Title: Kendall v. Malcolm
Citation: 404 P.2d 414, 98 Ariz. 329
Docket Number: 8648
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 1965

98 Ariz. 329 (1965) 404 P.2d 414 Richard A. KENDALL and Robert Moughler, Petitioners, v. Richard MALCOLM, City Manager of the City of Scottsdale, and the City of Scottsdale, a Municipal Corporation, Respondents. No. 8648. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. July 16, 1965. *330 Lawrence H. Doyle, Jr., Phoenix, Donald Maxwell, Scottsdale, P. Richard Meyer, Tempe, for petitioners. *331 Osmond Burton, Jr., Scottsdale, Johnson, Shelley, Roberts &amp; Riggs, Mesa, for respondents. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. Richard A. Kendall and Robert Moughler petitioned this Court for an alternative writ of mandamus to test the legality of their discharge as police officers of the City of Scottsdale. We issued the alternative writ on the 2nd day of April, 1965. It is now our conclusion that the alternative writ should be quashed. Prior to January 11, 1965, petitioners were employed as police officers in the City of Scottsdale. On that day, they were discharged by the acting city manager for refusal to answer questions put to them by the Chief of Police of Scottsdale relative to an official department investigation. Petitioners requested a hearing before the Scottsdale Personnel Board which, on February 1, 1965, revoked petitioners' dismissal. Thereafter, the City of Scottsdale refused petitioners' demands that they be reinstated, resulting in this petition for mandamus. The sole issue before this Court is whether the personnel board has the power to revoke a dismissal ordered by the city manager. Article 3, § 3 of the Charter of Scottsdale provides: By Article 4, §§ 2, 3 and 4 of the charter, the city clerk, city treasurer and city attorney serve at the pleasure of council. Hence the city manager, by Article 3, § 3, may remove all other employees including petitioners except those named officers. Petitioners, however, rely on Article 4, § 5 of the charter providing: The charter was adopted on October 31, 1961. Thereafter the city council adopted Ordinance No. 172 entitled, "AN ORDINANCE * * * FOR THE ADOPTION OF A PERSONNEL SYSTEM AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A CIVIL SERVICE BOARD TO BE KNOWN AS THE SCOTTSDALE PERSONNEL *332 BOARD; * * *." Ordinance No. 172 provides, in part: Plainly the City of Scottsdale's Ordinance No. 172 is inconsistent with the charter, Article 3, § 3. Ordinance No. 172 itself recognizes the inconsistency for by Article 11 it provides: The precise question here presented was raised in Paddock v. Brisbois, 35 Ariz. 214, 276 P. 325, and answered in this fashion: *334 Petitioner contends that the authorization in Article 4, § 5 to establish a civil service commission implies that it will be clothed with all the powers usually granted to such bodies. But the rule is that administrative officers and agencies have no common law or inherent powers, Gardner v. Ewing, D.C., 88 F. Supp. 315; Howell Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 9 v. Hubbartt, 246 Iowa 1265, 70 N.W.2d 531; State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347; Kasper v. O'Connell, 38 Misc.2d 3, 237 N.Y.S.2d 722. We have held that the Corporation Commission of Arizona has no implied powers. Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 64 Ariz. 129, 166 P.2d 943. The powers and duties of an administrative agency are to be measured by the statute creating them. Pressley v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 22, 236 P.2d 1011; Magma Copper Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 67 Ariz. 77, 191 P.2d 169. The only implication that can be derived is that the charter means exactly what it says; namely, that the power to appoint and discharge other than the stated officers is lodged in the city manager. Since the Personnel Board of the City of Scottsdale has no recognized common law powers, it cannot be assumed from the authority alone to create such a board that it could in any of its functions supercede any of the powers granted specifically in the charter. The personnel board can do no more than make recommendations for the appointment and removal of the officers and employees of the city. State ex rel. West v. City of Seattle, 50 Wash. 2d 94, 309 P.2d 751. Petitioners urge that the City of Scottsdale and the City Manager may not attack the civil service system created by its own ordinance; but we think in an action such as this, where petitioners are seeking relief against the action of the City of Scottsdale and the manager, there may be asserted the unlawfulness of the city ordinance. The charter of a city is its organic law bearing the same relation as the constitution of the state bears to its statutes. 5 McQuillen, Municipal Corporation, 3d Ed., § 1519, p. 93. We have no doubt that the invalidity of an ordinance may be raised by any interested party to litigation where it is asserted that lawful action is dependent on or derived from the organic law. The alternative writ of prohibition heretofore issued is quashed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., and UDALL and McFARLAND, JJ., concur. BERNSTEIN (dissenting). The majority is destroying an important protection for city employees provided for by the City of Scottsdale civil service system. Civil service was fathered by President Grover Cleveland to do away with the spoils system of employment and discharge *335 of public employees. Its purposes have been well put by the Court of Appeals of New York: The majority does not question the validity of a civil service system under which certain classes of employees may only be fired on recommendation of a civil service board. Welch v. State Board of Social Security and Welfare, 53 Ariz. 167, 87 P.2d 109. The majority reaches its result, however, by misapplying and refusing to give effect to the provisions of the City of Scottsdale charter. The pertinent provisions read: The majority reaches its result through failing to give effect to the words of the charter "except as otherwise provided." And what is otherwise provided in the charter? "Otherwise provided," I think, means that where the charter specifically provides for a civil service board with power to provide and enforce rules for certain classes of employees, the civil service board may of its own choosing and subject to the approval of the council, adopt rules having the effect of law. George v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 83 Ariz. 387, 322 P.2d 369; City of Phoenix v. Sittenfeld, 53 Ariz. 240, 88 P.2d 83; Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 28 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 1946), affd. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373. The majority quotes extensively from Paddock v. Brisbois, 35 Ariz. 214, 276 P. 325. But that opinion does not square with the facts in the instant case. In Brisbois the court held the ordinance to be actually in conflict with the charter and therefore *336 invalid. In Brisbois the then charter of the City of Phoenix stated that the city manager alone had the power to hire and fire employees. In the instant case the city manager has the power to hire and fire employees "except as otherwise provided in this charter." And the method otherwise provided is by the setting up of a civil service board and the adoption of rules that have the effect of law when approved by the city council which the city of Scottsdale has done by Ordinance No. 172. There is no question but that the petitioners were subject to the power of the board and not subject to the power of the city manager, and for the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.