Title: MISKOVICH v CITY OF HELENA
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13210
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1976

No. 13210 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA GEORGE D. MISKOVICH, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, CITY OF HELENA, M O N T A N A , a Municipal Corporation, JACK WILLIAMS, Chief of Police o f said City of Helena; T H E POLICE COMMISSION of s a i d City of Helena and t h e members thereof i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l capacity a s Police Commissioners, e t a l . , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable N a t Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : C. W. Leaphart, Jr. argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Loble, P i c o t t e and Pauly, Helena, Montana Gene A. P i c o t t e argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: A p r i l 21, 1976 Decided : A I R 2 ,1 :976 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. The City of Helena appeals from a judgment of the district court, Lewis and Clark County, Hon. Nat Allen presiding, reversing the Helena Police Commission's findings and adjudication and restoring policeman George D. Miskovich to the rank of sergeant with retroactive pay. On April 25, 1974, Sergeant Miskovich an eight year veteran of the Helena Police Department, with a spotless record and an early appointment to the rank of sergeant, was charged by the Chief of Police with three specific episodes, each alleged to con- stitute "misconduct in office", "conduct unbecoming an officer1' and conduct "such as to bring reproach upon the police force". The charges were in writing: 1. Cameron arrest, February 3, 1974 ( a ) Striking arrestee Cameron in the face while transporting him to police station, breaking Cameron's nose. ( b ) Grabbing Cameron by the hair in the police station and pounding his head upon the booking desk on two or more occasions. (c) Throwing Cameron to the floor and beating him with fists after Cameron requested permission to take a breathylizer test. 2. Coldwell arrest, March 4, 1973. Putting a "full Nelson" upon an arrestee named Coldwell, then releasing Coldwell, grabbing him with one hand and hitting him in the face. 3. St.Marks arrest, June 23, 1973. Arresting a woman named Mrs. St. Marks for public drunken- ness, and when t h i s woman i n d i c a e d t h a t she did not d e s i r e t o go i n t o the police s t a t i o n , grabbing her, pulling her forward and " h i t t i n g her i n t h e face with her purse", a t the same time shouting accusations a t her and holding her by the h a i r . A l l three charges were contained i n one written document. The f i r s t occurred about three months p r i o r t o charges, the remaining two approximately a year before. It s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c i t e d t h a t a l l charges were brought under section 11-1806(1), R.C.M. 1947, notifying Miskovich t h a t he would be t r i e d before t h e police commission i n accordance with the s t a t u t e . I n the same paragraph Miskovich, on those i d e n t i c a l charges, was suspended without pay and without hearing, e f f e c t i v e immediately. This suspen- sion without notice o r hearing was expressly done by t h e Chief of Police i n accordance with section 11-1806(10), R.C .M. 1947. Miskovich f i l e d a mandamus proceeding i n the d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County, successfully obtaining a w r i t of mandate t o forbid the summary suspension beyond the l a s t day of April 1974, because the s t a t u t e provided a maximum suspension under subsection (10) of ten days i n any one calendar month, and he was suspended on April 25. Miskovich appealed t h i s summary f i v e day suspension t o the $'olice commission, a s provided i n the s t a t u t e . That appeal was heard on the same evidence as were the charges under subsection ( I ) . The p o l i c e Commission held against Miskovich on the suspension appeal, and because the l e g i s l a t u r e did not provide f o r a f u r t h e r appeal, the summary d i s c i p l i n e under subsection (10) became f i n a l . The Helena Police Commission, a three man body, was o f f i c i a l l y chaired by Commissioner P f e i f f e r , who became ill and l e f t the hearing. A t h i s departure it was apparently stipulated by a l l p a r t i e s t h a t P f e i f f e r would be excused and would not p a r t i c i p a t e further i n the case. The p a r t i e s agree there was a s t i p u l a t i o n but the specific terms a r e i n doubt. P f e i f f e r missed the testimony of several witnesses, plus most of the d i r e c t examination of M i s - kovich. He returned t o the hearing i n the course of Miskovich's d i r e c t examination, and proceeded t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the tommission's findings and decision, signing as Chairman of the p o l i c e Commission. The police commission found the charges a r i s i n g out of the Coldwell a r r e s t of March 1973 were not proven. Those a r i s i n g out of the St.Marks a r r e s t of June 1973, were found proven i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y . Those a r i s i n g from the Cameron incident of February 1974 were found proven i n p a r t , s p e c i f i c a l l y the use of excessive force i n backhanding Cameron and slamming h i s face i n t o the booking counter. I n accordance with these findings, the commission suspended Miskovich an additional t h i r t y days and permanently reduced h i s rank from sergeant t o patrolman. These penalties were approved by the c i t y manager. The s t a t u t o r y action f o r review i n the d i s t r i c t court by Miskovich ensued. The d i s t r i c t court reviewed the record i n the manner directed by t h e decision of t h i s Court i n a p r i o r proceeding by the City of Helena i n supervisory control, (City of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 52.), reversed the police commission decision and restored Miskovich retroactively t o h i s pay, emoluments and rank. This appeal by the City of Helena followed. The City presents four issues f o r review: (1) Whether the d i s t r i c t court exceeded i t s scope of review i n reversing the police commission findings on the weight of the evidence. ( 2 ) Whether a policeman subject to charges under section 11-1806 (I), R.C.M. 1947, can also be suspended on the same charges under section 11-1806 ( l o ) , R.C.M. 1947. (3) Whether the district court erred in concluding the police commission findings were nul'lified by the absence of Commissioner Pfeiffer. ( 4 ) Whether certain evidentiary rulings of the p'olice oommission materially prejudiced Sergeant Miskovich. The City contends the district court exceeded its scope of review of the police comtrkion proceedings. In support of its position the City relies on the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, specifically section 82-4216 ( 7 ) , R.C .M. 1947, which states in pertinent part: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. * * *I1 First, the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, Title 82, Chapter 42, is not applicable to the administrative functions of metropolitan police commissions. The full title of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 2, Laws of Montana 1971, Extraordinary Session, reads in pertinent part: "An act prescribing .uniform procedures for state administrative agencies * * * . ' I (Emphasis supplied.) The Montana Administrative Procedure Act defines "agency" at section 82-4202 ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, as: "* * * any board, bureau, commission, department, authority or officer of the state government authorized by law to make rules and to determine contested cases * * * . I 1 (Emphasis supplied.) Though city police commissions are creations of state statute, they are obviously entities of municipal government. It is the mayor or city manager who appoints the police commissioners with the consent of the c i t y council or commission. The c i t y council o r c i t y commission determines the compensation of police commissioners, section 11-1804, R.C.M. 1947. It is the duty of the police commission t o oversee the hiring and discipline of police o f f i c e r s , t h e police o f f i c e r s being municipal employees, sections 11-1805, 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947. See S t a t e of Montana v. D i s t r i c t , Mont . Y P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 464. Since the metropolitan police commission is not a s t a t e adminis- t r a t i v e agency as defined i n the Montana Administrative Procedure A c t , the a c t i s not applicable t o the question of the scope of d i s t r i c t court review of police commission findings. The controlling s t a t u t e is the Metropolitan Police Law, T i t l e 11, Chapter 18. Section 11-1806 (7), R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "When a charge against a member of the police force i s found proven by the board, and i s not vetoed by the mayor, the mayor must make an order enforcing the deci- sion of the board, o r i f modified by the mayor, then such decision a s modified, and such decision o r order s h a l l be subject t o review by the d i s t r i c t court of the proper county on a l l questions of f a c t and a l l questions of law." (Emphasis supplied. ) This Court i n disposition of a previous application by the City of Helena f o r a w r i t of supervisory control directed t o the d i s t r i c t court (City of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 52,54), interpreted d i s t r i c t court review of police commission findings i n t h i s manner: "* * *However, t o review the law i s t o ascertain whether the rulings thereon were c o r r e c t , t o review the f a c t s i s t o determine whether the evidence supports the police commission findings. This would be similar t o the review of law and f a c t s a s i n an equity case. See section 93- 216, R.C.M. 1947." It has long been held by t h i s Court t h a t review of f a c t s i n an equity case is based on the substantial evidence t e s t . White v. Nollmeyer, 151 Mont. 387, 443 P.2d 873; Bender v. Bender, 144 Mont. 470, 397 P.2d 957; Kyser v. Hiebert, 142 Mont. 466, 385 P.2d 90. Thus the d i s t r i c t court's power t o make i t s own deter- mination as t o the weight of the evidence resulting from the police commission hearings i s analogous t o t h i s Court's power t o do the same i n equity cases. Here, the d i s t r i c t court deter- mined there was not substantial evidence t o warrant the police commission findings. Upon review of the transcript of the police commission hearing, we agree with the d i s t r i c t court's determination as t o the weight of the evidence bearing i n mind the two basic princi- ples espoused by t h i s Court i n State ex r e l . Wentworth v. Baker, 101 Mont. 226, 53 P.2d 440. In that case, the c i t y council and mayor suspended a policeman. After issuing a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i and holding a hearing, the d i s t r i c t court s e t aside the suspension and ordered the policeman reinstated. In reviewing the d i s t r i c t court's action, t h i s Court f i r s t said the d i s t r i c t court judgment i s presumed t o be correct and therefore the burden i s on the party challenging it. Second, i n determining whether the challenging party has met i t s burden, t h i s Court has the duty of determining whether o r not substantial evidence exists i n the record t o support the charge. A s a f i n a l statement on t h i s Court's role i n reviewing a proceeding such as t h i s and by way of introduction t o discussion of the evidence i n the instant case, we note the police discipline case Bailey v. Examining & T r i a l Board, 42 Mont. 216,218, 112 P. 69, where the Court said: "The effect of t h i s provision i s that a decision of the examining and t r i a l board on questions of fact is f i n a l and conclusive on a l l courts i f there i s any substantial evidence t o support it. Whether there is or not i s a question i n the f i r s t instance f o r a d i s t r i c t court t o decide. A charge without substance is no charge, and a finding without substantial evidence a s i t s basis i s no finding. One of the e s s e n t i a l requirements of law i s t h a t a charge s h a l l be brought against the o f f i c e r and t h a t such charge s h a l l embody f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a cause of action within the meaning of the Act. Another is t h a t , before the charge can be sustained, some substantial evidence must be given i n support of it. 9 : * *" Turning t o the testimony presented a t the police commission hearing, w e note t h i s testimony i n support of the holding t h a t there was not substantial evidence t o support the police commission findings : (1) A s t o the charges stemming from the Cameron incident, Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t enroute t o the police s t a t i o n Miskovich engaged i n an unprovoked attack against him a t a time when he was handcuffed. Cameron claimed Miskovich's a t t a c k broke h i s nose. However other testimony reveals the incident may not have been q u i t e a s Cameron pictured it. Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had spent three t o four hours i n a l o c a l bar p r i o r t o h i s a r r e s t . Officer Sebens, present a t the time of Cameron's a r r e s t , t e s t i f i e d Cameron r e s i s t e d a r r e s t but t h a t Miskovich engaged i n no police b r u t a l i t y a t t h a t time. Officer Crawford, a l s o present a t the time of Cameron's a r r e s t , v e r i f i e d Officer Sebens' testimony. Miskovich t e s t i f i e d Cameron was abusive, unruly, and r e s i s t e d a r r e s t and during the drive t o the police s t a t i o n , Cameron kicked him i n the chest, momentarily stunning him, so t h a t he f e l t compelled t o backhand Cameron i n the face t o protect himself. Upon h i s a r r i v a l a t the s t a t i o n , Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t Miskovich continued t o abuse him, a t one point grabbing him by the h a i r and slamming h i s face i n t o the booking counter. Officers Valiton and Stradley confirmed Cameron's story on t h i s point. However, once again other testimony would tend t o cast substantial doubt on t h i s particular version of the incident. Bonnie Goltz, working as a dispatcher near the booking counter a t the time of the alleged face slamming incident, directly contradicted the testimony of these two officers, stating Cameron was so unruly that Miskovich held h i s head t o the booking counter t o calm him down. She explicitly stated that a t no time did Miskovich slam Cameron's head against the counter. In addition, one of the officers who t e s t i f i e d for the City, Officer Stradley, was under investigation in connection with an alleged felony in Broadwater County. The victim of that felony t e s t i f i e d that no police investigation o r disciplinary action was t o be taken against Officer Stradley u n t i l 'I* * *after the Miskovich case was taken care of * * * ' I . The victim t e s t i f i e d further that t h i s was the reaction, even though he informed the authorities of a signed confession by Officer Stradley on the matter. Officer Eielena Stradley has since been removed from thelpolice department. Finally, :in view of the alleged charge of excessive violence inflicted on Cameron by Miskovich, evidence as t o Cameron's actual physical condition subsequent t o the alleged incident i s of the utmost importance. Officer Grant ~ohnson, a witness for the c i t y and the officer in charge of the s h i f t on the day of the a r r e s t , stated on cross-examination that he told Miskovich on the day of the a r r e s t that Cameron did not appear t o be injured. A close examination of the photo of Cameron taken the day of h i s a r r e s t and marked Miskovich Exhibit 2, shows no marks on the prisoner compatible with the alleged violence purportedly inflicted on Cameron's head and face. In view of the foregoing evidence, we hold the findings of the police commission as to charges against Miskovich stemming from the Cameron arrest are not supported by substantial evidence, ( 2 ) The police commission findings as to the St. Marks arrest of June 1973. Officer Bryson who assisted Miskovich in arresting the St. Marks woman testified that upon arriving at the police station, Miskovich proceeded to grab the woman by the hair and pull her down an entrance ramp, at the same time striking her in the face with her purse. Miskovich testified he felt com- pelled to strike her once with her purse because she was kicking and biting and had taken his thumb in her mouth and refused to let go. Further scrutiny of Officer Bryson's testimony reveals ( 1 ) he admitted the woman had been drinking, ( 2 ) it was necessary for both officers to exert force to accomplish the arrest and place her in the patrol car, and ( 3 ) the woman attempted to jump out of the patrol car on the way to the station. Mrs. St. Marks plead guilty to a charge of resisting arrest, paid a $50 fine, and was given a suspended jail sentence. She also plead guilty to a charge of drunkenness and paid a fine of $25. Further, she failed to appear at the commission hearing. On the basis of this evidence the police commission findings as to the St. Marks incident were not supported by substantial evidence. This type of case should properly be decided on the merits if a t all possible. This we have done and consequently an in depth discussion of the procedural due process issues raised is not necessary to the disposition of this matter--but we will comment briefly for clarification of these issues. Appellant City's second issue seeks a clarification of section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947 as to subsections ( 1 ) and ( 1 0 ) . Miskovich was suspended pursuant to subsection ( 1 0 ) of section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947. Utilizing the same charges used to justify his suspension, he was then subjected to a police commission hearing pursuant to subsection ( 1 ) of section 11-1806. The City contends subsection ( 1 0 ) is a proper means of suspending a policeman pending charges brought under subsection ( I ) , it argues that the power of suspension is incident to the power of removal. Miskovich, on the other hand, contends the applicable subsections are mutually exclusive, and thereforeace charges were brought under subsection ( l o ) , those same charges could not be used to institute proceedings under subsection ( 1 ) . The City contends that suspension pending hearing on the charges is a perfectly legitimate administrative exercise. We agree. However, that principle is not dispositive of the issue. The question here is the mode of such suspension, considering the applicable statute. While subsections ( 1 ) through ( 9 ) and subsection ( l o ) , of section 11-1806, all deal with matters of police discipline, it is apparent the procedure and remedies available under subsections ( 1 ) through ( 9 ) are more detailed in their due process protections than those under subsection ( 1 0 ) . In particular, contrary to sub- sections ( 1 ) through ( 9 ) , subsection ( 1 0 ) does not provide for written notice of charges or a hearing prior to suspension, rather the only action required is a notice of suspension given by the mayor or the chief of police, with the approval of the mayor. In addition, suspension under subsection ( 1 0 ) can only be for ten days in any one month, with the only appeal of that suspension being to the police commission since subsection ( 1 0 ) does not provide for judicial review. In construing a statutory situation such as exists here, this Court in Adair v. Schnack, 117 Mont. 377, 386, 161 P.2d 641, quoted with approval from the California case People v. Campbell, 110 Cal.App. 783, 291 P. 161, 162: "'It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, where different language is used in the same con- nection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the legislature intended a different meaning and effect. " I In State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 20, 195 P. 2d 989, the Court said: "A fundamental rule of construction is that, if possible, effect shall be given to all parts of a statute. * * * And each part of a statute must be given a rea- sonable construction which will enable it to be har- monized with other provisions * * * and give it vitality and make operative all of its provisions. * * * Statutes I should be so construed as to give a sensible and in- telligent meaning to every part and avoid absurd and unjust consequences. Section 516, Lewis' Sutherland Stat.Const. (2d ~d.)' * * *.I' (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, in view of provisions in section 11-1806, subsections ( 1 ) through ( 9 ) and subsection ( l p ) , R.C.M. 1947, we hold they are mutually exclusive with subsection ( 1 0 ) intended to deal with minor disciplinary matters capable of being handled within the police department and subsections ( 1 ) through ( 9 ) intended for charges of a more serious nature, charges which could, if proven, lead to discharge from the police force. Therefore, a policeman charged under section 11-1806, subsection ( l o ) , cannot also be subject to identical charges under section 11-1806, subsec- tion ( 1 ) . To construe this statute otherwise would be to hold the legislature intended to subject the policeman, on one set of charges, to two proceedings before the police commission, one with various procedural safeguards and t h e r i g h t t o j u d i c i a l review, and the other of a more summary nature with no r i g h t of j u d i c i a l review. It i s such "absurd and unjust consequences" alluded t o i n S t a t e Board of Equalization v. Cole, supra, t h a t t h i s Court s t r i v e s t o avoid. However, we emphasize t h i s holding does not mean a police o f f i c e r cannot be suspended pending a hearing on charges but only t h a t the same charges may not be used t o e f f e c t both suspension under subsection ( l o ) , and t h e i n i t i a t i o n of the formal hearing process under subsection (1). W e agree with the position t h a t a member of an administra- t i v e tribunal who was absent from a portion of the adjudicative proceedings before t h a t tribunal should not be allowed t o p a r t i - cipate i n i t s f i n a l decision. This would be p a r t i c u l a r l y im- portant as it pertains t o a police commission. Here, there was a t r a n s c r i p t record of the proceedings before the commission but t h i s may not always be t r u e as the s t a t u t e does not require t h a t a record be kept. City of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 52. Finding no abuse of discretion and s u f f i c i e n t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support the d i s t r i c t court, we affirm the judgment t o r e i n s t a t e respondent police o f f i c e r t o sergeant's rank with retroac t i v e and other. We concur: Justices / ' i dlu! f,JA fi611." Robert J I . ' Nelson, District g for chief Justice Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: n I dissent. 1