Title: Hamel v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46332
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2000

FILED:  April 6, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

GEORGE F. HAMEL,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
DAN JOHNSON,Superintendent,Snake River Correctional Institution,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 97-05-28-838-M; CA A100349; SC S46332)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 3, 2000.
	Bob Pangburn, Caldwell, Idaho, argued the cause and filed
the petition for petitioner on review.
	Kelly Knivila, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Eric M. Cumfer, Salem, filed a brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs Justices.**  
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
	*Appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court.
	158 Or App 276, 974 P2d 260 (1999).
	LEESON, J.
	In this habeas corpus proceeding, ORS 34.310 et seq.,
the Court of Appeals dismissed as moot petitioner's challenge to
a January 1997 order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision (Board).  Hamel v. Johnson, 158 Or App 276, 974 P2d
260 (1999).  See ORS 34.310 (allowing prosecution of writ of
habeas corpus to inquire into cause of imprisonment).  For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case to that court for further
proceedings.
	In 1991, petitioner was convicted of two counts of
first-degree sodomy, ORS 163.405, for crimes that he committed in
1988.  Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive 10- and 20-year
terms of imprisonment in the custody of the Oregon Department of
Corrections (Department).  Because petitioner had committed his
crimes before November 1, 1989, he was subject to the parole
matrix system that the legislature had established in 1977.  Or
Laws 1997, ch 372, §§ 1-18.  Under that system, "[t]he
legislature * * * authorized the Board to determine the actual
duration of an inmate's imprisonment."  Price v. Board of Parole,
300 Or 283, 288, 709 P2d 1075 (1985).  
	Petitioner was assigned to the Snake River Correctional
Institution.  Following his admission, the Board held a hearing
to set petitioner's parole release date.  See ORS 144.120(1) 
(directing Board to hold hearing to set initial release date
after admission of inmate to any Department institution).  After
that hearing, the Board set petitioner's scheduled parole release
date for May 29, 1997.  On January 23, 1997, however, the Board
issued an order postponing petitioner's scheduled release until
May 29, 1999. (1) 
	On May 28, 1997, petitioner filed the present habeas
corpus proceeding in the Malheur County Circuit Court, alleging
that he was imprisoned unlawfully because the Board had extended
his scheduled parole release date in violation of both state and
federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws. (2)  See Bedell v.
Schiedler, 307 Or 562, 567, 770 P2d 909 (1989) (habeas corpus
used to determine whether person being held lawfully).  The trial
court issued the writ, respondent filed a return, and petitioner
filed a replication, again alleging that the Board's action
postponing his parole release date violated state and federal ex
post facto prohibitions.  The trial court rejected petitioner's
ex post facto argument:
"It appears to this court based on the evidence
before it that the parole Board made its decision based
on the law in effect at the time the defendant was
convicted and therefore plaintiff has not met his
burden of proof." 
(Emphasis added.)  The court denied habeas corpus relief and
entered judgment for respondent.  Petitioner appealed.
	In October 1998, while petitioner's appeal was pending,
the Board issued another order postponing petitioner's scheduled
parole release date.  In issuing that order, the Board relied on
information that had not been available to it when it issued its
1997 order, including a psychological evaluation of petitioner
that was performed in 1998.
	After the Board issued the 1998 order, respondent moved
to dismiss petitioner's appeal.  Respondent argued that the 1998
order had superseded the 1997 order and that any decision
regarding the legality of the 1997 order would resolve only an
"abstract question."  Accordingly, respondent contended,
petitioner's appeal should be dismissed as moot.  The Court of
Appeals granted respondent's motion.  Hamel, 158 Or App at 281. (3) 
This court allowed the petition for review to determine whether,
under the foregoing circumstances, the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing petitioner's appeal of the 1997 order as moot. (4)  
	Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding abstract,
hypothetical, or contingent questions.  Gortmaker v. Seaton, 252
Or 440, 442, 450 P2d 547 (1969).  A court's decision on a matter
must have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.  Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405-06, 848 P2d
1194 (1993).  Even if a case otherwise is justiciable, if the
court's decision "no longer will have a practical effect on or
concerning the rights of the parties," then the matter will be
dismissed as moot.  Id. at 406.  For example, a case becomes moot
when an event occurs that "render[s] it impossible for the court
to grant effectual relief."  Greyhound Park v. Ore. Racing Com.,
215 Or 76, 79, 332 P2d 634 (1958).
	As noted, respondent contends that the Board's 1998
order "superseded" the 1997 order, thereby making petitioner's
appeal from the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus moot.  Even assuming that the 1997 order was
invalid, respondent argues, the Board was entitled to issue the
1998 order, because, in respondent's view, the Board was not
required to release petitioner on parole until the expiration of
his 20-year indeterminate sentence. 
	Petitioner responds that ORS 144.245 (1987) required
the Board to release him on parole on his scheduled release date,
unless the Board had a valid reason to postpone that release
date.  According to petitioner, the Board did not have a valid
reason to postpone his release date, because it applied the
incorrect version of ORS 144.125(3) in making the decision to do
so.  If the Board had applied the correct version of that
statute, petitioner asserts, then it would have concluded that he
did not suffer from a "severe emotional disturbance such as to
constitute a danger to the health or safety of the community,"
ORS 144.125(3) (1987), and it would have released him on parole
on May 29, 1997.  If petitioner had been released on parole, he
reasons, then he would not have been in prison in 1998, and the
Board could not have issued the 1998 order.  Therefore,
petitioner argues, the 1998 order did not render moot his
challenge to the 1997 order. 
	The Court of Appeals majority agreed with respondent
that the 1998 order superseded the 1997 order, thereby rendering
moot petitioner's appeal from the 1997 order.  Hamel, 158 Or App
at 281.  The majority relied on its decision in Jones v.
Thompson, 156 Or App 226, 968 P2d 380 (1998), where it had held
that an indeterminate sentence authorizes the Department to
retain custody of a prisoner until he or she has served out the
sentence, "either by serving it in the custody of [the
Department] or by serving it on parole."  Jones, 156 Or App at
231.  Under that view, any Board order setting a release date has
no legal effect until the end of the indeterminate sentence.  Our
review of the relevant statutes satisfies us that the foregoing
view misapprehends the nature of the indeterminate sentencing
scheme that was in effect when petitioner was sentenced.
	As noted, petitioner was sentenced under the parole
matrix system that went into effect in 1977.  See Or Laws 1977,
ch 372, §§ 2-6 (describing system).  Under that system, a trial
court imposed an indeterminate sentence of a specified duration
on a defendant who had been convicted of a crime.  An
indeterminate sentence stated only a maximum term to be served
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.  Such a
sentence did not establish the length of time that a defendant
was to be incarcerated.  Harris v. Board of Parole, 288 Or 495,
503, 605 P2d 1181 (1980).  Regardless of the length of an
indeterminate sentence, under ORS 144.780 and ORS 144.785, "it is
the [Board] that determines the actual duration of imprisonment." 
Id.  In other words, for prisoners sentenced under the matrix
system, the Board, not the court, determines the actual duration
of imprisonment.  Price, 300 Or at 288.  See also OAR 213-002-0001(3)(b) ("Although many citizens believe the indeterminate
sentence sets the length of imprisonment, that sentence only sets
an offender's maximum period of incarceration and the matrix
controls actual length of stay."). 
	In sum, under the matrix system, the parole release
date that is set by the Board, not the indeterminate sentence,
establishes how long a prisoner will be incarcerated.  The
indeterminate sentence merely provides the outermost limit of the
Board's authority over the length of a prisoner's term of
incarceration.
	A brief summary of the workings of the parole matrix
system helps to explain why, in this case, petitioner's appeal
from the Board's 1997 order did not become moot when the Board
issued its 1998 order.  ORS 144.120(1) directs the Board to
conduct a hearing within six months to a year after the prisoner
has arrived in a correctional facility and to set an initial
parole release date "pursuant to ORS 144.780."  ORS 144.780, in
turn, directs the Board to adopt rules establishing "ranges of
duration of imprisonment to be served for felony offenses prior
to release on parole."  Under the Board's rules, the "ranges of
duration" referred to in ORS 144.780 are known as the "matrix
ranges."  OAR 255-005-0005(28) (1998).  The matrix ranges
identify the ranges of months within which the Board has
discretion to set a prison term.  Id.
	In 1985, the legislature added the following provision
to the parole matrix scheme:
"When the [Board] has set a date on which a
prisoner is to be released upon parole, the prisoner
shall be released on that date unless the prisoner on
that date remains subject to an unexpired minimum term
during which the prisoner is not eligible for parole,
in which case the prisoner shall not be released until
the expiration of the minimum term."
ORS 144.245(1); Or Laws 1985, ch 53, § 2 (emphasis added).  Under
that statute, if a prisoner does not have an unexpired minimum
term, then the prisoner must be released on the scheduled release
date.  Cf. Collins v. Foster, 299 Or 90, 94, 698 P2d 953 (1985)
(under release provision of ORS 136.290, "shall release" is
mandatory, affording no discretion); see also Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 US 1, 11-12, 60 L Ed 2d 668, 99 S Ct
2100 (1979) (state parole statutes phrased in mandatory terms
create liberty interest in parole release date).  However, in
addition to the condition stated in ORS 144.245 for postponing a
release date, ORS 144.125 (1987) lists three additional grounds
on which the Board either may or shall postpone a release date: 
"serious misconduct during confinement," ORS 144.125(2) (1987);
the presence of a "severe emotional disturbance such as to
constitute a danger to the health or safety of the community,"
ORS 144.125(3) (1987); and an inadequate parole release plan, ORS
144.125(4) (1987).  Any one of the statutory reasons for
postponing a release date, if valid, suffices to postpone a
scheduled parole release date. 
	In this case, consistent with ORS 144.120(1), after
petitioner had arrived in the corrections facility, the Board
held a hearing to set his initial parole release date.  Applying
the matrix range, the Board set May 29, 1997, as petitioner's
initial release date.  Under ORS 144.245(1), the Board was
required to release petitioner on parole on that date unless the
Board identified a valid reason for postponing his release.  In
1997, the Board issued an order identifying one of the statutory
reasons for postponing petitioner's parole release date, namely,
that he suffered from "a present severe emotional disturbance
[sic] that constitutes a danger to the health or the safety of
the community."  
	In his habeas corpus petition, petitioner alleged that
the reason that the Board gave for postponing his release date
was not valid.  As noted, under ORS 144.245, the Board was
required to release petitioner on parole on the scheduled release
date unless it had a valid reason for postponing that release
date.  Respondent does not contend that petitioner was subject to
an unexpired minimum term.  Therefore, if petitioner were to
prevail on his claim that the Board's reason for postponing his
release date under ORS 144.125(3) was not valid, then the Board
should have released him on parole on May 29, 1997, and his
continued imprisonment is unlawful.  The Board is not entitled to
rely on evidence and reasons that it acquired after that date to
justify its decision not to release petitioner then.  In other
words, in this case, the Board could not rely on petitioner's
1998 psychological evaluation to justify its decision to postpone
petitioner's 1997 parole release date.
	Under those circumstances, petitioner's appeal
challenging the validity of the Board's 1997 order did not become
moot when the Board issued its 1998 order.  If the Board did not
have a valid reason for postponing petitioner's 1997 parole
release date, then it should have released him on parole. 
Respondent concedes that, if petitioner had been released on
parole, then the Board could not have issued its 1998 order.  The
Court of Appeals therefore erred in dismissing the appeal as
moot, and the case must be remanded to that court for it to
address petitioner's claim that the Board improperly postponed
his May 27, 1997, parole release date.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.

1. 	The Board relied on ORS 144.125(3) in postponing
petitioner's parole release date.  Between 1981 and 1993, ORS
144.125(3) provided:
"If a psychiatric or psychological diagnosis of
present severe emotional disturbance such as to
constitute a danger to the health or safety of the
community has been made with respect to the prisoner,
the board may order the postponement of the scheduled
parole release until a specified future date." In 1999,
the legislature amended ORS 144.125.  Or Laws 1999, ch
141, § 1.  
Unless otherwise indicated, we refer to this version of the
statute as ORS 144.125(3), because that is the version that was
in effect when petitioner committed his crimes.  
	In 1993, the legislature amended ORS 144.125(3), Or Laws
1993, ch 334, § 1.  Between 1993 and 1999, ORS 144.125(3)
provided:
"If the board finds the prisoner has a mental or
emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition or disorder
predisposing the prisoner to the commission of a crime to a
degree rendering the prisoner a danger to the health or
safety of the community, the board may order the
postponement of the scheduled parole release date until a
specified future date."   
	In 1999, the legislature further amended ORS 144.125.  Or
Laws 1999, ch 141, § 1.  The 1999 amendments are not relevant to
this case.  

2.   Petitioner argued that the Board had applied the 1993
version of ORS 144.125(3), rather than the pre-1993 version, and
that, because ORS 144.125(3) is more onerous than the pre-1993
version, application of the 1993 version violated the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.  As support for that argument,
petitioner cited Meadows v. Schiedler, 143 Or App 213, 219-20,
924 P2d 314 (1996), rev den 325 Or 367(1997), which held that
retroactive application of ORS 144.125(3) violates the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. 

3. 	The Court of Appeals relied on Jones v. Thompson, 156
Or App 226, 968 P2d 380 (1998), in holding that the October 1998
Board order rendered moot petitioner's appeal from the January
1997 order.  In Jones, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, held that a subsequent order of the Board supersedes a
previous order, thereby rendering the first order moot.  Id. at
230.  After this court had allowed review in this case, the
petitioner in Jones also sought review.  This court has held in
abeyance the petition for review in Jones pending resolution of
this case. 

4. 	On the day of oral argument in this case, respondent
submitted a supplemental memorandum informing the court that
petitioner also had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the Board's 1998 order.  After reviewing the Board's
1998 order, the circuit court dismissed the petition.  According
to respondent, the Board's 1998 order provided petitioner "with
all of the relief that he would have been entitled to receive had
he prevailed in this action before it became moot."  That
petitioner also sought relief in habeas corpus from the Board's
1998 order does not affect our analysis in this case.  Petitioner
remains entitled to challenge the validity of any Board order
that allegedly has resulted in his being held in prison
unlawfully.