Title: State v. Ebert
Citation: 110 Ariz. 408, 519 P.2d 1149
Docket Number: 2739
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 1974

110 Ariz. 408 (1974) 519 P.2d 1149 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Richard Allen EBERT, Appellant. No. 2739. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. March 14, 1974. *409 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Howard L. Fell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, and Charles L. Weninger, Third Year Law Student, University of Arizonia, Tucson, for appellee. O'Dowd, Fahringer &amp; Diamos by Clay G. Diamos, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to the crime of unlawful sale of narcotics, § 36-1002.02 A.R.S., and a sentence thereon of not less than six years nor more than ten years in the Arizona State Prison. We are asked to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On or about 12 July 1972, an undercover narcotics agent of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad of Tucson, Arizona, went to a residence on South 4th Avenue in Tucson and, after being admitted, purchased from the defendant two papers of heroin. The defendant, along with his wife, was indicted on the 27th day of July 1972 for unlawful sale of narcotics. After some preliminary matters, at which time the trial of the defendant Ebert and his wife was severed, the defendant went to trial on 16 January 1973. Three witnesses were called by the State. The first, Officer Neil Edwin Teitjen, an undercover agent for the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad of Tucson, testified that after being admitted to the premises of the defendant he told defendant he needed some heroin for himself and his wife. The defendant then obtained a bag of folded yellow and white papers from his wife and went behind a partition in the back of the room where the agent was given two papers in return for a $20 *410 bill. The agent then left and hitchhiked to 4th Avenue where he met two other agents. The second witness, Fred C. Ball, a special agent with the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad, testified that he and another officer let Officer Teitjen off near defendant's house and picked him up after the purchase. Joan Arlene Davis, a criminalist, testified that the substance was heroin in usable amounts. The defendant did not testify and presented no other witnesses. During the trial the defendant moved for a continuance in order to obtain witnesses who would show entrapment. The motion was denied. He also moved for a mistrial based upon misconduct by a third party which allegedly prejudiced one of the jurors against the defendant. This motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant moved for a new trial based upon the same prejudice. This was denied, and from the verdict, judgment, sentence, and denial of the motion for new trial defendant appeals. DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE After the close of the State's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, based on entrapment as a matter of law, which was properly denied. State v. McKinney, 108 Ariz. 436, 501 P.2d 378 (1972). Defendant then moved for a continuance in order to subpoena witnesses to show that there was entrapment. The defendant, although represented by counsel, argued: The granting of a continuance is generally within the trial court's discretion and the party desiring such continuance must show good cause to the trial court. Rule 241, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; State v. Guthrie, 108 Ariz. 280, 496 P.2d 580 (1972); United States v. Mirenda, 443 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.1971), cert. den., 404 U.S. 966, 92 S. Ct. 343, 30 L. Ed. 2d 286. In the instant case, there was a failure to show that the defendant did not have ample opportunity to obtain his witnesses, and there was no showing of surprise. The case was a simple one in which an undercover agent testified without contradiction that he purchased two papers of heroin from the defendant which heroin was identified by the criminalist of the City-County Crime Laboratory. There was no substantial or reasonable evidence of entrapment and no indication to the court that the witnesses the defendant was asking to subpoena at that late date would influence the outcome of the trial or would be otherwise helpful to the defendant. Nor do we find that the failure of defendant's attorney to subpoena the witnesses requested by the defendant at the time the motion was made, denied the defendant the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz. 417, 499 P.2d 712 (1972); State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966); State v. Cuzick, 5 Ariz. App. 498, 428 P.2d 443 (1967). We find no error. PREJUDICE OF THE JUROR Prior to the commencement of the trial, three prospective jurors were excused because they had sat on another trial in which the defendant had been charged with another offense. During the trial, one of the jurors selected was seated outside in the hall when two of the excused jurors allegedly discussed the prior trial. This was brought to the attention of the court; the juror was brought into the courtroom; and the following questions were asked: After the jury verdict the defendant moved for a new trial based primarily on the prejudice of the juror. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Mrs. Pablo testified again as follows: We have held that potential prejudice to a juror is not necessarily grounds for a mistrial or a new trial. State v. Rivera, 103 Ariz. 458, 445 P.2d 434 (1968). However, in a recent case concerning jury prejudice, we reversed due to the fact that the jurors had read a newspaper article under the headline "Convicted Killer Faces New Charge": Each case must rest on its peculiar fact situation. The facts in the instant case can be distinguished from Skinner, supra, in that in Skinner there was no doubt that the jurors had been exposed to highly prejudicial information. In the instant case, there is conflict between the testimony of the juror and Joan Farmer as to whether the prejudicial statements were in fact heard by the juror and if so to what extent they were understood by the juror. The trial court evidently gave greater weight to Mrs. Pablo's testimony that she did not have any knowledge of the defendant's previous trial than he did to Joan Farmer's testimony that Mrs. Pablo could not help hearing the conversation. Reading the testimony at the motion for mistrial as well as the motion for new trial, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying both motions. We do not believe that the defendant has shown sufficient facts which would compel this court to declare the denial of *414 the motion for a mistrial or a new trial error. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.