Title: MARRIAGE OF HILL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-275
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 1982

No. 81-275 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ZELDA SANGRAY HILL, and ROBERT A . HILL, Petitioner and Appellant, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Christensen and McLean, Stanford, Montana Jack M. McLean argued, Stanford, Montana For Respondent: Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana Leo Graybill, Jr. argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: January 12, 1982 Decided : M I 4 j . 5 ' a 2 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the Court. T h i s is an appeal frorn a judgment of t h e District Court, Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, Cascade County, a r i s i n g o u t of a d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. Appellant wife was g r a n t e d a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e on October 21, 1976, w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y r e s e r v e d . O n December 17, 1980, a h e a r i n g on t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y was held i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, The t r i a l judge e n t e r e d judgment d i s p o s i n g of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , and from t h a t judgment w i f e a p p e a l s . The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on appeal a r e : 1. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o f i n d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t husband owned o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t a s a t e n a n t i n common i n t h e "Galloday Place"? 2. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f i n d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e "Richardson Place" had a f a i r market v a l u e of $160,000 a s of t h e d a t e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage? 3 . Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f i n d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e "Home Place" had a f a i r market v a l u e of $260,00I?I a s of t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage? 4. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t which respondent received from h i s f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e was a v e s t e d remainder s u b j e c t t o divestment? 5. Should a v e s t e d remainder i n t e r e s t be included i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r purposes of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ? 6 , Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o conclude t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e "Woodbury Pldce" should n o t be included i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ? 7. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n deducting c h i l d s u p p o r t from t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s when respondent f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t ? Respondent and a p p e l l a n t were married i n Geyser, Montana, on June 14, 1959. Three c h i l d r e n were born a s i s s u e of t h e m a r r i a g e , b u t t h e i r c u s t o d y is n o t i n d i s p u t e . The d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ' marriage was g r a n t e d October 21, 1976, w i t h t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y r e s e r v e d . Respondent is a farrner and c a t t l e rancher. During most of t h e p a r t i e s ' seventeen-year m a r r i a g e , t h e y l i v e d on a ranch near Raynesford, Montana, which respondent farms i n c o n j u n c t i o n with h i s mother, Anna H i l l , and h i s b r o t h e r LeRoy H i l l . The ranch h a s always been a family o p e r a t i o n . Respondent i n h e r i t e d a one-fourth remainder i n t e r e s t i n one-half of h i s p a r e n t s ' ranch p u r s u a n t t o a d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n e n t e r e d on October 1 6 , 1958, about e i g h t months p r i o r t o t h e p a r t i e s ' marriage. T h i s p r o p e r t y e x i s t e d i n two s e p a r a t e p a r c e l s known a s t h e Home P l a c e and t h e Richardson P l a c e , Respondent's b r o t h e r r e s i d e d on t h e Home P l a c e which c o n t a i n s about 2,956 a c r e s . Respondent and a p p e l l a n t r e s i d e d on t h e Richardson P l a c e which c o n t a i n s 1,199 a c r e s . Respondent and h i s b r o t h e r each worked t h e p a r c e l of land on which he r e s i d e d , O n J u l y 25, 1963, respondent and h i s b r o t h e r pur- chased, a s t e n a n t s i n common, about 795 a c r e s of land known a s t h e Galloday Place. The land was financed by a mortgage on a l l of t h e land owned by t h e H i l l s , i n c l u d i n g Anna and LeRoy H i l l . A t t h e time of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n respondent o p e r a t e d t h e Galloday P l a c e a s h i s own p r o p e r t y . Appellant t e s t i f i e d t h a t while LeRoy, t h e husband's b r o t h e r , had a one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e Galloday P l a c e , it was i n o r d e r t h a t one day t h e husband would have t h e Richardson and Galloday P l a c e s and h i s b r o t h e r would have t h e Home P l a c e . Appellant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r o t h e r d i d n o t have anything t o do w i t h t h e Galloday P l a c e but was h e l p i n g pay f o r it s o he could g e t t h e Home P l a c e . I n a d d i t i o n , i n 1972 t h e p r o p e r t y was mortgaged t o buy more land. A t t h a t time r e s p o n d e n t ' s two s i s t e r s signed a q u i t c l a i m deed t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s over t o t h e i r mother. Respondent t e s t i f i e d t h i s was done a s a convenience t o t h e F e d e r a l Land Bank t o o b t a i n t h e l o a n and t h a t t h e s i s t e r s s t i l l have t h e i r e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s coming t o them. The mortgage of a l l t h e H i l l l a n d s was i n c r e a s e d again when t h e b r o t h e r purchased o t h e r l a n d s . T h i s c a s e was some f o u r y e a r s i n coming t o t r i a l . I t was not u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t t r i a l judge i n s i s t e d and s e t time p e r i o d s t o ready t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l t h a t it f i n a l l y was t r i e d . One of t h e problems a t t r i a l a r o s e from an o r d e r of t h e c o u r t , i s s u e d November 1 4 , 1980, s h o r t e n i n g t h e time f o r response t o a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s concerning t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y i n which t h e husband claimed an i n t e r e s t and a r e q u e s t f o r a list of e x h i b i t s and permission t o e n t e r upon tile p r o p e r t y f o r i n s p e c t i o n purposes. T h i s o r d e r was n o t timely complied w i t h , causing a p p e l l a n t problems a t t h e t r i a l . A t t r i a l , respondent introduced h i s 1976 income t a x r e t u r n i n t o evidence, and a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s s h e d i d n o t have time t o i n s p e c t it. A p p e l l a n t a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t because of t h e l a t e n e s s of its submission, s h e could n o t p r o p e r l y cross-examine respondent on t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e r e t u r n . Subsequently, a p p e l l a n t requested t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of r e s p o n d e n t ' s claimed one-half i n t e r e s t i n 2,270 a c r e s of land a c q u i r e d i n 1972 known a s t h e Woodbury Place. However, no f i n d i n g s of f a c t o r conclu- s i o n s of law were made regarding t h i s p r o p e r t y . Respondent d i d n o t p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d support. The D i s t r i c t Court, however, i s s u e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclu- s i o n s of law on t h e m a t t e r . The judgment e n t e r e d on March 3 1 , 1981, deducted $7,126 f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t payments from a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y award. The D i s t r i c t Court found a p p e l l a n t ' s s h a r e of t h e i n a r i t a l e s t a t e t o be $30,432.51, l e s s $7,126 f o r c h i l d sup- p o r t and $1,125 f o r a p p r a i s a l . The f i r s t i s s u e is whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f i n d t h a t t h e husband owned a one-half e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e Galloday Place. The Galloday P l a c e was purchased i n 1963 and recorded i n t h e names of respondent and h i s b r o t h e r a s t e n a n t s i n common. A s p r e v i o u s l y noted, testimony i n d i - c a t e d t h a t t h e record owners of t h e H i l l p r o p e r t i e s a r e n o t always t h e e q u i t a b l e owners. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s s i s t e r s q u i t - claimed t h e i r remainder i n t e r e s t i n c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s t o t h e i r mother t o a s s i s t i n g e t t i n g a l o a n from t h e F e d e r a l Land Bank. While t h e respondent is t h e l e g a l one-half owner of t h e p r o p e r t y a s a t e n a n t i n common, according t o t h e a p p e l l a n t , he c o n s i d e r e d himself t h e owner of t h e e n t i r e p r o p e r t y . The Galloday P l a c e c o n s i s t s of 795 a c r e s . The Black P l a c e , which was p a r t of t h e o r i g i n a l Galloday P l a c e , con- s i s t e d of f i v e a c r e s . The respondent a r g u e s t h a t while t h e Galloday P l a c e was bought by him and h i s b r o t h e r t o be h e l d i n common ownership he does farm t h e p r o p e r t y and h a s a t t i m e s l i s t e d it i n h i s f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t . However, a s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , i n t h i s f a m i l y ranch, o p e r a t i n g much l i k e a p a r t n e r s h i p , it was n o t uncommon when borrowing from a bank t o i n c l u d e a l l t h e H i l l f a m i l y l a n d which was t o s t a n d good f o r t h e loan. A l l t h e H i l l l a n d s were farmed t o g e t h e r , and each p l a c e made a c o n t r i b u t i o n whenever p o s s i b l e t o t h e payment on t h e F e d e r a l Land Bank mortgage. T h e r e f o r e , respondent a r g u e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t had r e a s o n a b l e evidence b e f o r e it on which it could draw its c o n c l u s i o n , The r u l e i n Montana f o r our review of a p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l c a s e s is whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y , w i t h o u t employment o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment o r exceeded t h e bounds of reason i n view of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Kuntz v. Kuntz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 181 Mont. 237, 593 P.2d 41, 36 St.Rep. 662. O n review, t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s do n o t appear t o be a r b i t r a r y o r beyond reason concerning t h i s i s s u e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s appear t o be supported by substan- t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence, and t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t Court concerning t h e Galloday P l a c e a r e s u s t a i n e d , I s s u e s two and t h r e e , concerning t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on t h e v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t i e s known a s t h e Richardson P l a c e and t h e Home P l a c e , w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r . The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e Richardson P l a c e had a f a i r market v a l u e of $160,000 a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s - s o l u t i o n and t h a t t h e Home P l a c e had a f a i r market v a l u e of $260,000 a t t h a t time. However, t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o s e t f o r t h i n its f i n d i n g s of f a c t how t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s was determined, a s r e q u i r e d by Nunnally v. Nunnally (1981) , Mont . , 625 P.2d 1159, 38 St.Rep. 529. The c o u r t found t h e f a i r market v a l u e of t h e Richard- son P l a c e was $160,000. T h i s v a l u e was based e n t i r e l y upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s testimony of per a c r e v a l u a t i o n . Respondent t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e per a c r e v a l u e of hay and g r a z i n g land. However, no testimony was p r e s e n t e d a s t o how many a c r e s of c r o p , hay o r g r a z i n g land t h e r e were on t h e Richardson P l a c e o r on t h e Home P l a c e . The o n l y e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t we can a r r i v e a t f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n is t h a t i t adopted t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t on t h e s e m a t t e r s verbatim. Appellant a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y Hamilton v. Hamilton ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 607 P.2d 102, 37 St.Rep. 247, is c o n t r o l l i n g . I n Hamilton, Arabian h o r s e s were a p p r a i s e d i n t h e p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n without a f i n d - ing a s t o t h e t o t a l number of h o r s e s i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . T h i s Court held t h a t t h e t o t a l number of h o r s e s was neces- s a r y t o p l a c e a v a l u e on them. The s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r h e r e f o r it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court ignored t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a competent cour t-appointed a p p r a i s e r , who valued t h e p r o p e r t y some $68,000 h i g h e r t h a n t h e v a l u e g i v e n by t h e respondent. Viewing t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , we conclude t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n its v a l u a t i o n of both t h e Richardson P l a c e and t h e Home Place. The c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e number of a c r e s of each t y p e of land which was used i n t h e valua- t i o n . While r e s p o n d e n t ' s E x h i b i t B r e f e r s t o 1,200 a c r e s on t h e Richardson P l a c e , t h e r e is no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c r e a g e breakdown so we a r e unable t o determine what p a r t of t h e l a n d was c r o p l a n d , hay l a n d , o r g r a z i n g land. A s a r e s u l t , we conclude t h a t t h e v a l u a t i o n s of t h e Richardson P l a c e and t h e Home P l a c e a r e n o t supported by t h e evidence. Respondent a r g u e s t h a t h i s remainder i n t e r e s t i n both t h e Richardson P l a c e and t h e Home P l a c e should n o t be included a s a p a r t of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e and t h a t t h e i r v a l u a t i o n s a r e t h e r e f o r e n o t r e l e v a n t . T h i s c o n t e n t i o n is based on r e s p o n d e n t ' s c l a i m t h a t h i s remainder i n t e r e s t i n t h e Home P l a c e and t h e Richardson P l a c e is s u b j e c t t o divestment i n t h e event t h a t he d i e s b e f o r e h i s mother, Respondent b a s e s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n on t h e wording of t h e w i l l of h i s f a t h e r , J. Elmer H i l l . That c o n t e n t i o n d i s r e g a r d s t h e d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h e e s t a t e of J. Elmer I i i l l , d a t e d October 1 6 , 1958, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t provided: "IT I S HERE ADJUDGED AND DECREED, t h a t . . . t h e r e s i d u e of s a i d E s t a t e of J. Elmer H i l l , . . . h e r e i n a f t e r p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d . . . be and t h e same is hereby d i s t r i b u t e d a s f o l l o w s , to-wit: "Real e s t a t e : To Anna Mae H i l l , f o r and d u r i n g her l i f e t i m e , with f u l l c o n t r o l , use, p o s s e s s i o n , proceeds, and income t h e r e f r o m , and w i t h o u t l i a b i l i t y f o r a n y i n j u r y , d e s t r u c t i o n , damage, l o s s o r waste t h e r e t o , w i t h r e m a i n d e r s h a r e and s h a r e a l i k e t o Robert A. H i l l [respondent] . . . [ d e s c r i p t i o n of Richardson P l a c e and Home P l a c e ] ." The c o n t e n t i o n s of t h e respondent i g n o r e t h e s e t t l e d law i n t h i s s t a t e . Even p r i o r t o t h e enactment of t h e Uniform P r o b a t e Code, a d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n is c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e r i g h t s of d e v i s e e s under a w i l l . A s s t a t e d i n I n r e B e l l ' s E s t a t e ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 134 lvlont. 345, 350, 331 P.2d 517, "A d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n is c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e r i g h t s of h e i r s , l e g a t e e s o r d e v i s e e s , s u b j e c t o n l y t o be r e v e r s e d , s e t a s i d e o r modified on a p p e a l . R.C.M. 1947, s e c t i o n 91- 3902; I n Re E s t a t e of Murphy, s u p r a [ o t h e r c a s e s c i t e d ] . A d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n h a s t h e same f o r c e and e f f e c t a s d o e s a f i n a l judgment." The r e s p o n d e n t ' s remainder i n t e r e s t is c o r r e c t l y de- s c r i b e d i n t h e d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n and cannot be changed by a c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k i n which t h e respondent s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e w i l l r e q u i r e d a d i f f e r e n t t y p e of d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u - t i o n . W e t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d - ing t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s remainder i n t e r e s t was a v e s t e d i n t e r - e s t s u b j e c t t o divestment is n o t supported by t h e evidence. The n e x t i s s u e is whether t h e v e s t e d remainder i n t e r - e s t of respondent should be included i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r purposes of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . A t t h e time of t h e m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n on October 21, 1976, t h e respondent had a remainder i n t e r e s t with a p r e s e n t v a l u e , a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t which w i l l r i p e n i n t o a f u l l one-fourth i n t e r e s t i n a l l of t h e land upon t h e d e a t h of h i s mother. A t l e a s t t h r e e j u r i s d i c t i o n s , Kansas, Wisconsin and Kentucky, have held t h a t a s p o u s e ' s v e s t e d remainder i n t e r - e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y should be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of a m a r i t a l e s t a t e . A s i m i l a r problem was c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e c a s e of McCain v. McCain ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 219 Kan. 780, 549 P.2d 896. There, t h e c o u r t noted t h a t t h e husband owned s p e c i f i c undivided f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s i n two q u a r t e r s e c t i o n s of l a n d . N e i t h e r of t h e s e would r i p e n i n t o a possessory i n t e r e s t u n t i l t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e e s t a t e of t h e l i f e t e n a n t of each t r a c t . Nonetheless, h i s i n t e r e s t s were v e s t e d re- mainders which could be s o l d . They had p r e s e n t v a l u e . The c o u r t , speaking of a remainder i n t e r e s t s u b j e c t t o l i f e e s t a t e , s a i d t h a t it held i n Woolums v. Simonsen ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 214 Kan. 722, 522 P.2d 1321: ". . . t h e a p p e l l a n t and her c h i l d r e n have a remainder i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o a l i f e e s t a t e i n t h e mother of t h e appel- l a n t , Considering t h e age of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s mother, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t and her c h i l d r e n w i l l s u r v i v e her mother. . . is a good p r o s p e c t , Because of t h i s prob- a b i l i t y t h e a p p e l l a n t has a s a l e a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t of c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s e n t v a l u e . . . "Under t h e law of t h i s s t a t e , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e is t h a t any i n t e r e s t a person may have i n p r o p e r t y , v e s t e d o r c o n t i n g e n t , l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e , . , may be l e v i e d upon and s o l d under execution. [ C i t i n g c a s e s . ] Another c a s e holding t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t of a remain- derman , . . is s a l e a b l e is Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 181 P . 621." McCain, 549 P.2d a t 900. See a l s o : Jordan v. Jordan ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 44 Wisc.2d 471, 171 N.W.2d 385; Rompf v. Rompf (Ky. 1 9 6 8 ) , 433 S.W.2d 879. I n a d d i t i o n , s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have reached t h e same c o n c l u s i o n s when c o n s i d e r i n g o t h e r f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s of m a r i t a l e s t a t e s , See, Trowbridge v. Trowbridge (1962) , 16 Wisc.2d 176, 114 N.W.2d 129; Maxwell v. Maxwell ( 1 9 2 1 ) , 106 Neb. 689, 184 N.W. 227; Hughes v. Hughes (1975) , 132 Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e D i s t r i c t Court, i n d i s - posiny of p r o p e r t y following a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e , t o " f i n a l l y , e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s t h e prop- e r t y and a s s e t s belonging t o e i t h e r o r both, however and whenever acquired and whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o is i n t h e name of t h e husband o r wife o r both." S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. While t h e r i g h t t o p o s s e s s i o n of a v e s t e d f u t u r e i n t e r e s t is postponed, it is s t i l l a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t t h a t can be d i s t r i b u t e d . See s e c t i o n s 70-1-315 and 70-1-317, MCA. W e a g r e e with t h e c o u r t i n McCain, s u p r a , where i t found t h a t s i n c e such v e s t e d i n t e r e s t could be s o l d o r t o t h e r w i s e a l i e n a t e d , t r a n s f e r r e d o r mortgaged, t h e p r o p e r t y had a p r e s e n t v a l u e and should be included. Respondent a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h McCain because Kansas h a s n o t adopted t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. However, t h e Kansas s t a t u t e on t h e d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y is s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Montana: "The d e c r e e s h a l l d i v i d e t h e r e a l and per- s o n a l p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s , whether owned by e i t h e r spouse p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d by e i t h e r spouse i n t h e s p o u s e ' s own r i g h t a f t e r m a r r i a g e , o r a c q u i r e d by t h e i r j o i n t e f f o r t s , i n a j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e manner . . . I' S e c t i o n 60-1610 ( d ) , Kansas S t a t u t e s Annotated. W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n n o t i n c l u d i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e s t e d remainder i n t e r e s t i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r t h e purpose of d i s t r i b u t i o n . The next i s s u e is whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i - dence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o conclude t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e Woodbury P l a c e should n o t be included i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . W e have p r e v i o u s l y noted i n s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e t h a t one of t h e problems t h a t a r o s e d u r i n g t r i a l was r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o co~nply w i t h t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r t o a l l o w s h o r t e r time t o respond t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . T h i s included r e s p o n d e n t ' s 1976 f e d e r a l income t a x r e t u r n about which t h e a p p e l l a n t complained s h e d i d n o t have s u f f i c i e n t time t o p r o p e r l y cross-examine o r analyze. T h i s r e t u r n c o n t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e Woodbury P l a c e . I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s c a s e n u s t be r e t u r n e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e a s s e t s of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , we d i r e c t t h a t on r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p e l l a n t be allowed t o pursue examination a s t o t h e Woodbury P l a c e . W e a l s o n o t e t h a t t h i s Court d o e s n o t condone r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r o r any o t h e r f r u s t r a t i o n of d i s c o v e r y . Owen v. F. A, B u t t r e y & C h a r l e s Revson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont, , 627 P.2d 1233, 38 St.Rep. 714. - The f i n a l i s s u e is whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n deduct- ing c h i l d s u p p o r t from a p p e l l a n t ' s s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s when respondent f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r such s u p p o r t , A p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e f a m i l y home i n J a n u a r y 1973 and went t o Great F a l l s where she a t t e n d e d a Vo-Tech school f o r e l e v e n months. The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t respondent paid f o r her t u i t i o n and expenses and t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n remained on t h e ranch with him during t h i s p e r i o d . Appellant r e t u r n e d t o t h e family home on December 21, 1973, b u t l e f t t h e ranch a g a i n and d i d n o t r e t u r n u n t i l s e v e r a l months b e f o r e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . During t h a t time t h e c h i l d r e n remained w i t h respondent a t t h e ranch. The d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n , d a t e d October 21, 1976, p r o v i d e s , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t "custody, s u p p o r t and v i s i t a t i o n of t h e minor c h i l d r e n was r e s e r v e d , " Appellant i n her complaint asked t h a t t h e p a r t i e s be g r a n t e d "mutual" c u s t o d y , and respondent a l l e g e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of neces- s a r y c h i l d s u p p o r t and custody of t h e c h i l d r e n was t h e r e b y placed i n i s s u e . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t , " t h e r e a s o n a b l e c o s t of s u p p o r t of t h e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s from October 21, 1976, through t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e m a j o r i t i e s , is $14,252. One-half of t h i s sum, o r '$7,126' is t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of [ a p p e l l a n t ] t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e minor c h i l d r e n from her s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . " The c o u r t heard no evidence on t h e c h i l d r e n ' s f i n a n - c i a 1 r e s o u r c e s o r s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g b e f o r e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o r on t h e f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s of t h e a p p e l l a n t . These f a c t o r s must be c o n s i d e r e d i n determining c h i l d s u p p o r t under s e c t i o n 40-4-204, MCA. W e f i n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was n o t supported by evidence and c o n s t i t u t e s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . When t h e m a t t e r comes b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court on remand, t h e s e m a t t e r s may be c o n s i d e r e d with proper testimony by both p a r t i e s t o a r r i v e a t an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n . The cause is remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s o p i n i o n . W e conc