Title: Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97895, 97899
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 2005

Docket Nos. 97895, 97899 cons.-Agenda 8-May 
2005.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS 
et al., 
Appellees, v. LANDAU, OMAHANA &amp; KOPKA, LTD., et al., 
Appellants.
Opinion filed September 22, 2005.
 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians (NIEP), 
brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County against the law firms of 
Landau, Omahana &amp; Kopka, Ltd., and DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak, and two of the 
firms' attorneys alleging that the law firms had committed legal malpractice 
while representing NIEP in connection with a medical malpractice claim. The 
circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the law firms and their 
attorneys and against NIEP on the grounds that NIEP had sustained no damages as 
a matter of law and therefore could not establish a necessary element for a 
cause of action for legal malpractice. The appellate court reversed and 
remanded. No. 1-02-1218 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The law 
firms and their attorneys then petitioned our court for leave to appeal. 177 
Ill. 2d R. 315. We granted their petitions and consolidated the cases. For the 
reasons that follow, the cause of action against attorney Stephen J. Schostok is 
dismissed. As to all of the remaining attorneys, the judgment of the appellate 
court is reversed.
The events giving rise to these proceedings began 15 years 
ago, when Erica Johnson, a 22-month-old child, fell ill and was taken by her 
parents to the emergency room at St. Therese Medical Center in Waukegan. Erica 
was treated at the hospital by Dr. Bruce Sands, a partner in NIEP. Erica's 
symptoms included high fever, an elevated respiratory rate, a red rash, and a 
purple mark on the back of her neck and shoulder. Dr. Sands believed, 
erroneously, that Erica's symptoms were attributable to an ear infection and 
child abuse. He did not think the child was in any imminent danger. He therefore 
discharged her from the hospital and sent her home with her family, a syringe of 
antibiotics, and a prescription for more antibiotics.
In fact, Erica did not have an ear infection and was not 
the victim of child abuse. She was actually in shock and suffering from 
petechiae, purpura, and a bacterial infection known as meningococcemia. Her 
condition was life threatening, but could have been treated successfully had it 
been properly diagnosed. Because Dr. Sands failed to recognize her symptoms for 
what they were, however, Erica did not receive the care she required. Within 11 
hours of her discharge from St. Therese, Erica lapsed into a coma. Her parents 
took her to the emergency room of another hospital, but it was too late. Efforts 
at emergency resuscitation failed, and she was pronounced dead.
Erica's parents, as special administrators of Erica's 
estate, subsequently filed a medical malpractice action in the circuit court of 
Lake County against Dr. Sands, NIEP, and St. Therese Medical Center. St. 
Therese, in turn, filed a third-party claim for common law implied indemnity 
against Dr. Sands and NIEP based on vicarious liability.(1) 
Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Erica's parents and 
against all defendants in the amount of $4 million. On St. Therese's motion, the 
trial court then directed a verdict against Dr. Sands and NIEP and in favor of 
St. Therese on the medical center's indemnity claim.
St. Therese, Dr. Sands and NIEP all appealed, arguing that 
they should not have been held liable, that they were entitled to a new trial 
based on various errors committed by the trial judge, and that the jury's damage 
award was not supported by the evidence and was excessive. Dr. Sands further 
argued that the trial court should not have directed a verdict in favor of St. 
Therese on its claim for indemnity because that claim was filed beyond a 
deadline set by the circuit court and was barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitation and repose. The appellate court rejected these arguments and 
affirmed. Johnson v. Sands, Nos. 2-96-1479, 2-96-1480 cons. (1997) 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The appellate court's order affirming the circuit court's 
judgment was filed November 19, 1997. While that appeal was pending, Erica's 
parents initiated postjudgment collection proceedings against Sands and all but 
one of the other partners of NIEP. Sands filed for personal bankruptcy. The 
other partners named in the proceedings argued that their personal assets could 
not be reached because they had not been sued individually and the circuit 
court's judgment named only the partnership, not the individual partners. 
Although the circuit court rejected these arguments, the appellate court found 
them to be meritorious. It therefore reversed various orders entered by the 
circuit court holding NIEP's partners in contempt for failing to cooperate in 
the proceedings to discover their assets and requiring them to turn over their 
assets to Erica's parents. See Johnson v. St. Therese Medical Center, 
296 Ill. App. 3d 341 (1998).
Shortly before the appellate court filed its opinion in 
the collection case, St. Therese satisfied the judgment by paying Erica's 
parents the full $4 million awarded to them. Erica's parents acknowledged that 
payment by executing a release of the judgment as to St. Therese on April 20, 
1998. With that payment and the accompanying release, the involvement of Erica's 
parents in this litigation ended. The litigation itself did not.
When Dr. Sands treated Erica at St. Therese Medical 
Center, both he and NIEP were covered by professional liability insurance 
policies issued by Premier Alliance Insurance Company. Premier became insolvent 
in 1994, while the action filed by Erica's parents was still pending, and its 
obligations were assumed by the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (the Fund) in 
accordance with section 532 et seq. of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 
ILCS 5/532 et seq. (West 1994)). After judgment was entered in favor of 
Erica's parents and against Dr. Sands, NIEP, and St. Therese, the Fund brought a 
declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Cook County to obtain a 
determination as to its statutory obligation to indemnify Dr. Sands and NIEP. 
The circuit court ultimately determined that the Fund was required to indemnify 
Dr. Sands and NIEP for $300,000 each, the maximum authorized by the statute, 
making the Fund's total liability $600,000. That judgment was affirmed on 
appeal. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Sands, Nos. 1-98-2798, 
1-98-2803 cons. (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
While the Fund was litigating its statutory liability to 
Sands and NIEP, the partners who comprised NIEP, including Sands, brought a 
separate action for legal malpractice, individually and on behalf of the 
partnership, against the lawyers who had represented Sands and NIEP in the 
underlying medical malpractice case. That action, which gave rise to the present 
appeal, named as defendants the law firm of Landau, Omahana &amp; Kopka, Ltd.; 
Robert A. Bower, a lawyer then associated with Landau, Omahana &amp; Kopka, Ltd.;(2) the law firm of DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak; and 
Stephen Schostok, an attorney with DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak.(3)
According to the complaint, Bower and the firm of Landau, 
Omahana &amp; Kopka, Ltd., were hired by the Fund to represent Sands and NIEP in the 
medical malpractice case. Sands and NIEP, in turn, hired Schostok and the firm 
of DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak to represent them as additional counsel in that 
case. The NIEP partners claimed that they had meritorious defenses to the 
third-party indemnity action asserted against them by St. Therese Medical 
Center, specifically, that the indemnity claim was barred by the applicable 
periods of limitation and repose. According to the NIEP partners, however, the 
defendant lawyers neither moved for dismissal of the third-party complaint nor 
raised, as an affirmative defense, that the complaint was time-barred. The NIEP 
partners asserted that these omissions constituted a failure "to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence" required by the attorneys' professional 
obligations and damaged NIEP and its partners by allowing judgment to be entered 
against them on St. Therese's third-party claim. Accordingly, the NIEP partners 
sought recovery from the attorneys for $4 million, the full amount of the 
third-party judgment, plus interest.
NIEP's action for legal malpractice triggered a separate 
action by Landau, Omahana &amp; Kopka, Ltd., against St. Therese Medical Center. In 
its complaint, as amended, Landau, Omahana alleged that St. Therese had asserted 
its third-party complaint against NIEP and its partners merely to force the 
Fund, NIEP's insurer, to settle the case for a higher amount. According to 
Landau, Omahana, St. Therese had agreed, orally, that if it were successful in 
obtaining judgment on its third-party claim, it would not enforce that judgment 
against NIEP and its partners. Landau, Omahana's action sought to hold St. 
Therese to that oral promise.
Landau, Omahana's amended complaint was ultimately 
dismissed by the circuit court. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the 
law firm was neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of any agreement 
that may have been reached between St. Therese and the NIEP partners and 
therefore had no standing to enforce it. Landau, Omahana &amp; Kopka, Ltd. v. 
Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp., 323 Ill. App. 3d 487, 494 (2001). The 
question of whether an agreement not to enforce the indemnity judgment actually 
existed was not resolved.
As the Landau, Omahana litigation ran its unsuccessful 
course, the legal malpractice action filed by Sands and the other NIEP partners 
against Landau, Omahana; Robert Bower; DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak; and Stephen 
Schostok proceeded. The defendants in the malpractice action filed a combined 
motion to dismiss. That motion was granted as to Sands and the other individual 
partners of NIEP in May of 1999, leaving only the claims asserted by the NIEP 
partnership itself.
In July of 2001, more than three years after the legal 
malpractice lawsuit commenced, two separate motions for summary judgment were 
filed, one by Landau, Omahana and Robert Bower, the second by DiMonte, Schostok 
&amp; Lizak and Stephen Schostok. The Landau, Omahana motion asserted that it and 
Bower were entitled to judgment because NIEP had improperly assigned its 
malpractice claim to St. Therese. The motion further asserted that NIEP's 
malpractice claim could not be sustained, as a matter of law, because the 
partnership sustained no actual damages.
DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak's motion for summary judgment 
made the same arguments. In addition, it asserted that the firm breached no duty 
to NIEP or its partners because it did not actually serve as trial counsel for 
the partnership and played no role in the decision not to challenge St. 
Therese's indemnification claim as untimely. According to DiMonte, Schostok &amp; 
Lizak, it was retained simply to negotiate with the Fund on behalf of the 
partnership and protect the partnership's assets in the underlying medical 
malpractice action.
Both summary judgment motions were subsequently 
supplemented by the defendant attorneys. NIEP filed written responses to the 
motions. Landau, Omahana and Robert Bower, in turn, filed their own response to 
a motion for summary judgment that had been filed by NIEP a year earlier, but 
which remained pending.
Following a hearing, all of the pending summary judgment 
motions were denied. The law firms and attorneys moved for reconsideration. 
Following another hearing, their motions were granted. In an order filed 
February 13, 2002, the circuit court reversed its position and entered summary 
judgment in favor of the law firms and attorneys and against NIEP. That decision 
was founded on the fact NIEP had never had to pay St. Therese and St. Therese 
had never attempted to collect the indemnity judgment. Because NIEP had paid 
nothing to St. Therese, the court reasoned that the attorneys' alleged 
malpractice could not be said to have caused any actual damage to the 
partnership. Without such actual damages, the court believed, no action for 
legal malpractice could lie.
NIEP moved for reconsideration. That motion was denied. 
NIEP then appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. Rejecting the view taken by the circuit court, the appellate court 
held that payment of the indemnity judgment was not a prerequisite to NIEP's 
legal malpractice action. In the appellate court's view, the fact that the 
indemnity judgment had been entered and remained outstanding "could constitute 
proof of actual damages as a result of [the lawyers'] alleged negligence, absent 
any evidence to the contrary" and raised a genuine issue of material fact, 
precluding summary judgment on the legal malpractice claim. No. 1-02-1218 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The appellate court further held that NIEP's negligence 
claim could not be barred on the grounds that it was part of an impermissible 
scheme to assign a malpractice claim in violation of Illinois law. In addition, 
the court rejected an argument advanced by DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak and Stephen 
Schostok that NIEP's action is premature. The court likewise found no merit to 
the lawyers' alternative claim that DiMonte, Schostok &amp; Lizak was not 
responsible for NIEP's damages, as a matter of law, because NIEP had not 
retained the firm as trial counsel and it had no authority to control the 
litigation with respect to St. Therese's indemnity claim. Citing deposition 
testimony from Dr. Sands that refuted the lawyers' characterization of their 
role in the case, the appellate court held that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the scope of Schostok's responsibility. No. 1-02-1218 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Landau, Omahana and Robert Bower petitioned for leave to 
appeal. A separate petition for leave to appeal was filed by DiMonte, Schostok &amp; 
Lizak and Stephen Schostok. We granted both petitions and, on a joint motion 
filed by the attorneys, consolidated the cases for briefing, argument and a 
decision on the merits.
On this appeal, the lawyers assert that the appellate 
court's judgment should be reversed for two reasons: (1) the circuit court 
correctly held that NIEP had not sustained any actual damages as a result of the 
attorneys' alleged negligence and therefore could not assert a claim against 
them for legal malpractice; and (2) if the appellate court's decision is allowed 
to stand and NIEP subsequently prevails against the lawyers on the merits, any 
recovery obtained by NIEP would contravene public policy because, if the damage 
award were retained by NIEP, the partnership would obtain a windfall and be 
unjustly enriched. Alternatively, if NIEP handed the award over to St. Therese, 
the partnership would violate the prohibition against the assignment of 
malpractice claims.
