Title: Berry v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT D. BERRY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 13, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 30302253DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 10, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: September 28, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of September 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Robert D. Berry, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s January 12, 2007 order denying his motion for 
modification of his sentence for a violation of probation.  We find no merit 
to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In December 1993, Berry pleaded guilty to Murder in the 
Second Degree.  He was sentenced to twenty years of Level V incarceration, 
to be suspended after twelve years for eight years of probation.  The 
 
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sentence was later modified, providing for suspension of the sentence after 
ten years for ten years of probation.   
 
(3) 
Berry was discharged on conditional release pursuant to Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4348.  In June 2002 and October 2002, the Board of 
Parole found that he had violated the terms of his conditional release.  Berry 
was sentenced to Level IV Halfway House.  Several days after his release, 
Berry was charged with Assault in the Second Degree and Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  The victim of the 
assault was Berry’s girlfriend, Marocka Jeter. Berry was found to have 
committed a violation of probation (“VOP”) and was sentenced to eight 
years at Level V, to be suspended for two years of probation.   
 
(4) 
In December 2004, Berry was found in violation of his 
probation.  He was sentenced to seven years at Level V, to be suspended for 
four years at Level III probation.  In August 2005, Berry again was found to 
have committed a VOP, based on arrests in December 2004 and April 2005.  
He was sentenced to one year at Level V, to be followed by three years of 
probation.  The Superior Court ordered at that time that Berry was to have 
no contact with the assault victim, Marocka Jeter.       
 
(5) 
In August 2006, the Superior Court found that Berry had 
committed another VOP and sentenced him to four years at Level V, to be 
 
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followed by six months of Level IV supervision and eighteen months of 
Level III probation.  The Superior Court found that Berry had submitted two 
urine samples that tested positive for cocaine, missed an office appointment, 
violated his curfew, and violated the order prohibiting contact with Marocka 
Jeter.  The record reflects that Berry admitted to the curfew violation and 
admitted to having contact with Jeter, but insisted that it was Jeter who 
solicited the contact.  The record also reflects that Jeter entered the 
courtroom after the VOP hearing had concluded and, therefore, did not 
testify.  
 
(6) 
In this appeal, Berry claims that his motion for sentence 
modification should have been granted because the Superior Court 
improperly exceeded the Truth-in-Sentencing (“TIS”) guidelines, based its 
findings on the probation officer’s unreliable testimony, failed to inquire 
whether he and his counsel had reviewed the presentence report, failed to 
state the reasons for the finding of a VOP, and failed to reopen the VOP 
hearing to permit Jeter to testify.  Berry also claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.   
 
(7) 
Berry’s first claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
exceeded the TIS guidelines when sentencing him for the VOP.  It is well-
settled that a departure from the TIS guidelines, in and of itself, does not 
 
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provide a basis for challenging a sentence.1  As such, we conclude that 
Berry’s first claim is without merit. 
 
(8) 
Berry’s second claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
based its findings on the probation officer’s unreliable testimony.  The 
record, however, does not reflect that the probation officer’s testimony was 
unreliable.  In light of Berry’s earlier conviction for assaulting Jeter, his 
failed drug tests, and his psychological history, as well as his lengthy history 
of probation violations, the probation officer’s opinion that Berry was 
“dangerous” and a “menace,” although strongly worded, had a factual basis.  
The Superior Court, particularly in the absence of an objection by Berry’s 
defense counsel, was within its discretion to rely on that opinion.2  We, 
therefore, conclude that Berry’s second claim is without merit. 
 
(9) 
Berry’s third claim is that the Superior Court failed to inquire 
whether Berry and his counsel had reviewed the presentence report.  
Because this claim was not presented to the Superior Court in the first 
instance, we decline to review it in this appeal.3  Even assuming that the 
Superior Court erred in this respect, Berry has not demonstrated any 
prejudice. 
                                          
 
1 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 846 (Del. 1992). 
2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 719 (Del. 2006). 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
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(10) Berry’s fourth claim is that the Superior Court judge failed to 
state the reasons for his finding of a VOP on the record.  Because this claim 
also was not presented to the Superior Court in the first instance, we decline 
to review it in this appeal.4  It is clear from the hearing transcript what the 
basis for the VOP was in any case.    
 
(11) Berry’s fifth claim is that the Superior Court judge failed to 
reopen the VOP hearing so that Jeter could testify.  There is no indication in 
the record that Jeter had been identified as a witness and Berry’s counsel did 
not request that the hearing be delayed until she arrived.  As such, the 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to reopen the hearing 
sua sponte.  There was no prejudice to Berry in any case, since the Superior 
Court explicitly considered a document that Berry claimed was Jeter’s sworn 
affidavit in connection with Berry’s motion for sentence modification.  The 
Superior Court stated that Jeter’s testimony would not have altered the 
sentence it imposed.   
 
(12) Berry’s sixth, and final, claim is that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.  Berry raises this claim for the first time in this appeal.  
Because the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised and 
                                          
 
4 Id. 
 
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decided in the proceedings below, we decline to address it for the first time 
in this appeal.5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
5 Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267-69 (Del. 1985).