Title: Hill v. Kraft, Inc.
Citation: 496 So. 2d 768
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 1986

496 So. 2d 768 (1986)
Craig HILL
v.
KRAFT, INC., a Corporation, et al.
85-649.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 3, 1986.
*769 James M. Prestwood of Prestwood, Prestwood &amp; Jazwinski, Andalusia, for appellant.
W.H. Albritton IV of Albrittons, Givhan &amp; Clifton, Andalusia, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal.
Nothing was considered by the trial court but the complaint and the motion to dismiss. The motion was not treated as a motion for summary judgment with all parties given an opportunity to present all pertinent material in accordance with the last provision of Rule 12(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. Therefore, this Court must test the action of the trial court under the standard of review applicable to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Roberts v. Meeks, 397 So. 2d 111 (Ala.1981).
Motions to dismiss should be granted sparingly, and a dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garrett v. Gilley, 488 So. 2d 1360 (Ala.1986).
In the first count Craig Hill prayed for the following relief:
In the second count it was alleged: "On or about the 11th day of February, 1980 the Defendants converted to their own use certain monies due the Plaintiff under an insurance contract" provided and issued by defendants of a value believed to be in excess of $15,000.
It will not benefit the parties to this controversy, the Bar, or the judiciary to set out Hill's first claim in its entirety. This Court certainly would not want to encourage *770 such pleading, but suffice it to say that though it is difficult to express what claim is alleged, it does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of an action for an accounting.
As to the second claim, we cannot say as a matter of law that "`certain monies due the Plaintiff under an insurance contract,' whether still in the hands of Ideal Mutual Insurance Company or paid to Kraft, Inc. by that insurance company," cannot be specific property which would support an action in conversion, under any conceivable set of facts which plaintiff might prove. In support of its position, Kraft cites as authority the cases of Lewis v. Fowler, 479 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1985), and Humana of Alabama, Inc. v. Rice, 380 So. 2d 862 (Ala.Civ.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So. 2d 864 (Ala. 1980). In both of those cases, the respective courts held that the defendants were entitled to directed verdicts because the plaintiffs failed to prove their conversion claims.
In Lewis v. Fowler, supra, at 726, this Court explained:
And, in that case, we held that plaintiff proved neither the existence of identifiable money nor the existence of a special account into which the garnished wages had been placed:
(Emphasis added.) 479 So. 2d  at 726-27. There is no question that, had the plaintiff in Lewis v. Fowler produced evidence showing that his employer had deposited his garnished wages into a segregated garnishment account, this Court would have concluded that his conversion count was properly submitted to the jury. Clearly, the problem for plaintiff in Lewis was a failure of proof.
In Humana of Alabama, Inc. v. Rice, supra, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the defendant in that case was entitled to a directed verdict, again because plaintiff had not proved every element of his claim for conversion. Quoting from Scott Paper Co. v. Novay Cherry Barge Service, Inc., 48 Ala.App. 368, 265 So. 2d 150 (1972), the Court stated the general rule for conversion as:
(Emphasis added.) 380 So. 2d  at 863. It was as to the last element quoted above that the Court determined that plaintiff's conversion claim failed as a matter of law and upon which the Court distinguished its *771 earlier decision in Coffee General Hospital v. Henderson, 338 So. 2d 1022 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976):
(Emphasis added.) 380 So. 2d  at 864. Thus, the holding in Humana did not concern the specificity of the property alleged to have been converted.
In the present case, the plaintiff has not been given the opportunity to prove any of the elements of his conversion count. Furthermore, it is entirely conceivable that the plaintiff can prove a set of facts entitling him to relief, particularly if he can prove that the insurance company paid money to Kraft for plaintiff's benefit pursuant to the alleged settlement agreement, and that Kraft placed those proceeds in a special account. For these reasons, the dismissal was improper.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.