Title: Commonwealth v. Littles
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12238
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12238 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CASANDRA B. LITTLES. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 9, 2017. - June 28, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Larceny.  Fraud.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Harmless error.  Due Process of Law, Inference.  
Constitutional Law, Harmless error.  Error, Harmless.  
Evidence, Fraud, Prima facie evidence, Inference. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of 
the District Court Department on January 21, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before Michael A. Uhlarik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney (Lindsay M. 
Nasson, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Joseph K. Kenyon, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The case before us challenges the 
constitutionality of a jury instruction for the crime of drawing 
or uttering a fraudulent check.  The challenged instruction 
2 
 
 
informed the jury that they could infer that the defendant had 
both (1) knowledge of insufficient funds and (2) fraudulent 
intent if they found that the defendant "failed to make good on 
th[e] check within two days after she was notified that the bank 
had refused payment because of insufficient funds."  The 
instruction stems from G. L. c. 266, § 37, which designates the 
failure to make the required payment on the bad check within two 
days of notice as "prima facie evidence" of the defendant's 
intent and knowledge.  We conclude that the statute's 
designation of prima facie evidence and the corresponding 
instruction are constitutionally infirm because a defendant's 
failure to pay a check within two days of being notified of its 
dishonor is, without more, insufficient to warrant a jury in 
finding the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, and therefore we affirm 
the defendant's convictions. 
 
Background.  The jury could have found the following facts.  
Between July 26 and 28, 2013, the defendant deposited four 
checks, totaling $15,000, into certain bank accounts she held at 
TD Bank via automated teller machines (ATMs).  The funds were 
credited to the respective accounts electronically on the day of 
the transaction, before the checks were finally negotiated.  
Each check was drawn from a single Citizens Bank account in the 
3 
 
 
defendant's name that had been closed for years.  All four 
checks eventually bounced and were returned to TD Bank by July 
31, 2013. 
 
Between the time she deposited the checks and the 
negotiation of the checks, the defendant transferred funds 
between her accounts at TD Bank, in the manner of a "check-
kiting" scheme.1  After transferring the funds, but before the 
checks had been returned, the defendant made a number of 
expenditures, including nearly $3,000 on Walt Disney World and 
                                                          
 
 
1 The United States Supreme Court has described a "check-
kiting" scheme as follows: 
 
 
"The check kiter opens an account at Bank A with a 
nominal deposit.  He then writes a check on that account 
for a large sum, such as $50,000.  The check kiter then 
opens an account at Bank B and deposits the $50,000 check 
from Bank A in that account.  At the time of deposit, the 
check is not supported by sufficient funds in the account 
at Bank A.  However, Bank B, unaware of this fact, gives 
the check kiter immediate credit on his account at Bank B.  
During the several-day period that the check on Bank A is 
being processed for collection from that bank, the check 
kiter writes a $50,000 check on his account at Bank B and 
deposits it into his account at Bank A.  At the time of the 
deposit of that check, Bank A gives the check kiter 
immediate credit on his account there, and on the basis of 
that grant of credit pays the original $50,000 check when 
it is presented for collection. 
 
 
"By repeating this scheme, or some variation of it, 
the check kiter can use the $50,000 credit originally given 
by Bank B as an interest-free loan for an extended period 
of time.  In effect, the check kiter can take advantage of 
the several-day period required for the transmittal, 
processing, and payment of checks from accounts in 
different banks . . . ."  (Citation omitted.) 
 
Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 281 n.1 (1982). 
4 
 
 
Sea World tickets, nearly $600 on her cellular telephone bill, 
over $700 on clothing and shoes, and a $2,000 cash withdrawal.  
The defendant ultimately overdrew her accounts at TD Bank by 
roughly $12,000. 
 
In early August of 2013, a representative of TD Bank 
contacted the defendant by telephone and informed her that the 
checks had been returned.  The defendant responded that she was 
out of town, but would remedy the situation when she returned.  
The defendant never did so, however, and testified at trial that 
she "forgot" and was overwhelmed by her own, and her mother's, 
health problems.  By August 21, 2013, no repayment had been made 
and TD Bank sent a demand letter informing the defendant that 
she owed TD Bank $11,664.20.  Within a week, the defendant still 
had not made any deposit.  When TD Bank attempted to follow up 
with the defendant, it discovered that the defendant's cellular 
telephone number was no longer in service. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified that she believed that 
her account at Citizens Bank was still open and that her tax 
refund had been deposited into that account.  There was 
evidence, however, that the Citizens Bank account had been 
closed for years, and that she already had spent much of her 
$13,000 tax refund, which had been previously deposited into one 
of her accounts at TD Bank, well in advance of the four bounced 
checks. 
5 
 
 
 
The jury convicted the defendant on four counts of larceny 
by uttering a false check.  The defendant appealed, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  Pursuant to § 37, an individual commits 
larceny if, with the intent to defraud, she obtains goods or 
services in exchange for a check that the individual wrote 
knowing there were insufficient funds in the account from which 
the check draws.2  Section 37 further provides that the act of 
"making, drawing, uttering or deliver[ing] such a check" 
constitutes "prima facie evidence of intent to defraud and of 
knowledge of insufficient funds . . . , unless the maker or 
drawer shall have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon 
. . . within two days after receiving notice that such check 
. . . has not been paid by the drawee." 
 
Based on the statutory language, the District Court has 
promulgated a model supplemental instruction in larceny by check 
cases in which the defendant does not take the requisite action 
within two days of notice of dishonor.  Instruction 8.460 of the 
Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 
                                                          
 
 
2 In relevant part, G. L. c. 266, § 37, states: "Whoever, 
with intent to defraud, makes, draws, utters or delivers any 
check, draft or order for the payment of money upon any bank 
. . . , with knowledge that the maker or drawer has not 
sufficient funds or credit . . . for the payment of such 
instrument . . . , and if money or property or services are 
obtained thereby shall be guilty of larceny." 
6 
 
 
(2009).  The instruction given in this case over the defendant's 
objection, which conformed with the model instruction, stated: 
 
"There has been some evidence in this case suggesting 
that the defendant failed to make good on this check within 
two days after she was notified that the bank had refused 
payment because of insufficient funds.  If you find that to 
have been proved, it may be relevant to the issues of the 
defendant's knowledge and intent. 
 
 
"If the defendant failed to make good on a check 
within two days after being notified that it had bounced, 
you are permitted to infer two other things:  that at the 
time when the defendant originally wrote the check, she 
knew that there were insufficient funds or a line of credit 
to cover it at the bank, and also that she wrote the check 
with the intent to defraud.  You are not required to draw 
such an inference of knowledge and intent, but you may. 
 
 
"Even if there has been contrary evidence, you may 
still consider a failure to make good on the check within 
two days of notice as some evidence on the questions of 
knowledge and intent, and you may weigh it in your 
deliberations along with all the rest of the evidence on 
those two issues." 
 
 
The defendant argues that the prima facie designation in 
§ 37 and the related instruction are unconstitutional, because 
an individual's failure to pay a check within two days of notice 
of dishonor does not have a sufficiently strong, logical 
connection to the individual's knowledge of insufficient funds 
or intent to defraud at the time the check was written.  We 
agree.  Because the defendant objected to the instruction at 
trial, we will affirm the convictions only if the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 189 (2011).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
7 
 
 
Klein, 400 Mass. 309, 314-315 (1987) (instruction did not create 
substantial risk of miscarriage of justice). 
 
1.  Statutory designation of prima facie evidence in 
criminal statutes.  In criminal cases in the Commonwealth, when 
the Legislature designates "evidence 'A' [to be] prima facie 
evidence of fact 'B,' then, in the absence of competing 
evidence, the fact finder is permitted but not required to find 
'B' beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 
Mass. 577, 581 (2006).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 302(c) (2017).  The 
designation of prima facie evidence in this context is 
"structurally the same as" a "permissive inference."  
Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 292-293 (1975).  In other 
words, the permissive inference satisfies the Commonwealth's 
burden of production as to one or more elements of a crime.  As 
reflected in the judge's instruction in this case, when contrary 
evidence is introduced, the basic fact (i.e., the first fact) 
continues to be some evidence of the inferred fact (i.e., the 
second fact or resultant fact).  Mass G. Evid. § 302(c). 
 
When a jury may find an inferred fact based on proof of a 
basic fact, there must be a strong, logical connection between 
the two facts to ensure that the defendant receives the full 
benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.  See Tot v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-468 (1943).  See generally Pauley, 368 
Mass. at 294-299.  An instruction explaining a permissive 
8 
 
 
inference should only be given when it will "not undermine the 
factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced 
by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 
140, 156 (1979).  Provisions designating prima facie evidence, 
such as § 37, "do not . . . alter the Commonwealth's substantive 
burden of proof . . . .  Rather, when properly employed . . . , 
such provisions are merely a matter of administrative 
convenience that eliminate uncertainty as to what will 
constitute sufficient proof."  Maloney, 447 Mass. at 581-582. 
 
We have yet to address the constitutionality of the prima 
facie designation in § 37.  See Klein, 400 Mass. at 315 (not 
reaching constitutionality issue).  But see id. at 316-320 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (relationship between initial and 
inferred facts in § 37 not sufficiently rational to satisfy due 
process).  The key inquiry in assessing the constitutionality of 
a permissive inference is the strength of the relationship 
between the basic fact and the inferred fact "in light of 
present-day experience."  See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 
837, 844-845 (1973).  The constitutionally required connection 
between the two facts has been described as a "rational 
connection," a connection that is "more likely than not," and as 
a connection that leaves no "reasonable doubt."  Id. at 841-843, 
and cases cited.  Yet, this "ambiguity is traceable in large 
9 
 
 
part to variations in language and focus rather than to 
differences of substance."  Id. at 843.  Accordingly, other 
circumstances involving permissive inferences in criminal 
statutes are illustrative. 
 
a.  The connection between the basic fact and the inferred 
fact.  In Pauley, 368 Mass. at 289, 292, 297, we found no 
constitutional infirmity in a regulation that permitted the fact 
finder to presume that the registered owner of an automobile was 
responsible for evading a toll.  We concluded that the 
relationship between the basic fact (ownership of the vehicle) 
and the inferred fact (that the owner was the individual driving 
the vehicle) was sufficient to allow the fact finder to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 298.  
Similarly, in Barnes, 412 U.S. at 843-846, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of drawing "an 
inference of guilty knowledge . . . from the fact of unexplained 
possession of stolen goods," where the defendant possessed 
"recently stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not 
know."  In these circumstances, the Court determined that the 
unexplained possession of such items was "sufficient to enable 
the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] petitioner 
knew the checks were stolen."  Id. at 845-846. 
 
Where courts have rejected the sufficiency of the 
connection between the initial and inferred facts, they 
10 
 
 
typically have done so where the inferred fact has a 
sufficiently probable, noncriminal explanation.  For example, in 
Tot, 319 U.S. at 466, 472, the Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction premised on an inference that a defendant who 
possessed firearms and ammunition after being convicted of a 
violent crime had received the alleged illicit material via 
interstate commerce -- an element of the Federal crime.  In the 
absence of additional evidence regarding the mechanisms by which 
the defendant received the material, "there [was] no reasonable 
ground for a[n] [inference] that its purchase or procurement was 
in interstate rather than in intrastate commerce."  Id. at 468.  
Compare United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 69-71 (1965) 
(upholding inference that person's unexplained presence at 
illegal still could be used to infer guilt for participation in 
crime of illegal distilling), with United States v. Romano, 382 
U.S. 136, 141-144 (1965) (striking down inference that person's 
unexplained presence at illegal still could be used to infer 
guilt for crime of possessing illegal still). 
 
b.  The permissive inference of § 37.  We agree with the 
dissent in Klein that the prima facie designation in § 37 and 
the corresponding jury instruction are unconstitutional; that 
is, the basic fact (that the defendant did not make good on a 
check with insufficient funds within two days of being notified 
that it had bounced) does not constitute prima facie evidence of 
11 
 
 
the two inferred facts, both of which are elements of the crime: 
that the defendant, at the time the check was issued, (1) knew 
there were insufficient funds and (2) had fraudulent intent. 
 
The instruction in this case informed the jury that, based 
on the defendant's failure to make good on the checks within two 
days of notice of dishonor, "[they were] permitted to infer two 
other things:  that at the time when the defendant originally 
wrote the check, she knew that there were insufficient funds or 
a line of credit to cover it at the bank, and also that she 
wrote the check with the intent to defraud."  This instruction 
suggested that no more evidence was needed to prove these 
elements, which the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  A permissive inference cannot have the effect 
of reducing the Commonwealth's burden to prove a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Maloney, 447 Mass. at 581-582. 
 
Without a stronger, rational connection between a 
defendant's failure to correct a bad check within two days of 
notice and the defendant's knowledge and intent, "the 
combination of natural chance and absence from the evidence of 
an explanation consistent with innocence" does not prove the two 
inferred facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  Pauley, 368 Mass. at 
293.  "Surely, a defendant's inability to make restitution for a 
bad check within two business days after notice of dishonor does 
not warrant a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that an honest 
12 
 
 
mistake or inattention was not the genesis of the check."  
Klein, 400 Mass. at 319 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).  See Tot, 
319 U.S. at 468 (inference invalid in light of probable, 
innocent explanation).  Further, the essential question is 
whether the defendant had the requisite knowledge and intent at 
the time she wrote the check.  Section 37 does not establish any 
temporal limitation between the writing of the check and notice 
of dishonor.  If, for example, a defendant received notice of 
dishonor regarding a check written three months earlier, the 
defendant's failure to pay the check within two days of the 
notice would say little about her state of mind at the time she 
wrote the bad check. 
 
Unlike the possession of stolen checks made out to persons 
unknown to a defendant and knowledge that the checks were 
stolen, Barnes, 412 U.S. at 844-846, the defendant's failure to 
make the appropriate payment after notice of dishonor does not 
tilt the "balance of probabilities . . . in favor of the 
Commonwealth."  Klein, 400 Mass. at 319 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting).  See Tot, 319 U.S. at 468.  See also Pauley, 368 
Mass. at 292-293.  Because the designation of prima facie 
evidence in § 37 effectively dilutes the Commonwealth's burden 
of proof, it is constitutionally infirm and thus the instruction 
given by the judge was invalid. 
13 
 
 
 
2.  Harmless error.  When faced with a preserved 
constitutional error, we reverse a conviction unless we are 
satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Petetabella, 459 Mass. at 189.  "Finding that an improper 
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
equivalent of saying that the error was 'unimportant in relation 
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in 
question,' requiring the reviewing court 'to make a judgment 
about the significance of the [inference] to reasonable jurors, 
when measured against the other evidence considered by those 
jurors independently of the [inference].'"  Commonwealth v. 
Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 218 (2007), quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 
U.S. 391, 403-404 (1991). 
 
This analysis involves two steps.  First, we determine 
"what evidence the jury actually considered" by evaluating the 
instructions given to them, and assuming that the jury 
considered "relevant evidence on a point in issue when they are 
told that they may do so."  Nolin, 448 Mass. at 218.  Second, we 
weigh the probative effect of the evidence actually considered 
against the probative effect of the inference.  Id. at 218-219.  
For a conviction to survive the second step, we must conclude 
that "the evidence considered was 'so overwhelming as to leave 
it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that 
evidence would have been the same in the absence of the 
14 
 
 
[improper inference]."  Id. at 219, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 803 (2000).  Both steps are satisfied in 
this case. 
 
As to the first step, we have acknowledged already that the 
instruction incorrectly informed the jury that proof of the 
defendant's failure to address the bounced checks within two 
days was sufficient to infer the defendant's knowledge of 
insufficient funds and intent to defraud.  However, unlike the 
instruction challenged in Nolin, 448 Mass. at 219, the 
instruction did not go so far as to "direct" the jury to find 
knowledge and intent on proof of the defendant's failure to make 
the checks good.3  Rather, the instruction in this case told the 
jury that they were permitted to find intent and knowledge, but 
not required to do so. 
 
The instruction further made clear to the jury that, if 
evidence contradicted the defendant's knowledge and intent, they 
could consider the failure to pay as some evidence of knowledge 
and intent.  Because the defendant testified that she did not 
have the knowledge or intent, we presume that the jury 
considered the basic fact in this manner.  See Nolin, 448 Mass. 
at 218; Klein, 400 Mass. at 314.  Therefore, the jury were 
                                                          
 
 
3 In Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 217 (2007), the 
judge informed the jury that "a person is presumed to intend the 
natural and probable consequences of his acts.  So, in 
considering intent, remember that." 
15 
 
 
instructed in a manner that conveyed that the unconstitutional 
permissive inference did not apply in this case, due to the 
defendant's testimony that she lacked the requisite knowledge 
and intent. 
 
Although an insufficient basis to find the requisite 
knowledge and intent, a defendant's failure to make good on a 
bad check may still be relevant evidence to support those 
elements.4  We can then resolve the second step of the Nolin 
analysis by determining whether instructing the jury that the 
failure to make good on the check within two days after notice 
of dishonor constitutes reversible error.  Because the 
instruction was unnecessary, although its substance was not 
legally incorrect, it should not have been given.  We are 
convinced, however, that any error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt in light of all of the evidence.  Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
4 In many cases, if a defendant knowingly wrote a check with 
insufficient funds with the intent to defraud, the defendant 
would not voluntarily make the aggrieved party or parties whole.  
Thus, the defendant's failure to make good on the check may make 
it "more probable" that the defendant knew of the insufficient 
funds and intended to defraud than "it would be without the 
evidence."  Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2017).  Simply because 
evidence is relevant, however, does not require that an 
instruction be given to the jury explaining its relevance.  Nor 
does the statute mandate the provision of an instruction.  A 
prosecutor may argue a defendant's failure to pay as evidence of 
intent, and a defendant may introduce evidence to the contrary.  
Similarly, a trial judge may consider a defendant's failure to 
make good on a bounced check as evidence of knowledge or intent, 
when considering whether to grant a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty. 
16 
 
 
v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 362 (2010) (error harmless when other 
evidence is so overwhelming that it nullifies any effect).5 
 
The overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the defendant 
knowingly with the intent to defraud, rather than mistakenly as 
she testified, wrote checks that drew funds from a long-closed 
account.  Further, the defendant utilized ATM deposit systems 
that posted funds electronically, allowing her to move funds 
before the checks cleared -- which she promptly did in the 
manner of a check-kiting scheme.  Finally, the defendant did not 
merely fail to make good on the checks within two days of notice 
of dishonor, but did not enter into a repayment agreement for an 
additional nine months.  The strength of the Commonwealth's 
case, when juxtaposed against the defendant's testimony 
explaining her conduct, "nullif[ies] any effect" that the minor 
instructional error "'might have had' on the fact finder or the 
findings."  Vasquez, 456 Mass. at 362, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 704 n.44 (2010). 
 
Conclusion.  The designation of prima facie evidence in 
§ 37 is unconstitutional and, thus, so too was the corresponding 
instruction.  The instruction suggested that proof of a 
defendant's failure to make good on a bad check within two days 
                                                          
 
 
5 We need not decide whether the error of unnecessarily 
providing this instruction should be viewed as constitutional or 
prejudicial error, because even under the less forgiving 
constitutional standard, we conclude that reversal is not 
warranted. 
17 
 
 
of being notified was sufficient to infer that the defendant (1) 
knew of the insufficient funds and (2) possessed the intent to 
defraud.  Each of the inferred facts is an essential element of 
the crime that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
proof of the basic fact alone does not warrant finding the 
inferred facts by that standard.  Nevertheless, the defendant 
offered contrary evidence through her testimony, and the jury 
were instructed that, when there is contrary evidence, they may 
consider a failure to honor the check within two days of notice 
only as "some evidence" of the defendant's knowledge and intent. 
In light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
knowledge and intent, the instructional error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  We therefore affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.