Title: State v. LaPlanche
Citation: 349 N.C. 279
Docket Number: 582A97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 582A97
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
MIKELSON JOSHUA LaPLANCHE a/k/a MICHAEL J. WILLIS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a
judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by
Allen (J.B., Jr.), J., on 25 August 1995, in Superior Court, Wake
County, upon a jury verdict of first-degree murder.  Defendant’s
motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional
judgment imposed for second-degree murder was allowed 30 June
1998.  Calendared in the Supreme Court 30 September 1998;
determined on the briefs without oral argument pursuant to N.C.
R. App. P. 30(d) upon motion of the parties.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Teresa L. Harris,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Thomas H. Eagen for defendant-appellant.
FRYE, Justice.
On 7 March 1994, defendant was indicted for the murders of
Gail Ann Brown and Curtis Melvin Brice.  The two cases were
joined for trial.  In a capital trial, defendant was convicted by
a jury of first-degree murder for the killing of Mr. Brice and
second-degree murder for the killing of Ms. Brown.  In a capital
sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000,
the jury recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of
life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction. 
Defendant was also sentenced to forty-nine years’ imprisonment
for the second-degree murder conviction.  Defendant appeals from
both convictions.
The State’s evidence tended to show that defendant shot both
victims multiple times at close range with a .380 Browning
semiautomatic handgun.  Defendant authorized his trial attorneys
to concede that he was guilty of second-degree murder, but to
argue that his actions were not premeditated or deliberate. 
Defendant did not present any evidence and did not testify at the
guilt phase of his trial, and he did not testify at his capital
sentencing proceeding.
Defendant’s appellate counsel, in his brief filed with this
Court, states that, “after a conscientious examination of this
case, [counsel] has been unable to identify an issue with
sufficient merit to support a meaningful argument for relief on
appeal.”  However, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), State v. Noble, 326 N.C. 581,
391 S.E.2d 168 (1990), and State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99, 331
S.E.2d 665 (1985), defense counsel discusses five possible
assignments of error “that might arguably support the appeal.” 
He also states that he believes the appeal to be “wholly
frivolous,” but requests that the Court review the record to
determine whether there is any prejudicial error.  Defendant’s
attorney has sent a copy of his brief, the record, and the trial
transcript to defendant and has advised defendant that he may
independently file written arguments with this Court.  Defendant
has not submitted a brief.  We conclude that defendant’s
appellate counsel has fully complied with Anders.
We have examined the five assignments of error in the
record, and we agree with defendant’s attorney that an appeal
based upon them is wholly frivolous.  The first assignment of
error addresses the trial court’s failure to impose sanctions on
the State for a purported violation of discovery rules. 
Defendant argued at trial that the State should prohibit the
testimony of a witness, Steve Griffin, because the State failed
to inform the defense, until jury selection began, that Griffin
had given a statement to police concerning what he saw the night
of the shootings.  Defendant contended that Griffin’s statement
might constitute exculpatory material which the State was
obligated to disclose pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
The trial court ordered the State to prepare any and all
statements of Griffin and give them to the defense at the time
Griffin testified, and the State ultimately provided defendant a
copy of the interview materials prior to Griffin’s testimony.  At
trial, defendant conceded that the State had complied with
discovery requirements and that he had a reasonable time to
review the materials.  The record demonstrates that there was no
intent on the part of the State to withhold Griffin’s statements
from defendant.  The trial court took prompt action to ensure
that the statements were provided to defendant.  Any information
favorable to defendant was fully revealed in sufficient time for
him to prepare his case.  For these reasons, there was no basis
for the imposition of sanctions.
The second assignment of error asserts that the trial court
erred in allowing the State to call Steve Griffin and have him
testify before the jury when in fact the witness was not “Steve
Griffin,” but rather “Gaspard Mureau.”  A defendant is entitled
to a new trial when the State knowingly and intentionally uses
testimony which is both false and material in order to obtain a
conviction.  State v. Williams, 341 N.C. 1, 16, 459 S.E.2d 208,
217 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 133 L. Ed. 2d 870
(1996).  In this case, there is no evidence in the record that
the prosecutor knew that the witness was known by any name other
than Steve Griffin.  Further, the identity of the witness was not
material to the case.  After a complete examination of the
evidence presented, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood
that the fact that this witness may have been testifying under a
false name could have affected the judgment of the jury.
The third assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the charge of first-degree murder. 
Defendant admitted to the second-degree murder of Gail Brown and
Curtis Brice.  Thus, the only element at issue was whether
defendant committed the murders with premeditation and
deliberation.  Substantial evidence tended to establish that
Mr. Brice was killed minutes after defendant killed Ms. Brown,
that Mr. Brice was unarmed and hiding in a closet when he was
shot, and that he sustained four gunshot wounds to the forehead
fired at close range.  When all the evidence in the record is
considered in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable
inference of premeditation and deliberation could be drawn from
the circumstances; thus, the trial court did not err in
submitting the charge of first-degree murder.  See State v.
Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 198-99 (1995).
The next assignment of error is that the trial court erred
by allowing the State to introduce into evidence, over
defendant’s objection, photographs of the victims and by allowing
the jury to view the photographs repeatedly.  “Whether the use of
photographic evidence is more probative than prejudicial and what
constitutes an excessive number of photographs in the light of
the illustrative value of each likewise lies within the
discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279,
285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).  A careful examination of the
record reveals that the State presented a limited number of
photographs of the victims; that the photographs were used to
illustrate the testimony of witnesses; and that the trial court
conducted a thorough review of the photographs and witnesses,
outside the presence of the jury, prior to allowing the
photographs to be admitted into evidence.  The trial court
concluded that the photographs were relevant and that their
probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Further, there is no indication that the jury viewed the
photographs “repeatedly.”  There is no meaningful argument on
this record that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting these photographs into evidence or that their admission
deprived defendant of a fair trial.
The final assignment of error is that the trial court abused
its discretion in sentencing defendant to serve forty-nine years’
imprisonment for second-degree murder, that sentence to commence
at the expiration of an unrelated twenty-year sentence then being
served by defendant, and to life imprisonment for first-degree
murder, that sentence to commence at the expiration of the forty-
nine-year sentence for second-degree murder.  This assignment of
error also charges that the consecutive sentencing was
disproportionate when compared with that of similarly situated
defendants.  It is undisputed that the trial court has express
authority under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1354(a) to impose consecutive
sentences.  See State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 697, 343 S.E.2d
828, 847 (1986).  Additionally, “[o]nly in exceedingly unusual
non-capital cases will the sentences imposed be so grossly
disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.”  State v.
Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983).  We
conclude there is no meritorious argument that the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive
terms or that, based on the facts of this case, the consecutive
sentences violated any constitutional requirement of
proportionality.
In accordance with our duty under Anders, we have conducted
a thorough review of the record, the transcript, and the brief
filed by defendant’s appellate counsel.  We find no error
warranting reversal of defendant’s convictions or modification of
his sentences.  We find the appeal to be wholly frivolous.
NO ERROR.
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.