Title: In re Summer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50870
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2005

FILED:  February 3, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
D. SCOTT SUMMER,
Accused.
(OSB 01-199; SC S50870)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 10, 2004.
Christ. T. Troupis, Troupis &amp; Summer, Meridian, Idaho,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the accused.
Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the Oregon
State Bar.
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 180 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision.
PER CURIAM
This lawyer disciplinary proceeding involves an Idaho
lawyer (the accused) also licensed to practice law in Oregon,
whom the Oregon State Bar (Bar) contends attempted to recover
twice for a client's injuries.  The Bar's complaint alleged that
the accused violated several rules of the Oregon Code of
Professional Responsibility (1) and Oregon statutes or, if the
choice of law provision of Oregon State Bar Rule of Procedure
(BR) 1.4(b) required application of Idaho's rules, several Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The trial panel concluded that
the accused violated Oregon Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(2)
(committing criminal act reflecting adversely on lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law); DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation); DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly making false
statements of fact in course of client's representation); and ORS 
9.527(4) (authorizing sanctions for willful deceit or
misconduct).  The trial panel also concluded that it lacked
"jurisdiction" to consider the alleged Idaho rule violations. 
The trial panel imposed a 30-day suspension.
The Bar sought review under ORS 9.536(1) and BR 10.1. 
It does not dispute the trial panel's findings, but argues that
the accused's misconduct warrants at least a 180-day suspension
from the practice of law.  The accused maintains that he did not
commit the violations alleged, but asserts that, if this court
holds otherwise, the court should impose a lesser sanction in
light of the applicable mitigating factors. 
We review the record de novo, and the Bar has the
burden of establishing the alleged misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6; BR 5.2.  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), and DR 7-102(A)(5) (2) and that the
appropriate sanction is a 180-day suspension from the practice of
law.
I.  FACTS
The following facts either are undisputed or have been
established by clear and convincing evidence.  The accused became
a member of both the Idaho and Oregon bars in April 1996.  Soon
thereafter, the accused assumed a heavy caseload at a high-volume
personal injury law firm in Nampa, Idaho. (3)  To process each
case, the accused relied on support staff to obtain medical
records, provide him with summaries of those records, and
assemble pertinent records that supported demand letters that he
drafted.  In negotiating settlement with insurers, it was common
firm practice and the accused's practice to instruct staff to
withhold any medical records that might be adverse to a client's
claim.  The accused, nonetheless, retained final approval and
authority over all demand letters and supporting documentation. 
Michael White was one of the accused's first clients. 
White was involved in two unrelated automobile accidents within
11 days of each other on April 4 and 15, 1996.  Neither accident
was White's fault.  The first accident occurred in Idaho. 
Immediately after the first accident, White received emergency
medical treatment for face, mouth, and dental injuries; bruised
ribs, knees, and shoulder; and some back and neck injuries. 
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance (State Farm) insured the at-fault driver in that accident.  The second accident occurred in
Oregon, but involved a driver and truck from an Idaho-based
company, Boise Cascade.  Shortly after the second accident, White
told Boise Cascade's Oregon claims adjuster that he had not been
injured in that accident.
White continued receiving medical treatment for
injuries sustained in the first accident, although much of that
chiropractic, physical therapy, and dental care took place after
the second accident occurred. 
White retained the accused to represent him in his 
injury claim against State Farm.  The accused sent a letter of
representation to State Farm in May 1996.  After receiving the
letter, State Farm learned about White's second accident with
Boise Cascade, a self-insured entity.  State Farm conferred with
Boise Cascade more than once concerning White's second accident.  
On September 20, 1996, the accused sent State Farm a
demand letter describing White's injuries as, among other things,
lacerated gums, loosened front teeth, violent insult to entire
spinal structure, and "continued pain, soreness, and stiffness." 
Supporting those claims, the accused also submitted White's
emergency care, medical, dental, chiropractic, and physical
therapy records. 
State Farm responded to the accused by inquiring about
White's second accident.  The accused consulted White, then
replied on October 8, 1996, stating that the accused was unaware
of the second accident because White had not been injured in that
accident.  State Farm independently assessed the value of White's
injuries and settled the claim for $10,500 on October 30, 1996.  
One week thereafter, on November 6, 1996, the accused
sent a demand letter to Boise Cascade stating that, although
White had been in an earlier accident, White "did not suffer any
symptoms nor did he seek treatment until after the accident and
injuries caused by [Boise Cascade]." (4)  The accused further
claimed that Boise Cascade caused White "neck, back, and a
laceration to [the] mouth" injuries.  The accused demanded $9,081
to settle White's claim.  Although the accused included with his
demand letter some new medical records from White's orthopedist
and internist, he also submitted the same physical therapy,
chiropractic, and dental records that he previously sent to State
Farm. (5)  
Because its claims adjuster reported White uninjured in
the Boise Cascade accident, and because many of the submitted
medical records referenced the first accident as the source of
White's injuries, Boise Cascade denied White's claim, alerted
State Farm, and contacted Idaho's insurance fraud investigation
department.  
State Farm eventually concluded that its settlement
with White was appropriately valued.  However, the State of Idaho
criminally charged the accused and a criminal proceeding
commenced in April 2001.  A jury found the accused guilty of
attempted grand theft by deception under the Idaho criminal code. 
The trial court withheld entry of the judgment and ordered
probation, according to a sentencing procedure available in
Idaho.  
The Bar delayed its own formal proceeding against the
accused at his request, pending completion of his criminal trial
and appeal.  Accordingly, the Bar did not file its final amended
complaint until April 11, 2003, seven years after the events at
issue.  The parties have stipulated that the Idaho Bar also has
commenced but not concluded disciplinary proceedings against the
accused.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Although not a matter of dispute between the parties,
we first consider the threshold issue of choice of law.  BR
1.4(b) provides:
"In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of
Oregon, the rules of professional conduct to be applied
shall be as follows:
"(1) For conduct in connection with a proceeding
in a court before which an attorney has been admitted
to practice, either generally or for purposes of that
proceeding, the rules to be applied shall be the rules
of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the
rules of the court provide otherwise; and 
"(2) For any other conduct,
"(A) If the attorney is licensed to practice only in
Oregon, the rules to be applied shall be the Oregon Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Bar Act; and
"(B) If the attorney is licensed to practice in Oregon
and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be
the rules of the jurisdiction in which the attorney
principally practices; provided, however, that if particular
conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another
jurisdiction in which the attorney is licensed to practice,
the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that
conduct."
BR 1.4(b) (emphasis added).
The accused principally practices law in Idaho.  Thus, 
the trial panel erred when it asserted that it did not have
"jurisdiction" to consider Idaho's disciplinary rule violations
unless, consistently with the second clause of BR 1.4(b)(2)(B),
the accused's conduct had its "predominant effect" in
Oregon. (6) 
Although the accused principally practiced law at his
firm's Idaho office, he occasionally practiced out of its Oregon
office, and he is admitted to practice in both jurisdictions. 
The first accident occurred in Idaho, but the second accident
occurred in Oregon.  Boise Cascade is principally an Idaho
company, but its claims adjuster was located in Oregon.  That
adjuster collected accident information from White in Oregon and
was the first to receive the accused's Boise Cascade demand
letter.
It follows, then, that the effects of the accused's
conduct were felt in both Oregon and Idaho.  It could be argued
that the accused's acts had approximately equal impact in each
jurisdiction.  However, neither party has argued for the
exclusive application of Idaho's rules, and both have briefed and
argued under Oregon's disciplinary rules. (7)  In effect, the
parties have litigated this proceeding as if the accused's acts
had their predominant effect in Oregon.  Where that conclusion is
at least plausible, we will accept it and proceed accordingly by
applying Oregon's disciplinary rules.
III.  OREGON DISCIPLINARY RULE VIOLATIONS
A.  DR 1-102(A)(2)
DR 1-102(A)(2) provides that "[i]t is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to * * *[c]ommit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness[,] or
fitness to practice law[.]"  The court first must determine what
criminal act the accused committed, then whether that act
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness to practice law.  In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 120-21, 949
P2d 710 (1997).  For the rule to apply, the lawyer need not be
convicted of the crime, nor must criminal conduct be established
beyond a reasonable doubt; the Bar need only establish the
criminal act by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Lawrence,
332 Or 502, 507, 31 P3d 1078 (2001); In re Anson, 302 Or 446,
453-54, 730 P2d 1229 (1986).
Because the accused was criminally charged in Idaho, we
first turn to the legal standards of Idaho Code section 18-2403(1) and (2)(a).  Under that statute, a person is guilty of
theft by deception when that person (1) has the intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate it for another; and (2)
wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds property by
deception. (8)        On de novo review, we find that the Bar
established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had
the requisite intent to deprive Boise Cascade of $9,081 and
attempted to do so by deception.
The accused argues that White suffered injuries in each
accident and had legitimate claims against both State Farm and
Boise Cascade.  He further argues that, although he acted
negligently in his correspondence to Boise Cascade and in
supervising the selection and submission of supporting medical
records, he did not attempt to deceive Boise Cascade.  Rather,
the accused claims it was true that White suffered "no symptoms"
after the first accident and that the accused never falsely
asserted White had been uninjured in that accident.  The accused
further contends that it was true that White did not "seek any
treatment until after the [Boise Cascade] accident" because most
of White's medical care took place after the second accident
occurred. 
The accused's arguments are unconvincing.  Resubmitting
to Boise Cascade the same medical records previously sent to
State Farm does not convey a belief that White had a legitimate
claim against Boise Cascade.  It conveys an intent to obtain a
second recovery for the same injuries and take advantage of the
timing of White's medical care.  Further, the accused knew that
he falsely attributed White's neck, back, and mouth injuries to
the second accident.  In testimony before the trial panel, the
accused admitted that it was "not a completely true statement" to
make such attributions.  More to the point, the record is clear
and convincing that the accused's statement was false.  
The accused also admitted in his testimony that he made
a conscious effort not to disclose anything to insurers "that
would be damning to [his] client" and that he had instructed
staff to select supporting medical documentation accordingly. 
Consciously employing such tactics in this instance evinces a
clear intention to deprive Boise Cascade of money wrongfully.
Finally, even if this court were to accept the
accused's distinction between symptoms and injuries, asserting to
Boise Cascade that White suffered "no symptoms" after the first
accident remains deceitful and untrue.  White received extensive
emergency room treatment after the first accident, which
demonstrates the presence of both injuries and "symptoms."  
We conclude that the accused attempted to deceive Boise
Cascade when he falsely attributed White's neck, back, and mouth
injuries to the second accident and obscured their source.  We
further conclude that the accused bolstered his deceit by
resubmitting medical records from White's first accident claim
against State Farm.  Finally, we conclude that the accused
committed those acts with the intent to wrongfully deprive Boise
Cascade of property.  As such, the Bar established by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused committed the criminal act
of attempted theft by deception under Idaho law. (9) 
Turning to our second inquiry under DR 1-102(A)(2),
this court generally has held that theft reflects adversely on a
lawyer's fitness to practice law.  See Kimmell, 332 Or at 486. 
That is particularly true when the theft occurs in connection
with the lawyer's practice.  See In re Morin, 319 Or 547, 878 P2d
393 (1994) (accused lawyer disbarred after selling invalid wills
and living trusts packages to clients).  Here, the accused's
attempted theft by deception reflects adversely on his honesty,
trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law, in violation of DR
1-102(A)(2).
B.  DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5)   
DR 1-102(A)(3) provides that "[i]t is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to * * * [e]ngage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]"  An
affirmative misrepresentation or misrepresentation by omission in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) must be "knowing, false, and
material."  In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 53, 36 P3d 468 (2001)
(citations omitted).  The "materiality" requirement refers to
information that, "would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process."  Id.  This court has explained
that misrepresentations by omission involve information that the
lawyer had in mind and failed to disclose and that the lawyer
knows is material to the case at hand.  In re Gustafson, 327 Or
636, 648, 968 P2d 367 (1998).
DR 7-102(A)(5) provides that "[i]n the lawyer's
representation of a client * * *, a lawyer shall not * * *
[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact." 
Based on our analysis of DR 1-102(A)(2), we already
have concluded that the accused engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty and deceit, and did so intentionally to deprive Boise
Cascade of money.  Similarly, we conclude that the accused made
both affirmative misrepresentations and misrepresentations by
omission to Boise Cascade.  White suffered "symptoms" after the
first accident, received most of his medical treatment for those
"symptoms," and never injured his mouth in the second accident. 
The accused misrepresented all those facts to Boise Cascade.  The
accused also failed to disclose to Boise Cascade that White had
recovered from State Farm for the same or similar injuries.  
The accused made the above misrepresentations to Boise
Cascade knowingly.  The accused settled White's State Farm claim
just one week before he sent his demand letter to Boise Cascade. 
Three weeks before that, the accused represented to State Farm
that White had been uninjured in the Boise Cascade accident.  We
infer from those facts that the first accident was in the
accused's mind when he made contrary representations to Boise
Cascade and when he instructed his staff to select only those
medical records that supported the purported second accident
claim. 
Finally, the accused's knowing and false statements
concerning whether and to what extent White was injured were
material.  And, contrary to the accused's arguments, Boise
Cascade's ultimate denial of White's claim does not alter that
conclusion.  As noted, materiality is not limited to
circumstances in which a misrepresentation successfully misleads,
but to those that "would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process."  Eadie, 333 Or at 53.  Boise
Cascade's claims manager testified before the trial panel that a
lawyer's statements have such an influence because they can
constitute "the entire basis for * * * negotiation."  The
accused's misrepresentations could have caused Boise Cascade to
expend its resources investigating White's claim, analyzing its
value, and negotiating settlement.  Because the accused's
statements could have influenced those decisions significantly,
they were material.
By making false, knowing, and material
misrepresentations to Boise Cascade, the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).  Because the accused made knowing and false statements
of fact in the course of White's representation, he also violated
DR 7-102(A)(5). 
IV.  SANCTION
In determining the appropriate sanction, we consider
the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), and this court's
case law.  Kimmell, 332 Or at 487-88. 
A.  Preliminary Sanction
We begin by determining a preliminary sanction under
the ABA Standards.  Under those standards, we examine the duty
that the accused lawyer violated, his or her mental state, and
the extent of the actual or potential injury that the misconduct
caused.
Here, the accused violated his duty to the public to
maintain standards of personal integrity pursuant to ABA Standard
5.1:
"The most fundamental duty which a lawyer owes to
the public is the duty to maintain the standards of
personal integrity upon which the community relies. 
The public expects the lawyer to be honest and to abide
by the law; public confidence in the integrity of
officers of the court is undermined when lawyers engage
in illegal conduct."
ABA Standards at 36.  
The mental state of the accused was intentional.  An
intentional state of mind represents a "conscious objective or
purpose to accomplish a particular result."  ABA Standards at 17
(defining "intent").  The facts establish that the accused had
the conscious objective to obtain a second recovery for his
client's injuries.
Finally, the accused's conduct caused potential injury
to Boise Cascade.  Had Boise Cascade paid White's claim as
demanded, it would have been injured by paying an unwarranted
$9,081 claim.   
A preliminary sanction of disbarment is warranted when
a lawyer engages in (1) serious criminal conduct involving
misrepresentation, fraud, misappropriation or theft as an
element; or (2) engages in any other intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
"seriously [and] adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice" law.  ABA Standards 5.11(a), (b).  Because the
accused's attempted theft by deception involves serious criminal
conduct, disbarment is warranted as a preliminary sanction. 
B.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
We next consider the applicable aggravating and
mitigating factors.  Referring to ABA Standard 9.22, the Bar
agrees with the trial panel regarding the following aggravating
factors:  (1) the accused acted with a dishonest or selfish
motive; and (2) the accused committed multiple offenses.  ABA
Standards 9.22(b), (d).  The accused argues against a finding of
selfish motive because his percentage of any recovery from Boise
Cascade would have been minimal.  The accused further argues that
he has not committed multiple offenses, but rather that he
committed one bad act that has been charged under multiple rules. 
We agree with the accused in part.  The accused has not committed
multiple violations by engaging in multiple acts.  However, for
the reasons already discussed, we find that the accused acted
with a dishonest motive pursuant to ABA Standard 9.22(b). 
The Bar agrees that the trial panel correctly found the
following mitigating factors under ABA Standard 9.32:  (1) the
accused has no prior disciplinary record; and (2) the accused was
inexperienced in the practice of law.  ABA Standards 9.32(a),
(f).  On de novo review, we also agree.  In addition, we further
find that Idaho's past and pending imposition of other criminal
penalties and disciplinary sanctions is a third mitigating
factor.  ABA Standard 9.32(k); See also In re Page, 326 Or 572,
579-80, 955 P2d 239 (1998) (imposition of bar discipline from
another jurisdiction is mitigating factor).  We will not consider
as mitigating the significant seven-year delay in bringing this
disciplinary proceeding, because the accused contributed to that
delay by choosing to focus on his criminal trial and appeal.  ABA
Standard 9.32(i); cf. In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 201, 951 P2d 149
(1997) (delay in disciplinary proceeding may operate as
mitigating factor when lawyer does not contribute to delay).  
C.  Oregon Case Law
Finally, in determining an appropriate sanction, this
court examines the accused's conduct in light of our prior case
law.  The Bar argues that a 180-day suspension from the practice
of law is warranted under the following line of cases involving
fraud and theft:  Kimmell, 332 Or 480 (180-day suspension for
Class A misdemeanor theft of jacket); In re Benson, 317 Or 164,
854 P2d 466 (1993) (180-day suspension after recording fraudulent
encumbrance to deter forfeiture proceedings on client's
property); In re Benett, 331 Or 270, 14 P3d 66 (2000) (180-day
suspension after receiving and  then refusing to refund opposing
counsel's inadvertent duplicate payment). 
In cases involving fraud, theft, or misrepresentation,
this court has imposed a range of sanctions depending on the
nature and type of theft or misrepresentation.  This court has
stated that "theft from a client is the most egregious form of
theft that can be committed by a lawyer and generally warrants
disbarment."  See Kimmell, 332 Or at 490 (citing In re King, 320
Or 354, 883 P2d 1291 (1994) (so stating); In re Phelps, 306 Or
508, 520, 760 P2d 1331 (1988)  (when lawyer "steals funds from a
client, the sanction is disbarment" despite mitigating factors);
In re Pierson, 280 Or 513, 518, 571 P2d 907 (1977) (single
conversion of client funds will result in disbarment)).  
On the other hand, this court's cases also demonstrate
that theft from someone other than a client that occurs outside
the practice of law generally will not result in disbarment or a
lengthy suspension.  Id. at 490-91 (citing In re Mahr, 276 Or
939, 556 P2d 1359 (1976) (90-day suspension for theft of plug
socket from store)); In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 683 P2d 992
(1984) (public reprimand for conversion of wife's joint ownership
interest in vehicle)).
Although this court distinguishes between those thefts
resulting in harm to a client and those that do not, this court
takes seriously any theft and misrepresentation that occurs
within the practice of law.  See In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 13
P3d 994 (2000) (two-year suspension for misrepresentations in
motions filed with court).
In Benson, this court imposed a 180-day suspension when
a lawyer violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and two other
disciplinary rules.  Benson, 317 Or at 166, 168.  That accused
lawyer filed fraudulent encumbrances on his client's property
with the intent to assist the client in illegally interfering
with the property's impending forfeiture.  Id. at 166-67. 
Although that accused lawyer had only one prior disciplinary
violation, the "significant and ongoing potential for harm to the
criminal justice system" warranted this court's imposition of a
180-day suspension from the practice of law.  Id. at 170-71. 
In Benett, that accused lawyer violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
when he received and retained a second payment made by opposing
counsel after a first payment failed to clear the bank.  Benett,
331 Or at 272-73.  That accused lawyer ultimately retained both
payments when opposing counsel reissued a second check and the
bank cleared the first check.  Id.  That accused lawyer failed to
notify opposing counsel that the first check had cleared and
later represented to opposing counsel that the overpayment
settled an additional claim against the client in question.  Id.
at 273.  This court imposed a 180-day suspension, because that
accused lawyer committed multiple offenses and because several
aggravating factors applied.  Id. at 281-82.
Here, the accused committed a criminal act within the
practice of law, as did the accused lawyer in Benson, and acted
with dishonesty within the practice of law, as did the accused
lawyer in Benett.  Notwithstanding mitigating factors, we
conclude that a 180-day suspension from the practice of law is
the sanction most consistent with our past treatment of similar
misconduct.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 180 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision. 
1. The parties tried and this court has decided this
proceeding under the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility
and not the new Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct that became
effective on January 1, 2005.
2. We have not considered, in addition to the Oregon
disciplinary rule violations, the accused's alleged violation of
ORS 9.527(4).  As this court reasoned in In re Kimmell, 332 Or
480, 487, 31 P3d 414 (2001), further consideration of statutory
violations "generally [will] not serve[] to enhance the
sanction." 
3. The firm maintained, and the accused occasionally
worked at, an Oregon office as well.
4. The accused first sent that demand letter to Boise
Cascade's Oregon claims adjuster in Oregon, who then forwarded
the letter to Boise Cascade's principal office in Idaho.
5. Omitted from the dental record was a chart notation
marking the date of the first accident.  Also included was a May
1996 emergency room record for "Michelle White." The Bar argued,
but did not establish by clear and convincing evidence, that the
accused either had altered the medical records directly or had
knowledge of those alterations and submissions.  The accused's
legal assistant, who purportedly assembled the medical records,
testified that she had no knowledge of the alterations or how
Michelle White's records had been included with the Boise Cascade
demand letter. 
6. The trial panel concluded that it lacked "jurisdiction"
to apply Idaho's disciplinary rules, but what is at issue here is
choice of law, not "jurisdiction."   
7. The Bar provided some analysis under the disciplinary
rules of Idaho, but argued that Oregon's rules should apply.  The
accused argued against adding Idaho disciplinary rule violations
to the Oregon rule violations already alleged, and he appeared to
concentrate his arguments under Oregon's rules.
8. Idaho Code section 18-2403 provides:
"(1) A person steals property and commits theft
when, with intent to deprive another of property or to
appropriate the same to himself or to a third person,
he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property
from an owner thereof.
"(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining
or withholding of another's property, with the intent
prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed
in any of the following ways:
"(a) By deception obtains or exerts control over
property of the owner[.]"
9. Our finding is further supported by the Idaho
jury's guilty verdict that the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed in State v. Summer, 139 Idaho 219, 76 P3d 963
(2003).