Title: WESTERN LITHO v BRD OF COUNTY COM
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13694
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 1977

No. 13694 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 WESTERN LITHO, a Montana corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Hon. LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counse of Record: For Appellant: Hibbs, Sweeney & Colberg, Billings, Montana Maurice Colberg argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Morrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana Edmund P . Sedivy argued, Bozeman, Montana C. W. Jones argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted: September 23, 1977 ' i ,-, p Decided: .)v 1 A 8 377 Filed: , L I - - : &Q-iT .+A% M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court, Plaintiff filed a complaint i n the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, requesting a declaratory judgment. The d i s t r i c t court dismissed the complaint on the ground plaintiff lacked standing t o bring the action and was not the real party i n interest. Plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff is Western Litho, a printing establishment located in Billings, Montana. Defendants are the Board of County Commissioners of Yellowstone County and The Artcraft Printers, Inc., another printing firm loca ted in Bozeman, Montana. The facts as alleged in the complaint are: For the two year period preceding January 1, 1976, Campbell Calvert, d/b/a Laurel Outlook, a newspaper in Yellowstone County, hereinafter referred t o as Calvert, had the contract for legal advertising, publications and printing for Yellowstone County, and subcontracted the printing portion of the work to plaintiff. Calvert also submitted a bid for the period commencing in 1976 and agreed again to subcontract the printing t o plaintiff, i f his bid was accepted. Plaintiff contends Calvert's bid was the only qualified bid on the entire contract, and therefore the Board of County Commissioners was required t o accept it under sections 16-1230 through 1233, R. C,M. 1947. The Board, however, chose to s p l i t the contract and awarded the printing portion to Artcraft and the remainder to Calvert. Plaintiff instfhted a declaratory judgment action, naming the Board and Artcraft as defendants and requesting sections 16-1230, et-seq., be interpreted t o mean: "* * * that i f there is a low bid from any newspaper for a l l of the legal advertising, publications and printing work of the county and i f that newspaper owns and operates a commercial printing establishment, then a l l of the county legal advertising, publications and printing work must be awarded to that particular newspaper and the contract cannot be divided into two parts, one for legal advertising and publications and the other for printing and further that the phrase I commercial printing establishment' as used i n 516-1230 does not contemplate that a l l of the printing work must be accomplished by the particular newspaper upon its premises but may be subcontracted to other qualified firms , 'I Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to sue and was not the real party in interest. Plaintiff subsequently moved t o amend i t s complaint t o add Calvert as a party plaintiff and to add a prayer for lost prof its. Without ruling on plaintiff' s motion, the d i s t r i c t court granted the motion to dismiss. The threshold question here is whether plaintiff has the requisite standing to bring an action under Montana's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Section 93-8902, R.C.M. 1947 provides, so far as is pertinent here: "Any person * * * whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute * * * may have determined any .question of construction or validity arising under the * * * statute * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. " The complaint alleges plaintiff has a contract with Calvert for printing work conditioned upon the acceptance by the Board of County Commissioners of Calvert's entire bid. Further, it alleges Calvert's entire bid was not accepted because the Board acted in contravention of sections 16-1230, e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, i n accepting Artcraft's bid for the printing work. The United States Supreme Court stated i n Flast v. Cohen, 392 U . S . 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942,1952, 20 L ed 2d 947, "* * * The ' g i s t of the question of standing' is whether the party seeking relieQ has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult consti- tutional questions.' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L Ed 2d 663, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962)." Here plaintiff has alleged a substantial and personal economic injury that is the direct result of what it claims to be the unlawful action of the Board of County Commissioners. The "concrete adverseness" required by Baker and Flast is assured. Defendants rely on Chovanak v. Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 188 P.2d 582 (1948), for the proposition that plaintiff lacks standing t o seek a declaratory judgment. Such reliance is misplaced. The Court i n Chovanak denied standing t o a citizen who challenged the constitutionality of a law relating to the licensing of s l o t machines for certain purposes. The Court noted plaintiff's only interest was that of a citizen, elector, resident and taxpayer, and stated: "It is held i n Montana, as it i s held by the United States Supreme Court, and by courts throughout the nation, that a showing only of such interest i n the subject of the s u i t as the public generally has is not sufficient t o warrant the exercise of judicial power. * * *" 120 Mont. 527. The instant case is clearly distinguishable. Here, plaintiff asserts a right of a subcontractor under the statutes governing the letting of bids for county printing work. Far from being shared with the public a t large, this right is shared by, a t most, one other person, the contractor, Calvert. Plaintiff has standing to bring the action for a declaratory judgment. Defendants concede Calvert is the r e a l party i n interest, but the d i s t r i c t court dismissed the action without giving plaintiff a reasonable opportunity t o join Calvert a s a party p l a i n t i f f . I n view of our holding, w e find it unnecessary t o discuss the other questions on appeal. The order of the d i s t r i c t court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with t h i s opinion. W e Concur: