Title: People v. Huddleston
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 96367
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2004

Docket No. 96367-Agenda 3-March 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
GERALD SCOTT HUDDLESTON, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 4, 2004. 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Gerald Huddleston, was charged by information in the
circuit court of Livingston County with three counts of predatory criminal
sexual assault pursuant to section 12-14.1(a) of the Criminal Code of
1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)). Each count
pertained to a separate victim. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion
seeking to have section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code declared
unconstitutional, arguing that it violates state principles of proportionality
and due process. Section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) mandates a sentence of natural
life imprisonment when a person is "convicted of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child committed against 2 or more persons regardless of
whether the offenses occurred as the result of the same act or of several
related or unrelated acts." 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(b)(1.2) (West 2002).
The circuit court deferred ruling on the motion until after it had heard
evidence in the case.
	After the court found defendant guilty on all three counts, the court
entertained arguments on defendant's motion and ultimately ruled that the
statute is not unconstitutional "on its face." The court left open the question
of whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied to defendant
until the court considered the evidence adduced at sentencing. Following
the presentation of that evidence, the circuit court ruled that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to defendant in that it violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §11). The court sentenced defendant to consecutive 10-year
sentences of imprisonment. The State appealed directly to this court. See
134 Ill. 2d R. 603. The sole issue we are asked to consider is whether the
circuit court erred in holding section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code
unconstitutional as applied to defendant. We hold that it did.

BACKGROUND
	The information in this case, filed on May 9, 2002, alleged that
defendant had committed an act of predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child, on or about March or April of 2002, in that he had placed his penis
in the mouth of C.D., a child "nearly" 10 years old. The other two counts
charged that defendant had committed similar acts with 10-year-old K.F.
and D.R. on or about May 7, 2002.
	On September 12, 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress a
statement he had made to the police and a motion challenging the
constitutionality of the sentencing provisions of section 12-14.1(b)(1.2)
of the Code on grounds that it violates constitutional principles of
proportionality and due process. On October 31, 2002, the circuit court
heard testimony and argument on defendant's motion to suppress. The
evidence presented indicated that defendant initially denied having
engaged in any sexual activity with the children and he continued to do so
for "a period of time." However, he eventually acknowledged that he had
engaged in acts of sexual penetration with the children, and he gave a
statement to that effect. The court ultimately denied defendant's motion to
suppress, ruling that defendant's statement was "both voluntarily and
knowingly given." The court deferred ruling on defendant's other motion
until it had heard the evidence in the case.
	The matter was tried before the court on November 12 and 13,
2002. Detective Earl Dutko of the Livingston County sheriff's department
testified that he and Detective John Johnson met with defendant on May
8, 2002, at defendant's home in Fairbury. They arranged for the
defendant to meet with them at the Fairbury police department. At the
police department, defendant was informed of his rights and apprised of
the allegations against him. Defendant initially denied any involvement. At
some point in the questioning, defendant was asked about a criminal
"conviction" in McLean County in 1996. The presentence report indicates
that defendant had pled guilty to public indecency in 1996. After a time,
defendant acknowledged improprieties with the children and he agreed to
provide a written statement of his activities. He declined to participate in
an audio/video statement. Detective Dutko identified defendant's written
statement, which was subsequently admitted into evidence. The statement,
with appropriate modification to protect the privacy of the juvenile victims,
reads, verbatim, as follows:
			"I Scott Huddleston do hereby attest that while in the course
of my teaching duties I had inappropriate sexual contact with
three of my students. After school I played a food taste game
with them and placed my penis in their mouth [sic]. I placed my
penis in [C.D.]'s mouth for a period of about 15 seconds. In
[K.F.]'s for about 5 seconds. And in [D.R.]'s for 30 seconds.
I used food for them to lick off. Food which I had left-over in my
day's lunch. I stopped at the end of [D.R.]'s time because I
became aroused and realized how wrong it was. I never would
have physically hurt them. Never!! It was a stupid thing to do
and I know that. All of the incidents occurred after the school
day was over.
			I used pudding on May 7th with [D.R.] and [K.F.]. I cannot
recall the food that I used with [C.D.]. I wish that I could tell
them how sorry I am for betraying their trust. I need help with
this problem. Please let them know that I was wrong and that
adults can still be trusted.
			I had only intended to have them help me in cleaning chores
in the room. Something snapped inside me and I went too far. I
wish I could fix my transgressions. I don't know why I did what
I did. I need help concerning this. My wife and son mean
everything to me. I am sorry for disappointing them. I ask for
everyones forgiveness.
			I never fantasized about doing this. It was a stupid thing that
happened that I truly regret." (Emphases in original.)
	Detective Johnson testified, corroborating what Detective Dutko said
in his testimony. Johnson stated that defendant "eventually *** confided
*** that he had in fact had sexual acts with the children." Johnson also
noted that the officers had questioned defendant about a 1996 incident in
his criminal history. The officers asked defendant what had occurred
during that incident, and whether the conduct might have involved young
victims.
	C.D. testified that she was born on June 19, 1992, and, in the spring
of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in
Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. Sometime
in March of 2002, defendant asked her to come to the art room. She was
alone with defendant in the art room for about 15 minutes after school,
and he suggested that they play a food taste-test game. Defendant seated
her in a "really tiny" chair, along the same wall as the only door to the
room, but at the other end of the room from the door.
	After he blindfolded her, defendant gave her foods and she tried to
guess what they were. Defendant first placed pickles in her mouth; she
recognized the taste. He then gave her chocolate pudding. She testified
that she could taste the chocolate, but she could not identify the type of
food or the object it was on. Defendant did not place a spoon in her
mouth; it was, rather, a cylindrical object. After she guessed incorrectly,
defendant told her it was pudding, he took off the blindfold, and she left
the room.
	Sometime later, she spoke to the other two victims and they came to
the consensus that "something weird" was going on. Subsequently, they
mentioned the incidents to the lunch room teachers.
	K.F. testified that she was born on October 7, 1991, and, in the
spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in
Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. Pursuant
to defendant's designation, she was the helper in defendant's art class on
May 7, 2002. She stayed after school to help clean up. Defendant told her
if she did a good job she would get to play a taste-test game. After she
had finished cleaning up, defendant placed her in a small chair back in the
corner of the room, where she could not be seen from the door. He
blindfolded her and the "game" began.
	Defendant first gave her marshmallows and then pretzels to taste. She
guessed correctly and was given Starburst candy as a reward. Defendant
then put either pudding or peanut butter in her mouth. The object he used
was not a spoon or a wooden stick or tongue depressor. Defendant was
so close to her at the time that she could feel her breath back in her face.
She felt "kind of weird." Defendant told her to open her mouth wider, so
he could get the object into her mouth. K.F. said the substance she was
given did not taste at all like pudding or peanut butter. She described it as
"sour and salty and nasty."
	When K.F. told defendant she was going to take off her blindfold,
defendant said, "No, wait," and ran behind her. She heard defendant get
a paper towel out of the towel dispenser and wipe something off. She also
heard a sound like pants going together. It took defendant a while, but he
finally told her she could take the blindfold off, get her Starburst, and go.
K.F. talked about the incident with her friends afterward.
	D.R. testified that she was born on April 17, 1992, and, in the spring
of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in
Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. On May
7, 2002, she was in the boys and girls club after school and decided to go
to the art room to finish a project. Defendant was there and asked if she
wanted to play a game. He took her to the back of the room, along the
same wall as the door, and told her to sit down in a small chair. He then
placed food in her mouth: first a marshmallow, then a graham cracker,
then pudding. The pudding was not on a spoon or a wooden object such
as a tongue depressor. It was on something long, straight and circular. The
end of the object was round. It was bigger than a marker. D.R. swallowed
the pudding from the object and it was then removed from her mouth. At
that time, there was a knock at the door. Defendant said she could take
off the blindfold and leave.
	D.R. later told her teacher about the incident. In fact, D.R. said she
thought something was not right when she went home that night. She
thought the pudding did not taste right, and the object used to introduce
it into her mouth was a part of a person, and should not have been in her
mouth.
	After D.R.'s testimony, the State rested. The defense rested without
presenting evidence. The court found defendant guilty on all three counts.
On January 2, 2003, prior to the commencement of defendant's
sentencing hearing, the circuit court ruled that section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of
the Code is "on its face valid." The court left open the question of
"whether that statute is a constitutional exercise of authority by the
legislature as it is applied to this defendant and the facts of this case." The
court reserved ruling on that issue until it heard the evidence at sentencing.
	Just prior to the taking of testimony at defendant's sentencing hearing,
the court acknowledged that it had received and examined the
presentence report. The report was compiled from reports of the
Livingston County sheriff's department, the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services, and other sources available to the reporting
probation officer. Given the magnitude of the issue before us, we will
examine the report, and all other evidence pertinent to sentencing, in
depth.
	The report cites various oral statements defendant made that
elaborate on the details of the crimes. For example, defendant admitted
that he had put chocolate pudding on the end of his penis and K.F. had
licked it off. Afterward, he turned around, wiped off the pudding with a
paper towel, and then pulled up his pants. Later the same day, he again
put pudding on the end of his penis and put his penis in D.R.'s mouth for
about "thirty to sixty seconds." Defendant stated, "I think I got an erection
towards the end." He admitted he told her: "open your mouth big" and
"use your tongue." Defendant acknowledged he had previously placed his
penis in C.D.'s mouth for "about fifteen or thirty seconds." Examination
of garbage taken from defendant's classroom shortly after the incident
revealed therein two paper towels with a brown substance on them that
appeared to be chocolate pudding.
	Defendant expressed sorrow for what he had done. As noted
previously, when he gave his written statement, defendant voiced concern
for the welfare of the children.
	School secretary Stephanie Nagey was interviewed and told of an
incident approximately one month before when she had gone to
defendant's classroom to deliver a message to him at the end of the school
day. Nagey found the door to the classroom locked. Defendant came to
the door and stood in the doorway, seeming to block her entrance. Nagey
noticed one of the victims (C.D.) in the room and Nagey wondered why
she was still there at that time of day. Nagey noticed that defendant
seemed "hurried," and she felt she had intruded on something and was not
welcome there.
	The presentence report indicates that defendant sent his wife and
pastor to the school on May 29, 2002, to remove some of his personal
items, and they were allowed to do so. However, defendant's pastor was
not allowed to open defendant's locked filing cabinet. Subsequently, with
the school principal's permission, defendant's filing cabinet was forcibly
opened to further the investigation of this matter. Inside the cabinet,
officers found female underwear, Playboy magazines, pornographic
pictures, pornographic playing cards, a pornographic catalog, a video tape
containing, in part, a pornographic movie, and 48 computer discs, 28 of
which contained pornography. All the subjects depicted in the
pornography were adults.
	On a written information sheet, completed as part of the presentence
investigatory process, defendant stated:
			"Your honor, I feel that a life sentence is too extreme. I would
like the chance to prove to you and society that I can be
rehabilitated. I have already lost my house, car, and my job. My
wife and son mean the world to me. Please give me a chance to
prove myself."
	The portion of the presentence report dedicated to criminal history
contains only one notation relevant to the issue before us. On October 5,
1996, defendant pled guilty to the offense of public indecency and
received a sentence of 12 months' court supervision. The victim's
statement in that case indicated that defendant, on three separate
occasions, stood in the doorway of his apartment, which faced hers, and
while nude "flopped his penis back and forth."
	Defendant indicated that his wife and parents had been supportive
through the prosecution of this case. He described his relationship with his
parents as "good" and his relationship with his wife as "perfect, wonderful,
amazing." Defendant told the reporting officer that he had an eight-year-old son by Trisha Webb, a previous paramour. Defendant stated he was
paying child support as ordered until he was incarcerated on these
charges. He denied ownership of any significant assets.
	Defendant denied any past mental health treatment or any current
mental health problems. He further denied any problems with alcohol or
drugs.
	The reporting probation officer noted, in conclusion, that defendant
seemed remorseful in his statements to police. The officer observed,
however, that, with regard to defendant's written comments to the court
on the presentence information sheet, "no concern about the victims is
noted."
	The first witness to testify at defendant's sentencing hearing was Dr.
Robert Chapman, a psychiatrist called by the defense. Chapman evaluated
defendant at defense counsel's request. He spent two hours with
defendant. Chapman testified that defendant suffers from adult attention
deficit disorder (ADD)-characterized by "impaired attention
concentration, impulse control and judgment"-and an unspecified
personality disorder with obsessive-compulsive and dependent features.
Chapman believed the clinical evidence was insufficient to make a
diagnosis of paraphilia and/or its subcategory, pedophilia. Chapman
indicated that a diagnosis of paraphilia would apply to an individual "who
suffers over a period of at least six months intense recurring sexually
deviant arousal or behavior" that "impairs the person's function in most
areas of their life."
	Chapman testified that ADD was more likely relevant to the
commission of these offenses than the personality disorder because a
person with ADD suffers "some degree of impairment of impulsivity and
judgment and difficulty controlling inhibitions." Chapman noted that ADD
is manageable and treatable. Chapman stated his opinion that defendant
presented a minimal risk of reoffending so long as he was not in a "position
of authority, power or trust with prepubescent females."
	Under cross-examination, Chapman admitted there might be "a lot"
of positions of "authority, power or trust" from which defendant would
have to be restricted in order for a minimal risk assessment to apply. The
prosecutor asked Chapman if he had taken account of certain behavior
that exhibited planning and orchestration in the commission of these
offenses. When Chapman said he had, the prosecutor asked, "So are we
talking about some kind of developed opportunism?" Chapman
responded affirmatively.
	The prosecutor then asked Chapman to define "pedophilia." The
definition Chapman supplied tracked that previously given for "paraphilia"
with the additional element that the objects of sexual arousal or behavior
are "prepubescent children." Chapman testified there was no "clinical"
evidence sufficient to make a diagnosis of pedophilia. He explained:
			"[T]here is no clinical evidence of the intense recurring sexual
interest, fantasies and arousal. It may be there. We have no
evidence of it. The only objective [evidence] absent him
providing that or some indirect evidence such as a history of
stalking and/or obsession with child pornography or something
would be *** what we call penile polysmograph which would
measure the degree, if any, of sexual arousal by this subject
class."
Chapman indicated there was no indication that defendant had possessed
child pornography. Chapman was not asked how the restriction he would
place upon defendant's future interaction with "prepubescent females"
might relate to a diagnosis of pedophilia or, more to the point, the failure
to reach that diagnosis.
	Chapman was asked for recommendations to "effectuate"
compliance with his contingency. Chapman responded, "I presume it
would have to be under a mandate of the Court and it would be in the
form of a probation status *** with certain restrictions about reporting as
living and his work and so forth that would take those things into account."
When the prosecutor suggested that truly effective supervision of
defendant might entail someone watching him "24 hours a day," Chapman
responded that global position system devices are now available, as are
radio frequency ankle bracelets. Chapman acknowledged that a global
positioning system would not indicate whether young girls are "in the path"
of offenders so monitored. With the conclusion of Chapman's testimony,
the sentencing hearing was continued to February 6, 2003.
	When the hearing resumed, the court received victim impact
statements. One such statement was read in open court by the mother of
K.F., and the other was read on behalf of C.D.'s mother by Alicia Dornan
of the Children's Advocacy Center.
	K.F.'s mother spoke "of the destruction that the defendant's actions
[had] caused" in the lives of her daughter and her family. She described
K.F. as independent, confident and curious about the world prior to the
sexual assault. K.F. loved going to school, church and social events. She
had many friends and "always seemed to keep busy meeting new people."
She did well in school and was excited to go there each day. She enjoyed
reading and was talented in art. At the end of her day, K.F. had no
difficulty falling asleep.
	After the sexual assault, life "significantly changed and became a
struggle for [K.F.] and her family." K.F. has had to cope with "many
symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, including feelings of fear,
paranoia, anxiety and seclusion." K.F. would panic when she would see
someone with physical features resembling those of the defendant, or hear
a voice similar to his. She begged to stay home from normal social events,
avoiding crowds because she believed people would stare at her or talk
about her. K.F. is no longer independent and obviously suffers from
feelings of insecurity. She does not want to be left alone in a room. She
wants family members constantly by her side. "She has lived in terror
expressing concern that Mr. Huddleston will come after her and harm
her."
	K.F.'s mother described "numerous nights [when K.F. would] lie
awake until mid-hours of the morning, finally falling asleep only with the
comforting thought of protection from her father lying on the floor right
next to her bed and her mother at the foot of her bed sleeping in a chair."
As of the date of the sentencing hearing, K.F. was still experiencing
interrupted sleep patterns.
	For K.F., school has changed from "a place of fun and adventure to
a dreaded, haunting atmosphere. Almost daily, [K.F.] continues to request
to be allowed to stay home from school." Her mother stated that K.F.
"will beg to stay home and complains of not feeling well. It is devastating
to see her trying to gain the strength and courage she needs just to pull the
covers back and step a foot to the floor. This is a little girl who used to
love school and wake with energy." K.F. has struggled scholastically. Her
mother stated that K.F. now frequently becomes frustrated with
assignments and expresses an inability to concentrate. K.F. used to
complete her work at school and rarely had to bring work home "because
school was top priority." Now, K.F. gives up on assignments, sobbing.
She was forced to drop out of art class due to "haunting" memories
associated with that class.
	K.F.'s mother testified that the consequences wrought by
defendant's actions have not been limited to K.F. alone; her entire family
has been affected. In particular, K.F.'s older, teenage brother has been
withdrawn since the sexual assault of K.F. and has shown a "lack of
desire to socialize with other high school friends." He displays a lack of
self-esteem that was not evident before the violation of his younger sister.
K.F.'s family has gone so far as to relocate so that she can be closer to
her best friends in the hope that she will overcome her current tendency
to withdraw from social interaction.
	K.F.'s mother stated that parenting has become "a nightmare."
Something as simple as mention of the words "peanut butter" or "pudding"
may trigger a reaction in K.F. Now, both parents worry constantly about
their children and it is difficult to let the children out of their sight for fear
of something terrible happening. Trusting others with the children has
become almost impossible. That tendency often eliminates opportunities
for all children in the family. The stress occasioned by the sexual assault
has resulted in the physical exhaustion of both parents and a stomach ulcer
in the case of K.F.'s mother. On-the-job concentration of both parents
has been affected, and both have missed work for counseling, court dates,
and for those days when they were called to school because K.F. was
having difficulty coping. Although many friends have shown support and
offered comfort, K.F.'s family "has also experienced the avoidance ***
of others who are unsure of what to say or do. Many times, [K.F.'s]
family has chosen to avoid going places of usual frequency to eliminate
undue stares and attention. Public appearance remains extremely
uncomfortable."
	K.F.'s mother stated, "The pain, worry, anger and fear overwhelms
a person." K.F.'s parents are concerned about K.F.'s future, and her
mother expressed the hope that defendant "will never be allowed the
future opportunity to inflict pain and suffering to this extent on another
child."
	Alicia Dornan read the victim impact statement written by C.D.'s
mother. That statement echoes many of the problems and concerns noted
in the impact statement read by K.F.'s mother.
	C.D.'s mother noted that, prior to the sexual assault, C.D. had been
a "very bright, accelerated student. She took advanced classes and
brought home excellent grades. She was full of self-confidence and ***
humor." She is a completely different child now. C.D. has become very
distant and shy. She cannot look people directly in the face when speaking
to them. C.D's sense of humor has turned to annoyance. Now, it "seems
as though she tries purposely to antagonize to bring on confrontation."
	Although she never slept in her parents' bed before, she now does
frequently. She has constant nightmares and anxiety. C.D.'s mother
explained that C.D. "somehow believes that her bed has all the bad
dreams in it from what happened to her. And they keep coming out to
remind her every night."
	Since defendant sexually assaulted her, C.D. has had a difficult time
speaking to men, especially men who resemble defendant. She instantly
retreats into silence when she sees someone with defendant's features.
C.D. had recently had her first music recital. When her mother later asked
her how she felt when it was over, C.D. responded," You know who was
there, don't you?" C.D. had seen a man who strongly resembled
defendant, and she was certain he was there at the school. She noted, as
she had looked out over the crowd of assembled parents, she had seen
"so many men who looked like Mr. Huddleston." C.D.'s mother
observed, "what should have been one of the most wonderful[,]
memorable nights of her life was ruined. He was there haunting her."
	C.D. had related to her mother that she had been having a hard time
concentrating on school work and she wanted to be at home more. She
complains constantly of stomachaches and throws up at school. Her fears
and anxieties magnify in a school setting. Although she never used to cry,
now C.D. does often.
	Like K.F.'s mother, C.D.'s mother expressed her fears for C.D.'s
future:
			"How will she deal with commitment and relationship issues
as she grows older? Scott Huddleston has taken her childhood
innocence. How much of her future has he tainted as well?"
	The two victim impact statements were admitted as evidence.
	The next witness to testify at defendant's sentencing hearing was his
"spiritual counselor," Reverend Steven Anderson. Anderson testified that
he first met defendant approximately one year prior, when defendant
attended church with his parents, who are very active in Anderson's
congregation. Anderson stated he is aware of the offenses of which
defendant has been convicted. Anderson had visited defendant in jail on
a weekly basis during the period of defendant's incarceration.
	Reverend Anderson worked with defendant in a program designed
for "sex offenders with Christian beliefs." Anderson testified that the
program is intended to help sex offenders take responsibility for what they
have done, and to understand that forgiveness does not mean avoidance
of consequences. The program also addresses ways in which the offender
can avoid recidivism. Reverend Anderson stated his belief that defendant
had responded positively to counseling. He had never tried to blame
anyone else, and he was sorry for what he had done to the victims and
their families, as well as what he had done to his family. Defendant had
asked Anderson to pray for him so that he would change and he would
not reoffend. Reverend Anderson was asked whether defendant
understood why he did what he did. Anderson responded, "I don't know
that anyone could understand it. But I believe he is extremely sorrowful
that he did it. He understands what he did and that it was wrong."
Anderson believed that defendant had been "consistent in his desire to
change." Reverend Anderson concluded his testimony by stating his
opinion that defendant's words were not simply "a jailhouse conversion
for somebody else's benefit."
	Joy Mason, defendant's friend and coworker, also testified for the
defense. Mason, a second-grade teacher at Westview Elementary School
in Fairbury, Illinois, expressed her sorrow for both the victims and their
families, and for defendant and his family. Mason did not, of course,
condone defendant's behavior, and she conveyed her "sadness" because
defendant "had so much to offer" as a teacher. Defendant had the ability
"to help children think positively about themselves, to be creative in their
expression of that through art." Defendant made his class "fun and
interesting."
	Mason considered defendant a friend who was always supportive,
a very good listener, and a good advisor. She stated, "He always thinks
of others and ways to help them." She said she hoped he would receive
a reasonable amount of time for his crime and he would receive help and
counseling to help him with his sickness.
	Under cross-examination, Mason was asked how she felt about
defendant having used his position as a teacher to commit these sexual
assaults upon children in his charge. Mason responded, "It makes me
angry and frustrated that anything like that could happen. And also aware
as a teacher of *** the things that we should all do in the profession to
keep children safe."
	Defendant's mother, Sidney Huddleston, testified on defendant's
behalf. Much of her testimony focused on the love that family members felt
for defendant. She brought numerous letters of support from defendant's
friends, relatives neighbors and associates. Defendant's mother spoke of
the trauma defendant may have experienced when he was two years old
and his father suffered from-but ultimately overcame-a "life-threatening
disease." She pointed to a "pretty serious head injury" defendant suffered
when he was young and helping his grandfather feed some puppies. She
acknowledged that the head injury was not so serious that defendant was
admitted to a hospital. Defendant's mother stated that defendant
"continued to love his grandfather and love those puppies." She
speculated that the head injury may have "contributed to the many learning
disabilities that came along later in school."
	Mrs. Huddleston testified at length regarding defendant's difficulties
in school. She admitted that diagnostic testing at Illinois State University
was "not conclusive." Nonetheless, she testified that she continued to
receive reports during defendant's early years in elementary school that he
was "slow," "not learning at a normal rate," and not paying attention. She
admitted that she had heard evaluations of defendant, subsequent to his
arrest, that described him as "highly intelligent." Defendant's mother took
issue with that description. She stated her belief that defendant is "an
average person, average intelligence, smothered by learning disabilities."
She testified at length regarding defendant's academic struggles which
culminated in a bachelor of science degree from Illinois State University.
	Defendant's mother described her son as "a man who touched a lot
of lives with a positive influence, especially students who struggled with
academics and insecurities." She stated her belief that defendant could
"still be of use to God's society if given the opportunity."
	After the attorneys spoke to sentencing issues, defendant was given
the opportunity to address the court. He expressed sorrow and remorse
for his actions, and for the pain he had caused the victims, their families,
his coworkers, and his family. He stated his hope that the victims would
"move forward and heal in a positive way." Defendant said he was sorry
that the victims had to appear before the court for trial; he attributed
responsibility to defense counsel who had advised him to proceed in that
manner so that he would not waive any of his rights.
	The trial judge recessed proceedings for a time, and then returned to
announce his decision on the constitutional question reserved for ruling,
and on defendant's sentence.
	The court first spoke to the circumstances of the offense. The court
recognized that defendant had violated three children and that his "sordid
conduct" was "despicable in the extreme." However, the court
characterized what defendant had done as different from "what usually
occurs in cases of molestation of children and probably what some of the
things [sic] the legislature was concerned about." The court noted:
			"In this case, the children saw nothing. *** They were told
nothing by the defendant that indicated what was happening.
There was no torture. There were no threats. There was no
intimidation. The children were essentially unaware, in a sense,
that this crime was being committed. I think they realized it later.
But what we have here is a crime of deceit."
The court questioned whether the State could even have proved that the
criminal acts occurred without the oral and written confession of
defendant. The court recognized that defendant's confession "removed all
that." The court continued: "None of this, however, changes the fact that
the defendant acted atrociously and that his victims were individuals to
whom he owed a special responsibility."
	The court then turned to the issues of defendant's rehabilitative
potential and the constitutionality of section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code.
The court noted that defendant was 36 years of age. Other than minor
traffic offenses, defendant had one criminal misdemeanor of record. On
March 3, 1997, defendant had pled guilty to public indecency and had
received a sentence of 12 months' court supervision and a fine of $385.
The court observed that defendant's acts had involved "exposure with no
physical contact by the defendant with another individual." The court did
not specify the nature of the acts in rendering its decision.
	The trial court addressed evidence which the court believed
supported an inference that defendant could be rehabilitated. The court
observed:
			"Taking into account that it is, of course, to his advantage to
be sorry at this time, the evidence before me convinces me that
he was and is truly remorseful for his actions. I say that because
he did choose to stop what was happening. I think he genuinely
recognizes that he has betrayed these children. From the record,
he is worried about the loss of faith these children would have in
adults."
The court perceived in defendant's confession "a desire on the part of the
defendant to come clean so he could get treatment." Finally, the court
pointed to the testimony of Dr. Chapman that defendant is a "minimal risk"
to reoffend. The court did not discuss the conditions Chapman had placed
on that assessment.
	The court then addressed the mandatory natural life sentencing
provision of section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code:
			"So what does this boil down to? The legislature saw fit to
pass a sentencing statute that was blanket in nature. If there is
one victim, the sentence is six to 30. If there is two [sic] or more,
the sentence is natural life. The legislature chose in this case to
use a blanket approach for all cases regardless of facts,
regardless of circumstances, regardless of any rehabilitative
potential on the part of a particular defendant.
			That raises the question of how could the legislature validly
pass such a statute if the statute ignores rehabilitative potential
entirely. And the answer is that such conduct by a defendant
where victims are multiple can be so egregious, that life in prison
is permissible without recognition of rehabilitative potential."
Although the court indicated that it could "readily visualize scenarios
where such an argument would be true," the court concluded it could "not
find such to be the circumstance" in this case. The court, therefore, ruled
that section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) is unconstitutional as applied to this
defendant.
	We disagree.

ANALYSIS
	Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and this court
has a duty to construe statutes in a manner that upholds their validity
whenever reasonably possible. Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157
(2002); People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d 401, 402-03 (2002). The party
challenging a statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity.
People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 335 (2002); Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d  at
402. We review, de novo, a circuit court's finding that a statute is
unconstitutional. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d  at 335; People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).
	This court has repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the
power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and that power
necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even
if such sentences restrict the judiciary's discretion in imposing sentences.
Miller, 202 Ill. 2d  at 336; People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984).
However, the power of the legislature is not without limitation; the penalty
prescribed must satisfy constitutional requirements. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d  at
336.
	In the matter before us, the issue is whether section 12-14.1(b)(1.2)
of the Code violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). The proportionate penalties
clause provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to
the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. As this court
observed in Taylor, "there is no indication [in our constitution] that the
possibility of rehabilitating an offender was to be given greater weight and
consideration than the seriousness of the offense in determining a proper
penalty." Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 206. Factors to be considered in
determining the seriousness of an offense include the degree of harm, the
frequency of the crime, and the risk of bodily injury associated with it.
People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002). The legislature may perceive
a need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an
increase in the commission of a particular crime. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454.
"As an institution, the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to
identify and remedy the evils confronting our society and is more capable
of gauging the seriousness of an offense." Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454.
Consequently, courts will generally defer to the legislature's judgment that
a particular offense is more serious than another. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454.
	This court has utilized three separate tests to determine whether a
proportionate penalties clause violation has occurred. First, a penalty
violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so
wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral
sense of the community. People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003);
Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 452. Second, a penalty violates the proportionate
penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that
creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished
more severely. People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003); Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 452. Finally, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where
offenses with identical elements are given different sentences. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  at 522; Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 452. In the instant case, defendant
contends that the ruling of the trial court can be upheld on the bases that
section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) fails the first two tests.
	Before we address the merits, we acknowledge, and reject, the
State's request that we reconsider our holding in People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002). In Miller, a unanimous court held that section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996)) was unconstitutional "as applied" to
that defendant. However, the Miller case is readily distinguishable from
the present case. in Miller, there was a rare convergence of several
factors, including: the defendant was a 15-year-old juvenile who, by
statute, was automatically transferred for trial as an adult; the defendant
was tried under an accountability theory which, by statute, holds all
participants with a common criminal design equally responsible; and the
applicable multiple-murder sentencing statute does not allow consideration
of the defendant's age or extent of participation in the crime. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d  at 340. The defendant had served as a lookout during the
encounter, and the circuit court described the defendant's role in the crime
as " 'passive accountability.' " Miller, 202 Ill. 2d  at 331. When affirming
the finding that the mandatory life sentence was unconstitutionally
disproportionate as applied to the defendant, we noted,
		"a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility
of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does
not accurately represent defendant's personal culpability such
that it shocks the moral sense of the community. This moral sense
is particularly true, as in the case before us, where a 15-year-old
with one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the
incident and stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never
handled a gun, is subject to life imprisonment with no possibility
of parole-the same sentence applicable to the actual shooter."
Miller, 202 Ill. 2d  at 341.
A holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied does not broadly
declare a statute unconstitutional but narrowly finds the statute
unconstitutional under the specific facts of the case. See Hill v. Cowan,
202 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (2002). The present case does not include the age
and level of culpability concerns that we found supported the as-applied
unconstitutionality finding in Miller. In addition, while recognizing the
convergence of several unusual circumstances in Miller, we in no way
weakened the well-established principle that review of a constitutional
issue begins with a presumption that the statute is constitutional. Miller,
202 Ill. 2d  at 335. In fact, "[i]t is a court's duty to construe a statute so as
to affirm the statute's constitutionality and validity, if reasonably possible."
People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992). Therefore, we decline
to revisit Miller in light of this case.
	Nonetheless, we begin by considering whether the sentencing
provision in question "is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate
to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community"
(Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522). Because the parties' briefs were somewhat
lacking in this regard, we have conducted independent research on this
issue, and what follows is the product of that inquiry. Although it is not
suggested that the result is comprehensive or all-inclusive, we believe it is
informative and pertinent to our disposition of this case. We address, first,
the seriousness of sex offenses against children and, in particular, the
degree of harm to the child victims and the frequency of the crimes.
	Sixty years ago, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a
principle as simple and self-evident as it is critical and compelling: "A
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens ***." Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 88 L. Ed. 645, 653, 64 S. Ct. 438, 443 (1944). In furtherance of that principle, the Court has "sustained
legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of
youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of
constitutionally protected rights." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
757, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 1122, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354 (1982). In that
regard, the Court has proclaimed the "prevention of sexual exploitation
and abuse of children *** a government objective of surpassing
importance." Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 757, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1123, 102 S. Ct. 
at 3355.
	As was noted in People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 509 (1999),
this state has traditionally exhibited an "acute interest" in the well-being of
minors. Indeed, "the welfare and protection of minors has always been
considered one of the State's most fundamental interests." American
Federation of State, County &amp; Municipal Employees v. Department
of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (1996). Long
ago, this court acknowledged the paramount importance of ensuring the
welfare of children, and others, who are least able to protect themselves:
			"It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every
enlightened government, in its character of parens patriae, to
protect and provide for the comfort and well-being of such of its
citizens as, by reason of infancy, defective understanding, or
other misfortune or infirmity, are unable to take care of
themselves. The performance of this duty is justly regarded as
one of the most important of governmental functions, and all
constitutional limitations must be so understood and construed as
not to interfere with its proper and legitimate exercise." County
of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882).
	Concern for the welfare and safety of children is reflected in various
criminal statutes and procedural enactments based upon the victim's age
or youth. Our legislature has created offenses on that basis, elevated or
differentiated the classification of existing offenses, allowed for sentence
enhancement, and relaxed evidentiary rules. See generally 720 ILCS
5/11-9.3 (West 2002) (prohibiting child sex offenders from being present
within a school zone); 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4 (West 2002) (prohibiting child
sex offenders from approaching, contacting or communicating with a child
within a public park); 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002) (predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(i) (West
2002) (making a defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence based
upon the young age of the victim); 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2002)
(allowing admission of other-crimes evidence in prosecution of sex
offenders); 725 ILCS 5/115-10(a)(2) (West 2002) (allowing testimony
of a child's out-of-court statement describing a sexual act perpetrated
upon the child). The sentencing provision at issue in the instant case was
obviously intended to protect this vulnerable segment of our society from
sexual predation by deterring would-be offenders and ensuring that those
who commit sexual acts with multiple victims will not have the opportunity
to reoffend.
	The vulnerability of children to sexual predation has been a topic of
considerable commentary in recent years, as has the psychological
damage that results to the developing psyches of these young victims. See
M. Meister, Note, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of
Capital Child Rape Statutes, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 197, 209 (Spring 2003);
N. Yell, Comment, The California Sexually Violent Predator Act and
the Failure to Mentally Evaluate Sexually Violent Child Molestors,
33 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 295 (2003); R. Whitcombe, Note, Child
Sexual Abuse: Adult Survivors, Repressed Memories, and Stories
Finally Told, 11 UCLA Women's L.J. 255, 259 (Spring-Summer 2001);
J. Broughton, Note, "On Horror's Head Horrors Accumulate": A
Reflective Comment on Capital Child Rape Legislation, 39 Duq. L.
Rev. 1, 35-8 (2000); B. Palmer, Note, Death as a Proportionate
Penalty for the Rape of a Child: Considering One State's Current
Law, 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 843, 858-59, 863-66 (1999); S. Ketring &amp;
L. Feinauer, Perpetrator-Victim Relationship: Long-term Effects of
Sexual Abuse for Men and Women, 27 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 109, 117
(1999); Y. Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and
Louisiana's Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 Am. J. Crim. L.
79, 86-88 (1997); A. Lurigio, Child Sexual Abuse: Its Causes,
Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 Fed.
Probation 69, 69-71 (1995); L. Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges,
Sentencing, and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 439, 441 (1993) (arguing that the idea of a "nonviolent" rapist is
fictional and that "[j]udges and attorneys must expand their definitions to
include injury to the victim's psyche"); I. Prager, "Sexual Psychopathy"
and Child Molesters: The Experiment Fails, 6 J. Juv. L. 49, 62-63
(1982); C. Bagley &amp; K. King, Child Sexual Abuse: The Search for
Healing 2 (1990); Handbook on Sexual Abuse of Children 6-7 (1988).
	 Commentators have recognized that, aside from any physical injury
a child may suffer in a sexual assault, children who are sexually assaulted
are subject to chronic psychological problems that may be even more
pernicious. Sexual assault (rape) has been described as, "[s]hort of
homicide, *** the 'ultimate violation of self.' " Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 992-93, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2869 (1977),
quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration Report, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens,
Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies 1 (1975). Although the
aftermath for an adult victim can be devastating and long-term (see 39
Duq. L. Rev. at 35-37; 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 86-87), the impact on a
child can be even more profound. Because of their emotional immaturity,
children are exceptionally vulnerable to the effects of sexual assault. 45
Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 39 Duq. L. Rev. at 38. Long-term follow-up studies
with child sexual abuse victims indicate that sexual abuse is " 'grossly
intrusive in the lives of children and is harmful to their normal
psychological, emotional and sexual development in ways which no just
or humane society can tolerate.' " 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 87, quoting C.
Bagley &amp; K. King, Child Sexual Abuse: The Search for Healing 2 (1990).
The child's life may be forever altered by residual problems associated
with the event. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 843.
	Studies indicate that as many as 40% of preadolescent sexual assault
victims are considered "seriously disturbed." 59 Fed. Probation at 70.
Psychopathology and mental disorders often follow the child into
adulthood. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 864; 59 Fed.
Probation at 70. Psychological problems associated with sexual assault or
abuse include sudden school failure, unprovoked crying, dissociation,
depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances, nightmares, feelings of guilt and
inferiority, poor self-esteem, and self-destructive behavior, including an
increased incidence of attempted suicide. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 39
Duq. L. Rev. at 38; 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 88. Beyond the compassion
one must feel for these innocent victims, pragmatism dictates a recognition
that the victim's problems are likely to become society's problems.
Correlations have been noted between child sexual abuse and problems
in adulthood such as substance abuse, dangerous sexual behaviors or
dysfunction, inability to relate to others on an interpersonal level, and
psychiatric illness. 39 Duq. L. Rev. at 38; 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 89; 59
Fed. Probation at 70-71; C. Bagley &amp; K. King, Child Sexual Abuse: The
Search for Healing 53 (1990); Handbook on Sexual Abuse of Children
7 (1988). The harm to the child victim of sexual abuse-and to society
itself-is well documented. We now consider the prevalence and frequency
of the offense.
	"Child sexual abuse is prevalent in America. From 1976 to 1986, the
number of reported cases of child sexual abuse grew from 6,000 to
132,000, an increase of 2100%. By 1991, the number of cases totaled
432,000, an increase of another 227% (United States Department of
Health and Human Services, 1992)." 59 Fed. Probation at 69. "From
1980 to 1994, sex offenders was the fastest-growing category of violent
criminal." J. Smulin, Protecting Life and Liberty: The Constitutionality
and Necessity of Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators, 52 DePaul
L. Rev. 1245, 1247 (2003), citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 109 (1997). Most cases
never come to the attention of law enforcement or treatment professionals.
59 Fed. Probation at 69; see also J. Peters-Baker, Challenging
Traditional Notions of Managing Sex Offenders: Prognosis is
Lifetime Management, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 629, 638 (1998) (a large
percentage of sexual assault victims never report the crime). Some experts
estimate that less than one-third of all sexual abuse or assault cases are
actually reported and investigated by child protective authorities. 45 Ariz.
L. Rev. at 198, citing 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 844, citing J. Treanor,
Orchestrating the Successful Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 39 A.F. L. Rev. 277, 278 (1996). Other authorities suggest that
the chance of being apprehended for child molestation may be as low as
3%. 52 DePaul L. Rev. at 1248; G. Abel, Self-Reported Sex Crimes of
Non-incarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. Interpersonal Violence 3 (1987).
Suffice it to say that the incidence of child molestation is a matter of grave
concern in this state and others, as is the rate of recidivism among the
offenders.
	As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 103, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (2003):
			" 'Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.' McKune
v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality opinion). '[T]he
victims of sex assault are most often juveniles,' and '[w]hen
convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more
likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new
rape or sex assault.' Id., at 32-33."
In McKune, the Supreme Court described the risk of recidivism posed by
sex offenders as "frightening and high." McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34,
153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 57, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 (2002).
	As we recently acknowledged in People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 174 (2003), our legislature has responded again and again to the
propensity of sex offenders to repeat their crimes and to increases in the
incidence of sexual assault and abuse cases. See also People v. Stork,
305 Ill. App. 3d 714, 721 (1999) (quoting a legislative declaration
referring to " 'the high recidivism rate of child sex offenders' "), quoting
90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 157, 1997 Sess. Similar declarations
can be found in the statutes of numerous other states. See C. Champagne,
Case Note, Sex Offender and Notification Statutes &amp; The Illinois
Supreme Court's Decision in People v. Malchow, 22 QLS 301, 308
n.64 (2003) (compilation of statutory declarations).
	Although there is considerable debate over the degree to which
treatment of sex offenders may be effective, it is clear that state legislatures
may respond to what they reasonably perceive as a "substantial risk of
recidivism." See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164,
183-84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1153 (2003) ("Alaska could conclude that a
conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of
recidivism. The legislature's findings are consistent with grave concerns
over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their
dangerousness as a class"). State legislatures have addressed this
substantial risk of child sex offender recidivism in many different ways.
Some statutes seek to protect children once an offender is released from
state custody by monitoring or restricting his or her movement and access
to children. Other enactments call for longer sentences of imprisonment,
so that the offender's opportunity to reoffend is foreclosed during the
period of incarceration.
	For example, every state in the nation has enacted a version of
"Megan's Law," requiring, inter alia, registration and monitoring of sex
offenders who are released into the community. Smith, 538 U.S.  at 90,
155 L. Ed. 2d  at 175, 123 S. Ct.  at 1145. At least 12 states have enacted
some form of residency restriction applicable to sex offenders. See Ala.
Code §15-20-26 (Supp. 2000) (restricts sex offenders from residing or
accepting employment within 2,000 feet of school or child care facility);
Ark. Code Ann. §5-14-128 (Lexis Supp. 2003) (unlawful for level three
or four sex offenders to reside within 2,000 feet of school or day care
center); Cal. Pen. Code §3003 (Deering Supp. 2004) (parolees may not
live within 35 miles of victim or witnesses, and certain sex offenders on
parole may not live within a quarter mile from a primary school); Fla. Stat.
Ann. §947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2001) (released sex offender with victim
under 18 prohibited from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care
center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly
congregate); Ga. Code Ann. §42-1-13 (Supp. 2003) (sex offenders
required to register shall not reside within 1,000 feet of any child care
facility, school, or area where minors congregate); 720 ILCS
5/11-9.3(b-5) (West 2002) (child sex offenders prohibited from
knowingly residing within 500 feet of schools); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§17.495 (Banks-Baldwin 2000) (registered sex offenders on supervised
release shall not reside within 1,000 feet of school or child care facility);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:91.1 (West Supp. 2004) (sexually violent
predators shall not reside within 1,000 feet of schools unless permission
is given by school superintendent); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2950.031
(Lexis 2003) (sex offenders prohibited from residing within 1,000 feet of
school); 57 Okla. Stat. §590 (2003) (prohibits sex offenders from residing
within 2,000 feet of schools or educational institutions); Or. Rev. Stat.
§§144.642, 144.643 (1999) (incorporates general prohibition on
supervised sex offenders living near places where children reside); Tenn.
Code Ann. §40-39-111 (2003) (sex offenders prohibited from
establishing residence within 1,000 feet of school, child care facility, or
victim). Many jurisdictions restrict the offender's movements in other
ways, similar to the Illinois statutes we have previously mentioned. See
720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (West 2002); 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4 (West 2002).
Perhaps the most common means of protecting children are statutes
providing for enhanced classification of sex offenses and/or sentences,
based upon the age of the victim. The rationale for these statutes is
undoubtedly specific and general deterrence: the chances of the offender
violating other children while incarcerated is nonexistent; and others might
be deterred by the lengthy sentences of those incarcerated. In this regard,
we are aware of many states that impose mandatory life sentences upon
repeat sex offenders. Illinois, of course, has such statutes. See 720 ILCS
5/12-14(d)(2) (West 2002) (natural life imprisonment for a second or
subsequent offense); 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(b)(2) (West 2002) (same).
	While several state statutes authorize a life sentence-with or without
parole-for a perpetrator's first sexual assault of a child, at least five
states, including Illinois, would require a sentence of mandatory life
imprisonment, under certain circumstances. Ohio requires the imposition
of a sentence of life imprisonment where the offender compels a victim less
than 13 years of age to submit to felonious sexual penetration "by force or
threat of force. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2907.02(B) (Lexis 2003). An
earlier version of the statute was upheld against a proportionality challenge
in State v. Gladding, 66 Ohio App. 3d 502, 513, 585 N.E.2d 838, 845
(1990) ("In this case, considering the heinousness of the crime of raping
a nine-year-old child, it cannot be said that appellant's sentence was
disproportionate or shocking to the moral sense of the community").
Florida and North Carolina have statutes that mandate the imposition of
a sentence of life imprisonment for "capital sexual battery" and "first-degree sexual offense," respectively, neither of which requires the use of
force or threat of force. These provisions have survived repeated
proportionality challenges. See Adaway v. State, 864 So. 2d 36, 37-38
(Fla. 2003); Jones v. State, 861 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 2003); Gibson
v. State, 721 So. 2d 363, 369-70 (Fla. 1998); State v. Higginbottom,
312 N.C. 760, 763-64, 324 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1985); State v. Bartlett,
153 N.C. App. 680, 688-89, 571 S.E.2d 28, 33-34 (2002). Louisiana
authorizes the death penalty for the offense of aggravated rape, which
includes the rape of a child under 12 years old. A defendant who does not
receive the death penalty is subject to a mandatory life sentence. La. Rev.
Stat. §14:42 (West Supp. 2004). Although the constitutionality of state
statutes that impose the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes is the
subject of debate (see 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 210-12; D. Schaaf, What If
the Victim Is a Child? Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana's
Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 347, 365-67), the
Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld Louisiana's sentencing scheme.
	We return to the first question posed at the outset of our discussion:
Is a sentence of natural life imprisonment, as applied to this defendant,
cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed
as to shock the moral sense of the community? Having applied the
appropriate criteria for review of this question, having taken account of the
pertinent considerations relevant to this type of offense and enactments in
other jurisdictions, and having considered the facts of defendant's case,
we cannot say that it is. We now speak to the circumstances attending the
commission of these offenses.
	Defendant committed sexual assaults against three victims, one more
than the minimum section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) requires for imposition of a
natural life sentence. We note that the first assault occurred at least one
month prior to the subsequent assaults; thus, there was a period of time
during which defendant could have reflected upon the gross impropriety
of his actions and refrained from further violations of children under his
supervision. Unfortunately for the latter two victims, he did not.
	 Although defendant did not have a prior felony conviction when he
committed these offenses, he had previously committed an offense
characterized as a "sex offense" in the Criminal Code. See 720 ILCS
5/11-9 (West 1996) (public indecency included among article 11 sex
offenses). The presentence report refers to the victim's statement in that
case, indicating that defendant, on three separate occasions, stood in the
doorway of his apartment, which faced hers, and while nude, "flopped his
penis back and forth." The commission of these offenses is obviously a
marked escalation of defendant's preexisting deviant tendencies.
Defendant's previous encounter with the legal system did nothing to deter
him.
	Defendant's sexual fixation is further evinced by the discovery of
pornographic materials in his file cabinet at the school. It would be
reasonable to assume that defendant looked at these materials during the
course of the school day. While these materials-including female
underwear, Playboy magazines, pornographic pictures, pornographic
playing cards, a pornographic catalog, a video tape containing, in part, a
pornographic movie, and 48 computer discs, 28 of which contained
pornography-portrayed only adults, it is impossible for us to believe
defendant's assertion that he never fantasized about sexual activity with
children prior to the commission of these offenses. In his written statement,
defendant admits he was sexually aroused during the assault of the third
victim. Whence came defendant's desire to place his penis in the mouth
of a 10-year-old girl? Having done it once, whence came the urge to do
it to additional children? Defendant's acts do not strike us as impulsive;
rather, the commission of these offenses appears to have been the result
of planning and well-orchestrated execution, on two separate dates, a
month apart.
	These observations bring us to Dr. Chapman's testimony. Chapman
testified that the "clinical" evidence was not sufficient to make a diagnosis
of "paraphilia and/or its subcategory, pedophilia." He conceded, "It may
be there." In that regard, we find Chapman's risk assessment of defendant
more than a little perplexing. Chapman testified that defendant is a
"minimal risk" to reoffend so long as he is restricted from a "position of
authority, power or trust with prepubescent females." If defendant is not
attracted to prepubescent females, and is not a danger to them, why is
there a need to, essentially, restrict his access to them? According to this
reasoning, a man thrice convicted of raping women might be a "minimal
risk" to reoffend so long as he is not given access to women. It seems to
us, this kind of recommendation perverts the very purpose of risk
assessment. Chapman acknowledged that defendant should not be a
teacher, a baby-sitter, or in any situation where he is in a position of
authority. We take this to mean that defendant should never be alone with
children, because he could then seek to exercise the inherent authority that
an adult can exert over a child. We recognize, of course, that defendant
did utilize his position of authority and supervision over the children to
commit these offenses-an aggravating factor in defendant's case. See 730
ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(14) (West 2002).
	We accord significant weight to the seriousness of defendant's
conduct. We are not convinced that any rehabilitative potential he may
have outweighs what he has done to the victims. The circuit court made
much of the fact that the victims were blindfolded when the sexual acts
were committed, referring to the admittedly "sordid" and "despicable" acts
as "crimes of deceit," as if this were somehow mitigating. We think
otherwise. The children are well aware of what happened to them. From
the victim impact statements it is clear that they exhibit many classic
symptoms of sexual abuse. We fail to see how their prognosis is any better
than other sexual assault victims. The circuit court also stated that
defendant had taken responsibility for his actions and had shown remorse:
			"Taking into account that it is, of course, to his advantage to
be sorry at this time, the evidence before me convinces me that
he was and is truly remorseful for his actions. I say that because
he did choose to stop what was happening. I think he genuinely
recognizes that he has betrayed these children. From the record,
he is worried about the loss of faith these children would have in
adults."
The court is correct: it is to the defendant's advantage to express remorse.
He perhaps recognized that at the time he gave his statement to police and
in allocution at sentencing. He appears to have overlooked it in his
presentence report statement. We are at a loss to explain what the circuit
court meant when it commented that defendant chose "to stop what was
happening." Defendant did not turn himself into authorities after the third
sexual assault. He did not seek counseling or treatment. When the
investigators of these matters came to him, defendant initially denied the
allegations. His concern for the children was first expressed some time
after the authorities confronted him with the allegations. Defendant
"stopped what was happening" with the third victim-in a physical
sense-the same way he "stopped' with his first two victims: he withdrew
his penis from the victim's mouth. In the third incident, a knock on the
door of the classroom may have had something to do with it as well.
However, to suggest, as defendant did, that he realized "how wrong" his
conduct was only after he became "aroused" during the third sexual
assault, strains credulity beyond the breaking point. Moreover, defendant
really had no opportunity to commit further sexual assaults. Soon after the
third sexual assault, school personnel became suspicious and the matter
was turned over to law enforcement authorities for investigation.
	Even if defendant is truly remorseful, that is hardly a determinative
factor with respect to the prospect of rehabilitation. A court may well find
that the seriousness of the offense outweighs any expression of sorrow.
See People v. Fyke, 190 Ill. App. 3d 713, 721 (1989). Moreover,
remorse may be part of a cycle in which the sex offender ultimately returns
to his deviant behavior. See People v. Lintz, 245 Ill. App. 3d 658, 668
(1993). If the circuit court really believed that the 36-year-old defendant
possessed significant rehabilitative potential, sentences that would permit
his earliest release from prison at age 61 would seem to be an odd way
of showing it. As this court observed in Taylor, "there is no indication [in
our constitution] that the possibility of rehabilitating an offender was to be
given greater weight and consideration than the seriousness of the offense
in determining a proper penalty." Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 206. Having
considered all relevant factors for purposes of the first test of
proportionality, we cannot say that the legislature's mandated sentence is
unconstitutional as applied to this defendant. Given that determination, it
obviously follows that the statute is constitutional on its face. "[S]o long as
there exists a situation in which a statute could be validly applied, a facial
challenge must fail." Hill, 202 Ill. 2d  at 157.
	We now turn to the contention that the statute violates the second
proportionality test. For purposes of the second test, a penalty violates the
proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and
conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is
punished more severely. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  at 522. The cross-comparison
analysis of the second test involves a potential two-step inquiry, depending
on the answer to the first question: (1) whether the offenses being
compared share a common statutory purpose (People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 476 (1998); Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522); and (2) if the purposes
are related, whether the less serious offense is punished more harshly than
the more serious offense (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 475-76). The
defendant offers for comparison the offense of aggravated battery of a
child. We reject defendant's argument because we do not believe the
offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and aggravated
battery of a child, share a common statutory purpose.
	Defendant argues that aggravated battery of a child is a more serious
offense because it requires conduct resulting in "great bodily harm" or
"permanent disability or disfigurement" (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West
2002)) whereas predatory criminal sexual assault of a child "does not
require or contemplate" such harm to the victim. In addition, defendant
suggests that the legislature must have considered the conduct proscribed
by section 12-4.3 of the Code more prevalent because "aggravated
battery of a child has been a crime since 1981, and predatory criminal
sexual assault was not a crime until 1996." The latter 
disingenuous assertion, of course, ignores the fact that the pertinent
elements of the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault were
previously criminalized in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute.
	In any event, we believe our previous lengthy discussion of the
problems associated with sexual assaults upon children adequately refutes
defendant's contentions regarding the comparative seriousness of these
two offenses. Defendant would minimize what happened to the victims.
Defendant states that his acts "were not even immediately recognized by
the children as unlawful" and did not cause them "any physical harm."
Defendant would have us accept the "fiction" of the "nonviolent" rapist
(see Fordham Urb. L.J. at 441) and ignore the devastating injury inflicted
upon a child's developing psyche. We reiterate the words of the Supreme
Court from Coker, describing rape as "[s]hort of homicide, *** the
'ultimate violation of self.' " Coker, 433 U.S.  at 597, 53 L. Ed. 2d  at
992-93, 97 S. Ct.  at 2869, quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice, Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration Report, Rape and Its Victims: A
Report for Citizens, Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies 1
(1975).
	The psychological injury suffered by a child victim of sexual assault
is different in kind from injuries sustained by a battered child. Moreover,
it appears from our research that sexual assaults upon children are
occurring with increasing frequency and have justifiably become a matter
of nationwide concern. Unlike the offender who batters a child, a sexual
predator is more likely to seek out multiple victims and more likely to
reoffend. The purpose of statutes like the aggravated criminal sexual
assault statute, and the predatory criminal sexual assault statute, is to
"protect victims from, and punish perpetrators for, sexually harmful and
offensive conduct." People v. Sanchez, 344 Ill. App. 3d 74, 82 (2003)
(addressing, inter alia, the differing purposes of the aggravated criminal
sexual assault and the female genital mutilation statutes). The purpose of
the aggravated battery of a child statute is obviously to protect children
from bodily harm associated with a battery. Because the purposes of the
predatory criminal sexual assault statute and the statute proscribing
aggravated battery of a child are different, comparison for purposes of
proportionality review is inappropriate.
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 12-14.1(b)(1.2)
of the Code is constitutional as applied to this defendant. We reverse the
judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.