Title: Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000308
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0308 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association, James 
Roe 1-5 and Jane Roe 1-2,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Milwaukee Board of School Directors, Joseph 
Fisher and Robert C. Jasna,  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Journal Sentinel, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Intervenor-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 93, 582 N.W.2d 122 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 2, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Steinmetz Wilcox & Crooks, JJ join 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., joins 
 
 
Prosser, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-intervenor-respondent-
petitioner there were briefs by David Lucey, Paul Bargren and 
Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee and oral argument by David Lucey. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief 
by Richard Perry, Robert J. Lerner, B. Michele Sumara and Perry 
Lerner, Quindel & Saks, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by 
Robert J. Lerner. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. 
Friedman, Robert J. Dreps and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison for 
the WI Newspaper Association, the WI Broadcasters Association and 
the Freedom of Information Council. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Melissa A. 
Cherney and Chris Galinat, as counsel, Madison, for the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce F. Ehlke, 
Aaron N. Halstead and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, 
Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, Madison, for District Council 40, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Gordon E. 
McQuillen and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison, for the 
Wisconsin Professional Police Association. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Jon P. Axelrod 
and DeWitt, Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, for Stephen M. Kailin 
& Linda Kailin. 
 
No. 
97-0308 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0308 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education  
Association,  
 
James Roe 1-5 and Jane Roe 1-2,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee Board of School Directors,  
Joseph Fisher and Robert C. Jasna,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Journal Sentinel, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Intervenor-Respondent- 
          Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The issue in this case is 
whether public employees are entitled to de novo judicial review 
under Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 
(1996), when a records custodian who is not a district attorney 
decides to release information from the employees' personnel 
records in response to a request made under Wisconsin's open 
records law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39 (1995-96).1  We hold that 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to 
the 1995-96 version of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
No. 
97-0308 
 
2 
the de novo judicial review we recognized in Woznicki applies in 
all cases in which a record custodian decides to disclose 
information 
implicating 
the 
privacy 
and/or 
reputational 
interests of an individual public employee, regardless of the 
identity of the record custodian.  Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for purposes of conducting a de novo review.      
I. 
¶2 
The facts of this case are undisputed.  As a result of 
a 1995 district-wide criminal background check, Milwaukee Public 
Schools ("MPS") discovered that 548 of its employees had 
criminal records.  MPS released the names and criminal records 
of these employees to the Journal Sentinel, Inc. ("Journal-
Sentinel").   
¶3 
Among the names released were those of plaintiffs 
James Roe 1-5 and Jane Roe 1-2, all of whom had been convicted 
of misdemeanors.  Six of the plaintiffs were educational 
assistants and one was a physical education teacher.  As a 
result of the background check, approximately 18 MPS employees, 
including the seven plaintiffs, were discharged by MPS or 
resigned under threat of discharge.  
¶4 
In a December 3, 1996, letter, a Journal-Sentinel 
reporter invoked Wisconsin’s open records law and requested the 
names, positions, building assignments, and hiring dates of any 
MPS employees who were fired, quit, or were disciplined as a 
result of the criminal background check.  The reporter also 
No. 
97-0308 
 
3 
wanted to know the specific action taken against each employee 
and whether any formal grievances had been filed.   
¶5 
Raymond Nemoir, Executive Director of MPS' Department 
of Human Resources and MPS' personnel records custodian, handled 
the Journal-Sentinel's request.  By letter dated January 3, 
1997, Nemoir notified each of the plaintiffs of his decision to 
release their names, positions, building assignments and hiring 
dates to the Journal-Sentinel unless they sought the de novo 
review provided by Woznicki within 10 days.  Nemoir indicated 
that he had performed the required balancing test and had 
concluded that the public interest in releasing the records 
outweighed any potential harm to the employees' privacy and 
reputational interests.  
¶6 
On January 13, 1997, the Milwaukee Teachers' Education 
Association (the "MTEA") and the seven individual plaintiffs 
filed this action in Milwaukee County Circuit Court seeking to 
prevent MPS from releasing the requested information pending de 
novo review of Nemoir's decision.  The circuit court granted the 
Journal-Sentinel's motion to intervene and issued an order 
temporarily restraining the Milwaukee Board of School Directors 
No. 
97-0308 
 
4 
("MBSD") from releasing information pertaining to the seven 
plaintiffs.2  
¶7 
The circuit court, Judge Victor Manian presiding,3 held 
an evidentiary hearing beginning on January 21, 1997, and 
continuing to January 27, 1997.  After hearing the evidence 
presented and the testimony of Nemoir, Judge Manian determined 
that Woznicki was limited to situations involving records 
custodians who are district attorneys.  Consequently,  Judge 
Manian did not perform the de novo review contemplated by 
Woznicki.4  Instead, he dismissed the action for lack of subject 
                     
2 The only information plaintiffs object to releasing is 
their names and specific school assignments because those items 
would allow plaintiffs to be identified.  The plaintiffs' 
identities have not been made public, but it should be noted 
that the name of one of them appears in the minutes of the MBSD 
meeting in which the person was discharged from a position at 
MPS.  Apparently, there was never any publicity about the 
discharge.  
3 Judge Manian presided over all circuit court proceedings 
except for the hearing concerning the temporary restraining 
order and the Journal-Sentinel's motion to intervene. Judge 
Francis Wasielewski conducted that hearing.  
4  The Journal-Sentinel contended in the court of appeals 
that Judge Manian had performed a de novo review, but apparently 
abandoned this position at oral argument in that court.  See 
Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 
220 Wis. 2d 93, 96 n.1, 582 N.W.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1998).  The 
Journal-Sentinel does not seem to reprise the argument in this 
court.  See Journal-Sentinel's Br. at 52 n.11.  In any event, 
our review of the record supports the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Judge Manian did not conduct a proper de novo 
review.  See Milwaukee Teachers, 220 Wis. 2d at 96 n.1.      
No. 
97-0308 
 
5 
matter jurisdiction, a ruling he confirmed in a written order 
filed January 29, 1997.5 
¶8 
 The court of appeals reversed in a decision filed May 
12, 1998.  Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n v. Milwaukee Bd. of 
Sch. Dirs., 220 Wis. 2d 93, 582 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1998).  The 
court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had subject 
matter jurisdiction in the case because Woznicki was not limited 
to cases in which a district attorney was the records custodian. 
 Id. at 97-99.  The court remanded the case to the circuit court 
with directions to conduct the de novo review by applying the 
balancing test discussed in Woznicki.  Id. at 101.  This court 
granted the Journal-Sentinel's petition for review. 
II. 
¶9 
We begin by examining the relevant portions of 
Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996), 
the decision at the heart of this appeal.  Woznicki involved 
open records law requests for the personnel file and telephone 
records 
of 
Thomas 
Woznicki, 
a 
school 
district 
employee.  
Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 182 & n.1.  Because Woznicki had been 
the subject of a criminal investigation, the requested records 
were in the custody of the district attorney.  Id. at 182.  The 
                     
5 In 
addition, 
Judge 
Manian 
vacated 
the 
temporary 
restraining order and denied the plaintiffs' request for a stay 
prohibiting the release of the requested information.  The court 
of appeals later determined that the denial of the stay was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion because MTEA had shown "more 
than a mere possibility of success on the merits."  Ct. App. 
Order, Feb. 14, 1997, at 8.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
granted a stay pending appeal.   
No. 
97-0308 
 
6 
district attorney decided to release the records and notified 
Woznicki.  Id.   Woznicki sought an injunction in the circuit 
court to prevent release of the records.  Id.  The circuit court 
declined to issue an injunction, but ordered that the district 
attorney would be enjoined from disclosing the records pending 
resolution of the issue if Woznicki were to appeal.  Id. 
¶10 Woznicki appealed, and the court of appeals held that 
the 
personnel 
records 
of 
public 
employees 
were 
exempt 
categorically from disclosure.  Id.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the 
case, directing the circuit court to issue the injunction 
preventing disclosure of the records.  Id. at 183. 
¶11 This court accepted the district attorney’s petition 
for review, reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case 
to the circuit court.  Id. at 183, 195.  In doing so, this court 
first held that the personnel records of public employees are 
subject to the open records law.  Id. at 183.  We also rejected 
the district attorney’s argument that the open records law 
provided no right to bring a claim for an individual seeking to 
prevent disclosure of public records pertaining to himself or 
herself.  Id. at 184-85.  We stated: 
 
We agree with the District Attorney that the open 
records law does not explicitly provide a remedy for 
an individual in Woznicki's position.  Yet a review of 
our statutes and case law persuades us that a remedy, 
i.e., de novo review by the circuit court, is implicit 
in our law. 
Id. at 185.  We analyzed several statutes and cases establishing 
that there is an important public policy interest in the 
No. 
97-0308 
 
7 
protection of an individual public employee's privacy and 
reputation.  See id. at 185-90.  Without a right to review of 
records custodians’ decisions, we reasoned, individuals affected 
by the release of requested public records would be left without 
a means of safeguarding their privacy and reputations.  Id. at 
190-91.  
¶12 We then went on to explain the procedure to be 
followed by custodians and courts in considering requests under 
the open records law.  We stated that prior to releasing 
records, custodians must apply the following balancing test:   
 
In the first instance, when a demand to inspect public 
records is made, the custodian of the records must 
weigh the competing interests involved and determine 
whether permitting inspection would result in harm to 
the public interest which outweighs the legislative 
policy recognizing the public interest in allowing 
inspection. 
Id. at 191-92 (quoting Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 
417, 427, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979)).  We continued: 
 
The duty of the District Attorney is to balance all 
relevant interests.  Should the District Attorney 
choose to release records after the balancing has been 
done, that decision may be appealed to the circuit 
court, who in turn must decide whether permitting 
inspection would result in harm to the public interest 
which 
outweighs the 
public interest in 
allowing 
inspection.   
Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192.  As a corollary to our holding 
that an individual whose interests in privacy and reputation 
would be impacted by "the district attorney's potential release 
of his or her records," we determined that "the District 
Attorney cannot release the records without first notifying that 
No. 
97-0308 
 
8 
individual and allowing a reasonable amount of time for the 
individual to appeal the decision.”  Id. at 193.  We concluded: 
 
We agree with the policy and purpose underlying the 
open records law:  to provide the broadest possible 
access of the public to public records.  However, the 
right to public access is not absolute.  In this case, 
Woznicki 
has 
important 
interests 
in privacy and 
reputation that warrant protection under our law.  
Id. at 193-94.  
¶13 The central issue in this case is whether the de novo 
judicial review recognized in Woznicki as implicit in the open 
records law is available when the public records custodian is 
not a district attorney.  Resolution of this issue involves the 
application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts and 
interpretation of our prior decision in Woznicki.  These are 
questions of law which we decide independently of the circuit 
court and court of appeals, benefiting, however, from their 
analyses.  Wisconsin Newspress v. Sheboygan Falls Sch. Dist., 
199 Wis. 2d 768, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996); Nichols v. Bennett, 199 
Wis. 2d 268, 272-73, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996).  See Ranes v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Wis. 2d 49, 54, 580 N.W.2d 
197 (1998). 
¶14 This court’s decision in Woznicki is grounded upon a 
substantial foundation of statutory and case law manifesting the 
importance placed by Wisconsin’s legislature and courts upon 
protection of the privacy and reputations of individuals.  We 
determined in Woznicki that a “specific legislative intent to 
protect privacy and reputation” is evident from at least four 
statutory sections.  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 185-87.  The first 
No. 
97-0308 
 
9 
of these sections, Wis. Stat. § 895.50 (1993-94), recognizes the 
right of privacy and provides equitable relief, compensatory 
damages, and attorney fees to individuals “whose privacy is 
unreasonably invaded.” § 895.50(1).  See id. at 185-86.   
¶15 The second section is Wis. Stat. § 19.85 (1993-94), 
which is part of Wisconsin’s open meetings law.  See id. at 186. 
 Section 19.85 provides that governmental bodies may close 
meetings in certain situations which implicate individuals’ 
privacy and reputational interests.  See § 19.85(1)(b),(c), and 
(f).  We pointed out in Woznicki that the open records law 
itself designates § 19.85 as indicating public policy for open 
records law purposes.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 186 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a)(1993-94)). 
¶16 The third statute cited by this court in Woznicki is 
Wis. Stat. § 103.13 (1993-94), which requires employers to allow 
employees 
to 
view 
their 
personnel 
files 
unless 
certain 
exceptions apply.  See § 103.13(2); Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 
186-87.  Notably, one exception is that an employee is not to 
have access to the personal information of someone else if such 
access would unjustifiably invade the other person’s privacy.  
§ 103.13(6)(e).  Employers who violate § 103.13 are subject to 
penalties.  § 103.13(8). 
¶17 The fourth statute we cited is Wis. Stat. § 230.13 
(1993-94).  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 187.  Section 230.13 
allows the secretary and a division administrator of the 
Wisconsin Department of Employment Relations to keep records 
involving certain personnel matters, including disciplinary 
No. 
97-0308 
 
10
actions, closed to the public.  §§  230.03(1), (9), and (13); 
230.13(1)(c).     
¶18 We concluded in Woznicki that "[t]ogether, the above-
referenced statutes evince a clear recognition of the importance 
the legislature puts on privacy and reputational interests of 
Wisconsin citizens."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 187.  We then 
turned to a discussion of the relevant case law.  See id. at 
187-90.  
We 
relied primarily 
upon four 
cases:  
Armada 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 516 N.W.2d 357 
(1994); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 430, 279 
N.W.2d 179 (1979); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 
672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965); and Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 
Wis. 2d 819, 472 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 475 
N.W.2d 584 (1991).  We found that "[o]ur case law has 
consistently recognized a public policy interest in protecting 
the personal privacy and reputations of citizens.”  Woznicki, 
202 Wis. 2d at 187.   
¶19 The same statutory and case law forms the backdrop for 
our decision today.  The relevant portions of the four statutory 
sections relied upon by this court in Woznicki have remained 
unchanged since the date of the Woznicki decision.  The cases we 
examined in Woznicki likewise have not been modified or 
overruled.  Moreover, in addition to this established precedent, 
we now have the Woznicki decision itself underscoring the 
important public interest in protecting persons' privacy and 
reputations and finding an implicit right of a person whose 
privacy and reputational interests are impacted by an open 
No. 
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11
records request to seek de novo review of the decision to 
release the records.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 185.  Given 
this body of precedent, it is difficult to see how we could come 
to any conclusion in this case other than one consistent with 
the conclusion we reached in Woznicki.6  
¶20 The Journal-Sentinel urges us to limit the de novo 
judicial review discussed in  Woznicki to cases involving 
records in the custody of district attorneys.  Undeniably, 
Woznicki involved a records custodian who was a district 
attorney and who was referred to throughout the opinion by his 
job title of “District Attorney.”  However, this court, in 
Woznicki, did not touch upon the effect of the custodian’s 
                     
6 The Journal-Sentinel argues that the legislative history 
of the open records law reflects that the legislature has 
consistently rejected any requirement that records custodians 
give 
records 
subjects 
notice 
before 
releasing 
records.  
According to the Journal-Sentinel, the only way this court could 
square Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 
(1996), with this legislative history would be to limit Woznicki 
to district attorneys.  For three reasons, we reject this 
argument. 
First, we note that our primary concern in this case is not 
Woznicki's establishment of a notice requirement.  Rather, this 
case involves our determination in Woznicki that there is an 
implicit right to judicial review of records custodian's 
decisions.  See id. at 192.  Second, most of the legislative 
history cited by the Journal-Sentinel predates Woznicki, in 
which we determined that custodians do have a requirement to 
give notice.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 193.  Accordingly, it 
is clear that we considered and rejected an argument similar to 
the Journal-Sentinel's when we decided in Woznicki that there 
was a notice requirement.  Finally, and most significantly, 
Woznicki has not been overturned by statute.  But see 1997 Wis. 
Act 27 § 155j (legislation passed by the legislature and vetoed 
by the governor).   
No. 
97-0308 
 
12
status as a district attorney until after we had analyzed the 
statutory and case law above, after we had held that Woznicki 
had the right to de novo review, and after we had explained in 
detail the duties of custodians and the judicial review 
procedure.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 181-192.  Only then, in 
the fifth paragraph from the end of the decision, did this court 
mention special concerns which are present when the records 
happen to be in the custody of a district attorney.  Id. at 194. 
  
¶21 Further, this court framed our discussion in Woznicki 
in terms of public records custodians; it was not limited to 
district attorneys.7  None of the cases we relied upon as 
establishing 
the 
important 
public 
policy 
of 
protecting 
individuals' privacy and reputational interests involved a 
district attorney as records custodian.  See Armada, 183 Wis. 2d 
at 468 (involving a school district as custodian of the 
requested records); Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 421 (chief of police); 
Owens, 28 Wis. 2d at 675 (mayor of the city of Waukesha); 
Village of Butler, 163 Wis. 2d at 823 (villages of Butler and 
Elm Grove).  We conclude that the court of appeals correctly 
held that the Woznicki custodian's status as a district attorney 
                     
7 Contrary to the Journal-Sentinel's assertion, we did set 
forth our holding in Woznicki in regard to public records 
custodians in general.  See, e.g., Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192 
(stating, “Although our previous cases have always involved a 
court’s review of a custodian’s denial of a records request, 
this does not change the fact that a custodian’s balancing of 
interests for and against disclosure is a question of law for 
which a court can substitute its judgment.”)    
No. 
97-0308 
 
13
was merely an additional reason supporting this court’s holding, 
not the factor upon which the decision turned.  See Milwaukee 
Teachers, 220 Wis. 2d at 99 n.2.  
¶22 The key to determining the status of records under the 
open records law is the nature of the records, not their 
location.  Nichols, 199 Wis. 2d at 274.  "To conclude otherwise 
would elevate form over substance."  Id. at 275.  Records 
containing personal information about a school district employee 
implicate the exact same concerns of protection of privacy and 
reputation whether those records are in the hands of a school 
district, as in this case, or a district attorney, as in 
Woznicki.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 212 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting).  It would defy common sense to give an individual 
the opportunity to present arguments in favor of protecting his 
or her privacy and reputational interests when a district 
attorney holds such records only to turn around and deny that 
individual the same opportunity if the records are in the hands 
of another custodian. 
¶23 In this case, the Journal-Sentinel seeks the names and 
school assignments of persons discharged due to misdemeanor 
convictions.  Release of this information clearly would impact 
No. 
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14
the privacy and reputations of the plaintiffs.8  It appears from 
the record that two of the plaintiffs had only a single 
misdemeanor conviction stemming from college incidents.  Several 
of 
the 
misdemeanor 
convictions 
preceded 
the 
plaintiffs' 
termination from MPS by over ten years.  Most of the plaintiffs 
had achieved satisfactory employment reviews, and by the time 
the case reached this court, six of the plaintiffs had been 
reinstated in their employment with MPS.9  Disclosure of the 
plaintiff's names and school assignments would permit plaintiffs 
                     
8 The Journal-Sentinel presents several arguments aimed at 
persuading us that the public policy interests in disclosure of 
the information outweigh the public interest in protection of 
the plaintiffs' privacy and reputations.  In essence, the 
Journal-Sentinel 
contends 
that, 
for 
various 
reasons, 
the 
plaintiffs have diminished privacy expectations.  Among the 
cases Journal-Sentinel relies upon in support of these arguments 
are State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel v. Arreola, 207 Wis. 2d 496, 
558 N.W.2d 670 (1996), Wisconsin Newspress v. Sheboygan Falls 
School District, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996), Zinda 
v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 149 Wis. 2d 913, 440 N.W.2d 548 
(1989), 
and 
 
Journal/Sentinel, 
Inc. 
v. 
School 
Board 
of 
Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994). 
We 
do 
not 
further 
address 
the 
Journal-Sentinel's 
contentions in this regard.  The question before us is not 
whether an application of the open records law balancing test 
would favor release of the records.  In contrast, the issue we 
face is whether the plaintiffs have any privacy or reputational 
interests which would be implicated by release of the records 
such that they may present arguments in the circuit court that 
the public policy interest in protecting their privacy and 
reputations outweighs the public policy interest in releasing 
the records.  The relative weights of the competing interests is 
of no concern at this initial stage of the proceedings.      
9 The reinstatement of the six plaintiffs occurred as a 
result of arbitration arising from the collective bargaining 
agreement between the MBSD and the MTEA.  The seventh plaintiff, 
who had resigned, did not seek reinstatement. 
No. 
97-0308 
 
15
to be identified by family members, persons in the community, 
co-workers, supervisors, and MPS students.  Disclosure could 
harm 
plaintiffs' 
personal 
relationships, 
tarnish 
their 
reputations, and undermine their authority with students.  As 
Justice Bablitch emphasized in his concurrence in Woznicki, 
"[p]rivacy and reputation are precious commodities."  Woznicki, 
202 Wis. 2d at 195 (Bablitch, J., concurring).  Once personal 
information is divulged to the public, "the revealed person 
carries the consequences forever."  Id. at 198.  See also 
Armada, 183 Wis. 2d at 474-75.     
¶24 To deny the plaintiffs in this case the right to a de 
novo review in the circuit court would be tantamount to 
depriving them of a forum in which to assert their important 
privacy and reputational interests.  A public employee's 
interest in protecting his or her privacy and reputation might 
be wholly adverse to the interest of his or her public 
employer/records custodian.  See, e.g., Armada, 183 Wis. 2d at 
476.  It would be untenable, in such circumstances, to force 
employees to rely on their employers to protect their interests. 
 See id.  An individual whose privacy and reputation might 
potentially be harmed by disclosure is in the best position to 
present 
arguments 
in 
favor 
of 
nondisclosure, 
given 
the 
significance and personal nature of the privacy and reputational 
interests.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 191; Armada, 183 
Wis. 2d at 476.  Such an individual might well present arguments 
in favor of nondisclosure that the records custodian did not 
consider in evaluating the disclosure request, even though 
No. 
97-0308 
 
16
Woznicki requires custodians to consider "all the relevant 
factors."10  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 191.  
¶25 The Journal-Sentinel contends that we differentiated 
district 
attorneys 
from 
other 
records 
custodians 
in 
two 
important ways in Woznicki.  First, according to the Journal-
Sentinel, we emphasized that district attorneys are secondary, 
rather than primary, records custodians.  Second, the Journal-
Sentinel contends that we highlighted district attorneys' broad 
police powers to bring information of a personal nature into the 
public arena.11 
                     
10 An example is provided by the instant case.  The 
plaintiffs argued in the circuit court that Nemoir should have 
taken several factors into account when determining whether to 
release the requested information, including the nature and 
staleness of their convictions, the plaintiffs' job performance, 
and the possibility of releasing the information but redacting 
plaintiffs' names and school assignments.  Nemoir testified that 
he did not consider these items in performing the balancing 
test. 
11 The Journal-Sentinel, and the dissent, also argue that 
extending Woznicki to records custodians who are not district 
attorneys will result in impermissible delays in obtaining 
requested information.  The Journal-Sentinel's argument is based 
upon State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 
585, 595, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996), in which this court determined 
that the statutory governmental notice requirement of 120 days 
did not apply to the open records law because it frustrated the 
purpose of the open records law provision stating that records 
custodians must either comply with or deny a records request "as 
soon 
as 
practicable 
and 
without 
delay." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(a).  
No. 
97-0308 
 
17
                                                                  
As the plaintiffs point out, however, "This litigation, 
which involved a challenge to the very process of holding a 
Woznicki de novo hearing, can in no way be compared to the 
routine administration of the Woznicki procedure."  Pls.' Br. at 
21.  Had the circuit court performed a de novo review, it is 
likely that it would have delivered its decision shortly after 
the January 27, 1997, hearing, or just a few weeks after Nemoir 
notified the plaintiffs of his decision to release the records. 
 See, e.g., Kailin v. Rainwater, No. 98-0870, op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 31, 1999) (circuit court decision on de novo review 
rendered 
about 
six 
weeks 
after 
custodian's 
decision 
to 
disclose). 
Moreover, Auchinleck predates Woznicki, in which this court 
declined to impose a blanket requirement on courts to speed the 
process of judicial review.  In response to the Woznicki 
dissent's reference to Auchinleck, Justice Bablitch, the author 
of the majority opinion, stated in his concurring opinion that 
"[i]nappropriate 
delay, 
or 
special 
circumstances 
requiring 
expeditious decisions, can be dealt with quickly and summarily 
by the courts."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 198-99.  We adhere to 
this principle.  If courts find it advisable to expedite review 
in a particular case, we certainly encourage them to do so, but, 
consistent with Woznicki, we do not require it.  
Certainly, we do not wish to see inordinate delay in the 
judicial processing of open records law cases.  If experience 
after the issuance of this opinion shows that such delay is 
occurring at the circuit court or court of appeals level, this 
court might consider using its superintending power to ensure 
that priority is given to open records law cases.  See Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 3; Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 
226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  As we emphasized in Arneson, 
however, we do not use our superintending power "lightly," and 
we decline at this time to do so.  Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 226. 
Finally, we choose not to accept the Journal-Sentinel's 
invitation to contemplate the appropriate standard of appellate 
review of a circuit court's de novo judicial review.  We have 
discussed the standard of review in other cases in which we have 
actually reviewed circuit courts' decisions to compel or deny 
disclosure of records.  See Wisconsin Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 
782; Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 N.W.2d 
179 (1979).  Since the circuit court in the instant case did not 
engage in a de novo review, the question is not directly before 
us at this time.         
No. 
97-0308 
 
18
¶26 We did state in Woznicki that district attorneys can 
"obtain records which they did not create and for which they are 
not the primary custodians."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 194.  
However, we did not further discuss the distinction between 
primary and secondary custodians or explain its import.  As we 
have already pointed out, information in public records can be 
damaging to a person's privacy or reputation regardless of the 
identity of the custodian.  Any custodian may have interests 
adverse to individuals whose reputation and privacy might be 
harmed by disclosure.  See, e.g., Armada, 183 Wis. 2d at 476.  
Consequently, we do not find the primary/secondary distinction 
to be determinative of whether there is a right to de novo 
judicial review of a custodian's decision.    
¶27 We also noted in Woznicki that district attorneys have 
"extraordinary police powers" allowing them to bring information 
of 
an 
extremely 
private 
nature 
into 
the 
public 
sphere.  
Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 194.  The common law exception which 
provides that district attorneys' case files are not open to 
public inspection was developed in part for this reason.  
Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 194 (citing State ex rel. Richards v. 
Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 433-34, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991)).  As we 
have already explained, however, the location of information is 
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether it should be 
disclosed under the open records law.  See Nichols, 199 Wis. 2d 
at 270.  Because the nature of the information determines its 
status under the open records law, it does not matter whether 
highly personal information is in the possession of a district 
No. 
97-0308 
 
19
attorney or a public records custodian who is not a district 
attorney.  See id.  The effect of disclosure on the individual 
public employee's privacy and reputation is the same in either 
scenario, and under the rule of Nichols, so is its status under 
the open records law.        
¶28 For these reasons, we hold that the implicit right of 
a de novo judicial review of a public records custodian's 
decision recognized by this court in Woznicki is available to an 
individual 
public 
employee 
whose 
privacy 
or 
reputational 
interests would be impacted by disclosure of records requested 
under the open records law.  This right of de novo judicial 
review applies whether or not the custodian of the records is a 
district attorney.   
¶29 Few ought to be surprised by our holding today.  In 
her dissent in Woznicki, then Justice Abrahamson (now Chief 
Justice) pointed out that the holding in the case applied to all 
public records custodians.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 201 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  She touched upon the very 
situation involved in this case when she stated, “The majority 
opinion’s reasoning with regard to privacy and reputational 
interests would apply if, for example, the records in this case 
were in the possession of the school district rather than the 
district attorney.”  Id.    
¶30 The court of appeals also anticipated our holding in 
this case.  It applied Woznicki to public sector employers as 
custodians of public records in Klein v. Wisconsin Resource 
Center, 218 Wis. 2d 487, 495, 582 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1998).  
No. 
97-0308 
 
20
This court denied review in Klein.  See Klein v. Wisconsin 
Resource Center, 219 Wis. 2d 923, 584 N.W.2d 123 (1998).  
¶31 Finally, it should be noted that public employees have 
apparently routinely obtained de novo judicial review of the 
decisions of records custodians other than district attorneys.  
E.g., Kailin v. Rainwater, No. 98-0870, op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 31, 1999).  Likewise, Woznicki has been widely interpreted 
by public entities as binding upon public records custodians who 
are not district attorneys.  It is important to note that Nemoir 
crafted his letter to the plaintiffs in this case under the 
assumption that Woznicki applied in this case.12   
III. 
¶32 We conclude that the right of de novo judicial review 
provided by this court in Woznicki is available whether or not 
the custodian of the requested public records is a district 
attorney.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and 
remand this case to the circuit court to conduct a de novo 
review of Nemoir’s decision to release the records, performing 
                     
12 Nemoir stated in his letter to the plaintiffs that he was 
notifying them of his decision to disclose the information as a 
result of the Woznicki decision.  He indicated that MPS would 
allow ten days from the date of the letter for the plaintiffs 
"to challenge MPS' decision in court, as provided for in the 
Woznicki decision."  See Hearing Tr., Jan. 21, 1997, Pls.' Ex. 
2.    
No. 
97-0308 
 
21
the balancing test required by law.13  Quite obviously, the 
information 
sought 
by 
the 
Journal-Sentinel 
is 
to 
remain 
confidential until such time as the circuit court is able to 
complete its review.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                     
13 The Journal-Sentinel contends that rather than remanding 
the case, this court should perform the balancing test and 
determine whether the information in question ought to have been 
released.  We decline to do so.  We took the preferable course 
in Woznicki  when we remanded the case to the circuit court for 
that court to determine whether the custodian applied the proper 
balancing test and, if so, to review de novo the custodian's 
decision to release the records.  See Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 
195. 
97-0308.wab 
 
1 
¶33 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Concurring).   You are a 
private citizen.  There is a great deal of personal information 
about you, your background, and your family in a document that 
is stored in a public office.  Some of that information, if 
publicly released, is highly embarrassing.  Some is potentially 
harmful to you and your family.  Unknown to you, a request is 
made for that document.  The custodian decides the document 
should be released under the open records law.  Should you have 
the right to be notified and heard before the custodian releases 
the document?  Should you have the right to have a neutral third 
party review the custodian’s decision?  The dissent says no.  
The majority says yes.  I agree with the majority and write only 
to address the dissent. 
¶34 The basic principle is fairness.  Is it fair to deny a 
person who is about to have facts about his or her life revealed 
to the public the right to be heard and the right to have that 
decision reviewed?  Is it fair to give the requester of that 
information the right to appeal if the request is denied (as 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(b)), but not allow the subject 
of that request the same right? 
¶35 Although the majority does not raise the issue to a 
constitutional dimension, I believe the lack of fundamental 
fairness raises due process issues.   
 
The root requirement of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is “‘that an individual be given 
an opportunity for a hearing before he [or she] is 
deprived of any significant protected interest.’”  
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532, 542 (1985) (footnote omitted).  The government 
97-0308.wab 
 
2 
must provide notice and some kind of hearing before it 
can lawfully deprive anyone of life, liberty, or 
property.  By requiring the government to follow 
appropriate 
procedures, 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
promotes fairness in such decisions.  Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
In 
his 
classic 
statement, 
Justice 
Brandeis 
characterized “the right to be let alone . . .” as the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by a civilized society.  See Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 
433, 434 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
protectable liberty interest is implicated “[w]here a 
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is 
at stake because of what the government is doing to 
him . . . .”  Id. at 437. 
Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 196, 549 N.W.2d 699 
(1996) (Bablitch, J. concurring).   
¶36 The dissent does not speak to the issue of fairness.  
It speaks only to the issue of efficiency: it takes too long, 
says the dissent, to allow the person to object, to allow the 
person to appeal.   
¶37 There is, admittedly, a tension between the interests 
sought to be protected by the majority opinion and the 
dissenting opinion. 
¶38 The majority seeks to protect the interests of 
privacy, of personal reputation, of individual safety.  The 
dissent seeks to protect the right of the public to know.  The 
majority seeks to reconcile both interests.  The dissent 
completely and unnecessarily sacrifices privacy, reputational, 
and safety interests in the name of efficiency. 
¶39 Efficiency, the dissent says, trumps all. 
97-0308.wab 
 
3 
¶40 Pencils 
have 
erasers. 
 
Courts 
allow 
appeals.  
Administrative decisions are reviewed.  All because we recognize 
the inevitability of human error.  Judicial review is one of the 
fundamental underpinnings of our Constitution.  It protects 
against error.  It protects the individual against unnecessary 
intrusion of government into our private lives.  The dissent, in 
its interpretation of the open records law, does not stop this 
intrusion, it fosters it. 
¶41 Custodians of public records are human.  And humans 
make mistakes.  Witness the case of Monfils v. Charles, 216 
Wis. 2d 323, 575 N.W.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1998).  An anonymous call 
comes to the police department warning of an impending theft.  
The call is taped.  The thief requests the tape.  The custodian 
of the tape releases it to him.  Monfils is later found brutally 
murdered.  The alleged thief, and some colleagues, are convicted 
of murder.  In retrospect, the release of the tape was a tragic 
mistake. 
¶42 Or witness the case of Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 208 
Wis. 2d 95, 559 N.W.2d 588 (1997).   Ms. Weiss requested that 
her residential information be kept confidential because of her 
fear of her abusive husband and his abusive and threatening 
telephone calls.  He called the city, falsely identified 
himself, and requested the residential information, including 
the telephone number.  The custodian of the record provided it 
to him.  Subsequently, she was regularly telephoned at work by 
her husband, informing her he now knew her home address and 
telephone number, and that he would kill her and their two 
97-0308.wab 
 
4 
children.  Her awareness that this was true, and her then 
existing financial inability to change her residence, caused her 
severe emotional distress.  The release of the information 
sought was a tragic mistake. 
¶43 These cases underline two basic realities: 1) not all 
requesters of public records are benign, public spirited 
citizens; and 2) custodians of public records make mistakes.  
Those mistakes can have tragic consequences.  In Monfils and 
Weiss, great physical and emotional harm resulted.  We can only 
guess at the harm done to privacy, reputational, or safety 
interests in other cases when custodians make a mistake.   
¶44 Total efficiency, i.e., the immediate release of a 
document, the dissent says, is necessary to maintain an 
effective open records law.  I disagree for two reasons.  First, 
many public records requests do not involve personnel at all, 
such as requests for minutes, government contracts, and the 
like.  They are not affected by the majority decision at all.  
Second, adequate measures can be taken by this court, or the 
legislature, to assure a prompt review.  The delay in this case 
could, in the future, be greatly ameliorated.  Ways can be found 
to speed appeals, to accommodate all interests.    
¶45 There are times when efficiency must be sacrificed for 
greater principles.  If efficiency were the only sought after 
objective, we would scarcely have chosen democracy as our form 
of government, we would scarcely have chosen our constitution to 
be our guiding force.  Efficiency is not always the lodestar of 
human achievement. 
97-0308.wab 
 
5 
¶46 I prefer the road chosen by the majority opinion. Both 
constitutionally and statutorily, it is the correct road.  It 
does not deny the information outright, as the dissent denies 
completely the right to be heard; it merely delays it.  And 
delay seems a small price to pay for the interests that remain 
protected. 
¶47 I join the majority opinion. 
¶48 I am authorized to state that Justices DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ, JON P. WILCOX, and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this 
concurrence. 
 
 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE. (dissenting). 
This case involves records containing information about a 
government employee whose salary is paid for with tax dollars.  
The majority opinion and concurrence ignore the legislature's 
statutory commands: Government employees are accountable to the 
public.  The conduct of government employees in their official 
duties is subject to public scrutiny.  Under the Wisconsin Open 
Records Law the people of the state are "entitled" to the 
"greatest possible information" about the "official acts" of the 
"employes who represent them."14  "[D]enial of public access 
generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied."15 
¶50 I dissent because the majority and concurring opinions 
rewrite the open records law, do away with the legislatively 
created "presumption of complete public access" to public 
records and severely damage the core function of the open 
records law.16  
¶51 I willingly acknowledge the importance of privacy and 
reputational interests.  What the majority and concurring 
opinions fail to acknowledge, however, is that the issue 
correctly framed is a balance between two public interests: 
privacy and open government.  The majority and concurring 
                     
14 Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (1997-98). 
15 Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (1997-98). 
16 Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (1997-98). 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
2 
opinions attempt to confuse the discussion by incorrectly 
framing the issue as privacy versus efficiency.  The ploy is 
transparent.  
¶52 The majority and concurring opinions obscure the 
discussion by refusing to recognize that in enacting the open 
records law the legislature has already performed the balance 
between privacy and open government.  Both the majority and 
concurring opinions attempt to redo the balance, not because the 
balance is legally infirm but because these justices would have 
decided the balance differently from the legislators.  They 
proceed to substitute their own judgment in legislative matters 
for the clearly expressed judgment of the legislators, and in 
the process, they undermine Wisconsin's tradition of open 
government.   
¶53 The legislature has established the procedure for 
access to public records.  First the requester asks for the 
records.17  Then the custodian of the records balances the 
interest of the public to be informed on public matters against 
the harm to reputation of the government employee.18  If the 
records custodian denies public access to the records, the 
legislature allows the requester to go to court to get the 
records opened.19  But if the custodian decides to release the 
                     
17 Wis. Stat. § 19.35 (1997-98). 
18 Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. Sheboygan Falls Sch. Dist., 
199 Wis. 2d 768, 778, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996). 
19 Wis. Stat. §§ 19.35 (4), 19.37 (1997-98). 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
3 
record, the legislature has not provided the government employee 
who is the subject of the records with the opportunity to go to 
court to keep the records closed.  The legislature makes the 
record custodians, not the courts, the decision makers for the 
release of records.20 
¶54 I conclude that when a records custodian, other than a 
district attorney, balances the interests of privacy and open 
government and decides to release a public record that contains 
information about a government employee in response to a request 
made under Wisconsin's open records law, that government 
employee is not entitled to court review of the custodian's 
decision.  Why do I reach this conclusion?  Because that's what 
the legislature mandated.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶55 The opinion today significantly extends Woznicki v. 
Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996).  I write to 
state my disagreement with this extension.  Before I proceed, I 
want the reader to know that I dissented in Woznicki and that I 
stand behind that dissent.  Woznicki is, however, the law in 
Wisconsin, at least until it is reversed by this court or the 
legislature amends the law.  I therefore accept  Woznicki as 
binding precedent, albeit reluctantly.  
¶56 The  Woznicki court expressly limited its decision to 
records in the custody of a district attorney and explained why 
a district attorney is treated differently from other custodians 
                     
20 Wis. Stat. § 19.37 (1997-98). 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
4 
of records.  The Woznicki court stated its holding in the first 
paragraph of the opinion as follows:  "We . . . hold that 
because of special public policy reasons that are raised when a 
district attorney chooses to release materials gathered during 
the course of a criminal investigation, the district attorney's 
decision to release these records is subject to de novo review 
by the circuit court."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 181.  The 
Woznicki court restated its holding in the last paragraph of the 
opinion as follows:  "[We] hold that the District Attorney's 
decision to release these records is subject to de novo review 
by the circuit court."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 295.  
¶57 A 
portion 
of 
the 
reasoning 
in 
Woznicki 
can 
unfortunately be directed to all custodians of records.  As I 
explained in my Woznicki dissent, "[a]lthough its holding is 
ostensibly 
limited 
to 
records 
held 
by 
a 
district 
attorney . . . the reasoning of the majority opinion is directed 
to the custodians of all records rather than to a district 
attorney, the custodian in this case."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 
201 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).   
¶58 But the reasoning of Woznicki need not be directed to 
all custodians.  A district attorney serving as a record 
custodian is distinguishable from other record custodians, as 
the Woznicki opinion explained.  That distinction can and should 
be maintained.  
¶59 Extending the notice and judicial review processes set 
forth in Woznicki to all custodians of records, as the majority 
does today, contravenes the language, spirit and purpose of the 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
5 
open records law.  The open records law explicitly states that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a 
right to inspect any record."21 The open records law enacted by 
the Wisconsin legislature makes no exception for notice to the 
subject of a record request nor does it provide for judicial 
review of a custodian's decision to release a record.  The 
majority opinion not only misinterprets the open records law but 
also writes a huge exception into it.  If an exception to the 
open record law is needed to protect a subject of a record 
request, the legislature is the branch of government to enact 
it.  This court should not legislate. 
II 
¶60 Further, I dissent because the majority opinion fails 
to sufficiently justify its holding and expansion of Woznicki.  
One simple example should suffice.  The legislative history of 
the open record law, as set forth in the Journal Sentinel brief, 
shows that the Wisconsin legislature rejected a proposed 
requirement that a custodian give the subject of a records 
request notice before releasing records sought by subpoena.  See 
S. Amend. 2 to S. Subst. Amend. 1 to 1981 S. Bill 250 (LRB-
0100/1); A. Amend. to 1981 S. Bill 250 (LRBa 2832/3).  The 
Journal Sentinel argues that the only way to reconcile this 
legislative history with Woznicki is to limit the reach of 
Woznicki to district attorneys.  
                     
21 Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) (1997-98). 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
6 
¶61 In footnote 6 the majority opinion dismisses this 
legislative history by saying it predates Woznicki.  True, some 
of it does, but this footnote misses the point.  One reason this 
court will re-examine a decision is that the decision has 
overlooked information in reaching its conclusion.  The Woznicki 
court never considered this legislative history.  None of the 
briefs in the Woznicki case mentioned the legislative history, 
and the legislative history does not appear in the majority, 
concurring or dissenting opinions of the Woznicki court.  
¶62 Ironically, the majority also dismisses post-Woznicki 
legislative history.  The legislature expressed its disapproval 
for a general pre-release notice requirement under the open 
records law in the 1997 biennial budget bill.  1997 Wis. Act 27 
§ 155j.  Although Governor Thompson vetoed this provision on 
grounds that it was "non-budgetary and should be instead debated 
as a separate bill," he also declared that he "would be glad to 
work with the advocates of this provision on legislation that 
would preserve the spirit of our open records law."  Governor's 
Veto Message, A.J. at 352 (Oct. 13, 1997). 
III 
¶63 Furthermore, I dissent because the majority opinion 
brushes aside the Journal Sentinel's practical argument that 
extending Woznicki will result in impermissible delays. In 
footnote 11 the majority opinion promises, as did the Woznicki 
opinion, that inappropriate delay can be dealt with summarily by 
the courts.  Yet it sets forth no expeditious procedure for 
handling Woznicki type proceedings.  Furthermore the majority 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
7 
refuses to exercise its power to review the records and decide 
this case.  Instead the majority remands the case to the circuit 
court for a decision and possible further appeal. 
¶64 The majority opinion ignores the time-consuming trial 
and appellate processes that we know are occurring.  For 
instance, in Klein v. Wisconsin Resources Center, 218 Wis. 2d 
487, 582 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1998) (cited favorably by the 
majority opinion at 19-20), the request for records was made on 
June 30, 1996.  The circuit court enjoined the custodian from 
releasing the records on July 16, 1996, and entered judgment on 
February 27, 1997.  The court of appeals issued its decision on 
April 1, 1998, almost two years after the request for the 
records was made.   
¶65 In Kailin v. Rainwater, No. 98-0870, Slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. March 31, 1999), cited favorably by the majority 
opinion in footnote 11 as illustrating a short time period for 
decision making under Woznicki, the request for the records was 
made on November 18, 1996.  On January 9, 1997, the subject of 
the record request sought review of the custodian's decision to 
release the records in the circuit court.  The circuit court 
issued its decision on February 10, 1998.  The court of appeals 
issued its decision on March 31, 1999, more than two years after 
the request for the records was made.  The Kailin case was, to 
use the majority's phrase, a routine administration of the 
Woznicki procedure.  
¶66 Most recently, in Kraemer Brothers, Inc. v. Dane 
County, No. 98-3061, Slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 24, 1999), 
No. 97-0308.ssa 
 
8 
three years elapsed from the request for the records to the 
court of appeals decision.  
¶67 In this case, more than two years have passed since 
the records custodian conducted his review and decided on 
January 3, 1997, to release the public records.  A final 
decision about the records has not yet been made.  The case is 
remanded for that decision.  Under the majority opinion rendered 
today, similar delays will become commonplace.   
¶68 This decision significantly erodes the open records 
law and open government in this state.  I therefore dissent. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
97-0308.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶70 David T. Prosser, Jr. (Dissenting).   I dissent.