Title: Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC21-159
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC21-159 
____________ 
 
STEVEN J. PINCUS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, INC., 
Appellee. 
 
February 3, 2022 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
 
This case is before the Court for review of questions of Florida 
law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit (the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals) that are 
determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there 
appears to be no controlling precedent.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified several 
questions to this court, including: “Does Pincus’s unjust 
enrichment claim fail because he received adequate consideration 
 
- 2 - 
in exchange for the challenged fee when he took advantage of the 
privilege of using his credit card to pay the penalty?”  Pincus v. 
American Traffic Solutions, Inc., 986 F.3d 1305, 1321 (11th Cir. 
2021).  For the reasons discussed below, we answer this 
determinative question in the affirmative and decline to address the 
remaining questions. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The City of North Miami Beach (the City) contracted with 
Appellee American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (ATS), to install and 
maintain red-light traffic cameras throughout the City, issue and 
mail citations, and process violators’ payments of the civil penalties 
imposed.  Id. at 1309.  In February 2018, ATS mailed Appellant 
Stephen J. Pincus a Notice of Violation (NOV) on behalf of the City 
for failing to comply with a steady red light signal, in violation of 
sections 316.0083, 316.074(1), and 316.075(1)(c)1, Florida Statutes 
(2017).  Id. at 1309-10.  The NOV informed Pincus he was required 
to pay a statutory penalty of $158.  Id.  The NOV explained Pincus 
could request a hearing or submit an affidavit if he wished to claim 
a statutory exemption; otherwise, the NOV instructed Pincus to pay 
the penalty online, by phone, or by mailing a check or money order.  
 
- 3 - 
Id. at 1310.  The NOV advised that a convenience fee would be 
charged for payments made online or by phone.  Id. at 1309.  
Pincus elected to pay with his credit card.  Id. at 1310.  In addition 
to the $158 penalty, Pincus paid ATS a 5% convenience fee of 
$7.90.  Id. 
Pincus subsequently filed a putative class action in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, arguing 
the convenience fee was prohibited by sections 316.0083(b)(4), 
318.121, and 560.204, Florida Statutes (2017), and ATS was 
therefore unjustly enriched by retaining the fee.  Id.  ATS moved to 
dismiss the complaint, arguing Pincus failed to state a claim for 
unjust enrichment.  Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc., No. 
18-cv-80864, 2019 WL 9355827, *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2019).  The 
federal district court agreed, finding: (1) ATS’s fee was not 
prohibited under section 316.0083(b)(4) because the fee was not a 
“commission” within the meaning of the statute; (2) ATS’s fee was 
not prohibited under section 318.121 because this statute only 
applies to violations assessed under chapter 318, Florida Statutes 
(2017), and Pincus’s violation was assessed under chapter 316, 
Florida Statutes (2017); and (3) section 560.204 does not provide a 
 
- 4 - 
private right of action, as violations of this statute are enforced by 
the Financial Services Commission’s Office of Financial Regulation.  
Id.  Accordingly, the court dismissed Pincus’s complaint for failure 
to state a claim.  Pincus, 2019 WL 9355827, at *5-9. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
there was no guiding precedent on the key issues and certified the 
following questions to this Court: 
(1) Did ATS violate Florida law when it imposed a five 
percent fee on individuals who chose to pay their red 
light traffic ticket with a credit card?  In particular: 
 
a. Does the challenged fee constitute a 
“commission from any revenue collected from 
violations detected through the use of a traffic 
infraction detector” under Fla. Stat. 
§ 316.0083(1)(b)(4)? 
 
b. Was the fee assessed under Chapter 318 
and therefore subject to § 318.121’s surcharge 
prohibition? 
 
c. Was ATS a “money transmitter” that was 
required to be licensed under Fla. Stat. 
§ 560.204(1)? 
 
(2) If there was a violation of a Florida statute, can that 
violation support a claim for unjust enrichment?  In 
particular: 
 
a. Does Pincus’s unjust enrichment claim fail 
because the statutes at issue provide no 
private right of action? 
 
- 5 - 
 
b. Does Pincus’s unjust enrichment claim fail 
because he received adequate consideration in 
exchange for the challenged fee when he took 
advantage of the privilege of using his credit 
card to pay the penalty? 
 
Pincus, 986 F.3d at 1320-21.  This review followed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege 
“a benefit conferred upon a defendant by the plaintiff, the 
defendant’s appreciation of the benefit, and the defendant’s 
acceptance and retention of the benefit under circumstances that 
make it inequitable for him to retain it without paying the value 
thereof.”  Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Winter Park, 887 So. 2d 1237, 
1241 n.4 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Ruck Bros. Brick, Inc. v. Kellogg & 
Kimsey, Inc., 668 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); see also 
Agritrade, LP v. Quercia, 253 So. 3d 28, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“The 
elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: (1) plaintiff 
has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge 
thereof; (2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit 
conferred; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without first 
 
- 6 - 
paying the value thereof to the plaintiff.” (quoting Peoples Nat’l Bank 
v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 667 So. 2d 876, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996))).  
There is no dispute that Pincus can plead the first two elements of 
this cause of action.  Pincus, 986 F.3d at 1311 n.8.  What is at 
issue here is whether he can plead that it was inequitable for ATS to 
retain what Pincus paid. 
We find that, as a matter of Florida law, he cannot, and that 
this is determinative of the other questions before us.  Pincus 
argues it would be unjust for ATS to retain a fee collected in 
violation of Florida law, specifically, sections 316.0083(1)(b)4, 
318.121, and 560.204, Florida Statutes (2021).  However, even if 
the fee is prohibited under one or more of these statutes, ATS’s 
retention of the fee is not inequitable because ATS gave value in 
exchange: (1) Pincus did not have to procure postage and a check or 
money order; (2) he could pay the balance over time; (3) he avoided 
the risk of his payment being delayed, stolen, or lost en route; (4) he 
was afforded more time to make the payment because it was 
 
- 7 - 
instantaneous;1 and (5) ATS provided immediate confirmation (by 
way of a “confirmation number”) that Pincus’s payment was 
received and his obligation to pay the penalty fulfilled.  Therefore, it 
is not inequitable under the circumstances for ATS to retain the 
convenience fee because it “first pa[id] the value thereof to the 
plaintiff.”  Agritrade, 253 So. 3d at 33 (quoting Peoples Nat’l Bank, 
667 So. 2d at 879). 
 
Accordingly, Pincus’s unjust enrichment claim fails because 
he has not alleged a benefit conferred and accepted which would be 
unjust for ATS to retain. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following 
question to this Court: “Does Pincus’s unjust enrichment claim fail 
because he received adequate consideration in exchange for the 
challenged fee when he took advantage of the privilege of using his 
credit card to pay the penalty?”  Pincus, 986 F.3d at 1321.  For the 
reasons discussed, we answer this determinative question in the 
 
 
1.  Indeed, Pincus’s penalty payment was due sixty days after 
the NOV was issued, and he paid on the sixtieth day. 
 
- 8 - 
affirmative, decline to answer the remaining certified questions, and 
remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 19-10474 
 
Bret L. Lusskin, Jr. of Bret Lusskin, P.A., Aventura, Florida; Keith 
J. Keogh of Keogh Law, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois; and Scott D. Owens 
of Scott D. Owens, P.A., Hollywood, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Kevin P. McCoy, and David R. Wright of 
Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief 
Deputy Solicitor General, Evan Ezray, Deputy Solicitor General, and 
David M. Costello, Assistant Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida; 
and Anthony Cammarata, General Counsel, Office of Financial 
Regulation, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Office of Financial Regulation