Title: Dailey v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 331, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 13, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD L. DAILEY,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 331, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0210012813 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 16, 2009 
Decided:  October 13, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 13th day of October 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Donald L. Dailey, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s May 13, 2009 denial of his third motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The appellee, State of Delaware, 
has filed a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Dailey’s 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
2 
 
(2) 
Dailey was indicted in January 2003 on multiple charges of rape and 
conspiracy.  In August 2003, Dailey pled no contest to three counts of Rape in the 
Third Degree.  The Superior Court sentenced Dailey to thirty-five years at Level V 
suspended after fourteen years for twenty-one years at decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Dailey challenged the sentence on direct appeal.  The Court rejected 
Dailey’s claims and affirmed.2 
 
(3) 
Dailey filed his first motion for postconviction relief in 2005. The 
Superior Court denied relief on the basis that Dailey’s allegations were based upon 
“information [he knew] at the time the guilty plea was entered.”3 
 
(4) 
Daily filed his second motion for postconviction relief in 2006.  
Dailey repeated claims that he had raised on appeal and in his first postconviction 
motion.  The Superior Court denied the second postconviction motion as 
procedurally barred pursuant to various subsections of Rule 61(i).4  On appeal, this 
Court affirmed.5 
 
(5) 
In May 2009, Dailey again moved for postconviction relief.  Dailey 
sought relief on the basis of Allen v. State, a 2009 decision wherein we clarified the 
law regarding jury instructions for accomplice liability.6  Dailey also argued that he 
                                          
 
2 Dailey v. State, 2004 WL 439855 (Del. Supr.). 
3 In re Dailey, 2005 WL 1950800 (Del. Super.). 
4 In re Dailey, 2006 WL 2333914 (Del. Super.). 
5 Dailey v. State, 2007 WL 328831 (Del. Supr.). 
6 Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203 (Del. 2009). 
 
3 
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware 
Code to determine the voluntariness of victim pretrial statements.7  Third, Dailey 
claimed that the judge, when imposing sentence, relied on victim impact 
statements that were not disclosed to Dailey prior to sentencing.   
 
(6) 
By order dated May 13, 2009, the Superior Court summarily denied 
Dailey’s motion as untimely pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1), repetitive pursuant to Rule 
61(i)(2), procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3), and formerly adjudicated 
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4), all without exception.8  This appeal followed. 
 
(7) 
After careful consideration of the opening brief and the motion to 
affirm, it is clear that the Superior Court appropriately barred Dailey’s third 
postconviction motion as untimely, repetitive, procedurally defaulted and formerly 
adjudicated.  Dailey’s third postconviction motion, filed more than six years after 
his convictions became final, is barred unless he can assert a newly recognized 
retroactively applicable right,9 reconsideration in the interest of justice,10 or a 
miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation.11  Dailey can do none 
of those things.   
                                          
 
7 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 (2007) (permitting the introduction of a witness’ voluntary, 
out-of-court prior statement as substantive evidence in the case so long as the witness is “present 
and subject to cross-examination”). 
8 State v. Dailey, 2009 WL 2219265 (Del. Super.). 
9 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
10 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
11 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
4 
 
(8) 
Neither the Allen decision, which concerns jury instructions, nor 
Dailey’s section 3507 claim concerning the voluntariness of victim pretrial 
statements, have any apparent applicability in Dailey’s case, which did not involve 
a trial.  Moreover, Dailey’s right to an evidentiary hearing was already considered 
and rejected as procedurally barred in his appeal from the denial of his second 
postconviction motion.  Finally, Dailey has not demonstrated cause for his failure 
to raise his sentencing claim earlier nor any prejudice.12 
 
(9) 
It is manifest on the face of Dailey’s opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  The issues raised on appeal are clearly controlled by settled 
Delaware law.  To the extent the issues on appeal implicate the exercise of judicial 
discretion there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the State’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
12 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).