Title: State v. Edwards
Citation: 232 La. 577, 94 So. 2d 674
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 1957

94 So. 2d 674 (1957) 232 La. 577 STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Rufus EDWARDS. No. 43315. Supreme Court of Louisiana. April 1, 1957. *675 Noel L. Adams, Jr., Jack C. Wimbish, C. P. Brocato, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin L. Blewer, Dist. Atty., Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee. HAMLIN, Justice ad hoc. The defendant appeals to this Court from his conviction of the crime of aggravated rape denounced by LSA-R.S. 14:42 and his sentence to death by electrocution. Defendant's counsel reserved nine bills to the rulings of the trial judge, but only seven are presented for consideration on this appeal. Bill of Exceptions No. Two was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's challenge of Juror Claude Hamel. During the examination on voir dire, Mr. Hamel stated that at a social gathering he heard a Member of the Grand Jury which indicted the defendant make the casual statement that he felt he had done his duty. Mr. Hamel stated that he placed no importance upon this casual statement, and that it would have no effect upon his verdict in the case if he were selected as a juror. On further examination, Mr. Hamel stated that he had read press accounts of the crime and had formed an opinion or impression on the basis of what he had heard and read; but that since he had had the benefit of the instructions from counsel on both sides of the case and from the court, he felt that he could and would state that his opinion or impression was not a fixed opinion or impression. He further said that if selected as a juror, he could and would decide the case solely on the evidence that might be introduced in open court and on the law as charged by the court. It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that "where the juror can try the accused on the law and evidence only, without interference from his past opinion or prejudice, then he is qualified," and does not fall within the prohibitions of LSA-R.S. 15:351. However, they argue that where a juror states that he has had an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused in a case such as this, he should be excused. The note of evidence, containing the questions propounded to Juror Hamel and his answers thereto, was not made a part of this bill. Therefore, we must accept as true the following statement of the trial judge in his per curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. Two: See State v. Wideman, 218 La. 859, 51 So. 2d 96; State v. Delatte, 219 La. 715, *676 53 So. 2d 906; State v. Hardy, 198 La. 1048, 5 So. 2d 330; State v. Boudreaux, 137 La. 227, 68 So. 422. Bill of Exceptions No. Two is, therefore, without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. Three was reserved to the ruling of the trial court on the challenge of Juror John R. Murphy. Mr. Murphy, who had been in the jury box during the questioning of a number of persons as to whether they belonged to the Louisiana White Citizens' Council, stated on voir dire that he did not belong to that organization, but that he believed in white supremacy. It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that Mr. Murphy was prejudiced against the colored race and could not relieve himself of the prejudice. They argue that the defendant was denied the constitutional guarantee of a trial by his peers. Since the testimony taken in connection with this bill was not transcribed, the same ruling applies as in Bill of Exceptions No. Two. The following per curiam of the trial judge, which must be accepted as true, ably explains the statement of this juror: We, therefore, find Bill of Exceptions No. Three to be without merit. *677 Bill of Exceptions No. Five was taken to the trial court's admitting in evidence certain enlarged photographs and negatives of the accused's fingerprints. Defense counsel objected to their admission in evidence for the alleged reason that they had not been sufficiently identified, in that the witness (Captain Booth) was not present when the negatives were developed and the photographs made, and that the defense had the right to cross-examine the person who made the negatives from the film and transferred the negatives to the prints. Since no evidence has been attached to this bill, we must take as true the trial judge's recitation of facts. See authorities cited under Bill of Exceptions No. Two, supra. The trial judge has more than fully complied with the requirements of Article 504 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:504, and from his per curiam we find a complete explanation of defense counsel's objections. It explains that after the accused was arrested, Sgt. King of the Shreveport Police Department lifted his fingerprints from several objects at the scene of the crime. These prints were delivered to Lt. Davis, Sgt. King's superior, who testified that the prints were delivered to him in person. The prints were compared with prints taken of the accused after his arrest, and Lt. Davis and Captain Richard, Chief of the Shreveport Fingerprint Department, testified that the prints were identical. The prints were then taken to the office of the State Bureau of Identification in Baton Rouge, and Captain Booth of the Bureau, a qualified fingerprint expert, confirmed that the prints were identical, and he testified to that effect on the trial. After confirming the identification of the prints, Captain Booth took enlarged photographs of all prints. He gave the films to a technical assistant and went with him into the dark room for the development of negatives. Captain Booth then made enlarged prints of the negatives, compared the prints with the originals, and testified that they were identical. Captain Richards also testified in the same manner. The enlarged prints were used in evidence at the trial. We find no merit in Bill of Exceptions No. Five, particularly because of the above statement and the following statement from the trial judge's per curiam: Bill of Exceptions No. Six was reserved when the trial judge permitted the introduction in evidence of the oral confession of the defendant over the objection of defense counsel. The defendant's counsel contended that the necessary and proper foundation had *678 not been laid by the District Attorney; and that the confession was not voluntarily made, because the accused was subjected to mental and physical duress. It was further argued that such alleged mental and physical duress was the means employed to secure the oral confession. Whether a confession is given freely and voluntarily is a question of fact, which addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 39 So. 2d 898; State v. Palmer, 227 La. 691, 80 So. 2d 374; State v. Hilliard, 227 La. 208, 78 So. 2d 835; State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So. 2d 207; State of Louisiana v. Isaac Peart, La., 93 So. 2d 920. There is no evidence attached to this bill, and, as stated in the bills discussed supra, the per curiam of the trial judge is controlling. Because of the gravity of the crime of which the defendant has been convicted and the serious nature of the sentence imposed, we quote in full the per curiam attached to this bill: A careful study of the above per curiam discloses no manifest error in the trial judge's ruling, and, therefore, we find no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. Six. Bills of Exceptions Nos. Seven and Eight were reserved to the ruling of the trial judge that the oral confession of the defendant was freely and voluntarily made to Lt. Cecil L. Payne and Detective M. U. James. To these two bills is attached the testimony of an arresting officer (J. C. Broome), that of the police officials who questioned the defendant, and that of the District Attorney and his Assistant. A thorough reading of this testimony convinces us that the findings of the trial judge in his per curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. Six[1] are correct. We believe that the defendant's oral confession was free and voluntary, and that it was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. Article 451, Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:451. It is further contended that the confession of the defendant was given at a time when he had not been booked, and that this constituted a violation of Article 77[2] of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:77. Since we find that the confession was made voluntarily, we do not believe that the trial judge erred in permitting it to be introduced in evidence, even though the defendant was not booked at the time it was given. Police officers are amenable to law, but their failure to strictly comply with its provisions would have no bearing on the present matter. In State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463, 471, we said: Counsel for the defendant rely on the recent case of Fikes v. State of Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S. Ct. 281, 284, 1 L. Ed. 2d 246, as authority for their contention that the conviction and sentence should be set aside because defendant's oral confession was made under alleged mental and physical duress. The following statement of the United States Supreme Court, compared with the facts of the present case as found by the trial judge in his per curiam to Bills of Exceptions Nos. Six and Nine, shows that the case is not apposite: We, therefore, find no merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos. Seven and Eight. Bill of Exceptions No. Nine is based upon the ground that the verdict rendered by the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence, and it is also based in part on the matters covered by Bills of Exceptions Nos. Two through Eight. Bill No. Four was abandoned. Since we have not had the advantage of having testimony attached to any of the *685 bills takenexcept to Bills Nos. Seven and Eightwe quote the per curiam of the trial judge to substantiate our holding that there is no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. Nine: For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. [1] Bills of Exceptions Nos. Six, Seven, and Eight are related. The trial judge's per curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. Six is referred to in his per curiam to Bills of Exceptions Nos. Seven and Eight. [2] "Every peace officer making an arrest or who shall have turned over to him any person arrested by a private person and any person making an arrest of another person shall immediately conduct the person arrested to the nearest jail or police station and then and there cause him to be booked, that is to say, shall cause to be entered on the book to be kept for that purpose the name of the prisoner and the crime or violation of ordinance charged against him and for which he shall have been arrested. Said book shall always be kept open for the inspection of the public, and the officer in charge shall furnish without cost a certified copy of the entry thereon to any person desiring such copy."