Title: J & J CONSTRUCTION CO V BRICKLAYERS & ALLIED CRAFTSMEN LOCAL 1
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119357
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2003

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2003  
J & J CONSTRUCTION CO.,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 119357  
BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTSMEN, 
LOCAL 1 and MARK KING, jointly and 
severally,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
Plaintiff appeals the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
regarding several issues involving the Petition Clause of the  
First Amendment. We reverse that judgment and reinstate the  
judgment of the trial court.  
I. Facts and Procedural History  
Plaintiff, a construction company, submitted a bid to  
perform a masonry contract for the city of Wayne. Plaintiff  
was the low bidder for the contract.  Pursuant to the Wayne  
City Charter, the city council was obligated to award the  
contract to the lowest qualified bidder unless it determined  
that the public interest would be better served by accepting  
a higher bid. Wayne City Charter, § 13.1(d).1  
Defendant Mark King,2 a Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen  
Union field representative with fifteen years experience as a  
mason, 
discovered 
that plaintiff, a nonunion employer, was the  
low bidder for the masonry contract.  He thereafter set out to  
dissuade the city council from awarding the contract to  
plaintiff. In this effort, defendant presented privately to  
the city manager, and to the city council in public session,  
deceptive photographs of plaintiff’s masonry work that  
suggested plaintiff’s workmanship was of poor quality.  He  
also represented that plaintiff might not be able to perform  
the contract in a timely manner.  After plaintiff attempted to  
1Section 13.1(d) specifically provides:  
Purchases shall be made from the lowest  
qualified bidder meeting specifications, unless the 
Council shall determine that the public interest 
will be better served by accepting a higher bid, 
sales shall be made to the bidder whose bid is most  
advantageous to the City.  In any case where a bid, 
other than the lowest, is accepted, the Council 
shall set forth its reasons therefor in its  
resolution accepting such bid.  
2Because the trial court found that King was acting in 
his capacity as a union representative and thus on behalf of 
the defendant union during the events at issue, we will refer 
to both defendants in the singular.  
2  
 
 
respond to these allegations during the public meeting of the  
council, defendant made reference to the fact that plaintiff  
was a nonunion contractor that did not pay the prevailing wage  
to its employees.  
Because of its concerns regarding the allegations  
defendant made against plaintiff, the city council referred  
plaintiff’s 
bid 
to 
the city administration for further review.  
Following that review, the city council awarded the masonry  
contract to the second lowest bidder, stating in its  
resolution that “the Council had concerns as to the low bidder  
because of claims made about faulty workmanship and because of  
concerns about noncompliance with the payment of prevailing  
wages and fringe benefits . . . .”  
Having 
lost 
the 
contract bid, plaintiff filed a complaint  
against defendant for defamation and tortious interference  
with business expectations. Applying an ordinary negligence  
standard, the trial court found that defendant’s statements  
regarding 
the 
quality 
of 
plaintiff’s 
workmanship and  
plaintiff’s prospective ability to complete the job on time  
were false and defamatory, but that plaintiff failed to meet  
its burden of proving that defendant’s prevailing wage  
statements were false.  Regarding the defamation claim, the  
trial court rejected defendant’s argument that a qualified  
privilege existed because the statements were made while  
3  
 
petitioning the government, reasoning that the qualified  
privilege “actual malice” standard was inapplicable because  
plaintiff was a private, not a public, figure. Having found  
defendant’s statements regarding plaintiff’s workmanship and  
prospective ability to timely complete the project to be  
false, defamatory, and unprivileged, the trial court held  
defendant liable for defamation under MCL 600.2911(7).3  
In addition, the trial court concluded that the  
defamation formed the foundation for tortious interference  
with business expectations.  The court declined to protect  
defendant from liability from this claim on the basis of the  
principles of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,4 which protect  
petitioning activity from antitrust violations when the  
petition 
concerns 
legislative or regulatory issues.  The court  
concluded that defendant’s statements were not made in an  
3MCL 600.2911(7) provides:  
An action for libel or slander shall not be  
brought based upon a communication involving a 
private individual unless the defamatory falsehood 
concerns the private individual and was published 
negligently.  Recovery under this provision shall 
be limited to economic damages including attorney 
fees.  
4The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is derived from two United  
States Supreme Court cases pertaining to the Petition Clause 
and antitrust laws: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v  
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 US 127; 81 S Ct 523; 5 L Ed 2d 
464 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 
381 US 657; 85 S Ct 1585; 14 L Ed 2d 626 (1965).  
4  
 
attempt to urge legislative or regulatory policy decisions.  
In essence, the trial court applied what the Court of Appeals  
and the parties have termed a “market participant” exception  
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.5  
The 
trial 
court 
awarded plaintiff damages of $57,888, the  
loss of expected profits under the contract for both the claim  
of defamation and the claim of tortious interference with  
business expectations.  Attorney fees of $104,286.95 and  
interest of $26,044.51 were also awarded to plaintiff.  
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in  
part,6 reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.  
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
concluded that where petitioning activity  
is involved, the “actual malice” standard for defamation  
5The “market participant” exception to the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine, adopted in some jurisdictions, but 
rejected in others, generally provides that a petitioner is 
not insulated from liability for defamation while petitioning 
the government where the governmental entity is acting as a 
market participant, as opposed to making policy.  245 Mich App 
722, 733-734; 631 NW2d 42 (2001), citing George R Whitten, Jr,  
Inc v Paddock Pool Builders, Inc, 424 F2d 25 (CA 1, 1970) 
(adopting 
an 
exception 
to 
Noerr-Pennington where the  
government is performing a proprietary function); Greenwood  
Utilities Comm v Mississippi Power Co, 751 F2d 1484, 1505 n 14 
(CA 5, 1985) (expressly rejecting Whitten).  
6The trial court also rejected defendant’s argument that 
plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 USC 151 et seq.
 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding this federal 
preemption issue.  Defendant has not cross-appealed on this 
issue or moved to have it added as an issue of dispute before 
this Court.  Accordingly, we will not address that portion of 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
5  
 
 
claims established in New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US  
254; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964), applies regardless  
whether plaintiff is a private or public figure.  Because the  
trial court only issued a finding that defendant’s defamatory  
statements were negligent, the Court of Appeals remanded the  
case to the trial court for a determination whether  
defendant’s conduct constituted “actual malice.”  
Regarding the claim of tortious interference with  
business expectations, the Court of Appeals held that “‘the  
Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine 
is 
a 
principle 
of 
constitutional 
law  
that bars litigation arising from injuries received as a  
consequence 
of 
First 
Amendment 
petitioning 
activity,  
regardless of the underlying cause of action asserted by the  
plaintiffs.’”  245 Mich App 730, quoting Azzar v Primebank,  
FSB, 198 Mich App 512, 517; 499 NW2d 793 (1993). Relying on  
Azzar, the Court of Appeals concluded that defamation is  
actionable on the basis of petition activity only where the  
petitioning was actually a “sham.”  Further, the panel  
reversed the trial court’s application of the “market  
participant” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,  
writing that “[i]t is not obvious why different rights,  
duties, or immunities should apply when one is lobbying for  
political 
action 
in 
the form of outright commercial patronage,  
as opposed to legislation or enforcement actions.” 245 Mich  
6  
App 736.  
We granted leave to appeal. 466 Mich 859 (2002).  
II. Standard of Review  
Plaintiff’s appeal raises three issues of federal  
constitutional law7 regarding the Petition Clause: first,  
whether a private-figure plaintiff must prove “actual malice”  
in a defamation claim against a defendant whose contested  
statements 
were 
made 
while 
petitioning 
the 
government; 
second,  
considering the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, whether a cause of  
action exists for tortious interference with business  
expectations as the result of statements made by a defendant  
while petitioning the government; and third, whether there  
exists a “market participant” exception to the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine.  
The protections provided by the First Amendment,  
including the Petition Clause, have been extended to the  
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whitehill v Elkins, 389  
US 54, 57; 88 S Ct 184; 19 L Ed 2d 228 (1967). We review de  
novo issues of constitutional law.  McDougall v Schanz, 461  
7Const 1963, art I, § 3 provides that “[t]he people have 
the right peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common 
good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.” However, the parties 
have 
neither 
rested 
their 
arguments 
on 
this 
state  
constitutional right nor suggested that this provision is 
interpreted any differently from the Petition Clause of the 
First 
Amendment. 
 
Accordingly, our consideration is limited to 
the federal constitutional issues presented.  
7  
 
 
Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).  
III. Discussion  
A. Defamation 
 The first issue presented is whether the private-figure  
and 
public-figure 
dichotomy embodied in defamation case law on  
freedom of speech and freedom of the press from the United  
States 
Supreme 
Court 
extends to defamation involving the right  
to petition. The United States Supreme Court has never been  
squarely presented with, or decided, this question.8  
However, we are guided by the general Petition Clause  
defamation concepts announced in McDonald v Smith, 472 US 479;  
105 S Ct 2787; 86 L Ed 2d 384 (1985). 
In rejecting an  
8While in this opinion we conclude that McDonald v Smith, 
472 US 479; 105 S Ct 2787; 86 L Ed 2d 384 (1985), provides 
sufficient guidance to resolve the pending issues, we believe 
the Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether the 
private-figure and public-figure doctrine of free speech and 
free press defamation law announced in Gertz v Robert Welch,  
Inc, 418 US 323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974), 
discussed below, applies in a petition case.  
The Court had no cause to discuss the Gertz doctrine in  
McDonald, inasmuch as the McDonald plaintiff was a public 
figure and, thus, defendant was constitutionally entitled to 
the qualified immunity “actual malice” standard of New York  
Times, as a result of the McDonald Court holding that the 
Petition 
Clause 
provided 
no 
greater 
defamation 
protection 
than 
the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause.  In  
addition, under the state common law of North Carolina, which 
was at issue in McDonald, “actual malice” was the governing 
standard for both private-figure and public-figure defamation 
actions.  As a result, the fact pattern in McDonald did not  
invite or require a discussion of the private-figure and 
public-figure dichotomy.  
8  
 
  
argument that absolute immunity attaches to the right to  
petition, the McDonald Court wrote:  
To accept petitioner’s claim of absolute  
immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to  
special First Amendment status. 
The Petition  
Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of 
liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to 
speak, 
publish, 
and 
assemble. 
These 
First  
Amendment rights are inseparable and there is no  
sound basis for granting greater constitutional  
protection to statements made in a petition to the  
President than other First Amendment expressions.  
[McDonald, 
supra 
at 
485 
(internal 
citations  
omitted; emphasis added).]  
By this reasoning, at least regarding the constitutional  
law of defamation immunity, the Court has made clear that it  
considers the Petition Clause as offering no greater  
protection than that of the Free Speech Clause and the Free  
Press Clause.  In so concluding, we believe the Court has  
strongly signaled its view that all the Free Speech Clause and  
Free Press Clause defamation doctrine developed in the past  
forty years is to be imported without change to constitutional  
adjudications 
arising 
under 
the 
Petition 
Clause.9  
Accordingly, an analysis of relevant United States Supreme  
Court case law on free speech and free press defamation is  
essential. Production Steel Strip Corp v Detroit, 390 Mich  
9In interpreting the federal constitution, state courts  
are not privileged to provide greater protections or  
restrictions when the Supreme Court of the United States has 
refrained from doing so.  Arkansas v Sullivan, 532 US 769, 
772; 121 S Ct 1876; 149 L Ed 2d 994 (2001).  
9  
 
508, 514; 213 NW2d 419 (1973).  
Under long-settled constitutional principles concerning  
the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of  
the press, a public-figure plaintiff must establish that a  
defendant made defamatory statements with “actual malice” in  
order to prevail in a defamation action.  New York Times,  
supra 
(establishing 
the 
“actual 
malice” 
standard 
for 
liability  
for defamation of public officials); Curtis Publishing Co v  
Butts, 388 US 130; 87 S Ct 1975; 18 L Ed 2d 1094 (1967)  
(extending the “actual malice” standard to public figures).  
“Actual malice” exists when the defendant knowingly makes a  
false statement or makes a false statement in reckless  
disregard of the truth.  New York Times, supra at 280. In  
other words, a defamation defendant is entitled to a qualified  
privilege in the form of a heightened “actual malice” standard  
required to be met by a public-figure plaintiff.  
In contrast, a defamation defendant whose alleged  
defamatory statements pertained to a private figure receives  
no such constitutional protection under case law on freedom of  
speech and freedom of the press. Rather, the states are left  
to decide for themselves whether a private-figure plaintiff  
must establish more than ordinary negligence as a predicate  
for recovery for defamation. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418  
10  
 
 
 
US 323, 346-348; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974).10  In  
Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich 157; 398  
NW2d 245 (1986), this Court held that a defamation defendant  
is not entitled to a qualified privilege in a case involving  
a private-figure plaintiff under Michigan law, and thus  
declined to extend greater protection than constitutionally  
required under Gertz.11
 More important, the Michigan  
Legislature codified the Rouch holding in 1988, statutorily  
providing that defamation of a private figure requires only a  
showing of negligence, not actual malice. MCL 600.2911(7).12  
Because the United States Supreme Court has concluded  
that the right to petition should be accorded no greater  
protection than the rights to free speech and free press,  
10Gertz specifically held that “so long as they do not 
impose liability without fault, the States may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a 
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to 
a private individual.” Id. at 347. Accordingly, defamation 
against a private figure still requires that fault be 
established.  In addition, private-figure plaintiffs may only  
recover actual damages under a negligence standard for 
defamation.
 In order to recover any presumed or punitive 
damages, Gertz requires proof of actual malice. Id. at 350.  
11Where the alleged defamation concerns both a private 
figure and a matter of private concern, the burden of proving 
that the statement was not false rests with the defendant.  
However, where the statements are of public concern, the 
private-figure plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity. 
Rouch, supra at 181, citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v  
Hepps, 475 US 767; 106 S Ct 1558; 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986). In  
this case, plaintiff proved falsity at trial.  
12See n 3.  
11  
 
 
McDonald, supra at 485, we conclude that the private-figure  
and public-figure dichotomy that applies to defamation claims  
involving the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause,  
Gertz, supra at 342-347, also applies to defamation claims  
involving the Petition Clause.  Accordingly, we reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals that the “actual malice”  
qualified immunity standard of New York Times applies in  
Petition Clause defamation cases regardless whether the  
plaintiff is a private or public figure. Extending Gertz in  
the 
manner 
suggested 
by McDonald, a defamation defendant whose  
statements about a private figure are made while petitioning  
the 
government 
is 
not constitutionally entitled to a qualified  
immunity in the form of the heightened “actual malice”  
standard.
 Because MCL 600.2911(7) provides no greater  
protection for such defendants, the Court of Appeals erred.  
The trial court’s decision concerning plaintiff’s defamation  
claim is reinstated.  
B. Tortious Interference With Business Expectations  
Although we maintain reservations about the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals regarding the claim of tortious  
interference 
with 
business 
expectations, 
concerning 
the 
Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine and any “market participant” exception to  
that doctrine, we need not review those issues here.  
The 
trial 
court 
awarded damages for lost business profits  
12  
 
 
 
under alternative theories of defamation and tortious  
interference with business expectations based on defamation.  
Attorneys 
fees 
were 
awarded pursuant to MCL 600.2911(7), which  
pertains to defamation actions. In light of our reversal of  
the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding defamation and  
the resulting reinstatement of the trial court’s decision on  
that claim, the full judgment amount awarded by the trial  
court to plaintiff is restored.  
Accordingly, our disposition of the remaining federal  
constitutional issues raised by the parties and decided by the  
Court of Appeals will not alter the ultimate resolution of  
this case. 
This Court will not unnecessarily decide  
constitutional issues, People v Riley, 465 Mich 442, 447; 636  
NW2d 514 (2001), and it is an undisputed principle of judicial  
review that questions of constitutionality should not be  
decided if the case may be disposed of on other grounds.  
MacLean v Michigan State Bd of Control for Vocational Ed, 294  
Mich 45, 50; 292 NW 662 (1940).  
For these reasons, we decline to address the federal  
constitutional 
issues 
presented 
concerning 
the 
Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine and the suggested “market participant”  
exception to that doctrine.  Although we question the analysis  
of the Court of Appeals regarding those issues, our resolution  
of the case makes it unnecessary for us to address them.  
13  
 
Conclusion  
The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the  
private-figure and public-figure dichotomy present in freedom  
of speech and freedom of the press case law is inapplicable to  
defamation claims involving the right to petition.  In  
McDonald, supra at 485, the United States Supreme Court stated  
that “there is no sound basis for granting greater  
constitutional protection to statements made in a petition  
. . . than other First Amendment expressions.” Accordingly,  
it 
is 
clear 
that 
the 
constitutional rules regarding defamation  
claims involving the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press  
Clause are applicable to defamation claims involving the  
Petition Clause.  
The private-figure and public-figure dichotomy being one  
of the constitutional rules, we hold that private-figure  
defamation plaintiffs are only constitutionally required to  
prove ordinary negligence in order to establish defamation in  
cases involving the right to petition.  No qualified immunity  
is constitutionally provided to defamation defendants whose  
statements about private figures are made while petitioning  
the government.  Because MCL 600.2911(7) does not provide  
greater 
protection 
for 
defamation 
defendants 
than  
constitutionally 
required, 
ordinary 
negligence 
is 
the 
standard  
required to be met by private-figure defamation plaintiffs in  
14  
cases involving the Petition Clause.  
For these reasons, we reverse and vacate the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial  
court.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
15  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
J & J CONSTRUCTION CO.,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 119357  
BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTSMEN, 
LOCAL 1 and MARK KING, jointly and 
severally,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
YOUNG, J. (concurring).  
Given that we are constrained to follow our best  
understanding of the United States Supreme Court’s direction  
concerning the Petition Clause, I write separately to suggest  
that a proper application of the rules of constitutional  
interpretation produces a result contrary to that reached in  
McDonald v Smith, 472 US 479; 105 S Ct 2787; 86 L Ed 2d 384  
(1985). I believe that, under an originalist interpretation  
of the Petition Clause, the defendant union and union  
representative 
would 
enjoy 
an 
absolute 
immunity 
from  
plaintiff’s suit for their petitioning activity. Should the  
Supreme Court of the United States seek to revisit its  
Petition 
Clause 
jurisprudence, 
there 
is 
significant,  
 
persuasive 
historical 
evidence 
suggesting 
that 
the  
contemporary 
understanding 
of 
the 
Petition 
Clause 
as 
announced  
in McDonald 
is 
incompatible with the original understanding of  
the Petition Clause.  
If our majority has correctly determined that McDonald  
stands for the proposition that, at least concerning  
defamation immunity, the sibling clauses of the First  
Amendment have no distinctive meaning under our Constitution,  
I believe McDonald was incorrectly decided. 
Further, an  
attempt to import constitutional law on defamation involving  
free speech and free press to situations involving the right  
to petition raises questions about the soundness of such a  
principle, as exemplified by our application of the private­
figure and public-figure dichotomy to the present case.  
Accordingly, by laying out the historical record  
supporting a conclusion based on an originalist understanding  
of the Petition Clause, it is my hope that the United States  
Supreme Court may choose an alternative course to the one  
suggested by McDonald.  
I. The Petition Clause  
A. The Rules of Constitutional Interpretation  
In interpreting a constitution, the primary objective is  
to discern the original intent of the constitutional text.  
See, e.g., Utah v Evans, 536 US 452, 491; 122 S Ct 2191; 153  
2  
 
 
 
 
 
L Ed 2d 453 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and  
dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy, J.); McIntyre v Ohio  
Elections Comm, 514 US 334, 359; 115 S Ct 1511; 131 L Ed 2d  
426 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment, quoting South  
Carolina v United States, 199 US 437, 448; 26 S Ct 110; 50 L  
Ed 
261 
[1905]); 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Secretary  
of State, 464 Mich 359, 373; 630 NW2d 297 (2001) (YOUNG, J.,  
concurring); People v DeJonge, 442 Mich 266, 274-275; 501 NW2d  
127 (1993). 
See also, 1 Story, Commentaries on the  
Constitution of the United States (4th ed, 1873), § 426, p 315  
(Justice Story stated that the Constitution must “have a  
fixed, uniform, permanent, construction . . . not dependent  
upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same  
yesterday, to-day, and forever”); Bork, The Tempting of  
America (New York: The Free Press, 1990), ch 7, pp 143-160;  
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
University Press, 1997), pp 37-47.  Further, the rights  
created under the Bill of Rights must be preserved as they  
existed in 1791.  McIntyre, supra at 371-372 (Scalia, J.,  
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (stating that the  
traditional view held by the Court and society is that the  
Constitution’s original meaning is unchanging); Curtis v  
Loether, 415 US 189, 193; 94 S Ct 1005; 39 L Ed 2d 260 (1974)  
(a common-law action that becomes statutory is nonetheless  
3  
 
 
 
 
protected by the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury);  
Story, supra. 
This principle of interpretation follows  
inexorably from the fact that the People provided an explicit  
method and means for amending the Constitution. US Const, art  
V.  
The questions presented in this case concern the meaning  
of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. Accordingly,  
a thorough analysis of both the history of the practice of  
petitioning the government before its codification in 1791 as  
a part of the First Amendment and the common understanding of  
the text of the Petition Clause at that time is in order.  
B. The Original Understanding of the Petition Clause  
1. The Pre-1791 History of the Petition Right  
The right to petition has historical roots in Anglo- 
American constitutional history dating back to 1013. Smith,  
“Shall make no law abridging . . .”: An analysis of the  
neglected, but nearly absolute, right of petition, 54 U Cin L  
R 1153, 1154-1155 (1986) (discussing English nobles’ petition  
to Aethelred the Unready in 1013).  Even before democracy was  
practiced in Great Britain, petitioning was recognized as a  
right granted by the royal sovereign to his subjects, as  
evidenced in the Magna Carta of 1215. 
Id. at 1155.  
Developing through the centuries, “petitioning reached  
enormous popularity” during the era of the Civil War and  
4  
 
 
 
  
Interregnum in England.  Id. at 1157. 
In fact, James I  
expressly provided “the Right of his subjects to make their  
immediate Addresses to him by Petition.”  Id., quoting 5 Parl  
Hist Eng App ccxiv (1701) (Proclamation 10 July, 19 Jac).  
Charles I followed suit and it is documented as late as 1644  
that 
he 
invited 
petitioning and promised that such petitioning  
would be heard. Id.  
In the case of Lake v King, 1 Wms Saund 131, 85 Eng Rep  
137 (1668), whether a defamation action could lie where the  
alleged defamatory statements were made while petitioning  
Parliament was at issue.1 
In Lake, as in the present case,  
the libel at issue was civil in nature.  Defendant King’s  
petition to Parliament allegedly defamed plaintiff Lake, yet  
it was held that because the defendant was petitioning  
Parliament, his statements were immune from liability.  Thus,  
Lake established that absolute immunity from defamation  
1Although I realize that the Supreme Court in White v  
Nichols, 44 US (3 How) 266, 289; 11 L Ed 591 (1845), labeled 
Lake 
“anomalous” 
and 
inconsistent 
with 
“modern 
adjudications,” 
I note that constitutional interpretation inquiries are 
directed at the original understanding of a provision. 
Accordingly, that Lake proved to be inconsistent with post­
1791 adjudications should be of no consequence where there is 
no record of Lake’s vitality being questioned before 1791. 
Nor does the absence of any pre-1791 challenge to Lake warrant  
that its rule of law be considered “anomalous.”  This is  
particularly evident where subsequent events can be relied on 
as an indication that Lake was considered sound. 
See the  
discussion below regarding The Case of the Seven Bishops, 12 
Howell’s State Trials 183 (1688), and the establishment of the  
English Bill of Rights.  
5  
 
 
actions attaches to a petition, regardless whether the  
petition contains libelous statements. Id.  
If there were any question that petitioners in England  
were protected from defamation liability following Lake, The  
Case of the Seven Bishops, 12 Howell’s State Trials 183  
(1688), and the monumental pivot in English constitutional  
history 
that 
immediately followed Seven Bishops appear to have  
resolved the matter.  In April 1688, James II decreed that all  
churches read a declaration, “Liberty of Conscience,” at  
divine services, which directive many bishops and clergy  
refused to follow.  After seven bishops petitioned to be  
relieved from the King’s mandate, they were prosecuted for  
seditious libel. Smith, supra at 1160-1161.  
A central inquiry in Seven Bishops was whether the  
defendants were “petitioning” the King. Seven Bishops, supra  
at 320-321. 
Defense counsel advanced that the King’s  
indicting document—the information—was insufficient inasmuch  
as it presented the bishops’ allegedly libelous statements in  
an excerpted fashion, separated from the petition as a whole.  
The King’s prosecutors argued that the defamatory statements  
were delivered in the pretense of a petition and thus only the  
libelous paragraphs were germane.  The resolution of this  
question was dispositive because unpopular political speech  
and press were prosecuted as seditious libel during this  
6  
 
period 
in 
English 
history. 
Smith, 
supra 
at 
1180.  
Accordingly, if the bishops’ statement was not properly  
communicated pursuant to the recognized petition right,  
namely, in a petition, the bishops were not immune and could  
have been rightly prosecuted for seditious libel. Following  
a lengthy discourse, the entire petition was permitted to be  
introduced into evidence and provided to the jury for its  
deliberations.  The jury returned a verdict of not guilty.  
Id. at 1161.  
Notwithstanding the verdict in Seven Bishops, James II  
appealed to the army to enforce his Liberty of Conscience  
decree.  In response to the King’s appeal, much of the army  
declined, laying down their arms. Thereafter,  
[a] convention of the peers and representatives of 
the realm resolved on January 28-29, 1689, that 
James II had broken the “original contract between 
King and people.”  The crown was offered to William  
and Mary upon the condition that they accept the 
Declaration of Rights; acceptance was given on 
February 13, 1689.  The Declaration of Rights 
provided “that it is the right of the subjects to  
petition 
the king, 
and 
all 
commitments 
and  
prosecutions for such petitioning is illegal.”  
[Smith, supra at 1162 (emphasis added).]  
The adoption of this petition right in the English Bill  
of Rights evinces a clear understanding that the rule of Lake,  
that petitions to Parliament may not be the subject of  
defamation actions, was also the rule concerning petitions to  
the king.  As the English codified petition right provided in  
7  
 
 
 
 
1689, it is the “right of the subjects to petition the king,  
and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are  
illegal.” Schnapper, “Libelous” petitions for redress of  
grievances–Bad historiography makes worse law, 74 Iowa L R  
303, 315 (1989), quoting An Act declaring the Rights and  
Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the  
Crown (The Declaration of Rights), 1 W & M, sess 2, ch 2  
(1688-1689), 9 Statutes at Large 67, 69 (Pickering 1764).  
That the people of England intended their petitions to be  
immune from all penalty seems unquestionable in light of the  
textual language of the 1689 Declaration of Rights,  
particularity given the English people’s awareness of the  
Seven Bishops case and the historical events it prompted.2  
Thus, Lake, the dispositive inquiry in Seven Bishops  
regarding 
whether 
the defendants’ speech was in petition form,  
and the historical effect of Seven Bishops are instructive  
about the scope and meaning of the petition right before 1791.  
First, they crystalize the common-law understanding in late  
seventeenth-century England that speech was absolutely immune  
when made in petition form.  Second, the historical role that  
Seven Bishops had in inducing the creation of the English Bill  
2Defense counsel in Seven Bishops proclaimed to the Court 
that the dispute was “a case of the greatest consequence that 
ever was in Westminster-hall . . . or in this court.” Seven  
Bishops, supra at 239.  
8  
 
 
 
of Rights (Declaration of Rights) and the explicit inclusion  
of the right to petition in the English Bill of Rights  
immediately 
following 
the 
Seven 
Bishops 
decision 
reinforce 
the  
foundational 
understanding of the importance and full scope of  
the right to petition. Finally, the elementary distinctions  
maintained between the freedoms of speech and press and the  
right to petition in the seventeenth century is evident in  
Lake and Seven Bishops, where the outcomes were influenced by  
whether 
the 
defendants’ 
statements 
were 
made 
while 
petitioning  
because 
the 
same 
subject matter spoken outside the petitioning  
activity was not protected. Smith, supra at 1177, 1180.  
“The American colonies adopted and adapted the right to  
petition from petition’s English precursors.” Mark, The  
vestigal constitution: The history and significance of the  
right to petition, 66 Fordham L R 2153, 2161 (1998). “In no  
case did the colonial affirmation of the right narrow the  
English right.”  Id. at 2175. 
Indeed, our Declaration of  
Independence is the most famous example of the colonists’  
commonplace use of petitioning as a recognized political  
right:  
We have Petitioned for Redress in the most  
humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been 
answered only by repeated injury.  
Following the drafting of the Constitution in 1787 and  
its ratification in 1789, it became clear that the Anti­
9  
 
 
 
Federalists would demand amendments to the Constitution to  
assure 
the 
continued 
protection 
of 
the 
well-understood 
natural  
rights that a self-governing people do not forfeit to their  
government.  Mark, supra at 2207. Regarding consideration of  
the petition right, what arose was a focus on the role of the  
petition right in the new national governmental experiment  
and, more directly, an exhaustive dialogue regarding whether  
any petitioning should be accompanied by the power to instruct  
the people’s representatives.  Instruction was ultimately  
rejected.  
No discussion is recorded that challenged the protective  
scope of the petition right recognized under English law and  
practiced in the colonies, including the protection from  
defamation under the case law of Seven Bishops and Lake.  
Schnapper, supra at 345 (1989) (stating that “there is  
absolutely no contemporaneous history suggesting that anyone  
connected with the framing and approval of the petition clause  
harbored any objection to or intended any limitation on the  
right to petition as it had existed under English law prior to  
the Revolution and as it continued in the several states.”).  
Accordingly, 
the 
lack of any discussion regarding limiting the  
petition right as it was understood at that time undoubtedly  
suggests that the Petition Clause that was ratified as a part  
of the First Amendment, in 1791, embodied the same petition  
10  
 
 
 
right present in the English Bill of Rights and freely  
practiced in colonial America.  
In fact, even codified qualifications on the petition  
right found in several colonial and early state declarations  
of rights were not included in the First Amendment Petition  
Clause.3
 Smith, supra at 1181-1182. 
Without textual  
references 
in 
the 
Petition 
Clause 
itself 
suggesting 
otherwise,  
and the rejection in the adopted Petition Clause of any of the  
minor qualifications that were prescribed by individual  
colonies and states, the compelling conclusion is that the  
First Amendment drafters and ratifiers intended the broad  
petition protection that had been recognized in England and  
practiced in the colonies.  
This conclusion is fortified by the contentious debate  
that occurred regarding the lack of a Bill of Rights in the  
original Constitution. 
Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia  
(Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1966), ch XXI, pp 243-253.  
Anti-Federalists 
were 
astounded 
that 
the 
proposed 
Constitution  
failed to expressly protect the rights of free people that  
3While there existed a few qualifications on the form and 
manner of presentation of petitions that were unique to 
individual colonial states, none addressed defamation.  
Several colonies and states required that a petition be 
submitted in an “orderly and peaceable manner.”  Smith, supra 
at 1181-1182.  This requirement was consistent with statutory 
requirements that accompanied the English Bill of Rights, but 
it did not concern the content of the petition.  
11  
 
 
dated back to the Magna Carta.  Id. at 245; The Federalist  
(New York: Barnes & Nobel, Wright ed, 1996), p 15.  The  
Federalist 
response 
was not, however, that these rights should  
not be protected or should be protected differently than they  
had been in the past.  Rather, the Federalists advanced, inter  
alia, that the rights of man were so well established and  
understood that the listing of them was not only unnecessary,  
as the federal government could not touch them, but dangerous  
inasmuch as it would be impossible to list all the natural  
rights of man.  Hamilton, Federalist No 84 (available at  
Wright ed, supra at 535); Bowen, supra at 245.  
Therefore, 
the 
1787-1789 debate whether to include a bill  
of rights in the Constitution reveals that neither the  
Federalists nor Anti-Federalists questioned the vitality of  
the various rights specifically proposed to be listed in such  
a bill of rights, rights that were eventually adopted in 1791.  
Rather, these rights were admitted to exist and be preserved  
as rights natural to all men in the new Constitution, and the  
debate on these rights concerned only whether they should be  
constitutionally codified. 
Accordingly, this 1787-1789  
discussion of the rights that were eventually incorporated as  
the Bill of Rights in 1791 is persuasive support for the  
proposition that the drafters and ratifiers of the Petition  
Clause clearly understood what the petition right meant: what  
12  
 
  
it had always meant.  
In colonial America, two characteristics of the petition  
right further disclose the broad reach and distinctive role  
the right was understood to have in our new republic.  First,  
just as the petition right protected the king’s subjects in  
England from prosecution for libel, petitioning was available  
in America to the enfranchised as well as the disenfranchised.  
Petitioning was apparently one of the few mechanisms by which  
the disenfranchised joined the enfranchised in the political  
life of colonial America.  Mark, supra at 2169-2170.  In fact,  
the right to petition was considered so fundamental to the  
operation of government that in documented cases “women, free  
blacks, and even slaves, were allowed to petition” in colonial  
America, as were prisoners.  Smith, supra at 1172; see also  
Mark, supra at 2181-2184 (citing Bailey, Popular Influence  
Upon 
Public 
Policy: 
Petitioning 
in 
Eighteenth 
Century 
Virginia  
[Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979], pp 43-46).4  
This broad availability of the right of petitioning  
government was contemporaneous with explicit statutory  
limitations on freedom of speech and press that were enacted  
4At least in colonial Virginia, the right to petition was 
not limited by class, sex, or race. Bailey, supra at 43. In  
fact, 
Bailey 
documents that after the Virginia legislature was 
given authority over the manumission of slaves in 1776, 
petitions increased from blacks both free and enslaved. Id.  
at 44.  
13  
 
 
and practiced in colonial America.  Smith, supra at 1171  
(discussing licensing of the press and punishment for  
offensive 
political 
speech 
in 
Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, 
and  
New York as late as the early 1720s); see also Garry, The  
American Vision of a Free Press (1990).  “Seditious libel laws  
existed in all of the colonies, and punishment for statements  
critical of the government was an accepted, lawful practice  
which continued even after the framing and ratification of the  
First Amendment.”  Spanbauer, The First Amendment right to  
petition government for a redress of grievances: Cut from a  
different cloth, 21 Hastings Const L Q 15, 37 (1993).  Yet,  
the presentation of a petition to the government was not  
considered a “publication” under the libel laws in both  
England and colonial America.  Id. at 38; see also Clar,  
Comment, Martin v City of Del City: A lost opportunity to  
restore the First Amendment right to petition, 74 St John’s L  
R 483 (2000).  
In addition, while there is a clear indication that the  
First Amendment drafters rejected the idea that the people  
could “instruct” their representatives, the understanding of  
the petition right in 1787 was that petitioning was such an  
influential force in the idea of self-government that it  
included the right to consideration and response.  Mark, supra  
at 2204-2212.  In other words, the filing of a petition with  
14  
 
the government entitled the petitioner to legislative  
consideration of the petition, as well as a legislative  
response to the petition.  
Interestingly, one of the most powerful indications of  
the breadth of, and political importance attached to, the  
right of petition in the early days of the United States  
occurred within its first years of founding and immediately  
before the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  The filing of the  
Quaker petitions in the 1st Congress in 1790, concerning  
demands for ending the practice of slavery, occasioned what  
many congressional members considered a constitutional crisis  
that might destroy the fragile new national government. See  
Ellis, Founding Brothers (New York: Knopf, 2000), ch 3, pp 81­
119.  What is remarkable for constitutional analysis is not  
that 
such 
politically 
and 
constitutionally 
explosive 
petitions  
were filed, but why the petitions were not simply ignored by  
America’s new Congress and why none of the Quaker petitioners  
was threatened with prosecution for defamation or sedition.  
It is well understood that one of the significant  
constitutional compromises that was struck in order to gain  
approval within the Constitutional Convention (and eventually  
among the colonies that were to adopt the proposed  
constitution) was the Sectional Compromise. The question of  
how to address the slavery issue in a national government  
15  
proved to be impossible for the drafters to wholly resolve.  
Ellis, 
supra 
at 
85-86. Consequently, the Sectional Compromise  
placed the issue of the slave trade beyond the powers of the  
federal government until 1808, by adding article I, § 9, cl 1,  
to the Constitution.5  Ellis, supra at 85-86. It was believed  
that 
by 
thus 
placing 
the 
importation-of-slaves 
question 
beyond  
congressional reach the issue of slavery would not raise its  
divisive and insoluble head, at least in the early days of the  
Union.  Bowen, supra at 200-204. However, the founders and  
ratifiers who so believed had not reckoned on the passionate  
abolitionist Quakers of the Northeast who well understood and  
would exercise their right to petition. Ellis, supra at 81.  
Notwithstanding clause 1 of article I, § 9, upon receipt  
of the Quaker petitions, one personally endorsed by Benjamin  
Franklin, the 1st Congress was immediately convulsed over how  
to proceed.  Id. at 81-119. 
There was much debate about  
whether the Quaker petitions should be read in the House  
chamber because of their potential to rekindle a question the  
drafters of the Constitution, a number of whom were members of  
the 1st Congress, were unable to resolve other than by  
5“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of 
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not 
be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand 
eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on 
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.” 
US Const, art I, § 9, cl 1.  
16  
 
 
 
  
constitutionally 
deferring 
its 
consideration 
for 
twenty 
years.  
Ellis, supra.  Eventually, the Congress resolved to refer the  
Quaker petitions to a special committee for a more private  
consideration.
 Thereafter, the 1st Congress adopted a  
resolution permanently precluding the consideration of the  
slavery question.6 
Id.  
Again, even given the constitutional crisis that the  
Quaker petitions posed for the new national government, the  
remarkable thing about this historic episode is that there  
does not appear to be any indication that the 1st Congress  
believed 
it 
could 
simply ignore the petitions, despite Article  
I, § 9, cl 1.  More important, these petitioners were not  
prosecuted for what at least the southern members of Congress  
undoubtedly considered libelous, seditious statements.  
2. The Text of the Petition Clause  
As a textual matter, I note that although the United  
States Supreme Court has stated that all the First Amendment  
6A good deal of the congressional time and activity was 
devoted to the debate on the Quaker petitions, with veiled 
threats of secession made by southern members of Congress if 
any aspect of slave practices were disturbed by the federal 
legislature.  Ellis, supra.  Eventually, by resolution, the 
1st Congress adopted an amended recommendation of the  
committee formed to consider the Quaker petitions.  Ellis,  
supra at 118 (citing De Pauw, 3 Documentary History of the  
First Federal Congress of the United States [Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Univ Press, 1972], p 341). That resolution forbade not 
only 
congressional 
consideration of the issue of slavery until 
1808, but banned its consideration forever. Ellis, supra at  
118.  
17  
 
 
 
rights are cut from the same cloth, McDonald v Smith, supra at  
482, the clauses are nonetheless distinct in their natures.7  
The First Amendment provides:  
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably 
to 
assemble, 
and 
to 
petition 
the  
Government for a redress of grievances.  
Inasmuch as the First Amendment protects the “freedom of  
speech,” the word “speech” has often been dissected in order  
to determine what constitutes speech.  In this pursuit, the  
United States Supreme Court has often focused on the subject  
of the speech.  See, e.g., Miller v California, 413 US 15; 93  
S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973) (obscenity); Virginia State  
Bd of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc, 425  
US 748; 96 S Ct 1817; 48 L Ed 2d 346 (1976) (commercial  
speech); Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568; 62 S Ct 766;  
7At the least, the presentation of the Petition Clause as 
one separate from the clauses concerning freedom of speech in 
the First Amendment alerts us textually that the purpose and 
intent of the Petition Clause must be distinct from its  
sibling clauses. Higginson, A short history of the right to  
petition government for the redress of grievances, 96 Yale L  
J 142, 155-156 (1986).  Further, I note that whereas the Free 
Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause are separated by a 
comma, both are separated from the Petition Clause by a semi­
colon.
 
See 
Kesavan 
& 
Paulsen, 
Is 
West 
Virginia  
constitutional?, 90 Cal L R 291, 334-352 (2002) (discussing, 
inter alia, the interpretation of the sixty-five semi-colons 
contained in the original constitution, particularly the 
punctuation of US Const, art IV, § 3 concerning the creation 
of new states).  
18  
 
86 L Ed 1031 (1942) (fighting words); RAV v City of St Paul,  
505 US 377; 112 S Ct 2538; 120 L Ed 2d 305 (1992) (hate  
speech).  In fact, case law on freedom of speech has developed  
a bifurcated analysis differentiating whether contested  
regulations on expression are “content-neutral” or “content­
based.” 
See, 
e.g., 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed),  
§ 12-2, pp 791-792.  
However, while the text of the Free Speech Clause fairly  
invites an analytical focus on the subject of speech, the text  
of the Petition Clause, the right “to petition,” denotes a  
focus not on the identity of the speaker or subject matter,  
but the identity of the listener. 
The text of the First  
Amendment 
accordingly implies that where the government is the  
listener, the speaker’s right to petition the government is at  
issue.  
This textual distinction is not, in my opinion, without  
significance. Rather, it signals the original intent of the  
Petition Clause to protect citizen input when presented in the  
form of a petition to government, regardless whether it would  
be considered “speech” or “press” under the sibling clauses of  
the First Amendment.  
3. Post-1791 Development  
While petitioning in colonial America afforded even the  
disenfranchised access to the People’s representatives,  
19  
 
 
 
  
petitioning eventually atrophied as a popular tool of self­
governance at the center of our republican form of government  
with the increased emphasis on voting and the expansion of  
rights of enfranchisement in the United States.8  Mark, supra  
at 2154, 2158-2160.  Because petitioning itself has receded in  
its political prominence, it is not hard to understand why,  
especially with the enormous expansion of protections now  
accorded under the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press  
Clause during the last century, the Petition Clause has lacked  
apparent independent political importance in constitutional  
adjudication.  Despite what I believe is a compelling  
historical and textual case for according the Petition Clause  
distinctive meaning,9 by the twentieth century, the federal  
judiciary had all but relegated the Petition Clause to the  
8See, e.g., the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments, which extended the right to vote to individuals 
regardless of race, color, or previous servitude and to women 
and citizens eighteen years old and older.  
9Further, it seems illogical that the founders, wary of 
an overpowering and unaccountable federal government, would 
create immunity from defamation for governmental actors under 
the Speech and Debate Clause, US Const, art I, § 6, cl 1, but 
expose the People to defamation when petitioning.  Barr v  
Mateo, 360 US 564; 79 S Ct 1335; 3 L Ed 2d 1434 (1959). 
Consider a mutually libelous exchange between a citizen and a 
congressman 
at 
a 
congressional hearing.  While the congressman 
would be absolutely immune from liability because of the 
Speech and Debate Clause, under McDonald’s interpretation of 
the Petition Clause, the citizen would face potential 
liability. 
Such an outcome seems incompatible with the 
founders’ understood view that the People are the masters and 
the government the servant.  
20  
 
status of a step-sibling without independent identity or  
import apart from the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press  
Clause of the First Amendment.  Our contemporary Petition  
Clause jurisprudence is thus entirely anchored in that  
developed under the other First Amendment clauses.  See, e.g.,  
McDonald, supra.  
4. Resolution  
Although I would adhere to the principle that a  
constitutional provision is to be interpreted consistently  
with its original understanding,10 I acknowledge that our  
obligation is to follow the United States Supreme Court’s  
interpretation of this constitutional provision.  In light of  
the Court’s holding that absolute immunity from defamation  
does not exist for petition activity in McDonald, I accept as  
I must the analysis offered in my majority opinion.  
10While I acknowledge that contemporary, postratification 
judicial interpretations of a constitutional provision could 
permissibly aid an effort to determine the original intent of 
a provision, I suggest that such consideration is misplaced 
where the original intent can be surmised from the  
preratification understanding of the provision’s meaning. 
Inasmuch as McDonald essentially ignores the preratification 
understanding of the petition right, I find its concentration 
on 
the 
postratification 
case 
law 
insufficient 
and 
unjustified. 
Schnapper, supra (stating that McDonald fails “to discuss any 
seventeenth- 
or 
eighteenth-century 
materials 
that 
might 
reveal 
the contemporaneous understanding of the petition clause, but 
relies instead solely on postratification materials,” id. at  
305, and concluding that “[h]ad McDonald written his letter . 
. . to President Washington or to George III, rather than to 
President Reagan, a libel action by Smith would have been 
dismissed out of hand,” id. at 343).  
21  
 
 
However, I believe the history and text of the petition  
right, as analyzed above, support an interpretation that the  
Petition Clause is distinct from its First Amendment siblings  
and therefore deserves consideration regarding whether  
distinct treatment in the constitutional law of defamation is  
warranted under the Petition Clause.  For this reason, I  
believe McDonald was incorrectly decided.  
II. Application of the McDonald Principle  
While I concur in the majority opinion because of the  
clear direction provided by McDonald, in addition to my  
original-intent analysis, I believe there are meritorious  
arguments for declining to extend the private-figure and  
public-figure defamation distinction to cases involving the  
right to petition. 
Further, the flaw of the McDonald  
principle that the First Amendment clauses are to be treated  
without distinction in defamation cases is exposed, in my  
opinion, by the extension of the private-figure and public­
figure dichotomy to petition-right cases—particularly the  
present case.  
The rationale for the private-figure and public-figure  
dichotomy announced in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323;  
94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974), seems potentially  
misplaced in petition settings where the alleged defamation  
damages derive from the resulting actions of the government.  
22  
 
 
Gertz reasoned 
that 
private individuals are more vulnerable to  
defamation than public figures because public figures have  
“significantly greater access” to the media and can use the  
media to counteract false statements.  Gertz, supra at 344.11  
It is arguable that the Gertz “access to the media”  
rationale in the free speech and free press contexts is ill­
fitted to the right to petition context, particularly where a  
plaintiff’s damages are a product of the adverse actions of  
government, albeit induced by a third party. 
Unlike  
falsehoods disseminated by or in the media, access to city  
council meetings is not similarly limited.  City council  
meetings are generally not run so that only public figures can  
be heard and private figures ignored.  A central purpose of a  
11I recognize that Gertz also opined that public figures 
deserve less protection against defamation because they have 
“voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury 
from defamatory falsehood[s],” Gertz, supra at 345, unlike 
private persons.  While this reasoning would appear to provide  
an alternative Gertz-based avenue for extending the private­
figure and public-figure dichotomy to the Petition Clause, I 
suggest that this rationale is also perhaps misplaced in a 
petition setting like the present one.  
Although it is well established in the case law on 
freedoms of speech and press that a private figure who throws 
himself into a public dispute can become a limited purpose 
public figure for defamation qualified immunity purposes, 
Gertz, supra at 351, plaintiff in this case petitioned the 
city council to award him a public contract.  It appears 
questionable to me that one who invites comment from his 
fellow citizens by petitioning the government on a public 
issue, seeking the fruits of a taxpayer-funded construction 
project, remains a private figure.  
23  
 
public meeting of the city council is to allow citizenry input  
and to maximize the exposure of the government’s decision­
making in an open meeting.  
In fact, the access to respond to defamatory statements  
in a petition context is evident in the present case, where  
plaintiff was given the opportunity at the city council  
meeting to answer defendant’s assertions.  Further, the  
Petition Clause itself protected plaintiff’s right to deliver  
a written petition to the city council in order to answer the  
defamatory statements made by defendant. For these reasons,  
it is questionable whether the rationale for the private­
figure and public-figure dichotomy announced in Gertz, and  
applied in defamation actions involving freedom of speech or  
freedom of press, provides a solid foundation for the private­
figure and public-figure standard in the right to petition  
context.  This extension is particularly questionable where  
the damages are a result of a decision made by the listener,  
a city council, to which both plaintiff and defendant have  
constitutionally guaranteed access under the Petition Clause.  
III. Conclusion  
An 
analysis 
of 
the original understanding of the Petition  
Clause leads to the conclusion that McDonald was incorrectly  
decided.  Consistent with its preratification history and its  
text, I believe that the Petition Clause offers protections  
24  
 
distinct from its sibling clauses under the First Amendment  
and that the defendant union representative’s statements were  
absolutely immune from defamation liability.  
However, McDonald provides this Court with clear  
direction about whether the private-figure and public-figure  
dichotomy of free speech and free press defamation law is to  
be extended to petition right defamation cases.  As this Court  
is bound by McDonald because of the Supremacy Clause of the  
United States Constitution,12 I reluctantly but obediently  
agree with the analysis set forth in my majority opinion.  
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
12US Const, art VI, cl 2.  
25  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
J & J CONSTRUCTION CO,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 119357  
BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTSMEN, 
LOCAL 1 and MARK KING, jointly and 
severally,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I agree with the majority’s observation that the United  
States Supreme Court has never been squarely presented with  
the question whether the public-figure and private-figure  
dichotomy embodied in the case law on defamation involving  
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and Free Press Clause  
should extend to defamation cases involving the Petition  
Clause.  However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion  
that McDonald v Smith, 472 US 479; 105 S Ct 2787; 86 L Ed 2d  
384 (1985), requires application of the public-figure and  
private-figure dichotomy to Petition Clause defamation cases.  
 
While, arguably, McDonald may allow application of the  
dichotomy to Petition Clause defamation cases, it certainly  
does not require it.  Further, the principles expressed by our  
high court do not support the majority’s conclusion. Because  
I do not agree with the majority’s assertion that McDonald  
forces states to import the public-figure and private-figure  
dichotomy to Petition Clause defamation cases, and because I  
recognize the historical significance of the Petition Clause,  
as well as the fact that the text and structure of the  
Petition Clause in the Michigan Constitution differ from the  
text and structure of the First Amendment of the United States  
Constitution, I respectfully dissent. I would ask the parties  
for additional briefing regarding the effect of the Petition  
Clause in the Michigan Constitution.  
I.  THE PETITION CLAUSE: IS THERE A PUBLIC-FIGURE VERSUS  
PRIVATE-FIGURE DISTINCTION?  
The majority acknowledges that the defamation action in  
McDonald was brought pursuant to North Carolina’s common law,  
which requires a showing of “actual malice” to recover for  
defamation, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public or  
a private figure.1
 The majority concludes that this  
1 Plaintiff’s cause of action in this case, by contrast, 
arises under Michigan’s defamation statute, MCL 600.2911(7), 
which provides:  
An action for libel or slander shall not be  
(continued...)  
2  
 
 
 
application of state law by the United States Supreme Court  
“strongly signaled its view that all Free Speech Clause and  
Free Press Clause defamation doctrine developed in the past  
forty years is to be imported without change to constitutional  
adjudications arising under the Petition Clause”2 and rejects  
an alternative interpretation, instead relying on Arkansas v  
Sullivan, 532 US 769; 121 S Ct 1876; 149 L Ed 2d 994 (2001).  
The majority states:  
In interpreting the federal constitution, 
state courts are not privileged to provide greater 
protections or restrictions when the Supreme Court 
of the United States has refrained from doing so. 
[Ante at 11 n 9.]  
In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court reversed the  
Arkansas Supreme Court’s holding that it was free to interpret  
the United States Constitution to provide greater protection  
than United States Supreme Court federal constitutional  
precedent provides.  The Sullivan Court noted that such a  
possibility was foreclosed by Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714; 95 S  
Ct 1215, 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975):  
We reiterated in Hass that while “a State is  
1(...continued) 
brought based upon a communication involving a 
private individual unless the defamatory falsehood 
concerns the private individual and was published 
negligently.  Recovery under this provision shall 
be limited to economic damages including attorney 
fees.  
2 Ante at 10.  
3  
 
 
 
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater 
restrictions on police activity than those this 
Court 
holds 
to 
be 
necessary 
upon 
federal  
constitutional standards,” it “may not impose such 
greater restrictions as a matter of federal  
constitutional law when this Court specifically 
refrains from imposing them.” [Sullivan at 772, 
quoting Hass at 719 (emphasis in original).]  
The majority’s reliance on Sullivan is misplaced for two  
reasons.  First, requiring all plaintiffs to prove that  
defamatory 
statements were made with actual malice in Petition  
Clause defamation cases would not impose a “greater  
restriction” than that imposed by the United States Supreme  
Court in McDonald. In fact, it would apply the same standard  
utilized by the Court in McDonald. The majority’s reliance on  
Sullivan is also misplaced because the United States Supreme  
Court has not “specifically refrained” from applying the  
actual-malice standard to private-figure plaintiffs in  
Petition Clause defamation claims. 
This remains, as  
acknowledged by the majority, a question not yet decided by  
the United States Supreme Court.  
Further, in McDonald, the United States Supreme Court  
held that the right to petition should be accorded no greater  
protection 
than 
other 
First 
Amendment 
expressions, 
inasmuch 
as  
absolute immunity was held inappropriate.  McDonald did not  
hold that the right to petition was limited to the same  
protection as the rights to free speech and free press. The  
4  
  
 
  
 
 
Court did not indicate a clear intent to import the veritable  
plethora of jurisprudence surrounding the rights to free  
speech and free press into Petition Clause defamation.  
Moreover, the principles articulated in McDonald do not  
support the interpretation employed by the majority.  The  
question the Court was presented with in McDonald was  
whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment  
provides absolute immunity to a defendant charged 
with expressing libelous and  damaging falsehoods 
in letters to the President of the United States.  
[McDonald at 480.]  
The Court repeatedly examined the claim of absolute  
immunity in light of the actual-malice standard.  Reviewing  
early state libel cases, the McDonald Court determined that  
there were conflicting views of the privilege afforded  
petitioners: some states afforded petitioners absolute  
immunity, while others allowed recovery for petitioning  
activity performed “maliciously, wantonly, and without  
probable cause . . . .” Id. at 483, quoting, Gray v Pentland,  
2 Serg & R 23 (Penn, 1815).  The McDonald Court also noted  
that in White v Nicholls, 44 US (3 How) 266; 11 L Ed 591  
(1845), it did not recognize an absolute privilege, rather it  
concluded that “the defendant’s petition was actionable if  
prompted by ‘express malice . . . .’” McDonald at 484. The  
McDonald opinion does not mention negligence; it simply holds  
that there is not absolute immunity for Petition Clause  
5  
 
  
defamation.  
As scholars have noted:  
The text [of McDonald] merely requires proof 
of actual malice ‘defined...in terms...consistent  
with New York Times v. Sullivan.’ If the Court had  
intended to establish the entire public/private 
figure [dichotomy] for Petition Clause [defamation] 
cases, [it] would have discussed Gertz v Robert  
Welch, Inc. [Gary, First Amendment Petition Clause  
immunity from tort suits: In search of a consistent  
doctrinal framework, 33 Idaho L R 67, 110  
(1996)(citations omitted).]  
McDonald is more commonly interpreted as employing the  
actual-malice standard of New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US  
254; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964); to interpret McDonald  
as 
incorporating 
the 
public-figure 
and 
private-figure  
dichotomy is a misreading of the case. Gary at 109; see also,  
4 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law (3d ed),  
§ 20.53, p 690 n 3 (The Petition Clause does not require state  
libel law to expand the qualified privilege already afforded  
by New York Times.).  
Justice 
Brennan’s 
concurrence 
in 
McDonald 
provides 
useful  
insight, he stated:  
There is no persuasive reason for according 
greater or lesser protection to expression on 
matters of public importance depending on whether 
the expression consists of speaking to neighbors 
across the backyard fence, publishing an editorial 
in the local newspaper, or sending a letter to the 
President of the United States.  It necessarily 
follows that expression falling within the scope of 
the Petition Clause, while fully protected by the 
actual-malice standard set forth in New York Times  
6  
 
Co v Sullivan, is not shielded by an absolute  
privilege. [McDonald at 490.]  
“This forceful statement suggests that actual malice is  
the standard for petitioning activity, regardless of the  
status of the plaintiff.” Gary at 112.  
Thus, while it is clear that the United States Supreme  
Court intended that a defendant claiming immunity from  
defamation on the basis of the Petition Clause not be afforded  
absolute immunity, it is not at all clear that the Court  
intended 
the 
qualified 
immunity 
to 
apply 
differently 
depending  
on whether the plaintiff is a public or a private figure.  The  
majority’s assertion that McDonald requires the states to  
import 
the 
public-figure 
and 
private-figure 
dichotomy  
applicable in free-speech and free-press cases is simply not  
supported by a careful reading of that case.  
II. MICHIGAN’S PETITION CLAUSE  
While I recognize the principles underlying, and the  
historical significance of, the Petition Clause, as outlined  
by Justice Young in his concurring opinion, I am reluctant to  
question the wisdom of the United States Supreme Court in  
interpreting the federal constitution.  However, on the basis  
of 
the 
principles 
noted in Justice Young’s concurring opinion,  
I think the bench and bar in this state would benefit from a  
thorough analysis of the protections afforded petitioners  
under the Michigan Constitution. Because this Court was not  
7  
 
presented with such an analysis, I would request additional  
briefing from the parties.  
Notably, the structure of Const 1963 differs from the  
federal constitution.  Each right included in the federal  
constitution’s First Amendment is expressed as a separate  
clause in Const 1963, art 1, the Declaration of Rights.  Const  
1963, art 1, in pertinent part, provides:  
Sec 2.  No person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be 
denied the enjoyment of his civil or political 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise 
thereof because of religion, race, color or  
national origin.  The legislature shall implement 
this section by appropriate legislation.  
Sec 3.  The people have the right peaceably to  
assemble, to consult for the common good, to 
instruct their representatives and to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.  
Sec. 4.  Every person shall be at liberty to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience. . . .  
Sec. 5.  Every person may freely speak, write, 
express and publish his views on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of such right; and 
no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the 
liberty of speech or of the press.  
By contrast, the First Amendment to the federal constitution  
provides: 
 Congress shall make no law respecting an  
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably 
to assemble, 
and 
to 
petition 
the  
Government for a redress of grievances.  [US Const, 
Am I.]  
8  
 
 
 
Because McDonald’s determination that the rights to free  
speech and free press and the right to petition were  
inseparable was based on the structure of the Petition Clause,  
and because the structure of Michigan’s Petition Clause is  
decidedly different from the federal clause, I would inquire  
whether the framers of the Michigan Constitution intended to  
afford greater protection to petitioners by creating a  
distinct clause.  Because this issue was not briefed by the  
parties, and, thus, is not properly before the Court, I would  
ask the parties for further briefing on the issue.  
III. CONCLUSION  
I do not agree with the majority that McDonald requires  
states to impose the public-figure and private-figure  
dichotomy when deciding Petition Clause defamation cases.  
Further, McDonald can be and has been interpreted as  
establishing that, whenever the right to petition is  
exercised, that right is afforded the protection of the  
actual-malice standard. 
Because I believe it may be  
significant 
that 
the 
text and structure of Michigan’s Petition  
Clause 
differs 
from 
the 
federal 
constitution’s 
First 
Amendment  
and because I recognize the historical significance of the  
right to petition in a democratic society, I would request  
additional briefing.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
9