Title: P. v. Hamilton
Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 863
Docket Number: S052288
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 2009

Filed 2/23/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S052288 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 San Diego County 
BERNARD LEE HAMILTON, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR47283 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
On January 5, 1981, a jury found defendant Bernard Lee Hamilton guilty of 
the murder of Eleanore Buchanan (Pen. Code, § 187),1 and of robbery (§ 211), 
kidnapping (§ 207), and burglary (§ 459).  The jury found true special 
circumstance allegations of robbery, kidnapping, and burglary.  (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17)(A), (B), (G).)  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and 
the court imposed judgment accordingly.   
 
On direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of guilt but set aside the 
special circumstance findings because of instructional error under Carlos v. 
Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, and reversed the sentence of death.  (People 
v.  Hamilton (1985) 41 Cal.3d 408 (Hamilton I).)  The United States Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to this court for further 
consideration in light of Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570.  (California v. 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 
 
1
Hamilton (1986) 478 U.S. 1017.)  This court again affirmed the judgment of guilt 
and, contrary to the determination in Hamilton I, concluded the special 
circumstance findings must be upheld under People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
1104, 1147 (overruling Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131), and 
affirmed the penalty judgment of death.  (People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
351.)  On March 22, 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
penalty judgment because of instructional error under Boyde v. California (1990) 
494 U.S. 370, 380, and remanded the case to the trial court for a penalty phase 
retrial.  (Hamilton v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1994) 17 F.3d 1149.) 
On December 13, 1995, after the penalty phase retrial, at which defendant 
represented himself, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The court denied a 
motion for a new trial and the automatic application to modify the verdict  
(§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death.  This appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
 
Defendant kidnapped and murdered Eleanore Buchanan after she left a 
night college math class in San Diego.  He dismembered her body, disposed of her 
headless and handless corpse in California, and drove to Texas and Oklahoma 
where he was caught driving her stolen van.   
 
Defendant represented himself at the penalty retrial; throughout the trial, 
however, counsel appointed to assist defendant conducted the majority of the voir 
dire, examination, and arguments. 
 
A.  The Prosecution’s Case 
 
In the penalty phase retrial, the prosecution introduced as evidence in 
aggravation under section 190.3 the facts and circumstances of the underlying 
capital crime, evidence of 10 incidents of criminal activity involving force or 
 
2
violence or the threat of force or violence, and victim impact evidence.  In most 
respects, the evidence presented differed little from that presented at the earlier 
trial.   
1.  The Underlying Crime 
a.  The events of May 30, 1979 to June 8, 1979 
 
On May 30, 1979, 24-year-old Eleanore Buchanan, known as “Fran,” 
attended an evening math class that was scheduled to meet from 7:00 until 10:00 
p.m. at San Diego Mesa College.  Because she had missed several classes due to 
the birth of her second child, she chose not to take an optional quiz, given at 
approximately 9:15 or 9:30 p.m., and left the class.  She was last seen walking 
toward the campus parking lot or a nearby street.  She had driven the new blue van 
she and her husband Terry Buchanan had purchased weeks earlier; Terry used the 
van during the day to make deliveries for a dental lab.   
 
About 1:30 p.m. the following day, May 31, 1979, Harry Piper, a target 
shooter, discovered a body, later identified as that of Eleanore Buchanan, in a cul-
de-sac in Pine Valley,2 south of Interstate Highway 8.  The head and hands were 
missing and there were ligature marks on the ankles and wrists. 
 
Forensic pathologist Dr. Joseph Luibel, who conducted the autopsy, 
testified the cuts around the head and right hand were smooth and consistent with 
marks made by a saw, while the cut on the left wrist was consistent with having 
been made by a knife.  All of the amputation marks were consistent with having 
been made by someone without much knowledge of anatomy and with 
rudimentary knowledge of the use of a knife and saw.  Although the body was 
exsanguinated, he was unable to determine with certainty the cause of death, and 
                                              
2  
Pine Valley is approximately 45 miles from San Diego Mesa College. 
 
3
noted several postmortem wounds to the chest and abdomen.  He noted that when 
the body was discovered, it was lying on its back and both forearms were raised 
several inches off the ground, a common result of rigor mortis.  Based on an 
examination of the stomach contents he concluded the victim died between 10:00 
and 10:30 p.m. on May 30, 1979.  Based on the stage of rigor mortis and the 
condition of the forearms at the time of discovery, he concluded the body was left 
in Pine Valley approximately six hours after death, or between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. 
on May 31, 1979.  
 
Defendant lived with his parents on Comstock Street in Linda Vista, 
California, approximately one mile from San Diego Mesa College.  Donna Hatch 
lived in Terrell, Texas.  She and defendant had corresponded since 1973, and first 
met in person in 1976.  Telephone records from the Hamilton residence in Linda 
Vista revealed that at 1:52 a.m. on May 31, 1979, just hours after Eleanore 
Buchanan’s classmates last saw her alive, defendant telephoned Hatch.  Hatch 
testified defendant told her he planned to head for Texas that morning after he got 
some gas.  During the evening of June 1, 1979, defendant showed up at Hatch’s 
house in Terrell, Texas, driving a van.  Hatch noted that the van had a broken 
window, a broken armrest, and a bent inside curtain rod.  The next day, Hatch and 
her sister, niece, and daughter drove with defendant to Oklahoma and Ft. Worth, 
Texas, and back to Terrell, Texas, stopping to sleep at a rest stop where defendant 
used Buchanan’s credit cards to buy gas.  On June 4, 1979, defendant and Hatch 
stopped at a phone booth near a hotel where defendant made two telephone calls.  
After the second call, defendant’s demeanor changed and he became nervous.3  
                                              
3  
Defense witness Clifford Harris was a friend of defendant’s in San Diego.  
Harris received a phone call from defendant in Texas, and Harris told defendant of 
a local news report about the police finding a woman’s body. 
 
4
Hatch overheard defendant say he had traveled to Texas by airplane, which she 
knew to be untrue, and that “he thought he had killed somebody,” or thought he 
had killed “a man.”  Defendant asked Hatch to go to a car lot and steal Texas 
license plates to exchange with the California plates on the van, but she refused.  
Defendant and Hatch talked about his former wife; defendant had led her to 
believe that his former wife was dead, but on this day he told her she was alive.  
When Hatch became upset about the lie, defendant asked her if she wanted him to 
kill his former wife.  Hatch decided to end her relationship with defendant.  
 
On June 8, 1979, from Greenwood, Louisiana, defendant phoned Hatch at 
her house.  Her grandmother answered the phone, and when Hatch got on the line, 
she heard defendant say, “I’ll kill you, too.”  
 
On June 8, 1979, the use of Terry Buchanan’s credit card at a Stuckey’s 
restaurant in Marietta, Oklahoma triggered an alert to the Love County Sheriff’s 
Office to be on the lookout for the Buchanans’ blue Dodge van bearing Oklahoma 
license plates.  Officers thereafter found defendant driving the van.  Upon his 
arrest, defendant told the officers he got the van from a friend of his sister in 
Oklahoma City.  Love County Sheriff’s deputies searched a site south of Marietta 
and, in a pile of dumped trash, found fast food wrappers, unset false teeth, dental 
equipment, literature and pamphlets dealing with dental supplies, a Texas 
Department of Public Safety traffic warning slip bearing defendant’s name and 
dated June 7, 1979, a collection of school notes and a quiz from a math class, a 
license plate bracket that said “National City, Stanley Dodge” (the dealership 
where the Buchanans purchased the van), and credit cards, courtesy cards and 
receipts bearing Eleanore Buchanan’s and Terry Buchanan’s names and bearing 
signatures that were not in Terry Buchanan’s handwriting. 
 
5
b.  Forensic evidence 
 
A sheriff’s deputy found a saw, two shanks of rope, a butcher knife, a 
screwdriver, credit cards, a spiral notebook entitled “Math 118,” and a handwritten 
note addressed “Look, Donna” inside the van.  
 
Blue fibers from the carpet in the van matched fibers found on top of 
Eleanore Buchanan’s abdomen, on her socks and feet, and on the exposed bone of 
her right wrist.  The rear of the van had a couch seat spanning the two rear fender 
wheel wells; the seat folded up to reveal the spare tire and additional storage 
space.  San Diego County Sheriff’s officers found a “fairly extensive” bloodstain 
on the inside, top, and side carpeting covering the right fender wheel well and 
running down over the edge of the fender wheel well onto the flat surface of the 
carpet bed and van floor underneath the couch seat; blood drops on the rim and 
wheel of the spare tire; blood on the couch rail; two small bloodstains in the 
middle of the van forward of the couch seat and behind the driver’s seat; and 
blood on the inner right toe of a pair of shoes identified as belonging to defendant.  
A total of approximately one unit of blood was found in the van.  Using blood-
type group characteristics, Criminalist Brandon Armstrong opined that Eleanore 
Buchanan’s blood was consistent with the blood found inside the van:  The 
samples of Buchanan’s blood taken at the autopsy, the blood taken from the couch 
rail of the van, and the blood taken from the carpet in the van were all of blood 
group “O,” and each of the three samples contained identical enzymes and serum 
proteins.  The  blood found on defendant’s shoe inside the van could only be 
tested for blood type, and was found to be type “O.”  Defendant’s blood was type 
“A.”  
 
Armstrong testified that the one unit of blood found in the van, which was 
approximately one-twelfth the amount of blood in a human body, was inconsistent 
with the amount of blood he would have expected to find had the body been 
 
6
dismembered inside the van.  He believed the body had been transported inside the 
van on top of the spare tire in the wheel well. 
 
Tire marks, compressed grass, drag marks, and blood on the berm of the 
cul-de-sac in Pine Valley where Eleanore Buchanan’s body was found indicated 
something heavy had been dropped and dragged away from the middle of the tire 
tracks.  Several sets of tire tracks were found at the scene; none matched the tires 
on the Buchanans’ van and none was definitively connected to the Buchanan 
murder.  
c.  The Crawford interviews 
 
Detective Crawford of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department 
interviewed defendant on June 9 and 10, 1979, in the Love County Sheriff’s 
Office in Oklahoma.  Crawford made audiotapes of each interview, and the 
prosecution played both tapes during trial and gave each juror a written transcript 
of each tape.  In the first interview, defendant said he ran into Calvin Spencer, also 
known as “Spider,” a friend whom he had not seen since 1973, and Spider’s “old 
lady,” Fran, at College Billiards in San Diego on Wednesday, May 30, 1979.  Fran 
had left her husband, and she and Spider were driving across the country.  
Defendant, who told Spider and Fran he would like to do some traveling, agreed to 
travel with them.  Defendant told them he had no money, and Spider and Fran said 
they would take care of expenses.  Defendant told Crawford he thought he might 
be able to make some money with a “check writer” machine he brought with him 
from home. 
 
Defendant told Crawford he, Spider and Fran drove to his parents’ house in 
Linda Vista to pick up his clothes and shoes before leaving San Diego.  They 
drove east on Interstate Highway 8, using Fran’s and her husband Terry’s credit 
cards to buy gas along the way.  Throughout the trip, all three of them signed the 
credit card receipts. 
 
7
 
Defendant told Crawford he dropped off Spider and Fran in Shreveport, 
Louisiana, after Fran gave him permission to drive the van on his own to his 
cousin’s house in Oklahoma City.  Fran and Spider were to call him there the 
following day.  Fran also left the credit cards with defendant for him to use “for 
gas and stuff along the way.”  Defendant explained that Spider had exchanged the 
California license plates on the van for Oklahoma license plates in order to 
minimize any difficulty defendant might encounter in using the Buchanans’ credit 
cards at gas stations when Fran would not be there to vouch for his use of the 
cards.  Defendant first learned there was something wrong when he tried to use 
one of the credit cards at the Stuckey’s restaurant in Marietta, Oklahoma, and the 
cashier called the police.  
 
Defendant said he bought the butcher knife sheriff’s deputies found in the 
van at a variety store in Shreveport, Louisiana, explaining that he thought he might 
need some protection on the road and, since he was “an ex-con,” he could not 
purchase a gun.  He denied purchasing the saw and rope found in the van, and 
denied picking up any hitchhikers along the way. 
 
Defendant acknowledged that Terry Buchanan’s name was on the credit 
card he used.  He told Crawford that Spider sometimes referred to Fran as 
Eleanore, that a photograph of Eleanore Buchanan holding her newborn baby, 
shown to him by Crawford, looked like Fran, and that Fran was wearing 
light-colored jeans and carrying a beige cloth purse when they were traveling.  He 
said he last saw her in Shreveport, Louisiana, on Thursday, June 7, and she was 
alive, well, and hiding from her husband.   
 
In the second interview, conducted the next day on June 10, 1979, 
defendant told Crawford that earlier in the evening of Wednesday, May 30, 1979, 
before going to College Billiards where he met Spider and Fran, he visited a 
friend, Theresa, at her house in San Diego.  Theresa then drove him to the house 
 
8
he shared with his parents, where he stayed until at least 9:00 p.m.  Five or 10 
minutes later, without speaking to his parents, he left and “went down the road 
hitchhiking.”  He then walked to College Billiards, arriving shortly before 10:00 
p.m.  There he ran into Spider, whom he had not seen in “quite a few years.”  
They discussed defendant’s desire to get some paper with which to print up and 
write bad checks on the check writer, and defendant suggested that Fran would 
cash the checks he wrote.  He also stated that he brought the butcher knife from 
his parents’ home, and he did not remember telling Crawford the day before that 
he had bought the butcher knife in Shreveport, Louisiana.  He also said he might 
have bought it in Benson, Arizona.  He acknowledged police in Texas had stopped 
him for speeding and issued him a warning ticket while Spider and Fran were with 
him.  
 
Defendant told Crawford he never went near San Diego Mesa College on 
the night of May 30, 1979; he hadn’t seen any blood in the van but any blood 
found there was his; and no crime had been committed but the police “just got 
stuck with a corpse and a runaway wife.” 
d.  Defendant’s testimony in the first trial 
 
The prosecution read into the record defendant’s testimony from the first 
trial; there, defendant admitted stealing the Buchanans’ van and forging Terry 
Buchanan’s name on credit card receipts, but denied knowing, seeing, or ever 
coming into contact with Eleanore Buchanan, alive or dead. 
 
Specifically, in the first trial defendant testified that around noon on May 
30, 1979, he walked from his home to his doctor’s office to receive treatment for a 
cut on his right hand.  He then walked toward his home but before he got there his 
friend Theresa Roch picked him up in her car.  They drove to several locations 
before stopping at Jean Zimmerman’s house, where they stayed until 7:00 or 7:30 
p.m. when he left to return home.  He got into the car of another friend, Johnny 
 
9
Renault, who drove first to the Linda Vista shopping center, where defendant got 
out and talked to friends for five minutes before walking home.  He got home 
around 8:00 p.m.   
 
Around 9:00 or 9:10 p.m., his friend Clifford Harris stopped by.  Defendant 
and Clifford left around 9:10 p.m. and walked several blocks to his sister-in-law 
Carolyn’s house.  He stayed there for 25 or 30 minutes.  When he left, he walked 
alone to a Minute Mart store, where he bought a beer.  He ran into a security guard 
he knew, Butch Smith, talked for a moment, and then walked home.  He saw no 
one when he got home, and went to his room where he listened to the radio and 
wrote poetry for a “couple of hours.”  He again left the house sometime after 
12:00 a.m. to go to a 7-Eleven Store where he bought cigarettes and saw his friend 
Butch McIntyre.  He saw a police car and, because he knew there were traffic 
warrants for his arrest, he took another route home. 
 
Defendant claimed he first saw the Buchanans’ van around 1:00 a.m. on 
May 31, 1979, parked on Tait Street in Linda Vista when he was walking from the 
7-Eleven store on Linda Vista Road.  He peered inside and saw a purse on the 
passenger seat.  He found the van unlocked, opened the door and reached for the 
purse.  He saw the keys in the ignition and because he “didn’t feel like walking,” 
drove it home.  
 
Defendant called Donna Hatch, his fiancée, who lived in Texas and was a 
prospective witness in a criminal case defendant had pending in San Diego 
involving a 1976 crime.  He earlier had made plans to go to Texas to visit Hatch, 
and after he stole the van he decided to use it to get there.  He went through the 
purse he found in the van, kept the credit cards, and packed some clothes and 
shoes.  By the time he left his parents’ house in the van, it was “nearly light.”  He 
 
10
drove east on Interstate 8,4 stopping for gas in El Cajon.  He tossed the purse out 
of the window in El Centro, after he turned onto Interstate 10, and drove to 
Terrell, Texas.       
 
Defendant admitted that when Detective Crawford first interviewed him 
after his arrest, he made up the story about driving across the country with Spider5 
and Fran because he stole the van and “didn’t want to get stuck with auto theft.”  
He testified that he intended to burglarize several stores in Terrell, Texas, and to 
that end bought a saw, a wrench set, and a screwdriver.  He admitted that he 
bought the butcher knife and rope on June 7, 1979, in Lewisville, Texas, because 
he planned to abandon the van in a wooded area near Shreveport, Louisiana, and 
use the knife and rope to cut and tie bushes to camouflage the van from view so he 
could leave inside items taken during the burglaries; he would then fly home.  He 
admitted he told Donna Hatch he “may have killed a man,” but he did so in order 
to distract her from the lies he told her about his former wife.  Defendant testified 
that he exchanged the California license plates for Oklahoma license plates while 
he was in Oklahoma City because “I always do that the week after I’m driving a 
stolen vehicle.”  He identified the shoes found in the van as his, and denied ever 
seeing blood on the shoes or anywhere inside the van.   
 
Defendant acknowledged that in June 1979, before the preliminary hearing, 
he wrote a letter from the San Diego jail to Terry Buchanan in which he said, 
“Fran is not dead! . . . She is alive and either in Shreveport, Louisiana or 
                                              
4  
Interstate Highway 8 passes by Pine Valley, California, where Eleanore 
Buchanan’s body was found. 
5  
A “wanted poster” for a David L. Walls, alias “Spider,” was on the bulletin 
board in view of jail inmates in the hallway of the Love County, Oklahoma 
Sheriff’s Office at the time of defendant’s arrest.  Defendant later acknowledged 
that the Spider to whom he referred did not exist.  
 
11
Oklahoma City with a guy named Calvin Spencer . . . you are probably full of 
grief when you should be highly pissed off . . .  Fran might be somewhere all 
wacked off from P.C.P. and about to get into some really serious trouble with 
Calvin.”  He also acknowledged that these statements were lies, and explained he 
wrote the letter because he did not trust his appointed counsel or the district 
attorney’s office, and “it was my hope that if I present such a letter and was 
convincing enough that I might possibly . . . get Mr. Buchanan to get the FBI to 
investigate to determine whose . . . body was found out there.  Because I didn’t 
think my luck was bad enough to have stolen a homicide vehicle.” 
 
He admitted he wrote several letters to Theresa Roch in June 1979, asking 
her to pretend she was Eleanore Buchanan and to call Terry Buchanan and the 
television news stations and tell them she was still alive.  He also wrote a letter to 
a friend, B.J. Brown, asking him to tell the police that “I came to your house on 
June 1, 1979, with a Black dude and his lady . . . his name was Spider and his lady 
was Fran.  It’s very important that you remember this because I need witnesses 
who can say they saw me with these two people in that blue van.”  
 
2.  Other Criminal Acts Involving Force or Violence or Threats of 
Force or Violence 
 
 a.  Assault of Beverly Manning 
 
Beverly Manning met defendant in Shreveport, Louisiana, when she was a 
teenager.  On two occasions, when Manning refused to go somewhere with 
defendant, defendant threatened her with a weapon; in Louisiana he pulled a gun 
on her, and in California he held a knife to her throat. 
 
b.  Assault and robbery of Ruth Story 
 
On November 7, 1976, defendant and Beverly Manning assaulted 
55-year-old Ruth Story of Linda Vista while she was walking home from the 
grocery store.  Defendant hit Story in the face with his fist, knocked her to the 
 
12
ground, tore away the purse Story had attached to her cane and wrist, pulled Story 
on her stomach to the curb, and ran away.  Story suffered a broken cheekbone, 
required plastic surgery to correct injuries to her jaw, and stayed in the hospital for 
a week.  
 
c.  Assault of Kenneth Dotson and Frank Auer 
 
In the fall of 1976, defendant, in the company of Beverly Manning and 
Jerre Brown, stole a television set from a hotel at a truck stop in Louisiana and 
sold it to Jerre Brown’s mother for $90. 
 
Defendant stood trial for the burglary in March 1977, in Shreveport, 
Louisiana.  Kenneth Dotson, Jerre Brown’s brother, testified for the prosecution.  
During the pendency of the trial, while in a secured area of the jail, defendant 
jumped on and hit Kenneth Dotson, who fell against his attorney, Frank Auer, 
knocking both to the ground.  Defendant continued to hit Dotson four or five more 
times until stopped by sheriff’s deputies. 
 
d.  Assaults on Jerre Brown 
 
In December 1976, defendant, Jerre Brown, and Beverly Manning were in 
jail in Shreveport, Louisiana, under arrest for the burglary of the truck stop hotel.  
Defendant asked Brown and Manning, who were both juveniles at the time of the 
burglary, to take full responsibility for the burglary in order to exonerate him.  
Brown instead told the truth about the burglary and gave testimony unfavorable to 
defendant.  While in a holding cell with 40 other inmates awaiting transportation 
to the courthouse from the jail, defendant attempted to stab Brown in the head 
with a pen, requiring the guards to spray mace on both of them.  Later, at the 
courthouse, defendant hit Brown in the face with his fist, knocking him against the 
wall. 
 
13
 
e.  Assault on Rosie Blackmon 
 
In early 1979, defendant was dating Rosie Blackmon, who drove a taxi and 
was going to truck driving school.  They spent a night in a motel and when 
Blackmon tried to leave the following morning to go to school, defendant told her 
she could not leave and punched her in the head five or six times.  Later, when she 
tried to end the relationship, he stalked her and eventually assaulted her on the 
street, knocked her to the pavement and kicked her in the head.  
 
f.  Threats of violence to Frank Sexton, Thomas McArdle, 
Patrick O’Connor, and Brandon Armstrong 
 
On July 6, 1979, defendant wrote a letter to Theresa Roch from the San 
Diego County Jail in which he threatened to “take out” his trial counsel, the two 
prosecutors, the prosecution’s criminalist and their families if he were to be 
convicted.6   
 
g.  Assault on Thomas Ryan 
 
On September 17, 1980, defendant assaulted Thomas Ryan, the attorney 
who represented him in the first trial, in the San Diego County Jail.  Defendant 
had asked Ryan to visit him in the jail that evening.  When Ryan arrived at the 
visiting room at 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., he sat down on a small stool and waited for 
defendant.  Defendant entered the room, approached Ryan and began to hand him 
a set of papers.  Before he could take the papers, defendant struck him in the jaw 
                                              
6  
Defendant wrote, “By the way, today I got news from Quack.  He says he 
knows I am innocent but also knows how I will get railroaded.  So if I loose [sic] 
this case, they will take out O’Connor, Sexton, McCarno [sic] and Armstrong, or 
at least one member of their family [sic].  I don’t like the idea of violence, since I 
have never been a violent person and the proposal seeks my agreement.  I haven’t 
sent an answer as of yet because I have to consider a lot of things before I do.  I 
don’t like the idea . . . but I also don’t like sitting on someone else’s murder 
charge!  So that gives me a lot to think about.” 
 
14
with what Ryan described as a “very hard blow,” a “sucker punch,” which 
knocked Ryan to the floor.  Defendant said nothing.  Before Ryan could get up, 
defendant turned and left the room.  Ryan testified that during the 20 years in 
which he practiced criminal defense and represented 500 or more clients, 25 or 30 
of whom were accused of murder, none had ever punched him in the face.  
 
h.  Assault on Patricia Robinson 
 
On a Sunday morning in September 1980, defendant assaulted Patricia 
Robinson, a paralegal hired to assist Ryan in the pending capital trial.  Robinson 
had visited defendant numerous times to help prepare for trial and met with him in 
the attorney visiting room.  At the end of the visit that morning, as Robinson got 
up to leave, defendant grabbed her and said, “No, no.  Stay longer.”  She again 
tried to leave and defendant blocked her exit.  He grew agitated and said, “Well, I 
could rape you.”  She kicked the arch of his foot and punched him, but he did not 
respond.  She started yelling for help from the guards and tried to pull aside the 
privacy curtain that was covering the window in the door.  Defendant slammed her 
against the window and put his hands around her neck and mouth, and Robinson 
started to lose consciousness.  Defendant had control of her arms and legs, but she 
managed to bite his finger.  Defendant released her and said, “You bit me, I’m 
bleeding.”  Robinson managed to leave the room, and thereafter had bruises on her 
arm, legs and throat.  She testified she thought she would die that day.  
 
i.  Assault on William Hanson and Johnnie Christiansen 
 
On October 8, 1980, defendant assaulted San Diego County Sheriff’s 
Deputies William Hanson and Johnnie Christiansen in his cell at the San Diego 
County Jail.  Defendant refused to get out of bed to come to court.  When one of 
the deputies pulled off defendant’s blanket, defendant leaped up, backed into the 
corner and assumed a fighting stance with his arms and fists raised.  He told the 
deputies, “If you want . . . me to go to court you’re going to have to take me to 
 
15
court.”  The deputies grabbed defendant, forced him out of the cell and up against 
a wall, and placed waist and leg chains on him.  Defendant resisted and struggled 
before the officers gained control.  As the deputies led defendant down the hall, he 
continued to resist and spat on Hanson’s face.  
 
3.  Victim Impact Evidence  
 
The prosecution presented several witnesses who testified to the impact of 
Eleanore Buchanan’s murder on her family, particularly on her husband Terry 
Buchanan, who died of coronary heart disease in 1994 before the penalty retrial.  
These witnesses included Eleanore’s mother and grandmother, Terry’s mother, 
Eleanore and Terry’s sons Jason and Joseph, neighbors and friends, and the former 
prosecutor.  This evidence is discussed in detail below.  (See III.G., post.)   
B.  Defendant’s case in mitigation 
 
Defendant presented evidence aimed at showing a lingering doubt of his 
guilt of the murder of Eleanore Buchanan, the artwork he produced during his 
incarceration, his positive adjustment to prison life, and his family history.  
1.  Lingering Doubt 
 
Defendant argued that, notwithstanding the guilty verdict in the first trial, 
there existed evidence in support of a lingering doubt as to his guilt of the capital 
crimes, warranting a penalty of less than death.   
 
Defendant testified in his own defense, offering essentially the same 
testimony he gave at the first trial:  He denied killing Eleanore Buchanan.  He 
denied ever seeing her, alive or dead, but admitted he stole her van and used her 
credit cards to travel to Texas in order to pick up Donna Hatch and make money 
committing burglaries.  He admitted he made up the “Spider and Fran” story when 
first questioned by Detective Crawford in an attempt to avoid being charged with 
forgery and taking a stolen vehicle across state lines.   
 
16
 
Defendant offered the testimony of investigators and forensic scientists to 
challenge the prosecution’s physical evidence.  He argued the prosecution had not 
established that the Buchanans’ van made the tire marks at the cul-de-sac in Pine 
Valley where the body was found, and he challenged the prosecution’s conclusion 
that the body was transported to Pine Valley inside the Buchanans’ van.  
 
Several witnesses testified they were with defendant at various times during 
the night of Eleanore Buchanan’s murder. 
2.  Artwork 
 
Numerous witnesses testified regarding artwork defendant made while on 
death row in San Quentin State Prison.  Some saw the artwork in the prison gift 
shop; others saw it displayed at private parties or conferences held in support of 
the abolition of the death penalty.  Many were impressed with the artwork’s 
beauty.  Others were impressed with the gentility, grace, humanity, “plea for racial 
harmony” and “message of brotherly love” they saw revealed in the work. 
3.  Adjustment to Prison Life 
 
James Park, former associate warden of San Quentin State Prison, reviewed 
defendant’s prison records and gave his opinion that if the jury returned a verdict 
of life without the possibility of parole, prison officials would house defendant in 
a maximum security prison and defendant would not pose an escape risk or a risk 
to the safety of other inmates or correctional officers. 
 
An artist who worked as a teacher and art facilitator at San Quentin State 
Prison testified defendant was a dedicated and serious art student who was 
ambitious, talented and had a particular style.  Defendant had painted portraits on 
commission.  
 
Another art teacher who worked at San Quentin State Prison testified that 
art programs in prisons had positive effects on inmates, and a sentence of life 
 
17
without the possibility of parole served at a maximum security prison would allow 
defendant to continue to paint and to help other inmates learn to paint.  
4.  Family History  
 
Christopher and Ernest Hamilton, defendant’s brothers, testified they had a 
normal relationship with defendant while they were growing up.  The family was 
close and their parents created a safe and diverse environment.  Hazel Hamilton, 
defendant’s mother, testified she and defendant’s father, Ernest Hamilton, Sr., 
were devoted to their church and family and raised their children in a loving 
household.  She and defendant communicated regularly since his incarceration, 
and he sent her drafts of his artwork for her to critique.  Bernard Hamilton II, 
defendant’s son, testified he did not know his father well when he was young, but 
since defendant’s incarceration, they corresponded regularly and had gotten to 
know each other.  Finally, Reverend Forest Hancock testified that when defendant 
was 15 years old he started coming to the Freewill Missionary Baptist Church in 
San Diego.  Hancock recognized that defendant was “a good kid” with leadership 
abilities and other children looked to him for help.  Hancock noticed a change in 
defendant’s demeanor after defendant divorced his first wife.  
II.  JURY SELECTION 
A.  Restriction on Voir Dire 
 
Defendant first claims the trial court improperly restricted him from 
questioning three prospective jurors about specific biases they may have had 
related to the facts of the case, and thereby violated his federal and state 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.  We conclude the trial court did 
not err. 
 
“Prospective jurors may be excused for cause when their views on capital 
punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties 
as jurors.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  ‘The real question is 
 
18
“ ‘ “ ‘whether the juror’s views about capital punishment would prevent or impair 
the juror’s ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the 
juror.’ ” ’ ” ’  [Citations.]”   (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 719–720.)  
We have explained, however, that “death-qualification voir dire must avoid two 
extremes.  On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those 
jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of their duties as jurors in the case being tried.  On the other hand, it 
must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the 
penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence 
likely to be presented.  [Citation.]  In deciding where to strike the balance in a 
particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion.  [Citations.]  They may 
not, however, . . . strike the balance by precluding mention of any general fact or 
circumstance not expressly pleaded in the information.”  (Id. at pp. 721–722.)   
 
The questionnaire informed the jurors that “[i]n this case a young woman 
who attended Mesa College was murdered on May 30, 1979.  Her decapitated 
body was found the next day in Pine Valley, about 45 miles east of San Diego.  
The defendant, Bernard Hamilton, was arrested about a week later in Oklahoma 
while driving the victim’s van.”  The court orally informed the jurors that the jury 
in the first trial convicted defendant of murder in the first degree, robbery, 
burglary and kidnapping, and found true the special circumstances of robbery, 
burglary and kidnapping.  
 
1.  Prospective Juror M.F.  
 
During voir dire, defendant’s counsel asked of Prospective Juror M.F., a 
mother of eight who home-schooled her children and was still nursing the 
youngest, “You know that in this case in the course of a robbery, burglary and 
kidnapping a young mother was killed, and another jury has found Mr. Hamilton 
did that killing.  Is that the type of crime that leads you to believe the death 
 
19
penalty is the right answer?”  M.F. answered, “It is the type of crime that would 
make me lean in the direction of the death penalty . . . the fact that I’m a mother 
and I have protective instincts a mother bears.”  Counsel then asked if nursing a 
child was an “important part of the mother [and] child relationship, correct?”  M.F. 
answered, “Yes, very important.”  
 
The court sustained the prosecution’s objection to defense counsel’s next 
question:  “And in your opinion is [there] something particularly heinous about 
depriving [a] child of that relationship?”  Defendant’s challenge for cause was 
denied and defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse M.F.  Defendant 
argues the court improperly restricted his ability to determine M.F.’s biases. 
 
We find no abuse of discretion.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the 
ruling did not preclude defendant from probing into M.F.’s views regarding 
whether a defendant who deprived a child of a relationship with his or her mother 
might deserve the death penalty.  Rather, it restricted him from asking M.F. to 
describe how bad she thought such a crime might be.  We agree with the trial court 
that such a question essentially asked M.F. to prejudge the case and weigh a factor 
in aggravation before trial. 
2.  Prospective Juror P.A. 
 
Defendant asked Prospective Juror P.A. if she supported the death penalty; 
she answered she did.  He asked if she would automatically impose the death 
penalty because defendant had been found guilty; she answered she would.  He 
then asked if she would suspend her decision until she heard evidence about 
defendant’s background and character, and if she thought defendant’s background 
and character would be relevant to her determination of penalty; she answered she 
did not think defendant’s background was “particularly relevant.”   
 
The prosecutor then asked if P.A. could follow the court’s instructions that 
she must consider all of the factors in mitigation and in aggravation before she 
 
20
reached her verdict; she answered she could.  The court asked if she would fairly, 
objectively and impartially evaluate evidence offered in mitigation and in 
aggravation, and if she would consider that evidence before making her choice of 
penalty and “not focus just on the crime itself?”  She answered, “Okay.”  The 
court also asked her if there were “certain categories of crimes” that deserved the 
death penalty, or if she would reach a verdict “based on the evidence of this 
particular case?”  She answered, “I think the degree of violence.  . . . I just feel in 
my heart that if somebody is — does something so bad that they should deserve to 
die also.”  
 
Defendant then asked, “ Are there those cases which the facts are such that 
you can’t consider character and background, that there are cases so bad people 
deserve to die . . . whether or not you’re told as a matter of law you have to 
consider [defendant’s background and character]?”  P.A. gave a lengthy answer to 
the last question,7 after which the court said, “All right.  I think we’ve sufficiently 
probed that matter.”   
 
Defendant asked no further questions, and the court thereafter denied 
defendant’s challenge for cause.  P.A. served on the jury.   
                                              
7  
P.A. answered, “I don’t know.  I honestly have to say I don’t know what 
kind of information that I would receive that would make me make a decision one 
way or the other on that.  You know, I can’t say that the character information 
that’s given to me, that I need to weigh that, something that I have to do 
personally and make a decision on that, compared to the evidence, the crime or the 
degree of the crime.  I was not aware of the character part of it that the judge just 
explained.  I would have to rethink that.  It can’t be just black and white.  Maybe 
the court is going to tell us we have to look at the person and what they have done 
that’s been maybe the good, the bad, we have to kind of weigh it, and it’s our 
choice to weigh how important it is.  So I can’t say by your question that — and 
I’m sorry I’m not real clear — that the death penalty I would waive, definitely 
would waive depending on their character.  I can’t give you an exact answer.” 
 
21
 
Defendant now argues that in stating, “we’ve sufficiently probed that 
matter,” the court refused to allow him to determine if any particular type of crime 
would impair P.A.’s ability to render a fair judgment in this case.  Defendant did 
not ask P.A. any other questions, nor did he ask the court to clarify the scope of its 
ruling; hence, he cannot complain on appeal that the court denied him the 
opportunity to ask P.A. if any particular type of crime would impair her ability to 
render a fair judgment in this case. 
 
In any event, we conclude defendant was not limited in his ability to assess 
P.A.’s views on the death penalty.  The queries of the court, the prosecutor and 
defense counsel together sufficiently covered the issue of whether or not there 
were any types of crimes for which P.A. would invariably vote for the death 
penalty.  These questions did, in fact, cover the area defendant now claims the 
court precluded him from exploring.   
 
3.  Prospective Juror D.O.  
 
Finally, defendant argues the court erred by restricting defendant’s 
questions of Prospective Juror D.O.   
 
Defense counsel told Prospective Juror D.O. that in this case “there are two 
choices.”  “[I]n arriving at one of those two choices you have to consider a 
multitude of things; that you can’t just consider the crime itself, that you have to 
consider other factors that might be offered to you in mitigation that have nothing 
to do with the crime itself specifically,” “like whether Mr. Hamilton has made a 
contribution to society, could continue to do so, that sort of thing.  The law says 
that you must consider it.  It doesn’t tell you how much weight you have to give it 
but you must consider it.”  “If your mind is such that you really can’t consider it, 
that you’ll listen to it but you can’t consider it, . . . you can’t sit as a juror.”  
 
Prospective Juror D.O. replied that he “can consider, I will adhere to the 
law of California.”  
 
22
 
Defense counsel then asked, “So there’s no crime in your opinion, or is 
there, is there a threshold level that’s so heinous, you don’t care what good works 
a man has done that’s . . .”  D.O. answered, “Yeah.  The Oklahoma City bombing.  
They prove those guys guilty, I mean, I’m sorry.  They kill a bunch of kids and a 
bunch of people that have, you know, no business being dead.  And do it in that 
kind of senseless, violent way, I would have very little trouble, you know, sitting 
in a penalty phase of that one because it would be over.  Sorry about that if it 
sounds strong.”  
 
Defense counsel then asked, “So if in this instance you were moved to that 
level of personal abhorrence over the crime — not saying the facts were the same, 
but if you were moved to that level of personal abhorrence over the crime, you’re 
telling us from your heart that you cannot consider anything about Mr. Hamilton’s 
personal life, whatever good works he did?”  The prosecutor objected to the 
question on the grounds that it asked D.O. to prejudge the case; the court sustained 
the objection.  (See People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, 719–720.)  Defense 
counsel asked again, “Well, what I’m really trying to find out, in reality, deep in 
your heart, knowing how you feel about the Oklahoma City case, can you in good 
conscience tell Mr. Hamilton that you can in reality consider personal factors in 
his life, or is it your state of mind such that given a certain set of facts, if you’re 
moved to a certain point you’re not going to think about them?”   
 
The prosecutor objected again on the same grounds; the court sustained the 
objection.  Defense counsel then asked, “Can you in this case forget about facts 
specific — can you, when you sit there, really consider factors about the defendant 
himself independently of the crime?”  D.O. answered that he could.  The court 
thereafter denied defendant’s motion to excuse D.O. for cause (see II.C.6., ante) 
and defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse him.  
 
23
 
Defendant now argues the court improperly restricted voir dire in that he 
was prohibited from gauging what would be the threshold level of abhorrence to a 
crime that would preclude D.O. from being able to consider factors in mitigation.   
 
We agree with defendant that the court was mistaken when it sustained the 
objections to his questions, but disagree that the mistake violated due process or 
the mandates of People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, 719–720.  Contrary to the 
court’s ruling, defendant’s questions did not ask D.O. to prejudge the facts of this 
case — with the exception of the court’s initial description that this case involved 
“a first degree murder under special circumstances [and] the related crimes of 
robbery, kidnapping and burglary,” none of the voir dire of D.O., and neither of 
the two restricted questions, contained any direct or indirect references to the facts 
of this case.  But, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the restricted questions did not 
attempt to get D.O. to place this case somewhere on a relative scale of abhorrence 
upon which the Oklahoma City bombing was at the top, a question which would 
improperly have asked D.O. to prejudge the case.  Rather, the restricted questions 
asked D.O. if, in this case, he were to be moved to the same level of abhorrence he 
felt with regard to the Oklahoma City bombing case, would he or would he not be 
able to consider any factors offered in mitigation.  In essence, the restricted 
questions merely mirrored back to D.O. his own stated sentiments that the 
Oklahoma City bombing case would be the kind of crime for which he knew he 
could not consider any factors in mitigation.  This line of inquiry did not ask D.O. 
to prejudge the case, but also was not highly relevant to D.O.’s qualification to be 
a juror — the questions asked if D.O. could or could not follow the court’s 
instructions, that he must consider the factors in mitigation, under circumstances 
that admittedly were not present in this case.  (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
at p. 424 [prospective jurors may be excused for cause when their views on capital 
 
24
punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties 
as jurors].)   
 
Thus, the court was incorrect in concluding that the questions improperly 
asked D.O. to prejudge the case, but the court did not abuse its discretion in 
restricting the questioning.  The restricted questions were not highly relevant, and 
defendant was not limited thereby in his ability to assess D.O.’s views on the 
death penalty or thoughts on his ability to be a fair juror.   
B.  Excusal for Cause of Prospective Juror W.B. 
 
Defendant next contends the trial court erroneously excused for cause 
Prospective Juror W.B. after voir dire concerning his views on the death penalty.  
We see no error.   
 
“ ‘The state and federal constitutional guarantees of a trial by an impartial 
jury include the right in a capital case to a jury whose members will not 
automatically impose the death penalty for all murders, but will instead consider 
and weigh the mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate sentence.’  
(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910; accord, People v. Crittenden 
[(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83,] 120–121.)  However, a ‘juror may be challenged for cause 
based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views 
would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of the juror’s duties as 
defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 338–339.)   
 
“ ‘ “Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter 
falling within the broad discretion of the trial court.  [Citation.]  The trial court 
must determine whether the prospective juror will be ‘unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law in the case.’  [Citation.]  A juror will often give 
conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to 
serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror’s responses in deciding whether to 
 
25
remove the juror for cause.  The trial court’s resolution of these factual matters is 
binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]  
‘[W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective 
juror’s ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court’s determination as to his 
true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]” ’  
(People v. Boyette [(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381,] 416; accord, People v. Moon (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 1, 14.)”  (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 339.)  “In other 
words, the reviewing court generally must defer to the judge who sees and hears 
the prospective juror, and who has the ‘definite impression’ that he is biased, 
despite a failure to express clear views.”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 970, 1007.)  The United States Supreme Court recently explained: 
“Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the 
demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical 
importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.”  
(Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. ___, ___ [127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224].) 
 
Prospective Juror W.B. made statements during voir dire that suggested he 
could be fair to both sides and had not foreclosed the possibility of returning a 
verdict of either death or life without the possibility of parole.  In his answers to 
the juror questionnaire, however, he indicated he was opposed to the death 
penalty,8 and when pressed further by both parties and the court, he gave 
                                              
8  
Each prospective juror completed a questionnaire.  For reasons that are not 
explained in the record, the questionnaire completed by Prospective Juror W.B. is 
not a part of the record on appeal.  His answers, however, are reflected in part in 
the voir dire conducted by the court.  Question 44 of the questionnaire asked, “Do 
you support or oppose the death penalty?”  The trial court’s questions during voir 
dire indicated that W.B.’s answer to question 44 was that he was opposed to the 
death penalty. 
 
26
conflicting and ambiguous answers.  The trial court asked if he could ever actually 
return a verdict of death.  W.B. replied, “No, sir.”  He explained that he believed 
“there were better ways of doing it, even though we haven’t come up with one.  
Not to say that I couldn’t be opposed to it.”  He then stated, “It really doesn’t serve 
a purpose.  I mean an eye for an eye, . . . what does an eye for an eye mean?”  The 
court asked, “Realistically, then, do you think you would always choose the other 
choice, the other option of life without possibility of parole?”  W.B. answered, 
“Yes.”  The court asked, “The [P]eople here don’t really have any realistic chance 
of persuading [you to] return a death verdict, do they?”  W.B. replied, “There’s 
always that possibility.  You know, it depends on the situation.  But I really look at 
it is [sic] that it’s – there’s really no – life imprisonment is a better way of doing it, 
but I’m not saying that I couldn’t be convinced otherwise, but that’s the human 
side of it.”  When asked if he had thought it out pretty well, he stated, “I’ve seen 
enough death in my life.”  
 
The court granted the prosecutor’s challenge for cause.  Defendant now 
argues the court erred because even though W.B. voiced opposition to the death 
penalty, he also indicated he could still impose death in an appropriate case.  The 
record shows that W.B.’s demeanor and attitude as observed by the court revealed 
more about his opinion regarding the death penalty than what he expressed in 
words.  The court watched him as he was answering questions and decided he was 
“a man of pretty strong convictions” who did not like to appear to have a closed 
mind or to speak in absolutes and say “always” or “never,” but who, nonetheless, 
would “unequivocally put [himself] in that absolute extreme position” of always 
voting against the death penalty.  The court concluded W.B. was substantially 
impaired within the meaning of the applicable law because “realistically and 
honestly” he would not be able to give the prosecution “a fair hearing and a fair 
opportunity to at least persuade him to [vote for] the death penalty.”  In light of 
 
27
substantial evidence in support, we defer to the court’s assessment of W.B.’s 
attitudes and in the decision to excuse him for cause. 
C.  Denial of Challenges for Cause 
 
Next, defendant argues the court erred in denying his for-cause challenges 
to seven additional prospective jurors to who favored the death penalty. 
 
 
As noted, a juror may be challenged for cause if his or her views on capital 
punishment prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties, 
and the trial court has discretion to assess the juror’s qualifications and decide 
whether to remove the juror for cause.  (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
pp. 338–339.)  The reviewing court generally must defer to the judge who sees 
and hears the prospective juror.  (People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
at p. 1007.)   
 
“A defendant who claims that the trial court wrongly denied a challenge for 
cause must demonstrate that his or her right to a fair and impartial jury was 
affected.”  (People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 174.)  “To preserve an 
objection to the trial court’s failure to excuse a juror for cause, a defendant must 
(1) exercise a peremptory challenge against the juror in question, (2) exhaust all 
peremptories, and (3) express dissatisfaction with the jury as finally empanelled.”  
(People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 339.)  Defendant exhausted his 
peremptory challenges but did not communicate to the court any dissatisfaction 
with the jury selected.  Accordingly, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  As 
explained in People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at page 911, it is possible that, 
despite counsel’s initial misgivings about the composition of the jury, he 
ultimately was satisfied with the jury as sworn, and, had he expressed 
dissatisfaction, the trial court may have allowed him to exercise additional 
peremptory challenges.   
 
In any event, as explained below, his contentions lack merit.   
 
28
1. Prospective Juror P.M.   
 
Prospective Juror P.M. supported the death penalty, thought it should be 
imposed on every defendant who killed intentionally, and thought “it would have 
to be an awful, awful strong case” on behalf of defendant to sway him from voting 
for the death penalty.  He also indicated that he found it problematic that this case 
was still in the court after 16 years, asking, “why this gentleman is here.  It’s 
horrendous.  It’s  —  it’s scary to be in a room with [a] man like that.”  He 
remembered some of the details of the case from the time of its occurrence in 
1979, and thought them to be “pretty grizzly [sic].” 
 
The court denied defendant’s request to excuse Prospective Juror P.M. for 
cause, and defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse him.  Defendant 
contends P.M.’s views on the death penalty in general and this case in particular 
showed he was unable to give him a fair trial.   
 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Initially, P.M. did 
not know that for death-penalty-eligible crimes, California law allowed for an 
alternative penalty of life without the possibility of parole, or that the jurors would 
learn facts about defendant’s background, character and history and other factors 
in mitigation, in addition to the “grisly” facts of the crime he remembered from 
reports in 1979.  After being so instructed by the court, he indicated he could 
withhold judgment until he had heard all of the evidence, and once he understood 
that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole meant defendant would 
never be paroled, he indicated he could consider that sentence.  The court did not 
err in denying defendant’s challenge. 
2.  Prospective Juror P.A.   
 
As noted, Prospective Juror P.A. supported the death penalty and thought 
“the punishment should fit the crime.”  Defendant sought to excuse her for cause, 
arguing she would automatically vote for the death penalty if she found the crime 
 
29
to be “bad enough.”  In light of P.A.’s statements that “we all have to have an 
open mind, and I think I could listen to the evidence with an open mind and then 
make my decision upon the instructions that you give the jury,” and that she 
would “decide whether somebody has . . . done something so bad that they deserve 
to die based on the evidence of this particular case” and “not any other case or 
anything else,” we see no error in the court’s denial of the motion to excuse for 
cause.   
3.  Prospective Juror A.P. 
 
Prospective Juror A.P. indicated in the questionnaire that he both opposed 
and supported the death penalty, “depending on the case,” and clarified during 
voir dire that he supported the death penalty but would not impose it in every case 
and that life without the possibility of parole was also a reasonable penalty.  
 
Defense counsel asked him, “Once you’ve found out it’s a deliberate 
murder, it’s not an accident, there’s no mental defect here, the person kills another 
— at that point you have two choices.  What I want to know is do you stop right 
there and say, ‘Okay, now it’s time for the death penalty,’ or do you wait and say, 
‘No, I want to hear something about the individual himself first’?”  He answered, 
“No, I would stop and say I was for the death penalty.”  
 
The prosecutor asked, “[Defense counsel] was concerned that you’d only 
look at the crime, and if you found it was a certain kind of crime that you would 
just not look at anything else and say automatically that’s the death penalty.  Is 
that your position or not?”  A.P. answered, “That’s my position only because I 
don’t know how courtrooms are, you know.”  He indicated that he could render a 
verdict of death, but it would be “very tough,” and that “I would listen to both 
sides but I don’t like to be the judge of someone’s future.  I don’t like disputes.”  
The prosecutor explained the court would ask him to look at the evidence about 
 
30
the murder that was committed, and evidence about the man who committed the 
murder, and A.P. agreed he would “look at those fairly and rationally.” 
 
Defendant argues A.P.’s statements that he could be fair and impartial were 
only the result of leading questions by the prosecutor, and that any prospective 
juror would agree to be fair and impartial.  We disagree.  The trial court 
reasonably could conclude A.P.’s statements revealed his own concerns and 
thoughts, and were not merely expressions of agreement with the prosecutor.  We 
see no error in the denial of the motion to excuse him for cause.   
4.  Prospective Juror M.F. 
 
As noted, Prospective Juror M.F. was a mother of eight who home-
schooled her younger children, one of whom was an infant still being nursed.  She 
strongly supported the death penalty and explained, “because I believe it to be the 
correct punishment for certain crimes.  I also believe it’s best for an example it 
shows to others.  We must be responsible for all of our actions.”  
 
She gave inconsistent answers in the questionnaire, stating that she would 
not return a verdict of death in any murder case without regard to the aggravating 
or mitigating factors, but she could not think of any case in which she would be 
willing to return a verdict of life in prison without parole, and she believed the 
death penalty should be imposed on every defendant who intentionally killed the 
victim.  She explained during voir dire that when filling out the questionnaire she 
thought a defendant who received any sentence of less than death eventually 
would be released from prison, and that she made her answers “off the top of her 
head.”  After learning that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
means just that, she stated that before deciding on a sentence, she would “really 
need to weigh the evidence, . . . to hear the story,” and she could choose a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole if she “thought that was the 
appropriate choice.”  
 
31
 
On questioning by defense counsel, M.F. indicated that the robbery, 
burglary, and kidnapping and killing of a young mother were the type of crimes 
“that would make me lean in the direction of the death penalty.”  On questioning 
by the prosecutor, M.F. agreed there were intentional killings that did not warrant 
the death penalty, for example, where the father of a murdered child lies in wait 
and kills the murderer. 
 
The court denied defendant’s challenge for cause, explaining that “her 
answers were ambiguous and inconsistent within the questionnaire,” but he was 
“satisfied she’s not substantially impaired by virtue of her strong support of the 
death penalty.  She may be a strong candidate for a peremptory challenge,” but 
was not subject to excusal for cause.  
 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling.  M.F. clearly 
supported the death penalty, stating that murder during the course of a robbery 
was the type of case she thought would justify the death penalty and that she 
would lean toward the death penalty for crimes of robbery, kidnapping and murder 
of a young mother.  She did not, however, state that she would automatically vote 
for the death penalty.  She understood she would be required to listen to and weigh 
all the evidence, and indicated she could vote for life without the possibility of 
parole if she thought it was the “appropriate” sentence. 
 
In light of this evidence, we are bound to accept the trial court’s 
determination that M.F. was not subject to excusal for cause.  (People v. Bonilla, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 339.)   
5.  Prospective Juror S.L. 
 
Prospective Juror S.L. supported the death penalty but not for every murder 
case.  Question 59 of the questionnaire asked, “Does it make any difference to you 
that the victim was a white woman and the defendant is an African-American 
man?”  She answered, “As a white woman I would want to know why she was 
 
32
killed.”  When asked during voir dire to explain why the cross-racial nature of the 
crime would have such an impact on her, she stated, “I don’t know other than the 
fact that I would probably identify more with her, or might identify more with her 
because she was white.”  
 
Defendant challenged S.L. for cause, arguing that her racial identification 
with the victim impaired her ability to be a fair and impartial juror.  The court 
denied the challenge, reasoning that most people tend to identify with people of 
their own age, gender, race, and similar circumstances, but there was no indication 
that S.L.’s racial identification with the victim would impair her ability to be a fair 
and impartial juror.  
 
The record supports the court’s decision.  S.L. revealed during voir dire that 
she had mixed feelings about the death penalty and had opposed it for many years, 
but had changed her mind in recent years in light of several disturbing murder 
cases in San Diego, although she would not support the death penalty in every 
case.  She struggled with her stance on the morality of the death penalty, had 
spoken to her husband and her fellow church members about it, and admitted she 
found it very difficult to write down in words her thoughts about the death 
penalty.    She acknowledged initially she thought defendant should be put to 
death because he had already been convicted of the murder, but she indicated she 
knew very little about the case and might be persuaded to vote for life without the 
possibility of parole once she learned more.  She stated, “I’m still wavering.  I 
would have to hear everything.”  She also indicated that since the beginning of the 
jury selection process, she had been focusing on what happened to the victim and 
wondering what were the facts of the case.  
 
A reasonable inference to be drawn from S.L.’s questionnaire answer is that 
it reflected not a racial bias that would impair her ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror but, rather, an acknowledgment that there were cross-racial elements in the 
 
33
crime and that she may have had questions as to whether race played a role in the 
murder.  She apparently gave serious consideration to the morality of the death 
penalty, but the record does not reveal that any of her indecision was based on 
racial bias.   
6.  Prospective Juror D.O.  
 
Prospective Juror D.O. indicated in the questionnaire that he both supported 
and was undecided about the death penalty.  He explained that “up until the past 
five or six years, [I] was opposed to the death penalty.  I sort of felt it served no 
purpose, it wasn’t a deterrent.  Maybe I’m getting older, more conservative.  There 
are circumstances where people just revoke their rights to citizenship, revoke their 
rights to life by actions they have done.”  As noted earlier, D.O. cited as an 
example of the type of case that in his mind would always deserve the death 
penalty the Oklahoma City bombing and cases where children were killed, and 
explained further that “where someone takes the life of someone coldly and 
maliciously, I would have to assume for first degree murder.  That person most 
likely should be put to death.”  When the court explained to him that under the law 
not all first degree murderers are eligible for the death penalty, and in no case is 
the death penalty mandatory but the jury is always charged with choosing between 
life without the possibility of parole and the death penalty, D.O. stated that his 
mind would be open, he would “try to adhere to the law,” would “listen to the 
evidence” and from what he knew about this case, he “would probably be leaning 
towards the death penalty” but “that doesn’t mean I will find the death penalty.”  
 
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the record does not support an inference 
that D.O. would invariably vote for death in every case of an intentional killing.  
D.O.’s attitudes were in conflict, and although he had strong feelings about 
holding murderers responsible for their actions and he was “leaning towards the 
death penalty,” he assured the court he would consider the facts and circumstances 
 
34
of the case before making a decision as to punishment.  The record supports the 
court’s decision to deny the challenge for cause.  
7.  Prospective Juror D.A.  
 
Prospective Juror D.A. strongly supported the death penalty.  In her 
questionnaire she gave conflicting responses, both that she would consider 
evidence in mitigation and aggravation before imposing the death penalty and that 
she thought the death penalty should be imposed on every defendant who 
intentionally kills the victim.  She could not conceive of any case in which the 
defendant was eligible for the death penalty but in which she would be willing to 
return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole.  During voir dire, she 
offered different answers, stating not only that she believed the death penalty 
should not be imposed on every defendant who intentionally killed the victim, but 
also that “I just feel like when people take another person’s life, they should 
recognize at that time that they are doing this and that they should be willing to 
give up theirs, too.”  She did not think her views on the death penalty were so 
strong that she would be unable to listen to and evaluate additional evidence 
beyond those associated with the crime itself, and she could realistically conceive 
of voting for a sentence other than death once she knew more about the facts and 
circumstances of the case.  
 
Defendant challenged Prospective Juror D.A. for cause, arguing her view 
that “if you take a life, you should be willing to give up yours” indicated she 
would invariably vote for death for an intentional killing.  The court disagreed, 
reasoning that in making that statement D.A. apparently meant that, to her, “ ‘you, 
the offender, should be willing to give yours up,’ [means] realize at least that — 
you run that risk.  That may be the result.  I don’t think that necessarily translates 
into always without exception the death penalty.”  
 
35
 
Because it finds support in the record, we are bound by the trial court’s 
assessment of D.A.’s true state of mind when she made this statement.  (People v. 
Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 339.)  We therefore defer to the court’s conclusion 
that D.A.’s views on the death penalty did not impair her ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror.  (People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1007.)  
 
D.  Batson/Wheeler 
1.  Background 
 
After the excusal of prospective jurors for hardship and for cause, 77 
prospective jurors remained from the original venire panel of 300.  Of those 77 
prospective jurors, six were Black.  Before the commencement of peremptory 
challenges, defendant, who is Black, filed a motion he had written himself in 
which he sought to preemptively challenge the exclusion from the jury of “a 
cognizable group within the community,” citing People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 258, 272 (Wheeler).  The prosecutor acknowledged that the motion also 
raised issues regarding defendant’s federal constitutional rights under Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson).  The court informed defendant that his 
motion was premature and instructed him to renew the motion when the 
prosecution made an objectionable peremptory challenge.  The court also warned 
both parties that the first challenge to a Black prospective juror likely would not 
be enough to establish a design or pattern of discrimination, but that the prosecutor 
should be prepared, in any event, to offer a race-neutral justification for a 
challenge to a Black prospective juror.  
 
The prosecutor peremptorily challenged all six of the Black prospective 
jurors who were called into the jury box for general voir dire; defendant renewed 
the Batson/Wheeler motion at each instance.  No Black jurors served on the jury 
sworn to hear defendant’s case.  
 
36
 
Defendant now renews his contention that the prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges to excuse the six Black prospective jurors based solely on their race 
and the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motions, thereby violating 
his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair and impartial 
jury. 
 
It is well settled that “[a] prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to 
strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias — that is, bias against 
‘members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or 
similar grounds’ — violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury 
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, 
section 16 of the California Constitution.  (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-
277; see People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 553.)  Such a practice also 
violates the defendant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 88; see also 
People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 732.)”  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 491, 541.) 
 
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the procedure and 
standard to be used by trial courts when Batson motions challenging peremptory 
strikes are made.  “ ‘ “First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a 
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that 
showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for 
striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the 
trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful 
discrimination.” ’  [Citation.]”  (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. ___, ___ 
[128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207].)   
 
37
 
2.  Failure to Find a Prima Facie Case as to First Challenge to a 
Black Prospective Juror 
 
The prosecutor exercised his second peremptory challenge to excuse L.F., 
the only Black in the first group of 20 prospective jurors.  Defendant renewed his 
Batson/Wheeler motion, arguing that the challenge to the only Black prospective 
juror under consideration, standing alone, was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination.  The court ruled defendant had not made a prima facie 
showing and denied the motion.  The court nonetheless invited the prosecutor to 
give a further explanation of his reasons for challenging L.F.9 
 
Defendant now argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in 
denying the motion.  We disagree.  In the first stage of an inquiry under 
Batson/Wheeler, the burden rests on the defendant to “ ‘show[ ] that the totality of 
the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ”  (Johnson 
v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168; accord, Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 
U.S. 231, 239; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 96.)  Contrary to defendant’s 
assertion that the trial court had required him to show “a strong likelihood” that 
the prosecution challenged L.F. with discriminatory purpose, the court correctly 
looked for “evidence from . . . which one might draw certain inferences” of 
                                              
9  
The court asked the prosecutor to give his reasons “as a practical matter” 
“while everything is fresh in everybody’s mind” since the prosecutor had indicated 
he was going to be ready from the outset to justify whatever challenges there 
might be.  The prosecutor explained he excused L.F. because her son spent three 
years in prison for a violent crime and when discussing the crime during voir dire, 
she tried to minimize his culpability and excuse his actions by blaming the victim; 
and he thought she was not “sharp enough to handle this case,” based on the 
numerous spelling errors he found in her questionnaire.  In denying the motion, 
the court indicated it did not take into account the prosecution’s justification for 
the excusal since the defendant had not made a threshold showing for a prima 
facie case. 
 
38
discrimination, and found none.  The court reasoned that a pattern of 
discrimination was circumstantial evidence from which one might draw 
inferences, but correctly rejected defendant’s argument that the challenge of the 
only Black person subject to challenge was sufficient in and of itself to suggest a 
pattern.  (See People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 342–343 [the challenge of 
one or two jurors rarely suggests a pattern of impermissible exclusion].)  The trial 
court properly found no prima facie case of discriminatory intent with the 
challenge of L.F.   
 
3.  Denial of Batson/Wheeler Motions after Finding a Prima Facie 
Case of Discrimination 
  
 
The prosecutor thereafter challenged the second and third Black 
prospective jurors, A.M. and S.B., who were the only two Black prospective jurors 
in the group then under consideration.  Defendant again renewed the 
Batson/Wheeler motion.  The trial court found defendant had made a prima facie 
showing of discriminatory purpose in the challenge of the second and all 
subsequent Black prospective jurors, and asked the prosecutor to give his reasons 
for the challenges.10  
 
The prosecutor explained he had several reasons for challenging 
Prospective Juror A.M.:  in his view, A.M. came from a family that did not have 
“an abiding respect for the rule of law” and was not smart enough to serve on the 
jury.  Moreover, A.M. had “considerable sympathy for Black people on trial” and 
thought the justice system was unfair to Blacks.  Next, the prosecutor explained he 
                                              
10  
Defendant did not ask the court to reconsider whether the excusal of L.F. 
was made with discriminatory intent, and the court was not required to do so sua 
sponte.  (See People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 552 [although the court has 
no sua sponte duty to revisit earlier Batson/Wheeler challenges that it had 
previously denied, upon request it appropriately may do so].) 
 
39
challenged S.B. because she was young, single, less sophisticated and less mature 
than was his ideal juror; she was opposed to the death penalty and found it to be 
“the easy way out”; and she harbored a “wholly naïve view of the criminal mind.”  
 
The court found that the reasons stated were not constitutionally infirm and 
denied the Batson/Wheeler motion.  
 
The prosecutor thereafter challenged Prospective Juror C.B., the fourth 
Black prospective juror, because of her unkempt and slovenly appearance, because 
she was unemployed and the unwed 33-year-old mother of a 14-year-old boy, 
because she harbored hostility toward the police, and because she felt the death 
penalty law treated Black people unfairly.  The court found these explanations 
established race-neutral reasons for the challenges and denied the Batson/Wheeler 
motion.  
 
The prosecutor thereafter challenged Prospective Juror B.H., the fifth Black 
prospective juror, because of her youth and status as an unmarried mother of a 
two-and-a-half-year-old child. 
 
The court accepted this explanation, though it commented, “I think [the 
prosecutor’s] credibility is beginning to wear a little thin.” 
 
Finally, the prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror M.M., the sixth Black 
prospective juror, explaining that she was acquainted with one of the defense 
witnesses, expressed some hostility toward the police, had a history of arrest, had 
family members in prison, and had reservations about imposing the death penalty.  
The court found these reasons to be race neutral and denied the Batson/Wheeler 
motion.   
 
Defendant argues the court erred in finding the prosecution’s reasons to be 
race-neutral. 
 
“[T]he question presented at the third stage of the Batson inquiry is 
‘ “whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” ’  (Miller-El v. 
 
40
Dretke, 545 U.S., at 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317.)”  (Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, 552 U.S. 
___, ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1212].)  “[T]he critical question in determining whether 
[a party] has proved purposeful discrimination at step three is the persuasiveness 
of the prosecutor’s justification for his peremptory strike.”  (Miller-El v. Cockrell 
(2003) 537 U.S. 322, 338–339.)  The credibility of a prosecutor’s stated reasons 
“can be measured by, among other factors . . . how reasonable, or how 
improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some 
basis in accepted trial strategy.”  (Id. at p. 339.)   
 
The existence or nonexistence of purposeful racial discrimination is a 
question of fact.  (See Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 339–340.)  We 
review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard,11 
according deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a sincere 
and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a 
particular juror.  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104–105, citing People 
v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 
725.)  “[T]he  trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for 
the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for 
exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.”  
(People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919.)  “We presume that a prosecutor 
                                              
11  
The United States Supreme Court recently indicated that “[o]n appeal, a 
trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it 
is clearly erroneous” (Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, 552 U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at 
p. 1207] italics added, citing Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 369 
[Batson’s treatment of intent to discriminate is a pure issue of fact, subject to 
review under the “clearly erroneous” deferential standard]).  We have held that our 
“substantial evidence” standard for review of pure issues of fact is equivalent to 
the federal “clearly erroneous” standard.  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 
649; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984–988.)   
 
41
uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to 
the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.  
[Citation.]  So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to 
evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to 
deference on appeal.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 
864.)  A prosecutor’s reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge “need not rise 
to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 
at p. 97.)  “ ‘[J]urors may be excused based on “hunches” and even “arbitrary” 
exclusion is permissible, so long as the reasons are not based on impermissible 
group bias.’ ”  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1186, fn. 6.) 
a.  Prospective Juror A.M.  
 
The first reason given by the prosecutor to justify his challenge to A.M. 
was that A.M. came from a family that did not have “an abiding respect for the 
rule of law.”  Substantial evidence supports the statement, and the trial court could 
reasonably conclude it was race neutral:  During voir dire, A.M. revealed his 
brother was in prison, and his daughter had been arrested for receiving stolen 
property and evidently prosecuted by the San Diego County District Attorney’s 
Office.  
 
The next reason given by the prosecutor was that A.M. had “considerable 
sympathy for Black people on trial” and thought the justice system was unfair to 
Blacks.  Defense counsel argued that rather than being race neutral, the challenge 
of A.M. because of his attitudes about the treatment of Blacks in the justice system 
was itself race based.  The court correctly ruled that a challenge based solely on 
the prospective juror’s race is different from a challenge “which may find its roots 
in part [in] the juror’s attitude about the justice system and about society which 
may be race related.”  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 1016 [a party does not offend Batson or Wheeler when it challenges prospective 
 
42
jurors who have shown orally, in writing, or through conduct in court, that they 
personally harbor biased views].)  Substantial evidence supports the statement, 
and the trial court reasonably could conclude it was race neutral:  A.M. did not 
expressly state as much, but his answers to three questions on the juror 
questionnaire indicate he harbored a skepticism regarding the fairness of the 
treatment of Blacks within the criminal justice system.  Question 57 asked, “Do 
you believe the death penalty law is administered fairly with respect to [Black 
men]?”  A.M. did not check either the “Yes” or “No” response, but wrote, “Will 
all the facts be brought out for the jury?”  When asked in question 58 to explain 
why he thought Blacks make up a larger percentage of the prison population than 
of the general population, A.M. answered, “In some cases the law is bias [sic].”  
Finally, question 75 asked, “What do you believe are the major causes of crime in 
our society?”  A.M. answered, “Society bias.  Parents give a care attitude [sic]. 
 
The final reason given by the prosecutor was that A.M. had not risen above 
the rank of Petty Officer First Class after serving 20 years in the Navy.  The 
prosecutor suggested that the reason for that was either A.M. was not smart 
enough to pass the tests that would have allowed him to rise in the ranks, or he 
may have felt he was discriminated against in the Navy because of his race, which 
the prosecutor linked to A.M.’s attitudes toward the treatment of Blacks in the 
justice system.  The record reflects that A.M. did not graduate from high school 
and spent 20 years in the Navy as a Petty Officer First Class.  Viewing these 
characteristics of A.M. in the light of his answers pertaining to his family’s legal 
difficulties and his apparent sympathy for a Black defendant, the trial court’s 
ruling that challenge of A.M. was unrelated to his race is supported by substantial 
evidence.   
 
43
 
The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests12 does not further his 
claim.  He suggests that seated Juror J.R., who was not Black, harbored an attitude 
similar to that of A.M. regarding the role race plays in the judicial system.  He 
points to the portion of the record where the prosecutor discussed with the entire 
panel the verdict in the O.J. Simpson trial and the racial issues that arose therein.    
The prosecutor asked if there were any jurors for whom “the situation in the O.J. 
Simpson verdict caused you to rethink your position regarding this case? . . . That 
was a Black jury.  Here as you look around you see this is a predominantly White 
jury.  Anybody here that thinks race may play a role in this case?”  J.R. answered, 
“The question I have is, if an all White jury would be truly of Mr. Hamilton’s 
peers?”  The court explained that J.R. should not be concerned with that fact 
“unless you think that would prevent you from being . . . a fair and impartial 
juror.”  J.R. replied, “It will not affect my decision.  It was a question I had.”  
Defendant asserts J.R.’s question revealed an attitude about race and the judicial 
system that was no different from that harbored by A.M. 
 
Not so.  J.R.’s question revealed a curiosity about how the law defines “a 
jury of one’s peers,” and, inferentially, a concern that an all-White jury might treat 
defendant differently than a diverse jury.  The record reveals that A.M.’s attitude 
toward race and the judicial system was not just a curiosity or a concern, but 
amounted to a belief that the law and society were biased, and a lack of trust that 
the justice system would bring to light all the facts regarding a Black defendant.  
                                              
12  
Comparative juror analysis must be performed for the first time on appeal 
on review of claims of error at Wheeler/Batson’s third stage, as here, when the 
defendant relies on such evidence, and when the record is adequate to permit the 
comparisons.  (See People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 607.)  The reviewing 
court need only consider responses by stricken panelists or seated jurors identified 
by the defendant in the claim of disparate treatment.  (Id. at p. 624.)  
 
44
Comparing A.M. to J.R., therefore, does not show that the prosecutor challenged a 
Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did a non-Black juror he did 
not challenge.   
b.  Prospective Juror S.B. 
 
The prosecutor stated he challenged S.B. because she was young and 
single.   
The record reveals S.B. was 22 years old and unmarried.  The 
prosecutor explained he did not want unsophisticated, immature jurors, since he 
thought the case would “definitely appeal more to married people and particularly 
married people with children.”  His ideal juror would be between the ages of 40 
and 65, although he would accept otherwise acceptable jurors who were over 30 
years of age.  
 
We need not examine the objective reasonableness of the prosecutor’s  
stated basis for the challenge of S.B., namely his desire to exclude younger jurors.  
The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry is on the subjective genuineness of 
the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective 
reasonableness of those reasons.  (See People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 917, citing Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 769 [the prosecutor’s reason 
for thinking a prospective juror would not make a good juror in the case — that 
the prospective juror had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard — 
constituted a valid nondiscriminatory reason for exercising the challenge].)  What 
matters is that the prosecutor’s reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is 
legitimate.  A “ ‘legitimate reason’ is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason 
that does not deny equal protection.  [Citation.]”  (514 U.S. at p. 769.)  Neither the 
United States Supreme Court nor this court has held that the exercise of 
peremptory strikes on the basis of age violates the Constitution.  (U.S. v. Maxwell 
(6th Cir. 1998) 160 F.3d 1071, 1075; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 278.)  
 
45
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor’s desire for a more 
mature jury was not genuine.   
 
Substantial evidence also supports the prosecutor’s contentions that S.B. 
was opposed to the death penalty and harbored a “wholly naïve view of the 
criminal mind,” and the trial court reasonably could conclude they were race 
neutral.  S.B. wrote in her questionnaire that she opposed the death penalty 
because she felt “it is the easy way out for a person who committed a crime.  If 
one is guilty then I believe that he or she should get life in prison.  So they can 
remember for the rest of their lives, the crime that he or she has committed.”  In 
voir dire, she elaborated, “I think either way it would be the easy way out, whether 
he was in jail or if he died, because if he had no conscience he really wouldn’t care 
where he was at the time.”  
 
Thus, S.B.’s questionnaire and voir dire answers suggested she was not in 
the prosecutor’s ideal age group, and might not be inclined to agree with his 
argument that the death penalty was the most severe of punishments.   
 
The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests does not further his 
claim.  He points out the prosecutor did not challenge Alternate Juror J.S. even 
though, at age 23, she was only a year older than S.B., whom the prosecutor found 
objectionable at age 22.  The record, however, reveals that unlike S.B., J.S. had 
characteristics apart from her age that were positive factors in the prosecutor’s 
assessment of an ideal juror:  J.S. was married and supported the death penalty.  
Comparing S.B. to J.S., therefore, does not show that the prosecutor challenged a 
Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did a non-Black juror he did 
not challenge.  Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination 
that the prosecutor challenged S.B. for reasons not related to her race.   
 
46
c.  Prospective Juror C.B.  
 
The prosecutor explained he challenged C.B. because she was unkempt and 
slovenly in appearance, she was unemployed and the unwed 33-year-old mother of 
a 14-year-old boy, she harbored hostility toward the police and favoritism toward 
the defense, and she felt that the death penalty law treated Black people unfairly.  
 
Substantial evidence supports the prosecutor’s contentions, and the trial 
court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral.  According to the 
prosecutor, C.B. stood out from all the other jurors because “[s]he dressed in a 
way which is extraordinary for somebody of her age.  She’s 33 years old but she 
dressed like a 15-year-old, with baggy clothes . . . very unkempt and slovenly 
looking person.”  We can assume this description was accurate, as neither the 
court nor defense counsel challenged it.  
 
The record reveals C.B. did not respond to question 44, which asked if she 
supported or opposed the death penalty, but later indicated that she would support 
the death penalty “depending on the circumstances that led up to the crime.”  She 
answered only “Confidential” to question 57, which asked if she thought the death 
penalty was administered fairly with respect to Blacks, and to question 58, which 
asked her to explain why Blacks make up a larger percentage of the prison 
population than of the general population.  She explained further during voir dire 
that she thought the number of Blacks in prison “probably has a lot to do with the 
way Blacks are treated and are still treated, and probably a lot of themselves [sic].”  
When asked in question 83 what she thought was the role of a defense attorney, 
she wrote, “I hope he knows what he’s doing.”  She explained during voir dire that 
she meant, “I don’t put much hope in the legal system.”  When asked during voir 
dire why she didn’t give an answer to question 82, which asked her attitude 
toward the prosecuting attorney, she answered, “Probably didn’t pay attention to 
— just wanted to get out of here.” 
 
47
 
The record thus suggests that C.B.’s appearance revealed characteristics 
legitimately undesirable to the prosecutor, and her answers hinted she might have 
harbored a bias in favor of a Black defendant and against the prosecution.  Thus, 
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that the prosecutor challenged 
C.B. for reasons unrelated to her race.  
d.  Prospective Juror B.H. 
 
The prosecutor explained he challenged B.H. because of her youth and her 
status as a single mother.   
 
Substantial evidence supports the prosecutor’s contentions, and the trial 
court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral.  B.H. was 24 years old 
and the unmarried mother of a two-and-a-half-year-old child.  She was therefore 
younger than the prosecutor’s ideal juror, and would not appear to represent 
traditional “family values” as did Eleanore and Terry Buchanan.  
 
The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests does not further his 
claim.  He points to C.M., who was White and who served as a juror.  C.M. 
indicated in the questionnaire that she had been married and divorced twice and 
was then “living with [a] domestic partner or significant other.”  Defendant argues 
that, by “living out of wedlock,” C.M., like B.H., also failed to represent the 
traditional “family values” the prosecutor sought in his ideal jurors.  The record 
reveals, however, that C.M. had other characteristics that were positive factors in 
the prosecutor’s assessment of an ideal juror:  She was 44 years old and supported 
the death penalty.  Comparing B.H. to C.M., therefore, does not show that the 
prosecutor challenged a Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did 
a White juror he did not challenge. 
 
Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that the 
prosecutor challenged B.H. for reasons unrelated to her race. 
 
48
e.  Prospective Juror M.M. 
 
The prosecutor explained he challenged M.M. because she was acquainted 
with one of the defense witnesses, expressed some hostility toward the police, had 
a history of arrest, had family members in prison, and had reservations about 
imposing the death penalty.   
 
Substantial evidence supports the prosecutor’s contentions, and the trial 
court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral.  M.M. indicated that 
defense witness Reverend Forest Hancock had officiated at her fiancé’s funeral.  
While her nephew was living with her, police had arrested but not charged M.M. 
for possession of a stolen handgun.  At the time of jury selection, one of her 
nephews was in prison in Texas for murder, and a second nephew was in jail in 
San Diego on drug charges.  She indicated she would “feel more comfortable” if 
someone other than herself made the decision regarding the imposition of the 
death penalty and she agreed with the prosecutor’s assessment that she had 
“serious reservations about [her] ability to impose the death penalty on anybody, 
even though [she] support[ed] it.”  
 
The record thus suggests M.M. might be sympathetic to a defendant whom 
the police had arrested for a crime but who professed his innocence, or who was 
charged with a crime of violence, and might have difficulty returning a death 
verdict, all characteristics that would not appeal to the prosecution.   
 
Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that the 
prosecutor challenged M.M. for reasons unrelated to her race.   
 
4.  Trial Court’s Evaluation of Prosecutor’s Reasons 
 
Finally, defendant claims the trial court failed to make a careful assessment 
of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for challenging the Black prospective jurors and 
instead simply accepted the prosecutor’s rationale.  We disagree.   
 
49
 
When ruling on a Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court must make “a 
sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation in light of 
the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, 
and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined 
members of the venire and has exercised challenges for cause or 
peremptorily . . . .”  (People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167–168.)  The court 
need not make affirmative inquiries, but must determine whether the prosecutor’s 
reason for exercising peremptory challenges is sincere and legitimate in the sense 
of being nondiscriminatory.  (People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th 903, 920, 924.) 
 
At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down 
to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be 
credible.  Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s 
demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by 
whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.’  (Miller-
El [v. Cockrell], supra, 537 U.S. at p. 339.)  In assessing credibility, the court 
draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire.  It may also rely on 
the court’s own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and 
even the common practices of the advocate and the office who employs him or 
her.  (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)”  (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 
Cal.4th 602, 613, fn. omitted.)  “When reasons are given for the exercise of 
challenges, an advocate must ‘stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he 
gives.’  [Citation.]  The plausibility of those reasons will be reviewed, but not 
reweighed, in light of the entire record.  [Citation.]”  (Id., at p. 621.) 
 
Defendant first argues the court failed to conduct a sincere and reasoned 
evaluation of the prosecutor’s explanation that he challenged B.H. because she 
 
50
was a young, single mother.  Not so.  The court listened to the lengthy arguments 
offered by both parties,13 accepted the prosecutor’s explanation as to why he 
challenged B.H. but did not challenge A.P., who was also under the age of 30, but 
thereafter warned the prosecutor, “I think [your] credibility is beginning to wear a 
little thin . . . on these explanations.  I’ll accept this one.  I still think we’re not at a 
point where I can say it’s constitutionally infirm because it was based solely on 
race but getting close, getting close.”  This warning by the court reveals, not that 
the court abdicated its responsibility and accepted the prosecutor’s rationale, as the 
defense would have us conclude, but rather that the court listened to the arguments 
and weighed the facts known about B.H. against the prosecutor’s desires to have a 
mature jury, and decided that, although it was a close call, the prosecutor’s reasons 
were legitimate.   
 
Defendant next argues the court failed to conduct a sincere and reasoned 
evaluation of the prosecutor’s explanation that he challenged A.M. because he 
came from a family that did not have an abiding respect for the rule of law, had 
considerable sympathy for Black people on trial, and was not smart enough to 
serve as a juror on this case.  Not so.   
                                              
13  
The prosecutor explained why he did not want any jurors under the age of 
30, and why he considered B.H. to be too immature, emotionally unconnected and 
bereft of sufficient life experience to be a juror on this case.  The defense 
questioned the genuineness of that explanation and pointed out that the 
prosecution had not challenged Prospective Juror A.P., who, at 25 years old, was 
also younger than the prosecutor’s ideal juror.  The prosecutor explained the 
decision to pass on A.P. was a tactical one aimed at forcing the defense to use a 
peremptory challenge to excuse him.  The defense had unsuccessfully moved to 
excuse A.P. for cause, and the prosecutor correctly guessed that the defense would 
not leave him on the jury but would peremptorily excuse him. 
 
51
 
The record reveals that the court initially characterized A.M. as a 
pro-death-penalty juror who, “at least on the surface,” would be attractive to the 
prosecution.  The prosecutor explained that he, too, found A.M. to have 
characteristics that were both attractive and unattractive to both parties and while 
he had intended to try to gain a tactical advantage over the defense by initially 
passing on A.M. and letting the defense use a peremptory challenge to excuse him, 
he made a mistake and challenged A.M. early on in the selection process.  He 
nevertheless defended the challenge, explaining that he was ultimately moved to 
challenge A.M. when he reviewed his answers related to racial bias in the justice 
system and decided “he has a racial issue that makes him a very dangerous juror 
for me.”  The court then pointed out that A.M.’s attitudes on race in the justice 
system were set out in writing in his answers in the questionnaire and were 
therefore “something more than sheer speculation.”  We infer from this statement 
that the court reviewed the prosecutor’s reasons and decided they were legitimate.  
 
Finally, defendant argues the court failed to make a sincere and reasoned 
evaluation of the prosecutor’s explanation that he challenged M.M. because she 
had reservations about imposing the death penalty.  Not so.  When the prosecutor 
stated that M.M. “has very serious reservations about imposing the death penalty 
on anyone,” the court challenged the prosecutor’s memory, stating, “I didn’t recall 
that” and “in my own review of her questionnaire I had her indicated as supportive 
of the death penalty.”  The prosecutor referred the court to the transcript where 
M.M. stated, “I would just feel more comfortable if someone else did it,” and 
where she answered, “Right” to his question, “I understand that answer to mean 
you have serious reservations about your ability to impose the death penalty on 
anybody, even though you support it?”  The court acknowledged that the 
prosecutor “may have read certain reactions on her part differently that you and I 
did,” but stated, “I don’t think I have any legitimate reason to question his . . . 
 
52
impression, despite what she said in the questionnaire, for her personally to 
actually do it would be difficult.  I’m not in a position to counter that.  I came to 
the same conclusion you did I think from reading the questionnaire.”  We infer 
from this record that the court listened to M.M. and read her questionnaire, formed 
its own opinion about her qualifications, challenged the prosecutor’s interpretation 
of her answers in voir dire, and thereafter acknowledged that the record could 
support the prosecutor’s position.  In doing so, the court reviewed the plausibility 
of the prosecutor’s stated reasons and decided they were legitimate.14 
                                              
14  
Hamilton also argues the trial court erred by applying too lenient a standard 
to its assessment of the prosecution’s motives, requiring Hamilton to demonstrate 
that race was the “sole” motive behind each peremptory strike.  While it is true 
that the trial court at various points explained it was allowing peremptories 
because it concluded they were not based “solely on race,” our careful review of 
the context of these statements leads us to conclude the trial court was not 
expressing a belief that race was one among several motives for these 
peremptories.  Instead, it appears in each instance that the trial court considered 
whether race or the prosecution’s proffered justification better explained the 
challenged peremptory, concluded the proffered justification was not pretextual, 
and on that basis denied the Batson/Wheeler motion.  As substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s conclusions, it is unnecessary to consider here whether 
the trial court erred in failing to apply a mixed motive analysis to any of the 
challenged peremptories.  (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 276-277 
[finding it unnecessary in light of the record to decide whether a mixed-motive 
peremptory challenge could constitute a constitutional violation]; cf. Snyder v. 
Louisiana (2008) ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. 1203, 1212] [recognizing open question 
whether mixed-motive precedents applied to Batson claim, but finding it 
unnecessary to resolve question where discriminatory intent was at least a but-for 
cause for the challenged strike].) 
 
53
III.  TRIAL 
A.  Trial Court’s Refusal to Allow Evidence of Inconsistent Theories of 
Guilt 
 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in not allowing him to ask the 
prosecutor or the defense counsel from the first trial questions regarding the 
prosecution’s theory at that trial about how the killer placed the victim’s body 
within the Buchanans’ van when he transported it to Pine Valley.  He argues the 
theory in the first trial differed significantly from that of the penalty retrial, and 
exposure of the alleged differences, and therefore exposure of the weaknesses in 
the prosecution’s case, was relevant to his defense of lingering doubt.  Exclusion 
of this evidence, he argues, violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a 
reliable penalty verdict.   
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proffered 
evidence was irrelevant. 
 
Defendant’s lingering doubt defense rested in large part on his challenges 
to the prosecution’s forensic evidence.  He presented evidence at the penalty 
retrial regarding the efforts of his investigators and attorneys to recreate the scene 
in which the decapitated body was placed in the van in the only position they 
assumed was possible for the body to have deposited the blood where it was found 
under the couch seat; their conclusions that such placement would have left 
injuries and marks on the body; and evidence that the body did not have such 
injuries and marks.  Defendant offered the opinion of Criminalist Joseph Orantes 
that, based on the patterns of blood within the van, the lack of particular markings 
that should have been left on the body had it been pressed against the wheel well 
or spare tire, the small number of fibers found on the body, and the configuration 
of the seats and wheel well within the van, the victim’s body could not have been 
transported in the van on top of the wheel well, as described by prosecution 
 
54
Criminalist Brandon Armstrong, because the body would not fit on the wheel well 
and allow the couch seat to be lowered to a seated position.  Orantes offered his 
opinion that the amount and placement of blood in the wheel well was more 
consistent with the perpetrator’s having transported only the victim’s head in the 
van.  Defendant offered a theory that the real killer or killers transported the body 
to Pine Valley in another vehicle and put the head and hands under the van’s 
couch seat while en route to dispose of them in a separate location, but shortly 
thereafter abandoned the van when it ran out of gas; defendant was merely 
unlucky enough to have stolen the van after it had been abandoned on Tait Street 
by the killers. 
 
The prosecution’s theory at the penalty retrial was that defendant 
transported the victim’s body to Pine Valley in the Buchanans’ van.  Criminalist 
Brandon Armstrong testified the blood left in the van and on defendant’s shoe was 
consistent with that of the victim; the blue fibers found on the victim’s abdomen, 
feet and exposed bone were consistent with the carpet in the van; and the patterns 
of blood inside the van were consistent with the victim’s body being placed on top 
of the wheel well or spare tire inside the van during transportation.  In his opinion, 
there was enough room to place a body on top of the spare tire in the space 
beneath the couch seat to allow the couch seat to be fully lowered to a seated 
position, in effect concealing the body inside the van. 
 
Defendant contended that this theory in the penalty retrial, that the body 
was placed on top of the wheel well or spare tire, differed significantly from that in 
the first trial, where, defendant asserts, the prosecution theorized “the body was 
laying on its stomach in the van . . . . And the neck and shoulders were raised up 
against the wheel well.  That is why the blood is there.”  The prosecution objected 
when defendant attempted to ask both Frank Sexton, the prosecutor in the first 
trial who testified for the prosecution in the penalty retrial, and Thomas Ryan, 
 
55
defense counsel in the first trial who testified for defendant at the penalty retrial, 
questions regarding the prosecution’s theory in the first trial about how the killer 
placed the body inside the van.  The court found the proffered evidence to be 
irrelevant and sustained the objections.  
 
Defendant now argues the court erred in not allowing him to expose “the 
inconsistent theories of guilt” between the first trial and the penalty retrial.  He 
cites as authority United States v. GAF Corp. (2d Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 1253, 1260, 
which held, “Confidence in the justice system cannot be affirmed if any party is 
free, wholly without explanation, to make a fundamental change in its version of 
the facts between trials, and then conceal this change from the final trier of the 
facts.”   
 
The trial court did not err.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the evidence 
in the first trial was not “substantially different” from that in the penalty retrial, 
nor did the prosecution present inconsistent theories of guilt in the two trials.  The 
prosecution’s argument that the killer transported the body in the van did not rely 
on a precise determination of how he placed the body within the van.  The 
prosecutor in the penalty retrial acknowledged as much in closing argument when 
he stated, “We don’t know exactly how — we don’t know exactly what was done 
with the head or the hands, nobody has ever seen them.  And it’s very possible, in 
fact likely, that the body, the head and the hands were all transported in that van.  
There’s no reason whatsoever that you couldn’t lay the body out there, put the 
head there and maybe one of the hands. . . . Did the body rest on the spare tire?  
Again we don’t know for sure.  There’s some indication that it did.”  The 
prosecution’s theories in the first trial and the penalty retrial — that the killer 
transported the body to Pine Valley in the van — remained consistent.  The 
evidence at the first trial and the penalty retrial — Brandon Armstrong’s testimony 
that the blood in the van was that of the victim and the fibers on the victim’s body 
 
56
were from the van — remained consistent.  The prosecution did not make a 
fundamental change in its version of the facts between trials.  The court did not, 
therefore, err in refusing to allow evidence or argument regarding inconsistent 
theories of guilt.   
B.  Exclusion of Evidence Designed to Raise Lingering Doubt  
 
Defendant next asserts the trial court erred in excluding significant 
evidence relevant to his defense of lingering doubt.  He argues the error violated 
his federal and state constitutional rights to due process, to present a defense, to 
compulsory process, and to a fair and reliable determination of penalty.  We 
disagree.   
 
Although a capital defendant has no federal constitutional right to have the 
jury consider lingering doubt in choosing the appropriate penalty (People v. Gay 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195, 1220), evidence of the circumstances of the offense, 
including evidence that may create a lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt of 
the offense, is admissible at a penalty retrial as a factor in mitigation under section 
190.3 (42 Cal.4th at pp. 1218–1220).  “The ‘circumstances of the crime’ as used in 
section 190.3, factor (a), ‘does not mean merely the immediate temporal and 
spatial circumstances of the crime.  Rather it extends to “[t]hat which surrounds 
materially, morally, or logically” the crime.’ ”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
686, 749.)  
 
A defendant, however, has no right to introduce evidence not otherwise 
admissible at the penalty phase for the purpose of creating a doubt as to his or her 
guilt.  (See People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 750; People v. Gay, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 1220.)  “ ‘The test for admissibility is not whether the evidence tends 
to prove the defendant did not commit the crime, but, whether it relates to the 
circumstances of the crime or the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.’  
[Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 1223.)  The evidence must not be unreliable (People v. Blair, 
 
57
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 750), incompetent, irrelevant, lack probative value, or 
solely attack the legality of the prior adjudication (People v. Terry (1964) 61 
Cal.2d 137, 144, 145, fn. 5; People v. Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1219).  Error in 
admitting or excluding evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial is reversible 
if there is “a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict.”  (People v. Lancaster 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 94; see People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1144-
1145.)   
1. Testimony of Joseph Orantes 
 
Defendant first asserts the trial court erred in excluding the opinion of 
Criminalist Joseph Orantes that the fact the killer dismembered or otherwise 
disfigured the victim would tend to suggest that he sought to hide the victim’s 
identity, which in turn would tend to suggest that he knew the victim.  Orantes 
would have testified that, sometime “in the early 1980’s,” during a crime 
laboratory directors association meeting at FBI headquarters in Quantico, Virginia, 
he attended a four-hour presentation on the “elements of criminal profiling” in 
which he learned that the presenters from the FBI had observed in “a number of 
cases” that when a victim is disfigured, it “tends to suggest that the killer knows 
the victim.”  He also would have testified to his involvement in the investigation 
of two cases in which the killer disfigured the victim and knew the victim, and one 
case in which the police suspected, but could not firmly establish, such a 
connection.  He acknowledged, however, that the information he received in the 
FBI course was anecdotal, lacked any statistical foundation, was not included in 
any published data and was intended for use only as an investigative tool, and that 
he could not remember the names or any details of the cases in which he was 
involved.  
 
The trial court correctly found the proffered testimony, based on imprecise 
facts and limited experience, lacked an adequate foundation for an expert opinion 
 
58
(see Evid. Code, § 801 [expert opinion limited to special knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, education of a type reasonably relied on]), and was 
insufficiently probative on the issue of defendant’s guilt.  Even if the court abused 
its discretion, however, defendant has not established a reasonable possibility that 
the error affected the verdict.  (People v. Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 94.)  
Defendant’s conclusion, that the dismemberment of the body had a tendency to 
prove the killer was someone other than defendant, was speculative at best.   
 
2. Testimony of Dr. Lipson 
 
Defendant’s second argument is the court erred in limiting the testimony of 
Dr. Lipson, a clinical and forensic psychologist who would have testified he 
consulted with defendant and suggested that the police should have conducted 
more investigation into Terry Buchanan as a possible suspect.  At a hearing in 
limine, Dr. Lipson testified that Terry Buchanan had a juvenile record, a Navy 
record that reflected “some events related to alcohol abuse,” and a police record 
from Las Cruces, New Mexico, related to a “documented event of domestic 
violence” involving his second wife.  He also testified that police reports revealed 
Terry told his mother he had a recurring dream in which Fran was being tortured 
with a knife to her throat.   
 
The trial court ruled the proffered evidence had little probative value and 
was not admissible as evidence of third party culpability.   
 
Defendant now argues the trial court erred, in that he offered Dr. Lipson’s 
testimony not simply to establish Terry Buchanan’s possible guilt, but to raise a 
lingering doubt by showing that the unusual circumstances of this crime made it 
unlikely that defendant was the killer and that the police conducted an inadequate 
investigation in focusing solely on defendant.  
 
We disagree.  “ ‘ “Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 
210 as evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed 
 
59
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.’  The test of 
relevance is whether the evidence tends ‘ “logically, naturally, and by reasonable 
inference” to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.  
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]  The trial court has broad discretion in determining the 
relevance of evidence [citations] but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.  
[Citations.]” ’ ”  (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167.)   
 
The trial court correctly concluded that none of the proffered evidence 
would have been relevant to defendant’s efforts to raise a lingering doubt as to his 
guilt.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the proffered evidence would not have 
established that Terry Buchanan was a viable third party suspect.  “[T]he standard 
for admitting evidence of third party culpability [is] the same as for other 
exculpatory evidence:  the evidence [has] to be relevant under Evidence Code 
section 350, and its probative value [cannot] be ‘substantially outweighed by the 
risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion’ under Evidence Code section 352.”  
(People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 685, citing People v. Hall (1986) 41 
Cal.3d 826, 833.)  “To be admissible, the third-party evidence need not show 
‘substantial proof of a probability’ that the third party committed the act; it need 
only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.  At the same 
time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to 
show a third party’s possible culpability. . . .  [E]vidence of mere motive or 
opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice 
to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt:  there must be direct or 
circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the 
crime.”  (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833.)  The proffered evidence 
regarding Terry Buchanan did nothing to connect him to the crime in any manner.  
It therefore was inadmissible as evidence of third party culpability and irrelevant 
to the issue of lingering doubt. 
 
60
 
Further, the proffered evidence would not have established that good reason 
existed for the police to suspect someone other than defendant.  Contrary to 
defendant’s assertions, the circumstances of the crime point to no one other than 
defendant as the killer of Eleanore Buchanan.  Defendant admitted he stole her 
van near the place and time her classmates last saw her alive.  Sheriff’s deputies 
found her blood on his shoe inside the van.  The route defendant drove from San 
Diego to Terrell, Texas, passed near the site where Harry Piper, the target shooter, 
discovered her dismembered body.  Defendant claimed he never saw Eleanore 
Buchanan, alive or dead, yet in early interviews with the police, he accurately 
described the clothing she wore the night of her murder.  None of the proffered 
evidence from Dr. Lipson challenged any of the evidence against defendant or 
otherwise raised a lingering doubt by suggesting that someone other than he was 
responsible for the murder. 
3.  Evidence Regarding Continuing Investigation 
 
Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing, under Evidence 
Code section 352, to allow evidence that in 1988, and 1989, years after his 1981 
conviction, the district attorney’s office conducted investigations into allegations 
that Jessie Moffett, a defendant in another murder case, bragged to others that he 
took part in the murder of Eleanore Buchanan.  Again, we find no error.   
 
Before the penalty retrial, defendant learned that in 1988, detectives of the 
San Diego Police Department interrogated one Rory Keller regarding a series of 
residential robberies.  During the interrogation, Keller told Detective Bordine that 
her boyfriend, Jessie Moffett, confessed to her that in 1979 he was involved in 
several murders, including the “one that Bernard Hamilton got blamed for.”15  
                                              
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
15  
The police report reveals the following colloquy:   
 
61
Keller also told Bordine that her mother, Geraldine Elmore, told her that a 
Clarence Horn told her defendant was at his house at the time of Eleanore 
Buchanan’s murder and therefore could not have participated in the murder.  
Investigators interviewed Geraldine Elmore in 1989.16   
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
“[Bordine]:  This other case you were telling me about?   
 
“[Keller]:  The one Bernard Hamilton got blamed for?  Were the arms and 
legs cut off the girl?  He said he was involved in that one, too.   
 
“[Bordine]:  Did he say how he was involved in that?   
 
“[Keller]:  He said, he helped kill the girl or whatever.  The girl wouldn’t 
give up some money or something like that and they were getting pissed off at her 
because she knew some dope spots or something like that.  And he was getting 
angry with her so they got mad and they cut off her arms and legs, or something 
like that.  That’s what he mentioned.  He was telling Michael and Terry.  It’s like I 
wasn’t even in the conversation.   
 
“[Bordine]:  When was this?   
 
“[Keller]:  It was in, I believe, the same day, in room 72 on Pacific 
Highway at the Budget Inn, after the security officer was killed.   
 
“[Bordine]:  Was he under the influence again?   
 
“[Keller]:  No, he was pretty straight.   
 
“[Bordine]:  Did he say that he took part in cutting her arms and legs off?  
 
“[Keller]:  That he said, that she wouldn’t give up no information on some 
money and some dope.  So, him and somebody else killed ’em, but he never 
mentioned the other person’s name.   
 
“[Bordine]:  He never mentioned Bernard Hamilton?   
 
“[Keller]:  No.”  (Italics added.) 
16  
The police report regarding the 1989 interview with Geraldine Elmore 
indicates Elmore told investigators she was addicted to crystal methamphetamine 
and that she met Jessie Moffett in 1987.  The report quoted Elmore as saying, 
“Bernard Hamilton didn’t commit that murder they got him for.  Jessie Moffett 
committed that murder because my daughter Rory told me that Moffett said that 
he did it.  [¶]  Years ago, Clarence Horn . . . told me that Bernard Hamilton was 
 
62
 
Defendant now argues the court erred in not allowing him to support his 
defense of lingering doubt by establishing, through the testimony of the 
investigators, the fact that investigation continued into the murder of Eleanore 
Buchanan years after defendant’s conviction for the crime.  
 
The trial court did not err.  The record reveals the investigators concluded 
the only evidence that might have implicated Jessie Moffett in the murder of 
Eleanore Buchanan was “this one kind of wild hair statement of Rory Keller.”  
The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding this evidence bore little 
probative value to the defense of lingering doubt and thus properly excluded it 
under Evidence Code section 352.  
C.  Evidence of Investigating Officer’s Interview with Defendant  
 
In Oklahoma on June 9, 1979, shortly after defendant’s arrest, Detective 
Norman Crawford of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department interviewed 
defendant.  After defendant twice indicated he was “ready to deal with it,” 
Detective Crawford told him, “I don’t know what it is, but like I say, you know, a 
person is, uh, is sick they’re going to lay it right out and tell me what happened 
because they were sick. . . . The person that plays it cool, the cold con, that’s going 
to indicate to me that this thing is premeditated. . . .  Set up and that the person 
could care less about the person that was killed.”17  
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
drinking with him on the night that lady was murdered.  They were drinking in the 
apartments in the 220 block of Ulric Street where I used to live.  [¶]  Is all 
Hamilton did, was probably just find the van and drive it around and he got 
caught, but I don’t think he did that case.” 
17  
The relevant portion of the interview is as follows: 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Are you into religion now? 
 
63
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
“Defendant:  I’m into religion of myself.  I believe in me. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Uh-huh.  You believe in me and the hell with 
everybody else? 
 
“Defendant:  I believe in me.  And I’m part of everybody else too. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  In what way are you a part of everybody else? 
 
“Defendant:  By being a human being. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Uh-huh. 
 
“Defendant:  I care about life just as much as other, the next person, you 
know. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  You care about life. 
 
“Defendant:  Yeah.  Care about the next person just as much as they care 
about me.  If they don’t give a damn about me, fuck them too.  I ain’t involved in 
this bullshit you’re talking about.  I’m  . . . 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Yes, you are. 
 
“Defendant:  I’m ready to deal with it. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Yeah, I think you been trying to deal with it. 
 
“Defendant:  Uh-huh. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  For about a week. 
 
“Defendant:  I’m ready to deal with it. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Yeah.  I think you just wandered a little too long 
before you got picked up. 
 
“Defendant:  I know what I done and haven’t done. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Yeah, uh-huh.  You’re down there searching.  
You’re searching for something. 
 
“Defendant:  (Inaudible) 
 
“Detective Crawford:  I don’t know what it is, but like I say, you know, a 
person is, uh, is sick they’re going to lay it right out and tell me what happened 
because they were sick. 
 
“Defendant:  Uh-huh. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  The person that plays it cool, the cold con, that’s 
going to indicate to me that this thing is premeditated. 
 
“Defendant:  Uh-huh. 
 
64
 
At the penalty retrial, counsel sought to have these statements redacted 
from the tape and transcript of the interview offered into evidence, arguing that 
Crawford’s statements were legal conclusions and opinions that allowed the jury 
to improperly conclude that a defendant’s silence in response to police questioning 
is evidence of premeditation.  The court denied defendant’s request under 
Evidence Code section 352.  
 
Defendant now argues the court erred in admitting the statements in full.  
He first asserts that Crawford’s statements constituted the improper opinion of a 
lay witness, but his failure to object on this ground at trial forfeited the claim for 
appeal.  He also argues Crawford’s statements improperly allowed the jury to 
“ascribe greater culpability simply because [defendant] maintained his innocence,” 
thereby violating his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a 
reliable determination of penalty.  
 
We disagree.   
 
The state standard of review for error at the penalty phase, which is a more 
“exacting standard” than that employed for state-law errors at the guilt phase, is 
set forth in People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447–448:  “[W]hen faced with 
penalty phase error not amounting to a federal constitutional violation, we will 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
 
“Detective Crawford:  Set up and that the person could care less about the 
person that was killed. 
 
“Defendant:  Uh-huh. 
 
“Detective Crawford:  That’s what I’m trying to understand. 
 
“Defendant: Uh-huh.  You trying to tell me I’m some kind of nut that’s 
going around setting up people? 
 
“Detective Crawford:  I’m not trying to tell you anything.” 
 
65
affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) 
possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error or 
errors not occurred.”  (Id., at p. 448.)  “When evidence has been erroneously 
received at the penalty phase, this court should reverse the death sentence if it is 
‘the sort of evidence that is likely to have a significant impact on the jury’s 
evaluation of whether defendant should live or die.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 738.)  The federal standard of review for 
constitutional error is set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24:  
“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  We 
recently reiterated that “ ‘ “Brown’s ‘reasonable possibility’ standard and 
Chapman’s ‘reasonable doubt’ test . . . are the same in substance and effect.”  
(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1299.) 
 
Error, if any, in allowing the penalty retrial jury to hear Crawford’s opinion 
was not prejudicial.  Crawford’s statements, suggesting the possibility that the 
murder was the act of a sick mind rather than that of a cold killer, apparently were 
made in an effort to create an atmosphere in which defendant could more easily 
admit complicity in the murder.  Defendant’s lingering doubt defense centered 
around his claim that he did not commit the murder, not his state of mind at the 
time of the killing.  Defendant fails, therefore, to show a reasonable possibility 
that, had Crawford’s opinions of how a killer reveals his state of mind during an 
interview not been presented to the jury, he would have received a more favorable 
penalty verdict.  
D.  Evidence of Defendant’s Confession Offered at First Trial  
 
At defendant’s first trial, Steven Thomas testified that on January 24, 1980, 
he had a conversation with defendant about defendant’s case when they were both 
inmates at the San Diego County Jail.  As recited in Hamilton I, “He asked 
 
66
defendant, ‘Who are you trying to convince, Hamilton, me or yourself?’  
Defendant replied, ‘Well, I did it but they’ll never prove it.’ ”  (Hamilton I, supra, 
41 Cal.3d at p. 416.)  During cross-examination, the jury in the first trial learned 
Thomas had been convicted of murder, robbery, forgery, burglary and escape, and 
was in the federal witness protection program against organized crime, but had not 
received any money under that program.  (Ibid.)   
 
The prosecution read to the jury defendant’s testimony at the first trial, 
including defendant’s denial of making a confession to Thomas:   
 
“ ‘Counsel:  Did you have a conversation with Mr. Thomas about this case?   
 
“ ‘Defendant:  Not about this case, no.  [¶]  . . .   [¶] 
 
“ ‘Counsel:  Did you hear Mr. Thomas testify that you told him that you did 
this murder but that they’d never prove it, or words to that effect?   
 
“ ‘Defendant:  Yeah, I heard him.   
 
“ ‘Counsel:  Is that true, did you tell him that?   
 
“ ‘Defendant:  No, I didn’t tell him like that.   
 
“ ‘Counsel:  Did you have any conversation about this case at all with Mr. 
Thomas?   
 
“ ‘Defendant:  No I didn’t.  Wouldn’t have.   
 
“ ‘Counsel:  Did he talk to you about this case at all?   
 
“ ‘Defendant:  No.  He made comment [sic] that he had either overheard the 
deputies or he had heard about me in the newspaper or something.  The newspaper 
was being brought in the cell every day to him.’ ” 
 
Thomas did not testify at the penalty retrial, and the jury heard none of his 
testimony from the first trial.   
 
After the entirety of defendant’s testimony from the first trial was read to 
the jury without objection, the court expressed concern that in hearing evidence of 
defendant’s denial that he had confessed to Thomas, the penalty retrial jury 
 
67
inferentially learned of Thomas’s testimony asserting defendant had confessed to 
the murder.  The jury never heard any other evidence about the context of the 
alleged confession or Thomas’s cross-examination.  Both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel agreed that the above quoted portion of defendant’s testimony 
should not have been read to the jury and could have been edited out, but could 
not agree to a remedy.  The prosecutor and the court suggested it would be best 
not to draw further attention to Thomas’s statement.  The prosecutor stated he 
never intended to call Thomas as a witness in the penalty retrial and would “just 
pass over it” in his argument, in part because he had learned from the defense after 
the first trial that Thomas “had some mental problems of some sort,” and in part 
because it would be difficult to find a federally protected witness.  The court 
suggested “the cure might be worse than the problem” and “to mention it might be 
worse than just to let it go at this point.”  
 
Defense counsel disagreed, arguing that “the bell had been rung” and 
evidence of an alleged confession was before the penalty retrial jury.  He sought to 
impeach Thomas’s credibility with unspecified evidence that Thomas suffered 
from a mental problem.  The court denied the request under Evidence Code 
section 352, ruling that any probative value of the proffered evidence would be 
outweighed by the efforts involved in trying to impeach a witness who was not 
before the jury in the penalty retrial.  
 
Defendant now argues that even though Thomas did not appear in person at 
the penalty retrial, his allegations that defendant confessed to the murder of 
Eleanore Buchanan were before the jury, and, because evidence of a confession 
would severely undermine his lingering doubt defense, the court denied him due 
process in not allowing him to impeach Thomas’s credibility.  We disagree.  
 
In order to impeach Thomas’s credibility, the evidence would have to 
establish Thomas suffered from a mental illness that, at the time of the first trial, 
 
68
affected his capacity to perceive, recollect, or communicate.  (See Evid. Code, 
§§ 210, 780.)  The record reveals the proffered evidence was an undefined 
“report” that defendant asserted showed “Mr. Thomas was found to be . . . literally 
crazy at some point.”  Standing alone, this is insufficient to call into question 
Thomas’s credibility at the time of trial, and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding it.   
 
Defendant further argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in allowing 
Thomas’s testimony to be read even though he knew he would not be calling 
Thomas as a witness in the penalty retrial.  Defendant did not object on these 
grounds at trial and therefore failed to preserve this claim for appeal.  (People v. 
Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 503.)  In any event, this claim has no merit.  “A 
prosecutor’s conduct violates a defendant’s constitutional rights when the behavior 
comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects ‘ “the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”  
[Citation.]’  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.)  The focus of the 
inquiry is on the effect of the prosecutor’s action on the defendant, not on the 
intent or bad faith of the prosecutor.  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)  
Conduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair is error under state law 
only when it involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt 
to persuade either the court or the jury.’ ”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Mendoza 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 700.)  The prosecutor acknowledged he should have edited 
out this portion of defendant’s testimony and agreed with the court that the best 
remedy was to make no further mention of it.  In light of the fact that the 
prosecutor did not refer to Steven Thomas or defendant’s alleged confession in his 
closing argument or at any other time during trial, and did not rely on the alleged 
confession when he urged the jury to vote for the death penalty, we cannot see that 
the prosecutor’s failure to redact that portion of defendant’s prior trial testimony 
 
69
infected the retrial with unfairness or constituted deceptive or reprehensible 
methods of persuasion.   
E.  Evidence of Harassment by Defendant’s Investigator  
 
Beverly Manning testified for the prosecution that when she was 16 years 
old and living in Shreveport, Louisiana, she met defendant through her cousins, 
Jerre Brown and Kenneth Dotson.  Defendant took her on a trip to California, 
where she participated in the assault and robbery of Ruth Story.  When she said to 
defendant, “you could have killed this lady for $5.00,” he answered that he didn’t 
care and just wanted money.  Manning told the jury that defendant had a bad 
temper, that “anytime I rebelled against him he wanted to dominate me,” and that 
defendant struck her, pulled a gun on her, and put a knife to her throat.  
 
Defendant asked Manning during cross-examination whether she recalled a 
contact with a defense investigator.  Manning volunteered that the investigator 
was “[h]arassing” her.  
 
On redirect examination, over defendant’s objection, the prosecution asked 
Manning if she had some concern about defense investigators learning where she 
lived, and whether she felt harassed by the defense investigators during the trial.  
Manning answered, “His investigator.  I mean, yeah, by his investigator.”  
 
Defendant now argues that whether or not Manning felt harassed was 
irrelevant and the prosecution’s questions suggested without foundation that 
defendant had attempted to threaten Manning.  
 
The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to ask these questions 
of Manning on redirect examination.  “ ‘It is well settled that when a witness is 
questioned on cross-examination as to matters relevant to the subject of the direct 
examination but not elicited on that examination, he [or she] may be examined on 
redirect as to such new matter.’ ”  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1247–
1248.)  “ ‘The extent of the redirect examination of a witness is largely within the 
 
70
discretion of the trial court.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1247.)  Where, as here, one side presents 
evidence on a point, then tries to prevent the other side from responding, trial 
courts “should strive to prevent unfairness to either side.”  (Id. at p. 1248.)   
 
Defendant acknowledges that Manning “opened the door” to the subject of 
harassment by defense investigators during her cross-examination, but nonetheless 
argues the subject was irrelevant and immaterial because Manning’s state of mind 
at the time of her interview with the defense investigator was not at issue.  He 
argues the trial court should not have allowed the prosecution to capitalize on 
defendant’s error by eliciting further irrelevant evidence on redirect examination.   
 
We disagree.  Manning’s perception that the defense investigator harassed 
her is a factor that reasonably might have affected her willingness to cooperate 
with the defense investigation and thus her credibility.  The inquiry was relevant 
on either direct or cross-examination.  Further, any error in allowing the inquiry 
was nonprejudicial.  Exploring the extent of the harassment Manning felt the 
defense investigator inflicted might, in fact, have benefited defendant.   
F.  Evidence Regarding Effectiveness of Representation Rendered by 
Former Trial Counsel  
 
Thomas Ryan, the attorney who represented defendant in the first trial, 
testified for the prosecution that defendant assaulted him in the San Diego County 
Jail.  Ryan told the jury that he arrived at the jail’s visiting room for a pretrial visit 
and sat down on a small stool.  Defendant entered the room, approached Ryan and 
began to hand him a set of papers.  Ryan remained seated, but before he could take 
the papers, defendant struck him in the jaw with what Ryan described as a “very 
hard blow,” a “sucker punch,” which knocked Ryan to the floor.  Defendant said 
nothing.  Before Ryan could stand, defendant left the room.  
 
On cross-examination, Ryan acknowledged generally he and defendant had 
had numerous differences of opinion about trial tactics and strategy, that defendant 
 
71
thought he was not working with his best interests in mind and had expressed a 
high level of skepticism toward attorneys in general.  The prosecution objected to 
defendant’s efforts to ask questions regarding specific incidents in which 
defendant and Ryan disagreed.  
 
In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defendant indicated he wanted 
to establish that Ryan had rendered ineffective assistance in the first trial.  Such 
evidence, he argued, was relevant to rebut the prosecution’s evidence in 
aggravation by establishing objective support for defendant’s frustration with 
Ryan, and relevant to the defense of lingering doubt in that it would help convince 
the jury the conviction was the result of inadequate representation.  To that end he 
sought to ask Ryan about the specific instances of disagreement, and to offer the 
expert opinions of two criminal defense attorneys regarding the quality and 
adequacy of Ryan’s representation in the first trial.  
 
The court refused to permit testimony regarding the effectiveness of Ryan’s 
representation, ruling that ineffective assistance of counsel was not an issue for the 
jury to decide and was not relevant to rebut the prosecution’s evidence in 
aggravation or support the defense of lingering doubt.  The court limited 
defendant’s cross examination of Ryan, refused to allow questions about the 
details of a number of specific disagreements, and refused to allow defense experts 
to testify to their opinion of the quality of Ryan’s representation.   
 
Defendant now argues that by refusing to permit evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional 
rights to due process, to present a defense, and to a reliable penalty verdict.  We 
find no error. 
 
“ ‘The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the jury in a capital case 
to hear any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant offers, including “ ‘any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
 
72
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 352, 353.)  The court, however, has the 
authority to exclude as irrelevant evidence that does not bear on the defendant’s 
character, record, or the circumstances of the offense.  (Ibid.)  “The trial court 
determines relevancy of mitigating evidence and retains discretion to exclude 
evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that 
its admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading 
the jury.”  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1145.)    
We see no abuse of discretion.  The determination of whether a defendant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel is a legal one made by a reviewing court, 
not a factual one entrusted to a finder of fact.  (See In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
783, 822.)  It has no bearing on a defendant’s character, prior record, or the 
circumstances of the offense, and therefore is not admissible as evidence in 
mitigation.  (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989.)   
G.  Victim Impact Evidence  
 
The prosecution presented several witnesses who testified to the impact of 
Eleanore Buchanan’s murder on her family, particularly on her husband Terry 
Buchanan, who died of coronary heart disease in 1994 before the penalty retrial.  
Defendant argues the court erred in admitting this evidence and thereby violated 
his federal and state rights to due process, a reliable penalty verdict, and to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment.  We see no error.   
 
1.  Prosecution’s Evidence 
 
Dorothy Lininger, Eleanore’s mother, testified to the following:  Eleanore 
was on several sports teams and the drill team in high school, made her own 
clothes, had an active social life, and liked to go camping and to church.  In 1973, 
before she met Terry, Eleanore married her high school boyfriend but the marriage 
ended in an annulment.  Over the objection of her parents, Eleanore joined the 
 
73
Navy when she was 19; she was independent and adventurous, and matured 
during her time in the service.  She met and married Terry Buchanan while they 
were both in the Navy.  Eleanore and Terry divorced shortly after they were 
married in 1975; Mrs. Lininger attributed this to Eleanore’s unwillingness to 
tolerate Terry’s drinking.  Mrs. Lininger testified that when Terry and Eleanore 
agreed to remarry in 1976, Terry promised to, and did, quit drinking.  Eleanore left 
the Navy when she got pregnant with Jason.  Mrs. Lininger testified Eleanore was 
eager to improve herself by going to college.  
 
Mrs. Lininger testified to the heartbreak she witnessed at a family reunion 
after the murder:  Joseph, at age four, became very upset when he realized that his 
cousins had mothers and he did not, and Terry found it difficult to be around 
Eleanore’s sisters because of their close physical resemblance to Eleanore.  After 
that reunion, Terry never came to another.  Further, since the murder, Eleanore’s 
sister Judy was devastated and anxious, and required counseling to stop her fears 
from destroying her life and her relationship with her children.  Mrs. Lininger 
herself was very fearful since the murder, would not go out at night alone, would 
lock the doors and windows even on a nice evening, and was very leery in public.  
 
Eileen Banker, Eleanore Buchanan’s grandmother, spoke of Eleanore’s joy 
at becoming a mother in 1978 and again in 1979, and of the family gathering held 
on May 28, 1979, two days before the murder, where Eleanore’s and Terry’s 
families met the new baby.  She told the jury that when Eleanore was young she 
“was feisty and played tricks, and she was clever and cute and argumentative and 
— when she wanted to open all her Christmas gifts early, we asked her why, and 
she said, ‘so you can see my happy, smiling face.’ ”  
 
Netty Fisher, Terry’s mother, testified that Terry was devastated in the 
months after the murder.  He would stare silently into space with his baseball cap 
pulled down over his eyes, and would often cry.  He had trouble sleeping and had 
 
74
nightmares about Eleanore.  He chewed holes in his tongue and ground his teeth.  
When Jason and Joseph were in their teens they came back to live with her 
because Terry was unemployed and could not take care of them. 
 
Barbara Busch, a neighbor of the Buchanans’ at the time of the murder, 
testified that in the days and weeks after the murder, Terry Buchanan needed 
emotional and moral support and was unable to care for the two small children by 
himself. 
 
William Conover testified he met Terry in the Navy after Terry and 
Eleanore divorced but before they remarried.  Terry was a fun-loving friend while 
in the Navy, who liked to go out for drinks and a good time, and after marriage to 
Eleanore, Conover knew Terry to be a proud father and loving husband.  
Immediately after the murder, Terry was reclusive, distraught, dejected and “very 
down.”  Conover saw Terry several years later, and believed that Terry never got 
over the murder of his wife.  
 
Jason Buchanan, Eleanore and Terry Buchanan’s eldest son, who was 14 
months old at the time of the murder and 17 years old at the time of the penalty 
retrial, testified that for five years after his mother’s murder his father was unable 
to care for him and his brother during the day so they lived with his father’s 
parents in Las Cruces, New Mexico and his father lived nearby in his own 
apartment.  His father would come by in the evenings and weekends.  Eventually, 
he and his brother moved with their father to Phoenix, Arizona, where they lived 
until shortly before their father’s death in 1994.  
 
Jason told the jury that his father was ill near the end of his life and unable 
to work.  He testified that his father encouraged him and his brother to become 
active in sports, and he served as assistant coach to their baseball teams.  He had 
no memory of his mother, but his father told them about her and talked about her a 
lot: “He always told us how much he loved her and how he still wishes she was 
 
75
around, and how things would be better if she was.”  Jason stated that on the day 
before his father’s death, his father had been feeling badly and had pains in his 
chest, but refused his sons’ efforts to get him to go to the doctor.  That evening, 
his father “told us how much he loved our mom,” and “how much he loved us.”  
Defendant made no objection at the time the prosecution offered this testimony.   
 
Joseph Buchanan, Terry and Eleanore’s youngest son, who was an infant at 
the time of his mother’s murder and 16 years old at the time of the penalty retrial, 
testified that his father developed a drinking problem near the end of his life and 
spent time in bars.  On the night before his death, “he told me and [Jason] both 
that he loved us a lot, that he loved our mom.  And he told us that if anything 
happened to him that he wanted us to call first his friends . . . and then my 
grandma, and then he wanted us to call the police.”  Joseph told the jurors that he 
thought his father knew he would die soon when he said that.  Joseph told how the 
next day, after returning home from school, he went into his father’s bedroom “to 
make sure he was all right” and found his father dead on the bed.  Defendant made 
no objection at the time the prosecution offered this testimony.   
 
Frank Sexton, who prosecuted defendant for the robbery of Ruth Story in 
San Diego in 1978 and the capital crime in 1979 testified he kept in contact with 
Terry Buchanan in the years following the capital trial up to Terry’s death in 1994.  
Over defendant’s objection on grounds of relevance and lack of foundation, 
Sexton testified to his opinion that the murder took an emotional toll on Terry 
Buchanan, who “was heartbroken and overwhelmed.  He had to take care of two 
little kids by himself.  And he was totally devastated.  And I don’t think he ever 
got over it.  It haunted him for the rest of his life, and it was finally the end of 
him.”  
 
76
 
2. Retroactive Application of Payne v. Tennessee 
 
At the time of defendant’s first trial in 1981, federal and state law 
prohibited the introduction of victim impact evidence.  (Booth v. Maryland (1987) 
482 U.S. 496 [reversible error to admit victim impact evidence in 1983 trial]; 
People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1266 [victim impact evidence 
inadmissible in 1983 trial].)  Before the commencement of the penalty retrial in 
1995, the United States Supreme Court partially overruled Booth v. Maryland, 
supra, 482 U.S. 496, and held that the Eighth Amendment does not per se bar the 
admission of victim impact evidence if the state chooses to permit such evidence.  
(Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827.)  We thereafter overruled People v. 
Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 1266, and concluded that victim impact 
evidence is admissible in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (a), as a 
circumstance of the crime of which defendant was convicted.  (People v. Edwards 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835.)  Defendant first renews the argument he made in a 
motion during the penalty retrial that Payne v. Tennessee and People v. Edwards 
should not be applied retroactively and the admission of any victim impact 
evidence constituted error.  We rejected his argument in People v. Claire (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 629, 672, and see no reason to reconsider our decision.   
 
Defendant also argues that the retroactive application of Payne v. 
Tennessee and People v. Edwards at the penalty retrial would violate the ex post 
facto and due process guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions.  Because 
defendant failed to object at the penalty retrial to the introduction of evidence on 
these grounds, however, he failed to preserve this claim for appeal.  (Evid. Code, § 
353; see, e.g., People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 92; People v. Champion 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 918-919.)  In any event, we have rejected this contention.  
(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 394.)   
 
77
 
3.  Evidence of Terry Buchanan’s Life and Death 
 
Defendant next renews his objection that the evidence regarding Terry 
Buchanan’s continued depression and suffering for over 16 years from the time of 
the murder, the details of his use of alcohol near the end of his life, and the 
circumstances of his death as related by his sons exceeded the scope of 
permissible victim impact evidence and was irrelevant to the circumstances of the 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  Not so.  The “circumstances” of the crime 
under section 190.3, factor (a) are not merely the immediate temporal and spatial 
circumstances of the crime, but extend to that which surrounds the crime 
materially, morally, or logically.  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835.)  
Defendant urges us to restrict victim impact evidence to the “immediate injurious 
impact” of the murder, and argues that evidence of Terry Buchanan’s state of mind 
at the time of his own death is irrelevant to the circumstances of the capital 
offense.  We rejected a similar argument in People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 
page 397, in which we held it was logical to conclude that the psychological and 
physical effects of a violent murderous assault more than 20 years earlier would 
endure, and were relevant as direct results of the defendant’s crimes.  The same 
reasoning applies here.   
 
Further, the rationale behind allowing victim impact evidence is that 
“ ‘[t]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence 
which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as 
the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an 
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his 
family.’ ”  (Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)  The federal 
Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is “so unduly prejudicial” as to 
render the trial “fundamentally unfair.”  (501 U.S. at p. 825.)  State law under 
section 190.3, factor (a) bars victim impact evidence if it “ ‘diverts the jury’s 
 
78
attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response.’ ”  
(People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.) 
 
Defendant was entitled to, and did, present in mitigation evidence regarding 
productive aspects of his life in the years of his incarceration for the capital crime 
up to the time of the penalty retrial.  He presented numerous witnesses who 
testified to the positive aspects of the artwork defendant created during his 
incarceration for the capital crime and the positive responses the artwork 
generated in the statewide and national communities committed to the abolition of 
the death penalty. 
 
Evidence that the Buchanan family continued to suffer the effects of the 
capital crime up to and during the penalty retrial was relevant to “ ‘remind[] the 
sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too 
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in 
particular to his family.”  (Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)  
Nothing in the testimony of any of the prosecution’s witnesses who testified to the 
Buchanans’ sufferings was unduly inflammatory or prejudicial, nor did it invite an 
irrational or purely emotional response from the jurors.  Rather, the evidence was 
short, not overly sentimental, melodramatic or emotional, and not unexpected 
from the sons, parents, and in-laws of a young woman brutally murdered shortly 
after the birth of her second son.  That Terry Buchanan suffered the effects of the 
crime up to the day of his own death was not unexpected, and testimony to that 
effect was not prejudicial.   
 
4.  Argument That Terry Buchanan Was a Second Victim of the 
Murder 
 
Defendant further renews his trial objection to the prosecutor’s statement in 
closing argument that defendant “not only killed Terry’s wife[,] he took Terry’s 
reason to live.  I think Terry Buchanan [was] a murder victim just like Fran [was;] 
 
79
just took him 15 years to die.”  Defendant argues this statement transformed a 
single-victim case into a multiple-murder case, asked the jury to look on Terry 
Buchanan’s death as a homicide, and, in effect, charged defendant with culpability 
for an event that occurred 15 years after the crime.  We disagree.  A prosecutor 
engages in misconduct by misstating facts, but enjoys wide latitude in 
commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions 
that can be drawn therefrom.  (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 1, 95.)  The prosecutor’s single statement18 characterizing Terry 
Buchanan as a “victim” was an appropriate summation of the evidence regarding 
the effect of the capital crime on the surviving widower.  No reasonable jur
would conclude that the prosecutor was asking him or her to find defendant le
responsible for the death of Terry Buchanan. 
or 
gally 
                                             
 
5.  Question Withdrawn by Prosecution 
 
Defendant next renews an argument at the penalty retrial regarding the 
prosecution’s use of the term “anesthetize” to characterize Terry Buchanan’s 
actions near the end of his life.  During direct examination of Joseph Buchanan, 
the prosecutor asked several questions regarding Terry’s use of alcohol.  He then 
aborted a question as follows: “Basically trying to anesthetize himself — never 
mind.  Let me go to the night before he died.  What did he tell you the night before 
he died?”  Defendant did not object at the time, but when next out of the presence 
of the jury argued that “the suggestion now is that [Terry] was anesthetizing 
himself and, by inference, killing himself because of the loss of his wife.”  
 
18  
Defendant also argues the prosecutor erred in commenting that Terry and 
sons Jason and Joseph Buchanan were “other victims of this case.”  The 
prosecutor made this comment, however, out of the jury’s presence and therefore 
it could not have prejudiced defendant.   
 
80
 
Defendant sought a mistrial on the grounds that the question constituted 
improper victim impact evidence in that it allowed the prosecution to imply that 
defendant was responsible for Terry Buchanan’s death.  The court denied the 
motion, ruling that the prosecutor withdrew the question and the witness did not 
answer it.  
 
Defendant now argues the court erred.  We disagree.  The court instructed 
the jury, “[i]f a question was put to a witness, but the witness did not answer the 
question, of course, that produces no evidence for your consideration. . . . [¶]  The 
questions themselves may have suggested the existence of certain facts.  And the 
question may have been [‘]isn’t it a fact such and such[’;] if that question wasn’t 
answered, then the question doesn’t establish that it is a fact.”  The court’s 
instruction correctly informed the jury that questions by counsel were not evidence 
and eliminated the possibility that the jury would improperly consider facts not in 
evidence.   
 
Defendant further argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in asking 
the question.  In light of our determination that the instruction by the court 
properly eliminated any possibility that the jury would improperly consider facts 
not in evidence, any misconduct could not have prejudiced defendant.   
 
6.  Lay Opinion of Former Prosecutor 
 
Defendant next renews the objection at the penalty retrial to the 
introduction of the opinion of former prosecutor Frank Sexton.  Sexton testified 
that Terry was heartbroken and overwhelmed at the murder of his wife, that the 
murder haunted Terry for the rest of his life “and it was finally the end of him.”  
Defendant argues this was not proper lay witness opinion, in that it lacked a proper 
foundation.  We disagree.  The opinion of a lay witness is admissible if it is 
rationally based on the witness’s perception.  (Evid. Code, § 800, subd. (a).)  
Sexton told the jury he had kept in contact with Terry “all through the court 
 
81
proceedings [of the capital trial] . . . and . . . in the years following the case and up 
until his death.”  The trial court reasonably could infer that in those years of 
contacts, Sexton observed Terry’s mood and demeanor, and that the opinion to 
which he testified was based thereon.  In any event, any such error was harmless, 
because there was ample other evidence admitted establishing the impact of 
Eleanore’s murder on her husband. 
 
7.  Exclusion of Evidence to Rebut Evidence in Aggravation 
 
Defendant next argues the court improperly refused to allow him to 
introduce evidence of Terry’s subsequent marriage, which ended in divorce after 
six months, and his records from the Navy reporting alcohol-related incidents.  
Defendant argued this evidence was necessary to refute the prosecution’s 
implication that it was his grief over the loss of Eleanore that caused him to drink 
himself to death, and to offer additional explanations for his behavior and 
depression.  The trial court found the proffered evidence to be of limited probative 
value and excluded it under Evidence Code section 352. 
“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate 
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  “Our 
review on this issue is deferential.  A trial court’s decision whether to exclude 
evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1118.)”  (People v. 
Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 699.)   
We see no abuse of discretion.  Defendant argued the proffered evidence 
would have given the jury a more balanced picture of Terry Buchanan’s life and 
offered other factors that might have contributed to his drinking and depression 
and untimely death.  The trial court reasoned that evidence of Terry’s drinking and 
 
82
depression was offered by the prosecution not to establish a causal link between 
the capital crime and his drinking and death, but to show the murder had a 
significant impact on him.  Defendant’s evidence would not have refuted this, 
would have required “a mini-trial” about the reasons why Terry Buchanan drank, 
and therefore was of limited probative value and properly excluded under 
Evidence Code section 352.  
 
Even if the court did err, defendant suffered no prejudice.  The proffered 
evidence would not have altered the general picture of Terry Buchanan given to 
the jury through testimony of Jason and Joseph, who testified that he spoke of 
their mother the night before his own death, of William Conover, who testified to 
Terry’s drinking habits before and after Eleanore’s murder, and Eleanore’s 
mother, who explained that Terry and Eleanore’s first marriage ended in divorce 
because of his drinking.   
 
8.  Photographs 
 
Defendant next argues the court erred in admitting three photographs.   
 
We review for abuse of discretion rulings by the trial court on the 
admissibility of evidence, including rulings that turn on the relative probativeness 
and prejudice of the evidence in question.  (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
774, 805.)  “ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative (see Evid. 
Code, § 352) if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the 
proceedings or the reliability of the outcome” [citations].’. . .  ‘The admission of 
relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial 
as to render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
Defendant renews his objection that the first photograph depicting 
Eleanore, Jason, and Terry Buchanan, was cumulative of others already admitted.  
The record reveals the prosecution introduced only one other photograph of 
Eleanore while she was alive, depicting Eleanore with her infant son Joseph.  We 
 
83
see no abuse of discretion and no prejudice in the introduction of one additional 
photograph of Eleanore with her other son and husband.   
 
The second and third contested photographs, respectively, depicted Terry 
Buchanan and his sons in their baseball and football uniforms.  Defendant did not 
object when the prosecution asked the witness to show these two photographs to 
the jury; when the prosecutor later moved to admit both photographs into 
evidence, however, defendant objected, arguing they constituted improper victim 
impact evidence.  The court overruled the objection, but found the introduction of 
both photographs would have been cumulative, and admitted only the photograph 
of Terry and his sons clad in football uniforms.  
 
Defendant’s argument that the court improperly admitted the photograph 
has no merit.  As the prosecutor argued, the photograph was relevant to show 
Terry Buchanan’s “efforts to provide a home . . . and a happy life” for his sons 
after the murder of his wife.  This is not improper victim impact evidence.  The 
photograph is not overly emotional, sentimental, or otherwise prejudicial, and did 
not pose a risk to the fairness of the proceedings.  The court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the photograph into evidence.   
9.  Section 190.3, Factor (a) as Unconstitutionally Vague 
 
Defendant argues that if we interpret section 190.3, factor (a) to allow for 
such a broad array of victim impact evidence as was presented here, we will 
render that statute unconstitutionally vague.  We rejected this argument in People 
v. Pollack (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183, and defendant fails to convince us to 
reconsider that decision.   
H.  Trial Court Error in Failing to Instruct Sua Sponte Regarding 
Testimony of Former Prosecutor  
 
Frank Sexton, a retired Deputy District Attorney for San Diego County, 
testified at the penalty retrial.  He told the jury he had been retired from the 
 
84
practice of law since 1983, and had been hearing impaired since World War II 
when the plane in which he was serving as a United States Air Force aerial gunner 
was shot down.  
 
He told the jury that in 1978 he was assigned to prosecute defendant for the 
robbery of Ruth Story and, after the preliminary hearing in that case, received two 
letters defendant had written while in jail: one defendant sent to Story, who in turn 
passed it on to Sexton, and one defendant sent to the District Attorney of San 
Diego County, who also passed it on to Sexton.  Sexton testified that the trial for 
the Story robbery was scheduled to begin on June 19, 1979, but never took place 
because defendant was arrested for the capital murder in Oklahoma in early June 
1979.  Sexton was assigned to prosecute the capital murder, traveled to Marietta, 
Oklahoma, to investigate the case, and, while at the sheriff’s office, saw on the 
wall a wanted poster for “Spider,” which caught his eye because defendant had 
been telling stories about how Eleanore Buchanan was still alive and “running 
around with a guy named Spider.”  He testified that Terry Buchanan, who testified 
at the first trial, had died on June 2, 1994; that he had kept in contact with Terry 
since the first trial and thought that the murder had haunted Terry for the rest of 
his life.  Finally, Sexton testified that in the first trial, defendant admitted to 
having suffered the prior felony convictions for forgery and burglary in San 
Diego, and auto theft in Fresno and Louisiana, as was alleged in the information.  
 
Defendant argues the penalty retrial court erred in not instructing the jury, 
sua sponte, that they were not to give Sexton’s testimony special weight simply 
because he was a prosecutor associated with this case.  He argues this failure 
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process, a fair and 
impartial trial, and a reliable penalty verdict.  We disagree.   
 
When a witness is a courtroom officer who testifies to statements defendant 
made to him during the pendency of the trial and who then resumes his duties in 
 
85
the trial courtroom, the trial court should instruct the jury not to give any artificial 
weight to the witness simply because he is a courtroom officer.  (See People v. 
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 842-843.)  Defendant argues such is the case here, 
relying on U.S. v. Torres (2d Cir. 1974) 503 F.2d 1120, 1126, which found 
reversible error where, in the absence of a showing that he was the only possible 
source of this information, the second-chair prosecutor testified to an encounter he 
witnessed between the defendant and a codefendant, and U.S. v. Birdman (3d 
Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 547, which held that where the prosecutor’s appearance as a 
witness was unavoidable, the prosecutor should withdraw from participating in the 
trial.  The danger alluded to in these cases — that the jury would accord greater 
weight to the testimony of a witness who was an officer of the court and with 
whom they interacted during trial — was not present in this case.  The court 
commits no error in refusing to instruct when the testifying courtroom officer had 
no interaction with the jury.  (See People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1122 
[no error in failing to give such an instruction when a bailiff testified to statements 
defendant made to him during a pretrial hearing and the bailiff did not serve at 
defendant’s trial and had no interaction with the jury].)  Sexton’s participation in 
the prosecution of defendant had ended 12 years before the penalty retrial, and he 
was presented as a retired, not an active, prosecutor.   
 
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Arends (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 496, 
serves him no better.  There the reviewing court found reversible error where the 
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary hearing, but not the trial, testified to his 
“ ‘considered opinion that the defendant was guilty.’ ”  (Id. at p. 509.)  The danger 
was that the jury would “view the prosecutor’s expressed belief in the defendant’s 
guilt as being based on outside sources.”  (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 
971.)  Here, in contrast, the majority of Sexton’s testimony concerned events to 
which he was a percipient witness — receipt by the district attorney’s office of 
 
86
letters written by defendant; seeing the “Spider wanted poster” in the Marietta, 
Oklahoma, Sheriff’s department; defendant’s admission to various prior 
convictions; and Terry Buchanan’s continued suffering.  He gave his opinion not 
as to defendant’s guilt or deserved punishment, but only to Terry Buchanan’s state 
of mind at the time of Terry’s death, and made it clear the opinion was based on 
personal contact with Terry over the intervening years.   
 
Defendant therefore fails to establish that the trial court erred in not, sua 
sponte, giving cautionary instructions concerning Sexton’s testimony.  
I.  Assertedly Insufficient Evidence of Unadjudicated Assault on 
Sheriff’s Deputies  
 
William Hanson and Johnnie Christensen, deputies at the San Diego 
County Jail, each testified to the events of the morning of October 8, 1980, when 
defendant refused to get out of bed and come to court.  When the deputies entered 
his cell, defendant “rolled over, looked at [the deputies], and then pulled the 
blanket back up over his head.”  When Hanson pulled off the blanket, defendant 
“immediately stood up . . . kind of backed in the corner and faced us and brought 
his arms and fists in a . . . fighting stance” with his fists doubled up, leading 
Hanson to believe defendant was about to strike him.  Christensen testified 
defendant stated, “If you want . . . me to go to court you’re going to have to take 
me to court.”  The deputies grabbed defendant, forced him out of the cell and up 
against a wall, and placed waist and leg chains on him.  Defendant resisted their 
efforts to take him out of the cell and “struggled as violently as he could.”  
Christensen remembered it as “an extraordinary event” and “an instantaneous 
confrontation.”  He stated that no fight occurred because “we didn’t allow that to 
occur . . . we gained control of him and moved him out of the cell.”  Christensen 
testified that “there was no question at the time that had we not [grabbed his arms] 
 
87
. . . there would have been a fight that transpired.”  As the deputies led defendant 
down the hall, he resisted and spat on Hanson’s face.  
 
Defendant sought to exclude any argument or instructions regarding the 
crime of assault as related to the incident with Deputies Hanson and Christensen, 
arguing the evidence presented was insufficient to establish an assault as a factor 
in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), which requires a showing of 
criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence.  He argued that because he did 
not throw any punches or otherwise attempt to strike the deputies, his resistance to 
them was limited to use of profanity and assuming a fighting stance, neither of 
which, he argues, was sufficient to constitute an assault.  The court determined the 
evidence was “not the strongest case[] of assault that one could imagine, but I 
think there’s some substantial evidence there based on what a reasonable juror 
would find” and permitted the prosecutor to argue it to the jury.  The court 
instructed the jurors on the definitions of both assault and battery, and instructed 
further that no juror could consider such evidence unless first convinced of its 
truth beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Defendant now renews his argument that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish an assault.  He also argues for the first time on appeal that the evidence 
of battery was only speculative and the court, therefore, erred in admitting any 
evidence of the event at all.  Because defendant did not challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence of battery at trial, and did not object to the evidence when it was 
introduced, he may not do so now for the first time on appeal.  (Evid. Code, § 353; 
People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 92.)  In any event, we see no error.   
 
The evidence that defendant spat upon Deputy Hanson was sufficient for 
jurors to find defendant committed a battery, or “any willful and unlawful use of 
force or violence upon the person of another.”  (§ 242; see People v. Pinholster 
 
88
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 961 [throwing a cup of urine in a person’s face is a battery].)  
The evidence was also sufficient for the jurors to find defendant committed an 
assault, or “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a 
violent injury on the person of another.”  (§ 240.)  Defendant leaped out of bed in 
a confrontational manner, raised his fists, took a fighting stance, informed the 
deputies that he would go to court only if they “took him,” and struggled violently 
as the deputies extracted him from the cell, all of which led both deputies to testify 
that the only reason there had not been an actual “fight” was because they secured 
defendant’s arms before he could strike them.  A reasonable interpretation of this 
evidence would be that in the moments before the deputies could secure him 
defendant attempted, and had the present ability, to commit a violent injury on the 
deputies.   
J.  Threats as Evidence in Aggravation  
 
Defendant next argues the court improperly instructed the jury regarding 
threats contained in a letter defendant wrote to Theresa Roch, and threatening 
words spoken over the telephone to Donna Hatch.  He argues the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that these acts violated any penal statute and therefore was 
inadmissible as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b).  He also 
argues the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352.  
The error, he argues, violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due 
process and a reliable penalty verdict.   
 
1.  Letter to Theresa Roch 
 
On July 6, 1979, defendant wrote a letter to Theresa Roch from the San 
Diego County Jail in which he stated the following:  “By the way, today I got 
news from Quack.  He says he knows I am innocent but also knows how I will get 
railroaded.  So if I loose [sic] this case, they will take out O’Connor, Sexton, 
 
89
McCarno [sic] and Armstrong, or at least one member of their family [sic].  I don’t 
like the idea of violence, since I have never been a violent person and the proposal 
seeks my agreement.  I haven’t sent an answer as of yet because I have to consider 
a lot of things before I do.  I don’t like the idea . . . but I also don’t like sitting on 
someone else’s murder charge!  So that gives me a lot to think about.”  
 
Over defendant’s objections, the prosecution introduced the letter as a 
factor in aggravation, characterizing it as a threat to kill Deputy District Attorneys 
Frank Sexton and Frank McArdle, defense attorney Patrick O’Connor, San Diego 
County Sheriff’s Department laboratory criminalist, Brandon Armstrong, and 
members of their families, in violation of sections 69 (deterring an executive 
officer)19 and 71 (threat to injure a public officer),20 and title 18 United States 
Code section 876 (use of mail to communicate threat).21 
                                              
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
19  
Section 69 provides in pertinent part:  “Every person who attempts, by 
means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from 
performing any duty imposed upon such officer by law, . . . is punishable by a fine 
not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in the state 
prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year . . . .” 
20 
Section 71 provides in pertinent part:  “Every person who, with intent to 
cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any . . . public officer or employee to do, or 
refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, 
directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any 
person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such 
threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense . . . .  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  As used 
in this section,  ‘directly communicated’ includes, but is not limited to, a 
communication to the recipient of the threat by telephone, telegraph, or letter.”     
21  
Title 18 United States Code section 876 provides, in pertinent part:  
“(a) Whoever knowingly deposits in any post office or authorized depository for 
mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service or knowingly causes to 
be delivered by the Postal Service according to the direction thereon, any 
communication, with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, 
addressed to any other person, and containing . . . .  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  (c) . . . any threat 
to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of 
 
90
 
Defendant argues the court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements 
of these three crimes and admitting the letter into evidence as a factor in 
aggravation.  We agree that the prosecution lacked sufficient evidence to prove 
that defendant violated either section 71 or title 18 United States Code section 
876, but conclude the evidence was sufficient to find that he violated Penal Code 
section 69.  The letter, therefore, was properly admitted.  Any error in instructing 
the jury regarding section 71 or title 18 United States Code section 876 was 
harmless.  
 
Section 69 requires that the defendant attempted, by threat, to deter 
executive officers from performing their legal duties.  The fact that defendant 
wrote the letter at the start of the capital proceedings against him and in it 
threatened to kill the prosecutors, Sexton and McArdle and Criminalist 
Armstrong, his own defense counsel, and their families should he lose at trial is 
sufficient evidence to find the letter contained threats to executive officers.  
Further, in spite of the fact that the letter was addressed to Theresa Roch, there is 
sufficient evidence to find defendant knew the threats would be delivered to the 
district attorney’s office.  Defendant was incarcerated at the San Diego County Jail 
and therefore was unable to deliver the letter directly to the United States Postal 
Service.  He used the only means available to him under those circumstances, and 
placed the letter into the San Diego County Jail’s normal mail circulation routine 
by giving the letter to a deputy sheriff assigned to process outgoing mail.  The 
deputy sheriff, however, intercepted the letter upon learning that there had been a 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.” 
 
91
security “hold” placed on defendant’s mail and delivered it instead to the district 
attorney’s office.  The record reveals that at the time defendant placed the letter to 
Theresa Roch with the deputy sheriff, he was aware of the existence of the hold on 
his mail and knew that the district attorney would read his letters.22  It can be 
argued, therefore, that even though defendant placed the letter to Theresa Roch 
into the jail’s outgoing mail by giving it to the deputy sheriff, he knew it would 
eventually be delivered to the prosecutor’s office.   
 
Contrary to defendant’s argument, section 69 does not require a showing 
that McArdle, Armstrong, Sexton or O’Connor took the threats seriously or felt 
threatened by the letter (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153), or that 
defendant had the present ability to carry out the threats (People v. Hines (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 997, 1060).  Evidence that the letter contained the threats was sufficient 
to support a finding that defendant violated section 69.   
 
Whether the letter sufficed to prove a violation of title 18 United States 
Code section 876 is a closer question.  That statute requires proof of only two 
elements for conviction:  first, the defendant must have written and mailed a letter 
or other communication containing a threat to injure another person, and second, 
he or she must have knowingly caused the letter to be deposited in the mails.  
(United States v. Sirhan (9th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 818, 819.)  Contrary to 
defendant’s argument, the threat need not be directed to the recipient of the letter.  
(Ibid. [letter addressed to U.S. Secretary of State Rogers contained a threat to kill 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir].)  Nor is it necessary that the victim receive the 
threat.  (United States v. Geisler (7th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 1070, 1072.)   
                                              
22  
On June 21, 1979, weeks before defendant wrote the letter to Theresa Roch, 
defendant wrote a letter to Terry Buchanan from the San Diego County Jail in 
which he stated, “I know the D.A. will get this letter.” 
 
92
 
Defendant correctly argues the evidence failed to prove he violated title 18 
United States Code section 876 because it did not establish that he caused the 
letter to be deposited in the mail.  As set forth above, even though defendant 
placed the letter to Theresa Roch into the jail’s outgoing mail by giving it to the 
deputy sheriff, he knew it would be intercepted by the deputy sheriffs and 
delivered to the district attorney’s office.  He knew it would not be, and arguably 
did not intend for it to be, actually deposited into the United States Postal Service, 
and therefore he did not violate title 18 United States Code section 876.   
 
That the evidence was insufficient to show a violation of section 71 is clear.  
Section 71 requires a showing that the defendant “with intent to cause, attempts to 
cause, or causes, any . . . public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, 
any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly 
communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or 
property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat 
could be carried out . . . .”  The prosecution presented no evidence that the threats 
were directly communicated to the four intended victims and no evidence that any 
of the victims harbored a reasonable belief that the threat could be carried out.  In 
the absence of such evidence, the prosecution failed to establish defendant 
violated section 71 by writing the letter to Theresa Roch.   
 
Because the letter included threats to use force and violence and violated 
section 69, the court did not err in admitting it as evidence in aggravation under 
section 190.3, factor (b).  We see no reasonable likelihood that in giving the 
additional instructions regarding section 71 and title 18 United States Code section 
876 the court misled or confused the jury.  Although it is error to give an 
instruction that, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the 
facts of the case, such an error does not appear to be of federal constitutional 
dimension.  (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129–1130.)  Further, the 
 
93
court instructed the jurors not to consider a factor in aggravation unless they first 
were convinced of its truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and we presume they 
followed those instructions.  (See People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 920.)  
Even assuming error in the giving of the instructions, in light of the great weight 
of evidence presented in aggravation we see no reasonable possibility defendant 
would have obtained a different verdict in the penalty retrial had the instructions 
regarding section 71 and title 18 United States Code section 876 not been given.   
2.  Words to Donna Hatch 
 
Donna Hatch testified that on June 8, 1979, defendant called her house in 
Terrell, Texas.  Her grandmother initially answered the telephone and when Hatch 
took the line, defendant “was still babbling on.  I guess he thought she was still on 
the phone.  When he found out it was me he said, ‘I’ll kill you, too.’” 
 
Defendant asserts the court erred when it instructed the jury that they could 
consider whether defendant’s words to Donna Hatch constituted a threat to Hatch 
in violation of California Penal Code section 653m (making annoying phone 
calls), and Texas Penal Code section 42.07 (harassment by telephone).  We agree, 
but conclude the error was harmless.   
 
In 1979, when the telephone call was made, Texas Penal Code section 
42.07 defined harassment by telephone as a communication that intentionally 
“threatens, by telephone or in writing, to take unlawful action against any person 
and by this action intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly annoys or alarms the 
recipient or intends to annoy or alarm the recipient.”  (Tex. Penal Code Ann., 
former § 42.07(a)(2).)  In 1983 the Texas Legislature amended Texas Penal Code 
section 42.07 to clearly delineate what types of actions would alarm or annoy 
people, and to specify that such actions, to be unlawful, must be performed in a 
manner reasonably likely to “annoy” or “alarm” the recipient of the telephone call.   
 
94
In 1989, the Texas courts decided that Texas Penal Code former section 42.07, as 
it existed before the 1983 amendment, was unconstitutionally vague (May v. State 
(Tex. Crim.App. 1989) 765 S.W.2d 438, 440), and that the 1983 amendment was 
constitutional (Bader v. State (Tex.App. 1989) 773 S.W.2d 769, 770) but not 
retroactive (May v. State, supra, 765 S.W.2d at p. 440). 
 
Therefore, in 1979, when the telephone call was made, there was no 
constitutionally valid statute in effect in Texas prohibiting defendant’s actions, and 
when the court instructed the jury pursuant to the 1983 amendment of Texas Penal 
Code section 42.07, it erred.  The 1983 amendment did not apply retroactively and 
the statute in effect before the amendment was unconstitutional.   
 
In addition, because defendant called Terrell, Texas, from Greenwood, 
Louisiana, and not from within California, he did not violate the laws of 
California.  (Cf. §§ 27 [persons are liable for punishment for crimes committed, in 
whole or in part, within the state], 653m [an offense is deemed committed either in 
the place where the telephone call was made or where it was received].)  The court 
erred, therefore, in instructing the jury to consider the facts in light of section 
653m.   
 
Further, the prosecution did not argue that the telephone call was 
admissible as a violation of any other penal statute.  Because the telephone call 
originated in Louisiana, it may have violated Louisiana law, but the prosecution 
did not so argue.  The court therefore erred in admitting the evidence as a factor in 
aggravation.   
 
Any error, however, in admitting the evidence of the phone call or 
instructing the jury as to California and Texas penal statutes was harmless in light 
of the great weight of evidence presented in aggravation.  We see no reasonable 
possibility defendant would have obtained a different verdict in the penalty retrial 
 
95
had the evidence of the phone call not been admitted and the erroneous 
instructions not been given.   
K.  Asserted Error in Admitting Physical Evidence  
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted certain items of 
evidence in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process, 
fundamental fairness, and a reliable penalty verdict.   
Before trial, defendant moved to exclude the saw, butcher knife, and rope 
found in the van after defendant’s arrest, arguing these items, which he claimed he 
acquired after Eleanore Buchanan’s death, were not relevant to any circumstances 
of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  Defendant also argued the admission 
of these items would be more prejudicial than probative because it would allow 
the jury incorrectly to conclude that defendant had planned to use them to murder 
Donna Hatch.  
The prosecutor countered that the items were relevant and probative under 
section 190.3, factor (a), as circumstantial evidence of identity, in that their 
similarity to the sorts of items used in the murder of Eleanore Buchanan23 had a 
tendency in reason to identify defendant as Buchanan’s killer.  The prosecutor also 
argued the items were relevant under factor (b) as evidence of express or implied 
threats to use force or violence against Hatch and her family.  The court agreed, 
ruling that in light of defendant’s continued denial of any complicity in the murder 
of Eleanore Buchanan, these items were admissible on the issue of identity.  
Defendant now argues the court erred.  First, he renews his argument that 
the evidence bore no relationship to the murder of Eleanore Buchanan and was 
                                              
23 
Eleanore Buchanan was bound hand and foot, her head and one hand were 
cut off with a knife and a saw, and her other hand was cut off with a saw. 
 
96
therefore inadmissible under section 190.3, factor (a).  Second, he argues the items 
were purchased before, not after, he made threats to Hatch and her family, and 
therefore were not connected to those threats and irrelevant to factor (b).  Lastly, 
he argues the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, in that it allowed the 
jury to speculate that defendant intended to repeat his crime and murder Hatch, 
and therefore the court should have excluded the evidence under Evidence Code 
section 352.   
We see no abuse of discretion.  “ ‘ “Relevant evidence is defined in 
Evidence Code section 210 as evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove 
or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action.’  The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends ‘ “logically, naturally, 
and by reasonable inference” to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or 
motive.  [Citations.]’ . . .  The trial court has broad discretion in determining the 
relevance of evidence [citations] but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.  
[Citations.]” ’ ”  (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167.)  
In light of defendant’s continual denial that he was involved in the murder, 
we find the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the items of 
evidence were relevant and admissible on the issue of identity as a circumstance of 
the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  A reasonable juror could conclude that 
the butcher knife, saw, and shanks of rope found inside the stolen Buchanan van 
driven by defendant bore marked similarities to the weapons thought to have been 
used to murder Eleanore Buchanan and would tend logically to support the 
inference that defendant was the person who murdered Eleanore Buchanan.   
Further, contrary to defendant’s assertions, the evidence was admissible 
under section 190.3, factor (b).  The factual record shows that defendant purchased 
the butcher knife, saw, and rope after, not before, as defendant asserts, he first 
made threats of violence in a note he wrote Hatch.  Hence, a jury could logically 
 
97
conclude he purchased them in anticipation of carrying out his threats.24  It 
matters not that defendant never delivered the threatening note.  The note revea
that defendant’s anger at Hatch and her family, and his desire to harm them if he 
ls 
                                              
24  
The record reveals the following chronological series of events: 
On June 5, 1979, while defendant was still in Terrell, Texas, Hatch decided 
she no longer wanted to have a relationship with him, and she “broke up” with 
him.  She attempted to hide from him by going to her brother’s house and having 
her brother tell defendant she was not there.  
On June 6, 1979, defendant remembered he had left some of his things at 
Hatch’s grandmother’s house.  He attempted to retrieve them, but Hatch’s 
grandmother “started raving at [him] for owing her rent” for the storage of his 
things at her house.  Defendant said he had no money to pay her, and when he 
reached for his things, she “had a coke bottle in her hand and tried to hit [him] in 
the head with it.  She threatened [him], talking about having her grandsons . . . 
getting a hold of [him.]”  
Later that same day, June 6, 1979, defendant wrote the following letter to 
Hatch, which he did not deliver but crumpled up and tossed in the back of the van 
where it was found by the police:  “Look, Donna.  I don’t know what kind of trip 
you are on.  But I’m not going to accept being fucked over by nobody.  ¶  I 
already told my cousins that if anything was to happen to me that they are to get 
you or someone who is close to you.  Which means that if I don’t leave safe or if I 
get crossed up — you will pay one way or the other.  ¶  You were an accessory to 
each forgery I committed and I will turn us both in.  Silbpoenas [sic] will be made 
for you to come to court and if you refuse they will come get you to make you go.  
I don’t know what it is but someone has got to either pay for this fucking or kill 
me because I have put too much in this and too much has been taken out.  I want 
my registration or I will send the police.  ¶  Further more — my ride is not hot 
because they never got the license number in San Diego.”  (Italics added.) 
Still later that same day, June 6, 1979, after writing the letter, defendant 
purchased a saw, a wrench set and a screwdriver in Terrell, Texas.  He then drove 
to Oklahoma City to visit cousins, where he switched license plates on the van.  
 
The following day, June 7, 1979, he purchased the butcher knife and 50 
feet of rope in Lewisville, Texas, then drove toward Shreveport, Louisiana.  The 
next day, June 8, 1979, defendant called Hatch from Greenwood, Louisiana, and 
told her, “I’ll kill you, too.”  Authorities arrested defendant later that day in 
Marietta, Oklahoma. 
 
98
did not get what he wanted, existed before he purchased the butcher knife, saw 
and rope.  The court, therefore, did not err in admitting those items as evidence 
under section 190.3, factor (b).  
Finally, defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in 
encouraging the jury to speculate that he was planning to repeat his crimes and kill 
Donna Hatch as he had killed Eleanore Buchanan.  Defendant forfeited this claim 
by failing to timely object.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.)  
Nevertheless, because prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw 
inferences from the evidence at trial, we see no misconduct in the prosecutor’s 
comment.  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522.)   
L.  Restriction of Cross-Examination of Robert Borg  
 
James Park, a retired associate warden with the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, testified for defendant.  He reviewed defendant’s 
prison records and gave his opinion that nothing in the records suggested 
defendant was an escape risk or prone to violence towards guards or other 
inmates.  In his opinion, if defendant were given a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole he could be reclassified and placed in a facility where he 
would have the opportunity to continue producing works of art and could lead a 
useful, productive life. 
 
To rebut Park’s testimony, the prosecution presented the testimony of 
Robert Borg, warden of Folsom State Prison from 1985 to 1992.  He refuted some 
of Park’s testimony regarding inmate classification.  Borg disclaimed any ability 
to foretell whether defendant would engage in violence in prison, but testified to 
his opinion, based on his review of defendant’s prison records, that defendant 
remained a threat to other inmates and guards.  Borg acknowledged that he relied 
in great part on reports of defendant’s violent encounters with other inmates 
during his early years in prison starting at age 16, on the violence involved in the 
 
99
capital offense, on the fact that many of defendant’s assaults involved vulnerable 
victims, and on the fact that defendant committed crimes in which he snuck up on 
his victims.  Borg stated he did not take into consideration the years defendant had 
spent on death row during which there were no recorded incidents of violence; he 
explained that in his opinion, the paucity of violence was because on death row 
defendant had limited opportunities to interact with other prisoners or guards 
while not in shackles or “under the gun.”  
 
On cross-examination, Borg acknowledged he had not reviewed 
defendant’s entire record, and stated it might have made a difference in his 
assessment if he were to learn that defendant had gone into “the yard” with other 
death row inmates every day for a year with no incidents of violence.  Defendant 
then sought to ask if Borg had reviewed the record of defendant’s federal habeas 
corpus petition and hearing transcript which, he argued, indicated that for a year 
while on death row, defendant did have opportunities daily to engage in recreation 
with other inmates with no reported incidents of violence.  Borg indicated he had 
not reviewed the habeas corpus records, and the court would not allow defense 
counsel to ask any other questions regarding the habeas corpus record.  
 
Defendant now argues the restriction on his cross-examination of Borg 
violated his right under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.   
 
The contention lacks merit. 
 
“ ‘ “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause 
by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the 
witness, and thereby, ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ”  
(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 . . . , quoting Davis v. Alaska 
(1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318.)  However, not every restriction on a defendant’s 
 
100
desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation.  Within the 
confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in 
restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, 
or of marginal relevance.  [Citation.]  California law is in accord.  (See People v. 
Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 780.)  Thus, unless the defendant can show that 
the prohibited cross-examination would have produced “a significantly different 
impression of [the witnesses’] credibility” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 
p. 680), the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the 
Sixth Amendment.’ ”  (People v. Chatman (2006)  38 Cal.4th 344, 372.) 
 
The court appropriately restricted defendant from asking Borg to form an 
opinion about information contained in records he did not review and about which 
he had no knowledge.  (Evid. Code, § 803.)  In doing so, the court did not 
preclude the jury from accurately assessing Borg’s credibility; defense counsel 
established that Borg based his opinion on a less than complete review of 
defendant’s records, and Borg acknowledged that if he had had more information 
about defendant’s opportunity to interact with other inmates, he might have 
formed a different opinion about defendant’s propensity for violence.  Defendant 
fails to show that the prohibited cross-examination, which sought only to ask 
specific questions about the habeas corpus record, would have significantly altered 
the jurors’ impression of Borg’s credibility.   
M.  Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Defendant’s Teaching Art to 
Other Inmates  
 
Defendant testified that at certain times while on death row in San Quentin 
State Prison, he had “time out on the tier” during which he and “a few other 
inmates would sometimes bring out our [art] materials and we would give each 
other pointers” or he “would just sit down with them and start giving them some 
of the techniques . . . [he] had learned [him]self.”  “Other times, used to be where 
 
101
we could take our materials up to the yard and work in the daylight.”  He testified 
that teaching art to other death row inmates came easily to him, and painting 
“makes him feel better about himself.”  He told the jurors that if he were to be 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and be housed with other 
inmates who would some day get out of prison, he “could help them by teaching 
them how to paint.” 
 
Defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Aida De Arteaga, an art 
facilitator at San Quentin State Prison, who would have testified to defendant’s 
capacity to teach art to other inmates.  Defendant argued this evidence would 
corroborate his own testimony about teaching other inmates to paint, and rebut 
Robert Borg’s opinion testimony that defendant would be a threat to other 
prisoners if allowed to be near them without physical restraints or the presence of 
armed guards.  The court excluded the proffered evidence as cumulative and 
repetitive under Evidence Code section 352. 
 
Defendant now argues the court deprived him of a witness important to his 
efforts to convince the jurors to give him a sentence less than death, and thereby 
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense, to present 
evidence in mitigation, and to a reliable penalty verdict. 
 
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on relevance and 
the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 (People v. Avila, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 578), and conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.  
Numerous witnesses testified to the intrinsic value of defendant’s artwork, and 
defendant fails to show that the excluded testimony would have offered anything 
the jury had not already heard.  In addition, the excluded testimony merely 
addressed defendant’s willingness to teach art; it did not address whether or not 
defendant was under physical restraints or under the watch of armed guards while 
he interacted with other inmates and taught art “on the tier” or “on the yard.”  
 
102
Defendant fails to show, therefore, that the excluded evidence would have rebutted 
Borg’s opinion testimony.   
N.  Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence Against Jerre Brown  
 
Jerre Brown testified for the prosecution on October 11, 1995.  He told the 
jury that in the fall of 1976, when he was 16 years old, he, his cousin Beverly 
Manning, and defendant committed a burglary at Kelly’s Truck Stop in 
Shreveport, Louisiana, during which they stole a television set and later sold it to 
Brown’s mother for $90.  Thereafter, defendant and Manning drove to California.  
Defendant and Manning returned to Shreveport, Louisiana, one month later, and 
defendant admitted to Brown that while in California, he and Manning had beaten 
and robbed Ruth Story.  
 
In December 1976, Brown, defendant, and Manning were in jail in 
Shreveport, Louisiana, under arrest for the burglary.  Defendant asked Brown and 
Manning, who were both juveniles at the time of the burglary, to take full 
responsibility for the burglary in order to exonerate him.  Brown instead testified 
to the truth about the burglary and gave testimony unfavorable to defendant.  
While in a holding cell with 40 other inmates awaiting transportation to the 
courthouse from the jail, defendant attempted to stab Brown in the head with a 
pen, requiring the guards to spray mace on both of them.  Later, at the courthouse, 
defendant hit Brown in the face with his fist, knocking him against the wall.  
 
Brown told the jurors in the penalty retrial that he had been convicted of 
felony theft and two “crimes against nature” in Louisiana in 1977 when he was 17, 
but had not been convicted of any other felonies since then.  The “crimes against 
nature” of which he had been convicted were, in fact, “aggravated crimes against 
 
103
nature.”25  Defendant then asked Brown if he had ever been convicted of 
“aggravated rape,” a much more serious crime,26 to which Brown truthfully 
answered he had not.  Out of the presence of the jury, defendant argued that a 
“crime against nature” by definition was “aggravated rape” and he should have 
been allowed to so argue to the jury.  The court refused to allow defendant to ask 
                                              
25  
Defense exhibit A, which was marked as an exhibit but never received into 
evidence, contained records from the Fourth District Court, Parish of Ouachita, 
Louisiana, that reveal that on two occasions in 1977, at the Ouchita Parish Jail, 
Brown was reported to have committed the aggravated rape of fellow inmates, but 
on both occasions he was charged with and pled guilty to the lesser offense of 
“aggravated crime against nature.” 
26  
Under Louisiana law at the time of Brown’s conviction, a “crime against 
nature” was the “unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with another of the 
same sex or opposite sex or with an animal.”  It was punishable by a fine not to 
exceed $2,000, or imprisonment with or without hard labor, for not more than five 
years, or both.  (La.Rev.Stat.Ann. former § 14:89.)  An “aggravated crime against 
nature,” as applicable herein, was a crime against nature committed (1) when the 
victim resists the act to the utmost, but such resistance is overcome by force, 
(2) when the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great and 
immediate bodily harm accompanied by apparent power of execution, or (3) the 
victim is prevented from resisting the act because the offender is armed with a 
dangerous weapon.  An aggravated crime against nature was punishable by 
imprisonment at hard labor for not less than three or more than 15 years without 
the benefit of suspension of sentence, probation or parole.  (Id., former § 14:89.) 
 
Under Louisiana law at the time of Brown’s conviction, “aggravated rape,” 
as applicable herein, was a rape committed upon a person 65 years of age or older 
or where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without 
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the 
following circumstances:  (1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but 
whose resistance is overcome by force, (2) when the victim is prevented from 
resisting the act by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by 
apparent power of execution, or (3) when the victim is prevented from resisting 
the act because the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.  It was punishable 
by life in prison at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or 
suspension of sentence.  (La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:42.) 
 
104
Brown any details about the crimes against nature for which he was convicted or 
to introduce documents regarding Brown’s convictions, ruling that such evidence 
was not relevant to impeachment.  Thus, the jury was not informed of the exact 
definition of a “crime against nature,” or of the fact that Brown was convicted of 
“aggravated crimes against nature.”  
 
Defendant filed a motion on October 18, 1995, a week after Brown 
testified, to introduce the documents pertaining to Brown’s convictions, arguing 
that the record was unclear and therefore misleading, thereby allowing the 
prosecution to present a “sanitized” picture of Brown that did not reveal he had 
committed acts involving force and violence inherent in an aggravated crime.  
Nearly two months later, on December 6, 1995, the court held a hearing on the 
motion and acknowledged that the record did not satisfactorily establish that 
Brown had suffered a conviction for an “aggravated” crime and that the crimes for 
which he was convicted were referred to in “rather antiquated language” that 
might not be commonly understood by a California jury.  The court denied the 
motion, however, under Evidence Code section 352, ruling that because of the 
lapse of time since Brown’s testimony, defendant could not raise the issue again 
without confusing the jury and prejudicing the prosecution.  The court also 
concluded that defendant erred in the first instance in not asking Brown questions 
that would have established that his convictions were for aggravated crimes, and 
that Brown’s credibility nevertheless had been impeached with evidence showing 
that he “was no angel,” but a man who assisted defendant in a burglary and 
thereafter suffered convictions for three other serious felonies.  
 
Defendant now argues the court erred in denying the motion.  We disagree.  
The trial court has broad discretion to exclude impeachment evidence under 
Evidence Code section 352.  (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296.)  
Although wide latitude should be given to cross-examination designed to test the 
 
105
credibility of a prosecution witness, “[t]he statute empowers courts to prevent 
criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral 
credibility issues.”  (Ibid.)  The record reveals that during the course of Brown’s 
testimony, both court and counsel were less than clear in their understanding of 
the details of Louisiana’s laws regarding “crimes against nature.”  In light of other 
evidence admitted to challenge Brown’s credibility, we see no abuse of discretion 
in the trial court’s determination that any further attempts to clarify Louisiana’s 
laws regarding the “crimes against nature” would have been confusing.   
O.  Instructions Regarding Prior Unadjudicated Criminal Activity  
 
The trial court instructed the jurors they could consider in aggravation the 
following allegations of incidents of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 
190.3, factor (b): the assault and battery of Ruth Story; the assault and battery of 
Beverly Manning; the assault and battery of Frank Auer; the assault and battery of 
Kenneth Dotson; the two assaults and batteries of Jerre Brown; the assault and 
battery of Rosie Blackmon; the threat to Donna Hatch; the threats to Frank Sexton, 
Thomas McArdle, Patrick O’Connor and Brandon Armstrong; the assault, battery 
and attempted rape of Patricia Robinson; the assault and battery of Thomas Ryan; 
the assault and battery of William Hanson; and the assault of Johnnie Christiansen.  
The court further instructed the jurors that before they could consider these 
allegations as factors in aggravation, they must first be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant in fact committed those acts.  The court also 
instructed that they need not unanimously agree regarding each circumstance in 
aggravation.  
 
Defendant argues the failure to require unanimity as to factors in 
aggravation allowed the jurors to impose a penalty of death based on unreliable 
factual findings that were not subjected to the test of a unanimous jury verdict.  
We have rejected this argument, and concluded that the United States Supreme 
 
106
Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 have not altered these conclusions.  (People v. 
Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th 310, 365-366.)  Defendant fails to persuade us to revisit 
this issue.  
 
Defendant further argues the court’s instructions failed to limit the criminal 
acts the jurors could consider as factors in aggravation to those specifically alleged 
by the prosecution.  He argues the jurors might have concluded that the list of 
assaults set forth in the instruction was a list of examples of the types of criminal 
activities they could consider, rather than a list of the specific criminal actions they 
could consider.   
 
We disagree.  The court instructed as follows:  “The mitigating 
circumstances I’ve just read for your consideration are given as examples of some 
of the factors that you may take into account and as reasons for deciding not to 
impose a death sentence in this case.  You should not limit your consideration of 
mitigating circumstances to these specific factors.”  “So, the factors in mitigation 
really are cited by way of example and not by way of limitation.  On the other 
hand, the factors in aggravation — and those essentially are the first three matters 
I mentioned, the facts and circumstances of the crime itself, any prior felony 
convictions, and any other criminal activity by Mr. Hamilton which involves the 
use or attempted use of force or violence or express or . . . implied threat to use 
force or violence.  Those are the only circumstances in aggravation which the law 
permits you to consider.  You’re not allowed to consider any other facts or 
circumstances as circumstances in aggravation as a basis for determining that the 
death penalty is the appropriate penalty in this case.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Contrary to defendant’s argument, these instructions clearly informed the 
jurors they were specifically limited to the listed criminal acts they could consider 
in aggravation.  
 
107
P.  Lingering Doubt Instructions  
 
Defendant requested the court instruct the jury they could consider 
lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation.  The court modified defendant’s proposed 
instruction and gave the following instructions regarding lingering doubt: “Any 
lingering doubt you may entertain on the question of guilt may be considered by 
you in determining the appropriate penalty, which, of course, is the sole issue 
before you, choice of penalty.  A lingering doubt is defined as any doubt, however 
slight, which is not sufficient to create in the minds of a juror reasonable doubt. . . 
. [¶]  “[A] lingering doubt is some doubt, however slight, not sufficient to create in 
your mind a reasonable doubt, but yet leaving a lingering doubt about his — the 
question of his guilt.  If there is such a lingering doubt, of course, you may 
consider that in determining the appropriate penalty and helping you make your 
choice of penalty.” 
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jurors as he 
had requested, that lingering doubt may be considered a factor in mitigation.  The 
error, he argues, violated his federal and state rights to due process.   
 
We independently review the legal correctness of an instruction.  (People v. 
Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1089.)  Applying that standard, we find no error.  
 
We have previously held that “ ‘[t]here is no constitutional entitlement to 
instructions on lingering doubt.’  (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 903.)  
Instructions to consider the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) and 
any other circumstance extenuating the gravity of the crime (id., factor (k)), 
together with defense argument highlighting the question of lingering or residual 
doubt, suffice to properly put the question before the penalty jury.”  (People v. 
Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 42.)  The court here instructed the jury to 
 
108
consider the circumstances of the crime and any other circumstances extenuating 
the gravity of the crime.27  Defense counsel gave a lengthy argument about 
lingering doubt, in which he directly stated “lingering doubt [is] . . . an aspect of 
mitigation.”28  Defendant fails to convince us that the jury was not adequately 
informed that they could consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation.  
 
The jury, however, did ask the court for clarification of the use of lingering 
doubt.  On the second of their three days of deliberations, the jurors sent a note to 
the court that said, “In regards to ‘lingering doubt’ if we have questions, however 
slight, ‘lingering doubt,’ about the conviction for murder (in the 1st trial) is that 
appropriate?  In other words is that to be considered as mitigating or at all.”  
(Original underscoring.)  The court sent the note back to the jurors with the 
following typed on the bottom of the page, above its signature:  “Please see the 
page immediately following CALJIC 8.84 with the number 8 on the bottom.”  The 
page in the jury instruction binder given to the jurors for use during deliberations 
to which the court referred, which was nearly identical to that read by the court as 
instructions, read as follows:  
                                              
27  The court instructed the jurors, inter alia, they were to consider “the 
circumstances of the murder” and “any other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”  
28  
Defense counsel spent approximately one-fourth of his closing argument 
discussing the facts and his theories of lingering doubt.  He told the jury, “If you 
have any lingering doubt as to whether the defendant committed the crime you can 
rely upon that factor, and that factor alone all by itself to refuse to impose the 
ultimate penalty.  If you have any lingering doubt at all”; “[i]f you find there are 
problems with this case that rise to the level of lingering doubt, you can rely upon 
that to not impose the death penalty”; and “[t]he first thing we’ve talked about in 
terms of mitigation is lingering doubt. . . . Lingering doubt, that’s what we’ve been 
talking about, that aspect of mitigation.”  
 
109
 
“For the purposes of this penalty trial, you must accept the verdicts and 
findings rendered by the jury in the guilt trial.  That is, you must accept that the 
defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges of 
murder in the first degree, burglary, robbery, and kidnapping, as set forth in the 
information.  You must accept that the special circumstance allegations have been 
proved to be true beyond a reasonable doubt; namely that the murder was 
committed by defendant and that the murder was committed while the defendant 
was engaged in the commission of burglary, robbery and kidnapping.  [¶]  Any 
lingering doubts you may entertain on the question of guilt may be considered by 
you in determining the appropriate penalty.  [¶]  A lingering doubt is defined as 
any doubt, however slight, which is not sufficient to create in the minds of the 
jurors a reasonable doubt.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Defendant now argues the court failed to adequately answer the jury’s 
question and merely added to their confusion when it directed them back to the 
previously given instruction.  He argues the jurors did not understand that they 
could consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation.  
 
The record reveals the court notified defense counsel and defendant of the 
jury’s question and that they agreed to the court’s response.  Hence, defendant 
failed to preserve this claim for appeal.  In any event, the court did not err.  The 
question did not, as defendant asserts, show confusion as to whether the jurors 
could consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation.  Rather, a reasonable 
interpretation of the jury’s question is that the jury was confused as to whether a 
slight doubt they may have had about defendant’s guilt was enough to constitute a 
factor in mitigation, or if a slight doubt was not enough to be used at all in their 
consideration of penalty.  The court correctly reinstructed the jury that doubt, 
however slight, may be considered.   
 
110
Q.  Prosecutorial Misconduct  
 
Defendant contends the prosecution engaged in numerous acts of 
prejudicial misconduct requiring reversal of the death judgment.   
 
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates a defendant’s constitutional rights when 
the behavior comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects ‘ “the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”  
[Citation.]’  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.)  The focus of the 
inquiry is on the effect of the prosecutor’s action on the defendant, not on the 
intent or bad faith of the prosecutor.  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)  
Conduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair is error under state law 
only when it involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt 
to persuade either the court or the jury.’ ”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Mendoza, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 700.)   
1.  Statements by Prosecutor During Cross-Examination of Defendant 
 
a.  Defendant as poster boy for the death penalty 
 
During jury selection, an editorial in the local newspaper referred to 
defendant as “the poster boy for the death penalty.”  Defendant expressed concern 
that the inflammatory nature of this editorial comment would bias prospective 
jurors against him and moved for a change of venue.  The court agreed the 
comment was inflammatory, but denied the motion.  
 
During cross-examination of defendant at retrial, the prosecutor asked, 
“You think it’s hurt your kids that some people call you the poster boy for the 
death penalty?”  Defendant did not object to the comment until the following day, 
when he moved for a mistrial, arguing it amounted to prejudicially inflammatory 
testimony by the prosecutor in the form of a question.  The court denied the 
motion and agreed to give a curative instruction that statements of counsel are not 
evidence.  
 
111
 
Defendant renews his argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
in asking the question.  Defendant forfeited this claim, however, by his failure to 
timely object.  (See People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.)   
 
In any event, we see no error.  When a misconduct claim focuses on 
comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is 
a reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of 
remarks in an objectionable fashion.  (See People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 
284.)  The jury here would not construe the question, reviewed in context, as 
particularly inflammatory.  It came in the midst of a series of questions about 
defendant’s relationship, or lack thereof, with his first wife and two children.  The 
prosecutor asked defendant whether he valued and respected his family and 
established that, for the most part, defendant failed to provide them financial 
support and failed to hold a steady job.  Defendant convinced his then pregnant 
wife to take part in his check-forgery schemes, and they both suffered felony 
convictions in 1972.  He disgraced and embarrassed his parents, and had “hardly 
seen” his children in the past 20 years.  The prosecutor then asked, “You call 
yourself a parent, right?”  Defendant replied, “I am a parent,” in a tone the court 
later described as a bristling, “sharply emphasized response, with at least a verbal 
exclamation point,” indicating to the court that defendant “obviously took some 
umbrage to the tone of the question.”  The prosecutor then asked the single 
question, “You think it’s hurt your kids that some people call you the poster boy 
for the death penalty?”  Defendant did not object, but answered, “I’ve never heard 
anybody call me that to my face.”   
 
The prosecutor acknowledged that he used “a poor choice of words” but 
was trying to establish that defendant was not a good father and had left his 
children with “a legacy of shame.”  
 
112
 
We agree with the trial court that the comment was not well chosen, but see 
no reasonable likelihood the jury would construe it in an objectionable fashion.   
b.  Comments on defendant’s sketch of a headless and handless 
corpse  
 
Defendant drew a sketch of a headless and handless corpse and included it 
in a letter he addressed to Terry Buchanan.  Jail authorities intercepted the letter 
and delivered it to the district attorney’s office.  At trial, the prosecutor asked 
defendant if he recalled making the sketch.  Defendant said he recalled writing the 
letter to Terry Buchanan in which he professed his innocence of the murder, but 
could not identify the sketch without seeing it in the context of the entire letter.  
The prosecutor did not offer the letter, but showed defendant the sketch and 
reminded him that the prosecution had taken great care not to expose Terry 
Buchanan to photographs of his wife’s dismembered body.  The prosecutor then 
asked, “After avoiding [him] all that time you sent him that sketch, didn’t you?”  
Defendant repeated he could not identify the sketch out of the context of the letter.  
Before defendant could object, the prosecutor said, “Maybe we can show that to 
Eve de Bona, see if she . . . .”  Eve de Bona was an artist who taught painting at 
San Quentin State Prison and who had testified that defendant produced many 
studies of faces and portraits of women and had a particular and recognizable 
artistic style.  
 
Because defendant refused to identify the sketch, the prosecution did not 
offer it into evidence.  Defendant now argues the prosecutor nonetheless showed 
the sketch to the jurors by holding it up in their line of sight while questioning 
defendant.  He argues this constituted prejudicial misconduct. 
 
The record does not support the claim.  The record indicates only that 
during discussion out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel said, “Then he 
lifted up the sketch.  Did you draw that sketch?  Look where he’s sitting.  Look 
 
113
where the jury is.”  In spite of defendant’s inferences to the contrary, this record 
does not establish that the jurors actually ever saw the sketch.   
 
Defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s sarcastic remark about Eve de 
Bona, arguing that it allowed the prosecutor to change evidence defendant offered 
in mitigation about his prison artwork into evidence in aggravation.  Even if 
arguably inappropriate, the prosecutor’s comment was not evidence, and did not 
constitute misconduct.   
c.  Comments on other sketches by defendant 
 
Defendant also claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, during 
defendant’s cross-examination, he handed defendant more of his sketches, offered 
into evidence by defendant, and asked him if the sketches were “basically sketches 
of heads of women? . . . Portraits?” 
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor’s questions improperly suggested to the 
jury that evidence of defendant’s artistic talents he had offered in mitigation 
actually revealed an underlying morbid fascination with women’s heads.  He 
argues the prosecutor thereby improperly turned evidence in mitigation into 
evidence in aggravation.   
 
Defendant forfeited this claim on appeal when he failed to object at the 
time the prosecutor asked the complained-of questions.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 503.)  In any event, the claim lacks merit.  Prosecutors “have wide 
latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,” and whether 
“the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.”  
(People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522.)  The prosecutor here merely 
pointed to defendant’s sketches and allowed the jury to draw their own inferences 
as to what, if anything, they revealed about defendant.   
 
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2.  Questions of Witness Park 
 
a.  Prison violence 
 
Defendant next argues the prosecutor erred when he asked a series of 
questions of defense witness James Park about specific incidents of violence in 
California prisons.  
 
During cross-examination of Park, a former associate warden at San 
Quentin State Prison, the prosecutor asked, “You know who George Jackson was, 
don’t you?  . . .  [¶]  . . .  He was a killer, wasn’t he?”  When the prosecutor asked, 
“Let’s go back to George Jackson’s days at Soledad,” defendant objected on 
grounds of relevance.  Out of the presence of the jury the prosecutor explained that 
at San Quentin State Prison in 1971, when Park was responsible for the security of 
visitors coming into the prison, an attorney allegedly smuggled a gun to inmate 
Jackson, who used it later that day to murder three guards and two fellow inmates 
before being shot to death on the prison yard.  The court excluded the proffered 
evidence under Evidence Code section 352.  
 
Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asked Park, “[Did you] have a stress 
problem in . . . late 1971?”  Park replied, “Well, I think the incident you referred 
to was stressful.  I was not incapacitated, I was stressed out, as they say.”  The 
prosecutor asked, “As a result of that incident in 1971 there was a lot of disruption 
in the prison system, wasn’t there?”  The court sustained defendant’s relevance 
objection.  
 
The prosecutor returned to the area of inquiry several minutes later, asking, 
without further objection by the defense, “August 21, 1971, three guards were 
killed at San Quentin Prison, right? . . . And two white prisoners were killed the 
same day, right? . . . That last one was San Quentin while you were there?”  The 
prosecutor then asked Park if he knew that “a civilian laundry worker was killed at 
Folsom [State Prison] [in September, 1971],” “that same month, September, 1971, 
 
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two guards were attacked at [Deuel] Vocational Institute, right, one of them 
stabbed almost fatally,” and at Soledad State Prison in “1969 . . . a prison guard 
was thrown off the cell block to his death below by some members of the Black 
Guerrilla Family?”  Park acknowledged he was aware of these incidents, but to his 
knowledge, members of the Black Guerrilla Family were not involved or charged 
with the killing of the guard at Soledad State Prison.  Defendant then objected to 
the area of questioning on grounds of relevance.  The court sustained the 
objection.   
 
Defendant now argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in raising the 
issues surrounding the 1971 murders at San Quentin State Prison in spite of the 
court’s initial ruling, thereby inflaming the jury against him and Park.  Defendant 
also argues the prosecutor introduced impermissible racial factors into the jury’s 
consideration and diverted the jury’s attention from its proper function.  
 
We disagree.  The court’s initial ruling prohibited the prosecutor from 
asking specific questions about the details surrounding the 1971 San Quentin State 
Prison murders, not general questions about incidents of prison violence.   
 
Further, the record does not support defendant’s argument that the 
prosecutor’s questions introduced racial factors into the jury’s consideration.  With 
the exception of the description of the two prisoners killed at San Quentin State 
Prison as “two white prisoners,” and the killers at Soledad State Prison as 
“members of the Black Guerrilla Family,” which Park directly refuted, the 
prosecutor did not identify the race of any of the killers or victims in his list of 
other violent prison incidents, did not improperly suggest to the jurors that “black 
prisoners were particularly dangerous,” as defendant suggests, and did not argue 
or infer that defendant was in any manner associated with these incidents of prison 
violence or with the Black Guerrilla Family.   
 
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b.  Inmate lawsuits 
 
Defendant next argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, after 
establishing that prisoners in maximum security prisons sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole are given the opportunity to play basketball and handball, 
lift weights, play chess and other board games, watch television, listen to the 
radio, and read books and magazines, he asked Park if prisoners file lawsuits “just 
for fun.”  The prosecutor attempted to ask the question in three different ways; the 
court sustained defendant’s objections that the questions were argumentative, 
irrelevant, and speculative.   
 
Defendant now argues that in asking and reasking the objectionable 
questions, the prosecutor exploited recent public concerns about an increase in 
frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners and suggested to the jury that if defendant 
received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, he, too, would 
entertain himself by filing frivolous lawsuits.  
 
We disagree.  This exchange of three general questions regarding Park’s 
knowledge of frivolous lawsuits was not egregious, deceptive, or reprehensible.   
3.  Eliciting Sympathy and Bolstering Credibility of Two Prosecution 
Witnesses 
 
Defendant next argues the prosecution committed misconduct when he 
elicited the following testimony from Ruth Story, the victim of defendant’s 1977 
assault and robbery: “I was in a major automobile accident in 1958 and I was — I 
was almost killed.  I was severely injured on the whole right side, and I’ve used a 
cane ever since then. . . .We were going to Camp Pendleton to take my son back to 
the base after he had been home on leave.”  
 
Defendant argues that none of this testimony was relevant to the issue of 
defendant’s penalty, and the prosecution elicited it in order to appeal to the 
sympathy of the jurors.  
 
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We disagree.  The fact that Ruth Story had walked with a cane for years 
before the time defendant assaulted and robbed her was relevant to paint the 
picture of defendant using force and violence against a frail and vulnerable victim, 
a fact in aggravation admissible under section 190.3, factor (b).  Her testimony as 
to how she came to need the cane was merely foundational.  It was not extensive 
or melodramatic, and did not inappropriately bolster her credibility or increase the 
sympathy of the jurors.   
 
Defendant further argues the prosecution engaged in misconduct when he 
elicited from witness Frank Sexton, the deputy district attorney formerly assigned 
to the case, the fact that his hearing was impaired as a result of his having to jump 
out of an airplane during World War II.  We disagree with defendant’s 
characterization of this testimony as an attempt to enhance Sexton’s credibility.  
These few background facts served only to introduce the witness to the jurors and, 
arguably, to explain any difficulties Sexton might have in hearing the proceedings 
during the course of his testimony.  
4.  Closing Argument 
 
Defendant next argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his 
closing argument when he made statements that injected irrelevant and 
inflammatory factors into the jury’s consideration.   
a.  Defendant as “monster” 
 
The prosecutor described defendant as “a monster below the surface” who 
“pretends to be something he is not,” and compared him to Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde.  The court overruled defendant’s objection to this comment, stating the 
argument was not improper because defendant’s prior convictions involved acts of 
theft, dishonesty or deception, and the prosecution was entitled to speak to the 
egregious aspects of the capital crime.  Defendant now argues that by making the 
comment, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suggesting, without 
 
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psychological evidence in support, that defendant harbored an inner compulsion to 
kill.   
 
Defendant did not object on these grounds at trial, and, therefore, has 
forfeited the claim on appeal.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.)  In 
any event, we see no misconduct.  In light of the numerous incidents in which 
defendant admitted he lied and gave conflicting stories to the police, a comment 
that defendant might have harbored two sides to his personality, akin to Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde, was neither objectionable nor inflammatory.  Nor was there a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would infer from the prosecutor’s suggestions 
that the prosecution was actually offering a scientific analysis of defendant’s 
psyche.   
b.  Characterization of life without possibility of parole (LWOP) 
 
The prosecutor reminded the jury of defendant’s numerous acts of violence:  
“Pat Robinson at the jail . . . he didn’t want her to leave.”  “Rosie Blackmon.  She 
wanted to leave the hotel room and he didn’t want her to leave.”  “Kenneth Dotson 
[who] crossed him by testifying against him.”  “Jerre Brown testified against him, 
crossed him.  That resulted in a battery.”  “Tom Ryan crossed him, I suppose, . . . 
and Hamilton asked him to come down to the jail for an interview and that’s when 
he socked Ryan.”  “Donna Hatch crossed him . . . and he threatened to kill her.”  
“Ruth Story . . . [who was] walking down the street with the aid of a cane, holding 
on to her purse.  She was no threat to Bernard Hamilton at all . . . [and he] 
punched her in the face.”  “Frank Auer, jail visitor, attacked.”  “Deputy sheriff 
officers Christensen and Hanson, jail guards, [assaulted.]”  
 
The prosecutor then stated, “Bernard Hamilton always was and always will 
be a vicious, self-centered individual.  The defense is going to ask you to give him 
a penalty of life without the possibility of parole, and I think that we call that 
LWOP.  There’s another meaning you can give LWOP.  You can call it a license 
 
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without penalty to commit acts of violence on people in prison.  Anybody that 
comes into that prison that’s around Bernard Hamilton is going to be at risk.”  
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he 
characterized a sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a license to 
commit acts of violence.  Defendant failed to object to the statement when made 
and thus failed to preserve this contention for appeal.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 503.)  In any event, there was no misconduct.  The prosecutor made 
this single attempt at word play in the course of a larger argument regarding 
defendant’s numerous acts of violence.  It was a proper comment on defendant’s 
assertions that if given a sentence of less than death he would not be a threat to 
others in prison.  We see no reasonable probability the jury would construe the 
comment in an objectionable fashion.   
c.  Misstatement of evidence   
 
Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated evidence.  Donna Hatch testified 
on direct examination that defendant told her “he thought he had killed 
somebody.”  (Italics added.)  On cross-examination, defendant asked her to correct 
herself, suggesting that the exact words he had said were, “they think I killed a 
man.”  Hatch answered, “It was ‘a man.’  You did say ‘man.’ ”  (Italics added.)  In 
closing argument the prosecutor stated, “Donna said he was very upset, very 
nervous. . . . He said, ‘The police are looking for me, I think I may have killed 
somebody.’ ”  (Italics added.) 
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor prejudicially misstated the evidence to 
conform to his version of the facts.  He did not object at trial and therefore failed 
to preserve this claim for appeal, but, in any event, the claim has no merit.  The 
court instructed the jury that argument by counsel was not evidence, and we 
presume it followed the court’s instructions.  (See People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 920.) 
 
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d.  Characterization of defendant’s defense 
 
Several sets of tire tracks were found at the site in Pine Valley where Harry 
Piper, the target shooter, discovered Eleanore Buchanan’s body.  The prosecution 
established that some of the tire marks might have been made by Piper’s small 
sports car but none matched the tires on the Buchanans’ van or were definitively 
connected to the Buchanan murder.  A large portion of defendant’s case included 
challenges to the forensic evidence regarding the tire marks. 
 
In the course of his closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed defendant’s 
testimony regarding the events of the night of May 30, 1979, and defendant’s 
consistent denial of complicity in the murder, and commented, “There’s another 
one of Hamilton’s favorite suspects, Harry Piper.”  Contrary to defendant’s 
assertions, this offhand comment on defendant’s continuing efforts to suggest that 
someone other than he was responsible for the murder was not misleading or 
improper, and did not constitute misconduct.   
e.  Mischaracterization of defense witness 
 
Gary McIntyre testified for defendant that he met with defendant on the 
night and at the time of the murder.  On cross-examination, McIntyre 
acknowledged the prosecution had served him with two subpoenas requiring him 
to appear and testify for the prosecution.  He told the jury he lost the subpoenas 
that informed him of the correct trial date after being evicted from his home, and 
therefore failed to show up.  The prosecutor then asked McIntyre, “[B]ecause you 
didn’t show up, you were arrested and brought in?”  McIntyre denied the truth of 
this assertion, and the prosecution presented no evidence that McIntyre had been 
arrested.   
 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to dismiss McIntyre’s 
testimony that gave defendant an alibi for the time of the murder and argued, “he 
was in the wind.  We gave him two subpoenas and he didn’t show up.  . . . Of 
 
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course later, as revealed in the testimony, he was arrested and brought in here.  
The defense put him on as a witness.”  
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing, in the 
absence of any evidence in support, that McIntyre had been arrested.  Defendant 
did not object at the time the comment was made and therefore failed to preserve 
the issue for appeal.  In any event, we find no prejudice.  The court instructed the 
jury that questions and argument by counsel were not evidence, and we presume it 
followed the court’s instructions.  (See People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 920.) 
f.  Injection of personal beliefs 
 
Defense witness Thomas Baier, past president of the Louisiana Coalition to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, testified he bought one of defendant’s paintings at a 
conference for the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty.  In closing 
argument, the prosecutor commented, “And I want to tell Mr. Baier that the death 
penalty is not the problem.  The problem is murder, murder of people like Fran 
Buchanan.  So, Mr. Baier, if you want to do the community some good, why don’t 
you form the Louisiana Coalition to Abolish Murder.”  
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly injected his personal beliefs 
about the death penalty into his argument, using the “weight of his office” to 
inflame the jury against death penalty opponents.  Defendant did not object to the 
comment at trial and thus failed to preserve the claim for appeal.  In any event, the 
claim is without merit.  Even if this comment could be interpreted as a statement 
of the prosecutor’s personal beliefs, it was limited, isolated, and neither 
inflammatory nor so egregious as to infect the trial with unfairness, nor was it a 
deceptive or reprehensible method used to persuade the jury.  (People v. Mendoza, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 700.) 
 
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g.  Rejection of defendant’s evidence in mitigation 
 
Defendant next argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he 
urged the jury to reject defendant’s evidence in mitigation with his comments on 
the testimony of San Quentin State Prison art facilitator Eve de Bona.  The 
prosecutor stated, “My question to Miss de Bona is:  Do you think any painting 
he’s ever done or ever will do can possibly excuse what he did to Fran Buchanan?  
Is that a reason to let him live?  I don’t think so.”  
 
Defendant argues the prosecutor again interjected his personal views on the 
death penalty into the jury’s minds and misled the jury as to the nature of 
mitigating evidence.  Defendant did not object to this comment at trial and 
therefore failed to preserve the claim for appeal.  In any event, the claim has no 
merit.  Even if the comment was an inappropriate statement of the prosecutor’s 
personal beliefs, it was not egregious, deceptive or reprehensible.   
h.  Call for vengeance 
 
Finally, defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he 
inappropriately called for vengeance from the jury.  Not so.   
 
“ ‘[I]solated, brief references to retribution or community vengeance . . . , 
although potentially inflammatory, do not constitute misconduct so long as such 
arguments do not form the principal basis for advocating imposition of the death 
penalty.’ ”  (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 262.)  Near the end of his 
closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “I don’t get a rebuttal argument.  When 
I’m done, I’m done.  And you’ll hear from the defense.  They are going to argue to 
you to spare this man’s life. . . .Whatever they say there’s always going to be a 
good counterargument to it.  They may say putting Bernard Hamilton to death will 
not bring back Fran.  Well, the truth is sparing his life won’t bring back Fran 
either. . . .  They may say that the death penalty is just revenge.  Well, you know, 
any punishment is revenge in a sense.  And I say, what’s wrong with revenge?  
 
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There are some things that should be avenged.  What’s moral about letting a killer 
live? . . . The defense may say that life without the possibility of parole is an 
adequate punishment in this case.  You know, I — do you remember the Disney 
movie, ‘Song of the South’ years ago, came out in the late 40’s? . . . Brer Rabbit 
was a cunning fellow. . . . The briar patch was a bad place for most people but not 
for Brer Rabbit.  Well, I look at prison as Bernard’s briar patch.  That’s a terrible 
place for most people. . . but that’s where he’s been all these years. . . . This is just 
business as usual for him.”  (Italics added.) 
 
The prosecutor’s mention of vengeance and revenge was a brief portion of 
a larger argument asking the jurors to keep in mind that there were other ways to 
think about arguments he anticipated the defense would make.  The remark was 
brief, not inflammatory, and could not be construed as being the principal basis of 
the prosecutor’s argument regarding the appropriate and fair sentence.  Any 
conceivable error, therefore, was harmless.  
R.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Law  
 
Defendant raises a number of facial constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty law, claims we have repeatedly rejected and find no 
persuasive reason to reexamine.  Accordingly, we continue to hold: 
 
Consideration of the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor 
(a), does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty.   
(People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 703.) 
 
California death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a 
burden of proof — whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of 
the evidence — as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater 
weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, and the 
appropriateness of a death sentence.  (People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 703; see also People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 731 [neither Apprendi 
 
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v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, nor Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 
warrants reconsideration of our conclusion that the death penalty statute is not 
unconstitutional for failing to provide the jury with instructions on the burden of 
proof].) 
 
A jury in a capital case need not make written findings.  (People v. Watson, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 703.)  
 
The jury is not constitutionally required to achieve unanimity as to 
aggravating factors.  (Ibid.; People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402.)  Recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 
U.S. 466, and Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584 have not altered these 
conclusions.  (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402.) 
 
The failure to require intercase proportionality review does not render the 
law unconstitutional.  (People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 704; People v. 
Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402.) 
 
The trial court is not required to identify which factors are aggravating and 
which are mitigating, or to instruct the jury to restrict its consideration of evidence 
in this regard.  (Watson, supra, at p. 704; Brown, supra, at p. 402.) 
 
California's death penalty statute does not violate equal protection by 
denying capital defendants certain procedural safeguards, such as jury unanimity 
and written jury findings, while affording such safeguards to noncapital 
defendants.  (People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 703–704; People v. Blair, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th 686, 754.) 
S.  Death Penalty Imposed in Violation of International Law 
 
Defendant argues California is bound by international law and treaties to 
which the United States is a signatory, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the United Nations 
 
125
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  He 
argues that imposing the death penalty violates his right to life, to be tried before 
an impartial tribunal, to access to the courts, to protection against prosecutorial 
misconduct, and the right to a fair hearing as protected by these international laws 
and treaties.  
 
We disagree.  International law does not prohibit a sentence of death where, 
as here, it was rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and 
statutory requirements.  (See People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1332; 
People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 106; People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
at p. 366.)  To the extent defendant challenges the death penalty itself as violative 
of international norms, we again reject this claim as we have done repeatedly and 
consistently in other cases.  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 500-501.) 
T.  Cumulative Error  
 
Finally, defendant contends that the cumulative effect of errors in the 
penalty retrial requires reversal.  Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we 
have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered separately.  
Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does 
not warrant reversal of the judgment. 
 
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127
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Hamilton 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S052288 
Date Filed: February 23, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: David M. Gill 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Arnold A. 
Erickson, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Pat Zaharopoulos and Holly D. 
Wilkens, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arnold A. Erickson 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Holly D. Wilkens 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2209