Title: State v. Tullberg
Citation: 2014 WI 134
Docket Number: 2012AP001593-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 2014

2014 WI 134 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1593-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael R. Tullberg, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 349 Wis. 2d 526, 835 N.W.2d 291) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 26, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Shawano 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Habeck  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Sarah Schmeiser, with whom on the brief was Tracey 
Wood, and Tracey Wood & Associates, Madison. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 134
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1593-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF202) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Michael R. Tullberg,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
DEC 26, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 which affirmed 
Michael R. Tullberg's ("Tullberg") criminal convictions in 
Shawano County Circuit Court.2  Tullberg appeals his judgment of 
conviction and the denial of his request for post-conviction 
relief.  Specifically, he argues that the circuit court erred 
when it denied his motion to suppress a warrantless blood draw. 
                                                 
1 State v. Tullberg, No. 2012AP1593-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 25, 2013) (per curiam). 
2 The Honorable James R. Habeck presided. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
2 
 
He seeks our review in light of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
¶2 
Tullberg was involved in a single-vehicle, fatal 
accident.  There were several occupants of the vehicle, 
including the person who died as a result of the accident.  The 
State alleged that Tullberg was the driver of the vehicle, was 
under the influence of an intoxicant, and was criminally 
responsible for, among other things, the fatality.  Tullberg 
denied being the driver.  
¶3 
While Tullberg was being treated at the hospital, a 
sheriff's 
deputy 
instructed 
hospital 
staff 
to 
perform 
a 
warrantless blood draw.  Tullberg argues that the blood draw 
evidence should have been suppressed because the blood draw was 
an 
unreasonable 
search 
without 
a 
warrant 
and 
thus 
unconstitutional.  He argues that the good faith doctrine does 
not apply to this case.  
¶4 
The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
blood 
draw 
was 
a 
constitutional search because it was supported by both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances.  The State further asserts 
that, if exigent circumstances did not exist, the good faith 
doctrine nonetheless allowed the blood test result to be 
admitted into evidence.3  
¶5 
We conclude that the motion to suppress was properly 
denied because the warrantless draw of Tullberg's blood was 
                                                 
3 We applied the good faith doctrine in a similar case.  See 
State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
3 
 
supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances.  Because 
we conclude that the blood draw was constitutional, we need not 
address the good faith exception.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On July 30, 2009, Tullberg was involved in a fatal, 
one-vehicle accident in Shawano County when his truck ran off 
the road, struck a rock, flipped one or two times, and came to 
rest 70 feet from the rock, on the driver's side.  M.A., 
deceased, was pinned under the driver's side of the vehicle.  
The crash was so violent that the removable cap covering the 
truck bed behind the cabin was flattened and torn from the 
truck, loosening the cap's door in the process, and debris from 
the truck littered the accident scene.4  Based on cell phone 
records, the accident occurred between 12:18 a.m. and 12:26 a.m.  
¶7 
M.A., A.M., and C.M. were passengers in the truck at 
the time of the accident.  M.A., who was riding in the truck 
bed, fell out when the truck flipped over.  After the accident, 
Tullberg and A.M. spent approximately 15 minutes looking for 
M.A., but to no avail.  C.M. looked for M.A. for a few minutes 
and then left the scene because he was in violation of his 
probation. 
¶8 
Shortly thereafter, Tullberg's brother, Joseph Hauke 
("Hauke"), arrived at the accident scene and gave Tullberg and 
                                                 
4 Also known as a box, a truck bed is the large cargo area 
in the back of the truck, located behind the cabin area intended 
for passengers. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
4 
 
A.M. a ride to Tullberg's mother's house, which is located 
approximately five miles from the accident scene.  Tullberg's 
mother gave Tullberg and A.M. a ride to the Langlade Memorial 
Hospital in Antigo, which is about 20 miles away.  At 12:53 
a.m., Tullberg's father called 9-1-1 to report the accident, and 
Hauke did the same shortly thereafter.  
¶9 
At approximately 12:55 a.m., Deputy Sheriff Justin 
Hoffman ("Deputy Hoffman") of the Shawano County Sheriff's 
Department was dispatched to the accident scene.  At 1:03 a.m., 
the deputy arrived at the scene and spent the next 30 minutes 
there.  No readily observable occupants or witnesses were at the 
scene. The terrain was rocky, steep, and wooded, and he 
described it as hazardous.  Deputy Hoffman ultimately discovered 
M.A.'s body pinned under the driver's side of the truck.  After 
he investigated and took photographs of the scene for five to 
ten minutes, firefighters and emergency medical services persons 
arrived at the scene.  
¶10 While Deputy Hoffman was investigating the accident 
scene, Tullberg's father, Melvin Tullberg ("Melvin"), arrived at 
the scene.  Melvin was very shaken up and speaking frantically.  
He told Deputy Hoffman that Tullberg owned the truck and that 
Tullberg and A.M. had gone to the hospital.  Melvin told Deputy 
Hoffman several times that, according to Tullberg, a passenger 
who was riding in the bed of the truck was missing.  Melvin 
stated that Tullberg spent several minutes looking for this 
passenger and implored Deputy Hoffman to look for him.  Melvin 
said that Tullberg did not say whether he was the driver of the 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
5 
 
truck when it crashed.  Melvin began to walk along the roadside 
as if he was heading toward the crash site.  Because Deputy 
Hoffman did not want Melvin to be near a traumatic crime scene, 
he physically guided Melvin to wait near his squad car.  Melvin 
then received a phone call from Hauke and handed the phone to 
Deputy Hoffman.  Hauke told Deputy Hoffman that Tullberg and 
A.M. were headed to Langlade Memorial Hospital.  
¶11 When Deputy Bradley Schultz and Sergeant Michael 
Wizner ("Sergeant Wizner") arrived at the accident scene, Deputy 
Hoffman left to go to the Langlade Memorial Hospital.  He spent 
approximately 30 minutes driving to the hospital. 
¶12 Deputy Hoffman arrived at Langlade Memorial Hospital 
around 2:00 a.m. and interviewed Tullberg approximately ten 
minutes later.  This interview lasted approximately ten minutes.  
Tullberg told Deputy Hoffman that M.A. was driving the truck 
when it crashed and that Tullberg did not know M.A.'s last name.  
Tullberg stated that he knew M.A. for only three days and never 
let M.A. drive his truck before that night.  Tullberg said he 
was in the passenger seat of the truck when the accident 
happened and that he did not remember how he exited the truck.  
Tullberg said that the passenger's side airbag deployed.  
Tullberg stated that a fourth person may have been in the truck.  
Deputy Hoffman noticed that Tullberg appeared to have been 
struck by an airbag because hair on Tullberg's right forearm was 
singed consistent with friction from an airbag and because 
Tullberg smelled like the residue from a deployed airbag.  
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
6 
 
¶13 Tullberg admitted to Deputy Hoffman that he consumed 
alcohol that night, specifically, a mixed drink and a "Jӓger 
bomb."5  While interviewing Tullberg, Deputy Hoffman noticed that 
Tullberg had an odor of intoxicants, slurred speech, and 
bloodshot and glassy eyes.  Based on these facts, Deputy Hoffman 
determined that Tullberg was intoxicated.  
¶14 Deputy Hoffman next spent approximately five to ten 
minutes interviewing A.M., who was in a different room in the 
Langlade Memorial Hospital.  A.M. said that when the accident 
happened, she was in the bed of the truck, M.A. was driving the 
truck, and Tullberg was riding in the passenger's seat. 
¶15 After interviewing A.M. and while still at the 
hospital, Deputy Hoffman telephoned Sergeant Wizner to gather 
information about the accident scene.  Sergeant Wizner told 
Deputy Hoffman that the airbag on the passenger's side had not 
deployed and that the airbag on the driver's side had deployed.  
Sergeant Wizner confirmed that the truck was lying on its 
driver's side and that its driver's side window was intact and 
partially rolled down.   
¶16 Deputy Hoffman thereafter concluded that he had 
probable cause to believe that Tullberg was intoxicated and the 
driver of the truck at the time of the accident.  Deputy Hoffman 
based this determination on the fact that the passenger's side 
                                                 
5 A Jӓger bomb is made by dropping a shot glass of 
Jägermeister (a 70-proof liqueur) into a glass of an energy 
drink, such as Red Bull® or Monster Energy®. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
7 
 
airbag did not deploy but the driver's side airbag did deploy.  
Tullberg appeared as if an airbag struck him because his right 
forearm hair was singed and he smelled like airbag residue.  
Further, Deputy Hoffman determined that even though Tullberg 
said that M.A. was the driver, the evidence indicated that M.A. 
could not have been the driver.  M.A. was pinned underneath the 
driver's side of the truck, and the evidence from the accident 
scene showed that M.A. could not have been ejected from the 
vehicle.  Specifically, the driver's side window was intact and 
partially rolled down.  M.A., whose weight Deputy Hoffman 
estimated was between 240 and 250 pounds, could not have fit 
through the window opening.  M.A. could not have been the driver 
and then pinned under the driver's side of the vehicle without 
being ejected from the vehicle.  There was no indication that he 
could have been ejected.  Also, Deputy Hoffman did not detect 
any airbag residue on M.A. 
¶17 Simply stated, as a result of the information Deputy 
Hoffman learned from his observations and interview of Tullberg, 
coupled with the evidence at the scene of the accident, Deputy 
Hoffman determined that Tullberg had operated the motor vehicle 
while intoxicated. 
¶18 Because of the facts and circumstances of this 
investigation, Deputy Hoffman did not follow standard protocol 
for an operating under the influence arrest.  He did not 
administer field sobriety tests, issue a citation, arrest 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
8 
 
Tullberg, or read the Informing the Accused form to Tullberg.6  
Deputy Hoffman testified that he did not follow the standard 
procedure because, among other things, Tullberg's medical 
condition was unknown, Tullberg was hospitalized after a serious 
car accident, and medical personnel needed to perform a 
Computerized Tomography scan ("CT scan") on Tullberg with some 
immediacy.  
¶19 More than two and a half hours after the accident, 
Deputy Hoffman instructed medical staff to draw two vials of 
Tullberg's blood for testing.  He did not have a warrant.  
Deputy Hoffman believed that Tullberg's blood needed to be drawn 
urgently because, based on his training, he believed the alcohol 
in Tullberg's bloodstream was rapidly dissipating and time was 
of the essence.  Based on his training, Deputy Hoffman knew that 
a suspected drunken driver's blood should be drawn within three 
hours of an automobile accident in which the driver was 
involved.7  At 3:05 a.m. hospital staff drew Tullberg's blood.  
The blood test results indicated that Tullberg's blood alcohol 
concentration ("BAC") was 0.141, above the legal limit. 
                                                 
6 Tullberg did not object to the blood draw.  However, the 
State does not argue that Tullberg consented to it. 
7 If a blood sample is taken more than three hours after an 
automobile accident, the blood draw evidence is admissible only 
if an expert testifies to its accuracy.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 885.235(1g), 885.235(3) (2009-10).  All subsequent references 
to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
 
See 
also 
State 
v. 
Bohling, 
173 
Wis. 2d 529, 546, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), abrogated on other 
grounds by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013). 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
9 
 
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶20 On August 7, 2009, a warrant for Tullberg's arrest was 
issued.  On the next day, Tullberg turned himself in. 
¶21 On 
August 
10, 
2009, 
Tullberg 
made 
an 
initial 
appearance and was charged in a criminal complaint with six 
offenses: homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle,8 
second-degree reckless homicide,9 two counts of operating while 
intoxicated causing injury,10 failure to aid a victim or report a 
crime,11 and obstructing an officer.12  On August 19, 2009, a 
preliminary hearing was conducted and Tullberg was bound over 
for trial.  An information was filed on August 21, 2009.  The 
information differed from the complaint only in that it replaced 
the second-degree reckless homicide charge with a charge of 
homicide by use of a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration,13 included a new charge of hit and run resulting 
in death,14 and omitted the complaint's charge of failure to aid 
a victim or report a crime.  On August 24, 2009, the State filed 
                                                 
8 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a).  
9 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1). 
10 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a)1.  One count was 
for injuring A.M. and the other count was for injuring C.M. 
11 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.34(2)(a).  This count was 
for failing to aid M.A. 
12 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
13 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(b). 
14 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1). 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
10 
 
an amended information that included the six charges in the 
information and added two counts of operating with prohibited 
alcohol concentration causing injury15 and one count of failure 
to aid a victim or report a crime.  On August 24, 2009, Tullberg 
was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty.  
¶22 On January 19, 2010, before McNeely was decided, 
Tullberg filed a motion to suppress the blood test results.  He 
argued, inter alia, that the blood draw was unconstitutional 
because it was not performed in compliance with legally 
recognized protocols, not done pursuant to implied consent laws 
or pursuant to a warrant, not done with his express consent, and 
not justified by exigent circumstances.  On May 25, 2010, the 
circuit court held a hearing on Tullberg's suppression motion.  
After hearing the evidence presented and considering the 
arguments of counsel, the circuit court concluded that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw.  The circuit 
court denied the suppression motion. 
¶23 On March 28 through April 1, 2011, Tullberg was tried 
before a jury.  The jury found Tullberg guilty of six counts.  
On May 31, 2011, the circuit court sentenced Tullberg. 
¶24 On February 3, 2012, Tullberg filed a motion for post-
conviction relief, seeking a new trial.  He argued, inter alia, 
that the circuit court erred in denying Tullberg's motion to 
suppress the blood draw evidence because the blood draw was 
                                                 
15 Contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a).  The victims of 
these counts were A.M. and C.M. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
11 
 
unconstitutional.  On June 27, 2012, the circuit court denied 
the motion for post-conviction relief.  These proceedings also 
occurred before McNeely was decided. 
¶25 Tullberg appealed his conviction.  On June 25, 2013, 
the court of appeals upheld the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and order denying his motion for post-conviction 
relief.  The court of appeals reasoned that both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances supported the blood draw.16  McNeely 
was decided before the court of appeals issued its decision.  
¶26 On July 17, 2013, Tullberg petitioned this court for 
review.  On February 19, 2014, we granted review.  The petition 
requests 
review 
to 
clarify 
the 
law 
relating 
to 
exigent 
circumstances under McNeely.  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
N.W.2d 463 (citing State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶15, 233 
Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621).  "When presented with a question 
of constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step 
inquiry."  Id. (citing State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶27, 236 
Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568; Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶15).  
"First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical 
fact under a deferential standard, upholding them unless they 
                                                 
16 The court of appeals also resolved other issues not 
petitioned to this court. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
12 
 
are clearly erroneous."  Id. (citations omitted).  "Second, we 
independently apply constitutional principles to those facts."  
Id. (citations omitted). 
¶28 We apply this two-step inquiry when determining 
whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search, 
State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 
N.W.2d 29, and whether a law enforcement officer had probable 
cause, State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶10, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 
N.W.2d 569. 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶29 "The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution protect '[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'"  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24 
(citations omitted).17  "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
17 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in full: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
13 
 
is reasonableness."  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) 
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).  "The 
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches 
and 
seizures; 
it 
merely 
proscribes 
those 
which 
are 
unreasonable."  Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 
(1990)).  
¶30 A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, 
State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 
613, and is constitutional only if it falls under an exception 
to the warrant requirement, State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24, 
255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385.  One exception to the warrant 
requirement is the exigent circumstances doctrine, which holds 
that a warrantless search complies with the Fourth Amendment if 
the need for a search is urgent and insufficient time to obtain 
a warrant exists.  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24. 
¶31 A blood draw to uncover evidence of a crime is a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Bentley, 92 Wis. 2d 860, 863-64, 286 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1979).  
A warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw of a suspected drunken 
driver complies with the Fourth Amendment if: (1) there was 
                                                                                                                                                             
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
We generally interpret the search and seizure provision of our 
state constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24 n.11, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 
(citations omitted). 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
14 
 
probable cause to believe the blood would furnish evidence of a 
crime; (2) the blood was drawn under exigent circumstances; (3) 
the blood was drawn in a reasonable manner; and (4) the suspect 
did not reasonably object to the blood draw.  State v. Erickson, 
2003 WI App 43, ¶9, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407; Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-71 (1966).  
¶32 We first examine whether Deputy Hoffman had probable 
cause to instruct hospital staff to draw Tullberg's blood.  Next 
we 
consider 
whether 
exigent 
circumstances 
justified 
the 
warrantless blood draw.  Tullberg has conceded that his blood 
was drawn in a reasonable manner and that he did not reasonably 
object to the blood draw.  Finally, we analyze Tullberg's 
argument that a suspected drunken driver must be arrested before 
his or her blood may be drawn without a search warrant.  We 
conclude that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified 
the warrantless blood draw.  Tullberg did not need to be under 
arrest before his blood could be drawn. 
A. Probable Cause to Search 
¶33 "In the search context, probable cause requires a 
'fair probability' that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶26 
(quoting 
Hughes, 
233 
Wis. 2d 280, 
¶21) 
(quotation 
marks 
omitted).  To have probable cause to search a suspect, a law 
enforcement officer must be aware of and reasonably believe 
evidence that shows the suspect's guilt of a crime is more than 
a possibility, although the evidence need not show the suspect's 
guilt is more likely than not.  State v. Richardson, 156 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 128, 148-49, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (citing State v. 
Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986); State v. 
Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 625, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971)).  To 
determine whether probable cause to search existed, a court 
determines whether law enforcement acted reasonably.  Robinson, 
327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶26 (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185; 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 
280, ¶23).  A reviewing court considers the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether probable cause to search 
existed.  State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶26, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517 (citing State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 131, 454 
N.W.2d 780 (1990)).  
¶34 We 
conclude 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, Deputy Hoffman had probable cause to believe that 
a test of Tullberg's blood would produce evidence that Tullberg 
had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  Deputy Hoffman 
relied on several factors to conclude that Tullberg was under 
the influence of an intoxicant.  While interviewing Tullberg in 
the hospital, Deputy Hoffman noticed that Tullberg's speech was 
slurred, his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and his breath 
smelled of intoxicants.  Tullberg admitted to Deputy Hoffman 
that he had multiple alcoholic drinks that night.  These facts 
establish that Deputy Hoffman reasonably believed that Tullberg 
was intoxicated.  See State v. Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 622, 558 
N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an officer had probable 
cause to arrest defendant for operating while intoxicated 
because defendant smelled of intoxicants, his speech was 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
16 
 
slurred, he was injured, and he was lying next to his van which 
had struck a telephone pole); Erickson, 260 Wis. 2d 279, ¶¶15-16 
(holding that an officer had probable cause to have defendant's 
blood drawn because defendant smelled strongly of intoxicants, 
crashed her truck into another vehicle, admitted to drinking one 
to three beers, and had recently left an all-night party). 
¶35 Tullberg argues that bloodshot and glassy eyes are not 
a sign of intoxication, relying on a National Highway Traffic 
and Safety Administration study regarding the accuracy of clues 
that law enforcement officers use to determine whether someone 
is intoxicated.18  The study argues that law enforcement officers 
should not consider bloodshot and glassy eyes to be an indicator 
of intoxication because such eye conditions may be caused by 
allergies or shift work.  However, the study does not conclude 
that intoxication does not cause eyes to become bloodshot and 
glassy.  We reaffirm that a law enforcement officer may consider 
bloodshot and glassy eyes to be one of several indicators of 
intoxication, even though such eye descriptors may have an 
innocent explanation.  See Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶29 
("'[I]nnocent' behavior frequently will provide the basis for a 
showing of probable cause.'") (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 
n.13). 
                                                 
18 Jack Stuster, U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA 
Final Report, The Detection of DWI at BACS below 0.10, DOT HS-
808-654 (Sept. 1997) at 14 and E-10. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
17 
 
¶36 Deputy Hoffman also reasonably believed that Tullberg 
was the operator of the truck when it crashed.  Again, the 
deputy did not rely on one fact alone.  First, Tullberg owned 
the truck, which supports Deputy Hoffman's view that he was the 
driver.  Second, an airbag deployed only on the driver's side of 
the truck, and Tullberg appeared as if an airbag struck him.  
Specifically, he looked like an airbag struck him because the 
hair on his right forearm was singed consistent with friction 
from a deploying airbag.  He smelled like airbag residue, which 
also suggests that the airbag struck him.  Deputy Hoffman made 
these 
observations 
about 
Tullberg's 
appearance 
while 
interviewing him, and Deputy Hoffman subsequently confirmed with 
Sergeant Wizner over the telephone that an airbag deployed only 
on the driver's side of the truck.  Thus, Deputy Hoffman 
reasonably concluded that the driver's side airbag struck 
Tullberg.  Third, Deputy Hoffman determined that A.M. was not 
the driver of the truck because she did not have singed hair on 
either arm or smell like airbag residue.  Finally, Deputy 
Hoffman reasonably believed that Tullberg lied when he said that 
he was the passenger and M.A. was the driver of the truck when 
it crashed.  Specifically, not only did the airbag evidence 
indicate that Tullberg was the driver, but Deputy Hoffman knew 
that M.A.'s body was pinned underneath the truck and that the 
driver's side window of the truck was intact and partially 
rolled down.  Deputy Hoffman estimated M.A.'s weight to be 
between 240 and 250 pounds and determined that M.A. could not 
have been ejected from the truck through the window opening.  
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
18 
 
Further, Tullberg's father told Deputy Hoffman that Tullberg 
said that a person who was riding in the truck bed when the 
truck crashed was missing, and Deputy Hoffman discovered that 
M.A. was the missing person.  Deputy Hoffman did not smell 
airbag residue on M.A.  Based on all of this evidence, Deputy 
Hoffman reasonably believed that Tullberg was the driver of the 
truck when it crashed. 
¶37 Because 
Deputy 
Hoffman 
reasonably 
believed 
that 
Tullberg was intoxicated and that Tullberg was the driver of the 
truck when it crashed, he had probable cause to believe that 
Tullberg had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.19   
¶38 Relying on State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 471 
N.W.2d 226 (1991), and State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 475 
N.W.2d 148 (1991), Tullberg argues that the facts in the present 
case do not establish probable cause that he was operating while 
intoxicated.  First, he argues that Seibel is factually similar 
to this case, and in Seibel this court held that an officer had 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating while 
intoxicated.  Tullberg argues that, because reasonable suspicion 
is a lesser burden of proof than probable cause, there was no 
                                                 
19 Tullberg 
argues 
that 
Deputy 
Hoffman 
should 
have 
investigated Tullberg's claim that a fourth person might have 
been in the truck when it crashed.  However, Tullberg does not 
argue that he told Deputy Hoffman that this fourth person was 
driving the truck when it crashed or even that he said this 
fourth person was definitely in the truck.  Even if Tullberg had 
claimed this fourth person was driving the truck when it 
crashed, Deputy Hoffman still had probable cause to believe that 
Tullberg was the driver. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
19 
 
probable cause in Seibel.  However, this court in Seibel never 
determined whether the facts in that case established probable 
cause that the defendant was operating while intoxicated.  See 
Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d at 172-79.20  Instead, Seibel analyzed 
whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to 
perform a warrantless blood draw subsequent to a lawful arrest.  
Id. at 180-83. 
¶39 Tullberg next argues that this court in Swanson held 
that erratic driving and a subsequent automobile accident around 
the time that bars close did not constitute probable cause of 
operating while intoxicated.  By analogy, he argues that 
probable cause was lacking in the present case.  Tullberg 
misinterprets Swanson.  The court in Swanson expressly declined 
to determine whether probable cause existed.  Swanson, 164 
                                                 
20 In a footnote in Swanson, this court stated in passing 
that the Seibel court held that probable cause did not exist in 
that case.  State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 453 n.6, 475 
N.W.2d 148 (1991).  This statement in Swanson is incorrect.  The 
court in Seibel did not even consider whether probable cause 
existed.  See State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 172-83, 471 
N.W.2d 226 (1991).  
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
20 
 
Wis. 2d at 453 & n.6.21  Instead, the issue in Swanson was 
whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement justified a search that preceded an arrest.  Id. at 
441-42. 
¶40 Tullberg also argues that Deputy Hoffman lacked 
probable cause to determine that Tullberg was operating while 
intoxicated because Tullberg did not perform a field sobriety 
test.  Tullberg notes that field sobriety tests preceded 
determinations of probable cause in State v. Colstad, 2003 WI 
App 25, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394, and State v. Begicevic, 
2004 WI App 57, 270 Wis. 2d 675, 678 N.W.2d 293.  However, in 
his reply brief, Tullberg correctly acknowledges that a law 
enforcement officer need not administer a field sobriety test in 
order to have probable cause that a suspect operated while 
                                                 
21 In any event, the present case has more evidence of 
intoxication than Seibel or Swanson did.  In Seibel this court 
held that an officer had reasonable suspicion that Seibel was 
operating 
while 
intoxicated 
because 
Seibel 
was 
driving 
erratically, he caused a car accident, police officers smelled 
intoxicants emanating from Seibel's traveling companions, a 
police officer thought he smelled intoxicants on Seibel, and 
Seibel was belligerent.  Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d at 180-83.  In 
Swanson this court stated that officers had reasonable suspicion 
that Swanson was operating while intoxicated because his driving 
was erratic near the time bars close and because his breath 
smelled of intoxicants.  Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d at 453 n.6.  In 
contrast, in the present case, Tullberg smelled of intoxicants, 
admitted to consuming alcohol, had slurred speech, and had 
bloodshot and glassy eyes. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
21 
 
intoxicated.22  E.g., Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d at 622.  Tullberg 
nevertheless argues that probable cause is lacking under the 
facts of the present case because Tullberg did not perform a 
field sobriety test.  We disagree because field sobriety tests 
are not always possible, let alone required, and because 
probable cause existed in this case without a field sobriety 
test.   
B. Exigent Circumstances 
¶41 "Like our analysis of probable cause, the test for 
determining the existence of exigent circumstances is an 
objective one."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30 (citing Brigham 
                                                 
22 However, in his opening brief, Tullberg seems to argue 
that this court in Swanson held that a field sobriety test is 
required in order to establish probable cause of operating while 
intoxicated.  In a footnote in Swanson, this court stated: 
"Unexplained erratic driving, the odor of alcohol, and the 
coincidental time of the incident form the basis for a 
reasonable suspicion but should not, in the absence of a field 
sobriety test, constitute probable cause to arrest someone for 
driving while under the influence of intoxicants."  Swanson, 164 
Wis. 2d at 453 n.6.  However, we later clarified that "Swanson 
did not announce a general rule requiring field sobriety tests 
in all cases as a prerequisite for establishing probable cause 
to arrest a driver for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant."  Washburn Cnty. v. Smith, 2008 WI 
23, ¶33, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243; see also State v. 
Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 622, 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(stating that Swanson did not require an officer to administer a 
sobriety test before determining probable cause exists to arrest 
a suspect for operating while intoxicated).  Instead, probable 
cause is based on the totality of the circumstances on a case-
by-case basis.  Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶¶34-35; State v. Ward, 
2000 WI 3, ¶26, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517; State v. Lange, 
2009 WI 49, ¶¶42-43, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551 (Ziegler, 
J., concurring); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶21, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
22 
 
City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-04 (2006); State v. 
Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 230, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986)).  To 
determine if exigent circumstances justified a search, a 
reviewing court determines "whether the police officers under 
the circumstances known to them at the time reasonably believed 
that a delay in procuring a warrant would . . . risk the 
destruction of evidence."  Id. (citing Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 
230).  
¶42 Evidence of a crime is destroyed as alcohol is 
eliminated from the bloodstream of a drunken driver.  McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. at 1556.  "[W]hile the natural dissipation of alcohol 
in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific 
case, . . . it does not do so categorically.  Whether a 
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable 
must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances."23  Id. at 1563.  Ultimately, "[i]n those drunk-
driving investigations where police officers can reasonably 
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without 
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so."  Id. at 1561.  Stated 
differently, 
although 
the 
dissipation 
of 
alcohol 
in 
the 
bloodstream of a suspected drunken driver alone does not 
constitute an exigency justifying a warrantless draw of the 
                                                 
23 Because we consider the totality of the circumstances, no 
single fact is dispositive.  See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 
¶41, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
23 
 
suspect's blood, the totality of the circumstances may justify a 
warrantless blood draw.  See id. ("[S]ome circumstances will 
make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation 
of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency 
justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test.").  
While McNeely changed the landscape of warrantless blood draws 
in Wisconsin, we note that the United States Supreme Court left 
room for warrantless blood draws if exigencies exist.  In fact, 
the Court in McNeely used the term "exigent" or "exigency" no 
fewer than ten times in the majority opinion.  Thus, today we 
determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. 
¶43 We 
conclude 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the draw of Tullberg's blood was justified by 
exigent circumstances.  A reasonable law enforcement officer, 
confronted with this accident scene and these circumstances, 
would reasonably conclude that the totality of the circumstances 
rendered a warrantless blood draw necessary. 
¶44 At the outset, we note that Deputy Hoffman did not 
improperly delay in obtaining a warrant.  He did not have 
probable cause to believe that Tullberg operated the motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant until nearly 
three hours after the accident.  If anything, Tullberg's 
actions, rather than the deputy's, necessitated the warrantless 
blood draw. 
¶45 Deputy Hoffman was dispatched in the early morning 
hours to a horrific accident which involved a fatality.  The 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
24 
 
accident scene's terrain was rocky, wooded, steep, and trying.  
No witnesses were available to be interviewed.  After he 
investigated the scene for five to ten minutes, firefighters and 
emergency medical services persons arrived, followed shortly 
thereafter by the arrival of Tullberg's frantic father, Melvin.  
Deputy Hoffman reasonably called for backup, secured the scene, 
talked with Melvin, spoke with Tullberg's brother over the 
phone, and determined that he needed to go to the hospital to 
investigate further.  
¶46 We observe that Tullberg went from the accident scene 
to his mother's house and then to a hospital in another county.  
Tullberg's hospitalization required Deputy Hoffman to spend 30 
minutes driving from the accident scene to the hospital, further 
delaying his ability to interview Tullberg.  See Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 770-71 (holding that exigent circumstances justified 
warrantless draw of suspected drunken driver's blood partly 
because the defendant went to a hospital after a car accident). 
¶47 At the hospital, Tullberg and A.M. tried to mislead 
the deputy into believing that the deceased, M.A., was the 
driver of the truck when it crashed.  Tullberg falsely stated 
that M.A. was the driver.24  This deception required the deputy 
to conduct additional investigation in order to determine who 
the driver of the vehicle was at the time of the accident.  
Specifically, this deception required Deputy Hoffman to question 
                                                 
24 Tullberg was convicted of obstructing an officer for 
lying to Deputy Hoffman. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
25 
 
A.M. about who was driving the truck and to call Sergeant Wizner 
to learn more information about the accident to determine who 
was driving the truck.  Ultimately, Deputy Hoffman had probable 
cause to believe that Tullberg had operated a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated, but only more than two and a half hours after 
the accident.  See id. at 769, 771 (holding that exigency 
justified warrantless draw of suspected drunken driver's blood 
that was performed more than two hours after car accident).  
Deputy Hoffman, confronted with such an accident scene and 
obstruction of his investigation, conducted himself reasonably. 
¶48 Furthermore, at the time of the blood draw, Deputy 
Hoffman knew that hospital staff was about to perform a CT scan 
on Tullberg.  The procedure could very well have taken a 
considerable amount of time, and the CT scan could have revealed 
that Tullberg needed immediate subsequent medical treatment.  
The blood draw occurred more than two and a half hours after the 
accident.  Thus, if the blood draw had occurred after the CT 
scan, the blood draw could have occurred long after the 
accident, if ever.  Based on his training, Deputy Hoffman knew 
that a motorist's blood sample should be taken within three 
hours of an automobile accident to ensure its accuracy and 
admissibility as evidence.  Deputy Hoffman therefore determined 
that Tullberg's blood needed to be drawn before the CT scan to 
ensure the blood was drawn within three hours of the accident.  
Moreover, because Deputy Hoffman did not know whether the CT 
scan would lead to subsequent medical treatment, he determined 
that delaying the blood draw until after the CT scan could 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
26 
 
result in the blood draw occurring much later than three hours 
after the accident, if ever.  Under these circumstances, Deputy 
Hoffman 
could 
not 
have 
"reasonably 
obtain[ed] 
a 
warrant . . . without significantly undermining the efficacy of 
the search . . . ."25  See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. 
¶49 A law enforcement officer, such as Deputy Hoffman, who 
is confronted with an accident scene, should first attend to the 
emergency circumstances at hand.  Deputy Hoffman properly spent 
30 minutes investigating the accident scene.  See Schmerber, 384 
U.S. 
at 
769, 
770-71 
(holding 
that 
exigent 
circumstances 
justified warrantless draw of suspected drunken driver's blood 
partly because officer needed to investigate the scene of a car 
accident); McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568 ("the need for the police 
to attend to a car accident" is one factor that the exigency 
analysis may consider).  Deputy Hoffman did not spend an 
unreasonable amount of time at the accident scene.  He was the 
                                                 
25 To get a warrant to draw Tullberg's blood, Deputy Hoffman 
would have needed to contact dispatch, who in turn would have 
contacted a prosecutor for him.  The prosecutor would have 
contacted a staff member from the district attorney's office, 
and together they would have prepared a warrant application.  
The prosecutor then would have contacted a judge.  In light of 
this process, Deputy Hoffman could not have obtained a warrant 
to draw Tullberg's blood before the CT scan, which Tullberg 
urgently needed.  Performing a blood draw on Tullberg after the 
CT scan would have significantly undermined the efficacy of the 
blood draw.  We note that Deputy Hoffman could not have had 
other officers assist him in obtaining a warrant while he 
investigated the accident because he did not have probable cause 
to have Tullberg's blood drawn until immediately before it was 
drawn. 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
27 
 
first person to respond to the accident, he discovered a body 
under the truck, and he had to interact with Tullberg's frantic 
father, Melvin, and other emergency personnel.  He did not know 
that Tullberg owned the vehicle until Melvin arrived at the 
scene, and he did not know where Tullberg was until he spoke 
with Tullberg's brother.  Deputy Hoffman headed directly to the 
hospital once other law enforcement officers arrived at the 
accident scene to relieve him.  An accident scene, such as the 
one at issue, can create exigent circumstances which would 
justify a warrantless blood draw. 
¶50 Viewing the totality of these facts and circumstances, 
Deputy Hoffman reasonably responded to the accident, secured the 
scene, investigated the matter, and ultimately was left with a 
very narrow time frame in which Tullberg's blood could be drawn 
so as to produce reliable evidence of intoxication.  This sort 
of "now or never" moment is the epitome of an exigent 
circumstance.  See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 ("The context of 
blood testing is different in critical respects from other 
destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly 
confronted with a 'now or never' situation.") (quoting Roaden v. 
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973)) (quotation marks omitted).  
However, we do not mean to suggest that a warrantless blood draw 
would always require a "now or never" situation in order to be 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances. 
 
Rather, 
exigent 
circumstances justify a warrantless blood draw if delaying the 
blood draw would "significantly undermin[e] [its] efficacy."  
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
28 
 
See id.  The "now or never" moment in the present case quite 
clearly meets that test.26  
¶51 Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that 
exigent 
circumstances 
justified 
the 
warrantless 
draw 
of 
Tullberg's blood.  Deputy Hoffman acted reasonably and the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  See 
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶26; McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558-60.  
C. Arrest Not Necessary 
¶52 Tullberg argues that the warrantless draw of his blood 
was unconstitutional because he was not arrested before the 
blood draw.  We disagree. 
¶53 Specifically, Tullberg argues that Schmerber and State 
v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), required an 
officer to arrest a suspect before having a sample of his or her 
blood taken.  Although the defendant in Schmerber was arrested 
before his blood sample was taken, the Supreme Court in 
Schmerber never suggested that a warrantless blood draw would be 
                                                 
26 In particular, although a blood sample taken more than 
three hours after an accident can be admissible as evidence, 
Deputy Hoffman reasonably concluded that allowing Tullberg to 
undergo a CT scan before undergoing a blood draw would have 
"significantly undermin[ed] the efficacy" of the blood draw.  
See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561; see also id. at 1560-61 
("[B]ecause an individual's alcohol level gradually declines 
soon after he stops drinking, a significant delay in testing 
will negatively affect the probative value of the results."); 
id. at 1563 ("While experts can work backwards from the BAC at 
the time the sample was taken to determine the BAC at the time 
of the alleged offense, longer intervals may raise questions 
about the accuracy of the calculation."). 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
29 
 
unconstitutional unless performed subsequent to an arrest.  In 
fact, the Supreme Court in McNeely stated that "'absent an 
emergency, [a search warrant is] required where intrusions into 
the human body are concerned,' even when the search was 
conducted following a lawful arrest."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 
1558 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).  This quote suggests 
that 
an 
exigency 
renders 
a 
warrantless 
blood 
draw 
constitutional, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
blood 
draw 
is 
performed subsequent to a lawful arrest.  
¶54 Tullberg's reliance on Bohling is also misplaced.  In 
Bohling, this court held that 
a warrantless blood sample taken at the direction of a 
law enforcement officer is permissible under the 
following  circumstances: (1) the blood draw is taken 
to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person 
lawfully 
arrested 
for 
a 
drunk-driving 
related 
violation or crime,1 (2) there is a clear indication 
that 
the 
blood 
draw 
will 
produce 
evidence 
of 
intoxication, (3) the method used to take the blood 
sample is a reasonable one and performed in a 
reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no 
reasonable objection to the blood draw. 
Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 533-34.  In footnote one, the court 
explained that "[p]robable cause to arrest substitutes for the 
predicate act of lawful arrest."  Id. at 534 n.1 (citing 
Bentley, 92 Wis. 2d at 863-64).  Tullberg argues that Bentley is 
inapposite because it was abrogated by McNeely.  Indeed, the 
McNeely 
Court 
expressly 
abrogated 
Bohling's 
holding 
that 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream of a suspected drunken 
driver categorically constitutes an exigency.  See McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. at 1558 & n.2; State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶29, ___ 
No. 
2012AP1593-CR   
 
30 
 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  However, the McNeely Court left 
intact the holding in Bentley and Bohling that an arrest need 
not precede a warrantless blood draw.  
¶55 In sum, the Fourth Amendment provides sufficient 
protection such that an arrest need not precede a warrantless 
blood draw.  When there is probable cause for a blood draw, as 
there is in the case at issue, there also is probable cause to 
arrest for operating while intoxicated.  An arrest is not a 
prerequisite to a warrantless blood draw justified by probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. 
¶56 Accordingly, we reaffirm that an arrest of a suspected 
drunken driver need not precede a warrantless draw of the 
suspect's 
blood 
in 
order 
for 
the 
blood 
draw 
to 
be 
constitutional.  See Erickson, 260 Wis. 2d 279, ¶¶5-12. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that the motion to suppress was properly 
denied because the warrantless draw of Tullberg's blood was 
supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances.  Because 
we conclude that the blood draw was constitutional, we need not 
address the good faith exception.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2012AP1593-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶58 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
instant case is part of a trilogy of cases examining the 
constitutionality of warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws 
performed on persons suspected of driving under the influence of 
an intoxicant in light of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013).  The other two cases in this trilogy are State v. 
Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and State 
v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  For a 
discussion of these three opinions, including the instant case, 
and the issues arising therein, see my dissenting opinion in 
State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
 
No.  2012AP1593-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1