Title: IN THE MATTER OF STRONG
Citation: 115 P.3d 889, 2005 OK 45
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF STRONG Annotate this Case IN THE MATTER OF STRONG 2005 OK 45 115 P.3d 889 Case Number: 99408 Decided: 06/21/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH R. STRONG, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. THE OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendant/Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV Honorable David M. Harbour, Trial Judge ¶0 The respondent/appellant, Kenneth R. Strong (Strong/retiree), served over sixteen years with the Midwest City Police Department. Upon his separation, Strong opted to leave his retirement in the defendant/respondent's, Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Board (Board), retirement program (OPPRS/Retirement Program), electing a vested benefit. Board employees informed Strong, over the phone and in an initial letter, that he would be eligible to begin drawing his retirement in December of 1999. Nevertheless, when Strong contacted the Board in early 1999 to verify the date he would begin receiving benefits, he was told that the original information was inaccurate and that he would not be entitled to benefits until July 23, 2008, when he turned fifty. Following a hearing, the Board determined that Strong was prohibited statutorily from receiving retirement benefits before he reached fifty years of age. The trial judge, Honorable David M. Harbour, affirmed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed finding that the Board was equitably estopped from denying benefits. The clear language of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 allows the disbursal of retirement benefits to a retiree leaving the system and electing a vested benefit when the retiree reaches fifty years of age or the date on which the retiree would have had twenty years of uninterrupted service - whichever is later. Under the facts presented, we hold that, where the retiree signed a form containing the statutory language giving notice of the age and service requirements preceding the right to retirement benefits and he acknowledged an awareness of the time restrictions, the Board is not estopped from denying benefits despite its originally having given the retiree incorrect information concerning the date he was entitled to draw retirement. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED; ORDER OF OKLAHOMA POLICE AND RETIREMENT BOARD SUSTAINED. Stephen J. Merrill, Wilson H. Busby, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Steven K.Snyder, Assistant Attorney General, Wellon B. Poe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 We granted certiorari to determine whether, under the facts presented, the defendant/respondent, Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Board (Board), is estopped from relying on 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1. ¶2 Here, the respondent/appellant, Kenneth R. Strong (Strong/retiree), admits signing a form containing the statutory language giving notice of the age and service requirements which preceded the right to retirement benefits and of being aware of the time restrictions. Under these facts, we determine that the Board is not estopped from denying benefits despite its originally having given the retiree incorrect information concerning the date he was entitled to draw retirement. FACTS ¶3 Strong became a member of the Retirement Program through his service as a member of the Midwest City Police Department beginning in December of 1979. In May of 1996, he received an outside job offer. Before accepting the offer, the retiree alleges that he spoke with two Board employees who advised him that, if he elected a vested option, he would be entitled to begin drawing retirement benefits in December, 1999. He also received a letter from the Board's Executive Director stating that benefits would begin at the end of 1999. Nevertheless, when Strong submitted his application for vested retirement benefits, the form he signed contained language specifically stating that he would not be entitled to receive benefit payments until either his fiftieth birthday or the date he would have had twenty years of credited service had his employment continued, whichever occurred later in time. Furthermore, Strong admitted that he was aware of the limiting "whichever is later" restriction. ¶4 In March of 1999, Strong contacted the Board to inquire how returning to police work would affect his retirement benefits. He alleges that it was after this contact that he was first informed that he would not be eligible for benefits until he turned fifty in 2008. The discussion was followed by a Board letter indicating that their communication of 1996 contained an error and advising Strong that the date he would begin receiving benefits would be July 23, 2008, rather than December of 1999. ¶5 At the end of the 1999 calendar year, Strong demanded the payment of retirement benefits. The Retirement Program refused asserting that payment would violate the "whichever is later" rule of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1. I. ¶6 THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111 ALLOWS THE PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS ON THE LATER OF ONE OF TWO OCCURENCES -- THE RETIREE REACHING THE AGE OF FIFTY OR THE DATE WHEN THE RETIREE WOULD HAVE HAD TWENTY YEARS OF UNINTERRUPTED SERVICE. DESPITE THE RETIREMENT BOARD'S INCORRECT ADVICE THAT BENEFITS WOULD BEGIN AT AN EARLIER TIME, A RETIREE, AWARE OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, MAY NOT RELY ON ESTOPPEL AS AN AVENUE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW. ¶7 Title 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 provides in pertinent part: ". . . If the member who has completed ten (10) or more years of credited service elects the vested benefit, the member shall be entitled to a monthly retirement annuity commencing on the date the member reaches fifty (50) years of age or the date the member would have had twenty (20) years of credited service had the member's employment continued uninterrupted, whichever is later. . . ." [Emphasis added.] The Board argues, and Strong does not dispute, that the explicit language of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 undeniably allows only the disbursal of retirement benefits to a retiree leaving the system and electing a vested benefit when the later of one of two things occurs: 1) the retiree reaches fifty years of age; or 2) the date on which the retiree would have had twenty years of uninterrupted service. Although an officer or an agency may have implied powers not granted by statute, implied authority is limited to that necessary for the due and efficient exercise of express powers. ¶8 A cardinal precept of statutory construction is that where a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and the meaning clear and unmistakable, no justification exists for the use of interpretative devices to fabricate a different meaning. ¶9 Equitable estoppel is generally understood to prevent one party from taking a position which is inconsistent with an earlier action that places the other party at a disadvantage. ¶10 Strong relies on a cause in which we recognized an exception to the general rules regarding estoppel and governmental entities, Burdick v. Independent School District No. 53, ¶11 Strong's position is distinguishable from the one in which the Burdick students found themselves. There, the students had been enjoying the benefits of school attendance for over five years. Here, Strong has received no benefit payment. Although we have sympathy with the economic situation Strong finds himself in, there is no strong public interest that supports the payment of early benefits nor is there any compelling or overriding equitable consideration in favor of the payments. This Court has no way of discerning whether other retirees have been given similar misleading or incorrect information. Instead of supporting the public interest, allowing the early payment of benefits might well cause harm to other retirees by destabilizing the financial status of the Retirement Program. ¶12 In Kinzy v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System, ¶13 The allowance of payment of benefits would require us act as a super-legislature by ordering the Board to pay benefits clearly neither authorized by law nor anticipated by the Legislature. This we may not do, CONCLUSION ¶14 The Retirement Board has no authority to pay retirement benefits to a police officer until the officer meets the time restrictions of 11 O.S. Supp. 2004 §50-111.1 To apply estoppel would: 1) require us to ignore the general rule that estoppel will not lie against the government; 2) have the effect of granting to the Retirement Board the power to bind the state merely by representing that they have the authority to do so; 3) require us to dismiss the clear, implicit and unmistakable statutory language; 4) ignore the fact that the retiree had actual knowledge of the date restrictions; and 5) send a signal to potential retirees that allegations of the receipt of incorrect information might result in benefit payments not authorized by statute. ¶15 Under these facts, we determine that the Board is not estopped from denying benefits despite its originally having given the retiree incorrect information concerning the date he was entitled to draw retirement. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED; ORDER OF OKLAHOMA POLICE AND RETIREMENT BOARD SUSTAINED. ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT