Title: City of Milwaukee v. Sammie L. Glass
Citation: 2001 WI 61
Docket Number: 1999AP002389
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2001

2001 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2389 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In Re the Return of Property in State v. Sammie 
L. Glass: 
 
City of Milwaukee,  
 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
Sammie L. Glass,  
 
Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 252 
Reported at:  239 Wis. 2d 373, 620 N.W.2d 213 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 13, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 1, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by George P. Kersten, Leslie Van Buskirk and Kersten & McKinnon, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by George P. Kersten and 
Leslie M. Van Buskirk. 
 
 
For the appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by David J. Stanosz, assistant city attorney, with whom 
 
2 
on the brief was Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
 
2001 WI 61 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2389 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Return of Property in State v.  
Sammie L. Glass: 
 
City of Milwaukee,  
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Sammie L. Glass,  
 
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing 
an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Dennis P. 
Moroney, Circuit Court Judge.  The order of the circuit court 
awarded the plaintiff, Sammie L. Glass, $1,606.80 in response to 
his petition for the return of property seized from him by the 
Milwaukee Police Department.  The plaintiff's petition for the 
                     
1 In re the Return of Property in State v. Sammie L. Glass: 
City of Milwaukee v. Sammie L. Glass, 2000 WI App 252, 239 
Wis. 2d 373, 620 N.W.2d 213. 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
2 
return of property seized from him was filed pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20 (1997-98).2  The City of Milwaukee appealed the 
order, contending that § 968.20, providing for the return of 
seized property, does not authorize a circuit court to award 
monetary damages against the City when the City cannot return 
the seized property because it no longer has possession of the 
seized property.  The court of appeals reversed the order of the 
circuit court, and the plaintiff now seeks review in this court. 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, 
concluding that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 does not authorize a circuit 
court to award monetary damages against the City when the City 
cannot return the seized property because it no longer has 
possession of the seized property. 
 
I 
 
¶3 
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute.  
On March 20, 1996, the Milwaukee police arrived at the 
plaintiff's garage to investigate a complaint of theft from a 
construction site.  Inside the garage, the officers found 
property they believed to be stolen, including copper wire, 
copper roofing nails, and other scrap metal.  They arrested the 
plaintiff for the crime of receiving stolen property and seized 
the property believed to have been stolen. 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
3 
¶4 
On March 11, 1998, at the close of the State's 
criminal proceedings against the plaintiff, the circuit court 
dismissed the criminal charges against the plaintiff.  On 
September 17, 1998, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 968.20, the 
plaintiff filed a petition for the return of the property seized 
from his garage.   
¶5 
The plaintiff represented himself at the hearing on 
the petition on October 26, 1998.  At the hearing, the City 
requested additional time to document what police had done with 
the property.  The attorney for the City suggested that the City 
no longer had possession of the property because the officers 
had turned the property over to a third person, whom they 
believed to be the rightful owner.  The circuit court scheduled 
a second hearing to establish what the City had done with the 
property at issue.  The circuit court further stated that it was 
treating the case as a bailment situation and that the plaintiff 
should establish the fair market value of the property, for 
which the City would be liable. 
¶6 
At the second hearing, on December 4, 1998, the City 
took the position that the plaintiff had failed to establish 
that the City ever had possession of the property.  The 
inventory number that the plaintiff had provided on the petition 
form did not correspond to the property described.  The circuit 
court asked the plaintiff if he had a receipt for the seized 
property, but the plaintiff stated that the officers had not 
provided a receipt.  Instead, the plaintiff offered photographs 
of the property that he alleged had been provided to his 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
4 
attorney by the City police.  The City denied that the police 
had taken these photographs.  The City further contended that it 
could not be liable for the fair market value of the property, 
because Wis. Stat. § 968.20 does not provide for monetary 
damages as a remedy for failure to return the seized property. 
¶7 
At a third hearing, on January 15, 1999, the plaintiff 
offered an amended inventory number that corresponded to the 
property described.  In addition, the plaintiff's attorney for 
the criminal case testified that the City police had indeed 
taken the photographs in question, as the plaintiff had 
asserted. 
¶8 
The City then conceded that the officers had seized 
the property but moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds 
that the City no longer had possession of the property.  It 
again argued that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 only authorizes a circuit 
court to order the return of seized property and does not 
authorize a circuit court to award monetary damages for failure 
to return the seized property.  In addition, the City argued 
that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice of claim 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).3 
                     
3 The parties have also raised the issue regarding the 
applicability of the notice of claim statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80, in this court.  Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 does not allow a circuit court to award monetary 
damages, we need not address the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80.   
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
5 
¶9 
Alternatively, the City requested additional time to 
review the amended inventory number, to implead third parties, 
and to conduct discovery.  The circuit court denied the City's 
motion to dismiss but allowed the City 120 days to implead third 
parties and to conduct discovery. 
¶10 At the final hearing, on May 14, 1999, the circuit 
court awarded the plaintiff $1,606.80, which the plaintiff 
established as the fair market value of the property seized. 
¶11 The City appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
the order of the circuit court.  Over a dissent by Judge Charles 
B. Schudson, the court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 contemplates only a return of seized property and does 
not authorize a circuit court to award monetary damages for 
failure to return the seized property.4  Judge Schudson 
dissented, arguing that the majority decision placed form over 
substance and led to an absurd result. 
 
II 
                                                                  
We also need not address whether a circuit court should 
proceed to determine ownership under Wis. Stat. § 968.20 when 
the person in possession of the property has not been notified 
of the proceedings.  The sole issue in this case is whether Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20 authorizes a circuit court to award monetary 
damages when seized property is no longer in the possession of 
the entity that seized it.  The plaintiff does not seek a 
determination 
regarding 
the 
ownership 
of 
the 
property.  
Accordingly, this question is not before us. 
4 The court of appeals further held that a monetary judgment 
against the City was barred because the plaintiff had not filed 
a notice of claim, as required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80. 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
6 
 
¶12 The issue before this court is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 authorizes a circuit court to award a plaintiff the 
fair market value of seized property when the City no longer has 
possession of the seized property.  
¶13 The relevant portions of Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20, 
entitled "Return of property seized," provide: 
 
(1) Any person claiming the right to possession of 
property seized pursuant to a search warrant or seized 
without a search warrant may apply for its return to 
the circuit court for the county in which the property 
was seized or where the search warrant was returned.  
The court shall order such notice as it deems adequate 
to be given the district attorney and all persons who 
have or may have an interest in the property and shall 
hold a hearing to hear all claims to its true 
ownership.  If the right to possession is proved to 
the court's satisfaction, it shall order the property, 
other than contraband or property covered under sub. 
(1m) or (1r) or s. 951.165, returned if: 
 
  (a) The property is not needed as evidence or, if 
needed, satisfactory arrangements can be made for its 
return for subsequent use as evidence; or 
 
  (b) All proceedings in which it might be required 
have been completed. 
 
¶14 
The parties' dispute centers on the nature of the 
action authorized by Wis. Stat. § 968.20.  The plaintiff 
contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 creates a civil cause of 
action, allowing a circuit court to exercise its full equitable 
powers to do complete justice between the parties.  In contrast, 
the City contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 is an in rem 
proceeding. 
 
The 
City 
urges 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
has 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
7 
jurisdiction over seized property, but not personal jurisdiction 
over the parties, and that without personal jurisdiction over 
the City, a circuit court cannot award money damages to a person 
whose property was seized.  
¶15 
Accordingly, we must determine whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 establishes an in personam action, as the plaintiff's 
arguments suggest, or an in rem action, as the City contends.  
Two factors lead us to conclude that § 968.20 contemplates an in 
rem action. 
¶16 
First, we consider the aims and objects of the action 
to determine whether it is in rem or in personam in nature and 
character.  An in personam action is directed against specific 
persons and seeks a judgment to be enforced personally against 
the defendant.  An in rem action is directed against the 
property and seeks a judgment as against the world with respect 
to 
the 
property 
that 
is 
the 
subject 
of 
the 
action.5  
Section 968.20 appears to describe an in rem action in that it 
authorizes a circuit court to determine the ownership of seized 
property and order its return.  
¶17 
Second, we consider the procedure set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20.  Actions in rem are procedurally distinct from 
actions in personam.  Chapter 801 of the statutes, entitled 
"Civil Procedure—Commencement of Action and Venue," sets forth 
different procedural requirements for the two types of actions. 
                     
5 See Delta Fish and Fur Farms, Inc. v. Pierce, 203 Wis. 
519, 530-31, 234 N.W. 881 (1931); State ex rel. Atkinson v. 
McDonald, 108 Wis. 8, 14, 84 N.W. 171 (1900). 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
8 
 In an in personam action, one or more jurisdictional grounds 
set forth in the statutes must exist and a defendant must be 
served with a summons in order for a court to render a judgment 
against a party personally.6  In contrast, in rem jurisdiction 
may be invoked when the subject of an action is personal 
property in which a defendant has an interest, and a notice of 
the action is served on the defendant pursuant to the statutes.7 
¶18 
The explicit purpose of § 968.20(1) is to hear all 
claims to the true ownership of property seized under certain 
conditions.  A circuit court is required "to order such notice 
as it deems adequate to be given the district attorney and all 
persons who have or may have an interest in the property."  Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20(1).  Section 968.20 does not set forth grounds 
for personal jurisdiction over the parties and does not provide 
for a judgment against any defendant personally.  Section 968.20 
thus does not seem to describe an in personam action.  
¶19 Considering the aims and objects of a Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 action and the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 establishes an in 
rem proceeding.  The court reached this same conclusion in a 
recent case.8  
                     
6 Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 801.04(2). 
7 See Wis. Stat. (Rules) §§ 801.04(3); 801.07(1); 801.12. 
8 See Jones v. State, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 595, 594 N.W.2d 738 
(1999) (stating that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 is an in rem action).  
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
9 
¶20 We now turn to whether the plaintiff may obtain 
monetary damages from the City in this proceeding under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20.  He cannot.  Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20 does not 
expressly state that a circuit court may award monetary damages 
if seized property is not returned.  Furthermore, the circuit 
court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the City in 
accordance 
with 
the 
statutes 
governing 
civil 
actions, 
a 
prerequisite for awarding monetary damages against the City.9 
¶21 We have concluded that a proceeding under § 968.20 is 
a proceeding in rem to determine true ownership of specific 
property.  A judgment in an in rem proceeding is valid only 
against the specific property and not against a defendant or a 
defendant's other assets.10 
¶22 The plaintiff urges this court to read broader 
equitable powers into the statute.  He contends, as did Judge 
Schudson's dissent, that the court of appeals elevated form over 
substance.  Moreover, he contends that this result is contrary 
to the legislative intent behind Wis. Stat. § 968.20, which was 
to provide a simplified means of recovery for seized property 
that is no longer needed as evidence in criminal proceedings.  
In particular, the plaintiff highlights the inequity that arises 
when an individual whose seized property has been disposed of in 
                     
9 See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 801.04(2). 
10 See Wis. Stat. (Rules) §§ 801.04(3) and 801.07; see also 
Edwin E. Bryant, 1 Callaghan's Wisconsin Pleading and Practice 
§ 6.12, at 467 (4th ed. 1997). 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
10
an unauthorized manner is denied the benefit of a simplified 
means of recovery. 
¶23 
While the plaintiff's arguments regarding fairness are 
persuasive, these arguments do not allow this court to transform 
an in rem proceeding into an in personam proceeding in order to 
achieve a more fair result.  This court cannot confer upon a 
circuit court jurisdiction that the circuit court does not 
possess by law.11 
¶24 
Courts have personal jurisdiction only to the extent 
authorized by Chapter 801.  Wisconsin Stat. (Rule) § 801.04(2) 
provides that a court:  
 
may render a judgment against a party personally only 
if there exists one or more of the jurisdictional 
grounds set forth in s. 801.05 or 801.06 and in 
addition either: 
 
(a) A summons is served upon the person pursuant to s. 
801.11; or 
 
(b) Service of a summons is dispensed with under the 
conditions in s. 801.06. 
 
¶25 No summons was served on the City of Milwaukee in this 
action.  Instead, Wis. Stat. § 968.20 authorized the circuit 
court to proceed "with such notice as it deems adequate."  
Although Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 801.06 allows a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has waived the 
affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over his or her 
person, Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 801.06 specifically provides:  
                     
11 See Defiance Mach. Works v. Gill, 170 Wis. 477, 486-87, 
175 N.W. 940 (1920). 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
11
 
An appearance to contest the basis for in rem 
 . . . jurisdiction under s. 802.06 (2)(a) 3. without 
seeking any other relief does not constitute an 
appearance within the meaning of this section. 
 
¶26 
We turn to the transcripts of each hearing to 
determine whether the City has waived its right to contest 
personal jurisdiction.  In the first hearing, the City requested 
additional time to clarify the basis for in rem jurisdiction 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.20, namely, to determine whether the City 
had possession of the property in question at the time of the 
proceeding.  At each of the next three hearings, the City 
contested the circuit court's authority to award monetary 
damages after the City had established that it no longer had 
possession of the property.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not gain personal jurisdiction over the City of 
Milwaukee by virtue of its appearances in this matter. 
¶27 In affirming the court of appeals, we pay heed to 
Judge Schudson's dissent, which noted that the plaintiff, "a pro 
se litigant, will be amazed that this court casts him back into 
a legal maze."  However, we can discern no alternative under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20, which sets forth a simplified means for 
returning seized property.  Section 968.20 rests on the 
assumption that a person who seizes property will retain 
possession of the seized property.  Indeed, this assumption 
would be in keeping with Wis. Stat. § 968.19, entitled "Custody 
of property seized," which requires seized property to be safely 
kept.  Section 968.19 provides:  
 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
12
Property seized under a search warrant or validly 
seized without a warrant shall be safely kept by the 
officer, who may leave it in the custody of the 
sheriff and take a receipt therefor, so long as 
necessary for the purpose of being produced as 
evidence on any trial.  
 
¶28 
Although 
we 
are 
sympathetic 
to 
the 
plaintiff's 
contention that an individual whose property has been seized 
should not be denied a simplified remedy merely because 
authorities have unlawfully disposed of the property, we 
conclude that it is for the legislature, not the courts, to 
create that simplified remedy.  
¶29 
For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals, which reversed the order of the circuit 
court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
99-2389 
 
 
1