Title: Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-1371
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2013

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1371 
____________ 
 
DIAMOND AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC.,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
ALAN HOROWITCH,  
Appellee. 
 
[January 10, 2013] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of four questions of Florida law 
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that are 
determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no 
controlling precedent.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
The four certified questions before this Court are:   
DOES FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 ENTITLE A PREVAILING 
DEFENDANT TO AN ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD IN A CASE IN 
WHICH A PLAINTIFF BRINGS AN UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES CLAIM UNDER THE FDUTPA [FLORIDA 
DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT], BUT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DECIDES THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE 
 
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LAW OF A DIFFERENT STATE GOVERNS THE UNFAIR 
TRADE PRACTICES CLAIM, AND THE DEFENDANT 
ULTIMATELY PREVAILS ON THAT CLAIM? 
 
IF FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 APPLIES UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN THE PREVIOUS 
QUESTION, DOES IT APPLY ONLY TO THE PERIOD OF 
LITIGATION UP TO THE POINT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
HELD THAT THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT PURSUE THE 
FDUTPA CLAIM BECAUSE FLORIDA LAW DID NOT APPLY 
TO HIS UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES CLAIM, OR DOES IT 
APPLY TO THE ENTIRETY OF THE LITIGATION? 
 
DOES FLA. STAT. § 768.79 APPLY TO CASES THAT SEEK 
EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO MONEY 
DAMAGES; AND, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT GENERALLY APPLY 
TO SUCH CASES, IS THERE ANY EXCEPTION FOR 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE 
RELIEF IS SERIOUSLY LACKING IN MERIT? 
 
UNDER FLA. STAT. § 768.79 AND RULE 1.442, IS A 
DEFENDANT’S OFFER OF JUDGMENT VALID IF, IN A CASE 
IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS ATTORNEY’S FEES, 
THE OFFER PURPORTS TO SATISFY ALL CLAIMS BUT FAILS 
TO SPECIFY WHETHER ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE INCLUDED 
AND FAILS TO SPECIFY WHETHER ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE 
PART OF THE LEGAL CLAIM? 
 
Horowitch v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc., 645 F.3d 1254, 1262-67 (11th Cir. 
2011).  
The action from which these certified questions arose involves a contract 
dispute between Dr. Alan Horowitch, M.D., a resident of the State of Arizona, and 
Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc., a foreign corporation that operates in Florida 
and has an agent here.  In June 2004, Horowitch contracted to buy a single engine 
 
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jet aircraft from Diamond Aircraft for the price of $850,000.  Diamond Aircraft, 
however, failed to deliver the aircraft to Horowitch and refused to complete the 
transaction unless he paid a purchase price of at least $1,380,000.  Consequently, 
Horowitch filed an action against Diamond Aircraft in the Circuit Court for the 
Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida in which he sought specific performance of the 
contract with Diamond Aircraft and claimed that Diamond Aircraft breached both 
the terms of the contract and the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.  
Horowitch filed the action in a Florida state court with the contract at issue 
containing a provision that established exclusive jurisdiction and venue in Florida 
for all disputes and controversies arising from the contract.    
The action filed in state court was removed to the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida.  After removal of the action, Horowitch 
amended his complaint.  The amended complaint provided four claims:  (1) 
specific performance of the contract; and, in the alternative, (2) breach of contract; 
(3) breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) deceptive trade 
practices under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).  
Horowitch demanded attorney’s fees pursuant to a prevailing party attorney’s fees 
provision provided under FDUTPA.   
Pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2011), Diamond Aircraft served 
Horowitch with an offer of judgment for $40,000.  The offer of judgment stated:  
 
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Diamond Aircraft offers to settle this case on the following terms:  
 
1. 
Diamond Aircraft shall pay Plaintiff the sum of forty thousand 
dollars ($40,000.00).   
 
2. 
This offer is intended to resolve all claims that were or could 
have been asserted by Plaintiff against Diamond Aircraft in the 
Amended Complaint filed March 15, 2007.  The condition of 
this offer is that Plaintiff will dismiss his pending claims 
against Diamond Aircraft, with prejudice to re-file.  
 
3. 
This offer shall remain open for thirty (30) days from the date 
hereof.  Failure to accept this offer within thirty (30) days shall 
be deemed a rejection of this offer under Fla. Stat. § 768.79(1).   
 
4. 
This offer shall be accepted by filing a written acceptance with 
the Court within 30 days after service.  Fla. Stat. § 768.79(4).   
 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
 
Horowitch did not accept this offer and both parties subsequently moved for 
summary judgment.  The federal district court applied Florida law with regard to 
Horowitch’s demand for specific performance of the contract, as well as for his 
claims of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and 
fair dealing.  Application of Florida law caused the trial court to enter a summary 
final judgment on all three of those claims in favor Diamond Aircraft.  With regard 
to the remaining deceptive trade practices claim, the district court permitted the 
claim to proceed, but held that Arizona law (specifically, the Arizona Consumer 
Fraud Act (ACFA)), not Florida law, applied.  The district court reasoned that 
Arizona law was applicable because that state was the location of most of the 
 
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business contacts between the parties.  After a nonjury trial, the district court 
entered judgment in favor of Diamond Aircraft and against Horowitch on the 
deceptive trade practices claim.   
After the final judgment had been entered, Diamond Aircraft moved for 
attorney’s fees.  It claimed entitlement to fees (1) pursuant to the offer of judgment 
it previously served on Horowitch and section 768.79, Florida Statutes; and (2) 
pursuant to the prevailing party attorney’s fee provision provided in FDUTPA 
(section 501.2105, Florida Statutes (2006)).  Diamond Aircraft contended that it 
was entitled to fees under FDUTPA notwithstanding that the district court had 
previously concluded that FDUTPA did not apply to Horowitch’s deceptive trade 
practices claim.  Diamond Aircraft contended that by asserting and seeking 
recovery under FDUTPA, Horowitch had invoked the application of FDUTPA’s 
attorney’s fees provision, even if he did not prevail under that statutory provision.   
The district court denied the motion for attorney’s fees.  The court held that 
section 768.79 was inapplicable because Horowitch asserted both an equitable 
claim for non-monetary relief (specific performance) and, in the alternative, a 
claim for damages based on either breach of contract, breach of implied covenants, 
or a deceptive trade practice by Diamond Aircraft.  The district court also held that 
Diamond Aircraft was not entitled to attorney’s fees under FDUTPA because 
Arizona law and not FDUTPA applied to the deceptive trade practices claim 
 
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advanced by Horowitch.  The district court concluded that Diamond Aircraft was 
not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Arizona law because the ACFA did not 
contain an applicable attorney’s fees provision.  Diamond Aircraft sought review 
of the denial of its motion for attorney’s fees in the Eleventh Circuit.    
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit examined Florida law with regard to 
Diamond Aircraft’s claim for attorney’s fees under FDUTPA and Florida’s offer of 
judgment statute.  See generally Horowitch, 645 F.3d at 1254-67.  The federal 
appellate court concluded that Florida law has not specifically addressed these 
issues and certified the four questions to this Court.  See id.   
FDUTPA CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 
First Certified FDUTPA Question 
DOES FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 ENTITLE A PREVAILING 
DEFENDANT TO AN ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD IN A CASE IN 
WHICH A PLAINTIFF BRINGS AN UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES CLAIM UNDER THE FDUTPA, BUT THE 
DISTRICT COURT DECIDES THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
OF A DIFFERENT STATE GOVERNS THE UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES CLAIM, AND THE DEFENDANT ULTIMATELY 
PREVAILS ON THAT CLAIM? 
 
We answer this question in the affirmative because Horowitch invoked FDUTPA 
by filing an action asserting a claim seeking recovery under that act in which 
Diamond Aircraft ultimately prevailed. 
 
 
 
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Standard of Review and Applicable Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
 
The issue before this Court is a matter of statutory construction, which we 
review de novo.  See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 
2006).  Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the 
construction and application of the statute.  See Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 
1185 (Fla. 2003).  Our statutory analysis begins with the plain meaning of the 
actual language of the statute, as we discern legislative intent primarily from the 
text of the statute.  See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 
2007).  If statutory language is “clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious 
meaning.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, 
Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  In instances of an ambiguity in 
statutory language, we may resort to the rules of statutory construction, which 
permit us to examine the legislative history to aid in our determination regarding 
legislative intent.  See Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993).  It is 
also well-established in Florida that a statute that awards attorney’s fees is in 
derogation of the common law rule that each party pay its own attorney’s fees and 
must be strictly construed.  See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 
So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003).   
 
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FDUTPA and its Attorney’s Fees Provision 
 
Under FDUTPA, the Florida Legislature has declared that deceptive or 
unfair methods of competition and practices in trade and commerce are unlawful.  
See §§ 501.204, 501.2075, Fla. Stat. (2011).  The express legislative purpose of 
FDUTPA is to protect individual consumers and certain defined business activities 
from deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable methods of business competition and 
trade practice.  See id. § 501.202; see also § 501.203(7), Fla. Stat. (2011) (defining 
“consumer” under FDUTPA to include both individuals and certain types of 
business activities).  The Legislature has specifically articulated that the provisions 
of FDUTPA are to be construed liberally with this legislative purpose.  See id. § 
501.202.  To encourage citizens to invoke the protections of FDUTPA and file 
actions under that statute, the Legislature has provided that a prevailing party in a 
FDUTPA action may recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees from the 
nonprevailing party.  See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Governmental Operations, HB 1915 
(1973), Staff Analysis 3-4 (May 3, 1973) (stating that the purpose of the attorney’s 
fees provision in FDUTPA was to “attract private attorneys to accept a consumer’s 
civil case since the attorney would be assured that if his client prevails, he would 
gain a legal fee proportionate to his efforts,” and that the attorney’s fees provision 
“applies to civil litigation arising from a consumer transaction in violation of 
[FDUTPA]”) (available from Fla. Div. of Archives); see also Standard Guar. Ins. 
 
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Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla. 1990) (“[T]he primary purpose of 
these fee-authorizing statutes is to encourage individual citizens to bring civil 
actions that enforce statutory policy.”).   
The Legislature articulated FDUTPA’s attorney’s fees provision in section 
501.2105(1), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides:  
In any civil litigation resulting from an act or practice involving a 
violation of this part, except as provided in subsection (5), the 
prevailing party, after judgment in the trial court and exhaustion of all 
appeals, if any, may receive his or her reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs from the nonprevailing party. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In accordance with the plain language of this provision, to 
recover attorney’s fees in a FDUTPA action, a party must prevail in the litigation; 
meaning that the party must receive a favorable judgment from a trial court with 
regard to the legal action, including the exhaustion of all appeals.  See id.; see also 
Heindel v. Southside Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 476 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1985) (“In summary, we hold that to recover attorney’s fees a party must (1) 
recover judgment on the chapter 501, part II claim, and (2) recover a net judgment 
in the entire case.”).   
Pursuant to the plain language of section 501.2105(1), the attorney’s fees 
provision applies to “any civil litigation” that has resulted from an act or practice 
“involving a violation of this part,” i.e., to an action filed under FDUTPA.  See § 
501.203(3), Fla. Stat. (2011) (defining “[v]iolation of this part” as “any violation of 
 
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[FDUTPA] or the rules adopted under [FDUTPA]” (emphasis added)).  The 
legislative summary in a staff analysis regarding FDUTPA affords further support 
for the principal that the attorney’s fees provision applies to claims asserted under 
FDUTPA, which notes that FDUTPA “[p]rovides for payment of attorney’s fees 
and costs to the prevailing party in an action under [FDUTPA].”  Fla. H.R. Comm. 
on Governmental Operations, HB 1915 (1973), Staff Analysis 13 (May 4, 1973) 
(emphasis added) (available from Fla. Div. of Archives).  Florida’s Third District 
Court of Appeal has applied this interpretation, holding that FDUTPA’s attorney’s 
fees provision applies to a defendant who prevailed in an action filed against him 
under that act, even though the trial court ultimately held that FDUTPA did not 
apply.  See Rustic Village, Inc. v. Friedman, 417 So. 2d 305, 305-06 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1982) (stating that upon a trial court’s finding that a plaintiff filed a claim under 
FDUTPA, an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant is permissible in 
the action, even if the trial court ultimately holds that FDUTPA does not apply).  
This reasoning was followed by Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Brown v. Gardens by the Sea South Condominium Ass’n, 424 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1983).   
 
In Brown, the plaintiff filed an action pursuant to FDUTPA and included a 
claim for attorney’s fees under the act.  See id. at 184.  The defendant prevailed 
when the trial court determined that, because the transaction at issue pertained to 
 
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real estate which does not fall within FDUTPA’s definition of a “consumer 
transaction,” FDUTPA was not applicable to the plaintiff’s claim.  See id.  The 
defendant moved for attorney’s fees under FDUTPA, but the trial court denied that 
motion based on its previous determination that FDUTPA was not applicable to the 
transaction.  See id.  The Fourth District reversed and held that, even though the 
trial court found that FDUTPA was inapplicable, because the plaintiff invoked 
FDUTPA’s protections and filed an action under FDUTPA, the plaintiff, as the 
nonprevailing party, was responsible to the defendant for attorney’s fees under that 
act.  See id.  (“The plaintiff, having invoked the Act, is liable for an attorney’s fee 
because he did not prevail.” (quoting Rustic Village, 417 So. 2d at 306)).1
The Instant Case 
 
 
Diamond Aircraft is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 501.2105(1) 
because Horowitch, similar to the plaintiffs in Brown and Rustic Village, filed an 
action against Diamond Aircraft under FDUTPA and ultimately was the 
nonprevailing party.  By invoking FDUTPA and seeking redress under its remedial 
provisions, Horowitch exposed himself to both the benefits and the possible 
consequences of that act’s provisions.  As recognized in Brown and Rustic Village, 
                                         
1.  In the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, the court relies on BDO Seidman, 
LLP v. British Car Auctions, Inc., 802 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), for its 
conclusion that FDUTPA’s attorney’s fees provision likely applies in this case.  
However, because we recently disapproved of that decision in Southeast Floating 
Docks, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 82 So. 3d 73 (Fla. 2012), we do not rely on 
BDO Seidman.   
 
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simply because FDUTPA is ultimately held to have no application and does not 
provide a plaintiff with a basis for recovery after the provisions of the act have 
been invoked does not negate a defendant’s status as a prevailing party in an action 
filed by a plaintiff under that act.  See Brown, 424 So. 2d at 184; Rustic Village, 
417 So. 2d at 305-06. 
 
We agree with Horowitch that Brown and Rustic Village are factually 
distinguishable from this case.  In Brown, the Fourth District held that FDUTPA 
did not apply because the real estate transaction at issue did not fall within 
FDUTPA’s definition of a “consumer transaction”—not because the law of another 
jurisdiction applied.  See Brown, 424 So. 2d at 184.  Similarly, in Rustic Village, 
the trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff’s FDUTPA 
claim was not covered by the provisions of that act; not because the law of another 
jurisdiction applied.  See Rustic Village, 417 So. 2d at 305-06.  Horowitch claims 
that the distinguishable facts in his case—i.e., that the application of the law of 
another jurisdiction negates his FDUTPA claim—thwarts the application of 
FDUTPA’s attorney’s fees provision.  
We disagree with Horowitch and also view the decision in Love v. 
Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2010), as persuasive.  There, 
the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant for claims under California’s 
statutory and common law rights of publicity.  See id. at 607-08.  California’s 
 
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publicity statute mandates an award of attorney’s fees for “[t]he prevailing party in 
any action under this section.”  Id. at 614 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3344).  A 
federal district court ultimately held that English law rather than California 
statutory and common law applied and dismissed the plaintiff’s action.  See id. at 
607.  The defendant moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to the California publicity 
statute.  See id. at 614.  The district court awarded the defendant attorney’s fees 
pursuant to the California publicity statute and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that 
award.  See id.  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had 
filed an action under California’s right of publicity statute and an award of 
attorney’s fees to the defendant was warranted, notwithstanding that the statute’s 
other substantive provisions did not apply.  See id.  
 
Similarly, in this case, Horowitch filed an action under FDUTPA.  The 
district court held that the law of another jurisdiction applied.  This did not negate 
the fact that Horowitch asserted his initial cause of action under FDUTPA.  Like 
the plaintiff in Love, Horowitch cannot assert and invoke the protections of this act 
by filing a legal action under its provisions, but then rely on the act’s ultimate 
inapplicability as a shield against the application of the act’s attorney’s fees 
provision.  To hold otherwise would negate individual accountability in filing 
actions by permitting meritless filings of FDUTPA claims without recourse for a 
defendant who was forced to defend an action initially filed under a law ultimately 
 
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held to be inapplicable.  As the Fourth District reasoned in Brown, that approach 
would permit the plaintiff to assert claims under FDUTPA pursuant to the dubious 
rationale:  “heads I win, tails you lose.”  Brown, 424 So. 2d at 184. 
 
Therefore, we answer this certified question in the affirmative. 
Second Certified FDUTPA Question 
IF FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 APPLIES UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN THE PREVIOUS 
QUESTION, DOES IT APPLY ONLY TO THE PERIOD OF 
LITIGATION UP TO THE POINT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
HELD THAT THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT PURSUE THE 
FDUTPA CLAIM BECAUSE FLORIDA LAW DID NOT APPLY 
TO HIS UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES CLAIM, OR DOES IT 
APPLY TO THE ENTIRETY OF THE LITIGATION? 
 
We conclude that Diamond Aircraft is entitled to fees but only for the period of 
litigation until the federal district court held that FDUTPA did not apply to 
Horowitch’s claim. 
Scope of Attorney’s Fees Under FDUTPA 
 
Under FDUTPA, a prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs in civil litigation arising from a violation of that act “after judgment in 
the trial court and exhaustion of all appeals.”  § 501.2105(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).  To 
recover attorney’s fees, subsection 501.2105(2) provides that the attorney for the 
prevailing party must submit a sworn affidavit regarding the time expended 
litigating a civil action involving a FDUTPA claim.  See § 501.2105(2).  
 
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Subsection 501.2105(3) permits an award of attorney’s fees for the hours actually 
expended on a civil action involving a FDUTPA claim.  See § 501.2105(3).   
Florida’s district courts of appeal have adopted an accurate and reasonable 
interpretation of those statutory provisions.  In Heindel, 476 So. 2d at 271, the First 
District construed the language of subsections 501.2105(1)-(3) as contemplating 
recovery for the hours an attorney dedicated to litigating a civil action involving a 
FDUTPA claim “unless the attorney’s services clearly were not related in any way 
to establishing or defending an alleged violation of chapter 501.”  (Emphasis 
added); see also Mandel v. Decorator’s Mart, Inc., 965 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2007) (quoting the interpretation of subsections 501.2105(1)-(3) provided in 
Heindel and utilizing its analysis).  The Heindel court elaborated further that even 
if a FDUTPA claim is based on the same transaction as an alternative theory of 
recovery, a court may allocate attorney’s fees under section 501.2105 for only the 
FDUTPA portion of an action if either (1) counsel admits that the other services 
provided in that action were unrelated to the FDUTPA claim, or (2) a party 
establishes that the services related to non-FDUTPA claims “were clearly beyond 
the scope of a 501 proceeding.”  Id. at 272; see also Mandel, 965 So. 2d at 314.   
We agree with this interpretation of subsections 501.2105(1)-(3) because to 
construe those subsections otherwise—i.e., to award attorney’s fees for parts of an 
action clearly unrelated to or beyond the scope of a FDUTPA violation—is 
 
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tantamount to an interpretation of FDUTPA that renders an absurd and 
unreasonable result.  See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, 
LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1270 (Fla. 2008) (“We have long held that the Court should 
not interpret a statute in a manner resulting in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd 
consequences.”).  Simply, such an interpretation would be contrary to the purpose 
of FDUTPA’s attorney’s fees provision, which is to award attorney’s fees to the 
party that prevailed in civil litigation that involved a violation of FDUTPA—not 
for an action clearly beyond FDUTPA’s scope.  See § 501.2105(1) (providing for 
an award of attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in an action “involving a 
violation of [FDUTPA]”).  
The Instant Case 
We conclude that Diamond Aircraft is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees 
for the time expended on this litigation until the federal district court held that 
FDUTPA was inapplicable.  After the federal district court supplanted FDUTPA 
with Arizona’s deceptive trade practice act, the action evolved into civil litigation 
clearly beyond the scope of a FDUTPA proceeding.  From that point forward, the 
parties were no longer establishing or defending an alleged violation of FDUTPA, 
or even litigating under applicable Florida law.  Rather, the parties were then 
establishing or defending an alleged violation of Arizona’s deceptive trade practice 
law.    
 
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Therefore, we conclude that Diamond Aircraft is entitled to attorney’s fees 
for the period of litigation up to the point that the federal district court held that 
FDUTPA was not applicable to Horowitch’s claim.   
OFFER OF JUDGMENT CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 
Impact of Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.  
 
 
The next two certified questions concern Florida’s offer of judgment statute, 
as delineated in section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2006).  The specific matters we 
must address are (1) whether section 768.79 is inapplicable because Horowitch’s 
action concerned both monetary (damages) and nonmonetary (equitable) relief, and 
(2) whether section 768.79 applies when the offer of judgment Diamond Aircraft 
served on Horowitch did not satisfy the specific requirements of Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(2).  We recently decided Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. 
v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 82 So. 3d 73 (Fla. 2012), which is instructive here. 
In Southeast Floating Docks, the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to 
this Court regarding the applicability of section 768.79.  Id. at 76.  One of the 
questions inquired whether a federal court sitting in Florida should apply section 
768.79 when a contract stipulates that the substantive law of another jurisdiction is 
applicable.  See id.  We held that section 768.79 is substantive for both 
constitutional and conflict of law purposes.  Id. at 80.  We then held that when 
parties agree to be bound by the substantive law of another forum, absent a 
 
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sufficient public policy concern, section 768.79 has no application.  See id.  This 
led to our conclusion that an award of attorney’s fees under section 768.79 was not 
proper in that case because the parties’ agreement to be bound by the substantive 
law of another state rendered section 768.79 with no application.  Id. at 81.     
However, the facts of Southeast Floating Docks are distinguishable from the 
facts in this case and, thus, that decision does not answer the certified questions 
now before us.  In Southeast Floating Docks, the cause of action arose from a 
contract with a choice-of-law provision that required the application of Michigan 
law, causing a conflict of law between Michigan law and Florida law.  In contrast, 
in this case, there was no conflict of law problem, as the choice-of-law provision 
required the application of Florida law.  Instead, the federal district court decided, 
based on relevant facts and not a contractual provision, that the deceptive trade 
practices law of another jurisdiction applied.  Moreover, in consideration of the 
motion for summary judgment and the determination of that motion, the federal 
district court applied Florida law to Horowitch’s specific performance, breach of 
contract, and bad faith claims.  The only claim to which the district court applied 
Arizona law was Horowitch’s deceptive trade practices claim.  The district court 
applied the substantive law of Florida to three of Horowitch’s four claims.   
Florida’s offer of judgment statute applies in this case.  We now address the 
certified questions before us regarding Florida’s offer of judgment statute.   
 
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First Certified Offer of Judgment Question  
DOES FLA. STAT. § 768.79 APPLY TO CASES THAT SEEK 
EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO MONEY 
DAMAGES; AND, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT GENERALLY APPLY 
TO SUCH CASES, IS THERE ANY EXCEPTION FOR 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE 
RELIEF IS SERIOUSLY LACKING IN MERIT? 
 
We answer both parts of this certified question in the negative and conclude that 
section 768.79 does not apply to cases that seek both equitable relief and damages, 
and that section 768.79 does not provide an exception to this rule for equitable 
claims that lack serious merit.   
Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Construction 
 
 
As with the first two certified questions, this issue involves a matter of 
statutory construction that we review de novo.  See Borden, 921 So. 2d at 591.  
When the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, this Court applies its plain 
meaning.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067, 1073 
(Fla. 2006).  The language of section 768.79, as well as Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.442, must be strictly construed because those provisions are in 
derogation of the common law rule that a party is responsible for its own attorney’s 
fees, and because they are penal in nature.  See Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 
223, 226 (Fla. 2007); TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak
 
, 663 So. 2d 606, 615 (Fla. 
1995).   
 
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Section 768.79 and Applicable Case Law 
 
As we recently stated in Southeast Floating Docks, the Florida Legislature 
enacted section 768.79 to deter individuals from rejecting purportedly reasonable 
settlement offers through the imposition of the sanctions of costs and attorney’s 
fees.  See Southeast Floating Docks, 82 So. 3d at 79.  The relevant portion of 
section 768.79 provides:   
(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a 
defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the 
plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by her or him or on the 
defendant’s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other 
contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of 
no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 
percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and 
attorney’s fees against the award. 
 
§ 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added).   
 
Courts have routinely held that the phrase in section 768.79(1) which states 
“in any civil action for damages” is applicable to a claim in a civil action in which 
a party seeks only damages, i.e., monetary relief.  See, e.g., Beyel Bros. Crane & 
Rigging Co. of South Fla., Inc. v. Ace Transp., Inc., 664 So. 2d 62, 64-65 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1995).  For example, Nelson v. Marine Group of Palm Beach, Inc., 677 So. 
2d 998, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), involved a declaratory action arising from a 
breach of contract in which an offer of judgment was made.  The only matter at 
issue was entitlement to money held in escrow.  See id.  The district court held that 
 
- 21 - 
the dispute over the money held in escrow clearly framed the action as an action 
for damages and, with that predicate, the offer of judgment statute applied.  See id.   
Similarly, in DiPompeo Construction Corp. v. Kimmel & Associates, Inc., 
916 So. 2d 17, 17-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a plaintiff filed a declaratory action in 
which it requested that the trial court declare that a contract did not exist and, 
therefore, the plaintiff was not liable to the defendant for moneys owed under that 
contract.  The plaintiff served an offer of judgment on the defendant, ultimately 
prevailed in the litigation, and then sought recovery of attorney’s fees under 
section 768.79.  See id. at 18.  The trial court denied the motion for attorney’s fees.  
See id.  On appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court’s denial and held that 
section 768.79 applied.  See id. at 18-19.  The district court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s claim was in actuality an action for damages because the real issue 
before the court was whether the plaintiff owed money to the defendant.  See id. 
 
