Title: Moseley v. Virginia State Bar (order)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092126
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2010

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Thursday, the 10th day of June, 
2010.  
 
Jonathon Alden Moseley, 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
against 
Record No. 092126 
 
 
 
Circuit Court No. CL52390 
 
Virginia State Bar, ex rel. 
Seventh District Committee, 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal of right from a judgment rendered by 
the Circuit Court of Loudoun County. 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion there is no error in the 
memorandum order that is the subject of this appeal. 
 
Jonathon Moseley represented Tracy E. Ammons in a breach of 
contract action against the Christian Coalition of America (CCA).  
The CCA argued that the proceedings were stayed by the operation of 
an arbitration clause in the employment contract.  Moseley argued 
that the contract existed, but that his client did not have a copy; 
therefore, his client was not sure that there was an arbitration 
clause. 
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
contents of the employment contract as regards an agreement to 
arbitrate.  On cross-examination, Ammons admitted that he had given 
a copy of the employment contract to Moseley and that the contract 
did contain an arbitration clause.  The contract was produced and 
 
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Moseley then made a motion for nonsuit, which was granted.∗ 
The circuit court sanctioned Moseley and Ammons because they 
proceeded with their decision to have an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, knowing that 
the alleged employment contract containing an arbitration clause 
existed.  The circuit court also reprimanded Ammons and Moseley, 
who filed in excess of eighty pleadings and motions in the case, 
for using abusive discovery tactics and filing frivolous pleadings.  
The circuit court stated that Ammons and Moseley conducted the 
proceeding without any basis and with the goal "to specifically 
harm, deter, and harass the Defendant through vexatious 
litigation."  Moseley and Ammons were sanctioned and ordered to pay 
attorney’s fees and costs. 
After the evidentiary hearing, Roberta Combs, the president of 
the CCA, filed a complaint with the Virginia State Bar, alleging 
that Moseley had acted in an unprofessional manner by filing nearly 
90 pleadings and also writing letters to the CCA that were 
unprofessional and intended to intimidate and harass the CCA. 
Moseley also wrote a letter to the AAA, stating that the 
circuit court judge who had adjudicated the evidentiary hearing 
"was caught engaging in serious misconduct" and that the circuit 
court judge was the subject of an investigation by the Judicial 
                     
∗ The case concerning the employment contract proceeded to 
 
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Inquiry and Review Commission as a result of this misconduct.  
Additionally, Moseley sent an email to colleagues in which he 
stated that the monetary sanctions award entered by the circuit 
court judge was "an absurd decision from a whacko judge, whom I 
believe was bribed," and that he believed that opposing counsel was 
demonically empowered.  
After these and other incidents, Moseley’s right to practice 
in the Circuit Court of Arlington County was revoked.  Moseley 
appealed that revocation to this Court, where it was affirmed.  In 
re: Moseley, 273 Va. 688, 643 S.E.2d 190 (2007).  The circuit court 
also referred the issue to the Virginia State Bar and this Court 
"for consideration of reciprocal revocation of licensure." 
The Seventh District Committee of the Virginia State Bar filed 
a complaint against Moseley, after investigating the various 
allegations, and charged Moseley with violating Sections 1.7, 3.1, 
3.3, 3.4, 3.7, 4.1, 8.2 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Moseley requested a three-judge circuit court panel (the 
panel) pursuant to Code § 54.1-3935 and appeared before the panel.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel found that Moseley had 
violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(e), 3.4(j), 4.1(a), 8.2 and 8.4(a), 
(b), and (c).  The panel suspended Moseley’s license to practice 
law for six months. Moseley appeals. 
                                                                     
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 
 
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Moseley contends that the Rule 8.2 violations were improperly 
based on private speech that should not have been a predicate for 
discipline under the Rules of Professional Conduct.  He also argues 
that Rule 8.2 is void for vagueness because it does not distinguish 
between private attorney speech and public attorney speech.  
Moseley relies on Anthony v. Virginia State Bar, 270 Va. 601, 609, 
621 S.E.2d 121, 126 (2005), for the proposition that a lawyer’s 
right to free speech is limited only by the lawyer’s obligation to 
abstain from public debate that will obstruct the administration of 
justice. 
However, as we have previously stated, public statements by 
attorneys concerning the integrity of judges and judicial officers 
are not protected speech because they create a "'substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice' to the administration of 
justice." Id. at 610, 621 S.E.2d at 126 (quoting Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074-75 (1991)).  Moseley clearly 
made derogatory statements about the integrity of the judicial 
officer adjudicating his matters and those statements were made 
either with knowing falsity or with reckless disregard for their 
truth or falsity.  Therefore we hold that Moseley’s contentions 
that Rule 8.2 is void for vagueness and that his statements were 
not a proper predicate for discipline under that Rule are without 
merit.  
 
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Moseley also contends that his due process rights were 
violated.  Moseley argues that the disciplinary proceedings are 
quasi-criminal; therefore, he asserts that the original complaint 
was not valid because it was not verified by an affidavit that 
included detailed allegations which could not be amended during the 
proceedings.  Moseley also argues that the panel erred in failing 
to dismiss as invalid various allegations that never identified the 
precise conduct violating the rules. 
We have previously stated that the proceeding to discipline an 
attorney is a civil proceeding.  Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass’n v. 
Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 837, 172 S.E. 282, 284 (1934).  The primary 
purpose of such disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, 
not punish the attorney.  Virginia State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 
278, 284, 183 S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971).  To that end, "it is only 
necessary that the attorney be informed of the nature of the charge 
preferred against him and be given an opportunity to answer."  Id.  
The record reflects that Moseley had adequate notice and 
opportunity to answer, as he was present for the proceedings and 
responded not only to the charges of misconduct pending against 
him, but disputed the underlying facts as well.  Further, the 
Virginia State Bar complied with the statutory requirements of Code 
§ 54.1-3935 by verifying the district committee complaint by 
affidavit.  Therefore, we reject Moseley’s contention that his due 
 
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process rights were violated by the proceedings before the panel. 
Moseley contends that the panel erred in its decision because 
the actions of the Virginia State Bar were barred by the statute of 
limitations.  As we have previously stated, disciplinary 
proceedings are not subject to any statute of limitations.  See 
Drewry, 161 Va. at 842, 172 S.E. at 286.  The Virginia State Bar 
did not violate any statute of limitations in filing a complaint 
against Moseley and we hold that Moseley’s claim that it did so is 
without merit. 
Moseley also asserts that the panel’s decision is invalid 
because the Virginia State Bar did not conduct an annual review of 
the professional regulations governing the practice of law in the 
Commonwealth as required under Code § 54.1-100.  Moseley bases this 
argument on United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 
260, 266-67 (1954), a case in which the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated that a federal agency’s actions may be invalid if the 
agency fails to follow its own procedures and regulations.  We hold 
that the lack of an annual review did not invalidate the charges of 
misconduct, nor did the lack of an annual review invalidate the 
panel’s decision to sanction Moseley.   
The remainder of Moseley’s assignments of error address the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  On appeal, this Court reviews the 
decision of the three-judge panel and conducts "an independent 
 
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examination of the record, considering the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party below," and gives "the factual findings of the 
three-judge court substantial weight, viewing them as prima facie 
correct."  Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 260, 268-69, 634 
S.E.2d 341, 345-46 (2006).  Furthermore, "[t]he factual 
conclusions, while not carrying the weight of a jury verdict, will 
be sustained unless they are not justified by the evidence or are 
contrary to law."  Id. at 269, 634 S.E.2d at 346.  
 
We have conducted an independent review of the record and, 
after considering the evidence and the legal conclusions of the 
panel, we find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 
panel’s findings. 
Moseley also argues that a six-month suspension was 
inappropriate in light of the fact that this Court upheld a 
reprimand imposed for public comments in Anthony, 270 Va. at 604, 
621 S.E.2d at 122.  However, upon any finding of misconduct, the 
panel has the discretion to impose an admonition with or without 
terms, a public reprimand with or without terms, a suspension of up 
to five years, or a revocation.  See Code § 54.1-3935(D) (providing 
that "if the attorney is found guilty by the court, his license to 
practice law in this Commonwealth shall be revoked or suspended for 
such time as the court may prescribe," and that "[i]n lieu of 
 
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revocation or suspension, the court may impose any other sanction 
authorized by Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of 
Court");  see also Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-18(M) 
(listing available sanctions).   In determining whether a particular 
punishment is appropriate, this Court reviews such decisions for an 
abuse of discretion.  Maddy v. First District Committee, 205 Va. 
652, 658-59, 139 S.E.2d 56, 60-61 (1964).  Such sanctions imposed 
are viewed as "prima facie correct" and we will not disturb those 
sanctions, unless, upon an independent examination of the whole 
record, we find that the sanctions were unjustified by a reasonable 
view of the evidence or are contrary to law.  Tucker v. Virginia 
State Bar, 233 Va. 526, 534, 357 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1987). 
The panel was within the bounds of the law in imposing a six-
month suspension because the panel’s factual findings supported 
numerous violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  We hold 
that the six-month suspension imposed upon Moseley was justified by 
a reasonable view of the evidence and was not contrary to law. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the three-judge 
panel of the Circuit Court of Loudoun County is affirmed.  The 
appellant shall pay to the appellee thirty dollars damages. 
 
Justice Mims took no part in the consideration of this case. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and 
shall be certified to the said circuit court. 
 
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk