Title: Stephenson v. State
Citation: 655 So. 2d 86
Docket Number: 84208
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 1995

655 So. 2d 86 (1995)
Edgar STEPHENSON, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 84208.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 4, 1995.
Randall O. Reder, Tampa, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Krauss, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michele Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the following question certified to be of great public importance:
Stephenson v. State, 640 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the negative.
On August 17, 1992, Edgar Eugene Stephenson was charged with two counts of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed robbery. Three months later, the State filed its notice that Stephenson should be treated as a habitual felony offender. Stephenson was found guilty of all the charges. Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the verdict was contrary to law and against the manifest weight of the evidence. The motion was stricken as being filed untimely. On December 30, 1992, the trial court sentenced Stephenson to three concurrent life sentences, and adjudicated him to be a habitual felony offender under section 775.084(4), Florida Statutes (1991).
Defense counsel filed a notice of appeal on February 1, 1993, although the 30-day time period for filing a notice of appeal had expired on January 29, 1993. Consequently, the Second District dismissed the appeal as *87 being untimely and certified to this Court a question of great public importance.
Logically, our analysis in this case must begin with State v. District Court of Appeal, First District, 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990). In District Court of Appeal,
Id. at 440. After the First District denied the State's motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition directed to the First District. To begin our analysis in District Court of Appeal, we stated:
Id. at 441. After detailing the present procedure then in effect, we reasoned:
Id. at 442. In conclusion, we stated that "henceforth petitions for belated appeal because of ineffective assistance of counsel should be filed in the trial court by a motion under rule 3.850 rather than in the appellate court by a petition for writ of habeas corpus." Id. (footnote omitted).
For now, we continue to adhere to this principle and find that it is dispositive in this case.[1] Thus, a district court of appeal does not have the authority to grant a belated appeal in a criminal case when it is claimed that trial counsel, through neglect, filed an untimely notice of appeal and hence rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.
In sum, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the district court decision. We decline to address the other issues raised by the Petitioner and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
[1]  We wish to note that this issue is currently under review by this Court and the Committee on Rules of Appellate Procedure.