Title: Robert Prosser v. Richard A. Leuck
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000686
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0686 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Robert Prosser,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Richard A. Leuck and Cedarburg Mutual Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEASL 
Reported at:  216 Wis. 2d 115, 573 N.W.2d 900 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 13, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Barron 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward R. Brunner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. and Steinmetz, J., join. 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent-
petitioner there were briefs by Jason W. Whitley and Novitzke, 
Gust & Sempf, Amery and oral argument by Jason W. Whitley. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants 
there was a brief by Timothy M. Doyle and Thrasher, Doyle, Pelish 
& Franti, Ltd., Rice Lake and oral argument by Timothy M. Doyle. 
 
No.  97-0686 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0686 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert Prosser,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard A. Leuck and Cedarburg Mutual  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants.  
FILED 
 
APR 21, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner, Robert Prosser 
(Prosser), requests that this court reverse the court of 
appeals’ decision which determined that Prosser’s settlement 
offer 
to 
respondent 
Cedarburg 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Company 
(Cedarburg) was ambiguous and therefore invalid.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals also determined that Prosser was not 
entitled to double costs and interest from Cedarburg.  The 
ambiguity arose from the lack of clarity as to whether the offer 
of settlement was extended only to Cedarburg or to both 
Cedarburg and its insured, Richard A. Leuck (Leuck).  We hold 
that an insurer, as part of its fiduciary duty to its insured, 
has a duty to clarify an offer of settlement that is ambiguous 
with respect to whether the offer applies to only the insurer or 
No.  97-0686 
 
2 
both the insurer and the insured.  Failure to clarify the 
ambiguity results in a valid offer pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01.  We also hold, based on the plain language of 
§ 807.01(3) and (4), that Prosser is entitled to double costs, 
including 
costs associated 
with determining 
coverage, and 
interest from the date of the settlement offer throughout the 
trial on determining coverage.   
¶2 
The history underlying this case is not in dispute.  
In 1992 defendant Leuck, a minor, started a fire which destroyed 
a warehouse owned by Prosser.  On March 25, 1993, Prosser sued 
Leuck and his parents’ insurance company, Cedarburg, for the 
damages to his warehouse and its contents. 
¶3 
On October 13, 1993, Prosser served Cedarburg with an 
offer of settlement for $99,750 “plus the actual costs of this 
action.”  The offer was addressed only to Cedarburg and its 
attorneys.  Prosser offered to dismiss “this pending litigation 
and the entirety of defendant’s liability attendant to said 
litigation . . . in exchange for the defendant’s payment” of 
$99,750 
“cash, 
plus 
the 
actual 
costs 
of 
this 
action.”  
Cedarburg’s insurance policy limit in this case was $100,000.   
¶4 
Cedarburg made no response to Prosser’s settlement 
offer.  Rather, because there was some evidence that Leuck 
intentionally started the fire, Cedarburg challenged coverage 
under its policy which provided an exclusion for intentional 
acts.  On June 30, 1994, Cedarburg filed a motion to bifurcate 
the coverage issue from the liability and damages issues and to 
stay the underlying proceedings pending resolution of the 
No.  97-0686 
 
3 
coverage issue.  The Barron County Circuit Court, Judge James C. 
Eaton presiding,1 granted this motion on August 22, 1994.   
¶5 
After a trial and appeal, the court of appeals 
determined that the Cedarburg policy did provide coverage to 
Leuck for the claim.  Prosser v. Leuck, 196 Wis. 2d 780, 788, 
539 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995).  The court of appeals remanded 
the case to the circuit court for entry of judgment in favor of 
Prosser in such amount as ultimately determined.  Cedarburg 
filed a petition for review but this court denied review of the 
court of appeals’ decision on November 14, 1995.  
¶6 
On November 30, 1995, Cedarburg tendered its policy 
limit of $100,000 to Prosser.  Prosser did not accept this 
tender and on January 2, 1996, filed a motion for summary 
judgment and for double costs and interest pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01(3) and (4)2 for Cedarburg’s failing to accept its 
                     
1 Following the court of appeals’ decision on the coverage 
issue, Prosser filed a motion for substitution of judge and the 
Honorable Edward R. Brunner was assigned to the case.  
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1991-
92 version unless otherwise noted.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 807.01(3) and (4) provide: 
(3) After issue is joined but at least 20 days 
before trial, the plaintiff may serve upon the 
defendant a written offer of settlement for the sum, 
or property, or to the effect therein specified, with 
costs.  If the defendant accepts the offer and serves 
notice thereof in writing, before trial and within 10 
days after receipt of the offer, the defendant may 
file the offer, with proof of service of the notice of 
acceptance, with the clerk of court.  If notice of 
acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given as 
evidence nor mentioned on the trial.  If the offer of 
No.  97-0686 
 
4 
settlement offer of October 13, 1993.  At a hearing on December 
19, 1996, the parties stipulated that judgment would be entered 
against Cedarburg in the amount of its policy limit, $100,000, 
and that the issue of double costs and interest pursuant to 
§ 807.01(3) and (4) would be determined by the circuit court. 
¶7 
The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Prosser’s 
motion 
for 
interest pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) but determined that 
the accrual of interest was tolled, along with the stay of the 
liability and damages issues, pending resolution of the coverage 
issue.  Accordingly, the circuit court awarded Prosser interest 
from the date of the settlement offer, October 13, 1993, through 
the date the circuit court stayed the underlying action, and 
from the date this court denied review of the court of appeals’ 
decision regarding coverage, November 14, 1995, through the date 
Cedarburg tendered its policy limits, November 30, 1995.  The 
circuit court denied Prosser’s motion for double costs pursuant 
to § 807.01(3), reasoning that most of Prosser’s costs were 
associated with litigating the coverage issue. 
                                                                  
settlement is not accepted and the plaintiff recovers 
a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall recover 
double the amount of the taxable costs. 
(4) If there is an offer of settlement by a party 
under this section which is not accepted and the party 
recovers a judgment which is greater than or equal to 
the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the 
party is entitled to interest at the annual rate of 
12% on the amount recovered from the date of the offer 
of settlement until the amount is paid.  Interest 
under this section is in lieu of interest computed 
under ss. 814.04(4) and 815.05(8). 
(5)  
No.  97-0686 
 
5 
¶8 
Prosser appealed the circuit court’s decision that 
interest did not accrue while the underlying action was stayed 
pending resolution of the coverage issue.  Prosser also argued 
that the circuit court erred in denying him double costs 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  Cedarburg cross-appealed, 
arguing that Prosser’s settlement offer was ambiguous and 
therefore invalid and that Prosser accordingly was not entitled 
to recover interest or double costs. 
¶9 
In an unpublished decision,3 the court of appeals held 
that Prosser’s settlement offer was ambiguous because it did not 
enable Cedarburg “to determine the amount required to settle the 
case and determine whether its duty to defend [Leuck] would 
survive the proferred settlement.”  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals determined that the offer was invalid and Prosser was 
not entitled to double costs or interest under Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3) and (4).   
¶10 This court accepted Prosser’s petition for review 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1).  This case presents 
two issues for our determination.  First, does an insurance 
company have a duty to clarify an ambiguous settlement offer?  
We hold that an insurer, as part of its fiduciary duty to its 
insured, has a duty to clarify an offer of settlement that is 
ambiguous with respect to whether the offer applies to only the 
insurer or both the insurer and the insured.   Failure to 
                     
3 Prosser v. Leuck, No. 97-0686, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997).  
No.  97-0686 
 
6 
clarify the ambiguity results in a valid offer pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01.  The second issue presented is whether, given 
the circumstances of this case, Prosser is entitled to double 
costs and interest pursuant to § 807.01(3) and (4) and if so, to 
what extent.  We hold that Prosser is entitled to double costs, 
even for costs associated with determining coverage, and 
interest from the date of the settlement offer, throughout the 
trial on determining coverage. 
I. 
¶11 We now turn to the first issue: whether an insurer has 
a duty to clarify an offer of settlement that is ambiguous with 
respect to whether the offer of settlement applies to only the 
insurer or both the insurer and the insured.  Whether an offer 
is unambiguous and therefore valid for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01 is a question of law that appellate courts review de 
novo.  Testa v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 164 Wis. 2d 296, 300, 474 
N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1991).  
¶12 Cedarburg argues that the offer it received from 
Prosser was ambiguous and we agree.  As the court of appeals 
aptly stated: 
 
. . . Cedarburg was unable to determine from the offer 
the amount necessary to settle the case. . . .  The 
offer’s ambiguity as to whether the entire litigation 
would be dismissed also prevented an evaluation of 
Cedarburg’s 
collateral 
exposure. 
 
Specifically, 
Cedarburg could not determine from the offer whether 
it would still owe a duty to defend its insured. 
Prosser v. Leuck, No. 97-0686, unpublished slip op. at 5,  (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997). 
No.  97-0686 
 
7 
¶13 Generally, a plaintiff or offeror has the burden to 
make an offer of settlement clear and unambiguous.  DeMars v. 
LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 375, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985).  “The 
defendant’s only duty is to accept the offer in writing within 
ten days after its receipt, if so desired."  Id.  The offer must 
allow the defendant to fully and fairly evaluate his or her own 
exposure to liability.  Testa, 164 Wis. 2d at 302.  This general 
rule works well and is appropriate when the defendant or offeree 
is concerned with, and responsible for, only his or her own 
interests.  
¶14 This general rule does not work well, however, when 
the offeree must be concerned with and is responsible for not 
only its own interests and exposure to liability, but also the 
interests and liability of another.  Such is the case with 
Cedarburg. 
 
[I]n the standard liability insurance contract the 
insured surrenders completely the right to control the 
settlement or litigation of the victim’s claim within 
the limits of the insurer’s exposure.  The threat to 
the insured is obvious: If the insurer fails to settle 
a third-party claim within the limits of the policy 
and chooses instead to litigate the matter, the 
insured will be exposed to that portion of any 
judgment which exceeds the policy limits. 
Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 60, 307 
N.W.2d 256 (1981).  By entering into an insurance contract and 
taking control of settlement or litigation the insurer assumes a 
fiduciary duty on behalf of the insured.  “Because the insured 
has given up something of value to the insurernamely, the right 
to defend and settle a claimthe insurer has been said to be in 
No.  97-0686 
 
8 
the position of a fiduciary with respect to an insured’s 
interest in settlement of a claim.”  Mowry v. Badger State Mut. 
Cas., 129 Wis. 2d 496, 511, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986) (citing Alt v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 348, 237 N.W.2d 
706 (1976)).   
¶15 The fiduciary duty “carries with it the duty to act on 
behalf of the insured and to exercise the same standard of care 
that the insurance company would exercise were it exercising 
ordinary diligence in respect to its own business."  Alt, 71 
Wis. 2d at 348.  See also Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 
204 Wis. 1, 7, 231 N.W. 257, 235 N.W. 413 (1931) (the insured 
"'ought to be held to that degree of care and diligence which an 
ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the management of 
his own business . . . .'"  (citation omitted)). 
¶16 The fiduciary duty imposes several obligations on the 
insurer.  These include: 1) the insurer must diligently 
investigate to ascertain facts upon which to base a good-faith 
decision whether to settle; 2) the insurer must inform the 
insured of any likelihood of liability in excess of policy 
limits so that the insured might properly protect him or 
herself; 3) the insurer must timely inform the insured of any 
settlement offers received and of the progress of settlement 
negotiations.  Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 510.  The insurer must 
fulfill these obligations as part of its fiduciary duty even if 
it challenges coverage.  Id. at 524. 
¶17 When an insurer receives an offer of settlement that 
is ambiguous with respect to whether the offer applies to only 
No.  97-0686 
 
9 
the insurer or both the insurer and the insured, it cannot 
fulfill these obligations without clarifying the offer.  
¶18 The present case provides an illustration.  Cedarburg 
argues to this court that it could not ascertain whether 
Prosser’s offer, addressed only to Cedarburg, proposed releasing 
only Cedarburg or also its insured, Leuck.   However, under 
either interpretation, the potential impact on its fiduciary 
Leuck was significant.  If the offer released only Cedarburg, 
Leuck would remain in the case but bereft of the coverage 
provided by Cedarburg.  If the offer applied to both, acceptance 
of the offer would release Leuck from any further exposure.  
Under either scenario, the impact on Leuck is apparent.  
Accordingly, consistent with its fiduciary duty, Cedarburg had a 
duty to clarify the ambiguity of whether the offer applied only 
to Cedarburg or to Cedarburg and its insured.  Because Cedarburg 
did not clarify the ambiguity, the offer is a valid offer 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  
¶19 This holding comports with our recent holding in Towne 
Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 201 Wis. 2d 260, 548 N.W.2d 64 
(1996) in which this court determined that an insurance company 
has a duty to clarify whether an insured wants the insurer to 
provide a defense.  Towne Realty, 201 Wis. 2d at 269.   
 
[W]e hold that if it is unclear or ambiguous whether 
the insured wishes the insurer to defend the suit, it 
becomes 
the 
responsibility 
of 
the 
insurer 
to 
communicate with the 
insured 
before the 
insurer 
unilaterally foregoes the defense.  . . .  [T]his 
holding 
should 
not 
create 
an 
onerous 
duty 
for 
insurers: a simple letter requesting clarification of 
No.  97-0686 
 
10
the insured's position should suffice.  (Footnotes 
omitted). 
Id.  Similarly, a simple letter or telephone call requesting 
clarification of the offeror’s position should suffice. 
¶20 Our holding also promotes the purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01 which is to encourage settlement and accordingly, 
secure just, speedy and inexpensive determinations of disputes. 
 See In re Marriage of Schmidt v. Schmidt, 212 Wis. 2d 405, 412-
13, 569 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1997); White v. General Cas. Co. of 
Wisconsin, 118 Wis. 2d 433, 438, 348 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 As noted by the court of appeals in this case, there is no 
reason that an insurer, bound by its fiduciary duty, cannot make 
reasonable 
inquiries regarding ambiguities 
so 
that 
easily 
correctable errors do not compromise the utility of a settlement 
offer.   
¶21 Cedarburg argues that if the court imposes a duty on 
the insured to clarify an ambiguous settlement offer, such rule 
is new and should be applied prospectively only.  We disagree.  
¶22 “Generally, this court adheres to the ‘Blackstonian 
Doctrine,’ 
which 
provides 
that 
a 
decision 
overruling 
or 
repudiating 
an 
earlier 
decision 
operates 
retrospectively.”  
Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 363, 550 N.W.2d 124 
(1996).  The court has recognized exceptions to the Blackstonian 
Doctrine when it would be inequitable in the particular case to 
apply the new rule retrospectively.  Id. at 363-64.  Recognizing 
an exception to retrospective application is a question of 
policy for the court.  Id. 
No.  97-0686 
 
11
¶23 We recognize that prior case law, even that involving 
defendant insurers, determined that the offeror has a duty to 
draft a clear and unambiguous settlement offer.  See, e.g., 
DeMars, 123 Wis. 2d at 375.  However, insurers have had a 
fiduciary duty to their insureds at least since 1931 with this 
court’s decision in Hilker, 204 Wis. 1.  Prior case law imposing 
the burden on the offeror to make a clear and unambiguous offer 
even when the offeree was an insurer did not consider the 
relationship 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 807.01 
and 
the 
well-
established fiduciary duty that an insurer owes to its insured. 
 Requiring insurers to clarify ambiguity in settlement offers is 
simply part of their long and well-established fiduciary duty to 
their insureds.  Accordingly, we are not convinced that a 
balancing of equities requires an exception to the Blackstonian 
Doctrine of retrospective application.  
¶24 In sum, we conclude that as part of its fiduciary duty 
to its insured, an insurer has a duty to clarify any ambiguity 
in a settlement offer it receives with respect to whether the 
offer applies to only the insurer or both the insurer and the 
insured.  Failure to clarify the ambiguity results in a valid 
offer pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  Accordingly, because 
Cedarburg did not clarify Prosser’s settlement offer, the offer 
was valid. 
II. 
¶25 Having determined that Prosser’s settlement offer was 
valid, we now turn to the second issue presented: given the 
circumstances of this case, is Prosser entitled to double costs 
No.  97-0686 
 
12
and interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3) and (4), and if so, to 
what extent?  To resolve this issue, we must first determine 
whether the judgment in this case was more favorable than 
Prosser’s offer of settlement.  If it was, Prosser is entitled 
to double costs and interest.  However, if Prosser is entitled 
to double costs and interest we must also consider whether costs 
associated with determining a coverage issue are subject to 
doubling under § 807.01(3) and whether a stay of an underlying 
case pending determination of coverage also stays accrual of 
interest under § 807.01(4).   
A. 
¶26 Whether Prosser is entitled to double costs and 
interest requires application of Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3) and (4). 
 Applying a statute to a set of facts is a question that this 
court reviews de novo.  St. ex rel. Badke v. Greendale Village 
Bd., 173 Wis. 2d 553, 569, 494 N.W.2d 408 (1993).   
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 807.01(3) provides that a plaintiff 
shall recover double the amount of taxable costs if the 
plaintiff recovers a judgment that is more favorable than the 
amount of the rejected settlement offer.  Therefore, to 
determine whether Prosser is entitled to receive double costs 
under § 807.01(3), we must determine whether he recovered a 
judgment that is “more favorable” than the settlement offer he 
made. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 807.01(4) provides that a party is 
entitled to interest under that section if the party recovers a 
judgment which is greater than or equal to the amount specified 
No.  97-0686 
 
13
in the rejected settlement offer.  To determine whether Prosser 
is entitled to interest under § 807.01(4), we must determine 
whether he recovered a judgment that is “greater than or equal 
to” the settlement offer he made. 
¶28 On 
October 
13, 
1993, 
Prosser 
sent 
Cedarburg 
a 
settlement offer for $99,750 “plus the actual costs of this 
action.”4  On December 19, 1996, the parties stipulated that 
Prosser’s damages exceeded Cedarburg’s policy limits of $100,000 
and that judgment would be entered against Cedarburg in the 
amount of $100,000.  Although the record shows that Prosser’s 
“actual costs of this action” exceeded $250, we nevertheless 
conclude that the judgment was more favorable, and greater than 
Prosser’s settlement offer. 
                     
4 We 
recognize 
that 
after the circuit 
court granted 
Cedarburg’s motion to bifurcate the coverage issue and stay the 
underlying case, Prosser made a second offer of settlement on 
September 21, 1994, for $80,000.  Cedarburg then filed an offer 
of judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(1) on September 27, 
1994, for $20,000.  After the coverage issue was resolved and 
Prosser did not accept Cedarburg’s tender of its policy limits, 
Cedarburg filed a second offer of judgment pursuant to § 807.01 
on October 14, 1996, for “such amount which when added to 
taxable costs and disbursements will total an offer of judgment 
in the sum of $106,000.”  Despite this exchange of offers, in 
arguing to this court both parties assume that Prosser’s offer 
of settlement made on October 13, 1993, is the offer applicable 
to determining double costs and interest pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3) and (4).  Neither party considered the effect of 
these subsequent offers on the initial offer.  Although this 
court may sua sponte consider issues not raised by the parties, 
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 39-40, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982), 
we decline to do so here.  Therefore, we consider Prosser’s 
settlement offer of October 13, 1993, is the applicable 
settlement offer in this case. 
No.  97-0686 
 
14
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 807.01(3) provides that a plaintiff 
may make an offer of settlement “for the sum . . . with costs.” 
 “The statute contemplates that offer of a specified sum should 
also state that the amount is ‘with costs,’ that is, in addition 
to costs.”  Stahl v. Sentry Insurance, 180 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 509 
N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1993).  “[U]nder § 807.01(3), Stats., the 
offer and the judgment must be compared exclusive of any costs.” 
 Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 205 Wis. 2d 267, 290, 556 
N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1996)).    
¶30 Accordingly, to determine if Prosser should receive 
double costs, we must compare the judgment, exclusive of costs, 
with the settlement offer, exclusive of costs.  In Prosser’s 
case the parties stipulated that the judgment, exclusive of 
costs, was $100,000.  Although the settlement offer was for 
$99,750 “plus the actual costs of this action,” the settlement 
offer, exclusive of costs, was for $99,750.  Because the 
judgment of $100,000 is more favorable than the settlement offer 
for $99,750, Prosser should recover double the amount of taxable 
costs under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  
¶31 Regarding interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4), we 
recognize that both Stahl and Northridge only addressed double 
costs under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  However, § 807.01(4) 
regarding interest, applies to offers of settlement made “under 
this section.”  In other words, § 807.01(4) applies to an offer 
of settlement made pursuant to § 807.01(3) “for the sum . . . 
with costs.”  Therefore, we conclude that in determining whether 
a judgment is greater than or equal to a rejected settlement 
No.  97-0686 
 
15
offer for purposes of determining whether a party is entitled to 
interest, we apply the same principles as we did in determining 
double costs.  We compare the judgment of $100,000, exclusive of 
costs, with the rejected settlement offer of $99,750, exclusive 
of costs.  Because the judgment is greater than the settlement 
offer, we conclude that Prosser is entitled to interest under 
§ 807.01(4). 
B. 
¶32 Having determined that Prosser is entitled to double 
costs under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3) we must consider whether 
costs associated with determining a question of insurance 
coverage are subject to doubling under this statute.  This 
question requires that we interpret § 807.01(3).  Questions of 
statutory interpretation are questions of law which we review de 
novo.  Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 
550 N.W.2d 96 (1996) (citation omitted).  Our purpose is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  Id.  If the legislative 
intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, we need 
not go further.  Id. at 220 (citing Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 
201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the plain 
language of the statute is ambiguous, we turn to legislative 
history, scope, object, subject matter, and context of the 
statute to determine legislative intent.  Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d 
at 327. 
¶33 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3) provides 
that “[i]f the offer of settlement is not accepted and the 
plaintiff recovers a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff 
No.  97-0686 
 
16
shall recover double the amount of the taxable costs.”  The 
plain language is unambiguous.  Two conditions must be met to 
recover double the amount of taxable costs: 1) the offer of 
settlement must not be accepted; and 2) the plaintiff must 
recover a judgment that is more favorable than the settlement 
offer.  If these two conditions are met, the statute specifies 
that the plaintiff “shall” recover double the amount of taxable 
costs.  Section 807.01(3) provides no exceptions for assessment 
of double costs.  We also find no exceptions in either case law 
or other statutes, and Cedarburg has pointed to no exceptions 
that would preclude the plaintiff from recovering double the 
amount of taxable costs under § 807.01(3) for costs associated 
with determining the coverage issue.   
¶34 “Taxable costs” are those allowed as items of cost 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.04 (reprinted in part below).5  These 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04 provides in pertinent part: 
 
Items of costs.  Except as provided in ss. 93.20, 
101.22(6)(i) 
and 
(6m)(a), 
814.025, 
814.245, 
895.035(4), 895.75(3), 
943.212(2)(b), 943.245(2)(d) 
and 943.51(2)(b), when allowed costs shall be as 
follows: 
(1)  ATTORNEY FEES.  (a) When the amount recovered or 
the value of the property involved is $1,000 or over, 
attorney fees shall be $100; when it is less than 
$1,000 and is $500 or over, $50; when it is less than 
$500 and is $200 or over, $25; and when it is less 
than $200, $15. 
. . .  
(2) DISBURSEMENTS.  All the necessary disbursements 
and fees allowed by law; the compensation of referees; 
a reasonable disbursement for the service of process 
or other papers in an action when the same are served 
by a person authorized by law other than an officer, 
but the item may not exceed the authorized sheriff’s 
No.  97-0686 
 
17
allowable costs include attorney fees and various disbursements. 
 There is nothing in § 814.04 to indicate that costs associated 
with a coverage dispute, determined while the underlying case is 
stayed, are not included in items of cost.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 814.10, regarding taxation of costs, also makes no exceptions, 
even for costs associated with determining coverage.   
¶35 Our conclusion is supported by the legislature’s use 
of the term “shall” in Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3) (“the plaintiff 
shall recover double the amount of taxable costs”).  When a 
statute uses the term “shall” we presume that its intent is 
mandatory.  GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 
477, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998) (citing Karow v. Milwaukee Co. Civil 
 Serv. Comm’n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978)).  
Accordingly, we presume that the use of “shall” in Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3) is mandatorythe plaintiff “shall” recover double 
the amount of taxable costs if the statutory conditions are met. 
 Our presumption is strengthened because “shall” and “may” are 
both used in the same statutory section.  When “shall” and “may” 
are used in the same section, we “‘can infer that the 
                                                                  
fee for the same service; amounts actually paid out 
for certified copies of papers and records in any 
public office; postage, telegraphing, telephoning and 
express; 
depositions 
including 
copies; 
plats 
and 
photographs, not exceeding $50 for each item; an 
expert witness fee not exceeding $100 for each expert 
who testifies, exclusive of the standard witness fee 
and mileage which shall also be taxed for each expert; 
and in actions relating to or affecting the title to 
lands, the cost of procuring an abstract of title to 
the lands.  Guardian ad litem fees shall not be taxed 
as a cost or disbursement. 
No.  97-0686 
 
18
legislature was aware of the different denotations and intended 
the words to have their precise meanings.’”  GMAC Mortgage 
Corp., 215 Wis. 2d at 478 (quoting Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571).   
¶36 Finally our conclusion that costs associated with 
determining coverage are subject to doubling under Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3) is supported by the purpose of § 807.01to encourage 
pretrial settlement.  See DeMars, 123 Wis. 2d at 373.  The risk 
of being assessed the penalty of double costs under § 807.01(3) 
encourages parties to seriously assess their chances of winning 
a coverage or liability dispute.  The party who rejects a 
settlement offer and forges ahead with litigation does so with 
the full knowledge of § 807.01(3) and that if not successful, 
they may be subject to double costs under § 807.01(3).   
¶37 Cedarburg relies on Oliver v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 
179 Wis. 2d 1, 20 n.4, 505 N.W.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1993) to assert 
that Prosser is not entitled to double costs or interest from an 
insurer who declines a settlement offer and then, after learning 
new facts, tenders its policy limits as long as the insurer is 
not negligent in investigating the facts and the new facts are 
material to the case and changed the insurer’s mind.  Cedarburg 
asserts that it was not negligent in investigating the facts 
because it did as the law allowschallenge coverage by moving 
for bifurcation of the coverage issue.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.04(2)(b); Newhouse v. Citizens Security Mut. Ins., 176 
Wis. 2d 824, 836, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993);.  See also Elliott v. 
Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 317, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992) (“An 
insurer does not breach its contractual duty to defend by 
No.  97-0686 
 
19
denying coverage where the issue of coverage is fairly debatable 
as long as the insurer provides coverage and defense once 
coverage is established.”)  
¶38 We recognize that bifurcation, to allow determination 
of the coverage issue before litigating the liability and 
damages issues, is the accepted practice when coverage is 
disputed. 
 
The rule has thus developed that an insurer who has 
a duty to defend . . . and who claims that the terms 
of the policy deny coverage for the incident forming 
the basis of the suit, must take steps to seek and 
obtain a bifurcated triallitigating coverage first 
and obtaining a stay of all proceedings in the 
liability and damage aspects of the case until 
coverage, or lack of coverage, is determined. 
Kenefick v. Hitchcock, 187 Wis. 2d 218, 232-33, 522 N.W.2d 261 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 318).  Although 
bifurcation is the accepted practice when coverage is disputed, 
we are not persuaded that costs associated with determining 
coverage 
are 
not 
subject 
to 
doubling 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 807.01(3).   
¶39 Bifurcation of the coverage issue from the liability 
and damages issues is specifically allowed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.04(2)(b) (reprinted below).6  However, neither Wis. Stat. 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.04(2)(b) provides as follows: 
If an insurer is made a party defendant pursuant to 
this section and it appears at any time before or 
during the trial that there is or may be a cross issue 
between the insurer and the insured or any issue 
between any other person and the insurer involving the 
question of the insurer’s liability if judgment should 
be rendered against the insured, the court may, upon 
No.  97-0686 
 
20
§ 807.01(3) nor § 803.04(2)(b) carve out an exception to the 
award of double costs under § 807.01(3) for costs associated 
with determining coverage under § 803.04(2)(b).   
¶40 In 
addition, 
the 
predecessor 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.04(2)(b), already existed when the legislature enacted the 
predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3), allowing bifurcation of 
trials on liability and coverage issues.  In construing 
statutes, we presume that the legislature knew existing law when 
it enacted a statute.  In Interest of R.E.H., 101 Wis. 2d 647, 
652, 305 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing Mack v. Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 3, Village of Hales Corners, 92 Wis. 2d 476, 285 
N.W.2d 604 (1979)). 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.04(2)(b), taken from Wis. Stat. 
§ 260.11, Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 
647 (1976), was amended in 1931 to allow a circuit court to 
direct a separate trial on the issue of coverage.  L. 1931, c. 
375, s.2.  It was not until 40 years later, in 1971, that the 
                                                                  
motion of any defendant in the action, cause the 
person who may be liable upon such cross issue to be 
made a party defendant to the action and all the 
issues involved in the controversy determined in the 
trial of the action or any 3rd party may be impleaded 
as provided in s. 803.05.  Nothing herein contained 
shall be construed as prohibiting the trial court from 
directing and conducting separate trials on the issue 
of liability to the plaintiff or other party seeking 
affirmative relief and on the issue of whether the 
insurance policy in question affords coverage.  Any 
party may move for such separate trials and if the 
court orders separate trials it shall specify in its 
order the sequence in which such trials shall be 
conducted.  
No.  97-0686 
 
21
legislature first allowed a plaintiff who recovers a judgment 
that is more favorable than the settlement offer to recover 
double the amount of taxable costs.  L. 1971, c.27, s.3 
(regarding Wis. Stat. § 269.02, the predecessor to Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3)).  Because we presume that the legislature is aware 
of existing law when it passes a new statute, In Interest of 
R.E.H., 101 Wis. 2d at 652, we presume that the legislature was 
aware of the circuit court’s ability to order a separate trial 
on the issue of coverage when it enacted a statute allowing 
double costs in the event a plaintiff recovers a judgment more 
favorable than the settlement offer.  However, the legislature 
failed to take the opportunity to make any exceptions for the 
award of double costs under § 807.01(3).   
¶42 Cedarburg 
also 
argues 
that 
after 
coverage 
was 
determined, it re-evaluated its exposure and properly tendered 
its policy limit.  Prosser rejected the tendered policy limit 
and went forward with steps to litigate the liability and 
damages issues.  Therefore, Cedarburg argues, according to 
Oliver, it would be unjust to penalize Cedarburg with double 
costs and interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3) and (4).  
¶43 Oliver does not resolve this issue.  In Oliver, the 
plaintiff filed an offer to settle for the insurance policy 
limits of $25,000 on February 7, 1990.  The insurer did not 
accept Oliver’s offer within 10 days as prescribed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3).  Oliver, 179 Wis. 2d at 16.  Nearly six months 
after Oliver tendered his offer to settle, and following 
discovery, the insurer tendered its policy limits of $25,000 on 
No.  97-0686 
 
22
August 8, 1990.  Id. at 18.  Oliver refused to accept the 
insurer’s offer.  Id.  The court held that Oliver was not 
entitled to double costs and interest following the insurer’s 
tender of its policy limits. 
¶44 In Oliver, the court did not decide whether Oliver was 
entitled to double costs and interest prior to the insurer’s 
tender of its policy limits.  Here, the circuit court held that 
Prosser was entitled to double costs and interest (except for 
the period of time required for resolution of the coverage 
question) prior to Cedarburg’s tender of its policy limits.7  
This issue was not resolved in Oliver.  Accordingly, Oliver is 
not determinative.  
¶45 We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3) makes no exception for assessment of double costs.  
If the plaintiff’s settlement offer is not accepted and the 
judgment is more favorable than the settlement offer, the 
plaintiff “shall” recover double the amount of taxable costs.  
Because the statute provides no exceptions we hold that if the 
statutory conditions are met the taxable costs subject to 
doubling include costs associated with determining coverage. 
                     
7 We recognize that Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) provides that 
interest is calculated on the amount recovered from the date of 
the settlement offer “until the amount is paid.”  However, 
Prosser appealed from the circuit court order which granted him 
interest and double costs through November 30, 1995, when 
Cedarburg tendered its policy limits, arguing only that he is 
entitled to interest and double costs while the underlying case 
was stayed pending determination of the coverage issue.  Prosser 
did not argue, nor do we decide, whether he is entitled to 
interest “until the amount is paid.”    
No.  97-0686 
 
23
C. 
¶46 We have determined that Prosser is entitled to recover 
interest pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) because he recovered 
a judgment that is greater than or equal to the amount he 
offered.  However, this case requires that we also consider 
whether a stay of underlying issues pending determination of 
coverage also stays accrual of interest under § 807.01(4).  
Cedarburg does not contest that Prosser is due some interest.  
Cedarburg only argues that Prosser is not entitled to accrue 
interest 
when 
the 
underlying 
case 
was 
stayed 
pending 
determination of the coverage issue.  This issue requires that 
we interpret § 807.01(4).  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Stockbridge, 202 Wis. 2d at 219. 
¶47 Wisconsin Stat. § 807.01(4) specifies that if the 
party making the settlement offer recovers a judgment which is 
greater than or equal to the settlement amount, that party is 
entitled to interest on the amount recovered from the date of 
the offer to when it is paid.  The plain language of this 
statute does not carve out an exception for any time period 
during which the calculation of interest could be stayed.  In 
fact, 
the 
plain 
language 
provides 
that 
interest 
accrues 
throughout the litigation: “from the date of the offer of 
settlement until the amount is paid.”  § 807.01(4).  Even Wis. 
Stat. § 803.04(2)(b), which allows circuit courts to bifurcate 
coverage and liability questions, does not stay the accrual of 
interest under § 807.01(4) pending determination of coverage. 
No.  97-0686 
 
24
¶48 Our determination is consistent with the obligations 
imposed by the insurer’s fiduciary duty.  Even while the 
underlying case is stayed pending determination of coverage, the 
insurer still has the obligations attendant to its fiduciary 
duty 
to 
inform 
the 
insured 
of 
settlement 
offers 
and 
negotiations.  See, e.g., Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 525-26.   
 
Once an insurer has rejected an offer, the insured 
should then have the opportunity to settle for the 
proffered amount.  . . .  If the coverage trial 
results in a finding of coverage, then the insurer 
would 
assume 
responsibility 
for 
its 
insured’s 
indemnification.  If coverage does not exist, then the 
insured will at least have limited its liability in 
what was concededly an excess liability case, rather 
than exposing itself to extensive liability. 
Id. at 526.  In other words, even when the underlying case is 
pending determination of coverage, the insurer’s fiduciary duty 
regarding settlement is not stayed.  Settlement negotiations can 
continue.   
¶49 Because settlement negotiations can continue while the 
underlying case is stayed, accrual of interest on a settlement 
offer should also continue.  The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 807.01 
is to encourage settlement.  DeMars, 123 Wis. 2d at 373.  The 
risk of being assessed interest under § 807.01(4) is meant to 
“encourage settlement of cases prior to trial by providing an 
incentive to accept reasonable settlement offers.”  Erickson v. 
Gundersen, 183 Wis. 2d 106, 124, 515 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1994 
(citations omitted).  If interest does not accrue when an 
underlying action is stayed pending determination of coverage 
No.  97-0686 
 
25
there would be no “incentive,” or at least a greatly reduced 
incentive, to accept a reasonable settlement offer.   
¶50 Cedarburg relies on State ex rel. Rabe v. Ferris, 97 
Wis. 2d 63, 293 N.W.2d 151 (1980) for its assertion that the 
stay of the underlying case pending determination of the 
coverage issue also stayed accrual of interest under Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(4).  Specifically, Cedarburg asserts that Rabe held 
that a stay of underlying proceedings stops the running of all 
other statutory time periods.  Cedarburg argues that a stay, 
therefore, temporarily stops all activity relating to the 
underlying action, even accrual of interest under § 807.01(4).  
¶51 The facts and holding of Rabe are distinguishable from 
the present case.  In Rabe, a case before this court on a writ 
of habeas corpus, Rabe alleged that his statutory right to a 
speedy trial was violated because of a delay in proceedings 
against him caused by the state’s interlocutory appeal.  Rabe, 
97 Wis. 2d at 66.  This court held that “[a] stay of proceedings 
directed to a lower court tolls the running of any time period 
within which a particular act is to be done in that court.  
(Footnote omitted).”  Id. at 68.   
¶52 Accrual of interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4), 
however, is not a particular act that is to be done within any 
time period.  It is a result triggered by the defendant’s 
failure to do a particular actaccept the plaintiff’s settlement 
offer within 10 days after receipt of the offer.  See 
§ 807.01(4).  Accordingly, the stay of the underlying case could 
No.  97-0686 
 
26
not have affected the accrual of interest under § 807.01(4).  
Therefore, Rabe does not apply to this case. 
¶53 In sum, we hold that the accrual of interest under 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) is not stayed when the underlying action 
is stayed pending determination of coverage.  The plain language 
of 
the 
statute, 
§ 807.01(4), 
provides 
that 
interest 
is 
calculated on the amount recovered “from the date of the offer 
of settlement until the amount is paid.”  The statute carves out 
no exceptions for staying the accrual of interest.  Therefore, 
we determine that interest accrued “from the date of the offer 
of settlement,” that is, from October 13, 1993.   
¶54 We 
remand 
the 
cause 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
determination of double costs and interest consistent with this 
opinion, and to enter judgment accordingly.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
  
 
97-0686.awb 
 
1 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   Although I join 
the other parts of the majority opinion, I conclude, as did the 
circuit court, that Cedarburg Mutual Insurance Company is not 
subject 
to 
double 
costs 
and 
interest 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 807.01(3), (4) for litigating whether Richard Leuck had 
coverage under his insurance policy.  Because the majority 
opinion concludes otherwise and in the process unreasonably 
forces an insurer in Cedarburg's position to settle before it 
can fully and fairly assess its liability for damages, I 
respectfully concur.   
¶56 There can be little doubt that Wis. Stat. § 807.01 
exists to encourage parties to settle their cases rather than 
take them to trial.  Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power 
Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993); DeMars v. LaPour, 
123 Wis. 2d 366, 373, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985).  To the extent that 
§ 807.01 forces parties to carefully analyze their realistic 
chances of liability or recovery and reevaluate the merits of 
taking their case to trial, the statute serves an important 
purpose.  Settlement is to be encouraged rather than discouraged 
in the law. 
¶57 Yet, the virtues of settlement are not unbounded.  
While Wis. Stat. § 807.01 exists to encourage settlement, it 
cannot be employed to unreasonably force settlement.  Nelson v. 
McLaughlin, 211 Wis. 2d 487, 517-18, 565 N.W.2d 123 (1997) 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); White v. General Casualty Co. of 
Wisconsin, 118 Wis. 2d 433, 439-40, 348 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 
1984).  As courts in this state have repeatedly said, a 
97-0686.awb 
 
2 
settlement 
offer 
unreasonably 
forces 
settlement 
when 
the 
recipient of the offer is not able to fully and fairly evaluate 
its liability.  Nelson, 211 Wis. 2d at 504, 517-18; Blank v. 
USAA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 2d 270, 276, 546 
N.W.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1996); Testa v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 164 
Wis. 2d 296, 302, 474 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶58 The majority opinion unreasonably forces an insurer in 
Cedarburg's position to settle because that insurer cannot 
fairly and fully assess its liability.  This is not a case in 
which an insurer is presented with an offer to settle but 
incorrectly guesses that it can get a lower dollar amount by 
taking the case to trial.  See, e.g., Northridge Co. v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 205 Wis. 2d 267, 288-89, 556 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 
1996); Testa, 164 Wis. 2d at 299-300.  Rather, this is a case 
where the insurer had legitimate doubts about whether it even 
had a duty to provide coverage to its insured in the first 
instance.  I do not see how Cedarburg could fully and fairly 
assess the amount of its liability for any wrongful actions 
attributed to its insured until it first knew if it would be 
obligated to indemnify its insured.  Under the majority's 
analysis, what sort of choice does Cedarburg have?  Only a 
Hobson's choice:  either buy its way out of a suit to which it 
arguably had no financial obligations, or press for an answer to 
that question and risk double costs and interest.   
¶59 The court of appeals in Oliver v. Heritage Mut. Ins. 
Co., 179 Wis. 2d 1, 18-20, 505 N.W.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1993), 
recognized 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 807.01 
can 
be 
utilized 
in 
97-0686.awb 
 
3 
unreasonably coercive ways.  While the facts of that case are 
not on all fours with the facts in this case, the underlying 
principle that formed the Oliver decision is what should form 
this one as well.   
¶60 In Oliver an injured party offered to settle with an 
insurance company early in the litigation before the facts of 
the case were conclusively known.  Id. at 18.  At the time of 
the settlement offer, the insurance company could not know the 
extent of Oliver's contribution to his injuries because the 
facts of the case were not yet completely developed.  Id.  
Later, when the insurance company learned that Oliver's part in 
his injury was relatively minor, it reassessed its risk and 
tendered the policy limit which Oliver then refused.  Id. at 18-
19.  The court of appeals concluded that the penalties of Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01 were not applicable in that situation because the 
insurance 
company 
did 
what 
it should 
have 
done: 
 
upon 
discovering 
additional 
facts 
which 
altered 
its 
risk, 
it 
attempted to settle the case.  Id. at 20. 
¶61 The facts of this case are more compelling than 
Oliver.8  In Oliver the insurer knew that it would be financially 
                     
8 I 
do 
not 
understand 
the 
majority's 
attempt 
at 
distinguishing this case from Oliver.  Majority op. at 22.  
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the circuit court in 
Oliver must have determined that Oliver was entitled to double 
costs and interest prior to the insurer's tender of its policy 
limits because the court of appeals reversed that award.  It 
would seem axiomatic that before Wis. Stat. § 807.01's penalties 
can be assessed, a court must determine that the party 
requesting such measures is entitled to them. 
97-0686.awb 
 
4 
responsible for any wrongful acts of its insured up to the 
policy limits but at the time could not assess the extent of its 
insured's misconduct.  Here Cedarburg did not even know whether 
it would be financially responsible for its insured's actions.  
If the Oliver insurer was relieved from the penalties of Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01, I cannot see why Cedarburg should fare any 
worse. 
¶62 In sum, the majority opinion's imposition of double 
costs and interest on Cedarburg for determining whether it had a 
duty to indemnify its insured does not encourage settlement.  It 
unreasonably forces settlement.  As a result, consistent with 
the circuit court, I would not award double costs and interest 
to Prosser for the time and expense associated with litigating 
Cedarburg's duty to provide coverage for the actions of its 
insured.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE DONALD W. STEINMETZ join this opinion. 
 
97-0686.awb 
 
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1