Title: Taylor & Stanley v. DFS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 18, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
RICHARD TAYLOR AND 
 
) 
NANCY STANLEY, 
 
 
)  No.  18, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
)  Court Below:  Family Court of 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
)  the State of Delaware in and for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  File Nos. 07-11-06TN 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, )  CN07-35699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 8, 2010 
Decided:  October 22, 2010  
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 22nd day of October 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Richard Taylor and Nancy Stanley (the “Parents”), appeal from the 
Family Court’s granting of the Division of Family Services’ Termination of 
Parental Rights Petition related to the Respondents-Appellants’ two children.  
Parents argue that the Family Court violated Parents’ Due Process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by finding probable 
cause to terminate at the Preliminary Protective Hearing (the “PPH”) on May 9, 
2007.  We find no merit to the Parents’ argument and AFFIRM the judgment of 
the Family Court. 
2 
 
2. 
N.T. and A.T. are the Parents’ children.1  In early May 2007, after a 
social worker at Wilmington Hospital alerted the Division of Family Services to 
troubling circumstances, DFS questioned the Parents at Wilmington Hospital. 
3. 
On May 3, 2007, the Family Court granted DFS’s emergency ex parte 
request for custody of the Children.  On May 9, 2007, the Family Court held a 
PPH, during which Stanley indicated that she currently earned $100 per week, a 
job she held for approximately a week-and-a-half. Taylor indicated that he left 
Children’s birth certificates at a previous residence, which caused Children’s 
medical benefits to lapse.  Also, at the PPH, DFS counsel relied on several other 
facts, including the Parents’ flight from Wilmington Hospital, a Wilmington Police 
chase after the Parents, and the Parents resisting arrest. 
4. 
The Family Court found that probable cause existed to believe that the 
children continued to be dependent as defined by 10 Del. C. §901(8) because: 
[T]he parents appear to be homeless although they deny it.  
They had been living in North Carolina and went to Minnesota 
in late November, 2006.  They went to New York to get 
mother’s birth certificate.  They then went to North Carolina to 
make funeral arrangements for mother’s grandfather and were 
driving through Delaware on the way to or from New York on 
May 1, 2007.  They took their daughter, [N.T.], who had an 
infected finger and who is diabetic to the Christiana Hospital 
who then sent them to the Salvation Army.  They were then 
sent to Wilmington Hospital.  There are allegations, which the 
parents deny, that they left the hospital during an interview at 
                                                           
1 These are the pseudonyms assigned on appeal pursuant to SUPR. CT. R. 7(d). 
3 
 
the hospital.  The parents say they are now living in North 
Carolina.2 
 
5. 
The Family Court further explained:  “Mother is pregnant.  The 
parents’ stories are confusing, complicated and raise questions about the parents’ 
ability to provide for these children.”  The Family Court granted DFS continued 
custody of Children.3 
6. 
On August 16, 2007, the Family Court held an Adjudicatory Hearing.  
Parents failed to appear.  They had not visited the children over the last three and 
one-half months that DFS had custody of them.  The Family Court found the 
Children to be dependent or neglected as defined by 10 Del. C. §901(8) or (11) and 
granted DFS continued custody of Children. 
7. 
On November 20, 2007, the Family Court held a Dispositional 
Hearing and found that DFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify Parents and 
Children, but that Parents had failed to reciprocate in efforts to reunify the family.  
Parents did not provide an address to DFS.  The Family Court granted DFS 
continued custody of Children, ordered DFS to continue efforts to reunify if the 
Parents cooperated and scheduled a termination of parental rights hearing for 
                                                           
2 App. to Ans. Br. at B1. 
 
3 App. to Ans. Br. at B1-B2. 
4 
 
March 14, 2008.  Parents arrived late for the TPR hearing on March 14, 2008.  The 
Court rescheduled the hearing until August 12, 2008. 
8. 
On August 12, 2008, the Family Court held a Termination of Parental 
Rights Hearing.  Parents did not appear.  After hearing testimony, the Family Court 
terminated the Parents parental right on the grounds of abandonment and failure to 
plan. 
9. 
Parents appealed to this court contending that they received 
inadequate notice of the TPR hearing.  This Court remanded the case to the Family 
Court based on publication in the wrong newspaper. 
10. 
On Remand, the Family Court conducted a new TPR Hearing before 
a different Judge.  Parents attended most of the TPR hearing.  On December 11, 
2009, the Family Court entered an order terminating Parents’ rights on the grounds 
of abandonment and failure to plan. 
11. 
Parents contend that the Family Court violated their Due Process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by finding 
probable cause at the PPH on May 9, 2007. 
12. 
When reviewing a Family Court’s order, our standard and scope of 
review involves a review of the facts and law, as well as the inferences and 
5 
 
conclusions made by the trial court.4  To the extent that the issues on appeal 
implicate rulings of law, we conduct a de novo review.5  To the extent that the 
issues on appeal implicate findings of fact, we conduct a limited review of the 
factual findings of the trial judge to assure that the record supports them and are 
not clearly wrong.6  This Court will not disturb inferences and conclusions the 
record supports and that are not clearly wrong.7  If the trial court has correctly 
applied the law, our review is limited to abuse of discretion.8 
13. 
Family Court Rule 212(b) provides that:  “Upon a finding by the 
Court that probable cause exists to believe that a child  . . . continues to be 
dependent, the Court shall continue the custody order in effect if an ex parte order 
has been entered granting custody to the Department.”  Family Court Rule 212(a) 
further provides that “[t]he finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay 
evidence in whole or in part.”  The term, “dependent,” as defined by 10 Del. C. 
§901(8) at the time of the PPH, means “a child whose physical, mental or 
emotional health and well-being is threatened or impaired because of inadequate 
                                                           
4 Powell v. Dep’t of Serv. for Children, Youth, & Their Families (Powell), 963 A.2d 724, 730 
(Del. 2008); Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
 
5 Powell, 963 A.2d at 730-31; In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
 
6 Powell, 963 A.2d at 731; In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995). 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 Powell, 963 A.2d at 731; Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279. 
6 
 
care and protection by the child’s custodian, who is unable to provide adequate 
care for the child . . .” 
14. 
Here, the record sufficiently supports the Family Court’s finding that 
probable cause existed to believe that Children’s physical, mental, or emotional 
health and well-being were threatened or impaired because of inadequate care and 
protection by Parents.  As permitted by Family Court Rule 212, the Family Court 
relied on Parents’ statements and the hearsay statements of DFS counsel at the 
PPH.  The Family Court did not abuse its discretion by granting DFS’ continued 
custody of the Children in its order after the PPH.  The record shows that by clear 
and convincing evidence that DFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the Parents 
with the Children and that the Parents parental rights were subject to termination 
for failure to plan and abandonment. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice