Title: Jackson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC14-842
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-842 
____________ 
 
JERMAINE C. JACKSON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[May 5, 2016] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Jackson v. State, 137 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).  Because 
the district court expressly declared a state statute valid, this Court has jurisdiction 
to review the decision.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
Appellant, Jermaine Jackson, was convicted of one count of robbery with a 
firearm while wearing a mask and sentenced to the statutory maximum of life in 
prison.  Jackson, 137 So. 3d at 472.  Jackson was 20 years old when he committed 
the crime, but 21 years old when he was tried and sentenced.  If he had been 
sentenced under the youthful offender statute, he faced a six-year cap as to his 
 
 
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sentence.  Jackson filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), alleging in part that his life sentence was 
more severe than other defendants in similar situations.  Id.  In addition, he argued 
that he had a right to be informed of the ability to dispute the court’s imposition of 
investigative costs and public defender costs.  Id.  The trial court did not rule on 
the motion within sixty days, and the motion was deemed denied.  Id.  
 
Jackson appealed, arguing that: (1) the sentencing court considered 
impermissible factors when imposing his sentence; (2) the court erred in denying 
his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct illegal sentence on the basis that it was 
disparate compared to other similarly situated defendants; (3) the court erred in 
denying his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct certain costs imposed against him; 
(4) section 958.04 (1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), Florida’s Youthful Offender Act, 
violates equal protection and due process.  Id.  The Fourth District held that the 
sentencing court did not consider any impermissible factors when it sentenced 
Jackson and did not err when it denied Jackson’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion without 
an evidentiary hearing.  Moreover, the Fourth District held that section 
958.04(1)(b) did not violate equal protection or due process.  However, the court 
did reverse the costs imposed against Jackson.  Id.  
 
Before this Court, Jackson raises a facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
section 958.04(1)(b).  Jackson argues that section 958.04(1)(b) violates equal 
 
 
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protection because the age-at-sentencing classification creates arbitrary and 
irrational distinctions between otherwise eligible defendants.  He claims that no 
other Florida statute distinguishes between defendants based solely on their age at 
sentencing and therefore this classification triggers strict scrutiny.  Furthermore, 
Jackson argues that section 958.04(1)(b) violates due process because eligibility 
implicates liberty interests, and in attempting to be eligible for youthful offender 
sentencing, a defendant may forgo certain constitutional rights.  For the reasons 
that follow, we hold that section 958.04(1)(b) is constitutional as amended and 
does not violate equal protection or due process.  
 
In 2008, the Legislature changed the requirements for youthful offender 
sentencing from someone who committed a crime before their twenty-first 
birthday, to someone who is younger than 21 at the time of sentencing.  The 
statute, in relevant part, states that  
The court may sentence as a youthful offender any person . . . [w]ho is 
found guilty of or who has tendered, and the court has accepted, a plea 
of nolo contendere or guilty to a crime that is, under the laws of this 
state, a felony if the offender is younger than 21 years of age at the 
time sentence is imposed.  
 
§ 958.04(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008).  
 
  Constitutional challenges to statutes are pure questions of law, subject to de 
novo review.  Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010).  Generally, statutes 
are presumed constitutional, and the challenging party has the burden to establish 
 
 
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the statute’s invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d 
52, 53 (Fla. 1980).  It is the Court’s duty to “construe challenged legislation to 
effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.”  Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005).  
 
A statutory classification will be deemed to violate equal protection only if it 
causes “different treatments so disparate as relates to the difference in 
classification so as to be wholly arbitrary.”  In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 
40, 42 (Fla. 1980), abrogated by Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 
563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).  Where no suspect classification is involved, “the statute 
need only bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.”  Id.  Some 
inequality or imprecision will not “render a statute invalid.”  Acton v. Fort 
Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983).  
 
In analyzing whether or not section 958.04(1)(b) violates equal protection, 
the first question is whether or not the statute affects a fundamental right or a 
suspect class.  Neither this Court nor any other Florida court has determined 
whether youthful offender status is a fundamental right.  However, courts in other 
states have held that youthful offender status is not a fundamental right for eligible 
defendants.  See People v. Robert Z., 511 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1986) 
(“There is no constitutional right to youthful offender treatment.  Such treatment is 
entirely a gratuitous creature of the Legislature, subject to such conditions as the 
 
 
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Legislature may impose without violating constitutional guarantees.”  (citations 
and emphasis omitted)); State v. Johnson, 279 S.E.2d 606, 447 (S.C. 1981) (“The 
statutory right to youthful offender treatment is simply not a fundamental right.”); 
Hilber v. State, 277 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Wis. 1979) (“Hilber and Mayes argue that 
the statutory right to youthful offender treatment is ‘fundamental,’ but their 
arguments are not convincing and are not supported by any authority.  Indeed, 
differences in the treatment of criminal defendants have been viewed as being 
subject to the rational basis test.”  (citations omitted)).  We agree with our sister 
courts. 
 
The discretionary nature of youthful offender sentencing provides further 
support that it is not a fundamental right for defendants.  A “lower court is under 
no obligation to sentence [a defendant] under the Youthful Offender Act unless the 
lower court believes such a sentence would be appropriate.”  Holmes v. State, 638 
So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021, 1023 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“[A]pplication of the Youthful Offender Act to any particular 
defendant is discretionary with the trial judge who is in the best position to 
determine whether sentencing under the act is the most desirable treatment for that 
defendant.”). 
 
Moreover, the youthful offender statute does not involve a suspect class.  
Under a constitutional analysis, a suspect class is one where strict scrutiny is 
 
 
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required when questions of equal protection arise.  Generally, classifications such 
as race, national origin, or alienage have been held to be suspect classifications.  
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973).  Youth, 
however, is not a suspect classification.  See art. I, § 2, Fla. Const. (defining the 
protected classes as “race, religion, national origin, or physical disability”); see 
also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (holding that age is not a 
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause).  
 
Because section 958.04(1)(b) does not affect a fundamental right or suspect 
class, the rational basis test applies.  Miller v. State, 971 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2007).  Under rational basis analysis, a statute must be upheld if the 
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective.  Id.  
The statute must be upheld if there is any conceivable state of facts or plausible 
reason to justify it, regardless of whether the Legislature actually relied on such 
facts or reason.  McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).  
 
The Legislature did not provide guidance when it amended section 
958.04(1)(b).  However, as the Fourth District noted, an examination of the 
statute’s legislative intent gives possible insight into the amendment.  The 
legislative intent of Chapter 958 states, in relevant part,  
The purpose of this chapter is to improve the chances of correction 
and successful return to the community of youthful offenders 
sentenced to imprisonment by providing them with enhanced 
vocational, educational, counseling, or public service opportunities 
 
 
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and by preventing their association with older and more experienced 
criminals during the terms of their confinement.  
 
§ 958.021, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).  
 
 
 
Section 958.04(1)(b) bears a rational relationship to the legitimate 
government objective of preventing the association between young offenders and 
older criminals.  By requiring that a defendant be sentenced before the age of 21 in 
order to be eligible for youthful offender sentencing, section 958.04(1)(b) ensures 
that defendants entering the program are truly youthful.  It also ensures that 
defendants eligible for the program will complete their sentence without being 
exposed to more experienced and sophisticated criminals during their 
incarceration.  Because the statute bears a rational relationship to this legitimate 
government objective, it does not violate equal protection.  
 
Substantive due process protects fundamental rights that are so “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.”  Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).  Analyzing a 
substantive due process claim begins with a “careful description of the asserted 
right.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  As discussed above, eligibility 
for youthful offender sentencing is not a fundamental right; instead, eligibility is at 
the discretion of the trial court.  Therefore, section 958.04(1)(b) need only satisfy 
the rational basis test.  Under substantive due process, the test “is whether the 
statute bears a rational relation to a permissible legislative objective that is not 
 
 
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discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive.”  Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974).  Courts will not be concerned with whether the 
particular legislation in question is the most prudent choice, or is a perfect panacea, 
to cure the ill or achieve the interest intended.  If there is a legitimate state interest 
that the legislation aims to effect, and if the legislation is a reasonably related 
means to achieve the intended end, it will be upheld.  State v. Walker, 444 So. 2d 
1137, 1138-39 (Fla. 2d DCA), aff’d, 461 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1984).  
 
The Youthful Offender statutes are the means to achieve the State’s goal of 
providing rehabilitation to young offenders and preventing association between 
young offenders and older criminals.  Section 958.04(1)(b) as amended serves a 
legitimate state interest by ensuring that only those who are truly youthful are 
eligible for youthful offender sentencing.  By restricting eligibility to those who are 
younger than 21 at the time of sentencing, the legislation guarantees that young 
offenders will not associate with older, more experienced offenders.  For this 
reason, section 958.04(1)(b) does not violate due process.  
 
Jackson has failed to demonstrate that section 958.04(1)(b), as amended, 
violates equal protection or due process.  Accordingly, we affirm the Fourth 
District. 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent because the 2008 legislative change to section 958.04, Florida 
Statutes, as to what determines a defendant’s eligibility for youthful offender 
sentencing—from the defendant’s age at the time of the offense to the defendant’s 
age at the time of sentencing—arbitrarily infringes on the defendant’s fundamental 
right to a trial.  See ch. 2008-250, § 7, Laws of Fla.  A defendant who pleads not 
guilty and chooses to go to trial, thereby exercising this fundamental right, is 
penalized if the delay inherent in the discovery and trial process causes the 
sentencing to occur after the defendant has reached the age of twenty-one—
eliminating his or her eligibility to be sentenced as a youthful offender.  A 
defendant who commits a crime close to his or her twenty-first birthday may feel 
pressured to plead guilty and forego his or her constitutional right to trial solely 
because the clock on youthful offender eligibility is ticking.   
Prior to the legislative change, the same defendant would be eligible for 
youthful offender classification, even if the defendant, in exercising the 
fundamental right to trial, turned twenty-one before the trial began.  A defendant 
should not be forced to relinquish his or her right to a trial in order to obtain the 
benefit of a specific sentencing statute that seeks to “improve the chances of 
correction and successful return to the community,” by “providing . . . enhanced 
 
 
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vocational, educational, counseling, or public service opportunities and by 
preventing [the] association with older and more experienced criminals during the 
terms of [] confinement.”  § 958.021, Fla. Stat.  
The Legislature provided no reason for the change in what determines 
eligibility for youthful offender sentencing.  If the legislative justification for the 
change is to ensure that young offenders will not associate with older, more 
experienced offenders, as the majority speculates, the change does not bear a 
reasonable relationship to that objective because the trial court could have 
accounted for that factor under the previous statute.  Indeed, the legislative intent 
of the Youthful Offender Act, even before the 2008 amendment, was in part to 
prevent the association of youthful offenders “with older and more experienced 
criminals during the terms of their confinement.”  § 958.021, Fla. Stat. (2007).  For 
example, a trial court would have been able to classify a defendant as a Youthful 
Offender on the basis of the crime occurring before the defendant turned twenty-
one, but could have considered the defendant’s age at sentencing in determining 
the precise Youthful Offender sentence to impose to avoid the defendant’s 
association with hardened criminals.  See, e.g., § 958.04(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) 
(providing the court with discretion to impose a split sentence, including a period 
of incarceration between one and four years).   
 
 
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Tying eligibility for youthful offender sentencing to the defendant’s age at 
sentencing—the timing of which may be delayed by several factors outside of the 
defendant’s control—rather than at the time of the offense, means that two 
defendants who commit a crime at the exact same age will be treated differently 
solely based on when they are ultimately sentenced.  To me, that arbitrariness, 
which has an effect on the defendant’s fundamental right to trial, results in a 
substantive due process violation.  For that reason I dissent.  
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Statutory 
Validity 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D11-3174 
 
 
(St. Lucie County) 
 
Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nan Ellen Foley, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Consiglia Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Allen R. Geesey, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent