Title: State of Florida v. Adkins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-1878
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
______________ 
 
No. SC11-1878 
______________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
LUKE JARROD ADKINS, et al., 
Appellees. 
 
[July 12, 2012] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case we consider the constitutionality of the provisions of chapter 
893, Florida Statutes (2011), the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act, that provide that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled 
substance is not an element of any offenses under the chapter but that the lack of 
such knowledge is an affirmative defense. 
Based on its conclusion that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2011)—which 
creates offenses related to the sale, manufacture, delivery, and possession of 
controlled substances—is facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clauses 
of the Florida and the United States Constitutions, the circuit court for the Twelfth 
 
 
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Judicial Circuit issued an order granting motions to dismiss charges filed under 
section 893.13 in forty-six criminal cases.  The circuit court reasoned that the 
requirements of due process precluded the Legislature from eliminating knowledge 
of the illicit nature of the substance as an element of the offenses under section 
893.13.  On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal certified to this Court that 
the circuit court‘s judgment presents issues that require immediate resolution by 
this Court because the issues are of great public importance and will have a great 
effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the State.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const. 
 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
determining the statute to be unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit 
court‘s order granting the motions to dismiss. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Section 893.13, part of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act, provides in part that except as otherwise authorized ―
it is 
unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to 
sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance‖ or ―
to be in actual or 
constructive possession of a controlled substance.‖  § 893.13(1)(a), (6)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2011).  Depending on the controlled substance involved and the 
circumstances of the offense, a violation of section 893.13 can be punished as a 
 
 
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misdemeanor, a third-degree felony, a second-degree felony, or a first-degree 
felony.  See, e.g., § 893.13(1)(a)(1), (1)(a)(2), (1)(a)(3), (1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011).   
Section 893.13 itself does not specify what mental state a defendant must 
possess in order to be convicted for selling, manufacturing, delivering, or 
possessing a controlled substance.  In Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996), 
this Court addressed whether section 893.13 should be interpreted to include a 
mens rea—that is, a ―
guilty mind‖—element.  In reviewing a conviction for 
possession of cocaine, this Court determined that ―
guilty knowledge‖ was one of 
the elements of the crime of possession of a controlled substance and that the State 
was required to prove that Chicone knew he possessed the substance and knew of 
the illicit nature of the substance in his possession.  Id. at 738-41.  This Court 
reasoned that the common law typically required ―
scienter or mens rea [as] a 
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime‖ and that the 
penalties facing defendants convicted under chapter 893, Florida Statutes, were 
much harsher than the usual penalties for crimes where a knowledge element is not 
required.  Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 741.  This Court further reasoned that the 
Legislature ―
would have spoken more clearly‖ if it had intended to not require 
proof of guilty knowledge to convict under section 893.13.  Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 
743.   
 
 
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More recently, in Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002), this Court 
clarified that the ―
guilty knowledge‖ element of the crime of possession of a 
controlled substance contains two aspects: knowledge of the presence of the 
substance and knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance.  808 So. 2d at 169.  
In addition, this Court clarified that the presumption of knowledge set out in State 
v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973), and reiterated in Chicone—that a 
defendant‘s knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance can be 
presumed from evidence that the defendant had possession of the controlled 
substance—can be employed only in cases in which the State proves actual, 
personal possession of the controlled substance.  Scott, 808 So. 2d at 171-72.   
In response to this Court‘s decisions, the Legislature enacted a statute now 
codified in section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2011).  Section 893.101 provides in 
full: 
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State, Slip 
Opinion No. SC94701 (Fla. 2002)[,] and Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 
736 (Fla. 1996), holding that the state must prove that the defendant 
knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her 
actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent. 
(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of 
a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this 
chapter.  Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled 
substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter. 
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the 
affirmative defense described in this section, the possession of a 
controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to 
a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature 
of the substance.  It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases 
 
 
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where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be 
instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection. 
(Emphasis added.)  The statute thus expressly eliminates knowledge of the illicit 
nature of the controlled substance as an element of controlled substance offenses 
and expressly creates an affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of the illicit 
nature of the substance.  The statute does not eliminate the element of knowledge 
of the presence of the substance, which we acknowledged in Chicone, 684 So. 2d 
at 739-40, and Scott, 808 So. 2d at 169.  
Since the enactment of section 893.101, each of the district courts of appeal 
has ruled that the statute does not violate the requirements of due process.  See 
Harris v. State, 932 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Burnette v. State, 901 So. 2d 
925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Taylor v. State, 929 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); 
Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Lanier v. State, 74 So. 3d 
1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently 
concluded, however, that section 893.13 is unconstitutional because it does not 
require sufficient mens rea on the part of the defendant to sustain a conviction.  See 
Shelton v. Sec‘y, Dep‘t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011).  First, the 
Middle District reasoned that to withstand constitutional scrutiny, section 893.13 
should have provided lighter penalties, ―
such as fines or short jail sentences, not 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary.‖  Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (quoting 
 
 
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Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994)).  Second, the Middle District 
reasoned that because of the substantial social stigma associated with a felony 
conviction, a conviction under section 893.13 should require a guilty mind.  
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.  And third, assuming that a defendant could be 
convicted under section 893.13 for delivering or transferring a container without 
being aware of its contents, the Middle District concluded that section 893.13 
violates due process by regulating potentially innocent conduct.  Shelton, 802 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1305. 
Citing Shelton as persuasive—not binding—authority, the circuit court in 
this case concluded that section 893.13 is facially unconstitutional because it 
violates the Due Process Clauses of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The circuit court 
reasoned that the Legislature did not have authority to dispense with a mens rea 
element for a serious felony crime. 
The State now appeals the circuit court‘s decision in this Court.  The State 
asserts that section 893.13, as modified by section 893.101, is facially 
constitutional and that the circuit court therefore erred in granting the motions to 
dismiss.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
 
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In the following analysis, after acknowledging the applicable standard of 
review, we first consider the case law that discusses the broad authority of the 
legislative branch to define the elements of criminal offenses as well as the case 
law that recognizes that due process ordinarily does not preclude the creation of an 
offense without a guilty knowledge element.  We then examine the limited 
circumstances in which the absence of a guilty knowledge element has resulted in a 
holding that the requirements of due process were not satisfied.  Finally, we 
explain our conclusion that sections 893.13 and 893.101 do not violate due 
process. 
―
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo 
review.‖  Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2011).  In considering a challenge 
to the constitutionality of a statute, this Court is ―
obligated to accord legislative 
acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to 
effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.‖  Fla. Dep‘t of Revenue v. City 
of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fla. Dep‘t of Revenue v. 
Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005)).  ―
[A] determination that a statute is 
facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
statute would be valid.‖  Id.    
 
―
Enacting laws—and especially criminal laws—is quintessentially a 
legislative function.‖  Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 615 
 
 
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(Fla. 2008).  ―
[T]he Legislature generally has broad authority to determine any 
requirement for intent or knowledge in the definition of a crime.‖  State v. 
Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 2004).  We thus have recognized that generally 
―
[i]t is within the power of the Legislature to declare an act a crime regardless of 
the intent or knowledge of the violation thereof.‖  Coleman v. State ex rel. Jackson, 
193 So. 84, 86 (Fla. 1939).  ―
The doing of the act inhibited by the statute makes the 
crime[,] and moral turpitude or purity of motive and the knowledge or ignorance of 
its criminal character are immaterial circumstances on the question of guilt.‖  Id. 
Given the broad authority of the legislative branch to define the elements of 
crimes, the requirements of due process ordinarily do not preclude the creation of 
offenses which lack a guilty knowledge element.  This point was recognized long 
ago in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922), where the Supreme Court 
considered the imposition of criminal penalties—fines of up to $2000 or 
imprisonment for up to five years, or both—under section 9 of the Narcotic Act of 
1914 where the indictment ―
failed to charge that [the defendants] had sold the 
inhibited drugs knowing them to be such.‖  The Narcotic Act required ―
every 
person who produces, imports, manufactures, compounds, deals in, dispenses, 
sells, distributes, or gives away‖ a substance containing opium or coca leaves to 
register and pay a tax.  Narcotic Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785 
(1914).  The Narcotic Act prohibited possession of the specified drugs by any 
 
 
- 9 - 
unregistered person, subject to certain exceptions—including an exception for 
persons to whom the drugs ―
have been prescribed in good faith‖ by a registered 
medical professional.  Narcotic Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 8, 38 Stat. 785 
(1914).  The Act also provided that ―
possession or control‖ of the specified drugs 
―
shall be presumptive evidence of a violation‖ of the statute.  Id.  As recognized by 
the Supreme Court, the statute did not make ―
knowledge an element of the 
offense.‖  Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.  Despite the substantial penalty for 
noncompliance with the Narcotic Act, the Supreme Court declined either to read a 
mens rea element into the Narcotic Act or to conclude that the lack of such an 
element in the Narcotic Act was unconstitutional. 
The Balint court specifically rejected the argument that ―
punishment of a 
person for an act in violation of law when ignorant of the facts making it so, is an 
absence of due process of law.‖  Id. at 252.  The Supreme Court observed that ―
the 
state may in the maintenance of a public policy provide ‗
that he who shall do 
[proscribed acts] shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense 
good faith or ignorance.‘‖  Id. at 252 (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 
218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910)).  The Supreme Court explained that offenses lacking such 
a knowledge element were commonly ―
found in regulatory measures in the 
exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is 
 
 
- 10 - 
evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment 
of crimes as in cases of mala in se.‖  Id.   
The Balint court thus gave effect to the ―
manifest purpose‖ of the Narcotic 
Act—that is, ―
to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril 
whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he 
sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him.‖  258 U.S. at 
254.  The Supreme Court recognized that the statutory purpose was properly based 
at least in part on ―
considerations as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the 
fact and the difficulty of proof of knowledge.‖  Id. 
 
Since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Balint, both the Supreme Court and 
this Court have repeatedly recognized that the legislative branch has broad 
discretion to omit a mens rea element from a criminal offense.  For example, in 
Staples, which reviewed a federal law criminalizing the unregistered possession of 
certain automatic firearms that did not expressly include or exclude a mens rea 
element, the Supreme Court explained that whether or not a criminal offense 
requires proof that a defendant knew of the illegal nature of his act ―
is a question 
of statutory construction‖ and that the ―
definition of the elements of a criminal 
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, 
which are solely creatures of statute.‖  511 U.S. at 604 (quoting Liparota v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)).  Similarly, in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 
 
 
- 11 - 
601 (1971), and United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 
U.S. 558 (1971), the Supreme Court rejected the view that due process required 
that mens rea elements be read into public safety statutes regulating the possession 
of unregistered firearms and the shipping of corrosive liquids.  
Likewise in State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1983), this Court determined 
that the district court erred by construing a witness tampering statute to include 
scienter and intent elements, explaining:  
The problem with the district court‘s analysis is its failure to 
recognize that unless the law in question directly or indirectly 
impinges on the exercise of some constitutionally protected freedom, 
or exceeds or violates some constitutional prohibition on the power of 
the legislature, courts have no power to declare conduct innocent 
when the legislature has declared otherwise.  Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 
U.S. 500, 25 S.Ct. 756, 49 L.Ed. 1142 (1905). 
It is within the power of the legislature to declare conduct 
criminal without requiring specific criminal intent to achieve a certain 
result; that is, the legislature may punish conduct without regard to the 
mental attitude of the offender, so that the general intent of the 
accused to do the act is deemed to give rise to a presumption of intent 
to achieve the criminal result.  The legislature may also dispense with 
a requirement that the actor be aware of the facts making his conduct 
criminal.  A recent decision from the district court of appeal has 
recognized these principles.  State v. Oxx, 417 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1982). 
The question of whether conviction of a crime should require 
proof of a specific, as opposed to a general, criminal intent is a matter 
for the legislature to determine in defining the crime.  The elements of 
a crime are derived from the statutory definition.  There are some 
authorities to the effect that infamous crimes, crimes mala in se, or 
common-law crimes may not be defined by the legislature in such a 
way as to dispense with the element of specific intent, but these 
authorities are suspect.    
 
 
 
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Gray, 435 So. 2d at 819-20 (some citations omitted). 
In a limited category of circumstances, the omission of a mens rea element 
from the definition of a criminal offense has been held to violate due process.  A 
salient example of such circumstance is found in the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), which addressed a Los Angeles 
municipal code provision requiring that felons present in the municipality for more 
than five days register with law enforcement.  The code provision applied to ―
a 
person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register.‖  Id. at 227.  In 
Lambert, the Supreme Court concluded that a legislative body may not criminalize 
otherwise entirely innocent, passive conduct—such as a convicted felon remaining 
in Los Angeles for more than five days—without sufficiently informing the 
population of the legal requirement.  As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the registration requirement then at issue could be enforced only when the 
defendant was aware of the ordinance.  Still, the Supreme Court emphasized that in 
a situation where the lawmaking body seeks to prohibit affirmative acts, it can do 
so without requiring proof that the actor knew his or her conduct to be illegal: 
 
We do not go with Blackstone in saying that ―
a vicious will‖ is 
necessary to constitute a crime, for conduct alone without regard to 
the intent of the doer is often sufficient.  There is wide latitude in the 
lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of 
knowledge and diligence from its definition.  But we deal here with 
conduct that is wholly passive—mere failure to register.  It is unlike 
the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that 
should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed.  The rule that 
 
 
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―
ignorance of the law will not excuse‖ is deep in our law, as is the 
principle that of all the powers of local government, the police power 
is ―
one of the least limitable.‖ 
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
In Giorgetti, this Court followed the holding of Lambert in invalidating 
Florida‘s sexual offender registration statutes.  Because the defendant‘s alleged 
illegal conduct ―
was similar to the passive conduct discussed in Lambert, i.e., 
relocating residences and failing to notify the State within forty-eight hours,‖ we 
determined that ―
as in Lambert, knowledge is required here to define the wrongful 
conduct, i.e., the defendant‘s failure to comply with a statutory requirement.‖  
Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d at 519. 
 
The Supreme Court has also concluded that the omission of a scienter 
element from the definition of a criminal offense can result in a due process 
violation where the omission results in criminalizing conduct protected by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  For example, in Smith v. 
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Supreme Court determined that a scienter 
element was required in an ordinance making it illegal for any person to have in his 
possession any obscene or indecent writing in a place of business where books are 
sold.  The Supreme Court reasoned that without such an element, the ordinance 
would cause a bookseller ―
to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; 
and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of 
 
 
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constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature.‖  Id. at 153.  Similarly, in 
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), the Supreme Court 
construed the modifier ―
knowing‖ in the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act to apply to the element of the age of the performers.  The 
Supreme Court explained that because nonobscene, sexually explicit materials 
involving persons over the age of seventeen are protected by the First Amendment, 
―
a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the 
performers would raise serious constitutional doubts,‖ and it was ―
therefore 
incumbent upon [the court] to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as 
such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.‖  Id. at 78. 
In Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 413 (Fla. 1991), we concluded that ―
a 
due process violation occurs if a criminal statute‘s means is not rationally related to 
its purposes and, as a result, it criminalizes innocuous conduct.‖  Specifically, we 
considered a statute prohibiting the possession of a depiction involving ―
actual 
physical contact with a [minor] person‘s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, 
buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.‖  Id. at 408 (quoting § 
827.071(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987)).  We held that the statute violated due process 
because it criminalized family photographs of innocent caretaker-child conduct, 
such as bathing the child or changing a diaper.  While Florida‘s civil child abuse 
statute expressly excluded from the definition of sexual child abuse physical 
 
 
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contact that ―
may reasonably be construed to be a normal caretaker responsibility,‖ 
the criminal statute declared depictions of such acts to be a felony.  Id. at 413 
(quoting § 415.503(17)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987)).   
In In re Forfeiture 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So. 2d 233, 235 n.6 (Fla. 1992), 
this Court concluded that the Legislature could not authorize the confiscation of 
airplanes based on the presence of additional fuel capacity—where extra fuel 
capacity was not ―
the exclusive domain of drug smugglers.‖  This Court reasoned 
that such an action would impinge on protected property rights.  Id. at 236.  
Similarly, this Court determined that statutes criminalizing the possession of 
embossing machines, lawfully obtained drugs not in their original packaging, and 
spearfishing equipment—without requiring proof of intent to use the items 
illegally—were not reasonably related to achieving a legitimate legislative purpose 
and interfered with the property rights of individuals who used those items for 
noncriminal purposes.  See State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986); State v. 
Walker, 444 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA), aff‘d, 461 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1984) 
(adopting district court of appeal‘s opinion); Delmonico v. State, 155 So. 2d 368 
(Fla. 1963). 
The provisions of chapter 893 at issue in the present case are readily 
distinguishable from those cases in which definitions of particular criminal 
offenses were found to violate the requirements of due process.  The rationale for 
 
 
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each of those cases is not applicable to the context of controlled substance offenses 
under Florida law.  
Sections 893.13 and 893.101 do not trigger the concern raised in Lambert 
and Giorgetti.  The statutes do not penalize without notice a ―
failure to act [that 
absent the statutes] otherwise amounts to essentially innocent conduct,‖ such as 
living in a particular municipality without registering.  Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d at 517 
(quoting Oxx, 417 So. 2d at 290).  Rather than punishing inaction, to convict under 
section 893.13 the State must prove that the defendant engaged in the affirmative 
act of selling, manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance.  The 
controlled substance statutes are further distinguishable from the statutes in 
Lambert and Giorgetti—which would impose criminal liability for failing to 
register regardless of the defendant‘s knowledge of the regulation and his or her 
status—because in section 893.101 the Legislature has expressly provided that a 
person charged under chapter 893 who did not have knowledge of the illegality of 
his or her conduct may raise that fact as an affirmative defense.  
Furthermore, sections 893.13 and 893.101—unlike the provisions we 
invalidated in Schmitt, 1969 Piper Navajo, Saiez, Walker, and Delmonico—are 
rationally related to the Legislature‘s goal of controlling substances that have a 
high potential for abuse, and the statutes do not interfere with any constitutionally 
protected rights.  The Legislature tailored section 893.13 to permit legitimate, 
 
 
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medical uses of controlled substances but to prohibit non-medically necessary uses 
of those substances.  Section 893.13 expressly excludes from criminal liability 
individuals who possess a controlled substance that ―
was lawfully obtained from a 
practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription,‖ § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011), 
and the following persons and entities who handle medically necessary controlled 
substances as part of their profession: pharmacists, medical practitioners, hospital 
employees, government officials working in their official capacity, common 
carriers, pharmaceutical companies, and the employees and agents of the above, § 
893.13(9), Fla. Stat. (2011).   
Because there is no legally recognized use for controlled substances outside 
the circumstances identified by the statute, prohibiting the sale, manufacture, 
delivery, or possession of those substances without requiring proof of knowledge 
of the illicit nature of the substances does not criminalize innocuous conduct or 
―
impinge[] on the exercise of some constitutionally protected freedom.‖  Gray, 435 
So. 2d at 819.  Because the statutory provisions at issue here do not have the 
potential to curtail constitutionally protected speech, they are materially 
distinguishable from statutes that implicate the possession of materials protected 
by the First Amendment, such as those at issue in Smith and X-Citement Video.  
There is no constitutional right to possess contraband.  ―
[A]ny interest in 
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‗legi
timate.‘‖  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
 
 
- 18 - 
U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 
(1984)).   
Nor is there a protected right to be ignorant of the nature of the property in 
one‘s possession.  See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1970) 
(―
‗
Common‘ sense tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become 
aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, unless they practice a studied 
ignorance to which they are not entitled.‖) (emphasis added) (citation and 
footnotes omitted); Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (upholding as constitutional a statute 
that ―
require[d] every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that 
which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute‖).  Just as ―
common sense 
and experience‖ dictate that a person in possession of Treasury checks addressed to 
another person should be ―
aware of the high probability that the checks were 
stolen,‖ a person in possession of a controlled substance should be aware of the 
nature of the substance as an illegal drug.  Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 
845 (1973).  Because controlled substances are valuable, common sense indicates 
that they are generally handled with care.  As a result, possession without 
awareness of the illicit nature of the substance is highly unusual.  See United States 
v. Bunton, No. 8:10-cr-327-T-30EAJ, 2011 WL 5080307, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 
2011) (―
It bears repeating that common sense dictates, given the numerous drug 
polic[i]es that are designed to discourage the production, distribution, and 
 
 
- 19 - 
consumption of illegal drugs, that one can reasonably infer guilty knowledge when 
a defendant is in possession of an illegal substance and knows of the substance‘s 
presence.  In other words, having knowledge of the presence of the substance 
should alert the defendant to the probability of strict regulation.‖). 
Any concern that entirely innocent conduct will be punished with a criminal 
sanction under chapter 893 is obviated by the statutory provision that allows a 
defendant to raise the affirmative defense of an absence of knowledge of the illicit 
nature of the controlled substance.  In the unusual circumstance where an 
individual has actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance but has 
no knowledge that the substance is illicit, the defendant may present such a defense 
to the jury.   
Because we conclude that the Legislature did not exceed its constitutional 
authority in redefining section 893.13 to not require proof that the defendant knew 
of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, we likewise conclude that the 
Legislature did not violate due process by defining lack of such knowledge as an 
affirmative defense to the offenses set out in chapter 893.  The Legislature‘s 
decision to treat lack of such knowledge as an affirmative defense does not 
unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof of a criminal offense to the defendant.   
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207 (1977), the Supreme Court 
concluded that the New York legislature‘s decision to define extreme emotional 
 
 
- 20 - 
disturbance as an affirmative defense to the crime of murder was permissible 
because the defense did ―
not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the 
State is to prove in order to convict of murder‖ but instead ―
constitute[d] a separate 
issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion.‖  The 
Supreme Court explained that because the fact constituting the affirmative defense 
was not logically intertwined with a fact necessary to prove guilt, the affirmative 
defense did not ―
unhinge the procedural presumption of innocence.‖  Id. at 211 
n.13 (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, C.J., 
concurring), aff‘d, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)). 
 
This Court applied similar reasoning in State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 
1990).  In Cohen, this Court reviewed a statutory affirmative defense to Florida‘s 
witness-tampering statute.  The affirmative defense required Cohen to prove that  
he engaged in lawful conduct and that his sole intention was to encourage, induce, 
or cause the witness to testify truthfully.  Id. at 51.  This Court concluded that the 
supposed affirmative defense was merely an illusory affirmative defense.  This 
Court explained that the purported affirmative defense was illusory because Cohen 
could not logically both raise the affirmative defense and concede the elements of 
the crime.  By attempting to prove the affirmative defense that he had acted 
lawfully with the intent to encourage the witness to testify truthfully, Cohen would 
necessarily negate the State‘s theory that he illegally contacted a witness, as 
 
 
- 21 - 
opposed to conceding the State‘s charges.  Thus, the purported affirmative defense 
unconstitutionally placed a burden on Cohen—as a defendant—to refute the 
State‘s case.  Id. at 52.  
 
Here, the Legislature‘s decision to make the absence of knowledge of the 
illicit nature of the controlled substance an affirmative defense is constitutional.  
Under section 893.13, as modified by section 893.101, the State is not required to 
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled 
substance in order to convict the defendant of one of the defined offenses.  The 
conduct the Legislature seeks to curtail is the sale, manufacture, delivery, or 
possession of a controlled substance, regardless of the defendant‘s subjective 
intent.  As a result, the defendant can concede all elements of the offense but still 
coherently raise the ―
separate issue,‖ Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207, of whether the 
defendant lacked knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance.  The 
affirmative defense does not ask the defendant to disprove something that the State 
must prove in order to convict, but instead provides a defendant with an 
opportunity to explain why his or her admittedly illegal conduct should not be 
punished.  ―
It is plain enough that if [the sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession 
of a controlled substance] is shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as 
a [criminal] unless he demonstrates the mitigating circumstances.‖  Patterson, 432 
 
 
- 22 - 
U.S. at 206.  Thus, the affirmative defense does not improperly shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In enacting section 893.101, the Legislature eliminated from the definitions 
of the offenses in chapter 893 the element that the defendant has knowledge of the 
illicit nature of the controlled substance and created the affirmative defense of lack 
of such knowledge.  The statutory provisions do not violate any requirement of due 
process articulated by this Court or the Supreme Court.  In the unusual 
circumstance where a person possesses a controlled substance inadvertently, 
establishing the affirmative defense available under section 893.101 will preclude 
the conviction of the defendant.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in granting the motions to dismiss and we reverse the circuit 
court‘s order. 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LABARGA, J., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., dissents. 
PERRY, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
Forty-eight states, either by statute or judicial decision, require that 
knowledge of a controlled substance—mens rea (―
guilty mind‖)—be an element of 
a criminal narcotics offense.1  Despite the Legislature‘s elimination of knowledge 
of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an element of a drug-related 
offense, conviction for such an offense under the Florida Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention Act (Act) can subject a defendant to staggering penalties, 
ranging from punishment of up to fifteen years‘ imprisonment to life in prison for 
recidivists.  
I share Justice Perry‘s concerns about the Act‘s harsh application to a 
potentially blameless defendant, but in my view, these legitimate concerns do not 
render the Act facially unconstitutional; that is, under no set of circumstances can 
                                          
 
 
1.  A national survey reveals that Florida‘s drug law is clearly out of the 
mainstream.  Except for Washington, which eliminates mens rea for simple drug 
possession offenses, and now Florida, the remaining forty-eight states require 
knowledge to be an element of a narcotics possession law, either by statute or by 
judicial decision.  See State v. Bradshaw, 98 P.3d 1190, 1196 (Wash. 2004) 
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (noting that at least forty-eight states have adopted the 
Uniform Controlled Substance Act and all but two expressly require knowledge to 
be proved as an element of unlawful possession); Dawkins v. State, 547 A.2d 
1041, 1045, 1046 n.10 (Md. 1988) (―
In surveying the law of other states that have 
adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, we note that the overwhelming 
majority of states, either by statute or by judicial decision, require that the 
possession be knowing‖; ―
Most states addressing the issue of possession of 
controlled substances hold that the accused must not only know of the presence of 
the substance but also of the general character of the substance.‖). 
 
 
- 24 - 
the Act be constitutionally applied.  Although I concur in the result reached by the 
majority, I write separately to emphasize the very narrow basis for my 
concurrence.   
The Act is facially constitutional only because it (1) continues to require the 
State to prove that a defendant had knowledge of the presence of the controlled 
substance as an element of drug-related offenses and (2) expressly authorizes a 
defendant to assert lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled 
substance as an affirmative defense.  Both aspects reduce the likelihood that a 
defendant will be punished for what could otherwise be considered innocent 
possession and save this Act from facial invalidity.  However, because of genuine 
constitutional concerns that notwithstanding the availability of an affirmative 
defense, the Act could be unconstitutionally applied to a specific defendant by 
criminalizing innocent conduct while subjecting him or her to a substantial term of 
imprisonment, I would not foreclose an individual defendant from raising an as-
applied challenge to the Act on due process grounds.  In short, it would be difficult 
to uphold the Act, which codifies felony offenses with substantial penalties, against 
a constitutional attack when mounted by a person who possessed a controlled 
substance unwittingly or without knowledge of its illicit nature. 
Being one among a distinct minority of states to eliminate an element 
traditionally included in criminal offenses does not, of course, render Florida‘s 
 
 
- 25 - 
drug law unconstitutional.  After all, this Court‘s task is not to decide whether the 
Legislature has made a wise choice—or even one in keeping with the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions—when defining the elements of drug-
related offenses.  Rather, we must determine whether the Legislature deprived 
defendants of due process of law under the United States and Florida Constitutions 
by omitting knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance as an element 
of the offense.2  When reviewing the constitutional validity of a statute, we must 
remain mindful of the United States Supreme Court‘s consistent recital of the 
notion that the ―
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, 
the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.‖3  The inclusion of mens 
rea as an essential element of an offense is a mechanism that safeguards against the 
criminalization of innocent conduct.  As this Court has recognized, ―
scienter is 
often necessary to comport with due process requirements,‖ and the elimination of 
                                          
 
 
2.  The due process language used in article I, section 9, of the Florida 
Constitution is virtually identical to the language used in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Cf. State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 
761, 770 (Fla. 1998) (holding that an accused‘s right to remain silent under article 
I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution precluded the use of post-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence to impeach a defendant‘s testimony at trial even though the 
Federal Due Process Clause permitted such a use). 
3.  United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (quoting 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)); see also Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (reciting the same). 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
this element ―
from a criminal statute must be done within constitutional 
constraints.‖  State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 518, 520 (Fla. 2004).  Therefore, 
laws that dispense with the requirement of mens rea require very close judicial 
scrutiny to ensure their compliance with what the Constitution commands. 
Initially, I recognize, as does the majority, that the Legislature‘s 2002 
amendment to the Act abrogated only the requirement that the State prove a 
defendant had knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance.  See ch. 
2002-258, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 893.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2002)).  
Significantly, the State still bears the burden of proving a defendant‘s knowledge 
of presence in order to establish a defendant‘s actual or constructive possession of 
the controlled substance.  See Maestas v. State, 76 So. 3d 991, 994-95 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2011).  Therefore, I agree that ―
the statute does not punish strictly an 
unknowing possession or delivery,‖ id. at 995, thereby saving the Act from being 
unconstitutionally applied to defendants where knowledge of the presence of the 
substance is unknown.  Cf. United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1411 (5th Cir. 
1993) (noting that ―
a serious due process problem would be raised by application 
of [a statute criminalizing gun possession on an aircraft], which carries fairly 
substantial penalties, to someone who did not know and had no reason to know that 
he was carrying a weapon‖). 
On the other hand, I disagree with the majority‘s broad pronouncement that 
 
 
- 27 - 
due process will not ordinarily preclude the Legislature from creating criminal 
offenses that dispense with the mens rea requirement.  See majority op. at 8.  The 
majority‘s analysis upholding the constitutionality of the Act is flawed because it 
appears to be based on whether the Legislature has a rational basis for imposing 
criminal liability.  In fact, there are constitutional limitations on the Legislature‘s 
ability to create crimes that dispense with mens rea and in effect criminalize 
actions that could be characterized as innocent conduct where such crimes carry 
substantial penalties. 
The majority‘s reliance on several cases from the United States Supreme 
Court to reach that broad pronouncement is misplaced and fails to discuss the fact 
that courts and commentators have expressed serious concerns about the 
constitutionality of criminal statutes that eliminate mens rea as an element of a 
criminal offense.   
The majority affords great significance to the Supreme Court‘s 1922 
decision in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), as standing for the 
proposition that due process does not, as a general matter, preclude the creation of 
offenses lacking a guilty knowledge element.  See majority op. at 8-10.  But unlike 
the drug law at issue here criminalizing clandestine drug deals, the public welfare 
Narcotic Act of 1914 under scrutiny in Balint was a ―
taxing act‖ that regulated and 
taxed the legal distribution of drugs to secure ―
a close supervision of the business 
 
 
- 28 - 
of dealing in these dangerous drugs.‖  258 U.S. at 253-54.  There, the defendants 
knew they were distributing drugs (a derivative of opium and coca leaves), they 
just did not know that the substances at issue were regulated as narcotics and had 
to be distributed pursuant to a written order form.  See id. at 251.  Knowledge that 
the substances seeking to be distributed were in fact regulated was not an element 
of the offense.  See id.; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) 
(acknowledging that the Narcotic Act discussed in Balint ―
required proof only that 
the defendant knew he was selling drugs, not that he knew that the specific items 
he had sold were ‗
narcotics‘ within the ambit of the statute‖). 
The Supreme Court upheld the Narcotic Act, rejecting the argument that 
―
punishment of a person for an act in violation of law when ignorant of the facts 
making it so‖ violated due process.  Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.  The Court in Balint 
reasoned that the act was much more similar to ―
regulatory measures‖ designed for 
―
social betterment‖ than to those designed for ―
punishment.‖  Id.  Concluding that 
knowledge was not an aspect of this element of the offense, the Court held that the 
―m
anifest purpose‖ of the act was ―
to require every person dealing in drugs to 
ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the 
statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize 
him,‖ using a criminal penalty merely ―
to secure recorded evidence of the 
disposition of such drugs as a means of taxing and restraining the traffic.‖  Id. at 
 
 
- 29 - 
254.   
Notably, when examining the statute in Balint contextually, at least one 
court has more recently observed that Balint no longer has any application as a 
case about strict liability and narcotics given the serious nature of contemporary 
drug laws: 
[T]he statute must be understood in context.  It predated the era during 
which all possession and sale of drugs came to be regarded as serious 
crimes.  Aside from its penalty, it fairly can be characterized as a 
regulation.  It required manufacturers and distributors of certain 
narcotics to register with the IRS, pay a special tax of one dollar per 
year and record all transactions on forms provided by the IRS.  
[Narcotic Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 223,] §§ 1-3 and 8[, 38 Stat. 784 
(1914)]. 
As a case about strict liability and narcotics, Balint has no 
application today.  Prior to the [Narcotic] Act narcotics had been 
freely available without prescription.  This change by tax statute was a 
first modest transitional step towards the present complex and serious 
criminal statutes dealing with narcotics offenses.  They have come to 
be treated as among the most serious of crimes in the federal criminal 
code.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 960 (mandatory minimum sentences as 
high as 10 years for certain drug offenses); 848(e) (possible sentence 
of death for drug offenses in which killing results). 
 
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 
The majority similarly relies upon United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 
(1971), and United States v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 
558 (1971), for the conclusion that the Supreme Court has rejected the view that 
due process mandates that a mens rea element be read into public safety statutes 
regulating the possession of unregistered firearms and the shipping of corrosive 
 
 
- 30 - 
liquids.  However, the matters involved in Freed and International Minerals—and 
even Balint—placed those cases squarely within the realm of traditional public 
welfare offenses regulating conduct of a particular nature.   
By contrast, in Staples, another decision cited by the majority, the Supreme 
Court declined to apply the public welfare rationale to the statute under review due 
in part to the fact that it imposed a penalty of up to ten years‘ imprisonment for a 
felony offense.  See 511 U.S. at 616-18.  Indeed, the Court in Staples specifically 
distinguished ―
the cases that first defined the concept of the public welfare 
offense,‖ which ―
almost uniformly involved statutes that provided for only light 
penalties such as fines or short jail sentences, not imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary.‖  Id. at 616. 
Unlike the possession or delivery of substances one does not know to be 
illicit (an innocent act), certain items of property regulated by public welfare 
statutes, such as unlicensed hand grenades (Freed), corrosive liquids (International 
Minerals), and legalized narcotics (Balint), by their very nature suggest that a 
reasonable person should know the item is subject to public regulation and may 
seriously threaten the community‘s health or safety.  See Liparota v. United States, 
471 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1985) (describing ―
public welfare offenses‖ as rendering 
―
criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to 
stringent public regulation or may seriously threaten the community‘s health or 
 
 
- 31 - 
safety‖ and citing Freed, International Materials, and Balint for support). 
Accordingly, Freed, International Minerals, and Balint are of limited 
precedential value because the Act at issue in the present case could not, in my 
view, be deemed a public welfare statute as that term has been used and imposes 
substantial felony penalties for drug-related offenses where the accused might be 
unaware of the illicit nature of the substance of which he or she is in possession.  
See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. at 497 (concluding that modern, anti-drug 
offenses could no longer be characterized as public welfare offenses); Dawkins, 
547 A.2d at 1047 (concluding that the prohibition against possessing a controlled 
dangerous substance, such as heroin or cocaine, ―
is regarded as a most serious 
offense,‖ the purpose of which was not to regulate conduct but to punish and deter 
behavior).  But see United States v. Bunton, No. 8:10-cr-327-T-30EAJ, 2011 WL 
5080307, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011) (concluding that because the criminal 
offenses enumerated in Florida‘s drug law are public welfare offenses, mens rea 
was not a required element). 
I recognize that ―
[t]here is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an 
offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.‖  
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).  This discretion is not unbridled, 
however.  The complementary principle is that legislative bodies must ―
act within 
any applicable constitutional constraints‖ when defining the elements of an 
 
 
- 32 - 
offense.  Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424 n.6; see also Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d at 518, 520.  
 Although neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other court ―
has 
undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for 
distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do 
not,‖ Staples, 511 U.S. at 620 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
260 (1952)), the requirement that an accused act with a culpable mental state is an 
axiom of criminal jurisprudence that must be emphasized.  As Justice Jackson 
stated when writing for the Supreme Court in Morissette: 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.  It is as 
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom 
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal 
individual to choose between good and evil.  A relation between some 
mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as 
instinctive as the child‘s familiar exculpatory ‗
But I didn‘t mean to,‘ 
and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished 
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and 
vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.  Unqualified 
acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth 
Century was indicated by Blackstone‘s sweeping statement that to 
constitute any crime there must first be a ‗
vicious will.‘  Common-law 
commentators of the Nineteenth Century early pronounced the same 
principle . . . . 
342 U.S. at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).   
Since Morissette, the Supreme Court has oft repeated that the ―
existence of a 
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence.‖  U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436 (quoting 
 
 
- 33 - 
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 500); see also Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (reciting the same).  
And in applying this principle, the Supreme Court has likewise recognized that 
offenses dispensing with mens rea are generally disfavored.  Staples, 511 U.S. at 
606.4  Therefore, the Supreme Court‘s reluctance to devise a precise line does not 
mean that limitations do not exist where the criminal laws of a state are non-
regulatory in nature and have the potential to subject a defendant to substantial 
punishment for conduct that might be entirely innocent or where the defendant 
lacks culpability. 
In fact, some state courts over the years have pointed out the constitutional 
dimension of mens rea when confronting drug laws similar to the one the Court 
addresses in this case, stressing that due process would prevent the sanctioning of 
blameless conduct.  See, e.g., State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 50-51 (La. 1980) 
(declaring a portion of a state statute criminalizing the ―
unknowing‖ possession of 
a dangerous controlled substance unconstitutional because there could be a 
circumstance where a conviction would result notwithstanding the accused never 
being aware of the nature of the substance); Walker v. State, 356 So. 2d 672, 674 
(Ala. 1977) (reading into the state‘s controlled substances statute a knowledge 
                                          
 
4.  In a similar vein, lower courts and contemporary scholars have 
characterized the guilty knowledge requirement as a fundamental tenet of criminal 
law.  See, e.g., Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. at 495-96; Garnett v. State, 632 
A.2d 797, 801 (Md. 1993). 
 
 
- 34 - 
component because ―
the desirability of efficient enforcement of regulatory statutes 
must give way to the traditional requirement that criminal sanction be imposed 
only for blameworthy conduct in order to comply with the requirements of due 
process of law‖).5 
Absent from the statutes addressed by the courts in Brown and Walker, 
however, was the availability of any affirmative defense like the one available 
under Florida‘s drug law.  Notably, the two states that have gone further than 
Florida by eliminating knowledge, including knowledge of possession, entirely 
from the offense of possession of a controlled substance—Washington and North 
Dakota—have recognized that allowing a defendant to raise the affirmative 
defense of lack of knowledge spares those state statutes from constitutional attack.  
                                          
 
5.  Professor LaFave, who is considered to be a leading authority in the area 
of criminal law, has also offered in his substantive criminal law treatise the 
observation that ―
some authority is to be found to the effect that a strict-liability 
criminal statute is unconstitutional if (1) the subject matter of the statute does not 
place it ‗
in a narrow class of public welfare offenses,‘ (2) the statute carries a 
substantial penalty of imprisonment, or (3) the statute imposes an unreasonable 
duty in terms of a person‘s responsibility to ascertain the relevant facts.‖  1 W. 
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.5(b) at 389-90 (2d ed. 2003) (footnotes 
omitted).  In addition, some federal precedent holds that a felony statute 
prescribing substantial penalties for conviction will subject the defendant to 
significant social stigma and violates due process unless it requires the State to 
prove intent or knowledge.  See, e.g., United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a felony provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
which did not require proof of scienter, violated due process because the crime was 
not one known at common law, had a maximum penalty of two years‘ 
imprisonment or fine of $2,000, and created a felony conviction that irreparably 
damages reputation). 
 
 
- 35 - 
See City of Kennewick v. Day, 11 P.3d 304, 309 (Wash. 2000) (observing that the 
―
unwitting possession defense is unique to Washington and North Dakota‖). 
Before the North Dakota law was amended to include willfulness,6 the state 
supreme court held that the pre-amended version of North Dakota‘s controlled 
substance law, which prohibited possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver, was constitutional despite imposing strict liability.  See State v. Michlitsch, 
438 N.W.2d 175, 178 (N.D. 1989).  In adhering to this conclusion that the 
Legislature intended the possession of a controlled substance and possession with 
intent to deliver to constitute strict liability offenses, the court did note that as 
applied, ―
it would be difficult to sustain these statutory provisions, the violation of 
which are punishable as felonies in many circumstances, against a constitutional 
attack when mounted by a person who possessed the controlled substance 
unwittingly.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, the court in Michlitsch held that an 
affirmative defense that the defendant unwittingly or unknowingly possessed the 
controlled substance was ―
a logical accommodation which recognizes the reasons 
for both the legislative designation of the crimes as strict liability offenses and the 
constitutional interests of the accused.‖  Id.; see also State v. Holte, 631 N.W.2d 
595, 599 (N.D. 2001) (holding that because it was possible for a person to be 
                                          
 
 
6.  See N.D. Cent. Code § 19-03.1-23 (2012); see also State v. Mittleider, 
809 N.W.2d 303, 306 (N.D. 2011). 
 
 
- 36 - 
convicted of the strict liability offense of violating a domestic violence protection 
order based on innocent or mistaken conduct, a Michlitsch-type affirmative 
defense instruction could be given under appropriate circumstances). 
Like the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the Supreme Court of Washington 
has rejected the argument that a mens rea element must be read into that state‘s 
drug possession statute.  See Bradshaw, 98 P.3d at 1195.  However, as in North 
Dakota, in Washington unwitting possession is an affirmative defense in simple 
possession cases because such a defense ―
ameliorates the harshness of the almost 
strict criminal liability [the] law imposes for unauthorized possession of a 
controlled substance.‖  State v. Cleppe, 635 P.2d 435, 439 (Wash. 1981) 
(reaffirmed by Bradshaw, 98 P.3d at 1195).  The affirmative defense in 
Washington ―
is supported by one of two alternative showings: (1) that the 
defendant did not know he was in possession of the controlled substance; or (2) 
that the defendant did not know the nature of the substance he possessed.‖  Day, 11 
P.3d at 310 (citations omitted). 
I agree with the reasoning of the North Dakota and Washington state courts.  
As has been articulated, it would be ―
fundamentally unsound to convict a 
defendant for a crime involving a substantial term of imprisonment without giving 
him the opportunity to prove that his action was due to an honest and reasonable 
mistake of fact or that he acted without guilty intent.‖  LaFave, supra § 5.5(d) at 
 
 
- 37 - 
393 n.51 (quoting Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 
55, 82 (1933)).  
An affirmative defense that affords the defendant with an opportunity to 
place his or her culpability at issue hampers the concerns of innocent 
criminalization and a violation of due process.  Similar to the judicially recognized 
affirmative defenses of mistake of fact in North Dakota and Washington, where the 
accused believes he or she possesses or is delivering an innocuous substance in 
Florida, the accused may—but is not required to—assert the affirmative defense 
enumerated under section 893.101(2), Florida Statutes (2011), of ―
lack of 
knowledge of the illicit nature‖ of the controlled substance.  Moreover, when this 
defense is asserted, the trial court must then instruct the jurors to find the defendant 
―
not guilty‖ if they ―h
ave a reasonable doubt on the question of whether [the 
defendant] knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance.‖  Fla. Std. Jury 
Instr. (Crim.) 25.2.  That is, if the defense is raised, the State has the burden to 
overcome the defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knew of the illicit nature of the substance.   
Therefore, although the Act is not a public welfare statute like the statutes 
reviewed in Balint, Freed, or International Minerals, and it imposes harsh penalties, 
this statutorily authorized affirmative defense, when read in conjunction with the 
applicable jury instruction, ameliorates the concern that the statute criminalizes 
 
 
- 38 - 
truly innocent conduct and saves the Act from a facial due process challenge.7  In 
short, the Act does not codify true strict liability crimes because the Legislature has 
expressly allowed the defendant to place his or her lack of knowledge of the illicit 
nature of the substance at issue as a complete defense. 
But, there is an important caveat.  Given that the jury is also permitted to 
presume the defendant was aware of the illicit nature of the controlled substance 
just because he or she was in possession of that substance, even when the 
affirmative defense is raised, see Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.2, I do not 
foreclose the possibility for a defendant to claim on an as-applied basis that his or 
her innocent possession of an illicit substance was criminalized.  A serious due 
process problem would be raised by application of the Act to this latter scenario.  
Cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (construing a statute to include mens rea, noting that 
                                          
 
 
7.  I emphasize that requiring the defendant to establish lack of knowledge 
of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, as opposed to requiring the State to 
prove the presence of such knowledge, does not impermissibly shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant.  A state cannot require a defendant to prove the absence of 
a fact necessary to constitute a crime, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684-
85, 701 (1975), and the State must prove each element of the charged crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).  
However, removing a component of mens rea from the offense does not amount to 
shifting the burden of proof; rather, the Legislature has chosen to redefine what 
conduct amounts to an offense under the Act.  See Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 
F.2d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that by removing the element of intent 
from a criminal statute, the state legislature did not impermissibly shift the burden 
of proof because the legislature simply redefined the conduct that violates the 
statute). 
 
 
- 39 - 
―
to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of 
apparently innocent conduct‖).  
In sum, I concur in upholding the statute against a facial challenge because 
the Act continues to require the State to prove knowledge of presence of the illicit 
controlled substance and authorizes an affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of 
the illicit nature of that substance.  However, I would not foreclose an as-applied 
challenge to the Act on due process grounds. 
 
PERRY, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent.  I cannot overstate my opposition to the majority‘s 
opinion.  In my view, it shatters bedrock constitutional principles and builds on a 
foundation of flawed ―
common sense.‖ 
Innocent Possession 
The majority pronounces that ―
common sense and experience‖ dictate that 
―
a person in possession of a controlled substance should be aware of the nature of 
the substance as an illegal drug‖ and further that, ―
[b]ecause controlled substances 
are valuable, common sense indicates that they are generally handled with care.  
As a result, possession without awareness of the illicit nature of the substance is 
highly unusual.‖  Majority op. at 18.   
But common sense to me dictates that the potential for innocent possession 
is not so ―
highly unusual‖ as the majority makes it out to be. 
 
 
- 40 - 
[T]he simple acts of possession and delivery are part of daily life.  
Each of us engages in actual possession of all that we have on our 
person and in our hands, and in constructive possession of all that we 
own, wherever it may be located.  Each of us engages in delivery 
when we hand a colleague a pen, a friend a cup of coffee, a stranger 
the parcel she just dropped. 
State v. Washington, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1129, 1133 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 
17, 2011) (footnote omitted), rev‘d, No. 3D11-2244 (Fla. 3d DCA June 27, 2012).  
―
[C]arrying luggage on and off of public transportation; carrying bags in and out of 
stores and buildings; carrying book bags and purses in schools and places of 
business and work; transporting boxes via commercial transportation—the list 
extends ad infinitum.‖  Shelton v. Sec‘y, Dep‘t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 
1305 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
Given this reality, ―
[i]t requires little imagination to visualize a situation in 
which a third party hands [a] controlled substance to an unknowing individual who 
then can be charged with and subsequently convicted . . . without ever being aware 
of the nature of the substance he was given.‖  State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 51 
(La. 1980) (finding that such a situation offends the conscience and concluding that 
―
the ‗
unknowing‘ possession of a dangerous drug cannot be made criminal‖).  For 
example, 
[c]onsider the student in whose book bag a classmate hastily stashes 
his drugs to avoid imminent detection.  The bag is then given to 
another for safekeeping.  Caught in the act, the hapless victim is guilty 
based upon the only two elements of the statute: delivery (actual, 
constructive, or attempted) and the illicit nature of the substance.  See 
 
 
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FLA. STAT. §§ 893.02(6), 893.13(1)(a).  The victim would be faced 
with the Hobson‘s choice of pleading guilty or going to trial where he 
is presumed guilty because he is in fact guilty of the two elements.  
He must then prove his innocence for lack of knowledge against the 
permissive presumption the statute imposes that he does in fact have 
guilty knowledge.  Such an outcome is not countenanced under 
applicable constitutional proscriptions. 
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.  The trial court order presently under review 
provides even more examples of innocent possession: a letter carrier who delivers 
a package containing unprescribed Adderall; a roommate who is unaware that the 
person who shares his apartment has hidden illegal drugs in the common areas of 
the home; a mother who carries a prescription pill bottle in her purse, unaware that 
the pills have been substituted for illegally obtained drugs by her teenage daughter, 
who placed them in the bottle to avoid detection.  State v. Adkins, Nos. 2011 CF 
002001, et al., slip op. at 14 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011). 
As the examples illustrate, even people who are normally diligent in 
inspecting and organizing their possessions may find themselves 
unexpectedly in violation of this law, and without the notice necessary 
to defend their rights.  The illegal drugs subject to the statute include 
tablets which can also be and are commonly and legally prescribed.  A 
medicine which is legally available, can be difficult for innocent 
parties to recognize as illegal, even if they think they know the 
contents.  For example, the mother of the teenage daughter carries the 
pill bottle, taking it at face value as a bottle for the pills it ought to 
contain, even during the traffic stop at which she consents to [a] 
search of her belongings, confident in her own innocence.  These 
examples represent incidents of innocence which should be protected 
by the requirement of [a] mens rea element, particularly given the 
serious penalties for the crime of drug possession required under 
Florida law.  
 
 
- 42 - 
Id. at 14-15.  Other examples of innocent possession spring easily and immediately 
to mind: a driver who rents a car in which a past passenger accidentally dropped a 
baggie of marijuana under the seat; a traveler who mistakenly retrieves from a 
luggage carousel a bag identical to her own containing Oxycodone; a helpful 
college student who drives a carload of a friend‘s possessions to the friend‘s new 
apartment, unaware that a stash of heroin is tucked within those possessions; an ex-
wife who is framed by an ex-husband who planted cocaine in her home in an effort 
to get the upper hand in a bitter custody dispute.  The list is endless. 
The majority nevertheless states that there is not ―
a protected right to be 
ignorant of the nature of the property in one‘s possession,‖ elaborating that  ―
 
‗
[c]ommon‘ sense tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become 
aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, unless they practice a studied 
ignorance to which they are not entitled.‖  Majority op. at 18 (quoting Turner v. 
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1970)).  But the above examples, and surely 
countless others, do not involve such a ―
studied ignorance.‖  Rather, they involve 
genuinely innocent citizens who will be snared in the overly broad net of section 
893.13.  And therein lies the point: 
Section 893.13 does not punish the drug dealer who possesses or 
delivers controlled substances.  It punishes anyone who possesses or 
delivers controlled substances—however inadvertently, however 
accidentally, however unintentionally. . . . What distinguishes 
innocent possession and innocent delivery from guilty possession and 
guilty delivery is not merely what we possess, not merely what we 
 
 
- 43 - 
deliver, but what we intend.  As to that—as to the state of mind that 
distinguishes non-culpable from culpable possession or delivery—     
§ 893.13 refuses to make a distinction.  The speckled flock and the 
clean are, for its purposes, all one. 
Washington, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 1133. 
Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof 
The majority rather cavalierly offers that, ―
[i]n the unusual circumstance 
where a person possesses a controlled substance inadvertently, establishing the 
affirmative defense available under section 893.101 will preclude the conviction of 
the defendant.‖  Majority op. at 22.  As discussed at length above, I do not agree 
that innocent possession is such an ―
unusual circumstance.‖  Moreover, the 
majority‘s passing reference to simply ―
establishing the affirmative defense‖ 
implies that it is an inconsequential and easy thing to do.  The majority further 
minimizes the enormity of the task, making it seem even friendly, in stating that 
―
[t]he affirmative defense does not ask the defendant to disprove something that 
the State must prove in order to convict, but instead provides a defendant with an 
opportunity to explain why his or her admittedly illegal conduct should not be 
punished.‖  Id. at 21.   
But the affirmative defense at issue is hardly a friendly opportunity; rather, it 
is an onerous burden that strips defendants—including genuinely innocent 
defendants—of their constitutional presumption of innocence.  ―
The principle that 
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, 
 
 
- 44 - 
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.‖  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 
(1895).  It is as ancient as it is profound:  
Numerius [was on trial and] contented himself with denying his guilt, 
and there was not sufficient proof against him.  His adversary, 
Delphidius, ―
a passionate man,‖ seeing that the failure of the 
accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and exclaimed, 
―
Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will 
become of the guilty?‖ to which Julian replied, ―
If it suffices to 
accuse, what will become of the innocent?‖ 
Id. at 455.  ―
What will become of the innocent?‖  The answer to that question in 
the present context is as inevitable as it is disturbing.  Under the majority‘s 
decision and the above examples, the innocent will from the start be presumed 
guilty.  The innocent will be deprived of their right to simply deny the charges and 
hold the State to its burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
innocent will instead be forced to assert an affirmative defense, whereupon ―
the 
possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise 
to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the 
substance.‖  § 893.101(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). 
The innocent will then have no realistic choice but to shoulder the burden of 
proof and present evidence to overcome that presumption.  See generally Stimus v. 
State, 995 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (recognizing that a defendant 
who raised an affirmative defense ―
had the burden to establish the defense and 
 
 
- 45 - 
present evidence‖ regarding same).  The innocent will thus have to bear the 
considerable time and expense involved in conducting discovery, calling witnesses, 
and otherwise crafting a case for their innocence—all while the State, with its 
vastly superior resources, should be bearing the burden of proving their guilt. 
The innocent will then hear their jury instructed on the permissive 
presumption that they knew of the illicit nature of the substance in question.  § 
893.101(3), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Finally, the innocent—in I fear far too  many 
cases—may be found guilty, convicted, and sentenced to up to life in prison.  See 
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (―
Sentences of fifteen years, thirty years, and life 
imprisonment [possible under section 893.13] are not by any measure ‗
relatively 
small.‘ ‖).   
Such convictions and sentences will be a disgrace when, on a profoundly 
foundational level, ―
the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape 
than that one innocent suffer.‖  Coffin, 156 U.S. at 456 (quoting 2 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *357).  The majority opinion breaks that sacred law 
and, as discussed below, threatens bedrock principles of the presumption of 
innocence and burden of proof in contexts well beyond the one at hand. 
Slippery Slope 
 
As in the present case, the effect of the trial court order in Washington 
would be the dismissal of charges against all the defendants at issue—―
the 
 
 
- 46 - 
overwhelming majority of whom may have known perfectly well that their acts of 
possession or delivery were contrary to law.‖  18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 1133. 
Viewed in that light, these movants are unworthy, utterly unworthy, of 
this windfall exoneration.  But as no less a constitutional scholar than 
Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, ―
It is easy to make light of 
insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties 
when invoked on behalf of the unworthy.  It is too easy.  History bears 
testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, 
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.‖   
Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)).  In this vein, the court in Shelton noted with some consternation that  
if the Florida legislature can by edict and without constitutional 
restriction eliminate the element of mens rea from a drug statute with 
penalties of this magnitude, it is hard to imagine what other statutes it 
could not similarly affect.  Could the legislature amend its murder 
statute such that the State could meet its burden of proving murder by 
proving that a Defendant touched another and the victim died as a 
result, leaving the Defendant to raise the absence of intent as a 
defense, overcoming a permissive presumption that murder was the 
Defendant‘s intent?  Could the state prove felony theft by proving that 
a Defendant was in possession of an item that belonged to another, 
leaving the Defendant to prove he did not take it, overcoming a 
permissive presumption that he did?  
802 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 n.12 (citation omitted); see also Norman L. Reimer, Focus 
on Florida: A Report and a Case Expose a Flawed Justice System, The Champion, 
Sept. 2011, at 7, 8 (―
The singularly extraordinary effort by the Florida Legislature 
to strip intent requirements from one of the most serious of felony offenses [under 
section 893.13] was an extreme example of the trend toward the dilution of intent 
requirements.‖) (footnote omitted).   Making similar observations, the court in 
 
 
- 47 - 
Washington lamented, ―
Oh brave new world!‖  18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 1134 
n.14. 
Conclusion 
―
Brave‖ indeed, in the most foreboding sense of that word.  The majority 
opinion sets alarming precedent, both in the context of section 893.13 and beyond.  
It makes neither legal nor common sense to me, offends all notions of due process, 
and threatens core principles of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof.  
I would find section 893.13 facially unconstitutional and affirm the trial court order 
under review. 
 
Certified Judgments of Trial Courts in and for Manatee County – Scott MacKenize 
Brownell, Judge - Case No. 2011CF002001 - An Appeal from the District Court of 
Appeal, Second District, Case No. 2D11-4559 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, John M. Klawikofsky, and Diana K. Bock, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Arthur I. Jacobs, General Counsel, and Yvonne R. Mizeras of Jacobs Scholz and 
Associates, LLC, Fernandina Beach, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Prosecuting 
Attorneys Association, Inc.; Honorable Nancy Daniels, President, Richard M. 
Summa and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, Florida, 
on behalf of Florida Public Defender Association, Inc.; Todd Foster of Cohen and 
Foster, P.A., Tampa, Florida, and David Oscar Markus of Markus and Markus, 
 
 
- 48 - 
Miami, Florida, on behalf of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Drug Policy Alliance, Cato Institute, 
Reason Foundation, and Libertarian Law Council; and Elliot H. Scherker of 
Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida and Karen M. Gottlieb, Coconut Grove, 
Florida, on behalf of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
Miami Chapter of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
 
 
As Amici Curiae