Title: Commonwealth v. Campbell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11980
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 2016

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SJC-11980 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMIL J. CAMPBELL. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 10, 2016. - September 30, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, 
JJ.1 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operation, Permission to operate, Unauthorized 
use.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable 
cause.  Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Inevitable 
discovery, Motor vehicle.  Probable Cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on August 19, 2013. 
 
 
After transfer to the Central Division, a pretrial motion 
to suppress evidence was heard by Charles R. Johnson, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the case was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (Aditi Goel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
with her) for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  On August 17, 2013, at approximately 4:30 P.M., 
Trooper Thomas Hannon of the State police stopped a vehicle 
driven by the defendant for failing to stop at a stop sign.  The 
vehicle had been rented by the defendant's mother, who has a 
last name that is different from the defendant's.  Upon request, 
the defendant provided Hannon with a valid driver's license and 
the rental agreement.  The agreement listed only the mother as 
the renter and stated, "[N]o other drivers permitted."  Hannon 
concluded that the defendant was using the vehicle without 
authority, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), which 
makes it illegal to "use[] a motor vehicle without authority 
knowing that such use is unauthorized."  Accordingly, he decided 
to impound the vehicle.  During an inventory search in 
preparation for impoundment, a loaded handgun and a box of 
ammunition were seized from the vehicle.  The Commonwealth 
maintains that, upon learning of the seizures, the defendant 
made incriminating statements to police. 
 
This case is before us on the Commonwealth's interlocutory 
appeal from a Boston Municipal Court judge's order allowing the 
defendant's motion to suppress the handgun, the ammunition, and 
statements he made to police.  We conclude that the inventory 
3 
 
 
search was unlawful under the circumstances, and therefore 
affirm the allowance of the motion to suppress. 
 
Background and prior proceedings.  The defendant was 
arrested on August 17, 2013, and charged with unlawful 
possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); unlawful 
possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  He also was given a civil citation 
for failure to stop at a stop sign, G. L. c. 89, § 9.  At an 
evidentiary hearing on May 14, 2014, a judge of the Boston 
Municipal Court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, 
including Hannon, Trooper John McCarthy of the State police, and 
the defendant. 
 
Hannon testified as follows.  On the day of the seizure, he 
was monitoring the flow of traffic at the Heath Street rotary in 
the Roxbury section of Boston.  He explained that there had been 
several instances of recent violence in the area, including 
shootings and gang-related incidents.  When Hannon saw the 
defendant's vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign, he stopped the 
vehicle on Heath Street in a residential area, where the 
defendant provided his driver's license and the rental 
4 
 
 
agreement.2  Other than the fact that the defendant's name was 
not on the rental agreement, Hannon had no basis to believe that 
the vehicle was stolen -- the defendant had a key for the 
vehicle, the defendant's license was valid, and the vehicle 
appeared to be in good condition.  In addition, there was no 
evidence suggesting that the rental period for the vehicle had 
expired, or that the vehicle had been reported stolen.  The 
defendant did not appear to Hannon to be nervous, never made any 
furtive or threatening gestures, and was generally cooperative. 
 
Hannon did not remember asking the defendant during the 
traffic stop whether he knew the person whose name was on the 
rental agreement, or if that person had given him permission to 
drive the vehicle.  Hannon stated that he did not attempt to 
contact the rental car company to determine whether the 
defendant was authorized to drive the vehicle, and did not 
recall whether a civilian dispatcher had telephoned on his 
behalf.  Nonetheless, because the defendant's name was not on 
the rental agreement, Hannon informed the defendant that the 
vehicle was going to be impounded for unauthorized use.  
Although Hannon had not yet decided whether he would place the 
defendant under arrest, he placed the defendant in the rear 
                     
 
2 Only the first page of the rental agreement is in the 
record.  The agreement apparently is four pages long. 
5 
 
 
passenger seat of his police cruiser, uncuffed, and initiated an 
inventory search of the rental vehicle. 
 
Hannon further testified that he found the handgun in the 
center console during that search.  At that point, he informed 
the defendant of the Miranda rights and asked whether the 
defendant had a license to carry the weapon.  According to 
Hannon, the defendant then stated, "No.  I got problems with 
some dudes and bought the gun on the street for my protection."  
Hannon also said that, at some point during the stop, he learned 
from a police dispatcher that there was a default warrant for 
the defendant for failing to appear for jury duty. 
 
McCarthy testified that he arrived at the scene after 
hearing a request for assistance on his police radio, and saw 
the defendant sitting handcuffed in Hannon's cruiser.3  McCarthy 
then found the box of ammunition in the rental vehicle.  
McCarthy testified that he told the defendant that he had an 
outstanding warrant for failure to appear for jury duty, and 
that the defendant told him in response that he had purchased 
the firearm to protect himself. 
 
The defendant, on the other hand, testified that he told 
Hannon that his mother had rented the vehicle and had given him 
permission to use it.  The defendant also testified that Hannon 
                     
 
3 The defendant apparently already had been arrested for 
unlawful possession of the loaded handgun by the time McCarthy 
arrived. 
6 
 
 
had spoken with the defendant's mother on the telephone during 
the traffic stop, and that the defendant's mother told the 
trooper that the defendant had permission to drive the vehicle.  
The defendant denied knowing that there was a firearm in the 
vehicle, and stated that he did not recall what he had said to 
police during the stop.  The defendant also denied that he had 
been informed of the Miranda rights until he was under arrest 
and being driven to the State police barracks.  He testified 
that he said nothing to police after being informed of those 
rights. 
 
The motion judge allowed the defendant's motion to suppress 
in a handwritten, signed order that was dated July 1, 2014.  The 
judge wrote, 
 
"Allowed:  Trooper Hannon lawfully stopped [the 
defendant's] vehicle for failure to stop it at a posted 
stop sign as required by law.  However, the absence of [the 
defendant's] name on the [rental] agreement without more is 
not sufficient justification under the circumstances 
presented for the arrest of [the defendant] for "[u]se 
without authority" or any of the other consequences which 
befell [the defendant] as a result of the traffic stop by 
[the trooper].  The gun, ammunition and the statements made 
by [the defendant] should be suppressed and not admitted at 
trial." 
 
On July 5, 2014, the motion judge retired, and the case was 
assigned to another judge for trial.  The motion judge's 
suppression order was entered on July 11, 2014. 
 
On July 18, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a motion to vacate 
the suppression order on the ground that the order was entered 
7 
 
 
after the motion judge's retirement.  On August 4, 2014, the 
Commonwealth filed an application in the county court for leave 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996), and G. L. 
c. 278, § 28E.  The following day, the Commonwealth withdrew its 
motion to vacate the suppression order.  On September 2, 2014, a 
single justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth's 
application for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal in the 
Appeals Court.  Thereafter we allowed the defendant's 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  In reviewing an order allowing a motion to 
suppress, we consider "the facts found or implicitly credited by 
the motion judge, supplemented by additional undisputed facts 
where they do not detract from the judge's ultimate findings."  
Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015).  We 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error, "but conduct an independent review of [the judge's] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law."  Id. at 129, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).  "[O]ur duty 
is to make an independent determination of the correctness of 
the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found."  Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 
(1996). 
8 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth contests the motion judge's conclusion 
that the inventory search of the vehicle was unlawful.  Whether 
an inventory search is lawful "is contingent on the propriety of 
the impoundment of the [vehicle]."  Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 
474 Mass. 10, 13 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Brinson, 440 
Mass. 609, 612 (2003).  The appropriateness of impoundment, in 
turn, is guided by a "touchstone of reasonableness."  
Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 109 n.12 (2011).4  
Where police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle is 
being operated illegally, impoundment may be appropriate in some 
circumstances even if the driver is not under arrest.  See 
Commonwealth v. Daley, 423 Mass. 747, 750 (1996) ("Here, the 
fact that the defendant was not under arrest is irrelevant to 
the propriety of the impoundment because the vehicle at issue 
was unregistered, uninsured, and had attached plates belonging 
to another vehicle").5  Even so, "an inventory search must not be 
a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover 
                     
 
4 The decision to impound a vehicle also must be made in 
accordance with standard, written police operating procedures in 
order to comply with art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 108 n.11 
(2011), citing Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, 430 Mass. 769, 773 n.8 
(2000). 
 
 
5 See also G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a) ("A summons may be 
issued instead of a warrant for arrest upon a complaint for [use 
without authority] if in the judgment of the court or justice 
receiving the complaint there is reason to believe that the 
defendant will appear upon a summons"). 
9 
 
 
incriminating evidence."  Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 
(1990).  The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the 
propriety of the impoundment.  See Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 
Mass. 24, 28 (2014). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that impoundment was appropriate 
here because Hannon had probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was using the vehicle without authority, in violation 
of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).6  In the alternative, the 
Commonwealth argues that impoundment otherwise would have been 
appropriate based on the default warrant, and that the 
defendant's motion to suppress therefore should have been denied 
pursuant to the inevitable discovery rule.  We address each 
argument in turn.7 
 
1.  Use without authority.  Although there was conflicting 
testimony at the motion hearing regarding the extent to which 
Hannon investigated the defendant's authority to drive the 
                     
 
6 On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts, and the defendant 
does not dispute, that there was probable cause for the initial 
traffic stop. 
 
 
7 The Commonwealth additionally seeks a new evidentiary 
hearing, arguing that the suppression order at issue is not 
valid because it was entered after the motion judge's 
retirement.  This argument is without basis.  See Nessralla v. 
Peck, 403 Mass. 757, 761 (1989) (handwritten order signed before 
judge's retirement is valid although not issued in final form 
until after retirement).  In any event, the argument has been 
waived; the Commonwealth withdrew its motion in the Boston 
Municipal Court to vacate the suppression order on August 5, 
2014, the day after it sought leave to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015). 
10 
 
 
vehicle at the time of the stop, we infer from the written order 
that the judge found that the trooper decided to impound the 
vehicle based solely on the absence of the defendant's name on 
the rental agreement and the fact that the agreement stated 
explicitly that no other drivers were permitted besides the 
listed renter.  Given the testimony described above, that 
finding was not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we consider 
whether that information on its own supplied probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was using the vehicle without 
authority, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). 
 
a.  Statutory construction.  General Laws c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a), provides, in relevant part, "whoever uses a motor 
vehicle without authority knowing that such use is unauthorized 
shall . . . be punished."  The crime comprises at least four 
distinct elements:  (1) use; (2) of a motor vehicle; (3) without 
authority; (4) knowing that such use is unauthorized.  See 
Commonwealth v. Giannino, 371 Mass. 700, 702 (1977).8  The 
Commonwealth argues that, in the rental context, the rental 
company, not the renter, must provide the requisite authority to 
                     
 
8 We also previously have required the Commonwealth to 
establish that the use at issue took place "in a public way."  
See Commonwealth v. Giannino, 371 Mass. 700, 702 (1977).  But 
see Commonwealth v. Morris M., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 696 (2007) 
(concluding that "public way" is not element of crime of use 
without authority). 
 
11 
 
 
use its vehicle if the rental agreement only permits use by 
listed drivers. 
 
This court has not yet considered what constitutes use of a 
rental vehicle "without authority" pursuant to G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a).9  Looking first to the plain meaning of the 
statute, see Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 660 
(2016), we note that G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), is silent 
regarding the meaning of "authority" or who can provide it.  
Accordingly, we interpret the word "authority" in light of its 
"usual and accepted meaning[]."  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 
Mass. 118, 124 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 
372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  Recent dictionary definitions for 
"authority" include "a power or right delegated or given," 
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 139 (2003), 
"[p]ower assigned to another," The American Heritage Dictionary 
                     
 
9 The Appeals Court has suggested on several occasions that 
only a driver authorized under the express terms of a rental 
agreement may drive a rental vehicle without violating G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 
Mass. App. Ct. 322, 326 n.4 (2011) (assuming in dicta that 
"[o]nly the rental company could authorize the defendant to 
drive the vehicle"); Commonwealth v. Watts, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 
514, 518 (2009) (noting in dicta that police could have 
impounded rental vehicle after learning during traffic stop that 
driver's rental agreement had expired); Commonwealth v. Henley, 
63 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5-6 (2005) (concluding that police had 
probable cause to impound rental vehicle during traffic stop 
after learning that driver had expired license, and that neither 
driver nor passengers who had valid licenses were authorized 
drivers under terms of rental agreement).  To the extent that 
our holding today may conflict with the Appeals Court's 
decisions, those decisions are overruled. 
12 
 
 
of the English Language 124 (3d ed. 1996), and "delegated power 
over others," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 146 
(1993).  Each of these definitions describes a situation in 
which someone in possession of a certain power transfers that 
power to, or shares it with, another. 
 
In accordance with these definitions, we previously have 
noted that the "authority" described in G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a), may be provided either by the owner of a vehicle 
or "by one who in law possesses the right of control ordinarily 
vested in the owner."  Commonwealth v. Coleman, 252 Mass. 241, 
243 (1925).10  Accord Instruction 5.660 of the Criminal Model 
Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009).  In 
Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra at 242, we affirmed a defendant's 
conviction of use without authority under G. L. c. 90, § 24, for 
riding in a vehicle that was operated by a driver who did not 
have permission to drive it from the owner of the vehicle.  
Although the defendant argued that he was unaware that the 
driver lacked authority to operate the vehicle, we concluded 
that the version of G. L. c. 90, § 24, in effect at the time 
subjected users of a vehicle without authority to strict 
                     
 
10 Definitions of "authority" at the time were similar to 
today's.  See Webster's New International Dictionary of the 
English Language 155 (1926) (defining "authority" as "[l]egal or 
rightful power; a right to command or act; power exercised by a 
person in virtue of his office or trust"). 
13 
 
 
liability.11  See id. at 244.  In so doing, we recognized that a 
person lawfully in control of a vehicle may authorize another's 
use.  Id. at 243. 
 
We think it plain that authorization to use a rental 
vehicle may be provided by renters as well as by the rental 
company in at least some circumstances.  Under standard rental 
agreements like the one in this case, the renter, not the rental 
company, legally possesses the right of control of the vehicle, 
at least during the rental period.  The renter may, for example, 
decide when to use the vehicle, where to drive it, and whom to 
invite along for the ride.12  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth 
argues that a renter's right of control is limited by the terms 
of the rental agreement.  In its view, if the rental agreement 
prohibits use of the vehicle by those whom the agreement has not 
authorized explicitly, knowing use of this sort violates G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  Considering the statute in context, we do 
not agree. 
 
Our understanding of "without authority" in the rental 
context is shaped by "the aims and remedies intended to be 
                     
 
11 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), subsequently was 
amended to include a scienter requirement.  See St. 1926, c. 253 
(inserting phrase "knowing that such use is unauthorized"). 
 
 
12 In the tort liability context, we previously have 
suggested that a rental company is "unlikely" to retain any 
right of control over a renter's operation of a rental vehicle 
during the rental period.  See Cheek v. Econo-Car Rental Sys. of 
Boston, Inc., 393 Mass. 660, 663 (1985). 
14 
 
 
advanced by the Legislature . . . as evidenced by other parts of 
the statute as well."  Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 
406 Mass. 431, 442 (1990).  The other crimes enumerated in G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), aim at two main purposes:  protecting the 
public from reckless and negligent drivers, and ensuring that 
those who drive unsafely may be held accountable for any damage 
they cause.13  See Opinion of the Justices, 250 Mass. 591, 601 
(1925) (explaining that statute was enacted "for the particular 
protection of travellers upon the highways . . . and to afford 
them means of redress in case of injury by enabling them readily 
to ascertain the name and address of the owner of an automobile 
from which they might suffer injury").  This context indicates 
that the criminalization of using a vehicle "without authority" 
similarly is aimed at protecting the public from harm caused by 
                     
 
13 Crimes addressing the public safety goal include 
"operat[ing] a motor vehicle recklessly" in any place where "the 
public has a right of access," "operat[ing] such a vehicle 
negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be 
endangered," and operating a vehicle "upon a bet or wager or in 
a race."  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  Crimes addressing the 
accountability goal include leaving the scene after an accident 
"without stopping and making known [one's] name, residence and 
the register number of [one's] motor vehicle," "loan[ing] or 
knowingly permit[ting] [one's] license or learner's permit to 
operate motor vehicles to be used by any person," "mak[ing] 
false statements in an application for . . . a license or 
learner's permit," and "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement 
in an application for registration of a motor vehicle."  Id. 
 
15 
 
 
a user of a motor vehicle who is not readily identifiable.14  
Punishing a person who uses a vehicle with the permission of 
someone who is in lawful possession of the vehicle, such as a 
renter, does not advance that purpose, because a user with such 
permission readily may be identified by the person with explicit 
authority to use the vehicle. 
 
Furthermore, we previously have described G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a), as "a lesser included offense under a charge of 
larceny" of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28, because the 
                     
 
14 In enacting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), the Legislature 
apparently assumed that a person who uses a vehicle without 
authority is more likely to use it recklessly or negligently 
than a person who uses the vehicle with authority.  See G. L. 
c. 90, § 24F (making persons convicted of use without authority 
civilly liable for damage caused to vehicle by their use).  
Commentators likewise have suggested that G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a), primarily was intended to criminalize unsafe 
"joyriding."  See Simonian & Tarantino, Common Criminal Motor 
Vehicle Offenses in Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Offenses: 
Criminal, Civil, and Registry Practice § 3.11 (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Educ. 2d ed. Supp. 2016); R.J. Kenney, Jr., T.J. Farris, & P.R. 
Keane, Motor Vehicle Law and Practice § 28:50 (4th ed. Supp. 
2015).  As one commentator has explained, 
 
 
"The social problem back of this legislation is well 
known.  When the automobile began to appear and was limited 
to the possession of a few of the more fortunate members of 
the community, many persons who ordinarily respected the 
property rights of others, yielded to the temptation to 
drive one of these new contrivances without the consent of 
the owner.  This became so common that the term 'joyrider' 
was coined to refer to the person who indulged in such 
unpermitted use of another's car. . . . The chief harm was 
due to the fact that the 'joyrider' was frequently not a 
skillful driver, and sometimes unintentionally damaged the 
car while using it." 
 
R.M. Perkins & R.N. Boyce, Criminal Law 333 (3d ed. 1982). 
16 
 
 
crime that is sought to be prevented involves depriving someone 
temporarily of the use of a vehicle, not permanently depriving 
the owner of that vehicle of his or her ownership.  See 
Commonwealth v. Giannino, 371 Mass. 700, 703 (1977).  A person 
who has been authorized by the renter listed on the rental 
agreement to use the vehicle during the rental period does not 
deprive the rental company of any short-term use to which it 
otherwise would have been entitled. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that we should apply the definition 
of "authorized driver" under G. L. c. 90, § 32E1/2, which 
regulates collision damage waivers in vehicle rental agreements, 
in construing the meaning of "authority" under G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a).  Under G. L. c. 90, § 32E1/2 (A), an "authorized 
driver" is defined to include only "a renter who drives a 
private passenger automobile rented under the terms of a rental 
agreement or any person expressly listed by the rental company 
on the rental agreement as an authorized driver."  Damage or 
loss incurred by drivers who are not so "authorized" may be 
excluded from the protection of a collision damage waiver.  
G. L. c. 90, § 32E1/2 (C) (5) (f). 
 
By its own terms, however, the definition in G. L. c. 90, 
§ 32E1/2 (A), applies only to that provision and to G. L. c. 90, 
17 
 
 
§ 32E3/4, neither of which criminalizes unauthorized use.15  
While concern about collision damage waiver liability may be one 
reason that rental agreements distinguish between authorized and 
unauthorized drivers, that question of civil liability in the 
event of an accident does not affect our interpretation of use 
"without authority" under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), a criminal 
statute that imposes substantial penalties on those who violate 
it.16 
 
A renter's decision to allow a person who is not a 
permitted driver according to the rental agreement to drive a 
rental vehicle may be a breach of that agreement, but it does 
not also result in a violation of criminal law.17  We are aware 
                     
 
15 See G. L. c. 90, § 32E1/2 (A) ("As used in this section 
and section 32E3/4 the following words and phrases shall have 
the following meanings unless the context requires otherwise"). 
 
 
16 A first offense is "punished by a fine of not less than 
fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars or by 
imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than two 
years, or both."  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).  Second and 
subsequent offenses are subject to more extensive fines and 
terms of imprisonment.  Id. 
 
 
17 Other courts also have taken this view.  See State v. 
Veniegas, 80 Haw. 75, 79 (Ct. App. 1995), overruled on another 
ground by State v. Vallesteros, 84 Haw. 295 (1997) (noting that 
use of rental vehicle with permission of renter by person not on 
rental agreement did not violate statute criminalizing use 
without authority); People v. Johnson, 71 Misc. 2d. 423, 427 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972) (same); State v. Bass, 300 P.3d 1193, 1195 
(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (same).  See also United States v. 
McLaughlin, 278 F. Supp. 320, 321 (D.D.C. 1967) ("To hold that 
one using a rented car in excess of authority given is subject 
to prosecution under the criminal laws . . . would be tantamount 
18 
 
 
of only one context in which the Legislature explicitly has 
criminalized the violation of a rental agreement:  under G. L. 
c. 266, § 87, a renter who "fails or refuses to return [the 
rental vehicle] to the owner within ten days after expiration of 
the . . . rental agreement" may be subject to criminal 
liability.  General Laws c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), however, is not 
similarly explicit.  In light of the usual and accepted meaning 
of "authority," and the purposes for which G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a), apparently was enacted, we conclude that an 
individual does not violate G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), by using 
a rental vehicle with the renter's permission when the rental 
company also has not authorized that use.18  To hold otherwise 
would expose every parking lot attendant who knows he or she is 
parking a rental vehicle to potential criminal liability. 
 
b.  Probable cause.  Based on our construction of G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), we conclude that Hannon lacked probable 
cause to determine that the defendant was using the rental 
vehicle without authority.  "[P]robable cause exists where . . . 
                                                                  
to making a person criminally liable for a simple breach of 
contract").  But see United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 
(7th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that police may impound vehicle 
where driver is not authorized by rental company). 
 
 
18 Contrast Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 18–106(b) (LexisNexis 
2012) ("If a person rents a motor vehicle under an agreement not 
to permit another person to drive the vehicle no other person 
may drive the rented motor vehicle without the consent of the 
lessor or his agent").  This statute was repealed in 2014.  See 
Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 18–106(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). 
19 
 
 
the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police 
are enough to warrant a prudent person in believing that the 
individual arrested has committed or was committing an offense."  
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 469 Mass. 257, 262 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992).  "The 
officers must have entertained rationally 'more than a suspicion 
of criminal involvement, something definite and substantial, but 
not a prima facie case of the commission of a crime, let alone a 
case beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 
Mass. 507, 517 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Santaliz, supra. 
 
On the facts of this case, Hannon's determination that the 
defendant violated G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), was not 
reasonable.  Although the absence of the defendant's name on the 
rental agreement provided the trooper with a basis to 
investigate whether the authorized renter had permitted the 
defendant to use the vehicle, that information by itself could 
not establish probable cause to conclude that the defendant was 
in violation of the statute.  The asserted violation of G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), therefore did not provide a sufficient 
basis for the officer to impound the vehicle and conduct an 
inventory search.  See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 
(2003), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949) ("probable cause protects 'citizens from rash and 
20 
 
 
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded 
charges of crime'"). 
 
2.  Inevitable discovery.  The Commonwealth argues in the 
alternative that the motion to suppress should have been denied 
because the defendant could have been arrested on the default 
warrant for failure to appear for jury duty and the vehicle 
impounded on that basis, resulting in a lawful inventory search.  
"Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence may be 
admissible as long as the Commonwealth can demonstrate that 
discovery of the evidence by lawful means was certain as a 
practical matter, 'the officers did not act in bad faith to 
accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular 
constitutional violation is not so severe as to require 
suppression.'"  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 386 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 810 
(1997).  In addition, the discovery must have been inevitable 
under the "circumstances existing at the time of the unlawful 
seizure" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 
539, 548 (1990). 
 
Discovery on the basis of the default warrant for failing 
to appear for jury duty would have required police both to 
execute the warrant and to impound the rental vehicle after that 
arrest.  Yet neither trooper testified at the suppression 
hearing that they had intended to take these steps at the time 
21 
 
 
of the illegal seizure, and the record does not make clear 
whether the troopers had even learned of the existence of the 
default warrant before the seizure occurred.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth has not shown that it is "certain as a practical 
matter" that the seized evidence would have been discovered but 
for the impoundment of the defendant's vehicle based on 
unauthorized use.  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 
675, 679 (2002) (existence of default warrant, without more, 
does not make inevitable discovery of evidence certain as a 
practical matter).19 
 
Conclusion.  The impoundment of the rental vehicle was not 
proper, because the police did not have probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was operating it in violation of 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), and it is not certain as a practical 
matter that they would have executed the default warrant and 
impounded the vehicle on that basis.  Accordingly, the inventory 
search was not lawful, and the handgun and ammunition properly 
were suppressed.  The defendant's statements in response to the 
discovery of those items also properly were suppressed.  See 
                     
 
19 Because we conclude that there was not probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was operating the rental vehicle 
without authority, and that the evidence at issue would not have 
been discovered inevitably by other means, we do not reach the 
Commonwealth's arguments that the decision to impound the 
vehicle complied with the State police department's written 
policies.  See Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 108-109 
(2011). 
22 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 864-865 (2015) 
(statements made directly in response to unlawful search must be 
suppressed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.