Title: In re Guardianship of K.N.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12195
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12195 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF K.N. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 6, 2016. - April 13, 2017. 
 
Present (Sitting at Lawrence):  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, 
Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Probate Court, Guardian, General equity power.  Constitutional 
Law, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, Assistance 
of counsel.  Practice, Civil, Guardianship proceeding, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for appointment of a guardian for a minor child 
filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court 
Department on November 4, 2005. 
 
 
A motion by the child for appointment of counsel for the 
guardian was heard by Brian J. Dunn, J. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was allowed in the 
Appeals Court by Judd J. Carhart, J., and the appeal was 
reported by him to the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court granted an application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Claudia Leis Bolgen for the child. 
 
Deborah W. Kirchwey for the mother. 
 
Stephen H. Merlin, for the guardian, was present but did 
not argue. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Abigail B. Taylor, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate and 
Family Court Dep't, 474 Mass. 231, 232 (2016), this court held 
that a parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship 
petition pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206, has a right to 
counsel in certain situations.  The issue in this case is 
whether an indigent guardian who is the subject of a removal 
petition under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212, is entitled to appointed 
counsel in the proceedings.  We conclude that guardians who have 
established a de facto parent relationship with their wards do 
not have a liberty interest in that relationship such that they 
have a procedural due process right to counsel.  We hold, 
however, that the equitable powers of the Probate and Family 
Court allow a judge of that court to grant a motion requesting 
counsel for a guardian in a removal proceeding where the judge, 
in his or her sound discretion, concludes that doing so would 
materially assist in determining the best interests of the 
child.2 
 
Background.  K.N., a minor child, was born in 2005 when her 
mother was fifteen years of age.  Within a matter of weeks, the 
child's maternal grandmother was appointed as the child's 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Attorney General. 
3 
 
 
permanent guardian, and has remained so ever since.  The 
guardianship arrangement has not proven satisfactory to the 
mother.  The removal proceeding that is now at the center of 
this dispute is the fourth such proceeding that the mother has 
initiated (in addition to the myriad other complaints and 
motions that both the mother and the guardian have filed 
regarding the custody of the child). 
 
In connection with the current removal petition, the mother 
and the guardian were each appointed counsel in the fall of 
2015.  Several months later, the mother filed an emergency 
motion to remove the child from the guardian's care.  The judge 
allowed this motion, and the child was temporarily returned to 
her mother.  The next day, the guardian filed a motion for the 
appointment of counsel, which was denied.  One week after the 
mother's emergency motion was filed, the judge issued an order 
returning the child to her guardian. 
 
With the current removal petition still pending, the 
guardian retained counsel, who filed a limited appearance and a 
motion to reconsider the guardian's request for counsel.  The 
judge denied the motion and stayed the proceedings while her 
counsel appealed.  The Appeals Court, however, ordered that her 
counsel move to dismiss the appeal due to procedural error.  At 
this point, her counsel withdrew from the case. 
4 
 
 
 
In the summer of 2016, the child, through counsel, filed a 
motion in the Probate and Family Court to appoint counsel for 
her guardian.  This motion was denied.  Counsel petitioned the 
Appeals Court for relief, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first 
par.  A single justice of that court allowed the appeal, 
reported the issue, stayed the proceedings below, and ordered 
that the child be treated as the appellant.  We granted the 
child's application for direct appellate review.3 
 
Discussion.4  1.  Alleged liberty interest.  The child 
asserts that guardians who are de facto parents have a 
procedural due process right to appointed counsel in contested 
guardian removal proceedings.  The mother counters that only 
legal parents have a protected liberty interest in the context 
of raising children, and even guardians who qualify as de facto 
                                                          
 
 
3 At our request, the guardian's previous counsel filed a 
letter in which he agreed to represent her pro bono before this 
court, and adopted and joined the child's brief.  Counsel noted 
in his letter that much of the legal representation he had 
provided the guardian concerning the denial of her motion for 
appointment of counsel also was done pro bono because the small 
retainer she had given him (her "living expense money") was 
exhausted early in the representation and it was obvious to him 
that she could not afford to pay more. 
 
 
4 The mother argues that the child has no standing to bring 
this appeal because she is asserting a right of the guardian.  
The issue of representation raised by the child, however, is one 
that will arise in other cases, and is of public importance.  We 
therefore choose to decide it.  See Wellesley College v. 
Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731 (1943). 
5 
 
 
parents do not have a procedural due process right to appointed 
counsel in removal proceedings. 
 
"The interest of parents in their relationship with their 
children has been deemed fundamental, and is constitutionally 
protected."  Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 
3 (1979), and cases cited.  "Due process requirements must 
therefore be met before a parent is deprived of his or her 
parental rights."  Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. 590, 592 
(2015), citing J.K.B., supra. 
 
"Guardianships, by contrast, are solely creatures of 
statute."  Care & Protection of Jamison, 467 Mass. 269, 283 
(2014).  See G. L. c. 190B, § 1-302.  They do not give rise to a 
protected liberty interest in the guardian's relationship with 
his or her ward.  Jamison, supra.  ("A guardianship is neither 
the equivalent of nor coextensive with parenthood").  Therefore, 
if the guardian here has a protected liberty interest in her 
relationship with the child, such that she has a right to 
appointed counsel in a removal proceeding, it must be found in 
her alleged de facto parent relationship with the child.5 
 
This court has recognized the concept of de facto 
parenthood.  In E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 1005 (1999), we defined a de facto parent as "one who 
                                                          
 
 
5 The guardian has not yet been adjudicated a de facto 
parent. 
6 
 
 
has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in 
the child's life as a member of the child's family.  The de 
facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and 
encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of 
caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent."  
Id. at 829, citing Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 776 & n.3 
(1999), and ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
§ 2.03(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 3 Part 1 1998) (adopted at annual 
meeting May, 1998). 
 
