Title: Acro Extrusion Corporation v. Cunningham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 452, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ACRO EXTRUSION 
 
 
§ 
CORPORATION,  
 
§ 
§ 
Defendant Below,  
§ No. 452, 2001 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
§ for New Castle County 
PHILLIP CUNNINGHAM, 
 
§ C.A. No. 98-C-05-167 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
§  
 
Submitted: October 22, 2002 
Decided: 
November 15, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, 
Justices, constituting the Court En Banc. 
 
Appeal from Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
Nancy Chrissinger Cobb, Esquire, Chrissinger & Baumberger, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
Gary S. Nitsche, Esquire, Weik, Nitsche & Dougherty, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
 
 
 
In this appeal from the Superior Court, we address the issue of whether an 
employee may file a valid Huffman1 suit based on an Industrial Accident Board (the 
“Board”) award where that employee sought, and was granted, reargument and an 
additional evidentiary hearing before the Board with respect to one claim of several 
addressed in the Board’s decision.  We conclude that given the uncertainty surrounding 
the subsequent Notice of Appeal in the Superior Court, the late correspondence from 
employee’s counsel to carrier’s counsel sufficiently delineated the issues upon which the 
Huffman demand was based.  Nonetheless, the Superior Court incorrectly calculated the 
time requirements for default under Huffman and we accordingly reverse. 
 
 
I. 
                                                 
1  Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Son, 432 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1981). 
On February 28, 1997, Phillip Cunningham filed a petition with the Board  to 
determine additional compensation due resulting from a work-related injury he 
sustained on December 8, 1995 while employed by Acro Extrusion Corporation (“Acro 
Extrusion”).  In his petition, Cunningham alleged total disability, permanent partial 
disability, and medical expenses.  On January 28, 1998 the Board awarded 
Cunningham permanent disability to his neck and lower back, medical expenses, and 
 
 
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attorney’s fees.  The Board did not address Cunningham’s claim for partial disability in 
its initial decision because it believed the issue had not been raised.  On February 13, 
1998, Cunningham filed a Motion for Reargument on the issue of partial disability, 
claiming that this issue had, in fact, been raised in his original petition.  On March 23, 
1998, the Board granted Cunningham’s motion.  The Board determined, however, that 
while Cunningham had indeed raised this issue, an additional evidentiary hearing on 
partial disability (the “Hearing”) was required before a decision could be rendered. 
On April 9, 1998, more than three months before the Hearing, Cunningham’s 
counsel sent Acro Extrusion a Huffman letter demanding payment on the basis of the 
Board’s January, 28, 1998 decision.  Counsel’s letter delineated the matters on which 
the Huffman demand was based: permanent partial disability benefits at the percentages 
assigned by the board, medical expenses, attorney’s fees, and medical witness fees 
(collectively the “Award”).  In addition, this letter informed Acro Extrusion that a 
Huffman suit would be filed if payment was not made within thirty days of the letter.  
Acro Extrusion did not respond to the demand, and Cunningham filed a Huffman suit 
in Superior Court on May 18, 1998.   
On June 29, 1998, the Board held the evidentiary hearing on the issue of partial 
disability.  Cunningham presented no additional evidence, however, and on July 10, 
 
 
4 
1998, the Board denied his partial disability claim.  On July 27, 1998, Cunningham 
appealed the Board’s July 10 decision to the Superior Court.  In effect,  Cunningham 
appealed only the determination that he was not entitled to partial disability benefits.  
Cunningham withdrew the appeal on December 31, 1998.  
During the time between the appeal of the Board’s July 10, 1998 Order, and the 
withdraw of that appeal, the parties continued to litigate the April 9, 1998 Huffman 
demand.  On July 16, 1998, Cunningham’s counsel wrote again to Acro Extrusion.  On 
July 24, 1998, Cunningham sought a default judgment against Acro Extrusion for 
failure to file an answer to the Huffman complaint that had been filed in Superior Court 
on May 18, 1998.  On August 21, 1998, however, the Superior Court granted Acro 
Extrusion’s motion to stay the execution of the default judgment.   
One month 
later, Cunningham’s counsel wrote again to Acro Extrusion, reiterating the demand for 
payment of the undisputed amounts first outlined in the April 9, 1998 demand letter.  
On October 13, 1998, the Superior Court granted Acro Extrusion’s motion to lift the 
default judgment but nevertheless ordered it to pay the Award immediately.  The next 
day, although the Huffman suit was still pending, Acro Extrusion paid the Award.    
Acro Extrusion then moved for summary judgment in the Huffman suit to which 
Cunningham responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment.  The Superior 
 
 
5 
Court held that while Cunningham’s April 9, 1998 Huffman demand was premature, he 
was nevertheless entitled to summary judgment in his favor because Acro Extrusion was 
on notice that he expected prompt payment of the compensation awarded, and that to 
require Cunningham to make a second demand would “def[y] logic and [be] contrary to 
the philosophy of worker’s compensation law[.]” Cunningham v. Acro Extrusion Corp., 
C.A. No. 98C-05-167, (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2001), Mem. Op. at 11.  Finally, the court 
found Acro Extrusion responsible for damages from September 25, 1998 to October 
14, 1998 - the time between when Cunningham was entitled to Huffman damages and 
when Acro Extrusion finally paid the Award.  Id. at 12.  Acro Extrusion appeals from 
this judgment, arguing that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it 
determined that a premature Huffman demand became valid with the mere passage of 
time.   
 
 
 
II. 
This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment.  Blue Hen Lines, Inc. v. Turbitt, 787 A.2d 74, 77 (Del. 2001).  On appeal, the 
Court must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences taken therefrom, in the 
 
 
6 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and determine whether an issue of 
material fact exists such that summary judgment was improper.  Id.  “The moving party 
bears the burden of demonstrating both the absence of a material fact and entitlement 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.   
In Blue Hen Lines, this Court noted that an award becomes final when the 
statutory period of thirty days passes without an appeal.  Blue Hen Lines, 787 A.2d at 78 
(quoting 11 Del. C. § 2349).  Thus, even if either party appeals certain aspects of the 
Board’s decision, a claimant may make a Huffman demand for payment of the amounts 
due under the unappealed portion of the Board’s decision.  Id.   Further, “[i]f the 
employer fails to make payment within thirty days of the demand, the employer may 
become liable for liquidated damages as provided by statute.”  Id. at 78-79. 
In Delmarva Warehouses, Inc. v. Yoder, 2001 WL 1329691, * (Del. Oct. 23, 2001), 
we addressed a situation similar to the matter presented here.  In Yoder, the employee-
claimant’s attorney made a Huffman demand a mere four days after the Superior Court 
affirmed the Board’s decision awarding benefits.  Id. at *1.  Once the appeal period had 
run, Yoder filed suit against the employer for nonpayment of the award.  Id.  Despite 
the fact that Yoder did not make a second, timely demand, we affirmed the judgment of 
the Superior Court granting Yoder damages for the delay.  Id.  In particular, we held 
 
 
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that “it would be an unreasonable elevation of form over substance to require the 
employee to reassert his demand in order to trigger the employer’s obligation to pay the 
award.”  Yoder, at *1.   
In the final analysis, however, the focus of the Huffman award must be on the 
employer’s failure to pay once the thirty day default period has expired after proper 
demand.  Our review of the record suggests that the critical time line begins when the 
Board rendered its decision on July 10, 1998, not July 16, 1998 as determined by the 
Superior Court.  Although the Board’s decision became final on July 10,  
Cunningham’s notice of appeal injected confusion into the process because it did not 
specify that Cunningham accepted certain portions of the award.2  The Superior Court 
correctly combined the thirty day appeal period with the additional seven days imposed 
by Board rule but did not apply the September 21, 1998 letter of demand as the 
Huffman trigger.  Had the notice of appeal been unambiguous, the September 21, 1998 
demand letter would not have been required under Yoder.  It was, however, necessary 
here because of the confusion introduced by Cunningham’s notice of appeal, and thus 
it served as a Huffman trigger. 
                                                 
2  We have urged the Superior Court to adopt a rule that would require a claimant to specify 
in his notice of appeal that portion of the award accepted.  Blue Hen Lines, 787 A.2d at 79.  This case 
illustrates, yet again, the need for such a rule. 
 
 
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We conclude that the Huffman trigger, i.e., the event that begins the thirty day 
statutory period for payment, was the September 21, 1998 letter because it put the 
employer on clear notice that Cunningham was appealing only the denial of partial 
disability benefits.  Since the employer paid the undisputed portion of the award within 
thirty days of the September 21, 1998 reiteration of the Huffman demand, Cunningham 
was not entitled to payment of damages.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Superior Court.