Title: Lake Oswego Review v. Steinkamp
Citation: 298 Or. 607, 695 P.2d 565
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 12, 1985

695 P.2d 565 (1985)
298 Or. 607
LAKE OSWEGO REVIEW, Inc., Petitioner On Review,
v.
Joseph STEINKAMP, Respondent On Review.
TC CV 82-7052; CA A28122; SC S30556.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Decided February 12, 1985.
Argued and Submitted July 11, 1984.
Stuart O. Kendall, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Robert Lohman, West Linn, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
CAMPBELL, Justice.
This case presents an issue of first impression under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue is whether service of *566 summons on an individual by certified mail, return receipt requested (restricted delivery), is valid service pursuant to ORCP 7. We hold that, under the facts of this case, it is.
Plaintiff mailed the summons and complaint to defendant at a particular address, certified, return receipt requested (restricted delivery). The letter carrier, who knew defendant, delivered the letter to defendant at a different address and had him sign for it. Plaintiff's proof of service recounted the above. The return receipt was attached. On January 17, 1983, a default judgment was entered against defendant. On defendant's motion, the judgment was set aside. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and held that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant because the service did not comport with ORCP 7 D. 67 Or. App. 197, 677 P.2d 751 (1984). Rossman, J., dissented.
Numerous provisions of ORCP 7 are important to the resolution of this issue. They are:
The legislative history of this Rule is lengthy, and not without contradiction. We find the plainest statement of intent was made to the legislature by the Council on Court Procedures, who drafted the Rule. They stated:
Summary of Rules: Council on Court Procedures  Rules 1 through 10, p 6, Exhibit A, House Judiciary Committee, H.B. 3131, 1979. We rarely find a more brutally frank manifestation of the intention of the drafters of a piece of legislation.
This language is reinforced by the "Staff Comment" to the Rule. It states:
Council on Court Procedures, Staff Comment to Rule 7, reprinted in F. Merrill, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: 1984 Handbook 22-23 (1984). (Emphasis in original.)[1]
Commentary on Rule 7 appears contradictory at first blush. For example, Professor Merrill states that:
Merrill, Jurisdiction Over Parties; Service of Summons (Rules 4-7), reprinted in Oregon Law Institute, Oregon Civil Procedure Rules 1980, at 237 (1979). However, this same piece contains the following explanation for the existence of Rule 7 D.(2)-(4):
Merrill, supra, at 236. It is only after making this statement that the author explains specific sections. In that context, we understand the explanation of sections 7 D.(2)-(4) more clearly. These sections provide plaintiff with detailed information regarding service of summons on particular defendants in particular circumstances. The cautious plaintiff (or perhaps the plaintiff with much at stake) will follow the method prescribed for the circumstances involved and the type of defendant being served. This is a far cry from reading ORCP 7 D.(2)-(4) to require compliance with the particularized methods and manners of service in every case. Indeed, we are expressly told in the text of the Rule, the "legislative history" and the commentary that the specified methods are not required, but merely advisory. There is nothing, other than an out-of-context interpretation of certain statements explaining Rule 7, to support the erroneous conclusion that mail service on individual defendants is prohibited per se.
Service by mail on individual defendants is not presumptively adequate notice under ORCP 7. If it were, this inquiry would be at an end, for there is nothing in this record to overcome such a presumption. Under the facts of this case, the inquiry is slightly more difficult. Defendant does not claim that the service accomplished was not "reasonably calculated" to notify him of the action, but only that plaintiff did not use one of the methods of service specifically described for service on individuals.
The Rule states that the service "shall" meet the federal due process standard and that it "may" be accomplished in numerous specified ways. ORCP 7 D. The Rule provides that mail service "shall" be made as specified, but that is not at issue in this case. ORCP 7 D.(2)(d). In ORCP 7 F.(4) and 7 G. the word "shall" is again used. The Rule's contrasting usage of the words "shall" and "may" is too conspicuous to be ignored. Compliance with methods or manners of service which are preceded by the word "may" is not required. The methods of service listed in ORCP 7 D.(2)-(4) are not exclusive of other methods of service reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of the action.
The service accomplished in this case is different than the "service by mail" *569 illustrated in ORCP 7 D.(2)(d). The statutory service by mail requires only that the summons and complaint be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. Such a letter may be signed for by someone other than the addressee. However, where certified mail, return receipt requested (restricted delivery) is used, the letter must be signed for by the addressee. Unless the summons and complaint are returned by the post office as undeliverable, restricted delivery mail addressed to an individual defendant is more likely to result in adequate notice than is the "service by mail" of ORCP 7 D.(2)(d).
ORCP 7 does not require that actual notice be provided defendant by plaintiff. There is no indication in the Rule or its legislative history to that effect. The Rule requires adequate notice. Defendant received an envelope containing the summons and complaint. It was hand-delivered to him, and he signed for it. Not only was the service accomplished in this case "reasonably calculated * * * to apprise the defendant * * * of the action," it did everything possible to do so short of reading the summons and complaint to defendant. Defendant received adequate notice.
Defendant's argument is that plaintiff did not provide him with a method of service statutorily provided for service on individuals. See ORCP 7 D.(3)(a)(i). That may be so, but is insufficient under ORCP 7 to invalidate the service. ORCP 7 G. specifically provides that courts "shall disregard any error in the content of or service of summons that does not materially prejudice the substantive right of the party against whom summons was issued."[2] Defendant has not shown such material prejudice on this record. He received an envelope in the same manner as if he had been personally served by someone other than a letter carrier. He would not have been more "apprise[d]" of the action had technical compliance with ORCP 7 D.(3)(a)(i) been accomplished.[3]
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court.
[1]  The source of the above comments may be the minutes of the meeting of the Council on Court Procedures held on November 18, 1978 with Justice Lent presiding.

"Upon motion of Randolph Slocum, seconded by Judge Sloper, the Council directed that the comment to ORCP 7 make clear that the basic test of adequate service of summons is that which is set forth in the first sentence of ORCP 7D.(1) and that the specific methods of service as applied to particular defendants in the rule would be service which is presumed to be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the existence and pendency of the action. The comment should also make clear that other service methods could under some circumstances satisfy the basic standard. Judge Tompkins voted against the motion."
Minutes of the Meeting of November 18, 1978, p. 3, reprinted in Council on Court Procedures, Legislative History, Promulgation of Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, Vol. 1(1979).
[2]  Rule 7 G. does not restate the same standard in two ways. It contains two standards. As explained by Professor Merrill:

"ORCP 7G. provides that, if a defendant actually received notice, defects in form, issuance of, and person serving summons do not invalidate service. ORCP 7G. also provides that the summons or certificate of service may be amended and the court `shall disregard any error in the content of or service of summons that does not materially prejudice the substantive rights of the party against whom the summons was issued.'"
Merrill, Jurisdiction Over Parties; Service of Summons (Rules 4-7), reprinted in Oregon Law Institute, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure 1980, at 235 (1979). The first standard is used when the question involves the form, issuance of, or person serving summons. The second standard applies to questions, like the one in the instant case, involving the content or service of summons. These two groupings are not the same.
[3]  Because we resolve the issue in favor of plaintiff, we do not reach plaintiff's alternative allegation that defendant received actual notice.