Title: State v. Smith
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-1542
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1542 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
JOSEPH P. SMITH,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 5, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order granting a successive 
motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851.  Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, 
we have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
 
This Court has previously detailed the gruesome facts of this case.  Smith v. 
State (Smith I), 28 So. 3d 838, 844-53 (Fla. 2009).  Relevant to the instant 
proceeding, Joseph Smith was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and 
capital sexual battery of eleven-year-old Carlie Jane Brucia and was sentenced to 
 
 
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death.  Id. at 844.  After a penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence 
by a vote of ten to two.  Id. at 851.1  On direct appeal, we held that the trial court’s 
                                          
 
 
1.  As we stated in Smith I, 
The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of six statutory aggravators: (1) Smith 
committed the felony while he was on probation, see § 921.141(5)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (2003) (moderate weight); (2) the murder was committed 
while Smith was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or 
kidnapping, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (significant weight); 
(3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful 
arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (4) the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC), see 
§ 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (5) the murder was 
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. 
Stat. (2003) (great weight); and (6) the victim was under twelve years 
of age, see § 921.141(5)(l ), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight). 
The trial court concluded that Smith had failed to prove the 
existence of any statutory mitigating circumstances.  The trial court 
found a total of thirteen non-statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) a 
long and well-documented history of mental illness (moderate 
weight); (2) a long and well-documented history of drug abuse 
(moderate weight); (3) longstanding severe pain from back injuries 
that contributed to his addiction (little weight); (4) Smith repeatedly 
sought help for his problems (little weight); (5) Smith was repeatedly 
denied treatment or received inadequate treatment (little weight); (6) 
positive qualities, including—(a) skills as a mechanic, plumber, and 
carpenter; (b) performance of kind deeds for others; (c) love and 
support with his family; (d) despite his incarceration, attempts to exert 
a positive influence on family members; (e) artistic skills; and (f) he 
cares about animals (moderate weight); (7) providing information that 
led to the resolution of this case (very little weight); (8) his family 
assisted law enforcement with Smith’s knowledge and cooperation 
(slight weight); (9) demonstration of spiritual growth (moderate 
weight); (10) maintenance of gainful employment (slight weight); (11) 
he is a loving father to his three daughters (moderate weight); (12) 
 
 
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finding of the CCP aggravator was not supported by competent, substantial 
evidence and thus the CCP aggravator was stricken.  Id. at 868.  Nevertheless, we 
ultimately affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentence.  Id. at 878.  The United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 28, 2011.  Smith v. Florida, 
564 U.S. 1052 (2011).   
 
Smith subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief raising numerous 
challenges, including a Ring2 challenge, which the postconviction court summarily 
denied.  Smith v. State (Smith II), 151 So. 3d 1177, 1181 (Fla. 2014).  Smith 
appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the denial of postconviction relief.  Id. at 
1184.  Next, Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which was stayed as of July 15, 
2016.   
 
On January 5, 2017, after the issuance of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016), Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 
(2017), and its progeny, Smith filed this Successive Motion to Vacate Death 
Sentence, which the postconviction court granted with regard to the claim that 
                                          
 
remorse (little weight); and (13) he is amenable to rehabilitation and a 
productive life in prison (little weight). 
28 So. 3d at 852-53 (footnotes omitted).   
 
2.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).   
 
 
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Smith is entitled to a new penalty phase.  The State’s appeal followed.  On 
September 19, 2017, this Court issued an order to show cause why the lower 
court’s order should not be affirmed based on this Court’s precedent in Hurst, 
Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016), and Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 
(Fla. 2016), to which the parties responded.   
ANALYSIS  
 
Smith contends that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hurst v. Florida, which held that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires 
a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.  A 
jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  136 S. Ct. at 619.  On remand, this 
Court held that a unanimous jury recommendation for death is required before the 
trial court may impose a sentence of death.  Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 54.  Moreover, 
this Court held that “in addition to unanimously finding the existence of any 
aggravating factor, the jury must also unanimously find that the aggravating factors 
are sufficient for the imposition of death and unanimously find that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigation before a sentence of death may be considered by 
the judge.”  Id.  We also determined that Hurst error is capable of harmless error 
review.  Id. at 67. 
 
 
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Hurst applies retroactively to defendants whose sentences became final after 
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.  Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 
1283.  Thus, Hurst applies retroactively to this case, which became final in 2011. 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the Hurst error during Smith’s 
penalty phase proceeding was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  “[I]n the 
context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of 
the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s failure to unanimously 
find all the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to 
[the] death sentence . . . .”  Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68.  As applied to the right to a 
jury trial with regard to the facts necessary to impose the death penalty, it must be 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found 
that each aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
aggravating factors were sufficient to impose death, and that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 
We conclude that the State cannot establish that the error in Smith’s case 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In Smith’s case, the jury did not make 
the requisite factual findings and did not unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death.  Instead, the jury recommended the sentence of death by a vote of ten to 
two.  Therefore, this Court has no way of knowing if the jury unanimously found 
any of the five valid aggravating factors—(1) Smith committed the felony while he 
 
 
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was on probation; (2) the murder was committed while Smith was engaged in the 
commission of a sexual battery or kidnapping; (3) the murder was committed for 
the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; (4) HAC; and (5) the victim was under 
twelve years of age—that the aggravating factors were sufficient to impose a death 
sentence, or whether the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances.  Further, this Court cannot speculate why the two jurors who voted 
to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment determined that a sentence of death 
was not the appropriate punishment.  Thus, in line with our post-Hurst precedent,3 
we conclude that the Hurst error in Smith’s case was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we vacate Smith’s sentence of death and remand 
for a new penalty phase. 
                                          
 
 
3.  E.g., Mosley, 209 So. 3d 1248 (granting Hurst relief for nonunanimous 
jury recommendation, post-Ring defendant); Peterson v. State, 221 So. 3d 571 
(Fla. 2017) (same); Bevel v. State, 221 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 2017) (same); Snelgrove 
v. State, 217 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 2017) (same); Newberry v. State, 214 So. 3d 562 
(Fla. 2017) (same); Orme v. State, 214 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 2017) (same); Baker v. 
State, 214 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2017) (same); Deviney v. State, 213 So. 3d 794 (Fla. 
2017) (same); Jackson v. State, 213 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 2017) (same); Smith v. State, 
213 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2017) (same); Hodges v. State, 213 So. 3d 863 (Fla. 2017) 
(same); Anderson v. State, 220 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. 2017) (same); Ault v. State, 213 
So. 3d 670 (Fla. 2017) (same); Dubose v. State, 210 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 2017) (same); 
Hojan v. State, 212 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 2017) (same); Durousseau v. State, 218 So. 3d 
405 (Fla. 2017) (same); Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. 2017) (same); 
McGirth v. State, 209 So. 3d 1146 (Fla. 2017) (same); Williams v. State, 209 So. 
3d 543 (Fla.) (same), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2302 (2017); Armstrong v. State, 211 
So. 3d 864 (Fla. 2017) (same); Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 3d 568 (Fla. 2017) (same).   
 
 
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CONCLUSION  
 
Therefore, we affirm the postconviction court’s order granting Smith a new 
penalty phase.   
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent. 
LAWSON, J., dissents with an opinion.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., dissenting. 
 
 
See Pagan v. State, 235 So. 3d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 2018) (Lawson, J., 
dissenting).  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County,  
Charles E. Roberts, Judge - Case No. 582004CF002129XXXANC 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Christina Z. 
Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie 
Mirialakis and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee