Title: Vogel v. Board of County Com'rs of Gallatin Co.
Citation: 483 P.2d 270
Docket Number: 11876
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 1971

483 P.2d 270 (1971) W. Glen VOGEL and Okarche M. Vogel, Husband and Wife, Petitioners and Appellants, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF GALLATIN COUNTY, Montana, et al., Respondents and Respondents. No. 11876. Supreme Court of Montana. March 16, 1971. Rehearing Denied April 13, 1971. *271 Lyman H. Bennett, Jr., argued, Bozeman, for appellants. Berg, O'Connell, Angel &amp; Andriolo, Bozeman, Ben E. Berg, Jr., argued, Bozeman, McKinley Anderson, Jr., argued, Bozeman, for respondents. DALY, Justice. Appellants, W. Glen Vogel and Okarche M. Vogel, husband and wife, brought a petition for a writ of mandate in the district court to compel the respondents, Harold Fryslie, City Manager and Director of Public Service of the city of Bozeman; Ralph Armstrong, Clifford Pasha and Leslie O. Anderson, as the board of county commissioners of Gallatin County, to approve appellants' map of 0.950 acres of land lying within three miles of the city limits of the city of Bozeman, a duty specifically required by law upon their respective offices. The application for the writ was also directed against Carl L. Stucky, county clerk and recorder of Gallatin County, to compel the recording of appellants' deed and map. David Vogel, Sr., appellants' father, gave and transferred to appellants by warranty deed dated October 3, 1969, a tract of land containing 0.950 acres carved out of his farm. This tract fronts on Bridger Highway on the north, joins Green Acres Subdivision on the east; directly across Bridger Highway to the north is the Ed Vogel Subdivision, a suburban residential area having direct access to Bridger Highway. Vogel Sr. gave the property to his son for the purpose of constructing a home which was underway at the time appellants presented their deed and plat to respondents. Green Acres, which joins this property on the east has reserved a 40 foot frontage road easement to the south of Bridger Highway designed to provide limited access to Bridger Highway for traffic safety purposes. Appellants presented their map of the area and deed for recording under section 11-614, R.C.M. 1947, as an irregularly shaped tract. Section 11-614, R.C.M. 1947, provides: Appellants urge that section 11-614 is controlling with respect to irregular shaped tracts of less than ten acres inasmuch as there was no indication that the property was being subdivided or platted for building purposes. They further maintain that section 11-614.1, R.C.M. 1947, has no application. That section provides: Upon this premise it was argued that respondent Harold Fryslie, Director of Public Service for the city of Bozeman, had no jurisdiction to act under section 11-3305, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: Following a personal inspection of the described property of appellants, Harold Fryslie refused to endorse his approval of appellants' map unless and until they dedicated a frontage road forty feet south of the Bridger Highway and coterminous with the frontage road reservation in the Green Acres subdivision. Traffic safety was ascribed as the reason for the requirement of the frontage road. In support of his decision Fryslie made reference to the regulations compiled and recommended by the city-county planning board and adopted by the city commission of the city of Bozeman, specifically requiring frontage road approaches to principal or arterial highways. The district court sitting without a jury heard the appellants' petition, denied the writ of mandate and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment. Appellants then appealed to this Court from the district court's final judgment; from a denial by that court of their motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law; and from its denial of exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that appellants' plat indicated the land to be for building purposes; that the county commission of Gallatin County may require the plat to be prepared in accordance with all of the requirements for plats of cities, towns or additions thereto, under and pursuant to sections 11-602 through 11-614.1, R.C.M. 1947; *273 that respondent Harold Fryslie, as Director of Public Service and supervisor of plats of the city of Bozeman, under and pursuant to section 11-3305, R.C.M. 1947, may require and is justified in requiring in accordance with the regulations prescribed therefor that appellants' plat provide a frontage road over and across the north 40 feet of appellants' proposed plat as access to and from appellants' property abutting on Bridger Road Secondary Highway No. 293 and for the protection of through traffic on said Bridger Highway. Appellants present five issues for determination by this Court, however, two basic issues control this matter. First, appellants argue that the requirement for the frontage road as determined by the city commission and the county commission is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to zone the area outside the city, unless accomplished by establishing a zoning district approved by a vote of the residents therein. Appellants rely on Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc., 139 Mont. 263, 362 P.2d 1021, which did declare as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to counties statutes empowering city-county planning boards to exercise complete control over areas contiguous, unincorporated and surrounding cities and within a 12 mile radius with a master zoning plan. Respondents contend appellants are correct in so far as zoning is concerned and zoning, generally speaking, concerns the land use as opposed to planning and platting regulation which, although a related endeavor, is in no way to be considered zoning. This distinction is discussed by the New Mexico Court in City of Carlsbad v. Caviness, 66 N.M. 230, 346 P.2d 310. In that case the city contended that it could prevent the transfer of a liquor license to a location outside the city limits by virtue of its extraterritorial authority to plat and plan within three miles of the city limits. The New Mexico Supreme Court stated the issue in this manner: Then, holding that zoning powers were not within the purview of planning or platting, the court noted this distinction between zoning and platting: The New Mexico court held that the legislature had granted the cities extraterritorial jurisdiction for planning and platting; the authority did not include zoning power. An identical situation is found in section 11-3305, R.C.M. 1947, which confers extraterritorial platting powers on the city; it is not an extension of zoning authority. Concerning the validity of extraterritorial jurisdiction of municipal platting statutes the Ohio court in examination of a statute similar to section 11-3305, R.C.M. 1947, in Prudential Co-op. Realty Co. v. City of Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N.E. 695, 698, said: In Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 36, 394 P.2d 182, this Court in speaking of section 11-602(9), R.C.M. 1947 (one of the sections determinative of this appeal), which was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in that the city council or board of county commissioners could in their discretion in certain cases diminish or waive the area to be dedicated for parks, made the following observations: This Court in Billings Properties also approved the doctrine of "reasonableness" as set out in Prudential Co-op. Realty Co. and held that the legislature could set guidelines within which boards, commissions, and municipalities could make discretionary technical application and it was not an unconstitutional delegation merely because of this latitude or because the legislature could itself have set the standards. There is no question but that the legislature in section 11-602, R.C.M. 1947, set the standards within which municipalities, planning boards and county commissions have to view plats and subdivisions with regard to layout and planning requirements as it concerns streets as well as parks and because it was not definitive as to all specific details and allows "reasonable" rules to be formulated by virtue of the failure to apply specific requirements does not in any way constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. *275 The question then becomes the reasonableness of the regulation in relation to the governmental purpose to be served and each case must be viewed in the light of its own circumstances. We have no difficulty in finding sufficient evidence to support the reasonableness of the regulation under consideration here and approved by the trial court. The second issue that controls here, simply stated, is whether or not the acreage here being considered is merely a tract less than 10 acres to be platted by metes and bounds and a map furnished with the instrument passing title and to be recorded therewith so it can be identified by the county authorities charged with the processing of these transfers or is it a parcel less than 10 acres which comes under the classification of a subdivision being platted for building purposes which then falls within the regulatory provision of platting as set forth in the three code sections quoted above. Both parties argued at length with considerable conviction on the subjects of the definition of maps, plats, subdivisions and related matters, and also the statutory history of the controlling statutes. The fact still remains that the statutory sections treat both types of acreage that are less than 10 acres in size and it necessarily becomes a fact situation in the final analysis as to the duties and obligations of the parties when land is subdivided from larger acreage into tracts of less than 10 acres, to be determined in each case into which classification the tract will fall and which regulations will apply. It is not unreasonable to consider the adjoining and surrounding areas, as was done here, to determine if in fact the parcel if not regulated would destroy the orderly development of the area as it pertains to public use, enjoyment, benefit and safety. The argument by appellants that the map or plat itself did not indicate on its face that it was a subdivision or for building purposes is not sound in the sense that the language of section 11-614.1, R.C.M. 1947, when it commands that "Where the survey plat indicates that the property is being subdivided or platted for building purposes", could very easily be interpreted to mean it must indicate and end the argument at that point. (Emphasis supplied). In the interest of not belaboring this opinion with a full legal discussion on that point it should be sufficient to observe that if the appellant's position were to be adopted it would take the regulatory powers from the hands of the authorities constituted by statute and place it in the hands of the platter and subdivider in that they could bring in full subdivision a parcel at a time, as long as each was less than 10 acres and contained no other designation or intention, if the authorities charged by statute to regulate could not look beyond the individual plat to make their determinations. We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of the trial court. Judgment affirmed. JAMES T. HARRISON, C.J., and JOHN C. HARRISON and CASTLES. JJ., concur. HASWELL, J., did not participate.