Title: State of New Jersey v. Abdul A. Abdullah
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-73-04
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2005

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Argued March 14, 2005 -- Decided August 2, 2005 ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The United States Supreme Court has declared in a string of rulings, Apprendi v. New Jersey, Blakely v. Washington, and United States v. Booker, that the Sixth Amendment s jury trial guarantee forbids a judge from imposing a sentence beyond the range authorized by either a jury s verdict or a defendant s admissions at a plea hearing. In State v. Natale (Natale II), decided today, we held that the Code of Criminal Justice s system of presumptive term sentencing violated the dictates of those cases. We now must decide whether other sentencing procedures intrude on the constitutional authority reserved to the jury. Catrina Lark was brutally murdered in her apartment in Atlantic City. Abdul Aleem Abdullah was charged and convicted of her murder, burglary, and weapons possession offenses. At sentencing, the trial court identified four aggravating factors. Finding the aggravating factors to be overwhelming and no mitigating factors, the court sentenced Abdullah to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier on the murder conviction and to a consecutive ten-year prison term with a five-year parole disqualifier on one of the burglary convictions. On Abdullah s appeal, the appellate panel dismissed the claim that the maximum sentence that could be imposed for burglary based on the jury s verdict was the presumptive term for second-degree offenses. The panel also concluded that the imposition of a term of life imprisonment for murder did not violate Blakely. The panel held that the Sixth Amendment under Blakely and Apprendi does not require that a jury determine the factors necessary for the imposition of parole ineligibility or consecutive terms. This Court granted Abdullah s petition for certification. HELD: Abdullah s ten-year sentence for second-degree burglary is reversed; the trial court is to determine that sentence anew in accordance with Natale II; Abdullah s sentence of life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier on the murder conviction is affirmed; finally, judicially-imposed parole disqualifiers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) and judicially-imposed consecutive sentences do not violate the Sixth Amendment. Under the Code of Criminal Justice, a second-degree crime is punishable by a term of imprisonment between five and ten years, with a presumptive term of seven years. In Natale II, we held that the maximum sentence that can be imposed based on a jury verdict alone is the presumptive term, and therefore the statutory maximum is the presumptive term. A sentence above the presumptive term premised on a judge s finding of aggravating factors, other than the fact of a prior criminal conviction, is incompatible with the holdings in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. (pp. 10-11) In this case, the trial court imposed a ten year sentence for second-degree burglary based on its finding of four statutory aggravating factors. It appears that the sentencing court used the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved nature of the crime a fact not specifically found by the jury as a basis for increasing the burglary sentence above its presumptive term. We cannot tell from the record whether the court used that fact-finding to support only that aggravating factor or whether it also was used to support other aggravating factors. In light of Blakely, and our decision in Natale II, only a jury finding of that fact would justify increasing a sentence above the presumptive. Accordingly, we are compelled to remand for resentencing on the burglary conviction. (pp. 11-12) In Natale II, we excised the presumptive terms from the Code so that judges still will decide the aggravating factors as the Legislature would have intended. Therefore, on remand, without the presumptive term as the required starting point, the trial court will consider all aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sentence within the range for second-degree burglary. On remand, the court also must articulate why it selected the applicable sentencing factors and how it weighed those factors in imposing the appropriate sentence. (p.13) The trial court sentenced Abdullah to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier for murder. Murder has no presumptive term. In contrast with Abdullah s burglary conviction, in which the upper sentencing limit based on the jury s verdict alone was the presumptive term, the murder conviction did not impose a de facto ceiling below life imprisonment. Therefore, the trial court had discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range of thirty years to life based on its consideration of the applicable sentencing factors. Because the crime of murder has no presumptive term, Abdullah, like every murderer, knows he is risking life in prison. We therefore conclude that the sentence of life imprisonment was not in derogation of Abdullah s Sixth Amendment jury trial right. (pp. 14-16) Based on its finding of aggravating factors the trial court imposed the maximum parole disqualifier five years on the ten-year burglary sentence. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have upheld the constitutionality of statutes that allow judges to impose mandatory-minimum parole ineligibility terms within the sentencing range authorized by the jury verdict. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) invests the sentencing court with the discretion to impose a parole disqualifier where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. In light of the decisions upholding the constitutionality of statutes that allow judges to impose mandatory minimum ineligibility terms, and the constitutional principles that undergird them, we hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) does not violate the federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury. (pp. 16-21) Abdullah s five-year term of parole ineligibility for second-degree burglary falls squarely within constitutional boundaries. However, because of our earlier holding requiring a remand for resentencing on the burglary conviction, the remand court again will consider the appropriate parole disqualifier based on its weighing of the applicable factors. The court must articulate on the record whether it was clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors. (pp. 21-22) The Code does not set forth any standards to guide the court s discretion in deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences when a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses. To bring rationality to the process and to further the goal of sentencing uniformity, this Court, in State v. Yarbough, developed criteria to be applied by the courts in making those decisions. Under our sentencing scheme, there is no presumption in favor of concurrent sentences; the maximum potential sentence authorized by the jury verdict is the aggregate of sentences for multiple convictions. In that vein, consecutive sentences do not invoke the same concerns that troubled the Supreme Court in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. Imposing a consecutive sentence for murder and burglary in this case did not exceed the statutory maximum for Blakely or Apprendi purposes. However, because the trial court did not explain why it imposed consecutive sentences, we are compelled to remand for the court to place its reasons on the record. We remind our courts that when imposing either consecutive or concurrent sentences, the focus should be on the fairness of the overall sentence, and that they should articulate the reasons for their decisions with specific reference to the Yarbough factors. (pp. 22-26) We reverse Abdullah s ten-year sentence for second-degree burglary and remand to the trial court to determine the sentence anew in accordance with Natale II. The court will consider again the imposition of a parole disqualifier. We affirm Abdullah s sentence of life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier on the murder conviction. We also hold that judicially-imposed parole disqualifiers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) and judicially-imposed consecutive sentences do not violate the Sixth Amendment. On remand, the court must articulate for the record its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences and any parole disqualifier. (pp. 26-27) The decision below is REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ABDUL A. ABDULLAH, a/k/a LOWELL CAMPER, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 14, 2005 Decided August 2, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 372 N.J. Super. 252 (2004). Marcia H. Blum and Linda Mehling, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Blum, Ms. Mehling and Frank J. Pugliese, on the briefs). Jeanne Screen, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Screen, Mark Paul Cronin, Deputy Attorney General and Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The Sixth Amendment s jury trial guarantee forbids a judge from imposing a sentence beyond the range authorized by either a jury s verdict or a defendant s admissions at a plea hearing. United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, , 125 S. Ct. 738, 749, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 453-55 (2000). To conform the Code of Criminal Justice to that constitutional principle, today, in State v. Natale, we struck down the Code s system of presumptive term sentencing. ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op. at 30) (Natale II). Under the Code, the maximum sentence that a judge may impose based on a jury verdict alone is the statutory presumptive term. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 29). Without being bound by the verdict, however, the judge is empowered by the Code to sentence a defendant above the presumptive term based on a finding of one or more aggravating factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a). Id. at ___ (slip op. at 29-30). It is the delegation of that authority to a judge to impose a sentence above the presumptive based on judicial factfinding that runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at (slip op. at 30). In Natale II, supra, we removed the presumptive terms from N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f) to bring the Code into compliance with the Sixth Amendment. ___ N.J. at (slip op. at 34). We now must decide whether other sentencing procedures under the Code intrude on the authority reserved to the jury under the Constitution. In this case, we conclude that the powers given to a judge by the Code to sentence a defendant to a period of life imprisonment for murder, to a period of parole disqualification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b), and to consecutive sentences for multiple convictions do not run counter to the Sixth Amendment. [(Emphasis added).] The provision of the Code that implements presumptive term sentencing specifically exempts murder from its sweep: Except for the crime of murder, unless the preponderance of aggravating or mitigating factors . . . weighs in favor of a higher or lower term within the sentencing ranges for the four degrees of crimes, the court shall impose the presumptive term. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the standard range for murder is a sentence between thirty years and life imprisonment. In contrast with defendant s burglary conviction, in which the upper sentencing limit based on the jury s verdict alone was the presumptive term, defendant s murder conviction did not impose a de facto ceiling below life imprisonment. Therefore, the trial court had discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range of thirty years to life based on its consideration of the applicable sentencing factors. This state s sentencing scheme for murder is almost identical to the example of an indeterminate sentencing scheme depicted with approval in Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2540, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403. In the Blakely example, an indeterminate sentencing system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, is constitutionally permissible because in such a system every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail. Id. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2540, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403. Under such a system, a judge may rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion within the statutory range. Id. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2540, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403. Likewise, because the crime of murder has no presumptive term, defendant, like every murderer, knows he is risking life in prison. Abdullah, supra, 372 N.J. Super. at 283 (internal quotations omitted). We therefore conclude that defendant s sentence of life imprisonment was not in derogation of his Sixth Amendment jury trial right. [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) (emphasis added).] In making the discretionary decision whether to impose a parole disqualifier, the court balances the same aggravating and mitigating factors used to determine the length of the sentence, but applies a stricter standard that reflects the serious impact that a parole disqualifier will have on the real time a defendant serves on his sentence. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 359 (1987); see also State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 90 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 903, 124 S. Ct. 259, 157 L. Ed. 2d 187 (2003). Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have upheld the constitutionality of statutes that allow judges to impose mandatory-minimum parole ineligibility terms within the sentencing range authorized by the jury verdict. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524, 545 (2002); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-86, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 2415-16, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67, 75-76 (1986); Stanton, supra, 176 N.J. at 96-97. See footnote 4 Apprendi, supra, and Blakely, supra, stand for the proposition that the jury s verdict sets the maximum range of the sentence and that any fact extending the defendant s sentence beyond that range, other than that of a prior conviction, must be decided by the jury. Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2537, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403; see also Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at 557, 122 S. Ct. at 2414, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 537-38 (plurality opinion). However, for Sixth Amendment purposes, facts used to extend the sentence beyond the statutory maximum are deemed different from facts used to set the minimum sentence. Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at 566-67, 122 S. Ct. at 2419, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 544 (plurality opinion). Within the range authorized by the jury s verdict, . . . the political system may channel judicial discretion -- and rely upon judicial expertise -- by requiring defendants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings. Id. at 567, 122 S. Ct. at 2419, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 544 (plurality opinion). Accordingly, the imposition of a minimum sentence based on judicial findings does not evade the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 568, 122 S. Ct. at 2420, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 545. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, supra, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that authorized a judge to sentence a convicted felon to a five-year mandatory-minimum term. 477 U.S. at 81, 84-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2413, 2415-16, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 73, 75-76. The statute provided that if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the felon visibly possessed a firearm when he committed the offense, the parole disqualifier would automatically apply. Id. at 81-82, 106 S. Ct. at 2413-14, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 73. In that case, the five-year parole disqualifier fell well within the maximum range permitted by the jury verdict. Id. at 82, 106 S. Ct. at 2414, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 73. In Harris v. United States, supra, the Court again upheld the constitutionality of a statute authorizing a judge, based on judicial factfindings, to impose a minimum term of imprisonment within the range sanctioned by the jury verdict. 536 U.S. at 568, 122 S. Ct. at 2420, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 545. In that case, a federal statute provided that a person convicted of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime must be sentenced to a mandatory-minimum term of five years. Id. at 550-51, 122 S. Ct. at 2410-11, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 533. The statute further required the sentencing judge to increase the mandatory minimum to seven years if he found the gun was brandished and to ten years if he found the gun was discharged. Id. at 550-51, 122 S. Ct. at 2410-11, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 533. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] had brandished the gun. Id. at 551, 122 S. Ct. at 2411, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 534. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant s seven-year mandatory-minimum sentence. Id. at 552, 122 S. Ct. at 2411, 153 L. Ed 2d at 534. In State v. Stanton, supra, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the vehicular homicide statute that required the sentencing judge to impose a mandatory-minimum sentence if he found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant drove while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 176 N.J. at 78-79, 96-97. In that case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree vehicular homicide, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5. Id. at 80. Based on evidence presented at trial that the defendant was driving while under the influence, the sentencing court imposed a three-year parole disqualifier. Id. at 80-81. This Court determined that the under-the-influence sentencing factor was not an element of vehicular homicide necessitating a jury determination. Id. at 96-97. Relying on McMillan, supra, and Harris, supra, the Court further held that there was no federal or state constitutional impediment to a judge imposing mandatory-minimum sentences based on judicial factfindings. Id. at 91, 95-96. In this case, defendant challenges N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b), which invests the sentencing court with the discretion to impose a parole disqualifier where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. Those sentencing factors are the traditional factors that courts always have considered in determining an appropriate sentence. Natale II, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 32). They were neither intended by the Legislature to constitute elements of a crime nor were they transformed into constitutional elements when the judge used them to justify imposing a parole disqualifier. In light of the outcomes in McMillan, supra, Harris, supra, and Stanton, supra, and the constitutional principles that undergird them, we hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) does not violate the federal or state constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. Accordingly, defendant s five-year term of parole ineligibility for second-degree burglary falls squarely within the constitutional boundaries set forth in those cases. However, because of our earlier holding requiring a remand for resentencing on the burglary conviction, the remand court again will consider the appropriate parole disqualifier based on its weighing of the applicable factors. We note that the court must articulate on the record whether it was clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e); see also R. 3:21-4(g). (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous; (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors; (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense; and (6) there should be an overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms (including an extended term, if eligible) that could be imposed for the two most serious offenses. [Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted).] In 1993, the Legislature eliminated the cap on the number of consecutive sentences that could be imposed pursuant to the sixth factor by amending N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) to provide that [t]here shall be no overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. The amendment granted greater discretion to judges in determining the overall length of a sentence. Under our sentencing scheme, there is no presumption in favor of concurrent sentences and therefore the maximum potential sentence authorized by the jury verdict is the aggregate of sentences for multiple convictions. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). In other words, the sentencing range is the maximum sentence for each offense added to every other offense. The Yarbough factors serve much the same purpose that aggravating and mitigating factors do in guiding the court toward a sentence within the statutory range. Thus, every [criminal] knows he is risking an aggregate sentence covering all the offenses he has committed. Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2540, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403. In this case, defendant was on notice that based on the jury s findings, his convictions for murder, second-degree burglary, and the other offenses exposed him to a sentence exceeding life imprisonment. In that vein, consecutive sentences do not invoke the same concerns that troubled the Supreme Court in Apprendi, supra, Blakely, supra, and Booker, supra. See footnote 5 As in any indeterminate sentencing scheme, the jury verdict in this case allowed the judge to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence within the maximum range based on the sentencing court s discretionary findings. Unlike a trial court that engages in factfinding as the basis for exceeding the sentence authorized by a jury s verdict, the court here imposed consecutive sentences that were supported by the jury s separate guilty verdicts for each offense. With the exception of merged offenses, defendant knew that he potentially could be sentenced to the sum of the maximum sentences for all of the offenses combined. We therefore conclude that imposing a consecutive sentence for murder and burglary in this case did not exceed the statutory maximum for Blakely or Apprendi purposes. However, because the trial court did not explain why it imposed consecutive sentences, we are compelled to remand for the court to place its reasons on the record. Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 122; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e); R. 3:21-4(g). We remind our courts that when imposing either consecutive or concurrent sentences, [t]he focus should be on the fairness of the overall sentence, and that they should articulate the reasons for their decisions with specific reference to the Yarbough factors. Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 122. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ABDUL A. ABDULLAH, a/k/a LOWELL CAMPER, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED August 2, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY