Title: State v. Alan Keith Burns
Citation: 2011 WI 22
Docket Number: 2009AP000118-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2011

2011 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
09AP118 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alan Keith Burns, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 323 Wis. 2d. 822, 781 N.W.2d 550 
(Ct. App. 2010-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 26, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Richland 
 
` 
Edward E.Leineweber 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by David R. Karpe and Karpe Law Office, 
Madison. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
  
 
 
2011 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP118-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2005CF49) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan Keith Burns, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 26, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished opinion of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
circuit court's order2 denying Alan Burns' motion for a new trial 
in the interest of justice.  The issue presented in this case is 
whether the real controversy, that is, whether S.B. lied when 
she alleged Burns sexually assaulted her, was fully tried.  
Burns argues S.B.'s truthfulness was not fully tried and he, 
                                                 
1 State v. Burns, No. 2009AP118-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010). 
2 The Honorable Edward E. Leineweber of Richland County 
presided. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
2 
 
therefore, is entitled to a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  Specifically, Burns contends that S.B.'s misleading 
testimony regarding her virginity, the circuit court order that 
forbid him from cross-examining the expert witness about 
previous sexual assaults alleged by S.B., and statements made 
during the prosecutor's closing argument, all prevented the real 
controversy from being fully tried.  After thorough review of 
the record, we conclude that the real controversy was fully 
tried.  Therefore, a new trial in the interest of justice is not 
warranted.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The facts of this case are both unfortunate and 
disturbing.  They involve the repeated sexual assaults of S.B., 
a minor, by both her maternal grandfather, Keith Burns (the 
grandfather) and her maternal uncle, Alan Burns (Burns).  The 
facts are drawn from the record, including the trial transcripts 
of both Burns' and the grandfather's trials.  For the most part, 
they are presented in chronological order.  Additional facts are 
discussed where applicable during our discussion in section II 
below. 
A.  Charges against Burns and the Grandfather 
¶3 
In May of 2005, Burns was charged with 12 counts of 
sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age, due to conduct 
with his niece, S.B. when she was 14 years old.  The incidents 
were alleged to have occurred in July and December of 2004 when 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
3 
 
S.B. was visiting her maternal grandparents in Wisconsin.3  Burns 
was living with his parents, S.B.'s grandparents, at this time.  
Most assaults were alleged to have taken place in an upstairs 
bedroom of S.B.'s grandparent's house while her grandparents 
were downstairs.  Eleven of the counts were based on sexual 
contact, and one was based on sexual intercourse. 
¶4 
In September of 2005, four months after the complaint 
was filed against Burns, the State of Wisconsin filed a 
complaint against the grandfather.  The complaint alleged that 
he had sexually assaulted S.B. numerous times since 1990, when 
S.B. 
was 
approximately 
four 
years 
old, 
including 
sexual 
intercourse starting when S.B. was approximately eight years 
old.4 
B.  Burns' Pre-Trial Motion 
¶5 
Burns filed a pre-trial motion to admit evidence of 
S.B.'s allegations against her grandfather.  He claimed they 
were relevant to S.B.'s credibility and provided a motive to 
fabricate.  Burns contended that they were admissible under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 906.07 
(2007-08)5 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 906.08(2).6  
                                                 
3 S.B.'s mother passed away in 2002.  Following her mother's 
passing, S.B. moved from Wisconsin where she lived with her 
mother to live with her father in South Carolina.  She 
subsequently moved with her father to Missouri.  After moving to 
live with her father, she visited her maternal grandparents in 
Wisconsin periodically.   
4 The same district attorney who tried Burns' case was the 
assigned district attorney on the grandfather's prosecution. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.07 provides:  "Who may impeach. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including 
the party calling the witness." 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
4 
 
Furthermore, he argued that certain pretrial statements made by 
S.B., that called her credibility into question, fell under 
exceptions 
to 
Wisconsin's 
rape 
shield 
law, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)(2)&(3).7  Specifically, Burns pointed to S.B.'s 
statements that she was a virgin prior to Burns' assaults, that 
she was worried about being pregnant as a result of Burns' 
assaults, that her grandfather had never bothered her, and that 
she had never had any problems with anyone else in her family.  
Burns also sought to admit evidence of the victim's healed 
hymenal tears allegedly caused by the grandfather.  Finally, 
citing State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990), Burns stressed his right to mount a meaningful defense.8  
Prohibiting him from bringing up allegations against the 
                                                                                                                                                             
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.08(2) provides:   
Specific 
instances 
of 
conduct. 
 
Specific 
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose 
of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility, 
other than a conviction of a crime or an adjudication 
of delinquency as provided in s. 906.09, may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, 
subject to s. 972.11 (2), if probative of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness and not remote in time, be inquired 
into on cross-examination of the witness or on cross-
examination of a witness who testifies to his or her 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
7 See infra ¶¶31-32 for a discussion on the rape shield law. 
8 See infra ¶35 for a discussion of State v. Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
5 
 
grandfather, Burns argued, violated his constitutional right of 
confrontation and compulsory process.  
¶6 
The State sought to exclude those pretrial statements 
and evidence of the hymenal tears, arguing that they did not fit 
within one of the enumerated exceptions to the rape shield law 
or the exception created by Pulizzano.  The State also moved to 
present evidence that S.B.'s behavior following the alleged 
assaults by Burns was consistent with the behavior of other 
sexual assault victims, otherwise known in Wisconsin as "Jensen 
evidence."9  
¶7 
Applying the rape shield law and Pulizzano, the 
circuit 
court 
excluded 
all 
evidence 
relating 
to 
S.B.'s 
                                                 
9 In State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 
(1988), also a child sexual assault case, we held it was 
permissible 
for 
an 
expert 
witness 
to 
testify 
that 
the 
complainant's 
post-assault 
behaviors 
were 
consistent 
with 
behaviors typically exhibited by child sexual assault victims.  
We concluded: 
[A]n expert witness may be asked to describe the 
behavior of the complainant and then to describe that 
of victims of the same type of crime, if the testimony 
helps the jury understand a complainant's reactive 
behavior. . . .  [T]he circuit court may allow an 
expert 
witness 
to 
give 
an 
opinion 
about 
the 
consistency of a complainant's behavior with the 
behavior of victims of the same type of crime only if 
the testimony will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue. 
Id. at 257.  
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
6 
 
virginity.10  The court also held that evidence of hymenal tears 
and 
of 
S.B.'s 
allegations 
against 
her 
grandfather 
was 
inadmissible unless the State first introduced evidence about 
the grandfather's conduct.   
C.  Burns' Jury Trial 
¶8 
In August of 2006, Burns was tried to a jury.  Burns 
argues in this appeal that several aspects of the trial 
prevented the real controversy from being fully tried.  We begin 
with S.B.'s testimony.  Of relevance here, S.B. spoke of her 
relationship with the grandfather.  She said, "I've always been 
the grandpa's girl" and "[E]verything I did was with my 
grandfather since my dad was never there."  Shortly thereafter, 
however, the court allowed the State to interrupt S.B.'s 
testimony and present the testimony of Michael P. (Michael) and 
Terri Stoff (Stoff), a social worker involved in the case.11  
¶9 
Michael, a friend of S.B.'s, testified that S.B. had 
revealed to him that her uncle had done "inappropriate things to 
her" and "things that he shouldn't have been doing as someone 
who is related to her."  Pursuant to the pre-trial order 
excluding all evidence regarding S.B.'s virginity, Michael had 
been instructed not to testify that S.B. told him she did not 
think she was a virgin anymore because of the assaults by Burns 
                                                 
10 The circuit court concluded that evidence relating to 
S.B.'s virginity did not come in under one of the three 
enumerated exceptions to the rape shield law, see infra ¶¶31-34, 
or the exception created by Pulizzano, see infra ¶¶35-36. 
11 Michael and Stoff needed to testify at this time because 
they had a flight back to St. Louis that afternoon. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
7 
 
and the grandfather.  However, on redirect, the court allowed 
the following questioning by District Attorney Sharp (Prosecutor 
Sharp): 
Q: [Michael], without saying exactly what [S.B.] said, 
did she say anything to you that indicated she 
believed her uncle had penetrated her? 
A: Yes.  
¶10 Following Michael and Stoff's testimony, S.B. retook 
the stand.  During the direct examination of S.B., the following 
exchange took place: 
Q: So on that day you told [Michael] what was going on 
with your uncle? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you recall what you told him about what was 
going on with your uncle? 
A: I had told him that I didn't think I was a virgin 
anymore and that I didn't know what had truthfully 
happened.  I didn't—— 
Q: Okay, it sounds like you were expressing things 
with some degree of uncertainty when you were 
talking to him? 
¶11 At this point, given the pre-trial order excluding any 
statements about S.B.'s virginity, Burns moved for a mistrial. 
In the alternative, Burns moved for permission to introduce 
evidence regarding the assaults by the grandfather for the 
purpose of attacking the truthfulness of S.B.'s testimony. If 
those motions were denied, Burns asked for permission to ask one 
question on cross-examination along the lines of "your statement 
that you weren't a virgin anymore, that wasn't true, was it?"  
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
8 
 
¶12 In response to Burns' requests, the court found that 
S.B.'s testimony was "inadvertent, accidental, not premeditated 
or calculated in any sense."  The court went on:  "I say that 
based on observing the witness after the statement was made.  
I'm convinced of that and I so find."  Based on this finding, 
and the court's belief that it would be a violation of the rape 
shield law to admit evidence of the assaults by the grandfather, 
the court denied a mistrial.  The court also denied Burns' two 
alternative requests, concluding "the best course of action is 
to simply leave it alone and continue with the trial."  
Prosecutor Sharp then finished his direct examination of S.B. 
and Attorney Benavidas had an opportunity to cross-examine her.   
¶13 Burns also attacks the testimony of Dr. Beth Huebner, 
expert witness for the State.  Dr. Huebner gave extensive Jensen 
testimony.  In particular, she explained common post-assault 
behaviors exhibited by adolescent sexual assault victims.  She 
underscored 
certain 
"red 
flags" 
including: 
 
unhappiness, 
preoccupation, withdrawal, both physically and emotionally, loss 
of self-esteem, and irritability.  She noted that there is often 
a dramatic drop in school grades.   
¶14 Dr. Huebner testified that based on her review of 
S.B.'s case, S.B.'s behavior was consistent with that of other 
adolescent sexual assault victims.  She noted that S.B. had 
become more irritable after the assaults allegedly took place, 
that her family struggled to figure out what had caused her 
change in behavior, and that her school grades fell.  While Dr. 
Huebner was seemingly unaware that S.B. had engaged in self-
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
9 
 
cutting behavior,12 she testified that self-cutting is very 
typical of sexual assault victims.  Finally, Dr. Heubner 
testified that adolescents frequently have trouble recounting 
the facts of their assaults, both omitting facts and putting in 
facts that didn't actually occur.   
¶15 On cross-examination, Attorney Benavides challenged 
Dr. 
Huebner's 
conclusions, 
pointing 
out 
that 
they 
were 
generalizations.  In response to his questioning, Dr. Huebner 
testified to the existence of "false reporting" and admitted 
that, while there are tests available to examine a person's 
ability to perceive and relate reality, no such tests were 
performed on S.B.  Moreover, she admitted she had never talked 
with S.B.   
¶16 Following Dr. Huebner's testimony, the State rested.  
The first witness for Burns was his girlfriend, and alibi 
witness, Cynthia Schroeder (Schroeder).  Schroeder testified 
about the grandfather's house——that it was old, creaky, and you 
could hear "just about anything anywhere."  She also testified 
that on the night of the December 23, 2004, a night S.B. alleged 
Burns had assaulted her, she and Burns had been together until 
they feel asleep, which was after four a.m.  She testified that 
                                                 
12 Dr. Huebner stated that she was not "aware [of any self-
cutting] in this particular case."  S.B., however, had testified 
that following the assaults she was plotting suicide and her 
self-cutting behaviors were so severe that her father and step-
mother cleared out her room of objects she could use for 
cutting.  When the self-cutting still didn't stop, they took her 
to Center Point, a psychiatric hospital in Missouri. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
10 
 
she 
and 
Burns 
had 
sexual 
relations, 
including 
sexual 
intercourse, from approximately two o'clock a.m. to four o'clock 
a.m.  They slept in the same bed, and Schroeder was not awakened 
at any other point during the night, despite her testimony that 
she was a "light sleeper."  Moreover, Schroeder testified that 
the following morning she observed S.B. and S.B. "seemed fine" 
and that Schroeder "didn't notice anything different" about S.B.  
¶17 Burns also called the grandfather to the stand.  He 
opined about S.B.'s character in regard to truthfulness.  He 
said that she was "untruthful" and "there is times that she has 
stretched the truth some."  Moreover, the grandfather explicitly 
disavowed portions of S.B.'s testimony that related to him, 
e.g., that the grandfather had asked Burns if anything was going 
on between Burns and S.B.   The court's order prohibiting 
evidence of the grandfather's assaults prevented the State from 
cross-examining the grandfather on his motive for characterizing 
S.B. as untruthful. 
¶18 The last portion of Burns' trial relevant to Burns' 
claim that the real controversy was not fully tried, is 
Prosecutor Sharp's closing arguments.  Prosecutor Sharp argued, 
"There's nothing in this girl's past to suggest that she has any 
kind of questionable past . . . that she was having any problems 
other than normal teenage girl problems, if even those, prior to 
this visit at Christmas time of 2004 . . . ."  In rebuttal, 
Prosecutor Sharp reiterated this point:  "All the evidence in 
the record shows [that] when she came home from [her visit to 
Wisconsin] she was experiencing problems for no reason, no 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
11 
 
reason anybody could make heads or tails out of until she 
revealed what happened."  Later in rebuttal he stated:   
No one can suggest a reason, again, as to why she 
was displaying the behaviors that she was that Dr. 
Huebner talked about as being consistent with that of 
someone who was sexually assaulted.  There's no other 
thing that went on in her life at that period of time 
that would explain those behaviors. . . .   
There is no explanation here for why she was 
acting the way she was and why it persisted for as 
long as it did.   
In his closing, Prosecutor Sharp also emphasized that Burns had 
not suggested any motive on S.B.'s part to lie, and that none 
existed. 
¶19 The jury found Burns guilty of 11 counts of sexual 
assault.13  Burns was sentenced to a total of 25 years of initial 
confinement and ten years of extended supervision.  
D.  The Grandfather's Trial 
¶20 Portions of S.B.'s testimony at the grandfather's 
trial in December of 2007 are also relevant to the issue here.  
In particular, at the grandfather's trial, S.B. admitted that 
she was untruthful at Burns' trial when she said she told 
Michael she didn't think she was a virgin anymore because of 
what Burns had done to her, therefore implying Burns took her 
                                                 
13 At the close of evidence, the court dismissed count 10, 
the count based on Burns' performing oral sex on S.B., because 
Prosecutor Sharp never introduced evidence to satisfy this 
count. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
12 
 
virginity.14  She testified as follows during her cross-
examination by Attorney Schrader, counsel for the grandfather: 
Q: Were you under oath to tell the truth at [Burns' 
trial]? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did you tell the truth? 
A: No.   
. . .  
Q: . . . you are saying that you were not a virgin 
when you had intercourse with your uncle in 2004, 
is that correct? 
A: That is correct.  That was a slip on my part during 
that trial. 
Attorney Schrader next read the portion of S.B.'s testimony from 
Alan Burns' trial about her virginity. The following exchange 
then occurred: 
Q: . . .  Did you give those answers to those 
questions? 
A: Yes, I did, but they weren't directed towards my 
grandfather. 
Q: Just so we have a context here, you were talking to 
Michael [], correct, your friend in Missouri? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: You told him that you were telling him that you 
didn't think you were a virgin anymore, correct? 
A: Yes. I told him that when I had told him, because 
when I came out to him and everything I told him 
about my uncle and my grandfather at the same time. 
                                                 
14 At the grandfather's trial, evidence of Burns' assaults 
was admitted. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
13 
 
Q: But you were referring him to the actions that your 
uncle had with you, the intercourse your uncle had 
with you? 
A: No.  I was referring to my grandfather and uncle.  
It was in the context of when I told Michael I was 
——I had been sexually assaulted by my grandfather 
and uncle and I don't think I'm a virgin anymore 
because of the intercourse.  It was directed for 
both of them.  It wasn't directed toward one single 
person.  
On redirect-examination, Prosecutor Sharp elicited testimony 
from S.B. explaining why she was untruthful at Burns' trial: 
Q: Why did you only say uncle at trial? 
A: I was put under a motion by the court that I could 
not talk about my grandfather at all.  Everything 
had to be in context to my uncle with not 
mentioning anything about my grandfather. 
Q: Now, yesterday at the very end Mr. Schrader asked 
you a question whether or not you told the truth at 
the prior trial and you hesitated for a long time 
and then said no.  Why did you say no? 
A: I said no because the reason why I said no is 
because of that motion that was put through.  I 
couldn't actually tell the truth of well, yes, I'm 
not a virgin.  I have had intercourse, because my 
grandfather could not be brought into that trial.  
I had to cover up for my grandfather during that 
trial and just make it sound like everything was 
based on my uncle without going into further 
context of anything with my grandfather.15   
                                                 
15 The December 5, 2007 trial of the grandfather resulted in 
a hung jury on two counts and an acquittal on a third.  Upon re-
trial in July of 2008, the grandfather was found guilty of two 
counts of sexual assault. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
14 
 
E.  Post-Conviction Proceedings and Appeal 
¶21 Burns moved for post-conviction relief in the interest 
of justice.16  The circuit court denied his motion.  Burns then 
appealed the judgment convicting him of ten counts of second-
degree sexual assault of a child.  State v. Burns, No. 
2009AP118-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 
2010).  
The 
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of 
conviction, concluding that the real controversy had been fully 
tried.   
¶22 We granted review and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶23 When the contention is made that the real controversy 
has not been fully tried, we determine whether to exercise our 
discretionary power of reversal independently of prior court 
decisions.  See Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 456 N.W.2d 
797 (1990).  Moreover, "[w]hether a defendant's right to due 
process was violated [is] a question of law" for our independent 
review.  State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶26, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 
N.W.2d 227. 
                                                 
16 In his motion for post-conviction relief, Burns made 
several other claims that are not before us.  First, he argued 
that the court should overturn the jury verdict on count 12——the 
count based on sexual intercourse——because the verdict was not 
supported by sufficient evidence.  The court granted this relief 
and that decision was not appealed.  Second, Burns argued that 
the court should grant a new trial because his counsel was 
ineffective.  The court disagreed, denying a new trial on this 
ground.  Burns did not appeal this issue.    
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
15 
 
B.  Interest of Justice 
¶24 We have the ability to set aside a conviction through 
the use of our discretionary-reversal powers.17  There are two 
categories of cases in which we may reverse in the interest of 
justice:  (1) when the real controversy has not been fully tried 
and (2) when it is probable that justice has miscarried for any 
reason.  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 417, 424 N.W.2d 
672 (1988).  We established the analyses for a motion to set 
aside a conviction based on our discretionary reversal powers in 
Schumacher.  We explained that: 
under the "real controversy not fully tried" category, 
two different situations were included:  (1) Either 
the jury was not given an opportunity to hear 
important testimony that bore on an important issue in 
the case, or (2) the jury had before it testimony or 
evidence which had been improperly admitted, and this 
material obscured a crucial issue and prevented the 
real controversy from being fully tried. 
                                                 
17 Our discretionary power to reverse judgments arises from 
both statute and common law.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 
13, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  The statutory power arises from Wis. 
Stat. § 751.06 that directs: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
16 
 
Under the second prong of the discretionary-
reversal statute, the "miscarriage of justice" prong, 
the case law made clear that, in order to grant a 
discretionary reversal under this prong, the court 
would 
have 
to 
conclude 
that 
there 
would 
be 
a 
substantial probability that a different result would 
be likely on retrial.   
Id. at 400-01 (citing State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 741, 370 
N.W.2d 745 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)).  See also 
State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶181, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 
N.W.2d 98 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
¶25 We exercise our discretionary-reversal powers "'only 
in exceptional cases.'" McGuire, 328 Wis. 2d 289, ¶59 (citing 
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 161, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996)).  
See also, State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶79, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 
647 N.W.2d 244 (concluding that discretionary-reversal power 
"should be exercised sparingly and with great caution").  As we 
have explained:  
Such exceptional cases are generally limited to cases 
in 
which 
the 
jury 
was 
erroneously 
denied 
the 
opportunity to hear important testimony bearing on an 
important issue of the case, when the jury had before 
it evidence not properly admitted that "so clouded a 
crucial issue that it may be fairly said that the real 
controversy was not fully tried," or when an erroneous 
instruction prevented the real controversy in a case 
from being tried. 
State v. Doss, 2008 WI 93, ¶86, 312 Wis. 2d 570, 754 N.W.2d 150 
(quoting Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160).  In determining whether a 
new trial is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice, we 
employ a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  McGuire, 328 
Wis. 2d 289, ¶59. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
17 
 
¶26 Burns argues that he is entitled to a new trial in the 
interest of justice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  We agree 
with the court of appeals that the real controversy here was 
whether S.B. truthfully alleged that Burns sexually assaulted 
her.  See Burns, No. 2009AP118-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶23.  
We interpret Burns' argument to be that this controversy remains 
untried because:  (1) S.B. gave an incomplete statement that 
implied that Burns took her virginity, and Burns was unable to 
challenge S.B. on her statement; (2) the jury did not hear 
evidence 
of 
the 
grandfather's 
prior 
sexual 
assaults, 
specifically during the cross-examination of Dr. Huebner; and 
(3) Prosecutor Sharp made improper statements during his closing 
arguments.  If, individually, the above factors do not merit a 
new trial in the interest of justice, Burns argues that they do 
so collectively.   
¶27 Taking each of Burns' arguments in turn, and then 
considering them collectively, we conclude that the real 
controversy was fully tried; accordingly, a new trial is not 
warranted in the interest of justice. 
1.  S.B.'s testimony 
¶28 As discussed above, see supra ¶10, S.B. testified at 
Burns' trial that she "didn't think [she] was a virgin anymore" 
because of "what was going on with [her] uncle" (hereinafter 
"S.B.'s virginity testimony").  This testimony violated the pre-
trial order that precluded testimony regarding S.B.'s virginity.   
¶29 Burns moved for a mistrial.  In the alternative, he 
moved for permission to cross-examine S.B. on the grandfather's 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
18 
 
assaults or ask S.B. if she was telling the truth when she 
implied she lost her virginity to Burns.  The trial court denied 
all three motions.   Burns contends that S.B.'s virginity 
testimony, uncontroverted by cross-examination, allowed the jury 
to 
make 
the 
incorrect 
inference 
that 
Burns 
took 
S.B.'s 
virginity.   
¶30 Burns' argument on this issue is twofold.  First, 
Burns argues that while the pre-trial ruling excluding evidence 
of the grandfather's assaults was correct, once S.B made the 
misleading virginity statements on direct, testimony regarding 
the assaults by the grandfather became admissible to challenge 
the veracity of those statements and, hence, S.B.'s credibility.  
Second, the virginity testimony was improper given the pre-trial 
order.  Burns contends that this improper testimony so clouded a 
crucial issue of the case that a new trial in the interest of 
justice is warranted.   
¶31 Starting with the first of Burns' arguments——once S.B 
made the misleading virginity statements on direct, evidence of 
the assaults by the grandfather became admissible to challenge 
the veracity of those statements——we discuss whether evidence of 
the assaults by the grandfather was admissible given the rape 
shield law and Pulizzano.  Under Wisconsin's rape shield law, 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b):   
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 
940.225, 948.02, 948.025, 948.05, 948.051, 948.06, 
948.085, or 948.095, or under s. 940.302(2), if the 
court finds that the crime was sexually motivated, as 
defined in s. 980.01(5), any evidence concerning the 
complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
19 
 
of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation 
as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11): 
1.  Evidence of the complaining witness's past 
conduct with the defendant.  
2.  Evidence of specific instances of sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
3.  Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness. 
¶32 The rape shield law "reflect[s] the . . . view that 
generally evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct is 
irrelevant or, if relevant, substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect."  Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 644.   
¶33 The evidence of the assaults by the grandfather is 
evidence concerning S.B.'s prior sexual conduct.  Therefore, 
unless it meets one of the three enumerated exceptions to the 
rape shield law, it is impermissible evidence under Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b).   
¶34 This evidence does not fit under any of the three 
enumerated exceptions in Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b).  First, it 
is not evidence of S.B.'s past conduct with Burns.  Second, it 
is not evidence of specific instances of conduct showing the 
source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.  Third, it is 
not evidence of untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
20 
 
the complaining witness.18  Therefore, the evidence of the 
grandfather's assaults is not admissible under a statutory 
exception to the rape shield law. 
¶35 Pulizzano provides another exception to the rape 
shield law separate and apart from the three enumerated 
exceptions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)1.-3. 
 
Pulizzano 
concludes that while evidence may be inadmissible under the rape 
shield law, there are instances when it may be admitted to 
protect a defendant's right to mount a meaningful defense.  We 
held in Pulizzano that: 
[T]o establish a constitutional right to present 
otherwise excluded evidence of a child complainant's 
prior 
sexual 
conduct 
. . . 
prior 
to 
trial 
the 
defendant must make an offer of proof showing:  (1) 
that the prior acts clearly occurred; (2) that the 
acts closely resembled those of the present case; (3) 
that the prior act is clearly relevant to a material 
issue; (4) that the evidence is necessary to the 
defendant's case; and (5) that the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  If the 
defendant makes that showing, the circuit court must 
then 
determine 
whether the State's interests in 
excluding the evidence are so compelling that they 
nonetheless overcome the defendant's right to present 
it." 
Id. at 656-57.   
¶36 The third element of the Pulizzano test——that the 
prior act is clearly relevant to a material issue——precludes 
                                                 
18 To the contrary, Burns argued at his trial, which took 
place before the grandfather had been tried and adjudicated 
guilty, that the allegations against the grandfather were true.  
In other words, Burns argued that S.B. was being truthful about 
the assaults by the grandfather, but lying about Burns' 
assaults.    
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
21 
 
admission of evidence of the grandfather's assaults under the 
Pulizzano exception to the rape shield law.  Evidence of the 
grandfather's assaults is not "clearly relevant" to the issue of 
S.B.'s allegation that Burns sexually assaulted her.  There is 
no assertion that S.B. lied about the grandfather's conduct, and 
her truthfulness about those sexual assaults is not probative of 
Burns' claim that she lied about his conduct with her.  Burns 
does not provide any compelling argument that S.B.'s assault by 
the grandfather is "clearly relevant" to whether she is being 
untruthful in her allegations against Burns.19  The circuit court 
did not err when it denied Burns' motion to cross-examine S.B. 
on the alleged assaults by the grandfather.  
¶37 We now turn to the second of Burns' arguments 
regarding S.B.'s virginity testimony.  Burns contends that even 
if the circuit court did not err when it denied Burns' motion to 
cross-examine S.B. on the assaults by the grandfather, S.B.'s 
virginity testimony was improper because the pre-trial order 
excluded all evidence of S.B.'s virginity.20  For improperly 
introduced evidence to merit a new trial in the interest of 
                                                 
19 While it is possible other elements of the Pulizzano test 
also preclude Burns' argument that the evidence is admissible 
under the Pulizzano exception to the rape shield law, because 
all five elements of the test must be met, we stop our analysis 
at the third element. 
20 The pre-trial ruling was based on the rape shield law, 
that, as discussed above, see ¶¶31-34, prohibits either party 
from admitting evidence "concerning the complaining witness's 
prior sexual conduct."  Consequently, S.B.'s virginity testimony 
also arguably violated the rape shield law. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
22 
 
justice, the testimony must "so cloud[] a crucial issue that it 
may be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully 
tried."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160.  S.B.'s virginity testimony 
does not meet this standard.  
¶38 We agree with the court of appeals that S.B.'s 
testimony 
at 
the 
grandfather's 
trial 
that 
her 
virginity 
testimony at Burns' trial was untruthful and that she said she 
"had to cover up for [her] grandfather during [Burns'] trial," 
does not suggest that S.B. falsely attributed acts of the 
grandfather to Burns.21  See Burns, No. 2009AP118-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶31.  Rather, her testimony shows that she was 
referring to both the grandfather and Burns.  She explained that 
it "was in the context of when I told Michael I was——I had been 
sexually assaulted by my grandfather and uncle and I don't think 
I'm a virgin anymore because of the intercourse.  It was 
directed for both of them.  It wasn't directed toward one single 
person."  At Burns' trial, S.B. did nothing more than to remove 
the grandfather from her virginity comment, a choice that S.B. 
believed was required by her understanding of the pre-trial 
order.  Consequently, she "omitted reference to her grandfather 
when it would have been more truthful in her view to also 
mention what her grandfather did to her."  Id.   
¶39 Burns argues at length that S.B.'s virginity testimony 
was particularly prejudicial because the concept of rape of a 
                                                 
21 Paragraph 20 supra quotes S.B.'s testimony at the 
grandfather's trial.  
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
23 
 
virgin causes significantly more outrage in our society than 
rape of a non-virgin, especially in "agricultural county" where 
this trial took place.  We disagree with Burns, and conclude 
that given the facts of this case, testimony that S.B. lost her 
virginity to Burns is not more prejudicial than testimony that 
Burns had intercourse with a 14-year-old child. 
¶40 Furthermore, while Burns was not allowed to challenge 
the veracity of S.B.'s virginity statement, he was able to 
challenge S.B.'s allegation that Burns had intercourse with her.  
For example, on cross-examination of S.B., she admitted that 
when she reported the assaults, she didn't mention intercourse 
and that she wasn't sure whether Burns had intercourse with 
her.22   
¶41 Moreover, Attorney Benavides was able to challenge 
S.B.'s credibility on numerous other points during cross-
examination.  For instance, she admitted that she had given 
incorrect testimony during direct examination.  She admitted 
that prior to trial she had never mentioned that on both 
occasions when Burns had intercourse with her, he removed her 
tampon. 
                                                 
22 On cross-examination, Attorney Benavides asked S.B. if it 
was fair to say that her answer on direct examination indicated 
she was not sure whether Burns had intercourse with her.  She 
responded, "I didn't want to say yes because I wasn't 100 
percent sure and positive, and I don't believe in saying yes he 
did have intercourse with me when I'm not 100 percent positive." 
She continued, "I'm still not 100 percent positive." 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
24 
 
¶42 Further, Burns also called an alibi witness, his 
girlfriend, Schroeder, who testified that she was with Burns on 
the night in December when S.B. said Burns assaulted her, 
therefore disputing S.B.'s allegations of what took place during 
the December visit.  Schroeder also spoke of the characteristics 
of the house in which S.B. alleged the assaults had taken place, 
noting that you could hear movement throughout the house.  Her 
testimony questioned the veracity of S.B.'s claims that assaults 
were taking place while her grandparents were downstairs.  By 
challenging her credibility on previous statements, Burns placed 
S.B.'s 
truthfulness, 
including 
her 
allegation 
that 
Burns 
sexually assaulted her, directly before the jury.   
¶43 In sum, S.B.'s testifying in a way that could imply 
that Burns took her virginity did not differ in any significant 
way from her allegation that Burns had intercourse with her when 
she was 14 years old; Burns was able to challenge S.B.'s 
truthfulness 
that 
intercourse 
took 
place. 
 
We 
conclude, 
therefore, that S.B.'s virginity testimony did not so cloud the 
critical issue of whether S.B. lied about what Burns did, as to 
warrant a new trial in the interest of justice.23  
                                                 
23 We 
also note that "in Wisconsin, when one party 
accidentally . . . takes advantage of a piece of evidence that 
is otherwise inadmissible, the court may, in its discretion, 
allow the opposing party to introduce otherwise inadmissible 
evidence if it is required by the concept of fundamental 
fairness to cure some unfair prejudice."  State v. Dunlap, 2002 
WI 19, ¶32, 250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 N.W.2d 112 (emphasis added).  
Here, the circuit court exercised its discretion and decided 
that the best course of action was to continue with the trial 
and not disrupt any of the court's pre-trial rulings.   
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
25 
 
2.  Dr. Huebner's testimony 
¶44 Burns next contends that he should have been allowed 
to cross-examine Dr. Huebner to elicit testimony about an 
alternative explanation for S.B.'s behaviors.  Namely, that her 
behaviors may have been a result of the assaults by the 
grandfather.   
¶45 Discretionary reversals based on a determination that 
the jury was denied the opportunity to hear important evidence 
have occurred when "the jury was erroneously denied the 
opportunity" to hear important, relevant evidence while other 
evidence was erroneously admitted.  Doss, 312 Wis. 2d 570, ¶86.  
The "erroneous" denial of relevant evidence refers to a legal 
evidentiary error by the trial court.  See, e.g., State v. 
Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 327 N.W.2d 662 (1983) ("We 
conclude that the case was not fully tried inasmuch as the 
circuit court erred in its interpretation of sec. 906.08(1) and 
excluded admissible and material evidence on the critical issue 
of credibility."); State v. Joyner, 2002 WI App 250, ¶25, 258 
Wis. 2d 249, 653 N.W.2d 290. 
¶46 Here, as discussed above, see supra ¶¶30-36, the 
circuit court did not err when it excluded evidence of the 
alleged assaults by the grandfather.  Evidence of the assaults 
by the grandfather was inadmissible under the rape shield law 
and the exception created by Pulizzano.     
3.  Prosecutor Sharp's closing arguments 
¶47 Burns argues that Prosecutor Sharp's statements in 
closing argument were so improper as to warrant a new trial in 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
26 
 
the interest of justice.  Burns contends that Prosecutor Sharp 
misrepresented that there was no other explanation for S.B.'s 
behavior subsequent to Burns' assaults, when the assaults by the 
grandfather could explain S.B.'s behavior.  Burns contends that 
these statements went beyond an analysis of the evidence and 
constituted a misstatement of fact.  Further, Burns claims that 
Prosecutor Sharp unfairly referred to a court's legal ruling in 
an attempt to convince the jury of his point of view. 
¶48 Counsel is allowed considerable latitude in closing 
arguments, 
with 
discretion 
given 
to 
the 
trial 
court 
in 
determining the propriety of the argument.  State v. Draize, 88 
Wis. 2d 445, 454, 276 N.W.2d 784 (1979).  A "prosecutor may 
comment on the evidence, detail the evidence, argue from it to a 
conclusion and state that the evidence convinces him and should 
convince the jurors."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The 
prosecutor should aim to "analyze the evidence and present facts 
with a reasonable interpretation to aid the jury in calmly and 
reasonably drawing just inferences and arriving at a just 
conclusion upon the main or controlling questions."  Id. (citing 
State v. Genova, 242 Wis. 555, 561, 8 N.W.2d 260 (1943)).  It is 
impermissible, therefore, for a prosecutor to suggest the jury 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
27 
 
reach its verdict by considering facts not in the evidence.24  
Id.  
¶49 When 
deciding 
whether 
a 
prosecutor's 
statements  
necessitate a new trial in the interest of justice, the test 
applied is whether the statements "'so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.'"  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶43, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 
N.W.2d 115 (quoting State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶88, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606).  "Even if there are improper 
statements by a prosecutor, the statements alone will not be 
cause to overturn a conviction.  Rather, the statements must be 
looked at in context of the entire trial."  Id.  See also United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) ("[A] criminal conviction 
is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's 
comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be 
viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether 
the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."). 
¶50 In Prosecutor Sharp's closing argument, he made 
several statements inferring that there was nothing else that 
could explain S.B.'s behavior in the winter and spring of 2004, 
                                                 
24 The United States Supreme Court has long held that a 
prosecutor "may prosecute with earnestness and vigor——indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain 
from 
improper 
methods 
calculated 
to 
produce 
a 
wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about 
a just one."  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), 
overruled on other grounds, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 
212 (1960).  
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
28 
 
the behavior that Dr. Heubner had testified was consistent with 
the behavior of sexual assault victims.  For example, he stated 
that there was nothing in S.B.'s "past to suggest . . . she was 
having any problems other than normal teenage girl problems 
. . . prior to [the] visit at Christmas time of 2004."  In 
rebuttal he argued, 
No one can suggest a reason, again, as to why she 
was displaying the behaviors that she was that Dr. 
Huebner talked about as being consistent with that of 
someone who was sexually assaulted.  There's no other 
thing that went on in her life at that period of time 
that would explain those behaviors. 
. . .  
The evidence in this case doesn't make any sense 
except one way, that during that period of time when 
her uncle absolutely had the opportunity to sexually 
assault her, he did . . . . 
¶51 We understand why Prosecutor Sharp's comments are 
troublesome to Burns.  However, prosecutors comment on evidence 
before the jury; they do not comment on evidence the jury has 
not heard.  We also note that Prosecutor Sharp's first statement 
about the lack of an alternative explanation for S.B.'s 
behaviors in his rebuttal argument——the portion of the closing 
arguments that Burns contends contains the most improprieties——
highlighted that he was focusing on the record before the jury.  
He stated, "All the evidence in the record shows when she came 
home from [her visits to Wisconsin] she was experiencing 
problems for no reason, no reason that anybody could make heads 
or tails out of until she revealed what happened.  Otherwise, 
there's no explanation for it." (emphasis added).   
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
29 
 
¶52 Burns agrees that the circuit court's initial ruling 
precluding testimony about the grandfather's sexual assaults was 
correct, yet his criticism of the prosecutor's closing argument 
is grounded in the notion that the jury should have known of the 
grandfather's prior sexual assaults.  We are unpersuaded by 
Burns' argument.  Prosecutor Sharp's statements in closing 
argument did not muddle the jury's understanding of the evidence 
before them.  
¶53 Accordingly, 
upon 
examining 
Prosecutor 
Sharp's 
statements in the context of the entire trial, we conclude that 
they did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make 
the resulting conviction a denial of due process."25  Mayo, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, ¶43 (citation omitted).  
4.  Totality of the evidence 
¶54 Finally, Burns argues that if each above event, 
independently, does not merit a new trial in the interest of 
justice, then the combination of the events resulted in an 
unfair trial that produced a verdict in which we should not have 
confidence.  An analysis of the events together, however, does 
                                                 
25 Burns cites State v. Bvocik, 2010 WI App 49, 324 Wis. 2d 
352, 781 N.W.2d 719 and State v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, 312 
Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372 as support for his position that 
Prosecutor Sharp violated his due process rights.  However, the 
prosecutor's statement that the anticipated victim was only 14 
years old when he knew she was 28, in Bvocik, and the 
prosecutor's false statement that Weiss never denied committing 
the crime until he testified at trial, in Weiss, burdened the 
respective defendants' due process rights under the totality-of-
the-circumstances present in those cases.  Under the totality-
of-the-circumstances here, Prosecutor Sharp's statements did not 
do so. 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
30 
 
not minimize our confidence in the verdict so as to warrant 
discretionary-reversal.   
¶55 This was a trial of S.B.'s credibility as the reporter 
of sexual assaults by Burns.  Attempting to undermine her 
credibility was the central focus of Burns' defense.  In that 
regard, Burns was able to challenge S.B.'s credibility numerous 
times throughout the trial.  For example, he called the 
grandfather to testify about S.B.'s character for truthfulness.  
In his testimony, the grandfather claimed that S.B. was 
"untruthful" and there were "times that she stretched the truth 
some."  He also testified that S.B. made up certain events in 
which she claimed the grandfather had been involved; for 
example, that the grandfather had confronted Burns about his 
interactions with S.B.  All of this testimony came after S.B.'s 
testimony that she was "Grandpa's girl" and without any cross-
examination by the State on the grandfather's motive to portray 
S.B. as a liar because the State was precluded from questioning 
the grandfather about his own conduct with S.B.  And finally, 
Burns cross-examined S.B. extensively.  The issue of S.B.'s 
credibility was fully tried.  The jury believed S.B. and 
convicted Burns.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 The issue presented in this case is whether the real 
controversy, that is, whether S.B. lied when she alleged Burns 
sexually assaulted her, was fully tried.  Burns argues S.B.'s 
truthfulness was not fully tried and he, therefore, is entitled 
to a new trial in the interest of justice.  After thorough 
No. 
2009AP118-CR   
 
31 
 
review of the record, we conclude that the real controversy was 
fully tried.  Therefore, a new trial in the interest of justice 
is not warranted.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP118-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The issue 
presented is whether Burns is entitled to a new trial in the 
interest of justice when (1) the circuit court barred Burns from 
presenting evidence that the accuser's post-assault behavior and 
loss of virginity were caused by her having been sexually 
assaulted by her grandfather rather than by Burns; and (2) the 
State's closing argument misleadingly stated that no explanation 
existed for the accuser's post-assault behavior other than 
Burns' guilt.  I conclude that Burns should be given a new trial 
under these circumstances. 
¶58 Applying the totality of the circumstances test, I 
conclude that the real controversy of the case is whose story 
was more credible, the accuser's or Burns'.  This issue was not 
fully tried.  Accordingly, I would grant the defendant a new 
trial.   
¶59 The 
State's 
case 
focused 
on 
buttressing 
the 
credibility of the accuser, especially through expert testimony 
describing the reaction of a sexual assault victim.  Burns' case 
relied heavily on impeaching the credibility of the accuser and 
presenting an alternative story for the events in the time 
period in question.  Burns was not able to introduce evidence 
relating to the accuser's allegations of the grandfather's 
conduct that would have called into question the strength of the 
State's case.   
¶60 The prosecutor exacerbated the defendant's inability 
to introduce evidence by inviting the jury to infer that there 
No.  2009AP118-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
was nothing other than Burns' conduct that "went on in her life 
at 
that 
period 
of 
time 
that 
would 
explain 
those 
behaviors . . . ."  Majority op., ¶50.    
¶61 But there was something else going on in the accuser's 
life that would explain those behaviors.  The accuser was being 
sexually assaulted by her grandfather.  And the prosecutor knew 
these facts even though he prevented the jury from knowing the 
facts.   
 
¶62 Due process requires that the real controversy be 
fully tried, not merely tried to some extent.  The State argues 
that the defendant was able to develop an effective defense 
strategy.  The majority opinion concludes that because Burns was 
able to challenge the "she said" evidence on numerous points, 
the real controversy was fully tried.  I disagree.  Burns was 
able to go to trial with only "half a story"; he could not 
present the other half, namely the grandfather's alleged 
assault.        
¶63 I conclude that the prosecutor's closing statements 
are more than merely "troublesome," as the majority understates.  
The prosecutor exploited evidence that was excluded from trial 
at the prosecutors' request.1  The prosecutor asked the jury to 
                                                 
1 "Counsel may not, in closing, 'exploit[] the absence of 
evidence 
that 
had 
been 
excluded 
at 
his 
request.' 
Such 
exploitation of absent, excluded evidence is 'fundamentally 
unfair' and 'reprehensible.'  '[A] party's success in excluding 
evidence from the consideration of the jury does not later give 
that party license to invite inferences (whether true or, as in 
this 
case, 
false) 
regarding 
the 
excluded 
evidence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 732, 825 N.E.2d 58 (2005) 
(internal citations omitted). 
No.  2009AP118-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
infer a fact that the prosecutor knew was false.  "Prosecutors 
may not ask jurors to draw inferences that they know or should 
know are not true.  That is what occurred here and it is 
improper."2      
¶64 The 
majority 
"understands 
why" 
the 
prosecutor's 
statements in closing argument are "troublesome," majority op., 
¶51, but concludes that the prosecutor's comments did not 
"muddle the jury's understanding of the evidence," majority op., 
¶52, and did not "infect the trial with unfairness," majority 
op., ¶53.    
¶65 And how does the majority support its conclusions?  
Because, says the majority, the prosecutor said he was talking 
about what was in the "record."  The majority places a great 
deal of weight on that one word, "record."  Nowhere is the word 
"record" defined for the jury.  It is a word with special 
meaning to law-trained people.  
¶66 As a result of the exclusion of evidence and the 
prosecutor's closing argument, the controversy was not fully 
tried.  The case violates a basic rule of criminal law:  "To 
maintain the integrity of our system of criminal justice, the 
jury must be afforded the opportunity to hear and evaluate such 
critical, relevant, and material evidence, or at the very least, 
not be presented with evidence on a critical issue that is later 
determined to be inconsistent with the facts."3  
                                                 
2 State v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, ¶15, 312 Wis. 2d 382, 752 
N.W.2d 372.  
3 State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 171, 549 N.W.2d 435 
(1996). 
No.  2009AP118-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶67 Because the jury did not hear evidence central to the 
determination of whose story was more credible and in his 
closing statement the prosecutor invited the jury to make an 
inference he knew was incorrect, I conclude that the real 
controversy was not fully tried.4 
¶68 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
4 Two 
recent 
court 
of 
appeals 
decisions 
support 
my 
reasoning.  See State v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, ¶17, 312 
Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372; State v. Bvocik, 2010 WI App 49, 
324 Wis. 2d 352, 781 N.W.2d 719. 
No.  2009AP118-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1