Title: People v. Prudholme
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S271057
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RICKY PRUDHOLME, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S271057 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E076007 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FWV18004340 
 
 
June 26, 2023 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.   
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
S271057 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly 
Bill 1950) became effective on January 1, 2021 and reduced the 
maximum length of probation for most felonies to two years.  
(See Pen. Code, § 1203.1, as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 328, 
§ 2.)  We must decide whether this provision applies 
retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal and, if so, the 
proper remedy for applying the new law to an existing plea 
agreement that provided for a longer probationary term.  We 
hold Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases 
and the proper remedy is to modify the probationary term to 
conform with the new law while maintaining the remainder of 
the plea agreement.  Accordingly, we modify the judgment to 
reduce the length of probation from three years to two and 
otherwise affirm the judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
In November 2018, defendant Ricky Prudholme and two 
others were seen loading items from a commercial loading dock 
into two pickup trucks.  As they began to drive off, employees of 
the business blocked the way.  Defendant tried to evade them 
but hit an obstruction.  He got out of his truck and began yelling 
at the employees, claiming he injured his back and threatening 
to sue them.  Police arrested defendant and his cohorts.  The trio 
had loaded their trucks with over $4,100 worth of electronic 
equipment, which was recovered.  All three were originally 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
charged together with one count of second degree robbery.1  The 
codefendants are not part of this appeal.   
Proceedings were suspended for a time because defense 
counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence.2  The 
court found him competent several months later and reinstated 
proceedings.  The record reflects that defendant was 58 years 
old at the time of the crime.  His only prior offense was a 
misdemeanor vandalism conviction in 2000.  The maximum 
exposure for a second degree robbery is five years in state 
prison.3  Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the robbery 
charge was dismissed and defendant pled to second degree 
burglary, a wobbler punishable by a prison term of 16, 24, or 36 
months, or up to one year in the county jail.4  The maximum 
available probationary term was five years.  The parties agreed 
to three years of probation.  Conditions required defendant to 
serve a year in the county jail, which he had already completed; 
submit to a search of his person and residence; stay away from 
the victim business; and otherwise obey all laws.  Defendant 
filed a notice of appeal, the bases of which were not set out in 
the notice.   
While that appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted 
Assembly Bill 1950.  (See Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2, amending 
Pen. Code, § 1203.1.)  Defendant argued the new law applied to 
 
1  
See Penal Code sections 211, 212.5, subdivision (c).   
2  
See Penal Code section 1368.   
3  
Penal Code section 213, subdivision (a)(2).   
4  
See Penal Code sections 459, 460, subdivision (b), 461, 
subdivision (b), and 1170, subdivision (h)(1).  “A wobbler is a 
crime that can be punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor.”  
(In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1122, fn. 1.)   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
him retroactively and required his probation term be reduced to 
two years but that the remainder of the plea agreement should 
remain in place.  The Court of Appeal agreed the probation limit 
applied to defendant retroactively but that People v. Stamps 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps) required the case be remanded to 
the trial court to “permit the People and trial court an 
opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement.”  (People v. 
Prudholme (Aug. 26, 2021, E076007) [nonpub. opn.].)  We 
granted defendant’s petition for review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Probation and Assembly Bill 1950 
Following a conviction, the court may release certain 
offenders on probation.  “Probation is generally reserved for 
convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses 
minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation.”  
(People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)  A grant of 
probation is “qualitatively different from such traditional forms 
of punishment as fines or imprisonment.  Probation is neither 
‘punishment’ (see [Pen. Code,] § 15)[5] nor a criminal ‘judgment’ 
(see [Pen. Code,] § 1445).  Instead, courts deem probation an act 
of clemency in lieu of punishment [citation], and its primary 
purpose is rehabilitative in nature [citation].”  (People v. 
Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092.)   
 
5  
Penal Code section 15 defines a crime or public offense as 
“an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or 
commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction, either 
[sic] 
of 
the 
following 
punishments,” 
specifying 
death, 
imprisonment, fine, removal from office, or “[d]isqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit in this State.”   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
The Legislature has declared “that the provision of 
probation services is an essential element in the administration 
of criminal justice.”  (Pen. Code,6 § 1202.7.)  A primary goal of 
probation is to ensure the safety of the public through the 
enforcement of court-ordered conditions.  A number of factors 
bear on a decision to grant probation.  The sentencing court 
considers the nature of the offense; the needs of the defendant; 
the loss to the victim; and the interests of justice, which include 
punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, 
and enforcement of probation conditions.  (See ibid.; see also 
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414.)  “If the court determines that 
there are circumstances in mitigation of the punishment 
prescribed by law or that the ends of justice would be served,” it 
may place the defendant on probation.  (§ 1203, subd. (b)(3).)  A 
court may impose probationary conditions it determines “fitting 
and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends 
may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury 
done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally 
and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the 
probationer . . . .”  (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)  “Although the 
Legislature has directed in some circumstances that probation 
be unavailable or limited, in most circumstances the trial court 
has broad discretion to choose probation when sentencing a 
criminal offender.”  (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402, 
fns. omitted; see § 1203, subds. (e), (k).)   
Before Assembly Bill 1950 amended section 1203.1, a 
“court could impose felony probation for a period ‘not exceeding 
the maximum possible term of the sentence,’ except ‘where the 
 
6  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless noted. 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
maximum possible term of the sentence [was] five years or less,’ 
in which case probation could [not] ‘continue for . . . over five 
years.’ ”  (People v. Forester (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 447, 451, 
quoting former § 1203.1, subd. (a).)7  The new two-year 
probation limit of Assembly Bill 1950 does not apply to violent 
felonies defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c), offenses which 
include “specific probation lengths within its provisions,” or to 
certain theft or financial crimes exceeding a loss of $25,000.  
(§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1) & (2).)8  None of these exceptions apply 
here.   
According to the bill’s author, the reduction of the 
maximum probation term for most offenses was based on 
research showing “that probation services, such as mental 
health care and addiction treatment, are most effective during 
the first 18 months of supervision” and “that providing 
increased supervision and services earlier reduces an 
individual’s likelihood” to reoffend.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg Sess.) as 
amended June 10, 2020, p. 4.)  Additional research cited by bill 
proponents suggested “ ‘that the maximum time needed to 
engage probationers in behavior change and reduce the 
likelihood of reoffending is no more than two years, while also 
 
7  
“Assembly Bill No. 1950 also amended section 1203a to 
limit probation terms to one year for most misdemeanor 
offenses.  (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 1.)”  (People v. Forester, supra, 
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 452, fn. 3.)   
8  
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended 
section 1203.1 to eliminate an administrative fee for the 
collection of victim restitution ordered as a condition of 
probation.  (See Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 22.)  That provision is not 
before us.   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
creating incentives for individuals to engage in treatment and 
services early on.’ ”  (Id. at p. 5.)  The bill’s author urged that it 
“creates reasonable and evidence-based limits on probation 
terms, while lowering costs to taxpayers, allowing for the 
possible investment of savings in effective measures proven to 
reduce recidivism and increasing public safety for all 
Californians.  The bill also supports probation officers in 
completing the duties of their job more effectively, by making 
their caseloads more manageable.”  (Id. at p. 4.)  A report of the 
Assembly Committee on Public Safety also noted that “[i]f the 
fact that an individual is on probation can increase the 
likelihood that they will be taken back into custody for a 
probation violation that does not necessarily involve new 
criminal conduct, then shortening the period of supervision is a 
potential avenue to decrease individuals’ involvement in the 
criminal justice system for minor infractions.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 6, 2020, p. 5.)   
B.  Assembly Bill 1950 Applies Retroactively to All 
Nonfinal Cases 
Defendant contends Assembly Bill 1950 applies to him 
retroactively because it went into effect while his case was 
pending on appeal and, thus, not final.  The Attorney General 
agrees, as do we.   
“ ‘It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to 
operate prospectively absent an express declaration of 
retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the 
Legislature, intended otherwise.’  [Citations.]  The Penal Code 
provides that ‘[n]o part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared.’  (§ 3.)”  (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 698–699.)  It 
is undisputed that both the Legislature and the electorate 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
(sometimes hereafter “enactors”) have the power, subject to 
constitutional limitations, to declare that an amendment is to 
apply retroactively.  (Ibid.)  A difficulty arises when enactors fail 
to express a clear intention on that subject.   
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) involved just 
such a case.  A new statute reduced the prison term for the 
defendant’s offense but made no express statement as to 
whether that reduction should apply retroactively.  Previous 
Court of Appeal cases had held “the old law should continue to 
operate as to past acts, so far as punishment is concerned.”  (Id. 
at p. 747.)9  Estrada noted and disapproved those cases.  (See 
Estrada, at p. 748.)  It reasoned that the prospective application 
provision of section 3 “simply embodies the general rule of 
construction, coming to us from the common law, that when 
there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will 
be presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to 
operate prospectively and not retroactively.  That rule of 
construction, however, is not a straitjacket.  Where the 
Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, 
the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in 
complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the 
legislative intent.  It is to be applied only after, considering all 
pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to 
ascertain the legislative intent.  In the instant case there are, as 
 
9  
See People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812; In re 
Crane (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 265, 266–267; People v. King (1934) 
136 Cal.App. 717, 721; People v. Lindsay (1925) 75 Cal.App. 115, 
121; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 119; People v. 
Pratt (1924) 67 Cal.App. 606, 608; People v. Davis (1924) 67 
Cal.App. 210, 215; People v. Williams (1914) 24 Cal.App. 646, 
650.   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
will be pointed out, other factors that indicate the Legislature 
must have intended that the amendatory statute should operate 
in all cases not reduced to final judgment at the time of its 
passage.”  (Estrada, at p. 746.)   
Estrada explained that in such a situation, the problem “is 
one of trying to ascertain the legislative intent — did the 
Legislature intend the old or new [punishment] statute to apply?  
