Title: Armijo v. Town of Atrisco
Citation: 312 P.2d 91, 62 N.M. 440
Docket Number: 6145
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 1957

312 P.2d 91 (1957) 62 N.M. 440 Jake ARMIJO, Benjamin Benavidez, David J. Armijo, Trinidad Lovato, Ufelia Games, Marcelino Saavedra, Manuel Garcia, Tranquilino Barela, Roman Salas, Samuel Garcia, Carlos Games, Rumaldo Garcia, Filemon Chavez, B.W. Sloan, Arturo Gonzales, Max griego, in their own behalf and in behalf of others Similarly situated, Petitioners-Appellants, v. TOWN OF ATRISCO, a corporation, Respondent-Appellees. No. 6145. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 29, 1957. Hannett, Hannett &amp; Cornish, Albuquerque, for appellants. John N. Brunacini, Lewis R. Sutin, Albuquerque, for appellees. SADLER, Justice. This is not the first time there has been before this Court a case involving the affairs of the Town of Atrisco Grant. A little more than five years ago we handed down an opinion in the case of Armijo v. Town of Atrisco (Grant), 56 N.M. 2, 239 P.2d 535, on review from the district court of Bernalillo County, in which the history of the Grant was chronicled at great length in findings made by the trial court, which we approved. We also approved an opinion filed by the trial judge in the cause by adopting it in language, as follows, to wit: We refer the reader to pages 4 to 9 of the report of that case in 56 N.M., pages 535 to 539 of 239 P.2d, for a readable and illuminating history of the Grant up to the time the trial judge filed his opinion in the case. The events which became the basis of complaint by appellants, called petitioners below, transpired subsequent to the mandate on the former appeal, reported as indicated in the citation, supra. It was on April 22, 1954, that Jake Armijo and others, in their own behalf and in behalf of others similarly situated, by their attorneys, filed a petition in the same cause out of which the judgment affirmed on the former appeal arose, numbered 27,432 on the civil docket of the district court of Bernalillo County, asking that certain orders theretofore entered in said cause for the authorized distribution of 10,000 *92 acres of the common lands of the Grant to so-called heirs of the Grant, be vacated and held for naught. The petition alleged that petitioners were residents of the Town of Atrisco Grant, residing within its exterior boundaries and were either descendants of the original incorporators and resident property owners and taxpayers living within the Grant for a period of five years last past; or, were resident property owners and taxpayers living within the Grant who had been such residents and taxpayers for more than five years last past. The defendants to said proceeding were said to be the corporation and its Board of Trustees. The petition went on to allege that the corporation held title to some 45,000 acres of land to be administered under the provisions of New Mexico law governing community land grants; that in the above entitled cause the district court of the second judicial district had retained supervisory jurisdiction over the corporation and its Board of Trustees by judgment or order entered September 17, 1941, and that subsequent thereto the court had entered a further order continuing the supervisory jurisdiction previously retained by it. The Town of Atrisco, a corporation, was joined as a party defendant to said reservation of jurisdiction by the district court; that since the corporation and its Board of Trustees were under the jurisdiction of the district court as a result of an order entered September 17, 1941, and other orders, the Board of Trustees petitioned the court to distribute, by lottery, some 10,000 acres of land to so-called heirs of the Grant for the costs of abstracts, quieting title and surveying the land preliminary to such distribution. The petition further alleged that the court had approved the proposed distribution by orders entered in the cause. It was next alleged in the petition that the persons entitled to the benefits of the Grant were those who came within the definition of "owners and proprietors" under the Community Land Grant law; that the Grant was a community land grant and the common lands of the Grant were for the benefit of all the owners and proprietors of the Grant; that a protest had been filed with the Board of Trustees concerning their action claiming the proposed distribution was illegal and invalid and deprived the petitioners of their rights. The petition went on to recite that subsequent to entering the initial order for distribution of the 10,000 acres on July 4, 1953, the Board of Trustees of the Grant changed the manner, procedure and land to be conveyed as set forth in such order, and that a protest to said action was filed as required by law; that any attempt to distribute lands of the Grant as set forth in the last mentioned order would amount to a preference as between persons entitled to the benefits of the Grant, was without statutory authority, illegal and invalid and deprived the petitioners of their rights as persons entitled to share in the benefits appertaining to the Grant. A response or answer was filed to the petition so filed by appellants, generally denying the allegations thereof except that it admitted the ownership by the Grant of a fee-simple title to about 45,000 acres of the common lands, as alleged in the petition. The trial court treated the issue before it as one of law. On September 17, 1941, as already shown, an order had been entered, placing the Board of Trustees of said Grant under the supervisory jurisdiction of the district court of Bernalillo County. By that order the Town of Atrisco, a corporation, was also joined as a party defendant. It should be added that this order further provided that no sale, mortgage or other alienation of the common lands of the Town of Atrisco should be made unless approved by the court. It seems that at a time prior to some of the events recited above, indeed, at a date prior to February 7, 1952, the then Board of Trustees of the Grant was about to petition the court in this cause to sell about *93 4,500 acres of the common lands to one Esteban Herrera for $4.50 per acre, or $20,000. Learning of the proposed sale, certain members of the Board as well as other owners and proprietors within the Grant petitioned the court to stop the sale and to issue an order to show cause why it should not be abandoned. A response to the order to show cause was filed by the Board denying generally the allegations of the foregoing petition. The court, preliminary to a ruling on the order, appointed three appraisers of the land, the sale of which was sought. The matter came on for hearing later before then district judge, R.F. Deacon Arledge, at a sort of pre-trial conference, following which in an order entitled "Memorandum for Pre-Trial Conference," the court stated that in the opinion of the appraisers, the land proposed to be sold for $20,000 had a value of $236,500. Accordingly, the court denied the application for the sale to Esteban Herrera and, later entered a formal order disapproving and permanently enjoining the sale. It was subsequent to this action by the court and on March 19, 1953, there came on for hearing before the district court of Bernalillo County, the Honorable R.F. Deacon Arledge, district judge, presiding, the petition of the Town of Atrisco, a corporation, filed February 17, 1953, and supplemental petition of the Town of Atrisco filed March 17, 1953. The appearances noted in the transcript of said hearing are, as follows: The proceedings at the beginning of the hearing and through a certain part thereof are set out herein, as follows: Explanatory of the plan to be used for distribution of the lands, the attorney for the Grant, Mr. Brunacini, stated into the record the following, to wit: After a short colloquy between the judge and Mr. Brunacini, Judge Arledge stated into the record a summary of his understanding of what the plan proposed was in the following language: Apparently, before the hearing ended, the court became somewhat concerned about the notice of the hearing then being held, for we find this colloquy between the court and counsel, to-wit: At the conclusion of the hearing, from the transcript of which we have quoted freely to give a true picture thereof, the court entered the following order, on March 30, 1953, to wit: "It is so ordered. "Done in open Court this 30th day of March, 1953." Thereafter, on to wit, April 22, 1954, the appellants before us, filed in said cause their petition, as hereinabove recited, alleging themselves to be residents of the Town of Atrisco Grant, residing within its exterior boundaries, and either descendants *98 of the original incorporators and resident property owners and taxpayers living within the Grant for a period of five years, last past, or resident property owners and taxpayers living within the Grant who have been such residents and taxpayers for more than five years, last past, and suing on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The allegations of the petition were summarized in the opening paragraphs of this opinion and will not be repeated here. The relief prayed for was, also as stated above, that the order of the court authorizing and approving the distribution of the common lands of the Grant as in the petition set forth be vacated and held for naught. Under date of February 6, 1956, the court, Judge Robert Reidy presiding, entered an order dismissing said petition, from which order of dismissal this appeal is prosecuted. The order allowing the appeal further provided for a stay of proceedings looking to distribution of the common lands involved as proposed by the order sought to be vacated pending determination of this appeal. The petitioners below, who are the appellants before this court, present two points in support of their claim for reversal of the trial court's action in dismissing the petition protesting the proposed distribution of some 10,000 acres of the common lands of the Grant. Their first point reads, as follows: The foregoing Point I is based upon appellants' assignments of error Nos. 2, 4 and 5, which read: The Town of Atrisco was organized as a corporation under the authority of 1953 Comp. §§ 8-2-1 through 8-2-18, as amended, and took on the character of a quasi-municipal corporation. Herrera v. Zia Land Co., 51 N.M. 390, 185 P.2d 975; Kavanaugh v. Delgado, 35 N.M. 141, 290 P. 798; Merryfield v. Buckner, 41 N.M. 442, 70 P.2d 896; Board of Trustees of Town of Torreon Land Grant v. Garcia, 32 N.M. 124, 252 P. 478. The Grant was before this Court in the case of Armijo v. Town of Atrisco, supra. It was there held to be a community land grant vested with a fee-simple title to the common lands of the Grant. Of course, the lands owned by the Grant must be administered in conformity with the statutory law cited, supra, under which the Grant was incorporated, as amended. As disclosed by a reading of the opinion in Armijo v. Town of Atrisco, supra, the Grant whose common lands are the subject of this suit was originally made by the King of Spain, through the then Governor and Captain General of the Kingdom and Province of New Mexico, about 1700 A.D., to the inhabitants and settlers of the community of Atrisco, through its founder, Fernando Duran y Chavez and contained 41,000 acres of land. Later on, a petition was presented to Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta, Governor and Captain General of New Mexico by fifteen citizens of Atrisco, praying that they be granted an additional 25,000 acres of land adjoining the first Grant to be used for grazing and as a source of firewood. Accordingly, this petition was granted. While some portions of the new Grant were designated for certain individuals, it was clearly understood *99 that practically all of the lands of the new Grant were to be used in common by the residents of the colony of Atrisco. Subsequently, as already indicated, the Grant was incorporated under the authority of L. 1891, c. 86 (1953 Comp. §§ 8-2-1 to 8-2-18) which though amended from time to time, is still in effect, substantially in its original form. The Grant was approved by the Court of Private Land Claims, and a patent issued by the United States to the Town of Atrisco, and to their successors in interest and assigns on May 5, 1905, covering 82,728 acres. The act under which the Grant was incorporated bestowed certain powers upon the corporation. 1953 Comp. § 8-2-2, among other things, provides: The portion of this section following the proviso was added by amendment by L. 1933, c. 47, § 2. It is further provided by 1953 Comp., § 8-2-18, as follows: The portion of the section quoted following the proviso here likewise was added as an amendment by L. 1939, c. 202, § 1. We think a mere reading of the transcript of proceedings looking to a sale or distribution of 10,000 acres of the common lands of the Grant will disclose or prove the case for appellants, petitioners below. From beginning to end thereof the want of due process fairly leaps from the pages of the record. At the very beginning in noting the appearance of counsel for certain parties, note the following: This prompts the inquiry whether anyone was there representing the absent heirs, if such a category of parties actually exists. As counsel for appellants pertinently state, no appearance seems to have been entered by anyone for any of the owners and proprietors of the Grant. *100 Furthermore, it was frankly stated by counsel that they were determining rights to beneficial interest in the Grant, using as a base a portion of the record listing 233 supposed heirs, found in a copy of the files in the case of James M. Hubbell v. Town of Atrisco, cause No. 22,606. It was the record in this case which was sought to be used in the trial out of which the former appeal arose, as res adjudicata. The trial court properly rejected so much of this record as was produced in that case, which action we approved in Armijo v. Town of Atrisco, supra, because no final judgment or order had ever been entered in the case. It is to be noted from recitals in portions of the transcript of the hearing before the court on March 19, 1953, copied supra, that the cause was then heard before Judge Arledge on a petition of Town of Atrisco, a corporation, filed February 17, 1953, and supplemental petition of said Town filed March 17, 1953. In the course of the proceedings the court adverted to the fact that notice of the hearing had been given by a publication, one time, in each of the two Albuquerque papers, the Journal and the Tribune. The notices appear in the transcript and are signed by John A. Brunacini as attorney for Town of Atrisco along with proof of publication. By what authority, statutory or otherwise, the attorney published said notice, unless based on a direction, apparently oral, from the trial judge to one of the attorneys to do so, nowhere appears. There was here no affidavit for publication of a summons by publication as per rules of civil procedure. Indeed, no summons of any kind was ever issued by clerk of the court and under its seal, touching the hearing. As a result of the hearing on March 19, 1953, Dale Walker, an attorney, was appointed a Special Master to be later succeeded by Peter Gallagher in that capacity. Under date of August 3, 1953, there appears in the transcript a report of progress, entitled "Court's Message to the Atrisco Land Grant." The Preamble to the Message and certain portions thereof, follow: It appears from the record that the number of applicants claiming beneficial interests in the Grant is in excess of 2,000. A careful screening of same by a committee chosen for the purpose by the President of Board of Trustees of the Grant reduced the number to 1,801, rejecting 333 applications. These facts we mention only for the purpose of indicating what a monumental task faces any tribunal attempting to ascertain who are the rightful owners of beneficial interests in the Grant. It was taken for granted, as well as asserted to the court by counsel that the rightful owners, or some of them, would be found scattered over the three states of New Mexico, Colorado and California. We think enough appears to convince anyone that, however worthy the effort, the means about to be employed for making a distribution of the lands of the Grant, not only amount to a violation of the statute law of this state prohibiting lotteries, State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324, as claimed in appellants' Point I, but as well amount to a dissipation of the assets of the corporation, contrary to law, as claimed in their Point II. In fine, the plan of distribution proposed discloses a pronounced absence of primary and elemental concepts of due process and equal protection of the laws, in violation of constitutional guaranties existing in favor of owners of the beneficial interest in the common lands of the Grant. As pointed out by appellants' counsel, the lucky participant in the drawings, or lottery, for an outlay of $50 to $100, as the case might be, may draw a tract worth $1,000, whereas the unlucky participant, finding his tract largely occupied by an arroyo, or the victim of ruinous erosion, might secure land having a value not to exceed the amount of his deposit. Just how the Special Master was to determine who are, or were, the true owners of beneficial interests in the common lands of the Grant is not disclosed. Whether he as a roving emissary should tour the highways and by-ways seeking individuals whom he might determine had the character of an "owner," "proprietor," or "heir," based on sworn testimony, or otherwise, the record leaves in doubt. *102 Indeed, confusion exists in the minds of counsel, as indicated by the record, whether the phrase "owners and proprietors," as defined in the act (1953 Comp. § 8-2-18) and the word "heirs" as used in later amendments thereto, are synonymous. We do not presume to say beyond announcing the obvious fact that the descendants of the original owners of beneficial interests in the common lands have acquired by descent, or devise, whatever rights, privileges and interests their ancestors possessed. The fact that a large metropolitan area has grown up around this Grant and its common lands since its inception more than two and a half centuries ago, considered in the light of the fact that the original settlers and inhabitants have multiplied until their progeny now approximate two to three thousand in number scattered over, at least, three states of the west, presents a tangled skein of legal imponderables well calculated to tax the wisdom and ingenuity of a Solomon for solution. It is not for us to say how it must, or can, be solved. Counsel for appellants have given it as their opinion that it can not be done without an appeal to the legislature. Whether it can afford the needed aid we do not venture to say. It is almost as if one were asked to name the heirs of the Pilgrims who landed at Plymouth Rock, or to bring it closer to home, to prepare a roster of the descendants of the Conquistadores. In truth, that is exactly what is sought here, to wit, the descendants of a select group of those Conquistadores. Such is the big problem presented by these tangled facts. But, hard as the problem may be, difficult as it is to place these common lands in a state that will render them marketable, there lies within the body of the law an ability to do that very thing. It is a maxim of equity that there is no right without a remedy. Hence, it is that somewhere within the vast reservoir of equitable relief, whether by suits to quiet title, class suits, sale of the common lands and distribution of the proceeds through an interpleader suit, or otherwise, may be found the answer to the problem posed here. That it will, perhaps, be expensive there can be little doubt. That it will require the talent of the best legal minds to work out a feasible plan, is equally obvious. But whatever the means employed, due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard must be observed and equal protection of the laws must be accorded all. We entertain no doubt that if these conditions are met, the "owners and proprietors," or their "heirs, successors, and assigns," whoever they are, whatever they are and, wherever they may be, can be brought before the court, or become debarred for failure to appear, and their rights be determined and adjudicated. It is enough to settle this appeal, for us to say that they were given no such opportunity in the record before us. Accordingly, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein expressed. It is so ordered. McGHEE, COMPTON and KIKER, JJ., concur. LUJAN, C.J., not participating.