Title: Garcia v. Super. Ct.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S127432
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2007

1 
Filed 8/9/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S127432 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G032739 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 
) 
COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Respondent; 
)  
Super. Ct. No. 02CF1970 
 
 
) 
CITY OF SANTA ANA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Jose Antonio Garcia filed a motion for discovery of law enforcement 
personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 
(Pitchess).  In support, he filed a declaration under seal asserting, inter alia, that 
the declaration contained information protected by the attorney-client1 and work 
product privileges.2  The question here is whether he is permitted to do so, and if 
                                              
 
1  See generally Evidence Code section 954; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 557, 594.  All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Evidence Code.   
 
2  Penal Code section 1054.6 “expressly limits the definition of ‘work 
product’ in criminal cases to ‘core’ work product, that is, any writing reflecting 
‘an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.’ 
Thus, the qualified protection of certain materials under Code of Civil Procedure 
[section 2018.030, subdivision (a)], applicable in civil cases, is [not] available in 
Footnote continued on next page 
2 
so, whether release of the declaration to the police department’s attorney, subject 
to a protective order, provides a sufficient safeguard.  We conclude that the trial 
court may permit a defendant to file a Pitchess declaration under seal if the court 
determines that such a filing is necessary.  A declaration filed under seal must be 
redacted before being served on the city attorney.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Garcia was involved in an altercation with officers while being booked in the 
Santa Ana City jail.  He ultimately brought the Pitchess motion at issue here, 
accompanied by a “Sealed Declaration of Defense Counsel.”  He served the City 
of Santa Ana (City) with a redacted copy of the declaration.  The City opposed the 
Pitchess motion, asserting as relevant here that it could not adequately respond 
because the declaration was sealed.   
The trial court reviewed the sealed declaration in camera.  It concluded 
certain portions were privileged and ordered them redacted.  It found other 
portions could be provided to the City under the safeguard of a protective order, 
relying on City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 255 
(Davenport).3   
Garcia sought writ review of the order directing release of the unredacted 
portions of the declaration under a protective order, contending these contained 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Footnote continued from previous page 
criminal cases.”  (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 382, fn. 19, 
italics omitted (Izazaga).)  We have held the “work product doctrine is not 
constitutionally founded.”  (Id. at p. 381.)   
3  The trial court’s specific rulings on the precise scope of the asserted 
privileges is unclear from this record.  However, the correctness of the underlying 
privilege rulings is not at issue here.   
3 
attorney-client and work product information.  The City in turn asserted that it 
should be permitted to review the entire declaration under a protective order.  The 
Court of Appeal granted Garcia’s writ petition, and held as follows.  Defense 
counsel may file a Pitchess declaration under seal.  If, after in camera review, the 
trial court agrees with the privilege claim, the declaration should be redacted 
before being served on the City.  Disagreeing with Davenport, supra, 96 
Cal.App.4th 255, the Court of Appeal concluded that a protective order would not 
sufficiently protect Garcia’s interests.   
We granted the City’s petition for review.4  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Background 
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, “we recognized that a criminal defendant 
may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in [a] law 
enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to 
defend against a criminal charge.  ‘In 1978, the California Legislature codified the 
privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as “Pitchess 
motions” . . . through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7[5] and 832.8 and 
                                              
4  Following oral argument in this case, Garcia withdrew his Pitchess motion 
and pleaded guilty.  Although technically this action renders the City’s petition 
moot, we have exercised our inherent authority to retain this case in order to 
resolve the conflict and in view of the recurring nature of these issues.  (See In re 
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 879; People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 
859, fn. 1; In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23.) 
 
5  Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: 
“Peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by 
any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from 
these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil 
proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the 
Evidence Code.”   
4 
Evidence Code sections 1043[6] through 1045.’  (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal 
Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81 (Santa Cruz) . . . .)  By providing that the trial court 
should conduct an in camera review, the Legislature balanced the accused’s need 
for disclosure of relevant information with the law enforcement officer’s 
                                              
 
6  Section 1043 provides: 
“(a) In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or 
custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section 
832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records, the party seeking the 
discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or 
administrative body upon written notice to the governmental agency which has 
custody and control of the records. The written notice shall be given at the times 
prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
Upon receipt of the notice the governmental agency served shall immediately 
notify the individual whose records are sought.  
“(b) The motion shall include all of the following: 
“(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is 
sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer 
whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control 
of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or 
disclosure shall be heard. 
“(2) A description of the type of records or information sought. 
“(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, 
setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending 
litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency 
identified has the records or information from the records. 
“(c) No hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held 
without full compliance with the notice provisions of this section except upon a 
showing by the moving party of good cause for noncompliance, or upon a waiver 
of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the records.” 
Section 1046 provides:  “In any case, otherwise authorized by law, in which 
the party seeking disclosure is alleging excessive force by a peace officer or 
custodial officer, as defined in Section 831.5 of the Penal Code, in connection with 
the arrest of that party, or for conduct alleged to have occurred within a jail 
facility, the motion shall include a copy of the police report setting forth the 
circumstances under which the party was stopped and arrested, or a copy of the 
crime report setting forth the circumstances under which the conduct is alleged to 
have occurred within a jail facility.” 
 
5 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her personnel records.”  (People 
v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219-1220 (Mooc).)   
To obtain Pitchess information, the defendant must file a written motion.  
(§ 1043, subd. (a).)  It must describe “the type of records or information sought” 
and include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure 
sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the 
pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency 
identified has the records or information from the records.”7  (§ 1043, subd. (b)(2) 
& (3).)  This good cause showing is a “relatively low threshold for discovery.”  
(Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.)  Assertions in the affidavits “may be on 
information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge [citation], 
but the information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to 
preclude the possibility of a defendant’s simply casting about for any helpful 
information.”  (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.)  If the defendant establishes 
good cause, the court must review the records in camera to determine what, if any, 
information should be disclosed.  (Ibid.; § 1045, subd. (b).)   
We discussed what constitutes a good cause showing of materiality in 
Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011 (Warrick).  The supporting 
affidavit “must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges.”  (Id. at p. 
                                              
 
7  Here, counsel filed a declaration, not an affidavit.  Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2015.5, with exceptions not relevant in the Pitchess context, 
“allows use of ‘unsworn’ declarations made under penalty of perjury whenever 
state law ‘require[s] or permit[s]’ facts to be evidenced by affidavits or other 
‘sworn’ statements.  A valid declaration has the same ‘force and effect’ as an 
affidavit administered under oath.”  (Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial 
Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 610.)  Because the statute speaks in terms of an 
affidavit, we generally use that term except when discussing the declaration filed 
in this case. 
6 
1024.)  To show the requested information is material, a defendant is required to 
“establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending 
charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a 
defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.”  (Id. at p. 1021.)  
The information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the 
defendant’s request is “limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the 
misconduct asserted by the defendant.”  (Ibid.)   
Counsel’s affidavit must also describe a factual scenario that would support a 
defense claim of officer misconduct.  (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-
1025.)  “That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may 
consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.”  (Ibid.)  “In other 
cases, the trial court hearing a Pitchess motion will have before it defense 
counsel’s affidavit, and in addition a police report, witness statements, or other 
pertinent documents.  The court then determines whether defendant’s averments, 
‘[v]iewed in conjunction with the police reports’ and any other documents, suffice 
to ‘establish a plausible factual foundation’ for the alleged officer misconduct and 
to ‘articulate a valid theory as to how the information sought might be admissible’ 
at trial.”  (Id. at p. 1025.)  Corroboration of or motivation for alleged officer 
misconduct is not required.  (Ibid.)  Rather, “a plausible scenario of officer 
misconduct is one that might or could have occurred.”  (Id. at p. 1026.)  A scenario 
is plausible when it asserts specific misconduct that is both internally consistent 
and supports the proposed defense.  (Ibid.)  “A defendant must also show how the 
information sought could lead to or be evidence potentially admissible at trial.”  
(Ibid.)  A defendant who meets this burden has demonstrated the materiality 
requirement of section 1043.  (Warrick, at p. 1026.)   
7 
B.  Analysis 
1.  Whether a Pitchess declaration may be filed under seal 
We first consider whether a Pitchess affidavit may be filed under seal.  
Nothing in the relevant statutes precludes such a filing.  Indeed, a trial court has 
inherent discretion to allow documents to be filed under seal in order to protect 
against revelation of privileged information.  (See Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 383, fn. 21.)  The courts have recognized the efficacy of similar procedures to 
protect the interests of both the accused and law enforcement.  For example, in the 
context of a subpoena duces tecum, “declarations and other supporting evidence 
may be submitted to the trial court for in camera examination” to protect a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  (City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 
Cal.App.3d 1118, 1130 (Alhambra).)  Likewise, the “Legislature and the courts 
have . . . sanctioned the procedure of sealing portions of a search warrant affidavit 
that relate facts or information which, if disclosed in the public portion of the 
affidavit, will reveal or tend to reveal a confidential informant’s identity.”  (People 
v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 963, italics omitted (Hobbs).)   
While the trial court has discretion to permit filing of a Pitchess affidavit 
under seal, it is not “bound by defendant’s naked claim of confidentiality.”  
(Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1130.)  The Pitchess process itself 
requires the balancing of an accused’s need for disclosure and the officer’s 
expectation of privacy.  Likewise, a ruling on a request to file under seal involves 
balancing an accused’s interest in protecting privileged information against 
opposing counsel’s right to effectively challenge the discovery motion.  In ruling 
on a request to file under seal, a trial court must carefully weigh these competing 
concerns.   
8 
We note that particularly after Warrick,8 a litigant in the vast majority of 
cases will be able to obtain Pitchess discovery without revealing privileged 
information.  Thus, filing under seal will usually be unnecessary.  The Legislature 
has required only a minimal showing before a court reviews an officer’s personnel 
record.  Essentially, the defendant must propose a potential defense to the pending 
charge, articulate how the discovery might lead to or constitute evidence providing 
impeachment or supporting the defense, and describe an internally consistent 
factual scenario of claimed officer misconduct.  Depending on the circumstances 
of the case, the scenario may be a simple denial of accusations in the police report 
or an alternative version of what might have occurred.  (Warrick, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026.)  Because counsel need not disclose the source of the 
information asserted or how it was obtained, counsel generally is not required to 
reveal any attorney-client or work-product information.   
In relatively few cases, counsel may conclude that privileged information 
should be included in the supporting affidavit.  Even so, if other options short of a 
sealed filing exist, the trial court has discretion to request an amended affidavit.  
For example, in some cases, instead of providing defendant’s statement of how 
events unfolded, the affidavit could simply deny the incident happened as 
described in the police report.   
Therefore we hold that when counsel wishes to file a Pitchess affidavit under 
seal, the following procedure should be adhered to.  Counsel should give “proper 
and timely notice” of the privilege claim (Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1131), and provide the court with the affidavit the defense seeks to file under 
seal, along with a proposed redacted version.  The proposed redacted version 
                                              
 
8  The declaration in this case was filed before the Warrick, supra, 35 
Cal.4th 1011, decision.   
9 
should be served on opposing counsel.  The trial court must then conduct an in 
camera hearing on the request to file under seal.  At that hearing, counsel should 
explain how the information proposed for redaction would risk disclosure of 
privileged material if revealed, and demonstrate why that information is required 
to support the motion.  Opposing counsel should have an opportunity to propound 
questions for the trial court to ask in camera.  (See Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 
973.)  If the court concludes that parts of the affidavit do pose a risk of revealing 
privileged information, and that filing under seal is the only feasible way to protect 
that required information, the court may allow the affidavit to be so filed.    
We also note that the Pitchess process generally does not implicate the Sixth 
or Fifth Amendment.  Thus, the minimal showing required, along with the 
safeguards provided in this opinion, should ensure that a criminal defendant will 
not be forced to choose between pursuing discovery efforts by revealing privileged 
information or forgoing discovery to maintain a privilege.   
These constitutional implications must be reviewed in the context of changes 
to California’s related procedure for reciprocal discovery in criminal cases.  As for 
the Sixth Amendment, in Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033 
(Alford), this court held that the prosecutor is not entitled to information disclosed 
after a Pitchess motion, which we characterized as “essentially a third party 
discovery proceeding.”  (Alford, at pp. 1045-1046.)  “We are not suggesting that” 
notice of the motion to the prosecutor “include the affidavits and/or any other 
information in support of the Pitchess motion.  (Cf. People v. Superior Court 
(Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1320-1321 [party seeking discovery of 
materials in possession of third party by means of subpoena duces tecum not 
required to provide opposing party with notice of theories of relevancy of 
materials sought].)”  (Alford, at p. 1045, fn. 5.)  In the context of a subpoena duces 
tecum, “the defense is not required, on pain of revealing its possible strategies and 
10 
work product, to provide the prosecution with notice of its theories of relevancy of 
the materials sought, but instead may make an offer of proof at an in camera 
hearing.  (People v. Superior Court (Barrett), supra, at pp. 1320-1321.)  A 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in the preparation 
of a case for trial likewise encompasses the assistance of, and confidential 
communication with, experts in preparing a defense.  [Citation.]  The right 
logically extends to the opportunity to investigate and develop evidence generally, 
such as impeachment evidence of the kind at issue here.”  (Alford, at pp. 1045-
1046.)  
Alford relied on Barrett, which itself relied on cases preceding the 1990 
passage of Proposition 115.  (People v. Superior Court (Barrett), supra, 80 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320-1321.)  Proposition 115 amended the California 
Constitution, and dramatically changed the criminal discovery landscape.  One 
purpose of Proposition 115 was “[t]o provide that no discovery shall occur in 
criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory 
provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1054, subd. (e).)  In Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 379, we held the 
reciprocal pretrial discovery provided for under Proposition 115 was congruent 
with the Sixth Amendment, and observed “that the Supreme Court has never 
struck down a discovery scheme as violative of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.”  Thus, while privileged material may be filed under seal, Alford should 
not be read as concluding that a Pitchess affidavit stating theories regarding the 
11 
relevance of the materials sought, or possible trial strategies, must be filed under 
seal and reviewed in camera.9   
A defendant seeking Pitchess discovery need satisfy only a “relatively low 
threshold for discovery.”  (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.)  This procedure 
is unlike other contexts in which we have been cognizant of possible self-
incrimination and fair trial issues, such as advance disclosure of intended penalty 
phase evidence that might jeopardize a guilt phase defense.  (People v. Superior 
Court (Mitchell) (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1229, 1237, 1239.)  Generally, as with 
Proposition 115’s compelled discovery provisions, nothing in the minimal 
Pitchess showing “would penalize exhaustive investigation or otherwise chill trial 
preparation of defense counsel such that criminal defendants would be denied the 
right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.”  (Izazaga, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 379.)   
Nor, in most cases, are a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights implicated.  
The defendant need not make any statement to the court in support of a Pitchess 
motion, or sign an accompanying affidavit.  The statements in counsel’s affidavit 
can be made without further attribution.  Under both the federal and state 
Constitutions, a defendant in a reciprocal discovery scheme has no valid self-
incrimination claim against compelled disclosure of an alibi defense or defense 
witnesses.  (Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 83; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d 
at pp. 366-372.)  It follows that no such federal or state right generally exists when 
a defendant seeks discovery of confidential records, and the showing required may 
be made by his attorney on information and belief.   
                                              
 
9  The City’s petition for review raised only the question of information 
falling under the attorney-client or work product privilege.  We limit our 
discussion to that question.   
12 
Defendant relies on the Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, holding that 
in the context of a subpoena duces tecum, “declarations and other supporting 
evidence may be submitted to the trial court for in camera examination” to protect 
a defendant’s constitutional rights.  (Id. at pp. 1130.)  The court observed, “Those 
constitutional rights have been characterized in Prudhomme v. Superior Court 
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 325-326, as prohibiting the compelled discovery of any 
defense information that conceivably might lighten the load the People must 
shoulder in proving their case-in-chief.  This is based upon the defendant’s right 
against self-incrimination which ‘forbids compelled disclosures which could serve 
as a “link in a chain” of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal 
offense. . . .’  (Id. at p. 326.)  See also, In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 546-
551.)  We recognize that both Prudhomme and Misener are prosecutorial 
discovery cases while the case at bench involves the scope of permissible defense 
discovery.  However, the same concerns regarding the defendant’s privilege 
against self-incrimination are involved in either setting and the governing 
principles are unchanged.”  (Alhambra, at p. 1130, fn. 13.)  The court also noted, 
“It is conceivable that if too much is required of a defendant, he could be forced to 
reveal anticipated defense strategy.”  (Id. at p. 1131.)   
While Alhambra correctly held that an affidavit containing privileged 
material may be filed under seal, its constitutional analysis is overly broad in light 
of the subsequent enactment of Proposition 115.  In Izazaga, we observed, “The 
concept of ‘reciprocal’ discovery mandated by article I, section 30(c) [of the 
California Constitution, added by Proposition 115] is inherently inconsistent with 
the roadblock to prosecutorial discovery created by our earlier interpretations of 
the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as developed in the 
Prudhomme line of cases.”  (Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 371.)  “Therefore, to 
the extent that the Prudhomme line of cases impeded reciprocal discovery, article 
13 
I, section 30(c) must be seen as abrogating those cases, and limiting the scope of 
the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as it relates to 
reciprocal discovery.”  (Izazaga, at p. 371.)   
2.  Redaction or a Protective Order 
If a court permits portions of an affidavit to be filed under seal, the question 
remains whether this sealed information can be revealed to the city attorney under 
a protective order.  
In Davenport, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at page 258, the defendant seeking 
Pitchess discovery filed an affidavit under seal.  When the trial court refused to 
allow the city attorney to review the document, the city attorney suggested that 
defense counsel provide a copy of the affidavit subject to a protective order.  
(Davenport, at pp. 258-259.)  The trial court denied the request, and after in 
camera review, ordered disclosure of the personnel records.   
The city attorney filed a writ petition.  (Davenport, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 259.)  Citing Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at page 1130, the Court of 
Appeal observed that “ ‘effective participation in an important pretrial matter’ ” 
should not be precluded “ ‘merely because the defendant asserts that the factual or 
legal showing made in support of a particular motion should remain 
confidential.’ ”  (Davenport, at p. 263.)  It placed great reliance on the fact that the 
city attorney’s office was not the agency prosecuting Davenport.  (Id. at pp. 263-
264.)  “We have reviewed the affidavit and conclude that to allow the city attorney 
to review it, under a protective order, will in no way compromise Davenport’s 
defense or right to a fair trial.”  (Id. at p. 264.)   
Contrary to the conclusion in Davenport and the City’s claim here, the city 
attorney is not an entirely neutral third party.  The parties vigorously debate the 
extent of the interaction between the city attorney and the officer whose records 
14 
are sought, and whether the city attorney consults with the officer when 
responding to a Pitchess motion.  While the City may be correct that it is an entity 
distinct from the prosecution, it nevertheless acknowledges that such an officer is 
its client.  He is a holder of the privilege, and the city attorney speaks in defense of 
his privacy interest.  (City of Hemet v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 
1411, 1430.)  The officer is often “a prosecution witness or affiliated with the 
prosecution team.”  (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1046, fn. 7.)    
The Court of Appeal here declined to adopt the Davenport reasoning, and 
concluded instead that redaction was required.  We agree and disapprove City of 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 255 (Davenport), to the 
extent it holds that a supporting Pitchess affidavit filed under seal may be released 
to the city attorney under a protective order.   
This outcome is appropriate in light of the procedure set out here.  A trial 
court will have determined that disclosure of identified portions of an affidavit 
would impinge upon privileged information, that those portions are necessary to 
support the Pitchess motion, and that filing under seal is the only feasible way to 
honor the privilege.  This determination will not have been made merely on the 
defendant’s assertion, but after a particularized showing scrutinized during an in 
camera hearing.  As we have observed in other contexts, “mere disclosure of client 
confidences and attorney work product to third parties, in itself, would violate 
these privileges.”  (People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 719 
[seized documents]; see § 915.)10  A criminal defendant should not be forced to 
                                              
 
10  Indeed, under the reciprocal discovery scheme, “[n]either the defendant 
nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any materials or information 
which are work product as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 2018.030 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, or which are privileged pursuant to an express statutory 
provision, or are privileged as provided by the Constitution of the United States.”  
(Pen. Code, § 1054.6.) 
15 
choose between pursuing discovery efforts by revealing privileged information or 
forgoing discovery to maintain a privilege.   
We appreciate that when the affidavit is redacted, the resulting Pitchess 
procedure will be less informed by adversarial debate.  We have recognized other 
procedures, however, in which limitations on the adversarial process are 
necessary.  Neither defense nor prosecution counsel are present, for example, 
during in camera review of Pitchess records themselves.  Thus, they cannot argue 
the discoverability of particular documents in the file.  Similarly, when the defense 
moves to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and the court holds an 
in camera hearing on the question, defense counsel is not entitled to attend the 
hearing and argue, subject to a protective order.  In these analogous situations, we 
reasonably rely on trial courts to make the necessary factual findings, and for 
appellate courts to objectively review the record.  We repose that same reliance 
here.11  
                                              
 
11  The trial court may, of course, consider the entire affidavit in 
determining whether a defendant has demonstrated good cause to discover 
Pitchess material.  The unredacted affidavit, along with the transcript of the in 
camera privilege hearing, should be maintained under seal in the record.  This 
process will strike a balance between the defendant’s need for confidentiality and 
the opponent’s right to meaningfully argue against the motion.   
16 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Garcia v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 120 Cal.App.4th 1252 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S127432 
Date Filed: August 9, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Carla Singer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Deborah A. Kwast, Public Defender, Thomas Havlena, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Kevin Phillips, 
Assistant Public Defender, and Donald E. Landis, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Joseph W. Fletcher, City Attorney, and Paula J. Coleman, Assistant City Attorney, for Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, and 
Kim Rodgers Westhoff, Deputy City Attorney, for League of California Cities and California State 
Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Donald E. Landis, Jr. 
Deputy Public Defender 
14 Civic Center Plaza 
Santa Ana, CA  92701 
(714) 834-2144 
 
Paula J. Coleman 
Assistant City Attorney 
20 Civic Center Plaza, M29 
Santa Ana, CA  92702 
(714) 647-5201 
 
Kim Rodgers Westhoff 
Deputy City Attorney 
500 City Hall East 
200 North Main Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 978-8104