Title: Marriage of Fellows
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S127874
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2006

Filed 7/20/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re the MARRIAGE of MARY ANN and ) 
DARRIN FELLOWS. 
) 
 
) 
 
) 
MARY ANN MOYSE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S127874 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C044636 
DARRIN FELLOWS, 
) 
 
) 
Shasta County 
 
Appellant. 
) 
Super.Ct.No. 146580 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We consider whether Family Code section 4502, subdivision (c),1 applies 
retroactively and bars a parent from relying on laches to defend an action to 
enforce a child support order.  We hold that it does and affirm the Court of 
Appeal.   
I.  Facts And Procedural Background 
In June 1985, a New York court ordered Darrin Fellows to pay $50.00 a 
week in child support to Mary Ann Moyse.  Over 17 years later, Moyse registered 
the child support order in California.  She alleged that Fellows had never made 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
support payments and owed her $26,000 plus interest.  Fellows sought to vacate 
the registration asserting, among other things, a laches defense.  
The trial court denied Fellows’s motion to vacate, confirmed the 
registration, and ordered arrearage payments of $20,800.  The court noted that 
Moyse “testified that no child support payments were made” while Fellows 
“testified [that] all child support payments were made.”  Both parties “called 
corroborating witnesses supporting their respective testimony.”  The court found 
that Fellows failed to establish, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child 
support was paid.”  
The trial court applied section 4502, subdivision (c) (section 4502(c)), 
retroactively and disallowed the laches defense.  The section, added in 2002, 
provides:  “In an action to enforce a judgment for child, family, or spousal 
support, the defendant may raise, and the court may consider, the defense of laches 
only with respect to any portion of the judgment owed to the state.”  Although the 
court determined that Fellows had “met his burden of proof as to the defense of 
laches,” it concluded that the defense was statutorily unavailable.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed, declining to follow In re Marriage of 
Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 140 (Garcia), which held to the contrary.  Instead, 
relying on Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89 (Rice), the court concluded that 
section 4 of the Family Code demonstrates a general legislative intent that future 
Family Code amendments “are to be retroactively applied.”  The court also noted 
that the Legislature’s intent to right a “perceived injustice . . . dictates the 
retroactive application of section 4502(c).”  Finally, the court concluded that 
subdivisions (f) and (g) of section 4 did not compel a contrary result and that 
retroactive application did not violate due process. 
We granted review to resolve the conflict between Garcia, supra, 111 
Cal.App.4th 140, and the Court of Appeal opinion here. 
 
 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Retroactive Application Of Section 4502(c) 
If, in light of the lapse of time and other relevant circumstances, a court 
concludes that a party’s failure to assert a right has caused prejudice to an adverse 
party, the court may apply the equitable defense of laches to bar further assertion 
of the right.  (Nealis v. Carlson (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 65, 69.)  The parties agree 
that section 4502(c), by its terms, bars the laches defense in a private action to 
enforce a child support order.  They disagree over its application here.  We review 
the retroactive application of the statute de novo.  (In re Marriage of McClellan 
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.)2 
1.  Section 4502(c) Changed Existing Law 
As a general rule, statutes do not operate retroactively3 “unless the 
Legislature plainly intended them to do so.”  (Western Security Bank v. Superior 
Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western Security).)  Nonetheless, “a statute that 
merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively 
even if applied to transactions predating its enactment.”  (Ibid.)  Such a statute 
“may be applied to transactions predating its enactment without being considered 
retroactive” because it “is merely a statement of what the law has always been.”  
(Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 599, 603.)   
In determining whether a statute clarified or changed the law, we give “due 
consideration” to the Legislature’s intent in enacting that statute.  (Western 
Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244.)  The Legislature’s declaration of an existing 
                                              
2  
The parties do not dispute that section 4502(c) was retroactively applied 
here. 
3  
We note that the cases use the terms “retroactively” and “retrospectively” 
interchangeably. 
 
 
statute’s meaning, while not dispositive, is a factor entitled to consideration.  
(McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 473 
(McClung).)  We look to “the surrounding circumstances” as well as the 
Legislature’s intent when determining whether a statute changed or merely 
clarified the law.  (Western Security, at p. 243.)   
Here, the Legislature intended to change the law.  Explaining the need for 
the statute, both the Senate Rules Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee 
observed that “the equitable defense of laches remains applicable in an action to 
enforce a support order.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 2; Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 
2002, p. 2.) 4  According to the Senate Rules Committee, the enactment of section 
4502(c) would “change that” by “substantially restricting the laches defense in 
support enforcement cases.”  (Assem. Floor Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 3, italics 
added.)  Thus, section 4502(c) would “[s]et[] forth new statutory restrictions on 
the use of the common law defense of laches in support enforcement actions.”  
(Assem. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) 
June 25, 2002, p. 2, italics added.)  In doing so, it would close “a loophole that 
allow[ed] child support obligors to evade responsibility for their debts.”  (Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 
2002, p. 3.)  “By amending the statute to close the loophole, the Legislature sought 
                                              
4  
(See also Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-
2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 6 [“laches . . . remains a viable 
equitable defense in a subsequent enforcement action to collect past-due child or 
spousal support”].)   
 
 
to change the law.”  (City of West Hollywood v. 1112 Investment Co. (2003) 105 
Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145.)   
A review of the law before the enactment of section 4502(c) confirms that 
the statute did effect a change.  “Prior to 1992, judgments for child and spousal 
support expired within a stated period of years.”  (In re Marriage of Fogarty & 
Rasbeary (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359 (Fogarty).)  California courts had 
recognized a laches defense in spousal support cases but held that the defense did 
not apply to claims for arrearages brought within the statutory enforcement period.  
(See, e.g., DiMarco v. DiMarco (1963) 60 Cal.2d 387, 394; Leiden v. Hudson 
(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 72, 74-75.)  In 1992 and 1993, however, the Legislature 
made all support orders enforceable “until paid in full.”  (Civ. Code, former § 
4384.5, now Fam. Code, § 4502, subd. (a).)5  In doing so, the Legislature cast 
some doubt on the viability of the laches defense in support actions. 
However, the court In re Marriage of Plescia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 252, 
262 (Plescia), held that the legislative changes in 1992 and 1993 did not eliminate 
the laches defense in actions for spousal support arrearages.  Three years later, the 
Fogarty court followed Plescia and recognized laches in actions for child support 
                                              
5  
In 1992, the Legislature repealed and reenacted Civil Code former section 
4384.5, to provide:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a judgment for 
child or spousal support, including a judgment for reimbursement or other 
arrearages, is exempt from any requirement that judgments be renewed.  A 
judgment for child or spousal support, including all lawful interest and penalties 
computed thereon, is enforceable until paid in full.”  (Stats. 1992, ch. 718, § 3, pp. 
3319-3320.) 
 
The Legislature later moved this provision to Family Code section 4502, 
subdivision (a), which provided:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
judgment for child, family, or spousal support, including a judgment for 
reimbursement or other arrearages, is exempt from any requirement that 
judgments be renewed. . . .”  (As added by Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 143, p. 1650.) 
 
 
arrearages.  (Fogarty, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364.)  These precedents were 
consistently followed until the enactment of section 4502(c). 6  The Legislature 
may certainly amend a statute to overrule a judicial decision.  But, in doing so it 
changes the law.  (See McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 473-474.) 
In re Marriage of Cordero (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 653, does not alter our 
conclusion.  The Cordero court disagreed with the reasoning of Plescia, supra, 59 
Cal.App.4th 252, and opined that support orders less than 10 years old would not 
be subject to a laches defense.  (Cordero, at pp. 664-665.)  The court 
acknowledged, however, that its observation was dictum.  (Id. at p. 666, fn. 17.)  
Thus, there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature enacted section 4502(c) in 
response to any controversy created by Cordero on this point.  Indeed, the 
legislative history behind section 4502(c) is replete with references to Plescia, 
Fogarty, Hamer, Dancy, and Copeman, but makes no mention of Cordero.7  
Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature enacted section 4502(c) to change 
existing law, not to clarify a controversy over its interpretation.   
2.  The Legislature Intended That Section 4502(c) Apply Retroactively  
Before section 4502(c) became effective on January 1, 2003, a viable laches 
defense would have barred Moyse’s claim.  The statute applies to this case       
                                              
6 
See In re Marriage of Copeman (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 324, 332; In re 
Marriage of Dancy (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148; In re Marriage of Hamer 
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 712, 723. 
7  
See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, pp. 2-3; Assem. 
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended July 2, 2002, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 1658 as amended June 19, 2002, pp. 3, 5-8; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 2002, p. 2. 
 
 
only if the Legislature intended to give it retroactive effect.   We conclude that it 
did.   
While nothing in the language or legislative history of section 4502(c) 
speaks directly to retroactive application, section 4 of the Family Code provides 
guidance.  The Family Code was enacted in 1992, and made operative on January 
1, 1994, to create a unified statutory scheme.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, p. 463 et seq.)  
It drew together a number of statutes scattered throughout various parts of the 
California codes, and enacted some new provisions.  Section 4 provides that, in the 
Family Code, the term “new law” describes either the enactment of the Family 
Code itself, or future modifications of the code.  (§ 4, subd. (a)(1)(A) & (B).)8  
The term “old law” refers to the law in effect before the Family Code was adopted.  
(§ 4, subd. (a)(2).) 
Section 4, subdivision (c) provides:  “Subject to the limitations provided in 
this section, the new law applies on the operative date to all matters governed by 
the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred or circumstance existed 
before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not limited to, 
commencement of a proceeding, making of an order, or taking of an action.”  
Thus, by its terms, section 4, subdivision (c), establishes that amendments to the 
Family Code apply retroactively unless otherwise provided by law.   
The Law Revision Commission comment to section 4 confirms this 
interpretation.  The Commission explains that section 4 “applies both to the act 
that enacted the Family Code and to any later act that changes the code, whether 
                                              
8  
Section 4, subdivision (a)(1)(A) defines “New Law” as “[t]he act that 
enacted this code.”  Subdivision (a)(1)(B) defines “New Law” as an “act that 
makes a change in this code, whether effectuated by amendment, addition, or 
repeal of a provision of this code.”     
 
 
the change is effectuated by amendment, addition, or repeal of a provision of the 
code.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29C West’s Ann. Fam. Code (2004 ed.) 
foll. § 4, p. 7, italics added.)  The comment then notes:  “The general rule 
prescribed in subdivision (c) is that a new law applies immediately on its operative 
date to all matters, including pending proceedings,” (ibid.) and that section 4 
governs the “substantive provisions” of the Family Code.  (Cal. Law Revision 
Com. com., at p. 8.)  Thus, as a general rule, future changes to the Family Code 
apply retroactively. 
We reached a similar conclusion in Rice, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 100, 
where we held that the 1995 amendments to Probate Code section 21350 applied 
retroactively to “instruments executed before the amendments’ effective date.”  
Specifically, we found that section 3 of the Probate Code “mandates application of 
the law as amended in 1995, even though the trust and will were executed prior to 
that amendment’s effectiveness.”  (Rice, at p. 99.)  Section 4 of the Family Code is 
“comparable” to section 3 of the Probate Code (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 
29C West’s Ann. Family Code, supra, foll. § 4, p. 7) and contains virtually 
identical language.9  Thus, Rice is highly persuasive and consistent with our 
conclusion that section 4502(c) applies retroactively absent some exception to the 
rule of retroactivity found in section 4 of the Family Code.10  In re Marriage of 
                                              
9  
As relevant here, Probate Code section 3, subdivision (c), states:  “Subject 
to the limitations provided in this section, a new law applies on the operative date 
to all matters governed by the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred or 
circumstance existed before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not 
limited to, creation of a fiduciary relationship, death of a person, commencement 
of a proceeding, making of an order, or taking of an action.” 
10  
We note that section 4 is a general rule, subject to numerous exceptions.  
(See, e.g., § 4, subds. (d)-(h).)  The Legislature may enact statutes that direct 
prospective application.  (§ 4, subd. (b).)  
 
 
Wood (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1059 is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with 
our opinion today, because the Wood court did not adequately consider the 
language and history of section 4. 
3.  Section 4, Subdivisions (f) and (g) Do Not Bar Retroactive 
     Application Here 
Notwithstanding the general rule of retroactivity established by section 4, 
subdivision (c), Fellows contends the exceptions found subsequently in 
subdivisions (f) and (g), bar such application here.  The argument fails.   
a.  Section 4, Subdivision (f) 
Subdivision (f) of section 4 provides that:  “No person is liable for an action 
taken before the operative date that was proper at the time the action was taken, 
even though the action would be improper if taken on or after the operative date, 
and the person has no duty, as a result of the enactment of the new law, to take any 
step to alter the course of action or its consequences.”  Fellows creatively argues 
retroactive application would impose new duties on him:  (1) to indefinitely 
preserve written proof of his compliance with the New York support order, and (2) 
to strictly comply with and refuse to orally modify the order.  His contention lacks 
merit.   
Section 4502(c) placed no new duties on Fellows.  Both before and after its 
enactment, Fellows had a duty to pay his child support, and could establish 
compliance through testimony alone.  The elimination of a laches defense did not 
create some novel proof requirement.  Even before the enactment, prudence would 
have counseled preservation of written payment records.  Indeed, success on a 
laches claim is always uncertain because it is an equitable remedy that depends on 
“the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”  (Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co. 
(1943) 21 Cal.2d 718, 734.)  Assertion of a laches defense seeks an equitable act 
 
 
of grace to relieve the burden of an existing obligation.  Elimination of the defense 
does not create a new duty.   
b.  Section 4, Subdivision (g)  
Subdivision (g) of section 4 is also inapplicable here.  It provides that “[i]f 
the new law does not apply to a matter that occurred before the operative date, the 
old law continues to govern the matter notwithstanding its repeal or amendment by 
the new law.”  (Ibid.)  According to Fellows, subdivision (g) limits the 
retroactivity rule to procedural changes.  He contends section 4502(c) is a 
substantive change and must, therefore, apply prospectively.  Nothing in the text 
or history of section 4 suggests an intent to distinguish between procedural and 
substantive changes in applying the rule of retroactivity.  There is no reasoned 
basis for adopting such a distinction especially when “California has rejected this 
type of classification” in determining whether a statute has retroactive effect.  
(Western Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, fn. 4.)   
Instead, read together, subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 4 establish that 
the “old law” will govern only if the “new law” falls within the other statutory 
exceptions to the rule of retroactivity or does not apply to a “matter” previously 
governed by the “old law.”  Section 4502(c) does not fall within either statutory 
exception and applies in this action to “enforce a judgment for child . . . support.”   
Finally, in In re Marriage of Garcia (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 693, 698-699, 
the court declined to apply the 1993 amendments to the Family Code retroactively 
and held that the pre-1993 scheme governing support orders still controlled.  In re 
Marriage of Garcia, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 693, did not, however, consider 
section 4, and is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with this opinion. 
B.  Due Process 
Even in the face of specific legislative intent, retrospective application is 
impermissible if it “impairs a vested . . . right without due process of law.”  (In re 
 
 
Marriage of Fabian (1986) 41 Cal.3d 440, 447, codified in section 4, subdivision 
(h).)11  Fellows was not denied due process.   
In evaluating a due process claim, we consider two groups of factors:       
(1) “ ‘[T]he significance of the state interest served by the law [and] the 
importance of the retroactive application of the law to the effectuation of that 
interest’ ”; and (2) “ ‘[T]he extent of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy 
of that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance, and the 
extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would disrupt those 
actions.’ ”  (In re Marriage of Heikes (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1211, 1219, quoting In re 
Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592.)  These considerations support 
retroactive application. 
1.  State Interests 
Stating the need for section 4502(c), the sponsor noted “that over 2 million 
children in California are owed over $19 million in unpaid support, and that ‘many 
of these children fail to thrive because there are not adequate resources to meet 
their basic needs.’ ”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 
(2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as introduced May 7, 2002, p. 3.)  According to the 
sponsor, “ ‘[t]hese non-payors are escaping justice by hiding from the child 
support system for long enough to allow a defense of laches to shield them from 
ever having to pay the child support they have been court-ordered to pay.’ ”  (Id., 
                                              
11  
Subdivision (h) of section 4 states:  “If a party shows, and the court 
determines, that application of a particular provision of the new law or of the old 
law in the manner required by this section or by the new law would substantially 
interfere with the effective conduct of the proceedings or the rights of the parties 
or other interested persons in connection with an event that occurred or 
circumstance that existed before the operative date, the court may, notwithstanding 
this section or the new law, apply either the new law or the old law to the extent 
reasonably necessary to mitigate the substantial interference.” 
 
 
at pp. 2-3.)  Eliminating the defense of laches would close “a loophole that allows 
child support obligors to evade responsibility for their debts,” (id., at p. 3.) and 
“strengthen the public policy favoring enforcement of an obligor’s responsibility 
to pay support.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 
(2001-2002) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 9.) 
Fellows concedes that the state’s interests in protecting California’s 
children and enforcing support obligations are compelling.  Yet he contends that 
retroactive application does not serve those interests.  The argument fails.  
Unquestionably, the availability of laches impaired the ability of a parent to collect 
child support.  Eliminating the defense necessarily advances the state’s interest in 
securing payment of all child support obligations.  Moreover, to the extent obligor 
parents benefit from their efforts to evade support obligations through the use of 
the defense, section 4502(c) cures this “ rank injustice of the former law.”  (In re 
Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 594.)  Notwithstanding his claims to 
the contrary, “[t]here is nothing unfair about requiring a parent to fulfill his moral 
and legal responsibilities.”  (In re Marriage of Cutler (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 460, 
476.)  Retroactive application is “necessary to subserve a sufficiently important 
state interest” (In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 593), and our 
“inquiry need proceed no further.” (In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 
761.)  
2.  Reliance 
The second group of factors is likewise unavailing.  Fellows contends he 
reasonably relied on the availability of laches in failing to preserve written proof 
or to obtain judicial acknowledgment of payment.  Fellows’s defense did not fail 
for lack of proof.  In fact, the trial court determined that Fellows would have 
prevailed if laches were available.  However, his purported reliance was not 
reasonable, as discussed previously.  The retroactive application of section 4502(c) 
 
 
did not “substantially interfere” with his conduct in violation of due process.  (§ 4, 
subd. (h).)12  
Accordingly, we also disapprove In re Marriage of Garcia, supra, 111 
Cal.App.4th 140,13 and hold that section 4502(c) applies retroactively to bar 
Fellows from asserting laches.  
 
III.  Disposition 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J.  
 
 
 
                                              
12 
Fellows also contends that section 4502(c) is overbroad because it 
impermissibly restricts his right to due process.  Assuming that a due process 
claim permits an overbreadth analysis (see Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 1069, 1108), retroactive application of section 4502(c) did not violate his 
right.  
 
13  
The Garcia court did not consider the language and history of section 4 in 
holding that section 4502(c) did not apply retroactively.  (Garcia, supra, 111 
Cal.App.4th 140.) 
14   
Because we conclude that section 4502(c) applies retroactively and bars 
Fellows from raising laches as a defense, we do not address Moyse’s contention 
that the 1993 amendments to the Family Code eliminated the defense. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Marriage of Fellows 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 121 Cal.App.4th 607 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S127874 
Date Filed: July 20, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Shasta 
Judge: Jack Halpin* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Enochian & Kenny and Mark D. Norcross for Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edgar J. Lana and Robert J. McNair for Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Shasta Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 
of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark D. Norcross 
Enochian & Kenny 
2701 Park Marina Drive 
Redding, CA  96001 
(530) 225-8990 
 
Robert J. McNair 
18 Orinda Way, P.O. Box 2180 
Orinda, CA  94563 
(925) 253-1010