Title: State v. Ziegler
Citation: 2012 WI 73
Docket Number: 2010AP002514-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2012

2012 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2514-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Scott E. Ziegler, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Ralph M. Ramirez 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents 
in part (Opinion filed).    
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in the court 
of appeals) by Christopher William Rose and Rose & Rose, Kenosha 
and oral argument by Christopher William Rose. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Aaron 
R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
(in the court of appeals) was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2514-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF120) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott E. Ziegler, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Ralph M. Ramirez, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This appeal is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2009-10).  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(2) 
(2005-06)1 prohibits a person from interfering with the custody 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(2) (2005-06) provides:  
Whoever causes a child to leave, takes a child 
away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours from 
the child's parents or, in the case of a nonmarital 
child whose parents do not subsequently intermarry 
under s. 767.803, from the child's mother or, if he 
has been granted legal custody, the child's father, 
without the consent of the parents, the mother or the 
father with legal custody, is guilty of a Class I 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
2 
 
of a child.  In State v. Bowden, 2007 WI App 234, ¶18, 306 
Wis. 2d 393, 742 N.W.2d 332, the court of appeals interpreted 
the phrase "withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the 
child's parents" in § 948.31(2) as "address[ing] a situation 
where the person who takes the child has some initial permission 
to do so."  In the instant certification, however, the court of 
appeals expressed its disagreement with its interpretation of 
§ 948.31(2), explaining that following Bowden would compel it to 
overturn the defendant's conviction for interference with child 
custody despite the conviction appearing statutorily sound.  The 
court of appeals therefore asked us to determine whether its 
interpretation of § 948.31(2), as set forth in Bowden, is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
¶2 
Stemming 
from 
allegations 
involving 
four 
teenage 
girls, the State charged the defendant, Scott Ziegler (Ziegler), 
with one count of repeated first-degree sexual assault of a 
child; one count of interference with child custody; two counts 
of child enticement; one count of second-degree sexual assault 
by use of force; two counts of physical abuse of a child, 
intentionally causing bodily harm; and seven counts of second-
degree sexual assault of a child.   
                                                                                                                                                             
felony.  This subsection is not applicable if legal 
custody has been granted by court order to the person 
taking or withholding the child. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
A jury found Ziegler guilty of each of the 14 counts, 
and the circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict.  The 
circuit court sentenced Ziegler to a total of 310 years of 
imprisonment, but several of the 14 sentences were structured to 
run concurrently.  As a result, Ziegler would serve a total of 
35 years in initial confinement and 20 years on extended 
supervision. 
¶4 
Ziegler appealed, challenging his conviction on four 
grounds.  First, relying on Bowden, Ziegler argued that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict him of interference with 
child custody.  Second, he contended that five of the seven 
counts 
of 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault 
of 
a 
child 
are 
multiplicitous in violation of his constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy.  Third, Ziegler asserted that the 
admission at trial of his mug shot2 deprived him of his right to 
a fair trial.  Fourth and finally, Ziegler maintained that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering 
him to wear a stun belt at trial. 
¶5 
The court of appeals certified Ziegler's appeal to 
this court, asking us to examine its interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.31(2) in Bowden.   
¶6 
We granted the court of appeals' certification and now 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
                                                 
2 A "mug shot" is the colloquial term for "[a] photograph of 
a person's face taken after the person has been arrested and 
booked."  Black's Law Dictionary 1035 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
First, in answer to the certified question, we 
conclude that the court of appeals' interpretation of the phrase 
"withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the child's 
parents" in Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2), as set forth in Bowden, is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute.  We therefore 
withdraw from Bowden any language that suggests that § 948.31(2) 
requires the State to prove that the defendant had the parents' 
"initial permission" to take the child.  The remainder of Bowden 
retains its precedential value.3 
¶8 
Applying the appropriate interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) to the instant case, we determine that the evidence 
was sufficient to convict Ziegler of interference with child 
custody. 
¶9 
Second, we conclude that Counts 10 through 14 of the 
information, each charging Ziegler with second-degree sexual 
assault of the same child, are not multiplicitous.  The five 
offenses, while identical in law, are different in fact.  We 
further 
conclude 
that 
Ziegler 
has 
failed 
to 
rebut 
the 
                                                 
3 Because we are only withdrawing language from State v. 
Bowden, 2007 WI App 234, 306 Wis. 2d 393, 742 N.W.2d 332, rather 
than overruling the decision, we conclude that the rule in Blum 
v. 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶56, 326 
Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, which governs the precedential value 
of 
a 
prior 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
that 
this 
court 
subsequently overrules, is not implicated here.  See id. 
(concluding 
that 
"a 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
expressly 
overruled by this court no longer retains any precedential 
value, unless this court expressly states that it is leaving 
portions of the court of appeals decision intact" (emphasis 
added)). 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
5 
 
presumption that the legislature intended to permit cumulative 
punishments for the five offenses. 
¶10 Third, we determine that the circuit court's admission 
at trial of Ziegler's mug shot did not deprive Ziegler of his 
right to a fair trial.   
¶11 Fourth and finally, we conclude that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion in ordering Ziegler to 
wear a stun belt at trial. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶12 Ziegler owned a store in downtown Waukesha, Wisconsin 
that sold various sexual novelties and smoking paraphernalia, as 
well as pornographic magazines and videos.  Prior to its closing 
in November 2007, the store, named "Twisted," was recognized as 
a hangout for juveniles.  
¶13 On January 17, 2008, the City of Waukesha Police 
Department received a report from a county social worker that 
Ziegler was having sexual intercourse with 14-year-old Kaitlyn 
R. (Kaitlyn) and that Kaitlyn was planning to run away with him.  
The next day, on January 18, 2008, Kaitlyn's mother informed 
police that Kaitlyn did not return home from school.   
¶14 Ten days later, on January 28, 2008, the police caught 
Ziegler leaving his residence with Kaitlyn.  At the time, 
Kaitlyn was wearing a dog collar and leash.   
¶15 Several friends of Kaitlyn's provided statements to 
the police, advising that Kaitlyn had disclosed to them that she 
frequently hung out with Ziegler and had sexual intercourse with 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
6 
 
him on numerous occasions.  In exchange for sex, Ziegler 
allegedly provided Kaitlyn with alcohol and marijuana. 
¶16 Samantha M. (Samantha), then 15 years old, informed 
the police that she too spent time at Ziegler's residence, 
smoking marijuana.  Samantha recounted that on one occasion, in 
November 2007, Ziegler "grabbed her, put her over his knee and 
held her down by her arms and legs."  Despite Samantha's 
resistance, Ziegler pulled down her pants and underwear and 
spanked her bare buttocks for approximately five minutes. 
¶17 The accounts were largely reiterated by two of 
Ziegler's adult roommates.  One indicated that he personally 
observed Ziegler spank and inappropriately touch underage girls.  
He reported that one girl in particular, 16-year-old Kari K. 
(Kari), stayed at Ziegler's residence for over a week in 
December 2007, getting drunk on vodka and high on marijuana.  
Ziegler's roommate described how he could hear Ziegler and Kari 
having sex through the walls of Ziegler's bedroom. 
¶18 When interviewed by the police, Kari acknowledged that 
she had visited Ziegler's residence "approximately 50 to 100 
times" since July 2007, often with Kaitlyn.  She recalled 
consuming alcohol and drugs on every occasion and sleeping over 
"approximately 40 times."  According to Kari, Ziegler had a rule 
that any female who spent the night had to sleep naked in his 
bedroom; when Kari objected, he spanked her bare buttocks with a 
wooden paddle.  Kari advised that she often awoke to find 
Ziegler's fingers inside her vagina, and on one occasion, 
Ziegler forced her to perform oral sex on him.  Kari described 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
7 
 
another night when, pursuant to Ziegler's rule, both she and 
Kaitlyn were required to sleep naked with Ziegler.  When Kari 
awoke, she observed Kaitlyn performing oral sex on Ziegler. 
¶19 That same rule was recounted by 15-year-old Nicole V. 
(Nicole), who reported spending the night at Ziegler's residence 
in December 2007:  
[Ziegler] provided her with Adderall pills, and she 
was "high."  She said that she was in [Ziegler's] 
bedroom with him, and the door was shut and locked 
from the inside.  She said they were lying on the bed 
and she was trying to fall asleep when [Ziegler] 
started touching her breasts.  She said that they 
started making out and both ended up taking off all of 
their clothing.  She said [Ziegler] then placed his 
hands on top of and inside of her vagina.  She said 
that his penis was erect, and he had her rub it with 
her hands.  He then had her put her mouth on his 
penis, and she performed oral sex on him until he 
ejaculated in her mouth.  She said that after this, 
[Ziegler] had her lay across his lap and he hit her on 
the buttocks with a wooden paddle. 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶20 On July 1, 2008, the State filed an information 
charging Ziegler with the following 14 counts: (1) repeated 
first-degree sexual assault of Kaitlyn, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 948.02(1)4 and 948.025(1)(b);5 (2) interference with the 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02, "Sexual assault of a child," 
provides, in relevant part:  
(1) First degree sexual assault (a) In this 
subsection, 
"sexual 
intercourse" 
means 
vulvar 
penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal 
intercourse between persons or any intrusion of any 
inanimate object into the genital or anal opening 
either by the defendant or upon the defendant's 
instruction.  The emission of semen is not required.  
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
8 
 
custody of Kaitlyn, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2); (3) 
enticement of Kaitlyn, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.07(3);6 
(4) enticement of Kari, in violation of § 948.07(3); (5) second-
degree sexual assault of Kari, then 16 years old, in violation 
                                                                                                                                                             
