Title: People v. McClanahan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86953
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2000

Opinion filed April 20, 2000.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of section 115-15 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1998)). This section 
allows the State, in prosecutions under the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 
et seq. (West 1998)) or the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 
ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 1998)), to use lab reports in lieu of actual 
testimony as prima facie evidence of the contents of the substance at 
issue unless the defendant files a demand for the testimony of the witness who 
prepared the report. The demand must be filed within seven days of the defense's 
receipt of the report.
BACKGROUND
Defendant, Donald E. McClanahan, was charged with unlawful possession of less 
than 15 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1996)). The State filed 
supplemental discovery that included the state police crime lab report 
identifying the substance at issue as cocaine. The State also tendered the 
affidavit of Sandra Brown, who prepared the lab report. Eight months later, 
defendant filed a motion asking the State to call Sandra Brown as a witness at 
trial. The State objected, arguing that section 115-15 gave it the right to 
introduce the lab report into evidence without Brown's testimony.
Section 115-15 provides:
In his motion to compel the State to call Brown as a witness, defendant 
argued that the seven-day demand period was unconstitutional. The trial court 
denied both that motion and defendant's subsequent motion to reconsider. At 
trial, a police officer testified that, during a field test, the substance at 
issue in this case tested positive for cocaine. The State sought to use Brown's 
lab report and her accompanying affidavit to establish that the substance was in 
fact cocaine. The lab report and affidavit were admitted into evidence over 
defendant's objection. The jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court 
sentenced him to three years' imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant argued that section 115-15 is unconstitutional because 
it violates the confrontation clauses of the United States and Illinois 
Constitutions(1) (U.S. 
Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8) and because it allows 
defendants to unknowingly waive their constitutional confrontation rights. The 
appellate court disagreed and affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. 301 
Ill. App. 3d 216.
We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Defendant's argument in 
this court consists of two main points. The first focuses on the type of 
evidence that is admissible under the statute; the second focuses on the 
procedures that the statute requires a defendant to follow to secure his 
confrontation rights.(2)
ANALYSIS
A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the statute 
bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550 (1999). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law 
that we review de novo. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448 
(1998).
"The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability 
of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous 
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 678, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990). The confrontation clause permits hearsay evidence to be 
admitted against a defendant only where either the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 
assure the reliability of the evidence. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 
66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980).
Reliability of the Evidence
Defendant's first argument, that the statute violates the confrontation 
clause, consists of three prongs: (1) the statute does not require the State to 
establish the unavailability of the crime lab employee before introducing the 
lab report; (2) the statute neither falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception nor requires particularized guarantees of trustworthiness; and (3) the 
statute is not necessary to further an important public policy. We agree with 
defendant's second point and thus see no need to address the other two 
arguments.
Defendant's argument is based primarily on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), in which the Supreme Court held 
that hearsay evidence must possess certain indicia of reliability. 
Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 65-66, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 607-08, 100 S. Ct.  at 
2538-39.(3) For 
the third prong of his argument, defendant relies on Craig, 497 U.S.  at 
850, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 682, 110 S. Ct.  at 3166, in which the Supreme Court held 
that a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him may be denied 
only where that denial is necessary to further an important public policy. The 
State does not address these arguments on their merits, instead choosing to 
argue that section 115-15 does not create a confrontation clause problem because 
subsection (c) of the statute allows defendants to preserve their confrontation 
rights.
We agree with defendant. First, the evidence admissible pursuant to section 
115-15 does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In the trial 
court, the State argued that section 115-15 lab reports fall within the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule. This is unquestionably false. An 
exception to the business records hearsay exception are those writings or 
records that have "been made by anyone during an investigation of an alleged 
offense or during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated 
litigation of any kind." 725 ILCS 5/115-5(c)(2) (West 1998); People v. 
Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 72 (1990). The lab reports covered by section 115-15 
are prepared during the course of criminal investigations and are requested by 
the State in anticipation of prosecutions.
Second, section 115-15 does not contain particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. Essentially, the preparer of the report merely has to attest 
that he or she is qualified to conduct the test and that he or she used due 
caution and acted within established procedures. Indeed, in this case, the only 
information as to Sandra Brown's qualifications is her own statement in the 
affidavit that her "education, training and experience qualify [her] to perform 
the analyses conducted in this manner." The statute does not require the State 
to provide any information as to how the tests are conducted, what the accepted 
scientific procedures are, and what qualifications and training the crime lab 
employees must have. In other words, after the defendant has been arrested, the 
entity that seeks to prosecute him sends the evidence to its own lab for 
testing. The evidence is then admissible on nothing more than the vague 
assurances of the prosecuting authority's own employee that proper testing was 
done and that the employee is qualified to do the testing. The State does not 
argue, nor do we discern, that the statute contains particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.
In sum, we agree with defendant that the lab reports admissible pursuant to 
section 115-15 neither contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness nor 
fall within a firmly established hearsay exception. We turn next to the question 
of whether any confrontation clause problems are avoided by subsection 
115-15(c), which allows defendants to demand the testimony of the report's 
preparer within seven days of a defendant's receipt of the report.
Demand Provision
Defendant's argument with respect to the demand provision of section 
115-15(c) consists of two interrelated parts. Defendant argues that section 
115-15(c) impermissibly requires defendants to take an affirmative step to 
secure their confrontation rights or be deemed to have waived them, and that it 
fails to contain sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that any such waiver 
is knowing and voluntary. We agree.
The State does not cite any relevant authority to contravene defendant's 
argument that defendants cannot be required to take an affirmative step to 
secure their constitutional confrontation rights. Rather, the State endorses the 
rationale given by the appellate court in upholding the statute on this basis. 
The appellate court reasoned that "an accused has a right to put on relevant 
evidence favorable to him, but he can lose that right by failure to give 
reasonable required discovery in this regard. [Citations.] By the same logic, a 
defendant's right of confrontation can be limited by a requirement to take 
reasonable action such as that required here." 301 Ill. App. 3d at 221-22. The 
United States Supreme Court disagrees.
In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988), a case not cited by the appellate court, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a trial judge's discovery sanction violated the defendant's 
constitutional right to obtain the testimony of favorable witnesses. In that 
case, the trial court sanctioned the defense by refusing to allow a defense 
witness to testify because the defense did not disclose that witness in a 
pretrial discovery request. The court held that such sanctions were not 
absolutely prohibited by the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment 
(U.S. Const., amend. VI). As part of its discussion, the court explained the 
difference between compulsory process and other rights guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment:
The court elaborated on this principle in a footnote:
Thus, contrary to the assertions of the State and the appellate court, the 
"same logic" that allows a defendant to lose his right to present favorable 
evidence if he fails to comply with discovery does not allow a state to require 
a defendant to take affirmative steps to invoke his constitutional right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him. The right of a defendant to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him is guaranteed by the Constitution and 
arises automatically at the initiation of the adversary process. 
Taylor, 484 U.S.  at 410, 98 L. Ed. 2d  at 811, 108 S. Ct.  at 653. 
Subsection (c) of section 115-15 impermissibly requires the defendant to take 
affirmative action to secure a right that he has already been constitutionally 
guaranteed or be deemed to have waived that right. We are unaware of any 
authority that permits the legislature to make a defendant's confrontation 
rights contingent upon action by the defendant, and the State has not argued 
that such authority exists.
As stated, if a defendant does not take the procedural step required by 
subsection (c), he is deemed to have waived a fundamental constitutional right. 
Defendant argues that any such waiver must be knowing and voluntary, and that 
subsection (c) lacks sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that any waiver 
of the right of confrontation is knowing and voluntary. We agree.
"Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established 
that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
***.' " People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938). Such waivers must not only be voluntary, but must be 
" 'knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.' " Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d  at 
187, quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970). This principle has been specifically 
applied to a defendant's confrontation rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 243, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279-80, 89 S. Ct. 1709 , 1712 (1969); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255, 260, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 1322 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4,16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 317, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1246 (1966).
If a defendant fails to take the procedural step required by section 
115-15(c), he has waived his right to confront and cross-examine the preparer of 
the report. The statute does not guarantee that this waiver is a knowing and 
intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences. Rather, this waiver automatically occurs if a defendant 
does not respond within seven days of being served with a lab report. In the 
absence of this statute, the State would have to secure a knowing waiver of the 
confrontation right by acquiring a defendant's stipulation to allow the lab 
report into evidence without the testimony of the report's preparer. Unlike 
section 115-15, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his 
right to confront the preparer of the report.
The State argues that a defendant who fails to comply with the statutory 
deadline has not lost his confrontation rights because he can always subpoena 
the preparer of the report and cross-examine him as a hostile witness. We 
disagree. The United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee a defendant the 
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const., amend. VI; 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8. The wording of these provisions is significant. 
They do not say that the accused has a right to confront the witnesses 
against him; they say that the accused has a right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him. This is a mandatory constitutional 
obligation of the prosecuting authority. It arises automatically at the 
inception of the adversary process, and no action of the defendant is necessary 
to activate this constitutional guarantee in his case. Taylor, 484 U.S. 
at 410, 98 L. Ed. 2d  at 811, 108 S. Ct.  at 653.
Accepting the State's argument-that a defendant does not lose his 
confrontation right if a defendant can still subpoena the witnesses against 
him-would necessarily mean that there would be no constitutional problem with 
allowing the State to introduce all of its evidence by affidavit as long as a 
defendant is allowed to bring the prosecution's witnesses into court himself.(4) Trial 
by affidavit is the primary evil that the confrontation clause was designed to 
prevent:
We emphatically reject any notion that the State's constitutional obligation 
to confront the accused with the witnesses against him can be satisfied by 
allowing the accused to bring the State's witnesses into court himself and 
cross-examine them as part of his defense.
Having determined that defendant's constitutional confrontation rights were 
denied when the court refused his request to compel the State produce the 
testimony of the preparer of the lab report, we must next determine whether 
defendant's conviction should be reversed. Confrontation errors do not 
automatically warrant reversal. People v. Johnson, 116 Ill. 2d 13, 28 
(1987). However, before a constitutional error can be held to be harmless, the 
reviewing court must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
did not contribute to the finding of guilt. People v. Smith, 38 Ill. 2d 13, 15 (1967). The burden of proof is on the State to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the constitutional error did not affect the outcome of the 
proceeding. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 
710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967); People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259, 276 
(1988).
Here, the State has confined its argument to asserting that the statute is 
constitutional. The State does not argue that, assuming that we find the statute 
unconstitutional, any error in the admission of the hearsay report was harmless. 
Accordingly, the State has failed to satisfy its burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the guilty verdict. We 
therefore reverse defendant's conviction and sentence and remand the cause for a 
new trial.
CONCLUSION
Section 115-15 is unconstitutional under the confrontation clauses of the 
United States and Illinois Constitutions. This statute impermissibly requires a 
defendant to take a procedural step to secure his confrontation rights or be 
deemed to have waived them, and does not require that the waiver of this 
fundamental constitutional right be a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary act. 
The statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, and the appellate and 
circuit courts erred in rejecting defendant's constitutional challenge. Because 
the State did not establish that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, defendant's conviction and sentence must be reversed, and the 
cause must be remanded for a new trial.
The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed, and the cause 
is remanded for further proceedings.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE MILLER took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
case.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
In construing statutory provisions substantially similar to section 115-15 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1998)), numerous 
state and federal courts have allowed the introduction of laboratory reports in 
evidence without requiring the testimony of the analysts who prepared the 
reports. I agree with these courts that the introduction of a laboratory report 
through a witness other than the analyst who prepared it does not violate a 
defendant's right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The 
laboratory report bears adequate indicia of reliability and trustworthiness. I 
also note that in the present case, defendant McClanahan had the opportunity to 
demand the production of the analyst or to subpoena the analyst as a witness. 
Thus, I conclude that McClanahan's right to confront the witnesses against him 
was protected, and I dissent from the holding of the majority declaring section 
115-15 unconstitutional.
The confrontation clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., 
amend. VI) provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him ***."(5) As 
the Supreme Court observed in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
242-43, 39 L. Ed. 409, 411, 15 S. Ct. 337, 339 (1895), the confrontation clause 
envisions:
The confrontation clause is thus of paramount importance in our criminal 
justice system.
Notwithstanding the integral role the confrontation clause plays in the 
administration of justice, however, the accused's right to confront witnesses 
"must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case." Mattox, 156 U.S.  at 243, 39 L. Ed.  at 411, 15 S. Ct.  at 340. A competing interest to the right of the accused under the 
confrontation clause is the interest of every jurisdiction, including Illinois, 
"in effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of 
the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 
(1980).
In Roberts, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between the 
confrontation clause and the rules of evidence governing the introduction of 
hearsay statements in criminal proceedings. Initially, the Supreme Court noted 
that: "If one were to read [the confrontation clause] literally, it would 
require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not 
present at trial. [Citation.] But, if thus applied, the Clause would abrogate 
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too 
extreme." Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 63, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 605-06, 100 S. Ct. 
at 2537. The Court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause was not intended to 
exclude all hearsay. Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 63, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 100 S. Ct.  at 2537. The Court then articulated the rule for admission of hearsay 
statements:
A showing of unavailability is not required when the utility of trial 
confrontation is remote. Ohio, 448 U.S.  at 65 n.7, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 607 
n.7, 100 S. Ct.  at 2538 n.7. See also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
353-57, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 858-60, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741-43 (1992); United 
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390, 106 S. Ct. 1121 
(1986).
With these principles in mind, I turn to an examination of the statutory 
provision at issue. Section 115-15 provides:
Thus, section 115-15 allows the introduction of a laboratory report through a 
witness other than the lab analyst who prepared the report. Under 
Roberts, the laboratory report is a hearsay statement, but is 
admissible upon a showing of unavailability (or a demonstration that such a 
showing is not required), and a showing that the laboratory report bears 
adequate indicia of reliability.
In the present case, the State did not show that the analyst who tested the 
cocaine was not available to testify at trial. Was the prosecution required to 
show unavailability in order to introduce the laboratory report? I believe not. 
In White, 502 U.S. 346, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 112 S. Ct. 736, the Supreme 
Court determined that a showing of unavailability was not required for the 
admission of spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of 
receiving medical care. The Court noted:
Further, "adversarial testing can be expected to add little to [the 
statements'] reliability." White, 502 U.S.  at 357, 116 L. Ed. 2d  at 
860, 112 S. Ct.  at 743. The Court concluded there was no basis for excluding 
these statements "under the aegis of the Confrontation Clause." White, 
502 U.S.  at 357, 116 L. Ed. 2d  at 860, 112 S. Ct.  at 743.
Likewise in Inadi, the Supreme Court determined that a showing of 
unavailability was not required for the admission of a co-conspirator's 
statements. The Supreme Court observed that the statements "provide evidence of 
the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant 
testifies to the same matters in court." Inadi, 475 U.S.  at 395, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 398, 106 S. Ct.  at 1126. Further, an "unavailability rule" would not 
likely "produce much testimony that adds anything to the 'truth-determining 
process.' " Inadi, 475 U.S.  at 396, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 399, 106 S. Ct.  at 1127, quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 227, 91 S. Ct. 210, 220 (1970).
The same reasoning supports the introduction of the laboratory report without 
a showing of unavailability. The laboratory reports are prepared by analysts who 
are trained professionals. These analysts perform scientifically accepted tests 
on the substances, and they make objective measurements. Further, the analysts 
perform the tests as part of their regular duties. The context in which the 
laboratory reports are generated may cause the jury to place greater value on 
the report than on the testimony of the analysts at trials months removed from 
the time of testing. Further, each analyst will likely have performed hundreds 
of such tests and will not be able to recall individual tests. At trial, the 
analyst will have to rely on his or her notes and the laboratory report 
generated. Cross-examination "can be expected to add little to [the report's] 
reliability." White, 502 U.S.  at 357, 116 L. Ed. 2d  at 860, 112 S. Ct. 
at 743. See also United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 
1996); Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1990).
Turning next to the trustworthiness of the laboratory report, I believe the 
report is admissible because it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Pursuant 
to section 115-15, the laboratory report must be signed and sworn to by the 
analyst who tests the controlled substance. In addition, the analyst must submit 
a notarized statement giving her name and the name and location of the 
laboratory where the analysis was performed. The analyst must state that she is 
employed by the Illinois State Police, division of forensic services, that she 
analyzed the substance at issue, that performing the analysis is a part of her 
regular duties, that she is qualified by her education, training, and experience 
to perform the analysis on the substance, that the tests she used are 
scientifically accepted and were performed with due caution, and that the 
evidence was handled in accordance with established and accepted procedures 
while in the custody of the laboratory. Thus, the analyst avers that she is a 
skilled and trained professional, experienced in performing such tests. It is 
difficult to perceive any incentive for the analyst to falsify the test results. 
It is extremely unlikely that the analyst would know the particular defendant 
involved in the case or have a personal interest in the test results; the 
analyst would jeopardize her professional career by presenting test results 
which could be shown to be false through retesting; and the analyst would 
subject herself to a charge of perjury by making a statement she knows to be 
false, in an affidavit to be used at trial. For these reasons, I conclude that 
the laboratory report bears sufficient indicia of reliability and is admissible. 
See Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 142 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Because the 
testimony of the supervisor demonstrated that the report had particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness and because cross-examination of the chemists who 
prepared the report would have been of little use to [defendant], we find that 
the admission of the report did not violate the Confrontation Clause"); 
Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
analyst's notes had sufficient particularized indicia of reliability because 
they concerned mechanically objective tests performed on the powder and were 
taken contemporaneously with the performance of the tests); Manocchio, 
919 F.2d 770; Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986) (when 
chemists who performed tests reported the results to their supervisor there was 
no realistic possibility that their statements were based upon faulty 
recollection, and they had no motive to jeopardize their careers by falsifying 
such information); State v. Crow, 266 Kan. 690, 974 P.2d 100 (1999) 
(finding that Kansas statute, which allowed admission of laboratory report into 
evidence, did not violate defendant's right to confront witnesses where statute 
required that a certificate (which would subject its preparer to the same 
perjury penalties as live trial testimony) be signed under oath by the party 
making the analysis); DeRosa v. First Judicial District Court, 115 Nev. 
___, 985 P.2d 157 (1999) (affidavits of a laboratory evidence technician and an 
analyst were sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted over Confrontation Clause 
objections); State v. LaRochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 397, 297 A.2d 223, 226 
(1972) ("scientifically reliable evidence, gathered and recorded pursuant to a 
public duty and admitted under [statute], carries sufficient characteristics of 
trustworthiness to be safely placed before the trier of fact without 
confrontation of the tester"); State v. Hughes, 713 S.W.2d 58, 61 
(Tenn. 1986) ("justification for this intrusion upon the right of confrontation 
is found in the generally accepted reliability of reports of scientific test 
results conducted in accord with well established procedures, the absence of 
motive or opportunity of scientific personnel to falsify the reports and the 
likelihood that the lab technician's entire testimony and cross examination 
would be effectively limited to the contents of the report"); State v. 
