Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DONALD ANDREW HAMILTON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118615
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2002

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 23, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 118615  
DONALD ANDREW HAMILTON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
The circuit court dismissed a drunk driving charge  
against the defendant because the arrest was made by a police  
officer acting outside his jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals  
affirmed.  We conclude that the fact that the arrest was made  
by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not require  
exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest  
or dismissal of the charge.  We reverse and remand to the  
circuit court for further proceedings.  
 
I  
During the early morning hours of November 21, 1999, city  
of Howell Police Officer Darren Lockhart observed the  
defendant driving on M-59 in Howell Township.1  The officer  
observed that the vehicle did not have operating taillights  
and left the pavement and briefly touched the shoulder of the  
roadway.  He stopped the vehicle on suspicion that the driver  
was operating under the influence of liquor and because the  
vehicle was being driven without operating taillights.  The  
officer performed sobriety tests and arrested the defendant  
for OUIL.  It was later determined that the defendant had two  
prior OUIL convictions and that his license had been  
suspended.  This led to his being charged with felony OUIL,  
third offense, MCL 257.625(10)(c), and operating a vehicle on  
a suspended license, MCL 257.904(3).  
The 
defendant 
moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that  
the arrest by the officer outside his jurisdiction was  
illegal.  The district judge disagreed and bound the defendant  
over to the circuit court.  However, the circuit court granted  
the defendant’s motion to quash and dismissed the case.  
1 In the district court, the parties stipulated to the 
essential facts.  
2  
 
The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals  
affirmed.2  The Court noted that the prosecutor conceded the  
officer was not acting in conjunction with the other law  
enforcement agencies and was not in hot pursuit of the  
defendant at the time of the stop. It rejected the  
prosecutor’s arguments that the arrest could be justified  
under MCL 762.3(3)(a),3 which relates only to venue and not to  
the authority of officers to act outside their jurisdictions.  
The Court also rejected the suggestion that the arrest could  
be justified on a theory that officers acting outside their  
jurisdictions have the same authority as private citizens to  
make arrests for felonies committed in their presence or with  
probable cause.  MCL 764.16. 
In this case, the Court said  
that principle was not applicable because the officer did not  
have probable cause to believe that the defendant had  
committed a felony.  It then turned to the question whether  
suppression of evidence and dismissal was appropriate as a  
remedy for the statutory violation.  It concluded that  
suppression of the evidence and dismissal was required.  
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 26, 2001 
(Docket No. 225712).  
3  
If an offense is committed on the boundary of 
2 
or 
more 
counties, 
districts 
or 
political 
subdivisions or within 1 mile thereof, venue is  
proper in any of the counties, districts or  
political subdivisions concerned.  
3  
 
 
 
  
  
II  
Ordinarily, this Court reviews a trial court's ruling  
regarding a motion to suppress for clear error. People v  
Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).4  However,  
the ruling in the present case turns not on factual  
determinations, but on a question of law, which we review de  
novo. People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998);  
People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).  As is  
explained later, the question before us is one of statutory  
interpretation—whether the Legislature intended that a  
violation of MCL 764.2a should result in exclusion of evidence  
obtained as a result of the arrest.  People v Sobczak-Obetts,  
463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).  Such questions of  
statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. People v  
Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999).  
III  
It is undisputed that, at the time of the stop and  
arrest, Officer Lockhart was acting outside his jurisdiction.  
MCL 764.2a,5 captioned authority of peace officers outside  
4 In this case, the question of suppression of evidence 
and dismissal of the charge are closely intertwined, as the 
critical evidence supporting the OUIL charge was obtained as 
a result of the arrest.  
5  
A peace officer of a county, city, village, or 
township of this state may exercise authority and 
(continued...)  
4  
 
 
 
their own bailiwicks, provides that police officers may  
exercise 
their 
authority in jurisdictions other than their own  
if they are working in conjunction with authorities of that  
other jurisdiction.  In this case, the officer was not acting  
in 
conjunction 
with 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
having  
jurisdiction in Howell Township, and thus his actions were not  
within MCL 764.2a.  It is also undisputed that the officer did  
not have a warrant to arrest the defendant or to search his  
personal property, and that the officer was not in “hot  
pursuit” of the defendant within the meaning of MCL 117.34.6  
The officer was acting outside his jurisdiction, without  
a warrant, not in hot pursuit, and not in conjunction with law  
enforcement officers having jurisdiction. Thus, as the Court  
of Appeals recognized, he had no greater authority than a  
private person. “As a general rule, peace officers who make  
5 (...continued) 
powers outside his own county, city, village, or 
township, when he is enforcing the laws of this 
state in conjunction with the Michigan state  
police, or in conjunction with a peace officer of 
the county, city, village, or township in which he 
may be, the same as if he were in his own county, 
city, village, or township.  
6  
When any person has committed or is suspected 
of having committed any crime or misdemeanor within 
a city, or has escaped from any city prison, the 
police officers of the city shall have the same 
right to pursue, arrest and detain such person 
without the city limits as the sheriff of the 
county.  
5  
 
 
  
a warrantless arrest outside their territorial jurisdiction  
are treated as private persons, and, as such, have all the  
powers of arrest possessed by such private persons.” People  
v Meyer, 424 Mich 143, 154; 379 NW2d 59 (1985). 
Under MCL  
764.16,7 a private person has the authority to make a felony  
arrest, but lacks the authority to make a misdemeanor arrest  
except in nonapplicable circumstances.  “‘No one without a  
warrant has any right to make an arrest in the absence of  
actual belief, based on actual facts creating probable cause  
of guilt.’” People v Panknin, 4 Mich App 19, 27; 143 NW2d 806  
(1966), quoting People v Bressler, 223 Mich 597, 600-601; 194  
NW 559 (1923), paraphrasing People v Burt, 51 Mich 199, 202;  
16 NW 378 (1883). Here, the officer only had probable cause  
to make an arrest for a misdemeanor, i.e., OUIL.  The fact  
that defendant may have committed a felony, i.e., OUIL, third  
offense, was only discovered after the arrest.8  Accordingly,  
7 MCL 764.16 provides in relevant part:  
A private person may make an arrest in the 
following situations:  
(a) For a felony committed in the private 
person’s presence.  
(b) If the person to be arrested has committed  
a felony although not in the private person’s 
presence.  
8 As the Court of Appeals explained:  
The prosecutor admits that the traffic stop 
(continued...)  
6  
the officer lacked the statutory authority to make the arrest  
under MCL 764.16.  
The Court of Appeals concluded that because the arrest  
was illegal, it warranted exclusion of evidence as the  
remedy.9  We disagree.  That the officer acted without  
8 (...continued) 
was made because the vehicle had no taillights and 
appeared to be weaving.  Viewing a car with no 
taillights gave Lockhart probable cause to believe 
that a civil infraction had occurred in his  
presence. Furthermore, even if the weaving of the 
vehicle gave Lockhart probable cause to believe 
that defendant was intoxicated, Lockhart still had 
no authority to arrest defendant under MCL 764.16; 
MSA 28.875 because he was not aware that a felony 
had occurred in his presence.  A person guilty of  
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is  
generally 
guilty 
of 
a 
misdemeanor.  
MCL 257.625(8)(a); MSA 9.2325(8)(a).  As previously 
noted, if defendant had been convicted of operating 
a motor vehicle while intoxicated, he would have 
been 
guilty 
of 
a 
felony 
pursuant 
to  
MCL 257.625(10)(c); MSA 9.2325(10)(c), because it 
would have been his third conviction within ten  
years.  However, the lower court record indicates 
that officer Lockhart was unaware of defendant’s  
previous convictions at the time he stopped and 
arrested defendant.  Therefore, at most, Lockhart 
had probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor 
had been committed in his presence. [Slip op at 3­
4.]  
9 The Court of Appeals concluded:  
We find that the information was properly 
quashed because the exclusionary rule of evidence 
is applicable in this case.  In Meyer and Clark  
[People v Clark, 181 Mich App 577; 450 NW2d 75  
(1989)], the police officers’ violations were  
statutory, not constitutional, because probable 
cause 
existed 
to 
arrest 
the 
defendants 
for 
committing felonies.  Meyer, supra at 160; Clark,
(continued...) 
7 
  
statutory authority does not necessarily render the arrest  
unconstitutional. 
 
The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
exclusionary 
rule 
only  
applies to constitutionally invalid arrests, not merely  
statutorily illegal arrests. People v Lyon, 227 Mich App 599,  
611; 577 NW2d 124 (1998).  “The constitutional validity of an  
arrest depends on whether probable cause to arrest existed at  
the moment the arrest was made by the officer.”  Id. Here,  
the officer did have probable cause to arrest the defendant.  
The stop of the vehicle was justified because of the apparent  
equipment defect and the defendant’s erratic driving, giving  
rise to the suspicion that he was operating the vehicle while  
9 (...continued) 
supra at 580. Similarly, in [People v Davis, 133 
Mich App 707; 350 NW2d 796 (1984)], this Court 
found that although the police officers may have 
acted in violation of MCL 764.2a; MSA 28.861(1) in 
surveilling and arresting the defendant outside 
their jurisdiction, the exclusionary rule was  
inapplicable because probable cause existed to 
arrest the defendant for the commission of a  
felony. Davis, supra at 714-715. This Court has  
stated that “[t]he per se exclusionary rule arose 
out of and applies to constitutionally invalid 
arrests. The constitutional validity of an arrest 
depends on whether probable cause to arrest existed 
at the moment the arrest was made by the officer.” 
People v Lyon, 227 Mich App 599, 611; 577 NW2d 124 
(1998).  Because probable cause did not exist to 
arrest defendant for the commission of a felony, 
his arrest by Officer Lockhart was constitutionally 
invalid.  Thus, the exclusionary rule applied to 
the evidence against defendant, and the district 
court abused its discretion by binding defendant 
over to the circuit court. 
Accordingly, the 
circuit court properly quashed the information. 
[Slip op at 4.]  
8  
intoxicated.  After the stop, the sobriety tests administered  
by the officer provided probable cause to arrest the defendant  
for OUIL.  
The key premise of the Court of Appeals decision is that  
this was an unconstitutional arrest because of the lack of  
probable cause to arrest for a felony. 
However, probable  
cause to arrest for a felony is not required; rather, probable  
cause that a crime (felony or misdemeanor) has been committed  
is 
the 
constitutional requirement for an arrest.  Accordingly,  
that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest  
defendant for OUIL, third offense (a felony), does not render  
the arrest unconstitutional.  Instead, that the officer did  
have probable cause to arrest defendant for OUIL (a  
misdemeanor) means the arrest did not violate the Fourth  
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures. Because  
the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the  
exclusionary rule does not apply here.10  
A 
number 
of 
decisions 
establish 
that 
statutory 
violations  
do not render police actions unconstitutional. For example,  
10 That the arrest here did not violate the Fourth  
amendment is further evidenced by the fact that if the 
Legislature had provided that a municipal police officer like 
Lockhart could exercise police powers in other jurisdictions 
within the state, such an exercise of legislative authority 
would have been valid and there could have been no  
constitutional objection to this arrest.  Thus, the only 
violation here is the statutory one based on Lockhart’s 
noncompliance with MCL 764.2a.  
9  
 
in People v Meyer, supra, an undercover officer participated  
in 
a 
narcotics 
transaction 
outside 
his 
jurisdiction.  
Defendant sought to have the resulting charges dismissed.  
However, as we said:  
The defendant makes no claim that Officer  
Carpenter’s actions in this case resulted in any 
constitutional deprivation to the defendant, and we 
perceive none. [Id. at 156].[11]  
Similarly, in People v Burdo, 56 Mich App 48, 52; 223 NW2d 358  
(1974), in the context of an arrest for a misdemeanor not  
committed in the officer’s presence, arguably in violation of  
MCL 764.14, the Court of Appeals explained:  
Where, as here, the officer had probable cause 
to believe that the crime had been committed, and 
therefore had the constitutionally required basis 
to search and seize, there would appear to be no 
need to suppress such evidence, even though the 
arrest was statutorily illegal.  
It is clear from previous decisions of this Court that a  
statutory violation like the one in this case does not  
necessarily require application of an exclusionary rule. The  
question in such cases is whether the Legislature intended to  
apply the drastic remedy of exclusion of evidence.  In several  
recent decisions we have found such intent lacking.  See  
People v Sobczak-Obetts, supra (failure to comply with the  
statutory requirement that an affidavit in support of a search  
11 See also People v Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 707, 
contrasting 
the 
constitutional 
violation 
of 
a 
defective 
search 
warrant with violations of statutory procedures for executing 
valid warrants.  
10  
warrant be left with the defendant at the time of execution of  
the warrant, MCL 780.654, 780.655); People v Stevens, supra  
(failure to comply with the “knock and announce” statute, MCL  
780.656, in executing a search warrant).  
As in Sobczak-Obetts and Stevens, we find no indication  
in the language of MCL 764.2a that the Legislature intended to  
impose the drastic sanction of suppression of evidence when an  
officer acts outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Rather, we  
believe that the language supports the analysis of several  
Court of Appeals decisions that the statute was intended, not  
to create a new right of criminal defendants to exclusion of  
evidence, but rather to “protect the rights and autonomy of  
local governments” in the area of law enforcement.  See People  
v Clark, 181 Mich App 577, 581; 450 NW2d 75 (1989); People v  
McCrady, 213 Mich App 474, 480-481; 540 NW2d 718 (1995).12  
IV  
Because 
MCL 
764.2a does not require exclusion of evidence  
obtained as a result of police conduct that is not in  
accordance with the statute, the circuit court erred in  
suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against  
12 Clearly, Officer Lockhart acted here without statutory 
authority.  It is not to condone such activity to conclude 
that its sanction does not lie with the suppression of 
evidence.
 We do not address whether there are any other 
administrative, civil, or criminal remedies available for 
failure to comply with MCL 764.2a.  
11  
 
 
 
 
the defendant.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Livingston Circuit  
Court for further proceedings.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., would grant leave to appeal, but  
would not dispose of this case peremptorily.  
12