Title: STATE v TAYLOR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13035
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 1975

No. 13035 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, BRUCE E L M E R TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward Dussault , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert J. Campbell argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Richard P. Heinz, County Attorney, argued, Polson, Montana Submitted: September 10, 1975 Decided: o C T 1 . 0 1375 {- $-t >- 3 5 5 . . " r Filed: * - - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from the d - i s t r i c t court, Lake County, from a conviction of the charge of sexual intercourse without consent. Prior t o t r i a l defendant challenged the jury panel, which challenge was denied. A jury t r i a l followed resulting i n a "guilty" verdict. Judgment was entered sentencing defendant t o twelve years i n the Montana s t a t e prison with s i x years suspended. De- fendant appeals from t h a t judgment and sentence. The issue presented f o r determination i s whether or not the selection of jurors f o r a criminal t r i a l under sections 93- 1301(4) and 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, the procedural s t a t u t e s f o r selecting jurors f o r t h e jury panel, i s unconstitutional thereby depriving defendant of an impartial jury and violating Article 11, Section 4, 1972 Montana Constitution, which guarantees the equal protection of the laws and prohibits discrimination based on s o c i a l origin o r condition. O n June 26, 1974, an Information was f i l e d charging de- fendant with sexual intercourse without consent under section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. A t t h a t time defendant pled not guilty. O n February 24,1975, defendant moved t o discharge the jury panel. The motion was considered and denied a t the time of t r i a l on March 10, 1975. Following a verdict of "guilty", defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l based upon alleged improper jury selection was denied a t the sentencing on March 24, 1975. Judgment was entered and defendant appeals. Defendant c i t e s and argues a number of United States Supreme Court cases and cases from t h i s Court i n support of h i s position t h a t the provisions of sections 93-1301(4) and 93-1402, X.C.M. 1947, a r e unconstitutional because the jury panel was taken from those persons "Assessed on the l a s t assessment r o l l of the county on property belonging t o him o r her." Defendant argues t h a t t 1 such a r e s t r i c t i v e drawing" deprives him of the equal protection of the law thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment o i t h e United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution. Defendant fur- ther argues t h a t t h i s protection has been extended i n the I972 Montana Constitution by A r t i c l e 11, Section 4, which specifically declares what discriminatory factors a r e prohibited. Section 4 reads : "The dignity of the human being i s inviolable. N o person s h a l l be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the s t a t e nor any person, firm, cor- poration, o r i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l discrimin;-te against any person i n the exercise of h i s c i v i l or p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on account of race, color, sex, culture, s o c i a l origin o r condition, o r p o l i t i c a l o r religious ideas. I I In support of his argument defendant r e l i e s on State v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232; State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P. 2d 984; Allen v. State, 110 Ga.App.56, 137 S.E.2d 711; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L ed 1181; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S . C t . 667, 98 L ed 866; Wkitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L ed 2d 599; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L ed 2d 567; Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S . C t . 1900, 26 L ed 2d 523; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S . C t . 692, 42 L ed 2d W e have no disagreement with the case authority c i t e d by defendant nor the law established by t h a t authority, however the case authority c i t e d i s not applicable t o the i n s t a n t case. Here, defendant raised no r a c i a l issues and the jury panel of Lake County consisted of both white and Indian c i t i z e n s . I n most of the cases c i t e d and r e l i e d on by defendant the challenge was t o the Fourteenth Amendment t o the United States Constitution involving r a c i a l r i g h t s in elections, o f f i c e holding, o r voting r i g h t s i n bond and school board elections. The c i t e d cases arose i n parts of the United States where members of minority races were prevented from ex- ercising t h e i r r i g h t s . In the Montana case, State v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232, t h i s Court found the t r i a l court erred in picking additionalneedd jurors from jury box No. 3, persons located i n the c i t y of Helena, and i n so doing deprived the appellant of a jury drawn countywide. Such i s not the issue i n the instant case. To put the issue i n proper perspective we w i l l examine the three basic elements fundamental t o the r i g h t t o an impartial jury. (1) Was the jury drawn from a cross section of the community? (2) Was some significant o r i d e n t i f i a b l e group excluded? (3) Was defendant prejudiced by the operation of the Montana s t a t u t e s governing jury selection7 F i r s t , was the jury drawn from a cross section of the community? In Montana, u n t i l the 1975 l e g i s l a t u r e amended section 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, jury l i s t s were drawn from those persons assessed on the l a s t assessment r o l l of t h e county of property belonging t o him o r her. State ex r e l . Bennick v. D i s t r i c t Court, M o n t . , 538 P.2d 1369, 32 St.Rep. 793. Here, defendant alleges t h a t such a procedure discriminates against poor people and deprives them of an impartial jury because the l i s t from which the jury was chosen was composed only of persons who pay property taxes. Does t h i s v i o l a t e defendant's r i g h t t o equal protection of the law? W e answer i n the negative. A n impartial jury i s described i n the numerous c i t e d cases 1 r a s one i n which the potential membership is drawn from a cross section of the community". Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L ed 84; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L ed 680. The United States Supreme Court i n i t s most recent case considering t h i s question, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L ed 2d 690, 43 Lid 4167,4169, f u l l y reviews the numerous cases and makes these comments on constitutional guidelines from these cases : 1) Smith v. Texas, supra: I" [ i ] t i s part of the established t r a d i t i o n i n t h e use of j u r i e s a s in- struments of public j u s t i c e that t h e jury be a body t r u l y representative of the community. 1 1 1 2) Glasser v. United States, supra: "'Jc Jc ; ? our notions of what a proper jury is have developed i n harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic system and re- presentative government' and repeated the Court's under- ' standing t h a t t h e jury be a body t r u l y representative and not the organ of any special of the community * i? " group o r c l a s s . I 1 1 3) Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L ed 469: I" [olur duty t o protect t h e federal constitu- t i o n a l r i g h t s of a l l does not mean we must o r should impose on s t a t e s our conception of the proper source of jury l i s t s , so long as the source reasonably r e f l e c t s a cross-section of the population suitable i n character and intelligence f o r t h a t c i v i c duty. I l l 4) Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L ed 2d 446, on t h e use of a s i x man jury: "* i k * t h a t the number of persons on the jury should 'be large enough t o promote group deliberation, f r e e from outside attempts a t intimidation, and t o provide a f a i r possi- b i l i t y f o r obtaining a representative cross-section of the community. 1 I' The Supreme Court noted i n Taylor t h a t since Smith v. Texas, supra, t h a t it has consistently held t h a t the selection of a p e t i t jury from a representative cross section of t h e community i s an e s s e n t i a l component of the Sixth Amendment. Montana has followed the f a i r cross section requirement a s fundamental t o a t r i a l guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. S t a t e v. Hay, supra; State v. Porter, supra. Further, t h i s Court has held t h a t a de- fendant i s e n t i t l e d t o an impartial jury, not a particular juror. N o claim i s made here t h a t defendant did not have an impartial jury. State v. Hay, supra; Petition of Eoe, 156 Mont. 303, 481 P.2d 45; State v. Gates, 131 Mont. 78, 307 P.2d 248; State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777; Ehni v. Northern P.Ry.Co., 152 Mont. 373, This Court i s convinced, under the f a c t s s e t f o r t h i n the i n s t a n t case, t h a t the f a i r cross section requirement was not violated. While no technical evidence was offered or received, the t r a n s c r i p t of the hearing before the court contains dis- cussions, not disputed, of c e r t a i n l e g a l s t a t i s t i c s and f a c t s . These figures and f a c t s were used by the d i s t r i c t court t o find neither prejudice nor discrimination. A t the time the jury was drawn from the l a s t completed assessment r o l l , 1974, it contained more names than did the l i s t of registered voters. The assessment r o l l i n 1974 provided a l i s t of 11,637 potential jurors, while the number of registered voters was 8,497. The o f f i c i a l 1970 census showed a t o t a l population i n Lake County of 14,445. Using the above figures, it i s apparent approximately 80% of the population of the county were potential jurors p r i o r t o July 1, 1975, while approximately 59% of t h e popu- l a t i o n was currently registered. In addition, it i s estimated t h a t a great number of the 2,808 persons i n Lake County who a r e not on t h e assessment r o l l s a r e juveniles, so t h a t the c l a s s of people who pay no property taxes i s not such a definable c l a s s a s t o provide a basis f o r objection on an equal protection ground. Too, a l l persons who do not pay taxes a r e not necessarily poor. Recent revelations on those who do not pay taxes seem t o include many of the l i s t e d wealthy. Perhaps t h a t i s how they become wealthy. Even i f a c l a s s of poor people can be specifically identi- f i e d , and i t was not i n t h i s case, by i t s absence from the assessment r o l l s , such a c l a s s i s so small a s t o be insignificant as compared t o the f a c t s i n Taylor where 53% of the persons e l i g i b l e f o r jury duty was female and no more than 10% of the persons on the jury wheel of the parish was female. Such a discrepancy was found t o v i o l a t e a f a i r cross section requirement by the federal court. The second element---was some significant o r i d e n t i f i a b l e group excluded from jury service, we a l s o answer i n the negative. Counsel f o r defendant did not s e t f o r t h case authority 11 on the phrase systematic and intentional exclusion of a c l a s s of persons from jury duty" that i s applicable here. )luch r e l i a n c e was put upon the case of Turner v. Fouche, supra, where the Supreme Court held t h a t a s t a t u t o r y system t o s e l e c t j u r i e s and school boards was unconstitutionally r e s t r i c t e d t o free- holders. In Turner 60% of the population of the county was Negro yet the system of selecting jury commissioners from the l i s t of freeholders who i n turn s e l e c t the grand jury which, i n i t s turn selected the members of the school board, resulted i n a minority of Negroes on the grand jury and none on the school board. Turner a s well a s other cases r e l i e d on by defendant here, turned on the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s before the court i n each case, and a s we read Turner the holding was intended only t o c o n s t i t u t e a judgment on the evidence presented and did not i n d i c t any system based on tax r o l l s . The use of tax l i s t s f o r selecting jurors has been s p e c i f i c a l l y upheld by federal court decisions. Brown v. A.llen, supra. In Roach v. Mauldin, 391 F.2d 907, 908, the Circuit Court r e l i e d on Brown i n holding t h a t : I t J , * i n the absence of r a c i a l considerations the use of t a x digests, which necessarily exclude nonproperty owners, seems t o have been s e t t l e d a s not prima f a c i e unconstitutional * fc * . I ' Many of the c i t e d cases note t h a t any system used would r e s u l t i n the exclusion of some names. To hold the Montana system un- constitutional, we would have t o be shown t h a t an i d e n t i f i a b l e and significant c l a s s of people had been excluded. There i s no evidence i n the record t o support such a finding. The t h i r d element f o r consideration i s whether the defendant was prejudiced by the operation of Montana s t a t u t e s governing jury selection. W e hold he was not. Defendant has f a i l e d t o show any prejudice against him or any injury affecting h i s r i g h t t o an impartial jury resulting from any discriminatory practice of jury selection. Much dis- cretion i s l e f t t o the s t a t e s , a s i t should be, i n the various methods used i n jury selections. Brown v. Allen, supra. ~ o n t a n a ' s system of jury selection "reasonably r e f l e c t s a cross section of the population" and defendant has f a i l e d t o meet the burden of showing he was denied the benefit of an i m - p a r t i a l jury as guaranteed by the 1972 Montana Constitution. Judgment of the t r i a l court i s affirmed. / \ J u s t i c e / 2 1 hief J u s t i