Title: Clint v. Stolworthy
Citation: 357 P.2d 649
Docket Number: 19235
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 1960

357 P.2d 649 (1960) Ane D. CLINT, Plaintiff in Error, v. Daniel Robert STOLWORTHY, an Infant, by his Next Friend, Junuetta B. Greenwood, Defendants in Error. No. 19235. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. December 12, 1960. Rehearing Denied December 30, 1960. Joseph A. Myers, H. D. Reed, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Barry, Dawkins &amp; Boyle, Denver, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court where defendant in error was plaintiff and plaintiff in error was defendant. All pertinent facts were submitted to the trial court upon stipulation of the parties. In essence they are as follows: *650 The plaintiff, a minor, is the son of David K. Clint, Jr., deceased. Said decedent and plaintiff's mother were formerly husband and wife and their marriage was terminated in divorce. At the time of the divorce an agreement was entered into between the parents by which the father made certain provisions for the support of the minor child. The provisions thus made did not take the form of monthly payments but consisted of the conveyance of real estate from the father to the mother. The property settlement was fully performed by the parties thereto. Plaintiff lived apart from his father who made no contribution to his son's support except as provided by the agreement with the mother. The mother remarried and caused plaintiff's surname to be changed from Clint to Stolworthy. The father married the defendant. Thereafter he was killed while riding on a railroad train and defendant as his widow brought an action to recover damages for his wrongful death. She was awarded judgment in the amount of $10,000.00 from which she received the net sum of $5,298.25 after payment of attorneys fees and other expenses which were conceded to be necessary and reasonable. Plaintiff, minor son of the deceased Clint, brought this action by his mother to share in this net recovery to the extent of one-fourth thereof, being the proportionate amount to which he would be entitled in accordance with the statute of descent and distribution. C.R.S. 1953, 41-1-1(1) provides in pertinent part: "(a) By the husband or wife of deceased; or It is clear that the above statute imposes liability as a penalty, and pecuniary loss or compensatory damages do not form the basis of recovery. The amount of recovery under this section depends on the degree of culpability of the defendant. Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company v. Frederic, 57 Colo. 90, 140 P. 463. C.R.S. '53, 41-1-2, provides: C.R.S. '53, 41-1-3, reads in pertinent part: This section then provides that no recovery shall be had under both sections of the act, and that, "* * * plaintiff shall be required to elect under which section he will proceed." In the instant action the plaintiff elected to proceed under C.R.S. 41-1-2. Do the proceeds of a judgment obtained by a widow and based only on her pecuniary loss under Sections 41-1-2 and 41-1-3 belong solely to her, or is the judgment to be owned by and divided among the heirs as provided in 41-1-1, even though heirs other than the widow personally suffered no pecuniary loss? We hold that the proceeds of such a judgment are owned by and are to be divided among the heirs pursuant to the mandate of 41-1-3, which decrees that the judgment "shall be sued for and recovered by the same parties and in the same manner as provided in section 41-1-1." This latter section requires proportionate division among the heirs. The right to maintain an action for wrongful death did not exist at the common law, and we look exclusively to the terms of the statute for direction as to the distribution to be made of moneys recovered thereunder. The statute must be construed as one act and each section construed as it is connected with and related to the whole act. We think the trial court correctly construed the act. The "Conclusions and Judgment" there entered contain the following language which we approve and adopt as part of this opinion: "It is clear, then, that Sections 41-1-1 and 41-1-3 complement each other and are to be construed together, Section 41-1-1 providing (1) who may bring the action and (2) the method of distributing the amount recovered; while Section 41-1-3 provides the *652 method of determining the amount of the damages to be recovered. The judgment is affirmed. KNAUSS and DOYLE, JJ., concur.