Title: Tobler v. Door County
Citation: 158 Wis. 2d 19, 461 N.W.2d 775
Docket Number: 89-0580
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1990

Decided November 6, 1990.
*20 For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there was a brief by William J. Corrigan and Menn, Nelson, Sharratt, Teetaert &amp; Beisenstein, Ltd., Appleton and oral argument by Mr. Corrigan.
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief and oral argument by Dennis D. Costello, Door County Corporation Counsel.
STEINMETZ, J.
The issue in this case is whether a certiorari review under sec. 801.02(5), Stats., may be commenced by the filing of a summons and complaint pursuant to sec. 801.02(1).
The trial court answered "no" and the court of appeals affirmed. We hold to the contrary. An action for a remedy available by certiorari may be commenced by filing and serving a summons and complaint pursuant to sec. 801.02(1), Stats.
On May 26, 1988, the plaintiffs, John Tobler and Beth Tobler, individually and as members of a group of similarly situated property owners (hereinafter plaintiffs), filed a summons and complaint in Door county circuit court, John D. Koehn, Judge. The complaint asked the circuit court to issue a writ of certiorari and to review the decision of the Door County Board of Adjustments. *21 The defendants, Door county and Door County Board of Adjustments, answered and alleged that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not follow the procedure required by sec. 801.02(5), Stats., for an action seeking a remedy available by certiorari.
The trial court concluded that sec. 801.02(5), Stats., provides only two methods to commence an action seeking a remedy available by certiorari. A person can commence such an action by filing and serving a petition for a writ, together with the original writ, or, alternatively, by service of a complaint and order, the trial court said. Since the plaintiffs did not follow one of these two methods but instead commenced this action by filing and serving a summons and complaint pursuant to sec. 801.02(1), the court held that it had "no subject matter jurisdiction" because no action was commenced.
[1]
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and therefore no special deference is owed to the trial court's determination. DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 370, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985).
In Marshall-Wis. v. Juneau Square, 139 Wis. 2d 112, 133, 406 N.W.2d 764 (1987), we held:
*22 In County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 164, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980), the court stated:
Section 801.02, Stats., provides:
. . . .
Shortly after the parties to this action filed their briefs to this court, the court of appeals issued a published decision of a case involving the same issue. In Nickel River Inv. v. City of La Crosse Review Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 429, 432, 457 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1990), the *23 court of appeals concluded that the appellant, who had commenced a certiorari action under sub. (1) by filing a summons and complaint, had properly commenced the certiorari action for purposes of sub. (5). Id. In view of Nickel River Inv., the defendants in this action conceded their position at oral argument.
We agree with the outcome in Nickel River Inv. and reach the same outcome in this case, although our conclusion is based upon our own independent analysis.[1]
The meaning of sec. 801.02, Stats., taken as a whole, is plain. It is neither unclear nor ambiguous. Giving effect to each and every word, clause and sentence of the section requires that the language "under sub. (1)" of sec. 801.02(5) refers to sec. 801.02(1). Such a reference, in turn, requires that an action for a remedy available by certiorari under sec. 801.02(5) may be commenced by filing and serving a complaint pursuant to sec. 801.02(1). Any other construction of sec. 801.02(5) would render superfluous the language "under sub. (1)."
No inquiry into the intent of the legislature is necessary because it requires no more than a mere facial reading of the statute to conclude that the statute permits the use of a summons and complaint to commence a certiorari action. Reference to the legislative history of *24 sec. 801.02, Stats., simply spotlights what already is at center stage. The legislature, when it enacted secs. 12 and 13, ch. 289, Laws of 1981, removed certain restrictive language from sec. 801.02(1) (1979-80) and created ch. 781, which deals with extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. The result of the legislative action is to make extraordinary writs unnecessary and to allow extraordinary remedies to be reached via the provisions used for ordinary civil actions. Actions for "certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus or prohibition," which previously were excluded from the summons and complaint procedure specified in sec. 801.02(1), no longer are excluded under the statute.
Expounding upon the obvious meaning of the legislature's action, the 1981 Judicial Council Notes pertaining to sec. 781.01, Stats., read as follows:
Judicial Council Notesec. 12, ch. 289, Laws of 1981.
With respect to sec. 801.02, Stats., the Judicial Council Notes show that:
Judicial Council Notesec. 13, ch. 289, Laws of 1981.
[2]
Thus, under the plain language of sec. 801.02(5), Stats., there are three methods by which a certiorari review "may be commenced": (1) "under sub. (1)," by use of a summons and complaint; (2) "by service of an appropriate original writ"; or (3) "by filing a complaint . . ., if service of . . . the complaint and of an order . . . is made upon the defendant." Clear legislative intent supports this construction.
[3]
Accordingly, the plaintiffs properly commenced an action seeking a remedy available by certiorari under sec. 801.02(5), Stats., by filing a summons and complaint pursuant to sec. 801.02(1).
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
[1]  In reaching its conclusion in Nickel River Inv., 156 Wis. 2d at 431 n.2, the court of appeals withdrew "[its] dictum in Schwochert v. Marquette County Bd., 132 Wis. 2d 196, 201, 389 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Ct. App. 1986), that `certiorari actions may be commenced in one of two waysby obtaining and serving an original writ or by filing and serving a complaint and an order.'" In this case, we do not reach the question of whether the language in Schwochert was in fact dictum or, if it was not dictum, whether the court of appeals properly could overrule what it said in Schwochert, because our decision is based upon our own construction of sec. 801.02, Stats.