Title: Hicks v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 741, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
VINCENT HICKS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 741, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0812020875 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: May 31, 2011 
 
 
 
 
      Decided: July 21, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 21st day of July 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Vincent Hicks, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a 
Person Prohibited, Assault in the Second Degree and two counts of 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  Hicks was sentenced on the aggravated 
menacing conviction to 5 years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended for 
2 years at Level III probation.  On each of the weapon convictions, he was 
 
2
sentenced to 5 years at Level V.  On the assault conviction, he was 
sentenced to 8 years at Level V, to be suspended after 1 year for 7 years at 
Level IV Work Release, in turn to be suspended after 6 months for 2 years at 
Level III probation.  Finally, on each of the conspiracy convictions, Hicks 
was sentenced to 2 years at Level V, to be suspended for 1 year at Level III 
probation.  This is Hicks’s direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
Hicks’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1    
 
(3) 
Hicks’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record and the law, there are no arguably appealable 
issues.  By letter, Hicks’s counsel informed Hicks of the provisions of Rule 
26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3
accompanying brief and the complete trial transcript.  Hicks also was 
informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Hicks 
responded with a brief that raises several issues for this Court’s 
consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by Hicks’s 
counsel as well as the issues raised by Hicks and has moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Hicks raises several issues for this Court’s consideration, which 
may fairly be summarized as follows.  He claims that a) his right to a speedy 
trial was violated; b) his indictment was improperly amended during trial; c) 
his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were 
violated; and d) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
 
(5) 
The evidence presented at trial established the following.  On 
December 17, 2008, in the City of Wilmington, the victim, a 19 year-old 
pregnant woman, was offered a ride by another young woman whom she 
believed was her friend.  After picking up two young men, including Hicks, 
the group drove to Newark, Delaware, to a house where several other 
individuals were waiting.  There, the victim was held captive, assaulted and 
terrorized by members of the group, three men and three women, all of 
whom belonged to various gangs.  While the victim herself was not a 
member of a gang, she had become friendly with some gang members and 
 
4
was attacked for allegedly causing friction between Hicks and another gang 
leader.   
 
(6) 
The victim was slapped, punched, burned with cigarettes and 
had the barrel of a handgun stuck down her throat.  The victim testified that 
Hicks told another gang member to watch her when he left the room, asked 
her questions and ordered the others to punch or kick her if she failed to 
answer correctly, and himself punched her in the face and put the gun down 
her throat.  Eventually, the victim was driven back to Wilmington and 
released.  The victim telephoned the police and was taken to Christiana 
Hospital for treatment of her injuries.  Because the victim knew her attackers 
personally, they all were identified and arrested.  At trial, the victim testified 
about the attack.  In addition, several of Hicks’s co-defendants testified and 
confirmed the victim’s account in all relevant respects. 
 
(7) 
Hicks’s first claim on appeal is that his right to a speedy trial 
was violated.  In order to determine whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights 
were violated, a court assesses four factors: a) the length of the delay; b) the 
reason for the delay; c) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and d) 
prejudice to the defendant.2  Unless the delay is lengthy enough to be 
                                                 
2 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
 
5
presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the remaining 
factors.3   
 
(8) 
In this case, Hicks was arrested on the relevant charges on 
February 12, 2009, at the Howard B. Young Correctional Facility, where he 
was being held on a violation of probation warrant.  Hicks went to trial on 
February 24, 2010, approximately one year later.  The record reflects that 
trial was set to begin on September 22, 2009.  However, Hicks’s appointed 
counsel moved for a continuance of the trial date due to a conflict.  The 
Superior Court granted the motion, appointed new counsel and set a new 
trial date for November 3, 2009.  Because the prosecutor was scheduled for a 
murder trial on that date, however, another trial date was set for December.  
Trial ultimately took place in February.  Both continuances were requested 
and granted for good cause.  We do not find a delay of one year under the 
circumstances presented here to be presumptively prejudicial.4   
 
(9) 
As for the other speedy trial factors, the record does not reflect 
that Hicks, either pro se or through counsel, ever asserted his right to a 
speedy trial in the Superior Court.  Nor does Hicks identify any prejudice 
suffered by him as the result of any alleged violation of his right to a speedy 
                                                 
3 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273-74 (Del. 2002). 
4 Id. 
 
6
trial.  Weighing all of the above, we find Hicks’s claim of a speedy trial 
violation to be without merit. 
 
(10)   Hicks’s claims of an improperly amended indictment and 
violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are asserted without 
any record support.  Nor does our review of the record in this case reveal a 
factual basis for any such claims.  As such, we conclude that they, too, are 
without merit. 
 
(11) Hicks’s final claim is that his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance.  The record reflects that the attorney who represented Hicks at 
trial unsuccessfully sought to withdraw from the case prior to trial due to 
Hicks’s non-cooperation.  However, there is no indication that the Superior 
Court ever fully considered and adjudicated any complaints of ineffective 
assistance.  In the absence of a fully-developed record below, we decline to 
consider Hicks’s claims of ineffective assistance for the first time in his 
direct appeal.5            
 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Hicks’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguable 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Hicks’s counsel has made a 
                                                 
5 Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1985). 
 
7
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Hicks could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice