Title: PEOPLE OF MI V LINDA PETIT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119348
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2002

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
 No. 119348  
LINDA PETIT,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether defendant must be resentenced because the trial court  
did not specifically ask defendant if she wished to allocute,  
that is, speak on her own behalf, before she was sentenced  
pursuant to a sentence agreement.  The Court of Appeals denied  
leave to appeal.  We conclude that defendant was given an  
opportunity to allocute as required by MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).  
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s sentence.  
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and  
felony-firearm for the shooting death of her sister.  Pursuant  
to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded nolo contendere but  
mentally ill to second-degree murder and felony-firearm.  In  
return, it was agreed that defendant would be sentenced to 16½  
to 40 years for second-degree murder, plus two years for  
felony-firearm.  
At 
the 
sentencing 
hearing, 
defendant’s 
attorney 
allocuted  
on defendant’s behalf.  The court also heard from the victim’s  
daughter.  Although the court asked if there was “anything  
further” 
before 
it 
imposed sentence pursuant to the agreement,  
and defense counsel specifically responded, “No, Judge,” the  
court did not specifically ask defendant if she had anything  
to say on her own behalf before the court sentenced her.  
Defendant 
argues 
that 
this 
failure 
violated 
MCR  
6.425(D)(2)(c), and thus that she is entitled to be  
resentenced.  The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.  
This Court subsequently granted leave to appeal.  465 Mich 942  
(2002).1  
1 We granted leave to appeal in this case in order to 
consider  
whether the failure to afford the defendant an  
opportunity to allocute at sentencing is harmless 
error in light of the fact that the sentence to be 
(continued...)  
2  
  
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This case presents an issue involving the interpretation  
of a court rule, which, like a matter of statutory  
interpretation, is a question of law that we review de novo.  
CAM Construction v Lake Edgewood Condominium Ass’n, 465 Mich  
549, 553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
MCR 
6.425(D)(2)(c), 
the 
court 
rule 
that 
defendant 
alleges  
the trial court violated at sentencing, provides in relevant  
part:  
At sentencing the court, complying on the 
record, must:  
* * *  
(c) give the defendant, the defendant’s  
lawyer, 
the 
prosecutor, 
and 
the 
victim 
an  
opportunity 
to 
advise 
the 
court 
of 
any 
circumstances 
they 
believe 
the 
court 
should  
consider in imposing sentence . . . .  
As is apparent, this straightforward rule requires the trial  
court to provide a defendant an “opportunity” to address the  
court before the sentence is imposed.  At issue here is  
whether defendant had such an opportunity. We conclude that  
1(...continued) 
imposed was a part of the guilty plea agreement. 
See People v Berry, 409 Mich 774 (1980).  
However, because we conclude that the trial court here did  
afford defendant an opportunity to allocute at sentencing, as 
required by MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c), and thus that there was no 
error, we do not reach the question of harmless error.  
3  
she did.  
It is well established that we interpret the words of a  
court 
rule 
in 
accordance with their “everyday, plain meaning.”  
CAM 
Construction, 
supra 
at 
554, 
quoting 
Grievance  
Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 194; 612 NW2d 116  
(2000). “Opportunity” is commonly defined as:  
1. an appropriate or favorable time or  
occasion. 2. a situation or condition favorable for  
attainment of a goal. 3. a good position, chance, 
or 
prospect, as 
for 
success. 
[Random 
House  
Webster’s College Dictionary (1995).]  
Accordingly, this court rule means that the trial court must  
make it possible for a defendant who wishes to allocute to be  
able to do so before the sentence is imposed.  However, in  
order to provide the defendant an opportunity to allocute, the  
trial court need not “specifically” ask the defendant if he  
has anything to say on his own behalf before sentencing.  The  
defendant must merely be given an opportunity to address the  
court if he chooses.  
In this case, although the court did not specifically ask  
defendant if she wished to allocute, it did ask if there was  
“anything further?” and defense counsel said, “No, Judge.”  
While it is unclear to whom this question was addressed, it is  
clear that defendant’s counsel responded to the court’s  
inquiry by indicating that there was, in fact, nothing further  
4  
  
to say.2 At this juncture, defendant had the option, that is,  
the opportunity, of addressing the court, and she was not  
precluded or prevented from doing so.  
In 
our 
judgment, 
the 
trial 
court’s 
failure 
to  
specifically ask defendant if she had anything to say did not  
violate MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) because this rule simply does not  
require such a personal and direct inquiry.  It is noteworthy  
that some of our court rules do require the court to  
personally address the defendant, see, e.g., MCR 5.941(C)  
(requiring the court to “personally address the juvenile”);  
MCR 6.302(B) (requiring the court to “speak[] directly to the  
defendant”); MCR 6.402 and MCR 6.410 (requiring the court to  
“address[] the defendant personally”).  To give meaning to  
those instances where our court rules require the court to  
directly address the defendant and to those rules, like that  
at issue here, where they do not, we conclude that MCR  
6.425(D)(2)(c) only requires that the opportunity to allocute  
2 We would like to point out that we do not, as the 
dissent asserts, conclude that “defense counsel’s response 
indicates that defendant had nothing to say.”  Post at 3. As  
the dissent acknowledges, “[t]he record provides no basis, 
aside from speculation,” to conclude that defendant did not 
have anything to say.  Id. However, the inverse is also true; 
that is, the record provides no basis, aside from speculation, 
to conclude that defendant did have something to say. 
Further, the issue here is not whether defendant had something 
to say, but rather, whether defendant had the opportunity to  
say something, and we conclude that defendant did have such an 
opportunity.  
5  
  
  
be given.  Accordingly, in our judgment, the trial court here  
complied with the rule by generally asking if there was  
“anything further.”3  
We are reinforced in our conclusion that we have given  
the proper reading to MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) by reference to the  
United State Supreme Court’s handling of a similar matter in  
Green v United States, 365 US 301; 81 S Ct 653; 5 L Ed 2d 670  
(1961). Green arose out of a dispute concerning an analogous  
federal rule covering sentencing in the federal courts.4 
In  
Green, the trial court asked, “Did you want to say something?”  
Id. at 302. 
As in our case, it is unclear to whom this  
question was directed.  However, also as in our case, it is  
3 Although we conclude that the trial court here did 
comply with the court rule, we note that asking generally if 
there is “anything further” is certainly not the best way to 
provide a defendant with an opportunity to allocute. Rather, 
the best way to provide such an opportunity is to specifically 
ask the defendant if he has anything to say.  
The 
dissent 
emphasizes that to require a specific inquiry 
would establish a bright line rule that would be easy to 
understand and easy to apply.  Post at 2-3. 
While this is  
unquestionably true, we do not agree that such a specific 
inquiry is necessarily required by the court rule.  
4 Fed R Crim P 32(a), in effect at the time Green was  
decided, required the trial court to provide the defendant 
with an “opportunity” to allocute.  Fed R Crim P 32(a) 
provided:  
Before imposing sentence the court shall  
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement in his own behalf and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment.  
6  
  
clear that it was the defendant’s counsel who responded to the  
court’s inquiry.  
Faced with the claim that these trial court proceedings  
were not in compliance with Fed R Crim P 32(a), the United  
States Supreme Court first noted that “[i]f Rule 32(a)  
constitutes an inflexible requirement that the trial judge  
specifically address the defendant, e.g., ‘Do you, the  
defendant, Theodore Green, have anything to say before I pass  
sentence?’ then what transpired in the present case falls  
short of the requirement.”  Id. at 303.  However, the Court  
ultimately concluded that such a personal and direct inquiry  
is not necessary to provide the defendant with an opportunity  
to allocute.  Accordingly, the Court provided, “we do not read  
the record before us to have denied the defendant the  
opportunity to which Rule 32(a) entitled him. 
The single  
pertinent 
sentence—the trial judge’s question ‘Did you want to  
say something?—may have been directed to the defendant and not  
to his counsel.”5 
Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
On these  
facts, the Court concluded that the judge’s question afforded  
the defendant a sufficient opportunity to allocute, and thus  
5 The Court noted that perhaps there was a “significant 
cast of the eye or [a] nod of the head” that would not be 
apparent from the record. Green, supra at 304-305.  
7  
 
 
 
the court rule was not violated.6  
We are aware that our construction in People v Berry, 409  
Mich 774; 298 NW2d 434 (1980), of the former version of this  
court rule, GCR 1963, 785.8, is inconsistent with our  
interpretation of the current version, MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).  
GCR 1963, 785.8 provided in relevant part:  
Sentencing.  Before sentence is imposed the court  
shall:  
* * *  
(2) give defendant and his lawyer a reasonable  
opportunity 
to 
advise 
the 
court 
of 
any 
circumstances 
they 
believe 
the 
court 
should  
consider in imposing sentence;  
* * *  
Provisions of subrule 785.8 are mandatory and  
6 Although the Supreme Court concluded that the rule was 
not violated, it also made clear that “[t]rial judges before 
sentencing 
should, 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
good 
judicial 
administration, unambiguously address themselves to the  
defendant.  Hereafter trial judges should leave no room for 
doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation 
to speak prior to sentencing.”  Id. at 305.  Accordingly, the 
federal rule has since been revised to provide:  
Before imposing sentence, the court must:  
(C) address the defendant personally and  
determine whether the defendant wishes to make a  
statement and to present any information in  
mitigation of the sentence. 
[Fed R Crim P  
32(c)(3).]  
We also would urge trial courts, as a better practice, to 
specifically ask the defendant if he has anything to say on 
his own behalf before sentencing because this is the surest 
way of demonstrating compliance with MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
failure to comply shall require resentencing.  
[Emphasis added.]  
In Berry, this Court concluded that GCR 1963, 785.8  
requires strict compliance and should be understood 
in all cases to require the trial court to inquire 
specifically of the defendant separately whether he 
or she wishes to address the court before the  
sentence is imposed.[7] [Id. at 781.]  
Additionally, we provided that, under this rule, a defendant  
must be given a reasonable opportunity to allocute, even where  
the court sentences the defendant pursuant to a sentence  
agreement. Id. at 780-781.  
The principal difference between the former and the  
present court rule is that the latter no longer provides that  
“failure to comply shall require resentencing.”8  
The provision . . . declaring that a failure  
to comply with the provisions of that subrule 
“shall require resentencing” was deleted from this 
subrule [in 1989]. Whether failure to comply with 
a provision in this subrule will entitle a  
defendant to resentencing [now] depends on the 
nature of the noncompliance and must be determined 
by reference to past case law or on an individual  
7  In order to “inquire specifically of the defendant,” 
the court would have had to personally address, and directly 
ask, the defendant, “do you have anything to say before you 
are sentenced?” See Green, supra at 303.  
8 Although the dissent points out that under common law, 
reversal was required when a court failed to invite a 
defendant to speak before sentencing, post at 2, such a 
reversal 
is 
no 
longer automatically required under the current 
court rule.  
9  
  
  
case basis. [MCR 6.425, 1989 Staff Comment.][9]  
Further, while the former rule required the court to provide  
a defendant with a “reasonable opportunity” to allocute, the  
current rule requires the court to provide a defendant with an  
“opportunity” to allocute.10  
As noted above, in our interpretation of the former rule,  
we required that the trial court “specifically” ask the  
defendant if “he or she wishes to address the court before the  
sentence is imposed.”11 
Berry, supra at 781. However, we no  
longer believe that such a specific inquiry is required  
because the straightforward language of the court rule simply  
requires a trial court to provide a defendant with an  
opportunity to allocute.  Such language cannot be read to  
require the court to “specifically” ask the defendant if he  
9 We note that this staff comment is not part of the text 
of the court rule, nor is it a binding interpretation of the 
rule. People v Grove, 455 Mich 439, 456; 566 NW2d 547 (1997).  
10 We are not at all sure what the significance is, if 
any, of the deletion of the word “reasonable” in the current 
rule. A rule requiring an “opportunity” to allocute, in our 
judgment, necessarily implies a “reasonable opportunity” to 
allocute.  
11 In Berry, supra at 781, this Court simply stated that 
“[t]he rule . . . should be understood in all cases to require 
the trial court to inquire specifically of the defendant 
separately whether he or she wishes to address the court 
before the sentence is imposed.” It came to this conclusion  
without 
addressing 
the meaning of the term “opportunity,” and, 
therefore, without addressing whether that was required, in 
its judgment, in order to provide a defendant with an 
“opportunity” to allocute.  
10  
 
 
has anything to say before being sentenced.  It merely  
requires that the defendant be presented with an opportunity  
to allocute.  Accordingly, we overrule Berry to the extent  
that its construction of former rule GCR 1963, 785.8 is  
inconsistent with our interpretation of MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).  
IV. STARE DECISIS  
It is well established that overruling precedent must be  
undertaken with caution.  The application of stare decisis is  
generally “‘the preferred course because it promotes the  
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal  
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and  
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the  
judicial process.’” Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613  
NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States, 524 US 236,  
251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).12  “However, stare  
decisis is not to be applied mechanically to forever prevent  
the Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions . . . .”  
Id. at 463.  
Rather, when a court errs by misconstruing a court rule,  
a subsequent court should not blindly apply such a  
misconstruction on the basis of the doctrine of stare decisis,  
but 
should 
instead 
overrule 
the 
earlier 
court’s  
12 “Stare decisis” is defined as “[t]o abide by, or adhere 
to, decided cases.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).  
11  
  
misconstruction. 
Id. at 467.  We must keep in mind that  
“stare decisis is a ‘principle of policy’ rather than ‘an  
inexorable command.’” Id. at 464 (citations omitted).  
Accordingly, “this Court will not close its eyes to a possible  
error it may have committed in the past.” Wilson v Doehler- 
Jarvis, 358 Mich 510, 514; 100 NW2d 226 (1960).  
However, “[b]efore this court overrules a decision  
deliberately made, it should be convinced not merely that the  
case was wrongly decided, but also that less injury will  
result from overruling than from following it.”  McEvoy v  
Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006 (1904). 
In  
this regard, courts must consider:  
(a) whether the earlier decision was wrongly 
decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision 
would work an undue hardship because of reliance 
interests 
or 
expectations 
that 
have 
arisen.  
[Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 
757; 641 NW2d 567 (2002).]  
With regard to the first inquiry, we believe, as we have  
already observed, that Berry was wrongly decided. The court  
rule provides simply that the trial court must provide a  
defendant with an opportunity to allocute before being  
sentenced, while Berry concluded that the court must  
“specifically” ask the defendant whether he has anything to  
say before being sentenced.  However, in our judgment, such a  
personal and direct inquiry is not required by the court rule.  
12  
 
 
 
 
Rather, the court rule simply requires the court to provide a  
defendant with an opportunity; it says nothing about  
personally addressing the defendant or speaking directly to  
the defendant.  
With regard to the second inquiry, we must examine  
“whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so  
accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to  
change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical  
real-world dislocations.”  Robinson, supra at 466. 
We  
conclude that the decision in Berry has not become so  
fundamental that overruling it will interfere with any  
legitimate reliance or expectation interests.  “[T]o have  
reliance, the knowledge must be of the sort that causes a  
person or entity to attempt to conform his conduct to a  
certain norm before the triggering event.” Id. at 467. Our  
decision in Berry cannot be said to have caused defendants to  
alter their conduct in any way.  Therefore, our decision here  
will create no “practical real-world dislocations.”  
Because of our decision in Berry, courts are now in the  
practice of specifically asking defendants if they have  
anything to say before sentencing. We agree with the United  
States Supreme Court that this is the best of practices  
because it will “leave no room for doubt” that the defendant  
has been provided the required opportunity to allocute. See  
13  
 
 
Green, supra at 305. 
Accordingly, trial courts should  
continue this practice because it is the most certain way to  
ensure that they have acted in compliance with MCR  
6.425(D)(2)(c).  
For these reasons, we conclude that Berry was wrongly  
decided and overruling it will not interfere with legitimate  
reliance or expectation interests. 
Accordingly, after  
considering the imperatives of stare decisis, we believe that  
it is appropriate here to overrule Berry to the extent that  
its construction of former rule GCR 1963, 785.8 is  
inconsistent with our interpretation of MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).13  
V. CONCLUSION  
That the trial court is required to provide a defendant  
with an opportunity to allocute means only that the trial  
court must allow the defendant a chance to speak on his own  
behalf before being sentenced.  This does not mean that the  
trial court must specifically ask the defendant whether he  
wishes to allocute, although this would be the most certain  
way to ensure that all defendants who do want to allocute on  
13 The dissent concludes that the trial court’s general 
inquiry was not sufficient under Berry because Berry requires 
a specific inquiry, and thus resentencing is required. Post  
at 1.  Although we agree with the dissent that the trial 
court’s inquiry was not sufficient under Berry, we conclude 
that the trial court’s inquiry did comply with the plain 
language of the court rule, and that is all that the trial 
court was required to do.  Accordingly, there is no need to  
remand for resentencing.  
14  
 
 
 
their own behalf are, in fact, given the opportunity to do so.  
In this case, defendant was given the opportunity to address  
the court when the court asked if there was “anything  
further.”  Accordingly, the trial court complied with the  
requirement of MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c), and thus we affirm the  
sentence imposed on defendant by the trial court.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ.,  
concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
15  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119348  
LINDA PETIT,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that defendant  
had the opportunity envisioned by MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) to  
address the court before sentencing.  This decision is an  
unfortunate departure from precedent.  
We held in People v Berry1 that compliance with the right  
of allocution requires the sentencing court to specifically  
address the defendant. The trial judge's general inquiry of  
"anything 
further" 
directed apparently at no one in particular  
was not sufficient under Berry or under the principles that  
1409 Mich 774; 298 NW2d 434 (1980).  
 
  
 
 
gave rise to it.  Therefore, I would remand the case to the  
sentencing court for proper allocution and resentencing.  
The right of allocution is deeply embedded in this  
country’s criminal jurisprudence.  As early as 1689, the  
common law acknowledged that reversal is required when a court  
fails to invite a defendant to speak before sentencing.  Green  
v United States, 365 US 301, 304; 81 S Ct 653; 5 L Ed 2d 670  
(1961); United States v De Alba Pagan, 33 F3d 125, 129-130 (CA  
1, 1994).  The right of allocution is designed to temper  
punishment with mercy and to ensure that sentencing reflects  
individualized circumstances.  Its value lies in maximizing  
the perceived equality of the process. Id. at 129.  
In keeping with these principles, we announced in Berry  
in 1980 that the right of allocution is "an important and  
integral 
aspect 
of 
the truth-discovery purpose of the criminal  
justice process . . . ." Berry, supra at 780-781.  The right  
provides a defendant with an opportunity to make a statement  
in mitigation, extenuation, or justification of the crime for  
which a sentence is being imposed. Id. at 780. Nothing has  
occurred during the intervening twenty-two years to alter  
those truths. Berry was not wrongly decided.  
It established a bright line rule easily applied by the  
courts.  It avoided litigation in cases, as in the case before  
us, where the record is ambiguous about whether a defendant  
2  
 
was given an intelligible opportunity to address the  
sentencing judge.  The Berry rule guaranteed defendants a fair  
and meaningful opportunity to exercise the right to allocute.  
It signaled to trial court judges that they should not  
pronounce sentence before specifically asking whether a  
defendant wished to speak.  
The majority removes this easily understood and easily  
applied rule for no good reason.  It replaces the rule with  
one that encourages sloppiness and uncertainty in the  
imposition of sentences.  
Despite the majority's acknowledgment that it is unclear  
whom the sentencing court was addressing here, it concludes  
that defense counsel's response indicates that defendant had  
nothing to say.  This overlooks the possibility that defendant  
might have had something to say even if defense counsel was  
unaware of it or had nothing more to say himself.  The record  
provides no basis, aside from speculation, for concluding  
otherwise.  
The majority's reasoning also ignores the intimidating  
environment of a courtroom.  It ignores the stress of  
sentencing for a person like defendant who was most certainly  
about to lose her liberty. It is not reasonable to presume,  
as does the majority, that a defendant will seize on such a  
vague inquiry as "anything further" as representing a last  
3  
 
opportunity to address the court before sentencing.  
Given the importance of the right of allocution and the  
flaws present in the sentencing here, the best rule is the  
longstanding and accepted rule of Berry.  Because the trial  
judge failed to specifically inquire of defendant whether she  
wished to address the court before sentencing, defendant was  
denied her right to allocute under MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).  I  
would abide by the rule of stare decisis and remand the case  
to the sentencing court to give defendant an opportunity to  
allocute and for resentencing.  
4