Title: Allen v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S-XP-00506
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-XP-506 
Brian J. Allen 
Appellant (Petitioner), 
–v– 
State of Indiana 
Appellee (Respondent). 
Decided: December 22, 2020 
Appeal from the Dearborn Superior Court,  
No. 15D01-1811-XP-44 
The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 19A-XP-1013 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Slaughter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 22 2020, 3:05 pm
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-XP-506 | December 22, 2020 
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Goff, Justice. 
Our legislature provided a mechanism by which people convicted of 
certain crimes can obtain a fresh start by seeking expungement of those 
convictions. For certain minor convictions, expungement is mandatory if 
the petitioner meets certain criteria. For more serious convictions, the trial 
court retains the discretion to determine whether the circumstances 
warrant an expungement. Courts considering whether to grant a 
discretionary expungement are tasked with looking at the unique facts of 
each case to determine whether the individual has demonstrated that his 
case merits a fresh start.  
The defendant here challenges the trial court’s decision to deny his 
petition for expungement, contending that the court erroneously 
determined that he was ineligible for expungement. Because the trial court 
may have denied the petition on the erroneous belief that Indiana Code 
section 35-38-9-4(b)(3) rendered the defendant ineligible for expungement, 
we reverse and remand for further consideration consistent with this 
opinion. 
Factual and Procedural History 
In 2002, nineteen-year-old Brian J. Allen accompanied three of his 
friends to burglarize the home of Larry and Judith Pohlgeers in West 
Harrison, Indiana. Upon arriving, Allen and another man remained 
outside, keeping watch as their confederates—armed with a lead pipe—
broke into the residence. At some point during the burglary, the men who 
entered the home struck Larry Pohlgeers repeatedly on the head with 
their cudgel, causing serious bodily injury to their victim.  
The State charged Allen with six counts: Class A felony attempted 
robbery, I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (1998), I.C. § 35-41-5-1, I.C. § 35-41-2-4; Class A 
felony conspiracy to commit robbery, I.C. § 35-42-5-1, I.C. § 35-41-5-2; 
Class A felony burglary, I.C. § 35-43-2-1(2) (Supp. 2002), I.C. § 35-41-2-4; 
Class A felony conspiracy to commit burglary, I.C. § 35-43-2-1(2), I.C. § 35-
41-5-2; Class B felony aggravated battery, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5; and Class C 
felony battery with a deadly weapon, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(3). The State 
 
 
 
 
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ultimately dismissed the six original counts in exchange for Allen 
agreeing to plead guilty to Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary. 
See I.C. § 35-43-2-1(1) (Supp. 2002), I.C. § 35-41-5-2. 
Allen was sentenced to sixteen years of imprisonment. He later sought 
and received a modification of his sentence. Allen was placed on 
probation after serving just over thirty-four months of incarceration. He 
completed all the terms of his probation without any violations. After 
waiting the required three years, Allen, who had no prior criminal history, 
petitioned for expungement under Indiana Code section 35-38-9-4 (the 
Permissive Expungement Statute).  
At the hearing on his petition, the court heard testimony from Allen on 
his commitment to work and to his wife and two children. The 
expungement, he testified, would permit him to advance his career, to “do 
a better job of being able to provide for [his] family,” and to teach his 
children responsibility. Tr. Vol. I, p. 15. The court also admitted into 
evidence letters of recommendation from Allen’s brother-in-law, his 
coworker, and a doctor—each of whom attested to Allen’s good character 
and strong work ethic. And while neither of the Pohlgeers attended the 
expungement hearing, the court considered their testimony from other 
sources. Larry Pohlgeers, who had passed away, opined at an earlier 
sentence-modification hearing that Allen “should be given a break” since 
he’d “learned his lesson.” Id. at 4. For her part, Judith Pohlgeers informed 
a victims’ advocate that she “was in agreement with Mr. Allen’s 
conviction being expunged in this matter.” Id. at 31.  
Allen admitted at the hearing that Larry Pohlgeers had suffered serious 
bodily injury as a result of the burglary. Because of his admission, and 
because the Permissive Expungement Statute exempts convictions of 
crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, the State expressed doubt as to 
whether Allen was eligible for expungement. The trial court denied the 
petition for expungement without explaining its reasoning.  
 In a unanimous, published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed. 
Allen v. State, 142 N.E.3d 488, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The panel held that 
the trial court had improperly interpreted the Permissive Expungement 
Statute and, because the crime of which Allen was convicted didn’t result 
 
 
 
 
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in serious bodily injury, the trial court improperly denied his petition for 
expungement. Id. 
The State sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the 
Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
Standard of Review 
The Court ordinarily reviews the denial of a petition for expungement 
under the Permissive Expungement Statute for abuse of discretion. See 
Cline v. State, 61 N.E.3d 360, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“The use of the term 
‘may’ in a statute ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of 
discretion.”). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly 
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. Where, as 
here, the interpretation of a statute is at issue, we apply a de novo standard 
of review. State v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012). 
Under this standard, the goal is to determine and give effect to the 
legislature’s intent. Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm'n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 
79 N.E.3d 371, 376 (Ind. 2017). If the language of a statute is unambiguous, 
we apply the plain meaning of its words and phrases. Id. We are mindful 
both of what a statute says and what it does not say and we “may not add 
new words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the 
legislature.” Id.  
Discussion and Decision 
Indiana Code chapter 35-38-9 governs the sealing and expungement of 
a person’s conviction records. Under the Permissive Expungement 
Statute, a trial court may order conviction records expunged if the court 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the requisite period has 
elapsed (eight years from the date of conviction or three years from the 
completion of the sentence); (2) no charges are pending against the person; 
(3) the applicable fines, costs, and restitution have been paid; and (4) the 
person has not been convicted of a crime within the previous eight years 
(or a shorter period agreed to by the prosecutor). I.C. § 35-38-9-4(e). 
However, the Permissive Expungement Statute expressly does not apply 
 
 
 
 
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(i.e., a conviction may not be expunged) if the felony “resulted in serious 
bodily injury to another person.” I.C. § 35-38-9-4(b)(3) (the SBI Exclusion). 
I. Allen was eligible for expungement. 
There’s no question that Allen met all of the conditions in subsection 
4(e) of the Permissive Expungement Statute. The only question is whether 
his conviction for Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary (the crime 
for which he stood convicted) is eligible or ineligible for expungement 
under the SBI Exclusion. Allen and Amicus Curiae argue that, because that 
crime resulted in no serious bodily injury to another person, the trial court 
erred by denying his motion.1 The State, on the other hand, argues that the 
SBI Exclusion renders Allen ineligible for expungement because the facts 
incidental to his conviction involved serious bodily injury.  
Our appellate courts haven’t directly addressed whether the SBI 
Exclusion in the Permissive Expungement Statute prohibits expungement 
when the elements of the crime of conviction don’t include serious bodily 
injury. However, the Court of Appeals has addressed a similar situation 
with reference to mandatory expungements under Indiana Code section 
35-38-9-3 (the Mandatory Expungement Statute). Like the Permissive 
Expungement Statute, the Mandatory Expungement Statute excludes from 
eligibility a “person convicted of a felony that resulted in bodily injury to 
another person.” I.C. § 35-38-9-3(b)(3). In Trout v. State, the Court of 
Appeals held that, because “that” is a restrictive clause, the felony of 
conviction must have resulted in bodily injury to another person. 28 
N.E.3d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).  
The logic of Trout applies with equal force in this case. The phrasing of 
the statutes calls for the same result: a person may be eligible for 
expungement unless the felony for which he stands convicted resulted in 
serious bodily injury to another person. That the facts of the incident 
                                                 
1 Allen proceeded pro se before the Court of Appeals. When the State filed its Petition for 
Transfer, Allen didn’t respond. Amicus Curiae, who also filed a brief in support of Allen before 
the Court of Appeals, filed a response to the State’s petition.  
 
 
 
 
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leading to the conviction show serious bodily injury is not enough to 
exclude a person from eligibility for expungement. 
Still, the State contends that this Court should interpret the SBI 
Exclusion such that the trial court may consider the underlying facts of the 
criminal activity, rather than just the elements of the offense. The State 
argues that this interpretation isn’t a novel one, citing to White v. State, 961 
N.E.2d 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. In White, the Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court could consider the facts of the underlying crime to 
determine if the defendant was a credit-restricted felon.2 Id. at 56–57. But 
unlike the credit-restricted-felon statute, the expungement statutes are 
“inherently remedial,” so courts must construe them liberally to 
accomplish their remedial purpose. See Cline, 61 N.E.3d at 362. The State 
also argues that if we interpret the Permissive Expungement Statute in 
this manner, prosecutors will be less likely to give favorable plea offers. 
But this policy argument cannot overcome the text of the statute. See e.g., 
Booker, Inc. v. Morrill, 639 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
While Allen was charged with crimes that involved bodily injury to 
another person (e.g., aggravated battery and battery with a deadly 
weapon), those charges were dismissed when he pled guilty to conspiracy 
to commit burglary. Conspiracy to commit burglary doesn’t result in 
bodily injury to another person.3 Allen isn’t excluded from eligibility for 
expungement under the SBI Exclusion because he wasn’t “convicted of a 
felony that resulted in serious bodily injury to another person.” I.C. § 35-
38-9-4(b)(3). 
The fact that Allen was eligible for expungement doesn’t end the 
inquiry, however, because, unlike the Mandatory Expungement Statute at 
                                                 
2 The credit-restricted-felon statute limits the amount of good time credit the defendant 
receives while imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing. I.C. § 35-50-6-
3.1; I.C. § 35-50-6-4.  
3 Allen was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary under Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-
1(1)(B), which involves breaking and entering the dwelling of another. He was not convicted 
under Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-1(2), which is breaking and entering the building or 
structure of another that results in bodily injury or serious bodily injury. 
 
 
 
 
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issue in Trout, the Permissive Expungement Statute vests discretion in the 
trial court to deny expungement. 
II. 
A trial court evaluating an expungement petition 
may consider facts incident to the conviction, but 
the trial court here gave us nothing to go on. 
The trial court didn’t indicate why it denied Allen’s petition for 
expungement. At the hearing on the petition, the State questioned 
whether Allen was eligible, leaving the court itself in doubt.4 In the order 
denying Allen’s petition, the trial court found “in its discretion” that the 
petition should be denied, but the court didn’t discuss the basis of its 
decision. App. Vol. 1 p. 15. 
A. A trial court may consider facts incident to the 
conviction when evaluating an expungement petition. 
Expungement statutes manifest an intent to grant relief from stigma 
associated with criminal convictions. Cline, 61 N.E.3d at 362. Indiana 
courts generally construe expungement statutes liberally to advance the 
remedy for which they were enacted. Id. However, the legislature also 
clearly recognized that some convictions require a more detailed 
examination before they are expunged. Unlike under the Mandatory 
Expungement Statute, the Permissive Expungement Statute vests in the 
trial court the discretion to either grant or deny a petition for 
expungement. This grant of discretion necessarily requires the court to 
engage in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether the circumstances 
of the case warrant expungement of the conviction. In short, the statute 
recognizes the possibility that the crime might be too serious to expunge. 
                                                 
4 During its closing argument, the State said “regarding the first issue of whether or not Mr. 
Allen is eligible for expungement, I think this is a matter that is purely one of the law and I’m 
leaving up to the Court to decide. I think, however, it is somewhat unclear as to whether or 
not he is eligible.” Tr. at 30. 
 
 
 
 
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In other cases, the same crime might be a serious but isolated event and 
the petitioner might prove deserving of a second chance. See, e.g., Cline, 61 
N.E.3d at 363 (reversing the denial of expungement where the petitioner 
had obtained advanced education and been promoted at work).  
Relying on Cline, Amicus Curiae argues that a trial court shouldn’t be 
able to consider the facts of the incident that didn’t lead to a conviction at 
the discretionary stage. Cline held that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the petition for expungement when the only evidence 
militating against expungement was the type of offense and the time that 
had elapsed between the offense and the petition. 61 N.E.3d at 363. But the 
Cline court’s reading is inconsistent with the language of the Permissive 
Expungement Statute, which gives discretion to the trial court without 
listing any factors to inform the court’s consideration. See I.C. § 35-38-9-
4(e). In other words, a trial court, when deciding whether to exercise its 
discretion, is not prohibited from considering the facts of the incident 
leading to the conviction—even if the conviction itself doesn’t require 
proof of those facts. 
B. A trial court should first determine whether the 
conviction is eligible for expungement and then 
whether it merits expungement.  
Because the Permissive Expungement Statute excludes from eligibility 
persons convicted of certain offenses, but vests in the court discretion to 
either grant or deny a petition, a trial court should engage in a two-step 
process when considering a petition for expungement. First, a court must 
determine whether the conviction is eligible for expungement and the 
petitioner has met the requirements. I.C. §§ 35-38-9-4(b), -4(e). If the 
conviction is ineligible, the inquiry ends there. But if the court determines 
that the conviction is eligible for expungement, it must then collect 
enough information to determine whether it should grant or deny the 
petition. In issuing its decision, a trial court may consider a broad array of 
information, including the nature and circumstances of the crime and the 
character of the offender. In this case, significant evidence supported 
Allen’s petition: testimony about his role as a committed father, husband, 
 
 
 
 
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and provider; letters of recommendation from family, friends, and co-
workers; and support from the victims themselves. The trial court, 
however, didn’t articulate its reasons for denying Allen’s petition for 
expungement. And because the trial court in this case did not articulate 
why it denied Allen’s petition, we’re unable to determine what 
consideration the court gave the evidence presented at the hearing or if it 
entirely failed to consider the evidence favoring expungement based on a 
mistaken belief that Allen was ineligible for expungement.  
Conclusion 
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Allen’s 
petition for expungement and remand with instructions for the court to 
reconsider its decision consistent with this opinion.  
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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APPELLANT PRO SE  
Brian J. Allen 
Sunman, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  A M IC U S  CU R IA E  
I N D IA NA  U NI VE R SIT Y  R O BE R T H.  
M C K IN NE Y  S C H O OL  O F L A W C I VI L 
P R A CT I CE CL I NI C 
Carrie Hagan 
Director, Civil Practice Clinic  
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Sherell Scott 
Elizabeth Whitaker 
Malorie Palmer 
Grace Dillow 
Natalie Gaynier 
Katherine Bender 
Certified Legal Interns 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
Lauren A. Jacobsen 
Stephen R. Creason 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana