Title: Sorenson v. Batchelder
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP001213
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2016

2016 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1213 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Cheryl M. Sorenson, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard A. Batchelder, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
United Healthcare Insurance Company, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cites) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 12, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 20, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Timothy W. Schelwat, Jason F. Abraham and Hupy and 
Abraham, S.C., Milwaukee.  Oral argument by Jason F. Abraham. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 34
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP1213   
(L.C. No. 
2013CV5012) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Cheryl M. Sorenson, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Richard A. Batchelder, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
United Healthcare Insurance Company, 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed an 
order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court2 denying defendant 
Richard A. Batchelder's (Batchelder) motion to dismiss for 
improper service of notice of claim. 
                                                 
1 Sorenson v. Batchelder, No. 2014AP1213, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015).   
2 The Honorable Michael D. Guolee of Milwaukee County 
presided.  
No. 2014AP1213    
 
2 
 
¶2 
After sustaining property damage and personal injury 
in a car accident occasioned by State employee Batchelder, 
Cheryl M. Sorenson (Sorenson) delivered notice of claim to the 
attorney general by personal service and subsequently instituted 
a negligence action against Batchelder.  Batchelder moved to 
dismiss, arguing that Sorenson did not strictly comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.82 (2013-14),3 which requires service of notice of 
claim on the attorney general by certified mail.   
¶3 
The central issue before us is whether Sorenson's 
personal service of notice of claim satisfies Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82 
such 
that 
her 
claim 
against 
Batchelder 
may 
be 
continued.  We conclude that personal service does not comply 
with the plain language of § 893.82(5) because it requires 
service of notice of claim on the attorney general by certified 
mail. 
 
As 
§ 893.82(2m) 
mandates 
strict 
compliance 
with 
requirements of § 893.82 in order to institute an action against 
a state employee, and Sorenson's service failed to so comply, we 
affirm the dismissal of Sorenson's claim against Batchelder.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On October 28, 2010, Batchelder was operating a motor 
vehicle in his capacity as an employee of the Wisconsin 
                                                 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 2014AP1213    
 
3 
 
Department of Administration (DOA).4  Batchelder's vehicle rear-
ended the vehicle of a third party, causing that vehicle to 
rear-end Sorenson's vehicle.  Sorenson alleges property damage, 
as well as personal injury, resulting from the accident.   
¶5 
On January 18, 2011, Sorenson served notice of claim 
on the attorney general by personal service at the attorney 
general's office in the capitol in Madison, Wisconsin.  Personal 
service was accepted by a state employee, who acknowledged its 
receipt at the time of delivery.  The notice of claim was then 
forwarded to the attorney general's Main Street office in 
Madison where it was processed and endorsed by another state 
employee on January 19, 2011; thereafter, it was returned to 
Sorenson's attorney's office.  
¶6 
On February 28, 2011, after investigating Sorenson's 
claim, the Bureau of State Risk Management issued a check to 
Sorenson in the amount of $241.45 as payment in full for the 
damage sustained by her vehicle as a result of the accident.5  
The Bureau of State Risk Management also issued a letter to 
Sorenson, stating that "[t]his payment does not represent an 
admission of any liability on the part of the state, or any of 
                                                 
4 The record shows that Batchelder is an employee of the 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services.  For purposes of the 
motion to dismiss, however, we assume Sorenson's facts to be 
true as alleged.  State ex rel. Shroble v. Prusener, 185 Wis. 2d 
102, 108, 517 N.W.2d 169 (1994).   
5 Sorenson had previously submitted a property damage 
estimate reflecting this amount to the State of Wisconsin's 
insurer.   
No. 2014AP1213    
 
4 
 
its employees or agents, and is not a waiver of any defenses the 
state, or any of its employees or agents, may have."6 
¶7 
On May 28, 2013, Sorenson instituted a negligence 
action against Batchelder,7 who filed a motion to dismiss due to 
improper service of notice of claim.  Specifically, Batchelder 
argued that Sorenson did not satisfy Wis. Stat. § 893.82, which 
requires service by certified mail and, because Sorenson 
employed personal service, she did not strictly comply with the 
statute.  The circuit court denied Batchelder's motion to 
dismiss, concluding that service was proper because the attorney 
general received notice of claim and, therefore, received all 
that was required.   
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) requires service by 
certified mail and that Sorenson failed to strictly comply with 
the statute by personally serving notice of claim.   
¶9 
We granted Sorenson's petition for review.  
                                                 
6 In her brief, Sorenson fleetingly raises a waiver argument 
with no supporting law.  Waiver was not mentioned in Sorenson's 
petition for review.  Accordingly, we do not address it.  Jankee 
v. Clark Cnty., 2000 WI 64, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297 
("Generally, a petitioner cannot raise or argue issues not set 
forth in the petition for review unless this court orders 
otherwise.")   
7 Sorenson's 
suit 
also 
joined 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration (DOA) and Secretary of the DOA as defendants; 
however, the circuit court dismissed both of these additional 
defendants, and Sorenson has not appealed their dismissal. 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 Batchelder's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 893.82.  Interpretation and 
application of a statute present questions of law that we review 
independently, while benefitting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 
2007 WI 38, ¶9, 300 Wis. 2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415. 
B.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation  
¶11 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Plain meaning may be ascertained 
not only from the words employed in the statute, but also from 
the context.8  Id., ¶46.  We interpret statutory language in the 
context in which those words are used; "not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id.  Statutory history aids in a plain 
                                                 
8 "[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a 
plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long 
as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the 
text and structure of the statute itself."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   
No. 2014AP1213    
 
6 
 
meaning analysis.  Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., 2014 WI 79, 
¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 529, 850 N.W.2d 272. 
¶12 "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, 
clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is 
applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms."  
State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 
769 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  However, where the 
statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  Where the language is 
ambiguous, we may then consult extrinsic sources, such as 
legislative history.  Id., ¶50.  "While extrinsic sources are 
usually not consulted if the statutory language bears a plain 
meaning, we nevertheless may consult extrinsic sources 'to 
confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation.'"  Grunke, 311 
Wis. 2d 439, ¶22 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51).   
¶13 Ultimately, 
we 
bear 
in 
mind 
that 
"[s]tatutory 
interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a 
search for ambiguity."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 
WI 28, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  With these 
general principles in mind, we turn to our review of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82.  
C.  Wis. Stat. § 893.82 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. §893.82 applies to claims brought 
against state employees.  Section 893.82(2m) provides that "[n]o 
claimant may bring an action against a state officer, employee 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
7 
 
or agent unless the claimant complies strictly with the 
requirements of this section." 
¶15 With 
regard 
to 
notice, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.82(3) 
provides, in relevant part, that:  
[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought 
against any state officer, employee or agent for or on 
account of any act growing out of or committed in the 
course of the discharge of the officer's, employee's 
or agent's duties . . . unless within 120 days of the 
event causing the injury, damage or death giving rise 
to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant 
in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney 
general written notice of a claim stating the time, 
date, location and the circumstances of the event 
giving rise to the claim . . . . 
¶16 With regard to service of notice of claim, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(5) requires that "[t]he notice under sub. (3) shall be 
sworn to by the claimant and shall be served upon the attorney 
general at his or her office in the capitol by certified mail.  
Notice shall be considered to be given upon mailing for the 
purpose of computing the time of giving notice."   
¶17 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1) provides that the 
purposes of the section are to: 
(a) Provide the attorney general with adequate 
time to investigate claims which might result in 
judgments to be paid by the state.  
(b) 
Provide 
the 
attorney 
general 
with 
an 
opportunity to effect a compromise without a civil 
action or civil proceeding. 
(c) Place a limit on the amounts recoverable in 
civil actions or civil proceedings against any state 
officer, employee or agent.   
No. 2014AP1213    
 
8 
 
¶18 Having set forth the text of the statutory provisions 
at issue, we now turn to the parties' arguments with respect to 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82.   
D.  Parties' Positions 
¶19 The parties do not dispute that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) requires that notice of claim be served 
by certified mail.  There is likewise no dispute that the plain 
language of § 893.82(2m) requires strict compliance with the 
statute in order to bring a subsequent action against a state 
employee.   
¶20 The dispute between the parties arises out of their 
disagreement about what constitutes strict compliance with the 
certified mail requirement.  Batchelder argues that strict 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 893.82 cannot be accomplished 
without serving notice of claim by certified mail as the words 
of § 893.82(5) provide.  According to Batchelder, Sorenson's 
personal service is not service by certified mail and, as such, 
she failed to strictly comply with § 893.82(5), which required 
dismissal of her claim.   
¶21 Sorenson argues that, although the words of the 
statute direct strict compliance, literal compliance with the 
words of the statute is not required.  Rather, according to 
Sorenson, her delivery of the notice of claim to the attorney 
general by personal service fulfilled the purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82 and provided the attorney general with actual notice of 
her claim more effectively than delivery by certified mail.  
Sorenson also argues that her personal service should be held to 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
9 
 
