Title: LOVE v RALPH S FOOD STORE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12427
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1973

No. 12427 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T OF THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 D E L L A M. LOVE, Claimant and Respondent, -vs - RALPH'S F O O D STORE, INC., Employee and Appellant, and TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman Bennett, Jr. and Lyman Bennett 1 1 1 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Thomas A. Olson argued, County Attorney, Bozeman Montana Submitted: September 27, 1973 Decided : DECS ~$n Filed : OEC:: I9?3 M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by the employer's insurer in a Workmen's Compensation case. The Workmen's Compensation division (formerly the Industrial Accident Board) found no compensable injury and denied the employee's claim. On appeal, the district court heard additional testimony, found a compensable in jury and awarded the employee benefits total ing $9,259 -86. The employer ' s insurer n o w appeals from that judgment. Claimant i s Della M . Love, an employee of Ralph's Food Store, Inc. i n Bozeman, Montana. The employer's Plan I1 insurer under the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act i s Truck Insurance Exchange. Claimant was employed as a meat wrapper a t the store. In general her duties involved wrapping and marking meat, cleaning and stocking the meat display cases, and washing parts of the meat saws and grinders. She claims t o have suffered an accidental injury to her lower back resulting in temporary total and permanent partial disability as well as substantial medical expenses. Claimant filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Division on January 16, 1969. She claimed an accidental injury to her lower back on August 26, 1968 which she described as caused "by continuously l i f t - ing something heavy" and that she had developed a type of arthritis. She attached a letter to her claim stating in relevant part t h a t she did not "quite understand how industrial accident operates b u t Dr. Whitehair (her attending physician) was very positive that this was an industrial accident claim * * *." This letter went on to indicate t h a t she was required to unload freight for the meat department and carry i t into the meat department which involved heavy lifting. Subsequently her employer filed his f i r s t report of injury giving August 29, 1968 as the date of claimant's injury and describing the injury in this language: "Unknown complaint of back and said she could not l i f t trays above her shoulders." The claim adjuster for the employer's insurer filed a report indicating that claimant "claims back hurt, no particular incident, 'just an accumulation o f a l l the l i f t i n g " ' and f i l e d a memo w i t h h i s superior s t a t i n g t h a t "From information o f claimant theFe was no accident and an accumulation o f 1 ift- ing." Dr. Mhitehair, claimant's primary attending physician, l i s t s a v a r i e t y o f dates f o r the accident i n various reports and claims f o r h i s services f i l e d w i t h the Workmen's Compensation Division: July 16, 1968, approximately J u l y 20, 1968, June 15, 1968. D r . Kelly, who performed surgery on claimant, l i s t e d the date of the accident as August 29, 1968. The hospital and physical therapist indicated the date o f claimant's accident as September 18, 1968 (the date o f claimant's admission t o the hospital ) . An employee o f the Workmen's Compensation Division talked t o claimant over the phone and f i l e d the following memorandum s t a t i n g i n pertinent part: "On the day she alleges i n j u r y they were having a chuck roast sale. She had t o l i f t many more trays o f meat on t h i s day, and handle more chuck roasts, which are heavy, than usual. She also cleaned the grinder etc. which weighs about 50# * * * she had done t h i s many times before. However, the chuck r o a s t sale made i t necessary t o lift many more roasts on t h i s par- t i c u l a r day." A hearing on the claim was held before the Workmen's Compensation D i v i - sion. Testimony indicated t h a t claimant had had back problems p r i o r t o the alleged i n j u r y . Dr. Whitehair, her physician, indicated t h a t X-rays taken about a year p r i o r t o the alleged i n j u r y d i d , n o t reveal much more than a l i t t l e e a r l y o s t e o a r t h r i t i s o f the spine which, according t o the doctor, i s not a t a l l unusual. A t t h a t time claimant missed no work and responded t o conserva- t i v e therapy consisting o f muscle relaxants, pain k i l l e r s , and ultrasound diathermy. D r . Whitehair t e s t i f i e d t h a t on September 3, 1968 he again examined claimant and found fundamentally d i f f e r e n t problems a t t h i s time as compared w i t h e a r l i e r examinations. This time claimant was hospitalized for f i v e days and treated f o r nerve r o o t i r r i t a t i o n by t r a c t i o n and muscle relaxants. A f t e r her release, claimant was permitted t o work where i t would not require 1 i f t i n g anything over 5 pounds. I n e a r l y 1970 claimant was again hospitalized. A myelogram indicated a herniated disc and surgery was recommended. During surgery a fragment o f nucleus pulposus was found i n the nerve canal where the nerve goes i n t o the vertebrae and removed. A t t h i s hearing claimant's testimony was very confusing concerdi ng the dates o f the occurrence she r e l i e s upon as the basis o f her claim f o r compensation. She t e s t i f i e d under cross examination t h a t she suffered an i n j u r y on J u l y 13, 1968 and another on August 26, 1968, i l l u s t r a t e d by the following testimony# " Q . L e t ' s t a l k about the early p a r t of July; what happened, i f anything? A. I d o n ' t know what you mean. "Q. The reason f o r the question i s t h i s , Mrs. Love: you indicated on E x h i b i t ' B ' your i n j u r y occurred July 13th. A. It started then. "Q. A l l r i g h t , t e l l us what happened then? A. I was j u s t unloading the boxes and washing the meat parts and i t started, my back started twinging i n the lower part, and t h a t ' s the date i t started, when i t was noticeable. "Q. Did something happen on the 26th o f August d i f f e r e n t than what happened i n July? A. It j u s t b u i l t up t o the point where I couldn't stand it any longer. "Q. Right, you had a heavy l i f t i n g job, a m I r i g h t ? A. Yes. "Q. You had a heavy l i f t i n g job f o r q u i t e awhile? A. Yes. "Q. And f i n a l l y i t got too much for you, i s t h a t r i g h t ? A. Yes." Scmetime i n ,the l a t t e r p a r t o f J u l y o r the f i r s t p a r t o f August a chdnge i n butchers occurred which required claimant t o do heavier work than before. Claimant t e s t i f i e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r incident t h a t occurred a f t e r the new butcher came. She had washed heavy parts o f the meat grinder and was l i f t i n g them out o f a low sink when she had sharp pains i n the lower p a r t o f her back. Claimant t e s t i f i e d she had a l o t o f trouble w i t h her back a f t e r t h i s , t h a t her back got progressively worse, and she f i n a l l y could not do the work any longer. The hearings o f f i c e r f o r the Workmen's Compensation D i v i s i o n made findings o f fact "That no specific date and no s p e c i f i c incident has been established t o indicate t h a t an accidental i n j u r y occurred t h a t i s cornpensable under the provisions o f the Workmen's Compensation Act." and "That claimant f a i l e d t o establish by a preponderance of credible evidence t h a t she s u f f e r - ed an accidental i n j u r y as defined i n Section 92-418, R.C.M. 1947." Con- clusions o f law were entered t h a t claimant d i d not s u f f e r a compensable i n - j u r y and was not e n t i t l e d t o benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Claimant appealed t h i s decision t o the d i s t r i c t court o f G a l l a t i n County. The d i s t r i c t court, over the i n s u r e r ' s objections, permitted addi - t i o n a l testimony by claimant concerning dates and occurrences forming the basis o f the claim for compensation. A t the hearing i n d i s t r i c t court claimant t e s t i f i e d she f i r s t h u r t her back a t the store on J u l y 12, 1968. Her testimony concerning t h a t incident i s as follows: "Q. What p a r t i c u l a r incident happened t h a t day? A. Well, when Carl Geertz took over Ralph's Food Store he was having m e wash the meat grinder and saw parts. And I was washing the funnel type thing t h a t the meat goes i n t o f o r the meat grinder. And i t was i n the sink and I was washing it, and I was t r y i n g t o get i t up and my back h u r t so bad I had t o drop it. I c o u l d n ' t l i f t it. And Fay, I asked Fay i f he would f i n i s h washing it, and he did. I had t o go s i t down." Claimant t e s t i f i e d t h a t she continued working although her back was bothering her. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t the butcher would help her by doing p a r t o f her work. Claimant t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n August a change o f butchers occurred. A t t h a t time a change took place i n claimant's duties--thereafter claimant had t o carry lunch meat and bacon from the back room where the truck unloaded it t o the meat department, and had t o wash a casing weighing 50 t o 60 pounds t n a t went on the outside o f the meat saw. She t e s t i f i e d concerning an i n c i - dent t h a t occurred i n the l a t t e r p a r t o f August: "Q. And towards the end of August d i d you remember a p a r t i c u l a r incident t h a t happened? A. Well, my back j u s t kept getting worse and worse. I j u s t had t o s i t down more often. "Q. Did you try t o lift t h a t 50 pound piece of metal? A. Yes, I t r i e d t o . "Q. Did i t h u r t your back? A. Yes. "Q. This would be about the end of August. What happened t o you a f t e r these change of duties, what d i d your back do? A. Well, I found out -- I t h i n k i t was going into muscle spasms, which I didn't know i t was doing. "Q. For example, what kind of symptoms did you have? A. I had constant pain, and m y legs hurt when I stood. And i t would take m e a few minutes to make up m y mind that I would take a step before I could do it. "Q. You had trouble walking? A. Yes. I knew i t was going to hurt. "Q. When you went to the doctor that was just i n the f i r s t part of September, whatever the records show? A. Yes." Claimant went on to explain that the dates i n the different reports were approximations and that the variance in dates i n the different reports were in some cases typographical errors and i n some cases errors of memory. The d i s t r i c t court found that claimant received a compensable indus- t r i a l accident on July 12 and i n l a t e August, 1968, and awarded her temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation, and medical expense benefits total ing $9,259.86. From this award, the em- pl oyer ' s insurer appeal s. W e will summarize the issues for review i n this fashion: (1 ) Did claimant suffer a compensable industrial accident within the coverage of the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act? (2) Is the claim barred by the one year statute of 1 imitations i n section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947? ( 3 ) Did the d i s t r i c t court properly permit additional evidence to be taken from claimant a t the d i s t r i c t court hearing? (4) Did the d i s t r i c t court err i n determining the amount of the award to claimant? The f i r s t issue i s the principal issue i n this appeal. The thrust of appellant's argument i s that claimant did not establish a tangible happening of a traumatic nature constituting an unusual strain a t a specific point i n time; therefore there i s no compensable injury; and the hearings officer of the Workmen's Compensation Division correctly so found. Appellant further argues that there was no evidence a t the d i s t r i c t court hearing preponder- ating against such finding so it must stand. Section 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, as i t existed a t the time of this claim, defines a compensable injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act: "Injury or injured defined. 'Injury' or 'injured' means a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unex- pected cause o r unusual strain, resul ting in either external or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result therefrom and exclud.ing disease not traceable to injury. 11 T w o cases have construed that part of the foregoing statute relating to the term "or unusual strain" added b y legislative amendment i n 1967, Jones v . Bair's Cafes, 152 Mont. 13, 19, 445 P.2d 923 and Robins v . Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 333, 485 P.2d 692. Jones involved the compensability of a back injury resulting from a dishwasher picking up a heavy tray of dishes from the floor during an un- usoally heavy work schedule due to a basketball tournament crowd. In con- struing the meaning of the term "or unusual strain" added by legislative amendment in 1967 and h o w the Court should measure i t , w e concluded: " * * * B y adding the separate distinct phrase, 'or unusual strain,' the legislature intended to cover just such a situation as w e have here. There was no 'unexpected cause' b u t there was an 'unusual strain;' thus the measure would seem to be the result of a tangible happening of a traumatic nature which results in physical harm, be i t a rupture, a strain or a sprain." I n Robins this Court considered the compensability of a back injury received by a cook mopping a cafe floor who was lifting a m o p pail full of water when she f e l t a pull and a burning sensation. In holding the injury compensable w e said: " * * *The preposition 'or' preceding the term 'unusual strain' simply signifies a tangible happening of a traumatic nature either (1) from an unexpected cause, or (2) from an unusual strain. Accordingly, a tangible happening of an unexpected nature from an unusual strain qualifies, irrespective of whether the strain i s 'unusual ' from the standpoint of cause or effect. While i t may be arguable in the instant case whether the strain was unusual from the standpoint of cause, i t i s clear that the effect here was unusual--herniation of an intervertebral disc resulting from picking up the bucket in the wrong manner and turning t o pick u p the mop. An un- usual result from a work-related strain qualifies as 'an unusual strain' under section 92-418, R.C.M. 1947. * * *" Both Jones and Robins make i t clear that the statute requires a tangible happening of a traumatic nature in addition to the resulting unusual strain. Here the decision of the hearings officer of the Workmen's Compensation Division appears t o be predicated on the absence of such tangible happening of a traumatic nature. The memorandum opinion accompanying this decision, after pointing out the discrepancies and contradictions concerning the date of the injury and the cause of claimant's back problems, concludes with this statement: "The confusion as to the date of accident along with the statements and testimony about the gradual buildup of back pain tend t o indicate that there i s no compensable injury under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act." However a t the hearing in district court this confusion was explained by claimant and the district judge believed her. Her testimony clearly supported two specific injuries, one on July 12 in which she was trying to l i f t a part of a meat grinder t o wash i t in a low sink and strained her back to the extent she dropped i t ; and the second on August 26 when she tried to l i f t a 50 pound casing on the meat saw and suffered muscle spasms. In fact there was no testimony to the contrary except the confusion that arose from claimant's o w n testimony before the Workmen's Compensation Division. In cases where the district court hears a Workmen's Compensation appeal on the basis of the record before the Board plus additional testimony, the district court becomes trier of the facts, and the judge of the credibility of any witness de novo as to such additional testimony. Dosen v. East Butte Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 P. 880; Novak v. Industrial Accident Board, 73 Mont. 196, 235 P . 754; Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Min. Co., 79 Mont. 358, 257 P. 270; Paulich v. Republic Coal Co., 110 Mont. 174, 102 P.2d 4. Where the district court receives additional evidence not presented to the Board, every presumption i s in favor of correctness of the district court's decision. Obie v. Obie Signs, Inc., 143 Mont. 1, 386 P.2d 68. Here the testimony of claimant i n district court, although inconsistent in some respects to that given i n the hearing before the Board, was nevertheless believed by the district court and under such circumstances constitutes a preponderance of substitute evidence supporting the district court's finding. The second issue for review i s whether the claim i s barred by section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947. This statute provides: "Claims must be presented within what time. In case of personal injur.~ or death, all claims shall be forever barred unless in writing under oath to the employer, the insurer, or the board, as the case may be, within twelve months from the date of the happening of the accident, either by the claimant or someone legally authorized to act for him in his behalf." In our view this contention lacks any substance. Claimant filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Board on January 16, 1969, covering an injury on August 26, 1968. This was well within the twelve month period required by section 92-601, R.C.M. 1947. Because the record indicates that the two injuries during the summer of 1968 were closely intertwined and re1 ated,,i t would be unconscionable to deny claim- ant redress because the July 12 injury was not specifically identified. The issue of the bar of the statute of limitations was not raised a t the hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Division a1 though many vary- ing dates of the accidental injury appeared in various reports. The follow- ing excerpt indicates the scope of the issues a t the hearing. "The fol 1 owing proceedings were had : " M R . S H E R M A N : This i s the time and place the Workmen's Compensation Division has set t o hear the disputed case of Della M. Love v. Ralph's Food Store and Truck Insurance Exchange, No. 6039-B-54. First of a1 1, I would 1 i ke to get a statement of the issues involved i n this case. "MR. O L S O N : A s I understand i t from reviewing the f i l e , the Hearings Officer will realize this i s an old case, and the issue i s really whether or not there was an industrial accident under the terms of the Montana Act, and then, of course, i f there was an accident, what award i s coming to the claimant, i f any. "MR. BENNETT: I represent the Truck Insurance Exchange, the insurer of the employer, and from m y f i l e , the indications I have are that there i s a claim for compensation dated Sep- tember 4, 1970 showing the date of injury July 13, 1968, and apparently there was a previous claim for compensation i n the f i l e dated August 29, 1968. " M R . S H E R M A N : August 26th. " M R . BENNETT: August 26, 1968, right, and there i s an issue as to whether or not an injury as defined by the statute occurred on either date, and i f such did, the issue as to which date, and obviously, the question of what the amount of the award i s i f the Workmen's Compensation Division, in fact, determines there was an injury as defined by the statute. " M R . S H E R M A N : Very we1 1 , proceed. " Additionally the employer and his insurer had actual knowledge of the claim and conducted an extensive investigation of the claim long before one year had elapsed following the alleged injury. Such circumstances, coupled with no showing of prejudice, estop the employer and his insurer from insisting on literal compliance with the statute with respect to the July 12 injury. Proceeding to the third issue, w e find that the district court properly permitted additional testimony from claimant a t the district court hearing. Many cases decided by this Court have approved this as a reasonable exercise of discretion vested in the district court. Young v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., 138 Mont. 458, 357 P.2d 886; Johnson v . Industrial Accident Board, 157 Mont. 221, 483 P.2d 918; O'Neil v. Industrial Accident Board, 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 688; Tweedie v. Industrial Accident Board, 101 Mont. 256, 53 P.2d 1145. The following excerpt from Paulich v. Republic Coal Co., 110 Mont. 174, 187, 102 P.2d 4, illustrates the correct rule: "This court has indicated and held that the district court i s not precluded from admitting testimony through the same witnesses and on the same matters that were testified to before the board, and in the Kelly Case, supra, i t said that where the testimony so adduced i s important and differs in any degree from the testimony adduced before the board on the same matters, the record of the board may be disregarded." Directing our attention to the final issue for review w e find that determination of the degree or extent of claimant's disability i s properly a matter for initial determination by the Workmen's Compensation Division sub- ject to subsequent appeal to the district court. Robins v. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692. The Board determined that the injury was not compensable and therefore did not award compensation. The district court had no juris- diction to determine initially the extent of disability nor the amount of compensation payable and should have remanded the claim to the Board for that determination. Robinsv. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692; Lind v. Lind, 142 Mont. 211, 383 P.2d 808; Obie v. Obie Signs, Inc., 143 Mont. 1, 386 P.2d 68. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court i s modified by striking the amount of compensation, and as so modified the judgment of the district court is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Division of the Department of Labor and Industry for establish- ment of the extent of claimant's disability and the amount of her award. ? k d - J * - & d -------- Justice Harrison. M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles dissenting: I concur i n remanding the case on the l a s t issue but dissent on the other issues. The f a c t s of t h i s case a r e sub- s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t , i n m y view and i n view of the Board, from those r e l a t e d by the majority opinion. The inquiry here should be whether there was a tangible happening of an unexpected nature from an unusual s t r a i n . See: Robins v. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692; Jones v. air's Cafes, 152 Mont. 13, 16, 445 P.2d 923. The whole tenor of claimant's testimony i s t h a t she does n o t know when the trouble came on but does know t h a t she has had a sore back f o r a long time, a t l e a s t since 1965. I n Jones t h i s Court said: he d i s t r i c t court on appeal from the board i s not j u s t i f i e d i n reversing a finding of the board unless the evidence c l e a r l y preponderates against such finding. I' See also: Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95; R o m v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 250, 22 P.2d 161. The Board found s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t no specific date o r incident was established and t h a t no credible evidence of acci- dental injury as defined i n section 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, was offered. I n one of her claims dated January 16, 1969, claimant gave a s the description of the injury the date of August 26, 1968, and t h a t "this injury was caused by continuously l i f t i n g something heavy. I have developed a type of a r t h r i t i s . " I n another of her claims dated September 4, 1970, claimant gave a date of i n j u r y of July 13, 1968, and t o describe the acci- dent said, "other report given t o Sam Munson." I n the report given t o Sam Munson i n her own handwriting dated June 8 , 1970, she s a i d , " i k 9; * I do not r e c a l l any p a r t i c u l a r incident of slipping o r f a l l i n g t h a t might have caused m y back t o be hurt but I think it was a combination of l i f t i n g of the heavy bacons and the saw casing cover which was so heavy. On July 13, 1970, 1 had a lot of pain in my back and it was hard to straighten up when I was stooped over. I do not recall any particular moment it started to hurt but I just noticed it was sore. * ik *I1 Claimant admitted that at no time did she ever tell her employer what day she was injured. Dr. Whitehair's report dated October 30, 1968, gives the date of the accident as June 15, 1968. Dr. Whitehair's report dated December of 1968, gives the date of the accident as July 20, 1968, and a third report of Dr. Whitehair gives the date of the accident as July 16, 1968. Thus from claimant and her doctor we have the following dates: June 15, July 12, July 13, July 16, July 20, August 24, and August 26. These conflicting dates, coupled with her statement that she did not recall any incident, amounts to exactly what the hearings officer found, that no tangible happening of an unexpected nature occurred or was shown. The so-called additional testimony before the district court "clarifying the confusion over the various dates when the injury occurred'' does nothing to show a traumatic happening. I would reverse the trial court and affirm the Board. I fear that this decision overlooks the rules of burden of proof, presumption of correctness of the findings, rules on additional testimony; and under the guise of "liberal1' construction has required no proof at all---rather just an assertion that sometime during a three month period a sore back of long standing became an unusual strain from a traumatic happening of an unexpected nature.