Title: Tinney v. East Alabama Medical Center
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1111364
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2012

Rel: 10/19/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
_________________________
1111364
_________________________
Ex parte East Alabama Medical Center
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  John Tinney
v.
East Alabama Medical Center)
(Randolph Circuit Court, CV-11-900087)
MAIN, Justice.
East Alabama Medical Center ("EAMC") petitions this Court
for a writ of mandamus directing the Randolph Circuit Court to
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transfer the action filed against it by John Tinney to the Lee
Circuit Court.  For the reasons set out below, we grant the
petition and issue the writ.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Tinney represented Jerry Benefield in a personal-injury
action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident.  Benefield was
treated at EAMC for injuries he sustained in the accident. 
EAMC filed a hospital lien in Lee County for $3,361 against
any recovery Benefield might receive in settlement of his
personal-injury action.  Tinney recovered a settlement for
Benefield.  As part of the settlement, Progressive Insurance
Company issued a check made payable to EAMC and Tinney in the
amount of $3,361.
On October 14, 2011, Tinney filed the underlying lawsuit
against EAMC in the Randolph Circuit Court, claiming that he
had asked EAMC to allow him to receive 40% of the lien check
as an attorney fee but that EAMC "failed and refused to
negotiate the check or to agree on a division of the money." 
On November 18, 2011, EAMC moved to transfer the action to Lee
County, citing § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, and stating that its
principal office is located in Opelika, Lee County; that Lee
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County is where all actions taken by EAMC, such as telephone
calls and letters, occurred; and that EAMC has no facilities
and does no business by agent in Randolph County.  In support
of its motion for a change of venue, EAMC filed an affidavit
of its president, Terry Andrus.  According to Andrus, EAMC is
an Alabama corporation that has its principal office in
Opelika, Lee County.  Further, Andrus stated, EAMC has no
facilities in Randolph County and has not done business by
agent in Randolph County.  EAMC also filed an affidavit of its
business-office 
supervisor, 
Sandra 
Davis. 
 
According 
to 
Davis,
"[a]ll actions taken by EAMC and it employees with respect to
Jerry Benefield or his lawyer[,] John Tinney[,] took place in
Lee County, Alabama."  Davis further stated that all
communications regarding the delinquent account, the hospital
lien, and any reduction in the lien amount occurred in Lee
County and that no activities occurred in Randolph County.
Tinney did not file a response in opposition to EAMC's
motion for a change of venue.  On February 16, 2012, the trial
court conducted a hearing on the venue question.  On June 6,
2012, the trial court denied EAMC's motion for a change of
venue without stating any ground.  The trial court's order
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stated in its entirety: "Motion having been made to transfer
venue in the above case and the Court having considered the
same, the motion is due to be denied."  EAMC timely petitioned
this Court for mandamus relief.
II. Standard of Review
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So. 2d 886,
888 (Ala. 2000).  'Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995).  Moreover, our review is limited to those
facts that were before the trial court.  Ex parte
National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.
1998).
"'The burden of proving improper venue is on the
party raising the issue and on review of an order
transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of
mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear
showing of error on the part of the trial judge.' 
Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458, 460
(Ala. 1987).  In addition, this Court is bound by
the record, and it cannot consider a statement or
evidence in a party's brief that was not before the
trial court.  Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663
So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala. 1995)."
Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.
2002).  Thus, if EAMC made a prima facie showing that venue in
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Randolph County was improper, the burden then shifted to
Tinney to rebut that showing.  Ex parte Movie Gallery, Inc.,
31 So. 3d 104, 109 (Ala. 2009).
III. Analysis
EAMC contends in its petition for a writ of mandamus that
"[t]he only proper venue is Lee County" and that "Randolph
County is an improper venue for the claims against EAMC." 
Section 6–3–7, Ala. Code 1975, governs venue for actions
against corporate defendants.  That section provides, in
pertinent part:
"(a) All civil actions against corporations may
be brought in any of the following counties:
"(1) In the county in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of real property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
"(2) 
In 
the 
county 
of 
the
corporation's principal office in this
state; or
"(3) In the county in which the
plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is
an entity other than an individual, where
the plaintiff had its principal office in
this state, at the time of the accrual of
the cause of action, if such corporation
does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence; or
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"(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3)
do not apply, in any county in which the
corporation was doing business by agent at
the time of the accrual of the cause of
action."
EAMC argues that venue is not proper in Randolph County under
any of the subsections of § 6-3-7(a).  
A. Section 6-3-7(a)(1)
Section 6–3–7(a)(1) provides, in part, that a corporation
may be sued "[i]n the county in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 
EAMC argues that "the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim" refers to the actions or omissions of the defendant. 
This Court so held in Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc.,
74 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2011): 
"This Court has construed 'the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim' to refer to the wrongful
acts or omissions of the corporate defendant.  Ex
parte Volvo Trucks North America, Inc., 954 So. 2d
583, 587 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte Suzuki Mobile, Inc.,
940 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Ala. 2006); and Ex parte
Pikeville Country Club, 844 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala.
2002)."
74 So. 3d at 943.  Tinney's complaint states that EAMC "failed
and refused to negotiate the check or to agree on a division
of the money with [Tinney]."  However, Davis testified that
EAMC took no action in Randolph County and that all of EAMC's
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actions relative to Benefield or Tinney took place in Lee
County.  Moreover, Tinney does not argue that venue is proper
in Randolph County pursuant to subsection (a)(1).  Venue,
therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under §
6–3–7(a)(1).
B. Section 6-3-7(a)(2)
It is undisputed that the materials before this Court
show that EAMC's principal office is in Lee County.  Venue,
therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under §
6–3–7(a)(2). 
C. Section 6-3-7(a)(3)
The only contested issue before this Court is whether
EAMC does business by agent in Randolph County within the
language of § 6–3–7(a)(3) and, thus, whether venue under
subsection (a)(3) is proper in Randolph County.  Section
6–3–7(a)(3) provides that a corporation may be sued "[i]n the
county in which the plaintiff resided ... at the time of the
accrual of the cause of action, if such corporation does
business by agent in the county of the plaintiff's residence." 
According to Andrus's affidavit, EAMC has not done business by
agent in Randolph County, the county where Tinney resides. 
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Andrus's affidavit was sufficient to make a prima facie
showing that EAMC does not do business in Randolph County,
thereby shifting to Tinney the burden of proving that EAMC
does in fact conduct business by agent in Randolph County.  Ex
parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, 74 So. 3d at 943 (citing Ex
parte Citizens State Bank, 989 So. 2d 507, 508 (Ala. 2008)). 
In his answer in opposition to the mandamus petition,
Tinney contends that EAMC does business in Randolph County
through a subsidiary, East Alabama Heart and Vascular
Consultations, LLC, which has a clinic in Randolph County, and
through Dr. David G. Holmes, a cardiologist on the medical
staff of EAMC in Opelika, Lee County, who also treats patients
at the clinic in Randolph County.  With his answer in response
to the mandamus petition, Tinney filed an exhibit referred to
as "Business Entity Details" from the Secretary of State's Web
site showing that EAMC is the manager of a limited-liability
company named "East Alabama Heart and Vascular Consultations,
LLC."   The exhibit, however, does not list the address of the
LLC as being in Randolph County–-the principal address on the
form is shown as "Not Provided."  Instead, Tinney simply
asserts in his response to the mandamus petition that the
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entity is a clinic located in Roanoke, Randolph County. 
Tinney also attached EAMC's "Medical Staff Directory 2012" as
an exhibit to his answer in response to the mandamus petition. 
He claimed that Dr. David G. Holmes practices at EAMC in
Opelika and also treats patients at the clinic in Randolph
County, which is an affiliate of EAMC.  
Tinney, however, offered no evidence in the trial court
in opposition to the motion for a change of venue indicating
that EAMC does business by agent in Randolph County.  The
exhibits Tinney attached to his answer in response to the
mandamus petition were not presented to the trial court.  It
is well settled that, "in a mandamus proceeding, this Court
will not consider evidence not presented to the trial court."
Ex parte Cincinnati Ins. Co., 51 So. 3d 298, 310 (Ala. 2010).
See Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co., 772 So. 2d 437, 442 (Ala.
2000)("'On review by mandamus, we must look at only those
facts before the trial court.'"(quoting Ex parte Baker, 459
So. 2d 873, 876 (Ala. 1984))).  "[T]his Court is bound by the
[materials before it], and it cannot consider a statement or
evidence in a party's brief that was not before the trial
court."  Ex parte Pike Fabrication,  859 So. 2d at 1091. 
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Accordingly, we have not considered those exhibits 
attached to
Tinney's answer in response to the mandamus petition.  See Ex
parte Pike Fabrication, 859 So. 2d at 1091, and Verbena United
Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d 395, 399 (Ala. 2006) (refusing to
consider an affidavit submitted in opposition to a mandamus
petition because the affidavit was not before the trial court
when that court rendered the decision under review).   Venue,
1
therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under §
6–3–7(a)(3).  
D. Section 6-3-7(a)(4)
This Court held in Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed that
"the 
'"catch-all" 
venue 
provision, 
§ 
6–3–7(a)(4), 
applies 
only
if no county would be a proper forum under the other three
corporate-venue provisions.'  Ex parte Siemag, Inc., 53 So. 3d
974, 980 n. 3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)." 74 So. 3d at 942. 
Venue, therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under §
6–3–7(a)(4).  
On mandamus review, this Court has consistently stated
1
that we will not consider materials that have not been before
the trial court.  See, e.g. Ex parte Wright Bros. Constr. Co.,
88 So. 3d 817, 820 (Ala. 2012); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc.,
72 So. 3d 1, 2 (Ala. 2011); Ex parte Ford Motor Co., 47 So. 3d
234, 241 (Ala. 2010); and Ex parte ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 933
So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. 2006).
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IV.  Conclusion
EAMC has proved that venue is not proper in Randolph
County under any of the subsections of § 6-3-7(a); therefore,
the trial court clearly erred in denying EAMC's motion to
transfer the case to Lee County.  Because EAMC has shown that
it has a clear legal right to have this action transferred to
Lee County, we grant EAMC's petition and issue a writ of
mandamus directing the Randolph Circuit Court to vacate its
order denying EAMC's motion to transfer and to enter an order
transferring the action to Lee County.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Malone, C.J., and Woodall and Bolin, JJ., concur. 
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
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