Title: Commissioner of Administration & Finance v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12208
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2017

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SJC-12208 
 
COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE  vs.  COMMONWEALTH 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2017. - May 12, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.  Labor, Unfair labor 
practice, Duty to bargain.  Commonwealth, Financial 
matters, Collective bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Division of Labor Relations. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the 
plaintiff. 
 
T. Jane Gabriel for the defendant. 
 
Alan H. Shapiro (John M. Becker also present) for the 
intervener. 
 
Mathew D. Jones, for Massachusetts Teachers Association, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In June, 2010, near the height of the global 
economic downturn that became known as the Great Recession, the 
                                                          
 
 
1 Coalition of Public Safety, intervener. 
2 
 
 
Secretary of the Executive Office of Administration and Finance 
(Secretary) submitted to the Legislature a request for an 
appropriation to fund collective bargaining agreements between 
the Commonwealth and two public employee unions reached more 
than thirteen months earlier.  In the letter containing the 
request, the Secretary informed the Legislature that several 
similar requests for salary increases had been rejected by the 
Legislature; that attempts to renegotiate the agreements with 
the unions had failed; and that approval of the request would 
require renegotiating several other collective bargaining 
agreements that the Legislature had already approved. 
 
The unions both filed a charge of prohibited practice with 
the Department of Labor Relations (department), arguing, in 
essence, that the letter was a violation of the Commonwealth's 
purported duty to support an appropriation's request pursuant to 
G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and also that the letter constituted a 
failure to bargain in good faith, in violation of G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 10 (a) (5).  In January, 2014, a hearing officer with the 
department agreed with the unions and found that the 
Commonwealth had violated its § 7 (b) duty and had committed a 
prohibited practice under § 10 (a) (5) by failing to bargain in 
good faith.  The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board)2 
                                                          
 
 
2 Formerly the Labor Relations Commission.  See G. L. c. 23, 
§ 9O, as appearing in St. 2007, c. 145, § 5.  References to the 
3 
 
 
affirmed, the Commonwealth appealed from the decision, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
We reverse the board's decision and conclude that the 
Secretary's inclusion of information about the anticipated 
fiscal effects of a legislative decision to fund the collective 
bargaining agreements in his request for an appropriation did 
not violate § 7 (b) or constitute a prohibited practice. 
 
Background.  The facts of this case are not in dispute.  In 
April, 2009, the Commonwealth, represented by the Executive 
Office of Administration and Finance, and the Coalition of 
Public Safety (COPS) entered into collective bargaining 
agreements for the periods of July 1, 2009, through June 30, 
2010, and July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2013 (2010-2013 
agreement).  The 2010-2013 agreement called for annual salary 
increases of one per cent, three per cent, and three per cent, 
respectively, over the three years it covered.  The Commonwealth 
had also entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the 
Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union (MCOFU) that 
covered the same period as the COPS 2010-2013 agreement and that 
also contained cost items that required appropriation. 
 
In June, 2009, then Governor Deval Patrick submitted a 
revised appropriation recommendation to both houses of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board) include the 
former Labor Relations Commission. 
4 
 
 
General Court for fiscal year 2010 (July 1, 2009, to June 30, 
2010).  In his accompanying message, the Governor estimated that 
there would be about $1.5 billion less in revenue compared with 
earlier projections because "Massachusetts continue[d] to 
experience the effects of a global economic downturn unseen 
since the Great Depression." 
 
In June, 2010, the Secretary3 submitted the cost items for 
both of the 2010-2013 agreements to the Legislature for funding 
pursuant to his obligation under § 7 (b).  In the letter that 
accompanied the request, the Secretary, addressing the 
respective chairs of the committees on ways and means of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, wrote: 
 
"In addition to previous requests, I am fulfilling my 
statutory obligation to ask your consideration of the 
attached additional collective bargaining items in Section 
2 of H.2, the Governor's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal. 
These items fund the collective bargaining agreements 
negotiated some time ago with [MCOFU] (Unit 4) and [COPS] 
(Unit 5).  We are submitting them now because their costs 
first occur in fiscal year 2011. 
 
 
"These items provide for collective bargaining salary 
increases similar to contracts that were not funded during 
calendar year 2009.  We have worked with the MCOFU and COPS 
leadership to reach agreement on contracts similar to those 
signed by other unions for this fiscal year and have failed 
to reach an agreement.  Funding of these items will trigger 
                                                          
 
 
3 The positions of the Secretary of Administration and 
Finance (Secretary) and the Commissioner of Administration were 
effectively merged in 2012.  See G. L. c. 7, § 4, as amended 
through St. 2012, c. 165, § 33.  The parties do not dispute that 
it is now the Secretary who is responsible for submitting budget 
requests pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and that the former 
Secretary acted in that capacity. 
5 
 
 
a reopener in collective bargaining agreements that the 
Legislature recently did fund only because they contained 
delays in the salary increases." 
 
 
The Legislature did not appropriate funds in fiscal year 
2011 for the cost items contained in the 2010-2013 agreements.  
Since that time COPS and the Commonwealth have entered into two 
successor agreements -- one of which covered the 2010-2013 
period -- that were fully funded by the Legislature.  The 
successor agreement covering the 2010-2013 period, however, 
resulted in the delay of each of the wage increases by one year. 
 
About one week after the Secretary's June, 2010, request 
letter, COPS filed a charge of prohibited practice with the 
department, alleging that the Commonwealth failed to bargain in 
good faith, as required by § 10 (a) (5), because the Secretary's 
letter did not support the 2010-2013 agreement.4  A complaint was 
issued following the department's investigation.  The parties 
waived a hearing and submitted the case to the hearing officer 
on a stipulated record. 
 
In January, 2014, the hearing officer found that the 
Commonwealth had violated the law because it had refused "to 
take all necessary and appropriate steps to support the 
collective bargaining agreement."  The hearing officer ordered 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union 
(MCOFU) filed a similar charge three months later, and the cases 
were consolidated.  MCOFU subsequently withdrew its complaint on 
the ground that the issue had become moot. 
6 
 
 
the Commonwealth to "[s]ubmit to the Legislature a request for 
an appropriation to fund the cost items and take all appropriate 
steps to support the [2010-2013 agreement]." 
 
The Commonwealth appealed to the board, which affirmed the 
decision of the hearing officer.5  The Commonwealth appealed from 
the board's decision to the Appeals Court, G. L. c. 150E, § 11 
(i), and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
Standard of review.  This court reviews the board's 
decisions in accordance with the standards laid out in G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7), which provides that a final administrative 
agency decision will be set aside if, among other grounds, it is 
"[u]nsupported by substantial evidence," G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7) (e), or "[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).  See G. L. c. 150E, § 11 (i).  See also 
Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 
563, 567-568 (2015). 
 
Discussion.  A crucial point in the board's decision is the 
connection between the Commonwealth's statutory duty to request 
appropriations for cost items in executed collective bargaining 
                                                          
 
 
5 Because the board incorporated the facts set forth by the 
hearing officer, fully affirmed the officer's analysis, and 
agreed with all of his conclusions, we refer to the two 
decisions collectively as the board's. 
7 
 
 
agreements under § 7 (b) and its obligation to bargain in good 
faith under § 10 (a) (5).  The board concluded that by failing 
to affirmatively support the agreement, as required by § 7 (b), 
the Commonwealth had committed a breach of its duty to bargain 
in good faith, as required by § 10 (a) (5). 
 
We are not persuaded that the two provisions operate in the 
manner suggested by the board.  In our view, there are three 
flaws in the board's decision.  First, the board erred in 
determining that § 7 (b) requires an employer not only to submit 
but also affirmatively to support a § 7 (b) appropriation 
request; second, its conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to 
bargain in good faith in violation of § 10 (a) (5) is 
unsupported by substantial evidence; and third, the board 
erroneously conflated the employer's obligations under the two 
statutory provisions. 
 
a.  Employer's duty under § 7 (b).  General Laws c. 150E, 
§ 7 (b), provides in relevant part: 
 
"The employer . . . shall submit to the appropriate 
legislative body within thirty days after the date on which 
the agreement is executed by the parties, a request for an 
appropriation necessary to fund the cost items contained 
therein . . . .  If the appropriate legislative body duly 
rejects the request for an appropriation necessary to fund 
the cost items, such cost items shall be returned to the 
parties for further bargaining." 
 
 
We have previously discussed what constitutes a violation 
of § 7 (b) and its statutory predecessor.  We have held that an 
8 
 
 
employer fails to comply with the statute when the employer 
refuses even to submit a request for appropriations to the 
appropriate legislative body, Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. 
School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 474-475 (1976) (mayor 
required to transmit school committee's request for 
appropriations to city council, notwithstanding mayor's special 
veto power);6 Mendes v. Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 118-119 (1974) 
(successor mayor must submit request to city council even though 
predecessor negotiated collective bargaining agreement), or when 
the employer submits a request that makes full funding of the 
agreement contingent on voters passing an override to cover a 
budget shortfall, Local 1652, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. 
Framingham, 442 Mass. 463, 464 (2004) (Framingham) (officials 
did not fulfil obligation under § 7 [b] where budget submitted 
to town meeting made full funding of collective bargaining 
agreement contingent on voters passing property tax override).  
We have also held that although successor officials must submit 
                                                          
 
 
6 In Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of 
Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 474-475 (1976), we stated that "[t]he 
mayor, of course, may recommend disapproval of the request."  It 
is important to note that in that case it was the school 
committee that negotiated with the unions and not the mayor, and 
thus if the mayor recommended his disapproval it could not have 
been argued that the negotiations took place in bad faith based 
on the mayor's subsequent conduct.  See Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, 
AFL-CIO v. Secretary of Admin., 413 Mass. 377, 380, 382-383 
(1992) (Alliance) (successor governor may recommend 
disapproval); Labor Relations Comm'n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 
Mass. 619, 626 (1978) (same for successor selectmen). 
9 
 
 
the request, they may not be compelled to publicly support a 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their 
predecessors, because the successor officials' "constituents are 
entitled to the unfettered exercise of their judgment on matters 
of policy."  Labor Relations Comm'n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 
Mass. 619, 625 (1978). 
 
Contrary to a number of board decisions cited by the board 
and COPS, we have never required officials affirmatively to 
support a § 7 (b) request.  Contrast Town of Belmont, 22 M.L.C. 
1636, 1639 (1996); Town of Rockland, 16 M.L.C. 1001, 1005 
(1989); City of Chelsea, 13 M.L.C. 1144, 1149-1150 (1986); 
Worcester Sch. Comm., 5 M.L.C. 1080, 1083 (1978).  Based on our 
review, these cases trace back to Turners Falls Fire Dist., 
4 M.L.C. 1658, 1662 (1977), where the board stated:  "It is 
well-settled law that an employer's refusal to take affirmative 
steps to support the terms of a collective bargaining agreement 
before the legislative body constitutes a violation of its duty 
to bargain in good faith."  The board cites only to Mendes v. 
Taunton, 366 Mass. 109 (1974), for that proposition of law.  The 
Mendes decision, however, merely requires that an official, even 
a successor official, must submit a request to the appropriate 
legislative body.  Id. at 118-119. 
 
We cited several of these board cases with approval in 
Framingham.  See Framingham, 442 Mass. at 469-470 & n.6.  See 
10 
 
 
also id. at 479-480 (Sosman, J., dissenting).  Those cases were 
cited, however, to illustrate that the obligation to seek 
funding is "unconditional" in the sense that requests for 
funding may not be conditioned on the occurrence of another 
event under the language of § 7 (b).  Id. at 469.  To the extent 
that these cited decisions of the board (and any dicta in 
Framingham) suggest that a lack of affirmative support 
inevitably constitutes a violation of § 7 (b), they rest on an 
error of law, and we do not follow them. 
 
Accordingly, when an employer submits a § 7 (b) request to 
the appropriate legislative body for an appropriation to fully 
fund cost items in a collective bargaining agreement and the 
request includes pertinent information concerning fiscal and 
public policy matters, it does not violate its statutory 
obligation under § 7 (b).  See Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO v. 
Secretary of Admin., 413 Mass. 377, 380 (1992).7 
                                                          
 
 
7 In Alliance, 413 Mass. at 379, during the final days of 
Governor Michael Dukakis's administration, the Secretary signed 
a collective bargaining agreement with a number of unions.  The 
§ 7 (b) request obligation fell to the successor administration 
of Governor William Weld.  Id. at 380.  At the time of the 
§ 7 (b) request, Governor Weld also sent a written message to 
the Legislature urging it to reject the appropriation request 
because of the financial circumstances of the Commonwealth.  Id.  
In that case, neither party raised the issue whether Governor 
Weld's message violated § 7 (b), and the court, without itself 
remarking on the issue, had no trouble determining that the 
Governor's actions in sending the message were appropriate.  Id. 
at 382-383. 
11 
 
 
 
Here, the employer submitted the § 7 (b) request to the 
Legislature and did not condition funding the request on the 
occurrence of another event.  Thus, there was no violation of 
§ 7 (b), and the board's conclusion to the contrary was an error 
of law. 
 
b.  Good faith in collective bargaining.  Under the public 
employee collective bargaining statute,8 G. L. c. 150E, both the 
employer and the exclusive representative of the employee 
organizations must "negotiate in good faith." G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 6.9  Refusing to "bargain collectively in good faith" is a 
prohibited practice.  G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5).10  The duty to 
bargain in good faith is the duty to meet and negotiate in good 
faith.  See School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 
                                                          
 
 
8 The Commonwealth is a public employer, and the unions are 
employee organizations within the meaning of G. L. c. 150E, § 1. 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 150E, § 6, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"The employer and the exclusive representative shall 
. . . negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
standards or productivity and performance, and any other 
terms and conditions of employment . . . ." 
 
 
10 General Laws c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), provides in relevant 
part: 
 
 
"(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public 
employer or its designated representative to: 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"(5) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with 
the exclusive representative as required in [§ 6] . . . ." 
12 
 
 
388 Mass. 557, 572 (1983).  "'Good faith' implies an open and 
fair mind as well as a sincere effort to reach a common ground."  
Id. 
 
A comprehensive analysis of the precise contours of what 
constitutes good faith during negotiations would fill volumes, 
but a few examples may be helpful.  Appellate courts in the 
Commonwealth have held that a public employer violates the 
obligation to bargain in good faith when the employer refuses to 
bargain at all, id. at 574-575, or when it reaches an agreement 
with a union but then makes its execution contingent on approval 
by a supervisory entity, Springfield Hous. Auth. v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 654, 658-659 (1983) 
(bad faith where housing authority ratified agreement with 
condition that it be approved by agency of Executive Office of 
Communities and Development, which had supervisory functions 
over housing authorities). 
 
What emerges from the case law is that for a public 
employer to comply with the obligation to bargain and negotiate 
in good faith it must have an open and fair mind during the 
negotiating and bargaining process.  A contrary conclusion would 
run afoul of the plain language of G. L. c. 150E, §§ 6 and 
10 (a) (5).  See Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983) 
("In construing a statute, words are to be accorded their 
ordinary meaning and approved usage"). 
13 
 
 
 
Here, the board concluded that the Commonwealth failed to 
bargain in good faith in 2009 because it included statements 
regarding the fiscal consequences of approving the submitted 
appropriation in its § 7 (b) request submitted in June, 2010. 
This conclusion was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
 
There was no evidence presented to the board alleging bad 
faith on the part of the Commonwealth at the time the agreement 
was reached.  The only purported evidence of bad faith was the 
letter from the Secretary containing pertinent information 
concerning the fiscal implications of funding the 2010-2013 
agreement, sent thirteen months after negotiations concluded and 
while the Commonwealth continued to find itself in the throes of 
a nearly unprecedented economic crisis. 
 
The temporal gap is indisputable, and there was no evidence 
presented suggesting that the Secretary's characterization of 
the economic consequences of funding the agreement was 
inaccurate.  In these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be 
said that the employer did not have an "open and fair mind" when 
it concluded its agreement with the unions, simply based on the 
Secretary's letter. 
 
c.  Connection between § 7 (b) and § 10 (a) (5).  Our 
review of the board's decision in the case, as well as its prior 
decisions, suggests that the board has viewed the employer's 
obligation to submit an appropriations request under § 7 (b) as 
14 
 
 
directly linked to its obligation to bargain in good faith under 
§ 10 (a) (5). 
 
In essence, the board appears to have used its 
interpretation of § 7 (b) to impose an ongoing obligation on the 
employer that covers the period of time between the conclusion 
of negotiations and the submission of the § 7 (b) request.  
Under this view, the employer's failure to affirmatively support 
an agreement shows that it did not have an "open and fair mind" 
when negotiating a collective bargaining agreement because the 
"affirmative support" obligation reaches back to the moment in 
time when the bargain is struck and thus could be said to be 
dispositive of the employer's state of mind during negotiations.  
See, e.g., Turners Falls Fire Dist., 4 M.L.C. at 1662. 
 
That logic fails.  The plain language of § 7 (b) and 
§ 10 (a) (5) focuses on two distinct moments in time.  Section 
10 (a) (5) focuses on the state of mind of the employer during 
the negotiations, up until the negotiations are concluded.  
Indeed, § 10 (a) (5) contemplates that negotiations may not even 
result in an agreement and imposes no obligation to reach an 
agreement.  Section 7 (b), however, contemplates action 
occurring after a collective bargaining agreement has been 
finalized and executed: 
 
"The employer . . . shall submit to the appropriate 
legislative body within thirty days after the date on which 
the agreement is executed by the parties, a request for an 
15 
 
 
appropriation necessary to fund the cost items contained 
therein . . . ."11 
 
 
Because of the distinct and different points of temporal 
focus found in the respective statutes' plain language, it 
cannot be said that a violation of § 7 (b) (e.g., submitting a 
contingent request), in and of itself, constitutes a failure to 
negotiate in good faith under § 10 (a) (5). 
 
That is not to say, however, that the form, contents, or 
legality of a § 7 (b) request may not be probative of whether 
the employer negotiated in good faith.  Under certain 
circumstances, a § 7 (b) request may indicate that the employer 
engaged in bad faith negotiations.  For example, a particularly 
negative letter requesting an appropriation but recommending 
rejection sent shortly after negotiations concluded would be 
probative of a lack of good faith during negotiations.  Such 
circumstances might constitute evidence that the employer had 
entered into the agreement with the intention of repudiating it 
before the legislative body.  Those circumstances are not 
present here, however. 
 
Conclusion.  We reverse the board's decision finding that 
the Commonwealth violated G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and committed 
                                                          
 
 
11 Although submission of the § 7 (b) request occurred 
outside the thirty-day window mentioned in the quoted statute, 
neither party suggests the timing has any bearing on the case. 
16 
 
 
a prohibited practice in violation of G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 10 (a) (5).  The board's order is vacated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.