Title: Downing v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 359, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TEREK R. DOWNING, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 359, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0110011346A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 16, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: March 28, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of March 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Terek R. Downing, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s June 9, 2006 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In September 2002, a Superior Court jury found Downing 
guilty of two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Assault in the Second Degree.  
 
2
Downing was sentenced to two years at Level V on each of the robbery 
convictions and to five years at Level V on each of the weapon convictions.  
He was sentenced on the assault conviction to eight years at Level V, to be 
suspended after one year for decreasing levels of supervision, and on the 
conspiracy conviction to one year at Level V, to be suspended immediately 
for Level II probation.  This Court affirmed Downing’s convictions and 
sentences on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his 
postconviction motion, Downing claims that a) the prosecutor improperly 
elicited testimony from Downing’s girlfriend that he had threatened to kill 
her and had admitted to the robbery; b) the chief investigating officer was 
improperly absent from trial and unavailable for cross-examination; c) the 
photo array shown to the robbery victim was unduly suggestive; d) his 
girlfriend’s statement to the police was not properly investigated; and e) his 
trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to suppress his statement to 
police and his photo identification, by failing to interview witnesses, and by 
failing to advance the appropriate arguments on direct appeal. 
                                          
 
1 Downing v. State, Del. Supr., No. 651, 2002, Berger, J. (July 8, 2003).  
 
3
 
(4) 
Because Downing failed to raise his first three claims in his 
direct appeal, those claims are procedurally barred2 unless Downing can 
demonstrate cause for the failure to so raise them and prejudice from a 
violation of his rights.3  Downing provides no reason why he did not raise 
his claims in his direct appeal, nor does he demonstrate any prejudice from a 
violation of his rights.  Moreover, Downing has not demonstrated a 
miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined 
the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction.4  We, thus, affirm the Superior 
Court’s denial of these claims, albeit on grounds different from those 
articulated by the Superior Court.5   
 
(5) 
Downing’s fourth claim is that his girlfriend’s statement to the 
police was not properly investigated.  This claim was raised previously in 
Downing’s direct appeal.  It is, therefore, procedurally barred as formerly 
adjudicated unless Downing can demonstrate that reconsideration of the 
claim is warranted in the interest of justice.6  Because Downing has failed to 
demonstrate that reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of 
                                          
 
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
5 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (The 
Superior Court found that Downing’s claims were conclusory and summarily denied 
them.) 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
 
4
justice, we conclude that the Superior Court properly denied this claim as 
procedurally barred. 
 
(6) 
Downing’s final claim is that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress his statement to police 
and his photo identification, by failing to interview witnesses, and by failing 
to advance the appropriate arguments on direct appeal.  In order to prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different.7  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”8  The defendant must make concrete allegations 
of ineffective assistance, and substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.9   
 
(7) 
Downing has failed to demonstrate that any alleged error on the 
part of his counsel affected the outcome of his trial.  Moreover, he offers 
only conclusory allegations concerning the issues he believes should have 
been presented on direct appeal and fails to demonstrate how the inclusion 
                                          
 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 1984). 
8 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
5
of those issues would have affected the outcome of the appeal.  For all of the 
above reasons, we conclude that the Superior Court correctly denied 
Downing’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice