Title: In re E.F.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 14A20 
Filed 14 August 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 
12 September 2019 by Judge Stephen Higdon in District Court, Union County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 29 July 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Perry, Bundy, Plyler & Long, LLP, by Ashley J. McBride and Dale Ann Plyler, 
for petitioner-appellee Union County Division of Social Services. 
 
La-Deidre Matthews for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
David A. Perez for respondent-appellant. 
 
 
NEWBY, Justice.  
 
Respondent appeals from the trial court’s order (termination order) 
terminating her parental rights in her minor children Ethan, Isaac, Henry, and 
Zane.1 Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining 
that it was in the children’s best interests that respondent’s parental rights be 
terminated, we affirm. 
                                            
1 We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the juveniles discussed in this opinion.  
IN RE E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Ethan was born in January 2011. His father is Jamie R. Dallas W. is the father 
of respondent’s twins, Isaac and Henry, born in September 2012, and of Zane, born 
in April 2014. On 19 February 2018, the Union County Division of Social Services 
(DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging neglect and dependency. On 26 March 2018, 
DSS obtained nonsecure custody of the four children. The trial court adjudicated the 
children to be neglected and dependent juveniles on 22 August 2018.  
In support of the adjudication, the trial court found that respondent left the 
children with Dallas W. when she was arrested on 6 March 2018; that Dallas W. 
subsequently placed the children with Angela S., a caretaker for the children, because 
he was unable to care for them; and that Angela S. was unable to obtain necessary 
medical care for the children because she lacked their Medicaid information and 
parental authorization. The trial court further found that the family had a history of 
instability and inadequate housing; that respondent had been evicted from her 
residence and was unable to secure suitable housing; and that respondent was 
unemployed, suffered from untreated mental health issues, and had expressed no 
willingness to engage in remedial services for herself or her children. Respondent 
signed a DSS case plan agreeing to complete parenting classes and domestic violence 
counseling and comply with all recommendations, submit to a mental health and 
substance abuse assessment and comply with all recommendations, submit to 
random drug screens, and obtain and maintain stable employment and housing.  
DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Jamie R., 
IN RE E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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and Dallas W. on 19 February 2019. At the time, Dallas W. was incarcerated. None 
of the parents filed an answer to the termination petition. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1107 
(2019). After a series of continuances, the trial court convened a hearing on the 
termination petition on 21 August 2019. Counsel for DSS advised the trial court that 
it was proceeding only against respondent and Jamie R. and that it was not 
proceeding against Dallas W. at that time.  
At the adjudicatory stage of the termination hearing, the trial court heard 
testimony from respondent, her DSS social worker, and Angela S., who had served as 
the children’s foster care placement since their entry into DSS custody in March 2018. 
Respondent testified that she was unemployed, homeless, and using heroin daily, 
including on the morning of the termination hearing. She had been arrested five 
times since March 2018 and was awaiting trial on pending charges. Despite paying 
for her heroin habit, respondent had contributed nothing toward the children’s cost 
of care while they were in DSS custody. Respondent acknowledged she was “unstable 
and unfit and that [she] need[ed] help.” The trial court concluded there were grounds 
to terminate respondent’s parental rights for neglect, failure to pay a reasonable 
portion of the children’s cost of care, and dependency. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (3), 
(6) (2019). The trial court also found grounds to terminate the parental rights of 
Jamie R.  
At the dispositional stage, the trial court received written reports from DSS 
and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and heard testimony from the social 
IN RE E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
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worker and the GAL. In accordance with the recommendations of DSS and the GAL, 
the trial court concluded that terminating the parental rights of respondent and 
Jamie R. was in the best interests of their respective children. The trial court entered 
its written termination order on 12 September 2019. Respondent filed notice of 
appeal.2  
Respondent does not challenge the grounds for termination adjudicated by the 
trial court under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), but argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in concluding it was in the children’s best interests that respondent’s 
parental rights be terminated. “An abuse of discretion is a decision manifestly 
unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 
reasoned decision.” In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 57, 839 S.E.2d 735, 740 (2020) (quoting 
Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998)). The trial court’s 
dispositional findings are binding on appeal if they are supported by any competent 
evidence. Id. We are likewise bound by all uncontested dispositional findings. In re 
Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2019). 
The dispositional stage of a proceeding to terminate parental rights is governed 
by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), which provides as follows:  
(a) 
After an adjudication that one or more grounds for 
terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall 
determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the 
                                            
2 There is no indication that Jamie R. appealed the termination order, and he is not a 
party to this appeal. 
IN RE E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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juvenile’s best interest. . . . In each case, the court shall 
consider the following criteria and make written findings 
regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) 
The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2)  
The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3)  
Whether the termination of parental rights will  
 
 
aid in the accomplishment of the permanent  
 
 
plan for the juvenile. 
 
(4)  
The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5)  
The quality of the relationship between the  
 
 
juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent,  
 
 
guardian, custodian, or other permanent  
 
 
placement. 
 
(6)  
Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). Although the trial court must “consider” each of the 
statutory factors, id., we have construed subsection (a) to require written findings 
only as to those factors for which there is conflicting evidence. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 
190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417, 424 (2019).  
 
The trial court’s termination order expressly states that the trial court 
“considered all factors set out in N.C.G.S. [§] 7B-1110 in determining whether 
terminati[ng] the parental rights of [respondent] to her children” is in their best 
interests. The trial court made written findings about each of the criteria in N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110(a)(1)–(5) as follows: 
(A) 
The age of the juveniles: [Zane] is 5 Years and 4 
Months, [Henry] and [Isaac] are 7 Years and 11 
IN RE E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
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Months, [Ethan] is 8 Years and 7 Months. 
 
(B) 
The likelihood of adoption of the juveniles: The 
juveniles’ [foster] placement wants to adopt the 
juveniles. There is a high likelihood of adoption. 
 
(C) 
Whether the termination of parental rights will aid 
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juveniles: The permanent plan for the juveniles is 
adoption. Termination of [respondent’s] and Jamie 
R[.’s] 
parental 
rights 
will 
aid 
in 
[the] 
accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption. 
 
(D) 
The bond between the juveniles and their parent: 
The juveniles do not have a good bond with 
[respondent]. [Respondent’s] own action contributed 
to the court staying her visitation with the juveniles 
[on 22 August 2018]. The lack of visitation has 
affected the bond between the children and their 
mother. 
 
(E) 
. . . The quality of the relationship between the 
juveniles and the proposed adoptive parents: The 
juveniles and Angela S[.] and her family have a 
strong bond. The S[.’s] have tended to all of the 
juveniles’ well-being needs. They have provided a 
safe, stable and loving home to the juveniles since 
being placed in the S[.] home around March of 2018. 
The S[.’s] intend to adopt the juveniles. 
 
To the extent that respondent does not contest these findings, they are binding. See 
In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437, 831 S.E.2d at 65.  
Specifically, respondent argues these findings fail to account for the fact that 
DSS did not proceed against Dallas W. at the termination hearing, thereby leaving 
intact his parental rights in Isaac, Henry, and Zane. Because Dallas W. retained his 
parental rights in these children, respondent contends the evidence did not show a 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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high likelihood that they would be adopted or that terminating her parental rights 
would facilitate their adoption. Respondent did not raise Dallas W.’s parental rights 
or their impact on the prospects for adoption as an issue during the dispositional 
hearing.  
 
The record shows only that DSS filed a petition to terminate his parental 
rights, but was not proceeding against him at the termination hearing.3 The fact that 
Dallas W.’s parental rights remained in place at the time of the termination hearing 
does not render the trial court’s findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2)–(3) 
erroneous. Subsection (a)(2) refers to the “likelihood”—not the certainty—of the 
children’s adoption. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2). Similarly, subsection (a)(3) asks 
whether terminating respondent’s parental rights would “aid in the accomplishment 
of the permanent plan for the juvenile[s].” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(3) (emphasis 
added). Unquestionably, the termination of respondent’s parental rights was a 
necessary precondition of the children’s adoption. 
Moreover, the DSS social worker attested to the high likelihood of the 
children’s adoption and to the fact that terminating respondent’s parental rights 
would aid in realizing the permanent plan of adoption. The social worker further 
                                            
3 The record on appeal includes a “Notice of Dismissal of Petit[io]n for Termination of 
Parental Rights” filed in the trial court by DSS on 11 October 2019. The notice of dismissal 
states that Dallas W. had relinquished his parental rights in Isaac, Henry, and Zane and that 
“the time for revocation has expired.” It appears this document may not have been before the 
trial court at the time of the termination hearing on 21 August 2019.  
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advised the trial court that Dallas W. had made no effort to regain custody of his 
children and wanted Angela S. to adopt them. The GAL reported that Angela S. and 
her spouse “have gone through the licensing procedure to be able to adopt the children 
and have expressed a strong desire to do so.” This competent evidence is sufficient to 
support the trial court’s findings as to the likelihood of adoption. In the absence of an 
evidentiary conflict, the trial court is not required to make written findings under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) on this issue. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199, 835 S.E.2d 
at 424.  
Respondent makes a similar argument regarding the availability of her own 
maternal grandmother, Linda R., as a potential guardian for the children. Although 
the GAL’s written report included a bare statement that Linda R. “has been approved 
for consideration of guardianship/adoption of the children, and the home has been 
approved by DSS,” Linda R. is only mentioned once during the adjudicatory stage of 
the termination proceeding. We recognize the trial court may—and should—consider 
evidence introduced during the adjudicatory stage of a termination hearing in 
determining the children’s best interests during the disposition stage. See In re Pierce, 
356 N.C. 68, 71–72, 75–76, 565 S.E.2d 81, 84, 86 (2002); In re M.A.I.B.K., 184 N.C. 
App. 218, 225, 645 S.E.2d 881, 886 (2007). Respondent, however, made no reference 
to Linda R. or any other alternative placement for the children at the disposition 
stage, during which the sole focus was upon identifying the best possible outcome for 
the children. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)–(b); see also In re Pierce, 356 N.C. at 76, 565 
IN RE E.F., I.F., H.F., Z.F. 
 
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S.E.2d at 86 (characterizing the “determination of best interests [a]s more in the 
nature of an inquisition” than an adversarial process).  
Respondent testified only that her grandparents “want” her children and 
would allow respondent to “live with them once [she is] clean and once [she has] 
treatment and everything.” Absent additional evidence regarding Linda R.’s 
willingness or ability to provide permanence for respondent’s children, the trial court 
cannot be said to have erred even if, arguendo, it failed to consider Linda R. as a 
placement option. Cf. In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. 285, 290, 837 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2020) 
(explaining “the extent to which it is appropriate” for the trial court to consider a 
relative placement for a child under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) is “dependent upon the 
extent to which the record contains evidence tending to show whether such a relative 
placement is, in fact, available”).  
DSS and the GAL presented undisputed evidence that Angela S. and her 
husband had provided excellent care for respondent’s four children since March 2018 
and wished to provide them a permanent home through adoption. Because 
respondent did not present evidence about Linda R. to contradict the evidence that 
DSS and the GAL presented, the trial court was not obligated to make written 
findings about Linda R. under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6). See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 
199, 835 S.E.2d at 424. 
Finally, we hold that respondent has failed to show the trial court abused its 
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discretion under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) by concluding it was in the children’s best 
interests to terminate her parental rights. The termination order reflects the trial 
court’s consideration of the statutory dispositional factors. Its findings are supported 
by the evidence. Its assessment of the children’s best interests arises rationally from 
its findings of fact and is consistent with the recommendation of the children’s GAL. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
AFFIRMED.