Title: Com. v. Adams
Citation: 381 A.2d 882, 476 Pa. 91
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 1977

476 Pa. 91 (1977) 381 A.2d 882 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Richard ADAMS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted January 10, 1977. Decided December 24, 1977. *92 Joel H. Ziev, Anthony S. Blasco, Easton, for appellant. Charles H. Spaziani, Dist. Atty., Alan B. McFall, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and PACKEL, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. On February 13, 1975, appellant, Richard Adams, was convicted by a judge sitting with a jury of murder of the third degree in connection with the stabbing death of Cheryl McNeil. Post-verdict motions were denied on July 31, 1975. Subsequently, appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten to twenty years in a state correctional institution. This appeal followed. Appellant first argues that the court below erred in denying him an opportunity to challenge the array of the jury. We do not agree. Appellant's challenge to the array is premised on an alleged systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury. *93 The facts surrounding this issue are as follows. On Monday, February 10, 1975, prior to voir dire, defense counsel challenged the array of the jury: Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1104(b) and (c) state: Pa.R.Crim.P. 1104(b) establishes the procedure when a challenge to the array of the jury should be made. Rule 1104(b) requires that challenges to the array of the jury be made "not later than five days before the first day of the week the case is listed for trial . . ." and not thereafter, *94 absent a prior opportunity. Moreover, all challenges shall be in writing and specify the reasons for the challenge. In the instant case the oral challenge to the array was made minutes before the voir dire was to begin. The Trial Court did not err in refusing appellant an opportunity to challenge the array. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1104(b). Appellant alleges that this case is governed by Commonwealth v. (Ronald) Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 304 A.2d 684 (1973). We do not agree. In Jones this court stated: In Jones, supra, this court held that untimely challenges to the array of the jury that are denied on substantive grounds, i.e., conformity with the constitution and prevailing case law, rather than procedural grounds should not be dismissed without a hearing. The instant case is clearly distinguished from Jones, supra. The record in the instant case reveals that while the trial court mentioned "substantive grounds", the trial court also proffered the independent and sufficient *95 reason of the untimely nature of the challenge.[1] We are of the opinion that the court below properly denied appellant's untimely challenge to the array of the jury. Appellant next argues that a portion of the testimony of Police Officer Donald English of the City of Easton Police Department was inadmissible because it referred to police records and, therefore the jury could reasonably infer prior criminal activity and that such an inference was used as substantive evidence of the instant crimes. We do not agree. The complained of portion of Officer English's testimony was: In Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 292 A.2d 373 (1972), we attempted to clarify the area of law concerning references that may indicate prior unrelated criminal activity on the part of the defendant by saying: In Allen, supra, after stating the general prohibition against reference to the defendant's prior criminal action, we stated two exceptions to the prohibition: The court, in Allen, supra, held that references to prior criminal activity of a defendant do not automatically compel reversal of a conviction; rather, the court required that the reference create a reasonable inference of prior criminal activity and further that there be no independent explanation of police possession of the information. This court has had two occasions to discuss references to "records" and "files" and whether such references constituted reversible error. In Commonwealth v. Groce, 452 Pa. 15, 17, 303 A.2d 917, 918 (1973) the chief of police of Media testified as follows: The court, in Groce, supra, reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The reference to "files" in Groce is more detailed than that in the instant case and the court determined the inference of prior criminal activity was reasonable. *98 In Commonwealth v. McFadden, 464 Pa. 265, 346 A.2d 550 (1975), an investigating police officer testified as follows: The police officer explained his question concerning "records" by later testifying: In the instant case, we are confronted with a brief passing comment concerning checking "our records" for addresses.[2] We are of the opinion that this reference is not of such a *99 nature nor magnitude that prior criminal activity is reasonably inferable and, therefore, find no reversible error. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning the defendant's prior possession of a knife. We do not agree. The basis of appellant's argument is that the testimony concerning his prior possession of a knife showed prior criminal conduct and, therefore, was violative of Commonwealth v. Allen, supra. The testimony which appellant complains of was that of John Kies, a witness to the altercation which resulted in the stabbing death of Cheryl McNeil. The testimony in relevant part is as follows: As was made clear in Allen, supra, evidence of defendant's prior criminal conduct may not be introduced as substantive evidence of the crime for which he is presently charged. In the instant case there is testimony concerning appellant's prior possession of the knife used in the stabbing. However, there is no testimony equating such prior possession of the knife as being in violation of the criminal laws of this Commonwealth. Testimony relating to possession of a knife does not in and of itself create a reasonable inference concerning prior criminal conduct. This being appellant's only argument concerning the admissibility of the knife, we find no reversible error. Judgment of sentence affirmed. MANDERINO, J., files a dissenting opinion. MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. The instant case is factually and legally indistinguishable from Commonwealth v. Groce, 452 Pa. 15, 303 A.2d 917 (1973). The jury in the instant case, just like the jury in Groce, could reasonably infer from the police officer's testimony that appellant had a prior record of criminal conduct. The police officer in the instant case very plainly stated that he looked through police records in order to locate an address at which appellant might be apprehended. *102 Moreover, the transcript of the instant case contains no mention of an "independent explanation" of the police possession of appellant's address such as was found by a majority in Commonwealth v. McFadden, 464 Pa. 265, 346 A.2d 550 (1975). I would therefore reverse the judgment of sentence and grant appellant a new trial. [1] "TRIAL COURT: . . . So that the application at this time within moments of the beginning of the voir dire is denied." [2] The comment in Groce, while brief, was more explicit in relating that defendant had a history of prior criminal conduct.