Title: STATE v BAIN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13754
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 1978

No. 13754 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, ALLYN WESLEY BAIN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith, Connor, VanValkenburg & Larrivee, Missoula, Montana Fred VanValkenburg argued, Misoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana / & $ f s e l n a e , L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Ed McLean argued, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Keith Plaristuen, Legal Intern, County Attorney's Office, Missoula, Montana Submitted: December 9, 1977 Decided: MAR - 1 1 9 7 8 Filed: MAR - 1 19te Hon. R. D. McPhillips, D i s t r i c t Judge, delivered the Opinion of the Court: This is an appeal by defendant Allyn Wesley Bain from a conviction by a jury i n the D i s t r i c t Court, Missoula County. I n the early evening of M a y 10, 1976, defendant walked from downtown Missoula, Montana t o the 2000 block of South Avenue to v i s i t family friends. When he l e f t h i s friends' house about 1 1 : O O p.m. it was windy and raining lightly. Defendant did not l i v e i n Missoula, but was staying i n Missoula with a cousin, Karen Skroch, who lived i n the Holly- wood Trailer Court, 1700 Cooley Street. This was across town from where defendant's friends lived. A s defendant walked back t o the t r a i l e r court, the weather became worse. Defendant started looking i n parked cars a s he was passing to see i f one was unlocked and had keys i n it. H e noticed keys i n a car parked on the 1400 block of South 5th West. H e took the car, which belonged t o Ray Otto, and drove t o h i s cousin's t r a i l e r . Defendant parked the car outside the t r a i l e r , went inside, and soon went t o bed. The next morning defendant awoke around 10:OO or 1 1 : O O a.m. and upon remembering the stolen car was outside, he decided t o drive the c a r t o downtown Missoula and leave it parked somewhere. O n h i s way downtown, defendant was spotted by Lieutenant Richard Thurman, who recognized the car a s a stolen car from a list of stolen cars he carried i n h i s vehicle. Defendant saw the police c a r and attempted t o escape. Lieutenant Thurman i n i t i a l l y l o s t sight of the car, but radioed for help i n searching the area for it. H e soon spotted the car again and proceeded t o pursue it with l i g h t s flashing and siren blaring. Defendant did not stop, but attempted t o escape by traveling through the Missoula s t r e e t s a t speeds between 25 t o 50 miles per hour. The police chased de- fendant f o r approximately 15 blocks before defendant was stopped by a police car ramming into the car defendant was driving. There were no injuries and defendant, offering no resistance, was taken into custody. The only damage t o the car resulted from the police ramming it, i n t h e i r attempt t o stop it. Defendant did not take anything from the c a r , did not change the vehicle identification number, did not repaint it, nor change the license plates. . Defendant was charged with t h e f t , a felony, i n violation of section 94-6-302, R.C.M. 1947. T r i a l commenced October 4, 1976 and concluded October 5, 1976. During the course of t r i a l , defendant moved f o r a mistrial on the grounds of alleged prosecu- tion misconduct. The motion was denied. The jury convicted defendant of the offense of t h e f t and he was sentenced t o 10 years i n the Montana s t a t e prison. T w o issues are presented on appeal: 1) Was the conduct'of the prosecuting attorney during t r i a l prejudicial t o defendant thereby denying him a f a i r t r i a l ? 2) Was there substantial evidence t o support defendant's conviction of the offense of t h e f t ? O n d i r e c t examination defendant t e s t i f i e d he did not stop when he f i r s t saw the police because he knew he was driving a car t h a t did not belong t o him, and because he did not have a valid driver's license. Before the prosecution cross-examined defendant, counsel for both parties had a hearing before the t r i a l judge and out of the presence of the jury. The prosecution believed defendant "committed a fraud" upon the jury by testifying that he did not stop when he first saw the police only because he was driving a car that belonged to someone else and because he did not have a valid driver's license. It therefore wanted to go into defendant's parole status, contending the defendant's primary motive was that if caught driving a stolen vehicle, he would be returned to the Montana state prison. The prosecution cited no authority for its contention and the court refused to allow the prosecution to go into defendant's background. On cross-examination immediately following the hearing in the trial judge's chamber, this colloquy occurred: "BY MR. McLEAN: [Deputy County Attorney] Q . Mr. Bain, have you ever been convicted of a felony? A. Yes, I have. Q . Did that have anything to do with why you avoided Lieutenant Thurman? "m. VanVALKENBURG: [defendant's attorney]. Objection, Your Honor. I'm asking the Court to declare a mistrial at this point. He' s trying to do something here that he can't do. "THE COURT : Sustained. "MR. VanVALKENBURG: Will the Court grant a mistrial? "THE COURT: No, not mistrial; I'm just saying -- "MR. VanVALKENBURG: Then I'd ask the Court to instruct Mr. McLean to stick with what his questions are supposed to be. "rHE COURT: Very well, you're so instructed, Mr. Mc1,ean. IJQ. (By Mr. McLean) Why did you avoid Lieutenant Thurman? A. I told you. "Q. Tell me again, please. A . Okay, because I didn't have a driver's license. I was driving a stolen vehicle. "Q. Mr. Bain, did you have any other motive other than being in a stolen vehicle and being without a driver's license for avoiding Lieutenant Thurman when he put on his siren? A. No. "Q. No. Now, that i s your direct and unequivocal answer t o that question? A. Didn't have any other motive except I didn't have a driver's license and I was driving a stolen vehicle. "Q. I n regard t o that, do you need to acquire per- mission from anyone t o come into Missoula? "MR. V a n V A L K E N B U R G : Your Honor, I ' m going to object. I think you already know the grounds. "THE COURT : Sustained . "MR. V a n V A L K E N B U R G : I ' m going t o ask that M r . McLean be admonished t o refrain from questioning i n t h i s area, and that he receive some instruction from the Court. "THE COURT: The objection is well taken, and the jury w i l l disregard the question just asked by M r . McLean. "Q. [BY M r . ~ c ~ e a n ] Can I ask you: I f you're such a law abiding citizen, why you -- God damn, didn't you stop when you saw the sirens or lights behind you? "MR. V a n V A L K E N B U R G : A l l right, asked and answered. "THE COURT : Overruled. "MR. M c L E A N : Pardon, Judge. "THE COURT: Overruled. "A. I told you that because I was i n a stolen vehicle and I didn't have no driver's license." I n rebuttal, the prosecution wanted t o put on the stand a witness from the Adult Probation Office'to establish the fact defendant was on parole and had no authority t o be i n Missoula. The Court would not allow the witness t o take the stand. Under the United States Constitution and the 1972 Montana Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right t o a f a i r t r i a l . United States Constitution, Amendment -5 ; 1972 Montana Constitu- tion, Article 11, Section 24. Misconduct by the prosecutor qay form the basis of a new t r i a l where the prosecutor's actions have deprived the defendant of a f a i r and impartial t r i a l . State v. Toner, (1953), 127 / , . Mont. 283,-* P.2d 971. This Court has recognized that evidence of the same kind a s that previously ruled incompetent should not be repeatedly offered within the hearing of the jury, and i f so offered, even though rejected, may be grounds for reversal. State v. Searle, (1952), 125 Mont. 467, 239 P.2d 995. I n State v. Toner, supra, t h i s Court held that a defendant has not had a f a i r and impartial t r i a l where the prosecutor continually asks the defendant o r h i s witnesses prejudicial and incompetent questions. The s t a t e apparently f e l t the questions asked were valid questions and that the Court was i n error for not allowing the s t a t e t o question defendant about h i s parole status. The s t a t e f e l t t h i s evidence was relevant to defendant's intent t o deprive the owner of h i s car. Evidence was already introduced t o show that when defendant saw the police, he did not return o r park the car but fled. Defendant admitted he knew he would be i n trouble for driving a stolen vehicle and not having a valid driver's license. Any possible evidence regarding defendant's parole status could not add t o defendant's already demonstrated intent t o evade the police. Not a l l evidence is admissible merely because it may be relevant. The court must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potentially prejudicial effect on the defendant's right t o a f a i r t r i a l . The t r i a l judge should and does have latitude of discretion on the admissiblity of such evidence. State v. Rollins, (1967), 149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d 462. See: ~ o n t a n a ' s new Rules of Evidence, Rule 403, effective July 1, 1977. Here,there was already evidence i n the record t o show defendant's admitted and very apparent intent t o avoid capture. The additional evidence regarding defendant's parole or probation status would only prejudice the defendant. The court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the evidence was inadmissible . It is not the duty of the prosecuting attorney t o make independent determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence once the court rules such evidence is inadmissible. Willful attempts by counsel t o place excluded evidence before the jury may result not only i n a mistrial, but reversal. A s a general rule, evidence of a separate or c o l l a t e r a l crime is not admissible. But an exception may occur when one criminal a c t is so closely related t o the one upon which the charge i s based a s t o form part of the "res gestae". State v. Hensley, (1976), Mont . , 554 P.2d 745, 33 St.Rep. 874. However, there is no application of that rule involved i n the factual situation here. W e next consider whether the repeated attempts t o place the excluded evidence before the jury was prejudicial t o defendant. Under the existing rules of evidence a t the time of the t r i a l , defendant was properly asked the question i f he had ever been convicted of a felony. The defendant responded, yes. This evidence was admissible for purposes of impeachment, section 93-1901-11, R.C.M. 1947. Despite the court's ruling, the prosecution then attempted t o ask defendant several ques- tions from which it could be inferred that defendant was on probation o r parole. I n determining whether such questions are so prejudicial t o the defendant as t o require reversal, t h i s Court must look (1) t o the reasonable inference t o be drawn from the questions, State v. Toner, supra, and (2) whether such repeated attempts t o offer excluded evidence might have contributed t o the conviction. State v. Langan, (1968), 151 Mont, 558, 445 P.2d 565. The only reasonable inference that could be taken was that defendant not only was a convicted felon, but was on parole o r probation, thereby putting into issue further evidence of bad character. The issue of defendant's character was never opened by the defense. Given the f a c t the jury deliberated some 6 hours before rendering a verdict of "guilty", and the fact that the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle i s a lesser included offense within the crime of t h e f t , State v. Shults, 169 Mont. 33, 544 P.2d 817, certainly rendered a very r e a l possibility of prejudice to defendant i n the factual situation of t h i s case. W e hold the repeated attempts t o put the excluded evidence before the jury t o be reversible error. W e have reversed the case on the f i r s t issue, therefore it is not necessary t o discuss the second issue. The judgment of the t r i a l court i s reversed and a new t r i a l is ordered. I I Hon, R.D. McPhillips, District Judge, s i t t i n g for M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell. We Concur: Justices.