 . . . . 
(c) Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 16 years by use or 
threat of force or violence is guilty of a Class B 
felony.  
 . . . . 
(2) Second degree sexual assault.  Whoever has 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who 
has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a 
Class C felony. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025, "Engaging in repeated acts of 
sexual assault of the same child," states, in relevant part: 
"(1) Whoever commits 3 or more violations under s. 948.02(1) or 
(2) within a specified period of time involving the same child 
is guilty of: . . . (b) A Class C felony if fewer than 3 of the 
violations were violations of s. 948.02(1)." 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.07, "Child enticement," states, in 
relevant part:  
Whoever, with intent to commit any of the 
following acts, causes or attempts to cause any child 
who has not attained the age of 18 years to go into 
any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is 
guilty of a Class D felony: 
. . . .  
(3) Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing 
the child to expose a sex organ . . . . 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
9 
 
of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a);7 (6) second-degree sexual assault 
of Kari, then 15 years old, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2); (7) second-degree sexual assault of Samantha, in 
violation of § 948.02(2); (8) physical abuse of Samantha, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b);8 (9) physical abuse of 
Kari, in violation of § 948.03(2)(b); (10) second-degree sexual 
assault of Nicole ("mouth to penis oral sex"), in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2); (11) second-degree sexual assault of 
Nicole ("digital penetration of vagina"), in violation of 
§ 948.02(2); 
(12) 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault 
of 
Nicole 
("touching breasts"), in violation of § 948.02(2); (13) second-
degree sexual assault of Nicole ("hand to penis"), in violation 
of § 948.02(2); and (14) second-degree sexual assault of Nicole 
("striking of buttocks"), in violation of § 948.02(2).9 
¶21 On September 4, 2009, Ziegler filed a pre-trial motion 
to dismiss Counts 10 through 14 as multiplicitous, arguing that 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(2), 
"Second 
degree 
sexual 
assault," provides, in relevant part: "Whoever does any of the 
following is guilty of a Class C felony: (a) Has sexual contact 
or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of 
that person by use or threat of force or violence." 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.03(2)(b) states that "[w]hoever 
intentionally causes bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class 
H felony." 
9 The 14-count information was amended down from 19 counts 
after the circuit court dismissed three additional counts of 
physical abuse of a child and two additional counts of 
interference with child custody at the February 22, 2008, 
preliminary hearing and a June 30, 2008, pre-trial motion 
hearing, respectively. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
10 
 
the five alleged acts involving Nicole are so similar in fact 
that they may not properly be denominated separate crimes. 
¶22 The circuit court denied Ziegler's motion at a hearing 
on October 12, 2009.  The court reasoned that although the five 
counts comprise "a consecutive series of events," each of the 
five alleged acts is distinct in nature and "require[s] a 
separate, volitional act" on the part of Ziegler. 
¶23 At that same hearing, the circuit court indicated that 
Ziegler would be wearing street clothes and a stun belt at 
trial, in order to prevent any "problems."  Ziegler's counsel 
objected, questioning whether the use of a stun belt was common 
practice.  The circuit court explained that a stun belt is 
"commonly used" when a defendant is in custody, as it allows 
some restraint "without being readily apparent."  Absent any 
tight clothing, the court remarked, the stun belt "should be 
[i]ndiscernible to the jurors." 
¶24 Ziegler's trial began on October 19, 2009, and lasted 
four days.  At the start of the first day, outside the jury's 
presence, the circuit court explained on the record that Ziegler 
was wearing borrowed clothing because his own clothes did not 
accompany him from the jail.  While acknowledging defense 
counsel's complaint that the borrowed clothing was too big, the 
circuit court nevertheless commented that Ziegler was dressed 
"appropriate[ly]," wearing "a white shirt and tie and a pair of 
dark trousers and dress type of shoes."  In addition, the 
circuit court expressly observed that Ziegler was not wearing 
any visible restraints: "Mr. Ziegler also has the stun belt, 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
11 
 
which I believe is on his leg, so there are no visible 
restraints.  There's no manacles, there are no shackles.  
There's no belly chain."  When asked whether he had any other 
concerns relative to Ziegler's appearance, defense counsel 
privately consulted with Ziegler and then responded, "We're fine 
with the clothes situation." 
¶25 Each of the four alleged victims testified at trial.  
Kaitlyn testified that she first met Ziegler at his store in the 
fall of 2007.  According to Kaitlyn, her visits to Twisted 
became a pattern: "[T]hat's what I'd do, I'd run away and I'd 
show up at Twisted."  Ziegler eventually began driving Kaitlyn 
from Twisted to his house because, in her words, she "had 
nowhere else to go."  Kaitlyn indicated that she went to 
Ziegler's residence "a lot," approximately 10 or 15 different 
times.  If she stayed the night, she was required to sleep in 
Ziegler's bedroom and "had to sleep with no clothes on"; "[i]f 
[she] didn't sleep in his room, he'd get angry and kick [her] 
out the next day."   
¶26 Kaitlyn described several instances of sexual contact 
and intercourse with Ziegler, including Kaitlyn "giving him oral 
sex" and Ziegler "putting his fingers in [her] vagina," "feeling 
[her] butt," "tr[ying] to have anal sex with [her]," and 
"touching [her] leg and [her] private areas."  According to 
Kaitlyn, she had sexual contact with Ziegler "[p]retty much 
every time [she] stayed over there."  When asked why she 
continued to return to his house, Kaitlyn explained, "I just 
wanted somewhere to get away. . . .  And he had drugs, and I 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
12 
 
wanted drugs, so I figured I'd put up with him just to get what 
I wanted out of it."  By the time the police caught Ziegler 
leaving his residence with Kaitlyn on January 28, 2008, Kaitlyn 
had been "staying at his house" for over a week.   
¶27 Kaitlyn's mother, Tammy R. (Tammy), also testified at 
trial.  Tammy reported that Kaitlyn was missing from January 18, 
2008, until January 28, 2008, when she was located by police.  
When asked whether Kaitlyn had Tammy's permission to stay at 
Ziegler's residence, Tammy responded, "No." 
¶28 The State introduced Ziegler's mug shot in the course 
of Samantha's testimony.  The State asked Samantha whether she 
knew an individual by the name of Scott Ziegler, and she 
answered in the affirmative.  Samantha further identified 
Ziegler as the owner of Twisted.  However, when asked whether 
Ziegler was in the courtroom, Samantha responded, "I don't see 
him."  Ziegler's counsel immediately objected to Samantha's 
testimony, citing a lack of foundation.  The circuit court 
overruled the objection in a sidebar conference. 
¶29 The State introduced Ziegler's mug shot at the close 
of its direct examination of Samantha, asking Samantha whether 
she 
recognized 
the 
person 
in 
the 
photograph. 
 
Samantha 
identified the person as "Scott Ziegler." 
¶30 In a subsequent offer of proof, outside the jury's 
presence, 
Ziegler's 
counsel 
reiterated 
his 
objection 
to 
Samantha's testimony and requested that Ziegler's mug shot not 
be published to the jury.  The circuit court again overruled the 
objection, reasoning that the State established a foundation for 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
13 
 
Samantha's testimony through her identification of Ziegler as 
the owner of Twisted and her familiarity with Ziegler's 
residence.  While it admitted Ziegler's mug shot into evidence, 
the circuit court stated that it had no intention of publishing 
the mug shot to the jury. 
¶31 The State further authenticated the mug shot through 
the testimony of Detective Shelley Fisher (Detective Fisher) of 
the City of Waukesha Police Department.  Detective Fisher 
identified the mug shot as Ziegler's booking photo, taken after 
his arrest on January 28, 2008. 
¶32 The jury returned its verdict on October 22, 2009, 
finding Ziegler guilty of each of the 14 counts. 
¶33 On December 23, 2009, the circuit court entered 
judgment on the jury verdict.  The circuit court sentenced 
Ziegler to a total of 310 years of imprisonment, but several of 
the 14 sentences were structured to run concurrently.  As a 
result, Ziegler would serve a total of 35 years in initial 
confinement and 20 years on extended supervision. 
¶34 Ziegler appealed, challenging his conviction on four 
grounds.  First, relying on Bowden, Ziegler argued that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict him of interfering with 
Kaitlyn's custody.  Second, he contended that the circuit court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss Counts 10 through 14 as 
multiplicitous.  Third, Ziegler asserted that the admission of 
his mug shot deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  Fourth, 
Ziegler maintained that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in ordering him to wear a stun belt at trial. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
14 
 
¶35 The court of appeals certified Ziegler's appeal to 
this 
court, 
expressing 
its 
disagreement 
with 
its 
own 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) in Bowden.  The court 
of appeals explained that its interpretation of § 948.31(2) 
seems to add language, namely, an element, to the statute.  
Denying that its interpretation of § 948.31(2) was dicta, the 
court of appeals acknowledged that it was bound by Bowden and 
thereby 
compelled 
to 
overturn 
Ziegler's 
conviction 
for 
interference with child custody, even though the conviction 
appears statutorily sound.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
certified Ziegler's appeal to this court, asking us "to 
determine whether Bowden's interpretation is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute." 
¶36 We granted the court of appeals' certification and 
accepted for consideration all four issues raised before the 
court of appeals. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 The interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) present questions of law that this court reviews 
de novo while benefitting from the analyses of the court of 
appeals and circuit court.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel 
Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶24, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465.  We 
also independently review whether the evidence presented to the 
jury was sufficient to convict Ziegler of interfering with the 
custody of Kaitlyn.  See State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶15, 338 
Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
15 
 
¶38 Likewise, 
whether 
Counts 
10 
through 
14 
of 
the 
information are multiplicitous in violation of the federal and 
state constitutions is a question of law subject to our 
independent review.  See State v. Patterson, 2010 WI 130, ¶12, 
329 Wis. 2d 599, 790 N.W.2d 909; State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, 
¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437. 
¶39 We will not disturb the circuit court's decision to 
admit at trial Ziegler's mug shot unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  State v. Ringer, 2010 WI 
69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448.  "'A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies an improper 
legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported by 
the facts of record.'"  Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 
31, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756 (quoting 260 N. 12th 
St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶38, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 
N.W.2d 372).  At the same time, whether the admission of the mug 
shot violated Ziegler's right to due process presents a question 
of law that we review de novo.  See State v. Burns, 2011 WI 22, 
¶23, 332 Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166. 
¶40 We also will not disturb the circuit court's decision 
to order Ziegler to wear a stun belt at trial unless the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion.  See State v. 
Grinder, 190 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51, 527 N.W.2d 326 (1995). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A 
¶41 We granted the court of appeals' certification in 
order to determine whether the court of appeals' interpretation 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
16 
 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2), as set forth in Bowden, is contrary 
to the plain language of the statute. 
¶42 Our canons of statutory interpretation are often 
stated and well understood.  "'The purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.'"  Heritage 
Farms, 339 Wis. 2d 125, ¶26 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110).  To that end, statutory interpretation begins 
with the language of the statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  
With the exception of technical or specially-defined words, 
statutory language is given its common and ordinary meaning.  
Id.  If the language is plain, our inquiry ends.  Id. 
¶43 At the same time, ascertaining the plain meaning of a 
statute requires more than focusing on a single sentence or 
portion thereof.  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 
89, ¶12, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  We therefore 
interpret statutory language in the context in which it is used, 
"not in isolation but as part of a whole."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  In addition, we must construe statutory 
language reasonably.  Id.  An unreasonable interpretation is one 
that yields absurd results, id., or contravenes the statute's 
manifest purpose, id., ¶49. 
¶44 In this case, Ziegler was charged with and convicted 
of one count of interference with child custody in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2).  Section 948.31(2) states, in relevant 
part, that "[w]hoever causes a child to leave, takes a child 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
17 
 
away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the 
child's 
parents . . . without 
the 
consent 
of 
the 
parents . . . is guilty of a Class I felony."   
¶45 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) in Bowden, concluding that the jury was presented 
sufficient evidence to find that the defendant caused two 
children to leave their parent without the parent's consent.  
306 Wis. 2d 393, ¶1.  In that case, the jury was presented 
evidence that the 55-year-old defendant approached two boys, 
eleven- and five-year-old brothers, as they walked home from 
school, 
engaging 
them 
in 
conversation 
about 
sports 
and 
repeatedly asking them to go with him to his house.  Id., ¶¶2-3.  
The boys initially resisted, explaining that their mother was 
expecting them at home.  Id., ¶3.  However, fearful that the 
defendant might hurt them, the boys eventually followed him to 
his house and went inside.  Id.  Once at the house, the 
defendant gave the boys two basketballs and a drawing board.  
Id., ¶6.  It was estimated that the boys were inside the 
defendant's house for as long as 45 minutes before friends of 
the defendant's eventually walked the boys home.  Id., ¶¶5-6. 
¶46 The State charged the defendant with two counts of 
interference with child custody in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2), alleging that the defendant caused the boys to 
leave their parent without the parent's consent.  Id., ¶7.  The 
jury found the defendant guilty of both counts.  Id., ¶9. 
¶47 The defendant challenged his conviction on appeal, 
contending that he could not have "cause[d] [the children] to 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
18 
 
leave" their parent within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) 
because the boys were not with their mother when the incident 
occurred.  See id., ¶¶11, 17.  In support of his interpretation 
of § 948.31(2), the defendant pointed to the statute's third 
method of interference, namely, "'withhold[ing] a child for more 
than 12 hours'" from the child's parents.  Id., ¶17 (quoting 
§ 948.31(2)).  The third method of interference, the defendant 
posited, contemplates a circumstance in which the child is not 
with his or her parent, and therefore, the other two methods of 
interference——"caus[ing] a child to leave" or "tak[ing] a child 
away"——must apply only to those circumstances in which the child 
initially is with his or her parent.  Id., ¶¶ 17-18. 
¶48 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2), denying that the third 
method of interference focuses on the presence of the child's 
parents.  Id., ¶18.  Instead, the court of appeals stated, 
"[t]he withholding method addresses a situation where the person 
who takes the child has some initial permission to do so."  Id.  
By contrast, the court of appeals explained, "[t]he other two 
methods speak to situations where the parent has given no 
permission to the person who 'causes a child to leave' or 'takes 
a child away.'"  Id.   
¶49 In Bowden, the court of appeals held that the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that the defendant 
caused the boys to leave their mother without her consent.  Id., 
¶19.  The jury was presented evidence that the defendant 
approached the boys; lured them into conversation; and, without 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
19 
 
permission from their mother, insisted that they deviate from 
their route home.  Id.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
concluded that the defendant's conduct, despite being "sweetened 
with sports talk and basketballs," "amount[ed] to mental 
manipulation of a child by doing things to persuade the child to 
leave the parent."  Id. 
¶50 The instant case was charged under the third method of 
interference enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2): the State 
alleged, and the jury found, that between January 18, 2008, and 
January 28, 2008, Ziegler withheld Kaitlyn for more than 12 
hours from her parents without her parents' consent.  Relying on 
Bowden, Ziegler now argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain the jury's finding that he withheld Kaitlyn within the 
meaning of § 948.31(2) because it is undisputed that he did not 
have her mother's "initial permission" to take Kaitlyn.  See 306 
Wis. 2d 393, 
¶18. 
 
That 
is, 
Kaitlyn's 
mother, 
Tammy, 
specifically testified that she did not give Kaitlyn permission 
to stay at Ziegler's residence in January 2008 and in fact, at 
the time, did not even know who Ziegler was. 
¶51 In its certification, the court of appeals did not 
quarrel with Ziegler's application of Bowden.  Instead, the 
court of appeals expressed its disagreement with its own 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) 
in 
Bowden, 
acknowledging that "there is nothing in the statutory language 
to indicate that in order to withhold custody from a parent, a 
defendant must have had 'initial permission' from the parent to 
take the child."  We agree. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
20 
 
¶52 Pursuant 
to 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2), a person is guilty of interference with child 
custody if, without the consent of the child's parents, the 
person either (a) "causes a child to leave" the child's parents, 
(b) "takes a child away" from the child's parents, or (c) 
"withholds a child for more than 12 hours" from the child's 
parents.  See also Wis JI——Criminal 2167.  Specific to the third 
method of interference, therefore, the State must prove three 
elements: (1) on the date of the alleged offense, the child was 
under the age of 18 years; (2) the defendant withheld the child 
for more than 12 hours from the child's parents; and (3) the 
child's parents did not consent.   
¶53 As the court of appeals correctly acknowledged in its 
certification, nothing in the text of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) 
suggests that the State must also prove that the defendant had 
the parents' initial permission to take the child.  Indeed, the 
statute's only arguable reference to permission comes in the 
form of the phrase "without the consent of the parents"——a 
phrase that requires the State to prove that the defendant was 
without the parents' permission to withhold their child for more 
than 12 hours.  Moreover, the common and ordinary meaning of the 
phrase "withholds a child . . . from the child's parents" does 
not suggest that the actor necessarily had the parents' initial 
permission to take the child.  The word "withhold" is commonly 
understood to mean "[t]o keep in check; restrain" or "[t]o 
refrain from giving, granting, or permitting."  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 2050-51 (3d ed. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
21 
 
1992).  Thus, a defendant withholds a child from the child's 
parents within the meaning of § 948.31(2) if the defendant 
restrains the child or otherwise refrains from giving the child 
to the child's parents, irrespective of whether the defendant 
had the parents' initial permission to take the child. 
¶54 Accordingly, in answer to the certified question, we 
conclude that the court of appeals' interpretation of the phrase 
"withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the child's 
parents" in Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2), as set forth in Bowden, is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute.  We therefore 
withdraw from Bowden any language that suggests that § 948.31(2) 
requires the State to prove that the defendant had the parents' 
"initial permission" to take the child.  The remainder of Bowden 
retains its precedential value.10  
¶55 Applying the appropriate interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) to the instant case, we conclude that the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Ziegler 
withheld Kaitlyn for more than 12 hours from her parents without 
her parents' consent.   
¶56 A defendant bears a heavy burden in attempting to set 
aside a jury's verdict on the grounds of insufficient evidence.  
Hanson, 338 Wis. 2d 243, ¶31; State v. Booker, 2006 WI 79, ¶22, 
292 Wis. 2d 43, 717 N.W.2d 676.  Evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction "only if the evidence, when viewed most 
favorably to the State, 'is so insufficient in probative value 
                                                 
10 See supra note 3. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
22 
 
and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier 
of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'"  Booker, 292 Wis. 2d 43, ¶22 (quoting State 
v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)). 
¶57 In this case, Kaitlyn testified that beginning on 
January 18, 2008, when she was only 14 years old, she stayed 
with Ziegler at his residence for over a week.  The jury was not 
presented any evidence tending to show that Ziegler ever offered 
or attempted to bring Kaitlyn back to her mother, Tammy, or to 
otherwise contact Tammy.  Instead, by all accounts, Ziegler 
wanted Kaitlyn to stay with him, requiring her to sleep naked in 
his bedroom and perform sexual favors in exchange for drugs and 
alcohol.  Indeed, the pair was not separated until January 28, 
2008, when the police caught Ziegler leaving his residence with 
Kaitlyn in tow, wearing a dog collar and leash.  Tammy testified 
that Kaitlyn was missing from January 18, 2008, until January 
28, 2008, and that she never gave permission for Kaitlyn to stay 
at Ziegler's residence.  Viewing such evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, we have little difficulty determining 
that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ziegler withheld Kaitlyn, then 14 years 
old, for more than 12 hours from her mother without her mother's 
consent.  That is, the jury could have reasonably found that 
between January 18, 2008, and January 28, 2008, Kaitlyn stayed 
with Ziegler at his residence and that over Tammy's objection, 
Ziegler either restrained Kaitlyn or refrained from giving 
Kaitlyn to Tammy for a period of more than 12 hours. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
23 
 
B 
¶58 Ziegler also contends that the circuit court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss Counts 10 through 14 of the 
information as multiplicitous.  Analogizing the five counts with 
those at issue in State v. Hirsch, 140 Wis. 2d 468, 410 
N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1987), Ziegler argues that the five alleged 
acts, each involving Nicole, comprised one continuous episode 
and therefore could not properly be charged as five separate 
crimes. 
¶59 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and its parallel provision in the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, Article I, Section 8(1), prohibit 
multiple punishments for the same offense.11  When a defendant is 
charged in more than one count for a single offense, the counts 
are deemed impermissibly multiplicitous.  State v. Rabe, 96 
Wis. 2d 48, 61, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980). 
¶60 We review multiplicity claims according to a well-
established 
two-pronged 
methodology. 
 
First, 
the 
court 
determines whether the offenses are identical in law and fact 
using the "elements-only" test set forth in Blockburger v. 
                                                 
11 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides, in relevant part, that "nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb."  Likewise, Article I, Section 8(1) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution mandates that "no person for the same offense may 
be 
put 
twice 
in 
jeopardy 
of 
punishment." 
 
This 
court 
traditionally views these two clauses as identical in scope and 
purpose.  State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶18, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 
666 N.W.2d 1.  
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
24 
 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).  Patterson, 329 
Wis. 2d 599, ¶12; State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶43, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1.  Under the "elements-only" test, two 
offenses are identical in law if one offense does not require 
proof of any fact in addition to those which must be proved for 
the other offense.  See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.  Still, 
offenses identical in law are not necessarily identical in fact.  
See State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 30-31, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980).  
Two offenses, which are legally identical, are not identical in 
fact if the acts allegedly committed are sufficiently different 
in fact to demonstrate that separate crimes have been committed.  
See id. at 31; Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶¶56-57. 
¶61 The results of the "elements-only" test determine the 
presumption under which we analyze the second prong of our 
methodology.  Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15.  If the offenses 
are identical in law and fact, a presumption arises that the 
legislature did not intend to authorize cumulative punishments.  
Id.; Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶43.  The State may rebut that 
presumption only by a clear indication of contrary legislative 
intent.  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶43.   
¶62 Conversely, if the offenses are different in law or 
fact, the presumption is that the legislature intended to permit 
cumulative 
punishments.  Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15; 
Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶44.  At this juncture, we are no 
longer concerned with a double jeopardy violation but instead a 
potential due process violation.  See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 
¶33; State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶22, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
25 
 
N.W.2d 801.  If the offenses are different in law or fact, the 
defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the offenses are 
nevertheless multiplicitous on grounds that the legislature did 
not intend to authorize cumulative punishments.  Patterson, 329 
Wis. 2d 599, ¶17; Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶45.  If the 
defendant succeeds, he or she has a legitimate due process 
claim.  See Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶46. 
¶63 To discern legislative intent under the second prong 
of our methodology, we analyze the following four factors: (1) 
all applicable statutory language; (2) the legislative history 
and context of the statutes; (3) the nature of the proscribed 
conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple punishments for 
the conduct. Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶16; Davison, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶50; State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶34, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833. 
¶64 In this case, we agree with the circuit court that 
Counts 10 through 14 of the information are not multiplicitous.  
We conclude that the five offenses, while identical in law, are 
different in fact.  We further conclude that Ziegler has failed 
to rebut the presumption that the legislature intended to permit 
cumulative punishments for the five offenses. 
¶65 Ziegler was charged with and convicted of five counts 
of second-degree sexual assault of Nicole in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(2).  Section 948.02(2) provides that "[w]hoever 
has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has 
not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony."  
In Counts 10 and 11, respectively, the State alleged that 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
26 
 
Ziegler had sexual intercourse with Nicole by having Nicole 
perform oral sex on him and by digitally penetrating Nicole's 
vagina.  In Counts 12 through 14, respectively, the State 
alleged that Ziegler had sexual contact with Nicole by touching 
her breasts, by having Nicole touch his penis with her hand, and 
by striking Nicole's buttocks. 
¶66 There is no question that the five offenses are 
identical in law.  Each of the five offenses was charged under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  Consequently, applying the "elements-
only" test, all five offenses require proof of the same facts, 
or elements.12  See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
¶67 It does not follow, however, that the five offenses 
are necessarily identical in fact.  See Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d at 30-
31.  We conclude that the five offenses, while identical in law, 
are different in fact.  That is, the five acts allegedly 
committed are sufficiently different in fact to demonstrate that 
Ziegler committed five separate crimes.  See id. at 31. 
¶68 In Eisch, this court concluded that the defendant's 
four 
alleged 
acts 
of 
forcible 
and 
nonconsensual 
sexual 
intercourse constituted four separately chargeable offenses, 
even though the four acts involved the same victim and took 
place at the same location over a period of time that did not 
exceed two and one-half hours.  Id. at 27.  In that case, the 
                                                 
12 The crime of second-degree sexual assault of a child has 
two elements: (1) the defendant had sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with the victim, and (2) the victim was under the 
age of 16 years at the time of the alleged sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse.  See Wis JI——Criminal 2104. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
27 
 
State alleged that on May 18, 1978, the defendant forcibly 
removed the victim's clothing and inserted his penis into her 
vagina several times while striking her and choking her.  Id.  
The State further alleged that the defendant inserted his penis 
into the victim's anus, forced a beer bottle into her vagina, 
and forced his penis into her mouth.  Id.  The record revealed 
that the alleged attack was continuous and took place between 
1:00 a.m. and 3:30 a.m.  Id. at 28. 
¶69 The State charged the defendant with four counts of 
second-degree sexual assault by use of force in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (1977-78).  Id.  The four counts 
comprised the following four acts: (1) genital intercourse, (2) 
anal intercourse, (3) fellatio, and (4) insertion of a beer 
bottle into the victim's genitals.  Id.   
¶70 The defendant moved to dismiss all but one of the four 
counts, arguing that the counts were multiplicitous because each 
of the four alleged acts arose out of the same incident.  Id. at 
29.  The circuit court agreed and dismissed three of the four 
counts.  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 26-27. 
¶71 On appeal, this court reversed and remanded the cause 
to the circuit court.  Id. at 42.  The court concluded that the 
four 
alleged 
offenses, 
although 
identical 
in 
law, 
were 
sufficiently different in fact to demonstrate that four separate 
crimes had been committed.  Id. at 31.  The court reasoned that 
each of the alleged acts required a separate volitional act; 
involved a different method of bodily intrusion; required a 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
28 
 
separate application of force and threat; and resulted in a new 
and different humiliation, danger, and pain.  Id. at 37. 
¶72 By contrast, in Hirsch, the court of appeals affirmed 
the dismissal of three counts of first-degree sexual assault of 
a child on the grounds that the counts were multiplicitous.  140 
Wis. 2d at 470.  In that case, stemming from allegations that 
the defendant touched the five-year-old victim by moving his 
hand from her vagina, to her anus, and back again to her vagina, 
id. at 474, the State charged the defendant with three separate 
counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(d) (1987-88), id. at 470.  The court of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
three 
alleged 
acts 
were 
not 
sufficiently different in fact to be properly denominated 
separate crimes.  Id. at 474.  The court reasoned that the 
alleged acts were "extremely similar in nature and character," 
each involving the defendant's hand and two of the three 
involving the victim's vaginal area.  Id.  In addition, because 
the entire episode "took no more than a few minutes," the court 
of appeals was not convinced that the defendant had sufficient 
time for reflection in between the alleged acts.  Id. at 475. 
¶73 Comparing Eisch and Hirsch to the instant case, it is 
readily apparent that the five alleged acts comprised in Counts 
10 through 14 of the information are much more akin to those 
acts at issue in Eisch.  The five alleged acts——fellatio, 
digital penetration of Nicole's vagina, the touching of Nicole's 
breasts, the touching of Ziegler's penis, and the striking of 
Nicole's 
buttocks——are 
significantly 
different 
in 
nature, 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
29 
 
involving different methods of intrusion and contact and 
different areas of Ziegler and Nicole's bodies.  While the five 
alleged acts took place in the course of the same evening, each 
act is distinct and hence "required a new volitional departure" 
in Ziegler's course of conduct.  See Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d at 36; 
see also Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶¶56-57.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the five alleged acts are sufficiently different 
in fact to demonstrate that Ziegler committed five separate 
crimes. 
¶74 Because we conclude that the five offenses, while 
identical in law, are different in fact, we presume that the 
legislature intended to permit cumulative punishments, see 
Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15; Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶44, 
and Ziegler bears the burden of demonstrating otherwise, see 
Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶17; Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶45.  
In his briefing, Ziegler makes no effort to demonstrate that 
cumulative punishments for the five offenses are contrary to 
legislative intent.  Indeed, our independent review of the 
relevant statutory language and legislative history, the nature 
of the proscribed conduct, and the appropriateness of multiple 
punishments supports the presumption otherwise. 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) prohibits "sexual contact 
or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 16 years . . . ."  Thus, by its plain language, § 948.02(2) 
proscribes two forms of conduct: "sexual contact" with a child 
under the age of 16 and "sexual intercourse" with a child under 
the age of 16.  The terms "sexual contact" and "sexual 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
30 
 
intercourse" are specially-defined for purposes of Chapter 948.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.01(5)(a) defines "sexual contact," in 
relevant part, as "intentional touching . . . for the purpose of 
sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant," including both 
(1) intentional touching of the complainant's intimate parts by 
the defendant and (2) intentional touching of the defendant's 
intimate 
parts 
by 
the 
complainant 
upon 
the 
defendant's 
instruction. 
 
That 
the 
legislature 
separately 
enumerated 
touching by the defendant and touching by the complainant 
indicates that the legislature considered each act——here, the 
touching of Nicole's breasts by Ziegler, the touching of 
Ziegler's penis by Nicole, and the striking of Nicole's buttocks 
by Ziegler——to be distinct and chargeable in its own right.  
Likewise, § 948.01(6) defines "sexual intercourse," in relevant 
part, to include "vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, 
fellatio or anal intercourse . . . ," again indicating that the 
legislature intended each act——here, fellatio and Ziegler's 
digital penetration of Nicole's vagina——to give rise to a 
separate, substantive crime. 
¶76 The legislature has separately defined the terms 
"sexual contact" and "sexual intercourse" since the inception of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 948.  Pursuant to 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 55, the 
legislature created Chapter 948 in order to specially organize 
crimes against children, offenses which were previously located 
throughout the general Criminal Code.  See Drafting File for 
1987 Wis. Act 332, Information Memorandum 88-2: New Law Relating 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
31 
 
to Crimes Against Children 1 (Apr. 29, 1988), Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  The Legislative Council's 1986-
87 Special Committee on Crimes Against Children, which developed 
Act 332, concluded that a separate chapter accomplishes the 
objective of "[e]mphasizing the seriousness of offenses against 
the most vulnerable crime victims in our society."  Id. at 4.  
In this case, permitting cumulative punishments for Ziegler's 
five 
offenses 
perpetrated 
against 
Nicole 
furthers 
the 
legislature's express objective of emphasizing the seriousness 
of crimes against children. 
¶77 Relatedly, the nature of the conduct proscribed by 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) renders cumulative punishments especially 
appropriate.  Each act of sexual contact and sexual intercourse, 
while proscribed by the same statute and perpetrated against the 
same victim on the same evening, resulted in a new and different 
humiliation and danger on the part of a child.  Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine a series of acts that is more appropriately 
subject to cumulative punishments. 
C 
¶78 Ziegler also argues that the circuit court's admission 
at trial of his mug shot deprived him of his right to a fair 
trial.  In particular, relying on United States v. Harrington, 
490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973), Ziegler asserts that he is entitled 
to a new trial on the grounds that the admission of his mug shot 
impermissibly suggested to the jury that he had a prior criminal 
record, despite the fact that Ziegler exercised his right not to 
testify in his own defense.  In addition, Ziegler contends that 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
32 
 
Counts 7 and 8, those alleging crimes against Samantha, ought to 
be dismissed on the grounds that the mug shot constituted an 
impermissible "showup"13 in violation of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 
126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  We address these 
arguments in turn, concluding that neither has merit.   
¶79 If, at trial, the defendant exercises his right not to 
testify in his own defense and is not otherwise responsible for 
causing the jury to be informed about his previous convictions, 
then the defendant "is entitled to have the existence of any 
prior criminal record concealed from the jury."  Harrington, 490 
F.2d at 490.  In such circumstances, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that the introduction at trial of the 
defendant's mug shot "may well be equivalent to the introduction 
of direct evidence of a prior criminal conviction" in violation 
of the defendant's right to a fair trial.  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Harrington court determined that in the event that the defendant 
does not testify at trial, the introduction of the defendant's 
mug shot constitutes reversible error unless the following three 
prerequisites are satisfied: (1) the Government must have a 
"demonstrable need" to introduce the mug shot; (2) the mug shot, 
"if shown to the jury, must not imply that the defendant has a 
prior criminal record"; and (3) the manner in which the mug shot 
                                                 
13 A "showup" is "[a] pretrial identification procedure in 
which a suspect is confronted with a witness to or the victim of 
a crime."  Black's Law Dictionary 1385.  "Unlike a lineup, a 
showup is a one-on-one confrontation."  Id. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
33 
 
is introduced must "not draw particular attention to the source 
or implications" of the mug shot.  Id. at 494. 
¶80 Assuming arguendo that Harrington applies to the 
instant case, we conclude that all three of the foregoing 
prerequisites 
are 
satisfied. 
 
First, 
the 
State 
had 
a 
demonstrable need to introduce Ziegler's mug shot.  Samantha, 
the alleged victim in Counts 7 and 8 and the only witness to the 
underlying acts, recognized Ziegler by name but failed to 
identify him in court.  As the record reflects, Ziegler lost a 
considerable amount of weight while awaiting trial.  The State 
therefore needed to introduce Ziegler's mug shot in order for 
Samantha to identify Ziegler and thereby provide a foundation 
for her crucial testimony.  Second, there is no indication in 
the record that the jury was ever shown Ziegler's mug shot.  In 
fact, the circuit court expressly stated that it had no 
intention of publishing the mug shot to the jury.  Third and 
finally, the manner in which the State introduced Ziegler's mug 
shot specifically dispelled any implication that the photograph 
concerned Ziegler's prior criminal record.  Defense counsel's 
objection to the mug shot was discussed outside of the jury's 
presence, and Detective Fisher, testifying for the State, 
explicitly identified the mug shot as Ziegler's booking photo 
from his January 28, 2008, arrest for the underlying charges. 
¶81 Dubose is likewise inapplicable to the instant case.  
A 
showup, 
by 
definition, 
is 
an 
out-of-court 
pre-trial 
identification.  See Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶1 n.1; Black's 
Law Dictionary 1385 (7th ed. 1999).  A showup implicates a 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
34 
 
defendant's right to due process on the grounds that the 
practice of showing a single suspect to an excited or stressed 
eyewitness or victim for the purpose of identification gives 
rise to the likelihood of an irreparable misidentification.  See 
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶¶18, 22.  Accordingly, in Dubose, this 
court held that "evidence obtained from an out-of-court showup 
is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was 
necessary."  Id., ¶33.  A showup is deemed necessary if "the 
police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a result 
of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a 
lineup or photo array."  Id.   
¶82 In the instant case, Samantha's identification of 
Ziegler through his mug shot did not constitute a showup.  The 
identification occurred in court, during trial.  By that time, 
Ziegler was no longer only a suspect but rather a charged 
defendant. 
 What 
is more, there is no indication that 
misidentification was an issue at Ziegler's trial, as every 
other alleged victim identified Ziegler, in court, as the 
perpetrator.  We therefore see no reason to apply Dubose to the 
instant case, and Ziegler points us to none. 
D 
¶83 Finally, Ziegler maintains that he is entitled to a 
new trial on the grounds that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in ordering him to wear a stun belt at 
trial.  Specifically, citing State v. Champlain, 2008 WI App 5, 
307 Wis. 2d 232, 744 N.W.2d 889, Ziegler asserts that the 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
35 
 
circuit court committed reversible error by failing to inquire 
into the necessity of the device.  We disagree. 
¶84 Generally, 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
should 
not 
be 
restrained during trial.  State v. Miller, 2011 WI App 34, ¶4, 
331 Wis. 2d 732, 797 N.W.2d 528.  Restraints may jeopardize a 
criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by 
"psychologically engender[ing] prejudice in the minds of jurors 
when they view 'a man presumed to be innocent in the chains of 
the convicted.'"  Grinder, 190 Wis. 2d at 551-52 (quoting State 
v. Cassel, 48 Wis. 2d 619, 624, 180 N.W.2d 607 (1970)).  At the 
same time, the general rule against restraining a criminal 
defendant may give way when necessary to protect the public.  
Id. at 552; Miller, 331 Wis. 2d 732, ¶5.  Accordingly, in the 
exercise of its discretion, a circuit court may require 
restraints when "they are 'necessary to maintain order, decorum, 
and safety in the courtroom.'"  Grinder, 190 Wis. 2d at 552 
(quoting Flowers v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 352, 362, 168 N.W.2d 843 
(1969)). 
¶85 In Champlain, referenced by Ziegler, the court of 
appeals concluded that a circuit court has the "affirmative, sua 
sponte duty" to inquire into the necessity of a restraint once 
the circuit court becomes aware that the defendant is wearing 
one at trial.  307 Wis. 2d 232, ¶32.  At the same time, in 
Miller, a more recent case not cited by Ziegler, the court of 
appeals explicitly clarified that a circuit court's duty under 
Champlain "does not extend to situations in which the jury 
cannot 
see 
the 
defendant's 
restraints." 
 
Miller, 
331 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
36 
 
Wis. 2d 732, ¶8; see also id., ¶11 ("[A] trial court has no sua 
sponte 
duty 
to 
inquire 
into 
the 
necessity 
of 
hidden 
restraints."). 
¶86 In 
the 
instant 
case, 
in 
order 
to 
prevent 
any 
"problems," the circuit court ordered Ziegler to wear a stun 
belt at trial.  On the first day of trial, the circuit court 
expressly 
found 
that 
Ziegler 
was 
wearing 
"no 
visible 
restraints."  That finding is supported by several photographs 
in the record, taken before jury selection.  The stun belt, 
according to the circuit court, was located on Ziegler's leg, 
assumedly underneath his "dark trousers."  While Ziegler, in his 
briefing before this court, makes much of the fact that the 
circuit court expressed only that it "believe[d]" the stun belt 
was on Ziegler's leg, Ziegler offers no evidence that the stun 
belt was located anywhere else or was otherwise visible.  
Indeed, that the circuit court was not positive as to the 
location of the stun belt actually supports the court's finding 
that Ziegler was not wearing any visible restraints.  Moreover, 
once Ziegler was wearing the stun belt, neither Ziegler nor his 
counsel expressed any concerns relating to the restraint.  In 
fact, their only complaint about Ziegler's appearance was the 
bagginess of his borrowed clothing.  It goes without saying that 
Ziegler's loose pants made it even less likely that the stun 
belt was visible underneath.  Because the circuit court's 
finding that Ziegler was wearing "no visible restraints" is 
supported by the record, we conclude that Champlain has no 
application to this case.   
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
37 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶87 First, in answer to the certified question, we 
conclude that the court of appeals' interpretation of the phrase 
"withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the child's 
parents" in Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2), as set forth in Bowden, is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute.  We therefore 
withdraw from Bowden any language that suggests that § 948.31(2) 
requires the State to prove that the defendant had the parents' 
"initial permission" to take the child.  The remainder of Bowden 
retains its precedential value.14 
¶88 Applying the appropriate interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) to the instant case, we determine that the evidence 
was sufficient to convict Ziegler of interference with child 
custody. 
¶89 Second, we conclude that Counts 10 through 14 of the 
information, each charging Ziegler with second-degree sexual 
assault of the same child, are not multiplicitous.  The five 
offenses, while identical in law, are different in fact.  We 
further 
conclude 
that 
Ziegler 
has 
failed 
to 
rebut 
the 
presumption that the legislature intended to permit cumulative 
punishments for the five offenses. 
¶90 Third, we determine that the circuit court's admission 
at trial of Ziegler's mug shot did not deprive Ziegler of his 
right to a fair trial.   
                                                 
14 See supra note 3. 
No. 
2010AP2514-CR   
 
38 
 
¶91 Fourth and finally, we conclude that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion in ordering Ziegler to 
wear a stun belt at trial. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶92 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The defendant in the present case, 42 
years of age, engaged in despicable conduct.  He was convicted 
of 14 felony counts and was sentenced to 35 years in initial 
confinement and 20 years on extended supervision.  Majority op., 
¶33.    
¶93 The defendant challenges his convictions on four 
grounds.  I disagree with the defendant's position on three of 
his grounds.  I therefore agree with the majority opinion that 
the defendant's convictions of 13 felony counts stand.   
¶94 However, I disagree with the majority's interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2), which affects one of the 14 
convictions, namely the conviction for interference with child 
custody.  
¶95 I 
dissent 
because 
the 
majority 
errs 
in 
its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2): 
(1) The majority fails to apply basic, accepted rules of 
statutory 
interpretation. 
 
Although 
the 
majority 
asserts that "we must construe statutory language 
reasonably" and that "[a]n unreasonable interpretation 
is one that yields absurd results . . . or contravenes 
the statute's manifest purpose," majority op., ¶43, 
the majority does not analyze or apply this rule of 
interpretation in the present case. 
(2) The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) yields absurd results.  I agree with the 
State that the majority's statutory interpretation is 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
broad enough to criminalize innocent conduct.  I am 
unpersuaded, however, by the State's argument that we 
may rely on prosecutorial discretion to ensure that 
the statute will be applied in a way that avoids 
criminalizing innocuous conduct.   
(3) The majority fails to pay proper heed to precedent, 
namely 
State 
v. 
Bowden, 
2007 
WI 
App 
234, 
306 
Wis. 2d 393, 742 N.W.2d 332, and fails to apply 
accepted approaches to statutory interpretation.  
(4) The majority's interpretation untethers the statute 
from its intended purpose and scope, as described in 
the 
Legislative 
Council 
Notes 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2).  The Legislature adopted the Notes as 
part of 1987 Wis. Act 332. 
I 
 
¶96 The majority mechanically examines the text of the 
statute and fails to apply basic, accepted rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
¶97 The defendant was charged with violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2).1  More specifically, he was charged with one of the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(2) provides: 
Whoever causes a child to leave, takes a child away or 
withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the 
child's parents or, in the case of a nonmarital child 
whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 
767.803, from the child's mother or, if he has been 
granted legal custody, the child's father, without the 
consent of the parents, the mother or the father with 
legal custody, is guilty of a Class I felony.  This 
subsection is not applicable if legal custody has been 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
three ways of violating the statute, namely, withholding a child 
for more than 12 hours from the child's parents.   
 
¶98 A prior court of appeals decision, State v. Bowden, 
2007 WI App 234, 306 Wis. 2d 393, 742 N.W.2d 332, analyzed Wis. 
Stat. § 948.31(2) and declared that "[t]he withholding method 
addresses a situation where the person who takes the child has 
some initial permission to do so."  Id., ¶18.   
¶99 In its certification, the court of appeals framed the 
issue as "whether Bowden's interpretation is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute."  The court of appeals also 
opined that "Bowden's interpretation seems to add language to 
the statute (and an element to the crime), which is something we 
may not do."  
 
¶100 The majority wholeheartedly accepts the court of 
appeals' one-dimensional framing of the issue.  The majority 
concludes that the "initial permission" requirement created by 
Bowden "is contrary to the plain language of the statute" and 
therefore that the conviction may stand.  Majority op., ¶¶7-8, 
51-55. 
 
¶101 Relying solely on a rote application of the "plain 
language" rule of interpretation, the majority is of course 
correct that the statute makes no reference to "initial 
permission."  Majority op., ¶53.   
 
¶102 The majority's statutory interpretation is, however, 
oversimplified.  This court is expected to do more than 
                                                                                                                                                             
granted by court order to the person taking or 
withholding the child. (Emphases added.) 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
robotically read the words of a statute.  As the majority itself 
explains, 
this 
court 
"must 
construe 
statutory 
language 
reasonably," and "[a]n unreasonable interpretation is one that 
yields 
absurd 
results . . . or 
contravenes 
the 
statute's 
manifest purpose."  Majority op., ¶43.  Yet the majority does 
not even pause to consider whether its interpretation of the 
statute is reasonable.  
II 
¶103 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) yields absurd results.  I agree with the State that 
the majority's interpretation of the statute is so broad that it 
encompasses innocuous, innocent behavior that would not be 
considered felonious. 
¶104 According to the majority, the elements of the felony 
are "(1) on the date of the alleged offense, the child was under 
the age of 18 years; (2) the defendant withheld the child for 
more than 12 hours from the child's parents; and (3) the child's 
parents did not consent."  Majority op., ¶52.  The majority 
explains that the second element is satisfied "if the defendant 
restrains the child or otherwise refrains from giving the child 
to the child's parents."  Majority op., ¶53. 
¶105 Under the majority's interpretation, there is no 
intent or knowledge required on the part of the defendant, which 
makes the potential breadth of the majority's interpretation 
staggering.      
¶106 For example, under the majority's interpretation, if a 
child under the age of 18 (without permission from his or her 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
parents) goes over to a friend's house and stays at the friend's 
house for over 12 hours, the friend's parent falls within the 
plain language of the statute and could be charged with a 
felony.  Element (1) is satisfied because the child was under 
18; element (2) is satisfied because the parent of the friend 
"refrain[ed] from giving the child to the child's parents" for 
12 hours; and element (3) is satisfied because the child's 
parents did not consent.  
¶107 In fact, a child who invites another child over for a 
sleepover 
could 
be 
charged 
under 
the 
statute 
under 
the 
majority's interpretation. 
¶108 At oral argument, the State forthrightly acknowledged 
the potential breadth of the interpretation it sought.  The 
State accepts that its interpretation of the statute encompasses 
not only culpable conduct that one would ordinarily consider 
criminal, but also innocent conduct.  The State's proposed 
solution to this dilemma is to rely on prosecutorial discretion 
to ensure that the statute is applied only in appropriate 
situations.  
¶109 I recognize the necessity and value of prosecutorial 
discretion in our system, but the majority opinion's statutory 
interpretation takes prosecutorial discretion too far and allows 
prosecutorial discretion to invade the legislative role of 
deciding what conduct constitutes a crime. 
¶110 I conclude that the majority's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.31(2) is unacceptable because it yields absurd 
results.   
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
III 
¶111 The majority fails to pay proper heed to precedent, 
namely the Bowden case, and fails to adhere to accepted 
approaches to statutory interpretation.   
¶112 The "initial permission" requirement adopted in Bowden 
that the State now seeks to void was actually adopted at the 
State's suggestion in Bowden.  In the State's brief in Bowden, 
the State argued as follows:  
"Withholds" suggests a situation where a defendant has 
permission to take the child for a set period of time 
but then fails to return the child to the parents, and 
keeps the child for more than twelve hours without the 
parents' consent.  It addresses a situation where the 
defendant has permission of the parents to have 
physical 
possession 
of 
the 
child 
in 
the 
first 
place . . . .2 
¶113 Bowden has been the law since it was decided in 2007. 
¶114 Principles of stare decisis ("to stand by that which 
has 
been 
decided") 
apply 
to 
published 
court 
of 
appeals 
decisions, and stare decisis commands that this court adhere to 
a prior court of appeals decision "unless a compelling reason 
exists to overrule it."3  Thus, "[w]hen a party asks this court 
                                                 
2 State v. Bowden, 2007 WI App 234, 306 Wis. 2d 393, 742 
N.W.2d 332, Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 6. 
The State asserts in its brief before the court in the 
present case that "the State does not believe that its argument 
in Bowden should be interpreted as stating that the withholding 
method can only be applied where the defendant has initial 
permission to have the child, but instead speaks to what 
normally would be the case."  Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 
13-14 n.2. 
3 See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 
682 N.W.2d 405 (citations omitted). 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
to overturn a prior interpretation of a statute, it is his 
'burden . . . to show not only that [the decision] was mistaken 
but also that it was objectively wrong . . . .'"4  
¶115 Although the "initial permission" requirement does not 
appear in the text of the statute, the requirement is not 
"objectively wrong."  Interpreting the statute to include this 
requirement is one way to prevent the absurd results created by 
the majority opinion.  
¶116 The "initial permission" requirement in Bowden is a 
step 
closer 
to 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation 
than 
the 
interpretation the majority adopts today, although Bowden is  
not necessarily the ideal way to place a reasonable limit on the 
scope of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2).  Were the court's sole options 
either retaining Bowden's "initial permission" requirement or 
abandoning it and robotically applying the text of the statute, 
the former would have been the more reasonable choice.5 
¶117 The State, which argued in favor of the "initial 
permission" requirement in Bowden, seemingly understands that 
the requirement is a reasonable interpretation.  The State 
asserts in its brief before this court that "[w]hile the 
                                                 
4 Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶45, 281 
Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 (quoting Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 
¶21). 
5 In reality, the court has other options.  For one, the 
court could read an intent requirement into the statute.   
Another important consideration left unaddressed by the 
parties and the majority is whether the present case should be 
governed by the Bowden interpretation because it was the law at 
the time of the defendant's offense. 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
withholding method of interfering with child custody does not 
require that the defendant have initial permission to have the 
child, this will undoubtedly be the case in most applications of 
the statute."6 (Emphasis added.) 
¶118 Furthermore, although the fact that the legislature 
has not overturned a court's interpretation of a statute is far 
from 
determinative 
of 
legislative 
intent,7 
legislative 
acquiescence in a court decision is a "presumption to aid in 
statutory construction."8  In the present case, the legislature's 
failure to amend the statute in response to the court of 
appeals' 2007 Bowden decision "'evinces legislative approval of 
the interpretation.'"9       
¶119 As noted above, the court must have a compelling 
reason to overrule a prior court's interpretation of a statute.  
No compelling reason exists to overturn Bowden, particularly 
when Bowden is not being replaced by a reasonable alternative.  
¶120 In sum, giving short shrift to precedent and to 
accepted approaches to statutory interpretation, the majority 
cursorily concludes that the "initial permission" requirement 
adopted in Bowden does not appear in the statute, that the 
                                                 
6 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 13 n.2. 
7 See, e.g., Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶¶32-37. 
8 Id., ¶35. 
9 Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 556, 
456 
N.W.2d 143 
(1990)). 
 
For 
additional 
discussion 
of 
legislative inaction as an interpretive tool, see Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶¶43, 53, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
"initial permission" requirement must be eliminated, and that no 
other analysis of statutory interpretation is required.  The 
majority does not analyze whether its statutory interpretation 
is reasonable and does not explore more reasonable alternative 
interpretations.  I therefore conclude that the majority opinion 
does not demonstrate an acceptable approach to precedent or to 
principles of statutory interpretation.   
IV 
¶121 The majority's interpretation untethers the statute 
from its intended purpose and scope. 
¶122 The language and statutory history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31 make clear that the legislature did not intend Wis. 
Stat. § 948.31 to apply to situations like the present case, in 
which the child is with a person who is a stranger to the 
family.  Rather, Wis. Stat. § 948.31 applies to situations in 
which one of the parents or guardians interferes with the lawful 
custody of another parent or guardian. 
¶123 Although Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) begins with the all-
inclusive word "[w]hoever," the title to Wis. Stat. § 948.31 
suggests that the statute is primarily meant to address custody 
disputes as opposed to abductions by strangers.  The title of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31 is "Interference with custody by parent or 
others."  The focus on "parent" is indicative of the statute's 
intended scope.   
¶124 It is also noteworthy that Wis. Stat. § 948.30, the 
neighboring statute, has the title "Abduction of another's 
child; constructive custody" (emphasis added).   
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶125 Based on the titles (which the court sometimes 
considers useful), it appears that the defendant in the present 
case fits more neatly within Wis. Stat. § 948.30 than Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31.10  
¶126 Further, the affirmative defenses set forth in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(4) 
indicate 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
prosecutions under Wis. Stat. § 948.31 to focus on parents and 
guardians, not strangers.  There are three specific affirmative 
defenses.  The first two protect the defendant if the actions 
were "taken by a parent" in certain situations.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(4)(a)1.-2.  The third protects the defendant if the 
actions were "consented to by the other parent."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(4)(a)3. (emphasis added).  These affirmative defenses 
strongly indicate that the legislature expected the person being 
prosecuted under Wis. Stat. § 948.31 to be a parent of the 
child.11 
¶127 Finally, 1987 Wis. Act 332, which created Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31 and Wis. Stat. § 948.30, confirms that the legislature 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.001(6) provides that "[t]he titles 
to 
subchapters, 
sections, 
subsections, 
paragraphs 
and 
subdivisions of the statutes and history notes are not part of 
the statutes."  Nonetheless, "courts often examine titles and 
history notes because they provide valuable clues to the meaning 
of statutory text."  Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cnty., 2011 WI 72, ¶65 n.12, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 
N.W.2d 442.  
11 Cross-references to Wis. Stat. § 948.31 elsewhere in the 
Wisconsin Statutes support a similar conclusion.  For example, 
Wis. Stat. § 49.22, which addresses child support and other 
topics, refers to "persons who are alleged to have taken their 
child in violation of s. 948.31" (emphasis added).    
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
did not intend Wis. Stat. § 948.31 to be invoked by prosecutors 
in cases like the present case.  1987 Wis. Act 332 includes 
explanatory Notes that were drafted by the Legislative Council.  
These Notes appear in the text of Act 332 and were adopted by 
the legislature.  Unlike drafting records or analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau, these Notes are part of the text 
of Act 332.  They should be examined in deciding the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 948.31 because they were adopted by the 
legislature.   
¶128 Two particularly important points can be gleaned from 
these Notes.   
¶129 First, a Note explains the intended scope of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.30 and Wis. Stat. § 948.31.  The Note provides that 
the amendment to the child abduction statute (Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.30) is meant to "[s]pecify that the prohibition applies 
only to a person who abducts a child who is not his or her own 
child by birth or adoption."12  Crucially, the Note goes on to 
explain that "[t]here are other statutory provisions which more 
appropriately deal with a parent who takes or conceals his or 
her child from the other parent or other legal custodian of the 
child [see s. 948.31 in this bill, relating to custody 
interference by parents and others]."13  Thus, the legislature 
explicitly explained that Wis. Stat. § 948.31 is intended to 
address parents who take or conceal their children, not 
strangers. 
                                                 
12 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 55. 
13 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 55 (emphases added). 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
 
¶130 Second, a Note explains the origins of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31, the provision at issue in the present case, and how it 
differs from the statutes that were combined to create it. 
 
¶131 The Note explains that Wis. Stat. § 948.31 was created 
by combining Wis. Stat. § 946.71 (1985-86) ("Interference with 
custody 
of 
child") 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.715 
(1985-86) 
("Interference by parent with parental rights of other parent").   
¶132 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.71 (1985-86) became Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2).  Interestingly, the earlier statute included mens 
rea.  It provided that "whoever intentionally does any of the 
following is guilty of a Class E felony: . . . (4) Entices away, 
takes away or withholds for more than 12 hours any child under 
the age of 14 from the parents, or the child's mother in the 
case of a nonmarital child where parents do not subsequently 
intermarry under s. 767.60, without the consent of the parents 
or the mother . . ." (emphasis added). 
¶133 The Note explains that the earlier statute was amended 
to make it applicable to children of any age, not just children 
under the age of 14.14  The Note also explains several other ways 
in which Wis. Stat. § 948.31 differs from its predecessors, but 
there is no reference to the legislature's abandoning the 
requirement of intentional conduct.  Had such a drastic change 
in the statute been intended, one would think it would be 
referenced along with the other changes in the explanatory Note. 
¶134 In 
sum, 
there 
is 
sufficient 
evidence 
in 
the 
Legislative Council Notes adopted by the legislature indicating 
                                                 
14 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 55.  
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
that the intended purpose and scope of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) is 
much narrower than the sprawling scope created by the majority's 
interpretation.  The legislature did not intend Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) to apply when the defendant is not a parent or legal 
guardian 
of 
the 
child 
or 
a 
person 
with 
permission.  
Additionally, it is not likely that the legislature intended 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2)——a serious felony——to operate without any 
mens rea requirement.   
¶135 Because the majority's interpretation of the statute  
untethers it from its intended purpose and scope as illustrated 
in the Legislative Council Notes adopted as part of 1987 Wis. 
Act 332, and because the majority's interpretation renders Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.31(2) 
absurdly 
broad,15 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
majority's interpretation is unreasonable.  
* * * * 
 
¶136 As I stated at the outset, 13 of the defendant's 
convictions stand.  The defendant's assertions of error that I 
have not addressed are not persuasive.  The defendant does not 
escape severe punishment for his abhorrent course of conduct.  
The court cannot, however, affirm the defendant's conviction for 
violating Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) based on an unreasonable 
interpretation of the statute.  Because the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31(2) adopted by the majority in the present 
case 
is 
unreasonable, 
the 
defendant's 
conviction 
for 
interference with child custody should be overturned.   
                                                 
15 See supra Part II. 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
 
¶137 For the reasons stated above, I dissent on this single 
issue only. 
 
¶138 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence/dissent. 
No.  2010AP2514-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1