Where, as here, an appeal arises from the reversal of a 
circuit court's order granting summary judgment, our standard of review is 
de novo. Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 315 (2004). In undertaking such review, our function is to determine 
whether the court reached the proper result. The reasons given by the court for 
its decision or the findings on which its decision is based are not material if 
the judgment is correct. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 
491-92 (2003). Accordingly, we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any 
basis appearing in the record, regardless of whether the lower courts relied 
upon that ground. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d  at 315.
The standards governing summary judgment motions are well 
established. The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, 
but to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adams v. 
Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004). Summary judgment 
is proper where, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. General Casualty Insurance Co. v. 
Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284 (2002).
Because summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing 
of litigation, a court must exercise extraordinary diligence in reviewing the 
record so as not to preempt a party's right to fully present the factual basis 
for its claim. See Sullivan's Wholesale Drug Co. v. Faryl's Pharmacy, Inc., 
214 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1077 (1991). At the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs 
are not required to prove their cases. Allegro Services, Ltd. v. 
Metropolitan Pier &amp; Exposition Authority, 172 Ill. 2d 243, 256 (1996). 
Although summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff cannot establish an 
element of his claim (Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001)), 
it should only be granted when the right of the moving party is clear and free 
from doubt (Dowd &amp; Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483 (1998)).
In the matter before us today, NIEP's action against the 
defendant lawyers alleges legal malpractice. To prevail on a legal malpractice 
claim, the plaintiff client must plead and prove that the defendant attorneys 
owed the client a duty of due care arising from the attorney-client 
relationship, that the defendants breached that duty, and that as a proximate 
result, the client suffered injury. Sexton v. Smith, 112 Ill. 2d 187, 
193 (1986).
The injury in a legal malpractice action is not a personal 
injury (Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 411 (1999)), nor is it the 
attorney's negligent act itself (Palmros v. Barcelona, 284 Ill. App. 3d 
642, 646 (1996)). Rather, it is a pecuniary injury to an intangible property 
interest caused by the lawyer's negligent act or omission. See Eastman, 
188 Ill. 2d  at 411; Palmros v. Barcelona, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 646. For 
purposes of a legal malpractice action, a client is not considered to be injured 
unless and until he has suffered a loss for which he may seek monetary damages. 
See Griffin v. Goldenhersh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 398, 407 (2001). The fact 
that the attorney may have breached his duty of care is not, in itself, 
sufficient to sustain the client's cause of action. Even if negligence on the 
part of the attorney is established, no action will lie against the attorney 
unless that negligence proximately caused damage to the client. See Metrick 
v. Chatz, 266 Ill. App. 3d 649, 654 (1994). The existence of actual damages 
is therefore essential to a viable cause of action for legal malpractice. See
Palmros v. Barcelona, 284 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646 (1996).
In a legal malpractice action, actual damages are never 
presumed. See Griffin, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 404. Such damages must be 
affirmatively established by the aggrieved client. Eastman, 188 Ill. 2d  
at 411. Unless the client can demonstrate that he has sustained a monetary loss 
as the result of some negligent act on the lawyer's part, his cause of action 
cannot succeed. See Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Gamble, 197 Ill. 
App. 3d 101, 103 (1990).
Making that demonstration requires more than supposition 
or conjecture. Where the mere possibility of harm exists or damages are 
otherwise speculative, actual damages are absent and no cause of action for 
malpractice yet exists. See Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel &amp; Stouffer, 
Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353 (1998). Damages are considered to be 
speculative, however, only if their existence itself is uncertain, not if the 
amount is uncertain or yet to be fully determined. Profit Management 
Development, Inc. v. Jacobson, Brandvik &amp; Anderson, Ltd., 309 Ill. App. 3d 
289, 309 (1999).
Our appellate court has held that where an attorney has 
been engaged to defend an action and the action is lost through the attorney's 
negligence, the amount of the judgment suffered by the client is, generally, a 
proper element of recovery in a malpractice proceeding against the attorney. See
Gruse v. Belline, 138 Ill. App. 3d 689, 698 (1985). Based on that 
precedent, NIEP asserts that the $4 million judgment entered against it on St. 
Therese's indemnity claim is sufficient to satisfy the damage requirement for 
its malpractice claim against the defendant lawyers. Although NIEP has never 
been asked to pay that judgment and St. Therese has never attempted to enforce 
it, NIEP contends that under Gruse, an adverse judgment can constitute 
evidence of actual damage even when the judgment remains unpaid at the time the 
malpractice claim is tried. See Gruse, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 698.
The defendant attorneys oppose that position, arguing that 
the indemnity judgment itself is not sufficient to establish NIEP's damages. In 
their view, the partnership's damages must be measured by the amount the 
partnership actually paid toward satisfaction of the judgment. As we have 
already indicated, that amount is zero. NIEP has paid nothing to St. Therese and 
St. Therese has never attempted to collect on the judgment. The defendant 
attorneys argue, moreover, that because NIEP transferred all of its significant 
assets to a successor partnership and had been reduced to an empty shell by the 
time the indemnity judgment was entered, any future attempt to enforce that 
judgment would have no adverse consequences for the partnership. As a practical 
matter, it is now judgment proof.
In support of their position, the defendant attorneys look 
to our appellate court's decision in Sterling Radio Stations, Inc. v. 
Weinstine, 328 Ill. App. 3d 58 (2002). That case involved a legal 
malpractice action in which the plaintiff sought damages from attorneys he had 
hired to defend him in an action seeking payment on a promissory note the 
plaintiff had guaranteed. After judgment was entered against the plaintiff on 
the guarantee, plaintiff hired new lawyers to appeal the judgment at a cost of 
$100,000. The appeal was unsuccessful, but a settlement agreement was ultimately 
reached under which the plaintiff's liability was extinguished through payments 
made on his behalf by another party. As a result of that agreement, the 
plaintiff was not required to pay any part of the judgment out of his own 
pocket. The $100,000 in attorney fees he incurred in his unsuccessful appeal 
did, however, remain his responsibility.
The defendant attorneys in the malpractice action moved 
for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that because the plaintiff had 
paid nothing himself toward the underlying judgment, he could not be said to 
have suffered any damages and therefore did not have a legally cognizable claim 
against the attorneys for malpractice. The circuit court agreed and granted 
summary judgment in the attorneys' favor. The appellate court reversed in part, 
holding that the $100,000 in attorney fees paid by plaintiff in his unsuccessful 
bid, on appeal, to avoid the consequences of the defendant attorneys' actions 
should be considered damages. With respect to the monies paid in satisfaction of 
the underlying judgment, however, the appellate court agreed with the circuit 
court that because those sums had been paid by another party and not the 
plaintiff personally, the plaintiff could not claim them as damages. To hold 
otherwise, the appellate court reasoned, would unjustly enrich the plaintiff, 
permit him to obtain a double recovery, and place him in a better position by 
bringing the malpractice action than he would have occupied had he prevailed in 
the underlying action. Sterling Radio Stationse, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 
65.
In the case before us here, the appellate court found 
Sterling Radio Stations to be inapposite because, unlike Gruse,
Sterling did not speak to the issue of whether unsatisfied judgments 
can constitute actual damages in legal malpractice actions. Rather, it addressed 
the separate question of whether benefits received by an injured party from a 
source independent of and collateral to the torfeasor will diminish the damages 
the injured party could otherwise recover from the tortfeasor. That question is 
not at issue here, the appellate court held, for no payments have been made 
toward the judgment by a third party. The $4 million indemnity judgment obtained 
by St. Therese against NIEP has not been satisfied and remains outstanding. No. 
1-02-1218 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The defendant attorneys in this case argue that the 
appellate court misinterpreted and misapplied both Sterling Radio Stations 
and Gruse. They also assert that the appellate court failed to properly 
apply the standards for summary judgment. Specifically, they contend that 
because the materials they adduced in support of their motion showed that NIEP 
had not been compelled to pay the indemnity judgment and was unlikely to ever 
actually pay that judgment, the burden should have shifted to NIEP to produce 
some factual basis to show that it suffered pecuniary injury and was entitled to 
judgment in its favor. According to the attorneys, that did not happen. The 
appellate court permitted NIEP's action to proceed based on nothing more than 
the existence of the adverse indemnity judgment. In the attorneys' view, that 
was improper.
We agree with the defendant attorneys that the appellate 
court erred in reversing the circuit court's order granting summary judgment and 
allowing NIEP's malpractice claim to go forward. In our view, however, the flaw 
in the appellate court's judgment is not related to shifting burdens of 
production, nor does it turn on whether the existence of an unsatisfied judgment 
is sufficient, in and of itself, to withstand a challenge to the damages element 
of a legal malpractice claim on a motion for summary judgment. The problem with 
the appellate court's disposition is that it fails to take into account the 
actual effect of the indemnity judgment under the facts of this case.
St. Therese's third-party indemnity action did not create 
the $4 million damage claim NIEP is presently facing. NIEP is responsible for 
those damages because of the medical malpractice committed by Bruce Sands, one 
of its partners. NIEP became responsible for those damages after the jury found 
it liable for the acts and omissions by Dr. Sands which resulted in Erica 
Johnson's death. Pursuant to the jury's verdict, on which the circuit court 
entered judgment, NIEP was jointly and severally liable for all damages awarded 
to Erica's parents. Because NIEP was jointly and severally liable, Erica's 
parents could have sought full satisfaction of the judgment from NIEP alone. See
Prince v. Atchison, Topeka &amp; Santa Fe Ry. Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 898, 909 
(1979). In other words, Erica's parents could have proceeded against NIEP 
directly for the entire $4 million judgment.
Because NIEP was already liable for the entire $4 million 
judgment, entry of the indemnity judgment against it on St. Therese's 
third-party action did not impose any greater burden on the partnership than it 
already faced. The indemnity judgment's only effect was to change the party to 
whom the $4 million was owed. When judgment was entered on the underlying 
medical malpractice action, NIEP was liable to Erica's parents. When judgment 
was entered on St. Therese's indemnity claim and St. Therese satisfied the 
malpractice judgment, NIEP's liability shifted to St. Therese. In each case, 
however, the amount NIEP owed remained exactly the same. The acts or omissions 
of NIEP's lawyers in defending against the indemnity claim therefore did not 
place NIEP in any worse position than it was already in. That being so, their 
alleged negligence cannot be said to have proximately caused any injury to the 
partnership.
When this was pointed out to NIEP's counsel during oral 
argument, counsel responded by suggesting that the $4 million judgment in the 
underlying medical malpractice case could not be considered as harming NIEP 
because Erica's parents would not have looked to anyone other than St. Therese 
to collect the judgment. If the medical center had not voluntarily paid the 
judgment, counsel's theory was that the parents would have attempted to execute 
the judgment against it (i.e., St. Therese), not the other defendants. 
For NIEP, the $4 million judgment in the medical malpractice action therefore 
had no practical effect.
This argument is untenable for several reasons. First, it 
is not supported by the facts. Contrary to counsel's speculation, St. Therese is 
not the first and only defendant Erica's parents would have looked towards to 
enforce the judgment. The record plainly shows that Erica's parents' initial 
collection efforts were actually directed to the NIEP partners, not St. Therese.
The claim that Erica's parents would never have sought to 
collect from NIEP is also flawed because it presupposes that proceeding against 
that entity would have been futile because the partnership had nothing from 
which the judgment could be satisfied. Clearly, however, St. Therese did not 
believe that seeking recourse from NIEP was fruitless. That is why it filed and 
prosecuted an implied indemnity claim. Whatever resources were available to meet 
St. Therese's claim were equally available to Erica's parents. Accordingly, if 
St. Therese thought action against NIEP was worthwhile, there is no reason to 
believe that Erica's parents would not have made the same assumption. Indeed, if 
Erica's parents had not considered NIEP to be a viable target, they would have 
had no reason to include it among the parties they named as defendants.
Finally, counsel's argument is inconsistent with the 
position NIEP is taking with respect to St. Therese's indemnity judgment. If, as 
NIEP contends, the existence of the indemnity judgment, standing alone, is 
sufficient to constitute legally cognizable damage even though the judgment has 
never been enforced against NIEP, it must also be true that the existence of the 
underlying malpractice judgment, standing alone, was sufficient to constitute 
legally cognizable damage prior to its satisfaction by St. Therese even though 
the judgment was not enforced against NIEP. The situations are parallel. The 
magnitude of the harm was the same. It therefore cannot be said that one 
judgment was any more onerous than the other. Correspondingly, entry of the 
indemnity judgment cannot be said to have made NIEP any worse off than it was 
when the jury returned the $4 million verdict against it on the underlying 
medical malpractice claim.
It is true that if NIEP's lawyers had mounted a successful 
challenge to St. Therese's third-party action, St. Therese could not have 
obtained indemnity from NIEP. The only circumstance under which the absence of 
the indemnity judgment would benefit NIEP, however, is if St. Therese were 
willing to voluntarily pay the full amount of the judgment to Erica's parents 
before Erica's parents initiated collection proceedings against NIEP directly.(4) Under that scenario, NIEP would be relieved of 
any further financial responsibility to Erica's parents, for the parents, having 
once obtained full satisfaction of the judgment, could not look elsewhere to 
collect it again. As a result, NIEP would evade liability completely.
The problem with this scenario is that it suffers from the 
same impediment as the argument we just discussed: it has no basis in fact. For 
St. Therese to voluntarily assume the full burden of the judgment without first 
seeing whether Erica's parents would look elsewhere to satisfy the judgment 
would be contrary to the medical center's own financial interests and 
inconsistent with its view of who was ultimately responsible for Erica Johnson's 
death. St. Therese certainly did nothing like that here. It made no payments 
until after collection proceedings against the NIEP partners had reached the 
appellate court. There is nothing in reason or the record to suggest that it 
would have acted any differently had its indemnity action against NIEP been 
successfully challenged. To postulate damages based on this sequence of events 
would therefore be entirely hypothetical. That is fatal to NIEP's position, for 
as we noted earlier in this opinion, a cause of action for malpractice cannot be 
sustained where the mere possibility of harm exists or the damages are otherwise 
speculative.
Under these circumstances, NIEP has no grounds for 
claiming that the defendant attorneys' failure to challenge the timeliness of 
St. Therese's indemnity action had adverse consequences for the partnership. 
Even if the attorneys had succeeded in defeating the indemnity claim as 
time-barred, NIEP's situation would be unchanged. It would still have been 
liable for $4 million in damages. The only difference, as we have already noted, 
is that it would have owed those damages directly to Erica's parents rather than 
to St. Therese. A mere change in the identity of the judgment creditor, without 
more, entails no quantifiable damages. It is therefore insufficient to meet the 
requirement of actual damages necessary to sustain a cause of action for legal 
malpractice. Accordingly, the circuit court was correct in granting the motion 
for summary judgment filed by the defendant attorneys in this case. Its judgment 
should not have been overturned by the appellate court. In light of this 
conclusion, we need not reach the attorneys' additional argument that allowing 
NIEP to recovery on its legal malpractice claim would contravene public policy.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit 
court is affirmed and the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. As to 
defendant Stephen J. Schostok, who is now deceased, NIEP's cause of action is 
dismissed.



Circuit court judgment affirmed;
appellate court judgment reversed;
cause dismissed in part.
1.  1For a discussion of the continued viability of implied 
indemnity claims following enactment of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act 
(740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)), see American National Bank &amp; 
Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 154 Ill. 2d 347 (1992).

2.  2Public records maintained by the Attorney Registration 
and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) show that Bower left Landau, Omahana &amp; Kopka 
and is now a member of the firm Tucker, Bower, Rubin &amp; Merker, LLP.
3.  3ARDC records disclose that Stephen J. Schostok is now 
deceased. Actions for professional malpractice do not abate with the death of a 
defendant attorney. See Beastall v. Madson, 235 Ill. App. 3d 95, 99 
(1992); McGill v. Lazzaro, 62 Ill. App. 3d 151, 154 (1978). Another party 
may be substituted for the decedent by order of court upon motion for purposes 
of defending the action. See 735 ILCS 5/21008(b) (West 2004); 155 Ill. 2d R. 
366(a)(2). The record before us gives no indication that a motion to substitute 
has ever been filed. The action shall therefore be dismissed as to Schostok. 735 
ILCS 5/21008(b) (West 2004). It shall proceed with respect to the remaining 
parties.
4.  4Obtaining dismissal of the indemnity claim would yield 
no benefit to NIEP if St. Therese were unwilling to satisfy the judgment prior 
to the instigation of collection proceedings against NIEP by Erica's parents 
because defending against the parents' collection action would entail the same 
burdens and subject NIEP to the same amount of damages as St. Therese's 
indemnity action would have. NIEP's position would be unchanged. Again, from 
NIEP's perspective, the only difference would be the identity of the party 
pursuing collection of the judgment.