Title: Britton v. Board of Bar Examiners
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11703
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2015

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SJC-11703 
 
RANDY A. BRITTON  vs.  BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS. 
 
 
April 30, 2015. 
 
 
Board of Bar Examiners.  Attorney at Law, Admission to practice. 
 
 
 
On May 12, 2006, Randy A. Britton applied for admission to 
the Massachusetts bar, and he took and passed the written bar 
examination in July of that year.  Based on information in his 
application, including his responses to questions concerning his 
employment history and involvement in litigation, and the 
pendency of his application for admission to the Connecticut 
bar, the Board of Bar Examiners (board) interviewed Britton and 
then stayed further investigation pending a final determination 
on the Connecticut application.  After Britton withdrew that 
application, the board resumed its investigation, appointed 
special counsel to assist in the investigation, and thereafter 
conducted a hearing to inquire whether Britton "is of good moral 
character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications" to 
warrant his admission to the bar.  G. L. c. 221, § 37.  See 
S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992).  
Britton was the sole witness at the hearing.  The board 
determined that he was not qualified for admission and 
recommended that the petition be dismissed.  S.J.C. Rule 3:01, 
§ 5.3, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992).  Britton 
petitioned the county court for a hearing on his application, 
raising a variety of constitutional, statutory, and other 
challenges to the board's decision.  After a hearing, a single 
justice issued a very thorough memorandum in which he carefully 
addressed and rejected each of Britton's challenges.  The single 
justice thus denied Britton's application and dismissed his 
petition.  We affirm for essentially the same reasons stated by 
the single justice. 
 
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1.  Facts.  In his application, Britton disclosed that he 
had been "wrongfully terminated" by two employers, and that he 
had brought multiple lawsuits involving separate incidents 
against former employers, attorneys, police officers, and a 
media outlet alleging, among other things, wrongful termination, 
violation of civil rights, defamation, breach of contract, 
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.  In addition, he 
reported that his application for admission to the Connecticut 
bar had been pending since 2004.  The board's investigation 
revealed additional involvement with the legal system and other 
matters, which he had failed to disclose in his application. 
 
 
a.  Failures to disclose.  In support of his application, 
Britton submitted three letters of recommendation.  One of those 
letters was from an attorney who had obtained a criminal 
complaint against Britton and whom Britton had sued.  After 
investigation, the board determined that the criminal complaint 
was dismissed with an order that Britton pay restitution, and 
that the civil matter was settled under terms requiring the 
attorney to provide a positive letter of recommendation.  In his 
application, Britton stated that the attorney had written the 
letter "[i]n an effort to minimize the damage he has done."  The 
board found that Britton attempted to mislead it as to the 
nature of the recommendation. 
 
 
In addition, the board's investigation revealed that 
Britton twice had been charged criminally.  Although neither 
charge resulted in a conviction, Britton failed accurately to 
disclose his criminal history as the bar application required.  
Likewise, the board found that Britton failed to disclose a 
civil complaint he had filed that unsuccessfully challenged the 
denial of his request for a firearms identification card and a 
license to possess an assault weapon.  Finally, the board 
determined that Britton violated his "continuing duty" to 
disclose relevant information by failing to report that he had 
filed a petition for redetermination of a tax deficiency with 
the United States Tax Court.  See Rule V.1.2 of the Rules of the 
Board of Bar Examiners (2010). 
 
 
b.  Litigation history.  The board found that Britton has a 
substantial history of initiating pro se legal actions, the 
majority of which have been unsuccessful, and some of which have 
resulted in sanctions or an order to pay restitution.  Among 
other things, in 2007, Britton removed an action brought against 
him and his spouse by a condominium association in the Concord 
Division of the District Court Department to the Federal 
District Court in Boston, where it was promptly remanded with 
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the observation that "attorney's fees and costs are appropriate 
because the Brittons lacked anything remotely like an 
objectively reasonable basis for removal."  On remand, the judge 
dismissed Britton's counterclaims, which included claims of 
Federal mail fraud, attempted extortion, G. L. c. 93A 
violations, and other claims, and awarded attorney's fees and 
costs to the plaintiff. 
 
 
In 2005, Britton brought an action against the city of 
Lawrence and its police officers for false arrest, civil rights 
violations, malicious prosecution, and other crimes, arising out 
of criminal proceedings against him that eventually were 
dismissed.  The civil case was dismissed, in part because of 
Britton's "history of disregard of his discovery obligations, 
and . . . for his disobedience of the [c]ourt's . . . order."  
After multiple requests for extensions of time, his appeal also 
was dismissed. 
 
 
In 1993, Britton commenced an action in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking 
damages in excess of $50 million against a former employer and 
others, claiming that he had been wrongfully terminated, and for 
breach of a settlement agreement.  He subsequently commenced a 
second action arising out of the same facts, adding additional 
parties.  After the actions were consolidated, and the second 
action was stayed, Britton nonetheless continued to issue 
subpoenas in the second case, resulting in an order not to issue 
subpoenas or document requests without leave of court.  The 
first action was resolved adversely to Britton, and the second 
action was dismissed.  His appeals were unsuccessful.  Britton 
disclosed only the first action in his application. 
 
 
c.  Unauthorized practice of law. In October, 2007, a 
reviewing committee of the Connecticut Statewide Grievance 
Committee found that Britton had engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law in Connecticut. 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  We accord deference to the board's 
recommendation, but it is ultimately this court's responsibility 
to determine an applicant's fitness to practice law in the 
Commonwealth.  See Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91 (1996), 
citing G. L. c. 221, § 37.  That determination requires 
consideration of the public interest, Matter of Prager, supra, 
and "[a]ny significant doubts about an applicant's character 
should be resolved in favor of protecting the public by denying 
admission to the applicant."  Matter of an Application for 
Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 393, 397 
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(2005), quoting Matter of Prager, supra at 100.  We have said 
that "[c]andor with the board is essential.  'It is the 
obligation of an applicant to assure the members of the board 
and, ultimately, this court that he or she possesses the 
necessary qualification to practice law in the Commonwealth.  
Such a showing requires a full and exhaustive disclosure of 
prior wrongdoing, including all relevant circumstances 
surrounding the conduct, both militating and mitigating, and 
official documentation where appropriate.'"  Strigler v. Board 
of Bar Examiners, 448 Mass. 1027, 1029 (2007), quoting Matter of 
Prager, supra. 
 
 
Britton's conduct in filing multiple lawsuits that have 
resulted in sanctions or orders to pay costs and fees and in 
repeatedly failing to comply with court orders demonstrates lack 
of respect for the judicial process.  See Desy v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 452 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2008); Matter of an Application 
for Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, supra at 398.  
Likewise, Britton's failure to disclose relevant and material 
information, both in his application and during the board's 
investigation, shows a marked lack of candor.  See Strigler v. 
Board of Bar Examiners, supra, citing Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 
Mass. 448, 456, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 919 (1998) (failure to 
fully answer "is a powerful indication that the applicant lacks 
the good character required for admission to the bar").  See 
also Rule V.1 of the Rules of the Board of Bar Examiners, supra 
("There shall be a rebuttable presumption that nondisclosure of 
a material fact on the candidate's application[s] to the bar, 
law school or undergraduate school is prima facie evidence of 
the lack of good character").  Britton's conduct in Connecticut 
is consistent with the conclusion that he lacks the necessary 
character and fitness for admission to practice here. 
 
 
There is no merit to Britton's claims that the board's 
proceedings were defective or unlawful.  Although he claims that 
the board "illegally" circumvented sealed record and criminal 
offender record information statutes in the course of its 
investigation, the single justice properly concluded that the 
statues neither prohibit the type of investigation conducted by 
the board nor forbade the board from inquiring into his criminal 
history.  See Corliss v. Board of Bar Examiners, 437 Mass. 1023, 
1024 (2002) ("We would expect the board to inquire into the 
background of applicants who present a criminal history . . . 
[and], on discovering inconsistent statements and 
misrepresentations in an application, to conduct a more thorough 
investigation . . .").  Moreover, there is nothing to suggest 
that the board considered Britton's history to be evidence of 
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misconduct:  rather, it was his failure to disclose that 
history, and the explanation he gave for omitting the 
information, that demonstrated a lack of candor.  Whether a bar 
applicant is of good moral character and fitness "is a most 
serious issue," and "[q]uestions exploring this issue are not to 
be answered by gamesmanship."  Matter of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 
295 (2004).  Finally, the record amply supports the single 
justice's observation that Britton's criminal history was 
obtained by the board through his own disclosures, including 
disclosures in Connecticut, and publicly available court 
filings.  See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the 
Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 653 (1978) (information that is 
publicly accessible not protected criminal offender record 
information). 
 
 
We also reject Britton's claim that the board failed to 
provide him with adequate constitutional safeguards in the 
investigation and hearing process.  Britton was given ample 
notice of the board's formal hearing, and was provided in 
advance of the hearing with the character and fitness report 
prepared by the board's special counsel.  He had a "full and 
fair opportunity to present evidence in support of his case and 
to call witnesses, including those identified in the special 
counsel's report."  Desy, 452 Mass. at 1014.  No more is 
required.  While the proceedings were lengthy, there is nothing 
to suggest that either the process itself or the duration of the 
proceedings amounted to a due process violation.  Indeed, as the 
single justice concluded, "[t]he time (and expense) needed to 
discover that which [Britton] should have disclosed is 
attributable entirely to [Britton], not to the board." 
 
 
On the record before us, therefore, we are "left with grave 
doubt about [Britton's] present character and fitness to 
practice law.  We resolve that doubt 'in favor of protecting the 
public by denying admission.'"  Desy, supra.  Britton has not 
met his burden of demonstrating that he presently "possesses the 
necessary qualification to practice law in the Commonwealth."  
Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 100.  See Matter of an 
Application for Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, 444 
Mass. at 398, quoting Matter of Prager, supra (applicant has 
burden "of demonstrating that his admission to the bar would not 
be 'detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration 
of justice, or the public interest'").  As the board found, 
"Britton's disregard for the rules and standards by which the 
legal system operates and for which the legal process is 
structured, show his unwillingness to conduct himself with 
respect for the law and his inability to use sound judgment in 
6 
 
 
conducting professional business."  This, coupled with his 
demonstrated lack of candor, amply supports the board's 
recommendation that the application be denied. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The decision of the single justice denying 
Britton's application for admission to the bar, and dismissing 
his petition, is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Randy A. Britton, pro se. 
 
Sara Gutierrez Dunn (Robert G. Jones with her) for Board of 
Bar Examiners.