Title: In the Matter of:  Terry Lee Smith
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91S00-1603-DI-136
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 25, 2016

RESPONDENT PRO SE 
Terry Lee Smith 
Reynolds, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT  
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Secretary 
Seth T. Pruden, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 91S00-1603-DI-136 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TERRY LEE SMITH, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________ 
 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Robert C. Reiling, Jr. 
_________________________________ 
 
 
October 25, 2016 
 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission filed a “Verified Complaint for 
Disciplinary Action” against Respondent Terry Lee Smith, charging him with attorney 
misconduct based on actions taken while prosecuting a defendant’s retrial.  Respondent’s 1977 
admission to this state’s bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction.  See IND. 
CONST. art. 7, § 4.   
 
This matter is now before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 
Court to hear evidence on the verified complaint and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties.  
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Respondent did not engage in attorney 
misconduct as charged and therefore enter judgment in Respondent’s favor.  
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 25 2016, 9:59 am
 
 
2 
Procedural Background and Facts 
 
 
At relevant times, Respondent served as a deputy prosecuting attorney in White County.  
In 2011, Respondent represented the State during the trial of Ryan Bean on child molestation 
charges.  Bean was convicted and appealed.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a 
new trial, holding Bean’s confession to police was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights and should not have been admitted into evidence.  Bean v. State, 973 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2012), trans. denied. 
 
 
Respondent again represented the State during Bean’s retrial in 2013.  Respondent’s 
actions during that retrial, which we examine below, provide the basis of the allegations in this 
disciplinary proceeding.  Bean was convicted following retrial, appealed, and again had his 
conviction reversed, this time upon the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that improper vouching and 
prosecutorial misconduct cumulatively amounted to fundamental error.  Bean v. State, 15 N.E.3d 
12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Bean II”), trans. denied.  Bean eventually pled guilty to lesser charges.     
 
 
The Commission charged Respondent with violating Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 
8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice during Bean’s retrial.  
Following a hearing, the hearing officer filed his report to this Court on April 28, 2016, 
concluding that the Commission had not met its burden of proving that Respondent violated Rule 
8.4(d) as charged.  
 
Discussion 
 
The Commission has petitioned this Court to review the hearing officer’s findings and 
conclusions.  The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate attorney misconduct by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23(14)(i).  While the 
review process in disciplinary cases involves a de novo examination of all matters presented to 
the Court, the hearing officer’s findings nevertheless receive emphasis due to the unique 
opportunity for direct observation of witnesses.  See Matter of Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 
(Ind. 2012).   
 
 
3 
We first address the Commission’s threshold argument that Bean II should be given 
preclusive effect in this disciplinary proceeding.  The Commission concedes “that res judicata 
does not technically apply when there is no exact privity of parties.”  (Pet. for Review at 13).  
Nevertheless, the Commission argues that the underlying question of Respondent’s misconduct 
is the same in both proceedings, and therefore the Court of Appeals’ conclusions in this regard 
should now be treated as “conclusively established.”  (Id. at 14).   
 
We agree with the hearing officer’s conclusion that Bean II is not dispositive of this 
disciplinary matter.  “It is the exclusive province of this Court to regulate professional legal 
activity.”  Matter of Mitthower, 693 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. 1998).  While appellate claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct and disciplinary allegations of Rule 8.4(d) violations may share some 
similarities, the analyses are not exactly the same, nor are the parties and interests at stake in the 
proceedings the same.  A criminal appeal examines the propriety of a defendant’s conviction, not 
whether an attorney’s conduct merits professional discipline.  Respondent was not a party to the 
criminal appeal and did not have an opportunity prior to the instant proceedings to defend his 
own professional conduct.  Moreover, disciplinary proceedings afford the opportunity for 
evidentiary development beyond the cold record available to the Court of Appeals in a criminal 
appeal.  We have previously recognized that a written trial transcript “presents only a small part 
of the whole picture,” see Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. 2012), and in a disciplinary 
proceeding the parties may be able to offer additional evidence that paints a more complete 
picture.   
 
Indeed, that is precisely what has happened here.  The Commission alleges that 
Respondent committed misconduct in three respects – first, by improperly eliciting testimony 
from the county sheriff (“Sheriff Shafer”) about Bean’s confession, in violation of an order in 
limine; second, by eliciting improper vouching; and third, by making statements during closing 
argument that were inaccurate and that placed undue emphasis on the improper vouching 
testimony.  However, we agree with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the evidence adduced 
in these proceedings fails to prove the Commission’s allegations. 
 
 
 
4 
On this first issue, the hearing officer credited Respondent’s disciplinary testimony that 
he specifically instructed Sheriff Shafer prior to his trial testimony not to mention the police 
interview.  By contrast, the trial transcript is largely silent on this point.  The Commission 
concedes that Respondent did not directly ask Sheriff Shafer about the interview but argues that 
asking Sheriff Shafer questions about his investigation “necessarily included the interview 
assuming Sheriff Shafer was going to answer the question completely and truthfully.”  (Pet. for 
Review at 11).1  This argument rests on the untenable proposition that Respondent, having fully 
and accurately advised Sheriff Shafer of the order in limine, nonetheless should have anticipated 
that Sheriff Shafer would violate that order in responding to generally-worded questions about 
his investigation.  While Sheriff Shafer’s reference to the interview unquestionably was 
improper, the Commission has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
elicited that reference.    
 
On the second issue, the Commission focuses largely on testimony by Darrel Noonkester 
(an investigator for the Indiana Department of Child Services) that he and his agency 
“substantiated” the allegations.2  This term of art was not encompassed by the trial court’s order 
in limine and its brief use by Respondent and Noonkester prompted no objection.  Further, Bean 
II acknowledged divergent lines of Court of Appeals’ precedent on the propriety of 
“substantiation” testimony, Respondent testified he attempted to craft his questions consistently 
with appellate guidance and the order in limine, and the hearing officer credited that testimony.  
We agree with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the Commission has failed to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed misconduct by eliciting improper 
vouching testimony. 
 
                                                 
1 Sheriff Shafer’s brief mention of an interview occurred at the end of a longer answer to Respondent’s 
open-ended question, made in reference to police investigations of molestations that are not immediately 
disclosed, “So, what do you do?”  (Comm’n Ex. 3 at 130). 
 
2 The victim’s mother volunteered at one point that she believed the victim after talking with her.  (Id. at 
46-47).  Respondent also asked the mother’s boyfriend if he believed the victim after talking with her; 
however, a defense objection was sustained and the question was not answered.  (Id. at 93).  The 
Commission’s petition for review does not mention the question Respondent asked the boyfriend and 
mentions the mother’s volunteered statement only in passing. 
 
 
5 
On the third issue, the evidence in these disciplinary proceedings includes the audio 
recording of Respondent’s closing argument, which differs from the written transcript.  The 
Court of Appeals held in Bean II that Respondent’s statement in closing argument that Sheriff 
Shafer “substantiated” the allegations against Bean was inaccurate.  However, the audio 
recording demonstrates that Respondent did not actually make the statement attributed to him in 
the written transcript; rather, Respondent stated that Sheriff Shafer arrested Bean.  We agree with 
the hearing officer that this is a material difference.  As reflected in the audio recording, 
Respondent’s closing argument accurately described Sheriff Shafer’s testimony.   
 
Still, the Commission faults Respondent for referring in the same passage of closing 
argument to Noonkester’s “substantiation” testimony and to the belief of the victim’s mother and 
the mother’s boyfriend that the victim was telling the truth.  For the reasons described above, 
Respondent had no basis at this juncture to believe that a brief reference to “substantiation” was 
improper.  And while we are more troubled by Respondent’s subsequent statement about the 
belief of the victim’s mother and her boyfriend, under the circumstances of this case we cannot 
conclude that this isolated comment, standing alone, rises to the level of conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice under Rule 8.4(d).      
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court concludes that the Commission has not met its burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d). We 
therefore enter judgment in favor of Respondent.  The hearing officer appointed in this case is 
discharged.   
 
All Justices concur.