Title: State v. Norfolk
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92252
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2012

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC92252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
ELTON J. NORFOLK, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS CITY 
The Honorable Donald L. McCullin, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 12, 2012 
 
Elton Norfolk appeals from the circuit court's judgment finding him guilty after a 
bench trial of one count of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon, § 571.030,1 and one 
count of possession of marijuana, § 195.202.  The circuit court sentenced Norfolk to 
concurrent terms of three years' in prison for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon and 
one year in jail for the possession of marijuana and suspended execution of his sentences.  
Norfolk was placed on probation for three years to be supervised by the Missouri Board 
of Probation and Parole on the concealed weapon charge, and was placed on 
unsupervised probation for one year on the possession of marijuana charge.  Norfolk 
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
argues on appeal that the circuit court clearly erred in overruling his motion to suppress 
evidence and his objections to the admission of evidence seized because the police officer 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and check for a weapon. 
Officer Reynolds was on routine patrol in a marked police car near the 3900 block 
of Lexington and Vandeventer in the city of St. Louis.  She was patrolling that particular 
area because there had been several armed robberies there in the recent past. While 
traveling southbound on Vandeventer, Officer Reynolds observed a male, later identified 
as Norfolk, standing alone on the corner.  Officer Reynolds made eye contact with 
Norfolk, after which he adjusted his pants in a manner that led her to believe he was 
concealing a weapon.  After observing this action, which she described as reaching 
around to his back with a single hand, Officer Reynolds turned her patrol car around and 
parked in front of a convenience store. 
As Officer Reynolds exited the vehicle, Norfolk walked into the store.  She 
followed Norfolk into the store, approached him, and asked, "Will you come outside and 
speak with me?" to which Norfolk replied, "F--- you. I don't need to speak to you." 
Officer Reynolds told Norfolk, "If you're not doing anything wrong, then you'll come 
outside and you'll speak to me." They both exited the store. Officer Reynolds told 
Norfolk to turn around and place his hands on the wall of the store so that she could 
check him for weapons; Norfolk complied.  When his shirt came up and the butt of a gun 
became visible, Officer Reynolds put her hand against the back of Norfolk's head and 
called for assistance.  Norfolk was arrested.  While conducting a search incident to arrest, 
Officer Reynolds retrieved the gun she saw in Norfolk's waistband and the marijuana 
from his pocket. 
Norfolk was charged with one count of unlawful use of a weapon,2 one count of 
possession of under 35 grams of marijuana, and third-degree assault of a law enforcement 
officer.3  Norfolk filed a motion to suppress all of the items seized, arguing the search 
was unlawful because it was conducted pursuant to an illegal stop.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the circuit court overruled Norfolk's motion to suppress. 
Norfolk waived his right to a jury trial; therefore, the case proceeded to bench 
trial.  Norfolk testified Officer Reynolds approached him while he was inside the 
convenience store, had a taser gun in her hand, and ordered him to go outside and stand 
up against the wall for a search.  Norfolk admitted during cross-examination by the State 
that he possessed the gun and the marijuana that were seized.  The circuit court found 
Norfolk guilty of unlawful use of a weapon in that he was carrying the gun in a concealed 
manner and of possession of marijuana.  Norfolk argues the circuit court clearly erred in 
overruling his motion to suppress and overruling his objections to the admission of 
evidence seized during the search because Officer Reynolds lacked reasonable suspicion 
to conduct a Terry Stop and Frisk.  Norfolk further claims any evidence obtained during 
                                             
 
2 Officer Reynolds testified she initially thought Norfolk was 17 to 18 years old, and § 571.101 
at the time did not allow a person to obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon unless the 
person was 23 years old.  Section 571.101, RSMo Supp. 2010.  The statute has since been 
amended to reduce the age to obtain a carry conceal permit to 21 years old.  It was proven that 
Norfolk did not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon. 
3 Norfolk was acquitted on the assault charge.  The evidence adduced relating to that charge has 
been omitted from discussion because it is not relevant to the issues on appeal. 
 