Had the Legislature expressly stated which statute should 
apply, its determination, either way, would have been legal and 
constitutional.  It has not done so.  We must, therefore, attempt 
to determine the legislative intent from other factors.”  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)  Estrada held that “[w]hen the 
Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it 
has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was 
too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as 
punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.  It is an 
inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended 
that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.  The amendatory act imposing the 
lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts 
committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting 
the defendant of the act is not final.”  (Id. at p. 745.)   
Estrada involved an amendment that reduced the prison 
term the defendant was serving.  However, as noted, a grant of 
probation is generally not considered punishment but an act of 
leniency aimed at reforming the defendant, reducing recidivism, 
and securing restitution to the victim.  The amendment in 
Estrada reduced his term of incarceration, not a length of 
probation.  As a result, that case is not directly on point.  When 
enacting Assembly Bill 1950, the Legislature did not express an 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
intent with regard to retroactivity, nor did it decrease the 
punishment for an offense.  The question here, then, is the same 
as in Estrada:  Despite its silence regarding retroactive 
application, does the new statutory language and the history of 
its enactment by “necessary implication” lead to an “inevitable 
inference” that the Legislature “must have intended” to reduce 
the available probationary period “to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply”?  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 
744, 745.)  We conclude that the Legislature must have so 
intended.   
While placing a defendant on probation itself is deemed an 
act of clemency, the court may impose various conditions on the 
probationary grant.  These include the imposition of a jail term, 
the suspension of a further jail or prison sentence, and the 
payment of a fine or victim restitution.  In addition, the court 
may require the probationer to submit to a search of his home, 
car, person, electronic devices and social media accounts.  
Probation conditions may restrict where the defendant can go, 
with whom he can associate, where he lives and whether he can 
move or leave the county.  He may be required to wear a device 
that continuously monitors his whereabouts.  While probation 
conditions can serve rehabilitative ends, they can also be 
invasive and restrictive.  Their violation can lead to a return to 
jail or prison, without the right to a jury trial on the question of 
the violation or the commission of a new offense.  (See People v. 
Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 959–960 (Sims).)   
Although probation is not considered a traditional form of 
punishment, in light of these restrictions on personal liberty 
contemplated by the imposition of probation, we conclude the 
rationale of Estrada applies equally here.  Estrada concluded 
that a reduction of punishment reflected a legislative conclusion 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
that the previous term of incarceration was too lengthy, and the 
new shorter term was sufficient.  A similar inference may be 
made here.  By noting the significant impacts probation places 
on a defendant’s liberty interests, along with the perceived 
practical advantages and increased efficacy achieved by 
reducing the probationary term, the Legislature clearly 
indicated an intent to reduce those impacts and achieve those 
advantages as expeditiously and economically as possible.  It 
concluded that, as a matter of policy, the longer probationary 
terms 
previously 
allowed 
were 
unduly 
costly 
and 
counterproductive, and that a reduced maximum probationary 
term serves the public interest.  (See discussion, ante, at pp. 5–
6.)  An analysis by one legislative committee noted studies which 
“argue that rather than being rehabilitative, the experience of 
probation can actually increase the probability of future 
incarceration . . . . 
 
Scholars argue 
that 
the 
enhanced 
restrictions and monitoring of probation set probationers up to 
fail, with mandatory meetings, home visits, regular drug 
testing, and program compliance incompatible with the 
instability of probationers’ everyday lives.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as 
amended May 6, 2020, p. 5.)   
As a result, there is adequate support for the conclusion 
that the Legislature “must have intended” to reduce the 
available probationary period in “every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 
745.)  As Sims reasoned, “by limiting the maximum duration a 
probationer can be subject to such restraint, Assembly Bill 
No. 1950 has a direct and significant ameliorative benefit for at 
least some probationers who otherwise would be subject to 
additional months or years of potentially onerous and intrusive 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
probation conditions.”  (Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 959; 
see People v. Burton (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 15–16.)   
Because defendant’s case was still pending on appeal 
when Assembly Bill 1950’s amendment went into effect, the new 
law applies retroactively to him.  Estrada involved a conviction 
after trial.  It concerned one simple question:  When the 
Legislature reduced punishment, what did it intend with regard 
to retroactivity?  In answering that question Estrada was not 
called upon to grapple with legislation reflecting other policy 
considerations, like the modification of a plea bargain.  In the 
context of a plea agreement, deciding that a statute applies 
retroactively “does not answer the [separate] question of how 
that statute should be applied.”  (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 
700.)  We now turn to that inquiry.   
C.  The Appropriate Remedy 
Defendant contends the proper retroactive application of 
Assembly Bill 1950 to a probationary term bargained for in a 
plea agreement is to simply reduce the length of probation to 
that now specified under the current law while leaving the 
remainder of the plea bargain intact.  The Attorney General 
argues the proper procedure would be to remand to the trial 
court to allow the parties to renegotiate a resolution in light of 
the newly applicable alternatives.  Under the particular facts 
here, we agree with defendant.   
1.  Plea Agreements, Section 1192.5, Stamps and 
Harris 
When parties enter a plea bargain, each side negotiates to 
gain a benefit.  The prosecution most often agrees to a term that 
is less than the defendant’s maximum exposure, obviating the 
need for a trial and thus lessening the burden on victims, 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
witnesses and the system itself while providing the certainty of 
a conviction.  As here, the defense often achieves the benefit of 
counts being dismissed or reduced and gains the protection of a 
more limited exposure to what would otherwise be the risk of 
harsher punishment.  The court may be actively involved in the 
negotiations and, in any event, must approve the plea 
agreement, making it the ultimate arbiter of whether the 
disposition is fair and appropriate.  (See People v. Segura (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 921, 929.)  “Plea negotiations and agreements are an 
accepted and ‘integral component of the criminal justice system 
and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our 
courts.’  [Citations.]  Plea agreements benefit that system by 
promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments.”  
(Ibid.)   
Section 1192.5 provides, with exceptions not applicable 
here, that “[u]pon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an 
accusatory pleading charging a felony, . . . the plea may specify 
the punishment . . . and may specify the exercise by the court 
thereafter of other powers legally available to it.”  (§ 1192.5, 
subd. (a).)10  Upon acceptance of the agreement by the parties 
and approval by the court, a defendant generally “cannot be 
sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that 
specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea 
other than as specified in the plea.”  (§ 1192.5, subd. (b).)  The 
court, however, may “withdraw its approval in the light of 
further consideration of the matter” (§ 1192.5, subd. (c)), in 
 
10  
Section 1192.5, subdivision (a) has recently been amended 
to modify the offenses which are excluded from its provisions.  
(See Stats. 2022, ch. 197, § 19.)  This amendment did not affect 
the application of the statute to defendant’s offense.   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
which case defendant may withdraw his plea.  (See § 1192.5, 
subd. (d).)   
“The statutory scheme contemplates that a court may 
initially indicate its approval of an agreement at the time of the 
plea but that ‘it may, at the time set for the hearing on the 
application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, 
withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the 
matter . . . .’  (§ 1192.5.)  ‘The code expressly reserves to the 
court the power to disapprove the plea agreement’ up until 
sentencing.  [Citation.]  ‘In exercising their discretion to approve 
or reject proposed plea bargains, trial courts are charged with 
the protection and promotion of the public’s interest in vigorous 
prosecution 
of 
the 
accused, 
imposition 
of 
appropriate 
punishment, and protection of victims of crimes.  [Citation.]  For 
that reason, a trial court’s approval of a proposed plea bargain 
must represent an informed decision in furtherance of the 
interests of society . . . .’ ”  (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 705–
706; see In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 941.)  “The court’s 
authority to withdraw its approval of a plea agreement has been 
described as ‘near-plenary.’ ”  (Stamps, at p. 708.)   
Stamps, as here, involved the intersection of this statutory 
scheme of plea bargaining and the retroactivity rule of Estrada.  
Stamps, who faced a potential “third strike” sentence of 25 years 
to life, agreed to a plea bargain imposing a nine-year sentence, 
which included a mandatory five-year enhancement for a prior 
conviction of a serious felony.  (§ 667, subd. (a); see Stamps, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 693.)  At the time the plea was negotiated, 
“a fundamental assumption underlying the plea bargain” 
(People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 215 (Collins)) was that 
the sentencing court could not strike such an enhancement.  
While that case was on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 
2018, ch. 1013), which “removed provisions that prohibited a 
trial court from striking a serious felony enhancement in 
furtherance of justice under section 1385.”  (Stamps, at p. 700.)11   
The defendant argued his case should be remanded to 
allow the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike 
the enhancement, potentially reducing his agreed-upon prison 
term of nine years to four.  Stamps noted, however, that “[e]ven 
when applicable, section 1385 ordinarily does not authorize a 
trial court to exercise its discretion to strike in contravention of 
a plea bargain for a specified term.”  (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at p. 700.)  Stamps reasoned that “it is not enough for defendant 
to establish that the amended section 1385 applies to him 
retroactively under Estrada in order to receive the remedy he 
seeks.  In order to justify a remand for the court to consider 
striking his serious felony enhancement while maintaining the 
remainder of his bargain, defendant must establish not only 
that Senate Bill 1393 applies retroactively, but that, in enacting 
that provision, the Legislature intended to overturn long-
standing law that a court cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-
upon term by striking portions of it under section 1385.  We are 
not persuaded that the Legislature intended this result.”  (Id. at 
p. 701.)   
With respect to legislative intent, Stamps observed that 
the “Legislature may have intended to modify the sentencing 
scheme, but the legislative history does not demonstrate any 
intent to overturn existing law regarding a court’s lack of 
 
11  
Section 1385 sets out the circumstances in which a court 
may dismiss an action or enhancement “in furtherance of 
justice.”  (§ 1385, subd. (a).)   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
authority to unilaterally modify a plea agreement.  Indeed, none 
of the legislative history materials mention plea agreements at 
all.”  (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702.)  Stamps continued:  
“Senate Bill 1393 was intended to bring a court’s discretion to 
strike a five-year serious felony enhancement in line with the 
court’s general discretion to strike other enhancements.  Thus, 
the Legislature gave a court the same discretion to strike a 
serious felony enhancement that it retains to strike any other 
sentence enhancing provision.  Its action did not operate to 
change well-settled law that a court lacks discretion to modify a 
plea agreement unless the parties agree to the modification.”  
(Ibid.)   
In this context, Stamps concluded a limited remand was 
appropriate to allow the defendant “the opportunity to seek the 
court’s exercise of its section 1385 discretion.”  (Stamps, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 707.)  If the court were inclined to exercise its 
discretion to strike the enhancement, “such a determination 
would have consequences to the plea agreement.”  (Ibid.)  The 
court may withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement 
because “[t]he court’s exercise of its new discretion to strike the 
serious felony enhancement, whether considered a new 
circumstance in the case or simply a reevaluation of the 
propriety of the bargain itself, would fall within the court’s 
broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of the plea 
agreement.”  (Id. at p. 708.)  Further, barring the prosecution’s 
agreement to reduce the agreed-upon sentence, “ ‘the prosecutor 
is entitled to the same remedy as the defendant — withdrawal 
of assent to the plea agreement.’ ”  (Id. at p. 707.)  Stamps 
directed the defendant “should be allowed to make an informed 
decision whether to seek relief on remand.”  (Id. at p. 708.)   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Section 1192.5 imposes a limitation on the court.  While 
the enactors themselves retain the power to amend relevant 
statutes in a manner that permits modification of previous plea 
agreements, in the legislation at issue in Stamps the Legislature 
did not do so.  Stamps distinguished the amendment there at 
issue from that in Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 
(Harris).  Harris considered the effect of Proposition 47 (Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014)) on convictions, including those resulting 
from plea agreements.  “Proposition 47 reduced certain 
nonviolent crimes . . . from felonies to misdemeanors” (Harris, 
at p. 988), and created a resentencing petition procedure 
applicable to those “serving a sentence for a conviction, whether 
by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been 
guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this 
section . . . had this act been in effect at the time of the offense” 
(§ 1170.18, subd. (a), italics added).  Harris rejected the People’s 
claim that they should be allowed to withdraw from the plea 
bargain if the defendant successfully petitions for resentencing 
under Proposition 47.  Harris observed that “[b]y expressly 
mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated 
relief to all eligible defendants.”  (Harris, at p. 991.)  Harris 
reasoned “[t]he resentencing process that Proposition 47 
established would often prove meaningless if the prosecution 
could respond to a successful resentencing petition by 
withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and 
reinstating the original charges filed against the petitioner” and 
“ ‘the financial and social benefits of Proposition 47 would not be 
realized, and the voters’ intent and expectations would be 
frustrated.’ ” (Id. at p. 992.)   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
2.  Assembly Bill 1950’s Amendment to Section 1203.1 
Created A Statutory Ambiguity With Section 
1192.5 
“If defendant stood convicted of a crime . . . as a result of 
trial or an open plea of guilty as charged” (Stamps, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at p. 700), the remedy for retroactive application of 
Assembly Bill 1950 would be straightforward:  The probationary 
term should be reduced to two years, the maximum period 
allowed under section 1203.1 as amended.  (See People v. Quinn 
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879–885.)   
However, the inquiry regarding the proper retroactive 
application of Assembly Bill 1950 is complicated here by the 
existence of a plea bargain.  Section 1192.5 generally constrains 
what a court may do when presented with a plea agreement 
between the parties.  “Although a plea agreement does not 
divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, ‘a judge 
who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence 
within the limits of that bargain.  [Citation.]  “A plea agreement 
is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the 
prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.”  [Citation.]  
Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, 
its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.  
[Citation.]  Once the court has accepted the terms of the 
negotiated plea, “[it] lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a 
plea bargain so that it becomes more favorable to a defendant 
unless, of course, the parties agree.” ’ ”  (People v. Segura, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 931.)  As noted, section 1192.5, subdivision (b) 
expressly provides that once it approves a plea agreement, “the 
court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in 
the plea.”   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
The end result is that the Legislature has enacted two 
statutes that could bear upon the outcome here.  Section 1192.5 
prohibits a court from violating plea bargain terms.  On the 
other hand, Assembly Bill 1950 amended section 1203.1 (Stats. 
2020, ch. 328, § 2) to reduce the authorized probationary period 
but, unlike the provision in Harris, it made no mention of the 
legislative intent regarding an application to pleas.   
The parties to a plea agreement ordinarily negotiate a 
disposition that offers benefits to both sides.  Here, defendant 
was initially charged with second degree robbery and faced a 
maximum sentence of five years in prison.  In exchange for 
dismissal of that count and imposition of a three-year 
probationary term, defendant pled to second degree burglary.  
This resolution by plea agreement created an added wrinkle.  
Although Assembly Bill 1950 generally reflected an intent to 
reduce probationary terms in applicable cases, it “did not, 
however, eliminate or reduce sentences related to other offenses 
and enhancements [like the original robbery charge] that 
remain legally valid in any particular case, but which may not 
have been imposed or may have been dismissed as part of the 
original agreed-upon sentence.”  (People v. Scarano (2022) 74 
Cal.App.5th 993, 1011, review granted June 1, 2022, S273830.)  
Indeed, the parties here could have achieved the same three-
year probationary term by having defendant plead to the 
originally charged second degree robbery count.  Had they done 
so, Assembly Bill 1950 would not have reduced the applicable 
probationary term because robbery falls within an exception for 
violent felonies.  (See §§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), 1203.1, subd. (l)(2).)   
The language of amended section 1203.1 has created a 
statutory ambiguity regarding how the law should be applied 
retroactively to existing plea agreements.  Did the Legislature 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
intend such application should be governed by section 1192.5, 
subdivision (b), which mandates “the court may not proceed as 
to the plea other than as specified in the plea”?  Or did the 
Legislature intend to exercise its own inherent power to alter 
plea bargains in cases not yet final?   
Generally, a court may not accept an unauthorized plea.  
“ ‘Where a trial court is asked to approve an illegal plea 
bargain — illegal because it violates a policy condition 
established by the Legislature or the people through the 
initiative process — the proper course of action for the court is 
clear.  It should decline to act in excess of its authority and 
should refuse to approve an arrangement under which it is 
called upon to do so.’ ”  (People v. John (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 
168, 176.)  “Faced with . . . an unlawful plea bargain, a trial 
court should withhold approval of the bargain.”  (People v. Ellis 
(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334, 342.)  Thus, if a court has approved 
a plea bargain containing an illegal term, ordinarily, the 
recourse for a court would not be to reform the bargain to make 
it legal; it would be to withdraw its prior approval of the 
agreement.  Under such circumstances, a limited remand akin 
to that employed in Stamps might seem most appropriate to 
allow the prosecution to either agree to the new, reduced term 
or for the parties to negotiate a different, legally authorized 
disposition in light of the new law.  (See Stamps, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at pp. 705–708.)   
However, the plea agreement here was undoubtedly 
lawful at the time the parties negotiated it and the court 
assented.  As we have previously observed, “[t]hat the parties 
enter into a plea agreement thus does not have the effect of 
insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has 
intended to apply to them.”  (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
66, italics added.)  We found such an intent in the context of 
Proposition 47, concluding the electorate did not intend to allow 
the prosecution to withdraw from a plea bargain when a 
defendant successfully sought resentencing under that law’s 
new scheme.  (See Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 991–993.)  The 
Legislature has subsequently codified our statement in Doe v. 
Harris that plea agreements are not insulated “from changes in 
the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them,” and 
any provision of a bargain “that requires a defendant to 
generally waive future benefits of legislative enactments, 
initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that 
may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as 
against public policy.”  (§ 1016.8, subds. (a)(1), (b), italics added.)   
So the question remains:  When it amended section 
1203.1, did the Legislature intend to exercise its own authority 
to change the terms of an existing plea bargain to reduce the 
length of an agreed-upon term of probation?  In Harris, we based 
our conclusion “on the unambiguous language of section 1170.18 
and the expressed intent of Proposition 47” (Harris, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 992).  That level of clarity does not exist here.  “At 
the end of the day, the language of the [the new law] is simply 
unclear.  ‘When the language of a statute is ambiguous — that 
is, when the words of the statute are susceptible to more than 
one reasonable meaning, given their usual and ordinary 
meaning and considered in the context of the statute as a 
whole — we consult other indicia of the [the enactors’] intent, 
including such extrinsic aids as legislative history and public 
policy.’ ”  (People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 51.)  The 
Legislature 
clearly 
intended 
to 
reduce 
the 
maximum 
probationary periods going forward.  But given section 1192.5’s 
prohibition on a court’s modification of a plea agreement, a 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
textual and contextual ambiguity exists concerning the 
Legislature’s intent to exercise its own authority to modify 
existing plea agreements.   
3.  The Legislature Intended To Reduce The 
Probationary Terms in Nonfinal Plea Agreements 
“Our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s 
intent to effectuate the law’s purpose, giving the statutory 
language its plain and commonsense meaning.  We examine 
that language, not in isolation, but in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole to discern its scope and purpose 
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.  [Citation.]  
‘If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain 
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd 
consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the statutory 
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, 
courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, 
legislative history, and public policy.’  [Citation.]  The wider 
historical circumstances of a law’s enactment may assist in 
ascertaining legislative intent, supplying context for otherwise 
ambiguous language.”  (Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 
Cal.5th 1147, 1157–1158.)  “Generally, we consult extrinsic 
sources, like a statute’s history, to interpret a statute only when 
its language is ambiguous.”  (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 
1169, 1220.)   
Initially, we observe that Assembly Bill 1950 did not 
reduce the punishment for any particular offense or 
enhancement.  Instead, it reduced the maximum allowable 
probation term for a wide range of offenses.  As noted, a 
legislative analysis of the bill stated, “Proponents of reducing 
the length of probation terms argue that probation supervision 
is most beneficial in the early part of a probation term.  In 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
addition, advocates argue that increased levels of supervision 
can lead to increased involvement with the criminal justice 
system due to the likelihood that minor violations will be 
detected.  The proponents of probation reform further contend 
that reducing the length of probation terms would enable 
probation officers to more effectively manage their caseloads by 
focusing resources on those most at risk of reoffending.”  (Sen. 
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 
10, 2020, p. 5.)  According to the bill’s author, a 2018 study 
“revealed that 20 percent of prison admissions in California are 
the result of probation violations,” and research showed “that 
probation services, such as mental health care and addiction 
treatment, are most effective during the first 18 months of 
supervision.  Research also indicates that providing increased 
supervision and services earlier reduces an individual’s 
likelihood to recidivate.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as amended June 10, 2020, p. 5.)   
The legislative history of Assembly Bill 1950 reflects a 
determination by the Legislature that a shorter period of 
probation would more effectively achieve the rehabilitative 
goals undergirding probation by concentrating services earlier 
in the probation cycle when they are predicted to be most 
effective.  Further, according to the bill’s author, to the extent 
that “half of those [probation] violations are technical and minor 
in nature, such as missing a drug rehab appointment or 
socializing with a friend who has a criminal record” (Sen. Com. 
on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as 
amended June 10, 2020, p. 4), a shorter period of probation 
would reduce the length of time during which a defendant could 
violate probation on such technicality.  (See Assem. Com. on 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as 
amended May 6, 2020, pp. 5–6.)  As Sims observed, “[T]hese 
legislative materials . . . suggest the Legislature viewed 
Assembly Bill No. 1950 as an ameliorative change to the 
criminal law that would ensure that many probationers avoid 
imprisonment.”  (Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 962.)   
The Legislature thus enacted Assembly Bill 1950 to 
reduce the length of probation across the board in order to 
increase probationary effectiveness and reduce the likelihood of 
incarceration for minor probation violations.  These goals would 
seem to apply to all probationary terms regardless of whether 
they are imposed following conviction at trial, an open plea, or a 
plea agreement.  A reduction in punishment for a particular 
offense says nothing, directly, about the Legislature’s intent to 
modify plea bargains.  Yet, the reduction of the authorized 
probationary period does not speak to punishment precisely, but 
to the efficiency and efficacy of probation as a rehabilitative 
device in a variety of circumstances.  (See § 1203.1, subd. (l).)   
As the legislative history indicates, opponents of the bill 
argued “that a case-by-case approach is needed rather than an 
across the board decrease in the length of probation terms.”  
(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, 
supra, as amended June 10, 2020, p. 5; see also id., at pp. 7–8.)  
Similarly, the Attorney General argues “[i]t would be 
speculative to infer from AB 1950’s purposes an intent to deprive 
the trial court of its broad sentencing discretion and statutorily 
vested authority to withdraw its prior approval of the plea in 
cases where a shorter probation term does not further the 
interests of justice or society.”  However, the Legislature 
adopted 
an 
across-the-board 
approach, 
notwithstanding 
arguments for a more case-specific consideration.  The 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
Legislature has thus signaled its view that, for an eligible 
defendant, a shorter period of probation generally serves the 
public’s interests, regardless of how a conviction was secured.   
As defendant argues, employing the Stamps procedure 
and allowing the prosecution to withdraw from the plea 
agreement would appear contrary to the purposes underlying 
the new law as explored in the previous paragraph.  
Presumably, the prosecution would seek to withdraw from a 
plea bargain as a result of Assembly Bill 1950 if it views the 
newly reduced maximum probationary term as insufficient 
under the particular circumstances of the case.  Yet if the 
bargained-for statutory probation term is now considered 
insufficient, the People’s only recourse would be to require a plea 
to a more serious offense, making Assembly Bill 1950’s  two-year 
probation limit inapplicable, or to seek a prison term.  It seems 
doubtful the Legislature intended that its ameliorative action 
would transform plea bargains for probationary terms into 
dispositions calling for admission of a more serious offense or a 
state prison sentence, given the legislative history.   
Reducing defendant’s probationary term from three to two 
years here would not so “fundamentally alter[] the character of 
the bargain” that the People should have an opportunity to 
withdraw from the plea agreement.  (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 
at p. 215.)  In Collins, the defendant was originally charged with 
attempted burglary, six counts of burglary, two counts of forcible 
rape, three counts of assault with intent to commit rape, and 
three counts of forcible oral copulation, as well as an 
enhancement for a prior felony conviction.  As part of a 
negotiated disposition, he pled guilty to one count of oral 
copulation without force as a lesser offense to one of the forcible 
oral copulation allegations.  All other substantive offenses and 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
the prior conviction allegation were dismissed.  Criminal 
proceedings were then suspended and Collins was indefinitely 
committed to the state hospital as a mentally disordered sex 
offender.  (See id. at p. 211.)   
Months later, the Legislature amended the statute 
criminalizing oral copulation.  While the act remained a felony 
if effected by force, consensual oral copulation between 
nonprisoner adults was decriminalized.  Fourteen months after 
his commitment, Collins was found no longer a danger to others 
and criminal proceedings were reinstated.  The court sentenced 
him to a prison term of one to 15 years, the term provided under 
the indeterminate sentencing scheme at the time of his plea.  
Collins reversed the sentence, reasoning that, under Estrada, 
his conviction was not yet final and the defendant could not be 
sentenced for an offense that was no longer a crime.12  (See 
Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 212–213.)   
However, Collins concluded the prosecution was entitled 
on remand to reinstate the dismissed counts, reasoning:  
“Critical to plea bargaining is the concept of reciprocal benefits.  
When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of 
benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie 
from concessions made.”  (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 214.)  
“The state, in entering a plea bargain, generally contemplates a 
certain ultimate result; integral to its bargain is the defendant’s 
vulnerability to a term of punishment. . . .  When a defendant 
 
12  
The People argued the sentencing court should be allowed 
to examine the facts underlying the plea, which showed that 
Collins used force to commit the crime.  The court rejected the 
argument because, notwithstanding the original charge, the act 
that Collins actually admitted was no longer criminal.  (See 
Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 213, fn. 1.)   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is 
substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to 
enter the bargain.”  (Id. at p. 215.)   
Collins is distinguishable.  Initially, Prudholme, unlike 
Collins, would not “gain[] total relief from his vulnerability to 
sentence.”  (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 215.)  He was required 
to serve a county jail sentence and would remain subject to a 
probationary term, albeit one of shorter duration.  But even 
assuming a modification granting less than total relief to a 
defendant could still fundamentally alter a plea bargain under 
some circumstances, the People here agreed to a disposition that 
included a probationary term for less than the maximum period 
of five years allowed under then-existing law.  Other than a one 
year probation term reduction, every other condition of 
probation would remain in place.  (See discussion, ante, at pp. 2–
3.)  Defendant pled guilty to a lesser offense than the single 
count charged.  His conviction of that single count reduced his 
maximum prison exposure by two years.  However, the 
prosecution was satisfied that the county jail term imposed a 
sufficient penalty.  No additional allegations had been charged, 
so none were dismissed as part of the agreement.  (But see 
Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 693.)  Under these circumstances, 
“we find the People have not been substantially deprived of the 
benefit of the plea agreement, and under Collins, they are not 
entitled to withdraw from it.”  (People v. Shelly (2022) 81 
Cal.App.5th 181, 189, italics added; see Bowden v. Superior 
Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 735, 745–747.)   
In sum, we determine that, by enacting Assembly Bill 
1950, the Legislature intended that its new limitations on the 
maximum term of probation in amended section 1203.1 should 
be applied to existing, nonfinal plea agreements while otherwise 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
maintaining the remainder of the bargain.13  We discern this 
intent from the goals of the legislation, which would be thwarted 
if the prosecution could routinely withdraw from plea 
agreements where it deemed the probationary length 
insufficient.  Assembly Bill 1950 reflects the Legislature’s 
categorical 
determination 
that 
a 
reduced 
maximum 
probationary term serves the public’s interest in those cases to 
which it applies.  As noted, the reduction in punishment for a 
particular offense, standing alone, says nothing about the 
Legislature’s intent with regard to existing plea bargains in 
nonfinal cases.  However, Assembly Bill 1950 does not reduce 
the punishment prescribed for a given offense.  While it appears 
prompted in part by concern about the potentially punitive 
effects of probation, it primarily reflects a changed approach to 
the rehabilitative aspects of probation.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that neither the mandates of section 
1192.5 nor the Stamps remand procedure should apply.  The 
proper remedy here is to modify the judgment to reflect the new 
probationary term of two years.   
We conclude by noting that determining legislative intent 
in these circumstances can be a difficult, divisive, and time-
consuming one for courts, which have to discern intent from 
sometimes opaque sources.  That process, and the attendant 
delay and confusion it brings, can be avoided by an express 
statement by the enactors, which they have employed effectively 
in other circumstances.  (See, e.g., Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)  We 
echo the words of one court addressing the issue here that 
“[g]iven the interpretative difficulties courts have faced, the 
 
13  
We disapprove People v. Scarano, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th 
993 to the extent it reached a contrary conclusion.   
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
divergence of opinion on these matters, and the sheer volume of 
nonfinal criminal cases in this state, the majority of which 
involve plea bargains, the benefit of greater specificity from the 
Legislature, or the electorate, cannot be overstated.”  (People v. 
Flores (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420, 452–453.)  Simply put, 
“[t]hese issues need not be addressed by appellate litigation if 
the Legislature expressly states whether the sentencing reforms 
it enacts are to be given retroactive application on appeal or not, 
and if so, whether retroactive application applies to negotiated 
sentences or not.”  (People v. Scarano, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1000, fn. 2.)  We urge the Legislature, and the electorate with 
respect to ballot measures, to consider the retroactive 
application of new laws and to regularly express their intent 
regarding if and how they should be applied retroactively.   
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is modified to reduce the length of probation 
to two years.  As modified, the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Prudholme 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 8/26/21 – 4th 
Dist., Div. 2 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S271057 
Date Filed:  June 26, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Bernardino  
Judge:  Kyle S. Brodie 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Steve Oetting and Elizabeth M. 
Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Erica Gambale 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2896 
Mission Viejo, CA 92690 
(949) 293-3486 
 
Elizabeth M. Kuchar 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9109