Title: People v. Castillo
Citation: 2022 IL 127894
Docket Number: 127894
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 28, 2022

2022 IL 127894 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 127894) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.  
JOSE CASTILLO, Appellant. 
 
 
Opinion filed November 28, 2022. 
 
 
JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Anne M. Burke, Neville, Overstreet, and Carter 
concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Holder White took no part in the decision. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant, Jose Castillo, was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery 
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c), (d)(4)(i) (West 2018)), following a bench trial in the circuit 
court of Livingston County. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction on the 
 
 
 
 
 
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basis that, inter alia, the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery 
because (1) a cellblock in a maximum-security prison that is inaccessible to the 
public is not “public property” for purposes of the aggravated battery statute and 
(2) the State failed to prove ownership of Pontiac Correctional Center, the public 
property at issue. 
¶ 2 
 
The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed defendant’s conviction and 
sentence. 2021 IL App (4th) 190633-U. For the following reasons, we affirm the 
appellate court’s judgment. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
The incident giving rise to the aggravated battery charges against defendant, an 
inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac), occurred on February 9, 2016. In 
count I, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery in that, in committing 
a battery, defendant  
“knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with 
Correctional Lieutenant John Thorpe [sic], in that the defendant struck John 
Thorpe with an unknown liquid substance about the face and body, knowing 
John Thorpe to be a correctional institutional employee of the State of Illinois 
Department of Corrections, who was engaged in the performance of his 
authorized duties,”  
in violation of section 12-3.05(d)(4)(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal 
Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018)). 
¶ 5 
 
Count II charged defendant with aggravated battery in that defendant, in 
committing a battery, “knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or 
provoking nature with Inmate John Eilers, in that defendant struck John Eilers with 
an unknown liquid substance about the face and body, knowing Pontiac 
Correctional Center to be public property,” in violation of section 12-3.05(c) of the 
Criminal Code (id. § 12-3.05(c)). Only count II is at issue in this appeal. 
¶ 6 
 
At defendant’s bench trial, correctional officer John Thorp testified that he was 
employed at Pontiac. On February 9, 2016, Thorp was escorting inmate John Eilers 
from the north cell house of Pontiac to the east cell house. Eilers, in restraints, 
 
 
 
 
 
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walked approximately 8 to 12 inches in front of Thorp. As Eilers and Thorp walked 
past defendant’s cell, defendant threw a liquid substance that smelled of feces, 
striking both Eilers and Thorp.  
¶ 7 
 
Jeremy Olson testified on behalf of the State that he was employed by the 
Department of Corrections as an investigator. Olson’s role was to investigate 
possible infractions or incidents at Pontiac. Olson was assigned to investigate the 
allegations against defendant. Olson interviewed defendant in Olson’s office at 
Pontiac. In his statement, defendant told Olson that he had thrown the feces at Eilers 
because Eilers had threatened to kill defendant’s family and to beat up defendant. 
Defendant also told Olson that he did not think Thorp was anywhere near Eilers 
when he threw the substance. 
¶ 8 
 
Defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant stated that he was currently 
imprisoned in the Department of Corrections. Regarding the incident at issue, 
defendant testified that Eilers had threatened to kill defendant’s family and to rape 
defendant’s mother when Eilers was released from prison. In response to those 
threats, defendant threw four milk cartons containing feces, urine, and semen at 
Eilers, hitting Eilers in his face and mouth. Defendant denied that Thorp was 
escorting Eilers when Eilers walked by defendant’s cell. Defendant testified that 
Thorp was not in the area when he threw the substance at Eilers and denied that any 
of the substance hit Thorp.  
¶ 9 
 
Following closing argument, the trial court found defendant guilty on both 
counts of aggravated battery and sentenced defendant to a term of 10 years on count 
I and 5 years on count II, to run concurrently with one another and consecutively 
to the sentences for which defendant was imprisoned. The trial court later denied 
defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence.  
¶ 10 
 
Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty of count 
II because a cellblock in a maximum-security prison does not constitute “public 
property” within the meaning of the aggravated battery statute. In the alternative, 
defendant argued that the State failed to prove ownership of Pontiac.1  
 
 
1Defendant also raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the appellate court. The 
appellate court denied that claim, and defendant does not raise the issue in this court. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 11 
 
In affirming defendant’s conviction, the appellate court first noted that 
defendant had not raised either issue in the trial court by way of objection, motion, 
or posttrial motion. 2021 IL App (4th) 190633-U, ¶ 9. Defendant did not ask the 
appellate court to forgive the procedural forfeiture or to consider the issues under 
the plain error doctrine, and he instead simply argued the issues. Id. The State 
likewise failed to raise the procedural forfeiture issue. Id. Given its discretion to 
review otherwise forfeited issues, the appellate court chose to consider the merits 
of defendant’s claims. Id.  
¶ 12 
 
Turning to those claims, the appellate court then noted that, contrary to 
defendant’s framing of his first claim of error, defendant’s public property issue did 
not require the court to decide whether a particular cellblock within Pontiac was 
“public property.” Id. ¶ 12. The appellate court explained that the charges against 
defendant were not drawn so narrowly. Id. Count II of the indictment charged that 
defendant committed a battery, “knowing Pontiac Correctional Center to be public 
property.” Accordingly, the State need only prove that, at the time of the offense, 
defendant knew that it was occurring on public property, namely Pontiac, rather 
than on a particular cellblock within the facility. Id. 
¶ 13 
 
The appellate court then noted a conflict among the districts of the appellate 
court concerning whether “public property” meant that property must be accessible 
to the public to be defined as such. Id. ¶ 13. The Fourth District in People v. Hill, 
409 Ill. App. 3d 451, 454 (2011), concluded that there was nothing to indicate that 
the General Assembly intended the plain and ordinary meaning of “public property” 
to be anything other than government-owned property. Accordingly, Hill held that 
the defendant could be found guilty of aggravated battery based on a battery 
occurring within a pod in the county jail. Id. at 455.  
¶ 14 
 
The Appellate Court, Third District, likewise found that the plain and ordinary 
meaning of “public property” was simply property owned by the government. 
People v. Messenger, 2015 IL App (3d) 130581, ¶ 22. The Messenger court thus 
held that the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery for a battery 
that occurred inside the county jail.  
¶ 15 
 
The Appellate Court, Second District, however, found that “public property” 
for purposes of the aggravated battery statute is property that is both owned by the 
government and is accessible to the public. People v. Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d 285 
 
 
 
 
 
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(2009). At issue in Ojeda was whether a high school was public property for 
purposes of the aggravated battery statute. Id. at 286. Ojeda concluded that “public 
property” must be both accessible to the public, even if that access was limited, and 
funded by taxpayers. Id. at 287. 
¶ 16 
 
In the appellate court, defendant relied “heavily” on Ojeda in support of his 
argument that Pontiac was not “public property” for purposes of the aggravated 
battery statute because Pontiac was not accessible to the public. 2021 IL App (4th) 
190633-U, ¶ 13. The appellate court noted that it had rejected the Ojeda analysis in 
Hill and declined defendant’s invitation to reconsider that holding. Id. The appellate 
court stated that, as in Hill and Messenger, the battery in this case occurred within 
Pontiac, which is public property, regardless of the specific location of the battery. 
Id. ¶ 15.  
¶ 17 
 
The appellate court next addressed defendant’s claim that the State offered no 
evidence concerning the ownership of Pontiac. Id. ¶ 17. At trial, neither party 
contested the fact that Pontiac was public property owned by the State, and neither 
party argued that issue in their closing arguments. Id. ¶ 18. The trial witnesses 
testified that the offenses took place at Pontiac. Id. ¶ 17. The appellate court held 
that it could take judicial notice that Pontiac was owned by the State. Id. ¶ 18. The 
appellate court explained that it could take judicial notice of matters generally 
known to the court and not subject to reasonable dispute, even if the judicial notice 
is of a fact that constitutes an element of the offense. Id. ¶ 17. Given the evidence 
that the offense occurred at Pontiac, along with the judicial notice that Pontiac was 
owned by the State, the appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to 
prove defendant guilty of the aggravated battery charged in count II. Id. ¶ 18. The 
appellate court therefore affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id. ¶ 28. 
¶ 18 
 
Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which this court allowed pursuant 
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). 
 
¶ 19 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 20 
 
Defendant raises the same issues in this court that he raised in the appellate 
court. First, defendant argues that property that is inaccessible to the public, such 
as the cellblock in this case, should not be considered public property under section 
 
 
 
 
 
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12-3.05(c) of the Criminal Code. Second, assuming this court agrees with the 
appellate court that public property is simply any property owned by the 
government, this court nonetheless should vacate defendant’s conviction for 
aggravated battery because the State failed to prove the ownership of Pontiac, an 
element of the offense of aggravated battery.  
¶ 21 
 
At the outset we note that defendant continues to narrowly frame the issue as 
whether a prison cellblock should be considered public property under section 12-
3.05(c). As the appellate court observed, however, the indictment against defendant 
charged that he committed a battery against Eilers “knowing Pontiac Correctional 
Center to be public property, in violation of Section 12-3.05(c).” The issue before 
this court, then, is whether Pontiac is public property under the aggravated battery 
statute.  
¶ 22 
 
Having clarified the issue before us, we address the merits of that issue, looking 
first to the language of the aggravated battery statute itself. Section 12-3.05(c) of 
the Criminal Code provides: 
“A person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, other 
than by the discharge of a firearm, he or she is or the person battered is on or 
about a public way, public property, a public place of accommodation or 
amusement, a sports venue, or a domestic violence shelter.” 720 ILCS 5/12-
3.05(c) (West 2018).  
¶ 23 
 
Defendant argues that “public property” in the statute is limited to property that 
is both owned by the government and is accessible to the general public. The State 
responds that “public property” is simply government-owned property, with no 
other qualifiers.  
¶ 24 
 
Because this issue presents an issue of statutory construction, our review is 
de novo. People v. Kastman, 2022 IL 127681, ¶ 29. A court’s fundamental 
objective in addressing issues of statutory construction is to ascertain and to give 
effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 14. The most 
reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, given its 
plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Words and phrases in the statute are construed in 
light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Id. Where the 
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, a court will apply it as written, 
 
 
 
 
 
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without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction. People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 
2d 277, 287 (2010). In determining the plain, ordinary, and popularly understood 
meaning of a statutory term, it is entirely appropriate to look to the dictionary for a 
definition of the term. Id. at 288. 
¶ 25 
 
Defendant notes that section 12-3.05(c) does not contain a definition for “public 
property.” Because the term is not defined, defendant argues that this court should 
look to the popularly understood meaning of the term “public property” to 
determine its meaning.  
¶ 26 
 
In support of his argument, defendant first looks to dictionary definitions of the 
word “public.” Defendant cites the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “public” 
as “[o]pen or available for all to use, share, or enjoy.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1483 
(11th ed. 2019). Defendant also cites the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of 
“public building” as “[a] building that is accessible to the public; esp., one owned 
by the government.” Id. at 1484. Based upon the preceding definitions, defendant 
contends that the plain meaning of “public property” is property that is both owned 
by the government and accessible to the general public. 
¶ 27 
 
The State responds that the dictionary definitions relied upon by defendant are 
inapplicable because defendant relies upon definitions for “public” and “public 
building,” when the statutory term at issue in this case is “public property.” The 
State asserts that, under virtually all dictionary definitions, the meaning of “public 
property” is something owned by the city, town, or state. For example, Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “public property” as “[s]tate- or community-owned property not 
restricted to any one individual’s use or possession.” Id. at 1472. The State cites 
other dictionary definitions of “public property,” which similarly define the term as 
property owned by a “city, town, or state” (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public%20property 
(last 
visited 
Nov. 9, 2022) [https://perma.cc/R9JE-98BG]); “owned by the government or *** 
the public as such in a governmental capacity” (Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3d 
ed. 2010)); and “all property owned by a government” (Bouvier Law Dictionary 
(Desk ed. 2012)). None of the dictionary definitions of “public property” add that 
government-owned property must also be publicly accessible. The State argues that 
the plain and unambiguous definition of public property, then, is simply 
government-owned property.  
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 28 
 
We agree with the State. The statute uses the term “public property,” not the 
word “public” alone or the term “public building.” The plain, ordinary, and 
popularly understood meaning of “public property” is property owned by the 
government, with no additional qualifiers. 
¶ 29 
 