satisfy the statute because to hold otherwise would lead to an 
absurd result; namely, the dismissal of her otherwise viable 
claim in spite of her fulfillment of the statutory purpose.  We 
will address these arguments in turn.   
E.  Interpretation and Application of Wis. Stat. § 893.82  
1.  Literal compliance  
¶22 As set forth above, the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(5) requires service of notice of claim on the attorney 
general by certified mail, and § 893.82(2m) requires strict 
compliance with provisions of § 893.82.  Contrary to Sorenson's 
argument that strict compliance does not require literally 
complying with the words of the statute, it has been repeatedly 
stated that requirements of § 893.82 are not general guidelines 
but, rather, a claimant must strictly comply with the words in 
the statute in order to proceed with his or her claim.  Kellner 
v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 195, 539 N.W.2d 685 (1995) 
(concluding that a claimant "must adhere to each and every 
requirement in the statute"); Modica v. Verhulst, 195 Wis. 2d 
633, 641-42, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that 
strict 
compliance 
with 
§ 893.82 
is 
required; 
substantial 
compliance is insufficient).   
¶23 Moreover, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
equated 
strict 
compliance with literal adherence to the words used in the 
statute.  Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶14, 
356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866 (comparing a "strict literal 
interpretation" with statutory interpretation that furthers 
legislative purposes); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶56 (equating 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
10 
 
"strict" with "literal" statutory interpretation); Bar Code Res. 
v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 229 Wis. 2d 287, 291, 294, 599 
N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that Wisconsin service 
statutes are "literally read and strictly applied"); see also 
Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Certificate of Acknowledgement, 1 Am. 
Jur. 2d Acknowledgments § 29 (database updated Feb. 2016) 
(equating 
strict 
compliance 
with 
literal 
compliance 
and 
distinguishing substantial compliance).  
¶24 Therefore, we enforce literal compliance with the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) unless such enforcement 
would lead to an absurd result.  Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 
163, ¶16, 338 Wis. 2d 190, 807 N.W.2d 687.  It necessarily 
follows that, in order to strictly comply as § 893.82(2m) 
requires, a claimant must literally follow the words of the 
statute.  This requires a claimant to serve notice of claim on 
the attorney general by certified mail pursuant to the plain 
language of § 893.82(5).  Kelly v. Reyes, 168 Wis. 2d 743, 747, 
484 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that service by regular 
mail did not strictly comply with the certified mail requirement 
even though the attorney general received actual notice).  
Sorenson's choice of personal service is simply not service by 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
11 
 
certified mail.9  Consequently, we conclude that Sorenson did not 
strictly comply with § 893.82(5). 
2.  Fulfilling statutory purposes (substantial compliance) 
¶25 Sorenson next contends that, without serving notice of 
claim by certified mail, she strictly complied with the statute 
because she fulfilled its stated purposes, and the attorney 
general received actual notice of her claim.  Sorenson contends 
that she met the purposes set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1), 
which are to "[p]rovide the attorney general with adequate time 
to investigate claims . . .[,] [p]rovide the attorney general 
with an opportunity to effect a compromise without a civil 
action . . .[,] [and] [p]lace a limit on the amounts recoverable 
in civil actions."   
¶26 Sorenson emphasizes that, through personal service, 
notice of claim was processed by the attorney general's office 
in the same manner in which it would have been processed if 
notice of claim had been delivered by certified mail.  Namely, 
although notice of claim was personally served at the attorney 
general's capitol office, it ultimately was received at the 
attorney 
general's 
Main 
Street 
office, 
acknowledged, 
and 
returned to counsel, indicating that notice of claim had been 
                                                 
9 Black's Law Dictionary defines certified mail as "[m]ail 
for which the sender requests proof of delivery in the form of a 
receipt signed by the addressee.  The receipt . . . must be 
signed before the mail will be delivered."  Black's Law 
Dictionary, 1038 (9th ed. 2009).  Personal service, on the other 
hand, is defined as "[a]ctual delivery of the notice or process 
to the person to whom it is directed."  Id. at 1259. 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
12 
 
received by the attorney general.  Therefore, according to 
Sorenson, the statute's purposes were fulfilled by personal 
service of notice of claim because the attorney general received 
the required notice and took action with respect to her claim.  
We are not persuaded.   
¶27 Sorenson appears to argue that she strictly complied 
with Wis. Stat. § 893.82 by substantially complying with it.  As 
set forth above, strict compliance requires exactly following 
the words of the statute.  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 194-95.  
Substantial compliance, on the other hand, provides that 
statutory directives may be met where the purpose underlying the 
statute has been fulfilled notwithstanding the words chosen by 
the legislature.  Andrews Constr., Inc. v. Town of Levis, 2006 
WI App 180, ¶11, 296 Wis. 2d 89, 722 N.W.2d 389 (explaining that 
"substantial 
compliance 
contemplates 
actual 
compliance 
in 
respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective 
of the statute." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nicolazzi, 138 Wis. 2d 192, 200, 405 
N.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. 1987))).  Stated otherwise, in the context 
of a notice statute such as Wis. Stat. § 893.82, where the 
underlying purpose is to effect notice, a claimant may be able 
to substantially comply by effecting actual notice to the 
respondent.  See Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 195-96 (examining the 
distinction between substantial compliance and strict compliance 
by comparing § 893.80 and § 893.82 (citing Figgs v. City of 
Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984))). 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
13 
 