The recognition of de facto parenthood "proceeds from the 
premise 'that disruption of a child's preexisting relationship 
with a nonbiological parent can be potentially harmful to the 
child.'"  A.H. v. M.P., 447 Mass. 828, 838 (2006), quoting Blixt 
v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 658–659 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1189 (2003).  As such, we have held that de facto parents may be 
granted visitation rights over the objection of legal parents.  
See E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 832-833; Youmans, 429 Mass. at 785.  
The visitation rights that de facto parents receive derive from 
the Probate and Family Court's equitable powers under G. L. 
c. 215, § 6, to protect the welfare of children.  See A.H., 
supra at 837-838.  These visitation rights, however, are not 
based on any liberty interest that de facto parents have in 
their relationship with the children in question.  E.N.O., supra 
at 833; Youmans, supra at 787 ("It is not the [de facto 
7 
 
 
parent's] interests that the visitation order protects, but [the 
child's] interests").  Indeed, we have found no case where we 
have held that de facto parents have such a liberty interest. 
 
Although the raising of children by guardians and de facto 
parents provides incalculable benefit to many children and 
society as a whole, we decline to recognize a liberty interest 
in de facto parent-guardians sufficient to warrant a procedural 
due process right to appointed counsel. 
 
2.  Equitable powers of the Probate and Family Court.  The 
child argues that even if the guardian has no liberty interest 
entitling her to counsel, the Probate and Family Court has the 
equitable power to allow for the appointment of counsel for 
indigent guardians in removal proceedings.  We agree. 
 
The Probate and Family Court has equity jurisdiction over 
"all matters relative to guardianship," G. L. c. 215, § 6, and 
its equitable powers are "broad," Youmans, 429 Mass. at 782-783.  
The court's "duty as parens patriae necessitates that its 
equitable powers extend to protecting the best interests of 
children in actions before the court, even if the Legislature 
has not determined what the best interests require in a 
particular situation."  E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 827-828. 
 
Guardianship removal proceedings require judges to " make 
complex determinations that consider numerous factors regarding 
the child's best interest and the parent's fitness."  L.B, 474 
8 
 
 
Mass. at 238.  Given the complex nature of the legal and factual 
questions before the judge, the presence of counsel for the 
guardian may help the judge reach the best possible result for 
the child.6  Cf. id. at 239 (presence of counsel for parent in 
guardian removal proceeding assists judge in making accurate and 
fair determinations).  For instance, guardian removal 
proceedings may require the judge to consider "the child's 
bonding with the guardian during the guardianship, and the 
potential effect on the child of being removed from the 
guardian's care and returned to the parent's custody."  Id. at 
239.  Appointed counsel for the guardian may assist the court in 
resolving these issues with the "utmost care."  J.K.B., 379 
Mass. at 4.  This is particularly true where the child or legal 
parent may be unwilling or unable to present a full picture of 
the case to the judge, whether because the guardian has all the 
necessary and relevant information about the child or the legal 
parent has an incentive to withhold information. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the equitable powers of the 
Probate and Family Court allow a judge of that court to grant a 
motion requesting the appointment of counsel for an indigent 
                                                          
 
 
6 The appointment of a guardian ad litem may be the most 
appropriate way to determine the best interest of the child in 
certain circumstances.  See G. L. c. 215, § 56A.  The ability to 
appoint counsel to represent a guardian in a removal proceeding 
is simply another tool in the judge's toolbox, which may be used 
separately from or in conjunction with a guardian ad litem. 
9 
 
 
guardian who is the subject of a removal proceeding, G. L. 
c. 190B, § 5-212, where the judge, based on the exercise of his 
or her sound discretion, concludes that doing so would 
materially assist in determining the best interest of the child 
and parental fitness.7,8 
 
Conclusion.  A guardian who is a de facto parent does not 
have a liberty interest in her relationship with her ward 
sufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel.  A Probate and 
Family Court judge, however, may grant a motion requesting the 
appointment of counsel to the guardian in a removal proceeding 
if the judge finds, in the exercise of his or her sound 
discretion, that doing so would materially assist in determining 
the best interests of the child.  The case is remanded to the 
Probate and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                                          
 
 
7 To the extent that this holding is inconsistent with dicta 
found in Greco v. Probate and Family Court Dep't of the Trial 
Court, 422 Mass. 7, 9 (1996), we do not follow it. 
 
 
8 Such appointment of counsel for the guardian does not 
derogate from the due process right of the legal parent, who is 
also entitled to counsel at guardianship removal proceedings 
provided the parent presents a meritorious claim for removal.  
L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Dep't, 474 
Mass. 231, 242 (2016).  See Institute of Judicial 
Administration-American Bar Association Joint Commission on 
Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Counsel for 
Private Parties 1.1 (1976) ("The participation of counsel on 
behalf of all parties subject to . . . family court proceedings 
is essential to the administration of justice and to the fair 
and accurate resolution of issues at all stages of those 
proceedings"). 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.