Title: Severance v. Armstrong
Citation: 620 P.2d 369
Docket Number: 12328
State: Nevada
Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1980

620 P.2d 369 (1980) Daniel S. SEVERANCE, Appellant, v. Bryn ARMSTRONG, and The Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners, Respondents. No. 12328. Supreme Court of Nevada. December 3, 1980. Powell &amp; Ray, Ltd., and Michael K. Powell, Carson City, for appellant. Richard H. Bryan, Atty. Gen., and Ernest E. Adler, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, for respondents. PER CURIAM: Appellant was convicted of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of 14 (NRS 201.230) and was sentenced to serve two concurrent ten-year terms in prison. He subsequently applied to the state board of parole commissioners for parole release. The board denied appellant's application. Thereafter, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court contending the board had unlawfully denied his application. The district court denied the petition and this appeal followed. The specific contentions raised in this appeal are that Nevada's statutes governing parole release are unconstitutionally vague and vest too much discretion with the board of parole commissioners, and that appellant was denied due process of law when the board, which allegedly acted arbitrarily and capriciously, denied him a parole release from prison. The statute which appellant is challenging, NRS 213.1099, provides: "Want of structured and mandated parole eligibility standards does not per se constitute denial of due process." Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okl. 1980). A state may be specific or general in defining the conditions for release and the factors that should be considered by the parole authority. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979). Concerning Nebraska's parole statute, the Court in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13, 99 S. Ct. at 2107, said: Thus, in view of the foregoing authority, we must reject appellant's contention that NRS 213.1099 is unconstitutionally vague and vests too much discretion in the board of parole commissioners. See Murphy v. Indiana Parole Bd., 397 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1979). Appellant's contention that the board denied him due process of law by arbitrarily and capriciously denying his parole application is also without merit. As the court said in Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479, 480-481 (7th Cir.1980): NRS 213.1099 does not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore does not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra. Affirmed.