Title: Hughes et al. v. Division of Family Services
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 29, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SUSAN HUGHES and WALTER H. 
VERNON,1 
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 95, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court BelowFamily Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  File No. 01-02-01TPR 
§  Petition No. 01-04759 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 8, 2003 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 29, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc). 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Margaret R. Cooper, Esquire, Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Fisher, 
Georgetown, Delaware, attorney for appellants. 
 
 
James S. Reichert, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the appellants pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 7(d). 
 
2
 
The respondents-appellants, Susan Hughes (the “Mother”) and Walter 
H. Vernon (the “Father”, or collectively, “the parents”), filed a timely notice 
of appeal with this Court from a final judgment of the Family Court.  
Pursuant to that judgment, the Family Court granted the petition of the 
Division of Family Services (“DFS”), petitioner-appellee, to terminate the 
Mother’s and the Father’s parental rights.   
 
The Mother and the Father have raised three issues on appeal.  First, 
they argue that the decision of the Family Court to terminate their parental 
rights, based on the couple’s failure to plan, was not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence and was not the result of a logical deductive reasoning 
process.  Second, they argue that the Family Court erred in finding that DFS 
had exerted all reasonable efforts to reunify the child with her natural 
parents.  Third, the Mother and the Father submit that their due process 
rights under both the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
Constitution were violated by the failure of the Family Court to appoint an 
attorney to represent the Mother and the Father at the outset of the 
dependency and neglect proceedings.   
The Father died during the pendency of this appeal and his estate does 
not contest the termination of the Father’s parental rights.  We conclude that 
the Family Court’s decision to terminate the Mother’s parental rights based 
 
3
upon their failure to plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence and 
was the product of a logical deductive process.  We further conclude that the 
Family Court properly determined that the failure to appoint counsel to 
represent the Mother during the dependency and neglect proceedings 
constituted harmless error under the circumstances of this case.  The issue of 
reunification is also without merit and is addressed within our analysis of the 
Mother’s other two contentions in this appeal.  Accordingly, the judgments 
of the Family Court must be affirmed. 
Facts2 
 
 
On November 24, 1999, DFS received a report that the Mother had 
given birth to Debbie Hughes (the “Minor Child”).  Before the time that the 
Mother entered the emergency room in labor, she had not received any 
prenatal care.3  Both the Mother and the newborn child tested positive for 
cocaine.  Because of the condition of the newborn child, DFS was contacted 
by hospital personnel.  A DFS treatment worker met with the Mother at the 
hospital.  Initially, the Mother denied cocaine use, but then acknowledged 
that she had put cocaine on her gums.   
                                                 
2 There is no substantial dispute between the parties about the material facts.  The 
recitation in this opinion relies extensively upon the brief filed on behalf of DFS and the 
Family Court’s opinion following remand. 
3 At trial, it was learned that the Mother had not received prenatal care for any of her 
other three children.   
 
4
 
Because of concerns about the Mother’s ability to care for the Minor 
Child, DFS contacted the Mother’s sister (the “Maternal Aunt”) and inquired 
whether she would be in a position to take the newborn child home with her.  
The Maternal Aunt, already having placement of three of the Mother’s 
children, expressed concern for having to care for a fourth child.  
Nevertheless, she agreed to take the Minor Child, rather than having the 
child placed into foster care.  Several days after delivery, the newborn child 
was released into the custody of the Maternal Aunt, and was subsequently 
transferred to the care of the Maternal Grandmother at the request of the 
Maternal Aunt.  The Maternal Grandmother had also been approved by DFS 
for temporary placement of the Minor Child.     
 
On December 2, 1999, the Mother, the Maternal Grandmother and 
another family member came to DFS’s center and requested formula for the 
Minor Child.  During the visit, the DFS caseworker became concerned when 
she discovered that the formula the family was feeding the Minor Child was 
sour, that the family had no other formula for the infant, and that neither the 
Mother, the Maternal Grandmother or the other family member could 
remember the Minor Child’s name.  The caseworker also attempted to 
discuss substance abuse treatment with the Mother, but the Mother would 
not discuss that subject, and again denied using cocaine.  Based on these 
 
5
observations and discussions, DFS applied for and received emergency 
custody of the Minor Child that same day. 
 
A probable cause hearing was scheduled for December 9, 1999.  
Neither the Mother nor the Father was served, however, because the 
Mother’s whereabouts had become unknown.  Additionally, DFS had been 
unable to make contact with the Father, who had only recently been 
identified as a possible parent.  As a result, neither parent appeared at the 
hearing.  The Family Court continued custody of the Minor Child with DFS, 
on the basis of its finding that both the Mother and the Minor Child had 
tested positive for cocaine at the time of the child’s birth.  The Family Court 
further ordered that service of process be accomplished with respect to both 
parents. 
 
On February 8, 2002, the Mother and the Father, accompanied by the 
Maternal Grandmother, visited DFS’ office.  This was the Father’s first 
contact with any DFS worker.  By this time, the Minor Child was two and 
one-half months old, and had been in foster care for two months.  The Father 
stated that he was unable to care for the Minor Child and could not provide 
names of any family relatives who could provide a home for his daughter.  
Additionally, the DFS caseworker determined that the Mother had consumed 
alcoholic beverages before coming to the DFS meeting.  Therefore, the 
 
6
meeting was rescheduled, and the caseworker advised the Mother that she 
would need to be sober the next time they conferred. 
 
The Mother and the Father next met with DFS on February 16, 2000.  
They were transported to the DFS office by the Maternal Grandmother.  The 
Mother stated that she would soon be incarcerated for six to twelve months 
and was unwilling to discuss any plans for the Minor Child.  The Father 
reiterated that he was unable to care for the Minor Child.  The Maternal 
Grandmother, for the first time, stated that she would be interested in having 
the Minor Child placed with her and that she would be filing a petition for 
guardianship.  Neither the Mother nor the Father asked the DFS worker to 
schedule a visit for them with the Minor Child at this time. 
 
An adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for March 16, 2000.  By that 
time, the Mother was incarcerated.  Because the Mother was not transported 
to the Family Court from the Women’s Correctional Institute for that March 
hearing, however, the Family Court scheduled a new hearing. 
 
On May 26, 2000, an adjudicatory hearing was held in the Family 
Court.  This time, both the Mother and the Father were present.  The Mother 
remained incarcerated and was unable to provide the Family Court with a 
date for her release.  The Father stated that he was unwilling to care for the 
Minor Child.   
 
7
The Family Court considered a guardianship petition filed by the 
Maternal Grandmother.  That petition was denied.  A second maternal aunt 
also filed a guardianship petition, but that petition was dismissed after she 
failed to appear in the Family Court.   
 
A dispositional hearing was held on July 13, 2000.  DFS advised the 
Family Court it was willing to consider the possibility of placement with the 
Maternal Grandmother.  The Family Court considered a case plan presented 
by DFS outlining steps to be taken by the Maternal Grandmother before 
DFS would place the Minor Child in her care.  The Maternal Grandmother 
declined to sign the case plan at the July hearing and instead asked to take it 
home to read. 
 
A review hearing was held on October 19, 2000.  The Mother and the 
Father were present at the hearing, but the Maternal Grandmother did not 
attend.  The Mother was still incarcerated and participating in a drug 
rehabilitation program.  The Father continued to assert that he was unable to 
care for his daughter.  DFS reported that the Maternal Grandmother had 
refused to sign the case plan proposed by DFS at the July hearing, and had 
not visited with the Minor Child.  The Family Court asked the Mother and 
the Father to provide DFS with the names of any relatives who could care 
 
8
for the Minor Child.  The Mother suggested that one of her sisters might be 
willing to provide care. 
 
On December 15, 2000, a permanency hearing was held.  At that time, 
the Mother was still in jail and not expected to be released until February 21, 
2002, and the Father remained unwilling to provide care for his daughter.  
Only one of Mother’s sisters had contacted DFS as a possible placement for 
the Minor Child.   
After being advised that she would have to file a petition for 
guardianship to be considered for placement, that sister failed to do so.  
Thus, that sister’s home was never considered for placement by DFS.  Based 
on the Mother and the Father’s inability to care for the Minor Child, and 
because of the lack of any suitable relatives coming forward to offer their 
home for placement, the Family Court approved the DFS request to change 
the goal for the Minor Child from reunification to a termination of parental 
rights. 
 
The termination hearing took place over two days, on October 25, 
2001 and January 24, 2002.  The Mother and the Father were represented by 
counsel.  This was the first time that either the Mother or the Father were 
represented by counsel at a hearing in matters involving the Minor Child.   
 
9
At that time, the Mother was still incarcerated.  The Family Court 
heard testimony from two individuals who were involved with the Mother’s 
substance abuse treatment while she was incarcerated.  It was noted that the 
earliest that the Mother would complete her treatment was August 21, 2002, 
six months after her original expected release date and approximately eight 
months from the last day of the termination hearing.   
The Mother testified about her substance abuse problem.  She 
supported the petition for guardianship of the Minor Child that had been 
filed by her sister, the Minor Child’s maternal aunt, after the commencement 
of the termination proceedings.  The Mother stated, however, that placement 
with the Maternal Aunt was not her permanent plan for the Minor Child.  
Rather, the Mother’s plan was for the Minor Child to remain with the 
Maternal Aunt long enough for the Mother to “get back on her feet,” when 
she would take back custody from the Maternal Aunt.  The Mother also 
testified that although she was not in favor of the Maternal Aunt having 
permanent custody of the Minor Child, she would consider it if there was no 
other alternative.  
Family Court Termination Decision 
 
The Family Court issued its opinion on February 4, 2002.  After 
finding a failure to plan by both the Mother and the Father, and after finding 
 
10
that it was in the best interests of the Minor Child, the Family Court granted 
DFS’ petition for termination of the Mother’s and the Father’s parental 
rights.  At the same time, the Family Court denied the Maternal Aunt’s 
petition for guardianship, concluding that it was in the Minor Child’s “best 
interests that she continue to reside in the home of her foster family, so that a 
permanency goal of adoption by the foster family can be achieved.” 
Family Court Decision on Remand 
Both the Mother and the Father appealed the Family Court’s 
termination judgments.  While those appeals were pending, this Court was 
notified that the Father had died.  During the pendency of this appeal, we 
also decided Watson v. Division of Family Services,4 in which we held that 
pursuant to the United States and Delaware Constitutions, a trial judge must 
decide whether counsel for indigent parents in a dependency and neglect 
proceeding should be appointed on a case-by-case basis.   
We remanded this matter to the Family Court to consider the 
implications of the Father’s death on these proceedings and to ascertain 
whether the Father’s personal representative intended to appear and assert an 
interest in this matter on behalf of the father’s estate.  The remand order also 
directed the Family Court to determine, in accordance with Watson, whether 
                                                 
4 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101 (Del. 2002). 
 
11
the parents had been denied their due process rights based on the failure to 
appoint counsel for them at the outset of the dependency and neglect 
proceedings. 
At the remand hearing, the Family Court heard limited testimony and 
argument from counsel in accordance with this Court’s remand order.  On 
April 25, 2003, the Family Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  The Family Court held that, because the Mother was incarcerated 
from the time of her initial court appearance through the conclusion of the 
termination proceedings—a period of almost two years—appointment of 
counsel for the Mother at the dependency proceeding would not have 
affected the outcome of the termination proceeding.  Accordingly, the 
Family Court determined that the failure to appoint counsel for the Mother at 
the dependency and neglect proceedings constituted harmless error. 
With respect to the Father, the Family Court concluded that because 
he was never interested in reunification with his child, the appointment of an 
attorney would not have resulted in a different outcome for him either.    The 
Family Court also found that the Father’s death terminated his interest in the 
matter.  The personal representative of the Father’s estate had expressed no 
desire to appear and assert an interest in the Family Court proceeding.   
 
12
The Father’s estate does not contest the Family Court’s findings of 
fact and holdings of law.  The Mother does not contest the Family Court’s 
holding that the Father’s rights are no longer at issue.  The Mother does 
contest, however, the Family Court determination that the failure to 
appointment of counsel at the dependency and neglect proceedings did not 
violate her due process rights.  Additionally, the Mother continues to appeal 
the termination of her parental rights on the merits. 
Failure to Plan Established 
 
 
 
The Mother’s first contention on appeal is that the decision of the 
Family Court to terminate her parental rights, based on her failure to plan, 
was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not the result 
of a logical deductive reasoning process.  In support of that contention, the 
Mother argues that her plan was participation in a drug treatment program 
while incarcerated and for the Minor Child to live with a relative.  The 
Mother submits that this was an adequate permanent plan for the Minor 
Child.  The record supports the determination by the Family Court to the 
contrary, as a matter of both fact and law.   
 
The Family Court has authority to grant a DFS petition for the 
termination of parental rights, if DFS proves by clear and convincing 
evidence:  first, that facts justifying termination under Delaware law exist, 
 
13
and second, that such a determination is in the best interest of the child.5  In 
addition, the Family Court must be satisfied that DFS has made all 
reasonable efforts to preserve the family unit.6  Moreover, when the 
termination of parental rights is based primarily on the ground of failure to 
plan, “‘the [Family Court] is required to make appropriate findings of fact 
and conclusions of as to the State’s bona fide efforts to meet its own 
obligations.’”7  
In this case, the Family Court granted termination of the Mother’s 
parental rights based on a failure to plan, pursuant to Title 13, Section 
1103(a)(5), which authorizes such termination where: 
(5) The parent or parents of the child, or any person or persons 
holding parental rights over the child, are not able, or have failed to 
plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or mental and emotional 
health and development, and 1 or more of the following conditions are 
met ….8 
                                                 
5 See Div. of Family Servs. v. Hutton, 765 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Del. 2001); Shepherd v. 
Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000) (en banc). 
6 See In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989). 
7 Id. (quoting In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 649 (Del. 1986). 
8 Those conditions are listed as follows: 
a. In the case of a child in the care of the Department or a licensed agency: 
 
1. The child has been in the care of the Department or licensed 
agency for a period of 1 year, or for a period of 6 months in the case of a 
child who comes into care as an infant, or there is a history of previous 
placement or placements of this child; or 
 
2. There is a history of neglect, abuse or lack of care of the child or 
other children by the respondent; or 
 
 
14
                                                                                                                                                 
3. The respondent is incapable of discharging parental 
responsibilities due to extended or repeated incarceration, except that the 
Court may consider post-conviction conduct of the respondent; or 
 
4. The respondent is not able or willing to assume promptly legal 
and physical custody of the child, and to pay for the child's support, in 
accordance with the respondent's financial means; or 
 
5. Failure to terminate the relationship of parent and child will 
result in continued emotional instability or physical risk to the child. In 
making a determination under this paragraph, the Court shall consider all 
relevant factors, including: 
 
A. Whether the conditions that led to the child's placement, or 
similar conditions of a harmful nature, continue to exist and there appears 
to be little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early 
date which would enable the respondent to discharge parental 
responsibilities so that the child can be returned to the respondent in the 
near future; 
 
B. The respondent's efforts to assert parental rights of the child, 
and the role of other persons in thwarting the respondent's efforts to assert 
such rights; 
 
C. The respondent's ability to care for the child, the age of the 
child, the quality of any previous relationship between the respondent and 
the child or any other children; 
 
D. The effect of a change of physical custody on the child; and 
 
E. The effect of a delay in termination on the chances for a child to 
be placed for adoption. 
 
b. In the case of a child in the home of a stepparent or blood relative: 
 
1. The child has resided in the home of the stepparent or blood 
relative for a period of at least 1 year, or for a period of 6 months in the 
case of an infant; and 
 
2. The Court finds the respondent is incapable of discharging 
parental responsibilities, and there appears to be little likelihood that the 
respondent will be able to discharge such parental responsibilities in the 
near future. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 11303(a)(5)(a)-(b) (1999). 
 
15
 
The Mother challenges only the Family Court’s finding of failure to plan.  
She does not challenge the Family Court’s conclusion that at least one of the 
conditions listed under Section 1103(a)(5)(a)—namely, that the Minor Child 
had been in the care of DFS for a period in excess of six months—had been 
met.  Accordingly, as to the Mother’s first contention on appeal, the question 
for this Court to decide is whether DFS met its burden of proof on the issue 
of failure to plan. 
 
The record reflects clear and convincing evidence of the Mother’s 
failure to plan for the care of her Minor Child.  Neither the Mother nor the 
Father were capable of caring for their Minor Child from the period 
beginning with the dependency and neglect hearings, and continuing through 
the termination of their parental rights.  The Father stated under oath on 
several occasions that he was unable to care for the Minor Child.  His only 
plan for his Minor Child was that she be placed with another relative.  No 
suitable relative could be located, however, and the Father offered no other 
plan for his child, even though the Minor Child had been in foster care for 
over two years.  
 Throughout most of the proceedings, the Mother was incarcerated.  
Before being incarcerated, she admitted to using and selling cocaine.  She 
also acknowledged that she was unable to care for her Minor Child.  The 
 
16
earliest that the Mother was originally expected to be released was February 
21, 2002.  Even if the Mother had been released on that date, she would have 
needed to establish a minimum of six months of sobriety and outpatient 
treatment before she could complete the drug and alcohol treatment program 
ordered as part of her criminal sentence.  The termination hearings were held 
on October 25, 2001 and January 24, 2002.   
Nevertheless, the Mother argues that she did plan for the care of her 
Minor Child in that she was participating in a drug treatment program while 
incarcerated and had completed a parenting class.   As the Family Court 
noted, at the time of the permanency hearing, the Mother “admit[ted] that 
she [would] not be in a position to care for [the Minor Child] for several 
months, or longer.”  This time frame was not compatible with the statutory 
mandate of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”).9   
Under AFSA, each state must formulate a system for conducting a 
permanency hearing for each child, once the child has been in state foster 
care for twelve months.10  The purpose of the permanency hearing is to 
approve a “permanency plan for the child that includes whether, and if 
applicable when, the child will be returned to the parent, placed for adoption 
                                                 
9 42 U.S.C.  §§ 620-279 (1998). 
10 See id. § 675(5)(C); Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 953 (Del. 2002). 
 
17
and the State will file a petition for termination of parental rights, … or 
placed in another planned permanent living arrangement ….”11  Thus, the 
statutory frameworks enacted by both the General Assembly and Congress 
do not afford parents an unlimited period of time to address and resolve the 
issues that caused their children to be found dependent or neglected.  This 
Court has also acknowledged the right of children to have timely 
permanency decisions made on their behalf and to be heard in proceedings 
where their vital interests are at stake.12   
In this case, the Mother and the Father had several opportunities to 
develop a suitable plan for their daughter’s care within a time frame of 
approximately two years.  They never did.  Because neither parent was able 
to care for their daughter, each believed the Minor Child would be placed 
with a relative.  The relatives suggested for placement of the Minor Child, 
however, were either found not suitable, failed to petition the Family Court, 
or failed to appear on the day scheduled for their hearings.   
The Mother and the Father did not develop any alternative plan.  
Because neither the Mother nor the Father offered the Family Court a timely 
plan for the permanent placement of their Minor Child, the Family Court 
                                                 
11 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). 
12 See Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d at 953-54; Shepard v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 
at 538-39; In re Frazer, 721 A.2d 920, 923 (Del. 1998). 
 
18
found that DFS had presented clear and convincing evidence of a failure to 
plan by both parents. 
The Mother contends, nevertheless, that the Family Court should have 
considered and granted the petition for guardianship of the Maternal Aunt as 
an appropriate plan for the Minor Child.  This argument fails for two 
reasons.  First, the record shows that the Family Court considered and 
rejected the Maternal Aunt’s guardianship petition.  Trial on the Maternal 
Aunt’s guardianship petition was held on the same days as the trial on the 
termination petition.  After hearing the evidence, the Family Court 
determined that it would be contrary to the Minor Child’s best interest to be 
placed into the home of the Maternal Aunt.  Consequently, the Mother’s 
claim that DFS and the Family Court failed to properly consider the merits 
of the guardianship petition of the Maternal Aunt is not supported by the 
record. 
Second, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the Mother’s 
challenge to the Family Court’s decision that denied the guardianship 
petition of the Maternal Aunt.  Because the Maternal Aunt is not a party to 
this present appeal, and because she did not file an appeal in her own right, 
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider that claim.  The 
Mother may not now expand the issues on appeal in this termination 
 
19
proceeding to include the guardianship petition of the Maternal Aunt.13  The 
Family Court held that placing the minor child in a guardianship with the 
Maternal Aunt would not be in the Minor Child’s best interest.  In the 
absence of a timely appeal by the Maternal Aunt, the Family Court’s 
judgment on that issue is considered final.14   
The record also reflects that the Family Court carefully considered the 
circumstances of both the Mother and the Father.  The Father never 
expressed any serious desire to care for the Minor Child.  The Mother was 
incarcerated and was unable to care for the Minor Child herself.  Her plan 
consisted of participation in, and anticipated completion of, a drug treatment 
program while incarcerated.  The Mother still would not have been in a 
position to care for her daughter immediately upon release and, in fact, many 
months following the Mother’s release would have passed before she could 
even be considered as placement for her child.  Additionally, relatives that 
the Mother believed could be placements for the Minor Child either had 
their guardianship petitions considered and denied by the Family Court as 
not in the child’s best interests, or did not appear for their scheduled 
hearings, or did not actually file a petition.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
                                                 
13 See Trowell v. Diamond Supply Co., 91 A.2d 797, 801 (1952). 
14 See Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778 (Del.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 829 (1989). 
 
20
Family Court’s termination of the Mother’s parental rights based upon a 
failure to plan for her Minor Child is supported in the record by clear 
convincing evidence and is the product of a logical deductive reasoning 
process. 
Dependency Due Process Claim 
 
The Mother next contends that her due process rights under both the 
United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution were violated by 
the failure of the Family Court to appoint an attorney to represent her at the 
outset of the dependency and neglect proceedings.  Although both parents 
were indigent, neither the Mother nor the Father was represented by counsel 
throughout the course of the dependency and neglect proceedings.  Not until 
the conclusion of the dependency and neglect proceedings did the Family 
Court appoint counsel to represent the indigent parents in the termination of 
parental rights proceedings.   
During the pendency of this appeal, we decided Watson v. Division of 
Family Services.15  In Watson, this Court held that both the United States 
and Delaware Constitutions require a trial judge to determine whether to 
appoint counsel at State expense for indigent parents in a dependency and 
neglect petition on a case-by-case basis.  We recognized in Watson that the 
                                                 
15 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 1101 (Del. 2002). 
 
21
proper application of that holding would routinely require the appointment 
of counsel at State expense for indigent parents in virtually every 
dependency and neglect proceeding.16 
We remanded this matter to the Family Court to determine whether, 
“in accordance with our decision in Watson, … the failure to appoint counsel 
at the outset of the dependency and neglect proceeding violated the parents’ 
rights to due process in this case.”  On remand, the Family Court recognized 
that, under our holding in Watson, those indigent parents would have been 
entitled to representation by appointed counsel at State expense.  
Nevertheless, the Family Court concluded that, by the failure to appoint 
counsel for the Mother, any violation of the Mother’s due process rights 
during the dependency and neglect proceedings was harmless error because 
the outcome of the termination proceedings would have been the same. 
Dependency and Termination Continuum 
In several prior opinions, this Court has discussed the continuum that 
begins with a dependency and neglect hearing and frequently evolves into 
and ends with a termination proceeding.17  We have acknowledged that the 
factual basis for terminating parental rights is often the conduct that occurs 
                                                 
16 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d at 1109. 
17 See Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 951 (Del. 2002); Watson v. Div. of 
Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101, 1106 (Del. 2002). 
 
22
during the time frame between the commencement of a dependency and 
neglect proceeding and a judicial determination that a termination 
proceeding is in the child’s best interest.18  Accordingly, in Watson, we 
recognized that “[i]f an attorney is only appointed to represent an indigent 
parent after the petition to terminate has been filed then the outcome is 
almost inevitable, assuming the factual allegations in the petition to 
terminate can be established with credible evidence.”19  Because of this 
“almost inevitable” outcome, we held in Watson that both the United States 
Constitution and the Delaware Constitution required the issue of whether to 
appoint counsel at State expense must be decided by the trial judge on a 
case-by-case basis20 in all dependency and neglect proceedings commenced 
against an indigent parent.21   
Dependency Representation Analysis 
 
 
Trial judges have been making similar case-by-case determinations in 
termination proceedings since the Lassiter decision by the United States 
Supreme Court22 and this Court’s analysis of Lassiter in In re Carolyn S.S.23 
                                                 
18 See Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d at 1106. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1103. 
21 Id. at 1109. 
22 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
23 In re Carolyn S.S., 498 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1984). 
 
23
In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court held there is a “presumption 
that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he 
looses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”24    In termination 
proceedings, the Lassiter presumption against a right to appointed counsel, 
except where a litigant’s physical liberty is at stake, must be balanced 
against the sum total of three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due 
process requires.25  The three factors identified by the United States Supreme 
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge are:  first, the private interests at stake; 
second, the government’s interests; and third, the risk that procedures used 
will lead to an erroneous result.26   
In Watson, we recognized that the private interests at stake in 
dependency and neglect proceedings are compelling, because “the parent 
faces the loss of temporary custody of her child that may eventually lead to 
permanent termination.”27  Because of that compelling interest, we 
concluded that the parents’ right to “companionship, care, custody and 
management” of their children, enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Lassiter, not only requires deference, but also warrants protection. 
                                                 
24 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. at 26-27. 
25 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
26 Id. at 335.  These factors are now commonly referred to as the Eldridge factors.   
27 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101, 1110 (Del. 2002). 
 
24
The compelling interest of the parent must always be balanced against 
the interest of the government, which we described in Watson as the welfare 
of children and in fostering an accurate decision.28  Additionally, we noted 
that ASFA requires a permanency decision to be rendered as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.29  But, following the United States Supreme Court’s 
similar analysis in Lassiter, we concluded that the government’s interest, 
although significant, “is not enough to override the great compelling 
interests of the parents that are at stake.”30 
Most importantly, however, the interests of the parents and the interest 
of government must both be balanced against the risk that the procedures 
used will lead to an erroneous result.  Dependency and neglect proceedings 
will often be complex, and may involve weighing many factors and several 
court hearings.  In such matters—indeed, in any litigation—the absence of 
counsel increases the potential of an erroneous result.  In Watson, we held 
that this third factor will routinely require the appointment of counsel at 
State expense for indigent parents in every dependency and neglect 
proceeding to ensure that an erroneous result does not occur.31   
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(A), 675(5)(E) (1998). 
30 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d at 1110. 
31 Id. at 1109. 
 
25
In this case, in the absence of representation by appointed counsel, the 
primary safeguard for the Mother’s due process rights was periodic judicial 
review, which occurred in the form of multiple Family Court hearings,32 and 
took place before a Family Court judge.  That same judge conducted the 
remand hearing and was in the best position to determine whether the 
appointment of counsel at any stage in the dependency proceedings would 
have increased the risk of an erroneous result.33  That judge concluded, in 
this case, that the failure to appoint counsel was a harmless error because, 
even with the effective assistance of counsel, the result would have been the 
same, i.e., the Mother’s parental rights would have been terminated. 
The General Assembly has appropriated funds to contract with 
attorneys to provide legal representation in accordance with the State and 
Federal Constitutional mandates upon which this Court based its holding in 
Watson.34  In 2002, the Family Court Civil Procedure Rules were amended 
to provide for mandatory appointment of an attorney in the case of an 
indigent party if so requested by that party.35  Consequently, it should be 
                                                 
32 Today, the practice of periodic judicial review is set forth explicitly in Family Court 
Rules 212-17. 
33 Cf. Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 487 (Del. 2003) (noting that trial judge is in best 
position to weigh prejudicial effects of evidence). 
34 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d at 1109. 
35 See Fam. Ct. R. 206, 207. 
 
26
unnecessary to conduct a harmless error analysis in future cases because the 
Family Court will routinely be appointing counsel to represent an indigent 
parent in a dependency and neglect proceeding. 
Harmless Error Analysis 
On remand, the Family Court conducted its harmless error review by 
applying the three-part due process analysis prescribed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Lassiter36 that formed the basis for this Court’s holding in 
Watson.37  The Mother does not challenge the Family Court’s findings with 
respect to the first two parts of the three-part analysis.  The Mother 
challenges only the Family Court’s evaluation of whether the procedures 
used led to an erroneous result in the absence of her representation by an 
attorney.   
The Minor Child went into foster care on December 9, 1999.  
Accordingly, ASFA required that a permanency plan for the Minor Child be 
developed by December of 2000.  It is undisputed that the Mother was 
unable to provide a home for her Minor Child because of her incarceration.  
Federal requirements of permanency under ASFA dictated that the Minor 
Child’s placement be resolved long before the Mother was scheduled to be 
                                                 
36 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
37 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101 (Del. 2002). 
 
27
released from jail and, thereafter, finished with her drug rehabilitation 
program.38  The record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that 
appointed counsel would not have been able to remove the impediment 
caused by the Mother’s incarceration. 
The Mother contends that, had counsel been appointed, the attorney 
could have sought relatives for placement that would have eliminated the 
need to terminate the Mother’s parental rights.  The Mother proposed 
numerous relatives as possible placements.  But, as previously discussed, all 
of those relatives’ petitions were either rejected on the merits or dismissed 
for failure to appear, and some of the other relatives identified by the Mother 
failed to file a petition at all. 
One relative placement specifically identified in the Mother’s brief is 
the Maternal Aunt.  The Maternal Aunt was considered by the Family Court 
for placement and was rejected.  On the same days as the termination 
hearing, the Family Court held a hearing on the Maternal Aunt’s petition for 
guardianship and denied that petition on the merits as not being in the best 
interests of the Minor Child.   
                                                 
38 The Mother was sentenced on April 14, 2000 to five years at Level V.  Upon 
successful completion of a Level V drug treatment program, her sentence was to be 
suspended for placement at a Level IV drug treatment program for fifteen months, to be 
followed by two and one-half years of probation.  Mother was actually released from 
Level IV on March 5, 2002.  ASFA requires state courts to determine a permanency plan 
for a child within twelve months following the child’s entrance into foster care.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).   
 
28
Moreover and significantly, DFS did place the Minor Child with the 
Maternal Aunt before it took custody, but she declined to keep the child in 
the home.  Indeed, the Maternal Aunt initially expressed reluctance to take 
the Minor Child, because she was already providing care for the Mother’s 
other three children.  Nevertheless, the Minor Child was briefly placed with 
the Maternal Aunt, but was soon removed by DFS at the request of the 
Maternal Aunt and placed with the Maternal Grandmother.  The Maternal 
Aunt never contacted DFS concerning placement of the Minor Child again 
until after the termination petition had been filed.   
Although both DFS and the Family Court considered the Maternal 
Aunt for possible placement of the Minor Child, the record supports the 
Family Court’s determination that it was in the Minor Child’s best interests 
to remain in foster care.  The Family Court properly concluded that 
appointment of counsel for the Mother would not have changed the outcome 
of the Maternal Aunt’s guardianship petition. 
The Family Court also considered several other relatives suggested by 
the Mother for possible placement.  Two of those relative’s guardianship 
petitions were denied, one relative failed to appear in the Family Court for a 
scheduled hearing, and two other relatives failed to file petitions at all after 
being contacted by DFS.  The Family Court concluded that “no credible 
 
29
evidence has been presented … to indicate that other placement relatives 
exist.”  Therefore, the record supports the Family Court’s determination on 
remand that appointed counsel would not have been able to assist the Mother 
in attempting to locate other relatives for placement of the Minor Child.   
The Mother raises several other contentions to support her argument 
that the Family Court erred in concluding that no due process violation had 
resulted from the failure to appoint counsel to represent her in the 
dependency proceedings.  First, the Mother submits that, because she had a 
substance abuse problem at the time the Minor Child was born, counsel 
should have been appointed to represent her.  To be sure, in Watson, this 
Court found that an unincarcerated mother’s untreated substance abuse and 
mental health problems made it impossible for her to complete a case plan 
without the assistance of appointed counsel.39  But Watson is distinguishable 
from the present matter.  In Watson, this Court was concerned that, due to 
her untreated substance abuse and mental health problems, the 
unincarcerated mother lacked the ability to understand and complete her 
case plan.   
None of those concerns is present here.  In this case, appointed 
counsel would have played no role in helping the Mother to obtain 
                                                 
39 See Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d at 1111. 
 
30
treatment, because such treatment was actually made available to the Mother 
while she was incarcerated.  Accordingly, there is no factual support for the 
assertion that the absence of appointed counsel led to an erroneous result. 
Second, at the remand hearing, the Mother testified for the first time 
that she is illiterate.  Her illiteracy, she claimed, interfered with her 
understanding of the proceedings.  The Family Court noted that “Mother’s 
illiteracy and unfamiliarity with [the] Court’s proceedings placed her in a 
difficult position.  It is likely that she was unable to read the pleadings filed 
by DFS ….  It is just as likely that she could not read the several Court 
orders that were issued.”  The Family Court further noted that the 
appointment of counsel would have assisted the Mother to understand the 
various legal documents, by explaining the procedures of the Family Court, 
and by participating in court hearings.   
The Family Court concluded, nevertheless, that “despite Mother’s 
participation in the dependency/neglect proceedings, there was never a 
likelihood that [the Minor Child] would be returning home with her.”   The 
Mother’s incarceration and the lack of any suitable relative for placement of 
the Minor Child made that impossible.  Accordingly, the record supports the 
Family Court’s finding that appointment of counsel would not have changed 
the outcome, despite the Mother’s illiteracy. 
 
31
Nor do the facts of this case implicate our observation in Watson that 
due process tips the balance in favor of appointing counsel during the 
dependency and neglect stage of the proceedings when counsel can 
“advocate [a parent’s] need for the reunification resources that are available 
through the DFS.”40  Here, the Mother’s incarceration relieved DFS of any 
obligation to provide reunification services to her as a matter of law.41    
Because of the Mother’s incarceration, no case plans for reunification were 
provided to the Mother during the dependency and neglect proceedings.  
Thus, appointed counsel would have played no role in assisting the Mother 
to complete a case plan involving reunification.   
The Family Court concluded that, because of the Mother’s 
incarceration throughout the dependency and neglect proceedings, and 
because of the absence of a suitable placement for the Minor Child other 
than foster care, no due process violations occurred by reason of the 
Mother’s lack of appointed legal representation.  We agree.  In evaluating 
the due process claims of the Mother upon remand, the Family Court 
properly applied this Court’s decision in Watson and the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter.  We hold that to the extent that the 
                                                 
40 Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d at 1111. 
41 See In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 30  (Del. 1995) (holding reunification services with an 
incarcerated parent are not required, if such serves are not feasible). 
 
32
Mother’s right to due process was violated by the absence of appointed 
counsel for the Mother during the dependency and neglect proceedings, the 
error was harmless.42  The Family Court properly concluded that, even with 
the assistance of counsel during the dependency and neglect proceedings, the 
continuum that ended with the termination of her parental rights would have 
yielded the same result.    
Conclusion 
The judgments of the Family Court are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1967) and Van Arsdall v. State, 524 
A.2d 3, 11 (Del. 1987).  See also In the Matter of C.V., 579 N.W.2d 17 (S.D. 1998); In 
the Interest of L.L., C.L., K.L. and L.L., 715 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1986) and Jeffrey O. 
Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness; Method and Madness in the Supreme Court’s 
Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 309 (2002).