Title: Crump v. Geer Brothers, Inc.
Citation: 336 So. 2d 1091
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 1976

336 So. 2d 1091 (1976)
Timothy P. CRUMP et al.
v.
GEER BROTHERS, INC., a corp.
SC 1395.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 6, 1976.
Rehearing Denied September 3, 1976.
*1092 Jones, McEachin, Ormond &amp; Fulton, Tuscaloosa, for appellants.
Hugh W. Roberts, Jr., Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
FAULKNER, Justice.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict, and judgment of the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, awarding Geer $54,000 damages for negligence of an insurance agent by *1093 procuring inadequate coverage of insurance against loss or injury, by fire, and other perils. We affirm.
Geer Brothers, Inc. is a business engaged in selling campers and other recreational vehicles. Crump, an insurance agent, visited Geer several times with intent to sell it insurance. Geer claims that on one of these visits, August 1, 1973, an agreement was reached for Crump to provide "complete and adequate" insurance for the business. No letter, policy, or binder put this into effect. On February 18, 1974, however, Geer was given a "summary of proposed coverage" with coverage of $69,000 for fire and allied perils. This was later increased to $150,000. On May 2, fire destroyed one of Geer's buildings. Geer claimed that the building was worth $10,000; the inventory therein, $90,000. Crump asserts that even though the fire insurance coverage was increased from $69,000 to $150,000, the destroyed building remained insured for only $10,000, and its contents for $20,000. The other $120,000 of fire insurance covered the other buildings on the property, and their contents.
At the trial, Geer contended that Crump knew of the seasonal nature of the business, and its fluctuating inventory; that once Crump had agreed to procure insurance, he was under a duty to use reasonable skill in doing so, by being sure Geer's inventory was adequately covered. Crump, on the other hand, contends there was no agreement reached between him and Geer on August 1, 1973. He says the "summary of proposed coverage" dated February 18, 1974, is unambiguous and the sole "expositor" of any agreement between the parties. Furthermore, he contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding an agreement to procure "complete and adequate" insurance. Crump also says that the trial court admitted inadmissible evidence; the opposing counsel engaged in improper argument by suggesting to the jury to put themselves in the shoes of Geer; that the issue of personal liability insurance was injected into the trial, to the prejudice of Crump. Finally, he contends that the measure of damages was erroneous because a mark-up was added to the cost of goods in computing the value of the destroyed inventory.
This court stated in Timmerman Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Miller, 285 Ala. 82, 229 So. 2d 475 (1969):
Here the agent procured insurance, but the questions are, did he procure "complete and adequate" coverage, as alleged by Geer, and did he agree to procure the insurance on August 1, 1973.
The evidence is conflicting about when an agreement to procure insurance was reached. But the evidence is clear that insurance was procured. It appears that there just was not enough. "Complete and adequate" coverage, then, appears to be the principal bone of contention.
Mr. Geer testified that several discussions with Crump were had concerning the necessity of adequate insurance. Crump was advised by Geer of the seasonable nature of the business, and the fluctuating inventory. Crump had access to the financial records of the business, and he examined the Geer warehouses. To show that he relied on the skill of the agent, Mr. Geer testified:
*1094 Crump, on the other hand, contends that Geer knew how much coverage he had; that he had explained the coverage to Geer, and that the insurance contract was unambiguous. He testified that after the fire, he told Geer he should be pleased that the coverage on the burned building had been increased to $30,000. Geer testified he agreed that $10,000 was sufficient for the building, but inventories fluctuated rapidly, and $20,000 was insufficient for the contents. Geer's evidence tended to show that in his dealings with Crump he was under the impression he had $100,000 coverage on inventory and warehouse.
To reverse the trial court, we would have to be convinced that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Moreover, in view of the trial court's denying a motion for new trial, the presumption of the jury verdict is strengthened. From a review of the evidence, we cannot hold that the trial court abused his discretion by not granting a new trial. The rule announced in Cobb v. Malone &amp; Collins, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738 (1890) provides that:
Crump alleges the trial judge erred by overruling his objections to questions propounded to Geer. He states that they called for a conclusion of the witness, conjecture, and invaded the province of the jury.
The questions are:
This court stated in Mobile, J. &amp; K.C.R. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 163 Ala. 565, 51 So. 37 (1909) that:
We hold that the trial court did not err by overruling objections to the questions. It is true that a non-expert witness may not give his opinion on the legal effect of a legal document, but that is not the effect here. The effect of Geer's testimony was a shorthand statement of the facts about the agreement to procure insurance. Cf. Hughes v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile, 256 Ala. 88, 53 So. 2d 386 (1951).
Crump alleges error when the trial court overruled his objection to the following questions propounded to him by Geer's counsel:
The trial court overruled Crump's motion for mistrial. The questions were also included in Crump's motion for new trial. The questions to the witness leading to the objections are cataloged as follows:
Geer contends that by propounding the question about insurance to Crump he was bringing out the remainder of the conversation between them. When part of a conversation is put into evidence, the opposing party may rightfully call for the whole conversation or all that was said in connection with that statement. Gibson v. State, 91 Ala. 64, 9 So. 171 (1890). Moreover, a defendant's mentioning his liability insurance is not inadmissible if it is associated with or interwoven with another part of his statement admitting fault, so as to be inseparable. Pittman v. Calhoun, 233 Ala. 450, 172 So. 263 (1937); Smith v. Baggett, 218 Ala. 227, 118 So. 283 (1928).
In Hunt v. Ward, 262 Ala. 379, 79 So. 2d 20 (1955), this court said:
In this case, there were two questions propounded to the witness on the subject of liability coverage. They were asked under color of right or show of right to do so. We opine that a mistrial was not warranted. See Burnett v. Bledsoe, 276 Ala. 139, 159 So. 2d 841 (1964). We observe that the trial court admonished counsel not to mention coverage again, after having ruled on objections, and the motion for mistrial.
Crump objected to testimony of Geer's witness, Marion Posey, concerning damages. Posey was in business with Geer. His background was in accounting, and he was called as an expert in that field. Geer says an accounting expert was necessary to explain to the court and jury the complicated procedures involved in extrapolating the market value of the merchandise stored in the warehouse destroyed by fire. Posey testified he was familiar with the stored merchandise, had participated in their inventory, and was familiar with the accounting procedures. He was permitted to testify about the cost of the merchandise, and a 27.9% mark-up to the cost. Crump objected to this testimony.
As a general rule, the measure of damages for injury to property is the difference between the reasonable market value before and after the injury (market value may be defined as the price that a willing *1097 seller would sell, and a willing buyer would buy, neither being compelled to sell or buy). However, evidence of the amount required to make necessary repairs to a damaged automobile is a factor which a jury was authorized to consider in arriving at the true measure of damages. Arrick v. Fanning, 35 Ala.App. 409, 47 So. 2d 708 (1950). In Southern Hardware Supply Co. v. Standard Equipment Co., 158 Ala. 596, 48 So. 357 (1909), this court said, "The general rule as to the measure of damages for property destroyed . . . is the market value of same at the time of the injury or destruction, and the interest."
Posey, having knowledge of the merchandise stored, and the price at which it was sold, was competent to give his opinion as to its value. Sussex Fire Ins. Co. v. Barton, 225 Ala. 570, 144 So. 439 (1932). Mark-up, when added to cost, results in selling price. If Posey was competent to testify as to "price sold," it follows he could testify what the mark-up was, when he had already testified as to the cost of the merchandise. The weight given this testimony was for the jury.Sussex.
During the summation to the jury, Geer's counsel said,
We are of the opinion that if there was error, it was error without injury. In Hayles v. Jeter, 279 Ala. 283, 184 So. 2d 363 (1966), counsel for plaintiff stated, "`I ask you, gentlemen, to put yourself in Plaintiff's place . . .'"
This court said:
The trial court instructed the jury that the statement was not evidence. He said:
This should have cured any injurious effect the argument may have had.
Finally, Crump contends the trial court erred by denying his motions for a directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We hold the trial court did not err. A critique of Rule 50 A.R.C.P. was given by this court in Loeb and Co., Inc. v. Martin, 295 Ala. 262, 327 So. 2d 711 (1976). There we discussed the Reasonable Man Test, and the scintilla evidence rule, and reversed the granting of a motion for directed verdict. Here, we apply these rules, and hold that the denial of the motions was proper.
AFFIRMED.
HEFLIN, C. J., and BLOODWORTH and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
ALMON, J., concurs specially.
ALMON, Justice (concurring specially):
I concur specially in the majority opinion, feeling constrained to note my reservation on the measure of damages. If appellant had adequately insured the appellee, then under the policy the appellee would have been entitled to "actual cash value of the property at the time of loss, but not exceeding the amount which it would cost to repair or replace the property with material of like kind and quality . . . without *1098 compensation for loss resulting from interruption of business or manufacture."
Under the charge and evidence submitted to the jury, damages were to be the difference between the reasonable market value before and after the fire, which under the circumstances of this case included profit. Appellants made no objection to the court's oral charge on this point. Consequently, the issue is not before us. Nevertheless, I think a brief comment is in order.