Title: Com. v. Silverman
Citation: 373 Pa. Super. 274, 541 A.2d 9
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1988

373 Pa. Superior Ct. 274 (1988) 541 A.2d 9 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Michael L. SILVERMAN. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued December 10, 1987. Filed April 18, 1988. *275 Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Com., appellant. Michael J. Healey, Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, entered April 12, 1985, granting the appellee's, Michael L. Silverman's, motion to suppress evidence. We reverse. On or about January 11, 1984, appellee was charged with one (1) count of receiving stolen property (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925). The charge was filed as the result of a search of appellee's apartment on January 11, 1984. The search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued on that day by District Justice Raymond L. Casper. *276 On July 10, 1984, appellee, through his trial counsel, filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that the search warrant in question lacked probable cause. On February 13, 1985, an evidentiary hearing was held, and appellee's motion was granted on April 12, 1985. On April 25, 1985, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal and petitioned the lower court to extend the time for trial in view of the pending appeal. The Commonwealth presents one issue for our review on appeal: whether the lower court erred in granting the appellee's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant as the totality of circumstances presented to the issuing magistrate would support a finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant in question. Before discussing the merits of the Commonwealth's claim, we must determine whether the Order appealed from in the instant case is final. In Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 546-547, 486 A.2d 382, 386 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held: Since the record shows that the certification requirement has been satisfied in the case at bar, we hold that the Commonwealth has an absolute right of appeal to this Court to test the validity of a pre-trial suppression order. Id. In Commonwealth v. Hubble, 509 Pa. 497, 503, 504 A.2d 168, 171 (1986), the Court identified the appropriate standards of appellate review of suppression court's rulings: *277 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court established the current requirements for the issuance of a search warrant based on information received from confidential informants, and the standard of review to be applied to such an action. These requirements were adopted by Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985). Prior to 1983, the standards applied in such cases was the rigorous Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test. Under the test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), the affidavit must demonstrate, on its face, both the circumstance by which the informant knew of the criminal activity and the basis for finding the informant reliable. Commonwealth v. Gray, supra. Now, under Illinois v. Gates, supra, and Commonwealth v. Gray, supra, the standard for evaluating probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant based on information received by confidential informants consists of an analysis of the totality of circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. at 483, 503 A.2d at 925, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the new test for analyzing warrants set forth in Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548: *278 In the instant case, the affidavit of probable cause presented by Detective Gary W. Anderson of the McCandless Police Department to District Justice Raymond L. Casper reads as follows: (Docket Entry 2). The lower court determined that the affidavit on its face was inadequate to establish probable cause in that "1) the reliability of the informant was not sufficiently established; 2) the affidavit does not state the circumstances under which the informant obtained the information; and, 3) the police should have corroborated the tip by conducting surveillance to verify that criminal activity was, in fact, afoot at the location specified by the informant." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). (Opinion, pp. 6-9). We disagree. Under the Gates totality of circumstances approach, we find the warrant in this case to be valid. District Justice Casper, the issuing authority, learned the following facts from the affidavit presented by Detective Gary W. Anderson: (Docket Entry 2). (Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-16). In Commonwealth v. Gray, supra, 509 Pa. at 485, 503 A.2d at 926, which also dealt with an anonymous informant, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held: Thus, in applying the Gates test, the same holds true in the instant case. The affidavit in this case, as in Gray, supra, does not show on its face that the anonymous informant is credible or reliable. However, the whole affidavit contains facts that are consistent with the informant's disclosure. As in Gray, supra, "[t]heir total effect confirms it with the ring of truth which is sufficient for men of common sense to conclude that a search is reasonable and justified by probable cause." 509 Pa. at 485, 503 A.2d at 926. *282 In the case at bar, an anonymous informant offered unsolicited information concerning a burglary at a David Weis store and appellee's involvement with it to the police. The informant stated that he wished to pass the tip on to the Sharpsburg Police Department because he wished to repay them for a favor that they had done for him. (Docket Entry 2). Therefore, Officer Rudski of the Sharpsburg Police Department, upon receiving the information from Patricia Kutzer, a police dispatcher with the Shaler Police Department, at approximately 3:00 a.m., actually went out to the area where the apartment in question was located in order to verify the story as told by the informant. He found the information as presented to be truthful. In addition, information was inspected concerning the burglary of a David Weis store in Wexford in the beginning of January 1984, which the McCandless Police were investigating. In this instance, the information as presented by the informant as to the details concerning the type and cost of merchandise taken during the burglary was also found to be truthful. And finally, appellee was known to have a prior arrest and conviction record for thefts and was known by the Sharpsburg Police to be living in their area at that time. Thus, viewed together, all the allegations presented in the affidavit raise a fair inference that the contraband described by the informant would be discovered in a search of appellee's residence. Therefore, we find that, pursuant to the Gates totality of circumstances test, the current standard for determining probable cause, probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant in question and that the lower court improperly granted appellee's motion to suppress evidence. Order reversed and case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.