Title: Shockley v. Danberg et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 10, 2009

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SYLVESTER SHOCKLEY,  
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CARL DANBERG, Commissioner 
of Correction, RICK KEARNEY, 
Bureau Chief, PERRY PHELPS, 
Warden of James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center, 
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 88, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 08M-09-013  
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 14, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: September 10, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 10th day of September 2009, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, Sylvester Shockley, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s February 12, 2009 order granting the State’s 
motion to dismiss his petition for a writ of mandamus.  We find no merit to 
the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
Shockley is an inmate incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center.  In 1981, he was convicted of Rape in the First Degree 
 
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and, in 1982, was sentenced to life imprisonment.  Shockley’s life sentence 
was imposed prior to the enactment of the 1989 Truth in Sentencing Act 
(“TIS”) and allows for the possibility of parole.  In 2008, Shockley filed a 
petition for a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court requesting that the 
Superior Court compel the Department of Correction (“DOC”) to credit him 
with “good time” against his 1982 life sentence.1  The Superior Court 
granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition on the merits and on res 
judicata grounds and granted the State’s motion to rescind Shockley’s in 
forma pauperis (“IFP”) status.2       
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Shockley claims that he has a clear legal right to 
statutory good time credits and that, therefore, the Superior Court 
improperly dismissed his petition for a writ of mandamus.  He also claims 
that the Superior Court’s rescission of his IFP status violated his 
constitutional rights and requests free copies of his plea colloquy and 
sentencing hearing transcripts. 
 
(4) 
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued by the 
Superior Court to compel a board or agency to perform a duty.3  As a 
condition precedent to the issuance of the writ, the petitioner must 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§4381(a) and 4348. 
2 The Superior Court also denied Shockley’s motions to strike and for entry of summary 
judgment. 
3 Clough v. State, 686 A.2d 158, 159 (Del. 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §564. 
 
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demonstrate that a) he has a clear right to the performance of the duty; b) no 
other adequate remedy is available; and c) the board or agency has 
arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.4  Moreover, mandamus will 
issue only to require the performance of a clear legal or ministerial duty.5  
Mandamus will not issue to compel a discretionary act.6 
 
(5) 
 This Court previously has ruled that inmates serving pre-TIS 
life sentences with the possibility of parole are not entitled to good time 
credits pursuant to Section 4381 and can never be conditionally released 
pursuant to Section 4348.7  As such, Shockley can not demonstrate the 
“clear right” to statutory good time credits necessary to prevail on a petition 
for a writ of mandamus.  Moreover, Shockley’s claim is barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata.8  This Court has previously affirmed the Superior 
Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Shockley that 
requested the Superior Court to compel the DOC to recalculate his release 
date, barring his current claim.9  We, therefore, conclude that the Superior 
Court properly denied Shockley’s petition for a writ of mandamus. 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 In re Bordley, 545 A.2d  619, 620 (Del. 1988). 
6 Id. 
7 Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 558 (Del. 2005);  Jackson v. Multi-Purpose Criminal 
Justice Facility, 700 A.2d 1206, 1207 (Del. 1997). 
8 Dover Historical Society, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Commission, 902 A.2d 1084, 
1092 (Del. 2006). 
9 Shockley v. Taylor, Del. Supr., No. 216, 2005, Berger, J. (Aug. 24, 2005). 
 
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(6) 
Shockley also claims that the Superior Court improperly 
rescinded his IFP status.  In its February 12, 2009 order, the Superior Court 
determined that the State’s motion to rescind Shockley’s IFP status 
contained “clear and convincing evidence that [Shockley] has had at least 
three actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim 
prior the filing of the instant action.”  Pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, 
§8804(f), the Superior Court is authorized to deny IFP status to prisoners 
who abuse the judicial process.10  We, therefore, conclude that the Superior 
Court acted within its discretion when it rescinded Shockley’s IFP status.  
We also conclude that Shockley has manifestly failed to demonstrate any 
violation of his constitutional rights and has failed to justify his request for 
transcripts at State expense. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice      
                                                 
10 Walls v. Taylor, Del. Supr., No. 489, 2003, Holland, J. (Apr. 26, 2004).