Title: Commonwealth v. Pagan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11714
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2015

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SJC-11714  
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JUAN PAGAN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 6, 2015. - June 1, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Intent, Motive, Age.  Intent.  Mental 
Impairment.  Practice, Criminal, Verdict, Lesser included 
offense, Instructions to jury.  Malice. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 22, 2006. 
 
 
The case was tried before S. Jane Haggerty, J.; a motion to 
reduce the verdict was heard by her; and a motion for a new 
trial, filed on June 13, 2012, was also heard by her.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John F. Palmer for Juan Pagan. 
 
Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Afton M. Templin, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  On July 24, 2007, a jury convicted the 
defendant, Juan Pagan, of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of deliberate premeditation.  At trial, there was no 
dispute that the defendant, when he was sixteen years of age, 
stabbed Alex Castro Santos (victim) to death.  His defense was 
that he was not guilty of murder because he had acted in self-
defense and with a mental impairment, namely attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and depression, which when viewed 
in the context of his age, caused him to act reflexively and 
instinctively.  One month following his conviction, the 
defendant filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
25 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 896 (1979), to reduce the verdict to 
murder in the second degree, which the trial judge granted and 
from which the Commonwealth appeals.  After he was resentenced, 
the defendant filed a notice of appeal.  Subsequently, on June 
13, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in the 
Superior Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), arguing that the court room 
had been closed during jury empanelment in violation of his 
right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Following a hearing, a judge denied the 
motion.1  The defendant thereafter filed a separate appeal from 
 
1 The trial judge was also the judge who heard both the 
motion to reduce the verdict and the motion for a new trial. 
                     
3 
 
this order.  The defendant's direct appeal2 and his appeal from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial were consolidated in 
the Appeals Court, and we granted the Commonwealth's application 
for direct appellate review.  We affirm the orders allowing a 
reduction of the verdict to murder in the second degree and 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, and affirm the 
defendant's conviction. 
 
Trial.  We recite the facts the jury could have found based 
on the Commonwealth's case, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), reserving certain details for our 
discussion of the specific issues raised.  During the late 
evening of May 14, 2006, a group of young men in their late 
teens and early twenties gathered at the apartment of Stephen 
Peddle in Lowell to socialize and to play cards.  Peddle and 
some of the men were or had been affiliated with GRIP, a housing 
program for homeless or displaced youth.3  Although not involved 
with GRIP at the time, the defendant was living with Peddle.   
 
Among those gathered at Peddle's apartment that night were 
Peddle, the defendant, Michael May, and Ramon Normil.  At around 
2 In his direct appeal, the defendant argues reversible 
error in the judge's failure to instruct on involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 
 
3 In the GRIP program, homeless youths are taught life 
skills in a group home setting.  Once the youths have acquired 
these skills and have obtained employment, the organization 
assists them in finding independent housing.   
 
                     
4 
 
10:30 P.M., Brian Patrick Murphy, Markeem Bishop, Joshua Spencer 
Apostolos, and Adam Costas joined them.  Approximately twenty 
minutes later, the victim arrived.  He was upset because his 
friend had been "jumped" by some member or members of a gang. 
The victim blamed the defendant, Normil, and Peddle for the 
incident because he suspected they associated with the gang that 
allegedly had been involved.  When asked, Normil informed the 
victim that he did not know who had participated in the attack.  
The victim told everyone that friends were looking for members 
of that gang, implicitly suggesting there would be retaliation.  
The defendant grew upset, stating that some of those people were 
his friends.   
 
Having exhausted the last of a "blunt," or marijuana 
cigarette, Murphy, Costas, Bishop, and the victim left, heading 
to a nearby convenience store to purchase a cigar.4  They were 
gone for about five to ten minutes before returning to Peddle's 
apartment.5  When they arrived, the defendant and May were no 
longer there.   
 
The defendant and May left to visit a friend of the 
defendant's, Nicholas George Giuliani.  On approaching his 
 
4 The victim was not present when some of the men smoked the 
first blunt.   
 
 
5 Joshua Apostolos used the cigar the group purchased to 
make another blunt that everyone took turns smoking.   
 
                     
5 
 
automobile,6 the defendant and May saw that some of the windows 
had been broken.  The defendant told May that he suspected that 
the victim had been responsible.   
 
After briefly visiting Giuliani, the defendant and May 
returned to Peddle's apartment.7  The defendant was upset and 
verbally confronted the victim, who stated that he had had a BB 
gun earlier, but not anymore.8  The victim went on to deny any 
involvement with breaking the windows of the defendant's 
vehicle, but stated that he knew who had done it and would not 
tell the defendant.  The defendant asked the rest of the group 
whether anyone had seen anything.  No one volunteered 
information about the incident.  The victim decided to leave and 
started saying goodbye.  He told the defendant he was "sorry" 
and it just had been a "joke."  The victim repeated that he was 
upset about his friend and wanted to go find the perpetrators.  
Apostolos, a friend of the victim, testified that the victim 
 
6 The automobile was owned by the defendant's father.   
 
 
7 The defendant told Nicholas George Giuliani what had 
transpired that evening and asked whether Giuliani would 
accompany him to Stephen Peddle's apartment to "watch his back."  
Giuliani declined and returned to bed.   
 
 
8 There was evidence that Markeem Bishop had a BB gun that 
"looked like a pistol."  The day prior, "everyone" had played 
with the BB gun, including the victim. 
 
                     
6 
 
patted his waist area indicating that he had a weapon.9  The 
defendant asked the victim tauntingly, "Are you ready to use 
that?"  The victim replied that he was, and the defendant "got 
quiet."   
 
After taking a cigarette from Normil, the victim headed 
toward the door, which was in the direction of the defendant, 
and stood inside the doorway.  The defendant, meanwhile, had 
taken a seat on a mattress in the living room and had picked up 
a large combat-style knife with an eight-inch blade and began 
twirling it.  Murphy testified that the victim walked toward the 
defendant; Apostolos testified that the victim turned toward the 
direction of the defendant from the doorway.10  The defendant 
abruptly jumped up from the mattress, stepped around Apostolos, 
punched the victim three times in the face, and stabbed him in 
the abdomen.  When Apostolos ran to the victim's aid, he 
observed a BB gun approximately three to four feet from the 
victim's body.   
 
9 Brian Patrick Murphy testified that he did not see the 
victim make any threatening gestures and did not see the victim 
in possession of any type of gun.  Ramon Normil's testimony was 
the same.  Although Apostolos observed a BB gun on the floor 
after the stabbing, he did not see it in the victim's 
possession, nor did he hear the victim make any threats to the 
defendant.   
 
 
10 The defendant's friend, Michael May, testified that the 
victim had not approached the defendant just before the 
stabbing.  Normil stated that the victim was walking toward the 
door.   
 
                     
7 
 
 
Murphy took over assisting the victim, who asked to go to a 
hospital, and Apostolos restrained the defendant.  The knife the 
defendant had been holding was on the floor.   
 
The defendant fled the apartment and arrived at Giuliani's 
home at about 1:30 A.M., now May 15.  The defendant said that 
someone had had a gun.  He was scared and crying, and told 
Giuliani that he thought that he had just killed someone and 
that he had stabbed him.  After falling asleep on Giuliani's 
couch, the defendant awoke to pounding at the front door.  
Seeing that it was the police, the defendant ran out the back 
door, but was caught and arrested.   
 
The victim was treated by ambulance personnel at the 
apartment.  He did not survive.  The medical examiner who 
conducted his autopsy opined that the victim died as a result of 
a stab wound to the abdomen, with perforation of the liver and 
vena cava.11   
 
The police recovered a BB gun outside the rear window of 
Peddle's apartment.  They also took possession of the knife.  
 
The theory of the defense was that the defendant, who was 
sixteen years of age at the time of the stabbing, did not intend 
to kill the victim and had acted impulsively or in self-defense.  
 
11 The medical examiner explained that the stab wound had 
cut the victim's interior vena cava, which is a large vein that 
carries blood from one's lower extremities to the heart to be 
reoxygenated.   
 
                     
8 
 
The defendant did not testify.  He supported his defense with 
the expert testimony of Dr. Bernice Kelly, a forensic 
psychologist.  Dr. Kelly interviewed the defendant four times 
and took note of the fact that he had a very "troubling" 
childhood involving a mother who abused drugs and a father who 
physically abused him frequently.  On the basis of her 
interviews, testing, and review of school, medical, and other 
records, Dr. Kelly concluded that the defendant suffered from 
ADHD12 and dysthymic disorder (depression from an early age) at 
the time of the stabbing.  She opined that his ADHD exacerbated 
the impulsivity of an adolescent brain that is prone to risk-
taking.13  Dr. Kelly testified that in the circumstances the 
defendant was in just before the stabbing, being an adolescent 
with ADHD and depression and being in fear of imminent bodily 
harm, he would not have been able to consider alternative 
choices and was only capable of acting impulsively.   
 
12 The defendant had been diagnosed with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) when he was in kindergarten.  Dr. 
Bernice Kelly explained that about seven per cent of the 
population has ADHD.  She explained that it is "a condition that 
has to begin before age seven."  Symptoms include hyperactivity, 
impulsivity, and difficulty with attention, concentration, 
planning, and problem-solving.  She also cited research that 
states that the brain undergoes more change during adolescence 
than at any other time, ending when one is approximately twenty-
one years of age.   
 
 
13 Dr. Kelly testified that the frontal lobe area of the 
brain, which controls thinking and planning, and enables one to 
inhibit responses, is not well developed in adolescents.   
                     
9 
 
 
The judge instructed the jury on murder in the first degree 
on a theory of deliberate premeditation, murder in the second 
degree, and voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable 
provocation and the use of excessive force in self-defense.  The 
judge also gave an instruction on self-defense as a complete 
defense.  The judge further instructed on the relevance of 
mental impairment as it bore on the requisite intent to kill, on 
deliberate premeditation, and on whether the Commonwealth met 
its burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-
defense, did not act with reasonable provocation, and did not 
use excessive force in self-defense.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Commonwealth's appeal; motion to reduce 
the verdict.  As has been stated, the judge allowed the 
defendant's motion under rule 25 (b) (2) and reduced the verdict 
to murder in the second degree.  The Commonwealth appeals, 
seeking reinstatement of the jury's verdict of murder in the 
first degree.  We affirm the judge's order. 
 
The guiding principles for reducing a verdict under rule 25 
(b) (2) are set forth in Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 
Mass. 370, 381-382 (2006): 
 
"A trial judge has the authority, pursuant to rule 25 
(b) (2), to reduce a verdict, despite the presence of 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. . . .  
Although the purpose of the power to reduce a verdict is to 
ensure that the result in every case is consonant with 
justice, . . . the power is to be used sparingly, . . . and 
the judge is not to sit as a second jury. . . .  A most 
10 
 
important consideration is whether the jury verdict is 
markedly inconsistent with verdicts returned in similar 
cases. . . .  Our role is not to decide whether we would 
have acted as the trial judge did.  The judge has the 
advantage of face to face evaluation of the witnesses and 
the evidence at trial and is therefore in a far better 
position than we[] to make the judgment required by [rule 
25 (b) (2)]. . . .  We decide only whether the judge abused 
his discretion or committed other error of law. . . . 
 
 
"A judge's discretion to reduce a verdict pursuant to 
rule 25 (b) (2) is appropriately exercised where the weight 
of the evidence in the case, although technically 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, points to a 
lesser crime.  Thus, for example, where evidence of 
premeditation was slim, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in reducing a verdict of murder in the first 
degree to murder in the second degree. . . .  Similarly, 
where the weight of the evidence suggests that the 
defendant did not act with malice, a murder verdict may be 
reduced to manslaughter. . . .  We must examine, therefore, 
whether there was some weakness in the evidence, . . . that 
the defendant committed murder in the first degree and 
determine whether the judge was correct in concluding that 
the evidence is more consistent with a lesser form of 
homicide." (Quotations and citations omitted.) 
 
In addition, a judge considering a motion to reduce a verdict 
under rule 25 (b) (2) "may rely on essentially the same 
considerations as does this court when deciding whether to 
reduce a verdict to a lesser degree of guilt pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 891 
(2013). 
 
The judge concluded that the weight of the evidence 
demonstrated a weakness in the Commonwealth's evidence 
concerning the defendant's ability to deliberately premeditate, 
thereby pointing to a lesser degree of homicide.  She based her 
11 
 
findings on the trial testimony of Dr. Kelly and "the materials 
presented and argued at the post-trial motion to reduce the 
verdict, including the report of Dr. Kelly."  The judge's 
findings of fact were as follows. 
 
At the time of the murder, the defendant was sixteen years 
of age and suffered from ADHD.  He came from an extremely 
dysfunctional family.  His mother was drug dependent and had 
used drugs during her pregnancy with the defendant.  When the 
defendant was eighteen months old, his mother abandoned the 
family, and the defendant was in foster care until three years 
of age.  Although there had been some limited contact with the 
mother over the years, the defendant essentially had no 
relationship with his mother.  The defendant's father, who was 
seventy-four years of age at the time of the murder, provided 
little parenting or guidance to the defendant, due in part to 
his age and his own medical problems.  Thus, the defendant had 
no adult supervision and spent most of his teen years on the 
streets with peers.  Despite these circumstances, the 
defendant's juvenile record consisted solely of an assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  That event arose out of 
an argument that occurred with one member of the defendant's 
dysfunctional family.   
 
The defendant was diagnosed with ADHD at an early age and 
was treated with medication for the condition until he was 
12 
 
twelve years of age.  Since that time, his ADHD went untreated.  
In addition to ADHD, the defendant has suffered from untreated 
clinical depression from early childhood to the time of the 
murder.  His early school years were marked by disruptive 
behavior and poor performance.  In 2004, the defendant's father 
transferred guardianship of the defendant to his brother in 
California because the father was incapable of managing the 
defendant.  The brother could not manage the defendant and sent 
him back to Lowell.  In the spring of 2006, the defendant was 
expelled from Lowell High School.  Following the expulsion, the 
defendant was homeless until he went to live at Peddle's 
apartment a couple of weeks before the murder.   
 
The judge noted a "constellation of factors at play 
preceding and at the moment of the stabbing."  She found 
particularly significant that the defendant did not leave to 
procure a murder weapon (it was already there) and did not seek 
out the victim.   
 
In addition to the thin evidence of deliberate 
premeditation, the judge took into consideration the defendant's 
youth and turbulent background, as well as his medical history.  
Especially troubling to the judge was the fact that, at the time 
of the murder, the defendant's ADHD was not being treated.  The 
judge also credited Dr. Kelly's testimony that the defendant 
lacked the cognitive capacity to premeditate the killing as a 
13 
 
result of his untreated ADHD, inadequate adult supervision, and 
immature adolescent neurodevelopment.  The judge noted that the 
defendant's impulsiveness not only was affected by untreated 
ADHD, but also was exacerbated by his youth, familial neglect, 
and developmental immaturity.  She thus determined that a 
reduction of the verdict to murder in the second degree was more 
consonant with justice.   
 
As an initial matter, the Commonwealth correctly does not 
argue that the judge improperly considered the defendant's youth 
(and adolescent brain) and personal experiences (such as his 
untreated ADHD and troubled childhood) in reducing the verdict.  
The judge properly noted that the defendant's age and personal 
circumstances alone cannot warrant a reduction of the verdict.  
See Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 825 (2003).  The 
judge, however, considered those factors in combination with the 
fact that the evidence of deliberate premeditation was slim, a 
permissible basis on which to reduce the verdict.  See id. at 
821, 825; Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 322 
(1993); Commonwealth v. Millyan, 399 Mass. 171, 188-189 (1987).   
 
The Commonwealth challenges the judge's assessment 
concerning the evidence of deliberate premeditation and her 
conclusion that it was weak.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
judge's determination that the defendant's actions reflected 
more spontaneity than deliberate premeditation, see Commonwealth 
14 
 
v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 158-159, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 
(1982) (reducing verdict to murder in second degree in part due 
to defendant's spontaneous, rather than planned, reaction to 
victim's alleged insults), was based on a mischaracterization of 
the sequence of the events preceding the stabbing.  We disagree.   
 
The judge's recitation of the facts correctly acknowledged 
that Apostolos was the only witness who testified that the 
victim, before the stabbing, had made a gesture to indicate that 
he had a gun.  She then went on to say that the defendant next 
abruptly jumped up from the mattress and stabbed the victim.  
While the word "next" in her findings did not necessarily 
exactly describe every witness account, the fact that the victim 
may have turned first or have spoken with someone about a 
cigarette before stabbing the victim, did not detract from the 
consistent witness testimony that the defendant's actions in 
jumping up from the mattress to stab the victim were unexpected 
to everyone there and were abrupt.  There was no evidence to the 
contrary, and the evidence bearing on the fact that the victim 
may have indicated that he had a gun or had started walking in 
the direction of the defendant bore on provocation, self-
defense, or excessive use of force in self-defense, but not to 
the spontaneity of the incident.   
 
The Commonwealth also overlooks the other factors that the 
judge properly considered, including the fact that any motive on 
15 
 
the part of the defendant to retaliate against the victim for 
allegedly having broken the windows to the defendant's 
automobile weakened any suggestion of premeditation when the 
victim apologized to the defendant.  In addition, the knife was 
already in the apartment and the defendant did not have to leave 
to obtain it, see Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 320-321 
(1982), nor did he have to leave to seek out the victim.  
Further, the defendant inflicted just one stab wound to the 
victim.  See Commonwealth v. Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 317 
(1987) (consideration in favor of spontaneity, rather than 
deliberate premeditation, is whether defendant inflicted single 
blow or separate distinct acts capable of causing death).  
 
The Commonwealth argues that different inferences should 
have been drawn from this evidence.  The judge acknowledged that 
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, but 
from the evidence and witnesses she heard firsthand, she was not 
foreclosed from considering the weight of the evidence and doing 
so in combination with compelling and uncontroverted testimony 
regarding the defendant's youth, adolescent brain, untreated 
ADHD, and troubled childhood, which served to mitigate the level 
of culpability.14  See Keough, 385 Mass. at 321.  The judge's 
 
14 The Commonwealth contends that the judge erroneously 
relied on Dr. Kelly's testimony to find that the defendant's 
actions were impulsive and not deliberately premeditated because 
the evidence "indisputably supports that there was no threat to 
                     
16 
 
decision reflects careful and serious deliberation.  We cannot 
say that she abused her discretion in determining, based on the 
facts of this case, that the lesser verdict of murder in the 
second degree was more consonant with justice.   
 
2.  Defendant's appeal; failure to instruct on involuntary 
manslaughter.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter based 
on his mental impairment of ADHD and depression in an adolescent 
brain.  Because the defendant did not specifically request an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction on this basis at trial,15 or 
object to the charge on the ground of its absence on this basis, 
we review whether there was error and, if so, whether it created 
the defendant that night," such that the basis for Dr. Kelly's 
opinion testimony was unsupported.  Again, the Commonwealth 
views the evidence only in a light favorable to it.  There was 
testimony from Murphy that before the stabbing the victim walked 
toward the defendant.  According to Apostolos, before the 
stabbing, the victim made a gesture by his waist indicating that 
he had a gun and told the defendant he was ready to use it.  
Just after the stabbing, a BB gun was found on the floor next to 
the victim.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, the jury could have inferred from this evidence 
that the victim had reached for or had taken out the BB gun just 
before the stabbing.  This permissible view of the evidence 
warranted the judge in instructing the jury on provocation, 
self-defense, and the use of excessive force in self-defense.  
There was an evidentiary basis for Dr. Kelly's opinion 
testimony. 
 
 
15 The defendant requested an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction at trial on the basis that the defendant's conduct 
was reckless.   
 
                                                                  
17 
 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.16  
See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002).  An 
involuntary manslaughter instruction is required if the evidence 
warrants a jury in finding the defendant guilty of that 
offense.  Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440, 444 (2013).  In 
this case, however, there was no error because the evidence 
supported only a finding of malice, thus precluding an 
instruction on manslaughter.  
 
"Malice is what distinguishes murder from 
manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. Vizcarrando, 427 Mass. 392, 396 
(1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 (2000).  The distinction means that 
a verdict of manslaughter is possible only in the absence of 
malice.  See Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 437 (1995) 
("Without malice, an unlawful killing can be no more than 
manslaughter").  "To prove malice, the Commonwealth must prove 
one of three prongs:  (1) an intent to kill the victim; (2) an 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm to the victim; or (3) 
commission of an act that, in the circumstances known to the 
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain 
and strong likelihood of death."  Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 
Mass. 799, 821-822 (2014).  By contrast, involuntary 
manslaughter is "the unintentional result of an act committed 
 
16 We use the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
standard because we affirm the defendant's conviction of murder 
in the second degree, not murder in the first degree. 
                     
18 
 
with such disregard of its probable harm to another as to amount 
to wanton or reckless conduct."17  Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 
Mass. 478, 492-493 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 
Mass. 209, 217 (1994).  In the context of involuntary 
manslaughter, wanton and reckless conduct18 is "intentional 
conduct that create[s] a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another person."  Commonwealth 
v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 536 n.15 (2013).  See Commonwealth 
v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440, 443 n.2 (2013), and cases cited.   
 
No view of the evidence adduced at trial supports the 
argument that the defendant's conduct was merely wanton and 
reckless, and not intentional.  The degree of the risk of 
physical harm that a reasonable person would recognize was 
created by the defendant's conduct is simply not compatible with 
the "high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result 
to another person" associated with wanton and reckless conduct. 
 
17 "A verdict of involuntary manslaughter is possible only 
where the defendant caused an unintentional death (1) during the 
commission of an act amounting to wanton or reckless conduct, or 
(2) during the commission of a battery."  Commonwealth v. 
Brooks, 422 Mass. 574, 578 (1996).  At trial, the defendant 
argued on the wanton and reckless conduct prong only, conceding 
that the basis for doing so was "weak." 
 
 
18 "This court has described conduct amounting to 
involuntary manslaughter as both 'wanton or reckless' and 
'wanton and reckless.'"  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 
437 n.13 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Chase, 433 Mass. 293, 
301 (2001). "Expressed either way, the words articulate a single 
standard, not two."  Tavares, supra, citing Chase, supra. 
                     
19 
 
 
Here, the defendant had to bypass Apostolos in order to 
reach the victim and then, after punching him, stabbed him in 
the abdomen with a knife having an eight-inch blade.  Stabbing 
someone in the abdomen with an eight-inch blade involves an 
obvious risk of harm consistent with second or third prong 
malice and not just a risk of substantial harm that would 
warrant an involuntary manslaughter instruction.  
See Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 105 (1997) (when 
obvious that risk of physical harm to victim created plain and 
strong likelihood that death will follow, instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter not required).19  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 438-439 (2015) (where defendant 
"simply pointed the gun at [the victim] and then backed away").  
 
The defendant argues that because of his mental impairment, 
any intent required for murder is vitiated, thus providing a 
basis for the jury to find him guilty of the lesser included 
 
19 "The difference between the elements of the third prong 
of malice and wanton and reckless conduct amounting to 
involuntary manslaughter lies in the degree of risk of physical 
harm that a reasonable person would recognize was created by 
particular conduct, based on what the defendant knew.  The risk 
for the purposes of the third of prong malice is that there was 
a plain and strong likelihood of death . . . .  The risk that 
will satisfy the standard for wilful and wanton conduct 
amounting to involuntary manslaughter 'involves a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.'"  
Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 396 (1998), S.C., 
431 Mass. 360 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 
292, 303 n.14 (1992). 
 
                     
20 
 
offense of involuntary manslaughter.  We previously have 
rejected an argument similar to that advanced here by the 
defendant involving a defendant's involuntary chemical 
intoxication.  See Commonwealth v. Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 
315-316 (1987).  There, we explained that the issue of 
involuntary intoxication at the time of the killing "goes to the 
question of criminal responsibility and not to the issue of 
involuntary manslaughter."  Id. at 316.  The same can be said 
here with evidence of mental impairment.  Even if a mental 
impairment negates malice, a necessary element of murder, a 
defendant would not be entitled to an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter.  "A killing without malice aforethought does not 
automatically constitute involuntary 
manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 302 
(1992).  Before an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may 
be given, the defendant would be required to adduce evidence of 
the "traditional elements" of involuntary manslaughter that the 
jury might believe.  Id. at 302-303.  As we have said, no such 
evidence was presented to the jury.20   
 
20 Cases of involuntary manslaughter require proof of 
intentional wanton or reckless conduct, resulting in an 
unintentional killing, and not proof of intentional conduct 
bearing on a specific intent to kill or a specific intent to 
injure.  See Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 203 (2004).  
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398 (1944) ("What 
must be intended is the conduct, not the resulting harm"). 
                     
21 
 
 
Even if, however, the failure to give the instruction on 
the basis now argued was error, it was not one likely to have 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  As 
in Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 650 (2009), the jury 
"rejected the option of murder in the second degree, the malice 
element of which comes closest to involuntary manslaughter," 
namely "an intent to do an act that in the circumstances known 
to the defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a 
plain and strong likelihood that death will result."  Id.  
See Commonwealth v. Novo, 449 Mass. 84, 99 (2007).  "In finding 
the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree [based on 
deliberate meditation only], the jury necessarily found that the 
defendant had both a specific intent to kill and that the 
shooting was premeditated."  Tolan, supra.  "These findings 
negate the possibility of involuntary manslaughter."  Id.  
See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 831 (2000) (conviction 
of murder in first degree negates claim of prejudice in denying 
instruction for involuntary manslaughter). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The orders reducing the verdict and 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial are affirmed.  
The defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.