Title: Forbes v. Rapp
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 041722
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2005

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
 
 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
BRUCE FORBES 
 
v.  Record No. 041722   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  April 22, 2005 
RAYMOND E. RAPP, TRUSTEE, HARRISONBURG 
PHYSICIANS FOR ANESTHESIOLOGY, INC., ETC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the chancellor erred: 
1) in awarding damages to a property owner for breach of a 
contract for the sale of land offered at public auction; and 2) 
in admitting certain expert testimony. 
 
The following facts are undisputed.  In the spring of 2003, 
Raymond E. Rapp hired Bland Land Company (BLC) to sell about 143 
acres of undeveloped mountain land in Rockingham County (the 
property) at a public auction.1  BLC produced and distributed a 
brochure containing photographs, maps, and a description of the 
property that stated it was “[t]o be sold by a trustee under 
special warranty, with a deeded right of way.”  Bruce Forbes, an 
adjoining landowner, received a copy of the brochure before the 
auction and decided to attend. 
 
BLC held the auction on May 17, 2003.  Before the auction, 
Gerald C. Bland, owner of BLC, circulated and read aloud a 
document entitled “Rapp Auction Sale Announcements.”  One of the 
announcements stated, “Included with the property is an 
appurtenant right of way over and across the existing access 
road we all used this morning[.]” 
At the end of the auction, Forbes was the high bidder for 
the property at $3,600 per acre, for a total bid price of 
$514,944.  Gregory S. Kellam was the second-highest bidder at 
$3,550 per acre.  Forbes tendered a ten percent deposit and 
signed an acknowledgment agreeing to purchase the property.  
Under the auction terms, Forbes agreed to settle on the property 
on or before June 17, 2003, and to pay a penalty for any delay. 
 
Forbes later unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement to 
sell the property to Kellam.  On June 30, 2003, Forbes, by 
counsel, notified Rapp that he was withdrawing his offer to 
purchase the property and demanded the return of his deposit.  
Forbes stated that his withdrawal was based on 
“misrepresentations regarding the existence of a deeded right of 
way to the property and . . . the ability to subdivide the 
property.”  Rapp eventually sold the property to Kellam for 
$400,000. 
 
Forbes filed an amended bill of complaint against Rapp, 
BLC, and Bland (collectively, the defendants) seeking rescission 
                                                                  
1 Harrisonburg Physicians for Anesthesiology, Inc., Profit 
Sharing Plan Earmark Investment Trust No. (1) owned the 
 
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of Forbes’ contract to purchase the property and the return of 
his deposit.  In the alternative, Forbes sought damages for 
breach of contract or breach of an “implied understanding” that 
his deposit would be returned if the parties failed to reach an 
agreement.  He also claimed that the defendants wrongfully 
converted his deposit.  Forbes’ claims were based on allegations 
that the property did not have a deeded right of way, and that 
the defendants’ representations in the brochure and auction sale 
announcements were false and misleading.  He sought compensatory 
damages equal to his $51,490 deposit and punitive damages of 
$250,000. 
 
In response, Rapp filed an answer and a cross-bill for 
breach of contract against Forbes.2  Rapp alleged that Forbes 
breached his express written agreement to purchase the property 
when he failed to close on the property and informed Rapp that 
he did not intend to complete the transaction.  Rapp sought 
damages of $114,900, the difference between Forbes’ bid price 
and the amount received in the sale to Kellam. 
 
The chancellor heard the evidence in a bench trial.  The 
majority of the evidence addressed the value of the property and 
whether Rapp failed to mitigate damages incurred as a result of 
Forbes’ alleged contract breach.  Forbes presented the testimony 
                                                                  
property.  Rapp sold the property in his capacity as trustee. 
 
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of his son, Jeffrey C. Forbes (Jeffrey), who stated that the 
property contained timber worth at least $150,000, and that the 
property was worth between $1,000 and $1,500 per acre, excluding 
the timber value. 
Forbes testified that he was surprised that the bidding for 
the property exceeded $2,000 per acre, but that the property was 
worth $3,600 per acre to him as protection for his adjoining 
land.  Forbes agreed with Jeffrey’s valuation of the timber on 
the property.  Forbes also presented testimony from Dean M. 
Nichols, one of his attorneys, and Kevin Williams, his agent, 
who both stated that Kellam had been willing to pay Forbes 
$450,000 for the property. 
 
Rapp presented testimony from various witnesses.  Kellam 
testified he originally hoped to purchase the property for 
$300,000, and that he intended to make no higher bid than 
$380,000, but that he nevertheless made a final bid of $3,550 
per acre, or about $505,000.  Kellam stated that he negotiated 
with Forbes to purchase the property after the auction and that, 
although he indicated an interest in paying about $450,000 for 
the property, he never made a written offer.  Kellam also stated 
that Bland approached him about purchasing the property after 
                                                                  
2 BLC and Bland filed an answer, special plea in bar, and 
interpleader action.  They are not parties to this appeal. 
 
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Forbes refused to complete the sale, and that Kellam ultimately 
purchased the property for $400,000. 
 
Rapp also presented the expert testimony of Michael W. 
Pugh, a certified real estate appraiser.  Pugh testified that he 
appraised the property and determined that it had a fair market 
value of $415,000.  He stated that this figure represented an 
accepted range for fair market value of plus or minus ten 
percent, as is customary in the field of real estate appraisal.  
Pugh acknowledged that he did not assign value to any timber on 
the property. 
 
Regarding Rapp’s efforts to mitigate damages, Bland 
testified that the only effort he made on Rapp’s behalf after 
Forbes refused to complete the sale was to contact Kellam about 
purchasing the property.  Bland also stated that he was 
“astounded” at the high price Forbes had bid for the property, 
and that he advised Rapp to sell the property to Kellam for 
$400,000 because Bland thought that this price was still “high 
as a kite.” 
 
Rapp presented the expert testimony of George R. Heatwole, 
a licensed auctioneer and real estate broker, who had auctioned 
about 100 properties per year over the past 25 or more years.  
Over Forbes’ objection, the chancellor asked Heatwole to relate 
his experience re-auctioning real estate that had not settled 
after a first auction.  Heatwole replied that in such instances, 
 
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his experience has been that the real estate sold at a lower 
price at a second auction. 
The following exchange then occurred between Heatwole and 
Rapp’s counsel: 
Q: 
Can you quantify whether it’s significantly less 
or close to the same price, but less? 
 
A: 
Well, it happens so infrequently and, you know, 
my experience has been, gosh, a, a figure off the 
top of my head would be 10 to 20 percent less at 
least, but it happens so infrequently that I, I 
don’t have a basis. 
 
Forbes objected to this testimony, arguing that it was 
speculative.  The chancellor overruled the objection.  Heatwole 
further testified that auctioneers in Virginia generally agree 
that it is not a good practice to re-auction property that has 
failed to close, and that he would recommend against doing so.  
David A. Penrod, one of Rapp’s attorneys, also testified that he 
advised Rapp that putting the property up for auction a second 
time would be “a bad idea.” 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the chancellor held that 
Forbes wrongfully breached his contract to purchase the property 
from Rapp.  The chancellor found that Forbes’ testimony was 
“totally lacking in credibility,” and that Forbes’ conduct after 
the auction “was a continual pattern of acting in bad faith.”  
The chancellor concluded that the fair market value of the 
property was $415,000, and awarded Rapp judgment on the cross-
 
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bill in the amount of $99,944.00, the difference between Forbes’ 
final bid and the fair market value, plus interest.  The 
chancellor entered a final judgment order reflecting this award 
and dismissing all Forbes’ claims against the defendants.  
Forbes appeals. 
 
Forbes argues that the chancellor erred in awarding 
judgment to Rapp because Rapp failed to mitigate his damages.  
According to Forbes, Rapp should have re-auctioned the property, 
advertised the property for sale to the general public, placed 
the property with a “multiple listing service,” or contacted 
other bidders in addition to Kellam.  Forbes asserts that the 
record shows that Rapp did not obtain a reasonable price for the 
property, because Kellam previously had offered a much higher 
price to both Forbes and Rapp.  Forbes also argues that the 
chancellor erred in admitting Heatwole’s testimony because it 
was speculative and Heatwole was unfamiliar with the facts 
surrounding the auction at which Forbes purchased the property. 
In considering the merits of these arguments, we apply an 
established standard of review.  The chancellor, who heard the 
evidence ore tenus, evaluated the witnesses’ testimony and their 
credibility.  See Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat, 265 Va. 
256, 264, 576 S.E.2d 497, 501 (2003); Tauber v. Commonwealth, 
263 Va. 520, 526, 562 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2002).  Thus, his 
judgment is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.  The 
 
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Dunbar Group, LLC v. Tignor, 267 Va. 361, 366-67, 593 S.E.2d 
216, 219 (2004); Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 
L.P. v. Smith, 264 Va. 350, 355, 568 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2002).  We 
will not set aside the chancellor’s judgment on appeal unless it 
is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  
Code § 8.01-680; Tignor, 267 Va. at 367, 593 S.E.2d at 219; 
Shooting Point, 265 Va. at 264, 576 S.E.2d at 501. 
 
We first consider Forbes’ argument that Rapp failed to 
mitigate his damages.  We have long recognized the obligation of 
an injured party to mitigate damages.  Thus, when a purchaser 
has breached a contract for the sale of real estate, the seller 
nonetheless has the duty of making reasonable efforts to 
mitigate damages resulting from the breach, and to the extent 
that the seller fails to do so, he may not recover the 
additional damages incurred.  Lawrence v. Wirth, 226 Va. 408, 
412, 309 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1983); Haywood v. Massie, 188 Va. 176, 
182, 49 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1948); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 350, cmt. b. (1981); Charles T. McCormick, Handbook 
on the Law of Damages § 33 (1935); see Jennings v. Realty 
Developers, Inc., 210 Va. 476, 483, 171 S.E.2d 829, 834-35 
(1970). 
An assertion that an injured party has failed to mitigate 
damages is an affirmative defense.  See R.K. Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Bank of the Commonwealth, 256 Va. 74, 77, 501 S.E.2d 769, 771 
 
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(1998); Stohlman v. S&B Ltd. P’ship, 249 Va. 251, 256, 454 
S.E.2d 923, 926 (1995); Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 245 
Va. 255, 266, 427 S.E.2d 363, 369 (1993).  In the present case, 
Forbes, as the party asserting this defense, bore the burden of 
proof on that issue.  See R.K. Chevrolet, 256 Va. at 77, 501 
S.E.2d at 771; Stohlman, 249 Va. at 256, 454 S.E.2d at 926; 
Marefield Meadows, 245 Va. at 266, 427 S.E.2d at 369. 
We conclude that Forbes did not satisfy his evidentiary 
burden.  First, he failed to present any evidence that marketing 
the property in the manner he advocated would have resulted in a 
higher purchase price for the property.  Second, the chancellor 
was not required to accept Forbes’ testimony that Kellam had 
offered $450,000 for the property as evidence of the property’s 
value, because Kellam testified that he had not made a written 
offer at that price and ultimately had concluded that “it wasn’t 
a deal that I was interested in.” 
 
In the absence of further evidence from Forbes, the 
chancellor found that the fair market value of the property was 
$415,000, which was supported by Pugh’s expert testimony.  This 
amount surpassed the valuation placed on the property by Forbes’ 
son, Jeffrey, whose highest estimate of the combined timber 
value and land value of the property was $364,500.  Moreover, 
Forbes had testified that the property was worth between 
$250,000 and $300,000.  Therefore, Forbes’ own evidence showed 
 
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that Rapp sold the property for more than its fair market value.  
Based on this record, we hold that the chancellor did not err in 
rejecting Forbes’ claim that Rapp failed to mitigate his 
damages. 
 
We next consider Forbes’ argument that the chancellor erred 
in admitting Heatwole’s testimony.  Before expert testimony may 
be admitted in a civil case to assist the fact finder, that 
testimony must meet certain requirements, including the 
requirement of an adequate factual foundation.  Countryside 
Corp. v. Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002); 
John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 319-20, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002); see 
Code §§ 8.01-401.1 and –401.3.  Generally, the decision whether 
to admit expert testimony is a matter committed to the 
chancellor’s sound discretion, and we will reject the 
chancellor’s determination in this regard only when the record 
shows an abuse of that discretion.  John, 263 Va. at 320, 559 
S.E.2d at 696; Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee, 258 Va. 
235, 258, 520 S.E.2d 164, 177 (1999). 
 
Expert testimony is inadmissible if it is speculative or 
based on assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis.  
Countryside Corp., 263 Va. at 553, 561 S.E.2d at 682; John, 263 
Va. at 320, 559 S.E.2d at 696; Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 
161, 524 S.E.2d 645, 648 (2000); Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. 
Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1995).  
 
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Expert testimony is also inadmissible when an expert has not 
considered all variables bearing on the inferences to be drawn 
from the facts presented.  Countryside Corp., 263 Va. at 553, 
561 S.E.2d at 682; John, 263 Va. at 320, 559 S.E.2d at 696; ITT 
Hartford Group, Inc. v. Virginia Fin. Assocs., Inc., 258 Va. 
193, 201, 520 S.E.2d 355, 359 (1999). 
 
We agree with Forbes that certain portions of Heatwole’s 
testimony were inadmissible because they were speculative and 
lacked an adequate factual foundation.  Heatwole improperly was 
allowed to testify that real estate auctioned a second time sold 
at a lower price, without being required to consider whether the 
facts presented here would have led to a different conclusion 
concerning the expected price at a re-auction.  Also, in 
attempting to fix a percentage at which a purchase price 
generally might be expected to decrease upon a re-auction, 
Heatwole effectively conceded that he lacked a factual basis for 
rendering such an opinion but nevertheless stated a figure “off 
the top of [his] head.” 
 
We disagree, however, with Forbes’ contention that the 
improper admission of these portions of Heatwole’s testimony 
requires reversal of the chancellor’s judgment.  Under the 
doctrine of harmless error, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment when we can conclude that the error at issue could not 
have affected the court’s result.  Blue Stone Land Co., Inc. v. 
 
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Neff, 259 Va. 273, 279, 526 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2000); Rhoades v. 
Painter, 234 Va. 20, 24, 360 S.E.2d 174, 176 (1987); see Holmes 
v. LG Marion Corp., 258 Va. 473, 483, 521 S.E.2d 528, 535 
(1999). 
 
Heatwole’s testimony was relevant to show that Rapp did not 
fail to mitigate his damages by declining to re-auction the 
property.  However, because Forbes did not present evidence that 
Rapp would likely have obtained a higher price if he had re-
auctioned the property, Heatwole’s testimony merely served as an 
unnecessary rebuttal to a defense that was not proved.  Thus, we 
hold that the chancellor’s error in admitting this evidence was 
harmless because it could not have affected the result that he 
reached in this case. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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