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the Terry Stop and Frisk was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and 
should be excluded from evidence pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.  
Without that evidence, Norfolk claims there was insufficient evidence to support the 
convictions. 
As a general rule, "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution is ... inadmissible in state court."  State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 
(Mo. banc 2011) (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).  The exclusionary rule also 
requires excluding the "'fruit of the poisonous tree,' that is, 'evidence discovered and later 
found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation.'"  Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 147 
(State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). 
The State argues Officer Reynolds had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal 
activity was afoot; therefore, the Terry Stop and Frisk for a weapons check was 
warranted, and the gun and marijuana were appropriately received as evidence.4  
Standard of Review 
 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, there must 
be "substantial evidence" to support the ruling.  State v. Rousan, 961 
S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc 1998).  "[T]he facts and reasonable inferences 
from such facts are considered favorably to the trial court's ruling and 
contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded."  State v. Galazin, 58 
S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo. banc 2001) (citing State v. Kinkhead, 983 S.W.2d 
518, 519 (Mo. banc 1998)). 
 
                                             
 
4 The State additionally argues that, even if the evidence was erroneously admitted, Norfolk 
suffered no prejudice by the admission of this evidence because there was overwhelming 
evidence of his guilt. Specifically, the State cites Officer Reynolds' testimony regarding the items 
she seized during the search and Norfolk's admission on cross-examination that he possessed the 
items seized.  Norfolk disagrees, arguing were it not for Officer Reynolds illegal search, she 
could not have witnessed or testified about the seized items.  
 
 
4
 
In "reviewing the trial court's overruling of a motion to suppress, this 
Court considers the evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and 
at trial to determine whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to 
support the trial court's ruling."  State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. 
banc 2005).  "Deference is given to the trial court's superior opportunity to 
determine the credibility of witnesses."  Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 845.  This 
Court gives deference to the trial court's factual findings but reviews 
questions of law de novo.  Id.   
 
State v. Gaw, 285 S.W.3d 318, 319-20 (Mo. banc 2009). 
 
Facts 
Officer Reynolds testified at the suppression hearing and the trial regarding the 
basis of her reason to suspect Norfolk was carrying a concealed weapon unlawfully.  The 
testimony on which the circuit court may have relied to determine the officer's conduct 
was permissible included the following:   
Motion to Suppress Hearing 
Direct Examination 
Q  Did you have occasion to be in the 3900 block of Lexington 
around 9:00 p.m. that night? 
A  I was. 
Q  What was that?  Why were you there? 
A The area we were paying attention to closely, we had several 
robberies, armed robberies in that area.  So they – our supervisors had us 
patrolling that area very heavily due to the crimes in the past. 
Q  Okay.  What kind of robberies are we talking? 
A  We're talking armed robberies.  We're talking holdups. 
Q  Okay.  All right.  So you're on a robbery detail, I guess, and 
around 9 p.m. does anything eventually draw your attention? 
A  It does.  I'm traveling south on Vandeventer passing Lexington.  I 
see a black male standing on the corner, which at the time, we made eye 
contact.  This individual adjusted his pants in a manner which I believed he 
was concealing a weapon.   
Q  All right.  I'm going to stop you.  Were you in a marked patrol 
car? 
A  I was. 
 
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Q  All right.  So it looked to you like he recognized you as the 
police? 
A  He did. 
Q  All right.  And you say he touched his waistband in a manner that 
led you to believe he was concealing a weapon? 
A  He did. 
Q Can you describe that for me?  Why did you believe he was 
concealing a weapon? 
A  In the past of every weapons arrest I've been assisting or been on, 
a lot of individuals that carry weapons happen to adjust the weapon for 
some reason when the police come.  I don't know if it's a subconscious 
thing they check it.  So I believe the way he adjusted his pants was not in a 
manner to pull his pants up, as if he was checking to see if a weapon or the 
item that he had was still there. 
Q All right.  So it didn't look to you like he was adjusting his 
clothing.  It looked to you like he was checking to make sure whatever he 
had concealed was still there. 
A  Correct. 
Q  And have you –you've seen that before? 
A  I have. 
 
Cross-Examination 
Q  Now, you said that the individual grabbed at his pants, correct? 
A  Yes. 
Q  And can you describe how that's different from someone who is 
pulling up their pants? 
A  When individuals – I guess the quote, the saying is "sag" – their 
pants don't sit at their waist properly.  When they adjust their pants, they 
adjust in the front.  They don't adjust in the back.  That's what I commonly 
see. 
Q  So at the top of his pants, when you said that he grabbed at the 
top of his pants – 
A  In the back area, yes. 
Q  In the back area. 
A  Yes. 
Q  Pulling up his pants? 
A  Well, when they adjust their pants, they use two hands to pull 
their pants up. 
 
Redirect Examination 
Q  All right.  Now, when you first saw him touch his waistband, 
what exactly did you believe he was doing? 
 
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A  Adjusting the gun. 
Q  All right.  So you thought he had a gun? 
A  Correct. 
Q  So that's why you then checked him for weapons? 
A  Correct. 
Q  Were you afraid for your safety at that point? 
A  I was, yes. 
 
Bench Trial 
Direct Examination 
We were in the area doing robberies. 
* * * 
There was a black male standing on the corner that drew my 
attention. 
Q  Okay.  And what about the man standing on the corner drew your 
attention? 
A  I was passing the gentleman.  I observed him grab his waistband 
in a manner which I believed he was concealing a weapon. 
 
Redirect Examination 
Q  Now, you initially thought he had a gun because of the way he 
adjusted his waistband when you first saw him, right? 
A  Correct. 
Q  When you took him out of the store, you saw the gun after his 
shirt came up, right? 
A  Correct.  Yes. 
* * * 
Q  Did it turn out that the defendant eventually had a concealed and 
carry permit? 
A  No, he did not. 
Analysis 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution preserves the right of 
citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
Generally, a search or seizure is only permissible if there is probable cause to believe a 
person has committed or is committing a crime.  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  
For Fourth Amendment purposes, a "seizure" occurs "whenever a police officer accosts 
 
7
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 
(1968).  "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has 
occurred."  Id. at 19 n.16.  In other words, "[a] seizure occurs when the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident indicates that 'a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave.'"  Sund, 215 S.W.3d at 723. 
As a general rule, warrantless seizures are unreasonable and unconstitutional.  
State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. banc 2005). However, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment allows a brief investigative detention 
if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that 
illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 
472.  In determining whether the seizure and search were unreasonable, a court must 
determine "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.  "In evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must 
'determine if the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of 
reliability is sufficient to create a 'reasonable suspicion' of criminal activity.'"  State v. 
Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Mo. banc 2011) (State v. Berry, 54 S.W.3d 668, 673 
(Mo. App. 2001)). "[W]e are mindful that police officers are permitted to make use of all 
of the information available to them" when forming a particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting criminal activity.  State v. Johnson, 316 S.W.3d 390, 396 (Mo. App. 
2010). "This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized 
 
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training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'"  State v. Hawkins, 137 
S.W.3d 549, 558-59 (Mo. App. 2004) (United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 
(2002)).  Whether the facts as found by the circuit court amount to reasonable suspicion 
is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  State v. Goff, 129 S.W.3d 857, 862 
(Mo. banc 2004). 
Officer Reynolds articulated a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot when she performed the Terry Stop and Frisk of Norfolk.  Officer Reynolds 
testified that Mr. Norfolk made eye contact with her when she drove by him in a marked 
police car while she was routinely patrolling an area where there had been several recent 
armed robberies.  Officer Reynolds then saw Mr. Norfolk make a furtive movement that 
her experience and training reasonably caused her to believe was the illegal concealment 
of a weapon.  Based on the totality of these circumstances, reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the circuit court’s ruling, this Court determines there was sufficient evidence 
to support the finding of the circuit court.   
Conclusion 
Therefore, Norfolk's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the evidence 
seized was properly admitted, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, 
and the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge, Stith and  
Price, JJ., and Beetem, Sp.J., concur. Draper, J., 
not participating.