Title: James R. Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin
Citation: 2008 WI 110
Docket Number: 2006AP000396, 2009AP000608
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2008

2008 WI 110 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP396 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the matter of attorneys fees in: Grant E. 
Storms, plaintiff, v. Action Wisconsin Inc. and 
Christopher Ott, defendants. 
 
James R. Donohoo, 
          Appellant, 
     v. 
Action Wisconsin, Inc. and Christopher Ott, 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE DECISION RELATING TO 
THE DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 30, 2008 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 110
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP396  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of attorneys fees in: Grant E. 
Storms, plaintiff, v. Action Wisconsin Inc. and 
Christopher Ott, defendants. 
 
James R. Donohoo, 
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Action Wisconsin, Inc. and Christopher Ott, 
 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 30, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTION to vacate decision based on disqualification of 
justice.    Motion denied.  
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   On June 5, 2008, this court issued a 
decision reversing a court of appeals' decision, which, in turn, 
reversed a circuit court judgment requiring Attorney James R. 
Donohoo to pay costs and attorney fees for filing and 
maintaining a defamation lawsuit that was found to be frivolous.  
Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin Inc., 2008 WI 56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
750 N.W.2d 739.  The case was decided by a 4-3 vote, with 
Justice Bradley writing the majority opinion, in which Chief 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
2 
 
Justice Abrahamson, Justice Crooks, and Justice Butler joined.  
Justice Roggensack authored a dissent, in which Justice Prosser 
and Justice Ziegler joined.  
¶2 
Donohoo has filed a motion to vacate the decision 
based on the disqualification of Justice Butler by law.1  The 
alleged grounds for disqualification are that Justice Butler 
accepted serial campaign contributions from Donohoo's opponent 
without disclosing those contributions to Donohoo, in violation 
of his pledge not to do so; that Justice Butler appeared at a 
fund raiser for a political action committee (PAC) supporting 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights;2 and that 
Justice Butler obtained the endorsement of one of the attorneys 
for Action Wisconsin. 
¶3 
Based on the record before us and the applicable law, 
we conclude that the facts alleged by Donohoo do not support a 
finding that Justice Butler was disqualified by law from 
participating in this matter. Consequently, we deny Donohoo's 
motion.  
                                                 
1 On 
June 
26, 
2008, 
Donohoo 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
and 
petitions 
for 
Justice 
Butler's 
disqualification and for rehearing.  On July 7, 2008, he filed a 
"stipulation for dismissal" of the motion for reconsideration, 
in which he stipulated that the motion for reconsideration was 
untimely, and a request to withdraw the two petitions.  This 
court dismissed the motion for reconsideration as untimely and 
granted Donohoo's request to withdraw the petitions on July 30, 
2008.  
2 The materials attached to the memorandum in support of 
Donohoo's motion identify the PAC as the "Center Advocates 
Political Action Committee-Wisconsin LGBT PAC." 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
3 
 
I 
¶4 
Donohoo filed a defamation complaint on behalf of 
Grant E. Storms against Action Wisconsin and Christopher Ott, 
its executive director.  Action Wisconsin filed an answer to the 
complaint and a motion for costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025.  The circuit court granted the 
motion, concluding that prior to filing the lawsuit Donohoo knew 
or should have known that neither the facts nor the law 
supported the claim of actual malice, which would have to be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence.  The circuit court also 
concluded that Donohoo had failed to conduct a reasonable 
inquiry into the claim before filing the lawsuit and that 
Donohoo continued the lawsuit even though he knew or should have 
known that the claim was brought "without any reasonable basis 
in law or equity."  The court of appeals reversed, concluding 
Donohoo did engage in a reasonable inquiry into the facts and 
law and that there were disputed issues of material fact 
regarding whether there was actual malice.  This court reversed, 
concluding that the circuit court did not err in determining 
that 
the 
defamation 
suit 
was 
frivolously 
commenced 
and 
continued.   
¶5 
Donohoo now asserts that he has discovered evidence 
that Justice Butler was disqualified by law from participating 
in this case because of his financial and personal interest in 
the outcome of the matter and his violation of supreme court 
rules.  The memorandum in support of Donohoo's motion attaches a 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
4 
 
detailed chronology of events that Donohoo deems significant.  
That chronology, with minor editing, is as follows: 
2/2/2006 
Circuit court dismisses Donohoo's suit as 
frivolous.  Action Wisconsin represented by 
Attorneys 
Lester 
Pines 
and 
Tamara 
B. 
Packard. 
2/16/2006 Donohoo files notice of appeal.  Action 
Wisconsin forms Fair Wisconsin as its PAC 
opposing Wisconsin's Marriage Protection 
Amendment in the 2006 election. 
9/11/2006 Pines files motion for frivolous costs. 
11/3/2006 Fair Wisconsin pays NGL Task Force $5,298.  
Fair Wisconsin transfers $27,000 and all of 
its remaining debt to Action Wisconsin. 
12/16/2006 Fair Wisconsin transfers $27,590.66 cash 
and related debt to Action Wisconsin, Inc.  
Action Wisconsin changes its name to Fair 
Wisconsin. 
5/30/2007 Appeals court reverses order and judgment. 
6/29/2007 Pines files notice of intent to appeal. 
6/30/2007 Peter Bock, Fair Wisconsin board member, 
contributes 
$125 
to 
Butler's 
campaign.  
Butler does not disclose contribution. 
7/13/2007 Pines submits petition for supreme court 
review. 
7/23/2007 Pines 
contributes 
$300 
to 
Butler's 
campaign. 
8/26/2007 Butler speaks at LGBT PAC garden party. 
9/11/2007 Supreme court accepts review. 
10/9/2007 Tamara Packard, Action Wisconsin attorney, 
files motion for miscellaneous relief. 
10/15/2007 Oral arguments assigned. 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
5 
 
11/28/2007 Butler announces he will advise all parties 
of having accepted contributions.  Butler 
previously announced that while he would 
not 
accept 
campaign 
contributions 
from 
parties to cases before the court, he would 
accept 
contributions 
from 
attorneys 
representing parties in cases, but that he 
would disclose those contributions.  Media 
reports indicate Butler did not immediately 
disclose that an attorney appearing before 
the court sat on his campaign finance 
committee 
and 
contributed 
$500 
to 
his 
election campaign. 
12/3/2007 Butler sends letter advising parties of the 
Pines contribution. 
12/7/2007 Ruth Irvings, Fair Wisconsin board member, 
contributes 
$100 
to 
Butler's 
campaign.  
Butler does not disclose contribution. 
1/15/2008 Oral argument heard. 
1/22/2008 Wisconsin LGBT PAC issues endorsement of 
Butler for Supreme Court. 
1/28/2008 Ruth Irvings contributes $1,000 to Butler 
campaign. 
 
Butler 
fails 
to 
disclose 
contribution. 
2/7/2008 
Butler 
concurs 
in 
decision 
prohibiting 
municipal governments and legislators from 
joining 
as 
parties 
in 
Helgeland 
v. 
Wisconsin Municipalities, 2008 WI 9, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 745 N.W.2d 1, a case brought 
by 
State 
employees 
relating 
to 
State 
benefits. 
2/19/2008 Fair Wisconsin announces absentee ballot 
drive for supreme court race and announces 
absentee ballot effort for spring general 
election. 
3/24/2008 Butler gives radio interview in which he 
talks about appearing at LGBT garden party. 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
6 
 
3/25/2008 Tamara 
Packard 
writes 
editorial 
in 
Wisconsin Gay News from Quest endorsing 
Butler for supreme court. 
¶6 
Donohoo asserts that on November 27, 2007, the 
Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel reported that Justice Butler stated 
he would refuse donations from parties that had cases before the 
court but that he would accept donations from attorneys 
representing parties and would disclose those contributions to 
litigants.  Donohoo acknowledges that on December 3, 2007, 
Justice Butler sent him a letter disclosing Lester Pines' $300 
contribution and informing Donohoo that the contribution would 
not affect Justice Butler's impartiality in his participation in 
the case.3  Donohoo did not raise any objection to Justice 
Butler's participation in the case after receiving the letter.  
¶7 
Donohoo further asserts that approximately two weeks 
before this court issued its decision, he learned that on March 
28, 2008, Wisconsin Family Action, Inc., had filed a formal 
request 
for 
investigation 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Commission, charging that Justice Butler had misled citizens and 
impaired his ability to render fair and impartial decisions in 
cases affecting gay rights and marriage.   
¶8 
According to Donohoo, the document filed with the 
Judicial Commission by Wisconsin Family Action stated that 
between June 2007 and January 2008, Peter Bock and Ruth Irvings, 
two of the twelve board members of Fair Wisconsin, Action 
Wisconsin's PAC, made contributions to Justice Butler's election 
                                                 
3 A copy of Justice Butler's December 3, 2007, letter is 
attached as Appendix A. 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
7 
 
campaign.  Donohoo makes no allegation that Justice Butler was 
aware of these contributions or that he was aware that Bock or 
Irvings had any connection to or interest in this case.  Donohoo 
asserts that by accepting serial contributions from a litigant 
after he had vowed not to do so, and by failing to disclose the 
contributions, Justice Butler deprived Donohoo of the right to 
object to Justice Butler's participation in the case based on 
the contributions. 
¶9 
Donohoo also alleges that on August 26, 2007, Justice 
Butler appeared at a fund raiser for the Center Advocates' PAC, 
which supports LGBT equality and the passage of legislation 
benefiting LGBT people and their families.  Donohoo alleges that 
the PAC's sole purpose is to advance the cause of LGBT equality, 
including same sex marriage.  He also asserts that the PAC was 
working to help re-elect Justice Butler.   
¶10 Donohoo asserts that while at the fund raiser Justice 
Butler avowed his support for LGBT equality and "lent the 
dignity of his office to help the group raise money." Donohoo 
also says that by appearing at the fund raiser and delivering a 
speech "Justice Butler joined himself at the hip with the PAC, 
and consequently also to Action Wisconsin," and "aligned himself 
with Wisconsin's premiere homosexual rights PAC and premiere 
radical homosexual advocacy group . . . and their common goals 
and agenda."  Donohoo also asserts that by appearing at the fund 
raiser Justice Butler "tipped his hand regarding his personal 
bias."   
No. 
2006AP396   
 
8 
 
¶11 Donohoo also alleges that on March 31, 2008, Action 
Wisconsin posted an entry on its Web site indicating that it had 
sent surveys to Justice Butler and his opponent and that only 
Justice Butler responded to the survey.  Donohoo asserts that in 
his response to the survey Justice Butler said he had friends or 
family who were LGBT.  When asked if that relationship has 
affected the way he saw injustices facing the community, Justice 
Butler said, "I respectfully decline to express an opinion on 
any issue where the court may be required to rule."  Donohoo 
asserts this response verified that Justice Butler knew his 
speech at the fund-raising "garden party" in support of LGBT 
equality was inappropriate and unethical. 
¶12 According to a transcript of a March 24, 2008, radio 
interview attached to the memorandum in support of Donohoo's 
motion, when asked about his appearance at the fund raiser 
Justice Butler said, "I spoke at the organization about my own 
candidacy for the Supreme Court.  I did not get involved, I 
don't get involved in individual cases.  I don't think it's 
appropriate for the courts to do that."  Justice Butler also 
said, "I think it's important for me to reach out to . . . all 
citizens."  Donohoo asserts that on January 22, 2008, the 
Wisconsin 
LGBT 
PAC 
endorsed 
Justice 
Butler, 
among 
other 
candidates, saying, "These candidates have a long history of 
advancing LGBT equality."   
¶13 Donohoo 
also 
asserts 
that 
while 
Fair 
Wisconsin 
refrained from formally endorsing Justice Butler, Fair Wisconsin 
"delivered . . . their endorsement through the back door" in the 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
9 
 
form of an editorial in the March 25, 2008, edition of Wisconsin 
Gay News from Quest in which Tamara Packard, one of Action 
Wisconsin's attorneys, urged readers to "vote for Louis Butler 
on April 1."  Donohoo says Attorney Packard served on the board 
of directors of Action Wisconsin and he asserts that her law 
firm will be receiving any fees awarded as the result of this 
court's majority decision.  Donohoo asserts that as the result 
of Attorney Packard's connections to Action Wisconsin, "the 
appearance of impropriety on the part of Justice Butler is 
palpable."  
¶14 Donohoo asserts that Justice Butler's appearance at 
the fund raiser violated SCRs 60.05(1),4 60.05(3)(c)2.,5 and 
                                                 
4 SCR 60.05(1) provides:  
Extra-judicial Activities in General.  A judge 
shall 
conduct 
all of the judge's extra-judicial 
activities so that they do none of the following:  
(a) Cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity 
to act impartially as a judge.   
(b) Demean the judicial office.   
(c) Interfere with the proper performance of 
judicial duties.  
5 SCR 60.05(3)(c)2. provides: A judge, in any capacity: 
a. 
May assist the organization in planning 
fund-raising activities and may participate in the 
management and investment of the organization's funds 
but may not personally participate in the solicitation 
of funds or other fund-raising activities, except that 
a judge may solicit funds from other judges over whom 
the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate 
authority;   
No. 
2006AP396   
 
10 
 
60.03.6 Donohoo contends that "[r]estoration of public confidence 
in the impartiality of the decision in the petitioner's case 
demands that Justice Butler be disqualified by law." Donohoo 
                                                                                                                                                             
b. 
May 
make 
recommendations 
to 
public 
and 
private fund-granting organizations on projects and 
programs concerning the law, the legal system or the 
administration of justice; 
c. 
May not personally participate in membership 
solicitation if the solicitation reasonably may be 
perceived as coercive or, except as permitted in subd. 
2.a, if the membership solicitation is essentially a 
fund-raising mechanism; and 
d. 
May not use or permit the use of the 
prestige of judicial office for fund raising or 
membership solicitation. 
6 SCR 60.03 provides as follows:   
A 
judge 
shall 
avoid 
impropriety 
and 
the 
appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's 
activities.   
(1) A judge shall respect and comply with the law 
and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary.   
(2) A judge may not allow family, social, 
political or other relationships to influence the 
judge's judicial conduct or judgment.  A judge may not 
lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the 
private interests of the judge or of others or convey 
or permit others to convey the impression that they 
are in a special position to influence the judge. A 
judge may not testify voluntarily as a character 
witness.   
(3) A judge may not hold membership in any 
organization that practices invidious discrimination 
on the basis of race, gender, religion or national 
origin.    
No. 
2006AP396   
 
11 
 
further asserts that Justice Butler was disqualified by law 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f)7 because of his substantial 
financial and personal interest in the outcome of the case and 
that Justice Butler was also disqualified by law pursuant to 
Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g),8 which prohibits a judge from 
participating in a case when the judge determines he or she 
cannot retain his or her impartiality.  
¶15 Further, Donohoo asserts that in deciding whether 
Justice Butler is disqualified by law from participating in this 
matter under § 757.19(2)(g), this court should apply both a 
subjective test and an objective test as discussed in Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's concurrence in State v. Harrell, 199 
Wis. 2d 654, 665, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996).  He also points to the 
Chief Justice's comment in her concurrence in Harrell that an 
objective test is required by the due process guarantees of the 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. 757.19(2)(f) provides:  
Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when 
one of the following situations occurs:  
. . . .  
(f) When a judge has a significant financial or 
personal interest in the outcome of the mater. Such 
interest does not occur solely by the judge being a 
member of a political or taxing body that is a party. 
8 Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) provides:  "Any judge shall 
disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action 
or 
proceeding 
when 
one 
of 
the 
following 
situations 
occurs: . . . [w]hen a judge determines that, for any reason, he 
or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an 
impartial manner." 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
12 
 
federal and state constitutions.  Id. at 671.  Donohoo contends 
that Justice Butler's "pattern of conduct was guaranteed to 
create, at a minimum, the appearance that [he] cannot act in an 
impartial 
manner . . . ." 
 
Donohoo 
also 
raises 
various 
criticisms of the majority's decision in the instant case and 
says, "It does not appear that the . . . decision was based on 
the facts, logic, or existing law." 
II 
¶16 This is not the first time we have been asked, 
following the issuance of a decision, to declare that a justice 
was disqualified by law from participation in the matter.  In 
the past 20 years we have been faced with this issue three 
times.  We undertook similar examinations in State v. American 
TV & Appliance, 151 Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989), City of 
Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 527 N.W.2d 305 
(1995), and Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 
N.W.2d 545.  In the present case, as in the three prior cases, 
we consider Donohoo's allegations and decide the matter without 
the need for further briefing.9  In the present case, as in the 
prior three cases, we determine from the face of Donohoo's 
motion and accompanying documents that, even accepting all of 
his allegations as true, neither on the law asserted nor on the 
facts alleged can it be established that Justice Butler was 
disqualified by law from participating in this case.  
                                                 
9 On July 22, 2008 Donohoo filed a motion requesting that 
the court establish a briefing schedule. Because we can resolve 
the matter without further briefing, we dismiss the motion as 
moot.  
No. 
2006AP396   
 
13 
 
¶17 Donohoo states that he first became aware of the 
alleged basis for Justice Butler's disqualification when he 
learned that Wisconsin Family Action, Inc., had filed a formal 
request 
for 
investigation 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Commission.  That request allegedly revealed the contributions 
made to Justice Butler's election campaign by members of Action 
Wisconsin's PAC and Justice Butler's attendance at the fund 
raiser.  
¶18 In Edgerton, Justice Geske provided the court with a 
letter from the Judicial Commission stating that the complaint 
against 
her 
had 
been 
dismissed 
upon 
the 
Commission's 
determination that there was no probable cause to believe that 
any violation whatsoever had occurred.  Edgerton, 190 Wis. 2d at 
522.  Similarly, Justice Butler has granted a limited waiver of 
his 
confidentiality 
rights 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
Judicial 
Commission proceedings10 and has furnished the court with the 
Judicial Commission's letter dated April 28, 2008, stating that, 
"[t]he Commission's examination of this matter has resulted in a 
determination that there is no evidence of misconduct within the 
jurisdiction of the Commission to warrant further action or 
consideration by the Commission."11  We do not rely solely on the 
Commission's determination, but have also carefully examined 
Donohoo's allegations and all of the materials he submitted.  
                                                 
10 A copy of Justice Butler's limited waiver is attached as 
Appendix B. 
11 A copy of the Judicial Commission's letter is attached as 
Appendix C. 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
14 
 
After doing so, we too conclude that Justice Butler was not 
disqualified by law from participating in this case.  
¶19 As to Donohoo's claim that Justice Butler should be 
disqualified by law from participating in the case pursuant to 
§ 757.19(2)(f) because he received campaign contributions from 
members of Action Wisconsin's PAC and its attorney, we note that 
the Judicial Commission stated: 
There is no case in Wisconsin or elsewhere that 
requires recusal of a judge or justice based solely on 
a contribution to a judicial campaign.  The amounts of 
the contributions presented in your submission are 
relatively insignificant.  They were legal and well 
within the maximum for individual contributions in 
Supreme Court races as established by state law.  
There were no contributions from any litigants in 
cases before the court, but rather two board members 
out of twelve made personal donations as did an 
attorney.  
SCR 60.04(4), Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct 
requires recusal when the facts and circumstances 
indicate 
that 
a 
reasonable, 
well-informed 
person 
knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the 
justice system would reasonably question the judge's 
ability to be impartial.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Judicial Conduct Advisory Committee Opinion 03-1 says 
as follows: 
"[T]he mere fact of prior support for, or 
opposition to, a judge's election does not 
necessarily 
rise 
to 
the 
level 
of 
an 
appearance of impropriety.  Both the public 
and 
knowledgeable 
persons 
within 
the 
judicial system, are fully aware of, and 
likely 
comfortable 
with, 
the 
fact 
that 
people 
will 
support 
an 
individual 
for 
judicial 
office 
with 
various 
levels 
of 
assistance, 
monetary 
support 
or 
endorsements.  This fact in and of itself 
does 
not 
create 
so 
close 
or 
special 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
15 
 
relationship so as to require automatic 
recusal."  
¶20 In addition to there being no requirement that a 
judicial candidate disclose all contributions to his or her 
campaign, the record before us does not support Donohoo's 
assertion that Justice Butler violated his campaign promise 
regarding contributions.  According to the materials Donohoo has 
submitted, Justice Butler said he would refuse contributions 
from parties with pending cases before the court, but would 
accept and disclose donations from attorneys with pending cases.  
From the record before us, it appears this is precisely what 
happened. 
Justice 
Butler 
accepted 
and 
disclosed 
a 
$300 
contribution from Attorney Pines.  As the Judicial Commission 
noted, Bock and Irvings were not parties to a pending action.  
In addition, nowhere does Donohoo assert that Justice Butler 
knew that Bock or Irvings were board members of Fair Wisconsin.  
The 
code 
of 
judicial 
conduct 
does 
not 
require 
judicial 
candidates to attempt to research every possible organization 
with which contributors may have an affiliation.  Such a 
requirement would be unduly burdensome to candidates for 
judicial office and we decline to impose it.   
¶21 As to Donohoo's claim that Justice Butler acted 
improperly in attending the fund raiser, the Judicial Commission 
noted that "[j]udges and candidates for judicial office can 
announce their views on political and legal issues as long as 
they are not pledges or promises to decide cases in a certain 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
16 
 
way." 
 
In 
addition, 
we 
note 
that 
the 
Comment 
to 
SCR 
60.05(3)(c)2.d provides: 
A judge may be a speaker or guest of honor at an 
organization's fund-raising event provided there is no 
advertising of the judge as speaker or guest of honor 
in order to encourage people to attend and make 
contributions and provided that any contributions at 
the event are made prior to the judge's speech or 
presentation as guest of honor.  A judge's attendance 
at such event is permissible if otherwise consistent 
with this chapter.  
¶22 There 
is 
no 
allegation 
in 
Donohoo's 
motion 
or 
accompanying materials or in the complaint that Wisconsin Family 
Action filed with the Judicial Commission, portions of which are 
attached to the memorandum in support of Donohoo's motion, that 
Justice Butler's attendance at the fund raiser was advertised in 
advance.  When asked about the event in the March 24, 2008, 
radio interview, Justice Butler stated that while at the event 
he spoke about his own candidacy.  We find nothing in the record 
to suggest that Justice Butler's attendance at the event, which 
is not prohibited by the code of judicial conduct, should be 
held to disqualify him from participating in this matter.  
¶23 As to Donohoo's complaints about Attorney Packard's 
endorsement 
of 
Justice 
Butler's 
candidacy, 
SCR 
60.06(5) 
explicitly provides that a judge is not prohibited from 
soliciting and accepting endorsements from lawyers.  Indeed, the 
comment to SCR 60.06(5) states, "The receiving of endorsements 
is an important method of informing the electorate of broad-
based 
and 
presumably 
informed 
support 
for 
a 
particular 
candidacy."   
No. 
2006AP396   
 
17 
 
¶24 While Donohoo asserts that the court should follow 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence in Harrell and apply both 
subjective and objective standards in deciding whether Justice 
Butler was required to disqualify himself under § 757.19(2)(g), 
we note that the majority opinion in Harrell set forth the 
appropriate analysis to be employed as follows: 
In American TV we stated that subsection (2)(g) 
concerns 
"not 
what 
exists 
in 
the 
external 
world . . . but what exists in the judge's mind." 
American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 182-83, 443 N.W.2d 662. We 
explained: 
Section 757.19(2)(g), Stats., mandates 
a judge's disqualification only when that 
judge makes a determination that, in fact or 
in appearance, he or she cannot act in an 
impartial 
manner. 
It 
does 
not 
require 
disqualification in a situation where one 
other than the judge objectively believes 
there is an appearance that the judge is 
unable to 
act in an impartial manner; 
neither 
does 
it 
require 
disqualification . . . in 
a 
situation 
in 
which 
the 
judge's 
impartiality 
'can 
reasonably be questioned' by someone other 
than the judge. 
Id. at 183, 443 N.W.2d 662. Appellate review of this 
subjective determination is "limited to establishing 
whether the judge made a determination requiring 
disqualification." Id. at 186, 443 N.W.2d 662. See 
also City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 190 
Wis. 2d 510, 521-22, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995); In re 
Disciplinary Proc. Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 
584, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991). The reviewing court must 
objectively decide if the judge went through the 
required 
exercise 
of 
making 
a 
subjective 
determination. 
Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d at 663-64. 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
18 
 
¶25 From the record before us, we find that Justice Butler 
clearly made a subjective determination regarding his ability to 
proceed in the case.  In the December 3, 2007, letter he sent to 
the parties, Justice Butler stated that after consulting with 
the executive director of the Judicial Commission he chose to 
disclose Lester Pines' contribution and said because campaign 
contributions would in no way affect his judgment as to the 
outcome of the proceeding, he was advising the parties of his 
decision to participate in the case.  By sending the December 3, 
2007, letter and continuing to participate in the case, Justice 
Butler clearly determined that he could be impartial.  This is 
all that is required by § 757.19(2)(g). 
¶26 We do not hold that a judge is required to send a 
letter or otherwise give formal notice to the parties in order 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
or 
she 
has 
made 
a 
subjective 
determination regarding his or her ability to proceed in the 
case.  Since Justice Butler did send a letter to the parties, in 
this case the letter serves as an indicia that he made a 
subjective determination that he could be impartial.  In other 
cases, a judge's subjective determination may be demonstrated in 
other ways.  For example, in State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 274 
Wis. 2d 656, 684, 683 N.W.2d 31, we assumed that, in the absence 
of any objection, by continuing to preside in the matter a judge 
believed she could act in an impartial manner. 
¶27 Donohoo appears to be asking this court to overturn 
the decision in Harrell and impose an objective standard of 
review for a judge's initial subjective decision not to 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
19 
 
disqualify himself or herself.  We decline to do so.  As we said 
in Harrell: 
Wisconsin Statute § 757.19(2)(g) is clearly drafted so 
as to place the determination of partiality solely 
upon the judge.  See American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 182-
83, 
443 
N.W.2d 662. 
 
In 
fact, 
the 
legislature 
specifically 
included 
six 
other 
objectively 
determinable 
situations 
in 
subsection 
(2) 
which 
require withdrawal. These are the six situations on 
which it chose to focus. It is not this court's role 
under subsection (2)(g) to expand this list by 
requiring a judge to recuse himself or herself in all 
situations where an objective basis of impropriety may 
exist. If the general prohibition in (2)(g) were read 
so broadly, the six specific situations enumerated in 
the statute would become superfluous. 
Id. at 664-65 (emphasis in original). 
¶28 We do not address Donohoo's arguments about the merits 
of the court's June 5, 2008, decision.  Donohoo conceded that 
his motion for reconsideration of the decision was untimely and 
should be dismissed.  Consequently, arguments going to the 
merits of the decision are not before us.  The only issue that 
is before us is whether Justice Butler was disqualified by law 
from participating in the case.  We conclude he was not. 
¶29 In addition to concluding that none of Donohoo's 
allegations support his contention that Justice Butler was 
disqualified by law from participating in the case, we are 
troubled by the timing of Donohoo's motion.  On December 3, 
2007, Justice Butler advised the parties of Pines' campaign 
contribution.  Donohoo could have objected to Justice Butler's 
participation in the case at that time but did not do so.  
Donohoo states that he learned about Wisconsin Family Action's 
No. 
2006AP396   
 
20 
 
complaint against Justice Butler approximately two weeks before 
this court issued its decision.  Since the decision was issued 
on June 5, 2008, Donohoo presumably had all the information 
contained in his motion and accompanying memorandum by the third 
week in May, yet he failed to raise the issue of Justice 
Butler's participation in the case before the decision was 
rendered, at a time when Justice Butler could have been 
presented with the decision whether or not to recuse himself.  
¶30 As we noted in Jackson, "Motions such as this, having 
the potential to undermine the public's trust and confidence in 
the legitimacy of this court's decisions and the integrity and 
impartiality of this court as an institution, are very serious 
indeed, and, accordingly, must be raised in a timely fashion."  
Id., ¶22.  While we are appreciative of the fact that requesting 
the disqualification of a judge by law is a very serious matter, 
in fairness to the parties and the court, if a party has 
information while a case is pending that goes to the issue of a 
judge's or justice's participation in the matter, that party has 
an obligation to promptly bring the matter to the individual 
judge's or justice's attention before a decision has been 
rendered. 
¶31 In summary, our review of the record establishes that 
the claims made in Donohoo's motion to vacate the decision based 
on Justice Butler's disqualification are insufficient to warrant 
the relief sought.  Accordingly, we deny the motion. 
¶32 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶33 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The issue 
presented by the motion to vacate the decision in Donohoo v. 
Action Wisconsin, Inc., 2008 WI 56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 750 
N.W.2d 739, is whether Justice Butler was disqualified from 
participating in this case as a matter of law. 
¶34 The motion puts the issue about as starkly as it can 
be put, for it challenges the impartiality of a member of the 
court.  The motion should not come as a surprise, however, given 
the predicament in which the movant finds himself and the 
frequency of similar attacks on other members of the court. 
¶35 The court's response is a swift rebuff.  This, too, 
should not be a surprise because any other response would 
encourage more challenges from disappointed or apprehensive 
litigants and others who seek to advance their interests or 
political agenda by attempting to induce targeted justices to 
withdraw from cases under pressure. 
¶36 This case exposes some of the flaws in a system in 
which justices are elected.  The court's opinion, which 
necessarily discloses the campaign details giving rise to this 
challenge, is not likely to enhance confidence in the court. 
¶37 Why the supreme court finds itself in this awkward 
position and how elections to the court can be reformed are 
questions that deserve thoughtful analysis. 
¶38 This concurrence will attempt to discuss several of 
these points in turn. 
I 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶39 Attorney James R. Donohoo filed a defamation suit on 
behalf of Grant E. Storms against the defendants on February 23, 
2004.  The facts of the case are discussed in this court's 
Donohoo 
opinion, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
¶¶7-30;id., 
¶¶92-99 
(Roggensack, J., dissenting), and in the unpublished decision of 
the court of appeals, Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin, Inc., No. 
2006AP396, unpublished slip op. and order (Wis. Ct. App., May 
30, 2007). 
¶40 On June 28, 2005, the circuit court granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  On January 4, 2006, 
the circuit court denied Storms's motion for reconsideration and 
granted the defendants' motion for costs and attorney fees. 
¶41 In their original motion, the defendants asked for 
costs and attorney fees from both Storms and Attorney Donohoo.  
In a September 6, 2005, letter to the court, the defendants 
altered their request, asking for costs and attorney fees from 
only Attorney Donohoo.  The circuit court's approval of this 
request is embodied in its January 23, 2006, order for judgment 
and in the February 2, 2006, judgment.  As a result, Attorney 
Donohoo has been made solely liable for costs and attorney fees 
of $87,452.59. 
¶42 On February 8, 2006, less than a week after the 
circuit court entered judgment, defendants filed a garnishment 
action against Attorney Donohoo's personal and business bank 
accounts.  This action implicated Donohoo's wife.  See Action 
Wisconsin, Inc. v. James R. Donohoo, 2006CV1039 (Milwaukee 
County, Feb. 8, 2006); Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, "'Timing is 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
3 
 
everything,' 
a 
costly 
lesson," 
Feb. 
18, 
2006, 
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=402734&format=print 
(last visited July 22, 2008).  Although this action was 
subsequently dismissed, a similar action cannot be ruled out in 
the future. 
¶43 Thus, this case sends a chilling message to attorneys 
who agree to represent persons and causes that are not viewed as 
politically correct. 
¶44 Attorney Donohoo is not oblivious to contemporary 
legal developments.  In recent years, justices of this court 
have been subjected to repeated demands that they recuse 
themselves from participation in pending cases.  Often those 
demands are amplified by sensation-seeking reporters who appear 
to believe that freedom of the press entails a right to tamper 
with the administration of justice.  Sometimes these well-
publicized demands have caused a justice to withdraw from a case 
because the justice is not in a position to answer false 
allegations without appearing to comment on pending litigation. 
¶45 If Attorney Donohoo believed that his claims of bias 
would 
be 
sympathetically 
reported, 
he 
is 
likely 
to 
be 
disappointed.  In any event, he has failed to provide grounds to 
vacate the court's decision. 
II 
¶46 In Wisconsin, justices come to the supreme court 
either by election or by gubernatorial appointment.  Wis. Const. 
art. VII, secs. 4(1), 9.  When a justice is appointed to the 
court to fill a vacancy, he or she must run for the office to 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
4 
 
retain the position in the first year in which there is not 
another election.  To illustrate, Chief Justice Abrahamson was 
appointed to the court in 1976.  She was required to run in 1979 
while serving as a member of the court.  In the past quarter 
century, justices who were appointed to the court and then ran 
for the position while serving are Louis J. Ceci (1984), Janine 
P. Geske (1994), Jon P. Wilcox (1997), Diane S. Sykes (2000), 
David T. Prosser (2001), and Louis B. Butler, Jr. (2008).  Of 
course, any justice who is elected to the court will seek re-
election while serving on the court.  Current examples are 
Shirley S. Abrahamson (1989, 1999, 2009), Ann Walsh Bradley 
(2005), and N. Patrick Crooks (2006). 
¶47 When any sitting justice runs for the court, the 
justice is confronted with the problem of how to campaign and 
how to raise money for a campaign without creating a real or 
possible conflict of interest.  Justices inevitably deal with 
attorneys, and attorneys have always played a significant role 
in funding judicial campaigns. 
¶48 There are ethical rules that prohibit judges from 
personally soliciting campaign contributions, see SCR 60.06(4), 
but there are no clear guidelines or bright-line rules on when a 
justice's campaign committee may receive contributions from a 
party, a party's attorney, or members of the attorney's law 
firm.  Consequently, the receipt of contributions——which is 
expected and probably necessary in a system of judicial 
elections——is bound to raise questions and generate differing 
reactions. 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶49 In the absence of clear guidelines, however, members 
of this court are not in a good position to second-guess a 
colleague's decision to participate in a case after his or her 
committee has received contributions.  In some instances, there 
is no justification for such a review. 
III 
¶50 This case involves a publicly reported contribution 
from an attorney representing a party in a pending case as well 
as contributions from several members of that attorney's law 
firm.  Attorney Lester Pines filed a petition for review in this 
case on behalf of the defendants on June 29, 2007.  On July 23, 
2007, Attorney Pines contributed $300 to Justice Butler's 
campaign.  On September 11, 2007, this court granted the 
petition for review.  On December 3, 2007, Justice Butler 
advised the parties of the Pines contribution.  On January 15, 
2008, the court heard oral argument and tentatively decided the 
case.  On June 5, 2008, the court issued its decision.  Attorney 
Pines is a prominent attorney who appears frequently before the 
supreme court.  There is no rule prohibiting the Pines 
contribution, and no likelihood that the Pines contribution had 
any influence on Justice Butler's decisions. 
¶51 In the period after the case was decided internally 
and assigned by lot to Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, several 
members of the law firm of Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach LLP 
contributed money to Justice Butler's campaign: Jordan Loeb 
($100, February 2, 2008), Alison TenBruggencate ($250, February 
25, 2008), Terri Gabriel ($100, March 6, 2008), Jordan Loeb 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
6 
 
($100, March 17, 2008), and Nick Fairweather ($100, March 17, 
2008).  Attorney Fairweather appeared in court on behalf of 
Action Wisconsin in the garnishment action.  These contributions 
all came after the case was decided internally and did not 
affect Justice Butler's decision.1 
¶52 Attorney Donohoo also complains that Justice Butler's 
campaign received contributions from two members of the Action 
Wisconsin board: Peter Bock and Ruth Irvings.  Peter Bock's $125 
contribution to the campaign came before the court granted the 
petition for review in this case.  However, Peter Bock is much 
better known as a former legislator from Milwaukee who is 
married to Dane County Executive Kathleen Falk than as a member 
of the Action Wisconsin board.  Ruth Irvings contributed $1,100 
to Justice Butler's campaign but only $100 was contributed 
before the case was argued and decided.  Ruth Irvings is a 
Milwaukee attorney and identified herself as such.   
¶53 As a practical matter, a sitting justice is not well 
equipped to disclose to litigants all the affiliations of a 
contributor, even if those affiliations were timely disclosed by 
the contributor.  At present, there is no such requirement in 
law.  There is also no requirement that a justice disclose 
contributions 
to litigants.  Disclosing arguably relevant 
contributions to every litigant forces a justice's professional 
staff to work closely with the justice's campaign staff. 
                                                 
1 A justice's vote at conference after oral argument is a 
"tentative" vote in the sense that a justice may revise his or 
her position, even if the justice is the one writing the 
opinion.  Changes in position occur but are infrequent. 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶54 Attorney Donohoo also points to the fact that Justice 
Butler appeared and spoke at the fundraising event for Center 
Advocates Political Action Committee (Center Advocates PAC) on 
August 26, 2007, while Action Wisconsin's petition for review 
was pending. 
¶55 Supreme Court Rule 60.06(5) governs the "Solicitation 
and Acceptance of Endorsements."  It reads: 
 
A judge or candidate for judicial office may 
solicit or accept endorsements supporting his or her 
election or appointment personally or through his or 
her committee.  A judge, candidate for judicial 
office, or his or her committee is not prohibited from 
soliciting and accepting endorsements from lawyers and 
others.  A judge or candidate for judicial office 
shall not knowingly personally solicit or accept 
endorsements from parties who have a case pending 
before the court to which election or appointment is 
sought.  Nevertheless, a judge or judicial candidate 
may personally solicit or accept endorsements from the 
types 
of 
organizations 
that 
ordinarily 
make 
recommendations for selection to the office.  In 
soliciting or accepting an endorsement, a judge or 
candidate for judicial office should be mindful of the 
requirements of SCR 60.03 and 60.04(4). 
¶56 The record shows that Action Wisconsin's petition for 
review was received by our court commissioners on July 13, 2007.  
A recommendation was made to the court for the court's August 
13, 2007, conference.  The petition was held for our conference 
on September 10, 2007, at which time the court granted review.  
Justice Butler appeared at the Center Advocates PAC Garden Party 
for Equality fundraiser on August 26, 2007.  Presumably, he was 
present to promote his candidacy, meaning that he solicited the 
organization's support. 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶57 Although 
Justice 
Butler's 
appearance 
might 
seem 
problematic in that the Action Wisconsin petition was then 
pending, there are at least two reasons why this appearance was 
not prohibited.  First, there is a distinction between Action 
Wisconsin, Inc., the party in this case, and Center Advocates 
PAC.  According to a news release endorsing Justice Butler, 
Center Advocates PAC is "affiliated with Center Advocates, 
Inc.," which is a corporation separate from Action Wisconsin.  
In short, Center Advocates PAC was not a party.  Second, Center 
Advocates PAC is the type of organization that ordinarily makes 
recommendations for selection to both partisan and non-partisan 
offices, including judicial offices.  Thus, the organization is 
not implicated by the prohibition in SCR 60.06(5). 
¶58 Because 
Justice 
Butler 
was 
not 
prohibited 
from 
appearing before and speaking to Center Advocates PAC, he was 
not prohibited from receiving their endorsement.  His appearance 
raises no question unless the organization used Justice Butler 
to promote the organization's fundraising and/or Justice Butler 
committed 
himself 
to 
decide 
cases 
of 
interest 
to 
the 
organization in a certain way.  The court has no evidence that 
either event occurred. 
¶59 Attorney Donohoo complains that Justice Butler was 
endorsed by Attorney Tamara Packard.  The court has no evidence 
that Justice Butler sought this endorsement.  There is no 
evidence that he accepted, approved, or was even aware of 
Attorney Packard's endorsement. 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶60 In sum, there is no violation of any statute or 
judicial rule, and, consequently, there is no basis on which to 
vacate the Donohoo decision. 
IV 
¶61 The system of electing supreme court justices is not 
without flaws.  However, eliminating judicial elections would 
create an entirely new series of problems, and any notion of 
complete 
public 
funding 
of 
judicial 
campaigns 
is 
both 
unrealistic and meaningless without changes in the United States 
Constitution.  Public funding will not eliminate independent 
expenditures, which are, by definition, beyond the control of a 
candidate. 
¶62 It is entirely reasonable to have a dispassionate 
discussion on the role of public funding in judicial campaigns.  
But people who care about the judiciary must also look long and 
hard at why supreme court elections have become so contentious 
and expensive. 
¶63 A court that is in the vanguard of making and changing 
law in a way that greatly benefits some interest groups and 
seriously damages others is a court that is actively, if 
inadvertently, 
promoting 
the 
politicization 
of 
its 
own 
elections.  Every litigant believes he is entitled to an 
impartial review of his case.  If litigants do not believe they 
can get an impartial review of their cases, they will inevitably 
attempt to change the composition of the court. 
¶64 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
 
2006AP396.dtp 
 
 
 
1