In contrast, when a plaintiff seeks only nonmonetary relief—i.e., a purely 
equitable remedy—courts have held that section 768.79 does not apply.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Idem. Co. v. Consol. Ins. Servs., 778 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  
In National Indemnity, a plaintiff filed an action for declaratory relief in which he 
requested that the trial court declare whether an insurance policy was in full force 
and effect on the day of an underlying tort action.  See id. at 406.  In the action, the 
plaintiff did not request payment of money or damages.  See id. at 408.  The trial 
 
- 22 - 
court determined that the action was not a civil action for damages as contemplated 
by section 768.79.  See id.  The Fourth District agreed and held:  “The ‘real issue’ 
in this case is insurance coverage for an underlying tort action.  No money 
damages or payment of money is directly requested in this suit, as it was in Nelson, 
and we conclude that the trial court’s ruling was correct.”  Id.  
Courts have also held that when a plaintiff seeks both monetary and 
nonmonetary relief, and a party makes a general offer of settlement, section 768.79 
is not applicable.  See Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enters., 66 So. 3d 
336, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Equestrian Club 
Estates Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 22 So. 3d 140, 143-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).  
The reasoning adopted in those decisions is that strict construction of the phrase 
“any civil action for damages” in the offer of judgment statute does not include a 
claim for equitable relief, or one that involves claims for both monetary and 
nonmonetary relief.  See Winter Park, 66 So. 3d at 338-42; Palm Beach Polo, 22 
So. 3d at 143-45. 
 
In Palm Beach Polo, the plaintiff filed an action for damages as well as an 
independent claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in which the plaintiff 
requested that the court require the defendant to recognize an implied grant of a 
way of necessity.  See 22 So. 3d at 142.  After a nonjury trial, the court entered 
judgment for the defendant, in which it denied all claims for damages and held that 
 
- 23 - 
a common law way of necessity did not exist.  See id.  Based on three separate 
proposals for settlement submitted by the defendant to the plaintiff, each of which 
presented a general offer of settlement that proposed to resolve all of the plaintiff’s 
claims in the action, the defendant moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 
768.79.  See id.  The trial court found that the plaintiff’s cause of action was an 
action for damages—thus falling within the scope of section 768.79—and awarded 
the defendant attorney’s fees.  See id.  The Fourth District reversed.  See id. at 145.  
In strictly construing section 768.79, the district court concluded that in a civil 
action for both monetary and nonmonetary relief, in which a party has made a 
general offer to settle “all claims,” the fact that a party sought damages in addition 
to nonmonetary relief does not bring the claim within the parameters of the offer of 
judgment statute.  See id. at 144. 
 
Similarly, in Winter Park, the plaintiff filed an action against multiple 
defendants in which it requested injunctive relief and also sought monetary 
damages.  See 66 So. 3d at 337-38.  Each defendant served separate general offers 
of judgment on the plaintiff, each of which offered to tender a monetary amount in 
settlement of all of the plaintiff’s claims against that particular defendant.  See id. 
at 338.  The plaintiff rejected the offers and the defendants prevailed.  See id.  The 
defendants then filed motions for attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 768.79 and the 
trial court denied those motions.  See id.  The Fourth District agreed with its prior 
 
- 24 - 
holding in Palm Beach Polo and held that strict construction of section 768.79 
renders that statute “inapplicable where a party’s general offer of settlement is 
directed to a claim in which both damages and non-monetary relief is sought.”  
Winter Park, 66 So. 3d at 341-42.  The district court bolstered its analysis by 
noting that section 768.79 makes no provision for a court to determine the value of 
nonmonetary relief and, thereby, further evinces a legislative intent that the statute 
apply only to monetary claims.  See id. at 340.   
The district court also noted in Winter Park that Florida courts have not 
decided whether a party may utilize section 768.79 when he or she has asserted 
separate claims for monetary and nonmonetary relief in the same pleading and the 
opposing party has served an offer directed specifically to the monetary claim.  See 
id. at 341.  However, in this case, the Court need not decide whether section 
768.79 applies under such circumstances because the offer in this case was clearly 
a general settlement offer, i.e., Diamond Aircraft intended and stated that the offer 
“resolve all claims that were or could have been asserted by Plaintiff against 
Diamond Aircraft in the Amended Complaint filed March 15, 2007.”  Horowitch, 
645 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis added).   
This Case  
We hold that section 768.79 does not apply to an action in which a plaintiff 
seeks both damages and equitable relief, and in which the defendant has served a 
 
- 25 - 
general offer of judgment that seeks release of all claims.  We further conclude that 
there is no basis to establish an exception for instances in which the equitable 
claim lacks serious merit.  As exemplified in Palm Beach Polo and Winter Park, 
strict construction of of section 768.79 compels this result.  More specifically, 
section 768.79(1) explicitly states that the offer of judgment statute applies to “any 
civil action for damages.”  (Emphasis added.)  The statute does not state that it 
applies to actions in equity, or in an action, such as in this case, where a plaintiff 
seeks both monetary and nonmonetary relief.  If the Legislature intended to 
authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees under those circumstances, it could have 
and would have explicitly provided for them in section 768.79.   
Furthermore, Winter Park demonstrates that the statutory framework of 
section 768.79 supports this result.  More specifically, the only method of 
calculation that the Legislature provided in the statute pertained to the “amount of 
the offer” as compared to the “judgment obtained.”  § 768.79(6)(a) (emphasis 
added).  To calculate the amount of the judgment obtained in comparison to an 
offer, logic dictates the use of a monetary number that a court could use in 
calculating a mathematical formula which exists in a cause of action for damages.  
See id. § 768.79(6) (“For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (a), 
the term ‘judgment obtained’ means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus 
any postoffer collateral source payments received or due as of the date of the 
 
- 26 - 
judgment, plus any postoffer settlement amounts by which the verdict was 
reduced.”).  Comparatively, section 768.79 does not provide a method by which 
this or any other court is to evaluate the amount of a nonmonetary judgment 
obtained against the amount provided in an offer of judgment.  This further reflects 
a legislative intent that section 768.79 does not apply to nonmonetary claims. 
Diamond Aircraft contends that because Horowitch pled for specific 
performance and, in the alternative, damages, its offer of judgment was 
distinguishable from the offer provided in Palm Beach Polo and fell within the 
parameters of section 768.79.  Generally, to plead in the alternative is to “set up in 
the same action as many claims or causes of action or defenses in the same right as 
the pleader has . . . .”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) (emphasis added).  Simply, when a 
party pleads an action in the alternative, the party is merely electing different 
claims or remedies that stem from the same cause of action.  See id.  Thus, an 
equitable claim in the alternative to a monetary claim is still part of the same civil 
action. 
In addition, we reject a possible exception under section 768.79 for equitable 
claims that lack serious merit.  Notably, subsection 768.79(7)(b) requires a court to 
consider a claim’s lack of merit in determining the reasonableness of attorney’s 
fees.  See § 768.79(7)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that when “determining the 
reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to this section,” a court 
 
- 27 - 
shall consider, among other relevant factors listed, “[t]he then apparent merit or 
lack of merit in the claim”).  However, this factor of subsection 768.79(7) does not 
apply to a determination as to whether section 768.79 applies to a cause of action.  
Instead, this factor applies only after a determination that section 768.79 is 
applicable and a court has moved forward to determine the reasonableness of the 
fees.  See id. § 768.79(7)(a) (applying when “a party is entitled to costs and fees 
pursuant to the provisions of [section 768.79]”).  Furthermore, if the Legislature 
had intended that section 768.79 contain an exception where an equitable claim 
lacks serious merit, it would have explicitly provided for such an exception.  Thus, 
section 768.79 does not contain an exception and upon strict construction of that 
section, we reject the assertion that an exception exists. 
We hold that section 768.79 does not apply to an action for both damages 
and equitable relief and no exception for a meritless equitable claim exists.  
Accordingly, we answer both parts of this certified question in the negative. 
Second Offer of Judgment Certified Question 
 
UNDER FLA. STAT. § 768.79 AND RULE 1.442, IS A 
DEFENDANT’S OFFER OF JUDGMENT VALID IF, IN A CASE 
IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS ATTORNEY’S FEES, 
THE OFFER PURPORTS TO SATISFY ALL CLAIMS BUT FAILS 
TO SPECIFY WHETHER ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE INCLUDED 
AND FAILS TO SPECIFY WHETHER ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE 
PART OF THE LEGAL CLAIM? 
 
 
- 28 - 
Due to the strict construction required of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, we 
answer this certified question in the negative. 
Rule 1.442 and Section 768.79 
 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 implements section 768.79.  See 
Willis Shaw Express, 849 So. 2d at 278.  In 1996, we amended rule 1.442 to 
require greater detail in an offer of settlement under section 768.79.  See id.  That 
amendment, which remains in effect, included the following with regard to the 
wording of an offer of settlement: 
(2) A proposal shall: 
 
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or 
parties to whom the proposal is being made; 
 
(B) identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve; 
 
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions; 
 
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity 
all nonmonetary terms of the proposal; 
 
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for 
punitive damages, if any; 
 
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorney fees and whether 
attorney fees are part of the legal claim; and 
 
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 
1.080(f). 
 
 
- 29 - 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2) (emphasis added); compare Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (1996), 
and, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (1997) (stating that rule 1.442 was amended on Oct. 31, 
1996, but that this amendment did not became effective until Jan. 1, 1997).   
Both section 768.79 and rule 1.442 are in derogation of the common law rule 
that each party is responsible for its own attorney’s fees which requires that we 
strictly construe both the statute and the rule.  See Willis Shaw Express, 849 So. 2d 
at 278.  For example, in Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 225-26 (Fla. 
2007), we decided whether an offer of settlement under rule 1.442 must explicitly 
provide a citation to section 768.79.  We stated that both section 768.79 and rule 
1.442 require that an offer of settlement be in writing and include a citation to the 
applicable section of the Florida Statutes (section 768.79).  See id. at 226.  We 
concluded:  
The plain language of the statute provides that an offer must state it is 
being made pursuant to this section.  This is a mandatory requirement 
for this penal, fee-shifting provision. Because the overall subject is in 
derogation of the common law, all portions must be strictly construed.  
The district court erred in failing to strictly construe the plain 
language of the rule and statute. 
 
Id. at 227 (emphasis added).   
 
 
However, in Bennett v. American Learning Systems of Boca Delray, Inc., 
857 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District called into question when 
a party must satisfy the strict requirements of rule 1.442.  There, the 
defendant/appellee had provided the plaintiff/appellant an offer of settlement that 
 
- 30 - 
did not identify the amount of the proposed settlement for punitive damages, if 
any, and failed to state whether the offer included attorney’s fees and whether the 
legal claim included attorney’s fees.  See id. at 987.  The plaintiff in that case had 
not claimed punitive damages or attorney’s fees, and there was no contractual or 
statutory provision providing for an award of attorney’s fees.  See id. at 988.  The 
district court held that these facts validated the offer of settlement notwithstanding 
the offer’s failure to follow the strict requirements of rule 1.442.  See id. at 988-89.  
The court concluded that, “It would make no sense to require a defendant to state 
in its offer of judgment that the offer does not include attorney’s fees, when 
plaintiff did not claim an entitlement to them and could not recover them because 
of failure to plead.”  Id. at 988.  The appellate court further held that because the 
offer proposed settlement of all counts of the complaint, including costs and 
interest, that language was sufficient to include a claim for attorney’s fees, had the 
plaintiff included such a claim in the pleadings.  See id.  The district court stated 
that the purpose of rule 1.442 was to provide an efficient mechanism to convey an 
offer of settlement free from ambiguities, enabling the recipient to fully evaluate 
the terms of the offer and any conditions.  See id.  The district court concluded that 
because no such ambiguity existed in the offer before the court, the proposed offer 
was valid and enforceable.  See id. at 988-89.   
The Instant Case 
 
- 31 - 
 
We conclude that, even if section 768.79 applied in this case, Diamond 
Aircraft would not be entitled to attorney’s fees under that section because 
Diamond Aircraft’s offer of settlement did not strictly comply with rule 1.442, as it 
did not state that the proposal included attorney’s fees and attorney’s fees are part 
of the legal claim.  Unlike the complaint in Bennett, the complaint here contained a 
legal claim for attorney’s fees, which created an ambiguity in Diamond Aircraft’s 
offer of settlement that was not present in Bennett, thereby necessitating the 
presence in the offer of settlement of a specific statement regarding attorney’s fees.   
 
The court in Bennett did state that a general offer of settlement like the offer 
here (i.e., one that stipulates settlement of all claims) is broad enough to include 
any claim for attorney’s fees.  See Bennett, 857 So. 2d at 988.  However, the 
Fourth District decided Bennett in 2003, which was approximately four years 
before this Court’s 2007 decision in Campbell.  In Campbell, this Court stated that 
“all portions” of both section 768.79 and rule 1.442 must be strictly construed, 
which draws the continuing validity of Bennett into question.  See Campbell, 959 
So. 2d at 227.  Furthermore, if the elements of rule 1.442(c)(2) were not 
mandatory, we would have stated at the beginning of rule 1.442(c)(2) that the 
proposal “may” contain the requirements listed in that subsection.  That 
subdivision of rule 1.442 explicitly states that a proposal “shall” contain the 
 
- 32 - 
following requirements, which includes the requirement of a statement directed to 
the attorney’s fees at issue.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2). 
We decided Campbell after Bennett, and in Campbell we emphasized the 
necessity of strict construction of rule 1.442.  Campbell dictates our answer with 
regard to the certified question.  Strict construction of rule 1.442 required that 
Diamond Aircraft’s offer of settlement include a provision with regard to 
attorney’s fees, and whether such fees were a part of Horowitch’s legal claim.  The 
offer of settlement here failed to include such a statement, and the offer would be 
invalid and unenforceable even if section 768.79 applied.   
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. 
Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989), George v. Northcraft, 476 So. 2d 758, 759 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1985), and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Ramos, 565 So. 2d 
798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), for the proposition that an offer of settlement need not 
include a specific provision regarding attorney’s fees.  See Horowitch, 645 F.3d at 
1260.  However, these decisions were rendered prior to the 1996 amendment to 
rule 1.442, which changed the rule to specifically require that an offer state 
whether the proposal includes attorney’s fees and whether attorney’s fees are part 
of the legal claim.  These cases involved an earlier, less stringent rule 1.442, and 
they are not applicable to this case.   
Accordingly, we answer the fourth certified question in the negative. 
 
- 33 - 
Conclusion  
 
We answer the first certified question with regard to FDUTPA in the 
affirmative because Horowitch filed an action specifically under FDUTPA, which 
invoked the provisions of FDUTPA (including attorney’s fees) until the claim was 
determined.  With regard to the second certified question concerning FDUTPA, 
Diamond Aircraft’s recovery is limited to the time expended on the litigation until 
the federal district court determined that FDUTPA did not apply, because at that 
point, the parties were asserting and defending actions clearly beyond the scope of 
a FDUTPA proceeding.  We answer both certified questions that concern Florida’s 
offer of judgment statute in the negative because (1) pursuant to the language of 
section 768.79, that statutory section does not apply to an action that involves both 
an equitable claim and a claim for damages, and does not provide an exception for 
equitable claims that lack serious merit; and (2) in accordance with our prior 
precedent, an offer of judgment is not valid under rule 1.442 if it does not meet the 
strict requirements of that rule.  Having answered the certified questions, we return 
this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  
 
It is so ordered.  
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
 
- 34 - 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in answering the two certified questions regarding the Florida 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the affirmative.  I also concur in the 
negative answer to the first certified question concerning Florida’s offer of 
judgment law—which concerns the application of section 768.79, Florida Statutes 
(2011), to cases that seek equitable relief in the alternative to money damages.  I 
would decline to answer the second certified question relating to Florida’s offer of 
judgment law, which concerns offers of judgment that do not specify whether 
attorney fees are a part of the claim.  That question is rendered moot by the answer 
to the other question regarding Florida’s offer of judgment law. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 10-12931 
 
Hala A. Sanridge of Fowler, White, Boggs, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Marc Philip Ossinsky of Ossinsky & Cathcart, Winter Park, Florida and James C. 
Hauser, Maitland, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee