Title: Kathleen F. Ronan v. Peter G. Adely
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-58-03
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2004

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff Kathleen F. Ronan (plaintiff) and defendant Peter Adely, Jr. (defendant) are the biological parents of Brendan Peter Adely (Brendan). Brendan was born on October 29, 1998. Plaintiff and respondent never married and plaintiff assumed most, if not all, of the childcare responsibilities. The parties relationship began to deteriorate and in December 1999 they separated. Plaintiff and Brendan moved in with her parents. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking sole legal custody of Brendan and reasonable child support. Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking joint legal custody. The trial court ordered joint legal custody, continued the child support arrangement between the parties and set temporary visitation rights for defendant. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion seeking increased visitation and other relief unrelated to this appeal. Plaintiff filed a cross motion opposing the increased visitation and seeking permission to change Brendan s name from Brendan P. Adely to Brendan P. Adely Ronan. The trial court, in part, denied plaintiff s request to change Brendan s surname, noting that Adely had been used for over two years. On September 27, 2002, the trial court denied a request by plaintiff to postpone defendant s overnight visitation. Plaintiff appealed from that order and from the prior order denying her request to change Brendan s surname. In her brief to the Appellate Division, plaintiff asserted that Brendan referred to himself by the surname Ronan. Defendant did not dispute that assertion. Brendan was more than four years old at the time plaintiff filed her appeal below. In an unreported decision, the Appellate Division concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate how assuming the surname Ronan would promote Brendan s best interests without risking damage to a significant connection with his father. The panel affirmed the trial court s determination. The Supreme Court granted certification limited solely to the issue of Brendan s surname. HELD: When the primary caretaker seeks to name or, as here, change the surname of a child, there is a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker that the name selected is in the best interests of the child. That presumption may be rebutted by proof offered by the secondary caretaker that the name change is not in the best interests of the child. Because the trial court failed to apply that presumption and failed to make findings of fact, a remand is required. 1. In Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120, 141 (1995), this Court concluded that gender-based presumptions should play no part in a child s surname and that in resolving disagreements between parents concerning a child s surname, we apply the best-interests-of-the-child standard. In applying the best interests of the child standard, we noted that courts have considered a number of specified criteria. Courts have experienced difficulty in applying those criteria to the speculative quality of the inquiry into the effect that the chosen surname would have on the future welfare and happiness of the child. Id. at 142. To lessen that difficulty and to increase the predictability of such analyses, we adopt[ed] a strong presumption in favor of the surname chosen by the [primary caretaker]. Id. at 144. We further concluded that the secondary caretaker bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that despite the presumption favoring the [primary caretaker] s choice of name, the chosen surname is not in the best interests of the child. Id. at 145. (Pp. 7-10) 2. We first note that the record in this case is deficient to make a meaningful review. In rejecting plaintiff s name change request, the trial court received no testimony from either of the parties and made no findings of fact. Additionally, the record does not contain a certification by the parties setting forth their respective reasons for or against the name change. Clearly, the trial court was incorrect in finding there was no precedent for imposing [a child-name-change] under circumstances where a name has already been given and has been used for over 2 years. Moreover, neither the trial court not the Appellate Division addressed the presumption in favor of the primary caretaker s choice of surname. There is a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker, here plaintiff, that the surname chosen by her is in the best interests of the child. Defendant bears the burden to rebut that presumption. It is imperative that the trial court make clear its findings of fact in determining whether defendant met his burden to overcome the presumption that the name chosen by plaintiff was in the best interests of the child. Lastly, we note that plaintiff did not seek to remove the surname Adely from Brendan s full name. Rather, she sought to add Ronan after the birth-given surname Adely. That approach would be consistent with the public policy expressed in the regulations issued by the New Jersey State Department of Health for resolving disagreements concerning the selection of a surname at birth. The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LAVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, and RIVERA-SOTO join in Justice WALLACE s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER G. ADELY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 13, 2004 Decided December 15, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Kathleen F. Ronan argued the cause pro se. Rosanne S. DeTorres argued the cause for respondent. JUSTICE WALLACE delivered the opinion of the Court. The trial court denied the request of the mother, the primary caretaker to change the surname of her son. The issue in this appeal is whether the court properly applied the best interests of the child standard, which includes a presumption in favor of the name selected by the primary caretaker. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. We conclude that the courts below applied an improper standard and reverse. [Id. at 141 (citations omitted).] Courts have experienced difficulty in applying those criteria due to the speculative quality of the inquiry into the effect that the chosen surname would have on the future welfare and happiness of the child. Id. at 142. To lessen that difficulty and to increase the predictability of such analyses, we adopt[ed] a strong presumption in favor of the surname chosen by the [primary caretaker]. Id. at 144. Underlying that presumption is a basic principle of family law--that the parent having physical custody of the child is generally accorded broad responsibility in making daily child-rearing decisions. Id. at 142. We found implicit in that broad responsibility the supposition that the primary caretaker act[s] in the best interests of the child in discharging that obligation . . . [,] and that the naming or changing of the name of a child is like other decisions left to the primary caretaker. Ibid. We concluded that the secondary caretaker bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that despite the presumption favoring the [primary caretaker] s choice of name, the chosen surname is not in the best interests of the child. Id. at 145. In applying that new standard in Gubernat, we held that the father had not presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that the retention of the [maternal] surname would be contrary to [the child] s best interests, nor . . . that the [paternal] surname would better serve [the child] s interests. Id. at 147. Because there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the name chosen by the primary caretaker, we concluded it was error for the trial court and the Appellate Division to grant the father s name change request. Ibid. Following Gubernat, our Appellate Division first addressed the child name change issue in J.S. v. D.M., 285 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 1995). In that case, the mother and father conceived a child out of wedlock. The mother was the primary caretaker and the father was the secondary caretaker. The father sought to change the surname of the child from the mother s surname to his own. The trial court denied the request to change the surname, but ordered that the father s surname be the child s middle name. Id. at 499. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the father had failed to overcome the presumption that the surname selected by the primary caretaker was in the best interest of the child. Id. at 500. In Staradumsky v. Romanowski, 300 N.J. Super. 618 (App. Div. 1997), an unmarried couple named their newborn child Stefan Francis Joseph Romanowski, Romanowski being the surname of the father. After the parties separated, the court ordered joint legal custody with the mother having primary custody. The mother began using Christian as the child s first name instead of Stefan. The mother eventually sought to change both the first name and the surname of the child and to eliminate one of his middle names by renaming the child Christian Francis Staradumsky. The trial court found that the father presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the mother, as the primary caretaker, acted in the child s best interests in changing the child s name. The Appellate Division approved the change of the child s first and last name, but saw no reason why the child s middle name should not include the father s surname (or a name related to his family) if that is his desire. . . . Id. at 621. The panel concluded that this solution would preserve some of the father s heritage and also would provide a basis for the father s family to continue to call the child Stefan as that would be the child s middle name. The panel exercised its original jurisdiction to modify the order to change the child s name to Christian Stefan Staradumsky. Ibid. KATHLEEN F. RONAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER G. ADELY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED December 15, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY