquiry into, or findings regarding, the reasons Mr. Fleming 
failed to pay his court costs, the sentencing court’s revocation of Mr. Fleming’s probation 
solely for failure to pay outstanding court costs violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
It follows that Mr. Fleming’s probation was improperly revoked and he is entitled to be 
discharged from his sentence of imprisonment and subsequent parole and restored to his 
status as a probationer.   
Under normal circumstances, Mr. Fleming’s probationary term would continue 
upon his restoration to probationary status.  In this case, however, Mr. Fleming’s probation 
term has expired.  Therefore, the only options for the sentencing court are either to 
discharge Mr. Fleming or to reinitiate revocation proceedings.   
The evidence before the sentencing court was sufficient to establish, as a matter of 
law, that (1) Mr. Fleming was indigent such that he could not pay his court costs despite 
bona fide efforts to do so and (2) the state’s interests in punishment and deterrence were 
otherwise satisfied by the conditions Mr. Fleming already completed and by his time served 
following the improper revocation of his probation.  Nevertheless, because the sentencing 
court expressly limited the probation revocation hearing by stating the hearing was solely 
3 
 
for purposes of disposition, the state may not have had the opportunity to present other 
evidence on this issue.  If such additional evidence exists, the state or the sentencing court 
has 60 days from the date the mandate issues in this case to reinitiate revocation 
proceedings against Mr. Fleming.  If the state or the sentencing court does not so elect,    
Mr. Fleming must be discharged from probation. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
On July 31, 2008, Mr. Fleming pleaded guilty to two counts of domestic assault in 
the second degree, section 565.073.1  The court sentenced him to seven years in prison on 
each count and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.  The sentencing court 
suspended execution of Mr. Fleming’s sentences and placed him on probation for a term 
of five years.  The sentencing court imposed several special conditions on Mr. Fleming’s 
probation, including the completion of a domestic abuse or anger management program 
and the completion of a mental health program.  The sentencing court also ordered             
Mr. Fleming to pay his “court costs” and $92 to the crime victims’ compensation fund2 
within the first three years of his probation.3  In addition to the judgment in favor of the 
crime victims’ compensation fund, the ledger of “court costs” assessed showed costs and 
fees of $301.50 and a board bill of $3,870.  Mr. Fleming, therefore, was ordered to pay a 
                                              
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2008 unless otherwise noted.  
2 The court ordered Mr. Fleming to pay $46 to the crime victim’s compensation fund on 
each count of domestic assault.  
3 It was also a condition of Mr. Fleming’s probation that he pay a monthly intervention fee, 
in an amount set by the Missouri Department of Corrections pursuant to section 217.690, 
that was due and payable on the first day of the first month following his placement on 
probation.  Mr. Fleming, however, was eligible for a waiver of his intervention costs; as a 
result, all his monthly intervention fees were waived.    
4 
 
total of $4,263.50 within the first three years of his probation.4  His probation term was set 
to expire July 30, 2013.  
While on probation, Mr. Fleming was unemployed.  A case summary report dated 
May 19, 2009, states that Mr. Fleming was receiving treatment for “mental health issues” 
and that, as of April 2009, Mr. Fleming was approved for Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) payments of $449.34 per month.  He agreed to pay $118 a month, and extra when he 
received a balance of $1,500 from SSI, toward his court costs.  The report also states that 
Mr. Fleming was completing anger management classes because he was financially unable 
to attend domestic assault classes, which cost $40 per week for 27 weeks.  The report 
further indicated Mr. Fleming was living with his girlfriend, who had physical limitations 
and was not able to work, but who helped him monitor his probation appointments and 
requirements.   
In August 2009, Mr. Fleming’s probation officer issued a notice of citation after   
Mr. Fleming failed to make his scheduled payments.  The notice states that Mr. Fleming 
had not paid the $118 a month as agreed and that, as of May 2009, Mr. Fleming still owed 
$4,145.50 in court costs.  In a subsequent case summary report, Mr. Fleming’s probation 
officer noted that Mr. Fleming continued “to have financial difficulties” but was paying 
$10 a month.  The probation officer also noted that Mr. Fleming’s efforts to obtain housing 
                                              
4 At the conclusion of Mr. Fleming’s plea, the sentencing court also stated that it “enters 
judgment for the State and against [Mr. Fleming] in the amount of $300 for providing him 
the services of an attorney.”  The record does not reflect whether Mr. Fleming ever paid 
the $300 in attorney fees, and such amount is not included in the ledger of court costs.  
5 
 
assistance had been unsuccessful, but that Mr. Fleming had been accepted into a program 
at a Vocational Rehabilitation Center to sponsor his going back to school.  
 
On August 2, 2011, Mr. Fleming’s probation officer filed a violation report after 
Mr. Fleming failed to pay his court costs within the first three years of his probation.  The 
report notes that Mr. Fleming was “unemployed and receiving mental health treatment until 
he was granted disability in April 2009” and that Mr. Fleming made $10 payments “with a 
few missed payments” due to his financial struggles.  The report requested court action to 
address Mr. Fleming’s inability to pay the court costs and discussed the possibility of 
making alternative arrangements, such as community service, to count as credit toward his 
court costs.  The report also noted that the plan was for Mr. Fleming “to continue to pay 
$10 per month toward Court costs, until further notice.”  
 
On September 9, 2011, the sentencing court held a probation revocation hearing.  At 
the hearing, Mr. Fleming admitted to violating the condition of his probation that required 
him to pay his court costs within three years.  The sentencing court found Mr. Fleming had 
violated his probation but deferred disposition of the matter.  It then ordered Mr. Fleming 
to make minimum payments of $50 per month and continued the hearing until December, 
by which time Mr. Fleming was required to pay a minimum of $150.  Mr. Fleming timely 
paid the $150.  A case summary report, dated November 3, 2011, states the amount of Mr. 
Fleming’s SSI was then $674. 
 
The court continued or rescheduled the probation violation hearing until April 12, 
2013, when a hearing was held.  At the time of the hearing, Mr. Fleming had paid more 
than $1,100 but still owed more than $3,000 in court costs.  Mr. Fleming requested that his 
6 
 
probation not be revoked because he could not afford to pay the remaining court costs.  He 
asserted he was indigent, as evidenced by the fact that he qualified for a public defender 
and that his only source of income was his SSI disability payments.  Mr. Fleming further 
asserted that he had complied with all other conditions of his probation and that the $1,100 
he had paid in court costs showed he was making a good faith effort to pay.  The state 
argued that Mr. Fleming had the ability to pay his court costs because, when threatened 
with revocation, he would pay lump sums of more than $100 within a short period of time.  
The state further argued that Mr. Fleming should have raised his inability to pay prior to 
his admission at the 2011 revocation hearing. 
After hearing argument from both parties, the sentencing court revoked                      
Mr. Fleming’s probation and ordered execution of his concurrent seven-year sentences.  In 
revoking Mr. Fleming’s probation, the sentencing court stated that the purpose of the 
hearing was solely for purposes of disposition because Mr. Fleming had already admitted 
to violating his probation.  The sentencing court acknowledged that people should not “be 
sent to prison because they can’t pay their court costs” but stated that just because someone 
is represented by a public defender does not mean he or she should be relieved of paying 
court costs.  The sentencing court concluded that Mr. Fleming failed to comply with the 
probation order despite the court’s willingness to work with him; therefore, its only option 
was to revoke his probation.  The sentencing court made no inquiry or findings at the 
hearing as to whether Mr. Fleming had the ability to pay, and, if so, whether he willfully 
refused to do so or whether he failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to 
pay his court costs.   
7 
 
On June 20, 2016, Mr. Fleming sought a writ of habeas corpus from this Court5 
alleging that he was being unlawfully confined because his probation was revoked solely 
because he could not pay his court costs, thereby violating his due process rights.  At the 
time he filed his writ petition, Mr. Fleming was incarcerated at Algoa Correctional Center.  
Subsequently, Mr. Fleming was released on parole and filed an amended writ petition 
against the Board of Probation and Parole.  In his amended petition, Mr. Fleming asserts 
that, although on parole, his liberties are still unlawfully restrained as a result of his 
probation being improperly revoked.  This Court issued a writ of habeas corpus.   
Habeas Standard 
 
This Court has the authority to “issue and determine original remedial writs,” 
including writs of habeas corpus.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 4.  “Every person committed, 
detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, within this state, for any criminal or supposed 
criminal matter, or under any pretense whatsoever . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas 
corpus . . . to inquire into the cause of such confinement or restraint.”6  Section 532.010.  
                                              
5 Prior to filing with this Court, Mr. Fleming sought and was denied a writ of habeas corpus 
from both the circuit court of Cole County and the court of appeals.  
6 Judge Fischer’s dissenting opinion asserts that the case became moot upon Mr. Fleming 
being released on parole because the writ of habeas corpus is limited to those seeking relief 
from being physically held in a place of custody.  In doing so, Judge Fischer’s dissenting 
opinion applies the principle of statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis – a word 
is known by the company it keeps – to interpret “restrained of his liberty” to necessarily 
mean being physically restrained in a place of custody.  Judge Fischer’s dissenting 
opinion’s interpretation, however, would make “restrained of his liberty” superfluous 
language.  “This Court must presume every word, sentence or clause in a statue has effect, 
and the legislature did not insert superfluous language.”  Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 
441, 446 (Mo. banc 2013).  Moreover, while this Court has never interpreted the “restrained 
of his liberty” language, this Court has expressly stated, in the context of interpreting 
Missouri’s habeas statute, that “any restraint which precludes freedom of action is 
8 
 
“[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty 
in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.”  State ex rel. 
Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. banc 2003).  “[H]abeas corpus proceedings 
are limited to determining the facial validity of confinement” and are “properly invoked to 
challenge an improper probation revocation.”  State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 73 S.W.3d 
623, 624 (Mo. banc 2002).  The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he or she 
is entitled to habeas relief.  Id.  
Mr. Fleming’s Probation Was Improperly Revoked 
 
Mr. Fleming asserts he is entitled to be discharges from parole because the 
sentencing court violated his due process and equal protection rights by revoking his 
                                              
sufficient, and actual confinement in jail is not necessary.”  Hyde v. Nelson, 229 S.W. 200, 
202 (Mo. 1921).  And, although addressed in the context of determining whether a movant 
was in custody for purposes of post-conviction relief, this Court has twice reiterated the 
principle that, for purpose of habeas relief, actual confinement is not required.  See 
Nicholson v. State, 524 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. banc 1975) (“[F]or purposes of habeas 
corpus, any restraint which precludes freedom of action is sufficient, and actual 
confinement is not necessary.”); State v. Gray, 406 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. 1966) (“[F]or 
purposes of habeas corpus, any restraint which precludes freedom of action is sufficient, 
and actual confinement in jail is not necessary.”).  At least one Missouri court has found 
that it was appropriate for a parolee to seek habeas relief because he was restrained of his 
liberties.  See State ex rel. Nixon v. Dierker, 22 S.W.3d 787, 789 (Mo. App. 2000) (holding 
that, because the parolee “was restrained of his liberty within this state and was inquiring 
into the cause of his restraint, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was appropriate”).  
Similarly, although said in the context of determining whether a parolee was “in custody” 
for purposes of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that parole places significant restraints on a parolee’s personal liberties.  See 
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963).  Additionally, section 217.690.2 
provides: “Every offender while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of the 
department [of corrections] but shall be subject to the orders of the board.”  Mr. Fleming’s 
order of release on parole specifically states that he “shall remain in the legal custody of 
the Missouri Department of Corrections.”  Mr. Fleming, therefore, was restrained of his 
liberty for purposes of seeking habeas relief pursuant to section 532.010.   
9 
 
probation solely because he was indigent.  Mr. Fleming relies on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660 (1983), for the proposition that probation cannot be revoked due to a probationer’s 
inability to pay outstanding fines or court costs.    
 
In Bearden, a court revoked the defendant’s probation because he failed to pay a 
fine and restitution.  Id. at 663.  The defendant asserted that imprisoning him solely because 
of his inability to pay violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  The United States Supreme 
Court reasoned: 
The decision to place the defendant on probation . . .  reflects a determination 
by the sentencing court that the State’s penological interests do not require 
imprisonment.  A probationer’s failure to make reasonable efforts to repay 
his debt to society may indicate that this original determination needs 
reevaluation, and imprisonment may now be required to satisfy the State’s 
interests.  But a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay 
his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the other conditions of 
probation, has demonstrated a willingness to pay his debt to society and an 
ability to conform his conduct to social norms.      
 
Id. at 670 (internal citation omitted).  The Supreme Court concluded that, “in revocation 
proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the 
reasons for the failure to pay.”  Id. at 672.  The Supreme Court further instructed: 
If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona 
fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke 
probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized 
range of its sentencing authority.  If the probationer could not pay despite 
sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must 
consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment.  Only if 
alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests in 
punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has 
made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.  To do otherwise would deprive the 
probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of 
his own, he cannot pay the fine.  Such a deprivation would be contrary to the 
fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.    
 
10 
 
Id. at 672-73.  The Supreme Court then remanded the case for a determination as to whether 
the defendant made a bona fide effort to pay his fine and restitution.  Id. at 674.  The 
Supreme Court stated that, without such a determination, fundamental fairness required 
that the defendant remain on probation.  Id.  
 
Like in Bearden, the sentencing court revoked Mr. Fleming’s probation without 
determining why he failed to pay his court costs.  At the 2013 revocation hearing, the 
sentencing court made no inquiry as to whether Mr. Fleming had the ability to pay but 
willfully refused or failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay his 
remaining court costs; nor did the court consider alternative measures of punishment other 
than imprisonment.  Instead, it focused on the fact that Mr. Fleming had previously 
admitted to violating his probation.  Despite argument from Mr. Fleming that he could not 
pay because he was indigent, the sentencing court failed to comply with the directives in 
Bearden that, prior to revocation, a court must inquire as to the reasons for failure to pay 
outstanding court costs and, if the failure to pay was not willful, must consider whether the 
probation conditions already completed or other alternative measures of punishment 
besides imprisonment adequately satisfy the state’s interests in punishment and deterrence.     
 
The state attempts to excuse the sentencing court’s failure to inquire by asserting 
that it is implicit in Mr. Fleming’s admission that he could, in fact, make payments but had 
not made bona fide efforts to do so.  Mr. Fleming, however, admitted only to failing to pay 
his court costs within the prescribed three years:   
The court: 
And Mr. Fleming, a violation report has been filed against you 
that alleged you violated Condition 11 of your probation in that 
you have failed to pay your court costs and your Crime 
11 
 
Victims’ Compensation Fund within the time frame as you 
were ordered to do so by this Court. Do you understand that 
allegation, sir? 
 
Mr. Fleming: Yes, I do. 
  
The court:  
And do you admit that that allegation is true? 
 
Mr. Fleming: Yes. 
  
The court: 
For the record, the Court accepts the admission of this 
defendant.  The Court finds that this defendant did in fact 
violate Condition 11 of his probation by failing to take care of 
his financial obligations, specifically court costs as ordered to 
do so by this Court.   
 
Nothing can be inferred from this admission as to why Mr. Fleming failed to pay his court 
costs.   
The record before the sentencing court includes substantial evidence as to why       
Mr. Fleming failed to pay his court costs.  In describing the circumstances surrounding the 
violation, the violation report referenced by the sentencing court states that Mr. Fleming 
“continues to receive mental health treatment and struggles financially” and that                  
Mr. Fleming “agreed he could only afford a $10 payment per month.”  The report even 
recommends that Mr. Fleming be continued on probation and requests that the sentencing 
court consider alternative arrangements, such as community service, to count as credit 
toward his court costs.  Other case summary reports similarly indicate that Mr. Fleming 
lacked the funds to pay for the domestic assault program and that he qualified for waiver 
of his monthly intervention fees due to his limited income.  Yet, the sentencing court never 
inquired about Mr. Fleming’s ability to pay his remaining court costs at the 2011 revocation 
hearing.  Accordingly, the admission, in and of itself, does not establish Mr. Fleming had 
12 
 
the ability to pay but willfully refused or failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire the 
resources to pay his court costs. 
Moreover, even if Mr. Fleming’s admission was somehow indicative of his 
unwillingness to pay, Mr. Fleming made the admission more than a year and a half prior 
to the sentencing court revoking his probation.  In the 19 months between the 2011 hearing 
and the 2013 hearing, the sentencing court continued to instruct Mr. Fleming to pay $50 a 
month in court costs.  Although Mr. Fleming missed some of his scheduled monthly 
payments, he did make payments totaling $864.95 toward his court costs during those 19 
months.7  Mr. Fleming made significant, genuine efforts to pay his court costs in the interim 
between his admission and the 2013 revocation hearing.   
The sentencing court failed to acknowledge that, despite his limited financial means, 
Mr. Fleming made considerable efforts to comply with the conditions of his probation 
following the 2011 revocation hearing.  Not only did Mr. Fleming continue to make court 
cost payments, he satisfied all other conditions of his probation, including completing an 
anger management course and attending a mental health program.  The only condition not 
satisfied at the time of the 2013 revocation proceeding was the payment of all court costs 
within the first three years of his probation.  Despite evidence of Mr. Fleming’s efforts to 
pay, his limited resources, his completion of all other probation requirements, and the 
extended period of time that had passed since his admission of the violation, the sentencing 
court failed to inquire about Mr. Fleming’s ability to pay his remaining court costs prior to 
                                              
7 Had Mr. Fleming made every monthly payment of $50 during those 19 months, he would 
have paid a total of $950.  That is a difference of less than $100.        
13 
 
revoking his probation in 2013.  It follows that, at no time prior to the revocation of Mr. 
Fleming’s probation, did the sentencing court comply with the directives in Bearden that 
required inquiry into the reasons for Mr. Fleming’s failure to pay his court costs, findings 
as to his willingness and efforts to pay, and, potentially, consideration of whether the state’s 
interests in punishment and deterrence are adequately satisfied by the conditions Mr. 
Fleming has already completed or alternative measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment.  
 
  Although the state asserts in its brief that the sentencing court concluded 
Mr. Fleming willfully refused to pay his court costs, the sentencing court made no findings 
regarding the reasons for Mr. Fleming’s failure to pay as required under Bearden.  The 
order revoking Mr. Fleming’s probation states only that Mr. Fleming “previously admitted 
to Violation of Condition #11 of his probation, therefore Court does revoke                       
[Mr. Fleming]’s probation.”  Bearden, however, “requires evidence and findings [as to the 
reasons for the failure to pay] as a matter of due process and, absent such evidence and 
findings, [probation] may not be revoked.”  Schmeets v. Turner, 706 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. 
App. 1986).  Such requirement is consistent with the minimum requirements of due process 
for revocation proceedings, which require the factfinder to make a written statement as to 
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.  Abel v. Wyrick, 574 S.W.2d 
411, 417 (Mo. banc 1978).  And, although the due process rights of a probationer are 
satisfied “if the record of the proceedings clearly shows what reasoning and evidence were 
relied upon to revoke probation,” id. at 420, this record is absent of any determination by 
14 
 
the sentencing court regarding whether Mr. Fleming willfully refused to pay his court costs 
or failed to make bona fide efforts to do so. 
 
At the 2013 revocation hearing, the sentencing court focused on Mr. Fleming’s 
previous admission that he violated his probation because he failed to pay all his court costs 
within the first three years of his probation.  After hearing argument from both parties about 
Mr. Fleming’s ability to pay his court costs, the sentencing court stated: 
[Mr. Fleming] admitted to violating his probation.  The Court tried to work 
with him.  He still has not complied with the conditions of his probation.  The 
Court is left with no option but to revoke his probation.  That’s where we’re 
at.   
 
So today the Court finds, having accepted the admissions of Mr. 
Fleming, that he did violate the conditions of his probation.  We’re here just 
for the sole purpose of disposition.  The Court makes a record the Court is – 
Mr. Fleming did not come on that day that he admitted, he did not come 
before the Court and say, Judge, I can’t pay my court costs, I can’t pay my 
obligations.  He came in and he admitted.  He said I’m not paying them, I’m 
not paying them and I admit that I violated my probation.  And that’s where 
we’re at.  That is what the Court has before it.  What I have before me is what 
I have before me.   
 
The record, therefore, reflects that, in revoking Mr. Fleming’s probation, the sentencing 
court relied exclusively on Mr. Fleming’s previous admission and put the onus on him for 
failing to raise his ability to pay prior to admitting he violated his probation.  As previously 
discussed, however, a sentencing court must inquire into why the probationer failed to pay 
his or her court costs prior to revocation and must make a determination as to whether the 
probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire 
the resources to pay.  Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73.  Here, the sentencing court made no 
such inquiry or determination even after Mr. Fleming raised the issue, and there was 
15 
 
evidence before the court to support such a finding.  As such, the sentencing court 
effectively imprisoned Mr. Fleming solely for failure to pay his outstanding court costs. 
Without a determination as to Mr. Fleming’s ability to pay and his willingness or 
bona fide efforts to do so, the law required that he remain on probation.  Id.  The sentencing 
court, therefore, improperly revoked Mr. Fleming’s probation.  Because Mr. Fleming’s 
probation was improperly revoked, he is ordered discharged from his sentence of 
imprisonment and subsequent parole and restored to his status as a probationer.  
Normally, Mr. Fleming’s probationary term would continue upon his restoration to 
probationary status.  In this case, however, had Mr. Fleming’s probation not been 
improperly revoked, his probation term would have expired July 30, 2013.  Therefore, the 
only options for the sentencing court are either to discharge Mr. Fleming or to reinitiate 
revocation proceedings.8   
                                              
8 Typically, when a “probation term ends, so does the court’s authority to revoke 
probation.”  State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2014).   But 
section 559.036.8 provides that the “power of the court to revoke probation shall extend     
. . . for any further period which is reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters 
arising before its expiration” if certain conditions are met.  A sentencing court’s authority 
to revoke extends beyond the expiration of the probation term only if: (1) “the court must 
have manifested its intent to conduct a revocation hearing during the probation term”; and 
(2) the court “must have made every reasonable effort to notify the probationer and hold a 
hearing before” the end of the probation term.  Strauser, 416 S.W.3d at 801.  The 
sentencing court manifested its intent and did, in fact, conduct a revocation hearing prior 
to the expiration of Mr. Fleming’s probation term.  It follows that, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the sentencing court’s authority to conduct revocation 
proceedings extends beyond the probation term as it is reasonably necessary to adjudicate 
the matters regarding Mr. Fleming’s probation violation, which arose prior to the expiration 
of his term.   
16 
 
If the sentencing court subsequently seeks to revoke Mr. Fleming’s probation for 
failing to pay his required court costs, it must conduct a hearing to determine whether         
Mr. Fleming had the ability to pay or whether he failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire 
the resources to pay his court costs.9  If Mr. Fleming did not have the ability to pay his 
outstanding court costs despite making bona fide efforts to do so, the sentencing court must 
consider whether alternative measures of punishment satisfy the state’s interests in 
punishment and deterrence.  Typically, alternative measures of punishment may include an 
extension of time to pay, a reduction of imposed fees, fines or costs required to be paid, 
credit for community service, and credit for successful completion of court-approved 
programs, such as drug treatment programs, educational programs, self-improvement 
programs, or mental health programs.  See section 559.021.7.  In considering alternative 
measures, a sentencing court also should consider that it has the ability to waive or suspend 
payment of imposed fines, costs, or restitution.  Id.  It is only upon a finding that the state’s 
interests in punishment and deterrence cannot be satisfied by these or other appropriate 
alternative measures that the sentencing court can revoke Mr. Fleming’s probation despite 
his inability to pay and his efforts to do so.         
                                              
9 Recently, this Court approved Model Local Rule 69.01 for determining indigent status in 
municipal division cases.  Under the rule, a person is presumed indigent if the person “[h]as 
unencumbered assets totaling under $5000, and . . . [h]as total household monthly income 
below 125% of Federal Poverty Guidelines.”  The Federal Poverty Guidelines for a one 
person household’s monthly income is currently $1,237.  Although not necessarily 
applicable to this case, the rule goes through a list of questions regarding the defendant’s 
ability to pay fines and costs, including whether the defendant is receiving public assistance 
and the amount of monthly household income the defendant receives.  
17 
 
The facts and circumstances before this Court establish that Mr. Fleming was 
unemployed and that his only source of income was his monthly SSI benefits.10  There was 
no evidence of what Mr. Fleming’s monthly obligations were or where his money went.  
Likewise, there was no evidence of any family, friends, or others from whom Mr. Fleming 
could borrow money to pay his court costs.  Mr. Fleming’s probation officer reported that 
Mr. Fleming was struggling financially and recommended the sentencing court consider 
community service as an alternative punishment.  And although Mr. Fleming’s fee report 
shows his monthly court costs payments were sporadic at times, it also reflects Mr. Fleming 
would attempt to make up for his missed payments with larger payments in the following 
months.  Furthermore, Mr. Fleming completed all other terms of his probation, including 
an anger management course and mental health treatment and served three years and two 
months in prison following the revocation of his probation.   
The evidence before the sentencing court, therefore, was sufficient to establish, as a 
matter of law, that Mr. Fleming was indigent such that he could not pay his court costs 
despite bona fide efforts to do so and that the state’s interests in punishment and deterrence 
were otherwise satisfied by the conditions Mr. Fleming already completed and by his time 
served following the improper revocation of his probation.  Nevertheless, because the 
sentencing court expressly limited the probation revocation hearing by stating the hearing 
                                              
10 Some evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Fleming was receiving $449.34 in 
monthly SSI benefits.  Other evidence indicated that his monthly income may have 
increased to $674 in SSI benefits prior to revocation of his probation.  Evidence in the 
record also indicated that Mr. Fleming expected to receive a balance of $1,500 in SSI 
benefits.   
18 
 
was solely for purposes of disposition, the state may not have had the opportunity to present 
other evidence on this issue. 
Conclusion 
 
 The sentencing court violated Mr. Fleming’s due process and equal protection 
rights when it improperly revoked his probation for failure to pay court costs without first 
inquiring as to the reasons for his failure to pay, making findings as to whether he willfully 
refused to pay or failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay, and 
considering the conditions he has already satisfied or other alternative measures of 
punishment.  Therefore, Mr. Fleming is ordered discharged from his sentence of 
imprisonment and subsequent parole and restored to his status as a probationer.  If there is 
additional evidence regarding Mr. Fleming’s ability to pay, the state or the sentencing court 
has 60 days from the date the mandate issues in this case to reinitiate revocation 
proceedings against Mr. Fleming.  If the state or the sentencing court does not so elect,     
Mr. Fleming must be discharged from probation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
Stith, Draper, and Russell, JJ., concur; 
Fischer, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Wilson, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE ex rel. WILLIAM FLEMING, 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
Relator, 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC95764 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
THE MISSOURI BOARD OF 
 
  ) 
PROBATION AND PAROLE,  
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.   ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the writ of habeas corpus is limited to 
those seeking relief from being physically held in a place of custody.  For this reason, I 
would hold that this case was mooted when Fleming was released on parole.1   
 
Article I, § 12 of the Missouri Constitution provides "[t]hat the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus shall never be suspended."  When this state's current constitution was 
adopted in 1945, the writ of habeas corpus already had an established meaning within 
Missouri as it was codified in chapter 8, article 6 (§§ 1590 to 1660), RSMo 1939.  The 
habeas statutes have since been reorganized into what is now chapter 532,2 but the statutory 
language quoted hereinafter has remained unchanged.  Section 532.010 (formerly § 1590, 
                                              
1  This Court has never granted habeas relief to someone already released on parole. 
2  Statutory citations for chapter 532 are to RSMo 2000; statutory citations for chapter 559 are to 
RSMo Supp. 2013. 
2 
 
RSMo 1939) governs who may seek state habeas relief, providing that "[e]very person 
committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, within this state, for any 
criminal or supposed criminal matter, or under any pretense whatsoever . . . may prosecute 
a writ of habeas corpus . . . to inquire into the cause of such confinement or restraint." 
(Emphasis added).  Having been released on parole, Fleming is certainly not committed, 
detained, or confined.  Any argument that Fleming may seek state habeas relief would 
necessarily be based on a construction of the phrase "restrained of his liberty."   
Read in isolation, this phrase could mean a number of things.  But when the word 
or phrase at issue appears within a list of words, this Court "will apply the principle of 
statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis—a word [or phrase] is known by the 
company it keeps."  Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. banc 
2014).  "Under this principle, a court looks to the other words listed in a statutory provision 
to help it discern which of multiple possible meanings the legislature intended."  Id.  
Noscitur a sociis is "often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in 
order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth in statutory construction."  Aquila 
Foreign Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 362 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2012) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).  Here, the phrase "restrained of his liberty" 
is included in a list of words—"committed," "detained," and "confined"—that all refer to 
being physically held in a place of custody.  Applying noscitur a sociis, it follows that 
"restrained of his liberty" likewise refers to being physically restrained in a place of 
custody, not merely subject to conditions of parole supervision.   
 
3 
 
This construction is supported by another well-settled rule of statutory construction: 
"In determining the intent and meaning of statutory language, the words must be considered 
in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia, as well as cognate sections, must be 
considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words."  State ex rel. 
Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., 254 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal 
quotations omitted).  "The provisions of a legislative act are not read in isolation but 
construed together, and if reasonably possible, the provisions will be harmonized with each 
other."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).   
Chapter 532 is replete with provisions indicating that state habeas relief applies only 
to those who are physically held in a place of custody.  For example, § 532.020 (formerly 
§ 1591, RSMo 1939) requires that a writ petition state "the place where" the petitioner is 
"imprisoned or restrained of his liberty" and why "the imprisonment" is illegal.3  Section 
532.030 (formerly § 1658, RSMo 1939) requires that a writ petition first be filed in the 
county in which the petitioner "is held in custody."4  Section 532.080 (formerly § 1595, 
RSMo 1939) requires that an issued writ command the person who is restraining the 
petitioner to bring "the body of the person so detained or imprisoned, together with the 
time and cause of such imprisonment and detention, before the court or judge, without 
delay, to do and receive what shall then and there be considered concerning the person 
imprisoned or detained."  Section 532.200 (formerly § 1607, RSMo 1939) further requires 
                                              
3  Notably, Rule 91.04(a)(2) also requires that a habeas petition state "[t]he place where the person 
is detained," an impossibility for a petitioner already released on parole. 
4  Rule 91.02(a) has the same requirement, specifically referring to "the county in which the person 
is held in custody." 
4 
 
that any person served with the writ who has "in his custody or power, or under his restraint, 
the party for whose benefit the writ was awarded . . . shall also bring the body of such 
person before the court."  And throughout chapter 532, the person petitioning for habeas 
relief is frequently referred to simply as a "prisoner."  See §§ 532.050, .140, .220, .250, 
.270 to .310, .340 to .360, .430; see also §§ 1592, 1600, 1614, 1616, 1619, 1623, 1625, 
1628, 1636, 1639 to 1642, RSMo 1939. 
 Considering the phrase "restrained of his liberty" in the context of the other words 
used in § 532.010, as well as the rest of chapter 532, it is evident that the phrase was not 
intended to be construed so broadly as to apply to a person who is merely subject to 
conditions of parole supervision.  Rather, state habeas relief is properly limited to those 
who are physically held in a place of custody.  This conclusion is consistent with this 
Court's previous explanation of the writ: 
The writ at common law was directed to the custodian of the prisoner and 
required the custodian to show the basis for which the prisoner was being 
held. . . . The statutes and Rule 91 governing the writ of habeas corpus under 
Missouri law establish procedures similar to the traditional common law writ.  
For example, the writ merely allows a prisoner to inquire into the cause 
of his confinement.  A petition for habeas corpus relief under Missouri law 
is said to be limited to determining the facial validity of confinement, 
which is based on the record of the proceeding that resulted in the 
confinement. 
 
State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. banc 2001) (emphasis added) 
(internal citation omitted).   
In State ex rel. Aziz v. McCondichie, the habeas petitioner was also released on 
parole while his case was pending in this Court.  132 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Mo. banc 2004).  
Although this Court noted that parole conditions "restrict a parolee's activities," it held the 
5 
 
case was moot after the petitioner was released on parole.  Id. at 240–41.  While the 
principal opinion suggests Fleming may still be restrained of certain liberties because there 
are conditions of parole, he is no longer being physically held in a place of custody—i.e., 
he is no longer a prisoner inquiring into the cause of his confinement—which is what state 
habeas relief is intended to address.  See id.  There being no "validity of confinement" to 
determine after Fleming's release on parole, I would accordingly deny the petition as moot. 
The principal opinion's reliance on Nicholson v. State, 524 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. banc 
1975), State v. Gray, 406 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1966), and Hyde v. Nelson, 229 S.W. 200 (Mo. 
1921), is woefully misplaced.  As the principal opinion recognizes, neither Nicholson nor 
Gray was a case in which a petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus; rather, both concerned 
only the applicability of Rule 27.26 (the precursor to Rules 24.035 and 29.15).  Nicholson, 
524 S.W.2d at 108; Gray, 406 S.W.2d at 581.  Moreover, Hyde, from which the principal 
opinion, Nicholson, and Gray all lift an isolated quote while ignoring its holding, clearly 
supports my view.  In Hyde, this Court expressly held that although a person released on 
bail was subject to terms and conditions of bail and "constructively" in custody, he was 
still "at liberty and . . . one at liberty is not imprisoned" for purposes of the habeas statute.  
229 S.W. at 202. 
Additionally, the principal opinion erroneously relies on Jones v. Cunningham, 371 
U.S. 236 (1963), which was not based on the constitutional authority of the federal writ of 
habeas corpus, but rather was a matter of statutory interpretation of the relevant federal 
habeas provisions.  Id. at 237–38, 243.  In fact, many federal habeas cases involve 
interpretation of the federal statute governing the writ.  That is why state supreme courts 
6 
 
look to their own state constitutions and state statutes for guidance rather than to federal 
court decisions.  The Supreme Court of South Dakota expressed my view very 
straightforwardly: "Our [state habeas] remedy extends only as far as the language used by 
our legislature allows, as federal decisions on the application of the federal habeas statute 
do not control the interpretation of our state habeas remedy."  Bostick v. Weber, 692 
N.W.2d 517, 521 (S.D. 2005). 
 
In addition, I write separately to highlight the curious nature of the relief granted by 
the principal opinion.  Having been released on parole during the pendency of this matter, 
Fleming amended his petition to seek discharge from parole rather than prison.  The 
principal opinion purports to restore Fleming to his status as probationer, concluding that 
even though Fleming's probation term has expired, the circuit court can still initiate 
revocation proceedings.5  As such, if the circuit court again chooses to revoke Fleming's 
probation, Fleming, currently released on parole, may be returned to prison.  In other 
words, Fleming may ultimately be made worse off than had he not sought habeas relief.   
 
The principal opinion also directs the circuit court to consider "alternative measures 
of punishment," citing to § 559.021.7, which provides that "[t]he court may modify or 
enlarge the conditions of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of 
the probation term."  (Emphasis added).  But as the principal opinion properly recognizes, 
Fleming's term of probation has expired.  Therefore, if the circuit court chooses not to 
                                              
5 When this Court has previously granted habeas relief based on the improper revocation of 
probation, the petitioner was still in prison and could be returned to an unexpired term of probation.  
See, e.g., Abel v. Wyrick, 574 S.W.2d 411, 414–15, 421 (Mo. banc 1978). 
7 
 
revoke, it must discharge Fleming; it has no authority to continue Fleming on an expired 
term of probation for the purpose of imposing any alternative measures.  The only way the 
circuit court could possibly impose alternative measures through conditions of probation 
is if the circuit court first revoked Fleming's probation and then placed him on a second 
term of probation with the new conditions.  See § 559.036.5.  Therein lies the paradox of 
the principal opinion.  It suggests the circuit court may revoke only if it determines 
alternative measures to be inadequate.  In fact, though, if the circuit court determined 
alternative measures were indeed adequate and appropriate, it could not impose those 
alternative measures unless it revoked and placed Fleming on a second term of probation.  
And, notably, if the circuit court chose that route, it could place Fleming on another five-
year term of probation, see §§ 559.036.5, .016.1(1), meaning Fleming could be subjected 
to a longer term on probation than he currently has remaining on parole.6  Again, Fleming 
may ultimately be made worse off than had he not sought habeas relief.  
 
In my view, this Court does not have the authority and should not expand state 
habeas relief to petitioners not in custody.  Further, the anomalous and unintended 
outcomes that are possible under the rationale of the principal opinion are avoided if this 
Court simply followed its opinion in Aziz and the statutory limitations provided as to who 
may seek state habeas relief and reaffirmed that habeas corpus relief is available only to 
petitioners physically held in a place of custody.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
                                              
6  Fleming is eligible for discharge from parole January 9, 2020. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE ex rel. WILLIAM FLEMING, 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
Relator, 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC95764 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
THE MISSOURI BOARD OF 
 
  ) 
PROBATION AND PAROLE, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.   ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I would quash the writ for the reasons stated on pages 6–7 of the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Fischer. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Paul C. Wilson, Judge