In his reply brief, however, defendant asserts that the definition of “public 
property” in Black’s Law Dictionary has been defined differently throughout 
several editions. Defendant argues that this court must look to the definition in the 
edition published closest to the statute’s enactment, which in this case would be the 
revised fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1968. That edition 
defined “public property” as follows: 
“This term is commonly used as a designation of those things which are publici 
juris, (q.v.,) and therefore considered as being owned by ‘the public,’ the entire 
state or community, and not restricted to the dominion of a private person. It 
may also apply to any subject of property owned by a state, nation, or municipal 
corporation as such.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1383 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
¶ 30 
 
Defendant reads the 1968 definition as setting forth dual definitions of “public 
property.” According to defendant, one definition refers to the character of the 
property, who has access to the property, and whether private individuals have 
greater dominion over the property than the general public. The second definition 
reflects the ownership of the property. Defendant argues that, given the dual 
definitions of “public property” in the 1968 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, this 
court should consider both the ownership of the property and the public’s access to 
the property, in determining whether property is “public property” under the statute. 
We disagree. 
¶ 31 
 
Both portions of the definition concern ownership of the property. To the extent 
defendant may be reading “dominion” as encompassing access to the property, we 
note that the same edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dominion” as 
“[o]wnership, or right to property or perfect or complete property or ownership.” 
Id. at 573. Whether this court looks to the 2019 edition or the 1968 edition of 
Black’s Law Dictionary, we find that the plain, ordinary, and popularly understood 
meaning of “public property” is simply property owned by the government, without 
regard to the public’s access to the property.  
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 32 
 
With the preceding definition of “public property” in mind, we address the split 
in our appellate court districts concerning the plain, ordinary, and commonly 
understood meaning of “public property” in the aggravated battery statute. The 
courts in Hill and Messenger held that the plain and ordinary meaning of “public 
property” in the aggravated battery statute is simply property owned by the 
government. The Ojeda court, which defendant relied upon in support of his 
argument, held that “public property” was property that is both funded by taxpayers 
and is accessible to the public, although the court held that the public access need 
not be unrestricted and unlimited. The Ojeda court’s analysis was flawed, however, 
because the court looked to the definitions of “public building” and “public” to 
define public property, rather than simply looking to the definition of “public 
property” itself. See 397 Ill. App. 3d at 287.  
¶ 33 
 
The decisions of the Hill court and the Messenger court are consistent with our 
analysis in this case. The Ojeda decision, however, cannot stand following our 
decision. For that reason, we hereby overrule Ojeda.  
¶ 34 
 
Given our finding that the “public property” language in the aggravated battery 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this court need not address defendant’s additional 
arguments concerning the legislative history of the statute. It is only when the 
meaning of a statute is ambiguous that a court looks beyond the statutory language 
and considers the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and the 
legislative history of the statute. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers 
Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 217 (2008). We thus affirm the appellate court’s 
finding that the battery at issue in this case occurred on public property within the 
meaning of the aggravated battery statute. 
¶ 35 
 
Having affirmed the appellate court’s finding that Pontiac was public property 
for purposes of the aggravated battery statute, we turn to defendant’s second issue 
on appeal: that the appellate court erred in taking judicial notice of the ownership 
of Pontiac when the State presented no evidence concerning that element of the 
offense. Defendant concedes that the standard of review concerning an evidentiary 
matter, including judicial notice, is abuse of discretion. In re S.M., 2015 IL App 
(3d) 140687, ¶ 13. Defendant argues, however, that the issue in this case presents a 
question of law concerning whether the appellate court violated defendant’s due 
process rights when it took judicial notice of a fact that was not before the trial 
 
 
 
 
 
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court. Defendant does not otherwise explain or cite authority in support of this 
argument. Consequently, we see no reason to depart from the abuse of discretion 
standard of review.  
¶ 36 
 
With regard to the merits of his claim, defendant contends that the appellate 
court effectively absolved the State of its burden of proof in taking judicial notice 
concerning the ownership of Pontiac. Defendant argues that the State should be 
held to its burden of proof and should be required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt all the elements of the offense. The State having failed to do so, defendant 
asks this court to reverse the appellate court’s decision on this issue and reverse his 
conviction for aggravated battery on count II. 
¶ 37 
 
The State responds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
State, established both that defendant committed battery and that he did so on or 
about public property. There was no question that the battery took place at Pontiac. 
Defendant admitted that he threw milk cartons containing a mixture of feces, 
semen, and urine at Eilers as Eilers was walking past defendant’s cell at Pontiac. 
Jeremy Olson testified that he was employed by the Illinois Department of 
Corrections (IDOC) as an investigator at Pontiac and that he interviewed defendant 
at Pontiac during his investigation of the incident between defendant and Eilers. 
Defendant also testified that he was in the custody of the IDOC when he threw the 
bodily fluids at Eilers. The State argues that, based upon this evidence, a rational 
trier of fact could reasonably infer that Pontiac, a prison run by the IDOC on behalf 
of the State, which houses inmates in the IDOC’s custody, was in fact a prison 
owned by the State.  
¶ 38 
 
While we agree with the State that it presented uncontested evidence that 
defendant’s battery of Eilers took place at Pontiac, defendant is correct that the 
State did not present evidence concerning ownership of Pontiac, which is necessary 
to establish that Pontiac was public property. The fact that a battery occurred on 
public property is an element of the offense. However, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the appellate court’s decision to take judicial notice of the State’s 
ownership of Pontiac.  
¶ 39 
 
Illinois Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a court may take judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts at any stage of the proceeding. Ill. R. Evid. 201(a), (f) (eff. Jan. 
1, 2011). This includes taking judicial notice for the first time on appeal. See Dawdy 
 
 
 
 
 
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v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2003) (“ ‘appellate court may take 
judicial notice of matters not previously presented to the trial court when the matters 
are capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration’ ” (quoting Boston v. 
Rockford Memorial Hospital, 140 Ill. App. 3d 969, 972 (1986))). The rule further 
provides that “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Ill. R. Evid. 201(b) (eff. 
Jan. 1, 2011).  
¶ 40 
 
There is no question that the ownership of Pontiac is a fact that is not subject to 
reasonable dispute. The ownership of Pontiac is capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. See, e.g., Pontiac Correctional Center, Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 
http://www2.Illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/pontiaccorrectionalcenter.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9MGF-94GS]. Courts frequently take 
judicial notice of public documents, including records from the IDOC. People v. 
Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 54. Notably, defendant does not claim that Pontiac is 
not owned by the government. He simply argues that the State failed to prove that 
fact. Faced with a similar claim that the government failed to prove the Sangamon 
County Jail was public property for purposes of the aggravated battery statute, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals responded that the proposition was so “obvious 
that a detailed discussion of it by the parties would have been a waste of time.” 
United States v. Golden, 843 F.3d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 2016).  
¶ 41 
 
The fact that the ownership of Pontiac was an element of the offense does not 
change our analysis. Our appellate court, as well as other jurisdictions, has held that 
a court could take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute, 
even when that fact constitutes an element of the offense. See People v. White, 311 
Ill. App. 3d 374, 380 (2000) (court could take judicial notice of prior felony 
conviction, even though it was an element of the offense, because the doctrine of 
judicial notice includes facts readily verifiable from sources of indisputable 
accuracy); Messenger, 2015 IL App (3d) 130581, ¶ 33 (“Illinois courts, however, 
have regularly sanctioned the use of judicial notice to establish an element of the 
offense”); Hill, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 456 (court may take judicial notice of a fact even 
if that fact constitutes an element of the offense); Broome v. United States, 240 
 
 
 
 
 
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A.3d 35, 42-43 (D.C. 2020) (reviewing court would take judicial notice that 
hospital was a private building, even though that was an element of the offense); 
United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (trial court properly exercised 
discretion in taking judicial notice that the defendant’s offense took place within 
the “ ‘special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,’ ” an 
element of the offense).  
¶ 42 
 
We agree with the preceding cases that a court may take judicial notice of an 
element of the offense where that fact is readily verifiable from sources of 
indisputable accuracy. As stated, there is no question that the ownership of Pontiac 
is such a fact. Under the circumstances, then, the appellate court did not abuse its 
discretion in taking judicial notice of the ownership of Pontiac and in finding that 
Pontiac was public property for purposes of the aggravated battery statute. We 
therefore affirm the appellate court’s finding that the State presented sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the public property element in count II and in affirming 
defendant’s conviction. 
 
¶ 43 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 44 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment, which 
affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. 
 
¶ 45 
 
Affirmed. 
 
¶ 46 
 
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case.