Title: Com. v. Carter
Citation: 336 Pa. Super. 275, 485 A.2d 802
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 1984

336 Pa. Superior Ct. 275 (1984) 485 A.2d 802 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Nathaniel CARTER, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted April 30, 1984. Filed December 12, 1984. *277 Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, Souderton, for appellant. Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, Norristown, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ. WIEAND, Judge: Nathaniel Carter committed acts constituting violations of parole and probation. After hearing, his parole was revoked, and he was directed to serve the balance of a 23 month maximum sentence previously imposed for recklessly endangering another person. Carter's probation was also revoked, and he was sentenced to serve a concurrent term of imprisonment of not less than nineteen months nor more than five years on a prior conviction for a firearms offense. Carter appealed. Although his appeal was filed from both orders, he has conceded the violations. His argument, therefore, is directed toward the new sentence of imprisonment imposed by the court. This sentence was imposed, he contends, without benefit of a pre-sentence investigation by a sentencing court which gave inadequate reasons for the sentence which it imposed. Because there is merit in this contention, the judgment of sentence imposed for the firearms offense will be vacated, and that matter will be remanded for resentencing. The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for the firearms offense was not accompanied by a statement of the court's reasons for the sentence. Moreover, the sentence was not preceded by a pre-sentence investigation. Although defense counsel made a specific request for a *278 pre-sentence investigation, the court denied his request. Appellant had previously been on probation and parole,[1] the court said, and it was "not going to waste the facilities of the probation department." This is reflected by the following: Whether to dispense with a pre-sentence investigation rests primarily upon the exercise of a sound discretion by the trial court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 A(1). The reasons for dispensing with a pre-sentence report, however, must be stated on the record and must be adequate to permit appellate review. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 A(2). "The first responsibility of the sentencing judge [is] to be sure that he ha[s] before him sufficient information to enable him to make a determination of the circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Doyle, 275 Pa.Super. 373, 381, 418 A.2d 1336, 1340 (1979). Accord: Commonwealth v. Young, 299 Pa.Super. 488, 491, *280 445 A.2d 1235, 1236 (1982). The responsibility is no less urgent where the defendant comes before the court as a probation violator. A sentencing court is not excused from this responsibility merely because the court desires to relieve the probation department from an additional assignment. Each person sentenced must receive a sentence fashioned to his or her individual needs. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 301 Pa.Super. 17, 25-26, 446 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Knight, 479 Pa. 209, 212-213, 387 A.2d 1297, 1299 (1978) (citations omitted). In the instant case the court did not explain its sentence except to say that it was rejecting appellant's request that he be placed in a drug treatment program. Although the sentencing judge spoke generally of prior juvenile and adult records, the nature of appellant's prior record does not appear. Indeed, even appellant's counsel asserted a lack of knowledge of any juvenile record. Under these circumstances, and despite the broad discretion vested in the sentencing court, the court's unconfirmed assertion of familiarity with appellant's prior record does not constitute an adequate basis for dispensing with a pre-sentence investigation and imposing a sentence of imprisonment. Otherwise, *281 the sentence becomes entirely subjective with the sentencing judge and does not permit of appellate review. In Commonwealth v. Weldon, 287 Pa.Super. 533, 430 A.2d 1180 (1981), this Court held that "[t]he failure of [a] court to give reasons for dispensing with a presentence report especially considered with the failure to adequately state the reasons for sentencing and a consideration of the statutory guidelines for sentencing require that . . . we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing." Id., 287 Pa.Superior Ct. at 538, 430 A.2d at 1182. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bryner, 285 Pa.Super. 305, 309 &amp; n. 2, 427 A.2d 236, 237-238 &amp; n. 2 (1981); Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 267 Pa.Super. 170, 173 n. 5, 406 A.2d 573, 574 n. 5 (1979). So, too, in this case, the sentence imposed for the firearms offense must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The order revoking parole, however, was proper and can be affirmed.[2] It is so ordered. Jurisdiction is not retained. CIRILLO, J., filed a dissenting opinion. CIRILLO, Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to direct the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report prior to sentencing. Further he asserts that the sentence imposed is harsh and excessive, and lacking substantiation on the record. I would find these contentions to be without merit and would affirm the judgment of sentence. The record reveals that the trial court adequately complied with the provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 in electing to dispense with the pre-sentence investigation and in stating *282 its reasons for doing so. Rule 1403 provides in pertinent part: It is the responsibility of the sentencing judge to have before him sufficient information to enable him to determine the character of the defendant and the nature of the offense. Commonwealth v. Doyle, 275 Pa.Super. 373, 418 A.2d 1336 (1979). The majority's bare assertion that: "The responsibility is no less urgent where the defendant comes before the court as a probation violator. A sentencing court is not excused from the responsibility merely because the court desires to relieve the probation department from an additional assignment," ignores what actually occurred in the case at bar. Judge Salus was fully apprised of the circumstances attendant to the appellant's case, after having conducted extensive colloquies in October, 1981, and in March, 1983. The judge was impressed with the failure of the appellant to abide by the terms of his probation and parole, his failure to obtain employment, his continuing use of drugs, and his initial refusal to participate in a rehabilitative drug program. Noting both that the appellant had a thorough understanding of the criminal proceedings, and that any further investigation would serve only to waste the facilities of the probation department, Judge Salus denied the appellant's request for a pre-sentence report and sentence was imposed thereafter. Moreover, I would also find without merit, appellant's contention that the court failed to articulate its reasons on *283 the record and thereby imposed a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence. It is well settled that Pennsylvania trial judges are vested with broad sentencing discretion with which the appellate courts will not interfere absent manifest abuse. Commonwealth v. Black, 321 Pa.Super. 44, 467 A.2d 884 (1983). To facilitate meaningful appellate review and to insure that discretion has been exercised, the sentencing court must state on the record its reasons for the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977). Commonwealth v. Mead, 300 Pa.Super. 510, 446 A.2d 971 (1982). The crucial function of Riggins is to preserve the legitimacy of the sentencing process. Cf. Commonwealth v. Puchalski, 310 Pa.Super. 199, 456 A.2d 569 (1983). The requirement of setting forth a statement of reasons allows us to discern the sentencing judge's thought process. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 282 Pa.Super. 193, 422 A.2d 894 (1980). While the court need not enumerate the factors of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 et seq., there must be a sufficient statement to indicate that the court did consider them. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Wareham, 259 Pa.Super. 527, 393 A.2d 951 (1978). Although Judge Salus did not proceed seriatim, the record amply demonstrates that he considered the specified factors of the Sentencing Code. The appellant had originally received a light term of imprisonment with a subsequent parole and a term of probation to afford him an opportunity to pursue rehabilitation. These minimal restrictions had not been effective, and accordingly, Judge Salus felt obligated to impose total confinement. The sentence imposed comports with the general principle of the Sentencing Code, "that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). In short, we know why appellant is now behind bars. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence. [1] The record does not disclose that a pre-sentence investigation had been made prior to the earlier sentences. These sentences had been imposed pursuant to a plea bargain and, apparently, without benefit of a pre-sentence investigation. [2] The order revoking parole did not impose a new sentence; it required appellant, rather, to serve the balance of a valid sentence previously imposed.