Title: Delaney v. Dickey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2020

Delaney v. Dickey Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary At issue in this appeal was whether the arbitration provision in the retainer agreement plaintiff Brian Delaney signed when he engaged the representation of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. was enforceable in light of the fiduciary responsibility that lawyers owe their clients and the professional obligations imposed on attorneys by the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs). In 2015, Delaney, a sophisticated businessman, retained Sills to represent him in a lawsuit. He met with a Sills attorney who presented him with a four-page retainer agreement. It was understood that Trent Dickey was slated to be the attorney primarily responsible for representing Delaney reviewed and signed the retainer agreement in the presence of the Sills attorney without asking any questions. After the representation was terminated, a fee dispute arose and, in August 2016, Sills invoked the JAMS arbitration provision in the retainer agreement. While the arbitration was ongoing, Delaney filed a legal malpractice action against Dickey and the Sills firm. The complaint alleged that Dickey and Sills negligently represented him. The complaint also alleged that the mandatory arbitration provision in the retainer agreement violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and wrongly deprived him of his constitutional right to have a jury decide his legal malpractice action. The trial court held that the retainer agreement’s arbitration provision was valid and enforceable. Additionally, the court determined that Delaney waived his right to trial by jury by agreeing to the unambiguously stated arbitration provision. The Appellate Division disagreed, stressing that Sills should have provided the thirty-three pages of JAMS arbitration rules incorporated into the agreement, that Sills did not explain the costs associated with arbitration, and that the retainer included a fee-shifting provision not permissible under New Jersey law. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that, for an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement to be enforceable, an attorney must generally explain to a client the benefits and disadvantages of arbitrating a prospective dispute between the attorney and client. "Delaney must be allowed to proceed with his malpractice action in the Law Division. We affirm and modify the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the Law Division" for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .(NOTE: The status of this decision is .) SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Brian Delaney v. Trent S. Dickey (A-30-19) (083440)Argued September 15, 2020 -- Decided December 21, 2020ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the arbitration provision in the retainer agreement plaintiff Brian Delaney signed when he engaged the representation of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. is enforceable in light of the fiduciary responsibility that lawyers owe their clients and the professional obligations imposed on attorneys by the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs). On September 16, 2015, Delaney, a sophisticated businessman, retained Sills to represent him in a lawsuit. He met with a Sills attorney who presented him with a four- page retainer agreement. It was understood that Trent Dickey, who was not in the office that day, was slated to be the attorney primarily responsible for representing Delaney. During the meeting, the Sills attorney told Delaney that he should take his time reviewing the retainer agreement and ask any questions he had about its contents. The third page of the retainer agreement contained an arbitration provision stating that any dispute about the firm’s legal services or fees would be determined by arbitration and that, by agreeing to arbitration, Delaney waived his right to trial by jury; the agreement also advised Delaney that the arbitral result would be final and non- appealable. The fourth page of the retainer agreement indicated that the arbitration proceeding would be conducted through a private arbitration and mediation organization called JAMS and contained a hyperlink to thirty-three pages of JAMS rules governing the arbitral forum. The Sills attorney did not provide Delaney with a hard copy of the thirty- three pages of JAMS rules, offer an explanation of the arbitration provisions in the agreement or the hyperlink, or advise Delaney of the advantages and disadvantages of an arbitral forum in the event of a future fee dispute with or legal malpractice action against the Sills firm. Delaney reviewed and signed the retainer agreement in the presence of the Sills attorney without asking any questions. After the representation was terminated, a fee dispute arose and, in August 2016, Sills invoked the JAMS arbitration provision in the retainer agreement. While the arbitration was ongoing, Delaney filed a legal malpractice action against Dickey and the Sills firm. The complaint alleged that Dickey and Sills negligently represented him. The 1 complaint also alleged that the mandatory arbitration provision in the retainer agreement violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and wrongly deprived him of his constitutional right to have a jury decide his legal malpractice action. The court held that the retainer agreement’s arbitration provision was valid and enforceable. The court specifically found that the provision’s language -- “any dispute with respect to the Firm’s legal services and/or payment by you of amounts to the Firm” will be submitted to arbitration -- was sufficiently broad to encompass a claim of legal malpractice. Additionally, the court determined that Delaney waived his right to trial by jury by agreeing to the unambiguously stated arbitration provision, citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), and further observed that a law firm has no obligation to explain to a client the terms of a clearly written retainer agreement that “can be understood by a layperson.” Finally, the court noted that Delaney had sufficient time to consider the import of the retainer agreement. The Appellate Division disagreed, stressing that Sills should have provided the thirty-three pages of JAMS arbitration rules incorporated into the agreement, that Sills did not explain the costs associated with arbitration, and that the retainer included a fee- shifting provision not permissible under New Jersey law. The Court granted defendants’ petition for certification. 240 N.J. 194 (2019).HELD: For an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement to be enforceable, an attorney must generally explain to a client the benefits and disadvantages of arbitrating a prospective dispute between the attorney and client. Such an explanation is necessary because, to make an informed decision, the client must have a basic understanding of the fundamental differences between an arbitral forum and a judicial forum in resolving a future fee dispute or malpractice action. See RPC 1.4(c). That information can be conveyed in an oral dialogue or in writing, or by both, depending on how the attorney chooses best to communicate it. The Court refers the issues raised in this opinion to the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, which may propose further guidance on the scope of an attorney’s disclosure requirements. The new mandate will apply prospectively, except as to Delaney, who must be allowed to proceed with his malpractice action in the Law Division.1. Unlike the vendor in a typical commercial transaction, a lawyer serves in a fiduciary role to a client or prospective client. All fiduciaries are held to a duty of fairness, good faith and fidelity, but an attorney is held to an even higher degree of responsibility in these matters than is required of all others. Above all else, a lawyer’s fiduciary role requires that the lawyer act fairly in all dealings with the client and provide the client with not only complete and undivided loyalty, but also with advice that will protect the client’s interests. Lawyers typically prepare retainer agreements, and clients rely on the integrity of their lawyers who fashion the agreements. The attorney bears the burden of 2 establishing the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction given the special considerations inherent in the attorney-client relationship. One of the paramount duties of a lawyer is to make necessary disclosures to the client so that the client can make informed decisions. That duty is expressed in RPC 1.4(c), which states that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” (pp. 23-24)2. The American Bar Association (ABA) has issued a formal opinion construing the model rule on which RPC 1.4(c) is patterned. The ABA found that a provision in a retainer agreement requiring “the binding arbitration of disputes concerning fees and malpractice claims” did not violate the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, “provided that the client has been fully apprised of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration and has given her informed consent to the inclusion of the arbitration provision in the retainer agreement.” Additionally, the ABA opinion recognized that a mandatory arbitration provision in a retainer agreement that insulates the lawyer from liability which she otherwise would be exposed under common or statutory law would contravene ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h), which is substantially similar to New Jersey’s RPC 1.8(h). Professional ethics committees and courts in other jurisdictions have reached conclusions similar to those in the ABA opinion. (pp. 25-32)3. Noting that the advisory ethics opinions and judicial opinions from other jurisdictions require attorneys, at the very least, to explain the advantages and disadvantages of arbitrating a future fee dispute or malpractice action in light of the substantial differences between adjudicating a dispute in a judicial and arbitral forum, the Court reviews some of the differences between the arbitral JAMS forum in this case and a judicial forum. The Court makes no value judgment whether a judicial or arbitral forum is superior in resolving a legal malpractice action, which is a determination to be made by the lawyer and client, after the lawyer explains to the client the differences between the two forums so the client can make an informed decision. (pp. 32-36)4. The arbitration provision at issue in this case -- on its face -- would be enforceable if the Sills retainer agreement were a typical contract between a commercial vendor and a customer. See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444-45. But a retainer agreement is not an ordinary contract -- it must conform not only to the legal principles governing contracts, but also to the ethical obligations imposed on attorneys by the RPCs. Requiring attorneys to explain to a client the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration so that the client can make an informed decision whether to arbitrate a future fee dispute or legal malpractice claim against the firm does not single out a retainer agreement’s arbitration provision for disparate treatment and therefore does not run afoul of the Federal Arbitration Act or the New Jersey Arbitration Act. (pp. 36-39)5. The client comes to a lawyer for assistance in addressing a particular issue and is not likely anticipating a day when he may have to do battle with the lawyer, who is retained 3 to promote his interests and protect his rights. Yet, the insertion of an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement indicates that the attorney has given thought to the prospect that the client may be a future adversary and has selected the forum in which potential disputes, whether about the attorney’s fees or services, will be resolved. Not even a shadow of a conflict of interest should be cast over the attorney-client relationship at its inception. To dispel that shadow, lawyers should make the necessary disclosures in a disinterested manner to allow clients to make an informed decision, as required by the RPCs. Consistent with the ABA opinion, the weight of authority as expressed in professional advisory opinions and judicial case law in other jurisdictions, and this Court’s interpretation of its own RPCs, the Court holds that attorneys who insert provisions in their retainer agreements to arbitrate future fee disputes or legal malpractice claims must explain the advantages and disadvantages of the arbitral and judicial forums. Attorneys can fulfill that requirement in writing or orally -- or by both means. The Court provides examples of information that may be disclosed. (pp. 39-43)6. The Court sets forth in this opinion the rudimentary requirements expected of attorneys who include a provision in a retainer agreement that mandates the arbitration of a future fee dispute or malpractice action. Noting that the issues raised here would benefit from further study and discussion, the Court refers those issues to the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics. (pp. 43-44)7. Although the Court’s opinion does not break with established precedent, the retroactive application of its ruling may not have been reasonably anticipated and would disturb the settled expectations of many lawyers throughout New Jersey, who genuinely believed that an arbitration provision that met the standards of such cases as Atalese would satisfy the requirements of the RPCs. Therefore, the Court’s holding will apply prospectively from the day of the issuance of this opinion, except as to Delaney, in keeping with the general practice whereby the plaintiff receives the benefit of the rule established in the opinion. Here, because Delaney was not given an explanation of the advantages or disadvantages of arbitration, the present malpractice action is not subject to the arbitration provision of the Sills retainer agreement. Delaney therefore must be allowed to proceed with this malpractice action in the Law Division. The Court stresses that it makes no finding that Sills or its attorneys violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, and it accepts their representations that they acted good faith. (pp. 44-47) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. The matter is remanded to the Law Division.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 2019 083440 Brian Delaney, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Trent S. Dickey and Sills Cummis & Gross, P.C., Defendants-Appellants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 15, 2020 December 21, 2020Peter G. Verniero argued the cause for appellants (Sills Cummis & Gross, attorneys; Peter G. Verniero, Richard H. Epstein, and Joshua N. Howley, of counsel and on the briefs).Glenn A. Bergenfield argued the cause for respondent (Glenn A. Bergenfield, on the briefs).William E. Denver argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Kimberly A. Yonta, President, of counsel, and Andrea J. Sullivan and Kersten Kortbawi, on the brief).Michael S. Stein argued the cause for amicus curiae Bergen County Bar Association (Pashman Stein Walder 1 Hayden, attorneys; Michael S. Stein and Janie Byalik, on the brief). Michael J. Epstein argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (The Epstein Law Firm, attorneys; Michael J. Epstein, of counsel and on the brief, and Michael A. Rabasca, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. An attorney serves in a fiduciary role with a client at the very inceptionof the attorney-client relationship. In that fiduciary role, an attorney has aprofessional obligation to explain the content of a retainer agreement “to theextent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisionsregarding the representation.” RPC 1.4(c). Thus, a retainer agreement is notan ordinary contract governed by the rules of the marketplace but is a contractthat must meet the high standards of the Rules of Professional Conduct (orRPCs). An attorney’s professional and fiduciary obligations requirescrupulous fairness and transparency in dealing with clients -- requirementsdifferent from the typical norms that regulate arm’s-length commercialtransactions between vendors and customers. Through the lens of those basic principles, we view the issue before us:whether a lawyer has a duty to explain the benefits and disadvantages of a 2 provision in a retainer agreement that binds the client to arbitrate a future feedispute or legal malpractice action in a non-judicial forum. In this case, plaintiff Brian Delaney, a sophisticated businessman, soughtthe representation of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. (Sills), a prominent law firm,in an ongoing commercial lawsuit with his estranged business partners. At the Sills office, an attorney handed Delaney a four-page retaineragreement, including a one-page attachment (fourth page). The retaineragreement stated that any dispute about the firm’s legal services or fees wouldbe determined by arbitration and that, by agreeing to arbitration, Delaneywaived his right to trial by jury. The agreement also advised Delaney that thearbitral result would be final and non-appealable. The one-page attachmentindicated that the arbitration proceeding would remain confidential and wouldbe conducted through a private arbitration and mediation organization calledJAMS pursuant to its rules and procedures. The attachment, moreover,contained a hyperlink to thirty-three pages of JAMS rules governing thearbitral forum. 1 On the day Delaney reviewed and signed the retaineragreement, the Sills attorney did not provide a hard copy of the JAMS rules,1 The thirty-three pages of JAMS rules include the cover page and table of contents. 3 although he offered to answer any questions Delaney might have about theagreement. Delaney later terminated his relationship with Sills. When Delaneyrefused to pay the outstanding fees allegedly owed to Sills, the firm invokedthe arbitration provision. Delaney later sued Sills for professional malpracticeand moved before the Chancery Division to stay the fee dispute that wasalready in arbitration, pending the outcome of the malpractice action. TheChancery Division ruled that the fee dispute and the malpractice claim weresubject to the retainer agreement’s arbitration provision. The Appellate Division reversed. It found that Sills’s failure to provideDelaney with the thirty-three pages of JAMS rules referenced in the retaineragreement before Delaney signed the agreement or to explain to him the JAMSrules, “some of which were material to the arbitration clause and the client’sdecision to retain Sills,” rendered the arbitration provision unenforceableunder the Rules of Professional Conduct. We now hold that, for an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement tobe enforceable, an attorney must generally explain to a client the benefits anddisadvantages of arbitrating a prospective dispute between the attorney andclient. Such an explanation is necessary because, to make an informeddecision, the client must have a basic understanding of the fundamental 4 differences between an arbitral forum and a judicial forum in resolving a futurefee dispute or malpractice action. See RPC 1.4(c). An arbitration provision in a retainer agreement is an acknowledgementthat the lawyer and client may be future adversaries. That the retaineragreement envisions a potential future adverse relationship between theattorney and client -- and seeks to control the dispute-resolution forum and itsprocedures -- raises the specter of conflicting interests. An arbitral forum andjudicial forum, and their accompanying procedures, are significantly different. We do not make any value judgment about whether an arbitral or ajudicial forum would be more beneficial to a client if the