Title: Stikeleather v. Zappacosta
Citation: 293 A.2d 572
Docket Number: N/A
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1972

293 A.2d 572 (1972)
Herman STIKELEATHER, Appellant Below, Appellant,
v.
Thomas R. ZAPPACOSTA, Appellee Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
June 2, 1972.
On Reargument June 22, 1972.
Oliver V. Suddard, Wilmington, for appellant below, appellant.
Howard M. Berg, of Berg, Taylor &amp; Komissaroff, Wilmington, for appellee below, appellee.
Before WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ.
PER CURIAM:
In this workmen's compensation case, upon the employee's petition to determine compensation, the Industrial Accident Board found that he sustained a vertebra fracture and total disability as the result of a compensable accident on March 5, 1970; and "that the total disability should run from that date until November 6, 1970, the recovery date fixed by Dr. Cates". These findings were made by the Board on December 9, 1970 following a hearing on October 28, 1970. The employee appealed the termination decision to the Superior Court, which affirmed. The employee again appeals.
We hold that the Board erred in determining the termination of total disability upon the basis of the physician's prognosis in futuro.
Dr. Cates last examined the employee on July 14, 1970. At the hearing on October 28, 1970, the physician testified that he had "not yet released him for any full work as of this time". As to anticipated improvement, Dr. Cates testified that as of his last examination:
The ruling of the Board as to termination was obviously based upon the following conclusionary testimony of Dr. Cates:
The physician's prognosis testimony, as to recovery and termination of total disability, was too vague and conjectural to support the Board's finding of termination. Such speculative testimony does not constitute substantial evidence of the termination of "total disability" as that term is to be understood under our Statute. 19 Del.C. § 2324; M. A. Hartnett, Inc. v. Coleman, Del.Supr., 226 A.2d 910, 912-913 (1967). Moreover, the Board's action did not comply with the settled rule that total disability, once established, is deemed to continue until the employer establishes the availability of regular employment within the employee's capabilities. Huda v. Continental Can Company, Inc., Del. Supr., 265 A.2d 34 (1970).
The employer contends that the Board's action must be affirmed because (1) Dr. Cates was the employee's witness and the sole medical witness, and (2) the issue appealed arose under an employee's petition to determine disability rather than an employer's petition to terminate disability. There is no merit in either of these contentions.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
The employer points to 19 Del.C. § 2347[*] and contends that, in view of the six-month limitation contained therein, the foregoing *574 ruling means that a carrier will be required to pay disability compensation for at least six months after the award in every case.
Our holding does not have that result. The six-month limitation established by § 2347 is upon multiple reviews; it runs from the date of the last review, not from the date of the award. Accordingly, insofar as § 2347 is concerned, the employer here has been free to file a first petition for review ever since the entry of the award.
[*]  19 Del.C. § 2347 provides in pertinent part:

"§ 2347. Review by Board of agreements or awards; grounds; modification of award
"On the application of any party in interest on the ground that the incapacity of the injured employee has subsequently terminated, increased, diminished or recurred, or that the status of the dependent has changed, the Board may at any time, but not oftener than once in 6 months, review any agreement or award."