Title: Ex parte Nathan Rodgers Construction, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Nathan Rodgers Construction, Inc. v. City of Saraland)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070640
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2008

REL: 06/20/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070640
_________________________
Ex parte Nathan Rodgers Construction, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Nathan Rodgers Construction, Inc.
v.
City of Saraland)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-05-218.51;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2060803)
LYONS, Justice.
1070640
2
Nathan 
Rodgers 
Construction, 
Inc. 
("Rodgers"), 
petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the
Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion affirmance of the Mobile
Circuit Court's judgment upholding the City of Saraland's
denial of Rodgers's application for rezoning.  See Nathan
Rodgers Constr., Inc. v. City of Saraland (No. 2060803,
January 18, 2008), __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (table).
We granted the petition to consider Rodgers's contention that
the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with
Martin v. O'Rear, 423 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1982).  We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Rodgers is a real-estate development company that owns
eight acres of property in the City of Saraland on which it
wants to develop a subdivision consisting of patio homes.
However, patio homes traditionally sit on lots with frontage
of less than 100 feet and Rodgers's property is in an area
currently zoned R-1, which allows only single-family homes on
lots with frontage of 100 feet or more.  Rodgers filed an
application for rezoning with the Saraland Planning Commission
requesting that its property be rezoned to R-1(A), which
1070640
3
allows single-family homes on lots with less than 100 feet of
frontage.  
At 
the 
planning 
commission 
hearing 
on 
Rodgers's
application for rezoning, several residents expressed concern
that the rezoning would create traffic and drainage problems
in the surrounding areas, and the planning commission
recommended that the Saraland City Council deny Rodgers's
application.  The city council then held a public hearing on
Rodgers's application for rezoning.  Several residents again
expressed concern about potential traffic and drainage
problems caused by the rezoning, and the city council denied
Rodgers's application for rezoning.  
Rodgers sued Saraland, seeking a judgment declaring that
Saraland's zoning regulations and ordinances, under which the
property is presently classified, are unconstitutional and
otherwise invalid as applied to its property.  Rodgers also
sought injunctive relief to reverse Saraland's denial of the
application for rezoning and asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C.
1983 alleging that Saraland's actions in denying its
application for rezoning were discriminatory.  After a bench
trial in which, among others, a city councilman, a member of
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the planning commission, and a city councilman who also served
on the planning commission testified, the trial court found in
favor of Saraland on all counts.  The trial court's order
stated:
"[Saraland] presented substantial evidence to the
Court that its decision was based on legitimate
police powers consideration, which was the City's
concern regarding increased traffic congestion on
Celeste Road.  While some aspects of 'traffic
engineering' do require an expert witness in order
to 
offer 
testimony 
to 
a 
court, 
[Saraland's]
witnesses were qualified, as lay witnesses and
members of the City Council and long time residents
of the City of Saraland, to testify as to their
opinion regarding [the effect of Rodgers's] proposed
development on traffic on Celeste Road.  The Court
could 
accept 
or 
reject [Saraland's] testimony
regarding traffic congestion. The Court is not
impressed by the testimony offered by [Rodgers] to
counter [Saraland's] traffic testimony. ...  Thus,
the City Council's decision to discourage increased
automobile traffic by not rezoning [Rodgers's]
property is a valid exercise of the city's police
power as increased traffic can impact public safety.
The Saraland City Council may not necessarily be
correct in [its] assumptions about increased traffic
but there is no evidence that [it] discriminated
against the defendant or reached [its] decision
based on an improper motive.
"Thus from hearing all the testimony and
reviewing the applicable law, as to [Rodgers's]
count asking the Court for a declaratory judgment,
the Court finds that the decision of the Saraland
City Council in denying [Rodgers's] zoning change
was valid and lawful and was not arbitrarily [sic]
or capricious." 
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5
Rodgers appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which
affirmed the trial court's judgment without an opinion, citing
in its no-opinion affirmance Pollard v. Unus Props., LLC, 902
So. 2d 18, 24-25 (Ala. 2004); American Petroleum Equip. &
Constr., Inc. v. Fancher, 708 So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1997); BP
Oil Co. v. Jefferson County, 571 So. 2d 1026, 1028-29 (Ala.
1990); and City of Birmingham v. Morris, 396 So. 2d 53, 55
(Ala. 1981).  Rodgers then petitioned this Court for
certiorari review, contending that prior decisions of this
Court conflict with the Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion
affirmance.  We granted certiorari review in this case to
consider Rodgers's contention that the Court of Civil Appeals'
no-opinion affirmance conflicts with Martin v. O'Rear, 423 So.
2d 829, 831 (Ala. 1982).  
II. Standard of Review
"In reviewing a decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals on a petition for a writ of certiorari, this
Court 'accords no presumption of correctness to the
legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate
court.  Therefore, we must apply de novo the
standard of review that was applicable in the Court
of Civil Appeals.'  Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684
So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996)."
Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 308 (Ala. 2005).
1070640
6
The standard of review in a zoning case is highly
deferential to the municipal governing body.  See American
Petroleum Equip. & Constr., Inc., 708 So. 2d at 132 ("Because
the adoption of an ordinance is a legislative function, the
courts must apply a highly deferential standard in zoning
cases."). 
"'[P]assage of a zoning ordinance is a legislative
act, and it is well established that municipal
ordinances are presumed to be valid and reasonable,
to be within the scope of the powers granted
municipalities to adopt such ordinances, and are not
to be struck down unless they are clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable.' Cudd v. City of Homewood, 284
Ala. 268, 270, 224 So. 2d 625, 627 (1969)."
Pollard, 902 So. 2d at 24. 
III. Analysis
Rodgers contends that the Court of Civil Appeals'
affirmance of the trial court's judgment upholding Saraland's
denial of its application for rezoning conflicts with Martin.
According to Rodgers, Martin held that a city's zoning
decision must be based upon professional or expert studies,
and here, it says, Saraland's denial of its application was
based solely upon the speculative testimony of several
residents.  Specifically, Rodgers asserts that in Martin, 423
So. 2d at 831, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment
1070640
7
affirming the City of Jasper's adoption of an amendment to a
zoning ordinance because the City of Jasper produced "no
documentary studies or expert witnesses to indicate that there
was any factual basis" for the fears that the amendment would
cause overcrowding and other problems.  Rodgers contends that,
as was the case with the City of Jasper, Saraland had no
factual basis for denying its application for rezoning;
therefore, it argues, the Court of Civil Appeals' decision
affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of Saraland is
due to be reversed.  Saraland contends that Martin is
distinguishable from the present case because in Martin the
City of Jasper passed a zoning ordinance to prevent a
landowner from building, unlike here, where Rodgers is
requesting that its property be rezoned in order to build.
In Martin, Eula Mae Martin purchased a parcel of property
in the City of Jasper that was zoned for single-family homes,
apartments, and businesses.  423 So. 2d at 829.  Martin
obtained a permit to build a seven-unit condominium complex on
the property and began excavating.  423 So. 2d at 829.  Schley
O'Rear and 10 other residents of the City of Jasper ("the
O'Rear group") petitioned the city's planning commission to
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8
rezone Martin's property to allow only single-family homes and
thereby prevent construction of the condominium complex by
Martin.  423 So. 2d at 829-30.  The O'Rear group appeared at
a planning commission meeting in support of the petition, and
the planning commission recommended that the Board of
Commissioners for the City of Jasper rezone the property and
surrounding areas to allow only single-family homes.  423 So.
2d at 830.  
Pending action by the Board of Commissioners on its
petition for rezoning, the O'Rear group sought a temporary
restraining order ("TRO"), a preliminary injunction, and a
permanent injunction to prevent Martin from building her
condominium complex.  423 So. 2d at 829-30.  The trial court
issued the TRO, and the Board of Commissioners then adopted an
ordinance to rezone Martin's property and the surrounding area
to allow only single-family homes.  423 So. 2d at 830.  Based
on the Board's adoption of the rezoning ordinance, the trial
court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Martin from
proceeding with the construction of her condominium complex.
423 So. 2d at 830. 
1070640
9
After a hearing on the permanent injunction, the trial
court enjoined Martin from building the condominium complex.
423 So. 2d at 830.  Martin then appealed the trial court's
judgment to this Court.  423 So. 2d at 829.  This Court
reversed the judgment of trial court and remanded, stating:
"It is clear from this evidence that the new
classification is not consistent with the land use
pattern of the area.  The attempts by the plaintiffs
to show a substantial relationship of the zoning
amendment to public health, safety, morals and
general welfare amounted to speculative testimony by
the plaintiffs that a seven-unit complex might cause
traffic problems or parking problems, and general
overcrowding of an old, quiet neighborhood.  The
plaintiffs introduced no documentary studies or
expert witnesses to indicate that there was any
factual basis to these fears." 
Martin, 423 So. 2d at 831.
Our review of the record in Martin shows that the
following individuals testified at the hearing on the
permanent injunction: the mayor, the chairman of the planning
commission, one member of the Board of Commissioners, the city
engineer, the city building inspector, four members of the
O'Rear group, and Martin.   
Hal Coons, the chairman of the planning commission,
testified about the circumstances that led to the planning
commission's recommendation that the Board of Commissioners
1070640
10
rezone Martin's property and surrounding areas.  Coons
testified that before the planning commission's consideration
of the O'Rear group's petition for rezoning, O'Rear came to
him to discuss Martin's property.  The record reflects the
following exchange occurred between Coons and defense counsel:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And did Mr. O'Rear tell you what
his group planned to do or the intentions of his
group?  Well, let me ask you this–-what did he tell
you on that occasion?
"[COONS]: Well, I went with Mr. O'Rear up to look at
this area, and we did discuss the fact that there
might be some blight beginning to creep into this
old established neighborhood.
"....
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did Mr. O'Rear voice to you some
concern about blacks coming into the neighborhood?
"[COONS]: Yes, I think he did.
"....
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did the question of a black
buying one of these proposed condominium units come
up in this discussion?
"[COONS]: I believe we discussed that.
"....
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... [A]t the planning commission
did anyone purport to have made a study of what
effect the rezoning would have or was there any
discussion along those lines?
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"[COONS]: Well, we generally discuss it.  In this
case I'll say maybe not enough, but we did.
"....
"[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: 
Why 
did 
you 
tender 
your
resignation as chairman of the planning commission?
"....
"[COONS]: I felt that we had committed–-we had done
a bad thing after it came to light that Mrs. Martin
would not be able to build her proposed building on
the lot, because at the time we made the ruling-–
"....
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you have a judgment as to the
effect of the rezoning upon the safety of the
citizens of Jasper in this East Jasper community?
"[COONS]: I wouldn't think that it would be–-it
would not hurt the safety of it.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You don't feel that it would
affect it one way or the other?
"[COONS]: I don't.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It would have no effect one way
or the other?
"[COONS]: In my opinion.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As a matter of fact, Mr. Coons,
do you feel that the rezoning would affect the
public health one way or the other?
"[COONS]: In my opinion it would not affect it.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you feel that it would affect
one way or the other the public morals?
1070640
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"[COONS]: I would think not.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Wouldn't affect it one way or
the other–-things would be just like they were
before as afterwards, is that correct?
"[COONS]: That's correct.
"....
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Matter of fact this was done for
the benefit of Mr. Schley O'Rear, was it not?
"[COONS]: We did this one by heart instead of by
head.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And your heart is for O'Rear?
"[COONS]: That's correct."
Bill Trotter, a member of the Board of Commissioners, then
testified about the Board's adoption of the rezoning
ordinance.  Trotter was the only member of the Board who
testified at the hearing, and the record reflects the
following exchange occurred between Trotter and defense
counsel:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What investigation did you make
with regard to the area after receipt of the
recommendation and before the ... Commission acted
on it?
"[TROTTER]: I didn't make no investigation.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you make any inquiries of
anybody about whether the rezoning would help the
public safety in the area?
1070640
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"[TROTTER]: No, sir, the only thing I went by was
the zoning board's request.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You acted strictly in response
to 
what 
the 
recommendations 
of 
the 
planning
commission was.  Made no further inquiries, had no
further judgment about it except that, is that
correct?
"[TROTTER]: I had my own feeling about the thing,
but other than that; no sir.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Trotter, do you have any
reason to think that the public health of the City
of Jasper would be improved by rezoning of that
property from R-4 to R-2?
"[TROTTER]: From my standpoint?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
"[TROTTER]: I would presume that if you leave it
zoned R-2 I think it would help the neighborhood
over there; yes, sir.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Help the neighborhood?
"[TROTTER]: Well, yes, sir.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: In what respect?
"[TROTTER]: 
Well, 
the neighborhood is crowded
anyway, it would just add more people to it.
"....
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You acted totally in reliance on
the recommendation of the planning commission, is
that correct?
"[TROTTER]: That's true."
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After a review of the record in Martin, we conclude that
this Court's reference in Martin to "speculative testimony" of
the ill effects of Martin's condominium complex was grounded
in the Board's adoption of the rezoning ordinance based solely
on the planning commission's recommendation, which, in turn,
was based solely on the concern of the O'Rear group that
Martin's condominium complex would be a blight to the
neighborhood and would enhance the probability that African-
Americans would move into the area.  The reference in Martin
to the lack of "documentary studies or expert witnesses to
indicate that there was any factual basis to these fears" is
completely understandable in the context of the record in
Martin reflecting that the zoning decision was based solely on
speculation.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in
Martin.  In the present case, Saraland presented evidence
indicating that its decision to deny Rodgers's application for
rezoning was not based solely on speculation.  City councilman
Howard Rubenstein and planning commission member Barbara
Scarbrough both testified that the decisions they made
regarding Rodgers's application for rezoning were based on
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personal knowledge of the traffic congestion in the area and
concerns that rezoning the property to allow smaller lots and
more residential units would enhance the traffic problems.
The record reflects the following exchange between Rubenstein
and plaintiff's counsel:
"[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: You didn't rely on any
expert studies or reports in voting regarding
traffic or drainage when you voted [to deny
Rodgers's application for rehearing]? 
 
"[RUBENSTEIN]: I primarily relied on my experience
as a resident of Saraland.  I drive this area twice
a day, sometimes four or six times a day.  I've
experienced firsthand the traffic problems this
particular area has.  This area has been a frequent
area of complaint over the last four years from
residents because of the congestion.  And those were
some of the factors that as an elected official I
relied on in making my judgment.
"....
"[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: And do you have any evidence
that eight homes is going to create an impact on
traffic or drainage? 
"[RUBENSTEIN]: In my opinion as an elected official
I think it would have an adverse effect on traffic
and congestion. 
"[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: And that's based solely on
your personal knowledge of the area? 
 
"[RUBENSTEIN]: Yes, ma'am."
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The record reflects the following exchange between Scarbrough
and defense counsel:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Why did you vote against [the
application for rezoning]?
"[SCARBROUGH]: I had questions about the traffic
flow, the ingress into the property, how the streets
were developed, how the traffic was going to flow.
And also I live on Alvarez Drive, the street that
would come out, so I was concerned about the
traffic.
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]]: How long have you lived in that
area?
"[SCARBROUGH]: Thirty-five years."
Rodgers relies on the testimony of Marvin Adams, the city
councilman who also served on the planning commission, who
testified that he had only as much of a "clue" of what impact
the rezoning would have on traffic as defense counsel might
have.  However, we conclude that the testimony of Rubenstein
and Scarbrough constitute an independent and adequate basis
for concluding that Saraland's decision was not based solely
on speculation.  Thus, this case is distinguishable from
Martin.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
Saraland's denial of Rodgers's application for rezoning was
not arbitrary and capricious.
IV. Conclusion 
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Finding no conflict with Martin, we affirm the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.