Title: Brake v. Payne
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031948
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2004

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARK BRAKE, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 031948  
 
KELLY PAYNE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ESTATE OF EDUARDO CALZADA 
 
C. SCOTT MILLER, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 031949 
 
KELLY PAYNE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ESTATE OF EDUARDO CALZADA 
 
  OPINION BY 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D.KINSER 
SHEILA COLEY 
 
 
 
 
     June 10, 2004 
 
v.  Record No. 031953 
 
KELLY PAYNE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ESTATE OF EDUARDO CALZADA 
 
MARK GILLESPIE 
 
v.  Record No. 031954 
 
KELLY PAYNE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ESTATE OF EDUARDO CALZADA 
 
From the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville 
Donald E. Kent, Judge Designate 
 
 
In these appeals, we once again address a plaintiff’s 
right to suffer a nonsuit.  The question is: When a 
plaintiff who lacks standing to bring an action suffers a 
nonsuit, does that nonsuit then impair a proper plaintiff’s 
absolute right to a first nonsuit in a subsequently filed 
new action?  We answer that question in the negative 
because the plaintiff without standing and the proper 
 
2
plaintiff are not suing in the same right.  Thus, we will 
affirm the circuit court’s judgment allowing a nonsuit in 
the action brought by the proper plaintiff.  However, we 
will reverse the circuit court’s entry of that nonsuit 
order nunc pro tunc. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
Guadalupe Sias (“Sias”), as the parent and next of kin 
of Eduardo Calzada (“Calzada”), filed a motion for judgment 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville (“the 
First Action”), against Kelly Harrison (“Harrison”), an 
officer with the City of Charlottesville Police Department, 
alleging claims for assault and battery, and false 
imprisonment arising out of Calzada’s arrest on October 24, 
1998.  Harrison filed a demurrer, asserting that the First 
Action was improperly brought in the name of Calzada by his 
parent and next of kin.  According to Harrison, the action 
should have been filed by an executor or administrator of 
the estate of Calzada, who was deceased.  The circuit court 
sustained the demurrer but granted Sias leave to amend the 
motion for judgment to substitute a proper plaintiff.  
Instead of amending the motion for judgment, Sias elected 
to suffer a voluntary nonsuit of the First Action.  The 
circuit court entered an order nonsuiting that action. 
 
3
 
Subsequently, Kelly Payne (“Payne”), personal 
representative of the estate of Calzada, filed a motion for 
judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Charlottesville (“the Second Action”), naming as defendants 
Harrison; Mark Brake, an officer with the City of 
Charlottesville Police Department; Mark Gillespie, an 
officer “for the County of Albemarle;” Cheryl A. Thompson, 
a magistrate for the 16th Judicial District; and numerous 
individuals and entities associated in some capacity with 
the Albemarle-Charlottesville Regional Jail (the “Jail 
Defendants”).1  In addition to the claims for assault and 
battery, and false imprisonment asserted in the First 
Action, Payne stated claims alleging gross negligence for 
conspiring to deprive and depriving Calzada of necessary 
medical attention, violation of his constitutional rights 
against unreasonable seizure and loss of liberty without 
due process of law, use of unnecessary force amounting to 
an unreasonable search and seizure, commitment to jail for 
a non-incarcerable offense, and wrongful death. 
                     
1 The Jail Defendants were C. Scott Miller, Frank 
Johnson, Michael Fehl, Christopher A. Bibb, Keith Bazemore, 
Fred Kirschnick, Gerald [Patrick] Kinlaw, Eddie Shifflett, 
Gary P. Ferland, Asiberia Igbari, Jerome Hill, Phillip 
Barfield, Billy Bingler, John Woodson, Sheila Coley, John 
R. Isom, Robert Beatty, Albemarle-Charlottesville Regional 
Jail Authority, Albemarle-Charlottesville Regional Jail 
Board, and Unknown Named Agents of the Regional Jail and 
Jail Authority. 
 
4
Payne did not serve process in the Second Action on 
any of the defendants.  On October 22, 2001, which was one 
day before the expiration of the twelve-month period after 
commencement of the Second Action in which timely process 
should have been served pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-275.1 and Rule 3:3(c), Payne filed a “Notice of 
Voluntary Non-Suit.”  Although Payne submitted a proposed 
nonsuit order to the circuit court, she did not file a 
praecipe or otherwise schedule a hearing for entry of the 
nonsuit order.  Consequently, the circuit court never 
entered the order submitted by Payne. 
Despite the fact that the Second Action remained open 
on the court’s docket, Payne subsequently filed a third 
motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Charlottesville (“the Third Action”) on April 19, 2002.  
Payne asserted basically the same factual allegations and 
claims as she had stated in the Second Action and named 
primarily the same individuals as defendants.  This time, 
however, Payne effected service of process on some of the 
defendants.  The Third Action was subsequently removed to 
the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia. 
 
After Payne filed the Third Action, Gillespie and most 
of the Jail Defendants filed notices of special appearance 
 
5
and moved the court to dismiss the Second Action with 
prejudice because Payne had failed to serve process timely 
in the Second Action in accordance with the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-275.1 and Rule 3:3(c).  They also objected to 
Payne’s requested nonsuit of the Second Action.  Payne then 
filed a notice in the circuit court, stating her intention 
to tender the proposed order of nonsuit in the Second 
Action to the court. 
 
After hearing oral argument on April 16, 2003 with 
respect to Payne’s request for a nonsuit and the 
defendants’ objections,2 the circuit court concluded that 
that the Second Action was “a separate and distinct cause 
of action or claim” from the First Action, and that Payne’s 
request for a nonsuit was thus a request for “a first 
nonsuit and not a second nonsuit.”  The court further 
determined that the order of nonsuit should be entered nunc 
pro tunc to October 22, 2001, the date Payne originally 
submitted the proposed order to the court.  The circuit 
court subsequently entered the order of nonsuit as 
indicated.  These appeals followed, which were consolidated 
for purposes of oral argument and this opinion. 
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
                     
2 Counsel for Brake and Harrison, as well as counsel 
for Coley, also appeared at the hearing and objected to the 
proposed nonsuit order. 
 
6
 
 
The various defendants-appellants raise three issues:  
(1) whether the circuit court erred in allowing Payne to 
nonsuit the Second Action; (2) whether the circuit court 
erred in allowing Payne to suffer a second nonsuit with 
respect to the defendants who were not served with service 
of process within 12 months from the date of filing the 
Second Action as required by Code § 8.01-275.1 and Rule 
3:3(c); and (3) whether the circuit court erred by entering 
the nonsuit order nunc pro tunc to October 22, 2001.3 
 
With regard to the first issue, the dispositive 
question is whether the nonsuit of the First Action by 
Sias, who lacked standing to bring that action, in any 
manner affected or impaired Payne’s right to a first 
nonsuit of the Second Action pursuant to the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-380(B).  The defendants assert that, although 
Sias was not qualified as the personal representative of 
Calzada’s estate when she filed the First Action and thus 
lacked standing to bring that action, she was nevertheless 
the real party in interest in both the First Action and the 
Second Action because she was Calzada’s mother and a 
potential beneficiary under the Death by Wrongful Act 
statute, specifically Code § 8.01-53.  Payne, in contrast, 
                     
3 Coley did not raise the second issue in her appeal. 
 
7
argues that, since “a new plaintiff may not be substituted 
for an original plaintiff who lacked standing to bring the 
[action],” Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Virginia 
Nat’l Bank, 231 Va. 440, 442-43, 344 S.E.2d 913, 915 
(1986), Sias could not have substituted Payne as the 
plaintiff in the First Action.  Therefore, Payne contends 
that, while the only remedy was to nonsuit the First Action 
and to bring a new action in the name of a proper 
plaintiff, id. at 443, 344 S.E.2d at 915, the First Action 
was in effect a nullity and the nonsuit of that action 
should not prejudice Payne’s right to suffer a nonsuit of 
the Second Action under Code § 8.01-380(B).  We agree with 
Payne. 
 
In Fowler v. Winchester Med. Ctr., Inc., 266 Va. 131, 
133, 580 S.E.2d 816, 816 (2003), Rebecca Fowler filed a 
motion for judgment seeking damages for the wrongful death 
of her husband.  When Fowler filed the action, she was not 
qualified as the decedent’s personal representative in 
Virginia, and her appointment as the administrator of her 
husband’s estate in West Virginia had terminated.  Id. at 
132-33, 580 S.E.2d at 816.  Several defendants in that 
action filed motions to dismiss and demurrers asserting 
that Fowler lacked standing to maintain the wrongful death 
action and that, therefore, the pendency of the action did 
 
8
not toll the statute of limitations.  Id. at 133, 580 
S.E.2d at 816. 
 
Fowler conceded that she did not have standing to 
maintain the action.  Id., 580 S.E.2d at 817.  However, 
relying on McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 198 Va. 
612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956), she argued that she was a “real 
party in interest” and was entitled to the benefit of the 
tolling provision in Code § 8.01-244(B).  266 Va. at 133, 
580 S.E.2d at 817.  This Court disagreed. 
 
Unlike the plaintiff in McDaniel who was qualified in 
Nevada as the administrator of the decedent’s estate when 
he filed a wrongful death action in Virginia, Fowler was 
not qualified as her deceased husband’s personal 
representative in Virginia or any other state when she 
filed the wrongful death action.  Id. at 136, 580 S.E.2d at 
818.  Thus, we concluded that Fowler would “never be able 
to file a new suit as a qualified personal representative 
and claim that she [was] ‘substantially the same party’ as 
the plaintiff in the first suit.”  Id. (quoting McDaniel, 
198 Va. at 619, 95 S.E.2d at 206).  Accordingly, she was 
not a “real party in interest” and the pendency of her 
action did not toll the statute of limitations.  Id.; see 
also Harbour Gate Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 
107, 348 S.E.2d 252, 258 (1986) (an action filed by an 
 
9
entity that lacked standing to sue did not toll the 
applicable statute of limitations); Chesapeake House, 231 
Va. at 442, 344 S.E.2d at 915 (same). 
 
As a corollary principle, “a new plaintiff may not be 
substituted for an original plaintiff who lacked standing 
to bring the suit.”  Chesapeake House, 231 Va. at 442-43, 
344 S.E.2d at 915; accord Cook v. Radford Cmty. Hosp. Inc., 
260 Va. 443, 451, 536 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2000); see also 
Norfolk Southern R.R. Co. v. Greenwich Corp., 122 Va. 631, 
634, 95 S.E. 389, 390 (1918).  “Such a substitution amounts 
to the assertion of a new cause of action.”  Wells v. 
Lorcom House Condominiums’ Council of Co-Owners, 237 Va. 
247, 254, 377 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1989).  In that situation, 
“the sole remedy is a nonsuit followed by a new action 
brought in the name of a proper plaintiff.”  Chesapeake 
House, 231 Va. at 443, 344 S.E.2d at 915. 
 
Contrary to the defendants’ argument, Sias was not a 
real party in interest primarily for two reasons.  First, 
her status as a potential beneficiary under Code § 8.01-53 
did not make her a real party in interest for purposes of 
conferring standing to bring the First Action.  Cf. Grinels 
v. Legg, 208 Va. 63, 66, 155 S.E.2d 56, 59 (1967) 
(executrix could, as an individual, be substituted as 
plaintiff in the action brought by her as executrix because 
 
10
“the plaintiff was the real party in interest as the sole 
distributee of any recovery”).  The provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-50(B) allow only the personal representative of the 
deceased person to bring a wrongful death action.  See Horn 
v. Abernathy, 231 Va. 228, 237, 343 S.E.2d 318, 323 (1986) 
(“Code § 8.01-50(B) vests the right of action in the 
decedent’s personal representative”). 
 
Second, Sias, like Fowler, was not qualified as the 
personal representative of Calzada’s estate in Virginia or 
any other state when she filed the First Action.  Thus, she 
could not have filed a new suit as a qualified personal 
representative and claimed that she was “substantially the 
same party.”  See Fowler, 266 Va. at 136, 580 S.E.2d at 
818.  Stated differently, she could not have been 
substantially the same party because she would not have 
been 
suing in the same right, as where the second suit 
is by the personal representative of plaintiff in 
the first suit; where the first suit was by the 
original administrator, and the second by his 
successor; where the first suit was by the 
original trustee, and the second by his successor 
in trust. 
 
McDaniel, 198 Va. at 617, 95 S.E.2d at 205 (quoting 54 
C.J.S., § 293 at 362).  In contrast to Sias, the Nevada 
administrator in McDaniel was a “real party in interest” 
because he, along with the administratrix in Virginia, 
 
11
“were substantially the same plaintiff as the plaintiff in 
the first action, suing in the same right.”  Id. at 619, 95 
S.E.2d at 206. 
 
Thus, we hold that Sias and Payne were not 
“substantially the same parties.”  Since Sias did not have 
standing to bring the wrongful death action, she was not 
suing in the same right as Payne in the Second Action.  
Accordingly, Sias’ nonsuit of the First Action did not 
impair Payne’s absolute right to one nonsuit of the Second 
Action under the provisions of Code § 8.01-380(B).  The 
nonsuit of the Second Action was a first nonsuit, and the 
circuit court therefore did not err in allowing Payne to 
suffer a nonsuit of that action.4 
 
The only remaining issue is whether the circuit court 
erred in entering the nonsuit order in the Second Action 
                     
4 In light of the conclusion that the nonsuit of the 
Second Action was a first nonsuit due to Sias’ lack of 
standing to bring the First Action, we do not need to 
address the defendants’ argument that Payne’s request to 
nonsuit the Second Action must be considered a second 
nonsuit because the “cause of action” asserted in both 
actions arose out of the same set of operative facts, 
namely the events surrounding Calzada’s seizure, arrest, 
incarceration, and subsequent death.  Additionally, our 
conclusion on the first issue renders moot the second issue 
raised on appeal, that the circuit court erred in allowing 
a second nonsuit as to those defendants who had not been 
served with process within 12 months from the date of 
filing the Second Action. 
 
 
12
nunc pro tunc to October 22, 2001.  We have previously 
explained the purpose of a nunc pro tunc order: 
[N]unc pro tunc entry should not be made to 
supply an error of the court or to show what the 
court should have done as distinguished from what 
actually occurred. . . . 
 
More specifically, the purpose of a nunc pro 
tunc entry is to correct mistakes of the clerk or 
other court officials, or to settle defects or 
omissions in the record so as to make the record 
show what actually took place.  It is not the 
function of such entry by a fiction to antedate 
the actual performance of an act which never 
occurred, to represent an event as occurring at a 
date prior to the time of the actual event, “or 
to make the record show that which never 
existed.” 
 
Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 292-93, 94 S.E.2d 
245, 248 (1956) (quoting 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 227(a) at 
422, 423); accord Harris v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 205, 209, 
279 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1981). 
 
In the present case, Payne submitted a proposed 
nonsuit order to the circuit court on October 22, 2001, but 
she did not take any steps at that time to bring the matter 
on for a hearing to enter the order.  Consequently, the 
circuit court did not hear the motion for a nonsuit or 
consider the proposed order until April 16, 2003.  Thus, 
the court’s nunc pro tunc entry of the nonsuit order 
created a fiction because the court was antedating the 
performance of an act that did not take place on October 
 
13
22, 2001.  A nunc pro tunc order “may be used to make the 
record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what had 
not been spoken, even though it ought to have been spoken.”  
Gandy v. County of Elizabeth City, 179 Va. 340, 346, 19 
S.E.2d 97, 100 (1942).  Thus, we hold that the circuit 
court erred in entering the nonsuit order nunc pro tunc to 
October 22, 2001. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, Payne’s nonsuit of the Second Action was a 
first nonsuit because Sias lacked standing to bring the 
First Action.  Those two parties were not suing in the same 
right.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in 
allowing Payne to nonsuit the Second Action as a matter of 
right, but the court did err by entering that nonsuit order 
nunc pro tunc.  Therefore, we will affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
proper entry of a nonsuit order in the Second Action in 
accordance with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded.