Title: Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2019

Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The ethical mandate in N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d), prohibiting planning and zoning board members from hearing cases when cases of personal interest "might reasonably be expected to impair [their] objectivity or independence of judgment," was at the heart of this appeal. The Conte family filed an application to develop three lots in the City of Garfield. The issue raised was whether any members of the Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment had a disqualifying conflict of interest because of the involvement of certain Conte family members in the Zoning Board proceedings. The Piscitellis objected to the development project and claimed that a conflict of interest barred Zoning Board members who were employed or had immediate family members employed by the Board of Education from hearing the application. The Piscitellis also contended that any members who were patients or who had immediate family members who were patients of the Contes also had a disqualifying conflict. No Zoning Board member disqualified himself or herself on conflict-of-interest grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, namely for the trial court to make findings of whether any Zoning Board member had a disqualifying conflict of interest in hearing the application for site plan approval and variances in this case. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Vincent Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment (A-68-17) (079900)Argued November 28, 2018 -- Decided March 27, 2019ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. Planning and zoning board members are barred from hearing cases when a personal interest “might reasonably be expected to impair [their] objectivity or independence of judgment.” N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d); see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-23(b). That ethical commandment is at the heart of this appeal, which involves an application filed by members of the Conte family to develop three lots in the City of Garfield. The issue raised is whether any members of the Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment had a disqualifying conflict of interest because of the involvement of certain Conte family members in the Zoning Board proceedings. Two of the three lots to be developed were co-owned by the irrevocable trusts of Dr. Kenneth S. Conte (Dr. Kenneth) and his brother, Dr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr. (Dr. Daniel). Dr. Daniel personally owned the third lot. A trust benefitting Dr. Kenneth’s nephew -- Dr. Daniel P. Conte, III (Dr. Daniel III) -- and his two nieces applied for development approvals. All three Contes practiced medicine in the adjacent medical building owned by Dr. Kenneth and Dr. Daniel. Dr. Kenneth was a longtime member and the then-president of the Garfield Board of Education, which approves, among other things, school employee appointments, contracts, and salaries. Five Zoning Board members were employed or had immediate family members employed by the Garfield Board of Education. To avoid the appearance of a conflict, the two lots owned by trusts bearing the names of Dr. Kenneth and Dr. Daniel were transferred to the trust benefitting Dr. Kenneth’s nieces and nephew. Despite the intra-family transfer of property, Dr. Kenneth made his presence known at the hearing and made clear his position favoring the project. The Piscitellis objected to the development project and claimed that a conflict of interest barred Zoning Board members who were employed or had immediate family members employed by the Board of Education from hearing the application. The Piscitellis also contended that any members who were patients or who had immediate family members who were patients of the Contes also had a disqualifying conflict. 1 No Zoning Board member disqualified himself or herself on conflict-of-interest grounds. The Board granted site plan approval and the requested variances for the Conte project. The trial court upheld the Zoning Board approvals and denied the Piscitellis’ request to inquire whether any Zoning Board members or their family members were patients of Dr. Kenneth, his brother, or his nephew. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted the petition “limited to the issues related to the alleged conflicts of interests of some members of the Zoning Board of Adjustment.” 235 N.J. 392 (2018).HELD: The Court reverses and remands for further proceedings to decide whether any Zoning Board member had a disqualifying conflict of interest in hearing the application for site plan approval and variances in this case. The trial court must assess two separate bases for a potential conflict of interest. First, did Dr. Kenneth -- as president or a member of the Board of Education -- have the authority to vote on significant matters relating to the employment of Zoning Board members or their immediate family members? Second, did any Zoning Board members or an immediate family member have a meaningful patient-physician relationship with any of the three Conte doctors? If the answer to either of those questions is yes, then a conflict of interest mandated disqualification and the decision of the Zoning Board must be vacated. The Court does not possess sufficient information to answer those questions.1. The overall objective of conflict of interest laws is to ensure that public officials provide disinterested service to their communities and to promote confidence in the integrity of governmental operations. Whether a disqualifying conflict of interest required the recusal of any member of the Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment from hearing the development application is governed by three distinct sources of law: the Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2; the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; and the common law, which is now codified in those conflict statutes and still guides us in understanding their meaning, see Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 552 (2015). The overlapping conflict-of-interest codes that apply to this case can be distilled into a few common-sense principles. A citizen’s right to a fair and impartial tribunal requires a public official to disqualify himself or herself whenever the official has a conflicting interest that may interfere with the impartial performance of his duties as a member of the public body. The question is not whether a public official has acted dishonestly or has sought to further a personal or financial interest; the decisive factor is whether there is a potential for conflict. A conflict of interest arises whenever a public official faces contradictory desires tugging him or her in opposite directions. It is an objective inquiry. (pp. 19-25)2. The overarching issue is whether Dr. Kenneth’s association with and interest in the development application before the Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment had the capacity to tempt certain Zoning Board members to consider their private interests at the expense of their public duties. Concern by a public official that a vote might have a 2 negative impact on the official’s employment -- or a family member’s employment -- might give reason to consult one’s private interest. The record establishes Dr. Kenneth’s interest in the development project. In assessing an alleged conflict of interest, courts are not required to bow to formalisms concerning title to property when intra-family deals do not obscure a true interest at stake. If any Zoning Board members had reason to believe that voting against the application might be a bad career move for them or their family, a disqualifying conflict of interest would be present under the Local Government Ethics Law and the MLUL as informed by the common law. (pp. 25-30)3. In this case, no different from other conflict cases, the determination of whether a Zoning Board member possessed a disqualifying conflict of interest is a factual one. The Court does not have a sufficient record upon which to answer that question and so remands to the trial court. If the court finds that any Zoning Board member participated in the proceedings while impaired by a disqualifying conflict, then it must declare that the Board’s actions are a nullity and vacate the resolution granting site plan approval and variance relief to the DSJ Family Trust. In that event, the Zoning Board would be required to conduct new proceedings with conflict-free Board members. (pp. 30-32)4. The Court further holds that if a Zoning Board member or his or her immediate family member had a meaningful patient-physician relationship with Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III during or before the Board proceedings, that Board member had a disqualifying conflict of interest because of the special nature of the patient-physician relationship. The determination of whether the patient-physician relationship is meaningful will be fact specific in each case. Stressing that the potential disclosure of highly intimate and personal health-care information raises legitimate privacy concerns, the Court provides guidance on the precautions that must be taken to protect against the unnecessary release of a patient’s health-care information and remands to the trial court to explore this issue within the constraints set forth in the opinion. (pp. 32-38) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. JUSTICE SOLOMON, dissenting in part, agrees to a remand to permit further, but careful, examination of the nature and extent of the physician-patient relationships at issue but is of the view that Dr. Kenneth’s relationship to the DSJ Family Trust’s application is too attenuated to qualify as a disqualifying conflict of interest and that a remand to determine his authority by virtue of his position on the Board of Education is therefore unnecessary.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and FERNANDEZ-VINA join. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 68 September Term 2017 079900 Vincent Piscitelli and Rose Mary Piscitelli, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment; Arlene Patire; Robert Cochrane; DSJ Family Trust; Daniel P. Conte, III, Stacey A. Conte and Jamie G. Kreshpane, Trustees of the DSJ Family Trust; and Dr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr., Defendants-Respondents. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 28, 2018 March 27, 2019Anthony J. Sposaro argued the cause for appellants (Anthony J. Sposaro, on the briefs).Alyssa A. Cimino argued the cause for respondents City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment, Arlene Patire and Robert Cochrane (Cimino Law, attorneys; Alyssa A. Cimino, on the brief).Charles H. Sarlo argued the cause for respondents DSJ Family Trust; Daniel P. Conte, III, Stacey A. Conte and Jamie G. Kreshpane, Trustees of the DSJ Family Trust; 1 and Dr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr. (Charles H. Sarlo, of counsel and on the briefs). Robyn K. Lym argued the cause for amicus curiae Libertarians for Transparent Government (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief, and Suzanne M. Bradley, Robyn K. Lym, and Yelena Yukhvid, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Public confidence in the integrity of our municipal planning and zoningboards requires that board members be free of conflicting interests that havethe capacity to compromise their judgments. The maintenance of public trustin municipal government is the focus of statutory ethical codes, guided bycommon law principles, that bar planning and zoning board members fromhearing cases when a personal interest “might reasonably be expected toimpair [their] objectivity or independence of judgment.” N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d); see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-23(b). That ethicalcommandment is at the heart of the appeal before us. This case involves an application made by members of the Conte familyfor site plan approval and variances to construct a gas station, car wash, andquick lube on three lots in the City of Garfield. The issue raised is whetherany members of the Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment had a disqualifying 2 conflict of interest because of the involvement of certain Conte familymembers in the Zoning Board proceedings. Two of the three lots to be developed were co-owned by the irrevocabletrusts of Dr. Kenneth S. Conte (Dr. Kenneth) and his brother, Dr. Daniel P.Conte, Jr. (Dr. Daniel). Dr. Daniel personally owned the third lot. A trustbenefitting Dr. Kenneth’s nephew -- Dr. Daniel P. Conte, III (Dr. Daniel III) --and his two nieces applied for development approvals. All three Contespracticed medicine in the adjacent medical building owned by Dr. Kenneth andDr. Daniel. Dr. Kenneth was a longtime member and the then-president of theGarfield Board of Education. The Board of Education approves, among otherthings, school employee appointments, contracts, and salaries. Five ZoningBoard members were employed or had immediate family members employedby the Garfield Board of Education. To avoid the appearance of a conflict, thetwo lots owned by trusts bearing the names of Dr. Kenneth and his brother Dr.Daniel were transferred to the trust benefitting Dr. Kenneth’s nieces andnephew. Despite the intra-family transfer of property, Dr. Kenneth made hispresence known at the Zoning Board hearing and made clear his positionfavoring the project. 3 Vincent Piscitelli and his daughter Rose Mary objected to thedevelopment project. They claimed that a conflict of interest barred ZoningBoard members who were employed or had immediate family membersemployed by the Board of Education from hearing the application because Dr.Kenneth, as Board of Education president, voted on school-district personnelmatters. The Piscitellis also contended that any Zoning Board members whowere patients or who had immediate family members who were patients of Dr.Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III also had a disqualifying conflict ofinterest. No Zoning Board member disqualified himself or herself on conflict-of-interest grounds. The Board granted site plan approval and the requestedvariances for the Conte project. The Piscitellis filed a complaint in lieu ofprerogative writs in Superior Court to vacate the Zoning Board approvals,alleging that the Board members’ disqualifying conflicts of interestundermined the legality of the proceedings. The trial court upheld the ZoningBoard approvals, finding that no conflicts of interest had impaired the Boardmembers. The court also denied the Piscitellis’ request to inquire whether anyZoning Board members or their family members were patients of Dr. Kenneth,his brother, or his nephew. The Appellate Division affirmed. 4 We reverse and remand for further proceedings to decide whether anyZoning Board member had a disqualifying conflict of interest in hearing theapplication for site plan approval and variances in this case. The trial courtmust assess two separate bases for a potential conflict of interest. First, didDr. Kenneth -- as president or a member of the Board of Education -- have theauthority to vote on significant matters relating to the employment of ZoningBoard members or their immediate family members? Second, did any ZoningBoard members or an immediate family member have a meaningful patient-physician relationship with any of the three Conte doctors? If the answer toeither of those questions is yes, then a conflict of interest mandateddisqualification and the decision of the Zoning Board must be vacated. We donot possess sufficient information to answer those questions. We thereforereverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court todetermine whether any disqualifying conflicts impaired the Zoning Boardproceedings. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69. I. A. Dr. Kenneth S. Conte is a prominent citizen in the City of Garfield ,where he has practiced medicine for many decades.1 He has served since 19801 The facts adduced here come from the proceedings before the Zoning Board, 5 as a member of the Garfield Board of Education, including as vice presidentand president. The Board of Education governs the school district and makesimportant employment decisions concerning school personnel. Additionally,Dr. Kenneth’s brother, Dr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr., served for many years asmedical inspector of the school district, including during the Zoning Boardhearing. Five members of the Zoning Board were employed or had immediatefamily members employed by the Board of Education. The Kenneth S. Conte Irrevocable Trust II (Dr. Kenneth Trust) and theDr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr. Irrevocable Trust I (Dr. Daniel Trust) owned two ofthree lots on Midland Avenue in Garfield, the site of a proposed gas station,car wash, and quick lube. Dr. Daniel owned the third lot personally with hiswife, who was then deceased. Immediately adjacent to the proposedconstruction site is the Ken-Dan Medical Center owned by Dr. Kenneth andDr. Daniel. There, the two brothers practice medicine along with Dr.Kenneth’s nephew, Dr. Daniel P. Conte, III. Also adjacent to the constructionsite are other lots owned by Conte family members. Dr. Kenneth’s nephew and two nieces (Dr. Daniel’s children) -- Dr.Daniel III, Stacey A. Conte, and Jamie G. Kreshpane -- are the trustees andthe record developed in the action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Superior Court, and the appendices submitted to the Appellate Division and this Court. 6 beneficiaries of the DSJ Family Trust. 2 In March 2014, the DSJ Family Trustapplied for site plan and variance approvals with the Garfield Zoning Board toconstruct a four-bay gas station, car wash, and quick lube on the three lots onMidland Avenue. At the time of the application, the DSJ Family Trust did nothave an ownership interest in any of the three lots. 3 Vincent and Rose Mary Piscitelli resided within 200 feet of the proposedconstruction site. They objected to the merits of the development. They alsoasserted that Zoning Board members who were employed or had immediatefamily members employed by the Board of Education should disqualifythemselves on conflict-of-interest grounds. The Piscitellis argued that Dr.Kenneth, in his capacity as a Board of Education member and president, hadthe ability to influence the careers of Zoning Board members and theirimmediate family members employed in the school district. In an attempt to eliminate the conflict issue, Dr. Kenneth’s nephew andnieces, acting as trustees of their uncle’s trust, transferred the Dr. KennethTrust’s fifty-percent interest in two of the three lots to the DSJ Family Trust2 The trust’s initials -- DSJ -- correspond with the names Daniel, Stacey, and Jamie. 3 The initial land use development application stated that the applicant was the “Trust of Daniel P. Conte, III, Stacey A. Conte and Jamie G Kreshpane.” 7 for $420,500. On that same date, Karl Kreshpane, the then-trustee of the Dr.Daniel Trust, transferred for one dollar the remaining interest in those two lotsto the DSJ Family Trust.4 As a result of that transaction, Dr. Daniel and histhree children, who controlled the DSJ Family Trust, owned the three lotssubject to the development application. At the Zoning Board hearing, attorney David Piscitelli represented hisfather Vincent, who objected on conflict-of-interest grounds, demanding thatZoning Board members disclose their relationship to the school district.Piscitelli was not persuaded that the transfer of property in Dr. Kenneth’s trustto his nieces and nephew eliminated the conflict. Piscitelli argued that Dr.Kenneth’s interest in the project was still evident from the intra-familyproperty transfer and from Dr. Kenneth’s co-ownership of the adjacent medicalbuilding with his brother Dr. Daniel, who retained his interest in one of the lotsto be developed. The DSJ Family Trust responded that Dr. Kenneth had noremaining financial or beneficial interest in the subject property and thereforeno conflict barred a Zoning Board member from hearing the developmentapplication, regardless of whether a Board member or a family member wasemployed by the Board of Education. Piscitelli also objected on conflict4 One month earlier, the addendum to the land use development application filed by the DSJ Family Trust’s attorney listed Kenneth Conte as the trustee of the Dr. Daniel Trust. 8 grounds to Zoning Board members hearing the application if they or animmediate family member were patients of Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr.Daniel III. Dr. Kenneth appeared at the first meeting, greeting some in attendance.In brief testimony before the Zoning Board, Dr. Kenneth challenged thePiscitellis’ standing to object. Dr. Kenneth testified that Vincent Piscitelli’swife had been his patient for thirty years and that he also had treated herdaughters. Dr. Kenneth asserted that David Piscitelli’s representation of hisfather -- and the Piscitellis’ role in the proceedings -- “smells of a conflict.”Dr. Kenneth and his brother Dr. Daniel attended all of the Zoning Boardmeetings. Dr. Daniel III sat at the applicants’ table, except at one meetingwhen his father took his place. At the second Zoning Board meeting, the Board’s chairperson, ArlenePatire, disclosed that she worked for the Board of Education. Nonetheless,neither Patire nor any other Board member with an employment connectionwith the Board of Education disqualified himself or herself from hearing thedevelopment application. The Zoning Board attorney advised Board membersthat they did not have to disclose whether they had a patient-physicianrelationship with Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III, and none did. The 9 merits of the development application were addressed through the experttestimony of a number of witnesses at the hearing. At the third meeting, after the Board heard further expert testimony onthe application, the chairperson opened the floor to comments from the public.In all, thirty-one members of the public spoke, twenty-two in favor of and nineopposed to the application. Many who offered comments about theconstruction of the gas station, car wash, and quick lube perceived thedevelopment project to be a Conte family undertaking. Here are someexamples: Antoinette Scaravelloni: “Who are the Contes? They’re two very good doctors who have contributed to Garfield all their lives.” Joseph Cala: “[L]et’s get to the business at hand. And that’s the credibility of the Conte family.” Betty Ann Benigno: “I think it’s a great idea that the Contes open up a car wash.” Rico Benigno: “The Contes are going [to] give us a beautiful car wash.” Donna LaPierre: “I feel that the Contes can spend their money anywhere.” Choudhary Manzoor: “[W]e should appreciate the Conte family bringing this kind of nice project in [the] City of Garfield.” Richard Derrig: “The Conte family has a long, dedicated commitment to Garfield and they always 10 will. . . . [T]hey decided to open a new family business within their community. I commend the Contes for that decision.” Joyce Nitti: “I can vouch for the Contes because I know them a long time. I know they’re looking out for the community, they’re very good people.” Paul Crochiola: “[W]e need a good car wash. And it’s state of the art. I think the Contes should be approved for their project.” Anthony Barckett: “I support the Contes, yes. I believe what others have said is right, they’re putting money back in the community.” Charles Nucifora: “I think it’s a great project. It’s an entrepreneurial on the Contes part.” Rose Mary Piscitelli: “The Conte family doesn’t have to build a car wash to clean up this lot . . . . They can build what is allowed by the zoning laws . . . residential homes.” Four of the public members who gave testimony in favor of the project --Derrig, Barckett, Nucifora, and Jeffrey Stewart -- served with Dr. Kenneth onthe nine-member Board of Education in 2014. None apparently ownedproperty within 200 feet of the construction site. At the final meeting in August 2014, after hearing additional expert andpublic-member testimony, the Zoning Board voted seven to zero to grantpreliminary and final site plan approval and a number of variances to developthe gas station, car wash, and quick lube. At the time, the Board of Education 11 employed Zoning Board chairperson Arlene Patire and her husband, Boardmember Paul Houlis, and immediate family members of Board membersCarmine Breonte, Salvatore Lamendola, and Robert Cochrane. 5 In October 2014, the Zoning Board issued a formal resolution granting the DSJ FamilyTrust site plan approval and variances. B. In December 2014, the Piscitellis filed a complaint in lieu of prerogativewrits in the Superior Court, seeking to vacate the Zoning Board’s resolution.The complaint named as defendants the Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustmentand Board members Patire and Cochrane (Zoning Board); Dr. Daniel Conte,Jr.; and the DSJ Family Trust and its trustees, including Dr. Daniel Conte, III.As grounds for relief, the Piscitellis pointed to deficiencies in the Board’sgrant of the land-use approvals and, separately, to alleged conflicts of interestimpairing the impartiality of certain members of the Board. The Piscitellisasserted that a disqualifying conflict of interest applied (1) to any member ofthe Zoning Board who was employed or who had a family member employedby the Board of Education and (2) to any Zoning Board member who had been5 Zoning Board member Cochrane did not vote on the application, although he was present and participated at the first three of the four meetings. An alternate Zoning Board member voted in his place on the last hearing date. 12 a patient of Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III, or whose familymember had been a patient. The prerogative-writs action revealed, through interrogatory responses,that the Garfield Board of Education employed Zoning Board members Patireand Houlis as well as the immediate family of Board members Patire, Breonte,Cochrane, and Lamendola. The trial court, however, struck interrogatoryquestions seeking the disclosure of whether Board members or their immediatefamily members were or had been patients of Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr.Daniel III. The court held that the inquiry into a patient-physician relationshipwas not relevant and thus exceeded the permissible scope of discovery. Thecourt reasoned that those who serve on zoning boards of adjustment do notsurrender their right to withhold medical information from public disclosure. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court dismissed the Piscitellis’prerogative-writs action. The court found that the Zoning Board’s decision togrant site plan approval and variance relief for the gas station, car wash, andquick lube was not “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.” In its review ofthe record, the court made no distinction between Dr. Kenneth and Dr. Danieland the trusts bearing their names. The court noted that when the developmentapplication was filed, the subject lots “were jointly owned by Dr. Kenneth S.Conte and his brother Dr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr.” 13 The court rejected the Piscitellis’ argument that Zoning Board membersfaced a disqualifying conflict of interest if either they or their family wereemployed by the Board of Education. The court evidently gave great weight tothe fact that, despite his position as Board of Education president, Dr. Kennethwas not the applicant and had no direct ownership interest in the property afterits transfer to the DSJ Family Trust. The court determined it could not inferthat Zoning Board members lacked impartiality merely because the Board ofEducation employed some Zoning Board members or their family. C. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, a three-judge Appellate Divisionpanel affirmed the findings of the trial court, which upheld the Zoning Board’sgrant of site plan approval and variance relief.6 The panel agreed with the trialjudge “that the zoning board members were not disqualified from voting on theapplication.” The panel acknowledged that Dr. Kenneth was a member of theBoard of Education, which employed some of the Zoning Board members andtheir relatives. In the panel’s view, however, there was no conflict because Dr.Kenneth’s interest in the property, owned “through an individual trust in hisname,” was sold to the DSJ Family Trust after the filing of the development6 Our recitation of the issues before the trial court and Appellate Division is limited to those relevant to the appeal before this Court. 14 application. The panel observed that, although Dr. Kenneth’s nieces andnephew were the beneficiaries and trustees of the DSJ Family Trust, Dr.Kenneth had no control over that trust. The panel concluded that “theconnection between [the DSJ Family Trust] and the [Board of Education] wastoo attenuated to support a finding of a conflict of interest on the part of thezoning board members.” The panel did not address whether Board membershad a duty to disclose a patient-physician relationship with either Dr. Kenneth,Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III. The Piscitellis petitioned for certification raising four issues. Wegranted the petition “limited to the issues related to the alleged conflicts ofinterests of some members of the Zoning Board of Adjustment.” 235 N.J. 392(2018). We also granted the motion of Libertarians for TransparentGovernment to participate as amicus curiae. II. A. The Piscitellis contend that certain Zoning Board members were fatallytainted with conflicts of interest, despite the “eleventh hour transfer” of twolots from the Dr. Kenneth Trust and the Dr. Daniel Trust to a trust controlledby and benefitting Dr. Kenneth’s nieces and nephew. The Piscitellis maintainthat because the Board of Education employed Zoning Board members and 15 their immediate family, that employment “might reasonably be expected toimpair [their] objectivity or independence of judgment.” See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d). That is so, the Piscitellis reason, because Dr. Kenneth was the then-president of the Board of Education; his brother was the school district’slongtime medical inspector; and four of the public members who testified insupport of the development project served with Dr. Kenneth on the Board ofEducation. According to the Piscitellis, Dr. Kenneth and his brother were the“de facto applicants,” and the transfer of their trust property to their bloodrelatives did not alter the perception that the development application was aConte family project. The Piscitellis argue that the Board members faced apotential conflict between their private interests and their public duties . The Piscitellis also urge this Court to mandate that Zoning Boardmembers disclose whether they or their immediate family members had apatient-physician relationship with Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III.They claim that the intimate relationship between a patient and a physicianwould impair the impartiality of a decisionmaker, and that privacy concernsmust give way to ensure the integrity of public proceedings. Amicus Libertarians for Transparent Government echoes the Piscitellis’position that those Zoning Board members who were employed or had familymembers employed by the Board of Education “might feel influenced” to 16 render a decision favorable to the positions advanced by Dr. Kenneth and hisfour colleagues on the Board of Education who testified in support of thedevelopment application. Amicus, moreover, rejects the notion that ourconflict-of-interest laws can be circumvented by the transfer of an “ownershipinterest in property over to loyal relatives” after the filing of a developmentapplication. Confidence in the integrity of our government, amicus insists,requires that officials operate in an atmosphere where the public’s interests andtheir personal interests are not in conflict. B. The Zoning Board argues that Dr. Kenneth’s relationship to thedevelopment project and the Zoning Board members “is too attenuated toresult in disqualification” based on a conflict of interest. The Zoning Boardreaches that conclusion because Dr. Kenneth “sold the property to DSJ FamilyTrust, whose beneficiaries are his adult nieces and nephew,” because “heretained no interest or control over the property,” and because the development“application is entirely unrelated to the [Board of Education].” 7 It emphasizesthat Dr. Kenneth “had no financial gain to be derived from the Application”and rejects the description of Dr. Kenneth as the “de facto Applicant.” The7 The Zoning Board’s brief to this Court makes no distinction between Dr. Kenneth and his trust. 17 Zoning Board dismisses any notion that, in voting for the developmentapplication, its members might have been influenced by their or their family’semployment by the Board of Education. The Zoning Board considers asirrelevant that Dr. Kenneth served as president of the Board of Education andthat he and four other members of the Board of Education testified in favor ofthe development project. The Board concludes that the Zoning Boardmembers did not have a disqualifying conflict because they had nothing togain for themselves or their families -- and therefore had no identifiablepersonal interest -- by voting for the application. Last, the Board maintains that there is no disqualifying conflict ofinterest if a Board member had a patient-physician relationship with Dr.Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III. In its view, “a patient Board Member’shypothetical treatment with one of the Conte physicians would not reasonablybe expected to impair his or her objectivity.” The DSJ Family Trust aligns its arguments with those of the ZoningBoard. DSJ concedes that at the time of the filing of the developmentapplication, two of the “lots were owned by trusts controlled by DoctorKenneth Conte . . . and Doctor Daniel Conte, Jr.” and that “to avoid anyperception of conflicts of interest,” the titles to those lots were transferred tothe DSJ Family Trust. DSJ asserts that, for conflict-of-interest purposes, any 18 connection between the Zoning Board members and the Board of Educationwas too “remote or attenuated” because Dr. Kenneth and his brother were notthe applicants. Last, DSJ asserts no conflict would arise if any of the ZoningBoard members were patients of any of the three Conte doctors. III. The overall objective “of conflict of interest laws is to ensure that publicofficials provide disinterested service to their communities” and to “promoteconfidence in the integrity of governmental operations.” Thompson v. City ofAtlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 364 (2007). Whether a disqualifying conflict ofinterest required the recusal of any member of the Garfield Zoning Board ofAdjustment from hearing the development application is governed by threedistinct sources of law: the Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2; the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; and thecommon law, which is now codified in those conflict statutes and still guidesus in understanding their meaning. See Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 552 (2015). Historically, under the common law, the judiciary exercised“comprehensive prerogative-writ jurisdiction” over “governmental tribunals,including administrative agencies.” Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 522(1993). Today, “[t]hat common-law jurisdiction is guaranteed under N.J. 19 Constitution [A]rticle VI, [S]ection 5, [P]aragraph 4.” Ibid. An essentialguarantee of the common law is the right “to a fair and impartial tribunal.”Ibid. That right is protected by common law conflict-of-interest rules nowcodified in the Local Government Ethics Law and the MLUL. Id. at 522-23;see also Paruszewski v. Township of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 58 (1998). Thoserules continue to help guide our review of prerogative-writ challenges to“municipal action on conflict of interest grounds.” Paruszewski, 154 N.J. at 58. Our primary purpose is to construe the Local Government Ethics Lawand the MLUL, guided by the common law, in determining whether anyZoning Board member was impaired by a conflict of interest. We reviewissues of law before a Zoning Board de novo, owing no deference to theinterpretive conclusions of either the Zoning Board, the trial court, or theAppellate Division. Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp.of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018). The Local Government Ethics Law applies to all municipal officeholders, including mayors; municipal councils; municipal attorneys; and,importantly for our purposes, members of planning boards and zoning boardsof adjustment. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.3(g)(2) (defining a “[l]ocal governmentofficer” as “any person . . . serving on a local government agency which has 20 the authority to enact ordinances, approve development applications or grantzoning variances”). N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d) provides that [n]o local government officer or employee shall act in his official capacity in any matter where he, a member of his immediate family, or a business organization in which he has an interest, has a direct or indirect financial or personal involvement that might reasonably be expected to impair his objectivity or independence of judgment. In enacting this code of ethics for municipal officers and employees, theLegislature declared its intent by stating: a. Public office and employment are a public trust; b. The vitality and stability of representative democracy depend upon the public’s confidence in the integrity of its elected and appointed representatives; c. Whenever the public perceives a conflict between the private interests and the public duties of a government officer or employee, that confidence is imperiled[.] [ N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2(a) to (c).] We must construe N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d) to further the Legislature’sexpressed intent that “[w]henever the public perceives a conflict between theprivate interests and the public duties of a government officer,” “the public’sconfidence in the integrity” of that officer is “imperiled.” N.J.S.A. 40A:9- -22.2(b) to (c); see also Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 553. We also view thestatutory language consonant with common law principles. The issue is 21 whether Zoning Board members had an “interest” or “a direct or indirectfinancial or personal involvement that might reasonably be expected to impair[their] objectivity or independence of judgment.” N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d).Viewed in that light, we must determine whether the Board of Education’semployment of Zoning Board members, or the members of their immediatefamily, might reasonably have impaired a Zoning Board member’s objectivityor independence, given the interest of Dr. Kenneth -- the Board of Educationpresident -- in the outcome of the Zoning Board hearing. See Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 529. The issue is whether the “private interests” of certain Zoning Boardmembers -- their possible concerns over their employment and their families’employment in the school district -- clash with the exercise of their “publicduties” -- the faithful and impartial review of a development application. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2. Clearly, if Zoning Board members had reason toconsider their “private interests” in casting a vote, that alone could underminepublic confidence in their impartiality. In addition to the general ethics code applicable to all municipal officersand employees are the constraints the MLUL places on members of zoningboards. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69 provides that “[n]o member of the board ofadjustment shall be permitted to act on any matter in which he has, either 22 directly or indirectly, any personal or financial interest.” 8 Read harmoniouslywith the Local Government Ethics Law and the common law, a Zoning Boardmember’s personal and financial interest would be implicated if a vote mightadversely or favorably impact his or her employment, or immediate familymember’s employment, in the school district. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d). As noted earlier, common law conflict-of-interest principles inform ourunderstanding of the Local Government Ethics Law and the MLUL. SeeWyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523-25. One of the common law bases fordisqualification on conflict-of-interest grounds identified in Wyzykowski is anindirect personal interest. Id. at 525-26. An indirect personal interest is“when an official votes on a matter in which an individual’s judgment may be8 Notably, the City of Garfield has an independent ethics rule for members of its Zoning Board of Adjustment that largely tracks the language of the MLUL. It provides that [n]o member of the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment shall act on any matter in which he has, either directly or indirectly, any personal or financial interest. Whenever any such member shall disqualify himself from acting on a particular matter, he shall not continue to sit with the Board on the hearing of such matter nor participate in any discussion or decision relating thereto. [City of Garfield, N.J., Code ch. 188, art. III, § 188-25 (2018).] 23 affected,” such as when the official may cast a vote at odds with the wishes ofhis private employer. See Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 553 (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 525). The overlapping conflict-of-interest codes that apply to this case can bedistilled into a few common-sense principles. A citizen’s right to “a fair andimpartial tribunal” requires a public official to disqualify himself or herselfwhenever “the official has a conflicting interest that may interfere with theimpartial performance of his duties as a member of the public body.” Id. at551 (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 522-23). The question is not “whethera public official has acted dishonestly or has sought to further a personal orfinancial interest; the decisive factor is 'whether there is a potential forconflict.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 524). “The questionwill always be whether the circumstances could reasonably be interpreted toshow that [conflicting interests] had the likely capacity to tempt the official todepart from his sworn public duty.” Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523 (quotingVan Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 (1958)). A conflict of interest arises whenever a public official faces“contradictory desires tugging [him or her] in opposite directions.” Id. at 524(quoting LaRue v. Township of East Brunswick, 68 N.J. Super. 435, 448 (App.Div. 1961)). This objective inquiry into whether a disqualifying conflict is 24 present dispenses with any probing into an official’s motive because theultimate goal is to ensure not only impartial justice but also public confidencein the integrity of the proceedings. See Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554. Ourconflict-of-interest rules, however, do not apply to “remote” or “speculative”conflicts because local governments cannot operate effectively if recusalsoccur based on ascribing to an official a conjured or imagined disqualifyinginterest. See ibid. (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523). Requiring recusalswhen appropriate does not discourage public-spirited citizens from serving onboards. Dedicated public servants -- given proper guidance -- will not want tosit in judgment if they are encumbered by a potential conflict. To be sure, “[a] court’s determination 'whether a particular interest issufficient to disqualify is necessarily a factual one and depends upon thecircumstances of the particular case.’” Ibid. (quoting Van Itallie, 28 N.J. at 268). Given those basic principles, we turn to the facts of this case. IV. The overarching issue is whether Dr. Kenneth’s association with andinterest in the development application before the Garfield Zoning Board ofAdjustment had the capacity to tempt certain Zoning Board members toconsider their private interests at the expense of their public duties. Concernby a public official that a vote might have a negative impact on the official’s 25 employment -- or a family member’s employment -- might give reason toconsult one’s private interest. Five Zoning Board members were eitheremployed or had immediate family members employed by the Garfield Boardof Education at the time of the development application and hearing in thiscase. The chairperson and her husband were both employees in the schooldistrict. In 2014, Dr. Kenneth had served thirty-four years as a member of theBoard of Education and was the then-serving president of the nine-memberBoard. The Board of Education is the executive body that governs the schooldistrict and has the power to hire and dismiss “such principals, teachers,janitors and other officers and employees, as it shall determine, and fix andalter their compensation and the length of their terms of employment.” N.J.S.A. 18A:16-1. It also has the authority to “[p]erform all acts and do allthings . . . necessary for the lawful and proper conduct, equipment andmaintenance of the public schools of the district.” N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(d). Assuch, a Zoning Board member employed by the Board of Education mightreasonably have had concern about courting disfavor with Dr. Kenneth, whowas in a position to influence school-district personnel matters. The record establishes Dr. Kenneth’s interest in the development project.Dr. Kenneth’s nieces and nephew were the trustees and beneficiaries of the 26 DSJ Family Trust, which applied to the Zoning Board to construct a gasstation, car wash, and quick lube on three lots on Midland Avenue in Garfield.The DSJ Family Trust had no ownership interest in any of the lots at the timeit filed the development application. Instead, Dr. Kenneth and his brother’sirrevocable trusts owned two of the lots, and his brother owned the third lot.Dr. Kenneth and his brother, moreover, owned the adjacent Ken-Dan MedicalCenter, where they practiced medicine with Dr. Kenneth’s nephew, Dr. DanielIII. Additionally, Conte family members owned other adjacent lots. The Zoning Board and DSJ Family Trust claim that the sale of the twolots owned by Dr. Kenneth and his brother’s trusts to the DSJ Family Trustremoved any conflict of interest. Interestingly, the DSJ Family Trust’s brief tothis Court stated that the sold “lots were owned by trusts controlled by DoctorKenneth Conte . . . and Doctor Daniel Conte, Jr.” and the Zoning Board’s briefstated that “[Dr. Kenneth] sold the property to DSJ Family Trust.” We neednot speculate whether the trustees of Dr. Kenneth’s irrevocable trust -- hisnieces and nephew -- acted independently of direction from him. It merelybears mentioning that, at times, not even the Conte family or the Zoning Boardmakes a distinction between Dr. Kenneth and the trust bearing his name -- thetwo are referred to interchangeably. 27 Moreover, Dr. Kenneth’s brother, Dr. Daniel, the school district’s long-serving medical inspector, retained the third lot. Nor can we dismiss the factthat the two brothers owned the adjacent medical building. The interlockingConte family interests were not hidden, but were in plain sight. Dr. Kenneth left no doubt about his interest in the project to the ZoningBoard. In his brief testimony to the Zoning Board, he attacked the Piscitellis’standing to object to the project. He attended all four Zoning Board meetings,and at the first meeting greeted some in attendance.Many of those public members who testified at the hearing considered theproject a Conte family undertaking and did not distinguish among the Contes.Four of Dr. Kenneth’s colleagues on the nine-member Board of Educationtestified in favor of the gas station, car wash, and quick lube on MidlandAvenue. With those four joining Dr. Kenneth, a majority of the Board ofEducation had weighed in on the project -- a point, presumably, not lost onZoning Board members who were employed or had immediate family membersemployed by the Board of Education. We would have to put blinders on to ignore what must have been self -evident to those in attendance at the Zoning Board hearing: Dr. Kenneth’smanifest interest in his family’s project to develop the property on MidlandAvenue -- property owned, in part, by a trust in his name when the 28 development application was filed. In assessing an alleged conflict of interest,we are not required to bow to formalisms concerning title to property whenintra-family deals do not obscure a true interest at stake. See Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (emphasizing that our conflict of interest analysis always “dependsupon the circumstances of the particular case” (quoting Van Itallie, 28 N.J. at 268)). Under the Local Government Ethics Law, might the Zoning Boardmembers’ employment connections to the Board of Education “reasonably beexpected to impair [their] objectivity or independence of judgment”? See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d). Under the MLUL, given their employmentconnections to the Board of Education, did Zoning Board members have eithera direct or indirect personal or financial interest in the outcome of the Contefamily application? See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69. In plainer terms, under thecommon law, the question is whether, reasonably viewed, conflicting interests“had the likely capacity to tempt [Zoning Board members] to depart from[their] sworn public duty,” Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523 (quoting Van Itallie, 28 N.J. at 268), or whether those Zoning Board members faced “contradictorydesires tugging [them] in opposite directions,” id. at 524 (quoting LaRue, 68 N.J. Super. at 448). In short, if any Zoning Board members had reason tobelieve that voting against the development application might be a bad career 29 move for them or their family, a disqualifying conflict of interest would bepresent under the Local Government Ethics Law and the MLUL as informedby the common law. Illustrating this type of conflict is Wyzykowski. 132 N.J. 509. InWyzykowski, the mayor of Neptune Township applied to the township’splanning board to develop a previously vacant lot. Id. at 512. A planningboard member owed his appointment to three paid positions in municipalgovernment to the mayor. Id. at 516. We held that the planning board membershould have disqualified himself from hearing a matter involving the mayorwho assisted him in gaining the municipal government positions. Id. at 526.We recognized the very real prospect that the planning board member wouldface those “contradictory desires tug[ging] [him] in opposite directions” --desires that pitted his personal interest against his public duties. See ibid.(quoting LaRue, 68 N.J. Super. at 448). In the end, we must be mindful that “[w]henever the public perceives aconflict between the private interests and the public duties of a [Zoning Boardmember],” the “public’s confidence in the integrity of its . . . appointedrepresentatives” is imperiled. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2(b) to (c). In decidingwhether any member of the Zoning Board was impaired by a disqualifyingconflict, we must eschew a mechanical approach that ignores the true 30 circumstances faced by an officeholder whose impartiality may reasonablycome into question in the eyes of the public. In this case, no different fromother conflict cases, the determination of whether a Zoning Board memberpossessed a personal interest sufficient to warrant disqualification is “a factualone and depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.” SeeGrabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (quoting Van Itallie, 28 N.J. at 268). We do not have a sufficient record before us to answer that question orthe others posed earlier about the potential for a conflict in this case. Therecord does not disclose the precise statutory powers Dr. Kenneth exercised asa member or as president of the Board of Education concerning theappointment of school personnel, the approval of their contracts, the setting oradjustment of their salaries, or other significant personnel decisions. Nor dowe know whether Zoning Board members might have had reasons toapprehend that Dr. Kenneth would in the future vote on such matters -- mattersthat clearly would give rise to a personal interest and the potential for adisqualifying conflict. The minutes and resolutions of the Garfield Board ofEducation, including those related to Zoning Board members or members oftheir immediate family, and other sources of information may give insight onthis subject. 31 Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to determine whether anyZoning Board member possessed a disqualifying conflict based on theprinciples enunciated above. If the court finds that any Zoning Board memberparticipated in the proceedings while impaired by a disqualifying conflict, thenit must declare that the Board’s actions are a nullity and vacate the resolutiongranting site plan approval and variance relief to the DSJ Family Trust. SeeRandolph v. City of Brigantine Planning Bd., 405 N.J. Super. 215, 232-33(App. Div. 2009) (citing Haggerty v. Red Bank Borough Zoning Bd. ofAdjustment, 385 N.J. Super. 501, 516-17 (App. Div. 2006)) (voiding andsetting aside zoning board proceedings “in their entirety” because of animpermissible conflict of interest on the part of the board’s chairwoman). Inthat event, the Zoning Board would be required to conduct new proceedingswith conflict-free Board members. V. The trial court and Appellate Division determined that Zoning Boardmembers did not have to disclose whether they or their immediate familymembers had been or currently were patients of Dr. Kenneth, Dr. Daniel, orDr. Daniel III. We have recited in detail Dr. Kenneth’s involvement in thedevelopment application. It bears emphasizing, however, that Dr. Daniel andDr. Daniel III stood to directly financially benefit if site plan approval and 32 variances were granted for the three lots on Midland Avenue. Dr. Danielpersonally owned one of the lots. The DSJ Family Trust -- the project’sapplicant -- owned the other two lots, and Dr. Daniel III was both a trustee andbeneficiary of that trust. We hold that if a Zoning Board member or his or her immediate familymember had a meaningful patient-physician relationship with any of thosethree doctors during or before the Board proceedings, that Board member hada disqualifying conflict of interest. We reach that conclusion because of thespecial nature of the patient-physician relationship -- a relationship in whichthe patient “reposes the greatest trust for health-care decisions” in the hands ofthe physician. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 30 (1999).Physicians are responsible for caring for and maintaining the physical andmental health of their patients so that they can enjoy productive and happylives. In that light, the deep bonds that develop between patients and theirphysicians are understandable. Physicians every day diagnose and treat patients for the mild andmalignant maladies that afflict the human body and mind. It would be naturalfor a patient to owe a debt of gratitude to a doctor who has removed acancerous lesion from the skin, repaired a shoulder injury, replaced a knee, seta broken bone, performed heart or kidney surgery, delivered a child, prescribed 33 life-enhancing or -saving medications, provided psychiatric therapy, or everyyear treated symptoms for the common cold or flu. It is not unusual for aphysician to treat a family over the course of decades. A person may have difficulty judging objectively or impartially a matterconcerning someone to whom he would naturally feel indebted. By anymeasure, under the conflict-of-interest codes previously discussed, we cannotexpect Zoning Board members to have a disinterested view of a doctor withwhom they, or immediate members of their family, have had a meaningfulpatient-physician relationship. We cannot here fully limn the contours of what would constitute ameaningful patient-physician relationship because that may depend on thelength of the relationship, the nature of the services rendered, and many otherfactors. The determination will be fact specific in each case. A few examples,however, should provide some guidance. On one end of the relationshipspectrum may be the physician who, once five years ago, merely inoculated thepatient with a flu shot, and on the other end may be the physician who, tenyears ago, performed a life-saving heart transplant. A primary-care physicianwho examines a patient annually and tends to the patient’s health-care issuesas they arise or the surgeon who performs a life-altering or -enhancing 34 procedure will fall within the sphere of a meaningful relationship that shouldprompt disqualification. The potential disclosure of highly intimate and personal health-careinformation raises legitimate privacy concerns and therefore must be addressedwith great sensitivity. “[O]ur courts have recognized that competing publicpolicies may require disclosure of otherwise privileged information.” Kinsellav. NYT Television, 382 N.J. Super. 102, 110 (App. Div. 2005). “[D]isclosureis required only if the party seeking production makes a 'compelling’ showingof a particularized need for the information.” Id. at 111 (citing McClain v.Coll. Hosp., 99 N.J. 346, 362-64 (1985)). First, we must recognize that thosewho hold public office and make decisions affecting the safety and welfare ofthe community surrender some degree of privacy that common citizens enjo y.Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 N.J. Super. 250, 262 (App. Div. 1976) (“By acceptingpublic employment an individual steps from the category of a purely privatecitizen to that of a public citizen. And in that transition he must of necessitysubordinate his private rights to the extent that they may compete or conflictwith the superior right of the public to achieve honest and efficientgovernment.”), aff’d, 75 N.J. 459 (1978). After all, the public must haveconfidence that public officers are rendering decisions impartially and free of 35 any conflicts that may compromise their independence. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2(b); see also Thompson, 190 N.J. at 374. Nevertheless, the nature of any disclosure relating to a patient-physicianrelationship must be weighed against the official’s reasonable expectation ofprivacy. If the court determines that there is a meaningful patient-physicianrelationship, then the nature of the disclosure will depend on , among otherfactors, the degree of need for access to the information, the damage excessivedisclosure would cause to a patient’s right to privacy, the adequacy ofsafeguards to prevent excessive disclosure, and the personal dignity rights ofthe official. See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995) (discussing the factors tobe applied when determining whether the government must discloseinformation implicating a privacy interest); see also Burnett v. County ofBergen, 198 N.J. 408, 427 (2009) (adopting the Doe factors for determinationsof whether to disclose records sought under the Open Public Records Act). Every reasonable precaution must be taken to protect against theunnecessary release of a patient’s health-care information. Certain sensibleapproaches should be kept in mind. A zoning board member who recognizesthe applicant as one with whom he or she has a meaningful patient-physicianrelationship can simply disqualify himself or herself from the case, withnothing more being said. One would expect, in most cases, a zoning board 36 member to know whether that type of meaningful relationship exists, aftersome explanation by the zoning board attorney. If in doubt, the member canconsult with the board attorney and speak in hypothetical terms to gain anunderstanding whether recusal is appropriate. Erring on the side ofdisqualification when the board member has had a patient-physicianrelationship with the applicant is the most prudent course. The challenge will be in those cases where a board member, or themember’s immediate family, has had a patient-physician relationship that themember may not consider meaningful, but where an objector could concludethat the relationship is one that “might reasonably be expected to impair [themember’s] objectivity or independence of judgment.” See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d). In such cases, the board member should not be required to discloseanything more than that he or she, or a family member, was at one time apatient of the applicant or objector or someone with a property interest at stakein the outcome of the proceedings. Then, if the issue is contested in an actionin lieu of prerogative writs, any disclosures should be heard in camera and exparte before a Law Division judge. Only if the judge concludes that disclosureis necessary should some form of disclosure be mandated, and then only to theextent reasonably necessary, minimizing the invasion of privacy into suchsensitive matters. A board member should not be required to reveal the precise 37 nature of a medical condition or other intimate details of treatment. Anypotential disclosure must be balanced against the sanctity of the privacy of thepatient’s health information. Because the trial court determined that any inquiry into a meaningfulpatient-physician relationship between a Board member and Dr. Kenneth, Dr.Daniel, or Dr. Daniel III was irrelevant, it struck interrogatories that, ifanswered, may have revealed such a relationship. We conclude that the trialcourt erred in barring any inquiry into the subject matter. Dr. Kenneth and Dr.Daniel had practiced medicine in Garfield for many decades. That one or both,or Dr. Daniel III, may have had a meaningful patient-physician relationshipwith a Board member or with the member’s immediate family is not a far-fetched assumption. Because the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division judge, weremand to the trial court to explore this issue within the constraints set forth inthis opinion. VI. An impartial hearing before a zoning board is an essential promise of ourlaws. That promise cannot be fulfilled if those rendering decisions areimpaired by conflicts of interest. For the reasons expressed, we reverse the 38 judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court forproceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and FERNANDEZ-VINA join. 39 Vincent Piscitelli and Rose Mary Piscitelli, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment; Arlene Patire; Robert Cochrane; DSJ Family Trust; Daniel P. Conte, III, Stacey A. Conte and Jamie G. Kreshpane, Trustees of the DSJ Family Trust; and Dr. Daniel P. Conte, Jr., Defendants-Respondents. JUSTICE SOLOMON, dissenting. I agree with the majority that a physician-patient relationship can bedeeply personal and may be capable, under certain circumstances, of creating adisqualifying conflict of interest that imperils the public’s confidence . Hence,I agree to a remand to permit further, but careful, examination of the natureand extent of the physician-patient relationships at issue here. However,because Dr. Kenneth’s relationship to the DSJ Family Trust’s application istoo attenuated to qualify as a disqualifying conflict of interest, I do not agreewith the majority that a remand is necessary to determine whether Dr. Kennethmight, in his capacity as president or member of the Board of Education, voteon significant matters relating to the employment of Zoning Board members o r 1 their immediate family. Therefore, a remand to determine Dr. Kenneth’sauthority by virtue of his position on the Board of Education is unnecessary.Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent because I believe the trial courtjudgment, affirmed by the Appellate Division, was correct in rejecting thealleged Board of Education conflicts in this matter and should be affirmed. I. In 1991, the Legislature recognized that “[t]he vitality and stability ofrepresentative democracy depend upon the public’s confidence in the integrityof its elected and appointed representatives,” N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2(b), andtherefore established a statutory code of ethics for local government officersand employees. The Legislature acknowledged that public employees,particularly those representing their local municipalities, “cannot and shouldnot be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions andpolicies of government.” Id. § 22.4. Therefore, the Legislature sought tostrike the appropriate balance “between those conflicts of interest which arelegitimate and unavoidable in a free society and those conflicts of interestwhich are prejudicial and material and are, therefore, corruptive of ademocracy and free society.” Ibid. Of particular relevance to this appeal is N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d), whichprovides that a local official may not “act in his official capacity in any matter 2 where he, a member of his immediate family, or a business organization inwhich he has an interest, has a direct or indirect financial or personalinvolvement that might reasonably be expected to impair his objectivity orindependence of judgment.” 1 The statute in no way implicates a localgovernment official’s participation in an unrelated municipal board, absent afinancial or personal interest in the application at issue. Furthermore, when analyzing the existence of a disqualifying conflict,we are constrained to apply the ethics rules with caution. Grabowsky v.Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 554 (2015). In an effort to strike theappropriate balance envisioned by the Legislature in enacting the LocalGovernment Ethics Law, we must be mindful that “[l]ocal governments wouldbe seriously handicapped if every possible interest, no matter how remote andspeculative, would serve as a disqualification of an official.” Wyzykowski v.Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 523 (1993) (quoting Van Itallie v. Borough of FranklinLakes, 28 N.J. 258, 269 (1958)).1 The Local Government Ethics Law defines “interest” as “the ownership or control of more than 10% of the profits, assets or stock of a business organization,” N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.3(d), and “member of immediate family” as “the spouse or dependent child of a local government officer or employee residing in the same household,” id. § 22.3(i). 3 II. With those guidelines in mind, it is important to first note that anirrevocable trust bearing Dr. Kenneth’s name -- and not Dr. Kenneth himself --owned a fifty-percent interest in the relevant lots at the time of the DSJ FamilyTrust’s application. It is well settled that an irrevocable trust “cannot beterminated by the settlor once it is created,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1651 (9thed. 2009), and “[u]ltimately . . . it is the best interests of the beneficiaries thatcontrol,” Coffey v. Coffey, 286 N.J. Super. 42, 53 (App. Div. 1995); accordRestatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (Am. Law Inst. 1959). Dr. Kenneth wasnot a trustee of the Dr. Kenneth Trust; his nephew and nieces served as thetrust’s sole trustees. Indeed, from the application’s inception, an irrevocabletrust bearing Dr. Kenneth’s name was the only nexus between Dr. Kenneth andthe relevant lots. Additionally, nearly two months before the Zoning Board held its firstpublic hearing on the application, Dr. Kenneth’s nephew and nieces -- actingas trustees -- transferred the Dr. Kenneth Trust’s undivided fifty-percentinterest in the two lots to the DSJ Family Trust. Our colleagues acknowledgethat finding Dr. Kenneth directed the trustees to initiate this transfer would bemere speculation, making even more remote Dr. Kenneth’s feeble connectionto the lots. Absent any meaningful link to the relevant parcels or their transfer, 4 Dr. Kenneth’s relationship to the application is far too attenuated to qualify asan “interest” under N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.3(d).2 III. The supposed connection between the Zoning Board, the Board ofEducation, and the DSJ Family Trust’s application is Dr. Kenneth -- the then-president of the Board of Education who was also the brother and uncle of thebeneficiaries of the irrevocable trusts that owned the lots at the time of thehearing. As president of the Board of Education, Dr. Kenneth did not have theauthority to act unilaterally on behalf of the Board of Education as to anymatters regarding its employees. 3 Although five Zoning Board members hadeither a direct or familial employment relationship with the Board ofEducation at the time of the DSJ Family Trust’s application and hearing, theapplication was wholly unrelated to the Board of Education or its property.The Board of Education was neither the applicant nor an objector before the2 Dr. Kenneth and his brother owned the medical building adjacent to the relevant lots. However, any purported conflict created by ownership of the adjacent medical building vanished upon transfer of the lots to the DSJ Family Trust. 3 See Matawan Reg’l Teachers Ass’n v. Matawan-Aberdeen Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 223 N.J. Super. 504, 507 (App. Div. 1988) (explaining that “a majority vote of the members of the board constituting a quorum” is necessary under N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1 to take any action). 5 Zoning Board. Neither the Board of Education nor any Zoning Board memberwho had a direct or familial relationship with the Board of Education ownedthe subject property or any property affected by the DSJ Family Trust’sapplication. Nor did Zoning Board members vote on a matter that affected theBoard of Education’s interests, its revenue stream, or its employees when theyvoted on the application at issue. I agree with the trial court that absent a meaningful link between theZoning Board, the Board of Education, and the DSJ Family Trust’sapplication, which does not exist here, a Zoning Board member’s direct orfamilial employment relationship to the Board of Education cannot constitute adisqualifying conflict of interest. I reach this conclusion because “to abrogatea municipal action at the suggestion that some remote and nebulous interest ispresent[] would be to unjustifiably deprive a municipality in many importantinstances of the services of its duly elected or appointed officials.” Van Itallie, 28 N.J. at 269. IV. Nevertheless, the Piscitellis contend that the attenuated ties between theZoning Board, the Board of Education, and the DSJ Family Trust’s applicationcreated a disqualifying conflict by virtue of Dr. Kenneth’s service on theBoard of Education of the City of Garfield in several capacities for more than 6 thirty years. A local official’s decades-long dedication to public service on amunicipal board unrelated to the Zoning Board considering the applicationdoes not, in and of itself, create a disqualifying conflict of interest. Thisconclusion is consistent with the balance struck by the Legislature in enactingthe Local Government Ethics Law. “Local officials who are thoroughlyfamiliar with their community’s characteristics and interests and are the properrepresentatives of its people[] are undoubtedly the best equipped” to servetheir municipalities, “[a]nd their determinations should not be approached witha general feeling of suspicion.” Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954). It bearsrepeating that “[l]ocal governments would be seriously handicapped if everypossible interest, no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as adisqualification of an official.” Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523 (quoting VanItallie, 28 N.J. at 269). V. The Local Government Ethics Law governs whether any Zoning Boardmember has a disqualifying conflict of interest with respect to an application.It was enacted to provide clearer guidance to local officials by shoring up thelines between what is, and is not, a disqualifying interest. Yet, the majority’sconclusion renders murky those lines by impermissibly extending the LocalGovernment Ethics Law’s purview to reach the interests of Dr. Kenneth -- an 7 individual who is not subject to the limitations set forth under N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d). The application before the Zoning Board in no way implicated anyinterest of Dr. Kenneth or the Board of Education. Id. § 22.3(d). Therefore,Dr. Kenneth’s position on the Board of Education could not have, in and ofitself, imbued the matter with a Board of Education interest. The majority’sconclusion upsets the careful balance struck by the Local Government EthicsLaw. I therefore must respectfully dissent, in part. 8