Title: New Jersey v. Pinkston
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2018

New Jersey v. Pinkston Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The police spotted defendant Leo Pinkston in a car that matched the general description of a vehicle used in a shooting. The officers “activated their lights and sirens.” Defendant allegedly “disregarded” the lights and sirens and drove off. Ultimately, defendant struck another car, and both vehicles collided with a light pole and caught on fire. Defendant was charged with second-degree eluding and second-degree aggravated assault while eluding. Pretrial Services recommended against defendant’s release, and the State moved to detain defendant. Defense counsel asked for an adjournment to obtain additional discovery and subpoena police officers to testify at the hearing. The trial court denied defendant’s request. After considering the complaint, affidavit of probable cause, Public Safety Assessment, Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that: (1) probable cause existed; and (2) clear and convincing evidence established that defendant should be detained. The Appellate Division affirmed the finding of probable cause and order of detention. Shortly before this appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court was argued, defendant pled guilty, and the State moved to dismiss as moot. The Supreme Court determined hat defendants have a qualified right to call adverse witnesses at detention hearings. However, Pinkston pled guilty; the Supreme Court did not review the trial court's decision to detain him pretrial. This appeal was dismissed as moot. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Leo C. Pinkston (A-22-17) (080118)Argued March 12, 2018 -- Decided June 14, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) provides that defendants “shall be afforded an opportunity . . . to present witnesses” at pretrial detention hearings. N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 19(e)(1). In this appeal, the Court considers whether the provision allows a defendant to compel an adverse witness to testify at a detention hearing. The police spotted defendant Leo Pinkston in a car that matched the general description of a vehicle used in a shooting. The officers “activated their lights and sirens.” Defendant allegedly “disregarded” the lights and sirens and drove off. Ultimately, defendant struck another car, and both vehicles collided with a light pole and caught on fire. Defendant was charged with second-degree eluding and second-degree aggravated assault while eluding. Pretrial Services recommended against defendant’s release, and the State moved to detain defendant. Defense counsel asked for an adjournment to obtain additional discovery and subpoena police officers to testify at the hearing. The trial court denied defendant’s request. After it considered the complaint, affidavit of probable cause, Public Safety Assessment, Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that (a) probable cause existed, and (b) clear and convincing evidence established that defendant should be detained. The Appellate Division concluded that, under the circumstances, the trial judge did not mistakenly exercise his discretion in denying defendant’s request to call adverse witnesses. The panel affirmed the finding of probable cause and order of detention. The Court granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal. 231 N.J. 418 (2017). Shortly before this appeal was argued, defendant pled guilty, and the State moved to dismiss as moot. The Court denied the motion because “the appeal raise[d] an issue of public importance that is capable of repetition yet evades review.” 232 N.J. 299 (2018).HELD: The CJRA -- like the federal and D.C. laws on which it is based in part -- provides defendants a qualified right to summon adverse witnesses. Before calling an adverse witness, a 1 defendant must proffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to negate probable cause or undermine the State’s evidence in support of detention in a material way.1. The CJRA and case law outline various safeguards that apply to detention hearings. The State must provide discovery before the hearing in accordance with State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 69-71 (2017). At the hearing, the State must first establish probable cause that the defendant committed the charged offenses, unless a grand jury has already returned an indictment. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). The State may proceed by proffer to satisfy its burden of proof. See State v. Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 195 (2017). Defendants have various rights at the hearing: to be represented by counsel, “to testify, to present witnesses, to cross- examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1). To decide if detention is appropriate, “'the court may take into account information’ about the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the nature of the risk of danger and obstruction the defendant poses, and '[t]he release recommendation of the pretrial services program.’” State v. Mercedes, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op. at 14-15) (citingN.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (f)). (pp. 8-9)2. The text of the Criminal Justice Reform Act follows the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the District of Columbia’s statutory scheme for pretrial detention in many respects. The relevant text in all three laws is identical: a defendant “shall be afforded an opportunity . . . to present witnesses.” Compare N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B), and D.C. Code § 23-1322(d)(4). A number of federal courts have followed the reasoning of United States v. Edwards, in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals interpreted the D.C. Code. 430 A.2d 1321 , 1323 (D.C. 1981) (en banc). Relying in part on the statute’s legislative history, the court found that a defendant has “only a conditional right to call adverse witnesses.” See id. at 1334. The Edwards court concluded that requiring a preliminary proffer about how “a witness’ testimony will tend to negate substantial probability that the accused committed the charged offense, is a reasonable limitation on the accused’s right to call witnesses” at a pretrial detention hearing. Id. at 1338. Other courts likewise call for some type of preliminary showing before they allow defendants to compel adverse witnesses to testify at detention hearings. (pp. 10-13)3. In State v. Stewart, the Appellate Division canvassed the CJRA and relevant case law and concluded that Edwards struck “the proper balance.” 453 N.J. Super. 55, 68 (App. Div. 2018). The Appellate Division set forth the following standards. Before a defendant may call an adverse witness “to rebut the State’s evidence of probable cause, the judge must first ask for a proffer regarding the witness’ anticipated testimony and its relevancy to the issue of probable cause, and how the anticipated testimony negates the State’s evidence already adduced at the hearing.” Id. at 69. To compel an adverse witness to appear on the issue of detention, “a defendant must make a proffer demonstrating how the anticipated testimony would rebut or diminish the otherwise clear and convincing evidence the State must produce.” Id. at 70. In both instances, the trial court has “significant discretion to compel the production of a witness.” Id. at 71. (p. 14) 2 4. In light of the CJRA’s history, the Court agrees with Stewart that the law provides defendants a qualified right to call witnesses at detention hearings. An alternative reading of the statute would have far-reaching consequences. An absolute right would mean that a defendant accused of rape, for example, could compel the victim to testify at a detention hearing in many instances. There is no basis to believe the Legislature had that in mind when it drafted the CJRA. To the contrary, it borrowed language from other laws that stood for a very different approach. (pp. 15-16)5. A detention hearing has two components: the State must establish probable cause, unless there is an indictment, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2), and must present clear and convincing evidence to justify detention, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1). a. Decisions about probable cause, both before and after the enactment of the CJRA, have routinely been made without live testimony. Ultimately, the question of probable cause presents judges with but one choice to make: either there is sufficient probable cause to proceed with a case, or there is not. Against that backdrop, as to the issue of probable cause, before being allowed to call an adverse witness, a defendant must proffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to negate the State’s showing of probable cause. b. A more flexible standard is needed to decide when a defendant may call an adverse witness to challenge the State’s case for detention because that decision is more complex. Both sides have the right to present information about the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the nature of the danger to the community, the risk of flight, and the risk of obstruction. Those issues invite qualitative judgments, not “yes” or “no” answers. Before being allowed to call an adverse witness on the issue of detention, a defendant must proffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to undermine the State’s evidence in support of detention in a material way.After weighing a defense proffer, judges have discretion to accept and rely on the proffer, or not, and to compel an adverse witness to appear, or not. See Stewart, 453 N.J. Super. at 71. A judge’s decision whether to allow a defendant to compel an adverse witness to testify at a detention hearing is subject to review for abuse of discretion. See State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497, 500 (2018). Here, because defendant pled guilty, the Court does not review the trial court’s decision to detain him pretrial. (pp. 16-20) Defendant’s appeal is DISMISSED AS MOOT. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 22 September Term 2017 080118STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.LEO C. PINKSTON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 12, 2018 – Decided June 14, 2018 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Thomas R. Ashley argued the cause for appellant (Thomas R. Ashley, on the brief). Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephanie Davis Elson, on the briefs). Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Laura B. Lasota, of counsel and on the brief). Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, of counsel and on the brief). 1 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) provides thatdefendants “shall be afforded an opportunity . . . to presentwitnesses” at pretrial detention hearings. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1). In this appeal, we consider whether the provisionallows a defendant to compel an adverse witness to testify at adetention hearing. We find that the CJRA -- like the federaland D.C. laws on which it is based in part -- providesdefendants a qualified right to summon adverse witnesses. There are two components to a detention hearing. If noindictment has been returned, the State must present proof ofprobable cause. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). To justifydetention, the State must also present clear and convincingevidence that no release conditions would reasonably guardagainst the risk of danger, flight, or obstruction a defendantposes. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1). We find that, before callingan adverse witness, a defendant must proffer how the witness’stestimony would tend to negate probable cause or undermine theState’s evidence in support of detention in a material way. I. According to the affidavit of probable cause in this case,the police spotted defendant Leo Pinkston on June 4, 2017 in acar that matched the general description of a vehicle used in ashooting the day before. The officers observed the dark-colored 2 car, with tinted windows, parked improperly. From an unmarkedpolice vehicle, the officers “activated their lights andsirens.” Defendant allegedly “disregarded” the lights andsirens and drove off; he then gained speed and ignored trafficsignals. Because the police car had engine trouble, otherofficers picked up the pursuit. Ultimately, defendant struckanother car, and both vehicles collided with a light pole andcaught on fire. The victim in the other car suffered burns andwas taken to the hospital for treatment. The accompanying complaint-warrant charged defendant withsecond-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), and second-degreeaggravated assault while eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6). Pretrial Services prepared a Public Safety Assessment (PSA)that scored defendant 2 out of 6, with 6 being the highest, forrisk of failure to appear, and 4 out of 6 for risk of newcriminal activity. The PSA also had a flag for new violentcriminal activity. Among other things, the PSA noted thatdefendant had four prior indictable convictions that includedidentity theft, attempted murder, and possession of a weapon.Pretrial Services recommended against defendant’s release. The State moved to detain defendant. The day before thescheduled hearing date, defense counsel asked for an adjournmentto obtain additional discovery and subpoena police officers totestify at the hearing. The State had provided two police 3 reports in discovery. The first noted that when the policetried to conduct the motor vehicle stop, defendant’s car “beganto slowly travel,” and the police “were unable to clearlyidentify the make and model of the” car because of lowvisibility and poor lighting. The second report referred to aradio broadcast of “shots fired at the officers.” The author ofthe report spoke with an officer who said that he discharged hisweapon at defendant after hearing the transmission. Accordingto the report, two other officers also “discharg[ed] theirfirearms.” The trial court denied defendant’s request for anadjournment. The court explained that information related tothe pursuit and accident was not relevant to the detentionmotion. In addition, the court observed that federal courts haduniformly held that “a defendant does not have the right to calladverse witnesses at a detention hearing.” The detention hearing was held on June 22, 2017. At theoutset, defense counsel pressed his request for an adjournmentto call the officers involved in the incident. Counsel arguedthat the circumstances of the pursuit weighed against a findingof probable cause and detention. He proffered that defendantdid not knowingly speed away from the officers and did not shootat them; that the officers violated departmental policy byshooting from and at a moving car; and that defendant crashed 4 the car because the police fired shots at him. Counsel alsosubmitted that he had the right to call witnesses under thestatute. The court acknowledged that the CJRA allows live testimony.However, it found that the evidence counsel sought to presentwas not relevant to the issue of probable cause. Defendant’sarguments, the court noted, would probably be relevant at trialinstead. After it considered the complaint, affidavit ofprobable cause, PSA, Preliminary Law Enforcement IncidentReport, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that(a) probable cause existed, and (b) clear and convincingevidence established that defendant should be detained. Defendant filed an expedited appeal. The AppellateDivision granted defendant’s motion to supplement the recordwith the police reports recounted above, but the panel concludedthat, under the circumstances, the trial judge did notmistakenly exercise his discretion in denying defendant’srequest to call adverse witnesses. In an unpublished order, thepanel affirmed the trial court’s finding of probable cause andits order of detention.11 While the appeal was pending, a Hudson County grand jury returned an indictment against defendant. It contained the charges for eluding and aggravated assault alleged in the complaint, as well as two additional offenses, second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), and fourth-degree assault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(1). Had the indictment 5 We granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal andaccelerated the timing for oral argument. 231 N.J. 418 (2017).We also granted the Attorney General, the Public Defender, andthe American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) leave toappear as amici curiae. II. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not allowinghim to call witnesses at the detention hearing. He contends thepolice reports and officer testimony would have established thatprobable cause did not exist because “it was very likely thatdefendant never even realized that . . . officers were pursuinghim as he 'slowly’ departed the area,” and because “the carcrash was occasioned by defendant’s attempt to avoid death bygunfire.” Defendant claims the same evidence would haverebutted the State’s argument that he posed a danger to thecommunity. The Public Defender and ACLU both argue that the CJRAprovides defendants who face detention an unconditional right tocall witnesses, aside from generic limits that apply in allcases. For support, they rely on the plain language of thestatute. They also contend that live testimony can be relevantbeen returned before the detention hearing, it would have established probable cause for purposes of the hearing. SeeN.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). 6 as to both probable cause and the need for detention, and thatthe trial court abused its discretion in this case. The State contends that defendants do not have an absoluteright to call adverse witnesses under the statute. Instead, theState maintains, the Court should follow the majority view andadopt the approach outlined in United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc). The State also argues that theproffered reports and testimony were not relevant as to probablecause, and that the record amply supported defendant’sdetention. The Attorney General echoes the State’s position andcontends that defendants do not have an “automatic andunfettered right” to compel the State’s witnesses to testify.The Attorney General submits that, consistent with Edwards,defendants “should be required to either (1) proffer how [a]witness’s testimony will negate probable cause, or (2)articulate a good-faith basis for believing that the witnesswill testify favorably to the accused on a critical issuerelated to pretrial detention.” Under that standard, theAttorney General contends that the trial court did not abuse itsbroad discretion when it denied defendant’s request to callpolice officers to testify. 7 III. Shortly before this appeal was argued, defendant pledguilty to second-degree eluding and fourth-degree aggravatedassault by auto. The State then moved to dismiss defendant’sappeal as moot. We denied the motion because “the appealraise[d] an issue of public importance that is capable ofrepetition yet evades review.” 232 N.J. 299 (2018); see Statev. Mercedes, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op. at 23). For thesame reason, we now address when and under what circumstancesdefendants may compel adverse witnesses to testify at adetention hearing. Given the current posture of this case,however, we decline to evaluate whether the trial court abusedits discretion when it ordered defendant detained. IV. A. We begin with certain relevant principles under the CJRA.The law favors the pretrial release of defendants “by non-monetary means.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. A defendant may bedetained pretrial only if, after a hearing, a judge finds “byclear and convincing evidence that no release conditions wouldreasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court, thesafety of the community, or the integrity of the criminaljustice process.” State v. Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 200-01 (2017)(citing N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)). 8 The statute and case law outline various safeguards thatapply to detention hearings. The State must provide discoverybefore the hearing in accordance with State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 69-71 (2017). At the hearing, the State must firstestablish probable cause that the defendant committed thecharged offenses, unless a grand jury has already returned anindictment. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). The State may proceed byproffer to satisfy its burden of proof. See Ingram, 230 N.J. at 195. Defendants have various rights at the hearing: to berepresented by counsel, “to testify, to present witnesses, tocross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and topresent information by proffer or otherwise.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1). Central to this appeal is the scope of a defendant’sright “to present witnesses.” See ibid. To decide if detention is appropriate, “'the court may takeinto account information’ about the nature and circumstances ofthe offense, the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s historyand characteristics, the nature of the risk of danger andobstruction the defendant poses, and '[t]he releaserecommendation of the pretrial services program.’” Mercedes,___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 14-15) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (f)). 9 B. Defendant, the Public Defender, and the ACLU argue that theplain language of the CJRA grants defendants an unconditionalright to call witnesses at detention hearings. The State andthe Attorney General contend that defendants possess only aqualified right in light of the history of the CJRA. When a court interprets a statute, its task is to ascertainand give meaning to the Legislature’s intent. State v. S.B.,230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017). As we noted in Robinson, “the text ofthe Criminal Justice Reform Act follows the federal Bail ReformAct of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 to 3156, and the District ofColumbia’s statutory scheme for pretrial detention, D.C. Code §§23-1321 to -1333,” in many respects. 229 N.J. at 56. TheLegislature, in fact, “looked to both laws among others when itframed New Jersey’s reform measure.” Ibid. (citing sponsor’scomment at public hearing, Pub. Hearing Before S. Law & Pub.Safety Comm., S. Con. Res. 128 2 (2014)). We therefore “givecareful consideration to federal case law that interprets theBail Reform Act and the District of Columbia statute.” Ingram,230 N.J. at 205. The relevant text in all three laws is identical: adefendant “shall be afforded an opportunity . . . to presentwitnesses.” Compare N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1), with 18 U.S.C.§ 3142(f)(2)(B), and D.C. Code § 23-1322(d)(4). When, as here, 10 “the Legislature adopts or copies a law from anotherjurisdiction, we presume that it was aware of the constructiongiven to that law by the courts of the other jurisdiction.”Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 575 (2014). A number of federal courts have followed the reasoning ofUnited States v. Edwards, in which the District of ColumbiaCourt of Appeals interpreted the D.C. Code. 430 A.2d at 1323.Relying in part on the statute’s legislative history, the courtfound that a defendant has “only a conditional right to calladverse witnesses.” See id. at 1334. The decision emphasizedthat a court may require a proffer from the defense before compelling the presence of an adverse witness. The pretrial detention statute provides the accused with a right to present witnesses in his favor. Such an opportunity to respond is a fundamental procedural right which the government has no interest in restricting. Nevertheless, with regard to the government’s witnesses, and particularly the complaining witness, the government does have an interest in preventing premature discovery. It also has an interest in protecting the emotional and physical well-being of its witnesses. Under our holding that the government may proceed by proffer or hearsay, cross-examination for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness’ credibility is an insufficient reason to compel a witness’ presence. [Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).]The Edwards court concluded that requiring a preliminary profferabout how “a witness’ testimony will tend to negate substantial 11 probability2 that the accused committed the charged offense, is areasonable limitation on the accused’s right to call witnesses”at a pretrial detention hearing. Ibid. Other courts likewise call for some type of preliminaryshowing before they allow defendants to compel adverse witnessesto testify at detention hearings. In United States v. Winsor,for example, the government proceeded by proffer. 785 F.2d 755,757 (9th Cir. 1986). The defendant then sought to cross-examineinvestigators and police officers to show “that he was arrestedwithout probable cause.” Id. at 756. The Ninth Circuitconcluded that, “[w]ithout a proffer” from the defendant “thatthe government’s proffered information was incorrect, themagistrate was not required to allow” the cross-examination.Id. at 757; see also United States v. Cabrera-Ortigoza, 196 F.R.D. 571, 575 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A]bsent something credibleto challenge the reliability or the correctness of thegovernment’s proffer, the Court need not compel live witnessesto testify.”). The Third Circuit, in United States v. Accetturo, similarlyfound that the district court did not abuse its discretion whenit declined to compel a cooperating witness’s appearance at a2 In a later amendment to the D.C. Code, “probable cause” was substituted for the phrase “substantial probability.” See 56 D.C. Reg. 7413, 7440 (Sept. 11, 2009) (amending D.C. Code § 23- 1322(c)). 12 detention hearing. 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986). TheCircuit Court stressed that the defense proffer gave “no reasonto believe” the witness “would give evidence favorable” to thedefendants “or would retract information harmful to them.”Ibid. The court also observed that “the need for speed inreaching pretrial detention determinations justifies the use ofprocedures less demanding than those applicable to a 'full-blowntrial.’” Id. at 390; see also United States v. Sanchez, 457 F. Supp. 2d 90, 92-93 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that “a defendanthas no absolute 'right’ to subpoena adverse witnesses at adetention hearing” and that defense counsel “must give the Courtsome basis for believing that [a] witness would producetestimony favorable to her client” or “some reason to questionthe reliability of hearsay evidence proffered by theGovernment”). The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Gaviria, agreedwith Edwards that defendants have “only a conditional right tocall adverse witnesses” at detention hearings. 828 F.2d 667,670 (11th Cir. 1987). The court, however, declined to requiredefendants to make an initial proffer. Ibid. Instead, thecourt highlighted the presiding judge’s “discretion whether toallow defense counsel to call an adverse witness with orwithout” a proffer. Ibid. 13 C. In a recent, thoughtful opinion by the Honorable CarmenMessano, P.J.A.D., the Appellate Division canvassed the CJRA andrelevant case law and concluded that Edwards struck “the properbalance.” State v. Stewart, 453 N.J. Super. 55, 68 (App. Div.2018). The defendant in Stewart sought to subpoena severalpolice officers -- who allegedly saw him commit the offensescharged -- to testify at the detention hearing as to probablecause. Id. at 60. The trial court granted the request in part.Ibid. The Appellate Division reversed and set forth the followingstandards. Before a defendant may call an adverse witness “torebut the State’s evidence of probable cause, the judge mustfirst ask for a proffer regarding the witness’ anticipatedtestimony and its relevancy to the issue of probable cause, andhow the anticipated testimony negates the State’s evidencealready adduced at the hearing.” Id. at 69. To compel anadverse witness to appear on the issue of detention, “adefendant must make a proffer demonstrating how the anticipatedtestimony would rebut or diminish the otherwise clear andconvincing evidence the State must produce.” Id. at 70. Inboth instances, the trial court has “significant discretion tocompel the production of a witness.” Id. at 71. 14 V. We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. Statev. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017). As noted earlier, we alsolook to case law that interprets the Bail Reform Act and theDistrict of Columbia statute for guidance. Ingram, 230 N.J. at 205. The Legislature adopted the precise language used in bothof those laws when it granted defendants “an opportunity . . .to present witnesses” at detention hearings. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1); accord 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B); D.C. Code § 23-1322(d)(4). We presume that the Legislature was aware of howother courts had interpreted that language -- namely, that thetext did not afford defendants an absolute right to compel thetestimony of adverse witnesses -- when it enacted the CJRA. SeeMaeker, 219 N.J. at 575. In light of the CJRA’s history, weagree with Stewart that the law provides defendants a qualifiedright to call witnesses at detention hearings. An alternative reading of the statute would have far-reaching consequences. An absolute right would mean that adefendant accused of rape, for example, could compel the victimto testify at a detention hearing in many instances.Undoubtedly, the victim would have information that bears on thenature and circumstances of the offense and the weight of theevidence. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a), (b). The same would betrue in cases of attempted murder, robbery, aggravated assault, 15 and many other offenses. Yet there is no basis to believe theLegislature had that in mind when it drafted the CJRA. To thecontrary, it borrowed language from other laws that stood for avery different approach. To determine the nature of the qualified right to presentwitnesses, we consider the different aspects of a typicaldetention hearing. Once again, the hearing has two components:the State must establish probable cause, unless there is anindictment, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2), and must present clearand convincing evidence to justify detention, see N.J.S.A.2A:162-18(a)(1). We address each in turn. To establish probable cause in the context of an arrest,courts examine whether the police had a “well-grounded suspicionthat a crime has been committed” and that the defendantcommitted it. State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 24 (2018)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “That showingcalls for more than a mere suspicion of guilt but less evidencethan is needed to convict at trial.” Ingram, 230 N.J. at 213-14(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 243 n.13 (1983) (“[P]robablecause requires only a probability or substantial chance ofcriminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”).That “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018). 16 Traditionally, judicial officers have reviewed writtenaffidavits to decide whether probable cause exists. See R. 3:3-1(a)(1); R. 3:4-1(a)(2). Although defendants have a right to ahearing to determine probable cause under Rule 3:4-3(a), thathearing is not required by the Constitution. State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 536 (1960); State v. Ingram, 449 N.J. Super. 94, 104(App. Div.), aff’d, 230 N.J. 190 (2017). And in practice,probable cause hearings are rarely held. Today, under the CJRA,the State may proceed by proffer to establish probable cause atdetention hearings. See Ingram, 230 N.J. at 213. According tothe Administrative Office of the Courts, the State ordinarilydoes so. In essence, decisions about probable cause, bothbefore and after the enactment of the CJRA, have routinely beenmade without live testimony. Ultimately, the question of probable cause presents judgeswith but one choice to make: either there is sufficientprobable cause to proceed with a case, or there is not. Againstthat backdrop, as to the issue of probable cause, we find thatbefore being allowed to call an adverse witness, a defendantmust proffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to negatethe State’s showing of probable cause. Suppose the State presents an affidavit with astraightforward set of facts that appear to establish probablecause. In practice, a defendant’s proffer would have to reveal 17 how the testimony of an adverse witness would tend to show thatprobable cause is lacking. Minor inconsistencies in a witness’stestimony, for example, might raise credibility questions butwould not tend to negate the existence of probable cause. Thesame is true for immaterial facts. Undermining them could castdoubt on parts of the State’s presentation yet not tend to showthat probable cause is absent. In other words, it is not enoughfor a defendant to proffer that a witness has evidence that maybe relevant in some way; the proffered evidence must tend tonegate probable cause. A more flexible standard is needed to decide when adefendant may call an adverse witness to challenge the State’scase for detention because that decision is more complex thandetermining probable cause. As to detention, both sides havethe right to present information about the nature andcircumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, thenature of the danger to the community, the risk of flight, andthe risk of obstruction. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a), (b), (d),and (e). Those issues invite qualitative judgments, not “yes”or “no” answers. The test advanced by the Attorney Generalacknowledges that distinction. At the hearing, the State must shoulder its heavy burden ofestablishing grounds for detention by clear and convincingevidence. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1). If it fails to do so, the 18 CJRA calls for the defendant’s release, and there would be noneed for further testimony by witnesses the defense might wishto call. If, on the other hand, the court tentatively believedthe State had satisfied its burden, we conclude that thefollowing standard should apply: Before being allowed to callan adverse witness on the issue of detention, a defendant mustproffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to undermine theState’s evidence in support of detention in a material way.Thus, a defendant’s proffer must tend to reveal a good-faithbasis to believe that the witness will testify favorably to theaccused on an issue that is both relevant and material to thedecision whether to detain the defendant. Stated otherwise, theproffer must tend to negate the propriety of detention. At the hearing, defendants may of course proceed by profferand present relevant police reports and other documents to thecourt. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1).3 In many instances, that maywell obviate the need to summon an adverse witness. Beforebeing allowed to call a witness or victim whose testimony isalready described in a police report or affidavit, a defendantwould need to proffer why live testimony is needed as well.3 The Appellate Division properly granted defendant’s motion to supplement the record with police reports in this case, which were plainly relevant. 19 The above standard would limit efforts to summon a witnessto impeach her credibility on a non-material point, and wouldavert a fishing expedition for discovery. To be clear, after weighing a defense proffer, judges havediscretion to accept and rely on the proffer, or not, and tocompel an adverse witness to appear, or not. See Stewart, 453 N.J. Super. at 71. When a witness appears, trial courts alsoretain broad discretion to control the proceedings. Among othersteps, judges may curtail questioning to avoid repetition andensure that the testimony stays focused only on relevant issues;they can limit examinations to “protect witnesses fromharassment or undue embarrassment,” see N.J.R.E. 611(a); andthey can limit questions about a witness’s whereabouts forlegitimate safety reasons. The above standards seek to balance a number of concerns.They are designed to enable defendants to challenge motions forpretrial detention and protect a vital liberty interest; tospare the State’s witnesses from the equivalent of a mini-trialshortly after an arrest; and to underscore the trial judge’sauthority to control detention hearings. A judge’s decision whether to allow a defendant to compelan adverse witness to testify at a detention hearing is subjectto review for abuse of discretion. See State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 20 497, 500 (2018). Here, because defendant pled guilty, we do notreview the trial court’s decision to detain him pretrial. VI. For the reasons stated above, we find that defendants havea qualified right to call adverse witnesses at detentionhearings, and we outline standards to guide that issue.Defendant’s appeal is dismissed as moot. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 21