Title: Ex parte Rick Allen Belisle. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO Death THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Rick Allen Belisle v. Penalty State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061071
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 2008

REL: 10/3/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
____________________
1061071
____________________
Ex parte Rick Allen Belisle
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Rick Allen Belisle
v.
State of Alabama)
(Marshall Circuit Court, CC-99-200075;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-02-2124)
SEE, Justice.
Rick Allen Belisle was convicted of the capital offenses
of murder committed during the course of a robbery, see § 13A-
1061071
2
5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, and murder committed during the
course of a burglary, see § 13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975,
and was sentenced to death.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed his conviction and sentence. Belisle v. State, [Ms.
CR-02-2124, March 2, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2007).  Belisle subsequently petitioned this Court for the
writ of certiorari, and we granted certiorari review to
address whether the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
conflicts with Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),
Ex parte Johnson, 507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986), and Cochran v.
Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. 2006).  We also granted the writ
to address whether Alabama's method of execution is cruel and
unusual.  After reviewing the record and the briefs of both
parties, we determine that the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals does not conflict with prior caselaw, and we
conclude that Alabama's lethal-injection protocols do not
violate 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States
Constitution.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 19, 1999, Joyce Moore, a cashier at the T&J Kwik-
Mart convenience store in Boaz, was bludgeoned to death with
1061071
A more complete rendition of the facts relating to the
1
murder are found in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion.
Belisle v. State, ___ So. 2d at ___.
Annette and Belisle were indicted on two counts: murder
2
during the course of a robbery, see § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.
Code 1975, and murder during the course of a burglary, see §
13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975.
3
a six-pound can of peas and with a metal pipe.   State
1
investigators arrested Belisle and Annette Belisle, Belisle's
wife, and charged Annette with capital murder and held Belisle
on outstanding traffic warrants.  Annette and Belisle were
both eventually indicted on two counts of capital murder.   
2
According to Belisle, investigators interrogated Annette
on separate occasions over three days and obtained five
separate inconsistent statements.  Also according to Belisle,
the State negotiated a plea agreement with Annette because
those statements were illegally obtained and thus inadmissible
at her trial.  The State subsequently offered Annette a plea
agreement in which she would serve a 15-year sentence, without
the possibility of parole, in exchange for her testimony at
Belisle's 
capital-murder 
trial. 
 
The 
agreement 
was
memorialized (hereinafter "the proffer") and provides:
"Annette Belisle is expected to cooperate fully
in all continuing facets of the investigation and
prosecution of Rick Belisle for the Capital Murder
1061071
4
of Joyce Moore on or about May 19, 1999 at [the T&J
Kwik-Mart convenience store] in Boaz, Alabama.
[Mrs.] Belisle will be required to testify fully and
truthfully at the trial of Rick Belisle. [Mrs.]
Belisle has given several statements to law
enforcement officials regarding this case. [Mrs.]
Belisle agrees that her final statement given on
June 14, 1999 to Investigator Bill Strickland was
truthful and that the truth is as follows:
"Prior to May 19, 1999 Annette and
Rick Belisle were virtually destitute,
having no money to get their van out of
impound and to finance their planned trip
to Missouri.
"In order to remedy this situation,
Rick 
Belisle 
proposed 
to 
'rob'
(technically, burglarize) the [T&J Kwik-
Mart convenience store] where Annette
Belisle had been previously employed.
"Prior to the murder, Rick Belisle had
indicated 
his 
intentions 
to 
burglarize 
[the
T&J Kwik-Mart convenience store] 
to 
Annette
Belisle.
"Rick 
Belisle 
had 
specifically
communicated 
that 
he 
intended 
to 
burglarize
the store on the evening of May 19, 1999.
"Rick Belisle had either asked for, or
obtained 
from 
Annette 
Belisle, 
the
combination to the store's ([T&J Kwik-Mart
convenience store]) safe and the number to
the store's alarm system.
"Annette Belisle was privy to this
information 
(the 
combination 
to 
the 
store's
safe and the number to the store's alarm
system) by virtue of her former employment
with this entity.
1061071
5
"Annette 
Belisle 
provided 
this
information to Rick Belisle as per his
request by writing it down for him.
"At 
Rick 
Belisle's 
instruction,
Annette Belisle distracted Joyce Moore on
May 19, 1999, while Rick Belisle concealed
himself in the back of the store, in
furtherance 
of 
their 
plan to 
burglarize the
store.
"In accordance with the plan, Annette
Belisle left the store at approximately
10:50 p.m. on May 19, 1999.
"Annette Belisle arrived home by 11:05
p.m.
"Rick 
Belisle 
returned 
to 
the
residence they shared at approximately
12:30 a.m.
"Testify as to Rick's appearance and
the amount of money in his possession upon
his return from the murder. (Approximately
$898.00 and some change.)
"Rick 
Belisle's 
initial 
statement 
upon
arriving home after the murder 'I think I
killed her, Annette.' (in reference to
victim, Joyce Moore, cashier/clerk of the
[T&J Kwik-Mart convenience store])
"Annette 
Belisle 
witnessed 
Rick
Belisle cut up 
coin wrappers 
that contained
change stolen from T & J's and flushed them
down the toilet in their residence.
"Rick Belisle confessed to hitting
Joyce Moore eight times in [the] head with
a can of food and also to repeatedly
1061071
6
beating her about the head with a table leg
or metal pole.
"Rick Belisle described the victim
choking on her own blood as he beat her.
"Rick Belisle admitted to wearing
latex gloves, during the murder, that he
claimed to have obtained from inside the
store to comprise [sic] his fingerprints.
"Annette Belisle counted the proceeds
from the robbery and counted approximately
$898.00 
in 
paper 
currency 
and 
approximately
$70.00 in change and Rick bought concert
tickets with $40.00 in quarters.
"Annette Belisle was asked by Rick
Belisle to see if he had blood in his hair
while he was taking a bath subsequent to
the murder.
"Following the murder -- the couple
fled to Missouri where they stayed with a
friend of Annette Belisle's.
"Annette Belisle agrees to testify
where the proceeds of the robbery were
spent.
"Annette Belisle reaffirms the truth of the
above portions of her earlier statement. Should
Annette Belisle lie, fail to cooperate, or fail to
fullfill fully any of the conditions of her plea
agreement in any way, the agreement will be void, as
will Belisle's guilty plea, and the charge of
capital murder, set forth in the original indictment
against her, will be reinstated and all of her
statements will be used against her in court
(subject to constitutional challenges). It shall be
unacceptable and a violation of the terms of this
agreement for Annette Belisle to 'forget' or 'fail
1061071
7
to recall' testimony previously provided and/or
mentioned specifically herein." 
(Emphasis in original.)  Annette, however, successfully
withdrew this plea, and the State offered her a new plea
agreement, 
which 
provided 
that 
Annette 
would 
receive 
a 
20-year
sentence and that the State would remain silent regarding the
possibility of parole.  
The case against Belisle proceeded.  Before his trial,
Belisle moved the trial court "for an order directing the
State to reveal the identity of all confidential informants,
to reveal any promises or understand[ings] (explicit or
implicit) with any witness or informant, and to reveal whether
any threats or inducements of any nature whatsoever have been
made regarding any witness or informant."  The State, however,
did not provide the defense a copy of the proffer from
Annette's original plea agreement.  It was not until the
eighth day of trial, the third day of the defense's cross-
examination of Annette, that, through Annette's testimony,
Belisle discovered the existence of the proffer.
Belisle immediately moved the trial court to strike
Annette's testimony and for a mistrial based on the fact that
1061071
8
the proffer had not been disclosed.  The trial court denied
both motions, and, in doing so, stated:
"The Court finds, number one, that there was no
prosecutorial misconduct or intent on the part of
the prosecutors to hide [the proffer] from the
defense. Number two, the Court denies the mistrial.
And, number three, the Court finds that this
document, on its face, is beneficial to the
defendant and could be used to [his] benefit in this
trial. So it really wouldn't -- I mean, to order a
mistrial, I don't think -- I don't think you are
prejudiced any by the document being produced at
this -- at this hour."
Although the trial court did not grant Belisle's motions, the
proffer 
was 
admitted 
into 
evidence, 
and 
Belisle 
cross-examined
Annette using the document. 
Belisle also made a pretrial motion in which he asked the
trial court to exclude any mention of alleged prior bad acts,
specifically, any allegations of spousal abuse.  The trial
court decided, and the State agreed, that the State would not
present evidence relating to any prior criminal history or bad
acts, or any instances of spousal abuse, absent notice to and
a decision from the trial court.  However, one of the State's
exhibits included a fingerprint card that bore Belisle's name
and fingerprints.  It stated that the charge for which the
fingerprint card had been issued was "'Harassment (DV)'" and
1061071
9
that the "'date of offense [was] "01-02-99."'" Belisle, ___
So. 2d at ___.  Belisle did not object to the introduction of
the fingerprint card.
Belisle argued at trial that the State could not prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt "because its main witness,
Annette Belisle, was testifying in order to gain her freedom."
Petition at 5.  The defense also cast blame for the murder on
Annette and presented the testimony of three inmates who had
been incarcerated with Annette: Kitty Hyatt, Valerie Wheeler,
and Juanita Pitts.  Kitty Hyatt testified that Annette said
she was present at the murder but that she did not strike the
victim initially.  Valerie Wheeler testified that she
overheard Annette say that Annette had hit the victim with a
can of peas and that the man with her had hit the victim with
an iron bar.  Juanita Pitts testified that Annette said that
she struck the initial blow with a can and then asked Belisle
to help.
The jury convicted Belisle on both counts of capital
murder.  Belisle waived his right to a sentencing hearing
before the jury, and he also waived the presentation of
mitigating evidence.  The trial judge sentenced Belisle to
1061071
10
death.  Belisle appealed his conviction, arguing, among other
things, that he was entitled to a new trial because, he says,
the State withheld the proffer and because, he says, Belisle's
fingerprint card had been introduced into evidence.  The Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Belisle v. State, 
supra.  Belisle 
subsequently 
petitioned this
Court for the writ of certiorari.  We granted certiorari
review to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision conflicts with Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972), Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. 2006), and Ex
parte Johnson, 507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986).  We also granted
the writ to address whether Alabama's method of execution by
lethal injection is cruel and unusual.  
Discussion
A.  Standard of Review
"'"This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo."'" Ex parte Jett, [Ms. 1060281, July 20, 2007]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915
So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890
So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003)).
1061071
11
B.  Does the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflict
with Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)?
Belisle argues that in not disclosing the proffer "the
State did not disclose the most significant piece of
impeachment evidence with respect to its star witness, Annette
Belisle."  Belisle's brief at 6.  Belisle argues that the
State's failure to disclose the proffer is grounds for
reversal; thus, Belisle argues, the Court of Criminal Appeals'
refusal to reverse the conviction conflicts with Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  The State counters that
the proffer was irrelevant because it was associated with a
plea agreement that was rendered void and that Belisle was not
prejudiced by his late discovery of the proffer.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State's
failure to disclose the proffer did not amount of reversible
error, stating:
"Here, the document that was not disclosed to
the defense was based on the first plea agreement
that the State had with Annette, which was rendered
void when she withdrew that plea. Also, both of
Annette's 
plea 
agreements 
were 
based 
on 
her
testifying truthfully at her husband's trial. There
is no indication, as Belisle argues, that the
prosecutor had compiled a transcript for Annette to
follow at trial. Nor is there any indication that
the defense was not given a copy of Annette's
statement 
to 
police. 
Annette 
was 
thoroughly
1061071
12
cross-examined 
about 
her 
plea 
agreement 
and
repeatedly said that the State had told her to
testify truthfully.  Under the facts of this case,
there is no indication that the late disclosure of
the document affected the outcome of the trial."
Belisle, ___ So. 2d ___.  
Belisle argues that this holding of the Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with Giglio v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court of the United States held:
"... Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. [83], at 87
[1963)], held that suppression of material evidence
justifies a new trial 'irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' See American
Bar Association, Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice, 
Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function § 3.11(a).  When the 'reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting
credibility falls within this general rule. Napue[v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)]."
405 U.S. at 153-54.  However, the Supreme Court also noted in
Giglio:
"We do not, however, automatically require a new
trial whenever 'a combing of the prosecutors' files
after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly
useful to the defense but not likely to have changed
the verdict ....' United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d
138, 148 (CA2 1968).  A finding of materiality of
the evidence is required under Brady, supra, at 87.
A new trial is required if 'the false testimony
could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected
the judgment of the jury ....' Napue, supra, at
271."
1061071
In Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, the United States Supreme Court
3
held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."
See also Ex parte Brown, 548 So. 2d 993, 994 (Ala. 1989)
4
("This Court has held in Ex parte Kennedy, 472 So. 2d 1106
(Ala. 1985), cert. den., Kennedy v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 975, 106
S.Ct. 340, 88 L.Ed.2d 325 (1985), that a defendant must
demonstrate, first, that the State suppressed the evidence,
and, second, that the evidence suppressed was favorable to the
defendant or exculpatory, and, finally, that the evidence was
material.").
13
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154.  "Impeachment evidence, however, as
well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule."
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
Thus, under Giglio, the progeny of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963),  reversal is required when the State (1)
3
suppresses (2) evidence favorable to a defendant and (3) that
evidence is material.   Therefore, in order to determine
4
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with
Giglio, we address each element.
1.  Was the evidence suppressed?
Belisle argues that regardless of the status of the plea
agreement, the proffer was impeachment material to which the
defense was entitled.  The State argues that it was not
1061071
It appears that the State believed that the proffer had
5
in fact been turned over to the defense.  ("[District
attorney:] When I received this file, I saw this proffer, saw
the case number.  I think, on record, I'll say as we were
walking out, I thought it was made part of the court file.  It
was executed.  So if it was not provided -- I admit I have not
provided it.  It was a complete oversight.  I assumed that
[the defense] had it.").
14
required 
to 
disclose 
the 
proffer 
because Annette had withdrawn
from the plea agreement for which the proffer was created.  We
agree that the proffer was discoverable evidence that was
suppressed.
First, one of the State's attorneys stated at trial that
he did not "dispute that [the proffer] should have been turned
over to the defense.  Absolutely."   Second, the State signed
5
the proffer on April 29, 2002, at which time the trial court
had already entered an order entitling Belisle to discover
"[a]ll records, notes, memoranda, and documents in the
possession of the state relating to the grant of immunity,
promises, consideration, threats or any other inducements to
any individual to obtain information or testimony about this
crime by the State and any of its law enforcement or other
1061071
The trial court entered its discovery order on October
6
26, 2001.
Section II, paragraph 3, of the trial court's discovery
7
order states "[p]ursuant to Rule 16.3 of the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure, each request is continuing in nature and
additional responsive information should be revealed as soon
as it occurs."
Rule 16.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides:
8
"If prior to or during trial a party discovers
additional evidence or decides to use additional
evidence, which evidence has been subject to
discovery under this rule, that party shall promptly
notify the court and the opposing party of the
existence of the additional evidence."
15
agencies."   Under both the terms of the order  and Rule 16.3,
6
7
Ala. R. Crim. P.,  the State had a continuing duty to disclose
8
the requested discovery as it became available.  Therefore,
the State's argument that it was not required to disclose the
proffer because the plea agreement it accompanied was later
rendered void is incorrect.  At the time the plea agreement
was made and the proffer was signed, the State was obligated
to disclose the proffer because it "relat[ed] to the ...
promises, consideration, [and] threats ... to any individual
to obtain information or testimony."  Therefore, we conclude
that the proffer was subject to the discovery order and was
suppressed.  
1061071
16
2.  Is the suppressed evidence favorable to Belisle?
Belisle contends that the proffer is "a 'script' on which
the 
State's 
key 
witness 
relied 
at 
trial 
[that] 
is
unambiguously favorable to the defense."  Petition at 9.  The
State argues however, that the proffer was irrelevant and not
favorable to the defense because "the evidence contained in a
null and void proffer -- detailing an agreement that was no
longer in existence" -- was not relevant to Annette's
credibility and, thus, not favorable to the defense.  
"[I]mpeachment 
evidence 
is 
favorable 
evidence."
Jefferson v. State, 645 So. 2d 313, 316 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994).  See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
("Impeachment evidence ..., as well as exculpatory evidence,
falls within the Brady rule.").  "We have further held that
exculpatory evidence, regardless of its trustworthiness or
admissibility, should be disclosed ...."  Ex parte Brown, 548
So. 2d 993, 994 (Ala. 1989).  The proffer begins by stating
that "the truth is as follows," and then outlines expected
testimony, 
emphasizes 
specific 
passages, 
threatens 
to
reinstate capital 
charges 
if 
Annette does not cooperate 
fully,
and lastly notes that "[i]t shall be unacceptable and a
1061071
17
violation of the terms of this agreement for Annette Belisle
to 'forget' or 'fail to recall' testimony previously provided
and/or mentioned specifically herein."  Even if the original
plea agreement and accompanying proffer were no longer in
effect, the proffer certainly casts doubt on Annette's
testimony and the State's handling of the case.  Therefore,
regardless of its admissibility, the proffer is impeachment
material favorable to Belisle.
3.  Is the suppressed evidence material?
"Last, but perhaps most importantly, we must determine
whether the evidence was 'material.'" Jefferson, 645 So. 2d at
316.   Belisle argues that "impeaching Annette Belisle ...
was critical to the defense."  Belisle's brief at 9.  The
State argues that even if the proffer should have been
disclosed, the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct that
"'[u]nder the facts of this case, there is no indication that
the late disclosure of the documents affected the outcome of
the trial.'"  State's brief at 19-20 (quoting Belisle, ___ So.
2d at ___).
"The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
1061071
See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13
9
(1976) ("It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence
creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has been committed.  This means that the
omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire
record.  If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether
or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial.  On the other hand, if the
verdict is already of questionable validity, additional
evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt." (footnote omitted)).
18
different.  A 'reasonable probability' is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.   The same rule applies
9
when the State discloses Brady material in an untimely manner.
See Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 979 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)
("Tardy disclosure of Brady material is generally not
reversible error unless the defendant can show that he was
denied a fair trial." (citing United States v. Gordon, 844
F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1988); United State v. Shelton, 588 F.2d
1242 (9th Cir. 1978); Ex parte Raines, 429 So. 2d 1111 (Ala.
1982); and McClain v. State, 473 So. 2d 612 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985)). 
First, the issue of materiality distinguishes Belisle's
case from Giglio. In this case, the proffer was discovered and
used by the Belisle during trial, and it contained no
1061071
19
undisclosed promises or threats.  In Giglio, however, "defense
counsel discovered new evidence [during the pendency of the
defendant's appeal] indicating that the Government had failed
to disclose an alleged promise made to its key witness
[Taliento] that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for
the Government." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150-51.  Furthermore, the
facts of Giglio also indicate that Taliento testified at trial
that he had received no promises for his testimony, and that
"[i]n summation, the Government attorney stated, '(Taliento)
received no promises that he would not be indicted.'" Giglio,
405 U.S. at 152.  Because the facts of Giglio are
distinguishable from those in this case, the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision in this case does not conflict with Giglio.
Even if the facts of Giglio were not distinguishable,
however, Belisle still has failed to demonstrate that had the
proffer been disclosed sooner, the outcome of his trial would
have been different.  The gravamen of Belisle's arguments is
that the proffer "destroys [Annette's] credibility ... and
casts suspicion on the State's investigation and handling of
the case," Belisle's brief at 11, and that the State's failure
1061071
See also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 n.20 ("It has been
10
argued that the standard should focus on the impact of the
undisclosed 
evidence 
on 
the defendant's ability 
to 
prepare for
trial, rather than the materiality of the evidence to the
issue of guilt or innocence.  Such a standard would be
unacceptable for determining the materiality of what has been
generally recognized as 'Brady material' for two reasons.
First, 
that 
standard 
would 
necessarily 
encompass 
incriminating
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of
the prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in
planning the defense.  Second, such an approach would
primarily involve an analysis of the adequacy of the notice
given to the defendant by the State, and it has always been
the Court's view that the notice component of due process
refers to the charge rather than the evidentiary support for
the charge.").
20
to disclose the proffer "prevented [Belisle] from formulating
a key part of his defense."  Belisle's brief at 12.
Belisle's second argument has been previously addressed
by this Court.
"Appellant's argument that the information would
have enabled more effective preparation for trial
was rejected in United States v. Agurs, supra, 427
U.S. [97,] at 112 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. at 2401 n. 20
[(1976)], on the grounds that an argument could
always be made that knowledge of the prosecutor's
case, both incriminating and exculpatory, would help
defense counsel in preparation of the case for the
defense. Therefore, the proper focus is upon the
materiality 
in 
the 
nondisclosure 
or 
delayed
disclosure of exculpatory information in determining
the denial vel non of defendant's rights of due
process and fair trial ...."
Ex parte Raines, 429 So. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ala. 1982).   Thus,
10
Belisle is not entitled to a new trial simply because having
1061071
21
the proffer would have enabled him to more effectively prepare
for trial.
Belisle also argues that the proffer was material because
"Belisle's theory of defense was that the State did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the crime because
its main witness, Annette Belisle, was lying to gain her
freedom. 
 
Impeaching 
Annette 
Belisle 
therefore 
was 
critical 
to
the defense of this case."  Belisle's brief at 9.  He also
argues that the "revelation of this agreement committing her
to a specific version of facts would have undermined the
State's attempt to shore up Annette's credibility and would
have 'put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine the confidence in the verdict.'" Belisle's brief at
19 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  We
disagree.
Belisle did not initially have access to the proffer;
thus, he could not at that time attack Annette's alleged
"scripted" testimony.  The record, however, indicates that
Belisle had many other components of that proffer by which he
could similarly impeach Annette: Belisle was aware of and
cross-examined Annette on the fact that she was testifying as
part of a plea agreement with the State; he was aware of the
1061071
Belisle also argues:
11
"The lower court found that the fact that this
evidence [the proffer] came out before the close of
trial, allowing defense counsel an opportunity to
cross-examine Annette about it, rendered this error
harmless.  This is wrong for several reasons."
Petition at 13. In support of this argument Belisle cites Ex
parte Williams, 642 So. 2d 391, 393 (Ala. 1993), Ex parte
Grandberry, 640 So. 2d 919 (Ala. 1993), Ex parte Brown, 548
So. 2d 993 (Ala. 1989), and  Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78
(Ala. Crim. App. 1985).  However, as explained above, our
conclusion that the tardy disclosure of the proffer is not
reversible error is not premised solely on the fact that the
proffer was eventually disclosed to Belisle and that Belisle
was able to cross-examine Annette using the proffer.  Instead,
as noted above, Belisle had many other components of that
proffer by which he could similarly impeach Annette, in
addition to getting the opportunity to cross-examine Annette
on the proffer and to admit the proffer into evidence.
22
original 
plea agreement 
with 
which 
the proffer 
was associated;
and he used Annette's various previous statements given to
State detectives to impeach her.  Additionally, once the
defense was made aware of the proffer, it was admitted into
evidence, and defense counsel had the opportunity to
thoroughly cross-examine Annette regarding it.   
11
Moreover, the defense also presented other impeachment
testimony from three inmates who had been incarcerated with
Annette: Kitty Hyatt, Valerie Wheeler, and Juanita Pitts.
Kitty Hyatt testified that Annette said she was present at the
1061071
23
murder but that she had not struck the initial blow.  Valerie
Wheeler testified that she overheard Annette say that Annette
had hit the victim with a can of peas and that the man with
her had hit the victim with an iron bar.  Juanita Pitts
testified that Annette said that she struck the initial blow
with a can and then asked Belisle to help.  Thus, although
Belisle did not originally have the proffer in his possession,
Belisle was certainly able to establish that Annette had
incentive to lie (and had lied to investigators), to
demonstrate that Annette was not a credible witness, and, once
the proffer was disclosed, to cast suspicion on the State's
investigation and handling of the case.
Although the proffer both was suppressed and was
favorable to Belisle, so as to meet those two elements, we
cannot conclude that it was material.  Therefore, the decision
of the Court of Criminal Appeals does not conflict with Giglio
and Belisle is not entitled to a reversal.
C. Does the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflict
with Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. 2006), and Ex
parte Johnson, 777 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986)?
Before trial, Belisle moved the trial court to exclude
any mention of alleged prior bad acts, specifically, any
1061071
24
allegations of spousal abuse.  The trial court decided, and
the State agreed, that the State would not present evidence
relating to any prior criminal history or bad acts or any
instances of spousal abuse, absent notice to and a decision
from the trial court.  However, one of the State's exhibits
included a fingerprint card that bore Belisle's name and
fingerprints and that stated that the charge for which he was
being fingerprinted was "'Harassment (DV)'" and that the
"'date of offense [was] "01-02-99."'" Belisle, ___ So. 2d at
___.  Belisle did not object to the admission of the exhibit;
thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the admission of
the fingerprint card for plain error.  That court held that
"[b]ased on the unique facts presented in this case, we cannot
say that the admittance of Belisle's fingerprint card was
plain error."  Belisle, ___ So. 2d at ___.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals noted that "[t]here is no indication that the
jury was made aware of the contents of the fingerprint card,"
Belisle, ___ So. 2d at ___, because the card was 1 of 115
exhibits and no reference was made to the card when it was
admitted into evidence.  
Belisle argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
conclusion conflicts with Ex parte Johnson, 507 So. 2d 1351
1061071
25
(Ala. 1986), in which this Court held that it was plain error
to admit into evidence a fingerprint card containing a list of
dates and prior arrests that had no relevance to the charged
offense except to show the bad character of the accused.
Belisle also argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
conclusion that "[t]here is no indication that the jury was
made aware of the contents of the fingerprint card," Belisle,
___ So. 2d at ___, conflicts with Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d
1169, 1176 (Ala. 2006), which states that an appellate court
"presume[s] that the jury follows the trial court's
instructions unless there is evidence to the contrary."
1.  Cochran v. Ward
First, it does not appear that the decision of the Court
of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Cochran.  Although the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Belisle concluded that "[t]here
is no indication that the jury was made aware of the contents
of the fingerprint card," ___ So. 2d at ___, it does not
appear that the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
jury did not examine or consider the fingerprint card.
Instead, it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals was
merely distinguishing this case from Ex parte Johnson and
Brown v. State, 369 So. 2d 881 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), in
1061071
26
which police officers testified regarding fingerprint cards
being admitted into evidence and, thus, focused the jury's
attention on those fingerprint cards.  See Belisle, ___ So. 2d
___ ("'The circumstances of this case are clearly not as
compelling as those of Johnson and Brown.'" (quoting  Thomas
v. State, 824 So. 2d 1, 18 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999))); Ex parte
Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 1354 ("On direct examination, Officer
Brand was asked whether the name of the person whose print was
taken was on both sides of the [fingerprint] card and whether
the person was asked to sign the card."); and Brown, 369 So.
2d at  883 ("Officer McDonald stated that the appellant had
been admitted to jail and fingerprinted 'about a year or two
ago' ....").  Therefore, it does not appear that the decision
of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Cochran, and
Belisle is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction or
sentence on this issue.
2.  Ex parte Johnson
Belisle argues that the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with Ex parte Johnson, 507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala.
1986).  
"This Court has held that the exclusionary rule prevents
the State from using evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts
1061071
27
to prove the defendant's bad character and, thereby, protects
the defendant's right to a fair trial."  Ex parte Drinkard,
777 So. 2d 295, 302 (Ala. 2000).  Thus, under Alabama law, the
admission 
of 
the 
fingerprint 
card, 
which 
contained 
information
about a prior arrest, was error.  However, because Belisle did
not object to the admission of the card, the error will
constitute reversible error only if "'such error has or
probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the
[defendant].'" Ex parte Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 1356.
Before trial, Belisle moved the trial court to exclude
any mention of alleged prior bad acts, specifically, any
allegations of spousal abuse.  The trial court decided, and
the State agreed, that the State would not present evidence
relating to any prior criminal history or bad acts or any
instances of spousal abuse, absent notice to and a decision
from the trial court.  However, State's exhibit 82 included
"several ... documents –- a time card, a two-page letter to
the 
Alabama 
Public 
Safety 
Department, 
a
fingerprint-examination request form, and a copy of a
fingerprint card for Annette, and a copy of a fingerprint card
that bears the name 'Rick Allen Belisle.'"  Belisle, ___ So.
2d at ___.  The exhibit was admitted with some testimony
1061071
It appears that the following colloquy is the only
12
mention of the admitted fingerprint card during trial:
"Q.[Prosecution]: I'm going to show you what has
been marked as State's Exhibit 82. What's in State's
Exhibit 82?
"A. [Detective Turner]: The time card of Joyce Moore
at [the T&J Kwik-Mart convenience store], some
fingerprint cards, and a letter from DFS, Department
of Forensic Science.
"Q. So they tried to match fingerprints to that time
card, didn't they?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And they didn't find any fingerprints belonging
to Rick Belisle, did they?
"A. No, sir."
28
regarding its contents,  without objection from Belisle, and,
12
apparently, without specific approval from the trial court.
Belisle, ___ So. 2d at ___. Because there was no objection to
the admission of this exhibit, we are limited to reviewing
this issue for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
The front of Belisle's fingerprint card includes the date
the fingerprints were taken, Belisle's fingerprints, his
signature, 
his 
vital 
statistics, 
and 
other 
personal
information.  It also contains the "Signature of Official
Taking Fingerprints," a box titled "CHARGE" in which
1061071
29
"Harassment (DV)" is written, a box titled "DATE ARRESTED OR
RECEIVED" in which "01-02-99" is written, and a box titled
"YOUR NO. OCA" in which 0199003 is written.  It also contains
boxes titled "FINAL DISPOSITION," "ALIASES," "FBI NO.," and
"SID NO.," but these were left blank.  The reverse of the
fingerprint card included Belisle's address, as well as "01-
02-99" written in a box entitled "DATE OF OFFENSE."
The Court of Criminal Appeals, addressing the admission
of the fingerprint card under the plain-error standard of
review, concluded:
"Based on the unique facts presented in this case,
we cannot say that the admittance of Belisle's
fingerprint card was plain error.  Even if the
jurors examined the exhibit, '[i]t is inconceivable
that a jury could have been influenced, under the
circumstances here, to convict [the appellant] of
crimes of the magnitude charged here because of an
oblique reference to a prior criminal record." 
Belisle, ___ So. 2d at ___.  Belisle argues that this holding
by the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Ex parte
Johnson.
In Ex parte Johnson this Court addressed whether the
admission of Johnson's fingerprint card was plain error and
required a reversal of Johnson's conviction. 507 So. 2d at
1352.  In that case, the front of Johnson's fingerprint card
1061071
30
contained Johnson's name, an alias, "a series of police
numbers and an FBI number, the fingerprints themselves, and
the signature of the taker of the impressions and the date of
the card."  507 So. 2d at 1352.  The reverse of the
fingerprint card included Johnson's signature, the offense
charged at the time the fingerprints were taken, and a list of
dates of arrest, which
"show[ed] an arrest for burglary in 1977 followed by
a release, an arrest for burglary and grand larceny
in 1977 followed by a release, an arrest in 1978 for
grand larceny from a person followed by a release,
and the present charge of murder in 1978 followed by
a delivery to the sheriff's office.  The card also
show[ed] the original arrest in 1973 for robbery
followed by a delivery to the sheriff's office."
507 So. 2d at 1352-53.  
At trial, the State admitted Johnson's fingerprint card
into evidence without objection, and a police officer
testified regarding the exhibit.  See Ex parte Johnson, 507
So. 2d at 1354.  It appears that the front of Johnson's
fingerprint card was admitted into evidence, but it is unclear
whether the reverse of the fingerprint card was admitted as
well.  507 So. 2d at 1354 ("'It is not clear whether a
photocopy of only the front of [State's exhibit] 'EE' was
received into evidence or whether a copy of both front and
1061071
31
back were received into 
evidence.'" 
(quoting 
Johnson v. State,
507 So. 2d 1337, 1342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985))).
Johnson was subsequently convicted of capital murder and
was sentenced to death.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed Johnson's conviction and sentence. Johnson v. State,
507 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).  The Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that Johnson had waived his right to appeal
the admission of the fingerprint card because he was aware of
the contents of the card but did not object when it was
admitted into evidence.  The Court of Criminal Appeals also
concluded that "this is a case where evidence of guilt is so
overwhelming that evidence of previous arrests was not
significant, and its admission was harmless error in light of
the strong evidence identifying Johnson as the perpetrator."
Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 1344.
This Court granted certiorari review in Johnson.  We
first noted that
"[i]t is apparent that the Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that a substantial right of the
defendant had not been, or probably had not been,
adversely affected by the admission of state's
exhibit 'EE.' As we read the opinion, this
conclusion is based upon its determination that
evidence 
of 
the 
defendant's 
guilt 
was 
'so
overwhelming that evidence of previous arrests was
not significant, and its admission was harmless
1061071
32
error in light of the strong evidence identifying
[the defendant] as the perpetrator.'  However, the
proper inquiry here is not whether evidence of the
defendant's guilt is overwhelming but, instead,
whether a substantial right of the defendant has or
probably has been adversely affected."
507 So. 2d at 1356.  We then concluded:
"In the present case, the copy showing the front
of exhibit 'EE' contained information which clearly
revealed the defendant's past contacts with law
enforcement agencies.  From this the jury could have
readily inferred, at a minimum, that he had been
arrested in the past.  In our view, such an
inference would have had an almost irreversible
impact upon the minds of the jurors."
507 So. 2d at 1357.
Belisle contends that Ex parte Johnson is controlling,
and he argues that the fingerprint card "leaves no room for
question that [Belisle] had recently been charged with [an]
offense.  The reference to this prior charge was more than
likely to have [a] tremendous impact on the jury."  Belisle's
brief at 25.  The State counters, arguing that "a reversal is
not required in this case because the admission of [the]
fingerprint card in this case is distinguishable from the
admission of the prejudice[cial] information [found on the
fingerprint card] in Ex parte Johnson."  State's brief at 35.
The State, like the Court of Criminal Appeals below,
argues that this case is distinguishable from Ex parte
1061071
The State also cites Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1, 61-
13
62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).  However, Maples is clearly
distinguishable from this case because, in Maples, "[t]he
redacted copy of the fingerprint card did not contain any
reference to the appellant's prior arrest record.  The
offenses involved and the headings 'Date Arrested' and 'Date
of Offense' were deleted from the copy of the fingerprint
card."  758 So. 2d at 62.
33
Johnson, and analogous to Thomas v. State, 824 So. 2d 1
(1999), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Carter, 889 So. 2d
528 (Ala. 2004).   In Thomas, the defendant's fingerprint card
13
was admitted without objection and contained,
"[i]n 
addition 
to 
Thomas's 
fingerprints, 
... 
his
name and signature, an alias ('Tank'), his date and
place of birth, his physical description, and his
Social Security number.  Below the signature blank
appeared 
the 
sentence: 
'THIS 
DATA 
MAY 
BE
COMPUTERIZED IN LOCAL, STATE AND NATIONAL FILES.'
The card also contained the name of the 'OFFICIAL'
who took the fingerprints and the following
information blocks with the information supplied as
indicated: 
'DATE 
ARRESTED 
OR 
RECEIVED 
DOA'-
'09-17-92'; 
'YOUR 
NO. 
OCA'-'COO62417'; 
'FBI
NO.'-[blank]; 'SID NO.'-[blank]; 'CAUTION'-[blank];
'STATE USAGE'-[blank]; 'NCIC CLASS-FPC'-[blank];
'CONTRIBUTOR'-'AL0020000 SO MOBILE, AL.'; 'CLASS.'-
[blank]; 'REF.'-[blank]; and 'FBI'-[blank]. (R.
531.)  There was no reference to the charge of any
offense."
824 So. 2d at 15-16 (capitalization in original).  The Court
of Criminal Appeals in Thomas concluded that there was no
plain error, stating that "we believe the possibility of
prejudice that resulted from the admission of the fingerprint
1061071
34
card was remote." 824 So. 2d at 20.  In so concluding, the
Thomas court noted that the only reference to contact with law
enforcement was a date in the box entitled "DATE ARRESTED OR
RECEIVED" and thus determined that "the nature of Thomas's
presumed contact with law enforcement authorities was
'oblique.'" Thomas, 824 So. 2d at 19.  Additionally, the Court
of Criminal Appeals in Thomas noted that its conclusion that
the admission of the fingerprint card was not plain error "is
buttressed by the fact that defense counsel apparently did not
notice any allegedly potentially prejudicial information on
the card when he viewed it, as disclosed by the record" and
the fact that "testimony at trial contained references,
properly admitted into evidence, to Thomas's illegal drug
activity." Id. 
We find Thomas distinguishable from this case.  The
fingerprint card in Thomas contained "no reference to the
charge of any offense" and merely showed a date in the "DATE
ARRESTED OR RECEIVED." 824 So. 2d at 19.  In this case,
however, a charge is listed on the fingerprint card, and, in
addition to the date entered in the box entitled "DATE
ARRESTED OR RECEIVED," the box entitled "DATE OF OFFENSE" is
completed.  Further, there is no argument by the State that,
1061071
35
in this case, there was testimony regarding any previous
illegal activities in which Belisle may have been involved.
We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Thomas
and Maples v State, 758 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (see
note 13), we also conclude that it is distinguishable from Ex
parte Johnson.  As the State notes, the fingerprint card in
this case was admitted as an exhibit along with "several other
documents –- a time card, a two-page letter to the Alabama
Public Safety Department, a fingerprint-examination request
form, and a copy of a fingerprint card for Annette ....," with
little testimony regarding the exhibit and apparently no
specific mention of Belisle's fingerprint card.  Belisle, ___
So. 2d at ___.  The fingerprint card in Ex parte Johnson was
admitted as a separate exhibit and was accompanied by
extensive testimony. 507 So. 2d at 1341, rev'd, Ex parte
Johnson, supra (discussing the testimony of at least two
witnesses 
who 
testified 
regarding 
the 
defendant's 
fingerprints
and the fingerprint card).
The information found on Belisle's fingerprint card
further distinguishes this case from Ex parte Johnson.  Unlike
Johnson's fingerprint card, Belisle's fingerprint card does
not contain an alias.  Even though it is unclear whether the
1061071
Belisle has not argued, and we do not address, whether
14
Alabama's form of execution constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under Alabama's Constitution.  See Art. I, § 15
("That excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishment inflicted.").
36
reverse of Johnson's fingerprint card (which contained the
list of prior arrests) was admitted at his trial, the front of
the card contained "a series of police numbers and an FBI
number" that "clearly revealed the defendant's past contacts
with law enforcement agencies." 507 So. 2d at 1357.  Here,
Belisle's fingerprint card contains only one charge, and a
date of offense that coincides with the "DATE ARRESTED OR
RECEIVED."  
Ex 
parte 
Johnson is therefore 
distinguishable from
this case.  Moreover, the other caselaw cited by Belisle does
not support a reversal of his conviction and sentence.  Thus,
the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err by determining that
the admission of the fingerprint card was harmless error.   
D.  Does Alabama's method of execution constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?
Belisle argues that "Alabama's method of execution
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eight Amendment."   Petition at 158; Belisle's brief at 29.
14
1061071
See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (M.D.
15
Tenn. 2007) ("It is undisputed that, without proper
37
In Alabama, lethal injection is the method of execution
of a death sentence unless the inmate chooses electrocution.
See § 15-18-82(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("Where the sentence of
death is pronounced against a convict, the sentence shall be
executed ... as the court may adjudge, by lethal injection
unless the convict elects execution by electrocution as
provided by law.").
Belisle notes that "Alabama's lethal injection execution
procedure, which is similar to the procedure typically used by
lethal 
injection 
states, 
proscribes 
the 
sequential
administration 
of 
sodium 
thiopental 
for 
anaesthesia,
pancuronium bromide or Pavulon to induce paralysis, and
potassium chloride."  Belisle's brief at 30.  He contends,
however, 
that 
evidence 
indicates 
that 
"the 
three-drug 
protocol
creates an unnecessary risk of agonizing pain."  Id.  The risk
of unnecessary pain and suffering arises, says Belisle, "if
the sedative effect of the sodium thiopental is ineffective
and the inmate has retained or regained conscious[ness]" when
the State administers the final two drugs to induce paralysis
and death.  Belisle's brief at 31.  Belisle argues that "the
15
1061071
anaesthesia, the administration of pancuronium bromide and
potassium 
chloride, 
either 
separately 
or 
in 
combination, 
would
result in a terrifying, excruciating death. The basic
mechanics are that the inmate would first be paralyzed and
suffocated (because the paralysis would make him unable to
draw breath), then feel a burning pain throughout his body,
and then suffer a heart attack while remaining unable to
breathe.").
38
State of Alabama has taken none of the steps necessary to
safeguard against unnecessary pain and suffering."  Belisle's
brief at 30.  Specifically, Belisle contends that the method
employed 
by 
Alabama 
to 
check 
an 
inmate's 
level 
of
consciousness after the administration of the first drug --
sodium thiopental -- is insufficient. Belisle's brief at 37-
38. 
The State argues that "Alabama's execution protocol is
designed to minimize pain and is not inherently cruel and
unusual."  State's brief at 47.  It notes that "Alabama
eliminates the risk of unnecessary pain by using 2.5 grams of
sodium thiopental –- itself a lethal dose -– to sufficiently
anesthetize the inmate."  State's brief at 52-53.  The State
notes that "[a]s an additional safeguard to ensure that the
inmate 
is 
properly 
anesthetized, 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections
recently 
modified 
the 
execution 
protocol 
to 
add 
a
1061071
39
consciousness assessment."  These additional safeguards
include
"(1) examination of the prisoner by an execution
team member, following administration of the sodium
[thiopental] but before administration of the
pancuronium bromide, to assess his consciousness (by
calling his name, gently stroking his eyelashes, and
pinching his arm); and (2) administration of a
second dosage of sodium [thiopental] if the
preceding examination reveals consciousness."
Arthur v. Allen (Civil Action 07-0722-WS-M, Nov. 15, 2007)
(S.D. Ala. 2007) (not published in F. Supp. 2d).  Thus, the
State contends that Alabama's lethal-injection procedures do
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: 
"Excessive 
bail 
shall 
not 
be 
required, 
nor 
excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.
It 
implies 
there 
something inhuman 
and barbarous, 
-- 
something
more than the mere extinguishment of life." In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436, 447 (1890).  However, as the Supreme Court of the
United States recently stated in Baze v. Rees, ___ U.S. ___,
128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008):
1061071
40
"Our cases recognize that subjecting individuals to
a risk of future harm -- not simply actually
inflicting pain -- can qualify as cruel and unusual
punishment.  To establish that such exposure
violates 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment, 
however, 
the
conditions presenting the risk must be 'sure or very
likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering,' and give rise to 'sufficiently imminent
dangers.' Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33,
34-35 (1993) (emphasis added).  We have explained
that to prevail on such a claim there must be a
'substantial risk of serious harm,' an 'objectively
intolerable risk of harm' that prevents prison
officials from pleading that they were 'subjectively
blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.'
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, and n. 9
(1994)."
___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1530-31.  
In Baze, two death-row inmates challenged Kentucky's use
of the three-drug protocol, arguing "that there is a
significant risk that the procedures will not be properly
followed -- in particular, that the sodium thiopental will not
be properly administered to achieve its intended effect --
resulting in severe pain when the other chemicals are
administered." ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1530.  Belisle's
claim, like the claims made by the inmates in Baze, "hinges on
the improper administration of the first drug, sodium
thiopental."  Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1533.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Kentucky's method of execution, Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128
1061071
41
S.Ct. at 1538, and noted that "[a] State with a lethal
injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we
uphold today would not create a risk that meets this
standard." Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1537.  Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Souter dissented from the main opinion,
arguing that "Kentucky's protocol lacks basic safeguards used
by other States to confirm that an inmate is unconscious
before injection of the second and third drugs."  Baze, ___
U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The
dissenting Justices recognized, however, that Alabama's
procedures, 
along 
with 
procedures 
used 
in 
Missouri,
California, and Indiana "provide a degree of assurance --
missing from Kentucky's protocol -- that the first drug had
been properly administered." Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct.
at 1571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
The State argues, and we agree, that Belisle, like the
inmates in Baze, cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that
Alabama's lethal-injection protocol poses a substantial risk
of harm by asserting the mere possibility that something may
go wrong.  "Simply because an execution method may result in
pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of
death, does 
not establish the 
sort 
of 
'objectively intolerable
1061071
42
risk of harm' that qualifies as cruel and unusual."  Baze, ___
U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1531.  Thus, we conclude that
Alabama's use of lethal injection as a method of execution
does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeals does not conflict Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), Cochran v. Ward, 935 So.
2d 1169 (Ala. 2006), or Ex parte Johnson, 507 So. 2d 1351
(Ala. 1986), and that Alabama's use of lethal injection as a
method of execution does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
AFFIRMED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.