Title: P. v. Moore
Citation: 51 Cal. 4th 386
Docket Number: S081479
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2011

1 
 
 
Filed 1/31/11 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S081479 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
RONALD WAYNE MOORE, 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SS980646 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Ronald Wayne Moore was convicted of and sentenced to death for the 1998 
murder of 11-year-old Nicole Carnahan, which occurred during the commission of 
burglary and robbery.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)  On automatic 
appeal, we affirm the judgment. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Guilt Phase Evidence 
Prosecution Evidence 
Rebecca Carnahan lived with her daughter, Nicole, on Middlefield Road in 
Salinas.  Defendant was their next-door neighbor.  Carnahan was not friendly with 
defendant, had never invited him into her home, and had told Nicole to ignore 
him. 
Carnahan worked during the day; Nicole, 11 years old when she was killed, 
took the bus to school and back.  Nicole typically arrived home shortly after 
3:00 p.m., let herself in with a front door key and, after changing her clothes, fed 
2 
 
the animals she was raising in the backyard, had a snack, and started her 
homework.  She always relocked the front door and had been told not to let 
anyone in, but she did not always relock the back door after tending the animals.   
On the day of her murder, March 4, 1998, Nicole left for school around 
7:00 a.m., and Carnahan went to work an hour later.  Before leaving, Carnahan 
went into the backyard to feed the animals; at that time, she saw no holes in the 
wood fence between her property and defendant‘s.  At 2:15 p.m., a neighbor 
noticed two or three boards were missing from the fence.  When Carnahan 
returned from work a little after 5:00 p.m., Nicole did not come out to the car to 
greet her as usual and did not answer her knock at the front door, which 
(unusually) was dead bolted. 
Carnahan went around to the back door, which she found unlocked and 
ajar.  The house had been ransacked, ―turned upside down,‖ with things thrown 
about and the telephone cords pulled from the walls.  She did not see Nicole.  
After less than a minute, Carnahan returned to the back door.  She saw defendant 
running away from her toward the back pasture, a bundle of some sort tucked 
under his arm.  She yelled after him, but he ran to a hole in the fence and went 
through it.  Through the fence she asked him what was going on and where Nicole 
was, to which he eventually responded, ―I didn‘t do it.‖   
After calling the police from a neighbor‘s house, Carnahan returned to her 
backyard, where she again saw defendant through the fence.  Asked if he had seen 
Nicole, defendant replied that he had seen ―two Mexicans‖ in Carnahan‘s yard and 
had tried to chase them away.  While Carnahan waited by the road with neighbors 
for the police to arrive, defendant approached (carrying a can of Budweiser Light 
beer, the same brand Carnahan had had in her refrigerator) and told Carnahan that 
he had gone to her house to ask Nicole for a glass of water because he did not have 
any. 
3 
 
A responding Monterey County deputy sheriff, Larry Robinson, followed a 
trail in the unmown grass in Carnahan‘s yard, though the hole in the fence, to a 
trailer in which he found defendant.  Defendant said he had seen Nicole earlier at 
her back door; she had given him a drink of water and caught him when he started 
to fall.  Robinson noticed a can of beer in defendant‘s trailer; it was cold to the 
touch even though there was no electricity in the trailer.  In defendant‘s yard 
Robinson saw a guitar case, which drew his attention because, unlike the many 
other objects lying around the yard, it was clean and unweathered.   
Some minutes later, Deputy Robinson asked to interview defendant in his 
patrol car, as defendant‘s trailer was cold and dark.  Defendant agreed to be 
interviewed.  He told Robinson ―a couple of guys‖ had ―tried to rob[]‖ him; he had 
heard from one neighbor of someone ―crawling around‖ in her backyard and from 
another neighbor, Dennis Sullivan, that Sullivan had chased away two ―Mexican 
guys‖ who had tried to break into his house.1  Defendant then saw the hole in 
Carnahan‘s fence and went to warn her about the prowlers and to tell her about the 
missing boards.  Nicole gave him a drink of water and caught his arm when he 
became dizzy.  Later he saw a Mexican man in Carnahan‘s yard; the man ran off 
when defendant called to him, and defendant, who could not run because of ―Lou 
Gehrig‘s disease,‖ was unable to catch him.  When Carnahan arrived in her 
backyard, defendant urged her to call the sheriff‘s office.  After the interview, as 
defendant was still sitting in Robinson‘s patrol car, Carnahan began screaming.  
Defendant first seemed to ignore her, then asked, ―Did they find her?‖ 
                                              
1  
Sullivan testified he did not tell defendant two men had tried to break into 
his house.  Rather, he mentioned to defendant that a field worker looking for work 
had knocked on his front window and looked in.  Sullivan also testified defendant 
had a butcher knife and a pipe-like cylinder with him when he came to Sullivan‘s 
house on the afternoon of Nicole‘s death. 
4 
 
Defendant agreed to go to the sheriff‘s station and give a statement.  At the 
station, he repeated much of what he had told Deputy Robinson.  He added that he 
had talked to Nicole at Carnahan‘s back door and had not entered the house.  He 
gave a more detailed description of the ―Mexican‖ man he claimed to have seen in 
Carnahan‘s backyard, specifying his hairstyle and clothing.  He also said the 
stranger had run toward the back of Carnahan‘s property, not toward the hole in 
the fence along defendant‘s property line.  Defendant also told the deputy he 
carried a ―butcher‘s knife‖ in his waistband as well as a piece of pipe he called his 
―club,‖ but he did not have the knife when he went to Carnahan‘s.  When the 
deputy told defendant Nicole had been killed and asked if he was responsible, 
defendant said he could not have killed her because his degenerative muscular 
illness made him too weak.2 
Nicole‘s body was found stuffed between her bed and the wall of her 
bedroom.  She had suffered numerous wounds, the gravest of which were a four-
inch slash wound to her neck that severed her jugular vein and carotid artery (a 
broken knife blade remained lodged in this wound), and a blunt force injury to her 
head (inflicted by one extraordinarily heavy blow or by several strong blows) that 
severely fractured her skull, resulting in laceration to her brain.  Other injuries 
included a set of lacerations on her face and head that were deep enough to reach 
the underlying bone, a set of bruises on her face that could have been inflicted by 
the piece of pipe defendant said he had been carrying earlier in the day of Nicole‘s 
death, and a set of apparently defensive wounds on Nicole‘s hands and wrists. 
                                              
2  
The prosecution introduced evidence defendant had been seen walking, 
riding a bicycle, doing pushups, and climbing into and out of a dumpster without 
observable difficulty, but there was also evidence he sometimes used a cane, 
walked ―hunched over,‖ and, in jail, used a wheelchair.   
5 
 
Nicole‘s blood was found spattered throughout her bedroom — on the wall, 
ceiling, windowsill, furniture, bedclothes, carpet and other objects — although the 
greatest concentration of blood was near her body.  There was a single bloodstain 
on the living room floor.  Blood was also found in several areas and on objects in 
defendant‘s trailer, including still damp blood on a broken cane, smears on a light 
switch and in the bathroom, and on a poncho and a pair of gloves.  DNA analysis 
identified the blood as virtually certain to be Nicole‘s. 
Carnahan identified numerous items taken from her house and found in 
defendant‘s house or trailer, including several pieces of jewelry, an antique 
pocketknife, food and beer, a lamp, a telephone and answering machine, $2 bills 
she and Nicole had been saving, collectible coins, bottles of bubble bath, a guitar, 
and stereo equipment. 
Defense Evidence 
On the afternoon of Nicole‘s murder, a woman visiting her daughter in 
defendant and Carnahan‘s neighborhood saw a male ―Hispanic teenager‖ walking 
in the street. 
Analysis of defendant‘s blood and urine taken after his arrest indicated he 
had consumed marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methadone and valium within hours or 
days of the sample being taken.  David True, an HIV-prevention educator with the 
Monterey County AIDS Project, saw defendant about 5:00 p.m. on March 3, 1998, 
the day before Nicole‘s murder.  Defendant was agitated, under the apparent 
influence of an opiate, and ―a little bit out of control.‖3 
                                              
3  
In rebuttal, a psychopharmacologist testified that the level of morphine 
shown in defendant‘s blood analysis was ―not particularly high‖ for a regular 
heroin user.  From a review of defendant‘s arrest records and the pharmacology 
report, the witness found no signs of drug-induced delirium or psychosis.   
6 
 
Penalty Phase Evidence 
Prosecution Evidence 
The People presented evidence of three prior incidents involving violence.  
In 1983, defendant and others burglarized a wholesale nursery business.  The 
evidence suggested defendant shot twice at the owner before being shot by him.  
In 1997, defendant accosted a man he knew outside a methadone clinic, 
threatening him with a cane and a switchblade.  Finally, in March of 1998, two 
days before the capital crimes, one of defendant‘s neighbors heard him arguing 
loudly with two women, then saw him pull and drag one of the women back to his 
trailer when she started to leave.  
Both Nicole‘s parents testified regarding Nicole‘s life, activities and hopes, 
and the impact her death had had on them.  A criminalist who had testified at the 
guilt phase gave further testimony on the bloodstain and spatter evidence in 
Nicole‘s bedroom.  He concluded blows had been struck to Nicole‘s head both 
near her closet and, possibly, in another corner of the room.  
Defense Evidence 
Louise Moore DeMateo, defendant‘s sister, described their generally happy 
childhood, ending with defendant‘s heavy drug use, which began when he was 19 
or 20 years old.  She remained close to defendant and tried to help him, taking him 
to methadone treatments and visiting him and his family during the time he lived 
with his wife and children.  After his marriage ended and his wife took custody of 
the children, defendant lived in a trailer on his mother‘s Middlefield Road 
property.  He continued to use heroin and marijuana and developed a physical 
disability that involved difficulty walking and maintaining his balance.  Defendant 
designated DeMateo his payee for disability benefits, but in the autumn of 1997 he 
revoked that designation at the instigation of a woman named Ladell, who was 
living with him.  On Christmas Eve, 1997, DeMateo and defendant‘s mother, who 
7 
 
was not living on the property at the time, asked DeMateo to bring defendant some 
food; she tried, but Ladell and others would not let her into the house until she 
obtained the assistance of the sheriff‘s office. 
Two of defendant‘s daughters testified to his care for them as small 
children and their love for him.   
Two experts, neurologist Arthur Kowell and neuropsychologist Dale 
Watson, examined, tested and interviewed defendant.  Kowell found evidence of 
brain dysfunction in defendant‘s frontal and temporal lobes, which could cause 
problems in emotional function, impulse control, memory, and the ability to 
exercise the will to change.  Watson‘s testing showed mildly impaired brain 
function with a significant deficit in the ability to maintain attention.  Though 
these deficits did not cause defendant to kill Nicole, they could have influenced his 
judgment and behavior, and his ability to organize and to make decisions.   
Verdicts and Sentence 
In the guilt phase, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charges of first 
degree murder, burglary and robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 212.5, subd. (a), 
459)4 and found true the allegations that the murder was committed during the 
commission of first degree robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and that 
defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder and robbery 
(§ 12022, subd. (b)).  The court found true the allegation defendant had served two 
prior prison terms.  (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)  In the penalty phase, the jury returned a 
verdict of death.  The court sentenced defendant to death for the murder and to a 
prison term of 11 years four months on the remaining charges and allegations; 
                                              
4  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
8 
 
execution of the prison term was stayed pending execution of sentence on the 
murder charge. 
DISCUSSION 
I.  Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statements to Police 
Defendant moved to suppress statements he made to police, beginning with 
those he made to Deputy Robinson in his patrol car and including those made en 
route to and at the sheriff‘s station, on grounds he was in police custody but was 
not advised of his rights before questioning, as required by Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).  The trial court, finding defendant was not in 
custody until he was formally arrested and given Miranda advisements, denied the 
motion. 
An interrogation is custodial, for purposes of requiring advisements under 
Miranda, when ―a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way.‖  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.)  
Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest.  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1370, 1400; People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 271.)  When there has been no 
formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant‘s position 
would have understood his situation.  (Boyer, at p. 272.)  All the circumstances of 
the interrogation are relevant to this inquiry, including the location, length and 
form of the interrogation, the degree to which the investigation was focused on the 
defendant, and whether any indicia of arrest were present.  (Ibid.) 
―Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  [Citation.]  When reviewing a trial court‘s determination 
that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must 
‗apply a deferential substantial evidence standard‘ [citation] to the trial court‘s 
9 
 
factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it 
must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, ‗a reasonable 
person in [the] defendant‘s position would have felt free to end the questioning 
and leave‘ [citation].‖  (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.) 
We examine in sequence each of the three sets of statements defendant 
claims should have been excluded — those made in the patrol car parked at the 
scene, in the patrol car en route to the sheriff‘s station, and in an interview room at 
the sheriff‘s station. 
A.  Patrol Car Interview 
Sheriff‘s Deputy Robinson testified that after he talked briefly with 
defendant at defendant‘s trailer and searched the trailer, he asked if defendant 
would talk with him further in the deputy‘s patrol car.  Deputy Robinson chose the 
patrol car over defendant‘s residence because night was beginning to fall, it was 
getting cold and dark, and the trailer had no electricity.  Defendant agreed.  
Robinson was in uniform and carrying a firearm, but he did not draw his weapon 
or handcuff or patsearch defendant before interviewing him in the patrol car.  
Defendant was not a suspect; Robinson considered him an important witness 
because he had said he had seen the victim that afternoon.  Though the back doors 
of the patrol car automatically locked when closed, defendant would have been 
permitted to leave had he sought to do so. 
At the beginning of the taped interview, defendant said that he ―would 
invite you guys in if I had, uh, had power.‖  He seated himself in the vehicle‘s 
backseat and asked for the windows to be rolled up.  Before he was even asked a 
question, defendant volunteered that a neighbor, Ms. Hooper, had ―seen somebody 
. . . crawling around in the back‖ at night.  Deputy Robinson then questioned 
defendant about when he noticed the fence boards were missing, what Dennis 
10 
 
Sullivan had told him about ―two Mexican guys‖ on Sullivan‘s property, 
defendant‘s contact with Nicole when he went to warn Carnahan about the 
prowlers and the missing boards, and the man he had seen in Carnahan‘s 
backyard.  None of Robinson‘s questioning contained express or implied 
accusations against defendant. 
At the conclusion of the interview, which lasted less than 15 minutes, 
Robinson told defendant he appreciated his cooperation and asked him to ―hang 
tight‖ for a short time.  Robinson left the car.  When he returned a few minutes 
later, defendant was still sitting in the backseat, but the door was open.  
Defendant‘s feet were outside the car, and he was smoking a cigarette. 
That the patrol car interview was not custodial is clear.  Defendant‘s 
participation was requested and readily given.  The location was chosen because 
the alternative, defendant‘s residence, was cold and dark; defendant himself 
agreed it was not suitable.  No indicia of arrest were present.  Defendant was 
neither searched nor handcuffed.  No evidence indicated he knew the car doors 
were locked, and the windows were closed only at his request; later a back door 
was opened, and defendant partly exited to smoke a cigarette.  The interview itself 
was short, and the questions focused on information defendant had indicated he 
possessed rather than on defendant‘s potential responsibility for the crimes.  
Nothing in the interview or its circumstances, in short, would have led a 
reasonable person to think he was not free to end the questioning and leave.  
(People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.) 
B.  Conversation en Route to Sheriff’s Station 
After defendant, sitting in the patrol car‘s backseat with the door open, had 
smoked a cigarette, sheriff‘s investigator John Hanson approached to speak with 
him.  Hanson confirmed that defendant had seen the victim earlier that day and 
11 
 
asked:  ―[W]ould you volunteer to come down to the station and talk to me?  I 
need to take a real detailed statement about it.‖  Defendant asked, ―Right now?‖ 
and, when Hanson answered affirmatively, further asked, ―[C]an we do it in the 
morning?‖  Hanson responded, ―No, we have to do [it] now.‖  Hanson twice 
assured defendant he would be given a ride back home, and defendant said, 
―Okay‖ and ―Very good.‖ 
Sheriff‘s Deputy Michael Shapiro then drove defendant to the station, using 
the same patrol car in which defendant had been interviewed.  He did not handcuff 
or patdown defendant before they both got into the vehicle.  Shapiro did not 
attempt to interview defendant while transporting him, but the two did engage in 
conversation.  Just as they left the scene, defendant asked why Carnahan was 
screaming, to which Shapiro answered he did not know.  Defendant observed 
Carnahan had been upset at the length of time the sheriff‘s department had taken 
in responding to her call, and Shapiro noted that ―she really gave me a hard time‖ 
on a previous occasion, when he had responded to a call on a domestic matter.  
Defendant said he had been getting along ―pretty good‖ with Carnahan, but that 
she had a temper, which he had heard displayed in arguments with her boyfriend, 
Mike.  The arguments, defendant suggested, were prompted by a ―Black guy‖ 
renting a unit in the back of Carnahan‘s property.  Without being questioned, 
defendant also mentioned that Dennis Sullivan had said two men had tried to rob 
him, that there were ―a couple of guys going around doing burglaries,‖ that he, 
defendant, always tried to get along with his neighbors and was unable to run and 
lift heavy objects because of Lou Gehrig‘s disease, and that Nicole ―seemed all 
right‖ when he saw her earlier that day. 
Beyond that, the conversation ranged over several topics, including 
Sullivan‘s business and back problems, defendant‘s previous burglary sentence 
and the shooting injury he had sustained during the burglary (a topic defendant 
12 
 
raised), the prognosis for defendant‘s illness, an AIDS test defendant had just had, 
and how defendant kept food fresh without electricity (in a small ice chest).  At 
one point, defendant asked Shapiro for an assurance he would not have to walk 
back from the sheriff‘s station; Shapiro answered, ―Oh, no.  No-no-no-no-no.  
We‘ll give you a ride back.‖  On arriving at the station, defendant asked, ―You 
guys just want a statement?‖  Shapiro answered, ―Yeah,‖ and ―They‘re just going 
to talk to you, that‘s all.‖  Defendant said, ―Okay.‖ 
As with the patrol car interview, Deputy Shapiro‘s conversation with 
defendant en route to the station was plainly not a custodial interrogation.  There 
were, as before, no indicia of arrest.  Defendant had told several people, including 
Deputy Robinson and investigator Hanson, that he had seen the victim in the 
afternoon, not long before she was killed.  Obviously an important witness, 
defendant was asked to go to the station voluntarily to give a statement.  Though 
he apparently would have preferred doing so later, he acceded to Hanson‘s 
reasonable explanation that time was of the essence.  His only other reservation — 
the need for assurance he would be given transportation home when finished — 
having been satisfied, he agreed.  Deputy Shapiro did not interrogate defendant 
during the ride; defendant was at the least an equal partner in initiating and 
maintaining the conversation, which ranged widely in subject matter.  On arriving 
at the station, defendant sought confirmation that the officers only wanted a 
statement and would drive him home afterward.  Receiving that confirmation, he 
again agreed to give the statement.  Nothing indicates defendant thought he was 
not free to leave during the ride to the station, and no reasonable person would 
have thought so in these circumstances. 
13 
 
C.  Sheriff’s Station Interview 
On arriving at the station, Deputy Shapiro escorted defendant to the 
investigations section.  Defendant was taken to an interview room, where he was 
interviewed by investigator Hanson, later joined by investigator Ed Lorenzano.  
The interview was audio- and videotaped.  Hanson testified defendant was not 
handcuffed or otherwise restrained and he, Hanson, was not wearing a gun.  The 
interview room door locked automatically when closed, but Hanson recalled 
investigator Lorenzano, who came and went during the interview, either left his 
keys in the door or placed a wedge to keep it from closing and locking. 
After getting some background information about defendant, Hanson 
opened the interview by reiterating that defendant was ―not under arrest or 
anything‖ and was there only to make a statement because he was the last person 
known to have seen the victim.  Defendant said he understood he was not under 
arrest, and Hanson repeated that defendant had been brought to the station only for 
a statement and was ―free to go or whatever.‖ 
Hanson questioned defendant about Carnahan and Nicole, defendant‘s 
earlier meeting with Dennis Sullivan, his visit to the Carnahan residence, and his 
interaction with Nicole.  As in the patrol car interview with Deputy Robinson, 
defendant said Sullivan had told him of an attempted burglary, he noticed the 
missing fence boards, and at 2:00 or 2:30 p.m. he went to Carnahan‘s to warn her.  
Nicole answered the door, defendant asked for a drink of water, which Nicole 
gave him, he stumbled and she ―caught‖ him.  Defendant told her he needed to 
talk to her mother when she came home, then went back to his trailer.  About a 
half hour later, he saw a man running in Carnahan‘s backyard and gave chase 
unsuccessfully; at that point Carnahan came home. 
When investigator Lorenzano joined the interview, the questioning went 
over much the same ground again, with defendant giving more detail about the 
14 
 
―Mexican‖ man he had seen in Carnahan‘s backyard.  The detectives asked about 
events after Carnahan returned and before the first officers arrived, including a fall 
defendant took in which he claimed he sustained a visible injury to his elbow.  
Eventually, Hanson asked defendant about his drug use and any past 
arrests.  Defendant admitted some arrests and related, as he had to Deputy Shapiro, 
the circumstances of his 1983 shooting injury during an attempted commercial 
burglary.  Hanson asked, ―Now, how do I know that — that you didn‘t burglarize 
this house next door?‖  Defendant said his disability physically prevented him 
from doing so, and when Hanson asked directly, ―Did you burglarize the house?‖ 
defendant denied it.  The detectives then suggested he might have needed money 
for heroin and asked if he had any money.  Hanson urged him to tell them the 
truth, to which defendant replied he was doing so and he would never burglarize a 
person‘s house. 
After some discussion of Carnahan‘s personal life, defendant‘s relationship 
with her (defendant said they had had a talk about a week earlier about 
―boyfriends and girlfriends‖) and defendant‘s encounter with a man in Carnahan‘s 
backyard, Hanson asked a series of questions suggesting defendant might have 
been in the Carnahan house that day and might know what happened to Nicole.  
On defendant‘s denial, Hanson seemed to back off, but soon began questioning 
defendant about any weapon he might have had with him when he went to the 
Carnahan house; defendant admitted having a ―stout stick‖ that he always carried. 
Hanson told defendant Nicole had been killed and that ―this is the time for 
you to be honest with me.‖  When defendant denied knowing anything about 
Nicole‘s death, the detectives asked him about the knife he was wearing when he 
saw Dennis Sullivan that afternoon.  Defendant said he left it at his trailer after 
that; Hanson asked for permission to search the trailer, but defendant said he 
would get it for them instead.  When Lorenzano suggested defendant must still 
15 
 
have had the knife at Carnahan‘s, defendant said, ―You guys are trying to trick me, 
you know.‖  The following colloquy ensued: 
―Hanson:  We just want to make sure that you didn‘t break into that house. 
―[Defendant]:  I didn‘t break into it. 
―Hanson:  Okay.  And then while you were in the house maybe, uh, maybe 
Nikki surprised you and because you carried that knife with you—You were seen 
earlier.  You didn‘t want to get caught, so, you hurt Nikki.  And maybe in the 
process of hurting Nikki, you didn‘t mean to hurt her as bad as you did. 
―[Defendant]:  Huh-uh. 
―Hanson:  And, uh, and—  
―[Defendant]:  Am I under arrest? 
―Hanson:  No, you‘re not under arrest. 
―[Defendant]:  I‘d like to . . .  (Tape Inaudible)  . . . Can I get a ride home 
please?  I‘ve told you everything I know. 
―Hanson:  Right. 
―[Defendant]:  I‘ve told you the best I can, and you—you‘re trying to twist 
words.  I‘m being honest with you. 
―Hanson:  Well, you can see where we‘re—we‘re, you know, we‘re a little 
suspicious, you know—  
―[Defendant]:  Yeah. 
―Hanson:  Because of, um, uh, you were seen with that knife.‖   
Hanson again suggested defendant might have sought money for his 
addiction and perhaps ―didn‘t mean to harm anybody.‖  Defendant said he was 
physically incapable of attacking anyone; the detectives questioned how, then, he 
could have pursued the ―Mexican guy‖ in Carnahan‘s backyard.  Defendant 
accused the detectives of trying to trick him, which they denied.  The conversation 
continued as follows: 
16 
 
―[Defendant]:  Yeah, you guys are.  Man I—Can I get a ride home please?  
Can I please get a ride home?  You going to charge me or what, you know?  I got 
my rights.  I‘m not on pro—I‘m not on probation. 
―Hanson:  Right. 
―[Defendant]:  I told you everything I know, you know. 
―Hanson:  Right. 
―[Defendant]:  I‘ll give you my doctor—I‘ll give you my doctor‘s . . . 
address and name.  You can call up him, and he‘ll tell you how messed up I am, 
you know. 
[¶] . . . [¶] 
―Hanson:  You‘re the last one to see Nikki, you know, uh—  
[¶] . . . [¶] 
―[Defendant]:  How do you know that?  Because I volunteered and told you 
that, right? 
[¶] . . . [¶] 
―Hanson:  Uh-hum. 
―[Defendant]:  Yeah, not because you guys tricked me into say [sic] it.  You 
guys going to give me a ride home, or am I going to have to walk home like I 
always do when I come down here to—to—be honest with you. . . .  (Tape 
Inaudible). 
―Hanson:  Well—well, what I‘m going to have—to ask you to do, Ron—  
―[Defendant]:  Yeah. 
―Hanson:  Have a seat here.‖ 
Hanson then asked defendant ―to voluntarily give us your clothes‖ to be 
checked for trace evidence.  In exchange defendant would get a jumpsuit to wear 
home.  Defendant agreed.  While they waited for the lab technician to come, the 
detectives continued to question defendant, who continued to deny involvement.  
17 
 
Defendant at one point asked who was going to take him home, to which Hanson 
replied, ―We will as soon as we grab your clothes.‖  Lorenzano asked defendant 
whether anyone else had been at his trailer that day.  Defendant said his girlfriend 
had not been there because they had had ―a little fight.‖  In answer to further 
questions, he explained that the knife he had been carrying was one of a set of 
seven kitchen knives his mother owned.  The lab technician then took defendant‘s 
clothes and photographed his body, with special attention to scratches and bruises 
the detectives pointed out (and which defendant said were from falls or needle 
use). 
Hanson again asked defendant if he had been in the Carnahan house or was 
involved in Nicole‘s death, and defendant denied both.  He asked defendant to 
take a seat and assured him he would be ―out of here . . . [a]s soon as I get this 
patrol guy to take you back again.‖  Hanson then asked a few questions about 
defendant‘s family, clothing (defendant said he had changed from a sweatshirt to a 
jacket earlier), and drug and alcohol use that day (defendant said he had had a 
couple of beers but no heroin or methadone).  Hanson said he would either give 
defendant a ride back or ―get this, uh, patrolman‖ to do so. 
After a few more questions about defendant‘s visit that day with Dennis 
Sullivan, Lorenzano called Hanson out of the room.  Hanson testified that 
Lorenzano conveyed to him information gathered at the crime scene that linked 
defendant to the crime, including that property from the Carnahan residence had 
been found on defendant‘s property.  On returning to the interview room, Hanson 
asked if they could have a technician come in and swab defendant‘s hands.  
Defendant said he wanted to ―go home right now‖ and, when asked if he would 
stay voluntarily a little longer to talk to other officers, he refused. 
Hanson then told defendant he could not go home and read defendant the 
Miranda advisements.  Defendant said he would talk to the other officers when 
18 
 
they arrived.  After the lab technician took some hair samples, Hanson and 
Lorenzano engaged defendant in another round of accusatory questioning.  
Defendant barely responded to the questions, continuing to deny any involvement.  
Eventually he said, ―I want to talk to a lawyer.‖  Hanson said, ―That‘s the magic 
word‖ and stopped questioning defendant.   
We agree with the trial court that the sheriff‘s station interview did not, in 
its entirety, constitute custodial interrogation.  As already discussed, defendant, the 
last person known to have seen the victim and obviously an important witness, 
was asked — and freely agreed — to come to the station to give a statement.  In 
context, Hanson‘s statement that ―we have to do [it] now‖ rather than the next day 
clearly referred only to the importance of getting information promptly and did not 
convey a command that defendant go to the station.  On arriving at the station, 
defendant asked whether, and was again assured, he was there only to give a 
statement.  Once in the interview room at the station, Hanson expressly told 
defendant he was not under arrest and was free to leave.  Defendant said he 
understood.  Defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and there was 
no evidence the interview room door was locked against his leaving.  The 
interview was fairly long — one hour and 45 minutes — but not, as a whole, 
particularly intense or confrontational.  The interview focused, initially, on 
defendant‘s encounter with Nicole, the missing fence boards, and information 
defendant might have had about the man he reported seeing in Carnahan‘s 
backyard or others connected with Carnahan.  For a substantial period, while 
defendant filled in his previous statements with details, the questioning did not 
convey any suspicion of defendant or skepticism about his statements. 
After a while, to be sure, the detectives interjected some more accusatory 
and skeptical questions, with Hanson asking defendant straight out, ―Did you 
burglarize the house?‖ and, later, urging him to begin being ―honest with me.‖  
19 
 
The detectives‘ questions about defendant‘s prior arrests, drug use, need for 
money, and carrying of a knife and other weapons on the day of the crimes 
conveyed their suspicion of defendant‘s possible involvement.  But Miranda 
warnings are not required ―simply because the questioning takes place in the 
station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.‖  
(Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495, italics added.)  While the nature 
of the police questioning is relevant to the custody question, police expressions of 
suspicion, with no other evidence of a restraint on the person‘s freedom of 
movement, are not necessarily sufficient to convert voluntary presence at an 
interview into custody.  (See id. at pp. 493-495 [no custody where defendant 
agreed to interview at police station, was told in interview that the police 
suspected him of a burglary and told (falsely) his fingerprints had been found at 
the scene, but was allowed to leave at conclusion of interview].)  At least until 
defendant first asked to be taken home and his request was not granted, a 
reasonable person in defendant‘s circumstances would have believed, despite 
indications of police skepticism, that he was not under arrest and was free to 
terminate the interview and leave if he chose to do so. 
People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, on which defendant relies, is readily 
distinguishable.  The defendant there was a suspect when he was first contacted, 
and he was stopped by the police as he left his house by the back door, other 
officers having sought entry at the front door.  (Id. at p. 263.)  Although the 
defendant was asked, and agreed, to ―voluntarily‖ go to the police station for an 
interview, once at the station he was given Miranda advisements, directly accused 
of having committed the homicide under investigation, and repeatedly told that the 
police had evidence of his guilt of which he was unaware and that he would not be 
able to live with his guilt unless he confessed.  (Boyer, at pp. 264-265.)  Several 
times the defendant asked whether he was under arrest and said he wanted a 
20 
 
lawyer and did not wish to speak further, but the police interrogator ignored these 
remarks and continued questioning him.  (Id. at p. 265.)  We held this set of 
circumstances — the manner in which the police ―accosted‖ the defendant at his 
home (id. at p. 268), their administration of Miranda advisements at the 
interrogation‘s outset, the defendant‘s being subject to ―more than an hour of 
directly accusatory questioning‖ (Boyer, at p. 268) in which he was falsely told the 
police had the evidence to prove his guilt, and the officers‘ response to the 
defendant‘s questions about arrest — showed he had in fact been arrested, making 
his interrogation custodial for Miranda purposes (Boyer, at p. 272). 
Defendant, in contrast, was first contacted as a witness with potentially 
important information about the burglary of his neighbor‘s house and the possible 
abduction of a child, rather than as a homicide suspect.  (When Deputy Robinson 
first contacted defendant at his trailer and interviewed him in the patrol car, 
Nicole‘s body had not yet been found.)  From the time defendant was asked to 
come to the sheriff‘s station through the first portion of the interview, the police 
consistently conveyed to defendant that they wanted to question him only as a 
witness; defendant sought and received the assurance that he was being asked only 
to give a statement of what he had seen and heard that day.  Even when the 
interviewers began to express some skepticism about defendant‘s statements, they 
did not claim to know he was guilty or, until the point investigator Hanson 
expressly arrested him, to have evidence of his guilt.  Unlike the defendant in 
Boyer, moreover, defendant was not detained while trying to leave his house, nor 
did the police repeatedly ignore statements that he wanted a lawyer and did not 
want to talk to them further. 
People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151 is similarly distinguishable 
on its facts.  There police, on information of the defendant‘s involvement in a 
gang-related homicide, went to his house and asked him and his mother if the 
21 
 
defendant would talk to them at the station about the killing and for consent to 
search the house for evidence of homicide and gang involvement.  (Id. at p. 1159.)  
At the station, police conducted an interrogation the appellate court described as 
―intense, persistent, aggressive, confrontational, accusatory, and, at times, 
threatening and intimidating.‖  (Id. at p. 1165.)  The officers repeatedly told the 
defendant they had evidence of his involvement and that the interview would end 
only when he told them the ―truth,‖ conveying, in context, the message that the 
defendant would be interrogated until he admitted his involvement in the crime. 
(Id. at pp. 1163-1164.)  Without belaboring the point, none of these circumstances 
were present in the case at bench.5 
We need not decide whether the interview became custodial when 
defendant asked to end the interview and go home, but was not given the 
transportation he had been promised.  Defendant made no statements of any 
significance after that point, largely repeating his earlier responses.  Defendant 
argues admission of the interview was prejudicial because the prosecution used his 
exculpatory statements made during the interview to rebut his claim of an 
impaired mental state, but he points to no such statements that he first made after 
                                              
5  
Defendant also cites United States v. Lee (9th Cir. 1982) 699 F.2d 466.  
There the appellate court, reviewing under a deferential standard the trial court‘s 
implied finding the defendant was in custody, in a police car, at the time he 
confessed, affirmed the district court‘s ruling suppressing the confession.  (Id. at 
p. 468.)  While there may have been a ―reasonable view of the evidence‖ (ibid.) 
supporting the custody finding in Lee, the decision is not persuasive under the 
standard of review we apply here; as explained earlier, we must determine 
independently whether a reasonable person in defendant‘s circumstances would 
have believed himself free to end the interview and leave.  (People v. Leonard, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.)  Here the trial court found defendant was not in 
custody, and we reach the same conclusion on our independent evaluation of the 
circumstances surrounding the sheriff‘s station interview.  
22 
 
he sought to end the interview and be driven home.  Any error in not suppressing 
the last part of the taped sheriff‘s station interview would, therefore, be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
II.  Admission of Expert Opinion Regarding Bloodstain in the Living 
Room 
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing a 
criminalist to testify that if a bloodstain found on the Carnahans‘ living room 
carpet was deposited by a person, the person must have been lying down rather 
than standing up.  We agree the prosecutor‘s hypothetical question was improper, 
as there was no evidence the stain was deposited from a person rather than an 
object that had been in contact with a person, but do not agree admission of the 
evidence was prejudicial. 
During the prosecution‘s case, criminalist Gene Avilez described a small 
bloodstain on the living room carpet, the only bloodstain found in that room.  
(Nicole‘s body was found in her bedroom, where there were numerous bloodstains 
on objects in various parts of the room.)  Over defense objections of lack of 
foundation and of prejudicial effect outweighing probative value (Evid. Code, 
§ 352), Avilez was permitted to answer this hypothetical question from the 
prosecutor:  ―If you assume that that bloodstain was deposited by a human being, 
do you have an opinion as to whether or not the individual would have been 
standing or either lying down or very close to the carpet at the time that bloodstain 
was deposited?‖  The witness opined the person ―was either at or near the surface 
of the carpeting‖ at the time.  But on cross-examination by the defense, as in the 
hearing on admissibility, Avilez testified he could not determine whether the stain 
had been deposited from a person or from an object. 
This court recently summarized the relevant limits on hypothetical 
questions to expert witnesses.  ― ‗Generally, an expert may render opinion 
23 
 
testimony on the basis of facts given ―in a hypothetical question that asks the 
expert to assume their truth.‖  [Citation.]  Such a hypothetical question must be 
rooted in facts shown by the evidence, however.  [Citations.]‘  [Citation.]  It is true 
that ‗it is not necessary that the question include a statement of all the evidence in 
the case.  The statement may assume facts within the limits of the evidence, not 
unfairly assembled, upon which the opinion of the expert is required, and 
considerable latitude must be allowed in the choice of facts as to the basis upon 
which to frame a hypothetical question.‘  [Citation.]  On the other hand, the 
expert‘s opinion may not be based ‗on assumptions of fact without evidentiary 
support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors . . . .  [¶] Exclusion of 
expert opinions that rest on guess, surmise or conjecture [citation] is an inherent 
corollary to the foundational predicate for admission of the expert testimony:  will 
the testimony assist the trier of fact to evaluate the issues it must decide?‘  
[Citation.]‖  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1008, italics added.) 
The record contains no evidence the living room bloodstain was deposited 
directly from Nicole‘s wounds, rather than from, for example, a weapon used to 
attack her.  Avilez could not answer how it was deposited, and the Attorney 
General points to nothing beyond his testimony to support the hypothetical 
question‘s assumption.  For that reason, the premise of the prosecutor‘s 
hypothetical question was not rooted in the facts shown by the evidence; rather, it 
was an ― ‗assumption[] of fact without evidentiary support.‘ ‖  (People v. 
Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1008.)  The hypothetical question thus called 
for an opinion without adequate foundation. 
As the concurring and dissenting opinion points out, trial courts enjoy a 
measure of latitude in determining the permissible scope of expert testimony; a 
ruling on admissibility of such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Richardson, supra, 43 
24 
 
Cal.4th at p. 1008.)  But when the proposed expert testimony rests on an 
assumption without any support in the trial evidence, the court does abuse its 
discretion in admitting it.  Such testimony has little or no probative value, bears 
the potential to mislead the jury into accepting the unsupported assumption and 
drawing from it unwarranted conclusions, and thus cannot significantly ―help the 
trier of fact evaluate the issues it must decide.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., 
post, at p. 2.) 
The concurring and dissenting opinion argues the disputed question‘s 
assumption, that Nicole directly deposited the bloodstain in the living room, can 
be deduced from the fact Nicole ―could have been‖ in the living room at some 
point during the attack.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 3.)  That an 
event could have happened, however, does not by itself support a deduction or 
inference it did happen.  From the existence of a single small bloodstain in 
Nicole‘s living room one might speculate she was attacked in that room, but one 
might equally well speculate the blood dripped from defendant or his weapon as 
he left after murdering her in her bedroom.  Jurors should not be invited to build 
narrative theories of a capital crime on speculation. 
Defendant contends admission of this evidence was prejudicial because it 
allowed the prosecutor to suggest, in guilt phase argument, that defendant had first 
encountered Nicole in the living room, knocked her down, and then, after a pause, 
pursued the attack in her bedroom.  The prosecutor thus “conjure[d] a vivid and 
unsettling image of Nicole lying on the floor in a pool of blood and ma[d]e it into 
the turning point of the crime.‖ 
In light of all the evidence and instructions, we do not agree the error was 
prejudicial.  From defense counsel‘s cross-examination, the jury knew that the 
living room bloodstain might as likely have been deposited from an object as from 
Nicole, making it arguably insignificant.  Indeed, the jury was instructed it was for 
25 
 
them to determine whether the facts assumed in a hypothetical question had been 
proved and that they could consider any failure of such proof in evaluating the 
value and weight of the expert‘s opinion. 
More important, the evidence of Nicole‘s numerous wounds and the blood 
prolifically deposited in her bedroom, independent of the small bloodstain in the 
living room, told the story of an extraordinarily brutal attack.  Even without 
consideration of the living room bloodstain, the jury would have learned 
defendant, an adult man, repeatedly beat the 11-year-old victim on the head and 
face with one or more blunt objects and cut her neck with a knife, leaving the 
broken blade in the wound, so that he could steal from her and her mother.  The 
blood deposited throughout Nicole‘s bedroom, the force with which the most 
serious wounds were inflicted, the defensive wounds on Nicole‘s hands and wrists, 
and the fact defendant at some point in the attack must have switched weapons all 
pointed to a determined, cruel and extended assault on a weaker, unarmed victim.  
In light of that evidence, that the jury would have reached a different verdict in the 
guilt phase absent the erroneous admission of Avilez‘s answer about the living 
room bloodstain is not reasonably probable.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
818, 836.)  Nor is it reasonably possible the jury‘s penalty choice turned on this 
relatively minor aspect of the evidence.  (People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 
983-984.)6 
                                              
6  
Defendant also contends the admission of what he argues was highly 
prejudicial evidence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  Acknowledging he did not object on this ground 
below, defendant argues his Evidence Code section 352 objection was sufficient to 
preserve the constitutional issues under the analysis of People v. Partida (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 428.  He is correct.  As in Partida, defendant argues the trial court erred in 
overruling his Evidence Code section 352 objection and the error was so serious as 
to violate due process.  (Partida, at pp. 436-438.)  The Eighth Amendment 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
26 
 
III.  Sufficiency of Evidence to Prove Burglary and Robbery 
Defendant contends the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to show 
he formed the intent to take property from the Carnahans before entering their 
house, as required to prove burglary, or before attacking and killing Nicole, as 
required to prove robbery.  He argues on this ground that the convictions for those 
felonies as well as the first degree murder conviction and the felony-murder 
special-circumstance findings must be reversed. 
Observing that he could have gone to Carnahan‘s house earlier, when no 
one was home, and that he seemingly failed to plan thoroughly what items he 
would take from the Carnahans and how he would transport the items to his 
property, defendant argues ―it is just as likely that [Nicole‘s killing] was the result 
of a spontaneous explosion of violence, with any theft as an afterthought, rather 
than [defendant‘s] entering the Carnahan house with the intent to steal.‖ 
We disagree.  While no direct evidence indicated defendant formed the 
intent to steal before going to Carnahan‘s house, the circumstantial evidence was 
more than sufficient.  From the prosecution evidence, the jury could reasonably 
infer that defendant, a heroin addict without the money to pay his electricity bill, 
prearranged a passage to and from his neighbor‘s backyard by removing the fence 
boards, armed himself with a knife and metal pipe, and donned gloves before 
going to Carnahan‘s house.  He then used the weapons he had brought to attack 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
argument merely adduces another consequence, unreliability of the verdicts, to the 
error.  We do not, however, discern a constitutional violation in allowing the 
criminalist to give an answer that — as defense counsel showed on cross-
examination — was insignificant because it was based on an unproven hypothesis.  
Any constitutional error would, moreover, be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24) for reasons explained in the 
text. 
27 
 
Nicole, ransacked the Carnahan home, taking numerous items large and small, and 
began moving that property through the fence opening he had made, a process 
Carnahan interrupted when she came home.  The evidence suggested no motive, 
spontaneous or otherwise, for defendant to attack and kill Nicole, other than to 
facilitate his theft.  That defendant might have planned the burglary better did not 
negate or even vitiate the force of the inferences the jury could reasonably draw; 
poor planning was not inconsistent with what the guilt phase jury knew of 
defendant‘s mental state and lifestyle. 
Having ―review[ed] the entire record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, 
and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt‖ (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128), 
we conclude a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant 
entered the house with the pre-formed intent of taking property from the 
Carnahans and attacked Nicole to facilitate that plan.  Substantial evidence thus 
supports the burglary and robbery convictions and the felony-murder theory of 
first degree murder.  Substantial evidence also supports the finding, required for 
proof of the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations, that defendant had an 
independent felonious purpose for the burglary and robbery, that is, the theft was 
not merely incidental to his murder of Nicole.  (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 147, 171.)  Finally, the evidence supporting the murder conviction and 
special circumstance findings was not so equivocal or unreliable as to render 
the death penalty violative of defendant‘s Eighth Amendment rights. 
IV.  Failure to Instruct on Theft as a Lesser Offense 
Defendant contends he was denied his federal and state constitutional rights 
to due process, a jury trial, and reliable guilt and death penalty verdicts by the trial 
28 
 
court‘s failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on theft as a lesser included offense 
of robbery.  He relies on the same theory of after-formed intent to steal as in his 
previous claim attacking the robbery and burglary convictions. 
Instruction on a lesser included offense is required only when the record 
contains substantial evidence of the lesser offense, that is, evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably doubt whether one or more of the charged offense‘s 
elements was proven, but find all the elements of the included offense proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 365; People 
v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) 
As explained in the previous part, no evidence supports the theory of after-
formed intent to steal.  Defendant points to nothing in the record suggesting any 
motive for him to attack and kill Nicole other than to facilitate the theft.  Mere 
speculation that he might have killed out of some other, spontaneous and violent 
impulse is not sufficient to warrant the instruction.  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 327, 361.)  In the absence of substantial evidence from which the jury 
could have found defendant guilty of theft as a lesser included offense to robbery, 
no such instruction was warranted. 
V.  Instructions on Deciding Degree of Murder and Between Murder 
and Manslaughter 
The jury was instructed on first degree murder (on theories of felony 
murder and premeditation), second degree murder (with malice aforethought but 
without premeditation) and on involuntary manslaughter (where malice is lacking 
due to intoxication).  They were further instructed that if they found defendant 
guilty of murder they must determine the degree.  The court continued, using the 
current version of CALJIC No. 8.71 (6th ed. 1996):  ―If you are convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the crime of murder has been 
committed by a defendant, but you unanimously agree that you have a reasonable 
29 
 
doubt whether the murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give 
defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the 
second degree.‖  (Italics added.) 
With regard to the lesser included offense of manslaughter, the court, using 
the current version of CALJIC No. 8.72 (6th ed. 1996), instructed:  ―If you are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the killing was 
unlawful, but you unanimously agree that you have a reasonable doubt whether 
the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of 
that doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.‖  (Italics added.)7 
Defendant contends these instructions, in their above italicized parts, 
violated his constitutional due process and jury trial rights by suggesting to jurors 
that they must return a verdict on the greater offense unless they unanimously 
doubted whether it had been proven.  As defendant puts it, ―a juror who believed 
that [defendant] was guilty of some offense, but not necessarily first degree 
murder, would also believe that first degree murder must apply in the face of any 
disagreement.  In other words, first degree murder became the default verdict.‖ 
                                              
7  
Prior to revision in 1996, neither instruction required unanimity on 
reasonable doubt as to the greater offense in order for a juror to give the defendant 
the benefit of such a reasonable doubt.  CALJIC No. 8.71 (5th ed. 1988) stated:  
―If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has 
been committed by a defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such 
murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give defendant the 
benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second 
degree.‖  (Italics added.)  Similarly, CALJIC No. 8.72 (5th ed. 1988) stated:  ―If 
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you 
have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must 
give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather 
than murder.‖  (Italics added.) 
30 
 
The Attorney General first argues that any error in giving these instructions 
was invited because defense counsel included both on his list of requested 
instructions.  However, ―[t]he invited error doctrine will not preclude appellate 
review if the record fails to show counsel had a tactical reason for requesting or 
acquiescing in the instruction.‖  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28.)  Here, 
no such tactical reason appears in the record.  CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 were 
the commonly used pattern instructions on application of the reasonable doubt 
principle to lesser included homicide offenses, a topic on which counsel obviously 
and appropriately wanted the jury to be instructed.  Trial counsel‘s failure to detect 
in the standard instructions the flaw appellate counsel perceives and to request a 
modification does not demonstrate a tactical intent to induce the error now 
claimed. 
On the merits, the Attorney General correctly notes that in People v. Frye 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 963-964, we rejected a similar challenge to earlier versions 
of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72.  These earlier versions, however, did not contain 
the problematic language of which defendant now complains.  (See fn. 7, ante.)  
We have not previously decided whether the particular instructions at issue here 
are reasonably likely to be understood and applied in an unconstitutional manner.  
(See Frye, at p. 957.) 
In two decisions, the Third District Court of Appeal has rejected 
challenges, made on the same ground offered here, to the 1996 version of CALJIC 
Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, concluding in both cases that the challenged instructions, read 
together with the other instructions given, would not likely have led jurors to 
believe they were required to vote for first degree murder if any of the other jurors 
found that charge proven.  (People v. Gunder (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 412, 424-
425; People v. Pescador (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 252, 255-258.)   
31 
 
In Gunder, the court relied on the trial court‘s having instructed with 
CALJIC No. 17.40, a pattern instruction on the duty of individual jurors to decide 
the case for themselves, which tells the jurors, in part, that they are not to ―decide 
any question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors, or any of them, 
favor that decision.‖  In light of that instruction, the Gunder court concluded, ―a 
reasonable juror will view the statement about unanimity [in CALJIC No. 8.71] in 
its proper context of the procedure for returning verdicts, as indeed elsewhere the 
jurors are told they cannot return any verdict absent unanimity and cannot return 
the lesser verdict of second degree murder until the jury unanimously agrees that 
the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder.‖  (People v. Gunder, supra, 151 
Cal.App.4th at p. 425.)  CALJIC No. 17.40 was also given in the present case, as 
was CALJIC No. 8.75, the instruction on returning verdicts to which the Gunder 
court referred, in which the jury is told not to return a verdict for second degree 
murder unless the jurors unanimously acquit of first degree murder, and not to 
return a verdict of manslaughter unless they unanimously acquit of murder. 
In Pescador, the court relied, in addition to CALJIC No. 17.40, on two 
other instructions given:  CALJIC No. 17.11, which told jurors, without any 
requirement of unanimity, that if they had reasonable doubts as to the degree of 
murder proven, they had to find the defendant guilty only of second degree murder  
(People v. Pescador, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 257); and CALJIC No. 8.50, 
which, as given, stated in part:  ― ‗To establish that a killing is murder and not 
manslaughter, the burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
each of the elements of murder . . .‘ ‖ (Pescador, at p. 258).  Neither CALJIC No. 
17.11 nor CALJIC No. 8.50 was given in the present case, though the jury was, of 
course, instructed on the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
(CALJIC No. 2.90) and its application to the mens rea elements of the charged 
crimes (CALJIC No. 4.21).   
32 
 
We conclude the better practice is not to use the 1996 revised versions of 
CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, as the instructions carry at least some potential for 
confusing jurors about the role of their individual judgments in deciding between 
first and second degree murder, and between murder and manslaughter.  The 
references to unanimity in these instructions were presumably added to convey the 
principle that the jury as a whole may not return a verdict for a lesser included 
offense unless it first reaches an acquittal on the charged greater offense.  (See 
People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329-333.)  But inserting this language 
into CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, which address the role of reasonable doubt in 
choosing between greater and lesser homicide offenses, was unnecessary, as 
CALJIC No. 8.75 fully explains that the jury must unanimously agree to not guilty 
verdicts on the greater homicide offenses before the jury as a whole may return 
verdicts on the lesser.8 
We need not decide here, however, whether Gunder was correct that the 
possibility of confusion is adequately dispelled by instruction with CALJIC No. 
17.40 on the jurors‘ duty of individual decision.  Any error in giving these 
instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California, 
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24) in light of the jury‘s true findings on the burglary-murder 
and robbery-murder special circumstances.  Having found defendant killed Nicole 
Carnahan in the commission of robbery and burglary, the jury must also have 
                                              
8  
The Judicial Council approved instructions on choosing between degrees of 
murder and between murder and manslaughter do not contain the same potentially 
confusing unanimity requirement as the 1996 revisions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72.  (See CALCRIM No. 521 [―The People have the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime.  
If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of 
first degree murder.‖]; CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571, 580 [addressing manslaughter as 
a lesser included offense to murder].) 
33 
 
found him guilty of first degree murder on those same felony-murder theories.  
The lesser offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter were not legally 
available verdicts if defendant killed Nicole in the commission of burglary and 
robbery, as the jury unanimously determined he had.  (See § 189; People v. Bramit 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1238; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472.)  Any 
confusion generated by the challenged instructions, therefore, could not have 
affected the jury‘s verdicts.9 
VI.  Instruction on First Degree Felony Murder 
Because the information charged first degree murder in terms of malice 
aforethought and premeditation, defendant contends the trial court deprived him of 
due process by instructing the jury on first degree murder predicated on killing in 
the commission of robbery and burglary.  He further contends the court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on the need for unanimity on the type of first degree 
murder committed. 
For reasons given in prior decisions, we disagree.  ―A pleading charging 
murder in these terms adequately notifies a defendant of the possibility of 
conviction of first degree murder on a felony-murder theory.  (People v. Gallego 
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 188 [276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].)  Defendant 
mistakenly relies on a statement in the plurality opinion in People v. Dillon[, 
supra,] 34 Cal.3d 441 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] that the ‗two kinds of 
murder‘—that is, felony murder and murder with express or implied malice—‗are 
                                              
9  
The instruction on consideration of the special circumstance allegations did 
not contain the same potentially confusing language as the challenged instructions.  
In CALJIC No. 8.80.1 (6th ed. 1996), the jury was told:  ―The People have the 
burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance.  If you have a reasonable 
doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.‖ 
34 
 
not the ―same‖ crimes.‘  (Id. at p. 476, fn. 23 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  As we have 
since explained, however, this means only that the two forms of murder have 
different elements even though there is but a single statutory offense of murder. 
(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394-395 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 
708]; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 249 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 
643].)  ‗Felony murder and premeditated murder are not distinct crimes . . . .‘  
(People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 514 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].)‖  
(People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1131; accord, People v. Hughes, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 369-370.)  Moreover, in the present case the information charged 
defendant, in addition to first degree murder, with the crimes of burglary and 
robbery, and alleged as special circumstances that defendant murdered Nicole 
Carnahan during the commission of burglary and robbery.  These allegations gave 
defendant more than adequate notice the prosecution would pursue a felony-
murder theory of first degree murder.  (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 
616-617; Kipp, at p. 1131.) 
As to the asserted requirement for unanimity, it has long been settled ―that 
unanimity as to the theory under which a killing is deemed culpable is not 
compelled as a matter of state or federal law.  Each juror need only have found 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the single offense of first degree 
murder as defined by statute and charged in the information.  (Schad v. Arizona 
(1991) 501 U.S. 624, 630-645 [111 S.Ct. 2491, 2496-2504, 115 L.Ed.2d 555] 
(plur. opn. of Souter, J.); id. at pp. 648-652 [111 S.Ct. at pp. 2505-2507] (conc. 
opn. of Scalia, J.); People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 249-250, and cases cited; 
People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 670-672 [234 P.2d 632].)‖  (People v. 
Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 160.) 
Defendant argues our prior holdings cannot stand in light of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and its progeny.  This line of authority, however, 
35 
 
addresses the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of facts used in 
sentencing beyond the elements of the charged offenses.  Defendant cites nothing 
in the United States Supreme Court‘s decisions creating new notice or unanimity 
requirements for alternative theories of a substantive offense such as first degree 
murder.  (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 626; People v. Morgan, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 617.) 
VII.  Instruction on Consciousness of Guilt 
Defendant contends a standard instruction outlining the permissible 
inference of consciousness of guilt that may be drawn from a defendant‘s willfully 
false statements (CALJIC No. 2.03)10 was ―unfairly partisan and argumentative‖ 
and allowed the jury to make irrational inferences about his state of mind in 
commission of the offenses.  As in many other recent decisions, we reject 
defendant‘s claim that instruction on an inference of consciousness of guilt 
deprived him of due process or other rights under the United States and California 
Constitutions.  (See, e.g., People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1019; 
People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1025; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 705, 713; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 531-532 [noting that the 
instruction‘s admonition that evidence of false statements is insufficient by itself 
to prove guilt favors the defense but cannot sensibly be given without the 
complementary portion allowing the jury to consider the evidence].) 
                                              
10  
CALJIC No. 2.03 states:  ―If you find that before this trial a defendant 
made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the 
crime for which he is now being tried, you may consider that statement as a 
circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt.  However, that conduct 
is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, 
are for you to decide.‖ 
36 
 
Defendant repeatedly told Carnahan and the police he had seen a 
―Mexican‖ man (in the original telling, two men) in Carnahan‘s backyard.  He 
eventually went so far as to detail the man‘s clothing, hairstyle and movements.  
As in People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 1025, defendant‘s jury ―could 
quite reasonably conclude that defendant made a series of false statements to 
deflect suspicion from himself.‖  And while defendant may be correct that one 
could not rationally infer the existence of the exact mens rea required for each 
charged crime from his apparent falsehoods, the challenged instruction, read as a 
whole, did not suggest such an inference be made.  ―The instructions advise the 
jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of 
consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish 
guilt, thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a 
confession and is to be evaluated with reason and common sense.  The instructions 
do not address the defendant‘s mental state at the time of the offense and do not 
direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto.‖  
(People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871.) 
VIII.  Instructions on Evaluation of Evidence 
Defendant contends a number of standard instructions guiding the jury‘s 
evaluation of evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 8.83) 
undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, depriving him of 
his constitutional rights to due process, a jury trial, and reliable determination of 
the special circumstances and capital sentence.  We recently explained why the 
challenged instructions were not reasonably likely to have such an effect.  (People 
v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1058-1059; see also People v. Rundle (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 76, 154-155; People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714.)  
Defendant makes no compelling argument for revisiting those conclusions. 
37 
 
IX.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Law 
Acknowledging the same arguments have been raised and rejected in 
previous decisions, defendant, to preserve his claims, contends several features of 
California‘s capital sentencing scheme violate provisions of the United States 
Constitution.  For the reasons given in our precedents, we again reject these 
claims. 
The set of special circumstances qualifying a first degree murder for capital 
sentencing (§ 190.2) is not impermissibly broad.  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 731, 813.)  Nor is section 190.3, factor (a), under which the jury may 
consider the ―circumstances of the crime‖ as a factor in aggravation (or mitigation) 
of penalty, so broad as to make imposition of a death sentence arbitrary and 
capricious.  (People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1066.)  ― ‗As in [People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401], defendant argues that a seemingly inconsistent 
range of circumstances can be collected from decisions upholding imposition of 
the death penalty.  As we observed in Brown, however, ―[w]hat this reflects is that 
each case is judged on its facts, each defendant on the particulars of his offense.  
Contrary to defendant‘s position, a statutory scheme would violate constitutional 
limits if it did not allow such individualized assessment of the crimes but instead 
mandated death in specified circumstances.‖  (Brown, supra, at p. 401.)‘ ‖  
(Brasure, at p. 1066.) 
― ‗Our statute ―is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or 
unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖  [Citation.]  No instruction on burden of proof is required in a 
California penalty trial because the assessment of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances required of penalty jurors is inherently ― ‗normative, not factual‘ 
38 
 
[citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.‖ ‘  
(People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 620 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292] .)  
Nor is an instruction on the absence of a burden of proof constitutionally required.  
(People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 104 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622].)‖  
(People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1067.)  The United States Supreme 
Court‘s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny 
do not establish a Sixth Amendment right to determination of particular 
aggravating factors, or the balance of aggravation and mitigation beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or by a unanimous jury.  (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
850, 899; Brasure, at pp. 1067-1068.)  Finally, ―[n]o instruction on a presumption 
that the sentence should be life without parole, rather than death, was 
constitutionally required.‖  (Taylor, at p. 899.) 
―The Constitution does not forbid use of unadjudicated prior criminal 
activity as a circumstance in aggravation or require jury unanimity as to proof of 
such prior activity.  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1181-1182 [63 
Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4]; People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 962 [47 
Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736].)‖  (People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
p. 1068.) 
―The use of the limiting adjectives ‗extreme‘ and ‗substantial‘ in the 
instruction on section 190.3, factors (d) [referring to ―extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance‖] and (g) [referring to ―extreme duress‖ and ―substantial domination‖ 
by another] does not unconstitutionally prevent the jury from considering 
mitigating evidence.‖  (People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 899.)  As 
defendant acknowledges, we have rejected this contention because jurors remain 
free to weigh lesser mental disturbance, duress, or domination under the ―catchall‖ 
provision of section 190.3, factor (k), which permits consideration of ―[a]ny other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime.‖  (See, e.g., People v. 
39 
 
Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 443-444.)  Defendant urges us to reconsider these 
holdings, observing that in his case the prosecutor argued to the jury his mental 
impairments were not severe enough to qualify as ―extreme‖ disturbance under 
factor (d), and did not address any lesser mental disturbance in discussing factor 
(k).11  Nothing in the prosecutor‘s argument or the court‘s instructions, however, 
precluded the jury from considering the evidence of defendant‘s mental 
impairments, whether under factor (d) (to the extent jurors disagreed with the 
prosecutor‘s assessment of the impairments as less than extreme), factor (h) 
(referring to ―mental disease or defect‖ as potentially impairing defendant‘s ability 
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform it to the law‘s 
requirements) or the catchall factor (k).  Defense counsel argued to the jury that 
defendant‘s conduct during the crime showed he acted in the grip of a mental 
disturbance.  No objection was heard to this argument, and while counsel did not 
explicitly tie it to any of the listed mitigating factors, he was in no manner 
precluded from doing so.  As defendant was neither prevented from introducing 
evidence of mental impairment, nor precluded from arguing its relevance and 
force as mitigation, or from having it considered as such, we see no infringement 
on defendant‘s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. 
The trial court did not err in failing to delete from its instructions references 
to assertedly inapplicable factors listed in section 190.3 or to specify which factors 
may be considered only in mitigation.  (People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 
p. 899; People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1069.) 
                                              
11  
The trial court made a similar finding in denying the automatic motion for 
modification of sentence.   
40 
 
Comparative intercase proportionality review of death sentences is not 
constitutionally required.  (People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 900; People v. 
Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1068; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 
169.)  ―Because capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated in the 
pertinent respects, equal protection principles do not mandate that capital 
sentencing and sentence-review procedures parallel those used in noncapital 
sentencing.‖  (Brasure, at p. 1069.) 
X.  International Law and the Eighth Amendment 
―California‘s use of capital punishment as an authorized sentence for 
certain specified types of first degree murder does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment merely because most nations have chosen not to employ the death 
penalty at all.  (People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1071-1072; People v. 
Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43-44 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229].)‖  
(People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 900.) 
Defendant further argues international law requires that when the death 
penalty is invoked, the state must rigorously observe guarantees of a fair trial.  
While we have concluded the trial court erred in permitting a forensic expert to 
answer a hypothetical question that lacked foundation in the evidence (see pt. II, 
ante) and have, for purposes of discussion, assumed error in failing to suppress the 
last portion of defendant‘s interview at the sheriff‘s station (see pt. I, ante) and in 
giving certain standard instructions on deciding between greater and lesser 
offenses (see pt. V, ante), none of these errors, actual or assumed, rendered 
defendant‘s trial unfair or affected the jury‘s verdict either separately or, as 
discussed below, cumulatively. 
41 
 
XI.  Cumulative Prejudice from Errors 
The three errors we have concluded or assumed occurred below, each 
individually harmless, related to distinct procedural or evidentiary issues not 
closely related to one another.  We see no possibility their individual effects, if 
any, cumulatively resulted in prejudice to defendant. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
GEORGE, J.* 
                                              
*  
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY 
KENNARD, ACTING C. J. 
 
I concur in the majority‘s affirmance of the judgment of death.  But I 
disagree with the majority‘s analysis of an issue pertaining to a hypothetical 
question asked by the prosecutor.   
Defendant was charged with bludgeoning and stabbing to death his 
11-year-old neighbor, Nicole Carnahan, while burglarizing her house when she 
was home alone.  Police found the victim‘s body in her bedroom, which was stained 
heavily with blood.  On the carpet in the living room was a single, small bloodstain. 
That bloodstain became part of the prosecution‘s theory of the crime:  that 
Nicole saw defendant in her house and, presumably, cried out; that he hit her, and 
she fell; and that, as she lay on the living room carpet bleeding (and leaving a stain), 
defendant had what the prosecutor described to the jury as an ―opportunity to 
think.‖  Calling that moment ―the turning point‖ of the crime — at which defendant 
could have chosen to flee, but chose instead to kill Nicole and carry on with his 
burglary — the prosecutor used it to argue that the murder had been premeditated. 
To support its theory, the prosecution called criminalist Greg Avilez, an 
expert on bloodstains, to testify about the lone stain in the living room.  The 
prosecutor asked him whether the person who left the stain had likely been standing 
or lying down at the time.  The defense objected, asserting that no evidence proved 
that the stain had come from a person bleeding on the carpet rather than from a 
bloody object that had been placed there — such as the brass rod or pipe that 
defendant had with him, and that was later found, stained with blood, in his tool 
2 
 
shed.  The trial court, reasoning that jurors could logically infer that the stain had 
come either from a person or from a bloody object, ruled that the prosecutor could 
base a hypothetical question on the first of those two inferences.  
The prosecutor then asked criminalist Avilez whether, assuming that a 
person had ―deposited‖ the bloodstain, the person ―would have been standing or 
either lying down or very close to the carpet.‖  Avilez replied:  ―At or near the 
surface of [the] carpeting.‖   
The majority concludes, first, that the prosecutor‘s hypothetical question to 
the criminalist ―called for an opinion without adequate foundation‖ and the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing it, but, second, that the abuse of discretion 
was harmless.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23–24.)  On the first conclusion, I disagree.  
I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Therefore, I do not 
reach the question of prejudice. 
Decades ago, this court set forth principles governing hypothetical 
questions.  In discussing the breadth of a trial court‘s discretion in applying those 
principles, this court noted that ―[i]t is not essential . . . that the facts assumed should 
be undisputed.‖  (Guardianship of Jacobson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 312, 324 
(Jacobson).)  Rather, hypothetical questions are proper as long as they are based on 
―facts within the possible or probable range of the evidence‖ and are ―not unfair or 
misleading.‖  (Ibid.)  The trial court has ―large discretion relating to the form of 
the question.‖  (Ibid.) 
Because a trial court hears all the evidence, that court is in the best position 
to decide if a hypothesis is within the ―possible or probable range‖ of that evidence 
(Jacobson, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 324), and it therefore deserves a measure of 
latitude in doing so.  The trial court can also best determine whether, ultimately, the 
testimony will help the trier of fact evaluate the issues it must decide.  (People v. 
3 
 
Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1008.)  Hence, this court reviews a trial court‘s 
rulings on hypothetical questions for abuse of discretion.  (See, e.g., id. at p. 1009.)   
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
hypothesized fact — that the bloodstain came directly from a person — was within 
the ―possible . . . range‖ of the evidence.  (Jacobson, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 324.)  
A hypothetical question can rest on ― ‗ ―any theory which can be deduced‖ from 
any evidence properly admitted at trial, including the assumption of ―any facts 
within the limits of the evidence.‘‘ ‘ ‖  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 
449, italics omitted.)  ―[D]irect testimony is not required‖ to support a 
hypothesized fact as long as the fact ―is fairly inferable from the circumstances 
proved.‖  (1 McCormick on Evidence (6th ed. 2006) ch. 3, § 14, p. 89, fn. omitted.)  
The evidence here proved these circumstances:  The wounds inflicted on the 
murder victim caused her to bleed, and hers was the blood on the carpet in the 
living room, an area where she could have been.  From that evidence, a juror could 
reasonably deduce the factual theory assumed by the prosecutor‘s hypothetical 
question, namely, that the victim‘s blood was on the carpet because she bled there. 
That the expert could not exclude the alternative possibility — that the 
bloodstain on the living room carpet came from a weapon used to attack the 
victim — is of no consequence.  The inference must be a reasonable one, not the 
only reasonable one.  For the same reason, it does not matter that no evidence 
pointed exclusively to the prosecutor‘s hypothesis.  Yet that is what the majority 
seems to require.   
Nevertheless, because I find no impropriety in the trial court‘s ruling at 
issue, I agree with the majority‘s affirmance of the judgment of death.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, ACTING C. J. 
I CONCUR: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Moore 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S081479 
Date Filed: January 31, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Wendy Clark Duffy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Arnold A. 
Erickson, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre and Catherine McBrien, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arnold A. Erickson 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Catherine McBrien 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5760