Title: BUTTE TEACHERS UNION v BD OF TR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-186
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1982

No. 8 2 - 1 8 6 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA BUTTE TEACHERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 3 3 2 , AFL-CIO, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BUTTE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 OF SILVER BOW COUNTY, MONTANA, D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of Silver Bow H o n o r a b l e G o r d o n B e n n e t t , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : J . B r i a n T i e r n e y , B u t t e , M o n t a n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : P o o r e , R o t h & R o b i n s o n , B u t t e , Montana D o n a l d C. R o b i n s o n , B u t t . e , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d on briefs: S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 8 2 D e c i d e d : D e c e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 8 2 F i l e d : 3EC f 6 19@ j L - . ------ C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . The Second J u d i c i a l District C o u r t , Judge Gordon B e n n e t t pre- s i d i n g , e n t e r e d judgment i n f a v o r of r e s p o n d e n t and d i s m i s s e d a p p e l l a n t ' s d e c l a r a t o r y judgment claim based on t h e p a r t i e s ' c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement. B u t t e T e a c h e r ' s Union Local N o . 332 a p p e a l s . On March 23, 1981, B u t t e T e a c h e r ' s Union Local No. 332 b r o u g h t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment claim a g a i n s t t h e Board of T r u s t e e s of B u t t e School D i s t r i c t No. 1 of S i l v e r Bow County, a l l e g i n g t h a t r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r s , as p a r t of t h e i r s e v e r a n c e pay package under t h e p a r t i e s ' c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement, s h o u l d r e c e i v e s e v e r a n c e pay f o r unused " a d d i t i o n a l " s i c k l e a v e . The p r o v i s i o n s on which t h e claim was premised s t a t e i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " A r t i c l e 23: Severance Pay: S e c t i o n 1 - School District N o . 1 s h a 3 T pay-tld--ceac%er upon h i s o r h e r r e t i r e m e n t or d e a t h , one-half o f any unused p o r t i o n of t h e accumulated s i c k l e a v e remaining i n h i s o r h e r a c c o u n t . " A r t i c l e 32: S i c k n e s s - - and Death - -- i n Family . - -- Leave S e c t i o n 1: A t e a c h e r s h a l l be allowed - -- - - - e a c h y e a r an a n n u a l f i f t e e n ( 1 5 ) days s i c k l e a v e w i t h f u l l s a l a r y cumulative f o r t e n ( 1 0 ) y e a r s o r one hundred f i f t y ( 1 5 0 ) d a y s , p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l f i v e ( 5 ) days s h a l l be allowed i n which t h e t e a c h e r r e c e i v e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between h i s o r h e r rate of pay and $18 p e r d a y , accumulated up to t h i r t y - f i v e days . . ." The Union s o u g h t a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t h a s a d u t y to make payment of a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e to r e t i r e d and r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r s r e t r o a c t i v e to 1977, which was when t h i s Court i s s u e d its o p i n i o n i n School District No. 1 v . Driscoll (1977)r 1 7 5 Mont. 555, 568 P.2d 149, whereby a similar p r o v i s i o n i n a s e p a r a t e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement between t h e d i s t r i c t and s c h o o l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s was cons t r u e d to r e q u i r e t h e d i s t r i c t to i n c l u d e unused a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e i n t h e accumulated s i c k l e a v e due and owing e v e r y a d m i n i s t r a t o r upon r e t i r e m e n t . The s c h o o l d i s t r i c t answered, denying "any l i a b i l i t y of any k i n d or n a t u r e whatsoever to t h e r e t i r e d and r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r members f o r payment of a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e upon r e t i r e m e n t . " The Union f i l e d a motion f o r summary judgment along w i t h a s u p p o r t i n g a£ £ i d a v i t from its counsel a t t e s t i n g t h a t (1) s i n c e t h e 1977-1978 s c h o o l y e a r , p u r s u a n t t o t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Driscoll, s u p r a , t h e d i s t r i c t h a s paid a l l r e t i r i n g p r i n c i p a l s and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e as p a r t of t h e i r retire- ment b e n e f i t s ; ( 2 ) no r e t i r i n g o r r e t i r e d t e a c h e r members have been p a i d a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e as p a r t of t h e i r s e v e r a n c e bene- f i t s s i n c e 1977-1978; and ( 3 ) t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t h a s r e f u s e d to pay such b e n e f i t s a f t e r demand w a s made p u r s u a n t to t h e provi- s i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s ' c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement and t h e Driscoll d e c i s i o n . The s c h o o l d i s t r i c t opposed t h e summary judgment motion and f i l e d i n r e s p o n s e a n a f f i d a v i t from W i l l i a m C. M i l l i g a n , S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of School D i s t r i c t No. 1. M i l l i g a n ' s a£ f i d a v i t emphasized t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : (1) t h a t s i n c e 1964, similar a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e and s e v e r a n c e pay p r o v i s i o n s had been i n c l u d e d i n c o n t r a c t s between t h e p a r t i e s ; ( 2 ) t h a t s i n c e 1964, no r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r had r e c e i v e d from t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t addi- t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e as p a r t of t h e i r s e v e r a n c e pay; ( 3 ) t h a t a t no t i m e d u r i n g i n t e r m i t t e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s between t h e p a r t i e s had t h e Union proposed t h a t t h e s e v e r a n c e pay p r o v i s i o n be a d m i n i s t e r e d t o i n c l u d e a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e ; and ( 4 ) t h a t t h e f a c t s of t h e Driscoll case were d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t c o n t r o v e r s y because D r i s c o l l , being t h e f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t o r to retire under t h e first c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement between a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t , immediately c h a l l e n g e d t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n of a comparable s e v e r a n c e pay p r o v i s i o n i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t c o n t r a c t . The District Court concluded t h e r e were no genuine i s s u e s of material f a c t but denied t h e Union's p r a y e r f o r summary judgment. I n its memorandum and o r d e r t h e t r i a l judge e x p l a i n e d t h a t " t h e l o n g a c q u i e s c e n c e of t h e [Union] i n t h e [ s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s ] con- s i s t e n t and s y s t e m a t i c e x c l u s i o n of a d d i t i o n a l c u m u l a t i v e s i c k l e a v e from s e v e r a n c e pay, c o n t r a r y t o t h e e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t , c o n s t i t u t e d a waiver of t h e p r o v i s i o n and a n agreement t o amend t h e c o n t r a c t t o allow f o r such e x c l u s i o n . " T h e r e a f t e r , judgment was e n t e r e d f o r t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t . The Union c o n t e n d s t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying its motion f o r summary judgment and e n t e r i n g judgment f o r t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t . V i o l a t i o n s of t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e r u l e and Rule 56 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., are a s s e r t e d . The Union a r g u e s t h a t M i l l i g a n ' s a f f i d a v i t was i n a d m i s s i b l e under t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e r u l e because it v i o l a t e s t h e clear and unambiguous w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t terms. Under Rule 56 ( c ) , M.R.Civ. P. s u p p o r t i n g and opposing a f f i d a v i t s on a motion f o r summary judgment may o n l y set f o r t h f a c t s as would be a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i - dence a t t r i a l . A d m i s s i b i l i t y must be determined i n terms of r e l e v a n c e and t h e a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s of e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i v e law t h a t w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t s may n o t be v a r i e d by p a r o l e v i d e n c e . To a s c e r t a i n whether e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e c a n be a d m i t t e d i n a n a c t i o n on a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t , p l e a d i n g s must n e c e s s a r i l y be reviewed to d e t e r m i n e t h e n a t u r e of t h e p l a i n t i f f I s claim f o r r e l i e f and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e f e n s e s t h e r e t o . See s e c t i o n s 28-2-905, -1602, MCA. I n t h e i n s t a n t matter, t h i s Court cannot review t h e lower c o u r t ' s i m p l i c i t r u l i n g on t h e Union's o b j e c t i o n to t h e a d m i s s i o n o f p a r o l e v i d e n c e because t h e s t a t e of t h e p l e a d i n g s a t t h e time of t h e submission of t h e a f f i d a v i t was such t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of w a i v e r w a s n o t p r o p e r l y i n i s s u e . Rule 8 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e d e f e n s e of w a i v e r be a f f i r m a t i v e l y p l e a d . Here, waiver was n e i t h e r plead i n t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s answer o r r a i s e d by a subsequent motion o r cross-motion f o r summary judgment. Cf. Suckow Borax Mines Consol., I n c . v . Borax Consol., Ltd., ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 5 0 ) , 1 8 5 F.2d 196, 205, cert. d e n . 340 U.S. 943, 95 L.Ed. 680, 7 1 S.Ct. 506, c i t e d i n Rambur v. Diehl Lumber C o . I n c . ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 144 Mont. 84, 90, 394 P.2d 745, 749. A l l e g a t i o n s of waiver were i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court v i a a memorandum and s u p p o r t i n g af f i d a v i t i n o p p o s i t i o n to t h e Union's motion f o r sum- mary j udgment . A d d i t i o n a l l y " a t no t i m e d i d t h e Union j o i n i n t h e waiver i s s u e . Before t h e d i s t r i c t and a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s , t h e Union h a s m a i n t a i n e d its o b j e c t i o n to t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s of w a i v e r as being v i o l a t i v e of t h e par01 e v i d e n c e r u l e . T h e r e f o r e , it cannot be s a i d t h a t an i s s u e n o t r a i s e d by t h e p l e a d i n g s w a s t r i e d by t h e e x p r e s s o r implied c o n s e n t of t h e p a r t i e s , as Rule 1 5 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. would p e r m i t . Cf. R e i l l y v. Maw ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440, wherein implied c o n s e n t was found on t h e b a s i s t h a t e v i d e n c e e x t r i n s i c t o t h e claim p l e a d , was admitted -- a t t r i a l w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n . Without an i s s u e r e g a r d i n g w a i v e r , a . . - - . . - .- - -- - l a r g e p o r t i o n of M i l l i g a n ' s af f i d a v i t is i n a d m i s s i b l e s i m p l y because it is i r r e l e v a n t to t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t h a s a d u t y t o pay unused s i c k l e a v e to r e t i r e d and r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r s under t h e terms of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement and t h e Driscoll -- o p i n i o n . Given t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e f i r s t i s s u e , we need n o t a d d r e s s t h e second argument on a p p e a l . T h i s Court h e r e b y v a c a t e s t h e judgment below and remands t h e case w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e c o u r t to r e c o n s i d e r t h e Union's summary judgment motion i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e i s s u e s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . Amendment of t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s answer to i n c l u d e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s i n avoidance of t h e c o n t r a c t is n o t p r e c l u d e d by t h i s o p i n i o n . W e concur: Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, specially concurring: I concur in the opinion, but disagree that an amend- ment to the pleadings to include waiver is permissible in this case. Waiver is a voluntary and knowing relinquish- ment of a right. I do not see how waiver, if waiver occurred, by the Union could be binding upon the individual teacher-members of the Union on their severance. While the Union is the agent of the teachers in the bargaining which results in the contract, it can hardly be the agent of its members for the purpose of waiver when the school board violates the terms of the contract.