Title: Commonwealth v. Morgan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12114
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2017

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SJC-12114 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOEL D. MORGAN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 6, 2016. - April 18, 2017. 
 
Present (Sitting at Lawrence):  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, 
Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Veteran.  Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Continuance 
without a finding, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lowell Division of 
the District Court Department on October 3, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for pretrial diversion was heard by Barbara S. 
Pearson, J., and questions of law were reported by her to the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Elizabeth Hugetz, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also 
present) for the defendant. 
                     
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
John C. Mooney, for John C. Mooney & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case comes to us on two reported questions 
and calls upon us to construe for the first time the so-called 
VALOR Act, St. 2012, c. 108, entitled "An Act relative to 
veterans' access, livelihood, opportunity and resources."  The 
VALOR Act was enacted in 2012 in the aftermath of protracted 
American military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In 
recognition of the toll thereby taken on many who served in the 
military, the VALOR Act, among other things, amended the statute 
providing young adults with pretrial diversion, G. L. c. 276A 
(pretrial diversion statute), to include qualifying veterans and 
active duty members of our armed forces facing criminal charges 
in the District and Boston Municipal Courts. 
 
We address first whether, under the pretrial diversion 
statute, as amended by the VALOR Act, a judge is authorized to 
dismiss or to continue such charges without a finding upon a 
defendant's successful completion of an approved pretrial 
diversion program.  We conclude that the judge is so authorized, 
rejecting the Commonwealth's view that the VALOR Act amendments 
permit only a continuance of court proceedings, on the flawed 
view that, while military defendants could seek treatment 
through court-approved programs, they would face resumed 
prosecution of the charged offenses even after the successful 
3 
 
 
completion of such a program. 
 
We go on to address the reported questions and consider 
whether the pretrial diversion statute, as amended by the VALOR 
Act, permits a judge to continue without a finding (CWOF) or to 
dismiss a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI), second or subsequent 
offense, notwithstanding the provisions of G. L. c. 90, § 24, 
which generally proscribe such dispositions.  Our analysis of 
this question ultimately turns on the legislative intent of the 
VALOR Act and its multifaceted approach to assisting members of 
the military in their often-difficult return to civilian life, 
during which many succumb to substance abuse.  We conclude that, 
notwithstanding otherwise applicable constraints on alternative 
dispositions that the preexisting OUI statute imposes, the 
pretrial diversion statute, as amended in 2012 by the VALOR Act, 
vests judges with discretion to order either of the two 
alternative dispositions at issue in appropriate cases that 
involve charges of OUI, second or subsequent offense.  We 
accordingly answer both reported questions2 in the affirmative.3 
                     
 
2 See part 1, infra, for the full text of the reported 
questions. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by John C. 
Mooney and Disabled American Veterans Department of 
Massachusetts, Inc., in support of the defendant, Joel D. 
Morgan. 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  We set forth the relevant facts, which are 
largely undisputed.4  The defendant, Joel D. Morgan, is a veteran 
of the United States Army, in which he served from 2002 to 2011.  
During his last four years of service, he completed three 
consecutive tours of duty, two in Iraq and one in Afghanistan.  
As early as the first of these deployments, he began to 
experience symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 
by the time he returned from his final tour of duty in 
Afghanistan in 2011, his untreated symptoms had significantly 
worsened.  He also had numerous physical disabilities as the 
result of injuries received during his tours of duty.5 
 
Immediately upon returning from Afghanistan, Morgan sought 
mental health treatment through the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), but the VA was unable to schedule an 
intake appointment for four months.  While awaiting evaluation 
and treatment, Morgan began to self-medicate by abusing alcohol 
and opioids.  In January, 2012, he was evaluated and was 
diagnosed with PTSD.  In the fall of 2012, the VA also 
determined that Morgan was one hundred per cent disabled.  On 
Veteran's Day, in November, 2012, Morgan's identical twin 
                     
 
4 Because no evidence was taken, the facts consist largely 
of the statements in the police incident report and the 
undisputed submissions of the parties. 
 
 
5 Morgan's son was born during his final deployment.  Morgan 
and his wife are divorced. 
5 
 
 
brother, himself a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
who suffered from PTSD and a traumatic brain injury, committed 
suicide.  The impact of his twin's suicide on Morgan's efforts 
to return to ordinary civilian life was considerable. 
 
In April, 2013, Morgan entered a short-term detoxification 
program at a VA hospital in Bedford.  Immediately after release 
from that program, he entered an intensive outpatient program, 
but completed only one month.  In July, 2013, Morgan visited his 
mother, who had moved to California, and he successfully 
completed a two-month residential treatment program there.  He 
thereafter relapsed. 
 
On September 29, 2014, Morgan was driving erratically on 
Interstate 495 in Tewksbury when his vehicle swerved into 
another lane and hit the side of a tow truck.  Morgan did not 
stop to exchange insurance information at the scene.  The tow 
truck driver telephoned police and reported the incident; he 
also said that he had observed a Toyota (later identified as 
Morgan's) driving very erratically for ten miles before the 
accident.  Morgan continued driving until he was stopped by a 
State police trooper in Boxborough, who had been alerted by the 
truck driver's report, and who observed Morgan still driving 
erratically. 
 
When stopped, Morgan appeared to be under an intoxicating 
influence; he was disheveled and sweating, with glassy eyes and 
6 
 
 
slurred speech.  Dried blood and needle marks were visible on 
his left arm.  The trooper who conducted the stop called for 
backup, and ultimately was joined by four other troopers.  
Morgan informed one of the troopers that he had heroin and a 
hypodermic needle in his possession, and those items were taken 
into police custody.  Morgan was arrested and driven to the 
State police barracks for booking.  He waived his Miranda rights 
and agreed to be evaluated by a drug recognition specialist, who 
concluded that Morgan was exhibiting signs of opioid use.  
Police found drug paraphernalia in the vehicle near the driver's 
seat, including plastic bags, a bottle cap, and two hypodermic 
needles. 
 
The following week, Morgan was arraigned in the District 
Court on charges of OUI, second offense; possession of heroin; 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle; and leaving the scene of 
property damage.  When his attorney later learned that Morgan 
was a veteran, she sought pretrial diversion under the VALOR 
Act.  He was evaluated by the VA, which determined that he would 
benefit from such a program. 
 
At different VA medical centers, Morgan underwent 
detoxification, received specialized PTSD counselling for the 
first time, and also began supportive counselling for substance 
7 
 
 
abuse, in conjunction with monthly Naltrexone6 injections.  He 
passed a union examination, joined a local carpenters union, and 
has maintained employment as a carpenter.7 
 
Three months after arraignment, in January, 2015, Morgan 
filed a motion, pursuant to the pretrial diversion statute, 
seeking dismissal of all charges should the pretrial diversion 
program prove successful.  In the alternative, he sought to 
admit to sufficient facts and have the case continued without a 
finding.  The prosecutor opposed both dispositions, contending 
that, given the terms of the OUI statute, G. L. c. 90, §§ 24 
and 24D, the judge could not continue a second offense8 without a 
                     
 
6 Naltrexone helps treat opioid addiction by blocking opioid 
receptors in the body, but carries no risk of abuse or illicit 
resale.  See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-
treatment/treatment/naltrexone [https://perma.cc/LVS4-ZT3F]. 
 
 
7 In support of his motion to report questions of law, 
Morgan executed an affidavit in July, 2015, stating that he had 
not consumed alcohol or drugs since his arrest.  Morgan's 
counsellors also submitted affidavits and letters in support of 
the motion, stating that he has maintained sobriety and 
employment, has made significant progress in treatment, was 
providing for his son, and was taking steps to restore family 
relationships.  Morgan's attorney also submitted a letter from 
her investigator stating that the tow truck driver, himself a 
veteran, had told the investigator that he did not want Morgan 
to "end up with a criminal conviction over this," so long as 
Morgan receives the help he so "desperately needs." 
 
 
8 In December, 2004, approximately nine years and ten months 
prior to the incident at issue here, Morgan admitted to 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding that he had operated a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
 
8 
 
 
finding.  He also maintained that, in any event, the pretrial 
diversion statute did not permit a judge to dismiss a case 
involving a veteran or active duty member of the military and 
that, absent statutory authorization, such dismissal, over the 
Commonwealth's objection, infringed on the separation of powers.9  
See art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; 
Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 301 & n.10 (2014). 
 
Acknowledging that the case presented an unsettled question 
of law, the judge reported the following two questions to the 
Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 
Mass. 1501 (2004): 
                                                                  
(OUI).  The case was continued without a finding and dismissed 
upon his successful completion of probation.  Although Morgan 
did not have a prior criminal conviction at the time of the 2014 
incident, because ten years had not elapsed since December, 
2004, he was not eligible for another continuance without a 
finding under the terms of the OUI statute.  Where a defendant 
previously was "assigned to an alcohol or controlled substance 
education, treatment or rehabilitation program [by a court] 
because of" operating while under the influence, a subsequent 
OUI charge "shall not be placed on file or continued without a 
finding," unless the defendant was convicted or assigned to a 
treatment program at least ten years previously; this exception 
shall apply only "once in his [or her] lifetime."  See G. L. 
c. 90, §§ 24 & 24D, second par.  Otherwise put, had at least ten 
years elapsed between the resolution of the 2004 matter and the 
2014 incident, Morgan would have been eligible for a continuance 
without a finding upon successful completion of a court-approved 
program under the terms of the OUI statute itself, quite apart 
from the pretrial diversion statute, as amended by the VALOR 
Act.  The question before us arises because of his ineligibility 
under the OUI statute. 
 
 
9 The prosecutor did not oppose an admission to sufficient 
facts and a continuance without a finding on the other charges. 
9 
 
 
 
1.  "Under the VALOR Act, may a judge exercise 
discretion to enter a CWOF after an admission to an OUI-
second offense?" 
 
 
2.  "If a CWOF is not available, may a court dismiss 
the charge upon successful completion of diversion, over 
the Commonwealth's objection?" 
 
We allowed Morgan's application for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Statutory background.  Two statutes are relevant to our 
consideration of the reported questions.  We set forth each in 
pertinent detail. 
 
a.  Pretrial diversion statute, G. L. c. 276A.  In 1974, 
the Legislature inserted c. 276A into the General Laws by 
enacting St. 1974, c. 781, "An Act establishing a district court 
procedure to divert selected offenders from the district courts 
to programs of community supervision and service."  As initially 
enacted, the statute provided for pretrial diversion to a 
program, followed by dismissal or a continuance without a 
finding, for young adults who were at least eighteen, but not 
yet twenty-two years old. 
 
"The district courts, and in Boston, the municipal 
court of the city of Boston, shall have jurisdiction to 
divert to a program . . . any person who is charged with an 
offense or offenses against the [C]ommonwealth for which a 
term of imprisonment may be imposed and over which the 
[D]istrict [C]ourts may exercise final jurisdiction and who 
has reached the age of [eighteen] years but has not reached 
the age of twenty-two, who has not previously been 
convicted of a violation of any law of the [C]ommonwealth 
or of any other [S]tate or of the United States in any 
criminal court proceeding after having reached the age of 
[eighteen] years, . . . who does not have any outstanding 
warrants, continuances, appeals or criminal cases pending 
10 
 
 
before any courts of the [C]ommonwealth or any other 
[S]tate or of the United States, and who has received a 
recommendation from a program that he would, in light of 
the capacities of and guidelines governing it, benefit from 
participation in said program." 
 
G. L. c. 276A, § 2. 
 
 
In 2012, the pretrial diversion statute, among others, was 
amended by the VALOR Act, St. 2012, c. 108, to assist veterans 
and active duty service members of the United States armed 
forces in numerous ways as they resumed their civilian lives.10  
The VALOR Act added G. L. c. 276A, §§ 10 and 11. 
 
Section 10 defines eligible military defendants in language 
that almost precisely mirrors that used in G. L. c. 276A, § 2, 
to define young adults eligible for the protections of G. L. 
c. 276A, except that it applies to veterans: 
 
"The district courts, and in Boston, the municipal 
court of the city of Boston, shall have jurisdiction to 
divert to a program any person who is a veteran, . . . on 
active service in the armed forces of the United 
States, . . . or who has history of military service in the 
armed forces of the United States who is charged with an 
offense against the [C]ommonwealth for which a term of 
imprisonment may be imposed, regardless of age, who has not 
previously been convicted of a violation of any law of the 
                     
 
10 In addition to the provisions at issue here, the VALOR 
Act, inter alia, amended G. L. c. 7, § 61, to provide benefits 
for veteran-owned businesses; added G. L. c. 15A, § 42, to 
provide help for veterans seeking higher education; inserted 
G. L. c. 15E to streamline transfers between school districts 
for children of service members; amended G. L. c. 59 to provide 
property tax benefits for veterans; amended G. L. c. 146 to help 
veterans and members of the military maintain professional 
licenses; and amended G. L. c. 10, § 35CC, to expand access to 
food, housing, utilities, and medical benefits. 
11 
 
 
[C]ommonwealth or of any other [S]tate or of the United 
States . . . after having reached the age of [eighteen] 
years . . . who does not have any outstanding warrants, 
continuances, appeals or criminal cases pending before any 
courts of the [C]ommonwealth or any other [S]tate or of the 
United States and who has received a recommendation from a 
program that such person would, in light of the capacities 
of and guidelines governing it, benefit from participation 
in said program." 
 
G. L. c. 276A, § 10. 
The pretrial diversion statute, as originally enacted in 
1974, explicitly excludes otherwise eligible defendants charged 
with certain offenses from pretrial diversion, G. L. c. 276A, 
§ 4, and sets forth a detailed process to be followed in 
screening eligible defendants for admission to a program, G. L. 
c. 276A, § 3.  It allows a judge to "afford[] a fourteen-day 
continuance for assessment by the personnel of a program to 
determine if [the defendant] would benefit from such program."  
Id.  In 2012, the VALOR Act added G. L. c. 276A, § 11, creating 
a similar procedure for qualifying veterans:  a judge may 
"afford[] a [fourteen]-day continuance . . . to seek an 
assessment by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 
the [D]epartment of [V]eterans' [S]ervices or another [S]tate or 
[F]ederal agency with suitable knowledge and experience of 
veterans affairs to provide the court with treatment 
options . . . including diversion programs." 
If, after receiving the requisite information in the 
assessment, and any response by the Commonwealth, the judge 
12 
 
 
determines that the defendant should enter the program, and the 
defendant "agrees to abide by the terms and conditions in the 
plan of services," "[t]he criminal proceedings of [a] defendant 
who qualifies for diversions under [G. L. c. 276A, § 2,] . . . 
shall be stayed for a period of ninety days, unless the judge in 
his [or her] discretion considers that the interest of justice 
would be served by a hearing of the facts, after which the case 
may be continued without a finding for ninety days."  G. L. 
c. 276A, § 5. 
At the end of the ninety-day stay or the continuance 
without a finding, the judge may dismiss the underlying charge 
"[i]f the report indicates the successful completion of the 
program by a defendant."  G. L. c. 276A, § 7.  If, at the end of 
that time, the defendant has not completed the program 
successfully, or if the program recommends that the stay be 
extended, the judge may, in his or her discretion, extend the 
stay, dismiss the charges, return the case to the trial list, or 
"take such action as he [or she] deems appropriate."  Id. 
 
b.  OUI statute, G. L. c. 90, §§ 24, 24D.  Against the 
backdrop of otherwise available alternative dispositions,11 the 
OUI statute has long limited to only specific classes of OUI 
                     
 
11 See, e.g., G. L. c. 278, § 18 (allowing continuance 
without finding "unless otherwise prohibited by law"); Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 28 (e), 453 Mass. 1501 (2009) (allowing court to file 
case without imposing sentence after guilty finding or verdict). 
13 
 
 
offenders the availability of certain alternative dispositions.  
The statute has been amended numerous times in its eighty-five 
year history; at the time of Morgan's arrest, the OUI statute 
provided, as it does today, that "[i]f the defendant has been 
previously convicted or assigned to an alcohol or controlled 
substance education, treatment, or rehabilitation 
program[,] . . . [a] prosecution . . . shall not be placed on 
file or continued without a finding except for dispositions 
under [§ 24D]." 12  G. L. c. 90, § 24.  Adopted in 1974, G. L. 
c. 90, § 24D, in turn, allows a judge to dismiss a case or to 
enter a continuance without a finding after successful 
completion of a program, for certain defendants.  Such 
dismissals and continuances are limited to first offenses13 and, 
once in a lifetime, to those with "a single like offense . . . 
[ten] years or more before the date of the commission of the 
                     
 
12 General Laws c. 90, § 24, has been amended since Morgan's 
arrest; those amendments are not relevant to the portions of the 
statute at issue here. 
 
 
13 See St. 2002, c. 302; St. 1994, c. 25; St. 1975, c. 505; 
St. 1974, c. 647.  While the parties appear to argue whether 
"Melanie's Law," enacted in 2005, see St. 2005, c. 122, 
precluded an alternate disposition on a charge of OUI, second 
offense, such a disposition had been precluded several years 
earlier, by the amendments to the OUI statute in St. 2002, 
c. 302.  The 2005 revisions included enhanced penalties for a 
number of OUI offenses, and added provisions requiring ignition 
interlocks for those individuals who have been convicted of OUI, 
second or subsequent offense, if they are issued a hardship 
license or upon return of their driver's licenses. 
14 
 
 
[present] offense."14 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory authority under G. L. 
c. 276A.  Until the VALOR Act amended the statute in 2012, the 
special protections of the pretrial diversion statute that 
authorized judges to enter continuances without a finding or to 
dismiss charges against defendants who successfully completed a 
treatment program had been limited to young adults who were too 
old to fall under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, but 
had not yet reached their  twenty-second birthdays.15 As noted, 
the VALOR Act, in 2012, amended the preexisting pretrial 
diversion statute by adding §§ 10 and 11, thereby extending to 
veterans and service members the opportunity for pretrial 
diversion. 
 
The initial question we confront is whether G. L. c. 276A, 
as amended by the VALOR Act, permits a judge to dismiss or to 
continue without a finding criminal charges brought against a 
                     
 
14 Morgan's prior case was resolved in December, 2004, 
approximately nine years and ten months before the incident at 
issue here. 
 
 
15 As initially enacted, the pretrial diversion statute 
applied to young adults from the age of seventeen until they 
reached their twenty-second birthday.  See St. 1974, c. 781.  In 
2013, G. L. c. 276A, as amended by the VALOR Act, was further 
amended to limit its application to defendants who are at least 
eighteen years old, but who have not yet reached their twenty-
second birthday, see St. 2013, c. 84, § 32, in conjunction with 
the extension of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction to 
individuals who are seventeen years old. 
15 
 
 
qualifying military defendant upon his or her successful 
completion of an approved pretrial diversion program.  The 
Commonwealth is of the view that §§ 10 and 11 on their face in 
essence permit no more than a continuance of court proceedings 
to enable military defendants to seek treatment through approved 
programs; they do not themselves authorize alternative 
dispositions even upon the successful completion of such 
programs.  On this view, the successfully treated military 
defendant would then face resumed prosecution of the charged 
offenses.  We do not share this view.  In concluding that the 
statute confers upon judges the authority to order alternative 
dispositions and thereby divert successfully treated military 
defendants from further criminal prosecution, we reject the 
Commonwealth's contention that §§ 10 and 11, added by the VALOR 
Act, are to be read in isolation from the remainder of the 
pretrial diversion statute.  This conclusion follows from the 
application of our usual rules of statutory construction and the 
plain language of the statute itself, and is confirmed by our 
review of the history and purpose of the VALOR Act. 
 
In construing a statute, we strive to discern and 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.  The plain language of 
the statute, read as a whole, provides the primary insight into 
that intent.  See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 167 
(2017).  We do not confine our interpretation to the words of a 
16 
 
 
single section.  See Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 
(2012); 2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 46:5 (7th ed. rev. 2014).  To the extent that the 
meaning of a statute remains unclear, we seek to "ascertain the 
intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject 
matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as 
to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason 
and common sense."  Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477 
(2008).  We consider "the cause of [the statute's] enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object 
to be accomplished."  Wing v. Commissioner of Probation, 
473 Mass. 368, 373 (2015), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 
444, 447 (1934). 
 
We begin with the language of G. L. c. 276A, §§ 10 and 11, 
viewing it in the context of the pretrial diversion statute as a 
whole.  Doing so leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended 
to give veterans and active duty members of the military the 
same benefits of pretrial diversion programs and the alternative 
dispositions already afforded under the statute to young adults.  
"When the Legislature uses the same term in . . . different 
statutory sections, the term should be given a consistent 
meaning throughout."  Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 437 Mass. 809, 
816 (2002).  Here, not only did the Legislature use the same 
term –- "divert" -- in G. L. c. 276A, § 10, as in G. L. c. 276A, 
17 
 
 
§ 2, it also used nearly identical language throughout both of 
the two sections.  Compare G. L. c. 276A, § 2 (defining 
eligibility for diversion of young adults), with G. L. c. 276A, 
§ 10 (defining eligibility for diversion for veterans and active 
duty service members).  Virtually the only difference between 
these sections is that, while G. L. c. 276A, § 2, applies to 
those who have "reached the age of [eighteen] years but [have] 
not reached the age of twenty-two," G. L. c. 276A, § 10, applies 
to "veteran[s], . . . [those] on active service . . . , [and 
those] who [have] history of military service . . . regardless 
of age."  Accordingly, we conclude that in using the word 
"divert" in G. L. c. 276A, § 10, the Legislature intended it to 
have the same meaning as in the virtually identical language of 
G. L. c. 276A, § 2, to divert in contemplation of a continuance 
without a finding or dismissal. 
 
The Commonwealth nevertheless argues that the provisions of 
G. L. c. 276A, §§ 5 and 7 (allowing pretrial diversion programs 
and alternative dispositions), do not apply to veterans and 
active duty members of the military who have been deemed 
eligible for diversion under G. L. c. 276A, § 10.  The 
Commonwealth relies in this regard on the absence of language in 
§§ 5 and 7 (generally addressing continuances of cases for 
qualifying young defendants as defined in G. L. c. 276A, § 2), 
that cross-references §§ 10 and 11 concerning military 
18 
 
 
defendants.  At the same time, it ignores the fact that G. L. 
c. 276A, § 7 (permitting a judge, "[u]pon the expiration of the 
initial ninety-day stay of proceedings or . . . continuance 
without a finding" to dismiss the charges, extend the stay for 
further treatment, continue the case without a finding, or 
resume criminal proceedings), itself references no other section 
of the statute.  Such parsing of the statute is, in any event, 
unavailing.  The proffered construction is inconsistent with the 
fundamental canons of statutory interpretation, requiring that 
we read statutes concerning the same subject matter as a 
harmonious whole wherever possible, see Commonwealth v. Ventura, 
465 Mass. 202, 208-209 (2013); Keefner, 461 Mass. at 511, and 
that we read them in a commonsense way to effectuate legislative 
intent and avoid absurd results.  See, e.g., Worcester v. 
College Hill Props., Inc., 465 Mass. 134, 138-139 (2013), and 
cases cited. 
 
To read the statute in the fragmented fashion that the 
Commonwealth suggests would mean that the VALOR Act amendments 
do nothing more than allow military defendants some time away 
from court proceedings for treatment, after which they would 
face resumed prosecution.  We note that, prior to enactment of 
the VALOR Act, a District Court judge already had authority to 
continue a case for a period of time in order to permit a mental 
health evaluation of a defendant, and to consider that 
19 
 
 
evaluation in imposing a sentence.  Had the VALOR Act amendment 
simply allowed for a brief continuance for assessment, while the 
case remained on the trial track, it would have done little to 
change existing practice.16  The Legislature plainly had more in 
mind than this, and "[i]f a sensible construction is available, 
we shall not construe a statute to make a nullity of pertinent 
provisions or to produce absurd results."  Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 (2013), quoting Flemings v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375–376 
(2000). 
 
Providing pretrial diversion for veterans and active duty 
members of the military, on the same terms as young adults, is 
consistent with the Legislature's purpose both in enacting the 
pretrial diversion statute in 1974 and in amending it through 
the VALOR Act in 2012.  The pretrial diversion statute 
originally was intended to provide rehabilitation to those whose 
criminal habits had not become "fixed."  See Rosenbloom, Bill 
Backs 'Diversion' for Youths in Trouble, Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 
                     
16 The Commonwealth suggests that the VALOR Act served to 
alter previous practice by requiring the department of 
probation, rather than defense counsel, to identify eligible 
military defendants.  This minimal benefit is difficult to 
reconcile with the Legislature's stated goal of providing for 
"appropriate resolution[s]" in cases involving such defendants.  
See House Floor Hearing, May 12, 2012 available at 
http://www.statehousenews.com/content/gallery/audio/2012/House/ 
05-16audio-hou.mp3. 
20 
 
 
1973, quoting bill supporter.  See also Zablotsky, An Analysis 
of State Pretrial Diversion Statutes, 15 Colum. J.L. & Soc. 
Probs. 1, 8 (1979).  Its supporters observed that a criminal 
record, coupled with a short period of incarceration, could lead 
to a "cycle of crime and prison . . . , ever more vicious."  
Help Needed Now for Youthful Offenders, Boston Globe, July 23, 
1974, at 22.  Avoiding this cycle would benefit both these young 
adults and society as whole. 
In 2012, the Legislature added veterans and active duty 
members of the military to the pretrial diversion statute in 
service of the same goal:  addressing the special needs of a 
group of offenders for whom the Legislature believed conviction 
and punishment were not necessarily appropriate.  As with young 
adults, the Legislature recognized that, for veterans and active 
duty members of the military, the conventional path, leading to 
a permanent criminal record, fails to "address [their] needs" or 
to provide "the appropriate resolution," and that, if enabled to 
address the unique challenges they face, veterans could be 
strong candidates for rehabilitation.  House Floor Hearing at 
26:55, May 16, 2012, available at http://www.statehousenews.com/ 
content/gallery/audio/2012/House/05-16audio-hou.mp3 (Statement 
of Rep. James E. Vallee).  Cf. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 
43 (2009) (noting nation's "long tradition of according leniency 
to veterans in recognition of their service"). 
21 
 
 
The special consideration afforded to veterans in the 
District Courts was part of the VALOR Act's comprehensive effort 
to "[e]nsur[e] access to health care, education, employment and 
financial security" for veterans, particularly the 37,000 
Massachusetts veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan.  See 
Press Release, Governor Patrick Signs VALOR Act to Increase 
Opportunities for Veterans (May 31, 2012).  Imposing an 
alternative disposition to avoid a criminal conviction furthers 
these goals.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 316-317 
(2014) (effects of conviction may include severe collateral 
consequences including "unemployment, underemployment, or 
homelessness"). 
b.  Constitutional authority.  The Commonwealth maintains 
that, to the extent the pretrial diversion statute, as amended 
by the VALOR Act, authorizes judges to order alternative 
dispositions, it violates the separation of powers.  See art. 30 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("the judicial 
[branch] shall never exercise the . . . executive powers").  The 
Commonwealth is mistaken. 
A decision whether to prosecute a criminal case rests 
exclusively with the executive branch.  In the absence of a 
legal basis to do so, it is well established that a judge may 
not dismiss a valid complaint over the Commonwealth's objection.  
See Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 574 (2003).  Where 
22 
 
 
the Legislature has granted the authority to dismiss a case or 
to continue it without a finding, however, a judge may exercise 
that authority without offending art. 30.  See Commonwealth v. 
Guzman, 446 Mass. 344, 349 (2006) (dismissal); Commonwealth v. 
Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 719 (1996) (continuance without a 
finding).  This is so because of the Legislature's "broad 
authority to classify criminal conduct, to establish criminal 
penalties, and to adopt rules of criminal . . . procedure."  
Pyles, supra at 722.  As the pretrial diversion statute provides 
specific authority to a District Court judge to dismiss a case 
or to continue it without a finding, a judge exercising that 
authority is not in violation of the separation of powers. 
c.  Reported questions.  Having concluded that a judge has 
authority under the pretrial diversion statute to enter a 
dismissal or a continuance without a finding as to qualifying 
defendants in appropriate circumstances, we turn to the reported 
questions. 
The provisions of the pretrial diversion statute that 
authorize judges to allow the alternative dispositions discussed 
appear to conflict with the OUI statute, insofar as the latter 
prohibits a charge of OUI, second or subsequent offense, from 
being "placed on file or continued without a finding."  G. L. 
c. 90, § 24.  The Commonwealth urges that we resolve this 
apparent conflict by applying the maxim that a more specific 
23 
 
 
statute controls over one that is more general.  See 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 723-724 (2005); Boston 
Housing Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 398 Mass. 715, 718 
(1986).  It urges that the result will then be that a judge may 
not continue without a finding or dismiss such charges because 
the OUI statute controls over the pretrial diversion statute. 
Neither statute, however, fairly may be said to be more 
specific than the other, because each covers ground that the 
other does not.  See Harris, 443 Mass. at 724-725; Commonwealth 
v. John G. Grant & Sons, 403 Mass. 151, 156 (1988) ("neither 
penalty provision is more specific than the other and thus 
controlling").  The OUI statute is more specific in the sense 
that it applies only to one type of offense; the pretrial 
diversion statute is more specific in that its application is 
limited to two narrow subsets of defendants.  Neither statute 
fully encompasses the other, but, instead, the two statutes 
overlap in part, akin to a Venn diagram.  In the circumstances 
here, denominating one statute as more specific than the other 
would rest on no more than an arbitrary choice. 
Similarly, another statutory maxim, to the effect that the 
later statute controls over the earlier, see Commonwealth v. 
Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 521 (2001), does not resolve the matter.  
The history of amendments to both statutes precludes a simple 
answer to the question which statute predates the other.  The 
24 
 
 
limitations governing alternative dispositions for those charged 
with OUI, second offense, have been amended many times over the 
past eighty-five years,17 while the pretrial diversion statute 
was amended nearly thirty years after its enactment to include 
military defendants. 
These tools being of limited utility at best, we look 
beyond them in an effort to harmonize the two statutes by 
discerning the underlying policies each serves.  See Wing, 
473 Mass. at 373; Harris, 443 Mass. at 726 (we look to "serve[] 
the policies underlying both" statutes "to the greatest extent 
possible").  The OUI statute serves the evident goal of 
protecting the public from the grave dangers presented by those 
drivers who repeatedly drive while impaired by alcohol or drugs.  
                     
 
17 When the first version of the OUI statute was enacted in 
1932, it provided that "[t]he prosecution of any person . . . , 
if the offen[s]e is committed within a period of six years 
immediately following his final conviction of a like 
offen[s]e . . . , shall not in any event be placed on file or 
otherwise disposed of except by trial, judgment and sentence 
according to the regular course."  See St. 1932, c. 26, § 1. 
 
 
Soon thereafter, the Legislature eliminated this 
categorical rule, but, in language still in effect today, 
provided that a defendant charged with any OUI offense could not 
receive an alternative disposition "unless the interests of 
justice require."  St. 1936, c. 434, § 1.  In 1982, the 
Legislature limited the availability of continuances without a 
finding on a charge of OUI, even where required by the interests 
of justice, to the detailed and specific requirements set forth 
in G. L. c. 90, § 24D.  See St. 1982 c. 373, § 2.  In 1994, and 
again in 2002, the Legislature again limited those defendants 
eligible for pretrial diversion under G. L. c. 90, § 24D.  See 
St. 1994, c. 25; St. 2002, c. 302. 
25 
 
 
The pretrial diversion statute, for reasons already discussed, 
gives special consideration to two groups of people who are 
susceptible to substance abuse but may be amenable to successful 
rehabilitation.  The two statutes do not serve the same goals 
except to the extent that successful rehabilitation of drivers 
with substance abuse problems will redound to public safety. 
Mindful that the VALOR Act was enacted against the backdrop of 
two preexisting statutes with which the Legislature had 
familiarity, we reconcile both, however imperfectly, by 
concluding that the Legislature did not intend to preclude the 
alternative dispositions permitted under the pretrial diversion 
statute in situations such as this.  See Harris, supra. 
We note that, in amending c. 276A in 2012, the Legislature 
expressed special concern for veterans and active military 
service members struggling with substance abuse.  Specifically, 
in the words of then Secretary of Veterans' Services Coleman 
Nee, legislators recognized that trauma as a result of combat 
service, "may lead to . . . substance abuse," see Tuoti, Court 
for Vets Opens in Boston, Enterprise, Mar. 7, 2014, and that, 
for service members thus ensnared, "incarceration without 
medical or clinical support results in a higher rate of 
recidivism."  Bolton, Court Throws Veterans a Lifeline, Boston 
Globe, Apr. 11, 2013. 
As one of the sponsors of the VALOR Act, Representative 
26 
 
 
Jason Lewis, explained, the Legislature adopted the pretrial 
diversion provisions of the VALOR Act as part of a broader 
effort to provide an alternative to the traditional path of 
conviction and incarceration, particularly for those "veterans 
who face mental health and substance abuse issues."  The Need to 
Support, Thank Our Veterans, Beverly Citizen, Dec. 13, 2012.18  
This approach is consistent with a growing national recognition 
that the traditional processes of the criminal justice system 
fail adequately to support veterans suffering from substance 
abuse.19  Moreover, when the Legislature enacted the VALOR Act in 
2012, it was well aware of the provisions of "Melanie's Law," 
                     
 
18 As part of that ongoing effort, in 2014, the Legislature 
enacted a second VALOR Act, also sponsored by Senator Michael J. 
Rush, chair of the Joint Committee on Veterans Affairs.  That 
act, among other things, established a pilot program for 
"veteran's courts," to assist with implementation of the 
pretrial diversion provisions in the 2012 VALOR Act.  See 
St. 2014, c. 62, § 33. 
 
 
19 Commentators nationally have emphasized that veterans 
face unique challenges stemming from high rates of combat-
related PTSD and other mental health issues, and consequent high 
rates of substance abuse, frequently leading to criminal 
charges.  See, e.g., American Bar Association, Resolution 105A, 
at 3 (Feb. 2010) (ABA Report) (discussing "opinion of 
psychiatrists and law enforcement officials that the traumas of 
combat result in PTSD that can lead to addiction and erratic 
behavior that result in criminal charges" and "[r]ecognizing the 
important role" diversion programs can play); B.R. Schaller, 
Veterans on Trial:  The Coming Battles Over PTSD 18, 211 (2012).  
They also recognize that traditional criminal sanctions for 
those trapped in the cycle of substance abuse can "push veterans 
further outside society," at great cost to veterans and society 
as a whole.  See ABA Report, supra at 6. 
27 
 
 
St. 2005, c. 122, that it enacted in 2005 to increase penalties 
for those who drive while impaired by drugs or alcohol.20  In 
that light, categorically to exclude OUI, second offense, a 
common issue stemming from substance abuse,21 from the 
protections of G. L. c. 276A, as amended by the VALOR Act, would 
undermine the legislative purpose. 
 
This conclusion does not diminish recognition of the 
serious hazard to public safety presented by those who drive 
while impaired by drugs or alcohol, especially by those who do 
so repeatedly, nor does it question the importance of deterring 
this menacing conduct by all prescribed means.  The Legislature 
appears to have struck a delicate balance by permitting a 
discretionary rehabilitative alternative to criminal penalties 
in certain limited circumstances, for two discrete groups, that 
is also consonant with deterrence in service of public safety. 
 
It is also well to note that by vesting District Court 
judges with discretion to order pretrial diversion to certain 
military defendants, the statute does not in any way offer 
                     
 
20 See State House News Service (House Sess.), Oct. 27, 2005 
(comments of Representative Salvatore DiMasi). 
 
 
21 See, e.g., A.J. Peller, L.M. Najavits, S.E. Nelson, R.A. 
LaBrie, & H.J. Shaffer, PTSD Among a Treatment Sample of Repeat 
DUI Offenders, 23 J. Traumatic Stress 468 (Aug. 2010); National 
Institute on Drug Abuse, Drugged Driving (rev. June 2016), 
available at https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/ 
drugged-driving [https://perma.cc/DRB8-A3VS]. 
28 
 
 
assurance of an alternative disposition.22  A judge has 
discretion to allow pretrial diversion to a program only after a 
defendant has been assessed by a specific program, and after 
considering the Commonwealth's view of pretrial diversion for 
that particular defendant, to that specific program.23  Even 
after successful completion of that program, the judge retains 
                     
 
22 The pretrial statute has application only to the District 
and Boston Municipal Courts.  Even where the Commonwealth 
proceeds by complaint in the District Court or the Boston 
Municipal Court rather than by indictment in the Superior Court, 
given that G. L. c. 276A, § 10, confines eligibility to those 
without a prior conviction, it is difficult to envision 
circumstances where a judge would exercise discretion favorable 
to defendants charged with OUI offenses subsequent to a second 
offense. 
 
 
23 The decision that a particular defendant likely would 
benefit from such a program is individualized and fact-specific, 
reported in writing by a qualified treatment provider, working 
in conjunction with the VA, after a two-week assessment period.  
See G. L. c. 276A, §§ 3, 5.  A judge considering a report that a 
military defendant could benefit from such a program must weigh 
that report, any statement by the Commonwealth, and the judge's 
own observations, and determine, in the exercise of his or her 
discretion, whether to allow a stay or a continuance so that the 
military defendant can participate in the treatment program.  
See G. L. c. 276A, § 5. 
 
 
Throughout a defendant's participation in a pretrial 
diversion program, the program must submit periodic reports to 
the judge.  See G. L. c. 276A, § 6.  At any point during that 
period, should the program report that the defendant has failed 
to comply with program requirements, or if the defendant commits 
a new offense, the judge may order the stay terminated and the 
case returned to the trial list.  See id.  After the initial 
period of the stay, if the program reports that an extension of 
the stay would help the defendant successfully to complete the 
program, the judge may order such an extension.  See G. L. 
c. 276A, § 7. 
29 
 
 
discretion over the ultimate disposition of the matter; the 
statute provides only that a judge "may" dismiss the original 
charges upon successful completion.  G. L. c. 276A, § 7. 
 
Finally, while we conclude that the construction we provide 
of the pretrial diversion statute, as amended by the VALOR Act, 
satisfactorily reconciles it with the OUI statute and best 
effectuates the Legislature's intent when enacting the VALOR Act 
in 2012, we recognize that the matter is not free from doubt.  
If the result here does not comport with what was intended, the 
Legislature may, of course, remedy this by enacting clarifying 
legislation.  See Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Mass. 530, 533 n.4 
(2009). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer both reported questions, "Yes," 
and remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.