client and attorneypart as adversaries. We conclude, however, that an attorney’s fiduciaryobligation mandates the disclosure of the essential pros and cons of thearbitration provision so that the client can make an informed decision whetherarbitration is to the client’s advantage. See RPC 1.4(c). That obligation is inkeeping with an attorney’s basic responsibility to explain provisions of aretainer agreement that may not be clear on their face. Accordingly, thedisclosures required of an attorney in explaining an arbitration provision in aretainer agreement stand on an equal footing with the disclosures required inexplaining other material provisions in the agreement. Such comparable 5 treatment does not offend the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to16, or the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36. The arbitration provision in this case satisfies the requirements for atypical consumer or commercial agreement. The heightened professional andfiduciary responsibilities of an attorney, however, demand more -- anexplanation of the differences between an arbitral and judicial forum. Thatexplanation may include, for example, that in arbitration the client will nothave a trial before a jury in a courtroom open to the public; the outcome of thearbitration will not be appealable and will remain confidential; the client maybe responsible, in part, for the costs of the arbitration proceedings, includingpayments to the arbitrator; and the discovery available in arbitration may bemore limited than in a judicial forum. 2 That information can be conveyed in an oral dialogue or in writing, or byboth, depending on how the attorney chooses best to communicate it. We referthe issues raised in this opinion to the Advisory Committee on ProfessionalEthics for its review. The Committee may make recommendations to thisCourt and propose further guidance on the scope of an attorney’s disclosurerequirements.2 The nature of the disclosure requirements will depend on the particular rules of the arbitral forum chosen by the attorney. 6 Because the professional obligation we now impose may not have beenreasonably anticipated and would unsettle expectations among lawyers, we applythis new mandate prospectively, with one exception. Applying the holding of ouropinion here is “consistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party whobrings a claim that advances the common law should receive the benefit of hisefforts.” See Estate of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199, 204 (2020). To beclear, however, we do not find that Sills or its attorneys violated the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, and we accept their representations that they acted in goodfaith. Therefore, Delaney must be allowed to proceed with his malpractice actionin the Law Division. We affirm and modify the judgment of the AppellateDivision and remand to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with thisopinion. I. A. This appeal comes before us on facts essentially undisputed in theparties’ pleadings. In November 2014, Delaney filed a lawsuit in Morris County against hisbusiness partners in two limited liability companies involved in real estatedevelopment. In January 2015, one of those business partners filed a lawsuit 7 against Delaney in Sussex County. The law firm of Trenk DiPasqualerepresented Delaney in both actions. On September 16, 2015, Delaney retained Sills to represent him in theMorris County lawsuit, replacing Trenk DiPasquale. That day, Delaney metwith a Sills attorney who presented him with a four-page retainer agreement.It was understood that Trent Dickey, who was not in the office that day, wasslated to be the attorney primarily responsible for representing Delaney. TheSills attorney signed Dickey’s name to the agreement and affixed his owninitials below the signature. During the meeting, the Sills attorney toldDelaney that he should take his time reviewing the retainer agreement and askany questions he had about its contents. The third page of the retainer agreement contained the followingarbitration provision: [I]n the event that we and you are unable to come to amicable resolution with respect to any dispute (including, without limitation, any dispute with respect to the Firm’s legal services and/or payment by you of amounts to the Firm), we and you agree that such dispute will be submitted to and finally determined by Arbitration in accordance with the provisions set forth on attachment 1 to this retainer letter. In such case, you would need to engage separate counsel to represent your interests and you would incur additional expense in connection with such arbitration. The decision of the Arbitrator will be final and binding and neither the Firm nor you will have the right to appeal such decision, whether in a court or in another arbitration proceeding. 8 You understand that, by agreeing to arbitrate disputes as provided in this retainer letter, you are waiving any and all statutory and other rights that you may have to a trial by jury in connection with any such dispute, claim or controversy. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph and Attachment 1, the Company will retain the Company’s absolute right to proceed under the Fee Arbitration Rules set forth in New Jersey Court Rule 1:20A, which will take precedence. A one-page attachment entitled “Attachment 1 to Engagement Letter -Arbitration Provisions” -- the fourth page of the agreement -- gave a generaldescription of some of the arbitration rules and provided a hyperlink to thirty-three pages of JAMS rules governing any dispute between the law firm and theclient. The attachment stated: Any disputes arising out of or relating to this engagement agreement or the Firm’s engagement by you will be conducted pursuant to the JAMS/Endispute Arbitration Rules and Procedures (the “JAMS Rules”) then in effect (see http://www.jamsadr.com), except that, notwithstanding those rules, the following provisions will apply to the arbitration: Panel. The arbitration will be conducted by one impartial arbitrator (who may be a former judge, practicing attorney or person who is not an attorney), selected by mutual agreement or, if we and the Company cannot agree, the arbitrator will be selected in accordance with the JAMS Rules. Process. The arbitrator will not award punitive damages to either party, and we and the Company will each be deemed to have waived any right to such damages. The arbitrator will, in rendering his or her decision, apply the substantive law of the State of New 9 Jersey (excluding its choice of law rules that would require the application of the laws of another jurisdiction). The place of arbitration will be Newark, New Jersey. The award of the arbitrator will include a written explanation of his or her decision and specify the basis for any damages. The written decision of the arbitrator will be final, binding and non-appealable and may be enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction. The Firm and You will pay an equal share of all costs and expenses related to compensation of the arbitrator, the site and any administrative fees, except that the award rendered by the arbitrator may include the costs and expenses of arbitration, reasonable attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs for expert and other witnesses. Confidentiality. The arbitration proceeding will be confidential. The existence of any matter submitted to arbitration, and the award, will be kept in confidence by you, the Firm and the arbitrator, except as required in connection with the enforcement of such award or as otherwise required by applicable law. The Sills attorney did not provide Delaney with a hard copy of thethirty-three pages of JAMS rules, offer an explanation of the arbitrationprovisions in the agreement or the hyperlink, or advise Delaney of theadvantages and disadvantages of an arbitral forum in the event of a future feedispute with or legal malpractice action against the Sills firm. Delaneyreviewed and signed the retainer agreement in the presence of the Sillsattorney without asking any questions. In an October 7, 2015 supplemental retainer letter forwarded to Delaney,Dickey confirmed that Sills would substitute as counsel for Trenk DiPasquale 10 in the Sussex County lawsuit. The supplemental letter -- signed by Delaneyand returned to Sills the next day -- advised that an additional retainer wasrequired and that the firm’s “fees will likely exceed $300,000 up to trial, andcould be substantially higher.” That letter made no reference to arbitration. At some point, Dickey and Delaney agreed that Sills would withdrawfrom the Sussex County lawsuit, allowing another attorney, who agreed to capDelaney’s fees, to substitute as counsel. In April 2016, Delaney allegedlyagreed to accept a financial settlement in the Morris County litigation sub jectto the parties’ agreement to negotiate additional terms. After a final agreementwas purportedly reached, Delaney terminated his relationship with Sills onJuly 21, 2016. At the time, Delaney refused to pay the almost $440,000 inlegal fees that Sills asserted it was owed.3 By letter dated July 25, 2016, Sills forwarded a pre-action notice toDelaney advising him of his right to elect fee arbitration with the EssexCounty Fee Arbitration Committee under the New Jersey Court Rules. 4Delaney did not avail himself of that right.3 According to Delaney, the Sills firm billed him nearly $1,000,000 in legal fees. 4 Rule 1:20A-6 provides that “[n]o lawsuit to recover a fee may be filed until the expiration of the 30 day period herein giving Pre-action Notice to a client,” advising the client of the right to seek fee arbitration under the New Jersey 11 On August 29, 2016, Sills invoked the JAMS arbitration provision in theretainer agreement. The parties postponed the arbitration as they attempted toresolve the fee dispute through mediation. After mediation failed, on April 6,2017, Sills restarted the arbitration process, and the parties selected anarbitrator. In the ensuing months, the parties skirmished over discovery andprocedural matters. On August 31, 2017, Delaney filed a legal malpractice action againstDickey and the Sills firm in the Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County. 5The complaint alleged that Dickey and Sills negligently represented him. Thecomplaint also alleged that the mandatory arbitration provision in the retaineragreement violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and wrongly deprivedhim of his constitutional right to have a jury decide his legal malpracticeaction. Afterwards, the arbitrator stated that arbitration, scheduled for October10-12, 2017, would not be postponed on account of the filing of themalpractice case.Court Rules. In the scenario before us, under our Court Rules, Delaney, not Sills, could request arbitration of a fee dispute before a court-appointed fee arbitration committee. See R. 1:20A-3. 5 The malpractice lawsuit also named as defendants Delaney’s prior attorneys, the Brach Eichler firm and one of its lawyers. 12 On September 19, 2017, Delaney filed an Order to Show Cause andverified complaint in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Essex County ,seeking a declaratory judgment that the retainer agreement’s arbitrationprovision was unenforceable. Alternatively, Delaney requested that theChancery Division stay the arbitration pending the outcome of the legalmalpractice action, explaining that to do otherwise would result in the“likelihood of inconsistent rulings and piecemeal litigation.” In the verifiedcomplaint, Delaney asserted that Sills did not make him “aware of theinequities and costs associated with proceeding with arbitration.” Morespecifically, he asserted that Sills did not explain to him that he might beresponsible for arbitration fees that could greatly exceed the filing fees in acomparable court action and for the firm’s attorneys’ fees and costs, dependingon how the arbitrator ruled. Finally, he alleged that he would not have signedthe retainer agreement if he had been told that he was giving up his right to ajury trial in the event he had to bring a legal malpractice claim against Sills . The Chancery Division granted Delaney’s Order to Show Cause andheard oral argument. B. On November 9, 2017, the Chancery Division denied Delaney’sapplication to stay the arbitration proceeding and held that the retainer 13 agreement’s arbitration provision was valid and enforceable. The courtspecifically found that the provision’s language -- “any dispute with respect tothe Firm’s legal services and/or payment by you of amounts to the Firm” willbe submitted to arbitration -- was sufficiently broad to encompass a claim oflegal malpractice. Additionally, the court determined that Delaney waived hisright to trial by jury by agreeing to the unambiguously stated arbitrationprovision, citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430(2014), and further observed that a law firm has no obligation to explain to aclient the terms of a clearly written retainer agreement that “can be understoodby a layperson.” Finally, the court noted that Delaney had sufficient time toconsider the import of the retainer agreement. 6 The Chancery Division and Law Division entered separate ordersdirecting that Delaney’s malpractice action proceed in arbitration anddismissing his malpractice complaint filed in the Law Division.6 The Chancery Division incorrectly concluded that Delaney had twenty-two days to ponder the retainer agreement handed to him by the Sills attorney on September 16, 2015. In fact, Delaney signed the agreement on that date. The Chancery Division believed that Delaney did not sign and return the initial agreement until October 8, 2015, but it was Dickey’s supplemental retainer letter that Delaney signed and returned on that date. 14 C. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division declared that thearbitration provision in the Sills retainer agreement was unenforceable becauseSills did not fulfill its fiduciary responsibility under the Rules of ProfessionalConduct to explain to its client the effect of arbitrating a future malpracticeaction. The Appellate Division primarily focused its analysis on RPC 1.4(c),which requires that a lawyer “explain a matter to the extent reasonablynecessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding therepresentation.” In doing so, it noted that “[t]he potential effect of anagreement to arbitrate must be clear to the client to be binding upon him .”(alteration in original) (quoting Kamaratos v. Palias, 360 N.J. Super. 76, 87(App. Div. 2003)). The Appellate Division held that, when presenting the retaineragreement to Delaney for his signature, Sills should have provided the thirty-three pages of JAMS arbitration rules incorporated into the agreement, “someof which were material to the arbitration clause and the client’s decision toretain Sills.” The court emphasized that Sills did not explain the arbitrationprovision or the JAMS rules to Delaney and that, without having a copy of therules when he signed the agreement, Delaney could not have agreed to the 15 limitation on his right to discovery or to forgo other benefits available in anaction filed in a court. The Appellate Division observed that although the arbitration provisioninformed Delaney that “he would be required to pay an equal share of all costsand expenses related to compensation of the arbitrator,” without anexplanation from Sills, “the client had no way of gauging whether thearbitrator’s fee would be closer to $10,000, $50,000 or $100,000.” The courtalso pointed out that the text of the retainer agreement allowed for thearbitrator to impose “reasonable attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs” on theclient in the malpractice action -- fee-shifting not permissible under NewJersey law. In conclusion, the Appellate Division stressed that it was not holdingthat retainer agreements mandating arbitration of legal malpractice claims wereper se invalid or that the “reasonable explanation” required by RPC 1.4(c)could not be provided in writing. Rather, it determined only that when anattorney does not provide to the client, at the time of the signing of a retaineragreement with an arbitration provision, a document incorporated into theagreement containing material terms concerning arbitration and gives noexplanation of the import of those material terms, the arbitration provisioncannot stand. 16 D. We granted defendants’ petition for certification. 240 N.J. 194 (2019).We also granted the motions of the New Jersey State Bar Association, theBergen County Bar Association, and the New Jersey Association for Justice toparticipate as amici curiae. II. A. Sills argues that the clear and unambiguous four-page written retaineragreement handed to Delaney by one of its attorneys, who offered to answerany questions Delaney might have concerning the agreement’s contents,satisfied the firm’s obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Sillsrejects the notion that it had a duty under existing law to provide the clientwith any additional explanation about arbitration, such as opining on thebenefits or disadvantages of arbitrating a future fee dispute or legalmalpractice claim. Sills contends that the Appellate Division violated thisCourt’s jurisprudence by failing to place the arbitration provision on an equalfooting with other contracts or to view arbitration as a favored means forresolving disputes. Sills also maintains that the Appellate Division erred byretroactively imposing on it new disclosure requirements under the RPCs andby trespassing on the domain of the bodies responsible for promulgating new 17 ethical obligations -- the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, theProfessional Responsibility Rules Committee, and this Court. Sills asks thisCourt to reverse and remand the fee dispute and legal malpractice claim forarbitration. B. Delaney counters that Sills breached its fiduciary duty to him byincluding an arbitration provision in the retainer agreement and then by failingto explain the parts that did not benefit him in the event the firm committedmalpractice. That he asked no questions about the retainer agreement is of nomoment, he argues, because under RPC 1.4(c) the firm had a duty to disclosethat the language about arbitrating “any dispute with respect to the Firm’sservices” would encompass a malpractice claim against the firm. Delaneymaintains that he came to Sills to engage its services in his contract disputewith business partners -- not as the firm’s sophisticated and wary adversary.He insists that Sills had an ethical duty to disclose to him how -- in the eventSills committed malpractice -- he benefitted by waiving his rights to sue andpublicly air his dispute in court before a New Jersey judge and jury, toexpansive discovery, to appeal, and not to be bound by an automaticconfidentiality requirement. 18 Delaney also asserts that, in violation of RPC 1.8(h)(1), the arbitrationprovision impermissibly made him potentially liable for Sills’s legal fees andshielded Sills from a claim for punitive damages. He argues that theconflicting interest between Sills and its client made the firm incapable ofgiving him disinterested guidance. He therefore urges this Court to hold thatretainer agreements, like this one, requiring mandatory arbitration of legalmalpractice claims are against public policy and our ethics rules. C. Amicus New Jersey State Bar Association asks this Court to reverse thatpart of the Appellate Division’s judgment that imposes new professionalobligations on attorney-client communications and attorney retaineragreements and to allow the ethical issues raised to be vetted through theformal rulemaking process. The State Bar Association expresses concern thatthe Appellate Division’s interpretation of RPC 1.4(c) will require lawyers toengage in “an in-depth review of legal services agreements with prospectiveclients” beyond the present requirement that lawyers provide “a reasonableexplanation” about a retainer agreement sufficient for clients to make aninformed decision about the representation. The Bergen County Bar Association recognizes that retainer agreementsmandating arbitration for disputes, such as malpractice claims, raise “novel” 19 and “important” questions about disclosures that lawyers are required to maketo clients. It recommends that any proposed disclosure requirements beevaluated by the appropriate Supreme Court committees and through therulemaking process, and that any new disclosure requirements should beimposed prospectively only. The New Jersey Association for Justice posits that in light of theimbalance of power between a lawyer and client and the lawyer’s fiduciaryobligation to the client, “mandatory arbitration clauses in attorney -clientretainer agreements [are] inherently unfair and unreasonable.” It urges thisCourt to prohibit mandatory arbitration provisions in retainer agreements toprotect against “unwitting and uninformed prospective waivers of significantrights” by clients at the very moment they retain counsel. III. A. We must determine what disclosures an attorney must make to apotential client about a provision included in a retainer agreement thatmandates arbitration of a future fee dispute or legal malpractice claim.Typically, a retainer agreement addresses the terms governing an attorney’srepresentation of the matter for which the client has sought the attorney’scounsel. Here, the retainer agreement provides for the terms governing a quite 20 different matter, a future event -- a time when the attorney and the client mightbecome adversaries, a time when the client might file a malpractice lawsuitagainst the lawyer for money damages. The planning for that discordant event-- for an adversarial relationship with a client to whom the attorney owes afiduciary duty -- signals that the interests of the lawyer and client may bedivergent even at the inception of the attorney-client relationship. Although, presumably, Sills concluded that arbitration would be a morefavorable dispute-resolution forum for the firm and its client in the event of amalpractice action, it is at least reasonably debatable whether the client wouldbe best served by substituting an arbitral forum for a judicial forum to litigatean attorney’s malpractice. See Kamaratos, 360 N.J. Super. at 89 (Fuentes,J.A.D., concurring) (“The insertion of a commercial arbitration clause in aretainer agreement . . . pit[s] the lawyer’s interests against the client’s. Theterms and features of an arbitration clause are designed, not for the client’ sbenefit, but to protect and advance the lawyer’s interest in a forum of his orher choosing.”). In an arm’s-length transaction, ordinarily, a vendor and purchaser arefree to agree to mutually acceptable contractual terms in pursuit of theirindividual best interests. But the formation of the attorney-client relationship 21 is not an ordinary commercial transaction, and “a retainer agreement is not anordinary contract.” Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 580 (2020). “[A]n attorney’s freedom to contract” is subject to this Court’s exerciseof its constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law. Cohen v. Radio-Elecs. Officers Union, 146 N.J. 140, 155 (1996); N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.In exercising our constitutional authority, we have promulgated Rules ofProfessional Conduct and issued decisions setting forth the “ethical duties thatattorneys owe their clients and potential clients.” Balducci, 240 N.J. at 591-92. The RPCs and case law make clear “that a retainer agreement [must]satisfy not only ordinary principles governing contracts, but also theprofessional ethical standards governing the attorney-client relationship.” Id.at 592. Unlike the vendor in a typical commercial transaction, a lawyer servesin a fiduciary role to a client or prospective client. Id. at 580, 592.“[P]reserving the fiduciary responsibility that lawyers owe their clients” is aprinciple to which this Court is firmly committed. State in Interest of S.G., 175 N.J. 132, 139 (2003) (quoting Cohen, 146 N.J. at 155). It is the scope of the duties that Sills owed to Delaney in that fiduciaryrelationship -- as well as the tensions arising from the inclusion of thearbitration provision in the retainer agreement -- that is the preeminent issue in 22 this case. Therefore, we must first delineate the lawyer’s role as fiduciary to aclient or potential client. B. “All fiduciaries are held to a duty of fairness, good faith and fidelity, butan attorney is held to an even higher degree of responsibility in these mattersthan is required of all others.” In re Honig, 10 N.J. 74, 78 (1952). Above allelse, a lawyer’s fiduciary role requires that the lawyer act fairly in all dealingswith the client. Balducci, 240 N.J. at 592; see also Black’s Law Dictionary770 (11th ed. 2019) (stating that a fiduciary owes the beneficiary of his or herconcern the duty “of good faith, loyalty, due care, and disclosure”). In thatfiduciary role, a lawyer must provide the client with not only “complete andundivided loyalty,” but also with advice that will “protect the client’sinterests.” S.G., 175 N.J. at 139 (quoting In re Dolan, 76 N.J. 1, 9 (1978)).The foundation of the attorney-client relationship, like any fiduciaryrelationship, is trust and confidence. Ibid. The client places trust andconfidence in the attorney, expecting that the attorney will use his or hersuperior expertise, knowledge, training, and judgment for the client’s benefit.See ibid.; F.G. v. MacDonnell, 150 N.J. 550, 563 (1997). A lawyer is never“privileged to exercise an advantage which will in any respect provedetrimental to his client’s interests.” Honig, 10 N.J. at 78. 23 “We also must be mindful that lawyers typically prepare retaineragreements [and] that clients rely on the integrity of their lawyers who fashionthe agreements . . . .” Balducci, 240 N.J. at 594. In reviewing the fairness of aretainer agreement, “a court may consider the circumstances related to themaking of the agreement, including whether the parties 'actually negotiatedthe agreement,’ 'the client’s level of sophistication or experience in retainingand compensating lawyers,’ and other relevant factors.” Id. at 593 (quotingCohen, 146 N.J. at 160); see also Restatement (Third) of the Law GoverningLawyers § 18 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst. 2000). The attorney, however, bears theburden of “establishing the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction”given the “special considerations inherent in the attorney-client relationship.”Cohen, 146 N.J. at 156. One of the paramount duties of a lawyer is to make necessarydisclosures to the client so that the client can make informed decisions. SeeDolan, 76 N.J. at 9. That duty is expressed in RPC 1.4(c), which states that“[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permitthe client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Sills claims that its attorney fulfilled his professional obligation when hehanded the client the retainer agreement, which contained an arbitrationprovision and a hyperlink to the JAMS rules, and asked the client if he had any 24 questions. Delaney, on the other hand, contends that, at a minimum, the Sillsattorney had an affirmative duty to advise him of the advantages anddisadvantages of arbitrating a malpractice claim before he signed the retaineragreement. Although interpreting RPC 1.4(c) to address this issue is a novelundertaking for our Court, courts and professional ethics committees in otherjurisdictions already have trod this terrain. Also, importantly, the AmericanBar Association (ABA) has spoken on this issue in a formal opinion construingthe model rule on which RPC 1.4(c) is patterned. C. In 2002, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 02-425, Retainer AgreementRequiring the Arbitration of Fee Disputes and Malpractice Claims (ABAOpinion), which held that a provision in a retainer agreement requiring “thebinding arbitration of disputes concerning fees and malpractice claims” did notviolate ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(b), “provided that theclient has been fully apprised of the advantages and disadvantages ofarbitration and has given her informed consent to the inclusion of thearbitration provision in the retainer agreement.” 7 ABA Opinion at 1 (emphasisadded). According to the ABA Opinion, under Model Rule 1.4(b), a lawyer’s7 The language of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(b) is identical to New Jersey’s RPC 1.4(c). 25 fiduciary “duty to explain matters to a client” encompasses “the duty to adviseclients of the possible adverse consequences as well as the benefits that mayarise from the execution of an agreement” that includes an arbitrationprovision. Id. at 4-5. Thus, the lawyer must “'explain’ the implications of theproposed binding arbitration provision 'to the extent reasonably necessary topermit the client to make (an) informed decision’ about whether to agree to the[provision’s] inclusion” in the retainer agreement. Id. at 5 (quoting ModelRule 1.4(b)). The scope of the disclosure will depend on “the sophistication ofthe client.” Ibid. The lawyer, however, “should make clear that arbitrationtypically results in the client’s waiver of significant rights, such as the waiverof the right to a jury trial, the possible waiver of broad discovery, and the lossof the right to appeal.” Ibid. A lawyer “also might explain that the case willbe decided by an individual arbitrator or panel of arbitrators and inform theclient of any obligation that the lawyer or client may have to pay the fees andcosts of arbitration.” Id. at 6. Additionally, the ABA Opinion recognized that a mandatory arbitrationprovision in a “retainer agreement [that] insulates the lawyer from liability . . .to which she otherwise would be exposed under common or statutory law” 26 would contravene ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h). 8 Id. at 3-4. To illustrate that point, the ABA Opinion explains that “if the law of thejurisdiction precludes an award of punitive damages in arbitration but permitspunitive damages in malpractice lawsuits, the provision would violate Rule1.8(h) unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.”Id. at 4. Professional ethics committees, which primarily operate under theauspices of state bar associations, have issued advisory opinions reachingconclusions similar to those in the ABA Opinion. 9 Those ethics opinions8 The Model Rule is substantially similar to New Jersey’s RPC 1.8(h), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client fails to act in accordance with the lawyer’s advice and the lawyer nevertheless continues to represent the client at the client’s request. Notwithstanding the existence of those two conditions, the lawyer shall not make such an agreement unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement . . . .” 9 Unlike New Jersey’s Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, which is appointed by this Court, see R. 1:19-1, the ethics committees in many jurisdictions that issue professional advisory opinions are creatures of their 27 instruct attorneys in their jurisdictions that they must disclose the benefits anddisadvantages of arbitration when an arbitration provision is included in aretainer agreement. See Ariz. Ethics Op. 94-05, at 5 (1994) (advising that anarbitration clause in a retainer agreement is permissible if, among other things,the attorney “fully discloses, in writing and in terms that can be understood bythe client, the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration”); Tex. Ethics Op.586, 72 Tex. B.J. 128, 129 (2009) (advising that the lawyer must provide“sufficient information about the differences between litigation andarbitration” and “the significant advantages and disadvantages of bindingarbitration to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary for aninformed decision by the client”); 10 Conn. Ethics Op. 99-20 (1999) (expressingconcern over an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement in which thelawyer noted the benefits but not the potential drawbacks of arbitration); Pa.Ethics Op. 97-140, at 3 (1997) (advising that a retainer agreement’s arbitrationprovision must be “fully disclosed in writing to the client, setting forth theprincipal advantages and disadvantages of arbitration”); N.Y. Cty. Lawyersstate bar associations. The opinions referenced here are products of those committees unless noted otherwise. 10 This opinion was issued by the Texas Committee on Professional Ethics, whose members are appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas. 28 Ass’n Ethics Op. 723 (1997) (advising that an attorney must make a fulldisclosure of the “material differences between arbitration and litigation in acourt of law” if an arbitration provision is included in a retainer agreement);Okla. Ethics Op. 312 (2000) (same); Vt. Ethics Op. 2003-7, at 1 (advising that,in the absence of the client seeking the advice of independent counselregarding a retainer agreement’s arbitration provision, the attorney “must (1)fully apprise the client as to the advantages and disadvantages of bindingarbitration, and (2) obtain the client’s informed consent in writing to theinclusion of the binding arbitration clause in the representation agreement”). Some jurisdictions require lawyers to advise their potential clients toseek the advice of independent counsel before signing a retainer agreementcontaining an arbitration provision. See, e.g., Pa. Ethics Op. 97-140, at 3(1997) (“[T]he client [must] be advised and given an opportunity to seek theadvice of independent counsel.”); Va. Legal Ethics Op. 638, at 1 (1984)(stating that an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement is permissible“provided that the client consents after full disclosure of the effect of such aprovision and after the client is advised to seek independent counsel in regardto the advisability of such a provision”). Going even further, Michigan EthicsOpinion RI-257 (1996) bars a provision in a retainer agreement to arbitratefuture disputes unless “the client obtains independent counsel concerning the 29 advisability” of agreeing to the arbitration provision. At the far end of thespectrum, the Ohio Supreme Court’s Board of Commissioners on Grievancesand Discipline has advised that a client’s retainer agreement “should notcontain language requiring a client to prospectively agree to arbitrate legalmalpractice disputes.” 11 Ohio Advisory Op. 96-9, at 5 (1996) (emphasisadded). State courts have reached similar conclusions -- that lawyers have aheightened duty of disclosure when they include a provision in a retain eragreement requiring clients to arbitrate future disputes, including malpracticeclaims against the law firm. In Snow v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson,P.A., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that an attorney’s fiduciaryrelationship with a client mandates informed consent when the attorney seeks“to enforce a contractual provision that prospectively requires a client tosubmit malpractice claims against the law firm to arbitration.” 176 A.3d 729,736 (Me. 2017). The Maine high court set forth a “heightened standard” for anattorney to secure the client’s informed consent: “the attorney must effectivelycommunicate to the client that malpractice claims are covered under the11 Now referred to as the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct, each member of this “quasi-judicial body” is appointed by the Ohio Supreme Court. See https://www.bpc.ohio.gov/copy-of-about-the-board. 30 agreement to arbitrate”; “explain, or ensure that the client understands, thedifferences between the arbitral forum and the judicial forum, including theabsence of a jury” as well as “costs” and “appealability”; and “take intoaccount the particular client’s capacity to understand that information andexperience with the arbitration process, as these factors may affect both thebreadth of information and the amount of detail the attorney is obligated toprovide.” Id. at 736-37. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that a lawyer’sfiduciary duty of loyalty and candor to a client requires a full explanation “tothe client [of] the possible consequences of entering into an arbitration clause,including the legal rights the client gives up by agreeing to binding arbitration”of future disputes. Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069, 1077 (La. 2012).The lawyer’s duty of loyalty, the Court explained, “forbids a lawyer fromtaking any action in his own self-interest which would have an adverse effecton the client.” Ibid. To ensure that the client’s consent to a bindingarbitration clause in a retainer agreement is “truly 'informed,’” ibid., at aminimum, “an attorney must make full and complete disclosure of the potentialeffects of an arbitration clause, including the waiver of a jury trial, the waiverof the right to appeal, the waiver of broad discovery rights, and the possiblehigh upfront costs of arbitration,” id. at 1078. In addition, the retainer 31 agreement “must explicitly list the types of disputes covered by the arbitrationclause, e.g., legal malpractice, and make clear that the client retains the right tolodge a disciplinary complaint.” Ibid. Last, the attorney must advise the clientthat he “has the opportunity to speak with independent counsel before signingthe contract.” Id. at 1077; see also Castillo v. Arrieta, 368 P.3d 1249, 1257(N.M. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that if a retainer agreement includes a provisionrequiring the arbitration of a future legal malpractice claim, to secure informedconsent, the attorney must provide “any explanation reasonably necessary toinform the client . . . of the material advantages and disadvantages of[arbitration]” and discuss with the client “options and alternatives”). D. Advisory ethics opinions and judicial opinions in many jurisdictionsmake clear that, when a retainer agreement includes an arbitration provision,attorneys acting in their fiduciary relationship with a client, at the very least,must explain the advantages and disadvantages of arbitrating a future feedispute or malpractice action. That is so because of the substantial differencesbetween adjudicating a dispute in a judicial and arbitral forum. We cannotpresume that a person untrained and inexperienced in legal practices andprocedures would have a familiarity with those differences. The examples 32 below highlight some of the differences between the arbitral JAMS forum inthis case and a judicial forum. In the arbitral forum, a single arbitrator presides over the disputedissues. In a judicial forum, Delaney could bring his malpractice lawsuit inSuperior Court in the county where he resides or where Sills maintains itsoffices, R. 4:3-2(a)(3), and have a jury representing a cross-section of thecounty’s citizens sit in judgment of the case. In the arbitral forum, the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding withno right of appeal. In the judicial forum, the non-prevailing party has a rightof appeal to challenge any errors made in the trial court proceedings. See R.2:2. In the arbitral forum, the arbitration proceedings are conducted privately,and those proceedings and the award of any damages must be keptconfidential. In a judicial forum, the proceedings are held in an opencourtroom, and the jury’s verdict and award of any damages is a matter ofpublic record. If there is a settlement of the malpractice claim, then anyconfidentiality provision would be a negotiated term of the settlement. In this arbitral forum, there is no right to broad discovery. For example,the JAMS rules limit each party to “one deposition of an opposing Party or ofone individual under the control of the opposing Party” and the “necessity of 33 additional depositions” is determined by the arbitrator. In the judicial forum,our Court Rules provide for broad discovery with no set limitation on thenumber of depositions a party may take. 12 See R. 4:14; R. 4:15. In the arbitral forum, under JAMS procedures, both the party initiatingarbitration and the party filing a counterclaim must pay a $1,500 filing fee, andthe parties are jointly and severally liable for the costs of arbitration and thearbitrator’s compensation. Notably, the attorney-client fee dispute submittedto arbitration has already incurred $34,000 in JAMS costs, which includepayments to the arbitrator -- and a hearing has yet to be held. 13 In the judicialforum, a plaintiff filing a civil complaint must pay a filing fee of $250, and aparty filing a counterclaim must pay a filing fee of $175. See R. 1:43. Neitherparty pays for the services of the judge. In the arbitral forum here, the Sills retainer agreement provides that thearbitrator “will not award punitive damages to either party” and that the parties12 Although many arbitrations are conducted with only limited discovery, some arbitral settings allow for broader discovery. We also do not suggest that a court is not authorized to limit depositions in appropriate circumstances. 13 Because of Delaney’s challenge to the arbitration, Sills has had to cover the entirety of those fees. 34 “will each be deemed to have waived any right to such damages.” 14 In thejudicial forum, a prevailing plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may beentitled to punitive damages. See Guatam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388,400 (App. Div. 1987). In the arbitral forum here, the Sills retainer agreement allows thearbitrator to render an award that may include imposing “the costs andexpenses of arbitration, reasonable attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs”against the non-prevailing plaintiff/client in the malpractice action. In thejudicial forum, imposing reasonable attorneys’ fees against a non-prevailingclient in a non-frivolous malpractice action is not permissible under our courtrules or case law.1514 That arbitral provision barring punitive damages in a legal malpractice action evidently is contrary to substantive law. See, e.g., Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Ky. 2012) (stating that punitive damages can be awarded in a legal malpractice case against attorneys who have “acted with oppression, fraud, or malice”); Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, 69 P.3d 965, 1053 n.3 (Cal. 2003) (same). See also RPC 1.8(h)(1); ABA Opinion at 3- 4. Delaney did not seek punitive damages in his complaint for legal malpractice against defendants. 15 The general rule, known as the American Rule, “prohibits recovery of attorneys’ fees 'by the prevailing party against the losing party.’” In re Estate of Folcher, 224 N.J. 496, 507 (2016) (quoting In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 307 (2008)). A number of exceptions to that rule are set forth by court rule, see R. 4:42-9(a), state statutes, and case law. In the realm of legal malpractice cases, a prevailing plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J. 256, 272 35 Significantly, not all arbitration provisions are alike, and many havefeatures different from those in the Sills retainer agreement and may includemore liberal discovery. To be sure, arbitration can be an effective means ofresolving a dispute in a low cost, expeditious, and efficient manner. Theparties may be afforded the opportunity to choose a skilled and experiencedarbitrator in a specialized field to preside over and decide the dispute. And theproceedings may be conducted in a forum out of the public glare. We make no value judgment whether a judicial or arbitral forum issuperior in resolving a legal malpractice action, for that is a determination tobe made by the lawyer and client, after the lawyer explains to the client thedifferences between the two forums so the client can make an informeddecision. IV. The arbitration provision at issue in this case -- on its face -- would beenforceable if the Sills retainer agreement were a typical contract between acommercial vendor and a customer. See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444-45. In clearand unambiguous language, the arbitration provision explains that Delaney “ is(1996); see also Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001) (allowing a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees and costs in an action against an attorney for intentional violation of fiduciary duties). 36 choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court oflaw.” See id. at 447. But Delaney was not purchasing a telephone, arefrigerator, or an automobile -- he was retaining the services of an attorney,licensed to practice law in New Jersey and subject to the Rules of ProfessionalConduct promulgated by this Court. As earlier discussed, a retainer agreementis not an ordinary contract -- it must conform not only to the legal principlesgoverning contracts, but also to the ethical obligations imposed on attorneysby the RPCs. RPC 1.4(c)’s mandate that a lawyer “explain a matter to the extentreasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regardingthe representation” applies to every provision of a retainer agreement, not justan arbitration provision. Neither the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, nor the NJAA, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36, stands as an obstacle to the neutral enforcement ofthe RPCs. The FAA and “nearly identical” NJAA both “enunciate federal and statepolicies favoring arbitration.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 440 (citing AT&T MobilityLLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011)). The main thrust of the FAA,as well as the NJAA, is to ensure that states “place arbitration agreements onan equal footing with other contracts,” id. at 441 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339), and do “'[not] subject an arbitration agreement to more 37 burdensome requirements than’ other contractual provisions,” ibid. (quotingLeodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003)). Under this scheme ofuncompromising neutrality, the FAA and NJAA grant courts the authority toinvalidate an arbitration provision “upon such grounds as exist at law or inequity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; accord N.J.S.A.2A:23B-6(a); see also Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; Martindale v. Sandvik,Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 85 (2002). Our inquiry is twofold: “whether the agreementto arbitrate all, or any portion, of a dispute is 'the product of mutual assent, asdetermined under customary principles of contract law,’” Flanzman v. JennyCraig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 137 (2020) (quoting Kernahan v. Home WarrantyAdm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 319 (2019)), and whether it satisfies “theprofessional ethical standards governing the attorney-client relationship,”Balducci, 240 N.J. at 592. For example, in Balducci, we made clear that an attorney has a duty toprovide the client with needed information about the fee provisions in aretainer agreement to allow the client to make an informed decision whether toengage the attorney’s services. Id. at 601-04. Thus, “an attorney has anobligation to provide the client with meaningful information about thepotential aggregate hourly fees and costs that may be incurred during thecourse of the litigation so that the client may make an intelligent assessment 38 whether to retain the attorney and on what terms.” Id. at 603; see also Cohen, 146 N.J. at 157 (stating that to meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients,lawyers “must explain at the outset the basis and rate of the fee” and “advisethe client of potential conflicts, the scope of representation, and theimplications of the agreement”). When viewed through the lens of the RPCs, arbitration provisions arenot treated differently from other provisions in a retainer agreement.Requiring attorneys to explain to a client the advantages and disadvantages ofarbitration so that the client can make an informed decision whether toarbitrate a future fee dispute or legal malpractice claim against the firm doesnot single out a retainer agreement’s arbitration provision for disparatetreatment and therefore does not run afoul of the FAA or NJAA. See Snow,176 A.3d at 739; see also Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077. V. A. We conclude that the professional and fiduciary obligation imposed on alawyer by RPC 1.4(c) -- to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessaryto permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation”-- requires that the lawyer discuss with the client the basic advantages and 39 disadvantages of a provision in a retainer agreement that mandates thearbitration of a future fee dispute or malpractice claim against the attorney. We reach that conclusion for a number of reasons. Given the lawyer’sfiduciary duties of loyalty and candor to the client, there should never be aperception that a lawyer is exalting his own self-interest at the expense of theclient. The client comes to a lawyer for assistance in addressing a particularissue -- such as representing the client in bringing or defending a claim, or inpurchasing a home or a business, or handling a matrimonial dispute involvingthe custody of children and division of assets. The client is likelyconcentrating on his legal situation or predicament and looking for help fromthe attorney -- and not thinking that the lawyer may commit malpractice inhandling the case. The client is not likely anticipating a day when he mayhave to do battle with the lawyer, who is retained to promote his interests andprotect his rights. See Jean Fleming Powers, Ethical Implications of AttorneysRequiring Client to Submit Malpractice Claims to ADR, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev.625, 647-48 (1997). Yet, the insertion of an arbitration provision in a retainer agreementindicates that the attorney has given thought to the prospect that the client maybe a future adversary and has selected the forum in which potential disputes,whether about the attorney’s fees or services, will be resolved. Presumably, 40 the attorney has concluded that an arbitral forum is in his best interests -- andmaybe in the best interests of the client as well -- if there is a later falling out.But whether the client’s interests are best served by agreeing in advance tosubmit a future malpractice claim to an arbitral forum will be a reasonablydebatable issue. We will not find universal agreement among members of thebar that a client is better served arbitrating a malpractice claim as opposed tosubmitting the case to our judicial system, which guarantees, among otherthings, the right to broad discovery and the right to a jury trial. Not even ashadow of a conflict of interest should be cast over the attorney-clientrelationship at its inception. To dispel that shadow, lawyers should make thenecessary disclosures in a disinterested manner to allow clients to make aninformed decision, as required by the RPCs. Consistent with ABA Formal Opinion 02-425, the weight of authority asexpressed in professional advisory opinions and judicial case law in otherjurisdictions, and this Court’s interpretation of its own RPCs, we hold thatattorneys who insert provisions in their retainer agreements to arbitrate futurefee disputes or legal malpractice claims must explain the advantages anddisadvantages of the arbitral and judicial forums. Attorneys can fulfill thatrequirement in writing or orally -- or by both means. 41 Attorneys may explain, for example, that in arbitration the client will nothave a trial before a jury in a courtroom open to the public; the outcome of thearbitration will not be appealable and will remain confidential; the client maybe responsible, in part, for the costs of the arbitration proceedings, includingpayments to the arbitrator; and the discovery available in arbitration may bemore limited than in a judicial forum. Additionally, a lawyer who drafts a retainer agreement that channels anyfuture legal malpractice action into an arbitral forum must say so directly inthe written agreement. The client should not be left to discern the meaning oflanguage that is clothed in ambiguity. In Snow, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found that, in context, aretainer agreement’s language that “any other dispute that arises out of orrelates to this agreement or the services provided by the law firm shall also . . .be subject to binding arbitration” was insufficient to place the client on noticethat a future malpractice action was within the scope of the agreement. 176 A.3d at 737. Here, the Sills retainer agreement states that “any dispute(including, without limitation, any dispute with respect to the Firm’s legalservices and/or payment by you of amounts to the Firm), . . . will be submittedto and finally determined by Arbitration” and “[a]ny disputes arising out of orrelating to this engagement agreement or the Firm’s engagement by you will 42 be conducted pursuant to the JAMS/Endispute Arbitration Rules andProcedures.” We acknowledge that if this were an ordinary commercial contract, theterm “any dispute” is broad enough to encompass a dispute about whether theattorney committed legal malpractice. But again, we emphasize that theretainer agreement is not an ordinary contract and that the attorney has afiduciary duty to make clear the retainer agreement’s terms so that the meaningof those terms is readily apparent to the client. See Balducci, 240 N.J. at 594(“[C]lients rely on the integrity of their lawyers who fashion [retainer]agreements, and . . . , as such, an agreement susceptible to two reasonableinterpretations should be construed in favor of the client.”). We can wellimagine that an attorney might not be eager to discuss legal malpractice at thebeginning of an attorney-client relationship, but if the retainer agreementintends to cover that potential scenario, then the attorney must directly andclearly address the subject. B. In this opinion, we have set forth the rudimentary requirements expectedof attorneys who include a provision in a retainer agreement that mandates thearbitration of a future fee dispute or malpractice action. We do not pretendthat this opinion is or should be the last word on this subject. We believe that 43 the issues raised here would benefit from further study and discussion. Werefer the issues raised in this opinion to the Advisory Committee onProfessional Ethics. The Committee may make recommendations to this Courtand propose further guidance on the scope of an attorney’s disclosurerequirements. VI. A. We now address the relevant facts of the case before us. Delaney came to the Sills law firm for representation in a commerciallawsuit against his business partners. A Sills attorney presented him with afour-page retainer agreement. The third page of the agreement contained anarbitration provision, and the fourth page generally described some of the rulesgoverning arbitration and provided a hyperlink to thirty-three pages of JAMSprocedures. A hard copy of those procedures, which detailed the limitationson pre-arbitration discovery and the inapplicability of the rules of evidence atthe arbitration proceeding, was not given to Delaney. The Sills attorneyadvised Delaney to take his time reading the engagement letter and ask anyquestions he had about it. The Sills attorney did not explain to Delaney that, in the event of afuture malpractice action against the firm, the retainer agreement’s provisions 44 barring an arbitrator from awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff andallowing the arbitrator to award the costs and expenses of arbitration againstthe plaintiff were unenforceable because RPC 1.8(h)(1) forbids a lawyer frommaking “an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a clientfor malpractice.” 16 The Sills attorney did not explain the advantages anddisadvantages of arbitrating a malpractice action. He did not explain, forexample, that in the judicial forum Delaney would have access to broaddiscovery, the right to a jury trial in an open courtroom, the right to speakfreely on the subject matter without confidentiality restrictions, and the right toappeal an erroneous ruling. He did not explain that in a judicial forumDelaney would not have to pay a high filing fee or for the services of thejudge. We acknowledge that Delaney was a sophisticated businessman and notunfamiliar to litigation, but we cannot ascribe to him the knowledge ofattorneys whose training and experience make them keenly aware of the finedistinctions between an arbitral and judicial forum. To be sure, the detailedarbitration provisions in the Sills retainer agreement easily meet the standard16 Sills agreed at oral argument before this Court that the parts of the arbitration provision at odds with RPC 1.8(h) were severable from the agreement. 45 for an arbitration provision in a typical commercial contract. But, as we haverepeatedly noted in this opinion, lawyers are held to a higher standard underthe RPCs in the fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations to their clients. B. The opinion we issue today is not a break with established precedent,and the professional principles we apply to the unique facts of this case are notforeign to our jurisprudence. Our ruling is foreshadowed by ABA FormalOpinion 02-425 and opinions issued by courts and professional ethicscommittees in many other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.Nevertheless, the retroactive application of our ruling today may not have beenreasonably anticipated and would disturb the settled expectations of manylawyers throughout our state, who genuinely believed that an arbitrationprovision that met the standards of such cases as Flanzman, Kernahan, andAtalese would satisfy the requirements of our RPCs. Therefore, our holdingwill apply prospectively from the day of the issuance of this opinion, with oneexception. The general approach in our jurisprudence is that the plaintiff receivesthe benefit of the rule established in the opinion -- even if it is a new rule --because “to do otherwise would not only deprive the plaintiff of any benefitresulting from her own efforts but would also make it less likely that, in the 46 future, individuals will be willing to claim rights, not yet established, that theybelieve are just.” See Narleski, 244 N.J. at 228-29 (quoting Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 551 (1984)). In light of that recognized practice, it would beunfair to deprive plaintiff, who has helped clarify the application of our RPCsin his and all future cases, of the relief he has sought -- a judicial forum inwhich to air his claims. Because Delaney was not given an explanation of the advantages ordisadvantages of arbitration, we hold that the present malpractice action is notsubject to the arbitration provision of the Sills retainer agreement. Delaneytherefore must be allowed to proceed with this malpractice action in the LawDivision. We realize that Sills did not have the benefit of the clarity of thisopinion in interpreting a lawyer’s professional obligation under RPC 1.4(c). Inreaching this holding, we do not find that Sills or its attorneys violated theRules of Professional Conduct, and we accept their representations that theyacted good faith. VII. We affirm and modify the judgment of the Appellate Division and 47 remand to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.17 Delaney did not challenge the validity of submitting the fee dispute to arbitration until a year after Sills invoked the arbitration provision. An issue to be resolved on remand is whether the arbitration proceeding relating to the fee dispute should be stayed pending the outcome of the malpractice action. We offer no opinion on that subject. 48