Title: Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 230491
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2024

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 230491 
JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH 
 
 
 
June 20, 2024 
RITA M. LEACH-LEWIS, TRUSTEE OF THE 
RITA M. LEACH-LEWIS TRUST 18MAR13 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that a provision of Fairfax County’s zoning 
ordinance required the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) to consider whether the search of a 
residence, conducted by a zoning official who was investigating a zoning violation, complied 
with the Fourth Amendment.  The proceeding at issue, a review of a notice of violation of a 
zoning ordinance, was a civil proceeding.  The County challenges this decision.  It argues that 
the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of 
violation.  We agree with the County.  We further conclude that the residences in question were 
being used as an “office” as that term is defined in the zoning ordinance.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The New World Church of the Christ (the “Church”) is a non-profit religious 
organization.  Rita M. Leach-Lewis (“Leach-Lewis”) is described in the record as the Reverend, 
Matriarch, and President of the Church.  The Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, for which Leach-Lewis 
serves as trustee, owns a number of homes in Fairfax County (the “Houses”).  Members of the 
Church, including Leach-Lewis, reside in the Houses.  Leach-Lewis and the persons who live 
and work in the Houses receive a stipend for their work.  Church members work from the Houses 
 
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to handle correspondence, prepare spiritual teachings, and store files and boxes.  A significant 
portion of one of the Houses is configured for office space, with desks, computers, and 
telephones.  Signs had been installed in this home that are consistent with office use, including 
one sign that is posted above a room that is labeled “office.”  The Houses are located in an area 
that is zoned “Residential-Conservation,” a zoning designation which prohibits office uses. 
 
The Fairfax Police Department alerted zoning officials that there may be zoning 
violations at the Houses.  An investigator with the Department of Code Compliance, John Enos, 
arrived at one of the Houses while the Police Department was there executing a search warrant 
for an unrelated matter.  When Enos arrived, the police were “generally done” but they were still 
present. 
 
Enos and Leach-Lewis provided differing accounts about whether Leach-Lewis gave 
Enos consent to search.  Enos testified that he was greeted at the entrance by “a lady” he 
believed was a member of the Church.  This lady informed Enos that Leach-Lewis was in the 
back sunroom, and she offered to bring him there.  According to Enos, Leach-Lewis then gave 
him consent to walk around the home.  Leach-Lewis, however, testified that she did not grant 
Enos consent to search. 
 
Based on Enos’s findings, the zoning administrator for Fairfax County issued a notice of 
violation of the zoning ordinance.  Specifically, the zoning administrator concluded that a home 
in a residential conservation district was being used as an “office” in violation of the zoning 
ordinance.  The notice of violation stated that the violation should be cleared within thirty days 
of the notice, either by discontinuing the office use on the property, removing “all related 
supplies, materials, and equipment associated with this use,” and “[r]estoring the property to the 
 
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principal use of a residential dwelling,” or by obtaining a special exception from the Board of 
Supervisors.1 
 
Leach-Lewis, as trustee, appealed the notice of violation to the BZA.  She argued that the 
residence at issue was not being used as an “office” because, properly understood, the term 
“office” as defined in the zoning ordinance does not apply to a nonprofit organization engaged in 
spiritual pursuits.  She further argued that the notice of violation was based on an improper 
search under the Fourth Amendment and that “the fruit of [the] unlawful search cannot be used 
to support” the notice of violation.  Leach-Lewis pointed to Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance 
§ 18-901(4), which provides in relevant part that “[n]othing in this Ordinance may be construed 
to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search.  All searches or inspections authorized by 
this Ordinance require a warrant, court order, consent, or another exception to the warrant 
requirement.”  After hearing argument and testimony, the BZA upheld the action of the zoning 
administrator.  The BZA did not address the propriety of the search. 
 
Leach-Lewis next filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the 
Board of Zoning Appeals.  She advanced the same arguments in the circuit court that she had 
made before the BZA.  The circuit court heard additional testimony and upheld the decision of 
the BZA.  The circuit court held that the property was being used as an office in violation of the 
zoning ordinance and that even if the BZA could adjudicate the constitutional issue of whether 
the search was proper, it was not required to do so. 
 
Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals.  A panel of that court reversed the 
judgment of the circuit court in an unpublished memorandum opinion.  Leach-Lewis v. Board of 
 
 
1 The notice of violation also detailed the violation of a separate part of the zoning 
ordinance which governed the height of storage sheds.  That separate violation is not at issue in 
this appeal. 
 
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Supvsrs. of Fairfax Cnty., 2023 Va. App. LEXIS 392 (2023).  The Court of Appeals held that the 
BZA “had a duty to interpret and apply” § 18-901(4) of the zoning ordinance.  Id. at 6.  The 
Court of Appeals directed the circuit court to remand the case to the BZA to determine whether 
the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church’s property.  Id. at 13.  The Court 
of Appeals declined to reach the question of whether the activities of the Church satisfy the 
definition of an “office” under the zoning ordinance.  Id. at 6. 
 
We granted the Board of Supervisors an appeal from this decision. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issues before us are legal issues, namely, whether the BZA should have considered 
§ 18-901(4) of the zoning ordinance in evaluating Leach-Lewis’s appeal from the notice of 
violation and whether the Church’s use of residential homes qualifies as an “office” under the 
zoning ordinance.  We review questions of law de novo.  See Miller & Rhoads Building, L.L.C. 
v. City of Richmond, 292 Va. 537, 541 (2016) (citing Renkey v. County Bd. of Arlington, 272 Va. 
369, 373 (2006)). 
 
I. 
THE ZONING ORDINANCE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OR THE  
 
 
TERMINATION OF A PROCEEDING EVEN IF EVIDENCE IS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED. 
 
 
The first part of § 18-901(4) of the zoning ordinance specifies certain avenues for zoning 
officials to remedy zoning violations.  It provides in relevant part: 
In addition to the remedies provided in Par. 3 above, the Zoning 
Administrator or her agent may seek the issuance of an inspection 
warrant, initiate injunction, mandamus, or any other appropriate 
action to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove such erection or use in 
violation of any provision in this Ordinance.  Such action may also 
be instituted by any citizen who may be aggrieved or particularly 
damaged by any violation of any provisions of this Ordinance. 
 
The ordinance then adds a caveat, that “[n]othing in this Ordinance may be construed to 
authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search.”  Id.  It then states that “[a]ll searches or 
 
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inspections authorized by this Ordinance require a warrant, court order, consent, or another 
exception to the warrant requirement.”  Id.  The apparent purpose of this provision is to insulate 
the County from liability under Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) 
(holding that a local government can be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of its 
employees if those actions were based on governmental custom or, alternatively, official policy 
as reflected in ordinances, regulations, or policy statements).  The text of § 18-901(4) does not 
provide that a zoning case cannot proceed if evidence is unconstitutionally seized, and it does not 
contain a rule calling for exclusion of evidence.2 
 
II. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE IN A  
 
 
CIVIL CASE INVOLVING A NOTICE OF A ZONING VIOLATION. 
 
 
The Fourth Amendment applies of its own force to all government searches, regardless of 
whether it is incorporated by reference in a statute or ordinance.  Under settled law, the 
exclusionary rule, which applies in criminal cases, does not apply in civil cases.  County of 
Henrico v. Ehlers, 237 Va. 594, 603-04 (1989).  See also Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 n.4 (1998) (“[W]e have generally held the exclusionary rule to 
apply only in criminal trials.  We have, moreover, significantly limited its application even in 
that context.”); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (plurality opinion) (exclusionary 
rule does not apply to deportation proceedings). 
Although the United States Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule to civil asset 
forfeitures, see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 & n.7 (1965), 
there are important distinctions between such cases and a case like this one involving the notice 
of a zoning violation.  As the United States Supreme Court observed, “a forfeiture proceeding is 
 
 
2 We express no opinion concerning whether, under Dillon’s Rule, a locality could 
fashion an exclusionary rule governing searches and seizures in the zoning context. 
 
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quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the 
commission of an offense against the law.”  Id. at 700.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted, 
“[i]t would be anomalous indeed . . . to hold that[,] in the criminal proceeding[,] the illegally 
seized evidence is excludable, while[,] in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination 
that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible.”  Id. at 701. 
 
Leach-Lewis observes that a zoning case could in time lead to a criminal prosecution and, 
therefore, application of the exclusionary rule is warranted.  The simple answer to that argument 
is that if the County does prosecute a zoning case as a criminal violation, then the exclusionary 
rule would come into play.  Here, however, we are dealing with a notice of violation of a zoning 
ordinance, not a criminal prosecution.  As noted above, in the absence of a criminal prosecution, 
the exclusionary rule does not apply. 
Although the zoning violation here is hardly catastrophic, we observe that extending the 
exclusionary rule to the civil and administrative context could, in many applications, have a 
significant damaging impact on the health and safety of a community or on the persons who 
work in a particular establishment.  For example, an administrative agency might conduct a 
search to determine whether a company was releasing toxic chemicals into the air or water, or it 
might be investigating unsafe labor practices that endanger the health and safety of workers. 
Finally, we note that a person who suffers from an illegal search that leads to a civil 
enforcement action is not without a remedy, even if that remedy is not the exclusion of evidence.  
Depending on the circumstances, tort law may provide a remedy, such as an action for trespass.  
In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 affords an individual the right to sue government employees for 
constitutional violations.  Under settled precedent from the United States Supreme Court, 
however, which we are bound to follow, the exclusionary rule does not apply to this zoning case. 
 
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III. 
THE BZA WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER § 18-901(4), BECAUSE THAT PORTION  
 
 
OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE HAD NO APPLICATION TO THE PROCEEDING BEFORE IT. 
 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Code § 15.2-2309(1) requires a BZA to “consider 
any applicable ordinances, laws, and regulations” in evaluating Leach-Lewis’s challenge to the 
notice of violation and, because § 18-901(4) is part of the zoning ordinance, the BZA should 
have considered it.  Leach-Lewis, 2023 Va. App. LEXIS 392 *9.  The key word from Code 
§ 15.2-2309(1) is “applicable” ordinances.  The BZA was not required to consider § 18-901(4) of 
the zoning ordinance because it had no applicability to whether Leach-Lewis’s property was 
illegally being used as an office.  Under the plain language of § 18-901(4), and under settled 
caselaw interpreting the Fourth Amendment, § 18-901(4) does not compel exclusion of evidence 
and does not foreclose enforcement of a civil zoning action.  Therefore, consideration by the 
BZA of § 18-901(4) would not have halted the proceeding or resulted in the exclusion of 
evidence even if (a point we do not resolve) the evidence was seized in contravention of the 
Fourth Amendment.  In effect, under the Court of Appeals’ holding, the BZA – an entity for 
which members are not required to have any legal training and which is generally not composed 
of lawyers, see Code § 15.2-2308 (BZA members are residents appointed by the circuit court) – 
would be asked to issue an advisory opinion concerning the legality of a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Neither state nor local law requires such an exercise. 
The question before the BZA was whether the house in question was illegally being used 
as an office.  Whether evidence was seized in contravention of the Fourth Amendment is not a 
consideration that is applicable to that determination.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing the judgment of the circuit court and in remanding for the BZA to hear evidence 
concerning the propriety of the search under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
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IV. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT THE CHURCH USED THE HOUSES IN QUESTION AS  
 
 
AN “OFFICE” UNDER THE FAIRFAX ZONING ORDINANCE. 
 
In the alternative, Leach-Lewis argues that the Houses do not constitute an “office” under 
the zoning ordinance.  Leach-Lewis contends that the Church’s activities, which are spiritual in 
nature, are not a “business” within the language of the ordinance.  Leach-Lewis invokes canons 
of construction known by their Latin expressions, “ejusdem generis” and “noscitur a sociis.” 
At the time, Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance § 20-300 defined an “office” as follows: 
 
Any room, studio, clinic, suite or building wherein the 
primary use is the conduct of a business such as accounting, 
correspondence, research, editing, administration or analysis; or 
the conduct of a business by salesmen, sales representatives or 
manufacturer’s representatives; or the conduct of a business by 
professionals such as engineers, architects, land surveyors, artists, 
musicians, lawyers, accountants, real estate brokers, insurance 
agents, certified massage therapists in accordance with Chapter 
28.1 of The Code, dentists or physicians, urban planners and 
landscape architects. 
 
In addition, any use shall be deemed an office use which: 
(a) involves the administration and conduct of investigation, 
examination or experimentation, but which does not include the 
operation of laboratory facilities, pilot plants, prototype 
production, or the assembly, integration, testing, manufacture or 
production of goods arid products on site; or (b) involves prototype 
production limited to computer software development, 
demographic and market research, technical or academic 
consulting services, and data processing facilities.  Office shall not 
involve manufacturing, fabrication, production, processing, 
assembling, cleaning, testing, repair or storage of materials, goods 
and products; or the sale and/or delivery of any materials, goods or 
products which are physically located on the premises.  An office 
shall not be deemed to include a veterinary clinic. 
 
“When construing a zoning ordinance and its undefined terms, we give such terms their 
‘plain and natural meaning.’”  Adams Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 274 Va. 
189, 196 (2007) (quoting Capelle v. Orange County, 269 Va. 60, 65 (2005)).  We also afford 
 
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“great weight” to the interpretation given to a zoning ordinance by the officials charged with its 
administration.  Id. 
The ejusdem generis canon translates as “of the same class or nature.”  This canon of 
construction can lead a court to conclude that “when a particular class of persons or things is 
enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general words are to be restricted in their 
meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words.”  Norton v. Board of 
Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty., 299 Va. 749, 759 (2021) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 
Va. 298, 301-02 (1982)).  That canon of construction does not apply here because the ordinance 
provides a general term followed by illustrative (“such as”) examples.  Tomlin v. 
Commonwealth, 302 Va. 356, 367-68 (2023). 
Noscitur a sociis translates as “it is known by its associates.”  Under the noscitur a sociis 
canon of construction, “when general and specific words are grouped, the general words are 
limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
things identified by the specific words.”  Sainani v. Belmont Glen Homeowners Ass’n, 297 Va. 
714, 724 (2019) (quoting Martin, 224 Va. at 301-02).  This canon of construction is also 
unhelpful here, because, again, the ordinance employs a plain language term followed by 
illustrative examples, as opposed to a grouping of general and specific words. 
The words employed by the zoning ordinance have a plain language meaning.  The word 
“business” is commonly understood to be both “[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit” 
and “a particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for livelihood or gain.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (11th ed. 2019).  The evidence, including from Church 
leadership, established that Church members earned their livelihood through their work for the 
Church and that they performed their work at least in substantial part in the Houses in question.  
 
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The ordinance does not employ the term “for profit” in characterizing a business and it contains 
no exception for spiritual endeavors.  The ordinance also uses the word “such as” to illustrate 
some of the activities that typically are conducted in an “office.”  The ordinance specifically lists 
“correspondence, research, and editing” as examples of activities that fall within the definition of 
an “office” use.  The Church admitted it was doing all of these things at these Houses.  The 
evidence plainly established that the Houses, which were situated in an area that is zoned 
residential, were being used as offices within the ordinary meaning of the word.  Consequently, 
we reject Leach-Lewis’s argument that the use of the Houses did not fall within the definition of 
an “office” as that term is defined by the zoning ordinance. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and final 
judgment is entered in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. 
Reversed and final judgment.