Title: State v. Corey J. Hampton
Citation: 2004 WI 107
Docket Number: 2001AP000509-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2004

2004 WI 107 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0509-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Corey J. Hampton,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 293 
Reported at:  259 Wis. 2d. 455, 655 N.W.2d 131 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mel Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Melinda A. Swartz, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2004 WI 107 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0509-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 4888) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Corey J. Hampton,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Hampton, 2002 WI App 
293, 259 Wis. 2d 455, 655 N.W.2d 131.  The court of appeals 
reversed an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, denying 
the defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his plea 
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion.  
At the earlier plea hearing, the circuit court neglected to 
advise the defendant personally that the court was not bound by 
his plea agreement with the State.  Later the court imposed a 
longer stayed sentence and a longer period of probation than the 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
2 
 
State had agreed to recommend.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the defendant had made a prima facie showing under State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), that he was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the 
plea. 
¶2 
This review presents three issues.  First, in taking a 
plea of guilty or no contest from a criminal defendant, must the 
circuit court advise the defendant personally on the record that 
the court is not bound by a plea agreement and ascertain whether 
the defendant understands this information?  We conclude that 
the answer is "yes," thereby affirming the decision in State ex 
rel. White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973).   
¶3 
Second, what is the appropriate way for a circuit 
court to advise the defendant personally that a plea agreement 
is not binding on the court?  We conclude that there is no 
single, inflexible way for the court to discharge this duty, but 
the most logical, consistent, and efficient method is for the 
court to personally deliver an explanation to the defendant and 
then ascertain whether the defendant understands that the court 
is not bound by a plea agreement.  The court may not discharge 
this duty by anything less than a personal dialogue. 
¶4 
Third, is the circuit court required to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea 
when the motion points to the court's failure in the plea 
colloquy to advise the defendant personally that the court was 
not bound by the plea agreement, and the defendant also alleges 
that he did not understand that the court was not bound by the 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
3 
 
plea agreement?  We conclude that the answer is "yes," because 
the defendant will have made the requisite showing for an 
evidentiary hearing, as provided in State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶5 
On the facts presented, we conclude that the circuit 
court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
determine 
whether 
Corey 
Hampton's 
plea 
was 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently entered.  Consequently, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit 
court for action consistent with this opinion. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On September 
16, 1998, Corey J. Hampton was charged with second-degree sexual 
assault of a child, a felony that carried a potential prison 
term of 20 years. See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.50(3)(bc), 948.02(2).1  
On December 8, 1998, Hampton entered an Alford plea to that 
charge.2   
¶7 
Prior 
to 
the 
plea 
hearing, 
Hampton's 
attorney 
negotiated a plea agreement with the State.  He also met with 
the defendant to review a two-page plea questionnaire. 
¶8 
Item 10 of the plea questionnaire read: "I understand 
that the Judge is not bound to follow any plea agreement or any 
recommendation made by the District Attorney, my attorney, or 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
4 
 
any presentence report.  I understand that the Judge is free to 
sentence me to the . . . maximum possible penalties in this 
case."  Immediately below this language the questionnaire listed 
the charge against Hampton and noted, "Years: 20" and "Fine: 
$10,000." 
¶9 
Item 15 of the questionnaire stated: "I have read (or 
have had read to me) this entire questionnaire, and I understand 
its contents."  Below this statement, Hampton signed his name 
and wrote in the date.  Hampton's attorney also signed the 
questionnaire, attesting that "the defendant acknowledged his 
understanding of each item in this questionnaire."  
¶10 The questionnaire was dated December 6, 1998.  Two 
days later, at the plea hearing, Hampton acknowledged that his 
counsel had read the information in the plea questionnaire to 
him and that Hampton had signed both sides of the form. 
¶11 The plea hearing on December 8 generated a 28-page 
transcript, with a lengthy plea colloquy, which the court of 
appeals later described as "exemplary . . . with one exception."  
Hampton, 259 Wis. 2d 455, ¶7. 
¶12 Circuit Judge Mel Flanagan elicited information about 
the 
defendant's 
age, 
his 
six 
years 
of 
post-high 
school 
education, 
his 
history 
of 
mental 
problems 
and 
voluntary 
commitments, his medications, the offense, the victim, and 
potential charges outside the county.  The court also asked 
questions about the appropriate plea.  Because the court had 
received a letter from Hampton in which he denied an element of 
the offense, the court questioned whether Hampton truly wished 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
5 
 
to enter a no-contest plea.  The court asked defense counsel to 
take a moment to discuss with Hampton whether he wanted to enter 
an Alford plea instead.  After a discussion with the defendant 
off the record, defense counsel informed the court that Hampton 
wanted to enter an Alford plea. 
¶13 The court also engaged in extensive discussion of a 
plea agreement in which the State offered the defendant an 
option on the State's sentencing recommendation.  In essence, 
the 
State 
offered 
the 
defendant 
a 
choice 
between 
a 
recommendation to the court of a seven-year prison sentence 
stayed, with seven years of probation and nine to twelve months 
in the House of Correction as a condition of probation; or a 
recommendation to the court of an imposed and stayed sentence of 
incarceration and probation with a period of time in the House 
of Correction, leaving the length of all terms to the court's 
discretion.  By asking probing questions, the court clarified 
the plea agreement.  In the discussion, the district attorney 
corrected his description of the agreement, and defense counsel 
explained 
to 
the 
defendant: 
"[The 
district 
attorney's] 
recommendation on the second [option] is just to stand silent as 
to how long you're in jail or a prison, leaving that all to the 
judge.  He would just stand silent as to the amount . . . .  In 
either case, we're free to argue for less.  Do you understand 
that now?"  Hampton answered, "Yes." 
¶14 In the colloquy, the court addressed both the maximum 
penalty for the offense and the defendant's understanding of the 
terms of the plea agreement: 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
6 
 
The Court: 
[The State has] agreed to the two 
possible 
recommendations 
at 
sentencing that they have offered 
to you; do you understand that? 
The Defendant:  
Yes. 
The Court: 
And 
you 
understand 
that 
the 
offense for which you are charged 
at this time carries a penalty of 
up to twenty years in prison; do 
you understand that? 
The Defendant:  
Now I do. 
The Court: 
 
Okay.  Is that news to you? 
The Defendant: 
I thought it was forty years, Your 
Honor. 
The Court: 
 
Am I wrong? 
The Prosecutor: 
No.  It's a -- It's a second 
degree. 
The Court: 
 
One count -- 
The Prosecutor: 
Correct -- 
The Court: 
 
-- so it's a -- 
The Prosecutor: 
-- twenty year -- 
The Court: 
-- twenty year penalty.  Okay now 
do you understand that? 
The Defendant:  
Yes. 
The Court: 
Okay.  Now, you understand that 
their 
recommendation 
of 
either 
making 
an 
affirmative 
recommendation 
of 
seven 
years 
imposed and stayed and seven-year 
probation or leaving it up to the 
Court 
to 
determine 
what 
the 
imposed and stayed sentence is and 
what the probation is are both far 
less than the maximum that they 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
7 
 
could recommend; do you understand 
that? 
The Defendant:  
Yes, I do. 
The Court: 
Okay.  So do you understand that 
you are receiving a benefit from 
them in the fact that they would 
not charge any other charges and 
make 
one 
of 
those 
two 
recommendations at sentencing? 
The Defendant:  
Yes, I do. 
. . . .  
The Court: 
Other than what the State has 
agreed 
to 
recommend, 
the 
two 
possible recommendations, have you 
been promised anything else? 
The Defendant:  
No. 
. . . .  
The Court: 
Do 
you 
understand 
that 
this 
offense 
[second-degree 
sexual 
assault of a child] is -- you can 
face a possible fine of up to 
$10,000 or imprisonment for not 
more than twenty years or both; do 
you understand that? 
The Defendant:  
Yes. 
The Court: 
And you understand that the State 
has agreed to recommend an imposed 
and stayed sentence of seven years 
in 
jail 
with 
a 
seven-year 
probation 
with 
appropriate 
conditions to include a nine- to 
twelve-month period in the House 
of 
Correction 
or 
a 
period 
of 
imposed and stayed sentence and 
probation 
with 
the 
same 
conditions, 
but 
the 
length 
of 
those sentences would be up to the 
Court; do you understand that? 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
8 
 
The Defendant:  
Yes. 
The Court: 
Do you have any question about 
their recommendation or anything 
we've discussed so far? 
The Defendant:  
No. 
¶15 The court engaged in extensive discussion with the 
defendant.  At no point, however, did the circuit court 
personally advise the defendant that it was not bound by the 
plea agreement, or ask the defendant whether he understood that 
the court was not bound by the plea agreement.  The State does 
not contend that the court's statements about "leaving it up to 
the Court to determine what the imposed and stayed sentence is" 
or "the length of those sentences would be up to the Court" were 
anything more than summaries of part of the State's second 
possible sentencing recommendation. 
¶16 On March 8, 1999, honoring the defendant's choice 
under the plea agreement, the State recommended a seven-year 
imposed and stayed sentence and seven years probation with a 
condition that Hampton serve a nine- to twelve-month jail term. 
¶17 The court placed Hampton on probation and ordered a 
twelve-month jail term but rejected the remainder of the 
recommendation.  Rejecting a seven-year imposed and stayed 
prison term with seven years of probation, the circuit court 
imposed and stayed a twelve-year prison term with twelve years 
of probation. 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
9 
 
¶18 Hampton filed a postconviction motion3 requesting an 
evidentiary hearing at which he intended to demonstrate that his 
plea should be withdrawn because it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made.  He alleged that the circuit court failed to 
personally advise him that it was not bound to follow the 
sentencing recommendation of the plea agreement and that he did 
not understand that the court was not bound by the prosecutor's 
recommendation.  The circuit court denied the motion without an 
evidentiary hearing and Hampton appealed. 
¶19 A divided court of appeals reversed, concluding that 
Hampton made a prima facie showing under Bangert, inasmuch as 
(1) the circuit court that accepted the plea failed to 
personally advise Hampton that it was not bound by the State's 
sentence recommendation; and (2) Hampton alleged that he was 
actually 
unaware 
that 
the 
court 
was 
not 
bound 
by 
the 
recommendation.  Hampton, 259 Wis. 2d 455, ¶17.  The court 
concluded that the circuit court erred in denying Hampton's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his plea without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing.  Id., ¶18.   
                                                 
3 Hampton in fact filed two postconviction motions.  The 
first, heard by Circuit Judge Mel Flanagan, was rejected without 
an evidentiary hearing.  Hampton filed an appeal which he then 
voluntarily 
dismissed. 
 
He 
subsequently 
filed 
a 
second 
postconviction motion to withdraw his plea, which was assigned 
to Circuit Judge Dennis Moroney.  This motion was also denied 
without an evidentiary hearing.  Both judges filed written 
explanations of their decisions.  Judge Moroney's order denying 
Hampton's motion for postconviction relief superseded Judge 
Flanagan's order.  We therefore discuss the issues as they 
relate to the second order. 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
10 
 
II. CIRCUIT COURT'S OBLIGATION TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT 
PERSONALLY THAT THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
¶20 The first issue is whether, in taking a plea of guilty 
or no contest from a criminal defendant, the circuit court must 
advise the defendant personally on the record that the court is 
not bound by any plea agreement and ascertain whether the 
defendant understands the information.  We conclude that the 
answer is "yes." 
¶21 Taking pleas is an increasingly important and complex 
stage in a criminal proceeding and is the source of frequent 
litigation.  The paramount principle at a plea hearing is that 
"a guilty or no contest [or Alford] plea must be knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently entered."  State v. Bollig, 2000 
WI 6, ¶15, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199 (citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)); Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257. 
¶22 "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which 
admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a 
conviction."  Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.  When a defendant pleads 
guilty or no contest, he or she waives several constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one's 
accusers.  Id. at 243.  "Waivers of constitutional rights not 
only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts 
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences."  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 
(1970).  Courts are required to notify defendants of the direct 
consequences of their pleas.  State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
11 
 
219 Wis. 2d 615, 636, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998) (citing Brady, 397 
U.S. at 755). 
¶23 The constitutional mandate set out in Bollig and 
Boykin 
is 
enforced 
and 
supplemented 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a), (b), and (c);4 and by a series of 
decisions 
including 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Burnett 
v. 
Burke, 
22 
Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964), Ernst v. State, 43 
Wis. 2d 661, 674, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), and Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 261-62, which established six "general duties" of the 
trial court in accepting a plea, namely: 
(1) To determine the extent of the defendant's 
education and general comprehension; 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 (2001-02) provides in part: 
 
971.08 Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal 
thereof.  (1) Before the court accepts a plea of 
guilty or no contest, it shall do all of the 
following: 
 
(a) Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise 
the defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law. 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
12 
 
(2) To establish the accused's understanding of the 
nature of the crime with which [the defendant] is 
charged and the range of punishments which it carries; 
(3) To ascertain whether any promises or threats have 
been made to [the defendant] in connection with [the 
defendant's] appearance, [the defendant's] refusal of 
counsel, and [the defendant's] proposed plea of guilty 
[or no contest]; 
(4) To alert the accused to the possibility that a 
lawyer 
may 
discover 
defenses 
or 
mitigating 
circumstances which would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the accused;  
(5) To make sure that the defendant understands that 
if [the defendant is] a pauper, counsel will be 
provided at no expense to [the defendant]; and 
(6) To personally ascertain whether a factual basis 
exists to support the plea. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 261-62 (citations omitted).   
¶24 Bangert added a seventh duty: (7) To inform the 
defendant of the constitutional rights that are waived by a 
plea, or determine whether the defendant already possesses this 
knowledge, and then ascertain whether the defendant understands 
that he is giving up these rights by entering a plea.  Id. at 
270-72.  The court stated that: "The defendant need not 
specifically waive each right, but the record or other evidence 
must 
show 
that 
he 
entered 
his 
plea 
voluntarily 
and 
knowingly with understanding of the rights he was waiving."  Id. 
at 270. 
¶25 The appearance of Bangert's seventh duty has led to 
plea questionnaires that set out a defendant's constitutional 
rights in detail and provide a place on the form where the 
defendant acknowledges that these rights are being waived.  The 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
13 
 
court then follows up on the record.  This was illustrated in 
State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶11 n.6, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 
N.W.2d 891, with the following language: 
The Court: 
Now, I'm not going to go over all of 
the things on the form with you. . . .  
I do want to touch bases though with 
certain constitutional rights. 
. . . .  
The Court: 
Now, if you enter a no contest plea, 
then you will be waiving and giving up 
your right to remain silent, your right 
to testify, your right to a 12 person 
jury trial, 
your 
right 
to 
have 
a 
unanimous 
verdict, 
your 
right 
to 
confront your accuser in court, cross-
examine that person under oath, right 
to call witnesses on your own behalf, 
and the right to [proof] beyond a 
reasonable doubt [of] each element of 
the offense to which you are charged.  
You understand that that would be the 
case? 
The Defendant: Yes, I do. 
¶26 The 
practice of 
plea-bargaining is 
an 
essential 
component of the administration of criminal justice.  Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).  "[W]hatever might be the 
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea 
and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components 
of 
this 
country's 
criminal 
justice 
system. 
 
Properly 
administered, they can benefit all concerned."  Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978) (quoting Blackledge v. 
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)); see also White, 57 Wis. 2d at 
21 ("Plea bargaining is an accepted and necessary part of the 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
14 
 
process whereby a good many criminal prosecutions are terminated 
as a result of a guilty plea."). 
¶27 In Wisconsin, circuit judges do not involve themselves 
in plea bargaining.  State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 481, 192 
N.W.2d 872 (1972); Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 150, 187 
N.W.2d 800 (1971); State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 487, 175 
N.W.2d 216 (1970).  In Farrar v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 651, 657, 191 
N.W.2d 214 (1971), this court declared that "any advance 
understanding between a prosecutor and defendant must not 
involve the trial judge." 
¶28 In White, the court embraced the corollary to the 
Farrer principle, namely: "If the prosecuting attorney has 
agreed to seek charge or sentence concessions which must be 
approved by the court, the court must advise the defendant 
personally that the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney 
are not binding on the court."  57 Wis. 2d at 24 (quoting 
American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, 
Approved Draft, § 1.5 at 29 (1968)) (emphasis added).   
¶29 Curiously, this important mandate was not listed among 
the "duties" outlined in Bangert. 
¶30 In White, a defendant pleaded guilty to burglary 
pursuant to a plea agreement.  The agreement provided for the 
dismissal of a similar charge against the defendant's brother.  
White, 57 Wis. 2d at 20.  The details of the plea agreement were 
not disclosed to the court at the plea hearing.  This court 
stated that the terms of any plea agreement should be made a 
matter of record at the plea hearing, id. at 22 (citing Austin 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
15 
 
v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971)), to assist 
review of such issues as whether a plea agreement was proper, 
whether a plea agreement was kept, and whether the resulting 
plea was voluntary.  To ensure compliance, we emphasized that 
"the standards specified in sec. 1.5 of the ABA Standards 
Relating to Pleas of Guilty must be observed with respect to 
ascertaining whether a plea agreement has been reached prior to 
the plea discussion and the terms of the agreement that has been 
reached."  Id. at 24 (emphasis added).   
¶31 Section 1.5 of the ABA Standards provided that a court 
should not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless it 
determines "whether the tendered plea is the result of prior 
plea discussions and a plea agreement."  Id.  This is consistent 
with the third enumerated Bangert requirement noted above, that 
a court must "ascertain whether any promises . . . have been 
made 
to 
[the 
defendant] 
in 
connection 
with 
[the 
defendant's] . . . proposed plea of guilty."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 262.   
¶32 Furthermore, when the court becomes aware that the 
guilty or no contest plea is the result of a plea agreement, it 
must inquire as to the terms of the agreement.  If the court 
discovers that "the prosecuting attorney has agreed to seek 
charge or sentence concessions which must be approved by the 
court, the court must advise the defendant personally that the 
recommendations of the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the court."  White, 57 Wis. 2d at 24 (quoting American Bar 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
16 
 
Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, Approved 
Draft, § 1.5 at 29 n.6 (1968)) (emphasis added).5 
¶33 White's mandate that the court advise the defendant 
that the prosecutor's recommendation is not binding on the court 
has been repeated by this court at least twice.6  In State v. 
McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990), we held that the 
                                                 
5 The State argues that "a court is not even obligated to 
inquire whether such [a plea agreement] exists," and therefore a 
court "should not be charged with the duty to inform the 
defendant it is not bound by the negotiated plea agreement."  In 
State v. Lee, the case the State cites for this proposition, we 
indeed "decline[d] to make it mandatory that, upon a plea of 
guilty or no contest, a court specifically ask whether there 
have been any plea negotiations or agreements or whether the 
state 
has 
promised 
to 
make 
any 
recommendations." 
 
88 
Wis. 2d 239, 251, 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979).  However, our holding 
did not obviate a court's duty to inquire "whether any promises 
or threats have been made . . . in connection with the proposed 
plea."  Id.  In Lee, the court complied with the holdings of 
this court when it inquired whether there had been any promises 
made by the prosecution; the defendant, however, answered in the 
negative despite the fact that the prosecutor had agreed to 
recommend a reduced sentence.  Id. at 242.  The court in that 
instance could not have been expected to follow up with 
questions regarding the terms of a plea agreement that it was 
told did not exist, and it would have required superior powers 
of prognostication for the court to have advised the defendant 
that it was not bound by a plea agreement of which it had no 
knowledge.  
It should also be noted that the Lee case was decided in 
1979, more than seven years before State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
6 We have also reiterated that the court is to abide by the 
standards of § 1.5 of the ABA Standard Relating to Guilty Pleas.  
See Melby v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 368, 385, 234 N.W.2d 634 (1975) 
(noting that the circuit court must inquire into voluntariness 
of plea in accordance with American Bar Association, Standards 
Relating to Pleas of Guilty, Approved Draft, § 1.5 cmt. (1968)). 
 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
17 
 
State cannot agree to withhold relevant information in exchange 
for a plea: 
Agreements by law enforcement officials, whether 
they be by the police or prosecutors, not to reveal 
relevant and pertinent information to the trial judge 
charged with the duty of imposing an appropriate 
sentence upon one convicted of a criminal offense, are 
clearly against public policy and cannot be respected 
by the courts. 
Id. at 125-26 (quoting Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 243 
N.W.2d 186 (1976)).  We concluded that the agreement at issue 
did not violate public policy because a sentencing court is not 
bound by the terms of the plea agreement.  Id. at 128 (citing 
Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 367, 182 N.W.2d 262 (1971)).  In 
this context, we explained that when the court must approve 
charge or sentence concessions, "the court must personally 
advise the defendant that the agreement is in no way binding on 
the court."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶34 In State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 920-21, 485 
N.W.2d 354 (1992), we addressed whether double jeopardy permits 
a circuit court to vacate sua sponte a previously accepted no 
contest plea in order to reinstate previously charged felonies.  
Answering in the negative, our analysis reiterated crucial 
components of the legal framework of plea agreements.  Id. at 
927 n.11.  Central to our discussion was the notion that the 
circuit 
court, 
before 
accepting 
a 
plea 
agreement, 
had 
considerable leeway to probe into the reasons why concessions 
were appropriate.  Id. at 927.  We set forth that: 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
18 
 
A circuit court has the power to accept or reject a 
plea agreement reducing or amending charges; it should 
consider the public interest in making its decision 
about the plea agreement and should make a complete 
record of the plea agreement.  The court must 
personally advise the defendant that the agreement is 
in no way binding on the court. 
Id. at 927-28 n.11 (citing White, 57 Wis. 2d at 29-30) (emphasis 
added). 
¶35 The State argues that our statements in White, McQuay, 
and Comstock, which unambiguously require circuit courts to 
advise defendants entering pleas that the court is not bound by 
a plea agreement, were insufficiently germane to the issues 
addressed in those cases to merit precedential value.  According 
to the State, these statements were dicta because they were not 
necessary to disposition, and we did not intentionally take up 
or decide whether a court must advise a defendant personally 
that the plea agreement is not binding on the court.  
¶36 We disagree, at least insofar as White is concerned.  
In White, this court clearly focused its attention on the 
procedures a court should follow when determining whether a 
plea, especially one that results from a plea agreement, is 
voluntary.  This court directed that the standards proposed by 
§ 1.5 of the ABA Standards "must be observed," exemplifying "a 
judicial act of the court" that should thereafter be recognized 
as a binding decision of the court.  See State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981).   
¶37 Perhaps even more telling is the case of State v. 
Williams, 2000 WI 78, 236 Wis. 2d 293, 613 N.W.2d 132.  In 
Williams, this court was asked to adopt a new rule of procedure 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
19 
 
requiring a trial judge who anticipated exceeding the state's 
sentencing recommendation under a plea agreement, to inform the 
defendant of the judge's anticipated action and to allow the 
defendant to withdraw his plea.  This court rejected the 
proposed rule saying: 
In Wisconsin, a trial court is not bound by the 
state's 
sentence 
recommendation 
under 
a 
plea 
agreement.  Before entering a plea, the defendant is 
informed 
of 
and 
understands 
that 
the 
sentence 
recommendation he or she has bargained for is not 
binding on the court.  Under this procedure, "failure 
to receive sentence concessions contemplated by a plea 
agreement is [not] a basis for withdrawing a guilty 
plea on the grounds of manifest injustice."  Melby v. 
State, 70 Wis. 2d 368, 385, 234 N.W.2d 634 (1975). 
Id., ¶2 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  With this 
analysis, 
the 
Williams 
court 
not 
only 
restated 
a 
well 
established rule but also used that rule as justification for 
preserving our current plea taking procedure.  Abandoning the 
White/McQuay/Comstock mandate in this case would destroy the 
foundation of our Williams decision. 
 
¶38 Consequently, we reaffirm the rule that a circuit 
court must advise the defendant personally that the terms of a 
plea agreement, including a prosecutor's recommendations, are 
not binding on the court and, concomitantly, ascertain whether 
the defendant understands this information. 
 
¶39 This holding presents a second issue: What is the 
appropriate way for a circuit court to advise the defendant 
personally that the terms of a plea agreement are not binding on 
the court? 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
20 
 
¶40 The State raises concerns.  It notes that in White, 
the mandate is stated that: "[T]he court must advise the 
defendant personally that the recommendations of the prosecuting 
attorney are not binding on the court."  Then it observes that 
McQuay and Comstock restated the mandate as: "The court must 
personally advise the defendant that the agreement is in no way 
binding on the court." 
 
¶41 What does the word "personally" modify, and what does 
it mean?  Does the mandate require that the circuit judge 
personally recite the substance of the admonition that the plea 
agreement is not binding on the court?  Is there a set script, 
similar to the script in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c), that the 
court must follow?  May the court ascertain a defendant's 
knowledge of the court's freedom to disregard the plea agreement 
through a combination of questions and reference to the plea 
questionnaire or some prior communication?   
¶42 The essence of the mandate is that the court must 
engage in a colloquy with the defendant on the record at the 
plea hearing to ascertain whether the defendant understands that 
the court is not bound by a sentencing recommendation from the 
prosecutor or any other term of the defendant's plea agreement.  
The plea colloquy is defective if it fails to produce an 
exchange on the record that indicates that the defendant 
understands the court is free to disregard recommendations based 
on a plea agreement for sentencing. 
¶43 The court's duty is to assure that the defendant has 
enough information and understanding of the court's independent 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
21 
 
role in sentencing, notwithstanding any plea agreement, that the 
defendant is able to enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
plea.  This duty does not require that the court provide all the 
essential information personally, although personal explanation 
by the court strikes us as the most logical, consistent, and 
efficient way of delivering information.  Nor does it require 
magic words or an inflexible script.  In every case, however, 
the court must make personal inquiry of the defendant to 
determine whether the defendant understands that the court is 
not bound by the terms of the plea agreement. 
¶44 In a legal sense, the purpose of the colloquy is to 
assure a voluntary and intelligent plea, as well as fundamental 
fairness in the taking of pleas.  In a practical sense, the 
purpose of the colloquy is to promote finality by eliminating 
one of the grounds for plea withdrawal.  As we have done in the 
past, we strongly encourage courts to follow the approved plea 
acceptance procedures as set forth in Wis JI-Criminal SM-32 
(1995).  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 272; State v. Minniecheske, 
127 Wis. 2d 234, 245-46, 378 N.W.2d 283 (1985); State v. 
Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d 467, 483-84 n.3, 334 N.W.2d 91 (1983).  We 
also encourage that these procedures be updated periodically to 
reflect recent developments in case law. 
 
III. REMEDY FOR COURT'S FAILURE TO PERSONALLY ADVISE THE 
DEFENDANT THAT THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
¶45 In Bangert, we adopted "a new remedy for prima facie 
violations of statutorily and judicially mandated plea hearing 
procedures."  131 Wis. 2d at 252.  In light of then-contemporary 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
22 
 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, we retreated from our 
earlier announcement that "the Federal Constitution" required 
that a circuit court ascertain the defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the charge from the record at the plea hearing.  
Id. at 256-57.  The judicial duties that we had earlier 
announced remained, but a new remedy was devised for violations 
of 
these 
duties 
in 
light 
of 
their 
non-constitutional 
underpinnings. 
¶46 Bangert provides that a defendant may move to withdraw 
his plea when the procedures outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 are 
not undertaken or other court-mandated duties at the plea 
hearing are not fulfilled.  The initial burden rests with the 
defendant to make a pointed showing that the plea was accepted 
without the trial court's conformity with § 971.08 or other 
mandatory procedures.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  When the 
defendant's motion shows a violation of § 971.08(1)(a) or (b)7 or 
other mandatory duties and alleges that he in fact did not know 
or understand the information which should have been provided at 
the plea hearing, the burden shifts to the state to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.  Under these 
circumstances, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing at which the State and the defendant can offer evidence 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of plea withdrawal when a court fails to 
comply with the procedures of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c), see 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
23 
 
as to whether the defendant in fact knew the information that 
should have been provided.  Id. at 274-75. 
¶47 To obtain an evidentiary hearing based upon defects in 
the plea colloquy, the defendant will rely on the plea hearing 
record.  To rebut the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea 
because the plea was allegedly not knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent, the state will likely rely on the totality of the 
evidence, much of which will be found outside the plea hearing 
record.  Id. at 275. 
¶48 Bangert applied its new remedy to violations of 
§ 971.08 and the other "duties" outlined in the opinion.  As 
noted, Bangert did not include the mandate set out in White.  
Nonetheless, we approve the use of the Bangert remedy for plea 
colloquies that are defective because of the failure of the 
court to advise the defendant personally that the terms of the 
plea agreement are not binding on the court and to ascertain 
that the defendant understands this information. 
¶49 Bangert spoke to a circuit court's obligations with 
regard to all guilty and no contest pleas, while the White 
mandate applies only to that subset of pleas in which the court 
determines there has been a plea agreement.  The Bangert remedy 
has proven to be a useful tool in enforcing a defendant's rights 
at plea hearings, and we see no reason not to apply it in the 
White context. 
IV. ESTABLISHING THE REQUISITE SHOWING UNDER BANGERT 
¶50 The third issue concerns a defendant's burden to make 
a showing that will require the court to conduct an evidentiary 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
24 
 
hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.  Is the 
circuit court required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea when the motion points 
to the court's failure in the plea colloquy to advise the 
defendant personally that the court was not bound by the plea 
agreement, and the defendant also alleges that he did not 
understand the court was not bound by the plea agreement?  We 
conclude the answer is "yes." 
¶51 The State asserts that Hampton should not be entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing despite the circuit court's failure to 
advise him personally that the court was not bound by the plea 
agreement, because his motion did not contain sufficient 
evidentiary facts, which, if true, would have entitled him to 
withdraw his plea.  The State relies on a line of cases 
highlighted by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996); see also Levesque v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 412, 217 
N.W.2d 317 
(1974); 
Nelson 
v. 
State, 
54 
Wis. 2d 489, 
195 
N.W.2d 629 (1972).  However, Bangert controls the facts of this 
case because Bangert-type cases are confined to alleged defects 
in the record of the plea colloquy.  Bentley is inapposite 
because it applies to allegations less susceptible to objective 
confirmation in the record.   
¶52 We begin our discussion with Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 
and Levesque, 63 Wis. 2d 412, two cases that serve as the 
foundation for Bentley.  In Nelson, the defendant was denied an 
evidentiary hearing to withdraw his guilty plea after alleging 
that his "plea was not made voluntarily after proper advice from 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
25 
 
counsel and with a full understanding of the consequences of 
said plea but rather it was obtained unfairly to the ignorance 
and fear of said affiant."  54 Wis. 2d at 493.  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the court is obligated to hold a hearing 
whenever a non-frivolous motion to withdraw or vacate a plea is 
filed.  Id. at 495.  We rejected that argument, and concluded 
instead that after the plea is entered, "it is within the 
discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant a hearing 
on the motion."  Id. at 496.  We went on to hold that: 
[when] a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after 
judgment and sentence alleges facts which, if true, 
would entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court 
must hold an evidentiary hearing.  However, [1] if the 
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his 
motion to raise a question of fact, or [2] presents 
only conclusionary allegations, or [3] if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion 
without a hearing. 
Id. at 497-98.  
¶53 Two years later, the defendant in Levesque also sought 
to withdraw his guilty plea because, first, the facts allegedly 
did not support the defendant's guilt, and, second, because the 
court allegedly did not ascertain that the defendant understood 
the nature of the charged offense. According to the defendant, 
both deficiencies were a result of the court's misconstruction 
of the elements of burglary.  63 Wis. 2d at 418.  We first 
concluded that the court correctly interpreted the elements of 
burglary.  Id. at 415, 418.  We then turned our attention to the 
defendant's claim that, at the time of the plea hearing, he was 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
26 
 
unable to understand the proceedings due to mental disease or 
defect.  Relying on Nelson, we reasoned that "the [defendant] 
cannot stand on conclusory allegations, hoping to supplement 
them at a hearing."  Id. at 421.  Because the defendant failed 
to allege more than ultimate facts, we held that the circuit 
court properly denied the defendant an evidentiary hearing.  Id. 
at 421-22.   
¶54 The State's assertion that courts are not required to 
hold an evidentiary hearing when a defendant merely alleges that 
he or she does not understand important information when 
entering a plea might be dismissed if it relied solely on these 
two cases.  Both Nelson and Levesque are distinguishable on the 
basis that they predate the advent of the burden-shifting 
framework announced in Bangert.  However, this court relied on 
both Nelson and Levesque in Bentley when it rejected a 
defendant's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 306.  Consequently, additional analysis 
is required. 
¶55 In Bentley, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea on grounds that his attorney erroneously advised him about 
the minimum eligibility date for parole.  Id. at 307.  In 
assessing the viability of the defendant's claim, we employed 
the test from Nelson in order to determine whether the court was 
required to hold a hearing on the plea withdrawal motion.  Id. 
at 309.  We interpreted Nelson to provide "a two-part test which 
necessitates a mixed standard of appellate review."  Id. at 310. 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
27 
 
"If the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the 
defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and 
must hold an evidentiary hearing."  Id. (citing Nelson, 54 
Wis. 2d at 497).  "However, if the motion fails to allege 
sufficient facts, the circuit court has the discretion to deny a 
postconviction motion without a hearing based on any one of the 
three factors enumerated in Nelson."  Id. at 310-11; see also 
Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98; ¶52, supra. 
¶56 We 
conclude 
that 
Bangert 
and 
Bentley, 
although 
different, are not inconsistent.  They are not inconsistent 
because they apply to different fact situations.  Both cases 
deal with a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea.  Both deal 
with requests for an evidentiary hearing.  Both assign to the 
defendant the burden of making a showing that an evidentiary 
hearing is required. 
¶57 We see several distinctions in the Bangert-type case.  
First, the defendant must point to a specific defect in the plea 
hearing which constitutes an error by the court.  The defendant 
will not satisfy this burden merely by alleging that "the plea 
colloquy was defective" or "the court failed to conform to its 
mandatory duties during the plea colloquy."  The defendant must 
make specific allegations such as "at no point during the plea 
colloquy did the court explain that it was not bound by the plea 
bargain and was free to disregard the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation."  In addition, the defendant must allege that he 
did not in fact understand that the court was not bound by the 
plea agreement because that information/explanation was not 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
28 
 
provided.  We think a motion of this nature passes the test of 
Nelson and Bentley: a motion to withdraw a plea that alleges 
facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief.  
The allegation that the defendant did not understand is, 
admittedly, conclusory; but the allegation raises a question of 
fact and perhaps law that requires resolution. 
¶58 The allegation that a defendant did not understand 
something is qualitatively different from the allegation of a 
legal conclusion such as "counsel's performance was deficient 
and resulted in prejudice to the defendant," or "the defendant's 
plea was not voluntary."  These legal conclusions cry out for 
supporting facts, and these supporting facts must be alleged to 
satisfy the defendant's burden for an evidentiary hearing. 
¶59 "The nature and specificity of the required supporting 
facts will necessarily differ from case to case."  Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 314.  For instance, in the case of a White violation, 
it is relatively easy to point to the discussion of the plea 
agreement in the plea hearing transcript and show that there was 
no reference to the fact that the court is not bound by the 
terms of the plea agreement.  It would be considerably more 
difficult to expand on an allegation that the defendant did not 
understand information that was not conveyed to him.  
¶60 By contrast, the Bentley court explained that normally 
a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing only upon a showing of "manifest injustice by clear 
and convincing evidence."  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311.  When, 
for example, the basis for this injustice is an allegation that 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
29 
 
defendant 
involuntarily 
entered 
a 
plea 
because 
of 
the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim raises questions 
about both deficient performance and prejudice.  Id. at 311-12.  
To establish deficient performance, a defendant must necessarily 
provide the factual basis for the court to make a legal 
determination.  To show prejudice, a defendant must do more than 
merely allege that he would have pleaded differently but for the 
alleged deficient performance.  He must support that allegation 
with "objective factual assertions."  Id. at 313. 
¶61 Bangert-type violations should be apparent from the 
record.  Bentley-type allegations will often depend on facts 
outside the record.  To ask the court to examine facts outside 
the record in an evidentiary hearing requires a particularized 
motion 
with 
sufficient 
supporting 
facts 
to 
warrant 
the 
undertaking. 
¶62 There is a second distinction between Bangert-type 
cases and Bentley-type cases.  In Bangert-type cases, the 
defendant has the initial burden of showing the basis for a 
hearing; but if he succeeds, the burden shifts to the state to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea 
was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.  Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274.   
¶63 In Bentley-type cases, the defendant has the burden of 
making a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing, and if he 
succeeds, he still has the burden of proving all the elements of 
the alleged error, such as deficient performance and prejudice.  
The defendant must prove the linkage between his plea and the 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
30 
 
purported defect.  The defendant's proof must add up to manifest 
injustice. 
¶64 Consequently, the requisite specificity required for 
establishing a prima facie case mirrors the defendant's ultimate 
burden of proof.  It also reflects the substantive basis for 
this court's shift of the burden of proof. 
¶65 Finally, if the Bangert-type case requires something 
less to support the defendant's allegation of his understanding 
at the time of plea, it must be remembered that the court can 
head off the problem with a sufficient plea colloquy.  For 
instance, the best defense against an allegation that the 
defendant did not understand the court's role in sentencing in 
the wake of a plea agreement, is an explicit colloquy in the 
transcript of the plea hearing establishing that the defendant 
understood the court was not bound by the terms of the plea 
agreement.  In sum, the court has the means to virtually 
eliminate this ground for plea withdrawal.  Requiring an 
evidentiary hearing in the face of a supported allegation that 
the plea colloquy was defective is an effective means of 
enforcing the court's plea taking obligations. 
V. APPLICATION 
¶66 We now turn our attention to applying the above 
principles to Hampton's request for an evidentiary hearing.  It 
is undisputed that the circuit court did not advise Hampton that 
it 
was 
not 
bound 
by 
the 
plea 
agreement 
by 
expressly 
communicating this information to Hampton at the plea hearing.  
The court never asked Hampton if he understood that the court 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
31 
 
was not bound by the plea agreement.  Thus, the plea colloquy 
was deficient for failing to comply with the requirements of 
White.  Because Hampton also alleged that he did not understand 
that the court was not bound by the prosecutor's sentence 
recommendation, he made the requisite showing and is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing.   
¶67 The State contends that the circuit court complied 
with the requirements set forth in White despite the absence of 
an express statement indicating that the court was not bound by 
the plea agreement.  The State's argument rests on subtle 
linguistic distinctions, the court's repeated reference to the 
prosecutor's recommendation of seven years imposed and stayed as 
only a "recommendation," and the court's repeated recitation of 
the maximum possible penalty.  As we understand the State's 
position, when we required in White that "the court must advise 
the defendant personally," the word "personally," because of its 
position 
within 
the 
sentence, 
should 
be 
read 
to 
modify 
"defendant," not the "court," the inference being that the 
information should be received by the defendant in person.   The 
State sees White as requiring only that the defendant himself be 
advised, 
and 
this 
was 
accomplished 
by 
the 
pre-sentence 
questionnaire 
and 
the 
court's 
repeated 
reference 
to 
"recommendation."   
¶68 The State also argues that the word "advise" carries 
the generally accepted meaning "to inform," which requires only 
that the judge make sure a defendant is aware that the court is 
not bound by the plea agreement.  It contends that to repeat 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
32 
 
information that the court believes the defendant has already 
heard is not to advise, but to reiterate.  Here, the State says, 
the court asked Hampton whether he had reviewed the plea 
questionnaire form, and the defendant acknowledged that it had 
been read to him by his attorney and that he had signed the 
form.  Thus, by the State's analysis, the court ensured that 
Hampton 
had 
been 
previously 
given 
this 
information, 
and 
therefore had ensured that Hampton had been advised. 
¶69 We reject this argument.  The circuit court cannot 
satisfy its duty by inferring from the plea questionnaire or 
from something said at the plea hearing or elsewhere that the 
defendant understands that the court is not bound by the plea 
agreement.  The court must make certain through dialogue that 
the defendant understands that the court is not bound by other 
people's promises.  The plea questionnaire may be used to aid 
the court (or the prosecutor or defense counsel) in explaining, 
on the record at the plea hearing, the court's role in 
sentencing.  But the court must ask the question that ascertains 
that the defendant understands what he has been told. 
¶70 Finally, the State relies on the circuit court's 
repeated use of the word "recommendation" and the reference to 
the maximum penalty as fulfilling the court's duty to advise the 
defendant.  We agree that a plausible inference may be drawn 
from the repeated reference to "recommendation" that Hampton 
understood that the court was not bound by the plea agreement.  
But contrary inferences may be drawn from other parts of the 
record.  The State is free to present its evidence to meet its 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
33 
 
burden of persuasion at the evidentiary hearing.  In every 
instance where the requisite showing is made that the defendant 
was not properly advised at the plea hearing, and the defendant 
asserts he was unaware that the court could exceed the 
negotiated sentencing recommendation, there is a genuine issue 
of material fact which must be resolved at an evidentiary 
hearing. 
¶71 We are not persuaded by the State's position that the 
court fulfilled its duty under White in this instance.  The 
requirement that the court advise the defendant that it is not 
bound 
by 
the 
plea 
agreement 
is 
neither 
cumbersome 
nor 
complicated.  As is plain from the burden-shifting remedy 
created by Bangert, we seek to "encourage the prosecution in a 
plea hearing proceeding to assist the trial court in meeting 
its . . . obligations."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275.  This case 
likely represents the rare instance where both the court and the 
prosecution inadvertently overlooked a duty that the court must 
discharge.   
¶72 The State has offered several arguments as to why the 
defendant in fact understood that the court was not bound by the 
plea agreement.  This case, however, is not really about Corey 
Hampton's understanding at the time of his plea.  It is about 
the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing when the court errs at a plea hearing.  We 
hold that Hampton is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion.  At the hearing the State will have the opportunity to 
prove that Hampton was aware in fact that the court was not 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
34 
 
bound by the terms of the plea agreement.  We affirm the court 
of appeals and order that this matter be remanded to the circuit 
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing in compliance with our 
decision in Bangert. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶73 Today, we reaffirm that where the court is aware of a 
plea agreement, the court must advise the defendant personally 
that the court is not bound by the terms of that agreement and 
ascertain that the defendant understands this information.  
Further, we hold that the remedial measures specified in Bangert 
apply in this instance.  When the defendant shows that the court 
failed to inform the defendant that it was not bound by the plea 
agreement, and the defendant alleges that he did not understand 
that the court was not bound, the defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing.  In this instance, the circuit court failed 
to advise Hampton that it was not bound by the plea agreement, 
and Hampton has alleged that he did not understand this fact; 
therefore, Hampton is entitled to have an evidentiary hearing on 
his motion to withdraw the plea.  We affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals, and remand the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶74 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
35 
 
All work on this opinion was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004. 
 
 
 
No. 01-0509-CR 
 
 
 
1