Title: In re Brown
Citation: 351 N.C. 601
Docket Number: 18A00
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 18A00
FILED: 5 MAY 2000
IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 238 CRAIG B. BROWN,
Respondent
This matter is before the Court upon a recommendation by the
Judicial Standards Commission, entered 28 December 1999, that
respondent, Judge Craig B. Brown, a Judge of the General Court of
Justice, District Court Division, Fourteenth Judicial District of
the State of North Carolina, be censured for willful misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Canons
2A, 3A(1), and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct.  Heard in the Supreme Court 17 April 2000.
William N. Farrell, Jr., Special Counsel, for the Judicial
Standards Commission.
Robert A. Hassell and Brian Michael Aus for respondent-
appellant.
ORDER OF CENSURE
The Judicial Standards Commission (Commission) notified
Judge Craig B. Brown (respondent) on 16 December 1998 that it had
ordered a preliminary investigation to determine whether formal
proceedings under Commission Rule 9 should be instituted against
him.  The subject matter of the investigation included an
allegation that respondent had engaged in the improper practice
of convicting a defendant of careless and reckless driving when
he was charged with driving while impaired (DWI).  There were
further allegations that the conviction was rendered out of court
at a time when the case was not calendared and after discussing
the case ex parte with defense counsel a few days earlier.
On 15 July 1999, special counsel for the Commission filed a
complaint alleging, inter alia, as follows:
3.  The respondent has engaged in conduct
inappropriate to his judicial office on the following
occasions:
a.  The respondent presided over the July 30,
1998, traffic court session of Durham County District
Court and tried the case of State v. Ludwig Charles
Debraeckeleer, Durham County file no. 97 CR 32970, in
which the defendant was charged with driving while
impaired (DWI) in violation of G.S. 20-138.1.  The
respondent granted defense counsel’s motion to dismiss
the DWI charge made at the conclusion of the State’s
evidence.  The respondent then declared the defendant
guilty of careless and reckless driving, a violation of
G.S. 20-140 which was neither a lesser included offense
of DWI nor an offense with which the defendant had been
charged and to which the defendant had pleaded.  The
respondent rendered this guilty verdict and entered
judgment on it over the objection of defense counsel
and knowing or having reason to know such a disposition
was improper in these circumstances.
b.  On September 1, 1998, the respondent met ex
parte with J. Wesley Covington, attorney for the
defendant in State v. Kenneth Arthur Podger, Jr.,
Durham County file no. 98 CR 05350, in which the
defendant was charged with driving while impaired (DWI)
in violation of G.S. 20-138.1 and had a [B]reathalyzer
reading of .15.  During this meeting, the respondent
agreed to counsel’s request that the respondent hear
the case on September 3, 1998.  In addition, after
discussing the facts of the case and the defendant’s
driving record, the respondent agreed to convict the
defendant of careless and reckless driving, a violation
of G.S. 20-140 which was not a lesser included offense
of DWI nor an offense with which the defendant had been
charged.  About noon on September 3, 1998, while the
respondent was presiding over a session of domestic
violence court, attorney Covington appeared in the
respondent’s courtroom along with Covington’s associate
William C. Fleming, Jr., defendant Podger, charging
officer T.P. Cullinan, and assistant district attorney
Brian T. Beasley.  Upon their arrival and after
Covington reminded the respondent about the Podger
case, the respondent invited them all to step out of
the courtroom into the hallway and then disposed of the
Podger case as he had agreed to do two (2) days earlier
by finding the defendant guilty of careless and
reckless driving and entering judgment thereon.  The
respondent disposed of the case out-of-court, when the
case was not calendared and neither the case file nor a
courtroom clerk were present, and when the respondent
knew or should have known that finding the defendant
guilty of careless and reckless driving and entering
judgment thereon was improper in these circumstances.
4.  The actions of the respondent constitute
willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute and are in violation of Canons
2A, 3A(1), and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of
Judicial Conduct.
On 10 August 1999, respondent answered the complaint,
admitting the facts as alleged in paragraph 3(a), except as to
(1) the guilty verdict to careless and reckless driving being
willfully improper, and (2) erroneously believing under the
circumstances that he was entitled to enter a verdict of guilty
to careless and reckless driving in the case.  As to paragraph
3(b), respondent admitted in part and denied in part.  In his
answer, respondent stated that when Covington approached him,
Covington informed respondent that the district attorney was
aware of and consented to the ex parte meeting.  Respondent
specifically denied that he knew or should have known at the time
that the Podger matter was not duly calendared.  Respondent
denied that finding the defendant guilty of careless and reckless
driving and entering judgment thereon was improper in the
circumstances of the Podger case.  As to paragraph 4, respondent
denied that his actions constituted willful misconduct in office
and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.
On 17 September 1999, respondent was served with a notice of
formal hearing concerning the charges alleged.  The Commission
conducted the hearing on 4 and 5 November 1999, at which time
both parties presented evidence and arguments.  Evidence was
presented tending to support the allegations in the complaint. 
After hearing the evidence, the Commission concluded that
respondent’s actions constituted:
a.
conduct in violation of Canons 2A, 3A(1), and
3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct with respect to the facts found in
paragraphs 9 and 10 [of the Commission’s
recommendation];
b.
conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute as defined in In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299,
226 S.E.2d 5 (1976); and
c.
willful misconduct in office as defined in In re
Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977), and
in light of In re Martin, 333 N.C. 242, 424 S.E.2d
118 (1993).
The Commission recommended that this Court censure
respondent. 
In proceedings pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, this Court
acts as a court of original jurisdiction, rather than in its
usual capacity as an appellate court.  See In re Peoples, 296
N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).  In reviewing the recommendations
of the Commission, the recommendations are not binding upon this
Court.  We consider the evidence on both sides and then exercise
independent judgment as to whether to censure, to remove, or to
decline to do either.  See In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 244, 237
S.E.2d 246, 252 (1977).
The quantum of proof in proceedings before the Commission is
proof by clear and convincing evidence.  See id. at 247, 237
S.E.2d at 254.  Such proceedings are not meant “to punish the
individual but to maintain the honor and dignity of the judiciary
and the proper administration of justice.”  Nowell, 293 N.C. at
241, 237 S.E.2d at 250.  After thoroughly examining the evidence
presented to the Commission, we conclude the Commission’s
findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence
and adopt them as our own.  See In re Harrell, 331 N.C. 105, 110,
414 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1992).  A thorough review of the record,
transcript, briefs, and oral arguments revealed the following:
State v. Debraeckeleer
Respondent presided over the 30 July 1998 trial of State v.
Ludwig Charles Debraeckeleer, Durham County file number
97 CR 32970, in which the defendant was charged with DWI in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1.  The district attorney had
moved to continue the case because the arresting officer was not
present.  Defense counsel, Michael Allan Jordan, objected to the
continuance on the grounds the case was somewhat old and had been
previously continued specifically to get witnesses to trial.  The
case was called for trial later that same day.  After the State
presented its evidence, Jordan moved to dismiss the DWI charge
for insufficient evidence because there was no evidence of an
arrest, an assessment of the defendant’s condition, or an
assessment of the Intoxilyzer results.  Respondent subsequently
allowed Jordan’s motion to dismiss.  However, respondent then
pronounced a verdict of guilty of careless and reckless driving. 
In making this ruling, respondent indicated that the State had
clearly not met its burden of proof but that there was sufficient
evidence to convict of careless and reckless driving.  Jordan
objected in open court to the guilty verdict and informed
respondent that the defendant had not been charged with careless
and reckless driving.  Respondent indicated that he understood
Jordan’s position, but believed it to be reasonable and proper to
convict the defendant of careless and reckless driving based on
evidence of the accident, an odor of alcohol on the defendant’s
breath, and his physical appearance.  Jordan later spoke with
respondent in chambers regarding certain conditions of the order
and reiterated his position that a finding of careless and
reckless driving was improper.  Respondent replied that he
“thought [he] had [Jordan] over a barrel,” meaning to Jordan that
respondent understood that he should not have entered the ruling. 
Respondent also indicated to Jordan that he did not think it was
wise for Jordan to appeal the case because the State would
probably get the missing trooper to court and Jordan would have
less of a chance of winning on the DWI charge.  At the hearing
before the Commission, Jordan opined that respondent was aware
that careless and reckless driving was not a lesser included
offense of DWI and that this was common knowledge for those who
practice in criminal courts in Durham County.
Brian Beasley was the assistant district attorney for Durham
County who called the Debraeckeleer case for trial before
respondent.  At the hearing before the Commission, he indicated
that careless and reckless driving is not a lesser included
offense of DWI and that he did not ask respondent to convict the
defendant of careless and reckless driving.  Beasley testified
that he was shocked when respondent found the defendant guilty of
careless and reckless driving.  It was his opinion that the
verdict was legally improper.  Beasley also believed that
respondent knew the verdict was not proper, as it was common
knowledge that careless and reckless driving was not a lesser
included offense to DWI.  He believed it was common knowledge
because the case of In re Martin had been discussed in the news
media’s coverage of the 1998 race for the North Carolina Supreme
Court.  Beasley further indicated that he understood from In re
Martin that a judge could not enter a verdict of careless and
reckless driving for a DWI charge.  In addition, Beasley heard
respondent say he thought he had Jordan “over a barrel” with his
verdict.
Respondent testified that he found the defendant guilty of
careless and reckless driving because he felt it was a “horrible
DWI” and he was following the evidence that the defendant crossed
the center line twice before the head-on collision.  Respondent
agreed that careless and reckless driving was not a lesser
included offense of DWI but testified that the evidence was so
compelling that he did not even think of that when he made his
ruling.
Durham County Chief District Court Judge Kenneth Titus
testified that respondent knew careless and reckless was not a
lesser included offense of DWI because of a conversation they had
involving the Debraeckeleer case.
State v. Podger
On 1 September 1998, respondent had an ex parte meeting with
Jay Wesley Covington and William Charles Fleming, Jr., attorneys
for the defendant, concerning State v. Kenneth Arthur Podger,
Durham County file no. 98 CR 05350, in which the defendant was
charged with DWI in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1.  At the
hearing before the Commission, Fleming testified that after
explaining the facts of the Podger case to respondent, Covington
asked respondent if he would be willing to hear the DWI trial two
days later.  Covington then told respondent that he wanted to
obtain a careless and reckless plea for the defendant.  Fleming
testified that Covington said “he was charging [the defendant] a
huge fee in the case, and that if [respondent] found [the
defendant] guilty of careless and reckless, that a substantial
portion of that fee would flow through to the appropriate
political campaigns.”  Respondent then agreed to reduce the
charge and find the defendant guilty of careless and reckless
driving, indicating to Fleming there was a predetermined outcome.
On 3 September 1998, while respondent was presiding over
domestic violence court, Covington appeared in respondent’s
courtroom with his associate, Fleming; the defendant; and the
charging officer, Terry P. Cullinan.  Fleming testified that
Covington asked to approach the bench and then said, “I just
wanted to remind you that we’re to do the Podger trial today, and
you’re going to find him guilty of careless and reckless.  You’re
going to fine him $1,000.  You’re going to give him community
service and probation.”  Assistant District Attorney Brian T.
Beasley then arrived in the courtroom.  Subsequently, respondent,
Covington, Fleming, the defendant, Beasley, and Cullinan left the
courtroom and moved into the hallway.  Once in the hallway, with
no court clerk present, Covington recited the facts of the case,
as he had two days prior, and then asked respondent for a
conviction of careless and reckless driving.  Fleming testified
that respondent then asked Beasley if the State agreed with the
facts recited by Covington.  When Beasley responded
affirmatively, respondent stated, “Well, in that case, I’ll find
[the defendant] guilty of careless and reckless, fine him $1,000,
give him probation, community service.”
Respondent testified before the Commission that Covington
approached him in the hallway on 1 September 1998 and indicated
he needed some help in a DWI case.  Covington was looking to
obtain a careless and reckless driving plea.  Respondent
indicated that he did not take Covington seriously and that he
did not remember Covington mentioning a huge fee.  However,
respondent agreed to hear the Podger matter on 3 September 1998,
as he was the resident traffic court judge that week.  Respondent
testified that on 3 September 1998 Covington approached
respondent during a mid-morning break.  Respondent asked
Covington some questions about the Podger case and about the
defendant’s record.  Covington stated that the defendant had a
prior DWI conviction from 1994 in which the defendant had blown a
.08.  Respondent indicated that he would agree to careless and
reckless driving only with consent of the State.  Around noon on
3 September, Beasley and Covington approached respondent, and
Covington indicated that there was a plea agreement.  Respondent
asked them to step into the hallway so he could assess the plea
because there was noise in the courtroom.  Respondent did not
believe the court clerk’s presence was required.  Once in the
hallway, Covington informed respondent that the defendant had
blown a .15 in the case at issue.  When respondent asked Beasley
and Cullinan if they consented to the plea, both responded in the
affirmative.  Respondent then imposed a standard careless and
reckless judgment.  Respondent subsequently learned that the
defendant had another prior DWI conviction in addition to the one
Covington mentioned and that the prior DWI mentioned by Covington
was actually in 1993 when the legal limit was .10.  Thereafter,
respondent testified that he filed a sua sponte motion pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1021(c) to vacate the judgment because he felt
critical facts had been misrepresented to him or omitted. 
Although respondent believed that he had the authority to enter
the plea out of court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-191, he
apologized for taking the plea in the hallway, acknowledged there
was a pall cast on the administration of justice, and stated he
would never do anything other than bond reductions outside of the
courtroom.
The Commission alleges respondent violated Canons 2A, 3A(1),
and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.  Canon
2A provides:  “A judge should respect and comply with the law and
should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.”  Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A, 2000 Ann. R. 274
(Lexis).  Canon 3A(1) provides:  “A judge should be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence in it.  He should be
unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism.”  Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(1), 2000 Ann. R.
276 (Lexis).  Lastly, Canon 3A(4) provides:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally
interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right
to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized
by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other
communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding.  A judge, however, may obtain the advice of
a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a
proceeding before him.
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(4), 2000 Ann. R. 276 (Lexis).
Censure or removal of a judge is governed by N.C.G.S. §
7A-376, which provides:
Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme
Court may censure or remove any judge for willful
misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to
perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.
N.C.G.S. § 7A-376 (1999) (emphasis added); see also In re Renfer,
347 N.C. 382, 384, 493 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1997).  Section 7A-377 of
the North Carolina General Statutes provides the procedure the
Commission utilizes in recommending censure or removal of a
justice or judge.  N.C.G.S. § 7A-377 (1999).
In the instant case, the Commission found that respondent’s
actions constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to
the administration of justice such that they brought the judicial
office into disrepute.  We have stated that “[w]ilful misconduct
in office is improper and wrong conduct of a judge acting in his
official capacity done intentionally, knowingly and, generally,
in bad faith.  It is more than a mere error of judgment or an act
of negligence.”  In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9
(1976).  “A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial
office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should
have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority
constitutes bad faith.”  Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248, 237 S.E.2d at
255.
In addition, we have defined “[c]onduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute . . . as ‘conduct which a judge undertakes in good
faith but which nevertheless would appear to an objective
observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct
prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office.’”  Edens,
290 N.C. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting Geiler v. Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 284, 515 P.2d 1, 9, 110
Cal. Rptr. 201, 209 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932, 41 L. Ed.
2d 235 (1974)).  “Wilful misconduct in office of necessity is
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute.”  Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248,
237 S.E.2d at 255 (emphasis omitted).
After carefully reviewing the evidence in this case, we
conclude that respondent’s actions in both the Debraeckeleer and
Podger cases constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial
to the administration of justice such that they brought the
judicial office into disrepute.  As to the Debraeckeleer matter,
it is clear that respondent knowingly convicted the defendant of
careless and reckless driving when the defendant had not been
charged with that offense.  The evidence provided by Beasley,
along with the testimony of Chief Judge Titus, also convinces us
that respondent should have known that careless and reckless
driving is not a lesser included offense of DWI.  Additional
support for this conclusion is garnered from our recent
pronouncement on this very issue.  See In re Martin, 333 N.C.
242, 245, 424 S.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1993) (where this Court held,
“[c]onvicting defendants of reckless driving when they were
charged with [DWI] were acts which respondent knew to be improper
and ultra vires, or beyond the powers of his office”).  As
respondent’s conduct in the Debraeckeleer case was unquestionably
“wilful misconduct,” we must also conclude that his action was
prejudicial to the administration of justice such that the
judicial office was brought into disrepute.  Nowell, 293 N.C. at
248, 237 S.E.2d at 255.
Regarding the Podger incident, it is important to note that
criminal cases should be heard in open court, as they are the
public’s business.  See id. at 249, 237 S.E.2d at 255; Edens, 290
N.C. at 306, 226 S.E.2d at 9-10.  In Edens, this Court determined
that the respondent’s removal of a criminal case “outside the
courtroom when court was not in session improperly removed the
proceeding from the public domain where it belonged and made it
instead a private matter.”  Edens, 290 N.C. at 306, 226 S.E.2d at
10.  In the Podger case, respondent acknowledges that taking the
guilty plea in the hallway “cast [a] pall” upon the
administration of justice.  We agree.  At least since the Nowell
case was published over twenty years ago, members of our
judiciary have been on notice that conducting court business
outside of open court will not be condoned.  We are convinced
that respondent should have known his action in taking the
disposition of this case outside of the courtroom was improper
and amounted to willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
judicial office.  Moreover, respondent knew or had reason to know
that it was improper to dispose of a DWI charge by convicting the
defendant of careless and reckless driving.  See Martin, 333 N.C.
at 245, 424 S.E.2d at 119-20.
“Judges especially must be vigilant to act within the bounds
of their judicial power.”  Id. at 245, 424 S.E.2d at 120.  We
have previously stated that “[e]ach judge and attorney in the
courts of our State has a duty to uphold the legal process. 
Neither complacency nor the search for efficiency should obscure
that responsibility.”  In re Tucker, 348 N.C. 677, 681, 501
S.E.2d 67, 70 (1998).  As we recognized in Nowell, “[t]he power
of the district court over the lives and everyday affairs of our
citizens makes it imperative that the district court judges of
the State not only be fully capable but also dedicated to
carrying out their official responsibilities in accordance with
the law and established standards of judicial conduct.”  Nowell,
293 N.C. at 252, 237 S.E.2d at 257.
The conduct of respondent unquestionably warrants censure. 
Respondent overstepped his authority, engaged in misconduct, and
brought disrepute to the judiciary of our State.  We will not
condone this conduct.  It is deserving of our harshest criticism.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that respondent’s
actions constitute conduct in violation of Canons 2A, 3A(1), and
3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.  Therefore,
pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and 7A-377 and Rule 3 of the Rules
for Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial
Standards Commission, it is ordered that respondent, Craig B.
Brown, be and he is hereby, censured for willful misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute.
Done by Order of the Court in Conference, this the 4th day
of May, 2000.
Freeman, J.
For the Court