¶28 While we do not dispute that the attorney general 
received actual notice through Sorenson's personal service, it 
is well established that Wis. Stat. § 893.82 is not simply an 
actual notice statute.  Id.  It is not enough to substantially 
comply with the statute by effecting actual notice, thereby 
fulfilling the underlying purposes of § 893.82(1).  Simply 
stated, Sorenson cannot strictly comply with the plain language 
of § 893.82(5) by substantially fulfilling the purposes of 
§ 893.82 because the legislature has chosen not to permit 
substantial compliance by requiring strict compliance with the 
terms of the statute.  Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m).   
¶29 To aid in our plain meaning analysis, we briefly 
examine statutory history.  A prior version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82 provided "[t]he provisions of this section shall be 
liberally construed to effectuate [its] intent."  § 893.82(1)(b) 
(1989-90).10  Because the intent of the notice of claim statute 
is to give notice to the attorney general, and the legislature 
mandated 
liberal 
construction, 
substantial 
compliance 
with 
§ 893.82 previously was sufficient to institute a claim against 
a state employee.  Daily v. Univ. of Wis., Whitewater, 145 
Wis. 2d 756, 761, 429 Wis. 2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988), superseded by 
statute as stated in Modica, 195 Wis. 2d at 641.   
¶30 However, Wis. Stat. § 893.82 subsequently was amended 
to its current form that directs strict compliance with the 
                                                 
10 1983 Wis. Act. 27, § 1782.   
No. 2014AP1213    
 
14 
 
terms of the statute.11  Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m).  In Modica, the 
court of appeals concluded that with this amendment, the 
legislature intended to "negat[e] [the] ruling in Daily that 
substantial 
compliance 
with 
§ 893.82(3) 
was 
sufficient."  
Modica, 195 Wis. 2d at 641-42.  Accordingly, strict compliance 
through certified mail is required, as § 893.82(2m) plainly 
states.  See id. at 642.  
¶31 Moreover, we note that strict adherence to the 
certified mail requirement promotes a "simple, orderly, and 
uniform way of conducting legal business."  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 195 (citing Kelly, 168 Wis. 2d at 747).    Furthermore, if we 
were to allow substantial compliance rather than enforcing 
strict compliance as mandated by Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m), the 
certainty created by the requirement of certified mail would be 
undercut by costly case-by-case determinations of whether notice 
of claim was timely sent and received and whether the lack of 
procedural compliance affected the purposes of the notice 
statute.  Kelly, 168 Wis. 2d at 747.   
¶32 Although the attorney general received actual notice 
here, such a determination may not be so easily made in the next 
case.  Condoning a deviation from the certified mail requirement 
could therefore encourage "[a] new level of litigation [to] be 
added to suits against state employees."  Id.  In light of this 
reality, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) must be strictly enforced even 
                                                 
11 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 3579. 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
15 
 
though enforcement produces harsh consequences that are of 
concern to us.  J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wis. State Bldg. Comm'n, 114 
Wis. 2d 69, 83, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983).  
3.  Stricter compliance  
¶33 Sorenson also argues that she satisfied the strict 
compliance requirement of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m) because 
personal service constitutes "stricter compliance," or more 
effective service, than certified mail.  Sorenson relies on 
Patterson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 103 
Wis. 2d 358, 360-61, 309 N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981), for the 
proposition that "stricter compliance than the statute demands 
is not necessarily a failure to strictly comply."   
¶34 In Patterson, the court of appeals examined an 
entirely different statutory scheme, Wis. Stat. § 227.16(1)(a) 
(1979-80), 
which 
at 
that 
time 
required 
that 
service 
be 
accomplished either by personal service or certified mail.12  Id. 
at 359.  Rather than complying with the statute, the claimant 
served by registered mail.  Id.  Although the court of appeals 
noted that strict compliance with ch. 227 procedures is 
required, it held that registered mail constituted a "form of 
certified mail" as the only difference between the two is that 
registered 
mail 
requires 
a 
receipt 
of 
delivery, 
whereas 
certified mail gives the option of a delivery receipt to the 
sender.  Id. at 360-61.  Because service by registered mail and 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.16(1)(a) (1979-80) was renumbered 
to Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a).  1985 Wis. Act 182. 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
16 
 
certified mail are identical as far as the recipient is 
concerned, the court of appeals held that registered mail may be 
substituted for certified mail under § 227.16(1)(a) (1979-80).  
Id. at 361.   
¶35 A federal court extended the Patterson decision to 
hold that personal service constitutes "stricter compliance" 
with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 than does service 
by certified mail.  Weis v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2011).  Relying on 
Patterson, the federal court stated that the "use of personal 
service 
fulfills 
the 
purpose 
behind 
the 
certified 
mail 
requirement in the notice of claim statute, and the [defendants] 
have failed to explain how the service effected in this case 
differs, other than in name, from the form of service specified 
in the statute."  Id.  We are not persuaded by the federal court 
decision; its reliance on Patterson is misplaced.   
¶36 In addition to the stated purposes under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(1), we note that there is a "more specific purpose of 
the certified mailing requirement in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5)[, 
which] is to 'allow[] the attorney general's office to easily 
identify mail whose contents are legal in nature and require 
immediate attention.'"  Hines, 338 Wis. 2d 190, ¶26 (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Kelly, 168 Wis. 2d at 748).   
¶37 Of course, Sorenson's chosen method of service did not 
permit use of the procedure for receiving notices of claim 
developed by the attorney general because the notice of claim 
did not arrive by mail at all.  See id., ¶9 (explaining attorney 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
17 
 
general's procedure for receiving notices of claim by certified 
mail at Post Office Box, which are then forwarded to the Main 
Street office).  Rather, Sorenson's notice of claim arrived at 
the capitol office by personal service and had to be forwarded 
to the Main Street office.  Therefore, unlike the situation in 
Patterson, personal service on the attorney general is not 
identical to service by certified mail to the attorney general 
and did not fulfill the foregoing objective of the statute.  
Moreover, unlike registered mail, personal service is not simply 
a "stricter form of certified mail" because it is an entirely 
different mode of service.  Patterson, 103 Wis. 2d at 360.  
¶38 Furthermore, holding that personal service constitutes 
"stricter compliance" than service by certified mail would 
require us to override the statute's plain language when the 
legislature has so clearly chosen the mode of service necessary 
to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).  We decline to do so.  As the 
court of appeals properly noted, there are numerous statutes 
under which the legislature has chosen to include both certified 
mail and personal service as acceptable modes of service.  
Sorenson v. Batchelder, No. 2014AP1213 at 4, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015).  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(4); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.978(2)(c)2.; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0217(4)(b); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 109.09(2)(b)2.; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 196.135(3); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 707.38(4)(b); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 766.588(4)(b); and Wis. Stat. § 895.07(1)(j). 
¶39 Furthermore, where the legislature decides personal 
service is sufficient, the legislature is clearly capable of 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
18 
 
enacting a statute to reflect that choice.  State v. Hemp, 2014 
WI 129, ¶31, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811 (explaining that we 
do not read language into the statute that the legislature 
omitted).  Consequently, we decline to override the plain 
meaning of the statute and the choice of the legislature by 
declaring that personal service is more effective than service 
by certified mail.  Braverman v. Columbia Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI 
App 106, ¶24, 244 Wis. 2d 98, 629 N.W.2d 66 ("[O]ur role is not 
to justify the legislative action or to substitute our judgment 
for that of the legislature.").  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Sorenson's personal service does not constitute service pursuant 
to the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).   
4.  Absurd result 
¶40 Finally, Sorenson argues that dismissing her otherwise 
viable claim would constitute an absurd result since she 
fulfilled the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 by effecting 
notice on the attorney general.  As set forth above, the plain 
language of § 893.82(2m) requires claimants to strictly comply 
with the certified mail requirement of § 893.82(5), and Sorenson 
failed to so comply.  We must require strict compliance.  Hines, 
338 Wis. 2d 190, ¶16 (enforcing strict compliance unless strict 
compliance is impossible).  Strict compliance was not impossible 
for Sorenson to accomplish. 
¶41 However, 
we 
recognize 
that 
"[o]ne 
of 
the 
few 
exceptions to this sound principle is that [we] will seek to 
avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable result."  State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶39, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.  We 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
19 
 
previously have recognized that an absurd result may arise where 
"an 
interpretation 
would 
render 
the 
relevant 
statute 
contextually inconsistent or would be contrary to the clearly 
stated purpose of the statute."  Grunke, 311 Wis. 2d 439, ¶31 
(footnotes omitted).   
¶42 Requiring notice of claim to be served by certified 
mail as plainly stated in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) does not bring 
about an absurd result.  First, Sorenson points to no internal 
inconsistencies created by the plain meaning of the statute, and 
we perceive none.  Moreover, enforcing the plain language of 
§ 893.82(5) is not contrary to its stated purposes.  Rather, 
service by certified mail is wholly consistent with the purposes 
of the statute; namely, to effect service and to "[p]rovide the 
attorney general with adequate time to investigate claims 
. . .[,] [p]rovide the attorney general with an opportunity to 
effect a compromise without a civil action . . .[,] [and] 
[p]lace a limit on the amounts recoverable in civil actions."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1).   
¶43 Simply because another mode of service seemingly would 
fulfill these stated purposes does not give rise to an absurd 
result.  The legislature specifically chose the acceptable mode 
of service, Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), and we may not second guess 
its choice.  State ex rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen, 
224 Wis. 398, 401, 272 N.W. 457 (1937) (explaining that we are 
not justified in rewriting the statute to "substitut[e] the 
judgment of the court for that of the legislature as to what is 
sound or absurd"); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty. 493 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
20 
 
U.S. 20, 27 (1989) (explaining that federal service statutes 
require strict, literal compliance, and the Court is "not at 
liberty to create an exception where Congress has declined to do 
so").   
¶44 Sorenson easily could have served notice of claim on 
the attorney general by certified mail.  See Hines, 338 Wis. 2d 
190, ¶16 (holding that enforcing strict compliance where strict 
compliance is impossible would lead to an absurd result).  
Accordingly, we must enforce the statute as written, which 
dictates the dismissal of Sorenson's claim.  Hamilton, 261 
Wis. 2d 458, ¶45 ("We exceed our authority when we ignore the 
clear 
language 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
attempt 
to 
surgically 
reconstruct the statute to accommodate alternative public 
policies.").   
¶45 Although the result in this case is harsh, and we are 
sympathetic to Sorenson's unfortunate situation, her remedy 
simply does not lie with us.  See Mannino v. Davenport, 99 
Wis. 2d 602, 615, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981) (enforcing strict 
compliance because we are not free to ignore the import of a 
statute's plain meaning even where we do not "enthusiastically 
endorse 
the 
result" 
that 
enforcement 
causes); 
see 
also 
Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 21 (acknowledging harsh result, but 
refusing to excuse failure to strictly comply with federal 
statutory service requirements on unfairness grounds because 
lawsuits are conducted by trained lawyers).  Rather, Sorenson's 
remedy lies with the legislature.  See Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 
No. 2014AP1213    
 
21 
 
458, ¶49 (calling on legislature to adjust statutory scheme if 
so desired); Mannino, 99 Wis. 2d at 615-16 (same).   
III.  CONCLUSION  
¶46 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that delivering 
notice by personal service does not comply with the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), which requires service of 
notice of claim on the attorney general by certified mail.  As 
§ 893.82(2m) mandates strict compliance with requirements of 
§ 893.82 in order to institute an action against a state 
employee, and Sorenson's service failed to so comply, we affirm 
the dismissal of Sorenson's claim against Batchelder. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.82 requires an individual, prior to filing suit 
against a "state officer, employee or agent," to serve a "notice 
of claim"1 on the attorney general in his office in the Capitol 
by certified mail.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.82(2m), (3), (5) 
(2013-14).2   
¶48 No one can literally (or "strictly," see Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(2m)) comply with the statute.  The attorney general no 
longer receives certified mail in his office in the Capitol.3  
The majority is not perturbed.  See majority op., ¶37.  The 
majority does not require strict compliance with this aspect of 
the statute.  Rather the majority adjusts its reading of the 
statute to fit the facts and to make practical sense.  
¶49 The majority does not, however, adjust its reading of 
the statute to allow notice of a claim to be delivered by a 
person in a sheriff's uniform or other process server's uniform 
rather than by a person in a United States postal uniform.  The 
majority opinion implicitly concludes that the uniform of the 
                                                 
1 An example of a notice of claim is available on the 
Department 
of 
Justice's 
website 
at 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dls/notice-of-
injury-and-claim-form.pdf.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 163, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 190, 
807 N.W.2d 687 ("[T]he undisputed facts in this case establish 
that service by certified mail to the attorney general's capitol 
office never occurs, and cannot occur, regardless of how a 
claimant addresses a notice, or what physical location the 
claimant has in mind as its destination.").   
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
2 
 
person delivering a notice of claim is key to whether the notice 
was validly served.  If a notice of claim is not sent by 
certified mail, and thus delivered by someone in a U.S. postal 
uniform, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
the 
notice 
was 
improperly served, and the claimant's case should be dismissed.  
¶50 The record demonstrates that Sorenson's notice of 
claim, although served by a process server, was processed at the 
attorney general's office by the same individuals in the same 
manner as notices of claim served by certified mail.  
¶51 I agree with the concerns of Judge Posner, who 
recently decried dismissal of a litigant's viable claim based on 
counsel's harmless procedural gaffe.  The concerns he expressed 
are pragmatic, but rest on the principles of fairness and 
justice upon which our legal system is based.  These concerns 
should guide the court in the present case.  Judge Posner wrote: 
I find myself increasingly uncomfortable with basing 
dismissals 
with 
prejudice 
on 
harmless 
procedural 
bobbles.  The only argument in favor of such summary 
justice that I can imagine is that by punishing 
parties for their lawyers' mistake we improve the 
quality of the bar; the lawyers who disserve their 
clients attract fewer new clients and eventually 
perhaps are forced to leave the practice——an example 
of the positive effect of competition on the quality 
of goods and service that a market provides.  But 
while this is plausible in theory, I have to say that 
in more than 33 years as a federal court of appeals 
judge I have not noted any improvement in the average 
quality of the lawyers who appear before us.  I find 
it difficult to believe that punishing [the plaintiff] 
and his lawyer by in effect a "fine" of $925,000 will 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
3 
 
promote the quality of legal representation in the 
courts of this circuit.4 
¶52 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
personal service in the instant case does not comply with the 
statutory service requirement and that only service by certified 
U.S. mail counts.  
¶53 I write separately to make two points:  
(1) A court scrutinizes the text of a statute in view 
of the purposes of the statute.  "Words are given 
meaning 
to 
avoid 
absurd, 
unreasonable, 
or 
implausible results and results that are clearly 
at odds with the legislature's purpose."  Force 
ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2014 WI 82, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866.  
Personal service fulfills the express purposes of 
the notice of claim requirement.   
(2) Personal service is a stricter form of service 
than certified mail, and "stricter compliance 
than the statute demands is not necessarily a 
failure to strictly comply."  See Patterson v. 
Bd. 
of 
Regents, 
103 
Wis. 2d 358, 
361, 
309 
N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981); Weis v. Bd. of Regents, 
837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2011).   
¶54 Because, in my opinion, personal service fulfills the 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 and is a stricter form of 
                                                 
4 See Reserve Hotels PTY Ltd. v. Mavrakis, 790 F.3d 738, 745 
(7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
4 
 
service 
than 
certified 
mail, 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.82(2m) to bar an action against a state officer, employee, 
or agent simply because the notice of claim was served 
personally by a process server rather than by a U.S. postal 
worker delivering certified mail would lead to the absurd result 
of dismissing an otherwise viable claim for a "harmless 
procedural bobble[]."5     
¶55 As a result, I dissent and write separately.   
I 
¶56 I begin with the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.82, which 
states (in relevant part and with emphasis added) the purposes 
of the section and the requirements the legislature has set 
forth: 
(1) The purposes of this section are to:  
(a) Provide the attorney general with adequate 
time 
to 
investigate 
claims 
which 
might 
result in judgments to be paid by the state.   
(b) Provide 
the 
attorney 
general 
with 
an 
opportunity to effect a compromise without a 
civil action or civil proceeding. 
. . . .  
(2m) No claimant may bring an action against a state 
officer, employee or agent unless the claimant 
complies strictly with the requirements of this 
section.   
(3) Except as provided in sub. (5m), no civil action 
or civil proceeding may be brought against any 
state officer, employee or agent for or on 
                                                 
5 See Reserve Hotels, 790 F.3d at 745 (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
5 
 
account of any act growing out of or committed in 
the course of the discharge of the officer's, 
employee's or agent's duties, . . . unless within 
120 days of the event causing the injury, damage 
or death giving rise to the civil action or civil 
proceeding, 
the 
claimant 
in 
the 
action 
or 
proceeding 
serves 
upon 
the 
attorney 
general 
written notice of a claim stating the time, date, 
location and the circumstances of the event 
giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage 
or death and the names of persons involved, 
including the name of the state officer, employee 
or agent involved. . . .  
 
 
 . . . . 
(5) The notice under sub. (3) shall be sworn to by 
the claimant and shall be served upon the 
attorney general at his or her office in the 
capitol by certified mail.  Notice shall be 
considered to be given upon mailing for the 
purpose of computing the time of giving notice.  
¶57 As Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1) explains, the purpose of 
requiring a claimant to serve a notice of claim on the attorney 
general is twofold: (1) to provide the attorney general with 
notice of claims against the state and time to investigate; and 
(2) to provide the attorney general time to reach a settlement 
prior to litigation.   
¶58 In Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), the legislature specified a 
method of service for notices of claim: certified mail.  
Certified mail is "[m]ail for which the sender requests proof of 
delivery in the form of a receipt signed by the addressee."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1096 (10th ed. 2014).   
¶59 The court of appeals has articulated a twofold purpose 
for requiring service on the attorney general by certified mail:  
(1) to "allow[] the attorney general's office to easily identify 
mail whose contents are legal in nature and require immediate 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
6 
 
attention"; and (2) to ensure that delivery of the notice of 
claim can be verified.  See Kelly v. Reyes, 168 Wis. 2d 743, 
747-48, 484 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1992); Patterson v. Bd. of 
Regents, 103 Wis. 2d 358, 360, 309 N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981).   
¶60 Personal service (by a process server) of a notice of 
claim serves both the express statutory purposes for notice of 
claim contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.82(1) and the purposes of 
requiring notices of claim be served on the attorney general by 
certified mail identified in the case law.   
¶61 A personally served notice of claim, like a notice of 
claim served by certified mail, informs the attorney general of 
claims against the state and gives him or her an opportunity to 
reach a settlement prior to litigation.  Moreover, personal 
service (by a process server) of a notice of claim, even more 
than service by a U.S. postal worker by certified mail, clearly 
identifies the notice as legal in nature and provides an easily 
verifiable means of confirming that the notice was actually 
served and when it was served.  
¶62 In sum, there is no reason "why signing a receipt for 
an envelope delivered by a U.S. Postal employee is different 
from signing an acknowledgement of receipt on a copy of a notice 
of claim delivered by a deputy sheriff or other process server."  
Weis v. Bd. of Regents, 837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 
2011).6   
                                                 
6 The Weis court wrote that the State defendant argued  
that 'the certified mail requirement facilitates the 
identification of that particular type of legal 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶63 The dismissal of an otherwise viable claim should not 
depend on whether notice of that claim was delivered by someone 
in a sheriff's uniform rather than a U.S. postal uniform.  To 
hold otherwise, as the majority opinion does, is to elevate form 
over substance and countenance an absurd result——dismissal of a 
viable claim based on a harmless procedural gaffe.  See Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶39, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832 
("[A] court will seek to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable 
result.") (citations omitted).   
II 
 
¶64 The 
absurdity 
of 
dismissing 
Sorenson's 
otherwise 
viable claims based on personal service of the notice of claim 
by a process server rather than service by a U.S. postal worker 
by certified mail is underscored by the fact that personal 
service is, in fact, a stricter form of service than certified 
mail.   
 
¶65 In dismissing Sorenson's otherwise viable claims, the 
majority opinion relies on the requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(2m) that a claimant "compl[y] strictly with the 
requirements of [Wis. Stat. § 893.82]."  See majority op., ¶24.   
                                                                                                                                                             
filing' . . . but offer no explanation why signing a 
receipt for an envelope delivered by a U.S. Postal 
employee is different from signing an acknowledgment 
of receipt on a copy of a notice of claim delivered by 
a deputy sheriff or other process server.  Seeing no 
difference between the two, I conclude that Plaintiffs 
strictly complied with the notice of claim statute. 
Weis v. Bd. of Regents, 837 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 
2011).  
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
8 
 
 
¶66 In an analogous context——the statute required service 
by registered mail and service was by certified mail——the court 
of 
appeals 
noted 
that 
"[a]lthough 
we 
agree 
that 
strict 
compliance . . . is required . . . we conclude that a stricter 
compliance than the statute demands [here, by certified mail] is 
not necessarily a failure to strictly comply.  Such a reading 
would lead to an absurd and unjust result, and we reject such a 
construction."  Patterson, 103 Wis. 2d at 360-61.   
 
¶67 Relying 
on 
Patterson's 
observation 
that 
stricter 
compliance is not necessarily a failure to strictly comply, the 
federal district court in Weis v. Board of Regents, 837 
F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Wis. 2011), rejected the same argument the 
State makes in the instant case.   
¶68 In Weis, the plaintiffs personally served notice of 
claim on the attorney general.  Weis, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 979.  
The defendants in Weis argued that because notice of claim was 
not served by certified mail, the plaintiffs' claims should be 
dismissed.  Weis, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 979.   
 
¶69 Noting that the plaintiffs' notice of claim was 
received and acknowledged by the attorney general, the Weis 
court concluded there was no meaningful difference between 
service by certified mail and service by process server.  Weis, 
837 F. Supp. 2d at 979.  As a result, the federal district court 
held that the plaintiffs strictly complied with Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82.  Weis, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80.   
 
¶70 The reasoning in Patterson and Weis is, in my opinion, 
more persuasive than that of the majority opinion.  Service of 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
9 
 
process by a sheriff or process server is reliable, verifiable, 
and almost universally accepted.  "Certainly, the gold standard 
of notice is service of process by the sheriff or other process 
server . . . ."  Schlereth v. Hardy, 280 S.W.3d 47, 52 n.4 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc).  For this reason, Wis. Stat. § 801.11(3) 
requires personal service on the State to be made by delivering 
a copy of the summons and complaint to the attorney general or 
leaving them at the attorney general's office in the Capitol 
with an assistant or clerk.   
¶71 If service of a notice of claim by certified mail 
strictly complies with Wis. Stat. § 893.82, then the "gold 
standard" of service——personal service by a sheriff or process 
server——complies even more strictly.   
¶72 In sum, because personal service fulfills the purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 and is a stricter form of service than 
certified mail, interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.82(2m) to bar an 
action against a state officer, employee, or agent simply 
because notice of claim was served by a process server rather 
than by a U.S. postal worker via certified mail would lead to an 
absurd result: dismissing an otherwise viable claim for a 
"harmless procedural bobble[]."  Reserve Hotels, 790 F.3d at 745 
(Posner, J., dissenting).   
¶73 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.   
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2014AP1213.ssa 
 
 
 
1