Title: Oregon v. Prieto-Rubio
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S062344
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2016

16	
April 7, 2016	
No. 20
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JESUS R. PRIETO-RUBIO,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 11693CR, 112523CR; 
CA A152030 (Control), A152033; 
SC S062344)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted February 4, 2015.
Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With her on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, Anna Joyce, Solicitor General.
John J. Tyner, III, Hillsboro, argued the cause and filed 
the brief for respondent on review.
Alexander A. Wheatley, Portland, filed the brief for 
amicus curiae Oregon Justice Resource Center and on behalf 
of amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, 
Inc. and the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. 
With him on the brief was Emily E. Elison, Portland.
Before Balmer, C.J., Kistler, Walters, Landau, Baldwin, 
Brewer, and Nakamoto, Justices.**
LANDAU, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The 
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
______________
	
**  Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Thomas Kohl, Judge. 262 
Or App 149, 324 P3d 543 (2014)
	
**  Linder, J., retired on December 31, 2015, and did not participate in the 
decision of this case.
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
17
Case Summary: Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sex-
ual abuse of A, a young girl in his extended family, and he retained counsel on 
those charges. Police later interviewed defendant without counsel about the pos-
sible sexual abuse of two of defendant’s nieces, K and L. In the criminal case 
involving K and L, defendant moved to suppress certain incriminating state-
ments he had made in the uncounseled interview. He argued that because he 
was represented on the charges involving A and those charges were factually 
related to the abuse of K and L, his right to counsel under Article I, section 11, 
of the Oregon Constitution, in the case involving A foreclosed uncounseled ques-
tioning about the abuse of K and L. The trial court denied that motion, but the 
Court of Appeals reversed. Held: (1) The Article I, section 11, right to counsel 
forecloses questioning of a defendant when it is reasonably foreseeable to a person 
in the questioner’s position that questioning will elicit information involving the 
charged offense, for which the defendant has obtained counsel; (2) in this case, 
it was reasonably foreseeable that questioning about the abuse of K and L would 
elicit information about the abuse of A.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The judgment of the cir-
cuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.
18	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
	
LANDAU, J.
	
After a defendant has been charged with a crime 
and the right to counsel has attached, Article I, section 11, 
of the Oregon Constitution prohibits the police from asking 
the defendant about that crime without first notifying his 
or her lawyer. State v. Randant, 341 Or 64, 71-73, 136 P3d 
1113 (2006). The issue in this case is the extent to which 
that same constitutional provision prohibits the police 
from questioning a represented defendant charged with a 
crime about other, uncharged offenses. Defendant argues 
that police violate the right to counsel by questioning about 
other, uncharged offenses if those matters were in any way 
“factually related” to the crime for which he had obtained 
counsel. According to defendant, that is what happened in 
this case, and so the trial court should have suppressed cer-
tain statements that he made to police without the assis-
tance of counsel. The state argues that defendant relies on 
the wrong test. In the state’s view, police who question a 
defendant about other matters violate that defendant’s right 
to counsel only if those other matters are part of the same 
“criminal episode” for which the defendant obtained counsel. 
According to the state, police are free to question a defen-
dant about matters not concerning the charged crime or the 
events surrounding that crime, and, because that is what 
happened in this case, the trial court correctly denied defen-
dant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals agreed with 
defendant. State v. Prieto-Rubio, 262 Or App 149, 324 P3d 
543 (2014).
	
We conclude that the appropriate test for deter-
mining the permissible scope of questioning of a criminal 
defendant who is represented by counsel is whether it is 
objectively reasonably foreseeable that the questioning will 
lead to incriminating evidence concerning the offense for 
which the defendant has obtained counsel. In this case, 
the charged and uncharged offenses were so closely related 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that questioning defen-
dant about the uncharged offenses would elicit incriminat-
ing evidence about the charged offense. As a result, that 
questioning violated defendant’s state constitutional right 
to counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court 
of Appeals.
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
19
I.  FACTS
	
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On August 8, 
2011, a 12-year-old girl, A, reported that defendant, a mem-
ber of her extended family, had sexually abused her the pre-
vious day. She said that defendant had touched her breasts 
and vaginal area while she was at his home. The following 
day, Detective Rookhuyzen went to defendant’s home and 
interviewed him. Defendant admitted that he had been in 
the same room with A, but he said that he did not remember 
what had happened there. Rookhuyzen arrested defendant 
for his abuse of A.
	
At the station, Rookhuyzen interviewed defendant 
again. He asked defendant primarily about A. But he also 
asked whether any other children had come to defendant’s 
home. Defendant mentioned another child, K, but only by 
first name. The state ultimately charged defendant with 
first-degree sexual abuse of A, alleging that the abuse 
occurred “on or between August 7, 2011 [and] August 8, 
2011.” Defendant retained counsel to defend him on that 
charge.
	
Over the next several weeks, Rookhuyzen contin-
ued to investigate. He located K, who turned out to be a 
niece of defendant. K reported that defendant had repeat-
edly touched her vaginal area. Rookhuyzen located another 
minor victim, L, who was another niece of defendant and 
who also reported that defendant once had put his hands in 
her pants and touched her vaginal area. Both K and L said 
that the incidents of abuse had occurred while they were 
alone with defendant at his home. They reported that the 
separate incidents occurred at least eight months before 
defendant allegedly abused A.
	
Rookhuyzen went to the Washington County Jail, 
where defendant was being held on the charges relating 
to A. Rookhuyzen read defendant his Miranda rights, and 
defendant waived those rights. The detective knew that 
defendant had retained counsel on the charges relating to 
A. But he did not notify defendant’s lawyer about the inter-
view, because he intended to ask defendant only about K 
and L. During the interview, Rookhuyzen questioned defen-
dant about K and L, and defendant made incriminating 
20	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
statements about the incidents involving those two victims. 
The state then charged defendant with three counts of first-
degree sexual abuse, two counts involving K and one involv-
ing L. The indictment alleged that defendant had abused 
K “on or between August 31, 2009 and January 1, 2011.” It 
further alleged that defendant had abused L “on or between 
January 1, 2010 and January 1, 2011.”
	
The state then moved to consolidate the case involv-
ing A with the case involving K and L. The state informed 
the court that it was proper to consolidate the cases because 
the crimes alleged against defendant “involve many of the 
same witnesses and arise from the same investigation” 
and that those crimes “are of the same or similar charac-
ter and show a common scheme or plan.” See generally ORS 
132.560(1)(b)(A) and (C) (grounds for consolidation). The 
trial court granted the state’s motion.
	
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the state-
ments that he had made to Rookhuyzen regarding K and L 
because they had been obtained in violation of his right to 
counsel, guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon 
Constitution. Defendant argued that Rookhuyzen knew 
that he already had retained counsel and yet failed to notify 
counsel before conducting the interview. In defendant’s view, 
even though he had obtained counsel to defend him only on 
the charge related to A, under State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 
672 P2d 1182 (1983), the detective was not permitted to 
question him about K and L because the incidents involving 
those victims was factually related to the incident involving 
A.
	
At the hearing on defendant’s motion, Rookhuyzen 
testified about his interview of defendant regarding K and 
L.
“The Court: How would I ultimately be able to say, Officer, 
that you weren’t ending up talking to the defendant about 
things that fell with—under the case that he was already 
represented? How do you know you weren’t doing that?
“The Witness: Well, I think it’s impossible to have a con-
versation with him and not have some overlap. These are 
family members. So I mean, I think that it’s fair to say, 
you, know, a name might have come up. But at this point, 
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
21
he’d been charged on the first victim, and I was completely 
focused on victims two and three.”
Rookhuyzen acknowledged on cross-examination that it was 
“fair to say” that during all of his interviews he had asked 
defendant about “the universe of kids who [had come] to his 
house” over the course of the preceding two years. But when 
asked about who actually was mentioned in the last inter-
view, the detective replied that only K and L were named.
	
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to sup-
press. It explained that defendant’s constitutional right to 
counsel had attached only as to the charges involving A, and 
Rookhuyzen’s questioning did not violate that right because 
the interview focused on the charges involving K and L, 
which involved different times and different victims:
	
“And the fact that the cases appear to be related, 
because, of course, first of all, they’re—the allegations are 
against [defendant]; that they’re from minors; and that 
they involve his house is sufficiently similar to say that 
they are the same. And the representations of counsel is 
to the offense charged, which would have been the offenses 
charged initially [involving A], not the ones related to 
by the officer that were charged after that, because they 
involved a different time frame and different victims and 
result in the allegations of different crimes.”
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the court 
found him guilty of one count of sexual abuse against K and 
L and two counts of attempted sexual abuse of A. In render-
ing the verdict on the case involving K and L, the trial court 
referred to the incriminating statements that defendant had 
made to Rookhuyzen during the final interview.
	
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements that 
he had made to Rookhuyzen about K and L. He argued to 
the Court of Appeals as he had to the trial court, namely, 
that Rookhuyzen had violated his state constitutional right 
to counsel by interviewing him without notifying his lawyer 
when the detective knew that he had retained counsel.
	
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and 
reversed. The court began with the general proposition that, 
once a defendant has retained counsel to provide a defense 
22	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
on a criminal charge, there can be no interrogation concern-
ing the events related to that charge unless the defendant’s 
lawyer is notified and afforded a reasonable opportunity 
to attend. 262 Or App at 155. Citing this court’s decision 
in Sparklin, the court noted that the right to insist on the 
presence of counsel, however, is limited to the “criminal epi-
sode” that gave rise to the charge for which he obtained the 
assistance of an attorney. Id. at 156. Even so, the court com-
mented, “ 
‘we cannot simply take at face value the Supreme 
Court’s statement that the Article  I, section 11, right is 
specific to the criminal episode in which the accused is 
charged.’ 
” Id. at 159 (quoting State v. Potter, 245 Or App 1, 
7, 260 P3d 815 (2011)).  In the view of the Court of Appeals, 
Sparklin must be understood to apply more broadly. Id. The 
court observed that interpreting Sparklin to apply solely to 
the criminal episode for which the defendant was charged 
could permit the state to game the rule to enable it to inter-
rogate defendants without informing their attorneys, for 
example, by strategically delaying filing certain charges. 
Id. To avoid such possibilities, the controlling inquiry must 
focus on whether the charged offense and the subject of the 
additional investigation are “factually related,” taking into 
account the extent to which there is overlapping evidence 
and close temporal proximity, as well as whether there is 
close collaboration among those investigating the different 
incidents. Id. at 156-57.
	
Applying those principles to the case, the court con-
cluded that the criminal episodes involving A, K, and L were 
factually related for the purposes of defendant’s Article I, 
section 11, right to counsel. Id. at 157-59. The court said 
that, although the crimes involving A, on the one hand, and 
K and L, on the other, occurred at different times and did not 
involve overlapping evidence, still, the victims were all fam-
ily members. Id. at 157-58. Moreover, the crimes occurred at 
the same location, were investigated by the same detective, 
and involved similar types of physical conduct toward the 
victims. Id. at 158-59. Even if Rookhuyzen’s final interview 
did not actually produce additional incriminating informa-
tion concerning the charges involving A, the court contin-
ued, “it is plain that that was a distinct possibility,” given 
that the detective himself had said that it was “impossible” 
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
23
for his questioning about K and L not to have some overlap 
with the charges involving A. Id. at 159.
	
On review, the state now argues that the Court of 
Appeals erroneously departed from this court’s decision in 
Sparklin. In the state’s view, Sparklin prohibits investiga-
tors from questioning a represented defendant only about 
the “events surrounding the charged crime,” that is, the 
events occurring immediately before or after the charged 
conduct. In this case, the state argues, the crimes involving 
K and L did not involve facts that occurred immediately 
before or after the abuse of A; rather the offenses involv-
ing K and L occurred between eight months and two years 
earlier.
	
Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly interpreted Sparklin to hold that the right to coun-
sel under Article I, section 11, extends to questioning about 
events that are factually related to the charged offense. In 
defendant’s view, an event is “factually related” to a charged 
offense for right-to-counsel purposes if questioning about 
the event could foreseeably produce information relevant to 
the charged offense. In this case, he argues, it was reason-
ably foreseeable that questioning about the abuse of K and L 
could produce incriminating information about the abuse of 
A because the abuse of all three victims involved members 
of defendant’s extended family and occurred at the same 
place, that is, defendant’s house.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
Both parties claim support for their positions in 
Sparklin. The state quotes a reference to “criminal episodes” 
in the decision, while defendant quotes a different reference 
in the decision to whether charges are “factually related.” 
Our task then is to clarify what is the appropriate test under 
Sparklin for determining the scope of the right to counsel 
under Article I, section 11. We address that task by first not-
ing the doctrinal context for that decision, then addressing 
what the court did and did not say in that opinion, following 
with a summary of subsequent doctrinal developments, and 
finally turning our attention to its appropriate application 
in cases such as this one.
24	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
A.  Doctrinal Context
	
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution pro-
vides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
have the right * 
* 
* to be heard by himself and counsel.” As 
this court explained in State v. Davis, 350 Or 440, 464-70, 
256 P3d 1075 (2011), the state constitutional guarantee—
like its federal counterpart, the Sixth Amendment to the fed-
eral Constitution—was originally understood to apply only 
to the conduct of criminal trials. But, as the nature of law 
enforcement and criminal prosecution changed, both state 
and federal courts expanded their views of the “criminal 
prosecution” that triggered the right to counsel, so that the 
constitutional guarantee applied as early as the commence-
ment of criminal proceedings by indictment or other formal 
charge. Id. at 470-76. The rationale for that doctrinal shift 
was the recognition that a defendant’s “assistance” of coun-
sel would be less than meaningful if it were limited to the 
trial itself. As the United States Supreme Court explained 
in United States v. Ash, 413 US 300, 310, 93 S Ct 2568, 37 
L Ed 2d 619 (1973), “[t]his extension of the right to counsel 
to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns 
of criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to 
generate pretrial events that might appropriately be consid-
ered to be parts of the trial itself.”
	
Although state and federal courts held that the 
constitutional right to counsel “attached” as of the time of 
charging, they also held that the scope of that pre-trial right 
was limited to certain “critical stages” of the criminal pros-
ecution. In Ash, for example, the Supreme Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant the assistance of 
counsel in pretrial confrontations “presenting the same dan-
gers that gave birth to the right itself.” Id. at 311. A pretrial 
event is considered a “critical stage” for Sixth Amendment 
purposes if counsel’s absence from that event “could dero-
gate from the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” United States 
v. Wade, 388 US 218, 226, 87 S Ct 1926, 18 L Ed 2d 11 (1967). 
More specifically, the right applies if “potential substantial 
prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular 
confrontation” and counsel’s presence would help avoid that 
prejudice. Id. at 227.
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
25
	
This court similarly held that, under Article I, sec-
tion 11, the scope of the right to counsel encompasses stages 
in criminal proceedings in which counsel’s presence could 
prevent prejudice to a defendant. In State v. Miller, 254 Or 
244, 249, 458 P2d 1017 (1969), for example, the court con-
cluded that the right applied to those stages of a criminal 
proceeding “when [a defendant] must take steps or make 
a choice which is likely to have a substantial effect on the 
prosecution against him.” Thus, in State ex rel. Russell v. 
Jones, 293 Or 312, 317, 647 P2d 904 (1982), the court con-
cluded that the defendant’s right to counsel under Article I, 
section 11, was violated by an order barring his counsel from 
a presentence interview. The court focused on the potential 
prejudice arising from that interview:
	
“At the hearing, the report of information given by the 
defendant is subject to disclosure and defense counsel can 
make objections and present evidence and additional state-
ments by defendant. Given these procedural opportunities, 
rarely would there be a risk of irremediable harm from the 
absence of counsel at the presentence interview. Yet, cir-
cumstances are conceivable where the presence of counsel 
would be helpful.”
Id. at 318.
	
An additional aspect of the scope of the state and 
federal right to counsel concerned whether the right applied 
only to interrogation about a charged offense, as opposed 
to interrogation about other matters as yet not the subject 
of a formal criminal charge. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 
387, 97 S Ct 1232, 51 L Ed 424 (1977), the United States 
Supreme Court appeared to suggest that the right was not 
limited to the charged offense, but extended to other mat-
ters that were, in some sense, closely related to the charged 
offense. In that case, the defendant was charged with the 
abduction of a young girl, and he retained counsel on that 
charge. Police later transported him to another city. On the 
drive, police—believing that defendant had murdered the 
young girl during the abduction—asked defendant whether 
he knew where the girl’s body was located and suggested 
that her parents deserved to give their daughter a proper 
Christian burial. The defendant then agreed to show the 
police where he had buried the body. The defendant was 
26	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
later convicted of the murder, based in part on his state-
ments to the police. On appeal, he argued that the trial 
court should have suppressed the statements, because 
they violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The 
Supreme Court agreed. In the process, it did not differenti-
ate between the interrogation related to the charged crime 
(kidnapping) and the questioning related to the uncharged 
conduct (murder). Id. at 398-99. Although the Court did not 
address the issue head-on, the fact that it concluded that 
the defendant’s right to counsel had been violated by the 
questioning related to the murder appeared to suggest that 
the right extended to questioning about matters other than 
the charged offense.
	
That, at least, is the way that most state and fed-
eral courts interpreted Brewer, concluding that the right to 
counsel extended not just to the charged offense, but also 
to other uncharged conduct that was “closely related” to 
the charged offense. See, e.g., People v. Boyd, 86 Cal App 
3d 54, 62 (1978), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 US 168, 
168, 121 S Ct 1335, 149 L Ed 2d 321 (2001); State v. Derrico, 
181 Conn 151, 168, 434 A2d 356 (1980). At least one state 
court, the New York Court of Appeals, went further, adopt-
ing a “bright-line rule” that prohibited police interrogation 
about any matter—whether or not related to the charged 
offense—once the defendant retained counsel on a criminal 
charge. People v. Rogers, 48 NY2d 167, 169, 397 NE 2d 709 
(1979).
B.  State v. Sparklin
	
It was in that context that this court decided 
Sparklin. In that case, the defendant was charged with forg-
ery after using a credit card at a Eugene shopping center 
stolen from one Mansell. The defendant retained counsel 
on that charge. Meanwhile, police obtained information 
linking the defendant to an incident in Portland in which 
Mansell had been beaten and his credit cards stolen. They 
also learned that the defendant might have been involved 
in an unrelated murder of another man, Davidson. The 
police, without notifying the defendant’s lawyer, gave defen-
dant Miranda warnings and then questioned him about the 
Mansell assault and the Davidson murder. The defendant 
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
27
waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder. 296 
Or at 87.
	
The defendant ultimately was convicted of the 
Davidson murder, based in part on his confession. On 
appeal, he argued that, among other things, the trial court 
should have suppressed that confession because the police 
had obtained it in violation of his right to counsel under 
Article I, section 11, and the Sixth Amendment. According to 
the defendant, his representation by an attorney on the forg-
ery charge insulated him from police questioning regarding 
any other crime. Id. at 94.
	
This court rejected the defendant’s argument. 
Beginning with Article  I, section 11, the court explained 
that the purpose of the guarantee is to ensure that, “once a 
person is charged with a crime he or she is entitled to the 
benefit of an attorney’s presence, advice and expertise in 
any situation where the state may glean involuntary and 
incriminating evidence or statements for use in the pros-
ecution of its case against [the] defendant.” Id. at 93. To 
effectuate that purpose, the court explained, there can be 
no interrogation of a defendant concerning the events sur-
rounding the crime charged unless the state first notifies 
the defendant’s lawyer and provides counsel a reasonable 
opportunity to attend. Id.
	
As for the scope of that right to counsel, the court 
had the following to say:
	
“The development of the right to an attorney at pre-
trial confrontations between the state and the individual 
reflects a concern for the preservation of the fairness of 
trial and counsel’s effectiveness in defending against the 
charge. Interrogations, like line-ups, polygraph sessions 
and psychiatric examinations, are investigative tools 
by means of which the state builds its case against the 
accused. An attorney’s presence at these encounters may 
serve to forestall the use of impermissibly derived evidence 
at trial.
	
“Yet the [A]rticle I, section 11, guarantee of an attorney, 
like the federal counterpart, remains focused on the trial; 
that is, it is the protection of rights to which a defendant is 
entitled in the trial itself which the guarantee is intended 
28	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
to preserve. In State v. Newton, 219 Or 788, 802-03, 636 
P2d 393 (1981), the plurality opinion observed, in the lan-
guage of the federal analysis:
“ 
‘The right to counsel attaches to certain evidence-
gathering processes which are deemed ‘critical stages’ 
of the prosecution as an extension of a defendant’s 
right to representation by counsel in court. Any pre-
trial adversarial contact of the state and a defendant 
at which some benefit of counsel would be lost if counsel 
is not present, that is, at which the state’s case may be 
enhanced or the defense impaired due to the absence of 
counsel, may be considered a critical stage of the pros-
ecution at which defendant has a right to the presence 
of counsel’
“It is the fairness of the ‘criminal prosecution’ which coun-
sel’s presence helps to ensure. For this reason the [A]rticle 
I, section 11 right to an attorney is specific to the criminal 
episode in which the accused is charged. The prohibitions 
placed on the state’s contact with a represented defendant 
do not extend to the investigation of factually unrelated 
criminal episodes.”
Id. at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
	
Turning to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
the court noted that, at that time, it appeared to be “of equal 
scope” with the right under Article I, section 11. Id. at 95. 
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court had 
not yet directly addressed the issue, though it had implicitly 
done so in Brewer. The court observed that, with the excep-
tion of New York, most other courts concluded that the right 
to counsel prohibits interrogation about uncharged conduct 
that is closely related to the charged offense. Sparklin, 296 
Or at 95-98.
	
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the court 
concluded that the Davidson case was “unrelated” to the 
charged offense for which the defendant had retained coun-
sel, and so the questioning about the Davidson murder was 
not improper. Id. at 98. Interestingly, in dictum, the court 
added that the questioning about the Mansell assault was 
improper, “[b]ecause [the] defendant was represented by an 
attorney for the crimes against * 
* 
* Mansell.” Id.
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
29
C.  Later Doctrinal Developments
	
Meanwhile, in the years following Sparklin, most 
lower federal courts continued to follow the rule that the 
right to counsel prohibits police interrogation concerning 
matters that are “closely related” to, or “inextricably inter-
twined” with the charged offense. See, e.g., U.S. v. Doherty, 
126 F3d 769 (6th Cir 1997), abrogated by Cobb, 532 US at 
168 n 1 (acknowledging that tribal charge for sexual abuse 
and federal charge for engaging in sexual abuse with a child 
were inextricably intertwined because the same underlying 
conduct formed the basis for both offenses); U.S. v. Arnold, 
106 F3d 37, 42 (3rd Cir 1997), abrogated by Cobb, 532 US 
at 168 n 1 (holding that a witness intimidation charge and 
the attempted murder of the same witness were inextricably 
intertwined for Sixth Amendment purposes because each 
involved the same factual predicate and central purpose); 
U.S. v. Kidd, 12 F3d 30, 32 (4th Cir 1993) (concluding that 
two drug transactions taking place on different days were 
not inextricably intertwined even though they involved the 
same type of offense because each was factually distinct 
from and independent of the other); U.S. v. Carpenter, 963 
F2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir 1992) (holding that burglary and 
possession of firearm by a felon were not inextricably inter-
twined when firearm was discovered during the defendant’s 
arrest for the burglary because the events leading up to the 
firearm charge were distinct form those constituting the 
burglary).
	
The Ninth Circuit adopted a slightly broader test, 
holding that, to determine whether an event is inextricably 
intertwined with the charged crime, courts must examine 
“all of the facts and circumstances relating to the conduct 
involved, including the identity of the persons involved, * 
* 
* 
and the timing, motive, and location of the crimes. No single 
factor is ordinarily dispositive.” U.S. v. Covarrubias, 179 F3d 
1219, 1225 (9th Cir 1999), abrogated by Cobb, 532 US at 168 
n 1.
	
Most state courts followed suit, almost all of them 
relying on the Sixth Amendment and not independently 
interpreting their state constitutional right-to-counsel 
guarantee. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 726 So 2d 841, 845 (Fla 
30	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
Ct App 1999) (police questioning violated right to counsel 
because “the facts of the charged and uncharged offense are 
inextricably intertwined”); People v. Clankie, 124 Ill 2d 456, 
462-63, 530 NE2d 448 (1988) (“[S]ome technically distinct, 
formally charged offenses are actually so closely related to 
certain offenses for which formal charges have not been 
made that the right to counsel for the charged offense can-
not constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for 
the uncharged offense.”); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 425 
Mass 540, 547-48, 681 NE2d 1218 (1997), abrogated by Cobb, 
532 US at 168 n 1 (questioning about uncharged conduct did 
not violate right to counsel because the facts “were not inex-
tricably intertwined with” the charged conduct); In re Pack, 
420 Pa Super 347, 355, 616 A2d 1006 (1992), abrogated by 
Cobb, 532 US at 168 n 1 (once the right to counsel attaches, 
defendant may be questioned about “unrelated offenses”).
	
In Cobb, the United States Supreme Court signifi-
cantly altered the legal landscape in holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is categorically offense-specific, 
unqualified by any exception that applies to uncharged 
offenses that are closely related to, or inextricably inter-
twined with, a charged offense. In that case, the defendant 
was charged with burglary of a neighbor’s home and obtained 
appointed counsel on that charge. Police later developed rea-
son to suspect that the defendant also was involved in the 
murder of the neighbor’s wife and daughter, who had been 
reported missing shortly after the burglary. The defendant 
was arrested for those murders and given Miranda warn-
ings. He waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the 
murders. Id. at 165-66.
	
The defendant ultimately was convicted of the mur-
ders. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in deny-
ing a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession on 
the ground that it had been obtained in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. The Texas Court of Appeals 
agreed, concluding that the right to counsel in the burglary 
cases precluded questioning about the murder because the 
two offenses were “inextricably intertwined.” Id. at 166-67.
	
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that, when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, 
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
31
it does so only with respect to the specific charged offense. 
Id. at 172.1 The Constitution, the court held, “does not negate 
society’s interest in the ability of police to talk to witnesses 
and suspects, even those who have been charged with other 
offenses.” Id. at 171-72. The Court acknowledged that a 
number of lower federal courts and state courts had adopted 
a rule, based on Brewer, foreclosing interrogation of a rep-
resented defendant on matters that were factually related 
to the charged offense. Cobb, 532 US at 168. It nevertheless 
held that those courts had read too much into Brewer, which 
the Court said simply had not directly addressed the issue. 
Cobb, 532 US at 168-69.
	
Justice Breyer, writing for four justices, dissented. 
Among other things, he suggested that the majority’s narrow, 
offense-specific test is likely to encourage strategic manip-
ulation of charging by prosecutors as a way to circumvent 
a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. Id. at182-83 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). “The majority’s rule,” he complained, 
“permits law enforcement officials to question those charged 
with a crime without first approaching counsel, through the 
simple device of asking questions about any other related 
crime not actually charged in the indictment.” Id.2
	
In response, most state courts—those that have 
adopted federal Sixth Amendment analysis—have adjusted 
	
1  The Court held that the test for determining what is the same or a separate 
“offense” is the test already used in determining the same or separate offenses 
for double-jeopardy purposes, under Blockburger v. United States, 284 US 299, 
304, 52 S Ct 180, 76 L Ed 306 (1932). Cobb, 532 US at 173. That test involves a 
comparison of statutory elements; offenses are said to be “separate” when the 
statute defining the elements of one offense requires proof of a fact that the other 
does not. Id.
	
2  The majority’s opinion in Cobb has generated a good deal of criticism on 
precisely that ground. See, e.g., Andrew Hanawalt, Investigation of Represented 
Defendants After Texas v. Cobb, 81 Tex L Rev 895, 896 (2003) (“Because prose-
cutors have almost absolute discretion in their charging decisions, Cobb invites 
* 
* 
* strategic misbehavior.”); David J. D’Addio, Dual Sovereignty and the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel, 113 Yale LJ 1991, 1996 (2004) (Cobb permits fed-
eral, state, and tribal governments to “deliberately elicit incriminating statements 
from the accused without the knowledge or presence of an attorney”); Michael J. 
Howe, Tomorrow’s Massiah: Towards a “Prosecution Specific” Understanding of 
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 Col L Rev 134, 149-50 (2004) (“Given 
the abundance of overlapping and related statutory offenses, a single criminal 
transaction can be characterized—and prosecuted—as a number of offenses, all 
just different enough from one another to satisfy the Blockburger test.”).
32	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
their case law accordingly, abandoning their precedents 
that had extended the right to counsel to include uncharged 
offenses that were closely related to, or inextricably inter-
twined with, the charged offense. See, e.g., People v. Slayton, 
26 Cal 4th 1076, 32 P3d 1073 (2001); State v. Schneider, 347 
Mont 215, 197 P3d 1020 (2008); Alston v. Commonwealth, 
264 Va 433, 570 SE2d 801 (2002).
	
A notable exception is the Indiana Supreme Court. 
In Jewell v. State, 957 NE2d 625 (2011), the court adhered 
to a version of the inextricably intertwined test as a mat-
ter of independent interpretation of its state constitutional 
guarantee of the right to counsel. In Jewell, the defendant 
was arrested and charged with tattooing a minor, a mis-
demeanor, and he retained counsel to defend against that 
charge. Meanwhile, police learned that the defendant may 
have sexually abused the same minor. They arranged to 
have the minor make recorded phone calls to the defendant, 
and during those calls, defendant made incriminating state-
ments about the sexual abuse. The state charged the defen-
dant with sexual abuse of the minor, and he was ultimately 
convicted of those charges. Id. at 627-28.
	
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress the incrimi-
nating statements that had been recorded, arguing that the 
statements had been obtained in violation of his right to 
counsel, guaranteed by Article I, section 13, of the Indiana 
Constitution. The court noted that, in response to Cobb, most 
state courts had retreated from prior holdings that the consti-
tutional right to counsel prohibited questioning about matters 
closely related to, or inextricably intertwined with, charged 
offenses. Id. at 632-33.3 Nevertheless, the court held, the 
right to counsel protections afforded by its state constitution 
“are sometimes broader than those flowing from the Sixth 
Amendment.” Id. at 633. The court acknowledged the state’s 
interest in investigating criminal activities, as emphasized 
by the Supreme Court in Cobb. Id. at 634-35. But it insisted 
that the state’s interest does not eliminate “the defendant’s 
	
3  Interestingly, the court observed that this court, in Sparklin, “appears 
to recognize some version of the ‘inextricably intertwined’ exception under its 
constitution,” which includes a right to counsel provision identical to Indiana’s. 
Jewell, 957 NE2d at 633.
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
33
right to aid of counsel before facing the full power of the pros-
ecutorial state.” Id. at 635. The court concluded:
	
“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ exception to the gen-
eral rule that [Article I,] Section 13’s right to counsel pro-
tection is offense specific applies when it was objectively 
foreseeable that the pending offense, for which the right 
to counsel has already attached, was so inextricably inter-
twined with the offense under investigation that the right 
to counsel for the pending offense could not be constitution-
ally isolated from the right to counsel for the offense under 
investigation. The inquiry focuses on the nature of the con-
duct involved rather than on the elements of the offenses. 
A reviewing court must examine and compare all the facts 
and circumstances—as known at the time of the investi-
gation—related to the conduct, including the nature of the 
conduct, the identity of thepersons involved (including the 
victim, if any), and the timing, motive, and location of the 
crimes.”
Id. Applying that test to the facts at hand, the court con-
cluded that the circumstances of the charged offense of 
unlawful tattooing of a minor, were not so linked to the 
uncharged sexual abuse offenses that it was objectively 
foreseeable to the police that the charged misdemeanor was 
intertwined with the uncharged crimes. Id. at 636.
D.  The Correct Rule and Its Application
	
With the foregoing in mind, we return to Sparklin 
and its application to this case. Sparklin is not a model of 
clarity. At one point in the opinion, the court suggested 
that the test under both state and federal constitutions is 
offense-specific. 296 Or at 95. At another point, however, 
the court referred to whether questioning is about “factu-
ally unrelated” conduct. Id. And, in dictum, the court sug-
gested that the police questioning about the Mansell assault 
was improper, even though that questioning concerned an 
entirely different offense from the charged offense. Id. at 98. 
Not surprisingly, the state seizes on one reference and urges 
us to interpret the decision to impose a very narrow, offense-
specific test that is not quite the statutory-elements test 
that the United States Supreme Court adopted in Cobb, but 
is close to it. And, equally unsurprisingly, defendant seizes 
on the reference to whether charged and uncharged offenses 
34	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
are “factually related” and argues for a much broader inter-
pretation of the decision.4
	
We conclude that neither party’s contentions are 
exactly on the mark. Beginning with the state’s argument, 
it is true that, as we have just noted, Sparklin stated that 
the right to counsel is “specific to the criminal episode in 
which the accused is charged.” 296 Or at 95. But that, by 
itself does not suggest what is meant by the term “criminal 
episode.” And the term is employed in a variety of different 
contexts in a variety of different ways. As then-Chief Judge 
Brewer observed in Potter, 245 Or App at 6, “ 
‘[c]riminal epi-
sode’ is a term that, at this point in time, has been used in so 
many diverse statutory and constitutional contexts within 
the criminal law that its precise meaning in any given con-
text, much less its origins, is not always clear.”
	
Certainly, there is a temptation to follow the lead 
of the United States Supreme Court in Cobb and borrow 
the definition that applies for double jeopardy purposes. See 
	
4  Amici Curiae Oregon Justice Resource Center, American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation of Oregon, and Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association 
urge us to abandon Sparklin and adopt in its stead a “bright-line” rule that would 
prohibit police from communicating at all with a represented person—and pre-
clude a represented person from waiving the right to counsel—without counsel 
being present, regardless of whether the questioning would pertain to matters 
factually unrelated to the charged conduct. Amici model their proposed rule on 
one that the New York Court of Appeals adopted in People v. Rogers, 48 NY2d 
167, 397 NE 2d 709 (1979). According to amici, this court “has not yet had the 
opportunity to adopt” the New York rule, but should do so in this case.
	
We decline the invitation to adopt the New York rule. To begin with, amici 
are incorrect in asserting that this court has not previously had the opportu-
nity to adopt the rule. The rule was explicitly identified, considered, and rejected 
in Sparklin. 296 Or at 90-91, 95 (“The prohibition placed on the state’s contact 
with a represented defendant do not extend to the investigation of factually unre-
lated criminal episodes.”). Aside from that, the New York Court of Appeals has 
more recently qualified its bright-line rule, indeed, to such an extent that its own 
members have recently complained that the rule now “is so complicated that it is 
almost incomprehensible” and that it “regularly produces unjust results.” People 
v. Lopez, 16 NY3d 375, 388, 947 NE2d 1155 (2011) (Smith, J., concurring); see 
generally Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: 
The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 Harv L Rev 670, 679 (1992) 
(“[T]he New York Court of Appeals recently rejected the existing state right-to-
counsel rule that the police could not subject a suspect represented on pending 
charges to interrogation concerning new, unrelated charges. The court saw an 
offender-specific, as opposed to an offense-specific, rule as excessively costly * 
* 
* 
[and one that] perversely gave more protection to the ‘common criminal’ already 
facing charges than to a ‘first-time arrestee.’ 
”)
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
35
ORS 131.505(4) (defining “criminal episode” for double jeop-
ardy purposes as “continuous and uninterrupted conduct 
that establishes at least one offense and is so joined in time, 
place and circumstance that such conduct is directed to the 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective”). The state’s 
reading of Sparklin comes quite close to that, although it 
does not cite the statute itself. According to the state, the 
term should be limited to the facts immediately preceding 
or immediately succeeding the events that form the basis for 
the charge.
	
Nothing in Sparklin, however, suggests that the 
court intended to adopt such a narrow definition of the term. 
Indeed, the state’s definition of “criminal episode” is hard to 
square with the balance of the court’s opinion in that case, 
especially its suggestion that the police had violated the 
defendant’s right to counsel by interrogating him about the 
Mansell assault that had occurred in Portland while he was 
represented on the forgery charge, which had been based 
on his attempt to use Mansell’s credit card some time later, 
in Eugene. Moreover, giving the phrase “criminal episode” 
too narrow a definition risks the sort of strategic charging 
behavior that the Court of Appeals fairly identified in its 
opinion in this case, echoing the criticism of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Cobb.
	
Defendant’s emphasis on whether the charged and 
uncharged offenses are simply “factually related” is likewise 
untenable. To begin with, the court in Sparklin did not use 
that phrase or apply that test. Rather, it said that the right 
to counsel does not limit police questioning about “factually 
unrelated” criminal episodes. It is not quite logical to deduce 
that, while questioning about factually unrelated criminal 
episodes is permissible, questioning about factually related 
criminal episodes is not. Aside from that, the phrase, with-
out more, is too amorphous to be of any value. Virtually any 
conduct involving the same defendant can be said to be “fac-
tually related” at some level of abstraction and yet not really 
implicate the concerns that underlie the state constitutional 
guarantee of the right to counsel.
	
The answer to the conundrum may be found in 
recalling precisely those underlying concerns. The court’s 
36	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
opinion in Sparklin suggests something narrower than just 
that there be some factual relation between charged and 
uncharged offenses; rather, the charged and uncharged 
offenses must be related in such a way that questioning 
about the latter is likely to compromise the right to counsel 
as to the former. As the court in Sparklin explained, the 
purpose of the Article I, section 11, right is to ensure that a 
defendant charged with a crime has the benefit of an attor-
ney’s presence, advice, and expertise “in any situation where 
the state may glean involuntary and incriminating evidence 
or statements for use in the prosecution of its case against 
defendant.” 296 Or at 93 (emphasis added). Just because 
police ask questions carefully avoiding the facts immediately 
surrounding the criminal episode of the charged offense 
does not necessarily mean that those questions will not 
elicit information that is incriminating about that charged 
offense. It would seems to follow from Sparklin that, to the 
extent that questioning about uncharged offenses may fore-
seeably lead to such incriminating information about the 
charged offense, it is foreclosed by the state constitutional 
right to counsel. Otherwise, the state constitutional guaran-
tee of the right to counsel would be circumvented.
	
In that regard, Sparklin recalls the Indiana Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jewell, which was based on the Indiana 
Constitution’s identical right-to-counsel guarantee. The 
court there concluded that whether it is objectively foresee-
able that questioning about uncharged conduct will implicate 
a charged offense for which counsel has been retained will 
depend on the facts and circumstances known at the time of 
the investigation, concerning “the nature of the conduct, the 
identity of the persons involved, * 
* 
* and the timing, motive, 
and location of the crimes.” Jewell, 957 NE2d at 935. Those 
factors likewise are consistent with those that the Court of 
Appeals mentioned in this case, including temporal proxim-
ity, location, nature of defendant’s conduct, and the nature 
of the investigation process itself and whether it involves the 
same or separate personnel. Prieto-Rubio, 262 Or at 157-59. 
We agree that whether charged and uncharged offenses are 
sufficiently related as to implicate the state constitutional 
right to counsel will depend on the facts and circumstances 
of each case and whether they establish that it is reasonably 
Cite as 359 Or 16 (2016)	
37
foreseeable to a person in the position of the questioner that 
questioning will elicit incriminating information involving 
the charged offense for which the defendant has obtained 
counsel. That is an objective test that does not turn on the 
subjective impression of the questioner.
	
Turning to the facts of this case, there is no dispute 
that, when the state charged defendant in the case involving 
A, his Article I, section 11, right to counsel attached and that 
the right applied to the particular stage of the proceedings 
at which Rookhuyzen questioned him. The question then is 
whether defendant’s Article I, section 11, right in the case 
involving A foreclosed questioning about his alleged abuse 
of K and L. The test, as we have just concluded, is whether 
it was reasonably foreseeable to a person in Rookhuyzen’s 
position, that questioning about K and L would elicit incrim-
inating information about the charged abuse of A, for which 
defendant had retained counsel. We conclude that it was 
foreseeable that the detective’s questioning would have that 
effect.
	
The investigations of A, K, and L were interrelated 
from the beginning, as Rookhuyzen acknowledged. All of 
the crimes were committed at the same place—defendant’s 
home. All of the offenses involved similar types of physical 
conduct, and all involved similar victims—children who 
were members of defendant’s family. The state itself invoked 
those very similarities in arguing to consolidate the cases 
because the crimes alleged against defendant “are of the 
same or similar character and show a common scheme or 
plan.” Rookhuyzen handled the investigation as to all three 
of the victims. Indeed, the state alleged in its motion to con-
solidate that the crimes alleged against defendant “involve 
many of the same witnesses and arise from the same inves-
tigation.” Moreover, Rookhuyzen explained that, although 
his later questioning of defendant focused on K and L—and 
not A—his questioning covered the “universe” of potential 
victims and that it was “impossible” to have a conversa-
tion with defendant “and not have some overlap” between 
the charged and uncharged offenses, demonstrating that a 
reasonable person in Rookhuyzen’s position would have fore-
seen the effect that the questioning would have.
38	
State v. Prieto-Rubio
	
To be sure, the offenses occurred at substantially 
different times, and, at least in some cases, that might weigh 
against concluding that the offenses are sufficiently factu-
ally related. But in this case, the difference in times does not 
alter what Rookhuyzen candidly acknowledged—that it was 
highly likely that his questioning would have some overlap 
with the charged offense.
	
The remedy for a violation of Article I, section 11, 
is the exclusion of any prejudicial evidence obtained as a 
result of that violation. State v. Dinsmore, 342 Or 1, 10, 147 
P3d 1146 (2006). In this case, defendant contends that the 
evidence that the state obtained in violation of his right to 
counsel was prejudicial, and the state does not contend oth-
erwise.5 In fact, as we have noted, the trial court expressly 
referred to the incriminating statements that defendant had 
made to Rookhuyzen. We therefore conclude that the Court 
of Appeals correctly determined that Rookhuyzen’s ques-
tioning in this case violated defendant’s Article I, section 11, 
right to counsel and that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	
5  It could be argued that a violation of defendant’s Article I, section 11, right 
to counsel in the case involving the abuse of A would justify the exclusion of evi-
dence only as to that case, not as to the case involving the abuse of K and L, for 
which defendant had not yet retained counsel. The state, however, advanced no 
such argument in this case, and we express no opinion one way or the other about 
it.