Title: State v. Randall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP001518-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2019

2019 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1518-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jessica M. Randall, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 602,918 N.W.2d 128 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Nicholas McNamara 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. concurs, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
and DALLET, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. withdrew from participation.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with 
Brad D. Schimel, former attorney general, on the initial brief 
and Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, on the reply brief. There 
was an oral argument by Michael C. Sanders. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Adam M. Welch and Tracey Wood & Associates, Madison. There was 
an oral argument by Adam M. Welch. 
 
 
 
 
2019 WI 80
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP1518-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CT1061) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jessica M. Randall, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   A police officer arrested Jessica 
M. Randall for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant.  Ms. Randall gave the officer 
permission to take a sample of her blood for the purpose of 
determining its alcohol concentration.  But before the Wisconsin 
State Laboratory of Hygiene could test it, she sent a letter 
revoking the consent she had previously given.  The letter also 
demanded the immediate return or destruction of her blood 
sample.  This, she says, made the subsequent test of her blood 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
2 
 
sample a violation of her constitutional right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  We do not agree, and so we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
After arresting Ms. Randall for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, the police 
read her a document entitled "Informing the Accused" (the 
"Form").2  The Form, in pertinent part, asks:  "Will you submit 
to an evidentiary chemical test of your blood?"  Ms. Randall 
consented, and the officer marked the Form accordingly.  An hour 
later, a medical professional withdrew a sample of her blood.   
¶3 
Two days later (and before her blood sample was 
tested), Ms. Randall (through her counsel) sent a letter to the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Laboratory 
of 
Hygiene 
(the 
"Laboratory") 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished opinion of the court of 
appeals, State v. Randall, No. 2017AP1518-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2018), which affirmed the Dane 
County 
Circuit 
Court, 
the 
Honorable 
Nicholas 
McNamara, 
presiding. 
A majority of the court agrees with the mandate in this 
matter, but not the reasoning.  This is the lead opinion; other 
members of the court will express their reasoning in separate 
opinions. 
2 "[T]he Informing the Accused form is mandated by Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4), and informs the driver that he or she has 
been arrested for drunk driving; that law enforcement wants to 
take a sample of his or her breath, blood or urine to determine 
the alcohol concentration in the driver's system; that refusal 
to submit to the test will result in negative consequences; and, 
the driver may take additional tests after completing the first 
test."  State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275, ¶8 n.3, 248 
Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
3 
 
"revok[ing] any previous consent that she may have provided to 
the collection and analysis of her blood, assert[ing] her right 
to privacy in her blood, and demand[ing] that no analysis be run 
without a specific authorization . . . ."  The letter further 
said Ms. Randall "does not consent to any person or entity 
retaining possession of her blood sample, and therefore demands 
that it be returned to her or destroyed immediately." 
¶4 
The Laboratory responded to Ms. Randall's letter with 
one of its own, in which it advised that it required 
authorization from the entity submitting the specimen (i.e., the 
Fitchburg Police Department) to release the requested sample.  
It did not, however, address the issue of consent.  The 
Laboratory then proceeded to test the specimen, which revealed a 
blood-alcohol 
level 
of 
0.210 
grams 
of 
ethanol 
per 
100 
milliliters of her blood.  It was unlawful for Ms. Randall to 
operate a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or 
more. 
¶5 
The Dane County District Attorney's Office charged Ms. 
Randall with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (in 
violation of Wis. Stat § 346.63(1)(a) (2017-18)),3 and operating 
a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (in 
violation of § 346.63(1)(b)), both as a third offense.  Ms. 
Randall filed two motions to suppress the results of the blood 
test.  In one, she argued that the consent she gave before the 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
4 
 
blood draw was not free, intelligent, unequivocal, and specific.  
The circuit court ruled against her, and she did not pursue that 
issue in the court of appeals or here.  In the other motion, she 
argued that the blood test comprised an unlawful search under 
the Fourth Amendment because she had revoked her consent before 
the Laboratory conducted the test.  The circuit court agreed, 
concluding that Ms. Randall's revocation of consent left the 
State with no constitutionally sufficient basis for discovering 
the amount of alcohol in her blood sample.  The State appealed 
the circuit court's decision granting the motion to suppress. 
¶6 
Based on the rationale of State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 
WI App 275, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411, and State v. 
Wantland, 2014 WI 58, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810, the court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed, 
reasoning 
that 
the 
Laboratory 
unconstitutionally tested Ms. Randall's blood.  State v. 
Randall, No. 2017AP1518-CR, ¶13, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 14, 2018).  We granted the State's petition for 
review, and now reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
Review of an order granting a motion to suppress 
evidence presents a question of constitutional fact.  State v. 
Delap, 2018 WI 64, ¶26, 382 Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175 (quoting 
State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
N.W.2d 463).  In considering such questions, we uphold a circuit 
court's findings of historical fact unless they are clearly 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
5 
 
erroneous.  State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, ¶18, 365 Wis. 2d 302, 
871 N.W.2d 661 (quoting Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22).  But we 
apply the relevant constitutional principles to those facts de 
novo.  State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶32, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 
N.W.2d 124 (citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶18, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶8 
Ms. Randall asks us to declare that, when a suspect 
consents to a blood test for the purpose of determining the 
amount of alcohol it contains, she may prevent the State from 
obtaining that information by withdrawing her consent subsequent 
to the blood draw but before the laboratory conducts the test.  
The facts of the case, so far as they are relevant to this 
issue, are uncontested.  Therefore, our analysis focuses on how 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 
Article 1, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, apply to them.  
¶9 
We begin where one must always begin in assessing 
constitutional claims——with the text of the documents.  The 
Fourth Amendment guarantees the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The Wisconsin Constitution uses almost 
identical language: 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
6 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11.  Because of the near equivalence of 
the language, we generally understand Article 1, § 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to provide the same constitutional 
protections as the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
State 
v. 
Kramer, 
2009 
WI 14, 
¶18, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598; see also State v. Dearborn, 2010 
WI 84, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97.  Consequently, when 
we refer to the Fourth Amendment's requirements, we should be 
understood as referring to the requirements of Art. 1, § 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution as well. 
¶10 The Fourth Amendment's reference point with respect to 
searches and seizures is reasonableness.  Brigham City, Utah v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness[.]'").  The general rule 
is that searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are 
not reasonable.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) 
("In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it 
falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.").  
One of the exceptions to the warrant rule is that an 
individual's consent to the search satisfies the constitutional 
"reasonableness" requirement.  "It is well established that a 
search 
is 
reasonable 
when 
the 
subject 
consents . . . ."  
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016); 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
7 
 
Thompson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 265 N.W.2d 467 (1978) 
("Some 
of 
the 
exceptions 
[to 
the 
constitutional 
warrant 
requirement] are consent to search . . . ."); Wantland, 355 
Wis. 2d 135, ¶20 ("'[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid 
consent is constitutionally permissible.'") (quoting Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)).  If a search is 
premised on an individual's consent, it must cease immediately 
upon revocation of that consent.  "One who consents to a search 
'may of course delimit as [she] chooses the scope of the search 
to which [she] consents.'"  State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶37, 
241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 252 (1991)). 
¶11 The court of appeals and the parties each offer us a 
different paradigm within which to consider the application of 
these principles to the Laboratory's test of Ms. Randall's blood 
sample.  For her part, Ms. Randall says her encounter with the 
police resulted in not one, but two discrete searches.  The 
first occurred when a medical technician drew a sample of her 
blood.  The second occurred when the Laboratory tested the 
sample to determine its alcohol concentration.  She argues that 
both searches must respect the constitutional mandate that she 
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.  Ms. Randall 
acknowledges that her consent (as documented on the Form) made 
the blood draw unobjectionable.  But she maintains that her 
withdrawal of consent made the second search——the Laboratory's 
analysis of her blood sample——unconstitutional. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
8 
 
¶12 The State's paradigm allows for only one search.  It 
says the search started and ended with the medical technician's 
acquisition of Ms. Randall's blood sample.  The subsequent 
analysis was not a search or seizure, the State says, so there 
was no Fourth Amendment basis for objecting to the analysis.  
Consequently, because Ms. Randall did not withdraw her consent 
until after completion of the search, the State says her 
revocation was ineffective on the general ground that one cannot 
revoke consent to something that has already happened.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 151 (7th Cir. 
1996) ("[W]hen a suspect does not withdraw [her] valid consent 
to a search before the illegal weapon or substance is 
discovered, the consent remains valid and the seized illegal 
item is admissible.").   
¶13 The court of appeals' paradigm is, in one sense, a 
portmanteau of the ones offered by the parties.  It said there 
was only one search, but its parameters were more expansive than 
either of the parties recognized.  It understood the search to 
have been one continuous event that commenced with the blood 
draw and ended with the Laboratory's analysis.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals said, the Laboratory received Ms. Randall's 
withdrawal of consent while the search was yet underway.  
Because the State acknowledged it had no justification for the 
search other than Ms. Randall's consent, the court of appeals' 
reasoning required the Laboratory to refrain from testing her 
blood 
sample 
immediately 
upon 
receiving 
her 
letter.  
Consequently, 
because 
the 
Laboratory's 
analysis 
was 
not 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
9 
 
supported by a warrant or any of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, the court of appeals concluded that the test was an 
unreasonable search.  We will address the paradigms advanced by 
Ms. Randall and the court of appeals to assess their fidelity to 
constitutional principles, starting with Ms. Randall's offering. 
A.  Two Searches 
¶14 Ms. Randall says she was subjected to two searches and 
that the State must demonstrate a constitutional justification 
for each one.  If we agree with that premise, she says, then we 
must also conclude the actual analysis of her blood was 
unconstitutional because she had revoked her consent and the 
State 
offered 
no 
other 
basis 
for 
satisfying 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement.  But we do not reach 
that conclusion because, as explained below, we do not accept 
her proposition that a blood draw and test involve two searches.   
¶15 Ms. Randall begins her argument with an examination of 
the State's invasions when it set out to discover her blood-
alcohol level.  She says such proceedings implicate two privacy 
interests.  The first is the obvious——a needle's intrusion to 
retrieve a sample of blood.  The second privacy interest relates 
to the information contained within her blood sample.  She finds 
support for these dual privacy interests in Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).4  There, the Court said 
                                                 
4 The dissent believes we (and, apparently, Ms. Randall) 
erred right here in the beginning of our analysis by confusing 
"searches" with "seizures": 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The lead opinion initially missteps by failing to 
ascribe independent constitutional significance to the 
testing of Randall's blood, conflating the lawful 
"seizure" 
of 
Randall's 
blood 
with 
the 
"search" 
conducted through chemical testing. As a result, it 
collapses the seizure and search into a single 
constitutional event. Such an error runs counter to 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
 
Dissent, ¶93.  This is an odd proposition to ascribe to Skinner, 
inasmuch as Skinner unequivocally contradicts the dissent on 
this very point.  Skinner says the "seizure" occurs when the 
suspect is restrained, and the "search" occurs when the State 
obtains the blood sample: 
The 
initial 
detention 
necessary 
to 
procure 
the 
evidence may be a seizure of the person, if the 
detention amounts to a meaningful interference with 
his freedom of movement.  Obtaining and examining the 
evidence may also be a search, if doing so infringes 
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable[.] 
 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (emphasis added and internal citations 
omitted).  The Court was really quite clear that obtaining a 
blood sample is a search:  "We have long recognized that a 
'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed 
for alcohol content' must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search."  
Id. at 603 (alteration in original, emphasis added, and quoted 
source omitted). 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
11 
 
"it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath 
the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical 
analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further 
invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests."  Id.  Ms. 
Randall points out that this is not the only time the Supreme 
Court has taken note of an individual's privacy interest in the 
information contained in one's blood.  In Birchfield, the Court 
observed that "a blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the 
hands of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be 
preserved and from which it is possible to extract information 
beyond 
a 
simple 
BAC 
reading." 
 
136 
S. Ct. at 
2178.  
Consequently, "[e]ven if the law enforcement agency is precluded 
from testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure 
BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the 
person tested."  Id.  So Ms. Randall concludes that courts have 
already noted that society is prepared to recognize a legitimate 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nonetheless, the dissent insists that our analysis must 
proceed on the erroneous belief that obtaining a blood sample is 
a seizure, not a search.  It says "[t]he lead opinion arrives at 
its flawed conclusion by conflating the 'seizure' of Randall's 
blood, which was accomplished lawfully, with the 'search' 
conducted through chemical testing.  As a result, it collapses 
the seizure and search into a single constitutional event. This 
flawed construct permeates and compromises its analysis."  
Dissent, ¶80; see also id., ¶98 ("The distinction between the 
initial seizure and the analysis of the seized material is a key 
one, yet the majority treats the two discrete events as one 
continuous 'search.'").  The dissent cites no authority for 
these contra-Skinner propositions, and so we will not address 
them further. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
12 
 
expectation of privacy in the information contained in one's 
blood.5 
¶16 Ms. Randall notes that, by definition, a governmental 
invasion of a person's legitimate expectation of privacy is a 
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.  "A 'search' occurs when 
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable is infringed."  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (footnote omitted).  Every such search, of 
course, must have a constitutional justification.  But as both 
Skinner and Birchfield demonstrate, the Court's analytical 
approach proceeds with the understanding there is only one 
search, even though the government is both: (1) obtaining a 
biological specimen; and (2) testing the specimen for the 
presence of alcohol.  Thus, the Skinner Court referred to a 
blood draw and test as involving a single search:  "We have long 
recognized that a 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood 
to be analyzed for alcohol content' must be deemed a Fourth 
Amendment search."  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (alteration in 
original; quoted source omitted).  Although the Court recognized 
                                                 
5 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley points out, correctly, that 
society 
is 
not 
only 
prepared 
to 
recognize 
a 
legitimate 
expectation of privacy in one's medical information, it has 
actually codified it.  Dissent, ¶101.  For example, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") created 
significant safeguards protecting the confidentiality of health 
records.  Wisconsin has done so as well.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.82.  Although neither of these statutory provisions 
control the disposition of this matter, they do tell us that any 
analysis that does not account for the privacy interests they 
reflect is necessarily incomplete. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
13 
 
in this sentence both the acquisition of the sample and the 
subsequent analysis, the entirety of the Court's reasoning 
depended on there having been just one search.  If the 
biological specimen testing regimen in Skinner involved an 
invasion of two distinct privacy interests, the Court would have 
been duty-bound to assess the constitutional fidelity of each 
search separately.  It did not.  Instead, it focused exclusively 
on the acquisition of the sample to be tested.  After the Court 
satisfied itself that the government had a constitutionally-
sufficient basis for obtaining the biological specimens, it 
declared the testing regime sound.6 
¶17 Similarly, Birchfield does not support Ms. Randall's 
assertion that a blood draw and subsequent test involve two 
searches.  One need only consider the Court's disparate 
treatment of the blood draw and the subsequent test to see that 
it did not treat the latter as a separate search.  The Court 
explicitly called out a blood draw and administration of a 
breath test as searches:  "The [Fourth] Amendment thus prohibits 
'unreasonable searches,' and our cases establish that the taking 
of a blood sample or the administration of a breath test is a 
search."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173.  Nowhere, however, did 
                                                 
6 The Court's grammar also signaled it understood itself to 
be addressing a single search.  It said "a Fourth Amendment 
search" occurs when there is a "'compelled intrusio[n] into the 
body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content . . . .'"  
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (alteration in original; emphasis 
added). 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
14 
 
the Court so much as hint that the ensuing test of the blood 
sample (or the breath collected for the breath test) might be a 
search.  Indeed, even when Birchfield referred to the test, it 
is apparent from the context that it actually meant the blood 
draw.  Id. at 2184 (emphasis added) ("A blood test also requires 
less driver participation than a breath test.  In order for a 
technician to take a blood sample, all that is needed is for the 
subject to remain still, either voluntarily or by being 
immobilized.").  So nothing in the Court's analysis, from its 
premises to its conclusion, suggests the actual testing of the 
blood sample was a search.  Indeed, the Court treated the 
discovery 
of 
the 
defendant's 
blood-alcohol 
level 
as 
a 
constitutional non-event.   
¶18 Although Skinner and Birchfield lie at the foundation 
of Ms. Randall's argument, it is impossible to escape the 
significant tension between her position and those authorities.  
If a blood draw and subsequent analysis constitute two searches, 
then Skinner and Birchfield erred in failing to independently 
assess the constitutionality of each one.  But if this brace of 
cases correctly treats only one of these events as a search, 
then there is something amiss with Ms. Randall's argument.  For 
the following reasons, we conclude that Ms. Randall's conclusion 
cannot follow from her premises. 
¶19 In the ordinary course of events, an individual enjoys 
both of the privacy interests identified by Ms. Randall——the 
right to be free from a non-consensual blood draw and the right 
to keep private the information contained in one's blood.  If 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
15 
 
the State wants to invade those privacy interests, it must do so 
consistently with the Fourth Amendment's requirements.  But the 
circumstances that gave rise to the testing of Ms. Randall's 
blood sample were anything but ordinary.  She had been arrested 
for operating a vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant. 
 
The 
evidence 
of 
that 
offense, 
and 
the 
instrumentality by which she committed it——the alcohol she had 
imbibed——was hidden in her blood. 
¶20 This, then, is the nature of the privacy interest she 
claims 
today: 
 
She 
says 
that, 
notwithstanding 
a 
constitutionally-compliant 
search 
(the 
blood 
draw), 
she 
nonetheless had a legitimate privacy interest in shielding from 
the State the very evidence for which it was authorized to 
search.  This has never been the law, and her argument fails to 
account for the age-old principle that an arrest reduces the 
suspect's privacy interests.  "The search incident to arrest 
exception rests not only on the heightened government interests 
at stake in a volatile arrest situation, but also on an 
arrestee's reduced privacy interests upon being taken into 
police custody."  Riley, 573 U.S. at 391. We are mindful of 
Riley's admonition that "[t]he fact that an arrestee has 
diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth 
Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.  Not every search 
'is acceptable solely because a person is in custody.'"  Id. at 
392 (quoted source omitted).  Consequently, we must now examine 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
16 
 
the principles that justify incidental searches and determine 
how they might apply to Ms. Randall's situation.7 
¶21 The reduction in an arrestee's privacy interests 
applies specifically to the instrumentalities, evidence, and 
fruits of crime for which the suspect has been arrested.  State 
v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 451, 458, 132 N.W.2d 502 (1965) ("Within 
such scope of the search, instruments, evidence, and fruits of 
the crime for which the defendant was arrested may be searched 
for and seized."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 
(1969), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Davis v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011)  ("When an arrest is 
made, . . . it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer 
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in 
order to prevent its concealment or destruction."); Agnello v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) ("The right without a 
                                                 
7 The concurrence is concerned that we do not account for 
the fact that this case involves an arrest for intoxicated 
driving while Riley (and the other cases on which we rely) 
involve arrests for different crimes: 
[T]he quotes must be understood in the context in 
which they were made.  That is, policies that 
permitted a search, or set aside evidence obtained, 
are apparent from the context in which the search 
occurred.  However, here, the lead opinion transplants 
quotes into an entirely new context without any 
recognition that the context impacts the meaning of 
the words chosen. 
 
Concurrence, ¶72.  We respectfully disagree.  Literally the 
entire remaining balance of this opinion is dedicated to teasing 
out the principles that are transportable from one context to 
another, and explaining why they apply in both contexts. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
17 
 
search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully 
arrested while committing crime and to search the place where 
the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected 
with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was 
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an 
escape from custody is not to be doubted."); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) ("When a man is legally 
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in 
his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may 
be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence 
in the prosecution.").8  
¶22 This principle predates both the Wisconsin and United 
States Constitutions and still obtains today.  Over a century 
ago, the United States Supreme Court observed that "the right on 
                                                 
8 The concurrence suggests that the amount of time between 
the search and testing of Ms. Randall's blood has some 
significance to the incidental search doctrine:  "Here, the 
objected-to search to determine the alcohol concentration of 
Randall's blood sample occurred nine days after her arrest.  
Therefore, safety of an officer or preservation of evidence of a 
crime which undergird the cases cited by the lead opinion are 
not relevant concerns."  Concurrence, ¶71.  But the lapse of 
time has nothing to do with this analysis.  It is the 
relationship between the arrest and the evidence found in the 
incidental search that matters.  So long as the scope of the 
search remains within proper boundaries, a person has no 
protectable privacy interest in the fruits and instrumentalities 
of crime the search may reveal.  Nor does that privacy interest 
grow back over time.  Whether the State tested Ms. Randall's 
blood the next day or the next year, her privacy interest in the 
amount of alcohol it contained would be precisely the same——
zero.  And it is zero because the alcohol in her blood was the 
instrumentality of her crime, and her arrest eviscerated her 
privacy interest in how much was there. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
18 
 
the part of the government . . . to search the person of the 
accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits 
or evidences of crime" has been "uniformly maintained in many 
cases."  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) 
(overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), and overruled in part by Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206 (1960)).  In fact, it said this right has "always 
[been] recognized under English and American law . . . ."  
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added).  We, too, recognize 
this ancient precept.  "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on 
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification."  State v. Sykes, 
2005 WI 48, ¶14, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 (quoting State 
v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 169, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), overruled 
on other grounds by Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252 (quoting United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973))).9   
                                                 
9 The concurrence says this is an incorrect statement of the 
law but does not say why.  Concurrence, ¶73.  If it is 
incorrect, we should overrule it.  But then we would have to 
explain why the United States Supreme Court also got this wrong 
when it said the exact same thing in 1973 (See United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)) and again in 2014 when it quoted 
itself (Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 384 (2014)), and why 
we made the same mistake when we repeated this quote in 1986 
(State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 169, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986)).  We 
would also have to give an account of our statements to the same 
effect in 2006 and 2010.  State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶27, 
327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97 ("[A] search incident to a lawful 
arrest may be justified when it is 'reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.'") (quoted source omitted); State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
19 
 
¶23 If an arrestee may prevent the State from knowing the 
amount of alcohol in her blood, then all of these cases are 
wrong and some additional justification is necessary to conduct 
a blood test.  But none of the search-incident-to-arrest cases 
cited 
above 
recognized 
an 
arrestee's 
right 
to 
keep 
the 
instrumentalities and evidence of crime secret from the police.  
And Ms. Randall offers no authority to support such a 
proposition. 
¶24 Additionally, if we were to accept Ms. Randall's 
argument, we would need to explain why a person's privacy 
interest in her alcohol concentration level varies depending on 
the type of search the State performs.  Birchfield addressed 
itself to two possible means by which the State may discover the 
concentration of alcohol in a suspect's blood stream——a breath 
test and a blood test.  The first, it said, could be performed 
as a categorical matter as a search incident to arrest.  
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.  The impact of that statement on 
Ms. Randall's argument cannot be overstated.  A breath test 
involves a search (obtaining a sample of the suspect's alveolar 
breath) from which the State may discover the information Ms. 
Randall says she may keep to herself (her blood-alcohol level).  
Id. at 2176-77.  Having obtained the breath sample, Ms. 
Randall's logic would require the State to obtain a warrant (or 
                                                                                                                                                             
WI 47, ¶31, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548 ("A lawful arrest 
gives rise to heightened concerns that may justify a warrantless 
search, including the need to discover and preserve evidence.").  
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
20 
 
satisfy one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement) before 
reading the results of the test.  But nothing in the Court's 
analysis could support such a conclusion.  To the contrary, it 
establishes that, upon arrest for intoxicated driving, the 
suspect loses any privacy interest she may have previously had 
in her blood-alcohol level.  And that allows the State to know 
this information upon no greater showing than a good arrest.  It 
is, of course, certainly true that the State must comply with 
constitutional requirements in obtaining the sample to be 
tested, which is why the Court distinguished between breath and 
blood 
tests. 
 
Id. 
at 
2185 
("Because 
breath 
tests 
are 
significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases 
amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that a breath 
test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search 
incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.").  But that 
distinction does not, and cannot, affect whether a suspect has a 
privacy interest in the amount of alcohol in her blood.   
¶25 The extent of an arrestee's privacy interest in the 
amount of alcohol in her blood is not contingent on the method 
the State uses to obtain that information.  Logic would not 
allow us to conclude that an arrestee has a privacy interest in 
her blood-alcohol level when the State performs a blood draw, 
but not when it performs a breath test.  The method by which an 
arrestee is searched does not affect the individual's privacy 
interest in the datum the search reveals.  The arrestee is 
either entitled to keep that information secret, or she is not.  
Birchfield teaches us that she is not.   
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
21 
 
¶26 This is in keeping with the general principle that an 
individual has a reduced privacy interest after arrest, Riley, 
573 
U.S. at 
391, 
which 
allows 
the 
State 
to 
seize 
the 
instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of crime discovered on 
the arrestee's person without any separate constitutional 
justification.   
The 
right 
without 
a 
search 
warrant 
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested 
while committing crime and to search the place where 
the arrest is made in order to find and seize things 
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means 
by which it was committed, as well as weapons and 
other things to effect an escape from custody is not 
to be doubted. 
Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30.10   
B.  One Continuing Search 
                                                 
10 Other jurisdictions have also concluded that an arrestee 
has no privacy interest in her blood-alcohol concentration 
level.  See, e.g., People v. Woodward, 909 N.W.2d 299, 305 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2017) ("[W]e conclude that society is not 
prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
alcohol content of a blood sample voluntarily given by a 
defendant to the police for the purposes of blood alcohol 
analysis."); State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2016) ("Once a blood sample has been lawfully removed from 
a person's body, a person loses an expectation of privacy in the 
blood sample, and a subsequent chemical analysis of the blood 
sample is, therefore, not a distinct Fourth Amendment event."); 
State v. Loveland, 696 N.W.2d 164, 166 (S.D. 2005) ("Once a 
urine sample is properly seized, the individual that provided 
the sample has no legitimate or reasonable expectation that the 
presence of illegal substances in that sample will remain 
private."); State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d. 131, 144-45 (Haw. 2003) 
("Any legitimate expectation of privacy that the [defendant] had 
in [her] blood disappeared when the blood was validly seized.") 
(quoted source omitted). 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
22 
 
¶27 Ms. Randall also agrees with the court of appeals' 
paradigm in which the blood draw and subsequent test are 
understood to comprise a single, continuing search.  Under this 
construct, the constitutional justification for obtaining the 
blood sample must persist until the Laboratory completes its 
test.  If the justification fails at any point during that time, 
so the reasoning goes, the State may not thereafter possess or 
examine the blood sample for the presence of alcohol.  Ms. 
Randall likens her situation to an individual who grants 
government agents permission to search her home, but then 
revokes consent before they are done.  The search, she says, 
must be "terminated instantly upon [the individual's] revocation 
of consent . . . ."  Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 567 
(6th Cir. 1999).  Because the State lost the only justification 
it had for possessing her blood sample when she revoked her 
consent, Ms. Randall says, her specimen thereupon became 
unavailable for testing. 
¶28 The court of appeals adopted this reasoning.  It said 
"this court [referring to its opinion in VanLaarhoven11] set the 
beginning and end points of a search of a person’s blood, 
specifically ruling that the taking and testing of blood 
comprise one continuous search under the Fourth Amendment."  
Randall, No. 2017AP1518-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶11.  Based on 
that understanding, it concluded that  
                                                 
11 248 Wis. 2d 881. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
23 
 
the search of Randall's blood, which comprised both 
the taking and testing of the blood, had not yet been 
completed at the time when the officials at the state 
laboratory possessed Randall's blood but had not yet 
tested Randall's blood; therefore, before the blood 
was tested Randall had the right to withdraw her 
consent to the continuation of that search.   
Id., ¶13.  We cannot agree with the court of appeals' analysis 
because its "one continuous search," id., ¶11, paradigm is 
unalterably in conflict with Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966). 
¶29 We 
first 
note 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
characterization of the VanLaarhoven holding is insufficiently 
precise.  What VanLaarhoven actually says is "the examination of 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant requirement or an 
exception to the warrant requirement is an essential part of the 
seizure and does not require a judicially authorized warrant."  
248 Wis. 2d 881, ¶16.  It then said that a defendant may not 
"parse the lawful seizure of a blood sample into multiple 
components, each to be given independent significance for 
purposes of the warrant requirement."  Id.  In reaching its 
conclusion, VanLaarhoven relied on the following observations in 
United States v. Snyder:   
It seems clear, however, that Schmerber viewed the 
seizure and separate search of the blood as a single 
event 
for 
fourth 
amendment 
purposes. . . .  
The 
[Schmerber] Court therefore necessarily viewed the 
right to seize the blood as encompassing the right to 
conduct a blood-alcohol test at some later time. 
852 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1988).  These statements do not 
necessarily establish that taking and testing a blood sample 
comprise a single continuous search.  Both the VanLaarhoven and 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
24 
 
Snyder courts were responding to a defendant's attempt to confer 
constitutional significance on the blood test by separating it 
from the search by which the State obtained the specimen.  Both 
courts concluded that defendants cannot multiply the number of 
constitutionally-significant events by slicing up the timeline 
and demanding a separate justification for each segment.  But 
just because a blood draw and test do not present multiple such 
events does not mean the single constitutionally-significant 
event must necessarily commence with the blood draw and end with 
the test.  The VanLaarhoven court could also be understood as 
asserting that the one event in need of a constitutional 
justification is the blood draw, not the test.  Its reliance on 
Schmerber and Snyder suggest this is the proper understanding. 
¶30 Schmerber establishes that it is not possible to 
consider a blood draw and test as part of a single continuing 
search in need of non-lapsing constitutional justification.  The 
Schmerber Court considered the "exigent circumstances" exception 
to the warrant requirement in the context of a non-consensual 
blood test conducted subsequent to arrest for intoxicated 
driving. 
384 
U.S. at 
770. 
 
Like 
Birchfield, 
the 
Court 
concentrated exclusively on whether acquisition of the blood 
sample was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  That is, it 
did not inquire into whether the justification for taking the 
sample still obtained when the State tested it.  This is 
especially important to our analysis here because, of course, 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
25 
 
the exigency that justifies a non-consensual blood draw never 
persists beyond the point the State acquires the sample.12  If 
the court of appeals is correct, this means that whenever the 
State's only basis for obtaining the blood sample is an "exigent 
circumstance," it never has a Fourth Amendment justification for 
the subsequent test.  Therefore, if the blood draw and 
subsequent test comprise one continuous search, then all such 
tests must be unconstitutional——according to the court of 
appeals' analysis——because the justification for obtaining the 
blood sample lapses immediately after the blood draw. 
¶31 But 
the 
Schmerber 
court 
saw 
no 
constitutional 
violation when the State tests a sample of blood obtained under 
exigent circumstances.  It is possible the Court's holding 
reflects an understanding that a blood draw and test do not 
comprise one continuous search.  It is also possible the Court's 
analysis represents a failure to accurately perceive "the 
beginning and end points of a search of a person's blood[.]"  
Randall, No. 2017AP1518-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶11.  We 
                                                 
12 One element of the exigency analysis is the body's 
constant metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream, a 
process that will continue until it is all eliminated.  Once the 
blood is withdrawn, however, the metabolization process stops, 
which means the amount of alcohol in the blood sample will 
thereafter remain.  United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 473 
(9th Cir. 1988) ("Removal of blood from a defendant's blood 
stream eliminates immediately the danger that evidence of blood-
alcohol content will be lost.").  As this case itself 
demonstrates, the Laboratory tested the blood sample several 
days after it was acquired with no apparent diminution in its 
ability to determine the amount of alcohol therein. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
26 
 
conclude the first is the more reasonable conclusion.  We are 
not the only ones to do so.  See, e.g., Synder, 852 F.2d at 474 
("[S]o long as blood is extracted incident to a valid arrest 
based on probable cause to believe that the suspect was driving 
under the influence of alcohol, the subsequent performance of a 
blood-alcohol test has no independent significance for fourth 
amendment purposes, regardless of how promptly the test is 
conducted.").  In fact, we are aware of no court (other than the 
circuit court and court of appeals in this case) to have ever 
concluded otherwise. 
¶32 The lesson we must draw from Schmerber is obvious.  
The constitutional basis for obtaining the blood sample both 
there and here was evanescent.  The exigency supporting the 
blood draw in Schmerber vanished just as surely (if more 
quickly) than Ms. Randall's consent here.  In both cases, the 
authorities 
tested 
the 
samples 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
the 
circumstances that made the blood draws compliant with the 
Fourth Amendment.  With respect to the question before us today, 
there is no constitutionally significant distinction to be drawn 
with Schmerber.  Therefore, if the State of California may test 
Mr. 
Schmerber's 
blood 
sample 
when 
the 
justification 
for 
obtaining it had passed, then the State of Wisconsin may test 
Ms. Randall's blood sample upon the same rationale.  And the 
rationale is that a blood draw and test do not represent a 
single continuous search.  What Schmerber concluded implicitly, 
Johnson v. Quander, stated explicitly:  "[A] 'search' is 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
27 
 
completed upon the drawing of the blood . . . ."  440 F.3d 489, 
500 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  We agree. 
C. 
Of Smart Phones and Blood Samples 
¶33 Ms. 
Randall 
argues 
that 
her 
circumstances 
are 
analogous to those at issue in Riley and require suppression of 
the blood test results for the same reason the Supreme Court 
suppressed 
the 
information 
discovered 
in 
a 
smart 
phone.  
Although there are some similarities between the two situations, 
they do not suggest that Riley should govern our conclusion.  
There, the police arrested Mr. Riley after discovering concealed 
weapons under the hood of his car.  The search incident to his 
arrest produced a smart phone, which the police proceeded to 
peruse 
for 
useful 
information. 
 
After 
describing 
the 
multitudinous types and amounts of information a smart phone can 
contain, the Court observed that searching such a device could 
reveal more information about the suspect than an exhaustive 
search of the owner's entire house.  Riley, 573 U.S. at 396-97.  
Something similar might be said with respect to the information 
contained in Ms. Randall's blood——and, in fact, she did.  She 
made the entirely reasonable observation that there resides in 
her 
blood 
"genetic 
information 
about 
ancestry, 
family 
connections, medical conditions, [and] pregnancy."   
¶34 The similarities between a smart phone and a blood 
sample in terms of the amount of information they each contain, 
and the personal nature of that information, are such that we 
must pay particular attention to what the Supreme Court said 
about the State's access to it.  The Fourth Amendment analysis 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
28 
 
turns, as Riley recognized, on whether there are principles that 
can effectively limit the incidental search to that which has an 
appropriate connection to the arrest.  Here, there are two.  The 
first relates to the type of information the State may collect 
from the blood sample.  When a government agent conducts a 
search pursuant to an individual's consent, the scope of the 
search may not exceed the individual's authorization.  "One who 
consents to a search 'may of course delimit as [she] chooses the 
scope of the search to which [she] consents.'"  Matejka, 241 
Wis. 2d 52, ¶37 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252).  The 
"Informing 
the 
Accused" 
form 
indicates 
that 
Ms. 
Randall 
consented to a blood test "to determine the concentration of 
alcohol or drugs in [her] system."  Therefore, the State may 
test the blood sample only for the concentration of alcohol or 
drugs. 
¶35 The second principle relates to the testing mechanism 
and its ability to focus on only the sought-after information.  
Perusing the contents of a smart phone, the Riley court 
concluded, would be reminiscent of "the reviled 'general 
warrants' and 'writs of assistance' of the colonial era, which 
allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an 
unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity."  Riley, 
573 U.S. at 403.  The Court recognized that there were no 
practical methods by which the police could limit themselves to 
reviewing only the information to which an incidental search 
justifies access.  Consequently, such searches may not be 
conducted without a warrant.  But here is where Ms. Randall's 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
29 
 
situation diverges from Riley.  Although her blood contains a 
wealth of personal information, the tests undertaken by the 
State reveal only information directly related to the purpose 
for her arrest, to wit, the presence and concentration of 
alcohol or other prohibited drugs.  If the State could not 
ascertain that data without also learning genetic information 
about her ancestry, family connections, medical conditions, or 
pregnancy, our conclusion would be different.  However, nothing 
in the record suggests that the State's tests result in such 
generalized rummaging.  Therefore, Riley does not suggest that 
Ms. Randall retains any privacy interest in the amount of 
alcohol in her blood, so long as the State lawfully obtained the 
blood sample.  
* 
¶36 The authorities support the conclusion we reach today, 
but logic compels it.  Ms. Randall's argument depends on the 
proposition 
that 
she 
had 
a 
privacy 
interest 
in 
the 
instrumentalities and evidence of crime for which the police 
were authorized to search.  Without such a privacy interest, of 
course, there can be no search capable of implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.  But if Ms. Randall is right, an entire branch of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (searches incident to arrest) 
would come to naught.  A hidden bag of white powder discovered 
on a suspect arrested for possession of drugs, or a secreted gun 
found on an individual arrested for a shooting death, would each 
be subject to the arrestee's privacy interest.  Without a 
constitutional justification separate and apart from the one 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
30 
 
warranting arrest, Ms. Randall's position would prevent the 
State 
from 
chemically 
testing 
the 
suspected 
drugs 
or 
fingerprinting the gun.  That is to say, having discovered the 
very thing for which it was authorized to search, the State 
could do nothing with it unless it thereafter obtained a warrant 
for its examination and use.  The Riley court recognized that 
searches incident to arrest are justified by the arrestee's 
reduced expectation of privacy.  And Birchfield confirms that 
this principle applies in the specific context of intoxicated 
driving.  Upon her arrest, Ms. Randall's reduced expectation of 
privacy meant that she could not keep the presence and 
concentration of alcohol in her blood secret from the police.  
So the only relevant question is whether the method by which the 
State obtained the non-private evidence satisfied the Fourth 
Amendment's requirements.  Ms. Randall's consent to the blood 
draw satisfied those requirements, and that left the State free 
to test the blood sample for the non-private information. 
¶37 The concurrence reaches the same conclusion, but in an 
uncomfortably abbreviated fashion.  It is uncomfortable because 
it lacks any justification for the conclusion that an individual 
does not have a privacy interest in the alcohol concentration in 
her blood.  It simply says there is no such interest.  The 
abbreviation is also troubling because it contains no limiting 
principles circumscribing this lack of a privacy interest.  So, 
for example, nothing in the concurrence would prohibit the State 
from testing a non-arrestee's blood sample for the presence of 
alcohol or drugs for no weightier reason than curiosity (so long 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
31 
 
as it did not violate the constitution in obtaining the sample).  
And what of blood samples drawn by non-State actors, such as 
hospitals?  If the concurrence's uncabined conclusion is 
correct, what prevents the State from randomly requesting 
alcohol and drug concentration tests on blood samples drawn for 
medical purposes?  Certainly nothing in the concurrence would 
prohibit this.  And what about the rest of the treasure trove of 
information we all carry around with us in our blood?  What, in 
the concurrence's view, protects all of that from the State's 
curious eyes?  The concurrence cursorily says its holding is 
limited to searches consequent upon arrest for intoxicated 
driving:  "This opinion is confined to blood samples that have 
been drawn for purposes of alcohol or drug testing subsequent to 
arrest for driving while intoxicated. It does not address 
privacy interests that might otherwise attach to testing for 
other purposes."  Concurrence, ¶42 n.1.  But not a single 
sentence in the concurrence explains why the arrest for 
intoxicated driving has anything to do with Ms. Randall's loss 
of her privacy interest in the amount of alcohol in her system.  
If there is a link between the two, the concurrence has not said 
what it is.  This is not "intellectually unfortunate and 
intentionally 
misleading," 
as 
the 
concurrence 
claims.  
Concurrence, ¶75.  It is a simple recognition that the reasoning 
offered by the concurrence has no bounds, even if the specific 
conclusion addresses just an arrest for intoxicated driving.13 
                                                 
13 The concurrence's conclusion ties the suspect's privacy 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
32 
 
¶38 We believe a person has a privacy interest in the 
information contained in her blood, including the concentration 
of alcohol or other drugs, until something happens to limit or 
eliminate that interest.  For the reasons explained above, Ms. 
Randall lost her privacy interest in the alcohol and drug 
concentration in her blood when she was arrested for intoxicated 
driving.  The concurrence, for some unexplained reason, says she 
                                                                                                                                                             
interests to the arrest for intoxicated driving, but nothing in 
its reasoning does.  See, e.g., concurrence, ¶55 ("[T]here is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration 
of a blood sample that has been voluntarily submitted to police 
for a blood alcohol testing. The blood sample is seized evidence 
that 
will 
be 
tested 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
crime 
was 
committed."); 
id., 
¶60 
("Just 
as 
there 
was 
no 
separate 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the 
undeveloped film [in State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 468 
N.W.2d 676 (1991)], there was no separate reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the alcohol concentration of blood that was 
voluntarily submitted to the State for testing to determine its 
alcohol concentration."); concurrence, ¶61 ("Numerous federal 
and state courts that have addressed this issue have reached the 
same result, concluding that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration of blood 
that a state has properly seized."); id., ¶63 ("Therefore, 
contrary to the decision of the court of appeals herein, there 
is 
no 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
the 
alcohol 
concentration of blood that has been lawfully seized. It is 
merely evidence to be tested in order to determine whether the 
operator 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
had 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration."); id. ("Therefore, just as the State may analyze 
a lawfully seized white powdery substance to determine whether 
the substance is cocaine, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 125-26 (1984), so, too, may the State test a lawfully 
seized blood sample to determine its alcohol concentration. In 
neither case, does a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of 
privacy affect such testing."). 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
33 
 
never had such an interest.  That is an assertion too broad, too 
unbounded, to be accepted.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 We conclude that the State performed only one search 
when 
it 
obtained 
a 
sample 
of 
Ms. 
Randall's 
blood 
and 
subsequently analyzed it for the presence of alcohol or other 
prohibited drugs.  That single search ended when the State 
completed the blood draw.14  We further conclude that, although 
the State must comply with the Fourth Amendment in obtaining a 
suspect's blood sample, a defendant arrested for intoxicated 
                                                 
14 The concurrence's author says she does not join this 
opinion because it: 
loses its constitutional thread in its concern for 
whether the drawing and testing of the blood sample 
should be analyzed as one search or two.  In 
actuality, it does not matter.  What matters is 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
legally 
protectable 
privacy 
interest in the alcohol concentration of a blood 
sample constitutionally obtained from the operator of 
a vehicle after arrest for driving while intoxicated.   
 
Concurrence, ¶64 (footnote omitted).  This is really just two 
ways of saying the same thing.  If the suspect has no protected 
privacy interest, there can be no search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  But if there is a protected privacy 
interest, and the State invades it, there has been a Fourth 
Amendment search.  So when we inquired into whether Ms. Randall 
was subject to one search or two, we were necessarily inquiring 
into whether the State invaded a protected privacy interest when 
it tested her blood sample for the presence of alcohol.  There 
was only one search because we concluded the State did not 
invade a protected privacy interest when it tested Ms. Randall's 
blood sample for the presence of alcohol, a conclusion shared by 
the concurrence.  Therefore, if we "lost the constitutional 
thread," then so did the concurrence. 
No. 
2017AP1518-CR   
34 
 
driving has no privacy interest in the amount of alcohol in that 
sample.  Where there is no privacy interest, there can be no 
constitutionally-significant search.  Therefore, the State did 
not perform a search on Ms. Randall's blood sample (within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment) when it tested the sample for 
the presence of alcohol.  As a result, Ms. Randall's consent to 
the test in this case was not necessary.  For these reasons, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶40 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation 
prior to oral argument. 
 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶41 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  The 
issue presented by this review is whether a defendant-driver of 
a vehicle who consented to a blood draw after her arrest for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1) can prevent testing of the blood sample for 
alcohol concentration by "revoking" her consent and invoking the 
Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.     
¶42 I conclude that a defendant who has been arrested for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration of the blood 
sample that has been lawfully seized.1  Therefore, the subsequent 
testing 
of 
the 
blood 
sample 
to 
determine 
its 
alcohol 
concentration initiates no Fourth Amendment protections through 
which a defendant may prevent testing the blood sample by 
"revoking" consent after the blood has been drawn.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully concur in the result reached by the lead opinion, 
although I do not join that opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶43 The lead opinion ably sets out the background for this 
controversy, so I will relate only what is helpful in 
understanding my discussion that follows.  On October 29, 2016, 
Jessica M. Randall was arrested for operating a motor vehicle 
                                                 
1 This opinion is confined to blood samples that have been 
drawn for purposes of alcohol or drug testing subsequent to 
arrest for driving while intoxicated.  It does not address 
privacy interests that might otherwise attach to testing for 
other purposes. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
while intoxicated, as a third offense.  The arresting officer 
read Randall the Informing the Accused form as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4), and Randall consented to an evidentiary test 
of her blood for alcohol and drugs.2  A sample of Randall's blood 
was drawn without incident by a trained medical professional.  
The sample was sealed, marked, and brought to the Wisconsin 
State Laboratory of Hygiene (the laboratory) for analysis.   
¶44 Before 
the 
laboratory 
had 
analyzed 
the 
alcohol 
concentration of Randall's blood sample, Randall's attorney sent 
a letter to the laboratory.  The letter stated: 
It is my understanding that as of this date a 
blood sample belonging to Jessica M. Randall has been 
received but has not yet been analyzed.  Jessica M. 
Randall hereby revokes any previous consent that she 
may have provided to the collection and analysis of 
her blood, asserts her right to privacy in her blood, 
and demands that no analysis be run without specific 
authorization by a neutral and detached magistrate 
upon a showing of probable cause and specifying the 
goal of analysis.  State v. Wantland, 255 Wis. 2d 135, 
152, 848 N.W.2d 810 (2014), Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967).  Further, Jessica M. Randall 
hereby advises the Wisconsin State Laboratory of 
Hygiene that she does not consent to any person or 
entity retaining possession of her blood sample, and 
therefore demands that it be returned to her or 
destroyed immediately. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) provides in relevant part: 
You have . . . been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs . . . . 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one 
or more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system.   
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
A copy of this letter is directed to the Dane 
County District Attorney's Office.  We request that 
you consult with that office prior to any analysis of 
the blood sample.   
¶45 The blood sample was not returned to Randall.  On 
November 7, 2016, the laboratory tested the blood sample, which 
showed that Randall had a blood alcohol level of .210.  She was 
charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated and 
Operating With Prohibited Alcohol Concentration, both as third 
offenses.  Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and (b).   
¶46 Randall moved to suppress the results of the blood 
test.  She argued that through her attorney's letter, she had 
clearly and unequivocally withdrawn her consent to test her 
blood for alcohol concentration.  She asserted that because 
consent was the only lawful basis for the State to retain her 
blood and "search" it for blood alcohol concentration, the State 
was required to return the sample without testing it once she 
revoked her consent.  The circuit court agreed, and issued an 
order granting Randall's motion to suppress the blood test 
results.3  In an unpublished one-judge opinion, the court of 
appeals 
affirmed. 
 
State 
v. 
Randall, 
No. 2017AP1518-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2018).   
II.  DISCUSSION  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶47 "When we review a decision on a motion to suppress 
evidence, we uphold a circuit court's findings of historical 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Nicholas J. McNamara of Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous."  State v. Blatterman, 
2015 WI 46, ¶16, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26 (citations 
omitted).  "[H]owever, the application of Fourth Amendment 
principles to the facts found presents a question of law that we 
review independently."  State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶17, 345 
Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (citations omitted). 
B.  Searches and Seizures 
1.  General principles 
¶48 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution "is substantively identical, and we normally 
interpret it coextensively with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."  State v. 
Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶19, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 
(citations omitted).4  
¶49 It is helpful to define a "search" and to distinguish 
it from a "seizure."  "A seizure deprives an individual of 
'dominion over his or her person or property,' whereas a search 
                                                 
4 When I refer to the Fourth Amendment, I include Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution as its provisions 
provide a similar framework in which to discuss Randall's 
contentions.   
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to 
consider 
reasonable 
is 
infringed.'" 
 
Brereton, 
345 
Wis. 2d 563, ¶23, (citations omitted).  For example, police 
might search a home pursuant to a valid warrant, and seize 
evidence 
of 
criminal 
activity 
found 
during 
the 
search.  
"[S]eizures 
generally 
are 
considered 
less 
intrusive 
than 
searches," 
because 
"a 
seizure 
affects 
only 
the 
person's 
possessory interests," whereas "a search affects a person's 
privacy interests."  Id. (citations omitted).   
¶50 Not 
all 
searches 
initiate 
Fourth 
Amendment 
protections.  Id., ¶31.  A Fourth Amendment search occurs 
when:  (1) the government violates an individual's subjective 
expectation 
of 
privacy, 
and 
(2) society 
recognizes 
the 
individual's expectation of privacy as reasonable.  Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); State v. Tate, 2014 WI 
89, ¶19, 357 Wis. 2d 172, 849 N.W.2d 798.   
¶51 "The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness."  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
248, 250 (1991)).  For this reason, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does 
not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it 
merely proscribes those which are unreasonable."  See, e.g., 
Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶29; Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250.   A 
search conducted without a judicially-authorized warrant is 
considered to be unreasonable, and therefore prohibited by the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
unless 
it 
falls 
within 
one 
of 
the 
"'specifically established and well-delineated' exceptions to 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
the warrant requirement."  State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶55, 364 
Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124 (citations omitted). 
¶52 Consent to search is a specifically established and 
well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement.  See id.  
"The United States Supreme Court has 'long approved consensual 
searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to 
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.'"  
State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶20, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 
N.W.2d 810 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973)).  For this reason, a warrantless search conducted with a 
person's consent is constitutional.  Wantland, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 
¶20; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.   
¶53 A person who has voluntarily consented to a search 
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment may withdraw that 
consent at any time during the search by an unequivocal act or 
statement.  See, e.g., Wantland, 355 Wis. 2d 135, ¶33.  When 
consent to search has been withdrawn, the search must stop 
unless and until some other lawful basis for the search exists.  
However, an individual may revoke consent only while a search is 
being conducted.  Consent cannot be retroactively "revoked" 
after the search has been completed.  See id., ¶¶20-21. 
2.  Blood sample taking and testing 
¶54 The act of drawing blood from one who has been 
arrested for driving while intoxicated is a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  The United States Supreme 
Court has long recognized that "any compelled intrusion into the 
human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
privacy interests."  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 159 
(2013).  The act of drawing blood requires the government to 
violate "a motorist's privacy interest in preventing an agent of 
the government from piercing his skin."  Id.  Because a 
reasonable expectation of privacy must be violated to draw 
blood, a blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search.  Id.  It is 
also, simultaneously, a seizure of evidence, i.e. that person's 
blood. 
 
State 
v. 
Perryman, 
365 
P.3d 
628, 
631-32 
(Or. Ct. App. 2015). 
¶55 However, once the search of the motorist's body has 
been 
conducted 
by 
lawfully 
drawing 
a 
blood 
sample, 
the 
subsequent testing of the evidence seized to determine its 
alcohol 
concentration 
has 
no 
further 
Fourth 
Amendment 
implications.  This is so because there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration of a blood 
sample that has been voluntarily submitted to police for a blood 
alcohol testing.  The blood sample is seized evidence that will 
be tested to determine whether a crime was committed.   
¶56 As the court of appeals has explained, determining the 
blood alcohol concentration of lawfully seized blood is the 
"examination 
of 
evidence 
seized 
pursuant 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement or an exception to the warrant requirement" and 
"does not require a judicially authorized warrant."  State v. 
Riedel, 2003 WI App 18, ¶16, 259 Wis. 2d 921, 656 N.W.2d 789; 
see also State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275, ¶17, 248 
Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411 (concluding that chemical testing of 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
lawfully seized blood sample is not "a separate event for 
warrant requirement purposes").  
¶57 The court of appeals' decision in State v. Sumnicht, 
No. 2017AP280-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Dec. 20, 2017), 
contains instructive reasoning.  In Sumnicht, which involved 
substantially the same factual history as Randall presents, the 
court of appeals relied on our decision in State v. Petrone, 161 
Wis. 2d 530, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991) and held that the defendant 
could not revoke her consent after the blood had been drawn.  
Sumnicht, No. 2017AP280-CR, ¶22.   
¶58 In Petrone, police searched a suspect's home pursuant 
to a valid warrant and seized rolls of film believed to contain 
illicit photographs of minors.  Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 538.  
Police developed the film, which resulted in the defendant being 
convicted of three counts of sexual exploitation of children.  
Id. at 538-39.  Petrone sought to suppress the photos on the 
grounds that the police did not have a separate search warrant 
to develop the film after seizing it.  See id. at 544. 
¶59 We rejected Petrone's contention that the development 
of the film constituted a second Fourth Amendment search for 
which a separate warrant was needed.  Id. at 545.  In doing so, 
we said: 
Developing the film is simply a method of 
examining a lawfully seized object.  Law enforcement 
officers may employ various methods to examine objects 
lawfully seized in the execution of a warrant.  For 
example, blood stains or substances gathered in a 
lawful 
search 
may 
be 
subjected 
to 
laboratory 
analysis . . . .  The defendant surely could not have 
objected had the deputies used a magnifying glass to 
examine lawfully seized documents or had enlarged a 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
lawfully seized photograph in order to examine the 
photograph in greater detail.  Developing the film 
made the information on the film accessible, just as 
laboratory tests expose what is already present in a 
substance 
but 
not 
visible 
with 
the 
naked 
eye.  
Developing the film did not constitute, as the 
defendant asserts, a separate, subsequent unauthorized 
search having an intrusive impact on the defendant's 
rights wholly independent of the execution of the 
search 
warrant. 
 
The 
deputies 
simply 
used 
technological aids to assist them in determining 
whether items within the scope of the warrant were in 
fact evidence of the crime alleged. 
Id.   
¶60 The court of appeals in Sumnicht employed our decision 
in Petrone and concluded that when the State analyzed the 
defendant's blood to determine its alcohol concentration, it was 
merely examining lawfully seized evidence rather than infringing 
on a separate reasonable expectation of privacy.  Sumnicht, 
No. 2017AP280-CR, ¶22.  Just as there was no separate reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of the undeveloped film, 
there was no separate reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
alcohol concentration of blood that was voluntarily submitted to 
the State for testing to determine its alcohol concentration.  
¶61 Numerous federal and state courts that have addressed 
this issue have reached the same result, concluding that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
alcohol concentration of blood that a state has properly seized.  
See, e.g., Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010) 
("[A] 
'search' 
is 
completed 
upon 
the 
drawing 
of 
the 
blood . . . .  Therefore, once Jones had sufficient grounds to 
draw blood from Dodd after he was arrested for driving while 
intoxicated, the subsequent testing of that blood had 'no 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
independent significance for [F]ourth [A]mendment purposes.'") 
(citations omitted); United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 474 
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that when blood is validly seized 
"based on probable cause to believe that the suspect was driving 
under the influence of alcohol, the subsequent performance of a 
blood-alcohol test has no independent significance for [F]ourth 
[A]mendment purposes"); Harrison v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 781 
N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) ("[W]hen the state has 
lawfully obtained a sample of a person's blood under the 
implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining 
alcohol concentration, the person has lost any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from 
analysis of the sample."); People v. Woodard, 909 N.W.2d 299, 
305 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) ("[S]ociety is not prepared to 
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol 
content of a blood sample voluntarily given by a defendant to 
the police for the purposes of blood alcohol analysis."). 
¶62 In reaching the opposite conclusion in the matter now 
before us, the court of appeals misconstrued VanLaarhoven as 
holding that the testing of a person's blood is a continuation 
of the Fourth Amendment search of the person begun by the blood 
draw.  In VanLaarhoven, the defendant voluntarily consented to a 
blood draw and was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated after an analysis of his blood revealed a blood 
alcohol concentration of 0.173%.  VanLaarhoven, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 
¶2.  VanLaarhoven moved to suppress the results of the blood 
test because the State did not obtain a warrant to test his 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
blood after the blood draw.  Id., ¶3.  The court of appeals in 
VanLaarhoven 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
argument 
that 
"the 
chemical analysis of his blood sample is a separate event for 
warrant requirement purposes" and held that the blood draw 
encompassed the right to analyze the alcohol concentration of 
the blood.  Id., ¶17.   
¶63 The court of appeals in this case erroneously asserted 
that VanLaarhoven "specifically rul[ed] that the taking and 
testing of blood comprise one continuous search under the Fourth 
Amendment."  Randall, No. 2017AP1518-CR, ¶11.  However, the 
court of appeals in VanLaarhoven actually held to the contrary.  
VanLaarhoven explained: 
[T]he examination of evidence seized pursuant to the 
warrant requirement or an exception to the warrant 
requirement is an essential part of the seizure and 
does not require a judicially authorized warrant.  
Both decisions refuse to permit a defendant to parse 
the lawful seizure of a blood sample into multiple 
components, each to be given independent significance 
for purposes of the warrant requirement. 
VanLaarhoven, 248 Wis. 2d 881, ¶16 (citing Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 
at 538 and Snyder, 852 F.2d at 472).  Therefore, contrary to the 
decision of the court of appeals herein, there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration of blood 
that has been lawfully seized.  It is merely evidence to be 
tested in order to determine whether the operator of a motor 
vehicle had a prohibited alcohol concentration.  Therefore, just 
as the State may analyze a lawfully seized white powdery 
substance to determine whether the substance is cocaine, United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125-26 (1984), so, too, may 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
the State test a lawfully seized blood sample to determine its 
alcohol concentration.  In neither case, does a Fourth Amendment 
reasonable expectation of privacy affect such testing. 
C.  Lead opinion 
¶64 While I agree with parts of the lead opinion, I do not 
join it.  In my view, the opinion loses its constitutional 
thread in its concern for whether the drawing and testing of the 
blood sample should be analyzed as one search or two.5  In 
actuality, it does not matter.  What matters is whether there is 
a 
legally 
protectable 
privacy 
interest 
in 
the 
alcohol 
concentration of a blood sample constitutionally obtained from 
the operator of a vehicle after arrest for driving while 
intoxicated.     
¶65 The Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250.  A Fourth 
Amendment search occurs when a person's subjective expectation 
of privacy is infringed and society recognizes that expectation 
of privacy as reasonable under the circumstances.  Kyllo, 533 
U.S. at 33; Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, ¶23; Tate, 357 Wis. 2d 
172, ¶19.   
¶66 Accordingly, the question that we must answer is 
whether determining the alcohol concentration of lawfully seized 
blood from one arrested for operating while intoxicated violates 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.  As explained more 
                                                 
5 Lead op., Section A "Two Searches" (¶¶14–19) and Section B 
"One Continuing Search" (¶¶27–31). 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
completely above, I have concluded that it does not.6  Therefore, 
regardless of whether the testing of the blood sample is 
characterized as part of one search or as a second search, the 
testing has no Fourth Amendment implications under the facts of 
this case.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33; Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 
¶¶32–34; Riedel, 259 Wis. 2d 921, ¶16.   
¶67 I also part company with the lead opinion's overly 
broad application of the search incident to arrest exception to 
the warrant requirement.7  No party argued this theory to us, 
either in briefs or during oral argument.   
¶68 Promoting officer safety and preserving evidence are 
the policies that underlie the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement.  Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (explaining that upon arrest, it is 
reasonable to search the person of a suspect, and the area in 
his immediate control, to remove any weapons that may endanger 
                                                 
6 My conclusion is bolstered by Wis. Stat. § 343.305, which 
specifically authorizes law enforcement to request a blood draw 
upon arresting a driver for operating under the influence, or 
upon having "reason to believe" the driver has been operating 
under the influence.  § 343.305(3)(a) & (am).  When an officer 
requests a blood draw, the driver may refuse.  See § 343.305(4) 
& (9).  However, refusal of a blood draw carries consequences, 
including revocation of the driver's operating privilege.  
§ 343.305(9).   
Here, consistent with Wis. Stat. § 343.305, the arresting 
officer requested a blood draw to test for alcohol and drugs and 
read Randall the requisite information under § 343.305(4).  
Randall had the opportunity to revoke consent prior to the blood 
draw, but she chose not to do so. 
7 Lead op., ¶¶20–23. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
officer safety and to prevent concealment or destruction of 
evidence of a crime).   
¶69 The lead opinion's quotation from Riley v. California, 
573 U.S. 373 (2014), seems to drive its expansive conclusion.  
The lead opinion quotes Riley as deciding that, "[t]he search 
incident to arrest exception rests not only on the heightened 
government interests at stake in a volatile arrest situation, 
but also on an arrestee's reduced privacy interests upon being 
taken into police custody."8  Id. at 391.  The quoted language is 
used to build the lead opinion's conclusion that an arrest is 
sufficient to overcome an individual's privacy interests.  
However, the question we decide herein is much more nuanced than 
the lead opinion recognizes.9   
¶70 For 
example, 
a 
more 
careful 
reading 
and 
an 
understanding of the policies that underlie the Riley opinion 
demonstrate the lead opinion's erroneous use of the quote it 
chose from page 391.  Riley also explains that "[n]ot every 
search 'is acceptable solely because a person is in custody.'"  
Id. at 392 (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013) 
(concluding that when "privacy-related concerns are weighty 
enough [] the search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the 
diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee").  Riley 
involved a lawful search of Riley's person, but an unlawful 
                                                 
8 Lead op., ¶20.   
9 Lead op., ¶26.   
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
search of a cell phone taken from him at the time of his arrest.  
Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.  
¶71 Furthermore, the cases relied on by the lead opinion 
involve searches for evidence or weapons on the arrestee's 
person or within the area from which the suspect may gain 
control of a weapon at the time of defendants' arrests.10  Here, 
the objected-to search to determine the alcohol concentration of 
Randall's blood sample occurred nine days after her arrest.  
Therefore, safety of an officer or preservation of evidence of a 
crime which undergird the cases cited by the lead opinion are 
not relevant concerns.   
¶72 Accordingly, while I agree that quotes from well 
recognized opinions can be very helpful, the quotes must be 
understood in the context in which they were made.  That is, 
policies that permitted a search, or set aside evidence 
obtained, are apparent from the context in which the search 
occurred.  However, here, the lead opinion transplants quotes 
into an entirely new context without any recognition that the 
context impacts the meaning of the words chosen.  See e.g., 
State v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 451, 457-58, 132 N.W.2d 502 (1969) 
(explaining that because the purse of a defendant arrested for 
disorderly conduct was properly in custody of the police, police 
were permitted to seize what was in plain sight sticking out of 
her purse); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (explaining that warrantless 
search of Chimel's entire house incident to his arrest was 
                                                 
10 Lead op., ¶¶20–23, n.7. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
illegal because it went well beyond a search for weapons on or 
near the arrestee that could have affected law enforcement's 
safety); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925) 
(concluding that a warrantless search of home for narcotics 
incident to arrest was illegal because the search occurred at a 
location different from the arrest); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 153-55 (1925) (concluding that during prohibition, 
seizure of liquor in car of transport based on probable cause to 
believe 
it 
contained 
liquor 
did 
not 
violate 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
prohibition 
on 
unreasonable 
searches). 
 
The 
examination 
of 
Randall's 
blood 
sample 
for 
its 
alcohol 
concentration has nothing to do with evidence of the type or 
location described in the above cases. 
¶73 In addition, the lead opinion's assertion that "[w]e, 
too, recognize this ancient precept[:]  'A custodial arrest of a 
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under 
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search 
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification'"11 
is an erroneous statement of law because the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has never held that "a search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification" in a context similar to 
that herein presented.   
¶74 For its far reaching contention, the lead opinion 
cites State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 
                                                 
11 Lead op., ¶22.   
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
277.  However, Sykes actually decided whether a search of Sykes' 
wallet conducted prior to arrest was lawful so long as there 
were grounds to support probable cause to arrest before the 
search, even if the crime charged was not the crime for which 
probable cause existed before the arrest.  Id., ¶¶23, 24.  Sykes 
has nothing to do with whether Randall has a privacy interest in 
the alcohol concentration of her blood under the circumstances 
presented herein.   
¶75 And finally, rather than trying to meet the conclusion 
of this concurrence with reasoned argument, the lead opinion 
repeatedly and purposefully misstates my conclusion that a 
defendant who has been arrested for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the alcohol concentration of the blood sample that has been 
lawfully seized.  This tactic is intellectually unfortunate and 
intentionally misleading to the reader.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶76 I conclude that a defendant who has been arrested for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration of the blood 
sample that has been lawfully seized.  Therefore, the subsequent 
testing 
of 
the 
blood 
sample 
to 
determine 
its 
alcohol 
concentration initiates no Fourth Amendment protections through 
which a defendant may prevent testing the blood sample by 
"revoking" consent after the blood has been drawn.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully concur in the result reached by the lead opinion, 
although I do not join that opinion.   
No.  2017AP1518-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER 
and 
REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET 
joins 
this 
concurrence. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶78 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Without a 
warrant 
or 
a 
constitutional 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement, a majority of this court1 countenances the search of 
a person's blood by the government.  Although set forth in two 
separate opinions, a majority of the court indicates that this 
is okay.  I call it an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
¶79 According to the lead opinion,2 once Randall consented 
to the draw of her blood, she forever gave up her right to 
object to the government analyzing her blood.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the lead opinion3 erroneously ascribes no independent 
constitutional significance to the chemical testing of blood 
seized by law enforcement. 
¶80 The lead opinion arrives at its flawed conclusion by 
conflating 
the 
"seizure" 
of 
Randall's 
blood, 
which 
was 
accomplished lawfully, with the "search" conducted through 
chemical testing.  As a result, it collapses the seizure and 
                                                 
1 Justice 
Kelly's 
lead 
opinion 
and 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence both uphold the warrantless testing of 
Randall's blood. 
2 Although I address the lead opinion, the concurrence 
suffers from substantially the same infirmities. 
3 The only reference to "lead opinions" in our Internal 
Operating Procedures (IOPs) states that if during the process of 
circulating and revising opinions, "the opinion originally 
circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of a 
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate 
writings as the 'lead opinion.'"  IOP III(G)(4).  For further 
discussion of our procedure regarding lead opinions, see Koss 
Corp. v. Park Bank, 2019 WI 7, ¶76 n.1, 385 Wis. 2d 261, 922 
N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring). 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
search into a single constitutional event.  This flawed 
construct permeates and compromises its analysis. 
¶81 Turning a blind eye to everyday realities, the lead 
opinion compounds its errors by discounting in this post-HIPAA4 
era, society's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of a person's blood.  Ultimately, it minimizes the significant 
privacy interest previously identified by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
¶82 Because I conclude that a person does not lose the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of one's own 
blood after it is seized by law enforcement, the results of the 
blood test conducted in defiance of Randall's withdrawal of 
consent must be suppressed. 
¶83 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶84 Randall was arrested for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant.  Lead op., ¶2.  She 
consented to a draw of her blood, and a medical professional 
completed the blood draw.  Id. 
¶85 However, after the blood was drawn but before the 
blood was tested, Randall's counsel sent a letter to the State 
Crime Lab indicating that Randall no longer consented to the 
                                                 
4 "HIPAA" refers to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accounting Act of 1996.  State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App 14, ¶1 
n.1, 307 Wis. 2d 360, 745 N.W.2d 431 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006)).  Among other 
provisions, it sets forth penalties for the wrongful disclosure 
of individually identifiable health information.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
testing of her blood.  Id., ¶3.  Specifically, the letter 
detailed that Randall "hereby revokes any previous consent that 
she may have provided to the collection and analysis of her 
blood, asserts her right to privacy in her blood, and demands 
that no analysis be run without specific authorization by a 
neutral and detached magistrate upon a showing of probable cause 
and specifying the goal of analysis."  She further indicated 
that "she does not consent to any person or entity retaining 
possession of her blood sample, and therefore demands that it be 
returned to her or destroyed immediately." 
¶86 Despite Randall's withdrawal of consent, the Crime Lab 
tested and analyzed the blood anyway.  Lead op., ¶4.  After the 
test revealed a blood alcohol level of .210 grams of ethanol per 
100 milliliters of blood, the State sought to use the blood 
evidence at trial.  Id., ¶¶4-5. 
¶87 Randall moved to suppress the blood evidence, arguing 
that she clearly and unequivocally withdrew her consent for the 
blood to be tested.  She contended that absent consent, no other 
exception to the warrant requirement applied, necessitating 
suppression of the evidence. 
¶88 Agreeing with Randall and suppressing the blood 
evidence, the circuit court analogized the blood at issue to a 
cell phone in the context of Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 
(2014).  It opined, "[w]e are exactly in the situation of the 
Supreme Court case Riley . . . where the State was in possession 
of an item that they believed contained evidentiary information 
that, with probable cause, would show that a crime had been 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
committed or was being committed; and, therefore, were justified 
in seeking and obtaining a warrant to have the phone searched.  
That's what we have." 
¶89 The circuit court ultimately determined that "as a 
matter of constitutional law, the defendant . . . did withdraw 
her 
consent 
for 
the 
search 
prior 
to 
the 
blood 
being 
tested. . . . She retained the right to withdraw that consent.  
For the State to be allowed to use that evidence at trial over 
her lack of consent or to have those test results used 
without . . . a warrant, and without a constitutional exception 
to a warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment." 
¶90 In the circuit court's view, Randall was not, however, 
entitled to have the blood returned to her or destroyed:  "She 
cannot withdraw her consent to have the blood taken from her.  
That was done and over with." 
¶91 The State appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, 
but on different grounds than those relied upon by the circuit 
court.  Rather than using the analogy to Riley, the court of 
appeals determined that although "the taking and testing of the 
blood, 
together, 
comprise 
a 
single 
search 
to 
which 
constitutional protections attach . . . the search had not yet 
been completed when Randall withdrew her consent before the 
blood was tested and, therefore Randall retained her right to 
withdraw her consent to continuation of that search . . . ."  
State v. Randall, No. 2017AP1518-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶2 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2018) (citing State v. VanLaarhoven, 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
2001 WI App 275, ¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411; State v. 
Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶¶33-34, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810). 
¶92 Now reversing the court of appeals, the lead opinion 
concludes that "the State performed only one search when it 
obtained a sample of Ms. Randall's blood and subsequently 
analyzed it for the presence of alcohol or other prohibited 
drugs.  That single search ended when the State completed the 
blood draw."  Lead op., ¶39.  Further, it determines that "a 
defendant arrested for intoxicated driving has no privacy 
interest in the amount of alcohol in that sample.  Where there 
is no privacy interest, there can be no constitutionally-
significant search."  Id. 
II 
¶93 The lead opinion initially missteps by failing to 
ascribe independent constitutional significance to the testing 
of Randall's blood, conflating the lawful "seizure" of Randall's 
blood with the "search" conducted through chemical testing.  As 
a result, it collapses the seizure and search into a single 
constitutional event.  Such an error runs counter to the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' 
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
¶94 In Skinner, the Supreme Court explained that "[o]ur 
precedents teach that where, as here, the Government seeks to 
obtain physical evidence from a person, the Fourth Amendment may 
be relevant at several levels."  Id.  Beyond the initial seizure 
of evidence, "[t]he ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
obtain 
physiological 
data 
is 
a 
further 
invasion 
of [a 
person's] privacy interests."  Id. 
¶95 Mere months ago, the Texas court of criminal appeals5 
addressed a similar issue.  In State v. Martinez, the court 
determined that "the Supreme Court considers the analysis of 
biological samples, such as blood, as a search infringing upon 
privacy interests subject to the Fourth Amendment."  570 S.W.3d 
278, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).  It founded this conclusion on 
"Skinner's 
characterization 
that 
chemical 
analysis 
was 
a 
'further' invasion of privacy interests and that collection and 
testing were 'intrusions' (plural) that constituted 'searches' 
(plural)."  Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-617). 
¶96 Yet, the lead opinion gives short shrift to the 
passages from Skinner that clearly demonstrate that the Court 
considered the "collection" and "testing" as separate intrusions 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.  The testing is a "further 
invasion of . . . privacy interests."  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 
(emphasis added). 
¶97 The lead opinion instead misreads grammatically a 
single sentence of the opinion and apparently relies on the 
Skinner Court's use of the singular definite article "a" to 
assert that "[t]he Court's grammar also signaled it understood 
itself to be addressing a single search."  Lead op., ¶16 n.6.  
Such a singular focus fails to see the forest for the trees. 
                                                 
5 The Texas court of criminal appeals is the court of last 
resort in Texas in criminal matters, and its decisions are 
appealable to the United States Supreme Court. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶98 Further elucidating the lead opinion's error is the 
United States Supreme Court's very premise in Riley:  "whether 
the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on 
a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested."  
573 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added).  The distinction between the 
initial seizure and the analysis of the seized material is a key 
one, yet the majority treats the two discrete events as one 
continuous "search."  See lead op., ¶39. 
¶99 Contrary to the lead opinion's assertion, the testing 
of a person's blood is an independent "search."  Whether a 
"search" occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment turns on 
whether the government violates a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.  State v. 
Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶34, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 
(citations omitted). 
¶100 Under the facts we address here, Randall expressed her 
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of her blood 
by way of her letter to the State Crime Lab.  The next question 
in 
the 
analysis 
is 
whether 
society 
recognizes 
such 
an 
expectation as reasonable.  It is plain to me that it does.6 
¶101 One need look no further than "the existence of 
federal and state privacy laws governing the disclosure and 
                                                 
6 Like 
the 
lead 
opinion, 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence determines that "there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the alcohol concentration of blood that has been 
lawfully seized."  Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶63.  
I disagree with the concurrence for the same reasons I disagree 
with the lead opinion. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
transmission of health information, such as HIPAA" as reflective 
of 
a 
societal 
view 
that 
health 
information 
is 
private.  
Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 291.  It is an everyday reality for 
people to call a health care provider seeking a loved one's 
medical test results and to be denied access based on privacy 
concerns codified in state and federal law.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.82; 42 U.S.C. § 1230d-6.  This omnipresent practice 
informs society's reasonable expectation of privacy in blood 
test results. 
¶102 That 
society 
recognizes 
such 
an 
expectation 
as 
reasonable is further illustrated by the United States Supreme 
Court's opinions in Riley, 573 U.S. 373, and Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).  In Riley, the Supreme Court 
determined that a warrant is required to search digital 
information on a cell phone seized from an arrested person.  It 
reasoned: 
Modern cell phones are not just another technological 
convenience.  With all they contain and all they may 
reveal, they hold for many Americans 'the privacies of 
life[.]'  The fact that technology now allows an 
individual to carry such information in his hand does 
not make the information any less worthy of the 
protection for which the Founders fought.  Our answer 
to the question of what police must do before 
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple——get a warrant. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Id. at 403 (internal citation omitted).7 
¶103 At the forefront of the Riley Court's decision were 
the 
strong 
privacy 
interests 
inherent 
in 
the 
personal 
information contained on a cell phone.  See id. at 393.  It 
wrote: 
The United States asserts that a search of all data 
stored 
on 
a 
cell 
phone 
is 
'materially 
indistinguishable' from searches of these sorts of 
physical items.  That is like saying a ride on 
horseback 
is 
materially 
indistinguishable 
from 
a 
flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from 
point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping 
them together.  Modern cell phones, as a category, 
implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated 
by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a 
purse.  A conclusion that inspecting the contents of 
an arrestee's pockets works no substantial additional 
intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make 
sense as applied to physical items, but any extension 
of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its 
own bottom. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
¶104 In my view, the privacy concerns regarding the data on 
a cell phone apply equally to data that can be gathered from a 
person's blood.  Indeed, the Riley court observed concerns 
regarding medical information on cell phones as a key part of 
its rationale in requiring a warrant to search a phone's 
                                                 
7 The Riley court's analysis was founded on whether the 
search incident to arrest exception applied, but the decision's 
principles are applicable outside of that context.  See Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 401-02 (2014).  Indeed, the Court 
emphasized that an exception to the warrant requirement is 
necessary to justify a warrantless search of cell phone data.  
Id. at 402.  Such an assertion further supports the conclusion 
that searching the lawfully seized phone was an independent 
Fourth Amendment event. 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
contents.  Id. at 395-96 ("An Internet search and browsing 
history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone 
and could reveal an individual's private interests or concerns——
perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with 
frequent visits to WebMD.").  The amount of information that can 
potentially be gleaned from a person's blood is significant and 
goes beyond mere blood alcohol content.8  See Birchfield, 136 
S. Ct. at 2178. 
¶105 Downplaying this concern, the lead opinion asserts 
that "[a]lthough her blood contains a wealth of personal 
information, the tests undertaken by the State reveal only 
information directly related to the purpose for her arrest, to 
wit, the presence and concentration of alcohol or other 
prohibited drugs."  Lead op., ¶35.  However, the United States 
Supreme Court in Birchfield found it of concern that a blood 
test "places in the hands of law enforcement authorities a 
sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to 
extract information beyond a simple BAC reading.  Even if the 
law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the blood for 
any purpose other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and 
may result in anxiety for the person tested."  Birchfield, 136 
S. Ct. at 2178. 
                                                 
8 For example, a blood sample contains "private medical 
facts," including HIV status and whether a person is "epileptic, 
pregnant, or diabetic."  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 
U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶106 This consideration is amplified by the fact that a 
person does not know what information a blood test may reveal, 
and it could even reveal information not previously known.  See 
Kelly 
Lowenberg, 
Applying 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
When 
DNA 
Collected for One Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 1289, 1311 (2011).  The majority does not assuage this 
concern. 
¶107 In sum, there exists a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of a person's blood regardless of the 
purpose for which testing is sought.  Such an expectation does 
not disappear after the blood has been seized. 
¶108 Under 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
suppression 
is 
appropriate because testing was completed without a warrant and 
absent any exception to the warrant requirement.9  After Randall 
withdrew her consent for the blood to be searched, there existed 
                                                 
9 Such a conclusion does not necessarily mean that Randall 
is entitled to the return or destruction of a blood sample that 
was legally seized.  The blood sample was properly seized under 
an exception to the warrant requirement——consent.  As the Riley 
court wrote, "Both [defendants] concede that officers could have 
seized and secured their cell phones to prevent destruction of 
evidence while seeking a warrant. . . . That is a sensible 
concession."  Riley, 573 U.S. at 388 (citations omitted).  
Similarly here, the police can seize and secure the blood 
pursuant to Randall's given consent.  In other words, the 
initial seizure was accomplished pursuant to a valid exception 
to the warrant requirement and was thus constitutionally 
permissible. 
I agree with the circuit court that "[w]e've got a vial of 
blood or two vials of blood that an officer, I would expect, has 
probable cause to believe contains information about a crime; 
and now, because there is not consent, could ask for a warrant 
to have that blood searched." 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
no 
independent 
legal 
justification 
on 
which 
to 
base 
a 
warrantless test. 
¶109  For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1518-CR.awb 
 
1