Sosa, 59 Wash. App. 678, 684, 800 P.2d 839, 843 (1990) ("lab reports in 
general are routine examinations in which the persons conducting the analysis 
have no motive to falsify the report. They do not meet the arresting officers or 
have a chance to meet the suspect").
Although I have focused my discussion on the trustworthiness of the 
laboratory reports admitted under section 115-15 without reference to any firmly 
rooted hearsay exception, I note that several courts have held that the 
laboratory reports are admissible under the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule. United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Roulette, 75 F.3d  at 418; United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir. 1988); State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 323 S.E.2d 316 
(1984); Williams v. State, 734 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. App. 1999). See also 
Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C. App. 1984) (allowing 
admission of Drug Enforcement Agency report and citing in support United 
States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1974), Kay v. United 
States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958), United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957), State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 
(1975) (en banc), In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1975), Coulter v. State, 494 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1973), Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969), 
and State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 131 A. 429 (1925)). These court 
focus on the routine nature of the tests performed. Other courts have held that 
laboratory reports are admissible under the public records exception to the 
hearsay rule. State v. Conway, 70 Or. App. 721, 690 P.2d 1128 (1984); 
State v. Smith, 66 Or. App. 703, 675 P.2d 510 (1984); State v. 
Huggins, 659 P.2d 613 (Alaska App. 1982). These courts presume that public 
officers do their duty. " 'The fundamental circumstance is that an official 
duty exists to make an accurate statement, and that this special and weighty 
duty will usually suffice as a motive to incite the officer to its 
fulfilment.' " State v. Smith, 312 N.C. at 370, 323 S.E.2d  at 321, 
quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1631 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). Still other 
courts have held the laboratory reports admissible on varied grounds. See 
United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993) (admissible 
under the residual hearsay exception); Fischer v. Powers, 957 F.2d 609 
(8th Cir. 1992); State v. Christianson, 404 A.2d 999 (Me. 1979) 
(statute only requires that a defendant follow a notice procedure prior to trial 
if he wants the testing chemist to testify in person as a witness called by the 
prosecution); Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 478 A.2d 695 (1984) (the 
legislature has safeguarded the defendant's sixth amendment right where the 
statute requires that the tester be produced, upon the defendant's request, 
before the evidence may be admitted despite its reliability); Zoerner v. 
State, 725 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1998); State v. Fischer, 459 N.W.2d 818, 822 (N.D. 1990) (defendant's confrontation rights were safeguarded because 
he had the opportunity to subpoena and cross-examine the chemist who prepared 
the laboratory report); State v. Hancock, 317 Or. 5, 854 P.2d 926 
(1993) (statute is a legislative decision to make in every case what amounts to 
an offer to stipulate to the laboratory report; if defendant refuses the offer, 
defendant may subpoena the analyst who prepared the report as a witness at trial 
at no cost to defendant); People v. Mayfield-Ulloa, 817 P.2d 603 (Colo. 
App. 1991) (defendant's failure to request testimony by the author of the 
laboratory report constituted a waiver of the right of confrontation); State 
v. Kittrell, 279 N.J. Super. 225, 652 A.2d 732 (1995) (statute may be 
construed to establish a constitutionally valid pretrial procedure for 
determining whether the State will be allowed to rely upon the certificate of 
its chemist).
The foregoing demonstrates numerous courts that have considered this issue 
have held that the admission of a laboratory report without the testimony of the 
analyst who prepares the report does not violate a defendant's right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him. Notable exceptions are the supreme 
courts of Georgia and Montana. In Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 472 S.E.2d 74 (1996), the court held that a statute allowing the introduction of a 
laboratory report without the testimony of the analyst was unconstitutional. The 
court observed the statute did not "provide that the filing of an objection to 
the admission of the certificate [would] result in the lab analyst's appearance 
in court." Miller, 266 Ga. at 855, 472 S.E.2d  at 79. Instead, the 
statute directed that "a defendant set forth 'specific grounds' that will be 
'contested in good faith at trial' in order to be entitled to a judicial 
determination on whether the defendant will be confronted with the lab analyst 
or with the analyst's certificate." Miller, 266 Ga. at 856, 472 S.E.2d  
at 79. The court found a denial of defendant's right under the Georgia 
Constitution to "be confronted with the witnesses testifying against" him. 
Miller, 266 Ga. at 856, 472 S.E.2d  at 79.
In State v. Clark, 290 Mont. 479, 964 P.2d 766 (1998), the court 
held that a portion of a rule which governed the introduction of crime 
laboratory reports violated the confrontation clause of the Montana 
Constitution. The court explained:
The court concluded, "[i]n light of the fact that Montana's Constitution 
specifically guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a face-to-face 
confrontation with his or her accusers, and in light of the critical importance 
of an accused's fundamental right of confrontation," that the introduction of 
the laboratory report was improper. Clark, 290 Mont. at 487, 964 P.2d  
at 771.
Both Miller and Clark are distinguishable. Unlike the 
statutory provision at issue in Miller, section 115-15 does not require 
that a defendant set forth "specific grounds" that will be "contested in good 
faith at trial" to secure the testimony of the analyst. To the contrary, section 
115-15 provides that "the report shall not be prima facie evidence of the 
contents, identity, and weight of the substance if the accused or his or her 
attorney demands the testimony of the person signing the report." 725 ILCS 
5/115-15(c) (West 1998). Thus, the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court is 
inapposite. Likewise, the reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court is inapposite. 
Prior to 1994, the confrontation clause of the Illinois Constitution provided 
that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to meet 
the witnesses face to face and to have process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his behalf." In 1994, the clause was amended to delete the 
reference to face-to-face confrontation. Thus, the confrontation clause of the 
Illinois Constitution no longer mirrors the confrontation clause of the Montana 
Constitution. To the extent that the Montana Supreme Court believes the 
confrontation clause of the Montana Constitution affords greater protection to 
an accused than the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, its 
reasoning does not compel a similar conclusion in interpreting the confrontation 
clause of the Illinois Constitution.
I am of the opinion that section 115-15 does not violate a defendant's right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The section allows the 
introduction of evidence which contains particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. The demand provision in section 115-15 further safeguards a 
defendant's right under the confrontation clause. As noted above, any defendant 
who wishes to contest the laboratory report may require the prosecution to 
present the analyst as a witness at trial merely by filing a demand requesting 
the testimony of the analyst. The defendant is not required to set forth the 
grounds upon which he objects to the laboratory report. Nor is the trial court 
required to make a determination that the laboratory report is flawed in any 
way, and therefore inadmissible. Instead, section 115-15 dictates that the 
laboratory report shall not be prima facie evidence of the contents, 
identity, and weight of the substance tested if the defendant demands the 
presence of the analyst at trial.
The analyst who prepares the laboratory report will have prepared reports in 
a number of cases. In cases where the analyst is called to testify, the 
questioning is often brief and unenlightening. The analyst does not recall each 
test performed and the results thereof. Instead, the analyst testifies by 
reviewing the report. The trial testimony of the analyst is costly to the State, 
and does not provide great benefit to the defendant. In other cases, the 
laboratory report is admitted by stipulation of the parties. The defendant 
realizes that the test performed is routine, and knows the results cannot be 
assailed. Meanwhile the State realizes certain savings since it does not have to 
present the analyst at trial. Section 115-15 is akin to an offer to stipulate to 
the laboratory report. See DeRosa, 115 Nev. at ___, 985 P.2d  at 162; 
Hancock, 317 Or. at 12, 854 P.2d  at 929-30. If the defendant knows that 
the test results are correct, he may dispense with the presence of the analyst. 
If the defendant believes that the test results are incorrect, that the tests 
performed are not generally acceptable, that the analyst is unqualified, or the 
test should not be admitted for whatever reason, the defendant can decline to 
stipulate to the laboratory report. The defendant thus determines whether the 
analyst's presence will be required at trial.
The majority holds that a defendant cannot be required to take an affirmative 
step to secure his right under the confrontation clause, whether the affirmative 
step consists of filing a demand requesting the production of a witness at 
trial, or the issuance of a subpoena to secure the presence of the witness as a 
hostile witness. I disagree. The demand provision in section 115-15, considered 
alone or in conjunction with the defendant's right to subpoena witnesses, does 
not constitute an impermissible burden upon the defendant's constitutional 
right.
As noted above, in Inadi the Supreme Court determined that a showing 
of unavailability was not required for the admission of a co-conspirator's 
statements. The Supreme Court noted that the benefits to the respondent in 
adopting an "unavailability rule" would be small:
Conversely, an "unavailability rule" would place a "significant practical 
burden on the prosecution." Inadi, 475 U.S.  at 399, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 
401, 106 S. Ct.  at 1128. In every case, the government would be required to 
locate each declarant, and ensure his continuing availability at trial. The 
Supreme Court then observed:
The Supreme Court concluded:
Thus, under the holding of Inadi, the prosecution is not required to 
produce a declarant at trial where the declarant's statement contains adequate 
indicia of reliability, the declarant's testimony at trial will not be of great 
benefit to the defendant, and the defendant does not avail himself of the right 
to call the declarant as a witness for the defense or as a hostile witness. In 
the present case, the laboratory report contained adequate indicia of 
reliability and the testimony of the analyst at trial would not likely have 
benefitted defendant. Defendant could have demanded that the State produce the 
analyst as a witness at trial, or could have subpoenaed the analyst. Defendant 
failed to do either. Under these circumstances, I believe the requirements of 
the confrontation clause were met. See Fischer, 459 N.W.2d  at 
821-22.
In sum, I believe that section 115-15 is constitutional. The statute 
represents a reasonable compromise between a defendant's right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him and the State's interest "in effective law 
enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of 
evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 64, 
65 L. Ed. 2d  at 607, 100 S. Ct.  at 2538. Section 115-15 is a practical provision 
which allows into evidence laboratory reports bearing adequate indicia of 
reliability. The provision further safeguards the defendant's right under the 
confrontation clause by affording the defendant an unfettered right to demand 
the presence of the analyst at trial. The defendant may stipulate to the 
admission of the laboratory report, demand the production of the analyst at 
trial for any reason whatsoever, or subpoena the analyst. Pursuant to section 
115-15, I would hold that the laboratory results were properly admitted into 
evidence at defendant's trial.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.
1. 1In 1994, the confrontation clause of the 
Illinois Constitution was amended to conform with the language of the 
confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. See People v. 
Dean, 175 Ill. 2d 244, 254 (1997). Defendant does not argue that he is 
entitled to greater protection under the Illinois Constitution, and we will 
apply the same analysis to both. 

2. 2Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting his conviction. Rather, he argues solely that he should 
be given a new trial because the lab report and affidavit were introduced into 
evidence in violation of the confrontation clause. 

3. 3The Supreme Court later limited the 
unavailability requirement of Roberts to those situations in which the 
hearsay statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding. 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 112 S. Ct. 736 
(1992). 

4. 4This concern is not merely theoretical. 
During the pendency of this appeal, the legislature broadened the scope of 
section 115-15 by amending it to include blood and urine testing in prosecutions 
for reckless homicide and driving under the influence. See Pub. Act 91-563, eff. 
January 1, 2000 (amending 725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1998)). 

5. 5The confrontation clause of the Illinois 
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8) is virtually identical, providing 
that: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him or her." For purposes of this dissent, 
I will refer to the confrontation clauses of the United States and Illinois 
Constitutions as "the confrontation clause."