Title: New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sanchez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2020

New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sanchez Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary New Jersey Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) sought to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee, David Mercogliano, who sustained injuries in a work-related motor vehicle accident. It sued the individuals allegedly at fault in the accident, defendants Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that authorized employers and workers’ compensation carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees to assert subrogation claims. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether that subrogation action was barred by the Auto Insurance Cost Recovery Act (AICRA). The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that New Jersey Transit could not assert a claim based on economic loss. It noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k) defined economic loss for purposes of AICRA to mean “uncompensated loss of income or property, or other uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses.” In the trial court’s view, because New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid benefits for all of Mercogliano’s medical expenses and lost income, he had no “uncompensated loss of income or property,” and thus sustained no economic loss for purposes of AICRA. The trial court relied on Continental Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 288 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1996), and policy considerations in reaching its decision. The Appellate Division reversed that judgment, agreeing with New Jersey Transit that its subrogation action arose entirely from “economic loss comprised of medical expenses and wage loss, not noneconomic loss.” However, it rejected the trial court’s view that an employer’s or workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogation claim based on benefits paid for economic loss contravened AICRA’s legislative intent. Finding no error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sandra Sanchez (A-68-18) (082292)Argued September 24, 2019 -- Decided May 12, 2020PER CURIAM New Jersey Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) sought to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee, David Mercogliano, who sustained injuries in a work-related motor vehicle accident. It sued the individuals allegedly at fault in the accident, defendants Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that authorizes employers and workers’ compensation carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees to assert subrogation claims. The Court considers whether that subrogation action was barred by the Auto Insurance Cost Recovery Act (AICRA). Mercogliano was acting in the course of his employment when the New Jersey Transit vehicle he was driving was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by defendant Sanchez and owned by defendant Smith. At the time of his accident, Mercogliano was insured under a standard automobile policy, under which he was entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) and other benefits. New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid Mercogliano workers’ compensation benefits. Mercogliano neither sought nor received PIP benefits under his automobile insurance policy in connection with his accident. New Jersey Transit filed a complaint seeking to “recoup workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).” Defendants pled as an affirmative defense that New Jersey’s no-fault insurance statutory scheme barred New Jersey Transit’s subrogation claim and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that New Jersey Transit could not assert a claim based on economic loss. It noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k) defines economic loss for purposes of AICRA to mean “uncompensated loss of income or property, or other uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses.” In the trial court’s view, because New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid benefits for all of Mercogliano’s medical expenses and lost income, he had no “uncompensated loss of income or property,” and thus sustained no economic loss for purposes of AICRA. The trial court relied on Continental Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 288 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1996), and policy considerations in reaching its decision. 1 The Appellate Division reversed that judgment. 457 N.J. Super. 98, 113 (App. Div. 2018). The Appellate Division agreed with New Jersey Transit that its subrogation action arose entirely from “economic loss comprised of medical expenses and wage loss, not noneconomic loss.” Id. at 112. However, it rejected the trial court’s view that an employer’s or workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogation claim based on benefits paid for economic loss contravenes AICRA’s legislative intent. Id. at 107-12. The Appellate Division noted that in the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Legislature imposed on an employer the obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits for an accident arising from an injured workers’ employment, and that N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 “gives the workers’ compensation carrier an absolute right to seek reimbursement from the tortfeasor for the benefits it has paid to the injured employee.” Id. at 107. The Appellate Division acknowledged that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateral source rule places the primary burden on the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier to compensate an employee injured in the course of employment, in the event that only workers’ compensation benefits and PIP benefits are available sources of reimbursement. Id. at 110-11. It noted, however, that “where both workers’ compensation benefits and the proceeds of a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary” under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. Id. at 111. The Appellate Division therefore concluded that the collateral source rule posed no obstacle to New Jersey Transit’s claim. Id. at 111, 113. The Appellate Division viewed Continental to have been rejected by subsequent Appellate Division jurisprudence, and declined to follow it. Id. at 109-10. The court instead invoked Lambert v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 447 N.J. Super. 61, 67, 75 (App. Div. 2016), which identified the Workers’ Compensation Act -- not AICRA -- as the governing law for subrogation claims based on workers’ compensation benefits paid to workers injured in motor vehicle accidents in the course of their employment. Id. at 111-12. The Appellate Division therefore reversed and remanded the matter for the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of New Jersey Transit. Id. at 113. The Court granted defendants’ petition for certification. 237 N.J. 317 (2019).HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court.JUSTICE PATTERSON, CONCURRING, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-VINA, notes that the Workers’ Compensation Act provides employers or carriers with a mechanism through which to recover benefits paid when the injuries that necessitated those benefits were caused by a third party, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, which limits the employer’s or carrier’s right of recovery to the same “action that the injured employee . . . would have had against the third person,” in accordance with traditional principles of subrogation. Justice Patterson next traces the history of AICRA and observes that, under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, when an employee injured in a work- related accident is entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, that statute 2 -- not AICRA -- provides his or her primary source of recovery for medical expenses and lost wages. Justice Patterson stresses that, when it enacted AICRA, the Legislature did not amend the Workers’ Compensation Act to eliminate or circumscribe the statutory right of subrogation in cases involving injuries to employees in motor vehicle accidents. Justice Patterson reviews relevant case law and notes that Continental was not followed in later Appellate Division decisions. Noting that the trial court will have the discretion upon remand to expand the record and resolve any factual dispute about whether all payments were economic loss, Justice Patterson confines analysis to workers’ compensation subrogation based on payments made for economic loss. Justice Patterson explains that, to the trial court, the act that gave rise to New Jersey Transit’s subrogation claim -- its payment of benefits to Mercogliano under N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 and N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a), (c) -- simultaneously defeated that claim, because it left Mercogliano with no “uncompensated” loss. Justice Patterson discerns no evidence that the Legislature intended to bar a workers’ compensation subrogation claim by virtue of the very benefits that created that claim in the first place and instead concludes, like the Appellate Division, that Mercogliano suffered an economic loss in the form of medical expenses and lost wages, and that New Jersey Transit paid him benefits for that economic loss. Finally, Justice Patterson explains why Lambert and two other Appellate Division cases are more persuasive than Continental as applied to this case.JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, joined by JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and SOLOMON, expresses the view that, when a driver is involved in a work-related automobile accident and his economic costs are recoverable under either his private automobile insurance carrier’s personal injury protection (PIP) policy or under his employer’s workers’ compensation scheme, New Jersey’s no-fault automobile insurance system makes the workers’ compensation carrier primarily responsible for reimbursing those costs. When an injured driver’s economic losses are “collectible” under his PIP policy but paid by his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, Justice Albin explains, the no-fault system prohibits a workers’ compensation subrogation action against the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance carrier. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, -12. In Justice Albin’s view, allowing the workers’ compensation carrier here to sue the tortfeasors or their automobile insurance carrier in a subrogation action permits the very outcome the Legislature intended to foreclose through adoption of no-fault insurance -- more litigation and greater financial burdens on the automobile insurance system. The members of the Court being equally divided, the judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.JUSTICE PATTERSON filed a concurrence, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA join. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and SOLOMON join. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 68 September Term 2018 082292 New Jersey Transit Corporation, a/s/o David Mercogliano, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith, Defendants-Appellants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 457 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2018). Argued Decided September 24, 2019 May 12, 2020John V. Mallon argued the cause for appellants (Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, attorneys; John V. Mallon, of counsel and on the briefs, and Ryan J. Gaffney, on the briefs).Shawn C. Huber argued the cause for respondent (Brown & Connery, attorneys; Shawn C. Huber, on the brief).Richard J. Albuquerque argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (D’Arcy Johnson Day, attorneys; Richard J. Albuquerque and Dominic R. DePamphilis, on the brief). 1 PER CURIAM The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equallydivided Court. JUSTICE PATTERSON, concurring. This appeal arises from an action brought by plaintiff New JerseyTransit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, aprovision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that authorizes employers andworkers’ compensation carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefitsto injured employees to assert subrogation claims. New Jersey Transit soughtto recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee, DavidMercogliano, who sustained injuries in a work-related motor vehicle accident.It sued the individuals allegedly at fault in the accident, defendants SandraSanchez and Chad Smith. Defendants argued that New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action wasbarred by the Auto Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Defendants asserted that because Mercogliano had elected thelimitation-on-lawsuit option permitted by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), and sustainedno permanent injury, AICRA barred New Jersey Transit’s claim. 2 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants anddenied New Jersey Transit’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Itbarred New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action on the grounds thatMercogliano sustained no economic loss as defined in AICRA and that NewJersey Transit’s subrogation claim would subvert AICRA’s goals. The Appellate Division agreed with New Jersey Transit that the workers’compensation benefits paid to Mercogliano related only to economic loss. N.J.Transit Corp. v. Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. 98, 112 (App. Div. 2018). Itconcluded that New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action did not implicate thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold imposed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Ibid. TheAppellate Division held that because Mercogliano’s economic loss wascovered by his workers’ compensation benefits -- not by personal injuryprotection (PIP) benefits under his automobile insurance policy -- New JerseyTransit’s subrogation action did not run afoul of AICRA. Id. at 113. Itreversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.Ibid. We concur with the Appellate Division’s determination. We view NewJersey Transit’s subrogation action to comport with the objectives and terms ofthe Workers’ Compensation Act. We find no evidence that when theLegislature enacted AICRA, it intended to bar employers and insurers that 3 have paid workers’ compensation benefits for economic loss from seekingreimbursement from third-party tortfeasors in cases such as this, in which theemployee’s losses were covered by workers’ compensation benefits and heneither sought nor received PIP benefits. We do not view New JerseyTransit’s subrogation action -- limited to workers’ compensation benefits paidfor economic losses -- to contravene AICRA’s provisions or to undermine itsgoals. I. A. The accident that gave rise to this action occurred on December 2, 2014in Cliffside Park. Mercogliano, acting in the course of his employment, wasdriving a vehicle owned by New Jersey Transit when his car was struck fromthe rear by a vehicle driven by defendant Sanchez and owned by defendantSmith. Mercogliano sustained injury to his “right upper extremity.” Histreating physician later diagnosed him with “cervical strain and strain of theright trapezius.” Mercogliano was treated for his injuries and was medicallycleared to return to work without restriction approximately two months afterthe accident. At the time of his accident, Mercogliano was insured under a standardautomobile policy issued by New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company. 4 Under that policy, Mercogliano was entitled to up to $250,000 in PIP benefitsand $400 weekly income continuation benefits. Because he had elected thelimitation-on-lawsuit option under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), Mercogliano wassubject to that provision’s threshold. It is undisputed that Mercoglianosustained no injury that would vault the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold. New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid Mercogliano$33,625.70 in workers’ compensation benefits, consisting of $6694.04 inmedical benefits, $3982.40 in temporary indemnity benefits, and $22,949.26 in“permanent indemnity benefits” characterized by New Jersey Transit asrelating to “lost wages.” The record does not identify the specific losses forwhich those benefits were paid. With his losses covered by workers’ compensation benefits, Mercoglianoneither sought nor received PIP benefits under his personal automobileinsurance policy in connection with his accident. B. 1. In its capacity as Mercogliano’s employer and subrogee, New JerseyTransit filed a complaint seeking to “recoup workers’ compensation benefitspursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).” New Jersey Transit alleged thatMercogliano’s injuries resulted from the negligence of Sanchez in the 5 accident. It also asserted a vicarious liability claim against Smith as Sanchez’semployer and the owner of the vehicle Sanchez was driving when the accidentoccurred. Defendants pled as an affirmative defense that New Jersey’s no-fault insurance statutory scheme barred New Jersey Transit’s subrogationclaim. Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2, defendants moved for summary judgmentdismissing New Jersey Transit’s complaint. They claimed that New JerseyTransit could not assert a subrogation claim because AICRA preventedMercogliano from pursuing a third-party action against defendants, given hiselection of the limitation-on-lawsuit option in his personal insurance policy. New Jersey Transit cross-moved for partial summary judgment. Itsought a declaration that defendants’ affirmative defense based on thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold would not bar the subrogation claim. NewJersey Transit conceded that it could bring no subrogation claim based onnoneconomic losses in light of Mercogliano’s inability to vault N.J.S.A.39:6A-8(a)’s limitation-on-lawsuit threshold. It argued, however, that becauseits subrogation claim was based entirely on workers’ compensation benefitspaid for economic losses, and Mercogliano received no PIP benefits, theWorkers’ Compensation Act -- not AICRA -- governed the action. 6 The trial court ruled that New Jersey Transit could not assert a claimbased on economic loss. It noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k) defines economicloss for purposes of AICRA to mean “uncompensated loss of income orproperty, or other uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to,medical expenses.” In the trial court’s view, Mercogliano could not have sueddefendants for economic loss. The court concluded that because New JerseyTransit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid benefits for all of Mercogliano’smedical expenses and lost income, he had no “uncompensated loss of incomeor property,” and thus sustained no economic loss for purposes of AICRA.Relying on Continental Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 288 N.J. Super. 185(App. Div. 1996), the trial court ruled that New Jersey Transit was barred fromasserting a claim against defendants for the benefits that it had paid. The trial court expressed concern about a scenario distinct from the casebefore it, in which an automobile insurer pays PIP benefits to an injuredworker, the employer or workers’ compensation carrier reimburses theautomobile insurer, and the employer or workers’ compensation carrier thenpursues a subrogation claim under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. In the trial court’s view,such a result would undermine the legislative policies expressed in AICRA.The trial court also cautioned that if New Jersey Transit prevailed, employersand workers’ compensation carriers might seek to recover in subrogation 7 actions against defendants shielded from direct claims by statutes such as theTort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:8-1 to 12-3, or the Charitable Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment and denied New Jersey Transit’s cross-motion for partial summaryjudgment. 2. New Jersey Transit appealed the trial court’s judgment. In a thoughtfulopinion by Judge Geiger, the Appellate Division reversed that judgment.Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 113. The Appellate Division agreed with New Jersey Transit that itssubrogation action arose entirely from “economic loss comprised of medicalexpenses and wage loss, not noneconomic loss.” Id. at 112. However, itrejected the trial court’s view that an employer or workers’ compensationcarrier’s subrogation claim based on benefits paid for economic losscontravenes AICRA’s legislative intent. Id. at 107-12. The AppellateDivision noted that in the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Legislatureimposed on an employer the obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefitsfor an accident arising from an injured workers’ employment, and that N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 “gives the workers’ compensation carrier an absolute right 8 to seek reimbursement from the tortfeasor for the benefits it has paid to theinjured employee.” Id. at 107. The Appellate Division acknowledged that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateralsource rule places the primary burden on the employer’s workers’compensation carrier to compensate an employee injured in the course ofemployment, in the event that only workers’ compensation benefits and PIPbenefits are available sources of reimbursement. Id. at 110-11. It noted,however, that “where both workers’ compensation benefits and the proceeds ofa tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary” under N.J.S.A.34:15-40. Id. at 111 (quoting Lefkin v. Venturini, 229 N.J. Super. 1, 8-9 (App.Div. 1988)). The Appellate Division therefore concluded that the collateralsource rule posed no obstacle to New Jersey Transit’s claim. Id. at 111, 113. The Appellate Division viewed the decision in Continental, on which thetrial court relied, to have been rejected by subsequent Appellate Divisionjurisprudence, and declined to follow it. Id. at 109-10. The court insteadinvoked Lambert v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, in which theAppellate Division had identified the Workers’ Compensation Act -- notAICRA -- as the governing law for subrogation claims based on workers’compensation benefits paid to workers injured in motor vehicle accidents in 9 the course of their employment. Id. at 111-12 (citing Lambert, 447 N.J. Super. 61, 67, 75 (App. Div. 2016)). The Appellate Division therefore reversed and remanded the matter forthe entry of partial summary judgment in favor of New Jersey Transit. Id. at113. 3. We granted defendants’ petition for certification. 237 N.J. 317 (2019).We also granted the motion of the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ)to appear as amicus curiae. II. A. Defendants assert that as a procedural matter, the Appellate Divisionshould not have considered New Jersey Transit’s cross-motion for partialsummary judgment, which was not the focus of the parties’ briefing before thecourt. Defendants also suggest that one of the three categories of workers’compensation benefits awarded to Mercogliano -- the partial permanentdisability benefits that he received -- included compensation for pain andsuffering and thus, at least in part, constituted benefits paid for noneconomicloss. As to economic loss, defendants argue that the Legislature intended thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold imposed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) to provide a 10 third-party tortfeasor with a defense against a workers’ compensation carrier’ssubrogation action. Defendants contend that the Appellate Division’s decisionraises the specter of an increase in the volume of claims and undermines theLegislature’s cost-saving goals. B. New Jersey Transit represents that its subrogation claim is entirelypremised on economic loss because the benefits paid to Mercoglianocompensated him for medical expenses and lost wages. New Jersey Transitcontends that the Appellate Division’s decision furthers the Legislature’sintent, in the Workers’ Compensation Act, to promote subrogation. It statesthat its subrogation claim does not interfere with the cost-saving legislativegoals of AICRA, given that its action and any comparable cases will involveuncomplicated claims for liquidated damages that can be resolved quickly andefficiently. C. Amicus curiae NJAJ states that the subrogation claim asserted by anemployer or its workers’ compensation carrier against a third-party tortfeasoris a rare category of claim. It primarily addresses a question that was notraised by any party and is not relevant to this appeal: whether an individualplaintiff should be allowed to pursue a direct claim for medical expenses and 11 lost wages against a tortfeasor, despite that plaintiff’s inability to meet thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). NJAJ urges theCourt to authorize individual plaintiffs to bring such claims. III. A. We review de novo the trial court’s summary judgment determinationsand apply the same standard that court used in deciding the motions. Woytasv. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019). Familiar principles of statutory interpretation guide our review. Westrive to “divine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” Perez v. Zagami,LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014) (quoting State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 263(2013)); accord DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). To that end, welook to the statute’s plain language as “the best indicator” of the Legislature’sintent, giving its words “their ordinary meaning and significance.” In reRegistrant H.D., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 7) (first quoting State v.Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014); then quoting State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591(2018)). When statutory construction involves the interplay of multiplestatutes, we seek to harmonize them to further the Legislature’s intent. Jonesv. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 164 (2017). We also assume that the 12 Legislature is “aware of judicial construction of its enactments.” Maeker v.Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 575 (2014) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494). To apply those principles to the issue at hand, we review key provisions ,first of the Workers’ Compensation Act, upon which New Jersey Transit’ssubrogation claim is premised, and, second, of AICRA, which defendantscontend provides a defense to that claim. We then consider case law in whichthose two statutory schemes have been harmonized. B. “For more than a century, the Workers’ Compensation Act has providedemployees injured in the workplace 'medical treatment and limitedcompensation “without regard to the negligence of the employer.”’” Vitale v.Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 250 (2017) (quoting Estate of Kotsovskaex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 584 (2015)). The Act “reflects 'ahistoric trade-off whereby employees relinquish[] their right to pursuecommon-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to certain, butreduced, benefits whenever they suffer[] injuries by accident arising out of andin the course of employment.’” Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Dep’t, 237 N.J. 255, 264 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Stancil v. ACEUSA, 211 N.J. 276, 285 (2012)). 13 “The remedial objective of the Workers’ Compensation Act is 'to makebenefits readily and broadly available to injured workers through a non -complicated process.’” Vitale, 231 N.J. at 250 (quoting Tlumac v. HighBridge Stone, 187 N.J. 567, 573 (2006)). The Act is liberally construed “inorder that its beneficent purposes may be accomplished.” Kotsovska, 221 N.J.at 584 (quoting Cruz v. Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 33, 42(2008)). The Workers’ Compensation Act identifies distinct categories of benefitsavailable to qualified employees injured in the course of their employment;benefits in three such categories were paid to Mercogliano and are thereforerelevant to this appeal. First, subject to limitations set forth in the statute, an employer orworkers’ compensation carrier may “furnish to the injured worker suchmedical, surgical and other treatment, and hospital service as shall benecessary to cure and relieve the worker of the effects of the injury and torestore the functions of the injured member or organ where such restoration ispossible.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-15. Second, an employer or workers’ compensation carrier may paytemporary disability payments, calculated as a percentage of the employee’s 14 weekly wage and “paid during the period of [the employee’s] disability, nothowever, beyond 400 weeks.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a). Third, an employer or workers’ compensation carrier may pay partialpermanent benefits, “[f]or disability partial in character and permanent inquality,” based on a percentage of the employee’s weekly wage, with theperiod of payment determined by the nature of the disability. N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(c).1 Partial permanent disability is defined as a “permanent impairment . . .based upon demonstrable objective medical evidence, which restricts thefunction of the body or of its members or organs.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-36. Minorinjuries and diseases, such as sprains, scars, lacerations, and contusions “whichdo not constitute significant permanent disfigurement” do not qualify as partialpermanent disability. Ibid. The Workers’ Compensation Act thus details categories of claims forwhich employees may seek recovery from their employers or their employers’workers’ compensation carriers; it simultaneously provides those employers orcarriers with a mechanism through which to recover benefits paid when theinjuries that necessitated those benefits were caused by a third party.1 No benefits in a fourth category, benefits “[f]or disability total in character and permanent in quality” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b), were paid to Mercogliano, and that provision is irrelevant here. 15 When it enacted N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, the Legislature “sought . . . toregulate 'the rights and responsibilities of the several parties concerned incompensation payments where, in the course of his employment, injury ordeath comes to a workman as the result of the fault of a third party.’” Vitale, 231 N.J. at 251 (quoting U.S. Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. 157,165 (1950)). A core component of the Legislature’s statutory schemebalancing the parties’ competing interests is the right of subrogation,recognized as “a device of equity to compel the ultimate discharge of anobligation by the one who in good conscience ought to pay it.” StandardAccident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 171 (1954). “The underpinningof subrogation is its derivative nature. The insurer obtains only the right of theinsured against the tortfeasor subject to defenses of the wrongdoer against theinsured.” Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 560-61 (1981). The employer’s subrogation right is set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-40,which authorizes employers and workers’ compensation carriers to seekreimbursement from third-party tortfeasors or their insurance carriers in one oftwo ways. First, if the employee recovers directly against the tortfeasor or thetortfeasor’s carrier, the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier mayassert a lien against the employee’s recovery, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b); “for everydollar of the employee’s recovery from the third party, the carrier’s lien under 16 [N.J.S.A. 34:15-40] entitles it to reimbursement of one dollar (less legal cost)of workers’ compensation benefits.” Frazier v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 590, 597-98 (1995). Second, the employer or its carrier may seek to recover directly from thethird party tortfeasor or that party’s insurance carrier. If, as in this case, theemployee does not settle with the third-party tortfeasor and declines to pursuea claim against that tortfeasor “within 1 year of the accident,” the employer orworkers’ compensation carrier, after serving “a written demand on the injuredemployee or his dependents,” may pursue a claim against the third party: Theemployer or its worker’s compensation carrier can either effect a settlement with the third person or his insurance carrier or institute proceedings against the third person for the recovery of damages for the injuries and loss sustained by such injured employee or his dependents and any settlement made with the third person or his insurance carrier or proceedings had and taken by such employer or his insurance carrier against such third person, and such right of action shall be only for such right of action that the injured employee or his dependents would have had against the third person, and shall constitute a bar to any further claim or action by the injured employee or his dependents against the third person. [N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).] 17 The statute thus limits the employer’s or carrier’s right of recovery to thesame “action that the injured employee . . . would have had against the thirdperson,” in accordance with traditional principles of subrogation. Ibid. Itsimultaneously provides that if, by settlement or judgment, the employer orworkers’ compensation carrier recovers from the third-party tortfeasor or his orher insurance carrier an amount “in excess of the employer’s obligation to theemployee or his dependents and the expense of suit, such excess shall be paidto the employee or his dependents.” Ibid. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 operates “[t]oovercome the inequity of double recovery,” which could occur if an injuredemployee were permitted to keep both workers’ compensation benefits anddamages from a third-party tortfeasor. Frazier, 142 N.J. at 596-97. Byauthorizing actions against third-party tortfeasors, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40“promot[es] the equitable balancing of competing interests that the statutoryscheme is designed to achieve.” Vitale, 231 N.J. at 252. Because it providesthe employer or workers’ compensation carrier a right to reimbursement, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f) serves the legislative goal “to make benefits readily andbroadly available to injured workers through a non-complicated process.”Tlumac, 187 N.J. at 573. 18 C. We next consider the Legislature’s intent when it created New Jersey’sno-fault insurance scheme in AICRA’s predecessor statute, the No-Fault Law,and when it reformed that scheme by enacting AICRA. The No-Fault Law was enacted in 1972. L. 1972, c. 70. It “requiredinsurance companies to provide insureds unlimited medical expense benefitswithout regard to fault” while “limit[ing] the right to sue for pain and suffering[and] requiring parties to have over $200 in medical expenses before theywould have standing for a negligence suit.” Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271, 284(2019) (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (1973); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8 (1973)), supersededby statute, L. 2019, cc. 244, 245. The statute’s mandated PIP benefits and related provisions wereintended to ensure “'prompt compensation for all [of a driver’s] economiclosses’ and to 'ease the burden placed upon [New Jersey] courts by the presentsystem.’” Id. at 284 (alterations in original) (quoting Governor’s SigningStatement to A. 667 (June 20, 1972)). As described by leading commentatorson New Jersey automobile insurance law, “the PIP law mandates speedy first -party payment of a range of benefits, including medical expenses, lost wages,essential services, survivor benefits and funeral expenses to certain classes of 19 persons injured in automobile accidents without any consideration of fault atall.” Craig & Pomeroy, N.J. Auto Ins. Law § 4:1 (2020). From its inception, the No-Fault Law made clear that the burden toprovide benefits to employees injured in work-related automobile accidentsremained on the workers’ compensation system. L. 1972, c. 70, § 6. Theoriginal No-Fault Law’s collateral source rule stated that PIP benefits under“section 4” of the statute would be “payable as loss accrues upon writtennotice of such loss and without regard to collateral sources.” Ibid. However,that provision identified workers’ compensation benefits for employees injuredin accidents in the course of their employment as an exception to that rule,providing that “benefits, collectible under workmen’s compensation insurance. . . shall be deducted from” the employee’s PIP benefits. Ibid. The Legislature’s intent to allocate the burden for such benefits toemployers and their workers’ compensation carriers was underscored by a1983 amendment to the statute’s collateral source provision. L. 1983, c. 362,§ 9. That provision authorized a PIP insurer to assert a claim forreimbursement of PIP benefits paid to an injured employee who was entitled toseek workers’ compensation benefits but failed to do so. Ibid. In 1998, the Legislature enacted AICRA, L. 1998, c. 21, § 1, describingit as “comprehensive legislation designed to preserve the no-fault system, 20 while at the same time reducing unnecessary costs which drive [automobileinsurance] premiums higher,” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b). AICRA “adhered to therecognized 'philosophical basis of the no-fault system . . . a trade-off of . . .providing medical benefits in return for a limitation on the right to sue for non -serious injuries.’” Haines, 237 N.J. at 287 (ellipses in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b) (1998)). New Jersey’s automobile liability insurance laws require that owners ofmotor vehicles registered or principally garaged in New Jersey maintain“minimum amounts of standard, basic, or special liability insurance coveragefor bodily injury, death, and property damage caused by their vehicles.”Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 466 (2004) (citing N.J.S.A.39:6B-1). Every policy must “contain [PIP] benefits for the payment ofbenefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind” for thenamed insured and members of his or her family residing in his or herhousehold who sustain bodily injury in an accident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. If a named insured elects the limitation-on-lawsuit option, certain third-party tortfeasors are exempted “from tort liability for noneconomic loss”unless the insured “sustained a bodily injury which results in death;dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displacedfractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of 21 medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A- -8(a). To recover for noneconomic loss, an insured must therefore “vault” thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold by “establish[ing] that 'as a result of bodilyinjury, arising out of the . . . operation . . . or use of’ an automobile, she has'sustained a bodily injury which results in’ one of the enumerated categories ofserious injury, including 'a permanent injury within a reasonable degree ofmedical probability.’” Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 186 (2007) (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)); DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 488; Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 470n.4. As used in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), the term “noneconomic loss” is definedas “pain, suffering and inconvenience.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(i). Economic loss,in contrast, is defined as “uncompensated loss of income or property, or otheruncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses .” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k). In AICRA, the Legislature retained the No-Fault Act’s provisionprecluding the admission of evidence of PIP benefits “collectible or paid”under an insured’s automobile insurance policy: Except as may be required in an action brought pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1], evidence of the amounts collectible or paid under a standard automobile insurance policy pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and -10], amounts collectible or paid for 22 medical expense benefits under a basic automobile insurance policy pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1], and amounts collectible or paid for benefits under a special automobile insurance policy pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3] to an injured person, including the amounts of any deductibles, copayments or exclusions, including exclusions pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.3], otherwise compensated is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such injured person. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.] That section was intended to ensure that an “injured person who was thebeneficiary of the PIP payments could not and should not recover from thetortfeasor the medical, hospital and other losses for which he had already beenreimbursed.” Cirelli v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 380, 387 (1977). TheLegislature intended the provision to further ancillary goals of “easing courtcongestion and lowering automobile insurance costs.” Bardis v. First TrentonIns. Co., 199 N.J. 265, 279 (2009). AICRA’s collateral source rule retains, among other exceptions, the No-Fault Act’s exception for workers’ compensation benefits. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6provides in part: The benefits provided in [ N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and -10], the medical expense benefits provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1] and the benefits provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3] shall be payable as loss accrues, upon written notice of such loss and without regard to 23 collateral sources, except that benefits, collectible under workers’ compensation insurance, . . . shall be deducted from the benefits collectible under [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and -10], the medical expense benefits provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1] and the benefits provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3]. The collateral source rule imposes the primary obligation to pay bothbenefits covered by workers’ compensation and PIP benefits “on the employerrather than the PIP insurer and reflects a legislative policy determination thatlosses resulting from work-related automobile accidents should be borne bythe 'ultimate consumers of the goods and services in whose production theyare incurred’ as opposed to 'the automobile-owning public’ in general.”Portnoff v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 392 N.J. Super. 377, 383 (App. Div. 2007)(quoting Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 12). Thus, the Legislature made clear that when an employee injured in awork-related accident is entitled to benefits under the Workers’ CompensationAct, that statute -- not AICRA -- provides his or her primary source ofrecovery for medical expenses and lost wages. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. Itenvisioned that the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier will paymedical and disability benefits to the injured employee, and that the employeewill neither seek nor receive PIP benefits under his automobile policy, thus 24 obviating the need for his or her automobile insurer to pay those benefits.Ibid. Significantly, when it enacted AICRA, the Legislature did not amend theWorkers’ Compensation Act to eliminate or circumscribe the statutory right ofsubrogation in cases involving injuries to employees in motor vehicleaccidents. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. It left that provision intact. D. In a series of decisions over three decades, the Appellate Division hasaddressed challenges based on provisions of AICRA or the No-Fault Law to anemployer’s or workers’ compensation carrier’s right of subrogation under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. The first such decision was Lefkin, decided prior to AICRA’s enactment.There, an employee injured in a work-related automobile accident receivedworkers’ compensation benefits, and his employer asserted a lien on any third-party recovery that he received. Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 6-7. The employeesued his automobile insurer, seeking PIP benefits, as well as the driversallegedly at fault in his accident, who settled with him. Id. at 5. After the accident, the employee “instituted a workers’ compensationaction against his alleged employer.” Id. at 5-6. The employee argued that hissettlement with the third-party tortfeasor should not be construed to include 25 payment for the medical expenses covered by workers’ compensation, because N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 would bar evidence of “amounts collectible or paid” underPIP coverage in a third-party action. Id. at 8-9. He argued that “the PIPcarrier, not he, should pay the medical expense portion of the compensationlien.” Id. at 8. The Appellate Division rejected that argument. Id. at 9. It held thatwhen workers’ compensation benefits are collected by an employee, PIPbenefits “are neither collectible nor paid,” and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12’s bar onevidence of “amounts collectible or paid” under PIP coverage does not apply.Ibid. The court accordingly ruled that an injured employee who receivesworkers’ compensation benefits for medical expenses and then settles with thetortfeasor subject to a workers’ compensation lien is not entitled to bereimbursed by his PIP insurer for the amount subject to that lien. Ibid. Noting the Legislature’s intent to ensure that an injured employee isreimbursed -- but reimbursed only once -- for his medical expenses, the courtheld: In the circumstances here, three potential sources of reimbursement of his medical expenses were available to plaintiff: workers’ compensation benefits, PIP benefits, and recovery from the tortfeasor. It is, moreover, clear that the overall legislative intention is ultimately to assure a plaintiff-insured-worker such reimbursement, but only by way of a single recovery. 26 Where only two potential payment sources are implicated, the controlling statute plainly dictates which of the two is primary. Thus, where both workers’ compensation benefits and proceeds of a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary. This accords with the purpose of N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, which is to implement the employer’s right to subrogation against the tortfeasor responsible for its payment obligation to its employee. Where only workers’ compensation benefits and PIP benefits are available, the primary burden is placed on workers’ compensation as a matter of legislative policy by way of the collateral source rule of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. And when only PIP benefits and tortfeasor liability are involved, the primary burden is placed as a matter of policy on the PIP carrier by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. [Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).] The Appellate Division thus underscored in Lefkin that absent a third-party recovery, the primary source of reimbursement for medical benefits foran employee injured in a motor vehicle accident in the course of theemployment is workers’ compensation. Ibid. It held, however, that if a third-party recovery is available, the provider of the workers’ compensation benefitshas the right to assert its lien on the third-party recovery under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 without contravening the No-Fault Act. Ibid. Two years before the Legislature enacted AICRA, the AppellateDivision decided Continental, the decision on which the trial court mostheavily relied in this case. 288 N.J. Super. 185. In Continental, an employee 27 who had elected the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold in his personal automobilepolicy was injured in a work-related automobile accident and was paidworkers’ compensation benefits for medical expenses. Id. at 187-88. Hisemployer’s workers’ compensation carrier sued the alleged tortfeasor pursuantto N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, seeking reimbursement of the workers’ compensationbenefits paid, and the tortfeasor raised the No-Fault Act’s limitation-on-lawsuit threshold as a defense to the third-party action. Id. at 188-89. Thetrial court granted the workers’ compensation carrier’s motion for partialsummary judgment striking the tortfeasor’s defense based on the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold that was in effect under the No-Fault Law prior to AICRA.Id. at 188. Reversing the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, theAppellate Division acknowledged that the No-Fault Act “does not limit 'theright of recovery, against the tortfeasor, of uncompensated economic losssustained by the injured party.’” Id. at 190 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12). Itnoted, however, that had the employee been injured in an accident unrelated towork, his sole source of benefits for medical and income continuation wouldhave been the PIP provisions of his automobile insurance policy, and thatunder those circumstances, the employee would be precluded from pursuing athird-party claim for those losses. Ibid. The Appellate Division reasoned that 28 the “[d]efendant’s liability is not affected by the fortuitous circumstance that[the] plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.” Ibid. The Appellate Division held in Continental that the injured employeewas “clearly entitled to receive PIP benefits for his economic loss” and that“[w]hether he received them is immaterial” to the analysis. Ibid. Observingthat the workers’ compensation carrier’s rights “rise no higher than theemployee’s rights to which it is subrogated,” the court barred the subrogationclaim for medical expenses. Ibid. It remanded the matter to the trial court todetermine whether the employee had an uncompensated income loss, whichmight give rise to a subrogation claim. Id. at 191; see also Patterson v.Adventure Trails, 364 N.J. Super. 444, 447-49 (Law Div. 2003) (applyingContinental and AICRA to bar a workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogationclaim against a third-party tortfeasor for medical benefits paid to an injuredworker). Two post-AICRA Appellate Division decisions addressed that statute’sinterplay with workers’ compensation subrogation under N.J.S.A. 34:15- -40. In Talmadge v. Burn, an employee injured in a work-related accidentreceived medical, wage, and indemnity benefits from her employer’s workers’compensation carrier. 446 N.J. Super. 413, 416 (App. Div. 2016). After theemployee settled her claim with the third-party tortfeasor, the workers’ 29 compensation insurer asserted a lien against her recovery. Ibid. Noting that asa no-fault insured she was barred from recovering medical benefits fromanother no-fault insured, the employee argued that the rights of the workers’compensation carrier were limited to the rights that she could have asserted,and that accordingly the carrier could not seek reimbursement of the benefitsthat it had paid to her. Id. at 417. The Appellate Division rejected that “syllogism” as an “inaccuratestatement of the law.” Ibid. The court considered AICRA’s collateral sourcerule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, to express the Legislature’s intent that workers’compensation -- not PIP benefits -- assume “the primary burden” when “onlyworkers’ compensation and PIP benefits are available” to the injuredemployee. Id. at 418 (citing Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 7). The court reasonedthat when workers’ compensation benefits are paid, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40’s rightof subrogation is essential to avoid a double recovery by the employee. Ibid.(citing Frazier, 142 N.J. at 597-98). It therefore enforced the workers’compensation lien. Id. at 419. In Lambert, the Appellate Division considered workers’ compensationcarriers’ appeals of trial court orders partially extinguishing liens for medicalbenefits that had been imposed on injured employees’ recovery againsttortfeasors. 447 N.J. Super. at 66-70. The Appellate Division reversed those 30 orders, holding that when it enacted AICRA, the Legislature “did not displacethe workers’ compensation system.” Id. at 74. Instead, the court noted,N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateral source rule requires that benefits collectibleunder workers’ compensation insurance “'shall be deducted’” from PIPbenefits collectible under enumerated provisions of AICRA, thus “shift[ing]the burden of providing insurance from the automobile insurance system to theworkers’ compensation system.” Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6).Accordingly, the Appellate Division enforced the workers’ compensation liens.Id. at 77. The Appellate Division’s decision in Continental was not cited in eitherTalmadge or Lambert. The Appellate Division panels in both cases, however,declined to follow the Continental panel’s reasoning that because an individualinjured in an accident unrelated to work could have recovered medicalexpenses under his automobile insurance policy, and would be barred by theNo-Fault Act from pursuing the tortfeasor for damages based on those twocategories of loss, the workers’ compensation carrier could not assert asubrogation claim based on those benefits. See Lambert, 447 N.J. Super. at 74-77 (enforcing workers’ compensation lien for medical benefits); Talmadge, 446 N.J. Super. at 417-19 (same). Both courts relied instead on the principlestated in Lefkin: when workers’ compensation benefits are paid to an injured 31 employee for economic loss, as the collateral source rule set forth in N.J.S.A.39:6A-6 envisions, and the PIP carrier is relieved from the obligation to paythose benefits, AICRA poses no obstacle to a subrogation claim under N.J.S.A.34:15-40. Ibid. IV. Against that backdrop, we review the Appellate Division’s decisionreversing the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgmentand its denial of New Jersey Transit’s motion for partial summary judgment.Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 113. A. We briefly comment on two procedural issues. First, we rejectdefendants’ argument that the Appellate Division improperly considered thetrial court’s denial of New Jersey Transit’s motion for partial summaryjudgment as well as the trial court’s grant of defendants’ summary judgmentmotions. New Jersey Transit clearly appealed the trial court’s rulings on bothcross-motions for summary judgment to the Appellate Division. Moreover,New Jersey Transit asserted before the Appellate Division the argument that ithad made before the trial court in its motion for partial summary judgment:that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)’s limitation-on-lawsuit threshold should not bar itssubrogation claim. The Appellate Division did not err when it reviewed the 32 trial court’s denial of New Jersey Transit’s motion for partial summaryjudgment. Second, we acknowledge defendants’ contention that there is anunresolved dispute as to the nature of the partial permanent disability benefitspaid to Mercogliano pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(c). Notwithstanding NewJersey Transit’s representation that it paid workers’ compensation benefits toMercogliano only for economic loss consisting of medical expenses and lostwages, defendants claim that some or all of the partial permanent disabilitybenefits paid to Mercogliano actually compensated him for pain and sufferingdue to his accident, thus implicating N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)’s limitation-on-lawsuit threshold. The trial court viewed the workers’ compensation benefits at issue tocompensate Mercogliano only for his economic loss in the form of medicalexpenses and lost wages. The Appellate Division agreed; it expressly assumedthat this appeal implicates only benefits for economic loss. Sanchez, 457 N.J.Super. at 112 (noting that New Jersey Transit “seeks to recover benefits toMercogliano for economic loss comprised of medical expenses and wage loss ,not noneconomic loss”). The record on appeal reveals no details about thepartial permanent disability benefits that would contravene the trial court’s and 33 Appellate Division’s conclusion that those benefits exclusively related toeconomic loss. Should the trial court deem it appropriate, it has the discretion to expandthe record on remand and resolve any factual dispute about the partialpermanent disability payments made in this case. As did the AppellateDivision, we confine our analysis to workers’ compensation subrogation basedon payments made for economic loss. B. We concur with the Appellate Division that the Workers’ CompensationAct reflects the Legislature’s clear intent to allow employers and carriers thathave paid workers’ compensation benefits to assert subrogation rights againstthird-party tortfeasors. Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 107; see also N.J.S.A.34:15-40(b), (c), (f); Vitale, 231 N.J. at 252-55 (discussing legislative policiesreflected in Workers’ Compensation Act); Frazier, 142 N.J. at 596-98 (same);Danesi v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 189 N.J. Super. 160, 165 (App. Div. 1983)(same). The Legislature’s objective is clear: protected by their statutorysubrogation rights, employers and workers’ compensation carriers willpromptly pay benefits for medical expenses and other economic loss toemployees injured in the course of their employment. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b), (c), (f); Vitale, 231 N.J. at 252-55 (discussing legislative policies 34 reflected in Workers’ Compensation Act); Frazier, 142 N.J. at 596-98 (same).The subrogation claim ensures that the employee will not be awarded a doublerecovery in workers’ compensation and then in a third-party claim. Frazier, 142 N.J. at 597; Marano v. Schob, 455 N.J. Super. 283, 290 (App. Div. 2018).Consistent with those objectives, the Legislature limits the subrogation rightonly by the principle that the employer’s or carrier’s right to reimbursement“shall be only for such right of action that the injured employee or hisdependents would have had against the third person.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). With a few words of statutory text, the Legislature could have excludedfrom the Workers’ Compensation Act subrogation claims based on thepayment of benefits to an employee injured in a work-related motor vehicleaccident, and treated such an accident, for purposes of AICRA, as it treats anyother. It could have expressed its intent that AICRA alone governs benefits toindividuals injured in motor vehicle accidents, even accidents that arise in thecourse of employment. The Legislature has declined to take such a step. It created noexceptions to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40’s subrogation right, either before theenactment of AICRA or in that statute’s wake, for employees eligible for PIPbenefits who are injured in work-related automobile accidents such as theaccident at issue here. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. As the Appellate Division 35 observed in Lambert, “had the Legislature intended to effectuate such a majorchange, it would have used express language in the statute and discussed thatincorporation in AICRA’s legislative history.” 447 N.J. Super. at 75. In the absence of direct evidence of legislative intent, the trial courtrelied on the description of economic loss in AICRA’s definitional provision, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k). The court reasoned that once New Jersey Transit hadpaid Mercogliano’s medical expenses and awarded him disability benefits,there was no longer an “economic loss” at issue, and thus no basis for asubrogation claim. To the trial court, the act that gave rise to New JerseyTransit’s subrogation claim -- its payment of benefits to Mercogliano under N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 and N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a), (c) -- simultaneously defeatedthat claim, because it left Mercogliano with no “uncompensated” loss. We respectfully disagree with the trial court. We discern no evidencethat the Legislature intended to bar a workers’ compensation subrogation claimby virtue of the very benefits that created that claim in the first place. As didthe Appellate Division, we conclude that Mercogliano suffered an economicloss in the form of medical expenses and lost wages, and that New JerseyTransit paid him benefits for that economic loss. Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 112. 36 As they did before the trial court and Appellate Division, defendants relyprimarily on the Appellate Division’s decision in Continental. They argue thatbecause Mercogliano would have been eligible to receive PIP benefits had henot qualified for workers’ compensation benefits, AICRA bars New JerseyTransit’s claim for reimbursement of the benefits it paid for that loss. Wedisagree. The Appellate Division’s decision does not contravene N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. In most settings, that statute bars the admission in a third-party action oflosses “collectible or paid” by PIP benefits under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, -4,-4.3, or -10. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. Reimbursed for his medical expenses andlost wages by virtue of his workers’ compensation benefits, Mercogliano wasnot entitled to -- and did not receive -- PIP benefits. Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super.at 113. As the Appellate Division noted in Lefkin, when workers’compensation benefits are available to an injured employee, “PIP benefits inthat situation are neither collectible nor paid,” and accordingly N.J.S.A.39:6A-12 has no bearing on the analysis. 229 N.J. Super. at 9. We areunpersuaded by the reasoning set forth in the Continental decision as appliedto the circumstances here, and agree that the Continental decision is “contraryto the purposes underlying the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Craig &Pomeroy, § 12:3. 37 Moreover, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 does not contravene AICRA’s collateralsource rule. In AICRA, the Legislature made clear its goal to provide promptbenefits to employees injured in work-related automobile accidents, with theultimate responsibility to pay medical expenses imposed on the employer or itsworkers’ compensation carrier. The statute’s collateral source rule providesthat workers’ compensation benefits “shall be deducted from the [PIP] benefitscollectible” under one of four enumerated provisions of AICRA. N.J.S.A.39:6A-6. As the Appellate Division noted in Lambert, “[w]hen a workersuffers a work-related injury in a motor vehicle accident, workers’compensation coverage is the primary source of insurance under the collateralsource rule.” 447 N.J. Super. at 73 (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6). The employer’sor workers’ compensation carrier’s payment of workers’ compensationbenefits “relieves the PIP carrier from the obligation of making payments forexpenses incurred by the insured which are covered by workers’ compensationbenefits.” Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 7. The result intended by the Legislature is precisely what occurred here.Mercogliano was paid workers’ compensation benefits for his medicalexpenses, temporary disability payments, and partial permanent disabilitypayments. He never sought or received PIP benefits from his automobileinsurer, and his accident imposed no burden on that insurer. The Legislature’s 38 objective in enacting the Workers’ Compensation Act -- and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateral source rule -- was achieved in the setting of this appeal. NewJersey Transit’s subrogation claim is entirely consonant with AICRA’scollateral source rule. In short, we concur with the Appellate Division in this appeal that theLefkin, Talmadge, and Lambert decisions properly reconciled the two statutoryschemes at issue here. See Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 109-13. Like thosecourts, we find in AICRA no evidence that the Legislature intended to barsubrogation claims in settings such as this.2 C. Our dissenting colleagues devote much of their argument to anexploration of the Legislature’s objective to reduce automobile insurancepremiums when it enacted AICRA. Post at ___ (slip op. at 1-2; 5-7; 10-11).We agree with the dissent that the Legislature’s cost-saving goal in AICRA islaudable and clear. That goal, however, does not resolve the question of2 We do not address the argument of amicus curiae NJAJ regarding potential claims by individual plaintiffs, as distinct from subrogation claims asserted by employers and workers’ compensation carriers that are governed by the Workers’ Compensation Act. That argument was not raised by any party. See Dugan v. TGI Friday’s, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 70 n.15 (2017) (declining to reach an issue raised by amici but not by any party); Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass’n., 91 N.J. 38, 48-49 (1982) (“[A]n amicus curiae must accept the case before the court as presented by the parties and cannot raise issues not raised by the parties.”). 39 statutory interpretation raised by this appeal: whether one or more provisionsof AICRA should be construed to bar New Jersey Transit’s subrogation claim. Our dissenting colleagues adopt the trial court’s view that because NewJersey Transit paid Mercogliano’s medical expenses and lost wages in the formof workers’ compensation payments, there is no “economic loss” within themeaning of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k), and therefore no subrogation claim for suchan economic loss. Post at ___ (slip. op. at 3-4). If our dissenting colleagueswere correct that by virtue of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k), there was no economic lossin this case, then the dissent’s contentions regarding the impact of N.J.S.A.39:6A-6 and -12 on a subrogation action based on an injured employee’seconomic loss, post at ___ (slip op. at 1-2, 6, 8, 10-11), would be irrelevant. In any event, for the reasons explained, see supra pp. 34-36, we view thetrial court’s and dissent’s application of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k)’s definitionallanguage to be incorrect. We view Mercogliano’s medical payments and lostwages to constitute economic loss and consider New Jersey Transit’s paymentof workers’ compensation benefits for medical expenses and lost wages toderive from that loss. Our dissenting colleagues embrace the holding of Continental, 288 N.J.Super. at 190. Post at ___ (slip op. at 3-4). Our colleagues evidently sharethe Continental panel’s view that economic losses paid entirely through 40 workers’ compensation benefits nonetheless constitute “amounts collectible orpaid” by PIP benefits inadmissible in a third-party action under N.J.S.A.39:6A-12. We disagree. Here, Mercogliano was never “paid” PIP benefits.Moreover, in the wake of New Jersey Transit’s award of workers’compensation benefits for Mercogliano’s loss, his economic losses were not“collectible” through his PIP carrier. See Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 9 (“PIPbenefits are not available to an insured if workers’ compensation benefits arealso available to him.”). As noted, see supra pp. 36-38, we do not viewContinental to be persuasive as applied to this case, and instead considerLambert, 447 N.J. Super. 61, Talmadge, 446 N.J. Super. 413, and Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. 1 -- unaddressed by the dissent -- to provide the more compellinganalysis. Finally, our dissenting colleagues enumerate three hypotheticalscenarios; in each, Mercogliano would receive PIP benefits instead of theworkers’ compensation benefits that he was actually awarded. Post at ___(slip op. at 9). Our dissenting colleagues argue that in each of their alternativefact patterns, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 would bar a workers’compensation subrogation claim, and that those statutes should also bar theclaim at issue here. Id. at 9-10. 41 We respectfully note that our task is not to address alternative factpatterns distinct from the one that is before us. According to the undisputedrecord, Mercogliano did not seek PIP benefits. He did not receive PIPbenefits. New Jersey Transit did not seek reimbursement from Mercogliano’sPIP carrier, let alone prevail in such an effort. Instead, it paid the benefits as N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a), (c) and -15 require, and sought reimbursement only fromthe third-party tortfeasor. See Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 9 (noting that “whereboth workers’ compensation and proceeds of a tort action have been recovered,the tort recovery is primary.”). In the actual setting of this case, PIP benefitswere never implicated. Alternative scenarios distinct from this case should beleft for another day. D. We acknowledge defendants’ contention that workers’ compensationsubrogation claims arising from work-related motor vehicle accidents mayincrease the volume of claims, thus exacerbating the burden on the no-faultautomobile insurance system as a whole. We also note New Jersey Transit’sresponse that any such claims would be simple and easily resolved. TheLegislature has the authority to address any such concerns by amending theWorkers’ Compensation Act, AICRA, or both statutory schemes. 42 JUSTICE PATTERSON filed a concurrence, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA join. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and SOLOMON join. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate. 43 New Jersey Transit Corporation, a/s/o David Mercogliano, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith, Defendants-Appellants. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The conclusion reached by my concurring colleagues will ultimatelylead to increased automobile insurance premiums and increased litigation overeconomic damages incurred in work-related automobile accidents -- anoutcome in conflict with a series of legislative enactments aimed at makingautomobile insurance more affordable in this State. The simple question inthis case is whether the economic costs of the injuries suffered by a driver in awork-related automobile accident are to be borne by the workers’compensation insurance system or the automobile insurance system. TheLegislature has answered that question. When a driver is involved in a work-related automobile accident and hiseconomic costs are recoverable under either his private automobile insurancecarrier’s personal injury protection (PIP) policy or under his employer’sworkers’ compensation scheme, New Jersey’s no-fault automobile insurance 1 system makes the workers’ compensation carrier primarily responsible forreimbursing those costs. When an injured driver’s economic losses are“collectible” under his PIP policy but paid by his employer’s workers’compensation carrier, the no-fault system prohibits a workers’ compensationsubrogation action against the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s automobile liabilityinsurance carrier. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, -12. Despite the clear language andintent of the no-fault system, the concurring opinion allows the workers’compensation carrier here to sue the tortfeasors or their automobile insurancecarrier in a subrogation action, thus permitting the very outcome theLegislature intended to foreclose -- more litigation and greater financialburdens on our automobile insurance system. The misreading of the applicable statutory schemes compels me todissent from my concurring colleagues. I. New Jersey Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) employee DavidMercogliano was driving one of his employer’s vehicles when he was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by defendant Sandra Sanchez, owned by defendantChad Smith, and insured by Allstate Insurance Corporation (Allstate). As aresult of his injuries, Mercogliano incurred economic damages ofapproximately $7000 in medical expenses and $27,000 in lost wages -- costs 2 recoverable both under his PIP policy and under his employer’s workers’compensation policy.1 Under its workers’ compensation policy, New JerseyTransit paid Mercogliano’s economic damages and then, in a subrogationaction, sued defendants. Because Allstate insured defendant Smith’s vehicle,Allstate was responsible for the defense and indemnification of any liabilitylawsuit as set forth in the insurance policy. Judge Polifroni dismissed New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action onsummary judgment on the ground that New Jersey Transit had no greater rightsthan those held by Mercogliano. Mercogliano could not sue the tortfeasors (ortheir automobile insurance carrier) because he did not suffer anuncompensated loss under the no-fault system. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k), -12.Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, New JerseyTransit could not undertake a cause of action that Mercogliano had no right topursue against the tortfeasors. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). Judge Polifroniunderstood that to rule otherwise would allow workers’ compensation carriersnot only to introduce claims into the court system that the Legislature meant to1 The policy limits of Mercogliano’s PIP coverage were $250,000 in medical expenses and $41,600 in lost wages. Mercogliano had selected the limitation- on-lawsuit threshold in his policy that barred him from suing for pain-and- suffering (noneconomic) damages in the absence of a permanent injury. Mercogliano did not allege that he vaulted that threshold. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8. 3 exclude, but also to shift costs allocated to the workers’ compensation systemto the automobile insurance system, in contravention of the no-fault scheme. Judge Polifroni followed the well-reasoned decision in ContinentalInsurance Co. v. McClelland, 288 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1996). There,the Appellate Division, addressing an issue similar to the one before us,pointed out that “[t]he compensation carrier’s rights rise no higher than theemployee’s rights to which it is subrogated. [The employee] was clearlyentitled to receive PIP benefits for his economic loss. Whether he receivedthem is immaterial.” Id. at 190. Thus, in Continental, the workers’compensation carrier could not sue the tortfeasor (or the automobile insuranceliability carrier) because of “the fortuitous circumstance that [the injuredemployee] was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.” Ibid. The Appellate Division panel that reversed Judge Polifroni permits anew class of claims against automobile insurers, previously barred byContinental, that will inevitably lead to increased insurance premiums -- anoutcome clearly not intended by the Legislature. See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 485 (2005) (“This State’s more than thirty-year history with no faultinsurance has been marked by legislative efforts to control the rising cost ofautomobile insurance . . . .”); see also Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271, 284-87(2019), superseded by statute, L. 2019, cc. 244, 245; Caviglia v. Royal Tours 4 of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 467 (2004). Because of the three-three split on thisCourt -- three members to affirm and three members to reverse -- that mistakenAppellate Division decision will stand. See Gallena v. Scott, 1 N.J. 430, 432(1949). A brief review of the history of New Jersey’s no-fault system lays barethe misguided path the concurrence has taken. II. Beginning in 1972, with the enactment of the New Jersey AutomobileReparation Reform Act (No Fault Act), L. 1972, c. 70, the Legislature passed aseries of laws, all aimed at controlling the ever-rising cost of automobileinsurance. See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 485. A major feature of the No FaultAct was PIP -- a form of first-party self-insurance that automatically covers aninjured driver’s economic losses, such as medical expenses and lost wages,regardless of fault. See ibid.; L. 1972, c. 70, § 4. In exchange for the swiftpayment of economic losses paid by the PIP carrier, the No Fault Actprohibited the injured driver from bringing a claim for economic losses“collectible or paid” under PIP, thus eliminating costly litigation. 2 See L. 1972, c. 70, § 12; Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 467.2 The No Fault Act also required all drivers to carry liability insurance. L. 1972, c. 70, § 3. 5 Since its inception, and in its present iteration, our no-fault law makesthe workers’ compensation system the primary source of reimbursement foreconomic damages suffered by a driver injured in a work-related automobileaccident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6; L. 1972, c. 70, § 6. When the economic lossesincurred by a driver injured in the course of his employment are covered byboth his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier and his PIP policy, theworkers’ compensation carrier is responsible for the costs. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.Consistent with the overall goal of the no-fault insurance system, this rule-- known as the collateral source rule -- was intended to lower automobileinsurance premiums by making the workers’ compensation system responsiblefor the economic losses of the injured employee. Over decades, the Legislature made a number of alterations to the no-fault system to further its original purpose of keeping insurance premiumsaffordable. See Haines, 237 N.J. at 284-87; DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 485-86;Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 467. Important to our analysis is the 1984 New JerseyAutomobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act (CostContainment Act), L. 1983, c. 362. With the Cost Containment Act, the Legislature again sought to achieve“reductions in premiums for New Jersey motorists.” Statement of GovernorThomas H. Kean to A. 3981 (Oct. 4, 1983). The Cost Containment Act 6 expanded the collateral source rule by providing that when a driver’s PIPpolicy pays for his economic losses that are also covered under the workers’compensation system, the automobile carrier may seek reimbursement fromthe workers’ compensation carrier. L. 1983, c. 362, § 9. By that expansion ofthe collateral source rule, the Legislature made clear again its intent to shiftlosses from automobile insurers to workers’ compensation carriers with thegoal of reducing automobile insurance premiums. The 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A.39:6A-1.1 to -35, was the Legislature’s most recent concerted effort to address“[t]he high cost of automobile insurance in New Jersey” that forced manylower income residents “to drop or lapse their coverage in violation of theState’s mandatory motor vehicle insurance laws.” See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1.Although the details of AICRA are not relevant to our discussion, our presentno-fault system still requires all drivers to carry liability insurance and PIP.See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, -4.3 Significantly, an injured driver whose economiclosses are “collectible or paid” under his PIP policy cannot sue the tortfeasor(or his automobile liability carrier) for those losses; instead, the injured drivercan seek only “uncompensated” economic losses. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.3 In very limited circumstances, some individuals on government assistance may opt for special insurance that does not require liability coverage. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3. 7 The Workers’ Compensation Act, passed in 1911 -- over sixty yearsbefore the No Fault Act -- requires employers to cover their employees’medical expenses and lost wages for work-related accidents. See N.J.S.A.34:15-7, -12, -15; L. 1911, c. 95. The Workers’ Compensation Act allowsemployers to sue third-party tortfeasors who injure their employees on the jobas subrogees of their employees, but “only for such right of action that theinjured employee or his dependents would have had against the third person.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). Harmonizing the no-fault automobile insurance system with theWorkers’ Compensation Act, the economic losses suffered by a driver injuredin a work-related accident are still “collectible” under PIP, even if covered byworkers’ compensation. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. The injured driver,moreover, cannot sue unless he has an “uncompensated” economic loss. Seeibid. An injured driver who has been made whole by a workers’ compensationcarrier that covers his economic damages does not have an “uncompensated”loss. See ibid. Because the injured driver would not have a cause of actionagainst the tortfeasor under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, the workers’ compensationcarrier does not have a right of subrogation against the tortfeasor or hisautomobile insurance carrier. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). A workers’compensation subrogation action that shifts the cost to the automobile 8 insurance system undermines the very goal of decades of no-fault automobileinsurance law. All three of the following outcomes are compelled by a common-sensereading of the legislation undergirding the no-fault system, which is aimed ateliminating economic damage lawsuits recoverable under PIP: (1) had Mercogliano recovered his medical expenses and lost wages through PIP, his insurance company could not have sued defendants (or their automobile insurance carrier) in a subrogation action, see N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12; (2) had Mercogliano not sought reimbursement of his economic damages through his PIP policy or through the workers’ compensation system, he could not have sued defendants because those damages were “collectible” under his PIP policy, see N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12; and (3) had Mercogliano received payment of his economic damages through his PIP policy, his PIP carrier would have been entitled to reimbursement from New Jersey Transit because Mercogliano’s injuries were work-related, see N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. If those outcomes are compelled -- if Mercogliano and his PIP carriercannot sue defendants’ automobile liability insurance carrier for compensatedeconomic losses, and if Mercogliano and his PIP carrier can both seek thepayment of economic losses from the workers’ compensation carrier -- itmakes no sense that the legislative scheme would allow the workers’ 9 compensation carrier to seek reimbursement from defendants’ automobileinsurance carrier. The legislative policy underlying the no-fault system is to reduce theburdens placed on our automobile insurance system that have made insurancepremiums unaffordable to many New Jersey residents. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1. The subrogation action that my concurring colleagues allow defeats “alegislative policy determination that losses resulting from work -relatedautomobile accidents should be borne by the 'ultimate consumers of the goodsand services in whose production they are incurred’ as opposed to 'theautomobile-owning public’ in general.” See Portnoff v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 392 N.J. Super. 377, 383 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Lefkin v. Venturini, 229 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1988)). Indeed, the reason that the workers’ compensation system is givenprimary responsibility for covering economic damages for work-relatedvehicular accidents is to relieve the financial pressure on the automobileinsurance system. III. The relentless logic of the No Fault Act and successor enactmentsforbids a workers’ compensation carrier from seeking reimbursement in asubrogation action, therefore reducing costly litigation and lowering 10 automobile insurance premiums. Because Mercogliano was injured in thecourse of his employment, New Jersey Transit covered his economic losses.That result fulfilled the purpose of the no-fault system’s collateral source rule,shifting the losses from the automobile insurance industry to workers’compensation. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. Permitting New Jersey Transit to suedefendants and their automobile insurance carrier for the economic losses, asthe concurrence does, shifts the costs right back to the automobile insurancesystem. I therefore respectfully dissent. Our task is to give life to the Legislature’s policy choices. If theconcurrence has misconstrued the interplay between the no-fault system andthe Workers’ Compensation Act, as I believe it has, the Legislature has thepower to correct the misinterpretation of its enactments. 11