Title: Davenport v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 321, 2019
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KERRI DAVENPORT, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 321, 2019 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. K1812009789 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 26, 2019 
Decided: 
October 31, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Kerri Davenport, was indicted in March 2019 on charges 
of Operating or Attempting to Operate a Clandestine Laboratory, Conspiracy in the 
Second Degree, two counts of Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance, and 
Possession of Marijuana.  On July 2, 2019, Davenport pleaded guilty to Conspiracy 
in the Third Degree, as a lesser-included offense of the indicted conspiracy charge.  
In exchange for Davenport’s guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges 
and agreed to recommend a sentence of one year of Level V incarceration, suspended 
 
2 
for one year of Level II probation.  The Superior Court imposed the recommended 
sentence.  This is Davenport’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
 Davenport’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Davenport’s counsel asserts that he has performed a 
conscientious review of the record and the law and has identified no arguably 
appealable issues.  In his motion to withdraw and statement filed under Rule 26(c), 
counsel indicates that he informed Davenport of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided her with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  
Counsel also informed Davenport of her right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  
Davenport responded with points she wanted to present for the Court’s 
consideration, which counsel included with the Rule 26(c) brief.  The State has 
responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues that the Superior Court’s judgment 
should be affirmed. 
(3) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.1  This 
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the 
                                               
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  
 
3 
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”2 
(4) 
Davenport asserts various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
In general, the Court does not consider on direct appeal claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and does not do so here.3  To the extent that Davenport claims, 
separate from her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that the State 
conducted an illegal search or obtained a search warrant based on evidence that it 
obtained illegally, it is well-settled that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives 
a defendant’s right to challenge any errors occurring before the entry of the plea, 
even those of constitutional dimensions.4   
(5) 
In this case, the record supports the conclusion that Davenport 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty with a full understanding of 
the rights she was waiving.  The judge engaged in a colloquy with Davenport in open 
court.  Under oath, Davenport informed the judge that she understood the charge 
against her and that she was pleading guilty because she was, in fact, guilty.  She 
indicated that she had reviewed the guilty plea agreement and that she understood 
its meaning and the rights that she was waiving by entering a guilty plea.  Davenport 
also told the judge that no one was forcing her to plead guilty and that she was 
                                               
 
2 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81. 
3 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
4 Scarborough v. State, 2015 WL 4606519, at *3 (Del. July 30, 2015). 
 
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satisfied with her counsel’s representation.  Davenport stated under oath that she 
understood the maximum sentence that she was facing.  Davenport’s knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waived her right to challenge the search 
warrant.5 
(6) 
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and concluded that the 
appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We 
also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record and 
the law and properly determined that Davenport could not raise a meritorious claim 
on appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                               
 
5 See Mumford v. State, 2000 WL 431600 (Del. Apr. 6, 2000) (“To the extent Mumford is 
complaining about a defect in the arrest warrant or the indictment, or about any other error that 
occurred before the plea, a properly entered plea of guilty, such as the plea entered here, constitutes 
a waiver of all errors or defects occurring before the plea, except a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”).