Title: Commonwealth v. Hernandez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11467
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2019

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SJC-11467 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE HERNANDEZ. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 9, 2018. - January 9, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand jury proceedings, 
Exculpatory, Cross-examination, Opinion.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Grand jury proceedings, Dismissal, 
New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 3, 2010. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., the 
case was tried before David A. Lowy, J., and a motion for a new 
trial, filed on July 27, 2015, was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, 
J. 
 
 
 
David H. Mirsky (Joanne T. Petito also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  On the evening of June 7, 2009, the defendant, 
Jose Hernandez, shot and killed Roberto Plaza as Plaza sat in 
his motor vehicle.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
2 
 
first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation in 
connection with the shooting death.  We consolidated his direct 
appeal with his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial.  After full consideration of the trial record and the 
defendant's arguments, we affirm the defendant's conviction and 
the denial of his motion for a new trial, and we decline to 
grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for discussion infra.  On 
the evening of June 7, 2009, the defendant and his friend, Jorge 
Santiago, were drinking beer and using heroin at the defendant's 
home in Lawrence.  As the defendant was inspecting a firearm 
that Santiago showed him, the victim knocked at the door, 
announced himself, and said he wanted to purchase narcotics.  
Without opening the door, the defendant told the victim to 
"[g]et away" and to "[c]all [his] workers."  The victim 
persisted, knocking again and stating that the defendant's 
workers "do not answer the phones."  The defendant opened the 
door and began to argue with the victim. 
 
The victim eventually walked back to his motor vehicle, 
which was parked in front of the defendant's home, and started 
the engine.  The defendant walked up to the passenger side of 
the motor vehicle, where the argument continued.  The defendant 
then pulled the handgun from his pocket and fired it into the 
3 
 
vehicle, and then walked away.  The victim's motor vehicle 
thereafter proceeded a short way down the street, left the 
roadway, knocked down a fence, and crashed into a couple motor 
vehicles parked in a nearby lot.  Neighbors found the victim 
breathing but unable to respond to questions.  He died soon 
after from a gunshot wound to the chest. 
 
In the meantime, after the shooting, the defendant hid the 
firearm in a tree stump located in the backyard of a neighboring 
home and then contacted a friend, Miguel Sierra, who retrieved 
(and later sold) the firearm and provided the defendant with 
travel arrangements to Connecticut the next day.  In November 
2009, the defendant was located and arrested in Connecticut. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial 
of his motion to dismiss the indictment and certain evidentiary 
rulings by the trial judge.  He also appeals from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered and 
improperly withheld evidence.  Finally, the defendant asks this 
court to reduce the verdict to manslaughter pursuant to our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Grand jury presentment.  Three days after the victim 
was killed, a confidential informant advised police that an 
individual claimed that he was "putting a hit out" on the victim 
because the victim previously had failed to pay for heroin that 
the individual had provided to the victim.  The confidential 
4 
 
informant further reported that the day after the shooting, when 
the informant asked the individual about the "hit," the 
individual told the informant, "[D]on't worry about [it], I 
already had it taken care of." 
 
The defendant argues that the information from the 
confidential informant should have been presented to the grand 
jury as exculpatory evidence that raised a "fundamental doubt as 
to the credibility of the prosecution's entire case" against the 
defendant, and that therefore his motion to dismiss the 
indictment was improperly denied.  We disagree. 
 
It is well settled that "[p]rosecutors are not required in 
every instance to reveal all exculpatory evidence to a grand 
jury."  Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746 (1985), 
citing Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 447 (1985).  "It 
is only when the prosecutor possesses exculpatory evidence that 
would greatly undermine either the credibility of an important 
witness or evidence likely to affect the grand jury's decision, 
or withholds exculpatory evidence causing the presentation to be 
'so seriously tainted,' that the prosecutor must present such 
evidence to the grand jury."  Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 437 Mass. 
33, 37 (2002), quoting O'Dell, supra. 
 
The defendant has made no such showing here.  The 
informant's uncorroborated statement about another individual 
putting a "hit" out on the victim did not affect the credibility 
5 
 
of the testimony of any of the grand jury witnesses.  This 
includes Santiago, who testified before the grand jury about the 
argument between the defendant and the victim just prior to the 
shooting, and further testified that he witnessed the defendant 
point the firearm at the motor vehicle where the victim was 
sitting, and shoot.  Given this evidence, the omission of the 
informant's statement cannot be said to have affected the grand 
jury's decision to indict the defendant in this case.1,2  See 
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209, 220-221 (1991). 
 
2.  Limits on cross-examination.  Both the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantee a criminal 
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him or her 
through cross-examination.  Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 
71 (1995), and cases cited.  The defendant argues that the judge 
improperly curtailed his cross-examination of Sierra, thereby 
denying him the ability to demonstrate to the jury the witness's 
true motivation for testifying against the defendant, i.e., that 
                     
1 Even if such a statement was made to the confidential 
informant, it would not have necessarily exculpated the 
defendant, as the statement would not have been inconsistent 
with the defendant having been the one who performed the "hit." 
 
2 We note that the defendant chose not to present this 
evidence at trial, opting instead to claim self-defense.  This 
strategy made sense given the strength of the evidence that the 
defendant was the shooter. 
6 
 
in exchange Sierra would receive a "deal" on then-pending 
charges.  Contrary to his assertion, the defendant had ample 
opportunity to explore fully Sierra's motivation to cooperate 
with the government through both cross- and recross-examination. 
 
On direct examination, Sierra acknowledged that he was 
cooperating with the Commonwealth in exchange for a "deal" on 
two drug charges.  During cross-examination, trial counsel 
explored thoroughly the particulars of the cooperation agreement 
-- that is, in exchange for testifying, Sierra received a prison 
sentence of from two and one-half to three years on a drug 
charge from 2008 and expected to receive a probation sentence of 
five years on a pending drug charge from 2009.3  Sierra also 
conceded on cross-examination that he came forward to cooperate 
only after he had been charged in a second drug case, and that 
he expected to receive immunity for the assistance he gave the 
defendant after the shooting.  The initial cross-examination 
began and ended with Sierra acknowledging all of the particulars 
of the "deal." 
On redirect examination, the Commonwealth sought to 
minimize the significance of the benefits Sierra was to receive 
by asking if there were other reasons why he was testifying at 
trial.  Sierra responded:  "The only reason I'm testifying is 
                     
3 Both charges carried a five-year mandatory minimum prison 
sentence that could have been imposed consecutively. 
7 
 
because I want his family to know what really happened to this 
kid, because I don't think they know what really happened 
. . . ."4 
On recross-examination the defendant sought to reemphasize 
the "deal" in an attempt to establish it as the "real reason" 
Sierra was testifying.  Although the defendant contends that, 
during his recross-examination, the judge improperly precluded 
him from demonstrating Sierra's bias by sustaining the 
Commonwealth's objections, we are hard pressed to understand the 
concerns he raises.  The Commonwealth's first two objections 
were to questions that had been asked and answered previously 
                     
4 Miguel Sierra initially responded, "The main reason is 
that they said the family, they stab me in the back."  Trial 
counsel objected to the response, and the judge held a voir 
dire.  When asked during the voir dire why he was testifying, 
Sierra responded:  "I just want this family to know what really 
happened to their son and I want them to know I've got nothing 
to do with their son's death.  It's my biggest concern.  That's 
what I want to say."  The judge allowed the question and answer.  
Any error resulting from the judge's failure to rule on the 
defendant's objection to Sierra's initial answer does not amount 
to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, let 
alone prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 
Mass. 168, 173 (2000) (we review testimony objected to at trial 
for prejudicial error); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 
439 (1980) ("In the absence of an objection and exception, 
although this court may still find reversible error under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, it will do so only 'upon a showing of grave 
prejudice or substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of 
justice has occurred'").  Sierra's initial statement had to do 
with his motive for testifying apart from the "deal," which is 
permissible for a party to elicit during questioning.  See 
Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 682-683 (2001) (not 
error to allow witness's answer because prosecutor's question 
was directed at witness's motive for testifying). 
8 
 
and had nothing to do with Sierra's motivation to cooperate with 
the government.5  The judge was well within his discretion to 
limit repetitive questions.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 377 
Mass. 814, 837 (1979) ("A judge certainly has wide discretion to 
limit repetitive or redundant cross-examination, and there was 
no showing that the judge's action on these matters unfairly 
impaired the defendant's right of cross-examination"). 
The remaining two objections were to questions regarding 
the timing of Sierra's decision to come forward to cooperate and 
his reason for doing so.  The objections properly were sustained 
based on the characterization of the cooperation agreement as 
"the deal of a lifetime" and a "huge break."  See Commonwealth 
v. O'Brian, 445 Mass. 720, 729 n.12, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 898 
(2006).  However, the defendant was permitted to rephrase the 
questions and was not precluded from eliciting from Sierra that 
he came forward with information about the shooting in order to 
get a deal from the government.  There was no error. 
 
3.  Lay opinion testimony.  At trial the defendant asserted 
that he killed the victim in self-defense.  The defendant sought 
to demonstrate that the reason for the victim's behavior was 
                     
5 Trial counsel asked Sierra to reconfirm that he was not 
present at the time of the shooting, and that he sold the 
firearm used in the shooting.  The objection to the second 
question was sustained further as being beyond the scope of the 
redirect examination.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 419 Mass. 
470, 476 (1995). 
9 
 
that the victim was in need of heroin and the defendant would 
not provide him with any.  On cross-examination of Santiago, the 
judge sustained objections to general questions posed to 
Santiago about what happens when one is "coming down" from a 
heroin high.  The defendant now argues that he was denied a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense because the 
judge curtailed testimony from Santiago regarding the reason for 
the victim's behavior.  We disagree. 
A lay opinion is admissible only where it is (a) rationally 
based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness's testimony or in determining a 
fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge.  Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2018).  See 
Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 (2013).  Here, the 
judge was careful to ensure that Santiago, a lay witness, did 
not answer general questions about how a person reacts when 
suffering from heroin withdrawal, as such testimony would 
10 
 
require specialized knowledge.6,7  As the judge properly 
precluded a lay witness from testifying as an expert, there was 
no error and no abuse of discretion.  See e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 330 (2010) (error to allow lay 
witnesses to testify to whether defendant showed "overt signs of 
a mental illness" because such witnesses were not qualified as 
experts). 
 
4.  Motion for new trial.  At trial, chemist Erik Koester 
testified as the crime scene supervisor.  He testified that at 
the scene he inspected the outside of the vehicle and searched 
the surrounding area.  He also testified regarding gunshot 
residue on the victim's clothes.  Prior to oral argument on the 
defendant's direct appeal, the defendant's appellate counsel 
became aware that Koester had work-related performance issues on 
                     
6 We are generally wary of lay opinion regarding the 
behavioral effects of intoxicants.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 544 (2013) (police officer may not offer 
opinion on whether defendant was operating motor vehicle while 
under influence of alcohol or whether ability to operate motor 
vehicle safely was diminished due to alcohol); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 702 (2018).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Finstein, 426 Mass. 200, 
203 (1997) (psychiatrist testified that inability to control 
impulses not typical of heroin withdrawal); Commonwealth v. 
Fielding, 371 Mass. 97, 110-111 & nn.18-19 (1976) (physicians 
testified at length describing symptoms and signs of withdrawal 
from heroin). 
 
 
7 The judge did, however, allow trial counsel to elicit from 
Santiago testimony regarding his own experience with heroin and 
whether he recognized similar characteristics in the victim's 
behavior prior to the shooting. 
11 
 
his record and had since resigned from the State police crime 
laboratory (crime lab).  Oral argument was postponed to allow 
the defendant to file a motion for a new trial based on this 
information.  The motion was remanded to the Superior Court, 
where it was denied after a nonevidentiary hearing.  The 
defendant now argues that the motion was improperly denied 
because the information on Koester's performance deficiencies 
raises doubts as to the accuracy and reliability of the evidence 
collection in his case. 
 
A judge "may grant a new trial at any time if it appears 
that justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  We only disturb the 
denial of a motion for a new trial where there has been a 
"significant error of law or other abuse of discretion."  
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  As the motion 
judge was not the trial judge,8 and as the motion judge conducted 
a nonevidentiary hearing, we are in "as good a position as the 
motion judge to assess the trial record" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 158 (2006), S.C., 448 
Mass. 621 (2007).  We conclude that although information 
regarding Koester's failed proficiency tests should have been 
                     
8 A Superior Court judge who was not the trial judge decided 
the motion because the trial judge had since been appointed to 
this court. 
12 
 
disclosed as exculpatory evidence, the motion judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. 
 
a.  Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.  The trial in 
this case began on March 21, 2012.  On March 9, 2012, Koester 
was informed that the "satisfactory" result he had previously 
received on his 2011 crime scene proficiency test had been 
rescinded and that instead he received an "unsatisfactory" 
result due to his method of measuring blood spatter.  On March 
15, 2012, a member of the crime lab quality assurance management 
section was informed that Koester received "unsatisfactory" 
results on his 2010 crime scene proficiency test, also as a 
result of improperly measured blood spatter evidence.  This 
information was not disclosed to the defense prior to trial. 
 
This court had occasion to consider the implications of 
failing to disclose Koester's performance deficiencies to the 
defense in another case in which Koester was involved.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369 (2017).  In Sullivan, we 
concluded that, because the information possessed by the 
prosecution at the time of trial could have been used to impeach 
Koester, it was exculpatory and should have been disclosed to 
the defense prior to trial.  Id. at 380-381.  The same is true 
for those performance deficiencies known at the time of 
Hernandez's trial.  See id. at 380, citing Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 823-824 (1998) (Commonwealth has duty to 
13 
 
disclose exculpatory evidence possessed by prosecution team, 
including information in possession of State police crime 
laboratory chemists who participate in case).9  See also United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (government's 
constitutional obligation to disclose such evidence applies even 
if defendant did not request it).  Notwithstanding the motion 
judge's ruling to the contrary,10 "[e]vidence tending to impeach 
an expert witness for incompetence or lack of reliability falls 
within the ambit of the Commonwealth's obligations under Brady."  
Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 381.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87–88 (1963). 
In addition, after the trial it was determined that Koester 
had failed a trace evidence proficiency test that he took in 
2011.11  Because this information concerned an event that 
occurred prior to trial, but was discovered posttrial, it may 
                     
9 We note that although Erik Koester's supervisors had been 
made aware of his 2010 test results prior to trial, Koester 
himself was not informed until after the trial had concluded.  
We have not opined on whether the duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence extends to supervisors of chemists on the prosecution 
team; however, the Commonwealth concedes this point. 
 
 
10 The motion judge determined that because Koester 
testified to only factual events, the evidence of his work 
performance would not have been admissible for impeachment 
purposes. 
 
 
11 The initial satisfactory result was rescinded after the 
defendant's trial had taken place, and Koester instead received 
an unsatisfactory result. 
14 
 
fairly be considered as newly available evidence.  See Grace, 
397 Mass. at 306 (newly discovered evidence must have been 
unknown to defense and not reasonably discoverable at time of 
trial).  However, as discussed infra, none of the evidence of 
Koester's performance deficiencies warrants granting a new 
trial.12 
b.  Effect of nondisclosure.  Even if evidence is 
exculpatory, a defendant seeking a new trial must still 
establish prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 20-
21 (2011).  Here, because the defendant did not specifically 
request information relating to Koester's work performance, we 
view the undisclosed evidence and the newly available evidence 
under the same prejudice standard, that is, "whether there is a 
substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different 
                     
 
12 The bulk of the evidence upon which the defendant relied 
in his motion for a new trial concerned failed proficiency tests 
and other performance-related incidents that took place after 
the defendant's conviction.  Because the events themselves 
occurred posttrial, they do not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence.  Accord Commonwealth v. Stewart, 422 Mass. 385, 389 
(1996) (posttrial polygraph results not newly discovered 
evidence for purposes of new trial motion).  See Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 790 (2004) (posttrial plea agreements 
with prosecution witnesses not newly discovered evidence).  Cf. 
Reporters' Notes (1973) to Rule 60, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, at 1255 (LexisNexis 2018) ("It is . . 
. settled practice that the phrase 'newly discovered evidence' 
refers to evidence in existence at the time of trial but of 
which the moving party was excusably ignorant"). 
15 
 
conclusion if the evidence had been admitted at trial."  Id. at 
21, quoting Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 413 (1992). 
We conclude, as we did in Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 382-383, 
that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial because the new evidence 
would not have been "a real factor in the jury's deliberations."  
Grace, 397 Mass. at 306, citing Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry., 
235 Mass. 482, 495-496 (1920). 
The defendant testified that he shot the victim in self- 
defense when he saw the victim reach for something shiny that 
the defendant believed was a gun.  The prosecution presented 
evidence that the only items found in the motor vehicle in which 
the victim sat were a steering wheel locking device, a baseball 
hat, a cigarette lighter, a cellular telephone, and a twenty 
dollar bill, and argued that none of these items could have been 
mistaken for a firearm. 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant claimed that 
the Commonwealth used Koester to bolster generally the 
credibility of the investigation and that the Koester deficiency 
evidence could have been used to raise doubts as to the 
thoroughness of the search of the vehicle.  This argument fails.  
First, although Koester was involved in the investigation, he 
neither searched the motor vehicle at the scene nor participated 
in the more thorough search that took place at the tow yard.  In 
16 
 
fact, his participation in the investigation at the crime scene 
yielded nothing of evidentiary value.  Further, although Koester 
was present at the crime scene in a supervisory role, he 
supervised other crime scene analysts, not the police sergeant 
who searched the vehicle at the scene.  Koester's only 
substantive testimony at trial pertained to the gunshot residue 
recovered on the victim's clothes, an issue that was ultimately 
made moot by the defendant's own admission that he shot the 
victim. 
 
At trial, the defendant sought to demonstrate through 
cross-examination, and argued at closing, that investigators 
failed to conduct a comprehensive search of the victim's 
vehicle.  In his motion for a new trial, although the defendant 
attempted to connect Koester's performance issues with the 
thoroughness of the investigation, because Koester was not 
involved in the search of the motor vehicle, the evidence of his 
performance issues had no bearing on the Bowden defense that the 
defendant raised.  See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 
485-486 (1980) (inadequacy of police investigation is 
permissible ground for defense). 
 
As the evidence regarding Koester's competence could have 
been introduced only to impeach him, its absence does not rise 
to the level of prejudice entitling the defendant to a new 
trial.  See Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 383, quoting Commonwealth v. 
17 
 
Lo, 428 Mass. 45, 53 (1998) ("Newly discovered evidence that 
tends merely to impeach the credibility of a witness will not 
ordinarily be the basis of a new trial").  The motion judge did 
not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary power to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the record 
in its entirety and see no basis to set aside or reduce the 
verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment is affirmed.  The order denying 
the motion for a new trial is also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.