Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. T. Christopher Kelly
Citation: 2012 WI 55
Docket Number: 2011AP001654-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2012

2012 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1654-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against T. Christopher Kelly, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
T. Christopher Kelly, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KELLY 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 23, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 WI 55
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1654-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against T. Christopher Kelly, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
T. Christopher Kelly, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 23, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Reserve Judge John B. Murphy, recommending that Attorney T. 
Christopher Kelly's license to practice law in Wisconsin be 
revoked, that he be required to pay $31,541.50 to the Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection (the Fund) as restitution for the 
amounts the Fund paid to Attorney Kelly's former clients due to 
his misconduct, and that he be required to pay the full costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding, which were $4,600.44 as of 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
2 
 
December 5, 2011.  Because no appeal has been filed in this 
matter, our review proceeds pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1 
¶2 
Attorney Kelly was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in June 1980.  He formerly maintained a private law 
practice in Madison.  In March 2009 this court temporarily 
suspended Attorney Kelly's license due to his willful failure to 
cooperate with the grievance investigations being conducted by 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR).  Attorney Kelly's license 
has remained temporarily suspended to the date of this opinion. 
¶3 
On July 20, 2011, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Kelly and an order to answer.  The complaint alleged 51 
separate counts of misconduct.  Attorney Kelly was personally 
served with the complaint and order to answer on August 6, 2011. 
¶4 
On August 22, 2011, Attorney Kelly filed a very brief 
answer to the OLR's complaint.  The answer consisted of a single 
sentence stating that Attorney Kelly denied "each and every 
material allegation of paragraphs 3 through 231."  One of the 
two paragraphs Attorney Kelly's answer did not deny has some 
procedural significance for this proceeding.  Paragraph 2 of the 
complaint alleged that Attorney Kelly resided at an address on 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
3 
 
Sidney Street in Madison.  Thus, by not denying paragraph 2, 
Attorney Kelly's answer admitted that he did reside at the 
stated address. 
¶5 
On September 9, 2011, this court appointed Reserve 
Judge Murphy to act as the referee in this matter.  On 
September 12, 2011, Referee Murphy sent a letter to Attorney 
Kelly and Attorney Thomas Basting, who was representing the OLR.  
The letter sent to Attorney Kelly was addressed to the Sidney 
Street address he had admitted.  The letter announced that the 
referee would hold a scheduling conference via telephone on 
September 20, 2011, at 8:15 a.m.  The letter directed Attorney 
Kelly to provide a telephone number at which he could be reached 
to Attorney Basting, who bore the responsibility of initiating 
the conference call.  The letter further informed the attorneys 
that if the date and time did not work for one of them, that 
attorney should notify the referee, who would then arrange 
another mutually agreeable date and time. 
¶6 
The referee's report indicates that Attorney Basting 
called the referee at the appointed time on September 20, 2011.  
Attorney Basting informed the referee that he had not received 
any communication from Attorney Kelly.  Thus, he did not have a 
number at which to call Attorney Kelly. 
¶7 
According to an affidavit filed by Attorney Basting, 
during the September 20, 2011 conference call, the referee 
instructed him to file a motion for a default and to schedule 
the motion for a telephonic hearing on October 11, 2011, at 8:15 
a.m.  Pursuant to the referee's direction, Attorney Basting 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
4 
 
filed a motion to strike the answer that Attorney Kelly had 
filed and for a declaration of a default against Attorney Kelly.  
The motion was again addressed to Attorney Kelly at the Sidney 
Street address. 
¶8 
At the scheduled time on October 11, 2011, Attorney 
Basting again called the referee.  Attorney Kelly did not call 
either the referee or Attorney Basting at the time of the 
hearing, nor did he otherwise contact either of them. 
¶9 
Although there is not a transcript of the October 11, 
2011 telephonic hearing, it appears that the referee orally 
found Attorney Kelly to be in default due to his failure to 
appear 
at 
the 
telephonic 
scheduling 
conference 
and 
the 
telephonic motion hearing.  On October 13, 2011, Attorney 
Basting sent a letter to the referee submitting a proposed order 
that would strike Attorney Kelly's previously filed answer and 
find him to be in default.  Attorney Basting's letter indicated 
that a copy of the letter was being sent to Attorney Kelly at 
the Sidney Street address.  It further advised Attorney Kelly 
that he had 15 days to object to the form of the order and that 
if he failed to object, the referee would sign the proposed 
order and the matter would proceed on a default basis. 
¶10 Attorney Kelly did not respond.  On October 30, 2011, 
Referee Murphy signed an order entitled "Order Striking Answer 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
5 
 
and Finding Respondent in Default."2  In the order, the referee 
struck Attorney Kelly's answer and found that Attorney Kelly was 
in default "for failing to attend the scheduling conference and 
for failing to appear at the motion hearing."  
¶11 In the cover letter that accompanied the October 30, 
2011 order, a copy of which was sent to Attorney Kelly at the 
Sidney Street address, the referee advised both attorneys that 
they 
should 
provide 
the 
referee 
with 
their 
respective 
recommendations for discipline by November 11, 2011. 
¶12 The OLR submitted a letter setting forth its position 
that Attorney Kelly's license to practice law in Wisconsin 
should be revoked.  The OLR's letter also stated that it was 
requesting that Attorney Kelly be required to pay $31,541.50 in 
restitution to the Fund to reimburse it for payments that it had 
made to certain specified clients.  Attorney Kelly did not 
submit a sanction letter or memorandum. 
¶13 On November 14, 2011, the referee filed his report and 
recommendation.  The report did not expressly state that the 
referee was accepting as true all of the allegations of the 
OLR's complaint, which would follow from a finding of a default, 
nor did it recount the specific allegations of the complaint, 
but the report did state that Attorney Kelly "is guilty of 
                                                 
2 Because this is an attorney disciplinary matter in which 
only this court can issue a final judgment, the referee did not 
enter a default judgment, as is contemplated in the rules of 
civil procedure for "standard" civil actions, but did declare 
Attorney Kelly to be in default and proceeded in the matter as 
if no answer had been filed. 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
6 
 
fifty-one (51) violations of the Supreme Court Rules."  This 
conclusion indicates that the referee accepted as true all of 
the allegations of the complaint. 
¶14 The OLR's complaint describes Attorney Kelly's conduct 
in connection with the representation of 12 criminal defendants.  
It also addresses a thirteenth matter where Attorney Kelly 
failed to respond to the OLR's request for information about a 
grievance.   
¶15 Repeating the allegations of each separate matter here 
is not necessary.  It is sufficient to describe the general 
pattern that each of the 12 representations followed.  At the 
beginning of a representation, Attorney Kelly collected a 
substantial advance "flat" fee in exchange for his promise 
either to assess a convicted individual's case for possible 
postconviction or appellate challenges or to pursue either a 
postconviction motion in the circuit court or an appeal.  In 
most cases Attorney Kelly did no substantial work on the 
individual's case.  In a couple of cases he did some work, but 
then stopped his efforts before they were completed.  He 
routinely failed to respond to inquiries from the clients or 
their families, some of whom were paying Attorney Kelly's 
attorney fees.  When he did communicate with the client or a 
family member, Attorney Kelly indicated that he was working on 
the matter and would soon have the promised legal assessment, 
motion or brief for the client.  Attorney Kelly, however, would 
not perform the promised services.  In each situation, the OLR 
ultimately sent a grievance to Attorney Kelly and made multiple 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
7 
 
requests to him for information about the grievance.  Attorney 
Kelly failed to respond to the OLR's requests, which ultimately 
resulted in this court's temporary suspension of his license in 
March 2009. 
¶16 Among the 51 counts of misconduct found by the referee 
were ten counts of demonstrating a lack of diligence, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.3.3  Ten of the counts involved Attorney 
Kelly's failure to communicate with the client or the client's 
family, in violation of the current and former versions of 
SCR 20:1.4(a).4  The referee further found that in seven 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.3 states "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
4 Former SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective through June 30, 2007), 
provided that a lawyer shall "keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information."  Current SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective 
July 1, 2007) states as follows: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
 
(1) Promptly inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance with respect to which the client's 
informed consent, as defined in SCR 20:1.0(f), is 
required by these rules;  
 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client's objectives are to be 
accomplished; 
 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter;  
 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information; and 
 
(5) consult with the client about any relevant 
limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
8 
 
instances Attorney Kelly had committed professional misconduct 
by failing to return all or a portion of the advance fees he had 
collected from his clients.  SCR 20:1.16(d).5  In all 13 matters, 
Attorney Kelly failed to respond to the OLR's requests for 
information 
during 
its 
investigation 
of 
his 
conduct, 
in 
violation of either SCR 22.03(2)6 or SCR 22.03(6).7 
                                                                                                                                                             
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
5 SCR 20:1.16(d) states: 
 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
6 SCR 22.03(2) provides as follows: 
 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
9 
 
¶17 Consistent 
with 
the 
OLR's 
request, 
the 
referee 
recommended that Attorney Kelly's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin 
be 
revoked 
as 
discipline 
for 
his 
professional 
misconduct.  The referee further recommended that Attorney Kelly 
be required to pay restitution to the Fund for the $31,541.50 it 
had paid to compensate the victims of his misconduct.  The 
referee also recommended that Attorney Kelly should be ordered 
to pay the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶18 Our 
review 
of 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions of law, and sanction recommendation follows long-
established standards.  Specifically, we affirm a referee's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 
126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the 
appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts of 
each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 
benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶19 Before turning to the merits of the conclusions of 
misconduct, we first address the referee's finding that Attorney 
Kelly was in default.  In considering this matter, we look to 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 SCR 22.03(6) states:  "In the course of the investigation, 
the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant information, 
to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and the 
respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are misconduct, 
regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in the 
grievance." 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
10 
 
the 
rules 
of 
civil 
procedure, 
which 
are 
applicable 
to 
proceedings before a referee in attorney disciplinary cases.  
SCR 22.16(1).  This is not a case where a defendant or 
respondent fails to join issue through an answer or other 
responsive pleading.  A defendant's or respondent's failure to 
join issue is the usual situation in which a default may be 
declared.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1) (2009-10)8 ("A default 
judgment may be rendered as provided in subs. (1) to (4) if no 
issue of law or fact has been joined and if the time for joining 
issue has expired.").   
¶20 In this case Attorney Kelly did file an answer, which, 
while brief, sufficiently joined issue with the OLR's complaint.  
Thus, the only possible way to find Attorney Kelly to be in 
default was by means of striking his answer as a sanction for 
misconduct in the action.   
¶21 Section 802.10(7) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides 
that violations of a scheduling or pretrial order can subject a 
party to the sanctions authorized in Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 
(signing a false or frivolous pleading), 804.12 (failing to 
provide discovery), and 805.03 (failure to prosecute or comply 
with procedural statutes).  Section 802.10(7), Stats., has been 
interpreted to mean that the failure to attend a scheduling 
conference is a failure to comply with a scheduling order that 
can subject a party to a sanction.  See, e.g., Gaertner v. 880 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
11 
 
Corp., 131 Wis. 2d 492, 501-02, 389 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1986).  
Thus, it seems clear that the referee had authority to impose 
some sort of sanction against Attorney Kelly due to his failure 
to 
appear 
for 
the 
telephonic 
scheduling 
conference 
and 
subsequent failure to appear for the default motion telephonic 
hearing. 
¶22 The striking of a timely answer and the granting of a 
default, however, is a drastic sanction.  The appellate courts 
of this state have indicated that under the various rules 
authorizing the imposition of sanctions, the granting of a 
default against a defendant is a sanction that may be used only 
where the trial court has determined that the defendant's 
violation was egregious or in bad faith.  See, e.g., Schneider 
v. Ruch, 146 Wis. 2d 701, 707-08, 431 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1988) 
("Under other statutes empowering the trial court to impose 
sanctions for failure to comply with court orders, failure to 
prosecute, and failure to make discovery, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court and the court of appeals have said that dismissal is a 
drastic penalty that should be imposed only in cases of 
egregious conduct by a party.  [case citations omitted]"); 
Gaertner, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
501-02 
(upholding 
trial 
court's 
striking of answer and granting of default due to failure of 
defendants to attend scheduling conference where trial court 
found defendants' conduct to be egregious). 
¶23 The referee's order striking Attorney Kelly's answer 
and finding him to be in default indicated that it was based on 
Attorney 
Kelly's 
failure 
to 
appear 
at 
both 
the 
initial 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
12 
 
scheduling conference and the default motion hearing.  It did 
not, however, include a specific finding that Attorney Kelly's 
conduct was either egregious or in bad faith.  While including 
such an explicit finding in a default order is certainly the 
better practice, the lack of such an explicit finding does not 
require that we remand the matter to the referee.  An appellate 
court may affirm a trial court's sanction if the trial court 
implicitly found the party's conduct to be egregious and the 
facts in the record "provide a reasonable basis on review for 
the court's conclusion."  Schneller v. St. Mary's Hospital, 162 
Wis. 2d 296, 311, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991); Sentry Ins. v. Davis, 
2001 WI App 203, ¶22, 247 Wis. 2d 501, 634 N.W.2d 553. 
¶24 Here the record, including the referee's October 30, 
2011 order, indicates that the referee impliedly found Attorney 
Kelly's conduct to be egregious.  Moreover, the facts in the 
record do provide a reasonable basis for that conclusion.  It is 
important to note that the referee did not strike Attorney 
Kelly's answer immediately upon his failure to appear for the 
initial scheduling conference.  Instead, the referee suggested 
that the OLR should bring a motion to strike the answer and find 
Attorney Kelly to be in default.  The notice of that motion and 
the subsequent hearing gave Attorney Kelly a second opportunity 
to appear and participate in the action.  He did not do so, but 
instead failed to appear yet again.  In addition, that motion 
hearing was not Attorney Kelly's last opportunity to be heard.  
The OLR's counsel submitted a proposed order and, pursuant to 
the referee's direction, informed Attorney Kelly that he had 15 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
13 
 
days to object to the form of the order.  This was a third 
opportunity to participate, which Attorney Kelly again chose not 
to take.  Each of the communications that preceded these three 
separate opportunities to participate was sent to the address 
that Attorney Kelly's answer admitted was his proper current 
address.9  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Attorney Kelly 
received 
notice 
of 
the 
proceedings 
in 
this 
case, 
but 
intentionally chose not to participate.  Such repeated refusals 
to engage in the disciplinary process warrant a finding that 
Attorney Kelly's pattern of failure to appear or participate 
constituted egregious conduct that merited the striking of his 
answer and proceeding on the allegations of the OLR's complaint. 
¶25 Because the referee properly struck Attorney Kelly's 
answer and found him in default, the factual allegations of the 
OLR's complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this 
proceeding.  We agree with the referee that those facts support 
a conclusion of professional misconduct on each of the 51 counts 
of misconduct set forth in the complaint. 
¶26 We now turn to the question of the appropriate level 
of discipline.  The facts detailed in the complaint demonstrate 
                                                 
9 Indeed, Attorney Kelly was given a fourth opportunity to 
participate when the referee asked the parties to submit 
memoranda regarding the appropriate sanction in this matter.  
Attorney Kelly again chose not to participate.  While that 
opportunity came after the referee had issued the order striking 
Attorney Kelly's answer and finding him in default, it provides 
additional support for the conclusion that Attorney Kelly would 
not have participated in this proceeding no matter how many 
opportunities he was given. 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
14 
 
a clear pattern of neglect by Attorney Kelly of his clients' 
needs and objectives and of disregard for his obligations as an 
attorney in this state.  Moreover, even though on most 
representations Attorney Kelly did little or no work, he 
repeatedly refused to refund any portion of the thousands of 
dollars he had obtained from the clients or their relatives.  In 
a number of the matters, Attorney Kelly also refused to return 
the file to the client or to forward it to the client's new 
attorney.  Attorney Kelly repeatedly refused to respond to the 
grievances filed by his clients or to the OLR's requests for 
information.  Finally, Attorney Kelly's misconduct was not an 
isolated or temporary occurrence.  It occurred in 12 separate 
representations and in some situations lasted for several years.  
We therefore conclude that the severe sanction of the revocation 
of his license to practice law in Wisconsin must be imposed to 
protect the public from a repetition of this misconduct and to 
deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct. 
¶27 We further agree with the referee that Attorney Kelly 
must be held responsible for the $31,541.50 that the Fund had to 
pay to the clients harmed by his misconduct, and that he must 
bear the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶28 IT IS ORDERED that the license of T. Christopher Kelly 
to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of 
this order. 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, T. Christopher Kelly shall pay restitution to the 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
15 
 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection in the amount of 
$31,541.50. 
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, T. Christopher Kelly shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payment of restitution to 
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection is to be 
completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. 
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that T. Christopher Kelly shall 
comply, if he has not already done so, with the requirements of 
SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked. 
 
 
No. 
2011AP1654-D   
 
 
 
1