Title: Aubrey v. State
Citation: 310 N.E.2d 556
Docket Number: 973S183
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1974

310 N.E.2d 556 (1974)
John W. AUBREY, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 973S183.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 6, 1974.
*557 George A. Purvis, Indianapolis, for appellant (defendant below).
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Carpenter, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee (plaintiff below).
HUNTER, Justice.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction for commission of a felony while armed, to-wit: robbery. Defendant presents two issues for our determination:
(1) Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to admonish the jury to disregard certain contempt proceedings held in open court;
(2) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
The evidence most favorable to the State discloses, in part, the following facts: On November 25, 1972, the Bill Jones Corner Bar in Indianapolis was entered by two nylon-masked men. One of the two was armed with a sawed-off shotgun, the second with a pistol, and a third man remained outside armed with a pistol. The two men inside ordered all the patrons to lie on the floor and proceeded to take wallets, purses, jewelry and to remove $325 from the cash register. None of the victims could identify any of the men.
During the trial, the prosecutor called an alleged accomplice to the witness stand and in the presence of the jury this direct testimony ensued:
At this time the jury was finally excused and the immunity hearing proceeded. The witness was granted the immunity requested by the State and thereupon the jury returned:
We are of the opinion that the failure to admonish the jury when requested constituted reversible error. While a *559 defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, he is entitled to a fair trial. White v. State (1971), Ind., 272 N.E.2d 312. The record discloses that the State was aware before trial that this witness would refuse to testify. The natural, even inevitable, inference which is raised in the jury's mind when an alleged accomplice refuses to testify is that the withheld testimony would be damaging, not only to the witness, but also to the defendant. Thus, the mere refusal to speak indelibly implants adverse inferences in the minds of the jurors and reaches them in a form not subject to cross-examination. Blake's refusal to testify "may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony." Douglas v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 415, 419, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1077, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934.
We concur in the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand as stated in United States v. Maloney, (2nd Cir.1959), 262 F.2d 535, 537-538:
Likewise, commencing the immunity hearing in the jury's presence served to emphasize Blake's refusal to testify. The State urges that the trial court may have had good reason to refuse to admonish the jury since to do so might have augmented the issue. We agree that this may, indeed, have been the motivating force behind the trial court. Nevertheless, as we recently stated in Gross v. State (1974), Ind., 306 N.E.2d 371, choice of trial tactics is within the province of the defendant and his counsel, and when requested by defendant on these facts, the admonition should have been given.
Neither do we find persuasive the State's argument that defendant could have tendered a final instruction to correct any error which might have previously occurred. *560 The time lapse between Blake's refusal to testify and summation was significant. Again, for tactical reasons, the defendant may have chosen not to broach the subject again. To contend that because the defendant did not submit a final instruction and that he, therefore, somehow "waived" error does not appeal to the sensibilities of this Court.
Considering our disposition of the first issue raised, we do not reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. The cause is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.