Title: State v. A.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022AP000652
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2023

2023 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP652 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
A.G., a person under the age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
A. G., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 511,979 N.W.2d 822 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 17, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen R. Brostrom   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court, 
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John T. Chisolm, district attorney, and Katie Gutowski, 
assistant district attorney. There was an oral argument by Katie 
Gutowski, assistant district attorney.  
 
 
 
2 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Christopher D. Sobic, assistant state public defender. There was 
an oral argument by Christopher D. Sobic, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
Guardian ad litem briefs were filed by Courtney L.A. 
Roelandts and The Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., 
Milwaukee. 
There 
was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Courtney 
L.A. 
Roelandts.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2022AP652 
(L.C. No. 
2021CV1469) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
A.G., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
A. G., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court, 
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
State 
filed 
a 
petition to terminate the parental rights of A.G. under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415 (2019–20), alleging A.G.'s biological daughter 
remained a child in continuing need of protection or services 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
2 
 
(continuing CHIPS) and A.G.'s failure to assume parental 
responsibility for his daughter.  This appeal concerns whether 
A.G. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled no contest 
to one of those two grounds in the termination of parental 
rights (TPR) petition.  A.G. argues he did not understand the 
circuit court at disposition would have to decide whether to 
terminate his parental rights.1  He further argues the circuit 
court erroneously indicated the State would have to prove at 
disposition that "termination was in . . . [the child]'s best 
interest" by "clear and convincing" evidence.  The State, A.G. 
claims, has no such burden; therefore, A.G. asserts he pled no 
contest under the belief that his odds of a favorable outcome 
were higher than they legally should have been. 
¶2 
The circuit court denied A.G.'s plea withdrawal 
motion.  The court of appeals reversed that decision in an 
unpublished 
opinion 
and 
ordered 
the 
cause 
remanded 
with 
directions to allow A.G. to withdraw his plea.  State v. A.G. 
(A.G. II), No. 2022AP652, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 12, 2022).  The State and the guardian ad litem (GAL) each 
filed a petition for review.  We granted both petitions.    
¶3 
We hold A.G. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
pled no contest.  During the plea colloquy, the circuit court 
told A.G., "[t]he second half of the case is where the [c]ourt 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Mark A. Sanders presided over the initial 
appearance in the case, but the Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom 
presided over the plea colloquy and was the judge who denied 
A.G.'s plea withdrawal motion.  Both judges serve on the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
3 
 
decides is it in the child's best interest to in fact terminate 
your parental rights."  At the initial appearance ten months 
before the colloquy, the court had already informed A.G. of 
potential dispositional outcomes: 
One thing I could decide is that termination of 
parental rights can [sic] best for the kids that are 
involved.  If I make that decision, that ends all 
legal relationship between that parent and that child.  
As far as the law is concerned, that parent and that 
child become complete strangers to each other.  But 
that's not the only potential outcome.  There are 
other 
potential 
outcomes 
that 
don't 
involve 
termination of parental rights. 
Assuming the colloquy was defective, A.G. had previously been 
notified that at disposition the court may or may not terminate 
his parental rights.  Additionally, the court conducted a 
contested dispositional hearing the day after the colloquy, and 
A.G.'s testimony shows he sought reunification rather than 
termination of his parental rights.  After the court held an 
evidentiary hearing on A.G.'s plea withdrawal motion, the court 
found A.G. had demonstrated an understanding of potential 
dispositions through his testimony at the dispositional hearing.  
That finding is not clearly erroneous and must be accepted.  
Other parts of the record confirm the validity of A.G.'s plea.  
Consequently, we must reject A.G.'s first argument under the 
applicable standard of review.  See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶19, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
716 
N.W.2d 906 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶16, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891). 
 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
4 
 
 
¶4 
Regarding A.G.'s second argument, he is correct to 
note that Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) (2021–22)2 does not place a 
burden of proof on the State; however, the circuit court 
actually held the State to the clear and convincing standard at 
disposition and reiterated at multiple points that the State 
satisfied this standard.  Accordingly, the court did exactly 
what A.G. claims the court told him it would do.  Placing a 
burden on the State benefitted A.G. and did not affect A.G.'s 
ability to weigh the pros and cons of entering this particular 
no contest plea.  If A.G. thought a favorable outcome was more 
likely because the State had to meet a clear and convincing 
standard, the State actually did meet that standard.  The court 
of appeals erred in permitting A.G. to withdraw his plea; 
therefore, we reverse its decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The State's TPR petition sought to sever the parent-
child relationship between A.G. and his daughter.  Toward the 
top of the first page, in bold lettering, the TPR petition 
states:  "Petition for Termination of Parental Rights[.]"  The 
TPR petition continues, "[t]he petitioner seeks termination of 
parental rights of . . . [A.G.]"  Toward the end, the TPR 
petition reads, "[b]ased on the foregoing, . . . [A.G.] is not 
fit to be a parent to the above-named child.  Upon consideration 
of the entire record in this case, termination of parental 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021–22 version. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
5 
 
rights is warranted. . . .  The best interest of the child will 
be served by termination of the parental rights of the 
parent[.]" 
¶6 
For context, the State alleged, among other things, 
that A.G. and the child's mother were addicted to heroin and the 
child "tested positive for drugs" at birth.  After spending 
approximately one month in the neonatal intensive care unit of 
the hospital where she was born, A.G.'s daughter was removed 
from her parents, both of whom later pled no contest to the 
allegations in the State's petition alleging their daughter was 
a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS).  Filed eight 
months after the circuit court entered its CHIPS order, the 
State's TPR petition alleged the child's parents failed to meet 
the conditions ordered by the circuit court for the return of 
their daughter.  Among other contentions, the State claimed A.G. 
did not seek treatment and "no call[ed], no show[ed]" multiple 
drug screenings.  Based on the allegations, the State claimed 
two independent grounds for TPR: 
 continuing CHIPS; and 
 failure to assume parental responsibility. 
See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), (6) (2019–20).  A.G. was represented 
by counsel at the hearings discussed below. 
 
¶7 
At an adjourned initial appearance, the circuit court 
explained the nature of TPR proceedings in detail.  Most 
relevantly, the court informed A.G. that if grounds were 
established, the court would proceed to the disposition phase.  
No. 
2022AP652   
 
6 
 
The court explained it would hold a "contested dispositional 
hearing" at which: 
[W]hat we focus on is not whether there's a reason 
anymore, but what's [sic] we focus on instead is 
what's best for the kids that are involved in the 
case.  Not what's best for anybody else.  Not what's 
best for any of the lawyers or social workers.  Not 
what's best for the foster parents.  Not what's best 
for parents, but what's best for the kids that are 
involved in the case. 
. . . .  
If I make that unfitness finding, then we go on to the 
second part of the proceedings.  That's that contested 
dispositional hearing.  There we focus on what is best 
for the kids that are involved.  So everybody gets to 
put on testimony and evidence and argue to me what 
they think is best for the kids that are involved.  
The State puts on testimony and evidence and tells me 
what they think is best.  The . . . [GAL] can put on 
testimony and evidence and tell me what she thinks is 
best.  Parents can do exactly the same thing.  Parents 
have the right to put on testimony and evidence and to 
subpoena witnesses and to testify or remain silent 
themselves.  Parents also have the right to confront 
any witness that testifies on behalf of any other 
party.  Parents have the right to argue to me what 
they think is best for the kids that are involved. 
. . . .  I then decide what outcome is best for the 
kids that are involved.  One thing I could decide is 
that termination of parental rights can [sic] best for 
the kids that are involved.  If I make that decision, 
that ends all legal relationship between that parent 
and that child.  As far as the law is concerned, that 
parent and that child become complete strangers to 
each other.  But that's not the only potential 
outcome.  There are other potential outcomes that 
don't involve termination of parental rights. 
At multiple points during this appearance, the court paused to 
inquire whether A.G. understood the court's explanation, and 
A.G. responded he did. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
7 
 
 
¶8 
At a later hearing, A.G. pled no contest to the 
continuing CHIPS ground, and the failure to assume parental 
responsibility ground was dismissed.  During the plea colloquy 
between A.G. and the circuit court, A.G. stated he was 26 years 
old, had an 11th-grade education, could read and write English, 
and had no mental illness or cognitive issues that would limit 
his ability to understand the colloquy.  A.G. denied taking any 
drugs (other than a prescribed medication that did not "alter[]" 
his mind) or drinking alcohol within the preceding 12 hours.  He 
also confirmed he read the TPR petition, understood the State's 
allegations, and was not promised or paid anything as an 
inducement to plea. 
¶9 
The part of the plea colloquy giving rise to appellate 
proceedings went as follows: 
Q. You understand that you do have the right to have a 
trial for this first half of the case, whether or 
not there is a legal reason to terminate your 
parental rights? 
A. I do. 
Q. And that could be a trial to the judge or a trial 
to a jury.  Do you understand that? 
A. I do. 
Q. If it were a jury it would be a 12 person jury and 
10 out of 12 would have to agree in order to reach 
a decision.  Do you understand that? 
A. I do understand. 
Q. And at that trial you would have a whole bunch of 
rights and I'm just going to list them.  You would 
have the right to force the State to prove the 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
8 
 
grounds by clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence to a reasonable certainty. 
 
You would have the right to cross-examination of 
your witnesses; the right to introduce evidence; 
the right to compel witnesses to come to court and 
testify for you; the right to testify yourself or 
remain silent, knowing, though, that silence be 
[sic] used against you in this kind of case.  Do 
you understand you would have all of these trial 
rights? 
A. I do. 
Q. And do you understand that by pleading no contest 
you're giving those rights up? 
A. I do. 
Q. Now, you understand that's just the first half of 
the case?  The second half of the case is where the 
[c]ourt decides is it in the child's best interest 
to in fact terminate your parental rights.  Do you 
understand that distinction? 
A. I understand. 
Q. You understand you're not giving up your right to 
fight about that second half, which is what we're 
going to do today.  Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. You'll have all those same trial rights today for 
that second half.  Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
 
¶10 A.G.'s arguments arise from portions of this plea 
colloquy he considers defective.  In particular, the circuit 
court stated, "[t]he second half of this case is where the 
[c]ourt decides is it in the child's best interest to in fact 
terminate your parental rights."  The court asked, "[d]o you 
understand that[?]"  A.G. responded "[y]es," but he now asserts 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
9 
 
"the court did not inform him of the potential dispositions he 
faced if he entered a no contest plea."  Specifically, he claims 
the court did not make clear that it had two options at 
disposition:  grant the TPR petition or dismiss it.  His second 
argument stems from the court explaining that during the grounds 
phase, A.G. "would have the right to force the State to prove 
the grounds by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence to a 
reasonable certainty."  The court later stated, "[y]ou'll have 
all those same trial rights today for that second half."  A.G. 
argues the later statement implied the State would have a burden 
of proof that termination of his parental rights would be in the 
child's best interest at the disposition phase because that was 
one of the "trial rights" identified by the court for the 
grounds phase. 
 
¶11 The circuit court proceeded to ask other standard 
questions, confirming A.G. had spoken with his counsel about the 
plea.  The court then asked if A.G. had any questions, to which 
A.G. responded, "[n]o, I do not."  A.G. also said he did not 
need more time to think about his decision, and he and his 
counsel both stated that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.  After this lengthy colloquy, the court accepted 
A.G.'s no contest plea. 
 
¶12 The next day, at disposition, A.G. testified in favor 
of reunification and continuation of the CHIPS case rather than 
termination.  Specifically, he testified, "[m]y goal in this 
case is to get myself better and have my daughter returned to 
the household." 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
10 
 
 
¶13 The circuit court concluded that termination of A.G.'s 
parental rights was in the child's best interest.  Twice, the 
court referred to the clear and convincing standard.  In 
summarizing the testimony of the family case manager, the court 
characterized the testimony as "clear, convincing, satisfactory 
evidence to a reasonable certainty."  Moments later, the court 
reiterated "[t]hat's clear, convincing, satisfactory evidence to 
a reasonable degree of certainty more or less.  I don't think 
there's case law that assigns a particular percentage to that 
standard, and I'm not either."  Continuing, the court said 
"[the] 
testimony 
was 
excellent. . . .  
[The 
family 
case 
manager]'s incredibly honest, and incredibly insightful."  At 
some points, the court used language indicative of a lower 
standard, e.g., "in balance, I do have to find that this 
termination is in the best interest of . . . [the child]." 
 
¶14 Post disposition, A.G. filed a motion for plea 
withdrawal, which the circuit court denied without taking 
evidence.  The court reasoned A.G. did not identify a defect in 
the plea colloquy and therefore was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing.  To the extent the colloquy did not convey 
potential 
dispositions, 
the 
court 
determined 
the 
lengthy 
discussion of potential dispositions at the adjourned initial 
appearance satisfied any requirement.  Additionally, the court 
noted it "actually did use a clear and convincing standard when 
it assessed whether it thought it was in the child's best 
interest to terminate the parental rights." 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
11 
 
 
¶15 A.G. appealed.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's decision and ordered the cause remanded with 
directions to hold an evidentiary hearing.  State v. A.G., 
No. 2021AP1476, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 
2022).  The court of appeals concluded that "A.G. was not 
advised of the potential dispositions at the plea hearing" and 
had "alleged he did not understand the potential dispositions," 
so he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  Id., ¶12.  The 
court did not reconcile its conclusion with the circuit court's 
statement during the plea colloquy that "[t]he second half of 
this case is where the [c]ourt decides is it in the child's best 
interest to in fact terminate your parental rights."  The court 
of appeals also concluded the circuit court needed to take 
evidence regarding A.G.'s second argument.  Id., ¶16.  It 
concluded the circuit court erred in suggesting A.G. would "have 
all those same trial rights today for that second half" because 
"[t]here is not a burden of proof placed on the State" at 
disposition.  Id., ¶17 (citing Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) (2019–
20)).  The court of appeals never considered how the State 
actually satisfying the clear and convincing standard might 
affect the analysis. 
 
¶16 On remand, the circuit court held an evidentiary 
hearing.  A.G. did not appear.3  The hearing proceeded and the 
court reviewed the record.  In a written decision, the court 
                                                 
3 The State and the GAL argue A.G. should have been held in 
default for not appearing.  We need not and therefore do not 
address this issue. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
12 
 
denied the motion, first noting A.G. had been informed during 
the plea colloquy that "at the disposition, the [c]ourt simply 
decides if it is in the child's best interest to terminate."  It 
also noted A.G. "had previously been informed of the potential 
outcomes" at the adjourned initial appearance.  Importantly, the 
court found A.G.'s testimony at the dispositional hearing showed 
he "understood" the potential dispositions.  The court also 
reasoned, "[t]hroughout the disposition, the [c]ourt appears to 
have applied both the preponderance and the clear and convincing 
standards." 
 
Accordingly, 
it 
reasoned, 
A.G. 
"was 
not 
prejudiced[.]" 
 
¶17 A.G. appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's decision, ordering the cause remanded with 
directions to allow A.G. to withdraw his plea.  A.G. II, 
No. 2022AP652, ¶1.  In the court of appeals' view, the State 
lacked evidence establishing the validity of the plea.  Id., 
¶25. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶18 This court generally considers precedent regarding 
plea withdrawal in the context of criminal cases to be 
persuasive authority regarding TPR proceedings.  See Waukesha 
County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 
N.W.2d 607 (citation omitted), modified on other grounds by St. 
Croix. Cnty. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Michael D., 2016 
WI 35, ¶¶3–4, 368 Wis. 2d 710, 880 N.W.2d 107.  In a criminal 
case, this court accepts the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Brown, 293 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶16).  It 
then independently determines whether those facts demonstrate 
that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Brown, 
293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶16).  
That same standard of review applies in this case.  See Steven 
H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
¶19 A.G. argues he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently plead no contest as required by well-established 
precedent.  See Kenosha Cnty. Dep't Health Servs. v. Jodie W., 
2006 WI 93, ¶24, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 (citing State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).  "A 
parent's interest in the parent-child relationship and in the 
care, custody, and management of his . . . child is recognized 
as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment [to the United States Constitution]."  Steven V. v. 
Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶22, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (citing 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).  A parent who 
enters a no contest plea waives several important procedural 
rights meant to safeguard this liberty interest, which is why 
such a plea must satisfy the aforementioned standard.  See Brown 
Cnty Dep't Hum. Servs. v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶34, 331 
Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730 (citing Jodie W., 293 Wis. 2d 530, 
¶25).   
¶20 This court has established a burden-shifting scheme 
for TPR plea withdrawals.  First, a parent must demonstrate the 
circuit court failed to conduct the plea colloquy in accordance 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
14 
 
with Wis. Stat. § 48.422 or failed to satisfy another mandatory 
duty.  Id., ¶36 (citing Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42).  The 
parent must also allege he "did not know or understand the 
information that should have been provided[.]"  Id. (citing 
Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42).  If the parent satisfies his 
burden, the circuit court is generally required to hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 (citing 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).  The State must demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that the plea was entered 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently despite the defective 
colloquy.4  Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶36 (citing Steven H., 
233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42).  While a plea's validity is based on the 
parent's understanding at the time the plea was entered, events 
before and after the plea can inform a court's analysis.  See 
State v. Finley, 2016 WI 63, ¶44, 370 Wis. 2d 402, 882 
N.W.2d 761; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274–75. 
 
¶21 We assume A.G. satisfied his burden.  First, the court 
of appeals determined A.G. demonstrated the plea colloquy was 
defective; therefore, it ordered the circuit court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  Second, the circuit court acknowledged it 
imposed a burden of proof at disposition——even though no such 
burden exists.  We therefore consider whether the State proved 
                                                 
4 The GAL argues the circuit court should be allowed to look 
at the full record in determining whether a parent has made a 
"prima facie case" for plea withdrawal.  We do not address this 
issue because an evidentiary hearing was held in this case.  
No. 
2022AP652   
 
15 
 
by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s plea was validly 
entered.     
 
¶22 Notwithstanding 
our 
assumption, 
we 
nevertheless 
examine the plea colloquy because A.G. grounds his arguments in 
potential errors during it.  Understanding whether the record as 
a 
whole 
refutes 
his 
arguments 
requires 
scrutinizing 
the 
colloquy. 
 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(7)(a) provides:  "Before 
accepting an admission of the alleged facts in a [TPR] petition, 
the [circuit] court shall:  (a)  Address the parties present and 
determine 
that 
the 
admission 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the acts alleged in the petition 
and the potential dispositions."  We assume a no contest plea is 
"an admission of the alleged facts[.]"  § 48.422(7).  A.G. does 
not argue the court failed to determine that he understood the 
acts alleged in the petition——he argues the court failed to 
inform him of potential dispositions.  Although this statute 
requires a circuit court to "determine" that a no contest plea 
is entered "with understanding" of "the potential dispositions," 
it does not require specific words be used.  The statute also 
does not mention a burden of proof at disposition; however, the 
court of appeals has held: 
[I]n order for the court's explanation of potential 
dispositions to be meaningful to the parent, the 
parent must be informed of the statutory standard the 
court will apply at the second stage.  That is, the 
court 
must 
inform 
the 
parent 
that 
"[t]he 
best 
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
16 
 
considered 
by 
the 
court 
in 
determining 
the 
disposition[.]"   
Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Therese S., 2008 WI App 
159, ¶16, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122 (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2) (2005–06)) (second modification in the original). 
A.  A.G. Understood His Parental Rights Could Be Terminated.  
 
¶24 In this case, the circuit court seemingly informed 
A.G. of potential dispositions as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.422(7)(a).  During the plea colloquy, the circuit court 
explicitly explained "[t]he second half of the case is where the 
[c]ourt decides is it in the child's best interest to in fact 
terminate your parental rights."  Essentially, A.G. contends the 
colloquy was defective because the court did not specify that 
"[t]he second half of the case is where the [c]ourt decides is 
it in the child's best interest to in fact terminate your 
parental rights or not."  The omission of "or not," A.G. claims, 
makes the court's statement "somewhat ambiguous" by failing to 
explicitly say the court must make an "either/or" decision:  
either terminate the parental rights or dismiss the TPR 
petition.  A.G. claims he may have mistakenly believed the court 
at 
disposition 
could 
order 
something 
between 
terminating 
parental rights and dismissing the petition. 
 
¶25 At oral argument, A.G.'s counsel clarified A.G.'s 
position regarding the content of the plea colloquy on potential 
dispositions: 
THE COURT: 
Which disposition did the court not 
review? 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
17 
 
A.G.'s COUNSEL:   . . . [S]o at the plea hearing in 
this case, what the court said to 
A.G. is that during the disposition 
phase "the [c]ourt decides is it in 
the child's best interest to in fact 
terminate your parental rights."  I 
don't believe that statement conveys 
the potential dispositions in a TPR 
case.  That statement does not convey 
to the parent that the court has two 
options.  And those options are 
basically all or nothing.  Either the 
court terminates the parent's right 
or the court dismisses the petition.  
And the court did not specifically 
tell A.G. that those were the only 
two options that it had under the 
statute. 
THE COURT: 
This 
feels 
like 
magic 
words 
to 
me. . . .  
It 
feels 
like 
you're 
asking circuit court judges to say 
magic words, to thread a needle with 
a really small eye. . . .  I just 
feel like your argument really has a 
lot of like, if the court doesn't say 
these exact words, then there's no 
way 
the 
parent 
could 
understand 
what's happening . . . . 
A.G.'s COUNSEL: 
. . . .  [W]hat the court said here 
left 
it 
somewhat 
ambiguous. . . .  [A] parent hearing 
what the court said here could think 
that potentially there's some middle 
ground disposition where the court 
hears all the testimony and evidence 
at disposition and the court makes a 
decision to just hold this open for a 
length 
of 
time 
to 
let 
the 
parent . . . get their life back on 
track. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: 
So what do you want us to do about 
it? . . . .  In an opinion, what are 
you asking us to say?  That courts 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
18 
 
must list out, "I'm going to decide 
(1) whether 
your 
rights 
will 
be 
terminated; or (2) whether they will 
not be?" 
A.G.'s COUNSEL: 
I believe there's cases interpreting 
the 
options 
that 
the 
court 
has 
indicating that a court has to tell a 
parent that it has to make one of two 
decisions in the case, terminate or 
dismiss the petition. 
. . . .  
THE COURT: 
[I]f the court says, "there are two 
potential 
dispositions, 
grant 
the 
petition to terminate your parental 
rights or not grant your petition to 
terminate parental rights," that's 
not sufficient? 
A.G.'s COUNSEL: 
No, I think that seems sufficient 
because its putting the case into the 
two options[.] 
 
¶26 A.G.'s argument seems to be anchored in a misreading 
of Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Therese S., 
314 Wis. 2d 493.  In that case, the court of appeals held, "a 
court must inform the parent that at the second step of the 
process, the court will hear evidence related to the disposition 
and then will either terminate the parent's rights or dismiss 
the petition if the evidence does not warrant termination."  
Id., ¶16.  In reply, the State references Brown County 
Department of Human Services v. Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310.  In 
that case, while discussing Therese S., this court held "the 
parent must be informed of the two independent dispositions 
available to the circuit court.  That is, the court may decide 
between 
dismissing 
the 
petition 
and 
terminating 
parental 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
19 
 
rights."  Id., ¶56.  A.G. argues the colloquy was defective 
because the circuit court did not precisely inform him of the 
two "independent dispositions."  See id.   
 
¶27 A.G. places far too much weight on a single sentence 
from Therese S., and he does not address Brenda B at all.  In 
Brenda B., the circuit court used the language A.G. would 
require of all circuit courts, specifically, "I can either grant 
the petition to terminate your parental rights or dismiss the 
petition to terminate your parental rights."  Id., ¶12.  This 
court deemed that statement sufficient, distinguishing it from 
an insufficient explanation in Therese S., in which the circuit 
court said, "[you're] admitting the grounds for termination but 
still leaving open the question as to what's gonna happen, the 
disposition. . . .  [I]t hasn't been decided yet what we're 
going to do.  Your termination is not actually entered today.  
We have more work to do to decide what to do."  Id., ¶54 
(quoting Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶14).  The circuit court's 
statement in A.G.'s case is more like the sufficient statement 
from Brenda B. because it informed A.G. that at disposition the 
court may decide to terminate A.G.'s parental rights, or, by 
negative implication, may decide not to terminate his rights.   
"[I]s it in the child's best interest to in fact terminate your 
parental rights" strongly implies a binary, yes/no, either/or 
decision.  The court described the dispositional options for 
A.G. with greater clarity than in Therese S., in which that 
court 
rather 
vaguely 
communicated 
that 
an 
unspecified 
disposition would be forthcoming after additional work. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
20 
 
 
¶28 In Brenda B., this court emphasized that a circuit 
court need not "inform parents in detail of all potential 
outcomes" because that requirement would be "unduly burdensome" 
and potentially "confuse or mislead rather than . . . inform."  
Id., ¶¶55–56 (quoting Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶17).  
Although this court said "the parent must be informed of the two 
independent dispositions available to the circuit court," this 
court never suggested that a failure to state the potential 
dispositions 
in 
explicit 
either/or 
terminology 
would 
automatically render a plea colloquy defective.  Id., ¶56.  
Imposing such a requirement would conflict with our longstanding 
rejection of requiring circuit courts to utter "magic words" to 
satisfy statutory commands.  
 
¶29 "Magic words" is a colloquial phrase in legal parlance 
describing a party's request to prioritize form over substance.  
This court strongly disfavors magic words.  See, e.g., State v. 
Lepsch, 
2017 
WI 27, 
¶36, 
374 
Wis. 2d 98, 
892 
N.W.2d 682 
(rejecting in the context of a circuit court inquiring about 
juror 
bias); 
State 
v. 
Wantland, 
2014 
WI 58, 
¶33, 
355 
Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810 (rejecting in the context of 
withdrawing consent under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution).  In Brenda B., this court rejected the 
parent's argument that the plea colloquy was defective for not 
explicitly informing the parent that the parent was waiving a 
"constitutional" right:  "the [circuit] court need not explain 
that the right to parent is a constitutional right.  What is 
important is that the parent understands the import of the 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
21 
 
rights at stake rather than the source from which they are 
derived."  331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶46.  In this case, the record 
confirms A.G. understood the "stake[s]." 
 
¶30 Based on the foregoing, we doubt the plea colloquy was 
defective for not explicitly explaining the two potential 
dispositions.  We need not, however, make that call.  The 
procedural posture of this case allows for a narrower holding.  
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and found A.G. 
understood potential dispositions based on his testimony at the 
dispositional hearing, which was conducted the day after the 
plea colloquy.  The court's finding is not clearly erroneous; 
therefore, we accept it as true.  See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶19 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶16).  Additionally, the 
court noted the thorough overview of TPR proceedings the court 
had provided at the adjourned initial appearance predating the 
plea colloquy.  During the colloquy, both A.G. and his counsel 
represented to the court that A.G. was entering the plea 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.   
 
¶31 Although not relied upon by the circuit court, during 
the plea colloquy A.G. confirmed he read the TPR petition, which 
made exceedingly clear that his parental rights were at stake. 
In State v. Taylor, a criminal defendant was told he faced a 
potential six-year term of imprisonment if he pled, when in fact 
he faced a total of eight years.  2013 WI 34, ¶¶2, 38–39, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.  He was sentenced to six years after 
pleading no contest.  Id., ¶3.  This court held, "on this 
record, a failure to discuss the additional two-year repeater 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
22 
 
penalty enhancer at the plea hearing is an insubstantial 
defect."  Id., ¶34.  The court emphasized, "[t]he record is 
replete" with evidence that the defendant "was aware" of the 
potential term of imprisonment, largely based on a complaint 
filed on May 8, 2009, which the defendant said he read and 
understood during the plea colloquy on August 23, 2010.  Id., 
¶¶35–39.  This court reasoned, "[t]o conclude that Taylor was 
not aware of the maximum eight-year term of imprisonment, we 
would have to assume . . . .  that Taylor misrepresented to the 
court 
that 
he 
had 
received, 
read, 
and 
understood 
the 
complaint[.]"  Id., ¶39.  We presume A.G. answered truthfully 
when he said he read the TPR petition, which is titled:  
"Petition for Termination of Parental Rights[.]" 
 
¶32 Additionally, A.G. confirmed during the plea colloquy 
that he had spoken with his counsel about the plea.  The court 
then asked if A.G. had any questions, to which A.G. responded, 
"[n]o, I do not."  A.G. also denied needing more time to think 
about his decision.  In his concurrence in Taylor, Justice David 
T. 
Prosser 
noted, 
"[t]here 
is 
a 
very 
high 
likelihood 
that . . . [the 
defendant]'s 
attorney . . . explained 
the 
meaning of eight years of imprisonment[.]"  Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶83 n.5 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Similarly, it is 
improbable A.G.'s counsel neglected to tell A.G. that his 
parental rights could be terminated.  We reject A.G.'s first 
argument because the record as a whole, before the plea 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
23 
 
colloquy, 
during 
the 
colloquy, 
and 
after, 
confirms 
A.G. 
understood the potential dispositions when he entered his plea.5   
                                                 
5 The point the concurrence tries to make is unclear, 
considering its analysis of A.G.'s first argument mirrors our 
own.  We "assume" A.G. made a prima facie case.  Supra, ¶21.  So 
does the concurrence but it "add[s]" a "caveat":  "[t]he 
briefing on this point was not especially helpful.  With the 
benefit of fuller assistance from the parties, it may be that 
our hands are tied in some way."  See Concurrence, ¶¶42, 43 n.1.  
We then state the issue as follows:  "whether the State proved 
by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s plea was validly 
entered."  Supra, ¶21.  The concurrence introduces the issue 
using 
nearly 
identical 
language: 
 
"whether 
the 
State 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."  Concurrence, ¶42.  Both 
opinions express skepticism that an error occurred in the 
colloquy.  Compare supra, ¶30 ("[W]e doubt the plea colloquy was 
defective for not explicitly explaining the two potential 
dispositions."), with concurrence, ¶43 n.1 ("[O]n both issues, 
the evidence of a facial deficiency in the plea colloquy was 
weak at best[.]").  Both opinions examine the full record and 
determine A.G.'s first issue is without merit.  See concurrence, 
¶44 ("The lead opinion recites additional evidence from the 
record both before and after the plea that I agree may be 
considered.  This evidence erases any doubt that the potential 
dispositions were sufficiently communicated, and by implication, 
sufficiently 
understood, 
when 
A.G. 
entered 
his 
plea.").  
Inexplicably, the concurrence rationalizes its unwillingness to 
join this opinion's analysis on the first issue by complaining 
about "inconsistencies" it never identifies. 
The concurring justices disserve the people of Wisconsin by 
blocking a clean precedential decision on A.G.'s first argument 
without cause.  Arguments analogous to A.G.'s are recurring in 
Wisconsin; our guidance in this important area of law is needed.  
See generally State v. S.S., Nos. 2022AP1179 & 2022AP1180, 
unpublished slip op., ¶19 (June 7, 2023) ("Relying on Therese 
S., S.S. asserts that the circuit court's colloquy must convey 
to the parent that there are only two legal outcomes at a 
dispositional hearing:  termination of parental rights or 
dismissal of the TPR petitions.").  Not a single justice who 
refuses to join any portion of this opinion even attempts to 
point out any flaw in our analysis of A.G.'s first argument; 
nevertheless, only one justice joins it.  See dissent, ¶55 ("I 
focus solely on A.G.'s second argument[.]").  "[I]t is this 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
24 
 
B.  Assuming A.G.'s Reading of the Plea Colloquy Is Reasonable, 
the Burden of Proof Error Was an Insubstantial Defect. 
 
¶33 We also reject A.G.'s second argument regarding the 
burden of proof at the dispositional hearing.6  As a preliminary 
                                                                                                                                                             
court's function to develop and clarify the law."  State ex rel. 
Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 
(Wis. 1988) (citations omitted).  "Part of our obligation as 
supreme court justices is to take complicated legal issues and 
decide them in a way that simplifies and explains them."  State 
v. Branter, 2020 WI 21, ¶42, 390 Wis. 2d 494, 939 N.W.2d 546 
(Roggensack, C.J., concurring).  The concurrence does not 
fulfill this obligation.  If a justice deprives the public of 
clear precedent, a straightforward, coherent explanation of why 
is warranted.  Doing so not only serves the public but 
facilitates a resolution of any disagreements for the purpose of 
establishing clear precedent.  We do not sit as seven courts of 
one but as one court of seven (or in this case six).  See, e.g., 
Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶3, 
403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263. 
6 The concurrence contradicts itself in analyzing A.G.'s 
second argument.  First, the concurrence says:  "Procedurally, 
the question before us concerns step two:  whether the State 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  This is because the court 
of appeals previously determined A.G. made the prima facie 
showing and was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing."  
Concurrence, 
¶42 
(citing 
State 
v. 
A.G., 
No. 2021AP1476, 
unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022)).  Next, 
the concurrence asserts, "A.G.'s argument rests on the premise 
that 
the 
most 
reasonable 
reading . . . [of 
the 
colloquy 
transcript] is that the circuit court communicated a clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
burden 
of 
proof 
would 
apply 
at 
the 
disposition.  But the circuit court never said that."  Id., ¶47.  
If the circuit court "never said that," then A.G. did not make a 
prima facie case.  Although on the first issue we express 
skepticism as to whether A.G. made a prima facie case, we do not 
resolve the issue because there is no need to do so.  
Considering the record as a whole avoids the inconsistencies 
undermining the analysis set forth in the concurrence, which 
confusingly 
considers 
"step 
two" 
notwithstanding 
the 
concurrence's implication that A.G. never made a prima facie 
case.  Additionally, the concurrence cites no authority for the 
proposition 
that 
A.G.'s 
reading 
needs 
to 
be 
"the 
most 
reasonable."  Finally, A.G.'s reading of the colloquy, in light 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
25 
 
matter, A.G. correctly argues Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) does not 
impose a burden on the State to prove that termination is in the 
child's best interests.7  The statute provides only that "[t]he 
best interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor 
considered by the court in determining the disposition of all 
proceedings under this subchapter."  § 48.426(2).  We are 
unaware of any Wisconsin decision analyzing whether the evidence 
regarding the best interests of the child must meet a particular 
burden.  See State v. L.J., Nos. 2017AP1225, 2017AP1226 & 
2017AP1227, unpublished slip op. ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2018) 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the entire record, appears pretty reasonable considering  the 
circuit court referenced the clear and convincing standard at 
disposition and later acknowledged it in fact applied that 
standard. 
7 The dissent claims "[t]his is a debatable conclusion."  
Dissent, ¶58 n.3.  It cites three foreign state supreme court 
decisions, one of which merely noted, "the clear and convincing 
standard might be constitutionally mandated" at disposition.  
See B.T.B. v. V.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 838 n.11 (Utah 2020) 
(emphasis added).  The dissent also quotes a South Dakota 
Supreme Court decision, which misquoted a United States Supreme 
Court decision, Santosky v. Kramer, as follows:  "The trial 
court 
must 
find 
by 
'clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 
child.'"  
In re D.H., 354 N.W.2d 185, 188 (S.D. 1984) 
(attributing the quote to Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 
(1982); citing In re S.L., 349 N.W.2d 428 (S.D. 1984); In re 
S.H., 323 N.W.2d 851 (S.D. 1982)).  That quote does not appear 
in Santosky.  The South Dakota decision placed two other 
decisions in the string citation, but neither of those decisions 
contain the quote either.  The dissent also cites a nearly two-
decade old student-authored law review comment.  See Brian C. 
Hill, Comment, The State's Burden of Proof at the Best Interests 
Stage of a Termination of Parental Rights, 2004 U. Chi. Legal 
Forum 557, 576–84.  A Westlaw search reveals this comment has 
never been cited in a legal opinion. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
26 
 
("L.J. identifies no case in which a determination of the best 
interests of the child has been analyzed in terms of whether the 
burden of proof has been satisfied. . . .  The legislature 
imposed no burden of proof in the statute, and the determination 
of the child's best interests does not turn on distinctions 
between levels of proof.").  The "polestar" at a dispositional 
hearing is simply the best interests of the child.  Brenda B., 
331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶33 (quoting Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of Health & 
Hum. Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 
N.W.2d 402). 
¶34 Regardless, A.G.'s second argument fails under Taylor, 
347 Wis. 2d 30 (majority op.).  Although this court emphasized 
the defendant knew, based on the record, that he faced eight 
years, it also emphasized, "in any event, . . . [the defendant] 
was verbally informed by the court at the plea hearing of the 
sentence 
that 
he 
actually 
received. . . .  
[The] 
sentence . . . did not exceed the six-year term of imprisonment 
that the court, at the plea hearing, specifically informed him 
that he could receive."  Id., ¶¶39, 42; see also id., ¶28 ("[A]t 
the plea hearing, the circuit court verbally informed . . . [the 
defendant] of the six-year term of imprisonment to which he was 
ultimately sentenced.  As a result, . . . [the defendant]'s plea 
was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and it 
was not a violation of . . . [the defendant]'s due process 
rights to deny his motion to withdraw his no contest plea."); 
id., ¶52 ("[T]he circuit court informed . . . [the defendant] 
that he could receive a maximum term of imprisonment of six 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
27 
 
years. . . .  [The defendant] received a six-year term of 
imprisonment.  In other words, . . . [the defendant] received a 
sentence that he was verbally informed he could receive.").   
¶35 In Taylor, quoting an earlier decision of this court, 
this court explained that "[r]equiring an evidentiary hearing 
for every small deviation from the circuit court's duties during 
a plea colloquy is simply not necessary for the protection of a 
defendant's constitutional rights."  Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. 
Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶32, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64).  As 
noted in that earlier decision, not every "insubstantial 
defect[]"——i.e., technical legal error——renders a plea invalid.  
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶32. 
¶36 Like the defendant in Taylor, A.G. received what the 
circuit court told him he would receive; the State was held to a 
burden of proof the law does not require, but the State met that 
burden.  At disposition, the court explicitly referenced the 
clear and convincing standard.  In denying the motion for plea 
withdrawal without an evidentiary hearing, the court explained, 
"[t]he [c]ourt actually did use a clear and convincing standard 
when it assessed whether it thought it was in the child's best 
interest 
to 
terminate 
the 
parental 
rights." 
 
After 
the 
evidentiary hearing, the court noted in its written decision 
that it seems to have held the State to both a clear and 
convincing and a preponderance of the evidence standard.  
Regardless, the court emphasized the State satisfied the higher 
clear and convincing standard, as expressed in the dispositional 
hearing transcript.  The mere fact the court also stated "in 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
28 
 
balance" termination was in the best interests of the child does 
not show the court applied a burden lower than clear and 
convincing evidence.  A.G. was not inhibited from weighing the 
pros and cons of entering this particular no contest plea by 
being told the State would have to satisfy a particular burden 
of proof because the State was actually held to and did satisfy 
that burden.8   
¶37 Our holding regarding the burden of proof argument 
presupposes that events subsequent to the plea colloquy can 
illuminate whether a plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently.  In State v. Finley, this court explained the 
State "bore the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
                                                 
8 The dissent complains we are "importing a harmless error 
standard[.]"  Dissent, ¶70.  Not so.  Although the dissent 
mischaracterizes our holding as "A.G. did not know the statutory 
standard that applies at the dispositional phase," id., we 
actually hold he did know the standard this particular circuit 
court would apply——because the court applied the standard it 
said it would.  Accordingly, as in Taylor, the error did not 
render the plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary.  2013 
WI 34, ¶¶41–42, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.  A harmless 
error analysis would instead consider whether and to what extent 
the information provided at the plea colloquy caused A.G. to 
enter a plea he would not otherwise have entered.  Cf. State v. 
Barnes, 2023 WI 45, ¶29, __ Wis. 2d __, 990 N.W.2d 759.  We do 
not hold that A.G. would surely have entered a no contest plea 
regardless of the information he received during the plea 
colloquy.   
Due process is not a game of gotcha to be sprung on the 
State.  A.G. benefitted from the circuit court holding his 
opponent, the State, to a burden of proof the law did not 
require the State to meet.  A.G. claims he considered this when 
weighing the pros and cons of pleading.  To permit him to 
withdraw his plea at this stage would make a mockery of a very 
serious TPR proceeding. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
29 
 
evidence," that a criminal defendant "knew the potential 
punishment he faced . . . at the time of the plea acceptance."  
370 Wis. 2d 402, ¶44 (emphasis added).  Our holding in this case 
is consistent with Finley.  A.G. claims he knew, at the time of 
the plea acceptance, the State would be required to satisfy the 
clear and convincing standard.  The State was then held to that 
standard even though it did not apply.  The error could have 
been consequential, but it became insubstantial when the circuit 
court actually held the State to the clear and convincing 
standard.  Given this subsequent development, A.G.'s knowledge 
at the time of the plea permitted him to accurately weigh the 
pros and cons of entering this specific plea.  However he 
calculated the odds of a favorable outcome at disposition, to 
the extent his calculation depended on the State being held to 
the clear and convincing standard, he calculated correctly.  Had 
the State not satisfied this burden and the circuit court 
nonetheless terminated A.G.'s parental rights, we might have a 
different case.9 
                                                 
9 The dissent contends this court in Finley held Taylor has 
no relevance as applied to cases in which an evidentiary hearing 
was held.  Dissent, ¶67.  A fair reading of Finley does not 
support the dissent's assertion. 
In Finley, a criminal defendant was told the maximum 
statutory punishment was lower than it actually was and then 
sentenced to more time than he was told he would face.  2016 WI 
63, ¶10, 370 Wis. 2d 402, 882 N.W.2d 761.  The question facing 
this court was one of remedy:  the State argued the sentence 
should be commuted, but the defendant sought plea withdrawal.  
Id., ¶¶9–10. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the State conceded 
the defendant "did not know the potential punishment he faced 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
30 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 We 
hold 
that 
A.G. 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently pled no contest to the continuing CHIPS ground for 
terminating his parental rights.  The circuit court found A.G. 
demonstrated he understood potential dispositions through his 
testimony at the dispositional hearing, which was conducted one 
day after the plea colloquy.  Based on the record, the court's 
findings are not clearly erroneous.  Although the court 
mistakenly imposed a clear and convincing evidentiary burden on 
the State in determining whether terminating A.G.'s parental 
rights was in the child's best interests, the court actually 
held the State to that burden and concluded it was met.  The 
court's mistake therefore was an insubstantial defect.  The 
court of appeals erred in permitting A.G. to withdraw his plea. 
                                                                                                                                                             
when he entered his plea."  Id., ¶85.  This court held the 
defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea.  Id., ¶95.   
Although this court in Finley noted that "no evidentiary 
hearing was needed" in Taylor, it did not suggest Taylor has no 
bearing on a case in which one has been held.  See id., ¶84.  If 
Finley does stand for the proposition the dissent suggests, it 
is simply wrong.  See id., ¶153 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) 
("There is a principle present in . . . Taylor——namely, that 
incorrect or insufficient knowledge about an aspect of a plea 
does not necessarily invalidate the entire plea[.]").   
In this case, an evidentiary hearing was held, in which the 
circuit court reiterated that it actually applied the clear and 
convincing standard, which has facilitated our review.  The mere 
fact that one was held, however, does not render the defect 
somehow more serious; rather, the record of the evidentiary 
hearing demonstrates why the defect was insubstantial. 
No. 
2022AP652   
 
31 
 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2022AP652.bh 
 
1 
 
¶39 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  A.G. argues that 
the no-contest plea he entered in his termination of parental 
rights 
(TPR) 
proceeding 
was 
not 
knowing, 
voluntary, 
and 
intelligent for two independent reasons.  First, he asserts the 
circuit court failed to advise him of the possible dispositions 
that it could enter after accepting his plea.  Second, A.G. 
contends the circuit court failed to explain the statutory 
standard it was required to apply at the dispositional phase of 
the TPR proceeding.  Neither argument wins the day. 
¶40 Contested TPR proceedings involve a two-step process:  
(1) a fact-finding hearing to determine if "grounds exist for 
the termination of parental rights," and (2) the dispositional 
hearing where the circuit court determines whether the rights 
should in fact be terminated.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.424, 48.427.  
Here, A.G. pled no-contest that grounds existed to terminate his 
parental rights.  On appeal, he contends that his plea at the 
grounds phase was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent based 
on what he was told (or not told) about the dispositional 
hearing. 
¶41 We 
analyze 
whether 
A.G. 
can 
withdraw 
his 
plea 
utilizing a two-step process.  Waukesha County v. Steven H., 
2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, modified on 
other grounds by St. Croix Cnty. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. 
v. 
Michael 
D., 
2016 
WI 35, 
¶¶3-4, 
368 
Wis. 2d 170, 
880 
N.W.2d 107.  First, the parent "must make a prima facie showing 
that the circuit court violated its mandatory duties and he must 
allege that in fact he did not know or understand the 
No.  2022AP652.bh 
 
2 
 
information that should have been provided at the" hearing.  Id.  
This prima facie showing will generally focus on the plea 
colloquy itself to determine whether certain requirements were 
not followed.  See State v. Clark, 2022 WI 21, ¶¶13-16, 401 
Wis. 2d 344, 972 N.W.2d 533 (explaining the defendant's burden).  
Second, if the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts 
to the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that even given the facial deficiencies, the parent's plea was 
knowing, 
voluntary, 
and 
intelligent. 
 
Steven 
H., 
233 
Wis. 2d 344, ¶42.  This usually involves the consideration of 
additional evidence at a hearing.  State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, 
¶47, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794.  At this stage, the 
circuit court considers all new evidence along with "the entire 
record" 
to 
ascertain 
if 
the 
parent's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42. 
¶42 Procedurally, the question before us concerns step 
two:  whether the State demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  
This is because the court of appeals previously determined A.G. 
made the prima facie showing and was therefore entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing.  State v. A.G. (A.G. I), No. 2021AP1476, 
unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022).  The 
State did not challenge this decision, and the case was remanded 
back to the circuit court for a hearing.  That's when the case 
transformed into something of a unicorn.  A.G. did not appear at 
the scheduled evidentiary hearing, so neither his testimony nor 
any other testimony was introduced.  Instead, the State moved 
No.  2022AP652.bh 
 
3 
 
into evidence all the transcripts in the case and relied on the 
transcripts alone to argue that it had proven A.G.'s plea was 
knowing, 
voluntary, 
and 
intelligent. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded the State satisfied its burden, but the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to permit A.G. 
to withdraw his plea.  State v. A.G. (A.G. II), No. 2022AP652, 
unpublished slip op., ¶25 (Wis. Ct. App. July 12, 2022).  We 
granted review of this second appeal. 
¶43 Our review involves an examination of substantially 
the same transcript evidence that the court of appeals had when 
it concluded A.G. made the initial prima facie case.  But at 
this stage, we must independently determine whether the plea was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  Hoppe, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 
¶45.  Thus, even though the court of appeals may have had much 
of the same evidence available to it when it determined A.G. 
made a prima facie case, our standard of review suggests we can 
come to a different legal conclusion when conducting our 
independent analysis under step two.1  
                                                 
1 I add one caveat to this conclusion, however.  The 
briefing on this point was not especially helpful.  With the 
benefit of fuller assistance from the parties, it may be that 
our hands are tied in some way.   
The dissent seems to think so when it employs a law-of-the-
case rationale to A.G.'s second argument.  But on both issues, 
the evidence of a facial deficiency in the plea colloquy was 
weak at best, and the broader plea withdrawal claim even weaker 
when the full spectrum of evidence in a stage two analysis is 
considered.  Given our standard of review, I don't understand 
why the conclusion that A.G. made a prima facie case——reached by 
a lower court in a different appeal focusing primarily on the 
plea colloquy alone——should transform into a binding conclusion 
for a higher court considering more evidence and conducting an 
independent review of whether the State met its burden. 
No.  2022AP652.bh 
 
4 
 
¶44 Turning to this analysis, A.G. first contends the 
circuit court failed to advise him of the possible dispositions 
of the proceeding consistent with Wis. Stat. § 48.422.  See 
§ 48.422(7)(a) (providing the circuit court must "determine that 
the 
admission 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding 
of . . . the potential dispositions").  And to enter a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent plea the defendant must be informed 
that the court can either dismiss the petition or terminate 
parental rights.  See Brown Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Brenda 
B., 2011 WI 6, ¶56, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730; see also 
Wis. Stat. § 48.427(2), (3).  As I read the record, the circuit 
court did so when it said that during the dispositional phase, 
it would decide if it was "in the child's best interest to in 
fact terminate [A.G.'s] parental rights."  The lead opinion 
recites additional evidence from the record both before and 
after the plea that I agree may be considered.  This evidence 
erases 
any 
doubt 
that 
the 
potential 
dispositions 
were 
sufficiently communicated, and by implication, sufficiently 
understood, when A.G. entered his plea.  Accordingly, I conclude 
the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s 
plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent with respect to the 
possible dispositions of the TPR proceeding. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The lead opinion is equally unclear.  While it seems to 
agree we can come to an independent conclusion on A.G.'s first 
argument, it criticizes this opinion for applying the same 
analytical approach to A.G.'s second argument.  Given the 
inconsistencies in the lead opinion and the potential for 
confusion, I do not join its analysis.    
No.  2022AP652.bh 
 
5 
 
¶45 A.G. also argues the circuit court failed to explain 
the statutory standard it was required to apply to the 
dispositional phase.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422 does not directly 
require disclosure of this standard when the circuit court 
accepts a no-contest plea.  However, a published court of 
appeals decision states that "the parent must be informed of the 
statutory standard the court will apply at the second stage" "in 
order for the court's explanation of potential dispositions to 
be meaningful."  Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Therese 
S., 2008 WI App 159, ¶16, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.426 states that the standard is the "best 
interests of the child"; no burden of proof is specified.   
¶46 A.G.'s argument on this point relies on a strained 
reading of the record.  The circuit court explained during the 
plea colloquy for the grounds phase that A.G. would be giving up 
a variety of trial rights, including "the right to force the 
state 
to 
prove 
the 
grounds 
by 
clear, 
convincing, 
and 
satisfactory evidence to a reasonable certainty."  The circuit 
court later communicated that during the dispositional phase, 
the court would determine whether it is "in the child's best 
interest to in fact terminate your parental rights."  And in the 
dispositional phase, A.G. would still have his trial rights.  In 
other words, A.G. was not giving up his trial rights in the 
dispositional phase by pleading in the grounds phase.   
¶47 A.G.'s argument rests on the premise that the most 
reasonable reading of this exchange is that the circuit court 
communicated a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof 
No.  2022AP652.bh 
 
6 
 
would apply at the dispositional phase.  But the circuit court 
never said that.  The circuit court merely said that standard 
applied "to prove the grounds."  When it pivoted to explaining 
the 
dispositional 
phase, 
the 
circuit 
court 
followed 
the 
statutory language and explained that it would render a decision 
based on the best interests of the child.  Sure, the circuit 
court could have been a bit more precise.  But the record shows 
A.G. was informed ten months before entering his plea that in 
the second phase of the TPR proceeding, the focus shifted to 
what was in the child's best interest.  Thus, reviewing the 
record independently and as a whole, in the face of A.G.'s 
argument that he was incorrectly informed of the statutory 
standard governing the dispositional hearing, the State met its 
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s 
plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.2   
¶48 For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY 
joins this concurrence.  
                                                 
2 The lead opinion concludes the same, but rests its 
conclusion in part on the basis that the circuit court held the 
State 
to 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing 
standard 
during 
the 
dispositional phase.  Like the dissent, I do not understand why 
that would be relevant to whether the State proved that A.G.'s 
plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶50 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Constitution requires that pleas be knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 
257, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  Accordingly, when we evaluate 
whether a plea met that constitutional standard, we must focus 
on what the person entering the plea knew "at the time of the 
plea acceptance."  See State v. Finley, 2016 WI 63, ¶44, 370 
Wis. 2d 402, 882 N.W.2d 761.  The lead opinion fails at this 
basic task, focusing instead on what A.G. knew many months 
before entering his plea and on what happened after.  Worse yet, 
if the lead opinion's approach were adopted, it would upset our 
well-settled approach to plea-withdrawal claims in the process.  
Because I conclude that A.G. is entitled to withdraw his plea, I 
respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶51 The State petitioned to terminate A.G.'s parental 
rights to his daughter.  Termination of parental rights (TPR) 
cases implicate parents' fundamental right to raise their 
children, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), and 
are thus "among the most consequential of judicial acts," 
involving "'the awesome authority of the State to destroy 
permanently 
all 
legal 
recognition 
of 
the 
parental 
relationship.'"  Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶21, 271 
Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (quoting Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 
2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768).  For that 
reason, numerous statutory and constitutional protections apply 
in TPR cases.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
2 
 
¶52 These protections apply at each of the two phases of a 
TPR case.  The first or "grounds" phase concerns whether one or 
more of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights 
enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)-(10) exist.  See Kenosha 
Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶10 n.10, 
293 
Wis. 2d 530, 
716 
N.W.2d 845. 
 
At 
this 
phase, 
the 
Constitution requires "fundamentally fair procedures," including 
a hearing and proof by the State1 of the grounds for termination 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748, 
753-54.  The second or "dispositional" phase concerns "whether 
it is in the child's best interest to terminate parental 
rights."  Jodie W., 293 Wis. 2d 530, ¶10 n.10.  At this phase, 
"[t]he parent has the right to present evidence and be heard," 
and if "'the evidence does not warrant the termination of 
parental rights,'" then the court may dismiss the petition.  
Evelyn 
C.R., 
246 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶23 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.427(2)).   
A 
¶53 In this case, A.G. pleaded no contest at the grounds 
phase, effectively conceding the State's allegation that his 
daughter was a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)——
one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights.  
See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  This was a meaningful concession, 
since it meant A.G. was giving up his constitutional right to 
                                                 
1 Counties may also file TPR petitions, but for simplicity I 
will refer to the petitioner as the State throughout this 
opinion.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
3 
 
hold the State to its burden of proving that he was an unfit 
parent by clear and convincing evidence.  See Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶22 (explaining that at the grounds phase "the 
parent's rights are paramount").  To ensure that he understood 
the important rights he was waiving, the circuit court conducted 
a colloquy before accepting A.G.'s plea.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.422(7); see also Brown Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. 
Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶34, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730 ("A 
parent who chooses to enter a no contest plea during [the 
grounds] phase is giving up valuable protections and must have 
knowledge of the rights being waived by making the plea."). 
¶54 During that colloquy, the circuit court explained what 
it called A.G.'s "trial rights" during the grounds phase.  Those 
included the right to a trial before the court or a jury to 
determine whether grounds to terminate his parental rights 
existed.  At that trial, the circuit court said "[A.G.] would 
have a whole bunch of rights," including:  (1) "the right to 
force the State to prove the grounds by clear, convincing, and 
satisfactory evidence to a reasonable certainty;" (2) "the right 
of cross-examination of your witnesses;" (3) "the right to 
introduce evidence;" (4) "the right to compel witnesses to come 
to court and testify;" and (5) "the right to testify . . . or 
remain silent, knowing, though, that silence be [sic] used 
against you in this kind of case."  After A.G. confirmed that he 
understood those "trial rights," the circuit court then told 
A.G. about the dispositional phase:  "[t]he second half of the 
case is where the [c]ourt decides is it in the child's best 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
4 
 
interest to in fact terminate your parental rights."  At that 
phase, the circuit court said, A.G. would have "all those same 
trial rights."   
¶55 A.G. argues that there were two defects in this 
colloquy.  First, he asserts that the circuit court did not 
inform him of the two potential outcomes of the dispositional 
phase——granting the petition and terminating his parental rights 
or dismissing the petition.2  See § 48.422(7)(a) (requiring the 
circuit court, before entering a plea, to ensure it is made 
"with understanding of . . . the potential dispositions").  
Second, A.G. contends that at the time of his plea, the circuit 
court did not inform him of the correct statutory standard that 
applies at the dispositional phase.  See Oneida Cnty. Dep't of 
Soc. Servs. v. Therese S., 2008 WI App 159, ¶16, 314 
Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122 (holding that before accepting a no-
contest plea to grounds, the circuit court "must inform the 
parent that '[t]he best interests of the child shall be the 
prevailing factor considered by the court in determining the 
disposition.'" (quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2))).  According to 
                                                 
2 If the circuit court terminates parental rights, it "may 
exercise 
several 
alternatives 
for 
designating 
custody, 
guardianship, and care of the child."  
Brenda B., 331 
Wis. 2d 310, ¶52.  Nevertheless, the availability of those 
alternatives depends on the circuit court first determining that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 
child.  Id.  Accordingly, the circuit court complies with 
§ 48.422(7)(a)'s 
directive 
to 
address 
"the 
potential 
dispositions" so long as it identifies  "the two independent 
dispositions available to the circuit court.  That is, the court 
may decide between dismissing the petition and terminating 
parental rights."  Id., ¶56.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
5 
 
A.G., the correct statutory standard that applies at the 
dispositional phase is simply the best interests of the child, 
and "Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) . . . does not set a burden of proof 
level."  During the plea colloquy, however, the circuit court 
indicated that the State would have the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence at the dispositional phase that 
termination of his parental rights was in his daughter's best 
interest.  As a result, A.G. contends that his plea was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  I focus 
solely on A.G.'s second argument because it is dispositive.   
B 
¶56 To understand why A.G. should be permitted to withdraw 
his plea on this basis, it is first necessary to review the 
legal framework for plea-withdrawal claims and the procedural 
history of this case.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-
75, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) provides the framework for evaluating 
whether A.G. is entitled to withdraw his plea.  See Waukesha 
County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 
N.W.2d 607, modified on other grounds by St. Croix Cnty. Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. v. Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶¶3-4, 368 
Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107.  Bangert and our subsequent plea-
withdrawal cases set forth a two-step approach.  First, a plea-
withdrawal motion "is reviewed by the court" to determine 
whether it "establishes a prima facie violation of . . . court-
mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations," namely 
that "the defendant did not know or understand the information 
that should have been provided at the plea hearing."  State v. 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
6 
 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶¶39-40, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  
If the motion clears that hurdle, the second step is an 
evidentiary hearing "at which the state is given an opportunity 
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the 
identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  Id., ¶40   
¶57 When A.G. moved to withdraw his plea, the circuit 
court initially denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing 
because it "actually did use a clear and convincing standard 
when it assessed whether it thought it was in the child's best 
interest to terminate the parental rights."  In other words, the 
circuit court concluded that A.G.'s motion did not satisfy the 
first step of Bangert——making a prima facie case for plea 
withdrawal——because even if A.G. wasn't told the correct 
statutory standard that applies at the dispositional phase, the 
circuit 
court 
ultimately 
applied 
the 
clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard that it said it would.   
¶58 The court of appeals reversed, holding that A.G. was 
not informed of the correct statutory standard that applies at 
the dispositional phase because "contrary to the [circuit] 
court's statement, at the dispositional hearing, the 'same trial 
rights' do not apply.  There is not a burden of proof placed on 
the State."  State v. A.G., No. 2021AP1476, unpublished slip 
op., ¶17 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022) (emphasis added).  Thus, 
the court of appeals held that the correct statutory standard 
that applies at the dispositional phase is simply the best 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
7 
 
interests of the child, with no burden on any party.3  See id.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that A.G.'s motion 
made a prima facie case for plea withdrawal and that he was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on remand to determine 
whether his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, 
despite the information he received regarding the statutory 
standard that applies at the dispositional phase.  Id., ¶22.      
¶59 Before discussing what happened at the evidentiary 
hearing, it is important to emphasize that the State did not 
appeal from this decision by the court of appeals.  And for that 
                                                 
3 This is a debatable conclusion.  To be sure, Wis. Stat. § 
48.426(2) does not contain a burden of proof.  It merely states 
that "[t]he best interests of the child shall be the prevailing 
factor considered by the court in determining the disposition."  
Id.  That being said, the State is the petitioner in this case.  
As such, the State must——at a minimum——produce some evidence of 
the best interests of the child at the dispositional phase.  
Otherwise, the petition would have to be denied.  Moreover, 
given the weighty constitutional rights at play in TPR cases, 
other courts have held that the Constitution requires proof that 
termination is in the child's best interest by a preponderance 
of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.  See Kent K. 
v. Bobby M., 110 P.3d 1013, 1021-22 (Ariz. 2005) (holding that 
due process requires proof of the child's best interests by a 
preponderance of the evidence); In re D.H., 354 N.W.2d 185, 188 
(S.D. 1984) (stating that "[t]he trial court must find by clear 
and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is 
in the best interests of the child" (quoting another source)); 
see also In re B.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 838 n.11 (Utah 2020) 
(explaining that, in the context of the best-interest-of-the-
child inquiry, "the clear and convincing standard might be 
constitutionally mandated"); Brian C. Hill, Comment, The State's 
Burden of Proof at the Best Interests Stage of a Termination of 
Parental Rights, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 557, 576-84 (arguing that 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Santosky, requires proof of the best interests 
of the child by clear and convincing evidence). Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, the question of whether there is a burden of 
proof at the dispositional phase is not before us.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
8 
 
reason, the court of appeals' conclusion that the correct 
statutory standard that applies at the dispositional phase is 
the best interests of the child with no burden on any party is 
the law of the case.  The law of the case is "a 'longstanding 
rule' that requires courts to adhere to an appellate court's 
ruling on a legal issue 'in all subsequent proceedings in the 
trial court or on later appeal.'"  State v. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 
¶13, 396 Wis. 2d 196, 957 N.W.2d 244 (quoting State v. Stuart, 
2003 WI 73, ¶23, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82).  Although 
there are exceptions to the law of the case, none of them apply 
here.4  Accordingly, we need not decide what the correct 
statutory standard is at the dispositional phase; instead, we 
must adhere to the court of appeals' holding that the standard 
is the best interests of the child with no burden on any party.  
And that means that to determine whether A.G.'s plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, we have to evaluate whether 
the State proved by clear and convincing evidence at the Bangert 
hearing that, at the time he entered his plea, A.G. knew that 
standard.   
                                                 
4 Those exceptions apply when "'a controlling authority has 
since made a contrary decision of law' on the same issue," "when 
the evidence at a subsequent trial is 'substantially different' 
than that at the initial trial; and when following the law of 
the case would result in a 'manifest injustice.'"  Jensen, 396 
Wis. 2d 196, ¶13, n.8 (quoting Stuart, 262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶24).   
Because the court of appeals' conclusion that there is no 
burden of proof on the State at the dispositional phase is the 
law of the case, I do not address the guardian ad litem's 
argument that the court should hold that the burden is clear and 
convincing evidence.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
9 
 
¶60 A.G. did not appear at the Bangert hearing and no 
witnesses were called to testify.  Instead, the State relied on 
the transcript of A.G.'s plea hearing, as well as transcripts of 
prior and subsequent hearings in the case.  See Steven H., 233 
Wis. 2d 344, ¶42 (explaining that at a Bangert hearing "a court 
may examine the entire record, not merely one proceeding, and 
look at the totality of the circumstances to determine" whether 
the plea was constitutionally sufficient).  The sole question is 
whether this evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates 
that, at the time he entered his plea, A.G. knew that the 
statutory standard that would apply at the dispositional phase 
was the best interests of the child with no burden on any party.   
 
¶61 The plea colloquy indicates that he did not.  During 
that colloquy, the circuit court described a different standard.  
The court explained that A.G.'s "trial rights" at the grounds 
phase included "the right to force the State to prove grounds by 
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence to a reasonable 
certainty."  And then the circuit court said that A.G. would 
have "those same trial rights" at the dispositional phase.  In 
other words, the circuit court told A.G. that the State would 
have to prove the best interests of the child by clear and 
convincing evidence.  But that is not the statutory standard 
that applies at the dispositional phase under the court of 
appeals' prior ruling in this case.  Thus, A.G.'s plea colloquy 
was defective.   
¶62 The remaining evidence falls far short of showing, let 
alone clearly and convincingly, that A.G. knew the correct 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
10 
 
statutory standard that would apply at the dispositional phase 
despite the defective plea colloquy.  Indeed, the only evidence 
that even suggests that A.G. knew the correct standard is a 
transcript of a hearing ten months before his plea.  At that 
hearing, the circuit court explained that the dispositional 
phase "focus[es] on what outcome is best for the kids that are 
involved," and that "everybody gets to put on testimony and 
evidence and argue to [the court] what they think is best for 
the kids that are involved," before the circuit court made the 
ultimate determination of "what outcome is best for the kids."    
This ten-month-old transcript describes the best-interest-of-
the-child standard and does not reference a burden of proof on 
any party. 
¶63 Given that A.G. received conflicting information at 
these two hearings, the State failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that, at the time he entered his plea, A.G. 
knew the statutory standard that applies at the dispositional 
phase.  To conclude otherwise would be absurd, since we would 
have to assume that A.G. ignored or disregarded the information 
he received from the circuit court during the plea colloquy in 
favor of different information he was told once ten months 
earlier.  Additionally, common sense tells us that people forget 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
11 
 
things they were told ten months earlier.5  That is especially 
true when a non-lawyer is advised about the details of legal 
proceedings he is facing and with which he is likely unfamiliar.  
For these reasons, the State failed to prove that A.G. knew the 
statutory standard that applies at the dispositional phase, and 
he is therefore entitled to withdraw his plea.  See Finley, 370 
Wis. 2d 402, ¶95 (explaining that when the State fails to meet 
its burden of proof at a Bangert hearing, the movant is entitled 
to withdraw his plea).     
C  
¶64 The lead opinion tries to justify a different result 
by relying on our decision in State v. Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30.  
In that case, a criminal defendant was told during his plea 
hearing that he could be sentenced to a maximum of six years of 
imprisonment.  Id., ¶16.  In fact, the maximum potential 
sentence was eight years of imprisonment.  Id.  After the 
defendant was sentenced to the six years of imprisonment, he 
                                                 
5 For this reason, I similarly question the lead opinion's 
reliance on this same ten-month-old transcript (and related 
factual findings by the circuit court) in rejecting A.G.'s 
alternative argument that he is entitled to withdraw his plea 
because the circuit court failed to advise him of the potential 
dispositions.  See lead op., ¶30.  Additionally, much of the 
other evidence the lead opinion cites in support of that 
conclusion is also suspect.  For example, what A.G. knew the day 
after he entered his plea is at best a weak indication of what 
he knew when that plea was entered since people can learn new 
things from day to day.  See id.  And the lead opinion's 
speculation about what A.G.'s counsel might have told him before 
entering his plea is just that——speculation.  See id., ¶32.  
There is no evidence in the record about what A.G.'s counsel did 
or did not tell A.G.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
12 
 
moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered because he did not know 
the maximum potential sentence.  Id., ¶18.  The defendant's 
motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing.  Id., ¶20.  We 
affirmed, explaining that an evidentiary hearing was not 
required because the record was "replete with evidence" that the 
defendant, in fact, knew the maximum sentence he faced at the 
time he entered his plea.  See id., ¶¶35-39.  In doing so, we 
emphasized that we were not engaging in a harmless-error 
analysis, instead reiterating that "the focus is on whether 
the . . . plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily" in spite of any claimed error.  Id., ¶41 n.11. 
¶65 According to the lead opinion, A.G. is not entitled 
withdraw his plea because, "[l]ike the defendant in Taylor, [he] 
received what the circuit court told him he would receive."  
Lead op., ¶35.  That is because, as mentioned previously, the 
circuit court said that it applied the clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard at the dispositional phase.  For this reason, 
the lead opinion concludes that "A.G. was not inhibited from 
weighing the pros and cons of entering this particular no 
contest plea by being told the State would have to satisfy a 
particular burden of proof because the State was actually held 
to and did satisfy that burden."  Id.   
¶66 There are several problems with the lead opinion's 
reliance on Taylor, and with its analysis more generally.  
First, Taylor was evaluating a different question than the one 
we are addressing in this case.  Taylor concerned only whether 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
13 
 
the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the 
first step of Bangert's two-part plea-withdrawal framework.  
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶42.  At that step, the court must 
determine only whether the defendant's motion makes a prima 
facie showing of that the plea colloquy was defective and that 
he "did not, in fact, know or understand the information that 
should have been been provided during the plea colloquy."  Id., 
¶32.  If the defendant's motion makes that showing, the next 
step is an evidentiary hearing at which "the State has the 
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea, despite the inadequacy of the plea colloquy, 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  Id.   
¶67 In this case, unlike in Taylor, the court of appeals 
has already determined that A.G.'s motion made the prima facie 
case entitling him to an evidentiary hearing, and remanded for 
an evidentiary hearing.  A.G., No. 2021AP1476, at ¶22.  And as 
explained previously, that decision was not appealed and the 
court of appeals' conclusion is thus the law of the case.  
Accordingly, the only question before us is whether the State 
met its burden at the evidentiary hearing of proving by clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
A.G.'s 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Thus, Taylor's rule simply does not 
apply to A.G.'s case.  Indeed, we distinguished Taylor on 
precisely these grounds in State v. Finley, 370 Wis. 2d 402.  In 
that case, we explained that Taylor does not apply when, as 
here, an evidentiary hearing was held on the plea-withdrawal 
motion.  Finley, 370 Wis. 2d 402, ¶¶82-85.   
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
14 
 
¶68 Second, even if Taylor did apply, the lead opinion 
mischaracterizes its conclusion.  Contrary to the lead opinion's 
assertions, Taylor did not conclude that whenever a defendant 
"receive[s] what the circuit court told him he would receive," 
he is not entitled to withdraw his plea.  See lead op., ¶35.  
Instead, we held that the plea in that case "was entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily [because] the record 
makes clear that the defendant knew the maximum penalty that 
could be imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing 
of the penalty that he received."  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶8; 
see also Finley, 370 Wis. 2d 402, ¶79 (describing Taylor 
similarly).  Thus, the reason the defendant in Taylor wasn't 
entitled to withdraw his plea was because "the . . . record 
revealed that the defendant knew the potential punishment he 
faced if convicted"——not because he received a sentence the 
circuit court told him he could receive.  
Finley, 370 
Wis. 2d 402, ¶87.  This conclusion is in keeping with our other 
plea withdrawal cases, which likewise focus on whether the 
defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary based 
on the information he knew at the time he entered the plea.  See 
id., ¶44.   
¶69 The lead opinion, by contrast, looks only to events 
that occurred after A.G. entered his plea.  To be sure, the 
State may rely on evidence from after a plea is entered to show 
that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See 
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶32; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 269, 283.  
But that evidence still must demonstrate what A.G. knew at the 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
15 
 
time he entered his plea.  And here, the fact that the circuit 
court held the State to a heightened burden of proof at 
disposition tells us nothing about what A.G. knew when he 
entered his plea.  Moreover, unlike in Taylor, where the plea 
questionnaire/waiver of rights form, information, and criminal 
complaint all demonstrated what the defendant knew when he 
entered his plea, here we have none of that.  See Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶35-38.  On the contrary, we have a description 
given once ten months before his plea that, under the law of the 
case, is correct.  And we have a different one given the day he 
entered the plea.  This is far from clear and convincing 
evidence that A.G. knew the correct statutory standard that 
applies at the dispositional phase.   
¶70 Finally, although the lead opinion denies it, it is 
importing a harmless error standard into the plea-withdrawal 
context.  See lead op., ¶36 n.8.  That is the upshot of the lead 
opinion's 
claims 
that 
"[t]he 
error 
could 
have 
been 
consequential, but it became insubstantial when the circuit 
court actually held the State to the clear and convincing 
standard," and that A.G. "benefitted from the circuit court 
holding . . .  the State[] to a burden of proof the law did not 
require [it] to meet."  Id., ¶¶36 n.8, 37.  In essence, the lead 
opinion is conceding that A.G. did not know the statutory 
standard that applies at the dispositional phase, but arguing 
that there was no harm because the State was held to the 
standard of proof the circuit court said it would apply.   The 
only reason we would care whether the circuit court did what it 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
16 
 
said it would do, or whether someone benefitted from an error, 
is if we are evaluating whether they were harmed by that error.  
Yet, as Taylor said, our plea-withdrawal cases "clearly d[o] not 
engage in a harmless error analysis."  347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶41.   
¶71 Nevertheless, the lead opinion claims that it isn't 
doing a harmless-error analysis, since it does not "consider 
whether and to what extent the information provided at the plea 
colloquy caused A.G. to enter a plea he would not otherwise have 
entered."  Id., ¶36 n.8 (citing State v. Barnes, 2023 WI 45, 
¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ____, 990 N.W.2d 759).  Doing that, in the lead 
opinion's view, would be evaluating whether an error was 
harmless.  See id.  But that is exactly what the lead opinion is 
doing.  It repeatedly asserts that A.G. "was not inhibited from 
weighing the pros and cons of entering this particular no 
contest plea" by the information he received in the plea 
colloquy, and that his "knowledge at the time of the plea 
permitted him to accurately weigh the pros and cons of entering 
this specific plea."  See id. ¶¶36-37.  Thus, the lead opinion 
is in fact "consider[ing] whether and to what extent the 
information provided at the plea colloquy" affected A.G.'s 
decision to plead no contest.  See id., ¶36 n.8.   
¶72 This approach, if taken seriously, would allow courts 
to substitute their own speculation about whether someone's 
"knowledge at the time of plea permitted him to accurately weigh 
the 
pros 
and 
cons 
of 
entering 
this 
specific 
plea" 
or 
"benefitted" from an error for the clear and convincing evidence 
of what he actually knew that our cases require.  Compare lead 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
17 
 
op., 
¶¶36 
n.8, 
37, 
with 
Finley, 
370 
Wis. 2d 402, 
¶95.  
Thankfully, because the lead opinion fails to garner four votes, 
that approach is not our law.  Because we should keep the focus 
in evaluating a plea-withdrawal motion where it belongs——"on 
whether the . . . plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily" in spite of any claimed error——I respectfully 
dissent.  See Taylor, 370 Wis. 2d 30, ¶41 n.11     
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
 
No.  2022AP652.rfd 
 
 
 
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